THE NEW TOWNS OF ISRAEL -

origins, development and implementation

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Synopsis

Israel is not generally perceived as a highly urbanized country yet 86% of its population now live in urban areas. The dominance of the anti-city Zionist ideology of the pre-1948 pioneers stressing the value of rural society and agricultural labout overshadowed the reality of urban development and growth.

Shortly after independence, demographic and defense pressures necessitated a policy for population dispersal and immigrant absorption. The dispersal of population policy utilized two approaches namely the creation of new towns and to a lesser degree the establishment of rural settlements.

The new towns have been described as 'planted' or 'administered' communities because of the highly centralized, externally imposed and paternalistic style of planning and administration. They were conceived of as regional, urban service centres in their respective rural areas. Primary emphasis was upon settlement, with economic goals and social planning as secondary considerations.

The policy of rapid urbanization led to a very rapid filling-up of the country especially in the first 10 years. Thirty new towns were created. The growth of the Tel Aviv area has been limited and its share of the national population reduced. The urban hierarchy was modified by the creation of intermediate sized settlements and in general, the policy of population dispersal has been a significant accomplishment.

But there are problems and failures. Many of the planned new towns are neither economically nor socially viable. Many are too small

and too few have acquired urban characteristics or become regional centres as intended. Economic benefits have lagged despite tax benefits, loans, grants, and other fiscal incentives. Too great an emphasis on spatial and physical development, on the rapid settlement of people without providing for economic and social infrastructure has generated an exodus of the younger, more upwardly mobile, able and energetic residents. Those left behind in the towns are the least able to cope with the difficulties. The vast majority of the outmigrants have left the new towns which had been assigned to them, despite their ineligibility for housing and employment assistance in their next community. The volume of the exodus is testimony to the perception by many of the unsuitability of the new towns.

In spite of the apparent shortcomings, little remedial action has been taken to rectify the situation. Since the mid-1960's no new towns have been founded and apart from one notable though unfinished study there has been no significant large scale research initiated by the Israeli Government into the present state of the towns.

This study suggests that by recognising the deficiencies and by adopting measures to overcome the problems, the new towns programme could be resuscitated. The programme may at present be a political failure which the Government is loath to admit. Further avoidance of the issues can only compound the failure. Detailed research and action are needed immediately.

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"Nations, no less than persons, want to keep up with the Joneses, and the Joneses of the minute are sometimes the votaries of fashions that give them no real subjective pleasure apart from that of display, and may, like Victorian tight-lacing, be extremely discomforting"

F.J. Osborn and A. Whittick (1969) <u>The New Towns</u> London: Leonard Hill. p.53.

Introduction

Throughout the ages new towns have been founded to meet specific objectives and to perform particular functions. The most common reasons for their establishment include

a) to serve as capital cities

b) to fulfil stratetic or military needs

c) to exploit natural resources and open up under-developed areas

d) to relieve urban congestion or to control and direct metropolitan growth

e) to absorb large population changes or population movements.

The Israeli new towns programme is of considerable interest because the reason for the programme does not fall into categories a) to e) though individual towns do so. The adoption of a new towns programme in Israel was envisaged as the preferred means by which a national policy for urbanization and settlement structure was to be accomplished. In this respect, Israel is unique in having utilized a new towns policy to achieve national, regional and local aims and objectives. Centralized decision-making was used as a means of achieving a multiplicity of planning goals in relation to the new towns. The scale of the programme differentiates it from those of other countries in terms of both the number of towns and the size of population involved compared to the national population.

The primary objective of the study is to examine the evolution, implementation and progress of the new towns. The study looks at the diverse elements which together contributed to the formulation of the new towns policy: these include the pre-State settlement pattern, Zionist ideology, demographic influences and the planning

background. It attempts to explain why new towns were perceived as the most practicable solution to the problems in existence at independence in 1948. It further seeks to analyse the changes and modifications in the programme within the framework of Zionist ideology and the prevailing European planning theories.

A constant theme is the contrast of planning theory and built reality. The failures of the towns are related to the inapplicability of theory and the serious lack of plan modification in light of obvious and well-documented defficiencies. The study suggests that in-depth analysis and research are vitally necessary as soon as possible together with a commitment to future plan formulation and policy-making which is responsive to the situation as indicated by such research.

The study has been limited to a selective description and analysis of the programme. It does not deal with the evolution and development of individual towns since such an approach is overly descriptive and somewhat repetitive. Further, the aims and objectives of the towns were established by national decision within a highly centralized planning process. The towns were never considered as individual units but as part of a national programme and thus must be evaluated in the context in which they were envisaged and developed. Consequently, this examination looks broadly at the new towns and reviews the successes and failures which are apparent at the national level while using examples of individual towns by way of clarification. The study thus seeks to unravel the complex situation by discussing and evaluating the general trends and by using data on individual regions and towns to elucidate the more specific issues.

Data availability has unfortunately been a continual constraint. Many studies are either unobtainable in this country or only available in Hebrew. Furthermore, there is a paucity of information dating from 1970 onwards. Detailed research and long-term studies are sadly lacking as are official statements of the future role of the new towns as part of the national policy of urbanization. The programme is continuing but there are no clearly defined goals. Despite official statements which state the achievements and allude to the problems there has been no major reassessment of the new towns policy in the light of changed circumstances and 30 years of operation. Rather, attention has turned elsewhere mainly towards rehabilitation of the cities and large towns by chance including some of the new towns.

This research ends by posing the questions 'what is to become of the new towns?' and 'why has attention moved away?', by suggesting that further research, analysis and policy reformulation is imperative, and by stating that planning as a dynamic process of intervention cannot just halt without causing very serious repercussions.

Planning whether national, regional, local, economic, physical or social must have clearly stated objectives and goals otherwise it is impossible to direct planning means in a concerted and consistent manner. Planning as a means of solving or ameliorating problems even in a situation of uncertainty requires a sound basis of knowledge and stated ends. At present, the Israeli new towns policy lacks both of these prerequisites.

CHAPTER 1. PRE-1948 SETTLEMENT

Events in Palestine in the 70 years or so preceeding independence are a key to the understanding of the settlement and urbanization policy goals of present-day Israel. Jewish settlement and the dispersal of the population have, to a very significant degree, influenced the various boundaries and partition proposals which evolved from the 1930's onwards. Moreover, many of the national institutions and types of settlements which were generated in the pre-independence period still exist today and exert a strong influence on many aspects of political life in Israel.

An evaluation of the influence of Zionism and the immigration flows together provide an invaluable insight into the actual pattern of urban (and rural) settlement as it developed prior to the existence of Israel as a nation-state.

1.1 The Anti-City Element in Zionism

Zionist ideology according to Cohen (1970 a) has consistently and completely ignored the existence and potential of urban settlements. The original and largely unchanged aim of Zionism was to establish a Jewish society and homeland while at the same time providing the ideological and cultural support necessary for this task - it was thus a combination of nationalism and Judaism. (Appendix A) Zionism rejected all the accepted concepts relating to Jewish identity.

The fathers of Zionism, including Theodor Herzl and Max Nordau, were not openly hostile towards the establishment of Jewish cities

in Palestine. They ignored the possibility rather, on the grounds that a return to the land provided a more positive self-image for the individual. An integral part of the more extreme pioneering spirit which dominated 20th century Eretz-Israel [1] was rejection of the city. The existence of urban living Jews in Palestine, it was believed, supported and reinforced the imposed image and inflicted identity of the Diaspora Jew [2].

The very strong agricultural bias of pioneering Zionism stemmed from two ideological beliefs:

a) the conquest of the soil by individuals and groups would ultimately lead to a return to the life of Biblical times and

b) the generation of a peasant class was the only means to normalise Jewish society. (Appendix B and C)

The anti-city belief, typical of the halutzim [3], was stated by Hantke at the 1923 Zionist Congress... "(It is self-evident) that the national existence of a nation in a country depends upon the question whether it is successful in the cultivation of its soil. The city orients itself by the country.... If we are forced to decide between the amount of work to be devoted to the city and the countryside, we must always bear in our consciousness that the decision falls in the countryside and the city follows the country" (quoted in Cohen, 1970 a).

The belief in the centrality of the village was even more strongly stated by Bergman in 1946... "Our yearnings for the village, our striving to make it the central point of our renaissance, did not

come from economic reasons only. Taking root in the soil meant for us more than physical rooting. Also the Jewish spirit sought to be rooted in the land. The village was given the task of materializing this taking root. And from the village this spirit was supposed to spread out and influence the city." (quoted in Weinryb, 1957).

The leaders of the colonizing programme in Palestine faced the task of preventing at best or discouraging at worst, the movement of the highly urbanized Jews of the Diaspora into the cities. To this end, a counter-attraction was created by directing Zionist effort towards the establishment of agricultural settlements - the kibbutz [4] and the moshav [5]. Thus, from the city was generated the village, a situation possibly unique to Israel.

The new rural settlements were developed with the expressed intention of being efficient, innovatory and able to compete in the market. They were progressive in that their concern was with agriculture and personal development, and were visualised as an advance from the farming methods of Europe and the moshavot [6] of Palestine, both of which relied upon the exploitation of tenant by landlord.

The national institutions of the Yishuv [7] focussed all their attention and their considerable means upon the agricultural sector. Scant attention was paid to the development of the urban sector. From 1918 until independence, as Cohen (1970 a) points out, there was not a single reference by Zionist leaders to the need for, or adoption of, an urban policy. The Zionist

movement was unerring in its belief that the future progress of Eretz-Israel was dependent upon agricultural settlement alone. As one Zionist leader stated "....the city (in Palestine) accepts the ideological supremacy of the village, which is characterized by its peculiar social and economic organisation, preserves the spontaneity of relationships between one human being and the other, and serves as the fountainhead of biological and political renovation, the village does not succumb to the rules of development - and finally destruction - which are characteristic of the modern city." (Tartakover, 1948).

For a long time, therefore, the city was subordinate to the village both ideologically and politically. Domination was political in that Zionist leadership and power in Eretz-Israel was concentrated in the members of co-operative and collective settlements. Their influence was, and still is though to a lesser degree, highly disproportionate to their numerical strength.

Urban settlements were subordinate to rural ones at both national and regional scale. At the regional level, this was clear from the regional urban centre's functional dependency on the surrounding villages whereas the villages themselves had functional links to the cities and <u>not</u> to the regional urban centres. Again, this relates to the generation of the village from the city. This situation was apparent throughout the Mandate and into statehood.

The Jewish population was attempting to create a progressive society with a rural basis. A necessary step in order to achieve this stated end was the transfer of urban economic functions, and especially industry, to rural settlements. The rural sector would

thus perform both rural and urban functions. The scheme, largely ignored the role of tertiary functions and trade for two major reasons:-

a) the establishment of tertiary functions could not be justified by the relatively low level of economic and technical development. Moreover, it was almost impossible to accurately project possible future levels of development. At the same time, the Zionist movement was actively encouraging the growth of national and co-operative and marketing institutions (e.g. Tnuva and Hamashbir) which in reality operated as substitutes for tertiary functions, and

b) relating again to Zionism, in the Diaspora, trade and services had been the most common Jewish occupations usually through necessity. The setting up of a tertiary sector was consequently avoided in the belief that such a policy would inevitably re-create the occupational structure which had existed in Europe.

1.2 The Reality of Urban Growth and Settlement

Before Zionism emerged as a major force and stimulus to immigration, there was already a small Jewish population in Palestine. In 1882, they numbered about 24,000, roughly 5% of the existing population and were concentrated in the ancient holy cities of Jerusalem, Hebron and Zefat. (It is important to note that these cities are all inland and situated in mountains). These peoples were descendants of ancient religious Hassidic communities plus a few other Orthodox Jews who had migrated to the Holy Land to live and die. All were urban, most lived on charity and they were largely unaware of the numerous political upheavals of the area.

The first settlers to found a new agricultural settlement were a group of Jews from Jerusalem who, in 1878, individually bought land near the Yarkon River and created Petah Tikva. This settlement and others, including Zikron Ya'akov, Rishon LeZion and Rosh Pinna were initially failures but were subsequently revitalised by the injection of finance made available by the Rothschild family, in particular Baron Edmond de Rothschild (Schama, 1978). The Rothschilds supported and encouraged many of the early moshavot. At this time, neither the establishment of towns nor the holding of private property had the negative value later to be ascribed by Zionism.

Throughout the early period of Zionism, no new urban settlements were founded. This resulted from a lack of need coupled with a lack of desire to initiate urban settlements. There was no restriction upon settlement in the existing cities such as Hebron, Jerusalem and Jaffa, and thus immigrants were attracted to these cities rather than by the idea of creating new towns.

At the beginning of this century, there was the first attempt to create a new completely Jewish urban centre. In 1909, a garden suburb was founded, intended for wealthy Jewish merchants, and originally called Ahuzait Bait, later renamed Tel Aviv. The foundation of Tel Aviv is important in three major respects. Firstly, it was not created as a new town per se but as a new urban quarter of the old Arab city of Jaffa. It became an independent town in 1921 though never envisaged as such. Secondly, the Jewish National Fund, created in 1901 to buy land, financially supported the venture. It was not until the founding of Kiryat Gat in the 1950's, that Jewish national institutions played an active role in the direct creation of any further urban settlements. Thirdly,

Tel Aviv was founded at a time when the pioneering agricultural bias had not yet emerged as the dominant attitude. Throughout this period, colonizing effort supported both rural (with public and private funds) and urban enterprise (with private funds) though due to the relative under-development of the rural sector together with the availability of institutional backing both financial and ideological, primary effort was directed towards agricultural colonization.

Zionist attitudes underwent a transformation with the ascendancy of the Socialist pioneering movements after the first world war, their domination being marked until independence and continuation in a modified form thereafter. Attention became increasingly focussed upon agricultural colonization - a process which could not have occurred without the large amounts of capital made freely available to the kibbutz and moshav organisations.

The cities, despite the prevailing negative ideological stance, were not stagnant. There was immense growth of urban settlements especially in the 1930's due to the characteristics of the immigrants of that period (see 1.3). Furthermore, growth of the cities was promoted by a shortage of land which was available only in limited quantities (Map 1). Land was purchased piecemeal by Zionist agencies and at periods of mass immigration the number of suitable rural settlers far exceeded the sites available. The excess was thus forced to remain in the urban areas.

Urban growth proceeded in an unplanned rather haphazard manner. Little attention was paid to the quality of urban life as it was not regarded as an integral part of national renewal. Zionist leaders in Palestine considered urban Jews as weak-willed creatures

Jewish-Owned Land In Mandatory Palestine (1942)



MAP 1

who could not see the potential of the new homeland (Cohen, 1970 a).

The rural-urban dichotomy generated considerable hostility especially from within the kibbutzim. The hostility was most apparent in the restriction of growth of the urban settlement of Afula in the Emek Yisre'el (Jezreel Valley). Afula supported by private enterprise was planned on a grand scale as the major inland Jewish settlement of Palestine. From its inception in 1925, the rural hinterland consisting of many kibbutzim and moshavim, avoided all contact with the town. This was made possible by the relatively self-sufficient nature of the moshavim and kibbutzim, and the existence of strong functional and institutional ties centring mainly upon Tel Aviv and Haifa. Thus, in both ideological and practical terms, the agricultural settlements were able to boycott all intermediate settlement levels, thereby exhibiting their disapproval of town life. Afula lacked support from either the local population or national institutions. By 1948, 23 years after its foundation, the population of Afula was only 2,500, the majority living in squalid conditions (Sarly, 1974).

Afula was the sole attempt to create a Jewish city in the Mandatory period and was a notably inauspicious beginning to planned urban development.

Although no other new urban settlements were attempted during the Mandate, several urban settlements developed in an unplanned manner. Three main types can be distinguished by their origins and type of growth.

a) progressive urbanization of the old established moshavot.

By far the majority of the moshavot were founded in the last quarter of the 19th century and the beginning of this century. Originally

the moshavot were purely agricultural but in time they became more urban in form and function. Lacking the socialist influence of the kibbutzim or moshavim, the moshavot were much more directly influenced by the expansion of the coastal cities. Further, by the beginning of the 20th century, many of the moshavot had surplus Jewish labour, a result of the preference for cheaper Arab labour for agricultural production. Clearly they had failed in their attempt to become agricultural villages based upon private enterprise and Jewish manual labour: instead they had become bourgeois settlements with Jewish landlords exploiting an Arab peasant class. (Laqueur, 1972). It was the available surplus of Jewish labour which actively encouraged the urbanization and industrialization of the moshavot.

The best example of this type is that of Petah Tikva, the first moshava, dating from 1878. The change of physical appearance and occupational structure was slow but by 1938 Petah Tikva was proclaimed a city. At the end of 1975, the population had reached 106,800 and the city had effectively incorporated into the Tel Aviv conurbation (see Table 1A).

A similar process of gradual incorporation has occurred at Rehovot, Rishon Lezion and Hadera all of which were moshavot of the coastal zone (Table 1A).

b) rapid urbanization of newer moshavot

Though most of the moshavot were established before 1914, there were some which were the result of inter-war immigration. Several of these exhibit a very rapid process of urbanization, including Natanya, Bnei Brak and Ramat Gan.

Table 1A.

Population of Some Smaller Coastal Plain Towns

	1922[1]	1931[1]	1944[1]	1958[1]	1967[2]	1975[3]
Petah Tikva	3032	6880	17250	49000	73000	106800
Rehovot	1242	3193	10020	29550		50100
Rishon LeZion	1396	2525	8100	24400		68300
Hadera	540	2135	7520	23650		35700
Natanya	-	253	4900	36000	58000	82400
Nahariya	-	-	1300	14000		27300
Herzlia	-	1217	4200	25500		47800
Kfar Saba	14	1395	3800	17100		31800
Nes Ziona	319	1012	1600	10900		12900

Sources
1. Amiran & Shachar (1961)
2. Cohen (1970 a)
3. Ministry of Social Welfare (1977)

Natanya, mid-way between Tel Aviv and Haifa was founded in 1929 when a substantial land area was made available for purchase. Soon afterwards, it was clear that the soil was unsuitable for agriculture. The town developed as a market and industrial centre with diamond-cutting and polishing, and fruit-canning. The beautiful situation on the coast also encouraged development as a resort. During the second world war, the British military authorities built one of the largest leave camps of the near-east at Natanya. By 1975, the population of Natanya was 82,400 (Table 1A).

Ramat Gan and Bnei Brak established in 1921 and 1925 respectively, urbanized very quickly in response to the process of growth of Tel Aviv. By 1975, Ramat Gan had a population of 121,100 and Bnei Brak 83,000.

With reference to the moshavot, it is important to remember that they were both the oldest and least revolutionary types of settlement developed in Palestine. The inhabitants were committed to neither ideology, reform nor socialism; rather they individually sought financial success from agricultural production, in the process utilising private capital from Europe. The inevitable result was a European type of farming transferred to a non-European area. This ought to be contrasted with the kibbutzim and moshavim which evolved in response to the European situation and which were a unique product of the beliefs and ideals of Zionism as they were transplanted in Palestine. The difference between the two movements (moshavot and kibbutzim/moshavim) is apparent in the virtual absence of agricultural characteristics at the present time in the former whilst none of the settlements established in the socialist

sector of Jewish colonization have become urban in either form or function.

c) transformation of housing estates into satellite towns

From the early 1920's, housing associations were founded with the intention of providing homes at reasonable cost for members. Urban land ownership was concentrated in few hands and the price of land, when available, was prohibitive. Land costs plus high costs of materials meant that most people found it a long and arduous process to secure accommodation suitable to their needs. Membership of these informal and relatively small housing associations was regarded as a means of saving and a method of avoiding the exploitation by the predominantly Arab landowners who controlled the sale of property in the coastal zone. Housing associations' sole purpose was housing provision. They did not intend to create new urban settlements nor did they have an ideological basis.

A number of the housing estates were founded within the confines of, or in proximity to, existing moshavot or cities. For example, the moshavot of Bnei Brak and Ramat Gan sold land to housing associations as they themselves became increasingly urbanized and required less land to fulfil a diminishing agricultural role. Purchase of land from moshavot was an ideal solution in a restricted land market. Most housing estates, however, were created independent of existing settlements for the simple reason that land was cheaper at a distance from existing towns and cities. As more estates were constructed and as the distance between narrowed, they co-operated in road building, service provision etc. and eventually amalgamated into new municipal units. The origins of Giva'tayim, Holon and Bat Yam, present day

satellites of Tel Aviv [8] are typical of this type of development and growth.

In the Haifa Bay area, a similar process occurred though the estates which were founded have remained largely suburban in character and have failed to gain full city status as seen in the Tel Aviv area. Examplesnear Haifa include Kiryat Motzkin, Kiryat Yam and Kiryat Hayim - the term Kiryat, meaning township, denoting the lack of municipal status.

1.3 Immigration 1882 - 1948 (see Tables 1B and 1C)

First aliya [9] (1882 - 1903)

The beginning of the modern Jewish return to Eretz-Israel derives from 3 causes:

a) traditional devotion to the historic homeland and the hope for messianic redemption.
b) the steadily mounting oppression against the Jews of Eastern Europe and
c) the rise in activity and influence of a few who believed that the only lasting solution to the Jewish problem was a return to their homeland. (Louvish, 1973).

These influences together generated great waves of Jewish migration from Eastern Europe. The majority of the migrants were neither pious nor believed that anti-semitism existed anywhere other than Eastern Europe. They were attracted by the personal freedom and opportunities available for free-enterprise in Western Europe and the United States. Only a tiny group opted to settle in Palestine, prepared to tolerate the hardships of land and climate.

Table 1B

Population Growth: Selected Years 1845 - 1948 (in thousands)

Date	Event	Total	Jewish	non-Jewish
1845		n.a.	11.8	n.a.
1882	Beginning of First Aliya	453.0	24.0	429.0
1903	End of First Aliya	n.a.	50.0	n.a.
1914	End of Second Aliya (beg.1904)	708.0	85.0	623.0
1917	Balfour Declaration	657.0	57.0	600.0
1919	Beginning of Third Aliya	648.0	65.0	583.0
1922	End of Third Aliya	752.0	84.0	668.0
1928		n.a.	150.0	n.a.
1931	End of Fourth Aliya (beg. 1924)	1,033.0	174.0	859.0
1936		n.a.	384.0	n.a.
1939	End of Fifth Aliya (beg. 1932)	1,506.0	450.0	1,056.0
1942		1,620.0	484.0	1,136.0
1947		1,899.0	630.0	1,269.0
1948		879.0	758.0	121.0

Source: Lichfield (1970)

Table 1C

The Jewish Population by Settlement Type 1882 - 1967

		rural Jewish population	
Year	Total Jewish population	total	%
1882	24,000	480	2.0
1890	47,000	2,960	6.3
1900	50,000	5,200	10.4
1914	85,000	12,000	14.1
1922	84,000	14,800	17.6
1931	174,000	41,340	23.8
1936	440,000	99,000	22.5
1943	539,000	132,700	24.6
1949	1,013,900	161,000	15.9
1953	1,483,600	346,000	23.3
1957	1,762,700	321,800	18.3
1962	2,068,900	303,260	14.7
1967	2,383,600	272,900	11.4

Source: Berler, 1970.

Land was bought and agricultural settlements established despite orders from the Turkish Government for a cessation of Jewish immigration. The majority of the first aliya came from Russia, eastern Poland and Rumania, swelling the number of Jewish inhabitants from 24,000 in 1882 to about 50,000 in 1903. It must be noted that during the same period relative emigration of Jews from Palestine reached half the immigration rate [10].

In 1903, influenced by several prominent British Zionists, the British Government offered an autonomous protecterate in East Africa for Jewish colonization [11]. The proposal, though acceptable to several influential Zionists was defeated resoundingly by the congress of that year though the African Zion Issue continued to be raised throughout the following decade.

Second aliya (1904 - 1914)

This immigration wave was characterised by individual settlers from Eastern Poland, Lithuania and Russia who were young and from middle-class families. They were, by and large, idealists opposed to the life style of the first aliya who were fairly well-to-do farmers. They went to Palestine not out of despair but inspired by optimism, hope and with a tremendous vitality to build and create a positive Jewish identity founded on labour Zionism. Their desire to eliminate the past European image of Jewish life, led to the founding of completely new settlement types, namely the kvutza (later to be called the kibbutz) and the moshav.

The second aliya brought 35 - 40,000 Jews, the majority of whom settled in urban areas (Table 1C). The influence, however, of

agricultural colonization should not be underestimated in its role of opening up new areas. The kibbutzim and moshavim were eminently suitable for isolated and difficult locations in particular the swampy areas of the north[12]. The kibbutz not only acted as a pioneer element but by physically extending the zone of Jewish influence was to have long-lasting political consequences.

The expansion of the collective movement was greatly enhanced by 3 major external occurrences namely:-

a) the Russian revolution of March 1917
b) the Balfour Declaration of 2 November 1917 (Appendix C) and
c) the entrance of General Allenby's troops into Jerusalem in December, 1917.

The above influences generated more arrivals from Europe, many of whom revitalised the somewhat flagging interest in the collectives and co-operatives.

Third aliya (1919 - 1923)

The optimism of the Balfour Declaration and the security provided by the British Mandate encouraged 37,000 immigrants to leave for Eretz-Israel mainly from Russia and Poland. They were still pioneers, though less idealistic than their predecessors in that many had some agricultural training and the majority spoke Hebrew. This period is marked more by the growth of the co-operative rather than that of the collective. By now, the Jewish population was almost 84,000 approximately 11% of the total population of Palestine.

Fourth aliya (1924 - 31)

In the years 1924 - 26, growing anti-semitism acted as a push for

many Eastern European middle-class Jews. There were 52,000 arrivals, 35,000 in 1925 alone, half of whom came from Poland. By 1931, they numbered 82,000 with the census of that year showing a Jewish population of 174,000 about 17% of a total population of 1,033,000 (Lichfield, 1970).

The majority of settlers in this period were middle-men, small traders and entrepreneurs who wished to set up small shops and businesses. The city to them was familiar and it was there they sought sanctuary and refuge (Carmi and Rosenfeld, 1971). Most immigrants went to Tel Aviv, the population of that city rising from 2,000 in 1920 to 16,000 in 1923 and 40,000 in 1926.

Fifth aliya (1932 - 39)

The final pre-independence wave began to reach Palestine in 1932, a consequence of the rise of Fascism. By the end of 1939, 230,000 immigrants had entered Palestine chiefly from Germany, Austria, Poland and Rumania. The estimated total population was 1,530,000 in 1940 of whom 22% (475,000) were Jewish.

Many of the immigrants were middle-class and possessing money and skills. They went to the cities while the younger element still went to the rural areas.

From the establishment of the British Mandate, the Arab population had become increasingly uneasy about their political future. They deplored the massive Jewish immigration and the lack of international concern. After 1936, when the number of immigrants rose markedly, Arab frustrations changed to outright hostility with riots against both Jews and British. A Royal Commission under Lord Peel was

sent to Palestine to investigate the situation (CMND 5479, 1936). The Commission, the fourth enquiry since 1919, recommended partition into separate Arab and Jewish states under British sovereignity.

The recommendations favoured Jewish interests in that all Jewish villages were to be included in the proposed Jewish state though large numbers of Arabs would be included also. The Report was rejected outright by the Arab leadership and provoked renewed unrest and violence. The response of the Jewish population who also felt threatened was to accelerate the founding of new agricultural settlements on JNF land, especially in the Negev and eastern Galilee. (Map 2) Their establishment was planned like a military operation with great precision and organisation. The Homa Vemigdal [13] period of 1935 - 39 occurring against a background of civil unrest, nevertheless attracted 131,200 immigrants to Eretz-Israel.

The report of the Woodhead Commission (CMND 5854, 1938) drew up several strategies all of which rejected partition as unworkable. The British Government accepted the proposals and announced new policies to be elucidated in a White Paper the following year.

The MacDonald White Paper (CMND 6019, 1939) stated that Palestine was to become an independent Arab-Jewish state within 10 years. Jewish immigration was to be limited to 75,000 in the next 5 years, bringing the Jewish population to one-third of the total. Any additional immigration was to require the consent of the Arabs. Further, land purchase by Jews was restricted to a small part of Western Galilee. All the Jewish leaders and institutions of the Yishuv regarded the White Paper as a surrender to Arab nationalism and a retreat from the Balfour Declaration.

ISRAEL: Key Areas.



MAP 2

With the advent of war, Zionist leaders elected to combat the new British policy by interalia the intensification of illegal immigration and the founding of more rural settlements. From 1939 to May 1948 over 110,000 Jews managed to enter Palestine illegally. Despite British attempts to curtail land purchase, the JNF had acquired more vacant land and had stocks ready for settlement. Colonization continued[14] for political and strategic reasons thereby increasing the land area under effective Jewish control.

The British Mandate officially terminated on 14 May, 1948. Independence was immediately announced. On that date, 6% of the total land area was owned by Jews, equalling 15% of the cultivable soil. The population of the new state, after approximately a million Arabs had fled, and over 100,000 Jews had entered was 879,000 of whom 82% were Jewish.

1.4 Conclusion

The indifference of Zionist ideology to the city ignored reality. The majority of the Jewish population in Europe and Eretz-Israel had always been urban. As a consequence, when urbanization took place it was unplanned and extremely rapid due to the volume of immigration. Not only did Zionism fail to take heed of the absolute numbers going to the cities but it also failed to recognise that in relative terms the rural percentage of the total Jewish population was declining.

The gulf between ideology and reality was summed up in the statement that..."the focus of attention, finance and institutional support went to a small minority of the population while the majority were

Table 1D

Immigration by Period, Origin and settlement Propensity

	Until 1933 pioneering, selective	1933 - 1948 non-selective (distress immigration)	1948 onwards mass immigration	
			Initial direction	subsequent migration
Eastern Europe	rural settlements	moshavot	development town and moshav	city and development town
Western Europe	rural settlements	city	-	-
Moslem Countries	-	-	development town and moshav	city and development town

Source: Berler, 1970.

ignored as being marginal to Zionist aspirations". (Cohen, 1970 a)

The process of urbanization though unchecked and undirected by stated planning aims and controls was influenced by several factors. The type of settlements which existed were important as were the characteristics and origin of the settlers (Table 1D). The settlement pattern which existed at independence was thus a result of diverse pressures. It was a pattern which strongly reflected the centralised control of the Zionist institutions in rural colonization together with the unplanned spread to the towns and cities.

National planning since independence has evolved against this complex ideological, demographic and political background. Explicit goals have been formulated and pursued, goals which echo the pre-state influences. The pre-state legacy remains clear to this day.

Footnotes

1. Eretz-Israel is the term used to refer to the Jewish homeland in Palestine, i.e. the land of Israel.
2. Diaspora Jews - those who live in the "dispersion" outside Eretz-Israel.
3. Halutzim (literally pioneers) - this term is used generally to refer to the Eastern European pioneers who were vehemently anti-city.
4. The kibbutz is a collective village.
5. The moshav is a co-operative village.
6. The moshavot (singular moshava) were villages formed from a collection of privately owned holdings. All ownership in the moshavot was private and individual.
7. The Yishuv (literally settlement) - more specifically, the Jewish community of Eretz Israel in the pre-state period. The pre-Zionist community is generally designated the "old Yishuv" and the community evolving from 1880, the "new Yishuv".
8. Tel Aviv itself is another example of transformation of a housing estate into a municipality in 1921. Since the 1940's, Tel Aviv has been the largest city in Israel.
9. Aliya (plural aliyot) - literally means a rising-up or ascent. Commonly used to mean a wave of migration into Israel from the 1880's onwards.
10. The newcomers were determined not to be urban dwellers and thus established agricultural settlements many of which were failures due to their inexperience. Undoubtedly the failure of the farms was a major contributer to the exodus of migrants back to Europe or more frequently on to the U.S.A.

11. The homeland was to be within the present day borders of Kenya and not Uganda as commonly thought. (Schama, 1978).

12. The swampy areas were attractive to the Russian settlers because the dark soils were similar to those of Eastern Europe. The areas of greatest colonization at this time were near Metulla and the (former) Hula Lake. (see Map 1).

13. Homa Vemigdal - the English equivalent is stockade and watchtower. Many of these settlements were created in one night with the construction of block houses, a watchtower, defence posts and barbed wire fences for protection against attack.

14. Colonization was by kibbutz, moshav and a new cross-breed the moshav shitufi which is a combination of the moshav and the kibbutz whereby members possess individual homesteads whilst the agriculture and economy are collective.

CHAPTER 2. THE NATIONAL SITUATION AT INDEPENDENCE

From the 1880's until independence the population distribution pattern of Israel underwent radical transformation in response to ideology and immigration. In the 19th century the Jewish population had lived predominantly in the inland mountain cities. By 1948 two quite different trends were apparent:-

a) the preference for the coastal zone from Tel Aviv to Haifa and
b) a concentration of 67% of the Jewish population in the three major cities of Tel Aviv/Jaffa, Jerusalem and Haifa.[1] (Tables 2A and 2B).

The first census of the new state indicated that about 70% of the population was concentrated in the Haifa, Tel Aviv and Central Districts[2] (Map 3). Tel Aviv District alone supported almost 40% of the population and contrasted markedly with the Northern and Southern Districts which together contained only 20% of the total population.[3]

The Jewish population distribution was extremely uneven as was that of the Arabs who remained. 60% of the Arab population was settled in Northern District, the majority of whom were located in Nazerat, Akko and Haifa. Moreover, density variations were pronounced, ranging from almost 5000 per square mile in Tel Aviv District down to 7.6 per square mile in the vast and empty Southern District.

The establishment of the State demanded a complete change in planning outlook. Pre-state, individual settlements were planned and established often without reference to each other. With independence there was a need to plan comprehensively for the future

Table 2A

Population Distribution by District, 1948.

District	Number (thousands)	Percentage
Northern	147	17.9
Haifa	151	18.5
Central	109	13.3
Tel Aviv	306	37.5
Jerusalem	86	10.5
Southern	19	2.3
Total	818	100.0

Source: Strong, 1971

Table 2B

Population of Major Metropolitan Areas, 1948

City	Number (thousands)	Percentage
Greater Tel Aviv	290	41.3
Greater Haifa	100	14.3
Jerusalem	82	11.7
Total	472	67.3

Source: Strong, 1971

ISRAEL: District Boundaries.



Boundaries: Pre-1967
Source: Spiegel (1966)

MAP 3

physical development of the country as a whole. The settlement pattern suddenly began to be perceived as less than satisfactory.

2.1 Problems

The demographic trends as indicated above generated three related problems:-

a) the primacy of Tel Aviv and the absence of medium-sized towns gave rise to a polar population distribution. Polarity has developed for three main reasons. Firstly, immigrants the creators of urban growth had numerically always preferred the large cities in which employment and housing opportunities were most readily available. Secondly, the rural sector had strong organisational links to the large cities and there was no functional need for intermediate towns. Thirdly, there was no public assistance available for the creation of urban settlements.

Some writers at the time argued that the primate structure was an inevitable consequence of the small size of the country. It was believed that size plus the ease of rapid communications by road and rail removed the necessity for intermediate centres. The more influential planners, however, greatly influenced by a European background and education felt that a primate pattern, characteristic of former colonies, was suitable only for the initial stages of economic development and would be detrimental to a more developed economy and more densely populated country. Great value was placed upon the role of intermediate-sized settlements in an integrated national settlement pattern. For example, intermediate centres offer an alternative to the cities to the rural-urban migrant, and also provide a suitable location for certain types of industry

which neither needs a city setting nor can exist in a totally rural milieu.

In Israel, it was believed that medium-sized towns could act as cushions between the city and village softening the processes of modernization, urbanization and all the other forces which development entails. History also appeared to provide supporting evidence from the U.S.A. and Europe, of the value in the mixed economy of medium-sized towns, which during the depression of 1928-32 had fared relatively better in withstanding the effects of economic recession and fiscal crisis. "Theoretical insight, which anticipated the rise of the 'tertiary' or service sector in the occupational structure of modern society, had a certain influence too. In spatial terms services tend generally to hierarchical patterns, and therefore support or contribute to the crystallisation of an hierarchical network of urban centres" (Brutzkus, 1964).

b) by far the most important and pressing stimulus for a comprehensive settlement policy was the expected mass immigration of Jews from all over the globe. "In its very Declaration of Independence, Israel repealed all limitations upon Jewish immigration and later formalized in the 1950 Law of Return, the principle right of all Jews to immigrate to the country" (Matras, 1965). Moreover, the Law of Return automatically conferred citizenship on all Jewish immigrants on arrival.

Independence initiated an unprecedented wave of immigration. It was expected that the population would double or triple within a very short time [4].

There were two main types of post war immigrants (see also Table 1D). Firstly the Ashkenazi Jews who came from Central and Eastern Europe. This group was of the same origins as the majority of pre-war immigrants. They were the survivors of European persecution, refugees who had been forced to go to Israel in spite of the difficulties of gaining access in the immediate pre-independence period. Some were prepared for their new life (they knew Hebrew , had agricultural training and were aware of the history of Israel) but the majority were totally unprepared. What distinguished this group from the pre-war settlers was their lack of personal capital and resources available to them on arrival.

The second group were the Sephardi Jews who began to arrive from Asia and Africa from 1949 onwards[5]. These Oriental Jews were quite different from any of the other groups which arrived either before or after independence. The Oriental Jews had been dispersed in Arab or pro-Arab lands for at least 1500 years. They were in general pious Jews who had never been attracted to Zionism since it offered few benefits to them. They were intellectually and educationally backward in comparison with the Ashkenazi Jews and were totally unprepared for a change of home and life style. Their move to Israel was not from choice, but out of necessity, expelled by persecution - or the fear of it - initiated by the upsurge of Arab nationalism and the first war against Israel.

In the years 1948 - 52 free transport was available to all immigrants. Thus, numbers of arrivals were huge. The Jewish Agency in 1952 abolished free passage but continued to encourage settlement of individuals and groups who could pay their own way. Table 2C indicates the number who took advantage of free passage in the first three years and their origin.

Table 2C

Number and Origin of Immigrants 1948 - 50

Year	Number	Africa %	Asia %	Europe %
1948	120,000	7	4	88
1949	240,000	16	30	51
1950	170,000	65		35

Thus there were demographic contrasts between the two types of new settlers. Also, their motivation was different not so much from each other but from the pre-1948 settlers (Table 1D). "On an overall level, the basic motivating force to immigrate on the part of post-1948 immigrants was probably not so much an internal ideological one, which was characteristic of pre-1948, but an internal situational one." (Shuval, 1963).

The contrast to which Shuval alludes is that of the vatikim [6] and the olim [7]. As pioneers, the vatikim had contributed decisively in the pre-state as farmers and fighters. They were fervent Zionists and saw Zionism as the means by which the state had been secured. In juxtaposition to the vatikim were the olim who neither shared the attachment to the land, nor the fervour and spirit of the pioneers. The olim had sought out Israel because it was an available homeland for Jews and a haven from anti-semitic sentiments (Spiegel, 1966).

At the basic level of physical needs, the immigrants required homes and jobs. More importantly the number and apparent differences between the immigrants put an end to the continuation of gradual incorporation and absorption of newcomers. It was hoped that some new migrants would enter the agricultural sector but fully realised that most would wish to live in towns. Further, land and water resources were restricted and it was

recognised that agricultural colonization could neither cope with large numbers of people at once nor continue at any significant scale. On the other hand, mass immigration without control could have generated squatter settlements or shanty towns, hindering the narrowing of the economic and social gap between vatikim and olim.

A new policy was essential - one which provided a means of integration and absorption of immigrants. According to Shachar (1971)... "Restructuring the spatial organisation of Israeli society became an absolute necessity."

c) the third major problem facing the Israeli Government in 1948 was the thorny question of security, both internal and external. The concentration of a large population into a small high density core was perceived as strategically risky. The existence of empty, virtually uninhabited areas, especially in proximity to borders made national security vulnerable. Physical expression of Israeli sovereignity necessitated the establishment of some form of civilian settlement in the same way as the 'Watchtower and Stockade' settlements of the late 1930's had acted as physical proof of ownership.

The main issue with regard to internal security was the existence of concentrations of Arabs in specific areas. In view of the outright threats and hostility towards Israel throughout its turbulent history, there was a call to minimise the potential conflicts by conscious and rational planning. In effect, for areas with significant Arab populations such as Galilee and the Negev, this meant altering the population structure in favour of the Jews.

The manipulation of population flows offered the answer to the need for national security and defence. As long as the empty areas were filled up, the borders secured, and the non-Jewish population kept within limits, then additional security could be left to the military.

A policy of population dispersal provided a readily acceptable means of mitigating the problems of unbalanced urban development, immigrant absorption and national security considerations.

2.2 Aims and Motives

The most urgent need was for housing and employment for immigrants. Apart from absorption there were other equally important aims which related to dispersal of population including:-

a) settling sparsely populated regions in order to overcome regional imbalance of development.
b) occupying frontier regions for purposes of defence as well as to establish national presence and sovereignity.
c) opening "resource frontiers", mainly natural resources in the desert areas.
d) changing the primacy structure of the urban system by limiting the growth of urban concentration in the central coastal plain and establishing the missing level of medium to small towns and
e) building integrated regional systems by planting urban service centres in each rural region, thus creating a complete hierarchical urban system. (Mandelbaum & Brachya, 1971, and Shachar 1971).

Policymakers and planners in formulating the national goals to be

achieved by a settlement policy, put far greater emphasis upon social values than upon economic efficiency. The achievement and maintenance of a high rate of economic growth was not a significant motive and was not pursued with the vigour seen in many other developing countries.

The policy to limit the growth of Tel Aviv was a response to objections concerning the primacy structure which themselves stemmed from three streams of thinking. Firstly, the dominant anti-city theme of Zionism remained extremely influential. Secondly, economic arguments stressed the diseconomies in production and distribution and rising costs of public service provision. Thirdly, the prevailing attitude of British planning in the 1930's and 1940's was anti-city in emotional and ideological terms. British planning had a profound influence on Israeli planning in many ways, the discontent with large cities being only one manifestation of the adoption of European concepts and theories into the evolving Israeli planning strategy.

Geo-political considerations were decisive in establishing the goal of populating frontier areas and avoiding regional inequalities in development (Strong, 1971). The existence of unsettled areas was regarded as unsatisfactory at national and regional scale. Further, Zionists argued that colonization of the land provided a method of preserving close links with it (Rosenbaum and Altman, 1973). The goal of opening up "resource frontiers" was based upon expectations of rich mineral resources which were notably lacking elsewhere in Israel. The aim of building integrated regional systems derived from the "regionalistic" concept of areas of district identity and character, almost self-contained in terms of services and with

and with strong relationships between urban and rural settlements (Shachar, 1971). Again, this goal, European in origin, was adopted in the belief that a more efficient system of service distribution could be achieved through a rank-size hierarchical structure as seen in the countries of Central Europe.

The implicit motive of a far-reaching structural change in the pattern of settlement was not, however, entirely new. The necessity for a national plan of this type had been expressed as early as 1938 by a group of planners who stressed the importance of regions in the development of Eretz-Israel (Brutzkus, 1964). In the opinion of the planners, an urban settlement hierarchy "appeared to be more mature and more adequate for a country which was to become a densely populated and intensely developed one" (Brutzkus,1964).

Another important motive for the adoption of a population dispersal policy was the growing conflict between urban expansion and agricultural production particularly along the coast. By restricting urban growth and by transferring urban development to areas unsuitable for agriculture, encroachment onto valuable agricultural soil could be virtually curtailed, the exception being the non-publicly owned land (Mandelbaum and Brachya, 1971).

2.3 The Population Dispersal Policy

Spatial redistribution policy was implemented by a series of seven national plans in the period 1948 to 1967. After 30 years, redistribution is still regarded as one of the major objectives of Israeli national planning. However, it is worthwhile to note that until 1967, the plans lacked formal and legal status. Their

weakness was discussed by Brutzkus (1964)... "these schemes were not forecasts with best chances for fulfilment, but rather 'working hypotheses', proposing the most desirable spatial distribution of population with still a reasonable chance of becoming reality."

The functions of the national physical plans in relation to population distribution were and remain threefold (Hill, 1974):-

a) they serve as a framework for the population targets for local plans
b) they are used by various government ministries and agencies as a guide to the future location and size of various institutions and services and
c) they are used by appropriate government institutions as a framework for the allocation of industrial development, the construction of public housing and the assignment of targets for immigrant absorption.

The first plans were based on the principle that the existing urban structure had to be modified by the insertion of intermediate grades of settlement. The major theoretical backing of the plans was the central place theories developed by Cristaller and Losch. (Appendix D). Accordingly, the plans identified the location and population size of each centre to a target date, usually 10 to 15 years ahead. The notion of a hierarchy of centres was intended only as a scheme of guidance and in time underwent changes and adjustments in theory and implementation (Mandelbaun and Brachya, 1971).

The imposition of intermediate grades of settlement relied upon two major programmes: rural settlements and development towns.

Dispersal of population and immigrant absorption was partly achieved by creating numerous rural settlements in the few remaining parts of the country suitable for agricultural development [8]. Spatially (more than numerically) the rural settlements contributed in a major way to the dispersion of population throughout southern Israel and especially the Negev.

The programme for the new and expanded towns was the major impetus in the process of induced urbanization and the creation of intermediate sized settlements.

The programmes, locations, detailed planning and implementation of plans were controlled by a multiplicity of government ministries and agencies. Their dependency upon central authorities for all aspects of urban development, including housing, employment and public services, was total. At the time, policy-makers believed that the only way to achieve the desired end of population dispersal was by exercising complete centralized control over decision-making. [9]

2.4 Why New Towns?

The reasons for choosing a new towns policy rather than any alternative include -

a) the magnitude and pressing nature of Israel's needs demanded immediate solution. There was no time available to embark upon time-consuming academic research despite the desirability of doing so.

b) the problems faced were unique as was the new town solution at such a scale. The adoption of a new towns policy appeared as feasible as any other tentative unproven theory available at the time.

c) Israel had only limited funds available. Massive capital was not available for short-term high-cost solutions whereas restricted funds were available over the long term. The situation favoured town extensions and small new towns. [10]

d) the risk of just leaving people to settle freely in areas of their own choice was too great, especially in terms of national security. [11]

e) new towns policies were being considered or accepted in Europe and the U.S.A. as a mechanism for reducing overcentralization and congestion. There was no reason to doubt the suitability of such a popular and prestigious programme in Israel.

Theoretically, there were two alternatives available to the founding of new towns. Existing rural settlements could have been developed into urban centres or small and medium-sized towns could have been expanded. However, for idealistic and practical reasons the majority of rural settlements were unsuitable for urban growth since their collective and co-operative organizational form could not allow for great extension of membership. Furthermore, the existing pattern of settlements did not comply with the desired regional distribution and the second alternative though partially implemented, would not fulfil all the aims of the policy makers.

The new towns programme was thus adopted as a matter of expediency. It was essentially an impulsive response to potential crises[12]. The rationale behind the decision was summed up by Sarly (1974)... "The concept of new towns appeared to offer an immediate prospect or organising the resources to meet...needs. Also the new towns idea, seemed, 1948, to meet the political requirements of nation building and, as a guiding concept, the new towns enjoyed widespread support both within and outside of Israel".

2.5 Conclusion

The problems of Israel at independence were unique. The urban structure was perceived as inadequate, there was a massive influx of immigrants and a need to demonstrate complete Jewish sovereignity over the whole national area.

A policy of population dispersal was selected as a means of counteracting the prevailing trends and achieving other stated aims. Physical, demographic and ideological influences thus acted together to create the need for national policy.

This first stage of Israeli planning is characterized by two major inputs - that of Zionism combined with the growing acceptance of European notions of planning. The considerable overlap of these themes in terms of the anti-city bias, supported the broad spatial aim of population dispersal. The mechanisms to achieve this end were in reality a compromise between Zionist ideology and European planning theory. Rural settlement remained the Zionist ideal while new towns were the fashionable solution to the multiple ills of the Western city. By accepting the partial validity of both solutions, Israeli policy-makers initiated a programme which was not wholly satisfactory in theoretical terms to either ardent Zionists or to the European planning school, and which resulted in the omission of means towards positive planning of the urban settlements (other than the new towns). As time was to show the theoretical dissatisfaction was to be translated to actual implementation.

Footnotes

1. Tel Aviv alone accounted for 41.3% of the Jewish population. Further, Tel Aviv's share of industrial production, commercial enterprises and cultural activities was even higher than its relative population (Shachar, 1971)
2. These three districts represented only 11.1% total land area.
3. Southern District, 70% of the land area of Israel, contained only 1% of the Jewish population though 2.3% of the total population (Spiegel, 1966).
4. Actually it took only 3 years for the population to double by immigration.
5. The first mass movement of Sephardim was that of the Yemeni Jews totalling 40,000 people. The group arrived together airlifted via Aden by the Israeli air force. Larger was the flow of Iraqis in 1950-51 totalling over 100,000. Other transports came from the ancient Jewish Communities in India (Calcutta, Goa) China (Shanghai) and Afghanistan.
6. Vatikim are the veterans of pre-1948, the pioneers.
7. Olim are the greenhorns, the post-1948 settlers.
8. From 1948 to 1968, almost 450 rural settlements were created, 62% of which were moshavim. By the end of 1968, the new rural settlements accounted for 8.6% of the total population increase of the preceeding 20 years. They impact of the moshav in absorbing immigrants was most important numerically in the first ten years of statehood. Thereafter, land and water resources became scarce thereby limiting further rural colonization.
9. Notably, though control was concentrated at national level,

it was divided sectorally. This type of planning in Israel has been termed "facet" planning by Akzin and Dror (1966).

10. Peripheral development was not considered since it was believed that it would promote increased polarity in the urban structure.
11. Note that 1948-49 was a year of war.
12. In the Israeli context, Akzin and Dror (1966) refer to this as"high-pressure planning".

CHAPTER 3. THE NEW TOWNS - THE FRAMEWORK

3.1 Definition

The criteria used to define the number and nature of Israeli new towns vary considerably between authors and over time. No single consistent definition has ever been stated by the various ministries or development agencies involved in the planning and implementation of the schemes. The variability of the definition is reflected in the data available in subsequent chapters (Map 4 and Appendix D)

Cohen (1970 a & b) stresses the following characteristics of new towns.

a) location in underdeveloped areas
b) more or less comprehensive planning
c) a predominantly immigrant population and
d) relatively small size.

In contrast, Lichfield's stage 1 study of 1970 uses slightly different criteria to define 28 new towns. These criteria include

a) establishment post-1948
b) significant change in physical size since 1948
c) significant movement of directed immigrants and
d) planned size of the town defined as "urban" by the Central Bureau of Statistics.

However, Lichfield in 1977 uses still different criteria which though unstated lead him to name 31 new towns.

During the past 32 years about 30 new towns have been planned and built throughout Israel (Table 3A). The variations in number can be seen in Table 3B. The most common definition is "a spatially self-contained urban place which has grown, usually

NEW TOWNS: Definition And Location.

/ No Core In 1948.

● Consistently Agreed Definition As New Town.

○ Disagreement Over Definition As New Town.



Boundaries: Pre-1967

Source: Spiegel (1966) And Others

MAP 4

Table 3A

New Towns, by Year of First Jewish Settlement and District

Year	North	Centre	South
pre-1948	Tiberias		
	Zefat		
	Afula		
	Nahariya		
1948	Bet She'an	Lod	Beersheba
	Akko	Ramla	Ashkelon
1949		Yavne	
1950	K. Shmona	B.Shemesh	
	Shlomi		
1951		Or Aqiva	K. Malachi
			Yeruham
			Sederot
			Eilat
1952	M. Ha'Emek		
1953	Hatzor		
1954			M. Ramon
			K. Gat
1955			Ofakim
			Dimona
			Ashdod
1956			Netivot
1957	Naz.Illit		
	Ma'alot		
1962			Arad
1964	Karmiel		
Total	13	5	13

Table 3B The New Towns, According to Selected Sources

	Berler (1970)	Sarly (1974)	Spiegel (1966)	Lichfield (1970)	Lichfield (1977)	Min. of Social Welfare (1977)
Kiryat Shmona	X	X	X	X	X	X
Hatzor	X	X	X	X	X	X
Zefat	X	X	X	X	X	X
Tiberias	X	X	X	X	X	X
Bet She'an	X	X	X	X	X	X
Afula	X	X	X	X	X	X
Nazerat Illit	X	X	X	X	X	X
Midgal Ha'Emek	X	X	X	X	X	X
Ma'alot	X	X	X	X	X	X
Nahariya	X	-	-	-	X	-
Akko	X	X	X	X	X	X
Or Aqiva	X	X	X	-	X	-
Ashdod	X	X	X	X	X	-
Ashkelon	X	X	X	X	X	-
Kiryat Malachi	X	X	X	X	X	X
Bet Shemesh	X	X	X	X	X	X
Kiryat Gat	X	X	X	X	X	X
Sederot	X	X	X	X	X	X
Netivot	X	X	X	X	X	X
Ofakim	X	X	X	X	X	X
Beersheba	X	X	X	X	X	-
Yeruham	X	X	X	X	X	X
Dimona	X	X	X	X	X	X
Mitzpe Ramon	X	X	X	X	X	-
Eilat	X	X	X	X	X	X
Shlomi	-	X	X	-	-	-
Lod	-	X	X	X	X	-
Ramla	-	X	X	X	X	-
Yavne Yavne	-	X	X	X	X	X
Karmiel	-	-	X	X	X	X
Arad	-	-	X	X	X	X

rapidly, since 1948, largely as a result of directed immigration and government planning" (Sarly, 1974).

This study uses the term "new town" and "development town" interchangeably. The term "new town" was initially avoided by Israeli writers because it appeared to imply that only new creations were includee. "Development town" was preferred as a description in that it linked the towns with the "development areas". However, planned communities sprang up elsewhere and to complicate things further, the "development areas" or "development towns" were never clearly defined.[1]

The lack of consensus over the definition of the new towns is symptomatic of the lack of agreement over the intended function and role of these towns. This is in stark contrast with the well-defined function and role of the agricultural settlement as conceptualized in Zionist ideology.

3.2 The Application of Central Place Theory in Israel

In order to create a hierarchical pattern of urban and semi-urban settlements and to promote regional ties, the country was divided into 24 regions. Each region was envisaged as a basic planning unit. The delineation of regional boundaries involved consideration of geographic features (such as topography, catchment areas and type of agriculture) and historic factors such as administrative boundaries. The most important considerations were the existing boundaries of the municipalities and the zone of influence of existing urban and rural centres. To each region there was one town assigned as a medium-size regional centre, sometimes with subsidiary small urban centres.

It was hoped that the urban centre in each region would form the focus of trade, industrial, administrative, social and educational life. It was also hoped that each region, conceived as a geographic unit with an economic base would develop as a complete and well-balanced social and economic entity, deriving benefits from the inter-relationship between the urban centre and the rural hinterland.

The intention was to structure the settlement system into a hierarchical ordering of size and function of settlement (Diagram 1). To regions that did not have a central place a new settlement was allocated.

The use of the following model was envisaged as a means of completing the hierarchical structure by providing 3 intermediate levels between the rural settlements and the existing large cities:-

A-centre:	village unit (moshav or kibbutz)	500 inhabitants
B-centre:	rural service centre	2000 "
C-centre:	rural-urban centre/small town	6000-12000 "
D-centre:	medium-sized town	15000-60000 "
E-centre:	large city (as existing)	1000000 or more "

(Brutzkus 1964)

In accordance with the importance of regional functions and services, each type of centre had a specific role to play.

The rural centres (B) were to serve as economic social and cultural centres for 4 to 8 villages or moshavim (the A centres which were the basic agricultural cell). Each village or moshav would have a population of up to several hundred. These service

A SCHEMATIC MODEL OF TOWNS AND RURAL SETTLEMENTS IN THE LACHISH REGION



C - CENTRE

B - CENTRE

A - CENTRE

Source: Amir (1967)

DIAGRAM 1.

centres would be the focus of the Regional Council Units which would have a population approximately double that of the rural centre itself (Amir, 1967). Apart from schools, clinics, child welfare units and cultural institutions, they were also to provide larger shops, small workshops, repair and service stations for agricultural machinery, refrigerator and storage plants. Even at this level, the kibbutzim had to be excluded from the scheme because of their collective and supra regional organizational ties; goods and services which could not be provided by a kibbutz, were obtained from other sources (Spiegel, 1966). Thus, the kibbutzim had no links with B-centres.

The rural-urban centres (C) were designed to serve approximately 30 villages with a total of about 15000 inhabitants in a district of 7-12 miles in diameter. Apart from some administrative functions, they would have secondary and vocational schools, more advanced crafts and service industry, and other industries based on regional produce or mineral wealth. Further, these rather than the rural centres were to house the agricultural workers needed in the surrounding settlements who could not be located in the rural settlements because of their numerical and organisational limitations. The small towns were thus designed as a place for the concentration of manpower, services and industry. The C-centre was also centre of a sub-planning unit comprising several of the rural units each centred upon B-centres (Amir, 1967).

The medium-sized towns (the D-centres) were meant to act as main centres and focal points for regional integration. The planning units which they served were the 24 regions mentioned earlier.

They were to contain government offices, banks, hospitals and higher order economic, social and cultural institutions. It was also emphasised that they would incorporate economic activities which were not tied to specific locations (i.e. not dependent on any particular region). These industries it was believed, would only overload the cities if permitted to remain or locate there. In the new centres, it was argued they would find conditions more condusive to growth - more space, cheaper labour and better services (Lichfield, 1970).

The missing levels in the hierarchy were the types B C and D. Stress in practice was placed upon types C and D because of their potential to absorb large numbers of immigrants. The more traditional and logical sequence would have involved the foundation of smaller centres of low rank at first with the founding of higher order centres at a later date. This option was, however, not available and as a consequence the higher ranks were commenced as a matter of urgency. Of the two (C & D) the D-centre, the medium-sized service town for the newly delineated regions, was regarded as more important in providing the basic pattern upon which other considerations were based (Cohen, 1970a). The vast majority of the new towns were categorized as D-centres, and were founded to fill the role assigned to such settlements.

3.3 Location Factors

The primary determinant of the location of the new towns was their function as a means of dispersing population and providing regional centres. Final size was a relatively subordinate consideration. It was only in a few cases that other functions were

substituted. For instance, the location of two new major port installations, at Ashdod and Eilat, was determined by the functional need for export centres for goods from the Negev. In this way, Ashdod and Eilat were a means of opening up the neglected areas of the south. Eilat, additionally, had geographical significance at the head of the Gulf of Eilat.* It was strategically important for the Israelis to hold the small coastal strip with the future Eilat which lay (until 1967) between Jordan and Egyptian Sinai.

Distance was not a major problem, save in the Negev. The country is small and though irregular in shape, distance did not operate as a restriction. Roads were well-developed especially between the major centres. The process of agricultural colonization had encouraged the efficient construction of good roads to most areas with minor approach roads leading to each kibbutz, moshav, or village. The need was thus to complete the road network and to supplement it with additional connecting and approach roads where necessary. The railway system was, however, fragmented. Boundary changes had disrupted the lines and few intact connections existed completely within the state. However, the Jewish population had never relied heavily upon the transport of goods or passengers by rail, always preferring to use the road network which was more extensive and equally fast. Since there was no perceived need to expand the rail system and the cost would have been prohibitive, the system went largely unchanged. The only sections which remained were the connections from Tel Aviv to Haifa, Beersheba and Jerusalem. The existence of the railway had little or no impact upon the location of new settlements.

* also known as the Gulf of Aqaba.

More than most other things, water supply was of crucial significance in the overall settlement programme. Availability of water acted as a limiting factor to agricultural production and the capacity of the country as a whole for absorbing immigrants. A national distribution system which collected and redistributed all available supplies was essential at an early stage. An efficient and effective national supply system was planned to allow areas with unsufficient local resources to be connected by branch line.

The power network, like the water system, was in need of reorganization. The existing systems were fragmented and based on local needs. Expected mass immigration would create a greater demand and better use of energy sources. Israel lacks coal and water power [2], the only energy sources used are imported oil and natural gas (the latter has been commercially developed in the last 25 years). The few large power stations which were needed were planned to be near the large agglomerations and at the coastal oil-importing centres. Additional power lines to the interior would expand the available network and allow the opening up of areas hitherto neglected.

In the Negev, the situation was slightly different. Roads, distances, water and power supply were all defficient. However, the objectives of exploitation of minerals, establishment of communications centres and national security were so important that the provision of utilities was guaranteed. The location of the Negev towns was not in any way dependent on existing networks; rather, the location of towns and settlements was to dictate future networks.

Most decisions for locating new towns, therefore, were based upon 'natural' factors such as topography, climate and landscape quality. In the hilly areas of Galilee and Judea, flatter slopes were chosen for climate and scenic reasons in preference to the valleys. Seven of the eight completely new towns of the north and centre were located for such reasons. Further, the large scale extensions at Tiberias, Afula and Bet She'an took place at considerable distance from the original settlement in order to take advantage of higher ground.

The choice of using slopes and high ground complied with the limitation of preserving productive agricultural land. Israel is not well endowed with good quality land in relation to area or population. The preservation of land is considered a major national concern and in 1953 a "Committee for the Preservation of Agricultural Land" was established and vested with considerable powers. The Committee's role was to check uncontrolled expansion of towns in the coastal area into the citrus belt and simultaneously to set-up and enforce rules for the location of new towns and the extension of old towns. In practical terms, this has meant the avoidance of fertile valleys and plains. Instead, the hilly areas and dune-belt of the coast have been used for urban development.

In summary, the three major factors affecting the size and location of development towns were:-

a) the spatial organization of the urban system and regional integration as expressed by central place theory.
b) the spatial distribution of resources

c) the distribution of a few small urban settlements existing before 1948 and the ma'aborot [3], which were used as nuclei for the development towns. (Shachar, 1971)

3.4 Land Ownership

A limitation which commonly restricts planning in other countries is almost non-existent in Israel; that is, the problem of finding continuous stretches of building land in sufficient quantity. One of the most outstanding characteristics of Israel is that about 92% of the land is in public ownership owned by the state and the Jewish National Fund [4] (Spiegel, 1966).

Of the 8% of holdings in private ownership, the majority in rural areas belongs to Arabs and Druze. Jewish private land ownership is mostly concentrated in the three large cities of Tel Aviv, Haifa and Jerusalem and their surrounding areas, as well as in the old-established settlements of the coastal plain which have in time become towns or cities. Individual ownership of extensive areas is practically non-existent (Mandelbaum and Brachya, 1971). The largest areas in industrial ownership rarely exceed a few score hectares, and even such cases are the exception rather than the rule.

A legal framework for land ownership came into being when the Knesset passed the Israel Lands Law and the Israel Lands Administration Law in 1960. An agreement between the Government and the JNF established the Israel Lands Authority with the sole purpose of managing all public land. The key statement in the land laws stipulates the inalienability of all holdings belonging

to public bodies represented by the Authority. Moreover, the term "holding" refers both to the land and all buildings and property on it. The Land Authority thus cannot sell land and grants only leases, usually for 49 years, with an option for renewal. The Authority's national land policy is defined in the dual aims of increasing the absorptive capacity of territory for additional population and the prevention of the concentration of large estates in the hands of individuals (Mandelbaum and Brachya, 1971).

The development areas and new towns have been relatively unaffected by the inflationary prices and land speculation of privately owned parcels of land. Where, as in some towns with old cores, parcels were in private ownership and not available on the market, it was possible to resort to peripheral areas which were more attractive than the old cores in qualitative and quantitative terms. This process occurred at Akko and Zefat, the new developments taking place at some distance from the formerly Arab core.

For the majority of the new towns land was freely available, constrained only by considerations regarding agricultural value. Once the site was chosen, Ministerial decision declared it a Town Planning Area, a future town.

3.5 The Legal and Institutional Background

The process of planning, creation and development of Israeli new towns shows several features which clearly differentiate it from the process of new town development in other countries.

There is no single portion of Israeli law which covers the

establishment and development of new communities. The general legislation was the Town Planning Ordinance of 1936, a product of the British Mandatory Government, which was modelled with modifications upon the Town and Country Planning Act of 1932.

In July 1965, a new Planning and Building Law was passed which little changed the 1936 legislation (Lichfield and Shachar, 1974). The 1965 Law introduced a comprehensive planning system in that there was provision for Local, District and National Planning Commissions, over and above preparation of plans for various aspects of national activity (e.g. National parks and coastline plans). At the regional level there are 6 District Commissions amongst whom the country is sub-divided.

Towns and cities are planned by elected councils which operate individually or combine as Local Planning Commissions. Rural areas are planned by Regional Councils. Thus, the entire country is covered by local councils responsible for preparing plans. The 1965 Law made it mandatory to prepare plans but progress even by 1974 was slow according to Lichfield.

The essential nature of planning remains negative and little different from the British 1932 Act in that land is zones for particular uses. The zoning looks forward into the indefinite future and with approval provides legal rights to the landowner. However, the scheme does not itself give a right to build. This requires a Town Planning Scheme which sets out zoning and street details. In turn, a building licence is necessary before building may commence.

The omissions in provision with regard to the new towns include:-

a) the lack of a central planning authority to which local and district planning commissions are responsible,

b) no provision for centralised co-ordination of the various commissions, ministries or public agencies involved in the new towns,

c) no single ministry or agency has overall jurisdiction in the planning, establishment and development of the new towns. Further, there has been considerable internal disagreement on the apportioning of jurisdiction amongst the ministries and agencies (Aronoff, 1973).

Lack of centralized planning authority, special legislation for new towns and clear lines of authority for responsibility, have all contributed to a situation in which any one of a large number of ministries could and did initiate the development of individual new towns. Various diverse goals in planning and development required that co-operation of several ministries had to be engendered and as a consequence several interministerial committees and ad hoc authorities were created. None of these bodies have legal powers to act alone. The ad hoc committees etc. could at best act only as a mechanism for co-ordination between ministries and agencies. They have no clear power of enforcement since jurisdictional lines are blurred. Disagreements between ministries, more common in the past than now, could not be solved by these committees which were unable to make any decisions. (Aronoff, 1974).

The National Planning Office was transferred from the Prime Minister's Office to the Ministry of the Interior in 1953, in the process becoming the Planning Department. The major plans of this department have been the very influential national population distribution plans. All other official national plans have, according to Aronoff (1974), sunk into relative obscurity. The Ministry of Construction and Housing, responsible for almost all housing construction in the new towns, has a gentleman's agreement to co-ordinate its activities with those of the Ministry of the Interior. But, it has the power, staff and resources to pursue its own objectives, designs and plans thereby ignoring the Ministry of the Interior and the District and Local Planning Commissions. The Ministry of Housing has built largely to its own rules and regulations with a resultant standardization of principles of planning and design (Spiegel, 1966).

The Ministry of Labour from which the Ministry of Housing developed still has an active interest in new town growth. It is responsible for public works and employment in the new towns. In the new town of Arad, the Ministry of Labour was the primary authority. The Ministry of Development is responsible for the mineral resources of the Negev and consequently considers the new towns of that area as falling within its sphere of influence.

The Ministry of Commerce and Industry is important in new town development as it is the major institution for the provision of industry. A major task has been the inducement of suitable industry. The Ministry of Commerce and Industry determines the type of incentives offered to industry to locate in the towns. This Ministry, therefore, had great powers in deciding the industrial base of most new settlements.

Another influential ministry for the new towns is the Finance Ministry. Budgets are derived from the national development budget which is determined by the Ministry of Finance. Thus, this Ministry has considerable powers in deciding the future development of all new towns.

Still other Ministries have traditionally been involved in the programme. The Settlement Department of the Jewish Agency was responsible for agricultural settlement. In collaboration with the Ministry of Agriculture, the Settlement Department played a regional planning role in the establishment and development of the Lachish Region with its urban centre, Kiryat Gat. It is interesting to note that Kiryat Gat, dating from 1955, was the first urban settlement aided by Jewish Agency resources since the establishment of Tel Aviv in 1909. Thus basically agricultural authorities planned an urban centre. The reason lies in the predominantly agricultural role of Lachish Region.

The Absorption Department of the Jewish Agency was initially responsible for the allocation of new settlers to the new towns. This function has now largely been taken over by the Ministry of Immigrant Absorption. The Absorption Department and the Ministry provided the majority of residents for all of the new towns with the exception of Arad which was populated in a different way (see Chapter 4).

The Ministry of Defence was a prime authority in the establishment and development of three new towns namely Akko, Nazaret Illit and Mitzpe Ramon [5].

The Land Authority, responsible for all public land, and the Water Authority, which allocates vital water resources, were and are involved at various stages in the new towns programme.

Spiegel (1966, p.95) said of this complex mixture of bodies and powers...."The picture is rich and colourful, not always without contrast and contradictions, but distinguished by flexibility and improvisation, allowing legal and institutional handicaps to be overcome, and missing legal and institutional supports to be substituted."

Footnotes

1. As Berler (1970) pointed out, the development town criteria are circular. Government policy is to give additional aid to settlements defined as development settlements. A development settlement is defined as one which receives additional aid from the Government.
2. There is a small coal-fired power station at Hadera based on local brown coal. Some peat has been found in the north in the Hula area, and a project is currently investigating the viability of a peat-burning plant. Two projects are under investigation for HEP: firstly one involving the diversion of the River Jordan and secondly a scheme to pipe water from the Mediterranean across the mountains and to the Dead Sea.
3. Ma'abarot were temporary transit camps which developed in the period of mass migration, many of which became permanent.
4. The State's lands derive from two sources; firstly, the land of Pica (the Palestine Jewish Colonization Association) which was largely bought before the end of the last century with funds made available by the Rothschilds' and secondly, relinquished Arab lands under trusteeship. The literature is unclear as to whether JNF land is actually publicly owned. In practice, it certainly operates as such.
5. The literature states no expressed reason for the development of these particular towns. However, I would venture to suggest that Akko and Nazaret Illit became development towns because of their existing large Arab population. By directing migration to these towns, the settlement would become more "Jewish" and

the security risk reduced. Mitzpe Ramon appears to have been a centre of directed migration for other reasons. Situated in the Negev, between Eilat and Yeruham; Mitzpe Ramon is near a line of military installations which protect the pre-1967 frontier from the Mediterranean to the Gulf of Eilat. Permanent army personnel are often provided with housing in Mitzpe Ramon and it would appear logical to assume that the town functions primarily as a military establishment though figures and data are unavailable to support or refute this assumption.

CHAPTER 4. THE NEW TOWNS - IDEOLOGY AND FORM

4.1 Ideological Approaches to New Town Development

Throughout implementation, the new town programme was influenced by Zionist ideology.

The C-centres of the model commanded more ideological importance than other centres for two reasons according to Cohen (1970a) (see also 3.2). Firstly, the lack of experience in town planning coupled with the adoption of European planning theories stressed the value of new towns as a means of bridging the gap between urban and rural settlement types. Secondly, it was assumed that Zionism would support the concept of a series of urban centres which also had a semi-rural function. Cohen also noted that "the hybrid conception of these centres was reflected in their physical manifestation". He was in particular referring to the low density village-like appearance of these centres. (This topic is discussed more fully later).

The function and form of the C-centres was not without its critics. The faction of planners who advocated more urban forms argued that the artificially created rural-urban centre could never maintain a high enough level of services to be attractive to the rural hinterland. They held nothing but contempt for a type of settlement for which there was neither precedent nor apparent justification in Israel. Further, they believed that the C-centre was unsuitable for the size of Israel, for the type of agricultural practices and would generate increased polarisation[1] (Cohen, 1970a).

More problems arose mainly from the failure to integrate the regional and sub-regional service centres (D and C respectively) into the region

itself. They were placed in a mechanical manner amidst well-established kibbutzim and moshavim which were in theory and practice hostile towards the introduction of urban centres, and which had no practical use for the low quality services that these towns could offer. The town though situated in the region was not part of it. The Government, anxious to provide some form of employment for new immigrants urged the moshavim and kibbutzim to employ additional hired labour from the towns. But the collective and co-operative federations have always been ideologically opposed to the use of hired labour and largely ignored the plea.[2]

Thus, the main aim of the initial physical plan (the establishment of a series of new urban settlements at predetermined locations) was achieved but the integration of these settlements into a functional hierarchy has been only partially realized.

In the mid-1950's a change in agricultural policy and planning took place which was to have repercussions on urban development. Agricultural colonization was changing in emphasis from intensive agricultural methods to extensive farming. A coincidental and possibly more influential change was the trend towards regional planning for agriculture. Previously the approach to colonization was restricted to the planning of individual self-contained settlements.

The new trends were a response to economic and political change which had evolved since independence. The agricultural market had become saturated with vegetable, dairy and poultry products and there was a lack of field crops which require large plots to be profitable. At the same time, the Land Administration was keen to open up the newly unified (in ownership terms) agricultural area of the Negev and Arava. Large scale development of field crops were suited to the new areas and thus attention focussed upon the pioneer

efforts in the Negev.

The new approach generated a change in the structure of the individual settlement. It was recognised that for the successful development of agricultural settlements a regional centre was a necessity for the provision of specialised industrial technical and social services for the entire region. Regional centres in this context developed not in response to an administrative decision based upon the mechanistic application of a model but to an expressed need. In other words, the regional centre was generated not from above but from below. The town is thus dependent upon and subservient to agriculture. Rather than this feature being negative, it is positive in that the town gains prestige and status and becomes legitimate in the same way as agricultural settlements had been perceived in the past. Consequently, this new conceptualisation of the town has contributed to the closure of the gap between the acceptability of town and countryside in Zionist ideology with regional agricultural colonization acquiring symbolic value for the whole nation (Rodwin, 1970).

The first attempt to make practical the new conception of region and regional town was begun in 1954 in the Lachish region of the northern Negev. The agricultural settlements were established at the same time as the regional centre of Kiryat Gat.[3] Notably, the creation of the settlements both urban and rural was carried out not by a Government ministry but by the Settlement Department of the Jewish Agency which is normally engaged in purely agricultural development. Diagram 1 illustrates the continuance of a hierarchical structure in the planning of this region.

However, as yet, only Lachish region has been comprehensively developed.[4] The scarcity of arable land and more crucially irrigation water have

constrained the prospects for future development of large scale agricultural projects.[5]

In order to push colonizing effort into areas incapable of agriculture, new means of regional development had to be utilized. The major emphasis gradually shifted towards the exploitation of mineral and other natural resources in largely uninhabited areas. In the early stages, only temporary camps were established for miners etc. With more intensive exploitation of natural resources, there was a need to create new urban centres providing homes and services for families in addition to sites for associated industrial development. Mitzpe Ramon and Dimona were established for this purpose amongst others.[6]

The final stage of this process was the comprehensive planning of the new mining region of Arad in the eastern Negev. The town of Arad[7] is the focus of a mining and industrial region devoid of other settlements either agricultural or urban. In this way it performs a different role from other regional towns in that it is not part of a herarchical structure at regional level. Function was largely determined by the economic basis[8] and has fostered a change in ideological standing for an urban centre. From the outset the town was perceived as different from other towns "since it was viewed within the frame of reference of the pre-State voluntary pioneer. Before the town was settled this positive image was projected through national publicity" (Aronoff, 1974).

Arad was the focus of pioneering spirit and thereby attained full status in official ideology. The town was an end in itself and not merely an auxiliary of agricultural development (Cohen, 1970b). Arad was thus the first and so far only town to attain equal legitimacy in pioneering effort as the moshav and kibbutz did in the past.

4.2 Urban Form in the New Towns

The planning ideas upon which the layout for the development towns were based had their origins in the Garden City movement founded in Britain in the late 19th century. The acceptance of Garden City ideals as a valid contribution to town planning in Israel was aided by the superficial similarity to the ideals of Zionism. Additionally, the legacy of the British Mandate encouraged acceptance. Both the Garden City movement and Zionism valued open space and placed great importance upon the land. However, a basic difference between the two lay in the use to which the land was put - the Garden City movement in practice used land to create the image of a rural setting while Zionism sought to use land for agricultural production.

At independence, priority was to provide housing for all new settlers. The poor economy and little guarantee of permanent employment together encouraged the provision of smallholdings in the new towns. The new town immigrant was provided with a smallholding immediately adjacent to his house which he could use for growing crops, raising chickens etc. The element of self-sufficiency can be traced to Zionist ideology, European theory and the prevailing economic climate. The potential of land for providing a partial living for the town-dweller was advocated whole-heartedly at this time.

The building techniques of the early period further aided this type of layout as the single or two-storey dwellings characteristic of the smallholdings, could be erected much more quickly than long rows or high blocks. Speed and simplicity of building construction was a paramount consideration in the initial stages of new town development. There were great hordes of people in the transitional camps (ma'abarot) who urgently required permanent accommodation. Cement, timber and

steel all had to be imported and as a consequence great emphasis was placed upon the use of former Arab properties and local materials where available. A further problem was the lack of skilled construction workers (Spiegel, 1966). In order to accelerate the building programme, new settlers had rapidly to be taught basic skills which would enable the quick and efficient construction of many houses of simple design. Design was thus severely constrained by the level of technology and skills available.

Land availability and land cost were not constraints. The marginal agricultural value of the land used was condusive to low density development. Thus, the particularly low density of Israeli new towns (as low as four dwellings per acre and a maximum of twelve) was encouraged by factors regarded elsewhere in the developing countries as limitations namely high cost and shortage of land. Moreover, the Zionist factions supported low density semi-agricultural development (Neufeld, 1971).

Characteristic of the design of new towns and town extensions are a series of neighbourhoods, separated by open areas, linked by circumferential and arterial roads with smaller service streets providing access to dwellings.[9] Each neighbourhood has a small shopping centre and at the centre is a larger shopping area with more specialised shops and services. This type of development may be seen in all the new towns begun prior to the mid-1950's for example Ashkelon, Kiryat Shmona, Beersheba and Dimona

By the mid-1950's, the trend in Israel was moving away from low density neighbourhood developments. The land costs were too high not in terms of monetary value but in terms of the rate at which

land was being taken into use, given that future requirements were an unknown factor. The costsof infrastructure were extremely high both to construct and maintain. Planners and residents were also beginning to feel that the atmosphere of the development towns was neither rural nor urban.

The causes of dissatisfaction with low density development were not restricted to Israel but there were additional negative aspects which did relate solely to the Israeli context. The inapplicability of Garden City concepts in Israel was physically apparent in the misuse of smallholdings and the underuse of roads. Inexperience of the immigrants, especially the formerly urban Africans and Asians, in tending smallholdings and the problems associated with an arid climate resulted in the frequent use of gardens and parkland for rubbish collection and a general deterioration of the environment (Neufeld, 1971). It proved too costly to maintain the green spaces either collectively or individually. Desolation became the physical expression of the cultural gap between Oriental immigrants and Western planners. The lack of contact was further apparent in the over-provision of roads in a country where vehicle ownership is extremely low. Gardens and roads separated and isolated residents from each other thereby hindering integration and accultivation of the recent settlers (Ministry of the Interior, 1968).

The climate, social and economic conditions of the state were not condusive to a type of planning which had developed in response to a quite different context. Theoretical conception and built reality diverged greatly. The tremendous pressure to provide houses quickly had resulted in the over-rigid application a single theory and the

subordination of other considerations. The consequence was monotony of design and a failure to experiment, to monitor results or to alter the design process in response to feedback (Altman and Rosenbaum, 1973).

During the 1950's a counter-movement against Garden City ideals occurred both in Israel and Europe. A radical change in thinking regarding new town layout was taking place. In Israel, adoption of new concepts was hampered by construction techniques, existing building forms and road patterns.

Within a few years however there was a noticeable move towards higher and denser buildings with fewer open spaces between.[10] In some of the older neighbourhoods, densities were increased by the insertion of additional dwellings usually in blocks into public open spaces or the smallholdings. The result was more satisfactory in numerical terms but of low aesthetic quality.

Paralleling the change in urban form was the adoption of new designs of dwellings. Increasingly, three and four storeyed blocks and rows of flats were constructed. Densities were upped to 24 to 28 dwellings per acre (Spiegel, 1966). Excessive repitition of forms was avoided and visual interest was stimulated by differing heights and lengths of buildings. The object was to create "unity through diversity" according to the Ministry of the Interior in 1968. Not only was diversity of design apparent in the building form but also at the scale of individual dwelling.[11]

The newer neighbourhoods of Beersheba, Kiryat Gat, Zefat, Afula, Karmiel, Eilat and Nazaret Illit for example are all characterised by a greater attention paid to space and local topography. Building

technology and the use of prefabricated units remain limiting factors in layout and design but despite these constraints there is far more variety and originality of design than in the initial phase. Ambitiously designed high buildings and water-towers have been erected to create vertical interest in predominantly low rise development (for example at Tiberias).

Throughout this period the validity of the neighbourhood unit remained intact. The neighbourhood unit was regarded as an essential means of easing the assimilation and integration of settlers in a new community and into an existing state.[12] Neighbourhoods thus played an important physical and social function (Ministry of the Interior, 1968 and Ministry of Housing, 1977). The self-contained concepts of neighbourhoods was however over-rigidly applied in Israel. For example, there was growing conflict between the central area of the towns and the neighbourhood shopping centres over the limited volume of trade which the new towns could supply. The situation was exacerbated by the inability of Israeli planners to accurately forecast growth rates and levels of services. Unwilling to inhibit further growth of the central areas, great swathes of land were left for future development. In many cases they remain underused and unoccupied.

The planning of Karmiel and Arad, the two new towns of the 1960's has taken cognisance of past mistakes as seen in Europe and Israel. Form and layout relate closely to the local climate and topography (Ash, 1974). The neighbourhood unit was utilized in a modified form which is more condusive to the development of the whole town rather than the unit as a sub-sector of the town. The radial street plan

of the past has been replaced by the linear form which is not only more flexible in terms of future growth but more suitable in light of the heavy use made of public transport. The linear model also permits neighbourhoods better access to one another and to centralised more efficiently located services. High density linear form thus reduced travel and facilitated public transport.

Extensions of existing towns or established urban areas (for example Zefat, Beersheba and Nazerat Illit) have also reflected the change in ideas relating to layout and form.

The general trend remains the adoption of European ideas and ideals but detailed implementation exhibits a closer adaptation to the Israeli context. More important though is the growing realisation that there is a need to experiment at a small scale, to adapt theory into reality at the local level and to monitor and modify accordingly.

4.3 Conclusion

The urgency of the problem of mass immigration necessitated an immediate response which relied partially upon ideologically acceptable courses of action. The national objective of population dispersal coincided with the long-standing goal of land reclamation. Incidentally, the goal of the normalization of Jewish life did not coincide with the creation of urban settlements. The reality of the situation centred upon the concessions made to Zionist ideology with the encouragement and adoption of rural-urban centres as a means to the achievement of national goals. The theoretical and physical compromise disregarded the urban origins and characteristics of the immigrant population whether they came from abroad or from existing settlements.

Initial planning efforts and ideology neglected the values of urban settlement and promoted great strains upon the new towns by denying them a positive self-image. The approach taken impaired both sound economic and viable agricultural development.

The inapplicability of both ideology and the initial planning perspectives gave way to eventual change. Ideological principles compromised with the demands of reality during the planning of Arad, the last of the new towns. There, institutions began to regard the new town "as a legitimate means for the realisation of the ideals of pioneering Zionism" (Cohen, 1970a). The change was in response to social and economic necessity. Unfortunately, it is only the last few of the new towns which have gained acceptance; the earlier and especially the smaller new towns retain their detrimental image.

Footnotes

1. By 1970, Eliezer Brutzkus who had been chiefly responsible for the introduction of the hierarchical structure, had himself admitted that the scheme was inappropriate for Israel (Ash, 1974).

2. The Kibbutzim and moshavim tend to be self-sufficient in terms of labour requirements. Additional labour is provided by volunteers (commonly from other countries) and by young Israelis who work in agricultural settlements as part of national service. Many well-established kibbutzim rather than having a shortage of labour have a surplus.

3. Kiryat Gat was originally classified in national plans as a C-centre but was upgraded to a D-centre as a result of its very rapid pace of development. The agricultural products of the region include sugar (refined in Kiryat Gat), cotton, citrus and other fruits, vegatables and flowers.

4. In this context comprehensive planning is used to mean the integration of economic, social and physical planning which lead to a set of policy measures and organisational frameworks which are intended for implementation. Unless this is achieved in reality, the term "comprehensive" is devoid of real meaning.

5. Future developments will probably take place in the Negev. There are plans to extend the Water Carrier to potential sites through the date at which this will occur is uncertain.

6. Dimona houses workers from the Dead Sea chemical companies. It also has textile plants and is the site of the largest atomic reaction in Israel (Church, 1975).

7. Arad was called 'Frontiertown' by Aronoff in 1974 because of its peculiar status as an urban centre.

8. The immediate area has rich concentrations of natural gas (11 wells), phosphates, marbles, bituminous shales and limestones. The Dead Sea works also supply potash, bromine, magnesium, salt and anhydrite. The availability of natural resources led to huge investment in the chemical industry which is predominantly Government owned. The dry climate and almost total lack of vegetation makes the area attractive to asthma sufferers. Arad houses a huge hospital complex and many hotels from which there is relatively easy access to the Dead Sea, to the Springs at Ein Gedi and the historic site of Masada. Industry and tourism are the raison dêtre of Arad though it is important to note that it also fulfils a security function by filling up an empty area.

9. In Beersheba radial streets were so narrow that buses, the most common form of transport could not pass each other (Berman, 1965).

10. Smallholdings were totally abandonned and public open space became more limited in extent.

11. Entrances, balconies, layout and window design were varied. Design began to be related to climate in several ways. The courtyard plan was adopted in many schemes, providing seclusion and shade in a traditional architectural form of the Mediterranean. Previously, plan form had been orientated towards the outside with open space around the dwelling. This form is North European in origin and is unsuited to the climate of Israel since no shade or shelter is provided, and was alien to the cultural background of the Oriental immigrants. More and more buildings were placed upon stilts thereby raising the occupants above dusty street level.

Balconies or shaded areas were provided at ground or roof level to supply extra living space for families. Covered walkways and arcades became much more common providing shade against both sun and desert winds. The layout of the streets increasingly began to take account of the prevailing winds - to prevent wind penetration in the desert and to promote it in coastal areas where breezes are cool. (There is a very full discussion of architectural forms in "Israel Builds 1977" by the Ministry of Housing)

12. In a similar way, neighbourhood units were used to promote social interaction and cohesion in the new towns of the United Kingdom and U.S.A.

CHAPTER 5. THE NEW TOWNS - SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ASPECTS

5.1 Social and Cultural Development

While the physical planners were concerned with the spatial redistribution of the population and the design and construction of the new towns, little thought was given to the social and cultural aspects of the new towns programme. There was no clear conception of who the inhabitants of the new towns would be or to what degree they would differ from the inhabitants of the older settlements. The literature suggests though never explicitly states that the inhabitants would be new immigrants rather than groups transferred from existing settlements. Unknown factors were the origins of the immigrants, their sequence, their destination and the rate at which they would adapt to a new situation.

During 1961-67 the development towns absorbed 43.3% of all immigrants. More significant is the fact that 51% of all new settlers in the development towns from 1957 to 1967 were of African-Asian origin, a proportion which is higher than that of the country as a whole (Lichfield 1970). By 1970 on average over 70% of all foreign-born immigrants in development towns were African or Asian. (For variations in the figures see Tables 5A and 5B). A large proportion of the African-Asians were illiterate and few had technical skills and aptitudes relevant to a modern westernised society. For instance, in Dimona, 84% of the immigrants until 1967 were from Africa and Asia, and 28% of them were illterate on arrival. For the whole

Table 5A

Immigrants in New Towns by Country of Origin (1967)

	% Asian- and African-born	% European and American-born
Total Jewish pop.	48.0	52.0
Older Towns	37.8	62.2
New Towns	70.7	29.3
Or Aqiva	73.4	26.6
Eilat	57.4	42.6
Ofakim	94.4	5.6
Ashdod	52.5	47.5
Ashkelon	69.9	30.1
Beersheba	67.7	32.3
Bet She'an	87.2	12.8
Bet Shemesh	88.6	11.4
Dimona	83.8	16.2
Hatzor	94.4	5.6
Tiberias	81.4	18.6
Yeruham	90.4	9.6
Ma'alot	96.8	3.2
M. HaEmek	71.4	28.6
Mitzpe Ramon	71.1	28.9
Nahariya	36.4	63.6
Nazaret Illit	32.0	68.0
Netivot	97.9	2.1
Akko	60.6	39.4
Afula	61.9	38.1
Zefat	57.1	42.9
Kiryat Gat	74.8	25.2
Kiryat Malachi	83.1	16.9
Kiryat Shmona	83.6	16.4
Sederot	85.8	14.2

Source Berler (1970)

Table 5B

Population Distribution in New Towns according to Period of Immigration (1967)

	Israel-born	Veteran settlers[1]	New settlers[2]
Total Israeli population	42.8	12.0	45.2
Total new Jewish towns	30.6	2.6	66.8
Or Aqiva	21.8	0.2	78.0
Eilat	42.3	6.8	50.9
Ofakim	25.7	0.4	73.9
Ashdod	21.2	1.8	77.0
Ashkelon	33.1	2.1	64.8
Beersheba	33.9	2.7	63.4
Bet She'an	32.8	0.5	66.7
Bet Shemesh	29.5	0.4	70.1
Dimona	23.0	0.9	76.1
Hatzor	34.5	0.2	65.3
Tiberias	46.8	3.9	49.3
Yeruham	19.0	0.5	80.5
Ma'alot	21.3	0.4	78.3
M. HaEmek	24.0	0.4	75.6
Mitzpe Ramon	35.4	3.5	61.1
Nahariya	24.2	8.7	67.1
Nazaret Illit	14.1	1.9	84.0
Netivot	32.3	0.4	67.3
Akko	31.4	4.2	64.4
Afula	34.0	5.3	60.7
Zefat	39.2	3.8	57.0
Kiryat Gat	24.8	1.4	73.8
Kiryat Malachi	31.2	0.4	68.4
Kiryat Shmona	30.9	0.9	68.2
Sederot	26.4	0.4	73.2

(1) immigrated prior to 1947

(2) immigrated 1948 onwards.

Source: Berler (1970)

of Israel, 53% of the 14-17 years age group was in secondary education in 1967, but the figure for Dimona was a mere 13%. The proportion of the population attending universities was five times higher in the older towns than in the new towns. In the towns of Ofakim and Sederot half the population lived in families with six or more members and a quarter in families with eight or more members (Berler, 1970). Krausz (1972) indicated in his study that Afro-Asian immigrants tended to have larger families, lower literacy, lower education standards, fewer skills, a higher unemployment rate, a higher dependency ratio and greater reliance on welfare payments - all as measured against the national rate or level for other urban settlements (Tables 5C, 5D and 5E).

The other settlers in the new towns are either Vatikim, Olim from Europe and the U.S.A. or sabras[1] (Table 5B). The population mix is heterogeneous. Initially "no clear policy was evolved by the settlement authorities about the desirable ethnic composition. The variation in composition is mainly influenced by the period at which the bulk of immigrants were brought to a certain town as well as upon later rates of fresh arrivals and departures of immigrants. The higher the rates, the more varied the population tends to be" (Cohen, 1970b).

This situation altered in the late 1950's and early 1960's with the social planning of Kiryat Gat, Karmiel and Arad[2]. There 'ideal quotas' were established for ethnic composition but even these may be unrealistic because of unexpected fluctuations in immigration.

Table 5C[23]

Percentage of the Population Belonging to Large Families in New Towns (1975) **

Bet Shemesh	44.1
Yavne	42.6
Migdal Ha Emek	31.1
Nazaret Illit	15.7
Akko	29.2
Afula	27.2
Kiryat Gat	38.9
Kiryat Malachi	39.4
Ofakim	49.1
Dimona	38.2
Tiberias	37.8
Karmiel	11.1
Netivot	60.3
Arad	12.0
Zefat	30.9
Sederot	43.4
Eilat	19.3
Bet She'an	47.3
Hatzor	49.3
Yeruham	46.9
Ma'alot	42.2
Kiryat Shmona	40.1
* Ashdod	28.1
* Ashkelon	31.3
* Beersheba	28.4
* Lod	32.6
* Nahariya	13.6
* Ramla	30.5
* Or Aqiva	36.1
Average (new towns)	33.4
Average (all other towns)	17.4
Average (Israel)	14.5

* not included as new towns by source

** a large family is defined as one with at least four children

Source: Ministry of Social Welfare (1977)

Table 5D[23]

Dependency Ratio** in the New Towns (1976)

	Bet Shemesh	1.29
	Yavne	1.12
	Migdal HaEmek	0.99
	Nezerat Illit	0.81
	Akko	0.96
	Afula	0.96
	Kiryat Gat	1.06
	Kiryat Malachi	1.20
	Ofakim	1.25
	Dimona	1.14
	Tiberias	1.13
	Karmiel	0.79
	Netivot	1.41
	Arad	0.80
	Zefat	1.07
	Sederot	1.16
	Eilat	0.67
	Bet She'an	1.21
	Hatzor	1.27
	Yeruham	1.28
	Ma'alot	1.24
	Kiryat Shmona	1.11
*	Ashdod	0.96
*	Ashkelon	1.01
*	Beersheba	0.96
*	Lod	1.05
*	Nahariya	0.81
*	Ramla	1.01
*	Or Aqiva	1.12
	Average (New towns)	1.06
	Average (all other towns)	0.85

* not included as new towns by source

** ratio of children under 19 plus adults over 65 to the working population

Source: Ministry of Social Welfare (1977)

Table 5E[23]

Percentage of Population in New Towns of Families in Receipt of Welfare (1975)

	Bet Shemesh	9.8
	Yavne	7.2
	Migdal HaEmek	6.3
	Nazerat Illit	1.8
	Akko	5.5
	Afula	3.5
	Kiryat Gat	6.9
	Kiryat Malachi	5.6
	Ofakim	7.1
	Dimona	7.0
	Tiberias	4.9
	Karmiel	2.8
	Netivot	6.6
	Arad	0.5
	Zefat	4.3
	Sederot	4.8
	Eilat	0.3
	Bet She'an	5.7
	Hatzor	11.2
	Yeruham	7.6
	Ma'alot	8.2
	Kiryat Shmona	4.8
*	Ashdod	6.0
*	Ashkelon	6.2
*	Beersheba	1.7
*	Lod	4.7
*	Nahariya	1.7
*	Ramla	4.7
*	Or Aqiva	10.5
	Average (new towns)	5.4
	Average (all other towns)	2.3
	Average (Israel)	2.6

* not included as new towns by source

Source: Ministry of Social Welfare (1977)

The manifold differences in occupational experience, values, culture, language of country of origin, religious traditions and previous contact with members of other ethnic groups have initiated serious tensions between groups. New immigrants have not only had to adjust to a radically different society but also to each other in the immediate environment. Opinion is divided as to whether heterogeneous or homogeneous neighbourhoods better promote the interaction and integration of residents into the macro- and micro-environment. Carmon (1976) and Shuval (1963) feel that homogeneous neighbourhoods made up of homogeneous units lead to better relations and easier integration of diverse social and demographic groups.[3] Spiegel (1966) noted that even such conditions do not necessarily generate the desired results. Obviously there are other factors which have to be taken into consideration such as socio-economic status, perceived isolation and general quality of the physical, social and economic environment.

The differences between groups in the development towns are exacerbated by the relations between vatikim and new immigrants. Inducements are available to both vatikim and others who settle in new towns - the prime inducement being new, low-cost housing. Altman and Rosenbaum (1973) point out that the inducements are aimed more at "the older, more experienced and supposedly more stable vatikim". Special programmes have provided housing for all incomers at low rents with the option to buy. There is however by virtue of the low rents little incentive to buy the homes and further, the generally lower income levels of immigrants new to the country makes the saving of substantial deposits exceedingly difficult.[4] Spiegel (1966) also noted that the better housing

quality and maintenance standards as seen in the 'Saving for Housing' and 'Housing for Young Couples' schemes are more accessible to the vatikim who have in general better paid and more regular employment. [5]

The policymakers believed that vatikim could bring an element of stability to the development towns. Erik Cohen (1970a) indicated the prevailing attitude by saying..."the veterans were considered to be representative of the absorbing society towards the immigrants since they would serve both as an example and a communicator, and thus contribute to the immigrants' cultural absorption." The hope was that veterans with contacts and intimate knowledge of the operation of Israeli society would demonstrate to the new immigrants how local affairs ought to be handled. However, by encouraging vatikim to become local leaders, the new settlers were placed at a disadvantage in that their own interests were not adequately or democratically represented (Cohen, 1974). Many rejected the imposition of vatikim as local leaders and continued to rely upon the head of their extended family or clan for advice, help and support.[6]

The situation as perceived in 1970 was summed up by Lichfield... "While traditional leaders exist (among the new immigrants) they are not directed towards development of a modern culture in a democratic society. The administrative leadership that does exist, therefore, generally comes from outside the town."

Leadership also tends to rest in a small, elite veteran population who either live in the town or at least work in it, while residing in some nearby long-established settlement (Cohen, 1970b). The

veterans tend to dominate the central roles in the formal institutions (the political parties, the schools and industrial enterprises) and the bureaucratic organisations which administer the new towns. Thus, the gap between the new mainly Oriental immigrants and the veteran residents of Israel is expressed and may grow wider. The new towns have stimulated the growth of two forms of leadership - formal control and power resting in European-American or Israeli residents and informal leadership and little power resting with the new Oriental group themselves.

The age distribution in the development towns is younger than that of the country as a whole as indicated by Berler (1970) and the Ministry of Social Welfare (1977). A consequence of this is that there are proportionately fewer able-bodied working people and a higher dependency ratio (Table 5D). Given the lower educational and occupational skills of the Orientals, they are often unable to take advantage of the better jobs who do exist in small numbers.

Despite the steady though slow growth of the population of the new towns there is a large out-movement (Tables 5F and 5G). The outmigration rate for the new towns in 1975 averaged 45.9% compared to an average of 37.5% for all other Israeli towns, cities and local councils. More significant however is the net migration change which for the new towns shows an average loss of 11.1% in 1975 compared to an average gain of 5.5% for other urban settlements. Even more significant, there were only six new towns, out of the 29 for which figures were available, which showed a gain in population through migration in 1975. The population of the towns grow because of small influxes of newer migrants and high natural increase. Established immigrants become aware of the lack of variety of employ-

Table 5F[23]

Migration Rates** - New Towns (1975)

	In	Out	Net
Bet Shemesh	21.5	53.1	-31.6
Yavne	20.0	31.1	-11.1
Migdal HaEmek	35.0	29.3	+ 5.7
Nazaret Illit	40.2	67.7	-27.5
Akko	29.0	30.3	- 1.3
Afula	36.4	65.2	-28.8
Kiryat Gat	23.0	28.8	- 5.8
Kiryat Malachi	26.1	32.0	- 5.9
Ofakim	14.9	47.5	-32.6
Dimona	30.9	62.1	-31.2
Tiberias	19.5	29.6	-10.1
Karmiel	93.9	89.5	+ 4.4
Netivot	18.3	31.7	-13.4
Arad	117.5	97.0	-20.5
Zefat	25.0	46.4	-21.4
Sederot	28.8	41.8	-13.0
Eilat	108.1	91.9	+16.2
Bet She'an	20.5	25.9	- 5.4
Hatzor	14.0	24.9	-10.9
Yeruham	30.6	50.3	-19.7
Ma'alot	18.3	47.5	-29.2
Kiryat Shmona	23.9	49.4	-25.5
* Ashdod	39.5	22.8	+16.7
* Ashkelon	24.4	26.2	- 1.8
* Beersheba	32.8	33.6	- 0.8
* Lod	40.9	38.2	+ 2.7
* Nahariya	32.2	52.3	-20.1
* Ramla	28.1	35.9	- 7.8
* Or Aqiva	14.9	49.1	-34.2
Average (new towns)	34.8	45.9	-11.1
Average (all other towns)	43.0	37.5	+ 5.5

* not included as new towns by source

** migrants as a percentage of the previous year's population

Source: Ministry of Social Welfare (1977)

Table 5G[23]

New Town Population 1972-75 (in thousands)

		1975	1974	1973	1972
*	Beersheba	96.5	93.4	90.4	85.3
*	Ashdod	52.5	50.2	48.2	40.3
*	Ashkelon	47.9	46.7	46.1	43.0
*	Ramla	36.8	36.3	36.0	34.1
*	Akko	35.6	34.8	35.5	33.7
*	Lod	35.5	33.9	33.2	30.6
	Dimona	27.4	26.9	26.3	23.7
*	Nahariya	27.3	27.9	27.2	23.8
	Tiberias	26.0	25.2	25.3	23.7
	Kiryat Gat	21.5	21.1	21.0	19.1
	Nazaret Illit	18.8	18.3	18.0	15.0
	Afula	18.5	18.7	19.0	17.3
	Eilat	15.8	14.9	14.0	13.1
	Kiryat Shmona	15.6	15.5	16.1	15.1
	Zefat	14.2	14.2	14.4	13.7
	Bet She'an	12.3	12.0	12.0	11.3
	M. HaEmek	11.8	11.3	11.0	10.0
	Bet Shemesh	11.2	11.2	11.4	10.1
	Ofakim	10.7	10.6	9.4	9.3
	Yavne	10.6	10.6	10.5	10.1
	Kiryat Malachi	9.7	9.4	9.4	8.9
	Arad	8.8	8.0	7.5	5.6
	Sederot	8.5	8.4	8.0	7.6
	Karmiel	6.9	6.3	6.0	3.8
	Netivot	6.8	6.6	6.2	5.8
*	Or Aqiva	6.8	6.6	6.6	6.7
	Yeruham	6.4	6.3	6.3	5.9
	Hatzor	5.5	5.4	5.5	5.3
	Ma'alot	5.4	5.3	5.4	5.0
	Total	611.3	596.0	585.9	536.9

* not included as new towns by source.

Source: Ministry of Social Welfare (1977)

ment, housing and cultural facilities and leave to find better conditions elsewhere. The veterans also tend to leave because the new towns grow but slowly in terms of economic and cultural level and standard of living. Berler (1970) argues that the exodus generated accelerated decline especially in terms of the availability of cultural assets.[7] The process of decline is self-propogating in that absence of cultural resources deters immigration and promotes outmigration of the stronger elements of the population. The weaker elements are thus further impoverished and decline even more. On the other hand, the presence of cultural resources raises the standard of the locality, as perceived from within and without, tends to increase migration to the town and helps to raise the standards of the indigenous population in relative and absolute terms. Thus, the stronger elements tend to remain and the weaker are prevented from becoming even more disadvantaged.[8]

In Israel, there appears to have been a disparity between on the one hand the economic investment in and demographic settlement of the development towns and on the other hand, the investment in the cultural resources made available to settlers. Investment in cultural assets for a community involves development which often has intangible results. Urban deglomeration and population dispersal cannot be successful if only economic development is considered. Social and cultural development has to be promoted hand in hand with economic development, even though social and cultural development is a slower process.

The lack or low level of cultural facilities in the new towns, as discussed by Berler (1970), further promotes the avoidance of the

towns by the rural settlements. The kibbutzim and moshavim tend to be populated by people of a higher educational and cultural standard.[9] The rural sector is thus characterised by a high demand for modern services and amenities owing to their high standard of living and aspirations. The comparatively low level of social and cultural services in the development towns is unattractive and the rural settlements consequently utilise the services infrequently. Ginsberg (1967) also pointed out that migration from the rural settlements avoids the new towns and focusses upon the cities.

A major problem as a result of the geographic disproportion in the distribution of socio-cultural resources has been the creation of a certain image of the new towns. Public opinion is that they are devoid of social and cultural facilities. People behave not according to the reality but according to the image which is often grossly exaggerated. The settlements are equated with cultural backwaters and this image acts as a deterrent for new settlers and is a contributor to outmigration. Berler (1977) suggests that a more positive image is required plus increased investment which will be extremely costly because of the time delay. He also notes that ommission of investment can only promote further decline and even higher costs when remedial action is taken. Results will be slow but..."The gap between the development towns and the older established settlements is broad and growing. There has to be some form of intervention otherwise matters will get worse" (Berler, 1970).

It would appear that two measures are imperative. Firstly, the channelling of educational resources to the existing population of the new towns to increase the indigenous potential. Secondly, those towns which lack a positive image and which are declining

require some stimulus through the injection of additional finance and the imposition of a stronger section of society. By encouraging say young Israelis, European-American and African-Asian immigrants to live and remain in the towns by providing local incentives, one would hope that aspiration levels and socio-cultural levels will rise in response to population stability.

The relative success of Arad and Karmiel ought to be a lesson in how a new town should be comprehensively developed and planned. Arad, despite in and out movements rates is showing a net gain of population through migration and its growth at present appears limited only by the speed of construction of housing and infrastructure (see 4.1).

The development towns are the outcome of a planned attempt to create a mediating link between city and country between which there has always been social and cultural proximity. The residents of the new towns many of whom were forced to live there, were unable to create a mediating social link between city and country since their enforced standard of living was less advanced than the dominant element of urban Israeli society. Thus, while in theory designed to fulfil an intermediate role in the settlement hierarchy, the social reality is that the new towns are displaced from the ordered system to occupy the lowers rank. The development towns will continue to occupy this position, exhibiting the physical elements of a small town or large village, while failing to offer the attributes of an urban society unless measures are taken to bring together the physical and socio-cultural reality.

5.2 Economic Activity and Employment

The strategies utilized for the economic development of the new towns have followed two main strands of thinking.

Firstly, the concept of new towns as providers of services to surrounding agricultural communities directly follows from the model of urban settlement structure. The function of the urban centres was envisaged as serving rural hinterland communities with transportation services, storage, processing works and wholesale, retail and professional services. According to Berler (1970) only the largest of the new towns Beersheba, with a 1975 population of 96,500 has been successful in these functions.[10] (Table 5H). The remaining new towns have been less able to compete effectively with the supplies of similar services in the larger cities of Tel Aviv, Jerusalem and Haifa. A size hierarchy of service settlements with a dominant regional capital and satellite centres appears largely inapplicable in such a small country with a well-developed road network and cheap public transport.

The relatively self-sufficient nature of the kibbutz and moshav in terms of services has seriously impeded the development of urban service centres outside the cities. Strong links persist between the city and country because it was the city which generated rural settlements. In many cases, the level of services provided by the rural settlements through their national organisations is higher than the services available in the new towns thus reversing the planned hierarchical relationship between new town and rural settlement. Supply and marketing services, vital to kibbutzim

Table 5H

Industrial and Service Employment per Thousand Inhabitants (end 1967)

Population	Employment in industry		Employment in services	
	new towns	est. towns	new towns	est. towns
- 10,000	145	131	118	142
10001 - 20000	119	95	125	148
20001 - 30000	87	118	133	142
30001 - 40000	107	107	120	186
40000 +	117	139	152	156

Source: Berler (1970)

Table 5J

Size of Plants and Employment Rate in New Towns and the Country as a Whole (end 1967)

Employees	Plants		Empl. Rate	
	Total	New Towns	Total	New Towns
total	100	100	100	100
5 - 9	51.4	27.5	12.5	2.9
10 - 14	15.7	13.2	7.2	2.5
15 - 24	12.7	12.6	9.1	3.7
25 - 49	10.4	16.8	13.7	8.8
50 - 99	5.4	11.7	14.3	13.0
100 - 299	3.3	13.4	21.0	33.0
300 +	1.1	4.8	22.2	36.1

Source: Berler (1970)

and moshavim are concentrated in the cities. There was little need to duplicate such services at an intermediate level which would only fragment the ordered and efficient national systems.[11] Thus, there was initially no clear justification for the new towns as service centres. No need has since emerged for intermediate service centres and the smaller development towns exhibit in terms of numbers employed in services the failure of reality to emulate the theoretical basis (Amir, 1967). Shachar's 1971 study suggested that in areas of predominantly co-operative settlements of new immigrants there is some demand for central services in the new towns. This feature helps to explain the relative success as service centres of some of the new towns in the southern region of Israel, which is populated mainly by co-operative settlements of new immigrants with a high degree of ethnic compatibility between the peoples of the rural and urban settlements.

Local enterprises intended to serve rural communities have had in reality no advantage over the more distant cities which can offer a wider and more specialised range of services and goods. Further, local service enterprises suffer from several other disadvantages including smaller size and restricted composition of the labour market, difficulties of personnel recruitment and a lack of skills and experience. Mandelbaum and Brachya (1971) and Shachar (1971) argue that the service centre notion has failed because the Government has not supported by any type of incentive the development of service and commercial activities.

The second means for generating economic development was by promoting industrial enterprise. Emphasis was twofold. Attempts were focussed

upon the exploitation of locally available natural resources. The second method was by encouraging the establishment of light industry.

Crucially important in the development areas with regard to industrial development has been a constant need for Government protection in terms of subsidies, financial concessions or incentives for establishment and continued operation. Both before and after independence, agriculture and village industrial enterprises have been subsidised by the State or by the Zionist institutions. However, as noted by Cohen (1970b) these subsidies have been very highly organised and centralised, administered through a number of clearly defined organisations and institutions with clear priorities. By contrast, industrial and other enterprises have been subsidised in diverse ways which have been remarkably disorganised.[12] They have lacked any coherent policy, ideology or series of priorities (Patras, 1973). The result has often been competition and conflict in and between industries for Government-allocated funds. There has also been competition between local officials of the various settlements and towns for financial resources.[13]

In practice, public assistance has been limited largely to manufacturing industry upon which it was hoped that a secondary or tertiary economic base would be generated.[14] Until the mid 1960's, 95% of public loans went to manufacturing industry and crafts (Spiegel, 1966). There has been no significant policy change since then and little reason to suppose that the situation has changed dramatically.

The reports of the Ministry of Finance (formerly the Ministry of Commerce and Industry) which controls public assistance and issues progress reports, indicate that comparatively large firms are found

more frequently in the new towns than in the rest of the country (Table 5J). Government incentives have tended to prefer resource-based or large labour-intensive footloose industries.[15] Great effort has been expended in assisting large enterprises which inject a large number of low skill jobs into the labour market. Many of the large industries are owned by the State, by public companies or by overseas investors (Strong, 1971). These firms by their nature of ownership have great or organisational and financial backing and are supported by well-established marketing and supply systems. Spiegel (1966) suggests that it is this well developed support system which makes the larger companies more willing to locate in new towns and it is the lack of such contacts which encourages small companies or hinders their progress in the development areas.

The large number and general lack of skills of the immigrants, the low cost and short time of training in weaving and spinning, and rapid construction of plants has meant that textile manufacture has been the most favoured type of industry in the new towns. Public assistance has encouraged the development of very large plants which dominate local labour markets. For example, in 1971 at Kiryat Shmona, 71% of industrial employment was in a single textile manufacturing unit representing 25% of the total labour force; in Dimona, 96% of industrial workers were in textiles, representing 50% of the total labour force; and at Afula, textiles accounted for 57% of the industrial workforce. Other towns with a significant percentage employed in textiles include Zefat, Bet She'an, Kiryat Gat, Or Aqiva, Netivot, Ofakim, and Beersheba (Spilerman and Habib, 1976).

The food-related industries are also important in the new towns

located in agricultural areas where local produce has generated manufacturing or processing establishments. At Kiryat Gat and Afula, there are major sugar refineries in addition to the ubiquitous fruit canning factories which commonly offer only seasonal employment. There is a chocolate factory at Nazaret Illit and a coffee factory at Zefat, both of which offer year-round employment. Ashkelon specialises in food-processing with 46% of industrial employment in that sector in 1971. Food industries are widely scattered throughout the country though there is a slight preference for the agricultural areas of the north and coast. An even greater preponderance of food-processing factories has been inhibited from locating in the new towns by their establishment within kibbutzim and to a lesser extent moshavim. Increased mechanisation on the collectives has meant less need for agricultural workers and increased industrialization especially in the collectives in Galilee and the Emek Yisre'el.

The manufacture of building materials is also scattered throughout the development towns. Many of the establishments are operated by Solel Boneh.[16] There are a few large establishments for example, cement at Bet Shemesh and Ramla, pipes in Ashkelon and Ramla, tiles and ceramic products in Beersheba and prefabricated building units in Karmiel. The majority of the units however are based on the supply of local needs and are consequently relatively small in terms of labour force.[17] The metal industry is concentrated in the large steelworks at Akko. Chemical and mineral processing are located at Arad, Dimona and Yeruham, the last of which has 92% of industrial employment in that industry. The manufacture of machinery, electrical equipment and vehicles takes place predominantly in towns near the coast at Lod, Ramla, Ashdod and Ashkelon.

On the whole, the only industries of real significance in the new towns are textiles, with food-processing and building materials being important in some specific locations. Specialisation and lack of diversity in due to:

a) the small size of most of the development towns. This tends to limit the number and type of industries which a town can support.
b) the national Government policy of incentives to certain types of manufacturing industry and
c) the preferred industries tend to have large plants, thereby reducing the variety of firms which the settlement can support.

The reason for preference for industries which are labour-intensive include the large number of jobs created and the relatively low capital cost of creating such jobs. This motive was extremely influential in a country which had limited resources and which had to accommodate a large refugee population. Low-skill operations also permit immigrants from varied cultural backgrounds to be assimilated into the labour force with a minimum of retraining, literary skills and knowledge of language (Spilerman and Habib, 1976). Policymakers viewed it as easier and quicker to redistribute population and open up the underdeveloped areas by directing immigrants rather than by transferring the existing population who had both skills and jobs.

Unemployment rates in the new towns compared to other settlements would be a useful tool in analysing the economic problems but the figures are difficult to obtain or out of date. In Israel many unemployed are used to carry out public relief works and the level of population involved in such works may be used as a surrogate for

Table 5K

Relief Work by Size of New Towns (end 1967)

Size	No. employed in relief work.	Relief workers per 1000 inhabitants
- 10,000	2455	30.0
10001 - 20000	2995	23.6
20001 - 30000	340	12.5
30001 - 40000	1070	16.0
40000 +	605	9.7

Source Berler (1970)

Table 5L

Employees in Productive Work by Activity(1968)

	Agriculture	Building	Industry	Services
New Towns	7.0	10.9	46.6	35.5
Israel	11.0	10.1	26.6	52.3
Tel Aviv	0.5	8.9	31.0	59.6
Haifa	0.8	11.5	23.1	64.6
Jerusalem	1.3	9.4	15.8	73.5
Urban settlements	5.1	10.3	31.4	53.2

Source: Lichfield (1970)

unemployment[18] (Table 5K). Berler's 1970 study (using 1967 data) indicates that the level of unemployment in relief work is more than three times greater in the smaller new towns than in the largest new town of Beersheba.

Table 5L exhibits the imbalance of distribution of employment between the new towns, the cities and other urban settlements. The differences briefly are:

a) a consistently high rate of industrial employment

b) a relatively low rate of employment in services and

c) a high rate of agriculture employment.

On the whole, the problems of industry and economic development are similar to those of developing countries. Berler (1970) quotes the Ministry of Commerce and Industry's summary of the problems...."The labour force available in the newly opened-up areas is not trained, and in many cases, this is the first encounter with industry. There are no basic services, such as electricity, sewage, water and roads, and substantial new investments are required to establish them. The towns have no special zones and buildings for artisans workshops needed to supply the plants with maintenance and repair services. The transportation of raw materials and the distribution of finished goods to marketing centres or ports is expensive. Difficulties are also encountered in obtaining local bank services, so that recourse must be had to financial institutions located in the centre of the country, with the resulting loss of time and money. Moreover, the entrepreneurs and the professional and managerial staff are not always prepared to live close to the plant."

The recognition of the deficiencies has led to increased measures of Government intervention though notably not in the form of comprehensive development planning as has been the case in many

countries. Central support and aid began in 1956 when it was clear that industry would not locate or relocate in the new towns unless given substantial advantages. Economic considerations were often relegated to second place and therefore industrialisation is more advanced in some of the smaller localities than in the bigger towns - for example Arad compared to Zefat. Greater encouragement was given to the more backward smaller towns with severe unemployment problems as it was assumed that industry would develop with fewer or without incentives in the bigger towns.[19] It was expected that the private sector would show initiative in the bigger and expanded towns especially since the infrastructure services were more highly developed. Unfortunately figures are not available to support or refute this assumption.[20]

Despite extensive and extended support, industry has met with several problems. The major issue is the disparity in production in identical industrial concerns between development areas and the centre of the country. The higher costs in the new towns has been of considerable disadvantage. Berler (1970) attributes higher costs to several factors including:

a) senior professional and administrative staff is more expensive and these experts tend not to live locally.
b) service costs are higher because of distance and
c) output per worker is 50-100% lower in the development areas than in the centre of the country.[21]

During the 1960's the number of large plants (over 100 employees) increased in the new towns at a rate considerably above the national average (Felber and Carmi, 1973). In the new towns the food, textile,

non-metallic mineral and basic metal industries are well represented while the clothing, printing, publishing, plastics, machinery, electrical, electronic and transportation equipment industries are almost non-existent. Notably, the industries which are poorly represented are those which require highly-skilled and well-trained labour and for which distance from marketing and supply points constitute a limiting factor.

During the period 1961-67, it was clear that the increase in industrial employment in the new towns lagged behind population increase, rising only 11.4% as against the 30.6% rise in the new town share of the total population. Felber and Carmi (1973) suggested that the share of total industrial development taken by Tel Aviv and Great Tel Aviv has declined. It is unclear however whether this is a direct consequence of the provision of Government support elsewhere or a by-product of the very high cost and limited availability of land in that area.

The development of an adequate and self-generating economic base for the new towns has been a mixture of success and failure. With the exception of the larger settlements such as Beersheba, Ashkelon and Ashdod and the anomalous Arad and Eilat, the new towns have singularly failed to develop into the hoped-for service towns providing for the needs of their respective regions. They have developed strong industrial bases which though lacking in diversity do provide employment for large numbers of people. This relative achievement has been extremely costly and has not been without drawbacks including:

a) the very limited choice of occupational opportunities for residents of the towns. This limitation is particularly disadvantageous to the new immigrants who do have manual or white collar skills.

b) upward mobility is severely restricted by the predominance of low skilled jobs and the lack of specialised training for other types of jobs and

c) over-dependence on a single industry has occurred in several towns. This has encouraged modern day 'company towns' and with it the danger of drastic repercussions should the dominant industrial concern contract or withdraw due to cyclical decrease or to technological change or demand obsolescence.

The above factors have contributed towards the prevailing negative image assigned to the new towns and especially the small ones. The result has been a significant trend towards outmigration and a reduction of the limited opportunities available.[22] The general feeling is that the residual population of the smaller new towns remain there only because they have little if any alternative or because they rationalise their position by pointing out the benefits of new town living such as tax allowances and low cost housing as outweighing the costs and advantages gained in moving elsewhere.

5.3 Conclusion

Regional integration has not been achieved by the location of a large number of small new towns within rural areas. A hierarchical ordering might have operated more efficiently in a functional manner by the elimination of the C-centres. By planning for a smaller number of larger new towns, the average size and distance between

would have been increased, and a higher level of autonomous economic development in industrial production and in commercial and service activities might have been achieved. A higher level of service activity may have stemmed the very high rates of out-migration which have plagued many of the new towns (Table 5F). Larger towns and cities with wider and more diversified economic bases and more stable populations, might have decreased the inequalities between the new towns and the coastal zone in terms of income, employment and social opportunities, and level of amenities and services. A more desirable and efficient urban system could be created by the concentration of effort in growth poles in addition to a series of measures to remedy the diverse problems of the smallest of the new towns.

5.4 Some Considerations

The preceeding comments have suggested that all development towns suffer from severe problems and are unattractive to all Israelis who have a realistic choice in the location of home and job. This is not so. There <u>are</u> new towns which have attracted settlers from diverse population groups via internal migration, have retained their more talented residents and have either acquired a diversified industrial base or were originally founded around industries which utilize a wider range of occupational skills than is normally found in development towns. Beersheba, Ashdod and Arad are examples of 'successful' development towns. Beersheba is a regional centre for southern Israel: it has a university, provides medical and commercial services for a large area and supports a varied white-collar labour force. Ashdod is a major seaport which has attracted ancilliary manufacturing,

transportation and commercial firms. Arad has developed an industrial base of mineral extraction, chemical processing and metal industries.

It is, however, of limited value to look merely at which towns are successful and which are not. The terms 'success' and 'failure' themselves have emotive value and cannot be adequately defined according to any single or multiplicity of criteria. However, it is of considerable value to establish why some towns have generated autonomous growth and why others have failed to develop into significant urban centres.

The lack of a positive image, or rather the perceived negative image of the new towns has undoubtedly contributed to the inability of many development towns to attract either people or jobs. The new towns were developed as part of a policy to absorb immigrants rather than a policy to integrate Israelis. This has in effect reinforced a negative image by creating in the minds of most Israelis the belief that the existing cities and the rural settlements are the home of integrated citizens while the new towns are a mechanism for integration and acculturation. Thus, the new towns have been perceived as a stepping-stone to larger towns and cities, places of transition from one culture to another.[24] The new towns are, as a consequence, not seen as an integral part of Israeli society.

The majority of the problems and the main sources of discontent have been generated not by ideological and perceptual considerations, but by the partial adoption of the new town model as seen in Europe. In the U.K., the writings of Howard generated experimentation at Welwyn and Letchworth. Reports and legislation

ensued. Then came a long-considered and modified programme based upon comprehensive planning. There was a logical sequence from theory through experimentation to a national programme which took nearly 40 years to accomplish. In Israel, there was no theory which related to the conditions of that country, no experimentation, no reports, no legislation and no means to comprehensively plan the settlements. There was no organised background knowledge and no standards by which progress or deficiencies could be measured.

Israeli policy-makers carried out the new towns programme in several ways significantly different from the means of implementation in the U.K. In Israel, populating the new towns initially involved little choice on the part of the settler or the town itself. Selection and recruitment was remote from the individual and the administrator. In the last 20 years or so, with less immigration and fewer pressures on settling new residents, in theory, choice has been made available to new arrivals. In practice, however, for many newcomers with little or no knowledge of Israel, choice is not based upon reliable information or sound judgement but more upon the influence of the Ministry of Immigrant Absorption's officials who meet olim on arrival. In contrast, the British new town residents were and are volunteers. The initiative to reside in a new town came from the individual who was usually attracted by employment and housing opportunities. In all of the Phase I new towns it was conditional that an applicant had a job in the town before becoming eligible for housing. The reverse occurred in Israel where housing was provided but no guarantee of a job.

In Israel, it was expected that employment would follow population yet until 1955 there were few incentives available to the entrepreneur who considered locating in a new town. Moreover, the incentives which did become available were highly selective and ultimately promoted a rather narrow economic base by excluding small businesses and non-manufacturing enterprises. In the U.K. a more diverse range of industrial enterprises have been attracted to the new towns from their conception. A great deal of money was channelled towards the indirect subsidisation of incoming industrial and service activities. Effort was focussed upon attracting jobs in the knowledge that people would follow as a result of personal desire to live outside the cities or as part of planned decentralisation and slum clearance programmes. In Israel financial incentives have been narrower in scope and have had less impact, having been directed at very specific type s of enterprise and at all new town dwellers (e.g. tax relief, concessionary airfares and low-cost housing). The direction of subsidies towards individuals was necessary in Israel to attract and retain population in the new towns - such direct measures have never been necessary in the U.K.

Social planning in Israel was initially lacking because of the brevity of time and the non-existence of a body to carry out social planning. As with economic planning, the lack of a centralised planning authority and blurred lines of responsibility between ministries encouraged omissions (see 3.5). Social planning remains little developed in Israel. There have been attempts to

experiment at the local level but there appears to be no literature which discusses the need for social planning as an integral part of the planning process as seen in the U.K.

In conclusion, the physical aspects of Israeli development town planning follow very closely the trends as seen in Europe and especially the U.K. The similarities between the two programmes are many and the changes in physical form are coincidental. However, the reasons for change in form in each country are quite different just as the adoption of a new towns programme was for different motives. The European model was found to be inapplicable in Israel in terms of layout and design for reasons of climate, topography and technology. The major difference between the implementation of the programme of the two countries relates not to form but to social and economic planning. Israel, like the U.K., wished to create self-sufficient and balanced communities yet failed to adopt the means by which these aims would be realised. This may be partly explained by the policymakers perception of short-term advantages in the supply of houses as being more important than long-range plans for comprehensive development of individual towns.

Israeli national planning was and is not comprehensive - it remains predominantly physical planning with lesser regard to social and economic needs. The centralised nature of the planning process has tended to strengthen the emphasis on national physical planning since the dispersal of population is a central goal for national planning in all its facets. Economic and social considerations have never been as central nor have they been related to physical

needs. Akzin and Dror in 1966 summarised the situation as follows... "How to balance social needs with economic needs and how to combine social planning with economic planning in some form of comprehensive planning are...the central problems of national planning in Israel". They continued..."significant progress is being made in sectoral and project planning, but as yet little national, and comprehensive planning exists".

By 1977, some change of approach is apparent in the following statement..."Because the needs for absorption and settlement took precedence over planning and, as a consequence, the new settlements were beset with social and economic problems, attention must now be drawn to the need to pilot the available potential towards consolidation of what has been established. Since consolidation requires that more weight be given to advance planning, and to the systematic development of a strategy for urban development in its macro-aspects (i.e. whether and where to establish new settlements and whether, or to what extent, to modify the size of the existing urban settlements) - as well as in its micro-aspects (i.e. what steps are required to achieve the objectives determined for a given town)"[25] (Ministry of Housing, 1977).

Footnotes

1. Sabra - literally a type of cactus native to Israel. It is more commonly used to refer to a native-born Israeli.
2. Aronoff (1974) provides some figures for the ethnic mix for Arad (date unknown). They are as follows - 64% Israeli-born, 36% immigrants of whom 59% were European-American, 33.6% were African-Asian and 7.4% of other origin. His comparative figures for other new towns were 30.9% Israeli born, 69.1% immigrants of whom 28.5% were European-American, 65.6% African-Asian and 5.9% from elsewhere. At Karmiel the assumed mix was to be 20% Israelis, 40% European-Americans and 40% African-Asians (Neufeld, 1971).
3. Evidence and results of experimental neighbourhood schemes are very difficult to obtain. Almost all the significant studies of small scale experiments have been published in Hebrew.
4. Berler (1970) discusses the problem of low incomes in the development towns especially amongst the most recent immigrants.
5. The 'Saving for Housing' scheme was begun in 1955. It requires the saver to accumulate 60% of the purchase price as a deposit. The remainder is usually supplied by mortgages from two sources. The 'Housing for Young Couples' scheme is also a means of purchasing a flat. It requires a deposit of up to 50% depending upon location (higher at the coast and in the cities than in the development towns).
6. The Ministry of Housing document 'Israel Builds, 1970' extensively discusses the role of the clan system in Nazerat.

7. In this context, 'cultural assets' is used to refer to facilities such as the number of cinemas, cinema seats, theatres, public halls, libraries, youth clubs, adult education programmes, sports clubs etc. - all related to the population of the town.
8. 'Stronger' is used in relation to economic capacity and level of aspirations and expectations.
9. Amir (1967) states that on average the educational and cultural standard of the residents of the rural settlements is higher than that of the urban dweller.
10. Note here that Berler (1970) has a restricted definition of new towns (see Table 3B).
11. As in many aspects of Israeli life, control of marketing and supply is at national level. Centralized decision-making derives from the necessity of such action in the pre-State era (Spilerman and Habib, 1976).
12. The variety of incentives include large low-interest loans, grants, partnership with Jewish agencies or Government bodies, protection against import competition, guaranteed markets, free services etc. All have been available to individuals, private firms, local authorities and co-operatives amongst others.
13. The internal conflicts have been discussed fully by Aronoff (1973 and 1974).
14. The exception to this is the tourist industry which is concentrated in a few of the new towns including Eilat, Ashkelon, Akko, Tiberias and Zefat. In Tiberias especially, industrial employment was of secondary importance to the tourist industry.

15. Small workshops usually do not qualify for support from the Development Budget (Berler, 1970).

16. Solel Boneh (literally Pioneer Builder) is an arm of the Histadrut the giant labour union. It operates in the building industry, builds roads, factories and acquires quarries and brickworks etc.

17. For thistype of manufacture transport costs of the finished product are very high and this limits production to the supply of local needs.

18. To alleviate unemployment especially in the construction industry, the Government initiated public works financed from the public purse, such as afforestation, land reclamation, drainage, archaeological excavations, and road construction and maintenance. Relief work of this kind is allocated to the unemployed, each applicant receiving 12-24 days work per month depending upon the number of persons he has to support. Wages are linked to those of agricultural workers. Special programmes, with part-time employment have been instituted for those with limited ability to work. Unemployment figures when available include both those actually unemployed and those employed on relief works. Reliance on welfare (Table 5E) is also a useful indicator for unemployment.

19. The little evidence available would tend to support this assumption.

20. I would venture to suggest that if data were available it would indicate that private initiative has been limited throughout the gamut of town size.

21. The differences vary according to the type of plant. In 1967, in the plastics industry output was 208% higher in the central area than in the development towns. The figure for diamonds was 190% higher.

22. Outmigration is more fully discussed in 5.1.

23. I believe from the Mayor of Ashkelon (personal communication 14.3.79) that the development towns with populations exceeding 30,000 no longer receive funds from the Development Budget, and for this reason are not included by the Ministry of Social Welfare as development towns. This would explain why Beersheba, Ashdod, Ashkelon, Ramla and Lod have been omitted from the Ministry's tabulations. The reason why Nahariya and Or Aqiva have been excluded is unclear though possibly it could relate to their lack of consistent definition as new towns (see 3.1).

24. Ginsberg (1967) noted that rural-urban migrants in Israel avoid the development towns and go directly to established towns and cities. There is no evidence of a step-like process as seen in developing nations.

25. The emphasis is mine.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

To summarise briefly, the new towns of Israel are characterised by four major problem areas:

a) the inducements for moving to and settling in the new towns have tended to draw immigrants who have low levels of personal qualifications and socio-economic resources,

b) commercial and industrial development has been spatially irregular despite massive governmental investment and subsidy: employment structure has also been unbalanced with average family incomes significantly lower than the national average,

c) return migration to the urban core has been extensive and selective thereby weakening the new communities and

d) the social, employment, health, school, government and welfare services have tended to be managed by bureaucratic and technical elites who are not socially or culturally integrated into the towns.

The weakness of the towns in the main relates to two factors. Firstly, there has been a lack of coherent government policy concerning priorities for investment, development and subsidies in the development towns and areas. The result has been an ad hoc, pragmatic approach to the direction of finance often based upon political muscle and an admixture of planning policies. Secondly, there has been a notable absence of ideological support for the new towns. Zionism has consistently ignored the value of urban settlements (with the exception of Arad and possibly Karmiel) and has thus directly promoted the negative image popularly assigned to the new towns.

These factors have led to disorganisation and acute competition for power, influence and access to resources and subsidies and have resulted in disruption of social relations, restricted economic growth and slow community development. Unplanned migration has not only harmed the new towns but also the receiving cities since the problems of overcrowding, poor housing and evident poverty in certain slum quarters coincide with a high proportion of oriental immigrants originally from the development towns. Voluntary migration from the new towns is a symptom of their failure to provide the benefits of urban living and is also a cause of accelerated decline. It is not merely a response to poor job opportunities, or lack of social or community infrastructure, but to a complexity of tangible problems and vague perceptions.

It is evident that many of the new towns would be unable to exist or to grow without massive governmental support. Economically, socially and ideologically the majority of the development towns remain inferior to the agricultural settlements and the cities - they are displaced in the hierarchical structure and occupy the lowest order position, not in terms of size but in terms of function. It would be naive to think that this situation will change dramatically though it has undergone gradual incremental change. Geographical, geopolitical and organisational factors will always operate to maintain the overall strength of the national core: the elongate shape of the country, the existence of hostile neighbours which force development outwards to the coast and the strong ties between the cities and rural settlements. Precisely because a strong national core will always exist and is desirable for security reasons does not mean that the urban periphery ought

to be weak. On the contrary, security considerations necessitated the establishment of many of the new towns and will continue to justify the existence of towns in specific locations. It is thus in the interests of national security to strengthen the development towns in areas potentially at risk and to reduce their dependency on the national core.

The discussion till now has dwelt mainly upon problems at the national level. Despite the ills, the new town programme has been somewhat of an achievement. By 1970, the new towns accounted for roughly 20% of the national Jewish population. They have increased the number of small and intermediate sized settlements and have thus achieved the stated national goal of diversifying the size distribution of settlements. The new towns have also played a major role in the exploitation and development of areas of national resources and have been a prime instrument in the settlement of regions of sparse population. Though the last two achievements may superficially appear synonymous they are not always - this may be elucidated by the example of the new towns of Eastern Galilee (Hatzor, Karmiel, Zefat and Kiryat Shmona) which were established in order to strengthen security and to impose a sighificant Jewish population in an Arab area of few natural resources. Likewise, Eilat was established for military reasons in an area which is devoid of natural resources including water. Many thousands of new immigrants have been provided with houses in the development towns the planning, design and building of which contrasts favourably with the shanty towns and uncontrolled city sprawl of many developing nations. Any evaluation of the contribution of the planned dispersal

policy must also consider the adverse background against which development has taken place... including four major wars in 25 years, a generally poor economy and the pressure of mass migration.

Lichfield's 1971 study described and attempted to evaluate hypothetical strategies for the new towns' future. Using a planning balance sheet, the team concluded that two alternatives were preferable to three others. The first of the preferred alternatives was based upon a series of discreet urban clusters each of which could offer the advantages of a large town and which would, it was hoped, be able to divert activities from the coast. The second strategy derived from the Ministry of the Interior's 1967 national plan which optimistically forecast a 1985 population of 4 million, and which was based upon a hierarchical distribution of urban centres. The rejected alternatives included those based on growth centres, axial development and existing trends. Neither preferred nor rejected strategies are innovative nor are they significantly different from each in their degree of conservatism or potential impact. The fact that the report remains unfinished leads one to suggest that whatever the preferred strategy, it is politically unacceptable for the Israeli Government to admit that such a prestigious and costly programme is in need of change.

Compounding the lack of clarity over the future of the existing new towns is the apparent cessation of official statements concerning the number and function of the towns since the mid-1960's. The 'silence' suggests that clear policy objectives are lacking and the central government direction is unformulated in spite of the costly Lichfield study. Ministry of Housing documents (1964, 1968,

1970 and 1977) certainly discuss neighbourhoods and housing schemes within the new towns but singularly fail to provide any clues as to the future policy orientation for individual new towns or the programme as a whole (A slight caveat must be made to this previous statement - the 1977 Ministry of Housing publication provides illustrations of a small regional centre being built at Sapir in the Arava and also discusses a feasibility study of a potential new town at Shaalavim, between Jerusalem and Tel Aviv).

Planned dispersal has thus been a mixture of success and failure at differing scales. Macro-policy has consistently overshadowed micro-policy considerations in the new towns. Individual settlements have been allowed to stagnate in the supposed interests of the programme as a national whole. Past mistakes lead one to suggest that settlements ought to be considered individually and planned for accordingly within the framework of the new towns programme and by relating the new towns to each other.

Continued and future success of individual towns should not be jeopardised in order to prevent failure elsewhere. Success must be promoted at the same time as failure arrested. Two current trends are operating against the interests of the new towns and are placing them at greater risk. Firstly, attention and finance is increasingly being diverted towards rehabilitation of city neighbourhoods. Secondly at the level of the new towns programme, financial incentives have been withdrawn from several of the largest new towns. Both trends ignore the true needs of the development

towns and fail to recognise that even the largest towns may be viable only with continued support from the Development Budget. There is an implicit belief that autonomous growth, self-sufficiency and a mystical economic take-off point are reached at a population figure of 30,000. The fallacy of this argument is clearly demonstrated by the example of Ashkelon, population 56,000, of whom 40,000 are officially described as disadvantaged in terms of social, economic and environmental opportunities. Yet, despite the awareness of this problem Ashkelon no longer receives money from the Development Budget because the population is in excess of 30,000. Clearly, it is ludicrous to suddenly and completely cut-off access to funds purely on the basis of a population figure without taking into account the total welfare of the population involved.

A great deal of rigorous analysis and research is needed in order to formulate what potential exists in the new towns. Their future will be determined by the programme itself and by the more fundamental issue of national planning goals and the existing constraints. Any planning procedure whether rehabilitation, new towns, agricultural settlements or whatever, is a function of the national planning process. Programmes do not operate in isolation but are part of a complex whole. This study suggests that not only are changes required in the new town programme but that Israeli national planning must undergo some fundamental modification by relating programmes and strategies to each other rather than continuing to operate strategies independently. With such modification, national planning would become less centralised, less sectoral and less pragmatic since co-ordination demands flexibility, phasing and adaptability. A necessary prerequisite of any future policy objectives is extensive research leading to

realistic aims and objectives.

Whatever the preferred strategies and however desirable they may be two major obstacles will continue to exacerbate the difficulties in implementing the new town programme. Firstly, legal procedures and planning concepts are inadequate in that they derive from British legislation of the 1930's. Equally serious is the lack of means to achieve co-ordinated decision-making. The many divisions in responsibility inhabit any single ministry or agency from assuming any real form of control and further restricts decision-making to ridigly defined spheres.

If national planning goals are to be broad, inter-related and flexible, the planning process must evolve in parallel, thus necessitating the concentration of financial and legal authority in a single ministry which can co-ordinate planning goals. The creation of a new towns authority or commission at national level would overcome the above-mentioned weaknesses and would also provide a means by which participation in the running of the new towns at the local government level could be achieved.

The most immediate need for the future welfare of the development towns is the acceptance of a policy of consolidation of achievements and remedial action where warranted. Towns cannot be ignored or removed when they appear to be suffering from severe economic and social ills - in Israel, more than in most countries security considerations especially in border areas make the existence of attractive, stable communities even more necessary. Many of the difficulties would be reduced if the economic and social opportunities

available in the new towns were equal to those of the established towns. Over-attention to purely physical development and a lack of emphasis on social and economic planning have together contributed to the problems which have emerged. The gap between the new towns and established urban centres can be narrowed by comprehensive planning and development, in addition to the provision of community infrastructure and means to community development. By providing mechanisms to achieve a wide range of goals seeking physical, economic and social well-being, the new towns can develop a positive image and can become an attractive environment in which to live. The relative success of Arad, Karmiel and Kiryat Gat must be attributed to the fact that they each have an attractive physical environment, they were comprehensively planned, they derived a positive image in terms of Zionism and great effort was made in promoting economic and social welfare. Other earlier towns lacked these advantages and all other things being equal, the evidence leads one to suggest that were the new towns which lack growth to be treated in the same way, great benefits would be derived. By strengthening the less viable towns, dependence upon the national core will be diminished and their political, economic and social strength secured.

On the other hand, cutting back on the new towns programme would have dire effects in that the least advantaged would be left behind and would have to live in a steadily declining environment. By transferring available resources to city locations, the cities will become even more attractive and accelerated migration to the cities promoted. The cities would thus grow and planned dispersal would rapidly transform into unplanned concentration thereby undoing the achievements of the last 30 years.

Without effective and meaningful collaboration of planning authorities, review of the constraints and reassessments of planning goals at national, regional and local level, the future of the new towns as an integrated and stable part of the national settlement policy is in grave doubt. The new towns have made a great contribution to the general welfare of the State of Israel and can continue to do so if modified. The precise manner in which the programme ought to be modified must be in response to detailed research concentrating on current and future national goals, the new town programme, and the specific needs of individual new towns. A comprehensive approach is suggested - only a multi-faceted, integrated plan can provide the impact necessary to over-come deep-rooted problems of social and economic deprivation and poverty, and to close forever the social gap that threatens to weaken Israel.

It is clear that if the growing population of Israel is not to be restricted to the coast, nor is to constantly migrate back to the coastal cities, but is to lead to an overall settlement of the whole country, this can only be attained with the help of the new towns. Concentration is still occurring, demand for housing is rising in both numerical and qualitative terms, and the new towns have been very successful in providing good homes and pleasant physical environment - given all this, there is still a very strong argument for the continuation of the new towns coupled with control over developments in coastal and city locations.

(approx 12,500)

APPENDIX A

The framework of principles adopted by the World Zionist Congress of 1902 at Koblenz clearly states the tasks faced:-

"Zionism seeks to secure for the Jewish people a publicly recognised, legally secured home in Palestine for the Jewish people. For the achievement of its purpose the Congress envisages the following methods:

1. the programmatic encouragement of the settlement of Palestine with Jewish agricultural workers, labourers and those pursuing other trades.
2. the unification and organization of all Jewry into local and wider groups in accordance with the laws of their respective countries.
3. the strengthening of Jewish self-awareness and national consciousness.
4. preparatory steps to obtain the consent of the various governments necessary for the fulfillment of the aims of Zionism"

(quoted in Laqueur, 1972 and Gilbert, 1978).

APPENDIX B

An anonymous pioneering Zionist of the early 20th century states... "Now it is true that every people has many individuals who shun physical labour and try to live off the work of others... We Jews have developed an attitude of looking down on physical labour...But labour is the only force that binds man to the soil...it is the basic energy for the creation of National Culture. This is what we do not have, but we are not aware of missing it. We are a people without a country, without a national living language, without a national culture. We seem to think that if we have no labour, it does not matter - let Ivan, John, or Mustapha do the work, while we busy ourselves producing a culture, with creating national values and with enthroning absolute Justice in the world."

APPENDIX C

The full text of the Balfour Declaration reads as follows:-

"Dear Lord Rothschild, I have much pleasure in conveying to you, on behalf, of His Majesty's Government, the following declaration of sympathy with Jewish Zionist aspirations which has been submitted to, and approved by, the Cabinet.

'His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country'

I should be grateful if you would bring this declaration to the knowledge of the Zionist Federation."

This document is dated 2 November 1917 and signed by A.J. Balfour the Foreign Secretary.

APPENDIX D

Amir (1967) summed up 6 major points from the various writings of Cristaller as:-

1. The basic function of a city is to be a central place providing goods and services for a surrounding tributary area.
2. The centrality of a city is a summary measure of the degree to which it is a service centre; the greater the centrality of a place, the higher is the order.
3. Higher order places offer more goods, have more establishments and business types, larger populations, tributary areas and tributary populations, do greater volumes of business, and are more widely spaced than lower order places.
4. Lower order places provide only low order goods to low order tributary centres; these low order goods are generally necessities requiring frequent purchasing with little consumer travel.
5. Central places fall into a hierarchy comprising discrete groups of centres. A consequence is a "nesting" pattern of lower order trade areas within the trade area of higher order centres, plus a hierarchy of routes joining the centres.
6. The hierarchy may be organized according to
   a) a market principle
   b) the principle of traffic
   c) the administrative principle.

APPENDIX E

Implicit in the various definitions of new towns is the existence of all such towns within pre-1967 boundaries. In all the literature available in English there is not a single reference to development towns outwith the borders as they existed from 1948 until the Six Day War of 1967. One may assume that this situation derives from one of two reasons. Firstly, one can assume that there are no new towns or other planned Jewish Settlements outwith the 1967 borders. The Israeli Government never refers to the lands taken in the wars of 1967 and 1973 as part of the State of Israel but rather as 'occupied zones' or 'administered territories'. To build on such land would, it is feared, be perceived internationally as a breach of this assigned status. Secondly, one can look beyond the use of the term new town and analyse what is actually happening in the occupied areas. The building of towns and rural settlements is occurring. Such settlements lack the official designation as a new town but they are, like all the other new towns, planned and financed directly and indirectly by the Israeli Government. (The reason for the lack of designation is probably the same as mentioned above).

The existence of new settlements in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, Sinai and the Golan Heights is acknowledged and discussed by the English language "Jerusalem Post" (for example, see the Jerusalem Post of 4th August 1978). The Gaza settlements appear to be a part of a grandiose scheme, the initial directive of which derived from the Defence Ministry's physical planning branch, and which was subsequently accepted, publicised and backed by Moshe Dayan,

the Defence Minister. The urban settlements of Yamit, Yamit Port, Rafiah and the surrounding moshavim took 10 years to plan from the late 1960's.[1] Their function has dual strategic importance - to separate Sinai from the Gaza Strip and to split the Arab concentrations within the Strip itself. Another motive was that of the economic benefits to be derived from agriculture, tourism and fishing.

The concept of West Bank settlement began under the rule of Shimon Peres as acting Prime Minister in early 1977. The plans called for 3 satellite cities to the north of Jerusalem, their function being to provide strategic depth that would preclude a return to 1967 borders and the narrow corridor access to Jerusalem. In 1977, Blake and Harris suggested that there were 10 suburban sites round Jerusalem. The future of these particular West Bank settlements plus others near Nablus and Jericho are in jeopardy in light of the Camp David agreements of September 1978. However, at the same time there are several rural settlements on the West Bank which have been established by a group of messiaric Zionists called Gush Emunim (they have settlements at Ramallah and Nablus). On occasion, the military has been used to forcibly remove these settlers from their "illegal" villages.

On the Golan Heights, at least 25 settlements, mostly moshavim have been laid out in clusters so compact that they will inevitably merge as they grow.[2] Some were initiated in a wild-cat manner immediately after the Six Day War when settlers from Upper Galilee decided to make the area more secure. The main argument used to justify settlement is that a buffer zone is vital to national

security.

In Sinai, since 1967, Jewish rural settlements have been created in four major locations, three of which previously had a small, settled Bedouin population. At Nuwaiba, the Jewish settlement of Neviot has been created. At Dahab, the moshav of Dizahab has been founded. Near Sharm-el-Sheikh, always an important gunboat port and military airport controlling the Straits of Tiran and thereby access to Eilat, the new garrison town of Ophira was established in 1971. The present population is only 1,000 though its projected population is to be 10,000 by 1986. The fourth location is in south-central Sinai near St. Catharine's Monastery where the Israelis have built an administrative/tourist complex in association with permanent housing for the Bedouin. Nearby is an airport which is served by small planes from Eilat bringing tourists to visit the monastery and associated biblical sites. Here, undoubtedly, a major motive for foundation unlike the others mentioned, is the attraction of economic returns from tourism. Other motives include the control of the Egyptian oilfields (returned to Egypt in 1975) and the value of Sinai as a bargaining tool (Blake and Harris, 1977).

The situation is obviously extremely complex. There are settlements in other parts of the occupied territories about which virtually nothing is known because of their military function (e.g. the radar and tracking stations at the Mitla and Gidi Passes, Ras Mohammed and along the Lebanese frontier). Most are small and relatively insignificant in numerical terms, as seen in the table below. Their functional importance, however, far exceeds numerical strength.

Estimated population in the occupied areas (1977)

	Arabs	Jews
Sinai	60,000	2,000
Gaza Strip	430,000	500
West Bank*	680,000	4,000
Golan	9,000	3,000

* excludes the suburbs of East Jerusalem

Source: Blake and Harris, 1977

Continued existence of the settlements is uncertain. What is clear though, is that like "official" development towns, the settlements in the occupied areas receive substantial funds from the Israeli Government. They may be likened to the illegal Homa Vemigdal settlements of the 1930's which also received funds and which were a physical expression of Jewish control.

Note.

1. Since September 1978 the Knesset has approved the spending of at least £27.5 million on the "thickening" of Jewish settlements in Gaza and the West Bank. (Observer 11 March, 1979)

2. A 1977 document by the Ministry of Housing has illustrations and plans of residential quarters and the civic centre to be built in an industrial-urban centre called Katzerin in the Golan Heights. The document also has illustrations of the urban centres of Yamit and Ophira.

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