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The Concept of Universal Grammar in the "Hermes" of James Harris, with Special Reference to his Classical Sources

thesis

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Table of contents

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Preface

The overwhelming majority of contemporary works on universal grammar are classified either within the field of linguistics or within that of philosophy, usually in accordance with their author's professional identity and field of study. As a result of the development of scientific thought and of the increasing need for specialisation, in comprehensive subjects such as that of universal grammar, many scientists, when trying to explore their sources, are unable to survey those parameters of the subject which are not part of their special area. Consequently, in works commenting on treatises like *Hermes*, which combine the philosophical with the linguistic aspect, a great number of passages are either misinterpreted, or simply not commented on. In many cases, the solution preferred by many scholars could be considered as rather unfortunate: a comparative quotation of passages from various authors makes easier a fragmentary and partial preoccupation with the content of their work. In the existent bibliography on *Hermes*, there are cases where eminent scholars are unaware of the origin of the passage they quote and thus unable to identify its primary sources.

Despite the fact that Harris states his sources most of the time, the modern bibliography lacks a work which would elucidate the classical background of *Hermes*. It is also true that up to now the book's philosophical background has not been commented on; modern research has focussed mainly on the linguistic contribution of *Hermes* to the eighteenth century study of English language. It is hoped that this thesis will fill that gap. *Hermes* represents the manner in which the post-Renaissance rationalistic thought incorporated and further developed the medieval realism of the speculative grammarians. But its major importance lies in the fact that Harris avoids relating his work to its medieval predecessors, and associates it with the higher ranked classical sources of ancient times. This thesis will trace this relation of *Hermes* with its classical background, in order to reveal Harris' comprehensive conception of philosophical patterns which at first sight seem to differ from each other, and to expose his idea of integrity in philosophy. An additional objective of this thesis is to familiarise the reader with the comprehensive eighteenth century notion of universal grammar, a combination of the linguistic with the philosophical field of study. It is also hoped that by this study the reader will become aware of the content of a text-book on universal grammar, and that he will become familiarised with the system of classification of the parts of speech which is suggested. The first part of this thesis focusses on the relation of *Hermes* to the philosophical and linguistic thought of its time. The second part is employed with the exposition of the grammatical content of the work, while the third treats the philosophical parameters of the subject.

Part I

An overview of Hermes

Philosophical, general, and *universal grammar*

During the first half of the eighteenth century the idea of words as pictures of our own mental concepts was predominant. In Britain, the Royal Society was following in the study of language the tradition of Locke, and the emphasis was on the pictorial significative power of the spoken form of the language. Thus, concern about language was directed mainly to its function in terms of synchronic communication. The tradition of medieval realism, which considered language as the means of communicating divine truths, and of paying tribute to them through the study of Greek, Latin, Hebrew, or German, was considered out of fashion, and was thus merely abandoned. Words were thought to be simply a means of conveying meaning; thus language was mainly studied as an aggregation of signs. In mid-eighteenth century Britain, *universal grammar* was more likely to be considered in relation to seventeenth century French general and rational grammars, while its future implementations were to be discovered in the German Enlightenment, and the manner in which this absorbed the French and English rational thought.[1]

In order to understand the content of *Hermes,* we have first to occupy ourselves briefly with four subjects treated in this introduction, which are i) the concept of *universal grammar* in comparison with the concept of *philosophical* and of *general grammar*, ii) a brief account of the life and works of Harris, as also of the authors whose works are the main sources for *Hermes,* iii) the deistic parameter in *Hermes*, and iv) a concise profile of the content of the book under examination.

The first thing noteworthy in the study of grammar, is the distinction between the terms *universal, philosophical,* and *general grammar,* especially in view of the confusion between the philosophical content of the universal grammar, and the one termed philosophical.

Philosophical grammar suggests the artificial construction of a new language, made from selected symbols that could be taught and learned, so as to achieve universal application. Often, the term *universal language* has been used to imply either an international language in the modern sense, or a philosophical language, or a combination of both of these. In the first decades of the eighteenth century, the French language established its dominancy in international communication. The Huguenot refugees from France helped considerably in that direction. The discussion about a universal language and a philosophical grammar received an additional stimulus from the growing popularity and importance of the general grammar movement, especially in France, and from the growing study of primitive tongues, from which languages were supposed to have derived.[2] The hope was to overcome the Babel of the diverse spoken languages. Practically, the need for a philosophical language appeared as a result of the rise of the vernacular languages after the fifteenth century, and the subsequent withdrawal from the practice of Latin and its international employment among the *literati* of the medieval era.

[1] Kant had studied Harris' *Three Treatises*. See on this the first two chapters of Hutchings, Patrick Ae., *Kant on absolute value*, London, G. Allen & Unwin, 1972.
[2] knowlson, p. 148.

General grammar focuses on those functional principles, which are common among the already existent languages. It aims not for the creation of new linguistic forms of expression, but for the manifestation of specific grammatical forms as prevailing upon the diverse peculiarities of each language. In this sense, it rejects the inconsistency of languages, and exemplifies them as yielding to the same ratio. The most eminent representative of this grammatical study is the *General and Rational Grammar*[3] written in the abbey of Port-Royal (1660), a work attempting a compromise between the medieval predominance of Latin with the languages of the post-renaissance period.

Universal grammar should be distinguished from the above mentioned species of grammatical study. It suggests a real existence of certain concepts (*realia*) in a certain metaphysical realm, and a natural subjection of our mental concepts to these original prototypes. The concept of universal grammar originates from a passage of Aristotle's *De Interpretatione*:

> spoken words are symbols of the affections of the soul; and written words are symbols of those spoken. Spoken words, as the written ones, are not the same for all men. But the mental affections they primarily symbolise are the same for all men, as are also the same the things represented by the objects of these affections.[4]

The origin of universal grammar can be traced further in the medieval coalescence between grammatical theory and logic,[5] and the association of language with philosophy. The speculative grammars of the modistae[6] were a step forward from what was considered as the ancient philosophy of language, namely, the works of Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, Dionysius Thrax, and Apollonius Dyscolus. The study of these was based primarily on the commentary works of Donatus, Priscian, and Boethius. In the most famous of these countless speculative grammars,[7] we find a comprehensive description of the objectives set by the medieval grammarian:

> ...the first and more important is, in what way is the mode of signifying divided and described? The second is, what does the mode of signifying basically originate from? Thirdly, what is the mode of signifying directly derived from? Fourthly, in what way are the mode of signifying, the mode of understanding, and the mode of being differentiated? The fifth is, in what way is the mode of signifying subjectively arrived at? The sixth is, what order obtains for the following terms in relation to

[3] a book praised by Harris for its observations on the subjunctive article: *Hermes*, 1751, p. 81.

[4] Ἔστι μέν οὖν τά ἐν τῇ φωνῇ τῶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ παθημάτων σύμβολα, καί τά γραφόμενα τῶν ἐν τῇ φωνῇ. Καί ὥσπερ οὐδέ γράμματα πᾶσι τά αὐτά, οὐδέ φωναί αἱ αὐταί· ὧν μέντοι ταῦτά σημεῖα πρώτως, ταὐτά πᾶσι παθήματα τῆς ψυχῆς, καί ὧν ταῦτα ὁμοιώματα, πράγματα ἤδη ταὐτά: *De Interpretatione*, 1.16a4-8.

[5] where grammar, logic, and rhetoric, formed the arts of the trivium of the medieval curricula.

[6] They were so called because they involved the grammatical study primarily of the modes in which words signify things (*modus significandi*).

[7] Thomas of Erfurt *Grammatica Speculativa*, 1325, a work previously attributed to Duns Scotus.

one another, ie sign, word, part of speech, and terminus?[8]

Universal grammar inherited this background, but received its impetus particularly from a phrase in Roger Bacon's *Greek Grammar* stating that

> Grammar is one and the same in accordance with the substance of all languages, although it varies in its accidental cases.[9]

This idea received most support during the seventeenth century's rationalistic approach to grammatical theory, after the works of Francis Bacon,[10] Tommaso Campanella,[11] and Juan Caramuel y Lobkowitz.[12] While Bacon's idea of grammar was rather related to the sociological and psychological study of different people,[13] Campanella reintroduced the Platonic metaphysic into the grammatical study, and defined grammar as a science.[14] The medieval discussion on the type of the conventional character of language was now reintroduced, in coordination with a differentiation between literary and philosophical grammar. We find now a terminological distinction between natural and artificial language and grammatical method,[15] which accounts respectively for a differentation between the common and the peculiar part in each language. The whole scheme reinstates the Aristotelian distinction between natural forms and accidental linguistic material as corresponding to such a distinction between real things. But now this is based in the humanist tradition of Scaliger and Sanctius, who had strongly supported a rational cause in the structure of language, reinterpreted through the concrete Cartesian rationalism.

The concept of universal grammar relates to the structure of the medieval trivium, and the speculative grammar, predominant during the thirteenth and fourteenth century.[16] It represents a pre-linguistic *science* of grammar, focusing on the interrelation between language (grammar) and philosophy (metaphysics), as also a field for controversy between the two major opposing branches of the theory of universals, the nominalist-empirical and the rationalistic one. Universal grammar does not set any linguistic-scientific exemplar. It is scientific,[17] only as much as science yields to philosophical meditation. With its non-linguistic approach, in the application of its terms it has no restrictions deriving from the tied relations between terminology and spe-

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8 : ...unum et primum est, quomodo modus significandi partiatur, et describatur. Secundum est, a quo modus significandi radicaliter oriatur. Tertium est, a quo modus significandi immediate summatur. Quartum est, quomodo modus significandi a modo intelligendi et a modo essendi distinguatur. Quintum est, in quo modus significandi tanquam in subiecto inveniatur. Sextum est, qualem ordinem habeant ad invicem isti termini, Signum, Dictio, Pars orationis, et Terminus.: from the author's preamble, in Bursill-Hall's edition and translation, p. 134-135.

9 *Grammatica una et eadem est secundum substanciam in omnibus linguis, licet accidentaliter varietur:* Bacon, p. 27, in the 1902 edition.

10 *De Augmentis Scientiarum,* Oxford, 1623, 6. 1.

11 *Philosophiae Rationalis,* Paris, 1638: a work in the type of speculative grammars following the Thomistic scholastic philosophy.

12 *Grammatica Audax* (1654). For more on the works of Campanella and Lobkowitz, see Padley, 1976.

13 Padley, 1976, p. 156.

14 and not an art: a subject of controversy during the medieval times.

15 Vossius, *De Arte Grammatica,* Amsterdam, 1635.

16 Leff, p. 111.

17 in the modern sense, brought up after the middle of eighteenth century.

cific theoretical models from which these terms originate. On the contrary, universal grammar has an outstretched time-reference in the terminology it employs. If spoken language is the external testimony of mental language, the only agreement between the universal grammarians' and the scientific approaches concerns naturality in language.

Comparatively, both the philosophical grammar of the language-planners and the universal one, are not grammars of a spoken language. But while universal grammar yields to a set of predominant logical interrelations between thoughts in a metaphysical order, the philosophical one suggests the creation of new speech patterns. Universal grammar is considered prearranged in a mental realm of a preexisting supreme mind, and it can only be *reflected* in our thoughts; thus our mental concepts are considered subjected to an eternal logic. Philosophical grammar derives its determination from human agreement. It is a later construction of artificially arranged signs, reflecting not any supreme, but our own human thoughts.

Universal and general grammar are identified with each other, as they both affirm the subsistence of common grammatical abstraction between human languages. But universal grammar differs from the general, in that it admits of an a priori truth and of a transcendental correspondence of these abstractions to specific forms to which these yield.

James Harris and the editions of *Hermes*

James Harris (1709-1780) was well known during his time for two things: his relationship to Lord Shaftesbury,[18] and the authorship of *Hermes,*[19] He was very competent in the study of Aristotle and music,[20] "in the theory and practise of which he is said to have had few equals".[21] Being several times a member of Parliament, he served also as Lord of the Admiralty, and of the Treasury, appointed additionally as a secretary and comptroller of the Queen Charlotte. His works are:

-***Three treatises*** (1744-45) containing:

i) ***Dialogue on Art,***

ii) ***Dialogue on Music,Painting, and Poetry***, and

iii) ***Dialogue on Happiness***.

-***Hermes, or a Philosophical Inquiry Concerning (Language and) Universal Grammar***, 1751.[22]

-***Philosophical Arrangements***, 1775.

-***Philosophical Inquiries***, 1781.

According to the 1891 *Dictionary of National Biography*, the following works are also attributed to Harris:

- ***On Rise and Progress of Criticism***, *from Papers by James Harris,* 1752.

[18] His second wife, Lady Elizabeth Ashley Cooper, was the third daughter of the second, and the sister of the third Lord Shaftesbury.

[19] That is why he was usually called by his contemporaries *Hermes Harris.*

[20] Being a very close friend to Handel, he tried to transform Salisbury into a city of music and art.

[21] The source from a biographical manuscript kept in Hampshire Record Office: *Malmesbury Collection,* 9M73/91008.

[22] The word language was omitted after the first edition.

-***Spring: a Pastoral,*** represented at Drury Lane on September the 22th, 1762.
Additionally, he contributed to the translation of Xenophon, made by Sarah Fielding.

In the eighteenth century, in Britain, *Hermes* gave a new impetus to the study of universals. The book appeared for the first time in 1751, under the title ***Hermes, or a Philosophical Inquiry concerning Language and Universal Grammar***. The publication was so successful that many editions followed the first one.[23] To these, produced either in London or Dublin, we must add its two translations, one in French (1795) by Francois Thurot (encouraged by and dedicated to Garat, a famous philosopher of language), and one in German (1788), by Chr. G. Ewerbeck.[24] The number of its editions testifies to the great appeal the book had for the readers of its era.

Harris[25] greatly influenced Thomas Reid (***Inquiry***,1764), James Beattie (***Dissertations Moral and Critical***, 1798, and***Theory of language***, 1788), Lord Monboddo (***Of the Origin and Progress of Language***, 1771-1792), and Robert Lowth (***A Short Introduction to English Grammar***, 1762).[26] The notion of universal grammar reintroduced by Harris in the eighteenth century, caused a gradually increased interest in the study of grammatical theory: Robert Lowth, Joseph Priestley,[27] and Lindley Murray[28] were Harris' direct antecedents; but their works included also the linguistic study of language: they belonged to the new era of modern scientific linguistic study of grammar.[29]*Hermes* was also the cause for many reactionary works, like John Horne Tooke's *Diversions of Purley* (1798-1805), and Georg Michael Roth's ***Antihermes oder philosophische Untersuchungr uber den reinen Begriff der menschlichen Sprache und die algemeine Sprachlehre.***

The authors and the tradition discussed in *Hermes*

We will not, of course, give any account here of Aristotle, Plato, Boethius, Locke, or Hobbes. There is no need, additionally, to repeat Harris' account of Greek and Latin authors he suggests to his readers as examples of linguistic perfection. By the explanatory memos of the authors either quoted, or indirectly referred to, it is hoped that in the progress of the exposition of Harris' universal grammar, the ideas introduced will be easily accommodated with a specific philosophical background.

Theodore Gaza was the first to incorporate in Gellius' *Noctes Atticae* (1469) the first

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23 1765, 1771, 1773, 1786, 1794, 1806, 1816, and 1825.

24 This was the book suggested by Humbolt to Schiller, when the last asked for advice on books for the study of Greek: Aarself, Han, *From Locke to Saussure*, University of Minnesota,1980, p. 350.

25 Also known among the literati of his age as *Hermes Harris.*

26 Lowth's concept of universal grammar is of a general and rational type, conceived at a secondary level, and aiming at grammatical accuracy, while the primary scope is confined to the linguistic practise within the limits of the specific English language:

> "...easiness and perspicuity have been sometimes preferred to logical exactness... Universal grammar cannot be taught abstractedly: it must be done with reference to some language already known; in which the terms are to be explained and the rules exemplified" (from the preface of his work).

27 *The rudiments of English Grammar* (1761, 1768).

28 *English Grammar, Adapted to the Different Classes of Learners* (1795).

29 See also the references on this in Hayashi, 1978.

edition of ancient Greek text: an extended extract from the Platonic *Gorgias*. Among others, he contributed to the education in Greek studies of innumerable humanists, including Lorenzo Valla and Antonio Beccaria, as also to the edition of countless classical Greek texts. But above all, his major legacy was his own work *Γραμματικῆς Εἰσαγωγῆς Βιβλία Τέσσαρα* (*Introductionis Grammaticae Libri Quattuor*, 1495), which, in subsequent centuries of western thought, was the main descriptive source of Greek grammatical theory and text study.

Georgius Gemistus (or **Pletho**, 15th c.) whose name was paraphrasing that of Plato's, took part in the Council of Florence and the negotiations for the reunion of the two Christian churches. He inspired Marcilio Ficino to establish a Platonic Academy (1459), and thus he marked the turn of Latin thought towards the study of Platonic works. Representing the higher tones of the Neoplatonic paganistic mysticism in the controversy with the Latin Aristotelianism of the time, his ample writings introduced a system of universal pantheism.

Nicephoros Blemmides (1197-1272), head of a school of philosophy established by the emperor Ioannes Batatzes in Nice, represents the higher achievements of medieval Greek thought in comprehension of ancient Greek philosophy. His *Ἐπιτομή Λογικῆς* and *Ἐπιτομή Φυσικῆς* were for both eastern and western European education the best and most precise abridgements of the Aristotelian thought, as elaborated in the first case by Porphyry, and in the second by Olymbiodorus, Simplicius, and Philoponus.

Aelius Donatus (4th cent.), a grammarian *par excellence*,[30] was the author of two works on the Latin language: the *Ars Minor*, an elementary grammar book in the form of a dialogue, concerning the parts of speech, and the *Ars Maior*, a more advanced study of language subjects, including solecisms and tropes. Donatus' work became very popular especially during the middle ages.

P. Consentius (middle of 5th c.): in his grammatical work, under the title *Ars P. Consentii V. C. de duabus Partibus Orationis, Nomine et Verbo*[31] (Basle, 1528) focused only on the noun and verb, using in his examples the material of Donatus and Charisius. A work under the title *Ars de Barbarismis et Metaplasmis*, a source for earlier views on language, is also attributed to him.

Sergius' work *De Littera* was comments on Donatus' *Ars Maior*, 1. It is not clear whether the *Explanationes in Artem Donati*, based on remarks made by Servius, should be totally ascribed to Pseudo-Cassiodorus, also called Sergius, or to the Sergius mentioned here. From the authors quoted by Harris, Servius and Sergius had written commentaries on Donatus, and thus are classified with the exegetical grammarians, while grammarians whose works, such as those of Priscian and Consentius, were preoccupied mainly with the inflections and dealt with the subjects of Donatus' *Ars Maior*, were called elementary ones.

Flavius Sosipater Charisius (first half of 5th c.), a Christian professional grammarian, author of five books with weak grammatical comments under the title *Institutiones Grammaticae*. He is also known as Flavianus, or Cominianus, names that belong to some of the authentic writers of the material he used.

Priscianus Caesariensis (late 5th c.) was the author of the influential eight volume

[30] *Donatus dixit* was a famous method of establishing a solid base for a grammatical argument.

[31] where *V. C.* probably stands for *Vir Clarus*.

Institutiones Grammaticae (also known as *Commentiariorum Grammaticorum Libri XVIII*), which deals with subjects of both grammar and syntax, as also of the *Institutio de Nomine et Pronomine et Verbo,* on the basic features of the inflections, a very popular work which often has been wrongly identified with the *Institutiones Grammaticae.* He taught grammar in Constantinople, and in his work he followed Apollonius Dyscolus.

Gerard(us) Johann(es) Voss(ius) (1577-1649) was one of the representatives of the Dutch "Golden Age" in the field of classics and education, a theologian, friend of Grotius, and Arminianist,[32] professor of Rhetoric and Chronology in Leiden University. Harris refers to his *Analogia.*

Carl von Linne (Carolus Linnaeus, 18th c.) was the first natural scientist to impose a unificatory set of principles on genera and species of organisms, in his *Systema Naturae* (1735). There, man is classified with the apes and the bat in a primary order of mammals, but is distinguished by his reason, which is considered independent of his physiological aspect. Additionally, Linnaeus presented a classification of the genus *Homo Sapiens* in terms of climate and culture.

Amafanius, an early Roman writer, follower of the philosophy of Epicurus, who is only known by Cicero's negative critique in *Academica,* 1.2, and *Tusculanae Disputationes,* 4.3.

Chalcidius (between the 4th and the 6th c.), a Platonic philosopher, author of the *Interpretatio Latina partis prioris Timaei Platonici,* printed in Corsica (1520).

Ioannes the Grammarian (or Ioannes Philoponus, 7th c.), an Alexandrian scholar, disciple of Ammonius, whose study of Plato and Aristotle led him to the sect of the Tritheists, a heresy condemned by the council of Constantinople of 681. Among his works we should refer to the *De Quinque Dialectis Graecae Linguae Liber,* and the *Συναγωγή τῶν πρός διᾶ φορον σημασίαν διαφόρως τονουμένων λέξεων* (Collectio vocum quae pro diversa significatione Accentum diversum accipiunt), the Commentarii in Aristotelem (:in Prior & Posterior Analytics, Physics, Meteorologia, de Anima, de Generatione Animalium, de Generatione et Corruptione, Metaphysica).

Macrobius (Ambrosius Aurelius Theodosius, 5th c.), a Greek grammarian. Harris quotes from the work *De Differentiis et Societatibus Graeci Latinique Verbi*, which is an abridgement of Macrobius' authentic text. The main point relating to Macrobius was the controversy over whether he maintained in his works the strictly philosophical attitudes of Neoplatonism or whether he accommodated himself with its Christianised version.

Olympiodorus (first half of the 6th c.), the last Alexandrian neoplatonist, influenced primarily by Damascius, and secondarily by Iamblichus and Syrianus. Very acute as he was in the perception of the Platonic philosophy, he bequeathed to us extended comments on several of Plato's dialogues.

Maximus Tyrius, a Platonic writer at the time of Antonines, author of the *Διαλέξεις* (*Dissertationes*) or *Λόγοι* (*Sermones*), on subjects relating to philosophy and theology.

Nicomachus of Gerasa was a Pythagorean who wrote on arithmetic and music. His influence on western European thought can be traced through Boethius' brief references to his

[32] The *Arminians,* or *Remonstrants,* members of a sect founded during the second half of the sixteenth century in Holland by Jacobus Arminus, were opposed to the determinism of the Calvinists.

work.

Servius, an unknown author of an eleven part work carrying the title *Servii Ars Grammatica: Expositio Magistri Servii super Partes Minores.*

Theodectes (4th cent. b. c.) was pupil of Isocrates, the style of whom he followed in his rhetoric and poetic work, but also of Plato, and Aristotle. He is considered the writer of a *Τέχνη Ῥητορική*, where he follows Aristotle in the classification of words, and also of a collection of orations; both works are now lost.

Terence (**Marcus Terentius Varro**) was a contemporary of Cicero and one of the most illustrious Roman writers. Harris, on several occasions, quotes from Terence's *De Lingua Latina* (first edition at Rome, 1471). Six of its twelve volumes have been preserved. The work was divided in three parts: i) *De Impositione Vocabulorum*, on the origin of words and terms, treating subjects of the history of Latin language, etymology, and classification of terms, ii) *De Declinationibus*, on the inflection of nouns and verbs seen as forms, the nature of which is divided into the natural (analogy) and the arbitrary part (anomaly), iii) *Ut Verba inter se conjungantur*, on the laws of syntax.

Alexander of Aphrodisias (end of the 2nd c.-beginning of the 3nd c.) was the most eminent Aristotelian commentator (thus called *ὁ Ἐξηγητής*, the Exegete), who tried to free the Aristotelian philosophy from Ammonius' syncretism. He strongly opposed the Platonists, the Stoics, and the Epicureans. In *Περί Εἱμαρμένης* his argument for a real existence of fate was based on the common use of language, internal consciousness, and universal opinion. He further emphasised the distinction between free and necessary action (two things that the Stoics were trying to reconcile), as also between fate, chance, and possibility. Harris, quoting from *Περί Ψυχῆς*, follows Alexander in the description of God as the very form of things. It is significant here, that Alexander has been discussed as an atheist, because of his many passages attributing intelligence and mind to the deity.

Apollonius Dyscolus, the Alexandrian grammarian who was so poor, that he wrote on shells, attracted the attention of the emperor M. Aurelius. As he was the first to systematise grammar, Priscian called him *grammaticorum princeps*. Harris quotes from his *Περί συντάξεως τοῦ λόγου μερῶν* (*De Constructione Orationis*, or *De Ordinatione sive Constructione Dictionum*).

Ammonius (late 4th c.) was a Neoplatonic, priest of the "Egyptian Ape," professor of grammar in Alexandria and Constantinople, and contemporary of Helladius. His work, from which Harris quotes, is entitled *Περί ὁμοίων καί διαφόρων λέξεων*, and *Περί Ἑρμηνείας*.

Damascius the Syrian (end of the 5th c.) was the last Neoplatonic philosopher in the School of Athens. He was the teacher of Simplicius, and was also known as *ὁ διάδοχος*, since he succeeded in the cathedra of Athens Proclus' disciples Marinus and Zenodotus. Harris quotes from Damascius' work *Ἀπορίαι καί Λύσεις περί τῶν πρώτων ἀρχῶν*, where all things have their first principle in an all-in-one and undivided divinity.

Proclus (**Diadochus**). Harris quotes from Proclus' commentary work on the Platonic *Parmenides* and *Timaeus*, avoiding any reference to the theological comments of Proclus' other

works (*Εἰς τήν Πλάτωνος Θεολογίαν* and *Στοιχείωσις Θεολογική*), with the content of which he is in almost absolute accordance. Proclus extended the mystic content of the Platonic works, so as to include his pantheistic views deriving from his study of Orphic and Chaldaean oracles. He was thus suspected of violating the laws of the Christian emperors, and he was compelled to quit Athens for some time. He wrote a special treatise on the coordination between the Orphic, Platonic, and Pythagorean doctrines, and he thought of himself as a reincarnation of Nicomachus of Gerasa. His doctrine of emanation aims to represent ideas in a realised logical classification, where the subordinate simple ideas derive from composite ones, regarded as the principles of things.

Simplicius (6th c.), a disciple of Ammonius and Damascius, was one of the last Neoplatonic Aristotelian commentators. His interpretation of Aristotle forced a compromise of it with the Platonic doctrines. His inquiries into the Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy are considered untainted by the Orphic and Chaldaic mysticism seen in the other neoplatonists. Harris quotes from Simplicius' commentary on Aristotle's *Categories*, and he also gives Simplicius' account and terminology of the triple order of ideas.

Themistius (4th c.) was a pagan Aristotelian commentator, philosopher and rhetorician, who served under several emperors in Constantinople, and was highly praised during his time. Harris quotes Themistius, as also Alexander of Aphrodisias, from the *editio princeps* of the Greek text made by Aldus in 1534.

Porphyry (3th c.), the famous anti-Christian Neoplatonist, disciple of Plotinus, who tried to reconcile the Aristotelian philosophy with the Platonic doctrines, is only referred to by Harris for his *Εἰσαγωγή*.

Alcinous, a Platonic of the Caesars' era, was the author of the'*Επιτομή τῶν Πλάτωνος δογμάτων*, a compilation of Aristotelian and Platonic terminology. He confined the Platonic ἰδέαι to the meaning of general laws, distinguishing them from εἴδη as the forms of things.

William Grocyn (1446-1519), an English scholar, one of the first, among More, Colet, and Linacre, who taught Greek in Oxford. He was accused by Erasmus for following the medieval scholastic preference of the Aristotelian doctrines in comparison to the Platonic philosophy. Harris refers to Grocyn's *Grammatica* in his discussion of the tenses, and he suggests that he himself follows in this subject the line traced, after Grocyn, in Scaliger, and Samuel Clarke.

Julius Caesar Scaliger (first half of 16th c.) was a French physician and scholar of Italian descent, who became famous for his biased attack against Erasmus' *Ciceronians.* With his *De Causis Linguae Latinae* (1540) he tried to determine a set of principles for the Latin grammatical theory. He was the first during the Renaissance era to introduce to language the Aristotelian methods of classification, avoiding the Platonic dualism between matter and form, and seeing matter in its potential character. The Aristotelian fourfold causality, having its predecessor in the modistic grammars of the middle ages, is followed by Scaliger. Harris quotes from Scaliger's work, especially on the function of the tenses, the indicative mood, the conjunction, and the preposition. Scaliger is also Harris' Latin source in his effort to establish grammar as a science, and not an art. The notion of common sense in *Hermes* is also reminiscent of Scali-

ger's *communis ratio* of language. Harris rejects Scaliger's speculative concept of language as the mirror of nature, an idea suitable for the language-planners of the seventeenth century.[33]

Samuel Clarke (1675-1729), a divine, is regarded as one of the greater anti-Lockian metaphysicians of the English rationalistic deism of that time. His assertion that *though two and three are equal to five, five is not equal to two and three*,[34] is upheld by Harris in *Hermes*. It is noteworthy that Clarke's theology attracted accusations from both the deists and the church, while he was also charged with Arianism. His D. D. thesis in Oxford defended the view that none of the articles of the Christian faith is opposed to the right reason. To protect his work, Harris refers only to Clarke's translation of Iliad (*Homeri Ilias Graece et Latine*), published in two parts (1729 and 1732).

Sanctius (Francisco Sanchez de las Brozas, also known as **Franciscus Sanctius Brocensis**, 16th c.), is the author of the *Verae brevesque grammatices Latinae institutiones* (1562), many of the ideas of which later became part of his famous *Minerva: seu de causis linguae Latinae*, Salamanca, 1587). In *Hermes*, where frequently Sanctius' notions are traced back to Scaliger's work, Harris quotes Sanctius' account of the arts of trivium and the grammars of the Arabic and Hebrew languages, his remarks on the infinitive, on the accidental character of gender and persons, his rejection of the impersonal verbs, and also his view on the comparative degrees, the conjunction, and the interjection. In the preface of *Hermes*, as also elsewhere, Harris considers his task to be, as with Sanctius, restorative of the ancient glory of language, bringing it back to the refined form of the classical languages, free from the barbarism of contemporary ones.

It is not that Harris just follows Sanctius' rationalistic approach. The formative guidelines of a universal grammar, as presented in *Hermes*, are indebted to Harris' study of *Minerva*. In *Hermes*, Harris himself does not admit to any immediate influence from Sanctius. But his son, in the preface to the complete edition of Harris' works, ascribes the initiative for writing *Hermes* to his father's reading of Sanctius' text.[35] We have no reason, of course, to argue against this. This being so, we have to identify the following passages in *Minerva* from which the concept of Harris' universal scheme seems to derive:

> ...Nam qui nomine casu facta contendunt, audacissimi sunt, nimirum illi, qui universi mundi seriem et fabricam fortuito ac temere ortam persuadere conabantur... Sed ut hoc in ceteris idiomatis asseverare non possum, ita mihi facile persuaderim, in omni idiomate cuiuslibet nomenclaturae reddi posse rationem: quae si in multis est obscura, non tamen propterea non investiganda... Non igitur dubium est, quin rerum omnium, etiam vocum, reddenda sit ratio: quam si

[33] For more on Scaliger, see Padley, 1976, p. 58-77.

[34] in the sense that a substance is something more than the material aggregate of its parts.

[35] "What first led my father to a deep and accurate consideration of the principles of universal grammar, was a book which he held in high estimation, and has frequently quoted in his *Hermes*, the *Minerva* of Sanctius. To that writer he confessed himself indebted for abundance of valuable information, of which appears that he knew well how to profit, and to push his researches on the subject of grammar to a much greater length, by the help of his various and extensive erudition": Harris, 1841, p. 6.
The first Earl of Malmesbury, when writing this, has in mind not a specific reference in *Hermes*, but Harris' words in the *Philosophical Inquiries*, where Sanctius is acknowledged as the source of this universal grammatical theory: "...this invaluable book (*Minerva*), to which the author of these treatises readily owns himself indebted for his first rational ideas of grammar and language..." (*ibid.*,p. 393).

ignoraverimus rogati, fateamur potius nos nescire, quam nullam esse constanter affirmemus. Scio Caesarem Scaligerum aliter sentire; sed haec vera ratio est. Haec tam multa invitus congessi contra morosos quosdam, qui, quum in Grammatica rationem explodant, testimonia tantum doctorum efflagitant. An non legerunt Quinctilianum lib. 1 cap. 6 init. qui sermonem constare ratione, vetustate, auctoritate, consuetudine scripsit? Ille igitur non rationem excludit, sed in praecipuis enumerat, quasi vero Laurentius, et alii Grammatici, suarum etiam ineptiarum non statim conentur adhibere rationes, quales quales ipsi sint. Usus porro sine ratione non movetur; alioqui abusus, non usus, dicendus erit: auctoritas vero ab usu sumpsit incrementum. Nam si ab usu recedat, auctoritas nulla est: unde Cicero Caelium et M. Antonium reprehendit, qui suo arbitrio, non ex usu, loquerentur.Nihil autem potest esse diuturnum, ut inquit Curtius, lib. IV, cui non subest ratio. Reliquum est igitur, ut omnium rerum ratio primum adhibeatur, tum deinde, si fieri poterit, accedant testimonia, ut res ex optima fiat illustrior. Quae causa fuit, ut has nostras vigilias, *Minerva seu de causis linguae Latinae*, inscriberemus; quia cuiuslibet quaestionis causas et vera principia eruere conamur, improbantes cum Cicerone (lib. II *De Natura deorum*) Pythagoricum illud. *Ipse dixit*..[36]

While Scaliger was influenced by the modistic speculative grammars and their conception of language as mirror of the universe, Sanctius took over from where Scaliger had stopped, overcoming this imitative function of language, and Harris, two centuries later, reintroduced Sanctius' patterns, assigning them to the earlier classical initiators of the philosophy of language.

The deistic dimension of Harris' universal grammar

In the strictest sense of deism, since reason is the same for all men, there should be one

[36] In this extract, I preferred the abbreviated interpretation of Sanctius' text, as given by Robin Lakoff, in his review of the edition of Port-Royal's grammar, in *Language*, 45 (1969):
People who claim that names come about by accident are very rash, particularly those who try to comvince us that the order and design of the whole universe arose accidentally and randomly... But while I cannot make this claim in other languages, still I can easily persuade myself that in every language a logical explanation can be given for any random name. If this is unclear in many cases, we should not refuse to look into it for that reason... Then there is in doubt that the explanation can be given for everything, even for words: if we do not know what that explanation is when we are asked, we should admit that we do not know, rather than declaring firmly that there is none. I know that Caesar Scaliger... feels otherwise, but this is the correct way to look at it. I have collected so many of these arguments against my will, to counter certain fastidious people who, since they throw out logical arguments in grammar, ask only for the attestations of scholars.Haven't they read Quintilian..., who wrote that language consists of logic, tradition, authority and custom? Clearly he does not exclude logic, but puts it at the very top of the list-as if Laurentius and other grammarians aren't always trying to use logical explanations, whatever they are worth, for their own stupid ideas. Furthermore, usage is not changed without a logical basis; otherwise it should be called abuse, not usage: but authority gains strength from usage. For if it deviates from usage, it is no authority at all; Cicero criticized Caelius and M. Antonius on these grounds, that they spoke according to their own judgment, not in accordance with usage. Nothing can last long, as Cutius says..., if logic is not behind it. So it remains first to summon up the logical explanation for everything, then, if possible, to provide attestations in addition, so that the argument, already strong, may become even more striking. That is the reason that we wrote this work of ours, *Minerva, or Explanations for the Latin language*: because we are trying to bring into the open the explanations for and real principles behind any questions that may arise; disapproving as we do along with Cicero... that motto of the Pythagoreans, *Ipse dixit*.

religion and all propositions should be universally accepted. As long as Plato is classified among the theists, true knowledge is not considered as favourably given to separated sects.[37] Additionally, for some of the deists, knowledge of dead languages and of systems of thought is not considered as necessary for conceiving truth. Harris does not follow this deistic anti-intellectualism;[38] in *Hermes*, proof of the one and the same truth[39] depends upon examples deriving from an authoritative tradition.

God is the supreme intellect, in an unspecified but composed sense: it is the God of the deists, the divinity. If one is to classify further Harris's deistic rationality, one should not reckon him with relation to the extreme, strictly critical, view of Christianity.[40] His deism should be seen as a constructive compromise with it, trying to restore a sense of unity in belief.[41] He seems not to reject Christian belief, but Christian theology. His rationalism appears weak, not as a result of a real philosophical weakness, but in order to avoid inconsistencies with his social status and a break with the establishment. He does not want a battle in the open field with the theists; there is no need to attack directly the Christian belief, and it is very wise of him to restrict himself to offering just an alternative source of thought.

On a certain view, the sources he chooses to reveal each time seem to offer him security during controversial times. The substance of works such as those of Pletho and Alexander Aphrodisiensis are too distant from the common reader of the middle eighteenth century, to provoke an immediate counter-attack on *Hermes*. Thus, Harris identifies himself with deism, as far as God is identified as an intellect, and as far as the Stoic doctrines of happiness are reflected. Additionally, the discussion on goodness is based also on Stoic terms, and there are many quotations from several of the Stoics' major works. Moreover, moral virtue, is discussed in the same way, reminiscent not so much of Herbert of Cherbury, but of the revivals of Platonic and Stoic arguments, immediately after the late medieval times. Indeed, Harris makes a real effort to stay away from Herbert's deism.[42] On the other hand, his rationalism follows the tradition of Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz, on the general principles that God exists, and that this is demonstrably true, as also in his antithesis to sensory experience and the British empiricism. Sometimes his language brings in mind Spinoza and his impersonalization of God. His rationalism occasionally sounds paradoxical and weak, because his argumentation remains mainly intra-theological. But it was this recommendation of apparently self-evident deductions, easily adapted to the *common notions* of its readers, that made *Hermes* so popular during its

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[37] For example, Jews.

[38] *Hermes* was written in a time when for theologians Christianity was based on reason rather than on faith, while in the years before 1751 Christianity was seen by the deists as essentially irrational.

[39] Harris calls it a truth of reason, although similes like that of the sun in the preface pinpoint the light of natural reason.

[40] Such as the view of Thomas Paine in his work *The Age of Reason* (1794 & 1796).

[41] i.e. *uniformitarianism*, according to which, since reason is identical in all men, there should be only one religion and all of its propositions should be universally accepted; see also Stein, p. 135.

[42] Something strongly supported by N. Chomsky, in his articles in Stich, *Innate Ideas*, 1975.

time.[43]

The choice of the name Hermes for the book's title coordinates with the book's sources.[44] On the one hand, the name is reminiscent of the previous century's preference for the Latin Mercurius.[45] It symbolises the unity of the spiritual and the material world, the contact between the physical and the metaphysical, the transition from the first to the second, from language and words to the universal forms, existing like them everywhere and in all time. Hermes is the God of language in-formed.[46] The confusion in ancient times that there may be not just one but many Hermes seems similar to the people's inability to see the unity of the forms and discern one in many. Moreover, Hermes represents that which only accidentally can be caught, that which because of its divine supremacy cannot be wholly conceived. A book on universal grammar should bare his name in its title as having the same intermediary role.

It is the Neoplatonic sources of *Hermes* that offer Harris an alibi, a shelter for, and a cover of his deism. What he does actually, is to reintroduce all the basic rationalistic dogmas and terminology of the previous one hundred years, by presenting the same principles and terms as reflecting the earlier philosophical tradition. This way of handling philosophical terminology and thought, namely the ascent to the first sources of rationalism, rendered *Hermes* popular, and, perhaps, security for the author, as for the ideas presented in the book. But above all, it permitted the compilation of a tightly compiled philosophical "vocabulary," where terms and modes of thinking which seem to differ in their very first origin are presented in their unity. Thus his extended quotations from Pletho's *Platonicae et Aristotelicae Philosophiae Differentia*[47] set the example for an empiricism incorporated in the comprehensive scheme of rationalistic philosophy.

The mind of Harris is the platonic νοῦς, "instantaneous, indivisible, and at once intellection," contrary to the temporary divisible and successive character of sensitive perception. It is so perfect, compared to the senses, and so supreme, that "if we were to define circle, either by one or the other, senses would perceive its circumference and mind would perceive its

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[43] If Harris had not painted his anti-empiricism with such bright colours, he would have offered himself the opportunity to present a total, well-composed, partly original, and compact philosophical stance. An effort, perhaps, of Harris to hide his coalescence with free thought, lies under the emphasis of his attack on experimentalism and empiricism. Otherwise, we cannot explain the absurdity of criticising someone who, like Harris himself, subordinated faith and revelation to reason.

[44] The title of *Hermes* seems to be in an utterly deistic sense; published three years after Rev. Con. Middleton's *Free Inquiry* (on the Christian miracles), and in the tradition of Shaftesbury's *Inquiry concerning Virtue* (1699), and Hume's *Inquiry concerning Human Understanding* (1748).

[45] John Wilkins, *Mercury, or The Secret and Swift Messenger: shewing how a man may with privacy and speed communicate his thoughts to a friend at any distance; together with an abstract of Dr. Wilkins's Essay towards a Real Character and a Philosophical Language*, London 1668: reprinted by J. Benjamin, Amsterdam-Philadelphia, 1984.

[46] The most comprehensive source for Hermes is the volume 13 (*Alchemical studies*) of C. G. Jung, in his *Collected Works*, Routledge & Kegan Paul, New York, 1967. Hermes is a) the guardian of the many -sounding tongue (παμφωνεῖ γλώσσης μεδεών), b) the participation mystique, c) the divine fire in the meaning not of an opposing but of an internal component of the deity, d) the *lumen naturae* as bestowed by God upon his creatures, e) the god of revelation, f) the unchanged unconscious, g) the wind god, h) the life-giving principle, i) the holding the world together and standing in the middle between body and spirit, j) the symbol of the united double nature, k) the λόγος becoming the world, l) the one in many, and the many in one, m) the symbol of prima and ultima materia and n) the mediator. For more, see also Vernant, 1983.

[47] It is a polemic against averroism, which ascribes (*ἀνάγει*) Aristotelian thought to its Platonic predecessor.

centre".[48] In *Hermes*, general ideas are original, connate, and essential to the divine truth. Harris admits of a triple order of general ideas:

> *the maker's form (intelligible and previous to the natural form) the form of the subject (natural,sensible and concomitant), and the form received from the contemplator (intelligible and subsequent).*[49]

His rationalistic concept of an "economy of the whole" is determined in the following way:

> *...objects from without first move our faculties, and thence we move of ourselves either to practice or contemplation. The life or existence of God ...is not only complete throughout eternity, but complete in every instant, and is for that reason immutable and superior to all motion.*[50]
> *...tho' we are not Gods, yet as rational beings we have within us something divine, and that the more we can become superior to our mutable, variable, and irrational part, and place our welfare in that good, which is immutable, permanent, and rational, the higher we shall advance in real happiness and wisdom. ...From this single principle of immobility, may be derived some of the noblest of the divine attributes; such as that of impassive, incorruptable, incorporeal etc.*[51]

Such observations derive from Aristotle, for whom immutability, perfection, and completion of God as the first mover, are the presuppositions of the supremacy of universals. General ideas must be independent of the increase or decline of our intellectual apprehension. While for contingent truths remission (namely, weakening) may proceed infinitely and never stops, this does not happen with universals, where the certainty of their truth is defined. In his discussion on intension and remission, Harris reflects the platonic concept of assimilation (ὁμοίωσις) to God as the end of philosophy.[52] He also quotes from MaximusTyrius' *Dissertationes*, 17:

> one may be naturally advanced to comprehend things, but without being conscious of his capability; another is moreover conscious of that; but also he is not perfect, unless his ability to apprehend and his apprehension of all and of the same things do not subject to time.[53]

In his comment on the abstraction of the universal from the particular, an act of abstracting from images the intelligible species and of contemplating without the accidental principles of the individuals,[54] Harris specifies that

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[48] Harris, 1751, p. 365.
[49] *Ibid.*, p. 377.
[50] *Ibid.* p. 359-p.360.
[51] *Ibid.*, p. 362
[52] In Plato's *Theaetetus*, 176a, and in Aristotle's *Ethics* 10.8.
[53] : Τοῦ γάρ Νοῦ ὁ μέν νοεῖν πέφυκεν, καί μή νοῶν/ ὁ δέ καί πέφυκε, καί νοεῖ. καί οὗτος οὔπω τέλεος, ἄν μή προσθῆς αὐτῷ τό καί νοείν. Ἀεί, καί πάντα νοεῖν, καί μή ἄλλοτε ἄλλα. Ὥστε εἴη ἄν ἐντελέστατος ὁ νοεῖν ἀεί καί πάντα, καί ἅμα. Harris cites as sources also *Physics*, 4, 19, and *Metaphysics*, chapters 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10 : Harris, 1756, p. 162.
[54] See also Leff, p. 223.

the images, impressions, pictures in our sensorium, or relicts of that motion caused within us, are the permanent phantasms that the human mind first works, and by an energy ... spontaneous and familiar to its nature, it discerns at once what in many is one; what in things dissimilar and different is similar and the same.[55]

What then perceives this constitution or union? ...We must neccessarily ...recur to some higher collective power, to give us a prospect of nature, even in these her subordinate wholes, much more in that comprehensive whole, whose sympathy is universal, and of which these smaller wholes are all no more than parts. And this is pure truth. By virtue of this power the mind views one general idea in many individuals; one proposition in many general ideas; one syllogism in many propositions; till at length by properly repeating and connecting syllogism with syllogism, it ascend into those bright and steady regions of science. Even negative truths and negative conclusions cannot subsist, but by bringing terms and propositions together, so necessary is this uniting power to every species of knowledge.[56]

The pertinence of universal grammar

The first thing to be defined is the field of application of a universal type of grammar. Certainly, a universal grammar does not have an instructional character, suggesting different guidelines in each language for the linguistic act. Its first aim is to disclose semantic principles, common amongst languages, which are reflected in the words of each one of them. For this purpose, it seems that the subject of universal grammar is the common syntax of languages. However, it is not just a type of general syntax. The words of each language have a specific *efficacy*, *force*, and *power*,[57] and the aim of such a grammar, is to reveal words and their semantic relations, as the effects of principles whose causal character is classified within the scope of a scientific approach to philosophy (Such as this of Metaphysics is considered to be). In an extract quoted from the second book of Alexander of Aphrodisias' *Περί Ψυχῆς*, it is explained that, while we are all acquainted with the existence of things describable by language, a universal grammar acquaints us with the substantial nature of them.[58] Thus such a subject is termed for the ordinary people as scientific, while for the *liberal* it is a speculation upon the theorems of science.[59] The meaning of this statement is that philosophy, as a *science* in the mode

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55 Harris,1786, p. 362.

56 *Ibid.*, p. 363-4.

57 Harris, p. 293.

58 Ἀλλ' ἔστι τῶν ὄντων, ἃ τήν μέν ὕπαρξιν ἔχει γνωριμοτάτην, ἀγνωστοτάτην δέ τήν οὐσίαν. Ὥσπερ ἥτε κίνησις, καί ὁ τόπος, ἔτι δέ μᾶλλον ὁ χρόνος. Ἐκάστου γάρ τούτων τό μέν εἶναι γνώριμον καί ἀναμφίλεκτον. Τίς δέ ποτέ ἐστιν αὐτῶν ἡ οὐσία, τῶν χαλεπωτάτων ὁραθῆναι. Ἔστι μέν τί τούτων ἡ ψυχή. Τό μέν γάρ εἶναι τι τήν ψυχήν, γνωριμότατον καί φανερώτατον. Τι δέ ποτέ ἐστιν, οὐ ῥάδιον καταμαθεῖν. The soul here mentioned will be the subject of the next, third part of *Hermes*. The above passage is translated by Harris in 1786, p. 433.

59 *Ibid.* p. 295. The distinction is based on *Metaphysics*, 1.2.982b20-21, where it is said that philosophers pursue scientific knowledge for the sake of understanding it, and not targeting its practical utility: φανερόν ὅτι διά τό εἰδέναι τό ἐπίστασθαι ἐδίωκον καί οὐ χρήσεώς τινος ἕνεκεν.

of conceiving universal and necessary truth,[60] stands at the heart of all sciences. Such a contemplation

> *...tends to call forth and strengthen nature's original vigour. Be the subject itself immediately lucrative*[61] *or not, the nerves of reason are braced by the mere employ, and we become abler actors in the drama of life, whether our part be of the busier, or the sedater kind.*[62]

Our perception, when contemplating *true science*, *strengthens* the vigour of natural substances, because the pursuit of truth is good, the latter being a final end[63] and a sign of our virtue.[64] Consequently, a universal perception of grammar is an intellectual action, an end in itself, serving no further purposes than that of an intellectual good, which is

> *the most excellent within us, ...accommodated to all places and times, ...depending neither on the will of others, nor on the affluence of external fortune, ...decaying no with decaying appetites, ...but rising in vigour, when those are no more.*[65]

Thus the application of universal grammar is demonstrative of our intellectual virtue. Intellectual virtue, which is concerned with the divine nature, is to be distinguished from the moral one, which concerns the ethical quality and purposes of human actions. Therefore, universal grammar is an inductive act, in the mode of which, by the application of our discursive faculty, we ascend to the pure intellect of God.[66]

The framework of *Hermes*

The book, in its 1751 edition numbers 437 pages of text, the preface included, apart from the dedication (to Lord Hardwicke) and an index. In its extensive footnotes we should note not only the absolute preference for quoting from the ancient classical authors, but also the avoidance of any reference to and citation of the author's rationalist contemporaries. The fact that Harris's work is an adoption of specifically selected philosophical traditions is a sign of his not being imitative, but intellectually fair.[67] Although the author calls his work an *inquiry*, this is

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[60] Ἡ ἐπιστήμη περί τῶν καθόλου ἐστίν ὑπόληψις καί τών ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὄντων: scientific knowledge is judgment about universal and necessary things: *Nicomachean Ethics*, 6.6.1140b31-32.

[61] Οὐ γάρ πρός χρήμαθ' ἡ ἀξία μετρεῖται: the value of philosophical teaching cannot be measured in money: *Nicomachean Ethics*, 9.1.1164b3-4.

[62] Harris, 1786, p. 295.

[63] Τἀγαθόν Οὗ πάντ' ἐφίεται:The good has been defined as that at which all things aim: *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1.1.1094a2-3. Τό δ' ἄριστον τέλειον τι φαίνεται: The highest good is clearly something final: *ibid.* 1..1097a28.

[64] Ἡ ἀρετή ἀγαθόν τι ἐστιν: virtue is a kind of good: *Topics*, 6.4.142b14.

[65] Harris, 1786, p. 299.

[66] Harris is citing here the philosophical definition of God, given in Metaphysics 1074b, which distinguishes between sciences and first philosophy in terms of their subjects: while in sciences the object of our thoughts is different from the thought itself, divine knowledge is self-predicating.

[67] "It is by J. Harris' *Hermes* that Sanctius is given the respect he deserves": Michael, p. 23.

not something attempted by himself, but suggested to the reader.

Hermes is the perfect example of a combination of the rationalistic approach to language and of the Aristotelian cast of mind; and that, regardless of its philosophical weakness and want of originality. It is also a first class example of the synthesis of Platonic and Aristotelian doctrines, and, as it follows the tradition originating from Renaissance Platonism, it verifies Platonism and Neoplatonism as a unity.[68] The subject is language and universal grammar; but it has nothing to do either with the language-planners' tradition, since it does not offer any new scheme, or with the idea of grammar as it developed after 1751, in a clearly linguistic-scientific approach. That is, perhaps, why the word *language* is omitted from the title of the English editions after the first one. Taking on that tradition, dominant in the middle ages, and after a gap of almost a century, *Hermes* revives the idea of a grammar yielding to philosophy. It does not reveal any original material. What is offered is a first class acquaintance with the ancient sources of *truth and reason. Hermes* is not an attempt to reintroduce scholasticism, although Harris knows that scholasticism will be the first thing attributed to his book:

> *the chief end ...to excite the readers to curiosity and inquiry, ...not to teach by prolix and formal lectures,from the efficacy of which he has little expectations, ...he* [the author] *thinks nothing more absurd than the common notion of instruction, as if science were to be poured into the mind, like water into a cistern, that passively waits to receive all that comes...*[69]

Harris tries to restore the image of this reasoned truth in a time focusing rather on the vernacular languages, than on the value of the classic ones. It is an attempt to reestablish the active power of ancient metaphysical doctrines, jointly with the belief in principles, which are invariable and traceable by one uniform mode of reasoning; the end is that the reader may

> *...see how the same reason has at all time prevailed; how there is one truth, like one sun, that has enlightened human intelligence through every age, and save it from the darkness both of sophistry and error.*[70]

Moreover, he aims to turn his readers to those neglected sublimer parts of science, the studies of mind, intellect, and intelligent principles.[71] This last relates *Hermes* with Harris' time and place, and puts it in its proper place in respect to the British philosophical tradition in relation to empiricism and the Royal Society.

Hermes' content consists of three parts: the first and second of these treat respectively the

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[68] These two become discrete later, in the nineteenth century: Wallis, p. 171.

[69] : from several points in the preface of *Hermes*.

[70] Harris, 1751, p. x.

[71] *Ibid*, p. 351.

resolution of speech into its constituent categorematic and syncategorematic terms,[72] while the third focuses on language in terms of the distinction between matter and form.

In his division of speech, Harris resolves language into two species of words, the substantives and the attributives, calling them principals and accessories respectively. Following Aristotle he defines the first as words significant by themselves and the second significant by relation. While substantives are analysed into primary (nouns) and secondary (pronouns), attributives are resolved into verbs, adjectives and participles. From the attributives, adverbs are called "attributives of the attributive", while the substantives are divided into the prepositive and the subjunctive (connective). Finally the accessories are analysed into the definitives (article, demonstrative pronoun) and the connectives (conjunction, preposition).

Practically what Harris does here, is take the Aristotelian four-part division of speech (noun-verb-article-conjunction, corresponding to substantive- attributive-definitive-connective) and build upon it a further subdivided structure. He defines speech as "the joint energy of our reason and social affection". To understand his idea of energy we must go back to 1774 and his *Dialogue Concerning Art,* the first of the three treatises he had published that year:

> *every production whose nature has its being or essence in a transition, call it what it really is, a motion or an energy: thus a tune and a dance are energies... On the contrary, call every production, whose parts exist all at once, and whose nature depends not on a transition for its essence, call it a work, or thing done, not an energy or operation...*[73]

Thus, energy takes its meaning by comparison with work or operation.[74] The relation between energy and social behaviour (*social affection*) is clear when we consider that "life is a certain energy, and each man energises about those subjects, and with those faculties, for which he has the greatest affection".[75] By a second definition of speech, Harris makes his point: since Aristotle declared that "life is the ἐνέργεια of νοῦς",[76]

> *speech or discourse* [namely language] *is a publishing of some energy or motion of the soul...*

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[72] This classification reflects the philosophical scope of Harris' approach to language. Despite the fact that he has to establish, for the sake of his subject, a grammatically solid ground, based on the grammarians of the past, Harris is reflecting on the parts of speech in the philosophical tradition, differentiating between significative and consignificative terms. The distinction is between words which have a self-sufficient signification, as the noun and the verb, and those which do not signify separately, but need a noun or a verb. While the noun and the common verb are traditionally seen as the categorematic terms of a sentence, the number of terms recognised as consignificative, increased in the advancement of philosophical linguistic thought. Aristotle has mentioned three syncategorematic, or consignificative terms (*every*, *no*, and the copula *is*). Apollonius added the pronoun and some of the Greek adverbs in the categorematic terms, and the conjunction, the preposition, and the articles in the syncategorematic. The whole subject was highly elaborated during the middle ages: by reading the works mainly of Priscian, but also of Boethius, western European thought developed the distinction between significantia and consignificantia; the most eminent treatise were the *Syncategoremata* ofWilliam of Sherwood and the *Tractatus Syncategorematum* of Peter of Spain.

[73] Harris, 1841, p. 18

[74] Διαφορά δέ τις φαίνεται τῶν τελῶν τά μέν γάρ ἐνέργειαί εἰσι· τά δέ πάρ' αὐτάς ἔργα τινά:

[75] : a quotation from *Ethics* in the *Dialogue concerning Art,* p.18.

[76] *Metaphysics*, 1072b.

Thus *ratio* and mind (soul) are the main guidelines for speech. The definitions of the several species of words are approximate extracts quoted from either Aristotle or his Alexandrian commentators. Language is "a system of articulated voices, symbols of our ideas and principally of the general and universal,[77] word is a voice articulated and significant by compact,[78] a sound significant of which no part is of itself significant".[79]

Harris lays a special stress on the character of the sentence. The sentence, and not the word, is the fundamental speech unit; whether it is assertoric (*assertive*), *interrogative*, *imperative*, *precative*, or *optative*, the soul's power of perception and volition are expressed through the sentence. Thus the sentence is the grammatical unit of a philosophical species of grammar. This is in absolute accordance with the rationale of a universal grammar: the grammatical unit is identified with the logical unit; the sentence is identified with the proposition of the logician and the unit of the syntactic structure of the philosopher of language.[80] The *sentence* of Harris' grammatical resolution of universal theory, is identified with the *sentiment* of the third book of *Hermes*, where the form of language is treated: it is that which in the *Philosophical Inquiries* is defined as that "through which we assert anything general or universal".[81]

However, what is most important here is reason in the sense of rational energy: speech, namely language, is rational communication, related to nature.[82] The species of the modes of speaking, which in great measure depend on those of the modes of thinking, are in fact "no more than so many literal forms intended to express these natural distinctions". Since interjections "coincide with no parts of speech, but are either uttered alone, ...without altering its form, either in syntax or signification",[83] they are not considered parts of a universal type of discourse. When the discussion comes to the adverbs, the attributives of the attributes, Harris notes:

> *...it is worth while to observe how the same thing participating in the same essence, assumes different grammatical forms from its different relations.*[84]

The whole proposal becomes more explicit in the second book of *Hermes*, treating accessories. The author, after talking about the distinctions between individuals, species and genus, and while discussing definitives, says that "minute change in principles leads to mighty change in effects". Following the tradition of universal grammar, he discusses the coalescence of some

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77 Harris, 1751, p. 328-9.
78 *Ibid.*, p. 328-9.
79 *Ibid.*, p. 20.
80 Harris also repeats the Aristotelian definition of the sentence (*De Interpretatione*, 4.16b26-28) as "a compound quantity of sound significant, of which certain parts are themselves also significant": *ibid.*, p. 19.
81 On the subject of νοῦς and διάννοια, Harris had stated: ...there are two pieces of *sentiment*, both called in English either a *sentiment* or a *sentence*, and in Latin *sententia*... διάννοια, or *sentiment* exists, where demonstrate anything either to be or not to be; or through we assert anything general or universal: Harris, 1841, p. 173-174.
82 A quotation from Sanctius is worth mentioning here(: *creavit Deus hominem rationis participe* , ibid., p. 5, and a comment on an anecdote concerning Heraclitus, quoted from Aristotle, which concludes: "there is no part of nature too mean for the Divine Presence".
83 Harris, 1751, p. 289.
84 Harris, 1786, p. 203.

pronouns with pronominal articles: *this*, *any*, *some*, *all* etc. are words which despite being pronouns, in a general concept of grammar, accept a more definitive and certain role. While conjunctions connect the meanings of simple sentences (and do that even when functioning as adversative), prepositions, connective only of words, extend themselves by degrees from corporeal to incorporeal and intellectual subjects, forming "this universe or visible whole, which is made one by that general comprehension".[85]

The grammatical concord between the substantive and the attributive stands for the logical concord between subject and predicate, while these concords in speech produce propositions and sentences.[86] The origin and the ultimate objective of these propositions is the intellect of the living God. This is the universal reason implied from the very first beginning. The Deity is defined as:

> *a perpetual energy of the purest intellect about the first, all-comprehensive objects of intellection, which are no other than the intellect itself.*[87]

In *Hermes*, Harris makes no special effort to clarify any distinction between soul and mind, as they are both immediate references to God. But it is interesting to see how Harris had specified the human mind a few years earlier:

> *Νοῦς is the inductive faculty, which out of the particulars and the many forms out what is general and one. This species of apprehension is evidently our first and earliest knowledge.*[88]

Even from that dialogue, Harris was talking about universal truths obvious to people's common sense.[89] This common sense is a power, with several propositions, formed by induction, as its proper objects, which are of a general character. Giving an account of the terms προλή ψεις, κοιναί-ἔμφυται-φυσικαί ἔννοιαι, and praenotiones, Harris adopts Diogenes Laertius view, that "a preconception is the natural apprehension of what is general or universal". For Harris,

> *..there are truths or universals, of so obvious a kind that every mind or intellect, not absolutely deprived, without the least help of art, can hardly fail to recognise them.*[90] *The recognition of them, or at least the ability to recognise them is the common sense (κοινός νοῦς), as "being a*

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[85] *Ibid.*, 1786, pp. 266-67.
[86] Harris, 1751, p. 279.
[87] *Ibid.* p. 301.
[88] Harris, 1841, p. 301.
[89] The primary meaning of common sense is that which stands in relation to *nonsense* and the nonsensical. Aristotle: "we must set the observed facts before of us and after first discussing the difficulties, go on to prove, if possible, the truth of all the common opinions about these affections of the mind, or, failing this, of the greater number, and the most authoritative; for if we both refute the objections and leave the common opinions undisturbed, we shall have proved the case sufficiently" (: *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1145b2-7;cf.1172b35-1173a2). Epictitus defines common sense (koinolq noy3q) as the state of affairs where there are some things which undistorted men perceive by the use of their common faculties (III,VI,8). Here common sense is the elementary mental outfit of the normal man (see also: C.S. Lewis, *Studies in words*, Cambridge, 1960, p. 146).
[90] Harris, 1841, p. 46.

sense common to all, except lunatics and idiots".[91]

Mind is the ultimate cause, the primary subject of the matter and form of language. Matter and form, the elements of this whole, are parts of the Deity's mental separation. While matter is admitted not as *material mind* (a term relating rather to the empiricists' senses) but as *natural capacity*, in the meaning of "original and native power of intellection," form is expressive of the intellectual supremacy of the mind. Harris speaks about the "form of forms, ...the supreme intelligence which passes through all things and which is the same to our capacities,the fountain of all symmetry, of all Good, and of all truth, imparting to every being its essential and distinctive attributes".[92]

While the matter of language is just articulate voices (sound), the aim of the signification of language is to bring man through his natural speech closer to the universal mind; it is some sort of completion for the human being:

> *...meaning is that peculiar and characteristic form, by which the nature or essence of language becomes complete.*[93]

Attributive words, referring to natural attributes, are in no way essential for such a completion. They are just "species of sounds with certain motions concomitant". For Harris, the distinction between arbitrary and natural accidents is an essential part of his theory. It is not enough to consider speech just in respect of natural issues. It is important for a universal grammar to present speech in the procedure of a composition towards mind. If language was just an imitation of the universal mind, then every one having the natural faculty to know the original, could become aware of its imitations, namely, of every word of every language concerning the same subject.[94] On the contrary, language should be examined in relation to the modes in which it reflects a unificatory intellective activity. Thus, while the common grammatical study focuses on the differentiation between semantic units, universal grammar identifies the coordinative unity of them:

> *... a sentence, connected by disjunctives, has a near resemblance to a simple negative truth. For tho' this as to its intellection be disjunctive (its end being to disjoin the subject from the predicate) yet as it combines terms together into one proposition, 'tis as truly synthetical, as any truth, that is affirmative.*[95]

In Harris' discussion on form, the meaning of language, we discover the Platonic ideas. When talking about the connective power of prepositions, he states that

> *those parts of speech unite of themselves in grammar, whose original archetypes unite of them-*

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[91] *Ibid.,*, p. 46.
[92] Harris, 1751, p. 310.
[93] Ibid., p. 315.
[94] Ibid., p. 330.
[95] Ibid., p. 250.

selves in nature.[96]

Language is symbols deriving from accidents in a quite arbitrary way, and not a pictorial image, an imitation of the universe, coming out of natural attributes:

> *there never was a language, nor indeed can possibly be framed one, to express the properties and essences of things, as a mirror exhibits their figures and colours.*[97]

The conventional and arbitrary character of the formal aspect of language is not anything more than an answer to the question how speech symbolises *archetypes*. Particular languages, additionally, differ exactly in that point, namely, in the system of conventions accepted:

> *...and many words possessing their signification under the same compact, unite in constituting a particular language.*[98]

By the question "what is language a symbol of", we are introduced to the examination of the general ideas. Language is significant of general truths.[99] These truths or ideas are common to individuals[100] and exist independently from a specific time reference. Of these two characteristics the first is essential for our *social affection*(namely, our intercourse-communication), the second for our acquiring the rational speech and doctrines of the classical languages, now dead.[101]

Language of course, does not consist only of general terms. It is also "expressive" of the particular and the ordinary, being the subject of every day intercourse[102] among people. But in terms of only this fact, someone could not contemplate sufficiently upon language: words which are commonly used in our everyday life are just *particular terms* having their own *utility* and *end*; but words signifying general ideas, reveal:

> *the most excellent and essential part of language, since from them it derives that just proportion of precision and permanence and that comprehensive universality, without which [language] could not possibly be either learnt, or understood, or applied to the purposes of reasoning and science.*[103]

Thus, because terms are precise, permanent, and universal, we are able to reason and to comprehend the world. These characteristics of the form of language, the very existence of universal truths is what makes up the definite and steady part of language: that part which the speculative mind admits, and which does not change by yielding to different subjects each time, or to

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[96] *Ibid.*, p.263.
[97] *Ibid.*, p.335.
[98] *Ibid.*, p. 327.
[99] *Ibid.*, p. 342.
[100] *Ibid.*, p. 20.
[101] "...the language of those who lived ages ago,...may be as intelligible now,as it was then": *ibid.* p. 342. It is very characteristic that such passages lack any reference to the future.
[102] a term which relates to the above mentioned *social affection.*
[103] *Ibid.* p. 345.

the different ways we experience things.

It is noteworthy here to repeat that Harris does not reject empirical science, but endorses the differentiation between that and speculative science: *practical wisdom*, as he says, is based only on senses; it yields only to the utilities of every day life,[104] but it is not a means to approach the universal mind. Perceptions coming just from the senses are "at least indefinite and more fleeting and transient than the objects they exhibit",[105] because they cannot subsist without the immediate presence of those objects. Sensitive perception is different from the intellective, as it can only conceive terms separately; on the contrary, mind conceives truth as a unity of its terms:

> *...it discerns at once what in many is one; what in things dissimilar and different is similar and the same.*[106]

Speculative science is the only way to approach this source of general truth. It is that sort of scientific knowledge with which we can ascend from the multitude of things to their causes which are their principal elements. In his dialogue *Concerning Art*, Harris had written on the subject of speculative science:

> *by the most excellent science ...is meant the science of causes, and above all others, of causes efficient and final, as these necessarily imply pervading reason and superintending wisdom. This science... with a view to itself, and the transcendent eminence of its object, was more properly called ἡ πρώτη φιλοσοφία, the first philosophy.*[107]

[104] *Ibid.*, preface.
[105] *Ibid.*, p. 353.
[106] *Ibid.*, p. 362.
[107] Harris, 1841, p. 26n.

This part intends to familiarise the reader with the resolution of speech according to the grammatical patterns of Harris' universal grammar. The content of this part refers to the grammatical material of language: not to the philosophical background and testification of the linguistic act, but to the common manner in which concepts physically appear in each language. Consequently, the arrangement of the chapters in this part will not vary much from that followed by Harris in the first and second parts of *Hermes*. The second task undertaken, both here and in the third part of this thesis, is the exposition of the relation between the observations made by Harris and the classical sources upon which these are based.

The species of words

The first thing noteworthy, is the distinction between the classification of the parts of speech in common grammar,[1] and the classification of the species of words in the universal one. Both types of grammar accept as a first criterion of the distinction between the parts of speech, the inflectiveness or variability of words. For a universal grammar this criterion is inadequate on the base that a word which is variable in one language, may be expressed in another language by some other form of wording. For example, the Greek dual number and the variation in gender, case, and number in the Greek and Latin adjectives, are not generally accepted as necessary distinctions, since they cannot be found in many other languages, and thus not essential. Similarly, the Latin genitive is expressed in English by a periphrasis, and the Latin accusative, the predicate, by mere position.

The only proper semantic distinction would be between those words significant by themselves (*principals*), and those significant by relation (*accessories*). The first may stand in speech absolutely, in the sense that they have a meaning even when uttered alone, while the second are attributed a significative fumction only when associated to the first. The root of this distinction it is to be found in a passage of Apollonius' *On syntax*, book 1, chapter 3, where is said that:

> In the same manner, as of the elements, or letters, some are vowels, which of themselves complete a sound; others are consonants, which without the help of vowels have no express vocality; so likewise may we conceive as to the nature of words. Some of them, like vowels, are of themselves expressive, as is the case of verbs, nouns, pronouns, and adverbs; others, like consonants, wait for their vowels, being unable to become expressive by their own proper strength, as is the case of prepositions, articles, and conjunction; for these parts of speech are always consignificant, that is

[1] : article, noun, pronoun, verb, participle, adverb (where interjection is included), conjunction, and preposition. This is the analysis of the Alexandrian grammarians. In Latin the analysis was the same, apart from that interjection was considered a separate part of speech.

are only significant, when associated to something else.[2]

Among the principal words now, there is a further functional distinction between substantive and attributive terms, which reflects the distinction between substance and attribute. This distinction is based on the predicational view of *Metaphysics* 1028b-1029a,[3] where the substratum is that of which else things are predicated, while it itself is not predicated of anything other. The accessories are subdivided into the *definitive* and the *connective* words, according to the number of principals they consignify. The first always refer to (*define* or *determine*) only one principal term, while the second relate the principal terms to each other. Substantives correspond to the nouns of traditional grammar, attributives to verbs, definitives to articles, and connectives to conjunctions.

Harris gives an account of different views as regards the number of the parts of speech. The Platonic division of speech into only two parts,[4] followed by Aristotle in *De Interpretatione,*[5] aimed to define a perfect assertive proposition; such a survey is confined within logic and dialectic. A universal grammar, according to Harris, should rather follow the tradition deriving from the *Poetics*, where, apart from the noun and the verb, article and conjunction are admitted as separate parts of speech. It was in the spirit of the *Poetics*, that the Stoics and the Latin grammarians took on the semantic resolution of the parts of speech, by suggesting further subdivisions of them. This last point made by Harris, accounts for the fact that universal grammar is not confined within a propositional interpretation of the semantic scope of language, but functions also within a more comprehensive philosophical realm.

The substantive terms

Substantive words signify substances, either natural, artificial, or abstract.[6] They are also classified in respect of the substantial nature they denote, namely the genus, the species, and the particular individuals. Seen in the material perspective of a universal grammar, they are

2: Ἔτι, ὅν τρόπον τῶν στοιχείων τά μέν ἐστι φωνήεντα, ἅ καί καθ' ἑαυτά φωνήν ἀποτελεῖ. Τά δέ σύμφωνα, ἅπερ ἄνευ τῶν φωνηέντων οὐκ ἔχει ῥητήν τήν ἐκφώνησιν. Τόν αὐτόν τρόπον ἐστίν ἐπῖ νοῆσαι κἀ πί τῶν λέξεων. Αἱ μέν γάρ αὐτῶν, τρόπον τινά τῶν φωνηέντων, ῥηταί εἰσι. Καθάπερ ἐπί τῶν ῥημάτων, ὀνομάτων, ἀντωνυμιῶν, ἐπιῤῥημάτων. Αἱ δέ, ὡσπερεί σύμφωνα, ἀναμένουσι τά φωνήεντα, οὐ δυνάμενα κατ' ἰδίαν ῥητά εἶναι. Καθάπερ ἐπί τῶν προθέσεων, τῶν ἄρθρων, τῶν συνδέσμων. τά γάρ τοιαῦτα ἀεί τῶν μορίων σσυσσημαίνει.: Harris, 1786, p. 28. In support of the above distinction, there is also cited an extract from Priscian: "Itaque quibusdam philosophis placuit nomen et verbum solas esse partes orationis; caetera vero, adminicula vel juncturas earum; quomodo navium partes sunt tabulae et trabes, caetera autem (id est, cera, stuppa, et clavi et similta) vincula et conglutinationes partium navis (hoc est, tabularum et trabium) non partes navis dicuntur" (: from book 11, quoted ibid. p. 29).

3 Νῦν μέν οὖν εἴρηται, τί ποτ' ἐστίν ἡ οὐσία, ὅτι τό μή καθ' ὑποκειμένου, ἀλλά καθ' οὗ τά ἄλλα.: ...substance is not that which is predicated of a subject, but that of which the other things are predicated: *Metaphysics*, 7.3.1029a8-9; also*ibid.*,, 6.3.1029a15-16: ...τό γάρ ποσόν οὐκ οὐσία, ἀλλά μᾶλλον ᾧ ὑπάρχει ταθτα πρῶτω, ἐκεῖνό ἐστιν οὐσία: quantity is not a substance, but rather the substance is that to which these affections primarily belong.

4 *Sophist*, 261c6-262e2.

5 *De Interpretatione*, chapters 2 and 3.

6 Abstract substances are said to derive from the transformation of attributes into substances, e.g. *whiteness*.

divided into those of a primary and secondary order. The first class includes words denoting substances by naming them, while the latter are substitute words which stand in the place of the proper substantives.

The substantives of first order

Number and gender are, according to Harris, the two features of the substantive words, as these two are the attributes of natural substances. Since, in the realm of substances, only genus and species denote plurality, general and special substantives only, admit of the plural number.[7]

The fourfold distinction of the substantial nature in terms of gender, is regarded as having its parallel in language, although there is not a special gender for the hermaphrodites,[8] despite the fact that in many languages there is no grammatical denotation of gender.[9] Harris tries to prove that the distinction of gender in the substantives of almost any language, has its prerequisite in nature. An error results from the incorporation of God in the category of substances which naturally carry the distinction of gender. This becomes almost resolved later, when the neuter comprehensive abstract noun of *deity* is introduced for the description of God,[10] The end of Harris' proof rests on more solid ground when he distinguishes between the *logical style* of discourse, which does not admit of gender, and *the rhetorical* one,[11] which accounts for the personification, different in each language, of abstract nouns. But the most persuasive ground for the distinction in gender of the substantives is to be found in the discussion of personal pronouns:

> *But though all these pronouns have number, it does not appear either in Greek or Latin, or any modern language, that those of the first and second person carry the distinction of sex. The reason seems to be that the speaker and hearer being generally present to each other, it would have been superfluous to have marked a distinction by art, which from nature and even dress was commonly apparent on both sides. But this does not hold with respect to the third person, of whose character and distinctions, (including sex among the rest) we often know no more, than what we learn from the discourse. And hence it is that in most languages the third person has its genders, and that even English (which allows its adjectives no gender at all) has in this pronoun the triple distinction of he, she, and it.*[12]

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[7] Particular names which are in plural, are actually of a special character, either when denoting *a smaller sort of species* (e.g. *Marki Antonii*), or in the meaning of some eminence attributed, as when the name becomes a common appellative.

[8] The neuter gender was called from Protagoras σκεύος (:Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, 3.5), while later it was defined as τό μεταξύ.

[9] Harris regards the lack of grammatical mark of gender in the English language as denoting the neuter.

[10] Harris states that the grammatical genus is defined only in reference to its opposite (he also quotes from Ammonius on this).

[11] Since the common use of language is not of a special concern for the universal grammar, the distinction between logical and rhetorical style stands as a differentiation between philosophical and literary uses of language.

[12] Harris, 1786, p. 69-70.

The meaning of this extract is that substantives, either primary or secondary, carry an essential distinction of gender, that this distinction is a semantic one, and that only its appearance varies from language to language.

The substantives of secondary order

The discussion of the secondary substantives opens with the distinction between objects of first and second knowledge and acquaintance.[13] Substances are differentiated in discourse in accordance with the way we refer to them. This mode of reference may be either demonstrative, or relative.[14] When we refer to a substance in the demonstrative way, we treat it as an object of first knowledge and we apply its name. The substantives of secondary order are words which refer to a substance without denominating it. They have no determined meaning, they cannot be significant when standing separately in speech, but they adopt each time a different meaning, in accordance with the word to which they are related in the sentence.

Personal pronouns are the first class of secondary substantives treated: they do not stand just in the place of the noun referring to a substance, but more strictly they substitute the substance's proper name[15] in discourse.[16] Since the substantive words participating in the formation of discourse are distinct from each other,[17] the distinction between the three persons of the pronoun, enables one specify which is the primary substantive implied by the secondary one. Therefore, the distinction of person is one of the mandatory properties of the pronoun.

The second essential property of a pronoun is the distinction of number, while a third one is the distinction of gender. This last is not rejected by the grammatical portrayal of gender only in the third person. It is just that there are different semantic parameters in discourse, as denoted by each one of the persons:

> *...an **I** to the first, and a **thou** to the second, are abundantly sufficient to all the purposes of speech. But it is not so with respect to the third person. The various relations of the various objects exhibited by this (I mean relations of near and distant, present and absent, same and different, definite and indefinite, etc.) made it necessary that here there should not be one, but many pronouns, such as **he, this, that, other, any, some,** etc.*[18]

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[13] Introduced by Apollonius in several parts of his work *On Syntax.*

[14] "Interest autem inter demonstrationem et relationem hoc; quod demonstratio, interrogationi reddita, primam cognitionem ostendit; quis fecit? Ego. Relatio vero secundam cognitionem significat, ut, is, de quo jam dixi", Priscian, book 8, quoted in Harris, 1786, p. 64-65. The relative character of the personal pronoun was defined by Apollonius, in book 2 ch. 5, as τό μετά δείξεως ἤ ἀναφορᾶς ἀντονομαζόμενον.

[15] "Pronomen est pars orationis, quae pro nomine proprio uniuscujusque accipatur", Priscian, book 12, quoted in Harris, 1786, p. 65.

[16] "For though the first and second [persons] be as commonly described, one the speaker, the other the party addressed; yet till they become subjects of the discourse, they have no existence. Again as to the third person's being the subject, this is a character, which it shares in common with both the other persons, and which can never therefore be called a peculiarity of its own": *ibid.* p.67-68. In support of this view, Harris quotes from Priscian and Gaza.

[17] because the substances denoted are distinct.

[18] *Ibid.*, pp. 71-72.

Pronouns stand as secondary substantives only when they substitute the primary ones, and not when they stand before a noun, adopting an adjectival character. In this case, they are not substantives, but *definitives* (or *articles*).[19]

The point is that the pronoun as treated here is not an accessory word;[20] pronouns as both substantives and pronominal articles, function in a mode of relation; but this mode is different in each case. In primary terms, we have signification in a mode of substitution, and the pronoun offered is an alternative wording in reference to the name of a substance. This reference is in a mode of reminiscence, so that at least one more sentence, apart from that given, is involved. In the accessory terms, we have consignification in the mode of grammatical juxtaposition. The pronoun, functioning as a definitive, modifies the meaning of the substantial term within the limits of the same sentence.

Another property of the substantive pronouns refers to the mode of coalescence between the persons, either those of the personal type with each other, or those of the personal with those of the demonstrative type. The first and the second person of the personal pronoun coordinates only with a pronoun of the third person (either personal or demonstrative). Obviously, this stands in respect of the distinction among substantial natures, and the only one perhaps which would not comply with such a rule is the substance of the higher and most comprehensive order.

An additional observation on the personal pronoun refers to the difference in the mode in which each one of its persons signifies the primary substantive:

> *It may be observed too, that even in epistolary correspondence, and indeed in all kinds of writing, where the pronoun I and you make their appearance, there is a sort of implied presence, which they are supposed to indicate, though the parties are in fact at ever so great a distance. And hence the rise of that distinction in Apollonius,* τάς μέν τῆς ὄψεως εἶναι δείξεις, τάς δέ τοῦ νοῦ, *that some indications are ocular, and some are mental.*[21]

The last diversity in function in the persons of the personal pronoun is to be found mainly in the Greek language. The case concerns juxtaposed propositions which are related by their pronominal predicational terms (e.g. *That is, I also will be a soldier.*). This relation is in the mode of contradistinction. According to whether there is an emphasis in the opposition among the pronominal terms, the result is a semantic variation of the personal pronoun between its enclitic (the Greek μοι) and its contradistinctive function (the Greek ἐμοί δέ).[22]

The variation in function of the demonstrative pronoun motivates an additional classification: a pronoun may function as having i) a prepositive, ii) a subjunctive, or iii) a pronominal

[19] The remark is based on Apollonius: Τό ἄρθρο μετά ὀνόματος, καί ἡ ἀντωνυμία ἀντ' ὀνόματος (:*On Syntax*, 1.3): "the article stands with a noun; but the pronoun stands for a noun": quoted *ibid.*, p. 73.

[20] the character of which is defined as consignificative by a relation of position.

[21] Ibid., p. 77. The citation from Apollonius is from *On Syntax*, 2.3.

[22] The distinction between ὀρθοτονούμεναι and ἐγκλιτικές ἀντωνυμίες had its function mostly in the Greek language, and thus they were considered by Apollonius as different types of the personal pronoun. Harris understands that since English has not separate morphemes to mark the contradistinctive pronoun, the whole distinction falls rather within the limits of a variation in accent.

character. The prepositive works within a simple proposition. Its capability to act as the subject of a simple proposition indicates that it retains the character of a substantive word incontrovertibly (e.g. *He is ill*). The pronominal one stands as a modifier of the primary substantive, with which it is juxtaposed (e.g. *That man defrauded me*). The subjunctive has a compound nature:[23] it compines the function of a secondary substantive with that of a connective (e.g. *Light is a body, which moves with great celerity*). Grammatically, subjunctive pronouns introduce relative clauses, namely the demonstrative and the relative ones. On this occasion, the pronoun connects the proposition in which it stands as a subject, to the proposition in which the primary substantive denoted subsists. This function is in the subjunctive mode, as the pronoun subjoins a whole proposition to a term of another. Thus, while the prepositive pronoun stands as a substitute of a propositional nominal term, the subjunctive presents a whole proposition (the relative clause) as the substitute of this term:

> *Hence we see why the pronoun here mentioned is always necessarily the part of some complex sentence, which contains, either expressed or understood, two verbs, and two nominatives.*[24]

The sources for this subjunctive function of the pronoun are to be traced in Apollonius, Gaza, and Scaliger. Harris quotes from the fourth chapter of *On Syntax*, where Apollonius rejects the pronominal function of the subjunctive pronoun:

> *The subjunctive article (that is the pronoun here mentioned) is applied to a verb of its own, and yet is connected withal to the antecedent noun. Hence it can never serve to constitute a simple sentence, by reason of the syntax of the two verbs, I mean that which respects the noun or antecedent, and that which respects the article or relative. The same too follows as to the conjunction* ***and****. This copulative assumes the antecedent noun, which is capable of being applied to many subjects, and by connecting to it a new sentence, of necessity assumes a new verb also.*[25]

By considering the employment of the subjunctive pronoun as universal,[26] Harris indicates its general character as seen in function. The universal is the mode in which the pronoun subjoins the proposition it introduces, to another one. But the proposition of a relative clause is not necessarily the essential definition of a primary subject, as it may or may not give the essential properties of it. Thus we have to distinguish here between two different types in the mode of signifying: the accidental and the demonstrative one.[27] In the first, the pronoun introduces a proposition which bears the accidental attributes of a primary subject in terms of time and place

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[23] *Ibid.*, p. 81.

[24] *Ibid.*, p. 80.

[25] : Τό ὑποτακτικόν ἄρθρον ἐπί ῥῆμα ἴδιον φέρεται, συνδεδεμένον διά τῆς ἀναφορᾶς τῷ προκειμένῳ ὀνόματι. Καί ἐντεῦθεν ἁπλοῦν λόγον οὐ παριστάνει κατά τήν τῶν δύο ῥημάτων σύνταξιν {λέγω τήν ἐν τῷ ὀνόματι καί τήν ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ ἄρθρῳ} ὅπερ πάλιν παρείπετο τῷ καί συνδέσμῳ. Κοινόν μέν παρελάμβανε τό ὄνομα τό προκείμενον, σύμπλεκον δέ ἕτερον λόγον πάντως καί ἕτερον ῥῆμα παρελάμβανε..

[26] *Ibid.*, p. 81-82.

[27] The terms here used are borrowed from Thomas of Erfurt's *Grammatica Speculativa*, Longman, 1972. Harris, actually, does not go so far as to describe this distinction in the mode of relation.

(e.g. *the man who approached us was John*), while in the second, it introduces a proposition as a definition of the subject signified by a primary substantive, namely as a universal (e.g. *a teacher is a man who has sufficient knowledge of grammar*). It is this last function of the subjunctive pronoun which Harris refers to, when saying that

> *The application of this subjunctive, like the other pronoun [namely, the personal ones], is universal. It may be the substitute of all kinds of substantives, natural, artificial, or abstract; as well as general, special, or particular... Nay, it may even be the substitute of all the other pronouns, and is of course expressive of all three persons.*[28]

The attributive terms

Attributives are the principal terms denoting not only attributes, but also those functioning as nominal substitutes of attributes. Such a description indicates the attributive character of verbs, adjectives, and participles, in the sense that these grammatical classes can stand as the predicate in a proposition.

> Every articulate sound, that forms the predicate in a proposition, is called a verb.[29]

On this definition of the verb, given by Ammonius, Harris assigns the common predicational function of the adjective and the verb.[30] This function was specified more accurately by Priscian, as a common semantic property irrelevant to the grammatical declinability of the terms:

> We must disclose not the declension, but the propriety of signification of the names... It is not the similarity in inflection that associates the parts of speech with each other or distinguishes them, but their significative power.[31]

The first property of the attributive term (the predicational one), is that it denotes the existence of the attribute ascribed to a substance. This becomes evident, either by the single application of the auxiliary verb (e.g. *He eats his food*), or, in the case of a common verb, by its resolution into the auxiliary verb and a complement (e.g. *He is eating his food*). This observation is based on *Metaphysics*, 5.7.1017a8-9 &27-30. The distinction in wording between propositions in which being is directly expressed, and propositions in which being is stipulated by *implication*, lies in the remark made by Aristotle, that

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[28] Harris, 1786, p. 81-82.

[29] Πᾶσα φωνήν, κατηγορούμενον ὅρον ἐν προτάσει ποιοῦσαν, ῥῆμα καλεῖσθαι., quoted in Harris, 1786, p. 87.

[30] "...Ammonius is explaining the reason, why Aristotle in his tract *De Interpretatione*[16a15] calls λευκός a verb".

[31] Non declinatio, sed proprietas excutienda est significationis... Non similitudo declinationis omnino conjungit vel discernit partes orationis inter se, sed vis ipsius significationis. The sentences quoted are respectively from the second and the thirteenth chapters of Priscian's work.

> Being is expressed either in the mode of its accidental properties, or by the application of its essential name... And there is no difference between *the man is recovering* and *the man recovers*, nor between *the man is walking* or *cutting* and *the man walks* or *cuts*.[32]

The first differentiation is between the *absolute existence* of the propositional subject, denoted by the single application of the copula, and the *qualified one*, when the copula ascribes to the subject a complement. It is a distinction between a simple affirmation of the subject by the application only of the substantive verb, and the act of predicating of the subject a certain attribute.

A further distinction in the function of the substantive verb refers to the mode of predication in accordance with the parameter of time. An attribute may by predicated to a substance as everlasting, or not. When, for example, the attributive stands for the definition of the substance, which is a universal, the proposition stands as a general axiomatic truth. The necessity of it is invariable, since its truth accepts no differentiation in time; thus the proposition becomes the ground on which demonstrative knowledge is built up. On the other hand, the substantive verb may predicate an attribute of a subject, which is ascribed to it not permanently, but accidentally (e.g. *George is running*), so that the validity of the proposition is dependent upon a time reference. Thus the function of the substantive verb in relation to its differentiated time reference is revealed in the present tense: it discloses the differentiation between propositions of general and those of particular validity. The source Harris bases his remarks on, is Boethius' comments on Aristotle's *De Interpretatione.*[33] The distinction between two types of syncategorematic function of the substantive verb, presented in the Aristotelian terminology, manifests the distinction between δόξα and ἐπιστήμη, as a result of the difference in status between propositions the truth of which happens to be the case, and those of which it is (or is held to be) always the case.

The common attributive terms

Verbs, participles, and adjectives are considered the common attributive terms. The prime distinction introduced here refers to the mode in which the attribute is associated with the substantive.

There are cases where the attributive (an adjective, or a participle) is just juxtaposed next to a substantive, without a denotation of semantic coalescence between them. In this case, the two

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[32] Τό ὄν λέγεται τό μέν κατά συμβεβηκός, τό δέ καθ' αὑτό... Οὐθέν γάρ διαφέρει τό ἄνθρωπος ὑγιαίνων ἐστίν ἤ τό ἄνθρωπος ὑγιαίνει, οὐδέ τό ἄνθρωπος βαδίζων ἐστιν ἤ τέμνων τοῦ ἄνθρωπος βαδίζει ἤ τέμνει..

[33] "Cum enim dicimus *Deus est* non eum dicimus *nunc esse*, sed tantum *in substantia esse*, ut hoc ad immutabilitatem potius substantiae, quam ad tempus aliquod referatur. Si autem dicimus *dies est,* ad nullam diei substantiam pertinet, nisi tantum ad temporis constitutionem; hoc enim, quod significat, tale est, tanquam si dicamus *nunc est*. Quare cum dicimus *esse*, ut substantiam designemus, simpliciter *est* addimus; cum vero ita ut aliquid praesens significetur, secundum tempus": quoted *ibid.*, p.92.

terms form an *imperfect sentence*, nothing more than an expression of juxtaposed utterances. On the other hand, the attributive may coalesce with the substantive, forming a *perfect* assertive *sentence*,[34] either when it has the grammatical form of a common verb, or when it is denoted by a complement (an adjective or a participle) predicated of the subject by the support of the substantive verb. The source of this distinction is in *Categories*, 2.1a16-19:

> Of the things expressed, some are expressed in a semantic combination with each other (like *man runs, man wins*), and others are not (like *man, ox, runs, wins*).[35]

Thus the foremost feature of an attributive term is its being predicated of the subject, denoting both the attribute and an assertion.

The second distinction of the attributives focuses on their semantic diversity. Adjectives signify the quality, or quantity, which is predicated of a subject. Verbs and participles signify motion, or privation of motion. Consequently, the next distinction is between adjectives, on the one hand, and verbs and participles on the other: the latter consignify time,[36] while adjectives lack this time-reference.

What is noteworthy here[37] is that Harris seems to modify deliberately the Aristotelian definition of the verb. In *De Interpretatione*, 3.16b6-8, Aristotle says that

> Verb is a sound which has an additional signification, this of time; no part of the verb has meaning if taken separately; the verb always represents something asserted of something else.[38]

The meaning of ***προσσημαῖνον*** is explained in 3.16b25-26: it indicates a synthesis which is difficult to comprehend if the verb is taken separately from the other words.[39] Harris explains the term as "over and above... its principal signification, which is to denote some *moving* and *energising* attribute".[40] This wording is proper in respect to the literal translation of *πρός*, but is not what Aristotle meant. For him, *σύνθεσις* is a well-formed *συμπλοκή*: a semantic composition made out of well-coordinated and harmonised parts; therefore, the consignification of time is to be considered as primary in comparison to the syntactic structure of the sentence, and not to its predicational signification. By reversing the semantic levels, Harris tries to make the

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[34] The distinction between *perfect* and *imperfect sentences* is an attempt by Harris to translate the Boethian terms *orationes perfectae et imperfectae*. This is in accordance with the Aristotelian λόγος, and also in accordance with the definition of the sentence given in *Poetics* 20, and in *De Interpretatione* 3, which Harris follows in *Hermes*,1.2. But actually it is doubtful whether an imperfect sentence is a sentence at all (on this, see Nuchelmans, Gabriel, 1973, p. 125).

[35] Τῶν λεγομένων τά μέν κατά συμπλοκήν λέγεται, τά δ' ἄνευ συμπλοκής. Τά μεν οὖν κατά συμ πλοκήν οἷον ἄνθρωπος, τρέχει, ἄνθρωπος νικᾶ, τά δ' ἄνευ συμπλοκῆς οἷον ἄνθρωπος, βοῦς, τρέχει, νικᾶ.

[36] by the fact that they are applied in a specific tense.

[37] Harris, 1786, p. 96.

[38] Ῥῆμα δέ ἐστι τό προσσημαῖνον χρόνον, οὗ μέρος οὐδέν σημαίνει χωρίς, καί ἔστιν ἀεί τῶν καθ' ἑτέρου λεγομένων σημεῖον.

[39] ...προσσημαίνει δέ σύνθεσιν τινα, ἥν ἄνευ τῶν συγκειμένων οὐκ ἔστι νοῆσαι.

[40] By *principal signification* is meant the grammatical one; if it were to be taken semantically, a principal signification having something else above, is not yet principal.

universal aspect of the semantic function more obvious. He seems to have in mind the signification *ad secundum tempus*, mentioned above by Boethius. But the truth is that προσσημαίνει is closer to the syncategorematic sense of the Stoic συσσημαίνει, which denotes the act of consignifying.

Harris understands that there is no ground for an argument supporting the consignificative power of the attributive as primary. As for the consignification of time, he reverts things into their proper order:

> *because the same time may be denoted by different verbs, ...and different times by the same verb ...neither of which could happen, were time any thing more, than a mere concomitant. Add to this, that when words denote time, not collaterally, but principally, they cease to be verbs, and become either adjectives,*[41] *or substantives.*[42]

Time is the second attribute (after motion), consignified by the verb. The distinction between past, present, and future tenses, as also the one following the different grammatical species of each one of them, results from this consignificative power.

The tenses of the verb

In common grammar the classification of tenses follows a relative perception of time. In a statement, the necessity of truth, yielding to the modes of scepticism of our knowledge, is restricted to what is believed to be certain; and thus a relative time reference, expressed by the tense of the verb, comforms with the relative necessity of the predicational act. But universal grammar is interested not simply in certain truths, but in truths which are necessary. For the grammarian of universals relativity in time refers to predicational acts which are directed to physical objects (the *matter* of the world) and not to the necessary truth of a tenseless formal substance.

The fundamental question focuses on the time reference in relation to the mode of predicating: how can time be both continuous and relative? Duration in time is essential, because it is one of the foundation stones on which universal propositions base their truth.[43] Contrary to this, the relative character of time refers to the way we perceive it, and that seems inconsistent with a universal application of reasoning. The contradiction between the omnipresent and the instantaneous present is focused in the linguistic employment of the present tense, and it is dismissed by a differentiation between that which exists and the instant. Time, which is divisible, does not exist; otherwise, it would be an essential attribute of God, and thus his reality would

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41 Such as *timely, yearly, daily.*

42 Such as *time, year, day.* The quotation *ibid.*, p. 97.

43 Thus Aristotle in *Prior Analytics*,1.15.34b7-12 says: Δεῖ δέ λαμβάνειν τό παντί ὑπάρχειν μή κατά χρό νον ὁρίσαντας, οἷον νῦν ἤ ἐν τῷδε τῷ χρόνῳ, ἀλλ' ἁπλῶς. διά τοιούτων γάρ προτάσεων καί τούς συλλογισμούς ποιοῦμεν, ἐπεί κατά γε τό νῦν λαμβανομένης τῆς προτάσεως οὐκ ἔσται συλλογισ μός: we have to consider the universal not as defined in respect of time, either of the present moment or in any wider sense of presence, but simply as defined. Because we construct our propositions of such premises; if the premise were to be defined in time, there could be no syllogism.

be divisible, something rejected by the rationalists. Thus the problem consists only in the double semantic function of the present tense. Harris devotes twenty pages to explain this relative character of time reference, until he reaches the same conclusion by using a quotation from Nicephorus Blemmides:

> *Present time therefore is that which adjoins to the real now or instant on either side, being a limited time made up of past and future, and from its vicinity to the real now said to be now also itself.*[44]

The main point of Harris' survey[45] is twofold:

i) the common grammatical order of past, present, and future tense, is a resolution of time reference, in respect only of the specific instance in which the verb functions. In this case, the predicational act is valid, and what is inferred by it is true, only for as much time as the essential mode of predication and the accidental consignification of time are identical with each other.

ii) a different order, that of present, past, and future, is a more qualified semantic resolution of time reference; it reflects the order in which we perceive and form the knowledge of things: experience of the present things, memory of the past, and analogical reasoning for the future. The description of future here is based on the third chapter of Aristotle's *De Anima*, and on a quotation from Scaliger's *De Causa Linguae Latinae:*

> However, the order of the tenses is in its function different from their nature. For what has passed, is prior to what is now; it seemed that priority should be given in accordance with this reason. However, what is offered to us in the present, this creates the first impressions in our mind; for this reason the present tense occupies the first place; for it is common to all animals. But the past is offered only to those yielding to memory, and the future to those, which are even fewer, who have the privilege of wisdom.[46]

The criterion for the distinction among the tenses is whether there is a denotation of definitiveness or not, and also the variety of it. Harris accepts the following scheme:[47]

a) **Aorist of the present**: *I write.*
b) **Aorist of the past**: *I wrote.*

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[44] Ἐνεστώς οὖν χρόνος ἐστίν ὁ ἐφ' ἑκάτερα παρακείμενος τῷ κυρίως νῦν. Χρόνος μερικός, ἐκ παῤ ελληλυθότος καί μέλλοντος συνεστώς, καί διά τήν πρός τό κυρίως νῦν γειτνίασιν, νῦν λεγόμενος καί αὐτός:from the'*Επιτομή Φυσικῆς,* θ.ιε.p. 1107, quoted in Harris, 1786, p. 119.

[45] which is full of references on Aristotle and his commentators.

[46] "Ordo autem (temporum scilicet) aliter est, quam natura eorum. Quod enim praeteriit, prius est, quam quod est, itaque primo loco debere poni videbatur. Verum, quod primo quoque tempore offertur nobis, id creat primas species in animo; quamobrem praesens tempus primum locum occupavit; est enim commune omnibus animalibus. Praeteritum autem iis tantum, quae memoria praedita sunt. Futurum vero etiam paucioribus, quippe quibus datum est prudentiae officium." The quotation is from *ibid.*, p. 139.

[47] Harris' classification of tenses was prevalent during the middle decades of the eighteenth century. Grammatically, his comments on the verb, as also those on the article, contributed towards an eclectic semantic approach to the parts of speech. For more, see Michael, 1970, p. 423 & 356. In strictly grammatical terms, his universal grammar aimed at *a better control over the* [vernacular] *language, for better descriptive and analytical procedures*: *ibid.*, p. 514.

c) **Aorist of the future**:*I shall write.*

d) **Inceptive present**: *I am going to write.*
e) **Middle or extended present**: *I am writing.*
f) **Completive present**: *I have written.*

g) **Inceptive past**:*I was begining to write.*
h) **Middle or extended past**:*I was writing.*
i) **Completive past**: *I had done writing.*

j) **Inceptive future**: *I shall be beginning to write.*
k) **Middle or extended future**: *I shall be writing.*
l) **Completive future**: *I shall have done writing.*

In the first three tenses, the consignification of time is comprehensive and indiscriminate; in the second triad only the commencement of the action implied by the verb is definite; in the third triad the time reference appears to be mediative and interposing, and in the last triad it consignifies a completion. The aorist of the future suits perfectly gnomic expressions and legislative statements. Harris distinguishes conclusively the three types of the aorist from all the other species of tenses. He calls the major characteristic of this species *indefitiveness*, but what he has in mind is that this is the group of tenses suggested to an attribute in order to be essentially predicated of a subject-especially the aorist of the present, which has the most time-extensive signification. This last is the most appropriate for predicational acts which ascribe an attribute to the eternal substance.[48] Compared to this, the remaining species of tenses seem "nearly to approach a perfect non-entity". This observation derives from Aristotle's remark that...τό δ' ἐκ μή ὄντων συγκείμενον, ἀδύνατον ἄν δόξειε κατέχειν ποτέ οὐσίας,[49] as it was further elaborated by Philoponus, in his work commenting on the *Introduction to Arithmetic* of Nicomachus:

> *How therefore is it that they approach nearly to non-entity? In the first place, because here (where they exist) exists the past and the future, and these are non-entities. For the one is vanished, and is no more, the other is not as yet. Now all natural substances pass away along with time, or rather it is upon their motion that time is an attendant.*[50]

The specific time allusion in the remaining species of tenses does not suit the universal predica-

[48] It is exactly in this spirit that the Stoics had called the present tense, seen in its common function, *imperfect present*. Harris quotes from Priscian on this, Harris, 1751, pp. 130-131.

[49] *De Partibus Animalium*, 4.14: "...Now that which is made up of nothing but non-entities, it should seem was impossible ever to participate of entity": quoted *ibid.*, p. 106.

[50] : Πῶς δέ τοῖς μή οὖσι γειτνιάζει; Πρῶτον μέν, ἐπειδή ἐνταῦθα τό παρελθόν ἐστι καί τό μέλλον, ταῦτα δέ μή ὄντα. Τό μέν γάρ ἠφάνισται καί οὐκ ἔτι ἐστί, τό δέ οὐπώ ἐστι. Συμπαραθέει δέ τῷ χρόνῳ τά φυσικά πάντα, μᾶλλον δέ τῆς κινήσεως αὐτῶν παρακολούθημά ἐστι ὁ χρόνος.: ibid., in p. 106 and 431.

tional act, but it is a consignification complying with predicating in the *modus accidentalis*. Consequently, these tenses are not examined in full detail.

There are two modes of time reference denoted by the completive present. The mode of the time in which the attribute is predicated of the subject is present. At the same time, there is an additional connotation of time (past) relating to the time of the completion of the act signified by the verb. Harris denominates them contrarily, although he recognises their complementary character.[51] The contrariety subsists between the sense of completion and the diversity amidst the two different semantic levels in which the predicational act of the verb may be resolved.[52] The origin of such a distinction is in *De Interpretatione,* 1.16a13-14. and 1.17a1-3:

> Truth and falsity subsist in combination and separation ... every sentence has a meaning ...but the proposition is that in which truth or falsity subsists.[53]

The conclusion to be deduced is that, in propositional terms, the meaning of the attributive is not an aggregate of the semantics of its grammatical parts.

Finally, the middle and the completive past tenses may coalesce in the same way. This is to show an extension of time, and to express either a frequency in repeating an action or modesty.[54]

The Modes

The relation between the substantive and the attributive accomplished by the verb, reflects the mental union of the substance with the attribute. The mood of the verb illustrates the manner in which the attributive term is assigned to the subject of the proposition. Since a verbal proposition is significant of a mental one, it is obvious that the grammatical mood of the verb reflects the manner in which the attribute is related to the substance.[55] Thus, in the Aristotelian terminology, the mood reflects either a perception, or a volition of our soul.

Harris presents a resolution of the different semantic manners in which the verb functions. His whole effort is an attempt to identify the species of the grammatical behaviour of the verb with the figures in which an attribute is predicated of a subject. That is why he introduces two classifications. The fundamental analysis reflects the grammatical variations of the verb known

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[51] "The completion of one contrary is put for the commencement of the other, and to say *has lived* or *has been* has the same meaning with *is dead* or *is no more*.

[52] For example, in the English present perfect, the auxiliary verb and its accompanying past participle in the sentence *he has died* seem respectively to affirm and deny the same thing.

[53] περί γάρ σύνθεσιν καί διαίρεσίν ἐστι τό ψεῦδος καί τό ἀληθές; ...ἔστι δέ λόγος ἅπας μέν σημαντικός, ...ἀποφαντικός δέ οὐ πᾶς, ἀλλ' ἐν ᾧ τό ἀληθεύειν ἤ ψεύδεσθαι ὑπάρχει.

[54] i.e. the type *scribebat* of the Latin verb, in the meaning of *he used to write*, and the Greek tense *παραταπκός* in examples such as *Πολείκλειτος εποίει.*

[55] "As therefore all these several modes have their foundation in nature, so have certain marks or signs of them been introduced into languages, that we may be enabled by our discourse to signify them, one to another. And hence those various modes or moods, of which we find in common grammars so prolix a detail, and which are in fact no more than so many literal forms, intended to express these natural distinctions": *ibid.*, p. 145-147.

as *ἐγκλίσεις*,[56] and are the following:

a) the **declarative** or **indicative**, *to assert what we think certain,*

b) the **potential**, *for the purposes of whatever we thing contingent,*

c) the **interrogative**, *to procure us information when we are doubtful,*

d) the **requisitive**, *to assist us in the gratification of our volitions,* which is resolved into i) the **imperative**, and ii) the **precative**, or **optative**, and

e) the **infinitive**.

The function of these modes is scrutinised in their comparison to each other. The indicative is the only mode for predicating truth; as its necessity either derives from nature, from our detecting the truth of things, or is based on axioms, this mode is favoured in demonstration and all sciences, as also in the predication of metaphysical truth. The indicative mood of the present tense of the verb stands as the verbal representation of substances existing either in time or eternally.[57]

A variation of the potential mode is the subjunctive, which refers to complex propositions; signifying the final cause, it subjoins the proposition to another of an indicative mode (e.g. *He says that this may turn against him*). It signifies the truth (or falsity) of a proposition by an assertion which is dubious and conjectural;[58] its potential character is lacking necessity.

The interrogative and the requisitive differ from the first two modes in that in many cases they postulate a proposition in response to what they testify.[59] They also differ from each other. The requisitive does not function in the first person of the singular number, while the interrogative performs in all the singular and plural persons. Whereas the requisitive form may be set in anticipation of an action, the interrogative coincides with assertoric propositions, as it always asks for an assertive statement in response. This coincidence becomes apparent in that the verbs of the interrogative and the assertive sentence are grammatically of the same form, and differ only in the addition of a particle, in tone, or in the accent. The actual difference is that the indicative mode of the interrogation lacks the assertion.[60] Finally, while the interrogative may function either in the past, the present, or the future tense, the time reference of the requisitive is always the future.[61] This unfolds the main distinction between the two modes: the truth in statements of the requisitive grammatical form lacks necessity (e.g. *Square the circle, please*). In

[56] This becomes apparent when Harris states that *the species of modes* (meaning the grammatical moods of the verb) *in great measure depend on the species of sentences*: *ibid.*, p. 144. Harris also notes that grammatically the variation of modes in the verb may be marked either by auxiliary verbs, or by syllables enhancing the verb's time reference.

[57] To explain the distinction between these two time-references, Harris quotes an extended extract from Boethius, *ibid.*, p.160-161.

[58] *Ibid.*, p. 158.

[59] Harris also refers here to the case of a question or command refering to things impossible: e.g. *is it possible to square the circle?*).

[60] The remark is based on Apollonius, 3.21:Ἤγε οὖν προκειμένη ὁριστικὴ ἔγκλισις, τὴν ἐγκειμένην κατὰ φασην ἀποβάλλουσα, μεθίσταται τοῦ καλεῖσθαι-ὁριστικὴ ἀναπληρωθεῖσα δέ τῆς καταφάσεως, ὑπὸ στρέφει εἰς τό εἶναι ὁριστική: "The indicative mode, of which we speak, by laying aside that assertion, which by its nature it implies, quits the name of indicative-when it reassumes the assertion, it returns against its proper character": quoted *ibid.*, p. 151.

[61] Following the grammatical tradition of Apollonius and Macrobius, Harris differentiates in the imperative between two different modes of time: the *imperative of the future* is the imperative of the present tense, and places the action of the verb in the future; *the imperative of the perfectum* is formed by the root belonging to the past tenses (*σκαψάτω, be gone*) and presents the future time-reference as an extension of the present.

interrogations of past and present tense, by their affinity with the assertoric type of proposition required, the truth in question has to be affirmed or denied definitely. Harris, reflecting the distinction noted by Ammonius between *ἐρώτημα* and *πύσμα*, distinguishes between simple and complex interrogations, namely between interrogations which demand a simple affirmation or denial, and interrogations introducing cases ordered in juxtaposition by the disjunctive *or*, and of which only one will be affirmed.

In the second classification, which is a re-naming of the basic grammatical moods, the terminology applied is more consonant with a rational acknowledgment of the distinctions between the modes; the infinitive and the optative are here omitted, which means that according to Harris these types do not signify directly a volition or affection of the soul. According to this classification, the modes of signifying are:

a) the ***mode of science***, identified with the grammatical indicative mood,

b) the ***mode of conjecture***, identified with a type of the subjunctive reffered to above as the potential,

c) the ***mode of proficiency***, identified with the interrogative mood,

d) the ***mode of legislature***, identified with the imperative form of the requisite mood. Occasionally, the indicative functions as an extended requisitive form of the imperative; it is the case of examples such as *Be it therefore enacted*, or *You shall not kill*, where the indicative expresses command.

By saying that the application of the infinitive is somewhat singular,[62] Harris means that this is to be found always in the same mode of signifying action, carrying no distinction of person or number. The infinitive is considered of an indefinite nature,[63] in the sense that it does not represent any natural distinction. As the propositional subject, it does not signify a substance, but an action, which may stand as a substantive term and may be attributed a complement. As a part of an attributive phrase, it coalesces naturally with all verbs. Harris distinguishes two types of coalescence between infinitive and verb. If the verb signifies volition (e.g. *I desire to live*), "the coalescence is so intimate, that the volition is unintelligible, 'till the action be expressed". In this case the character of the infinitive is complementary, and both terms cooperate in forming a single semantic function of the attributive. When the verb signifies action (e.g. *I eat for to live*), the actions implied by the two terms remain distinct. This is because the infinitive stands elliptically in the place of another clause, which denotes the final cause. Thus the two terms coincide in that they both are in the same mode of signifying action, but are differentiated from each other, in terms of the distinction between the action implied.

Finally, number, person, and gender are excluded from the modes of signification ascribed to the attributive. Even when marking the attributive,[64] they are considered by Harris as signs of the elegance of a language, as they are actually features of the substantive signifying accidental traits of the substance.

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[62] *Ibid.*, p. 167.

[63] *Ῥῆμα γενικώτατον* and *verbum generale* according to Ammonius and Priscian respectively.

[64] Either the verb, as it was Sanctius' opinion for the person, or the adjective, which in many languages has these three distinctions.

The species of verbs

Verbs are classified into different species in terms of the referential parameters of the energy they denote. Harris accepts three types of verb as essential to all languages: the active, the passive and the neuter. In order to explain their differences, he discusses them in respect of their differences with the traditional grammatical types of the transitive and the middle verbs.[65]

The first distinction is between the active (e.g. *Cato loves Portia*) and the passive form (e.g.*Portia is loved*). It refers to the active or passive character of the substantive standing as the propositional subject, or, in other words, to the nominative which denotes the substantive term *leading the sentence*. The second distinction is between neuter and transitive verbs. It is a distinction actually between those verbs which can be resolved into the substantive verb and an adjectival form of the verb as a complement(e.g.*Caesar walks*: *Caesar is walking*), and those verbs which are not likewise resolvable, as the substantive term denoted by the attribute is different from the propositional subject (e.g. *Caesar meets Cato*).

It is interesting to note that Harris considers active verbs which lack the accusative of their transitive reference, as functioning in the mode of the neuter verbs (e.g. *He doesn't know how to read Homer*). Actually, the accusative is omitted because of an ellipsis; but this seems to mark a different kind of verbal reference, as the verb "respects the mere energy or affection only, and has no regard to the subject, be it this thing or that".[66]

Apart from this semantic classification of verbs, there is another one, focusing on their etymological derivation: some verbs derive from adjectives, others from abstract nouns. This classification does not refer to all verbs, but only to a small number of them, such as *equals* and *whitens*.

The participle and the adjective

The participle is the term which, without participating in the assertive character of the verb, signifies the attribute, and additionally carries a time reference. The adjective signifies the attribute, but lacks the time reference. By the application of the adjective, a certain quality, quantity, and/or relation, are attributed to the substance denoted by the subject.

The *verbal adjectives* are those adjectives out of which a verb of the same grammatical root may be formed (as is the case with verbs such as the Greek *ἰσάζω* and the Latin *albeo*): they disclose the mode in which a verb may affirmatively refer to a propositional subject. Harris refers also to the type of adjective which derives its substantive character from being the genitive of a substantive in a nominal phrase (e.g. *the Socratic philosophy*).[67]

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65 In the middle verb, the subject reserves the energy denoted by the verb. "This energy has to the same being a double relation, both active and passive": *ibid.*, p. 175. Harris gives also the Stoic terminology of σύμβαμα ἤτον ἤ σύμβαμα,, παρασύμβαμα, and παρακατηγόρημα, in respect of the predicational act of the middle, the neuter, the transitive verb, and the case of predicating between substantive terms which are in the oblique case: *ibid.*, pp. 180-181.

66 *Ibid.*, pp. 178-179.

67 The pronoun functions in the same way: e.g. *the book of me*: *my book.*

While, in the case of verbal adjectives, the adjective adopts a specific time-reference, the participle, in its adjectival function, does not signify action, and loses its own time-reference. With this remark, Harris concludes his comments on the participle. It is remarkable that, since he is basing his observation on ancient and not on medieval sources, he does not specify the relation verb-participle on the analogy of their common verbal matter and their diversified forms. He restricts himself to a few grammatical observations on the deponent verbs of Latin, and on the way verb and participle coalesce in English.

Harris rejects the nominal character of adjectives as essential, as it is considered *homogeneous* with the verb, and can never properly denote a substance.[68] Finally, the semantic coalescence between the species of attributive terms reflects the one between natural species.[69]

The attributives of secondary order (adverbs)

The adverbs do not predicate attributes of a subject, but they do denote features of its attributive terms. Thus their adverbial character may refer to all attributive terms, i.e. to verbs (e.g. *He flies around*), participles (e.g. *He is running quickly*), and adjectives (e.g. *An admirably tall statue*), of which all the adverbs are considered *natural appendages*.[70] Adverbs are the modifiers of the attributives; they modify their significative power, by annotating an intension or remission of the quality or quantity these ascribe to the propositional subject. Thus they pertain to comparison and comparative degrees, which consequently are attributed to the verb and the subject. When Harris say that no substantive "is susceptible of these comparative degrees",[71] he does not mean that these degrees are irrelevant to the propositional subject: no substance accepts intension and remission, because comparison is a part not of its essential definition, but of its accidental description.[72] That is why he rejects the notion of three comparative degrees. This notion is based on *Categories*, 5.3b33-37:

> it seems that substance does not admit being more or less; ...each substance, being such, cannot be affirmed to be more or less.

Harris remarks here that "it must be confessed these comparatives, as well the simple [positive], as the superlative, seem sometimes to part with their relative nature, and only retain their intensive".[73] The adverb participates in the predicational act only in the mode of a simple relation between the signification it introduces and that of the primary attribute. A certain quality or quantity determinant of a substance accepts no intension or remission in terms of its definition even if uttered in the form of an adjective describing the noun of a nominal phrase. And

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[68] *Ibid.*, p. 190.

[69] *Ibid.*, p. 188.

[70] *Ibid.*, p. 194. As an *appendage* of the verb, the adverb is not a component part of it. The verb, within a simple proposition, cannot signify comparison.

[71] *Ibid.*, p. 201.

[72] Harris is especially praising Sanctius' comments on the *derived* accidental character of comparison, treated in *Minerva*, 5.10 & 5.11.

[73] Δοκεῖ δέ ἡ οὐσία μή ἐπιδέχεσθαι τό μᾶλλον καί τό ἧττον. ...ἀλλ' ὅτι ἑκάστη οὐσία τοῦθ' ὅπερ ἐστίν, οὐ λέγεται μᾶλλον καί ἧττον: Harris, 1786, p. 199.

since the most appropriate definition is the species and the genus, adverbs do not coalesce with attributives which predicate the species and the genus implied by the propositional subject.

The comparative act formed by the addition of the suffix to the positive degree is seen as a method of retrenching the adverb, by incorporating its mode of signification into the primary attributive term.[74]

Harris admits of the following basic classification of the adverbs: a) ***adverbs of discrete quantity*** (such as *once, twice*), b) ***adverbs of relation*** (such as *more, equally, proportionally*), c) ***adverbs of quality*** (such as *honestly, circularly*). These represent the fundamental forms of semantic modification of the attributive. Since adverbs are the attributives of the attributives, they are actually a subdivision of the general category of terms which signify attribute. This means that the adverb does not restrict its field of reference only to the attributive terms of the first order (verb, adjective, participle): in terms of the matter-form distinction, it shares the same matter with the above three terms, being a variation in utterance of the attributive form:

> *...it is worthwhile to observe how the same thing, participating in the same essence, assumes different grammatical forms from its different relations. For example, suppose it should be asked, how* ***honest, honestly,*** *and* ***honesty*** *differ. The answer is, they are in essence the same, but they differ, in as much as* ***honest*** *is the attributive of a substantive;* ***honestly,*** *of a verb; and* ***honesty,*** *being divested of these its attributive relations, assumes the power of the substantive, so as to stand by itself. The adverbs, hitherto mentioned, are common to verbs of every species.*[75]

The *essence* mentioned here, is the real form of the attribute *καθ' αὑτόν* (*per se*),[76] and it is inherent in the above grammatical forms, which are its accidental appearances, and which vary from language to language. The affirmation of a common, universal, and omnipresent semantic ground of these words, means that we move a step towards knowledge of the real substance and its natural union with the attribute.[77]

The *adverbs of time* constitute a distinction of the time-reference denoted by the tense of a verb which signifies motion. They are subdivided into those carrying a simple time consignifi-

[74] This, of course, holds also for the adjectives and the participles.

[75] *Ibid.*, p. 203.

[76] Καθ' αὑτά δ' ὅσα ὑπάρχει τε ἐν τῷ τί ἐστιν, ...(ἡ γάρ οὐσία αὐτῶν ἐκ τούτων ἐστί, καί ἐν τῷ λόγῳ τῷ λέγοντι τί ἐστιν ἐνυπάρχει). Καί ὅσοις τῶν ὑπαρχόντων αὐτοῖς αὐτά ἐν τῷ λόγῳ ἐνυπάρχουσι τῷ τί ἐστι δηλοῦντι...: I call these things *per se*, which exist in the essential nature of a thing (because they are components out of which this essential nature subsists, as also essential parts of the utterance describing this essential nature. I also call *per se* the attributes existing in this nature, which are elements of its definition: *Posterior Analytics*, 1.4.73a34-39. Also in *Metaphysics*, 4.18.1022a24-35: Ὥστε καί τό καθ' αὐτό πολλαχῶς ἀνάγκη λέγεσθαι. ἕν μέν γάρ καθ' αὐτό τό τί ἦν εἶναι ἑκάστῳ, ...ἔν δέ ὅσα ἐν τῷ τί ἐστιν ὑπάρχει, ...ἔτι δέ εἰ ἐν αὐτῷ δέδεκται πρώτω ἢ τῶν αὐτοῦ τινί, ...ἔτι οὗ μή ἐστιν ἄλλο αἴτιον· ...ἔτι ὅσα μόνῳ ὑπάρχει, καί ᾗ μόνον, ...διό τό κεχωρισμένον καθ' αὑτό: Hence *in virtue of itself* has to have various meanings; it denotes i) the essence of each particular, ii) everything that a definition includes, iii) any attribute of a thing received directly in itself or in any of its parts, iv) anything that has no other cause, v) everything belonging to a thing alone *qua* alone; and hence the thing taken as separate is *in virtue of itself.*

[77] Ἐπειδάν γάρ ἔχωμεν ἀποδιδόναι κατά τήν φαντασίαν περί τῶν συμβεβηκότων, ἢ πάντων ἢ τῶν πλείστων, τότε καί περί τῆς οὐσίας ἕξομεν λέγειν κάλλιστα: for when we are enabled to expound all the accidental properties, or most of them, then we become qualified to talk about the essence: *De Anima*, 1.1.402b21-25.

cation (such as *afterwards, formerly*), and those signifying the manner of motion (such as *swiftly, hastily*). In the first case, the consignification of time is simply *coinciding* with the motion signified by the verb. In the second, the adverb functions as a modifier of the signification denoted by the verb, showing "an intension or remission peculiar to motion".[78] The *adverbs of place* specify the signification of verbs which indicate privation of motion. Similarly to the classification of adverbs of time, they are divided into those which do not modify the meaning of the verb, and simply define a locution (such as *there, hence*) in a complementary mode, and those which act as modifiers of it (e.g. *upwards, downwards*).

In the first class, of either *adverbs of time*, or *adverbs or place,* the attributive action of the adverb and that of the verb coincide in the mode of a simple relation; the adverb here confines the semantic time or place reference denoted by the tense, and generally the grammatical form of the verb. Contrary to this constraining function, in the second class, an adverb predicates a modification of the verb, by indicating a semantic extension of its meaning. The adverbial function of the preposition, either when keeping the same grammatical form (e.g. *He rides about*), or not, is to be included in this case. Finally, *adverbs of interrogation* are held to coalesce with the subjunctive function they assume in the form of the relative pronoun. Here again, the same grammatical form is being ascribed to two different functions, working in one case in the mode of interrogation, and in the other, in the mode of a relation by subjunction. To explain this last distinction, Harris comments:

> *The difference is, that without an interrogation, they* [namely, the adverbial and the pronominal functions of the expressions here discussed] *have reference to a subject which is* ***antecedent, definite, and known****; with an interrogation, to a subject which is* ***subsequent, indefinite, and unknown****, and which it is expected that the answer should express and ascertain...*[79]

The grammatical form of the adverb, namely the word taken as a separate utterance in itself, and disunited from its variant functions, has a *general* or *multiform nature*. This comprehensive form of it, in terms of logic, brings forth the mode in which a complement is predicated of a subject during a predicational act. But in its universal semantic function, it discloses the capacity of language to illustrate the manner in which the essential nature of a real being coalesces with its accidental properties. This coalescence refers to the classification of realities in terms of the tripartite hierarchy particular- special-general. The Aristotelian categories are the ten types in which being can be predicated.[80] The adverb, which is the nominal formulation of the mode of a predicational act, needs to establish its power to signify the real being in every one of these ten ways.[81] While a philosopher would prove this simply by the semantic distinction between the adverbial species in accordance with the ten Aristotelian categories,[82] Harris proves it analo-

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[78] Harris, 1786, p. 205.

[79] *Ibid.*, p. 208.

[80] *De Anima*, 2. 412a.

[81] The authoritative source quoted from Harris on this is Gaza: διό δή καί ἄμεινον ἴσως δέκα καί τῶν ἐπιρρημάτων γένη θέσθαι ἑκαῖνα, οὐσίαν, ποιόν, ποσόν, πρός στ, κ.τ.λ.: therefore, to admit perhaps of ten genera of the adverb: from the second part of Gaza's *Introduction to Grammar.*

[82] Substance, quantity, quality, relation, place, time, position, state, action, and affection. The types of adverbs referred up to now are in respect of this classification.

gically, in respect of the multiformity in derivation of the grammatical form of the adverb:

> *...adverbs may be derived from almost every part of speech: from prepositions,...from participles, and through these from verbs, ...from adjectives, ...from substantives, ...nay even from proper names, as when from* ***Socrates*** *we derive* ***Socratically***.[83]

The doctrine of derivation has its root in Varro's *De Causis Linguae Latinae,* 6.37,[84] and refers to the derivation of not just the inflective, but of a great number of grammatical forms, from a limited number of primeval words. These primitive grammatical forms are the *general natures* mentioned above : a determined stock of terms denoting the genus, which may compile a fundamental dictionary of the matter of a language. The formatted types (both functional species and inflective types)[85] encountered in a common dictionary are just grammatical variations of this material.

A question seems to arise here when considering the word *nature*. The diverse meaning of this word is actually preparing the ground for the philosophical analysis of grammar following in the third part of *Hermes*. The point in question here is this: how these general terms are said to be natural, whereas words are said to be set by convention? The question relates to the analogy/anomaly controversy.[86] For the universal grammarian, the subject discloses the separate natural level of meanings and syntactic structures; these forms are independent of variation of words in general usage, as also from language to language.

Here, we have also to distinguish between two types of derivation: the natural and the voluntary. The voluntary derivation depends on the free will of the speaker: it reflects the conventional usage of language, and it accounts for its arbitrary character, as same things are uttered in each language in a different grammatical form (wording). The natural derivation yields to a natural *ratio*, traceable by our discursive faculty; it demonstrates a consistency amidst the etymological derivation of the grammatical forms in ordinary usage, and a natural arrangement of meanings. It is a function corresponding to all languages, and thus it reflects a universal regularity, traceable by universal grammar.

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[83] Harris, 1786, pp. 209-10. It is obvious that adverbs deriving from substantives (such as*apishly, leoninely*) cannot signify comparison, but just manner, or skill. The terms *substantives* here refers not simply to nouns, but to adjectival substantives generally.

[84] Primigenia dicuntur verba ut *lego, scribo, sto, sedeo* et cetera, quae non sunt ab alio quo verbo, sed suas habent radices. Contra verba declinata sunt, quae ab alio quo oriuntur, ut ab *lego, legis legit, legam* et sic indicem hinc permulta. Quare si quis primigeniorum milium simplicium verborum origines ostenderit, satis dixerit de originibus verborum, cum unde nata sint, principia erunt pauca, quae inde nata sint, innumerabilia: Primitive are words such as *lego, scribo, sto, sedeo,* and the others having their own roots and not deriving from some other word. Derivative words, on the other hand, are those developing from some other, as from *lego*, come *legis, legit, legam,* and in the same way from this same word derives a great number of words.Thus if one has shown the origins of primitive words, and if these are in number a thousand, at the same time he will have revealed the origin of five thousand different words. But if without showing the source of a single primitive word he has shown the way in which the rest have developed from primitives, he will have spoken adequately about the origins of words, because the primary elements of these words are few and the words which have sprung from them are innumerable.

[85] These two constitute the two different types of declension: the *derived,* which is the one here treated, and the *accidental,* the common inflection of nouns and verbs. For more in Breva-Claramonte, 1983, p. 225.

[86] For more on this, see Robins, 1951, p. 16.

The article

The discussion of articles (articuli, ἄρθρα) is set out in terms of their coalescence with pronouns: together they combine to form the semantic category of *accessories*, which are defined as words "significant by relation".[1] An article has no meaning, but is "by nature a definitive".[2] The *genuine* article, when subsistuting a noun, has always to be associated with an adjective or a noun, while the pronoun may sometimes be considered to be functioning as an article (or a definitive).[3]

Articles themselves are distinguished from each other according to their definite or indefinite character: the indefinite is used to indicate our "primary perception" of an object, which "lacks of a proper name or its proper name is not known",[4] by referring to its species or genus, and is to be used with objects of first knowledge and indication (*πρώτη δεῖξις*). With the definite article, we refer to objects of "secondary perception", namely to anything which is known and with which we have been familiarised in the past. But actually, both types of article are considered to be of a definitive character,[5] as they indicate the capacity of specific substantive terms to become definite.[6] Their definitive character becomes apparent when they refer to a species or a genus; in such a case, they both act in order to reduce the unknown by denoting a particular individual. The precise difference between the two types of the article is, according to Harris, that the so called indefinite article "leaves the individual *unascertained*, whereas the definite *ascertains* the individual *also*".[7]

The main part of Harris' discussion of the articles is based on Apollonius Dyscolus, from whom he quotes several extracts; articles, in their consignificative role as related to other words, are of a referential character;[8] there is also a semantic coalescence with the attributive character of the adjective in the case of a noun which must be further specified.[9] But apart from this referential role, an article may have a more direct con-significance when, applied to specific "common appellatives", it attributes to them the character of specific proper names (e.g. *the Philosopher* as implying Aristotle).[10] As for the use of the article as a mark corresponding to

[1] Harris,1786, p. 31.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 224.

[3] The grammatical quotations here are from the works of Apollonius Dyscolus, Priscian, Gaza, Donatus and Vossius.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 214.

[5] This is based on Apollonius: Τά γάρ ἀοριστωδῶς ποτε νοούμενα ἡ τοῦ ἄρθρου παράθεσις ὑπό ὁριδ μόν τοῦ προσώπου ἄγει.: "those things, which are at times understood indefinitely, the addition of the article makes to be definite as to their person", *ibid.*, p.217. Harris makes a point of the similarity in the indefinite signification between the application of the indefinite article in the singular forms, and the plural forms lacking of article. The observation was also made by John Wallis, in his *Grammatica Linguae Anglicanae*, Oxford 1653, p. 71: si vero pluribus particularibus (sive speciebus sive individuis) vox generalior applicetur, illud numero plurali innuitur...sic *men* homines, de individuis dici manifestum est; et *virtues* virtutes, de virtutis vel speciebus vel individuis: quoted in Michael, 1970, p. 360.

[6] Harris, 1786, p.225.

[7] *Ibid.*, p.217.

[8] : ἰδίωμα ἀναφορᾶς, according to Apollonius.

[9] "It is with reason therefore that the article is here also added, as it brings the adjective to an individuality, as precise, as the proper name": *ibid.*, p. 222 (: it is a translation of Apollonius from Harris.

[10] "...to presume a kind of general and universal notoriety": *ibid.*, p.223.

the grammatical genus of a proper name, Harris, probably having in mind that this is not of universal applicability, seems to consider it rather a sign of pleonasm.[11]

It seems that the syntactic operation of the articles upon adjectives, number words, or nouns, must be in accordance with certain rules referring to the semantic compatibility and coalescence of the words joined together; a number word or an adjective should never be *undefined* (: unassociated by an article) when applied to a *defined* (by the application of an article) noun. Interrogatives also do not need the support of an article, since the object of their reference, either in itself or its attributes (quantity or quality) is unknown, and we cannot define that of which we are ignorant. In the construction of propositions, Harris points to a difference between the Greek and the English language: while in the first the article serves to define the subject and to distinguish it from the predicate (e.g. *εἶναι τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀγαθόν*), in the second it enhances the force and efficacy of the noun (e.g. *Those are the men*).[12] Harris conceives the nature and function of the article[13] in terms of three parameters:

a) an act of reduction of the meaning of nouns, where the meaning descends grammatically from the realm of genus and species to that of individuals, and is a feature of both the definite and the indefinite article (e.g. *Αἴας ὁ Τελαμώνιος),*

b) a differentiation between the two different types of article in the degree of relation between the grammatical and the semantic form of the nominal phrase, and thus *in the degree of accuracy* in the description of the noun, where the indefinite article leaves the noun semantically unascertained, whereas the definite does not (e.g. *This is a/the man*), and

c) a differentiation between the two types of the article in terms of the referential familiarity, offered "in respect to the way the nominal phrase is perceived" (e.g. *the two men*).

In its general perception, the above theoretical perspective on the semantic function of the article, which firstly derives from Apollonius Dyscolus,[14] was introduced in Britain by John Wilkins.[15] But it is in Harris' work that the so called "familiarity theory" was reintroduced into the grammatical study of the article, a theory which endured throughout the eighteenth[16] and nineteenth century up to the time of Russell[17] and his "uniqueness theory".[18] Monboddo[19] fur-

[11] unless it marks a distinction of gender.

[12] Harris, following Apollonius and Gaza, rejects the denomination of the relative pronoun as a subjunctive article (being contrasted to the prepositive one, above commented) and includes the whole subject within the discussion of the pronouns.

[13] For more on the linguistic aspect of the subject see: Lyons, Christopher G. *References and Articles*, in Leitner, 1991.

[14] In Uhlig, Gustav, *Grammatici Graeci*, Part II, Vol. II, *Apollonii Dyscoli, De Constructione Libri quattuor* Edition and Commentary, Teubner, Leipzig, 1910. See also: Householder, 1981.

[15] Wilkins, John. 1668, *An Essay towards a Real Character and a Philosophical Language.*

[16] More on the subject can be found in: Joly And.: *The Study of the Article in England from Wallis to Horn Tooke, 1653-1789*, in Hans Aarsleff, Louis Kelly and Hans-Josef Niederehe, 1987.

[17] Russell, Bertrand, *On Denoting*, in *Mind* (1905) 14, p. 479-493.

[18] a uniqueness of the content of the nominal phrase indicated by the application of the definite article.

[19] Monboddo, James Burnett, Lord, 1774: *Of the Origin and Progress of Language*, Vol. II. Edinburgh: J. Balfour. Reproduced by Scholar Press, Menston, 1967. In the same series of facsimiles is also reproduced (1967) John Ward's *Four Essays Upon the English Language* (1758), a work which follows the same ideas about the use of articles.

ther widens the meaning of *eminence* attributed to a noun by the definite article.[20] Although he considers the article *a* or *un* as a defect of the English and the French language, he regards it as a particle and not an article; this last observation is in accordance with Harris' treatment of the article as of a grammarian of universals, despite the fact that he follows the traditional terminology. In the third part of *Hermes*, when discussing the form of language, he includes the definite and indefinite article in the same category with a number of other words:

> *Let the general term be man. I have occasion to apply this term to the denoting of some particular. Let it be required to express this particular, as unknown; I say,* ***a*** *man; known; I say* ***the*** *man; indefinite;* ***any*** *man; definite;* ***a certain*** *man; present and near;* ***this*** *man; present and distant;* ***that*** *man; like to some other;* ***such a*** *man; an indefinite multitude;* ***many*** *men; a definite multitude;* ***a thousand*** *men; the ones of a multitude, taken throughout;* ***every*** *man; the same ones, taken with distinction;* ***each*** *man; taken in order;* ***first*** *man,* ***second*** *man etc.; the whole multitude of particulars taken collectively;* ***all*** *men-the negation of this multitude;* ***no*** *man.*[21]

Harris was aware that little respect was accorded the article in the Latin language; he quotes on that from Quintilian,[22] and Scaliger. It was in the tradition of the last especially, that the article was not highly praised as having a considerable function in language, and it was Harris who changed that in the post-Wallis study of grammar, followed also by Lowth,[23] and others. Lowth, specifically, speaks about the great importance of the *proper* use of the article as, additionally, a sign of *excellence* of a language.[24] The meaning, for the grammarian of the universals, of such a function of the article, is that it has been attributed a specific task: not just as implied by contemporary linguistic scientific thought, according to which a definiteness or indefiniteness only is to be conveyed.[25] As shown in the text quoted above, the article relates the grammatical form of the name defined with its meaning by giving additional semantic data for it. By its reference to the name of the genus or species, in the case of a particular thing, the article serves to consignify the degree of our own perception of this thing. Such a description is seen in terms of the accuracy offered in the conveyance of the data: the *vague* character of the indefinite one is compared to the restricted latitude and specificity of the definite.[26] So that actually the article has not a referential character, but affects the referential character of the noun defined, and that is the function of a syncategorematic word.

The examples taken by Harris from the Greek, Latin, and English languages have the purpose of answering the question how we can describe and recognise a nominal term more accur-

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[20] He expands the *eminence* seen by Harris in phrases like *the City*, meaning London, by including it in examples like *the city*, in the more general meaning of something already well-known to the hearer (see also Lyons, p. 312).

[21] Harris,1786, p. 347.

[22] "*Noster sermo articulos non desiderat; ideoque in alias partes orationes fraguntur*": *Inst. Oratoria,* 1.4.19.

[23] Lowth, Monboddo and Beattie were the most faithful to the doctrine of universal grammar as presented by Harris.

[24] Lowth, 1762, p. 26n: quoted from Joly A., 1987.

[25] altought the concept of the article as a *determiner* is much closer to its syntactic function than to its grammatical one.

[26] "But this is not enough. The thing at which we are looking is neither a genus not a species. What is it then? An individual": from Harris, 1786, p. 215.

ately. In the answer given, it is clear that Harris combines both the grammatical-semantic and the universal perspective. For the first he follows the tradition of Apollonius, Priscian, Scaliger, and Gaza, the distinction between objects of first acquaintance and those of second knowledge being derived from the older of them.[27] This is in answer to the question "what is this thing... we are looking at?" From Apollonius he also derives the variation in the degrees of semantic *eminence* of the noun, due to the semantic definition carried by the definite article.[28] Harris analyses the differences in the semantic definition of a name and the semantic alterations in complex nominal phrases when the article may determine either the noun or the adjective.[29] It is obvious that there is a similarity between the function of the article and the adjective, so that they could be classified under the same category of syngategorematic terms. It is in this spirit that he quotes those extracts from Apollonius which lay a stress on the referential character of the definite article.[30]

> *We may carry this reasoning further, and show, how by help of the article even common appellatives come to have the force of proper names; ...and thus it is by an easy transition, that the article, from denoting reference, comes to denote eminence also; that is to say, from an ordinary preaquaintance, to presume a kind of general and universal notoriety.*[31]

After this point Harris' discussion ascends to the realm of universal grammar: "*what kind* of thing is this we are looking at?" There is a degree of *eminence* attributed to a noun, and what Harris does is to include in the same category, but as different subdivisions, the general and the universal:[32]

> *In a word the natural associators with articles are all those common appellatives, which denote the several genera or species of beings. It is these, which, by assuming different articles, serve either to explain the individual upon its first being perceived, or else to indicate, upon its return, a recognition or repeated knowledge.*[33]

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[27] There is also a citation from Gaza translated by Harris, which combines the parameters of time and noun reference: τό ἄρθρο ποιεῖ δι' ἀναπόλησιν προεγνωσμένου τοῦ ἐν τῇ συντάξει...: "the article causes a review within the mind of something known before the texture of the discourse", *ibid.*, p. 218.

[28] Another source for the doctrine of eminence is Christopher Cooper's *Grammatica Linguae Anglicanae*, London 1685, p. 102: quando loquimur de re vel persona, quam lector vel auditor scit vel scire supponatur, quia eminence est, vel antedicta; ut *the hing*: quoted in Michael, 1970 p. 359. According to Michael, Harris is the first English grammarian who makes the implication of the previous reference the essential function of the definite article.

[29] For the case of the article determining an adjective: Δεόντως ἄρα καί τι τοιοῦτον ἡ πρόσθεσις ἐστι τοῦ ἄρθρου, συνιδιάζουσα τό ἐπιθετικόν τῷ κυρίῳ ὀνόματι: "it is with this reason therefore that the article is here also added, as *it brings the adjective to an individuality*, as precise, as the proper name",Harris, 1786, p. 222.

[30] Τό ἄρθρον προυφεστῶσαν γνῶσιν δηλοῖ: "the article indicates a preestablished acquaintance", *ibid.*, p. 220.

[31] *Ibid.*, p. 223.

[32] In examples such as *the Speaker* as the high officer in the British Parliament, and *the Poet* as a name implying Homer, *ibid.*, p. 223.

[33] *Ibid.*, p. 229.

The Pronoun

Pronouns, or as they are called, substantives of the secondary order, are discussed in terms of the distinction between objects of first and second knowledge and are placed in the latter category. The definitions of the personal pronouns given by Harris are based on Priscian, Apollonius, and Gaza. As Harris observes in the first book of *Hermes*, where pronouns are mostly treated:

> *...when we read Euclid, we find neither first person, nor second in any part of the whole work. The reason is, that neither speaker nor party addressed (in which light we may always view the writer and his reader) can possibly become the subject of pure mathematics, nor indeed can anything else, except abstract quantity, which neither speaks itself, nor is spoken to by another.*[34]

Number, the lack of grammatical gender of the first and second person of the pronoun, and the differentiation in genders in the third one, are the general grammatical properties of the use of pronouns in most languages. Bearing in mind the criterion of *sufficiency* of language, the third person of the personal pronoun should be classified together with the demonstrative and the indefinite pronouns.[35] Such a classification is based on Priscian's grammatical theory, according to which "the first and second person do not require a differentiation in utterance as they are present for each other; and thus they function demonstratively but the third person in other cases functions as demonstrative (e.g. *hic*) and in other as relative (e.g. *is, ipse*).[36]

The genuine semantic role of the pronouns is as substitutes of words of primary signification, and thus they are called *substantives of a secondary race or order*. Harris distinguishes between this function of the pronoun, "always standing by itself, assuming the power of a noun and supplying its place",[37] and the definitive or articular character of it, when, by assuming a consignificative place before the noun, it has a function similar to that of an adjective. In the first book of *Hermes*, he states that specific pronouns (such as *he, this, that*) when attached to a noun seem to behave more like articles rather than *genuine* pronouns substituting the noun.[38] In accordance with their consignificative character, a universal grammarian has to consider, such words as articles (namely, definitives):

> *Yet in truth it must be confessed, if the essence of an article be to define and ascertain, they are much more properly articles, than anything else, and as such should be considered in universal grammar.*[39]

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[34] *Ibid.*, p. 69.

[35] *Ibid.*, p. 72.

[36] : ...quod prima quidem et secunda persona ideo non egent diversis vocibus, quod semper praesentes inter se sunt, et demonstrativae; tertia vero persona *modo demonstrativa est*, ut hic, iste; *modo relativa*, ut is, ipse...: *ibid.*, p. 71.

[37] *Ibid.*, p. 73.

[38] Two extracts quoted from Quintilian and Scaliger are given by Harris as comments on the lack of articles in the Latin language.

[39] *Ibid.*, p. 234.

On this occasion, demonstrative pronouns such as *this* and *that* are classified together with indefinite pronouns, such as *all* and *some*. For the grammarian of the universals the aim of these syncategorematic terms is to denote something which will identify the noun better and more accurately: *such a* and *many*, denote respectively the indefinite and definite multitude,[40] *this* and *that*, denote a referential parameter of space (distance), *all, some*, *others*, and *any* add to the noun a quantitative information defining it as a whole or part(s) of it:

> *...**Some**, to denote a definite part; **any** to denote an indefinite; and **other**, to denote the remaining part, when a part has been assumed already. Sometimes this last word denotes a large indefinite portion, set in opposition to some single, definite, and remaining part, which receives from such opposition no small degree of heightening.*[41]

It is apparent that as we deal with a more comprehensive type of grammar, the universal, the division of the parts of speech is made upon different semantic criteria, and is thus a different one. On the syntactic terms of this grammar, Harris distinguishes between the *prepositive* character of the personal pronoun,[42] and the *subjunctive* character of the relative one in the construction of propositions:

> *...it is in the united powers of a connective,*[43] *and another pronoun, that we may see the force, and character of the pronoun here treated. ...the sentence still retains its unity and perfection, and becomes if possible more compact than before. We may with just reason call this pronoun subjunctive, because it cannot (like the prepositive) introduce an original sentence, but only serves to subjoin one to some other, which is previous. The application of this subjunctive, like the other pronouns, is universal.*[44]

The universal application of the subjunctive pronoun is based on its ability to substitute substantives which refer to natural, artificial and abstract substances, or, in other words, to substitute general, special, and particular propositional subjects. It even substitutes other types of pronouns, its additional connective character making it essentially different to the others.[45] It is in this spirit, according to Harris, that subjunctive pronouns (namely the demonstrative and the indefinite one) fall into the same category of *pronominal articles*, classified together with the article, when taken as pronouns, and with the adjectival character of words such as *no* and *none*. This definitiveness of the subjunctive pronoun is evident once it is analysed: the demonstrative one, in phrases like *this picture I approve, but that I dislike* is attributed an act of reducing the meaning of the common appellative in order to denote the particular object, by also adding information referring comparatively to the two subjects. Similarly, indefinite pronouns

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40 *Ibid.*, p. 347, where Harris gives an account of these articles and definitives.

41 *Ibid.*, p. 235.

42 "as capable of introducing or leading a sentence, *without having reference to any previous*,": *ibid.*, p. 77.

43 meaning a conjunction.

44 *Ibid.*, p. 79-81.

45 *Ibid.*, p. 83 and 86.

such as *some*, *all*, *other(s)*, and *any*, coincide in their referential character with a degree of definitiveness. Here, it is interesting here to note the distinction between the grammatical-syntactic function of the pronoun and that considered within the scope of universal grammar. While for the common grammatical sense there can be no coalescence between article and pronoun,[46] and thus these cannot be juxtaposed, in the case of a universal semantic function, specific types do share the same consignificative role. While for Apollonius it is the article which, when quitting its connection with a noun, becomes a pronoun,[47] for Harris it is the pronoun which, in its coalescence with the article, falls into the same category as pronominal articles.[48]

The conjunction

Conjunction[49] is classified together with the article and the pronoun, falling into the class of accessory words.[50] Being in the same category with definitives, they are differentiated from them as their task is not to define or determine but simply to connect.[51] Harris devotes a whole chapter to the conjunction in the second book of *Hermes*. Semantically, they exceed prepositions, as their function is to connect not words (names), but propositions (sentences). Thus, compared to the *accidental* character of the preposition, they are attributed an *essential* role in the construction of speech. A conjunction is

> *a part of speech, void of signification itself, but so formed as to help signification, by making two or more significant sentences to be one significant sentence.*[52]

Harris distinguishes between two functions of the conjunction: the grammatical one, as a connective of sentences, and the semantic, as a connective of the meanings of these sentences. While the result, in the first case, is a compound sentence with its parts connected in mere juxtaposition, in the second case there is a semantic interrelation, of a specific sort, among the pre-

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46 Harris is basing his remarks on this on Apollonius (ἐκεῖνο οὖν ἀντωνυμία, τό μετά δείξεως ἤ ἀναφορᾶς ἀντονομαζόμενον, ᾧ οὐ σύνεστι τό ἄρθρον), Priscian (supra omnes alias partes orationis finit personas pronomen) and Gaza (πάντη δέ, οὐκ ἐπιδέχονται ἄρθρον), *ibid.*, p.226-7.

47 Αὐτά οὖν τά ἄρθρα, τῆς πρός τά ὀνόματα συναρτήσεως ἀποστάντα, εἰς τήν ὑποτεταγμενην ἀντωνυμίαν μεταπίπτει. Ὅταν τό ἄρθρον μή μετ' ὀνόματος παραλαμβάνηται, ποιήσηται δέ σύντᾶ ξιν ὀνόματος ἧν προεκτειθέμεθα ἐκ πάσης ἀνάγκης εἰς ἀντωνυμίαν μεταληφθήσεται, εἴγε οὐκ ἐγγῖ νόμενον μετ' ὀνόματος δυνάμει ἀντί ὀνόματος παρελήφθει: *ibid.*, p.73-74. There are also citation on the same from Donatus, Priscian and Varro.

48 Harris takes the term *pronominal article* from the works of Donatus and Priscian. It seems that for him, the remarks on the subject made by Priscian and Varro are in accordance with Apollonius, something not evident from the extracts quoted in *Hermes*. There is here a noteworthy comment on Vossius' *Analogia*, and his remarks on the dissimilarity between Greek and Latin in the function of the definite article: "...he [Vossius] did not enough attend (!) to the ancient writers on this subject, who considered all words, as articles, which being associated to nouns (and not standing in their place) served in any manner to ascertain, and determine their signification), *ibid.*, p. 74-75.

49 as also the preposition.

50 *Ibid.*, pp. 31-32.

51 *Ibid.*, pp. 30-31.

52 *Ibid.*, p. 238.

mises of a complex proposition. In other words, while the first is a grammatical aggregation, the second ends in a propositional inference. In this last case, there is a further functional differentiation between the several conjunctions, relating to the sort of connection they offer: that between the *conjunctive* (such as *because*) and the *disjunctive* one (such as *or*). While, for the common grammatical aspect of the subject, the division is confined between *coordinative* (such as *and, for, but, or (n)either...(n)or, both...and*) and *subordinative* conjunctions (such as *although, as, because, if, since, that, whether*), for the universal grammar the species of it differ and further are semantically subdivided. The conjunctive is of two types: the *copulative* (*as*) and the *continuative* type (*if, because, therefore, that*).[53] Such a distinction is based, according to Harris, on the fact that the conjunction actually connects not just the sentences in general, but their subjects. While in the case of the copulative the nature of them is simply compatible with each other, in the case of the continuatives there is an *essential co-incidence* among them, and thus the sentence constructed is consolidated into *one continuous whole:*[54]

> *The reason is, with respect to the first, the co-incidence is merely accidental; with respect to the last, it is essential, and founded in nature.*[55]

The continuatives now, are further divided into *suppositive* (*if*) and *positive* (*because, therefore, as*): this distinction is based not on the sort of connection offered, but on whether the character of the introductory clause is affirmative either contingently or necessarily. Harris carries on the subdivision of the positive conjunctions into the *causal*[56] (*because, since, as*) and the *collective*[57] (*therefore, wherefore then*). While the first subjoins causes to effects,[58] the second works in the opposite way. The main point of such a distinction is that the causal conjunctions function in deductive reasoning, while the collective in induction;[59] and that, as all the other continuative conjunctions, without of course rejecting their copulative character, which always stands as the base of their differentiated functions as semantic extensions of it. The priority of induction over deduction is reflected in Harris' distinction between the *fortuity* of the causal and the *essential* character of the collective conjunctions.[60] Furthermore, causal conjunctions, despite the fact that they serve all four types of causality, differ in the modus significandi of the sentence following them. Whereas, in the case of the material, the efficient, and the formal cause, the necessary truth of the causal function, introduced by the conjunction, is affirmed by the use of the indicative mood of the verb, in the case of the final cause the potential or contingent nature of the subject differs in the function of the conjunction:

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[53] The terminology comes from the Latin grammatical tradition, and Harris derives this directly from Scaliger and Priscian, showing the etymological derivation of this distinction.

[54] Harris,1786, pp. 242-243.

[55] *Ibid.*, p. 243.

[56] Causales, ai5tiologikoi1.

[57] Collectivae- illativae, syllogistikoi1.

[58] "Resolvuntur autem in copulativas omnes hac, propterea quod causa cum effectu suapte natura conjuncta est", quoted by Harris, *ibid.*, p. 247.

[59] "Now we use causals in those instances, where, the effect being conspicuous, we seek its cause; and collectives, in demonstration, and science properly so called, where the cause being known first, by its help we discern consequences", *ibid.*, pp. 246-247.

[60] *Ibid.*, p. 247.

the reason is, that the final cause, tho' it may be first in speculation, is always last in event. That is to say, however it may be the end, which set the artist first to work, it may be still an end beyond his power to obtain, and which, like other contingents, may either happen, or not. Hence also it [the final cause] is connected by conjunction of peculiar kind, such as ***that, ἵνα, ut,*** *etc.*[61]

The disjunctive conjunction

A disjunctive conjunction is a part of speech which, while it conjoins sentences, disjoins their meanings.[62] On this occasion, the semantic function is opposed to the grammatica-lone.This is as far as a grammatical examination would go.[63] But for universal grammar, the disjunctive conjunction is of major importance. It is one of the parts of speech indicating the analogy between language forms and ontological ones. When placed within a *simple* sentence, the disjunctive conjunction makes it resemble a negative truth (e.g. *It is day or night*). Despite its disjoining role, it combines the subject and the predicate in such a way, as to make it appear that they were of an affirmative character.[64] In this case, the grammatical function of the disjunctive resembles a physical interpretation of the language, according to which we deal with two predicational terms, which are, at the same time, opposed to each other in their essence, yet actually component parts of the same predicational term.[65]

The ontological parameter of a semantic interpretation, undertaken by a universal grammar, treats the disjunctive as a sign in the mode of diversity. The act of disjoining seen in the linguistic realm, is in accordance with the dialectical pursuit when dividing the ontological realities and moving progressively from the genus to the species, and, finally, to the particulars, which carry the mark of distinction, number, and order.[66] Even the distinction between the causal and the collective[67] conjunctions is based on this concept. The first ones are to be used in language, in respect of a descending act of self-dividing of a generic universal form. The descent from the all-encompassing one to the many parts of its definition resembles the self-predicational act of God as resolving his truth into its basic elements. The second refers to our own linguistic act of composing the terms of propositional truth, ascending from the particular to the universal. The comments made here by Harris, are based on Aristotle's *De Interpretatione* 16a13, and *Meta-*

61 *Ibid.*, pp. 248-249.

62 It is useful to keep in mind that the disjunctive conjunction treated here is commented on not as relating words, or simple phrases, but sentences.

63 The citations, in p. 250, in support of this are from Gaza and Priscian. According to Gaza, οἱ δὲ διαζευκτῖ κοί τά διαζευγμένα συντιθέασι, καί ἤ πρᾶγμα ἀπό πράγματος, ἤ πρόσωπον ἀπό προσώπου διαζευῦ νοῦντες, τήν φράσιν ἐπισυνδοῦσιν. In the same spirit, Priscian defined the disjunctives as "quae, quamis dictiones conjungant, sensum tamendisjunctum habent".

64 "For though this as to its intellection be disjunctive (its end being to disjoin the subject from the predicate) yet as it combines terms together into one proposition, it is as truly synthetical, as truth, that it is affirmative", *ibid.*, p. 250.

65 It is in respect of Aristotle's remark that "division and union are the same...but their essence is not", *Physics*, 4.13.222a19-20.

66 Harris, 1786, p. 250.

67 The term borrowed by Harris from the platonic *collection* (συναγωγή).

physics, 5.4. 1027b20-24.[68]

The differentiation within the type of the disjunctive between the *simple* (e.g. *either...or*), and the *adversative* (e.g. *either...or*) conjunction,[69] is investigated as to its respective relation to a specific degree of the diversity seen in propositional reasoning:

> *...it is to express in some degree the modification of this diversity, that disjunctive conjunctions seem to have been invented. ...the simple do no more, than merely disjoin; the adversative disjoin with an opposition concomitant. Add to this, that the adversative are definite; the simple indefinite.*[70]

The simple disjunctive *but* seen in its function within a complex proposition, offers the subject alternative types of predication, of which only one expresses a definite affirmation. Harris here makes the point that words introducing elliptic phrases of a comparative degree such as μᾶλλον or ἀντίς (interpreted as *rather...than*) seem to behave as a conjunction[71] and attribute to the subject a degree of definitiveness (e.g. *I desire the people should be saved and not be destroyed*). The degree in the mode of diversity is expressed in respect to the variation between the different types of the adversative conjunction: the *absolute*, the *comparative*, and the (*in*)-*adequate*. In the first case, the absolute disjunctive *but* denotes contradiction, either between the attributes of the same subject, or between different subjects when attributed the same predicament: (e.g. *Gorgias was a sophist, but not a philosopher- Brutus was a patriot, but Caesar was not*.) As Harris remarks "there can be no opposition of the same attribute in the same subject".[72] The adversative of comparison *as* (in examples such as *Virgil was as great a poet as Cicero was an orator*) apart from its connective character, consignifies a comparative relation between the subjects of a complex proposition, attributing to them a sense of *equality* or *excess*. In the third type of adversatives, which stands for what the Greek and Latin grammatical tradition had called respectively ἐναντιωματικοί σύνδεσμοι or *conjunctiones adversativae*, Harris includes the adverbs *unless* and *although*, denoting respectively the adequacy and inadequacy of one simple proposition to stand as the efficient cause of the other. This is the case in examples, such as *Troy will be taken, although/unless the palladium is preserved.*

This last distinction, in relation to a remark made by Harris on the same subject,[73] is dealt with in a mostly illuminating way. The aim of a general grammar is to overcome the specific languages and reveal semantic functions as common. Similarly, propositional logic uses in each language common functions, or forms, either in a priori or in a posteriori reasoning, in the con-

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[68] In Harris' own translation: a)"true and false are seen in composition and division", and b) "composition makes affirmative truth, division makes negative, yet both alike bring terms together, and so far therefore may be called synthetical", *ibid.*, p. 3.

[69] These two types of disjunction are identified in modern logic with the *inclusive* and *exclusive* disjunction.

[70] *Ibid.*, pp. 251-252.

[71] It is a remark based on Gaza's comment on the Greek sublative conjunction (ἀναιρετικός σύνδεσμος). Harris iterpretes it as a "disjunctive of the subsequent from the previous", *ibid.*, p. 253.

[72] *Ibid.*, p. 254.

[73] "This distinction [between adequate and inadequate adversative conjunctions] has reference to common opinion, and the form of language, consonant thereto. In strict metaphysical truth, no cause that is not adequate, is any cause at all", *ibid.*, p. 255.

struction of demonstrative and dialectical syllogisms. But due to its metaphysical perspective, universal grammar affirms the prevalence of a priori reasoning. And as for our own discursive faculty, it accepts a triple distinction between human judgment (δόξα),[74] "true knowledge accompanied by an account" (λόγος),[75] which is seen as knowledge of the forms to which languages correspond (εἴδη), and knowledge of their supreme form (εἶδος εἰδῶν), which stands as their only real adequate cause, being of an absolute necessity. For Harris, the semantic forms within a language, manage, *more or less*, to express these natural εἴδη.[76] The disjunctive form is the strongest possible wording for the incompatibility between the forms signified by the subjects of the propositions related.[77]

Concluding the subject of the conjunctions, Harris comments briefly on the adverbs of time and place. Although they keep their adverbial character when introducing a single interrogative sentence, they function as conjunctions when they adopt a relative character and conjoin propositions: thus they are called adverbial conjunctions. Words like *when*, *whence*, *where*, *whither*, *whenever*, and *wherever*, share with the prepositions this role of consignifying time and place, and are thus considered within the scope of universal grammar.[78]

The definition of the conjunction as a word consignificative of a relation between propositions, and not as just a connective of words,[79] derives from Harris' study of Scaliger, Sanctius, Apollonius, and Ammonius. In *Minerva*, Sanctius distinguishes between connectives relating the *partes orationis inter se*, and those relating *orationes inter se*, of which conjunction is one. Scaliger, before him, had made the same remark[80] when making a point about the different treatments of the conjunction offered by the grammarians, who "conjunctionis notionem veteres paullo inconsultius prodidere." The basic grammatical source for both of them is undoubtedly Apollonius, who had presented in innumerable references this semantic aspect of the conjunction. But the primary source is Aristotle and his discussion on the subject in *Poetics* and *Rhetoric*. The semantic aspect of the conjunction is based on the definition of it as

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74 which like the Aristotelian ἔνδοξον, is not very different from the *sensus* of Priscian .

75 which according to the universal grammar is the field of logic (the reference is from Plato, *Theaetetus*, 187b.

76 Harris, 1786, p. 257.

77 *Ibid.*, p. 257. The disjunctive *or* adopts a different parameter of diversity, when relating the subject or the predicament of a proposition with a sentence which is the actual definition of it. In the case of a simple act of distinction, the conclusion drawn is that the disjunctive "appears to have greater or less force, according as the subjects, which it disjoins, are more or less disjoined by nature".

78 Harris distinguishes between the consignificative character of the accessory words and the *obscure* one of the adverbial conjunctions, *a kind of middle beings, like zoophytes in nature*. He justifies this obscurity with the help of a citation from Themistius: πολλαχοῦ γάρ ἡ φύσις δήλη γίνεται κατά μικρόν μεταβαίνουσα, ὥστε ἀμφισβητεῖσθαι ἐπί τίνων, πότερον ζῶον ἢ φυτόν, *ibid.*, p. 259 and 432.

79 This was, and is, the grammatical definition of it. The difference between the traditional and the strictly grammatical view is reflected in John Dalton's *Elements of English Grammar*, 1801, p. 84: "As the only distinction between conjunctions and prepositions is, that the former connect one sentence to another, whilst the latter connect one or more words to a sentence; it is no wonder if the same connective term be used for both purposes. Accordingly we have several instances of the same word being used at one time as a conjunction and at another time as a preposition; but *late* writers, having adopted the false notions and distinctions of language of the Greek and Latin grammarians, have endeavoured to separate the prepositions and conjunctions into distinct classes, and to keep them apart as much as possible": quoted in Michael, 1970, p. 446.

80 "Sed conjunctio est, quae conjungit orationes plures," quoted in Harris, 1786, p. 238.

> an articulate sound, devoid of signification, which is so formed as to make one significant articulate sound out of several articulate sounds, which are each of them significant.[81]

The universal perspective of the conjunction relies on the definition given in *Rhetoric*:

> The conjunction makes many, one; so that if it be taken away it is then evident on the contrary that one will be many.[82]

To explain this universal application of the conjunction, Harris quotes from Ammonius' commentaries on Aristotle's *De Interpretatione*:

> *Of sentences, that which denotes one existence simply, and which is strictly one, may be considered as analogous to a piece of timber not yet severed, and called on this account one. That, which denotes several existences, and which appears to be made one by some conjunctive particle, is analogous to a ship made up of many pieces of timber, and which by means of the nails has an apparent unity.*[83]

The upshot of this is that conjunctive words are significant of a specific degree of relation among the things signified. Either conjoining or disjoining the meanings of the names they connect in speech, they are consignificative of: i) the relation between the subjects of the propositions connected in speech, ii) the analytical or synthetical method, followed in the construction of a syllogism (a priori or a posteriori reasoning), and iii) the degree of relation among the things signified by the subjects of the propositions. In strictly grammatical terms, Harris' discussion of the conjunction follows remarks made by John Wilkins, who had affirmed an act of conjoining *words or rather sentences,*[84] as did A. Lane, and John Collyer,[85] and this point was further discussed by Robert Lowth,[86] and Lord Monboddo.[87]

The modes of diversity

In an extended reference,[88] Harris presents his account of the modes of diversity. Diversity

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[81] φωνή ἄσημος, ἐκ πλειόνων μέν φωνῶν μιᾶς, σημαντικῶν δέ, ποιεῖν πεφυκῖα μίαν φωνήν σημαντικήν, *Poetics*, 20.1456b38. Harris' interpretation in Harris,1786, p. 239.

[82] Ὁ γάρ σύνδεσμος ἕν ποιεῖ τά πολλά, ὥστε ἐάν ἐξαιρεθῇ, δῆλον ὅτι τουναντίον ἔσται τό ἕν πολλά,*Rhetoric*,3.12.1413b4, quoted *ibid.*, p. 240.

[83] Διό καί τῶν λογῶν ὁ μέν ὕπαρξιν μίαν σημαίνων, ὁ κυρίως εἷς, ἀνάλογος ἄν εἴη τῷ μηδέπω τετμημένῳ ξύλῳ, καί διά τοῦτο ἑνί λεγομένῳ ὁ δέ πλείονας ὑπάρξεις δηλῶν, ἕνα τινά δέ σύνδεσ μον ἡνῶσθαι πῶς δοκῶν, ἀναλογεῖ τῇ νηί τῇ ἐκ πολλῶν συγκειμένῃ ξύλων, ὑπό δέ τῶν γόμφων φαινομένην ἐχούσῃ τήν ἕνωσιν, quoted *ibid.*, p. 241.

[84] *Essay towards a Real Character and a Philosophical Language*, London 1668, p. 314.

[85] *The general principles of English Grammar*, Nottingham 1735, p. 86.

[86] *A short Introduction to English Grammar*, London 1762, p. 92.

[87] *Of the Origin and Progress of Language*, Edinburgh 1774, p.178.

[88] Harris, pp. 250-252.

is a distinction between natural forms, seen in the relation they develop to each other. Since language may denote both forms and the sort of their relation, this distinction may become apparent under specific circumstances: a reference to a thing by the application of its particular name denotes this mode of diversity (e.g. *John*, as a name differentiating a person from others called by different names). On the contrary, a reference to the same thing, made by the application of the name of its species (e.g. the term *man*) or genus (e.g. the term *animal*), denies this diversity. The diversity affirmed in the lower realm becomes a *coincidence* in the higher one. The classification is extended beyond than the realm of genus: in the *transcendental comprehensions* of end, being, existence, quantities, and qualities, the higher diversity is seen between being and non-being.

A diverse relation among the several natural forms of being may be predicated in one of the following degrees of relation: a) as a simple relation, b) as contradiction, and c) as opposition. In the first case, where the relation among the subjects is denoted either by a comparative degree or is just implied,[89] the subjects of the propositions are related "by necessarily inferring each other".[90] In the second case, contrary words become *destructive of each other* . The third case is that of the absolute contradiction between the subjects related, where the attribute which is predicated of one subject as true, is denied of the other (e.g. *Brutus was a patriot, but Caesar was not*), or where of the same subject one attribute is affirmed and another is denied (e.g. *Gorgias was a sophist, but not a philosopher*). In the case of contradictory propositions, the same truth is affirmed and denied (**ἀντίφασις**).[91] In the construction of complex propositions, these three degrees of diversity are reflected in the three species of the disjunctive: the (in)adequate, the adversatives of comparison, and the absolute adversatives.

For Harris, diversity may also subsist between: a) the name of a thing and its definition, and b) the various names belonging to the same thing, and the various things denoted by the same name. The first observation is based on *Posterior Analytics*, 2.10.93b29-31, according to which

> since definition is said to be a statement of what a thing is, a nominal definition is a kind of it explaining the name of the thing, which is different from the wording definition explaining the thing itself.[92]

The distinction pointed out here is one neither between the substance and its name nor between the substance and its attributes as elements of its definition. Rather it is one between the substance and the nominal wording of the definition. The source of this lies in *Metaphysics* 4.9.1018a10-12, where it is said that those things are called diverse, of which either the species

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89 It is the case of adjectives in the comparative degree, and of words such as *cause, effect, father, son.*

90 It is the correlative opposition of the *Categories*, 10.11b17.

91 "Ωστε δῆλον ὅτι πάσῃ καταφάσει ἐστίν ἀπόφασις ἀντικειμένη καί πάσῃ ἀποφάσει κατάφασις. καί ἔστω ἀντίφασις τοῦτο, κατάφασις καί ἀπόφασις αἱ ἀντικείμεναι:... hence for each affirmative statement there is an opposite negative, quite as each negative statement has its affirmative opposite; and let there be called this a contradiction, and the affirmative and the negative statements let them be called contraries, *De Interpretatione*, 17a33-36.

92 Ὁρισμός δ' ἐπειδή λέγεται εἶναι λόγος τοῦ τί ἐστι, φανερόν ὅτι ὁ μέν τίς ἔσται λόγος τοῦ τί σημαίνει τό ὄνομα ἤ λόγος ἕτερος ὀνοματώδης, οἷον τό τί σημαίνει...

are numerous, or the matter, or the definition of the substance. The second distinction introduced here, is of a merely semantic content. It is actually a diversity-relation in the definition of the substances. In grammar, synonyms work in presenting the similarity between distinct substances, seen in the elements of their nominal definitions. Universal grammar, bearing in mind the distinction between substantial forms, distinguishes between ὁμώνυμα and συνώνυμα. The first[93] have the same name, but they differ in the definition of their substances.[94] For example, *man* and the word *man*. The definition of the first is substantial, while that of the second is nominal. The second term stands for the description of substances, not in the nominal realm, but in reference to the common species or genus of them. According to this, *man* and *sheep*, for example, although having a different nominal definition, are identified with each other semantically, in respect of their special definition of *animal*.

The preposition

The preposition[95] is defined as a part of speech, devoid of signification, but so formed as to unite two words that are significant and that refuse to coalesce or unite of themselves.[96] Such a definition is just a semantic expansion of the grammatical one, according to which a preposition connects two words within the limit of a simple sentence.[97] The function of it is to introduce in a simple proposition new substantives, which will not affect the completeness of its structure (e.g.*The splendid sun with his beams warms the fertile earth*).[98] This means that prepositions do not nullify the relation between the propositional terms, but they simply add informative material. Harris distinguishes between two semantic species in the connective function of prepositions. The first one is consignificative of a *contiguous relation of place* between a substantive term of a sentence and its new form introduced by the application of the preposition (e.g. *The lamp hang from the ceiling*). The second consignifies *a relation of motion or rest*, by relating one of the substantive terms of a proposition to the attributive of it (verb), on the mood of which the character of the preposition depends (e.g. *The lamp is falling from the ceiling*).

Prepositions may be applied to substantive words, either by *juxtaposition* (*κατά παράθε̃σιν*), as in the above examples, or *by composition* (*κατά σύνθεσιν*), where, by getting embodied within a word, they alternate its meaning (e.g. *understanding*). This second grammatical case does not imply a different function, as the relation denoted is actually resolvable into a consignificative one. Finally, prepositions may adopt an adverbial character (e.g. *He rides about*): in this case, they reject their role as connective words, and they denote place, despite

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93 which have nothing to do with homonyms or homophones, namely with words of the same pronunciation but different in meaning and origin.

94 Ὁμώνυμα λέγεται ὧν ὄνομα μόνον κοινόν, ὁ δέ κατά τοὔνομα λόγος τῆς οὐσίας ἕτερος... Συνώ νυμα δέ λέγεται ὧν τό τε ὄνομα κοινόν καί ὁ κατά τοὔνομα λόγος τῆσ οὐσίας ὁ αὐτός...: things are termed equivocally, when they share the same name but they are distinguished in the meaning implied by that...; they are termed univocally, when they share both the name applied to them and the meaning of this name: *Categories*, 1.1a.1-8.

95 Προθετικός σύνδεσμος, praepositiva conjunctio.

96 Harris, 1786, p. 261.

97 and where the word defined by the preposition is called the object of the preposition.

98 "The sentence as before remains entire and one", *ibid.*, p. 266.

the fact that their primary relation was with the attributives.[99] As for the formation of abstract nouns, prepositions function by extending the meaning of subjunctives, from denoting the local and corporeal, to the intellectual and incorporeal one.[100] In this case, their *proper* function is converted into a *metaphorical* one. This metaphorical use of language, by the transformation of common words into terms attributed a new content with a special meaning, and the coinage of new words, are the only methods to denominate new concepts.[101]

The *original* use of prepositions was to denote relation by position (place) between substantive words. This becomes apparent when considering that substances (as natural forms) preexist the coalescence each one has with its attributes (quantities and qualities).[102]

> *...from this natural concord of subject and accident, arises the grammatical concord of substantive and adjective...the great objects of natural union are substance and attribute.*[103]

Grammatically, the above is based on Priscian, according to whom, the reason why two substantives do not have a copula should be asked by philosophy, as two substantives, quite as substance and accidence, cannot be one in their essense.[104] Philosophically, it is based on Aristotle's *Physics*, where the meaning of substance is restricted to the substantial nature of physical bodies. Substances do not merge with each other. Distinct as they are, they coordinate only with energy, and only by this do they correspond to each other. In the same *mode of coalescence*, a subject of a proposition is combined with the verb, and by the application of this middle term, with the predicate. Whereas, within the field of grammar, a preposition ordinarily relates an accusative to a nominative,[105] within the scope of universal grammar it relates those substantives to sentences, which *at the time are unable to coalesce of themselves.*[106]

The Cases

Cases are suffixes which are considered to be a common ground of nouns,[107] verbs, and prepositions. In the modern languages, the genitive and dative are, when resolved, a combina-

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[99] *Ibid.*, p. 273 and 205.

[100] *Ibid.*, p. 268. In accordance with this sort of extension is the formation of Harris' universal grammar. In the first chapter of the first book, he makes a point of it when saying that in the design of his book he will follow "the order consonant to human perception, as being for that reason easy to be understood", *ibid.*, pp.11-12.

[101] *Ibid.*, p. 269, where also Harris is giving a brief account of philosophical terms formed either by metaphor, or by coinage: "...the first words of men, like their first ideas, had an immediate reference to sensible objects, and in afterdays, when they began to discern with their intellect, they took those words, which they found already made, and transferred them by metaphor to intellectual conceptions. There is indeed no method to express new ideas, but either this of metaphor, or that of coining new words, both of which have been practised by philosophers and wise men, according to the nature, and exigence of the occasion".

[102] which in language are denoted by the attributives.

[103] *Ibid.*, p. 262.

[104] Causa, propter quam duo substantiva sine copula, e philosophia petenda est: neque enim duo substantialiter unum esse potest, sicut substantia et accidens, quoted *ibid.*, p. 264.

[105] *Ibid.*, p. 284. The observation stands for most modern languages.

[106] *Ibid.*, p. 265.

[107] Pronouns, apart from some personal ones, which Harris calls *primitive* (e.g. *I, me* μου) have no cases.

tion of a preposition and a noun, while the accusative is placed after the verb. The vocative and ablative are considered almost unknown to the modern languages. In Latin, the ablative was used in association with a preposition, but, for Harris, its function was not easily distinghuishable from that of the Greek dative, so that its use is considered disputable. According to the Peripatetic School, cases were variations(*πτῶσεις, casae*) of the nominative, which was thus excluded from them. This last was denied by the Stoics, who defined the case as derived not from the nominative, but from our discursive faculty, distinguishing between *ὀρθή πτῶσις*,[108] indicating the primary form of a noun, and *πλαγία πτῶσις*[109] indicating a variation of it. They also coined the term *κλίσις*[110] to describe this "progressive descent from the noun's upright form through its various declining forms".[111] Harris comments on the four basic cases, namely on the nominative, the accusative, the genitive, and the dative. His comments focus mainly on the way cases functioned in the Greek and Latin languages, as their consignificative character is not so apparent in the modern ones.

The nominative is case of a noun which stands as a grammatically substantive word, and, at the same time, signifies both the subject of the proposition, and the natural substance. It is the grammatical ground, which syntax, logic, and metaphysics identify as common, despite functioning in different fields. The affinity between substance and attribute is reflected, in the application of the nominative, on the congruity between subject and copula, as also between substantive and attributive.[112] This last assimilates itself with the substantive, on adopting its case. And it does so also by adopting the number and the person of the substantive,[113] whether it does this in the verb, or in the adjective of which it may consist. Harris' account of the nominative concludes with the distinction between regular and perfect sentences. A sentence containing a nominative has to be both *regular and perfect*. By this observation he excludes *irregular* sentences which, despite being logically correct (*perfect*), do not seem to be acceptable grammatically, because the substantive and the attributive (either the verb or the adjective) coincide in an oblique case.[114]

The accusative is that case which "to an efficient nominative and a verb of action subjoins either the effect or the passive subject".[115] It is distinghuished from any other oblique case by its reference to the primary substantive of the sentence. In other words, it points to the subject of the proposition, which stands as the efficient cause of the action implied by the active verb.[116]

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[108] *Casus rectus*, erect or upright case or falling.

[109] *Casus obliquus*, oblique or *side-long falling*.

[110] *Declinatio, declension.*

[111] The citation, as also the major part of this account is based on Harris' study of Ammonius' commentaries on Aristotle's *De Interpretatione*.

[112] While in the English language this is a congruity in the number, in the Greek and Latin language it is also seen in the gender.

[113] of which number and person are real properties, *ibid.*, p. 170-171.

[114] The term, in examples as *Σωκράτει 'Αλκιβιάδους μέλει*,is παρασύμβαμα or παρακατηγόρημα and the sources, concerning only the Greek language, are Apollonius and Gaza, *ibid.*, pp. 180-181.

[115] *Ibid.*, p. 283.

[116] Harris stays within the etymological restrictions of the accusative,as a case concerned with the relation between cause and effect, presenting a judgment. He does not comment, apart from the above reference, on the application of the accusative when defining a subject in the passive mode.

As for the genitive and dative, they are discussed, as expected, in their use in the Greek and Latin languages, in comparison with each other. This is in accordance with the spirit of a universal grammar, as it reflects the philosophical base of language. On this Harris cites an extract from Bacon's *De augmentis scientiarum*, in which the slothfulness of the modern languages is compared to the elaborative character of the ancient ones. In the first, the primary method of expressing things is by a compilation of an auxiliary verb with a preposition. In the second, declensions, cases, conjugations, and tenses, make the Greek and Latin languages adequately subservient to philosophy.[117]

The genitive, by introducing a relation between a preposition and a noun, consignifies a substantive, as setting up the action implied by the verb. Semantically, the genitive is a proximate illustration of the substantive as an efficient cause (equal to the expressions *from* or *out of which*) and its consignificative character is laid out in the mode of diversity, with a segmentation of the primary substantive implied.[118] On the other hand, the dative consignifies a proclivity in action, towards the substantive term, and resembles the final cause.

The interjection

Interjection is styled as a part of speech, which "coincides with no other part of speech, but is either uttered alone, or else thrown into a sentence, without altering its form, either in syntax or signification".[119] Two things are to be considered here. First, the distinction between two different semantic fields: one is that of syntax, the other is that of propositional logic. According to Harris, interjection should not be considered within the scope of universal grammar, because its semantic function is independent of any other part of speech. It is not related to the sentence, the most important part of language, and thus it does not share the consignificative role of the other particles mentioned before. Indeed, interjection does not relate substantives, either in an active or a figurative manner. In accordance with this, the adverbial character attributed to it by the Greeks[120] should be rejected. Harris calls it a part of speech, but this is just in terms of conventional grammar. Rejecting this, he denominates the interjection as

> ...a voice of nature, rather than a [proper] voice of art, expressing those passions and natural emotions, which spontaneously arise in the human soul, upon the view or narrative of interesting

[117] "Annon et illud observatione dignum (licet nobis modernis spiritus nonnihil redundat) antiquas linguas plenas declinationum, casuum, conjugationum, et similium fuisse; modernas, his fere destitutas, plurima per praepositiones et verba auxiliara segniter expedire? Sane facile quis conjiciat (utcunque nobis ipsi placeamus) ingenia priorum seculorum nostris fuisse multo acutoria et subtiliora", *De augmentis scientiarum*, book 6. ch. 1.

[118] In support of the reciprocality in meaning between substantive terms, Harris quotes some examples from *Categories*, 7.6a29-32, so as to explain that πάντα δέ τά πρός τι πρός ἀντιστρέφοντα λέγεται... πλήν τῇ πτώσει διοίσει κατά τήν λέξιν...: all relatives have their correlatives... although the case or grammatical inflexion will perhaps differ.

[119] Harris, 1786, p. 289.

[120] The Greek grammarians considered the interjection and the adverb to be contracted sentences: "improperly, if we consider the adverbial nature, which always coincides with some verb, as its principal, and to which it always serves in the character of an attribute": *ibid.*, p. 289.

events.[121]

Instead of expanding on this, Harris prefers to cite extended extracts from Vossius, Sanctius, and Priscian. According to them, interjection is not a part of speech, because it derives its existence from nature, and not from convention (either arbitrary or accidental), which is implied by the artificial character of language. Although the wording of an interjection differs from language to language, in terms of its common function it is as a sign of *notae naturales*,[122] and thus its usage and semantic value are irrelevant to the sentence within the terms of which it is interposed.

[121] *Ibid.*, p. 290.

[122] as signs of natural sounds. Vossius in his *Analogia* uses the above term, while Sanctius calls them *partes naturales*, and Priscian accepts both the adverbial character of σχετλιασμός and that of *voces motus animi significatntes*.

Part III

The philosophical analysis of language

The material and formal parameters of language

Grammar, generally, is considered equally requisite for either logic, or rhetoric and poetry,[1] as it distributes one of its modes (indicative) to logic, for the construction of propositions, and some others to rhetoric, or poetry. In a sense, grammar seems to be the subject matter, a kind of stock, offered to the arts of trivium. Propositions inform the grammatical material (or matter) of specific sentences in a certain manner. Thus grammar provides logic with the stuff for such a campaign. Qualified by this, logic becomes inductively "in-formed" with scientific knowledge.[2]

For Harris, the rationalist, propositional truth is substantiated with respect to a supreme intellectual truth. Thus, while the relation of meaning to sign are artificial (*ad placitum*), the relation between grammar and universal modes of reasoning is not. Grammatical structures comply with those formed by natural realities,[3] and thus language becomes the tangible evidence of the natural union of universal ideas. As we are by nature designed to identify these archetypes,[4] by the application of linguistic forms in reasoning, we manage to approach these realities, and thus language, despite being a system of arbitrary signs, is termed as the medium in this action. The natural resemblance of words to *realia* rectifies the deficiency arising from the human derivation of their arbitrariness.

The two fundamental features of a rationalistic universal grammar are: i) the fact that, while it identifies itself as an art and not a science, its reasoning is considered scientific in character, as leading to necessary truths, and ii) that it focuses on the relation between the *matter* of grammar and the issues of metaphysic. From these two, the first is the common ground between *universal* and *rational* grammar, while the second relates universal grammar with its antecedent *speculative* grammar of the medieval era.

> *Language may be expressive of general truths; and if so, then of demonstration, and sciences, and arts; and if so, become subservient to purposes of every kind. Without (general terms), no art can be rationally explained.*[5]

Thus the purpose of universal grammar is the rational *explanation* of general propositions. These truths, deductively, have to be resolved to their necessary premises, so that then, by our own discursive faculty, we will be able to ascend to their first principles. Universal grammar has this explanatory task to carry out, aiming at the performance of true scientific knowledge.

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[1] Harris, 1751, p. 6 & 16.

[2] : "syllogisms, paragraphs, sections and complete works,belong to arts of higher order", ibid. p. 19.

[3] "those parts of speech unite of themselves in grammar, whose original archetypes unite of themselves in nature", *ibid.*, p. 263 .

[4] "there are truths or universals, of so obvious a kind that every mind or intellect, not absolutely deprived, without the least help of art, can hardly fail to recognise them..."

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 342.

Harris admits that there is

> *a multitude of occasions for minute particularising, of which 'twas not possible for mere generals to be susceptible; ...'twas neccessary to the perfection and completion of the language, that it should be epressive of particulars, as well of generals; ...general terms are by far its most excellent and essential part, since from these it derives that comprehensive universality, that just proportion of precision and permanance, without which it could not possibly be either learnt, or understood, or applied to the purposes of reasoning and science...*[6]

While proper names[7] signify the particulars artificially, it is by the use of the more advanced definitives, "properly applied to general terms", and articles that (the art of) language "without wandering into infinitude, contrives how to denote things infinite".[8] The examples cited (words such as *a, the, any, a certain, this, that, such, many, a thousand, every, each, first, second etc., all, no*) are the medieval syncategoremata: terms that have a consignificative power only when being juxtaposed to others. Many of these terms are elliptic, namely grammatical abbreviations of a sentence-term, or simply imply a quality or quantity attributed to the categorematic terms. The most laconic demonstration of the concept of universal grammar is implied by Harris' definition of language:

> *Language is a system of articulate voices, the symbols of our ideas, but of those principally, which are general or universal.*[9]

Consequently, in the matter of language there is *"in-formed"* existence of actualities. Harris does not just consent to the subsistence of the ideas of particulars. While he admits of a paradigmatic cause in the existence of natural forms, the particular truth of the individuals is actualised in virtue of the truth of these forms. Thus the difference between particular and general reasoning derives from this differentiation in causation.[10]

Matter and form jointly, represent the immanent formal cause of the compound beings, namely of natural forms. The form preexists (*pro rem*), becomes materialised (*in rem*) when being becomes a hylomorphic composition of matter and form, and is the result of our mental abstraction (*post rem*). *Abstraction* is a procedure which, accounting for the explanatory purposes of this approach, proximates the aristotelian cast of universals, while, in platonic terms, *reminiscence* (*ἀνάμνησις*) is awareness by spontaneous recognition of the form recollected, independently from any sense of progress in the intellectual procedures. Matter

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[6] *Ibid.*, pp. 344-345.
[7] "which are hardly a part of language", *ibid.*, p. 373.
[8] *Ibid.*, p. 346.
[9] *Ibid.*, p. 349.
[10] Also in Proclus' commentary on *Parmenides*, 3.825.

and form, conceived in their unity, constitute a universal,[11] in the sense of their natural ability to be predicated of several subjects.[12] Boethius regarded both matter (body) and form as necessary constituents of the individual subjects.[13] It is in the light of this tradition that Harris contemplates upon them. The distinction between universals as eternal patterns of beauty, pre-existing in a *modus intelligendi* and lacking any potentiality in character, and the sensible and perishable forms of the objects of everyday life is also the main point in Cicero 's definition of form.[14]

Regarding the questions set by Porphyry in his *Εἰσαγωγή*, on the existence and nature of the universals, Harris maintains that universals are i) real, ii) incorporeal, and iii) materialised only in order to become communicable. And as regards the fourth question raised and answered by Abelard on the sort of existence possessed by genus and species, Harris identifies himself with Abelard: iv) universals, namely genera and species, are of eternal existence.

The difference between Harris and the main branch of pure rationalism is that he admits a place for empirical truth, though not primarily, in the comprehension of reality as a whole. A priori reasoning, namely contemplating general propositions, is the medium for the discovery of absolute abstract truths and speculating upon them. Harris supports the supremacy of the a priori propositions in comparison with propositions a posteriori. It is a priori reasoning that which will unveil pure truth of universal validity. The form of beauty is an attribute of this truth. This is not about propositions of accidental validity, truth which happens to be the case, but about truth which is always the case, being an eternal reality unaffected by change and decay.[15] The type of proposition Harris has in mind is discovered by abstract reasoning and does not rest on sense experience; it concerns the ultimate truth. This sort of philosophical contemplation focuses successfully on eternal universal truths of actual existence, insependent of any spatio-temporal restriction, and transcending the world of the contingents. These general truths are necessary and infallible. Universal grammar is termed rational exactly because of its concern with propositions as epistemological tools for our accomplishment of these necessary truths. The existence of universal truths and the belief in their being perceptible and thus conceivable, are the two features in the base of any rationalistic theory.

On the other hand empirical propositions, for Harris, are not to be disregarded; they are of a certain value in our everyday intercourse with each other, relating to people's common sense, but are, consequently, of restricted validity.[16] The distinction between human and transcen-

[11] In the meaning of *Metaphysics,* 6.8.1033b18-20: ...τό μέν ὥσ εἶδος ἤ οὐσία λεγόμενον οὐ γίγνεται, ἡ δέ σύνολος ἡ κατά ταύτηνλεγομένη γίγνεται, καί ὅτι ἐν παντί τῷ γενομένῳ ὕλη ἔνεστι, καί ἔστι τό μέν τόδε τό δέ τόδε: the thing in the sense of the form or essence is not generated; but what is generated is the concrete whole whoich is called after; matter is present in everything generated, and matter is the one part, while form is the other.

[12] *De Interpretatione,* 17a.

[13] See also Leff, p. 49.

[14] *Orator,* 2.8-3.9, quoted in Harris, 1751, p. 311-312. In the same tradition is Bacon's idea of the form of language. It was the nominalists' view of the problem of universals, that universals are merely words in the linguistic syntactic realm, that they do not really exist, and that, on the other hand, the only things really existing are the specific individuals.

[15] The source of it, in Plato's *Republic,* 485.

[16] It is characteristic here that Harris does not reject empiricism. If we bear in mind all his aggressive attacks on empiricism as also the justified response of the son of *Hermes*'s dedicatee,(Probyn, p. 174) he seems to argue against himself.

dental understanding is analogous to the distinction between practical and speculative wisdom (for Harris, between *knowledge* and *understanding-comprehension.*). Dialectic is the key to bringing forth this differentiation. Harris's reference to dialectic does not have the sense of exploring the truth of the theologians; his discussion originates from Proclus and the third and fifth book of the commentary on *Parmenides*, where, in the moderate sense of realism, dialectic is defined as the methodological tool in exploring forms (*εἴδη*), which are seen not as eternal absolutes, but as the specific ideas of forms beheld by men.[17]

Harris's theology is more a philosophical meditation in metaphysics than a matter of pure theological science. Genera, species, forms, and divine ideas are not specifically differentiated. The third book of *Hermes* is an example of the Neoplatonic concept of universals, designated in Aristotelian terms. The discussion of universals is formed rather in the mode of metaphysical reasoning than in respect to theology; it was on this basis that accusations of atheism were made. Boethius had defined substance as being without accidents, and subsistence as the form of substance having additionally the specific accidents. Harris follows this tradition as much as he upholds a moderate rationalistic view of universals, treating genus and species rather as qualities than substances. But such a thesis is not dominant throughout his book. Additionally, he is not interested in the so called psychological aspect of the universals, namely in how the mind forms general concepts. His purpose is to explain the innate reality and not the recognition of it. This is for him the meaning of abstraction, and that is why, probably, he is not especially interested in metaphor as a universal.

The incidental material perspective of language

As is well known, it is the concept of the form and not of the matter of language that attracts the grammarian of the universals. But what is interesting in Harris 's discussion on this subject, is his extended references to his sources, through which he acquaints us with both the *matter* of language and the doctrines of the "philosophers of the ancient".

The third book of *Hermes* includes the resolution of language into its material and formal elements. Matter is the "common subject" of language; and what is meant by this is just those "species of sound called voices articulate",[18] namely the sounds of our verbal intercourse, without taking into consideration the semantic aspect of them. The definitions of human voice given are those of Priscian,[19] the Stoics,[20] Aristotle, and Ammonius. What is to be determined here, is the differentiation between voice (*φωνή, vox*) from sound, and articulate (*διάλεκτος, sonus*) from simple voice (*ἁπλῶς φωνή, loquela*). The stoic term *διάνοια*, meaning our

[17] See also on this Harris, 1841, p.94.

[18] Harris, 1751, p. 326.

[19] "...suum sensibile aurium, id est, quod proprie auribus accidit", quoted ibid. in p. 316, from the first book of Priscian's *Institutiones Grammaticae.*

[20] "...an undulation in the air propagated circularly",from the third book of Diogenes Laertius *Lives of the Eminent Philosophers,* quoted ibid., p. 316.

own human intellectual capacities, is the "human ratio" referred by Harris.[21]

The material aspect of language[22] is detected in terms analogous to those of the substantiality of the intellect. Harris is not interested in the stoic concept of corporeality of matter; his reference to the Stoics is made in order to suggest that it is our own discursive faculty that helps us to ascend with our mind to the supreme intellect. This faculty has the character of a mental action: our intellect has the innate power (*δύναμις*) of constructing out of the matter of simplest semantic units (words) more complex meanings (propositions, syllogisms, and arguments). As far as each of these terms corresponds to a specific wording functioning as the grammatical aggregate of subordinate syllables,[23] a sense of corporeality is credited to the whole course. The parts of a logically complex unit, seen not in relation to its form, are combined to form their truth in a realm beyond that of syntactical structure; however, this process is not distinct from the grammatical and the syntactical practice; this is the meaning of Harris' observation when saying that

> *letters and syllables they [the ancients philosophers] called the* **ὕλαι** [matter] *of words; words, or simple terms, the ὕλαι of proposition; and propositions themselves the* **ὕλαι** *of syllogisms.*[24]

The words as *ὕλαι* of proposition are the nouns of a sentence, or, in the syntactic realm, the subject and the predicate. These two constitute the matter of the proposition, whereas the verb, as copula, is the form of it, typifying the mode in which matter becomes *"in-formed"*. Harris here follows the Aristotelian doctrine of *Anal. Post.* 2.94a, and *Physics* 2.195a, where in terms of the Aristotelian causality, the premisses of a syllogism are identified with the material cause of it, leading necessarily to the inference.

This is how we rise from the grammatical to the syntactic *element*[25] of language. Substantives and attributives are the grammatical terms denoting the categorematic forms of substances and attributes, and furthermore, the *elementary principles* of logic.[26] To describe this materialised grammatical substance, Harris follows the Aristotelian definition of *ὕλη* as τό μή καθ' ὑποκειμένου, ἀλλά καθ' οὗ τά ἄλλα, given in *Metaphysics*, Z, 1029a: while the energies and affections of a subject are the attributes predicated of it,

> [Substance]...*is that which is not predicated of a subject, but of which all else is predicated.*

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21 "and human or rational sound they [the Stoics] defined as sound articulate and derived from the discursive faculty". According to Diogenes Laertius (Lives of Eminent Philosophers, 7.55), Zeno,when discriminating between animal and human voice, defines the second as an articulated percussion of air, which originates from human intellect: "while the voice of an animal is a percussion of air brought about by an internal impulse, the voice of man is articulated, deriving from his mind, and comes into maturity at his age of fourteen".

22 and the formal also, as we'll see later.

23 As those are the grammatical aggregate of letters.

24 Harris, 1751, p. 309.

25 In the first book of *Hermes*, Harris analyses the sentence into its semantic units, namely into categorematic and syncategorematic words: "..for all words are significant, or else they would not be words": *ibid.*, p. 27.

26 Harris's interest in matter is seen in its relation to the form, as these two are "...those elementary principles, which, being blended together after a more mysterious manner, are united in the minutest part, as much as in the mightiest whole", *ibid.*, p. 307.

The references to Aristotle focus on three motifs, accounting for the way Harris adopted the aristotelian concept:

i) a logical relation between substances and attributes, in terms of its analogy to the grammatical one between substantives and attributives.[27]

ii) substance as the undetermined matter, in the sense of it as the ultimate universal essence (*substratum*), which potentially may become materialised when predicated of particular matters.[28]

iii) the natural character of substance, which needs to be not simply a unit seen in its potentialities, but something which has a certain evidence of existence (such as body and magnitude), in order that the simple substances into which it is transformed have a certain existence.[29]

Both the resolution of substance into its constituent properties and the composition of those into one concrete whole are mental actions.[30] In these terms, the matter and form of the ultimate substance are identical with the two aristotelian species of qualities, the primary one, called *essence* (the presocratic idea of φύσις), and its properties, namely its changing appearances in the passage of time. The most common and immediate mental act is that of mental separation, an act where mind is resolved into its qualities:

> *But the mind surmounts all power of concretion, and can place in the simplest manner every attribute by itself; convex without concave; colour without superficies; superficies without body; and body without its accidents, as distinctly each one, as tho' they had never been united.*[31]

The products of such a division are not material quantities; they are qualitative concepts deriving from natural resolution. Specifically, and in the most Aristotelian sense, this resolution consists of this *body* or essence, and its *accidents* (the συμβεβηκότα of *Metaphysics* 1025a. 30) in the meaning of eternal attributes attached to this essence not by necessity or habit, but in virtue of the intellect itself. The idea Harris has of matter is of something "capable of becoming something else; or of being moulded into something else, whether of the operation of art, of nature, or a higher cause".[32] Following the version elaborated in Aristotle's *De Anima* and especially, in the manner it was further developed by Alexander of Aphrodisias, he admits matter not simply as material mind or intellect but as

> *natural capacity,... denoting the original and native power of intellection, which being previous to all human knowledge, is yet necessary to its reception.*[33]

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[27] *Categories*, 2.

[28] *Metaphysics*, Z,1029.

[29] *De Caelo*, 298a & 298b.

[30] [the mind] "...when it thinks, and reasons, and concludes...yet are these more properly its own peculiar acts", Harris, 1751, p. 306.

[31] *Ibid.*, p. 306-307. Harris also quotes from Lord Bacon's *Novum Organum*: "itaque natutae facienda est prorsus solutio & separatio; non per ignem serte, sed mentem, tanquam ignem divinum": therefore, we must employ ourselves in a complete resolution and separation of nature, not [just] by fire; but by the mind-that divine fire. This procedure could be carried out infinitely, and in a way merely materialistic.

[32] Harris, 1751, p. 309.

[33] *Ibid.*, p.310.

This natural capacity is the Aristotelian material intellect, where matter is seen as the potentiality of becoming something[34] and not as just a material substrate capable of being coined each time by the application of form. Had it been so, Harris would be rather close to the platonic concept of matter: a materialistic reality in the sense of a space *in which* everything derives its existence. On the contrary, even when Chalcidius is praised,[35] even then, Chalcidius's idea of matter, comprising both *in which* and *out of which,* has not any place in Harris's presentation.[36]

The formal status of language

Harris opens his discussion of form (εἶδος) with a referene to its common meaning in the everyday life of the ancient Greeks: the figure of a well-built and beautiful body perceived by sight.[37] He ascends then to the linguistic and philosophical perspectives on form: first, in the sense of *Metaphysics*, *Δ.* 6.1016b34-35,[38] in its less epistemological and materialised view of symmetry and proportion, where matter and form are the proportional parts of a visible corporeality. Then, by relating form to beauty, he ascends to a more complex substance. The *beauty*, *symmetry*, and *proportion* of it are not simply incidental attributes:[39] in a way moving from beauty as the symmetry of members of a body, to the beauty of the supreme universal truth, substance is distinguished by order, symmetry, and limit.[40]

> *...it is in the uniting of these [matter and form], that every thing, which is generable, may be said to commence; as on the contrary, in their separation, to perish and be at an end; ...that while they co-exist, 'tis not by mere juxta-position, like the stones in a wall, but by a more intimate coincidence, complete in the minutest part; ...that hence, if we were to persist in dividing any*

[34] "...it is simply a capacity for a certain sort of entelechy and soul and a capacity of receiving forms and thoughts. This intellect, being material, exists in all beings that share in the complete soul, that is, human beings", Alexander of Aphrodisias, *De intellectu*, 107.15.

[35] Chalcidius's concept of matter comprised both the platonic version of matter, as the cosmic space *in which* things are substantiated, and the Aristotelian one, as substantive potentiality *out of which* things may become real (the comments of Chalcidius (295-357) on the platonic *Timaeus* were greatly extolled all over medieval Europe and his term *silva* is the word chosen by Harris for further clarification of the concept of ὕλη)

[36] Harris also cites untranslated Cicero's definition of matter given in *Academica*, 1.7, which is nothing more than a simplified version of the Aristotelian one.

[37] "Form or figure in its original meaning denoted visible symmetry and proportion ... having its name from εἴδω to see, beauty of person being one of the noblest, and most excellent objects of sight. ...the form or figure of visible beings tended principally to distinguish them, and to give to each its name and essence; hence in a more general sense, whatever of any kind (whether corporeal or incorporeal) was peculiar, essential, and distinctive, so as by its accession to any beings as to its ὕλη or matter, to mark them with a character, which they had not before, was called by the Ancients εἶδος or form", Harris, 1751, p. 310.

[38] ...κατ' ἀναλογίαν δέ [ἐστι] ὅσα ἔχει ὡς ἄλλο πρός ἄλλο: those things are analogically one, which have the same relation to a third object.

[39] Τό δέ κάλλος τῶν μελῶν [τοῦ ζῴου] τις συμμετρία δοκεῖ εἶναι: for beauty is considered to be a certain symmetryof the limbs (of an animal).*Topics*, 3.1.116b22-23.

[40] Τοῦ δέ καλλοῦ μέγιστα εἴδη τάξις καί συμμετρία καί τό ὡρισμένον: the main species of beauty are order, symmetry, and definiteness,*Metaphysics*, M.3.1078a37-1078b1.

substance (for example marble) to infinity, there would still remain after every section both matter and form, and these as perfectly united, as before the division began; ...lastly, that they are both pre-existent to the beings, which they constitute; the matter being to be found in the world at large; the form, if artificial, pre-existing within the artificer, or if natural, within the supreme cause, the sovereign artist of the universe;[41] *...we may see among all animal and vegetable substances, the form pre-existing in their immediate generating cause; oak being the parent of oak, lion of lion, man of man etc.*[42]

Additionally, the distinctiveness of forms is also given by Harris in epistemological terms: the objective of science is our clear knowledge of them, what they reveal is truly objective knowledge.[43]

Forms are distinguished from each other in terms of the definition of the matter of language they indicate, namely in terms of the different qualities attributed to the primary substance in each individual case. As the natural and real constituent which marks the substantive nature, both of corporeal and mental realities proportionally, form is a universal, and its definition, as the predicate of that, is also universal. Definition is the primary manifestation of form, whether we bear in mind only the nominal definition (the linguistic entity of a statement of what a thing is, considered in the realm of ***modus significandi***)[44] or the essential (in the realm both of ***modi essendi*** and ***intelligendi***, and whether this essence is matter of ***first*** or ***second*** philosophy), or both the nominal and the essential. The examples of forms given by Harris are organised in three levels:

i) in the state of ***ratio recta***, where form is the mark of distinction between specific substantive natures,[45] the reason of the mathematical proportion,[46] and the evident reason in products of art.[47]

ii) in a realm of concepts, where our discursive faculty may have the character also of prudent reasoning in its ethical perspective, and where Harris stays close to Cicero's aristotelian version of practical wisdom,[48] in a sense not very distant from the platonic one of our intellectual contemplation εἴδη.

iii) in a realm where forms, harmonised in the state of genus, are comprehended as a unity, and where genus represents the highest predicational affirmation of the truth of a supreme

41 Harris, 1751, p. 312: in this point, Harris is following *Metaphysics,* ΣΤ.7.1032a12-13.

42 *Ibid.*, p. 313.

43 If Harris in that point was to specify more , he would have found himself contemplating in empirical terms. We ought to recognise here a trace of Spinoza's second realm of universal apprehension, that of *ratio*: according to Spinoza, while at first level (*imaginatio*) we conceive images mainly of particular things and scarcely of general, in the realm of *ratio* we adequately contemplate the truth of only transcendental subjects. For Spinoza, there is a third realm of intuitive knowledge of universals where our rational knowledge of them as abstract entities is seen in a more concrete and real existence.

44 in the sense of *Posterior Analytics,* 2.10.93b29-31.

45 E.g., the shape of the brass of a statue.

46 E.g., the proportion of the drugs as in medicine.

47 E.g., the orderly motion of the human body in dance, where dance is the *ad placitum* form of movement.

48 "the just arrangement of the proposition as the form of the syllogism, the rational and accurate conduct of a wise and good man in all the various relations and occurrences of life" (:Cicero, *De Oficiis*, 1), (Further one who is more accurate, and more competent to give instruction in the causes of things, we regard more wise about every science: *Metaphysics*,1.2.982a8-14.

intellect, a substantiated actuality in comparison with the potentiality of human contemplation:

> *the supreme intelligence, which passes thro' all things, and which is the same to our capacities, as light is to our eyes, this supreme intelligence has been called εἶ-δος εἰδῶν, the form of forms, as being the fountain of all symmetry, of all good, and of all truth; and as imparting to every being those essential and distinctive attributes, which make it to be itself, and not anything else.*[49]

In the above passage, *light* is a covert expression of the platonic simile of sun: quite as the natural light through the senses is the first cause of our knowledge and first intentions, in the same way the eternal light, which originates from the supreme truth, refers to our second intentions. Harris' citation of the Boethian *secundum placitum* relates to Aristotle's second intentions.[50] While first intentions refer to the act of conceiving first substances, namely individuals, of which we become aware through the grammar of specific languages, second intentions (***intentiones secundae***) refer to our own mental realisation of the real universal (*modus construendi*), when ascending to a mode of second substances, namely that of species or genus.[51] This sense of the Boethian term, cited by Harris, was additionally what Roger Bacon had in mind when writing that *grammatica una et eadem est secundum substanciam in omnibus linguis, licet accidentaliter varietur*.[52] The ***form of forms***, a term which seems to contrast with Bacon's ***sylva sylvarum***[53] is the aristotelian **νόησις νοήσεως**, the divine intellect, identified with the objects of its thought (as in *Metaphysics*, λ.), and thus having its knowledge by self-inspection.

Apart from form as the genus or species, we are also introduced to form as an internal, orderly, natural, and, preexisting primary quality.[54] Talking about the pre- and co- existence of forms, Harris restates what Aristotle saw as Plato's mistake: the hypostatization of forms (εἴδη as universals) to a level of a separate existence.[55] He then tries, in the final chapters of the third book of *Hermes*, to specify further the aristotelian concept of the third realm of forms by openly following Augustine: this realm is actually the mind of God, and it is there where forms exist.

The inaugural objective of language, according to Harris, is the verbalisation of our *sentiments*, which are the simplest semantic units: they are thoughts before being expressed,

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[49] Harris, 1751, pp. 311-312.

[50] Πρότερα δ' ἐστί καί γνωριμώτερα διχῶς. Οὐ γάρ ταὐτόν πρότερον τῇ φύσει καί πρός ἡμᾶς πρότερον, οὐδέ γνωριμώτερον καί ἡμῖν γνωριμώτερον. Λέγω δέ πρός ἡμᾶς μέν πρότερα καί γνωριμώτερα τά ἐγγύτερον τῆς αἰσθήσεως, ἁπλῶς δέ πρότερα καί γνωριμώτερα τά πορρώτερον. Ἔστι δέ πορρωτάτω μέν τά καθόλου μάλιστα, ἐγγυτάτω δέ τά καθ' ἕκαστα. καί ἀντίκειται ταῦτ' ἀλλήλοις: priority and knowability of things is in two senses; the *prior in nature* is not the same as the prior in relation to us, and the naturally more knowable is not the same as that which is more knowable by us. In my sense, *prior* or *more knowable* in relation to us is that which is nearer to our perception, while in the absolute sense is that which is further from it. The most universal concepts are furthest from our perception, while the particulars are the nearest to it; and these are opposing to each other:*Posterior Analytics*, 1.2.71b35-72a6.

[51] In the meaning of *Categories*, 5.1-4.

[52] *Greek Grammar*, p. 27.

[53] Bacon, Francis, *Sylva Sylvarum, or a natural historie,* New Atlantis, published by William Rawley, London, 1635.

[54] following *Categories*, 2a-b.

[55] *Metaphysics*, 1086a, 1087a.

and not simply common beliefs. While the *common* part of the language is its irrational animal sound, namely its natural matter consisting of utterances, the *peculiar* part of it is its form, its *ad placitum* content of *ratio*. The relation between object of reference (meaning) and word, in its significative potentiality, is established not naturally but by imposition (convention). This constitutes the very essence or *nature* of language and that in which its reality consists. Language is a conventional demonstration of the reality of forms, comforming with them in some sort of natural resemblance:

> but as to the employing of nouns, or verbs, or sentences composed out of them, in the explanation of our sentiments (the things thus employed being founded not in nature, but in position) this he [man] seems to possess by way of peculiar eminence, because he alone of all mortal beings partakes of a soul, which can move itself, and operate artificially; so that even in the subject of sound his artificial power shows itself, as the various elegant compositions both in metre, and without metre, abundantly prove.[56]

Harris asserts that language may also be preoccupied with the accidental traits of things;[57] but it literally pictures only particular individual objects and not qualities considered separately;[58] it cannot stand as a picture of a genus. Words are not themselves natural signs, as they cannot be found anywhere in the real universe. Their form (meaning) is attributed to them artificially; they are a certain species of positive symbols resembling in some way the really existing forms:

> *...all languages are founded by compact, and not in nature; for so are all symbols, of which words are a certain species.*[59]

The presuppositions here meant are i) that symbolic representation may efficiently depict truth, and ii) that language, as a system of symbols, can be a sufficient tool for our reaching this truth by reasoning. In order to make truth perceptible, words must have an intimate connection with their semantic content, despite the conventional type of this relation. Thus our mistakes in universal reasoning are actually misconceptions or inappropriate arrangements in the relations between symbols and their forms of reference.

> *Language is a kind of picture of the universe, where the words are as the figures or images of all particulars; it is symbols, deriving from accidents quite arbitrary, and not a pictorial image, an imitation of the universe, coming out of natural attributes.*[60]

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[56] This is a translation, made by Harris, of the folowing passage from Ammonius' Commentary on Aristotle's *De Interpetatione*: ...τό δέ ὀνόμασιν, ἤ ῥήμασιν, ἤ τοῖς ἐκ τούτων συγκειμένοις λόγοις χρῆσθαι πρός τήν σημασίαν, (οὐκέτι φύσει οὖσιν, ἀλλά θέσει) ἐξαίρετον ἔχειν πρός τά ἄλογα ζῶα, διότι καί μόνος τῶν θνητῶν αὐτοκινήτου μετέχει ψυχῆς, καί τεχνικῶς ἐνεργεῖν δυναμένης, ἵνα καί ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ φωνήν ἡ τεχνική αὐτῆς διακρίνηται δύναμις.

[57] Something, which, in the definition of language, would be specified in the use of particular terms.

[58] *The horse*, namely the thing, and not *the horseness*, the state of being a horse, which as all qualities is the real universal.

[59] Harris, 1751, p. 337.

[60] *Ibid.*, p. 329.

The advantages of a representative performance of words, compared to the graphic pictorial one, are *simplicity*, a certain *flexibility* in the formation of speech, and the ability to make knowable everything that really exists.[61] Words are the sensible bearers of meaning, quite as our bodies are the bearers of our souls. Since they are conceivable through the senses, and are thus attributed a sense of corporeality, names as *media* serve the intercourse of our souls by their application of the meanings these possess.[62] It is the restrictions of this *corporeality*, namely of communication through making things "tangible", which have to be overcomed by the symbolic use of language.

Quoting from Ammonius' commentary on *De Interpretatione*, Harris interprets the terms **ὁμοίωμα** and **σύμβολον** (or **σημεῖον**), respectively as *resemblance* (or *representation*) and symbol (sign). Ammonius had said that "a symbol or sign...is wholly in our power, as depending singly for its existence on our imagination" (**ἐπίνοια**).[63] Harris elaborates this concept further:

> *We may perceive a reason, why there never was a language, nor indeed can possibly be framed one, to express the properties and real essences of things, as a mirror exhibits their figures and their colours. For if language of itself imply nothing more, than certain species of sounds with certain motions concomitant; if to some beings sound and motion are no attributes at all; if to many others, where attributes, they are no way essential...if this be true, 'tis impossible the nature of such beings should be expressed, or the least essential property be any way imitated, while between the medium and themselves there is nothing connatural.*[64]

The metaphor of mirror, illustratedin this quotation, was a popular one among the Christian Platonists. Ultimately this particular metaphor is derived from St Paul,[65] it was subsequently developed in the work of certain medieval philosophers. The same metaphor can also be found in the work of Leibniz.[66] There the point is that the human mind is a mirror reflecting God and the universe in which we can view the truth of things through the truth of God.

Universal grammar in its *general* function is preoccupied with abstract entities which occur

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61 *Ibid.*, pp. 334-335.

62 Αἱ ψυχαί αἱ ἡμετέραι, γυμναί μέν οὖσαι τῶν σωμάτων, ἠδύναντο δι' αὐτῶν τῶν νοημάτων σημαίνειν ἀλλήλαις τά πράγματα. Ἐπειδή δέ σώμασι συνδέδενται, δίκην νέφους περικαλύπτουσιν αὐτῶν τό νοερόν, ἐδεήθησαν τῶν ὀνομάτων, δι' ὧν σημαίνουσιν ἀλλήλαις τά πράγματα:quoted ibid. p. 333: Our souls, being without bodies, could convey the ideas to each other; but when they become incorporated, their mental hypostasis was covered as if by clouds-and thus they required names, trhough which they convey to each other the issues.

63 Both Ammonius' text and Harris' translation, ibid., pp. 330-332.

64 *Ibid.*, p. 335. Earlier Harris had noticed that: " ...as words, besides their being symbols by compact, are also sounds variously distinguished by their aptness to be rapidly or slowly pronounced, and by the respective prevalence of mutes, liquids, or vowels, in their composition; it will follow, that, beside their compact-relation, they will have likewise a natural relation, to all such things, between which and themselves there is any natural resemblance": from p. 32 of chapter III: *On the subjects which Poetry imitates, but imitates only through natural media, or mere sounds*, in *A Discourse on Musik, Painting, and Poetry*, in Harris, 1841. In the same book the next chapter is on *Poetry ...imitating by words significant.*

65 *Corinthians*, 1.13.12.

66 *Discourse*, paragraph 9.

in the specific forms of each language, but subsist permanently. These general forms must a priori subsist independently from specific time references and also they have to be of a finite number. Proper nouns, and the substances presumed by them, cannot be identified with general forms, since they yield to time and place, which are modifications (accidents, not properties) of particular individuals, and are thus of an unlimited number. Also, they are not the most appropriate subjects offered for definition and demonstration,[67] in the sense that they constitute propositions of particular affirmative truth-not general ones. According to Harris, in the particular languages, words as symbols not just of proper, but also of common names, have an incidental function, compared to the general terms, and their semantic engagement is analogically incidental.[68] For Harris, words as symbols of proper names,[69] and as such of individuals, must be infinite,[70] because of the infinitude of the objects they represent. They are incomprehensible, and thus incommunicable, such as the words of the chinese language, which are symbols of innumerable particulars. The inferences formed out of propositions with such premises would be indefinite, and thus invalid.

In this argument the reference to the chinese language, a common example in the study of language during the eighteenth century, is not sufficient. The conclusion implied above is that a great number of chinese words lack a natural resemblance with the concepts they represent, and consequently they should not be considered as a solid ground for general reasoning. The weakness of this argument lies in the reference to proper names in an indiscriminate mode, where the names of persons and places (the grammatically *proper*) are classified together with the names of every sensible object. Using this grammatical term in its reversed sense, Harris states here that such a language does not exist independently of any referential parameters of time or place, since individuals subject to time (are *ever passing*). For him, if all the words of a language, seen as propositional terms, are proper names of particular individuals (the so called *singularia*), then language cannot express any universal affirmation or negation. The general and universal properties of it are substantiated, as far as the terms applied refer to the common essence, or to the common properties (qualities) of the propositions subjects, and not to their incongruous accidents. The issue refers to the difference between essential and accidental predication.[71] While, in the grammatical realm, affirmative sentences on particular subjects, may have in common not just their properties but their accidents too, the same statements, seen as propositions, differ in both the essential and the accidental part. Their subjects are different, and thus their definitions, their whole inner natural essences, are differentiated. On such an occasion, no valid argument or syllogism is constructible, since that would be a complex proposition made out of "particular negatives" premisses:

> *But if so, then is language incapable of communicating general affirmative truths. If so, then of communicating sciences,*[72] *which are so many systems of demonstrations. If so, then of*

[67] For Aristotle, individuals are not subject to definition and, because of that, not to demonstration either: *Metaphysics*, 1039b.

[68] Such observations constitute the moderate element of Harris's realism.

[69] Harris, 1751, p. 338.

[70] He does not specify whether it is an infinity in number or in the possible combinations of words.

[71] There is no reference made by Harris to the case of a syllogism which is based on axioms.

[72] As propositions of universal affirmation.

communicating arts, which are the theorems of science applied practically. If so, we shall be little the better for it either in speculation or in practise. ...Therefore, words[73] *are not symbols of external particulars, not also of sensible ideas (which are of the same infinitude and mutability of the particulars), but of general ideas... It follows that one word may be, not homonymously, but truly and essentially common to many particulars, past present and future; so that however these particulars may be infinite, and ever fleeting, yet language notwithstanding may be definite and steady.*[74]

The hypothesis on which this argument is based is that words are significant only of particulars. In relation to this, general ideas, or forms, should be considered segregated from particulars, which are finite in number.

The triple order of general ideas

Harris distinguishes between "operating artificially ...as a distinctive mark of the human soul", and the "mere producing the works of elegance and design", such as works of some animals.[75] These last may be either artificial in a metaphorical sense or just subjected to natural knowledge. But operating artificially has nothing to do with either metaphor or natural necessity; art[76] is just the medium between man as an intentional and habitual cause, and his creations. The power for artificial operation has the meaning not just of the ability for production,[77] but for production under the guidance of true reason.[78] Our mental acts are analogous to the mental acts of the eternal essence.[79] On this point, Harris follows *Metaphysics,*[80] holding language is the artificial form of the one existing in the soul; this reference is assigned directly to soul conceived as the first mover. The artificial operation of human soul, both in the linguistic-semantic and in the mental realm, is the apparent evidence of its resemblance to the divine soul specified above.

Natural forms have for Harris an intelligible subsistence (***νοητόν***). Opposed to sensible forms, the objects of our senses (αἰσθήσεις) exist in a way analogous to the artificial forms of works of art. Thus, art illustrates the knowledge of universals, while experience is involved in knowledge of the singulars.[81] This relation between natural and artificial forms, in which Harris follows Aristotle, is the necessary condition for the preexistence of a homogeneous cause of natural forms:

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73 : namely, common nouns.

74 Harris, 1751, p. 339.

75 "... many minds so fraught [with ideas], by a sort of compact assigning to each idea some sound to be its mark or symbol, were the first inventors and founders of language",Harris, 1841, p. 27, note c.

76 "Artbelongs neither to the divine nature (which is perfect and complete) nor to the brute or to the inanimate one",*ibid.,* 1841, p. 4.

77 *Nicomachean Ethics,* 1140a16.

78 *Ibid.,* 6.4.1140a10.

79 *Metaphysics,*11.7.1072a24-27.

80 *Ibid.,*6.7.1032a32-1032b1 & 6.9.1034a24.

81 *Metaphysics,*1.1.981a15-16. Art is form: *Metaphysics,* 6.9.1034a24. From Art are generated those things of whatsoever there is a form in the soul: *Metaphysics,* 6.7.1032a32-1032b1.

...in nature, as well as in art, there are intelligible forms, which to the sensible are subsequent;[82]
...with respect to the works of art, we may perceive ...a triple order of forms; one order, intelligible and previous to these works; a second order, sensible and concomitant; and a third again, intelligible and subsequent. After the first of these orders the maker may be said to work; thro' the second the works themselves exist, and are what they are; and in the third they become recognized, as mere objects of contemplation. To make these forms by different names more easy to be understood; the first may be called the maker's form, the second, that of the subject; and the third, that of the contemplator.[83]

Priority here has not the sense of potentiality, and neither there is any further indication that a single sense of time, place, movement, order, or consequence, is connoted. As will be clarified later in respect of the extracts quoted, for Harris the priority of universals is compared to the posteriority of sensible singulars. It is an absolute priority which complies with natural reason and is related to an epistemological base of a connatural predicational order.[84]

Harris' discusion of the triple order of general ideas is in its greatest part a compilation of quotations from i) the commentary of Simplicius on Aristotle's *Categories*, ii) the commentary of Ammonius on Porphyry's *Introduction*, and iii) the *Ἐπιτομή Λογικῆς* of Nicephorus Blemmides. There is also to be found a citation from Alcinous' *Διδασκαλικός*. It is with reference to these quotations that we may get a more precise idea of Harris' view on the subject, and consequently we have to comment on them as if it was Harris' original material.

According to Simplicius, as quoted by Harris, the first order, compared to that of *particulars*, is a state of platonic transcendency and superiority of general ideas. His term *particulars* does not refer to individuals, but, as determined in the Stoic theory, to the specific shapes of substrate after its becoming qualified by form (πνεῦμα). ***Uniformity*** and ***Sameness*** are the properties of ideas as the first universal cause. These two terms account for the communion of ideas (κοιναί) and mark an opposition to the diversity of forms of second order. *Uniformity* is a term of aristotelian origin indicating forms-εἴδη as parts of a genus, which as a whole is something more than a result of their aggregation. *Sameness* is one of the five platonic summa genera, the very important forms, a term actually inclusive of the

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[82] Harris, 1751, p. 379.

[83] *Ibid.*, p. 377. Harris, in order to explain his idea of the triple order of naturally existing forms, repeats Leibniz's example of the clock: a simile of the harmony of the universe, pre-established by the God of reason presented as a watchmaker, another example of Harris's deism (*ibid.*, p. 375). He avoids discussing openly any argument on the existence of God but what he actually states is that forms (universals) depend for their existence on that of God. The example cited by Harris reveals a view of forms, which is in accordance with *mechanical philosophy*: knowledge of the nature of universals should be attempted in terms of its function and under the principle of the efficient rather than the final cause. Harris says that the mind through retentive and collective powers, becomes fraught with natural forms, as before with forms artificial (*ibid.*, p. 378). Actually the discussion on the triple conception of forms is parallel to that on the actuality or the significative character of transubstantiation: for Harris, a first class opportunity to overcome any difficulty of taking the one side (the medieval belief of actuality) or the other side (the Enlightenment's belief on mere signification).

[84] See also *Categories*,12.14a-b.

aristotelian sense of sameness.[85] Both these two terms disclose universality, in a sense of unity, in all the three realms, being just transcendent in the first and subordinate in the second order. The second order of forms is for Simplicius differentiated by *participation* (μέθεξις), a term implying division and describing the relation between forms (εἴδη) and sensible particulars (αἰσθητά). In this status forms are "infused from the first universal cause into the various species of beings ...when merged in matter",[86] while in the third order ideas exist as products of personal abstraction, as individual mental acts of our imagination.

By choosing Simplicius, Harris lays stress on the reality of existence of the general ideas in the state of *participation*. This is not different from the fourth Stoic category of the *relative disposition*, which Simplicius had commented on: a criterion, according to which by the reasonable action of associating and communicating, we may partake of the happiness of being associated with nature and God. Harris does not need to follow closely the Stoic tradition in the tight relation between πνεῦμα and substrate and their forming a bound abstract reality. By subjecting the Stoic theory to the aristotelian categories seen as forms, he focuses more on the metaphysical rather than on the logical-linguistic perspective. The existence of forms is admitted in all the three realms.

In both Ammonius and Blemmides, the triple order of forms is represented by the example of a seal affixed on various pieces of wax, where the seal of a ring is differentiated (i) from the imprints embossed in the wax, and (ii) from the subsequent impression of the form of seal in the mind of a contemplator. What is implied is that forms are the thoughts of God, considered as νοῦς, and being like the exemplars in the craftsman's mind before becoming immanent in the specific objects. This is the aristotelian idea of formal cause, as it was established and embodied in the Christian theology. In their neoplatonic version, forms are both the genera and the species, and their three orders are termed *πρό τῶν πολλῶν* (*ante multa*), *ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς* (*in multis*), and *ἐπί τοῖς πολλοῖς* (*post multa*). The resolution of forms in a threefold order as introduced by Harris, dismantles Simplicius's sense of uniformity. In a very restricted sense of *participation*, the emphasis is on the (possibly differentiated) mental concepts, created in the human mind after the act of contemplating. The exemplary cause of the last is to be found only in their cast of the first order (something quite different from the aristotelian formal cause of essence).[87]

The citation from Blemmides is from his chapter *On genus and species and individual* (chapter XI). There, from the Stoic τί, a class of non-existing incorporeals which subsist on account of their forming the content of a thought, Blemmides advances a well-ordered classification. The subsistence of incorporeals is divided into *quaedam propriam habent subsistentiam*, like the angels and the soul, and *quaedam in aliis esse habent*, meaning the genera and species. The whole citation of extracts from Ammonius and Blemmides typifies Harris's triple order of forms as escalating from the philosophical to the theological point of

[85] It is evident that sameness is a certain unity of the being of either many things, or when one employs anything as many: *Metaphysics*, 4.9.1018a7-9.

[86] Harris, 1751, p. 382.

[87] "The assertion that ideas are models or exemplars, and that other things participate in them is to speak quite at random and to assert what is mere poetic metaphor": *Metaphysics*,12.5.1079b25-26.

view.

Finally, in chapters IX and X of his *Didaskalikos*, which are not quoted but are pointed out by Harris, Alcinous elaborated ἰδέαι in the sense of *exemplars*: Forms illustrate the God of Christianity as the exemplary cause, his eternal and perfect mental acts, the objects of our comprehension, the measure of the matter (ὕλη), and, in a pure materialistic sense, the examples of the essence (οὐσία) as a sort of natural and eternal pre-materialised substance. For Alcinous, the objects of our senses and contemplation are insufficient properties of forms, contrary to the perfect mental concepts of the divine mind, whose properties are divinity, essence, truth proportion, and good.

The process of perceiving universal forms

The rationalistic idea of universal grammar on this subject is in its consistency a peculiarity by itself, as it combines in the same cast various and frequently different theoretical perspectives. In studying the perception of general ideas, Harris moves from the field of *Metaphysics* to that of natural philosophy and *De Anima*. As in *De Anima* senses are the receivers of the form of things and not of their matter, he opens his discussion with the differentiation between the objects of sensible and those of intelligible perception. They are distinct in their mode of existence: the sensible exist only in their presence,[88] while those which exist eternally occur each time in different mode, as past, present, or future. A reference by sensible perception is directed to objects yielding to modification, namely time: it is substantiated and lasts, only as long as these objects subsist. But for the general ideas, not only has the mode of perceiving them a different time reference, but also the very objects of perception have their existence related to time in a completely different way. Time is a criterion of truth, and existence in all time is the property of truth in general propositions. No truth restricted by time limits may conduct knowledge predicated out of universal propositions, since it is only a partial truth: it is vague and incomplete, since there is no reference in it either to the past or to the future, and its perception has the validity of our *first, indefinite, fleeting,* and *transient* concepts, after being born.[89] General ideas have a permanence: an existence in all time, including past, present and future. Emphasising this, Harris says:

> *There is nothing appears so clearly an object of the mind or intellect only, as the future does, since we can find no place for its existence any where else. Not but the same, if we consider, is equally true of the past. For tho' it may have had another kind of being, when (according to common phrase) it actually was, yet was it then something present, and not something past. As past, it has no existence but in the mind or memory, since had it in fact any other, it could not properly be*

[88] Ταυτῇ γάρ (αίσθήσει) οὔτε τό μέλλον, οὔτε τό γενόμενον γνωρίζομεν, ἀλλά τό παρόν μόνον: "for by this faculty (namely, the faculty of sense) we neither know the future nor the past, but the present only", Harris, 1786, p. 105.

[89] "Our first perceptions are indefinite, more fleeting and transient than the objects they exhibit, as they cannot subsist without their immmediate presence, and offer us no sensation of either past or future. ..had the soul no other faculties, than the senses, it never could acquire the least idea of time".

called past. ...'Twas this intimate connection between time, and the soul, that made some philosophers doubt, whether if there was no soul, there could be any time, since time appears to have its being in no other region.[90]

From his remarks on the aristotelian text, it is worth noting that Harris interprets ***συνέχεια*** not just as continuity in the sense of extension,[91] but rather as that "junction or holding together, by which extension is imparted to other things".[92] The above passage is based on several extracts from the aristotelian *Physics*, as they have been conclusively interpreted by Themistius, when saying that

For when the mind, remembering the now, which it talked of yesterday, talks again of another now to-day, then it is it immediately has an idea of time, terminated by these two nows, as by two boundaries; and thus it is enabled to say, that the quantity is of fifteen, or of sixteen hours, as if it

[90] Harris, 1751, 112. This last question is referred to in Aristotle's *Physics* 4.20: Πότερον δέ μή οὔσης ψυχῆς εἴη ἄν ὁ χρόνος, ἀπορήσειεν ἄν τις. Harris several times quotes from this work: Φανερόν ὁτί οὐδέ μόριον τό νῦν τοῦ χρόνου, ὥσπερ οὐδ' αἱ στιγμαί τῆς γραμμῆς· αἱ δέ γραμμαί δύο τῆς μίας μόρια (: 4.17). Τό δέ νῦν οὐ μέρος· μετρεῖ τε γάρ τό μέρος, καί σύγκεισθαι δεῖ τό ὅλον ἐκ τῶν μερῶν· ὁ δέ χρόνος οὐ δοκεῖ σύγκεισθαι ἐκ τῶν νῦν (: 4.14). Τό δέ νῦν ἔστι συνέχεια χρόνου, ὥσπερ ἐλέχθη· συνέχει γάρ τόν χρόνον, τόν παρελθόντα καί ἐσόμενον, καί ὅλως πέρας χρόνου ἐστιν· ἔστι γάρ τοῦ μέν ἀρχή, τοῦ δέ τελευτή (: 4.19). Ὅτι μέν οὖν ὅλως οὐκ ἔστιν, ᾗ μόγις καί ἀμυδρῶς, ἐκ τῶν δέ τις ἄν ὑποπτεύσειε· τό μέν γάρ αὐτοῦ γέγονε, καί οὐκ ἔστι· τό δέ μέλλει, καί οὔπω ἐστίν· ἐκ δέ τούτων καί ὁ ἄπειρος καί ὁ ἀεί λαμβανόμενος χρόνος σύγκειται· τό δ' ἐκ μή ὄντων συγκείμενον, ἀδύνατον ἄν δόξειε κατέχειν ποτέ οὐσίας (: 4.14). Τότε φαμέν γεγονέναι χρόνον, ὅταν τοῦ προτέρου καί ὑστέρου ἐν τῇ κινήσει αἴσθησιν λάβωμεν.'Ορίζομεν δέ τῷ ἄλλο καί ἄλλο ὑπολαβεῖν αὐτά, καί μεταξύ τι αὐτῶν ἕτερον· ὅταν γάρ τά ἄκρα ἕτερα τοῦ μέσου νοήσωμεν, καί δύο εἴπῃ ἡ ψυχή τά νῦν, τό μέν πρότερον, τό δέ ὕστερον, τότε καί τοῦτο φαμέν εἶναι χρόνον (: 4. 16):'"Tis evident that a now or instant is no more a part of time, than points are of a line. The parts indeed of a line are two other lines. A now is no part of time; for a part is able to measure its whole, and the whole is necessarily made up of its parts; but time does not appear to be made up of nows. A now or instant is (as was said before) the continuity or holding together of time; for it makes time continuous, the past and the future, and is in general its boundary, as being the beginning of one time and the ending of another. That therefore time exists not at all, or at least has but a faint and obscure existence, one may suspect from hence. A part of it has been, and is no more; a part of it is coming, and is not as yet; and out of these is made that infinite time, which is ever to be assumed still farther and farther. Now that which is made up of nothing but non-entities, it should seem was impossible ever to participate of entity. 'Tis then we say there has been time, when we can acquire a sensation of prior and subsequent in motion. But we distinguish and settle these two, by considering one first, then the other, together with an interval between them different from both. For as often as we conceive the extremes to be different from the mean, and the soul talks of two nows, one prior and the other subsequent, then 'tis we say there is time, and this 'tis we call time": in several places of the seventh chapter in the first book of *Hermes*.

[91] "Time and space have this in common, that they are both of them things continuous, and as such they both of them imply extension ... But in this they differ, that all the parts of space exist at once and together, while those of time only exist in transition and succession", *Ibid.*, p. 100.

[92] *Ibid.*, p. 104.

were to sever a cubit's length from an infinite line by two points.[93]

While the tradition of *Physics* is followed by Harris in his account of sensitive perception, imagination,[94] memory,[95] and even recollection[96] are termed, in the aristotelian sense, faculties of the soul. Harris distinguishes between casual and rational association, as "a casual connection is often sufficient". Sense is the receptive power of the soul, "a kind of transient imagination", while imagination, a kind of permanent sense, is its *retentive* power:

It has to fix the fluency of sense, and thus provide a proper basis for the support of the [soul's] *higher energies, as it is trying to exert the powers of reason and intellect.*[97]

To understand these, we have to take into consideration the discussion of symbols: *fancy* is a power with which we contemplate a sign without thinking of the original idea;[98] memory, on the contrary, is a power of thinking in reference to the significance of the symbol.[99] Harris, following *De Anima*, 3.3.427b14-429a, defines first imagination (*fancy*) in relation to sense. Placed between the acts of perceiving and conceiving, it is an act of withholding the images of perceptible objects, in order to make contemplation of them possible:

...subsequent [as to its energies] to sense, yet truly prior to it both in dignity and use, ...retains the fleeting forms of things, when things themselves are gone, and all sensation [comes] at an end.

These images retained by imagination are the general ideas. Imagination is quite distinct from sensibility; to the senses, it is posterior in time, but prior in dignity.[100] These forms are of objects which are things *gone and extinct*-they are subjected to our will, and yield to our reason, "over which we have an easy command ...and can call them forth in almost what manner we please". To explain the distinction between sensitive and intellective perception Harris discusses the example *the angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles*:

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[93] "Οταν γάρ ὁ νοῦς ἀναμνησθείς τοῦ νῦν, ὅ χθές εἶπεν, ἕτερον πάλιν εἴπῃ τό τήμερον, τότε καί χρόνος εὐιύς ἐνενόησεν, ὑπό τῶν δύο νῦν ὁριζόμενον, οἷον ὑπό περάτων δυοῖν. Καί οὕτω λέγειν ἔχει, ὅτι ποσόν ἐστι πεντεκαίδεκα ὡρῶν, ἤ ἑκκαίδεκα, οἷον ἐξ ἀπείρου γραμμῆς πηχυαίαν δύο σημείοις ἀποτεμνόμενος. ...Εἰ τοίνυν διχῶς λεγεται τό τε ἀριθμητόν καί τό ἀριθμούμενον, τό μέν τό ἀριθμητόν δηλαδή δυνάμει, τό δέ ἐνεργείᾳ, ταῦτα δέ οὐκ ἄν ὑποσταίη, μή ὄντος τοῦ ἀριθμήσαντος μήτε δυνάμει μήτε ἐνεργείᾳ, φανερόν ὡς οὐκ ἄν ὁ χρόνος εἴη, μή οὔσης ψυχῆς: *ibid.*, p. 108.

[94] :"When we view some relict of sensation reposed within us, without thinking of its rise, or referring it to any sensible object".

[95] : (*μνήμη*): "when we view some such relict, and refer it withal to that sensible object, which in time past was its cause and original".

[96] : (*ἀνάμνησις*): "the road, which leads to memory thro' a series of ideas, however connected whether rationally or casually".

[97] *Ibid.*, p. 357.

[98] "Imagination may exhibit (after a manner) even things that are to come. 'Tis here that hope and fear paint all their pleasant, and all their painful pictures of futurity. But memory is confined in the strictest manner to the past", ibid., p. 356.

[99] : "with reference to the original represented", *ibid.*, p. 356.

[100] For Plato universals can only be seen in their true purity freed from imagination" (Leff, 117).

When the first word is present, all the subsequent are absent, and so on. No more exists at once than a single syllable (to sensation at least). So sensitive perception is dissipated, fleeting, and detached; if mind was so, it follows that one mind would no more recognize one truth, by recognising its terms successively and apart, than many distant minds would recognize it, were it distributed among them, a different part to each. The case is every truth is one, tho' its terms are many. It is in no respect true by parts at a time, but it is true of necessity at once, and in an instant....where sensation and intellection appear to concur, that sensation was of many, intellection was of one; that sensation was temporary, divisible, and successive; intellection, instantaneous, indivisible, and at once.[101]

The origin of universal ideas

The following question on the origin of ideas refers to the cause of things; even its wording is formated in accordance with the seventeenth and eighteenth century rationalism. Harris, who is not a rationalist philosopher but a *literatus* who accepted the doctrines of rationalism, does not need to spend much time with arguments proving the *design theory*; the answer to the question is for him simply subjected to necessity:

Are natural productions made by chance, or by design? ...We must of necessity admit a mind also, because design implies mind, wherever 'tis to be found.[102]

This is the classical argument of traditional rationalism; this proof was demolished three years before the publication of *Hermes*, by David Hume, in the 11th chapter of his *Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals*: according to Hume, since God does not belong to any species or genus, and is thus unique by definition, there can be no parity with the simile of the clockmaker,[103] as that would be an argument by experience and for rationalism no inference is valid in such an argument.

Harris also states that natural objects are more *exquisite* compared to those of art, an observation derived from *De Partibus Animalium,*[104] where natural and artificial bodies are discussed in respect of the differences between their ***modi construendi***, as a differentiation in terms of sufficiency in causality. He does not clarify that this self-sufficiency (**αὐτάρκεια**) is a quality of the divine virtue (something in accordance with the later platonic tradition).

By the term mind we mean something, which, when it acts, knows what it is going to do; something stored with ideas of its intended works, agreeably to which ideas those works are fashioned.[105]

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101 *Ibid.*, p. 365.

102 *Ibid.*, p. 379.

103 : a simile which Harris repeats.

104 : 1.1.640b20-38.

105 *Ibid.*, p. 380.

The self-awareness of the intellect is the evidence of its supremacy, as there is no prior cause above it. The intelligibility of forms and the necessity of their existence originate from their being products of divine activity. God, who is identified with this intellect, is omnipotent and omniscient. In the 1786 edition there is an additional note with references to Nicomachus and Philoponus. In his *Introduction to Arithmetic*, Nicomachus shaped the concept of God as the foremost artist, and forms were said to exist in the mind of the artificer God (ἐν τῇ τοῦ τεχνίτου Θεοῦ διανοίᾳ).[106] On the same point, a quotation from Philoponus is cited, presenting God as possessing within himself the first causes of all things, and their reasoned proportions (τεχνίτην, ...ὡς πάντων τάς πρώτας αἰτίας καί τούς λόγους αὐτῶν ἔχοντα). This last concept will be found again later,when Harris comments on Pletho. There is also another passage quoted from Philoponus:

> *As therefore we, looking upon such sketches as these, make such and such particular things, so also the creator, looking at those sketches of his, has formed and adorned with beauty all things here below. We must remember, however, that the sketches here are imperfect; but that the others, those reasons or proportions, which exist in God, are archetypal and all-perfect* .[107]

It is this reference that openly states that the nature of things consists of the same elements as the divine forms, despite their imperfection. *Reason* and *proportion* are the terms denoting the type of relation between the archetypical, all-perfect, divine forms, and the objects of the platonic divine creations, considered as their first causes. In order to elucidate this conception of first cause, which is rather the efficient, and inclusively only the final one, and to further advance the *existence* of universals, Harris follows Proclus and his third book of comments on Plato's *Parmenides*: in a sense close to *Physics*, 2.5.196b27-28,[108] Harris adopts Proclus's thesis that

> *...the forms are the previous [to the sensible and external ones], their active and efficient causes, pre-existing in that one and common cause of all the universe.*[109]

This operation by mere existence originates from the original, ever perfect, and essential nature of forms. Natural forms are primary, while corporeal forms are their incidental, subordinate, intermittent, and adventitious derivatives. Consequently, general forms act merely by existence, in contrast to our mental acts when by reasoning we ascend scientifically to them. This is the

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106 : *in Dei artificis mente.* Nicomachus had identified numbers with the Greek Gods, and is considered representative of the Neopythagoreans' influence upon the later Platonism, and especially Proclus. See also Wallis, p. 32.

107 : ..ὥσπερ οὖν ἡμεῖς, εἰς τά τοιαῦτα σκιαγραφήματα βλέποντες, ποιοῦμεν τό δε τι, οὕτω καί ὁ δημιουργός, πρός ἐκεῖνα ἀποβλέπων, τά τῆδε πάντα κεκόσμηκεν/ ἀλλ' ἰστέον, ὅτι τά μέν τῆδε σκιαγραφήματα ἀτελῆ εἰσιν, ἐκεῖνοι δέ οἱ ἐν τῷ Θεῷ λόγοι ἀρχέτυποι καί παντέλειοί εἰσιν: Harris, 1786, p. 437.

108 Τό μέν οὖν καθ'αὐτό αἴτιον ὡρισμένον, τό δέ κατά συμβεβηκός ἀόριστον...: the direct causation is determinate and calculable, but the incidental one is indeterminate.

109 ...ἔστιν ἄρα τά εἴδη πρό τῶν αἰσθητῶν, καί αἴτια αὐτῶν τά δημιουργικά κατά τόν εἰρημένον λόγον, ἐν τῇ μιᾷ τοῦ κόσμου παντός αἰτίᾳ προϋπάρχοντα..

ground for similes like that of fire, referred to by Bacon, and before him by Proclus.[110] Harris follows Proclus in associating knowledge with natural efficacy, in the sense of an effortless action. With a quotation from the second book of Proclus's work, universals are defined as the efficient and intelligent causes of all things produced in accordance with nature. Whilst their effectiveness is a potentiality (power) derived from principles relating to the natural existence of forms, our comprehension of these is based on artificial principles. These principles are identified with the above mentioned terms *reason* and *proportion*, and in all these cases account for the Greek λόγος.

Up to a point, the variability of names manifesting the universals reflects the manner in which Proclus discussed the subject in his comments on *Parmenides* 3.816, where anything which has the meaning of a copy or a likeness seems to be semantically devoid of reality; it also implies the distinction between the derivatives and original forms.

> *That such exemplars, patterns, forms, ideas...must of necessity be, requires no proving, but follows of course, if we admit the cause of nature to be a mind;*[111] *For take away these, and what a mind do we leave without them? chance surely is as knowing, as mind without ideas; or rather, mind without ideas is no less blind than chance.*[112] *...on this system, we have plenty of forms intelligible, which are truly previous to all forms sensible; ...we see that nature is not defective in her triple order, having (like art) her forms previous, her concomitant, and her subsequent.*[113]

Deviating from the tradition of Christian theism and that of Thomas Aquinas, Harris classifies himself with Spinoza, and accepts that the perfect, finite and real forms are included in the infinite (in time) supreme reason (God). This coordinates with the *one in many* speculation and with the argument by design. The opposed theory of the exclusive infinity of God was trapped between the doctrines of God's freedom and the necessity of the world. The way Harris defines language, as inclusive of both particular and general terms, is in accordance with the above sense of inclusive infinity, namely of a reality which is unlimited because it excludes nothing and includes everything incorporated within itself.[114]

The ontological status of general ideas

When considering the question *what kind* of beings are the general forms, Harris asks:

> *Now can we call the perception entire and whole, which implies either intellection without sensation, or sensation without intellection?*[115]

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110 :on his commentary on *Parmenides*, 3.787.

111 [Αἴτιον δέ εἶναι] ἄλλον... τό εἶδος καί τό παράδειγμα: The form and exemplar are regarded as causes: *Metaphysics*, 4.2.1013a26-27.

112 *Ibid.*, p. 380.

113 *Ibid.*, p. 381.

114 Ward, p. 218.

115 Harris, 1751, p. 348.

The three essential properties of universals derive from Leibniz's *Theodicy,*[116] where God's existence is determined by the ***order***, ***harmony***, and ***beauty*** of nature, and where the necessity of metaphysical truth is demonstrated by the actuality of natural substances.[117] The three qualities originate from the stoic tradition; the discussion of them was advanced after the late middle ages with the study of Cicero's *De Natura Deorum.*[118] The latter was the basic instrument for all those eighteenth century devotees of rationalised theology who tried to meditate on religion without, as they thought, superstition.

What we encounter in *Hermes*, is not so much the aristotelian concept of beauty.[119] Harris seems to be closer to the pre-pythagorean heraclitean sense of **λόγος**, as the order hidden in the appearance of things,[120] and also close to Leibniz's *Monadology*, 58, where *variety* does not contradict *order*, but they exist under the same natural law. It was Aquinas[121] who had advanced Aristotle's observations on the efficient cause[122] and demonstrated the existence of God through the order of action observable in the natural laws which determine bodies. Harris, commenting on the nature of these ideas says:

> *...that they are exquisitely beautiful, various, and orderly, is evident from the exquisite beauty, variety, and order, seen in natural substances, which are by their copies or pictures. That they are mental is plain, as they are of the essence of mind, and consequently no objects to any of the senses, nor therefore circumscribed either by time or place.*[123]

But, this may also work the other way round: the truth of our knowledge is proved by the beauty, variety, and order of the forms unfolded by our reasoning. According to Proclus, the order of universals suggests that they are not products of spontaneous generation; as they derive from the same intellectual single cause, they are naturally subjected to general laws.[124] Harris stays within the Platonic tradition, but on this point he does not follow Proclus. He includes order among the properties of forms, bearing in mind the rational order of the neoplatonic forms as a sign of ontological distinction in its most comprehensive sense. He does not refer to the Neoplatonic terminology of the three hypostase,[125] according to which there was a corespondence in this orderly distinction between these three realms,[126] as also between the ontological and the logical aspect of priority. Finally, the variety of forms accounts for the multifariousness of the creations seen as a whole, and it is also a variety in dignity and rank:[127]

> *That the previous may be justly so called is plain, because they are essentially prior to all things*

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116 *Theodicy, Essays on the Goodness of God, the Freedom of Man, and the Origin of Evil"*(1710).
117 The same also in *Monadology*, 58.
118 The references: beauty: 1.96 & 1.112, and order: 2.15 & 2.56.
119 As in *Metaphysics* 13.31078a36-1078b2 or in *Topics*, 3.1.116b21-22.
120 Heraclitus, q. v. 1.
121 *Summa Theologiae*, qu.2, art.3.
122 As in *Metaphysics* 2.2.996b22-23.
123 Harris, 1751, p. 381.
124 *Comment. Parm.*,3.3.
125 although it is a term often used by him.
126 See also, Wallis, p.125.
127 The source again is Proclus, 3.3.

else. The whole visible world exhibits nothing more, than so many passing pictures of these immutable archetypes. Nay thro' these it attains even a semblance of immortality, and continues throughout ages to be specifically one, amid those infinite particular changes, that befall it every moment.[128] *The same immortality, that is the immortality of the kind may be seen in all perishable substances, whether animal or inanimate; for tho' individuals perish, the several kinds still remain.*[129] *May we be allowed then to credit those speculative men, who tell us, 'tis in these permanent and comprehensive forms that the deity views at once, without looking abroad, all possible productions both present, past, and future -that this great and stupendous view is but a view of himself, where all things lie inveloped in their principles and exemplars, as being essential to the fulness of his universal intellection?*[130]

Harris quotes also from Damascius's *De Principiis.*[131] In this Damascius comments on Speusippus.[132] In his commentary, which is a source for Speusippus' theory, Damascius distinguishes between the One (ἕν) and the numerical unit (μονάς): One is explained in its differentiation from the multitude, as that which cannot be a subject of further division (ἀμερές). Damascius defines *one* as the absorbing principle of everything (ἐν ὡς πάντα καταπιών), differing from Speusippus, who seemed to have attributed to it the meaning of minimum quantity. Harris, in order to lay a stress on the transmitive character of forms, in the sense of the tied relation between ideas *per se* and our conceptions, interprets the above πάνθ' ἀμερές as *universal impartibility.* The citation from Damascius' commentary on Speusippus is also an indirect retort to the empiricists. Speusippus had rejected the platonic theory of forms, stating that the One is not a being, but just a principle of it. The discussion, as Taran notes,[133] is on the *Metaphysics*, 1084b23-28,[134] and on the comment of Aristotle on the way the Platonists treated One as a point occupying the minimum space. For Harris, One is the place

where all things lie inveloped in their principles and exemplars, as being essential to the fulness of his universal intellection.[135]

Harris does not quote Damascius for the significance of his work, but because the latter had separated the principle form from formal numbers, in terms of causality and priority. This sort of causality is in accordance with his point of view, quite as Speusippus's doctrine that *a*

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128 *Hermes*, 1751, p.3820-388.

129 Ibid. p. 389.

130 Ibid. p. 391.

131 : *Περί Ἀρχῶν*, 1.2-3 : ...ὅσαπέρ ἐστι τά πολλά κατά δή τινα μερισμόν, τοσαῦτα καί τό ἕν ἐκεῖνο πρό τοῦ μερισμοῦ κατά τό πάντη ἀμερές. Οὐ γάρ ἕν, ὡς ἐλάχιστον, καθάπερ ὁ Σπεύσιππος ἔδοξε λέγειν, ἀλλ' ἕν ὡς πάντα καταπιόν: As numerous as is the multitude of individuals by partition, so numerous is also that principle of unity by universal impartibility. For it is not one, as a minimum is one (according to what Speusippus seemed to say), but it is one, as being all things, Harris, 1751, p. 441.

132 The text as fragment 49 in Taran.

133 Taran, 1981, p. 357.

134 From this passage: Καθάπερ οὖν καί ἕτεροι τινες ἐκ τοῦ ἐλαχίστου τά ὄντα συνετίθεσαν καί οὗτοι: in the same way, some others [than the Platonists-probably the Atomists] represented things that exist as composed of that which is the smallest.

135 Harris, 1751, p. 391.

principle of Fs is not yet F seems, for him, to be irrational and empirical. He tries to present the various philosophical traditions as conformable to each other as possible. By the fragmentary testimony of Damascius he is able to avoid making a point of the different content attributed by Damascius to *unity*. Contrary to Proclus, for the Neoplatonists of the Iamblichian tradition, like Damascius, unity is defined in contrast to multitude, while *one* is the *ineffable* principle.[136]

The innateness of our general concepts

Innate ideas relate to a priori propositions and knowledge, where priority is taken in terms both of time and justification. It is the priority in existence of general truths in the divine mind, which justifies our true knowledge. In this subject, Harris does not openly follow Plato's theory of ἀνάμνησις. He discusses the subject on terms of Aquinas' phrase *nihil in intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu*, as it was further elaborated by Leibniz,[137] and he reconstructs the notion giving primacy to the divine intellect. He attempts a combination of the Platonic divine νοῦς and the aristotelian proposal of *De Anima,* 3.8, that some sort of empirical knowledge should lie at the base of our reasoning:

> ***Nil est in sensu, quod non prius fuit in intellectu.*** *For tho' the contrary may be true with respect to knowledge merely human, yet never can it be true with respect to knowledge universally, unless we give precedence to atoms and lifeless body, making mind, among other things, to be struck out by a lucky concourse.*

Harris cannot accuse empiricism of atheism; not just because Locke[138] had accepted revelation and had tried with *The Reasonableness of Christianity* (1695) to compromise things, but, especially, because a well-informed reader would bear in mind Harris's ancestry from Shaftesbury. That is why he has personal reasons for such a concession. On the other hand, following the tradition of the classical seventeenth century rationalists, he states that sensory experience is acceptable as far its truth is validated by the forms innately existing. He is not interested in the construction of new systems of knowledge, based on a priori reasoning. Even the term *modern philosophers* as a reference to the empiricists, is a repetition of the Leibnizian one suggesting the empiricists, but originally applied to describe the nominalists' denial of general truths.[139]

> *'Tis far from the design of this treatise, to insinuate that atheism is the hypothesis of our later metaphysicians. But yet 'tis somewhat remarkable, in their several systems how readily they admit of the above precedence*[140] *...according to their account...first comes that huge body, the sensible*

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136 *De Principiis,* 1.86.3ff.

137 *New Essays on Human Understanding,* 2.1.110-111.

138 Hume was considered not even a deist, but an atheist.

139 This last was the meaning of the term as used by Leibniz, when he commented on the *via moderna* of the nominalists: *Discourse*, prgrf. 3 & 8.

140 Harris, 1751, p.392; it is extraordinary, that a deist is accussing others for atheism; in the above quotation, the word *atheism* seems to have just the meaning of being unreligious, in the sense of not believing in the specific God. In the passage quoted, Harris' anti-empiricism seems rather insultive and tricky.

world. Then this and its attributes beget sensible ideas. Then out of sensible ideas, by a kind of lopping and pruning, are made ideas intelligible, whether specific or general. Thus should they admit that mind was coeval with body, yet till body gave it ideas, and awakened its dormant powers, it could at best have been nothing more, than a sort of dead capacity; for innate ideas it could not possibly have any.[141]

Harris feels that his aristotelian hylomorphism is challenged. In his attempt to reject empiricism, the duality *form-matter* is transformed into the type *mind-body*. For him, empiricism is based absolutely on materialism, and he roughly affirms this as the main difference between empiricism and his rationalism. In order to lay as great a stress as possible on the difference between innate ideas and accidental forms, he also attacks the natural scientists. He follows the mainstream of philosophers of the seventeenth and eighteenth century, who misconceived Locke's empiricism considering it as a theory of metaphysics. On the other hand accusations and criticisms like these made by Harris imply that empiricism should be accused of just not having been transformed and expanded from an epistemological theory of perception to a theory of metaphysics. The problem for both parts is how to explain the presence of ideas in our mind. Harris's innateness counters what Locke saw as an awareness of the operations of our mind. The argument here implied by him is that if we deny the preexistence of forms, that would mean that mind does not exist before experiencing them. Harris misconceives the empiricists as believing in preexisting sensible forms. But Locke had defined forms (*ideas*) as that which only occurs in our mind. The following passage refers to the Newtonians and scientific deists of the beginning of the eighteenth century, who jointly used mathematical discoveries and experiment in biology and physics as proofs of order in the universe and of a god controlling the system of nature. On the other hand, it may also refer to the seventeenth century vitalists. The terminology used by Harris brings to mind the Empedoclean theory of sensation and the doctrines of effluences (*ἀπορροαί*),[142] given off by the objects of knowledge, and entering the congruent passages (*πόροι*) in the senses, so as to result in sensation.

At another time we hear of bodies so exceedingly fine, that their very exility makes them susceptible of sensation and knowledge; as if they shrunk into intellect by their exquisite subtlety, which rendred them too delicate to be bodies any longer. 'Tis to this notion we owe many curious inventions, such as subtle aether, animal spirits, nervous ducts, vibrations, and the like terms, which modern philosophy, upon parting with occult qualities, has found expedient to provide itself, to supply their place.[143]

The response to this (the so called intellectual scheme) is the rationalist's theory, according to which our epistemological capacities are of a metaphysical origin:

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[141] *Ibid.*, pp. 392-393.
[142] Fragment 29.
[143] Harris, 1751, p. 393.

But the intellectual scheme, which never forgets deity, postpones every thing corporeal to the primary mental cause. 'Tis here it looks for the origin of intelligible ideas, even of those, which exist in human capacities. For tho' sensible objects may be the destined medium, to awaken the dormant energies of man's understanding, yet are those energies themselves no more contained in sense, than the explosion of a cannon, in the spark which gave it fire.[144]

By quoting Olympiodorus, Harris focusses on the difference between the efficient and formal cause, taking the last in a completely Platonic sense. In this quotation we find again a combination of different in their origin terms. The meaning of the term *principle*, as used by Harris, is reminiscent of the Parmenidean *One*, especially in the way it was developed in the Neoplatonic tradition, as the aim of an innately true knowledge, activated by means of *ἀνάμνησις*. Harris maintains the polarity between *αἴσθησις* and *νόησις*, but he attributes validity only to the noetic knowledge, and this specifically by ascending to the ultimate .. The extract of Olympiodorus is from his commentary on *Timaeus*: it focusses on the intermediary role in which sensitive perception should be restricted. Using a well-established terminology, Harris states the role of sensitive perception in the acquisition of knowledge, in contrast to the taints of the *vulgar* empiricists:

Those things, which are inferior and secondary, are by no means the principles or causes of the more excellent; and tho' we admit the common interpretations, and allow sense to be a principle of science, we must however call it a principle, not as if it was the efficient cause, but as it rouses our soul to the recollection of general ideas. -According to the same way of thinking is it said in the Timaeus, that through the sight and hearing we acquire to ourselves philosophy, because we pass from objects of sense to reminiscence or recollection; ...For in as much as the soul, by containing the principles of all beings, is a sort of omniform representation or exemplar; when it is roused by objects of sense, it recollects those principles, which it contains within, and brings them forth.[145]

In *Metaphysics* 1010a, Aristotle said that by knowing things we become aware of their εἶδος; this was further developed in *De Anima* 3. 431b-432a, with the discussion about the reason of the εἶδος of known objects, by which they enter our soul. For Harris senses are

the destined medium, to awaken the dormant energies of man's understanding, yet are those energies themselves no more contained in sense, than the explosion of a cannon, in the spark which gave it fire.

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[144] Ibid., p. 393-4.

[145] Οὐδέποτε γάρ τά χείρω καί δεύτερα ἀρχαί ἤ αἰτίαι εἰσί τῶν κρειττόνων· εἰ δέ δεῖ καί ταῖς ἐγκυκλίοις ἐξηγήσεσι πείθεσθαι· καί ἀρχήν εἰπεῖν τήν αἴσθησιν τῆς ἐπιστήμης, λέξομεν αὐτήν ἀρχήν οὐχ ὡς ποιητικήν, ἀλλ' ὡς ἐρεθίζουσαν τήν ἡμετέραν ψυχήν εἰς ἀνάμνησιν τῶν καθόλου- κατά ταύτην δέ τήν ἐννοίαν εἴρηται καί τῷ ἐν Τιμαίῳ, ὅτι δι' ὄψεως καί ἀκοῆς τό τῆς φιλοσοφίας ἐπορισάμεθα γένος, διότι ἐκ τῶν αἰσθητῶν εἰς ἀνάμνησιν ἀφικνούμεθα. ...'Επειδή γάρ πάμμορφον ἀγαλμα ἐστιν ἡ ψυχή, πάντων τῶν ὄντων ἔχουσα λόγους, ἐρεθιζομένη ὑπό τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἀναμιμνήσκεται ὧν ἔνδον ἔχει λόγων, καί τούτους προβάλλεται: Harris, 1751, pp. 394-395.

The uniformity of philosophical speculation, introduced with the reconciliation between the Platonic and the Aristotelian modes of thinking, was further developed in Rennaisance times, as a harmonised composition of the Latin-western and the Greek-eastern thought. As Sanctius stands in *Hermes* as a classic symbol of the western tradition, Pletho represents the eastern Christian philosophical thought. The extract quoted by Harris is from his work *De Platonicae et Aristotelicae Philosophiae Differentia,* a work trying to re-establish the authority of Plato over that of Aristotle. Harris adds Pletho to his extensive list of quotations in order to give further explanation of the principles referred to above:

> ... those who suppose ideal forms, say that the soul, when she assumes, for the purpose of science those proportions, which exist in sensible objects, possesses them with a superior accuracy and perfection, than that to which they attain in those sensible objects. Now this superior perfection or accuracy the soul cannot have from sensible objects, as it is in fact not in them; nor yet can she conceive it herself as from herself, without its having existence anywhere else. For the soul is not formed so as to conceive that, which has existence nowhere, since even such opinions, as are false, are all of them compositions irregularly formed, not of mere non-beings, but of various real beings, one with another. It remains therefore that this perfection, which is superior to the proportions existing in sensible objects, must descend to the soul from some other nature, which is by many degrees more excellent and perfect.[146]

Λόγος in the above quotation relates to knowledge of rational principles acquired by the soul; the prevalence of which compared to that coming directly from the objects themselves is based on Proclus' *Parmenides* 789.14-16. The target here is to discriminate between the nature of forms and their analogical reference to their natural principle, which reposes in a further realm, and of which forms are qualitative properties. On the other hand, as Harris specifies, mathematical numbers and geometrical magnitudes are both included in Pletho's account of proportions. This is actually the Platonic class of intermediaries (*μεταξύ*), a separate ontological status between forms and things.[147] Harris extends these mathematical entities (*ἀριθμοί μαθηματικοί*) to include also the ideal numbers (*ἀριθμοί εἰδητικοί*). Moreover, it is clear that his thought on this is along the lines of the Thomistic analysis of Plato,[148] dealing specifically with the distinction between abstract universals and the objects of our own intellectual abstraction.[149]

> *The λόγοι or proportions, of which Gemistus here speaks, mean not only those relative*

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[146] Τήν ψυχήν φασίν οἱ τά εἴδη τιθέμενοι ἀναλαμβάνουσαν ἔσγε ἐπιστήμην τούς ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς λόγους, ἀκριβέστερον αὐτούς ἔχοντας καί τελεώτερον ἐν ἑαυτῇ ἴχειν, ἤ ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς ἔχουσι. Τό οὖν τελεώτερον τοῦτο καί ἀκριβέστερον οὐκ ἄν ἀπό τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἴχειν τήν ψυχήν, ὅγε μή ἐστίν ἐν αὐτοῖς. Οὐ δ' αὖ μηδαμοῦ ἀλλοθι ὄν αὐτήν ἐξ αὐτῆς διαννοεῖσθαι· οὐ δέ γάρ πεφυκέναι τήν ψυχήν μηδαμῆ ὄν, τι διαννοείσθαι· τάς γάρ ψευδεῖς τῶν δοξῶν οὐχί μή ὄντων ἀλλ' ὄντων μέν, ἄλλων δέ κατ' ἄλλων εἶναι συνθέσεις τινάς, οὐ κατά τό ὀρθόν γινομένας: K.a4-b4.

[147] *Parmen.129* and *Phaedo*, 74c.

[148] *De Substantiis Separatis*, ch.1.

[149] See also O'Meara, 1982, p. 102.

proportions of equality and inequality, which exist in quantity, (such as double, sesquialter, etc.) but in a larger sense, they may be extended to mathematical lines, angles, figures, etc. of all which λόγοι or proportions, tho' we possess in the mind the most clear and precise ideas, yet it may be justly questioned, whether any one of them ever existed in the sensible world. To these two authors we may add Boethius, who ...enumerated many acts of the mind or intellect, wholly distinct from sensation, and independent of it.[150]

[150] Harris, 1751, p. 397.

Epilogue

The immediate predecessor of *Hermes* is the speculative grammars of the medieval scholars. The distinction between the material and the formal part of language is the primary feature of both the medieval speculative and the post-fifteenth centuryaccounts of universal grammar. Complying with this tradition, *Hermes* is divided into two parts: one containing the strictly grammatical observations on the matter of language (the first two books), and one which treats of the relation between this grammatical material and the specific philosophical principles to which this yields (in the last part). But *Hermes* emphasises not its relation with its medieval predecessor, but the relation with the common ancestor of both speculative and universal grammar, namely the ancient classical texts.

For the linguistic, *Hermes* represents the connective link between the pre-scientific study of language and the science of linguistics as developed after 1751. For the philosopher, *Hermes* has no original material to present; its employment with neoplatonic sources are not something innovative for its time. The great value of *Hermes* lies in the comprehensive way in which it reintroduced during the age of Enlightenment the classical philosophical and grammatical tradition. It is remarkable that during the eighteenth century, it was by this text that the educated people became familiarised with the forgotten philosophical and grammatical background of a terminology, which was thus thought at the moment to be new and original. Thus the main contribution of *Hermes* is neither strictly linguistic, nor strictly philosophical; it is the incorporation of the classical authors into the modern theory of language and by this, the rehabilitation of a uniformity between the traditional and the innovative, the old-fashioned and what was considered by the *enlightened* Europe as modern. This sense of uniformity in the modes of thinking gains its greatest tribute by depicting the Greek and Latin philosophical thought as a synthesis of harmonised components, quite as the choice to discuss Pletho, Blemmides, Sanctius, and Scaliger next to the ancient sources, reflects the continuity of the classical philosophical tradition and thought. Harris' conception of universal grammar combines the medieval and Renaissance discussion on the existence of a *reason* in language with the deistic attitudes of the eighteenth century and their neoplatonic background. Thus we may say that *Hermes* played a decisive role in the history of both the linguistic thought and study of philosophy.

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