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UKRAINIAN NATIONALISM AND SOVIET POWER
IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR

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being a thesis submitted for
the degree of M.Litt.
in the University of Glasgow

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SUMMARY

This paper is a study of the history of the Ukrainian nationalist movement which arose in Western Ukraine in the 1920's and reached the peak of its development during the German-Soviet war of 1941-45. Emphasis is given to the War period when this movement was able to penetrate the Ukrainian SSR in the wake of the German advance and occupation of Soviet territories. The study focuses on the development of the politics of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (Orhanizatsiya Ukrayins'ykh Natsionalistiv--OUN) and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (Ukrayins'ka Povstans'ka Armiya--UPA) which were the principal nationalist parties during the period, and examines their roles in the light of the changing balance of military forces and the attitudes of Eastern and Western Ukrainians to the German occupation.

The OUN was formed in 1929 as a fusion of several nationalist groups in Western Ukraine and in East European Ukrainian communities. The programme adopted by the OUN at its founding Congress called for the establishment of an independent corporatist state to include all ethnographically Ukrainian territories--Soviet Ukraine, Bukovina and Bessarabia in Northern Rumania, Transcarpathia in Czechoslovakia and the Ukrainian provinces of Poland. In the course of its activity during the decade before the outbreak of the Second World War, the nationalist movement succeeded in becoming the principal spokesman for national liberation with its own particular proposed solutions.

The ascendancy of the OUN concurred with the demise of the Communist Party of Western Ukraine (CPWU), the organisation which had championed national aspirations of the Western Ukrainian populace in the 1920's. The social conditions of Western Ukraine, the decline of the communist movement there and the emergence of the nationalist OUN are examined in Chapter One.

The German campaign against Poland in September, 1939 resulted in the division of Western Ukraine between the Soviet occupation to the east of the Sian--Vistula line and the establishment of Nazi occupancy rule to the west. The majority of OUN cells were in the Soviet territory between 1939 and 1941 but carried on little activity. In the Generalgouvernement, the OUN leadership had succeeded in placing its membership in the Gestapo units and in the administrations of the occupied Ukrainian territories. It also assisted in the formation of two German-Ukrainian legions, Nachtigall and Roland. In the course of the two years before the German attack on the Soviet Union, tactical differences in the leading organs of the OUN, related largely to the nature of the movement's co-operation with the Third Reich led to an organisational split creating two factions under the leadership of S. Bandera (OUN-B) and R. Mel'nyk (OUN-M). The latter group was to play a more consistent role of collaboration with the German occupation during the War than did the OUN-B.

When Germany invaded the USSR in June 1941, both factions of the OUN attempted to extend their influence into Eastern Ukraine. Both sent expeditionary forces (pokhidni hrupy) there, whose task it was to build up an organisational network of local persons. Their principal opponents in this venture were the communist underground and partisan movement. While the Red Partisans were a weak force from June 1941 to the summer of the following year, their support within the populace grew as Nazi repressions in the occupied East intensified.

The nationalists were unable to provide a clear political alternative to the Eastern Ukrainians and thereby defaulted to the communist movement which the Ukrainian masses in 1942 saw as the lesser of two evils. Chapter II of this paper examines the role of the nationalist movement from the German invasion of June, 1941 up to the beginning of the Soviet offensive in early 1943. Sections on the communist underground and partisan movement and on the political views of workers and peasants in Eastern Ukraine provide a preliminary insight into the reasons for the failure of the nationalists to create a mass base in Soviet Ukraine during the War.

Both factions of the OUN were unable to disassociate themselves from the German occupation or to present a coherent political programme to their audiences. In the first months of 1943, when the Soviet offensive was underway, the pressure of anti-Nazi sentiment in Ukraine and the extreme social dislocation there resulted in the formation of an anti-German and anti-Soviet guerrilla army in the North Western Ukraine--the Ukrayins'ka Povstans'ka Armiya-Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA). The UPA, which came to be linked with the OUN-B after the latter group's adoption of an anti-German orientation, constitutes the highest point of the nationalist movement's history. Chapter III examines the formation of the UPA, its programme, social composition and activity in 1943. The formation of the SS Division Galicia, examined here also, illustrates the continuation of the traditional orientation by the OUN-M, a policy which this group did not abandon for the duration of the War. At the Third Extra-Ordinary Congress of the OUN-B in August, 1943, the Bandera group defined its new anti-German position and adopted a progressive democratic programme. The new perspectives of the OUN-B and the UPA appear to have been due to the massive popular pressure in Ukraine which was opposing the occupation already in 1942 and the fact that Germany was losing the War.

As the Red Army crossed into Western Ukraine in 1944, the UPA remained the only nationalist force of any political or military significance. By the end of 1943, it had grown to a strength of 40,000 and controlled sizeable rural territories in North Western Ukraine. From its bases, the guerrillas organised raids into Central Ukraine and Galicia. The Red Army and partisan movement encountered considerable difficulties in the course of the Soviet advance from the UPA units. As the German armies were pushed out of Ukraine through the Carpathian Mountains, the Soviet military and police forces turned their attention to the nationalist insurgents.

While the UPA was fighting these forces, the re-emergence of Polish-Ukrainian hostilities in Western Ukraine forced it to turn its attention in this direction also. The conflict, amounting to a bloody national war in 1943 and 1944 in which the Red Partisans, the communist underground, Polish nationalist and communist forces, the UPA and remaining OUN-B groups participated, is dealt with in Chapter IV. The character of the Soviet offensive in 1944 and the UPA's response to it, mentioned above, are the subjects of other sections in this chapter.

The mass peasant base that the nationalist insurgents had developed complicated post-war Soviet efforts to defeat them. Moreover, the absence of border controls between the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and Poland provided the UPA with an easy exit from Western Ukraine when military campaigns against them there intensified. A great part of the nationalist forces moved to Southern Poland at the end of the War in order to protect Ukrainian villages from Polish nationalist and government units. It was not until 1947 when a combined campaign of Soviet, Polish and Czechoslovak armies blockaded the border regions that the UPA was destroyed. Chapter V traces the nationalist movement's decline and defeat, from the consolidation of

Soviet power in Western Ukraine to the 1947 campaign.

The author's conclusion evaluates the politics of both OUN factions and the UPA throughout the War and analyses the factors behind its inability to achieve a mass following in any part of Ukraine other than the Western Ukrainian peasantry--its ideological heritage, the absence of a science of analysis and practice, the OUN's association with Nazi rule and the contradictory character of the change of orientation in 1943.

ABBREVIATIONS AND TRANSLITERATION

Abbreviations in the Text

- AK: Armija Krajowa (Home Army)
- CPWU: Communist Party of Western Ukraine (Komunistychna Partiya Zakhidnoyi Ukrayiny).
- NKVD: Narodnyy Kommissariat Vnutrennikh Del' (People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs).
- OUN: Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (Orhanizatsiya Ukrayins'kykh Natsionalistiv).
- OUN-B: Bandera faction of the OUN.
- OUN-M: Mel'nyk faction of the OUN.
- UHVR: Ukrayins'ka Holovna Vyzvol'na Rada (Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council).
- UNDO: Ukrayins'ke National'ne Demokratychnе Obyednannya (Ukrainian National Democratic Union).
- UPA: Ukrayins'ka Povstans'ka Armiya (Ukrainian Insurgent Army).
- UVO: Ukrayins'ka Viys'kova Orhanizatsiya (Ukrainian Military Organisation).

Abbreviations in Footnotes

- (i) Reference to numbered documents appearing in the Documents section of the Bibliography are given as 'P. Doc.' followed by the appropriate number. Example: P.Doc. 86.
- (ii) Reference to documents and other materials of the Archive of the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council in New York are given as 'UHVR' followed by a transliterated listing of the original catalogue listing of the Archive's collection. Examples: a document listed in the Archive as A4-1 becomes UHVR A4-1; B1-1 becomes UHVR V4-1; C1-2 becomes UHVR S1-2; etc.

Transliteration

Transliteration from the Ukrainian of titles, publishers, proper names, etc. observes the following method:

(i) the multiple vowels are transliterated thus:

є :ye, ї :yi, я :ya, ю :yu;

(ii) the mute 'Ь' appears as an apostrophe (').

(iii) with the exception of proper names, 'иї' becomes 'yy'. In proper names it is rendered simply as 'y'.

(iv) the capital city of Ukraine appears in the most popular English spelling 'Kiev' rather than the accurate transliteration 'Kyyiv'.

INTRODUCTION

The roots of the Ukrainian nationalist movement are to be found in the Polish state established after the First World War and in the condition of the Ukrainian minority living in its eastern territories. An introduction to the role of the nationalist movement during the Second World War, which is the subject of this paper, must therefore summarise the implications of the Paris Peace Conference and Polish-Soviet negotiations over the western Soviet border upon the Ukrainian question in the interwar period.

The main objective of the Allies at Vers^aailles in 1919 with regard to Eastern Europe was the creation of independent states which would isolate Russia from Germany. The settlement attempted to construct a cordon sanitaire between these two powers, and to eliminate, as much as possible, their economic and political influence in Eastern Europe. This objective was challenged by both Russia and Germany. German aims in Eastern Europe were already evident in the 1918 Treaty of Brest-Litovsk--the setting up of a number of German client states in the Baltic area, Poland and the Ukraine, and the limitation of Russia to her narrow ethnic boundaries.¹ Germany's desire to have markets in the East remained a central factor in her foreign policy throughout the interwar period.

Russia had little regard for the newly established state boundaries immediately after the War. The Bolsheviks were prepared to

¹Antony Polonsky, The Little Dictators: The History of Eastern Europe Since 1918 (London, 1975), p. 16.

violate them in the event of a revolutionary upsurge in Germany; the Red Army entered Poland in 1920 hoping to reach Germany through Polish territory. After 1923, when the Polish-Soviet border was settled and there was little prospect of a revolution in Germany, the Soviet government recognised the established state boundaries.

The attempt by the Allies to establish the East European states on uniform ethnographic territories was made difficult by the historic intermingling of nationalities in these regions. Consequently, the borders of each state could only approximate the ethnic boundaries of each nation, leaving sizeable minorities within each country. Hungarians comprised 89.6% of the population in Hungary in 1920; Czechs and Slovaks were 66.2% of Czechoslovakia in 1930; Serbs and Croats 77% in Yugoslavia in 1931 and Rumanians 71% of Rumania's population in 1930. The Poles in Poland in 1921 amounted to 69% of the population. Of the remaining 30%, six million were Ukrainians.²

Responsibility for the protection of the rights of national minorities in Eastern Europe was entrusted to the League of Nations. In the case of Poland, the Polish Minorities Treaty, signed in 1919 at Versailles by the Allies and Polish representatives, provided for the protection of cultural, linguistic, legal and social rights of the Ukrainians, Jews, Byelorussians and other national groups.³ A procedure for presenting grievances to the Council of the League was formalised whereby any individual or national group could approach the League of Nations with its complaints.

Antagonisms between Poland and Germany developed in 1919 over the issue of their common border. Poland wanted a wide area joining

²Ibid., pp. 158-64.

³League of Nations, Protection of Linguistic, Racial and Religious Minorities by the League of Nations (Geneva, 1927), pp. 42-45.

Central Poland with the Baltic and including all of Poznan, Pomerania, Danzig and the western half of East Prussia. To the south, Poland claimed the whole of Upper Silesia. These claims were based on grounds of economic and strategic necessity and questionable arguments of a Polish ethnic majority in these areas. After strong protests by Germany and successive attempts by Polish partisans in August 1919, August 1920 and May 1921 to liberate the regions in question by force of arms, a settlement was reached. Germany succeeded in gaining a greater part of Upper Silesia, but lost important industrial assets in the territory Poland annexed.⁴ Greater losses were suffered along the eastern border when almost all the claims made by Poland were met by the Allies.

The attempt to settle the Polish-Soviet border issue was complicated by the continuation of Allied intervention in Russia and Polish attempts to gain a greater part of Western Ukraine, well beyond Polish ethnographic boundaries. In June, 1919, Pilsudski succeeded in occupying East Galicia with the blessing of the Allies.⁵ When the Red Army began its drive across Ukraine into Poland in the first months of 1920, Pilsudski signed an agreement with Simon Petliura, head of the Ukrainian People's Republic to join forces with the latter's army and oppose the Bolsheviks. In exchange for Pilsudski's co-operation, Petliura ceded the Kholm region and East Galicia to Poland.⁶

After the defeat of Petliura's forces and the collapse of the Ukrainian People's Republic in 1920, the Red Army advanced to Warsaw. After its retreat into Western Ukraine again, the two powers negotiated a settlement of borders. The Treaty of Riga in 1921 established the boundary at the river Zbrucz, thereby ceding to Poland East Galicia

⁴C. A. Macartney and A. W. Palmer, Independent Eastern Europe (London, 1962), pp. 105-107.

⁵Ibid., p. 111.

⁶Ibid., p. 113.

and Kholm as Petliura had previously negotiated.

As a result of the postwar settlements, Ukrainian territories became parts of four separate states. Thirty million Ukrainians lived in the Ukrainian SSR, one million in the northern territory of Rumania (Bessarabia and Bukovina); six million lived in Poland, and the Transcarpathian region with its population of five hundred thousand Ukrainians became part of Czechoslovakia.⁷

At first the Allied powers attempted to provide a status of autonomy for Galicia within the Polish state in order to prevent the resumption of traditional hostilities between the Ukrainians and Poles. This proposition was bluntly rejected by Pilsudski and Galicia was incorporated into Poland in February 1923 with the sole guarantee of minorities protection being the Minorities Treaty and the League of Nations' ability to enforce it.⁸

Apart from Soviet Ukraine, the strongest movement for national independence and unification of Ukrainian territories was amongst the Galician Ukrainians. Opposition to the Versailles agreement was only one of the stimulants to this movement. Austro-Hungarian rule up to the First World War had encouraged the development of republican sentiments and a modern national consciousness within the Western Ukrainian intelligentsia. This, combined with the experience of the Western Ukrainian People's Republic in 1918, established by a bloc of social democrats, radical socialists and other supporters of the independence-unification movement, resulted in the Ukrainian population in Galicia not only being aware of its social and national predicament, but also seeking political independence as a solution to

⁷ Hugh Seton-Watson, Eastern Europe Between the Wars 1918-1941 (Cambridge, 1945), p. 117.

⁸ Oscar I. Janowsky, Nationalities and National Minorities (New York, 1945), p. 117.

these problems.

The unwillingness of the Polish government to protect the rights of the Ukrainians and the inability of the League of Nations to act upon grievances (such action was regarded by Poland as an intrusion upon its sovereignty) was another factor giving way to the emergence of the nationalist movement. The discriminatory practices of the educational system in Western Ukraine and the implications of land reforms upon the Western Ukrainian peasantry were two of the problems, and subsequently grievances of the nationalists, which are dealt with in the first chapter of this paper.

The economic conditions brought about by the Depression of 1929 further aggravated the social conditions in Western Ukraine, particularly for the working class (unemployment and the drop in living standards) and the peasantry (drop in grain prices on the international market). This occurred at a time when the peasants' land was being expropriated by Polish colonists in Galicia and the Volyn region.

That the nationalist movement which arose in response to these conditions was of extreme right wing character may be explained by reference to the general political situation in Poland. On the one hand, the character of the nationalist movement had much in common with the growing trend to the right in Poland, especially after Pilsudski's coup against the elected government in 1926. This coup opened the door to an increasingly authoritarian state rule and the proliferation of militarist, anti-Semitic and fascist currents within Poland's middle classes.⁹ For many, Fascism appeared to be the system of the future. On the other hand, the decline of the communist movement in Western

⁹ Polonsky, Little Dictators, p. 49.

Ukraine, which had previously championed the cause of Ukrainian political independence and territorial unification, and the concurrent emergence of Stalinism in the Soviet Union lent credibility to the nationalists' programme for an independent, authoritarian and anti-communist Ukrainian state.

Germany's re-armament in the 1930's under the Nazi leadership made it apparent to many international observers that she may seek to redress her territorial grievances by military means. The rapid growth of her economy and its limited access to markets gave concrete arguments to these territorial grievances. In this situation, Poland became one target of the Nazi leadership. If Poland was captured by Germany, then a Soviet-German conflict appeared inevitable.

The Ukrainian nationalists saw in Nazi Germany an exemplary opponent of the Versailles agreement and an enemy of the Soviet Union. Not only did they emulate National Socialist doctrine, but also sought to develop real contacts with the German state. These took the form of regular liaison between the leadership of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), the main component of the Western Ukrainian movement, and German intelligence. The OUN expected to capitalise on such relations in the event of a German-Soviet war by playing an active role on the German side and extending its influence into Soviet Ukraine. There it could reach the greater part of the Ukrainian nation. These expectations flowered into concrete perspectives in 1939.

It was during the Second World War that the nationalist movement reached its zenith. At the same time it splintered, creating an anti-German guerrilla tendency alongside the traditional group. By the end of the war, this anti-German tendency had developed a progressive social programme and commanded the support of a mass peasant base in Western Ukraine. The consolidation of Soviet power

in 1945 over all Ukrainian territories prevented the growth of this nationalist current. The greater part of this paper is devoted to the evolution of the nationalist movement during the War, with particular emphasis given to its programme and strategy.

Three distinct schools of historical analysis have emerged since the Second World War on this subject. The 'Ukrainian nationalist' school, represented by Petro Mirchuk, author of Narys Istoriyi OUN,¹⁰ has tended to omit the OUN's association with Nazi Germany and imply that the movement's politics were always as progressive as those of the anti-German current of the movement. Having great difficulty in making such an analysis appear credible, this school of thought has been unable to present a single comprehensive history of nationalist politics during the Second World War. Analyses of specific activities of the OUN, such as Lev Shankowsky's history of the OUN's advance into Soviet Ukraine in 1941, Pokhidni Hrupy OUN¹¹ and memoirs of individual activists are, however, available.

The second school of thought, the 'Soviet school' has interpreted the nationalist movement during the war as a consistently pro-Nazi appendage and ignores the evolution of its politics after 1943.¹² Its analysis is strikingly uniform from one historian's work to another, differing only in minor aspects. Moreover, this school has not given due attention to the movement itself, but rather utilised its less savoury activities in a continuing polemic with emigre

¹⁰Petro Mirchuk, Narys Istoriyi OUN 1920-1939 (Munich, 1968).

¹¹Lev Shankowsky, Pokhidni Hrupy OUN (Munich, 1958).

¹²The standard interpretation of the Soviet school is the three volume history of the War Ukrayins'ka RSR u Velykiy Vitchyznyaniy Viyni Radyans'koho Soyuzu 1941-1945 r.r. (Kiev, 1969).

nationalist groups in the West.

The third "school" is not really ^a school because it has produced few works. John Armstrong's Ukrainian Nationalism¹³ is the only serious study of the subject by a Western scholar. Armstrong's method of investigation is largely sociological, attempting to provide an insight into the personalities of the OUN, the relationship between social class, religion, regional origin and adherence to the nationalist doctrine. Perhaps its most serious shortcoming is that it fails to explain the nature of Ukrainian nationalism and its evolution during the War and treats it as a constant, unchanged by social and political forces. Another study relating to this subject is German Rule in Russia¹⁴ by Alexander Dallin. Because Dallin has chosen to deal with the German policies in the USSR as his central topic, the nationalist movement is not analysed in depth.

The present study has attempted to utilise existing sources and the works of the above-mentioned schools of thought. The subject under study is of the very recent past, resulting in highly partisan interpretation, especially by participants on the Soviet and nationalist sides.

We have attempted to treat all materials, and especially interpretive studies critically; serious divergences of interpretation are noted in the text.

¹³ John A. Armstrong, Ukrainian Nationalism (New York, 1963).

¹⁴ Alexander Dallin, German Rule in Russia 1941-1945. A Study of Occupation Policies (London, 1957).

CHAPTER I

National and Social Divisions in
Western Ukraine

However much cultural differences and historical memories may have contributed to the formation of the Ukrainian nationalist movement, it is difficult to conceive how it could have arisen had it not, to a large extent, corresponded with a basic cleavage in the social structure of the Ukraine. There, to an unusual degree, nationality co-incided with economic class. The Ukrainians were, with the exception of a small intelligentsia, almost entirely peasants¹

The western part of ethnographically Ukrainian territories which came under Polish state rule in 1923 were the provinces of Galicia, Volyn, Polissia, Podlachia and Kholm. In Galicia, the national heartland of Ukrainians in Western Ukraine, there were approximately 3.7 million Ukrainians (65% of the population), in Volyn 1.4 million (68%), in Polissia approximately 700,000 (76%) and 2.1 million in Podlachia and Kholm. The main secondary industries were of a resource extraction character--timber from the Carpathian region, oil in Drohobych and Stanislav (Galicia) and chemical industries throughout the Lviv region. The chief means of communication was the railway system, which had been built to service these industries. The strongest secondary service industry in the towns and cities was the building industry.²

¹Armstrong, Ukrainian Nationalism, p. 10.

²Yu. H. Hoshko, Hromads'kyi Pobut Robotnykiv Zakhidnoyi Ukrayiny 1920-1939 r.r. (Kiev, 1967), pp. 9-11.

Among the industrial workers, three national groups predominated; in 1931 there were 338,900 Ukrainians, 261,000 Poles and 64,000 Jews.³ Most of the Ukrainian labour force was employed in low paid, unskilled and semi-skilled jobs in the building industry, oil rigs, brick kilns and timber camps. The Polish workers were a privileged stratum, many of them having migrated from Poland's industrial heartland to Western Ukraine.

In order to obtain work, Ukrainians were forced to change their religion from Orthodoxy to Roman Catholicism, this being the first step towards cultural assimilation in the predominantly Polish towns.

The heaviest concentrations of workers were in the Lviv województwo (administrative region) where oil refineries, chemical, leather and metal works predominated.⁴ In spite of this geographic concentration, the Western Ukrainian working class was an unstable social stratum in the 1920's, given the absence of a hereditary nucleus of worker families and the prevalence of seasonal employment of peasants.

The national composition of the middle classes (artisans, small businesses, professions) heavily favoured non-Ukrainians. Whereas there were 50,400 Ukrainians in these occupations, Jews numbered 168,000 and those of the Catholic faith (largely Poles and Armenians) numbered 63,000.⁵

The policy of industrialists in Western Ukraine was low capital investment and high labour intensity to yield maximum profits. The

³Ibid., p. 12.

⁴Ibid., p. 13.

⁵Ibid., p. 11.

pressure of unemployment in the towns and overpopulation in the rural areas kept wages down and enabled employers to enforce a rigorous pace of work on the shop floor. Consequently, the turnover of labour was high. In 1936, Polish official statistics gave the following figures for labour turnover in four Western Ukraine regions: those who stayed on one job for under two years accounted for the following percentage of the employed work force--in Lviv województwo, 43.6%; in Ternopil region, 46.9%; 63% in Stanislav and 68% in Volyn. Those who had remained on one job for ten to fifteen years accounted for the following percentages of labour employed in each respective region: 14.1%, 3.5%, 4.4% and 3.8%.⁶

Skills required on most industrial jobs were minimal owing to the low capital investment in mechanisation. The Polish government was not required, therefore, to establish technical training schools. Whatever skilled labour was needed could be brought in from central Poland. In the oil refining plant 'Galicia' in Drohobych in 1936, 308 of 507 workers were unskilled. Similarly in the nearby 'Polmin' factory, 419 of 614 were unskilled labourers.⁷ Where there existed a nationally mixed labour force, racial divisions amongst the workers were stimulated by the payment of higher wages to the more skilled Poles.

The lot of the Ukrainian worker was particularly onerous; not only was he subject to the arduous work in dangerous and unsanitary conditions along with the Polish workers, but in addition suffered national discrimination by his employers and the government. The Rev. J. Barr and J. Davies reported the following to the British House of Commons in 1931 after an inquiry into the Polish-Ukrainian conflict:

Before the War there was an equal portion of
Poles and Ukrainians in all government works;

⁶ Ibid., p. 11.

⁷ loc. cit.,

but then, now there is a very small number of Ukrainians in government employ . . . seven thousand Ukrainian railwaymen have lost their work and Poles have been put in their place.

. . . They further maintain that when, owing to the Depression, staffs had to be reduced, Ukrainian workmen were the first to go . . . Ukrainian workmen employed by industries under government control during Austrian times are not there now. Thus in the city of Drohobych, which I visited, in the petroleum refinery called Polmin, there are six hundred workmen employed of whom only ten are Ukrainians, and even these have to be careful to avoid their own organisations and parties.⁸

With the inflationary spiral of the thirties, the standard of living of workers in Western Ukraine declined severely. Unemployment there tripled between 1923 and 1937 amounting to approximately 22% of the urban population.⁹ In Lviv 50,000 persons were without means of subsistence in 1935. In 1938, 35% of workers' quarters in the city were cellars and attics. Sixty-five thousand persons, in families of between two and twelve members lived in one room flats.¹⁰

The overwhelming majority of the population, however, still lived on the land. Agricultural production figured prominently in the economy and constituted one of the main interests of the Polish state and landed aristocracy in Western Ukraine. Here again, national divisions corresponded to class divisions. Ukrainian peasants constituted the vast majority of the rural population but owned only twenty percent of the land. 37.5% of the farmers had holdings of between two and five hectares, while the large landowners--Polish magnates, the Catholic Church and army-officers--owned about 50% of the

⁸ J. Barr and J. Davies, Report on the Polish Ukrainian Conflict in Eastern Galicia (London, 1931).

⁹ Hoshko, Hromads'kyi Pobut Robitnykiv, p. 39.

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 35.

land. The latter group represented less than one percent of the population.¹¹

After the First World War, the Polish government had encouraged the settlement of Western Ukraine by retired army officers, particularly along the Polish-Soviet border. Their services as guardians of law and order were required in return for the land they occupied. This venture, beginning in 1922 resulted in considerable expropriation of peasants' land. Between 1926 and 1929, as a result of the Land Reform Act of 1925, 560,000 hectares of land occupied by Ukrainian peasants were redistributed to Polish settlers and military colonists.¹²

A significant portion of the peasantry became landless and took the form of roving bands of the unemployed. This stratum swelled in times of bad harvests on the plains or in the foothills of the Carpathian mountains. Violence ensued as these expropriated Ukrainians vent their frustration on the Polish aristocracy and government officials:

For years after the War there was discontent and distress among the Ukrainians of East Galicia. These were the days when nationalist ideas made headlong progress . . . When I rode through the villages I witnessed scenes and heard first hand accounts of local strife which were not pretty. Again the vicious circle of outrage and repression formed itself. Local enthusiasts, with mistaken ideas of advertising the justice of their cause, would burn down haystacks or kill a policeman. Polish authority naturally took stern action: enthusiasts promptly became martyrs, and when condemned to imprisonment or death their fate aroused new disorders, calling for even sterner action. If the reader will recall the unhappy days of the Black and Tans in Ireland, in fact, he will have an exact parallel of the picture in the Polish

¹¹Stephen Horak, Poland and Her National Minorities 1919-1934 (New York, 1961), p. 152.

¹²loc. cit., See also L. Ye. Kyzya, Narodni Mesnyky (Lviv, 1960), p. 11.

Ukraine in the first years after
the World War.¹³

Complementing the social discrimination against Western Ukrainians, a more blatant inequality developed in the education system. There was a drastic decline in the number of schools teaching the native language in the interwar period (See Table 1). The introduction of bilingual schools in 1924 served only as a cover for continued discrimination against the Ukrainian majority. Lectures in the native language were confined to hours allocated for religious instruction, sport, art, but not for literature, mathematics, history, etc. The student composition of these bilingual schools in 1925/26 was 88.2% Ukrainian and only 9.5% Polish.¹⁴ Similarly, statistics given in Table 4 show the discriminatory practices in teacher training a factor which re-inforced the overall inequality in educational opportunities for Ukrainians.

With the decline of the Ukrainian school system, and particularly after the pacification measures in 1930 in Galicia, when schools were closed because of the alleged involvement of Ukrainian students in nationalist terrorist activity, popular institutions of learning gained importance. The Prosvita movement as it became known, was organised in the late 19th century by radical socialists. Its institutions of popular learning were controlled by the communities they serviced and grew vigorously in times of national suppression. Thus in 1914, 230,000 persons enrolled in the Prosvitas in Western Ukraine. In 1920, the number had grown to 260,000 and by 1935 to 306,000.¹⁵

¹³Bernard Newman, The Story of Poland (London, n.d.), p. 106.

¹⁴Horak, Poland and National Minorities, pp. 144-45.

¹⁵Volodymyr Kubiovyc, gen. ed., Ukraine. A Concise Encyclopaedia 2 vols. (Toronto, 1963-71), 1: 842-43.

TABLE 1

ELEMENTARY SCHOOLS IN EASTERN GALICIA (EXCLUDING PRIVATE)
 ACCORDING TO LANGUAGE OF INSTRUCTION

School Year	Total	Polish	Ukrainian	Bilingual
1911/12	4010	1590	2420	-
1921/22	4719	2281	2437	-
1924/25	4728	2568	2151	9
1925/26	4705	2424	1179	1102
1927/28	4709	2322	744	1635
1929/30	4667	2189	684	1794
1934/35	4725	2100	487	2138
1937/38	?	?	452	2485

TABLE 2

ELEMENTARY SCHOOLS IN VOLYN (EXCLUDING PRIVATE)
 ACCORDING TO LANGUAGE OF INSTRUCTION

School Year	Ukrainian	Bilingual	Polish
1923/24	421	-	676
1926/27	40	381	708
1929/30	7	652	821

TABLE 3

PUBLIC HIGH SCHOOLS IN EASTERN GALICIA AND
 VOLHYNIA IN SCHOOL YEAR 1929/30

Voivodstvo	Public			Private		
	Pol.	Ukr.	Pol-Ukr.	Pol.	Ukr.	Pol-Ukr.
Lviv	37	3	-	28	4	-
Stanislav	10	2	-	9	4	-
Ternopil	11	1	1	6	3	-
Volyn	9	-	-	6	-	-
Total	67	6	1	49	14	-

TABLE 4 *

TEACHER TRAINING COLLEGES IN LVIV,
STANISLAV, TERNOPII AND VOLYN

Type of College	1929/30	1933/34
Bilingual	13	2
Ukrainian (public)	2	1
Ukrainian (private)	8	6
Polish (public)	10	23

*All tables are taken from Stephen Horak,
Poland and Her National Minorities 1919-1934
(New York, 1961), pp. 144-47.

Education being one of the principal factors determining social mobility, its denial by the authorities aroused bitter feelings amongst the Ukrainian population. Jobs, skills, an improvement in agricultural methods, access to government and social agencies depended upon this education. Thus the discrimination in the school system became a major grievance of the nationalist movement in the late twenties, and the existing institutions of learning a place of protest and object of attacks.

The Decline of the Communist Party
of Western Ukraine

The principal concern of the small, nationally conscious intelligentsia was the attempt to gain legal recognition of its rights and to improve the social and educational standing of the Ukrainian workers and peasants. Many were active in the Prosvita movement, in agricultural cooperatives and political organisations. The most important forum of activity was politics, where the Ukrainian parties attempted to protect the minority rights of their supporters in a generally hostile environment.

The most important legal party was the Ukrainian National Democratic Union (Ukrayins'ke Natsional'ne Demokratychnе Obyednannya--UNDO) which was formed in 1925. Most Ukrainians supported UNDO in elections, sending its representatives to the Sejm. The Ukrainian social democrats, representing a small section of the urban population, were also active and participated in electoral politics. In 1931, when they joined the Second International they claimed ten thousand members.¹⁶

The legal battle for recognition of minority rights however, provided meagre results, especially after General Pilsudski came to power in 1926 and the parliamentary process was relegated to the function of rubber-stamping the decisions of his dictatorial rule. These conditions were one reason for the proliferation of illegal and semi-legal political activity, contributing to the growth of the communist and nationalist movements alike in Western Ukraine. Throughout the 1920's, the separate groups which were later to form the core of the OUN were nurtured within the confines of illegal terrorist groups.

The main opponent of the emerging nationalist wing was the communist movement. The Communist Party of Western Ukraine (CPWU) succeeded the Communist Party of East Galicia. In 1925, the CPWU merged with the Communist Party of Working Poland, which in turn renamed itself the Communist Party of Poland (CPP). Numbering approximately 6,000 at its height in the mid 1920's, the CPWU commanded considerable support from city workers of all nationalities and some peasant communities, notably in Volyn.¹⁷

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 838.

¹⁷ See Armstrong, Ukrainian Nationalism, p. 19; and Kyzya, Narodni Mesnyky, p. 16.

The economic plight of Western Ukraine in the interwar period sparked off periodic waves of strikes in the towns and rural areas. In 1928-29, and again in 1936, poor peasants struck against landowners in the Lviv region. In 1926, workers in the Carpathian timber camps went on strike; oil rig workers went out in 1932 and in Lviv road building workers initiated a widespread strike in 1936. One hundred thousand workers demonstrated in Lviv on April 14, 1936 over the murder of one of their fellows. The police attacks on the march provoked extensive strike actions in Western Ukraine, with demonstrations in Boryslav, Stry, Stanislav and Ternopil.¹⁸

The CPWU did not fail to extend its influence on the shop floors in these waves of strikes. This continuous organising was supplemented by the formation of a mass front organisation Se1-Rob, enabling it to participate in elections and carry out work of a generally public nature. The communists also engaged in cultural and educational work, as did all political groups. Operating as organised factions within the popular institutions, student organisations and other focuses of autonomous Ukrainian life, they managed to build strong minorities in the 1920's to oppose the major influence here, the UNDO. For example, at the Ridna Shkola (Native School) conference in Lviv in 1929, of 247 delegates, eighty were CPWU members and sympathisers. At a Lviv student hromada meeting in 1925, 83 out of 265 were communists.¹⁹

¹⁸B. K. Dudkevych, 'Kryvava Sereda', Ukrayins'kyi Istorychnyy Zhurnal, 1966, no. 3.

¹⁹Ye. M. Halushko, Narysy Istoriyi Ideolohichnoyi ta Orhanizatsiynoyi Diyal'nosty KPZU v 1919-1928 r.r. (Lviv, 1965), pp. 202-203.

The identification of the CPWU with the Soviet Ukrainian government in the 1920's provided it with a rare opportunity to demonstrate the practical implications of its political perspectives to the Western Ukrainian population. The redistribution of land after the Civil War, Ukrainisation of government institutions and the educational system and the apparent consolidation of a republican government in Soviet Ukraine--in effect the beginnings of a solution to the national and social questions facing the Ukrainian masses--were unrivalled in any other country of Eastern Europe. The CPWU received significant practical aid from the Soviet Ukrainian government in the form of literature. The availability of the printed word in the native language in Soviet Ukraine could not be compared to the situation in Galicia, Transcarpathian Ukraine or Bukovina and Bessarabia in Rumania in the 1920's.

The political line of the Western Ukrainian party on the national question called for a socialist revolution throughout Poland, the establishment of a Polish workers' government and the simultaneous union of Western Ukraine with the Ukrainian SSR. This proposition was attractive to broad layers of the population for as long as the Soviet Ukrainian example of communist government appeared workable and benign.²⁰ Indeed, it is difficult to imagine the growth of a strong anti-communist nationalist movement in Western Ukraine alongside a healthy communist movement which not only addressed itself to the economic plight of the population but which also championed its national aspirations.

The demise of the CPWU, which paved the way for the emergence of the OUN was closely related to the changing situation in Soviet

²⁰Armstrong, Ukrainian Nationalism, p. 19.

Ukraine. Whereas the programme of Ukrainisation had served as a powerful example for the nationally oppressed intelligentsia in Poland, the end of this policy in 1928 and the subsequent liquidation of Ukrainian communists and republican leaders in the thirties brought an end to previous emulation. The collectivisation and the famines of 1931 and 1932 in Ukraine destroyed whatever prestige the CPWU had gained from its identification with the land seizures by poor peasants during the revolutionary period of 1917-21. The slogan for the unification of Western Ukraine with Soviet Ukraine similarly lost its power of attraction when news about Stalin's consolidation in the CPSU, and its effects upon political and cultural life became known in Western Ukraine.

The immediacy of repercussions of the ascent of Stalin's faction in Soviet Ukraine upon the Western Ukrainian communist movement can be measured in the pages of the journals and newspapers of the CPWU. For example, the journal Novi Shlyakhy faithfully transmitted the major political campaigns by Kaganovich's faction inside the Ukrainian Bolshevik party against the various oppositions throughout the 1920's.²¹ When Antin Krushylnytsky, editor of this journal returned to Soviet Ukraine in the early thirties, he disappeared. Such evidence of the Stalin purges was not simply news gleaned from the Soviet press in Western Ukraine, but was organically connected to the fate of the Western Ukrainian communist movement itself.

Factional lines inside the CPWU emerged parallel with the growing factions within the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Ukraine. Corresponding to the Shumsky tendency, which favoured a continuation

²¹See Antin Krushyl'nytsky's articles in Novi Shlyakhy (Lviv, n.p.) 'Hromads'ke Pravosudya', (May 1930); 'Tragedia Pomylok', (April 1930); and 'U Haryatchtsi 4lo' (February 1932).

of Ukrainisation policies and opposed Stalin's main lieutenant in Soviet Ukraine, Kaganovich, the Maksymovych tendency emerged as the dominant group in the CPWU. In 1926, Maksymovych's pro-Shumsky group had a majority on all leading bodies of the CPWU. The Comintern had intervened twice into the internal affairs of the party on behalf of the minority, but failed to alter the composition of the leadership, fearing a split.²²

Ye. M. Halushko's study of these years in the CPWU,²³ which appeared in 1965, is one of the few recent contributions on the subject. The split in the party, which took place in 1928 appears to be so sensitive to official Soviet historiography as to discourage any work on it. Halushko is to be congratulated for having chosen to deal with the subject at all. Nevertheless, his study remains a guarded interpretation of the main reasons for the demise of the communist movement in Western Ukraine. Referring largely to the 'nationalist deviation' in the Central Committee, a charge levelled at many oppositionists at that time in Soviet Ukraine, and accusing the majority tendency of encouraging a split in the front organisation Sel-Rob, Halushko attempts to lay the blame upon several individuals, and notably, Maksymovych. He does not however deal with the factors behind the 'nationalist deviation' of the pro-Shumsky group--the growing repressions against republican and cultural leaders in Soviet Ukraine, the brakes applied to Ukrainisation by the Kaganovich group, and Shumsky's expulsion from the debate in the Soviet Ukrainian party by his appointment to a position outside of the republic. The original material on this discussion between the Western Ukrainian communists and the Soviet

²²Myroslav Prokop, Ukrayina i Ukrayins'ka Polityka Moskvy (Munich, 1959), pp. 77-79.

²³Halushko, op. cit.

Ukrainians in the journal Budivnytstvo Radyans'koyi Ukrayiny (1927) provides a more comprehensive and objective account than does Halushko. Incidentally, Halushko had access to these materials. Recent articles by this author and other historians have contributed little towards understanding this important period.

The Sixth Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPWU, in January 1927 was the scene of growing factionalism and intransigence of both groups. These tensions mounted for a year, culminating in an open split of the party at its Gdansk conference in 1928. The Maksymovych tendency left the organisation and organised its supporters around the journal Kultura in Lviv.²⁴ The pro-Stalin tendency concentrated its efforts on rebuilding the party and organising the first of a long series of campaigns against Pilsudski and the fascist movement. OUN was one of the main objects of attack by the communists. This policy of opposition to the Pilsudski regime was part of the CPWU's primary responsibility in the 1930's of defending the Soviet Union by opposing the anti-communist wing of the Polish bourgeoisie and state leadership.

The Ukrainian nationalist analysis of the CPWU has tended to overstate the support received by these communists from the Soviet Union, and has attempted to characterise it as an adjunct of Soviet foreign policy with no indigenous basis in Western Ukraine. For the OUN, both Marxist doctrine and its carriers in Western Ukraine were a 'foreign' phenomenon.²⁵ This view overlooks the long tradition of social democracy there and the considerable support enjoyed by the communists in the early twenties, well before the OUN even existed. In spite of ample evidence pointing to the indigenous roots of the CPWU

²⁴Ibid., p. 214.

²⁵Mirchuk, Narys Istoriyi OUN, pp. 450-53.

nationalist historians, including the more liberal and democratic ones like M. Prokop have insisted that this was not the case.

In 1938, the Communist Party of Poland was dissolved by the Comintern allegedly because of the continued presence of 'trotskyite' and 'bourgeois nationalist' members in its ranks. Many of the Western Ukrainian militants who stayed in Galicia during the first occupation of the Red Army in 1939 were liquidated by the Soviet secret police.²⁶

The Emergence of the Nationalist Movement

Several factors combined to establish the basis for the emergence of an organised nationalist movement in Western Ukraine. The demise of the communist movement in the late 1920's, as has been already indicated, was a precondition for the emergence of the OUN as a new advocate of national liberation with a right wing solution to the national question.

The political realignment of the Western Ukrainian middle class, in particular the intelligentsia, created a milieu for nationalist agitation. This realignment preceded the penetration of the OUN's politics into wider social layers. While most of the peasants in Western Ukraine understood their social predicament to be the result of a government which expropriated their land and distributed it amongst Polish colonists and of the discriminatory practices in hiring which made town living a near impossibility, no political movement grew out of the peasant class as a coherent response to this situation. The rural intelligentsia, made up largely of the clergy looked to the towns for a movement in which it could participate. The

²⁶Chris Harman, Bureaucracy and Revolution in Eastern Europe (London, 1974), p. 28.

Ukrainian middle class of the towns, though well off in comparison to their country cousins were equally conscious of the limits of their social mobility. There were few training schools to study to become teachers, few jobs of a professional nature to which they could aspire and a weak upper class to support the work of artisans, artists, writers, etc. In the search for a new world view, a formula for social and national emancipation, greater numbers of the intelligentsia turned to the fascist theories which had gained a prominence in Western Europe.

The rise of fascist politics in Western Europe, coinciding with the crisis of the Third International parties, had an important impact upon the emerging nationalist movement. At first these theories interested only a small group of Ukrainian intellectuals living in Western and Eastern Europe, notable a Paris group led by M. Tsibors'ky and D. Dontsov, a leading publicist in Western Ukraine. But their influence quickly grew and national socialist and fascist theories provided an ideological and philosophical basis to the new nationalist school.

One of the primary influences in the regroupment of separate nationalist groupings into a single OUN in 1929 was the publicist Dontsov. Dontsov, a socialist during the Russian Revolution, turned to anti-communist and fascist theories in the early twenties after becoming disenchanted with the course of events in Soviet Ukraine. His polemical contributions to journals and a series of historical brochures stimulated a wide discussion in Western Ukraine amongst the then wavering student and intellectual circles. The historian Isaac Mazepo notes in his critique of Dontsovian politics that the turn towards integral nationalism coincided with the rise of fascist politics in Western Europe and the transmission of the West European experience and ideas to Western Ukraine via such publicists as Dontsov.

Dontsov's ideas, notes Mazepa^e, were based upon a generous borrowing from Spengler (on the cultural degeneration of Western civilisation, critique of modern urban society) and Sorel (on rural utopia, race, human nature, will). Later he contributed, in a more direct fashion, on the fascist experience by providing sketches of major leaders of the far-right in Europe and translating Hitler's writings.²⁷

The influence of these ideas was reinforced by the practical example of fascist government in Mussolini's Italy. In attempting to refute the influence of Italy upon the movement, the nationalist historian Mirchuk writes:

When the OUN arose, Italian fascism under Benito Mussolini's leadership already had several years' existence and activity behind itself and was marked by very serious achievements in the political, economic and social spheres of the life of the Italian people. In the critical years after the First World War, the fascist movement saved Italy from communist anarchy which had begun to engulf the country. Taking power into its own hands, fascism brought law and order, mastered the serious post-war crisis of production, and returned patriotism and discipline to the popular masses Not only in a declarative sense, but in practice an uncompromising enemy of socialism and communism, the fascist movement gained sympathy, even from its opponents. Communist and Bolshevik Moscow declared fascism its mortal enemy. If it had not been for fascism, then the communists would have hegemonised Italy, and already in the first post-War years, it would have become the Bolshevik launch base for the conquest of Europe and Africa.

It is not strange then, that amongst the Ukrainian nationalists, uncompromising opponents of communobolshevism that they were, that fascism as an anti-communist movement evoked sympathy, and as a new socio-political and economic phenomenon interest. However, they considered it to be a creation of a foreign mentality, unsuitable for application in the Ukrainian context.²⁸

Mirchuk goes on to observe that fascism arose in an already existing nation-state in order to rejuvenate it. And Ukrainian

²⁷ Isaak Mazepa, Pidstavy Nashoho Vidrodzhenya, 2 vols. (Munich, 1948-49), 2: 85-119.

²⁸ Mirchuk, Narys Istoriyi OUN, pp. 112-113.

nationalism could not have followed the fascist example because its aim was to construct a nation-state, not rejuvenate an existing one!

Another factor contributing to the rise of the nationalist movement, and perhaps the most significant in providing the OUN with its initial body of Western Ukrainian cadre, was the rejection by many middle class political activists of the legalist-participationist methods of the traditional parties such as UNDO and the social democrats. This factor became an important catalyst to the growth of the OUN after the UNDO failed to oppose effectively the government's pacification actions in Western Ukraine in 1930. In the early 1930's, the OUN took a hostile position towards legal political Ukrainian parties.²⁹

A brief examination of the groups which fused in 1929 into the single organisation illustrates, from another perspective, the process described above. From the older generation of political activists, the Ukrainian Military Organisation (Ukrayins'ka Viys'kova Orhanizatsiya-UVO) contributed the whole body of its membership, except for a small fraction which returned to legal politics. The UVO was made up primarily of ex-officers of the Sich Riflemen of the Ukrainian People's Republic and of the Ukrainian Galician Army. Retreating to Western Ukraine after the revolutionary period and the Civil War, these officers began to organise terrorist attacks upon the Polish Government, its institutions and officials.³⁰ When the UVO agreed to join the OUN, it brought into the organisation not only the experience of previous activity, a leadership core (notably Konovalets', who became the OUN leader) and an organisational network

²⁹Ibid., pp. 105-107.

³⁰See Volodymyr Martynets, Ukrayins'ke Pidpilya Vid UVO do OUN (Winnipeg, 1949), pp. 40-71.

throughout Western Ukraine, but also its own analysis of the reasons for the independence movement's failure in 1917-21. This analysis, strikingly similar to Dontsov's arguments, amounted to the contention that the Ukraine had failed to gain political independence because the socialists had ignored the issue of independence and had concentrated their efforts on social issues. The analysis was the basis for the UVO's rejection of all socialist and socially oriented political action; it re-inforced the OUN's integral nationalist temperament.

Other groups which joined the OUN in 1929 included the Union of Ukrainian Nationalist Youth (Spilka Ukrayins'koyi Natsionalistychnoyi Molodi) a force within the Western Ukrainian student movement which opposed the influence of the CPWU. The Legion of Ukrainian Nationalists (Lehia Ukrayins'kykh Natsionalistiv) most of whose members resided in Czechoslovakia, was a fusion of a number of smaller groups including the Organisation of Ukrainian Fascists (Orhanizatsiya Ukrayins'kykh Fashystiv).³¹ Its members were present at the negotiations for fusion before the OUN's founding conference. Apart from the UVO and the youth groups in Western Ukraine, a significant number of nationalists from West European countries, notably Czechoslovakia and Austria took a vital role in the regroupment. The groups from Austria and Czechoslovakia had developed in the 1920's inside the Ukrainian communities which had emigrated there at the turn of the century and after the First World War.

The founding Congress of the OUN was held in Vienna from January 28 to February 2, 1929. In the programme adopted by the delegates, the OUN called for the formation of a movement 'built on the

³¹Mirchuk, Narys Istoriyi OUN, pp. 68-88.

principles of all-Ukrainianism, supra-party and one-man rule'.³²
 They declared the nation to be the highest organic form of human collectivity and the state as the protector of the organic unity of the nation, its form of visible separatedness from other nations.

Under the title 'State Structure', the OUN stated that:

In the period of the liberation struggle, only a national dictatorship, developed in the course of the struggle can ensure the internal strength of the Ukrainian nation and its greatest resilience to the outer world

Only after the rebirth of statehood will the time come for internal reconstruction and transition to a monolithic state organ. In this transition period, the head of state will be entrusted in preparing for the creation of the highest governing organs on the basis of representation of all organised social layers³³

Under 'Social Policy':

The regulation of relations between social groups, particularly the right of arbitration in matters of social conflict is the domain of the state (our emphasis) which will ensure the co-operation between productive layers of the Ukrainian Nation

All social groups' members will have the right of coalition on which basis they will unite in trade unions with the right to syndicate on a territorial basis . . . and will have their representatives in organs of government.³⁴

On a definitive note, the OUN declared its attitude to other political groups to be the following:

The OUN categorically opposes all forces, our own and foreign, who actively or passively oppose these positions of Ukrainian nationalists, who act against them with any political methods, of individuals or collectivities who will appear in disagreement with the above-stated positions.³⁵

³²OUN v Svitli Postanov Velykykh Zboriv, Konferentsiy ta Inshykh Dokumentiv z Borot'by 1929-1955 r.r. (London, 1955), p. 6.

³³loc. cit.

³⁴loc. cit.

³⁵Ibid., p. 15.

The programme adopted in 1929 was clearly an authoritarian and anti-democratic one, calling for the creation of a corporatist state.³⁶ Indeed, the nationalists were calling for a Ukrainian dictatorship in Western Ukraine to replace Pilsudski's. The programme offered no clear land policy, save the assurance that the land would become the private property of Ukrainian farmers. This aspect of the programme was later elaborated to indicate preferential support for the middle peasant, with no regard for the landless.³⁷ The social policies of the OUN in 1929 negated the existence of a free trade union movement, the right to independent collective bargaining by workers and employers. It opposed the dissemination of any political ideas other than its own.

If the OUN claimed to be struggling for the emancipation of the Ukrainian population from social and national oppression, its programmatic demands did not support such a claim. The authoritarian independent state it proposed could alleviate linguistic discrimination and unemployment for the middle class by offering government jobs, teaching positions, etc. But its industrial programme proposed to give to Ukrainian private interests the Polish and international financial assets in Western Ukraine, and its land policy favoured the peasantry which already owned land. Isaac Mazepa succinctly noted that this was 'a nationalism with no national content'.³⁸

The communists were not alone in exposing the OUN; the nationalists met a reaction of scorn and denunciation from practically every political group in Western Ukraine. Those who supported the

³⁶The similarity between the OUN programme and those of other fascist organisations of the period is striking. See for example, the programme of the Italian movement in E. Weber, Varieties of Fascism (New York, 1964), pp. 145-147.

³⁷M. Tsibors'ky, 'Problemy Hospodarskoyi Vlasnosti' in Na Sluzhbu Natsiyi (Paris, 1938), pp. 7-11.

³⁸Issac Mazepa, 'Natsionalizm bez Natsional'noho Zmistu', Nashe Slovo (Munich, 1974).

OUN, noted with satisfaction that Ukrainian nationalism was practically indistinguishable from fascism:

Under the name Ukrainian nationalism, we have become accustomed to understanding it as the following particular phenomenon: it is a social movement which exists today throughout the whole world. In one country it appears as fascism, in another as Hitlerism, and in our country it is quite simply nationalism.³⁹

While the whole organisation formally adopted the new programme, it did not reflect unanimity of views throughout the membership. The corporatist project was adopted in 1929 largely as a result of the influence of the nationalists who resided in Western Europe or in East European countries outside of Poland. This group was an older generation, experienced in politics and conscious of the fascist movement after several years of relatively close examination. As far as the Western Ukrainian membership was concerned, the programmatic aspect was a secondary concern. The more youthful membership in Western Ukraine was more interested in direct action against the Polish state. This did not imply that they were unconscious of the general political perspectives of their movement, but simply that they had not been a central part of its creation. After the founding conference, these members took to active work.

The Provid (leadership) under E. Konovalts', chosen at the Vienna gathering resided in Western Europe. An executive in Lviv was appointed to oversee the activities of the Western Ukrainian network. The different attitude of these two bodies to the 1929 programme was but one aspect of a deeper division in the OUN, between the West European and West Ukrainian memberships which began to develop in the early thirties. With the outbreak of war, this division resulted in

³⁹Nash Klych, 9 July 1933.

an open split in the OUN.⁴⁰ Between the Wars, however, the nationalist organisation managed to survive without serious ruptures, the OUN in Western Ukraine failing to publicise its programme and the Provid in Western Europe seeking contacts and support from governments for their cause.

One notable divergent current did develop in Western Ukraine around a member of the Lviv executive, Ivan Mitringa. This current opposed ties with Nazi Germany and stressed the importance of developing a social programme that could respond to the needs of the Soviet Ukrainian masses. The Mitringa group did not break with the OUN until the Second World War, when the prospect of independent nationalist activity in Soviet Ukraine was counterposed to a collaborationist course with Nazi Germany.⁴¹

The average member of the OUN in Western Ukraine was recruited on the basis of subjective categories (such as willingness to kill a policeman) and once inside the organisation received little political education and considerable moral exhortation. He/she accepted the political line without question, as was the accepted practice in an authoritarian movement. A cell structure effectively isolated the membership into small pockets resulting in little discussion between members and no avenue for challenging the decisions of the leading bodies. As far as Nazi Germany was concerned, there is general agreement by participants of those years who are alive today, that not only the leadership of the OUN, but also the membership was sympathetic to the Nazi movement. The rank and file members,

⁴⁰See Chapter II.

⁴¹Borys Levytsky, 'Istorychne Znachynya Rozlamu v OUN', Vpered, no. 2 (11) 1950, p. 6.

many of whom had never left Western Ukraine in their lives were however quite ignorant of the precise nature of either Nazi Germany or Italy. According to their understanding of international politics, they were quite willing to chose, as Mirchuk has pointed out, 'anti-communist Italy and Germany' over 'Bolshevik Russia'.

Nationalist Activity Before the Second World War

In the ten years of activity before the Second World War, the OUN developed a distinct political style and succeeded in expanding its membership to several thousand activists. This period of formation and expansion can only be sketched in a general way because of the shortage of sources and the absence of any serious studies published to date by participants in the movement. Mirchuk's Narys Istoriyi OUN is marred by its declarative style and is of more service as a propaganda piece than as an objective recollection of the events between the Wars. Nationalist archives for the period 1929-39 have either been destroyed or are in the possession of Soviet institutions or nationalist organisations in the West. Neither have permitted open access to these sources.

The OUN's distinctive feature during the interwar period was its terrorist style of propaganda. The movement attempted to mobilise support for its aims by vanguardist actions, most frequently aimed at the Polish state. This included bombings of state institutions, assassinations of officials and the destruction of landowners' estates in the countryside. By these actions, the OUN attempted to turn public opinion against the policies of the government and to "discourage the Polish colonists' desire for enriching themselves at the expense of the Ukrainian peasant".⁴² In addition to these actions

⁴²Mirchuk, Narys Istoriyi OUN, pp. 233-34.

against Polish state and private interests, the OUN continued to raise the issue of the plight of Ukrainians in the Soviet Union. This usually took the form of demonstrations of nationalist students at the Soviet consulate in Lviv.

Characteristic of the OUN's style was the encouragement of a series of cults, such as the cult of 'fallen heroes', commemorating past fighters for independence, and the cult of 'Kruty', a largely fictionalised episode of a group of students defending the Central Rada in 1918 against the advance of the Red Army.⁴³ These commemorations were mass events drawing in town youth and students. It was from among these participants that the organisation sought the majority of its recruits in the early thirties.

In response to the increase in terrorist attacks upon Polish officials, banks and post offices, the government carried out pacification measures in September 1930, detaining 1739 activists and sending 914 of this number to trial.⁴⁴ The occupations of those arrested provide an insight into the social composition of the nationalist movement in its early phase. (See Table 5). High school and university students made up one third of the arrested. One hundred and twenty were artisans; there were only 45 workers in the group. Peasants arrested numbered over five hundred, but the information provided by M. Felinski for this table does not indicate the kind of peasants the detainees were--whether middle peasants, the sons and daughters of rich landholders or poor tenant farmers. It is possible to deduce from this information, however that the OUN sought its principal base inside the towns amongst middle layers of

⁴³ Lev Shankowsky, Ukrayins'ka Armiya v Borot'bi Za Derzhavnist' (Munich, 1958), p. 246.

⁴⁴ M. Felinski, Ukrainians in Poland (n.p., 1931), p. 158.

TABLE 5*
 OCCUPATIONAL STATUS OF PERSONS ARRESTED DURING
 PACIFICATION MEASURES IN WESTERN UKRAINE,
 SEPTEMBER, 1930

Occupation	Number arrested
High school student	220
University student	360
Clerk	9
Peasant	510
Merchant	6
Artisan	120
Workman	45
Teacher	20
Government clerk	8
Journalist	5
Clergy	30
Seminarist	2
Other clerics	3
Engineer	3
Doctor	2
Lawyer	6
Law student	6
Other profession	60
Without occupation	33
Not defined	210

*M. Felinski, *Ukrainians in Poland* (n.p., 1931), p. 170.

of the population and amongst Ukrainian peasants in the countryside.

In 1931, the nationalists assassinated a Polish member of the Sejm, T. Motylka and a police agent named Byk.⁴⁵ In 1933, an assassination attempt was made upon the Soviet consul in Lviv; they

⁴⁵Mirchuk, Narys Istoriyi OUN, p. 247.

failed to kill the consul, but succeeded in assassinating a high ranking official of the GPU (Soviet Internal Security police) who was visiting the consulate.⁴⁶ Attacks upon postal stations and banks continued unabated in this period. In many cases, the trials which followed such attacks were of greater propaganda use to the nationalist movement than the publicity ensuing from the attacks themselves. The prestige of the OUN as a terrorist formation grew in proportion to the number of nationalists languishing in Polish goals.

In 1933, the Lviv executive decided to launch public mass actions, hoping thereby to show the Polish government the extent of support in the local population for their cause. The 'school action', as it became known, was a mass protest by students in elementary and high schools. It consisted of a co-ordinated day of protest against the discriminatory language policy of the educational system, taking the form of strikes, dishonouring Polish emblems and refusal to sing the national anthem upon commencement of classes. The anti-monopoly boycott against liquor and tobacco outlets which were state controlled was carried out with a similar intent, the participants in this case being the older sector of the population.⁴⁷

Although the nationalists had succeeded in showing the government that their calls to action found a response in wide layers of the population, they had not anticipated the effects of open action by their members upon the security of their network. The assassination of the Polish Minister of the Interior, Pieracki,⁴⁸ soon after the

⁴⁶Ibid., p. 338.

⁴⁷Ibid., pp. 331, 336-37.

⁴⁸Petro Mirchuk, Stepan Bandera (New York, 1961), pp. 29-31.

mass actions provided the police with an excellent opportunity to make a massive sweep, arresting well over a thousand nationalists. Assuming leadership of the executive in 1934, after a short term by S. Bandera, during which the boycotts had been organised, Lev Rebet attempted to pull together the ranks of the organisation which had not been deconspired. Rebet notes in his memoirs that it was not until 1937 that the OUN was again a functioning organisation.⁴⁹

The extensive strike actions in Western Ukraine in 1936 passed almost unnoticed by the OUN. Although the strike had been initiated by road-building workers in Lviv, the overwhelming majority being Ukrainians, the OUN was unable, and perhaps unwilling to seek new converts from amongst the working class. Lev Rebet ponders this great lost opportunity in his memoirs.⁵⁰ M. Prokop asserts that the OUN began to organise workers after the 1936 strike;⁵¹ there is little evidence to support such a claim in available sources. It is perhaps logical to assume that the OUN, which viewed the working class as the domain of communist agitation, had no appropriate programmatic basis to offer to workers and therefore did not even attempt to reach them. The fact that OUN members attacked meetings of workers which had been organised by the CPWU, tends to confirm such an assumption.

In the two years preceding Nazi Germany's invasion of Poland, the OUN succeeded in rebuilding its network. M. Lebed', a leader of the OUN during the War claims that by 1939, the organisation totalled

⁴⁹Lev Rebet, Svitla i Tini OUN (Munich, 1964), pp. 49-54.

⁵⁰Ibid., pp. 70-72.

⁵¹Prokop, Ukrayina i Polityka Moskvy, p. 81.

12,000 members and seven thousand in its youth section.⁵² Although there are no other indications of the OUN's numerical strength, and this is expected given the conspiratorial nature of the movement, Lebed's position in the OUN lends credibility to this assertion. He was in charge of the organisation's internal security police force, the Sluzhba Bezpeky, whose members had contact with the entire cell network. No other body of the OUN, including the Provid was as capable of making such a count of the membership.

Up to 1938, relations between the OUN and Nazi Germany had consisted of little more than contact between the Provid and German intelligence, and Konovalets' occasional appearance as a guest at German military manoeuvres.⁵³ In 1939, the nationalists had the opportunity to test the sincerity of German support for their aims in the Carpathian region inhabited by Ukrainians. With the collapse of the Prague government, Ukrainians there declared an independent state in March 1939 under the leadership of Rev. Augustine Voloshyn.⁵⁴ The OUN, eager to lend support to this initiative sent significant forces to Carpathian Ukraine and organised defense forces for the nascent government. The Third Reich, preferring to allow Hungary satisfaction of its territorial demands in return for its diplomatic support, allowed Hungarian forces to enter the territory and crush the government in four days.

It should have been clear to the OUN at this point what the real aims of Nazi Germany were in Eastern Europe. In a fashion similar to their disregard for the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, the

⁵²Ibid., p. 137.

⁵³See Dallin, German Rule in Russia, p. 114; and Ukrayins'ka RSR, p. 381.

⁵⁴See Micheal Winch, Republic For a Day (London, 1939).

nationalists continued to place their hopes on a German-Soviet war in which they could be active, choosing to regard Germany's manoeuvre in the Carpathian Ukraine affair as a temporary setback, borne of the necessities of great power combinations.⁵⁵

Konovalets' assassination in Rotterdam in 1938⁵⁶ by a GPU agent signalled the beginning of a factional struggle in the OUN between the Bandera group, whose base of support was in Western Ukraine and Andrei Mel'nyk who had been designated the leadership post by Konovalets' before he died. The succession struggle, which is the subject of a future section of this paper, proved to be a drawn out one. It was not resolved without an open organisational split in the ranks in 1940.

The two principal aspects of the nationalist movement's role in the Second World War--its active association with the German war effort and its independent work within the Soviet Ukrainian population--are examined in the following chapters. It is important, however, to examine the OUN's capacity for independent activity in Soviet Ukraine at this juncture. Several features stand out in such an assessment.

First, the OUN was essentially a product of Polish social and political conditions. It was without any experience of Soviet reality, having not even made a detailed study of the conditions of Soviet life, its institutions or of the historical experience of the Soviet Ukrainian masses since the revolutionary period. Perhaps the most serious deficiency of the organisation in this respect was

⁵⁵ Gerald Reitlinger, The House Built on Sand: The Conflicts of German Policy in Russia (London, 1960), p. 164.

⁵⁶ Mirchuk, Narys Istoriyi OUN, pp. 530-31.

its inability to carry out work amongst proletarians. The OUN membership remained largely student and middle class. Whatever peasants existed in its ranks were not politically trained leaders, but mere rank and file members. Consequently, the organisation had come to understand its role as that of a vanguardist force, separated from the mass of the population it professed to lead, with no organic links with a mass base.

The irrationalist basis of nationalist politics, its aversion to logic, science and knowledge and its reliance upon such notions as will, spirit and extreme individualism made it even less prepared to handle the new situation where it would be expected to introduce itself to completely new societies. The programme of 1929, the sole declaration of aims produced by the OUN in ten years of activity, with its authoritarian character and highly objectionable (to workers and peasants) industrial and agrarian policies served little purpose, except to identify it with the Nazis and their crusade against the Soviet Union.

The outbreak of war spelt doom for all the political parties whose activity depended upon legality and social peace. The OUN was virtually the only political force in Western Ukraine to enter the war situation intact. Its practice of conspiracy was the most important asset ensuring survival in the forthcoming period of social upheavals and military conflict. With the collapse of the Polish government, the UNDO, the social democrats and other legal parties disappeared virtually overnight.

CHAPTER II

GERMAN PERSPECTIVES IN THE EAST
AND THE OUN

The hostility of National Socialist doctrine towards the Soviet Union cannot be regarded as the main reason for the outbreak of the German-Soviet conflict in 1941. Economic motives, to which the ideological rationale of Nazi leadership was harnessed, played a key role. The establishment of the German economy on a war footing in the latter half of the 1930's and its simultaneous inability to expand without new markets and raw materials was a basic objective process that German diplomacy in the immediate prewar period sought to satisfy by the annexation of the Sudetenland, and later in the invasion of Poland. Once the barrier which divided Germany and the Soviet Union had been broken by the capture of Poland by the former and the annexation of Western Ukrainian territories by the latter, Germany's ambitions turned to the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union attempted to stay out of the War during the first two years by responding diligently to German economic needs, at the same time hoping that this would not strengthen Germany's confidence in opening up an eastern war front against her own territories.¹ A serious miscalculation by the Soviet Union on this issue and the concurrent worsening of diplomatic relations between the two powers

¹R. J. Sontag and J. S. Beddie, Nazi-Soviet Relations 1939-41; Documents from the Archives of the German Foreign Office (Department of State, USA, 1948), pp. 83-85, 89, 334.

over Germany's intervention in the Balkans and Rumania in 1940 paved the way for the German attack in June 1941.

Looking to the East, Nazi leaders regarded Ukraine as a potentially useful pivot of international power combinations for themselves, or any other state which desired to exploit its potential. Already in 1927, Alfred Rosenb^erg, a future leading policy maker for the Third Reich in the eastern territories wrote:

Germany's attention with regard to the Eastern question must turn in another direction; it must take into account the strong separatist movement in the Ukraine and the Caucasus.²

The contacts between the OUN and the German intelligence service in the 1930's were designed by Germany to be made practically useful in the event of Germany's expansion, either militarily or politically into the East. They were considered small change in international politics, but of potential short term use in specific situations. German intelligence viewed collaboration with the Ukrainian nationalists in a cold and strictly calculated manner. It spoke of a future 'alliance of Germany with the Ukraine, the Volga Basin, Georgia . . . but not as equal partners; it will be an alliance of vassal states, with no army, no separate policy, no separate economy'.³ The nature of such a relationship between the Ukrainian nationalists and Germany was evident in the Carpathian Ukraine affair in January, 1939. At this time the OUN apparently did not understand the attitude of Nazi Germany towards it.

The German High Command was divided on how precisely to approach the Ukrainian question on the eve of the War, although it

² Alfred Rosenb^erg, Der Zukunftsweigerer deutschen Aussenpolitik (Munich, 1927), pp. 93, 97.

³ Dallin, German Rule in Russia, p. 50.

unanimously agreed to the clearly unequal relationship between Germany and minor political partners. At the root of this division, a difference essentially in tactics, lay differences in the knowledge and experience of Nazi leaders on the Eastern question. For some, the USSR appeared as a uniform, undifferentiated mass of ignorant Russian peasants; for others, the Soviet Union was full of contradictions, both national and social, which could be exploited successfully if they were first understood.

Alfred Rosenb^erg had lived in Lithuania before it became part of the Soviet Union and understood the complexity of national and social differences amongst the Slavic peoples. He therefore developed his perspective of Nazi rule in the East as one which would utilise these differences in its application. Rosenberg envisaged a policy of 'the furtherance of national distinctiveness (Eigenleben) up to the possible establishment of a separate state with the aim of always keeping Moscow in check (by the Ukraine) alone, or in an alliance with the Don region and the Caucasus'.⁴ This thesis applied specifically to the Ukrainian question, the 'symbiosis of Western Ukrainian nationalism aspiring to the creation of a state . . . and German interests which would set up a Ukraine dependent on the German prop'⁵ was at first put forward rather cautiously by Rosenb^erg.

Just before the outbreak of the German-Soviet war, however, in the spring of 1941, Ukrainian military units were set up by the Wehrmacht. The legion Nachtigall was made up of German officers

⁴Ibid., p. 52.

⁵Ibid., p. 111.

and Ukrainian soldiers. Ukrainian officers trained by the Wehrmacht were also added. The other, legion Roland, was formed from Ukrainian volunteers in Austria, in particular those belonging to the local OUN faction there. Both units had been established after extensive discussions between the Bandera faction leadership and the Wehrmacht.⁶ In addition to this co-operation between the nationalists and the German command before the outbreak of war, the OUN provided personnel to be trained as instructors for future Ukrainian police units in occupied territories. OUN-M members served as translators for the Wehrmacht as the armies crossed Ukraine.⁷

Rosenb^erg, as Reich Minister of Occupied Eastern Territories had formal authority in setting policy for the Ukraine, but was not powerful enough to enforce it. Erich Koch, as Gauleiter of Reichkommissariat Ukraine was able to establish his own policies once power passed to the civilian administration from the Wehrmacht. These policies limited Ukrainian cultural life and the work of the nationalists in the administrations of occupied territories and was also aimed at destroying, in a more brutal and direct manner, the intelligentsia of the Ukrainians and Poles there. Erich Koch's attitude towards the Ukrainians and the nationalists in particular, was clearly different from Rosenb^erg's prewar projections and from aspects of the Wehrmacht's dealings with the nationalists during the German advance into Ukrainian territories. Koch's views were supported by Himmler as well, whose Einsatzgruppen (task forces) were assigned to pacification work in the Ukraine.

⁶Jaroslav Stets'ko, 'The Truth About the Events in Lviv, Western Ukraine in June and July, 1941', Ukrainian Review, no. 3, 1963, pp. 62-70.

⁷S. Hulyak, 'Polk im. Kholodnoho Yaru v Rivnomu', Visti Bratstva kol. Voyakiv i UD UNA, August-September, 1952, p. 7.

The Ukrainian nationalists found in Rosenberg and the Wehrmacht their most sympathetic allies, the former viewing co-operation between the German command and the OUN as the basis for a long term strategy of keeping Russia in check by a nationalist, pro-German counter-weight in Ukraine and elsewhere, and the latter finding the nationalists useful immediately in the course of the attack on the Soviet Union in 1941. Once Rosenberg had been checked by Koch's power inside Ukraine, and the Wehrmacht handed over administrative powers to the Reichkommissariat and Himmler's police, the OUN's hopes of securing greater influence with the occupant forces diminished. The OUN-M and the Ukrainian Central Committee, an agency of Ukrainian quislings operating in Galicia during the War staffed by Mel'nyk supporters increased their bargaining power only in 1943 when the impending defeat of the Nazis moved the German command to organise Division Galicia.⁸ This subject is dealt with further in this paper.

The Division of Poland

The German armies crossed Poland in three weeks. By September 22, 1939 they were at the San-Vistula line, after having sortied deeper into Western Ukraine and then returned to this position. At the head of the German advance, Colonel Sushko, a member of the OUN and a Mel'nyk adherent led a column of six hundred Ukrainian soldiers. Sushko and his forces acted as a liaison between the German command and the Western Ukrainians. Later he was to serve as

⁸Wolf-Dietrich Heike, Ukrayins'ka Dyviziya 'Halychyna', trans. Roman Kolisnyk (Toronto, 1970), p. 17.

a high ranking OUN official in Galicia for the Mel'nyk faction.⁹

The Red Army occupied all of Western Ukraine up to the San-Vistula line and a civilian administration began to be established by incoming Soviet authorities. On November 1, 1939, the territory was incorporated into the Ukrainian SSR by law in the Supreme Soviet. Land was nationalised--45% of land not belonging to peasants was handed over to the landless, thereby expropriating large landowners and the Church holdings. Industry came under government control, in some cases this requiring the expropriation of foreign ownership. The Drohobych oil wells, where 53% of invested capital was French controlled reverted to Soviet ownership.¹⁰ These measures initiated the first two year occupation of the territories by the Soviet regime up to the outbreak of the German-Soviet war in June, 1941.

This period is the least documented as far as Ukrainian nationalist activity is concerned. Milena Rudnyts'ka, an inhabitant of Lviv had provided a collection of impressions by Lvovians, who witnessed the occupation which was published in New York in 1958 under her editorship.¹¹ Apart from observations concerning general attitudes in Lviv at the time, the collection offers little information of value. M. Prokop's Ukrayina i Ukrayins'ka Polityka Moskvy notes that the OUN's main objective was to protect its membership and await an opportunity for open mass revolt. The only political activity that the nationalists carried out during the occupation was to discourage

⁹Kubiovc, gen. ed., Ukraine Concise Encyclopaedia, pp. 871-74.

¹⁰Ibid., pp. 832-33.

¹¹Milena Rudnyts'ka, Zakhidna Ukrayina Pid Bol'shevykamy (New York, 1958).

application by peasants to collective farms and by the youth to the Komsomol.¹²

The general mood in Western Ukraine in September 1939 had been pro-German. A great part of the population had hoped that the German armies would advance into Western Ukraine and occupy the territory rather than leaving it to the Red Army.¹³ A small number of Ukrainians (small indeed, given the fact that the CPWU had been dissolved two years earlier) awaited Soviet power. The pro-German attitude by much of the population was, however, tempered by timidity and expectancy--there was no revolt against the Red Army as the nationalists may have expected.

One of the more striking aspects of the first Soviet occupation had to do with the meeting of two distinct cultures in the towns and cities. Most Ukrainians, awaiting the appearance of their 'liberators' with a good deal of curiosity, were surprised to observe how different these 'other' Ukrainians from Soviet Ukraine really were. The Red Army soldiers and the wives and families of party officials were 'different people, with different appearances, different manners and souls':¹⁴

Lvovians remember well those unusual days and understand the great demand then for suitcases which later disappeared altogether. 'Rich' buyers, to the amazement of all customers, took immediately and without warning, ten to twenty pairs of nylons, five pairs of shoes, suits--and not only one apiece. They usually paid without bartering, paying double, triple or more in comparison to pre-war prices . . .

¹²Prokop, Ukrayina i Polityka Moskvyy, p. 145.

¹³Rudnyts'ka, Zakhidna Ukrayina, p. 16.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 19.

The first meeting with Europe, taking place in Western Ukraine after many years of isolation opened the eyes of Soviet people and created a sympathetic foundation for their critical thinking.¹⁵

While the soldiers and officials who entered Western Ukraine were amazed at the relative abundance of goods in Lviv stores and the decidedly European character of the city and its inhabitants, this did not deter them from proceeding with the administrative and political tasks for which they were responsible. And the Western Ukrainians, as much as the appearance of Soviet Ukrainians created an impression of foreign rule for them, do not seem to have opposed the consolidation of Soviet rule in the first year to any noticeable extent. In fact it was almost the opposite case. The voting which preceded the formal entry of this territory into the USSR proceeded smoothly. By all accounts, both nationalist and Soviet, the turnout for the elections for a single list of candidates was huge.¹⁶ The voting was accompanied by no coercive measures. The OUN did not even attempt to call for a boycott of these procedures.

The main task of the new official administration was to establish the local party organisations and the state and economic apparatuses. Khrushchev notes in his memoirs that the district party committees were made up largely of local personnel, while the regional committees and other higher bodies were staffed by party officials and technicians brought in from the Soviet Union.¹⁷

The absence of a strong communist tradition in the countryside proved to be a hinderance to Soviet efforts to collectivise

¹⁵Ibid., p. 43.

¹⁶See Istoriya Ukrayins'koyi RSR (Kiev, 1967), p. 451; and Rudnyts'ka, Zakhidna Ukrayina, p. 55.

¹⁷E. Crankshaw, ed., Khrushchev Remembers (London, 1971), p. 126.

agriculture in 1940. The New York Times reported on January 17, 1940 (referring to the occupation in 1939), that 'as soon as the report spread that the Red Army had crossed the river Zbrucz, the peasants began to share out amongst themselves the landlords' acres. Land was given first to small holders and in this way about 30% of agricultural land was expropriated'.¹⁸ This is supported by Stepan Mazur in his book Koly Bahryanily Svitanky, who attributes an important role to the Western Ukrainian peasantry in the expropriation of land in September, 1939.¹⁹ What happened to the peasant committees which sprang up to distribute land equitably before the Red Army arrived is, however unclear. Trotsky, in his debates with American communists in 1940 asserts that these peasant committees were quickly suppressed by the incoming administration because they constituted an independent radical force capable of upsetting the bureaucratic intentions of the imported officials.²⁰ Mazur, like other traditional Soviet historians claims that such committees were integrated into the administrative structure.²¹

Prokop's account of land distribution approaches the issue from an entirely different perspective. It is characterised by the way in which it highlights what the nationalists believed to be the most negative aspects of land redistribution for their struggle. For Prokop, the progressive character of these measures is heavily outweighed by the fact that expropriation fomented quarrels between the rich Ukrainian landholder and the landless who took away his property.²² The heightening of class antagonisms undermined the

¹⁸Quoted in Leon Trotsky, In Defense of Marxism (London, 1971), p. 166.

¹⁹Stepan Mazur, Koly Bahryanily Svitanky (Lviv, 1970), pp. 10-11.

²⁰Trotsky, In Defense of Marxism, p. 165.

²¹Mazur, Koly Bahryanily Svitanky, pp. 10-11.

²²Prokop, Ukrayina i Polityka Moskvy, p. 116.

'national' unity of the OUN's struggle. Moreover, the land redistribution, Prokop contends, was intended to delude the peasantry into supporting the new regime and to disarm them in the face of coming collectivisation measures.

The Soviet administration began to introduce collectives in 1940. Opposition to these farm organisations existed in Western Ukraine well before this period--the peasantry feared a repetition of the 1931 events in Soviet Ukraine. The existence of such opposition and fears is not only confirmed by nationalist accounts of the period, but also by Soviet writers.²³

Certain measures that were introduced in the initial period of liberalisation, such as the introduction of the Ukrainian language into the school system, were complemented by a general tightening up of security and order in 1940. The Soviet security police began to round up political activists whom they suspected of oppositional activity. The trial of 'The Fifty Nine' in Lviv in the first half of 1940 marked the beginning of a campaign against the OUN in Western Ukraine. The Ukrainian Red Army divisions stationed on the territory were replaced with Asian troops in order to curb the influences that fraternisation with the local population had brought.²⁴

The OUN, while apparently inactive in the Soviet occupied territory, where the majority of its membership resided before the German invasion of Poland, was preparing for future developments and already consolidating its bases in German controlled territories.

²³Vasyl' Lozovy, V Dolyni Strypu (Kiev, 1951), p. 11.

²⁴Armstrong, Ukrainian Nationalism, pp. 67-69.

The small pockets of Ukrainian territory left in German controlled Poland, the Kholm and Lemko regions, were allowed a measure of self rule at the local level, including the formation of Ukrainian police units. The Mel'nyk and Bandera factions played an important role in the establishment of these institutions through which, in reality, Nazi policy was to be transmitted. A welfare and aid society, the Ukrainian Central Committee (Ukrainskyj Tsentral'nyj Komitet) under the leadership of V. Kubiovc, a noted geographer and Mel'nyk supporter was established with the permission of the authorities.²⁵ Although its functions appeared, on a superficial level, to be non-political, the Ukrainian Central Committee, like the police units, were transmission channels of German rule. This was made strikingly clear in 1943 in the Central Committee's tasks in recruiting Ukrainians to Division Galicia.²⁶

In December 1940, the OUN issued its first War-time manifesto. The entire text is devoted to an attack on the Soviet Union and its occupation of Western Ukraine. No mention is made in the manifesto of Nazi Germany, the other occupant in Eastern Europe.²⁷ The political choice of co-operation with Nazi Germany became clearer in April 1941 at the Second Great Gathering of the OUN Bandera supporters in Cracow. In the declaration issued by the Gathering, the OUN-B thus defined its attitude towards Nazi Germany:

The OUN stands at the head of those Ukrainian revolutionary currents, and co-operates with those revolutionary movements oppressed by Moscow, and with those states whose aim it is to completely destroy the USSR (our emphasis). The OUN considers all states, political groupings and forces

²⁵Dallin, German Rule in Russia, p. 118. The Committee was formally established in April, 1942.

²⁶Heike, Ukrayins'ka Dyviziya 'Halychyna', p. 17.

²⁷OUN v Svitli Postanov, pp. 21-23.

who are interested in the fall of the USSR, who lean in the direction of a Ukraine independent of all, as the friends of Ukraine. The relations of the OUN with states and political movements are determined primarily by their anti-Moscow position, and not by their relative political sympathy with the Ukrainian national movement.²⁸

Further declarations against the 'Moscow occupation of Western Ukraine, Bukovina and Bessarabia' and the call for 'a revolutionary struggle with the occupants' made it clear that the nationalists saw their ally against the Soviet Union to be Germany, and that the latter was by no means to be considered an 'occupant' as well. In the programme calling for an independent Ukrainian state, stress was given to the need for 'strong rule, a strong national army and one leading political organisation'.²⁹

The 1941 Great Gathering was the scene of the Bandera-Mel'nyk factional struggle coming to a resolution. This meeting had by its very occurrence indicated the Bandera group's unwillingness to accept Mel'nyk's leadership. By naming it the Second Great Gathering, the OUN-B thereby registered its non-recognition of the 1939 Second Great Gathering which was held in Rome at which Mel'nyk was confirmed as leader. There, Stets'ko, to become Bandera's close associate in 1941 had sworn allegiance to Mel'nyk. In Cracow the OUN-B, declaring Mel'nyk to be 'a petit bourgeois renegade' and a bad leader, 'expelled' him from the organisation and urged his followers to come over to the Bandera camp.³⁰

Mel'nyk's 'expulsion' by the OUN-B merely served to indicate to the entire membership that the differences between the two

²⁸ Ibid., pp. 31-32. See also Ukrayins'ka RSR, p. 283.

²⁹ OUN v Svitli Postanov, p. 28.

³⁰ Ibid., pp. 45-47. Mel'nyk, however, continued to lead a sizeable faction, now entirely separated from Bandera's OUN.

leaders were now irreconcilable. The actual struggle for leadership had been in progress for one year. Bandera, who was extremely popular in Western Ukraine for his conduct at the trial of nationalists accused of plotting Minister of the Interior Pieracki's assassination in 1934 had spent five years in prison before being released by the Germans in September, 1939. By that time, Mel'nyk was recognised as leader of the OUN Provid in Western Europe, allegedly on Konovalets'' instructions before he died. Upon Bandera's release, the antagonisms between the Provid and the Western Ukrainian nationalists, which had been smoldering throughout the 1930's came to the fore.

In the 1930's these antagonisms were attributable to the generation gap between the Western Ukrainian nationalists and the Provid, the former considering themselves to be worthy of self-rule because they took most of the risks, and the latter viewing the Western Ukrainians as too immature and impatient to produce level-headed leaders for themselves. Konovalets'' authority and his recognised ties with the 1917-21 period where he had served as a leader of the Sich Riflemen and later led his officers into the terrorist underground in Poland had kept the organisation together throughout the thirties. Although Mel'nyk was also once an officer of the Sich Riflemen and a member of the UVO, his conservatism, deep religiosity and lack of leadership qualities disappointed the nationalists in Western Ukraine. Bandera moved in to provide an alternative.

Bandera's criticisms of the Provid were more precise than the vague sentiments of the other members. He considered the Provid ill-equipped to lead the OUN in radical action in the event of war with the Soviet Union. His alternative to Mel'nyk's attitude of caution and 'wait and see what the Germans do' was for the Organisation to

prepare for an uprising in the Soviet occupied territories independent of German intentions.³¹ Such an action, if successful in placing the OUN in control over areas of Western Ukraine, would place them in a better bargaining position with the Germans when they arrived. The Provid urged caution and placed more hopes on the German armies than on the Western Ukrainian membership. Because the Wehrmacht had favoured the OUN-M group over Bandera's and the fact that many of the OUN-M were already serving in the Gestapo gave Mel'nyk good reasons to advise caution; he did not want to jeopardise the gains his group had already made with the German command or those they expected in taking over local administrations in the occupied territories. Bandera chose to negotiate relations with the Germans from a position of strength that he anticipated the OUN would secure if it controlled territories before the Germans arrived.

The differences between the two factions, which led to the split in 1941 were therefore essentially tactical differences. The politics of the two groups were virtually identical. Bandera's ability to split the organisation on this issue, and yet have fundamental agreement with German policy on issues such as land and social policy in the occupied territories is highlighted by the decision taken at the Cracow meeting on the question of the collective farm system:

The OUN is against the destruction of the collectives in the period of revolutionary upsurge.³²

³¹Stepan Bandera, 'V 10-mu Richnytsyu Stvorennya Revolyutsiynoho Provodu OUN', Surma no. 18-19, 1950, p. 5.

³²OUN v Svitli Postanov, p. 34.

The Germans upon entering Ukraine, had promised to disband them. They then found the collectives to be convenient organisational structures for labour exploitation, grain production and centres of police administration. The pious statements of the OUN (in contrast to past denunciations of the collective farm system) concerning their inviolability until a government had been formed which would disband them 'in an orderly manner', not only indicated its self-perceived separatedness from any popular mass movement for independence, but also the coincidence between OUN aims and Nazi policy in the occupied territories.

Neither OUN faction was far removed from Nazi Germany's policy on another issue: the Jewish question. Mel'nyk's group had made the practical choice in supporting Nazi plans and was anticipated as a striking force against Poles and Jews by the German command.³³ At the Second Great Gathering in Cracow, the OUN-B declared that the Jews constituted a major threat to the aspirations of Ukrainian independence. They were part of the 'Judeo-bolshevik bloc' which dominated the higher echelons of the Communist Party and state apparatus.³⁴

Immediately after the Gathering, two months before the outbreak of the German-Soviet war, the OUN-B released instructions to its expeditionary forces (Pokhidni Hrupy) who were to infiltrate the Ukrainian SSR. The history of these groups will be dealt with in the following pages.

³³Dallin, German Rule in Russia, p. 115.

³⁴OUN v Svitli Postanov, p. 36.

The Proclamation of June 30, 1941

On June 22, 1941, the German armies attacked the Soviet Union and rapidly advanced into the heartland of Ukraine. By June 30, they were in Lviv; in July and August, Kiev and Odessa were taken and by November all of Ukraine, except for Voroshilovgrad and the north eastern part of the Donbas region was in their hands. In the first hours of the invasion, the OUN organised uprisings in a number of towns in Soviet Western Ukraine: in the Sambir area, Pidhaitsi and Monastyrsky districts.³⁵ Ukrainian militia began to dismantle the collective farms almost immediately. Nachtigall took part in this offensive by the German armies and captured Lviv. By this time, Nachtigall was able to play the dual function of fighting on the German side and organising the city for Bandera's faction, as the nationalists had anticipated.³⁶

The first indications of the harsh realities of occupant rule came in the aftermath of an attempt by the OUN-B to proclaim an independent Ukrainian state on June 30, 1941 as soon as Nachtigall had taken the city. In a small Prosvita hall, the OUN-B, represented by Yaroslav Stets'ko proclaimed the independence of Ukraine and called for the formation of a new state structure. They hoped thereby to press the German command with a fait accompli and begin to extract their desired autonomous rule.³⁷ The nationalists then went to Metropolitan Sheptyts'ky and asked for the Church's blessing upon the proclamation. Sheptyts'ky, an authoritative figure amongst

³⁵ Armstrong, Ukrainian Nationalism, p. 76.

³⁶ Ibid., p. 86.

³⁷ Kubiovyc, gen. ed., Ukraine Concise Encyclopaedia, p. 888. See also Ukrayins'ka RSR, p. 384.

Western Ukrainians agreed and issued a Pastoral Letter.³⁸ The proclamation and Sheptyts'ky's blessing were then read over the radio. In small towns throughout Galicia, OUN-B members organised public meetings, read the proclamation and began to set up administrative bodies of rule.

The German High Command did not take to this action favourably and proceeded to arrest Stets'ko, Bandera and other leaders of the June 30 events. After the arrest of the OUN leaders, support for the proclamation quickly diminished. But the attitude of most OUN members to the Germans remained favourable in spite of these events. M. Lebed', the new leader of the OUN-B after Bandera's arrest, had great difficulty in convincing cells of the organisation to go underground, because the membership did not believe that the Gestapo would harm them. When tensions between the OUN and the Germans became even greater, some nationalists left the organisation because they did not want to fight the occupants!³⁹

The proclamation in Lviv was a minor event in the War, yet it has been treated by the OUN-B as a glorious and important occurrence, rivalling that of the Central Rada of 1917-18.⁴⁰ A more serious controversy about the Jewish question surrounds the events in Lviv. Timofei Strokach, commander of the Red Partisan movement during the War has written that the nationalists and Nachtigall assisted in pogroms against Poles and Jews when the city was taken.⁴¹ This charge is repeated in Ukrayins'ka RSR u Velykiy Vitchyznyzniy Viyni Radyans'koho Soyuzu, where it is pointed out

³⁸OUN v Svitli Postanov, p. 51.

³⁹Shankowsky, Pokhidni Hrupy OUN, p. 62.

⁴⁰Jaroslav Stets'ko, 30 Chervnya 1941 (London, 1967).

⁴¹Timofei Strokach, Nash Pozyvnyy--Svoboda (Kiev, 1964), p. 167.

that communists were principal targets in these pogroms.⁴²

Jaroslav Stets'ko denied charges that nationalists and Nachtigall were involved in these pogroms in an article written in 1963 in the nationalist emigre journal Ukrainian Review entitled 'The Truth About Events in Lviv, Western Ukraine in June and July 1941'.⁴³ In his response to these charges, made by Alexander Dallin again in 1963, Stets'ko rejects Dallin's view of these events by noting that his perception is distorted by the fact that he is left-wing and a Jew!

Stets'ko and others have been quick to point out that the ministers of the newly proclaimed government were arrested by the Gestapo. The Gestapo unit in fact was composed of OUN-M nationalists. Furthermore, Lev Shankowsky, a Bandera supporter has written that Stets'ko, Bandera and others were deported to concentration camps immediately after the June 1941 events.⁴⁴ In fact, they were only placed under house arrest and 'Stets'ko was even able to go to Cracow where he consulted with Lebed''.⁴⁵ The imprisonment of Stets'ko, Bandera and other leading nationalists came only on September 15, 1941.⁴⁶

The administrative organs of occupation rule began to be set up in the wake of the military invasion. One section, east of Kiev remained under military occupation rule. Bukovina and Bessarabia became part of the Rumanian administration (Transnistria);

⁴²Ukrayins'ka RSR, p. 383.

⁴³Ukrainian Review, no. 3, 1963, pp. 62-70.

⁴⁴Ukrainian Review, no. 2, 1955, pp. 8-18.

⁴⁵Armstrong, Ukrainian Nationalism, p. 83.

⁴⁶loc. cit.

Galicia, the Kholm and Lemko areas were part of the Generalegouvernement; the oblasts of Volyn, Podlachia, Zhytomyr, Kiev, Nikolaev Dnipropetrovsk and Touria became Reichkommissariat Ukraine under Erich Koch.

The Generalegouvernement, under Otto Wechter was one of the few peaceful areas of Nazi occupation in Eastern Europe, a factor which prevented the early ^{origin} ~~arise~~ of hostilities between the nationalists and the occupants there.⁴⁷ On the other hand, the eastern regions under military government and the Reichkommissariat witnessed savage repressions, hunger and devastation. It was into the territories of the Reichkommissariat that the expeditionary forces travelled, both from the OUN-M and OUN-B in the wake of the German advance.

The Communist Underground and Red Partisan Movement

The rapid advance of the German armies across the Soviet Union in 1941 made many believe that they would reach Moscow in several months. The inability of Soviet forces to check this advance is attributable to several factors. As a result of the purges in 1937-38, the Red Army had lost a whole generation of experienced generals. They were replaced by careerists with little or no knowledge of military affairs. As Strokach put it, the higher one went in the army command, the worse the leadership became.⁴⁸

⁴⁷ Heike, Ukrayins'ka Dyviziya 'Halychyna', p. 15.

⁴⁸ Strokach, Nash Pozyvnyy, p. 46.

From the technical point of view, the Red Army was inferior to the German forces; it had practically no artillery transport--horses acted in lieu of motorisation; its tank divisions, crucial in steppe warfare were outdated. There was a lack of proper arms for border soldiers, who, incidentally, were prohibited by higher authorities to fire on German planes which scouted over the border for weeks before the invasion.⁴⁹

Inside the country, citizens were not prepared for war; the Komsomol had not been trained in conspiratorial work. In the first weeks of the war, citizens of the Soviet Union learnt of the conflict when it was practically upon them.⁵⁰ Even where there were able bodies to defend the territories, to join the Red Army or to organise themselves, the machinery of bureaucracy seemed incapable of responding efficiently to such offers. Khrushchev describes such an occurrence in Kiev as the Nazis were approaching the city:

The situation turned very bad, mostly because there was so little help forthcoming from Moscow. Shortly after the war started, during the German advance on Kiev, there was a great awakening of patriotism among the people. The workers from the 'Lenin Forge' and other factories around Kiev came to the Central Committee in droves asking for rifles so that they could fight back against the invaders. I phoned Moscow to arrange for a shipment of weapons with which to arm these citizens who wanted to join the Front in support of Red Power. The only person I could get through to was Malenkov.

"Tell me", I said "where can we get rifles? We've got factory workers here who want to join the ranks of the Red Army and fight the Germans, and we don't have anything to arm them with."

"You'd better give up any thought of getting rifles from us. The rifles in the civil defense organisation here have all been sent to Leningrad."

⁴⁹Ibid., p. 12.

⁵⁰Mazur, Koly Bahryanily Svitanky, p. 38. The example here is of Drohobych, Western Ukraine.

"Then what are we supposed to fight with?"

"I don't know--pikes, swords, homemade weapons, anything you can make in your own factories."

"You mean we should fight tanks with spears?"

"You'll have to do the best you can. You can make fire bombs out of bottles of gasoline or kerosene and throw them at the tanks".⁵¹

As it became evident that the Red Army was being pushed decisively back out of the Western regions of the Soviet Union and that a protracted war with the Germans had to be prepared for, the Soviet leadership called for the formation of partisan brigades. Stalin's speech, broadcast on July 3, 1941⁵² urging the organisation of diversionary units and guerrilla bands to fight behind enemy lines met a quick response from the Soviet Ukrainian party leadership.

Underground cells of the party had been left throughout Ukraine to operate in occupied territory after the Wehrmacht had passed. In the Lviv region, taken at the end of June and in July, these cells existed in the rayons of Brody, Rava Ruski, Krasny, Zolochiw and Peremysl.⁵³ In Rivno it was difficult to organise them because of the rapidity of the German advance and the fact that a wide network of Ukrainian nationalists there was informed sufficiently to deconspire their members as soon as the Germans arrived.⁵⁴ As the Germans entered Kiev, there were nine raykom party cells in operation, and a total of forty conspiratorial groups prepared for diversionary and sabotage work throughout the city.⁵⁵

⁵¹Crankshaw, ed., Khrushchev Remembers, p. 150.

⁵²J. V. Stalin, The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union (New York, 1969), p. 15.

⁵³Strokach, Nash Pozyvnyy, p. 167.

⁵⁴Kyzya, Narodni Mesnyky, pp. 49-50.

⁵⁵Strokach, Nash Pozyvnyy, p. 181.

The organisation of the Red Partisan movement was the responsibility of the Communist Party leadership, the decisive role here being played by officers of the NKVD. Strokach himself, a leading figure in the movement, had been Deputy Commissar for the Interior up to the War, a position reserved for the most trusted members of the government's security police. The organisation of the partisan movement was considered to be a highly political affair, because it not only consisted of technical training and the provision of supplies for partisans, but also of enforcing the most stringent regulation of groups of guerrillas set free to roam in the marshes and forests, relatively independent of the standard controls so characteristic of Soviet society at that time. Approximately one third of the officers of the partisan movement were NKVD officers.⁵⁶

Armstrong delineates three stages of Soviet partisan activity during the War. From June to December, 1941, there was established a uniform spread of groups across the country, with close ties with the population.

During this first period, many partisans deserted or gave themselves up to the Germans when attacked. In the first few months of war this network practically disappeared. In the second period, from December 1941 to the autumn of the following year, there was virtually no partisan activity as all forces, Armstrong argues, were thrown into the defense of Moscow. The only exception was in North Byelorussia. The third period from Autumn, 1942 to the summer of 1944 witnessed the growth of the partisan movement anew as a result of the

⁵⁶ John A. Armstrong, ed., Soviet Partisans in World War Two (Madison, Wisc., 1964), pp. 78-80.

influx of Red Army stragglers and deserters, and the consolidation of smaller forces into large concentrations of partisans which were prepared for entry into Western Ukraine.⁵⁷

Until early 1943, there was no Red Partisan movement in Western Ukraine. Kovpak and Saburov's forces were specially assigned to this area in late 1942 in preparation for the Red Army offensive. Although the voluminous histories of the partisan movement attribute its absence in Western Ukraine to the rapidity of the Red Army retreat and the fact that the nationalists deconspired the party underground which was assigned the task of constructing partisan brigades, it is perhaps equally credible to attribute this absence of communist activity to the hostility of the Western Ukrainian population to Soviet power, and the absence of a strong communist tradition there, even in the mid-thirties. It is unlikely that the brief occupation of 1939-41 succeeded in building a strong indigenous communist movement or even a body of state and party functionaries which was prepared to defend its interests in the most pessimistic, for the Soviet Union, period of the German-Soviet war.

In the initial period of the conflict, when the Red Army was in full retreat, one of the main functions of the Partisans was to co-ordinate their work with the movement of Soviet troops, to act as diversionary forces and as a cover for the retreat. The second, and more important long term function was to embed themselves in enemy territory and carry out sabotage against communications, terrorise collaborators and where possible, engage Gestapo and police units.

⁵⁷ Ibid., pp. 21-25.

Membership in the partisan movement was voluntary, according to Strokach. Later in the war, after the movement had gained authority and prestige, and especially after the Soviet forces were on the offensive again, the voluntarism was accompanied by the subtle coercion of circumstance--the impending return of Soviet authority. The national composition of the partisan movement was roughly proportionate to the national composition of the population in Eastern Ukraine as a whole: 54.4% Ukrainian, 23.4% Russian, 5.8% Byelorussian, 1.2% Jewish, 2.1% Polish, 5.8% Armenian, .5% Tatars, .3% Georgians and the remaining 11.7% from other nationalities.⁵⁸ Nationality does not seem to have played an important role, therefore in the process of formation of the partisan brigades.

Other more important factors determining membership in the partisan movement had to do with the predicament of different social classes during occupation rule, and their interest in maintaining the Soviet system in Ukraine. For example, Kovpak's first band of partisans, which he organised in Putivlya, Eastern Ukraine as the Nazis approached, was made up of three generations of communists: 'old fighters of the Revolution, taught by the great lessons of life, middle aged people, hardened by industrialisation and the struggle against the kulaks, and finally the youth, Red Army soldiers who escaped the enclosures of the enemy and preserved their military honour and dignity'.⁵⁹ It appears from this example, that the motivation to fight, in the first instance came from those whose measure of commitment to and personal interest in the Soviet

⁵⁸M. Koval', Istoriya Pamyataye! (Kiev, 1965), p. 27.

⁵⁹Sydir A. Kovpak, Soldaty Maloyi Zemli (Kiev, 1964), p. 53.

system was greatest--members of the Communist Party or the NKVD echelons. A large part of the partisan movement in its early stages was communist intelligentsia, whose livelihood depended upon such a system and whose predicament was perhaps the worst of any social group during the Nazi occupation. Workers and peasants in Ukraine who had borne the brunt of industrialisation and 'de-kulakisation' adopted a less committed stance and decided to wait and see what the future would bring. Their political views and assessment of the Soviet system are dealt with in a future section of this chapter. Later, when the occupational policies put many workers out of jobs and attempted to deport them and peasants to Germany, the proportion of working class in the partisan movement grew considerably. The proportion of middle strata Soviet citizens in the movement declined as well as a result of the influx of Red Army stragglers and deserters in 1942 when the horrors of internment camps became widely known in Ukraine.⁶⁰ Armstrong's contention that the rebirth of the partisan movement came only in late 1942 is possibly misleading because it ignores the growing momentum in 1942 against the German authorities on the part of the population which already was contributing to the arisal of new groups of guerrillas and urban underground cells of the Communist Party. The central initiative of the Partisan Command under Strokach's leadership to bring these disparate groups together and service them with arms and food supplies was preceded by this spontaneous process of revival.

The turn of fortunes on the Eastern front and the stepped up repressions and deportations at the end of 1942 created a new climate

⁶⁰Earl Ziemke, 'Composition and Morale of the Partisan Movement' in Armstrong, ed., Soviet Partisans, pp. 142-44.

of confidence amongst the population of Eastern Ukraine, and especially amongst those already resisting Nazi authority. For their part, the Red Partisans began to attack individuals and groups which were openly collaborating with the Germans.⁶¹ Leaflets addressed to important collaborators were circulated in towns threatening reprisals. As a rule, the partisans did not engage in indiscriminate violence against the population. Violence was almost always directed against collaborators, and in 1943-44 against the nationalist sympathisers and activists in Western Ukraine, whom the partisans were led to believe were all direct agents of Nazi Germany.

The changing mood in Ukraine, turning decisively against German authority and the reversals in the Soviet-Germany military conflict were a major turning point in the Red Partisan movement's history. An excellent illustration of the newfound legitimacy of the movement was the defection of two thousand soldiers in the SS Division Byelorussia to the partisans in the summer of 1942 led by a former Red Army colonel. Seven hundred Tatars in a German unit also defected to the partisans in early 1943.⁶² By 1944, Soviet sources estimate that up to 20% of the partisan movement was made up of former collaborators.⁶³ These events were accompanied by a general recognition by the Eastern Ukrainian population that the Red Partisans were small nuclei of the authority which would later return in its entirety. The presence of the partisans and the communist underground, combined with the hostility towards the Nazi occupation provided a basis for the majority of the population choosing to support

⁶¹Lystivky Partiynoho Pidpilya i Partyzans'kykh Zahoniv u roky Velykoyi Vitchyznyanoyi Viyny (Kiev, 1969), pp. 146-47.

⁶²Zeimke 'Composition and Morale', p. 146-47.

⁶³loc. cit.,

the Soviet side from the end of 1942.

The Pokhidni Hrupy

If the Ukrainian nationalists were at all known in Eastern Ukraine before June 1941, then it is highly improbable that they were considered as a third alternative in the conflict. The formal independence of the Bandera and Mel'nyk organisations was heavily overshadowed by their co-operation with the German forces.

In the 1930's, the OUN vaguely understood the crucial importance of Soviet Ukraine in any struggle for independence. The overwhelming majority of the nation lived here, it was the historic centre of Ukrainian culture and the most developed economic region that Ukrainians inhabited. The first years of the nationalists' activity were confined to Poland and several West European emigre communities, making it a product of Polish social and political conditions and not of the Ukrainian reality. The movement, simply stated, was a minority movement and not a national one in the precise sense of the word. Konovalts'' contacts with nationalists in Soviet Ukraine, for which the nationalists claim the GPU assassinated him, do not appear to have been of any importance in shaping the politics or strategy of the OUN.

By nature of this exclusion from the centre of Ukrainian life and the dearth of any serious research on the part of the organisation into the reality of Soviet conditions in Ukraine, the OUN approached the test of penetration into the eastern territories with serious handicaps. They had no experience of political agitation amongst workers, and no social programme developed beyond the quasi-fascist declaration of 1929. Moreover, they naturally viewed the Eastern Ukrainians as foreigners, and conversely expected the same treatment

from them. All of these factors however did not rival the serious implications of the OUN's association with the policies of the Third Reich and their close practical co-operation with the Wehrmacht's advance. The declaration of independence in Lviv in June 1941 indicated, that while the Bandera faction was prepared to work with the Germans, they wished to be treated as equal partners. The arrest of Bandera and Stets'ko exemplified the reality, that the Germans had the power to make such a decision and not the nationalists.

The pokhidni hrupy of the OUN-B set out for Eastern Ukraine simultaneously with the German attack on the Soviet Union. The two interrelated objectives of these forces are best described in the instructions released by the leadership of the organisation immediately after the conclusion of the Second Great Gathering in Cracow:

Those states which lead the struggle against Moscow, who are not hostile to Ukraine, we treat as natural allies (emphasis in original). Stimulate the armed uprising against Moscow and begin to build our own state from the organised forces of the Ukrainian people--build a realistic foundation to become partners (our emphasis) and on the basis of such real factors, normalise the relations between Ukraine and those states as between allies . . .

Try to send some people, above all through legal channels, to help in administrative or economic affairs, and eventually into the army . . . where it will be necessary to organise small locals of our organisation and revolutionary actions . . .

. . . carry on intensive subversive work in the economy, administrations, transport, the army . . .

Simultaneously, with the fomenting of armed struggle against Moscow, we begin the reconstruction of the Ukrainian state . . .⁶⁴

The OUN-B forces prepared expeditions for three destinations in Eastern Ukraine. The first group, under the leadership of

⁶⁴OUN v Svitli Postanov, pp. 48-57.

M. Klymyshyn travelled towards the North-Eastern Ukraine; it numbered approximately 2,500. The group travelling to Central Ukraine had approximately 1,500 participants and was led by M. Lemyk. The expeditionary force travelling south towards Odessa and the Donbas constituted a body of 1,000 and was under the direction of Z. Matla and M. Rikhta.⁶⁵ The group heading for Kharkiv, the Central Ukraine expedition did not reach its destination because it was broken up by the Germans, a large number of the travellers being shot. The southern group, the most successful of the Bandera faction's emissaries managed to establish a broad organisational network in the Donbas region in the oblasts of Kirovograd, Donbas, Dnipropetrovsk and Stalino. Some of its political work in these centres involved the active co-operation of Greeks living in Mariopol and Russians in the Donbas region.⁶⁶

The Mel'nyk faction sent out its own pokhidni hrupy, but many of them were shot when they emerged in different centres and attempted to organise public cultural and political work.⁶⁷ The most successful centre of Mel'nyk's operations was in Kiev, where the local administrations in which the nationalists worked were closely tied to German rule or were the direct institutions of this rule.

Immediately after the retreat of the Red Army and before the Nazi administration had time to establish itself, the conditions in Central and Eastern Ukraine became more relaxed, allowing for a greater scope of political work by the expeditionary forces as they

⁶⁵Shankowsky, Pokhidni Hrupy OUN, pp. 12,30.

⁶⁶Ibid, pp. 11-13.

⁶⁷G. Polikarpenko, OUN Pidchas Druhoyi Svitovoyi Viyny (n.p., 1951), p. 57.

arrived in their designated centres. They quickly established contact with the local population.⁶⁸ In orienting themselves to the new conditions, the nationalists began to reconstruct a history of the Soviet period of rule and the attitude of the Ukrainians towards it during the interwar period. Two factors stood out in this history. First, the nationalists learnt of the long period of opposition by the peasantry to collectivisation, continuing well after the institutionalisation of the collective farm system. The peasants did not consider the collectives to be their own property under their control, but the means whereby the state extracted agricultural product from the countryside for the cities. The Eastern Ukrainian peasantry greeted the Germans in 1941 because they believed that they would dismantle the collective farms.⁶⁹

Second, the OUN activists found out that the workers in Western Ukraine were more nationally conscious than current Western Ukrainian opinion made them out to be. One of the main reasons for this high degree of consciousness was attributable to the fact that a great part of the working class, formed in the period of industrialisation, had come from the villages. Although they had integrated into urban life, their ties with the countryside remained strong. This became clear in the course of discussions between the nationalists and workers.

In beginning to construct a network of cadre groups amongst workers and the city population in general, this constituting the central task of the pokhidni hrupy, the nationalists at first worked

⁶⁸Yevhen Pavlyuk, 'Borot'ba Ukrāyins'koho Narodu na Skhidno-Ukrayins'kykh Zemlyakh 1941-44', Kalendar, 1947, pp. 37-57.

⁶⁹Shankowsky, Pokhidni Hrupy OUN, pp. 75-76. See also UHVR PH-1.

quite openly. They revived the Prosvita organisations and carried out cultural and educational activities.⁷⁰ The ability to work openly lasted for as long as it took the German administration to be established. Thereafter, conditions began to change rapidly. The refusal by the Germans to dismantle the collective farms aroused hostility from the peasants, not only towards the Nazi administration itself, but also those working for the Germans, which included the nationalists. The established factory regime and the deportations to labour camps in Germany quickly made clear the real intentions of the new order. Sabotage in the factories, often organised by the communist underground began in an effort to disrupt production.⁷¹ In the course of the War years approximately one million Donbas workers were to leave their cities and move west in search of work or be deported to Germany by the authorities.⁷²

The brutality of Nazi rule fell so quickly upon the population that the nationalists themselves, to a degree favoured in the eyes of the administration and police, were forced to take their political work underground. Many translators who had accompanied the army or became part of the Reichkommissariat institutions were shot when the Gestapo learnt that they were also under the discipline of the OUN and expected to carry out independent activity.⁷³ On the one hand, the expeditionary forces were attempting to agitate for an independent Ukraine while standing on the side of the Germans; on the other, the Germans now refused to tolerate any measure of independent political work by the nationalists and proceeded to repress them.

⁷⁰Shankowsky, Pokhidni Hrupy OUN, p. 17.

⁷¹Strokach, Nash Pozyvnyy, pp. 183-89.

⁷²Yevhen Paklyuk, Donbas u Borot'bi z Nimtsyamy (Munich, 1947).

⁷³Shankowsky, Pokhidni Hrupy OUN, p. 13.

Not only was the situation for the nationalists becoming embarrassing (in front of the Eastern Ukrainian population) but also dangerous to try to remain on both sides of the growing conflict. Shankowsky alludes to this developing situation when he writes that:

In the harsh conditions of the German occupation, the Ukrainian popular masses gave support to that organisation which not only was able to shout abstract slogans, no matter how good or convincing they sounded, but which could stand for the living interests of the people.⁷⁴

It rapidly became clear in the course of the latter half of 1941 that the 'living interests of the people' did not co-incide with the execution of German occupational rule.

An equally embarrassing problem for the expeditionary forces arose in connection with their ability to explain their political programme to the Ukrainian masses. They could not match the high level of political awareness of the people. Unlike the students and other audiences of the OUN in the 1930's in Western Ukraine, the Soviet Ukrainians were competent to discuss issues of economy, politics, state structures and above all, democracy, on a high level. A great number of the activists sent east by the OUN were not trained as propagandists and had little political skill. Many didn't even have a formal secondary school education, whereas the Eastern Ukrainian average in education was quite high. A great many of the enthusiasts became demoralised when they realised that a reading of the OUN decatalogue (The Ten Commandments of a nationalist) did not have the desired effect on the audience.⁷⁵ The audiences rejected out of hand the notion of the OUN as the single leading organisation in civic and

⁷⁴Ibid., p. 58.

⁷⁵Ibid., p. 71.

political life (A typical response was 'We've had enough of one party states'). M. Chubay, a member of the expeditionary forces notes that "increasingly there appeared before us such and similar, deeper problems . . . such that 'our' boys no longer had the confidence to appear before meetings".⁷⁶

Following two months of public work in semi-legality, the OUN-B groups had successfully introduced themselves to wide sections of Eastern Ukrainians. The intensification of repressions by the German administration against them and the population as a whole necessitated a radical change in methods of work. At a meeting of the leaderships of the expeditionary forces of the Bandera faction, on September 3, 1941, it was decided to go underground and form a conspiratorial organisation.⁷⁷

The OUN-M groups fared worse in the struggle for survival, perhaps because they were too confident about their relations with the Germans. They lost a great number of activists to the firing squads, not so much because they opposed Nazi rule, but because they trusted it too much. As part of the Gestapo, the army units, and later the staffs of town administrations, Mel'nyk's followers thought that they had gained a measure of independence from the Germans. On Nov. 21, one month after an attempt to establish a Mel'nyk-controlled Rada, similar to Stets'ko's project in Lviv earlier, had been suppressed, the OUN-M again overstepped the mark of acceptability in Kiev. The so-called Bazar incident began with a demonstration of nationalists and Kievans marching to a symbolic grave outside the city where they

⁷⁶M. Chubay, Reyd Orhanizatoriv OUN vid Poprad po Chorne More (Munich, 1952), p. 44.

⁷⁷Shankowsky, Pokhidni Hrupy OUN, p. 59.

intended to hold a meeting. Ukrainian police stood by and ensured passage for the marchers. The German police quickly reacted to the incident, arresting the organisers and executing them.⁷⁸ A wave of repressions against Mel'nyk's adherents then began, which also resulted in the destruction of expeditionary forces in Mikolayev, Kamenets-Podilsk, Chernihiv and Poltava.⁷⁹ After this incident the prestige of the OUN-M amongst nationalist Ukrainians waned considerably. The population of Kiev was by no means entirely sympathetic to the nationalists inside or outside the city administration. The communist underground, continually at work here, consistently exposed the collaboration of the OUN-M and local figures with the Nazis.⁸⁰ From such indicators as low theatre attendances and audiences at artistic gatherings organised by the new city authorities in 1942, M. Koval', a Soviet Ukrainian historian has shown that the population of Kiev did not appreciate the nationalist efforts.⁸¹

The Political Views of Workers
and Peasants

An important question of this period relates to those who did not have the opportunity to express their views, but were nevertheless deeply affected by the War and had certain positions of their own concerning the solution to the Ukrainian question. These were the working people of Eastern Ukraine who wanted neither German occupation nor Soviet rule of the pre-War variety.

⁷⁸Mykola Lebed', Ukrayins'ka Povstans'ka Armiya (Munich, 1946), pp. 20-21.

⁷⁹Armstrong, Ukrainian Nationalism, p. 106.

⁸⁰Lystivky Partiynoho Pidpilya, p. 39.

⁸¹Koval', Istoriya Pamyataye'. p. 25.

Without any encouragement or guidance, workers and professional groups of the city of Krivij Rih in the Donbas had begun to re-organise the economy, school system and social services as soon as the Soviet authorities left. Mines and factories were opened, schools were running, newspapers appeared and cultural activities were organised. After mastering the internal affairs of the city, an effort was made to duplicate this scheme of self-administration in surrounding areas. It was successfully initiated in Dniproderzhinsk when its citizens were free of the old administration. The Red Partisans who had remained nearby to await the Germans were driven out when they attempted to enter Krivij Rih. This spontaneous process of self-organisation and self-rule lasted for a short time; when the Nazis entered the city, the organisers of the project were killed.⁸²

Many would discount this short lived phenomenon as too brief to mention or to serve as a noteworthy indication of deeper processes at work in society. But even the nationalists in the pokhidni hrupy, who had little idea of the models of democratic self-administration on the local level as a basic unit for an independent state throughout Ukraine, praised the attempt of the Krivij Rih inhabitants and pointed to these efforts as proof that the Ukrainian people were entirely competent to run their own affairs. The lack of sources on the short intervening period between Soviet retreat and German occupation which occurred in some areas of Soviet Ukraine makes it impossible to gauge the extent of such self activity by workers and other social groups. The example provided does however

⁸²Yu. Semenko, 'Pamyati M. Pronchenka', Novi Dni, no. 39, April 1953, pp. 10-13.

indicate the capability of these people in responding to the war situation in an entirely unique way.

The expeditionary forces carried on extensive discussions with the people they encountered and recorded the views of workers and peasants at the numerous meetings they organised. The reaction to the reading of the OUN decalogue has been mentioned. It is also important to note that the position of the OUN against the dismantling of the collective farm system 'in the period of revolutionary upsurge', as recorded in the 1941 Cracow Gathering aroused great suspicion on the part of the Eastern Ukrainian peasantry that the nationalists were no more than German agents. Some peasants argued convincingly that it was not possible to have a revolution without the collective farms being dismantled.⁸³ After considerable avoidance of the issue, the expeditionary forces changed their position:

In relation to individual or collective land use, we didn't take the position that the collective farms had to be subdivided. We left the decision up to the peasants. I don't know of an incident in all of Southern Ukraine where the peasants wanted to leave the collective farm system as it was, although we explained to them that it could be governed by the peasants themselves, on a co-operative basis, and not by a foreign party or state.⁸⁴

On the basis of these discussions, a land programme was worked out. It was radically different from the land policy of the OUN in the 1930's, and for the first time, rooted in the reality of large-scale organised agriculture as existed in Eastern Ukraine. The programme called for the distribution of land and farming implements according to the democratic decision of the peasants. Socialised

⁸³ Chubay, Reyd Orhanizatoriv OUN, pp. 53-55.

⁸⁴ Zenoviy Matla quoted in Shankowsky, Pokhidni Hrupy OUN, p. 79.

land use in the form of co-operatives or otherwise was admitted. The state would keep 5% of land for experimental use and as building sites for technical facilities. The state would also be responsible for providing credit and technical/scientific aid to landholders. The machine tractor stations (MTS) would be used on a co-operative basis; large machines would, therefore, not be distributed to individual households. The formation of trade unions and political organisations was to be encouraged.⁸⁵

Not only was this programme adopted in the abstract, but it also became the basis for land distribution in the zones liberated by the Ukrainian Insurgent Army in 1943 in North Western Ukraine.⁸⁶

The question of an independent Ukraine was widely discussed also with workers and professional groups. Shankowsky summarises the majority views of the Eastern Ukrainians in the following way:⁸⁷ they wanted a democratic order, not only via the ballot box, but in the factories, educational system and other social institutions. The government should be entirely independent of Russia. Freedom of religious belief, speech, the press and independent trade unions should be ensured. All citizens to be equal before the law, there being no privileged classes or cliques to usurp this equality. They called for a multi-party system and the protection of all national minorities. The workers rejected the system of private capitalism, both the pre-revolutionary type and the one introduced by the German occupation. Heavy industry, transport, communication and engineering should be nationalised and production organised by a state plan. Secondary industries could be run by municipalities or

⁸⁵Shankowsky, Pokhidni Hrupy OUN, p. 58.

⁸⁶UHVR T-2. 1,500 subdivisions of land resulted from the enactment of this programme in Volyn in October 1943. See also Za Samostiynu Ukrayinu, no. 3-8, October 1943, p. 43.

⁸⁷Shankowsky, Pokhidni Hrupy OUN, pp. 107-17.

collectives; the banking system could only be co-operatively or state administered. There was general agreement that the equality of women had not been achieved, and that this had to be corrected. Most believed that the family and the institution of marriage, however, should be strengthened and that a major responsibility of women was to raise children. Education should be universally accessible and without cost.

M. Koval', in a fashion characteristic of Soviet accounts, claims that the peasantry in Soviet Ukraine was opposed to the dismantling of the collective farm system by the German administration.⁸⁸ On the one hand, the German administration would not dismantle collectives in most regions, and where they did, they exacted a quota of deportees to Germany. On the other, as has been mentioned, the OUN-B forces documented a history of continuous opposition to the farm system, not only during the War, but ever since the collectivisation drive began in the early thirties.

A more serious difference between historians arises on the issue of the nationalists' ability to provide a land programme in Eastern Ukraine and gain a sympathetic hearing for the views of the pokhidni hrupy. Armstrong argues that:

the initial failure of the nationalist groups . . . to grasp the overriding importance of the land question, and the necessity of making this a prime means by which the rural population could be won to the nationalist cause, must certainly be ranked as one of the great lost opportunities of this period. If the nationalists had, from the beginning used all their energies to present a positive programme for agrarian reform as the heart of their message . . . they might have left behind

⁸⁸Koval', Istoriya Pamyataye'. p. 64.

a conception of the Ukrainian nationalist movement as a defender of the interests of the peasantry.⁸⁹

. . . The failure of the OUN to present a constructive programme adapted to the needs of East Ukraine makes it difficult to approach the major question posed in this (i.e. Armstrong's) study: How strong was nationalism in East Ukraine? To a considerable extent, the initial experience of the East Ukrainians with propagators of nationalist doctrines was negative.⁹⁰

Shankowsky responds to Armstrong's views by pointing out that the expeditionary forces developed a land programme in late 1941 after the position of the OUN-B meeting in Cracow in April of that year became an entirely untenable position to propagate.⁹¹ He goes on to elaborate the essential elements of this programme-abolition of all compulsory forms of land use, distribution of land according to family size and the right to freely form co-operatives.

An objective assessment of the nationalists' success on the land issue appears to fall between these two interpretations. The OUN-B was certainly late in formulating a policy on the land question, but its failure to leave behind a lasting impression as 'a defender of the interests of the peasantry' is attributable to other reasons as well. One of the prime factors here was the confusion sown by the existence of two OUN factions and both groups' association with the Nazi occupation. As well, the inexperience of the nationalists in working with Soviet citizens, their political immaturity, slowed their work considerably and it is difficult to expect that any political organisation of their type could have left any lasting impressions behind after one year's work. By the end of 1942 when the Soviet re-offensive was about to begin, at which time Nazi

⁸⁹Armstrong, Ukrainian Nationalism, p. 254.

⁹⁰Ibid., p. 282.

⁹¹Shankowsky, Pokhidni Hrupy OUN, p. 89.

repressions were also at their height, the pokhidni hrupy had little chance of carrying out any more work in Eastern Ukraine.

Both authors appear to have missed the main point in this issue. Armstrong's question 'How strong was nationalism in East Ukraine' can perhaps be answered by two other questions--how strong was the OUN's social awareness and how did Eastern Ukrainian national consciousness differ from OUN nationalism? Nationalism does not appear to manifest itself as a constant, unalterable by objective processes and conscious decisions either in Ukraine, or in other countries. The nationalism of the OUN was based on a particular ideology and politics as was discussed in Chapter I. This was a different phenomenon from the national awareness which led many East Ukrainians to be in favour of a Ukrainian government independent of Russia. In the latter case, the social content of this consciousness was diametrically counterposed to the social content of the OUN programme.

Shankowsky's response to Armstrong's criticisms of the OUN not formulating a clear programmatic response on the agrarian question in time appears to be unsatisfactory because, like Armstrong, Shankowsky does not consider the OUN's actions in the context of the events and the consciousness of the Eastern Ukrainians. The Easterners did not evaluate the OUN on the basis of the latter's programme alone, but on the basis of its total approach; in Shankowsky's own words, 'the Ukrainian popular masses gave support to that organisation which not only was able to shout abstract slogans, no matter how good or convincing they sounded, but which could stand for the living interests of these people'. These interests, during the occupation, demanded outright opposition to Nazi rule. And it was on this basis above all, that the Ukrainians eventually came to judge the value of the OUN. The fact that a new land policy was worked out

towards the end of 1941 could only have been to the advantage of the OUN, and it appears to have affected seriously the course of later events. But the most important point of the experience of the pokhidni hrupy was that the Ukrainian masses were the political instructors and the nationalists were pupils, and not the expected reverse situation.

Changes in the Nationalist Strategy

While the intentions of the OUN-B and OUN-M expeditionary forces who headed into Eastern Ukraine appear to have been quite similar, the degree to which they utilised their opportunities for independent political work amongst the labouring classes and the intelligentsia were different. The political views of the Eastern Ukrainians, their idealism and high degree of national awareness profoundly affected the OUN-B over the course of the war. This influence was evident, not only from the influx of Eastern Ukrainians into the organisation, many of them playing important roles in the guerrilla war of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army from 1943 onwards, but also from the shift of the OUN-B away from the Germans. The political lessons of the pokhidni hrupy were only written into the nationalists' programme in August 1943.

At the Second Conference of the Bandera group in April 1942, the first reference in nationalist documents to the War as being 'a great imperialist war'⁹² is made. In the Byuletyn, an official organ of the OUN-B released immediately after the conference, the nationalists stated that the strategy of the Nazi occupation was to depoliticize and liquidate the active Ukrainian intelligentsia, to carry out an extensive exploitation of the economy in the country and to ensure the cultural degeneration of the population as a whole.

⁹²OUN v Svitli Postanov, p. 61.

At the same time, however, the Byuleten offered no political strategy of opposition, but rather called for the 'racial solidarity' of the Ukrainian people as the best defense of their interests.⁹³

The OUN-B defined its strategy in the coming months in an altogether unclear manner. The following excerpt is an indication of the crisis of perspectives which gripped the organisation at the time:

We are effecting a political course . . . which takes into account various eventualities of this war's conclusion. At the same time we are counting on an armed struggle in the near future, to be launched at the opportune moment (the destruction of Moscow, generalised exhaustion, an outward and internal crisis for Germany). Therefore, so that the energy of the people not be wasted away in partisan warfare, but be organised into a broad, popular movement, we are now organising and mobilising planned forces for all aspects of our struggle.⁹⁴

The Second Conference failed to make any statements concerning a land policy, and was content to assert that the land question was part of the struggle 'against foreign exploitation and control, against all imperialist economic systems--capitalist, Muscovite communist, totalitarian and national socialist'.⁹⁵

The reference to partisan warfare in the documents appears to have been aimed at the Polis'ka Sich, a small territory in Polissia controlled by the ataman Taras Bul'ba Borovets', which had been organised by independent nationalist partisan formations. Bul'ba Borovets' was not a highly developed political strategist, having negotiated since 1941 with nationalist, Soviet and German emissaries with the singular concern of preserving the territory for himself.

⁹³UHVR VI-I: Byuleten, no. 4, April 1942, pp. 2-4.

⁹⁴OUN v Svitli Postanov, p. 62.

⁹⁵Ibid., p. 65.

He did, however, welcome political partisans opposed to the occupation and the nationalists alike. Ivan Mitringa and a small group of OUN-B members had left the organisation in 1941 at the beginning of the march of the expeditionary forces and, in 1942 were encamped in the Sich. There they issued their anti-fascist newspaper Oborona Ukrayiny and founded their own political party, the Ukrainian People's Revolutionary Army (Ukrayins'ka Narodna Revolyutsiyna Armiya-UNRA).⁹⁶ The main political line of the UNRA was the demand for an independent Ukrainian government of workers and peasants. The membership was quite small in the UNRA, although its programme was distinctly progressive. Dissident members of the OUN-B in Polissia and Volyn had begun their own guerrilla operations in the beginning of 1942.⁹⁷ The reference to partisan groups mentioned above appears also to have been intended as a negative reply to these dissident initiatives.

The Third Conference of the OUN-B was convened immediately after the turn at the Stalingrad front on February 17, 1943. The conference began with an attack on 'collaborators in the nationalist movement'. For the first time, Bandera supporters rejected both belligerent powers, and contended that the struggle for national independence demanded opposition to both Nazi and Soviet presence in Ukraine. The characterisation of Nazi Germany in the conference documents was strikingly different from the instructions to the pokhidni hrupy to consider her as 'a natural ally':

Germany, by her imperialist policies against the European peoples, by her terror and ravage in the occupied territories has stimulated the

⁹⁶Oborona Ukrayiny. A single issue of this publication giving the programme of the UNRA is in the possession of Prof. B. Levytsky in Munich. See also Armstrong, Ukrainian Nationalism, pp. 154-55.

⁹⁷Armstrong, Ukrainian Nationalism, p. 149.

mobilisation of contemporary Europe against her and her so-called allies. In this way, she has created the ideological-political and material conditions for her own downfall, and is already teetering from the blows of millions of her enemies and from the growth of revolutionary forces of oppressed European peoples.⁹⁸

The Soviet Union, on the other hand, appeared to the OUN to be exploiting the war against fascism in order to subjugate the people of the USSR and to 'capture' the West. The nationalists saw no recourse on the international political arena other than an orientation 'towards the Anglo-American bloc'.⁹⁹ How this orientation was to be put into practice was not, however, explained in the conference records and resolutions.

The most concrete example of the shift in nationalist strategy evident in the documents of the Third Conference which are available was their opposition to the formation of Division Galicia. The attempt on the part of the Mel'nyk faction and Kubiovyc's Ukrainian Central Committee in Galicia to come to the assistance of the faltering German war effort was denounced as collaborationist and a response to 'German imperialist demands for cannon fodder from the Ukrainian people, so that they may win the war and be able to subjugate the Ukrainian people even more'.¹⁰⁰

While the OUN-B was making up its mind about which course to take throughout 1942, the mass of the population, which faced the harsh reality of occupation rule had far outstripped it. Opposition to German rule was universal, except in some parts of Galicia. Deportations and the imprisonment of Red Army soldiers in camps

⁹⁸ OUN v Svitli Postanov, p. 75.

⁹⁹ Ibid., p. 76.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., p. 87.

where hundreds of thousands had died affected practically every Ukrainian family. Grain requisitions created conditions of starvation in the countryside, and in the towns and cities many workers and greater numbers of middle class persons were unemployed.

In these conditions, it appears that the communist underground was gaining ground.¹⁰¹ Those bitterly opposed to Nazi rule saw in the communist underground and the partisan brigades an identifiable and unambiguous ally. As much as they may have disliked the prospect of eventual Soviet re-occupation, the nationalist organisations constituted no real alternative to the communists because they were associated with the occupants themselves. Until they opposed Germany in a practical way (conference resolutions serving little purpose in the eyes of the population) support for the communist underground and partisan movement would grow.

The OUN-M, at this point in the war, chose to steer the traditional course. The Bandera group, recognising the late hour, that the mood of the population whom they had hoped to lead in the struggle was far in advance of their organisation, and above all, that Germany would probably lose the War, attempted to catch up with mass sentiment.

¹⁰¹Nimets'ko--fashysts'kyi Okupatsiyyny Rezhym na Ukrayini. Zbirnyk Dokumentiv i Materyaliv (Kiev, 1963), p. 62.

CHAPTER III

THE UKRAINIAN INSURGENT ARMY

Throughout the year 1942, the German military effort faltered. By December, with the crisis at Stalingrad, the balance of forces on the eastern front shifted in favour of the Soviet Union. In an effort to bolster the collapsing front, the German authorities began an intensive exploitation of the territories of the East--escalating deportations of labour, ruthless measures to increase productivity in industry, greater requisitions of grain and political persecution of active opponents of the occupant regime.

By the end of January, 1943, Soviet forces were in a position to begin the counter-offensive. The return of Soviet troops across the territories of the USSR was almost as rapid as had been the German advance of 1941. From February 2 to August 22, all the territory between Stalingrad and Kharkiv in Eastern Ukraine was retaken. In early November, Kiev was liberated. It took approximately one year for the Red Army to capture all of Central, Western and Carpathian Ukraine. From November 1944, the Soviet advance made for Berlin.¹

By the end of 1942, each Red Partisan brigade in Ukraine was led by one or more partisans who had considerable experience in guerrilla warfare. The central command of the partisan movement was

¹Kubiovyc, gen.ed., Ukraine Concise Encyclopaedia, pp. 885-90.

now equipped with transport planes, enabling it to insert brigades and diversionary groups deep inside enemy territory without necessitating long and exhausting treks from Central or Eastern Ukraine.² The most important partisan initiatives taken in 1943 were by the united forces of Kovpak and Saburov in North Western Ukraine. The ability of the Soviet military command to deploy significant forces behind enemy lines not only indicated the strength of the military apparatus, but also the confidence that the partisan groups could strike a responsive chord amongst some Western Ukrainian communities.

The beginnings of nationalist guerrilla activity against German police units and administrative centres preceded the OUN-B initiatives. Mitringa's group and others encamped in the Polis'ka Sich, as was already mentioned were active since 1941. Numerous other groups found refuge in the deep forests and marshes of North Western Ukraine--Jews fleeing persecution, Red Army stragglers and deserters and peasants whose land had been taken from them or whose families had been killed. They formed self-defence units in the form of guerrilla bands. The distinction between banditry and political guerrilla activity was often blurred by the conditions of war and extensive social dislocation.

The OUN-B took the decision to form the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (Ukrayins'ka Povstans'ka Armiya-UPA) for several reasons. The most important appears to have been the fact that the population in parts of Western Ukraine, in particular Volyn and Polissia, had turned decisively against the occupation and the nationalists did not

²Strokach, Nash Pozyvnyy, p. 196.

want to be outflanked by the mass movement they hoped to lead. The entry of Soviet partisans into North Western Ukraine threatened to undermine their existing base, particularly in Volyn (which had been a stronghold of CPWU activity in the years of Polish rule). Second, the nationalists considered the establishment of armed guerrilla units to be one important preparation for the impending return of the Soviet authorities. They intended to carry on their struggle for as long as possible before retreating into the underground. The stage was thus set for the clash between the OUN and its primary enemy, the Soviet Union. As in other crucial turning points in Ukrainian nationalist history, the objective conditions demanded a change in their strategy; the OUN was seldom the master of its conditions.

The first units of the UPA were consolidated from the remnants of Bul'ba Borovets'' group, sympathisers of the OUN-M faction who had been forced to take up arms against the Germans and the OUN-B cadre in Volyn, who appear to have been ready to fight for some time.³ Although various OUN leaders have since argued that it was their faction's initiative and not the other's to establish the UPA, there seems to be little reason to belabour such an investigation into its origins. Above all, the nationalist guerrilla units were a product of a growing social phenomenon encompassing many political tendencies that the OUN-B managed to unite into a cohesive fighting force.⁴ This explains the fact that, throughout the history of the UPA, it always remained an independent organisation accessible to all who were prepared to fight for a sovereign Ukraine. The UPA

³UHVR B2-1: "Vyzvol'na Borot'ba Ukrayins'koho Narodu i Pol'shcha", p. 6.

⁴A. Osypenko, 'Vklad OUN u Spravu Tvorenya i Rozbudovu UPA' in UPA v Svitli Dokumentiv z Borot'by za Ukrayins'ku Samostiynu Sobornu Derzhavu 1942--1950 r.r. 2 vols. ((London, 1957-60), I, p. 27-28.

leadership always retained close ties with the OUN-B, however and was represented on the latter organisation's leading bodies from 1943 onwards.⁵ Taras Chuprynka (pseudonym for Roman Shukhevych) the leader of the Army after the end of the Second World War, wrote the following in 1949 about the genesis of the UPA:

The partisan detachments which formed after the massive movement of Ukrainian youth, men and women into illegal activity, could no longer remain as military units of the OUN, because in them, aside from the OUN members, there were people who sympathised with other political views, past members of other groups and non-aligned Ukrainian patriots. For this reason, the UPA was the product of armed detachments entering into a single, all national, supra-party organisation.⁶

In February, 1943, UPA units in Polissia launched their first campaign with the twin objective of destroying the German administration there and then driving out the Red Partisans who had already made incursions from Byelorussia.⁷ By March, many strongholds of the German occupation were destroyed and the Red Partisans temporarily driven east beyond the river Slush and north of the Kovel-Sarn line into the Pripet Marshes. The major battles occurred during this first two month campaign in Polissia near the towns of Stolyna, Sarn and Volodymyr.⁸

UPA bases were established on the sites of former Soviet partisan encampments in February and March. The nationalists also began another type of activity which became a characteristic feature of their struggle for the remainder of the War. The prisoner-of-war

⁵I. Butkovsky, 'Orhanizatsiyna Struktura UPA' in UPA v Svitli Dokumentiv, I. p. 13.

⁶UHVR A4-1: Taras Chuprynka, 'Do Genezy UHVR' (Lviv, 1949). See also UHVR v Svitli Postanov Velykoho Zboru ta Inshykh Dokumentiv z Diyal'nosty 1944-1951 r.r. (London, 1956), p. 52.

⁷Lebed' Ukrayins'ka Povstans'ka Armiya, p. 25.

⁸See Reitlinger, House Built on Sand, p. 247; UPA v Svitli Dokumentiv, II, p. 5; and Lebed, Ukrayins'ka Povstans'ka Armiya, p. 43.

camp in Lutsk was opened by the insurgents and prisoners set free. Prisons in Kremyanets, Dubno, Kovel, Lutsk and Horokhiv (Volyn) were destroyed and prisoners released. Some of them joined the UPA. By March, the OUN-B civilian network in North Western Ukraine was sufficiently prepared to co-ordinate its actions with the rural based guerrillas. The first recorded instance of such co-operation in actual battle operations was the entry of the UPA units into small towns where members of the OUN were serving in the police units of the German administration. Thereafter, these police units were increasingly instructed to desert with arms and join nearby UPA groups.⁹

By the end of April, the regions of Mizoch, Ostrih, Shumsk, Kremyanets and Verba in Polissia had been cleared of the Germans. Large landed estates, the Liegenschaften were dismantled in the Volodymyr region. These were formerly Polish landed estates which had been nationalised during the first Soviet occupation of Western Ukraine. Upon the arrival of the German armies, they were handed over to German landowners or were administered by the state. The Liegenschaften also served as focal points for the Nazi gendarmerie.¹⁰

While the Germans maintained control over the larger towns in Volyn and Polissia, the UPA steadily dominated the countryside. In the course of their expansion, the insurgents developed strong ties of co-operation with the local peasantry. The latter provided them with shelter, food and important information concerning the movement of German troops and Soviet partisans. In return, they

⁹See Lebed, Ukrayins'ka Povstans'ka Armiya, pp. 25-26; and UPA v Svitli Dokumentiv, II, pp. 6-7.

¹⁰Lebed, Ukrayins'ka Povstans'ka Armiya, p. 43.

defended the peasants militarily during harvests, affording them the time and security to gather their crops and hide them from roaming requisition units.¹¹ By the autumn of 1943, the UPA was in sufficient control of the country districts to begin creating 'liberated zones', the embryos of what it believed to be a future independent state:

The UPA command is faced with a new task--not only of defending the local population against the destructive German actions, but also of organising those territories where the occupants have been liquidated. This situation provides the possibility for constructing the new state within the existing state. On the one hand our military strength is being built in the consolidated forest bases; on the other, we have begun to organise the life of the people in all its aspects. A new Ukrainian state administration is being formed, in whose confines our national wealth is defended. An agricultural sector is being built which takes charge of distributing the seized property of the former state apparatus amongst the peasantry, and which ensures proper agricultural methods. Home industries and some factory industries have been re-started.¹²

By June, 1943, the nationalists were sufficiently strong to launch a three week raid into Zhytomyr and Kiev oblasts, where they engaged in fifteen battles with German units and Soviet partisans.¹³ In the second half of 1943, after encountering resistance from Soviet partisans in the above mentioned oblasts and in Kamyanets-Podilsk, they attempted to extend territory in their control east and further south. As before, the strategy of the guerrillas was to avoid large towns and concentrations of enemy forces, but to dominate the

¹¹P. Volosh and K. Virlyniv, 'U Borot'bi za Volyu--pid Praporamy UPA', in UPA v Svitli Dokumentiv, I, pp. 250-51.

¹²Lebed', Ukrayins'ka Povstans'ka Armiya, p. 29.

¹³UPA v Svitli Dokumentiv, II, p. 18.

the countryside and create links with the peasantry.¹⁴ By this time an Azerbaijani division of the UPA was active in Volyn against German attempts to retake lost territories.¹⁵ At the same time, Polish-Ukrainian relations in Volyn were worsening, creating new problems for the movement. The Polish question is dealt with in a further section. By October, the UPA had managed to make its presence felt in Kamyanets-Podilsk and Vinnitsia, two main targets of its expansion drive, but failed to secure control of the territories there.

An entirely new aspect of the nationalist movement appeared in 1943--the establishment of initial contacts with other nationalities and their recruitment to the UPA. In June, September and December, the insurgents launched separate propaganda campaigns in the form of mass leafleting directed at the various nationalities who were in their own 'national' divisions of the German army. The aim of this propaganda was to explain the UPA position on the War and to urge these soldiers to desert and come over to the side of the UPA. They argued that reliance on either of the principal belligerents was not a correct strategy for the national liberation of the oppressed peoples who had decided to enter the Germans or Soviet armies.

In June, the head command of the UPA released a leaflet addressed to Russians, calling for the reconstruction of Eastern Europe and Asia on the basis of independent nation states on respective ethnographic territories. Only fraternal harmonious co-existence,

¹⁴Ibid., p. 25.

¹⁵UHVR B4-3: Vil'na Ukrayina, no. 8, September 1943, p. 6.

the pamphlet stated, between such states would halt imperialist war and create a proper basis for peaceful economic progress. 'Only in these circumstances is the rebirth of the Russian national state possible.'¹⁶ The pamphlet also appealed to the Russians to struggle against both 'internal' and 'external' imperialisms alike by joining the UPA. In the same month, a pamphlet was issued under the heading 'UPA call to Uzbeks, Tatars, Kazakhs, Turkmen, Tadzhiks, Bashkirs, nations of the Urals, Volga and Siberia, nations of Asia'.¹⁷ They were urged to desert their German divisions with arms and join the UPA. A printed appeal went out to Armenians and Tatars in September with similar arguments.

This particular text begins with a well informed treatise on the historical predicament of the Tatar nation. Similar appeals were made to Georgians and Byelorussians.¹⁸

Concrete results of these campaigns showed themselves in the formation of new, non-Ukrainian divisions of the Insurgent Army, and in the organisation of the First Conference of Oppressed Peoples of Europe and Asia under UPA sponsorship in November 1943. Thirty nine delegates from thirteen nationalities took part in the conference. Representatives included Czechs, Bashkirs, Armenians, Georgians and Russians. The aim of the conference was to demonstrate the unity of nationalities in a coordinated struggle against the German occupation and the Soviet Union in the interests of each group's independent statehood.¹⁹

¹⁶UPA v Svitli Dokumentiv, I, p. 105-106.

¹⁷O. Honcharuk, 'UPA Nosiva Idevi Vyzvolenya i Druzhy Narodiv', in Ukrayina Protvy Moskvy (London, 1965), pp. 158-197. See also UPA v Svitli Dokumentiv, I, p. 103.

¹⁸UPA v Svitli Dokumentiv, I. pp. 107-109, 110-12.

¹⁹Nicholas Chubatyj, 'The Ukrainian Underground', Ukrainian Quarterly, no. 2, 1949, pp. 154-166.

With the intensification of fighting between the German army and UPA bands towards the end of 1943, and with the infiltration of the western oblasts by Red Partisans, the nationalists were unable to defend successfully all of the centres of population they had captured in the past. As a guerrilla force, they were always moving and could not continue to return to villages requiring defense at any time. To make matters worse, the German command organised teams of counter--insurgency experts and assigned them to clearing the Rivno area of partisans. One of these experts, Von dem Bach, was a principal organiser of the crushing of the Warsaw ghetto uprising in the spring of 1944.²⁰

To counter the disadvantages of their enforced mobility, UPA fighters began to establish Self Defense Groups (Samooboronni Kushchovi Viddily). These groups were made up of local inhabitants of villages and were trained in armed combat to defend their homes from grain requisition units and police teams. The formation of these groups in North Western Ukraine was widespread. In Galicia, where the UPA was not seen for the greater part of 1943, such units were already in existence to defend the population against increasing Nazi reprisals and ravaging during the German retreat.²¹

The political aims of the UPA were clearly stated in its declaration which appeared as a leaflet in early 1943:

What is the UPA fighting for?

The Ukrainian Insurgent Army is fighting for an independent Sovereign Ukrainian State and the right of each nation to its own life in its own, free

²⁰Lebed', Ukrayins'ka Povstans'ka Armiya, pp. 102-103. See also Warsaw Aflame: The 1939-1945 Years (Los Angeles, 1973) p. 137.

²¹Butkovsky, 'Orhanizatsiyna Struktura UPA', p. 11. See also OUN v Svitli Postanov, p. 98.

independent state. The destruction of national subjugation and the exploitation of nations by other nations, a system of free peoples in their own independent states--is the only solution to the national and social questions of the whole world.

Against imperialism, therefore against the USSR and the German 'New Europe'.

Against internationalist and fascist national socialist programs and political conceptions.

For the creation of a Ukrainian state without capitalists, landlords, bolshevik commissars, NKVD agents and party parasites.

Nationalisation of heavy industry and co-operative control of light industry.

Participation of workers in the running of factories, for the enforcement of the principle of skill in control and not party membership.

For an eight hour day, strictly voluntary overtime, like all work, with a separate scale of wages.

For a just wage and profitsharing. For a wage satisfactory to meet the needs of a whole family.

Dividends (to workers) from co-operatively controlled enterprises and premiums from state owned ones.

The right to work, a choice of profession and place of work.

Freedom of trade unions, destruction of Stakhanovism and other methods of exploiting labour.

Free artisanry, the right to form guilds or work individually.

National organisation of large scale trade, co-operative control of petty trade; for free bazaars.

Equality of women in all aspects of civic life, access to all schools and professions. The right to physically lighter work.

State care of maternities. For the development of medical facilities.

Freedom of the press, speech, thought, conviction and world view. Against officially enforced social doctrines and dogma . . . the separation of Church and State.

For cultural relations with other nations, the right to emigrate as citizens for further education or medical treatment and for purposes of observing the life and cultural achievements of other peoples.

For the full rights of national minorities to develop the forms and content of their own national cultures freely.

Equality of all citizens, regardless of nationality in state and civil rights and responsibilities.

Equal rights in work, pay and leisure.

For a free, in form and content, Ukrainian culture, for a heroic spirit, high morals, community solidarity, friendship and discipline. ²²

U.P.A.

By the end of 1943, the insurgents had confirmed in practice some of their programmatic positions as they are outlined above in the first declaration of aims. They had begun an active struggle against both German and Soviet forces; they had demonstrated their attitude towards other nationalities by fighting alongside of them. This stood in sharp contrast to the integral nationalist focus of the past. In the liberated zones, the UPA attempted to put some of its land and social policies into practice. These included the distribution of land to the landless--part of this project had its conceptual origins in the discussions of the expeditionary forces in Eastern Ukraine in 1941-42. It also included active military defense of the peasantry against the occupants.

More important still, however was the fact that the new political positions of the UPA reflected a basic knowledge of the grievances and demands of workers who lived under Soviet rule--Stakhanovism, heavy labour for women and the ban on emigration. The inclusion of basic social and political demands related to the status of the working population, such as the demand for free trade unions, and those considered to be fundamental democratic rights gave their programme for an independent Ukrainian state a content potentially acceptable to broad groups of Ukrainians and other nationalities living in Ukraine. By its political character, the UPA programme rejected the fascist notions of the 1929 OUN resolutions. This turn

²²UHVR B1--3.1: 'Za shcho Boret'sya Vyzvol'na Revolyutsiyna Ukrayins'ka Povstans'ka Armiya', 1943.

to the left in 1943 by the nationalist movement and the rapid growth of its cadres marks the high point in its entire history.

The Composition of the UPA

The national composition of the UPA may be divided into

- (a) its core Ukrainian divisions;
- (b) national contingents of Armenians, Byelorussians, Georgians, Crimean Tatars, Azerbaizhanis and Uzbeks.

These groups had their own separate commands, but were under the general discipline and directive of the UPA leadership. In all, the non-Ukrainian sections of the Army constituted roughly 10-15% of the entire force. Many of these recruits were Red Army deserters and those cut off from their units, and in similar circumstances, from divisions of the German army.²³ The contribution of Red Army officers who joined UPA, was not only a military and physical contribution as fighters, but also a political one, affecting seriously the left turn of the nationalist movement in 1943.²⁴

M. Lebed' notes that many doctors in the UPA were Jews who had been rescued from Nazi detention centres or were freed from deportation trains:

Most of the doctors in UPA were Jews whom the UPA rescued from Hitlerite liquidation actions. Jewish doctors were treated as full citizens of Ukraine and as ranking officers of the Ukrainian army. At this point it is necessary to emphasise that they not only carried out their important responsibilities and aided not only the insurgents, but also the whole population, travelling throughout areas and organising field and city clinics. They didn't quit the ranks in difficult situations, even when they had an opportunity to go over to the Red Partisans.²⁵

²³Danylo Shumuk, Za Skhidnim Obriem (Baltimore, 1974), pp. 13-14.

²⁴loc. cit.,

²⁵Lebed', Ukrayins'ka Povstans'ka Armiya, pp. 35-36.

Two articles by Leo Heiman in the Ukrainian Quarterly substantiate Lebed's reference to UPA practice in relations to the Jews in Ukraine. In one article entitled 'We Fought for Ukraine', Heiman recounts the co-operation established by a guerrilla unit made up of survivors of the Kovel ghetto massacre in 1942, led by Zelig Broiderman and the UPA units who entered the area. In another article entitled 'They Saved Jews', Heiman responds to Soviet charges to the effect that the UPA was anti-Semitic, and provides case evidence to the contrary.²⁶

The procedure for recruitment to the UPA, although it was never formally systematised, demanded more from applicants than had previous OUN policies. Applicants were required to demonstrate not only a willingness and ability to fight, but also to acquire an elementary political appreciation of the aims of the Army. The Army recruited from all sectors of the population--peasants, workers and the middle class (these latter coming mostly from the intelligentsia).

Peasants constituted approximately sixty percent of the army's rank and file.²⁷ They can be divided into three categories:

- (a) poor peasants who were considered to be the most nationally conscious elements, especially those who had spent some time in the towns looking for work. There, they had been exposed to nationalist and communist propaganda and were competent to undergo and understand elementary political indoctrination. From the military standpoint, they were excellent fighters;
- (b) middle peasants (those with average holdings) saw in the UPA a defense of their material interests. It was the social stratum in

²⁶ Leo Heiman, 'We Fought for Ukraine', Ukrainian Quarterly, no. 1, 1946, pp. 33-44; and 'They Saved Jews', Ukrainian Quarterly, no. 4, 1961, pp. 320-32.

²⁷ The statistics and description of the social composition of the UPA are taken from S. F. Khmel', Ukrayins'ka Partyzanka (London, 1959), pp. 22-23.

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Western Ukraine which had contributed the greatest portion of nationalist intelligentsia to the movement in the 1930's. From its ranks had come the most educated and nationally conscious militants. Many of these were sons of rural clergy, who, in material terms, were a certain aristocracy in village life.

(c) there were practically no rich peasants in the UPA in Galicia, but there were several in the Volyn units.

Separate categories are established by Khmel' in Ukrayins'ka Partyzanka for peasants from Podlachia, who were considered exceptional warriors, and those from Vyrkhovyna in the Carpathians. The Vyrkhovyna UPA soldiers were considered to be good fighters on their native terrain, but lacked the ability to fight on the flat lands east of the Carpathian mountains.

Khmel''s high estimation of the Western Ukrainian peasants as fighters in the UPA is based more on their physical and psychological attributes than on political awareness. For tasks like propaganda and agitation at large meetings, the rank and file member, and especially the peasant, was not competent to take initiative, but relied heavily upon his superiors to hand down a political line that he could pass on. The UPA embodied, to a degree, the classical East European phenomenon of peasant politics as the 'politics of brute force'; so characteristics in the revolts in 19th century Russia and the 1930's in Western Ukraine.

It is interesting to note that the Volyn peasantry who contributed greatly to the first UPA units was of a higher level of awareness because of its experience, not only with nationalism, but also with communist politics. It has often been pointed out that 'while Galicians were feeding the Germans, Volynians were already fighting them'. This peculiar combination of a communist tradition, a militant peasantry and a weak Nazi administration in the regions of

Volyn and Polissia explains the emergence of UPA here and not in Galicia.

Workers in the UPA constituted approximately 25% of the Army (up to 1944 and the re-occupation). They may be divided into three categories:

- (a) those who were members of the OUN prior to the formation of the UPA;
- (b) those who joined UPA directly in 1943;
- (c) a further categorisation of the above two groups would distinguish those who were married, those married with children, and young, unmarried workers. Marital status played an important role in the endurance of fighters.

Few married workers with children joined the UPA; those who did returned in their great numbers to factory work at the end of the War. As a rule, older members and sympathisers of the OUN remained in the cities and were active in the nationalists' civilian network. The greater part of workers in the Army were young and unmarried--they came from timber camps, oil rigs and the small towns. There were few divisions in the UPA made up exclusively of workers. One example is the Blakytyn division.²⁸ After the War, this group and similar ones disbanded, their members attempting to re-integrate into society.

Young workers were considered to be better combinations of political and military cadre than were peasants. While they were somewhat weaker physically, they gained strength in time. More important, they possessed the intellectual capacities for positions in the middle leadership levels.

²⁸Ibid., p. 28.

About 15% of the UPA was made up of intellectuals, high school and university students. Part of this group came from the older professional cadre of the OUN-B. High school and university students attempted to join the UPA en masse in 1943 when a general call for recruits was put out. They were attracted by the romanticism of guerrilla warfare and were quite ignorant of its harsh realities. High school students were considered unsuitable for membership for reasons of physical underdevelopment and the long period of time it took for them to become acclimatised to living outdoors. Often students aged fourteen presented themselves for recruitment after running away from home. Both high school and university students were ill-treated or rejected by established units of the UPA after they arrived from the central training schools. Many persisted and eventually took part in battles.²⁹ University students found it equally difficult to gain acceptance in the largely peasant units, but had better luck integrating themselves. They learnt the science of guerrilla warfare easily and often attained command positions.

By the end of 1943, when the Army was at the height of its military power, there were possibly 40,000 nationalists under arms in Western Ukraine.³⁰ The force was divided into regional structures and had an elaborate system of communications, political and military instruction, medical facilities, etc. The three basic territorial subdivisions were:

UPA North, encompassing active groups in Zhytomyr and Volyn;

²⁹ Ibid., pp. 31-32.

³⁰ Myroslav Prokop, 'Dvadtsyatpyati Rokovyny UPA', Suchasnist', no. 10 (82), October 1967, p. 92. A somewhat larger and unsubstantiated figure is given in Enrique Martinez Codo, 'Guerrilla Warfare in Ukraine', Ukrainian Review, no. 3, 1961.

UPA South--Vinnitsia and Kamyanets-Podilsk; UPA West in the oblasts of Lviv, Ternopil, Stanislav and the Lemko region.³¹

In contrast to the Soviet partisan movement, the nationalist army was not supplied with provisions, arms or other necessities by a state power. One may appreciate the overriding importance of its relationship with the populace in Central and Western Ukraine in the effort simply to survive and continue the fight. The ability of pockets of insurgents to fight in Western Ukraine for several years after the consolidation of the Soviet government over these territories indicates the durability of the relationship that was developed in these years.

Division Galicia

Apart from the advance of Soviet forces, two issues in 1943 seriously affected the course of the nationalist movement--the formation of the SS Division Galicia and the deliberations at the Third Extra-Ordinary Congress of OUN-B forces.

The German command abandoned the idea that only German soldiers could win the War in the East when the front was moving deeper into Ukraine in 1943. Two Latvian and one Estonian divisions were being trained to shore up the front already when the decision was made to utilise Ukrainians in Galicia. At first the Germans regarded the formation of the Division as too obvious a political compromise with certain nationalist aspirations. During early deliberations in the German command, the idea was opposed by Ribbentrop,

³¹Butkovs'ky, 'Orhanizatsiyna Struktura UPA', p. 5. See also Codo, 'Guerrilla Warfare', p. 209.

then Minister of External Affairs of the Third Reich, by Rosenberg, Erich Koch of Reichkommissariat Ukraine, Martin Bormann and Heinrich Himmler. Himmler later changed his mind.³²

The plan for Division Galicia came from Otto Wechter, governor of Galicia as part of a plan not only to strengthen the front, but also to secure more co-operation from Western Ukrainians. The idea of a Division that would be seen by the Ukrainian population as its own, could become, Wechter argued, a strong focus around which the civilian production effort could also be encouraged.³³ For their part, members of the 'welfare and aid' society, the Ukrainian Central Committee under Kubiovyc heartily supported the plan, for them a realisation of the historical and naive belief of Ukrainian conservative nationalists that all that was lacking in the struggle for independence was a strong army. The Ukrainian Central Committee was in an excellent position to ensure a successful recruiting campaign because it acted as the semi-official representative of Ukrainians in Galicia vis a vis the German administration. Thus it had connections with the government apparatus and a recognised authority before Ukrainians.

The announcement calling for the formation of the Division was made on May 4 by Kubiovyc:

The moment we have all been waiting for, when the Ukrainian people will again get the chance to fight their greatest enemy--Bolshevism, has arrived. The Leader of the Great German State has agreed to the convocation of a separate Ukrainian voluntary military formation under the name SS-Sharpshooter Division Galicia.³⁴

³²Heike, Ukrayins'ka Dyviziya 'Halychyna', p. 15.

³³loc. cit.

³⁴Appeal of V. Kubiovyc, head of the Ukrainian Central Committee to Galician Ukrainians in Heike, Ukrayins'ka Dyviziya 'Halychyna', p. 225.

To make the appeal more attractive, persons intended for work in Germany were allowed to join the Division as an alternative.³⁵ In the course of discussions, Kubiovyc had demanded, amongst other things, the release of political prisoners, in particular OUN-B members in return for his Committee's co-operation in the venture. This demand was not met.

In June 1943, 80,000 persons applied for recruitment, of whom 50,000 were accepted for training. Ninety percent of those who joined were between eighteen and thirty years of age. The middle and lower officer ranks were composed of former members of officer corps of the Ukrainian Galician Army and the Ukrainian National Army (Petliura's force) from the First World War, and former officers of the Polish and Red Armies.³⁶ The Division Galicia did not see action until June 1944 at Brody, Galicia when the major Soviet offensive on Lviv was underway.

Both the communist underground in Western Ukraine and the OUN-B press attacked the Ukrainian Central Committee, denouncing its actions. Soviet leafleteers in Western Ukraine distributed literature attacking Kubiovyc and several priests who were influential in the campaign which encouraged high school youth to register for call-up. The communist newspaper, Chervonny Prapor in the Rivno area declared that the formation of the Division as an ostensible 'Ukrainian' force was simply a trick by the Germans to bolster the failing front.³⁷ The OUN-B leadership unambiguously put forward its position in the

³⁵Lebed', Ukrayins'ka Povstans'ka Armiya, pp. 47-48.

³⁶Heike, Ukrayins'ka Dyviziya 'Halychyna', p. 24.

³⁷Nimets'ko-fashysts'kyi Rezhym, pp. 94, 110.

Byuleten:

We condemn all the traitors of the Ukrainian people and its liberation struggle who become lackeys of the occupants and help them to oppress Ukraine, all those sideline political speculators and 'leaders', paid advisors of the German occupation under the guise of various committees, editors of German newspapers in the Ukrainian language.

. . . Without a Ukrainian state or government, there cannot be a Ukrainian army. The Germans are planning another exploitation of the physical strength of the people; if it continues our response can only be a negative one.

The German act. . . has another side to it. It also attempts to draw a line between the Galicians and 'Nadnipyantsi' (Ukrainians in Central Ukraine). This is a compromise of the very idea of Ukrainian statehood.

. . . We haven't the slightest doubt that what is forming here is not a Ukrainian national army, but a German colonial division.³⁸

M. Lebed' claims that the Germans had great difficulty in recruiting Western Ukrainians to the Division, and that six hundred recruits escaped with arms after three months of training.³⁹ Heike, who was a leading officer in the Division reports massive numbers of applications in his book Ukrainian Division Galicia. The latter version is probably more accurate. Lebed''s apparent intent in underestimating the enthusiasm in Western Ukraine for the Division is to justify the passive attitude of the Bandera group towards the recruitment campaign. Although they opposed it in print, they did little to actively deter Galician youth from joining. When it became apparent that the formation of the Division was assured by the popular response in Galicia, the OUN-B leadership instructed some of its members to enter in order to ensure that the command would not allow

³⁸UHVR B5-1: Visnyk, no. 9, 1943, pp. 1-2.

³⁹Lebed', Ukrayins'ka Povstans'ka Armiya, pp. 47-48.

the soldiers to be used on a Western front, but only against the Red Army.⁴⁰ The original negotiations had produced tacit agreement between the nationalists involved (mainly Mel'nyk supporters) and the Germans that such a Division would only fight Soviet forces

The efforts of the Ukrainian Central Committee were backed up by Mel'nyk's group throughout the negotiations and during the recruitment period. This issue highlights the differences between the Melnyk and Bandera camp at this point in the War.

The Third Extra-Ordinary Congress of the OUN-B.

This Congress has been popularly referred to as the threshold of a new political period in the Organisation's history. Although the programme adopted by the members wrote into the official history of the OUN-B the new orientation of democracy and social progressiveness, its real beginnings are to be found already in the UPA in February, 1943. The extent to which the civilian network of cells of the Bandera organisation understood this new politics and attempted to put it into practice remains open to question.⁴¹

An important element in the deliberations of August 1943 was concerned with drawing up a balance sheet of the past two years of OUN activity. Traditionally, congresses and conferences had been self-congratulatory in this respect. At the Third Extra-Ordinary Congress, a public statement drawn up by the delegates conceded that there had been 'difficulties' in analysing and choosing a correct strategic course in 1941-42--an obvious reference to the

⁴⁰loc. cit.

⁴¹Interview with Daria Rebet, February 1975 in Munich.

close collaboration with Germany, miscalculation in Lviv in June, 1941, etc. A mild criticism of 'errors' made in the past was tactful enough to avoid specific reference to Bandera's leadership up to his arrest and imprisonment and the Cracow Gathering which had set the course for the beginning of the War. By 1943, Bandera's stature in Western Ukraine had grown to heroic proportions, more as a result of the propaganda carried out by the nationalist wing which supported him than of the actual deeds or wisdom of Bandera himself.

In assessing the reasons for the popular sentiment in Ukraine favouring the return of Soviet power after an initial orientation towards Nazi Germany in 1941, the Congress stated that:

the weaker element of our people, fearful of the return of Bolshevism, saw their salvation in German might; another section of society, beaten by the German colonial boot, chose in their minds the lesser evil. That is, they awaited the return of the Bolsheviks. When in Ukraine, as in other countries of Eastern Europe, a part of the people oriented and today continue to orient towards the Bolsheviks, it is in the first place the fruits and lessons⁴² drawn from experiencing the German colonial system.

The new political programme called for an independent, democratic Ukrainian state, for a progressive social programme, including opposition to the collective farm system or a return to large land ownership by the aristocracy and for the expropriation of existing large estates without financial compensation to the owners. The programme stated that co-operative farming was acceptable if the peasants freely chose it. It also declared support for workers' participation in economic management of factories and the distribution of its products, for an eight hour day and full freedom of independent trade union activity. In the new state, heavy industry, banks,

⁴²OUN v Svitli Postanov, p. 91.

transport and underground mineral resources were to be nationalised and light industry would be run by co-operatives or municipal authorities.⁴³ Freedom of speech, the press, religion and full rights for national minorities--these resolutions, like the ones listed above all reflected the basic political positions of the UPA.

In opposing Nazi German rule, the Third Extra-Ordinary Congress voiced its unconditional opposition to the Vlasov movement and the Union of Russian officers, both fronts of the German project in the East.⁴⁴

On the one hand, the Congress showed that the OUN-B, like the UPA had broken definitely with Nazi Germany. On the other hand, the world view of the nationalists was still weighed down by its heritage of idealist, irrationalist ideology. In struggling to gain a clear understanding of the social question in Ukraine, the OUN could not but subsume it in its nation-state concept. Rather than create a harmony between the social and national demands of the movement, the introduction of materialist elements into the idealist schema served only to create confusion and tensions in the nationalist analysis. For example, the OUN believed that the best way to secure international peace and cooperation was to allow each nation its own state. This simplistic solution, an arithmetic extension of its solution to the Ukrainian question could not resolve the contradiction between the struggle for nationhood by an oppressed people and the OUN's acceptance of the right for powerful nation states (Germany!) whose interests were counterposed to the former, to exist. Similarly, the

⁴³Ibid., pp. 105-112.

⁴⁴loc. cit.

injection of anti-capitalist demands, such as nationalisation of heavy industries with workers' participation in management and the expropriation of large landowners conflicted with the idea of the 'whole nation', capitalists included, having a place in an independent Ukraine. The nationalism of the OUN-B in the latter half of 1943 became an unstable perspective of the world and society, the intrusion of materialist concepts of the national struggle conflicting with the idealist philosophical foundations of the movement. It could only be resolved by a return to the notions of the past-- something which Dontsov was passionately arguing for at the time from North America--or by taking the left turn, programmatically and practically to its logical conclusion. The UPA ideologues chose the latter alternative after the end of the War and attempted to develop a revolutionary concept of the national struggle as one intrinsically tied to the class struggle in the Soviet Union.

CHAPTER IV

THE SOVIET OFFENSIVE IN UKRAINE

The Soviet re-occupation of Ukraine involved three interrelated processes: the entry of partisans into Right-Bank Ukraine ahead of the German-Soviet front, the Red Army drive throughout 1943 and into Western Ukraine in 1944 and the establishment of the Soviet administrative apparatus in late 1944 and throughout the following year. In this re-occupation the main objective was to drive the German armies out of Ukraine and to re-assert political control over the territories. The nationalist movement in Western Ukraine was a secondary concern for the military aspect of this drive, except in the case of Division Galicia as part of the German army, but a primary concern of the incoming officials of the state apparatus and the police system. After the exit of the German armies, the guerrilla movement of the UPA became an important factor, requiring the combined efforts of the NKVD, agitation teams of the Communist Party and those responsible for collectivisation, to crush it.

By the end of 1942 the Soviet partisan effort was formidable-- well over 100,000 partisans were entrenched in enemy territory; by the end of 1943, the movement had grown seven times.¹ This was the result of the conscious deployment of manpower by the Soviet military

¹Armstrong, ed., Soviet Partisans, pp. 35-36.

command into the movement and the ability of existing partisan groups to recruit from the local populace in Ukraine as the Nazi retreat became generalised. In November and December 1942, Red Partisans under the leadership of Kovpak, Saburov and Fedorov who had been up till then active on the left bank of the Dnieper were instructed to penetrate the western oblasts. By January 1943, twenty nine consolidated bands and eighty three brigades totalling over 40,000 partisans were successfully entrenched on the right bank of the Dnieper.²

Rivno oblast became a principal base for these groups. In March, the Soviet bands were in sufficient control of the forest areas here to hold a conference of 120 delegates of various Byelorussian and Ukrainian groups operating in the area and north of Rivno in the Pripet Marshes.³ At first sight this statement by Klovov and Kucher, two Soviet historians writing in Ukrayins'kyy Istorychnyy Zhurnal in 1970, appears to contradict our previous examination of UPA activity in Volyn in March 1943 (on pages 88, 89). Klovov and Kucher further contend that the partisan leader Fedorov was able to establish a mini-insurgent republic, a partisan krai here in the summer of 1943. At the same time Saburov and Malykov created similar bases to the south in Zhytomyr and Kiev oblasts.⁴ It is not possible, given the absence of extensive materials on this subject to determine the actual strength of the the UPA versus the

²V. I. Kucher, 'Rol' Partyzanskykh Krayiv i Zon u Rosvytky Narodnoyi Borot'by- na Ukrayini', Ukrayins'kyy Istorychnyy Zhurnal, 1973, no. 5, p. 19.

³V. I. Klovov and V. I. Kucher, 'Partyzans'ki Krayi ta Zony na Tymchasovo Okupovaniy Vorohom Teretoriyi SRSR u 1941-1944 r.r.', Ukrayins'kyy Istorychnyy Zhurnal, 1970, no. 7, p. 6.

⁴loc. cit.

Red Partisans in March of 1943 in Rivno and therefore consider one version of these events more credible than another. It is however quite possible that, given the extensiveness of the forest and marsh areas around the Ukrainian Byelorussian border where the conflict between the two partisan forces was taking place, that both the UPA and the Soviet groups considered themselves in control of the area because they both established their insurgent mini-republics. Most likely these republics co-existed for a short time, probably until the spring when each side was able to make long marches again. Apart from the political significance that nationalist and Soviet partisans attached to these encampments later in their literature and memoirs, the main feature of these camps was quite simply comfortable and protected shelters for the partisans until the spring came and there was no snow to identify the tracks of moving groups.

The main function of the Soviet partisans was sabotage of German communications and harrassment of army units where the small size of the latter permitted such action. Increasingly, however, they were forced to deal with the nationalists. The nationalist threat in North Western Ukraine was two-fold. It was an obstacle to a clean Soviet sweep across Western Ukraine against the German armies. The Soviet forces did not want to fight a rearguard action or diversionary battles with nationalist groups while driving out the occupant powers. Second, the UPA's success in recruiting from the local population and from certain German army units into an anti-German military effort placed it on a similar footing with the Red Partisans as a defender of the Western Ukrainian populace. It therefore threatened Soviet propaganda efforts carried out by the communist underground, who, up to this point, had been able to characterise the nationalist movement as an agent of Nazi rule in Ukraine.

While this characterisation applied still to the Mel'nyk

group, it did not in relation to the UPA. Undoubtedly one of the main reasons for the incursions of Soviet partisans into North Western Ukraine well before the military advance was to prevent the development of a nationalist guerrilla war against the Germans (and its ties with the local population) that was at the same time anti-Soviet.⁵

Fedorov's partisans carried out over fifty battles with the nationalists in the latter half of 1943. The Rivno oblast partisan command issued a standing order that the UPA groups be attacked and destroyed in the area. By the end of 1943, as a result of the Red Partisans' attention to this problem, thirty nationalist bases in Northern Rivno were wiped out.⁶ At the same time, the communist underground launched an extensive propaganda campaign directed at the nationalists urging them to give up and come over to the Red Partisan brigades.⁷ The UPA responded with its own appeals to the population and the partisans themselves, arguing that the two belligerent powers were equally repugnant to its ideals and that the Red Partisans should join it and fight 'both Moscow and Berlin.'⁸

The fact that the UPA was engaged in an anti-German struggle did not fail to have an important effect upon certain Soviet partisan

⁵Yona Liron, 'I Was a Soviet Counter Insurgency Expert', Ukrainian Quarterly, no. 4, 1963, p. 325. See also Crankshaw, ed., Khrushchev Remembers, pp. 190-191

⁶Kyzya, Narodni Mesnyky, pp. 138-140.

⁷Lystivky Pidpilya ta Partyzaniv do Naselenya Tymchasovo Okupovanoyi Teretoriyi Ukrayiny', Ukrayins'kyy Istorychnyy Zhurnal, 1965, no. 6. See also M. P. Makara, 'Kompartiya Zakhidnoyi Ukrayiny v Borot'bi za Internatsional'ne Zhurtonanya Trudyashchykh', Ukrayins'kyy Istorychnyy Zhurnal, 1968, no. 10, p. 91; and Lystivky Partiynoho Pidpilya, pp. 114-15, 121-24, 166-67, 264-65.

⁸UPA v Svitli Dokumentiv, I, p. 122-24.

commands in Western Ukraine. The logical procedure in the minds of these commanders was, at least, to agree to neutrality terms with the nationalists or even organise a cooperative attack upon the occupant forces. While this appeared logical to partisan leaders, the Ukrainian staff of the partisan movement thought otherwise. Kirichenko, a major general who served on the military councils of various fronts during the war and was a close associate of Khrushchev, noted in a speech to the central command of the partisan movement in Ukraine in July 1943:

Quite recently some commanders of partisan brigades took an incorrect position vis à vis nationalist formations. Instead of a broadening of the Soviet partisan movement and unequivocal exposure of the Ukrainian bourgeois nationalist brigades, they began negotiations, and even made 'neutrality agreements' with them. Other commanders, while fighting the fascist occupants, also carried on a war with the Ukrainian nationalist brigades, thus sidetracking from the main task—destruction of the fascist revengers.⁹

Kirichenko then stated that Red Partisans should only engage the nationalist formations when attacked, but should continually expose the leadership of these groups as German agents, understanding that the rank and file soldiers had been tricked into joining the UPA!¹⁰

There was a clear relationship between the strength of the partisan movement in different areas of Western Ukraine in 1943 and the success of the communist underground. The communists were particularly active, for example in Volyn in 1943 and collaborated closely with the partisans there.¹¹ In other areas, even those

⁹Strokach, Nash Pozyvnyy, p. 313.

¹⁰loc. cit.

¹¹Kyzya, Narodni Mesnyky, p. 76.

where the tradition of their politics had been strong before the Second World War, such as the Carpathian region, the underground was discreet and emerged only when the Soviet armies entered its territory.¹²

An exception to this rule was Lviv. Being the largest city in Western Ukraine, the German authority and a strong nationalist movement could not uncover all the communists who lived there. Undoubtedly, the leadership of the Communist Party concentrated a large amount of resources and manpower upon Lviv in order to ensure the existence of the underground and its propaganda work against the occupation, the nationalists, Division Galicja, etc. By October 1942, the communists in Lviv, made up of Ukrainian, Polish and Russian militants, were able to launch extensive propaganda campaigns in the Ukrainian and Polish languages. They were the only source of information in 1943 that consistently provided news about the front and partisan activity in other parts of Western Ukraine.¹³

Kovpak, who was active in the Volyn region in early 1943 led his brigades through Western Ukraine from July to August into the Carpathian mountains. Although Kovpak failed to destroy the main target of his raid, the oil refineries in Drohobych, and his brigades were decimated in the course of their march, he did succeed in organising several new partisan groups.¹⁴ The march through eighteen oblasts was more important, however, for its effect upon the morale of the communist underground because it was one of the most daring partisan penetrations into German occupied territory.

¹²Armstrong, ed., Soviet Partisans, p. 61.

¹³V. D. Varahina and H. S. Vakulenko, 'Pidpil'na Presa Narodnoyi Gvardiyi 1942-43 r.r.', Ukrayins'kyi Istorychnyy Zhurnal, 1966, no. 6, pp. 96-99.

¹⁴L. Kyzya, 'Pro Taktyku Partyzans'koyi Borot'by', Ukrayins'kyi Istorychnyy Zhurnal, 1971, no. 8, pp. 27-28.

The significance of Kovpak's raid should be understood in the context of the overall objective of the communist underground and partisan movement: to represent, albeit in a partial way, Soviet authority and thereby discourage the pro-German populace from assisting in the Nazi war effort.

The Red Army offensive through the western oblasts took place on four fronts. The main attack was in a south-westerly direction from Kiev against massed German formations 'South' and 'A'. These two formations numbered 1,760,000 soldiers. The Soviet force was over 2,300,000 strong.¹⁵ Between December 1943 and February 1944 the Red Army recaptured Zhytomyr and Kiev oblasts and parts of Rivno and Vinnitsia oblasts. These oblasts were the closest to the Dnieper river in Central Ukraine. During this part of the offensive, UPA units killed M. F. Batunin, commander of the First Ukrainian Front.¹⁶ Although there is some disagreement in sources, the date appears to have been February 29. In the south, Odessa oblast and Mikolayev were recaptured in March and the Soviet front moving across the central belt of Ukraine had entered Kamyanets-Podilsk oblast.

From April to the end of the year, the German command threw all possible forces against the Soviet offensive in order to gain time. Its reason for doing so was to allow the German war production effort in Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland a maximum

¹⁵O. V. Moseyev, 'Vyzvolenya Pravoberezhnoyi Ukrayiny vid Nimets'ko-fashysta'kykh Zahrabnykiv', Ukrayins'kyy Istorychnyy Zhurnal, 1969, no. 4, p. 43.

¹⁶UPA v Svitli Dokumentiv, II, p. 38.

opportunity to aid the western front where American and British forces had launched a new offensive. This slowed the Soviet advance considerably.¹⁷

The Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council

In the winter of 1943-44, the UPA command had initiated discussions with representatives of other Ukrainians political organisations (i.e. nationalist organisations) in an attempt to construct a political centre made up of all independence parties.¹⁸ Its function was to be two-fold--to direct the armed nationalist struggle inside the country and to be its representative abroad.

There appear to have been three basic reasons why such a body was planned at this specific point in the war. The main reason was that the scope of UPA military activities had become so broad territorially (having also moved into Galicia in 1944) that the insurgents could not, at the same time be responsible for important decisions, national in scope. The conditions of guerrilla warfare simply made such activity impossible. At the same time, the period of deep conspiracy was fast approaching and a duplication of functions for the command which would necessarily link it up with individuals and groups outside of the UPA network made it dangerous for its security. Second, the initiative for establishing a multi-party representation was judged as being most favourable for the OUN-B and the UPA because they dominated the political and military terrain.

¹⁷O. V. Moseyev, 'Vyzvolenya Zakhidnykh Oblastey Ukrayins'koyi RSR', Ukrayins'kyy Istorychnyy Zhurnal, 1969, no. 7, pp. 132-33.

¹⁸UHVR A4-1: Taras Chuprynka, 'Do Genezy UHVR'.

The Mel'nyk faction, having discredited itself in the first years of the war was not even planning to take up guerrilla activity when the Germans left Ukraine. All other organisations being minimally influential, the OUN-B forces could sweep them into their projects by pressing for such an all-parties representative body. Third, and perhaps most important, the nationalists recognised the necessity for an authoritative representation abroad to bring its influence to bear on post-War peace settlements.

Past representative bodies of Ukrainian nationalist political groups had fared badly--the Ukrainian People's Republic had been exiled in the West since 1921 and did not carry any diplomatic weight in 1944. In Western Ukraine during the occupation, many legal political parties, or rather their remnants, had worked with the Ukrainian Central Committee and supported the Mel'nyk faction. This body served little purpose for independist politics and had no future aboard. Not wishing to find itself tied to the German suit in the post-War discussions, and this was a concrete possibility through the Vlasov group which was under Nazi patronage and for which Pavlo Shandruk, a high ranking officer of Division Galicia was being groomed,¹⁹ the OUN-B realised the necessity of an entirely new body.

The initiative committee established by the UPA at the end of 1943 attempted to find a basis of agreement between itself, the OUN-B network and the remnants of UNDO, the Front of National Solidarity (Front Natsional'noho Yednosty, a group of UVO dissidents

¹⁹Pavlo Shandruk, Arms of Valour (New York, 1959), pp. 196-208, 219-22.

who did not join the OUN in 1929), the monarchist Het'manites and other smaller formations. Although the monarchists were somewhat distant from the politics of the nationalists, they were important to include because they represented a large part of the older, patriotic intelligentsia. The OUN-M was invited to these discussions, but did not attend.

The first general meeting of the participating groups who had negotiated into the spring of 1944 convened in July and named the representative body the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council (Ukrayin'ska Holovna Vyzvol'na Rada-UHVR).²⁰ The UPA command recognised the UHVR as its political leadership (a largely symbolic recognition) both inside Ukraine and in international representations. The OUN-B was in firm control of the body and therefore the UPA act of recognition was more like self recognition, as far as politics was concerned, than anything else.

The common basis of all groups' membership was their agreement with the demand for an independent Ukrainian state. While this demand was quite acceptable to all, the programme of the UHVR, which gave concrete content to this rather vague slogan, must certainly have been less palatable for some participants: it called for opposition to both Soviet and German occupations; the revolutionary armed road was the only realistic method for gaining independence; democracy was a basic operative principle in all UHVR activities and decisions and in the future independent state.²¹ The sections dealing with social and industrial policy, national minorities, civil liberties, etc., closely resembled the UPA programme and the decisions

²⁰UHVR A4-1.

²¹UHVR v Svitli Postanov, pp. 58-59.

of the August, 1943 Extra-Ordinary Congress.²²

It is difficult to imagine how the Ukrainian monarchists who were anti-democratic and believed in a rigid class system controlled by the Het'man's throne could have accepted this programme in any other way than by formal gesture. The Front of National Solidarity as well was neither imbued with democratic notions nor with a progressive social awareness. These issues were, most likely, swept away out of sight in order to achieve formal unity of the different parties.

Numerous documents testify to the activity of the UHVR in the struggle of the nationalist movement against Soviet consolidation up to 1951. Its role was closely tied to the UPA initiatives against the 1946 and 1947 elections, during the deportations of populace from Western Ukraine, on the occasion of collectivisation, etc.²³

In foreign representations, the Foreign Delegation (Zakordonne Prydstavnytstvo-UHVR) headed by Lebed', who left Ukraine after the War presented documents at the peace negotiations in Italy in 1944 and at the Paris talks in September 1946.²⁴ Of interest in the 1944 memorandum²⁵ is the new interpretation given to the role of the OUN in the 1930's and during the War stressing the ostensibly democratic features of its programme and opposition to the Nazi occupation from June, 1941. References to the legal democratic parties in prewar Poland, the document asserts, proves the consistently progressive nature of the whole nationalist movement, that democracy and not totalism or fascism was the guiding ideas of Ukrainian history.²⁶ As much as such a statement applies to the greater

²²Ibid., pp. 11-13.

²³See Chapter Five.

²⁴'Memoriya UNR i UHVR, Paris, September 1, 1946' in UHVR v Svitli Postanov, p. 30.

²⁵UHVR A-7: 'Ukrayina i Suchasna Viyna', 1944.

²⁶Ibid., p. 6.

part of this nation's history, it is quite inapplicable to the OUN from 1929 to 1943.

The Polish Question

The deterioration of relations between the Poles and Ukrainians in 1943 was the indirect result of Ukrainian police units in Volyn and Polissia going over to the UPA insurgents. The German occupation had utilised Ukrainians in the civilian police in order to maintain an amicable relationship with the majority of the population and to set the indigenous Polish population against the majority. Tensions between the two nationalities had remained high. Atrocities by nationalist Ukrainian groups against the Poles, including the actions taken by the Sluzhba Bezpeky, the security police of the OUN-B brought them to a boiling point.²⁷ When the Ukrainian police units deserted to the UPA, the German authorities replaced them with a Polish force, which in turn began to repress the Ukrainian population.²⁸

The Polish political underground was drawn into the conflict. One current, represented by the Armija Ludowa (People's Army) was made up largely of communists and was directed by the exile communists led by Beirut, then residing in Moscow. The leadership of Armija Ludowa only returned to Poland in 1944. The other current, directed by the pre-1939 Polish government in exile, which resided in London throughout the War, was Armija Krajowa (Home Army). The Armija Krajowa (AK) was opposed to the communists and favoured a return of the old regime. The mass sentiment in Poland appeared to favour its

²⁷ Shumuk, Za Skhidnim Obriem, p. 51.

²⁸ UHVR BI-3: M. Zakhidny, 'Chy Politychnyy Rozum Peremozhe', Byuleten, no. 11, 1943.

return as well.²⁹ While the Polish communist movement was securely tied to the interests of Soviet foreign policy and would abide by its decisions concerning the future of Western Ukraine, Polish conservative and anti-communist forces continued to make territorial claims on Western Ukraine. The following excerpts from the newspaper Wielka polska, representing this trend, illustrates their perception of the Ukrainian question:

Quite recently, the Ukrainian question has been put forward vigorously, because the Germans, who in the last century 'discovered' the Ukrainian people for their own aims are today again creating a Ukrainian people. In short, this is a German fiction plus several dozen Ukrainian activists raised and reared in German schools.³⁰

If the Ukrainian problem exists today at all--then it is in the first instance the result of the Poles. Here, in so-called Eastern Poland, foundations are being built (reference to the nationalist efforts--author) to uphold the Ukrainian people. But not in Kiev or Kharkiv. Why?--because the Russians will not allow it.³¹

We stand on the position that the eastern lands--Rzeczpospolita--were and remain exclusively Polish lands, to which no-one except us has any right--neither the Bolsheviks nor the Ukrainians. We will dismantle any separatist Ukrainian life, we will close down any popular or co-operative organisations and fraternities, we will dismantle the separate Ukrainian school system.³²

The attitudes of national hostility between the two peoples, ingrained by a long history of Polish rule in Western Ukraine and re-inforced by the bitterly anti-Polish sentiments of the Ukrainian nationalists since the 1920's made it practically impossible to establish any popular combined resistance against the occupation. Rather the groups were skilfully set against each other, a cynical

²⁹P. Doc. 94.

³⁰UHVR B2-1.

³¹loc. cit.

³²loc. cit.

application of Rosen^eburg's concept of Eigenleben by Koch. The Soviet partisans, seeing that the arming of Polish bands by the Germans was a tactic to distract the populace from the main oppressive force in Western Ukraine--the Nazis--denounced the mutual nationalist reprisals in literature distributed throughout the area in both languages.³³ The Rivno newspaper Chervonyy Prapor, which was being issued in Ukrainian also began to appear in Polish.³⁴ By this time the Soviet partisans had begun to recruit Poles to their movement and to establish separate units for them. They were less successful with the Ukrainian population because the Ukrainians were beginning to turn to the UPA, at the same time viewing the Red Partisans as foreigners. The Soviet advance into the Western oblasts, in confronting the national war going on, tended to stress the atrocities carried out by Ukrainians, often attributing them to the UPA.³⁵ A recent article by a historian of the period published in Soviet Ukraine has provided a more balanced view of the conflict in examining the actions taken by both sides.³⁶

The political consciousness of the rank and file OUN-B member in Volyn (and elsewhere) is better understood in the light of these events. The descriptions provided by Danylo Shumuk in his reminiscences of the OUN and UPA, of the actions of the Sluzhba Bezpeky against the Polish population tend to indicate that the left turn of the nationalist movement against the Germans was neither accompanied by a clear understanding on the part of the rank and file of the OUN-B of its full implications nor by a change in attitude towards the

³³Lystivky Partiynoho Pidpilya, pp. 89, 176.

³⁴Kyzya, Narodni Mesnyky, pp. 99-100.

³⁵Makara 'Kompartiya Zakhidnoyi Ukrayiny', p. 91. See also Kyzya, Narodni Mesnyky, p. 99; and Lystivky Partiynoho Pidpilya, p. 176.

³⁶B. Volchev, 'Do Polityky Pol's'koho Emihrants'koho Uryadu v Londoni v Ukrayins'komu Pytani', Ukrayins'kyy Istorychnyy Zhurnal, 1969, no. 6, pp. 122-25.

Polish population in Western Ukraine. The Polish non-communist and anti-communist underground was no less hostile towards the Ukrainians and continued to issue warnings of reprisals to the nationalists and regularly carried them out.³⁷ The only exception to this case, on the part of Ukrainian forces, was the UPA units whose propaganda stressed the need for political unity of the two peoples against the Germans and the Soviet Union. The UPA, nevertheless issued warnings of reprisal against the numerous roving bands, which were not political formations and the political Polish underground which engaged in atrocities and consistently carried out its threats in a most severe manner.³⁸ These actions were considered by the UPA to be a necessary defense of the Ukrainian populace. They did not, however, quell the tensions.

In the initial period of renewed conflict, the UPA found no common language with the Polish underground and the national war continued unabated throughout 1943 and into 1944. It was only in the last year of the war, when the AK found itself cut off from the prospect of having its government in power, that negotiations between the two sides began.

The UPA in 1944

A cardinal rule of guerrilla warfare is the avoidance of large troop concentrations; engagement with regular army units only takes place when it is unavoidable or under conditions of decisive advantage to the guerrilla force: ambush, harassment of the rearguard

³⁷ UHVR B4-4: Vil'na Ukrayina no. 8, September 1943.

³⁸ Spomyny Chotovooho UPA Ostroverkha (Munich, 1953), pp. 18, 33, 44.

of a moving column, in mountainous terrain, etc. The UPA, rather than attacking the Red Army formations which were moving through Western Ukraine, chose to appeal to the soldiers in a political way. It launched a propaganda campaign aimed at splitting conscious political elements away from the main offensive and recruiting them to its own units. The following leaflet is an excellent illustration of this campaign, and provides an insight into the Army's attitude towards the Soviet Union at this point in its struggle. The campaign also served to counter the official Soviet propoganda that the whole nationalist movement was pro-German:

Soldiers and Commanders of the Red Army, Victors over Hitlerite Germany:

At the cost of unheard of sacrifices, at the cost of millions of lives of your soldier comrades, at the cost of your own blood, you have destroyed one of the greatest prisons of people in the world-Hitlerite Germany. Because of your progressive love of freedom and hatred for all subjugation and tyranny, this infamous force has disappeared from the face of the earth, ushering in a progressive epoch. All the freedom loving people of the world thank you today for this, and for this future generations will remember you with gratitude.

Comrade Soldiers and Commanders!

Are the highest sacred ideals of free nations and free peoples being celebrated today amongst you when Hitler and his gang no longer exist in Europe? Is there no division of exploiters and exploited, rulers and ruled any more? Is the exploitation of the toiling masses something of the past today? Have the social parasites, those accorded privilege by the ruling authorities disappeared from amongst us in this new life?

Absolutely not. The peoples of Europe and the USSR today are being destroyed by another prison of nations. This prison is the Stalinist-imperialist USSR. Hundreds of millions of people today groan under the yoke of yet another bloody dictator--the dictator Stalin. Hundreds of millions are now delivered to the savage exploitation of new parasites--the Stalinist ruling clique.

What exactly has changed after the defeat of Hitler?

After Hitler's downfall, the dictator and the imperialists have 'changed'. Do we want an exchange of oppressors, or the destruction of all oppression and oppressors altogether? Only an enemy of the people, of the working masses will say that you struggled for a change of oppressors. Whoever is a true son of his people, who has the interest of the toilers at heart, struggles for the destruction of all oppression, all oppressors for all time.

Soldiers and Commanders of the Red Army.

When you return to your homes and face even greater hardship than you left before this war, when you meet your fathers, mothers and children hungry and tattered, when you see how they are hunch-backed and humbled from the unbelievable labours of the collective farms and the factories, and when you concurrently meet with well-dressed, well fed, self-satisfied party members, secretaries and commissars, when you meet again with the same barbarous terror of the Stalinist NKVD, when before you stands the image of the concentration camp, Solovky, executions--then remember that your struggle for justice in our lands is not finished. You will attain such goals only when you destroy the dictatorial, terrorist and exploiting regime of the greatest enemy of the people-Stalin and his clique. Only then, may we celebrate justice, only then will we strengthen the conquests of the Great October Revolution. Otherwise Stalin will exploit his victory over Hitler against you for even greater subjugation. For in binding your arms today, he prepares you for your death.

Comrade Soldiers! Comrade Commanders!

Forward to the struggle against the greatest enemy of the people--the bloody dictator Stalin. To the struggle for the reconstruction of the USSR on a truly democratic and just basis. To the struggle for the victory of the ideas of justice and freedom for people and for nations.³⁹

In other leaflets addressed to Red Army soldiers, the UPA called upon them to desert and join its movement. This campaign was most prominent in the first six months of 1944 as the Red Army

³⁹ Document in the author's possession.

moved towards Galicia and the capture of Lviv.⁴⁰

The results of the campaign cannot be satisfactorily judged. Nationalist sources do not provide figures for the composition of the Army in 1944. The memoirs of one UPA unit, published in the West in the 1950's show that a small number of Red Army soldiers joined the UPA in 1944. The reason for their joining is stated, however, as being desertion from the Red Army because the officers were driving the soldiers ruthlessly against the Germans and the UPA. Officers who were NKVD members appear to have been those most responsible for such practices.⁴¹ Danylo Shumuk notes in his memoirs the case of approximately fifteen Red Army officers joining the UPA--this group, however joined in the course of the Red Army retreat in 1941-42.⁴² Lebed's history of the UPA includes reprints of leaflets in Russian and Ukrainian addressed to Red Army soldiers in which the UPA urged them to desert.⁴³

Nationalist sources also point out that the Red Army continuously recruited local men to its divisions as it advanced into Western Ukraine. Recruitment was in some cases carried out with force, but many city and rural people joined voluntarily.⁴⁴

In the latter half of 1943, the UPA had recruited rapidly to its ranks bringing its numerical strength up to approximately 40,000 insurgents under arms.⁴⁵ This influx in such a short period of time did not allow it the time nor the assignment of sufficient political and military instructors to train the new members and

⁴⁰ UPA v Svitli Dokumentiv, I, pp. 113-16, 120-24.

⁴¹ Ibid., p. 397.

⁴² Shumuk, Za Skhidnim Obriem, pp. 13-14.

⁴³ Lebed', Ukrayins'ka Povstans'ka Armiya, pp. 118-21.

⁴⁴ UPA v Svitli Dokumentiv, I, p. 409.

⁴⁵ Myroslav Prokop, 'Dvadtsyatpyati Rokovyny UPA', p. 92.

integrate them as tested fighters in its units. The OUN-B network in the towns and cities had gone underground in August 1943, many of its members leaving their locations and joining up with the rural bases of the UPA.⁴⁶ Although these were seasoned activists, they also had to be integrated into the Army and often given a more complete political education. The numerical size of 40,000, therefore concealed certain weaknesses in the cohesion of the UPA at the beginning of 1944. These weaknesses and the changing conditions in which the nationalists were to fight in 1944 signalled the beginning of the decline of the movement.

The lack of cohesion of the UPA as a fighting force showed itself primarily in 1944 in the breakdown of a centralised command and the return of increasing numbers of insurgents to their homes. The biography of one UPA member Ostroverkha, published in Germany in 1947 recalls the progressive disintegration of individual units and the loss of contact with other groups and the central command in late 1944 as the UPA was being pushed into the Carpathians, caught between the German and Soviet lines.⁴⁷ By mid 1944, the UPA had already dwindled to approximately 25,000 members and proceeded to diminish even more rapidly as Soviet authorities took control of Western Ukraine.⁴⁸

In the winter of 1943-44, the UPA forces in Volyn were faced with having to deal with three types of opponents. Small forces of regular Red Army divisions and special NKVD detachments which were assigned to 'mop-up' operations behind Soviet lines attempted to

⁴⁶Ibid., p. 99.

⁴⁷Spomyny Chotovooho Ostroverkha, pp. 23-28.

⁴⁸Prokop, 'Dvadtsyatpyati Rokovyny UPA', p. 92.

blockade them in the forest areas. The Polish partisan movement was engaged in continual attacks upon the UPA, the AK and other non-communist partisans operating out of Polish villages and towns in the areas, and the Polish communist movement working with the Red Partisans.⁴⁹ UPA-West forces in Galicia were also fighting Red Partisan detachments which had flooded the area and were entrenched around the towns of Zolochiv, Lviv, Berezhany.⁵⁰

On March 28, 1944 Polish-Ukrainian tensions reached a new level in the Volyn and Polissia areas when UPA forces destroyed the village of Ostrih with all 500 inhabitants as a reprisal against atrocities carried out by Polish partisans who operated out of the village.⁵¹ This incident became symbolic for Polish communist and anti-communist guerrillas in Western Ukraine of the intransigence of the nationalists and contributed to further escalations. Polish inhabitants of the area began to flee towards Lublin after the UPA issued instructions that they leave. At the same time the first of several large blockades of UPA forest strong-holds was organised by the Soviet forces here. On April 10, 2,000 troops under NKVD officer leadership blockaded the nationalists in Kostopil and Kremyanets (bordering Ternopil and Rivno oblasts) where they had succeeded in driving them into massed forest areas.⁵² At this time, the UPA detachments in the Rivno region were instructed to move north toward the Polish border. In June, 1944, UPA-West forces also began to move towards the Polish border in order to protect Ukrainian

⁴⁹Spomyny Chotovooho Ostroverkha, p. 18.

⁵⁰UPA v Svitli Dokumentiv, II, p. 44.

⁵¹Ibid., p. 39.

⁵²Ibid., pp. 45-50.

villages against German attacks and Polish reprisals.⁵³

The defeat of the German armies east of Lviv (in which battles the SS Division Galicia took part at Brody) moved the centre of fighting of both German-Soviet armies and Ukrainian nationalist-Soviet forces into western Galicia and the Carpathian mountains. Stanislav became an important centre of the conflict between the UPA and the Red Partisans. Around Stanislav, large recruitment campaigns by the Red Army provoked the nationalists into attacking small regular Soviet units, Red Partisans and a generalised effort by the existing OUN-B network to eliminate as many communists as possible who were again becoming active. In late July, the UPA carried out large raids against Soviet partisans operating around the towns of Stanislav--Rosokakh, Zavadka and Rykiv.⁵⁴

In the Carpathian mountains, battles with retreating German forces gave way to encounters with the Red Partisans sent into the area in September. When the Partisans failed to win any significant battles with the nationalists, special NKVD units were brought into the Kosmach area in October. They, too, were successfully repelled by the UPA. Similar NKVD blockades taking place in Galicia (Pidhaitsi, Ternopil and near Stanislav) and in the north-western regions were, however increasingly successful.⁵⁵

Alexander Dallin notes in his book German Rule in Russia, that in September, 1944, the UPA 'was again prepared to work against the Red Army in step with the Wehrmacht, which, on its part, was willing to supply it with arms and goods in order to maintain a small 'second

⁵³Spomyny Chotovooho Ostroverkha, p. 33.

⁵⁴UPA v Svitli Dokumentiv, II, pp. 61-62.

⁵⁵Ibid., pp. 74, 82-84.

front' behind Soviet lines'.⁵⁶ Dallin supports this contention with one reference to German war archives.⁵⁷ The information available to this study does not confirm Dallin's analysis.

Leaflets distributed by Soviet partisans and the communist underground during the re-occupation of Western Ukraine, while attacking the OUN as Nazi collaborators, took a different attitude to the UPA insurgents.⁵⁸ In the latter case, Soviet partisan groups urged UPA members to join their ranks in a common struggle against the Germans and assured them that they would be treated 'as brothers'.⁵⁹ These leaflets also took up a political debate with the UPA, a practice reserved by the partisans to groups they felt could be influenced. Such a practice was not prevalent in leaflets distributed to nationalist forces working for the Nazi administration in Western Ukraine.⁶⁰

Although the UPA was an enemy of the Soviet partisan movement and the communist underground, the latter were quite capable of distinguishing between the nationalism of the OUN-M, the OUN-B and the UPA, whose opposition to the occupation was consistent from its inception as an organised political formation in February 1943. The willingness of some Red Partisan leaders to make neutrality accords with the UPA, as we have mentioned above, supports the position that the communists in Ukraine, both partisans and civilian underground, saw an essential difference between the UPA and other

⁵⁶Dallin, German Rule in Russia, p. 621.

⁵⁷Ibid., p. 622. The reference in RMfdbO. to RFSS (Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories. Rosenberg Ministry to Heinrich Himmler), September 4, 1944.

⁵⁸Lystivky Partiynoho Pidpilya, pp. 114-15.

⁵⁹Ibid., pp. 166-67.

⁶⁰Ibid., pp. 121-24, 150.

nationalist groups to be its opposition to the Nazi occupation. The consistency of the UPA command on this question is demonstrated by the fact that on March 7, 1944, it ordered the execution of two UPA unit leaders for merely having carried out discussions with German officials.⁶¹

Dallin's thesis of a consistent unity between all nationalist activity and German war aims, even in the period of the Nazi retreat, is contradicted not only by the above mentioned sources, but by others as well. Khrushchev comments in his memoirs that 'when Bandera realised that the Hitlerites didn't intend to keep their promise to sponsor an independent Ukraine, he turned his units against them During the second half of the war he fought against both us and the Germans'.⁶² Dallin apparently does not recognise the complex evolution of the nationalist movement after 1943 when he writes that 'the UPA and UHVR remained bitterly nationalist-fighting communist and hostile Ukrainian groups, Poles Russians, Jews and Rumanians'.⁶³ He does not, however, include the Nazis in his list of alleged UPA enemies. Official Nazi proclamations in occupied Ukrainian territories attempted to portray the UPA as communist, pointing out that it was anti-Nazi.⁶⁴ Soviet historians themselves, the least sympathetic to the nationalists, readily admit that the UPA fought the German occupation in Ukraine and was initially formed in February 1943 for this very purpose.⁶⁵

⁶¹Lebed', Ukrayins'ka Povstans'ka Armiya, p. 73.

⁶²Crankshaw, ed., Khrushchev Remembers, p. 123.

⁶³Dallin, German Rule in Russia, p. 621.

⁶⁴Lebed', Ukrayins'ka Povstans'ka Armiya, pp. 101-103.

⁶⁵See Ukrayins'ka RSR, p. 388; and Kyzya, Narodni Mesnyky, p. 45.

There is little evidence to support the claim that the UPA fought Jews. We have provided sources to the contrary in Chapter III. If they fought Rumanians, then these were Rumanian divisions of the German army stationed in Ukraine. In fact, the UPA, as we have shown, attempted to recruit this and other nationalities from German divisions by carrying out political propoganda amongst the soldiers. Dallin creates a mistaken impression that the UPA was merely an appendage of fanatical nationalists tied to the German war effort which spent much of its time killing other nationalities in Ukraine and assisting in the German retreat. This view does not distinguish between the different nationalist currents active in 1943 and 1944 (some which worked hand in hand with the Germans) and denies the explicitly political character of the Army.

It is difficult to imagine a guerrilla army whose political perspectives were thoroughly consistent and whose actions were entirely uniform at each point in the war. Dallin, who is a recognised authority on the conditions of German rule in the USSR would certainly agree that such consistency was impossible in the given circumstances. A rapidly changing war situation even ruled out the kind of coordination possible for a conspiratorial organisation in times of social peace. If isolated contradictory policies were put into effect by UPA units during the German retreat, then they do not convincingly demonstrate that the UPA supported the Wehrmacht or other Nazi forces.

This particular aspect of the nationalist movement's role in the war is but one illustration of the widely divergent interpretations currently available. More extreme formulations than the ones we have discussed, such as those which claim that the UPA fought only

Soviet forces and was always a 'lackey of Germany',⁶⁶ or to the effect that 'during the entire three years of German misrule in Ukraine, the Nazis failed to find one Ukrainian quisling'⁶⁷ are usually politically motivated and serve little in the search for an objective and complex understanding of the subject at hand. The abundance of such interpretations and the lack of original source materials in many areas of the subject necessarily place a limit on the depth of analysis currently possible.

In the autumn of 1944 the UPA was approaching the two year mark of activity and was already in serious decline. The autumn defoliation of forests and the outbreak of typhus amongst the guerrilla units which were cut off from adequate food and medical supplies had contributed to further losses. The size of blockades against them grew. No central command appeared to be operating and discipline in the ranks was difficult to maintain. Desertions increased as the rank and file insurgents realised the hopelessness of the situation. In 1943, the UPA had established its strongholds in Polissia and Volyn on the former sites of Kovpak's and other partisans' forces. The UPA sites in the winter of 1944-45 were now in the Carpathian mountains and in Southern Poland at the extreme western borders of the country. The UPA insurgent 'republic' in the Hutsul region near Bereziv and Zhebye survived the winter and exacted a toll of three hundred Soviet troops who had tried to capture the temporary stronghold.⁶⁸ To the east, the surviving guerrilla units fared worse and the numbers of dead nationalists began to outweigh the Soviet count.

⁶⁶Koval', Istoriya Pamyataye!, pp. 14, 17.

⁶⁷Editorial, Ukrainian Quarterly, no. 1, 1944-45, p. 5.

⁶⁸UPA v Svitli Dokumentiv, II, p. 87.

CHAPTER V

CONSOLIDATION OF SOVIET AUTHORITY

The defeat of Germany in the USSR ended the active resistance of all nationalist forces which had depended on her presence. The UPA and the surviving OUN-B network were the only groups which remained. The UPA wanted to continue a war with Soviet authority; the majority of the Western Ukrainian population did not. In spite of everything disagreeable about the new authority, it coincided with the end of the German occupation and the suppression of national hostilities between the Poles and the Ukrainians. But this did not mean that the UPA was without a base of support amongst the Western Ukrainian peasantry. Nor did the consolidation of Soviet power in Western Ukraine mean an end to the nationalist guerrilla war which had moved into Southern Poland-the Lemko, Kholm and Peremysl areas.

The main task of the incoming officials from Soviet Ukraine was to reconstruct the Communist Party there and to begin to rebuild the wartorn economy with the assistance of Soviet agricultural and industrial specialists. Soviet historians estimate that there were a little over seven thousand communists left in Western Ukraine at the end of the war, approximately one fifth of the figure in 1940.¹

¹A. B. Tkachuk, 'Diyal'nist' Komunistychnoyi Partiyi Ukrainy po Ideyno-politychnomu Vykhovanyu Robitnychoho Klasu Zakhidnykh Oblastey URSR 1944-1950 r.r.', Ukrayins'kyy Istorychnyy Zhurnal, 1970, no. 10, p. 99.

The strengthening of the city political apparatus and the economic institutions spanned over the first Five Year Plan. By March 1, 1945, 12,000 party members assigned to political work were brought in from the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Ukraine. By January 1, 1946 the number of agitation collectives of the party had grown to 13,000, totalling over 216,000 workers. These collectives were made up of local and imported cadre.² The sheer weight of such a political apparatus in a population of approximately six million is one indication of the odds against the UPA at this time. By mid-1946 over 85,000 organisers and economic specialists were in Western Ukraine working on the reconstruction of the economy. The majority of this number were communists.³

The main function of the ideological apparatus was to provide support for two ongoing projects in Western Ukraine--the continuing military operation against the UPA and the collectivisation of agriculture. The nationalist historian, A. Panasenko who was in Western Ukraine at the time points out that the two themes of agitation were:

- (a) the historic ties of friendship between the Russian and Ukrainian people, manifest in their common victory over fascism;
- (b) the fact that the nationalist bands were agents of Nazi Germany.⁴

In the cities, nationalist activity had diminished to the point that its presence was felt only in isolated terrorist attacks and sabotage of NKVD institutions. Often these were carried out by

²P. A. Borkovs'ky, 'Stvorenya i Vykhovanya Partiynumu Orhanizatsiyamy Zakhidnykh Oblastey URSR Masovo Aktyvu Trudyashchykh 1944-1950 r.r.', Ukrayins'kyy Istorychnyy Zhurnal, 1973, no. 4, p. 96.

³loc. cit.

⁴UHVR A-6: A. Panasenko, 'Borot'ba Ukrayins'koho Narodu z Zoyu Bol'shevyts'koyu Okupatsiyeyu'.

rural-based guerrilla groups.⁵ In the countryside, nationalism's traditional stronghold, opposition to Soviet authority and to collectivisation remained at a high point and provided the UPA with a base for continued work. This base, however, depended upon stalling collectivisation for as long as possible. In an organised agricultural economy, with strict accounting of food, administrative control over all land and the movement of labour, a rural-based guerrilla force could not obtain its basic necessities--food, shelter and information. The nationalists had no well-defined strategy for political work under the new conditions.

The first efforts by the government in the countryside were aimed at breaking the social cohesion of the peasants by attacking the two most important institutions around which they organised themselves--the church and the UPA. In March 1946, an attempt was made to lessen the church's influence by invoking a union between the Russian Orthodox Church, which was partially a state controlled institution, and the Greek-Catholic (Byzantine rite) church to which many peasants belonged.

Opposition from the Ukrainian Greek Catholic clergy at a staged synod on March 8-10 at which 281 priests refused to join the new 'union' led to widespread repressions against the Church. The majority of priests and bishops at this gathering in St. George's church in Lviv, numbering over 1,000 consented to unify the Greek Catholic and Russian Orthodox churches.⁶ At the same time, the authorities were screening films of UPA insurgents giving themselves

⁵UPA v Svitli Dokumentiv, II, p. 112.

⁶Ibid., p. 338.

up in an attempt to show that the nationalists had responded favourably to the numerous appeals by Khrushchev and other state leaders. The UPA responded by bombing film halls or local police offices on evenings when these films were being shown.⁷ Whether the films of nationalists surrendering were authentic cannot be determined; one nationalist historian has conceded, however, that the appeal made on May 18, 1945 immediately after Germany's formal surrender was more successful than previous ones.⁸

The UPA units, considerably shrunken in size by mid 1945, avoided the escalating Soviet pressures in Western Ukraine by launching propaganda raids into other territories. At this time, although borders were being settled with neighbouring states, border controls had not been properly established. In the spring of 1945, guerrilla units launched an eastward raid into Polissia, Zhytomyr and Kiev oblasts. Another headed into Poland, while the Galicia-based insurgents continued to raid from their forest enclaves into the flatlands in an effort to counter the growing propaganda campaign against them amongst the peasantry. Two summers raids in 1945 and 1946 into Slovakia by the UPA-West group were important excursions for the nationalists attempting to explain their case to other populations in Eastern Europe. The second Slovakia raid went as far as Kosice and Presov before returning back across the border into Western Ukraine. In the course of the 1945 trek, the nationalists encountered Slovak army units which wanted to join them; they were not admitted to the UPA, according to the report of the

⁷ Ibid., p. 103.

⁸ Yaroslav Bilinsky, The Second Soviet Republic. The Ukraine After World War (New Jersey, 1964), pp. 11, 127, 132.

⁹ UPA v Svitli Dokumentiv, II, p. 95.

Slovakia raid, but were urged to form their own groups and fight against the government in Prague.¹⁰

The UPA in Poland in 1945-46
and the AK

The issue of the Polish-Soviet border was first discussed at the Yalta Conference on February 4-11, 1945. Britain, the United States and the USSR were represented here by Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin. There were no Polish representatives in attendance, either from the London government in exile or from Bierut's Committee of National Union. The London government wanted a resolution of the border that would include Lviv and the Drohobych oil basin in Poland; the British and American delegations made representations to this effect, but did not press the point. Both Roosevelt and Churchill recognised that Stalin had the prerogative in this situation--the Red Army had liberated the territories in question. Another factor to the disadvantage of the London government was the predominance of Ukrainians in the areas under discussion. The Curzon line was agreed upon between the leaders upon Stalin's request as the territorial border, and Western Ukraine became part of Soviet Ukraine.¹¹

With international diplomatic recognition, Bierut's Committee in Poland was favoured to become the official government. The London government, in spite of considerable popular support inside Poland, dissolved its underground, the AK, in February after the Yalta

¹⁰UPA v Svitli Dokumentiv, I, p. 218.

¹¹Roman Oliynyk, 'Ukrayins'ke Pytannya na Kryms'ki, Konferentsiyi 1945', Suchasnist', no. 5 (53), May 1965, pp. 92-96.

discussions.¹² On April 21, 1945, the Soviet Union and Bierut's communists signed a pact of mutual assistance in military and economic affairs. The military assistance agreement was clearly aimed at preparing for a joint effort against Polish and Ukrainian insurgents still active in Southern Poland. A Polish Government of National Unity was proclaimed on June 23, 1945.¹³ In the same month, three Polish infantry divisions were sent after the UPA groups without any apparent success.¹⁴

One day after the proclamation of the Government of National Unity, a conference was called by the Director of the Bureau of the Praesidium of Ministers, Dr. Zhumak in Warsaw to discuss the issue of the Ukrainian population 'beyond the Curzon line' (i.e. on the Polish side). The conference was attended by government representatives and Ukrainian community leaders. According to an UPA report in the author's possession (the UPA apparently had a member present at the meeting in another capacity) the Ukrainian representatives and government officials discussed the territories in Southern Poland and the instability there which threatened the establishment of public order. The government side expressed the opinion that all 'progressive' Ukrainians had gone to Soviet Ukraine at the end of 1944 after the Soviet victory. Those remaining were, according to them, 'reactionaries'. Fearing the 'arival of a new Piedmont', the government felt that remaining Ukrainian villages should be deported. The Ukrainian representatives argued that the communities in the Peremysl, Kholm and Lemko regions had been there for many years, that the people

¹²Vaclav L. Benes and G. J. Pounds, Poland (London, 1970), p. 251.

¹³O. Halecki, A History of Poland (London, 1955), p. 323.

¹⁴Bilinsky, Second Soviet Republic, p. 113.

considered themselves to be Polish citizens with the right to full protection of the law. Furthermore, they demanded recognition of religious freedoms, Ukrainian language schools, re-creation of old cooperatives and the construction of new ones, political amnesty for those imprisoned at the end of the War, the right to their own political party and compensation for lands which had already been taken from them.¹⁵

Apparently the Ukrainian representatives felt themselves in a position to demand not only that their population remain in Poland, but also to put forward all of the requests listed above. It was clear to the Polish government that their confidence did not stem from official or unofficial backing by the Soviet Ukrainian government, but from the intransigence of the Ukrainian population in Poland and the authority of the UPA in Southern Poland. At this time it is estimated by Blum, a Brigadier General of the Polish army that the UPA had seventeen platoons on Polish territory numbering six thousand insurgents. These platoons were not only fighting against the Polish militia but had organised the area administratively and were even collecting taxes for the UPA from the Ukrainian population there.¹⁶ The danger that this state of affairs presented to the Polish government is evident in Blum's report:

The UPA bands disorganised the normal course of life in districts which constituted their area of activity. Thus, for example, in 1945 public administration in the province of Rzeszow was completely at a standstill: cantonal offices were working in only two communities, in some villages, authorities were formed for times only to be liquidated each time by the UPA

¹⁵P. Doc. 82.

¹⁶Bilinsky, Second Soviet Republic, p. 113.

platoons. Only 10-12 percent of the tax in kind were collected in that province. The bands destroyed and liquidated the majority of the Citizens' Militia outposts.¹⁷

In the latter half of 1945, the existing AK units in Southern Poland which had not disbanded at the London government's request in February entered into negotiations with UPA units. For both groups, these negotiations were borne of necessity. In Western Ukraine the Soviet government was consolidating its power, thereby suppressing the UPA's traditional peasant base; in Poland the AK was without a government to fight for. There was little political unity between the Polish and Ukrainian nationalists.

A considerable number of AK groups in Southern Poland were still active. They had originally expected that, given the mass sentiment in Poland favouring the government in exile, its supporters would be able to infiltrate the communist apparatus and through an evolutionary process gain state power.¹⁸ The AK forces were, however, at a disadvantage by 1945 because they had not opposed the incoming Red Army in 1944 on the instructions of the exile government and now the presence of the Red Army in Poland provided Bierut with a power base to counter the mass sentiment. They were faced with the prospect of opposing a pro-Moscow government which was already consolidating its control over the country through the state apparatus. In addition, the AK was actively opposed to the UPA; it did not recognise the rights of the minority in Southern Poland, and the legitimacy of UPA actions even less. The only common basis for possible negotiations at this time was both groups' opposition to the

¹⁷Ignacy Blum, 'Udział Wojska Polskiego w Walce o otrwalenie Władzy Ludowej: Walki z Bandami UPA', Wojskowy Przegląd Historyczny, Vol. IV, no. 1, January-March 1959, p. 12.

¹⁸p. Doc. 1.

Soviet Union. This commonality appears to have stimulated the first contacts between the two forces. At the same time, because the UPA had been active in the forcible expulsion of Poles from the Volyn and Polissia areas and continued to disrupt government attempts in Southern Poland to deport the Ukrainians to the east, and because the AK itself had been active in the campaign to 're-settle' the Ukrainian peasants living in the Kholm and Lemko regions, the negotiations were marked neither by mutual trust nor by any significant agreements.¹⁹

In the course of these negotiations the AK leadership and the UHVR did not meet. Leaders of territorial units met their counterparts. From the documents in the author's possession, it appears that the first contact was only in October, 1945.²⁰ The main subjects of this discussion were exchanges of information concerning the political situation in Poland, attempts to gain co-operation in a common fight against the communist administration on both sides of the border and plans to exchange political literature. In the initial meetings, UPA representatives requested lists of Polish communist party members and of Soviet sympathisers from the AK.²¹

In an unofficial capacity, local AK leaders expressed support for the goal of an independent Ukrainian state, but did not appear to be well informed about the nationalists' long standing proposal for a common front of East European anti-Soviet groups against the USSR. They nevertheless expressed interest upon hearing this idea. At a meeting between representatives of the two sides in December, AK members informed the UPA that their high command was

¹⁹V. Volchev, 'Do Polityky Pol's'koho Uryadu', p. 123. See also Spomyny Chotovocho Ostroverkha, p. 38; and P. Doc. 70, P. Doc. 86, P. Doc. 99.

²⁰P. Doc. 93.

²¹P. Doc. 95.

divided on the Ukrainian question, most of its members preferring to discuss the issue of UPA claims to territories east of the Curzon line before considering the broader question of statehood.²²

The most pressing problem evident in the discussions recorded in the UPA reports was the issue of the Ukrainian peasantry in Poland. This had led to antagonisms between the UPA and the AK in 1944 when the former had carried out widespread campaigns in Southern Poland destroying homesteads which deported Ukrainians had abandoned and opposing new colonisation attempts by Poles in the Lemko and Kholm areas.²³ Although the UPA had issued instructions to its members already in August, 1944 not to provoke attacks upon peaceful peasants by looting and killing Polish residents of the areas²⁴ (such actions by UPA are admitted in these documents) the sheer level of hostilities between the Polish and Ukrainian populations and the armed groups on each side had made AK-UPA conflicts inevitable. In the latter part of 1945, when the AK was considerably weakened and the UPA in Western Ukraine had re-inforced its Poland-based units from its Volyn and Galician strongholds, the UPA felt strong enough to begin to negotiate the AK's non-intervention into the re-settlement issue. No decisions, however, were reached in the recorded discussions.

The Defeat of the Nationalist Movement

The OUN-B declaration issued at the end of the Second World War had put forward an orientation of continued opposition to Soviet rule and the transformation of the existing structures of the organisation

²²P. Doc. 1.

²³P. Doc. 54.

²⁴P. Doc. 76.

into deeply conspiratorial cell networks. Stress was given to the new social content of the nationalist programme--the demand for a 'classless society'.²⁵ On the international level, the OUN-B pointed to the irreconcilable differences between Britain and the Soviet Union which it believed would shortly provoke a Third World War.²⁶ (The AK had the same position on the international situation in 1945).²⁷ As before, the theme of a national war of liberation in the context of an international war re-appeared in the OUN's perspectives.

On the strategic level, the nationalists outlined three components in their post-War approach:

- (a) the elimination of petty conflicts within the organisation and with other political groups (the AK?) and the need to create a common front of East European anti-Soviet groups;
- (b) the continuation of armed struggle by the UPA;
- (c) the preparation of cadre for long-term conspiratorial work.

None of these aims, except the first in a minimal way with the AK, materialised. There is little evidence to show that the nationalist movement survived as an organised force beyond 1948, after the last campaigns against the UPA.

In February, 1946, the UHVR and the nationalist guerrillas launched a fierce campaign of propaganda and military actions on the eve of general elections to the Supreme Soviet.²⁸ The campaign was repeated again the next year during the election period for the Council

²⁵OUN v Svitli Postanov, pp. 121-43.

²⁶UPA v Svitli Dokumentiv, I, pp. 127, 196.

²⁷P. Doc. 1.

²⁸UPA v Svitli Dokumentiv, I, pp. 153-59.

of Nationalities. Most of the UPA incursions were into small towns and villages in Western Ukraine, their groups being far smaller than those which fought in actions in 1944 in Western Ukraine or in 1945 in Southern Poland.

The decisive expedition against the UPA took place in 1947. In successive waves of deportations, the Soviet government moved large numbers of Western Ukrainian peasants east to Siberia;²⁹ the Polish government depopulated the Lemko, Peremysl and Kholm regions and re-settled approximately 200,000 Ukrainians in Olstyn and Stettin on the Baltic coast. Following the removal of this mass base of the UPA, the military campaign began. Acting upon a tripartite agreement signed by the USSR, Poland and Czechoslovakia, combined armies blockaded the border territories of the three states in May 1947, and proceeded to eliminate surviving Ukrainian guerrillas.³⁰ (Polish dissident groups also were a target in Poland). Blum estimates that the combined losses of Ukrainian and Polish guerrillas were 7,500 dead and 2,000 wounded. The Ukrainian losses here appear to have been the overwhelming majority, because only 145 of the 41,000 who surrendered to the Polish government forces were UPA members. Losses on the government side in the 1947 campaign were 1,300 regular Polish army soldiers 3,000 internal security troops, 4,500 members of the Polish Workers' Party; 3,000 regular soldiers and internal security personnel were wounded. To the UPA loss, 1,500 can be added from the June, 1945 campaign by the above mentioned infantry divisions.³¹ Soviet sources have not provided any description or figures for this

²⁹ UHR v Svitli Postanov, pp. 245-58.

³⁰ Nicholas Chubaty, 'The UPA Fights the Kremlin', Ukrainian Quarterly, no. 3, 1947, p. 359.

³¹ Bilinsky, Second Soviet Republic, p. 114.

same action taking place on Western Ukrainian territory. The losses on both sides in Western Ukraine may be appreciated from Khrushchev's comments in his memoirs that "after the war, we lost thousands of men in a bitter struggle between the Ukrainian nationalists and the forces of Soviet power".³²

At this point the history of the nationalist movement ends. All documentation of armed or other actions after this period refers to the participants, not as UPA or OUN members, but simply as 'insurgents', indicating the disintegration of the organisational structure.

³²Crankshaw, ed., Khrushchev Remembers, p. 123.

CONCLUSION

Nationalism as an ideology of a political movement does not appear to be the stable phenomenon ^{it may at first seem} from the historic point of view. This is clear, not only in the case of the OUN and the UPA whose activity we have examined in this paper, but also in numerous other cases. The Quebecois movement of the 1920's which had as its heroes Mussolini and Salazar is not the same as the nationalist movement there today; the movement in Brittany which supported Vichy and the Nazi occupation during the Second World War is qualitatively different from the Breton nationalists who support the Communist Party of France and other left wing forces today. The sections of the Irish Republican Army who were prepared to work with Germany during the Second World War cannot be considered the source of the current politics of either wing of the IRA today. The OUN and the UPA cannot be equated with the current dissident movement in Ukraine today although the latter is also imbued with a nationalist spirit. Even within the historic boundaries of the movement we have examined, the 'nationalism' of the movement does not appear to have been its central characteristic, except in ideological and proclamatory statements.

The fundamental characteristics that should be examined in order to understand the role of the Ukrainian nationalist movement in the historical process are the social content of its programme and the impact of its activity upon class alignment, both nationally and internationally. An examination of the OUN's and UPA's programmatic response to the social predicament of the Ukrainian people and of

the social forces who were active in the movement itself reveals the underlying factors which determined their historical role.

In the 1930's the programme of the OUN favoured the Western Ukrainian middle class at the expense of the mass of peasants and workers. It called for a corporatist authoritarian state as the solution to the plight of the Western Ukrainian middle class. This appears to be the overriding theme in spite of the OUN's declamatory stance for 'national liberation.' The middle class character of its membership, and to a far greater degree, the middle class leadership of the movement expressed this programmatic facet in another way. At the same time, the nationalists' practice-attacks on the Polish state institutions, officials and landowning aristocracy in Western Ukraine gave it the image of a separatist and vanguardist force, responding directly to the Polish government's and upper class' suppression of the Ukrainian peasantry. The separatist character of the OUN's politics in practice did not enable it to carry out a truly fascist approach to the social crisis in Poland because it demanded the movement's opposition to other parts of the middle class which were not Ukrainian. Its attacks on the CPWU and the workers' organisations were consistent with the classic practice of fascist organisations of the period. As much as nationalists may today protest that these institutions were controlled by Stalinists, they were at the same time important defenders of the living standards and political rights of the Western Ukrainian working class.

When Germany went to war with the Soviet Union, both the Mel'nyk and Bandera factions chose to ally with the former power. They thereby followed the dictates of their anti-communism and the tradition of their movement in the 1930's; this decision had little to do with the social and national interests of the Ukrainian people, again in spite of the abundance of nationalist declarations to that

effect. Here the class character of the nationalist movement (and opportunism) revealed itself in the OUN's choice on the international level.

The formation of the UPA, according to our method of investigation was a significant break with the past period because the UPA chose to side with the mass movement against the Nazi occupation and to take up the social demands of the workers and peasants. While the UPA's opposition to Soviet authority did not stem from a left wing critique of that authority, but one which considered the USSR to be quite similar to the fascist model, the anti-Soviet character of the Army in politics and practice cannot be viewed as being similar to the anti-communism of the OUN in the 1930's. On the level of analysis, this opposition to the Soviet state in the post-War period did become a left wing critique of the bureaucratic rule there. This subject falls outside the historical period of examination in the present paper; it is important to note however, that the development of the UPA in the post war period carried the left turn of 1943 towards its logical conclusions--a materialist analysis and a programme calling for an independent classless Ukraine, a state democratically controlled by the working classes.

Throughout its history, the nationalism of the movement acted as a veneer for more fundamental class characteristics of its programme and social composition. These characteristics provide the measure for examining the OUN and the UPA in a way more precise than the more ephemeral and subjective facets of its 'outer shell': its 'nationalism'. How is it possible to understand the difference between the OUN of the 1930's and the UPA without reference to the social content of the 1929 programme and the 1943 statement of UPA aims, and to the middle class composition of the OUN in one period and the mass base of the UPA in 1943-44? An attempt to discern the

relationship of the nationalist organisations to the populace before and during the War by answering such questions as Armstrong put forward in his study Ukrainian Nationalism (How strong was nationalism amongst the Eastern Ukrainians?) fails to analyse visible and objective categories. Rather it dwells at the subjective level.

The failure of the movement to achieve its aims during the War or to continue as a serious political opponent to the Soviet regime after 1945 cannot be attributed solely to its powerlessness in the face of two states, their armies and resources. There are numerous examples of popular movements (Vietnam is a recent example) which overcame such odds. The reasons for the nationalists' failure must be sought elsewhere.

The OUN did not develop a significant popular base in Western or Soviet Ukraine before 1943 because it was an 'independence' movement in name only. The association of the OUN-M and OUN-B with the Wehrmacht, the civilian administrations of occupancy rule and with the formation of the Nachtigall, Roland and the Galicia Division made it clear that their strategy was not one of building a popular movement to struggle for independence, but one securing concessions of autonomy from the Nazi authorities in return for their co-operation and remaining subordinate to their dictate.

It was not until 1943 when Germany was losing the War that the UPA emerged as an anti-German and anti-Soviet phenomenon. The OUN-B forces in Galicia, the stronghold of the organisation, opposed German rule in 1943 on paper, but in practice only in August of that year after the Third Extra-Ordinary Congress. In both cases, and moreso for the OUN-B than for the UPA, preparation for the imminent return of Soviet authorities was an overriding consideration which forced the turn of the movement at this time. If the nationalist historians claim that the OUN-B opposed Nazi Germany

as well as the Soviet Union, then we may ask--'Why only in 1943 and not in 1941?'. The timing of the nationalist turn was important.

They did not chose to oppose Nazi Germany, moreover, but were forced to do so because the mass of workers and peasants in Ukraine had far outstripped them in being the first opponents to Nazi rule.

Yona Liron, a former counter insurgency expert of the NKVD expressed this criticism in the Ukrainian Quarterly in 1963:

A grave political mistake was to allow Soviet propaganda to associate the Ukrainian nationalist movement with Nazi Germany. As soon as it became clear after the 1943 Kursk-Orel battle that the Germans had lost the war in the East, the UPA ought to have ordered all Ukrainians serving in German organised military formations or auxiliary police to kill their Nazi officers, seize their arms and flee to the woods. This was not done.¹

But even in 1943, such a radical turn as Liron suggests would not have compensated adequately for the practice of previous years. Although the Red Partisans represented a government that was hated by many Ukrainians, their position on the Nazi occupation was consistent throughout the War. This fact alone contributed to much of their growth in 1942 and 1943. Even after 1943 there was a lack of clarity in the nationalists' strategy and politics. While the UPA fought Nazi police and army units in Western Ukraine, it did not execute Ukrainian collaborators serving in the occupant administration. Many of these collaborators were OUN members. The links between the OUN-B and the UPA made such practice difficult for the guerrillas. The Red Partisans killed collaborators 'regardless of their nationality (and probably, original affiliation).

¹Yona Liron 'I Was a Soviet Counter Insurgency Expert', p. 332.

Other inconsistencies of the UPA's strategy were highlighted in its links with other East European movements--the A.K. and Croatian nationalists. The only common denominator between these groups and the UPA was their opposition to the Soviet Union. But the A.K. and the Croation movement were bitterly anti-communist. The UPA chose to submerge the progressive aspects of its programme in favour of an alliance based on anti-Sovietism.

At the root of these contradictions lay the inability of the nationalist movement to break with its past. Although the programme of the UPA addressed itself to the social demands of the Ukrainian masses and recognised the importance of a popular movement which was truly independent in programme and practice, it remained unable to find a hearing within the working class and had no strategy for reaching these social layers. The reliance of the movement upon the Western Ukrainian peasantry from 1929 to its defeat in 1947 proved to be its downfall. The political changes that were made in 1943 were too small and too late.

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- (i) the Archive of the Foreign Representation of the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council (Zakordonne Prydstavnytstvo Ukrayins'koyi Holovnoyi Vyzvol'noyi Rady--ZP UHVR) in New York City;
- (ii) taped interviews were made with five participants of the movement, all of whom became OUN members at the 1929 founding Congress or soon afterwards. Originally, a large and more representative sample of interviews was envisaged. This was made impossible by the dispersal of subjects over three continents and the author's inability to interview former members currently resident in East European countries. The five interviews which were completed, however assisted in establishing the initial framework for research into other sources.

Documents

The following documents were made available to this study by Myroslav Styranka in Munich. The great majority of them are original or carbon copies of original reports of UPA brigades in Southern Poland in 1945. They are presently in the possession of Professor P. Potichny at McMaster University in Hamilton, Canada. The documents were already numerated when received (apparently belonging to a larger collection previously) and appear below according to this original system.

- Doc. 1. UPA internal report of meeting with Armija Krajowa representatives, December 6, 1945; in Ukrainian.
- Doc. 6. (i) UPA internal report of meeting with Polish contacts, December 23, 1945; in Ukrainian.
(ii) UPA internal report of meeting with Armija Krajowa representatives, December 16, 1945; in Ukrainian.
- Doc. 8 UPA internal report of meeting with Armija Krajowa representatives, December 5, 1945; in Ukrainian.

- Doc. 54. UPA internal report on the deportation of Ukrainians from Polish territories, November 9, 1945; in Ukrainian.
- Doc. 59. UPA command instructions "to leaders of all combat divisions", October 23, 1945; in Ukrainian.
- Doc. 70. UPA leaflet entitled 'Poles!,' March 1945; in Ukrainian.
- Doc. 76. UPA internal circular entitled 'Once Again on Our Relations with the Poles', August 5, 1945; in Ukrainian.
- Doc. 82. UPA internal report on Warsaw government conference on minorities question, July 24, 1945; in Ukrainian.
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- Doc. 95. UPA internal report of meeting with Polish guerrillas, October 8, 1945; in Ukrainian.
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