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Organization for Negotiation:
Britain's first attempt to
join the European Economic
Community, 1961-1963

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1971

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1. Introduction

This thesis is concerned with one specific area of British political activity, in its domestic and external aspects, over a relatively short period of time. Its object is to make a systematic examination of a recent exercise in multilateral diplomacy, of the content and method of a particular phase of international bargaining.

Two foci are involved in the study, the domestic policy-process and the international environment. Treatment of both the home and the international arenas produces a study of 'linkage' politics. What analytical elements are involved?

The international system may be discussed in terms of giving and taking across juridical, political and economic boundaries. All giving and taking equals the 'international system'. With time halted, one seeks the contributing components, the configuration of the ensemble: over time, one studies performance, change and development. Thus, international relations as a study involves attention to systems structure and systems performance.

The evaluation of transformation, of stability and change, in the international system, may involve the broad historical survey ('the growth of European civilization') or the narrower study ('Britain and post-war European integration'). The process of integration is, in fact, specially relevant here. Integration - or community-building, or federalism, or supranationality - designates a relationship among units in which

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they have become mutually interdependent and jointly produce system properties which they had separately lacked. Integration may also describe the process by which such a relationship among formerly separate units is attained. The process of integration reveals the bargaining stages. In studying integration - actors, domain, and range or scope of activity - one may find a community of conflict, where outcomes rewarding for A are frustrating or penalizing for B, or a community of interest, where rewards run parallel.

For the outside observer, there is difficulty in setting limits to foreign policy analysis. The foreign policy of country A is not merely the resultant of certain processes of deliberation within the governmental institutions of A. It is also the resultant, remote or immediate, of the foreign policies of countries B, C and D with which A interacts internationally - situational compulsions originate in the activities of foreign government.

A traditionalist view would hold that intergovernmental order comes from commitment to the idea of the sovereign state (the end), from international law (the rules of the game), and from diplomacy (the method of operation). In being given its place in the maintenance of intergovernmental order, diplomacy can be variously defined; the conduct of relations between states by official, accredited representatives - more narrowly, by permanent professionals in residence; or, the carrying on of relations between and among states where there occurs negotiation, agreement or

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compromise; or, an element of national power which influences, threatens, forces or manipulates. Foreign policy looks to ends and purposes, diplomacy to means and methods(1).

Traditionally diplomacy has been bilateral save for rare congresses: traditionally actors have been diplomats and plenipotentiaries. Today, diplomacy is increasingly multilateral and chiefs of government walk the stage. Summitry may lend 'openness' to diplomatic proceedings but summit meetings - now in fashion, now out of fashion - are only the tip of the multilateral iceberg. Because of the many technical issues which need to be discussed by a large number of states, conference diplomacy is supplemented by a great amount of diplomatic work performed in the seminar atmosphere of working parties and committees, on a permanent or on a ad hoc basis.

To move, briefly, from analytical elements to 'practical politics', one may say that the days of the nation state, the 'vertical sovereign', operating within limited territory, are ended. Operations are now too wide for national machinery and domestic affairs depend heavily on external conditions. (See Footnote 1, p. 27.)

The post-war period has been one of substantial commitments to collective governmental action, leading to the need for agreement of

(1) Pejoratively, diplomacy becomes "tact carried to the point of guile" but the dog's bad name rightly belongs to its master - foreign policy. (Lord Strang, The Foreign Office, 1955 p.168)

And, with thoughts of process: the bulk of all diplomacy, multilateral as well as bilateral, is cobbling rather than creation. (Lord Strang, op.cit., p.144)

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foreign policies and strategic doctrines and, in the economic field, to the submission of national policies to international discussion. The average elector assumes that decisions are made, and should be made, in Westminster and Whitehall. Yet the activities of the individual citizen and the degree of freedom available to his rulers are both increasingly dependent upon forces and institutions that transcend national frontiers - this is an age of the penetrability of states.

The proliferation of international organizations has led the Germans to talk of 'die Politik der Buchstaben', which might be translated as 'Alphabet Politics'. As Busk remarks:

"In the modern world we are inundated by acronyms, among which even the most knowledgeable swimmers risk drowning."(2)

Here, one may refer to treaty or alliance preferences or to general international co-operative activity.

At home, the Cabinet and the Defence and Overseas Policy Committee work in a world where wages policy has implication for monetary policy planned in Basle, and Special Drawing Rights agreed in Stockholm have repercussions on industrial development in Yorkshire.

To describe the context of the present study one might state the following: since 1945 the world has experienced an era of unresolved conflicts; in a period neither relaxed nor secure,

(2) Busk, D.: The Craft of Diplomacy, 1967, p.246

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Europe's future is unsure(3); the central fact to note is that both Britain and Europe have lost status - the years since 1945 have witnessed the end of the 'Vasco da Gama epoch'. There has occurred a 'relance européenne' but no 'relance britannique' - we here study Britain's first attempt to integrate with the European Economic Community and her tentative admission of loss of 'vertical sovereignty'.

+ The examination of a political system involves attention to many variables(4). In the present study no attempt will be made to make an exhaustive application of all possible analytical elements to the domestic policy-making process - for example, the 'public battle', although it cannot be neglected, is not a main focus of attention (see pp. 61-64 and pp. 139-150).

Aims are articulated through foreign policy and accommodations are found through diplomacy. Who formulates the desired outcome? Who is the decision-maker?

(3) See Buchan, A. (Ed.): Europe's Futures, Europe's Choices, 1969

(4) Attention to political culture and to patterns power, interest, and policy rapidly involves a further subdivision as analysis of variables proceeds.

"The standard convention is to reserve the term decision-maker for one who has formal responsibilities for formulating the policies of an organization, usually an institution of government. Decision-making, however, denotes the dynamic process of interaction among all participants who determine a particular policy choice, officials as well as non-officials. Decision-making studies are studies that focus on all factors relevant to a policy choice and not just on the formal-legal relationships of decision-makers."(5)

An adequate description of a decision-situation will involve more than a listing of the decisional 'units' - prime minister, cabinet, party or interest group. Does the occasion for decision involve action or reaction, response to internal planning or to external initiative? What degree of anticipation has been possible? Do the decision-makers have ample time, or are they working against an impending deadline? Decision may involve routine or marginal consequences or high risks: here one may study the scope and domain of values involved - the number and quality of values, the number of persons and groups interested. Politicians may not be able to concentrate their attention on single problems. The idea of a 'political agenda' leads one to examine competing claims on time and energy.

Recent contributions to theory reflect a shifting interest, a departure from attention to international balances and structures towards the processes of relations between states, from the forms of institutions to the processes of politics. This shifts attention from decisions as the outcome of deliberate acts of choice made by individuals or groups in institutional settings to the outcome of a complex of inter-dependent

(5) Pye, Lucian W.: "Decision-Making", in A Dictionary of the Social Sciences, 1964

decisions and events. At its extreme, for example, the new view would hold that there is no such thing as 'British foreign policy', only a 'British foreign policy process'.

Thus, one moves from decision-making to policy-making:

"Policy-making involves a long series of more-or-less related activities, rather than a single, discrete decision taken in Downing Street, Westminster, Whitehall .. It thus covers far more than the term decision-making. The study of decision-making usually involves analysing the intentions of policy-makers up to and including the point at which binding governmental action is taken .. the policy-making process may be said to begin when uncertainties are consciously articulated in the form of political demands, or registered by observant civil servants noting that the instructions they have been given to carry out no longer have quite the consequences that their authors intended".(6)

For the policy-maker, the link between intention and event is not a simple causal one. Action may be taken successfully without courses being fully plotted or understood, a settled course may ipso facto fail.

In the sphere of foreign-policy-formation the best a government can do, perhaps, is to maintain a strategic purpose through a sequence of changing tactical goals. The identification of key variables in a situation and the definition of tactical goals will require the selection, verification and interpretation of both domestic and external environmental phenomena.

(6) Rose, R.: Policy-Making in Britain 1969, pp. x-xi.

The policy-makers, in this activity, are concerned with matters over which their control is doubtful and of which their knowledge is imperfect - their task is one of the harsh and continuous selection of topics on which to concentrate. The foreign political scene is indeterminate, and it is not immediately possible to descry causal relations between perceived phenomena:

"To the statesman, guiding a difficult programme to success may .. resemble the art of driving an automobile over an icy road: his problem is to anticipate the skids quickly enough so that he can still control them by small corrections at the steering wheel, where slowness of the action or oversteering would provide worse skids and might wreck the car." (7)

+ Britain is moving through a period of Transformation: her post-war dilemma, not quickly realized, has been to find an identity. The Acheson apophthegm will long survive in the text-books: "Great Britain has lost an empire and has not yet found a role" (8).

In this period of transformation there has been considerable dissatisfaction with national performance. In an age of technological forecasting, surprise-free projections, normative relevance trees and scenarios, British foreign policy-making has been severely judged. In reviewing the natural history of decision-making the observer sees events rather than decisions, snap judgments rather than analyses, guesses instead of plans. In the making of British foreign policy there has been a lack of prescience causing a lack of adaptivity.

(7) Deutsch, K.W.: "Communication Models and Decision Systems", in Charlesworth, J.C. Contemporary Political Analysis, p.281

(8) Acheson, D.: West Point Speech, 12th December, 1962.

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Defensively it might be said that the decision-making process is not defective: political man is by nature incoherent, confused, haphazard; political issues are unpredictable and all that decision-makers can do is to react to events to keep the ship afloat. This panders to the tribal gods of prudence and pragmatism and neglects the need, mentioned above, for strategic purpose.

In what follows we are concerned with the activities of international actors and national decision-makers, with interaction (or demand-response) analysis and the domestic policy-process.

The sources of evidence embodied in this research are given in the bibliography (p. 189). A problem of data analysis - the securing of 'primary facts' and the composition of a framework into which these facts may be fitted - arises from the multiplicity of components(9). In connection with Britain's relations with the European Economic Community in the early 'Sixties, an infinite number of activities occurs internally and externally but cannot be accommodated in a sequential order. In what follows, as far as is possible, activities in the domestic and European and international arenas are outlined in their separate sections and kept in time order.

A first task is to describe the post-war international arena, the development of European integration, and United Kingdom reactions to

(9) An addition of components produces a greater addition of channels:

<u>System with</u> <u>these components:</u>	2	3	4	5	6	7
<u>Potential inter-</u> <u>action channels:</u>	1	3	6	9	19	21

international co-operative activity in general and to European integration in particular (Chapter 2). Second, and in the light of these reactions, a description of Whitehall organization and activity in this period is attempted (Chapter 3).

The essential aim of the thesis is to penetrate the 'organization for negotiation', to estimate the activities of Whitehall and the Brussels Team concerned with the United Kingdom's first attempt to join the European Economic Community(10). A chapter outlining the factors related to the reorientation of the Macmillan government's views on Europe in the period from 1959 to July 1961 (Chapter 4) is followed by the main exposition on the negotiations proper (Chapter 5) and the results of these negotiations (Chapter 6).

(10) For comment on the private nature of public life - which exists because of party discipline, civil service secretiveness, legal limitation, as well as self-censorship on the part of many who participate in the communication business - read Ely Devons on 'Government on the Inner Circle' (The Listener, 27th March, 1956. Now included in: Cairncross, Sir, E. (ed): Ely Devons: Papers on Planning and Economic Management, 1970, Manchester University Press).

2. Britain to 1959: a search for identity

2.1 The International Arena: alphabet politics.

Even a brief rehearsal of the origins and development of post-war European and North Atlantic political organizations is difficult; it is not easy to separate out the political, economic and military intentions. (1) Apart from the question as to whether one can make valid distinctions between such intentions at this level, there is the fact that many of the organizations aspired to activity in several directions.

The proliferation of organizations inevitably created problems:

"It was undeniable that there was a good deal of overlapping. For instance, defence was the responsibility of N.A.T.O. and of W.E.U. and was discussed in the W.E.U. Assembly. But the Council of Europe discussed general questions of foreign policy, that is to say, the reasons for defence and the threats against which defence was necessary. On the economic side, the Council of Europe discussed the right of establishment, the relation of welfare systems to the migration of labour, and questions of tourism, while all these things were being handled at the inter-governmental level by the O.E.E.C.." (2)

By the mid-'Fifties continental parliamentarians had to man delegations to three assemblies - to E.C.S.C., the Council of Europe, and W.E.U.. The British attended the two last named and both British and continentals attended the unofficial N.A.T.O. Parliamentarians' Conference.

-
- (1) Ses P.E.P.: European Unity - co-operation and integration, 1967, Ch.1
- (2) Beloff, M.: New Dimensions in Foreign Policy, 1961, p.111

In 1952 Britain supported discussion of the possible amalgamation of N.A.T.O. and O.E.E.C.: the aid-distributing function of the latter was coming to an end and the organizations were jointly preoccupied with the inflationary effects of rearmament. (But what was to be done with Germany and the 'neutrals' within O.E.E.C.?)

The Eden Plan of March 1952 sought to remodel the Council of Europe to enable the organs - particularly its Assembly - to serve the needs of E.C.S.C. and the proposed European Defence Community. (Certain links between the first two named did result.)

In December 1956 Selwyn Lloyd produced his 'grand design' for rationalization:

"High political and military direction would be given by N.A.T.O., with W.E.U. functioning within its framework. Economic co-operation would be carried out under, and in association with, the O.E.E.C.. Finally, there would be an assembly on parliamentary lines, with powers and functions still to be assigned to it, which could complete the institutions of the Atlantic Community."(3)

The Assembly, divided into a number of commissions, would be like a chest of drawers - each nation could choose whether to be present when any particular drawer was pulled out.

In May 1957, David Ormsby-Gore, Minister-of-State at the Foreign Office, outlined British aims before the Council of Europe - to bring the activities of the various European and Atlantic organizations to the attention of the people; to expose inter-governmental activities to constructive

(3) Beloff, M.: op.cit., p.112

parliamentary criticism;; and to stimulate member governments.

Thus, through the early- and mid-'Fifties Britain was sufficiently concerned with Europe to put forward various plans for the rationalization of the many organizations in which she was quite extensively involved. The stated intention was to improve the effectiveness and reputation of the organizations but the member-states of the future 'Six', after 1950, tended to assume that British efforts were aimed at a dilution of the European impulse. Ideas of rationalization fell into the background as the European Economic Community took the centre of the stage.

2.2. European Integration

The post-war history of the development of the 'supranational triptych' began with a number of congresses(1). The 'Europeans' exhibited open differences and their aims were ambivalent:

"The European idea was .. originally neutral in foreign policy between a third force concept and the Atlantic alliance, undecided in trade policy between regionalism and multilateralism, ambivalent in its attitude to the problems of emergent nations in Africa and Asia, silent in cultural and educational matters between Catholicism and anti-clericalism, and neutral also in economic policy between laissez-faire liberalism and socialist planning."(2)

-
- (1) For the story of the 'Campaign of the European Congresses' - Montreux (1947), the Hague (1948), Lausanne (1949) - see de Rougemont, Denis: Government and Opposition, April - July, 1967, p.329
 - (2) Kitzinger, U.: The European Common Market and Community, 1967, p.7.

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But the first practical step taken - to establish the Coal and Steel Community - was firm enough. The United States having decided that German industry could not be controlled or contained, France performed a volte face in policy.

Schuman outlined his plan for a European Coal and steel Community in May 1950, a treaty was ratified in April 1951 and came into force in August 1952. The principal institutions of E.C.S.C. were a Council of Ministers and a High Authority. The treaty emphasized utilitarian power: the organization was compact in membership, specific in purpose, and aimed at a relatively low level of supranationality. In prescribed fields the High Authority could override national governments, elsewhere it was to act in consultation with, and with the consent of, the Council of Ministers. The preamble to the treaty pointed to further European integration.

In March 1953 M. Spaak offered the Six a draft statute for a political community, which would have involved the assimilation of a European Defence Community and E.C.S.C.. No decision was reached before the French killed E.D.C. in August, 1954. The defence community idea failed because national loyalties remained too strong. With the end of Korean hostilities and the death of Stalin world tension had eased. Unfavourable British reactions also played a part - France did not savour "being locked alone in a closet with fifty million Germans".

These failures were a check upon the growth of the 'European idea' but the relance europeenne was not long delayed. In 1953 and 1954 the Six had examined the Beyen Plan for a common market and customs union. The Messina Conference of foreign ministers took place in May 1955 and led to the

Rome Treaty of 1957. Following the May Messina Conference, the Spaak studies took place in Brussels between July and December, 1955. In April 1956 Spaak made his report and on 29th and 30th May in Venice the Six took their basic decisions. The E.E.C. institutions were to be a Council of Ministers, a Commission, and a European Parliament. The Commission was not to be as independent as the E.C.S.C. High Authority and this represented a certain retreat from supranationality.

The Treaty of Rome contained a gradualist strategy and this controlled subsequent integrative efforts. In the early post-war years those who founded the Council of Europe aimed high and accomplished little - they took on a maximal assignment with minimal powers. The foundation of the European communities, briefly sketched above, did not mean that integrationists were to have an easy path to follow. In 1959 a crisis arose relating to supranationality. France demanded a dilution of E.C.S.C. independence to bring it into line with that of the European Economic Community.

2.3 Britain and Europe

Britain came through the war quite well (1).

(1) "... in her finest hour Britain had stood alone. She was undefeated, she escaped occupation, she had not known bitter internal cleavages, she had no feelings of guilt, but came through with greater self-confidence, greater pride in her national virtues and national institutions than she had known for years." (Kitzinger, U.: The European Common Market and Community, 1967, p.2.

"We had not lost faith in ourselves and we had the illusion that the national state could survive on its own"(2). The impact of war on Britain was not as great as upon Europe. In Europe, national institutions were shattered and national self-confidence shaken. However, Britain did come out of the war burdened by debt and available economic resources were to be severely strained. As Keynes said, when fighting for life over three continents good housekeeping had not applied. In 1947, the 'freeze year', grim realities began to obtrude but there was no general readiness to accept that Britain was now merely a major power of the second order.

For fifteen years after the war Britain pretended to a global military capability and, over-ambitiously, clung to the 'three circles' foreign policy. Perhaps Britain's strongest enthusiasm was for the American connection(3). That Britain was not compulsorily deflated after 1945 was to a large degree because of American policy. The United States cushioned Britain against reality: Britain was an interlocutor, she displayed a reaction to world events similar to America's, she shared the burden of common defence (and was afforded special distinction in receiving nuclear information).

Adherence to the Commonwealth connection has not meant that Britain had a Commonwealth policy. Diverse in race, wealth and attitude to world politics, its members have interests elsewhere - in N.A.T.O. or in Pan Africanism, Conservatives in particular have felt little intimacy with the 'New'

(2) Duncan Sandys, interview

(3) See below, p. 48

Commonwealth. The Commonwealth has been a vehicle for faith and conviction rather than hard achievement, and yet it has not been 'foreign'.

As for the third, European, circle, the effects of Britain's insularity have been often quoted(4). After 1945 Britain retained her insularity from Europe. In the wartime period of global planning - which resulted in U.N.O. and the Bretton Woods organizations I.B.R.D. and I.M.F. - Europe had received little attention. In the early post-war years both U.S.A. and Britain regarded European regional action as a temporary expedient, as a framework for the recovery programmes. Europe, for Britain, was a geographical expression not a goal.

Britain, once the initial post-war economic problems were overcome, saw little need for a European community-system and adhered to a strong preference for functional co-operation. Official Britain desired to build something less than community through economic and social programmes while, in Europe, there occurred an overestimation of the strength of British federalists. Europe moved while Britain held back, preferring to take an

(4) "Although always vitally interested in Europe and anxious to prevent the danger of its domination by any state which could menace her security, Britain was no longer part of Europe ever since her rulers lost Calais, their last continental possession, in 1558. She became sea-oriented, built the most powerful navy in the world and the largest colonial empire, and developed the largest international trade. Her two traditional concerns were to maintain the balance of power in Europe and to keep the sea-lanes free, the former by skilful diplomacy and occasional military intervention, the latter through the possession of a huge navy."
Frankel, J.: International Relations, 1969
p.46.

active part in those international institutions whose foundation was based on the principle of leaving executive responsibility to national governments. The British attitude precluded her participation in the building of a base for European economic union - federal discussions in Europe were carried on in terms beyond the range of British thinking, which continued to take for granted the existence and responsibilities of the nation's own political system.

The British wrote-off the 'Europeans' as cranky and unrepresentative(5) and yet isolation was not possible - there existed a fear of an inward-looking, protectionist regional trade group. But Britain did abdicate leadership:

"Approached from very diverse points of view European unity seemed to make sense to continental leaders, to small but highly articulate pressure groups, and to many of the post-war generation: it would give greater scope to Europe for whatever policy aims were envisaged. On some of these issues Britain could have turned the scales between rival concepts - if only she had not stood aloof."(6)

A Bank of England official outlines the situation in the early post-war years as follows:

"I had virtually represented the Treasury in the international negotiations of 1946-1948 which had aimed at setting up an international trade charter of rather wide scope, but had ultimately to be content with the strictly trade portion of it which is now known as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. At the beginning of these negotiations the Americans seemed to hope that they might be able to

(5) As seen above, p. 13, post-war European federalism was not a clear and unambiguous conception

(6) Kitzinger, U.: The European Common Market and Community, 1967, p.7.

dislodge us from the Ottawa Treaties which had established Commonwealth preference before the war. But they had fairly soon recognised that that would be impossible and had therefore allowed special provision to be made covering the discriminatory aspects of Commonwealth Preference, on condition that we accepted full non-discrimination throughout the rest of the world. There were somewhat similar arrangements in the International Monetary Fund to cover the Sterling Area on the monetary side.

"Other articles with G.A.T.T. contained a provision to allow discrimination within genuine Customs Unions or Free Trade Areas - provided always that full non-discrimination applied outside the Union or Free Trade Area; but, when these latter articles on a Customs Union were being drafted (I think in 1947) we regarded them as irrelevant to our own position ... the Benelux countries first proposed them and got some support from sundry Latin American countries. At any rate, this particular provision seemed to us, and I think the Americans too, to be a matter of de-minimis.

"The result of the engagement into which we had entered under G.A.T.T. was that we were free to maintain Commonwealth preference or to join a Customs Union or Free Trade Area. But we could not do both. In those days the idea of dropping Commonwealth trade ties in favour of a European group would have been politically impossible. Hence the embarrassment of our position when the Europeans finally decided .. to embark on the work of creating a European Customs Union - I remember saying at the time that in classical days the Straits of Messina had been called the passage of Scylla and Charybdis, and that we would have good reason to appreciate why."(7)

(7) Letter, L.P. Thompson-McCausland (Bank of England), 2nd January, 1971

+ Following the Schuman proposals, Britain was not allowed to attend the proposed conference without a prior commitment to the supranational ideas involved (8). Requests for preliminary collective discussions were rejected, although British ideas were considered(9).

Britain's self-exclusion from E.C.S.C. - seen by Uwe Kitzinger as the 'great divide'-was welcomed with considerable relief in Britain by those who recognized that Europe was starting down the road to federalism. Others regretted the rupture: "It was a great misfortune that we did not go in but the British people were not ready" (Duncan Sandys). The Conservative Opposition attacked the Government (see House of Commons debate, 26th and 27th June, 1950) but, back in office, they reconsidered the treaty only to reject it (10).

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- (8) Chance factors attended Britain's exclusion from the treaty-drafting: "There were temporary difficulties on the side of the British Government in handling the proposal thus thrust at them, in that Bevin himself was ill in hospital, and both Attlee and Cripps were away. Herbert Morrison, who was temporarily in charge of the Foreign Office, felt that we could not go in to a conference if the outcome had thus been settled in advance. (Beloff, M.: op.cit., p.89)
- (9) White Paper: Anglo-French Discussions regarding French proposals for the Western European Coal, Iron and Steel Industries, Cmnd. 7970, 1950.
- (10) The British Government set up a delegation to E.C.S.C. in September 1952 and, after negotiations in Luxembourg, came to an agreement on a form of association (Cmnd. 9346). This was signed on 21st December 1954, approved in the Commons 21st February 1955, and came into effect on 20th September 1955. There was established a Standing Council of Association. (Duncan Sandys declares that he negotiated the whole thing with Monnet, who was 'very tough', prior to the public conference.)

In the third volume of his memoirs, Macmillan reveals a concern, occurring very soon after the Conservative post-war return to power, for the course of European integration:

"Early in 1952 I was much distressed by a memorandum compiled in the Foreign Office on European integration, which was given a wide circulation. It seemed to me to be based upon a complete misapprehension of the reality and strength of the movement for European unity. It indeed treated the whole of these efforts with a certain amount of levity and contempt."(11)

He also reveals a concern over Churchill's strange unwillingness to defend the ideas and ideals which he had done so much to promote while in opposition:

"Duncan Sandys, who was most helpful to me behind the scenes, said that Churchill seemed somewhat dazed and unable to realise the degree of disillusionment throughout Europe. Everyone had hoped that the new Government would set a new tone. But nothing new had emerged, from either side of Downing Street,"(12)

Macmillan feared a united Europe without Britain and thought in terms of confederation, of a limited commitment. In a direct quotation from his diary for 10th March, 1952 he declares:

"What folly there has been during the vital and formative years! The absurd constitution-making of Schuman and Monnet on the one side; the isolationism of Bevin and the Foreign Office on the other, have brought this about."(13)

(11) Tides of Fortune, 1959, p.468

(12) Op. cit., p.471

(13) Op. cit., p.471

Surely we ought now to announce the broad outline of the kind of European Union Britain would be prepared to join?

Instead Britain pressed the Eden Plan (14) for a strengthening of European structure through the organization of E.C.S.C. and E.D.C. institutions in connection with those of the Council of Europe. Macmillan feared the absorption of the Council of Europe into a new body and the exclusion of a Britain having little power or influence. He even contemplated resignation from the Government:

"When the Cabinet met on 13th March 1952 to discuss my views on Europe, I received loyal support from David Maxwell Fyfe [Home Office and Welsh Affairs]. But it was clear that Eden, although not himself present owing to illness, would gain the almost unanimous support of his colleagues. The discussion was of some value and might perhaps have some useful effect at a later stage. On the more restricted issue, Eden's proposals for the reorganization of Strasbourg were formally agreed. I asked for my dissent to be noted in the minutes. Churchill, not unkindly, observed that this was not necessary. My views would be on record. Altogether it was an unpleasant experience. I still did not know what to do. During the next few days I seriously contemplated resigning from the Government. My resignation would have been a blow - but by no means so powerful a blow as at a later stage, when I had proved myself a successful Housing Minister." (15)

Sir Michael Fraser finds this resignation story plausible, but Duncan Sandys discounts it.

(14) Above, p. 12

(15) Op.cit., pp.471-472

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Macmillan's interview with Rees-Mogg(16) reveals a regret that the Churchill Government had not taken a lead in Europe and sees reference to a 'post-war relapse of energy'. A cynical view of Churchill in opposition might be that he sought a European platform in case of an extended period of Labour rule. Sir Michael Fraser, at the Conservative Research Department at the time, says that speeches at Zurich and elsewhere did not make Churchill a European of the Duncan Sandys type - the leader of the Opposition wanted a United Europe, but with Britain maintaining her 'three circles' connections. Macmillan's memoirs reveal the limitations of his own European commitment - greater than Churchill's but still a tactical rather than a philosophical commitment.

As a member of the recently-formed Western European Union, Britain sent a delegation to Brussels for discussions about the establishing of a European Economic Community. British members sat as observers in each of the Expert 'Spaak Groups' (see above, p.15) but, finally, Britain was unwilling to make a commitment and participation ended after December 1955. Britain, enjoying a considerable technological lead, also rejected the supranational Euratom - she was particularly anxious not to jeopardize her connection with the United States (although little co-operation occurred between the two before 1958).

In the two years before he became Prime Minister in January 1957, Macmillan occupied several senior appointments - Minister of Defence (18th October, 1954); Foreign Secretary (7th April 1955); Chancellor of the Exchequer (20th December 1955). He was thus intimately connected with the important community-developments in Europe.

(16) Below, p. 41

Macmillan was to expand a good deal of government time on a free trade area plan without revealing any commitment to the Europe of the Communities. There still existed misunderstanding as to the force of 'Europeanism' and an attempt was made to find an easy alliance with the new Europe.

At a meeting of the O.E.E.C. Council of Ministers in July 1956, Macmillan, as Chancellor, said that the United Kingdom would welcome free trade in industrial goods between O.E.E.C. countries. In the same month the Council of O.E.E.C. decided to study the possibility of an association between the Six and the remaining members of the organization. On 26th November 1956 the House of Commons was informed that talks were in progress, although in fact these were in abeyance while the Rome Treaty negotiations were in progress. After Macmillan became Prime Minister in January 1957 British interest in Europe quickened and, in February, her proposal for a Free Trade Area was published(17). There was considerable commitment to the idea of a Free Trade Area in Britain in the months that followed.

In February 1957 O.E.E.C. set up three working parties to examine the details of possible trade links. Peter Thorneycroft was Chairman of the Council of Ministers when this decision was taken. Work was held up due to E.E.C. Treaty ratification and the committees did not report until October 1957, when Reginald Maudling took

(17) Cmd. 72

up chairmanship of a steering committee(18).
A further twelve months' work produced nothing.

A major dispute in O.E.E.C. over E.E.C. quota arrangements preceded the breakdown of the Free Trade Area talks in November 1958. (The Rome Treaty had been signed in March 1957 and came into force in January 1958. Britain's free trade initiative thus came before the emergence of E.E.C. and free trade proposals were examined at the same time as the Six organized themselves.) And a change of régime had occurred in France.

De Gaulle had assumed power in May 1958. Prior to this he had castigated those who favoured a Common Market. Now, with the devaluation of the franc and the subsequent austerity - *vérité et sévérité* - French industry suddenly found itself to be highly competitive. But the competition which would be afforded by a wider free trade area was feared. De Gaulle saw a way

(18) Peter Thorneycroft remained as principal co-ordinator. Reginald Maudling, Paymaster General, and from 17th September 1957 in the Cabinet, undertook actual negotiations - all the time working with interested ministers at home and reporting to the Prime Minister. Maudling's assumption of office as Chairman of the O.E.E.C. steering committee may have been unwise. "Diplomatists should seldom be allowed to frame policy and politicians seldom to conduct negotiation." (Busk, D.: The Craft of Diplomacy p.241) The ministerial appointment was a departure for Britain designed to ensure speed and to reduce paper work. After the failure of talks, however, it seemed that we had committed too much of the Government's prestige to the enterprise while weakening Maudling's position as an advocate of the British point-of-view.

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to settle accounts with the Anglo-Saxons. (In September he had written a memorandum to Eisenhower demanding a share, with Britain, in the direction of Western strategy). On 14th November 1958 a French ministerial statement announced that France would not accept any formal association which did not include a provision for a single tariff between the Six and the rest of the world. (See below, pp. 77-78.)

The resignation of Peter Thorneycroft as Chancellor of the Exchequer (on the public spending issue) on 6th January 1958 is a factor to be considered in the Free Trade Area failure - this removed from the British team the minister most alive to the continental point of view that the negotiations were not merely about technical economic arrangements but involved Europe's political future.

3. Diplomacy, Representation and Administration

3.1 Interdepartmental Co-ordination

Diplomatic relations today involve summit and permanent conferences; those with comprehensive agendas and those arranged on an ad hoc basis; and, global, regional and bi-lateral working parties. The complexity of international political life demands that diplomacy a deux be supplemented by a considerable amount of multilateral activity, public and private(1). The great public international forums like the U.N.O. are merely the tip of the diplomatic iceberg.

(1) "What is new is the array of international organizations which meet regularly to review the current situation in the field of their own responsibility. Montagu Norman was one of the earliest to see the need for developing this kind of thing when he took the lead in setting up the Bank for International Settlements in Basle. The International Monetary Fund was a later step in the same direction but, apart from occasional special activities, is not, perhaps, a leading example of the new type arrangements for routine review of the situation by an international organization. The O.E.C.D. in Paris, and especially its Working Party Three would be better examples, though the Bank for International Settlements remains, in its field, a very good instance of a body which meets regularly for the purpose of routine international review. Certainly the monetary committee of the E.E.C. is another good example, but, apart from the impression one gains from knowing all its leading members, we so far have no direct experience of it. There are, of course, other very important examples in the United Nations and military fields." (L.P. Thompson-McCausland, Bank of England. Letter, 24th January, 1970)

Following the Marshal Aid offer, the Committee of European Economic Co-operation was set up to draft a report. This represented the first joint action of the Western European states. The C.E.E.C. began work in Paris on 16th July 1947 under the chairmanship of Sir Oliver Franks, who had with him a strong British team, ultimately about fifty strong. Subsequently permanent United Kingdom delegations, responsible to the Foreign Secretary, were accredited to U.N.O. (in New York and Geneva); to O.E.E.C. in Paris; to the Brussels Treaty Organization, and to the High Authority of E.C.S.C. in Luxembourg. (In point of technical status the last-named of the five delegations was different from the others, for the body to which it was accredited as unique - the first supranational community ever to come into existence. Our permanent representation was thus accredited as a normal diplomatic mission to a foreign sovereign.)

A new burst of interdepartmental activity, at home and abroad, occurred in the period when a Free Trade Area was discussed. The work Whitehall had to perform during the 1957-1958 period was considerable and the scale of the machinery involved in investigation was greater than a decade earlier. Between the launching of the idea and the suspension of negotiations in November 1958, eight departments of government were heavily and continuously concerned.

+ Although the increasing role of economic affairs in foreign policy formulation created problems of co-ordination, interdepartmental co-operation largely disappeared after the first world war.

A partial explanation of this lies in the story of Sir Warren Fisher's successful attempt in 1919 to have himself designated as 'Head of the Civil Service'

and in the resultant Treasury-Foreign Office antagonism. Trouble existed between the departments before 1919, but in the inter-war years, there occurred an intensification of friction. Further explanation must be found in ministerial differences over policy.

Interdepartmental co-operation survived the second war. Belief that pre-war errors had to some extent represented a failure in co-ordination was present in the minds of those who shaped machinery.

The 1943 Eden proposals - Proposals for the Reform of the Foreign Service, Cmnd. 6420, para,5 - stated that the Foreign Office would in future be regarded as the headquarters of the Foreign Service, rather than as a department of the home civil service. In seeking to explain the post-war relaxation between the Foreign Office and the Treasury one must further add that the latter department functioned in a world where public expenditure was not abhorred.

The problem as to whether the Foreign Office should be primarily an instrument of negotiation or a department responsible for conducting the nation's affairs in all branches of external relations - economic and cultural as well as political - has not arisen in the post-war world.

There was a period when the claims of the Foreign Office, advanced by Mr. Bevin, for a major say in foreign economic policy were of considerable importance. With the move of Cripps to the Treasury this period came to an end. Once the new international machinery for economic recovery had been set in motion, the Foreign Secretary concentrated on the question of increasingly tense

East-West relations and the Treasury was free to exercise its talents.

With the coming into operation of those bodies mentioned at the beginning of this section - and with the operation of G.A.T.T., I.M.F., and I.B.R.D. - British policy-making demanded a considerable degree of co-ordination. By 1950 a fairly elaborate organization had come into existence to deal with the burden. On the ministerial side a Cabinet committee under the Lord President of the Council dealt with economic policy. On the official side bilateral, country-by-country negotiations looked after by the Overseas Negotiating Committee (1947), while Europe was looked after by the 'London' Committee. This interdepartmental committee, established in July 1947, had representatives from the Foreign Office, the Board of Trade, the Ministries of Food and Agriculture, Fuel and Power and Supply, and from the Economic Planning Staff.

A departure from the more formal methods of conducting relations between the Foreign Office and other departments had occurred. Arising from both bilateral and multilateral negotiations an easy inter-departmental relationship with no serious worry over precedence developed:

"By the end of the period /1959/, it was possible to claim that, at any rate in the economic field, British foreign policy could be looked at as an operation carried out by government as a whole, with no single department claiming priority. It was held that the problems of inter-departmental rivalry, noted in earlier periods in Britain and still extant in other countries, had largely disappeared."(2)

(2) Beloff, M.: New Dimensions in Foreign Policy, 1961, ~~312~~ p.24. (See Chester, D.N. & F.M.G. Willson: The Organization of British Central Government 1914-1964, 2nd Ed., 1968, Table XVI, Overseas Representatives of Departments Other than Those Concerned Exclusively with External Affairs & Defence, p.200.)

3.2 The Departments

In September 1947 it was announced that Sir Stafford Cripps would take up the new post of Minister for Economic Affairs. He was to have, not a department, but a small personal staff. At this point it might have been guessed that economic planning both domestic and foreign would be given to a Ministry of Economics, separate from the Treasury; the Dalton resignation and the move of Cripps to the Chancellorship, less than two months after the appointment mentioned above, removed this possibility. The effect was to bring within the Treasury most of the existing machinery for economic planning and co-ordination.

The Chancellor took with him to the Treasury a Second Secretary whose competence was broadened to cover the European Recovery Programme, including the 'London' Committee (see above). This work was kept somewhat apart from the rest of the Treasury machine. The Second Secretary regarded himself as having a triple responsibility - to the Chancellor, to the Foreign Secretary, and to the President of the Board of Trade - he made necessary submissions to all three and was available to report to any one of them(1).

By 1952 the big O.E.E.C. operations, the division of dollar aid, the creation of European Payments Union, and the liberalization of intra-European trade had been completed. Treasury activity declined and its organization reflected the diminution of the importance of Europe in British policy.

(1) Beloff, M.: op.cit., p.41

The Bank of England in pre-war years enjoyed a considerable degree of autonomy and, in post-war years, has retained significant influence(2). In the work of international financial institutions the Bank works in close partnership with the Treasury and other departments, not merely in preparatory work but in operations. The external side of the Bank's work is necessarily bound up with other aspects of external economic policy thus co-operation with the Treasury, in particular, must be close. The Bank's power derives from its technical expertise - what is technically feasible sets limits in policy decisions. The Bank has to be taken into account as a locus of activity but its mode of operation reveals little(3).

The Department of Overseas Trade was abolished in 1946 and its immediate successor was the Export Promotion Department of the Board of Trade. There

- (2) On 28th April 1925 Churchill, as Chancellor, announced Britain's return to the Gold Standard. He had put up a long and intensive fight against Sir Otto Niemeyer, Controller of Finance at the Treasury, and Montagu Norman, Governor of the Bank. The struggle was revealed when Treasury papers were made available in 1969. (See Skidelsky, R. in The Times, 17th March, 1969.)
- (3) In 1959 the Radcliffe Committee's Report on the Working of the Monetary System (Cmd.827) declared that the Bank was far too secretive and should publish fuller monetary information. Witness also the struggle of the Select Committee on Nationalised Industries to investigate the Bank against Government wishes (Commons debate 11th February 1969). Complaint continues. See Croome, D. and Johnson, H.: Money in Britain, 1959-1969

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was also a Commercial Relations and Treaties Department and, on 1st January 1949, these two merged into the Commercial Relations and Exports Department. This department of the Board of Trade accommodated work connected with O.E.E.C. trade liberalization, then with E.E.C. and free trade area initiatives.

It must be noted that the President of the Board of Trade, Sir David Eccles, was not given control of the Free Trade Area negotiations in 1957-58. (See above, p. 25.)

Not until October 1960 did the Board of Trade establish a new Export Council of Europe - "the most rapidly developing market in the world", to quote the department's head.

Although the formal independence of the Foreign Office had been declared (above), this was not to occasion a separation of its work from that of government as a whole. The formal duty of delegations abroad was to report through the Foreign Office and this department adapted its organization to meet the increasing burden.

The internal organization of the Foreign Office had to be constantly revised so as to see that the departments into which it was divided apportioned work in a rational manner. Through the Bevin era and beyond there occurred a rapid adaptation of organization. A growth of work showed itself in the development of departments dealing with economic relations and with European and Atlantic institutions, as compared with the geographic departments. In February 1948 the European Recovery Department was set up (to relieve the Economic Relations Department) to become, in 1951, the Mutual Aid Department.

By 1959 the departments in the Office mainly concerned with European and Atlantic organization were: the Mutual Aid Department, the Western Department, the Economic Relations Department and the Cultural Relations Department.

Foreign Service staff expanded greatly after the war: in 1960-61 over eleven thousand people were employed at home and abroad - a threefold increase over 1939(4). But Foreign Office resources during the period were strained.

The Foreign Office has been likened to an octopus - superbly equipped to receive impressions. But the octopus's power of reaction is deficient. Taking a longer-term view than domestic departments, thinking in words and not in figures, it has had a reputation for detachment while it has continued to produce its memoranda - facts blanketed by opinions(5). This in spite of a common atmosphere of urgency - a staff under constant pressure but working in a ministry not designed to plan or to make positive moves.

The Foreign Office has done little to build up machinery for long-range planning either as regards its own functioning or in respect of the kind of international problems it may have to face(6).

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- (4) Bishop, D.G.: The Administration of British Foreign Relations, 1961, p.213
 - (5) On detachment, cf. Claud Cockburn's first view of The Times editorial room: "... a sub-editor was translating a passage of Plato's Phaedo into Chinese for a bet." I. Claud, London, Penguin, 1967, p.70
 - (6) Since 1884 the telegraphic address of the Foreign Office and of all British embassies has been 'Prodrome', which derives from the classical Greek 'Forerunner'. (Busk,D., op.cit., p.254.)

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On the morrow of Duncan(7), The Times could remark that the Foreign and Commonwealth Office had adapted smoothly to its reduced circumstances and had taken well to the idea that Europe was more important to Britain than Asia or Africa. Some hard thinking had occurred:

".. the pressure upon the Foreign Office made it difficult for it to deal with long-term planning. The research Department, which had largely sprung from duties undertaken in wartime, was given increased responsibilities towards the end of our period [i.e. to 1959]. By this time the Foreign Office was recruiting specialists for this department and bringing in senior experts concerned with areas which were thought to be of special importance. The department now produced forward-looking papers, containing estimates of future development, as well as acting in the nature of a reference department upon which the other sections could call."(8)

But Beloff notes bleakly:

".. it would obviously be wrong to imagine that any internal re-organization within the Foreign Office could enable plans for a number of years ahead to be made, and this was particularly the case in our period in relation to the European organization since continental opinion seemed to be evolving at an unexpectedly rapid pace." (9)

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- (7) Report of the Review Committee on Overseas Representation, 1968-69 (Cmd. 4107.)
- (8) Beloff, M.: New Dimensions in Foreign Policy 1961, p.126. (There were other attempts at forward-planning. A small planning and co-ordination section in the Permanent Secretary's Department operated under the supervision of a Steering Committee composed of senior officials.)
- (9) Beloff, M.: op.cit., p.126

Discussion of departmental arrangements and of interdepartmental co-ordination is not all. If nearly all departments are now directly concerned with fields of activity of an international kind (and this includes the boards of the nationalized industries) and if the basic structure of interdepartmental co-ordination (seen in the 'London' Committee) has been worked out one must still say that operational bases depend on people. Dilettante staffs are inadequate.

The Foreign Office has been geared, traditionally, to the use of embassies abroad as the channels for contact with other countries. Negotiators abroad in earlier days had a great deal of freedom because the apparatus for communication with home was difficult. But the 'inner circle' of ambassadors - in Paris, Bonn, Rome, Moscow and Washington - are no longer eminent. In the post-war world the most influential diplomats have been a group of senior men in London (10) and: "Probably the growth of the Office's advisory function has in practice fully offset the decline in independence of the contemporary and (more or less) telegraphically-controlled British emissary abroad."(11)

What may be referred to as 'ambassadorial dispensability' should not be taken to signify that London is all-important. From traditional representation by embassy, the Foreign Office has had to develop a competence in permanent and semi-

(10) Sir Patrick Reilly, Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh, Sir Francis Rundall, Sir Roger Stevens, Sir Hugh Stephenson, Sir Roderick Barclay, Ralph Murray.

(11) Lord Strang, The Foreign Office, 1955, p.170

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permanent conference diplomacy, in the setting-up of delegations with varieties of skills. Delegations today evolve policy on the spot in a seminar atmosphere. The man on the spot is still important and:

"For diplomatic education.. permanent delegations are probably the best training schools that exist."(12)

But pressure on individuals can be great - hence attention to, among other things, the 'human time-clock' - and the price can be high:

"The representative at U.N.O. or on the Disarmament Commission in Geneva may thus fare better than his counterparts on a normal mission. Principals, however, probably pay the price for the training of their 'bag-carriers': the very success of the new process is beginning to put such a burden on individuals that it may soon begin to defeat its own purpose."(13)

At home in Britain decision-making is becoming slower - no matter how urgent the problem, more and more people have to be consulted(14).

Busk deplures the fact that Foreign Office personnel dealing with economic, financial and commercial affairs are often amateurs: "It is not easy to find Deputy or Assistant Secretaries who are fully trained in economics and who ... are really keen on the work. The flair that is so essential a quality in all forms of diplomacy does not suffice in economic affairs."(15) And The Times: "In general, Whitehall suffers appallingly from a Byzantine superstructure of co-ordination superimposed on all too narrow an operational base."(16)

(12) Lord Strang, The Foreign Office, p.143

(13) L.P. Thompson-McCausland, letter

(14) Busk, D.: The Craft of Diplomacy, p.239

(15) Op.cit., p.245

(16) 2nd November 1967

4. Reorientation 1959-1961

4.1. Development of the E.E.C.

By 1960 British scepticism about the E.E.C.'s success had declined and fear of exclusion from the enterprise became evident. Before coming to the story of these changes it seems appropriate to deal with developments in Europe.

In 1960 the E.E.C. was still at the beginning of the road to a customs union and the Treaty's gradualist strategy demanded comparatively little in the way of integration(1). However, as Britain thought anew about Europe, confident references were being made in Europe to the 'Community method'(2)

- (1) The E.E.C. treaty provided for a build-up of integrating power and for an acceleration of economic unity. But the treaty amplified close targets and underplayed the more remote. Removal of qualitative trade controls was to be gradual; tariffs among the member-nations were to be removed over a twelve- or fifteen-year period; there would be a step-by-step harmonization of external tariffs, and the formation of a common agricultural policy would wait until the first transition stage was completed. In all this the personality of Monnet was important; after earlier failures the astute tactician joined the enthusiast - 'Federation Now!' became 'A customs union in twelve to fifteen years!'
- (2) "The 'Community method' is difficult to characterize in a few words, partly because it is a concept which has changed somewhat over time, partly because it connotes a complex of institutions, procedures, objectives and attitudes. Perhaps the essential characteristics of the 'Community Method' are (1) the giving of wide powers of initiative to an independent body, (2) the delegation of real, if, at first, limited powers to an independent body, (3) legislative and judicial control over the exercise of the delegated powers,

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During the first five years' operation of the E.E.C., economic development, as illustrated in industrial production and trade figures, was markedly more favourable than in Britain(3). A clear trend was certainly not evident in 1960-61 and firm statistical evidence of the disparity of performance was not available sufficiently early to constitute a positive influence on Macmillan. No doubt an impression of European expansion was evident.

The first tariff reductions and quota enlargements in the E.E.C. took place on 1st January, 1959. On 1st January, 1961, in accordance with the acceleration decision of the previous May, the Six cut tariffs on internal trade by a further ten percent, thus bringing the total reduction to forty percent. Much more important was the first step taken to align their individual national tariffs with the agreed common external tariff - they started the process of turning themselves into a customs union. (A second acceleration agreement was decided on 15th May, 1962. This acceleration may have been facilitated by fear of British

(2) contd. (4) majority voting, if, again, only on a limited basis, among the participating governments, and (5) and most important, the progressive replacing of policies which are national in scope and purpose by common policies so that within the participating countries certain national policies are superseded by community policies and for certain purposes the participating countries act externally not as a coalition but as a single entity." (Camps, M.: Britain and the European Community, 1955 -1963, 1964, p.12)

(3) Kitzinger, U.: The Second Try, p.326 and p.329

'dilution' of market impetus. Certainly, during the negotiations leading to the 9th July 1961 association agreement with Greece, France took a very firm line on tariff quotas, desiring to avoid precedents useful to the United Kingdom.)(4)

These developments were seen as a severe threat to British trade and the New Statesman declared that the first acceleration presented Britain with its most serious economic challenge since the Great Depression(5).

One must not forget the E.E.C.'s ultimate aim of political union. The statesmen who proposed the three European Communities saw them as parallel roads towards political union. Following French soundings, the Six opened political discussions in September 1960. The 'Little Summit' took place on 10th and 11th February 1961 and the Dutch - perhaps encouraged by London - suggested that Britain might join in talks relating to the political development of the community. (On 16th February, in the Commons, Macmillan said that Britain was ready to participate.) The most tangible result of the E.E.C. summit was a decision to appoint a committee of representatives to try to formulate precise proposals. The Fouchet Committee, to become later the Gattani Committee, was set up and, after a second summit meeting, the Bonn Declaration was published on 18th July 1961. In this the Six restated their determination to achieve the political union implicit in the community treaties. They agreed to hold regular

(4) See Pryce, R.: "Common Market Timetable", in John Calmann(Ed.) Western Europe - a handbook, p.583

(5) 9th April, 1960

meetings of Heads of State, and of Foreign Ministers, and to hold periodic meetings of the ministers responsible for education, cultural matters and research. They also asked the committee to work out proposals for giving a statutory character to political union.

4.2 British Attitudes

(1) Westminster. The evolution of the British attitude towards Europe has already been traced with reference to Macmillan (above, pp. 21-23). Rees-Mogg reports from an interview with Macmillan that there were four major aims of his administration: first, to re-establish the American connection after the Suez disaster; second, to bring the Soviet Union into the European world and, with Kennedy, to end the Cold War; third, to encourage independence in Africa; and, fourth, to take Britain into Europe(1). As one has seen Macmillan was no 'European'.

The first major attempt to secure a closer connection with the Europe of the communities ended in failure, the Free Trade Area was never established.

"This was a shock for the British Government, though at this distance of time it is hard to understand how they could possibly have hoped to see their plan succeeding. It is probable that their negotiator, Reginald Maudling, able though he was, did not entirely grasp the political significance of the E.E.C. In any case his efforts to play off the Germans against the French were clearly doomed to failure. Moreover they aroused great, and it is to be feared, enduring

(1) The Times, 9th February, 1964

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suspicion of British motives among the members of the newly-formed European Commission in Brussels."(2)

In preparation for the 1959 Election, Macmillan established a committee under R.A.B. Butler with Lord Hailsham (Party Chairman) and Edward Heath (Chief Whip) among its members. Sir Michael Fraser, the committee's secretary, states that seventeen meetings were held from 23rd December 1957. The question of Europe was not to the fore. The October 1959 Election yielded the Conservatives a majority of a hundred without Europe being discussed.

The 1959 Election was a great victory for the Conservatives and the winning of Brighouse and Spenborough from Labour in March 1960 was a welcome postscript. And yet, as the 'Sixties began the Conservatives had run out of energy and had to discover new lines of political advance. This need did not arise because earlier aims had been achieved: the tasks acknowledged in the 1951 manifesto, Britain Strong and Free - to attack the size of public expenditure, to simplify the administrative

(2) Lord Gladwyn: De Gaulle's Europe, 1969, p.58

machine, to defeat inflation and to improve industrial relations - had not been accomplished.

The anti-planning philosophy of the 'Fifties had yielded only disillusionment and January 1960 saw the introduction of a 'stop' phase of 'stop-go'.(3) In February 1960 a new formula for the control of defence expenditure was announced - it was to be limited to seven percent of G.N.P. In April, with the cancellation of Blue Streak, it became evident that Britain could no longer enjoy a truly independent armoury. As Kitzinger notes:

"In the case of Harold Macmillan, the year 1960 had proved instructive: the abandonment of Blue Streak and with it Britain's independent deterrent; the fiasco of the Paris summit conference and with it the failure of perhaps Britain's last major initiative on the world's diplomatic stage; and yet another serious balance of payments crisis from which the central banks of the continent saved us in early 1961 - these displayed the premises that led to our first attempt to join Europe."(4)

Rethinking in the economic sphere led to the founding of the National Economic Development Council and to the National Incomes Commission. "Neo-liberalism seemed to be worked-out," says Sir Michael Fraser, Chairman of the Conservative Party Organization, "so we turned to indicative planning."(5) The volte face on planning was sudden - Central Office literature sneered at 'growthmanship' as new policies were announced.

With the arrival of the young Kennedy, Macmillan's services as an international broker

(3) See Note A, p. 177

(4) Kitzinger, U.: The Second Try, 1968, p.11

(5) Interview

were no longer necessary and, after the summit failure, Britain needed a new external mission, new avenues of influence. Sir Eric Roll's(6) comment on Macmillan's European initiative is crude: the Conservatives needed political 'oomph' for the future. As Britain surveyed her unsplendid isolation at the end of 1960 and reappraised her international posture opportunism was in the air. "I would not want to leave you with the impression that it is merely the collapse of the Summit Conference which has made European unity so imperative," said John Profumo before the W.E.U. Conference in Paris on 2nd June, 1960.

+ On 30th May, 1960 the political correspondent of The Times noted: "... the last week has been rich in signs of the shift in emphasis from hopes of a dramatic détente at the summit to the mending or tightening of Britain's relations with Europe, and especially with France." Macmillan's task was not easy - his recent efforts at summitry had profoundly annoyed both France and Germany.

On 21st June, 1960, in answer to a written question, Macmillan declared that our aim was to secure a partnership between the two European groupings in a common system of trade, consistent with G.A.T.T.

A Conservative Early Day Motion of 23rd June, 1960 urged the Government to, "... consult our partners in E.F.T.A. and in the Commonwealth, and to put forward firm proposals for subsequent negotiations with the Six."(7)

(6) Interview. And see below, p.103

(7) Commons Order Paper, Col.4109, E.D.M. No.99

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Six of the twenty-seven signatories were members of the party's Foreign Affairs Committee. Aubrey Jones (Minister of Fuel and Power 1955 - 1957 and Minister of Supply 1957 - 1959) declared that, eventually, we would have no choice but to enter Europe and to reject the idea of a special relations^{hip} with the United States.(8)

Selwyn Lloyd, Foreign Secretary, initiated the Commons debate of 25th July, 1960 by moving the motion:

"That this House recognizes the need for political and economic unity in Europe and would welcome the conclusion of suitable arrangements to that end, satisfactory to all the Governments concerned."(9)

The motion expressed a general objective while being vague as to methods of achievement of ends.

Maudling, President of the Board of Trade, who summed up for the Government, cautiously wondered whether a course less drastic than joining E.E.C. was open. Principal Labour speakers were not sanguine. Wilson declared that the case for entry was formidable but the decision could not be clear or simple - the nation was faced with a choice of evils. Healey believed that no-one in the House would hold it inconceivable that Britain should enter E.E.C. but believed also that we should wait. Labour was thus with the Government, being somewhat cooler than the Foreign Secretary but more realistic than the President of the Board

(8) The Guardian, 18th July, 1960

(9) 627 H.C. Deb., Col. 1099

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of Trade on the availability of middle courses.(10) The debate lacked drama and made no impact in Europe, where leaders could be forgiven for detecting no shift of emphasis in British feeling.

The Conservative Conference of 1960 (like the Liberal Assembly) passed a motion in favour of entry with a large majority.

During the Debate on the Queen's Speech on 4th November, 1960, Heath said that negotiations with the Six should not begin until there existed a genuine prospect of success - Europe could not risk another attempt ending in failure.

By the end of 1960 very little positive progress had been made towards an agreement with the Six. Ideas of 'bridge-building' were giving way to concepts of a modified customs union, perhaps on the basis of an inner and outer Europe. In the first half of 1961 some government opinion betrayed a willingness to contemplate acceptance of the essential features

(10) In the period until mid-1961 the weight of Labour opinion remained undecided about Europe - there was a general disinclination towards joining combined with a wait-and-see attitude. It is noteworthy that for nine months after the July, 1960 debate Labour had little time, even at conference, for the European debate. The party was too much occupied by unilateralism. And yet opinions were voiced. Labour signatories of the Early Day Motion of 26th May, 1960 expressed a willingness to accept some sacrifice of sovereignty through entry to E.E.C. In the summer of 1960, George Brown, declaring a change of mind on Europe, said that Britain should think what she could offer to Europe in order to find her way back. In 1960 Douglas Jay began his career of opposition to Europe on grounds of hard cost. Denis Healey wrote on the subject of federalism: inside E.E.C., the United Kingdom would have no more influence than California or Massachusetts in the U.S.A.

of the Treaty of Rome. In February Macmillan declared that Britain was ready for political consultations, (11) while Heath said that no arrangement would be satisfactory which did not involve a political as well as an economic link. On May 18th 1961 in the Commons Heath made evident that he himself favoured full membership of E.E.C.

After the activity of the winter, particularly after the prolonged private exchanges between governments, (12) tension was almost tangible in London by the spring of 1961. It was summer before matters came to a head:

"Some Ministers are known to believe that only a negotiation of some kind with the Six, whether it is called formal or informal, will settle whether the safeguards and preconditions Britain, E.F.T.A., and the Commonwealth need are to be had from the Six. Other Ministers do not conceal that their minds have still to be made up whether a negotiation would be worthwhile."(13)

(11) At this time the Six were examining the possibility of political union. (See above, p. 40.)

(12) See pp. 68-69.

(13) The Times, 21st July, 1961

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(ii) The Civil Service. From 1945 the American connection had been the sheet-anchor of British policy, says Sir Frank Lee (see below). In the early stages Europe was disorganized and hard up and might have battered upon Britain. The Europeans - Monnet, Marjolin, and so on - "did not cut any ice". The Foreign Office under Eden was a solid force against Europe(1). During the later 'Fifties many middle-range officials were for entry into Europe but the 'special relationship' (below, p. 69) was still strong. The 'Office' exhibited a conspicuous lack of interest during the long negotiations over a free trade area.

Herbert Andrew, Second Secretary at the Board of Trade in the early 'Sixties, has said that at the end of the 'Fifties many civil servants were seeking ideas. Partly by accident, a set of people more European-minded than incumbents of five years before were occupying important posts. This was a main input into the situation - people had begun to talk of entry to Europe in a serious manner. Sir Eric Roll remarked that Macmillan was easily persuaded about Europe; he had pride in his vision and historical sense. The crucial fact was that, as Andrew says, the Foreign Office had woken up.

(1) See p. 21, for Macmillan's comment on the Foreign Office memorandum of 1952.

Foreign Office interest was only aroused by the deterioration of relations which occurred after the breakdown of the free trade talks and became marked when the Six began to discuss seriously political unification. (2)

Lord Strang, until 1953, Permanent Secretary at the Office, made a declaration in 1960 which showed the evolution of view (^{below} above, p. 1492). Here, in the Foreign Office, was the great change says Sir Frank Lee.

"The permanent head of the Foreign Office, Sir Frederick Hoyer Millar, former Ambassador to Bonn, always remained sceptical but the new arrivals in the European Department - Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh, back from Paris in 1960, Sir Roderick Barclay, appointed that year to be special adviser on European trade, and Sir Patrick Heilly, ex-Ambassador to Moscow - were all Community minded. One of these recalls his astonishment when, returning in 1960 from a three-year stint abroad with definitely European ideas, and expecting to find himself in a heretical minority, he discovered on the contrary that all his colleagues agreed with him. In the months before the Prime Minister announced the Government's decision to seek entry, a senior official of the Foreign Office complained that he really hardly knew how to prevent some of his staff 'falling overboard in their European frenzy'". (2)

Herbert Andrew confesses that his attitude to Europe had at first been sceptical. While at the Board of Trade he had been affected by the views of younger and more junior civil servants on the Rome Treaty. He had watched the process of seeking answers to practical questions on the continent and had come to feel that Britain could 'put something in'. It was

(2) See Note B, p. 181

(2) Beloff, N.: The General Says No, 1963, pp. 89-90 and note reference above (p. 143) to the 'planning mood'.

not just a matter of making more money - there would be a big future if we could help break down the boundaries of nationalism. Before the end of the Brussels negotiations he felt quite positively that it would be a good thing for Britain to take a seat at the E.E.C. table.

Andrew declares that he is always inclined to question the idea of 'departmental tradition' -- in the departments men can make a lot of difference. A case in point would appear to be the Treasury under Makins then Lee. Roger Makins (later to become the first Baron Sherfield) had had long experience of the Foreign Office and the Diplomatic Service before coming to the Treasury, in 1956, as Joint Permanent Secretary. He enjoyed considerable influence and was indeed a key figure. His formative years had been spent in the United States and he had married an American. He was notoriously luke-warm towards Europe and his influence counted a great deal. This was illustrated, says Sir Frank Lee, both in the attempt to found a free trade area (a cheap way into Europe), and in the foundation of E.F.T.A. (a mistake). The great change at the Treasury came when Makins left: the date of his departure was "a happy chance".

With twenty years' experience of international financial and economic problems behind him, the energetic Sir Frank Godbould Lee became Joint Permanent Secretary at the Treasury in early 1960. He had been inclined towards Europe while at the Board of Trade: he now made up his mind. The confidential and reassuring advice must have influenced Macmillan greatly. In 1960, says Sir Frank, people at the Treasury - save himself- were lagging behind the Foreign Office in their concern for a move towards Europe. This was

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to change:

"The speed and extent of the change of official opinion on Europe should perhaps partly be attributed to the force of fashion. A young Treasury official, long a convinced advocate of Britain's entry into Europe, recalls that whereas in 1959 the very idea was enough to cause him to be written off as a long-haired eccentric, in 1960 it was getting to be all right, and, by 1961, you were a stick-in-the-mud if you thought otherwise."(4)

Sir William Gorell Barnes, Deputy Under Secretary at the Colonial Office in the early 'Sixties, traces the evolution of his pro-European views from the time that he assumed, in 1959, economic as against political duties within his department. He found that the Government was conducting a 'vendetta' against the Six related to their elaboration of association provisions for former French territories. (The difficulty had been revealed with the publication of the Rome Treaty in March 1957 although the association of the former territories had been announced on 15th February. This inclusion, the price of French acceptance of E.E.C., had surprised Britain.)

The general thought moving Gorell Barnes at the time was that the primary producers - and the Colonial Office concern was largely with tropical producers - were more and more going to have to sell their coffee and cocoa to Europe. Whether or not Britain joined the Community agreement would have to be reached with the Six, "tomorrow rather than ten years hence". Basically he was in favour of entry to Europe but he also wanted to ease the solution of Britain's African problems. E.E.C.'s

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association arrangements under Articles 131-136 were to expire on 1st January 1963. At a time when these arrangements were being re-examined, Gorell Barnes was responsible for a change of view on Europe in the Colonial Office.

(iii) Interest Groups. Industry in general, and the Federation of British Industries as its most influential spokesman, had strongly supported the idea of a free trade area with the Six between 1956-1958. During the winter of 1958-1959 the F.B.I. had pursued the project of a European Free Trade Association with more obvious zeal than had government officials. Essentially, however, the overriding interest of industry was to find an acceptable arrangement with the Common Market. Some industrial leaders pressed for an accommodation with the Six in 1960 but the prevailing business view, as in government, was that time would make a settlement easier. The main pressure for a move into Europe came in Spring 1961.

In July, 1961 the F.B.I. published British Industry and Europe: a statement for F.B.I. members. While the pamphlet declared that the Commonwealth should not be asked to pay a substantial part of the price of British entry and that moral and contractual commitments to E.F.T.A. must be honoured, it was by no means wholly negative in its survey of issues affecting industry:

Tariffs: in principle the F.B.I. was not opposed to the common tariff and in practice would not raise substantial objections to the level of tariff likely to obtain;

Commonwealth: there should be opportunities for the expansion of Commonwealth production, particularly that of the developing countries (largely an agricultural problem);

Commonwealth Preference: of some importance to most industries, of great importance to some, the F.B.I. would accept its disappearance with reluctance if Commonwealth nations decided to seek more liberal treatment from the E.E.C.;

United Kingdom import of Manufactures: while the F.B.I. recognized the need of Asian expansion, a problem of low-cost Asian exports existed. Britain was carrying a disproportionate share of these imports and a spreading of the burden was called for;

Raw Materials: the F.B.I. would deplore substantial increases in costs;

E.E.C. Restrictive Practices provisions: the E.E.C. was placing varying interpretations on provisions and this would give rise to great uncertainty and endless legal difficulties;

Dumped and subsidised imports: the F.B.I. would want prompt action against these;

Social Policy: the F.B.I. was against imposed harmonization.

The F.B.I. concluded that outstanding issues were not incapable of solution:

"A Europe-wide multilateral trading system has always been our desire and, we believe, that of the great bulk of industry in Europe. We would greatly welcome an early end to the present division. Nevertheless a large majority of us are of the opinion that it is right not to become committed to formal negotiations with the Six until existing differences over the problems outlined above have been so far narrowed as to offer the prospect of a satisfactory outcome."(1)

(1) Op.cit., p.5, para.15

The F.B.I. was distressed by the anti-European interpretation put on its document and it repeatedly emphasized that it was an aide-memoire for member firms and neither formal advice to the Government nor an attempt to influence national or international opinion. Sir Norman Kipping, Director-General of the F.B.I., agreed that the conclusion of the report could have been turned around to state that there should be preliminary discussion to narrow the differences between Britain and the Six before formal negotiations began.

The Sunday Times, 16th July 1961 noted that the F.B.I. conclusions (quoted above) may not have been intended by the Grand Council of the F.B.I. to be as emphatically negative or as feebly positive as they appeared. Further, the F.B.I. accepted the fact that the conclusions were the result of the strength of individual member-firms on the Council - the largest firms, more strongly pro-European, seemed to be under-represented by the federation's system of voting.

Ignoring the fact that Commonwealth trade over recent years had increased faster with E.E.C. than with Britain, the Commonwealth Industries Association fought to maintain the economic and political cohesion of the Commonwealth(2). In July 1961 it distributed a leaflet to all M.P.'s and to the chairman of Conservative constituency associations. Sir Tufton Beamish, between 1958-1963 Deputy Chairman of the 1922 Committee and, in 1960-1961 Chairman of the Conservative Foreign Affairs Committee, dissociated himself from this pamphlet - he and his fellow-M.P.'s had

(2) The C.I.A.: Monthly Bulletin served as a mouthpiece for 'Commonwealth' Conservatives. (See below, p.129.)

not been consulted, and the association spoke only of the disadvantages of entry(3). Opposition came also from Sir Beresford Craddock, Chairman of the Commonwealth Industries Association itself from the beginning of the 'Fifties. He and various ministers had tried to develop Commonwealth trade, with no result - the Commonwealth was not interested. It was short-sighted not to think of other developments(4).

British industry in 1961 was undoubtedly concerned with the deterioration of commercial relations with Europe. It was not wholly without fear of E.E.C's centralized institutions and of a loss of British commercial and fiscal freedom. Entry to Europe would bring a rise in food prices, and thus wages, and might damage British competitiveness. But industry desired entry, on conditions:

"Associations representing the motor, iron and steel, shipbuilding and chemical industries, and the British chambers of commerce, all reported a generally favourable opinion among their members on the question of the Common Market - provided there are effective safeguards to agriculture and Commonwealth trade."(5)

(Textiles and shoes anticipated severe setbacks if Britain entered Europe.) Hardly anyone, said the Sunday Times, mentioned E.F.T.A..

(3) The Times, 22nd July, 1961

(4) The Times, 20th July, 1961

(5) Sunday Times survey, 16th July, 1961

+ In an era when agriculture had to be maintained against possible siege, or severe restriction of imports, it was imperative that a high level of home-grown food be maintained. In conditions of possible nuclear warfare, when a new time-scale had to be considered, support for marginal production had to be questioned:

"These environment changes and the organizational crisis they induced were fully apparent two or three years before the question of Britain's possible entry into the Common Market first appeared on the political agenda - which, of course, further complicated every issue."(6)

Sir Anthony Hurd, chairman of the Conservative backbenchers' agricultural committee, declared in May 1961 that our system of subvention was one that we should not rashly abandon. But the system he and the farmers defended was already being reconsidered by the government(7). Three days before the Commons debate during which Hurd spoke, Christopher Seames visited the Conservative agriculture committee and said that the British system was not settled for all time. Indeed, the White Paper, Agriculture: report on talks between the agricultural departments and the farmers' unions, June - December, 1960(8), had reported: "During the course of these talks, the Agricultural Departments have discussed with the Unions in a preliminary way the possibility of modification in the detailed mechanism of some of the price guarantee schemes."(9) (Nothing happened during the Brussels negotiations: in the Commons on 11th February 1963, the Prime

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- (6) Emery, F.E. and Trist, E.L.: "The Causal Texture of Organizational Environments", Human Relations, Vol.18, No.1., 1965, p.27
- (7) See Note B, British and E.E.C. agriculture systems, p.178.
- (8) Cmnd.1249, December, 1960
- (9) Op.cit., para.25

Minister spoke of a change from the open-ended Exchequer commitment to agriculture.)

The National Farmers' Union, the Federation of British Industries and the County Landowners' Association were involved with the Ministry of Agriculture, the Secretary of State for Scotland and the leaders of the Marketing Boards during the preparation for negotiations with the Six. The National Union of Agricultural Workers also had a voice: Edwin Gooch, its President opposed entry as did the secretary, Harold Collison.

The organization that most consistently questioned British entry was the N.F.U. It had intimate contacts with the Ministry of Agriculture, and it operated also through the European section of the International Federation of Agricultural Producers, and the Chambers of Commerce. During negotiations it had contact with the E.E.C. Commission and the New Zealand Federated Farmers.

The N.F.U. annual report for 1960 (in British Farmer, 7th January, 1961) mentions the above contacts and also the visit, in October, of Dr. Sicco Mansholt, Vice-president of the E.E.C. Commission, who during a lengthy meeting dealt with the E.E.C.'s proposed common agricultural policy. The annual report for 1961(10) mentions meetings with M.P.'s of all parties and a considerable amount of travel by N.F.U. officials to meet representatives of various European farming organizations. A further visit by Mansholt was recorded: he had

(10) In British Farmer, 6th January, 1962

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addressed a public meeting with president Harold Woolley in the chair. (The fact that a prestige advertising campaign, with the president's report published like a company report for the first time, was initiated in this year had no connection with Europe, according to officials at Agriculture House.)

Given the importance of agriculture, there was surprisingly little detailed consideration of its problems in public debate before Macmillan's announcement. An attitude of mind prevailed which 'excluded agriculture', with a 'reverse preference' hitting the Commonwealth too awful to be considered. The Government was under some constraint: relations with the Farmers' Unions had deteriorated following a tough Annual Review in March, 1960. The White Paper of December, 1960 was almost deferential to the unions.(11)

+ The position of the trade unions between 1956-1961, as represented by the T.U.C., could be characterized as being partly in favour of successive government initiatives towards Europe, but at the same time seeming always at least one step behind. The T.U.C. was almost entirely concerned with domestic social and economic aspects of entry to Europe. Of particular concern was the maintenance of full-employment: whereas the unions of the Six were willing to rely upon economic growth and the free movement of labour to ensure this, the T.U.C. wanted guarantees. For the continentals free movement of labour was itself a guarantee. Initially at least, the British trade unions

(11) Butterwick, M. and Rolfe, E.: Food, Farming and the Common Market, 1968, p.75

held British collective bargaining and welfare provisions in particular esteem.

The first important trade union discussion of entry into Europe took place at the 1960 Conference of the Confederation of Shipbuilding and Engineering Unions. Opposition was held in check and there was no vote on a negative motion. Elsewhere the National Union of Agricultural Workers and the Transport and General Workers' Union spoke out against Europe for Frank Cousins the E.E.C. was a capitalist, non-socialist force. On 14th July, 1961 representatives of the Labour Party and the T.U.C. met: neither side had a declared policy and neither wanted to be bound by a decision until the Government view had become clearer.

On 26th May, 1961 the T.U.C. had received a telegram from the New Zealand Federation of Labour. British entry to E.E.C. it held: "... must not only spell the end of the Commonwealth and reduce the United Kingdom to minor status, but also expose the British workers to a future fraught with uncertainty." After this appeal the General Council sought the views of other Commonwealth trade union centres.(12)

But General Council speakers at the 1961 Congress were more positive than the Labour speakers in the Commons. The General Council supported the Government's decision to negotiate, while reserving judgment on the desirability of membership until the terms had been announced. This qualified approval of negotiations represented a significant shift in trade union opinion since 1956. This

(12) T.U.C. Congress Report, 1961, p.250

arose from a growing appreciation of Britain's relative economic weakness and increasingly positive evaluation of the quality of labour conditions on the continent. Yet, in 1961, one could not identify a collective position among the trade unions. Some influential leaders favoured entry; the bulk of local activists continued to oppose entry, and rank-and-file opinion was evenly balanced(13).

(iv) Public opinion and the Campaigners. During the period 1960-1963 the British public was made aware of the complex European issue by various groups. On 25th July 1960 on the morning of the Commons debate, a declaration appeared in The Times calling on the Government to re-examine the objections to joining Europe, and to initiate negotiations with a view to eventual full membership of E.E.C. Members of all three political parties signed, including Roy Jenkins, Jo Grimond, and Peter Kirk. A similar joint declaration was published exactly a year later.

Group activity occurred during 1960 but campaign publicity increased during 1961. The Government was encouraged to believe that a shift in public opinion was occurring but the publicists' oversimplifications made its task more difficult - ministers had to deny that dramatic moves were imminent and their reservations created anti-climax.

In 1960 there existed a United Kingdom Council of the European Movement - the United

(13) Beever, R.C.: "Trade Union Rethinking", Journal Common Market Studies (2) 1963-1964, p.141

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Europe Association was an offshoot organized for work outside London. The Council had supported the industrial free trade area proposal which Maudling had tried to persuade the Six to accept and it had later set up an E.F.T.A. Action Committee. The Council had, in fact, followed the Government - it sailed with the wind. Very British and pragmatic, it contrasted strongly with continental branches of the movement, which were very federal in sentiment. For many British 'Europeans' the Council could not be relied upon as a spearhead and there was some resentment of the autocratic leadership given by Sir Edward Beddington-Behrens.

Federal Union, founded in 1938 to promote world government, had an interest in European unity. It stated 'Britain in Europe' as an information service. Frank Cousins, no marketeer, was on its committee for a time as were Roy Jenkins, Peter Kirk, and several representatives of commerce and industry.

The Common Market Campaign was launched out of disappointment with the above organizations. A Preparatory Committee was established at the beginning of 1961 after a delay caused by the failure to find a chairman. The first two people approached had secured diplomatic appointments: the third was just leaving one - Lord Gladwyn, as Sir Gladwyn-Jebb, in his farewell speech as Ambassador in Paris in September, 1960 had revealed his European sentiments.

On 25th May, 1961 the Campaign's Statement on Europe was released at a Waldorf press conference with a hundred-and-fifty names attached. On 19th June the Preparatory Committee reconstituted itself into a Directing Committee with Gladwyn as Chairman, Roy Jenkins as his Deputy,

Peter Kirk as Secretary and R.J. Jarrett as Executive Secretary (recently returned from a year at the European College in Bruges). At the height of its activity the Campaign was to employ only three secretaries in London and two organizers in the provinces. (Britain in Europe and the Common Market Campaign worked together and their personnel overlapped. (In March 1963 they merged.)

+ Between the failure of the free trade area idea and the building of E.P.T.A. some newspapers had flirted with the notion of joining Europe. By 1960 debate was different in kind and in degree. The Financial Times, Sunday Times, Daily Telegraph and Daily Mirror backed negotiations many months before this became official policy. On 11th June, 1960 the Economist made up its mind for full-scale participation. Daily Herald editorials favoured entry from June 1961: on 31st January, 1962 it attacked the Opposition's waiting game, its dodging of an historic issue.

During the I.T.V. broadcast on 20th February, 1962 Woodrow Wyatt recorded that two members of the Government had assured him that the Daily Mirror campaign for entry had been the "tip-over factor" which had decided the Government to stop hawking about entry and to start negotiations. If the Daily Mirror was behind them then, as far as the public was concerned, they would probably be all right. Wyatt has confirmed this story and has added that the two ministers concerned were close to the Prime Minister.(1)

(1) Letter

Popular opinion on British entry into E.E.C. in September 1961, as revealed by Gallup (2) and Daily Express (3) polls was as follows:

	<u>Gallup</u>	<u>Express</u>
<u>Approval of entry:</u>	52%	39%
<u>Don't know:</u>	30%	35%
<u>Disapproval:</u>	18%	26%

(Gallup asked, "If Government were to decide.." while the Daily Express asked the direct question "Are you in favour...")

(2) Published in Sunday Telegraph, 17th September, 1961

(3) Published in Daily Express, 4th October, 1961

4.3 The External Environment

(1) Encouragement from Europe? The Common Market was undoubtedly affected by Britain's presence on the side-lines. Germany had important interests outside the community - she had built up impressive trading surpluses in Commonwealth and E.F.T.A. countries. Her business and banking circles favoured an accommodation with Britain and Dr. Erhard, German Minister of Economic Affairs and Deputy Chancellor, was very keen that Adenauer should seek terms. (At the end of 1960 and the beginning of 1961 the Mueller-Armack Plan was receiving attention in Germany. According to this, the Six and the Seven would remain separate but would largely harmonize tariffs against third countries. It was a cross between a free trade area and a customs union.)

In the summer of 1960 German farmers added their voice. Action on the community's

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agricultural policy - the basic proposals had been discussed at the July, 1958 Stresa Conference under Sicco Mansholt - had to be taken.(1) Much was at stake. French agriculture had flourished after a late technological revolution: the problem was to dispose of the surpluses produced by extremely fertile land. The French peasant-farmer would flourish in a Europe where prices were low enough to discourage over-production in Germany and levies high enough to discourage imports from outside the community. A million German peasants were threatened by French cereals. // On 14th January, 1962 the E.E.C.'s first 'agricultural marathon' ended after seventeen days' and nearly as many nights' discussion. The basic features of the Common Agricultural Policy were agreed and France had gained a victory. (The first regulations took effect from 1st July, 1962). This Franco-German battle lay behind subsequent negotiations with Britain: when Britain negotiated on behalf of the Commonwealth countries on a quantitative basis she was questioning a principle which had been established with great difficulty.(2)

+ Discussion of political development in the E.E.C. and its repercussions on the British relationship involves, first, some mention of French and German national attitudes. French posture must be seen in the light of the liquidation of the Algerian problem - Algeria secured her independence in 1962 - which enhanced national freedom just as departure from

(1) Butterwick, M. and Rolfe, H.R.: Food, Farming and the Common Market, p.6.

(2) Dixon, Piers.: Double Diploma p.287, and see Note B, p.178

Indo-China had enhanced freedom. Gaullist nuclear aspirations must be remembered. (But note: "The major decisions, with regard to both atomic weapons and disarmament, were made before de Gaulle returned to power on June 1st, 1958".)(3) Above all one must remember Gaullist flexibility:

"In the name of balance, de Gaulle has in the course of less than twenty years envisaged the following alliances: (a) with the British, in order to create an independent bloc vis-a-vis the Russians and the Americans; (b) with the Soviet Union, in order to maintain French supremacy in Europe vis-a-vis Germany; (c) with all against the revival of a unified, militarized, and strong Germany; and (d) with West Germany and the West European states, in order to create an independent bloc - a Third Force in Europe that might lead to drastic changes in the balance of power."(14)

On 31st May, 1960 de Gaulle delivered a broadcast analysis of the reason for the summit failure. He spoke of the possibility of an imposing federation - a European entente 'from the Atlantic to the Urals.' With no risk to the independence of each nation, this would be, "... une cooperation organisée des états". Although they had not been specifically mentioned, the British were optimistic. During the summer of 1960 de Gaulle gave voice to the idea of 'troika' leadership of N.A.T.O. and developed the theme of its reorganization at his 6th September press conference. At this conference the President outlined his ideas for community institutional development, ideas

(3) Macridis, Roy C.: "The French Force de Frappe", Modern European Governments, 1968, p.69

(14) Macridis, Roy C.: Foreign Policy in World Politics, 3rd ed., 1967, p.84

which left in doubt the future of the existing community institutions, and of inter-governmental co-operation through N.A.T.O. and W.E.U.. (The principal organizations of co-operation would be a Council of Heads of Government; a Permanent Secretariat based on Paris; four Specialized Commissions - political, economic, cultural, and defence; and an Assembly attended by delegates from national assemblies - the whole scheme to be approved by referenda.) The remaining members of the community felt hope and fear.

To understand the German posture one may simply note that, although sovereignty had been regained in 1955, in the early 'Sixties she was not yet complaining of being an 'economic giant treated as a political pygmy'. The German attitude towards France throughout 1960 was nervous. The imminence of the American presidential election created a political vacuum: while de Gaulle saw this as an opportunity for leadership, Adenauer felt the need for a closing of ranks. Perhaps America would weaken her commitment to Europe. Perhaps Russia would develop a Berlin offensive. De Gaulle rocked the boat: in October 1960 he declared that N.A.T.O. members not equipped with nuclear weapons were 'integrated satellites'.

There were thus external factors adding to those domestic pressures on Adenauer which indicated the need for a rapprochement with Britain. On 10th and 11th August, 1960 Adenauer talked with Macmillan. Having previously encouraged his economic advisers to make a thorough re-examination of the community relationship with Britain, Adenauer now agreed to Anglo-German talks which, in fact, lasted

several months. (Sir Roderick Barclay conducted bilateral talks with the French and the Italians as well as with the Germans.) There was, as seen above, some tension between Germany and France over agriculture: when, in December, 1960, an account was given of the Anglo-German talks Adenauer was ill and the pro-British Erhard, urging the Mueller-Armack Plan (above) was rebuffed by the French - the British were still trying to gain maximum commercial advantage at minimum political cost. Nora Beloff believes that British trust in unstinting German support was misplaced: although the conviction that Adenauer had changed his mind and had joined Erhard in promoting Britain's admission to the community was certainly one of the great factors influencing Macmillan's decision to seek full membership of E.E.C., Adenauer was in fact merely giving himself a little domestic leeway - and this was demonstrated by the signing of the Franco-German Treaty in early 1963(5).

At the end of 1960 there were numerous ministerial meetings in Paris in connection with W.E.U., the Council of Europe, E.E.C., and the newly-convened O.E.C.D.. There was resistance to the French ideas for institutional change. However, defence of E.E.C. institutions against France made it difficult for any of the Five to press for an accommodation with Britain.

(ii) The American Connection. Much of Macmillan's first year as prime minister was spent in re-establishing relations with the United States after the Suez rupture. Under Macmillan and Eisenhower the 'special relationship' subsisted with the help of the personal understanding of wartime colleagues. Arthur M. Schlesinger has recorded that the failure of 'Skybolt' offered Kennedy the grand opportunity to terminate the special relationship

(5) Beloff, N.: The General Says No, 1963, p.101

and force Britain into Europe.(1)

At the end of 1959 and the beginning of 1960 the Dillon proposals for reorganization of O.E.E.C. were under discussion.(2) The Americans were not prepared to go as far as Britain in freeing trade and co-ordinating policies and the limited character of American commitment for re-organization helped to disillusion those who had hoped that an Atlantic framework would be created soon enough to obviate the need for a British decision on Europe. The American initiative for an Atlantic relationship was to be a supplement, not a substitute for a European settlement.

As far as the narrower Europe of the Six was concerned, Kennedy supported acceleration

- (1) "The issue was, in its first appearance, technical: the decision of the United States Government to cancel an agreement made by President Eisenhower with Macmillan at Camp David in 1960 to provide Great Britain with Skybolt missiles. But the problem very quickly became profoundly political ... Its solution... compelled the President to choose between those in his own Government whose main interest lay in transforming western Europe, including Britain, into a unified political and economic entity, and those whose main interest lay in guarding the Anglo-American special relationship and integrity of the deterrent." Schlesinger, Arthur, M.: A Thousand Days, 1965, pp. 730-731
- (2) Douglas Dillon, American Under-Secretary of State. During the autumn of 1960 the G.A.T.T. countries were negotiating 'compensation' for tariff changes when the common external tariff was applied by the Six. The 'Dillon Round' of negotiations was scheduled to begin early in 1961.

plans (above, p. ³⁹~~60~~) and failed to support Britain's desire for a wider, inclusive community. Macmillan's concern was shown in a dramatic manner. A leak in the Washington Post in March, 1960, given much publicity in Europe, asserted that the Prime Minister had declared Britain's historic role to be the crushing of Napoleonic ambitions to integrate Europe. If France and Germany continued on this road Britain would have no alternative but to lead another peripheral alliance against them. With a widening division in Europe Britain might withdraw troops from Germany and with further discrimination against Britain might occur a restriction of dollar imports.(3) The Foreign Office issued a denial and Macmillan made a statement in the Commons on 1st April, 1960.

The leak attributed to Macmillan a fear of a revived Nazi movement after Adenauer's departure; certainly the fear of instability in Europe after the departure of French and German leaders was present in both British and American minds. "The United States wanted stability," says Sir Frank Lee (^{above} ~~below~~, p. 50) If Britain joined Europe the eccentricities of Paris and Bonn could be offset by London.(4) If the United States supported the political and economic unity of Europe in preference to a special relationship (which would get in the way of her relations with Europe), perhaps Britain

(3) Camps, M.: Britain and the European Community, p.284 and Sampson, A.: Macmillan, p.211. And compare the 'Chalfont Affair' of October, 1967.

(4) Schlesinger, Arthur, M.: op.cit., p.720

ought to move away from Churchillian ideas of the 'three interlocking circles'. Macmillan was attached to the Americans: he did not regret the passage of power to the other side of the Atlantic - Europe and the U.S.A. were like the two halves of the late Roman Empire.(5)
American influence led Macmillan forward:

"The reflection that the shortest, and perhaps the only, way to a real Atlantic partnership lay through Britain's joining the Common Market seems to have been a very important - perhaps the controlling - element in Mr. Macmillan's own decision that the right course for the United Kingdom was to apply for membership."(6)

The Kennedy inaugural in January, 1961 had included a mention of possible 'bridging arrangements' in Europe and Macmillan's April visit had revealed American enthusiasm for British entry to E.E.C. In a televised press conference on 14th April, Macmillan said that the Americans would accept resultant discrimination against themselves:

"I don't want to criticise the last Administration but we've always had a feeling that the Americans were rather anxious that we shouldn't do this [enter] on economic grounds. I think the new Administration would accept the degree of discrimination that would result on a wider field, against American goods, if the Eight and Six got together, because they would feel that the political advantages are on a more solid base."(7)

(5) Rees-Mogg, The Times, 9th February, 1964

(6) Camps, M: op.cit., p.336

(7) (B.B.C. Television, quoted Wiesner, Hans J: Die britischen Parteien und die europäische Integration, unpublished thesis, University Erlangen-Nurnberg, 1966, p.157)

During the winter of 1960-1961 American officials doubted whether Britain was yet ready to make the concessions necessary for entry into E.E.C. In March 1961 Under Secretary of State George Ball, visiting Europe on the President's behalf, had witnessed a quickening of British interest. He had asked to see Edward Heath and had expected a quiet chat. Instead he was ushered into ^a large conference room where all the key civil servants concerned with the shaping of Britain's European policies were assembled to hear his views of a British bid. Ball pressed the political advantages of Britain going into Europe. He had great influence, says Sir Frank Lee (18), and he was taken very seriously.

(iii) The Commonwealth. In 1961, for the first time in history, the United Kingdom was to export more to Western Europe than to the whole of the Commonwealth. Uncertainty about the cohesion of the Commonwealth had growth and, while some saw potential for political and economic growth, others were anxious to examine the essential characteristics of the association, to know the limits of friendship.

Awareness had grown that the Commonwealth had ceased to provide Britain with the economic strength and political influence it once had, and that the illusion of global power it provided should be shed. In any step towards Europe Macmillan chose to take he would be helped by a certain Conservative demoralization. Protective measures were being taken against British exports and new Commonwealth members were not anxious to accept 'guidance'. (Until

(18) Interview

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1964 suggestions of a joint Commonwealth Secretariat were resisted on the grounds that such an organization "... would inevitably cut across the direct personal relations between ministers and officials in different Commonwealth countries, which is such a special feature of our association."(1)

The May 1960 Prime Ministers' Conference discussed Europe only perfunctorily -- British ministers indicated that negotiations with the Six were unlikely to be resumed for some time. There was given a promise to safeguard existing entry arrangements for Commonwealth goods into the British market. It was autumn before there occurred any serious discussion of the implication of Britain's entry into a customs union.

Very little was made public after the September 1960 meeting of the Council of Commonwealth Finance Ministers -- preceding, as usual, I.B.R.D. and I.M.F. conferences -- since talks with the Six were, at this stage, purely exploratory. Britain had not yet taken up its position and the E.E.C. had not yet settled its own agricultural system. It was assumed, however, that in the event of British entry into Europe preferences between Britain and Commonwealth countries would vanish. The most significant development revealed by the conference communique was an evident dilution of British

(1) Gross, J.A.: Whitehall and the Commonwealth, 1967, pp.82-93, quoting Duncan Sandys. (In 1968 John Freeman was to say that, fundamentally, the Commonwealth was not a decision-making machine: what distinguished the organization was its 'intimacy of exchange'. The Times, 15th November, 1968)

commitment as seen in the appearance of reference to the safeguarding of 'essential interests of the Commonwealth' in place of the earlier commitment to maintain 'existing entry arrangements for food, drink and tobacco'.(2)

In March 1961 in London, Commonwealth prime ministers concerned themselves almost entirely with South Africa. South Africa's exclusion, imposed by the new states on the old dominions, might be used as evidence of the cohesion of the Commonwealth: Nora Beloff asserts that, from this time, for many Tories the Commonwealth remained an object of hope and charity, but not of faith.(3) Any diversion of Commonwealth attention from the European question was remedied by the May 1961 meeting of Commonwealth economic experts who reviewed the kinds of arrangement possible if Britain entered Europe for five main categories of goods - i.e. basic materials; temperate zone foodstuffs; tropical products; manufactures from developed countries; and, manufactures from the less developed countries. At this time there was pressure in the Commons for a new prime ministers' conference since, it was felt, a decision on principle was to be expected from Britain. The British government resisted: bi-lateral discussions were best since Commonwealth interests were so diverse - an argument rejected by, among others, Mr. Diefenbaker in the Canadian House of Commons. Civil servants believed it would be dangerous to summon all Commonwealth leaders to London.

(2) Camps, M: Britain and the European Community, pp. 317-318

(3) The General Says No, pp. 90-91

Macmillan countered domestic and Commonwealth pressure by announcing, on 1st June 1961, the ministerial trips which took place in the first fortnight of July.(4) Duncan Sandys had the most difficult time with the old dominions, as expected. The New Zealand communiqué used the expression 'comparable outlets' in respect of the diversion of future New Zealand exports: like the phrase 'safeguarding of vital interests' this represented a substitution of a general formula for an earlier outright commitment to preserve existing entry arrangements. The phrase 'comparable outlets' was to figure prominently in subsequent negotiations in Brussels. In Australia Sandys found talks tougher. The coalition of Conservatives and Country Party, i.e. farmers' party, was facing an election. The eventual communiqué was a statement of the view of both sides rather than an agreement. An example of its toughness was seen in the declaration by Australia that, "Absence of objection (to the opening of negotiations) should not imply approval". Australia even pressed for representation at the Brussels negotiating table where her interests would be discussed. Sandys gave no undertaking: this was a matter for the Six. (W.A. Westermann, Secretary of the Australian Department of Trade, was in fact heard in Brussels.) In Canada Sandys found concern about a stagnant economy,

(4) Duncan Sandys, Commonwealth Relations visited New Zealand, Australia and Canada. Peter Thorneycroft, Minister for Aviation went to India, Pakistan, Ceylon and Malaya. John Hare, Minister of Labour, visited Sierra Leone, Ghana, Nigeria and the Central Africa Federation. Lord Perth, Minister of State at the Foreign Office, visited the West Indies. Edward Heath, Lord Privy Seal, visited Cyprus.

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about increased dependence on the United States, and about a coming election.

A White Paper(5) reproduced the official communiques. Gaitskell was disappointed, having pressed for details of the various talks. It was evident that the Commonwealth countries received their visitors feeling uneasiness and resentment since they imagined that Britain had already reached her decision. In truth, Macmillan now felt that the only thing left to do was to negotiate with the Six. The visits may have been ill-advised. Commonwealth views were known and the visits merely added to demands for special arrangements. No alternative arrangements were put to Britain. Only New Zealand, possibly, strengthened her position. Duncan Sandys declares that the visits were essential: "We said we must do what we could for ourselves."(6)

(iv) The European Free Trade Association. 1959 was the year of the construction of E.F.T.A. The Stockholm Treaty was signed 20th November and the association came into operation in July 1960. The founding of E.F.T.A. followed quickly on the failure of the O.E.E.C. talks on a free trade area. Two days after the Soustelle statement (^{about} ~~below~~, p. 26) which ended hopes of a free trade area in industrial goods the British themselves declared the negotiations closed. At this O.E.E.C. ministerial meeting Sir David Eccles, President of the Board of Trade, having toned-down the Treasury draft

(5) Commonwealth Consultations on British Relations with the E.E.C., Cmd. 1449, July, 1961.

(6) Interview

supplied for his use, delivered a speech which contained a hint that if France did not co-operate in making trade arrangements she might regret it. Couve de Murville, the French Foreign Minister, left before the speech was completed - France was not in the habit of negotiating under duress.(1)

The morning after this episode members of O.E.E.C. who did not belong to E.E.C. met at the British embassy - the meeting was a spontaneous result of a shared concern over the future of European trade. On the British side there had been no preliminary discussion with the Foreign Office or the Prime Minister. From this small meeting emerged E.F.T.A.. (The brief period of mutual back-turning between the Six and the Seven produced a period of inactivity for O.E.E. - there was a drying up of daily contacts at working level which had been the rule since 1948)

The United Kingdom, unlike the Swiss and the Swedes, had little enthusiasm for E.F.T.A. as an end in itself. The Conservatives were impelled to accept the association partly out of fear that some of their new colleagues might make separate deals with the Six. The Labour Opposition, having urged the Government to co-operation with the outer ring of states, now doubted the ability of E.F.T.A. to improve relations with the Six - this was a period of talk of 'bridging arrangements'-and was sceptical about the pure free trade area form given to the convention. When E.F.T.A. was debated in the Commons on 14th December, 1959 the Opposition abstained in the final vote.

At the end of October, 1960 the second E.F.T.A. ministerial meeting was held in Berne.

(1) Beloff, N.: The General Says No. p.82

The cutting of tariffs parallel with those cuts made by the Six was discussed. The Swiss and the Swedes were anxious to build up the association and were the most sceptical of the possibility of chances of negotiations taking place with the Six.

At the Geneva meeting in February 1961 ministers again discussed parallelism in tariff cuts as well as the entry of Finland into the association. On relations between the Six and the Eight(2) it was generally felt that it was desirable that an agreement be concluded between the two groups. Although British opinion was by this time moving away from ideas of such agreements and towards Britain's joining Europe, Maudling (Board of Trade) was able to note differences of approach in the way the two groups saw integration and to declare that something less than a merger was needed. The Swiss and the Swedes wanted to leave it to the Six to initiate proposals for discussions: the Danes and the Austrians, both of whom conducted a large amount of trade with the Six were increasingly disturbed by exclusion from their markets, wanted E.F.T.A. to make active bridge-building efforts.

During the spring of 1961 there was uneasiness in E.F.T.A. as Britain occupied herself with thoughts of entry to E.E.C.. While Danes and Norwegians thought of joining along with Britain (Denmark announced her decision the day after Macmillan's announcement), Portugal thought of association but the Swiss, the Austrians and the Swedes showed fear of major political initiatives.

(2) Finland associated with E.F.T.A. in 1961

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The E.F.T.A. council meeting held in London between 27th and 29th June, 1961 was held on the eve of the announcement by Macmillan. As with the Commonwealth talks, the British Government did not put fellow-members of the association in the position where they had to agree with or veto British plans. It was promised that they would be kept informed. E.F.T.A. would remain united throughout the coming negotiations and actions would be co-ordinated. There would be no running-down of E.F.T.A. obligations until all could benefit from the establishment of a single European market - an economic division of Europe must not occur.

The United Kingdom had definite obligations to its fellow-members in E.F.T.A., obligations very recently assumed. With this 'London Agreement', however, she may have gone too far. Was E.E.C. to accept a market of fourteen?

(v) Council of Europe and Western European Union. The Council was founded in a flush of 'European' ambition in 1949, the Union in 1954 as a substitute for the failed defence community.(1) Both had assemblies which became platforms for political discussion of some significance in relation to Britain's European aspirations.

On 21st January, 1960 Selwyn Lloyd, Foreign Secretary admitted before the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe that it had been a mistake for Britain not to have taken part in E.C.S.C. negotiations. Before the same assembly on 27th September, 1960 the

(1) F.E.P.: European Unity: co-operation and integration, 1967

Vos Report, containing proposals for a modified customs union between the Six and the Seven, was debated. Heath, Lord Privy Seal, was careful not to endorse the proposals, although the United Kingdom itself had been advocating this kind of action. George Brown was more welcoming.

British entry to Europe was discussed in June 1960 at Western European Union on the basis of the Conte Report. Here, John Profumo, Minister of State at the Foreign Office, was circumspect. The suggestion that Britain might join E.C.S.C. and Euratom as a first step created suspicion. The merging of the three European communities - E.S.C., E.C.S.C., and Euratom - had been under active discussion for some time. Monnet declared that Britain should join the procession, not just a part of it.

In a Commons debate in July 1960 Selwyn Lloyd and Reginald Maudling, Board of Trade, stated categorically that the Six had shown themselves to be unready for negotiations. By now, however, Macmillan was making active use of Conservative Members with access to the Council and Union assemblies - his own son Maurice, Peter Kirk, (2) and Robert Mathew among them. The Foreign Office was active too.

"For several weeks in the autumn of 1960 W.E.U. Conservative M.P.'s were in private collusion with the Foreign Office discussing the text of a bold resolution flatly recommending Britain's entry into

(2) Peter Kirk, whose father had been Bishop of Oxford, had special links with eminent European protestants - including Walter Hallstein, Dr. Luns, and Couve de Murville - through a private society.

The Common Market. A W.E.U. 'general affairs' Committee (of parliamentarians only) was then arranged and located to coincide with a meeting of the foreign ministers of the Six scheduled in Brussels on 17th November, 1960. As soon as the W.E.U. Committee had been prevailed on to adopt unanimously a British draft, a telephone call was put through to the villa of the Val Duchesse, where the ministers were sitting, with a request that the W.E.U. group should be allowed to come and express their views. By the time the discussion had ended it was, and was meant to be, very plain to the six member countries that the British Government was by now very seriously considering Britain's entry."(3)

On 30th November, 1960 the Assembly of W.E.A. adopted a recommendation from the general affairs committee that urged the accession of the United Kingdom to E.E.C. and Peter Kirk supported this by visits to a number of E.E.C. members' foreign ministries.

Before a W.E.U. ministerial meeting on 27th February 1961, Heath stated that he wanted Britain to be consulted, not merely informed, on the political discussions of the Six. But he offered only the idea of a modified customs union as a bridge between Britain and the Six - there would be a common or harmonized tariff except for goods from the Commonwealth. Political and defence arrangements would be developed through W.E.U. and the Council of Europe, not through the E.E.C. in isolation.

(3) Beloff, N: op.cit., p.103

4.4 The Initiative

Following his talks with Kennedy in April 1961, Macmillan spoke at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology on the unity of the Western Alliance. He indicated his concern at the division of Europe: the consequences of economic division were only just beginning to make themselves felt in the political field. If the economic division persisted, the political rift would inevitably widen and deepen and, sooner or later, affect

military coherence and strength. Macmillan's Europeanism buttressed Atlanticism: discussion in E.E.C. of federal development was a spur to early British action.

At the start of the debate the economic advantages of entry were emphasized. During the 14th April 1960 adjournment debate, Anthony Barber, Secretary of State at the Treasury, referred to "This European trade problem". When, in the summer of 1961, John Biggs-Davidson raised the sovereignty issue both Macmillan and Heath countered by presenting E.E.C. as an economic community. Edward du Cann - from July 1962 to be Parliamentary Secretary to the Treasury - in his Taunton speech of 27th May, 1961 demanded to know if we should, "... surrender to any extent the right to decide our destiny ourselves - delegating it instead to other nations less politically stable?" Lord Altrincham, himself a pro-Market man, declared that the nation ought to be informed of the political consequences of entry.

The emergence of divisions and alignments in the parties was evident during the twelve months before the July 1961 debate. There was concern over the Brussels bureaucracy, possible damage to the American connection, and to our role as mediator between East and West. Lord Hinchingbrooke made the sharpest attacks on the Government: we could not enter Europe without a mandate from a general election - there had been no word on Europe in the last manifesto. There were other campaigners against Europe - John Biggs-Davidson, Robin Turton, Peter Walker, Sir Derek Walker-Smith, and Paul Williams.

Before July 1961, however, Macmillan was subjected to neither campaigns demonstrating

general support for entry nor those demonstrating violent antipathy. Opinion was not yet mobilized. Agriculture was obviously going to be a major problem but the Government was aware of problems to be solved here, in or out of Europe.

As far as time-scale is concerned, until 1959 the order of priorities held by most influential people in Whitehall had not seriously changed from what it had been in 1947. By 1959, however, it was becoming more difficult to dismiss the reality of the drive towards European integration.(1) In early 1960 there was general government pre-occupation with the European trade problem and at some time during the spring Macmillan made his first decision - to discuss possible entry into E.E.C. with the governments of the Six.

By mid-1961 Macmillan and a few other members of the Cabinet, with a few key people in the upper reaches of the civil service, had come to feel that, at the right time, it might be wise to join E.E.C.. But this did not yet constitute a government policy, there was to be no panic move.

In 1959 in the Commons Maudling had declared that he could think of no more retrograde step economically or politically than the signing of the Treaty of Rome. In July 1961 the Conservative News Letter, commenting upon a

(1) "It is possible .. that this study is being written at a time when the general framework of ideas about British policy is being subjected to serious reconsideration for the first time since 1947."
Beloff, M.: New Dimensions in Foreign Policy, 1961, p.21

Liberal call for entry, said that the Government were wise to reject such foolish advice. Thus was Central Office caught out (2). At the end of the same month Macmillan revealed the second decision - to try to edge into Europe while edging out of Africa.

+ Macmillan announced his intention to initiate negotiations with E.E.C. on 31st July, 1961:

"The future relations between the European Economic Community, the United Kingdom, the Commonwealth and the rest of Europe are clearly matters of capital importance in the life of our country and, indeed, of all the countries of the free world.

"This is a political as well as an economic issue. Although the Treaty of Rome is concerned with economic matters it has an important political

(2) As with economic planning, see p. 43.

objective, namely, to promote unity and stability in Europe which is so essential a factor in the struggle for freedom and progress throughout the world. In this modern world the tendency towards larger groups of nations acting together in the common interest leads to greater unity and thus adds to our strength in the struggle for freedom.

"I believe that it is both our duty and our interest to contribute towards that strength by securing the closest possible unity within Europe. At the same time, if a closer relationship between the United Kingdom and the countries of the European Economic Community were to disrupt the long-standing and historic ties between the United Kingdom and the other nations of the Commonwealth the loss would be greater than the gain. The Commonwealth is a great source of stability and strength both to Western Europe and to the world as a whole, and I am sure that its value is fully appreciated by the member Governments of the European Economic Community. I do not think that Britain's contribution to the Commonwealth will be reduced if Europe unites. On the contrary, I think that its value will be enhanced.

"On the economic side, a community comprising, as members or in association, the countries of free Europe, could have a very rapidly expanding economy supplying, as eventually it would, a single market of approaching 300 million people. This rapidly expanding economy could, in turn, lead to an increased demand for products from other parts of the world and so help to expand world trade and improve the prospects of the less developed areas of the world.

"No British Government could join the European Economic Community without prior negotiation with a view to meeting the needs of the Commonwealth countries, of our European Free Trade Association partners, and of British agriculture consistently with the broad principles and purpose which have inspired the concept of European unity and which are embodied in the Rome Treaty.

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"As the House knows, Ministers have recently visited Commonwealth countries to discuss the problems which would arise if the British Government decided to negotiate for membership of the European Economic Community. We have explained to Commonwealth Governments the broad political and economic considerations which we have to take into account. They, for their part, told us their views and, in some cases, their anxieties about their essential interests. We have assured Commonwealth Governments that we shall keep in close consultation with them throughout any negotiations which might take place.

"Secondly, there is the European Free Trade Association. We have treaty and other obligations to our partners in this Association and my right hon. Friends have just returned from a meeting of the European Free Trade Association Ministerial Council, in Geneva, where all were agreed that they should work closely together throughout any negotiations. Finally, we are determined to continue to protect the standard of living of our agricultural community.

"During the past nine months, we have had useful and frank discussions with the European Economic Community Governments. We have now reached the stage where we cannot make further progress without entering into formal negotiations. I believe that the great majority in the House and in the country will feel that they cannot fairly judge whether it is possible for the United Kingdom to join the European Economic Community until there is a clearer picture before them of the conditions on which we could join and the extent to which these could meet our special needs.

"Article 237 of the Treaty of Rome envisages that the conditions of admission of a new member and the changes in the Treaty necessitated thereby should be the subject of an agreement. Negotiations must, therefore, be held in order to establish the conditions on which we might join. In order to enter into these negotiations it is necessary, under the Treaty, to make formal application to join the Community,

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although the ultimate decision whether to join or not must depend on the result of the negotiations.

"Therefore, after long and earnest consideration, Her Majesty's Government have come to the conclusion that it would be right for Britain to make a formal application under Article 237 of the Treaty for negotiations with a view to joining the Community if satisfactory arrangements can be made to meet the special needs of the United Kingdom, of the Commonwealth and of the European Free Trade Association.

"If, as I earnestly hope, our offer to enter into negotiations with the European Economic Community is accepted we shall spare no efforts to reach a satisfactory agreement. These negotiations must inevitably be of a detailed and technical character, covering a very large number of the most delicate and difficult matters. They may, therefore, be protracted and there can, of course, be no guarantee of success. When any negotiations are brought to a conclusion then it will be the duty of the Government to recommend to the House what course we should pursue.

"No agreement will be entered into until it has been approved by the House after full consultations with other Commonwealth countries by whatever procedure they may generally agree."⁽¹³⁾

In debate Macmillan expressed the problem of entry in essentially political terms but spoke against federalism and denied that delegation of sovereignty would be excessive. He said that he did not feel that Britain would be obliged to preserve the Ottawa Agreements and that, at home, the methods of ensuring the continued health of agriculture would have to be changed whether Britain were in Europe or not. ⁽¹⁴⁾

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(14) 645 H.C. Debates, Cols. 928-931

(15) ~~See Note E, p. 188~~

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While Maudling was unable to hide his preference for arrangements other than with Europe - "There is the whole of the rest of the world for us to make a living in if we want to do so and have to do so" - Heath was notably full of understanding and sympathy for the European standpoint. He explained why association with Europe, under Article 238 of the Rome Treaty, was not preferable to entry under Article 237: application to associate would indicate a desire to maximise benefits and minimise obligations and would not earn us the right to participate fully in decision-making.

Gaitskell declared that the Opposition could not possibly come to a decision before conditions of entry were known - there would be no vote against the Government. Wilson said that Labour would 'utterly reserve its position'. The Labour leaders betrayed a considerable fear of European federalism - of the Commission with its 'peculiar independent status', of the system of qualified majority voting - and the Labour amendment (below) to the government motion was specific in demanding general acceptability of negotiated conditions to a Commonwealth prime ministers' conference. There should be a commitment to the Commonwealth akin to the pledge given to E.F.T.A. (above, p. 80.) (~~below, p. 74~~). Labour regretted that the Government would be negotiating from a position of economic weakness.

(During the summer of 1961 the Labour party had awakened to the European issue and there was concern over possible party-splits. The Campaign for Democratic Socialism - whose 1960 manifesto had stated that its members were, "convinced Europeans, certain that Britain's destinies were inextricably bound up with those of a resurgent and united Europe" - stressed the need for party unity.)

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The Government's motion of 2nd August, 1961
reads:

"That this House supports the decision of Her Majesty's Government to make formal application under Article 237 of the Treaty of Rome in order to initiate negotiations to see if satisfactory arrangements can be made to meet the special interests of the United Kingdom, of the Commonwealth and of the European Free Trade Association; and further accepts the undertaking of Her Majesty's Government that no agreement affecting these special interests or involving British sovereignty will be entered into until it has been approved by this House after full consultation with other Commonwealth countries, by whatever procedure they may generally agree." (16)
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The Opposition put down the following
amendment:

"To strike everything after House and substitute 'notes the decision of Her Majesty's Government to make formal application under Article 237 of the Treaty of Rome in order to initiate negotiations to see if satisfactory arrangements can be made to meet the special interests of the United Kingdom, of the Commonwealth and of the E.F.T.A.; regrets that Her Majesty's Government will be conducting these negotiations from a position of grave weakness; and declares that Great Britain should enter the European Economic Community only if this House gives its approval and if the conditions negotiated are generally acceptable to a Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference and accord with our obligations and pledges to other members of the European Free Trade Association.'" (17)
5

The amendment was defeated in both Houses. In the Commons the majority of Labour members and twenty-five Conservatives abstained when the Government's motion was put. Four Labour members and one Conservative voted against the

(16) 645 H.C. Debates, Col. 1480
4

(17) 645 H.C. Debates, Col. 1494
5

Government - the Conservative, Anthony Pell, declared that Macmillan was a "national disaster". Roy Jenkins, who had resigned from the Opposition front bench in order to have greater freedom of expression, lent support to the Prime Minister and Jo Grimond greeted Macmillan's statement unreservedly. Sir Derek Walker-Smith was notable among the anti-marketeers and made an elegant speech of opposition.

The Government's motion was approved without a vote in the Lords. Lord Chandos (Oliver Lyttleton), opposed as he was to the 'tranquillisers' of such Europeans as Lord Gladwyn and aware of the stark cost of entry, declared nevertheless that Britain would be stronger, richer, and happier for joining Europe. (Cf. the Lords debate twelve months before: Lord Strang rehearsed the obstacles to entry but thought that there might be no alternative but to try.)

Generally, in both Houses, there were few strong speeches. The prevailing feeling appeared to be that the Government's initiative was correct given the lack of policy options. In debate the Commonwealth was a first concern, then sovereignty, with agriculture a poor third.

5. The Negotiations

5.1 The Cabinet

In July 1960 Macmillan made Cabinet changes involving what might be termed 'positive' and 'neutralizing' appointments. The Earl of Home became Foreign Secretary. At this time Home was more candid and a little bolder than Macmillan on entry to Europe but, through the coming negotiations, he was loyal rather than enthusiastic. Macmillan countered Gaitskell's criticism of the secretaryship being based in the Lords by declaring that the time a Foreign Secretary could devote to Parliament was, in any case, limited. (At one stage, Macmillan was to take major Common Market questions in the Commons.)

At this time Edward Heath, previously Government Chief Whip and thereafter Minister of Labour, was named Lord Privy Seal and given special responsibility for European affairs:

"It is an ancient office with few specific duties of its own. The Prime Minister can therefore give to the Lord Privy Seal responsibility for any problem of special importance. By my appointment, Mr. Macmillan has shown in the most positive and practical way that in his view the particular need today is for a Minister to deal with European questions.."(1)

Heath's base was, possibly, of more significance than his titular appointment:

"He was to be, as well, a Foreign Office Minister and Foreign Office spokesman in the House of Commons. The concentration of responsibility for European

(1) Heath before Council of Europe Assembly, 27th September, 1960

questions, political as well as economic, in the hands of one minister was important. Moreover, the fact that Mr. Heath was to be in the Foreign Office (rather than functioning in a kind of limbo outside the established departments as Mr. Maudling had done during the free trade area negotiations) was evidence that Britain's relationship with the Six had now become a key foreign policy question and was no longer looked at primarily as a commercial problem."(2)

(Reginald Maudling has commented: "It is true that Mr. Heath was a Foreign Office Minister and I was non-departmental, combining with my work on the Free Trade Area, the jobs of Parliamentary spokesman for the Ministry of Fuel and Power, assisting the Chancellor of Exchequer and deputising for Mr. Macmillan in the field of Atomic Energy. While there was this difference, I am not sure it handicapped me in any particular way."(3)

At the time of his appointment Heath may not have seen with full clarity the revolution in the Prime Minister's policy-making that was occurring. He has stated that he had not made up his mind about entry to E.E.C. until after he was in office and had had time to examine the dossier then being prepared by an inter-departmental committee under Sir Frank Lee (below, p.100).

Duncan Sandys, one of the most European-minded of Conservatives, secured Commonwealth Relations and Christopher Soames the Ministry of Agriculture. These were key departments: the

(2) Camps, M.: Britain and the European Community, p.314

(3) Letter, 16th April, 1960

attitudes of the Ministers would be crucial when the time came for a final decision on entry. However, while Macmillan made his dispositions with the intention of gaining a certain sympathy for a move towards Europe, he himself was not a 'European' (below pp. 173-180) and his new Cabinet was by no means so- apart from Sandys, the Cabinet held no convinced Europeans.

Macmillan put R.A.B. Butler in charge of the Cabinet's Common Market Negotiating Committee. This, if anything, could be labelled as an astute strategic move. This act of diplomacy at home may possibly have slowed down progress in Brussels but, domestically, it made sense. Butler, the Member for a solidly agricultural constituency during thirty-five years, was particularly sensitive to electoral opinion. The Butler Committee of ten or a dozen Ministers back-stopped the negotiations and, occupying the chair, Butler's lack of enthusiasm for Europe was to a degree neutralized.

Sir Frank Lee points to the appointment as a characteristically dexterous move on the part of the Prime Minister. If brought to realize that the majority of his colleagues were in favour of a European entry, Butler might move the same way: if he accepted the chair of the Cabinet Committee he would be conscientious. "His acceptance was a relief."

Sir Eric Roll declares that Butler was won round primarily by an early 1960 E.E.C. report on agriculture and then by a more detailed list of proposals which appeared in the spring of 1961. Both Macmillan and Butler were influenced by these publications, believing that British farmers could operate perfectly

well within the framework promised. Butler continued to "exhibit public scepticism" as before - witness his 29th October, 1960 Reading speech devoted to possible high food prices.

Macmillan never persuaded Lord Hailsham, Lord President and Minister for Science and the party's philosopher, to speak publicly for the European connection. Several attempts were made to harness Hailsham's oratorical talents without success but he was persuaded against publicly announcing his opposition - his chief concern was a loss of national sovereignty - and thus making himself available as a leader of his dissidents. From the 1962 'European' Conservative Conference he excused himself - his wife was expecting a baby.

Reginald Maudling offered the sharpest criticism in public debate, although his attitude towards Europe never hardened into militant opposition.(4) He accepted the idea of a move from the Board of Trade, in October, 1961, to the Colonial Office where his preference for 'bridge-building' and his scepticism of the economic capacity of the Six would not be of such import.

Two further appointments need mention. In July 1962 Peter Smithers was made Parliamentary Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office - a 'European' appointment providing additional help for Heath. More interesting, William Deedes was made Minister without Portfolio in charge of government information services. Based in the Lord Privy Seal's Office, he actually exercised multiple functions. Occasionally he sat on the

(4) See above, p.90 and below, p.118

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Cabinet committee. He established a small - "relatively unimportant" - parliamentary committee with half-a-dozen colleagues, its aim to tap party thinking. His chief task, as a professional journalist, was the public information campaign. With the help of a small team recruited from the Foreign Office, the Treasury, and other department, he devised a good deal of "objective literature" which achieved considerable circulation. (This machinery, based in the Treasury Information Division, was used after January 1963 for other purposes - for example, in connection with industrial training.)(5)

There appears to have been no historic Cabinet meeting at which the decision to open negotiations with E.E.C. was solemnly and formally taken: ministers discovered the Prime Minister's intentions gradually, at different times. Macmillan's preparation of opinion in the Cabinet, the 1922 Committee, and in the party generally was executed with skill. With the announcement of the decision to embark upon negotiations(6) no resignations occurred - the time of the announcement, as the House rose for the summer recess, gave no encouragement to conspiracy.

(5) Following a complaint related to the need for more information on Europe from the National Council of Women, representing forty organisations and two million women, a Women's Advisory Council was established to work alongside the Treasury Committee. Here questions relating to Britain and the E.E.C. were discussed. The committee was retained by the Labour Government: to be known as the Women's National Commission it functioned under the Minister for Health and Social Security.

(6) The decision was to negotiate not, at this stage, to join Europe. (See above, p. 89)

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As far as the cohesion of the Cabinet during negotiations is to be considered, the major government reconstruction of July 1962 must be mentioned. The occasion of the reconstruction arose from the stagnation of domestic policies and public impatience with official complacency. By his reshuffle, Macmillan acknowledged the feebleness of Selwyn Lloyd at the Treasury and an accumulation of 'dead wood' in the Cabinet. The machinery of economic management was, with the National Incomes Commission and National Economic Development Council, to be refashioned: young cabinet members were needed to fight an election, and, in the case of defeat, to fight in opposition.

The government reshuffle, it is held, was forced upon the Prime Minister. Martin Redmayne, The Chief Whip, was most active in demanding government changes: Macleod and Butler were also involved - Macmillan is said to have feared a plot when a leak about 'impending changes' appeared in the Daily Mail (7). (Butler enhanced his position by becoming 'First Secretary of State'.)

Macmillan's action in rebuilding his cabinet has been held to indicate a loss of nerve and a cynical concern for the retention of personal power - the party was left bewildered and the spell of loyalty broken (Anthony Sampson). The successful Conservative Conference of 1962 (below, p. 140) contradicts this view. What does seem to be true is that, during the latter half of 1962, the Prime Minister was less physically

(7) For discussion of the role of the press in this matter see: Seymour-Ure, C.: The Press, Politics and the Public, 1968, pp.289-300.

strong, less able to listen, and was showing his age(8). The Cabinet enjoyed a certain accretion of European strength: Duncan Sandys took on responsibility for the Colonial Office as well as Commonwealth Relations and the William Deedes and Peter Smithers appointments (above) were made.

As far as the final decision on entry is concerned, Duncan Sandys has affirmed that, given reasonable conditions, Macmillan would have had unquestioning support from the Cabinet - "One could not negotiate for eighteen months and then have resignations because negotiations had succeeded". Sir Michael Fraser, Director of the Conservative Research Department and Secretary of the Committee on Policy during our period, who attended many meetings along with ministers, could "distinguish no great differences of opinion between ministers". Reginald Maudling writes: "I have no doubt whatever that if the French had been prepared to reach agreement with us, the Cabinet would have enthusiastically endorsed such an agreement."

Clearly the above begs a question - what conditions were 'reasonable'? It costs nothing to express ex post facto confidence in cabinet cohesion but undoubtedly, in the persons of Butler, Hailsham and Maudling, there existed much reserve opposition to entry.

(8) "Supermac's" image became tarnished. In November 1962 the corrosive T.W.3 broadcasts began. In January 1963 the Gallup poll of voting intention revealed the following percentages: Conservatives 28½; Labour 40; Liberal 12½. (Butler, D. and Freeman, J.: British Political Facts, 3rd ed.1969, p.162)

5.2
 (ii) Whitehall and the Brussels Team. As far as Whitehall is concerned one can distinguish two major phases of activity - the preparation of departmental reviews and the submission of an interdepartmental report to the Cabinet; and, later, the support of the Brussels negotiating team after work had begun in earnest.

Early in 1960 an interdepartmental committee of senior civil servants was established, with Sir Frank Lee in the chair - on 1st January he had moved from the Board of Trade to the Treasury as Joint Permanent Secretary. The committee's aim was to examine courses of action open to the Government, including that of a possible attempt to find a full accommodation with the Six. Short- and long-term implications of various courses of action were considered in the light of probable developments in Europe, in the Commonwealth, and in relations with the United States. The departmental reviews were completed in late May and early June, 1960.

The committee concluded that Britain should seek entry to Europe. Britain's long-term interests lay in giving a higher priority than previously to its European relationship and the joining of E.E.C. might be the only way of achieving the desirable relationship - joining, as against associating, might be the only available option. The reasons for the committee's conclusions were primarily, although not exclusively, political - the political case for entry was deemed to be stronger than the economic case. Joining Europe was technically feasible providing certain modifications in the Community's arrangements could be negotiated.

The Common Market Negotiating Committee

(Official)(1) survived after the July 1961 announcement to advise Ministers on the instructions to be sent from time to time to the delegation in Brussels. (A lower level inter-departmental committee worked at great pressure on detail.) The Brussels negotiators were to return to London constantly but two teams existed, although the Brussels team never grew to be so large that it represented a rival system to London.(2)

Sir Frank Lee has said that he does not think of the period 1960-1963 in terms of stages of work. After the submission of the interdepartmental report in the summer of 1960 the files were put away for a while but, once negotiations had started in Brussels the London end was busy at all times, with major periods of activity when Edward Heath returned to make a speech or to prepare a new phase of talk. The European Organizations Department of the Foreign Office acted as the principal briefing division and the negotiators found no mechanical deficiencies in the backing they received.

+ By the time that the Brussels negotiations began the British Ambassador to the E.E.C. had moved from Luxembourg, leaving a Counsellor to represent Britain at Euratom and the Coal and Steel Community, and, with a small staff of half-a-dozen people he now maintained an existence in Brussels separate from that of the

(1) Sir Frank Lee headed the Whitehall inter-departmental committee (see above, p. 50) from the Treasury. Sir Denis Rickett, a Second Secretary, was a second Treasury representative on the committee while the Foreign Office was represented by Sir Roderick Barclay and Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh, both Deputy Under-Secretaries.

(2) Sir Herbert Andrew, interview

Embassy to Belgium.

The Negotiating team of 'Flying Knights' was formed in September 1961:

- Official Head:** Sir Pierson Dixon
Ambassador in Paris
- Deputy Head:** Sir Eric Roll,*
Deputy Secretary,
Detached duty from Min.
Agriculture
- Foreign Office:** Sir Roderick Barclay
Deputy Under-Secretary
- Treasury:** Raymond Bell,
Under Secretary
- Commonwealth
Relations Office:** Sir Henry Lintott,
Deputy Under-Secretary

then, from mid-1962

Godfrey Shannon,
Assistant Under-Secretary
- Colonial Office:** Sir William Gorell-Barnes,*
Deputy Under-secretary
- Board of Trade:** Herbert Andrew*
Second Secretary
- Agriculture:** Arthur Propper,
Assistant Under-secretary
Detached duty

then, 1962

Frederick Bishop,
Deputy Secretary.

* Interviewed

During the initial phase of talks this group worked between London, Paris and Brussels and it was January 1962 before it finally settled in the Belgian capital. This team, too, retained an existence separate from the British Embassy, but after a period spent in the Metropole Hotel, occupied a suite of offices in a building also used by the Ambassador to E.E.C. This latter attended subsequent meetings with the Six, and the two British groups co-operated closely, taking into account the difference of their functions - the one group being concerned with terms of entry to Community, the other with questions relating to E.E.C. as a going concern.

The remarkably small team of 'Flying Knights' was headed on the official side, by Sir Pierson Dixon, British Ambassador to Paris. Sir Eric Roll, still on the Ministry of Agriculture books after a period away with the International Sugar Corporation, was deputy. Sir Roderick Barclay, appearing in the Foreign Office list for 1962 as 'Adviser on European Trade Questions', was the number three permanent official at Brussels: he, with the rank of Ambassador-at-Large, had conducted the bilateral talks with the French, the Germans and the Italians.

The staff supporting the negotiating team was quite compact. A Head of Chancery, Henry Hainsworth, with rank of Counsellor, was responsible for administration. Two First Secretaries, John Robinson and Christopher Audland, together having considerable experience of European questions, made most of the official contacts and

did much of the drafting of agreements during negotiations. Separate sources have volunteered the information that these two men were much overworked, performing as they did much more than was commensurate with their rank or station. A Third Secretary, Rosemary Morre from the Board of Trade, was added subsequently during the negotiations.

Donald Maitland handled Foreign Office press relations in Whitehall. Unlike Maitland, Clifford Jupp, a First Secretary in the Foreign Office, in Brussels as Press Officer, devoted the whole of his time to the E.E.C. negotiations. He attended all meetings with the Six, saw all briefs, and had knowledge of all decisions, verbal as well as written, agreed by the negotiating parties. The British made a special effort with the distribution of information, and Jupp's conduct of relations with the Press has been praised. His daily routine was to meet British correspondents as soon as possible after official meetings and, on free days, to fly back to London to talk to diplomatic correspondents - 'the Circus' - at the Foreign Office.

The principal negotiators travelled back to London during our period and sat with their Whitehall colleagues, under the chairmanship still of Sir Frank Lee. In Brussels there was little attendance by home departmental staffs although some help was drawn from London from time to time. Since the negotiators were in contact with Whitehall so often and since the length of negotiations was not foreseen, the team were not detached from home duty and, originally, no replacements were made in the departments.

In the home departments there occurred no specific or relevant change of structure to

accommodate the Brussels negotiations. Departments made different arrangements because departmental work varied in depth and intensity; but in my search for details of operations no important departmental reorganization or investment of staff revealed themselves. The Ministry of Agriculture came nearest to having a special force working full-time on the question of entry. At the Foreign Office there occurred little change and few new appointments were made. At the Board of Trade no extra staff were appointed and no change in departmental organization made.

5.3 The Timetable and Effectiveness of Negotiation

Negotiations between Britain and the Six took place on the seventh floor of the Belgian Foreign Ministry, and the final ministerial meeting of 29th January, 1963 was the seventeenth of the series. In the two months between Macmillan's announcement in the Commons and the first ministerial meeting in Paris in October 1961, British officials worked out the details of the arrangements they would seek to negotiate.

In the summer of 1961 the British Government had the following timetable in mind: the Prime Minister would make his statement before the House rose; serious negotiations would take place during the autumn and winter and would conclude in the spring of 1962; ratification of Britain's entry would occur during the autumn, with formal entry on the 1st January 1963 (1). Herbert Andrew, of the Board of Trade, comments that these dates, at least during the preparatory stages, may have been plausible. Gorell Barnes, Colonial Office, finds them optimistic. (But see above, p. on the non-replacement of staff in home departments.) Certainly Heath, during his first statement on 10th October 1961 indicated that the British Government thought that no formal amendments to the text of the Treaty of Rome would be necessary - simply certain adaptations consequent on the admission of a new member.

At the ministerial discussions of November 1961 it became clear that negotiations could not

(1) Camps, M.: op.cit., p.341

get under way until early 1962. There were several reasons for this. The first claim on E.E.C. Ministers' time was the Common Agricultural Policy and the move to the second market transition stage in January 1962. Second, the Six needed to address the United Kingdom from an agreed position. Third, the Six had to renew their own convention on association (above, pp. 51-52).

In fact, the six month period to April 1962 was one of exploration which included extensive surveys, and classification of trade into manageable components for negotiation. No real negotiations took place.

The second stage of negotiations between April, and August 1962 represented something of a breakthrough. After the slow start to the year, (even though, compared with earlier Free Trade Area talks, negotiations were given overriding priority) attempts were made to speed proceedings. After the activity of May and June the British Government hoped to keep to a timetable that was only six months behind the first. Negotiations might finish by the end of 1962, with ratification in the spring of 1963 and entry on the 1st July 1963. In June and July there were several long ministerial sessions and, by August, the period of all-night sittings began.

A breakthrough may have occurred but six weeks saved in the summer of 1962 might have made the difference between success and failure. M. Bernard Clappier, one of the French negotiating team, believed that if the concessions made near to the August 1962 break had come a few weeks earlier then success would have been achieved. Perhaps the key error lay here. In June 1962 it was reported that de Gaulle was

"resigned to British entry" (see below, p. 151):
by autumn the odds were lengthening.

"I am cautious," says Herbert Andfew, "but I would have gone more quickly." Duncan Sandys now expresses the opinion that, during autumn 1962, the negotiations had lost momentum from being bogged down in detail and should have been lifted to prime ministerial level - this might have saved the day.

The third stage of negotiations, the 'agricultural marathon', moved very slowly and, of course, ended in failure. Heath met the Six in several extended sessions and, in the latter days, officials were conferring uninterruptedly.

+ After the breakdown Pierson Dixon reconsidered the idea of an acceptance of the Treaty, in July 1962, when a less confident de Gaulle might not have refused us. Sir Frank Lee remembers that Jean Monnet advised us to join E.E.C. first and to negotiate afterwards. But we could not have worked with British and Commonwealth farmers on any basis other than the one we in fact adopted. (But note: having complained during the negotiations of 'neo-colonialism', six months after the breakdown Nigeria and East Africa were demanding association with E.E.C.)

Both sides hesitated to be the first to offer compromises:

"The Six felt, not unreasonably, that it was up to the British - as the applicant for admission - to put forward specific proposals. Moreover, it was easier (although still difficult) for the Six to respond with a common voice to proposals made by the British than it

was for the Six to reach agreement among themselves on compromises to put forward."(2)

The British difficulty was that it was easier, in particular, to persuade the Commonwealth of the acceptability of an offer put to her by the Six than one which she herself had formulated.

Britain had to demonstrate intellectual and emotional commitment to Europe at the same time as she bargained for terms. No tactical approach to the Brussels negotiations could be simple. Whatever tactic she employed could be counterproductive - too much enthusiasm for Europe, stiff terms of entry; too little enthusiasm, no terms at all. Resentment could easily be created in either Commonwealth or Community. At the first meeting, Britain refused to submit an initial comprehensive statement and reserved her position (3) (4).

(2) Camps, M.: op.cit., p.389

(3) "The discovery of vehement wishes generally frustrates their attainment; and your adversary has gained a great advantage over you when he finds you impatient to conclude a treaty. There is in reserve, not only something of dignity, but a great deal of prudence too. A sort of courage belongs to negotiation, as well as to operations of the field. A negotiator must often seem willing to hazard the whole issue of his treaty, if he wishes to secure any one material point."
(Edmund Burke, Letters on a Regicide Peace, 1796)

(4) In view of what was said (above, p.104) in praise of the facilities afforded to the Press in Brussels it is interesting to note that the British Government sought to maintain the privacy of the first ministerial meeting, which was held in closed session. The Heath speech, translated copies of which were made available to E.E.C. members at the meeting, was published only in summary. Details were

(contd.)

Geoffrey McDermot, in commenting on Heath and his negotiating team, refers to their uninspired, uninspiring and mishandled round of talks(5). One may question the competence of the British team without echoing the views of a Foreign Office man who had been retired early. The British tried to secure too much initially and held on for too long to a position they knew they would ultimately have to abandon:

"The negotiations contained a number of curiosities. In the early stages the United Kingdom spent a good deal of time defending parts of its existing agricultural policy, unrestricted entry of most foodstuffs, guaranteed prices and deficiency payments, and low retail food prices, which might well have been modified even without E.E.C. membership. Nor did the negotiations always seem clear about the difference of interest between United Kingdom and Commonwealth farmers. A concession favourable to one was often adverse to the other. Again, it turned out to be important to define more clearly than did the negotiators the reason why special privileges or concessions were being asked for. Why should Commonwealth countries have access arrangements to the enlarged E.E.C. market for a longer period than was guaranteed to them by their existing agreements with the United Kingdom? Why do tomato growers in the United Kingdom require greater protection than those in the Netherlands? (6)

(4) leaked in The Times on 24th and 25th Contd. November and the Government decided to publish full details in a White Paper. (The United Kingdom and the European Economic Community, Cmd. 1565, November, 1961.) This satisfied Conservative and Labour complainants at home and Commonwealth, particularly Canadian complainants abroad.

(5) The Eden Legacy, 1969, p.181
 (6) Butterwick, M. and Rolfe, M.N.: op. cit., p.81

We were, excessively careful in our negotiating approach. For example, the January 1962 agreement on agriculture concluded by Six themselves (above, p. 66) was drafted in deliberately vague terms. The Five felt that they could argue the matter later - as importing countries they would manage to get their way with France. In July 1962, harassed by parliamentary questions at home, Heath forced discussion on agriculture, then tried unsuccessfully, to shut the Pandora's Box of difficulties:

"Although there was still a chance that British proposals for agriculture would be forthcoming which would have due regard for the criticism or misgivings expressed by the Six, an overall view was still lacking because the Community had reached no decision on certain important products (dairy produce, beef, sugar and rice).

~~"The Six themselves were still not agreed on the interpretation of the financial regulation, which can be looked upon as a very important element in the system of agriculture.~~

"Similarly with regard to the financial regulation (7), the negotiations with

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- (7) Two important provisions of the 14th January 1962 agricultural agreement concerned 'price policy' and the 'financial regulation'. A common 'price policy' was agreed: in each country of the Community there was to be a 'target price' for grain - these would be gradually brought into line until, by 1st January 1970, there would be but one 'target price' for all. However, one vital decision was not taken - the actual level of this 'target price'. The other main provision was 'financial regulation' which concerned itself with the impact of external food prices. The price of imported grain would be maintained at an artificially high 'threshold' (see Note, p. 178)

Great Britain and particularly the views expressed at the outset on the British side had re-opened among the Six themselves difficulties of interpretation which they had not yet succeeded in overcoming when the negotiations were suspended." (8)

Butterwick and Rolfe thus conclude that:

"The main lessons then to be drawn concern the need to define objectives after careful preparatory study, to work with despatch ignoring trivia, and to bring negotiations to a conclusion as soon as possible, very probably making use of the package-making skills of the Commission. In this connection the constant reporting-back to parliament, such as occurred in 1961-63 is no help to a United Kingdom negotiator, and might have been curtailed except for the Macmillan government's need to take the Conservative Party, including its landed interest, along with it. Finally it may be necessary to take a long view of certain matters, which, though troublesome in the short run, might be modified through United Kingdom influence after membership has been obtained." (9)

It has been remarked that Heath at Brussels was "the master of his brief". However, he evidently had a grave fault - he was "too avid for detail". A participant in the Brussels negotiations has stated that, keen not to let the negotiations slip from his hands, Heath was even more aware of detail than his officials. (Eventually, no time remained - "De Gaulle swept the pieces from the board".) (And see below, p.¹⁵²)

(8) Report to the European Parliament on the state of the negotiations with the United Kingdom, E.E.C. Commission, pp.110-111 February, 1963.

(9) op.cit., p.81

Sir Pierson Dixon, official head of the British delegation was a man of considerable diplomatic experience and ability. He was hampered, however, by the retention of his post as Ambassador in Paris during negotiations. Further, not an economist, he betrayed some inability "to get down to details".

Sir Eric Roll, deputy head of the delegation was, by contract, an academic economist as well as a civil servant by background. He was trilingual and had intimate contacts in Europe - immediately before the negotiations he holidayed with M. Marjolin, a French member of the Commission. Perhaps Roll was too European, too good for British purposes. "He was very volatile and did not behave like an Englishman. He was slightly suspect in Brussels."

+ The arena in which Britain negotiated was not ideally suited for the speedy execution of business.

The Six, in their preparations for negotiation, found difficulties. The Treaty of Rome said nothing about methods of negotiation with potential new members. None of the Six would have been willing to entrust negotiations to the Commission, but France went furthest in arguing at one time that Commission members should not

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be present during talks (10). Eventually Britain found herself negotiating, not with the Council of Ministers, but with ministers representative of their governments, assisted by the Commission (11).

Had the Commission had greater responsibility, a realistic agreement might have been reached more quickly, but this matter was not in British hands.

From time to time during the negotiations some ad hoc sub-committees - e.g. on Jute - had been established, but there were never any standing sub-committees with independent existence. The Six had to stand together and the elaboration of agreed proposals slowed proceedings. (A ministerial committee under Sicco Mansholt, the Dutch member of the Commission responsible for agricultural questions, established at a late date failed to avert the eventual breakdown.)

Sir Eric Roll remarks that the E.E.C. members had to move more or less in unison - in negotiation they were reasonably compact and cohesive, but not monolithic.

The Dutch had reason to be grateful to de Gaulle for the sympathy he showed in 1962 towards Holland's last stand in New Guinea. The Dutch were, however, very friendly towards Britain - perhaps excessively so. During negotiations, noted Gorell Barnes, they were our greatest friends but our worse counsellors.

(10) France had also vetoed the suggestion that Henri Spaak should play a key role in the negotiations - as he had done at the time of the setting up of the E.E.C. - because he was too friendly towards Britain.

(11) E.E.C. Commission Report to the European Parliament, February 1963, p.12

More useful than our militant Dutch friends were the Italians. S. Colombo, the Italian Minister of Foreign Trade was particularly skilled in "carrying the French along". S. Polchi, chairman of an ad hoc committee on primary products during negotiations, was very helpful to Gorell Barnes - the two held similar portfolios.

The Germans did not favour Britain's cause quite as much as they pretended and were inclined to "hide behind the skirts of the French". At the final meeting in January 1963, when the highly emotional break-up was in progress and Couve de Murville was isolated, Dr. Schroeder was noticeably restrained. After all, he had spent most of the previous week in Paris, where the Franco-German Treaty was being signed.

At the final session Henri Spaak, Belgian Foreign Minister, had his Prime Minister Monsieur Lefevre by his side. It was felt in Brussels that the attendance of Lefevre, of whom little had been heard during negotiations, was meant to counter reports that certain right-wing Catholic and business elements in the Belgian Cabinet were not too unhappy about Britain's exclusion from the Market.

Britain had five votes in her favour at Brussels for anything that was reasonable, six votes against for anything unreasonable(12). This comment is perhaps unfair to the French, at least to those French who worked in Brussels. French officials afforded much help to the British, and Gorell Barnes acknowledges assistance from French political representatives also. Couve de Murville had suggested a standstill agreement whereby Britain could come into E.E.C.

(12) Clifford Jupp, above p. 104

without at first imposing tariffs against E.P.T.A. members. The French also shifted from their insistence that Britain should abandon her deficiency payments system the day she entered the Market, allowing that they should continue during the life of the existing Parliament.

+ If, technically, we negotiated with six separate governments, nevertheless, our initiative served to spur E.E.C. unification, to contribute to a 'setting of the bones' of the Community. The Six feared that time spent talking with Britain might slow down development and this, in some ways, reinforced our difficulties. Suggestions relating to 'association' had been discarded (13): there could now be no 'half-way answer' to the entry question. The problem was not to create a new system with some characteristics of the British and some of the Community systems. The real question was how Britain could effect a transition to community-membership.

However, efforts by the Six to further political union failed during our period. Negotiations to implement the Bonn Declaration took place in the autumn of 1961 and in early 1962, largely on the basis of two French draft projects known as Fouchet I and Fouchet II:

"But the first draft submitted by M. Fouchet .. hardly went very far, and the second draft (refurbished in 1962, it is said, by President de Gaulle personally) retreated even further, and also roused suspicions that the new political union would, by subordinating the existing

(13) Conte Report, above p. ⁸¹16; Vos Report, above, p. ⁸¹78; Mueller-Armack Plan, above, p. ⁶⁵61 and p. ⁶⁹65.

Communities to inter-governmental institutions, deprive them of their supranational character. In the end the Committee could do little more than set out the two texts synoptically and write a commentary on the differences between them."(14)

The failure of the Fouchet talks in April 1962 stemmed from a fundamental divergence of opinion over the form of political union and over questions relating to the defence and security of the Six in the context of existing N.A.T.O. commitments. De Gaulle's offer of a 'Europe of States' was made again at a press conference on 15th May 1962.

(Bilateral contacts between France and Germany were more fruitful. Plans for regular ministerial meetings and the co-ordination of policies were embodied in the Franco-German Treaty of Co-operation signed 22nd January 1963. Thus the 'Europe' of dialogue between the Commission and the Council of Ministers, if not replaced, was supplemented by institutionalized inter-governmental action.)

Geoffrey McDermot refers to the "condescending attitude of Heath and his fellow-negotiators". (15) One does capture a hint of patronage in this quotation from Pierson Dixon's collection of his father's diaries:

"My sense of the atmosphere is that they are rather resentful of our re-writing of their sacred writings, and perhaps a little bewildered by the English. So wrote Dixon to Eric Roll at the beginning of this last meeting. But they are

(14) Kitzinger, U.: The European Common Market and Community, 1967, p.24. And see 'Explanatory Report on Draft Treaty', op.cit., p.108

(15) Op. cit., p.201

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chattering with interest; not, I judge,
with hostility." (16)

If condescension was exhibited by the British so was ambivalence. It is possible to argue that Britain exhibited a desire, through entry into E.E.C., to dilute the force of European growth. In May 1961 in the Commons Edward Heath emphasized the commercial nature of the E.E.C.'s Commission's decisions: in the following month Joseph Godber, Minister of State at the Foreign Office, declared that, if we entered Europe, we would have the power of veto over federal extensions. In March 1962 Henry Brooke, Paymaster General, said that if the United Kingdom entered Europe, then it would be "different in character from the community as it exists at present".

Where British efforts were not destructive, they sometimes appeared diversionary. In April 1962 Heath, before Western European Union, declared that he looked forward to joining in the construction of a political as well as an economic community. A new power, Europe would not stand alone but as an equal partner in an Atlantic Alliance, retaining the traditional ties overseas and fully conscious of its growing obligations towards the rest of the world. To "play it on commercial grounds" (Sir Frank Pearson, Assistant Whip) was bad enough: to support Europe as a buttress for Atlanticism could hardly endear us to the French.

Just before the ministerial meeting of 10th and 11th November 1962 both Reginald Maudling (Chancellor) and Frederick Erroll (Board of Trade) at home declared that they hoped negotiations would end in success but did

not regard a possible failure as a disaster. These statements may have been intended to strengthen the position of the Brussels team, or they may have been insurances against failure - or both. During a Liverpool speech on 21st January, 1963, Macmillan reiterated that the British Government accepted the Treaty of Rome and aligned itself with the political as well as the economic implications contained therein. During a broadcast on 30th January, after the final breakdown, he affirmed that, as far as Britain had been concerned the 'challenge had been accepted'.

5.4 The Principals and Their 'Clients'

Compared with the discussion on the free trade area, the E.E.C. negotiations were difficult. Sir Eric Roll notes that, in 1957 and 1958, we were still dealing with each of the community states on a basis of reasonable equality. At Brussels it was Britain versus the Six. One trouble was that Whitehall was still under the influence of the free trade area talks. This represented a difference between Whitehall and the team - some people in London thought in terms of playing off the Six against each other. "In Brussels we realized the reality of the situation, Whitehall had not got the free trade area out of its system."

Sir Eric Roll says that the techniques used and mechanical characteristics employed in the Brussels negotiation were similar to those used and employed during the whole complex post-war era - when Marshall Aid and the founding of O.E.E.C., the establishing of N.A.T.O., and bargaining over the Dillon Round were at issue. A lot of people had been apprenticed.

But, compared with the free trade discussions, Brussels was a full-scale, major effort - more closely knit, complex and comprehensive. Sir Frank Lee says that Whitehall was very conscious in 1960 that a major effort had to be made in the entry negotiations. Interdepartmentally, this was a major diplomatic initiative involving more deliberation, more regular meetings. Seeing negotiations from the Conservative Research Department, Sir Michael Fraser says that the attempt to enter Europe in the early 'Sixties represented more than an interdepartmental effort - it was a project.

Technically, says Herbert Andrew, the entry negotiations represented a very successful British operation, a "well-played match". He, and other civil servants, claim that no inter-departmental brawls or wrangles occurred - "it was simply a question of optimization." (1) It must be recognized, however, that the departments did have distinct interests and one must seek to divine substantive and procedural differences in the way they conducted themselves. The remainder of this chapter relates to the personal and departmental contributions made to the Brussels negotiations.

Reference must also be made to the environment within which each department worked, to the 'clients' with whom each had relations.

+ The Treasury representative at Brussels, Raymond Bell, was in some ways a 'non-negotiator'. Independent sources confirm that he was highly regarded in the team: when items of interest to the Treasury arose - capital movements, for example - Bell was helpful and willing to settle. But the Treasury role was a small one. The Six had not yet reached the

(1) But note: the Treasury secured the press relations 'boss-job' at Brussels but Heath insisted that the Foreign Office should do the actual work and that the Commonwealth Relations Office should be represented. Clifford Jupp of the Foreign Office was thus based in Brussels (above, p. 104) but a senior Commonwealth Relations official came out from London to attend important ministerial meetings. Lacking continuous contact with the negotiators, his knowledge was not altogether adequate. The negotiations were not, of course, affected and in press relations as a whole the Foreign Office was left "nicely free".

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stage of discussion of advanced monetary issues, and for the Treasury, "everything had to be played for, once we were a member of the Community."

Sir Frank Lee says that there is no organized 'City' and thus no 'City channel', but contacts with the Government were close. There was no shortage of City-Government relationships says Sir Eric Roll. It has been estimated that the City, in the early 'Sixties, earned Britain about £185 millions per annum - without much of an import bill (2). The City, including the Bank of England, had hesitations over Europe - arising from a concern for Sterling, and for the close financial links maintained with the United States. But, as Sir Frank Lee noted, there would be great scope for City knowledge and skills with Britain in the E.E.C.

Sir Eric Roll says that the City, in the early stages of consideration of entry, was not particularly vocal. City opinion was ambivalent: Rolls's impression was that the most articulate were those in favour of entry. Michael Fisher, of the Financial Times is not aware of any important contacts between the Government and the merchant banks, insurance companies or pension funds during the negotiation period.

A flow of opinion between the Bank and the rest of the City began only after the Government had taken its decision to negotiate. During the free trade area talks the Bank had taken on

(2) Clarke, W.M.: The City in the World Economy, 1965

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an educational role(3). On Bank-City communications in 1961-63 as opposed to those of 1957-58, a Bank official writes:

"Here there was a real, though not very important difference in that, by 1961-1963, the idea of entry to Europe was familiar and there was no need to introduce the City to it or recommend that they should be taking it seriously and thinking about its effect on themselves. The Bank, therefore, did not revive the meetings held in the earlier period."(4)

The Bank had a representative on the Common Market Negotiating Committee (Official) - and two on the lower committee - but:

".. as there was very little on the monetary side in the Treaty which set up the E.E.C. itself, the main part of the work and the discussion fell to Whitehall departments, not to us. At various times we produced papers [on] possible monetary effects and, later, on rather far-reaching monetary arrangements which might ultimately be envisaged if we became full members. But in the stages of actual negotiation, monetary matters played rather little part."(5)

(3) "The Bank let it be known to a few 'opinion formers' in the City such as the heads of leading Merchants Banks and Clearing Banks that we would be glad to meet them and tell them what we properly could about the general shape of the project and to explore with them the consequences it might have in the City. I remember that two or three meetings were held in the Bank at which I did what I could to say how things were going and to suggest how they might affect the City. I was asked to lunch at various banks to discuss the thing further or answer questions in their minds." (Letter, L.P. Thompson-McCausland.)

(4) L.P. Thompson-McCausland, letter.

(5) Op.cit.

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This confirms what is reported (below, p. 159) about neglect of the balance-of-payments factor during discussions on agriculture.

In June 1962 Grimond spoke of the benefits of monetary integration in Europe and of the benefits of entry for Britain in connection with the solution of economic problems of the sterling area. Somebody was looking ahead.

+ The Board of Trade was committed to succeed in Brussels. The department was always in favour of entry to E.E.C., comments Gorell Barnes (Colonial Office). Herbert Andrew stood out in the negotiations - he knew what to give in advance, what concessions to make during bargaining, and what to hang on to.

The Federation of British Industries, through the Council of European Industrial Federations and through its own offices abroad, had independent sources of information which, when it wished, it could share with the Government. Industry had good informal contacts with the Board of Trade and during our period, a Board of Trade-Federation of British Industries standing liaison committee operated. Its chairman, Sir William Palmer, a representative of the Rayon Products Association, was a former Board of Trade man.

Herbert Andrew states that his impression was that industrial support for E.E.C. entry was quite strong. (Industry was already bridge-building. In March 1961 it was reported that I.C.I. were to begin large-scale manufacturing operations in Europe with an investment programme which would absorb £100 millions in ten years.)

Andrew says that his chief links were with Commonwealth industrialists but that it would be wrong to say that the British Commonwealth Industries Association were "on his back". British industry had taken its decision on the common external tariff and knew what its broad effect would be. (There was some fear of the continued free entry of Commonwealth manufactures into Britain. See above, p. 53) Some problems came to Andrew while he was in Brussels - Canadian aluminium, Australian lead and zinc, and Norwegian bauxite were discussed - but not many.

On the trade union side of industry, Heath made the contacts. In December 1961 the General Council of the T.U.C. met the Lord Privy Seal and he suggested that they hold monthly meetings, to be held after each round of ministerial talks in Brussels. The T.U.C. had meetings also with E.E.C. and E.F.T.A. national trade unionists. The T.U.C. in meetings with the E.E.C. unions in April 1962, found agreement on the need for a full-employment provision to be inserted in the Rome Treaty, but not on the issue of mobility of labour. Frank Cousins, speaking before the Scottish T.U.C. in Aberdeen on 20th April 1962 declared that the Labour Party should not leave initiative in the hands of the Conservatives but should prepare itself to fight a general election - he referred, obviously, to Ian Macleod's declaration of 12th April 1962(6). Motions of all possible shades - for, against, conditional - succeeded at the various trade union conferences during the spring and summer of 1962. The 1962 Trade Union Congress saw the General Council's 'wait-and-see' motion carried - the T.U.C. was reserved, if slightly warmer towards Europe than was the Labour Party.

(6) See below, p. 141.

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+ Sir William Gorell Barnes(7), who had worked with Monnet during the war, was left very much in charge as Colonial Office representative in Brussels. Reginald Maudling, his Minister (Duncan Sandys took over as joint Commonwealth Relations - Colonial Office Minister on 13th July 1962, four years ahead of the actual merger of the department), had seventeen rounds of independence negotiations proceeding at the time. Gorell Barnes did not feel that he was in the thick of the Brussels negotiations. Although he spent more and more time in Brussels and became more and more 'engaged', he did not feel that his lot was as difficult as that of some of his colleagues. A mixture of Herbert Andrew and Raymond Bell, according to one description, Barnes mirrored Treasury detachment with a Board of Trade realism as to what was possible from negotiation.

After the resumption of negotiations in Brussels in the autumn of 1962 tough bargaining secured from the Six some concessions on the association of ex-dependent territories. Despite regular briefings of their representatives in London, Britain was embarrassed by the refusal of Ghana and Nigeria to accept privileges similar to those enjoyed by French ex-colonies. The Colonial Office may not have prepared these new nations adequately: perhaps antipathy to 'neo-colonialism' would have rendered such preparation impossible. (Some African states changed their minds about association with E.E.C. only months after breakdown.)

In a September 1962 publication the Fabian Commonwealth Bureau declared that E.E.C. concessions should not be undervalued:

(7) Author of Europe and the Developing World association under Part IV of the Treaty of Rome. P.E.F., 1967

"They represent an acceptance of long-term international responsibilities which had been woefully muted before the start of Britain's negotiations."

The Labour Common Market Committee, too, welcomed the offer of association made to African countries.

+ Sir Henry Lintott, another close friend of M. Marjolin (he had been his deputy as Secretary-General at O.E.E.C.), represented Commonwealth Relations. He was more successful in negotiation than his replacement, Godfrey Shannon, who came to Brussels after Lintott fell ill in the middle of 1962. Shannon was not as high-ranking as Lintott - Assistant Under-Secretary as against Deputy Under-Secretary - and "did not carry the weight". Both were, of course, senior civil servants but neither, apparently, strong personalities. They were supported by a strong Minister, Duncan Sandys, but had to cope with resentment in the Commonwealth and indecision in the Cabinet. Rather like Agriculture, they wanted everything, did not know what to concede, and ultimately made concessions that offered too little, too late.

The Six had strong commercial interests in some Commonwealth countries - they provided more investment to India than did Britain - and, on French initiative, a comprehensive trade agreement was suggested for India, Pakistan, and Ceylon. The Six were not so kindly disposed to the old white dominions. The French conceded one point: they agreed to a statement that the Six, in perfecting the rational development of agricultural production, would contribute to a

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harmonious development of world trade by ensuring a satisfactory level of exchanges between itself and third countries, including those of the Commonwealth. The British failed to secure a more specific commitment.

Pressure to achieve an outline agreement suitable for discussion at the 1962 Commonwealth Prime Ministers conference was unsuccessful, despite the all-night sitting in August, but enough was achieved to make that conference worthwhile.

At the Commonwealth Conference Mr. Diefenbaker made one of the more notable emotional appeals to Britain (six months later Lester-Pearson favoured British entry to Europe) but Robert Menzies was the weightiest figure and feared by Macmillan. The Australian Prime Minister distrusted his host and resented the report Duncan Sandys had brought back to London the previous summer that he, Menzies, had been more co-operative in private than in public. But the Australians would gain advantages from international commodity agreements demanded by the French and, knowing of American concern that Britain should enter Europe, did not wish to travel on to Washington (as he later did) with the reputation of a wrecker and, in the event, he did not lead a revolt of black and brown Commonwealth members against Britain. The final conference communique contained no demand for a re-opening of agreements already made by Britain in Brussels, or for a limitation of British freedom when the time for a final decision came.

Although the Government had suffered a decline of support in by-elections, local

elections and opinion polls during the first half of the year, Macmillan on the morrow of the conference, saw fit to declare "we too are independent". Commonwealth opposition to Britain's entry expressed at the conference may have been counterproductive - many Conservatives resented attacks on the Government.

After the publication in the second half of July of the White Paper on ministerial visits to Commonwealth countries(8), differences within the Conservative Party strengthened. Opposition to the Government now came from an alliance of right-wing Conservatives and left-wing Socialists - the former stressing the interests of the old, white Commonwealth, the latter those of the new, black Commonwealth.

The 'Expanding Commonwealth Group' of Conservatives had been active for some time, supporting and being supported by the Commonwealth Industries Association. In June 1961 a motion had been put down in the House calling for a Commonwealth Free Trade Association. This motion, and several letters printed in the Times, carried relatively few signatures - the Conservatives in the majority were waiting. While Shinwell called for a Commonwealth Development Fund, members of both main parties demanded a Commonwealth Prime Ministers' conference.

On 25th April 1962, in The Times, Peter Walker announced his private tour of Commonwealth countries, to take place in August, which was to rally opposition to entry. Conservative Central Office stepped up its publicity activities: from the end of May the Weekly Newsletter devoted much space to the E.E.C.

(8) Cmnd. 1449. See p.76.

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question. The counterattack on Derek Walker-Smith's and Peter Walker's Call to Commonwealth publication was, on 20th June, a party political broadcast devoted entirely to Europe.

Leading Labour figures attacked entry. Barbara Castle linked entry with the Commonwealth Immigrants Bill: should continentals enjoy free entry to Britain while Commonwealth citizens were excluded? Messieurs Crossman, Healey, Jay and Wilson each tackled the question of the political implications of entry. Under the title 'Still Time to save the Empire', Wilson argued the case for an Atlantic Common Market(9).

Between the rising of the Commons at the beginning of August and the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' conference 10th and 19th September 1962 the opponents of entry made their biggest joint efforts - they even made efforts to secure the presence of prime ministers at their rallies but failed. On the last day of the conference a full-page 'Rally to Commonwealth' advertisement appeared in the Times.

Gaitskell was very much impressed by the concern of Commonwealth leaders in London and during this time placed great stress on conditions of entry. During a 13th September television broadcast he asserted:

"If the Government propose to go in on terms which seem to us, and to the Commonwealth, quite unacceptable, there is an obvious, clear division of opinion in the country and there ought to be an election before Britain commits herself."

During December the 'Commonwealth' Conservatives rallied. On 13th December altogether fifty-five Conservatives, including Sir Donald Kaberry, a former Deputy-Chairman of the party,

(9) Sunday Express, 10th June, 1962

signed an Early Day Motion congratulating Edward Heath on the firmness shown at Brussels, contemplated the discontinuance of negotiations, and called for a new major Commonwealth initiative.

+ Arthur Propper represented Agriculture. He was an Under-Secretary - not until the last phase of negotiations was the ministry persuaded to send out the more senior Frederick Bishop (Deputy Secretary). (Another Under-Secretary, B.C. Engholm, came from London once or twice.) However, it must not be forgotten that Sir Eric Roll, deputy head of the negotiating team (himself a Deputy Secretary) was on detached duty from the Ministry of Agriculture.

Comment on the performance of the Agriculture people could not be more varied. Herbert Andrew (Board of Trade) says that they were anxious to get on with the job but difficulties arose because the Six were still evolving their own agricultural policy. Agriculture, like Commonwealth Relations, says Sir Frank Lee (Treasury) was in no sense hostile and in no sense was work hampered - Agriculture did issue "valid warnings".

A Foreign Office estimate of Agriculture is that the department wanted the maximum and could not evaluate the situation. Gorell Barnes (Colonies) holds that Agriculture "misconceived the whole exercise" and was a brake. It was a mystery how the ministry 'stood for' the National Farmers' Union whose pressure amounted to harrying. The Foreign Office official believed the activity of Agriculture during negotiations amounted to "straightforward sabotage". Sir John Winifrith, the Permanent Secretary, was a strong personality and notoriously 'anti-Market' - he enjoyed enormous powers of delay. The great misfortune was that Christopher Soames was such a weak political head. (Asher Weingarten of the N.F.U.: I have always suspected that the Foreign Office were anxious to get into E.E.C. whatever the cost to agriculture. The ministry merely did its job: Winnifrith made no bones about being 'anti' but many in his ministry were 'pro'.) The Foreign Office were happier when Bishop came out to Brussels: he was opposed to the Market but was

a very effective negotiator.

As already noted(10) the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, of all departments, came nearest to establishing a special unit to deal with the E.E.C. negotiations. No details are available from the ministry but the Civil Service List 1963, covering the previous year, shows the External Relations Division III had enjoyed a modest expansion over the previous year. Little preparatory work had been done before negotiations started:

"It remains odd that the new minister Scames did not immediately form a much stronger E.E.C. section to work on the fundamental problems in anticipation of the decision to apply for membership. Nor did the government make any special effort to encourage research in this field at universities or other non-governmental institutions. This lack of preparatory work was to prove a major handicap in 1962.

"Failure to do in good time the detailed preparatory work on agriculture is all the more surprising because in the summer of 1961 it was expected that the negotiations would be completed and the Treaty ratified during the following year so as to make it possible for the United Kingdom to take up formal membership of the E.E.C. on 1st January, 1963."(11)

What is even more surprising than anything Butterwick and Rolfe have said comes from the ministry itself: "... this Department was not one of the major ones concerned with the negotiations in 1963 although of course our advice was sought."(12)

(10) Above, p.105-

(11) Butterwick, M. and Rolfe, E.: op.cit., p.76

(12) Letter, 10th July, 1969

"Our relations with the ministry were no more [i.e. intensively] active in the period 1961-1963 than during any price-review," says one N.P.U. official. Asher Weingarten, Chief Economist to the National Farmers' Union declares that there was no substantial change in the nature of the contacts he had with the ministry in the early 'Sixties but that many more informal as well as technical meetings, at Deputy- and Under-Secretary level, took place in London. (The annual reports of the N.P.U. for 1962 and 1963 give details of a continuation of those international contacts made before Macmillan's 1961 announcement.) (13)

As negotiations with the E.E.C. began the N.P.U. held a briefing session on the British agricultural support system which was attended by two hundred overseas journalists - the press statement was issued in French and German as well as English.

In July 1961 Harold Woolley, the president, in a pamphlet entitled British Agriculture and the Common Market, rehearsed the principal reasons for British farmers' opposition to the proposals put forward by the Six as conditions for entry. He said that if a common agricultural policy were accepted by Britain, it would be impossible to continue the system of annually determining guarantees to account for the trend of net income, changes in costs, and other relevant factors. In addition, the farmers would lose the income security provided by the system of guaranteed prices if the E.E.C.'s system of establishing 'target prices' and aiming to hit these targets by controlling import duties was imposed. To the extent that production might

(13) See above, p.56

increase faster than demand, average prices received by farmers would be below the target prices of the E.E.C.. Furthermore, because Common Market decision were made by majority vote, Britain, as the largest food importing country, would inevitably be pressed to concede access to the continental farmer's growing output.

Real negotiation with the Six did not start in Brussels until 1962 and serious discussion relating to food occurred from May onwards. Some progress was made on the key question of temperate zone foodstuffs, with the Six showing some willingness to treat New Zealand as a special case. As far as British agriculture was concerned nothing much was achieved in the pre-August period, although serious diplomatic 'in-fighting' did occur. An all-night session was needed to secure a compromise whereby the Six accepted the British system of an annual review of farm prices and incomes, based on government reports. If reports showed that farmers in certain 'areas' were not preserving their standard-of-living, the Commission would be bound to help them. Was an 'area' a region (French view) or a whole country (British view)? The conference almost broke up before the French, contrary to their usual habit, without having made any preliminary joint agreement with the rest of the Six, suddenly capitulated - at 3.15 a.m. on 31st July.

From October 1962 onwards a major difficulty immediately encountered concerned the transition period and the phasing-out of deficiency payments. The Six regarded a short change-over period as a test, the shorter the period the less time there would be for Britain to seek to modify community arrangements. At a late stage, Edward Heath finally made the concession that all transitional arrangements for agriculture should

terminate by the end of 1969.

The N.F.U., in consultation with the N.F.U. (Scotland) and the Ulster Farmers' Union, had published positive proposals in August 1962 with their 'Farm and Food Plan'. This plan, which was reported in all the national daily newspapers and nearly two hundred provincial and local newspapers, was concerned with the disruptive effect of surpluses on the British open market and pressed for international commodity agreements, the harmonization of national agricultural policies, and a World Food Programme organised through an enlarged O.E.C.D.. (N.F.U. officials are proud that parts of their 1962 plan have been adopted. A World Food Programme with commodity agreements and standard quantities is now operated. The annual report for 1963 - in British Farmer, 11th January 1964 - declares that the plan had become a plank in the programme of the main political parties.)

Asher Weingarten asserts that his union was positive in its attitude throughout the entry negotiations. The union had had fifteen years of frank discussions with European colleagues and now equally frankly declared, as a matter of principle, that the European agricultural policy must be adapted or modified. The E.E.C.'s own policy on which, in the final analysis it was going to judge its own success, was still in the process of formation. In so crucial and difficult an area for the Six themselves, it was inevitable that negotiations with Britain should be detailed and protracted - this could not be avoided. In an evolutionary situation, the N.F.U. could not always offer detailed proposals. Macmillan himself was exploring. To blame either minister, ministry or the union for caution exhibited during negotiation would be ridiculous.

In reporting to the 1962 annual general meeting, the union's president made fairly full demands. The N.F.U. required a continuation of the system of annual reviews (as seen above, conceded in Brussels) as a basis for determining price guarantees; effective support of non-review commodities, which received tariff protection; and, the continued full use of the producer marketing organizations. (14) The N.F.U. enjoyed considerable influence. (Nora Beloff reports that, just before de Gaulle's veto:

".. Soames had sent a private message to Mr. Harold Woolley, the new head of the National Farmers' Union, asking whether he might happen to be free to come over to Brussels, perhaps at the end of the week, to give his advice on a possible package deal." (15)

The N.F.U. cannot confirm this story and Christopher Soames will not speak; but certainly Woolley, on 21st January 1963, conveyed the views of his annual general meeting to Downing Street. The N.F.U. annual report said that it was still far from clear, at the end of negotiations, whether the British delegation would have been able to negotiate terms which would have met the unions' requirements. (16)

M.H. Fisher, who covered the Brussels talks for the Financial Times, declares that the N.F.U. links with the Ministry of Agriculture, of all links between interest groups and ministries, were of great importance but:

".. even here, the key to government policy was not what the N.F.U. said --

- (14) In British Farmer, 12th January 1963
- (15) Beloff, N.: The General Says No, p.146
- (16) British Farmer, 11th January, 1964, p.17

they kept on asking for the moon - but what the government thought it could get away with in political terms vis-a-vis the farmers."

The farming world was in a difficult situation. The 200,000 of 250,000 farmers of England and Wales who belonged to the N.F.U. looked to the union to protect them against market fluctuations, through the negotiation of comprehensive deals with the Government by annual reviews. Government opinion was moving towards the idea of a change, towards the limitation of Exchequer commitment (above, p. 56). This added to existing difficulties for farming: on the supply side, a small number of giant firms now supplied almost all the requirements in fertilizers, machinery, seeds, and veterinary products and, on the marketing side equally, a few large firms had come to dominate food processing and distributing industries - the farmer's autonomy was threatened from both sides. At a time when the British farmer was being asked to redefine his identity, reverse his basic values, and refashion his organisation, the cohesion of the N.F.U. was being threatened. (17)

Butterwick and Rolfe consider that the N.F.U.'s attitude during negotiations, if never downright hostile, was always negative and ultra-cautious. The industry enjoyed a 'special relationship' with Whitehall and seemed unlikely to secure a similar close relationship in Brussels. Some demands were unreasonable: why, for example, should guaranteed prices and special arrangements for horticulture beyond the transition period be allowed - when British farmers were technically ahead of their European colleagues?

(17) Emery, F.E. and Trist, E.L.: "The Causal Texture of Organizational Environments", Human Relations, Vol.18, No.1, 1965, p.27

Perhaps the long discussion of the transition period had been largely for the consumption of the N.F.U. constituency:

"One of the main preoccupations of the United Kingdom farmers' unions is to preserve the cohesion of the agricultural industry and to prevent the creation of splinter groups representing special interests within the industry. The issue of joining E.E.C. presented the unions with special difficulties. Following adoption of the Common Agricultural Policy some producers, for instance cereal growers, would benefit, others like horticulturalists might suffer. Doubtless the unions felt that by taking up a very cautious attitude, by pointing out all the disadvantages, they would at least run no risk of losing support." (18)

(18) Op. cit., p.80

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5.5 Domestic and External Environments

(1) Details of the 'public battle' relating to the United Kingdom's attempt to join E.E.C. must have a minor place in this thesis. However, extensive treatment having been given to the Whitehall departments and their 'clients', some brief mention must be made of the Prime Minister and his 'clients', of the pressures placed upon the Macmillan Government, and the management of those pressures, during negotiations.

During the summer of 1961 Conservative Central Office organized half-a-dozen regional briefings for key party works - eight hundred constituency representatives attended the London and Home Counties meeting at Church House. This signalled the beginning of the process of party education. Sir Michael Fraser says that the main task was to defeat the ignorance of Europe that existed, to get the facts across to the party. "We started from a weak position, but secured a positive evolution of opinion during the period 1961-1962".

In fact, special efforts were made by the party leadership to carry constituency opinion. William Deedes (above, p.96), in addition to the work he performed in the Treasury and in Parliament helped to prepare material for the Conservative rank-and-file. He also chaired the weekly meetings of the party Committee on Policy, the liaison between the Westminster leadership and the National Union executive.

After Macmillan's July declaration opinion in the two major political parties hardened. However, on 29th January 1962, The Times was able to state:

".. the main body of Conservative back-benchers are resisting alike the blandishments of the extreme European

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and anti-European groups in their midst. They are also allowing their judgement to be influenced by Mr. Heath.. whenever he deals with a challenge at question time."

The Conservatives' party political broadcast of January 1962 managed to evade the issue of Europe altogether.

Firm opposition to E.E.C. did exist within the Conservative Party. In April 1962, reports Ronald Butt:

"One senior cabinet minister spoke .. of the Common Market as threatening potentially the most fundamental shake-up in the Conservative Party since Disraeli's break with Peel over the repeal of the Corn Laws."(1)

On 20th June Macmillan made his first public speech on Europe, stressing the political value of Britain's link with Europe and referring to the risk of our becoming a poor, off-shore island. This was the first shot in the campaign to win over the 1962 Conference.

1962 was 'European Year' at the Conservatives' conference. Those delegates who wore 'Yes' badges set the tone and overwhelming support was given to the platform. Gaitskell's broadcast declaration, on 21st September, enabled Butler to make his celebrated and remarkable rejoinder: "For them a thousand years of history. For us, the future"(2) Labour had enabled the Conservatives to consolidate the question of entry into E.E.C. as a party issue.

(1) "The Common Market and Conservative Party Politics, 1961-62," Government and Opposition, April - July, 1967, p.382

(2) Conservative Conference Report, p.53

(11)

Eventually, of course, no decision on entry to E.E.C. had to be debated in Westminster. Sir Frank Pearson believes that Macmillan might have lost perhaps thirty votes had the question of entry been put in January 1963: "Even Peter Walker was coming round to acceptance of Europe and only Robin Turton remained as an important opponent". (Consequent on the Spiegel Affair, which began to unfold in October 1962, Lord Boothby attacked continental democratic practices and demanded a break-off of negotiations. This must have been a tactical demand for Boothby was a strong European).

Had the Conservatives in Parliament been deeply divided constituency opinion might have been called into play. Divergencies of view on entry did exist in Westminster but were never deep enough to occasion a problem in the constituencies - the Dorset by-election was the sole example of the creation of constituency passion (below, p. 149).

+ Opponents of market entry occasionally argued in constitutional terms but the issue never achieved constitutional status. In the event, it was not necessary to put entry to the electorate, but, had terms been secured in 1963, a general election would undoubtedly have been held, dominated by the entry issue. During a television broadcast on 1st February 1962, Edward Heath said that a general election should take place before entry. At Derby on 12th April Macleod said: "I do not mean to indicate that the general election will be fought on the issue of the Common Market itself. We do not go in for referendums in this country.. but when the next general election comes, clearly, this is going to be the great issue."

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A bipartisan approach to European problems was common among the nations of the Community. Late in the summer of 1961, it was reported, Macmillan brusquely rejected a modest Opposition proposal that an all-party committee of M.P.'s should examine the consequences of entry into Europe. Subsequently, in the spring of 1962, Heath offered to brief Opposition leaders privately on the course of the Brussels negotiations. Gaitskell rejected the offer, although George Brown accepted. At the 1962 party conferences both Heath and Gaitskell spoke of the European issue as being above party politics.

At some time during the summer of 1962 both Macmillan and Macleod, the party chairman, decided that the Common Market was a potential election winner. The Prime Minister may not have tried actively to make entry a bipartisan issue, but it was only at this time that he began to make it a party question. The Market could be exploited in a partisan manner. The Conservatives would be the forward-looking party. In this context must be read Butler's conference declaration.

For much of the period before July 1961 the attention of the Labour Party was directed to nuclear arms, and to its own constitution, and not to Europe.

During a broadcast on 8th May 1962 Gaitskell said that the economic arguments for or against entry were evenly balanced:

"To go in on good terms would, I believe, be the best solution to this difficult problem. Not to go in would be a pity, but it would not be a catastrophe. To go in on bad terms which really meant the end of the Commonwealth would be a step which I think we would regret all

our lives, and for which history would not forgive us."(3)

As late as 29th July 1962 Pierson Dixon could note that Gaitskell had said that Britain's entry into Europe was essentially right and that he would probably not make it a party issue(4).

During the summer of 1962 must have begun the stirrings of doubt in Gaitskell's mind(5). There was doubt as to whether Britain's conditions for entry could be obtained. The Conservatives appeared to be developing Europe as a party issue.

Gaitskell's opposition expressed at conference was regarded by some as a piece of blatant electioneering. His speech electrified the assembly. Certainly it departed from the spirit of the National Executive's views(6). Gaitskell revealed, not simply doubts, but a basically hostile attitude to the Six. In making his stand, Gaitskell turned his back on allies of recent troubles - Brown, Gunter, Strachey, Pakenham,

(3) Camps, M.: op.cit., p.448

(4) Double Diploma, p.287

(5) See Note C , p.181.

(6) The five conditions of Labour and the Common Market 29th September 1962, were: Strong and binding safeguards for the trade and other interests of our friends and partners in the Commonwealth: freedom to pursue a British foreign policy; fulfilment of government pledges to our associates in N.F.T.A.; the right to plan our economy; and, guarantees to safeguard the position of British agriculture.

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Jenkins - and was one with former left-wing, unilateralist foes. Frank Pakenham found it a heart-breaking experience - supporters of entry looked "shocked, beaten and betrayed". George Brown tried to redress the balance but the day had been lost. (See Note C . p. 181).

+ The Common Market Campaign (above, p. 62) was a small, compact all-party body aimed at informed opinion - it addressed itself primarily to persons in influential positions, to M.P.'s, the Press, and industrialists. Robert Jarrett, the Campaign's secretary, says that he and his colleagues became "respectable" after the July 1961 announcement but "not much ministerial support was obtained". There was some contact with William Deedes, Minister without Portfolio(7), who paid tribute to the campaigners at the Conservative Conference of 1962, but little else. The European Movement (8), by comparison, had close contacts with Macmillan and benefited from his dinner appearances for them. (The Prime Minister and Sir Edward Beddington-Behrens had been at school and Oxford together and the latter's fund-raising was thus facilitated(9)). The Common Market Campaign was "distressed and surprised by the lack of ministerial help."

The largest opposition organization was the Anti-Common Market League, founded by disgruntled Conservatives in August, 1961. The League at first was unsure of its role. Should its activity concentrate on research and lobbying, or should it

(7) Above, p. 96

(8) Above, p. 62

(9) William Deedes was involved, in an unofficial way, with this fund-raising.

become a militant organization fighting on all fronts - standard-of-living, employment, sovereignty, agriculture and not simply Commonwealth - inside and outside the Conservative Party? Eventually, the League decided to stir up suspicion and hostility to the E.E.C. on a nationwide scale.

A great amount of League literature was distributed. During the period between August 1961 to January 1963 the Conservative Central Office published twenty-three pamphlets, leaflets and such for general distribution, achieving a total circulation of just under two millions. The League did nearly as well with a much smaller and amateurish organization.

Derek Walker-Smith was the chief voice of the "anti's" and spoke at the League's first mass meeting in Kensington Town Hall on 4th October 1961. The largest public meeting was held at the Central Hall during the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference but the high-point of activity came with an Albert Hall demonstration on 26th August 1962 held in conjunction with the Forward Britain Movement and Keep Britain Out.

+ The Daily Mirror maintained its support of, the Daily Worker and the Daily Express remained adamantly opposed to the Common Market. A Daily Express leading article of 26th September 1956 had urged the Government to turn its back on old Europe towards the new lands beyond the seas. The Express remained consistent over time. From the summer of 1961 full- and half-page advertisements were placed in other newspapers, from Tribune to The Times. From June 1961 the Express's own front page offered a boxed 'fact a day' to its twelve million readers and its columns were opened to all anti-Marketees whether right-wing Conservative or left-wing Labour. The Express throughout the negotiating period fortified opponents of

E.E.C. by its support for the Commonwealth ideal, insular sovereignty, an alleged superior British standard-of-living, and by encouraging a suspicion of foreigners, especially Germans.

The Express's brochure You and the Common Market was published in January 1962 and sold two hundred thousand copies. The author, a leader-writer and earlier a Conservative candidate, James McMillan admitted later that this was an emotional broadside not a factual statement. The Conservatives devoted the whole of one issue of their Notes on Current Politics to putting the facts straight.

The Times, in a leader published on 2nd June 1960 applauded de Gaulle's nationalism and caused some apprehension on the continent.

There is no evidence to suggest that the British Press made any impact either at home or in Europe during the negotiations (10) (11).

Clifford Jupp, admittedly spending much of his time in Brussels, says that he found radio and television coverage of the Brussels negotiations to be colourless. An analysis of programmes shows that the main areas of interest and

(10) But note the Woodrow Wyatt story, above, p. 63

(11) "Nor is the popular press as influential as might be supposed. The foreign editor of a British daily with one of the largest circulations in the world recently has reminded me that for over a year his paper had constantly urged that Britain join the Common Market. Six months after de Gaulle had blocked this, the paper organized an opinion poll among its many millions of readers which disclosed that fifty-four percent did not know what the Common Market was." (Busk, D.: The Craft of Diplomacy, p. 87)

(4)

the major problems of entry were covered by experts and political personalities during the eighteen months here covered. But Europe was by no means a daily diet for British listeners and viewers.

+ Those who sought to make their highly complex estimates of the economic advantage of entry into Europe could examine several areas of possible gain - increased specialization, larger scale production, and increased competitive stimulus to efficiency. Some economists denied that they could provide quantitative analyses as an aid to policy-making:

"Given the present and prospective state of knowledge about economic relationships, the labour required for economic calculation, and the fact that the most important decision problems are unique experiments, it is inevitable that economic policy-makers and commentators must rely to a large extent on guessing at the magnitudes of economic effects." (12)

Hutchison was not alone in deploring bad guessing. Professor Jewkes declared that, certainly, there was nothing in economists' science nor in their past achievements which gave them any special claim to be able to foretell the future (13).

Some economists, like A.C.L. May, became champions of entry: other, like N. Kalder, opponents. Balogh first favoured closer working with the Sterling Area, then with Europe, then a 'going it alone' policy. The Observer sent out a questionnaire to every professor and reader of economics in Britain, and to at least one Fellow in each Oxford and Cambridge college, and to a few economists heading research institutes.

(12) Hutchison, T.W.: Economics and Economic Policy in Britain 1945-1966, p.197

(13) Hutchison, T.W.: op.cit., p.203

Editorial comment found that if the Market was regarded as a beginning and as an opportunity for new initiatives, then the Government could be confident that it had the great bulk of professional opinion behind it(17).

Chatham House remained a centre of European sentiment through the negotiations. After January 1963 it published Implications of the Brussels Breakdown: it is significant that the two, of four, essayists who were pro-European were senior officials of Chatham House, the two sceptics were outsiders.

Undoubtedly, the academic most publicly active was William Pickles. His publications - Keep Britain Out, Not with Europe - revealed the depth of his antipathy towards E.E.C.: he attacked its "mixture of bureaucracy and anarchy", its agricultural and trade policies. He was influential as one of Gaitskell's circle and as member of several of Labour's unofficial committees, and in the trade unions. Pickles had links with all the

(17) Of one hundred and twenty-seven questionnaires distributed, eighty-three were returned. Opinion on entry divided as follows:

Very much against	3
Against	9
Evenly balanced	18
In favour	38
Very much in favour	11
Non-committal	4

(Observer, 14th October, 1962)

campaigns opposing entry and suggested a declaration by them warning the Six on the doubtful status of a Conservative adhesion to the Rome Treaty. The nation was being sold "a political pig in an economic poke", and the electorate should be consulted.

In elite groups and in popular opinion there was little implacable hostility to entry into Europe. The Government moved in a very circumspect manner and felt it had adequate support for negotiation. Opinion was never tested by a positive Brussels decision. However, whereas opinion at the outset had been quiescent, hostility towards Europe did mount during the second half of negotiations.

The state of euphoria in which the Conservatives left Llandudno in 1962 was shortlived. Polls began to show a swing away from the Government and a hardening of opinion against entry became evident. On 12th December the Daily Telegraph gave results of Gallup Polls showing that, since October 1962, the percentage of those in favour of joining "on the facts as you know them at present" had declined from forty-one to twenty-nine, and the percentage against joining had risen from twenty-eight to thirty-seven. (The poll also showed that forty-two percent, as against thirty-seven percent in October, expected the Labour Party to win the next election.)

If the results of these polls were a check on a government which might have planned extravagant extensions of policy in order to gain entry to E.E.C. there were also other warnings. Conservative candidates did very badly in a series of five by-elections in November 1962. South Dorset, on the 22nd November, gave the Government cause for thought.

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Lord Hinchingbrooke had succeeded his father as Earl of Sandwich and had given up his Commons seat. Sandwich, with a big local following, had promised support to Angus Maude the pro-Market official Conservative candidate at the by-election. He then withdrew his support and gave it to Sir Piers Debenham, a former president of the constituency organization. Sandwich and Debenham built their campaign on opposition to Common Market entry, chiefly on the argument that a high cost-of-living would ensue. They received active support from Lord Beaverbrook. The Conservative vote was split: the unofficial candidate secured over five thousand votes, allowing the Labour candidate to win by seven hundred votes.

The Cuban crisis added a new element to the Brussels negotiations which is difficult to assess but which may have been important. The crisis dramatized the inequality and the lack of balance in the Atlantic Alliance and precipitated the debate on Europe's role in determining the policies of the Alliance:

"..the somewhat xenophobic mood that was apparent in the United Kingdom during November and December 1962 can be explained by the fact that both Cuba and the Common Market negotiations were underlining, in different ways, a changed situation which had been accepted intellectually, but not yet emotionally, the mood of the country undoubtedly made it difficult for the British Government to make concessions." (15)

(Cf. G. McDermott: Ambassador Ormsby-Gore was treated almost as a member of the Kennedy cabinet.) (16)

(15) Camps, M.: op.cit., p.463

(16) The Eden Legacy, p.184

(ii) At the end of his period as Ambassador in Paris, in September 1960, Sir Gladwyn Jebb asked de Gaulle what his reaction would be if Britain applied to join E.E.C.. De Gaulle replied that such a prospect was too remote to be worth serious consideration. At Strasbourg, before the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe on 2nd March 1961, Couve de Murville said that the Common Market was open to any other European country wishing to join and for some this was a valid possibility. This was taken by Britain to mean that, while objecting to half-measures, France's reaction to a British initiative would be favourable.

Pierson Dixon reported that at the New Year's Day reception at the Elysee in 1962 de Gaulle was more than usually warm towards him: he would consider dining privately at the British Embassy (for the first time). But Dixon believed in a French conspiracy. In March 1962 the Algerian question was settled but an election was near: de Gaulle did not relish going to the polls as a declared anglophobe. In May, Pompidou, the new Prime Minister, was convinced by his colleagues that it was obvious to the French people that de Gaulle intended to keep Britain out of the Market, and that this was an electoral liability. Pompidou then spoke to de Gaulle who agreed to be more friendly towards Britain.

The French President appeared to be genuinely surprised by Macmillan during their June 1962 meeting at the Chateau de Champs, surprised that Macmillan saw Britain's future role as being a European one. Couve de Murville stated on 13th June in the Assemblée Nationale that the E.E.C.'s and Britain's interests were perhaps not irreconcilable and that France saw little point in discussing political unity until it was known

whether the United Kingdom was to be in or out of Europe. France had, perhaps, begun to believe in British entry.

Observers believe that French representatives at Brussels were not working under orders from de Gaulle to keep Britain out - they appeared to have the widest freedom within the policy of making sure that, if Britain did enter Europe, then France should exact the best possible terms. The final decision was the General's, French officials negotiated in good faith. (Conservatives at Llandudno in 1962 bought 'Yes' badges: Nora Beloff was asked by a French diplomat to bring a pocketful to Brussels for the French delegation to wear(1).

At the end of October 1962 the French had their referendum to decide on the question as to whether the President should be elected by direct rather than indirect suffrage: a large majority favoured a change. In November the General Election gave de Gaulle a clear majority in the National Assembly. One does not have to accept the Pierson Dixon conspiracy theory to feel that the French referendum and election (of 18th and 25th November) created the circumstances in which a rupture with Britain was possible.

On 11th January 1963 Couve de Murville lunched at the British Embassy in Paris and was reassuring. On the 14th January came the press conference and de Gaulle's judicial sentence: on the 29th, in Brussels, came the execution. Between the two dates Pierson Dixon saw de Gaulle

(1) The General Says No, p.142

three times without being able to make any impact on the President. Dixon reports that some French ministers were still confident that a positive outcome could be achieved, Couve de Murville being among them(2). Heath was in Brussels "tidying-up the procedural machinery which would be set in motion by entry" - dealing with the questions of the distribution of votes, the use of English as an official language, and so on. On the very day of de Gaulle's press conference, 14th January, Heath discussed the question of the English translation of part of the Rome Treaty(3).

Sir Frank Lee says that the British, in previous years, had indeed wanted a strong French government. We had, however, deluded ourselves about the intensity of de Gaulle's opposition. During negotiations we always had the hope that France would see reason, that, as Macmillan had it, "Wormser would turn" (M. Olivier Wormser, a prominent French civil servant and representative at Brussels. He had once explained to his Quai d'Orsay colleagues that he could not bear the idea of Britain losing its fine imperial identity by merging with Europe). We were wrong(4).

+ The United States had treated Britain as a major power and as a close ally, deserving of special consideration and trust - as seen in the 1959 amendment of the MacMahon Act which permitted the sharing of American nuclear knowledge with the British. By comparison, France, with an unstable

(2) Double Diploma, pp.301-302

(3) Op.cit., pp.301-302

(4) See Note D . p.184

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government, a large Communist party, a war in Algeria, and fewer cultural ties with the United States, had long been regarded with suspicion. This represented a miscalculation. France's power, under de Gaulle, grew while Britain's stagnated: American policies, to the degree that they were inconsistent with European power trends, made the admission of Britain to E.E.C. more difficult and strained relations within the Community(1). As for Germany, the United States had welcomed her inclusion in Western European Union and in N.A.T.O. but, in the 'Sixties, American links with Germany were not as close as they had been under Eisenhower and Dulles. By contrast, German links with France became very close.

On 4th July 1962 Kennedy made his 'Declaration of Interdependence' speech(2). In this he appealed for a partnership between the United States and a strong and united Europe. Instead of being a stimulus to rapid consolidation of Europe, it contributed to de Gaulle's conviction that the British membership of E.E.C. would prejudice his own design for Europe:

"American policies .. made the admission of Britain more difficult and strained relations within the E.E.C.. France, as an internal leader of the union endeavouring to reduce American influence in Europe, did not want the most trusted ally of the former external elite in the E.E.C. De Gaulle pointed out to a visiting group of deputies on 24th January 1963 that Britain disqualified itself as a European power at Nassau by allowing one of the vital attributes of its national sovereignty, the British nuclear deterrent, to become

(1) Etzioni, A.: Political Unification, p.246

(2) Kitzinger, U.: The European Common Market and Community, pp.165-169

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dependent on the United States, and by allowing the United States unilaterally to cancel its earlier commitments to deliver Skybolt missiles without even a protest from London. Britain in Europe, the General said, would be like a 'travelling salesman' of United States interests."(3)

Said Opera Mundi-Europe, on 24th January 1963
"On peut dire aussi que les paroles prononcées par le fondateur de la Vie République, le 14 janvier 1963, paraissent inspirées presque plus par sa méfiance envers Washington qu'envers Londres".(4)

(3) Etzioni, A.: op.cit., p.246

(4) Jouve, Edmon: Le General de Gaulle et la Construction de l'Europe, 1967, p.180

6. The 'Package'

The Brussels negotiations were complex and threw up their own technical vocabulary - the Common External Tariff, variable levies, reverse preferences, décalage, and so on. It was part of British reaction to the French veto to declare that much had been achieved in the way of agreement between herself and the Six. Edward Heath, in his final statement in Brussels on 29th January, 1963 said: "The plain fact is that the time had come when the negotiations were for some, too near to success. It is clear to the world that they

have been halted, not for any technical or economic reasons, but on purely political grounds and on the insistence of a single Government."(1)

Conservative literature offers a neat and almost convincing list of provisional agreements reached with the Six before breakdown:

African and Caribbean Commonwealth countries: an offer of association under which almost all their raw materials and tropical foodstuffs would have had free entry into the enlarged Common Market. This offer would have remained open despite the fact that certain African countries were as yet unwilling, for political reasons, to accept it;

India, Pakistan and Ceylon: free entry for India's and Ceylon's tea exports, and comprehensive trade agreements for all three countries' manufactured goods; reduction of the Common External Tariff to zero in the case of some minor industrial products, and its application by stages for others;

Canada, Australia and New Zealand: on the all-important question of temperate foodstuffs, the Community expressed its intention to pursue a reasonable price policy within the framework of world-wide agreements; there was recognition of the need for special provisions to deal with New Zealand's particular problems. Raw materials such as wool and jute would have duty-free entry;

United Kingdom Agriculture: having accepted the principle of a common agricultural policy for the Community, the Government proposed certain arrangements for the United Kingdom in the transitional period; they also proposed, and the Community accepted, that it should adopt the practice of an Annual Review.(2)

(1) Camps, M.: op.cit., p.492

(2) Campaign Guide 1964, pp.467-468

A resolution adopted by the European Parliament on 6th February 1963 invited the European Commission to report to it on the state of the negotiations between Britain and the Six on 29th January 1963. The report, published on 26th February, 1963, offers a much more realistic assessment of the difficulties still to be solved by the parties:

"Many points left in abeyance may be classified as of minor consequence. In the tariff field in particular, the tactical manoeuvring inseparable from negotiations had certainly delayed in many cases the settlement of secondary problems for which there was no reason to believe that a solution could not be found. Broadly speaking it may be said that the normal provisions of the Treaty and the decision-making powers of Community institutions could certainly have been accepted as providing the means of reaching a reasonable solution of many points referred to in this report which stem from minor or quite special economic problems.

"On the other hand, it is important not to minimize certain questions which were still unanswered (apart from the problem of relations with the E.F.T.A. countries, the terms of which were rather special). With regard to temperate foodstuffs from the Commonwealth, although a solution had been put forward for cereals, its extension to certain other products might still have raised difficulties, even though the broad lines were already laid down.

"Again, even though some measure of agreement had been reached as to the final stage regarding British agriculture, it would be a mistake to underestimate the importance for the Community of effective transitional arrangements ensuring the progressive integration of the economies of the Member states and the final establishment of a single market."(3)

(3) Report to the European Parliament on the state of the negotiations with the United Kingdom. E.E.C. Commission, p.110

If the Commission believed that it was impossible to say that negotiations with Britain would have succeeded, but that it was equally certain that they had not failed, what are the mature views of the British negotiators themselves?

If Heath was confident that a 'package' for agreement existed, Herbert Andrew is more cautious. There was a block of stone there for chiselling, and chiselling was definitely needed. If de Gaulle's mind had moved the other way there existed material to work upon. Gorell Barnes has said that the elements of agreement existed but several important topics had never been touched. There had been no final settlement on temperate agriculture. The always difficult problem of British agriculture had received indeterminate treatment - some of the things discussed within this context were 'phoney': the important question of the impact of the Community's system of agricultural finance upon our balance-of-payments "never came to the crunch."(4) Looking back, Gorell Barnes believes that Pierson Dixon would have said that we had not succeeded at Brussels.

Duncan Sandys has admitted that a lot was left unsettled at Brussels. To the items mentioned above we can add:

"... no outline agreement had been reached on horticulture. Lacking community regulations little progress had been made on sugar, although a precise agreement on the status of the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement was clearly a 'must'. Arrangements for the other E.F.T.A. countries, one of the major pre-conditions of United Kingdom entry into the E.E.C., had not

(4) See also p. ~~108~~ 123.

been defined. Most important of all a satisfactory agreement over the future of New Zealand exports of agricultural produce was still a very long way off."(5)

Thus, if de Gaulle was wrong in saying that negotiations had been at a standstill since October 1962, it leans too far the other way to say that the break-off came just as the two sides were on the verge of agreement.

In the event, official meetings and untold hours of 'corridor work' failed to produce a convincing 'package'.

(5) Butterwick, M. and Rolfe, E.N.: op.cit., pp. 78-79

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7. Conclusions

This thesis began with a short review of analytical elements necessary to the work: reference was made to the international system, transformation and integration, and to decision-making and policy-making. Mention was made also to the post-war development of collective governmental action reflected in the so-called 'Alphabet Politics' and to criticisms of United Kingdom adaptivity in the field of foreign-policy formation.

The body of the thesis has been devoted to United Kingdom reaction to the 'relance européenne' and to Macmillan's exercise in seeking entry to the European Economic Community - after the Free Trade Area failure and the European Free Trade Association solution de rechange - while abandoning the 'three circles' foreign policy.

In this conclusion it remains to estimate the activity that occurred in the Brussels negotiating arena, to judge how Edward Heath, the 'Flying Knights' and Whitehall conducted themselves, given the problems of the negotiating process. Because of their influence upon the negotiations, however, a few paragraphs must be devoted first to the review of options and the initiative.

(1) The Review of Options

Eventually, failure and stagnation at home and a recognition of loss of status abroad occasioned a review of options. The 1959 election victory was quickly followed by a crowding-in of problems. As the 'Sixties began the political agenda was full; in January 1960 the Government imposed restrictive economic measures; in February a new formula - seven per cent of G.N.P. - was announced for defence expenditure and in April the Blue Streak programme was cancelled; in October the Monckton Commission began to look for a solution to one of Britain's last major colonial problems. The Paris summit came to nothing.

The rethinking of foreign policy was difficult and the take-up of new options not simple. Although British resources were those of a medium power only, British interests remained worldwide. Britain needed permanent partners, but the partners were different according to whether one approached the problem from the defence or the economic-industrial point-of-view.

Some easement of the British dilemma came from the United States - she was happy with E.E.C. acceleration plans and her attitude to British entry was not unfavourable. American views were very important to Britain - witness the reception of George Ball in Whitehall in March 1961. (See above, p73.)

A few influential civil servants began to re-examine Britain's place in the world system and, along with a few of Macmillan's associates and a few parliamentarians, they were ready to urge the Prime Minister on. The elements within the civil service who supported Macmillan's thinking - none more important than Sir Frank Lee at the Treasury - were people who had lately arrived at positions of influence. There had occurred no deliberate

refashioning of Whitehall in a European image. The Foreign Office, which had failed to keep pace with European thinking, now developed a European conviction, but this development was not mirrored throughout Whitehall.

Additionally, Macmillan reacted to events in Europe - To E.E.C. acceleration plans, and to the French and German rapprochement. From August 1960, prolonged private exchanges with all governments of the Six occurred. Sufficient encouragement came from these exchanges for Macmillan to make a positive move. The meetings with Chancellor Adenauer in August 1960 and February 1961 appear to have been very important in shaping the Prime Minister's thoughts. German agricultural interests and a general fear of French instability lay behind an apparently favourable predisposition towards Britain.

(ii) The Initiative

In July 1961 Macmillan made a major strategic move. Compared with the Free Trade Area venture, the E.E.C. negotiations were given a status of priority. The decision before Britain called for an enormous amount of activity, in many forums and interest areas, in a relatively short space of time. Important value consequences were involved. Decision situations with these characteristics may be considered as crises(1).

Conditions were not favourable for the launching of the new policy. Macmillan's

(1) Robinson, James, A.: Legislative Influence on Foreign Policy: Parliament and the Common Market. Unpublished paper, Ohio State University.

initiative was a response to domestic and external failure and was launched from a position of moral and tactical weakness. Failure and stagnation existed at home, and in the E.E.C. an impression of dynamic development - the E.E.C. discussed acceleration of tariff reductions, the first stage of her Common External tariff, and political union. For the Prime Minister this represented a 'shifting environment' and the need to approach the E.E.C. appeared to be thrust upon him.

Macmillan had 'friends at court'. The Dutch wanted our participation on talks on political union, and German interests in British entry have been mentioned above. However, the need to defend the E.E.C. against de Gaulle set limits to the support which could be given to a British candidature.

The announcement of July did not betoken a philosophical commitment towards Europe on the part of the Prime Minister. In the early 'Fifties he had deplored the 'absurd constitution-making' of the Europeans: now entry into Europe was obviously regarded with something less than enthusiasm. The Prime Minister was ahead of most of his cabinet but he was not a 'prime mover':

"In politics, Macmillan was an imaginative eclectic. In the 1930's he had joined forces with minority opinion in an attempt to solve the economic problems of the period and had given political expression to new economic thinking. In 1960, he likewise drew political sustenance from the views of groups of 'Europeans' in public life and power from a wind of 'Europeanism' which (as is the habit with political fashions) began to

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blow from more than one quarter at this time for reasons that cannot be subjected to precise analysis."(2)

(iii) The Negotiations

On several counts the status of the Brussels discussions was in doubt. Vagueness in the pre-July 1961 period on the nature of a possible rapprochement with Europe continued over into the new period. No formal cabinet decision about talks was taken and Macmillan's declaration in the Commons - "we must make an application to see our way further" - did not clearly demonstrate a 'European vocation'.

Entry to E.E.C. would involve the acceptance of a new kind of sovereignty - important decisions would be made in the community instead of in the national sphere. It is clear that in the Government's decision to move towards Europe the political considerations were the controlling ones - the civil service interdepartmental review had stressed the political case (3) for entry and this had been acknowledged in the Prime Minister's July statement.

Yet the economic case was given greatest publicity at home - the tactic was to "get into Europe on an economic ticket". Further, Edward Heath, Henry Brooke, Joseph Godber and others, through 1961 and 1962, stressed the commercial nature of the E.E.C. and referred to the

(2) Butt, R.: "The Common Market and Conservative Party Politics, 1961-1962", Government and Opposition, April - July, 1967, p.377

(3) "I had great sympathy with the Foreign Office in their view that the move towards Europe was more political than economic," says Sir Frank Lee. (Interview)

'European trade problem'. It was even stated that, with Britain a member, the Community would be different in shape and purpose - Britain could veto proposals for federal extensions.

In April 1962 Heath stressed the need to strengthen the Atlantic Alliance. Britain still adhered to 'Atlanticism'. The Atlantic Alliance might be no substitute for E.E.C. membership, but perhaps the latter could bolster the former.

Throughout the negotiations in Brussels a decision on principle was deferred while attention was given to detail. Despite the extent of political activity, for the most part a crisis atmosphere was lacking. The negotiators here considering a historic redeployment of national resources, did not negotiate with adequately informed ardour. The United Kingdom government was not quite sure of its strategic purpose (above, pp. 8-9) - witness the ambivalence of ministers towards political integration in Europe. (In 1962, de Gaulle's reservations about E.E.C. political unity could not, with impunity, be echoed by an applicant country.)

Macmillan launched new economic policies during our period - the National Economic Development Council was announced in July 1961 and the National Incomes Commission a year later - and was vigorous enough to carry through his great cabinet reshuffle in 1962. In respect of Europe, Gorell Barnes asserts, things were different. During the negotiations Macmillan was getting tired - he had possessed the élan to get talks started, but not to see them through.

Edward Heath evidently failed to compensate for Macmillan's lack of élan. Duncan Sandys's suggestion that the Brussels talks should have been raised to prime ministerial level in the summer of

1962 might be seen as an implied criticism of Heath. What were Heath's weaknesses as a negotiator?

The Lord Privy Seal was evidently not a 'European' at the outset of the talks. But, at least, his status was clear - he had a brief (cf. Maudling's rag-bag of responsibilities during the earlier free trade talks. Above, p. 94).

Edward Heath in Brussels held on too long to unrealistic demands. Initially there existed in Whitehall some belief in a relatively short timetable for negotiation and entry, a realization that the Brussels negotiations represented a major diplomatic effort. But the United Kingdom team were not agreed on 'what to give away'. M. Clappier's observation about time lost during the summer of 1962 is well made (above, p. 107).

Edward Heath, personally, betrayed a grave weakness - his avidity for detail. His method of working not merely slowed down proceedings in Brussels but also drew the attention of the Six to raw questions of principle they themselves had not yet fully explored. It is possible to excuse Heath since he suffered political restraints in having to report back to the Commons (or in having to keep a promise to publish White Papers when the Commons was not sitting). Finally, however, one must say that diplomacy forgot policy. Remembering the maxim that "diplomacy is cobbling rather than creation" one must say that generals should not allow tactical dispositions to obscure strategic goals. In Brussels, Heath failed to maintain strategic purpose.

Civil servants executed their departmental probes (4) and carried out extensive diplomatic

- (4) "I suspect that these examinations in depth which we are always being told have been made into the implications of joining the Common Market have been pretty amateur."
(Jo Grimond The Guardian, 18th August, 1967)

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investigation with European governments. However efficient these probes and investigations were - there appears to be some evidence of an inadequate 'operational base' (above, p. 37) - eventual negotiations in Brussels betrayed some lack of grip.

Neglecting the possibility that Whitehall had not yet rid itself of Free Trade Area thinking - of thinking in terms of 'accommodation with' rather than 'entry into' Europe - demands related to entry often failed to show adequate realism. Some British demands illustrated a lack of awareness of realistic outcomes. With the E.E.C. itself in a critical stage of evolution a greater degree of professional awareness was demanded.

As far as Herbert Andrew (above, p. 24) was concerned the Brussels negotiations were a 'well-played match'. Some lack of sympathy between Brussels negotiators and Whitehall evidently existed (see Sir Eric Roll above, p. 120) but, on a technical level, one cannot find fault with the degree of interdepartmental co-operation which supported the negotiations. In reference to those pressures of multilateral diplomacy mentioned above (p. 37) only Sir Pierson Dixon appears to have suffered significant fatigue as a result of double burden of work in Brussels and Paris. The two First Secretaries who carried much of the weight of official work in Brussels were evidently overworked too.

How may one summarize the substantive and procedural differences existing between the Whitehall departments as revealed by interviews with participants in the negotiations?

The Foreign Office had exhibited a conspicuous lack of interest in the earlier Free Trade Area talks, but, in 1960, it was in a 'European Frenzy'. Herbert Andrew makes the point that the 'Office' had "woken up" (above, p. 48). The Foreign

Office was taken by surprise when the E.E.C. began to move at an unexpectedly rapid pace and was particularly concerned when serious discussion began in Europe on political unification. The European Organizations Department of the Foreign Office acted as the principal briefing division for the Brussels Team, two of whose three official heads were 'Office' people (above, p. 102). But the early 'frenzy' did not convert itself into adequately serious dedication. If one discerns a lack of grip on negotiations in Brussels, remembering the department's reputation for detachment, one may lay at the Foreign Office door some of the blame for the lack of pace in the negotiations.

The Treasury had suffered an early post-war diminution of interest in Europe and a revival of interest came only with the change from Makins to Lee at the top (above, p. 50). At Brussels the Treasury's quiescence was odd and so was the fact that sterling did not become a 'sticking-point'. But, here, one must award praise: the 'agree now, argue later' gambit - which would have been eminently reasonable in the context of agriculture(5) - appears to have worked for the Treasury.

The Colonial Office representative at Brussels, who had been worried by a Whitehall 'vendetta' against the Six on the matter of association agreements (above, p. 51), displayed "sympathy and engagement" with negotiating problems in Brussels. Hampered by fewer pressures, the Board of Trade representative nevertheless showed realism in

(5) The Common Agricultural Policy was in the initial phase of preparation. "The United Kingdom side did not really understand much about it," comments a Foreign Office participant, "and the Commission made much of this mystique."

negotiation. Commonwealth Relations, either from conviction or because of the quality of its representatives in Brussels, seems not to have exhibited Macmillan's realism towards Commonwealth interests and towards the legacy of 'intimacy of exchange'.

If a 'community of interest' did not exist at Brussels as far as the British side was concerned one must explain this chiefly by reference to the fairly severe criticisms made of Agriculture's representatives. The delaying power attributed to Agriculture - and to a much lesser extent by Commonwealth Relations - must be accounted a significant factor in the eventual failure of negotiations.

Until July 1961 there had existed in Britain an attitude 'excluding agriculture' from possible changes involved in entry into Europe and little detailed consideration of the problem of British agriculture within the Common Market appears to have been made.

In Brussels the lack of preparatory work was evident and some Foreign Office irritation has been expressed at Agriculture's failure to "evaluate the situation". The most surprising revelation to the writer was the ministry's disclaimer - that the department was not a major participant in the negotiations (above, p. 132) Weight must be given to the opposition to Common Market entry shown by the ministry's Permanent Secretary(6).

(6) In 1971 a Common Market Safeguards Committee manifesto was composed to bring together both opponents to E.E.C. and the sceptics. "There are several surprise names, including those of Sir John Winifrith, who was Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Agriculture during the Brussels negotiation of 1967-68 (sic), Lord Woolley, former president of the N.F.U...." (The Times, 5.2.1971)

Organizational arrangements in Brussels were not ideal but were not under the control of the United Kingdom team. The U.K. representatives negotiated with the nominees of six governments - delegation of the negotiating function to the Commission had not been possible. The Six had to act in unison. Close personal relations which existed between the negotiators did not compensate for the long process of obtaining top-level agreement for everything - very little delegation to committees occurred. It took six months of exploration to classify items for negotiation before the Brussels talks began in earnest.

The management of the international arena by the United Kingdom government during the negotiations involved relations with the United States, the Council of Europe, Western European Union, and the European Free Trade Association. Of most importance, in this context, as a wider issue obtruding onto the negotiations, was de Gaulle's concern to modify the organizational arrangements and the command structure of N.A.T.O.

The French had emerged as the strong power within the Community. French negotiators had secured a Treaty to their own specifications and they always knew what kind of Europe they wanted. Skilled in the art of negotiating from weakness, the French at Brussels were able, despite some hostility from their community partners, to exploit British hesitation and divisions. But de Gaulle was not hostile to U.K. entry from the outset (see Note D, p. 184).

Eventually, Macmillan's major error was to act as if defence and politico-economic questions were not linked. The French feared American 'Contamination' and de Gaulle's goodwill (see ^{above} below, p. 151) was dissipated when Macmillan concluded his Polaris agreement with Kennedy at Nassau.

(12)

The goodwill of France's community partners, together with the repeated declarations in Britain's interest made by M. Monnet's Action Committee (an unofficial body), were not enough to overcome de Gaulle's hostility towards Britain. If in negotiation the United Kingdom team were administratively adequate (which has been questioned, above), their prime minister was nevertheless politically naive. Macmillan and his colleagues failed to see issues from a French viewpoint.

The sequence of French domestic events - the strengthening of de Gaulle through an election and a referendum - did not 'fit' the British sequence. As de Gaulle consolidated his position, Macmillan's became weaker.

Before the Brussels meetings Macmillan was reducing his demands made on behalf of the Commonwealth: during the Brussels meetings he made his 'declaration of independence'. The result of the 1962 prime ministers' conference was that United Kingdom negotiators were free to make their initiatives in Brussels. It is noteworthy, however, that for every six hours spent by Heath in talking with the Six, he spent eight with representatives of the Commonwealth and E.F.T.A. (The 'London Agreement' had appeared to constitute a major restriction on Heath's negotiating freedom. In fact, E.F.T.A. problems were not exhaustively treated in Brussels.)

(iv) Participatory Democracy

Macmillan exercised his prime ministerial freedom to act in a typically oblique manner. In making his Common Market initiative he gambled upon a development of European sentiment in his party and in the country as the Brussels talks proved successful.

(15)

Macmillan's position in respect of his party was strong after the 1959 election. He was able to attempt policies outside the party tradition and, indeed, the party was made to shift its interest from the past to the future. Planning, incomes policy, and Europe were part of a single revolution.

Nevertheless, the E.E.C. move flew in the face of Conservative instincts, and of many agricultural and some Commonwealth-industrial interests traditionally supporting the party. An extensive programme of party re-education had to be carried out - by William Deedes and others - and was to prove a little too successful at the party's 1962 conference.

In the Commons anti-marketeters organized their campaign carefully. In debates in the House they avoided either voting against the Government or deliberately abstaining on the European issue as a gesture of hostility. Instead they made use of the Order Paper. As noted above, a degree of harassment in the Commons fed Edward Heath's disposition to acquire detailed definition and explanation.

The Labour Party's official stand against an easy settlement in Brussels engendered continental doubts about the United Kingdom's long term adhesion to Europe. It has been argued that the Labour position stemmed from an inherent lack of interest in Europe. Electoral calculation was also present. Gaitskell played his part in the outcome of the Brussels negotiations; his opposition was certainly heightened by his belief that Macmillan was going to use Europe to 'dish the Socialists' (see Note^c, p. 81).

Remarkably little can be said about the European preoccupations of industrialists during

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our period. In general, interest groups did not exercise much control on government, with the exception of the National Farmers' Unions. The N.F.U. - J.D. Stewart's 'beau ideal' of British pressure groups - was very active and alive and provides an interesting case-study of effective interest articulation, an encapsulated environment within the total process. Here there obviously existed some control over British foreign policy-formation. The N.F.U. at the time of the veto were still holding firm in their opposition. Their representative, Mr. Weingarten, claims they were merely taking part in an 'evolutionary situation'. While the European agricultural situation was undoubtedly evolutionary, so was the United Kingdom agricultural situation, with potential splits of membership facing the N.F.U.

In regard to the campaigners one fact is worthy of note. In contrasting Campaign and League activity one sees a curious reversal of roles. Usually right-wing pressure is exercised quietly in the corridors of power while radical orators strive to arouse the populace. Here the Campaign, on the whole, worked discreetly while the League held its great public meetings.

The 'public' is not a passive environment - it works on the politicians who, in their turn, seek to work upon the public. In the evolution of British relations with Europe since 1945 public opinion was never rallied by government action. Informed opinion on Europe slowly changed after 1956 but, by 1959, only a small minority of parliamentary candidates even mentioned the Common Market(1).

(1) Butler, D.E. and Rose, C.R.: British General Election of 1959, p.132

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In 1962 the Government was reluctant to mobilize mass opinion for fear of prejudicing its position in Brussels, and the wider public remained confused. British people continued to live on their Welfare State island, not deeply committed either way on Europe (the Polls showed a hardening of opinion against entry towards the end of 1962). Had the Government been able to give the public a strong, early lead on Europe, particularly if this had been a bi-partisan lead, the advantages for Edward Heath in Brussels would have been considerable. (Clifford Jupp: "The Government did not 'plug entry' at any time, it seemed to be powerless. This was the problem - perhaps more should have been done".)

Kenneth Younger, shortly after the Brussels breakdown, wrote:

".. it is surely no matter for congratulation that, during more than a decade of discussion, public opinion was never crystallised by the kind of grand debate which regularly convulses the United States. The result was that, throughout the Brussels negotiations, it never emerged from its confusion to play a constructive part in the moulding of events."(2)

Had integration been preached public opinion might well have responded.

Having coaxed the nation out of the shock of Suez, Macmillan inched the country towards Europe while stressing the economic gains. Macmillan's task was to persuade the electorate to accept a diminished place in the world. His lack of frankness on the political implications of entry into Europe was no way to prepare the electorate for a historic change of direction, and no way to convince Europeans of our commitment. De Gaulle

(2) Younger, K.: "Public Opinion and British Foreign Policy", in International Affairs, Vol.40, No.1.1964.

found it all too easy to point out to Europe
the lack of change in the British national temper.

(v) The Settlement

Finally one must refer back to what was said about the 'Package'. Clifford Jupp believes that, in January 1963, the British team knew what basis for agreement existed, what degree of settlement had occurred, but that, in Whitehall, Commonwealth Relations and Agriculture would have resisted an agreement to sign the E.E.C. Treaty. It is doubtful whether, among ministers, Butler could have been persuaded to accept such a signature and more than residual opposition probably existed in the persons of Hailsham and Maudling.

Sir Frank Lee, at the Treasury in 1963, is laconic about the Brussels failure: "We were ten years too late!". Maybe so. But agreements were reached in Brussels and, remembering the strictures of Butterwick and Rolfe (above, p. 112), one must conclude that the opportunities of the occasion were not seized. There was failure in organization for negotiation and failure in policy-making.

Notes: Economic Management 1959-1963

- 1959 Cheerful budget
Total tax cuts £360millions
Election: 'Never had it so good!'
- 1960 Stop Phase
Bank Rate 5% (January)
Hire Purchase controls (April)
Credit squeeze
Bank Rate 6% (June)
Go Phase
Bank Rate cut (October)
Hire Purchase controls relaxed (December)
- 1961 Beginning of speculation against the Pound following balance-of-payments deficit and revaluation of German Mark (March)

Stop Phase
Bank Rate 7% (July)
'Little Budget'
Pay pause
Credit squeeze
£535millions borrowed from I.M.F. (August)
- 1962 Go Phase
Higher tax on cars, but investment allowances and other measures to stimulate economy (October-November)
- 1963 Bank Rate cut
Some purchase tax concessions (January)

Expansionary Budget
£269million given in tax relief (April)

Note B. British and E.E.C. agricultural systems.
 The Treaty of Rome sets out the aims of its agricultural policy as follows: to increase agricultural productivity; to ensure a fair standard-of-living for those employed in agriculture; to stabilize markets; to guarantee supplies; and to ensure reasonable prices for consumers (Article 39(1)). Government obligations under the British Agriculture Act 1947 are not greatly different. These are said to be to promote and maintain:

".. a stable and efficient agricultural industry capable of producing such part of the nation's food and other agricultural produce as in the national interest it is desirable to produce in the United Kingdom, and of producing it at minimum prices consistently /sic/ with proper remuneration and living conditions for farmers and workers in agriculture and an adequate return on capital invested in the industry."(1)

The position of agriculture in the British economy is small relative to agriculture in Europe. (One in twenty British workers are on the land, in Europe three times as many. The average size of British farms is seventy acres, in Europe twenty-five acres. Agriculture contributes a twentieth to total production in Britain, in Europe a ninth. Britain's dependence on food imports per head of population is three times that of the European countries.)(2) Public management of food production is quite different in the two areas. In Britain import duties are generally low and many types of agricultural produce from the Commonwealth enter duty free. This means that market prices are much lower than on the continent. The British Government makes direct payments to the farmers when the market price falls below the equitable price set by price review boards.

"The fundamental features of the system are that the farmer sells his produce in the open market in competition with imports from the rest of the world and the difference between the average market price and

(1) Agriculture: report on talks between the Agricultural Departments and the Farmers' Unions, June to December 1960. Cmd.1249, footnote p.6.

(2) Agriculture in Europe, C.O.I. for Treasury Information Division, December 1962.

the guaranteed price is met by the deficiency payment from the Exchequer. The consumer gets the advantage of the competition in the market.. at the same time, low food prices stimulate consumption and widen the producer's market."(3)

(Deficiency payments are not all. British agriculture gets government help in the form of grants for buildings, drainage, and fertilizers. The white paper states that the annual cost of deficiency payments is £160millions, while £100millions goes on production and improvement grants.

This system of support has several advantages other than keeping down food prices - and thus of industrial exports: it affords protection against subsidised imports into Britain; it gives stability to an industry subject to weather and seasonal variation. One million people gain a living from the land directly or from the ancillary industries producing machinery, fertilisers, wool and food products. A significant contribution to exports is made by the farm machinery industry and a small but valuable contribution by exports of food products.)

The E.E.C. management of agriculture, by contrast involves help to farmers through control of imports and employs duties and levies - a system used by the British only to protect horticulture. European farmers can sell produce at prices which do not need supplements from taxation, and food prices are maintained at a relatively high level.

British farmers have pointed out that agriculture is not the only industry to receive state support but that the form the support for their industry takes inevitably invites contention. Farming is supported in a way which inevitably means that every year, at Budget time, the cost is high-lighted.(4) For its part, the government has been concerned that expenditure on agriculture could vary considerably from year to year owing to circumstances outside the control of farmer or government:

(3) Cmnd.1249, p.4, para.7.

(4) Cmnd.1249, para.12.

"To the extent that the market may be depressed the amount of the deficiency payment per unit of output becomes greater; and to the extent that output increases, the total amount of the commodity on which the deficiency payment is made again becomes greater. As often as not, a fall in prices is the consequence of increased supplies from home or overseas. Whilst for certain commodities the Exchequer commitment is in some respects limited, for most it is open-ended."(5)

On a short-term, year-to-year basis the government has had to calculate agriculture's efficiency and, bearing in mind the aid it has given, estimate what proportion of increased profit should go to the farmer. Long-term considerations have grown in importance.

(5) Op.cit., para.10

Note C Hugh Gaitskell. Conditions demanded by the Six were clearly affected by their estimate of British commitment. In this connection the evolution of Gaitskell's views is important, and was possibly decisive for Britain's chances.

In the summer of 1962 the Economist estimated that eighty Labour M.P.'s were against entry, seventy-five were in favour, and the rest would follow their leader. Gaitskell, with unilateralist and Clause Four battles so recent, had to make a decision on Europe which was clearly of crucial importance for party unity. (had it meant voting against entry into Europe, Roy Jenkins and some other strong supporters might have found difficulty in remaining in the party.) Nora Beloff believes that suspicions that Gaitskell was being less than frank over Europe were encouraged by many months of subterfuge. The Labour leader publicly argued that he favoured entry, but only on conditions within which Europe would have ceased to be a community - Gaitskell was for the Common Market but against supranationality. (At various times Gaitskell advocated greater control by the Council if ministers over the Commission, and a weakening of the two thirds majority rule - suggestion which ran directly counter to the steps M. Spaak and other European Socialists demanded to strengthen the Communities.) Gaitskell, among other Labour Members, paid less attention to possible Community achievement than to restriction on national freedom. At the 1962 conference he,

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savagely snubbed some of his most loyal followers who happened to be as European as they were Gaitskellite and gave the anti-Gaitskellite Left a sense that they had scored a victory." (2)

(Willi Brandt recorded the disappointment of friends on the continent on the occasion of the conference speech.)(3)

There is no doubt that Commonwealth Socialist leaders did much to harden Gaitskell's feelings over entry. Particular influence has been attributed to the Indian Ambassador in Brussels, B.K. Lell. (Shortly after the rupture in Brussels India sought a trade agreement with the Six precisely along the lines worked out during the negotiations.)

Was Gaitskell influential? Piers Dixon guesses that Gaitskell in August 1962 may still have been in favour of British entry but that, by the time of his December visit to Paris he was firmly opposed. "He was unable to see de Gaulle but he left Pompidou in no doubt of his feelings. This change of front conveniently played into the hands of the French Government.(4) Miriam Camps does not go so far,; Gaitskell's position eased the General's task of breaking off negotiations:

"Mr. Gaitskell visited Paris early in December 1962 and in a speech to the Anglo-American Press Association was not only very critical of the concessions made by the British Government during the negotiations but very outspoken about the dangers he saw in a European federation. He also had talks with M. Mollet, M. Pompidou, and M. Couve de Murville. After these talks, suggestions began to appear (emanating apparently from

- (2)
(2) Rodgers, W.T.: op.cit., pp.155-156
(3) Rodgers, W.T.: op.cit., p.139
(4) Double Diploma, p.295

both M. Mollet and French government sources) that it might be better for the British to be associated in some way with the Common Market rather than to become members. Some people have felt that Mr. Gaitskell's talks in Paris at this time contributed significantly to General de Gaulle's decision to veto British membership of the E.E.C. This seems improbable. On the other hand, Mr. Gaitskell's views lent useful verisimilitude to General de Gaulle's case against the British.."(5)

Gorell Barnes has said, however that Gaitskell's position must have made a significant effect on the Six. Nora Beloff thinks that his status as possible next Prime Minister gave him an influence at home and abroad that finally enabled him to work, perhaps, decisively for Britain's exclusion from Europe(6).

On 7th November, 1962 Gaitskell sought to soften the negative impression of his stand in relation to Europe: he was no isolationist, but wanted better and friendlier relations with Europe. (George Brown, by contrast, became more critical of E.E.C.'s demands upon Britain. At this time he had to secure continuance of his position as Deputy Leader in the Parliamentary Labour Party. However, on 12th January, in Dewsbury, with the party election behind him, he went as far as to warn Macmillan that if he sought to take Britain into Europe on unsatisfactory terms he would do it without Labour and without the large majority of the British people.)

(5) Camp, M.: op.cit. p.469 ft.

(6) Beloff,N.: op.cit. p.135

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Note D.: De Gaulle "France is Europe, de Gaulle is France". This, says Duncan Sandys, was the French leader's belief. The negotiations could have succeeded and we should have pressed for a continuation of talks - the veto was not real since a comprehensive draft agreement did not yet exist. Clifford Jupp believes that the veto showed that France believed that entry was too near. The ground had been well-prepared, thinks Sir Michael Fraser, and de Gaulle's action was the strongest indication of likely success. Miriam Camps comments:

"On the evidence now available, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the Government of General de Gaulle advocated membership for the United Kingdom when they were confident that there was no chance that the British Government would apply to join, and that they subsequently acted on the assumption that the British Government would not, in fact, be willing, or politically strong enough, to accept the terms which a strict reading of the Treaty of Rome and of the subsequent decision of the Community implied."(1)

Some support for these views is available from the Peyrefitte memorandum, published in June 1962(2). In this, a strategy with respect to the United Kingdom which corresponded fairly

(1) Op.cit., p.500

(2) In June 1962 the Agence Internationale d'Information pour la Presse in Luxembourg reproduced a memorandum on how to sell the Gaullist conception of a European confederation which, it said, had been written in the summer of 1960 by M. Alain Peyrefitte, who was at that time a Gaullist Deputy but later became the French Minister of Information. In this memorandum ways of exploiting the hopes and making use of the forms of language of the 'Europeans' to attain Gaullist ends were very cynically outlined. (Camps, M.: op.cit., p.500 footnote.)

(5)

closely with that later followed by the French Government was suggested. The General, says Reginald Maudling, was at all times determined to say "No"(3).

One French historian has said that three sets of factors could explain de Gaulle's mistrust of Britain: the behaviour of the English during the war, and their non-participation in the building of Europe after the war; the slowness of the Brussels negotiations; and, the excessive demands made by Britain at Brussels - "les anglais ne savaient pas se plier aux regles". L'Express, 7th June 1962 observed:

"Au fond, de Gaulle veut fair une Europe dont il aurait la direction.. Si l'Angleterre s'intégrait a l'Europe, au contraire, la France aurait la une partenaire avec qui il faudrait compter et tout serait change."(4)

(3) Letter

(4) Jouve, Edmond: Le General de Gaulle et la Construction de l'Europe, 1967, p.180

To the above one must add nuclear considerations. At the time of the June 1962 meeting of Macmillan and de Gaulle at the Chateau de Champs the latter was much concerned with the problems associated with the production of France's nuclear weapons. Suggestions of an Anglo-French nuclear partnership had emanated from London but, at the meeting, the subject was not raised - both leaders spoke in generalities. Until December it was possible that a partnership could have been agreed:

"Aussi longtemps que la Grande-Bretagne avait sa force stratégique nucléaire indépendante avec ses bombes A et H, ses véhicules porteurs, ses avions 'Vulcan' prêts à transporter des fusées 'Skybolt' un accord franco-britannique restait possible dans ce domaine. Dans ce cas, des informations scientifiques et militaires auraient dû nous être communiquées, à la suite notamment d'un amendement à la loi MacMahon. Les perspectives changèrent lorsque, au début du mois de décembre 1962, Washington annonce que, la stratégie fondée sur l'aviation étant révolue, la fabrication des 'Skybolt' et la construction des 'B70' était interrompue."(5)

The French believed that Macmillan, during a visit by McNamara prior to Nassau, had been informed of Kennedy's intention to break off Skybolt and B70 programmes. Macmillan had failed to communicate the news at Rambillet on 16th December.(6)

Macmillan met Kennedy during the period 18th to 21st December 1962 at Nassau to discuss Skybolt. Pierson Dixon reported that de Gaulle had been told by Macmillan that there would be need for a substitute if Skybolt were cancelled.(7)

(5) Jouve, E.: op.cit., pp. 185-186

(6) Op.cit., p.185

(7) Double Diploma, p.299

De Gaulle was not invited to Nassau and no regard was paid there to the two years' work of the N.A.T.O. Permanent Council which had been devoted to the Alliance's nuclear armament. (83)

At the end of December Pierson Dixon was in London to discuss the impact on France of Britain's Polaris agreement and to find a formula for the avoidance of trouble. A Polaris offer to France might remove any pretext to exclude Britain from the E.E.C. and might tie France to N.A.T.O. (93) Macmillan did persuade Kennedy to make France a Polaris offer. The American Ambassador, Charles Bohlen, discussed the matter with de Gaulle on 2nd and 4th January 1963. On the 11th the General refused the offer.

France believed that the compelling reasons for the British attempt to enter E.E.C. had been the conviction that the shortest route to a genuine Atlantic partnership lay through membership of the Community. Nassau underlined that this goal was never far from British minds. De Gaulle's refusal of Polaris made sense:

"Ce refus créait une situation paradoxale, A Londres, les accords de Nassau avaient été interprétés comme signifiant la fin des relations privilégiées avec les Etats-Unis étant donné que la France faisait l'objet de la même proposition. Cet événement confirme le président de la République française dans sa conviction que le Premier britannique préfère une situation de 'satellite' américain à celle de partenaire européen. Dès lors, il redoute que la Grande-Bretagne, si elle parvenait à rejoindre les Six, ne se comporte avant tout comme le 'cheval de Troie' des Etats-Unis." (10)

- (82) Jouve, E.: op.cit., p.185
- (93) Pierson Dixon, op.cit. p.301
- (10) Jouve, E.: op.cit., p.186

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If Macmillan hinted at the possibility of a joint Anglo-French nuclear programme within a Union of Western Europe (as he may have done at the Chateau de Champs), he must have linked it with a scheme which made it compatible with the North Atlantic Alliance, something which the General could never accept. When, subsequently, Macmillan agreed at Nassau that British nuclear submarines should be provided with Polaris missiles, subject to their forming part of an Atlantic force, de Gaulle (even though he was offered the same facilities) was provided with a heaven-sent opportunity to break. For President Kennedy's extended offer to France was irrelevant in the context of de Gaulle's principle of total national independence, notwithstanding the fact that France had not as yet any nuclear submarines wherewith to house the Polaris weapons. And the General was in any case now powerful enough to torpedo Kennedy's 'Grand Design'.(11)

(11) Lord Gladwyn: De Gaulle's Europe, pp.76-77

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