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Summary of Thesis submitted by R.W. Thomas, B.D.
to the University of Glasgow - April 1964.

Title: RESURRECTION AND IMMORTALITY IN THE NEW TESTAMENT AND THE QURAN

This thesis has a twofold aim: first, to establish the connexion between the concept of immortality and the doctrine of resurrection, once the lexical data has been examined; secondly to compare the related concepts as they figure in the Quran with the corresponding presentation in the N.T.

Before turning to the argument proper I have attempted to place the title concepts in the setting of N.T. or Quranic eschatology. The first four chapters in Part I and the first three in Part II were alloted to this survey of the major divisions into which the N.T. and the Quran fall. Several other germane problems have also been considered in these introductory chapters.

In Chap.I of Part I the eschatological background of the Gospels and Acts is discussed. A brief note on the apocalyptic genre and another on eschatology in Acts are subjoined to this chapter. The all-embracing scope of resurrection is the closing observation that rounds off this chapter. Next in Chap.II there is an outline of the Pauline view of the Last Things. The issues here raised include the Parousia, and the crux in II Cor. 5: 1-8. Chap.III and IV follow up with the remaining literature of the N.T. from Hebrews to Revelation. In the section on the Apocalypse the value of symbolism in prophetic delineation is stressed.

Since the Kingdom of God is an eschatological reality a treatment of its implications was unavoidable; this has been done in Chap.V. The conclusion there reached is that the futurist

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element is ineradicable from the teaching of Jesus. The remaining chapters are more strictly philological studies. In Chap.VI the verbs of raising and sleeping as well as the Greek nouns that signify resurrection are examined. The significance of the pivotal term 'body' is assessed in Chap.VII, with special reference to its use in I Cor. 15. The final chapter of Part I is an evaluation of two further pertinent expressions, aiōnios and athanasia. The evidence thus gathered suggests that Immortality like Eternal Life is a gift rather than an innate possession.

Much the same procedure as above is adopted in Part II. Here the consecutive divisions surveyed in the introductory chapters are chronological. Various unusual terms occurring in the early Meccan Suras are sifted in Chap. I. Note is also taken of the rare allusions to resurrection and perpetuity. Chap. II deals with the major part of the Quran, the middle and later Meccan Suras. Here attention is drawn, inter alia, to Casanova's theory and the premonitory signs. The final stage of Quranic development represents a summing up of ideas previously set forth. Concepts such as the Last Day and the 'Spouses' are considered in Chap.III. Some of the singular features noticeable in the Suras are best explained by recourse to the milieu in which the Prophet moved.

The five chapters that follow deal more particularly with the subject of the thesis. In Chap.IV, after listing the equivalent phrases and epithets for the Day of Resurrection, I have endeavoured to describe some of the events of that Day. In the next chapter a number of verbs that imply revival or survival beyond death are looked into; the object is to trace out the mode of resurrection, assuming that the relevant data is conducive to such analysis. The soul in Quranic thought is the theme of Chap.VI; the conclusion reached is that nafs refers to intrinsic personality, which is inconceivable apart from a visible form.

The final chapters are complementary, the one dealing with 'time', and the other with 'eternity'. Hence, they bear affinity to Chap. VIII of Part I. God's time is not the same as ours, but the two dimensions are not totally disparate. Such terms for eternity as are extant in the Quran indicate a permanent state here after.

A brief conclusion to the entire thesis is appended. Here the results of the main lines of inquiry are summarized, and the practical purpose of eschatology demonstrated.

RESURRECTION AND IMMORTALITY IN THE NEW TESTAMENT AND THE QURAN

R.W. THOMAS, B.D.

TO EDNA

PREFACE

This thesis could not have been brought to completion without the help and encouragement of many well-wishers. Originally intended as an inquiry into the N.T. concepts of resurrection and immortality, the work has developed into a comparative study including within its purview the relevant Quranic data. It was partly at the suggestion of the Rev. E.F.F. Bishop, M.A. that the thesis was given this new turn; to him I owe a special debt of gratitude.

The bilingual nature of my research has afforded me the privilege of working under two supervisors. My sincere thanks are due to Prof. William Barclay, D.D. and Dr. J. Spencer Trimingham, D. Litt. for their patient supervision, valuable criticism and ready counsel. I am also most grateful to other members of the Divinity Faculty at Glasgow University for advice on various philological matters, and to the Librarians and their assistants both at Trinity College and at the University for their help.

I further wish to express my thanks to Mrs. Swan and to Miss Harvey, who have undertaken the task of typing the manuscript and done so with competence.

Acknowledgments of literary debts are due in several directions: I have consulted the leading commentaries on the N.T. text; Baidāwī's commentary has been a constant reference book, Bell's Introduction

has furnished useful notes. Studies by Barth and Dahl on the Resurrection Chapter have proved invaluable; I have frequently drawn upon two other sources, the virtuoso volume on the Background of the New Testament and its Eschatology, and the statistical information in D. Masson's Le Coran et la Revelation Judeo-Chretienne. For the rest, the extent of my literary dependence is shown in the bibliography and the notes.

R.W. THOMAS.

Easter Monday, 1964.

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ABBREVIATIONS

Lexicons and Longer Tomes

Abbott-Smith : G.Abbott-Smith, A Manual Greek Lexicon of the New Testament (3rd ed., T. & T. Clark, Edinburgh, 1960).
Baidāwī : Beidhawii, Commentarius in Coranum (ed. by H.O. Fleischer, 2 vols., Leipzig, 1846).
Bauer's Lexicon : A Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament and other Early Christian Literature (Trans. and ed. by W.F. Arndt and F.W. Gingrich (Chicago and Cambridge, 1957).
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B.N.T.E. : The Background of the New Testament and its Eschatology: Essays in Honour of C.H. Dodd (ed. by W.D. Davies and D. Daube (Cambridge, 1956).
E.I.(1) : Encyclopaedia of Islam (4 vols. and supplement, Leiden, 1913 etc).
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L.A. : Lisān al-'Arab, Arabic Lexicon of Ibn Manẓūr (20 vols., Cairo, A.H. 1308).
L.S. : H.G. Liddell and R. Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon (2 vols., new ed., Oxford, 1951).
M.M. : J.H. Moulton and G. Milligan, The Vocabulary of the New Testament (Hodder & Stoughton, London, 1949).

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S.E.I. : Shorter Encyclopaedia of Islam (eds. H.A.R. Gibb and J.H. Kramers, Leiden, 1953).
T.C.E. : Twentieth Century Encyclopaedia of Religious Knowledge : An Extension of the New Schaff - Herzog (2 vols. ed. by L.A. Loetscher, Grand Rapids, 1955).
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Journals

E.T. :	The Expository Times, Edinburgh
M.W. :	The Muslim World
N.T.S.:	New Testament Studies, Cambridge
S.J.T.:	Scottish Journal of Theology, Edinburgh
Transactions:	Transactions of the Glasgow University Oriental Society.

Versions and Translations

A.J.A. :	A.J. Arberry, The Koran Interpreted.
A.V. :	The Authorized Version.
J.M.R. :	J.M. Rodwell, The Koran
L.X.X. :	The 'Septuagint' version of the O.T.
N.E.B. :	The New English Bible.
R.B. :	R. Bell, The Qur'ān.
R.V. :	The English Revised Version.

INTRODUCTION.

The title of this thesis largely indicates its scope. To the religious mind the complementary concepts of resurrection and immortality are perennially fascinating. Accordingly, a fresh investigation of the meaning of each of these concepts and the relationship between them has here been attempted. For the purpose of comparison the N.T. and the Quran have been selected as source-books. Besides comparing the relevant material in the two books, we shall try to estimate the significance of the two doctrines for faith and living.

No sustained effort has been made to disentangle genuine utterances from what is commonly spoken of as Gemeindetheologie. The N.T. is at once the source-book of orthodox belief and of heretical deviation. The conflicting views that have emerged in the Church over the centuries of the Christian era owe their inspiration to the general pattern of thought observable in the N.T., or else to the subtle misinterpretation of isolated texts. A measure of authority is usually ascribed to the more luminous passages in the gospels and the epistles even by more advanced Christian scholars; and it is with these passages that we have to deal in the main.

Where grave doubts have been cast on the genuineness of any passage included in the present discussions, these will be taken into account. By and large, however, the passages that from the basis of the argument are accepted as authentic utterances of Jesus or as true

reflexions of apostolic thought. Hence, except where this course is unavoidable, we shall not interrupt the flow of the argument to embark upon literary criticism.

The Quranic evidence calls for even less sifting. In the Quran the authenticity of only a few verses has been questioned by Western scholars, and these do not seriously affect the overal impression of textual trustworthiness. In two or three instances the variant reading of a particular word alters the emphasis or eases a problem, and these variants have been considered. Scholars in the field of comparative religion customarily treat each scripture as a unity, when actually comparing two faiths, and its seems wisest to follow their example.

British and continental scholars have in recent years made valuable contributions within a wide range of Islamic study. Almost every sphere of Muslim life and thought has been explored by a host of able and diligent specialists. In selecting this particular aspect of Quranic doctrine we hope to add a modest supplement to the subject of Islamic eschatology. The subject itself deserves a tome; two of its facets, 'The Last Day' and the doctrine of immortality provide a well circumscribed field with which to work.

As the proposed treatment of the main theme is to be fairly extended, we can only touch upon other aspects of eschatology. In the introductory chapters (four in Part I, three in Part II) an

attempt has been made to place the ideas of resurrection and immortality in the proper setting of general eschatology. Here such themes as apocalypse, the Parousia, the Arabic names for Heaven and Hell are briefly considered. These themes are peripheral in relation to the thesis, though doubtless important in themselves. The introductory chapters are thus meant merely to provide the eschatological framework for the main divisions into which the N.T. and the Quran fall. In what follows we come to grips with the title concepts of the thesis.

With the introduction and conclusion the thesis runs to about 60,000 words. The Quranic section, being more strictly comparative, is slightly longer. Generally speaking the accent of the work is more lexical than speculative. All conclusions in a work of this nature are bound to be provisional, but the provisional character of such findings does not detract from the worth of the undertaking.

Flugel's edition of the Quran has been used for the Arabic text and his numbering followed. For the Greek text two editions have been used, Kilpatrick (B.F.B.S.) and Souter (Oxford). The N.T. quotations in English are from the R.S.V., except where otherwise indicated.

NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION.

The Arabic script of transliterated words is almost invariably given. For names of authors and their writings the system of transliteration adopted by most English-speaking scholars has been followed. The Hamzah is represented by a straight quotation mark', the 'Ayin by the inverted

comma', the ج by e 'j'. The following names that recur with great frequency are not fully transliterated but appear in the simplest form as: Allah, Quran, Muhammad, Sura, Islam. Transliterations employed by authors quoted in the thesis have been kept intact.

PART ONE

THE NEW TESTAMENT DATA.

CHAPTER I

THE ESCHATOLOGICAL SETTING IN THE GOSPELS AND ACTS

Immortality is not one of the more conspicuous notions affirmed in the first five books of the N.T. There is no explicit reference here to the idea of immortality apart from its association with and emergence out of the more obviously Biblical concepts of resurrection and eternal life. The related notion of incorruptibility is applied not to the soul, so much as to the treasure that men are exhorted to store up in Heaven (Matt.6: 19-20). Presumably, man must be capable of acquiring some comparable property to enjoy such imperishable treasures. However, the verb used in this Matthean context is ἀφανίζει , and its connexion with corruptibility tion may be accounted for by the accident of translation.[1] True, the Holy One is not subject to corruption in death (Acts 2: 27, 31), but this refers to his body, sui generis. In this instance the process of transformation counteracted natural dissolution. None of these texts sheds much light on the prospect of human immortality; the evidence for this truth must be sought elsewhere in the N.T.

Pre-existence may in fact be hinted at in John 9: 1-2, but the reference there is too oblique to be of value as testimony.[2] In any case the disciples' question is brushed aside as irrelevant; so it would seem that the N.T. has no interest in the possibility of an ante-natal life. Present realities and future vistas are the concerns that engage the attention of Evangelists and Apostles; the past has its import

to the extent that it indicates the trend of Salvation-history. In John 10: 28 Jesus promises his followers that they shall never perish, but this assurance is given only in virtue of a prior gift, 'eternal life'. We may, therefore tentatively assume that immortality, per se, is not an intrinsic quality possessed by man. Commenting on Mark 12: 26, F.C. Grant avers, 'This is probably the strongest argument for immortality, not the nature of man, but the character of God'.(3) It is noteworthy that Jesus adduces the arguments set forth in this section (Mark 12: 18-27) as proof for the resurrection, rather than of immortality.

Of concepts that recur in the N.T. Pentateuch the two which have a most obvious bearing upon the afterlife are 'The Kingdom of God' and 'Eternal Life'. Whilst the Synoptists seize upon the former phrase as most suited for their purpose, John dwells on the latter, because it harmonizes superbly with the opening theme of his Gospel. 'In him was life'. John himself does not ignore the message of the Kingdom (3: 3 ; 18: 36), nor do the Synoptists overlook the fact that membership in the Kingdom involves a transcendent order of life. The kingdom metaphor colours the Synoptists' conception of life; so whereas they speak of entering into or inheriting life (Matt. 7: 14; 18: 8; 25: 46; Mark 10: 17; Luke 10: 25), John prefers to look upon eternal life as a divine gift (John 3: 16; 5: 40; 6: 27; 10: 28; 17: 2). The two concepts are thus complementary; in Mark 9: 43-47 they appear as virtually interchangeable.

The Kingdom is both within us (Luke 17: 21), and is yet to come (Mark 14: 25; Matt. 19: 23-28). Similarly, eternal life is at once a present possession (John 3: 15; 3: 36), but remains

a future hope (John 4: 36). The present and forward looking aspects of these two concepts need to be considered in greater detail. To belittle the importance of either aspect would be to rob the Gospel massage of its fulness, quite apart from the precarious exegesis that goes with such attempts. Whether or not the basic notion that inheres in αἰώνιος is perpetuity, the epithet often displays a qualitative force, as it must on the strength of its issue from the Prince of Life. The twofold aspect of life is brought out significantly in Luke 18: 30, 'manifold more in this time, and in the age to come eternal life'.

In his discourse on the Bread of life, our Lord repeatedly stresses the fact that he is the agent of the final triumph over death (John 6: 39, 40, 44, 54); 'I will raise him up at the last day'. 'It is quite arbitrary', says Barrett, 'to regard these as insertions into a discourse with which as futurist eschatology they are inconsistent.'(4) Barth notes that John's Gospel while seemingly inviting us to explain away the Parousia by placing 'both the gift of eternal life and the judgment in the present', counteracts this tendency by being the only N.T. book 'to speak of the last day when Jesus will awaken the dead'. Barth adds that 'it is advisable not to solve the implied difficulty of interpretation by critical amputation'.(5) The predictions found in John 5: 25, 28-29 are further proof that a future event is envisaged. Here the voice of the Son, the resurrection and judgment are linked together in a manner, the delineation of which would anticipate its more appropriate treatment in the epistles.

Jesus, himself is the Resurrection, the door to new life,

in that he raised three representative creatures from the dead (Mark 5: 41; Luke 7: 14; John 11: 43); in that he arose as the first fruits of the Resurrection; and in that he will raise up his own at his second advent. This, at any rate, is the witness of the gospels. Early in his ministry (Matt. 11: 5) our Lord drew attention to his power of raising the dead, as the climax of wondrous manifestations which accompanied his preaching ministry.(6) This particular claim may be proleptic in purport, or else the original tense should be understood as combining present with future.

Doubtless, we cannot build solidly on the past, when contemplating future unexperienced events. But as we read the accounts of the raising of Jairus' daughter, the widow's son and of Lazarus, we are offered a preview of what universal resurrection entails. Three valid inferences can be drawn. First, the dead rise at the voice of the Son of God; secondly, they do so after a period described as sleep; thirdly, the period of 'sleep' varies with the individual. The girl was barely dead, while Lazarus had been dead some days. However, if John 5: 25 is a proper yardstick, the Son will need to call but once for all to rise instantly. In the resurrection of the last day death will not merely be postponed; it will be transcended.

Those who sleep in Christ may still be regarded as alive in him though unresurrected; just as many who seem very much alive by the standards of worldly realism are spoken of as dead in God's sight (Eph. 2: 1). To apply the notion of sleep only to the physical side of man is to go beyond the N.T. evidence. The N.T. says nothing of the body being asleep, nor for that matter does it suggest that the 'soul' is asleep. The body,

qua body, is not asleep, but in a state of disintegration. In this context the disjunction of body or soul does not reflect the current of N.T. thought. Jesus says, 'the child is sleeping'; 'Lazarus has fallen asleep' (Mark 5: 39; John 11: 11). Paul adopts the same mode of expression, when he refers to 'those who are fallen asleep' (1Thess. 4: 15); or 'we shall not all sleep' (1 Cor. 15: 51).

In the gospels the accent is on Jesus coming to receive his own (Mark 13: 27, 36; Matt. 25: 6; John 14: 3). Nothing is said about the soul soaring on its lonely journey through space to join its Creator. Those who would amalgamate the Biblical concept of resurrection with the Greek idea of the survival of the immortal soul would probably argue that 'the souls of the dead will be reunited to their bodies' at the 'great Renewal of the World', a solution as old as Zoroaster.(7) Whilst this view sounds plausible, it finds no echo in the N.T. In any event, the double journey of the soul is far too individualistic a notion to cover the facts, ignoring as it does the whole gamut of Christian teaching apropos the unity of the Church, the body of Christ.

As against the reiterated emphasis on a universal and final resurrection, the evidence for an immediate transition of the soul into the divine presence is both meagre and inconclusive. In the parable of 'Dives and Lazarus', the beggar is transported on dying to Abraham's bosom (Luke 16: 22). The details of any parable (let alone the more colourful) cannot be pressed into dogma. This parable is primarily a warning against complacency, and a clear-cut declaration that human destiny is irrevocably settled at death; it is not a chart for the regions beyond

time. Further, Abraham's bosom can scarcely be identified with 'My Father's house', where the blessed abide evermore. Neither the presence of the Father, nor yet the person of the Son appears in Abraham's preserve.

On the cross Jesus promises the penitent thief, 'Today you will be with me in Paradise' (Luke 23: 43). Even if we do not resort to the facile textual expedient of explaining away σήμερον, we could still insist that, Jesus not having risen, the thief could join him only in some spiritual manner, which somehow must be linked with Stephen's petition, 'Lord Jesus, receive my spirit' (Acts 7: 59). Ulrich Simon alludes to a saying that occurs in the 'Thanksgiving Psalms' (Dead Sea Scrolls), which throws light on the eternal security of the soul: "I thank Thee, O Lord Thou hast put my soul (nephesh) in the bundle of life" (cf 1 Sam. 25: 29); the nephesh is 'stored away in heavenly treasuries'.(8) If the Biblical view is at all authoritative, the state or status of the nephesh after death must not be conceived of in a way that would render resurrection superfluous. When re-assuring the dying thief, Jesus adopted a form of thought and words 'most level to his understanding', to use Salmond's phrase.(9)

Note on Apocalypse in the Gospels. We are not, in this thesis, primarily concerned with apocalypse, but rather with events that are assumed to follow hard on the heels of apocalyptic manifestations and upheavals. Bultmann right by observes that the message of Jesus is relatively 'free from all the learned and fanciful speculations of the apocalyptic writers ... and only a very few details of the apocalyptic picture recur in his words'. (10) However, a brief

note on the so-called 'Little Apocalypse' (Mark 13) may not be out of place. Jesus, who was nurtured on O.T. Scripture, could also on occasion make use of apocalyptic imagery current in his day. The significant thing about his teaching is not so much that it is unique, but that it is true.

Admittedly it is difficult to disentangle the strictly eschatological elements in this discourse (Mark 13) from predictions that found fulfilment during the Jewish War (A.D. 66-70). But while many of these prophecies may have been fulfilled at that juncture, their relevance has yet to be exhausted. Eschatology may or may not be realized; it must be relevant to Church history and to Christian witness through the ages. In this chapter, Cranfield would have us 'reckon .. with the possibility of intentional paradox .., the tension between ... the absolutely clear warning against trying to know the date of the End in v.32 and, all that is said about signs of the End in vv.5-23'.(11)

As regards the incongruity of the discourse with its immediate contexts, this feature has been needlessly exaggerated. Incongruity does not, in itself, constitute proof that a writing is unauthentic. Any pastiche of reminiscences produces an effect of stylistic disarray. More to the point is the fact that the 'Little Apocalypse' reflects in miniature 'many of the great ideas which inspired the apostolic church: gospel, spirit, witness, endurance; and according to this document it was Jesus who gave these ideas to the Church'.(12) The apparent incongruity arises from the juxtaposition of paradoxical truths in a passage which combines two related prophetic complexes, widely separated in time, but aligned in the Prophet's vision.

But is Mark 13 properly to be designated an apocalypse? Vincent Taylor finds the identification difficult to square with the data of the discourse;[13] Beasley-Murray is equally dubious about the designation.[14] Torrey, with his usual incisiveness, asserts, 'In the thirteenth chapter of Mark, there is no indication of any special revelation, no mystery in the language ..., none of the characteristic apparatus of the vision ... there is nothing in any part of it that can justify the use of the terms "apocalyptic".'[15] That there are apocalyptic touches in the overall eschatological picture painted in the gospels cannot be denied (Matt. 13: 40-42; 24: 31; 26: 64 with parallels, and John 1: 51). Nevertheless, Torrey's verdict lends added support to Bultmann's claim that in general Jesus avoids apocalypse.

Eschatology in Acts. Cadbury, in a special study, has noted the paucity of eschatological material in Acts. The narrative interest evinced by the writer partly accounts for this: 'What eschatology there is, is tersely given - much of it merely in rubrics'.[16] From this comparatively meagre supply we select three passages that most directly bear on our theme, and corroborate or supplement the evidence already set out.

The death of Dorcas presented Peter with a challenge akin to that faced by Jesus when responding to Jairus' entreaties (Acts 9: 36-38 cf. Mark 5: 23). The good lady had just expired when the news was passed on to Peter. Arriving on the scene, he went into action, and used a formula which in Aramaic would have sounded very like Christ's 'Talitha Cumi'. The words as well as the gesture may as F.F. Bruce suggests, be an imitatio

Christi.[17] Dorcas, along with the three whose raising is recorded in the gospels, might be taken as representative of those who will rise in Christ; two males and two females, of varying ages from the child to the matron.

In Acts 14: 22 Paul and Barnabas exhort their Anatolian converts to stand firm in the faith, for 'through many tribulations we must enter the kingdom of God'. The Kingdom here is most naturally understood as the ending of a path of trial which the Christian travels while in this world (cf. John 16: 33). 'Nothing obviously distinguished the term Kingdom of God in Acts', writes Cadbury, 'from such apocalyptic use as it has in the synoptic Gospels'.[18] In such a context, there is no question of the divine Kingship having entered the human sphere; rather men are to enter another sphere that lies beyond their earthly woes'.[19]

The resurrection from the dead is a subject mentioned in a number of passages in Acts (4: 2; 24: 21; 26: 8, 23 etc.) None of the foregoing verses add appreciably to our knowledge of the subject. There occurs, however, one of those rare N.T. references to the resurrection of the unjust in Acts 24: 15. Godet's comment on this text deserves quoting. 'Luke knew St. Paul sufficiently to avoid attributing to him on this point a declaration which would have been contrary to his view'.[20] At any rate, we are entitled to argue that Luke held the view that this conviction was wholly congruous with the Apostle's credo. Moreover, it accords with the tenets of Jewish Orthodoxy, which Paul as an erstwhile Pharisee saw no cause to discard (Acts 23: 6). In his preaching to the uncommitted Paul would tend to stress this corollary, even though it is not expressly taught in his

epistles.

We may sum up by affirming that such eschatological happenings as are foretold in the gospels will be visible to all; that the resurrection there envisaged is corporeal, yet corporeality has a totally new meaning, and transcends the material bounds to which our bodies are at present subject. Mark 13: 27 presents a picture of comprehensive ingathering that requires some unmistakable form of resurrection for its fulfilment. Finally, this rising again from the dead will embrace both the just and the unjust: 'All will hear his voice, and come forth' (John 5: 28-29). The factors and images that go into the making of bodily resurrection may seem incredible; they are in effect no more incredible nor less plausible than a philosophic belief in the continued survival of souls after death. The sceptic is not likely to accept either alternative; and the matter awaits eschatological verification; 'the truth will be revealed at the end of the journey'.(21)

NOTES.

(1) The N.E.B. renders 'grow rusty'; the R.S.V. has 'consumes'.
(2) For a brief note on Jewish speculations in the field of pre-existence see The Fourth Gospel, Hoskyns/Davey, Vol. II pp. 405-6.
(3) I.B. Vol. VII p.845.
(4) C.K. Barrett, John, p.244.
(5) K. Barth, Church Dogmatics, (IV, 3 pp.290-296). Quoted in Selections by Helmut Zollwitzer, p.241.
(6) There is striking attestion for this major miracle in the Quran, Suras III 44 and V 110.
(7) See J. Baillie, And the Life Everlasting, p.101.
(8) U. Simon, Heaven, p.204 (also n.2).
(9) S.D.F. Salmond, Christian Doctrine of Immortality, p.281.
(10) R. Bultmann, Theology of the N.T. Vol.I, p.5.
(11) C.E.B. Cranfield, Mark, pp.388 - 9.
(12) P. Carrington, According to Mark, p.277.
(13) V. Taylor, 'Unsolved New Testament Problems', E.T. LX No.4 (Jan.1949), p.95; where he asks, 'can we call such a torso an apocalypse?

(14) G.R. Beasley-Murray, A Commentary on Mark Thirteen, p.17.
(15) C.C. Torrey, Documents of the Primitive Church, pp.14-15.
(16) H.J. Cadbury,'Acts and Eschatology' in B.N.T.E., p.310.
(17) F.F. Bruce, Acts (Greek Text), p.213.
(18) Op cit., p.311.
(19) Cf. also Bruce op cit., p.286, 'The Kingdom of God is to be understood here in the sense of a consummation yet future, not as something already realised!
(20) Quoted by S.D.F. Salmond, Op cit., p.446.
(21) See J. Macquarrie, 'Second Thoughts', E.T. LXXV. No.2 (Nov.1963) p.46.

CHAPTER II

THE PAULINE PERSPECTIVE OF THE END.

One of the links that connect the teaching of Paul with the words of Jesus is the historic phrase βασιλεία τοῦ Θεοῦ . The Apostle says less about the Kingdom than the Evangelists saw fit to record. We assume that the stress laid on this point in the gospels faithfully reflects the teaching of Jesus. If so we may take it that, with the onset of apostolic preaching the Kingdom idea recedes into the background. Yet it never fades away, for the Kingdom will be restored (Acts 1: 6). Meanwhile, other facets of truth need to be proclaimed. The standpoint has shifted; and the Jewish nationalist outlook gradually changes to the more universal vision of the Church. Where the Kingdom is mentioned in Paul's epistles, the connotation is mainly negative: what the Kingdom is not; and for whom it is not. It is worth noting that both present and future aspects are brought out; the present in texts like Rom. 14: 17; I Cor.4: 20 - the future in others like I Cor 6: 9; 15: 50; Gal.5: 21; Eph. 5: 5; II Thess. 1: 5. If anything the future motif is dominant.(1)

The Parousia, Near or Never. The Thessalonian epistles together with 1 Corinthians are sometimes classified as primitive, reflecting an inchoate stage of development. But development is hardly an accurate tag, as the period of thought progession involved does not exceed a dozen years. (I Thessalonians - Philippians); all of which were years of spiritual maturity for Paul. Further, the movement is not always in one direction; in the Pastorals we observe a reversion to the

original hope which 'still hovered; the writer is able to speak of it in the language familiar to the previous generation'. (2) Moreover, Galatians which belongs to the same time as I Thessalonians, contains no hint of the imminence of the End. Why did Paul, for whom this theme had so little interest when he wrote Galatians, suddenly display such interest as is evident in the Thessalonian letters? It is not so much agonizing re-appraisal as urgent need and pressing problems which determine the slant of his epistles.

Goguel explains that the extent and intensity of Paul's efforts precluded any attempts on his part at correlating the seemingly divergent insights that one finds in his writings; 'L'intense activité missionaire de l'apôtre ne lui a laissé ni le temps nila tranquillité d'esprit necéssaires pour donner à sa pensée une forme equilibrée'.(3) Accordingly we may give heed to F.F. Bruce's caveat, 'we must beware of assuming anything in the nature of "linear progression", when trying to trace the advancing thought of such a man as Paul'. (4)

Did Paul alter his views on the nearness of the Parousia and <u>ipso facto</u>, on future resurrection? The evidence for the claim that he did has not been adequately sifted, and rests largely on the 'we who are alive' of I Thess. 4: 17a. However, the Apostle has an occasional habit of ranging himself alongside those whom he addresses or talks about (Rom. 15: 1; I Cor. 8: 1; 10: 22; 11: 32; of I Tim. 1: 8). From I Cor. 6: 14 a contrary inference could be drawn, namely that Paul expected to die and be raised, 'God ... will also raise us up ..'. While on the basis of I Thess. 5: 10, 'Whether we wake or sleep', we may argue that he at no time felt sure of surviving until the Advent. The

awkward fact remains that we cannot be certain of the validity of either argument, because Paul was himself uncertain of the outcome.

Throughout his ministry Paul did envisage the prospect of dying (I Cor. 15: 31). The catalogue of perils recorded in II Cor. 11: 23-27 was, for the most part, experienced long before he wrote this epistle. His initial marching orders (Acts 9: 15-16) included a promise of immense suffering. 'Is it not absurd to say that a man, whose life was constantly in peril had never thought of death until this time' (i.e. II Corinthians).(5) Paul never acted as if he had a charmed life (I Cor. 4: 9; 9: 15). He longed for the Parousia, but was ever ready for death.

The Thessalonian correspondence was addressed to a church living in an atmosphere of eschatological exhiliration. While in Thessalonica Paul had been unable to complete his instruction on the last things. From the urgent tone of his appeals, his converts concluded that the Parousia was soon to take place. It is clear from Phil. 4: 5, 'The Lord is at hand', that he never lost this sense of urgency. For Paul the Parousia must always be imminent (I Thess. 4: 17); nevertheless, it will flash unexpectedly upon an unsuspecting world (I Thess. 5: 1; II Thess. 2: 1,2). A date that the Son of Man did not know could scarcely be disclosed even to an inspired Apostle. Nor, conversely, had he any warrant for presuming that the Parousia would not take place during his own lifetime. 'His παρουσία, declares Van Oosterzee, 'will not come so quickly as impatience, nor yet so late as indifference supposes'.(6) Whenever the conviction of

imminence becomes blurred, the advent hope and other eternal verities vanish in speculation. But an inert expectancy is just as harmful. 'Both the expectation of a parousia the day after tommorow', writes Moule, 'and its postponement sine die seem to have led to unfruitful conclusions'. He goes on to state that neither attitude is characteristic of N.T. thought.(7)

Christ's part in our Resurrection. Christ's raising from the dead and our own are indissolubly bound, and that in a way that defies logical analysis. Robertson and Plummer regard the connexion between the two resurrections as causal rather than merely logical.(8) But it is doubtful if a passage can be found in the N.T. which expressly states that the former event is the efficient or material cause of the latter. Rather the link between the 'antecedent' and the 'consequent is analogical; and the raising of the Son becomes the antetype and guarantee of our future resurrection, with God declared to be the agent of both acts (I Cor. 6: 14; II Cor. 4: 14). As on the Resurrection of the first day (τῇ μιᾷ τῶν σαββάτων) God brought Christ's body to life, so likewise on the Resurrection of the last day God will make alive Christ's mystic Body, the Church, by another dramatic intervention.

This final act of life-giving is a concomitant of the Second Coming. At least that is the impression we are left with as we read Paul's letters. Both events are repeatedly set forth; and even when the two are not plainly collocated, it is implied that they are virtually simultaneous. 'The New Testament knows of only one coming again of Jesus Christ', says Karl Barth, 'when the matter is usually spoken of ... under the

terms of parousia or epiphany, the reference is usually or chiefly to the third and final form ....'. He adds, however, that this does not exclude the possibility that Christ's coming may also take 'place in different forms at times appointed by Himself'. (9) Parousia without resurrection would leave a major objective unaccomplished; while nothing less than a second epiphany can bring about a universal raising from the dead. These events will be attended by extraordinary audio-visual manifestations of divine majesty, and such phenomena could conceivably be independent of the normal mesh of physical causes and effects. J.W. Dunne thus sums up the matter, 'in every happening ... we find <u>after</u> we have abstracted every imaginable physical component, certain categorically non-physical <u>residua</u> ... these remnants are the most obstrusive things in the universe ... they produce the effect of a vast external world of flaming lights ... tumultuous sounds ... a tempest which remains to be considered <u>after</u> physics has completed its say'.(10)

The form of the resurrection body is a subject sufficiently complex to require a detailed analysis later. Rom. 6: 5 suggests that there will be a family likeness between the Firstborn and hims many brethren in the mode of rising. 'We shall also be one with him in a resurrection like his' (N.E.B.) As he came to dwell among us in the likeness of sinful flesh, so shall we go to live with him in the likeness of his risen body (Rom.8: 3, 29). Occasionally Paul addresses believers as if the resurrection is an accomplished fact (Col. 3: 1; Eph. 2: 6).(11) This rising with Christ is ideally the quickening of his own in union with their Head, a process accelerated at death and consummated on the day of Jesus Christ (Phil.1: 6, 10). Following

on this the Church will be presented before him resplendent in glory (Eph. 5: 27).

Note on II Cor. 5: 1-8 and Phil. 1: 23. Was there a turning-point in Paul's thinking, whereat he modified or abandoned belief in a universal eschatological resurrection? In rejecting this essentially Hebraic notion he is said to have embraced a hope in some form of survival after death, perhaps through the assumption of a heavenly body (II Cor. 5: 1-2).(12) Paul will not for one moment countenance the possibility, mooted by Greek philosophy, of a disembodied existence (II Cor. 5: 3). Such an eventuality is undesirable and is precluded by the sure knowledge that God has a new 'frame' made ready to replace the earthly body. The issue to be settled is whether this heavenly house is one that is acquired directly after death.(13)

But does this passage in II Corinthians unmistakably point to the moment of death? On this question Archbishop Ramsey comes to the negative conclusion: 'Paul refers not to the fate of those who died, but to the fate of those who will be alive at the Parousia'.(14) Be that as it may, the suggestion, that we have each a resurrection body ready-made to put on as soon as we die, seems highly improbable. J.A.T. Robinson argues cogently if not decisively that οἰκοδομή (II Cor. 5: 1) denotes the Body of Christ.(15) In favour of this view is the fact that, where the noun does not signify a concrete edifice (cf. Matt. 24: 1; Mark 13: 1, 2), it stands for Christ's Body (1 Cor. 3: 9; Eph. 2: 21). There are of course many instances of the abstract use of οἰκοδομή to mean 'upbuilding'. Yet even here the corporate sense is prominent, with the thought of the Church's

welfare uppermost (Rom. 14: 19; I Cor. 14: 12, 26; II Cor. 10: 8; 12: 19; 13: 10; Eph. 4: 12, 16).

Again Dahl, who starts with a different presupposition from that of Ramsey, insists that he cannot 'accept the view that St. Paul had abandoned the basically eschatological concept of the resurrection found in I Cor. 15 by the time he wrote II Cor. 5'.(16) There was in reality no exchange of a 'horizontal' eschatology for a 'vertical' one. Rather what we have here is a profound but by no means pellucid reflexion on our union with Christ as it affects the destiny of each member of his Body.

Closely linked with the foregoing is the text in Phil.1: 23, where Paul implies that when he departs this life he will gain an entrance into a deeper fellowship with Christ. We need not deny that this could well be so, if the matter were viewed from the divine vantage point. In his current Lent book Bishop Neill exposes 'the weakness of almost all attempts to picture the state of the departed', because 'they assume our categories of time, and this simply will not do'.(17) Paul is fully entitled to give expression to his longing for a still closer union with his Lord. But the realization of this desire must await God's own time. In a similarly fervent strain Paul, the Hebrew, wishes himself 'cut off from Christ' for the Salvation of his race (Rom. 9: 3). Yet could such a petition be granted in the manner it is worded?

Hering, who inclines to the opinion that Phil. 1: 19-26 imports an encounter with Christ directly after death, nevertheless admits that this survival cannot be visualised in a Platonic or Cartesian sense: 'Ce qui survit, ce n'est pas la partie

invisible de l'homme, mais une sorte d'être psycho-physique sui generis, dépourvue de la plénitude de l'existence semblable à une image de l'homme réel'.(18) This does not take us very far; it recalls the O.T. image of shades in Sheol. We should, however, in honesty concede 'that the one mode of representation must be qualified by the other';(19) though the key to qualification is not to hand. The latter representation cannot in any case nullify the former based squarely as the resurrection is on the teaching of Jesus. Moreover, in the very epistle where the alleged turning-point in Paul's attitude appears, he affirms his trust in 'God who raises the dead' (II Cor.1: 9). Further, in Phil. 3: 11 Paul continues to speak as if the resurrection from the dead is the supreme goal to be attained. The advent hope is aglow in his heart, and is inextricably linked with the process of bodily transformation which can scarcely be other than resurrection (Phil.3: 20-21 with 4: 5).

Eschatology in the Pastorals. We cannot in this chapter handle the thorny problem of the authorship of the Pastoral epistles. The debate still continues as the two most recent commentaries by Barrett and Kelly attest. For convenience we are treating the Pastorals as part of the Pauline family; the treatment accorded to them here is too summary to merit a special chapter. The eschatology of the Pastorals exhibits some distinctly Pauline traits. In general the passages selected for comment are those accepted as genuinely Pauline even by opponents of Pauline authorship.

We note first of all a preference for the term ἐπιφάνεια in allusions to Christ's coming (I Tim. 6: 14; II Tim. 1: 10;

4: 1; 4: 8; Tit. 2: 13). 'The choice of the word here', claims Kelly, 'is in harmony with Paul's practice in the Pastorals of borrowing his vocabulary from that of Hellenistic religion'.(20) Other scholars tend to draw a contrary deduction from the frequency of the term in these epistles. Whatever may have prompted the use of the term, it marks out the same event as παρουσία, though the precise nuances of the two words vary. Milligan has a helpful note on the different shades of meaning that these two nouns and a third ἀποκάλυψις have. From which we gather that ἐπιφάνεια signifies 'sudden appearance or manifestation' frequently with reference to supernatural intervention.(21) This closely agrees with Jesus' own description of his return (e.g. in Luke 17: 24). In II Tim.1: 10 the same word points back to the incarnation, and thus signifies 'the making visible of concealed divinity'.(22)

In his final appeal the writer recapitulates the triad of Kingdom, Coming and Crisis (II Tim. 4: 1-8). This charge and the testimony enshrined therein are basically Pauline as Harrison allows.(23) Apart from the more patently apocalyptic features, the Archangel's call, the trumpet, this passage in II Timothy is reminiscent of the Thessalonian picture of the End, proving that the distinctive eschatological note in apostolic thought is too pervasive to be disposed of easily. An interim and indeterminate period of apostasy is envisaged (II Tim.4: 3-4 cf. II Thess.2: 2-3, 10-11); while from II Tim. 4: 8 it is clear that the full reward is not bestowed until the day of Christ's appearing. The reference to the Kingdom in II Tim. 4: 18 is expressly futurist, 'The Lord will ... save me for his heavenly kingdom'.(24) A final point: whoever wrote Tit. 2: 13 was imbued with a hope as

bright and intense as that which inspired Paul from the outset of his writing career.

The two occurrences of ἀθανασία in the Pastorals (I Tim. 6: 16; II Tim. 1: 10) constitute half the lexical stock for this expression in the N.T. It thus seems expedient to hold over the available data for a more extended discussion of the N.T. concept of immortality.

NOTES.

(1) In at least two instances the Kingdom is spoken of as belonging to the Son (Col. 1: 13; II Tim. 4: 1).
(2) E.F. Scott, The Pastoral Epistles, p. 169.
(3) M. Goguel, 'Le caractere du salut dans la theologie paulinienne', in B.N.T.E. p.336.
(4) Peake's Commentary, p.928.
(5) J. Denney, II Corinthians, p.180.
(6) J.J. Van Oosterzee, St. Luke, Vol.I, p.430-1
(7) C.F.D. Moule, The Birth of the N.T., p.102.
(8) A. Robertson and A. Plummer, I Corinthians, p.347.
(9) Church Dogmatics, Selections by H. Gollwitzer, pp. 239-240.
(10) J.W. Dunne, An Experiment with Time, p.18 (his italics).
(11) J.A.T. Robinson, The Body, (esp. p.10) treats Ephesians as Pauline, and quotes more frequently from this Epistle than from any other except I Corinthians. The relevant data in Ephesians is less vital for our argument than it is for his, yet we see no reason for disagreeing with him on the point of authorship. Hence we take this Epistle to be by Paul.
(12) The case for 'modification' has been recently summarised by R.F. Hettlinger in S.J.T. Vol.10 No.2. 1957 pp.174-194, where he gives the names of the leading proponents and opponents of the view he favours.
(13) J.A.T. Robinson, op. cit., p.78 N.1 draws attention to the fact that the 'habitation' spoken of in II Cor. 5: 2 is said to be from heaven, not in heaven. The distinction is of some importance.
(14) A.M. Ramsey, The Resurrection of Christ, p.109. He does not expand the statement, which is presumably based on

Oepke's articles in T.W.N.T. on γυμνός, ἐκδύω, ἐνδύω This transpires from a reading of Hettlinger's articles cited above.

(15) Op. cit., pp. 65, 76 ff.
(16) N.E. Dahl, The Resurrection of the Body, p.78. n.2.
(17) S. Neill, The Eternal Dimension, p.105.
(18) J. Héring, 'Eschatologie biblique et Idéalisme platonicien', in B.N.T.E. p.460, n.1
(19) J.B. Lightfoot, Phillippians, p.93.
(20) J.N.D. Kelly, The Pastoral Epistles, p.145.
(21) G. Milligan, Thessalonians, p.148, (Note F.).
(22) Barth/Gollwitzer, op. cit., p.239.
(23) P.N. Harrison, The Problem of the Pastoral Epistles, Appendix IV. 'Text of the Pastorals'.
(24) The clause belongs to the indubitably-Pauline half of the verse per C.K. Barrett, The Pastoral Epistles, pp.10, 118 ff. (based on Harrison).

CHAPTER III

THE FINAL DESTINY OF MAN IN HEBREWS AND THE GENERAL EPISTLES.

With the exception of I Peter, (1) the epistles here in view are comparatively silent on the whole subject of resurrection, either as the focal event or the final drama of history. Other themes equally momentous engage the attention of the writer, of which themes some at least have a bearing on various aspects of eschatology.

The writer of Hebrews unquestionably makes use of terms that were current in Greek philosophy. Nevertheless, in this Hellenistic masterpiece the passages that have an eschatological reference are strikingly Hebraic in tone (Heb.4: 9; 6: 8; 10: 27, 31; 12: 22-29). Barrett maintains that 'certain features of Hebrews which have often been held to have been derived from Alexandrian Platonism were in fact derived from apocalyptic symbolism'. (2)

What place has eschatology in the teaching of this Epistle? Barrett regards it as central in the thought of Hebrews. (3) Salmond, on the other hand, contends that Hebrews 'is not a distinctively eschatological Epistle'. (4) The reason for this variance of opinion may lie in the fact that some of the typical expressions used therein - κατάπαυσις, σαββατισμός, τελείωσις - have both a present and a future application. Rest and perfection may be claimed as the Christian's portion here and now, but they remain future attainments, fully to be granted and enjoyed beyond the veil (6: 19). Perhaps W. Manson's phrase 'The Eschatological Now' (5) best conveys the general drift of

the Epistle's message.

The 'Sabbath', as Spicq remarks, possesses an eschatological signification, 'la mystique du repos'. He notes further that the Rabbis ascribed a similar significance to the Exodus, and assumes that the writer of Hebrews adopted the same line of interpretation. (6) The chiliastic extension of the concept, which Jewish and Christian teachers found so intriguing, is discussed at length by Barrett. (7) Suffice it to say that for our purpose rest might be regarded as the counterpart of 'eternal life', (a phrase absent from the text of this Epistle). Those who believe enter into initial rest (κατάπαυσις - 4: 3), but a total rest of unimpaired satisfaction is to follow (σαββατισμός - 4: 9).

With life visualised as a pilgrimage, perfection becomes a goal at the end. No wonder the idea of resurrection is soft-pedalled; it does not readily accord with the major theme. The Resurrection of the dead is a doctrine touched on incidentally in Heb. 6: 2. This article, along with eternal judgment, is considered one of the fundamentals from which the mature believer rises to loftier insights. It is clear, however from other passages in the Epistle that the writer had no reservations on the reality or finality of judgment, a truth solemnly underlined in Heb. 9: 27; 10: 27; 12: 26-9. As Westcott has it, 'The necessary condition of progress is a "giving up"' of what is elementary. A mature believer cannot afford to be taken up with isolated doctrines such as resurrection. 'At the same time all that is surrendered is incorporated in that which is afterward gained.' (8) God is able to raise the dead Heb. 11: 19), which miracle he performed in the past. But a better

resurrection is in store (Heb.11: 35).

For further light on the eternal prospect we turn to another concept, 'The Heavenly City'. Plato speaks of one who seeing the pattern of it founds a city in himself, καὶ ὁρῶντι ἑαυτὸν κατοικίζειν: 'But whether it exists anywhere or will ever exist is no matter'. (9) In contrast the city sought by patriarchs, prophets and patriots is not an abstract amorphous notion, but a commonwealth secure and lasting (Heb. 11: 10, 16). Whilst this metaphor is aptly eschatological, it too can be adapted for describing a present experience (Heb. 12: 22). 'In one sense the heavenly Jerusalem is already reached: in another it is still sought for' (Heb. 13: 14). (10)

'Jesus is coming again': This is the unanimous conviction of each of our writers. The term παρουσία actually occurs in Jas. 5: 7; II Pet. 1: 16; 3: 4, 12; I John 2: 28. When speaking of the same event I Peter favours another expression, ἀποκάλυψις (I Pet. 1: 7, 13; 4: 13 cf. the verbal form in 5: 1). Selwyn traces the dominical source for the term in the verb Jesus used in Luke 17: 30 and elsewhere in the Synoptic gospels. (11) The writer of Hebrews simply and unambiguously states that Christ 'will appear a second time' (Heb. 9: 28). Jude, on the other hand, depicts the Coming dramatically with the aid of apocalyptic imagery drawn from the Book of Enoch (Jude 14-15; Enoch 1: 9).

That the Advent will be a signal for judgment or deliverance may be inferred from the context of some of the foregoing passages and a few others. The 'co-incidence' is especially noticeable in Heb.9: 27-28; 10: 37-38; Jas. 5: 9; I John 2:

28; Jude 14-15. In Hebrews God, Himself, is declared to be the Judge (Heb. 12: 23; 13: 4); whereas in James and Jude the Lord Christ is given this title, and he executes judgment (Jas. 5: 9, Jude 14). On the use of 'Judge of all' in Heb. 12: 23 Spicq comments: κριτής serait donc le correspondant de μισθαποδότης, et ouvrirait une perspective eschatologique'. (12) The comment applies to other N.T. passages which speak of future judgment.

The continued delay of the Parousia left many Christians in a quandary, and at the mercy of scoffers. This particular problem is raised in II Pet. 3, 4 ff. and tackled with stalwart confidence. Cranfield declares that 'the author writes not as someone wrestling with his ... perplexity ..., but as someone who recognises a bogus problem for what it is'. (13) The 'ad hominen reply', to quote Moule's phrase is graciously introduced, 'beloved .. with the Lord one day is as a thousand years, and a thousand years as one day'. (14) For a Christian this reasoning should be conclusive, God's delay is Man's opportunity. As ever with N.T. writers in their insistence of the certainty of the End, the interest is not purely dogmatic but ethical also. 'The moral earnestness is reinforced by eschatological considerations', (15) or by converting the proposition it could be said that the eschatological issues are given relevance by ethical considerations.

Peter is imbued with a simple trust in ultimate vindication and glory through trial, δόξα is a choice expression with him (I Pet. 1: 7, 11, 21; 4: 13, 14; 5: 4, 10). Selwyn fitly remarks that 'there is no book in the N.T. where the eschatology is more closely integrated with the teaching of the doctrine ...

as a whole'. (16) Almost casually Peter springs two 'dark sayings' on his readers, to baffle the minds of a thousand exegetes (I Pet. 3: 18-22; 4: 5-6). If with Salmond we narrow down the scope of the latter saying to the departed saints, who in their lifetime heard the gospel;(17) and with Selwyn apply the former to 'spirit-powers of the antedeluvian dispensation',(18) we have plausible solutions to the problems posed. At all events the aorists employed in both passages make it certain that the contexts refer to past activities. Besides, we have no grounds for assuming that Christ's incursion into the realm of spirits will ever be repeated.

Both in II Peter and in Jude the writers argue from archetypal patterns of judgment to a forthcoming judgment of the ungodly (II Pet. 2: 4, 9; Jude 6, 14). In addition II Peter furnishes us with a graphic picture of cosmic devastation, which in an age of nuclear explosions sounds remarkably up-to-date (II Pet. 3: 7-13). 'Christ's final victory', says Stauffer, 'will have to be realized in cosmic upheavals'. (19) Cranfield reminds us that the idea of a final conflagration is Stoic in origin, but he finds a hint of the same idea in Zeph. 3: 8. (20) Zephaniah after all antedates Zeno, though doubtless the terminology of II Peter at this point is an echo of the στοιχεῖον ἀναλύεται which appears in Diogenes Laertius (7: 137 of στοιχεῖα ... λυθήσεται II Pet. 3: 10). (21)

Neither the term ἀθανασία nor its synonym ἀφθαρσία appears in this literature. (22) To discover the writers' views on immortality we are thrown back on correlate expressions. Once more John points the way with his luminous phrase 'eternal life' (I John 1: 2; 2: 25; 3: 15; 5: 11). The corresponding clause

μένει εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα (I John 2: 17) lends support to the evidence that the quality of continuance and imperishableness is somehow bound up with the concept of 'eternal life'. In Jude 21 it is implied that eternal life is a hope that the future holds for those who stand firm and wait. Eschatology becomes teleology in II Pet. 1: 4: God's purpose is that we become of His nature. 'The word nature,' explains Calvin, 'is not here essence but quality.' (23) Even on such terms Man's destiny is glorious (cf. I Pet. 5: 1).

The promise assured to those who love God is the 'Crown of Life' (Jas. 1: 12) epexegetically the crown which consists of life. In one instance the true destiny of mankind was splendidly fulfilled, for Enoch was translated, while yet alive, to seal an earthly experience of unbroken fellowship with God (Heb.11: 5). Finally as to the precise form of the glorified life, the one writer who comes closest to delineation confesses agnosticism (I John 3; 1-3): Amos N. Wilder comments, 'those verses reflect both the certainty and sobriety of the Christian expectation with regard to the conditions of the life to come'. (24) 'It does not yet appear ... but when he appears we shall be like him': This, in itself, should suffice as our assurance of Immortality.

NOTES.

(1) I Pet. 1: 3, 21; 3: 21.
(2) C.K. Barrett, 'The Eschatology of the Epistle to the Hebrews' in B.N.T.E., p.393.
(3) Op. cit., p.365.
(4) S.D.F. Salmond, Christian Doctrine of Immortality, p.338.
(5) W. Manson, The Epistle to the Hebrews, p. 52.
(6) C. Spicq, L'Epitre aux Hebreux, pp. 99, 103 (and n. 4).
(7) Op. cit., p. 366 ff.
(8) B.F. Westcott, Hebrews, p.144.
(9) The Republic of Plato, Trans. by F.M. Cornford, pp.313-3(592 B).

(10) B.F. Westcott, op.cit., p.415.
(11) E.G. Selwyn, I Peter, Additional Note B, p.251.
(12) C. Spicq, op. cit., p.408.
(13) C.E.B. Cranfield, I & II Peter and Jude, p. 188.
(14) C.F.D. Moule, The Birth of the N.T. p.102. The Quranic treatment of the 'equation' is discussed in Part II 'Quranic Words for Time'.
(15) C.K. Barrett, op. cit., p.363.
(16) E.G. Selwyn, 'Eschatology in I Peter', in B.N.T.E.p.394.
(17) Op. cit., p.382; see also E.G. Selwyn, I Peter, pp.214, 337-9.
(18) E.G. Selwyn, I Peter, pp.198-200, 314 ff.
(19) E. Stauffer, N.T. Theology, p. 74.
(20) Op. cit., p. 189.
(21) See Bauer's Lexicon p. 776.
(22) The use of ἄφθαρτον in I Pet. 1: 4 will be briefly considered in the chapter on Immortality.
(23) Quoted in C.E.B. Cranfield, op. cit., p.176.
(24) I.B. Vol. XII, p. 255.

CHAPTER IV

THE SIGNS AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE APOCALYPSE.

It has been pointed out that, whilst the arrangement of the various N.T. books bears no relation to chronological sequence, there is logical fitness in placing Matthew first and Revelation last in the sacred series.(1) Of all N.T. writings the First Gospel furnishes the most obvious link with the past of covenant history. By contrast Revelation anticipates the future with its triumphs and upheavals. Future events are depicted in a manner that is at once vivid and germane to the needs of the Church militant. The historicist, the futurist and the idealist, each according to his predilection, finds rich food for though in the inspired musings of the Apocalyptist.

Notwithstanding the order in which these two N.T. books stand, and the opposite directions which they face prima facie, one discerns a clear-cut eschatological strain running through Matthew. This is sounded out most dramatically in the last verse of the Gospel. Conversely, Revelation is not devoid of 'archaeological' interest, as is evident in the many O.T. citations or in such expressions as the Alpha, the Beginning. The phrase 'before' the foundation of the world' (Rev.13: 8) in fact carries us back far beyond the covenantal perspective of Matthew. Swete puts the first of these points thus: 'The use of the O.T. in the Apocalypse is by no means limited to its symbolical imagery and numbers; its thought and its very words appear in every part of the book'.(2)

Whether the Seer arranged his mosaic in an artless natural way as some claim, or whether his masterpiece displays con-

summate artistry as others conclude, the fact remains that he owes a formal debt to his predecessors in the apocalyptic field. Traces of Iranian and Babylonian myth have been discovered notably in the twelfth chapter. (3) For his imagery John may well be indebted to patterns of thought and symbolism current in his day. Originality has been described as the ability to disguise what one derives from others; earnest writers do not deliberately strive after this effect. The analysis of Shakespeare's plots leaves his genius unexplained. When we have classified John's images, we have still to account for the sublime solemnity of his message.

The Seer was scarcely conscious of his 'sources' as he composed his book; rather it seems that images and ideas which had long coloured his imagination spontaneously emerged in his visions. These he set down with the conviction that they were a revelation from Jesus. 'Nowhere in the N.T.', says Farrer, 'is an author's consciousness of writing under spiritual constraint more evident or more effectually communicated to his reader'. (4) Moreover, the ability of a musicologist to unravel one or two folk tunes in a symphony is of little value to the musician who is performing the piece, or to the music lover while he enjoys it: So with attempts to unearth 'scraps of apocalyptic tradition' or 'pagan myth' out of Revelation. The process of literary transmutation perceptible in the N.T. is neatly summed up by Casey: 'It is not a creation ex nihilo, but old materials were miraculously transformed. Its authors might with justice have asserted the claim of the Christ of the Apocalypse, 'Behold I make all things new'. (5)

Wherein lies the relevance of the Apocalypse for our time? Is the writer trying to pass on a message that will inspire and illumine every generation of believers right up to the end? 'The best that can be said of it', writes Loisy of the book, 'is that for centuries men have taxed their wits to find in it a meaning which is not there, for the simple reason that the meaning which is there was immediately contradicted by the course of events'.(6) Others more charitably see in the symbols of the Apocalypse pictorial counterparts of earthly realities, descriptive rather than determinative; thus they implicitly disallow the predictive element which the ordinary assumes to be there.(7)

Stauffer's suggestion as to John's primary aim in despatching his circular is worth quoting: 'We may read the Book of Revelation with new understanding when we see it as the apostolic reply to the declaration of war by the divine emperor in Rome ... as a weapon against Domitian's myth'.(8) Acting on the principle that every good myth deserves an answer, John put into words what he took to be a heavenly vision, timely for the Seven Churches, yet ever relevant. We need not deny that John was only partly aware of the import of what he so graphically describes. He, like Paul, saw through a glass darkly albeit more concretely. Even for the most confident interpreter a systematic presentation of the issues involved in proper sequence is an impossible task. All one can do is to draw certain inferences from the general impression that the book leaves on the mind.

To avoid 'the fallacy of misplaced concreteness' we shall not venture to decode the symbols and numerals of the Apocalypse, or to correlate the result with highlights from history. Caird main-

tains that 'the writer' is not concerned to give us a philosophy of history from the Ascension to the Second Coming';[9] not perhaps in the technical sense with which Caird is conversant. Butterfield, however, sees in the Apocalypse 'a further phase of the search for an interpretation of history which would embrace catastrophe itself and transcend the immediate spectable of tragedy. Altogether we have here the greatest ... attempt ever made to wrestle with destiny and interpret history ...'.[10] Whether this constitutes a philosophy of history is for the individual expositor to judge. It plainly offers us a forthright alternative to the philosophy of despair to which thinking men are often driven by a study of history.

Like many another N.T. writer John holds to the imminence of the Parousia (Rev. 1: 3, 7; 3: 11; 22: 7, 12). The announcement of the Second Coming is made in striking and dramatic tones. As the visions unfold humanity seems to approach the brink of universal destruction. Three times the march of death is brought to a halt in what Farrer has called 'cancelled conclusions'.[11] Again and again, like the finale of a Beethoven symphony, the end seems to be round the corner, when suddenly a new tune is intruded, and mankind receives a breathing-space. The sympathetic reader would agree with the comments of a music critic in a different connexion: 'His ingenious craftsmanship is continually fascinating. The theme instead of being brought to a full stop is given a turn in a new direction'.[12] No wonder, deluded millenialists have time and again expected the curtain to go down on history only to be disillusioned.

In passing we may mention certain factors in the 'scientific world view' which impinge upon the prophecies of the Apocalypse

and make their fulfilment somewhat more credible. Part of Rev. 1: 7 reads 'every eye will see him'. Television has been defined as the essentially instantaneous transmission of moving scenes and pictures'. (13) The image of the subject becomes visible almost at once all round the world, assuming that the conditions for adequate reception exist. Surely it is within the power of One who claimed to be Light Divine that his advent image be translated to every place 'without reliance on direct optical methods and in a space of time which to usual human senses is instantaneous'. (14)

The ex-President of the Methodist Conference has noted that modern man accepts as feasible the sudden appearance of a being from another planet, or the landing of an earth-man on Mars. 'The effect is to disappear entirely from the present co-ordinates of space and time, and to appear in some new co-ordinate an immense distance away'. (15) These projects may conceivably be carried out in our century. Why then should a visible parousia be deemed a mythical impossibility?

Many of the predictions set forth in Apocalype envisage a time when the world in a real sense has become one. We talk of the world as having shrunk not literally, but in a more significant manner than the literal. This 'shrinking' and consequent uniformity will facilitate the task of the universal tyrant, wielding immense power by dint of the cult of personality (cf. Rev. 13: 1-8).

A quotation from Karl Heim's recent book sheds further light; 'We have known since Einstein that even the measure of time is only relative; the time-measurement of fifty million years is only that of a certain system of reference. If, for example,

we were to imagine motion at a rate near to the speed of light, .. the fifty million years which separate us from heat-death would shrink to a few years.' (16) With this statement we may compare the premonitions of Rev.6: 12 f. These crude and sweeping changes of scene portend a grim outcome, the reality might turn out to be more bizarre than the image. Global chaos, which has been a leading topic in recent quasi-scientific publications on the nuclear arms race, may be at hand. Betrand Russell for instance, warns that 'our present courses lead inevitably sooner or later to the extinction of the human species. (17) This however, is only half the story, for the seer assures that catastrophe whatever its extent, is the transition to a new age (Rev. 21: 1).

Concerning resurrection the writer has surprisingly little to say. John mentions the first resurrection as the privilege of those who are presume to share in millenial joys (Rev.20: 4-6). Farther down this chapter another scene is unfolded, this time of universal rising when humanity is arraigned before the bar of judgment (Rev. 20: 11-15). Earlier commentators concluded that the whole passage implied two distinct resurrections with a Millenium interposed between them. (18) This unduly literalistic view can hardly be squared with what is said about the resurrection of the dead elsewhere in the N.T.

Without trying to unravel the mystery Ulrich Simon explains: 'The Apocalypse distinguishes between the vindication of the saints, immediately after their martyrdom, whereas the vast mass of the dead stay in death, without taking part in the first resurrection ...'. (19) On this interpretation the preliminary rising is no more that a spiritual vindication

of the martyr host. Swete regards the first resurrection as taking 'effect in the present life in contrast with what belongs to the new order'.(20) His explanation is too facile to be satisfying; it ignores the clear reference to physical death which precedes the first resurrection. All one can do is to connect this first resurrection with the ἐξ ἀναστασις ἐκ νεκρῶν to which Paul hoped to attain, and with the 'better resurrection' (Phil. 3: 11; Heb. 11: 35). The truth can then be fitted into one's own millenial or amillenial scheme.

In one of his visions John saw 'the souls of those who had been slain for the word' crying out for justice (Rev. 6: 9-10). This is almost the only passage in the N.T. where souls are spoken of in the context of the afterlife (cf. Matt.10: 28). However, these very souls are said to live again in Rev.20: 4, which suggests that they were less than fully alive before the first resurrection.

John dwells lovingly and longingly on the vistas of the City of God (Rev. 4: 1, 2; 21: 2, 10, 14; 22: 14, 19); the beauties of which he described in language that is almost poetic in content. There, in His temple, God's servants will serve Him night and day (Rev.7: 15); an idiomatic way of saying 'continually'. 'Work will not cease in heaven only its curse; it could be done to and will be done to Music.'(21)

The symbolic media John utilises bring us closer to heavenly realities than the language of propositions. Bearing in mind the fact of the Incarnation, the fusion of natural imagery with spiritual insight may be the best approach to supernatural truth the human spirit can find. Brunner enlarges

on the inadequacy of abstract formulation in the realm of the divine, 'the certitude of the resurrection ... will eventually be superseded by the ultimacy of vision the future coming (of Christ) is anything but a piece of mythology which can be dispensed with ... If we ask whether ... the apostle ... meant his words to be taken literally, we can answer neither with a simple yes or no ... For that reason it will be better to remain loyal to N.T. symbols ... and we shall not suppose that the measure of abstraction is a measure of approximation to the truth'. (22) Stephen Neill feels that the chief mark of the glorified saints will be 'astonished Joy'. (23) Perhaps the greatest surprise will be the discovery that the Apostles spoke truer than they knew.

NOTES.

(1) See for instance A.M. Hunter's, Introducing the N.T., p. 21.
(2) H.B. Swete, The Apocalypse, Preface p. CXXXIX.
(3) J. Baillie draws attention to Archbishop Söderblom's definitive inquiry into Mazdeism influences, and quotes the latter's verdict: 'Jewish eschatology took over from Zoroastrianism only some insignificant details and certainly not its original inspiration'. This could also apply to Judeo-Christian eschatology. See J. Baillie, And the Life Everlasting, pp.101-2.
(4) A. Farrer, A Rebirth of Images, p.18.
(5) R.P. Casey, 'Gnosis, Gnosticism and the N.T.', B.N.T.E., p.80.
(6) A. Loisy, The Origins of the N.T., p.11
(7) For a discussion on the distinction between descriptive and determinative symbols see G.B. Caird's art. 'On Deciphering the Book of Revelation', E.T. Vol. LXXIV No. 1 (Oct.1962), p.13.
(8) E. Stauffer, Christ and the Caesars, p.176.
(9) G.B. Caird, art. cit., p.14.

(10) H. Butterfield, Christianity and History, p.2.
(11) A. Farrer, op. cit., p.40. The phrase is illustrated in chap. 2 of his book. My debt to this author will be obvious to all who read his refreshing study.
(12) Anthony Hopkins in a B.B.C. broadcast on August 1st. 1963.
(13) See Encyclopaedia Britannica, Vol. XXI, p. 912A.
(14) Chamber's Encyclopaedia, Vol. XIII, p.518.
(15) L. Davison, Preacher's Gold, p.130-7.
(16) K. Heim, The World: Its Creation and Consummation, p.98.
(17) B. Russell, Common Sense and Nuclear Warfare, p.28. He gives a select bibliography of relevant literature.
(18) e.g. Henry Alford, The N.T. for English Readers, Vol.II Part II, p.355.
(19) U. Simon, Heaven, p.207.
(20) H.B. Swete, op. cit., p. 260.
(21) A.C. Welch, Visions of the End, p.246.
(22) E. Brunner, Eternal Hope, pp.136-40.
(23) S. Neill, Christian Holiness, p.130.

CHAPTER V

THE KINGDOM OF GOD : ITS IMAGES, CRISES AND FULNESS

Dalman's surmise that stands for an Arameic original malkuth, properly 'kingship' is suggestive and occasionally helpful for exegesis.(1) But, if uncritically accepted and uniformly applied, this equivalence tends to obscure more dramatic aspects of the Kingdom; aspects, moreover, which figure prominently not merely in the N.T. as a whole, but also in our primary sources for the kingdom-concept, namely Mark and Q.

The Meaning of Malkut. A cursory glance at any O.T. concordance brings out the fact that words and phrases other than malkuth are often employed to convey the thought of divine dominion. For instance מַמְלָכָה (more strictly kingdom) occurs twice in contexts which are clearly religious. The same cluster of connotations attach to three cognate expressions that derive from the root מלך. Brown, Driver and Briggs give the following definitions: מלכות = royal power, reign, kingdom; מַמְלָכוּת = kingdom reign; מַמְלָכָה = kingdom, sovereignty, dominion.(2) Furthermore God's sovereignty is conceived in terms both moral and cosmic. מַלְכוּת and its Aramaic variant more often than not refer to secular realms, where the meaning is almost certainly that of kingdom (Dan. 2: 37, 41; 5: 26; 8: 22 etc.)

In Dodd's The Parables of the Kingdom Dalman is quoted as claiming 'that in the O.T. as in Jewish literature, malkuth as related to God always means 'kingly rule' and never 'kingdom'.(3) As the majority of O.T. references to malkuth are Danielic, Dalman's inference is not as pertinent to the whole range of Biblical thought as Dodd supposes. Also it is by no means evident

that malkuth must mean one thing when applied to world empires and always mean something else when referred to God (cf. Dan. 4: 17, 25, 32; 5: 21; 7: 14, 18, 22). Thus, in a recent article on the subject Prof. Aalen observes that 'there may be a certain amount of material in Chronicles and in the Targums to Chronicles, which, seems to form the starting-point to the meaning 'Kingdom' = territory ruled by God, or better the community of God'. He goes on to deny the assumption that 'the idea ... predominant in Judaism whatever it may be, necessarily implies 'that the idea of the Kingdom of God is conceived in the same way by Jesus ...'. (4)

Cranfield says this regarding two distinct connotations of 'kingdom': these two ways of thinking are ... not mutually exclusive. Nor can we put every reference into one or other class securely'. (5) With this compare Baumgartner's note under מַלְכוּת, for most examples given 'reign' or 'rule' is 'not easy' to define over against kingdom','realm'.' (6) The two conceptions are not incompatible; a kingdom perfected rests on full sovereignty, while kingly rule must needs be exercised in a sphere and over loyal subjects.

In point of fact Dalman's translator is at times obliged to render Herrschaft 'theocracy', where sovereignty makes no sense as a substitute for 'kingdom'; 'theocracy' is suitably vague. 'The Theocracy is an order .... from which it is possible to be excluded, closed against men, a good which admits of being striven for or being bestowed, possessed or being accepted.'(7) Kingly rule may, indeed, be of the essence of yet this does not exhaust the meaning of the word in N.T. usage. In view of the foregoing, the assertion that βασιλεία must

always represent malkuth (and that as Dalman understands the Aramaic term) is conveniently doctrinaire. Dodd's 'theses concur very comfortably with certain current theological interests' is Cadbury's verdict.(8)

Further arguments (which need not detain us) are adduced by Aalen. These are of varying cogency, but the cumulative effect is to show that the Kingdom of God is essentially a community or an area'.(9) We would add an observation: the question addressed by the disciples to their Lord prior to his ascension suggests that they held other views about the Kingdom than those of spiritual sovereignty (Acts 1: 6). Jesus does not disabuse their minds, but simply refuses to disclose the date of restoration (cf. the plea of the dying thief and the answer given, Luke 23: 42, 43).

PROXIMITY AND ITS TENSES. 'There is no saying of unequivocal form, "The Kingdom of God will come"', writes Dodd, 'to balance the statement, "The Kingdom of God has come".' Thereupon he proceeds to relegate to secondary sources all references to a future coming, or else he discounts the futurity of tenses that prima facie, appear to signal some future event. Nevertheless he concedes 'that the teaching of Jesus ... has reference to the future';(10) though understandably he says little about this facet of the Kingdom.

A few concrete examples are vital for a discussion. In Luke 22: 18 Jesus promises, 'The Kingdom of God shall come' (R.V.) More pointedly he urges his disciples to pray, 'Thy Kingdom come' (Matt. 6: 10 - Q). 'The petition', as McNeile observes, is for the future advent of God to establish His sovereignty on earth.(11) We have also Luke 22: 29-30, διατίθεμαι ὑμῖν βασιλείαν ... ἵνα

ἐσθίητε ... ἐν τῇ βασιλείᾳ , where Vincent Taylor distinguishes the present and future extensions of βασιλείᾳ . The former he links with 'lordship'; the latter with 'Kingdom'. (12) Dodd draws attention to the shift of nuance as between the old Syriac rendering of Mark 9: 1, and the Peshitta version of the same verse which he favours, because it implies a completed event. If recourse must be had to the original spoken language, it could be pointed out that in Hebrew as in Arabic (and presumably in Aramaic) the imperfect expresses - the present, repeated past and the future;(13) there is no exclusively future tense. In the Quran there are many instances of the preterite used to express the imminent future. (14)

Kümmel has questioned Dodd's assumption that ἤγγικεν means 'has come'. 'For to begin with there are no grounds at all for the supposition that ἤγγικεν in Mark 1: 15 and Matt. 10: 7, and ἔφθασεν Matt. 12: 28 must represent the same Aramaic verb with no futurist' meaning ... in the LXX also in the preponderating number of cases ἐγγίζειν bears the same meaning of coming near'. Kümmel also notes that 'C.T. Craig emphasizes rightly that the perfect ἤγγικεν when used of time can only refer to the near future'. (15) Similarly Cadbury maintains, ' ἤγγικεν has not the same meaning of the future realized but rather of the future imminent, whereas the verb 'to come' even in the present tense means future'. (16) Cadbury's judgment in this matter can certainly be corroborated by appeal to the Arabic usage of such verbs.

On Luke 17: 30 Cadbury comments, 'the tense of the Phrisees is not what Jesus corrects, but the reliance on "observation".' (17) Nothing in this text can be taken as a denial that the Kingdom in

its full glory is still to come. The impression of a complementary futuristic hope, to balance the present reality, is strengthened if judged in the light of Filson's remark: 'All the beatitudes (except Matt. 5: 3 and 11) speak of the blessedness as future. Since Aramaic has no 'is' in the saying (of v.3) a dominant future reference is probably'. (18) Throughout his book Dodd's 'unitive' zeal tends to colour his exegesis. C.T. Craig trenchantly sums up the case against 'realized eschatology': 'The exegetical argument for this interpretation has been amply refuted.. this conception fails to face a crucial question: where is the source of the vivid eschatological hope which inspired the disciples? Craig like many others finds 'the source of this inspiration in Jesus himself. (19)

Dodd quotes with approval Otto's, 'Nicht Jesus "bringt" das Reich - sondern das Reich bringt ihn mit'. (20) This adage sounds fine, though one wonders how an abstraction(ex hypothesi)can bring a Divine Person in its train. We prefer Origen's title αὐτο βασιλεία for the Messiah,'so maybe he is the Kingdom itself ... if you ask how the Kingdom of heaven is theirs, you can say Christ is theirs'.(21) The stress laid is on the King's return, he who will firmly establish his Kingdom and his rule in righteousness.

THE POINT OF A PARABLE. Of all verbal vehicles utilized by our Lord to convey the message of the Kingdom none is more vivid or suggestive than the parable 'God's picture book', Thielicke has styled them. (22) Jesus' parables left an indelible mark not only on the minds but on the entire personality of many hearers. Various definitions of parable exist; no tidy description will cover all the facts. Jülicher's strictures on some of his predecessors' excesses in fancy, within the sphere of

parabolic interpretation are doubtless well-merited. (23) But a parable is much more than a crystal-clear similitude rounded off with a moral platitude. Whatever the derivation of the term maybe, the proper meaning of παραβολή must be sought for in Hebrew usage. The sense of a word in Classical Greek is not decisive in estimating its conceptual value for Biblical semantics.

Oesterley has this to say about O.T. parables, there are 'cases in which the meaning is not immediately apparent .... indeed they are intended to be obscure in order to force thought, and they can only be understood by the discerning'. He gives examples to show that משל can stand for oracles, contemptuous sayings, allegory, discourse and proverb. (24) This diversity in meaning is partly borne out by an entry in Bauer: 'The Greek O.T. also uses παραβολή for various words and expressions that involve comparison, even riddles'. (25) Our Lord's teaching was both simple and profound; he did not set out to baffle his audiences with 'allegorical mystifications'. None the less we ask with Carrington: 'Why should Jesus not make use of allegory, if that is really the right word?'. (26) Parable merges into allegory; it is not possible to distinguish the parabolic from the allegorical in the evangelic collection, save by an arbitrary classification of the two genres.

Modern Scholars decry the tendency fashionable formerly to treat the details of parables as cryptograms for doctrinal niceties. Centuries ago Chrysostom warned against pressing too anxiously all the circumstances of a parable, cutting his own interpretation short with - ἀλλὰ μὴ περιέργαζου '.(27) Julicher has laid down a canon for interpretation: a typical

parable presents a single point. Again Carrington queries, 'Why should a parable have only one point? It is perhaps a poor parable that has only one point'.(28) Julicher's dictum may fit the shorter Gleichnisse, but it has still to be proved that his rule does justice to the truths enshrined in the full-length Novellen. Why need we swing to the other extreme from Augustine's polychrome allegorizing; as if the alternative to polytheism is Unitarianism?.(29) We may also ask, what is a typical parable? Some of the Novellen are not specifically designated parables in the N.T.

Dodd sprinkles his historic book with comments like: 'The details are not intended to have independent significance'.(3) This is perhaps a tacit admission that such components may have significance within the framework of the parable. In an earlier work, The Meaning of Paul for Today, the same writer makes use of a secondary item from the parable of the 'Prodigal Son' to shed light on Paul's conversion, 'the older brother broken by the Father's love'.(31) We would go farther and claim that details have relevance if they conform to the overall pattern of Christian truth; and we should accept inferences drawn from such details even when they lead to disturbing conclusions. With this parable in mind Nygren denies Julicher's contention that parables are self-evident analogies from life. Nygren points out that as proof derived from human life the 'Prodigal Son' is a singularly unconvincing analogy. In other words, God's love is on a totally different plane from that of a human father.(32)

Without venturing to offer some banal definition of 'parable', we might indicate 'why' and 'how' this form was employed. 'He

did not speak to them without a parable', says Mark hyperbolically (Mark 4: 34). Jesus 'gave no doctrine in an abstract form, no skeletons of truth, but all clothed, as it were, with flesh and blood'. (33) Lessing's epigram, 'Events of time cannot reveal eternal realities', is unacceptable inasmuch as Jesus did reveal eternal truth, not only by his human activity, but by genuinely human illustrations. The affinity between the natural and the supernatural makes this possible; the disparity between these two orders makes for the element of mystery or paradox (αἰνίγματα παραβολῶν).

Much has been written about the Church's elaboration and modification of the parables, specially in the actual application with which some parables close. Dodd informs us that this or that parable 'has suffered a certain amount of expansion'.(34) In view of the length of the average parable (most can be read in under a minute each) it would seem that they have suffered a measure of contraction. Eminent churchman like William Temple and Edwyn Hoskyns confess that it is well-nigh impossible to recover the <u>ipsissima verba</u> of Jesus.(35) On similar grounds we may doubt whether we can 'reconstruct for ourselves the precise situation in which Jesus uttered' any particular parable, once we discount the originality of the setting presented by the evangelists: 'on this basis it is possible to argue in diametrically opposite fashions'. (36) As for Hellenistic details of architecture and agriculture, need we assume that an observant bilingual 'native' of Γαλιλαίας τῶν ἐθνῶν was less familiar with such features than an Antiochene?

As with the logia so with the parables, the likelihood of

repetition in altered situations cannot be excluded. Regarding one of these reiterated sayings Cranfield states, 'it might easily have been spoken by Jesus on more than one occasion'.(37) The more gripping the illustration, the more pointed the aphorism, the greater are the chances of repetition; with this every preacher will concur. Quite apart from the proverbial tenacity of the Oriental memory, the Easterner is a stickler for verbal accuracy in transmission, however inconsistent he may otherwise seem.(38) The naked word is a potent factor in Oriental Society, where words mean more than ideas, and ideas more than deeds.

If we assert that the great part of Jesus' teaching (which when harmonized amounts to but a few pages) was directed to adversaries and the uncommitted, it follows that he left singularly little in the way of instruction his followers could specifically call their own. Our Lord had a glorious vision of a universal Church; and the type of exegesis which ascribes the bulk of his teaching to the contemporary crises, and grudgingly allows that it might have some relevance to the Christian centuries is largely unsatisfying.

Crisis in some Representative Parables. Along with the note of urgency that characterises the message of the Kingdom, certain features stand out in the parables, features we associate with the notion of Kingdom-Kingship. The more prominent of these are - service, conflict, increase, crisis, glory. In present-day theology 'crisis' would probably conjure up the idea of 'divine confrontation' or 'call to decision'. We take κρίσις to signify judgment in the classic (and classical) sense of the word. The

coming of the Kingdom does not in itself constitute the crisis. Christ's coming is more εὐαγγέλιον than κρίσις (John 3: 17). Jeremias observes that, 'the primitive Church saw itself ... standing between two crises (cross and parousia)'.(39) It is the cross rather than the coming which precipitates the crisis; and this crisis is an essential element in the theologia crucis. Not surprisingly the subject of the Kingdom faded into the background after the Ressurrection; the Apostles proclaimed not the Kingdom but the cross.

The parables of growth (Leaven, Mustard Seed, Sower, Tares) all speak of increase, occasionally impeded by hostile action. A typical example of this group of parables is the Seed Growing Secretly (Mark 4: 26-29). Harvest inevitably comes round; this Dodd conceives as a picture of Jesus standing amid the ripe crop of Judaism's need. (40) In the light of what Paul says about sowing and raising, our Lord is more likely to have the final harvest in mind (I Cor. 15: 36 ff). Carrington relates the parable to the axiom laid down in John 12: 24. (41) The harvest follows death and burial. In Rev. 14: 14, 15 the Son of Man appears with a sickle in hand for the harvest of the world is ripe; the context clearly points to death and coming judgment.

To take another representative parable that of the Nocturnal Burglar (Matt. 24: 43 ff.): Jeremias finds 'the application ... to the return of the Son of Man ... strange', for a burglary is 'a disastrous and alarming event, whereas the Parousia, at least for the disciple ... is the great day of Joy'.(42) Yet as Thielicke notes 'Jesus was accustomed to use his metaphors with sovereign freedom'. He goes on to show that such dubious

figures as the thief were intended to set off the glories of the divine intruder. (43) On any interpretation it can be argued that the Parousia will turn out to be a day of shame even for many professing followers of Jesus (I John 2: 28).

The reference to the Parousia in the parable of the Ten Virgins does not depend on the fate of the two verses (Matt. 25: 1, 13) which are commonly regarded as additions. 'At the most the parable conceals a Messianic utterance of Jesus' is Jeremias' estimate. This comes with the statement that the bridegroom is not one of the Messianic categories familiar to the Jews. (44) Kummel, on the other hand, feels 'that it is intended to point to the parousia ... quite certainly from the metaphorical words of the bridegroom'. (45) The figure of the bridegroom was a familiar one to the disciples; the Baptist refers to the Christ as the bridegroom (Mark 2: 19; John 3: 29).

In another book Jeremias has apparently pointed out that the Messianic age is often described as a wedding feast. (46) According to Barrett, Israel in the O.T. is regarded as the bride of God. (47) Further, the only interpretation which will cover the implications of ἐκάθευδε (Matt. 25: 5) is that the verb presupposes the sleep of death. Falling asleep is not culpable; in this instance it seemed unavoidable. The issue had been determined by precautions taken or neglected beforehand. We may safely embrace the insights afforded by Chrysostom and Augustine, and refer this parable to the last day and the bliss that follows. (48)

While discussing the parables of the Tares and the Drag-net (Matt. 13: 24-30, 47 ff.), Jeremias alludes to Christ's rejection

of the criteria for ritual separation prescribed by the Pharisees. Instead Jesus substituted a new standard whereby some were excluded or self-excluded from the Kingdom. It is God who 'has fixed the moment of separation'. (49) Even if there are grounds for suspecting the genuineness of the allusions to the furnace in Matt. 13: 42, 50, there are equally emphatic references to final retribution elsewhere in Q and March, which are harder to eliminate (Mark 9: 43, 45, 47; Matt. 5: 29; 11: 23; Luke 10: 15; 12: 5). 'All the most terrifying texts come from the mouth of our Lord': says C.S. Lewis. (50) A priori it may be possible to dismiss the evidence for irreversible judgment, but only by arguing that Jesus misjudged the issue. The textual evidence for judgment is unassailable. 'We may be horrified by the fierceness of the conclusion', writes T.W. Manson, 'but beneath the grim imagery is an equally grim fact ...'. (51)

'On the historical plane', Dodd concludes, 'there is no "eschatology of bliss" in the sayings of Jesus'. (52) This again is an open question: 'Blessed are the meek for they shall inherit the earth', announces Jesus. (Matt. 5: 5). McNeill comments on Matt. 6: 10 ὡς ἐν οὐρανῷ καὶ ἐπὶ γῆς , the rhythm allows, if not requires, it to refer to all the foregoing petitions, and so taken it brings out more clearly the eschatological force of each' - including that is, 'Thy Kingdom come'. So also Origen (whose Greek is unimpeachable) understands the text. (53) In John 18: 36 we read, 'My Kingship is not of this world'. This, is the only passage where the R.S.V. renders 'kingship' for βασιλεία , but the difficulty of reconciling the Johannine saying with the Synoptic viewpoint is not thereby solved.

If γῆ and κόσμος were interchangeable the problem would persist. W. Manson's definition of 'world' helps to resolve this, 'it is the moral complex of the selfish instincts and concerns which dominate men's hearts', (54) thus corresponding to the Arabic Dunyā. Jeremias' more drastic suggestion, whereby he casts doubt on the use by Jesus of the Aramaic equivalent for κόσμος; also eases the problem. (55)

A qualified version of Dodd's considered opinion as to the coming of the Kingdom can now be offered. 'It is neither an evolutionary process, nor yet a catastrophic event in the near future, but a present crisis'. (56) Rather, we would say, the kingdom (the coming is but an aspect of the total picture) involves a process, at times secret and sporadic. Its crisis are all but interminable, but will be resolved in a future world-shaking crisis. Nothing less than this catastrophic (or apocatastatic) finale, is likely to move scoffers, for whom Kingship ἐντὸς ὑμῶν and waves of old-fashioned revival are alike delusions.

NOTES.

(1) G. Dalman, The Words of Jesus, p.94
(2) B.D.B., p. 574-75.
(3) C.H. Dodd, Parables, p.34. Dalman op. cit., pp. 94 ff. admits that Oriental 'sovereignty embraces a particular territory'. As evidence for his main argument he lists four O.T.-passages, in two of which rather than malkuth is used. For the rest his Jewish evidence is extra-biblical (mainly Targums).
(4) S. Aalen, art. 'Reign and House in the Kingdom of God', in N.T.S. Vol. VIII, No.3, pp. 215-40, esp. p.216.
(5) C.E.B. Cranfield, Mark, p.64.
(6) Koehler-Baumgartner, p.1094.
(7) G. Dalman, op. cit., pp.116, 121.
(8) H.J. Cadbury, art. 'Acts and Eschatology in B.N.T.E., p.313.
(9) S. Aalen, loc. cit., p.217.
(10) C.H. Dodd, Parables, pp. 51, 53.

(11) A.H. McNeile, Matthew, p.78.
(12) V. Taylor, Jesus and His Sacrifice, p.188 and n.3.
(13) Davidson/Mauchline, Introductory Hebrew Grammar, p.83
(14) See Suras III 77; XXXIX, 68; L, 19; LI, 10; LIV, 1. Of interest is Sura XVI, 1 where the verb atā corresponds to the Syriac verb in Dodd's quotation from the Peshitta. The Quranic passage refers to the imminent future(Parables p.54). Cf. also Jude 14, ἦλθε Κύριος ; and F.F. Bruce's note 'the Hebrew use of the 'prophetic past', by which a predicted event is marked out as so certain of fulfilment that it is described as though it had already taken place', in Romans, p.178.
(15) W.G. Kümmel, Promise and Fulfilment, p.24 with n.17.
(16) H.J. Cadbury, loc. cit., p.315.
(17) ibid.
(18) F.V. Filson, Matthew, p.77.
(19) C.T. Craig, I.B. Vol. VII, p.153. In the latest works on the Kingdom of God by Bishop Gosta Lundstrom and Prof. N.Perrin the futurist aspect tends to be re-emphasized, see R.P. Martin's art. 'The Kingdom of God in Recent Writing', Christianity Today Vol. VIII No.8 pp.5 ff., where the label inaugurated eschatology is recommended.
(20) C.H. Dodd, Parables, p.45.
(21) Quoted in C.E.B. Cranfield, Mark, p.66.
(22) H. Thielicke, The Waiting Father, p.11
(23) As set out in chap.I of Dodd's Parables.
(24) W.O.E. Oesterley, The Gospel Parables, p.3, 5.
(25) Bauer's Lexicon, p.617.
(26) P. Carrington, According to Mark, p.108. Jeremias agrees that 'the sharply defined distinction between parable and allegory is not Palestinian'; The Parables of Jesus, p. 69.
(27) Cited in R.C. Trench, Notes on the Parables, p.32.
(28) P. Carrington, op. cit., p.108.
(29) Augustine's method is illustrated in Chap. I of Dodd's Parables along with Julicher's reactions to its 'absurdities'.
(30) C.H. Dodd, Parables, p.19.
(31) C.H. Dodd, The Meaning of Paul for Today, p.16.
(32) A. Nygren, Agape and Eros, Part I, pp. 57 ff.
(33) R.C. Trench, op. cit., p.24.
(34) C.H. Dodd, Parables, p.124.
(35) See Hoskyns/Davey, The Riddle of the N.T. introd. esp. p.11. Also W. Temple, Nature Man and God p. 350-51.
(36) cf. J. Jeremias, op. cit., p.19 n. 66, with Hoskyns/Davey, op. cit., p.47.
(37) C.E.B. Cranfield, Mark, p.166-67.
(38) B.W. Anderson, The Living World of the O.T. p.157. He reminds us that 'there are Arabs who can recite the whole Koran with-

out faltering, and Brahmins who know the Rig Veda by heart'.

(39) J. Jeremias, op. cit., p.33.
(40) C.H. Dodd, Parables, p.179
(41) P. Carrington, op. cit., p.112.
(42) J. Jeremias, op. cit., p.39.
(43) H. Thielicke, op. cit., p.94.
(44) J. Jeremias, op. cit., p. 42, 41.
(45) W.G. Kummel, op. cit., p.56.
(46) This is pointed out by Kümmel, ibid., p.57 n.122. (Weltvollender).
(47) C.K. Barrett, John, pp. 185-86.
(48) Cited in Trench, op. cit., p.250-51.
(49) J. Jeremias, op. cit., p.155 ff.
(50) C.S. Lewis, 'Introduction to J.B. Phillips' Letters to Young Churches p. IX.
(51) T.W. Manson, Mission and Message of Jesus, p. 609.
(52) C.H. Dodd, Parables, p.74.
(53) A.H. McNeile, Matthew, p.79.
(54) W. Manson, The Way of the Cross, p.51.
(55) J. Jeremias, op. cit., p.64.
(56) C.H. Dodd, Parables, p. 178.

CHAPTER VI

SYNONYMS OF THE AFTERLIFE.

Egeiro and Anistemi. Philologists often assume that no two synonyms have precisely the same signification; a particular shade of meaning in one of a pair is supplemented by the distinctive nuance of the other synonym. These fine differences in meaning, however, are not always discernible; and are perhaps more a feature of modern usage. For instance, a careful examination of the two N.T. verbs which bear on our subject ἐγείρω (ἐξεγείρω) and ἀνίστημι (ἐξανίστημι) in their 'contextual environment' will bring out the fact that no useful purpose is served by attempts to draw subtle distinctions between the meaning of one and the other as applied to resurrection. It is noteworthy that Trench leaves out this pair from his historic survey of N.T. synonyms, so meagre seems the evidence in support of the existence of such distinctions as would warrant inclusion.(1)

Moulton and Milligan give one example from the Papyri, where ἀνίστημι does stand for 'restore';(2) the prefixed preposition may imply this sense on odd occasions in N.T. usage. Both verbs are frequently used in the ordinary non-religious sense of rising from a recumbent position or rousing from sleep (Mark 1: 35; 4: 38; Matt. 25: 7; Luke 4: 16 etc.) In the LXX both verbs translate קוּם, a verb which is employed only once in reference to resurrection (Isa. 26: 19). There the accent is on the revivification of the actual corpses of the fallen faithful.

The distribution of ἀνίστημι – ἐγείρω in the gospels and epistles (where applied to resurrection) appears to rest on stylistic preference or random choice: The phenomenon of distribution need

not be accounted for by more elaborate motives than these. Paul's handling of the verbs is a case in point; Milligan comments on I Thess. 4: 14, 'only here and in v. 16 does he employ ἀνίστασθαι with reference to the resurrection ... As a rule he prefers ἐγείρειν cf. 1: 10 and other forty occurrences in his Epp.' (3) On the use of the two verbs in Matt. 12: 41-42 (= Luke 11: 31-32) Matthew Black observes: 'In the Gospel passages ἀναστῆναι μετά and ἐγείρεσθαι μετά are synonymous terms ... ἐν τῇ κρίσει represent a purely Greek addition to make an otherwise foreign idiom intelligible'.(4) There is only an oblique reference to the resurrection in these passages; nevertheless the lexical point is still pertinent. A comparable variation occurs in another Synoptic setting; ἀναστῆναι is found in Mark 8: 31, while the Matthean and Lucan parallels give ἐγερθῆναι. An interesting metaphorical use of the two verbs appears in Eph. 5: 14 (a fragment of a baptismal hymn according to Armitage Robinson), Ἔγειρε, ὁ καθεύδων καὶ ἀνάστα.(5) This seems a clear case of elegant variation.

In their remarks on the usage of these verbs, commentators customarily bring out the force of the tenses employed, tacitly assuming that the meaning is otherwise self-evident. As regards the tenses they state the obvious, 'that the perfect concerns itself less with the historic fact and more with the result'.(6) Even the changes in voice, from passage to passage, do not appreciably add to our understanding of the text: 'Whether one can find any substantial difference between Luke VII 14 ἐγέρθητι (Passive form) and VIII. 54 ἔγειρε (Active) is doubtful', so Moule avers, 'they appear both to be simply intransitive in

sense'.(7)

Any attempt to describe how 'resurrection' operates by resorting to the two verbs in the relevant N.T. passages is doomed at the start. Kümmel admits that 'it is significant that Jesus does not describe all the process of the resurrection and only hints at the condition of the risen ones'.(8) All that can be inferred from the straightforward affirmations on the matter is that ἀνάστασις in the N.T. signifies the rising again of what 'lay low', and the visible re-emergence of what for a time was unseen. Our Lord's own rising from the grave was 'hid from mortal eyes'. In any event neither he nor those he raised went through the total bodily corruption that death works. At most it might be said of Lazarus that the initial stages of decomposition had set in, only to be halted by Christ's action. We can proceed no farther in describing the process of resurrection.

Something remains to be said with regard to the condition of the risen ones, especially as by contrast this has some bearing on the Quranic picture of the state of the blessed. Where St. Paul sums up the issue'in the far-reaching paradox - it is raised a spiritual body' - Jesus declares, 'when they rise from the dead, they neither marry nor are given in marriage, but are like angels in heaven' (Mark 12: 25). Luke transmits this as ἰσάγγελοι ... υἱοί εἰσι τοῦ Θεοῦ (Luke 20: 36). Angelic attributes will be conferred upon those who are already the children of God. One consequence is 'that when there is no death, marriage for the propagation of the race will be unnecessary'(9).

Both Vincent Taylor and Kümmel point out that our Lord's teaching here has affinities with contemporary and later beliefs held by the Jews. Similar forecasts appear in I Enoch 104: 4 'Ye shall have great joy as the angels of heaven'. Berakoth 17a cites a saying of Rab, which comes even closer to the Synoptic description of this aspect of the afterlife. (10) Incidentally in Luke's expanded version of the logion we have an intimation of immortality more categorical than anywhere else in the Synoptic gospels; this is expressed periphrastically οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀποθανεῖν ἔτι δύνανται (Luke 20: 36).

Who is it that raises the dead on the Last Day? Christ is undoubtedly the central figure in the final drama; whether in his Parousia or as the Judge he occupies the pre-eminent position to which God has exalted him. Yet the evidence impels us to the conclusion that God is the primary and ultimate cause of resurrection, both Christ's and ours. On the basis of this textual evidence Dahl criticizes Aquinas' contention 'that Christ's resurrection is the cause of ours'. St. Thomas's proof texts include I Cor. 15: 20, Rev. 1: 5, Rom. 4: 25 and John 1: 16. No causal connexion can be established between the two resurrections merely on the grounds of terms like 'firstfruits' or 'firstborn'; this is the gist of Dahl's argument. Nor is grace in John 1: 16 to be conceived of as a quasi-mechanical force which somehow generates resurrection. (11)

In the majority of the texts that speak of Christ's rising ἐγείρω and ἀνίστημι are used 'intransitively' (Middle or Passive and occasionally Active with the latter verb). Examples of ἐγείρω (Middle or Passive) occur in Mark 6: 14 = Matt. 14: 2 =

Luke 9: 7; Mark 14: 28 = Matt. 26: 32; Mark 16: 6 = Matt. 28: 6 = Luke 24: 6; Matt. 16: 21 = Luke 9: 22; Matt. 17: 9 (B.D.); 17: 23; 27: 63, 64; John 21: 14; Rom. 4: 24; 7: 4; 8: 34; I Cor. 15: 4, 12, 16, 20; II Cor. 5: 15; II Tim. 2: 8. Instances of the use of ἀνίστημι (Active intransitive or Middle) appear in Mark 8: 31; 9: 31; 10: 34; Luke 18: 33; 24: 7; I Thess. 4: 14. Matthew's predilection for ἐγείρω is noticeable.(12) In each of these examples Christ is the subject of the verb, or in other words, the Person raised.

It seems clear that the unexpected agent of the Son's resurrection is God the Father. Moule asks: 'is the Passive verb with which it (the Resurrection) is usually ... described, to be pressed as theologically significant - indicating the initiative of God Himself - or to be taken as a mere intransitive? that in this case the former is probable is suggested by the frequent use of a transitive with God as subject and Christ as object'.(13) Examples of this construction (Christ as object of the transitive verb) occurs in Acts 3: 15; 4: 10; 5: 30; 10: 40; 13: 30, 37; Rom. 4: 24; 8: 11; 10: 9; I Cor. 6: 14; II Cor. 4: 14; Gal. 1: 1; Col. 2: 12; I Thess. 1: 10; I Pet. 1: 21, all with ἐγείρω ; while in Acts 2: 24, 32; 3: 26; 17: 31 ἀνίστημι is used with a similar construction.

However, the fact that ἀνίστημι is often Active when applied to Christ as the Risen One, together with his prediction in John 2: 19, Λύσατε τὸν ναὸν τοῦτον – καὶ ἐγερῶ αὐτόν suggests that he was no mere passive recipient of the grace of resurrection but an active participant in the drama. Dahl points out that Westcott, Hoskyns and Davey et al. have interpreted the

passage as referring to the Church the Body of Christ.[14] This explanation, has its merits, but the mention of 'three days' in the context enforces the view that the saying applies first and foremost to our Lord's own role in all resurrection.

We may turn now to those passages where the two verbs are used transitively, with God as subject and Man as object. These texts have a more direct bearing on our theme than the groups listed above (John 5: 21; Acts 26: 8; I Cor. 6: 14 - ἐξεγείρω II Cor. 1: 9; 4: 14; Jas. 5: 15; Heb. 11: 19).[15] The tenor of these verses is clear and accords well with the tenets of Judaism and Islam: God the Creator is likewise the Re-creator, insomuch as resurrection may be accounted a form of re-creation. On I Thess. 1: 10 Milligan remarks that 'the resurrection of Jesus being traced as always to the direct act of God',[16] a fortiori the resurrection of Man should be traced to the same source. Dahl's criticism of Robertson and Plummer's proposition that 'the connexion between the antecedent (rising) and the consequent is therefore not logical merely but causal' - strikes one as valid. The relevant evidence in the N.T. suggests that the connexion can be accounted for only in terms of spiritual logic, and not by any law of causality. Or in F.F. Bruce's guarded words: 'the resurrection of Christ is bound up with the resurrection of men in general.'[17] Bound up with, but not necessarily brought about by, is the relation of the latter to the former event.

What are we to make of those passages where Christ expressly claims to raise the dead on his own initiative? This is a somewhat different question from the relation between the two resurrections. Only a few verses are applicable, all of which

are Johannine(John 6: 39, 40, 44, 54 cf. John 12: 1, 9, 17). The latter group of three simply reiterates a bald statement of fact, the raising of Lazarus. The former group of four sounds like a refrain ἀναστήσω αὐτὸ ἐν τῇ ἐσχάτῃ ἡμέρᾳ. Once again we see that the claims Christ makes for himself are even more startling than those made on his behalf by the Apostles.

Nevertheless those pronouncements require qualification. Previously in John 5: 21 Jesus had declared that raising the dead was the Father's prerogative; ὁ Πατὴρ ἐγείρει τοὺς νεκροὺς an authority delegated to the Son as is clear from what follows. Furthermore Barrett shows in his comments on John 6: 40 ἐστιν τὸ θέλημα τοῦ Πατρός μου, ἵνα πᾶς ... ἔχῃ ζωὴν αἰώνιον, καὶ ἀναστήσω αὐτὸν) that ἀναστήσω 'may be rather loosely constructed with the same ἵνα as ἔχῃ ... because the final raising up is also dependent on the will of the Father' (18) In all this the Spirit works integrally with the Father, and the Spirit's part in giving life to mortal bodies is emphasized in Rom.8: 11. Here as elsewhere the will of the Father is paramount, but the authority which He delivers to His Son is limitless. As in creation and the Incarnation, so also in resurrection the work of the Trinity stands indivisible.

A Note on the Substantives. Of the two nouns that could signify resurrection in Greek ἔγερσις appears only once in the N.T. (Matt.27: 53), in a passage peculiar to Matthew. This is the sole context where ἔγερσις describes resurrection. In Psalm 139: 2 the term denotes the act of standing up and complements καθέδρα, sitting down. (19)

The remaining noun for resurrection is of course ἀνάστασις,

which occurs far more frequently in the N.T. Like ἀγάπη this noun was elevated to new dignity once having found its way into Biblical language. Thus Moulton and Milligan write, 'The narrative of Ac. 17 (see v.32) prepares us for the total novelty of the meaning "resurrection": it was a perfectly natural use of the word, but the idea was itself new'. (20) According to Bauer, Aeschylus seems to have used ἀνάστασις with the meaning 'resurrection', in his Eumenides, but his aphorism - ἅπαξ θανόντος οὔτις ἐστ' ἀνάστασις - is an outright denial of such a possibility. (21)

Gnostic and other influences led to similar denials or equivocations with respect to the resurrection on the part of those who called themselves Christians. Hymenaeus and Philetus hold that the resurrection had already taken place, thus excluding 'the notion of a future resurrection'. Their error amounts to a gnostic denial of eschatology which so exalts the present status of Christians that it sees no need for hope and faith.' (22) Justin reports the objections of a party who rejected the idea of resurrection, yet clung to the hope that at death their souls would be taken up to heaven, ψυχὰς .. ἀναλαμβάνεσθαι εἰς τὸν οὐρανόν (23) Bauer also records a Graeco-Roman inscription to the effect that belief in resurrection is a sign of cowardice, οἱ δειλοὶ πάντες εἰς ἀνάστασιν βλέποντες (24)

The intensive form of the noun ἐξανάστασις occurs in Phil. 3: 11 and nowhere elsewhere in the N.T. In a comment on this verse Lightfoot distinguishes between the two standard phrases for the resurrection: ἡ ἀνάστασις τῶν νεκρῶν (I Cor. 15: 42) he regards as of general application 'of the dead whether good or

bed'. On the other hand, ἡ ἀνάστασις ἐκ νεκρῶν (from the dead) is best confined to the raising of the righteous.(25) This distinction seems fair, even though it is based on insufficient data. The second phrase appears in contexts where worth and attainment are mentioned as attendant factors. There the resurrection is more than a natural process or an automatic outcome; it is a prize to be won or else a mark of divine esteem.

Katheudō and Koimaō. Only one other pair of synonyms need concern us further: καθεύδω and κοιμάω, verbs that 'span' the period between death and resurrection. Both words are used to represent the daily round of sleep. Besides employing the verbs in the customary literal sense, Paul and the Evangelists use them figuratively as an apt description of that phase which is otherwise known as death. Before passing on to the metaphorical usages of the two verbs, we may briefly allude to the references to literal sleep in the N.T.: Jesus slept, ἐκάθευδε, Matt. 8: 24; the disciples were sleeping, καθεύδοντας (Matt. 26: 40) = κοιμωμένους (Luke 22: 45); the soldiers were bribed to say they were κοιμωμένων Matt. 28: 13; mankind in general may be classified as οἱ καθεύδοντες I Thess. 5: 7. In practice the two verbs are synonymous to the extent of being interchangeable.

In three instances καθεύδω has a derogatory sense of spiritual sloth or apathy (Mark 13: 36; Eph. 5: 14; I Thess. 5: 6). From the entries in Liddell and Scott it would seem that this extension of meaning can be paralleled in extra-biblical Greek, where καθεύδω often occurs as the equivalent of 'being idle'.(26) Not so with κοιμάω which neither in Biblical nor in secular Greek acquired this particular meaning; at least this is the

impression that one gets from a perusal of the lexicons. (27)

Whilst it is true that both verbs have sometimes been used to signify the sleep of death, in the case of καθεύδω this peculiar euphemistic sense cannot be exemplified in secular literature. This again is an inference drawn from data provided by lexicographers. (28) The few examples supplied for καθεύδω as depicting the state of death derive from the LXX and the N.T. Classical and Hellenistic Greek furnish many examples of κοιμάω to connote the sleep of death. (29) A natural development of this connotation was that the graveyard became known as the place of sleep, κοιμητήριον (cf. cemetry). Oepke's article on καθεύδω in T.W.N.T. tends to bear out the observations set above: Die Vokabel dient, seltener zwar als κοιμᾶσθαι, zur euphemistischen Bezeichnung des Todes (1. Th. 5, 10). Spezifisch Christliches liegt in dieser Redeweise nicht.' (30)

It could scarcely be argued on the basis of lexical evidence largely figurative that the sleep of death implied in κοιμάω is of a deeper kind than that indicated by its synonym. The safest course is to treat the two verbs as practically synonymous in their N.T. setting, but bearing in mind that as a euphemism for the notion of death κοιμάω is the more usual term.

Another group of references form a bridge between the literal and the metaphorical use of those verbs. These references occur in contexts of parables and miracles and symbolise or else prefigure the prolonged κοίμησις of death. The parable of the Ten Virgins has already been discussed. About the virgins it is said that they ἐνύσταξαν ... ἐκάθευδον (Matt. 25: 5). In the parable of the Seed Growing Secretly, the farmer sleeps (καθεύδῃ), while

God is giving the increase (Mark 4: 27).[31] By the use of καθεύδει in the story of one of Christ's miracles of life-giving (Matt. 9: 24 = Mark 5: 39 = Luke 8: 52) and of κεκοίμηται in another miracle story (John 11: 11), it is made clear that Jesus sees death as a transitory phase through which man passes into new life. He may have employed the same Aramaic word on both occasions.[32]

The metaphor of sleep is introduced in the O.T. and in apocalyptic literature to represent the repose of death (Gen. 47: 30; II Sam. 7: 12; Jer. 51: 39). Robertson and Plummer quote an example of this from the Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs: ἐκοιμήθη ὕπνῳ καλῷ .[33] Instances of similar figurative adoption of κοιμάω and its synonyms are given by Milligan; these occur in pagan literature, but Milligan notes that there as in Jewish writings 'the metaphor occurs ... without any reference to the resurrection hope'.[34] This standpoint is bluntly expressed in Jer. 51: 39, ὑπνώσουσιν ὕπνον αἰώνιον καὶ μὴ ἐξεγερθῶσιν: death, however mildly conceived, is the end for the enemies of God.

An improvement on this sombre prospect of unending sleep is discernible in Dan. 12: 2. (We need not consider the few other passages in the O.T. in which the possibility of an afterlife is hinted at, because the notion of sleep is absent from those passages).[35] Since this text from Daniel epitomizes one of the 'deux courants eschatologiques... l'eschatologie collective de la résurrection',[36] it is worth quoting in full: 'And many of them that sleep in the dust of the earth shall awake, some to everlasting life and some to shame and everlasting contempt' (R.V.). This appears to be the prevailing eschatological mood of the N.T. observable in almost

every writer and enforced by the authority of the Master.

The metaphorical usage of our two verbs is most clearly seen in the following verses: κοιμᾶσθαι in Matt. 27: 52; Acts 7: 60; I Cor. 7: 39; 15: 6, 18, 20, 51; I Thess. 4: 13, 14, 15; II Pet. 3: 4 - καθεύδειν in I Thess. 5: 10. If sleep is an apt simile of the unconscious state men call death, it is still more felicitous as a figure, when death is viewed as terminating in resurrection. For after all men expect to waken up from sleep and generally do so. Milligan observes that 'it was doubtless indeed the extreme appropriateness of the word κοιμᾶσθαι in the latter direction (future awakening) that led St. Paul to prefer it to ἀποθνήσκειν in speaking of the death of believers'. (37)

If we could believe that death despite its duration is somehow akin to the transience of sleep, then the grave would lose most of its terrors and be welcomed for what lies beyond its gloom: κοιμάω helps us to see death in proper perspective. F.F. Bruce describes ἐκοιμήθη in Acts 7: 60 as 'an unexpectedly beautiful word for so brutal a death'. (38) The reality of death and above all of Christ's death, is never in doubt, but reality and finality are different things. Milligan's quotation of Chrysostom's moving words brings out the catalytic effect of Christ's death upon ours: ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἦλθεν ὁ χριστὸς καὶ ὑπὲρ ζώης τοῦ κόσμου ἀπέθανε οὐκέτι θάνατος καλεῖται λοιπὸν ὁ θάνατος ἀλλὰ ὕπνος καὶ κοίμησις (39) It is a matter of differing viewpoints; what in man's estimate seems the final stroke of fate, 'describes... as God sees it ... a sleep from which there is to be a speedy awakening'. (40)

The attitude of the N.T. towards the so-called Intermediate State is one of significant reserve. After carefully examining the evidence (ten references to , mostly metaphorical or direct

quotations from the O.T.; three references to παράδεισος Salmond is led to the conclusion that 'the two terms ... each of them occurring only in a single relevant instance, give us no ground for saying that Christ taught any doctrine of an Intermediate State'. (41) Nothing will curb the human impulse to peer into the unknown, but doctrine cannot be securely built on so slender a foundation. What has been clearly revealed is assurance enough for the believer. 'Anyone who falls asleep in Jesus', writes Stauffer, 'sleeps in peace. He sleeps till the final reveille sounds'. (42) In effect no one need wait for the Resurrection longer than the years of his life, for the dead in Christ shall rise to greet their King without any awareness of the lapse of time.

All that remains to consider is the time factor as it impinges upon the notions of κοίμησις and immediate entrance into Glory, assuming that the two are somehow reconcilable. The attempt to fit in 'psychological time' into the 'tidy patterns of objective time' is hazardous. (43) But when we ponder the indefinable dimensions of God's unbounded Now, we are completely baffled. Prof. Moule has recently pointed out that in eschatology 'the real mistake is to make time the determining standard of all ... God's time scale is different'. (44) For the omniscient sustainer of the universe, with its staggering magnitudes of a million light year these dilemmas are unreal. 'The date of death belongs to this world. Our day of resurrection is the same for all and yet is not separated from the day of death by intervals of centuries - for these time intervals are here, not there, in the presence of God, where 'a thousand years are as a day'. (45) To those who sleep in Christ, the sleep of a millenium

will seem as but a night's rest that is followed by the sudden awakening of a glorious dawn.

NOTES.

(1) R.C. Trench, Synonyms of the New Testament.
(2) M.M. p.44.
(3) G. Milligan, Thessalonians, p.57.
(4) M. Black, An Aramaic Approach to the Gospels and Acts, p.97.
(5) J.A. Robinson, Ephesians, p.119. Cf. also Mark 9: 31 with Matt. 17: 23.
(6) H.B. Swete, Mark, p. 114.
(7) C.F.D. Moule, Idiom Book of N.T. Greek, p.26.
(8) W.G. Kümmel, Promise and Fulfilment, p.89.
(9) See A.H. McNeile, Matthew, p.322.
(10) V. Taylor, Mark p.483 and Kummel, op.cit., p.90 n.12.
(11) See M.E. Dahl, The Resurrection of the Body, Additional Note A for a succinct discussion of the preliminary issues, and Note B for a useful table of verbs.
(12) The preference may be explained as consonant with Matthew's Hebraic tone, if (as is probable) ἐγείρω marks a stronger emphasis on the Father's activity. This, however, may be an unduly subtle motive to ascribe to the Evangelist (cf. Paul's usage).
(13) C.F.D. Moule, op.cit., p.26.
(14) M.E. Dahl, op.cit., p. 97.
(15) Jas. 5: 15 probably refers to bodily healing, but the reference is included for grammatical reasons.
(16) G. Milligan, Thessalonians, p.15.
(17) F.F. Bruce, Acts, p.442.
(18) C.K. Barrett, John p.244.
(19) LXX Ps.138: 2, see McNeile, Matthew, p.424.
(20) M.M., p.38.
(21) Bauer's Lexicon, p.59.
(22) See C.K. Barrett, The Pastoral Epistles, p.106 (II Tim. 2: 18).
(23) Bauer's Lexicon, p.60 Dialogue LXXX, Justin calls them heretics.
(24) ibid., p.59.
(25) J.B. Lightfoot, Phillippians, p.151.
(26) L.S. Vol.I., p.852.
(27) ibid., p.967-68 and Bauer p.438.
(28) This is of course an argument from silence (or absence of data).
(29) See esp. L.S., Vol.I p.967-68 (the variant κοιμάω is also included).

(30) T.W.N.T. (3) p.p.439-40.
(31) The two parables have been considered in Chap. V.
(32) Abbott-Smith, pp. 223, 250 indicates this by inserting 'in LXX chiefly for שכב' under the entries for both Greek verbs.
(33) A. Robertson and A. Plummer, I Corinthians, p. 253
(34) G. Milligan, Thessalonians, p.56.
(35) In Ps. 17: 15 and Isa. 26: 19 the notion of 'awaking' is present; this could be taken to presuppose 'sleep'. See A.B. Davidson, Theology of the O.T. pp.465-66.
(36) See M. Goguel, art. 'Le caractère du salut dans la théologie paulinienne,' in B.N.T.E. p.336.
(37) G. Milligan, Thessalonians, pp. 55-56.
(38) F.F. Bruce, Acts., p.180.
(39) G. Milligan, Thessalonians, p.57 (de Coomit et Cruce, Op.ii. 470).
(40) See V. Taylor, Mark, p.295.
(41) S.D.F. Salmond, Christian Doctrine of Immortality, p.281. The two relevant instances, Luke 16: 23 and 23: 43, have been considered in Chap. I.
(42) E. Stauffer, N.T. Theology, p.212.
(43) See art. 'Time' by A.K. Rule in T.C.E. Vol.II, p.1116.
(44) C.F.D. Moule, The Birth of the N.T., pp.101-2.
(45) E. Brunner Eternal Hope, p.152.

CHAPTER VII

ASPECTS OF THE RESURRECTION BODY

'Resurrection' and 'body' are terms that stand together. Hence an enquiry into the meaning of 'body' in the context of resurrection is a vital step towards a proper understanding of the resurrection doctrine. This may be done most profitably by a consideration of I Corinthians 15, a chapter in which the two words occur more frequently than in any other chapter of the N.T. The Corinthian passage itself is thoroughly Pauline in thought and temper; once the validity of the Apostle's logic has been assessed, the remaining problems are mainly biological and metaphysical.

The Gospel and the Resurrection. For Paul the theme of resurrection was an experiential issue of prime importance. The only Christ he knew was the risen Son of God. What above all inspired him to restate this cardinal truth of the Gospel was the conviction that with its abandonment the whole structure of Christian belief and ethics would be in danger of collapse. Theologians of different eras and schools have shared Paul's creed in this respect, and have held to his corollary that faith in the Resurrection of the Body cannot be dissociated from the Resurrection of Christ. Both articles are essential elements of the Gospel, and may be viewed jointly as the fitting sequel to the Incarnation.

We shall confine ourselves to two representative pronouncements on the subject: Westcott speaking for classic orthodoxy avers that 'according to the divine instinct of the first age, the message of the Resurrection sums up in one fact the teaching

of the Gospel. It is the one link between the seen and the unseen'. (1) The obverse of this affirmation is strikingly expressed by a contemporary theologian, whom none can accuse of obscurantism; Reinhold Niebuhr confesses, 'there is no part of the Apostolic creed which, in our present opinion, expresses the whole genius of the Christian faith more neatly than just that despised phrase, "I believe in the Resurrection of the body".' (2)

What were the circumstances that gave rise to this extended treatment of a decisive matter? Scholarly opinion is divided on the issue, and it is unlikely that the precise Sitz im Leben can be recovered. Cullmann and Moffatt (inter alia) assume that Paul was combatting the Greek concept of the 'immortality of the soul'. (3) On the other hand Calvin felt that the Apostle was reaffirming the central fact of Christianity in opposition to a vague scepticism of the Sadducean type, (4) a cheerful (or cheerless) rationalism, which had crept into the Church and was crippling her witness. 'It is not truth that is threatened', explains Barth, 'but man in their relation to truth'. (5) In effect, Paul manages to counter all objections without pinpointing any single one.

Process or Miracle? In I Corinthians 15 the starting-point is an event rather than a hypothesis of natural immortality. The case for the crucial significance and continuing efficacy of our Lord's resurrection is enforced by the sevenfold repetition of the perfect, ἐγήγερται (vv. 4, 12, 13, 14, 16, 17, 20); this describes' a decisive action of God, which determines all that follows in Christian experience'. (6) At v.12 Paul embarks upon the argument proper. Basically this looks

like a syllogism (insofar as a question can be converted into propositions). The syllogism may be taken in two ways: if there is no resurrection, Christ is not risen - or else - if Christ is not risen there will be no resurrection. Dahl in the course of a detailed study distinguishes the traditional View (dominant up to the 19th Century) from the 'Accepted Exegesis'. The earlier view tended to emphasize the first form of the syllogism thus leaning towards the idea of natural immortality; whereas the 'Accepted Exegesis' sees the Lord's resurrection as the efficient cause of all resurrection. (7)

Is there something inevitable in the resurrection 'process'? This 'necessity', as we shall see, is Iqbal's postulate in his exposition of the Quranic approach to resurrection, 'the universal phenomenon of life'. (8) Dahl considers the implications of the view sympathetically, pointing out that δεῖ in vv. 25, 53, along with δεῖ implicito (ἔστι) in v. 44, lends support to such a theory. 'But this δεῖ is so important that it must proceed from some basic necessity either in the divine will or in the nature of things.' (9) Besides 'the seed-plant analogy of vv. 36 ff. looks very like an appeal to natural law ...' (10) Whilst the analogy suggests a process or an underlying principle, this is offset by the fact that Christ's resurrection is plainly regarded as a miracle, and it is the pattern of our own (Rom.6: 5).

Dahl, however, is merely seeking to rehabilitate the Traditional view as a counterblast to the 'Accepted Exegesis'. Further on in his study he declares that 'if the implication is that the resurrection body can grow naturally out of the present one ... then the whole biblical conception of God's free gift is imperilled'. (11) Eventually Dahl offers a com-

promise in which the Resurrection of the dead is deemed to be 'the fulfilment of God's plan for mortal man' rather than the 'pure miracle' of the 'Accepted Exegesis'. (12) Barth views the matter not in terms of logical necessity arising out of an original immortality, but as a general truth with a teleological pivot. He avoids the expression 'immortality' confining his argument to the two resurrections: 'the historical fact ... is bound up ... with the perception of a general truth, which by its nature cannot emerge in history, or ... can only emerge on the confines of all history ...'. (13)

Soul and Body. Hebrew thought conceived man as a psycho-physical unity, and extended the scope of redemption to his total being. The key to Paul's soteriology (in the fullest sense of that term) is to be found in his anthropology. Moreover in his anthropology the Apostle is 'fundamentally what he describes himself, a Hebrew of the Hebrews', as J.A.T. Robinson maintains.(14) This is why Dahl makes great play of the 'Semitic Totality Concept' (15); consequently an examination of Paul's ontological terms, notably σῶμα and ψυχή is called for.

The famous Orphic pun σῶμα σῆμα epitomizes the anthropological dualism of some leading schools of Greek philosophy, in particular Orphism and Pythagoreanism. Plato apparently quoted this pun on more than one occasion (Gorgias 493A; Cratylus 400 B); 'though it is doubtful how far he identified himself with the Orphic position; for unlike his Neoplatonic successors, he did not stigmatize the body as evil, nor did he regard matter as the source of evil'. (16) This modified Platonic dichotomy largely influenced Patristic and Scholastic exposition of the doctrine of resurrection, and was accepted by the main stream of the Reformation

Churches. Hence Dahl can speak of Calvin's 'conception of the nature and immortality of the soul as almost aggresively Platonic; and also since he tended to depreciate the value of the body'. (17)

Whatever may be our evaluation of ψυχή in this particular setting, or our estimate of Platonic influence in the shaping of traditional exegesis, the argument of I Corinthians 15 hinges on the connotation of σῶμα in the Pauline epistles. J.A.T. Robinson draws our notice to the difficulty of tracing Paul's vocabulary at this point back to its O.T. source. (18) Curiously enough the O.T. has no specific word for 'body'. What it does supply instead are words such as בָּשָׂר meaning flesh, נְבֵלָה corpse and גְּוִיָּה which is occasionally rendered 'body', but which has no religious import.

Wheeler Robinson's diagnosis of man's make-up is a useful starting-point: 'The Hebrew idea of the personality is an animated body, and not an incarnated soul'. (19) Not being in a position to dogmatise in matters of Hebrew philology, I shall content myself with quotations from outstanding O.T. scholars, even though this may sound like a pompous rolling out of famous names. A.B. Davidson thus analyses nephesh, 'the actual living creature ... in a word the living concrete individual, when the word was applied to the immaterial substratum of this life, the "soul" the same concrete individual character ... still adhered to it'. (20) More tersely Pedersen declares that 'the body is the soul in its outward form'. (21) As regards the permanence of this substratum Vriezen contends that the nephesh can never be taken 'in the sense of an independent element in man which possesses eternal life in its own right'. (22)

It goes without saying that where in the gospels, the

evangelists translate ψυχή, what Jesus really said and meant was נֶפֶשׁ. The Greek word occurs in Matt. 2: 20; 6: 25; 10: 39; 16: 25; Mark 3: 4; 10: 45; Luke 9: 56; 14: 26; John 10: 11; 12: 25. In each of these examples the A.V. and R.S.V. discerningly render 'Life'. Paul's usage follows a similar trend, though with significant deviations. He uses ψυχή twelve times. In eight instances the meaning is equivalent to 'life' or 'person' (Rom. 2: 9; 11: 3; 13: 1; 16: 4; I Cor. 15: 45; II Cor. I: 23; Phil. 2: 30; I Thess 2: 8). The remaining occurrences of the word may be regarded as more strictly 'psychical' (Eph.6: 6; Phil. 1: 27) Col. 3: 23; I Thess 5: 23), (23) though except in the case of the last reference the 'psychology' is one of emotion rather than of a constituent that cannot be destroyed.

The solitary reference to ψυχή in I Corinthians 15 occurs in v. 45 ψυχὴν ζῶσαν (N.E.B. 'animate being). This is a direct quotation from Gen. 2: 7, which Davidson renders 'he became a living being).(24) 'That which persists', says Barth, 'is not the soul (that latter is the predicate which must give place to something else), but the body, and even that, not as an immortal body, but in transition from life in death to life'. (25) All told, this otherwise crucial passage sheds no light on the nature or destiny of the soul, insofar as ψυχή is envisaged independently of σῶμα. Clearly little progress can be made along this line, and a consideration of σῶμα might yield profitable results.

The plurality of meaning that attaches to σῶμα in the LXX has already been alluded to; the term can be shown to represent no fewer than eleven different words.(26) In this respect the Greek word resembles the English 'body' (etymologically untraceable), which displays similar traits of polysemy, with at least

ten distinct meanings. σῶμα occurs nine times in the chapter under review (I Cor. 15: 35, 37, 38 bis, 40 bis, 44 thrice); an examination of its nuances is crucial to our understanding of Paul's resurrection doctrine.

Like σάρξ, σῶμα can stand for the external frame of man (Gal. 6: 17; I Cor. 13: 3). More frequently the expression 'is the nearest equivalent to our word personality'. The following examples can be brought forward in support of this equivalence: Rom. 12: 1, where the N.E.B. reads 'very selves'; I Cor. 6: 18, 19; Eph. 5: 28, here ἑαυτὸν ἀγαπᾷ best explains ἑαυτῶν σώματα; in Phil. 1: 20 σώματί μου is properly rendered 'in my person' N.E.B. J.A.T. Robinson who cites these examples goes on to point out that often σῶμα 'is simply a periphrasis for the personal pronoun' (Rom.6: 12; II Cor. 4: 10; cf. I Cor. 6: 15). (27) In Rom. 6: 6; 7: 24; 8: 23; Phil.3: 21, the collective application of σῶμα suits the context. Commenting on the first two of these verses F.F. Bruce writes, 'The body ... is that heritage of human nature subject to the law of sin and death ... massa perditionis in which the whole of the old creation is involved'. (28)

Obviously we cannot sharply define the individual aspect of σῶμα over against the corporate. For instance in Rom.6: 6 the N.E.B. translates 'the sinful self', a satisfactory alternative to the collective sense. Nor, as J.A.T. Robinson insists, can we readily distinguish σάρξ from all that is implied in σῶμα Robinson goes on to quote a comment by Altheus, 'Because the one and the same body is both κοιλία (sum of sensual functions) and σῶμα (a limb of Christ's risen body), any concrete or objective expression of what dies and what is preserved and purified

through resurrection is impossible'. (29) This statement does not militate against the conclusion that σῶμα is closer to the meaning 'person' than it is to any other sense conveyed by the word 'body'.

The collective sense of σῶμα insures that the truths embodied in the term 'solidaire' are not lost sight of; while its indefinable connexion with σάρξ betokens a visible form. It thus seems that whilst in Pauline parlance σῶμα is a fluid term, it approaches most closely to the meaning 'essential personality' or 'ego', however these words might be visually conceived. A parallel English usage is suggested by the sentence, 'somebody's calling you', whereupon we instantly visualise a person without much thought of sizing up his physical frame.(30)

Climax and Analogy. To recur to the argument proper (I Cor. 15: 12 ff.): Paul's premises and deductions are calculated to reassure the believer rather than impress the outsider. He introduces the hortatory ἀδελφοί at strategic points in his 'polemic' (vv. 1, 31, 50, 58). Chrysostom in a homily confesses that 'if Christ be not raised, neither should others be raised' does not at first sight seem plausible' ... what reason can there be in this? Since then this doth not appear to be very reasonable, see how he works it out fully...'(31) In similar strain Barth agrees that 'Luther was right enough when he said that to proceed as Paul proceeded here was a weak dialectica or demonstration among heathens and unbelievers, that is probare negatum per negatum, or petere principium'. (32) Eventually the Apostle resorts to anology (vv.35-44) and revelation μυστήριον (v. 51).

Rather than embark on a lengthy treatment of exegetical problems, we shall select a few salient points from the chapter, which bear on the theme of resurrection. The sublime paragraph (vv.20-28), that follows the initial presentation of the issues at stake (vv.12-19), is unusually rich in spiritual insights. ἀπαρχὴ (v.20) foreshadows the seed-plant anology unfolded from v.35 onwards. In v.22 we have a crux interpretum ἐν τῷ χριστῷ πάντες ζωοποιηθήσονται; this some have taken to suggest universal restoration. Reputable exegetes are adverse to the view that such restoration is necessarily connoted. R.H. Charles regards the phrase 'in Christ' as decisive, restricting the denotation of the clause to 'all who are spiritually in fellowship with Christ..' (33) Robertson and Plummer hold that it is precarious, on the basis of this text, to argue that 'all mankind will be saved', and further note that ζωοποιεῖν may be used in a 'natural sense' of resuscitation. (34)

No safe inference can be drawn regarding the question of universalism from a passage primarily intended to demonstrate the reality of resurrection. Hering correctly assesses Paul's aim: 'Il laisse entout ce chapître los damnés dans l'ombre'. (35) The denial voiced in II Macc.7: 14-6 equally lacks scriptural warrant, 'But for you there will be no resurrection to life'; if this is taken to exclude the ἀνάστασις κρίσεως of John 5: 29. Paul was more concerned with the positive side of the Gospel than with negative. Moffat in his commentary recalls the words of a Jewish writer, the Apostle's contemporary, who exclaimed, 'Truly I shall not weigh what sinners have prepared for themselves, death, judgment and perdition; rather I will rejoice in what the righteous have won, homecoming redemption and recompense'

(IV Esd. 8: 38 ff.).(36)

Theologically, v.28 represents the climax of the Epistle ἵνα ᾖ ὁ Θεὸς πάντα ἐν πᾶσιν , the import of this pronouncement lies in the assurance that individual resurrection is not an end in itself, but finds its rightful place within the context of divine-human solidaire.

Despite its shortcomings the seed-plant anology (vv.35 ff.) is remarkable both for its aptness and vividness. Not surprisingly it crops up in the Talmud, and is used by Jesus as well as by Paul. Death involves dissolution; life in Christ requires continuity. The tiny seed meets both conditions. The mystery of life out of death is thus graphically illustrated by an image drawn from nature; yet this very image retains, at least for the religiously-inclined, an element of the mysterious verging on the supernatural. 'The modern man', observes Jeremias, 'passing through the ploughed fields thinks of what is going on beneath the soil, and envisages a biological development. The people of the Bible passing through the same plough-land, look up and see miracle upon miracle, nothing less than the resurrection from the dead'.(37) Ultimately even the scientific mind will concede that the process of life and growth is as inexplicable as it seems inevitable.

Many of the Rabbis believed that the particles of the body would reunite at the resurrection. A modified form of this theory was held by several Church Fathers. Tertullian's elegant formulation of it will suffice as example: 'resurget igitur caro, et quidem omnis, et quidem ipsa, et quidem integra'.(38) Chrysostom inveighs against the opponents of the view and asks,

'But where is that wonderful and surprising trophy over death, if one body fall and another rise again? ... Why, it is not one substance that is sown and another that is raised, but the same substance improved'. (39) Predictably commentators of recent years have reacted against what they came to regard as crude and materialist opinions of resurrection. Meyer bursts out with 'How unintelligent to think ... that the same body that was buried must be restored .....: Every wheat stalk contradicts thee'. 'But', retorts Dahl, 'every wheat stalk does nothing of the sort since it is biologically identical with its seed'. (40)

After rapidly tracing the development of the 'crude' view enshrined in baptismal creeds, Archbishop Ramsey is loth to dismiss the formula 'resurrection of the flesh' as a perversion; rather he sees it as 'bearing witness to a Christian view of the body as against a "spirituality which threatened the whole Christian conception of man and the world'. (41) With all its defects the traditional view does hold fast the idea of continuity, without which there could be no justice in the sequel to resurrection. (42) However, once σῶμα is equated with essential personality (or self), the convictions of the past will be seen to dovetail with the results of modern scholarship.

It is the 'sown' σῶμα that is compared with the γυμνὸν κόκκον the epithet is applied not in any pejorative sense of 'mere' but as 'naked' grain (N.E.B.) seed that is yet to ripen and be fully clothed. The pre-resurrection process is hardly a biological one. Death is all too real an enemy, and could be viewed as a 'process, in which the bodily form of the human organism decays in order that its essential principle may pass into some new mode of

expression'. (43) But whilst the decaying may be prolonged, the 'passing' is instantaneous. Barth with his flair for coining the incongruously apt says, 'It might much rather be called a thanatological magnitude'. (44)

How radical is the change which the σῶμα undergoes, and by which the ἐπιγείων shine forth as the ἐπουρανίων (v.40)? Whereas Paul's first analogy 'secures' the identity of essence between past and future self; his second analogy would seem to suggest a drastic alteration of form (in the Greek sense of μορφή). There is no end to the variety of forms in the universe. Doubtless the heavenly body held in store will be decidedly unlike the earthly, yet truly derived from it. As, however, we see the hand of God in the miracle of resurrection, the new body cannot be wholly derived from the old.

On the evidential basis of this issue notable lexicographers are at variance. Grimm-Thayer assumed that ἕτερος meant 'totally different' in contrast to ἄλλος, which on the strength of this hypothesis should mean partially different. (45) Bauer, on the other hand, holds that the two terms are virtually interchangeable. (46) The occurrence of the synonyms in alternate verses (vv.40, 41) would appear to favour Bauer's judgment. Such refinements of language were foreign to the Apostle's mind. Perhaps the ἀλλαγησόμεθα of vv. 51, 52 most adequately conveys his intention, and gives the sense of a striking transformation which none the less does not exclude continuity.

The Spiritual Body. Our Lord's resurrection appearances help to explain this paradoxical set-up. Equally applicable to the resurrection body of Christ is Nazianzen's

aphorism on the Incarnation, "What He was not he became, what He was not He remained'; a truth which Forré, in line with his favourite thesis, paraphrases thus, 'Jesus remained the Godman forever, that he never shed his human nature'.(47) The probability is still stronger that for us human nature will remain a permanent possession. Clavier sees nothing incompatible in associating newness with continuity, rather the result will be in accordance with God's purposes: 'Continuité et nouveauté ne se contradisent pas, mais se combinent harmonieusement, suivant le plan de Dieu'.(48) Westcott expresses the same truth by stating that in the resurrection 'nothing is taken away, but something is added by which all that was before present is transfigured'.(49)

In addition to having a heavenly origin, the resurrection body is integrally linked with the Holy Spirit. No phrase so neatly epitomizes Paul's conception of this future 'bodily expression' as does the numinous σῶμα πνευματικον. Of adjectives pertaining to this class Clavier says 'La désinence κόν, la meme que dans σαρκικόν, semble indiquer que cette épithète ne désigne pas une composition ..., mais une dependance ou une direction ..'. Concluding his enquiry Clavier maintains that the essential characteristic of σῶμα πνευματικόν 'n'est pas d'être ou non un corps en esprit, mais une organe de l'Esprit, commande par l'Esprit.'(50) In other words the stress is not on some ghost-like appearance so much as on control by the spirit. With this Barth agrees, 'God's Spirit triumphs not just in a pure spirituality (Geistsein), but: it is raised a (God-) spiritual body, the end of God's way is corporeality'.(51)

'Flesh and blood', Paul insists, 'cannot' inherit the kingdom

of God' (I Cor. 15:50). This again points to the otherworldly, transcendental phase of the Kingdom. So far so good, yet the denial poses a problem: how can it be reconciled with Christ's post-resurrection, 'for a spirit has not flesh and bones as you see that I have' (Luke 24: 39). Perhaps the two sayings can be harmonized, if we regard them as bound phrases, the first representing our mortal nature, whilst the second signifies a visible shape of unvarying consistency.

Archbishop Ramsey has an instructive sentence apropos the abandonement of the rigid antithesis between spirit and matter, a view fashionable in the previous generation: 'But to-day there is in physics the tendency to regard material objects as the organisation of energy in particular forms, and to hold that the persistence of a body lies not in the immutability of its physical constituents but in their continued organization in accordance with the principle of the body's self-identity',(52) a principle first perceived by Origen as Ramsey informs us. May not the clue to this principle of organization lie in πνευματικόν

Science stands baffled before the more perplexing riddles of life and death. The particles of our present bodies are in constant flux over changing 'while the sameness of the subject continues'.(53) 'It is apparently a mystery to Science', writes Dahl, 'why cells grow old and die, since there is no reason why, given the right conditions and nourishment, cells should not exist indefinitely'. Dahl takes it that the right conditions will be restored in a different sphere of existence.(54) Nor need we rule out the possibility of a non-cellular body.

A point of contact with Paul's previous resurrection manifesto

is provided in I Cor. 15: 51 (cf. I Thess. 4: 13 ff); the parallels and contrasts are worth noting. Both passages bring out the element of surprise and suddenness that is associated with the End. In both the trumpet is sounded: 'This is the decisive sign of crisis. God wills it (the trumpet is the sign of command)'. (55) With this explanation we may combine the insight afforded by Rev. 1: 10b, 'a great voice as of a trumpet', and Rev. 1: 15 b. Carrington notes that the earlier 'highly imaginative expression of these hopes and aspirations was tempered .. by St. Paul in I Cor. XV'. (56) The vision of the Lord descending is central to the earlier view, whereas the event of Christ rising is the decisive element in the latter. Paul's intention has altered; in I Cor. 15 he focuses attention on the fate of the departed, while in I Thess. he is more concerned with the destiny and solace of those who survive.

σῶμα πνευματικόν is Paul's answer to the questions he poses in v.35. Correctly understood it answers both queries. Not only does the phrase serve as the link between the pre- and post-resurrection experience of man (σῶμα being the unchanging principle of human existence), it is also a pledge that the unity of all who rise in Christ will be confirmed through the new predicate of sound spirituality, πνευματικόν . A soul without a body, even if conceivable, would be 'incomplete and distressingly dull'. H.R. Mackintosh adds that 'an outer mode of being necessarily belongs to spiritual life as such, and that if we think away externality there is an end of fellowship. Philosophical idealists may disagree with the view that externality is anything but contingent; nevertheless Mackintosh's hypothesis conforms to the promise of Scripture. He quotes a couplet to clinch

the matter.

> The eternal form will still divide
> The eternal soul from all beside. (57)

We would substitute 'self' for 'soul', and venture to append a qualifying couplet:

> The Eternal Spirit shall all unite
> In Love's eternal circle bright.

NOTES

(1) B.F. Westcott, The Gospel of the Resurrection, p.6.
(2) Reinhold Niebuhr, Beyond Tragedy, p.290.
(3) O. Cullmann, Immortality of the Soul or Resurrection of the Dead? See esp. his preface. Also J. Moffatt, I Corinthians, p.240.
(4) J. Calvin, Commentary on the Corinthian Epistles, Vol.II, p.6.
(5) K. Barth, The Resurrection of the Dead, p.133.
(6) J. Moffatt, I Corinthians, p.237.
(7) See his introd. pp. 7 ff. in The Resurrection of the Body. In subsequent chapters the contrasting views are examined.
(8) Sir M. Iqbal, Religious Thought in Islam, p.110.
(9) M.E. Dahl, op. cit., pp. 29 ff.
(10) ibid., p.52.
(11) ibid., p.53.
(12) ibid., p.75.
(13) K. Barth, op. cit., pp.140-41.
(14) J.A.T. Robinson, The Body, p.11.
(15) M.E. Dahl, op. cit., see esp. chap.V.
(16) These issues are discussed by A.W. Argyle in E.T. Vol.LXVIII No.7 (April 1957) pp.196 ff. 'Outward and Inward in Biblical thought'.
(17) M.E. Dahl, op. cit., p.37 n.1.
(18) J.A.T. Robinson, op. cit., p.11.
(19) Quoted ibid., p.14.
(20) A.B. Davidson, Theology of the O.T. p.199.
(21) Johs. Pedersen, Israel, I - II, p.171.
(22) Th. C. Vriezen, Outline of O.T. Theology, p.203.
(23) On 'body, soul and spirit', I Thess. 5: 23 Wheeler Robinson remarks; 'But this is not a systematic dissection of

distinct elements of personality; its true analogy is such an Old Testament sentence as Deut. 6: 5, where a similar enumeration emphasizes the totality of the personality'; from The Christian Doctrine of Man, p.108.

(24) A.B. Davidson, op. cit., p.121.
(25) K. Barth, op. cit., p.206.
(26) J.A.T. Robinson, op. cit., pp.11 - 12 n.2 gives the full list of Hebrew 'equivalents' for σῶμα .
(27) ibid., pp.28-30.
(28) F.F. Bruce, Romans, p.155.
(29) J.A.T. Robinson, op.cit., pp.31-32, and n.1 for Althaus' comments.
(30) cf. E.G. Selwyn, I Peter, p.187. On σκεύει 'body, almost in the popular Scottish sense, e.g. "puir-body" = person'. The verse is I Pet.3: 7.
(31) J. Chrysostom, Homilies on I Corinthians, p.549.
(32) Quoted by Barth, op. cit., p.159.
(33) R.H. Charles, Eschatology, Hebrew, Jewish and Christian, p.449.
(34) A. Robertson and A. Plummer, I Corinthians, p.353.
(35) J. Hering in his commentary on I Corinthians, quoted by Dahl, op. cit., p.16.
(36) See J. Moffett, I Corinthians, p.245.
(37) J. Jeremias, Parables of Jesus, p.91. He gives a Talmudic reference to the same effect.
(38) Cited by G.F. Moore, Judaism, Vol.II, p.394, where also Jewish opinions on resurrection are discussed: See pp.379 ff.
(39) J. Chrysostom, op.cit., p.584-85.
(40) M.E. Dahl, op. cit., p.31 n.1, where Meyer's exclamation also appears.
(41) A.M. Ramsey, The Resurrection of Christ, p.111.
(42) See J.H. Crehan's translation of Athenagoras'. The Resurrection of the Dead, Ancient Christian Writers, XXIII, pp.105 ff.
(43) L.S. Thornton, The Common Life in the Body of Christ, p.264.
(44) K. Barth, op. cit., p.204.
(45) Grimm-Thayer, p.29.
(46) Bauer's Lexicon, p.315; though his note on 'interchangeability' does not specifically cover I Cor. 15: 40, 41.
(47) N. Ferré, Christ and the Christian, p.116. He also gives a different translation of Nazianzen's saying on p.108.
(48) H. Clavier, 'Brèves remarques sur la notion σῶμα πνευματικόν' in N.T.E. p.348.
(49) B.F. Westcott, op.cit., p.139.

(50) H. Clavier, loc. cit., pp.345, 361.
(51) K. Barth, op. cit., p.203.
(52) A.M. Ramsey, op. cit., p.113.
(53) See S.D.F. Salmond, Christian Doctrine of Immortality, p.455.
(54) M.M. Dahl, op. cit., pp.90 ff.
(55) K. Barth, op. cit., p.218.
(56) P. Carrington, According to Mark, Excursus p.290.
(57) The quotations are from H.R. Mackintosh's book Immortality and the Future, pp.165-66.

CHAPTER VIII

'ETERNAL' AND 'IMMORTAL' IN THE BIBLICAL CONTEXT OF LIFE.

Aiōnios. Space Time and Deity is the title of a famous philosophical work.(1) The man in the street regards the first two dimensions as more or less real, since they may be conceived of and measured; though precise definition of such categories eludes the observer. St. Augustine once confessed that he knew what time was until someone asked him what it was; then he did not know.(2) So far as the realist (naive, critical or neo-) is concerned deity is a concept of little consequence. To the idealist, on the other hand, deity is a magnitude of a different order from space and time, in some respects more real but equally indefinable. Conversely, he may look upon space and time as illusory.

We can discuss eternity only in terms of notions derived from time or analogies based on time. If in fact time and eternity were utterly disparate, further discussion of eternal dimensions would be pointless. Man was created in God's image, and this image is a pointer to our understanding of divine attributes. Apart from the image the substance remains inscrutable. Plato declares that time is the image of the eternal αἰῶνος .. εἰκόνα χρόνον .. ὠνομάκαμεν (Timaeus 37D).(3) To arrive at a tenable view of eternity our reasoning faculties are thrust onto the track of time. Austin Farrer puts it thus: 'the positive meaning we assign to the words "eternal", "spirit" .... is borrowed from finite experiences of our own. Our type of eternal is (say) a law of nature exemplified in all physical events throughout time'.(4)

Is there then any warrant for Cullman's view that eternity

must be taken as endless time, and that the two concepts do not stand opposed? (5) More recently Barr has disputed the validity of this conclusion, since he claims it rests on a faulty linguistic procedure. The burden of Barr's contention is that the lexical data on time in the Bible cannot be fitted into a preconceived theological scheme. (6) Bearing his strictures in mind we shall proceed cautiously and resist the temptation to theorize or generalize.

The noun αἰών is a convenient starting-point for this enquiry. Used without qualification it conveys the sense of 'an age' - a period of time. Converted into an adjective it signifies 'eternal'. Hence it may serve as a purely verbal link between the concepts of time and eternity. Barr reminds us of instances where Plato uses αἰων in one or other sense. (7) In the Timaeus (37d) his usage suggests the endless, ποιεῖ μένοντος αἰῶνος, which Archer-Hind translates 'eternity that abides'. (8) Elsewhere Plato seems to use the same noun to signify 'time' simply - χαλεπὸν αἰῶνα δίαγ ουτος (Laws 701 c). Barr gives this as 'passing a hard life'. (9) A.E. Taylor offers a more intensive paraphrase of this expression 'a hell of unending misery', (10) which is closer to the connotation of αἰών in the Timaeus.

Cullmann draws a corroborative deduction from the fact that 'the plural "ages" is particularly preferred when eternity is mentioned', to speak of 'eternity in the plural proves that it does not signify the cessation of time or timelessness .... it means the linking of an unlimited series of limited world periods, whose succession only God is able to survey'. (11) Apparently Cullmann is not alone in making this assumption; Sasse in his T.W.N.T. article αἰών laboured under a similar misconception. (12)

This is course is Barr's line, and he is at pains to demonstrate that the preference for αἰῶνες on the part of two N.T. writers is purely stylistic. The Seer of the Apocalypse and the Apostle to the Gentiles both plump for the plural, this being more in accord with the doxological setting 'to which many cases in Paul and the Apocalypse belong'. (13) Obvious examples of this form occur in Rom. 16: 27; Gal. 1: 5; Phil. 4: 20; II Tim. 4: 18; Rev. 1: 6; 5: 13; 11: 15.

Furthermore, Barr maintains that where αἰών / αἰῶνες appear in bound phrases like ἐκ τοῦ αἰῶνος and εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας the semantic value of αἰών need not be the same as when it is used freely. (14) Barr is right thus far, though the semantic value of αἰών/αἰῶνες may be constant whenever these bound phrases are used, if allowance is made for the backward-looking direction of some of these phrases and the forward-looking direction of the rest. More pertinent is Barr's observation that 'the use of the plural in contexts like εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας ... may be traced to ... the Hebrew or Aramaic phenomenon', which has been styled 'plural of extension'. (15) Accordingly αἰῶνες is only a formal plural of αἰών, and a similar relation exists between ʿolāmīm and ʿolām; plurality is not here a relevant factor.

Whilst Cullmann's argument cannot be sustained on lexical grounds, it does not follow that his conclusion is thereby proved false. On αἰώνιος Barr's conclusions are closer to Cullmann's who 'rightly sees that for his sense, the entirety of time without limitation, he has to turn mainly to the adjective αἰώνιος', especially as 'the sense of αἰών found in "this age" has no adjectival counterpart'. (16) For our present purpose it seems best to narrow down the discussion to αἰών with the

meaning 'unlimited duration' plus the matching adjective αἰώνιος and to ignore the equation αἰών = a limited period or this age.

Prof. Barclay is almost certainly correct in his surmise that 'Plato may even have coined αἰώνιος '. (17) The choice of the epithet, as descriptive of the Platonic universe of ideas was doubtless purely arbitrary, yet felicitous in its derivation from αἰών . Hesiod, Theognis and Isocrates had used the noun in the unlimited sense. (18) Plato does not employ the adjective with any frequency; it is used too sparingly by him for solid concept-building. And whereas it fits in brilliantly with his grand design, the philosophic usage of such words cannot be determinative for our grasp of the unsophisticated Biblical approach to the eternal.

Need we assume that the Platonic sense of this term was what the Biblical translators (LXX) and writers had in mind, when they rendered αἰώνιος for עוֹלָם or else reproduced the Greek term to express their Master's words? To take a tentative example: Plato sets 'indestructible' in sharp antithesis to 'eternal', ἀνώλεθρον ... ἀλλ' οὐκ αἰώνιον (19); the reference is to the complex of body and soul. Can the body in this Platonic complex be rightly described as imperishable? By contrast Jesus relates the two concepts of 'eternal life' and 'imperishability' as antecedent and consequent δίδωμι αὐτοῖς ζωὴν αἰώνιον, καὶ οὐ μὴ ἀπόλωνται ... (John 10: 28); or else the second clause is to be regarded as explanatory.

From a scrutiny of the entries under αἰώνιος in several lexicons I confess it difficult to locate the precise Platonic sense of the word, insofar as it goes beyond perpetuus. Abbott-

Smith's entry makes no mention of Plato, and defines the adjective in temporal or supra-temporal terms: 'age-long', 'that which is without either beginning or end'. (20) In Liddell and Scott the emphasis is again on duration rather than on the qualitative aspect: 'perpetual', 'holding an office for life - perpetual'. (21) Grimm-Thayer give the primary meaning as without beginning or endless, adding that from Plato onwards the epithet draws attention to the 'immeasurableness of eternity'. (22)

Turning to Bauer on αἰώνιος , we find that Plato is mentioned as an opening gesture: 'eternal', with the additional caption 'standing epithet for princely, esp. imperial power'. Under this head the following references are listed: II Thess. 2: 16; Heb.9: 12; Acts 13: 48; II Pet.1: 11. The second of these verses, Heb.9: 12, speaks of αἰωνίαν λύτρωσιν ; this, in the light of Rev.13: 8, and God's eternal plan of redemption, may well represent 'unending extension in the backward direction'. A similar case could be made out for the 'eternal Kingdom' of II Pet.1: 11, extension in both directions. Most of the examples from the N.T. provided by Bauer are grouped under temporal or supra-temporal headings - long ages ago, before time began, without end, for all future time. (23) 'It is impossible to carry the qualitative sense through the New Testament', declares Salmond, 'it is only when we take the quantitative sense as fundamental that the different uses of the term (αἰώνιος) explain themselves'. (24)

Perhaps, however, Moulton and Milligen's judgment on the matter in its comprehensive sweep best covers the facts: 'Without pronouncing any opinion on the special meaning which theologians have found for this word, we must note that outside the N.T. in

the vernacular as in the classical Greek ... it never loses the sense of perpetuus'. (25) From these pronouncements we could take it the meaning 'perpetual' or 'everlasting' is the common denominator in virtually all the contexts where αἰώνιος occurs.

To revert to Plato's definition of Time; he does not expressly deny that time is eternal -αἰώνιον εἰκόνα ...χρόνον ὠνομάκαμεν ; on which his annotator comments, 'notwithstanding this (contrast) time itself is declared to be eternal ... It is eternal, not as an aggregate, but as a whole'. (26) Strictly speaking it is the attribution of eternity to 'portions of time' that Plato decisively rejects: μέρη χρόνου .. λανθάνομεν ἐπὶ τὸν ἀίδιον οὐσίαν οὐκ ὀρθῶς (Timaeus 37 D). Prima facie, this intuition may be reconciled with the perspective of Gen. 1.

At the risk of self-contradiction we should raise the question, by no means superfluous, but not immediately germane, did time begin with creation? Barr quotes Philo's interpretation of the creation story as it impinges on the 'making' of time: χρόνον γὰρ οὐκ ἦν πρὸ κόσμου ἀλλ' ἢ σὺν αὐτῷ γέγονεν ἢ μετ' αὐτόν (27) Be that as it may, it is analogically probable that time like human life was created in the beginning, and yet becomes endless in the forward direction.

That the qualitative sense often adheres to 'eternal' is undeniable. Cullmann in fact admits this, '.. as an attribute of God, the adjective αἰώνιος has the tendency to lose its time sense and is used in the qualitative sense of divine-immortal'. (28) Though of course divine-immortal is not a sharply defined attribute, and cannot be easily distinguished from 'everlasting'. In numerous instances αἰώνιος is applied not directly to God's person, but to

relations, plans and realities of which he is the initiator. Merely to define the adjective in such contexts as conforming to the divine nature is to put the problem a stage further back. We have still to make a choice: is it to be the God of Aquinas Calvin, Barth or Tillich? The philological question is turned into a theological predicament. Besides one theologian, in his more specifically philosophical works, uses 'the eternal' as a substitute for God, 'because the latter has associations which are not common to all religion'. (29)

It is more than probable that Jesus used עוֹלָם or one of its derivatives, when describing the eternal. It is equally probable that for the Evangelists and the Apostles the O.T. concept of 'eternity' was a controlling factor in their adoption and adaptation of αἰώνιος . They quote freely from the O.T., but never once allude to Plato. C.H. Dodd adduces examples from Jewish apocalypse to illustrate the use of ζωὴ αἰώνιος 'for the life after death, conceived as indefinitely, or even infinitely prolonged'. In this connexion Dodd contrasts the lexical predilections of Philo and John. The former in using ἀθανασία leaned towards pagan usage; while 'in its preference for the form ζωὴ αἰώνιος the Fourth Gospel betrays the Jewish affiliation of its language'. (30)

A brief note on the use of עוֹלָם in the O.T. may be helful. Salmond observes that, 'The Hebrew Scriptures have a variety of expressions for indefinite or unlimited duration, of which the most important is the familiar עוֹלָם .... That it denotes duration admits of no question'. (31) As this is the opinion of a N.T. Scholar, we need to turn to Hebrew lexicons for verification. Koehler-Baumgartner define עוֹלָם as a long time,

long duration, all future time, eternally, eternity - 'but not to be understood philosophically'. (32) B.D.B. give the following expressions as equivalent to עוֹלָם 'long duration, antiquity, futurity, indefinite unending future'. (33)

Barr doubts whether 'words for time and eternity ... when brought together will fall into a pattern symmorphous with the truth about time and eternity'. Accordingly he advises us to consider the syntactical context of such words in order to appraise the semantic value of any specific word. (34) But, when this has been done, some form of synthesis must be worked out, if the positive content of say αἰώνιος is to be ascertained. Barr, however, does not concern himself with positive conclusions. The frequent occurrence of αἰώνιος in the N.T. precludes a piecemeal investigation of the evidence in a single chapter; so we shall confine the discussion to noteworthy examples and patterns of thought.

In the Synoptic gospels αἰώνιος sometimes qualifies a 'disturbing reality': πῦρ (Matt.18: 8); κόλασιν (Matt.25: 41-46); ἁμαρτήματος (Mark 3: 29); cf. πυρὸς (Jude 7). McNeile comments: το πῦρ τὸ αἰώνιον .... would suggest to a Jew of that day "unending fire"' (Matthew ad v,18: 8). In the Marcan text (3: 29) the epithet is further enforced by the preceding εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα , which without doubt bears a 'durative' meaning. V. Taylor describes this 'act of sin as a permanent barrier ...'; he is loth to regard the Evangelist's language as 'that of strong hyperbole.' (35) Of special interest is ὄλεθρον αἰώνιον found in II Thess.1: 9, poles apart from Plato's ἀνώλεθρον... ἀλλ' οὐκ αἰώνιον (Laws 904 a). The two phrases however, do not stand in clear contradiction to each other, and only misguided

ingenuity would seek to square the one with the other. According to Milligan the rendering 'age-long' is here possible though he does not embrace it because 'the thought of finality is necessarily present'. (36) To be sure, the severity of such passages might be softened by weightier considerations than the linguistic arguments set out here, but it is not our present object specifically to argue for or against Universalism.

'Eternal' is quite explicitly linked with 'times' in the following texts: Rom.16: 25 χρόνοις αἰωνίοις; II Tim.1: 9, Tit.1: 2 πρὸ χρόνων αἰωνίων. Eternity (or antiquity) is thereby conceived of in terms of portions of time, naively perhaps, but pertinently for our understanding of αἰώνιος in the Biblical setting. A plausible commentary on this conception is provided by Plato in a statement which Dodd translates, 'These are aspects of time, which imitates eternity and moves in a numerical cycle' (Timaeus 38 a). (37) This statement must presumably be interpreted in the light of Barr (and Boman's) view that, 'What is called a "cyclic view" on the Greek side is ... not a view that holds history to be cyclic'; the circularity has to do with the movement of heavenly bodies and their connexion with time. (38)

The foregoing instances recall a parallel usage in the LXX, Psalm 76: 6 (77: 5) ἔτη αἰώνια. Tucked away in Philemon (v.15) is a rare adverbial use of our term - ἵνα αἰώνιον ἀπέχῃς Moule takes this to mean 'for good, permanently, exactly as Ex.21: 6 ... It must not therefore be assumed to carry a deeper meaning ... of some condition transcending time'. (39) Perhaps the way αἰώνιος is employed in Hebrews should come closest to the 'Hellenic' usage. But here again the religious roots of the

substantives qualified - 'salvation', 'Spirit', inheritance, covenant (Heb. 5: 9; 9: 14; 9: 15; 13: 20), bulking large as they do in Israelite religion tells against a hasty correlation of the adjective with any extra-Biblical pattern of thought.

What remains to be considered is the most characteristic N.T. use of αἰώνιος in the phrase 'eternal life'. This expression recurs in many parts of the N.T. and therefore calls for investigation (Matt.19: 16; Mark 10: 17; Luke 18: 18; John 3: 15, 16 etc.; Acts 13: 48; Rom. 2: 7; Gal. 6: 8; I Tim.1: 16; I John 1: 2 etc. Jude 21). Barrett simply tells us that the phrase derives from חיי עולם, and further that the term 'retains its original eschatological connection, but also that it may equally be thought of as a present gift'. (40) Turning to R.H. Lightfoot we are informed that 'eternal life is never predicated of the Father or the Son', and that the noun is often used with the adjective'. (41)

This point is taken up by Dodd in his treatment of the leading ideas that figure in the Fourth Gospel: 'In just short of half the occurrences of the word ζωή it has the epithet αἰώνιος without any apparent differences of meaning'. (42) 'Life' in the Johannine perspective is self-explanatory and can thus occur absolutely. It derives its content from what we know of the Giver: it illumines (John 1: 4), sustains (John 6: 33), abounds (John 10: 10), and endures forever (John 6: 51): This last trait, one feels is adequately secured by 'To think of any end to such life', explains Dodd, 'would be a contradiction in terms. If therefore it is to be thought of in terms of time ... it must be thought of as everlasting'. (43) We must also concur in Dodd's conclusion that when this life ...

'is transplanted into the field of present experience ... then the chief thing about it is its difference in quality from merely physical life'. (44) Several other luminous expressions add to our appreciation of the qualitative excellence of 'eternal life', foremost among which is δόξα ; a word used over 120 times in the N.T. and used with an obviously non-Platonic connotation.

By sentiment as well as by argument we are led to the view that the A.V. rendering of αἰώνιος - 'everlasting' - is by no means ill-founded. The adjective might imply more than this in certain contexts; it never implies less, except where it is expressly referred back to the past (e.g. in LXX). There it need not be regarded as carrying any sense other than the temporal.

Eichrodt's observation 'that there may be no biblical conception of time' distinct from any other conception of temporal realities, is not a judgment we care to question. (45) Hence it is idle to propound a theory of timelessness or timefulness when contemplating the eternal, so we might well end on a non-academic note.

Merely to grow old endlessly along with Tithonus seems a prospect to chill the heart. But when δόξα is wedded to αἰώνιος, with its train of graces, then the hope of the believer becomes an unrivalled prospect. 'This life' declares Stauffer, 'is the only kind of existence that can be said to have a future in a mortal world ... it has eternity in itself'. (46)

Athanasia The paucity of lexical data on immortality in the

Greek N.T. is a point that has already been made. The evidence is as follows: ἀθανασία nowhere occurs in the O.T. (LXX excluding the Apocrypha), nor is the term used in the gospels Acts, and Apocalypse. Only in three of the N.T. epistles does the English equivalent - 'immortality' appear; in one instance this is strictly a variant reading for a synonym ἀφθαρσία

In a recent work on the subject Prof. I.T. Ramsey suggests 'that belief in God has in fact always been closely associated with belief in immortality'. He goes on to aver that one or other belief tends to become dominant. In the O.T. belief in God tended to overshadow any 'stirrings of immortality', whereas in idealist philosophy the converse trend is discernible. Ramsey cites the example of McTaggart who held 'that traditional belief in God compromised and impoverished belief in immortality.' (47) In Christianity, as perhaps in Islam, the two beliefs exist in conjunction in as agreeable a balance as can be achieved on the basis of textual evidence. That is if we take immortality here, in its widest sense, to embrace related concepts like 'eternal life' and the hereafter.

If immortality is to possess any distinguishable content it must refer to the whole person, rather than to one 'component' of the human dichotomy. Clavier in alluding to I. Thess. 5: 23 says, 'La formule tripartite ... que Paul utilise ... n'a pas la riguer trichotomique du platonisme'. In any event the universe of discourse is different, 'La trichotomie de Platon se prolonge dans l'âme elle-même, qui est partagée en trois'. (48) The problems raised by the doctrine of final resurrection are less baffling than those that beset notions of individual

immortality restricted to the soul. Oscar Cullmann reminds his critics that whilst 'resurrection is firmly rooted in historic revelation a mere wish to survive in a particular manner would give 'involuntary grounds to the opponents of Christianity who constantly repeat that the faith of Christians is nothing more than the projection of their desires'. (49)

The prior question, whether immortality is a proper conclusion that the relevant non-Theological evidence merits, is one that we cannot enter into. A variety of arguments from philosophy and psychology have been mooted down the ages with the aim of showing that the idea of immortality is as rational as the beings who hold it. I.T. Ramsey lists the more impressive and tabulates the scientific objections to each. (50) These arguments and counter-arguments are so evenly balanced that they tend to cancel one another in their total impression.

'Every argument for the soul's permanence hereafter, based upon its essential character, tells equally in favour of its pre-existence'. (51) Westcott, who maintains this, proceeds to show that such arguments, if at all demonstrable, are so only on philosophical or psychological grounds apart from Biblical evidence. But if the validity of these arguments be granted (and they cannot be conclusive), then 'if we survive in any future state, we shall be equally unconscious of this through which we are now passing, and not recognise any retributive justice in the condition under which we shall exist'. (52)

As the subject must be discussed, the safer course is to discuss it in terms of 'personal immortality'. 'So we shall

make no logical misallocations, ... if we speak not so much of the "immortality of the soul" as of the "immortality of the I" or of "my immortality".' (53) Though having said this we must still confess with P.T. Forsyth, 'And I do not remember where we have Christian warrant for believing that man was created immortal'. (54)

What then is the immortality of which the Bible speaks? We revert to the scriptural and apocryphal references for light on the theme. ἀφθαρσία the near synonym of ἀθανασία occurs once in the same context (I Cor. 15: 53-54); it seems advisable to include 'incorruption' in our survey. Again so meagre is the N.T. data for 'immortality', that we are falling back on the witness the Book of Wisdom to supplement the N.T. material. This does not mean that the relevant details in Wisdom have a direct bearing on apostolic usage.

In Wisdom the distribution of the synonyms is as follows: ἀθανασία, Wis. 3: 4; 4: 1; 8: 13, 17; 15: 3 - ἀφθαρσία Wis. 2: 23; 6: 19. The Alexandrian origin of Pseudo-Solomon sufficiently accounts for some of the linguistic features observable therein. In Wisdom 'the notions about life after death combine Platonic and Stoic doctrines with Jewish teaching' writes Pfeiffer. (55) L.H. Brockington expresses the same thought more vividly: 'He is apparently attempting to bring "Solomon" up-to-date in the light of a belief in immortality. The way of life advocated in the Jewish law gives fullest scope to wisdom and leads to immortal life'. (56) The writer was in part anxious to combat a form of Epicureanism, which presumably had infected the Judaism of his day: 'When it is extinguished, the body will turn to ashes, and the spirit will dissolve like

ompty air'. (57) Sadduceeism may perhaps have been influenced by sceptic views of this type.

Bruce Metzger notes that the writer of Wisdom borrows two other Platonic tenets that are commonly linked with belief in the immortality of the soul. (58) First, he presupposes the pre-existence of souls (Wis.8: 19-20). Secondly, he implies that the body is a clog weighing down the soul (Wis.9: 15). (59) From this it is a simple step to deduce that the writer believed that man is inherently immortal, more so because by postulating pre-existence he has buttressed the structure of the argument. and yet his manner of wording is noteworthy. It is virtue and wisdom that bring about immortality (Wis. 4: 1; 8: 13, 17). Could it be said that those who lack wisdom or virtue forfeit the right to immortality?

Those passages in Wisdom in which ἀφθαρσία is used shed further light on the writer's philosophy of religion: 'The incorruptible spirit is in all things.' Goodrick remarks, 'The question is whether Pseudo-Solomon is here thinking in Greek or in Hebrew'. If the former, then the reference may be to the Stoic idea of the 'soul of the world' (Wis. 12: 1). (60) Whether or not this 'incorruptible spirit' is the principle of human immortality is left an open question. In Wis. 2: 23 we come closest to the concept of intrinsic immortality, ὁ Θεὸς ἔκτισε τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἐπ' ἀφθαρσίᾳ , which Ronald Knox renders: 'God, to be sure framed man for an immortal destiny'. ἀφθαρσία as Moffatt has it retains the idea of 'eternal duration or indestructible essence'. (61) The insights of our Alexandrian scholar are valuable; he cannot of course be

hold to blame for not seeing immortality in its true light, since that light was yet to shine.

Before proceeding to the apostolic usage of ἀθανασία, we should mention one obscure reference to the term, which while subsequent to the N.T. period merits a brief note. C.H. Dodd in his extracts from the Hermetic literature quotes a appeal made by the prophet of Poimandres: 'why have ye given yourselves over to death, when ye have the right to partake of immortality? ..... Leave corruption and partake of immortality!' (C.H. 1, 28). (62) Even though the thought here expressed can be traced to a 'fusion of Platonic and Stoic doctrine', the implication seems to be that immortality is a privilege to be gained by turning away from error. It needs to be acquired, though in theory it may be deemed an innate possession.

It may or may not be significant that Paul uses ἀθανασία in one of the two epistles addressed to a church situated in Hellas proper. As the provenance and destination of the Pastoral Epistles are in dispute we shall not trouble to draw any inference from the occurrence of the term in I Timothy. The very morphology of ἀ-θανασία suggests a connotation chiefly negative. Hence, we may regard immortality as the obverse of eternal life, with its positive content of dynamic spirituality.

In I Cor. 15: 53 we read: 'For this corruptible must put on incorruption, and this mortal must put on immortality' (R.V.); and so again in v.54. The second clause in both verses sounds like an elegant variation or sonorous iteration of the first. Dahl notes 'the guarded introduction of ἀθανασία at this point, in such a way that it could not be confused with

the pagan use of the word'. (62) Paul carefully avoids relating the nomina adjectiva to any substantives, rather he employs φθαρτὸν and θνητὸν as indefinite nouns. Just as earlier in I Cor. 15: 43, 44 he leaves the verbs σπείρεται and ἐγείρεται unattached. Apparently throughout the chapter the Apostle has the indescribable 'ego' in mind.

'The function of the prefix "in" is then operational' declares I.T. Ramsey in cryptic fashion. (64) Quite clearly immortality, in Paul's scheme, operates as a sequel to resurrection, and 'the resurrection to immortality crowns the redemption from guilt.' (65) Or, we may view incorruption and deathlessness as qualities with which we are endued at the Resurrection, in which case Clavier's observation is to point: 'revêtement, et non métamorphose intime et spirituelle, du corps présent, par deux qualités abstraites qui appartiennent proprement au seul corps pneumatique: ἀφθαρσία et ἀθανασία (66)

In what ways does ἀφθαρσία differ from its synonym? Goodrick attempts a double difinition: 'and so it may be that the first refers to eternal life beyond the grave, while the second (ἀθανασία) denotes deliverance from that second death which seems to be meant in the next verse (I Cor. 15: 54).(67) Perhaps this is too subtle a distinction, as on the face of it ἀθανασία seems closer to eternal life. The adjective ἄφθαρτον describes the crown that Christians strive for (I Cor. 9: 25), and similarly it is applied to the inheritance kept in heaven for them (I Pet. 1: 4; cf. I Pet. 1: 23; 3: 4). Commenting on the first of these Petrine texts Selwyn says, 'the adjectives...

are well suited to describe an inheritance in which life is immortal ... and the satisfactions offered beyond all the vicissitudes of time'. (68)

Elsewhere the epithet is applied to the risen ones (I Cor. 15: 52), and to God (Rom. 1: 23; I Tim. 1: 17). Moffatt's definition quoted above 'eternal duration or indestructible essence' is the most satisfactory where ἄφθαρτος is attributed to God. ἀθανάτῳ is a relatively poorly attested variant reading in I Tim. 1: 17. The third reference to divine immortality is found in I Tim. 6: 16: Κύριος ... ὁ μόνος ἔχων ἀθανασίαν . In this verse immortality is ascribed either to God or to Christ, though the doxological context makes the former ascription more probable. This is, as it were, Immortality in the absolute sense, intrinsic and unqualified. Commentator's do no more then stress the unique sense in which God is here declared to be immortal. (69)

Yet what God possesses He willingly bestows upon his creatures. This is true of His holiness, love and righteousness. With the proper qualification it is true also of His immortality. And all, according to the N.T., is imparted through the Son. Thus we read in our final text II Tim. 1: 10: 'our Saviour Jesus Christ, who abolished death and brought life and immortality (ἀφθαρσίαν) to light through the gospel'. It is the Gospel which illumines the doctrine of eternal life and immortality, for thereby Christ's triumph is proclaimed over 'him who had death at his command' (Heb. 2: 14 N.E.B.). The concrete reality of the Incarnation culminating in Christ's Resurrection point man to what lies beyond death. The hope of immortality has been

converted into a certainty by the Gospel of the Resurrection.

NOTES.

(1) S. Alexander, Space, Time and Deity (London, 1920).
(2) Cited in T.C.E., Vol. II, p. 1115, art. 'Time' by A.K. Rule.
(3) Platonis Opera IV & V, in loc.
(4) A. Farrer, art. 'Anology' in T.C.E., Vol. I, p. 38.
(5) O. Cullmann, Christ and Time, p. 46; though he claims that time and unlimited time stand opposed (ibid.).
(6) See J. Barr, Biblical Words for Time, pp. 67 ff.
(7) ibid., p. 72.
(8) R.D. Archer-Hind, The Timaeus of Plato, p. 119.
(9) J. Barr, op. cit., p. 72.
(10) A.E. Taylor, The Laws of Plato, p. 84.
(11) O. Cullmann, op. cit., p. 46.
(12) J. Barr, op. cit., p. 65, quotes Sasse's remarks.
(13) ibid., p. 66.
(14) ibid., p. 68.
(15) ibid., p. 65.
(16) ibid., p. 77.
(17) W. Barclay, More N.T. Words, p. 25.
(18) See Bauer's Lexicon, p. 26.
(19) Laws 904 a (Platonis Opera V).
(20) Abbott-Smith, pp. 15-16.
(21) L.S. p. 45.
(22) Grimm-Thayer, pp. 20-21.
(23) Bauer's Lexicon, pp. 27-28.
(24) S.D.F. Salmond, Christian Doctrine of Immortality, p. 518.
(25) M.M. p. 16.
(26) R.D. Archer-Hind, op. cit., pp. 118-20.
(27) J. Barr, op. cit., p. 75.
(28) O. Cullmann, op. cit., p. 48 n.1.
(29) Anders Nygren, See E.T. Vol. LXXIV No. 10 (July 1963). p. 302 n.1. P.S. Watson's art. 'Theologians of our Time'.
(30) C.H. Dodd, The Fourth Gospel, pp. 144, 146.
(31) S.D.F. Salmond, op. cit., p. 517.
(32) Koehler-Baumgartner, p. 688.
(33) B.D.B. pp. 761-62.
(34) J. Barr, op. cit., pp. 94, 97.
(35) V. Taylor, Mark, p. 244. McNeile's note is from his Matthew p. 262.
(36) G. Milligan, Thessalonians, p. 91.

(37) C.H. Dodd, op. cit., p.150.
(38) J. Barr, op. cit., pp. 140-41. He also mentions Bowen's point.
(39) C.F.D. Moule, Colossians, p.146.
(40) C.K. Barrett, John, p.179.
(41) R.H. Lightfoot, St. John's Gospel, p.132.
(42) C.H. Dodd, op. cit., p.144.
(43) ibid., p.150.
(44) ibid., p.149.
(45) Quoted by Barr, op. cit.,pp. 143-44.
(46) E. Stauffer, N.T. Theology, p.171. See also quotation from Moffatt at my note (61).
(47) I.T. Ramsey, Freedom and Immortality, p.79.
(48) H. Clavier, art. 'Brèves remarques sur la notion de σῶμα πνευματικόν ', in B.N.T.E. p.350 and n.4.
(49) O. Cullmann, Immortality of the Soul or Resurrection of the Dead? p. 9.
(50) I.T. Ramsey, op. cit.,pp. 91 ff.
(51) B.F. Westcott, The Gospel of the Resurrection, pp. 127-28.
(52) ibid., p. 128.
(53) I.T. Ramsey, op. cit., p. 100.
(54) P.T. Forsyth, This Life and the Next, p. 21. Cf. his statement: 'Immortality is not founded on the nature of the psychic organism, but on its relation to Another' (ibid, p.20.)
(55) R.H. Pfeiffer, art. 'Apocrypha', in T.C.E. Vol.I, p.51.
(56) L.H. Brockington, A Critical Introduction to the Apocrypha, p.59.
(57) The ref. is Wis.2: 3. See A.T.S. Goodrick, 'The Book of Wisdom, pp. 101 ff. for a discussion on possible Epicurean influences.
(58) B.M. Metzger, An Introduction to the Apocrypha, p. 74.
(59) According to Goodrick, op. cit., p.378. Mengel finds a verbal knowledge of Phaedo 81 c in Wis. 9: 15.
(60) ibid., p. 255.
(61) J. Moffatt, I. Corinthians, p.267. According to Moffatt' "immortal" called up in mind associations which were practically the same as those of what is "imperishable", and they amount to an equivalent for "glory".' (ibid.)
(62) C.H. Dodd, op. cit., p.14. Cf. Rom.2: 7, Honour and incorruption are sought for by patience and well-doing. What is found is better still, eternal life.
(63) M.E. Dahl, The Resurrection of the Body, p.84 n.4.
(64) I.T. Ramsey, op. cit., p.92.
(65) P.T. Forsyth, op. cit., p.49.

(66) H. Clavier, loc. cit., p.350.
(67) A.T.S. Goodrick, op. cit., p. 118.
(68) E.G. Selwyn, I. Peter, p.124.
(69) See commentaries by C.K. Barrett, D. Guthrie and J.N.D. Kelly on The Pastoral Epistles (in loc.).

PART TWO

THE QURANIC DATA.

FACETS OF ESCHATOLOGY IN THE EARLY MECCAN SURAS

Scholars are agreed that the Quran is the fountain-head of Islamic thought and the mainspring of Muslim action. Some would go further and maintain that 'other sources for the Islamic Prophet's teaching inspire little confidence'. (1) The early traditions doubtless proved of value in satisfying the curiosity of the masses for colourful and intimate details of their leader's life, but as a guide to his teaching they are often unreliable. Guillaume, who speaks confidently of the formative influence of Tradition in Islamic life, declares that 'it is difficult to regard the hadith literature as a whole as an accurate and trustworthy record of the sayings and doings of Muhammad'. (2) It is with the Prophet's authentic words that we are mostly concerned in these chapters. Occasional allusion will be made to isolated hadiths, where these appear to shed light on salient points of Quranic eschatology; but, in the main, appeal will be made for evidence to the authority of the Quran.

The limiting of discussion to the Holy Book will afford a more suitable basis for comparison with the corresponding source-book, the New Testament. Fortunately in the Quran problems of authenticity scarcely exist. Derenbourg avers, 'L'authenticité du Coran n'a jamais été mise en doute, et la science n'a fait que confirmer et sanctionner la tradition qui nommait Mahomet comme l'auteur du Livre dans tous ses chapitres et versets'. (3) Moreover, there is a substantial textual uniformity that contrasts strikingly with the rich diversity of N.T. manuscript evidence;

single authorship and a speedy fixing of a standard recension contributed to this uniformity.

Islam lacks a doctrine of sacrifice or of full-scale mediation. 'The Quran', write Iqbal, 'is led to reject the idea of redemption'. He traces the root of this attitude to the unique view of man 'which makes it impossible for one individual to bear the burden of another'. (4) Further, as we shall see, the Quran relegates the historical to a secondary role. (5) What chiefly engages the attention of the Holy Book (apart from that more implicit 'view of man') are two cardinal dogmas - the unity of God and the certainty of the End. These tenets, above all others hold the field in the realm of Quranic thought. As an example we take the Fātihah (which, whatever its date, sums up the message of the Quran in the more vital aspects of creed and conduct). Here pride of place is given to the Divine Being and His attributes. This affirmation is directly followed by a clear-cut reference to the Day of Doom. The petition for guidance in the second half of Sura I has point only in the light of what comes before.

Any attempt on the part of a student to work out a systematic chronology of the Suras is bound to be precarious, and would be open to all the objections that previous attempts of this sort (from Jalāluddīn's to Bell's) have met with. If as Bell has surmised the Quran was first promulgated in short pieces, subsequently put together in Suras, (6) the effort to trace the development of the Sura forms, would require a preliminary incursion into form criticism, an endless and thankless task for anyone reckless enough to undertake it. A simpler course is to group the Suras roughly according to the order worked out

by Nöldeke. (7) This scholar's scheme has all the marks of Teutonic thoroughness, and is the one which has found the widest acceptance; in Rodwell's words it 'ought not to be departed from without weighty reasons'. (8) Accordingly Nöldeke's arrangement, duly modified by appeal to the traditional (Egyptian) order, and the cautious analysis of Bell, is the one we shall adopt as a basis for chronology.

Bell, himself, admits that Nöldeke's dating is useful as a first approximation, but he holds that 'the criterion of style seems to play too large a part in it'. (9) He assigns several passages embedded in the Suras of the earlier period to the Medinan sojourn, sometimes on tenuous grounds such as 'they appear so'. At other times no reason whatever is adduced in support of a particular dating. True, the criterion of style seems everywhere decisive in Nöldeke's work, but then style together with vocabulary are the main tests for dating the consecutive literary output of any creative mind. Admittedly matter, as well as form, should be taken into account in any reckoning of dates. However, as the eschatological materials is so widely and evenly distributed over the Suras, the validity of this test (of content) is correspondingly reduced.

Arberry in his preface notes that: 'there is a repertory of familiar themes running through the whole Koran; each Sura elaborates or adumbrates one or more - often many - of these'. (10) Of such recurrent themes that of Judgment (and the Last Day) comes second in importance surpassed only by the concept of deity. Hence the thematic and basic nature of our subject renders the criterion of content less important, wherever it is presumed to run counter to the test of style.

The salient features of the early Suras are well-known and readily distinguishable. Poetic fire and figurative colouring heighten the effect of the mysterious deliverances that introduce the new revelation. In these Suras, says Rodwell, 'we cannot but notice the entire predominance of the poetical element, a deep appreciation of the beauty of natural objects, brief fragmentary and impassioned utterances, denunciations of woe and punishment, expressed for the most part in lines of extreme brevity'. (11) It is the language of one who feels he has little time to lose, who is impelled by the urgency of a divine message. Yet somehow the gravity of the message is reinforced by the formal beauty of expression to make the total effect doubly impressive.

Sabbagh finds that illustrations borrowed from nature abound in these Suras, and he gives the reason, 'Car les figures se rapportant au ciel, a la terre, aux montagnes, aux valle's etc. sons plus poetiques'. (12) This phenomenon is strikingly exemplified in (S.LV; LXXX; LXXXI; LXXVIII; XCI; CV. Stanton discovers a further characteristic namely that these Suras contain 'exhortations' which are 'enforced by frequent oaths by various things created'. (13) Instances of this device occur in LII, 1 LIII, 1; LXXXV, I; LXXXVI, 1; XCI, 1; XCIII, 1; C, 1.

Almost from the outset Muhammad encountered opposition to his claims. Montgomery Watt lays stress on this factor, and draws the inference that those passages in the first Suras where this element is absent must antedate sections in which explicit mention is made of antagonism. (14) One thing seems certain, the message delivered by the Prophet soon aroused scorn and opposition. In all probablity the theme of judgment, though not clearly stated at

first, was hinted at from time to time. This together with the denunciation of idolatry and of man's ingratitude provoked such bitterness as later led to open conflict between the Prophet's adherents and his opponents. Montgomery Watt's 'kerygmatic' kernel, where there is no suggestion of opposition' includes patently early passages like XCVI, 1-8; LXXIV, 1-10; XCIII; LXXXVI, 1-10; LV. (15) We may take it that far more was said by Muhammad than is preserved in the terse lines of these Suras.

Ruj ʿā and Zabāniyah. The first of these Suras contains only a veiled allusion to the hereafter (XCVI, 8). For riming effect the hapax الرُجعى is used here, in place of the more familiar مرجع of subsequent Suras. Baiḍāwī interprets the verse as a warning against man's tendency to self-assertion; the prospect of meeting God thus acts as a deterrent to evil-doers. (16) Another term in this Sura deserves attention. Andrae links الزبانية (XCVI, 18) with Ephrem's dabora, 'the ductores who ... lead the departed souls to judgment'. The Syriac word is not properly cognate, and Jeffery has shown that the morphology of the Quranic term can be traced to an Iranian source, without inferring that it is a loan-word. There is no explicit reference in the passage to Hell, and we may assume that the expression زبانية, with its ominous ring, was understood by those who heard it. It would seem then that while the message of doom was implicit at this early stage, it did not come as an unmistakable clarion call.

Naqūr. Another word, in the next Sura (chronologically), is النقور. A synonym is substituted for this at a later date. نقور is the trump (LXXIV, 8); Baiḍāwī notes the connexion between the root verb and the 'striking' or 'plucking' by which sounds are

produced on musical instruments.[19] This observation in itself is a minor point, except insofar as the use of نقور illustrates a common feature of these early passages. In them one finds a substantial number of unusual words, many of dubious ancestry, to express notions which later become fixed in stereotyped formulas and refrains, the meaning of which requires little explanation.

Saqar and Hutamah. Sura LXXIV has yet another distinctive expression, سقر (vv.26, 27, 43 recurring in LIV, 48). On the assumption that the word is genuinely Arabic, it is adequately explained by the epexegetical verses that follow, and would thus constitute the earliest reference in the Quran to the Inferno. Soon after this the Prophet introduces the first of many synonyms for سقر. This is the cryptic الحُطَمَة, which occurs in CIV, 4, 5, but not elsewhere. Whilst Masson's remark, 'L'expression al Hutama semble être un nom propre crée pour la circonstance',[20] is doubtless correct, it fails to account for the purpose of the 'creation'. To strengthen the impact made by trumpet blasts and scorching flames the Prophet throws out this enigmatic word, which if anything would convey the force of a 'crushing' experience.

Hāwiyah. A genuine hapax crops up in CI, 6; this is هاوية.

The various suggestions for the foreign derivation of this term are listed and found wanting by Jeffery.[21] The equation of هاوية with cognate Hebrew and Syriac words meaning chasm or abyss appears sound enough, more so because the noun can plausibly be derived from هوى 'to fall' (per Zamakhshari and Rāzi).[22] Furthermore أُمّ, the noun to which هاوية acts as predicate, conjures up the picture of a vast enclosing womb. In the Arabic Bible هاوية generally represents the Hebrew Sheol (Gen.37: 35; II Sam. 22: 6; Job 11: 8; Ps.9: 17 etc.[23]

There is no evidence to show that Muhammad was conversant with the O.T. concept of Sheol and all its implications. By his time the Hebrew concept has given way to more elaborate representations of the hereafter in Jewish thought. Notwithstanding the 'topographical' affinity of the Hebrew Sheol with such ideas as the pit and the grave,(24) the Arabic term is never associated in popular Muslim theology with that popular topic of Tradition, the punishment in the tomb.(25) Explanations, in the context, to the effect that حُطَمَة and هاوية = fire, are curtly metonymical (container by the thing contained); and are not meant to be formal definitions of realities which after all transcend the categories of time and space.

Sāhirah and Sijjin. Two other terms have sometimes been classed as names for Hell, but the arguments behind the identification are not especially cogent. The first word الساهرة (LXXIX, 14) is vaguely related to the notion of 'wakefulness'. As an afterthought Baiḍāwī adds وقيل اسم لجهنم to his comments on the verse; even though his previous interpretation is more strictly etymological and so more convincing.(26) The second term سجين occurs in LXXXIII, 7. At first sight this looks like a corruption of the usual word for 'prison', and thus as the reverse of عليين (LXXXIII, 18) it makes good sense. The pair would be at once complementary and antithetical (the infernal and supernal regions, cf. جنّة عالية LXIX, 22). The probable connexion of the two terms is alluded to by Muslim commentators, though they are tied to the Quranic definition that the antonyms stand for 'a book inscribed'.(27) Nöldeke's suggestion that سجين was a word of Muhammad's own coining, to which Jeffery adds that كتاب مرقوم crept in as explanatory gloss.(28) But

why should a glossator fall back on so far-fetched an explanation?

Laẓā and the Seven. To these distinctive expressions لظى should be attached. Baiḍāwī defines the term as 'the genuine flame' or else a proper noun for the Fire (LXX, 15-16).(29) This 'place-name' along with three of the foregoing (سقر - هاوية - حطمة) and three others still to be mentioned(سعير - جهنم - جحيم) make up the seven sectors of Hell. The separate compartments (some more permanent than others) were each assigned to reprobates of various sects.

Muslim commentators vie with one another in supplementing the grim and garish details of the original imagery.(30) These absurdly elaborate interpretations are rendered improbable by the fact that the majority of the names for Hell belong to the early period, when the Prophet's only opponents were his fellow Meccans. No allowance had yet been made for the possible rejection of the new faith by monotheists of older religions.

Sa'ir, Jahannam and Nār. The more technical and recognised names for Hell do appear in these early Suras, but occur much more frequently in the Suras of the middle and later periods. Of these سعير appears once in an early passage (LXXXIV, 12) and 15 times in later portions: this term is properly a synonym for Fire. Also rare in the early period is the transparently foreign جهنم, Gehinnom (LII, 13; LV, 43; LXXVIII, 21; LXXXV, 10; LXXXIX, 24), that is 5 times out of a total 77 in the whole of the Qurʾān.

The distribution of نار (Fire) is a more complex matter. Used in the construct or qualified state it is common in the early period (LII, 13; LXXXVIII, 4; XC, 20; XCII, 14; XCVIII,

5; CI, 8; CIV, 6; CXI, 3, or 8 out of 20 occurrences). In the absolute form, however, it is very infrequent in these early Suras (النار LII, 14; LXXIV, 31; LXXXV, 5; LXXXVII, 12 - 4 out of nearly 100 instances. Moreover two of these verses are assigned to a later date by Bell, a dating with which Nöldeke would seem to agree. (31) Such obvious disparity in distribution suggests that 'The Fire' was gradually converted into the standard name for Hell, and it remains the most expressive and readily conceivable of the various names. At first, however, the concrete imagery of consuming flames, duly magnified by epithets and qualifying phrases, sufficed as a graphic symbol of the torments to come.

Jahīm and Naʿīm. As Ṣubḥī al Ṣālih has observed one of the traits that mark out the Suras of the first Meccan phase is 'an ardent brief and elliptical style, with the symmetry of antithesis'. (32) This antithesis is made all the more impressive by the assonance with which these passages are so profusely adorned. A case in point is the combination. The former term is the 'Hot Place' par excellence. جحيم is fairly frequent in the early stage (LII, 18; LXXIX, 36; LXXXI, 12; LXXXII, 14; LXXXIII, 16; CII, 6 - i.e. 6 out of 25 occurrences). One reason for this relative frequency is the fact that جحيم conveniently rimes with its opposite. نعيم - جحيم

The latter word, نعيم, is even more typical of the early Suras. It occurs sixteen times in the Qurān; and half of these occurrences are in the first Meccan period (LII, 17; LVI, 12, 88; LXVIII, 34; LXX, 38; LXXXII, 13; LXXXIII, 22, 24; CII, 8). In the last of these texts the reference may be to an earthly

summum bonum, and not to the bliss hereafter. نعيم is often associated with جنّات - جنّة, and being generally anarthrous it conjures up the image of a state rather than that of a place, (though it is difficult to visualise the one without the other). Bearing in mind the notions of luxury and ease that inhere in the expression, we see how aptly it symbolises the delights that are reserved for the faithful, delights which are vividly depicted in many of the contexts where the word occurs.

The Garden or Gardens. The link between جنّات - جنّة and نعيم has already been alluded to. Garden or Gardens are terms which in the Quran are employed in so general a sense and so freely distributed throughout the Book that no firm deduction can be drawn regarding its distinctive usage in the early Suras. By contrast فردوس and غرف have yet to make an appearance, so we may well defer the discussion of these terms until the next chapter. The locations of جنّات - جنّة recall the Garden of Eden, the idyllic domain over which the first pair ruled and roamed (Gen.1: 28; 2: 8); the vision of this primal oasis is thus projected into the unknown future. This is but a further illustration of a principle enunciated by Wensinck (following on Gunkel), namely that 'Oriental eschatology is the reflex of primeval events'. (33)

More important still is the consideration that the picture of a garden with cooling streams and luscious fruit was bound to have a strong attraction for the inhabitants of so barren a tract as the Arabian peninsula. The Quranic presentation in many of its forms was, in the words of Montgomery Watt, 'suited in the first place to the restricted horizons of Mecca and Medina'. (34) Oddly enough Heaven is never once designated a garden in the

figurative language of the N.T. The quasi-technical use of Paradise, in Luke 23: 43; II Cor. 12: 4; Rev. 2: 7, cannot be taken as proof to the contrary. The Garden was the scene of man's fall, as it became the arena of the Son of Man's conflict and betrayal. Whether or not this be the reason for his neglect of the expression as an eschatological metapher, the Seer of Revelation prefers the symbolism of a Holy City. Except for the river of living water and the tree of life, all the features in the vision of De Civitate Dei are civic or majestic (Rev. 21, 22).

Kawthar. Repeated attempts have been made to include الكوثر within the scenery of Paradise (CVIII, 1). Wensinck points out that such interpretations were adopted by the later commentators, whereas older exegetes were unaware of this particular extension of meaning. (35) As a peg on which to hang subsidiary ideas culled from Christian sources the word doubtless proved handy. For al-Ghazālī Kawthar denotes a river in Paradise perhaps flowing into a basin, from which one drinks never to thirst again. (36) Shahrastānī, on the other hand, finds a similarity between the basin and the rivers of Paradise, thus implying that the basin is a station on the way to Heaven. (37) The affinity of thought with the more spiritual conception of John 4: 14 instantly springs to mind (cf. Rev. 7: 16-17) Etymologically the grounds for a concrete denotation of الكوثر are tenuous, and the older interpretation that abundance (of favour) is meant has much to commend it (cf. John 7: 38).

Judgment and Resurrection. 'Muhammad's emphasis on punishment', states Bell, 'came not at the beginning, but as a reaction to indifference or opposition'. (38) Not quite at the start perhaps, but soon after the Fatrah the

attitude of the Meccans began to harden. The Prophet on his part proclaimed the message of judgment, predicting temporal disaster and cosmic catastrophe, the whole gradually merging into the concept of the Last Day. It would be difficult to show that one or other aspect of punishment - temporal cosmic or final - was predominant in Muhammad's view of judgment; unless of course the evidence is selected on a purely arbitrary basis on an a priori scheme of dating. Clearly all three aspects are envisaged in the early Suras, and that right from the first; though probably the Prophet's presuppositions as to what was involved in the 'imminent' judgment, became gradually modified.

At the outset there was no pressing need to set forth a doctrine of resurrection: the fact of judgment was in itself an effective spur (or deterrent) to those disposed to listen. We read of Judgment الدين (LXXXII, 9; XCV, 7; CVII, 1), of the Day of Judgment (LXX, 26; LXXIV, 47; LXXXII, 15), and of the Day used absolutely (LXX, 44; LXXX, 34; LXXXVI, 9). To be sure, the phrase يوم القيامة occurs in LXVIII, 39, but both Nöldeke and Tradition assign the second half of this Sura to the Medinan period. This leaves the two references to the 'Day or Resurrection' in LXXV, 1, 6. Sura LXXV is pre-eminently the resurrection Sura, simply because the Resurrection is there introduced, as it were without preamble. It would seem that at this point Muhammad realized the important part that resurrection must play in any balanced view of the End.

The foregoing statement requires qualification. The idea of resurrection is touched on somewhat earlier than in Sura

LXXV. (XCIX; LXXXII; LXXXIV). It is noteworthy that the verbs used in those contexts are other than the common verbs of rising. Two of the usual verbs بعث and خرج do in fact occur in the last phase of the earliest period (LVI, 47; LXXXIII, 4; LXX, 43). But the composite nature of Sura LVI is admitted by Noldeke, while Tradition assigns LXX and LXXXIII to the late Meccan period.(39) Bell regards both LVI, 47 and LXX, 43 as late additions.(40)

To begin with XCIX, 6: here we have the clause يَصْدُرُ النَّاسُ أَشْتَاتًا The passage belongs to the Earthquake Sura, and the earthquake is seen as the indirect cause or, at least, as the concomitant of the Resurrection. The earth brings forth her treasures of dead bodies. People emerge one by one and are confronted with the record of their deeds. In the next Sura (again per Noldeke's reckoning) yet another verb is used بُعْثِرَتْ القبور (LXXXII, 4). According to Baiḍāwī this verb is morphologically related to بعث, the additional consonant having an intensive effect.(41) The dictionary meaning, however, is to overturn. What follows this verse is a reference not to people en masse, but to the individual (نفس) who rises to recognize his folly and neglect.

The same verb بُعْثِرَ comes again in a similar context (C, 9). In another Sura, the language of which is reminiscent of Surat as-Zalzaleh, the verb employed is تخلّت, evacuated (LXXXIV, 4). The earth is emptied of its burden of humanity; the inference that humanity is the most important element in what is emitted seems fairly obvious. There is a hint of the resurrection idea in the re-assembling of bones mentioned in LXXV, 3-4. This verse foreshadows the fuller parabolic treatment of physical resuscitation found in II, 261.

The idea of resurrection somewhat eases the problem as to how those who died before the 'Hour' receive a just recompense for conduct on earth. Justice can be most condignly meted to individuals who are in no doubt concerning the survival of their personal identities. On the Semitic view of personality a restitution of the body is essential, insuring as it does this awareness of continuity with a past experience. 'To deny a bodily resurrection', says Shahrastāni, 'is to deny rewards and punishments, and leads to many contradictory theses ....'(42) At this early stage Muhammad has realized that if judgment was to embrace both the living and the dead, it had to be preceded by an act of resurrection. Judgment is logically the next step to resurrection; and resurrection, itself, becomes the door to Heaven or Hell, themes which the Prohpet preached with such earnestness and zeal.

As for immortality, whilst the concept is implicit in these early Suras, it finds no express mention. Such refrains as هم فيها خالدون first appear at a much later period. Other expressions involving the notions of perpetuity and permanence are similarly absent. The serving youths (LVI, 17), are said to be made immortal, and allusion is made to the natural desire in man for continued survival (CIV, 3); this is all. But these two unconnected texts may be taken as pointers to the probablity of an abiding state hereafter.

NOTES.

(1) D.S. Margoliouth, Mohammed, p.V.
(2) A. Guillaume, The Traditions of Islam, p.12 Cf. C.C. Torrey's more sweeping judgment: 'The Muslim Tradition gives a picture of this primitive period which is so untrustworthy in its religions, content that it very rarely can be given any weight.' The Jewish Foundation of Islam, p.8.

(3) Hartwig Derenbourg, quoted by P. Casanova in Mohammed et la Fin du Monde, p.3 n.1.
(4) Sir M. Iqbal, Religious Thought in Islam, p.90.
(5) See chap. VII under 'History and Chronology'.
(6) R. Bell, Introduction to the Qur'ān, p.82.
(7) Nöldeke/Schwally, Geschichte des Qorāns, pp.74-234. The comparative schemes of chronological arrangements including that of Nöldeke and of Tradition (Egyptian) is given by Bell in op.cit., p.110-13. Constant reference will be made to Bell's table.
(8) J.M. Rodwell, The Koran, Preface, p.3.
(9) R. Bell, op.cit., p.102.
(10) A.J. Arberry, The Koran Interpreted, Vol.I, p.28.
(11) J.M. Rodwell, op. cit., p.3.
(12) T. Sabbagh, La Métaphore dans le Coran, p.246.
(13) H.U.W. Stanton, The Teaching of the Qur'an, p.20.
(14) W.M. Watt, Muhammad at Mecca, p.61.
(15) Ibid., p.60.
(16) Baidāwi, in loc.
(17) T. Andrae, Les Origines, p.159. He gives the alternative chabbaya, which sounds rather more like the Arabic term.
(18) See A. Jeffery, Foreign Vocabulary of the Qur'an, p.148.
(19) Baidāwi, in loc.
(20) D. Masson, Le Coran, p.745.
(21) A. Jeffery, op. cit., p.283.
(22) Jeffery, ibid., refers to the two Muslim commentators.
(23) See for instance the B.F.B.S. translation.
(24) See A.B. Davidson, The Theology of the O.T., pp.425, 499.
(25) Cf. A.J. Wensinck, The Muslim Creed, pp.163 ff.
(26) Baidāwi, in loc.
(27) See Sale's, The Koran, p.573.
(28) A. Jeffery, op. cit., p.165. He also cites Nöldeke's surmise.
(29) Baidāwi, in loc.
(30) For a discussion, of the subject see Hughes, Dictionary of Islam, pp.170 ff.
(31) See Bell's notes on Sura LXXIV 'the palpably Medinan verses, 31-34' in The Qurān Vol.2, p.616; and on Sura LXXXV, 5 ibid., p.646. Nöldeke's observations on later fragments in these Suras are to be found in his Geschichte pp.88 ff. Further, the reference to fire in LXXXVII, 12 may not be absolute in the strict sense.

(32) In his thesis summarized L. Gardet, art. 'Djanna', E.I.(2) Vol.II, p.448.
(33) A.J. Wensinck, op.cit., p.169.
(34) W.M. Watt, art. 'Created in His Image' in Transactions, Vol. XVIII p.38.
(35) A.J. Wensinck, op.cit., pp.231 ff.
(36) Ihyā', Vol.IV, p.529.
(37) Shahrastānī, Kitāb Nihāyatu'l Iqdām, p.148 (Ar.p.470), A. Guillaume.
(38) R. Bell, Introduction, p.106.
(39) See R. Bell's chronological table, ibid., p.112.
(40) See his notes on Suras LVI and LXX, in Vol.2 of The Qur'ān, pp.553, 604.
(41) Baidāwī, ad LXXXII, 4.
(42) Shahrastānī, op.cit., p.148 (Ar. p.468).

CHAPTER II

PROBLEMS OF THE END IN THE MIDDLE AND LATER MECCAN SURAS.

The Suras of the mid-Meccan period belong to a so-called transitional stage of Quranic unfolding; accordingly they display certain features which have already been observed in the earlier Suras. Vivid imagery, poetic fervour expressed in pithy enigmatic lines are the more obvious of the common traits that come to mind, and along with this we find the peculiar assonance which makes such lines so memorable. Another characteristic, the opening asseveration, crops up intermittently. But in this second sub-period the few introductory oaths that occur are taken by the Holy Book rather than by natural objects as had been the Prophet's custom hitherto (XLIV, 1; L, 1; XXXVIII, 1; XXXVI, 1). 'The asseverative style', as Bell points out, 'seems to have gradually been discarded'. (1)

At the outset it should be stated that the bulk of the Suras from which we shall be quoting in this chapter are classified by Muir, Grimme and Tradition as pertaining to the second main period of Quranic evolution (Noldëke's second and third sub-periods), though predictably there is considerable disagreement among the four as to the exact order within the major grouping. (2)

A further characteristic of these middle and later Meccan Suras is the recounting of prophetic stories from antiquity. At times the purpose is decidedly eschatological, while at others it is hortatory. These ancient episodes are repeated in various forms to underline the inescapable nature of the judgment which overwhelmed infidels of successive generations in the past.

Bell feels that 'the prophetic stories are repeated almost to weariness'. (3) Such reiteration probably reflects the constant use of similar themes with appropriate variations in the Prophet's preaching to changing audiences and on several occasions. Gradually and unavoidably the freshness and novelty of any message, however startling at first, begins to wear off. The critical Western reader is more aware of the monotony of these narratives than the Arab hearers of the original. But growing monotony is undeniably an impression of the final Meccan phase. Thus Nöldeke avers, 'die Phantasie Muhammeds musste an Schwung and Ursprünglichkeit einbussen'. (4) On principle, the prophet could not afford to alter the emphasis that he held to be primary. In any event, to a relatively uncritical audience repetition of this kind is proof of intense conviction.

An added reason for the introduction of these accounts of patriarchal and prophetic preaching was Muhammad's increasing contacts with Jews and other monotheists, from whom the basic traditions were acquired. Among the characters who figure in the accounts are Noah (Suras XXXVII; LXXI; XXVI; XXIII; XXI; XI; XXIX; VII), Lot (XXXVII; XXVI; XV; XXVII; XI; XXIX), Moses-Pharaoh (XLIV; XX; XXVI; XL; VII). (5) In addition there are numerous references to lesser known communities, the people of 'Ād, Thamūd; ar-Rass, Tubba' and Midian, who were deaf to the entreaties of God's messengers. The full list of disbelieving people is given in L, 12, 13; subsequently in L, 35-36 the moral is enforced for the benefit of those with responsive hearts and attentive ears.

In sharp contrast with the apathy, obduracy and scorn that Noah and his faithful successors encountered was the experience

of Jonah, whose missionary endeavours, though unwillingly undertaken, were crowned with unexpected success (LXVIII, 48-50; X, 98; XXI, 87). This was to become a standing witness to the fact that threatened calamity may be averted by faith and conversion.

Bell distinguishes the two forms which the Prophet's ideas of punishment apparently took: 'The earlier was ... that unbelievers would be overwhelmed ... in this world. The later .. was Apocalyptic.' (6) We have already noted the many allusions to the Fire in the early Suras; the apocalyptic element in that group is specially marked. The middle and late Meccan Suras contain sundry references to temporal calamities that overtook unbelievers of former days. From this it could be inferred that similar catastrophes might occur in the Prophet's age, unless his contemporaries relent and turn to the truth. Otherwise threats and object lessons of the sort used by the Prophet would have had little point.

A temporal calamity of the type envisaged in XVII, 60 may equally be regarded as 'apocalyptic'. Every town is to be destroyed before the Day. Whether or not the towns are to be destroyed consecutively or simultaneously is not made clear. It is no easy task to disentangle warnings of temporal disaster in the Quran from what, for want of a better word, may be termed 'apocalyptic' upheavals: more so because the scene of the final drama is set within nature itself (Sura LXXXI is a comprehensive example cf. XX, 105-106). If the threatened calamities were purely local in extent, there would not have been any advantage in individual conversion. The entire community would need to be converted for disaster to be averted. Nowhere is it stated

in the Quran that all will be lead to the right path. On the contrary, there are many references to the ضالين, those who are misled (I, 7; VI, 77; XXXVII, 67). Emerging from and looming beyond the temporal was the spectre of eternal doom, ushered in by 'apocalyptic' convulsions.

Nöldeke's criterion of the occurrence of ar-Rahmān as a proper name in the mid-Meccan period and its absence from the Suras of the third Meccan period is not really relevant to our discussion.(7) Furthermore, the validity of such a test is questioned by Bell.(8) In view of the free use made of 'patriarchal' narratives in the Suras of both second and third periods, we propose to treat the two stages as a unity. The lines of division between the various creative phases, as laid down by critics, are somewhat arbitrarily drawn and admitted to be approximate. The Suras of the earliest period merge into those of the second, and these in turn into the next. Broad lines of demarcation will generally suffice.

In the Quran the Prophet is occasionally given the title نذير one who warns. The term occurs mainly (though not exclusively) in the Suras of this period (e.g. VII, 183; XI, 2; XXVI, 115; XXXV, 21). Montgomery Watt has briefly indicated the relevance of نذير and the roughly synonymous مذكّر to 'both eschatological judgment had temporal punishment'.(9) Muhammad's warnings were largely ignored in Mecca; it was there that he had to parry the incredulous questions and outright denials that were thrust at him whenever he mentioned resurrection - by implication the possibility of an afterlife was likewise rejected. Such objections are reproduced in the following texts: XXXVII, 16, 51; L, 3; XIX, 67; LXXII, 7; XXIII, 37, 39, 84; XVII, 52; XXVII, 69;

XLV, 23; XVI, 40; XI, 10; VI, 29. There is also the rhetorical question recorded in LVI, 47, a Sura of the first period, though claimed to be composite by Bell. (10) Quite understandably, at a still later date, the Medinans would not have dared dispute the veracity of this or any other doctrine taught by the Prophet, and the objections are no longer heard.

According to XLV, 24 the Prophet is challenged to bring forth 'our fathers' as evidence for the credibility of resurrection. He dismisses the challenge as a mere impertinence, Allah having assured him that isolated acts of resuscitation could not be vouchsafed on demand. Rather, the resurrection would be a universal event which all were to experience almost simultaneously, in His own appointed time. Jesus, according to the gospel narrative raised a few of those who had 'recently' died (Matt.11: 5). He did so not in reply to challenges, but as an act of compassion upon the living, and as a sign of his divine authority.

Earlier generations will take part in the resurrection; just as they had shared in the fashionable delusion that resurrection is impossible (LXXII, 7). Strangely enough these Meccans, like their worldly predecessors the Sadducees, were able to reconcil belief in a Supreme Being with a scornful rejection of the idea that dead men could be raised (XVI, 40). It is clear from XXIII, 85 that the doctrine in its vague form was not a complete novelty to the Meccans; their ancestors had heard of it. (11) Whether through Jewish or through Christian influences, ideas of this sort, were circulating among the pagans and sceptics of Arabia. Montgomery Watt expresses it thus: 'Such things were "in the air" before the Qur'ān came to Muhammad and were part of the preparation of himself and of his environment for his mission'. (12)

Space must here be given to a consideration of Casanova's thesis propounded in his book, Mohammed et la Fin du Monde. This scholar's views have not gained much acceptance; but as our subject is a related one, his 'findings' cannot be ignored. Casanova claims that his thesis is a novel reconstruction, 'entierement nouvelle', (13) and that it does justice to the eschatological facts recorded in the Quran. It looks however more like a reflexion of a view known as konsequente Eschatologie, consistent eschatology formulated by a Continental school of that name. Johannes Weiss was the first to espouse the view, and he subsequently modified its excesses. Later it was strenuously upheld by that many-sided genius Albert Schweitzer. It finds classic expression in his work, The Quest of the Historical Jesus, the German original of which was first published in 1906. The gist of this interpretation is that 'eschatological' factors and pressures largely determined the decisions Jesus made, and impelled to his actions. (14) Casanova, writing in 1911, does not in fact mention Schweitzer, but acknowledges the 'curieux parallélisme' of Muhammad's teaching at this point 'avec celle du Christ' as interpreted by Renan. (15)

Mutatis mutandis this theory bears a resemblance to Schweitzer's, with the Hegira replacing the crisis of the Crucifixion, and a completely different sequel. Casanova maintains that Muhammad came not only to herald the 'Hour', but that right up to the last he held the conviction that the 'Hour' would appear during his lifetime. In this, it is alleged, the Prophet was influenced by some obscure Christian group that misinterpreted the doctrine of the Paraclete in apocalyptic terms. (16) Muhammad's death, so the theory goes would have meant the virtual collapse

of Islam. But fortunately the astute diplomacy of Abu Bekr saved the day; thus the interest and energies of the faithful were diverted towards more practical enterprises. A suitable sprinkling of the Quranic text with 'sayings' implying the prospect of Muhammad's death and the postponement of the Hour was all Abu Bekr needed to carry out his plan. Casanova finds support for his thesis in the apocalyptic literature of the Muslim sects (notably in the Malahim), with this he combines a number of isolated snippets from Tradition. (17)

The crisis, if ever there was one, must have come to a head in the later Meccan period. In a number of verses such as LIV, 1; XX, 15; XXI, 1, the Prophet proclaims the approaching Hour. To be sure, he regarded himself as the last of the prophets; beyond him lay the prospect of the End. Shahrastānī substitutes the Resurrection for the Hour and states the matter thus: 'Similarly, man progressed from code to code till the perfection ... was reached. Nothing lies beyond it but the Resurrection'. (18) Viewed through the telescope of prophetism the End seemed very near. The Hour receded into the background as social and institutional problems arose, but the Prophet never lost sight of its reality.

There can be little doubt that with the march of events Muhammad altered his emphasis and became reconciled to the likelihood of his dying before the coming of the Hour. After all the decree (أمر XVI, 1) was one for Allah to implement, and could not be speeded up (cf. XLIII, 85; XLI, 47; VII, 186). How then could the Prophet be certain either that the Hour would or would not come, while he was still in the throes of his mission? The Quran speaks of death as the lot of all men (XXI, 35-36), with special reference to past prophets; from this the inference is drawn that the Prophet will also die. Even more explicit are

the words of XXXIX, 31, إنك ميت وإنهم ميتون . In spite of these clear-cut statements Casanova insists, 'dans cela ... il n'y a de preuve formelle que Mohammed doit necessairement mourir avant l'heur'. (19) Not necessarily, of course, but this all goes to show that he did envisage the possibility of death.

In XIX, 77 we have a disjunctive proposition إما العذاب وإما الساعة (cf. VI, 40); the context perhaps refers to the prolonging of the season for repentance. Baiḍāwī gives the unlikely explanation that the former (العذاب) points to the triumphs of Muslim arms. (20) But the issue is clear, the Prophet will not compromise himself by categorically affirming that the Hour is sure to coincide with his coming. In at least three instances the nearness of the End is asserted, but the proposition is rendered problematic by such qualifying expressions as عسى (XVII, 53); لعل (XLII, 16); إن ... أو (VI, 40). The Prophet would not (and could not on his view of progressive and revocable revelation) commit himself on the matter of the time and sequence of final events. As Tor Andrae observes: 'Une presentation ordonnee et coherente ... n'est pas dans l'intention du Prophete, ... Son mode d'exposition n'est pas celui de l'apocalypticien qui veut enseigner les choses dernières, mais celui du prédicateur qui veut reveiller et secouer ses auditeurs'. (21) In the concluding paragraphs of his book Casanova almost gives his case away by conceding that the note of indefiniteness and resignation is discernible in many Suras, and in particular (or so he assumes) after the Hegira. (22)

A definite contrast exists between the respective attitudes of the N.T. and that of the Quran towards the hastening of the day. In XVI, 1 the Prophet counsels his hearers not to seek

to hasten the day. Further, from XIII, 7; XXIX, 53 it appears that he was repeatedly challenged to accelerate the threatened calamity and thereby establish his credentials, but he had to confess that the matter was not in his hands (VI, 57). Proleptically speaking Hell already enfolds its future inmates (XXIX, 54), whose present cries of provocation sound ludicrous.

In the N.T., on the other hand, Christians are enjoined to work and pray for the speedy coming of the Lord and his Kingdom (Matt. 6: 10; I Cor. 16: 22; Rev. 22: 20). The explanation for the contrasting attitudes is simple enough. Whereas the relevant Quranic texts are in the main addressed to unbelievers, the exhortations in the N.T. are for believers. In the former, the stress is on impending judgment, which by God's mercy may be deferred (XI, 11); in the latter, judgment is overshadowed by the glorious hope of the Parousia, and with it deliverance for mankind from the vicious circle of earthly existence. Although the Day and Hour are fixed in the Divine mind (Mark 13: 32), yet paradoxically the interim period may be shortened for the elect's sake (Mark 13: 20).

Paradise. As already noted, the distinctive expressions for the infernal place occur mostly in the earlier Suras. A few terms not found in the first period appear in the middle Meccan Suras as alternative names for Heaven. Of these names the most evocative and least frequent is فردوس. As Jeffery observes this is a pre-Islamic borrowing from the Iranian and is the nearest synonym for جنّة, garden, in the Quran. (23) Paradise is in fact the only existing word for garden in Armenian պարտէզ (Bardez), and as such appears in Gen. 2: 8 and throughout the Armenian Bible. For the 'eschatological'

Paradise mentioned in the N.T. another expression (also of Iranian origin) is employed in Armenian. Baiḍāwī defines فردوس as a cross between a vineyard and a palm-grove, and regards the Quranic term as designating the highest reaches of Heaven (cf. II Cor. 12: 2; 'third heaven'). (24) Some support for this denotation is to be found in the two contexts where the word appears (XVIII, 107; XXIII, 11). From these contexts it would seem that those who inherit, Paradise are the spiritual elite, those that is who have passed the double test of faith and works with flying colours.

Eden. One of the recurrent phrases in these Suras is the construct جنّات عدن , with gardens always in the plural. The phrase more rarely crops up in the Medinan Suras. In the Quran this expression is invariably eschatological in reference (XIII, 23; XVI, 33; XVIII, 30; XIX, 62; XX, 78; XXXV, 30; XXXVIII, 50; XL, 8). 'Eden' as a place name does not occur in the N.T.; it is rare in the O.T. where it signifies the primeval garden. At times it is used figuratively, in similes for grandeur and luxuriance (Is. 51: 3; Ezek. 28: 13; Joel 2: 3 etc.).

The proper derivation of عدن , or for that matter of Eden, is a vexed problem. Arab scholars tend to derive it from the verb عَدَنَ meaning 'to abide' (Baiḍāwī الإقامة). The construct phrase would then convey the meaning of 'gardens of perpetual abode'. It would, moreover, suggest the sense of security, استقرار as Rāghib has it. Jeffrey discounts such explanations and assumes عدن to be a loan-word from the Hebrew by way of the Syriac. (25) However, the long-standing association of עדן with a homophonous root meaning 'delight' is now under fire: Semitic scholars would derive the name from the Sumerian edin (= plain, cf. the Arabic

عدن = coastal plain). (26) Perhaps the derivation suggested by Arab savants is after all not too wide off the mark.

Where the Quran speaks of Adam and Eve's garden, جنّة is used absolutely (VII, 18, 26; XX, 115). The usage of جنّات عدن in eschatological contexts is not particularly instructive; it follows the same pattern as garden/gardens. In XIX, 62 (cf. the Medinan IX, 73; LXI, 12), the insertion of the phrase appears to be purely epexegetical, some would say redundant. In general جنّات عدن serves a useful purpose as a stylistic variation for other names of Heaven.

Ghuraf. Here and there the Quran throws out hints that there will be some form of gradation in rewards for the pious (XX, 77 الدرجات العُلى). Baiḍāwi's comments on the eminence of Paradise in the scale of heavenly habitations suggests that various attempts were made to correlate degrees of reward and punishment with specific spheres in the hereafter. (27) The word غُرفة provides a fairly firm basis for this line of argument, even though it is almost as rare as فردوس in the Quran. غُرفة is properly a synonym of عِلّيّة an 'upper chamber'; the former term, however, is now the standing expression for 'room' in the wider sense.

In the singular غرفة occurs once only (XXV, 75); Arberry renders this 'highest heaven', a translation which agrees with Baiḍāwi's اعلى مواضع الجنّة. (28) Apparently the singular can be taken to denote a sphere more sublime than that implied by the plural. Logically there can be but one 'chamber' par excellence, whereas there are bound to be many 'chambers'. Two plural forms are used in the Quran غُرَف (XXXIX, 21; XXIX, 58),

and غُرفات (XXXIV, 36); the two are identical in meaning. The first of these references (XXXIX, 21) describes chambers above chambers, with the highest presumably symbolizing more exalted status. The last of the references (XXXIV, 36) speaks of the abode reserved for those who are worthy of recompense. And each of the four occurrences of the word carries within its context the implication that the 'chamber' or 'chambers' are kept for the noblest of believers. The nearest equivalent for this notion in the N.T. is the μονάι - mansions - of John 14: 2, used once with this celestial connotation. But here there is no hint that such mansions are allotted to the chosen few.

Barzakh. As counterparts for the Catholic dogma of purgatory, and for the notion of repose or harrowing experienced in the 'intermediate state', Muslim theologians offer us the 'punishment of the grave' and Barzakh. (29) The former of these conceptions will be treated in the next chapter, as some of the alleged allusions to the 'punishment of the grave' occur in the Medinan Suras.

For Barzakh the lexical stock in the Quran is more substantial. The word appears three times; twice it is used in a more or less concrete sense (XXV, 55; LV, 20; cf. حِجراً in XXVII, 62 for a similar idea). Jeffery relates this usage (barrier between two seas) to a cosmological myth, and shows conclusively that the term برزخ is of Iranian origin. (30) This barrier is vaguely reminiscent of the partition between upper and nether waters mentioned in Gen. 1: 6. Like the geometrical line it is real, albeit invisible; this point holds good even when applied to the metaphysical barrier of which we read in XXIII, 102. What

precisely is this latter barrier? Baiḍāwī rather unhelpfully defines it by giving a synonym حائل, and explains the term abstractly as a total prohibition, امتناع كلي, from a return to earthly existence. (31) He does not, so far as I can make out, take it to be either a state or place. Sale quotes the opinion of Ibn Maʿrūf to the effect that Barzakh signifies the grave. (32) The two or three different senses in which the word is employed by Muslims are given by Hughes. (33)

Ibn Khaldūn in line with his more philosophical approach regards Barzakh as a stage in which intellectual perfection is attained, presumably after death. (34) In popular religion Barzakh fills the position that Sheol occupies in O.T. religion; sometimes standing for the grave, at other times signifying an indeterminate abode of the departed somehow fitted into the intervening period between death and resurrection. Whilst semantically it parallels χάσμα of Luke 16: 26, in effect the two notions are distinct. The great gulf separates the blessed from the damned, whereas the Barrier divides the present life from the afterlife. It is doubtful whether the Prophet wished to convey any truth other than that of an irreversible step from which there can be no turning back. At death, man's fate is settled for ever, unless Allah wills otherwise beyond the resurrection. Any attempt to interpret برزخ in spatial or experiential terms would involve us in the 'fallacy of misplaced concreteness'.

Hijāb and Aʿrāf. Another word also approaches χάσμα in religious denotation: this is حجاب VII, 44 (cf. حيل XXXIV, 53). The first part of the verse reads وبينهما حجاب وعلى الاعراف رجال, which Arberry translates,

'And between them is a veil, and on the Ramparts men ...'. Bell, however conjectures إعراف for the أعراف of the received text.(35) The conjectural expression is uncommon in Arabic, and the emendation does not take us far in clearing up the mysteries of the passage. The 'screen' like the 'great gulf' completely separates the two parties on either side, but unlike the 'gulf' it is itself occupied by a third group. The thorny problem of how to dispose of those whose scales are almost evenly balanced is thus temporarily solved. Presumably their yearnings to pass over to Paradise will be satisfied in due course.(36)

Premonitory Signs. The premonitory signs that introduce the final event are adequately discussed in older works. These comprise eight lesser signs and the seventeen greater signs. A few of these may be traced back to the Quran, but the majority are obviously borrowed from Jewish and Christian apocalypses at a later stage of Islamic development. Apart from the natural and cosmic portents that loom large in the early Suras, we have three major signs the evidence for which may be plausibly derived from Quranic texts.

Gog and Magog appear on the scene in XVIII, 93,99, but here they are unaccountably associated with Alexander the Great. Thus the prophecies of Ezek. 38: 2 are conflated with the visions of Dan. 8: 21 and 11: 3. Unlike Alexander the Great, Gog and Magog are not historically identifiable. It may well be, as Jeffery says, that this composite picture is a reflexion of Syriac legends on the subject of Alexander's advance towards the East.(37) The passage in question is legendary rather than eschatological, though XVIII, 99 suggests that legend furnishes

an imaginative background for eschatology. Another passage (XXI, 96) is perhaps more truly eschatological: Yajūj and Majūj pour in from all sides, but a stop is put to their further advance by an abrupt change of scene. The context is obscure enough and may refer to the Resurrection; in which case the irruption of Gog and Magog will coincide with the End.

Baiḍāwī profusely elaborates the various theories relating to Alexander's sobriquet, ذو القرنين, and surmises that Gog and Magog hail from Central Asia 'the land of Turks and beyond'.(38) The Abbasid Caliphate had a bitter foretaste of the Yellow Peril, in 1258 A.D., which is coeval with Baidawi's career. More recently Dr. Azad has put forward a new suggestion as to the identity of ذو القرنين. He contends that the Quran has Cyrus in mind rather than Alexander when it speaks of ذو القرنين.(39) The Quranic figure is a worshipper of the true God on the pattern of Isaiah's Cyrus. But on either explanation, if ذو القرنين has any eschatological significance, then one or other conqueror merely prefigures a future deliverer.

The second of the major signs according to the traditional list is the Beast, دابه الارض. The word دابة occurs 14 times in the Quran, and from some of these occurrences it is evident that the term is wider in denotation than 'mammal' (XXIV, 44; XXXV, 44). As is presupposed in the verbal root, the noun applies to all creeping things.

In XXVII, 84 دابة clearly refers to an apocalyptic monster that emerges from the earth. In contrast to the elaborate picture of the Beast and the Dragon presented in Revelation (11: 7; 13: 1 ff.; 17: 3 ff; 19: 19 ff.) the Quranic allusion to

is bald and featureless. Baiḍāwī, however, adds a number of details to produce a freakish creature with the composite structure of crawling mammal and bird. (40) Masson reminds us that the Beast was a sermon topic with Cyril of Jerusalem and Ephrem. (41) The simple Quranic reference was gradually filled in with features borrowed from Christian sources. The whole conception may go back to the myth of the primeval monster, Leviathan (cf. Ps. 74: 14; Is. 27: 1). (42)

For a third sign, that of the Antichrist المسيح الدجال there is no evidence whatever in the Quran. With the development of the Gog Magog theme the introduction of this complementary figure became apposite. As regards Christ's second coming all one can say is that this sign may or may not be alluded to in XLIII, 61. The opening clause of this verse reads وانه لعلم للساعة . The pronoun could be regarded as impersonal, or else if the text, is fully coherent with its setting the pronoun should refer back to Jesus (vv.57-59). Then by pointing عَلَمٌ rather than عِلمٌ Jesus is declared to be a sign for the Hour. Masson informs us that reputable exegetes like Tabarī, Zamakhsharī and Jalālain so understand the passage. Thus interpreted the words provide a textual basis for a fascinating topic. From Baiḍāwī's comment on this text we gather that a sectarian twist was given to the incident: Jesus descends upon the Holy Land and not only destroys the Antichrist but also does away with all emblems of Nazarene veneration, replacing Christolatry with true worship. (43)

The trouble with this interpretation is the complete lack of allusions to Christ's second coming elsewhere in the Quran.

Moreover, whilst عِلْم is a common Quranic term, عَلَم would be a hapax if it were genuine in XLIII, 61. At all events آية is the usual word for sign in Arabic, and again like عِلْم it occurs frequently in the Quran. Masson concludes, 'Si l'interpretation de ce verset n'etait pas sujette à controverses, un rapprochement avec les textes chrétiens ... s'imposerait'. (44)

Another popular subject in Muslim 'apocalyptic' is the ascent of the Prophet to heavenly spheres معراج. Related to this is the إسراء, Muhammad's nocturnal journey on earth and through the lower regions. The occurrence of the verb (XVII, 1; cf. Sura LXX المعارج) was the rudiment of an extensive literature on this theme within and beyond the field of Tradition. The points of coincidence between the legendary cycles of popular Muslim theology and Dante's Divine Comedy have been thoroughly investigated by Asín y Palacios in his La Escatologia musulmana en la Divina Comedia.(45) He comes to the conclusion that Muslim legend served as a model for the Italian masterpiece.

There is a wealth of 'picturesque, descriptive and episodic' detail in the Quran from which the Traditional drama of the Mi'raj and Isrā' could be adapted and elaborated. The chief terms for Heaven and Hell have been considered in this chapter and the preceding, and a few details were and will be described. One further point may be mentioned here. Are Heaven and Hell at present in existence, and are they populated by eligible members of past generations? Tradition seems unanimous on the first point. Wensinck quotes from the Fiḳh Akbar II, 'We confess that Paradise and Hell are a reality and that they are created and existing at present.' (46) The Quranic texts adduced in support

of this confession state only that the destinations are already prepared (III, 127; II, 22; III, 126 all Medinan - cf. II Pet. 2: 9). According to XXVI, 89-91. Heaven and Hell will on the Day, be propelled into view for the benefit of the respective inmates. The context refers to Abraham's generation. In appears that the prospect of Heaven or Hell for these ancients lay directly beyond the Day.

In VII, 13 and XXXVIII, 80 the Devil pleads to be respited until the Day or Resurrection; his request is granted. This suggests that for the present he is let loose on earth to practise his knavish tricks, but one day he will be confined to a more restricted sphere. Again from XI, 100 and XL 49, it seems that the punishment of Pharaoh's host is still in the future, for on the Day he will lead his people into the Fire. Baidawi admits this, but sees in the passage solid proof for the doctrine of the soul's survival and the torment of the grave. (47) All this is inconclusive and passages could be quoted to show that the martyrs are translated into the divine presence at death (II, 149, III, 163, cf. VII, 36 for the Fire). Prophetic insights do not dove-tail neatly; the Prophet would doubtless have concurred with Emerson in his opinion that 'a foolish consistency is the bugbear of little minds' (Essays, Self Reliance).

The impression gained from a study of the eschatological material in these Suras, as it bears on our main theme, is as follows: the doctrine of resurrection is seen as an essential aspect of the Last Day. References to the resurrection are numerous and unequivocal. Its constant proclamation provoked ridicule from pagan Meccans; this gradually subsided or else

was brushed aside as unworthy of notice. In time the scornful objections cease to be recorded in the text. Dramatic scenes crowd the Day of Resurrection, leading on to the final destination. Already in the middle Meccan Suras the abiding character of this final state is indicated (LXXII; XXIII; XXI; XVIII). By the repeated use of خَلَدَ, its derivatives and its equivalents the eternity of Heaven and Hell is strongly implied. These points and others will be looked into more fully in later chapters.

NOTES.

(1) R. Bell, Introduction to the Qur'ān, p. 76.
(2) The comparative arrangements are given by Bell, ibid., pp. 110 ff.
(3) ibid., p.102.
(4) Nöldeke/Schwally, Geschichte des Qorāns, p. 118.
(5) Where not consecutive the order of Suras given is roughly chronological.
(6) R. Bell, op. cit., p.106.
(7) Nöldeke/Schwally, op. cit., p.121.
(8) R. Bell, op. cit., p. 103.
(9) W.M. Watt, Mvhammed at Mecca, p. 71.
(10) Bell marks out the entire passage LVI, 46-56 as probably a later addition. See his The Qur'ān, Vol. II, p. 555.
(11) Tor Andrae, Les Origines, p. 75.
(12) W.M. Watt, op. cit., p. 29.
(13) P. Casanova, Mohammed et la Fin du Monde, p. 1.
(14) A brief discussion of konsequente Eschatologie may be found in Sydney Cave's The Doctrine of the Work of Christ, pp. 10 ff.
(15) P. Casanova, op. cit., p. 21.
(16) ibid., pp. 23 ff.
(17) ibid., pp. 45 ff.
(18) Shahrestāni, Kitāb Nihāyatul - Iqdām, p. 159 (503 Arab)
(19) P. Casanova, op. cit., p. 34.
(20) Baidāwi, in loc.
(21) Tor Andrae, op. cit., p. 71.
(22) P. Casanova, op. cit., pp. 71, 82.
(23) A Jeffrey, The Foreign Vocabulary of the Qur'an, p. 224.
(24) Baidāwi, ad XVIII, 107.
(25) The judgment of Muslim savants is cited by Jeffery, op.cit., p.212. Baidāwi's definition is ad XIII, v. 23.
(26) See art 'Eden' by T.C. Mitchell in New Bible Dictionary, p.332. Also Koehler-Baumgartner, p. 684, entry II עֵדֶן ak. edinu, steppe. Cf. L.A. Waddell's The Indo-Sumerian Seals Deciphered,

p.33. For other aspects of Eden/Paradise see S.N.Kramer, History Begins at Sumer, pp. 209 ff.

(27) Baidāwi, ad XVIII v.107.

(28) ibid., in loc.

(29) On purgatory see further Asin Palacios, Islam and the Divine Comedy, p.125. He describes sirāt as the 'path of purgatory'. Wensinck in The Muslim Creed pp.232-33 supplies the Quranic references which Tradition regards as a 'scriptural basis' for the purgatorial notion. In neither of these passages (VII, 44, 46 and XIX, 72) does صِرَاط occur and Wensinck doubts whether the reference is appropriate. Elsewhere in the Quran we have صِرَاط مُسْتَقِيم 'the straight path (I:5 etc.), an ethical conception; see Masson, Le Coran, p. 679 with n.4.

(30) A. Jeffery, op. cit., p.77.

(31) Baidāwi ad XXIII, 102.

(32) G. Sale, The Koran, p.341 n.3.

(33) T.P. Hughes, The Dictionary of Islam, pp. 38-39.

(34) Ibn Khaldūn, The Muqaddimah, Vol. I pp. 198-99, (Rozenthal's trans.)

(35) R. Bell, The Qur'an, Vol. I p.141 n.2.

(36) Carra de Vaux writes l'araf, endroit ou sont les fous et les enfant de polytheistes mort en bas age .... est donc les limbes de la theologie musulmane (the Limbo of Muslim Tradition); in Fragments d'Eschatologie Musulmane p.34.

(37) A. Jeffery, op. cit., p.288-89.

(38) Baidāwi, ad XVIII vv.93-99.

(39) See Transactions, Vol. XV (1953/54) pp. 27 ff. 'A Fresh View of Dhu'l Qarnain, E.F.F. Bishop's translation of M.A.K. Azad's inquiry into the identity of ذو القرنين.

(40) Baidāwi ad XXVII v. 84.

(41) D. Masson, Le Coran, p. 738.

(42) See G.R. Beasley-Murray, A Commentary on Mark Thirteen, pp.66 ff.; also H. Gunkel's, Schöpfung und Chaos, pp. 41 ff.

(43) Baidāwi, in loc.

(44) D. Masson, op. cit., p.706.

(45) The information is culled from H. Sunderland's trans. of the Spanish, Islam and the Divine Comedy, Preface and Part I.

(46) A.J. Wensinck, Op. cit., p.129.

(47) Baidāwi, ad XLV v. 49.

CHAPTER III

ESCHATOLOGICAL SYNTHESIS AND THE MEDINAN SURAS

When we pass on to the Suras of the Medinan period, the criterion of style ceases to be decisive. Stylistically the Suras of this closing stage do not differ appreciably from the later Meccan Suras. Among Western scholars there is a wide measure of agreement as to the number of Suras that should be allocated to the Medinan sojourn. Nöldeke's list at this point almost coincides with what Tradition has assigned to Medina in respect of the actual Suras included, though not as regards arrangement. (1) As our main interest is in the overall picture that the consecutive groups of Suras present, Nöldeke's order will once more serve as a working basis. One exception to his arrangement is Sura XXII, which this scholar has for convenience placed in the last group, but which in its eschatology is solidly Meccan. The opening reference to the earthquake (v.1), and the insistence on the certainty of the Hour (v.7) are typical of an earlier phase of growth, as is the challenge hurled at the Prophet to hasten the coming of the End (v.46). (2)

The Medinan output includes two lengthy Suras, al-Baqarah and āl'Imrān, which Katsh has 'chosen as the most representative in the Koran'. The former, Katsh reminds us, has been described as the 'Koran in miniature', and is a 'summary of all the essential points of the Revelation .. elaborated elsewhere'.(3) Whilst recapitulation is undesignedly effected in these Suras, a number of fresh motifs also appear. Taking the Medinan Suras as a whole one may say that they are more readily identifiable

than earlier Suras. Allusions abound to topics of contemporary interest and to episodes which were occasions for a spate of prophetic deliverances. The historic encounters at Badr and Udud, as well as lesser conflicts and crises, have left their marks on the compilation of the text. These traces provide scholars with reasonably accurate clues whereby individual Suras can be dated. This remark could apply to the different strands that have been woven into some of the longer Suras.

We do not propose to examine the abundance of references, vague or definite, that can be made to dovetail with events in the post-Hegiran period. The critico-historical evidence has been adequately analyzed and collated in the light of Muslim Tradition. As Bell remarks, historical tradition is sound enough where it speaks of the Medinan experiences of the Prophet and his band, thus enabling us to fix a satisfactory outline and interpret many passages with confidence.(4)

While in Medina Muhammad steadily consolidated his power. Triumphs on the battlefield and the gains that accrued from isolated skirmishes all helped to enhance his prestige. Montgomery Watt refers to 'the deepening of the faith of Muhammad and his closest companions in his prophetic vocation', as a result of the victory at Badr. (5) True, yet paradoxically these very successes led to a modification of the prophetic role. As new circumstances arose and wider horizons open up the Prophet diverted his energies to practical channels of generalship, legislation and organization.

The flow of revelation is henceforth directed in a way that will minister to the welfare of the community. Right up to the

end the message of the hereafter is proclaimed, but increasingly the threats, warnings and promises acquire a didactic aim curbing baser tendencies and kindling the zeal of waverers. Thus Wensinck writes of 'the parenetic tenour of later Suras, which although lengthy, can at once be recognized as the expression of Muhammad's personal feelings'. (6)

The prophetic cast of mind is not conducive to any attempt at systematic legislation. Solutions for day to day problems were arrived at by spontaneous directives which the Prophet firmly held to be inspired. Wensinck draws attention to Snouck Hurgronje's observation that at Medina 'Muhammad even avoided regulating affairs once for all by revelation'. (7) This probably means that the Prophet felt secure enough to rely more and more on his personal authority without constantly referring back the issues to the divine source of that authority.

Bell rightly notes that 'in Medina Muhammad does not enter upon such full descriptions of the End.. or of the Afterlife as he gives in Meccan passages'. The more evocative details were already familiar and could thus be 'dropped or at least taken for granted'. (8) Specific offences are sternly censured and prohibitions enforced by warnings of torment hereafter. For instance in II, 214 we meet with a warning against apostasy; those who turn back are destined for the Fire (cf. III, 84 and Heb. 10: 38-39.) Further down in this Sura (II, 276-77 usury is condemned in similar terms. Katsh recalls the O.T. and Rabbinic antecedents of the prohibition, in none of which is the eschatological motive present. (9)

With the fortunes of war fluctuating as they did, desertion

became a real danger; so in VIII, 16 deserters are reminded of the severe penalties that attach to such cowardice. Social and ethical factors are not left out: the despoiling of orphans is grave enough an offence to merit fire (IV, 11). Murderers, hypocrites (IV, 34, 95, 137), hoarders (IX, 34), those who wrong or betray the Prophet (IV, 115; IX, 63-64) and slanderers in general are alike threatened with Allah's wrath (XXIV, 4, 7, 9, 18, 19). Incidentally in IX, 34 monks are singled out for rebuke for devouring the wealth of the community; and this centuries before the Reformation. (10)

On the positive side loyalty, hospitality, almsgiving and earnest endeavour for the cause are encouraged by promises of exceptional reward (IV, 17; VIII, 75; IX, 20; XLVIII, 17; LVII, 17). The Prophet is anxious to show that entry into Heaven must be by way of tribulation (II, 120; III, 136 cf. Acts. 14: 22). The prudential nature of this mode of legislation is apparent. At all cost morale and the social fabric must be preserved. Ethical and religious incentives are combined; for those who no longer doubt the Prophet's divine guidance, judgment hereafter becomes a most effective deterrent. Accordingly, the truths of eschatology constitute the 'sanctions of other requirements which he wishes to enforce'. (11)

The Last Day. Belief in 'Allah and the Last Day' is tacitly attributed to Abraham (II, 120), the father of monotheism, and the putative founder of Islam. Baidāwi identifies the new faith with the patriarch ملة الاسلام التي هي في الاصل ابراهيم. (12) Margoliouth is convinced that Abraham as a 'personage was absolutely unknown before Mohammed's time'. (13) Faced with growing hostility from the

Jews, Muhammad turned to the patriarch for support, on the principle that priority in time establishes precedence over Moses and Jesus. This was a masterstroke of religious policy which stood the Prophet in good stead. However, there is no suggestion in the O.T. that Abraham ever thought in terms of an afterlife, a belief which only gradually unfolds in Hebrew religion. Nevertheless in the N.T. his name figures in an argument for resurrection (Mark 12: 26), and he is accorded a place of prominence in the life beyond (Luke 16: 22-25; cf. Heb. 11: 10).

According to the Quran this selfsame fundamental doctrine (of God and the Last Day) is held by Jews, Christians and Sabaeans. Whatever their disagreements in other matters, this is the common ground on which the Prophet hopes to meet them (II, 59; V, 73). From these two verses it appears that such a minimal confession of faith would suffice to remove the threat of fear, لا خوف عليهم . Yet no express mention is made here of a definite reward. Apart from a firm belief in these two primary articles, good works are regarded as valueless (II, 266; IV, 42). Conversely, it is possible to repeat the confession and not be a believer at heart (II, 7, 8).

In addition to the foregoing references the formula الله و اليوم الآخر occurs in the following texts II, 228, 232; III, 110; IV, 43, 62, 160; IX, 18, 19, 29, 44, 45, 100; XXXIII, 21; LVIII, 22; LX, 6; LXV, 2. Every one of these texts belongs to the Medinan period. Nowhere in the Meccan Suras does the phrase appear, though in XXIX, 35 the service of Allah is mentioned in the same breath as the expectation of the Last Day. From this enumeration it is clear that faith in

Allah and hope in the Last Day have become the cardinal articles of the Muslim creed. The whole gamut of essential doctrine is set forth less frequently: Allah, His Angels, books, messengers and the Last Day are aligned in at least two passages (II, 172; IV, 135). But the sixth and more abstract doctrine of predestination is missing from these verses.

We conclude that the confession بالله وباليوم الآخر represents the bare minimum of belief acceptable to God. However, from various contexts it is obvious that He expects a measure of proper conduct and observance to prove the genuineness of the believer's confession.

Al-Ākhirah. Related to اليوم الآخر is the comprehensive expression for the afterlife الآخرة. The term, per se, is not peculiar to the Medinan Suras. In fact it occurs as early as S XCIII (Aḍ-Ḍuḥā). In another early passage (XCII, 13) it comes as part of the phrase 'the last and the first', used there in an impersonal sense which roughly parallels the ambiguous expression in Rev. 2: 19, but which contrasts with the pregnant Christological title in Rev. 1: 11 (cf.LVII, 3). Somewhat later the term الآخرة acquires its specifically eschatological colouring. Masson defines this as 'la vie future, en général qu'il s'agisse d'une survie en Enfer ou au Paradis'. Thus it comprehends most aspects of the hereafter. Masson also points out that there are the same number of definite references to Fire as there are to the Gardens in contexts where the word occurs. (14)

الآخرة occurs about 97 times in the Quran, and of these occurrences no fewer than 90 refer to the afterlife. The dominant

sense of the word is relatively more frequent in the Medinan Suras than elsewhere in the Quran (II, 3, 80, 196; III, 21, 20; IV, 76; XXIV, 14 etc.) The Arabic term is cognate with the Hebrew אַחֲרִית 'the latter end' (Num. 24: 20; Deut. 8: 16), which probably refers to national destiny, though doubtless an eschatological motif could be read into it. Semantically الآخرة should correspond to ἔσχατος an adjective construed with a variety of nouns for time (Acts 2: 17; II Tim. 3: 1; Heb.1: 2; II Pet. 3: 3 etc). The 'Eschaton', if one may venture to employ a vaguely technical term, oscillates in meaning, 'sometimes thought of as beginning with the birth of Christ, sometimes with his second coming'. (15) Hence, despite the apparent correspondence of the Arabic, Hebrew and Greek words, the three are semantically disparate. At most, the N.T. expression refers to an event or events that immediately precede the end of history, whereas الآخرة points to a sphere beyond earthly existence, and is properly the obverse of دنيا. Accordingly, Masson remarks: 'Le Coran centré sur des perspectives eschatologiques insiste sur la vanité de tout ce qui appartient à la vie immédiate (al dunya) opposée a la vie future (al 'akhira).(16)

Munkar, Nakir. In the traditional picture of the hereafter, the two tormenting angels are associated with that familiar dogma, 'the punishment of the grave'. Wensinck shows that the double conception is an accepted article of the major creeds (Fikh Akbar I and II.) (17) The resemblance of these notions to the Catholic dogma of purgatorial suffering will be apparent. But there seems to be no purging purpose behind the infliction of pain by the twin angels; their object

is to extract a confession of guilt from the dead.

A vast amount of literature grew around the subject of عذاب القبر . The various traditions as Wensinck shows diverge considerably from one another; the angels are sometimes anonymous, and in the tradition absent from the picture. (18) Munkar, Naqīr are popularly swarthy angels with blue eyes (an unlikely combination). The resources of the imagination are exhausted in describing the macabre details of the torments endured by the dead. In contrast to this profusion of detail in popular theology, there is scarcely any Quranic evidence for the conception. The following passages have sometimes been regarded as the grounds for the belief: VIII, 52; XLVII, 29 (Medinan) - with VI, 93 which Bell assigns to A.H. 2-3, and which is classed as Medinan by Tradition. (19)

Sale, following Baiḍāwī and Jalāluddin, informs us that VIII, 52 'was understood of the angels who slew the infidels at Badr with iron maces'. (20) Neither of the other two references is linked with 'the punishment of the grave', at any rate by Baiḍāwī. He holds, however, that the angels mentioned in these verses hasten death or administer the coup de grace. (21) (at an impressionable age I remember reading tracts in similar vein that described the dying moments of infidels and debauchees). It is far from clear that the punishment spoken of in say VI, 93 is other than that which attends death, or that the torment referred to in VIII, 52 is not that which precedes the final judgment. 'Obviously', says Tor Andrae, 'Muhammad is not thinking of a preparatory punishment before the final resurrection. For him the moment of death and judgment have become fused into a single event'. (22)

In these three passages there is no mention at all of the grave, which after all is the focal point. On the other hand, angelic intervention is expressly brought to mind in III, 120: 'He reinforces you with three thousand angels.' This shows that the possibility of such intervention was envisaged by the Prophet at critical moments in his struggle. A parallel presupposition is recorded in Matt. 26: 53, where Jesus declares that he is able to summon twelve legions of angels, but desists in order that Scripture might be fulfilled. The entire picture is consonant with the doctrine of angelic intervention that is taken for granted both in the Bible and the Quran.

The Spouses. According to a tradition recorded by Baiḍāwī the promise, embodied in III, 193 came as a result of Um Salma's complaint that Allah seemed to ignore the part played by women in the Hegira. (23) Whereupon God gave a pledge that no labour expended in His cause would be lost. There are parallels to this explicit mention of both men and women as heirs of eternal reward in the Meccan Suras (XVI, 99; XL, 43). Bell, however, regards the second of these two verses as Medinan, (24) while S. XVI is manifestly composite. It may well be that these deliverances came after the Um Salma episode. Her protest might have led to a review of the status of women in the afterlife.

One approaches a delicate subject of this sort with some diffidence. We are not here concerned with the more intriguing details of the picture of females in Paradise. These images have been bitterly derided by hostile critics of Islam, and persuasively spiritualised by moderns and mystics. The earlier references to beauteous damsels (XXXVII, 47; XXXVIII, 52;

XLIV, 54; LV, 70-72) are gradually modified into a conception of the faithful accompanied by their wives, basking in the radiance of Paradise (XXXVI, 56-58; XLIII, 70). In this connexion Rodwell comments: 'these promises of the Houris ... are almost exclusively to be found in the Suras written at a time when Muhammad had only a single wife of 60 years of age, and that in all the ten years subsequent to the Hejirah, women are only twice mentioned as part of the reward'. (25) On examination we find that Rodwell's remark would apply not only to Medinan Suras but also to the later Meccan period.

In the earlier Medinan Suras the spouses are described as purified مُطَهَّرَة (II, 23; III, 13; IV, 60). Zamakhsharī regards these 'pure mates' as the wives of the faithful alluded to above. (26) In Tradition these wives are never confused with Houris: Gaudefroy-Demombynes states, 'Neanmoins la tradition place au paradis les croyantes avec leur époux, sans les confondre avec les houris'. (27) Later in the Medinan period these notions give way to a loftier conception of believers male and female (مؤمنات) sharing the future delights on equal terms (LVII, 12; XLVIII, 5; IX, 73-72). (28) This final stage represents a major advance, whereby believing women are assured of a fair deal and a just reward hereafter.

Attempts have been made to show that the Quranic 'descriptions of Paradise were inspired by the ideas of the Christian Syrian preacher. Afrem's Hymns of Paradise depict the joys of the blessed in very mundane colours'. Tor Andrae regards this 'inspiration' as an unrefuted fact. (29) An unrefuted fact of this order is clearly incapable of proof, and refutation is

pointless. Horowitz, in a paper to which Bell alludes, has 'shown that nearly all the details of Muhammad's description of Paradise 'are to be found referred to by older and contemporary poets. (30) One would also need to demonstrate that the poets of the Jahiliyyah likewise owed their inspiration to the Syrian monks; but the effort would be gratuitous. Surely the poetic imagination can conjure up such scenes without external aids.

Sweetman similarly reminds us of Jerome's comment on Matt. 19: 29 (cf. Luke 18: 28-30), from which the irascible saint inferred that a recompense of a hundred wives awaited those who, having left all, follow their Lord. (31) There is no mention of wives in the Matthaean version of the logion, (32) while Luke expressly confines the unspecified multiple blessings to this world (where for a Christian even bigamy is out of the question), and is content with the gift of eternal life in the world to come. The erotic propensities of Jerome are well-known. Neither he nor Ephrem can be taken as typical of Christian piety in the early centuries of our era. Such deductions clearly do not reflect N.T. thought, and indeed are alien to its spirit.

In our Lord's teaching as in that of his apostles virginity is soberly but firmly commended. We may exemplify this commendation from Christ's restrained reply to the disciples' query on the advisability of marriage (Matt. 19: 12). Likewise Paul expresses his obiter dictum in I Cor. 7: 1,40 to the effect that women are better left alone. The Seer puts the matter more bluntly in his words about the priveleged station of those who 'have not defiled themselves with women' (Rev. 14: 4). But

the plainest indication of the shape of things to come is recorded in Luke 20: 35-36, where it is stated that the risen ones do not marry, but are like angels.

Montgomery Watt informs us that 'the early Muslims looked askance at celibacy'. (33) The family and clan units were basic, and these could be strengthened and enriched only through marriage. The corporate nature of heavenly joys is depicted in two passages (XIII, 23; XL, 8). From this is could be inferred that not only conjugal but also family relationships are forever preserved; parents, wives and progeny alike participate in the delights of Eden. The rewards offered had to be of such a quality as to thrill the hearts of simple fervent tribesmen and evoke the desired traits of heroism and unwavering loyalty. For those who aspired to higher things there is reserved the Beatific Vision (LXXV, 23). 'This above all', says al-Ghazālī, 'is what we should look for', after dutifully enumerating the various material pleasures وأما سائر نعيم الجنة فإنه يشارك فيه البهيمة 'all else is thoroughly sensuous'. (34)

Other points that bear more directly on the time and mode of resurrection will be treated in subsequent chapters. In the Medinan Suras poetic descriptions have largely disappeared, giving way to stereotyped pronouncements of doom or favour. The more spectacular apocalyptic features of earlier prophecy almost vanish from the scene. Ṣubḥī al Ṣāliḥ's note on the later Meccan Suras applies here with greater force, (the descriptive elements become ... more summary', and we find 'a more abstract means of evocation'. (35)

No longer is the Prophet pestered by derisive enquiries regarding the delay of the Hour. As to denials of resurrection,

there is but a solitary oblique reference to this form of scepticism (LXIV, 7), which is probably a 'throwback' to an earlier period. The majority of the texts in which the eternity or permanence of the afterlife is implied (by the use of ابداً and خالدون) belong to this period. Most of the vital elements of the earlier eschatology are here retained, seen perhaps in better perspective, and made relevant to the life and conduct of the growing community of believers.

NOTES.

(1) This transpires from a comparison of the two lists as given in Bell's Introduction to the Qur'ān, pp.110 ff.
(2) The point is made by Nöldeke/Schwally, Geschichte des Qorans, pp.213-14. 'Mekkanisch sind v.1 - 24 ... v. 43-56 ...'.
(3) A.I. Katsh, Judaism and Islām, p.XV.
(4) R. Bell, op.cit., p.20.
(5) W.M. Watt, Muhammad at Medina, p.15.
(6) A.J. Wensinck, The Muslim Creed, pp.11-12.
(7) ibid., p.19.
(8) R. Bell, The Origin of Islam, p.107.
(9) A.I. Katsh, op.cit., p.184-85.
(10) Guillaume draws attention to Asin's statement with ref. to the penetration of the monastic system into Islam: 'Slowly ... monasticism, an institution execrated by Muhammad, was evolved in the succeeding centuries'. As Guillaume notes this is too harsh a sentiment to ascribe to the Prophet, who merely condemned the abuses of the system; in The Traditions of Islam, p.146.
(11) R. Bell, The Origin of Islam, p.107.
(12) See Katsh, op.cit., p.91 who quotes Baidāwi, and discusses Abraham's 'role' in Islam.
(13) D.S. Margoliouth, Relations between Arabs and Israelites, p.12.
(14) D. Masson, Le Coran, II, p.740.
(15) Bauer's Lexicon, p.314.
(16) D. Masson, op.cit., p.637. There is also the phrase دار الآخرة which brings out the abiding quality of the future state, surpassing the pleasures of this life (II, 88; VI, 32; VII, 168; XII, 109; XVI, 32).
(17) A.J. Wensinck, op.cit., pp.129, 164 ff.
(18) ibid., p.164.
(19) See R. Bell, The Qur'ān, Vol.1, p.124; and the title-page of the Sura (VI) in the Egyptian ed. of the Quran.
(20) G. Sale, The Koran, p.174.

(21) Baidāwī, in loc.
(22) T. Andrae, Mohammed, p.79.
(23) Baidāwī, in loc.
(24) R. Bell, The Qur'ān, Vol. 2, pp.470-71.
(25) J.M. Rodwell, The Koran, p.76.
(26) Quoted by Katsh, op.cit., p.19.
(27) M. Gaudefroy-Demombynes, Mahomet, p.484.
(28) Cf. also the use of تَنَاتَ in the Medinan Suras (IV, 38; LXVI, 5; XXXIII, 35.)
(29) Tor Andrae, op.cit., p.120. For a more extended treatment of the same subject see his Origines, pp.145 ff.
(30) R. Bell, The Origin of Islam, p.53.
(31) J.W. Sweetman, Islam and Christian Theology, Part One, Vol.I, p.34.
(32) i.e. in the Greek text (Souter and Kilpatrick) cf. N.E.B.
(33) W.M. Watt, op.cit., p.329.
(34) Ihyā', Vol. 4 p.541.
(35) Thesis summarized by L. Gardet, art. 'Djanna', E.I.(2), Vol.II, p.448.

CHAPTER IV

'THE DAY OF RESURRECTION' AND EQUIVALENT EXPRESSIONS.

Whatever the origin of the resurrection idea it finds supreme expression in the N.T. Sages and saints of earlier times caught glimmers of light which brought them the assurance that death was not the ending of the road, but merely the gateway to a fuller life; a life, moreover, that would be untrammelled by the restrictions of earthly existence. Yet in some mysterious way the future mode of being would be integrally related to the former experience, and provide its fitting sequel. Wensinck reminds us that 'Judaism, Christianity and Islam ... emphasized, each in its turn the unity of God and the resurrection of the dead'. (1) By Judaism here is presumably meant the outlook and output of the Inter-testamental and Tannaitic period. The O.T. seldom alludes to the theme of resurrection, (2) while Wensinck's statement is not intended to apply to present-day Judaism. (3) For in Bell's words, 'The main stream of Judaism had .. practically dropped Apocalypse after the fall of Jerusalem'. (4)

Along with Islam, Christianity gives the doctrine of resurrection its due place in the creed, but interprets the unity of the Godhead in totally different terms. These disparate interpretations of Divine Being inevitably colour the respective views of resurrection; 'The Quran', says Iqbal, 'does not base its possibility, like Christianity, on the evidence of the actual resurrection of a historic person. It seems to take and argue resurrection as a universal phenomenon of life in some sense, true even of birds and animals'. (5) Iqbal gives VI, 38 as the scriptural basis for this wider view

of reanimation. A more comprehensive scope for re-creation is also hinted at in Rom. 8: 18-21, as the N.T. counterpart for this solitary Quranic passage. The disjunction of basic evidence (either historical event or natural process) is not a point the N.T. labours, when it speaks of the Final Resurrection. Rather the two explanatory strands are combined by the use of analogy in the context of credal affirmation (John 12: 24; I Cor. 15: 36).

Islamic theodicy like 'the Christian view of the Divine character cannot be easily maintained apart from an adequate doctrine of final destiny'. (6) Resurrection goes a long way towards ensuring the adequacy of any such doctrine. 'In the overwhelmingly theocentric theology of Muhammad the doctrine of resurrection and judgment was second only to Allah's creation of the world, was a necessary consequence to it, and could be proved by it.' (7) The frequent collocation of Allah and the Last Day, to which reference was made in the last chapter, bears out this proposition.

If the amount of space devoted to a subject in any given work were a valid criterion, then it could be said that the Quran seems even more insistent than is the N.T. on the ineluctable logic of resurrection. In this chapter we plan to concentrate on one aspect of Quranic eschatology, The Day of Resurrection as it is depicted in the pages of the Holy Book. Inevitably the treatment here and the ensuing discussion on verbs in the next chapter are bound to overlap. The contexts in which these verbs of rising appear furnish analogies and adumbrations of resurrection, and even hints of an alternative mode of returning to God. The phrase يوم القيامة more directly focuses attention

on the crowded events of the End.

The doctrinal import of the phrase اليوم الآخر has already been considered.(8) As has been observed, the expression was introduced comparatively late in the Suras. Numerous words and phrases of a more evocative quality turn up earlier in the Quran. The idea of finality is but one aspect of eschatological truth; for the Day is not just an end by a beginning. It is a prelude to judgment and inaugurates the bliss or wretchedness of the afterlife. Consequently, several other expressions are employed, and together these convey the substance of what is envisaged in the Prophet's eschatological message.

Masson reckons that of the 440 instances in which يوم figures approximately 385 are connected with the end of the present world: 'Les différentes appelations', he writes, 'données à ce jour en marquent les principeux caractères'.(9) Apart from the construct state in which يوم commonly appears it is qualified by a variety of epithets all of which amplify the meaning intended. The most familiar of such phrases is يوم القيامة . It occurs 70 times in the Quran, and is a commonplace of traditional theology and of simple piety.(10) In contrast to the Quranic usage, the N.T. nowhere employs the bound phrase the Day of Resurrection, though it is well-established in Christian terminology. When used by Christians the phrase more often than not denotes the original Day of Resurrection, the κυριακή of Christ's rising.

Other suggestive titles for the Day that marks the dividing line between this life and the next are listed below:-

The Day of emergence (L, 41)
The Day of anguish (XIX, 40) يوم الحسرة
The Day of emergence (L, 41) يوم الخروج

The Day of doom (I, 3) يوم الدين
The Day of encounter (XL, 15) يوم التلاق
The Day of eternity (L, 33) يوم الخلود
The Day of gathering (XLII, 5) يوم الجمع
The Day of mutual deceit (LXIV, 9) يوم التغابن
The Day of mutual outcry (XL, 34) يوم التناد
The Day of raising (XXX, 56) يوم البعث
The Day of reckoning (XL, 28) يوم الحساب
The Day of separation (LXXVII, 14) يوم الفصل (11)
The Day of Victory (XXXII, 29) يوم الفتح (12)

Construed with a variety of epithets the Day is described as follows:-

Difficult (LXXIV, 9) عسير
Enfolding (XI, 85) محيط
Great (VI, 15) عظيم
Grim and Calamitous (LXXVI, 10) عبوس قمطرير
Heavy or oppressive (LXXVI, 27) ثقيل
Irreversible (XXX, 42) لا مرد له
Painful (XLIII, 65) اليم
Promised (LXXXV, 2) الموعود

These twenty-odd labels by no means exhaust the list of names for the Last Day. For extra good measure al-Ghazālī supplies us with a hundred such names, some of which have been detailed above, but most of which are of traditional coinage. (13) Each of these appelations in its turn sheds some light on the proceedings of the Day. Whilst the Quran does speak of ايام الله, this particular expression is too wide of reference and cannot be taken as strictly eschatological. It includes times of divine visitation, intervention and revelation, when Allah's purposes were signally worked out (XLV, 13).

The final falling of the curtain may just as aptly be spoken of as the Hour. Further, the event which both Hour and Day denote can quite as readily be specified without recourse to temporal categories. A number of attributes, nomina adjectiva, also point to the same world-shaking event. Such forms of designation generally occur in the earlier Suras; thus we have:-

The Blast (LXXX, 33) الصاخّة
The Calamity (CI, 1-2) القارعة
The Event (LVI, 1; LXIX, 15) الواقعة
The Indubitable (LXIX, 1-3) الحآقة
The Overwhelming (XII, 107) الغاشية

In view of the feminine endings of these terms, we might conceivably regard them as epithets of the Hour (الساعة); Masson seems to imply this.(14) But Andrae has noted that similar expressions portending disaster occur in non-eschatological passages, such as the annihilation of 'Ad and Thamud (VII, 76 الرجفة - LI, 44 الصاعقة ; LXIX, 4 القارعة).(15)

It will be seen that almost all these expressions are designed to terrify rather than reassure the hearers. Where adherents are few and opponents many, the message of doom must take priority; it is the more likely to arouse the heedless to a sense of need.

So much for names and titles; we may recur briefly to the import of the Day and the Hour. No appreciable difference can be discerned between the longer and shorter span of time when applied to the End. In Matt. 24: 36 the Day and Hour are juxtaposed as synonymous pointers to the Parousia. On this verse McNeile comments, 'the addition of καὶ ὥρας is rhetorical "the day" and "the hour" having the same meaning (cf. Mark 13: 32; Matt. 25: 13).(16) May not this remark apply equally to the Quranic usage

of the two nouns, even though collocation is rare? (vide XLV, 26). Apart from these three synoptic texts the Hour in the gospels signifies the tragedy of Jesus' passion, the completion of the first stage in the final drama. This in a crucial sense was just as inevitable as the closing act of the drama. According to Masson in at least 40 out of 48 occurrences of الساعة in the Quran the reference is to the moment of resurrection and judgment. (17) By contrast the N.T. usage of ὥρα is more flexible; in addition to the 'critical' nuances noted above the word most often denotes the usual division of time into which a day falls.

Does the Day of Resurrection as it bulks large in its Quranic setting add substantially to our knowledge of the divine miracle of cosmic renewal? The phrase is used a number of times simply to indicate the terminus ad quem for decisions reached by Allah: He stirs up strife among Jews and others الى يوم القيامة (V, 69; cf. III, 48; V, 17; VII, 166). Satan is to be allowed scope for his wiles until that Day (XVII, 64; cf. VII, 13; XV, 36; XXXVIII, 80). In two other passages the phrase merely brings out idiomatically the notion of permanence or ceaselessness (XXVIII, 71-72; LXVIII, 39).

'A schematic statement of the order of events in Muslim eschatology' has been set out by the theologians; this order is given in the Shorter Encyclopaedia of Islam and consists of Signs - First Blast - The Interval - Second Blast - Judgment - The Bridge - Intercession. (18) The Quranic evidence could doubtless be made to fit into this sequence of events, but it is unlikely that any precise order is presupposed in the Prophet's visions of the End. It would thus be preferable to follow the course of Gaudefroy-

Demombynes: 'J'essayerai de décrire ici ces aspects divers du Judgment, sans prétendre les assembler en un ordre rationnel'.(19)

Allah is the central figure in the resurrection drama and the ensuing judgment as enacted in the Quran. So unmistakable is His presence that the writer resorts to anthropomorphic language when speaking of Deity in this particular setting. Allah intervenes to settle disputes between Jews and Christians (II, 107). He pronounces judgment on issues that divide the bickering sects (IV, 140; XXII, 17, 68; XXXII, 25; XLV, 16). His throne will be borne into view by the angels (LXIX, 17). At a later stage of doctrinal development this anthropomorphism is carried to extremes. In his refutation of the Djahmites ad Dārimī cites what purports to be hadith, according to which on the Day 'the Lord ( ) will appear with his cherubim. This is follwed by a similar saying ثم ينزل الله في برائه وجماله وبعد ما ... من الملائكة.(20) The two citations together form an almost exact replica of the Thessalonian picture of the Parousia, down to the use of the articular الرب; a characteristic usage among Christian Arabs, but unexampled in the Quran. There رب never occurs with a definite article in the absolute construction. The traditional imagery reflects an increasing absorption of Christian apocalyptic ideas into popular Muslim religion.

Apocalyptic manifestations, calamitous and spectacular, are part and parcel of the scenery depicted by the prophets of the O.T., when they describe the Day of the Lord. The more strictly apocalyptic writings of the Inter-testamental period furnished further material for later apocalyptists. The Quran has its fair share of this literary genre, and in particular

the early Suras paint lurid pictures of the fate that awaits a heedless world. Obviously, whilst such catastrophes are a sure judgment upon the infidel, the faithful who survive until the Day must somehow be involved in its terrors. The rolling up of the heavens serves as a fitting prelude to the end of history; this phenomenon is mentioned in XXXIX, 67.

In the verse that follows (XXXIX, 68) we hear the trumpet blast, the indubitable sign that the end has come. The trump is another dramatic item in the Thessalonian picture of the advent I Thess. 4: 16; it resounds in I Cor. 15: 52. In the Apocalypse, however, the seven trumpets 'are drawn out serially' (21) as preparatory warnings to mankind. The trumpet blast generally coincides with the Day, in the Suras (VI, 73; XVIII, 99; XX, 102; XXIII, 103; XXVII, 89; XXXVI, 51; XXXIX, 68; L, 19; LXIX, 13; LXXVIII, 18). Both Andrae (22) and Masson (23) allude to the Judeo-Christian antecedents of this standard apocalyptic feature.

Of the foregoing texts one at least deserves added comment (XXXIX, 68): 'The trumpet will be blown, and every one ... will be stunned (صعق) ...; then another blast ..., and lo they will be standing (قيام). The context refers specifically to يوم القيامة (cf. XXVII, 89). Casanova notes that قيام recalls the expression قيامة (24) while al-Ghazālī takes the verb صعق to imply an actual death. (25) From this it may be deduced that every one will share in some form of rising from the ground. For the living this semblance of death or loss of consciousness will be followed at once by a recovery of consciousness. The dead will emerge from their graves. There is here no suggestion of 'rapture', of being caught up ... to meet the Lord in the air' (I Thess. 4: 17). Casanova also cites

Ṭabarī's comment on XXXIX, 68) based on an earlier tradition, according to which Muhammad will be the first for whom the earth will open up; he will then take his place as the leading intercessor. (26) This presumably is the Muslim counterpart for the idea behind the phrase 'first fruits of the resurrection' (I Cor. 15: 20, 23).

Intercession, in the Quranic scheme of things, is confined to the Day, and may avail thereafter. It is not the continuing ministry envisaged in the N.T. and elaborated by the Church. (27) Indeed, in some of the warnings addressed to the Jews, the Quran seems to imply that intercession is either unacceptable or unavailing (II, 45, 117, 255; cf. VI, 94; XL, 19). The angels, themselves, cannot intercede, Allah is the paramount, intercessor, شفيع (VI, 51, 69; XXXII, 3; XXXIX, 45). This tacit assignment of the ministry of intercession to Allah raises its own problems of the meaning of intercession in Quranic theology; it comes closer to the O.T. notion of 'shield and defender' as expressed in passages like Gen.15: 1; Ps.3: 3; 18: 2.

By divine sanction the power of interceding may be delegated to others (II, 256; XIX, 90; XX, 108). Presumably each of these intercessors will speak on behalf of his community. Jesus does figure at the Judgment in the role of a witness. Thus we read in IV, 157 ويوم القيامة يكون عليهم شهيدا , where the antecedent is almost certainly Jesus. Yusuf Ali favours the rendering, 'He (Christ) will be a witness against them', and has a cross-reference to IV, 45. (28) There we are informed that God appoints a witness, some prophet or leader, to speak for or against a nation. Hence, whilst Christ's role is an exalted one, it is neither unique nor pre-eminent. By contrast, the N.T.

frequently speaks of Christ as the Judge, though apostolic language oscillates between the ascription of this title to the Father and its attribution to the Son (cf. Acts 10: 42; Heb. 12: 23 with II Cor. 5: 10; Jas. 5: 9).

This brings us to the judicial arrangements of the day, the precise order of which cannot be set out. The 'book' (or everyman's book) recording the balance of good and evil deeds is laid open. Each person in turn is called upon to revise his own account (XVII, 14-15), and pronounce judgment upon himself (cf. LXIX, 19). The Biblical references to a record kept in Heaven are rare but suggestive (Dan. 7: 10; Mal. 3: 16; Luke 10: 20; Rev. 20: 12). In the last of these, the Seer recognizes the opening of books and in addition the great 'book of life'. The single great book is, as Gaudefroy-Demombynes points out, the more general conception in the N.T. (cf. Rev. 3: 5). (29) In a striking passage, two of the metaphysical attributes of Deity, omniscience and ubiquity, are brought out (LVIII, 8). Here the Quran warns the Prophet's followers that Allah records the secret counsels of men, and the record will be 'played back' at the Resurrection. The wording of the Quranic text is curiously like Christ's promise: 'where two or three are gathered in my name, there am I in the midst of them' (Matt. 18: 20); but the aim in view is altogether different. Whereas the verbum Christi is intended to foster the fellowship of believers, the Quranic deliverance was aimed at discouraging the proliferation of secret cabals among the Prophet's followers.

On the day of Resurrection judgment will be meted out strictly according to works (III, 155). No pretexts on the ground of ignorance will be accepted (VII, 171), nor will partiality be

be shown. Above all it will be an occasion for redressing wrongs and the reversal of fortunes, when the pious will be lifted up and scoffers abased (II, 208). Whilst in this present age believers are not necessarily deprived of the world's goods or of God's gifts, the great blessings are still in store (VII, 30). There is no virtue in asceticism, but only in moderation (VII, 31). On the other hand, infidels, whatever their present lot, are pursued by a curse; nemesis overtakes them at the Resurrection (XI, 63, 101).

Along with the books, scales are produced to ensure that strict justice is done (XXI, 48). Evil deeds are deemed to be weightless (XVIII, 105), and yet the balances are sufficiently accurate to weigh the minutiae of conduct. Margoliouth regards the two metaphors (books and balances) as mutually exclusive, 'for if the contents of the "books" settle into which hand they are to be placed, i.e. whether the individual is to be saved or damned, there would seem to be no function for the scales'. (30) Andrae, however, describes the duplication of commercial metaphors 'a simple tautology, and indicates that an orthodox exegete like Baiḍāwī held the expressions to be figurative. This, in Andrae's view, accords with Muhammad's thinking. (31) Figurative language cannot, of course, be readily translated into logical propositions. The Prophet simply wishes to drive home the point that every individual will be made aware that the divine verdict is at once just and final.

Terror is the dominant note in the Quranic picture of the Resurrection Day. Prominence is given to the resurrection of the wicked. Insofar as the message of resurrection can be said to be specifically directed to any group, it was directed to the

incredulous; and to such it came as a threat. In contrast to this outlook, the N.T. doctrine of resurrection, springing as it does from an accomplished and triumphant fact, is held out as a promise to believers of future transformation (Phil. 3: 21). The resurrection of the unjust may be inferred in the N.T., but it is expressly referred to only in a few passages (John 5: 29; Rev. 20: 12).

Andrae makes much of the contrast between the two attitudes, The Quranic and the Christian, towards the events of the Day. (32) The coincidence of Parousia and Resurrection accounts for the contrasts. Christians venture forth (in parabolic language) to meet the Bridegroom (Matt. 25: 6; Tit. 2: 13; I Pet. 4: 13; Rev. 22: 17, 20). As for the Quranic delineation of the last things, it appears that even the faithful look ahead to the prospect of the Day with trembling hearts (XXIII, 62). Voices are hushed in the presence of the Merciful (XX, 107). The Day causes even children's hair to go grey (LXXIII, 17), a detail which may have found its way into the Quran from the Apocalypse of Thomas: 'Grey hairs shall be seen upon boys ...'. (33) Andras traces back this phenomenon to an earlier source in Jewish apocalypse. (34) When it comes to lurid embellishment rather than to basic concept, the closest parallels to many features of Quranic eschatology occur not in 'the canonical books of the Bible, but (in) rabbinical works and heretical N.T. apocryphal writings'. (35)

Etymologically the noun قيامة would seem to be derived from the verbal root قام, but it is common knowledge that the noun is borrowed from Christian Aramaic or Syriac. As Jeffery points out the noun occurs only in the bound phrase that we have been considering, يوم القيامة, and scholars suspect it to be 'a

technical eschatological term for the Last Day'. (36) Its probable derivation from Syriac is referred to in Lisan-al-Arab.

وقيل هو تعريب قيمثا وهو بالسريانية بهذا المعنى

(37). This abstract noun like other foreign expressions was in common usage in Muhammad's day, and we need not assume that it was a direct borrowing by Muhammad from the Syrian church. For as Bell maintains, 'The majority of these (Jeffery's collection) can be shown to have been in use in Arabic in pre-Islamic times and many of them had become regular Arabic words'. (38)

The phrase يوم القيامة illumines an important facet of Islamic eschatology. It tells us a great deal about the chain of events, far-reaching in scope, in which the miracle of resurrection is a vital link. One reason for its relative frequency as compared to its equivalents is that the Quran regards resurrection as the focal event of the great Day. The raising of the dead is preceded by natural upheavals, and leads on to the judgment of mankind. There remain other aspects of resurrection that require investigation. The antecedents, analogies and the process of rising may be conveniently treated by a consideration of the verbal pattern within the resurrection framework. To this inquiry we now turn our attention for a fuller understanding of what the Quran teaches on the subject.

NOTES.

(1) A.J. Wensinck, The Muslim Creed, p.3.
(2) R.H. Charles writes: 'The belief in a blessed future life springs not from prophecy but from apocalyptic. With this doctrine the Old Testament prophet qua prophet was not concerned'; quoted in And the Life Everlasting by John Baillie, p.97.

It is of interest that Tabari in his rebuttal of those who assert that Christ was the first to make known the doctrine of resurrection, ingeniously finds evidence for revivification (نشور) in Deut. 32: 39 and I Sam. 2: 6. See his Kitāb-ud-Din Wad-Dawlah pp.136-37 (Eng.tr. by A. Mingana, The Book of Religion and Empire, p.161.

(3) See the remarks of an orthodox Jew, H. Wouk in This is My God, pp.165 ff, and also K. Kohler's Jewish Theology, p.395, for the modern Jewish attitude.

(4) R. Bell, The Origin of Islam, p.104.

(5) M. Iqbal, Religious Thought in Islam, p.110.

(6) J.H. Leckie, The World to Come and Final Destiny, p.IX.

(7) See art. Kiyāma in S.E.I. p.264.

(8) In Chap. III.

(9) D. Masson, Le Coran, II, p.701.

(10) The colloquial form of القيامة اقام is roughly equivalent to the idiomatic 'raising hell'.

(11) A phrase which according to Andrae has its counterpart in IV Esdras and Sirach, see Origines de L'Islam, p.71.

(12) This expression is not necessarily eschatological, and may point forward to military victories. See Baidāwī ad XXXII, v.29.

(13) Ihyā', Vol.4, p.516-17.

(14) D. Masson, op.cit., p.704.

(15) T. Andraw, Origines de l'Islam, p.72.

(16) A.H.McNeile, Matthew, p.356.

(17) D. Masson, op.cit., p.704.

(18) As given in S.E.I. loc. cit., p.263.

(19) M. Gaudefroy-Demombynes, Mahomet, p.458.

(20) ad-Darimi, Kitāb ar-Radd ala l-Ğahmiya, p.36 (Cf. Suras LXXXIX, 23; LXXVIII, 38; LXIX, 16-17).

(21) See A. Farrer, A Rebirth of Images, p.41.

(22) T. Andrae, op.cit., p.72.

(23) D. Masson, op.cit., p.722.

(24) P. Casanova, Mohammed et la Fin du Monde, p.32.

(25) Ihyā', Vol.4, p.512.

(26) P. Casanova, op.cit., p.32.

(27) e.g. Heb.7: 25; Andraw, op.cit., p.79 gives comparative views of intercession in Jewish and Patristic literature.

(28) Y. Ali, The Holy Quran Vol. I p.231 n.

(29) M. Gaudefroy-Demombynes, op.cit., p.463.

(30) D.S. Margoliouth, Mohammed, p.106.

(31) T. Andrae, op.cit., p.77.
(32) ibid., p.98.
(33) M.R. James, The Apocryphal New Testament, p.558.
(34) T. Andrae, op.cit., p.78.
(35) W.M. Watt, Muhammad at Mecca, p.84.
(36) A. Jeffery, Foreign Vocabulary of the Qur'ān, p.244.
(37) L.A., Vol.15, p.409.
(38) R. Bell, Introduction to the Qurān, p.80.

CHAPTER V

A STUDY OF VERBAL USAGE FOR THE AFTERLIFE.

Of sundry Arabic verbs that convey some aspect of the resurrection drama (the rising, reviving, emerging), بعث is the most common in the Quran. We may tentatively assume that this verb, together with قام, corresponds to the N.T. pair ἐγείρω and ἀνίστημι. Yet while the Greek verbs are fairly evenly distributed over the N.T., بعث is the commonest and قام the rarest of this group of 'resurrection' verbs in the Suras. In all, the former occurs 34 times and the latter 3 times in relevant contexts. (1) This fact, along with the manifestly foreign origin of القيامة, leads to the inference that the commoner verb was the familiar term for the act of raising (or rising). The objections to and the denials of the miracle, placed on the lips of Meccan scoffers, generally include some form of (VI, 29; XI, 10; XVI, 40; XVII, 52, 100; XXIII, 39; XXXVII, 16; LVI, 47). As a rule, the Arabic versions of the N.T. avoid this verb, and almost invariably use قام (or its causative), occasionally opting for a synonym, نهض. (2)

In one instance the phrase Day of Resurrection and the customary verb are significantly juxtaposed, يوم القيامة تُبعثون (XXIII, 16). This mode of variation is hardly a conscious device of Semitic literary style (where cognate accusatives and infinitive absolutes abound). It would seem that the Prophet simply used the popular phrase alongside the usual verb. Where it does occur, قام is employed intransitively. As we might expect بعث is transitive or else in the passive, thus laying stress on the divine energy in the operation.

Not only is the Day of Resurrection sometimes styled the Day of coming forth يوم الخروج (L, 41), but in addition the verb أخرج often figures in many passages, since it describes the actual emergence of the 'body' from its grave: It thus seems to parallel the N.T. ἐκπορεύω , a verb used in a discourse where the literal coming forth is graphically depicted (John 5: 29). Another verb is احيى , which would presumably represent ζωοποιέω . In the N.T. this verb often indicates moral or spiritual rebirth. Whilst we dare not rule out the possibility that a similar meaning may attach to some of the Quranic utterances in which احيى occurs, the Arabic verb generally conveys the idea of a bodily resuscitation.

Ahya. To deal with the last of these verbs first: the act of life-giving on the Day has its prototype in the miracle of childbirth. And احيى is used to describe God's part in this initial endowment of life. According to Andrae, Lehmann and Pedersen have shown that this analogical proof of reanimation can be traced back to the Talmud, and it recurs in the writings of Christian apologists from Justin to Cyril. (3) The Quran clearly regards non-existence as a form of death, and childbirth as the first miracle of life-giving by divine fiat (VII, 158; IX, 117; X, 57; cf. XXII, 65; XXX, 39). (4) This in itself is not very subtle reasoning; nevertheless it provides a clue for understanding the manner in which the future life will emerge from apparent nothingness. In II, 26 the argument is carried a step further; death precedes life, and is its sequel. The first death is nonentity; the whole process culminates in a second life-giving. Will not even the infidel acknowledge a logic of this double action of making and unmaking (XL, 11)?

The second death in this verse is not a reference to that calamity of final rejection which is announced in Rev. 20: 14.

Despite the naive embryology on which it rests, this analogy of birth of a helpful one (XXII, 5). Life in the womb is, as it were, a state of continuous sleep. Our present life is lived in a state of partial sleep and partial waking. In the tomb, sleep is resumed in a deeper fashion than the pre-natal semi-consciousness. Eventually men will emerge from the grave to enjoy the fulness of life that has neither slumber nor end. A similar analogy is used by al-Ghazālī, who however, relates it to the soul's release from the confinement of spatio-temporal existence. (5) This of course is σῶμα σῆμα in Islamic garb. Does the twofold life-giving set forth in the Quran apply to everyone? The Prophet gives a paradoxical answer to the question. In Gehenna the guilty neither live nor die (XX, 76). Extinction is excluded, but such survival can be best described as a living death.

Another figure (akin to the simile found in Heb. 6: 7) recurs in the Suras: God sends rain from heaven to revive the desert (II, 159; XXV, 51; XXX, 18; XXXV, 10; L, 9-11). Sabbagh writes 'Pour le Bédouin l'idée de "sécheresse" évoque celle de "mort". Par contre, l'idée de "verdure" est pour lui le symbole de la "vie".' (6) The notion to which Sabbagh draws our notice is not restricted to the Béduin, but is widely held all over the East. In the last of these verses the natural coming forth is expressly likened to the supernatural (L, 11). Less emphasis is laid in the N.T. on the phenomenon of sprouting than on the hidden process of growth whereby the planted seed is transformed. There it is the seed which dies (John 12: 24;

I Cor. 15: 36); in the Quran the earth is looked upon as virtually dead, at least for a season. Consequently, the individual aspect of resurrection becomes more prominent in N.T. thought, as does the bond of continuity between the old self and the new (cf. VI, 95; XXXI, 27).

Were there any precedents to which the Prophet could point as proof that God is able to give life to the dead? Muhammad mentions the tale of Abraham, who at Allah's bidding, summoned four birds from 'every hill' (II, 262). Bell regards the episode as a 'confused reminiscence of Gen. 15: 9 ff'. (7) Katsh quotes an extract from Midrash Megadol and cites Sa'adia Gaon to show that the interpretation the Prophet put on the patriarchal incident is not original. (8) The meaning of the verb صُرهُن is uncertain. If the original story has any bearing on the issue, the verb would indicate that the birds were ripped in two. The older commentators favour this interpretation. Muslim modernists, on the other hand, tend to see a parable in the incident. (9) But unless the Prophet envisaged some form of reanimation, the incident could hardly serve as a parable of resurrection.

Two of the Suras contain explicit references to Jesus raising the dead, with the proviso that the miracle was performed by God's leave (III, 43; V, 110). (10) The fifth Sura as a whole is commonly held to be the last in the series, while the parallel passage in the third Sura is also of a late date. Hence, these declarations would reflect Muhammad's considered view on the subject. On the principle enunciated in II, 100, the later revelation has greater authority than that which came before. Baiḍāwī, for one accepts the literalness of the account, making

no attempt to spiritualise words which the Quran attributes to Jesus in this context. He draws attention to the iterated 'by the permission of God' inserted 'in order to refute the fancy of those who maintain his divinity. For raising life does not belong to the class of human actions'.(11) God, Himself, has in the past quickened thousands whom He had bidden to die (II, 244). This is vaguely reminiscent of the vision of Ezekiel and the valley of dry bones, as both Katsh and Rodwell point out.(12) In the Quranic passage there is no suggestion that the episode is based on a vision, while the spiritual application of the original incident is overlooked. The inference drawn is that God is bounteous to mankind, which links up well with the exhortations of the next two verses (II, 245-46).

Some at least of the faithful are granted the privilege of immediate translation into the presence of God. In II, 149; III, 163 the Prophet (or each individual) is addressed and assured that the martyrs are not to be counted as dead, but they are 'alive with their Lord', بل احياء عند ربّهم. Baiḍāwī says that some refer these words to the martyrs who fell at Uhud, whilst others claim that the battle of Badr occasioned the announcement.(13) A similar trend is observable in the N.T., but there the assurance of immediate entry into the joys of Paradise is not confined to martyrs (Luke 23: 43). On this development in Quranic thought Andrae remarks, 'This belief that the souls of martyrs really exist, and enjoy the blessedness of Paradise before all others, is a Christian conception adopted by Mohammed, without his realizing that it is entirely incompatible with his idea of the soul and of its state after death'.(14) We would, however, note, that nothing is said about the 'souls'

of martyrs in these passages; otherwise Andrae's remark is fully justified. Stauffer cites passages in apocalyptic literature which allude to the souls of martyrs in a provisional state of rest (AEN. 22: 5 ff and IV Ezra 4: 35).(15)

The Quran does indeed speak of the dead being raised, but makes no mention of the 'body' conceived as an integral whole. This point will be taken up in the next chapter. God gives life to the dead, and is accordingly spoken of as مُحيي ; the participle is used predicatively rather than as an epithet of Deity. Allah is also said to give life to the main structural components of the body, the bones for instance (XXXVI, 78, 79).

Ba'atha. From the lexicon it appears that the primary meaning of بعث is 'to send' (ارسله وحده).(16) In addition we find a few derived meanings, such as 'to appoint', 'to arouse', 'to awake'. Often the verb is used in connexion with the appointment of prophets II, 209, kings II, 248, leaders V, 15 and apostles III, 158; XVI, 38. The basic meaning, 'to send', is found in V.34.

A brave attempt is made by M. Ali to interpret the verb in terms of the spiritual and cultural rebirth of the Arab race.(17) Reputable philologists, however, are unaware of this nuance. Such an interpretation is an example of plausible eisegesis rather than of obvious exegesis. Without passing judgment on a well-known party movement, one does recognize the aptness of the title Ba'th (resurgence) adopted by the neo-nationlists of the Fertile Crescent, who strive for political and social renaissance. Whether one sympathises with or deplores the aims of the movement, it seems clear that the views propogated do not stem from the Quran. Muhammad throughout conceived his mission as

essentially religious and prophetic. His use of the verb was pointedly eschatological. Where the adjective عربياً occurs in the Quran it qualifies the Holy Book or else the Arabic tongue (XII, 2; XIII, 37; XX, 112; XXXIX, 29; XLI, 2 etc).

Besides عربياً we have the noun اعراب more strictly Arabian (and by inference Beduin). 'The usage of the Quran is probably in favour of the view that Arab means Bedouin', says Margoliouth. (18) More often than not اعراب is used in a derogatory sense (IX, 91, 98, 99, 121; XXXIII, 20; XLVIII, 11 etc.) At most it could be held that Muhammad viewed his mission as ethnic in scope rather than nationalistic. Wensinck finds it 'impossible to admit that Muhammad ... regarded himself as a missionary to the whole world'. He inclines to Vacca's verdict that the story of how Muhammad sent letters to the Great powers inviting them to embrace Islam was based on a correspondence 'invented to furnish the Prophet's exequatur for conquerors' who followed him. (19) The imminence of the End precluded thoughts and plans for worldwide expansion. The few verses sometimes adduced as evidence for a universal mission allegedly envisaged by Muhammad are patient of a more restricted interpretation (VII, 157; XIV, 52; XLI, 53). Casanova gives this opinion: 'Nous remarquerons qu'il ne s'y trouve aucun énoncé d'idée politique, aucune règle s'appliquant au pouvoir temporel'. (20) This proposition is valid enough, though the inference Casanova draws from it is more questionable.

A curious incident is related in the Quran (II, 261). An unnamed passer-by (said to be 'Uzair, Ezra) (21) enquires about a ghost town: 'How shall God give life to this, now it is dead?

Allah replies by a symbolic act, causing him to die for a century; after which the man is raised (بعثه), but has no inkling of the time that has elapsed. The story sounds like a conflation of Ezekiel's vision (ch.37) with the tale of Baruch, against the backdrop of Zion's ruins.(22) It was Nehemiah who surveyed the ruins of Jerusalem, but this does not affect the argument (Neh. 2: 12 ff). The sequel would indicate that Muhammad held to the 'crude' materialistic view of resurrection current in the Early Church, and enshrined in the article, 'I believe in the resurrection of the flesh'.

In this story the enquirer was invited to observe how the bones were brought together. Muhammad specifies bones and dust (XXIII, 84; XXXVII, 16; LVI, 47), or alternatively bones and fragments (XVII, 52; XVII, 100) as components of the human frame that reappear on the Last Day and are clothed with flesh. Most of these texts purport to register the objections of sceptics against the belief in bodily resurrection, but we may take it that their rhetorical questions would have drawn forth an unequivocal Yes from the Prophet, affirming that resurrection would be corporeal. In one passage he almost casually but suggestively describes the risen ones as a new creation خلقاً جديداً (XVII, 52; cf. XXXV, 17). Paul applies this pregnant phrase to the individual Christian (II Cor.5: 17); for him the concept is bound up with the believer's mystical union with Christ. This continuing process of renewal will be fully realized when the 'new creature' finds his rightful place in the 'new heaven and earth'.

With the foregoing episode we may consider the so-called 'Legend of the Seven Sleepers', discussed at some length by the Quran (XVIII, 9-25). This particular revelation came to Muhammad

much earlier than the contents of the second Sura; Gaudefroy-Demombynes entitles it 'une introduction à la doctrine de la résurrection'. (23) According to Bell, the passage dates 'from the time when the length of time between death and resurrection was an objection which Muhammad had to meet', and it incorporates a revision. (24) The story has been linked with an incident that took place during the Decian persecution. Torrey with his wonted ingenuity sees in الرقيم an allusion to Decius himself. (25) Be that as it may, the tale of some youths entombed in a cave for decades, emerging fresh and radiant, is offered as a preview of resurrection. The moral seems to be that the aeons elapsing between the death of individuals and the final raising of all will appear as but a day. Thus the transition to the afterlife, despite the intervening centuries, will have the semblance of instantaneous passage to a higher mode of existence (XXX, 55-56). That the dead remain in a state of unconsciousness is assumed in XVI, 21--22, where more specifically those whom men count divine are declared to be unaware of the hour of their awakening.

Akhraja. It is doubtful whether any appreciable difference in meaning can be made out between one and other of the verbs we are considering. Perhaps the life-giving represents the initial stage in the resurrection process; this is instantly followed by rising and coming forth. But any elaboration on possible shades of meaning discernible in one verb and not the others would be profitless subtilty. The basic sense of each verb is self-evident, and the entire operation is completed in a flash (ex hypothesi). In XXII, 7, God is said to raise those who are in the graves يبعث من في القبور . Again بعث is used in XXXVI, 51-52 to denote raising from a resting-place

together with another verb نسل, which conjures up the picture of 'bodies' streaming out in endless procession to be confronted by the Judge.

Thus the notion of 'emerging' or 'coming forth' can be expressed not only by اخرج but also by at least two of its synonyms. And اخرج itself adds but little to our understanding of the resurrection act. Occasionally the verb is used to convey the idea of bringing out men from darkness into light. This was a mission to which the Prophet felt himself called (XIV, 1, 5), in the steps of Moses. Yet in the last resort this work of spiritual translation is viewed as, the divine prerogative (XXXIII, 42; LVII, 9; LXV, 11). This theme runs right through the N.T. (Acts 26: 18; I Pet. 2: 9), where the antithesis between the two realms of light and darkness stands out at once sharp and starkly ethical.

The objections by sceptics to the notion of resurrection occur less frequently with اخرج than with بعث (XIX, 67; XXVII, 69; XLVI, 16). The last of these objections is specifically attributed to 'Abd ar-Rahmān, the son of Abu Bakr, as representative of Meccan unbelief. (26) In similes already met with, the bursting seed, the birth of a child, the earth springing to life, Muhammad describes the final coming forth (VI, 95; XXII, 5; XLIII, 10). These figures are partly merged in the contemplation that, after all, man has his origin in the sod, from which most fittingly, he will be brought forth anew, "يُخرجكم اخراجا" (LXXI, 17). al-Ghazālī conceives the act of coming forth in realistic terms, and asks us to visualise the body covered with dust from head to foot, staggering from the shock of the trumpet blast and moving in the direction of the sound. (27)

Raja'a. Two other verbs may be included in this survey: رجع and وفى are not strictly verbs of resurrection, but loosely speaking the action involved in these two verbs leads to the same result, that is bringing men face to face with their Creator beyond the grave. رجع is used either in the passive or as causative.

How does the Muslim concept of 'returning' مرجع (X, 47; X, 24; XI, 4; XXIX, 7; XXXI, 22) compare with its counterpart in Christianity? Unquestionably, the Parousia is one of the most distinctive ideas of the N.T. For the Christian the return of his Lord is the climax of hope, though not its consummation. Whilst the pious Muslim intones انا لله وانا اليه راجعون (II, 151), the Christian gives voice to his longing with 'Maranatha', 'Come Lord Jesus'. The promise of Christ that he will return to receive his own (John 14: 3), contrasts with Allah's assurance that humanity will be made to return to Him (X, 24; XIX, 41; XXI, 93; XXIII, 117; XXIX, 7; XXXI, 22; XL, 77).

Submission to God is either a preliminary or else a concomitant of this returning (III, 77). Willingly or unwillingly heavenly beings and the creatures of earth surrender at last to Allah, an attitude which is regarded proleptically as an accomplished fact (اسلم). It is interesting to compare this statement with Paul's still more emphatic declaration in Phil. 2: 10-11, to the effect that 'at the name of Jesus every knee should bow'. This again is all-embracing in its range. According to the Quran the eventual returning includes every individual, and thus may be regarded either as a promise or as a threat depending on one's present standpoint vis-a-vis the

Creator (X, 4; XXI, 36; XXIX, 57; XXX, 10; XLI, 20).

Evildoers and unbelievers will take part in the universal 'homecoming' (X, 46-47; XXXI, 22; XLV, 14), otherwise conceived as a 'meeting with God', لقآء الله (VI, 31; II, 43). Pharaoh and his host had fondly imagined that such a return would never take place (XXVIII, 39). Amos, the prophet of doom, rings out a similar message in a startling passage, where the meeting (divine confrontation) is seen as inevitable despite Israel's reluctance to face the issue: 'Yet have ye not returned unto me ... prepare to meet thy God' (Amos 4: 6-12). For some people this returning to Allah is merely a passing phase before the final reprobation. The eventual fate of infidels and the 'forgers of lies' is the torment of Hell (X, 71; XXXVII, 66). And yet, may it not be that الينا ترجعون is God's last word to man, and that beyond the grimness of Gehenna lies the prospect of a happier encounter? For does not Allah announce that the earth and all who dwell thereon are His inheritance (XIX, 41)? His creative purpose cannot be in vain (XXIII, 117). These texts, in themselves, are inconclusive; the Quran offers little ground for presumption in this matter. Here as elsewhere personal bias unavoidably determines exegesis.

Rafa'a. Our final verb رفع need not signify an eschatological action. It could denote elevation to a place of honour and esteem, as it surely does in II, 254, where the allusion is to the messengers of the past. A similar reference, probably to the honouring of Joseph occurs in XII, 76, while in LVIII, 12 it is worthy believers who are raised in dignity by Allah. In two suggestive verses the meaning is extended towards the literal and if taken literally the words would entail translation or ascension to a heavenly sphere.

Idrīs is mentioned in XIX, 58 (cf. XXI, 85), as one of the few who are exalted to a lofty station. The identity of this seer is in some doubt. Tradition sees in him the figure of that O.T. saint, Enoch, who was conveyed 'to another life' (N.E.B. Heb. 11: 5). Modern Western scholars question this identification and offer alternative solutions to the mystery. Torrey's surmise is as attractive as any: 'it would be easy for the Greek name of the famous Ezra to make its way to Arabia, there ultimately to be picked up by the Arabian prophet'. (28) Other derivations mooted by Arabists are tabulated by Jeffery (such as all of which sound far-fetched. (29) Clearly the Prophet confounded two Biblical characters whose names are credited with pseudepigrapha (Book of Enoch and Apocalypse of Ezra), (30) linking the latter's name with the former's role. The words of XIX, 58 may imply but do not compel the view that Muhammad believed in Enoch's translation. There would, however, be little point in singling out the patriarch in such a context unless the raising was of a supernatural and phenomenal order.

A somewhat more explicit reference to ascension appears in III, 48. Here Jesus is addressed: on the termination of his loose of life, he is to be raised on high. Baidāwī takes the participle مُتَوَفِّيكَ to mean 'cause thee to complete thy term', and he paraphrases إلى مُطَهِّرك '-to the place of My glory and the abode of My angels. (31) The verb itself does not invariably indicate mortality; for instance in V, 117 both Arberry and Bell render فلما توفيتني , 'when Thou didst take me to Thyself'. On the other hand, in XIX, 34 (a considerably earlier passage) Muhammad gives the impression that he supposed Christ's death to be a normal one. That the words of III, 48 are an allusion to some form of raising directly

after death (or an appearance of death) is more than probable. Such a degree of exaltation would readily ascribe to Jesus without in any way conceding the latter's divinity. After all if Enoch could be lifted bodily to the heavens so could Jesus, that is on the premises of supernatural religion.

To sum up: the overall impression one gains from this brief examination of the relevant data is that the resurrection as depicted in the Quran is not purely a miracle of omnipotence which an all-knowing God will bring to pass in His set time. It is an essentially credible sequel to the story of mankind, and one which the analogies of natural growth and human birth illumine and attest. Allah's promise stands secure; what He has begun in creation He will in due course renew in resurrection (X, 4) (XXX, 10).

NOTES

(1) Besides those 3 occurences, قام is used in eschatological contexts but with the sense of 'coming to pass' (XIV, 42; XL, 49; XL, 54).
(2) The rarer verb is used in the Paulist (Greek Catholic) version at Mark 7 : 14 etc.)
(3) T. Andrae, Les Origines de l'Islam, pp.168 ff.
(4) Masson draws attention to a saying by Ambrose, who talks about the birth of that which was non-existent as proof of rebirth; Le Coran, p.717.
(5) Ihyā', Vol. 4, p.497.
(6) T. Sabbagh, La Métaphore dans le Coran, p.146.
(7) R. Bell, The Qu'rān, Vol.1, p.39, n.2.
(8) A.I. Katsh, Judaism in Islam, p.179.
(9) See e.g. M. Muhammad Ali, The Holy Qur'ān, n.349. The older commentators whom he cites are Razi and I'Ab.
(10) In III, 43 احيي is used, whereas تخرج occurs in V, 110. Whether the latter verb is an allusion to Lazarus' emergence from the tomb is hard to say.
(11) The translation of Baidawi's comments is given in Chrestomathia Baidawiana, by D.S. Margoliouth, p.38.

(12) A.I. Katsch, op.cit., p.158; J.M. Rodwell, The Koran, p.365.
(13) Baidāwī, ad II v.149.
(14) T. Andrae, Mohammed, p.80.
(15) E. Stauffer, N.T. Theology, n.695 (p.312).
(16) See L.A. Vol.2, p.421.
(17) M. Muhammad Ali,; op.cit., notes 1671, 1934a, 2689.
(18) D.S. Margoliouth, Relations between Arabs and Israelites, p.3.
(19) A.J. Wensinck, The Muslim Creed, pp.7-8 ff.
(20) P. Casanova, Mohammed et la Fin du Monde, p.9.
(21) By Jalāluddin and Yahyā per Sale, The Koran, p.38.
(22) Katsh finds an even closer resemblance in the Talmudic story of Honi; op.cit., p.177.
(23) M. Gaudefroy-Demombynes, Mahomet, p.448.
(24) R. Bell, The Qur'ān, Vol.2, p.273.
(25) C.C. Torrey, The Jewish Foundation of Islam, p.46.
(26) See Baidāwī, ad XLVI v.16.
(27) Ihyā, p.512.
(28) C.C. Torrey, op.cit., p.72.
(29) A. Jeffery, The Foreign Vocabulary of the Qur'ān, pp.51-52.
(30) i.e. II (or IV) Esdras.
(31) Baidāwī, in loc.

CHAPTER VI

THE MEANING OF 'NAFS' IN THE QURAN.

Several problems revolve round the all-important issue of the 'soul' in the Quran. These stem in part from the polysemy that attaches to the Arabic usage of the word نفس. The term itself has been pressed into service by theologians philosophers, and more recently by psychologists and demographers. As regards the plurality of meaning, Calverley for instance notes that 'the Tādj al-ʿArūs lists 15 meanings for nafs', and also that 'Lisān al-ʿArab finds examples of these meanings in poetry and the Kuran'. (1) The senses which the various disciplines give to نفس may ultimately be reduced to a basal concept which all understand but none can define; yet some attempt must be made to discover the proper signification of this pivotal term in Quranic anthropology.

There are numerous occurrences of نفس in the Suras; so this data should provide a convenient start for a general inquiry, especially as it is sometimes assumed that the usage here bridges the gap between the early poetic and the later scholastic sense of the word. Greek thought penetrated deeply into the sphere of Muslim theology and philosophy, but it is unlikely to have had any appreciable influence on the less sophisticated locale that saw the birth of Islam.

To consider briefly what the lexicons have to say on the matter of connotation: Al-Qāmūs al-Muhīt offers روح as the equivalent of نفس, adding that the noun also means عين الشيء, the thing itself. (2) This twofold definition is primary and therefore most relevant to our purpose. Al-Munjid lists a variety of meanings for nafs; this includes

the two already mentioned, and such unexpected extensions as 'body' and 'blood'. Most pertinent is the definition شخص الانسان - person. (3) A further complication arises when we turn to the extensive data of Lisān al-'Arab. Here we are introduced to two 'souls', 'one vital and the other discriminative', to use Calverley's phrase. (4) The confusion between the two 'souls' is alluded to by Gaudefroy-Demonbynes, but he calls them 'nafs et rūh'. (5)

Ruh and Nafs. Judging by D.B. Macdonald's remarks in a monograph on the subject of 'Spirit', the word rūh originally possessed a 'tangle of meanings and uses' seemingly as complex as the senses that inhere in nafs. (6) It is then no wonder that the two substantives became gradually confused as both acquired more specifically religious connotations. In the later development of Muslim theology rūh and nafs are virtually interchangeable. Shahrastāni and al-Ghazāli prefer to speak of جسم when referring to the soul of man, at any rate in the two works of theirs which will be cited in this chapter. On the other hand, Ibn Sīnā tends to use نفس though for him, as befits a philosopher, the word has more of an intellectual or rational content. (7) However, in the Quran the two expressions are distinct in application. We may quote O'Shaughnessy's conclusion: 'It is clear from a study of the context in which rūh, always singular, occurs in the Koran that it is never found there as equivalent ... of نفس (nafs), human soul, self, although it has the last two meanings in post-Koranic and modern Arabic'. (8)

The tendency to treat the 'soul' and 'spirit' as synonymous is discernible as early as Job, the most Arabian of O.T.

books: 'I will speak in the anguish of my נֶפֶשׁ , I will complain in the bitterness of my רוּחַ (Job 7: 11; cf. Luke 1: 46, 47). After a brief survey of the O.T. ramifications of the two terms, A.B. Davidson concludes: 'The idea of 'spirit' is more that of something objective and impersonal; that of 'soul' suggests what is reflexive and individual'. (9) O' Shaughnessy's analysis would seem to bear out the first of Davidson's clauses, for what underlies a primary 'sense-group' of ruh, as the Jesuit scholar has it, is objectively and impersonality. (10) This particular sense is related to the function of life-breath, נְשָׁמָה , which both O'Shaughnessy and Porter recognise to be inseparable from the action of Yahweh's ruah. Thus Porter writes, 'When the Jews wished to speak of that which preceded and survived the earthly life of man, the word they naturally used was not nephesh but neshamah (less often ruah).. the word that suggested the divine in contrast to the earthly element that entered into his (man's) making'. (11) (Gen. 2: 7; Job 33: 4; cf. XV, 29; XXXII, 8; XXXVII, 72. Both Macdonald and Calverley allude to the adoption of نسمة with this meaning by the Traditionalists and by later writers. (12)

The term 'spirit', in its Quranic setting has received adequate treatment at O'Shaughnessy's hands, and it is unnecessary to retread the path traversed by his monograph on the subject. What he affirms with respect to the development of the idea applies equally to نفس , more so because the two terms were soon confused: 'Moslem theologians ... and the philologists .. were influenced by later doctrinal developments in Islam, by Graeco-Arabic scholasticism, and by traditions that are frequently

unreliable'. Hence, he contends that little help can be had from such sources in determining the true meaning of the word in question. (13) On nafs Macdonald's comments are also apposite: 'the nafs of Muslim theology is entirely different from the spiritual ψυχή of Greek philosophy. It is ... the ψυχή of Pauline theology ... and both derive from the Hebrew nephesh' (14) This comment applies with greater force to the relevant material in the Quran.

Soul and Body. We may illustrate this trend, of turning to other sources to construct a Muslim 'psychology', by turning to a fairly recent work: J.W. Sweetman advances a series of abstruse arguments to demonstrate the fact that the soul is not the body. (15) But this is beside the point: can the human soul be conceived of apart from the bodily frame, and are the two components regarded as separable in Semitic thought? Indeed Margoliouth swings to the other extreme, 'the philosophical distinction between soul and body is barely hinted at', in the Quran, 'soul in this context means only living being'. (16) With this we could compare Porter's statement: The nephesh is the life or self of man, the living man himself, just as he is here or now'. (17)

There is nothing in the Quran comparable to the Pauline conception of the 'body'. The four references to جَسَد (VII, 146; XX, 90; XXI, 8; XXXVIII, 33) have to do either with the golden calf or with phantom shades. The two incidental allusions to جِسْم (II, 248; LXIII, 4) are likewise irrelevant. The former is an idiomatic expression for stature, and in all probablity the latter has a similar reference. بَدَن occurs once, and whilst indubitably pointing to the physical

frame, it is to be treated either as emphatic or redundant - Jonah is to be rescued with his body (X, 92). Even here with the aid of a variant reading for the verb Baiḍāwī discovers a chance allusion to the body being denuded of the soul عارياً عن الروح , an improbable metaphor to say the least. (18)

Most of the points Sweetman makes are derived from Aristotelian or Neo-platonist metaphysics. One or two of the citations included in his chapter on the 'soul' are from Muslim sources, but by and large they are culled from Greek philosophy and the works of John the Damascene. (19) As an index of what Islam owes to Greek thought and to Graeco-Christian theology in this field, the whole discussion is extremely valuable (and this after all may be what Sweetman intends.) But it tells us little about the Quranic conception of nafs.

Similarly Ibn Khaldūn has much to say regarding the function of the soul, its destiny and the different classes of soul that are recognisable. (20) Whilst he deplores the disruptive influence of philosophy on religious thinking, (21) he admits his debt to Galen's 'anatomy' for a definition of soul and spirit: 'The spirit is a fine vapor ... The rational soul perceives and acts only by means of that vaporous spirit'. (22) To be sure, these speculations are fascinating, but they are far removed from the simplicity of Quranic affirmation as to the role of the nafs.

Reflexive Usage. Five different uses of nafs are distinguished by Calverley. (23) In reality the first four classes, judging by the Quranic examples given, may be subsumed under the 'reflexive and individual category'. In a more recent article Calverley states that early Arabic poetry used nafs

reflexively 'to refer to the self or person'. (24) Our main concern will be with those Quranic texts where the word occurs in an eschatological setting. So first to dispose of the non-significant occurrences of نفس. In over half of the verses in which the noun occurs it is employed reflexively (myself, himself, to one's own advantage). The following examples chosen at random illustrate this usage (III, 87; IV, 11; VI, 12; VI, 54; X, 108; XII, 23; XVII, 16; XXXI, 11). Such a usage is commonplace both in literary and in colloquial Arabic, and calls for little comment. At times it is not clear whether the reflexive or 'psychic' sense is intended. For instance we read in VII, 204, 'Remember Thy Lord within thyself' (R.B.); whereas Arberry renders the same injunction, 'in thy soul', an echo perhaps of the O.T. 'in thy heart'. But in all doubtful cases the reflexive explanation makes satisfactory sense.

In XX, 43 Allah addresses Moses: 'I have formed thee for Myself'. There is a parallel to this use of نفس in Lev. 26: 11, where Jehovah announces, 'I will set My tabernacle among you: and my soul shall not abhor you' (cf. Lev. 26: 15 'if your soul abhor My judgments!). To talk of 'soul' abstractly, as though it were set against any other aspect of being in a context like this, is surely meaningless. The nephesh here represents the very essence of God (cf. III, 27, 28; V, 116; VI, 12, 54.)

Nafs as Person. The word النفس has been adopted by psychology as the equivalent of 'ego', a convenient choice in view of its earlier secular connotation. Frequently, however, a synonym الذات is substituted as being relatively free of the religious undertones that mark the

appearance of نفس . It is noteworthy that Iqbal employs 'ego' in preference to soul' when discussing 'personal freedom and immortality', though the textual basis for his remarks is the Quranic concept of nafs. (25) With regard to نفس in the sense of 'person', this usage is at once the most obvious and the most common in Arabic. Thus دائرة النفوس stands for the government department that issues personal identity cards. (26) One way of recording casualty and mortality figures is to speak of so many نفوس as having perished.

The Quran occasionally describes the 'soul' as being subject to death, not merely in the sense of 'tasting death' (III, 182; XXI, 36; XXIX, 57) assuming such a phrase could be interpreted to imply a mere semblance of the death of the نفس . The Suras speak of this death more explicity in prohibitions and bald statements لا تقتلوا النفس XVII, 35 (cf. II, 67; XVIII, 73; XXV, 68; XXVIII, 18, 33).

Sabbagh in his volume on metaphors distinguishes the various uses of nafs: 'L'ame est au sens propre (II, 203; IX, 55; XXXIX, 57; Bell renders the first two occurrences of nafs - 'themselves', and the third as 'a soul'). Sabbagh's next group is the more usual personne: Elle remplace l'etre humain en général'. (27) It is doubtful whether this distinction was a real one for the Prophet. More specifically we might examine the way nafs is rendered by three of the most reliable modern translators of the original text. In VI, 13, 20; VII, 8, 51; XI, 23 انفسهم is the object of خسروا , whilst in III, 113, 129; IV, 67; XI, 103 the same plural stands as object to ظلموا (Without question both verbs, 'to lose' and 'to wrong', have a moral or spiritual tenor.) Bell consistently translates انفسهم

'themselves' in all nine instances. Arberry renders the خـــ group-souls, and the طـلـم group - themselves. Whereas Rodwell with his looser translation adopts a variety of equivalents. Of course if soul and self are taken to be identical, no problem exists.

The English translations of ψυχή in the better-known versions provide an interesting sidelight. In the A.V. of Matt. 16: 25 the Greek noun is translated 'life'; the N.E.B. renders the same word 'himself; while the R.V. margin faithfully retains the literal 'soul'. Selwyn's remarks on the meaning of ψυχή in I Peter afford a further instructive parallel to Sabbagh's grouping of the meanings of nafs: 'St. Peter uses the plural ψυχαί five times sometimes with special reference to the spiritual side of men's lives, sometimes quite broadly as almost = persons, selves'. (28)

On the whole it seems preferable to look upon nafs as the spiritual or inner side of men's lives, whenever the sense requires an added emphasis not fully covered by 'person'. For الوجه Sabbagh has this say: 'Le visage est employé par métonymie à la place de l'être tout entier' (29) (II, 109, 274; XX, 110; LXXV, 22). If this be so, نفس might refer to the inner and وجه, to the outer aspect of being, though the one can never be detached from the other. Moreover, the distinction far from being a formal one is just in a manner speaking.

In his renderings of nafs Bell favours such expressions as 'person' (II, 45; VI, 69, 159; XXXI, 27; LXIII, 11) - 'every-one' 'each one', 'any one' (II, 281; III, 24; XIII, 33; XIV, 51; XX, 16; XXXIX, 70) - 'individual' IV, 1 - 'life' (V, 49).

In my opinion, no exception can be taken to these renderings; they follow (unintentionally no doubt) a trend observable in the A.V. translation of ψυχή , ultimately influenced by the basic meaning of nephesh. The same trend is maintained by the N.E.B. (Matt. 2: 20; Mark 3: 4; John 10: 11; 12: 25; Rom. 2: 9; I Pet. 3: 20; Rev. 16: 3). Incidentally the last of these references furnishes an unexpected link with an item in Ibn Khaldūn's definition of Physics, where this historian writes of 'the soul in the different forms in which it appears in human beings, animals and plants'. (30) The Seer, himself, speaks of the denizens of the deep as living things - ψυχή ζωῆς (Rev. 16: 3). The thought here is presumably that of the life principle which animates all that is capable of growth (cf. Gen. 1: 21, 24; 7: 15).

How else other than by using nafs could the Quran express the concept of person or personality? Such a concept, together with the related notions of 'self' or 'the individual responsible for actions', to quote Stanton's terse definition of nafs, (31) could not in the Prophet's day be expressed more precisely than by nafs. The alternative شخص nowhere occurs in the Quran, while "فردا is there used adverbially to signify 'alone' (XIX, 83, 95; XXI, 89). This leaves us with نفس which adequately covers the social and moral connotations implied in persona, while at the same doing justice to the spiritual nuances that a term of this sort would inevitably acquire, when used in a sacred writing.

A received opinion as to what nafs may also convey is mentioned by Hughes. By drawing out some of the moral and spiritual senses inherent in the word, nafs is assumed to be roughly

equivalent to conscience in some contexts. Hughes refers to unnamed Muslim theologians who distinguish 'four kinds of consciences spoken of in the Quran': The upbraiding conscience النفس اللوّامة (LXXV, 12); the conscience prone to evil النفس الامّارة (XII, 53); the contented conscience النفس المطمئنة (LXXXIX, 27); and lastly, the evenly poised conscience النفس المُلهمة (XCI, 7-8).(32) Hughes goes on to cite a traditional saying: 'When anything pricks your soul (nafs) forsake it'.(33) Apparently Ibn Qaiyim has pondered the question whether the above enumeration can be accounted for by postulating one nafs or whether a plurality of anfus is implied. The apparent discord of the separate anfus is resolved when a state of contentment is reached (النفس المطمئنة) and the nafs is at peace with God.(34) The texts in question show that نفس does occasionally fulfil the function of conscience.

The Nafs in the Afterlife. Tor Andrae has rightly stressed the point that in the Quran, 'the redeemed in heaven and the damned in hell are never called spirits or souls ... for him (the Prophet) a soul is not an existence without a body'.(35) For instance in XXXII, 13 it is predicted that Gehenna will be filled not with souls but with jinn and human beings, even though the opening announcement is applied to every nafs. Similarly, as we have already noted, the martyrs in Heaven are not spoken of as 'souls', and this notwithstanding the fact that they have by-passed the process of resurrection.(36)

Going back a stage it can likewise be inferred that where nafs appears in a resurrection context it must, ex hypothesi, refer to the total personality and not merely to a disembodied

soul. For judgment takes place with the risen ones visibly arraigned before the bar of divine justice. A consideration of the following passages will bear out this inference: II, 45 اتقوا يوماً لا تجزي نفس عن نفس ; II, 286; III, 155 (where the Day of Resurrection is expressly mentioned); XVI, 112; XL, 17; LXXXII, 19; L, 20 (where each nafs is accompanied by a rider and a witness).

What of the state between death and resurrection? Andrae maintains on this point that, 'When Allah takes the soul at death, man enters a state of complete unconsciousness as, in deep and dreamless sleep'. (37) This theory, according to Andrae may have been derived by Muhammad from Aphraates by way of Babai, though its ultimate roots are traceable to Jewish apocalypse, or even to ancient Semitic anthropology. (38) Bell's version of L, 18 tends to confirm Andrae's deduction that Muhammad also shared in this belief. The verse reads, 'The drunken sleep of death comes in truth' (cf. XVI, 21-22). However, Baiḍāwī takes the crucial phrase, سكرة الموت to mean the reeling anguish of death. (39) Rodwell translates سكرة 'stupor', and this is as close as we can get to the meaning of the original. But the problem to be resolved is whether the whole clause is inceptive (simply the point of death) or whether by death is to be understood the continuous phase between present life and resurrection. And here again personal bias will determine exegetical choice. The Prophet did not express himself categorically on the matter, and the subject of the 'intermediate state' remains as dark for Muslims as it does for Christians.

The Disembodied Soul'. Al-Ghazālī strenuously holds to the belief in the soul's survival after death, its interrogation and punishment in the grave. The

soul (ruh) retains its senses without being dependent on the sense-organs. In the grave it will feel pain or pleasure. However he briefly moots the possibility of soul and body becoming reunited during the sepulchral phase ولا يبعد ان تعاد الروح الى الجسد في القبر . (40) In this connexion Ibn Qaiyim poses the query: 'How can souls be distinguished from one another when separated from their bodies?'. He proceeds to show that 'the question cannot be answered by those who assert that the soul is incorporeal. He has in mind philosophical theologians like al-Ghazālī and al-Rāzī. Ibn Qaiyim comes to the conclusion that the soul 'is an essence existent in itself,' with some measure of corporeality. (41)

Al-Ghazālī's whole treatment of eschatology is cramped at this point by his sense of loyalty to the orthodox position and a regard for popular sentiment. (42) But the problem is not his alone; it is shared by all who hold to the truth of bodily resurrection which is to follow an unspecified interval of waiting or sleep. In his dissertation on as-Suyuti's eschatology, Carra de Vaux puts his finger on the difficulty: 'La theologie musulmane n'a donc rien trouvé a faire de l'âme apres son jugement (i.e. the torment of the grave) sinon de la ramener dans le corps'. (43)

Shahrastāni, in his turn, is mindful of the logical problems that beset attempts to disentangle body from soul at any stage of existence or experience. Incidentally he like al-Ghazali substitutes ruh for nafs. He merely states the problem and adroitly side-steps the issue: 'The question in the grave is attested by sound tradition in many places. It be best to regard it as being addressed neither to a disembodied spirit

nor to a body such as we see'. (44) To whom then is it addressed? Shahrastāni's cautious approach finds an echo in I.T. Ramsey's warning against 'logical misallocations that are inevitable when 'we speak of the Immortality of the soul rather than that of the 'I'. (45)

Due consideration must be given to a number of passages in which the survival of disembodied souls is allegedly hinted at. Commentators find allusions to the soul in at least three passages which describe the action of some entity (unexpressed) leaving or being drawn out of the body (LVI, 82; LXXX, 26; LXXIX, 1). The omission of nafs from each of these contexts is of some significance, and may have been deliberate.(46) What flows out at death is the life-breath; nothing is said of the soul passing out to survive in another sphere.

Another enigmatic text is LXXXI, 7, النفوس زوجت The suggestion that this means 'souls are wedded to their respective bodies' is repeated by Baiḍāwi. But he admits that other views merit attention, such as the fastening of books onto individuals, and the pairing of male believers with Houris. (47) Needless to say the last of these interpretations is as plausible as the first, and creates fewer difficulties.

The utterance recorded in XXXIX, 43 admittedly constitutes the most compelling textual evidence for the view that the Quran teaches a particular theory, which in effect is the accepted one that the soul has an independent existence, and need not be tied to the body. Allah calls in the souls at death or in sleep detaining the former group and releasing the latter for a set term. The verse reads as follows الله يتوفى الانفس حين موتها والتي لم تمت في منامها فيمسك التي قضى عليها الموت.

(Two other texts which have affinities with this pronouncement are VI, 60, 93, but neither is sufficiently explicit for our purpose). It cannot be seriously contended that a man's soul departs from him even temporalily during sleep. What he loses is consciousness. May this not be the clue to the exegesis of a verse that otherwise cannot be squared with the notion of the essential unity of the ego? 'The body', says Iqbal, is accumulated action or habit of the soul, and as such undetachable from it.' (48) As in sleep so in death consciousness is lost only to be regained on waking (XXX, 54-56). Some may reckon this argument to be a purely verbal one, based on an analogy between sleep and death, and not reflecting the Prophet's train of thought. But then the analogy is there to be worked out. The less satisfactory alternative is to posit two souls, one vital the other 'discriminative' as is done by Lisān al-'Arab. (49) Moreover, يُمسك need not imply a particular form of survival akin to that proposed by Greek philosophy. What can validly and safely be deduced from this verse is that something committed to God is kept secure until that Day. (50)

A statement that spans the millenia between creation and resurrection occurs in XXXI, 27 ما خلقكم ولا بعثكم الا كنفس واحدة It is tempting to see in those words an allusion to the idea that personal identity is preserved intact through life and death, one aspect of what Dahl calls the 'Semitic totality concept'. (51) But the consensus of opinion refers the statement to another aspect of this concept, namely the biological unity of the human race, whereby by one word (كُنْ) the whole comes into being, and by another (ثُمَّ) all rise from

the dead.(52) Support for the traditional view may be found in the following texts, IV, 1; VI, 98; VII, 189; XXXIX, 8 where the initial (creative) act only is mentioned. In all five verses Bell renders نفس person or individual.

The cryptic wording of some contexts in which nafs appears lends itself to more than one interpretation. This together with the aura of mystery that surrounds the theme can lead and has led to endless speculation on the nature and destiny of the liberated soul. In the vast majority of instances where the word occurs 'person' or 'self' are unquestionably the closest English equivalents, while occasionally Andrae's 'impersonal power a life-breath' seems a fair alternative. Perhaps the best definition for نفس that is available is one that Lisān al-'Arab supplies جُملة الشيء وحقيقته ;(53) roughly translated this becomes 'the sum total of an entity and its essence'. For human beings, at any rate, this totality and essence is inseparable from a visible form, otherwise the promise of resurrection would be a grandiose and dispensable fantasy.

NOTES.

(1) E.I. (1) Vol. III, p.827, art. Nafs. Wehr's Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic gives no fewer than 18 possible meanings for nafs.

(2) Al-Qāmūs al-Muhīt, Vol. 2, p.255.

(3) Al-Munjid, p.900. The note by Louis Ma'louf, the compiler of this dictionary suggests that when nafs = rūh it is fem., but when nafs = person it is masc. Principal Adly Fam (Beirut) informs me that this distinction is a dubious one and not observed in practice. The author of Lisān al-'Arab writes, 'It is said that rūh is masc., while nafs is fem.', which again is not always so in practice: Ruh can often be fem. (ref. as n. 4).

(4) L.A. Vol.8, pp.119 ff. See also E.E. Calverley's art. 'Doctrines of the Soul in Islam, M.W., Vol. XXXIII (1943), p.256.
(5) M. Gaudefroy-Demombynes, Mahomet, p.443.
(6) D.B. Macdonald, The Development of the Idea of Spirit in Islam, p.307.
(7) Ibn Sīnā, Al-Najāt, pp.477 ff.
(8) T. O'Shaughnessy, The Development of the Meaning of Spirit in the Koran, p.11.
(9) A.B.Davidson, Theology of the O.T. pp.199, 202.
(10) T. O'Shaughnessy, op.cit., pp.25 ff.
(11) Quoted by A.T.S. Goodrick, The Book of Wisdom, p.379.
(12) See D.B. Macdonald, op.cit., p.309: E.E. Calverley M.W. loc. cit., p.256
(13) T. O'Shaughnessy, op.cit., pp.11-12.
(14) D.B. Macdonald, op.cit., p,320.
(15) J.W. Sweetman, Islam and Christian Theology, Part one, Vol.I, pp.118 ff.
(16) D.S. Margoliouth, Mohammed, p.68.
(17) Quoted by Goodrick, op.cit., p.379.
(18) Baidāwi, ad X, 92.
(19) J.W. Sweetman, op.cit., pp.118-148.
(20) Ibn Khaldūn, The Muqaddimah, Vol.I, p.195-99.
(21) ibid., Vol.III, p.246-58, 'A Refutation of Philosophy'.
(22) ibid., Vol.I, p.210.
(23) E.I.(1), Vol.III, loc.cit.
(24) M.W. loc.cit., p.254.
(25) Sir M. Iqbal, Religious Thought in Islam; see esp. his chap. on 'The Human Ego', pp.90-117.
(26) Cf. E.G. Selwyn's question on the use of ψυχαί with cardinal numerals: 'Was this the usage in formal documents, such as census-rolls, of the period?' I Peter, p.202 (ad. 3:20).
(27) T. Sabbagh, La Métaphore dans le Coran, p.112.
(28) E.G. Selwyn, op.cit., p.133.
(29) T. Sabbagh, op.cit., p.115.
(30) Ibn Khaldūn, op.cit., Vol.III, p.147.
(31) H.U. Stanton, The Teaching of the Qur'an, p.106.
(32) See Hughes, Dictionary of Islam, art. 'Conscience', p.60.
(33) ibid., from Mishkāt 1 Chap.1, pt. 3. Hughes also notes that the proper word for 'conscience', ضمير is not used in the Quran, while its synonym ذمة is employed in a single passage (IX, 8, 10) but with the sense 'contract'.

(34) Cited by D.B. Macdonald, op.cit., p.322.
(35) T. Andrae, Mohammed, pp.77-78.
(36) In chap.V under Ahya.
(37) T. Andrae, Mohammed, p.78.
(38) The information is given by O'Shaughnessy, op.cit., p.29. For a fuller statement of the theory see Andrae's Les Origines de l'Islam, pp.161 ff.
(39) Baidāwi, in loc.
(40) Ihyā', Vol. 4, p.494.
(41) Ibn Qaiyim's position is discussed at length by D.B. Macdonald, op.cit., pp.318 ff. esp. p.321.
(42) See Carra de Vaux remarks on al-Ghazāli's varying standpoints: Gazali, qui s'elevant sans peine au plus hautes speculations de la metaphysique, n'a pas eu honte de traiter, dans deux ouvrages, de l'eschatologie a la maniere de peuple'; Fragments D'eschatologie Musulmane, p.6.
(43) ibid., p.18.
(44) Shahrastani, Kitāb Nihāyatu'l Iqdām, p.148 (Arabic p.469).
(45) I.T. Ramsey, Freedom and Immortality, p.100.
(46) e.g. LVI, 82, اذا بلغت الحلقوم
(47) Baidāwi, in loc.
(48) M. Iqbal, op.cit., p.100.
(49) See above at n.4.
(50) Cf. a legitimate interpretation of II Tim. 1: 12.
(51) M.E. Dahl, The Resurrection of the Body, pp.59-73.
(52) e.g. Baidāwi, in loc. See also Sale's Koran, p.402.
(53) L.A. Vol.8, p.119.

CHAPTER VII.

QURANIC WORDS FOR TIME.

No more than in the Bible, is there to be found a distinctive conception of time in the Quran; no theory of time emerges that could be regarded as peculiar to Quranic thought. On the contrary, the chronological details here are singularly meagre and far less adaptable to concept building than the wealth of material in the two Testaments. The Old Testament has an elaborate chronological framework linking the historical books, and to a lesser degree observable in the prophetical writings. Chronology is likewise a feature of the New Testament record, and one which extends even to the symbolic numerals of the Apocalypse.

History and Chronology. Of this concern for historical sequence that typifies Judeo-Christian revelation there is little trace in the Quran. Indeed the very arrangement of the Suras suggests that the compilers deemed such sequence as of little value to the purpose for which their Holy Book was intended. Of course, there are allusions to a number of incidents in the Medinan Suras, some veiled and enigmatic, others fairly obvious. Commentators have linked various episodes in the Prophet's life with one or other of these allusions, as was noted in the survey of the Medinan Suras. But as such incidents are never dated, they do not constitute a basis for chronology; far less do they furnish us with a measure for the flow of time, or clues for a theory.

The few details of time preserved in the Quran can be related to disconnected phases of Biblical history or with early Christian

legend. The years of Noah's life are given in XXIX, 13, and the figure tallies with that of Gen. 9: 29, thus indicating a reliable source of information. Again, Joseph's career provides three items which have to do with time; an unspecified period is mentioned in XII, 42, and two specific figures in XII, 47-49. The fortunes of Moses may be divided into three convenient phases of forty years each. This skeletal chronology is hinted at in the Quran, but only the last forty years in the wilderness are expressly numerated (V, 29 with XXVI, 17; XX, 42); the period at Pharaoh's court and that in Midian are left indeterminate.

If the reference in II, 261 is in fact to Ezra, the century of oblivion could be interpreted symbolically, and may be in some way connected with the epoch during which Jerusalem lay in ruin and neglect. In XVIII, 24 we are given the figure of 309 years as the time during which certain Christian youths remained immured. The original (and legendary) figure of 187 years has been inflated. If we reckon the 'burial' to have occurred at the time of the Decian persecution, the seven sleepers would have wakened c.560 A.D. thus becoming the Prophet's older contemporaries.

The foregoing passages virtually exhaust the Quranic references to what has been called objective time. Of the Prophet's historical perspective Torrey has this to say: 'He associates Moses with Jesus evidently believing that very soon after the revelation to the Hebrew law-giver there had followed the similar revelation which had produced the Christians and their sacred book'. (1) We cannot, in the nature of the case verify such an inference, but we may take it that Muhammad had no real interest

in the course of past events or in the rise and fall of empires. There is, admittedly, a cryptic allusion to a Byzantine victory to be followed by reverses (XXX, 2-3). Historians assign the campaign in question to the second decade of the 7th century A.D. There is an even obscurer reference to an Abyssian incursion, and the repulse which these invaders suffered on their way to Mecca. If tradition can be trusted here the invasion coincided with Muhammad's birth (CV, 1-5), and proved a happy omen of future triumphs for Meccan generalship. But in these episodes time is not a factor that counts. True, the Prophet is deeply concerned with the successive missions of God's messengers leading up to his own; yet the sequence of prophetic visitation cannot be determined apart from external evidence.

Divisions of Time. From allusions to quasi-historical periods we turn to shorter divisions of 'calendar' time. In IX, 36 we find an incidental reference to Allah's regulating of months, 'twelve in number'; four of these are described as sacred. According to Baidawi the months are Rajab, Dhu'l Qa'dah, Dhu'l Hijjah and Muharram.(2) Here the Quran expressly declares that the ordering of months is of the essence of true religion. In the next verse (IX, 37) we are told that the commutation or postponement of a sacral month (النَّسِيءُ) is an act of impiety. Hartner, in the second of two articles on Zaman, informs us that the expression 'indicates as Moberg has recently conclusively shown, this intercalation of the extra month' in the old Arab luni-solar year.(3) On either interpretation (and intercalation could be an excuse for postponement) the 'objectivity' of time division and its immutability are underlined by the ban on intercalation. There

are a few other scattered references to trucial and fast months in II, 181, 190; V. 98; in each instance the rule is presumed to rest on divine authority.

Solar and lunar positions determine the length of a year (X, 5), and the arrival of the new year. Most fundamental is the scale of day and night whereby the year is measured (XVII, 13). It is noteworthy that this verse leaves the lunar cycle out of the reckoning, perhaps because of the difficulty of harmonizing the two cycles on which ancient calendars were based. On the strength of these utterances and of others that speak of alternation (اختلاف) of day and night (II, 159; III, 187; X, 6; XXIII, 82; XLV, 4), Iqbal avers: 'The Quranic view of the 'alternation of day and night' as a symbol of the ultimate reality which 'appears in a fresh glory every moment' among other factors 'constituted the intellectual inheritance of Ibn-i-Khaldūn'.(4)

The more strictly eschatological aspect of the 'Hour' has already been considered. The Day is narrowed down and converges on its apex الساعة. This shorter measure of time is not primarily temporal; it merely pin-points the suddenness and speed of the climax. Hartner reminds us that 'the division of the νυχθήμερον (اليوم بليلته) into 24 hours is to be traced back to Greek influence'.(5)

The plain fact that emerges from the foregoing passages is that God ordained time divisions, and this constitutes duration as experienced by men. From which one could deduce that God made time along with the solar system. Such an inference, however, is nowhere drawn; it is too metaphysical, and would

make little sense to the original recipients of Quranic revelation

Dahr. We pass on to the words for time that occur in the Quran. In a note on XLV, 23 ما يهلكنا الا الدهر, Bell remarks that 'Time was personified by the Arabs almost in the sense of Fate'.(6) But the pagan view expressed in this verse is dismissed as baseless: Allah alone gives life and takes it. Such vital processes cannot be ascribed to chance or to impersonal forces. In contrast to this there exists 'a well-known tradition' to which Iqbal draws attention, according to which the Prophet is said to have identified God with 'Dahr' time. Iqbal also mentions the fact that Ibn-ul-ʿArabi spoke of 'Dahr' as 'one of the beautiful names of God'.(7) The Quranic affirmation implicitly contradicts these later theories: a hypostatization of Dahr seems alien to the spirit of prophetic insight.

Baiḍāwī takes دهر to mean مرور الزمان, the passage of time; he goes on to add that in its origin the term refers to the duration of the world.(8) If so it corresponds to one of the nuances that αἰών has in the N.T. - the present age (Matt.12: 32; Luke 16: 8; Rom. 12: 2).(9) The only other occurrence of is in LXXVI, 1, where the word simply means an age, a segment of total time.

Zemān and Waqt. The lexical stock for time in the Quran is surprisingly meagre; for instance the most common word for time in Arabic زمان never occurs, while the three examples of وقت are simply instances of Semitic tautology, by which the Day is brought into focus الى يوم الوقت المعلوم XV, 38 (cf. VII, 186; XXXVIII, 82). In his comments on مواقيت (II, 185) Baidawi distinguishes the meanings of three words for time: مدّة is the duration of the astral circuit and thus

denotes the totality of time; زمان is any part of this totality; وقت is a point in زمان chosen for a purpose.(10)

Unlike its synonyms Zamān is common to the major Semitic languages and may in fact be a borrowing from Hebrew or Aramaic. Barr declares that in Hebrew as in Arabic the term 'has lost the express character of (its original) definiteness'.(11) Hartner notes that زمان is the more technical word and is preferred in philosophy and mathematics to وقت, adding that emphony largely determined the choice (it rimes with مكان).(12)

Fatrah and Qarn. Another term فترة, a hapax, is nowadays used to signify a brief interval of time (V, 22). By connecting it with فتور (quite legitimately according to the lexicons) Baiḍāwī finds a reference to the spiritual stagnation that marked the interludes between various prophetic appearances.(13) The application of the word was gradually restricted to denote the interval itself with no hint of spiritual or moral decline. The word, however, adds little to our understanding of conceptual time.

Again the usual meaning attached to the expression قرن a century, is no guide to its connotation in the Quran (VI, 6; XIX, 75, 98; XXXVIII, 2; L, 35 etc.) There it corresponds to the Biblical 'generation', and is thus rendered by most translators. The commoner word for generation in modern Arabic is جيل. Lisān-al ʿArab cites various estimates for the length of قرن, from ten to a hundred years.(14) Baiḍāwī gives the figure as from seventy to eighty years, the proverbial three score and ten. He goes on to explain that the word is applied to the people of an era اهل عصر during which a prophet comes to the fore.(15) The derivation of the word

suggests that the Quranic usage is original, the sense being that of contemporaries, (16) rather than that of the Biblical generation (דּוֹר cf. مواليد). In any event the temporal nuance of the term قرن is not stressed in the Quran.

Ajal. By far the most frequent word for time in the Quran is , defined by Lisān-al-'Arab as غاية الوقت في الموت وحلول الدين thus a terminus; and also as مدّة الشيء, a duration. (17) A concise discussion of the theological and secular significance of the term appears in the Encyclopaedia of Islam. The writers of the article state that the subject was widely canvassed in the earlier Kalām. (18) Everyone has an اجل 'the appointed time of a man's life or the date of his death' (VI, 2, 60). Likewise every community has its fixed term, which can neither be hastened nor delayed (X, 50; XV, 5; XXIII, 45). Design in creation entails a time fixed by God until the system runs out (XXX, 7; XLVI, 2). The sun and moon pursue their paths and serve the Maker's ends until their اجل is complete (XXXV, 14; XXXIX, 7).

Moral factors (repentance, conversion) do not, it would seem, alter the length of the set term (LXIII, 11). The magnitude of sin can scarcely affect a predetermined issue (XXXV, 44). It is the quality rather than the duration of life that is somehow modified by repentance (XI, 3). Frequently the irreversible nature of اجل is further stressed by the qualifying مسمّى 'stated' (II, 282; VI, 2; XI, 3; XIV, 11; XVI, 63; XXIX, 53; XXX, 7). The matter is settled by a word from Allah (XLII, 13).

From Heaven's standpoint the اجل cannot be indeterminate

(XI, 106) معدود where the reference is to the Day). For individual as for races the ajals [19] overlap. Hence we cannot conceive of the underlying notion either as a point or as a duration of time. Strictly speaking it does not correspond to any of the N.T. words for time: καιρός — χρόνος — αἰών, more so because Barr has cast doubt on the validity of attempts to deal conceptually with such words. اجل is really a theological term which draws attention to God's omniscience, and supreme control in all spheres. His concern with the different categories of اجل suggests not only that 'our times are in His hands', but also that He is active in the temporal order. So to talk of sheer timelessness in the spiritual realm is to misconstrue the Quranic as well as the Biblical view of the divine-human encounter.

Alleged Contrasts. Does any contrast exist between what Iqbal calls the 'Greek' idea of time and that of the Quran? Iqbal assumes that such a contrast is discernible, for 'the practical Arab mind could not regard time as something unreal like the Greeks'. [20] Similar claims have been made of recent years by Biblical scholars who distinguish between dynamic and static modes of reflexion. This leads to a dynamic or rectilinear concept of time allegedly characteristic of Hebrew thought, or alternatively to a cyclic view. In the same vein, Iqbal speaks of 'the anti-classical Spirit of the Quran' which 'scores its final victory over Greek thought... for with the Greeks time was either unreal ... or moved in a circle ....'. [21] The Quran seems scarcely aware of this phantom foe.

Any attempt to demonstrate that the Arab (or Semitic) mind

is more practical than the Greek is open to serious objections, if the matter is seen in the light of the respective achievements of the one and the other. Apart from this Barr has shown that such verdicts rest on hasty or faulty methods of linguistic analysis. He holds that 'it can by no means be taken for granted that "The Greeks" in general entertained a cyclic view of time'. Conversely, he points out that 'the Hebrews in certain cases ... did entertain a cyclic view...'.(22) Barr's study tends to confirm Eichrodt's opinion that there is no distinctive Biblical conception for time insofar as that involves opposition to some other conception.(23)

Iqbal's remarks are in fact based not on an analysis of Quranic material, but on inconclusive survey of Ash'arite metaphysics and Ibn Khaldūn's Weltanschauung. A historian cannot of course afford to treat time as illusory. Nonetheless, Iqbal rightly perceives that the 'notion of time as something wholly objective is beset with difficulties';(24) and with this proviso we come to our final point.

God's time and Ours. The Quran insists that categories of time with which we are familiar do not apply to divine action, or else these are often transcended. In XXII, 46 we read: 'a day with thy Lord is a thousand years of your counting' (R.B.). This insight is not strictly original; it recalls Ps. 90: 4, though Muhammad favours the converse of the proposition as it appears in II Pet. 3: 8. Comparable declarations crop up in XXX II, 4: LXX, 3-4; XCVII, 3. In the first of these texts Allah is said to 'direct the affair from heaven to earth in one day whose measure is a thousand years' (A.J.A.) Baiḍāwī refers this to causal laws which to men seem unduly prolonged, but

which in God's sight are all but instantaneous.(25) Luther is reported to have stated that in God everything is an eternal moment.(26) Here Baiḍāwī also mentions the picturesque interpretation that the distance between heaven and earth is 500 years; hence it would take a millenium of travel to do God's bidding, if angelic speed were the same as ours.

In this connexion al-Ghazālī quotes a phrase from tradition فَسِيرَةُ مائةِ عامٍ;(27) illustrating a tendency to measure distance by travelling time (specially in areas where linear measurements are only approximate). Thus the spatial and temporal orders are linked. The notion is vaguely reminiscent of a corollary of Einstein's theory 'which takes time to be a kind of fourth dimension of space' as Iqbal puts it.(28) However, the circle of ideas revolving round this celebrated theory is too complex for any worthwhile treatment here.

The second of these texts (LXX, 3-4) describes 'a day the length of which is fifty thousand years' (R.B.). This looks like a hyperbolic version of XXXII, 4. Zamakhsharī has a fanciful explanation; he assigns the millenia to the trial of fifty nations before the divine Judge.(29) Similarly in the Fikh Akbar the saying is associated with the Day of Resurrection.(30) Al-Ghazālī draws a penetrating deduction from the length of this day: 'Count as trifling thy years and those of the world, which are seven thousand years; for if thou waitest patiently seven thousand years, what is that in comparison to the day of fifty thousand years'.(31)

Such statements lend themselves to the numerical symbolism

of Chiliasm, whereby the six days of creation are reckoned to prefigure the six millenia of history. In popular Christian piety this gave rise to the doctrine of the Millenium. The Jewish antecedents of the doctrine appear in the 'Book of Jubilees' (4: 30),(32) while the 'Epistle of Barnabas' (15: 4) contributed to its fuller development.(33) Casanova records the fact that Tabari adopted a similar computation when trying to reckon the 'durée totale de l'islamisme'. The Prophet is credited with the following announcement: 'My advent and the Hour are separated the one from the other as the index from the middle finger'.(34) In a comment on XXII, 46 Ṭabarī recalls a further saying by the Prophet on a par with the above. The gist of the second saying is that the interval between the afternoon and the evening in relation to a whole day corresponds to the segment of history covered by Islam. This interval represents one fourteenth of a day, which fraction is the duration of the Prophet's religion; this works out at 500 years.(35)

As in the case of their Christian counterparts such timetables did not stand the test of time. Casanova also notes that a later exegete (Soheili d. 531 A.H.) regarded the Prophet's words as indicating proximity and no more; he thus sought to modify Ṭabarī's figures.(36)

Lastly, in XCVII, 3 we have a description of the Night of Power which is better than a thousand months. The best commentary on this text is the French adage, 'Le temp, ce n'est rient; l'emploi du temp, c'est tout'. Centuries may pass marked by cultural sterility and spiritual inertia; then God acts to accomplish this purposes through a world-shaking crisis, and

immense energies are released. 'Any block of objective time may be but a fleeting moment, or an interminable period in terms of psychological time .... yet the two must somehow be related'.(37) The Quran relates the two by a value judgment (خيرٌ مِن): one night becomes more significant than a decade, but the objective quality of the latter is not disputed.

The 'findings' of this enquiry into the meaning of Quranic words for time have been largely negative. In the former of two articles on Zamān, De Boer states that 'there is no monograph on the subject'.(38) This was in 1934 and the ommission may since have been repaired, though we are not aware of any recent contributions on this theme.(39) De Boer's own article shows the difficulty of dealing systematically with the genuinely Arabic data. By and large the article is concerned with the interplay of neo-Pythagorean, neo-Platonist, Aristotelean and Stoic speculations in the field of Arab thought. The difficulty turns on the fact that the commonplaces that make up the Quranic material on time cannot be converted into a neat theory, and were never meant to be. What Eichrodt avers about the Bible is true also of the Quran; 'the important thing lies not in the idea of time itself but elsewhere, in the use made of the historical (in this case 'the prophetic') sequence for the presentation of an encounter with God'.(40)

NOTES.

(1) C.C. Torrey, The Jewish Foundation of Islam, p.70.
(2) Baidāwi, in loc.
(3) W. Hartner, art. Zamān, E.I. (1) Vol.IV p.1210 a.
(4) Sir M. Iqbal, Religious Thought in Islam, p.135.
(5) W. Hartner, loc. cit., p.1211 a.

(6) R. Bell, The Qur'ān, Vol.2, p.505 n.3.
(7) M. Iqbal, op. cit., p.69.
(8) Baiḍāwī, ad XLV, 23.
(9) Bauer's Lexicon, p.27.
(10) Baiḍāwī, ad II, 285.
(11) J. Barr, Biblical Words for Time, p.92.
(12) W. Hartner, loc. cit., p.1209 b.
(13) Baiḍāwī, in loc.
(14) L.A. Vol.17, p.211-2.
(15) Baiḍāwī, ad VI, 6.
(16) Cf. the idiomatic هو على قرني = عمري, quoted in al-Munjid p.660; a usage found also in the N.T. see Abbot-Smith under γενεά (b).
(17) L.A. Vol.13, p.10.
(18) I. Goldhizer and W.M. Watt, art. Adjal, E.I.(2) Vol.I p. 204 ff.
(19) The plural is not used in the Quran; the dual once only in XXVIII, 28.
(20) M. Iqbal, op.cit., p.70.
(21) ibid., p.135.
(22) J. Barr, op.cit., pp.139, 137.
(23) Quoted by Barr, ibid., pp.143-44.
(24) M. Iqbal, op.cit., p. 70.
(25) Baiḍāwī ad XXXII, 4.
(26) Cited in Karl Heim's, The World its Creation and Consummation, pp.118-9.
(27) Iḥyā', Vol.4, p.517.
(28) M. Iqbal, p.37. op.cit.
(29) Quoted in Sale's Koran, pp.551-2 n.3.
(30) Quoted in Wensinck's Muslim Creed, p.130.
(31) Iḥyā' Vol.4, p.515.
(32) Book of Jubilees, Ed. R.H. Charles, p.41.
(33) See Ancient Christian Writers VI, pp.59, 179.
(34) P. Casanova, Mohammed et la Fin du Monde, p.15.
(35) ibid., p.16.
(36) ibid.
(37) See T.C.E. Vol.II, p.1116 (art. Time by A.K. Rule).
(38) De Boer, art. Zamān, E.I.(1), Vol.IV, p.1209 a.
(39) See also 'Al-Ghazālī's Argument from Time' in M.W. Vol.XLIX (1959) pp.306-314, where M.E. Marmura analyses this scholar's proposition that 'time and the world were created together', in the light of Ibn Rushd's contention that time is eternal, an Aristotelean idea; just as al-Ghazālī's inference is

traceable in Philo. These arguments are primarily cosmogonic, 'The issue is not the nature of time, but rather of God's causality'.

(40) Quoted by Barr, op.cit., p.144. See also Rudi Paret's art. 'Der Koran als Geschichtsquelle' in Der Islam (1961) pp. 24ff. This is really an assessment of the value of the Quran as source-material for biography. Paret regards the punishment stories (Die Straflegenden) as an indirect source for Muhammad's life-story.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE CONCEPT OF PERPETUITY AND ITS VOCABULARY

Eternity and immortality as terms have no precise equivalents in the eschatological vocabulary of the Quran. As might be expected philosophical notions of this kind are absent from a work possessing the intensely personal style and outlook of the Holy Book. How best to express abstract ideas of this order is in itself a problem for the linguist. Modern Arabic treatises on theology and metaphysics make do with خلود as a rough equivalent for what Western thought understands by immortality, but this equivalence is by no means obvious to the reader of the Quran.(1)

In Hebrew as in Arabic a prefixed negative abstraction is best expressed by periphrasis. The problem of expressing this class of abstract noun in one word. has partly been solved in Modern Arabic by prefixing لا to suitable stems thus yielding terms like لانهائية (infinity), لادينية (irrelegion). This is a grammatically anomalous but technically useful device. Further examples are listed in Wehr's A Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic.(2)

Regular terms for Perpetuity. The Arabic translations of the N.T. render ἀθανασία عدم الموت (I Cor. 15: 53) or خلود (II Tim. 1: 10).(3) For this last word Lisān al-ʿArab offers دوام and بقاء as synonyms.(4) Lammens cites ancient authorities who hold that these three words are distinct in usage. Apparently خلود should not strictly be predicated of Deity, while دوام and بقاء could be taken as divine attributes.(5) The Quran bears out this opinion; there the numerous occurences of خَلَدَ and its

derivatives are not once applied to Allah. On the other hand, we read in LV, 26 - 27 كل من عليها فان ويبقى وجه ربك ذو جلال where the contrast between earthly decay and divine constancy is stressed in a passage that recalls Heb.1: 11, 'they will perish, but thou remainest' (cf. XXVIII, 60, 88).

For 'eternal' the Arabic versions of the N.T. generally employ ابدي, while ازلي, دهري and سرمدي occur in current usage to express other aspects of this conception, or else (as with سرمدي) the whole range of eternity. The first of these epithets, ابدي, stands for 'eternal' viewed in a forward direction - that which has no end. The third refers to eternity in retrospect ما لا نهاية له في اوله.(6) In a footnote Wensinck supplies the Greek equivalents of These complementary adjectives as used by John of Damascus: ἀνάρχως ، ازلي , ἀτελευτήτως * .(7) The second adjective is applied to realities that, though not properly speaking eternal, are regarded as primordial, with their origins lost in antiquity - 'The everlasting hills'. The last of these terms سرمدي is widest in extent and covers the first and the third. Whilst there are few entities which it could qualify, it might in theory serve as an attribute of God, who has neither beginning nor end.

Of these four terms ازل does not occur in the Quran; دهر as a substantive conveys the thought of the temporal rather than the eternal (XLV, 23 ; LXXVI, 1). سرمد occurs twice only in a solitary context, and that with a meaning somewhat different from the one given above; in the Quran the word suggests the sense of 'continuous' (XXVIII, 71, 72): 'If God should make the night unceasing over you...' (A.J.A.).

As-Samad. Among the titles ascribed to Allah in the Quran is the cryptic الصمد, the only 'beautiful name' that could conceivably refer to His eternity. Al Qamus al Muhit defines the term as الدائم الرفيع.(8) The defining epithets are far from synonymous; elsewhere one or other appears as the equivalent of الصمد. In the Encyclopaedia of Islam this uncertainty of derivation is underlined: 'The "Eternal" (al-Samad CXII, 2 only); but the exact meaning and origin of this ἅπαξ λεγόμενον were uncertain to the earliest commentators ...'.(9) The title was perhaps intended as an honorific, suitably mysterious; its ontological function is acquired. Allah's eternity would seem to have been tacitly assumed rather than repeatedly affirmed.

Abadan. The bare formula 'therein to abide' is frequently reinforced by the adverbial ابدا. This expression represents the emphatic 'never' (not ever) in verses such as II, 89; V 27; IX 84, 109; LIX, 11; LXII, 7. In one instance we meet with the hyperbolic usage so common in the O.T. where 'for ever' indicates a more or less permanent attitude or relationship: Abraham has severed his connexion with idolaters (LX, 4); he declares his 'perpetual' enmity towards all such, but adds a mitigating 'until ye believe in Allah alone' (R.B.).

Just as the righteous pass over into the bliss of Paradise at last, there to abide for ever ابدا (IV, 60, 121; V, 119; IX, 22, 101; LXIV, 9; LXV, 11); so also evildoers go their way to Gehenna there to dwell ابدا (IV, 167; XXXIII, 65; LXXII, 24). At first sight it seems that the respective fates of the blessed and the damned are irrevocably settled at the

judgment. Very laudably M. Ali seeks to soften the severity of the divine verdict, but he does this on dubious lexical grounds: 'It must be borne in mind that abad signifies a long time, being synonymous with دهر طويل (Mughnee) or as Tāj-ul-'Arūs says الدهر الطويل الذي ليس بمحدود ; its plural ābād would be meaningless if the word signified nothing but eternity'. (10)

Apparently this Punjabi translator is unaware of the distinction discernible in Semitic languages between a plural of extension and that of an object denoted by the singular. The counterparts of اباد in the Biblical languages are apt examples of this plural of extension (αἰῶνες and עוֹלָמִים).(11) In Arabic both the singular and plural stand for the same abstract concept of eternity, and plurality ceases to be a relevant factor. The view that the plural of ابد springs from a similar lexical phenomenon is borne out by a citation in Lammens' wordbook. After stating that the singular conveys the sense of an unending period, the authority quoted goes on to explain قيل الابد لا يثنى ولا يجمع والآباد مولّد - that is, a made-up plural. (12)

In an article dealing with the same general theme James Robson shows up the inconsistencies evident in Muhammad Ali's rendering of terms that have to do with eternal desity such as Khuld. Robson quotes the judgment of leading commentators, who find no grammatical or logical difficulties in envisaging an endless catena of ahqab (ages). According to Robson tradition also corroborates what is after all orthodox belief, namely the eternity of Heaven and Hell. (13)

The agreeable suggestion that the torments of Hell are but for a season is mooted and refuted in the Quran (II, 74-76; III, 23): The Jews insisted that the fire would not touch them save for a number of days. Jalāluddin's estimate is 'forty; being the number of days their forefathers worshipped the golden calf'. Sale further reports the received opinion among Jews of his day 'that no person, be he ever so wicked, or of whatever sect, shall remain in hell above eleven months, or at most a year except Dathan and Abiram'. Sale also gives the appropriate Rabbinic references.(14) This is precisely the presumptuous attitude that Muhammad deprecates as disclosing an ignorance of God's nature.

Again the everlastingness of doom or bliss is brought out by the clause 'as long as the heavens and the earth endure' (XI, 109), and idiomatic way of expressing the unalterable. Theoretically we could argue that the heavens and the earth may pass away. When all is said and done there is the distant possibility that the seemingly final verdict might be reversed; the ultimate decision for such a reversal rests with the Almighty whose inscrutable will none can fathom. Shahrastānī is troubled by the stark finality of the sentence and asks, 'how is an eternal sentence for a temporal deed to be justified?' He does not venture to speculate on a solution for the problem, as such speculation might carry him beyond the ambit of orthodoxy. Accordingly he takes comfort in the Prophet's word, 'My intercession is for the mortal sinners of my community', in the earnest hope that such intercession might avail.(15)

Three times the Quran modifies the finality of the 'eternal' verdict by adding إلّا ما شاء ربّك 'except as thy Lord will'

(VI, 128; XI, 109, 110). We note, however, that this hypothetical limitation on the term of abiding words both ways, and applies just as much to those in Paradise as to the inmates of the Fire. In conformity with his conviction that Allah cannot be bound by previous revelation in His future action, the Prophet admits the possibility that God may will otherwise than He has willed for the time being. On this phrase Masson comments: 'Cette formule restrictive .... semblerait donc vouloir insister sur l'absolue liberté' de la Volonté divine plutôt qu'indiquer une limite réelle à la durée des peines ou des récompenses de la vie future'.(16) In the last analysis nothing is eternal save existence, the divine and perhaps the human. Setting aside for the moment the modern dialectical distinction between essence and existence, this would seem to tally with Shahrastani's digest of Muʿtazilite dogma 'eternity is the most peculiar description of Allah's essence. They absolutely reject all other eternal qualities'.(17)

Khalada and Derivatives. If frequency of occurrence were any guide, the concept of immortality in the Quran would be best studied by an examination of the derivatives of خَلَدَ. No less than eighty examples of this group crop up, mainly in the form of participles, but also as finite verbs, and abstract nouns. The participle itself, is variously translated 'dwelling', 'continuing', 'abiding'; thus it shows affinity with the N.T.

From the lexicons it transpires that the verbal root does not invariably convey the idea of perpetuity; Zamakhsharī defines خَلَدَ = اطال الاقامة.(18) Lammens' source maintains that the noun خلود, while it always entails a lengthy stay,

need not imply the endless. (19) The Semantic link with the idea of immortality is best observed in the use of the noun (gerunds). For instance in X, 53 عذاب الخلد is rendered 'of eternity' by both Arberry and Bell. In XX, 118 Rodwell, along with these two scholars, translates شجرة الخلد 'tree of eternity'; the setting of this verse suggests that the hope of an immortal life was held out from the start. All three translators give 'the day of eternity' for يوم الخلود (L, 33).

Bell's version of XXI, 35 reads, 'We did not appoint to any human being before thee immortality; if then thou diest will they be immortal'. Incidentally the purport of these words is to deny intrinsic immortality. The Prophet, himself, is addressed and assured that neither he nor his predecessors can claim immortal life as an inherent right; all men must taste death (XXI, 36), not so much as a consequence of original sin but because Allah has so decreed. Hence خلود, however we may understand it, follows resurrection by way of death. It must be reckoned as God's reward or requital for the kind of life lived in the present world.

Al-Ghazālī employs the finite verb خَلَدَ in a manner that implies an unending state. There is a passage in his Ihyā', the more literalistic of his studies on Islamic eschatology, where he refers to the place in which the captive is for ever bound يخلد فيها الاسير. From the context it is plain that the writer held to the deathlessness of the damned يتمنون الموت ولا يموتون - craving death but not dying. (20)

The participial (cum adjectival) use of خلد though most frequent, is perhaps least instructive. Phrases like هم فيها خالدون

and خالدين فيها recur in every part of the Quran, a pledge that the joys or pains of the hereafter are alike without end. It is with the Fire and the Garden that these stereotyped phrases are most commonly linked. Such texts are numerous, but for the record we list the majority. One form or other of the phrase is tagged on usually to the end of a verse as a rhythmic refrain. In the following texts the setting is that of the Gardens: II, 23, 76; III, 13, 130, 197; IV, 17, 60, 121; V 88, 119; VII, 40; IX 21-22, 73, 90, 101; X, 27; XI 25, 110; XIV 28; XVIII 107-108; XXIX, 58; XXXI 7-8; XLVI, 13; XLVIII, 5; LVII, 12; LVIII, 22; LXIV, 9; LXV, 11; XCVIII, 7. References to the Fire with the appended refrain are about as frequent: II, 37, 75, 214, 259, 276; III, 112; VI, 128; VII, 34; IX, 69; X, 28; XI, 109; XIII, 6; XLVII, 17; LVIII, 18; LIX 17; LXIV, 10; LXXII, 24; XCVIII, 5. To the foregoing we should add the following verses in which the locus is Gehenna: IV, 95, 167; IX, 64; XVI, 31; XXIII, 105; XXXIX, 72; XL, 76). Or else the formula is affixed to deliverances which evoke similar ideas, punishment in V, 83, the soul's desire in XXI, 102.

When the participial form does service for a noun the rendering 'immortal' is accurate enough. A case in point is VII, 19 (cf. XXI, 8, 35): Satan's whispered insinuation induces Adam and Eve to taste of the tree, whereby human beings join the ranks of the undying او تكونا من الخالدين. We may take this to mean that the original pair are not regarded as possessing the attribute of immortality, more so because Allah's warning to them contains no hint that steadfastness and obedience to Him would ensure endless life. Likewise Adam would, ex hypothesi, be under the impression that what was not yet his, could be

acquired by devious means. Nowhere is there any suggestion that an immortal soul exists; and that it is not subject to the law of human mortality.

Also noteworthy is the causative form of the verb as used in CIV, 3. Here we read يحسب ان ماله اخلده, the hoarder labours under the delusion that possessions will 'perpetuate him' (R.B.), or make 'him immortal' (A.J.A.). The import of this line is hard to elicit. Does this rich man imagine that wealth is a token of the divine favour that continues in the afterlife? Or, is he living a life of ceaseless activity with no thought of the beyond, as if death would never catch up with him? Baiḍāwī inclines to the latter view حُبّ المال اغفله عن الموت,[21] but on either count the 'immortalizing' referred to here is a figment of imagination.

The causative form appears in the participle مُخلّدون (LVI, 17), where we read of 'immortal youths going round about them' (A.J.A.) These youths have been made immortal in order to wait upon those who recline in Paradise. This is another aspect of the eudaemonism which to Forsyth seems typical of some Jewish and Moslem representations of Heaven, 'the re-pristination of the old life under happier circumstances'.[22] In Rev. 22: 3 we are offered a radically different 'philosophy of satisfaction' merged in the overal vision of radiance and splendour. Instead of being served, the followers of Christ will do their Lord service, a service in which worship (λατρεύσουσιν) forms the prime element.

That perpetual youth is inherent in the sense of the verb خَلَدَ, is a point the lexicons make ابطأ عنه الشيب والضعف.[23] Ṣubḥi al-Ṣāliḥ informs us of the traditionalists' belief that:

'Each of the elect will have the same stature as Adam, and the same age, 33 years as Jesus'. (24) Tor Andrae points out that a comparable statement appears in the apocryphal 'Apocalypse of John', to the effect that 'all mankind will be resuscitated at the age of thirty years'. (25) The pleasures of Paradise are of the sort that make the strongest appeal to young adults: Any children that may be desired (in the hereafter) will almost at once attain to these specifications. (26) Mishkat XXII ch.12 apparently records a saying of the Prophet, 'there will be no old women in heaven' (27); this is not a case of unfair discrimination, but a promise of rejuvenation.

The collocating of the two names recalls the reference to Adam and Christ in I Cor. 15: 22, where a contrast between natural and spiritual is drawn by singling out the two Heads of the human race (cf. III, 52). Apart from the fair deduction that our future bodies will display many of the qualities exhibited in Christ's risen body, we have the testimony of Phil. 3: 21 that the body of humiliation will be made to conform to his glorious body. Family likeness rather than parity of years is the criterion of relationship (I John 3: 2). Christ is described as having hair as white as wool (Rev. 1: 14). Heaven will have its quota of infants; not to mention the elders who occupy positions of honour round the throne (Matt. 18: 10; Rev. 4: 4). This may sound sentimental, but is in line with accepted exegesis both Catholic and Reformed.

Muqīm, Muqāmah, Qayyūm. It would appear from the Quranic evidence that خالد should not strictly speaking be applied to impersonal objects; rather as with 'immortal' it should be restricted to man, who being the

victim of mortality can become the heir of immortality. For other realities regarded as lasting the Quran employs مُقيم where the N.T. would speak of eternal or unfading. Thus punishment is described as enduring (V, 41; IX, 69; XI, 41; XXXIX, 41; XLII, 44); so are the delights that await the just (IX, 21). The permanence of Heaven as a dwelling place is brought out by the use of phrase دار المُقامة, which Masson renders 'la demeure du sejour permanent'. (28) The last term of the series is the title القيّوم (II, 256; III, 1; XX, 110). Arberry translates this 'the Everlasting', while Bell gives it as 'the Eternal' adding a note that it could mean 'all-sustaining'. (29). The dictionary definition reads الذي لا بدء له والقائم بذاته (30) which embraces both of Bell's alternatives. Hence, it is practically synonymous with الصَمد, except that the common denotation rests of firmer etymological ground in the case of القيّوم.

In fine: None of the derivatives of خَلَدَ is ever applied to God; thus it does not correlate exactly with 'immortal' as used in the N.T. and the Apocrypha. Further, we cannot speak of impersonal realities or experiences in terms of خالد. These conclusions do not necessarily hold true in modern Arabic, but emerge from the Quranic evidence. Men are not خالدون by nature, but enter into a state of خلود after resurrection and judgment. If we allow for the qualitative sense that αἰώνιος often has in the N.T. which خالد lacks, the Arabic term agrees fairly closely with 'immortal' and 'everlasting' when applied to human life.

NOTES.

(1) One of the points Azad raises in his commentary is that 'Simple words used in the Qur'ān, e.g. Khulūd (permanence) ... developed highly technical senses which could not have been imagined in the earliest age'. This transpires from S.A. Kamali's article: 'Abul Kalam Azad's Commentary on the Qur'ān in M.W., Vol. XLIX (1959), p.7.
(2) H. Wehr, A Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic, p.852.
(3) Arabic Bible, B.F.B.S. and the Paulist (Greek Catholic) version.
(4) L.A. Vol. 4, p.143.
(5) H. Lammens, Farā'id-al-Lughah, Vol.1, p.82.
(6) Al-Munjid, p.9.
(7) A.J. Wensinck, Muslim Creed, p.150 n.4, 5.
(8) Al-Qāmūs al-Muhit, Vol. 1, p.308.
(9) E.I (1), Vol. I, p.303, in art. Allāh, by D.B.Macdonald.
(10) M. Ali, The Holy Qur-án, p.472-3 n.1201.
(11) See J. Barr, Biblical Words for Time, p.64-67.
(12) H. Lammens, op. cit., p. 2-3
(13) J. Robson, art. 'Is the Moslem Hell Eternal?' in M.W. Vol. XXVIII (1938), p.386-93. The plural Ahqāb is used once only in the Quran and that in an eschatological context (LXXVIII, 23); cf. XVIII, 59 where a different plural is employed.
(14) G. Sale, The Koran, p.13 n.2. (This includes Jalaluddins remark).
(15) In Kitāb Nihāyatu'l - Iqdām, Edited by W. Guillaume p.150-1 (Arabic p.476).
(16) D. Masson, Le Coran, p.747.
(17) See A.J. Wensinck, op. cit., p.75. Apparently for Ibn Sīnā 'the Divine Essence and the Divine Existence are one and the same', see M.E. Marmura's art. 'Al-Ghazālī's Argument from Time' in M.W. Vol. XLIX, p.313.
(18) From the Asās quoted by M. Ali, op. cit., p.28 n.68.
(19) H. Lammens, op. cit., p.82.
(20) Ihyā' Vol. 4, p.530.
(21) Baidāwī, ad CIV, 3.
(22) P.T. Forsyth, This Life and the Next, p.77.
(23) Al-Munjid, p.187; also L.A. Vol. 3, p.143.
(24) In a doctoral thesis summaries in E.I. (2) Vol. II, p.449, art. 'Djanna', by L. Gardet.

(25) T. Andrae, Les Origines, p.89.
(26) G. Sale, Preliminary Discourse, p.106-7. The specifications are of course Adam's reputed stature and the age of 30.
(27) Quoted in Hughes Dictionary of Islam, p.249.
(28) D. Masson, op. cit., p.762. The reference is XXXV, 32.
(29) R. Bell, The Qur'an, p.36 n. 1.
(30) Al-Munjid, p.704.

CONCLUSION

MOTIVES AND ENDS

Eschatology cannot be divorced from experience. This is a conclusion that emerges from a survey of the eschatological material in the N.T. and the Quran. At every turn we find that the message of final confrontation with the Divine Majesty is related to practical interests and ordinary living. Right conduct, social justice and personal holiness are enjoined upon the faithful; and such injunctions are enforced by pointing the receptive to the reckoning that lies beyond the grave. 'The Apocalypse', declares Beckwith, 'is written for a distinctly practical purpose, the primary object of all prophecy'. (1) Eschatology is the summit of prophecy. The eschatological strand is woven into the teaching of one who is the Prophet of Islam and into the words of Jesus, who is more than a prophet. Indeed, virtually all prophecy in the Quran has an eschatological trend: 'En fait, toute la piete de Mahomet a une orientation eschatologique'. (2) An equally strong case could be made out for the dominance of the eschatological motif in the N.T.

One cannot fail to notice the difference of emphasis and approach between the two books, despite the substantial agreement on the decisive importance of the Last Things. Leaving aside the respective presuppositions of divine afflatus, we recognise the Quran to be the work of one man, and to that extent it is uniform in outlook. When we turn to the N.T. we find a rich diversity of outlook springing from the experience and meditation of many minds, but all within the wider unity of the magnetic field of Christ. The Resurrection of the Dead is to be understood, and was seen by the Apostles, in the light

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of an event that transformed life's meaning for multitudes. In the Quran, resurrection is supernatural in the sense that it is deemed abnormal and incredible by the majority; yet the Prophet discerns in the processes of nature the evidence for the reviving of mankind. Thus the supernatural is treated as wholly reasonable and consonant with the facts of life, creation, birth and growth. Similar analogies are employed in the N.T. to corroborate the testimony of eye-witnesses. But what analogy in itself can vie with an historical fact as proof for ultimate resurrection? The Resurrection of Christ is the earnest of our own.

In the Quran the promises of bliss hereafter and the threats of doom are offered as incentives to right conduct. Most of the utterances to which such injunctions are attached are in the third person, and graphically describe the fate of those who have followed the way of truth or turned away from it. A whole chain of good works and correct observance is assumed to proceed from individual choice. For evildoers as for the infidel the prospect is fearful to contemplate. The following passages which span the three main chronological periods demonstrate the practical aims of Quranic eschatology: LXXIV, 44-47; LXXXV, 10-11; XXV, 64-75; XVI, 99; III, 155; IX, 20-22. Virtue, devotion, generosity and courage never lose their reward.

In the N.T. the appeal is more direct (often preceded by 'beloved' or 'brethren'), and generally follows the announcement of the End. It is not so much an exhortation to good works as to vigilance, witness and prayer. The governing motive for spiritual preparedness is the prospect of the Lord's return, rather than a longing for Heaven or the fear of eternal loss.

Christ comes to inaugurate the Kingdom or, if the Kingdom be regarded as already inaugurated, to consummate what he has begun. The discursive and epistolary style makes for a more intimate method of approach to the mind than is possible with the stereotyped announcements of Quranic language. The recipients are urged to watch and pray (Mark 13: 35; Luke 18: 1-8; I Thess. 5: 1-11); they are encouraged to be sober (Rom. 13: 11-14), and steadfast (I Cor. 15: 58). Purity and holiness are enjoined upon them (II Pet. 3: 11-12; I John 3: 3). In each of these passages eschatology is brought down to earth and rounded off by parenesis. The last mentioned text (I John 3: 3) finely epitomizes the immediate object of the Christian hope: 'And every one who thus hopes in Him purifies himself as He is pure'.

Corresponding to the repeated assurance of the N.T. that Christ will appear once more to his own is an isolated line in the Quran which embodies a pledge that the deserving will gaze upon their Lord (LXXV, 23). The vision is to be vouchsafed on The Day, and involves more than seeing God with the eye of faith.

Again the imminence of the End is a point that is stressed in both the N.T. and the Quran. With this, however, goes the admission that there can be no certainty as to the actual date. God alone knows the Hour (XLI, 47; Mark 13: 32). This is all to the good: the believer, if he takes the promise seriously, is left with no ground for presumption, and must always be on his mettle. 'In every moment', says Bultmann, slumbers the possibility of being the eschatological moment'. (3) Quite so: but the N.T. presupposes the objectivity of the supreme eschatological moment, which apart from visible manifestations would be

unidentifiable. What Westcott maintains concerning the Resurrection of Christ is equally applicable to the Final Resurrection: 'Its objectivity is essential to its significance'. (4)

The conviction that faith and hope rest on objective realities can spur the human will to worthwhile endeavour: 'always abounding in the work of the Lord' (I Cor. 15: 58). Cullmann attempts to bring out 'the close relation between Christian action and the expectation of the end'. He denies the assumption that, when this expectation is held to tenaciously, missionary enterprise is inhibited. (5) Far from paralysing missionary effort eschatology does in fact provide its compulsive energy. It is not waiting with folded hands so much as watching with minds alert that is signified, in the knowledge that salvation comes from the Lord. This confidence precludes any false optimism as to the essential self-sufficiency of man, and is the cure for the numbing pessimism of those who do not know what to hope for. Mutatis mutandis, Islam can make a similar claim. What impelled the martyrs of Badr and Uhud was the hope of eternal reward. This hope supplied the initial impetus for the great expansion at the beginning of The Muslim era, though doubtless historians can discover other factors at work.

What is raised is the whole man, and no single term adequately expresses the conception of the total personality. Paul selected sōma to represent the idea. The Quran lacks a corresponding term: It is the nafs viewed as intrinsic personality which having fulfilled its obligations or neglected its responsibilities tastes death, and is subsequently revived. On the Resurrection Day it is held accountable for past conduct. But

it is a self which, whenever it comes on the scene, appears fully clothed with a visible form and aware of its identity.

Both scriptures make it plain that resurrection will be to endless life. The respective fates of the blessed and the reprobate are alike permanent. If there is to be a mitigation in the sentence of age-long punishment, the warrant for it lies beyond the horizon of revealed religion. The wish for such alleviations, is both legitimate and laudable, so long as it does not lead to complacency. John Baillie pleads for a form of universalism 'which does nothing to decrease the urgency of immediate repentance and which makes no promises to the procrastinating sinner'. He doubts whether such a form of the doctrine has been found. (6) Perhaps it was never meant to be found: Jesus was loth to propound it, and so was Muhammad.

Whether we regard the destiny of God's people as best stated in a doctrine of immortality, or view the prospect more positively in terms of eternal life, the fact remains that resurrection is the vital link between this life and the next. 'A materialist eschatology promises a perpetuation of our corporality'; declares Stauffer: 'A spiritualist eschatology seeks release from corporality. But the realistic eschatology of the N.T. promises us the redemption of the body itself'. (7) An idealist might be satisfied with the survival of his immortal soul; he may even relish the thought. Physical existence with audio-visual manifestations is what makes sense to the materialist; while the existentialist is concerned, above all, to insure that individuality does not become submerged in void. Christ's charter of redemption culminates in immortality, but through death and

resurrection. No alternative scheme so fully satisfies the aspirations of personality or so nearly meets the conflicting claims of philosophy.

NOTES.

(1) I.T. Beckwith, The Apocalypse, p.422.
(2) T. Andrae, Les Origines de l'Islam, p.92.
(3) R. Bultmann, History and Eschatology, p.155.
(4) B.F. Westcott, The Gospel of the Resurrection, p.4.
(5) O. Cullmann, art. 'Eschatology and Missions in the N.T.', in B.N.T.E. pp. 409 ff.
(6) J. Baillie, And the Life Everlasting, p.189.
(7) E. Stauffer, N.T. Theology, p.227.