LAND-USE PLANNING AND THE MARKET:

An examination of private housebuilding in West Central Scotland

by

Gordon Cameron

Submitted as part of the requirements for the Degree of Master of Philosophy

Department of Town and Regional Planning
University of Glasgow

APRIL 1981

SYNOPSIS

In a mixed economy the implementation of planning policies must, to a large extent, depend upon the actions of the private sector. This places an onus on the planning system to understand and appreciate how its objectives can be achieved through the management of market forces. The present study attempts to examine some of the problems which this can pose; particularly in relation to the control of private housebuilders. It is not, however, intended to be a comprehensive essay on the relationship between planning and the market. Rather, the emphasis is placed throughout on an examination of the practical problems which planners face in this respect; and on considering how the operation of market forces can frustrate the planning system in its efforts to control private investment.

The study is structured in the following manner:

Chapter One sets out to establish the rationale for land-use planning intervening in the operation of the market. Firstly, planning can be justified on the grounds that its purpose is to compensate for the imperfections which characterise the workings of the land market. Planning, in these circumstances, restricts itself to the task of removing any obstructions which hinder the efficient operation of market forces; playing, in effect, a passive rather than an active role. Secondly, planning can legitimize its actions by pointing out that the unfettered operation of market forces will inevitably work to the disadvantage of those in greatest need. Planning must, therefore, play a more active role, challenging the way in which private agents operate in

the market. The question is whether or not planning can actually fulfill this task, bearing in mind both the tools which are available to carry out land-use planning, and the hostility which this course of action is likely to generate in the private sector.

Chapter Two examines some of the practical implications of these problems by looking at the way in which the economics of private housebuilding can create special problems for the planning process. Here the emphasis is placed upon developing a critique of the land-use planning system by illustrating the limited opportunity which it has to control the decisions made by private builders, operating in the land and development market. The chapter highlights the conflicting and variable pressures which a planner can experience when attempting to deal directly with the market.

Chapter Three develops these considerations further with a study of the private builder/public planner relationship in the West of Scotland. The study traces, in some detail, the way in which the housing and land markets have developed in the area in order to stress their importance in determining the milieu within which land-use planning must take place. This provides the essential background for an analysis of the conflict between Strathclyde Region and the private housebuilders, over the allocation of land for private housing in the Structure Plan. Certain features of this conflict cogently illustrate how past and prevailing market forces can circumscribe the actions of planners. The role of the housebuilding lobby, representing the market, and the Secretary of State, representing central government, in determining the outcome of this conflict are seen as crucial.

Chapter Four deals with the practical problems which Glasgow District Council face in their efforts

to manage and direct the activities of private house-builders. The influence which the micro-political environment can have on the planner/market relationship is examined. In addition, the methods used by the planners to increase the level of 'in-town' private housebuilding are examined.

Basing its conclusions on evidence detailed in the previous two chapters the final chapter analyses the problems which can arise when planning attempts to influence the operation of the market-motivated, private sector. The chapter also includes some general suggestions on how the planning system might be made both more effective and more sensitive in its efforts to cope with the management of market forces.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES

LIST OF FIGURES

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I should like to thank those people in local and central government who spared some of their valuable time to answer my questions. Special thanks in this respect are due to: Miss Bruce of Motherwell District Council, Mrs. Henderson of Clydesdale (formerly Lanark) District Council, Mr. Sim and Mr. McGowan of Glasgow District Council, Mr. Ford of Eastwood District Council, Mr. Cowan of Strathclyde Regional Council and Mr. Wood of the Central Research Unit in the Scottish Office.

I also wish to acknowledge the cooperation extended to me by the senior management of several building firms which operate in the area.

My thanks also go to Miss Sheila McDonald, Dr. Gordon Adams and Mr. Miller Allan for their comments and advice.

In addition, my thanks go to all those who helped in the typing of this dissertation, particularly my parents and brother and all those at Caledonian Tractor and Equipment Co. Ltd.

Finally I am especially grateful to my wife Janet, who supplied either meals, coffee or encouragement whenever they were needed.

INTRODUCTION

INTRODUCTION

In a mixed economy the land-use planner has to recognise that his ability to attain certain objectives could be hampered by the need to take account of market forces. The planning system can, at present, only influence the location of private developments through its powers of negative control. While the local authorities prepare plans indicating those areas in which certain kinds of development are preferred, they have only a limited ability to directly carry out any of these projects. The initiative to develop the land allocated in plans has, in consequence, lain largely with market motivated, private enterprise. This means that the relationship between market forces and planning policies is critical, as it can determine the way in which future development occurs.

The present study sets out to examine firstly, why it was thought necessary for planning to control market forces; and secondly, what difficulties such policies can give rise to in both plan-making and plan-implementation. The latter question is analysed in relation to the attempts made by land-use planning to control the actions of private housebuilders.

The relationship which currently exists between the public and private sector is usually characterised by mutual distrust and misunderstanding. The quality, commitment and accountability of local authority planners is frequently challenged by the private sector. While to many planners, the private sector is "motivated by greed, steeped in speculation, staffed by furtive entrepreneurs and marshalled by a landed profession deeply sunk in abject cynicism" (Ratcliffe 1976). It seems almost inevitable that there will be a continuing tension between the private sector's profit motive and the public sector's social objective of ensuring development benefits those in need (Hambleton 1980).

Despite this almost traditional hostility, the planner has to operate within a society which is generally amenable to market operations. Therefore, in order to attain the social objectives set by the community he must function as an agent of the market if he is to encourage private sector investment in areas of need (Ratcliffe 1976). This would suggest that any urban policy which is designed to operate in a mixed economy, must "face the problem of how and to what extent the market in capital and land can be harnessed, regulated or controlled" (MacKay and Cox 1979). If, therefore, a planning authority is to manage the orderly development of a town or city then it must show an ability, and a willingness, to understand both the land and development markets.

This study investigates whether or not these criteria are being met; and if by themselves, they allow the planning system to control market forces.

It is a question which is becoming increasingly important as the pressure grows on planners to re-examine the relationship which presently exists between the public and private sectors. The problem of inner areas, in particular, is felt to be so acute "that it can only be effectively tackled by the public and private sectors working in concert" (Hart 1980).

This was a view which obtained perhaps its first airing in a report entitled "New Homes in the Cities", the main theme of which was concerned with attracting private housing investment back to city centres (National Economic Development Office 1972). It was felt that an increase in the level of private housebuilding in the inner city would not only supplement council housebuilding, in terms of the number of houses built and improvement of the physical environment; but would also "widen the choice of house types and tenure available in the inner areas, thus potentially increasing the attraction for people from outside, as well as affording alternatives for those already there" (Nicholls et al 1980).

These are advantages which have attracted the interest of both members and officials in local authorities. Consequently, a number of urban planning policies, in recent years, have been aimed at redirecting the activities of private housebuilders away from suburban sites, and towards the conurbations.

These attempts to control the actions of one group of private sector agents, operating in the land and development markets, provide an ideal opportunity to investigate the relationship between land-use planning and market forces. The question being posed is whether or not the land-use planning system can effectively influence the actions of private builders. The problem is examined in relation to the efforts made by both Strathclyde Regional, and Glasgow District Councils in order to control private sector investment in housing.

The study begins, however, by examining the rationale for land-use planning intervening in the operation of market forces. This is done in order to establish a background against which both later questions can be considered, and the success or failure of land-use planning in its efforts to control market forces can be judged.

CHAPTER ONE

LAND-USE PLANNING AND THE MARKET: SOME THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS.

1.1 Land-use planning, which relies on the powers made available to local authorities to grant or withhold planning permission and to zone land for different uses, could be regarded as the "key urban policy" (McKay and Cox 1979), as it can fundamentally affect population movements and patterns of public and private investment. Yet the motives which lie behind it have evolved on a somewhat piecemeal basis and planning objectives have often been formulated only as problems have arisen. Therefore, a clearly defined set of reasons why the public sector should undertake to make certain land-use decisions is not subject to a simple systematic presentation (Pearce et al 1978). Nevertheless, as the allocation of land is a product of actions taken in the public planning sector and the private land market, it is essential to establish at least something of the rationale used to legitimise the actions of planners.

1.2 The objectives of the 1947 Town and Country Planning Act (the main features of which are still reflected in the current powers available to carry out land-use planning) have been described by Hall et al (1973) as having three main policy elements- urban containment, protection of rural land and the creation of self contained and balanced communities. To attain these goals it is clear that the market in private land had, in some way, to expect restrictions in its operation. The policies which, however, followed on from these objectives and the powers make available to implement them, were strongly influenced by a pre-occupation with the achievment of physical standards, and lacked both social and economic components. Thus, initially at least, the attainment of planning objectives was not necessarily perceived to imply intervention in the workings of the land market to inhibit inefficiency (Pearce et al 1978).

Today the situation is somewhat different. The planner is now more aware that his intervention for the purpose of regulating land-use carrys with it the corollary that this means both influencing the efficiency of the land market,and the redistribution of real incomes. As a result it is now apparent that there are

two "driving forces" justifying government intervention in the allocation of land: First there is the search for efficiency,and second there is the desire for greater equity, or social justice, in the distribution of the products derived from land-use (Lichfield 1980).

In general,one of the strongest arguments for a system of land-use planning, carried out by the public sector, emphasises how the land market exhibits a number of distortions which cause an undesirable movement away from land and resource allocation efficiency. These inefficiencies are the result of what Pearce at al (1978) describe as market imperfections and market failures. The former is the result of distortions in the market itself, the latter a distortion that emanates from outside of the market altogether. Some of the most important of these features which have been identified as being responsible for the inefficient use of land are:

(1) Land is physically undepreciable and is not influenced by time, while the qualities of virtually all other commodities depreciates with time.

(2) Land is not transportable. Thus the concept of a national land market is a "particularly heroic idealisation of the reality" (Hyman and Markowski 1980).

(3) Land is limited in quantity; and its supply, though not completely inelastic (See 2.5.),cannot be increased absolutely:

(4) Land is used not only for production but also as a long term investment (See 2.6.):

(5) The commodity is not standardised and with the comparative lack of transactions the establishment of a firm market price is difficult:

(6) The supply of buildings takes a long time to adjust to demand because they take time to erect:

(7) The external effects of a particular land-use may not be reflected in the market price of the plot:

(8) Actions in response to market signals are slow because buyers and/or sellers lack market experience and information: (Harrison 1977, Darin-Drabkin 1979, Lichfield 1979a).

1.3 These unique characteristics, it is argued, can lead to a permanent disequilibrium in the land market between supply and demand. It has been a general willingness to accept, and acknowledge, the very real difficulties posed by these imperfections which has provided, at least in part, the rationale for some kind of land-use planning.

One way of responding to this need for public intervention is to accept the potential usefulness of the land market as an "indicator of citizen preferences in policy areas where the authority must make decisions" (Elkins 1974). The main purpose for intervention then becomes "the construction of a framework which induces the self-regulating market mechanism to achieve societal equilibrium" (Ratcliffe 1976).

Under these conditions land would be perfectly and rationally allocatable among competing users via coordinated supply and demand mechanisms. An agreement could be secured between buyers and sellers, at a mutually satisfactory price, by the process of bidding, which would also ensure that the quantity of land offered for sale equalled the quantity actually purchased. The resulting market equilibrium in a competitive economy such as this will produce a Paretian optimal allocation of resources - one which can be altered only by increasing the utility of some individual at the expense of the utility of others (Nath 1973). In the light of these alleged "qualities of the theoretical model, and given the real internal logical coherence of the neo-classical paradigm it is scarcely surprising that it has given rise to a widespread if not doctrinaire belief in the finality and universality of the market mechanism" (Scott 1980).

The conclusion which is an almost inevitable result of this reasoning is that the proper role of planning is to remove as many as possible of the distortions which inhibit the operation of the land market, the basic objective being to attain "the same land-use pattern that would have emerged naturally from the process of the urban real estate market under conditions of perfect competition" (Lichfield and Darin-Drabkin 1980).

This image of the beneficial perfect market "can be discerned without too much imagination in the writings of many social theorists and planning practioners" (Broadbent 1977). It has been a particularly pervasive influence on discussions surrounding the concept of rational planning.

The idea of rational planning has been traced back, by Camhis (1979), to the doctrine of free competition and individualism; the market rationality taking "good care of all those things that social planning is now supposed to do" (Camhis 1979). Although Lindblom (1973) and Etzioni (1973) later rejected the 'rationalistic tradition in planning' as being a model which could not be applied in the real world it still remains in planning as an "ideal which must be pursued" (Solesbury 1974). Furthermore, in view of what Camhis (1979) has said, it is an ideal which can best be pursued through refining and improving the operation of the market - one area in which Meyerson (1973) has identified an important role for planning to play.

The "Central Intelligence Function" which he allocates to planning accepts that decision takers (like housebuilders) rarely have the right kind of accurate information to make a rational decision. Here the planner steps in to regularly check and interpret the local market situation and supply the appropriate body, or individual, with the necessary information. The planner thereby can "lubricate the process of urban development and achieve many of the main objectives of city planning by facilitating intelligent individual actions"; planning through

"land-use and other controls" compensating "for the problems - the failures - of the market" (Meyerson 1973).

This proposition rests on the idea that it is for the planner to plan and the landowner or builder to implement. The key to successful planning lies in a readiness to understand and co-operate with the land market, and community objectives are achieved by directing rather than totally controlling the market forces (McKie 1974).

In these circumstances the kind of activity which planning should be carrying out involves giving landowners and builders all the relevant information on demand for land, within the planned area, and the nature of the uses which a given plan will generate and require. Thereafter, the planner takes into account the reactions of the private sector to these proposals, and plans accordingly. By using this method planning hopes to achieve its objectives through the establishment of general conditions to which all development must conform, but which within those conditions leaves decisions to the individual owner or builder. In effect the intention is "to make the market mechanism more effective" (Hayek 1960).

1.4 Of particular importance to this study is the way in which the private housebuilders have,by and large, sought to ensure that planning restricts itself to this kind of role. The aim of the private builders is to make a profit on their activities and this implies that their response to different opportunities is determined by relative profitability and market demand. In the circumstances what they want from planning is a system which will allow them to respond as efficiently as possible to this demand by eliminating some of the vagaries of the land market already outlined. Then, on completion of the project, some guarantee of "protection against excessive and incompatible activities" (Walshe 1980) to ensure that their product will have a good chance of being quickly sold.

One area in which the housebuilders are particulary anxious for planning to play an active role is in the provision of information. This is a result of the distaste which most builders have, particularly the larger ones, for any uncertaintity regarding the future pattern of public investment in an area; especially investment in infrastructure.

Unless the housebuilder has both clear cut planning policies which clarify the likely future prospects in an area, and regular contact with the planners on the more detailed aspects of these plans, then his ability "to assess accurately the financial viability of a site can be seriously impaired" (Craven 1970). This is an element of risk which can make any decision arrived at sub-optimal in terms of the potential profit which might be realised by a builder on a particular contract.

Therefore, as the House-Builders Federation emphasised in their paper "Land For Housing", their view is that the planning system should have "the purpose of permitting the market mechanism to allocate land, to determine its rate of usage, and its price" (H.B.F. undated), functions they argue which the market can perform better than any administrative machinery. The measure of success for the planning process is how sensitive it is to the demands of the market and how efficiently it allows these demands to be met (Baron 1980a).

1.5 So far the explanation for land-use planning has been couched solely in terms of improving the efficiency of the market mechanism. The planner performs only those tasks which will remove the hinderances that stand in the way of the effective operation of the market. In the performance of these duties the work of the planner can be represented as a technical and politically neutral activity which is intended only to produce a rational land-use pattern (Ambrose 1976a). This is at least one aspect of the planning system which appears to have the support of the housebuilders; however most, if not all planners, would argue that this is too limited and myopic a view to take, and that it ignores the wider consequences of some of the distortions outlined earlier.

In particular they point to the fact that even a "lubricated" land market will, by its very nature, "consistently trigger off negative and disruptive land-use outcomes" (Scott 1980).

In the first place, although a specific land-use decision might appear rational to the individual decision maker it cannot reflect the current, or indeed the future, "costs and benefits to those outside of that particular land transaction" (Lichfield 1979a). In addition, the pattern of land-use values which is determined by a market mechanism will ignore the needs of unprofitable, but socially desirable, uses of land such as schools and parks (Balchin and Kieve 1977). But perhaps most important of all is the way in which public intervention designed only to ease the operation of market forces would ignore the second "driving force" in planning - equity.

In the process of market bargaining the response of suppliers will depend upon the resources which the customer can use in the negotiating process. However, as Harvey (1973) points out the resources which can be used in these negotiations, particulary money and wealth, are not divided equally among the potential customers. Where there is to be any weight attached to the goal of equity, planning must, therefore, consider the implications of supporting a market process based upon the existing distribution of income and wealth in society. Unless this factor is taken into account then market forces, which as Simmie (1974) notes contain hidden methods of regressive distribution, will "tend towards inequality in a situation where resources are scarce; and this applies most strongly to land" (Eversley 1973).

On this evidence it is clear that land-use planning must do more than simply ease the operation of the market. It must confront, and, if necessary, overrule the forces which operate in the market. The tools which have been made available to land-use planners to carry out this task are land allocation or zoning, which attempts to direct private investment towards areas of need as opposed to areas

where maximum profit can be realised; and development control, which limits the rights associated with the private ownership of land. The extent to which planning has, however, succeeded in diverting, or mitigating, the effects of the private land market to the benefit of less privileged areas and people - as the goal of equity would dictate - is widely questioned. In fact as Goodall (1972) points out "similarites are more common than differences" between the patterns of land-use in a planned environment and those evolved via the market mechanism. While Hall et al (1973) notes that the operation of land-use planning has seen the most fortunate get the most benefits while the least fortunate have gained very little. In the same way the machinery of development control has been shown to "reflect rather than modify the distribution of power, and therefore land-use rights," its main purpose being to control "trivial and aesthetic judgements rather than the workings of the economy and society" (Simmie and Hale 1978). What explanation then can be offered for this apparent failure of land-use planning?

1.6 In view of what has already been said about the inherently regressive and unsatisfactory nature of the private land market it is clear that public intervention,through land-use planning, in order to achieve certain goals, must in a mixed economy set itself against the prevailing market system.

It is inevitable that in so doing it will come up against, opposition from those who have most to gain from the market system being left intact. Agents, such as housebuilders, who operate in the market can be expected to resist any intervention by planners with the intention being to minimise the effects where they are likely to impose costs. The market then is clearly not to be ordered around (Foster 1973).

This conflict is the inevitable outcome of planning, with its emphasis on need and goal maximization, coming up against, for example, the private housebuilder motivated by profit maximization and demand. If profits can be advanced, or the

worst effects of any proposed policy on profits minimised, by exerting pressure on the planning system then resistance is almost guaranteed. In the circumstances it is hardly surprising that the communications between the two sectors, private and public, take place in an atmosphere of mutual distrust, the "public sector keeping a distance from but wanting to control the private sector, and the private sector continually seeking ways of getting around the controls" (Hambleton 1980).

This argument does not, however, offer a completely satisfactory explanation for some of the disappointing results acheived by land-use planning. While it is clear planners should expect opposition to some of their policies why has the system failed to offer any effective resistance to these pressures when they have been applied by the private sector?

For Simmie (1974) the failure can be blamed on the planners themselves who have lacked the necessary vision, knowledge and will to tackle the problem of ensuring a redistribution of resources.

In the same vein Eversley (1973) lambasts planners for failing to recognise their role as the "master - allocator" of resources, with a responsibility for ensuring greater equality. This explanation, however, fails to take account of two further points.

First, as Pahl (1975) explains, 'gatekeepers' like the planners, may not in fact have the kind of power and influence which would allow them to significantly alter the allocation of resources. The responsibility for the apparent failure of planners may lie at a level of policy making and resource allocation which is beyond their responsibility and control. This would imply that "attacks at the level of urban management may be misdirected" (Pahl 1975),and unproductive.

Second, a workman is only as good as his tools, and the tools which are available to carry out land-use planning display some basic weaknesses. The dominant feature of the British land-use planning system, since 1953, has been the extent to which

"local authorities have lacked the power to direct and implement rather than merely draw up and regulate plans and development" (McKay and Cox 1979). As a result planning has been in practice of a passive rather than an active nature. Local authorities must rely on the initiative and activities of other development agencies and particularly, in relation to residential land programming, the response of private housebuilders. This is not the situation which was envisaged when the legislative framework for land-use planning was first established.

The 1947 Act "did not expect market forces to be very important in determining the future growth of urban England" (Hall et al 1973). Amendments to the 1947 scheme, however, were introduced by the Conservatives in 1953/54 and 1959 to re-establish the private land market. When this was combined with a growing demand for owner-occupation (unexpectedly giving the private sector a larger role in the implemention of plans), and a post-war increase in the birth rate (negating the static population assumptions of the legislation) then the whole developmental context in which the 1947 scheme was intended to operate was totally distorted. The new planning structures introduced in the 1971 and 1972 Planning Acts, for England and Scotland respectively, did not accept that the existing powers available to local authorities for land-use planning should be changed. Thus since 1947, particularly in relation to attempts to redirect private investment by housebuilders, "the planning system has faced a rapidly changing developmental context with a structure devised to accommodate a development process which barely operated for three years" (Hooper 1980). In particular, the resources to implement plans lie outside of the effective control of planners and they have few, if any, means of imposing their will on agents operating in the private market (Broadbent 1977). But this is not the only problem planners have in trying to control the actions of the private sector for redistributive ends.

As Foley (1973) has observed, the objectives which have been pursued in land-use planning have, perforce, been defined almost solely in terms of an idealised spatial design and have concentrated on the physical aspects of the plan. Physical and spatial goals have been assumed to bring socio-economic benefits, or to be desirable for their own sake without needing to be further justified (Harrison 1979).

Yet as Ambrose and Colenutt (1975) have shown this leaves the planner with no real power to create social plans or implement social policy. This is a handicap which severely constrains the planner in any attempt to exert influence over the regressive forces operating in the private market. The developer and builder has only to justify his proposals in pure physical planning terms, the general economic or social consequences of allowing a particular development cannot be taken into account.

This ambivalent attitude towards the market is reflected in the scope allowed to planning policies. Development plans "shall be" statements setting out proposals for the use of land, but they only "have regard to" the social and economic consequences of these spatial policies (H.M.S.O. 1972). The plans, therefore, have no explicit remit to examine in detail either the distributional consequences, or the structural implications of their policies, in terms of market processes (Hooper 1980).

In view of what has been said above it becomes easier to understand why land-use planning has found it difficult to control the operation of market forces. The weaknesses in the planning system have encouraged developers to regard the planning process as an obstacle to be overcome rather than a framework of constraints and guidelines within which their decisions must be made. The exercise of development planning has been devalued by the failure to take

account of the powers actually available to implement policies and this has contributed to a feeling that very little output is being obtained from plan making for the input required (Lichfield 1979b).

1.7 So far, implicit to this examination of why land-use planning has had difficulties in controlling market forces, has been the assumption that the barriers to redistribution and equity are self-imposed by either planners or legislators. This assumption can be, and has been, challenged.

It can be argued that land-use planning in capitalist countries "always tends to be concerned with the continued management of capitalism and the containment of class demands" (McDougall 1979). The state, in the form of land-use planning, only intervenes when the "autodestructive social and property relations of capitalism, as they make their way through the land contingent process" (Scott 1980), threaten the continued operation of the capitalist system. This approach, however, fails to make allowances for the fact that, on occasion, social reforms have been achieved through radical intervention in the market system. But worst of all it can only be seen as a philosophy of despair in which no potential is seen to exist for change or improvement without dismantling the entire institutional framework - "the only appropriate action being to throw stones or dismantle the state" (Broadbent 1977).

For any planner who is at work today, trying perhaps to achieve redistributive ends through the manipulation of agents who operate in the private market, this is a theory which offers no prescription or framework for action. It tends, if anything, to imply that the situation should be allowed to deteriorate until such time as "revolution" becomes inevitable. This, as Broadbent (1977) goes on to point out, is simply throwing away all the possibilities and potential of existing institutions such as planning. Therefore, it is necessary to consider some

alternative conclusions which are both practical and action orientated.

1.8 The above evidence has illustrated how planning can play two quite different and contrasting roles in its dealings with market forces. First, planning can be identified as the means for removing the distortions which inhibit the operation of market forces. In this role the planner attempts to make the land market operate more efficiently, the implicit assumption being that more than just economic benefits can be derived from the operation of a perfect market. This is an area where the housebuilders in particular are happy to see planning play an important part.

If planning, however, has any ambition to achieve those goals which are concerned with equity then it is clear that market forces must be challenged and resisted. This is the second role which planning can play, but in carrying out this task planning must anticipate, and be prepared for, opposition. The planners must, therefore, ensure that their reason for intervention is sound, their justification for intervention is defensible, their analysis of prevailing market conditions is accurate and, above all, that their policy is capable of being implemented. If it is clear that a plan cannot be implemented, and it does not meet all these criteria, then it will be ignored by the very people that it was meant to influence.

The means, however, which are available to carry out this 'action orientated' land-use planning have been shown to be deficient in a number of respects but "this does not justify the jettisoning of physical planning" or local authority development planning (Pickvance 1977). Jowell (1977) has illustrated how the powers which are presently available can be used as effective instruments for both achieving social policies and permitting positive planning "where the authority directs the use and development of land instead of simply reacting to market forces" (Jowell 1977).

The implication is that genuine and worthwhile results can be realised when and where the effort is made.

This chapter has shown that while the control of market forces may not be an easy job for land-use planning, it is both a necessary and feasible goal to aim for. The question is though, how effective has planning been in its response to this challenge? One area, as already indicated above (1.4.), in which it is possible to examine some of the more practical aspects of this confrontation is in the allocation of land for private housebuilding. This is an arena where the conflict between land-use planning and market forces is particularly visible, and this has been very much the case for West Central Scotland in recent years.

In consideration of this, and in order to provide a firm foundation for a later discussion of private housebuilding in this area, the following chapter goes on to examine how the unique features of both the housebuilding industry and the land market, create special problems for the planning process. It is, however, against the theoretical background set out in this chapter that any later questions must be considered, and subsequently answered.

CHAPTER TWO

THE ECONOMICS OF PRIVATE HOUSEBUILDING AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR LAND-USE PLANNING.

2.1 One of the most important elements in the process of house construction is the availability of land, and as such it is a focus of concern to all those with an involvement in housebuilding. In the past any conflicts over the question of land availability for private housing in Scotland have been comparatively muted, and "as a source of friction between builders and local planning authorities it appears to have been much less acute than in England and Wales" (Gaskin 1977). This situation, however, was almost transformed in the space of a year by the publication in 1978 of the Lothian Region Structure Plan, followed a year later by Strathclyde's Structure Plan (Lothian Region 1978a, Strathclyde Region 1979). In both these cases the policies which dealt with residential land allocation were an immediate source of considerable, and at times, rancorous dispute; but before exploring in more detail the background to, and progess of, events in Strathclyde it is neccessary to spend some time considering the economics of both the land-market, and the housebuilding industry. A number of the most important features of the land availability process depend, at least in part, upon the way in which these particular economic circumstances influence the decisions of both planners and builders.

2.2 In any consideration of the land question, particularly as it affects private housebuilders, one of the most important features which has to be recognised is "the extent to which their actions and opportunities are demand determined" (Department of the Environment 1975). In all the interviews carried out with the private builders this aspect of their work was consistently emphasised. The builders in question were in fact all operating in that part of the market which concentrates on speculative building for sale. As a result it was not only the level of actual and current demand which they identified as important, but also the industry's expectation of future demand.

The demand factor which has,till now, been almost exclusively linked with any fluctuation in the activity of private housebuilders is the variation in the supply of mortgages. The conclusion seemed to be that "the most important single variable which determined the activities of the private housebuilder was the number of mortgage advances being made by building societies" (Wilkinson and Archer 1976). The evidence from figure 2.1. would appear to confirm this. The ability of building societies to grant mortgages is measured by the net inflow of funds and, allowing for a time lag in the response from builders, the peaks and troughs in housing starts shadow the fluctuating fortunes of the societies. The housebuilders, however, revealed themselves to be less satisfied now with that explanation than they might have been two to three years ago.

As table 2.1. clearly indicates every housebuilder interviewed, bar one, failed in 1980 by a significant proportion to meet the target which they had set themselves for house sales. However, all the private builders who were interviewed

	House Sales	
Builders	Projected	Actual
A	250	170
B	500	523
C	450	380
D	400	340
E	500	420
F	350	240
G	"20 per cent	down"

Table 2.1.

Graph of Private Sector Dwellings started (Scotland) and Inflow of Funds to Building Societies (U.K.)



Figure 2.1.

Housing Starts - - - - - -

Building Society Funds ————

Source: Scottish Development Department (1972-1980)

declared quite unequivocally that during this same period a significant proportion of their quota mortgages, allocated to them by building societies, had gone unused. The building societies themselves, while they had some difficulty in maintaining a satisfactory intake of funds, had not experienced difficulties on anything like the scale observable in the building industry. In fact,the general manager of one of the largest building societies was able to assert that even if queues for mortgages did exist they did not last any longer than the time taken to sort out the details of a house transaction (Guardian 1980a). In a similar vein the director of the House Builders Federation, Roger Humber, described the question of mortgage availability as having nothing to do with the decline in private sector housebuilding (Sunday Times 1980).

In these circumstances the explanation for the recent decline in private housebuilding appears to lie less in the ability or inability of potential customers to obtain mortgages, and more in their willingness or capacity to take on the monthly repayments. This conclusion is further confirmed when the nature of the decline in housing output is considered.

The situation was described by one builder as being one in which "the first time buyer market has proved to be the most resiliant; the worst effect of the decline has been felt in the middle part of our range." This was a view to which all the builders subscribed. In every case the sector of the market which had experienced the most severe decline,proportionately,was the middle part (prices around £30,000). The first time buyer market had help up relatively well,and up market houses (prices over £35,000) had continued to sell. The people then who had shown the most propensity to postpone the decision to buy were probably those in a position to consider perhaps their first 'trade-up' move. This decline in the number of people moving from one house to another, in a better area or condition, was also identified by the Building Societies Association as being an

important feature of the housing market in 1980 (Guardian 1980b). The evidence above would suggest that for the individual purchaser the decision not to buy has turned, not so much on the availability of a mortgage, but on uncertaintity over future household finance - in attempting then to explain the current status of private housebuilding, consideration must be given to an even wider array of economic factors than simply the supply of mortgages.

The importance of this conclusion lies in the even greater emphasis it places upon the influence which broad, macro-economic policy, instituted by central government, can have on the housing market in general, and private builders in particular; the outcome often being unintentional and unforeseen. Now, more than ever, it is the case "that the chief impacts on the (private) housing sector have been the side effects of broad policies aimed at reducing inflation" (Bassett and Short 1980).

The implications of this for the land-use planning process are of some considerable importance. If, as we have seen, the actions, and so the land requirements, of private house-builders are largely if not wholly determined by centrally directed economic policy, then this is a factor over which the local authority planner has no control or influence. Faced with the task of allocating and programming future land requirements a planner, using the best available information, can find any scheme made redundant, almost overnight, by a decision to cut the minimum lending rate by 4 per cent. While it might be argued that all the elements of a plan are subject to the same kinds of influence, the position in regard to residential land allocation is of particular importance. This is because in most structure plans, and particularly in the case of Strathclyde and Lothian, the policies concerned with land allocation were meant to play a central, if not crucial role, in the attempts to actually implement the chosen strategies.

The way in which planning has been influenced by this situation will be considered later,but at this point it is important to bear in mind the way in which planning would appear to stand remote from the 'principia media' (Friedmann 1973) which influence private housebuilders, yet at the same time attempts to control their activities.

2.3 It is important, however, to emphasise at the same time that it is not only on economic but also on social and political grounds that politicians and others have varied in their approach to owner occupation - and so private housebuilders. While the private sector is currently faced with a difficult situation it should not be forgotten that in the past Conservative policies have usually favoured "profits for the private developer and builders", with those interests able to maximise their role in the land and property market when Conservative governments have attempted to implement free market policies (McKay and Cox 1979). The situation at present is one in which the housebuilders find themselves, in the words of the past - president of the Housebuilders Federation, "for the first time in many years entirely in step with the objectives of the Government of the day" (Latham 1979/80). In the circumstances one might expect this shared sense of purpose to have played an important part in shaping some features of the land availability conflict both in Strathclyde and other parts of the country. It is also possible to envisage that in view of the limited influence which planning authorities have on the major economic aspects of housebuilding that social and political pressures, exercised locally, will attempt to influence the process of residential land allocation, albeit within a narrowly defined economic framework. But before going on to consider some of these aspects of the land question it is neccessary to return to an investigation of the economics of housebuilding, this time with particular reference to the land market.

24 The way in which prices are determined in the residential land market is perhaps the most important side-effect of the demand influences outlined above.

As Drewett (1973) noted in his examination of private housebuilders most bid prices for sites are arrived at by the residual method. This was confirmed, without contradiction, by all the house-builders interviewed in this study. By this method the bid price for a piece of land is calculated "by deducting the costs of development, plus profit, from the price which the market is prepared to pay for the completed houses" (Howell 1972). The demand for land then is a derived demand, the amount a purchaser can offer depending upon the price consumers are prepared to pay for the product that is to be provided by that land; and this price, as we have seen above, is itself frequently the product of policies aimed at targets other than housing. Nevertheless,the form which this demand for land does take, plays an important part in determining the pattern of building activities and land prices.

The most important features of this process, and its implications for planning, are best revealed during a period of suddenly increased demand. With the help of some figures arrived at through information supplied by the Scottish Development Department it is possible to illustrate,during such a period, some of the most pertinent aspects of this relationship between housebuilders and the land market.

The potential supply of housing in the owner-occupied sector consists of the stock of existing houses, plus new ones under construction for sale. The latter, although they make up on average only 2-2½% per cent, per annum of the housing stock make a much greater contribution to supply than this might suggest. This is because not every owner-occupied house is bought and sold every year. Estimates do, however, vary of the exact contribution that new houses make towards the total number sold in a year.

Pearce et al (1978) calculated a figure of 20 per cent while Charles (1977) quotes a figure of 40-50 per cent. In Scotland in general, and West Central Scotland in particular, where the level of owner occupation has been consistently lower than elsewhere in Britian the available stock of "second-hand" houses will inevitably be small. In such circumstances it seems likely that the contribution which new homes make to the total number sold will be towards the higher end of these estimates. As a result any significant increase in demand will put considerable pressure on the capacity of the area's building industry. As table 2.2. shows such an increase in demand took place between the middle 1960's and the early to middle 1970's.

Number of privately built new houses completed in West Central Scotland

Year	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974
Total	3542	2886	2851	2718	3147	3620	3171	4820	4923	5323	5216

Table 2.2. Source: S.D.D. (1975)

The explanation for this lay in a combination of "rising rents for public sector tenancies, the growth of personal disposable incomes, and ample building society funds" (National Economic Development Office 1976), and as figure 2.2. illustrates, this was matched by a substantial rise in the price of houses in Scotland. It is in such circumstances that the producers of housing explain the

Annual Average Scottish House Prices 1968-74 (1968 = 100)

And Retail Price Index



Fig 22. Source: S.D.D. (1980)

high level of house prices by blaming the high cost of land. An analysis of table 2.3. reveals, however, that the proportion of the house price taken up by land

Average Plot Prices* in West Central Scotland as a Percentage of the

Average Scottish House Price

Year	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974
Per Cent	3.5	2.5	3.5	3.1	3.2	4.1	3.1	3.5	3.8	3.6	3.3

Table 2.3. Source: S.D.D. 1980

costs remained steady throughout the boom period. In effect then, house prices rose rapidly as the supply coming onto the market could not be increased quickly enough, because of constraints internal to the building industry. This meant that the price of those houses which were available could be increased, by the builders, to a level at which the number of purchasers, able and willing to afford them, was reduced to the number of houses available.

*This excludes prices paid in Glasgow where the very small number of transactions randomly distorts the figures.

Thus in the period 1972 - 74 house prices rose by nearly 60 per cent in Scotland, while during the same period land prices in the Central Belt increased by about 40 per cent. This compares with a 25 per cent increase in the retail price index over the same period.

While it might be argued that this is a unique and perhaps unrepresentative case, the point which it cogently illustrates is the extent to which house prices can rapidly, and quite substantially increase in a manner which is not directly related to trends in land prices. In addition,this case illustrates how the builders would have been able to substantially improve their bid prices for residential land. The increased selling price for new and completed houses would allow them more leeway in calculating how much they could afford to pay for a piece of land. In these circumstances the price of land could then be bid up to a new, higher level. All this points to the conclusion that new houses are not expensive because land costs are high but rather that house prices, forced up by an increase in demand acting against a relatively inelastic supply, can drag land prices up behind them (Ambrose 1976b).

In the circumstances it would seem reasonable to assume, as many planners have, that to simply release additional residential land will "not make a ha' porth of difference to the level of house prices" (Senior 1972). While such arguments remain substantially true they should not be taken to imply, as has sometimes been the case, that the land release policies of planners will have no impact on house prices. It is clear from the above evidence that the short term effect on house prices of any release of residential land will be negligible. It is, however, equally clear that the capacity of the private sector to respond to an increase in demand will in part be determined by the amount of land which has <u>already</u> passed through the planning system and can be made available, almost immediately, to the housebuilders.

It is the capacity of the planning system to carry out a programme of land allocation and release such that the resources are available in both the right place and at the right time, that the builders question. The private sector argument, most enthusiastically prosecuted by Tom Baron of Christian Salvesen, is that the structure plan system has grossly underestimated the potential future demand for private housing land, and that it operates in a manner which is both inflexible and unresponsive to any change in circumstances (Baron 1980a).

The most important point to emphasise here, however, is the extent to which prices in the residential land market are determined by forces,once again outside the control of planning authorities, which influence in the first instance the demand for houses. Therefore, even if a local authority was able to accurately forecast future house requirements and so allocate land, in the right place and at the right time,to meet that demand,the programme could still founder due to an inability to effectively intervene in the land market. In effect "fluctuations in the market price of land are beyond their powers of influence" (Groves 1980), and this inability to influence the price of land is particularly important in the effect it has on the decision by a landowner whether or not to allow his land to come forward for development.

2.5 For any landowner there will be a supply price below which he will be unwilling to sell. In a market which is characterised by rising values or even, as Neuburger and Nichol (1976) conclude, simply "the expectation of future (higher) prices",the owner will try to obtain the best possible price for his land by keeping it off the market until the amount offered reaches a satisfactory level. In contrast, a substantial downturn in the land market is, as Hyman and Markowski (1980) illustrated, accompanied by a considerably greater fall in the number of

transactions; the owners postponing the decision to sell until it is possible to make a satisfactory return on their asset. This power of the landowner to refuse the best offer that the market can make has two important implications for planning.

First there is the effect it has on attempts to tax betterment values; although the Property Advisory Group felt able to point out that "the principle of taxing development gain is no longer an issue and the rate of Development Land Tax is at a level which is generally acceptable" (Department of the Environment 1980); it seems clear that landowners may be reluctant to bring land onto the market due to their perceptions of the impact of the tax (Barrett et al 1978a). The extent to which the tax is a genuine deterrent to land release is unclear (Rose 1973, Neutze 1974, Foster and Glaister 1975) but there are indications that owners nevertheless perceive the tax to be a major disincentive. This is despite the fact that "some at least are not liable to pay it or would have paid more under previous arrangements" (Barrett et al 1978b). The landowner then can choose either, not to make his land available for development, or to wait until the price, net of tax, is that which he would have originally accepted. The planner then is faced with a situation in which the two objectives of recouping for the community any increase in land values, and at the same time ensuring a supply of development land,are mutually antagonistic. His impotence in the face of the major forces which shape the residential land market compounding his difficulty.

The second problem for planning is the way in which the nature and purpose of landownership can influence the likelihood of a piece of land coming forward for development, with different owners having different supply prices.

If,for example,a piece of land is held as a speculative investment,then, during a period of increased demand for housing, the owner can expect higher prices

tomorrow than he is likely to get today,as the higher house prices feed through to the land market. If this optimism is shared by a number of owners then they will hold back from selling their land; their psychic selling price having been increased. If sufficient owners hold out for higher prices then they will observe that prices do in fact increase. This bolsters the sellers' view of the future even more "and higher and higher prices are asked, and the process goes on until the bubble breaks" (Schmid 1970).

In a similar fashion a person who owns a particular property with development potential may continue to hold that property, whatever the price offered, because he considers the development would be detrimental to amenities currently enjoyed. Work done by Kaiser and Weiss (1970) has,for instance, demonstrated that the price which will induce an owner to part with his land will reflect how long the person has owned it and whether or not he or she uses it.

Analogous to this is the situation where a builder may hold land adjacent to a completed development with the intention of expanding on to it. The firm, for financial reasons of its own, may however decide to restrain development on the site while nevertheless retaining the wish to eventually make use of it. In the circumstances the selling price likely to induce the firm to part with the land will be well in excess of the real value of the site; therefore a potentially useable site might go undeveloped.

The planner in the above circumstances is placed in a position where the allocation of land for residential development simply does not guarantee that the sites can be made available at a price which is compatible to both sides in the bargain. At the same time, outside of the circumscribed and expensive powers of Compulsory Purchase, there is no way in which he can actively and purposely intervene in the process; an important limitation bearing in mind that ownership problems have been identified as one of "the most severe constraints on the

prospects of future (housing) developments" (Department of the Environment 1978).

From the above description of some of the details of the residential land market it has been possible to illustrate how the price offered for housing land reflects, above all, the existing demand for housing, a factor identified in 1.2 as being outside the control of planning authorities. At the same time, the power of a landowner to refuse any offer that the market can make for his land, illustrates how the supply of residential land is subject to influences over and above those of 'rational economics'.

In the circumstances this analysis suggests that market forces, however distorted, will play the leading role in postponing or bringing forward land for development, irrespective of the land allocation policies pursued by planners; The veracity of this conclusion will be tested later, but first we consider how transactions are actually carried out in the residential land market and the additional problems this creates.

2.6 One of the most interesting features of the residential land market is the way in which many transactions, especially those involving greenfield sites, are not outright purchases but the granting of options or conditional contracts. These guarantee the owner a sum approaching the development value of his land if the option is exercised or the contract becomes unconditional.

Such an event will occur if planning consent in obtained by the person taking out the option or conditional contract (Pearce et al 1978). The advantage of this method of purchase lies not only in the cash saving, but in the fact that a small amount of cash is tied up in relation to the final value of the land purchased.

The extent to which developers use this method of land purchase varies considerably. The Department of the Environment (1975) found that the norm

among developers in the South-East was 20 to 50 per cent with some holding as much as 80 per cent of their land in this way. Of the builders interviewed in this study none were willing, or able, to give precise figures, however, only two were involved in the outright purchase of long term speculative or "sleeper land". One other builder did buy land without planning permission but only in circumstances where there was a very strong possibility of approval being granted in the near future. The other firms either used options or only bought land, sometimes from other builders, which already had planning permission. In the circumstances, as Bather (1976) also noted, the factor which appears to be of paramount importance in influencing the decision whether or not to buy residential land is the immediate availability, or strong likelihood, of obtaining planning permission. This suggests that there are very few transactions involving land with long term development potential, and the explanation for this can be found in the motives of both buyers and sellers.

In the latter case most landowners do not sell their land until it has a real prospect of planning permission being granted as it is not until then that they will receive the whole development value of their land. For the builder the purchase of long term development land would involve holding charges, pending planning permission, and the opportunity cost of tying up valuable capital in such speculative purchases is considered to be too high (Goldberg and Ulinden 1976).

The end result of this practice is one smaller market in speculative land with no, or very little, immediate prospect of development taking place, and another larger market in sites either with planning consent, or virtually certain to obtain it in the near future (Drewett 1973).

This division of the land market into two distinct sectors is mirrored in the different attitudes adopted by builders towards their land holdings. In one case the land is treated as a straightforward input to the development process, the

ownership of the land being essential because it is a condition of production. In contrast the purchase of land in which there is an element of speculation implies a view of land which emphasises its value as an investment good, carrying with it the possibility of realising, from it alone, a substantial profit (Massey and Catalano 1978).

Although much of the evidence which is available indicates that this latter approach is not as common as one might expect, it has been argued that housebuilders are becoming "increasingly dependent upon landownership for the financing of their productive activities" (Hooper 1980). This is because productivity in the housebuilding industry has increased at a much slower rate than in other sectors of industry producing low profit margins from production per se, and thus increasing the attractions of speculation in land (Ball 1978). If this were to be the case then it suggests that land allocation programmes would become even more difficult to implement. The builders might be unwilling to make use of land which they owned, and had been allocated for housing, until such time as the financial returns on the land part of the operations repaid their initial investment; in the circumstances there would be very little which planning could do to speed up the process of housebuilding.

2.7 While the above section contemplated the likelihood of land being purchased speculatively, it is clear that the only firms with the means to do this will be those with sufficient internal sources of finance to fund such operations. These are likely to be large firms with good financial contacts and operating in diverse fields of activity. This, however, is only one aspect of the way in which the structure of the industry can affect its operations, and it is this aspect of its economics which will now be considered.

The agents involved in the actual construction of housing are builders and developers. In practice, although a distinction can be drawn between the two (the builder constructs housing, the developer assembles land, finances

construction etc), the division has become less clear as the larger construction companies have broadened their activities to include all the functions formerly associated with the developer. Nevertheless, the industry continues to be characterised by a variety of types of firm which differ in their modes of operation and in the constraints they experience. The criterion most commonly used as a basis for the classification of building firms is their size (Harloe et al 1974, Balchin and Kieve 1977, Basset and Short 1980). As Craven (1969) points out, however, a firms "attitude to growth" also plays an important part in influencing its behaviour, and as all the firms involved in this study were either medium or large sized builders it was this factor, above all, which accounted for differences in behaviour.

All of the firms interviewed had access to similar sources of finance. Short term loans were obtained from the clearing banks, secured against the overall business reputation of the firm, the interest charges being $1\frac{1}{2}$ to 5 per cent above base rate. The builders also had the usual overdraft facilities on which to meet recurring expenditures and, as all these companies were part of a larger group, the holding company, or another member of the group, were further sources of finance, the loan usually being granted at a rate of interest $1\frac{1}{2}$ to 2 per cent above base rate. The factor, however, which above all influenced their mode of operation was the degree to which they relied on share capital raised in the City to finance parts of their work. To raise money this way public companies need to be continually expanding their operations and keeping their profits up, and if their investors confidence is not to be undermined the firm must present an image of growth and prosperity.

Where firms rely on this means of finance, then in order to maintain dividend repayments, a high turnover and an increase in profits, it implies mass designed housing on large sites; with a requirement that a minimum number of houses be

built, and sold, to meet fixed operating costs. This can contrast quite sharply with other firms where the pressures are less intense, and where rapid turnover is less important than the maximum rate of return on any one project. In these companies the drive for growth is a less important feature of their style of operation and, even though they may be building the same number of houses as a growth motivated builder, the differences between them remain substantial.

Thus the structure of the industry, in particular the attitude of companies operating in any one area to the need for growth, will create different pressures for the planning system. The extent to which this factor has been an influence on the way the conflict surrounding land allocation has evolved in the Strathclyde area, particularly around Glasgow, will be considered later.

2.8 The purpose of this chapter has been to elucidate the way in which the economics of housebuilding impinges, at a number of points, on the very planning system which seeks to influence the industry's behaviour. A number of the most important influences on the builders, it has been suggested, lie outside of the immediate control of planners; and in the context of a dominant private market in land the planning authority would appear to have only a limited opportunity to ensure that land really is ready for development, or to programme effectively its future availability. The problems involve the interplay between market circumstances, fiscal policy, and the motives of both owners - regarding the holding of land, and builders - regarding their financial objectives.

The discussion has also emphasised the extent to which planning in a mixed economy must recognise the role of the market and allow for the fact that public intervention, when it occurs, must be such as to preserve profitability - otherwise development can come to a halt (Broadbent 1977). This is a conclusion which implies that in order for local authorities to achieve some of their objectives they may have to create conditions which are attractive to private development. The implications which this form of co-operative action can have for the planning

process will be considered later, as it clearly implies concessions being made by one side in a bargain to the benefit of the other.

In chapter one it was pointed out that while land-use planning must challenge the apparent logic of the market process it would find it difficult to do so effectively. This chapter has gone on from there to emphasise what might be some of the very real and practical problems confronting any attempt to influence both the actions of private housebuilders, and the behaviour of the land market. The evidence has shown that in some cases planning could find itself remote from the important levers of control, and indeed both planners and housebuilders were, on occasion, shown to be potentially vulnerable to external forces operating on a broader front. So far, however, it is only the potential effect of some of the above factors which has been considered. A number of questions remain unanswered relating to the way in which these different forces operating either individually, or in concert, really do influence events. It is therefore to a practical consideration of these matters that attention must now be turned.

CHAPTER THREE

PRIVATE HOUSEBUILDING IN WEST CENTRAL SCOTLAND

SECTION ONE: The Market Context

SECTION TWO: The private housebuilder and the Strathclyde Structure Plan

3.1 The kind of difficulties which land-use planning might encounter when attempting to achieve its objectives through the manipulation of market forces have, until now, been considered either in abstract, or on a comparatively broad scale. The next step therefore, is to examine how this conflict can develop in a particular case, and how the interplay between the actors who take part in the process can affect the way in which events unfold. In view of this the present chapter first considers, in section one, how the evolution of market forces, which characterise private housebuilding in the Glasgow area, have created both problems and opportunities for land-use planning. This provides an essential background against which it is possible to develop an understanding of the developmental, context wherein more recent events have taken place.

This review of the prevailing situation also provides a basis for the later examination, in section two, of the residential land policies contained in Strathclyde's Structure Plan. In particular how these policies were affected by the market forces which operate in this sphere. The way in which certain historical and contemporary factors have influenced the final shape of these policies, can be used as a model against which to test some of the questions outlined in chapters one and two.

3.2 Section One

An early feature of housing in the Clydeside conurbation - even before the Second World War - was the way in which Glasgow Corporation discouraged private housebuilders from operating in the city.

The emphasis which had been put on local authority housing from the 1919 Housing Act onwards was even further reinforced by the Labour party gaining control of the Corporation in 1933.

LOCATION MAP



KEY : DISTRICTS

1 Argyll & Bute
2 Dumbarton
3 Inverclyde
4 Renfrew
5 Clydebank
6 Bearsden & Milngavie
7 Strathkelvin
8 Cumbernauld & Kilsyth
9 Glasgow City
10 Monklands
11 Cunninghame
12 Kilmarnock & Loudoun
13 Eastwood
14 East Kilbride
15 Hamilton
16 Motherwell
17 Kyle & Carrick
18 Cumnock & Doon Valley
19 Lanark

Fig. 3.1

Location Map



Fig 3.2

The result of this was, that although "between 1919 and 1939, 76,630 houses were authorised to be built in the city" only "9106 or 12 per cent were privately built, a much lower proportion than in most English cities at this time" (Randall 1980). The private housebuilders were found, therefore, even before the Second World War, to be concentrating their activities on a few areas at the edge of the city where land could be more readily obtained. This was a pattern repeated in many of the industrial burghs throughout Clydeside where "most of the relatively low level of private housebuilding which did take place was concentrated in the county areas on the periphery of Glasgow" (Randall 1980).

This early momentum continued to direct events in the immediate post-war years and by 1951 a very clear split could be observed in the region's housing pattern. The private housebuilding which did take place in the Glasgow area was now concentrated in only a few contiguous, residential suburbs: To the north-west of the city there was Bearsden and Milngavie, in the north Bishopbriggs and, on the south side, Giffnock through to Newton Mearns. (These are now areas covered by Bearsden and Milngavie, Strathkelvin and Eastwood District Councils respectively). Most of the development which has taken place since then has continued to emphasise this dichotomy.

Between 1951 and 1961 nearly 1250 ha. of residential land were developed in the immediate Glasgow area.

The 761 ha. of this which lay within the city, most of it at four main sites - Drumchapel, Easterhouse, Nitshill and Castlemilk, was used almost entirely for high density local authority houses. In contrast, of the remaining 485 ha outside the city, only 73 ha, at Clydebank, was used for local authority houses. The

residue was almost entirely developed as low density private housing in Bearsden and Milngavie, Bishopbriggs and Newton Mearns (Table 3.1.).

Part of the explanation for this lies in the mutually antagonistic pressures under which the city had to operate at this time.

Extension of Glasgow's Immediate Periphery

	Additions to built-up land (ha)		
	1951-1961	1961-71	1971-76
Glasgow District	761	230	122
Clydebank	73	49	5
Bearsden/Milngavie	155	145	47
Bishopbriggs	122	111	64
Thornliebank/ Newton Mearns	135	72	26
Total	1246	607	264

Table 3.1. Source: Adapted from Lea (1980)

On the one hand, they had to reduce to a more acceptable level the intolerably high residential densities in some of the ciy's worst slum areas. To accomodate the people displaced during this process, additional land for housing had to be found elsewhere. On the other hand, Abercrombie's Clyde Valley Plan had

proposed a greenbelt for Glasgow, and this involved "taking up land within the boundaries of the city " (Checkland 1976). Thus at the same time as more land was required for housing, the potential supply was being put under pressure.

One solution to this problem was overspill and, throughout the 1950's,there was a relatively continuous flow of people leaving the city. Between 1951 and 1961 Glasgows population fell by over 175,000. This, however, was not enough to solve the city's problems and the Corporation was under intense pressure to fill the gaps in the city's housing supply, which were becoming more and more obvious. The councillors themselves "were profoundly conscious of the pressure of the house waiting list, variously estimated in the early 1950's as 80,000 - 90,000 families" (Checkland 1976). At the same time, however, it is possible to detect an undercurrent of opinion, amongst these same councillors, that overspill was not the only,or, indeed the best,solution to the city's housing problem.

The 'Bruce Plan', produced by the city engineer had argued, in contrast to Abercrombie's Plan,that it was possible to rehouse the whole of Glasgow's population, at acceptable densities, within the city boundary. As Randall (1980) points out, this report impressed the city council; and although by the early to mid 50's they had reluctantly accepted the need for a large overspill programme, there was still a feeling that, whenever possible, every effort should be made to provide housing within the city.

When the above circumstances are combined with a political environment, within the council, which emphasised the benefits of municipalisation of social capital, it is hardly surprising that any residential land in the city which could be built on, was almost immediately snapped up by the city for local authority housing. This was regardless usually of any interest which had been expressed in the site, by private housebuilders (MacFayden 1980).

The council used this land to satisfy the enormous need for housing in Glasgow and, at the same time, avoided decanting at least some of the city's population. The corollary of this was that private housebuilders were denied the opportunity to develop, what they then regarded as attractive greenfield sites within the city. They therefore continued to concentrate their activities in other areas, outside of the city, and this was a pattern which events continued to follow throughout the 1960's and early 1970's (Table 3.1).

3.3 Between 1961 and 1971 a further 607 ha. were added to the contiguous built up area of Glasgow, and on the 230 ha. added to the city itself, once again local authority housing dominated. The remainder was almost exclusively used for private housebuilding; Bearsden, Milngavie and Bishopbriggs being the main areas of expansion.

The most notable feature of these later figures,however, is the way in which the total acreage added to the immediate suburbs is less than half of what was added in the preceeding decade. This dramatic decline reflected a growing shortage of building land, most noticeable in Glasgow, as pressures for expansion came up against the restrictions imposed by the green belt.

This acted as a check on the steady growth of the built-up area.

In those suburbs which had been the almost exclusive preserve of the private builders the decline, though less severe, was equally dramatic and the trend continued through to 1976. (Table 3.1). The housebuilders operating in these areas were also, quite clearly, experiencing some difficulty in obtaining a supply of land sufficient to maintain their previous level of activity in these contiguous suburbs. How then did they react to this new situation?

The maps in Fig 3.3 to 3.5 show that by the early 1970's the private builders had extended their interest to detached settlements in the landward areas of Glasgow's surrounding districts. Table 3.2. shows the number of sites purchased in each of the 5 km. bands drawn around Glasgow, over the three time periods shown on the maps.

	NUMBER OF SITES		
Band (Kms)	1959-63	1963-1967	1968-71
0-5	9	9	5
5-10	24	22	9
10-15	37	21	17
15-20	11	20	26
20-25	10	22	8
25-30	4	12	20

Table 3.2.

It is clear that by 1972 the main areas of activity had shifted from the immediate edge of the city to sites up to 30 kms away.

Between 1961 and 1976 these settlements, beyond the contiguous built up area, emerged as the dominant zone of growth in the Glasgow area. However, despite this change there still remained the old distinction between areas characterised by private housebuilding and those dominated by public sector housebuilding.



SITES PURCHASED FOR PRIVATE HOUSING. Jan. 1959-June 1963.

Fig. 3.3

Source: S.D.D.(1974)

SITES PURCHASED FOR PRIVATE HOUSING. July 1963-Dec.1967.

2.West

IU SDD October 1973

Fig. 3.4

Source: S.D.D.(1974)

SITES PURCHASED FOR PRIVATE HOUSING. Jan. 1968-June 1972.

3.West

Fig. 3.5

Source:S.D.D.(1974)

The New Towns accounted for most of the latter but, in contrast, a number of small places, like Waterfoot in Eastwood District, South Lenzie in Strathkelvin District and Blanefield in the Strathblane area, all increased their population by more than 40 per cent in the late 60's to early 70's,almost wholly due to the work of private housebuilders. Similar developments took place in bigger settlements, such as Eaglesham in Eastwood District and Kirkintilloch and Stepps in Strathkelvin; all of which increased their population by more than 20 per cent between 1967 and 1975. Later additions to these growth areas were, Torrance and Milton of Campsie in Strathkelvin District, and on the south side of the city private housebuilding, previously concentrated in the Giffnock/Newton Mearns area, now spilled over with more frequency than before into what is now Renfrew District (Lea 1980). All of these developments reflected the pressure on housebuilders, to find new sources of land for private building.

A feature of all these developments, however, is the way in which they took place in areas long favoured by the housebuilders. The extension of their activities into the landward area of such districts was an almost natural progression; but this was not the only change. The builder's sphere of interest did expand to include some parts of Dumbarton, Hamilton and Lanark Districts; particulary those parts with good road and/or rail links to allow for easy commuting, and where suitable land could be bought for housing.

In spite of this belated and relatively minor spread in the activities of private housebuilders, a momentum which had started to build up before even the Second World War,had culminated by 1976, in an almost total split in the housing market of the Clydeside conurbation. This is clearly illustrated by the housing tenure figures in Table 3.3.

CURRENT TENURE OF HOUSEHOLDS (%) 1979

District	Owner Occupied	Public Rented	Private Rented
Argyll and Bute	44.3	37.1	18.6
Dumbarton	39.4	54.3	6.3
Renfrew	31.6	63.8	4.6
Inverclyde	25.9	65.2	8.9
Clydebank	17.2	79.8	3.0
Bearsden	81.2	15.4	3.5
Glasgow	25.4	65.2	9.4
Strathkelvin	53.2	43.5	3.3
Eastwood	86.8	11.2	2.0
Cumbernauld	19.5	79.7	0.8
Monklands	15.0	83.6	1.4
Motherwell	14.0	83.7	2.3
Lanark	39.1	56.1	4.8
Hamilton	30.2	67.0	2.8
East Kilbride	24.7	74.3	1.0
Cunninghame	34.3	61.4	4.3
Kilmarnock	28.4	67.5	4.1
Kyle and Carrick	45.5	47.4	7.1
Cumnock	13.3	79.8	6.9
Strathclyde	30.5	53.3	6.2

Table 3.3 Source: S.R.C. (1980)

The areas where private housebuilders had been active from an early date (Eastwood, Strathkelvin and Bearsden) show the highest figures for owner occupancy. The figures for these districts contrast vividly with these for areas in which no tradition of private housebuilding has existed - Motherwell, Monklands and Glasgow*. While even districts like Hamilton and Renfrew have figures for owner occupancy more than 50 per cent lower than Eastwood and Bearsden; despite having some past history of private housebuilding. The result of this has been a marked and growing social polarisation between some districts, including Glasgow, and suburban areas such as Eastwood and Strathkelvin where the vast majority of private investment in housing has taken place over the last 40 years.

As Donnison and Soto (1980) point out, this is a process which creates gaps and discontinuities in the ladder of opportunity, the disjunctions in the market making it difficult to move from one rung onto the next. This implies that "it would help people if the rungs in the ladders of opportunity were set close to each other, economically, spatially and culturally. People move most easily to a slightly more expensive house, close to their previous home" (Donnison 1972). To achieve this the planner must attempt to break the pattern of events described above, but history creates its own momentum and this creates problems when trying to control and direct the actions of private housebuilders.

---

*The Glasgow figure for owner occupancy still includes some poor quality tenemental property and therefore under emphasises the paucity of private investment in new housebuilding.

3.4 It was the exclusion of private housebuilders from the city, and other industrial burghs (eg. Motherwell and Airdrie), from such an early date and to such a marked extent, which established an almost self-fulfilling precedent. Once the housebuilders had turned their attention to other areas then they soon developed a predilection for working there. Previous investment decisions, particularly by some of the builders who had operated in the area from an early date, were able to generate opportunities for later similar decisions. In addition, the builders were able to establish a certain understanding of what was required of them in these areas, and developed an expertise for dealing with the special problems found there. No such tradition developed outside of these districts and even when some of the builders extended their activities in the 60's and early 70's, as was noted above, they did so mainly in settlements close to where they already had some experience of housebuilding.

The result of this geographically concentrated activity by private housebuilders was that certain areas were established in the customers' minds as being the one in which to buy and own a house. The builders had successfully created a market for new housing in these areas and could make plans to meet that demand by putting further investments into the area.

The above factors have contributed to the establishment of powerful vested interests in these areas and it would require, therefore, a great deal of effort if they were to be overcome. Any land-use planning policies which sought to turn round this well established process would have to be well briefed in the difficulties likely to be encountered.

Land-use planners would also have to be alive to the danger of such long established trends in housebuilding being presented as the normal way of things; as opposed to being the outcome of distinct historical circumstances. It is in the builders' interests to ensure that the former view prevails and that plans are

made which allow things to continue as before. The planner must be prepared not only to say that things can be different, but also explain why, and how he can make them so.

We have now considered the kind of market forces which have built up in the Greater Glasgow area and the way in which they might be used to dictate future developments. In order to bring this picture up-to-date, and before considering the residential land policies of the Strathclyde Structure Plan, attention must now be focussed on the agents working through these market forces - the housebuilders themselves.

3.5 In Britain the building industry is generally characterised by a multiplicity of small firms and a small number of large firms (Bassett and Short 1980).

Of the estimated 84,000 firms in operation in 1976 more than three-quarters of them employed fewer than 8 workers (Cowley 1979). Although it is clear that those small firms dominate in numbers, firms with over 1200 operatives accounted for 21.5 per cent of output in 1965 and 24 per cent in 1973 (Bassett and Short 1980). Nevertheless,even the largest English housebuilder constructed only 10 per cent of the new houses sold in 1979 - 11,000 units. In Scotland during the 20 year period up till 1970 the structure of the building industry was similar to the overall British picture in some respects but vastly different in others.

The industry showed, and still shows, the numerical domination of small firms which is a characteristic of the British scene: 60 per cent of builders in Scotland have fewer than 8 employees, and nearly a third of contractors' operatives work in firms employing under 35 people (National Economic Development Office 1976). At the top end of the scale, however, things were somewhat different from the British pattern.

Over 1967 and 1968, for example, a single housebuilder built almost 25 per cent of the entire output of private houses in Scotland, and together with nine other large firms was responsible for more than 65 per cent of the total Scottish output (Sidwell 1970). When these nationally aggregated statistics are further broken down the degree of competition is reduced even more, and many of the Scottish builders had near monopolies in their own area of activity.

For example, one builder (John Lawrence) between 1959 and 1972 bought over 40 per cent of all the private housing land purchased in one county (Dunbarton); and two builders, Varney and Wimpey (the only non-Scottish firm operating on any scale in West Central Scotland during this period) bought over 35 per cent of all the private housing land in Lanark county between the same dates; and in the county of Renfrew two builders, (Lawrence and McTaggart Mickel) bought 35 per cent of the housing land which was for sale over that period (Figures taken from S.D.D. (1974)). Thus, as Niven (1979) points out, a substantial acreage of the prime building land around Glasgow was, by the early 1970's owned by a small number of housebuilders. Furthermore, as Table 3.3 shows, a significant proportion of this would appear to have been land which was being banked for later use.

Actual Acreage of land purchased in Central Scotland compared with theoretical land requirements for the private housebuilding market (a.)

	1964	1965	1964	1967	1968	1967	1970	1971	1972
Actual	890	853	1068	1559	627	797	743	943	1292
Theoretical	455	433	451	429	516	527	473	774	749

Table 3.4. Source: From S.D.D. (1975)

It is important in this respect to note that the kind of housebuilders who were involved in these transactions were, by and large, the type of firm described in chapter two as being non-growth oriented. This meant that while they had purchased considerable quantities of land they did not feel the need to make full or immediate use of this resource.

The number of houses which they built were,therefore,often well below what the market might have been able to sustain, and profitability was a more important motive than growth. These Scottish based builders were, and still are, the firms which have shown the greatest propensity to purchase, outright, long term speculative land. This tendency to tie up resources in the comparatively long term purchase of land reflects a company policy, or 'ethic', which places a low priority on the rapid turnover of capital. It is, as we shall see later, a method of operations which contrasts sharply with that employed by the recently arrived firms now working in the area.

These 'local' building firms were also the companies who had been operating in the area from a very early date and, almost single-handedly, had built the early suburban estates around the city. Most of the land which they purchased was, therefore, in areas adjacent to, or obvious extensions of, those initial investments. They had, in that case,a vested interest in the continued growth of private housing in these traditional areas.

These were all factors which would require consideration should any attempt be made to employ land-use planning as the means to redirect the activities of these firms. This situation, however, was to be even further complicated from the late 1960's and early 1970's onwards by the incursion into the local housebuilding scene of a number of English based volume builders.

There would appear to be two main reasons for this new development.

First, as suggested earlier, the level of activity which characterised the Scottish based builders was not high enough to satisfy the potential demand for new private housing in the area. A gap had been left open in the market into which other builders could fit their operations. Second, some builders were beginning to run out of markets in England and were looking around for opportunities for growth elsewhere. As one planner in his evidence to the House of Commons Expenditure Committee pointed out, the builders "having had twenty or more years of easy pickings in England had developed all the easy sites" (H.M.S.O. 1977); they were now looking for new areas where they could continue to expand their activities. Several firms saw the, as yet untapped, opportunities which existed in West Central Scotland as representing the ideal opportunity for further growth. A number of the most important of those builders are listed below along with the date on which they commenced activities in Scotland.

Bellway Ltd	1967
Leech Homes Ltd	1968
Salvensen Homes Ltd	1969
Bovis Homes Ltd	1973*
Barratts (Falkirk) Ltd	1976
Broseley Estates Ltd	1977
Tarmac (McLeans Homes)	1977
Barratts (Glasgow) Ltd	1979

3.6 The distinguishing characteristic of all these firms is the way in which they differ from the traditional Scottish builders in their mode of operation. For these firms their main concern is for growth i.e. increased turnover and maximum cash flow. To do that they must build a relatively high minimum number of houses each year in order to both satisfy the shareholders and stock market, and meet the high fixed costs which are associated with a larger firm.

---

*Bovis had operated in Scotland prior to 1973 but only on a very limited scale building luxury homes.

Barratts (Glasgow) Ltd, who operate in the immediate Clydeside area, must, for example build and sell a minimum of 350 houses every year in order to meet operating costs alone; and aim for over 450 to achieve the kind of growth that their investors want to see.

This implies that for these firms the number one priority is to obtain land on which they can start building and selling houses, and the pressure on them to do so is intense. But as we have seen above much of the best building land was already in the hands of Scottish based builders. This left the incoming firms with only two courses of action open to them.

First, they could take over one of the Scottish based firms and so acquire a ready made supply of land. Bovis, who had operated for some years in Scotland but on a very limited scale, when they decided to expand their operations, did so by buying out Varney Homes in 1973; thereby acquiring a large, ready-to-use land bank. This allowed Bovis to extend their activities into the lower and middle ranges of house construction and enormously increase their rate of building from a few dozen to over 300. A number of other firms used the same approach; Leech, Bellway, Barratts (Falkirk) and Tarmac all acquired land banks by taking over Scottish based firms.

This method could not, of course, be used on every occasion and in some cases the land thus acquired was not sufficient to meet the new owners requirements. In order to deal with this problem a number of the new firms resorted to buying land from other builders.

This was a practise which grew in importance throughout Central Scotland during the 1970's. Initially it started out as only isolated cases but the proportion of land purchased in this way had increased to over 20 per cent by the mid 1970's

and in 1978/79 the figure was up to 36 per cent; one builder in particular, Barratts, appeared to favour this method of acquiring land and in 1978/79 it was responsible for 27 per cent of the 36 per cent purchased in this way (S.D.D. 1980). The reason for Barratts using this method is that land purchased from another builder often had planning permission; it is therefore a quick method of acquiring immediately useable land albeit at an inflated price.

In spite of all these efforts,however, there was almost no way in which the new firms could break into the lucrative markets established in the best parts of Eastwood, Bearsden and Strathkelvin. This was because, as indicated earlier, much of what was the best building land in these districts was already in the hands of a few builders,well before the incoming firms set up operations in Scotland. Of the builders who owned most of this land only Varney was taken over by an English based company and the other Scottish builders, as one would expect, showed no enthusiasm for selling this land direct to other firms. These constraints forced the English based firms to turn their attention towards what were previously quite unfashionable areas for private housebuilding.

Private House Completions in Motherwell and Monkland Districts 1975-79

	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979
Motherwell:	140	109	134	197	580
Monklands:	10	23	161	293	176

Table 3.5

There have been a number of major developments by incoming builders in areas such as Motherwell and Monklands District which, until comparatively recently,

had almost no tradition of private housebuilding (the very low owner-occupancy rates for these districts in Table 3.3. bears testament to this): And at the same time a number of the less popular areas in Districts such as Hamilton and Lanark, for example Larkhall and Blackwood respectively, were used as sites for very large private housing estates.

For the English based firms the one advantage which all these areas possessed was an absence of extensive land banks owned by their Scottish competitors. The new firms consequently could find room for manoeuvre and expansion in these areas.

From the above it is clear that the housebuilding industry in Central Scotland has experienced some major changes in recent years. But what implications does the resulting structure have for attempts to control and redirect its activities?

3.7 In the first place it is quite clear that the kind of housebuilder now operating in the Glasgow area is quite different from what was the norm only 10-15 years ago. Many of the firms are now large national, if not international, firms and in their methods of operation they differ quite substantially from the regionally based, traditional Scottish builder.

The latter group of firms had, from an early date, established themselves in a particular area. They had built up both the expertise and the resources to sustain a level of work which was felt to be satisfactory and, at the same time, placed them under no great strain. In particular they had already bought quite substantial amounts of land (held both with and without planning permission*) in areas where they knew they could sell houses.

---

*Although detailed planning permission on a site lapses after 3 years, unless work has been started, the definition of started has been so broadly interpreted that the digging of a single trench for foundations will preserve the permission.

These features all imply that such firms did not feel the need to exert any great pressure on the planners for the release of land. The security of their business did not depend on an ever increasing number of house sales, and the land which they had already bought was in good locations and would sustain their preferred level of activity for some years.

The corollary of this, however, is that the planning system finds itself in a situation where it can do little or nothing to influence the activities of these housebuilders. This is because there are very few ways in which the planner can apply either effective sanctions or pressure to these firms. The builders already had land, it was all they needed, and in many cases it was in areas where, on physical planning grounds alone, it was difficult to refuse permission for development; the site often being a natural progression from a previous development.

All these factors probably contributed to the tranquil relationship between planners and housebuilders which was noted by Gaskin (1977). He considered that the provision of housing land was not a problem which was particularly prevalent in Scotland. At the time he was writing, however, that phase in the Scottish housebuilding industry had recently come to an end; the new housebuilding firms moving into the area fundamentally changed the milieu within which the planning system had to operate.

These new firms were committed to growth and expansion and as a direct result, were desperate for housing land. Unfortunately for these firms, this intensive search for land came up against the obstacle that most of the best sites were already in the hands of other builders. Where this difficulty could not be overcome, by either buying land from other companies or, taking over a local firm to obtain their land back, it was inevitable that pressure would be applied to the planners for the release of more land. Furthermore because of the way in which these firms operated, and the almost compelling need for land this generated, it was a demand which they would be unlikely to withdraw unless they had achieved their objectives.

Yet, to the planner, the situation appeared to be one in which there was already an adequate supply of land, often in fact already owned by building firms. For the newly established companies the problem was that they, in fact, did not own the land, their Scottish based competitors did. A position had been established then, where conflict between the planners and the builders was almost unavoidable.

It is important to remember in this respect that, when the inevitable confrontation between the two sides took place, these firms, during any negotiations, could make use of some adroit bargaining skills. They were mostly large firms, part of even larger holding companies, and had learned a great deal from their operations in other parts of the country. This meant there was expertise, if not immediately available then on tap from elsewhere, which could be used to ensure that, as far as possible decisions went their way. Should the planner want to control the activities of these companies then his arguments, his bargaining skills and his commitment would have to match those of his 'adversary'.

This was particularly important now, because the arrival of these builders offered an opportunity to direct private investment in housebuilding which had not existed before. The die had not yet been cast which would dictate the areas in which these housebuilders would operate and, as we have seen, many of the firms did in fact choose to build in some of the previously neglected areas. Clearly then an instrument was now to hand which could be used to achieve some of the planners objectives for new housebuilding, but could it be wielded with any dexterity?

To answer that question we must look at how the private builders and and local authorities reacted to the residential land policies contained in the Strathclyde Structure Plan. As a precurser to that investigation the background to, and the eventual fate of,these policies is briefly sketched.

3.8 SECTION TWO

It was the West Central Scotland Plan which first emphasised the need to improve the urban environment of Clydeside, and as part of that strategy advocated the need to improve the opportunities for owner-occupation in the city:

> "One aspect of private housebuilding where we believe there is a special need for support from local authorities is the encouragement of schemes for owner-occupation within the inner areas of Glasgow and possibly other urban centres in the region"
> (West Central Scotland Plan 1974)

It is also of interest to note that the plan calculated there would be an average of 4000-6000 private house completions, per annum, over the period 1971-1981.

When Strathclyde Region was set up in 1975 it choose to follow and develop the tenor established by the West Central Scotland Plan. While Boyle (1980) considers this is because "only a very brave or very foolish council" could have discounted the statements contained in the West Central Scotland Plan, it is probably just as true to say that these policies reflected the immediate predilections of the council anyway.

The Regional Report, submitted in 1976, was the first major strategic document produced by the council and to a large extent it "fashioned the direction and scope of future land based policies" for the area (Boyle 1980). It did in fact carry forward many of the ideas contained in the West Central Scotland Plan and this was particularly true in the field of housing. With the selective outflow of population from the city very much in mind, the Regional Report stated:

> "There is an urgent need to encourage private housing by making land available and by other means, particulary in the inner conurbation where there is a declining choice of kinds of housing"
> (Strathclyde Regional Council 1976a)

The close parallel to the sentiments of the West Central Scotland Plan is transparently clear.

The Draft Structure Plan carried forward and developed these ideas, seeing as one of the main strategic issues.

> "The extent to which the attractiveness of the conurbation can be improved and the continuing decentralisation of population and decline of population curtailed"
> (Strathclyde Regional Council 1977)

This was a strategy which they felt was jeopardized by the existence of a substantial land bank for private housing, in some of the suburban districts around the edge of the city. To control this the Region initially proposed to rezone large parts of the land bank and

> "considered that any applications for residential development in these areas - (which the region wished to see rezoned)-should be refused"
> (Strathclyde Regional Council 1977)

The next stage, after consultations on the Draft Plan had taken place, was the publication, in 1979, of the Structure Plan Written Statement. This document continued in a similar vein and recognising the uneven distribution of owner-occupied housing within the region, proposed in policy RES 1 that:

> "Residential development on infill or redevelopment sites within urban areas excluding open space, in preference to peripheral 'Greenfield' sites shall accord with the Regional development strategy"
> (Strathclyde Regional Council 1979)

A policy which as Coon (1979) notes, expressed the essence of the Structure Plan philosophy as it had developed from the West Central Scotland Plan, through the Regional Report and Draft Plan.

There are, however, two points worth noting about the housing land policies contained in the Structure Plan. First, the plan contained what appeared to be, ambiguities in its approach. While, as policy RES 1 indicates, private residential development was to concentrate on the urban renewal of inner areas, elsewhere the plan advocated the building of private houses on

> "selected greenfield sites on the edge of established urban areas bordering on housing areas experiencing considerable population loss"
>
> (Strathclyde Regional Council 1979)

This is a 'compromise', or qualification, which had not appeared in previous documents pertaining to the Structure Plan.

The second point to note is that the council was forced to withdraw its earlier proposal, contained in the 1976 Survey Report, that the large peripheral land bank be controlled by the revocation of planning permission. The enormous compensation costs which would have been involved made it impossible for the region to pursue this policy.

The Structure Plan itself has now been amended by the modifications required by the Secretary of State after the Examination in Public (E.I.P.). The policies concerned with private housing have been approved, with qualifications, only as far as 1st June 1982,and the Secretary of State has concluded that "the potential of infill and redevelopment sites (for private housing) in urban areas has been over estimated" (S.D.D. 1981). The Regional Council has therefore been instructed, in effect, to rethink its housing policies by undertaking a re-assessment of housing-land supply,and demand,bearing in mind that "the release of further greenfield sites may be necessary" (S.D.D. 1981). The result has been that a philosophy pursued since 1974 of redirecting private investment in housebuilding away from greenfield sites, in suburban areas, has experienced its first major set-back at what might have been considered the last hurdle. What are the factors which contributed to this frustration of earlier established policy?

3.9 Some of the elements which might have contributed to this situation have been broadly indicated in this, and previous chapters but now require to be explored in more detail with reference to this particular case.

It is clear that the housebuilders themselves played an important part in influencing the Secretary of State's response to the Structure Plan's housing policies. It has already been shown that many of the firms now involved in private housebuilding in the area, were those for whom an adequate supply of

housing land was of paramount importance. These same firms were being squeezed out of the best areas for private housebuilding by the remaining Scottish builders who owned a number of quality sites in these districts. The incoming firms were therefore committed to ensuring their interests were not further prejudiced by the policies contained in the Structure Plan. As a result, when it came to preparing their contribution towards the Plan's Examination in Public, a great deal of effort and expertise was applied to the operation. It is interesting to note at this juncture that, although the housebuilders choose to make a joint submission to the E.I.P., John Lawrence (an important Scottish based builder) elected not to be part of this co-operative effort. They felt that their different interests would be better pursued by an individual submission and separate representation. In fact at the E.I.P. one of the demands which the incoming firms made was that sufficient land be released to allow them to build up to a 3 year land bank. John Lawrence, in contrast, admitted to having, a 6 year land bank with planning permission,and additional land awaiting permission (Planning Exchange 1979). This cogently illustrates the different circumstances of the two types of firm.

At the E.I.P. the joint submission put forward by the 'Strathclyde Region Housebuilders committee' (an ad-hoc group which relied very heavily on the work done by the English based volume builders), was a comprehensive and detailed, 16 page document. It concluded that the housebuilders would "not accept a series of policy statements and proposals (as contained in the Structure Plan) which could so radically affect the future of private housebuilding" (S.R.H.C. 1979). This document contained a detailed statistical examination of how the housebuilders' anticipated demand for private housing could not be met unless more land for housebuilding was identified in the Structure Plan; particularly greenfield sites. Based on a projected demand exceeding 6,000 p.a. and rising to over 7,000 p.a. in the years 1980-1983 the builders calculated that sites for a further 10,000

S.R.H.C. Graph of Private Housing in Strathclyde



1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984
Actual)	(Estimate)	3384	1752	698	284	
		3365	3575	2454	1571	
5149	6000	170	354	134	50	
		6919	5681	3286	1905	

Fig.3.6

Source: S.R.H.C. (1979)

Units per annual programme

additional houses (approximately 400 ha) would have to be identified in the plan. These figures were strikingly illustrated in an accompanying graph (fig 3.6) which illustrated the growing gap between what the builders said was needed in the way of housing land and what the Structure Plan was making available.

At the E.I.P. the housebuilders vigorously pursued their case throughout the discussion on the residential land policies. They expressed the view that the figure for annual house completions which should be used to calculate future land needs was 7,000, and that anything below 6,000 was unrealistic: They quoted figures to show how the price of land had increased from £10,000 per acre in 1976 to £30,000 per acre in 1979, because of land shortages; and they added that as a result land now represented some 15-20 per cent of the total house price; which in turn meant the builders were forced to construct smaller houses of poorer quality (Planning Exchange 1979).

The weight and authority of all these arguments clearly made an impact on the reporter, and subsequently the Secretary of State. In fact the housebuilders conclusion - that sites for as many as 10,000 additional houses would be required, was both quoted by the reporter and, used by the Secretary of State when explaining why he considered the release of further green field sites might be necessary. But why should the arguments of the housebuilders have so convincingly carried the day?

3.10 Part of the answer lies in the ease with which the housebuilders could discredit certain elements of the Strathclyde case. This was most obvious in the figures for annual private house completions which the Region used in its preparation of the Structure Plan.

In a paper published in 1978 "to provide a basis for information and analysis" of the Regions planning strategy, the planners calculated a "demand for around 3,400 new owner-occupied houses on average for each year in the period to 1983"



Fig 3.7

Source: Strathclyde Region (1980)

(Strathclyde Regional Council 1978). In the Structure Plan itself a figure of 3,000 dwellings per annum is put forward as the minimum average rate of private housebuilding during the plan period. The figure used as a basis for planning land supply was slightly higher than this at 3,500, but at the E.I.P. itself the planners stated that their calculations now led them to believe 3,200 was a more likely figure (Planning Exchange 1979).

In refuting these estimates, the builders were able to point out that only once in the past nine years had the figure for annual house completions fallen to anywhere near that figure (3,500 in 1974) and that only twice in the same period had it been below 4,000 (Fig 3.7). At the same time in the year immediately preceeding the E.I.P. over 5,000 houses had been built; and for 1979 the builders estimated, at the time of the E.I.P., a completions figure of 6,000 (in fact it turned out to be just over 5,000). The figures used by the Region to justify their policies appeared in the circumstances to be almost ridiculous, and with hindsight the planners have admitted that it was impossible to defend their figures against this kind of evidence. The estimates put forward by the housebuilders would appear, therefore, to have been accepted, almost by default, as being more representative of the prevailing situation; however inflated they might have been. In fact the 6,000-7,000 p.a. completion figure suggested by the builders would appear now, to have been somewhat over optimistic.

This was not, however, the only area in which the planners seem to have been at a disadvantage vis-a-vis the builders. Many of the figures which the housebuilders put forward at the E.I.P. were misleading, if not incorrect, yet went unchallenged by the planners. The builders, for example, quoted a figure of £30,000 per acre as the current price for building land. In fact the median price per acre of building land in the Central Belt of Scotland over the period October 1978-June 1979 was £7,168. It was only in the centre of Glasgow and

Edinburgh that a very small number of sites were sold for about £30,000 per acre. (S.D.D. 1980).

The builders also stated that 15-20 per cent of a house price was taken up by land costs: In 1975, 1976 and 1977 the plot price as a percentage of house price in Central Scotland was actually 3.3, 3.1 and 3.6 per cent respectively. As before,it was only in a few city centre developments that the figures approached those given by the housebuilders (S.D.D. 1980). The inability of the planners to question or challenge these statemerts from the housebuilders, illustrates how ill prepared and poorly briefed the public officials were compared to their private counterparts.

How much importance one should attach to the above events is difficult to assess, but it is clear from the Secretary of State's reply to the Structure Plan that the view which prevailed was that of the housebuilders. In view of the weak, unrealistic and apparently poorly prepared counter arguments put up by the Region this, with hindsight, would appear to have been inevitable.

3.11 A further weakness in Strathclyde's case was the ambivalent if not indifferent attitude adopted at the E.I.P. by both senior officials and members of the Regional Council.

The Regional Report,as Pritchard (1978) points out,had "incorporated a high degree of member involvement", and this involvement also implied a significant degree of political commitment to the policies which it contained (Young 1980). The Draft Plan followed the Report and Pritchard (1978) similarly identifies a strong political input, by the councillors, to that document. The Structure Plan written statement would appear, however, to have attracted somewhat less political support.

Many of the councillors found it difficult to involve themselves, once again, in

what was becoming a more and more technical document at each successive stage in the process. The plan, therefore, did not have the same political weight behind it that previous documents had exhibited (Young 1980). The result was that a number of the senior planning officials and councillors of the Region rarely attended the Examination in Public which followed the publication of the plan (Cameron 1980). This lack of visible and active support from the upper ranks of the council detracted from the plan's authority, and thus gave the housebuilders the opportunity to stamp their influence on events.

Of perhaps even greater importance in this respect was the almost total apathy displayed towards the policies in the Structure Plan by councillors and senior members of Glasgow District Council. At the E.I.P. none of the District's senior officials, or members, were present to lend support and authority to the Structure Plan proposals. While even in their written submission on the housing aspects of the plan, the strongest words of support expressed only "general agreement" with the Regional Council's strategy (Glasgow District Council 1979). As this was the area towards which it was hoped to divert private investment in housebuilding, the lukewarm reception accorded to the plan did nothing to bolster its credibility or prestige. One senior member of Strathclyde Region, Charles Gray, described Glasgow's disappointing response to the Structure Plan as being the major factor which contributed to the Secretary of State's very qualified acceptance of the housing policies (Gray 1981).

Why Glasgow should have chosen to adopt this course of action with the Structure Plan is not altogether clear; particularly in view of the efforts which the District Council were already making to encourage private housebuilding in the city. One District Councillor, Jean Mc Fadden, suggested that the city's hesitant support reflected their reluctance to antagonize the other 'less favoured'

districts in the region. In other words that it was an exercise in diplomacy (McFadden 1981). The officials at Strathclyde Region were more inclined to put it down to pique on the part of the District. The city, as it made plain to the Stodart Committee, still hankered after its lost, all-purpose status (H.M.S.O. 1981). It choose,therefore,to accord the minimum of recognition to the authority which had denied them of some of their powers - Strathclyde. This created an uncertain and ambiguous atmosphere between the two authorities.

All this ultimately meant, that Glasgow District and Strathclyde Region could not represent themselves as a cohesive and determined partnership prepared to resist the pressures applied by an almost wholly united housebuilding industry. A weakness which the builders could exploit by playing one side's views off the other,to reveal inconsistencies in their arguments. They used this tactic, with particularly telling effect, to reveal the Region's inadequate comprehension of housing land in the city (Planning Exchange 1979); and when this was combined with the Region's own apparent uncertainty about where the housebuilders should be encouraged to work - inner city sites or the peripheral estates (3.8) - then the plans very credibility in this area was clearly under suspicion.

3.12 A factor which played a less important role in this conflict than one might have expected was the response from the remaining District Councils. While it might have been forecast that the housebuilders would have been found "allied with the dynamic of the district authority against the prevarication of the county (regional) authority" (Gransby 1975), this was not always the case.

Bearsden and Milngavie (1979) "accepted that the Structure Plan policy of inner city regeneration --- would involve the promotion of private sector housebuilding in the inner city" -- and -- "accepted as a corollary that there must be restrictions on private housebuilding in the traditional areas". In similar spirit

Strathkelvin District Council had already, in its Housing Plan, opposed the development of large areas of land currently zoned for private housing; and Eastwood District Council, although expressing some disquiet over the projected house completion figures for their area, "raised no objections" to the residential policies in the plan (Strathkelvin District Council 1979, Eastwood District Council 1979).

The main reason for this somewhat muted reaction, however, was that the Region had already been forced to back down on an earlier proposal to control the land banks, held in these districts, by the revocation of planning consents (Strathclyde Regional Council 1976). It meant that the Region had no alternative but to accept the development of most sites currently allocated for private housing in these districts.

This land then had to be included in the overall total considered to be available for housing within the Region. It was land, however, which was usually held by Scottish based builders, and the rate at which it was developed was much slower than demand factors would normally have dictated (Eastwood District Council 1979). Yet, with the demise of the Community Land Act, there was no way in which the district, or regional authority, could effectively intervene in the land market to allow this land to be released to other builders; so easing the supply problems experienced elsewhere.

The subdued response from these districts, with regard to the Structure Plan, was in fact a reflection of both the Region's, and the Districts inability to control the land banks which 20 years of market forces had built up in these areas. The available means of control were clearly not up to the needs which were dictated by the plan's objectives.

The Districts which in fact raised the strongest objections were those into which the housebuilders had just recently extended their activities - Hamilton, Renfrew, Lanark etc. It was also in these areas that the incoming firms wanted the Structure Plan to show more flexibility and allow for the release of more greenfield sites. In these areas the new firms could at least expect to have an opportunity to both aquire and use any land which might be released.

It is clear from the above that the reception given to the Structure Plan's residential land policies , varied amongst the District Councils, from opposition, through indifference, to qualified support: A pattern which might have been expected in a region which contains 19 lower-tier authorities. In the circumstances, it is difficult to see how the view proffered by any one district might have had more influence than any of the others. If the Region had been able to find a policy, around which it could have rallied support of all its districts, then the weight of opinion which it represented would have been impossible to ignore. But, as it was, the conflicting views and aims of the districts simply cancelled each other out, leaving only the Region to champion, as best it could, the Structure Plan policies. And, in any event, it would be almost impossible to find any positive policy which failed to antagonise at least one of the Regions 19 lower-tier authorities.

3.13 A further factor which must have contributed to the housebuilders relative success at the E.I.P., though to what extent is uncertain, was the sympathetic reception being given, throughout the country, to any arguments put forward by the housebuilders.

This reflected the influence of a Conservative, free-market orientated, central government which had accepted (thanks largely to the work of Tom Baron at the D.O.E.) that to sustain the required level of private housebuilding there was "no alternative but to considerably increase the supply of greenfield sites" (Baron 1980a).

The effects of this have been particularly obvious in England where, as Elson (1981) points out, the demands of the housebuilders have prevailed on almost every occasion where there has been a dispute over housing land. In Scotland there is less opportunity to observe any such trend developing, but it is clear that the Secretary of State here, must, as far as is possible, follow the views of his collegues in England. It is, therefore, perhaps hardly surprising that the housebuilders viewpoint should have received such a sympathetic hearing in the Strathclyde case.

3.14 The above description of the private housing market, and the way in which it impinges upon the housing policies set out in Strathclyde's Structure Plan, provides a basis from which to draw some initial conclusions on the relationship between land-use planning and the market.

It is clear, perhaps above all else, that when any attempt is made to influence the market forces which operate in this arena, then the mechanisms which influence events must be analysed in detail. Without an understanding of the way in which the market actually operates, the conclusions arrived at, the goals set, and the policies adopted, all exist in a vacuum and are unrelated to the real world.

This implies that there must be something more than just a survey and analysis stage prior to that of plan-making; there has to be an attempt to uncover the micro-economic linkages which are operating in the area, and the sector, which is under investigation.

It is these linkages which dictate the behaviour of decision agents, such as housebuilders, operating in the market. If the planner intends to control and direct the actions of housebuilders he must understand and appreciate the contraints and pressures under which they are operating.

This analysis must also include a historical perspective of events. As Donnison (1972) points out, we do not live in "instant cities without a history"; in order therefore to change the present, and future, direction of market forces, the planner must be aware of the momentum with which history has endowed them; without this knowledge he may find himself being swept along by an apparently irreversible flow of events.

There should also be an attempt to forge a strong and determined partnership between the relevant planning authorities in order to counterbalance the committed and united opposition of the housebuilders. The two-tier planning system clearly makes this a difficult objective to achieve. It would be naive to assume that any allocative policy could be to the direct benefit of all parties and therefore be unanimously supported. Nevertheless, once priorities have been established, those who are to 'gain' should ensure, between them, that they are agreed on the objectives which are to be pursued. The failure of Strathclyde Region and Glasgow District was a neglect to devise a common set of policy objectives and an agreed means of implementing those policies. This only served to weaken the credibility of the Structure Plan and its related policies.

This chapter has shown, by its examination of a particular case, just how intricate and involved the problems can become when planning attempts to control market forces. Any error or weakness in the planners' case will be immediately exploited by other groups, for their own benefit. While if the planner should incorrectly interpret the prevailing market situation then the

wrong areas for intervention will be identified and the cru cial 'principia media' for effective action will be missed.

The investigation so far has mainly concentrated on those aspects of the housebuilding market in West Central Scotland which have frustrated attempts to control the activities of the building firms. The following chapter goes on from there to consider how certain factors operating on the District scale, in Glasgow, have influenced the relationship which exists there, between planners and housebuilders.

CHAPTER FOUR

PLANNING FOR PRIVATE SECTOR HOUSEBUILDING IN GLASGOW

4.1 The preceeding chapter has shown how most of the land which became available for housebuilding in Glasgow was used by the city to construct local authority houses. The enormous redevelopment programme which was being undertaken by the city implied an equally large need for new homes to accomodate the displaced population. As Gracey (1973) has pointed out, in cities throughout Britain, the very great need for housing land which this generated, left a feeling in some quarters that it would be "almost criminal to suggest some of this land be put aside for private developers and middle-class estates". This was a view which attracted particulary strong support in Glasgow City Chambers, where the councillors also adhered to the notion that "publicly owned housing was one of the most powerful tools for the redistribution of incomes towards the poorer end of the scale" (Checkland 1976).

The result was that by the mid 1970's of over 300,000 houses in Glasgow District more than 180,000 or 60 per cent were council owned; while at least half of the 120,000 houses attributed to the owner-occupied sector were old tenement flats either privately owned,or privately rented by landlords. As Table 4.1. shows, the level of private house completions in the city throughout the 1960's (and before

Private House Completions in Glasgow

Year	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971
Total	197	164	57	93	77	203	182	57

Year	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979
Total	291	91	119	107	426	530	347	817

Table 4.1 Source: S.D.D. (1972-80)

that), up to the early 1970's was very low. The table goes on, however, to show that since the mid 1970's there has been an almost dramatic increase in the number of private houses built in Glasgow. In view of what has been said above this must have involved a change in the relationship between the council, both at officer and member level, and the private housebuilder. How did this change come about?

4.2 One of the most important adjustments which had to be made, before the private housebuilders could increase their scale of operation in the city, was in the attitude of the councillors themselves. Prior to the mid 1970's the ideology of the councillors reflected an 'old-fashioned', almost paternalistic socialism. The city's housing problem was therefore perceived as one to be tackled directly by the council; and the only way to plan for, and administer to, this need was to own a high proportion of the city's social capital - its houses. But with the election of the new Glasgow District Council, after local government re-organisation in 1975, a train of events was first set in motion which would eventually see the councillors' attitude to private builders fundamentally transformed.

One of the first problems which the newly elected council identified was the ever continuing loss of population from the city through out-migration (Table 4.2).

Migration from the Area covered by Greater Glasgow Health Board

	In	Out	Net
1971/72:	6924	10,031	-13,107
1972/73:	6556	17,360	-10,804
1973/74:	6982	15,675	-8,693
1974/75:	6601	14,588	-7,987
1975/76:	7667	19,652	-11,985

Table 4.2 Source: Strathclyde Regional Council (1980)

The rate at which the city's population was declining showed no sign of decreasing, despite the run-down of the C.D.A. programme; and this, in turn, injected a sense of urgency into discussions on what the city's future housing policy should be. When this is combined with the fact that the city was now operating in a new local government system, under a changed District Council set-up, then the receptivity of the councillors to new policies was probably at its highest. One of the factors which helped to shape the direction of future housing policy, during this comparatively turbulent period, was the personal leadership of Baillie Dick Dynes.

Baillie Dynes peristently and persuasively argued that the ruling Labour group should adopt, what he described, as a more liberal and pragmatic approach towards housing policy. In particular he persuaded the council to accept that the city's lack of choice in housing tenure was the major factor contributing to out-migration, particularly of young, economically active families. If a better choice of houses was made available in the city then this tide of emigration would, he argued, be reversed. The Director of Administration in Glasgow during this period has described how, through these efforts on the part of Baillie Dynes, the Labour group were "persuaded to respond to changing public demand, and to break with tradition" in their formulation of future housing policy (Hamilton 1978). While it would be unwise to neglect the extent to which personal leadership alone dictated Glasgow's future housing policy (officials today still regard the role played by Baillie Dynes as having been crucial), there were a number of contemporary events which also contributed towards changing the council's attitude to private housebuilders.

One practical example in particular helped to focus the members' attention on the question of private housebuilding. In the Darnley area, where one of the council's latest schemes was being built, the houses were proving to be extremely hard to let. At the same time, however, in one of the few private housing developments in the city, at nearby Darnley Park, completed houses were being sold as fast as they could be built; a dramatic contrast which the council found difficult to ignore.

In addition there was the introduction of Housing Plans. The background work which had to be done in 1976/77 for the preparation, of the first of these documents, forced the council into looking at all aspects of housing in the city. This broader view provided a forum in which the council could consider the contribution which private builders could make towards the improvement of housing choice in the city.

Finally, at the national level, there was by 1976 an intensifying debate on what the future direction of inner city policy should be (McKay and Cox 1979). This debate helped to focus attention on what contribution private investment might make towards the regeneration of cities. In Glasgow, in particular, this debate became enmeshed in the early elaboration of Strathclyde's development strategy. A strategy which, as the previous chapter has already shown, has acknowledged from its earliest origins in the West Central Scotland Plan, the "contribution which private housebuilders could make towards the up-grading of the city centre environment" (West Central Scotland Plan 1974).

By the end of 1977 a combination of the above events had forced the councillors to look more favourable on the idea of encouraging private housing in the city.

This culminated in March 1977 with the Policy and Resources Committee, chaired by Baillie Dynes, recommending that "there should be no more large scale local authority housing developments on the periphery of the city"; and, that "every effort should be made to broaden the range of tenure within the city, and the Council should continue to consider radical new initiatives towards this end" (Glasgow District Council 1977). These recommendations were finally approved by the full council on 31st March 1977, just prior to the local elections in May 1977.

These views were endorsed, and reinforced in later years, despite the vacillation of power in a council which contained no majority party. By the end of the 1970's, however, it had become a view espoused more out of necessity than out of choice. The council has been forced to continually re-examine its housing policies and programmes in the context of a series of expenditure constraints imposed by central government. The sector of council spending most severely affected by these cuts has been housing, particularly new build. This has meant that the only way in which a significant house construction programme could be carried out in the city was through the encouragement of private housebuilding.

The series of events outlined above have, by now, seen the councillors', and therefore the city's, attitude towards private housebuilders fundamentally altered. In the past the council greeted almost every application which did come forward from private builders by refusing planning permission and then taking out a C.P.O. on the site to preserve it for local authority housing. In this way the city acquired all the suitable housing land almost as soon as it became available for development, which meant that all of the large private housing programmes were sited outside the city (McEachran 1975). Now the council's efforts are mainly directed towards attracting more private housebuilding, and it is to an examination of the methods used in an attempt to achieve this objective that we now turn.

4.3 When the District Council first decided, in 1977, to encourage private builders to work in the city, they immediately allocated 3 sites for private housebuilding. These sites had previously been earmarked for council housing and were located at Roughmussel, Sandyhills and Whitlawburn, covering 25 ha. in total. The council also decided to cease all council house building at Summerston in favour of a further release of land to private housebuilders. While at Darnley the projected number of local authority completions was reduced by 300.

The Sandyhills scheme was subsequently amended to a 'Build - for - Sale' project, but the remainder of the sites, all council owned, were marketed by the local authority. The development brief was drawn up by both the Planning and Estates Departments and the builders invited to submit tenders for the sites.

At the same time the Planning Department undertook a survey of land, within the city, in order to identify sites which it considered might be suitable for private housing. This work was collected into four booklets, listing sites in District ownership, Regional ownership and Private ownership. The documents were published in 1978 and sold to private builders for £50. As before tenders were invited, and interested parties were advised that the listing of a site implied planning consent, for some kind of private housing development, would be available.

An interesting feature of these published lists (Yellow Books) is that the Estates Department were authorised "to negotiate directly with any developer interested in a site owned by the District Council" (MacFadyen 1980). Several developers took advantage of this slightly streamlined procedure and, in total, the Yellow Books, updated from time to time, saw a further 35 ha. of land allocated to private housing.

This initial flurry of activity brought forward, for private housebuilding, approximately 55-65 ha. of land with a capacity of about 1600 houses - approximately half of these are now under construction, the remainder have developers nominated (Hamilton 1980). The next stage in the council's efforts to attract private builders was the direct result of government constraints on public expenditure,which forced the city to abandon virtually all future plans for mainstream council housing.

In response to this the Director of Housing produced, in March of 1980, the "Alternative Strategy: The New Build Housing Programme 1980-85." This document placed considerable emphasis on the need to harness the resources of the private sector in order to reduce some of the effects of cuts in public expenditure. It proposed,therefore,that 8 sites varying from 1 ha. - 6 ha.in size, which had originally been programmed for council housing, be released to the private sector. Some of these are to be developed as joint initiatives, incorporating an element of sheltered housing, but in total the land released is sufficient for over 600 private houses (Glasgow District Council 1980a). By the end of 1980 Glasgow District were already negotiating with Unit Construction Ltd and Barratts Glasgow Ltd on the disposal of two of these sites, each with a capacity for more than 50 houses.

The latest initiative being undertaken by the council is the release of land in peripheral housing estates at Easterhouse, Garthamlock and Priesthill. As part of this programme greenfield sites,adjacent to the peripheral estates,will be made available to private builders. This, however, will be on the strict understanding that the builder, at the same time, agrees to carry out the rehabilitation or renewal of part of the existing council house stock.

The greenfield sites which have been identified for release as part of this programme have a capacity for approximately 1900 houses (Glasgow District Council 1980b). Negotiations are already taking place with Laing Homes Ltd and Salvesen Homes Ltd on one site, while Bovis Homes Ltd have expressed an interest in one of the other sites. In addition, a consortium headed by John Lawrence and McTaggart Mickel have advised Glasgow District Council that they too wish to take part in any future discussions concerning the disposal of these sites.

The feature which is common to all of the above efforts made by the District Council is that they concentrate on the release of land which is already owned by the local authority. In order to encourage the private sector to acquire and develop sites not owned by the District Council, the builders are being sent copies of the vacant land chapters for each of the city's local plan areas. Once the builders' opinions on these sites has been obtained and, bearing in mind those views, the local plan for the area approved; then, as before, the prospective developer will be advised of the sites on which planning permission for private housing is likely to be granted. Thereafter however, in the majority of cases, the owners will still have to be persuaded to part with the land.

The statutory undertakers are the only other major source of land in the city and the principal landowners in this category are British Rail and the Clyde Port Authority. Most of this land, however, is unsuitable for private housing development because of either its shape or location. As Table 4.3 shows, the land which is made available by British Rail, for example, is very rarely used for housing.

Re-use of Railway Land in 1977 in Glasgow

	Size of Parcel (ha.)		
New Use (No of Sites)	1-4	4-7	7+
Industry and Warehouses	8	3	1
Other Transport	3	4	1
Scrap Yard	3	4	-
Public Open Space	1	-	-
Housing	-	2	-
Other	3	1	-

Table 4.3 Source: Dawson (1979)

The one very notable exception to this is the Robroyston site in the north of the city. This 34 ha. site formerly a hospital, was originally owned by the Greater Glasgow Health Board; after passing through a number of different owners (including the Scottish Office) it was finally purchased by Salvesen Homes Ltd. The site now has outline planning permission for the construction of 750 houses.

The outcome of the above efforts has been the complete transformation, in the space of 5 years, of the situation with regard to the availability of private housing land in the city. In 1975 it was almost impossible for a private builder to acquire any land in the city (McEachran 1975). By November 1980 the council had identified 280 ha. of land, in various ownerships, which is intended for private housing. This is an area sufficient for the construction of over 7000 houses and at November of last year there were detailed planning permissions for the construction of 3600 private homes (Glasgow District Council 1980c). All of this would suggest that the council has succeeded in its efforts to redirect the activities of the private builders. There are, however, a number of unresolved problems which may thwart the council's efforts to achieve the targeted 1142 private house completions, per annum, over the next 5 years (Strathclyde Regional Council 1980).

4.4 The viability of a number of the sites identified by the council, for private housing, has been questioned by several builders. As Baron (1980b) has pointed out, to the private builder a site can be "unviable because of physical, planning or market limitations". While Glasgow District Council have managed to eliminate many of the old planning problems, the other difficulties remain.

The actual cost of carrying out building work on redevelopment sites, particularly in cities, is generally much higher than for similar developments on virgin greenfield sites. Site clearance and development costs were said by all of the builders to be a major constraint on a number of the proposed sites in Glasgow. In some cases the sale of District Council owned land has been conditional upon the local authority completing any required site clearance work; Barratts have purchased a number of sites from the city in this way. This, however, involves the District Council in incurring costs which are not usually recovered in the sale price. The extent to which they can carry out this work is therefore strictly limited.

A particularly severe problem in this respect is that posed by the under-mining of extensive tracts of the city. As the city's chief planner has noted, this will probably have severely limiting effect in the scope for development. And there is little or nothing the planning authority can do until such time as instability, caused by mining, is recognised by central government as industrial dereliction, and grants are provided for the rehabilitation of this ground (Hamilton 1980).

The size of some of the sites designated for private housing has also attracted criticism from a number of builders. Only one quarter of all the sites intended for private housing are larger than 2 ha; a figure referred to by many builders as being the smallest they would consider purchasing. This problem, however, is less severe than these figures might initially suggest.

Although only 25 per cent of the sites meet what many builders regard as their minimum size requirement, the carrying capacity of these plots accounts for more than 80 per cent of the city's programmed, private house completions (Glasgow District Council 1980c).

In addition, where other factors have been favourable, the builders have carried out developments on sites which are less than 2 ha. in size. Bovis have, for example, completed a development of only 15 houses, on 0.2 ha. at Bridgeton; and where the conditions are suitable other builders have taken on sites of a similar size.

In discussions the builders invariably placed more emphasis on the quality of the environment surrounding a vacant site, than on the actual size of the plot itself. They have, therefore, consistently urged the District Council to divert more of their resources to carrying out environmental improvements. But, as the Directors of both Housing and Planning have pointed out, the city's existing commitments and resources limit the extent to which this can be done (Glasgow District Council 1980b). As a consequence, rather than as a preference, the builders have favoured, on the whole, the development of larger sites which allow them to create their own environment.

One further area of concern for the builder is the cost of land acquisition. As explained in chapter two, the price that the builder can afford to pay for land will depend on the likely market price of the completed dwellings and the costs of development, including an adequate margin for profit. Since development costs on city sites are higher than on virgin land, the price which a builder can pay for such land will invariably be less than what he could offer for a similar greenfield site (Stone 1972). The builders have also pointed out that the selling price of houses, on city sites, can be 5 to 10 per cent lower than for a similar house in the suburbs. This further reduces the price they can afford to pay for city centre land.

The problems which the builders have encountered in this respect are most commonly associated with the purchase of land from private owners. The price paid for local authority owned land is usually arrived at through negotiation with the Estates Department who, in most cases, have the authority to conclude the deal without referring back to the council. As the officials, however, have pointed out, the important point here is that the political environment within the council is such that neither officers nor members can now be seen turning away private housebuilders. This has meant that in the sale of council owned housing land the city has had to accept whatever offers were made by the builders.

In contrast to this, the building firms have experienced problems in their attempts to buy land from other owners. The particular aspect of land acquisition which has been fraught with most difficulties is the purchase of land in multiple ownership. Several builders, including Bovis, Wimpey and Barratts, have experienced difficulties in obtaining land, which were directly attributable to this factor. The problem was invariably either the owner of a small piece of land, essential to a larger development, holding out for what the builders considered as an exorbitant price; or the ownership of some sites being so complex that negotiations on a possible purchase price could not even be started.

The builders have submitted that in these circumstances the council should be prepared to use its compulsory purchase powers to acquire and assemble sites prior to reselling them to private builders. The Chief Surveyor, however, has pointed out that the financial position in the city is such that "there is no question in the immediate future of the local authority buying land to make it available for private housing" (MacFadyen 1980); particularly as the cost of acquisition would not necessarily be recovered by the council.

As in a number of instances described above, the capacity of the planning process to actively intervene in the management of market forces is circumscribed by external pressures; the planners role being ultimately a passive one rather than an active one. The continued success of their policies will depend therefore on how other interested parties respond to the initiatives made by the planners. It is possible in this respect to identify some areas of potential conflict and difficulty.

4.5 One area in which the conflict seems likely to intensify in the near future is in the response from surrounding District Councils. The recent moves being made by Glasgow District Council, to encourage private housing on greenfield sites on the periphery of the city, has antagonized a number of local authorities. It is clear that while they are willing to accept that private housing should be encouraged in the inner city, perhaps even at their expense; they are equally determined that the greenbelt which separates them from the city should not be used for housebuilding of any kind,for whatever reason (Strathclyde Regional Council 1980b).

The planners in Glasgow District Council, however, are well aware that in order to maintain the momentum which has been created in the allocation of sites for private housing,then the release of greenbelt land, within the city boundary, may have to be considered. This however, is one issue which, unlike the Structure Plan, will almost certainly attract the unanimous opposition of all the other district councils, making it extremely difficult for Glasgow to adopt this course of action.

Although the reactions of other district councils are important in determining the future pattern of private housing in Glasgow; the area in which the planners

are most vulnerable is in their dependence upon the co-operation and support of a comparatively small number of building firms.

The only firms which have taken part in site purchasing and actual housebuilding, on any significant scale,are the largest of the incoming firms whose activities were described in chapter three, and labelled as growth oriented in chapter two. The Scottish based firms, despite the interest shown in some sites by Lawrence and McTaggart Mickel, have been described by the planners as being incredibly cautious, and as yet have undertaken no major developments within the city. While even some of the medium - sized English based firms would,at best, only consider the later development of small sites around the edge of larger estates constructed by the volume builders.

The future rate of housebuilding in the city will depend,therefore, on the support of less than half-a-dozen large national companies. Worse still the foundation on which that support is based proves, on examination, to be extremely fragile.

The interest which these firms have shown in city centre sites has often been explained by referring to the greater expertise, and broader resource base of large national companies. The only builders who can afford to take the risks which are involved in the development of these sites are large firms like Barratts, Bovis, Wimpey and Salvesen. At the same time, the quality and the location of the sites invariably dictates that the only houses which will sell on them will be those which suit the 'first - time' buyer; the kind of house which only the largest firms can build at a profit.

All of this implies that it is only this small cadre of firms which have developed the experience to recognise, without prejudice, the profit-making potential of city centre sites. The builders themselves will usually add that they have switched some of their investment to these areas because they have perceived a

change in the nature of the housing market.

All the volume builders pointed out that it was becoming more and more difficult to sell houses, particulary to first-time buyers - their main market, which were located any further than 15 to 20 kilometres from the city. The builders have, therefore, in the words of Barratts' chairman in Scotland, welcomed the opportunity to build in the city, where they believe there is a huge unsatisfied demand for further private housing (Bruce 1980).

Although this provides part of the explanation for the pattern of private housebuilding in Glasgow; and would appear to guarantee the builders will continue in their own interests to support this policy, it ignores one further, and less favourable, factor: These are all firms which were picked out in chapter three as being under the most intense pressure to find land and build houses. And because of the nature of the land market in West Central Scotland they were forced to build in areas which they did not consider as ideal.

The higher costs and risks, both anathema to the private builder, associated with in-town housing give it a low priority in the builders' list of preferences. Therefore, while the builders readily acknowledge that the best market for the first-time buyers is now relatively close to the city, given a choice of locations they would still opt for suburban greenfield sites. In view of this, if the Secretary of State's instructions regarding the Structure Plan's housing policies result in the release of peripheral sites, then the builders will almost certainly reconsider their commitment to in-town private housing. As Nicholls et al (1980) recognised in their work, and as the planners in Glasgow District Council are only too well aware, without restrictive policies on peripheral development then it will be impossible to sustain the builders' interest in city centre sites. It is,

however, even more important to ensure that not only is there a restriction on peripheral development, but also that the builder can expect that restriction to be consistently enforced.

In the development of sites for in-town private housing the first phase of any project will frequently be completed at a loss (Baron 1980b). It is not until the builder has created the environment, and hence the market for private housing, that he will be able to make a return on his investment. In Govan, for example, Salvesen have invested £1M in the first stage of a development expecting, at best, to break even on the project. On later phases, however, the firm will make a profit on the site having used this initial expenditure to create a suitable environment and hence a viable market.

This implies that if these building firms believe there is any possibility of peripheral sites being released in the near future then they may well cancel their plans to continue with similar, 'trail-blazing' investments. Bearing in mind the better, and easier financial rewards which can be obtained from the development of suburban greenfield sites, there will be no reason to commit their resources to risky in-town housing when they might be more productively employed elsewhere, and at a later date.

The uncertainty which has been created by the necessity for Strathclyde Region to re-consider its housing policies clearly creates problems for Glasgow District Council. Although the builders will continue to operate on the sites where they have already committed resources, there will be a natural reluctance to proceed on any new development until the future land position in the area is made clear. It will require only a change in the company policy of four or five firms, based perhaps on no more than the hope generated by the Secretary of State's comments, to sabotage future private investment in in-town housing. Unless

there is both firm and predictable support for restrictive planning policies then the builders will simply postpone future developments and await more favourable circumstances.

Future planning for private sector housebuilding in Glasgow will, therefore, be subject to two constraints. First there is the need to allow for the increased resistance from other district councils: Second, there is the city's dependence on only a few building firms whose support is given only because they lack a supply of alternative sites to develop. These are both areas in which it is difficult for the district planning department to effectively exercise control.

4.6 This chapter has helped to elucidate the role which local polititians can play in influencing the private sector. While, as suggested in chapter two, the local authority may lack the means to intervene economically in the process of private housebuilding, the local political response can clearly play an important role in creating the right atmosphere for private sector investment. Neverthless, in a number of areas, the control which central government has on expenditure levels, grants and, ultimately, land-use policies, has also been seen to circumscribe the actions of local planners. In spite of this Glasgow, with the help of Strathclyde Region, has achieved a significant degree of success in its efforts to manage the investment patterns of private housebuilders; but some of this success is due to the unique circumstances which currently exist in the land market. As explained above, if these circumstances should change in any way then the continued support of the firms currently building private houses in Glasgow is very much in doubt.

CHAPTER FIVE

SOME CONCLUSION ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LAND USE-PLANNING AND THE MARKET

5.1 This study has focussed on the interaction between planners and housebuilders in order to draw out some of the features which characterise the relationship between planning and the market. In the first chapter a case was made out for planning to intervene in the operation of market processes in order to allow for both a more efficient and more equitable allocation of resources.

In the particular case considered in chapters three and four, the planners' objective has been to divert the activities of private housebuilders towards declining urban areas. The motives for this are mixed; it is partly to avoid costly duplication of urban infrastructure i.e. efficiency, and partly to locate new investment where it might generate concomitant social and welfare advantages i.e. equity. In attempting to meet these objectives, through the control of the private sector, it was anticipated, however, that the planning process would encounter a number of problems.

It is now possible to identify those areas of both plan-making and plan-implementation where the attempts made to control market forces are most likely to meet with resistance.

5.2 The planning authority is clearly constrained in its efforts to devise effective policies by its limited capacity to intervene in the economics of private housebuilding. The planner is compelled to rely on indirect controls "whose effect is to structure situations into which individual actions must be adapted" (Friedmann 1973). In the case of land-use planning, these indirect controls have concentrated on the physical aspects of land management; their impact on the market relying upon "the imposition of physical standards and the maintenance of rather crude zoning arrangements" (Harrison 1979). On this basis alone, however, it is difficult to construct planning policies which are not only

recognised to lie within the terms of the current legislation, but which also have the potential to successfully influence the developmental process.

In the context of this particular study, the private land market is one area in which the powers available to carry out land-use planning display certain limitations. In chapter two a general examination of the mechanisms which operate in the land market suggested that planners would find it difficult to influence the outcome, or effects, of land transactions. In chapter three the problems which this can create for the planning process were made even clearer.

The motives of one group of land owners - the Scottish based builders, were shown to conflict with those of another group - the incoming volume builders. As an investment, the Scottish based builders had built up, over the years, an extensive land bank in the peripheral suburbs of Glasgow. Strathclyde Regional Council had originally intended to control this land bank through the revocation of existing planning permissions. This policy, however, had proved, on examination, to be too costly and it was later abandoned. Much of this land, therefore, was still zoned for private residential housing.

In contrast to this, the incoming firms had no immediate source of land, and despite buying out existing firms and purchasing land from other builders, could not obtain a supply of housing land sufficient to meet their needs - they immediately sought the release of more land. For the planner, the difficulty is, that although there are significant tracts of land already zoned for private housing, and owned by builders, he has no means by which to ensure this land is made available to the firms who actually want to build on it.

The present powers which the local authorities possess to deal with this kind of problem, and even those powers which they formerly held under the Community Land Act, are heavily circumscribed and too expensive to implement. Therefore, the number of opportunities for local authorities "to mount entrepreneurial

ventures into the land market, in order to secure the availablity of land in a positive way, have been very limited" (Groves 1980). The limited ability of the planning authority to intervene positively in the land market is, however, in contradistinction to its powers for preventing development. The consistent application of these negative powers successfully ostracized the private housebuilders from Glasgow for over 25 years. It should not be forgotten, however, that the planner's ability to refuse permission for a development does not necessarily prevent that project altogether. The planner's main activity "is to redistribute development from one piece of land to another" (Broadbent 1977); and as pointed out, while the planner can repress a development in one area,he cannot dictate, or positively influence,where it does ultimately take place.

The difference which the possession of these powers could make to the planning process is well illustrated in chapter four, where Glasgow's efforts to attract private housebuilders were considered. Over several years the planning authority had steadily acquired a significant supply of land, originally designated for council housing. When the decision was made to encourage private sector housing in the city,the controlled release of parts of this land bank, combined with the negative controls partially imposed on peripheral sites, was able to positively influence the pattern of private housebuilding. If negative controls alone had been employed, with the planners being unable to ensure there was an existing supply of land in the areas where they wished private housebuilding to take place, then it is unlikely that the policy could have succeeded. The key point in the control of private sector investment is, not only must development be prevented in some areas; but also the resources which are necessary for that development, particularly land, must be available in the areas where the planner wishes to encourage investment.

This would suggest that in order to both satisfy the builders' demands for land, and give the planning process an opportunity to influence market forces, then

local authorities will need greater encouragement and resources to intervene in the land market. If this is not done, then the allocation and programming of land for private housing will reflect idealised objectives, not realistic policies. Furthermore, without this kind of help the planning process will be unable to use the management of market forces as a means of controlling future patterns of development.

5.3 In its efforts to control market forces the land-use planning system is constrained not only by the internal limitations on its powers but also by the need to take account of a number of external pressures.

In chapter two the possibility was considered that the local political environment might play an important role in determining the relationship between land-use planning and the private sector. This was, in fact, quite clearly the case in Glasgow. For many years the political ideology of the council was one which rejected the private sector as a legitimate source of investment in housebuilding. The attitude of the councillors "was one of single-minded concentration on municipal housing to the exclusion of all else" (MacFadyen 1980). In the circumstances the planning process was only called upon to fulfill a negative, regulatory role in order to prevent private housing developments. The relationship between land-use planning and the market was one in which there was very little room for manoeuvre, and where the planner had few opportunities to exercise his discretion.

In recent years, however, Glasgow's councillors have been forced, through a variety of circumstances to modify their opinions. They have now accepted the view that the economic decline of the city is so massive that it can only be effectively tackled by a combination of public and private investment. In particular, the councillors have been persuaded that the housing problems of the area cannot be alleviated without the help of the private housebuilder. It is now

hoped that an increase in owner-occupied housing in the city will in turn lead to a variety of social, economic and physical benefits for the whole area. For land-use planning this implies a major change in its relationship with market forces, as represented by the private housebuilders.

The planners are now under pressure to ensure that the political commitment of the council to "broadening housing choice and increasing opportunities for owner-occupation in the city" is implemented (Glasgow District Council 1980b). In order to do this the planner must attempt to break down the barriers which exist between the two sides, public and private, and thus forge some kind of partnership with the private builder. This,however, is not an objective which can be easily achieved. As Hambleton (1980) points out, the level of mutual distrust between these two worlds is inordinately high. The pecuniary motives of private sector agencies, such as housebuilders, remains anathema to the planner; while "the utopian unrealities of abstract planning policies produce intense cynicism on the part of the development industry" (Ratcliffe 1976).

This is a communication gap which Friedmann (1973) considers can only be closed by a "continuing series of personal and primarily verbal transactions" between the two sides. In this model, conflicts will be overcome by a "mutual desire to continue in the life of dialogue" (Friedmann 1973.) Friend et al (1974) have elaborated on some aspects of this theme,assuming as their starting point that the lack of co-ordination between organisations is the result of lack of knowledge about each others problems and interests. This block to effective co-ordination can,however, be overcome through developing better methods of communication, mainly, through inter-personal contacts. The mutual awareness created among the various agencies,and individuals,with interests in the course of development in an area,will, it is anticipated, lead to some change in the form, location and timing of development (Healey 1979).

The officials at Glasgow District Council in their efforts to bridge the communication gap between them and the private sector, have tried to follow the above course of action,and develop a closer and more direct relationship with private housebuilders. In the pursuit of this objective the officers have been supported by the councillors who, for example, have authorised the Estates Department to negotiate directly with potential purchasers of council owned housing land. In addition, both the Housing and Planning departments have been involved in direct negotiations with the private builders over the release of land on the peripheral council house estates (Glasgow District Council 1980b). These changes have helped to improve the level of communication between the two sides, and they have contributed to Glasgow's success in attracting private builders into the city.

Attention,however,must be drawn to the fact that the meetings which take place between the two sides are not only to allow for improved communications, but also about exchange. The liason between the two sides is one in which each now anticipates concessions from the other. Where bargaining such as this takes place power, as Jowell (1977) points out, will determine the outcome of the negotiations. The planner must, therefore, tread warily in his efforts to improve the level of inter-personal relationships with private sector agencies such as housebuilders. If the planner loses sight of the interests and values which legitimates his involvement in this process,then he may unwittingly concede more to his opposite number than he originally intended. While it is possible to admit there is some common ground between the two sides, the motivating force of each still remains fundamentally different. Land-use planning must, therefore, in its efforts to control market forces, balance the need for improved communications with private sector agencies, against the dangers of too close an identification with their interests and motives.

5.4 The local political environment has clearly contributed to a change in the relationship between land-use planning and the market. However, as indicated in chapter two, centrally controlled economic policy has proved to be a more pervasive influence on the private builder -local planner relationship.

The efforts which Glasgow District Council have made to encourage private housebuilding are partly due to the effect which public expenditure cuts have had on the city. These cuts have forced the council to abandon most of its mainstream local authority housing. This has further motivated the council in its efforts to encourage private builders to work in the city, and therefore has contributed to the change which took place in the city's attitude towards private sector housing. These broad economic forces have also been instrumental in determining the means which are made available to the land-use planning system for the control of the private sector.

In Glasgow the local authority has very few resources which it can allocate to site improvement or site assembly due to the restraints on public spending. The planners are consequently restricted in the extent to which they can positively influence the availability of land for private housing. Sites which might otherwise have been considered suitable for future development must be disregarded because of either problems of ownership or dereliction. The efforts made by Strathclyde Region to control private housing, by the revoking of planning permission, were similarly restricted. The costs involved were found to lie well beyond the council's means and as a result they were forced to abandon the policy.

Government economic policy has also been an important factor influencing the actions of the housebuilders. Current economic policy has badly affected the ability of builders to finance their activities and consumers to purchase the completed houses. The result has been a significant decrease in the number of

housing starts in 1980 (fig 2.1). This has created some apprehension amongst planners in Glasgow District Council. In recent months there has been a reduction in the sale and building rates in the city. The higher cost of in-town housebuilding, exacerbated by the risks and uncertainties which accompany such projects, make them a prime target for cut-backs when the builders are looking for areas in which to make savings. If the situation was to remain unchanged for any length of time, to be followed by a release of suburban sites, then the future of private housing in the city would be very uncertain.

It is, however, not only the economic but also the social objectives of central government which can influence the planning - market relationship. The empathy which would appear to exist between the current government and the housebuilding lobby has helped to create the climate for private market decisions. The sympathetic hearing which the Secretary of State accorded to the case presented by the housebuilders at Strathclyde's E.I.P. , is symptomatic of events throughout Britain. Over the last 2 years the housebuilders have commented on 25 structure plans and 18 have been amended to include the release of additional land (Planning 1981). As Elson (1981) points out, planners are therefore in danger of "being compelled to allocate for additional development large areas which, because of the recession, may not be built on for some years" (Elson 1981). Equally, the release of this land could make it extremely difficult for the planning system to exercise effective control over the actions of private builders.

It is clear from the above that the policies of central government, on both the economic and social level, can affect not just the means available to carry out land-use planning, but also the very nature of the market with which the planner has to work. The policies that the planning system uses to control the actions of private sector agencies must be, therefore, sufficiently adaptable to cope with the changes imposed by external forces. If this is not done then the use of

inappropriate controls, in the wrong circumstances, might give unexpected and unwanted results.

5.5 The land-use planning system, in its efforts to control market forces, must also take account of the conflicting views expressed by neighbouring local authorities.

In the case of Strathclyde Region's Structure Plan, the opinions voiced by the district councils ranged from qualified approval to outright opposition. There was such a broad spectrum of arguments put forward that it is difficult to see how any one in particular could have had more influence than another. The most important point, however, is that because the Region was faced with such a mixed reaction to its policies then the inevitable, internal wrangles which followed, weakened the Plans credibility. The Plan, therefore, appeared to lack a firm basis of support, and not even Glasgow, the one area likely to benefit most from the strategy, was 100 per cent behind the Region. This was a weakness which the private sector was able to exploit in their efforts to overturn the policies concerned with the control of housing land.

Glasgow District Council are also hampered in their attempts to influence the location of private housing by the reaction of surrounding districts. If Glasgow's planners did decide to release more land on the edge of the city, possibly greenfield sites, for the use of private builders, then they would be met by strong opposition from the neighbouring local authorities. These areas are willing to accept the diversion of private investment for the purpose of redeveloping inner city sites. They, however, are not prepared to accept that the private sector should build on greenfield sites in the city.

It is clear from the above, that the implementation of a strategy intended to control or divert market forces is not easy. There is such a variety of conflicting opinions to be taken into account that it is difficult to construct the framework

for an effective yet realistic policy.

One mechanism which might be used for this purpose is the National Planning Guildelines, introduced into Scottish Planning in 1977. At present these guidelines cover five subject areas, setting out Scottish Office policy and providing information for planning authorities.

As Diamond (1979) points out, the topics covered could be usefully extended to include the spatial distribution of urban populations. This would help to define, at the appropriate national or regional level, the objectives to be pursued in the allocation of housing land, and it would also give structure plans an explicit set of criteria against which to measure their objectives. Nevertheless, it would be naive to assume, that by following this course of action, further conflict over the allocation of housing land could be completely eliminated. But it would at least provide a more appropriate arena in which to judge the wider consequences of different policy options.

5.6 In chapter one it was made clear that if the planning process is to effectively tackle the goals of efficiency and equity, then, particularly in the case of the latter, the way in which the market does operate must be challenged. One area where land-use planning is particularly vulnerable in its efforts to achieve this objective is in the tendency to underestimate, or ignore, the influence of past and prevailing market trends.

In chapter three the influence which existing market forces can have on the planning process were discussed in some detail. The way in which the housing and land markets had evolved in Strathclyde had encouraged some builders to develop vested interest in certain areas. These were advantages which they would be unlikely to relinquish without a fight. At the same time, the monopoly

advantages enjoyed by these firms forced other incoming builders to compete for a proportionately smaller share of the land market. These firms, therefore, were also certain to oppose any policies proposed by the Region, which might prevent them from having the same benefits in similar areas. The operation of these particular market forces had generated a momentum which the planning system would find it difficult to resist; and the regional planners, therefore, were likely to be under intense pressure to release more land. This would suggest that the residential land policies proposed by the Region would have to be based on a sound understanding of past and recent trends in the land and housing markets. As chapter three, however, points out the evidence from the Strathclyde E.I.P. would suggest that this was not the case.

The planners displayed only a rudimentary and partial knowledge of the way in which these markets worked. The housebuilders, in contrast, had assembled a detailed, and apparently, authoritative, analysis of the prevailing market position. In the absence of any persuasive counter-arguments from the planners, this particular 'view of the future' was accepted as being the more realistic.

This clearly implies that if the planner is to influence the direction taken by market forces then he must fully appreciate the structural context within which he is operating. In addition, where planning is trying to control the way in which the market operates,then an understanding of the recent past, as proposed by Friedmann (1973), is essential, if the possible points a system offers for strategic and effective intervention are to be identified. Finally, once the policies to control the operation of the market have been decided on, then they must be applied with both firmness and consistency. If this is not done then the momentum which characterises the operation of market forces will inevitably sweep aside good intentioned, but weakly implemented policies. Thus, not only must a plan be adaptable in order, as suggested earlier, to cope with changing

circumstances; it must also display resolution when it comes to the application of a chosen strategy.

In a mixed economy it is clear, that if land-use planning is to achieve certain objectives then it must try to work with, or through, market forces. There is a growing realisation that, in consequence, planners need to understand market mechanisms more fully and use them more wisely than they have in the past (Willmott 1973). This study has used the example of private housebuilders to highlight some of the difficulties which the planning system faces in its efforts to achieve this objective. The evidence which has been assembled suggests that there are certain weaknesses which make it difficult for planning to effectively influence market trends. If some attention, however, is given to the problems and proposals outlined above, then a more sensitive and revitalized system of land-use planning could more effectively contribute to the control of market forces.

29,000 words

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Allison, L. and Benyon, J. (1978) "Public planning of private development", Public Administration, Vol. 56, p. 73.

Ambrose, P.and Colenutt, B. (1975) The Property Machine, Penguin, Harmondsworth.

Ambrose, P. (1976a) "British land use planning: a radical critique", Antipode, Vol. 8, p. 2.

Ambrose, P. (1976b) "The land market and the housing system", Urban and regional Studies; University of Sussex, Working Paper No.3.

Anderson, P. and Smith, A. (1979) "The private housing developer", The Planner, Vol.65, p.49.

Balchin, P.N. and Kieve, J.L. (1977) Urban Land Economics, MacMillan, London.

Ball, M. (1978) "British housing policy and the house-building industry", Capital and Class, Vol. 4, p.78.

Baron, T. (1980a) "Planning's biggest and least satisfied customer: housing", Proceedings of the R.T.P.I. summer school, 1980; R.T.P.I., London.

Baron, T. (1980b) "Derelict land for housing", Chartered Surveyor, Aug. 1980, p.44.

Barrett, S., Stewart, M, and Underwood, J. (1978a) "Land and development", The Planner, Vol. 64, p. 152.

Barrett, S., Stewart, M. and "The land market and development process", School for Advanced Urban

Addendum

Bassett, K. and Short, J.R. (1980) Housing and Residential Structure; R.K.P., London.

and urban growth", Reading University, Dept. of Geography; Geographical Paper No. 47.

Bearsden and Milngavie District council. (1979) Written submission to Strathclyde Structure Plan E.I.P.

Bowhill, A. (1972) "The land problem", Built Environment, Vol. 1, p. 363.

Boyle,R. (1980) "Examinations in Public", The Planner, Vol. 66, p. 73.

Broadbent, T.A. (1977) Planning and Profit in the Urban Economy, Methuen, London.

Bruce, W.H. (1980) "A volume builder's perception of the scope for in-town private housing", Planning Exchange Forum Report, No.22, Glasgow.

a retrospective view, Unpublished seminar paper given at Glasgow University, Dept. of Town and Regional Planning.

Camhis, M. (1979) Planning Theory and Philosophy, Tavistock, London.

Charles, S. (1977) Housing Economics, MacMillan, London.

Checkland, S.G. (1976) The Upas Tree, University of Glasgow Press, Glasgow.

Coon, A. (1979) "An appraisal of the housing aspects of the Strathclyde Structure Plan", Glasgow School of Art, Occasional Paper No.4.

Cowley, J. (1979) Housing for People or for Profit, Stage 1, London.

Craven, E. (1969) "Private residential expansion in Kent", Urban Studies, Vol. 6,p. 1.

Craven, E. (1970) Conflict in the land development process: The role of the private residential developer, Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis; University of Kent.

Craven, E. and Pahl, R.E. (1967) "Residential expansion; a preliminary assessment of the role of the private developer in the South-East", Journal of the Town Planning Institute, Vol.53, p. 137.

housing: Some methods and questions arising", in Housing, Construction and the State; Conference of Socialist Economists, London.

Darin-Drabkin, H.(1977) Land Policy and Urban Growth, Pergamon, Oxford.

Darin-Drabkin, H. and Darin, D. (1980) "Let the state control", Urban Law and Policy, Vol. 3, p.217.

Dawson, H.H. (1979) "Land and transport in the Scottish city", Scottish Geographical Magazine, Vol. 95, p. 83.

Diamond, D. (1979) "The uses of strategic planning", Town Planning Review, Vol. 50, p. 18.

D.O.E. (1975) "Housing land availability in the South-East", Economist Intelligence Unit, H.M.S.O., London.

D.O.E. (1978) "Land availability; a study of land with residential planning permission", Economist Intelligence Unit, H.M.S.O., London.

D.O.E. (1979) "Study of the availability of private house building land in Greater Manchester--1978-1981", H.M.S.O., London.

Donnison, D. (1972) "Ideas for town planners", Three Banks Review, Dec. 1972. p.3.

Donnison, D. and Soto, P. (1980) The Good City, Heinemann, London.

Drewett, R. (1973) "The Developers: Decision Processes", in P. Hall (ed.)(1973).

Eastwood District Council. (1979) Written submission to Strathclyde Structure Plan E.I.P.

Elkins, S.L. (1974) Politics and Land-Use Planning, Cambridge University Press, London.

Elson, M. (1981) "Farmland loss and the erosion of planning", Town and Country Planning, Vol. 50, p. 20.

Etzioni, A. (1973) "Mixed Scanning: A Third Approach to Decision Making" in Faludi (ed.)(1973).

Eversley, D. (1973) The Planner in Society, Faber, London.

Faludi, A. (1973) (ed.) A Reader in Planning Theory, Pergamon, Oxford.

Foley, D.L. (1973) "British Town Planning: one ideology or three" in Faludi (ed.) (1973).

Foster, C. (1973) "Planning and the Market" in P. Cowan (ed.) 1973. The Future of Planning, Heinemann, London.

Foster, C. and Glaister, S. (1975) "The anatomy of the development land tax" Urban Studies, Vol. 12, p. 213.

Friedmann, J. (1973) Retracking America , Anchor Press, New York.

Friend, J.K., Power, J.M. and Yewlett, C.J.L. (1974) Public Planning: The Intercorporate Dimension, Tavistock, London.

Gaskin, M. (1977) "Housing and the construction industry"; paper given at the Dept. of Political Economy, University of Aberdeen.

Glasgow District Council.(1977) Minutes of Council Meetings, Policy and Resources Committee 8/3/77, Glasgow.

Glasgow District Council.(1979) Written submission to the Strathclyde Structure Plan E.I.P.

Glasgow District Council.(1980a) "Alternative Strategy: The New Build Housing Programme", Report by the Director of Housing.

Glasgow District Council. (1980b) "Partnership Initiatives with the Private Sector", Report by the Director of Housing and Director of Planning.

Glasgow District Council.(1980c) "Housing Land Intended for Private Housing".

Glennerster, H.(1981) "From containment to conflict? Social planning in the 70's", Journal of Social Policy, Vol. 10, p. 31.

Goldberg, M.A. and Ulinden, D.D. (1976) "Residential developer behaviour: Additional empirical findings", Land Economics, Vol. 52, p.363.

Goodall, B. (1972) The Economics of Urban Areas, Pergamon, Oxford.

Gracey, H. (1973) "The Planners : Control of New Residential Development" in Hall, P. (ed.) 1973.

Gransby, D. (1975) "A future for the private developer", Built Environment, Vol. 4, p. 17.

Gray, C. (1981) "Two tier planning; the Scottish experience - a politicians view", unpublished seminar paper given at Glasgow College of Technology.

Groves, R. (1980) "The role of the local authority in land programming and the process of private residential development"; Housing Monitoring Team, Centre for Urban and Regional Studies, Research Memo 80, University of Birmingham.

The Guardian (1980a) 11/11/80, p.15.

The Guardian (1980b) 6/8/80, p.14.

Hall, P. (ed.)(1973) The Containment of Urban England, P.E.P., London.

Hambleton, R.(1980) "Inner cities: Engaging the private sector"; School for Advanced Urban Studies, Working Paper No. 10, University of Bristol.

Hamilton, S.F.(1978) "Glasgow's Housing Policies", in Clarke, M.G. and Drucker, H.M.(1978) Scottish Government Year Book, Harris, Edinburgh.

Hamilton, W. (1980) "The scope for in-town private housing in Glasgow - Planner's view", Planning Exchange Forum Report 22, Glasgow.

Harloe, M., Issacharoff, R.and Minns, R. (1974) The Organisation of Housing, Heinemann, London.

Harrison, A.J. (1977) Economics and Land-Use Planning, Croom Helm, London.

Harrison, M.L. (1979) "Land planning and development control- Research monograph ", Dept. of Social policy and Administration, University of Leeds.

Hart, D.A. (1980) "Urban economic developments", Occasional Paper No.2, School of Planning Studies; University of Reading.

Harvey, D. (1973) Social Justice and the City, Arnold, London.

Hayek, E.A. (1960) The Constitution of Liberty, R.K.P., London.

Healey, P. (1979) "Networking as a normative principle with particular reference to local government and land use planning", Local Government Studies, Vol. 5, p.55.

Hebbert, M. (1981) "The land debate and the planning system", Town and Country Planning, V. 50, p.22.

H.M.S.O. (1972) — Town and Country Planning (Scotland) Act 1972, H.M.S.O., London.

H.M.S.O. (1977) — Eighth Report from the Expenditure Committee, Planning Procedures, Volume 11 H.o.C. 395, H.M.S.O., London.

H.M.S.O. (1981) — Committee of Inquiry into Local Government in Scotland, H.M.S.O., Edinburgh.

Hooper, A. (1979) — "Land availability", Journal of Planning and Environment Law,(December), p.752.

Hooper, A. (1980) — "Land for private house-building", Journal of Planning and Environment Law,(December), p.795.

H.B.F. (undated) — Land for Housing, House Builders Federation, London.

Housing Monitoring Team (1980) — "New housebuilding and housing strategies: Report of the public/ private sector housing forum", Research Memo 82; Centre for Urban and Regional Studies, University of Birmingham.

Howell, B. (1972) — "Planning policies and land for housing", Housing Review, Vol. 21, p. 107.

Humber, J.R. (1980a) — "Land availability: Another view", Journal of Planning and Environment Law, (January), p. 19.

Humber, J.R. (1980b) "Can the private sector fill the gap", Roof, Vol.5, p.156.

Hyman, G. and Markowski, S. (1980) "Speculation and inflation in the market for house-building land in England and Wales", Environment and Planning, A.,Vol.12, p. 1119.

J.U.R.U.E. (1976) "Planning and Land Availability: Interim Report", Joint Unit for Research in the Urban Environment, University of Aston, Birmingham.

J.U.R.U.E. (1977) "Planning and Land Availability", Joint Unit for Research in the Urban Environment, University of Aston, Birmingham.

Jowell, J. (1977) "Bargaining in development control", Journal of Planning and Environment Law, (July) 1977, p.414.

Kaiser, E.J. and Weiss, S.F. (1969) "Decision agent models of the residential development process-- a review", Traffic Quarterly, Vol.63, p. 597.

Kaiser, E.J. and Weiss, S.F. (1970) "Public policy and the residential development process", Journal of the American Institute of Planners,Vol.36, p.30.

Lanark District Council (1979) Written Submission to Strathclyde Structure Plan E.I.P.

Latham, M. (1972) "Land for the private sector",Housing Review, Vol. 20, p.94.

Latham, M. (1979/80) Interview reported in Housebuilder, Dec./Jan., p.448.

Law, S. (1977) "Planning and the future", Planner, Vol.63, p.7.

Lawrence Building Company (1979) Written submission to Strathclyde Structure Plan E.I.P.

Lea, K.J. (1980) "Greater Glasgow", Scottish Geographical Magazine, Vol. 96, p.4.

Lichfield, N. (1972) "Land availability and housing policy", Housing Review, Vol.21, p.101.

Lichfield, N.(1979a) "Land values and planning", Urban Law and Policy, Vol.2, p.111.

Lichfield, N.(1979b) "Towards an acceptable planning system", Town Planning Review, Vol.50, p.5.

Lichfield, N. (1980) "Land policy - an overview", Urban Law and Policy, Vol.3, p.193.

Lichfield, N. and Darin-Drabkin, A.(1980) Land Policy in Planning, Allen and Unwin, London.

Lindblom, C. (1973) "The Science of Muddling Through", in Faludi (ed.) 1973.

Lothian Region (1978a) Lothian Region Structure Plan: Written Statement, Edinburgh.

Lothian Region(1978b) Lothian Region Structure Plan: Public Participation Report, Edinburgh.

MacFadyen, T. (1980) "The scope for in-town private housing in Glasgow-Estate Surveyor's view", Planning Exchange Forum Report 22, Glasgow.

McDougall, G. (1979) "The state, capital and land", International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, Vol. 3, p. 361.

McEachran, J. (1975) "Glasgow faces critical land shortage north of the Clyde", Building Trades Journal, Vol.169, 18/4/75, p.14.

McFadden, J. (1981) "Two-tier planning: The Scottish experience-a politicians view", Unpublished seminar paper delivered at Glasgow College of Technology.

McKay and Cox (1979) see end

McKie, R. (1974) "Cellular renewal", Town Planning Review; Vol. 45, p.274.

Massey, D. and Catalano, A. (1978) Capital and Land, Arnold, London.

Meyerson, M. (1973) "Building the Middle-Range Bridge for Comprehensive Planning", in Faludi (ed.) 1973.

Nabarro, R. and Richards, D. (1980) Wasteland, Thames Television, London.

Nath, S.K. (1973) A Perspective of Welfare Economics, McMillan, London.

National Economic Development Office (1976) — Scottish Construction into the early 80's, H.M.S.O., London.

Neuburger, H.L.I. and Nichol, B.M. (1976) — "The recent course of land and property prices and the factors underlying it", Department of the Environment, Research Report 4, H.M.S.O., London.

Neutze, M. (1974) — "The development land tax: A comment", Urban Studies, Vol.11, p. 91;

Nicholls, P.C., Turner, D.M., Kirby-Smith, R. and Cullen, J.D. (1980) — "The private sector housing development process in Inner City areas", Report to the Department of Environment, Dept. of Land Economy, Cambridge.

Niven, D, (1979) — The Development of Housing in Scotland, Croom Helm, London.

Pahl, R.E. (1975) — Urban managerialism reconsidered in Pahl, R.E. (1975), Whose City? Penguin, Harmondsworth.

Pearce, B.J., Curry, N.R. and Goodchild, R.N. (1978) — "Land planning and the market", Occasional Paper No. 9, Dept. of land Economy, Cambridge University.

Percival, R.N.(1973) — "Land, building and planning", Journal of the Royal Town Planning Institute, Vol. 59, p. 82.

Pickvance, C.G. (1977) — "Physical planning and market forces in urban development", National Westminster Bank Quarterly Review, August, p. 41.

Planning (1981) — Planning 3/4/81, p.4.

Planning Exchange (1979) — Summary of proceedings at Strathclyde Structure Plan E.I.P., Planning Exchange, Glasgow.

Planning Exchange (1980) — "In-town private housing", Planning Exchange Forum Report No. 22, Glasgow.

Pritchard, W.G.(1978) — "Inter-authority planning after re-organisation", Unpublished M. Phil. thesis, Planning Dept., Glasgow University.

Property Advisory Group (1980) — Structure and Activity of the development Industry, D.O.E., H.M.S.O.,London.

Randall, J.N.(1980) — "Central Clydeside: A Case Study of One Conurbation", in Cameron, G.C.; (1980), The Future of the British Conurbations, Longman, London.

Ratcliffe,J. (1976) — Land Policy Hutchison.London.

Rose, (1973) — "Development Value Tax", Urban Studies, Vol. 10, p.271.

Schmid, A.A. (1970) — "Suburban land appreciation and public policy", Journal of the American Institute of Planners, Vol.36,p.38.

Scott, A.J.P.(1980) — The Urban Land Nexus and the State, Pion, London.

S.D.D. (1974) — "Land prices in Scotland: A study of building land purchases 1959-72", Central Planning Research Unit Paper No.9, Scottish Office, Edinburgh.

S.D.D. (1972-80) — Housing Returns for Scotland and Housing Statistics for Scotland; published quarterly in each year, H.M.S.O., London.

S.D.D. (1975) — "Land prices in Scotland", Central Research Paper No. 14, Scottish Office, Edinburgh.

S.D.D. (1978) — "Trends in land prices in Scotland 1966-76; a study of private residential building land", Scottish Economic Bulletin, Summer 1978.

S.D.D. (1980) — "Recent changes in the residential land market", Unpublished discussion paper, Scottish Office, Edinburgh.

S.D.D. (1981) — Modifications to the Strathclyde Structure Plan, S.D.D. Edinburgh.

Senior, D. (1972) — "The framework for development", C.E.S. Conference Paper No.12.

Sidwell, N. (1970) — "The cost of private house building in Scotland", Scottish housing advisory committee, H.M.S.O., London.

Simmie, J.M. (1974) — Citizens in Conflict, Hutchison, London.

Simmie, J.D. and Hale, D.J. (1978) — "The distributional effects of ownership and control of land use in Oxford", Urban Studies, Vol. 15, p.9.

Smart, G. (1977) — "The future of structure plans", The Planner, Vol. 63, p.5.

Solesbury, W. (1974) — Policy in Urban Planning, Pergamon, Oxford.

Stone, P. (1972) "Inner city housing: A suitable case for subsidy?", Built Environment, Vol. 1, p. 371.

Strathclyde Region Housebuilders Committee (1979) Written submission to Strathclyde Region Structure Plan. Examination in public. S.R.H.C., Glasgow.

Strathclyde Regional Council (1976a) The Regional Report, Strathclyde Region, Glasgow.

Strathclyde Regional Council (1976b) Strategic Issues for Strathclyde; Survey Report, Glasgow.

Strathclyde Regional Council (1977) Strathclyde Structure Plan: A consultativ Draft, Glasgow.

Strathclyde Regional Council (1978) "Housing studies-changes in the private sector", Regional Planning Papers, No.1.

Strathclyde Regional Council (1979) Structure Plan: Written Statement. Glasgow.

Strathclyde Regional Council (1980) 1979 Base Projections to 1986, Glasgow.

Strathclyde Regional Council (1980b) Prospects for Housing 1980-85, Comments on the third round of housing plans produced by District Councils in Strathclyde.

Strathkelvin District Council (1979) Written submission to Strathclyde Structure Plan E.I.P.

The Sunday Times(1980) 16/11/80, p. 5.

Walshe, J.R. (1980) "The private developer: aims and objectives", Journal of Planning and Environmental Law, Occasional Paper.

West Central Scotland Plan (1974) Social Issues, Supplementary Report 4, Glasgow.

Wilkinson, P.K. and Archer, C. (1976) "Uncertainty, prices and the supply of housing", Policy and Politics, Vol.5, p. 63.

Willmot, P. (1973) "The Tasks for Planning", in Cowan (ed.) (1973). The Future of Planning, Heinemann, London.

Young, R. (1980) "A politicians view of corporate and inter-corporate planning", Unpublished seminar paper given at Glasgow University

McKay,D.H. and Cox,A.W. (1979) The Politics of Urban Change.Croom Helm. London.