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Leavening Society – The Role of Religious Organisations in Integration Processes in Norway

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Abstract

This thesis explores how religious organisations can influence integration processes in Norway through a case study of the Catholic Church, a Catholic charity, and a Catholic youth association. In order to fully understand the role of religious organisations, this thesis also examined secular identities/identifications/organisations and how, if at all, they diverge in influencing integration processes. I provide an extensive literature review that sets up a discursive framework, which allows me to draw together a range of concepts and understandings, and to critically analyse the findings in their appropriate context. The framework suggests a continuum of understanding integration processes, marked by three ideal types: a Redistributie Discourse of Exclusion (RED/Redintegration), a Social Integrationist Discourse (SID), and a Moral Underclass Discourse (MUD). Rather than imposing a view of integration processes on the participants and research, the discursive framework allows them to express nuanced understandings of how integration processes operate and how they may be shaped.

Integration processes are processes of societal reconstitution, and require an in-depth exploration of the contexts in which they occur. With the religious/secular emphasis of the thesis, this entails exploring both constructions of the nation and the development of Catholicism in Norway. Utilising a range of qualitative methods, centred on ethnography, I gathered data from multiple organisations, religious and secular, and across multiple locations, over the course of fourteen months. This continuous, in-depth, qualitative research is essential to capturing the processual and contested nature of integration processes. What I discovered was that the perception of the end goal of integration processes was fundamental to how different organisations influenced integration processes. Similarly, what stood out was how the Social Integrationist Discourse was prevalent in both the secular and religious organisations. The functional emphasis of SID renders perspectives susceptible to Moral Underclass Discourses. The Church and its youth organisation, on the other hand, had a more open-ended perspective on integration processes, which was also expressed by the migrant research participants; exhibiting a Redintegrationist discourse.

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Authors Declaration

I declare that, except where explicit reference is made to the contribution of others, that this dissertation is the result of my own work and has not been submitted for any other degree at the University of Glasgow or any other institution.

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Stephen Richard Trotter

Abbreviations

Acronym	Norwegian	English
UDI	Utlendingsdirektoratet	Norwegian Immigration Authority
SSB	Statistisk Sentralbyrå	Statistics Norway
IMDi	Integrering og Mangfoldsdirektoratet	Directorate for Integration and Diversity
NUK	Norges Unge Katolikker	Catholic Youth of Norway
RCB	Røde Kors Bodø	Red Cross Bodø
RWTB	Refugees Welcome to Bodø	Refugees Welcome to Bodø
OKB	Oslo Katolske Bispedømme	Catholic Diocese of Oslo
SID		Social Integrationist Discourse
RED		Redistributive Discourse of Exclusion
MUD		Moral Underclass Discourse
NFK	Nordland Fylkeskommune	Nordland County Municipality
WYD	Verdensungdomsdagene (VUD)	World Youth Days
LNU	Landsrådet for Norske Ungdomsorganisasjoner	National Council of Norwegian Youth Associations
NAV	Ny Arbeids- og Velferdsforvaltning	Norwegian Labour and Welfare Administration
LO	Landsorganisasjonen i Norge	Norwegian Conferedation of Trade Unions
NHO	Næringslivets Hovedorganisasjon	Confederation of Norwegian Enterprise

Chapter 1 – Introduction
1.1 – Leavening understandings of integration processes

In January 2008, the Norwegian minister for Labour and Social Inclusion met with Bp. Eidsvig of the Catholic Diocese of Oslo in order to discuss the positive role of the Catholic Church on the integration processes of Polish labour migrants in Norway (Katolsk.no, 2008a; 2008b). 2008 was the year migrants from Poland became the largest group of migrants in Norway, after nearly 40 years of Scandinavian migrants holding the title. Six years later, the Church was accused of membership fraud, related to the same migration of Poles, after Polands EU accession, to Norway. This forces us to question *how* the Church influences integration processes. For years, the Catholic Church in Norway has claimed to be a positive influence on integration processes, but the claim has not been thoroughly investigated. It is only the last few years there has been any extensive research on the Church's influence on integration processes in Norway (Erdal, 2016b; Hovdelien, 2016; Mæland, 2016; Aschim, et al., 2016). Much of this is exploratory, as opposed to a full analysis of integration processes.

The title of this thesis draws on a recurring theme and image in Pope Francis' papacy — leaven (Scalfari, 2013; Pope Francis, 2015; 2017; 2018a). Both the culinary and intellectual understanding of the term imply raising something, improving a combination of ingredients that will result in something greater than the sum of its parts. Yet, as anyone familiar with baking can attest to, success is never guaranteed, and a myriad of factors might cause something to go awry. Importantly, religion is not the *only* leaven; or as one interviewee, Gunnar from Caritas Bergen[1], put it 'what we have tried to do, is to not bake the same cake'. There is more than one route to integration, and there is no universal answer as to what the end goal is. What shapes integration processes at a local level may differ from the regional, national, transnational, global, and individual levels. Which does not suggest people, and organisations, do not have ideas of what an integrated society is, how it can be achieved, and how they differ.

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[1] One of the religious organisations explored in the thesis.

This thesis participates in and contributes to debates on integration processes and secularisation. These concepts are explored in depth in chapter 2. As this thesis will argue, integration processes are processes of societal reconstitution, and therefore are continuous, relational, and contextual. The thesis contributes to the secularisation debates, which questions the role of religion in society. This has resulted in the decision to explore not only the role of the Church, but to situate it in a wider context that extends beyond the religious sphere. It stems from a perspective that society should be considered holistically. In other words, we cannot consider the role of religion without also considering the role of the non-religious and everything in between. Furthermore, this thesis builds on previous research I have done on the Catholic Church in Norway (Trotter, 2013; Trotter, 2014).

The thesis utilises statistical data, historical data, policy reports, geographical data, participant observation, interviews, and documentary analysis. Therefore, the theoretical framework has to be able draw together all these forms of data and demonstrate the interrelationship between them. The approach in this thesis is reminiscent of Fredrik Barth's dictum that sociologists and anthropologists 'be like the magpie and steal all that glitters' (Barth, et al., 1990, p. 215). Although referring to the development of theory, the ethnographic approach of this thesis draws on the same idea methodologically. Despite an extensive review of literature on migration and integration processes, the discursive framework, that this thesis is built around, derives from analyses of political language and social exclusion (Levitas, 2005). This decision stems from the fieldwork data. The data required stepping beyond the concepts and theories developed by migration and integration scholars that appeared to offer only a partial analysis.

1.2 – Aims and research questions

The aim of this thesis is to contribute to the nascent field of research on the intersections of Catholicism and immigration in Norway. Despite previous studies and research, such as by Mæland (2016), Hovdelien (2016), and Aschim et al. (2016), none have explicitly included non-religious organisations and individuals. This is necessary in order to more fully explore the potential, or lack of, influence of religious organisations. The addition of an analysis of secular aspects and the intersections with the religious is one of the innovative contributions of this thesis. Rather than privileging religion, religious organisations, and religious identities, this thesis aims to shed new light on the religious-secular relationship by drawing attention to how they can reflect and/or refract each other. This challenges the idea that the religious and secular operate in distinct spheres of influence, but examines the relationship between them. In response to the stated aim of this thesis, I formulated the following research questions:

1. To what extent, and in what ways, do religious and secular identities and identifications influence integration processes?
2. What is the role of the Catholic Church (in Norway) and related institutions in integration processes?
    a. How does the nature of the Catholic Church affect its response to and perception of integration processes?
        i. How do the responses and perceptions of integration processes mirror or diverge from other organisations or institutions, such as the state?
    b. How does the relationship between different Catholic organisations influence integration processes?
3. How do secular organisations and activities in Norway impact integration processes?
    a. How do secular organisations and institutions, and their members, mirror or diverge from each other, and the state, in their understanding of integration processes?

1.3 – Thesis outline

In Chapter 2, I delve into the literature pertinent to the thesis. Building up to an exploration of theoretical underpinnings of integration processes, I first examine processes of migrant identification and categorisation. This stems from the perspective that identities are the fundamental components of integration processes. The next step is to present and discuss the discursive framework that allows us to understand how identities, categorisations, and integration processes interact. The discursive framework presents a continuum which allows us to sort a vast array of concepts in the integration and migration literature. Applied to the data in the substantive chapters, it deepens our understanding of how integration processes are viewed and influenced by organisations, migrants, and non-migrants. Finally, I offer a brief foray into how the discursive framework can help us understand how religion and religious organisations can be seen and understood in integration processes.

In Chapter 3 I discuss the methods used in pursuit of answers to the research questions. As mentioned above, this includes ethnography, interviews, and document analysis. Special attention is given to ethnography, as it was the principle method used during the data collection process. As ethnography is a holistic method, much of what is covered in those sections formulate the underlying methodology, where participant observation, interviews, and document analysis are tools available to the ethnographer. Subsequently, I consider some analytical issues related to the choice of methods, fieldwork sites, and data analysis. Following this, I explore issues around reflexivity and the impact researcher identities have on the research. Finally, I discuss ethical considerations in the research, such as participant anonymity, participant awareness of research and consent, and risks in social research.

Chapter 4 provides an in-depth look at some of the key factors that shape integration processes and establish the context under which those processes occur. Beginning with a detailed and extensive breakdown of statistics germane to the analyses. This entails an appreciation of historical developments in migration patterns, both international and domestic. The next step is to present

statistical data in ways that allows us to understand and appreciate the complexity and heterogeneity of migrants. Subsequently, I track the development of Norwegian policy in the migration and integration field over the last half century, and explore how understandings of integration processes have shifted in terms of policy. Following this, I devote some space to discussing the particular details concerning Bodø and Nordland, the county in which Bodø lies.

As religion is a particular focus of this thesis, Chapter 5 is devoted to exploring the particularities of the religious context in Norway. By initially looking at religion in Norway generally, it sets the stage for understanding how the Catholic Church fits into the overall landscape. In order to appreciate the full value of the findings, it is necessary to closely examine the Catholic Church in Norway in detail. Bearing in mind the details from the preceding chapter, exploring the interconnections between the Catholic Church and immigration in Norway provides a background that contributes to dispelling certain notions, such as its status as an "immigrant Church". Rather, as the chapter shows through a close scrutiny of demographic and documentary details, the emphasis should be on the Church as managing, or attempting to manage, a 'unity within complex diversity' (Erdal, 2016b, p. 264) while simultaneously negotiating its own place in Norway.

This sets the scene for Chapter 6, exploring how integration processes are influenced at Diocesan and Parochial levels. In particular, we see how the rapid growth over a relatively short period of time can affect parishes, such as St. Eystein in Bodø, and activities in NUK and Caritas. This is also where we see the utility of the discursive framework, as it helps distinguish the different influences religious organisations can exert on integration processes. The chapter also demonstrates how awareness of integration processes can cause shifts in activities and goals for the different organisations.

In the following chapter, I explore how a framework developed primarily for the analysis of religious organisations by Hirschmann (2004), can benefit from an expansion into the secular. In Chapter 7, I explore the pursuit and provision of

Hirschmann's three Rs: resources, refuge, and respectability. Based on my findings, focusing on interviews with migrants, I suggest adding a fourth R: reciprocity. Examining the interrelation of these concepts, I again draw on the discursive framework to demonstrate how the, now four, Rs can influence integration processes.

In the third, and final, substantive chapter, I explore how non-migrants in various positions of responsibility in Bodø frame activities within their respective organisations. By exploring how they perceive their activities, volunteers, and migrants, I critically examine the underlying perspectives on integration processes. Chapter 8 highlights how understandings of integration processes shift based on the context and situations being questioned. Thus, we find that despite using the same word, *integration*, the interviewees demonstrate vastly different discursive traits when focusing on influencing integration processes emphasising non-migrants' experiences of shifting demographics or migrants' arrival and needs.

1.4 – Thesis contributions

Finally, in the conclusion I draw attention to the key contributions of this thesis. The application of the discursive framework throughout the chapters, demonstrates how integration processes are perceived, understood, and influenced. It also shows how an emphasis on discourse can allow us to go beyond the religious-secular continuum and understanding, and demonstrates the similarities between two supposedly contrary spheres of influence. The scope of this thesis offers a significant contribution to the understanding of how religion can influence integration processes. Through the synthesis of previous literature on integration processes, a critical understanding of Norwegian nation-building and Catholic doctrine and structures, and findings, I have adapted a discursive framework that allows us to see how multiple actors, organisational and individual, religious and secular, influence integration processes based on their conceptualisations of integration and their discourses around it.

Chapter 2 – Theoretical framework

2.1 – Introduction

This chapter will outline and discuss the various concepts and theoretical underpinnings of this thesis. Constructing a theoretical framework is crucial to satisfactorily answering the questions this thesis asks. Here, I explore and discuss key concepts, such as *identities and identification*, and *integration*. In order to analyse the research material, and thereby provide some answers to the research questions, I propose a discursive framework. This framework allows us to distinguish the nuances contained in the language around migration and integration processes, and to point to the potential impact of the different discourses. The research questions are as follows:

1. To what extent, and in what ways, do religious and secular identities and identifications influence integration processes?
2. What is the role of the Catholic Church (in Norway) and related institutions in integration processes?
   a. How does the nature of the Catholic Church affect its response to and perception of integration processes?
      i. How do the responses and perceptions of integration processes mirror or diverge from other organisations or institutions, such as the state?
   b. How does the relationship between different Catholic organisations influence integration processes?
3. How do secular organisations and activities in Norway impact integration processes?
   a. How do secular organisations and institutions, and their members, mirror or diverge from each other, and the state, in their understanding of integration processes?

This chapter will focus on notions of identity and identification, as these notions inherently underpin all theoretical understandings of integration processes, which are discussed in section 2.4. Emphasising the most relevant markers of identity

relevant to migration, integration, and the questions of this thesis, I will first explore the triumvirate of identities: religious, ethnic, and national (REN). These three were chosen due to their interconnectedness (Baumann, 1999), and to a certain extent for their prevalence. REN identities are susceptible to criticisms of rigidity and encouraging a static understanding of identities, justifiably so, but this renders them, at a glance, easy to spot. To turn an axiom on its head: sometimes you have to see the forest before you can investigate the tress.

This is not to suggest that gender, sexuality, and age are not relevant, nor is this list exhaustive. Transnational, diasporic, or cosmopolitan identities are often offered as modifications to our understandings of the above identities (Vertovec, 2001), and are occasionally pertinent to the analysis, but was not a specific focus of this thesis due to limitations of space, resources, and scope. Regional identities, at both supranational (such as a Nordic identity) and sub-state levels (Northern v Southern Norwegian, urban v rural), are also relevant in certain contexts, and discussed as they become relevant in this thesis. Intrinsic to this discussion is the contextual nature of identities and identification processes, contexts that are explored and discussed in subsequent chapters.

The research questions also necessitate a discussion of another identity, that of "migrant". Breaking down migrant identities is essential in order to demonstrate relationships of power, and critically examining organisations that engage with migrants. Labelling and categorisation of migrants is an essential component of differentiating and legitimizing experiences of migration and responses to migration by both state apparatuses and other organisations, such as those discussed in this thesis (Crawley & Skleparis, 2018). Despite their permeation of processes of categorisation, the understanding of migrant identities through processes of identity formation and identification is rarely highlighted.

From there, we can have a fruitful discussion of the nature of integration and the concomitant field. The emphasis here is not on individuals (or places) in need of integration, i.e. migrants and their environs, but on the various aspects of

integration that underpin preconceptions of "successful" versus "failed" integration. This area is fraught with concepts and terminology in need of clarification. The discussion will attempt to carve a path through the jungle of competing understandings and highlight this thesis' base premise when referring to integration, a concept Robinson (1998, p. 118) characterised as 'chaotic'. The contestation of keywords is neatly summarised by Salazar (2017, p. 7):

> [Keywords] never acquire a closed or final meaning (not even within one domain or discipline). The meaning of a keyword is never settled until it truly disappears from common use or its scholarly paradigm goes into decline. As keywords acquire new meanings, they do not shed old ones. Historically, keywords accumulate meanings, sometimes contradictory ones, and even when one is dominant, others remain available and can be reaffirmed. Moreover, keywords rarely shift their meaning in isolation but rather in conjunction with others.

The clarification of keywords and concepts will result in a discursive framework, which I will subsequently apply to the role of religion and religious organisations impact on integration processes. This serves as an example of how the framework will be applied throughout this thesis, where the full depth and breadth of the context can provide a clear picture. This chapter, therefore, attempts to distil the relevant literature and strengthen our understanding of these contested keywords that are at the heart of the discussion. That is not to suggest they will cease to be contested, but that this thesis attempts to facilitate a clear, coherent answer to the research questions.

2.2 – Identification and categorisation – From individuals to groups

Identities are to Sociology what elements are to Chemistry. Two related questions need exploring in order to understand *Identities*: firstly, what are they and how are they formed? Secondly, how do they work? Pursuing these questions derives from the question of *why* they matter, which is, for now, explained by the view that 'identity tends to promote social cohesion', what Holtug calls 'the "Identity Thesis"' (Holtug, 2017, p. 1084). He makes a distinction between two forms of identity, a social identity and personal identity; although he fails to critically examine these categories.

They bear a resemblance to Brubaker and Cooper's (2000, p. 15) '*relational* and *categorical* modes of identification', respectively. According to Holtug (2017, p. 1086), the social identity derives from the knowledge of being a member of a social group, thus it is an identity contingent upon a relationship, imagined or real, to others. This is comparable to one of Brubaker and Cooper's "key uses" of identity, referring to identity as a '*collective* phenomenon' (2000, pp. 7, 15)[2], which they prefer to analyse as relational identification. Hall (2015, p. 394) refers to identities in this sense as 'the names we give to the different ways we are positioned by, and position ourselves within, the narratives of the past'.

The personal identity stems from an individual's unique characteristics and traits (Holtug, 2017), which Brubaker and Cooper (2000, pp. 7,15) understand as pointing to 'something allegedly *deep, basic, abiding, or foundational*', the categorical identification. These distinctions do not imply clear, bounded types of identities, merely ways of understanding how they are used, bearing in mind FitzGerald's (2012) admonition to not construct boundaries, categories, and identities out of force of habit but to be critically aware of the processes of construction, interaction, and prioritisation. This processual perspective is neatly captured by Hall (2015, p. 395) wherein identities are 'not an essence but a positioning'. I will return to this below.

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[2] Brubaker and Cooper (2000, p. 7) also suggest a relationship between social cohesion and the collective phenomenon – 'This sameness is expected to manifest itself in solidarity, in shared dispositions or consciousness, or in collective action'

A fundamental premise of the onward discussion is that an individual has multiple, intersecting, and overlapping identities (Amelina & Faist, 2012), hence an aversion to utilising the singular form "identity". This approach incorporates the argument from Brubaker and Cooper (2000) that, analytically, the concept of identification is more fruitful. *Identification* emphasises the internally oriented (Jenkins, 2000), processual, and relational nature of identities, hence if we seek to understand a singular identity it needs to be seen in relation to other identities, be they one's own or someone else's.

This is contrasted with "categorisation", which is an external form of identification (Jenkins, 2000). The key detail is how categories are not self-ascribed, but the result of the use of 'material and symbolic resources to impose [categories], classificatory schemes, and modes of social counting and accounting [...]' (Brubaker & Cooper, 2000, p. 16)[3]. Although the state is a prime example of the use of categorisation, states are not alone in imposing categories: processes of categorisation also take place through public narratives and in everyday life (Brubaker & Cooper, 2000). These two points hint at relationships of power (Jenkins, 2000), whereby an individual may not choose which identity is relevant in a situation or context, or that it may be contested, and an individual may be denied an identity[4]. This is fundamental to understanding integration processes, as discussed below.

Brubaker and Cooper (2000) describe identities as characterised by three elements: (1) categorical commonality, the sharing of an attribute; (2) relational connectedness, having a network sharing the relevant identity; and (3) a feeling of belonging. They function both as identifications and as categorisations. As categorisations, for example by the state, they are used to define, differentiate, demarcate, and isolate groups, and to subsequently apply a policy to them (Crawley & Skleparis, 2018). As Jenkins (2000), and Bartram, et al. (2014), argue

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[3] See also Jenkins (2000, p. 19)
[4] For example, claiming two national identities or religious identities may be contested, and the individual forced to choose one over the other.

categorisation is essential for the management of complexity of the social world, to the point where these concepts appear natural.

Furthermore, categorisation can offer a false sense of the timelessness of identities, and rarely display an appreciation of the history and trajectories of how identities are socially constructed and made relevant (Polzer, 2008)[5]. As Brubaker and Cooper remark, categorisation does not imply anything 'about the *depth, resonance, or power* of such categories in the lived experience of the persons so categorized' (Brubaker & Cooper, 2000, pp. 26-27). Yet, categorisations can be internalized (Jenkins, 2000), and give categorisations a sense of legitimacy. Similarly, categorisations can provoke resistance. These processes are integral to later discussions.

2.2.1 – Religious identities, identifications, and categorisations

The first research question this thesis seeks to answer pertains to the role of identities and identifications in integration processes. Having discussed general ideas around identities and identification, as well as categorisation, above, I turn to the three identities I have identified as most pertinent to this thesis.

Exploring each of the REN identities in turn[6], I will begin with Religious Identities, as it forms a significant part of this thesis. To reiterate Brubaker and Cooper's point above, religious identifications or categorisations do not imply depth, resonance, or the power of these identities. That is to a certain extent captured by the concept *religiosity*. Putnam (2007) argues that religious identities are uniquely situated to cut across ethnic or national identities, which is not to suggest they are alone in that. It can be argued that religious and national identities are both privileged in part due to the notion that these identities can "be done something about", through conversion and naturalisation[7], thereby mitigating or

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[5] See, for example, Umut Özkirimli (2000) on 'Primordialism' as a paradigm within studies of nationalism

[6] Note, this does not suggest they exist and operate independently of each other. Rather the opposite, they often overlap.

[7] The UN Universal Declaration on Human Rights, for example, specifically refers to an individual's right to change their nationality (article 15) or religion (article 18), whereas ethnicity is not mentioned in the same way (United Nations, 2018)

limiting an imposition of a religious or national identity. That is not to suggest religious identities, or national identities, have an unmitigated positive effect on integration processes, as that is context-dependent.

Looking more closely of what religious identities are, I refer back to Holtug's (2017) argument that the Identity Thesis is premised on social cohesion consisting of shared values. Religious identities involve sharing values characterised by reference to a religion and the construction of something sacred (Hall, 1995). For brevity, I will provide Knott's definition of religion: 'social relations given meaning by a certain type of ideology, set of traditions, values, and ritual practices' (Knott, 2005, p. 134). Religious identities also involve relationships to places constructed as important, such as places of worship[8] or sites of pilgrimage[9] (Rose, 1995). Religion, and religious identities, can therefore be seen as a 'system of organizing meaning, based upon identification with a chain or line of belief' (Hervieu-Léger, 2000).

Religion, and religious identities, are often contrasted with secularism and ideas of secularity. As in the research questions of this thesis, it is assumed that the secular operates differently or separately from the religious, a distinction which is not fruitful. Rather than seeing it as a binary relationship of religious-secular, the relationship between the two concepts is highly complex (Asad, 2003). I return to secularism and secularisation processes in section 2.4.3. Contrasting secular and religious identities, as in the research questions, merely recognises that there a range of identities and identification processes that exist and operate with varying degrees of reference to religion, religious authority, organisations, communities, groups, and institutions.

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[8] Churches, temples, synagogues, mosques, etc.
[9] Such as Mecca for Muslims, Rome for Catholics, or Jerusalem for Jews, Christians, and Muslims.

2.2.2 – Ethnic identities, identifications, and categorisations

Moving on to Ethnicity, identities shaped around this concept are highly elusive. Whereas religious identities attempt to reference some sacred truth contained within a religion, ethnic identities are more malleable. As Fredrik Barth posited in one of his most significant pieces: 'The features that are taken into account [in ethnic identities] are not the sum of "objective" differences, but only those which the actors themselves regard as significant' (Barth, 1998[1969], p. 14). Add to the mix that ethnic identities are not homogeneous (Macdonald, 1993) and can be layered[10], it is essential to underline the need for a critical understanding of how, as categorisations, ethnic identities are constructed (Polzer, 2008) and determined by context (Rothschild, 1981). This thesis sees ethnicity from a Constructivist perspective, as opposed to the defined, fixed, and timeless perspective of Primordialists.

Khosravi (2012) demonstrates how even names can be imbued with an 'ethnic tag', which points to the pervasive nature of categorisations and how identities can be imposed or assumed. These ethnic categorisations are then taken to imply something about an individual or a group (Friberg & Midtbøen, 2018). It becomes even more complex as *culture* is often tied to ethnic identities, necessitating a clarification of what is meant by culture. As with religion above, there is a vast plethora of material discussing and defining *culture*, most of which it is infeasible to cover here. As a starting point, I offer Bauböck's (1996a) summary:

> [Culture] refers, on the one hand, to complex systems of symbols and ideas that human beings use in their communication; and on the other hand, to comprehensive ways of life or to societal communities whose members share a system of symbols and ideas. In a shorthand manner, we may speak about culture as language and culture as community.
>
> Bauböck (1996a, p. 89)

This rudimentary understanding of culture allows us to attempt some clarification, if only by virtue of establishing ethnic identities as a means of 'rendering cultural differences comparable' (Eriksen, 2014, p. 170), or 'dialectical cultural

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[10] Such as Scottish to British to Anglo-Saxon, or Norwegian to Scandinavian to Germanic.

differentiation' (Jenkins, 1997, p. 13). By seeing ethnic identities in relation to culture, we simultaneously harken back to Holtug's social identity and Brubaker and Cooper's relational identification: culture, as ethnicity, should not be understood as categorical identification. This implies, and to a certain degree necessitates, an understanding that forces groupness.

Bloch and McKay (2015) refer repeatedly to the role of language in the construction of ethnic identities amongst employers within ethnic enclaves. Similarly, Phinney, et al. (2006), make repeated connections between language and ethnic identities. Additionally, as will be shown in the empirical chapters, language is often presented as one of the key factors influencing integration processes, echoing Phinney, et al. (2006, p. 78), argument that language proficiency is seen as a key indicator of acculturation by drawing a distinction between 'ethnic and national language'.

Ethnic identities and its attributes, in this case language, serves as a point of comparison to another group defined by another language. It is important to keep in mind that a language can function as *both* an ethnic language and national language, depending on the context. People being capable of speaking, and mastering, multiple languages complicate this, thus rendering dialects and accents pertinent to our understanding[11]. Language, therefore, is a highly problematic foundation for the construction of ethnic identities, reminding us again that ethnic identities are not about objective differences, but perceived differences between an "us" and "them".

Secondly, an important element of ethnic groups is a '*belief* shared by its members that, however distantly, they are of common descent' (Jenkins, 1997, pp. 9-10). This common descent has a reciprocal relationship with culture as a way of life as it becomes tied to a relationship with, and adaptation to, an imagined place, which can be either a region or country and leads us perilously close to

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[11] I return to this in the next chapter, when discussing my own processes of identification and researcher reflexivity.

conceptions of nationalism (Rothschild, 1981; Weber, 1978; Anderson, 2006). This ecological perspective is also found in Fredrik Barth's work (Barth, 2007).

The relationship to place and ecology brings ethnicity close to the concept of race and can draw on appearance as an element of commonality/difference. This is particularly relevant in the case of Norway, where negotiations of belonging are tied to notions of "looking or acting Norwegian" (Lynnebakke & Fangen, 2011; Erdal & Strømsø, 2016; Erdal, et al., 2017; Alghasi, et al., 2006a). Guðjónsdóttir and Loftsdóttir (2017) offer an interesting case of racialisation in a Norwegian context, in that the term "immigrant" is racialized and applied to 'people who are or have "Third World" origin, different values from the majority, "dark skin" [and] the privilege of Western migrants: to be referred to by their nationality […]' (pp. 799-800). A similar pattern is found by Friberg and Midtbøen (2018) in their exploration of ethnic hierarchies in low-wage labour markets in Norway.

As mentioned above, ethnic identities function as an identity based on differentiation of "us vs them", at the same time as they are '*not* conditioned either by political or economic or religious factors [but] come into existence by way of migration […]' (Weber, 1978, p. 392)[12]. In other words, although ethnic identities can draw on political, economic, or religious factors, ethnic identities do not arise from them but rather from contact with elements dissimilar to their own (Brubaker, 2004; Baumann, 1999; Eriksen & Sørheim, 1994) and cannot be seen independent of those factors (Rothschild, 1981). Importantly, this emphasises how ethnic identities is something possessed by both majorities *and* minorities, not only by the "Other".

Ironically, ethnic identities can be fiercely mobilised (Rothschild, 1981) and are 'readily accessible' (Brubaker, 2004, p. 17), but simultaneously 'unsuitable for a really rigorous analysis' (Weber, 1978, p. 395). As far as the analysis of this thesis is concerned, there has to be an awareness of how the malleability of ethnic identities can lead to a '"coding bias"' (Brubaker, 2004, p. 92). In the discussions

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[12] See also Barth (1998[1969])

surrounding integration processes, ethnic identities become important because they can be constructed as identities 'that defines and accepts them for what they are, rather than by what they do' (Rothschild, 1981, pp. 5-6), rendering them susceptible to calcification and hardening based on perceptions of security and safety (Barth, 1998[1969]). Ethnic identities, therefore, relate to power structures and processes of securitisation in society and are at risk of becoming rigid and constrictive (Rothschild, 1981; Fenton, 2003). In order to ensure fluidity, and challenge these power structures, there are a range of theoretical approaches and measures that are explored later in the chapter when discussing integration processes.

Before concluding this section, I need to address the concept and understanding of race in this thesis, as it has hitherto been absent. This is partly due to a relative absence of a critical exploration of race and racialisation in Norway[13], an absence noted by Gullestad in 2004. In particular, I seek to draw from perspectives of critical whiteness and focus on an astute theorisation by Owen (2007):

> [A] functional property of whiteness is that its borders are continuously being redefined, entailing that analyses of whiteness's functioning must always be grounded in specific contexts of its manifestation
>
> Owen, 2007, p. 206

Critical whiteness problematises and focuses on the role of power and privilege, challenging the normalisation of it as belonging to those deemed white. Rather than exploring where power *is not*, critical whiteness draws our attention to where power is situated *and why*. In the case of Norway, I argue, as Gullestad (2002), that race, and whiteness, has been redefined in terms of ethnicity and nationality. This is seen, for example, in Guðjónsdóttir and Loftsdóttir (2017) findings that Icelanders are positioned 'highly desirable compared to other migrant groups due to the intersection of perceived racial belonging and nationality' (pp. 803-804). Another argument in support of this is the similarity between Owen's argument that whiteness can be used as 'a form of property that defines identities, is a

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[13] For a critical exploration of race and racialisation in Norway, see Gullestad (2002; 2004; 2005)

resource to be used at will, and has systematic consequences [...]' (2007, p. 211) and Friberg and Midtbøen's findings that, in Norway, 'ethnicity has become a signifier of suitability for particular jobs, or even as a skill in itself' (2018, p. 1476). In this sense, ethnicity can communicate a degree of whiteness (Gullestad, 2004). I return to this in depth in section 4.4.2, in exploring policy developments and the shifts in understandings of "likhet", Norwegianness, and whiteness.

Whiteness, according to Bonnett (1998), does not operate uniformly: rather, it can expand and contract, and shapes, and is shaped by, gender and class. This argument is also made by Levine-Rasky (2011), who argues from an Intersectionality perspective, that 'class and ethnicity will reinforce each other in some circumstances and they will contradict each other in different circumstances' (p. 248). The key element to keep in mind is that whiteness can function insidiously to shape 'the cultural stock of knowledge [and] background presumptions we unavoidably draw upon in everyday communicative interactions' (Owen, 2007, p. 212). In other words, although the language of race and whiteness is conspicuously absent in Norway, its effects are not. Rather, it is masked by the language around ethnicity, nationality, and categorisations of migrant identities such as refugee, asylum-seeker, and migrant labour.

2.2.3 – National identities, identifications, and categorisations

National identities are framed around ideas of a national culture that embodies values and beliefs (Rose, 1995; Castles & Miller, 2009; Jenkins, 1997), and are produced discursively through '[...] education, literature, painting, the media, popular culture, the historical heritage, the leisure industry, advertising, marketing, etc.' (Hall, 1995, p. 184). The risk, when discussing national identities, is that it presents the nation/state as a natural entity; this fallacy is known as 'methodological nationalism' (Wimmer & Glick Schiller, 2002; Chernilo, 2006).

National identities are often constructed as highly exclusive, where 'nothing was inherited from "others"' (Berggren, 1993, p. 51), and in opposition to an "Other". National identities are further complicated by their relationship to nationality and

citizenship, where the concepts are often used interchangeably. Marshall, for example, argues 'citizenship […] is, by definition, national' (Marshall, 1950, p. 12). All of this combined leads to a complex relationship between the processes of identification and categorisation. Hence, the next paragraphs will attempt to disentangle these concepts.

Beginning with citizenship, an influential, but not without its flaws, theory by T. H. Marshall (1950), provides us with a starting point for a discussion. Marshall characterised citizenship as comprising of three parts: civil, political, and social. The civil component is comprised of rights pertaining to justice and freedom. The political element relates to the right to participate 'in the exercise of political power' (Marshall, 1950, p. 11). Finally, the social portion concerns the most malleable parts of citizenship, namely 'from the right to a modicum of economic welfare and security to the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilised being according to the standards prevailing in society' (Marshall, 1950, p. 11).

Other scholars offer a similar breakdown: firstly, citizenship is a legal status; secondly, citizenship can be practiced (the notion of active citizenship); finally, citizenship can be an identity defined by its relationship to rights and obligations (Damsholt, 2012; Bartram, et al., 2014; Joppke, 2008). Emotions can also feature prominently when discussing citizenship either as practice or identification (Askins, 2016; Birkvad, 2017), adding yet another layer to our understanding of the processes and reminding us to not be blinded by the 'rational-legal mask [of] the modern state' (Asad, 2003, p. 22).

Marshall (1950, p. 28) expressed this as a shift from a 'status bestowed on those who are full members of a community' to understanding citizenship as practicing and identifying with that identity, in effect internalising it. This is not to suggest Marshall had an entirely individualistic, and passive, understanding of citizenship, as he also argued that citizenship *requires*, rather than incites a 'direct sense of community membership *based on loyalty* to a civilisation which is a *common*

possession' (emphasis added) (Marshall, 1950, pp. 40-41). The distinction is thus whether citizenship precedes internalisation of an identity or if citizenship should be the proof of that internalisation (Jurado, 2008), as will be discussed below in terms of whether a state emphasises rights or duties in the process of constructing and defining citizenship and the concomitant hierarchies of belonging, rights, and claims-making.

What citizenship, according to Marshall, offers, is a replacement for 'differential status associated with class, function and family' (Marshall, 1950, p. 34). In other words, citizenship, and by extension national identities, seek to override other identities (Jenkins, 1997; Østerud, 1984), which is challenged by de-territorialized identities such as diasporic or transnational identies. This desire to override other identities can be seen in the introduction of citizenship ceremonies, where the goal is often to 'make [citizenship] not only a formality and legal contract, but fill it with moral and emotional content' (Aagedal, 2012a, p. 10; Aagedal, 2012b). There is a tension between the political, legalistic nature of citizenship (the categorisation aspect) and the emotional, communal ideal of national identities (the identification aspect) (Erdal & Strømsø, 2016).

This is further complicated where denizenship can be contrasted with citizenship: when limited rights are afforded those living and working within the political unit of the nation without having full membership (Brochmann, 2012; Damsholt, 2012). In denizenship, there is access to the civil and social elements of citizenship, as they are premised on ideas such as a universal right to justice and that access to welfare is contingent upon contribution, but access to the political sphere is limited and stratified[14].

In understanding national identities, it is important to briefly explore the notion of nationalism. It is nationalism that forces a bifurcation of denizenship and citizenship, as it ties citizenship inextricably to engagement with a political system and emotions (Leith & Soule, 2011; Østerud, 1984). Yet, nationalism also

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[14] Naturally, this varies between states

seeks to evoke passion and emotions regarding a place[15]. This understanding puts national identities close to ethnic identities, blurring the boundaries between the two (Østerud, 1984), establishing an ethnic nationalism. This blurring is clearly demonstrated by Bechhofer and McCrone (in Leith & Soule, 2011), in the case of Scotland:

> National identity in Scotland is an unquestioned fact of birth and upbringing in the main, and most people carry it around with them in a taken-for-granted way. They articulate certain common features of being Scottish. They possess and mobilise shared identity markers such as: birth and upbringing, ancestry and parentage, residence, accent, a sense of commitment and belonging, as well as a set of cultural symbols – sport, humour, landscape and languages.
>
> Bechhofer and McCrone, in Leith and Soule, 2011, p.99

This sets up criteria for inclusion and exclusion, echoing Brubaker (2004). National identities become something that have to be performed and asserted, as opposed to merely ascribed (Hall, 1995). This applies unevenly, where some have to prove their national identities whereas others take it for granted. The expression of this comes in the rhetoric and notion of "active citizenship", where duties and responsibilities take primacy over rights. A highly political concept, it draws on the notion of 'an imagined community created through relationships with each other' (Erdal & Strømsø, 2016, p. 3) and can be manipulated to create notions of "good/active" and "bad/passive" citizens. This form of nationalism finds it expression in civic nationalism. The tension between the rights and duties of citizenship and national identities is neatly illustrated by Borevi (2010).

	Rights-line	Duty-line
1. *Main responsibility*	Society	Individual
2. *Main instrument for governance*	Resources	Incentives
3. *Source of legitimacy*	Universal system [inclusive]	Selective system [exclusive]

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[15] I use "place", as opposed to nation/state/political unit as nationalism is not premised on the existence of a political unit, but can also express the desire for one, see also Rose (1995)

Table 1 - Ideal-typical notions of integration concerning the relation between rights and duties (reproduced from Borevi, 2010: p.28)

An emphasis on either rights or duties indicates an approach to integration and citizenship (Jurado, 2008). By accentuating the duties of a citizen, or someone claiming the national identity, integration/inclusion is contingent upon the individual, where rights are seen as an incentive to performing the duties, and the identity is legitimised through its exclusivity. Jurado (2008) identifies this as an assimilationist approach. Likewise, a rights-orientation implies that society is ultimately responsible for integration/inclusion, rights are seen as resources in facilitating that process, and national identities are legitimised through its inclusiveness: an approach characterised as civic nationalism or multiculturalism (Leith & Soule, 2011; Jurado, 2008).

Furthermore, the idea of a nation can also attach itself to religious identities (Weber, 1978), readily evidenced by constitutional declarations of 'Christian and humanist heritage'[16] or such as 'The Evangelical Lutheran Church is the Danish People's Church [...]'[17], 'Its religion shall be Islam and its constitution shall be the Book of God'[18], or 'The Republic of Sri Lanka shall give to Buddhism the foremost place [...]' (Lovdata, 2018a; grundloven.dk, 2018; WIPO, 1992; Constitute, 2018d). Even the EU resolved to add a reference to 'the cultural, religious and humanist inheritance of Europe' in the Lisbon Treaty (EU, 2007).

On the other hand, you have constitutions that proclaim 'France shall be an indivisible, *secular,* democratic and social Republic' (emphasis added); 'This charter shall be interpreted in a manner consistent with the preservation and enhancement of the *multicultural* heritage of Canadians' (emphasis added); and 'Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof [...]'[19] (Constitute, 2018a; Constitute, 2018b; Constitute, 2018c).

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[16] The Norwegian Constitution as of 2018, earlier versions referred only to Christian heritage
[17] The Danish Constitution as of 2018, "People's Church" is a translation of "folkekirke"
[18] Basic Law of Governance of Saudi Arabia
[19] 1st Amendment of the US Constitution

This relationship is not static, and changes over time, as well as not being as simple or straightforward as a constitutional clause or amendments would imply. Drawn to its extreme, national identities can assimilate most other identities and metamorphose into ideas of distinct, hierarchised civilisations[20] or present themselves as 'supreme moral [communities]' (Baumann, 2010, p. 48)[21] emphasising exclusive, inclusive, pluralist, republican, secular, religious, democratic, monarchical, or socialist traits.

Drawing this section to an end, it has sought to describe the nature of three forms of identities that regularly feature in discussions of migration and integration. Discussing these identities separately does not imply they exist or manifest in isolation, rather the opposite. It is because they are so thoroughly interwoven it is necessary to explore them separately, and by understanding the parts we can endeavour to see the whole picture. The important understanding to take from this section is the relationship between identification and categorisation, and how identities are manipulated. In other words, although I have attempted to differentiate between the three in terms of content, there is no firm rule on the separation: religious identities can be seen as expressions of ethnic or national identities, and vice versa.

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[20] This is stance is best exemplified by Huntington's theory of the clash of civilisations (Huntington, 1993)

[21] For more on this, see for example Fox (2012), Haynes (2010), and Norris and Inglehart (2011)

2.3 – Migration and identity

Identities relating to the processes of migration are integral to later discussions. With the above identities, there are processes of identity formation: religious identities usually involve a ritual or process of initiation or conversion; national identity can be apotheosized through citizenship ceremonies (for new citizens), or notions of sacrifice[22]; and ethnic identities are often seen as innate. A question that needs to be asked is what heralds migrant identities? On a general level, migrant identities can readily be identified as resulting from migration. Bearing in mind, as above, both processes of identification and categorisation, migration processes can result in a variety of identities, as encounters activate and situate a number of identities. Some which are rendered invisible, others that are considered problematic. These processes tie into issues of colonialism, racism, nationalism.

What this section seeks to do, is to provide a framework for understanding the process of identity-formation relating to migrant identities. By questioning the process of identity-formation, we can critically examine the range of identities associated with migration processes. At its most fundamental, migration is a process of exclusion (King, 1995): a juxtaposition of sedentary versus mobile. Because of the dominance of nation-states, migration is usually understood to be either internal, within the territorial borders of a nation-state, or international, outwith the borders of a nation-state.

This can lead to processes of categorisation establishing different identities with similar underlying characteristics that are only distinguished by the crossing of a border, such as internally displaced persons versus refugee. Aspects of temporality are also significant, as they lead to categorisations of tourists versus immigrants. Despite processes of categorisation seeming commonsensical, processes of identification are, in this context, more elusive. For the purpose of this thesis, migration will refer to international migration, and internal migration will only be

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[22] Encapsulated by the expression 'Dulce et decorum est pro patria mori' – 'What joy, for Fatherland to die'

touched upon as necessary. I also define a migrant as anyone who has crossed an international border.

The justification for such a broad definition lies in the need to see "migrant" as a keyword, with a multitude of connotations. The separation of one form of population movement from another derives in part from distinctions of time, distance, intention, and circumstance. These are components in the *categorisation* of migrants: labelling some as tourists, refugees, pilgrims, student, labourers, etc. A broad definition presupposes only a starting point, whereas the categorisations ascribe a range of assumptions and connotations which are contextual. This definition allows us to draw on Rothchild's (1981) point from section 2.2.2: should migrants be defined by what they are or what they have done? As researchers, we can only establish, with some degree of certainty, when an international border has been crossed, and even that can be contested[23].

The above definition risks re-affirming issues of methodological nationalism and perpetuating notions of the sanctity of a territory (Van Gennep, 1960) and the importance of boundaries (Massey, 1995). It privileges processes of categorisation, which forces us to tread carefully. Migrant identities, as results of processes of categorisation and identification, should be scrutinised. Particularly in relation to this thesis, due to its organisational focus, it is important to note how there are multiple processes of categorisation. Processes of identification are similarly varied and context-dependent and allows us to question the importance of migrant identities and whether they are meaningful.

There are a range of factors impacting migration processes. Leaving aside mental and emotional aspects for now, the physical aspect of migration can be divided into three phases: leaving, journeying, and arriving (or, in some cases, returning). The problems arise when assumptions are made about what this does to the migrant: how, if at all, does leaving, journeying, and arriving/returning change

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[23] For example, Australia's Pacific Solution, which detains migrants to Australia outwith Australia's border.

the migrant. What are the mental and emotional aspects? Migration is both an assertion of difference and similarity. In order to understand migration's *potential* to influence identity formation, we can draw on Turner's concept of Communitas: '[it] emerges where social structure is not' and emphasises notions of liminality and change that '[transgress] or [dissolve] the norms that govern structured or institutionalised relationships and is accompanied by experiences of unprecedented potency' (Turner, 1969, pp. 126, 128).

Let us start at the beginning: the process of leaving. There are, at least, two elements to take into account: 'structural elements that enable and constrain the exercise of agency by social actors', hereafter known as drivers (Van Hear, et al., 2018), and the migrant and concomitant relationships. The relationship between the two influences the transformative process of migration, shaping how it is understood and the impact we believe it to have upon the individual: is it forced or voluntary? Permanent or temporary? Answers to those questions are fluid and complex. Drivers and reasons behind migration are always multi-layered, and they have implications for the latter part of the migration process (Erdal & Oeppen, 2018). With regards to the migrant, there are also micro- and meso-factors to consider, such as family or networks (Van Hear, et al., 2018). Adding to this, there are also aspects of cumulative causation, whereby each act of migration feeds back into the plexus of macro-, meso-, and micro-factors (Bartram, et al., 2014; Castles & Miller, 2009; Massey, et al., 1993). Push and pull theories of migration is one possible approach to 'decomposing an enormously complex subject into analytically manageable parts' (Massey, et al., 1993, p. 433). While not providing all the answers, they provoke questions of "why" people migrate or do not migrate.

The second phase, the one often considered transformative, imbuing the individual with a special identity[24], is the migration. A useful supplement to understanding how this part can differ for people is the concept of mobility. As a concept, mobility has a range of meanings related to the circumstances, but

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[24] See for example the special issue of *Social Anthropology* on 'Key Figures of Mobility' (2017, vol. 25, no. 1)

importantly demonstrates how people have different experiences of migration (Salazar, 2017). Mobility posits a relational understanding of migration and integration processes that allows us to move beyond a focus on nation-states. As Van Hear, et al., (2018) emphasise, structural factors are important in shaping factors related to mobility. From geography to infrastructure, and war and peace, the migrant's experiences within the liminal phase are what is assumed to have a, if any, transformative impact. It is vital to emphasise that the result of this transformative process is not necessarily positive (Salazar, 2017), despite assumptions that migration results in improved outcomes for the migrant (Erdal & Oeppen, 2018; Norges Offentlige Utredninger, 2017).

Assumptions around the migration process contribute to shaping bureaucratic distinctions and labels that affect the final phase of a migration, which in turn can result in reshaping the migratory experiences after the migration event (Erdal & Oeppen, 2018).The obverse of mobility is immobility, which shapes migration processes in equal measure. The notion of voluntary or involuntary immobility is significant for the final phase of the process. The immobility can be forced upon the migrant, such as those held in detention centres or stuck in refugee camps, or it can be voluntarily through arriving at one's destination. The experiences of migration, mobility, and immobility, in the liminal phase are important to our understanding of processes of categorisation and identification of migrant identities. While in the liminal phase, 'the characteristics of [the migrant] are ambiguous' (Turner, 1969, p. 94). Rituals are usually contained within one social system or culture, which governs the full process of segregation, liminality, and aggregation. Migration goes beyond this, in that each phase is governed by multiple, potentially competing, social systems and cultures.

Throughout the migration process, we have to be mindful of the migrant's identification process, and simultaneously processes of categorisation. The migration can pass unnoticed and uncontested, e.g. tourists, or it can be discussed, debated, challenged, or rejected, e.g. asylum-seekers and refugees. Turner (1967, p. 97) emphasises the nature of this in his description of the *liminal personae* as 'polluting *to those who have never been, so to speak, "inoculated"*

against them, through having been themselves initiated into the same state' (emphasis added). Those attempting to ascribe an identity upon the migrant will be shaped by their own experiences, or lack thereof, of migration and their own sense of mobility/immobility (Døving, 2009). Bordering and categorisation operates 'as much for the perceptions and feelings of natives' (Bartram, et al., 2014, p. 20) as for migrants.

The final phase attempts to negotiate a transition to a non-liminal, non-migrant identity. The remainder of this chapter is devoted to exploring the strategies by which this done or attempted. There can be an emphasis of other identities (religious, ethnic, national, diasporic, transnational, etc.), or there might be an attempt at assimilation and erasure of other identities. This is where labelling and categorisation, in the pursuit of managing the migrant, can conflict with the migrant's processes of self-identification. As categorisations are external impositions, their validity, applicability, and purpose should be questioned and challenged. Polzer (2008, p. 480) presents us with five questions, whose answers allows us to do that:

1. Partiality – Who is defining the category?
2. Functionality and Immutability – What is the purpose of defining the category at a particular point in time?
3. Conflation – What characteristics of the category are emphasised over others?
4. Self-confirmation – What sources of information are used to create or confirm the existence of the category?
5. Negotiability – How can the categorisation be challenged?

2.4 – Integration processes – A conceptual forest

2.4.1 – Conceptual clarification

Leading on from the previous section, I will begin by outlining a range of migrant labels, some of which are assumed to imbue the migrant with special characteristics, before moving on to a discussion of strategies for managing identities, difference, and diversity (segregation, integration, inclusion, assimilation, etc.). Finally, I will briefly survey how religious organisations and religion can be understood to influence these processes and strategies.

Continuing the phased approach (departure, journey, aggregation) from the previous section, I isolate two components of the final phase: an internal component and an external component (Brochmann & Hagelund, 2012a; Christensen, et al., 2006). The external component attempts to control who is able to transition into the final phase, in other words, immigration control. This bounding/bordering does not only happen at territorial borders and at nexuses such as airports, but is shifted and moved based on political considerations, such as documentation checks by universities, employers or landlords[25]. In other words, it is an exclusionary process.

The internal component concerns what to do with those who have been permitted to transition into this phase, namely integration policy[26]. These policies can be either inclusive or exclusionary, where certain practices, values, traditions, or identities are constructed as acceptable or unacceptable. *Integration*, and related policies, raise the question of "integration into what?". I strongly advocate a processual perspective; therefore, the directionality of *integration* takes precedence over an imagined end result. Nonetheless, the imagined end result is significant, hence the development of a discursive framework which critically explores alternative result-oriented perspectives. The discursive framework I present allows for critical analyses of integration processes and multiple directionalities and layers. I will be referring to a Norwegian context and

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[25] See also Mulvey (2010) on the relationship between policy developments and integration/immigration control or Guentner, et al., (2016) on bordering practices in the UK welfare state.

[26] Understood here in its widest possible sense.

approach, which is covered in further detail in Chapter 4. A salient detail, which will become clearer later in this chapter and expanded upon in later chapters, is the dominance, on several levels, of a Social Integrationist Discourse that emphasises employment. Thus, *integration*, in Norway, is often seen as integration into the labour market, and failure to do so implies a lack of integration or failure on the part of the migrant. The discursive framework allows me to draw on the qualitative data in this thesis and challenge this perspective. Through multi-sited research, I compare and contrast discursive tendencies across locations, institutions, and across a range of migrant experiences. This discursive approach demonstrates the hydra-headed and multi-layered nature of *integration*.

An important reminder is that the preceding phases of departure and journey strongly influence this part of migration. The receiving society interprets predisposing (contextual), proximate, precipitating, and mediating drivers, evaluating them according to dimensions of locality, scale, selectivity, duration, and tractability[27] (Van Hear, et al., 2018; Bartram, et al., 2014). Another vital reminder is how, in talking about integration, we need to be critical of the concept, as it produces and reproduces ideas around society, the state, the nation, and the relationship between majorities and minorities. As Rytter (2018, p. 2) colourfully notes: 'the concept of *integration* is not innocent but [reflects] and promotes specific constructions [and] an asymmetrical relationship between majorities and minorities'.

In particular, it constructs migrants as reference points for defining belonging and individualises societal inequalities by obscuring structural issues within the nation-state (Korteweg, 2017). Due to the relationship between research and nation-states[28], whereby the latter often funds the former, migration and integration research risks, amongst other things, reproducing and strengthening state perspectives and political rhetoric, encouraging methodological nationalism

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[27] Factors that are more or less susceptible to change
[28] Alternatively, supra national bodies such as the EU or UN.

(Dahinden, 2016; Bartram, et al., 2014). Keeping these issues in mind, we can explore the topic further.

In order to examine the two issues of internal and external control, we can return to the notion of citizenship. As discussed above, citizenship seeks to override other identities, including, theoretically, a migrant identity (Bertossi, 2007). Legal citizenship implies a cessation of the liminal identity, and allows for ease of controlling access to the nation-state and the basis for limiting rights for non-citizens (Bertossi, 2007), as demonstrated in, for example, *Utlendingsloven*[29] (The Immigration Act): '§5 […] by foreigner it is understood, in this act, to be anyone who is not a Norwegian citizen' (Lovdata, 2018b).

That is not to say citizenship is not differentiated, as Balibar (2004, p. 76) notes 'it tends to divide humanity into unequal species'. It not only marks inclusion versus exclusion but is also differentiated by the active versus passive citizen, or the citizen versus the national (Castles, 2007)[30]. Furthermore, not all citizenships are created equal, as citizenship provides perhaps the simplest categorisation and process of granting and denying rights, as demonstrated by differentiated rules for visa requirements[31] and access to material and symbolic resources. The presence of dual-nationality further complicates the understanding of citizenship as erasing or devaluing competing identities, as it de facto opens up for multiple identities (Castles, 2007) and opens the doors for discussions of the post-national and transnational.

This permits us to distinguish between a few migrant identities. Firstly, a migrant clearly defined by their citizenship requires a specific form of integration approach dependent upon a few supplementary factors such as duration and

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[29] The shorthand term for 'The Act relating to the admission of foreign nationals into the realm and their stay here'

[30] See also Balibar (2004), in particular ch. 4, for an extensive discussion on citizenship as differentiated.

[31] See, for example, the Passport Index (2018), which ranks the "power" of different passports, or Hagelund, et al., (2012) arguing for the benefit of visa-free travel with a Norwegian citizenship as an incentive to naturalize.

selectivity. Thus, a tourist does not necessitate the same response as a foreign citizen arriving as a student. Both of these categories can be governed by visa regulations, and due to the assumption of duration (short-term) they do not necessarily warrant an integration-oriented response.

Secondly, by distinguishing migrant identities by citizenship, it enables a nation-state to perform its own ritual of incorporation: citizenship ceremonies. As discussed above, citizenship ceremonies transfer the migrant from their liminal identities into non-liminal citizenship (Pittaway, 2013). It might become apparent, at this point, that this sounds like assimilation (Portes & Rumbaut, 2001), which is evidenced by referring to citizenship acquisition as a 'naturalisation process' (Brochmann, 2012, p. 48). This attempt at rendering the migrant 'indistinguishable […] in the ways relevant to cohesion' (Bauböck, 1996a, p. 114), becomes apparent in citizenship ceremonies such as the one reported by Aagedal (2012b, p. 131): 'The County Governor makes a point of the fact that country of origin is not listed [in the presentation of participants], "because now they belong here"'. As has been emphasised by other scholars, despite citizenship's stated goal of representing full membership, this is often undermined by discourses of difference and discrimination[32] (Brochmann, 2012; Damsholt, 2012; Eriksen, 2012; Norges Offentlige Utredninger, 2017). From a migrant perspective, citizenship can also be seen in an instrumental light, whereby acquiring citizenship is a method of accessing status, resources, and security, as suggested by Ong's (1999) concept of 'flexible citizenship'[33].

Nor does citizenship necessarily operate uniformly, as it means something different for a naturalized citizen[34] than it does for their descendants who will rarely undergo the same ceremony and will have an entirely different relationship to their citizenship. I am avoiding the use of "2nd" or "3rd generation" because I find it establishes an artificial and analytically weak category. It raises questions

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[32] A recent example of this is the Windrush affair, see for example Wardle and Obermuller (2018) brief editorial in *Anthropology Today* for a very brief exploration.

[33] On a reflexive note, this was one of the reasons I acquired a UK passport, as it guaranteed a more favourable fee status when applying for studies in the UK.

[34] It can also mean different things to different people, and there can be a range of motivations behind naturalization (see Aagedal, 2012)

of where a generation begins and another ends, and results in notions such as the "1.5 generation"[35] or comparisons of "old" and "new" 2nd generations (Portes & Rumbaut, 2001; Zhou & Bankston III, 2016). Although there is some research on the effect of the descendants right to citizenship on parental integration (Avitabile, et al., 2013), and the transmission of citizen-identities from parents to children (Trovão, 2017), there is, to my knowledge, no research on the impact of parental naturalisation on processes of identification amongst descendants[36]. As such, when the focus is on descendants of migrants, it requires its own approach, and we cannot blindly apply the same understanding to that category.

If citizenship is not the desired panacea, what, through processes of identification or categorisation, are the migrant identities that are continuously attributed importance? Sticking to Norway, Alghasi, et al., (2006b, pp. 16-17), emphasise the racialisation of migrants, pointing to 'skin colour, dress, language, ethnicity, and religion'. Migrant identities entail a struggle, either for the ability to define yourself (Alghasi, 2006) or to be recognised as equal to the non-migrant Norwegian (Carli, 2006). Despite numerous definitions of integration relating to economic, political, civil, and social factors (Rytter, 2018), we ultimately return to notions of identity and social cohesion. In particular, integration is directed at 'immigrant groups that are cast as especially problematic' (Rytter, 2018, p. 8)[37]. As argued by Korteweg (2017), there is a need to emphasise that problems typecast as "immigrant problems" are in fact societal issues that cross-cut multiple groups.

What migrant identities warrant responses, and why those identities and not others? I am critical of the fact that answering this question requires categorisation and emphasise that these categories are not homogeneous or timeless: migrants arrive at the identities through different trajectories and move beyond them (Polzer, 2008; Crawley & Skleparis, 2018). Using Brochmann and Hagelund (2012b) as a starting point, we can identify migrant categorisations that

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[35] Foreign-born but migrated at a young age (Harker, 2001).
[36] For extensive research on young migrants from Eastern Europe now living in the UK, see the *Here to Stay?* (2018) Project, and for a critique of adult-centric migration research see White, et al. (2011)
[37] The Brochmann II-commission, for example, explicitly targets asylum seekers for integration policies

invoke different responses. These responses are contingent upon a range of drivers and factors, as discussed above with reference to Van Hear, et al., (2018). It is also important to keep in mind the contentious dichotomy of forced and voluntary migration (Bartram, et al., 2014; Erdal & Oeppen, 2018), and how those distinctions serve to justify differing responses (Crawley & Skleparis, 2018). Again, this discussion is with reference to a Norwegian case, and will invariably differ between contexts. Nor does it say anything about local responses or approaches, which will be explored in later chapters.

Table 2 - Migrant categorisation

Migrant categorisation	Duration of stay	Policy activated by categorisation
Nordic citizen	Irrelevant[38]	None/limited
Aspiring citizen[39]	Minimum stay required, future residence assumed indefinitely	Comprehensive – Governed by *Statsborgerloven* (Citizenship Act) (Lovdata, 2006). Criteria include: established identity; aged 12 or above; is and will continue to reside in the realm; fulfil the requirements for permanent residency; have at least 7 years residency over the last 10 years[40]; completed 300hours of Norwegian language and social studies; not serving a criminal sentence; rescind former citizenship.
Refugee	Has shifted from conceptions of 'permanent exile' to exclusion or eventual repatriation (Castles & Miller, 2009)	Comprehensive – Access: Immigration Act; subject to *Introduksjonsloven* (Introductory Act) (Lovdata, 2018b; 2016); technically shaped by the Refugee Convention (UNHCR, 1951/1967), but interpreted and applied at national level resulting in high levels of variation (Crawley & Skleparis, 2018); refugees dispersed throughout the country, subject to agreement with municipal administrations.
EEA citizen	Dependent upon circumstances	Access regulated by *EØS-loven* Part 3, ch. 1, Art. 28(The EEA Act) (Lovdata, 1994) and the Immigration Act, but exempt from the Introductory Act
Non-EEA citizen	Dependent upon circumstances	Moderate – Generally governed by the Immigration Act, and may be subject to the Introductory Act
Asylum seeker[41]	Subject to processing time	Comprehensive – Access regulated by the Immigration Act and subject to *Introduksjonsloven* (Introductory Act) (Lovdata, 2018c; 2016); housed in asylum centres, limited access to work and education.
Tourist	Temporary	Limited
Student	Temporary	Limited
Rejected asylum seeker	From a state perspective, ideally short, but variable	Detention and deportation
Undocumented migrant	From a state perspective, ideally short, but variable	Detention and deportation

[38] Citizens of Nordic countries (Sweden, Denmark, Finland) are exempt from a number of immigration rules (Lovdata, 2018b)

[39] This category refers to migrants seeking Norwegian citizenship and represents a more liminal category than some of the others.

[40] Reduced for persons married to a Norwegian citizen and Nordic citizens

[41] As with "Aspiring citizen", asylum seeker is a highly liminal category (James & McNevin, 2013; Andrews, et al., 2014)

It might be notable that the above table does not include the category "economic migrant", which is often used as a contrast to the refugee category, but is merely a shorthand for assumptions made about the migrant and used to justify a policy of exclusion (Crawley & Skleparis, 2018; Bartram, et al., 2014). For this reason, I choose to exclude it. One can ask the question what separates an EU/EEA citizen migrating for work from those usually categorised as "economic migrants", why are the former not considered "economic migrants" but are somehow legitimised?

The distinction, obviously, derives from where they originate from and how they journey. As suggested by Crawley and Skleparis (2018, p. 60), there should be an emphasis on the boundaries and trajectories between categories and the values and rights attributed to the different categories. Jenkins (2000, p. 13) reminds us that 'categorisations are not necessarily re-appropriated as self- or group identifications. History, context and, not least, the *content* and the *consequences* of the categorisation all matter.' The categories are *not* natural or innate, they are bureaucratic devices and should be seen as such, hence the inclusion of "Policy activated by categorisation" in order to emphasise that these categories play a part in the relationships between migrants and the state. Bureaucratic categories should be problematised and deconstructed, as is shown through the data and analysis in this thesis.

Where immigration control and categorisation form part of the external component of the final phase of migration processes, *integration* is the internal aspect. I have previously used "integration" as a broad, catch-all term, but it is due a closer inspection. The concept of *integration*[42] is highly contested, and by no means straightforward. Rytter (2018), situating the concept in a Danish context, emphasises how the concept 'carries a wealth of meanings and is constitutive and confirmative of social imaginaries among majority populations that need to be critically studied and analysed rather than simply being reproduced [...]'. It is necessary to be mindful of how discussions of *integration*

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[42] As Rytter (2018) does, I am italicising *integration* when I am referring to the concept, rather than the process.

contribute to reification, objectification, and exclusion (Rytter, 2018)[43], perpetrated even by academics, as in Eriksen and Sørheim (1994, p. 278):

> It is possible to say it as strongly that the degree of success for immigrants' integration process hinges on their loyalty to the state. For them to consider themselves, and to be considered, integrated, the immigrants have to feel at home in Norway. For them to feel at home, they have to be active participants in society's shared institutions.

Integration, according to Eriksen and Sørheim, is inextricably tied to loyalty, a sense of belonging, and active participation, yet they do not address thresholds or barriers to participation. This mistake is repeated by Bergh and Bjørklund (2010) in their discussion of political integration of minorities in Norway: they fail to address barriers to participation, draw conclusions based on voting[44], and ignore other forms of political participation.

This is in contrast to Papademetriou and Kober (2012), who emphasise that immigrants should be considered "successfully integrated" when they have equal opportunities and participate in society on an equal basis as non-migrants. I strongly agree with the latter conception, but it needs to be seen as an ideal to be pursued. Equal opportunities requires overcoming differences in status, wealth, privilege, as well as the lack thereof. Equal opportunities and participation in society is not only an issue for migrants, but also disenfranchised and marginalised groups that are not migrants, such as indigenous populations or other groups (disabled, LGBTQ+, women, etc.) (Castles, 2007). As has been repeated numerous times, these groups, and concomitant identities and categories, overlap, intersect, and are contingent upon context.

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[43] A similar and relevant comparison is Miles and Brown (2003) discussion on racism
[44] In local elections, rather than general elections. They do not address the fact that turnout is often lower for local elections, but nonetheless make sweeping generalisations based on their limited data.

Echoing Rytter's point that there is a wealth of meanings embedded in the concept *integration*, we can identify a short list that includes terms such as (but not limited to): assimilation (segmented, selective), accommodation, segregation, inclusion, adaptation, acculturation (dissonant, consonant, or selective), transculturation, incorporation, multiculturalism (cosmopolitanism, fragmented pluralism, interactive, critical, protective, offensive), interculturalism, marginalisation, "balkanisation", and exclusion (Bauböck, 1996a; Portes & Rumbaut, 2001; Hall, 1995; Castles & Miller, 2009; Bartram, et al., 2014; Turner, 2010; Heller, 1996).

Regardless of terminology, there is a fundamental question that needs to be kept in mind: 'who has the power and legitimacy to demand *integration* of others?' (Rytter, 2018, p. 13) A useful question is whether we can agree on what, ultimately, an integrated, socially cohesive society will look like. This will invariably depend on context, and I will hazard to claim there is no "perfect" end-point that will suit every society. Rather, integration processes are constant and variegated and will develop differently not only in different countries but also within a country.

Ultimately, the above list of terms are discursive and political choices. I understand this as each term attempting to present a way of acting and offering its own description and understanding of society. As such, each term involves opening up and closing down potential understandings and approaches (Levitas, 2005), they can function both descriptively and normatively. Whereas much of the literature and policy focuses on *integration* as pertaining to migrants, we should keep in mind the multiplicity and contextuality of identities that might be interwoven with migrant identities.

Therefore, as mentioned above, the idea of managing a diversity of identities needs to be conducted within a framework where the diversity is seen as the whole, rather than the particular. Echoing the Durkheimian (Greenwald, 1973, p. 159) notion that 'society is not constituted simply by the mass of individuals who

comprise it […] but, above all, by the idea which it forms of itself', it is useful to distinguish the above concepts by *how, who, and what* they seek to externalise as unwanted characteristics (Levitas, 2005). It is not discrete categories and static individuals who, when lumped together, morph into a greater unit, but their understandings of themselves and others[45] that shapes the continually, dynamically, shifting notion of society. A useful concept in this regard is Beaman's *deep equality*, which emphasises this subtle process:

> [deep equality is] a process, enacted and owned by so-called ordinary people in everyday life […] It recognizes equality as an achievement of day-to-day interaction […] It circulates through micro-processes of individual action and inaction and through group demonstrations of caring […] Paradoxically, deep equality is fragile.
> Beaman (2017, p. 16)

In Table 3, I present a discursive framework, developed by Levitas (2005), that attempts to distinguish how inclusion/exclusion is constructed and justified. Although not developed specifically for discussions around migration and integration, Levitas (2005) argues for a holistic conception of society where inequality has to be seen as endemic rather than externalised. The three discourses are ideal types, and should be seen as a continuum rather than discrete categories. Therefore, you can find examples of each ideal type within any situation that involves communication and discourse. The three types are (a) the Redistributive Discourse of Exclusion (RED), (b) the Social Integrationist Discourse (SID), and (c) the Moral Underclass Discourse (MUD). Levitas succinctly simplified the differences: 'in RED they have no money, in SID they have no work, in MUD they have no morals' (2005, p. 27). This framework provides us with a template for evaluating and grouping the concepts mentioned above.

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[45] Moreover, their understanding of The Other, those perceived or constructed as external to themselves and the internal others.

Table 3 - Discursive framework (Levitas, 2005, p. 14, 21, 26-27)

Redistributive Discourse of Exclusion (RED)	- Emphasises inequality as a prime cause of social exclusion - Addresses social, political, and cultural factors in addition to economic as constitutive of inequality - Focuses on processes which produce inequality - Implies a reduction of inequality through a multifactorial approach and redistribution of resources and power - Potentially able to valorise diversity of identities - Identities considered equal - Posits citizenship as the obverse of exclusion - Society constituted holistically
Social Integrationist Discourse (SID)	- Narrows the definition of exclusion/inclusion to participation in paid work - Obscures inequalities due to different categorisations (gender, ethnic identities, national identities, etc.) - Conceals the upper strata of society - De-emphasizes identity - Society constituted as fragmented but functional
Moral Underclass Discourse (MUD)	- Presents the unwanted characteristics as culturally distinct from the "mainstream" - Focuses on behaviour of the excluded/marginalised rather than on the structure of society - Implies benefits have negative consequences - encourage "dependency" - Inequalities among the rest of society are ignored - Strong homogenisation of the "native" population - Highly gendered discourse vilifying men and rendering women passive - Hierarchical understanding of identities - Reified and exclusive conceptions of identity - Society constituted as fragmented

Utilising this framework allows for a range of methods and sources, which will be explored in the next chapter. It also forces us to see how the data is embedded in a specific context that is the result of a host of intersecting factors such as history, geography, current events, language, politics, and processes of identification and categorisation. For example, Buxrud and Fangen (2017) — despite not relying on Levitas framework — analyse national day oratory in Norway and demonstrate how there is a range of sentiments reminiscent of both RED and SID. Similarly, it is easy to recognise the use of MUD, which is not to say there are not more insidious and hidden forms of it.

In Table 4, I assign the different integration strategies to the category I consider most appropriate. Adapting Levitas' framework is one of the key contributions of this thesis and will feature throughout the thesis. The framework allows me to reconcile the polysemic nature of many of the concepts. By seeing my participants and data in context, I can refrain from splitting hairs over which concept is most appropriate, as participants often had competing understandings of the same concept and related their understandings back to the context we were in at the time. Instead, their words reflected deeper discursive elements. The framework offers a degree of flexibility, which mirrors the conceptual stretching and contestation that often takes place in fields that are highly politicised. It allows me to evaluate and situate the data clearly by continuously reflecting on what is implied in addition to explicit remarks.

Table 4 - Categorisation of related concepts

Redistributive Discourse of Exclusion (RED)	Social Integrationist Discourse (SID)	Moral Underclass Discourse (MUD)
Multiculturalism	Enclaves	Racism
Accommodation	Segregation	Assimilation
Inclusion	Segmented Assimilation	Group Threat Theory
Interculturalism	Dissonant acculturation	Reactive ethnicity
Selective acculturation	Consonant acculturation	Welfare Chauvinism
Deep equality	Incorporation	Passing
Integration	Denizens	Integration
	Integration	
	Multiculturalism	

I assigned concepts to a category based on an extensive literature review. The sources (and quotes) used to match them to the framework can be found in Appendix A. In most cases, the concepts derive from specific definitions by the author(s) who developed them, and as such only appear once. That *integration* makes an appearance in each column is a testament to the malleability of the term. Rather than employing one concept over another, I choose to emphasise the similarity between the concepts, which allows us to make broader, more meaningful distinctions. The above categorisation also goes some way in enabling us to distinguish between emic and etic usages of the different concepts (Rytter, 2018). As most concepts only make one appearance, they require little modification, but we have to qualify two concepts to reflect their plurality of usage: *integration* and *multiculturalism*.

Multiculturalism has been categorised in two columns due to its prevalence as both a theoretical concept (the etic usage) and how it is used to describe a society or normative position (the emic usage). Therefore, it straddles two discursive categories. As for *integration*, I sympathise strongly with Rytter's (2018, p. 15) admonition to 'take responsibility for the concept of *integration*', and in order to demonstrate the prerequisite critical awareness of the concept I suggest taking a step back from it. Hence, instead of merely using *integration* in an undifferentiated form, where possible, I will prefix it with the appropriate discursive categorisation. In other words, as will become apparent throughout later chapters, there is MUD-Integration, SID-Integration, and redintegration. By linguistic providence, redintegration is an archaic term for restoring something to a state of wholeness, and therefore fits the precepts of the RED discursive category and obviates the need to use the style applied to the two other concepts. By probing their usage of the term, these distinctions allow us to identify what different actors may be referring to when they use *integration*. *Integration* can, therefore, signify the breadth of the discursive framework and function generically rather than specifically. With this in mind, we can finally turn to how religion and religious organisations, in theory, can influence integration processes. This will help us answer the research questions more clearly in the later, substantive chapters.

2.4.2 – Religion and integration processes

The discussion here is predominantly theoretical and abstract, and it needs to be stated that the relationship between religion, religious institutions, and integration processes (whether it is MUD-, SID-Integration, or redintegration) operates at numerous levels and in a multitude of ways: Structurally, historically, discursively at micro-, meso-, macro-levels, and is continuously and dynamically shifting even within a specific context. We need to keep in mind three, related, components: religiosity, dogma, and praxis. Dogma and praxis are closely related, as they refer to the organised aspects of religion. Dogma being the doctrine or teachings, and praxis being the practice those teachings lead to. An example can be how an orthodox/heterodox stance on liturgy can result in a specific performance of liturgy. Religiosity, on the other hand, emphasises the importance religion has for the individual.

Seen in light of the discursive framework, we can generate a set of ideas of how religion might influence integration processes. Distinguishing dogma, praxis, and religiosity allows us to question what about religion impacts integration processes and how. The table below presents a way of seeing religion and integration. Consistent with the discursive framework above, I have organised it in a matrix that allows us to separate the three components potential usages. The matrix considers religion generally, but different religions will manifest differently based on context. I look more closely at how Catholicism functions in Norway in Chapter 5.

One significant issue is the notion of native/non-native religion, i.e. whether there is a conception of a dominant, "natural" religion. As discussed in the section on identities, ethnic and national identities can seek to absorb religious traits, thereby privileging some religions over others. The matrix is not able to demonstrate this, which is why it is necessary to understand how contextual these concepts are. Furthermore, secularism plays a large part in understanding how religion can operate within a context (Casanova, 2009). Secularism is not merely religious indifference or political toleration of religion, but points to a dynamic relationship between 'legal reasoning, moral practice, and political authority'

(Asad, 2003, p. 255) and religious organisations as 'normative organisations' (Hornsby-Smith, 1991, p. 203). Casanova (2009, p. 1051) differentiates between three understandings of secularism, all of which need to be contextualised in order to facilitate analysis: as a 'taken-for-granted normal structure of modern reality'; as a principle of statecraft advocating the separation of religious and political authority; and as an ideology 'entails a theory of what "religion" is or does'.

Table 5 does not make the role of secularism explicit, as the three components will have different relationships to secularism and will shape the resultant discourse concerning dogma, praxis, and religiosity. For example, understandings framed by MUD can come from anti-religious attitudes, or from intolerant religious attitudes. Context will allow us to distinguish which it might be. Furthermore, despite it being presented as a 3x3 matrix, it would be imprudent to understand it as clearly bounded categories. It should, and has to, be seen as a continuum. Much in the same way the colours red, green, and blue can be combined to create any colour in the visible spectrum, our three components can be combined in innumerable ways to describe different contexts.

Table 5 - Religious components by discourse

	RED	SID	MUD
Dogma	• Flexible and can be adapted to local circumstances to promote contact (e.g., inter-faith work)	• Reified and used instrumentally to inform processes (for example, as part of funding policies for religious institutions)	• Reified and seen as conflicting with host society (for example, debates on gender equality)
Praxis	• Permitted in public spaces, and uncontested (for example, public processions)	• Subject to some regulation (for example, juxtaposing animal rights/welfare and religious practices (halal, kosher, etc.))	• Withheld from public space or strongly contested (e.g. limitations on religious architecture (minarets, steeples, etc.)
Religiosity	• Protected and treated equally (e.g., given equal time off for religious holidays)	• Only considered relevant insofar it relates to work or education (for example, sitting exams while fasting)	• Strongly contested or subject to hostility (for example, bans on religious garment or visible symbols of religiosity)

The above table echoes Hirschmann's (2004, p. 1207) assertion that 'there is not one monolithic interpretation of the role of religion' in integration processes. Seen in light of the different discourses, it is possible to understand *how* religion influences integration processes. Firstly, from a structural level, we can speak of religion, in the form of organisations and institutions, as impacting integration processes. Levitt (2004) and Kivisto (2014) argue that religious institutions and organisations allow for the negotiations of a common vocabulary and expectations about rights and duties.

In the case of the Catholic Church, at the macro-level we can point to Pope Francis (2018b; 2013), through his speeches, encyclicals, and similar[46], as engaging in a discourse strongly aligned with a redintegrationist discourse. Campese (2016, p. 28) points to how migrants 'have a central metaphorical relevance in [Pope] Francis' vision of the [Church]'. For example, in the Pope's emphasis on a 'culture of encounter, the only culture capable of building a better, more just and fraternal world' which cannot be achieved through 'economic growth alone [but] taking account of every dimension of the person' (Pope Francis, 2013). At the meso-level, we can examine how Bishops' Conferences and individual Bishops engage in public discussions of the shape and direction of society. Contemporaneously, we can point to the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops (USCCB)[47], and historically we can look to Bishop Fallize of Oslo consciously adapting to political currents in Norway at the turn of the 20th Century[48]. By virtue of position and power, the Pope and Bishops can legitimise forms of Dogma, Praxis, and Religiosity from a Catholic perspective. Naturally, not all religions operate the same way[49], and need to be seen in context. This is explored further in Chapter 5, with specific reference to Catholicism and Norway.

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[46] See Zalonski (2013) for a breakdown of the different levels of papal teaching and their importance (in a structural sense, there is debate about how it translates to individual religiosity, see for example some of the work by Hornsby-Smith).

[47] See in particular USCCB (2003) *Strangers No Longer, Together on the Journey of Hope*

[48] In the build-up to the dissolution of the union with Sweden, Bp. Fallize banned, within the Catholic Church in Norway, the use of foreign flags and eventually restricted the use of the union flag (Eidsvig, 1993).

[49] See Shavit and Spengler (2017) for a discussion of the authority and reach of the European Council for Fatwa and Research

If the religious institution has an extensive transnational connection, it can tap into networks that allow them to offer a degree of representation and protection for migrants where that may be necessary (Levitt, 2004; Huynh & Yiu, 2015). In other cases, religious organisations become facilitators for the reproduction of ethnic identities that have a strong religious component (Connor, 2008; Garcia-Muñoz & Neuman, 2012; Trzebiatowska, 2010). These are mere possibilities and are not inherently positive or negative. The process of evaluating those situations is shaped by the discursive landscape that serves 'to frame how religion [is] to be recognised and what sort of interreligious relations are to be encouraged and which discouraged' (Kivisto, 2014, p. 83).

At the micro-level, a congregational level, we can identify different reasons behind religion's impact on integration processes. De Guzman and Brazal (2015) point to a distinction between congregations that are monocultural or multicultural[50], where in the former a contestation of identities or praxis can be disruptive. Village, et. al, (2017) point to how congregations can contribute to developing networks that help migrants develop social capital. Keeping in mind the discussion of identities at the beginning of this chapter, Village, et. al, (2017) point to bonding capital, fostering cohesion within the group, and bridging capital, facilitating relationships outwith the religious identity, as a potential outcome of multicultural congregations.

Whereas Snyder (2016, p. 8) argues migrants potentially draw attention to 'social, ethnic, and economic rifts and lacunae', and through that force a re-negotiation of religious identities. This may result in a re-examination of theological foundations and established praxis, and a reorganisation of the congregation (Kivisto, 2014; Heyer, 2016). Ralston (2016), on the other hand, argues congregations can mirror, and thereby perpetuate, divisions in society.

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[50] Village, et. al, (2017, p. 1948) define a multicultural congregation as having 20 per cent or more of its members of a 'cultural background that is different from the dominant cultural group'. Whereas Kivisto (2014, p. 87), emphasising racialized divisions, approaches it from the other end and defines it as 'one in which no more than 80 per cent of its members are from one racial group'.

Finally, at an individual level, religious identities also work in different ways. As with the two preceding levels, religious identities can overlap and reinforce other identities, and at an individual level this can result in intergenerational maintenance of not only religious identities, but also national or ethnic identities (Huynh & Yiu, 2015). According to Kivisto (2014), religion competes for time against other spaces where integration processes take place, highlighting that the significance of religion is predicated on levels of religiosity. Connor (2012) finds that religious participation is conducive to emotional well-being for migrants, strengthening the argument of religion contributing to social bonding and social cohesion.

Hirschmann (2004) suggests religion serves three functions for migrants: resources, refuge, and respectability. Although his emphasis is on religion, I argue in Chapter 7 that this can be applied to non-religious settings, and that there is an element missing from his list — reciprocity. Hirschmann (2004, pp. 1207-1208) defines resources as 'social and economic assistance' and 'a means of collective and individual socioeconomic mobility'. Refuge is presented as 'physical safety as well as [...] psychological comfort' and a means of mitigating the 'trauma of migration' (Hirschmann, 2004, pp. 1210, 1229). Finally, respectability derives from '[...] opportunities for status recognition and social mobility' (Hirschmann, 2004, p. 1229).

Hirschmann's three Rs can be tied into the discursive framework of this thesis. RED, SID, and MUD imply views on the use of resources, the role of respectability, and the provision of refuge. Under RED, resources is only seen as one of many factors in resolving inequalities, whereas SID emphasises the economic aspect of resources, and MUD argues 'social and economic assistance' leads to dependency. Respectability is de-emphasised in SID and juxtaposed in MUD and RED. MUD perpetuates socially constructed hierarchies, externalises "unwanted" characteristics and imposes them on those it seeks to exclude, whereas RED emphasises the need to address multiple factors in order to ensure social mobility. Refuge is similarly de-emphasised in SID, while MUD and RED are again on opposite ends: in MUD, provision of refuge results in dependency, while in RED it is an important aspect of addressing processes of inequality.

Yet, the social bonding within religious identities and groups can be antithetical to integration processes, as Putnam (2007, p. 161) points out that combined with racial segregation the religious practices in the US exacerbated that segregation: 'it was proverbial among sociologists of religion that "11:00 am Sunday is the most segregated hour in the week"'. As emphasised above, context is key.

An example of this can be found in contrasting the development of conceptualisations of religiosity in Norway with similar conceptualisations from a different context. Leirvik (2007) argues for a distinction between a Popular Religiosity (*folkereligiøsitet*) and a Normative Religiosity, where those oriented towards a Normative Religiosity seek to disentangle their religion from national and cultural markers and influences. Ironically, he argues, in the case of Islam, that this would facilitate the creation of a 'Norwegian Muslim' (Leirvik, 2007; Døving, 2009). Muslims of a Popular Religiosity character would, in contrast, be culturally introspective and focus on preservation of their 'homeland identity' (Leirvik, 2007, p. 31). Giving Leirvik the benefit of the doubt, we can see Normative Religiosity as a means of adapting to local circumstances and shifting the discourse to a Redistributive Discourse, in part attempting to render different religious identities as equal.

A significant issue is that Leirvik situates the concepts in a power relationship without exploring the implications of that relationship: Popular Religiosity as a grassroots religiosity as opposed to the elite nature of Normative Religiosity. Leirvik's Popular Religiosity overlaps indiscriminately with nationalism, politics, and culture, whereas the Normative Religiosity becomes a sanitized, curated expression of religiosity that conforms to elite manipulation. Furthermore, the concepts do not allow us to address all aspects of religious identities: dogma, praxis, and religiosity.

This is somewhat addressed in Hornsby-Smith's notion of *customary religion*: which is beliefs and practices produced by and derived from formal religious socialisation, but outwith the purview of continued control of religious authorities and subsequently subjected to 'trivialisation, conventionality, apathy, convenience and self-interest' (Hornsby-Smith, 1991, pp. 90, 92). Here, dogma and praxis (formal religious socialisation), as well as religiosity (trivialisation, conventionality, etc.) are expressed components. Customary religion, therefore, allows us to draw more fully on the discursive framework, and to distinguish the necessary components. It also opens up to situating religious institutions, identities, and religiosity within different contexts.

2.4.3 – Secularisation processes

Early conceptualisations of secularism and secularisation processes emphasised the diminishment of the role of religion in the public sphere and predicted its eventual disappearance. As this has yet to occur, alternative perspectives have evolved. Casanova (2009) characterises secularism as either an ideology, with assumptions on what a religion is or does, or as a principle of statecraft that seeks to separate, or define, two forms of authority, the political and the religious. Taylor (2007) characterises secularisation as a pattern of 'identifying with [...] while professing widespread scepticism about' religion (p. 514). Davie (1994) referred to this as 'believing without belonging'. Hervieu-Léger (2000) offers a clear analysis of this phenomenon:

> The dominant religions can still supply individuals with a unifying ferment from their own experience, yet they have all but lost the power to inform the organisation of social life.
>
> Hervieu-Léger, 2000, p, 90

Secularisation processes relate to '*how* religion becomes public' (Asad, 2003, p. 182). With the expansion of religious freedoms, the opportunity to be non-religious simultaneously opens up. This points to secularism acting as a principle of statecraft (Casanova, 2009), whereby the state attempts to act equitably towards

all religions. Simultaneously, this results in a process whereby religious identities are side-lined as a 'political medium' (Asad, 2003, p. 5).

Yet, behind its 'rational-legal mask' (Asad, 2003, pp. 22-23), the state can be far from secular or neutral in regard to religion and religious identities. Establishment Churches, such as the Church of Norway, are seen as representative institutions, privileging them in the 'complex arrangement of legal reasoning, moral practice, and political authority' (Asad, 2003). This complexity is readily seen in Norway's funding policies concerning religious societies, explored in section 5.2.

Secularisation processes set constraints for the role religion can play in the public sphere. Subsequently, the impact these processes have on national and local contexts will contribute to shaping integration processes.

2.5 – Conclusion

This chapter has sought to equip us with the theoretical framework that will allow us to explore the data of this thesis. Key to this has been the discursive framework presented in Table 3. In order to answer the questions this thesis asks, we have had to clarify and discuss the terminology and concepts pertinent to understanding the answers. Without engaging with the national and specific context of the thesis, the main focus of this chapter has been to explore the question of how identities and integration processes are related and, on a theoretical level, interact.

This has involved exploring, first, the idea of identity. Arguing that identities are plural and contextual, the relevance of identities is premised on the notion that they are fundamental components in the formation of social cohesion. From there, I explored three identities that are regularly highlighted and privileged in discussions of migration and integration: religious, ethnic, and national. Through understanding the malleable bases of these identities, we can appreciate how they are often interdependent. Following that, it is necessary to understand how the migration process is construed as formative. This allows us to distinguish not between only migrants and non-migrants, but also between different forms of migrant identities. From there, we can critically analyse how processes of categorisation are developed and used to inform different integration strategies, as well as the role of processes of identification.

Finally, the discussion can focus on integration processes. By first problematizing the concept of integration and pointing to the risk of privileging the nation-state and citizenship, we could examine categorisations of migrants from a critical perspective. These categorisations also point to potential integration strategies undertaken by the state, and what can be constituted as "successful integration". Rather than listing and defining all the theoretical perspectives, I applied a framework based on discursive elements. From there, it is possible to group theoretical concepts based on their shared premises and goals, although they might disagree on the exact strategy.

As the thesis seeks to draw attention to the role of religion, I subsequently focused on how religion can be understood within this framework. It involved clarifying the underlying premises for *why* religion should be devoted time and attention in the pursuit of understanding integration processes. Keeping in mind that context shapes *how* the influence of religion affects integration processes, I pointed to several nodes of influence: institutional at the macro-, meso-, and micro-level[51], congregational, dogma, praxis, religiosity, and, ultimately, the individual. The emphasis on the role of religion necessitates a discussion of secularisation, which, like religion, operates in multiple ways. Fundamentally, secularism/secularisation processes question the importance/relevance of religion and religious organisations.

This is where the contribution of this thesis is directed: by exploring, in depth, the context and nature of integration processes in a case study, to deepen our understanding of integration processes. Subsequent chapters will provide historical, political, and religious context (Chapter 4 & Chapter 5) that will allow us to examine critically the research material and explore the research questions (Chapter 6-8). In the next section on methodology, I turn to *how* I sought to answer the research questions.

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[51] Alternatively, this distinction can be constructed along a centre-periphery line, where the Vatican and concomitant bodies and offices (in this thesis) constitute the centre of the Catholic Church and the congregational is constituted as peripheral.

Chapter 3 – Methodology and methods

3.1 – Introduction

Building on the theoretical framework presented in the previous chapter, the emphasis on discourses led me to employ qualitative methods in order to embed the answers within their relevant contexts. Through long-term ethnographic fieldwork, supplemented by semi-structured interviews and documentary analysis, I was able to explore multiple sites and explore their interconnections. Through prolonged fieldwork, I could explore the fluid nature of discourses and how they shift, or do not shift, in response to events and different contexts. Changes, or lack thereof, can be both obvious and subtle, and in order to explore the subtlety, qualitative methods were more suitable.

In this chapter, I introduce and explore the methods I utilised. Through outlining the background and development of the ethnographic method, I demonstrate why I find it to be the best suited to answer the research questions. As a holistic method, it stretches beyond merely performing participant observation, but emphasises the need to understand the surrounding context and factors that influence the fieldwork sites. In order to supplement the ethnographic data, I performed semi-structured interviews with figures of particular interest to the different sites. Qualitative methods rely on the researcher becoming the instrument of research, and therefore necessitates a discussion of the researcher's roles and identities. This reflexive exercise facilitates a critical scrutiny of the data gathered and the data collection process. Reflection on the researcher and research methods is vital to the integrity of the research (Charmaz & Mitchell, 2001).

Following this, I discuss the choice of organisations and locations presented in this thesis. I also briefly introduce the participants from the semi-structured interviews and the motivation to pursuing those interviews. This leads to a discussion of ethical aspects: how to manage consent, treading the line between overt and covert research, how to ensure participant anonymity, and risks incurred by both the participants and the researcher in the course of fieldwork.

3.2 – Ethnography and the Manchester School

Ethnography as a methodology can briefly be described as '*veni, vidi, scripsi*' – I came, I saw, I wrote (Macdonald, 2001, p. 64). It relies on long-term participant observation, during which the ethnographer may employ a host of methods and techniques for soliciting information (Atkinson, et al., 2001). As this research explores dynamic processes, I concluded that ethnography was the most viable methodology. Ethnography offers the possibility of sustained critical research that can respond to changing circumstances, while also recognising the subjectivity of qualitative research methods. In this section, I outline the nature of ethnographic research, approaching it from a chronological perspective (entering the field, in the field, and leaving/writing). The initial sections bear the mark of a literature review, according to Atkinson, et al. (2001, p. 1), the least life-enhancing genre of scholarly writing, but it is necessary in order to understand the nature of the data-collection process.

3.2.1 – Veni – I came

Despite changes and developments in what fieldworkers bring to the field in terms of theory or dispositions, ethnographic methods have remained relatively unchanged. Malinowski is commonly considered the founding father of ethnographic research: he conducted long-term fieldwork in the language of his research subjects at a time where anthropological knowledge was largely based on travellers' accounts and analysed by "armchair-anthropologists" (Gluckman, 2006, p. 13). In Malinowski's iconic *Argonauts of the Western Pacific*, he sets the standard for ethnographic work:

> [Ethnographic work] should deal with the totality of all social, cultural and psychological aspects of the community, for they are so interwoven that not one can be understood without taking into consideration all the others.
>
> Malinowski, 1922, p. xii

The means by which this totality could be achieved was through prolonged, personal, and constant fieldwork in the native language; rendering the ethnographer open to observing and participating in all facets of daily life, from

village brawls to ceremonial events (Malinowski, 1922). The foreword and acknowledgements in *Argonauts of the Western Pacific* offer some interesting insight into how Malinowski was able to conduct his research, but what is interesting from a contemporary perspective is the invisibility of his research objects. Acknowledgements are made to government officials, professors, traders, librarians, and the publishers, but the Trobrianders themselves are not mentioned (Malinowski, 1922, pp. xiv-xv). Contrast this with Rabinow's *Reflections on Fieldwork in Morocco* (1977), which demonstrates the importance of different key informers in obtaining access to the field and accumulating data. Whereas Malinowski privileges the role of the ethnographer, referring to other non-native residents as 'untrained minds' (Malinowski, 1922, p. 4), Rabinow (1977) recognises how different informants granted him equally valid insight into issues.

There is a distinct difference in tone between Malinowski and Rabinow. Malinowski employs a positivist language, attributing success to 'a patient and systematic application of a number of rules of common sense and well-known scientific principles' (Malinowski, 1922, p. 5). Contrast this with Rabinow's (1977, p. 151) belief that 'anthropology is an interpretive science […] Both the anthropologist and his informant live in culturally mediated worlds […]'. Whereas Malinowski (1922, p. 5) speaks of 'manipulating and fixing [the ethnographer's] evidence', Rabinow (1977, p. 119) emphasises that anthropological data is 'mediated by history and culture'. Perhaps rather amusingly, Malinowski (1922, p. 7) argues that 'ethnology has introduced law and order into what seemed chaotic and freakish', but Rabinow, fifty years later, describes fieldwork as intersubjective and 'neither quite here nor quite there' (Rabinow, 1977, p. 155). These differences represent different epistemic positions of objectivity versus subjectivity, and I would argue that Rabinow's subjective epistemology is the most suited for exploring highly complex social processes.

Malinowski's objectivist approach resonates with the criticisms of social anthropologists being tools of colonial authorities, whereas Rabinow seems intent on addressing these criticisms. Despite this epistemic development in Social

Anthropology, the nature of ethnography has remained the same: first-hand experience, diversity of research techniques, fluency in the native language, long-term fieldwork which grants the researcher an air of normalcy, and a grounded and symbiotic relationship between the data collection process and theory (Atkinson, et al., 2001; Faubion, 2001; Miller, 1997; Gluckman, 2006; Kempny, 2006). Put simply: '[...] now that I was in the field, everything was fieldwork' (Rabinow, 1977, p. 11). Where recent ethnography differs from Malinowski's approach is in its shift from a naturalist perspective wherein the ethnographer is in the field but not part of it, to seeing fieldwork as highly personalized and contingent upon the researcher (Atkinson, et al., 2001; Frankenberg, 2006).

In spite of a lot of formalized argot, Marcus and Fischer (1986, p. 22) argue that fieldwork is, in the end, a 'messy, qualitative experience'. I do not wish to suggest that Malinowski was blind to the unruly nature of the field, but there is a distinct difference in what Malinowski and early fieldworkers brought to the field when compared to post-war anthropology. Though Malinowski (1922) believed that the more 'problems' an ethnographer brought with him into the field, the more open he would be to developing theory, ethnographers now tend to recognise the ethnographer as a problem in and of him/herself. Or, as Marcus (1998, p. 246) put it: 'Identity questions (and politics) have thus entered, for better or worse, into the way ethnography is shaped.'

Accepting that identity and subjectivity are cemented features of ethnography, it necessitates critical discussions of the methods chosen and an exploration of the researcher's impact on the ethnography. I will return to the notion of reflexivity later, for now I will simply reiterate Hammersley and Atkinson (1983, pp. 14-15): 'the reflexive character of social research [...] is not a matter of methodological commitment, it is an existential fact.'

3.2.2 – Vidi – I saw

The ethnographer brings an extensive toolkit into the field, and a frame of mind. It is not simply a question of what one sees, but the full range of sensory input. Whether it is 'following one's nose' (Handelman, 2006, p. 95) or performing and interacting (Faubion, 2001), ethnography turns the ethnographer into the research instrument or as Hammersley and Atkinson (1983) argue: the ethnographer *is* the penultimate research instrument. In this section, I wish to explore what the ethnographer does once he or she is *in* the field. Smith (2001, pp. 220, 224) emphasises how the ethnographer should be 'learning by labouring' and endeavour to share in experiences of the research participants in order to generate the highest quality data. Although 'insightful industriousness' is seen a key trait in ethnographers, there are dangers in 'seeing data everywhere' (Charmaz & Mitchell, 2001, p. 161).

What does the penultimate research instrument do? Miller (1997) and Rabinow (1977) both admit that much of their time in the field was spent hanging around, wandering idly, or simply drinking tea and engaging in small talk. In my case, it involved drinking copious amounts of coffee with Red Cross volunteers, asylum-seekers, youth workers, parishioners, and polishing glasses and pouring pints in a bar. Participant-observation, the key method of ethnography, defines the research space as falling between the two poles of participation and observation (Rabinow, 1977). Navigating this space can present ethical issues or hazards, as participation and observation is often done on the informants' terms. The ethnographer is dependent upon establishing rapport with informants, and making his/her presence natural or unobtrusive. Establishing rapport and gaining insight involves sharing experiences, but where does the ethnographer draw the line on what to share or what to ask about? I will return to the issue of ethics in ethnographic research below.

The initial shock of entering the field can give an overwhelming sense that 'everything [is] fieldwork' (Rabinow, 1977, p. 11), but through constant reflection and repetition the fieldworker explores ideas and concepts of interest. There is

a measure of serendipity in ethnographic fieldwork, and this shapes the research and prods it in different directions (Marcus & Fischer, 1986). Rather than haphazardly meandering about a research field, the ethnographer will pursue ideas and pull at threads incessantly. Occasionally this leads to dead ends, but as the fieldwork extends over a longer period, the researcher simply shifts focus.

3.2.3 – The Manchester School

One particularly renowned approach to fieldwork is that of the extended-case method, as promulgated by Max Gluckman and other scholars at the University of Manchester. The extended-case method involves tracing events and situations, and observing how they spill over into one another, thereby also challenging previous notions of cultural stability and insulation: the social becomes a matter of practice and process (Evens & Handelman, 2006a; Mitchell, 2006; Kapferer, 2006). In Gluckman's own words:

> I am arguing that if we are going to penetrate more deeply into the actual process by which persons and groups live together with a social system, under a culture, we have to employ a series of connected cases occurring within the same area of social life.

> Gluckman, 2006, p. 17

Up until the 1950s, the pre-dominant idea in British Social Anthropology was that of Structural-Functionalism, represented commonly by Radcliffe-Brown and Evans-Pritchard. Within this paradigm, social systems were envisioned as existing in states of equilibrium (Evens & Handelman, 2006a; Leach, 1964). After WWII, there is a distinct shift away from this paradigm, with prominent anthropologists such as Edmund Leach (1964, p. xiii) vociferously distancing himself from the structural-functionalists: '[…] society is *not* an organism, nor even a machine.'

The Manchester School and the extended case method represent a step away from the grand, holistic theories that sought to account for all aspects of a society. In large part, this is due to the open and explorative nature of the extended case

method. As Glaeser (2006, p. 65) argues: '[…] Gluckman's work is neither a worked-out body of theory nor a bounded methodology, but rather […] an "open platform".' Ultimately, the Manchester School signifies one of the significant breaks away from the objectivist ideals embodied by Malinowski and contributed to shaping much of British Social Anthropology and the ethnographic methodology.

The extended case method attempts to focus on wider contexts (Mitchell, 2006). Key to seeing the wider context is following a case over a longer period. This extension in time led to an appropriation of history into ethnography, seen in, for example, Bourgois (2003, p. 48): 'the intimate details of the lives […] revealed in this book cannot be understood in a historical vacuum.' In addition to extending the purview of the case in time, the extended case method prompted a closer look at the actors in the case. Rather than focusing exclusively on the objects of study, the ethnographer becomes a feature of the social field and needs to explore his or her impact on it (Evens, 2006; Glaeser, 2006). Finally, the extended case method also prompts an extension into space, providing a foundation for multi-sited ethnography (Glaeser, 2006). The extended case method still begins with scrutiny of the practices of a set of actors (Handelman, 2006). Ethnography, drawing on the extended case method, begins with a focus on events, and zooms out to explore the web of connections that tie in to that event.

The Manchester School, and the extended case method, provide a solid theoretical foundation for ethnographic research on migration and integration. Rather than approaching a fieldwork site, a city, an organisation, or religious group, as isolated units of analyses, the extended case method demands a widening of perspectives. It is untenable to research migration and integration without extending the research in time and space; understanding where the migrant has come from, both geographically and emotionally, requires moving beyond isolated fieldwork sites unconnected to a greater whole. Exploring how different organisations and institutions interact with migration and integration processes requires an understanding of the different levels and units of analyses, from the global to the local, from the public to the private. The next sections will focus on these different units of analyses by exploring multi-sited research and reflexivity.

3.3 – Multi-sited research

Ethnography builds on a fundamental assumption that space is socially constructed, and that the ethnographer inhabits a liminal position alongside participants in the construction of the social space (Boccagni, 2016; Falzon, 2009). Where multi-sited research differs from single-sited research is the focus on expansion as opposed to containment of the researched space (Falzon, 2009). In multi-sited research, it is not the bounded site that is important, but the meaning of that site to the actors (Xiang, 2013). The question then becomes what guides, defines, and limits the research, if not a territorially bounded space? Marcus (1995) identifies several strategies for conducting multi-sited research: following the people, the object, the metaphor, the plot, the life, or the conflict.

What then is the strategy for my research? It is driven by the research questions: where and how integration processes develop. Reflecting the literature review, I have a particular focus on the role of religion and its relationship to secular processes. This leads to an emphasis on the Catholic Church and its connected elements, but an underlying premise was that the research should be defined by being 'substantially continuous but spatially non-contiguous' (Falzon, 2009, pp. 1-2). In a sense, I am following the people, but also the conflict: my focus is on what lies '*in-between*' (Boccagni, 2016, p. 2). Seeking to explore the discourses of integration presented in the literature review, the research benefits from broadening its parameters beyond a geographically or socially bounded area. This derives from an attempt to counter issues of methodological nationalism. Migration and integration are often framed by a nation-state context, but non-national contexts might be more significant (FitzGerald, 2012; Amelina & Faist, 2012; Wimmer & Glick Schiller, 2002; Chernilo, 2006). This necessitates emphasising that participants, and the researcher, possess multiple and overlapping identities that are not defined by the nation-state (Amelina & Faist, 2012). Similarly, the research explores different levels within state and Catholic Church, rendering the research not only multi-sited but also multi-scalar (Xiang, 2013).

Despite offering several advantages, multi-sited research is not without its weaknesses. It invariably involves splitting attention and effort, giving the data a variation in both intensity and qualities. One common criticism is that an ethnographer focusing on multiple sites will suffer a loss of depth in the data (Marcus, 1998; Nadai & Maeder, 2009). A moot criticism, as it is also recognised that fieldwork, despite its length and depth, will not erase differences between the researcher and the participant. Rather, what should be strived for is a 'limited fusion of horizons' (Faubion, 2001, p. 49). To understand the actors and concepts, you have to be where the actors are and the concepts manifest (Marcus, 1998), hence the researcher will invariably achieve different depths depending on the site and space (Nadai & Maeder, 2009).

Multi-sited research can also reinforce the legitimacy of the ethnographer in the primary site and the overall ecological validity of the research (Hammersley & Atkinson, 1983). My own fieldwork, for example, necessitated large amounts of travel throughout Norway. It impinged on my time spent in Bodø, but my travelling was seen as a necessary and natural part of my activities. My identities and social memberships fit into a web of translocal relationships that rendered my activities socially continuous despite their spatial dispersion (Gallo, 2009). For example, my involvement and work with the national Catholic youth organisation was both local and national. Parishioners in Bodø viewed moving between different, Catholic sites positively. Familiarity and experience with national events and structures were seen as contributing to local activities. Multi-sited research should not be understood as performing the same controlled experiment in different locations, but pulling at threads (Marcus, 1995).

3.4 – Interviews and document analysis

3.4.1 – Interviews

There are many kinds of interviews used in qualitative research, from oral history interviews to ethnographic interviews. They range from unstructured to fully structured. The interviews in this thesis are best characterised as semi-structured interviews, where I utilised open-ended questions and followed up answers (Davies, 2011; Ayres, 2012). In some of the cases, interviews are the result of long-term contact and establishing rapport with the informant. As a result of the overarching ethnographic approach of the thesis, the interviews with Dmitri, Thomas, and Vanessa are shaped by this process and bear hallmarks of ethnographic interviews (Fielding, 2011). In other cases, such as with Msgr. Olsen, Siv, Ali, Larsen, and Hasvoll, the interviews can also be seen as elite interviews (Moyser, 2011). In the case of Msgr. Olsen, Siv, Larsen, and the interviews with figures in Caritas, they served as experts, whereas Hasvoll also served as a gatekeeper. Ali, on the other hand, was an elite interview in the sense that it offered the opportunity to ask a relatively prominent local politician about personal background, outlook, and motivation.

3.4.2 – Document analysis

Document analysis is a useful method of providing additional context and when used in conjunction with ethnography and interviews can help minimise bias (Bowen, 2009). As a part of a qualitative approach, document analysis can draw on a wide array of sources and used to supplement findings (Bowen, 2009), such as in section 5.2, where a participant's contemporaneous reflection on why Norges Unge Katolikker (NUK)[52] was investigated was validated by a report published the following year. Drawing on documents can also 'provide a means of tracking change and development' (Bowen, 2009, p. 30), such as in Chapter 4, where I use policy documents to track changes in integration policy in Norway. Naturally, there are questions of documents' authenticity, credibility, representativeness, and meaning, as interpretations of documentations may not match the producer's intentions (Wharton, 2011). In disentangling contentious cases such as the

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[52] Catholic Youth of Norway

membership fraud case, explored in depth in Chapter 5, documents put forward by the Catholic Dioceses of Oslo (OKB) can be compared with official filings and records.

Documents collected and analysed in this thesis range from newspaper articles and opinion pieces, to annual reports and minutes from meetings. I recognise that 'not all social facts have been documented' and that 'not all documents are available to research' (Wharton, 2011, pp. 80-81). As mentioned initially, document analysis was used to supplement the ethnographic research and interviews.

3.5 – Analytical considerations

3.5.1 – Methods

This thesis draws on data collected over the course of fourteen months, June 2015 – August 2016. Ethnography was the primary method of data collection, and was supplemented by thirteen semi-structured interviews[53] and document analysis of associational documents, newsletters, newspaper articles, and other sundries that pertained to either the organisations or migration and integration generally in Bodø and nationally. The research was conducted primarily within five organisations, as well as within the cityscape of Bodø, my main base during the fieldwork. The five organisations were NUK (the national catholic youth organisation), Caritas Norway (the Catholic charity), Red Cross Bodø, St. Eystein (the Catholic parish, and school, in Bodø), and *The Borealis*[54] (a bar). These organisations offered a range of avenues for exploring integration processes, concerning religious/secular, local/national, and volunteer/paid organisations. The semi-structured interviews were conducted with members/volunteers of the organisations, as well as persons involved in municipal and county politics and administration. Casting a wide net allowed me to cross-reference topics with participants from the whole range of research sites.

Through participation in the above organisations, I established rapport with a range of potential interview subjects. The semi-structured interviews were primarily conducted with the intention of filling in gaps, when information could not be solicited through normal conversation or it was necessary to record the conversation. This process of conducting semi-structured interviews necessitated tailored questions, utilising the full flexibility offered by the semi-structured interview. All the interviews were conducted in Norwegian, and all but one interview subject gave answers in Norwegian: the non-Norwegian interviewee spoke Swedish. Due to the similarities of Norwegian and Swedish, this did not present any issues.

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[53] A list of participants can be found in appendix B
[54] The name of the bar has been anonymised

Ethnography relies on being able to recall encounters, and there are different methods of documenting encounters. Visually, through video and photo, aurally, through recording, or in writing, taking notes during or following situations and conversations. I focused on note taking and photography as primary modes of documenting and aiding recall. Field notes are used differently by different ethnographers, and adapt to the ethnographer's style and preference. From minute jottings on napkins, to fully formed notes written at the end of the day. Regardless of how one makes field notes, they primarily function as ways to recall colourful encounters and complex situations, something which is difficult to render in field notes (Emerson, et al., 2001, pp. 354-357, 365). Personally, I relied less on written notes, preferring to avoid, if possible, taking notes in "live" situations and wrote notes when I returned to my flat. In situations where taking notes was unobtrusive, I chose to do so. On the other hand, I utilised photography as a means of documenting situations and facilitating recall. With the prevalence of mobile phone usage and photography, I found it to be a more unobtrusive method.

3.5.2 – Fieldwork sites

3.5.2.1 – Bodø

Several factors influenced the choice of the dominant fieldwork site. Firstly, Bodø was chosen for its location and size. Bodø is introduced in depth in Chapter 4, and I will only briefly focus on my selection criteria. It is a regional centre within Northern Norway, and offered the opportunity to conduct the research in a peripheral context (Barth, 1963b, p. 16), while offering a basis for comparison to other cities and urban centres. Oslo, Bergen, Stavanger, and Trondheim, though interesting cases, arguably offer little in terms of comparison. In orders of magnitude, their circumstances are different from most municipalities. Hence, in order to provide a basis for comparison in later studies Bodø was chosen. Although this study is not comparative, the research touches on other locations in order to elucidate elements in Bodø or concerning integration processes. Bodø serves as a territorial anchor in the research, framing large parts of the research.

Another factor in choosing Bodø was the presence of a Catholic community and a Catholic school. There are only five Catholic schools in Norway, four primary/lower secondary schools (grades 1-10) and one upper secondary school (grades 11-13). The schools are located in Bodø (years 1-10), Arendal (years 1-10, plus a kindergarten), Bergen (years 1-13), and Oslo (years 1-10). As I sought to establish a sense of anthropological strangeness, I excluded Bergen and Oslo due to my familiarity with the cities and the Catholic communities. Arendal was excluded as I previously participated in activities in St. Hallvard in Oslo, where a Polish congregation of Franciscans[55] were responsible for the administration of the parish, and they moved to Arendal in 2008: thus, I concluded that Bodø offered the greatest possibilities for new experiences that I could approach from an anthropological perspective. Bodø also has the youngest Catholic parish of the four cities, which would enable me to find informants who could give me insight into how the Catholic community grew and developed within the city.

3.5.2.2 – Catholicism

The choice of Catholic as a common religious identifier between the religious organisations examined in depth in this thesis derives from my experience with the Catholic Church. As outlined in section 3.6 on reflexivity, I am a practicing Catholic, and have extensive experience with the Catholic youth community in Norway. As such, I had much more extensive access to informants and participants than if I had chosen another religious community, such as an Islamic community. My intimate knowledge of the Catholic Church in Norway allowed me to explore the connections between the dioceses, parishes, NUK, and Caritas Norway: seeing how the different organisations, groups, and people are interwoven.

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[55] Monastic orders in Norway are subsidiaries of monasteries in other countries, such as the Dominican monastery in Bodø having first been a subsidiary of a monastery based in Staffordshire, England, and subsequently responsibility was transferred to a monastery in the Philippines. I do not explore this relationship in detail, but it is worth noting that it tends to shift the weight of religious sisters or brothers in favour of the "home" country (though exceptions do exist). Though an interesting topic to explore with regards to the relationship between religion and integration processes, it fell beyond the remit of this thesis and will only be tangentially referred to as it becomes relevant to other discussions.

The Catholic Church in Norway consists of people from roughly 200 countries and territories (Tande, 2016), and represents as such one of the most internationalised organisations in Norway. This leads Mæland (2016), Hovdelien (2016), and Synnes (2012) to refer to the Catholic Church in Norway as a migrant church, due to the heterogeneity it derives from members of the Church having migration histories. I find the descriptive use of the term migrant church to be both misleading and ahistorical[56], as it implies the Catholic Church in Norway on several levels deviates from a norm defined by hegemonic views of society (Snyder, 2016).

It also carries the implicit assumption that the members retain their migrant identities, regardless of their life histories and will continually be defined in terms of their migrant identity. Furthermore, it downplays the presence of the Catholic Church in Norwegian society since its return to Norway in 1843. Identifying the Catholic Church in Norway as a migrant church carries the implicit assumption that the Catholic Church in Norway has remained unaffected by Norwegian society over the course of its recent history. This is reminiscent of Davie's (1994, p. 92) observation that the British addition of "Roman" to "Catholicism" accentuates 'the foreignness of Catholicism'. Thus, the use of "migrant church" is a de facto Othering that will inhibit a fruitful analysis of integration processes.

As one of the cases in this thesis, the Catholic Church in Norway offers both historical and current material for analysis. It has also been the origin of two of the organisations investigated, NUK and Caritas Norway. The Catholic Church in Norway has also attracted attention from researchers in Norway, with researchers in Stavanger, Bergen, Volda (outside Ålesund), and Oslo conducting research on their local Catholic parishes (Loga, 2011; Vedøy, 2016; Busengdal, 2015; Hovdelien, 2016; Mæland, 2016).

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[56] Describing the Catholic Church as a "migrant church" in a theological sense is a different discussion, one not addressed here.

3.5.2.3 – NUK

NUK is the national organisation for Catholic youth in Norway. In 2017, it celebrated its 70th anniversary, and tallies 90 local groups and almost 3000 members. The organisation is organised along three levels: the local parish level, seven regions, and the national. NUK, centrally, organises roughly 20 activities annually, from leadership training activities to fundraising for Caritas Norway. More activities are organised at the local level, from supporting catechesis in parishes to choirs and youth groups (NUK, 2016). I explore how NUK fits into the Catholic landscape in Norway in Chapter 5, for now I will only mention the activities that formed part of my fieldwork. Over the course of the fourteen months, I participated in events at local, regional, and national levels. These included 3-4 meetings in the local youth group, a regional weeklong camp for 15-16 year olds, two training weekends for aspiring leaders, and three national, week long camps, one for each age group (children 7-11, junior 11-14, youth 15-18). The regional and national camps also included a planning weekend for each.

I also took part in a two-week international pilgrimage to the World Youth Day in Kraków, as well as the planning weekend ahead of the pilgrimage and four-five meetings with the organising group. I also took part in the Annual General Meeting and three meetings in the national council of the organisation. My use of the organisation and its activities as a fieldwork site was clarified and approved by the national council, and I was in regular communication with members of the secretariat or executive council. In the interest of maintaining participant anonymity, I have categorised data from the activities into three categories: local, national, and international. This means I will avoid specific details that could lead to identifying either participants or the specific activity.

Related to the discussion on reflexivity, I have to mention that I have held positions of responsibility within NUK over the years. This brings into question the issue of impartiality and bias, which I address throughout the thesis. I will therefore clarify my role in the activities I participated in during my fieldwork. Firstly, I was the regional representative for the northern region, which provided

me with access to the national council, but also required me to support and develop activities at the parish level within the region. Secondly, I am a member in the leadership-training group, which is responsible for organising two training weekends a year for youths interested in becoming leaders, at any level or event, in the organisation. Thirdly, I was the deputy national coordinator for the pilgrimage to Kraków, which took place in the summer of 2016. Fourthly, I was an active part of several leadership teams at national camps. I discuss ethical considerations in detail below. Methodologically, this limited me from assuming a novice role, but forced me to critically rethink my familiarity. On the other hand, my experience and familiarity did not disrupt discussions and activities, and the base level of rapport with many participants allowed me to observe discussions that might not have taken place in front of a less familiar or trusted person.

3.5.2.4 – Caritas Norway

Caritas Norway is the official charity organisation for the Catholic Church in Norway, established in 1964 with the mission to promote the welfare of migrants and marginalised groups in Norway, as well as contribute to international aid work. It sprang from the Norwegian Catholic Refugees Aid, established in 1952, and its evolution into an independent organisation was prompted by a flow of Hungarian refugees to Norway following the Hungarian Revolution in 1956 (Caritas Norge, 2014)[57]. It is a member of the Caritas Internationalis and Caritas Europe networks (Caritas Norge, 2010). Caritas Norway works with both international and domestic issues, but the focus of this thesis is on the domestic aspects of their work. Caritas Norway is inextricably tied to the Norwegian Catholic Bishops Conference, and every Catholic parish in Norway may send a representative to Caritas Norway's AGM. Caritas Norway functions as an umbrella-organisation for local, parish-based Caritas groups, providing advice, information, and assistance (Caritas Norge, 2013). Although I focus on the larger centres in Oslo, Bergen, Stavanger, and Drammen below, there are smaller, local, parish-based groups as well.

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[57] See Mæland (2016) for a closer examination of historical material on Caritas Norway

Of particular interest is Caritas Norway's work in the areas of migration and integration, topics that accounted for twelve per cent of their expenses in 2016 (Caritas Norge, 2017b). Their high-profile domestic work consists of Information and Counselling Centres in Oslo, Drammen, Bergen, and Stavanger. The Information and Counselling Centre in Oslo is, by far, the most robust and offers the broadest services: guidance in fourteen languages[58], legal advice twice a week, health care advice twice a week, job application course, Norwegian language courses, and a mentorship program (Caritas Norge, 2017a). All services, barring the language courses, are free of charge. The centres in Bergen, Drammen, and Stavanger offer scaled down versions of these activities, dependent upon local resources. In addition to this, in 2016 Caritas Norway started working with asylum centres and providing basic language tuition and introductions to public services and offices in Norway. The vast majority of activities are volunteer-led.

My research activities in Caritas Norway, and its local groups, were confined primarily to semi-structured interviews, in addition to participant observation at Caritas Norway's AGM in 2016. I interviewed the activity coordinators in Stavanger, Bergen, and Drammen, as well as the leader of Caritas Norway's domestic section. I chose to examine Caritas Norway in part due to its activities, but also due to the overlap with the Catholic Church in Norway and NUK. Focusing on Caritas Norway is a result of seeking to answer the research question on how religious organisations influence integration processes.

3.5.2.5 – Red Cross Bodø (RCB)

The Red Cross is one of the other main organisations under the microscope. Though there are a plethora of secular organisations to choose from, the Red Cross is one of the few with a pervasive presence in Norway. The Norwegian Red Cross has 116 local groups throughout Norway, and approximately 43 000 volunteers (Norwegian Red Cross, 2016a; 2016b). The Red Cross is, arguably, one of the most recognisable charitable organisations in the world: for example, the International Committee

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[58] Permanently: Norwegian, English, Spanish, Polish, Romanian, and Russian. On an "as needed"-basis: Arabic, French, German, Dutch, Lithuanian, Portuguese, Swahili, and Urdu.

of the Red Cross has received the Nobel Peace Prize on four separate occasions (Norwegian Red Cross, 2016b). The Red Cross also has a clearly defined set of guiding principles, and enjoys a close relationship with several municipalities, counties, and the state. Due to time constraints, it was impossible to explore the full range of activities offered by the Norwegian Red Cross. After conferring with one of the coordinators at RCB, we decided that my time would be best spent participating in their recently started after-school homework program. In addition to this regular activity, I took part in workshops on multicultural social work, town hall-style meetings to discuss integration activities in RCB, and the Annual General Meeting.

I took part in the recently established weekly after-school program, which aimed to help pupils with homework. Although targeting children in primary and secondary education, adults attending the adult education program run by the municipality often visited the activity. The activity consisted of three-five volunteers assisting pupils with homework. On a busy week, there might be a dozen visitors, but large parts of the time was spent conversing with other volunteers. The activity was held at *Stormen*, the library and cultural centre in Bodø.

In addition to this program, I got involved with the social work organised for the asylum seekers that arrived in Bodø in the early winter of 2015. Volunteers from RCB coordinated daily two-hour social events at the reception centre, and I took part about twice a week in November and December. The work involved talking to the asylum seekers, making tea, coffee, and waffles, and generally interacting with the asylum seekers. This could be talking to, and getting to know, the asylum seekers, playing cards, answering questions about Norway (both about culture and language), or playing games with the children. There would be between 15-30 asylum seekers, and two-three Red Cross volunteers.

<u>3.5.2.6 – The Borealis</u>

The Borealis is a pub in central Bodø, and my research there consisted of participant observation and a semi-structured interview with one of the bartenders. My reason for conducting research at a pub are two-fold. Firstly, approximately two-fifths of the workforce in the service industry are migrants (SSB, 2016a), making it an interesting area for observing integration processes in a workplace. Secondly, it is a profession with few requirements as to education or formal qualifications, and was therefore available to me in a way other migrant-heavy industries, such as the construction industry, are not. I submitted open applications to several hotels and bars, but was only invited to an interview for a position at *The Borealis*. I worked shifts at the bar from October 2015 until I left Bodø in June 2016. To begin with, I was given the occasional shift, but following the holiday season, I worked more regularly, often covering shifts for colleagues.

My primary focus was observing my colleagues, their interactions with each other and customers. There was considerable variation in pace in the bar, where certain evenings were slow and allowed for longer conversations amongst the staff and with customers. Other evenings were busy, with the bar filled to capacity and leaving little time for idleness. My engagement with *The Borealis* and its staff was not limited to a strict working relationship, I also went to the bar outwith my working hours, sometimes because I was passing by, other times because I had time to spare before or after other activities. This mirrored the patterns of other staff, who would socialise with each other in the bar. Writing field notes while working was not very problematic, as I could withdraw to the back of the bar under the guise of re-stocking the fridges or shelves, and could make minor jottings.

3.5.3 – Data analysis

The process of analysing ethnographic material is an exercise in structuring and framing chaotic situations and encounters. Attempting to observe everything, while focusing on one's participation, can lead to overwhelming amounts of data (Charmaz & Mitchell, 2001). The question remains how, and when, to analyse the

data. After the fieldwork has been conducted and the ethnographer has returned from the field, one method of analysis is what Emerson, et al. (2001), refer to as the integrative strategy. Here the ethnographer attempts to conduct an analysis through a reflective narrative, writing in the first person to offer a more fluid transition between data from the field and the analysis. The integrative strategy is an inductive process, whereby the ethnographer 'generates as many ideas, issues, topics and themes as possible' (Emerson, et al., 1995, p. 166) This process starts with a close reading of field notes, which involves line-by-line open coding looking for themes and connections. The open coding process attempts to avoid pre-established categories, and encourages the ethnographer to use a multitude of codes. Following this coding, data is sorted and subjected to a critical examination. Naturally, the coding process is strongly influenced by disciplinary background, in the same way disciplinary background and training shape the fieldwork (Emerson, et al., 1995).

The audio-recorded interviews were transcribed and coded using Nvivo. Nvivo offers certain advantages in coding interviews as it can be done alongside transcribing, and interviews can readily be compared to each other. I personally transcribed and coded the interviews, which allowed me to situate the interviews in the wider fieldwork and in relation to my field notes. This was essential, as the interviews need to be seen in the context of the fieldwork, as the chronology of events was rather significant. As with the ethnographic data, I utilised a close reading of the transcripts to generate codes for each interview, and later extended my scope to include the ethnographic data. Combining the interviews and the field notes facilitated writing integrative memos that form the basis of the later analyses.

3.6 – Reflexivity

As the ethnographer is the research instrument, the data gathered is shaped by the ethnographer's ability to observe and collect information. Ethnography involves the exploitation of the innate capacities of social actors: the ability to engage in conversation, to draw attention to issues, and to manage impressions (Hammersley & Atkinson, 1983; Evens, 2006). The integrity of ethnographic research, therefore, is contingent upon the researcher's awareness and openness concerning his or her identities, values, beliefs, and influence upon the material. Reflexivity implies that ethnographic research does contain limitations and these limitations derive from the ethnographer's access to different data (Kapferer, 2006)

Neutrality in the field is a myth, but the research can be reconciled to scientific principles through balancing overtness and covertness in the field (Murphy & Dingwall, 2001). This balancing act is complicated by participants being less concerned with what the research is about than the kind of person the researcher is (Hammersley & Atkinson, 1983). Age, gender, ethnicity, nationality, religiosity, and a host of other possible identities, shape relationships with informants (Hammersley & Atkinson, 1983; Mitchell, 2006; Glaeser, 2006; Frankenberg, 2006). Furthermore, the informant does not suspend his or her life for the benefit of the ethnographer, but incorporates the researcher's presence into their daily life (Rabinow, 1977). In some situations, this incorporation also denies the researcher some identities, such as that of the academic researcher (Macdonald, 1993). Reflexive research considers these factors, and critically assesses their impact on the research.

My research was situated in locations and contexts with which I am intimately familiar, adding an element of autoethnography (Reed-Danahay, 2011) to the overall research. To Hammersley and Atkinson (1983, p. 92), this presents a problem as it might prohibit a 'novice role', where the researcher is permitted to pry and break social conventions under the guise of ignorance. Anthropology usually requires an attitude of seeing a culture as "anthropologically strange" in

order to expose underlying assumptions. In other words, the ethnographer should sometimes ask seemingly simple and obvious questions, and this method is less accessible to someone with intimate knowledge of the culture, group, or social space in question (Hammersley & Atkinson, 1983).

Accepting the premise that 'identity questions (and politics) have thus entered […] into the way ethnography is shaped' (Marcus, 1998, p. 246), there is a need to outline what identities were activated and made relevant during the fieldwork. Firstly, as a dual-national UK/Norwegian citizen having grown up in Norway, completing all primary and secondary schooling there, I am intimately familiar with a range of Norwegian cultural nuances. I am fluent in Norwegian, and easily pass as a Norwegian due to language and appearance. Despite this, I would emphasise a Scottish identity, such as by wearing a kilt on special occasions. When speaking English to people I encountered during the fieldwork, I would also be identified as non-Norwegian (usually Scottish), or would be compelled to explain how I mastered both languages and/or ended up living in Northern Norway. This tension between being Scottish/British and Norwegian, I would argue, has allowed me to establish the required distance necessary to view my fieldwork as anthropologically strange, but simultaneously achieve a depth that stems from autobiographical details. Moreover, I hope to highlight the complexities and diversity of identities that are often subsumed under broad categories.

Fluency in the language and awareness of cultural nuances alone do not mean I effortlessly entered into the field, as my background is from Oslo. For the purpose of reflexivity it is sufficient to say that being a "southerner" did shape some interactions. In interactions with some locals, being a southerner meant having to weather some abuse, though this was mostly kind-hearted. On the other hand, meeting other southerners usually afforded an easy conversation topic about what brought them to the North. The "northern" versus "southern" distinction is not necessarily analytical, but a distinction based on broad sweeping generalisations and stereotypes that go back as far as the 1960s (Hellstad, 2010). My generic South Eastern dialect meant participants could not easily identify my origins, hence

resorting to stereotypes. The distinction quickly ceased to be relevant, perhaps partly due to my disparagement of the capitol and praise of Bodø and Northern Norway, thereby beating them to the punch.

On an even more detailed level, meeting people from Oslo, or the surrounding area, created an extra similarity (or dissimilarity) based on where in Oslo one grew up. In my case, I was raised on the East side of Oslo, but attended a primary school in the city centre, and a secondary school on the West side. Growing up on the East side allowed me to distance myself from certain stereotypes associated with the West side of Oslo[59]. There are advantages to being familiar with aspects of Norwegian culture and language, but I was able to establish the methodologically required distance (Marcus, 1998, p. 252) by virtue of having lived in the UK since 2009, and by moving to a part of Norway which I was largely unfamiliar with. The relationship between the "Norwegian" and "Scottish" identities was shaped by my adolescence and has resulted in roots migration[60], as Wessendorf remarks in her work:

> Adolescence as a period of liminality during which young people "anchor themselves in style" in order to overcome feelings of marginalisation from the wider social environment.
> Wessendorf, 2013, p. 11

As a result of my adolescence, I rarely self-identify as Norwegian (ethnically or nationally), subordinating it to other identities. I might have attended primary and secondary schools in Oslo, but they were not "typical": my primary school was a private Catholic school, run initially by nuns and later taken over by the Catholic Dioceses of Oslo, and my secondary school, though state-run, offered the International Baccalaureate program. In many ways, my schooling kept me partially removed from 'The Norwegian Unitary school' and its 'hidden curriculum'

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[59] Without going into excessive detail on the social construction of Oslo, the general idea is based on class distinctions where the West side is (upper)middle class and the East side is working class
[60] 'the "roots-migrant", those members of the second generation who relocate to their parents' country of origin' (Wessendorf, 2013, p. viii)

of values and expectations, the idea that Norwegian state schools enforce national identity constructions (Lidén, 2001; Snyder, 1971). Another factor is that I was classified as a minority language pupil, as I spoke English at home rather than Norwegian. This does not mean I was seen as a minority pupil, as that label is more often attributed to pupils that visibly stand out as "non-Norwegian" (Hofslundsengen, 2011).

One example of this is when, while I was an upper secondary student, a guidance counsellor came to hand out exemption forms for not being assessed in "nynorsk" (New Norwegian), one of the official written forms of Norwegian, and automatically handed forms out to pupils who were not white. As exemption is given on the basis of what language the pupil uses as a native language, I asked for a form, and then had to explain to the guidance counsellor why I should have one, something she did not require from the other pupils she gave exemption forms. This blatant display of racialisation of my peers contributed to a desire to distance myself from a "Norwegian" identity. For many reasons, not all of which relate to my schooling, I have developed an aversion to being identified as Norwegian, and have emphasised and preferred to be identified as Scottish (or in a pinch, British).

Geographically contingent identities aside, another significant identity that needs to be reflected on is my religious identity. I am a practicing Catholic, and have been from a very young age. I have been an active member of NUK for over two decades. I was sent to summer camps as a child, and later went voluntarily as an adolescent. Several of my older siblings were also active in the organisation, and I have remained active throughout my adult life. I have had multiple positions of responsibility in the organisation over the years, and am intimately familiar with several aspects of the organisation and its activities. Though by no means a theologian, I take pride in being knowledgeable of multiple aspects of Catholic doctrine and practice. It is beyond any doubt that this research has been shaped by my religious identity. I highly doubt I would have had the unfettered access to research sites constructed around a Catholic identity had I not identified strongly with that identity.

This presents multiple issues with regards to ethics and bias, most (if not all) of which will be addressed throughout the thesis. I will argue that my ethnographic fieldwork amongst parts of the Catholic communities in Norway is not impugned by my Catholic identity, rather it places the onus squarely on the openness required from myself with regards to the inferences I draw from my data. As pointed out by Marcus (1998, pp. 246, 252), reflexive ethnography of groups one is intimately familiar with leads to much greater pressure on what is required of the ethnographer, both methodologically and personally.

Gender and age were also important in shaping my data. In the local parish, I was one of very few people between the age of twenty and thirty, and my age certainly played a factor in the organisational aspects of my research. Men, particularly young men, were almost as a rule few and far between in several of the activities I participated in. That is not to say they were not involved in the voluntary organisations, but there were gendered aspects of volunteering. Nor would I have been able to achieve such depth in NUK had I been older, although with my background in the organisation my age undoubtedly played less of a part in access.

A final aspect which also shaped my research is my mobility. This is naturally related to my age, occupation, class and perhaps even marital status. Hammersley and Atkinson (1983, p. 87) note a tendency for ethnography 'to be the province of younger research workers'. They hypothesize that it might be due to time commitments, or the lack thereof, as a young researcher. Being a young, unmarried, PhD candidate has given me a freedom of movement that is rarely available to researchers with more settled lives. With nothing but research laying claim to my time, I was able to devote myself to following leads and participating in research activities that necessitated travelling. In many ways, this reinforced an impression of my presence in the primary fieldwork site as itinerant or temporary. This might lead to some limitations, but as argued above it was a necessary aspect of the research.

In terms of being able to relate to the experiences of migrants, being a highly mobile, and undoubtedly privileged, migrant has shaped both the research and the researcher. Investigating aspects of integration and inclusion whilst simultaneously going through those processes was an interesting experience. Migration and integration are systems shaped by inequality, and there is no doubt that a single, young, white, highly educated man has an easier time of it. In terms of my migration history, I find it easiest to describe myself as having, for most of the last decade, lived a transnational life, split between Norway and the UK. This transnational existence, along with my educational and religious background, has contributed to my understanding of migration and integration. Migration offers challenges at personal, private, public, local, regional, and national levels, and the ideal outcome of integration processes is that migrants, of any kind, enrich any of these levels.

3.7 – Ethics

Any social research requires a discussion of ethical implications of both constructing and conducting research. Ethics is not confined to what, usually pre-approved, questions are asked in interviews or focus groups, but occurs at all stages of the research. Ethnography, in particular, puts the onus on the researcher's integrity. The Association of Social Anthropologists of the UK and the Commonwealth (ASA) provides extensive guidance on the ethical processes of ethnography and participant observation. The ASA (2011) identify two key pitfalls in ethical ethnographic research: participant awareness, and participant anonymity. In the following sections, I explore how I negotiated these two aspects of my fieldwork. Additionally, I reflect on the notions of risk and harm, which are important factors in ethical decision making in research processes.

3.7.1 – Negotiating consent

The process of negotiating consent, particularly informed consent, is rarely straight forward. In the case of interviews and surveys, the process usually entails the participant signing a consent form and being given a plain language statement that lays out the research. In the case of participant observation, the process of establishing consent is more diffuse.

With regards to interviews, I provided a written statement outlining the nature of the research project and how the interview data would be recorded, used, stored, and disposed of. The interview subject was subsequently given a consent form where they were given the choice of consenting to participating in the research, and whether they would prefer anonymity or if they consented to being named in the research and subsequent publications. The participant was offered the possibility of not answering questions they did not feel comfortable answering, and their participation was entirely voluntary. Due to lack of resources, no remuneration or incentive was offered. Rather, their participation was the result of established rapport, trust, and an interest in contributing to the research project.

In situations which were entirely observational, such as public speeches and celebrations on the 17th May or the deportation protest, I did not find it necessary to acquire consent from people present, as their anonymity provides ample protection. In smaller, more intimate situations where I would engage in conversation with potential participants, I maintained an open and honest approach. If anyone asked why I moved to Bodø, or was present at an activity, I would always include a statement concerning my role as a researcher and my project. In certain situations, such as with activities organised by NUK and the Red Cross, I would note that I had informed the organisations, or local branches, of my research and acquired organisational consent. If I felt the participant was unable to make an informed decision regarding my research, as would occasionally happen during my research at the Borealis[61], I did not pursue conversations relevant to the research. I return to this in the section below in terms of overt/covert research practices.

3.7.2 – Participant awareness

Issues surrounding participant's awareness of the researcher and the research are to be expected: overt versus covert research, individual versus collective informed consent, and recording of data. Firstly, the issues overt and covert research are not black and white, participant observation exists on a continuum of being overt or covert (McKenzie, 2009; Murphy & Dingwall, 2001). McKenzie (2009) argues that participant observation will inevitably contain covert elements, despite a researcher's best intentions of conducting overt research. An attempt can be made to pursue overt research through obtaining approval, access, and consent in advance from participants and organisations (ASA, 2011, p. 2). Yet, advance consent from gatekeepers does not guarantee consent from other participants (ASA, 2011; McKenzie, 2009; Calvey, 2008).

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[61] I would exercise judgement as to the level of intoxication, and would avoid research topics if I considered them too inebriated to make an informed decision as to the nature of my research. If the participant nonetheless pursued topics pertinent to my research, I would make a note of it and used it to inform other aspects of my research.

Lugosi (in Calvey, 2008, p. 908) argues that the overt/covert nature of the research depends on the relationship between the researcher and the participant. In this sense, the overt/covert nature of the research is not as important as the researcher's duty of care (European Science Foundation, 2011; ASA, 2011). Undeniably, aspects of my fieldwork were covert: observations at a rally against the deportation of asylum seekers, participating in 17th May celebrations, and similar situations where there is no possibility of, or anything to be gained by, informing the public or participants of my intentions. Ethnographic fieldwork requires a continual process of ethical reflexivity, and in the interest of openness and transparency, it is important to recognise that aspects of research are covert (Calvey, 2008).

The process of obtaining and maintaining consent is, in practice, maintaining a relationship with the participant. In interviews and focus groups, this relationship is defined as one between the researcher and the participant, clarified by consent forms and plain language statements detailing the research. In ethnographic research, on the other hand, the relationship between researcher and participant is more complex. The European Science Foundation (ESF) place 'questionable procedures for obtaining informed consent [and] insufficient respect and care for participants in the research' under the category of poor and inappropriate research practices (European Science Foundation, 2011, p. 9). There are several problems with this view, as it is not made clear what are 'questionable procedures' or displaying 'insufficient respect and care'. As criticisms, they rely on a value-judgement of the researcher's conduct and awareness, and in the following paragraphs, I reflect on the processes whereby I established, obtained, and maintained consent.

Both the issues of obtaining and maintaining consent can only be resolved *in situ*. One aspect of the resolution of these issues is recognising intrinsic power relationships between the researcher and the participants. Rabinow (1977) and the ASA (2011) argue that symbolic violence and unequal power relationships are inherent in ethnographic research. In this perspective, the relationship between

the researcher and the participant is a zero-sum game where the researcher inhabits the role of a superior and extracts information from participants (Dyrberg, 1997). The ethnographer defines the encounter, controls the conversation, and asks the questions, possibly to the detriment or disempowerment of the participant.

The alternative perspective is one where the power relationship is viewed as a 'plus-sum' game, and both the researcher and the participant define the interactions and gain from the relationship (Dyrberg, 1997). Power, in these two forms, is generated in significantly different fashions: the former relies on a derivative form of power, where power is inherited from position, whereas the latter is a self-constituting form of power, where it is constituted in the context — and interaction — taking place (Dyrberg, 1997). In the course of my fieldwork, I pursued the latter, symbiotic relationship as the preferred power-dynamic between researcher and participant.

Aspiring to achieve a 'plus-sum' relationship can be done through understanding and pursuing four principles: non-maleficence (no harm should come to participants), beneficence (a positive outcome from the research for all parties), autonomy (respect for decisions made by participants), and justice (participants should be treated equally) (Murphy & Dingwall, 2001; ASA, 2011). These principles are tied to obtaining and maintaining consent and rapport. Rapport-building can be distinguished as 'getting in' and 'getting on' (McKenzie, 2009, p. 5.2). The initial effort goes towards negotiating access to participants, whereas the later effort goes towards maintaining access. Initially, a researcher might approach an organisation or institution and clear the research with decision makers within the organisations, but this does not mean that all the people involved with the organisation are willing to submit to that decision and allow themselves to be researched.

Ideally, consent should be established by both the gatekeepers and the individual subject (ASA, 2011). Establishing consent is synonymous with establishing trust and rapport, and involves openness and transparency about both the research project and the researcher. The notion of informed consent is near sacrosanct within sociology, but there is, arguably, no such thing as perfect informed consent. Only the researcher is aware of the full extent of the research he/she is conducting, and ensuring a participant is made fully aware of the researcher's goals is unfeasible. Researchers will, inevitably, simplify their research when dealing with participants and the greater public (McKenzie, 2009). Although consent forms, plain language statements, participant information sheets, and sundries, generate a level of informed consent, they are essentially bureaucratically approved simplifications. Providing a participant with an information sheet and consent form does not guarantee their understanding (Murphy & Dingwall, 2001) For this reason, the onus should be on maintaining consent over time, avoiding inflicting any form of harm on participants, treating participants as equals, and respecting their decisions (ASA, 2011; Block, et al., 2013; Gillam, 2013).

In terms of my own fieldwork, treading the line of covert and overt research mirrors the experience of McKenzie (2009). Rather than pre-determining the overt/covert conduct of the researcher, it is up to the researcher to judge when it is appropriate to 'cut the continuum' (McKenzie, 2009, p. 5.14). In the vast majority of my interactions, it was easy to judge when to cut the continuum: one of the most frequent questions I received was "what brings you to Bodø?", and to answer anything other than "I am here to perform ethnographic research" (or in that vein) would involve a degree of deception which is unjustifiable. That being said, I would not volunteer the information unless prompted. I do not find this problematic, as most meaningful interactions involved getting to know participants, which inevitably necessitates a give and take. Hammersley and Atkinson (1983) accurately stipulate that it is unrealistic, and perhaps unethical, to expect honesty from participants if the researcher does not reciprocate. This is in line with ASA ethical guidelines, which hold that participants should be made aware of the research 'whenever reasonably practicable' (ASA, 2011, p. 2). To the

best of my ability, I would answer questions participants had concerning my research and conduct.

At this point, an example would be more illustrative of how I cut the continuum at different points. My work with RCB involved taking part in an after-school activity aimed at helping pupils in primary and secondary education. This was decided in conjunction with the Volunteer Coordinator following a lengthy conversation on the nature of my research: a clearly overt aspect of the research. This established organisational consent. Becoming involved in the activity put me in touch with a group of volunteers. As the activity ran on a weekly basis, I sought to establish rapport with the other volunteers over the course of several weeks: always answering honestly as to what my job was (researcher), what I was researching (all aspects of the activity), and my motivations. Here I had to negotiate when to cut the continuum: in a relatively large group of volunteers it takes time to get to know all the volunteers, especially when attendance is sporadic or irregular.

A larger ethical grey area concerns the people utilising the service the Red Cross provided: children. There were also adults that made use of the activity, and this presented a separate set of ethical considerations. With regards to including the children in the scope of my research, it would be irresponsible of me as a researcher to ignore their participation. Children are equal interpreters of the social world (James, 2001).

The problem arises in establishing consent: at no point was it feasible to acquire consent from parents or legal guardians. It is necessary for me to rely on the organisational consent, which involved a police background check, and my own judgement. As such, I deemed it most practicable to maintain a covert position vis-à-vis the children attending the activity. Unable to establish any meaningful consent, I restricted my actions to doing what the activity was there for: helping them with homework. I did not actively question the children with any research

themes in mind, only in pursuit of helping them with their work. I collected no information other than what was immediately relevant, nor did I keep individual records. In the absence of consent, my resolution is to maximise anonymity[62].

3.7.3 – Participant anonymity

Participant anonymity forms the other side of the ethics coin. The right to anonymity should be afforded every participant, but needs to be balanced with research that requires a certain degree of selection and identification. Conversations and interactions with a researcher, in confidence, should be treated with respect. Denying a participant anonymity should only be done with their explicit consent, and if the researcher cannot guarantee their anonymity the participant should be made aware of this (ASA, 2011). There are reasonable steps the researcher may take in anonymising participants: providing pseudonyms, altering non-essential information, or concealing locations. Participant anonymity ties into the principle of non-maleficence (Murphy & Dingwall, 2001): to protect participants from potential harm and unforeseen consequences, their identities are protected. Fortuitously, multi-sited and mobile research practices make anonymity easier to maintain, as the potential pool of participants is greatly expanded. Despite this, it is still difficult to guarantee absolute anonymity.

The ethnographic description of events and communities carries the risk that even if the wider readership might not know who the participants are, the participants themselves might recognise themselves or each other (Murphy & Dingwall, 2001). Occasionally, there is little to be gained by anonymising people or locations. By virtue of one of the organisations I have included in my study, it narrows down the possible locations to an extent where I cannot realistically conceal where I performed my research. There are only five Catholic schools in all of Norway, and only one of them is in Northern Norway. Had I even anonymised the religion, it would not have made a difference as there are few religious schools in Norway overall. As with the Red Cross, I obtained organisational consent, in this case from

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[62] The same issues presented themselves during my fieldwork with NUK, and I maintained that approach with them.

the principal of the school. I was also introduced to teachers and parents as a researcher, thereby maintaining an actively overt role. I avoided actively questioning children, relying more on observation or questioning parents and teachers. Though I can attempt to anonymise most participant data, it does not guarantee they do not recognise themselves or other from the same setting.

3.7.4 – Risk in social research

All sociological and anthropological research carries a certain amount of risk. Ideally, research should not compromise the health, safety, or welfare of both individuals and communities under study (European Science Foundation, 2011), but a salient question is when harm might occur. In some situations, distress may be caused by asking sensitive questions, or issues may arise after publication (Murphy & Dingwall, 2001). Appreciating the heterogeneity of risk comes from an understanding of vulnerability. Firstly, vulnerability is often related to the circumstances the participant is situated in, and is not necessarily innate (Block, et al., 2013). Secondly, we can identify three types of vulnerabilities: consent-based, risk-based, and justice-based. I have already touched upon the two first in the above sections, so will confine myself to the latter in this section.

Justice, in a research context, carries a vast array of connotations. For Murphy and Dingwall (2001), justice relates to ensuring that participants are treated fairly and equally. Under this condition, my research involving children and adolescents should be included, as to omit them would indicate a lack of respect for their experiences. Another aspect of just research is that those studied should benefit from the outcomes of the research (Block, et al., 2013). Social research should not be exploitative, but rather give 'fair return for assistance' (ASA, 2011, p. 6). Other than specifying that there should be no 'economic exploitation', the ASA do not actually specify what is meant by 'fair return'. The research, and subsequent publications, are a part of the fair return, but one can also include forms of remuneration for participating in the research. In the case of my research, the fact that I actively participated in the after-school program was considered a fair

return for access by the coordinators at RCB. A second element of my "repayment" to the Red Cross was that I would give them an evaluation of the activity before my departure. There is no clear cut answer to what constitutes 'fair return': it is context-dependent and subjective.

It is not only participants who are susceptible to harm in the course of fieldwork. The researcher can at times find him/herself in vulnerable positions. Rabinow (1977) found that his data was enriched by occasionally not dominating the terms of interaction between himself and the informants. There are, unfortunately, stark contrasts: one researcher suffered sexual assault while on fieldwork (Academics Anonymous, 2016). To ignore risks to the researcher would be an oversight, as a researcher's sense of safety will influence how they conduct their research. It is perhaps slightly disappointing that the ASA's ethical guidelines prefer problems and issues to be resolved 'without harming either the research participants or the scholarly community', omitting the responsibility the researcher has to secure their own safety (ASA, 2011, p. 1). The risks negotiated by researchers are varied, and depend on a host of factors. Calvey (2008), performing covert research on bouncers, faced a set of risks which were unique to his research. Nor are all risks physical, as Calvey (2008) focuses primarily on the emotional risks and demands the research incurred.

Just as research which causes harm to participants is unethical, as is research which harms the researcher. As risks to participants needs to be evaluated and mitigated, so for the researcher. I was aware of certain risks going into my fieldwork, some environmental, others emotional. Though used to cold winters, I was not prepared for the impact of the dark, arctic winter. Combined with performing fieldwork, and therefore carefully managing social interactions, the overall effect was emotionally, and physically, taxing. Tending a bar as a part of the research also put me in situations that could be considered risky, as anyone who has refused service to a customer can attest to, and though it never evolved into physical altercations it could have.

An entirely different form of risk came with the work with children and youths. As stated above, the Red Cross require anyone working with minors to undergo a police background check, a practice also being taken up by NUK. This vetting goes both ways, to protect the children, and the organisation, in the event of misconduct, but also to confirm the propriety of the volunteer. If I had not had years of experience of youth work in Norway, I would probably have shied away from children and adolescents in my research. Though no significant harm befell me in the course of the research, I find it important to elucidate aspects of risk to researchers. Calvey (2008, p. 909) argues that covert practices are 'glossed over' and edited out of completed research. In the same vein, I believe it is necessary to be clear that the risk of harm extends further than what may happen to participants or the discipline. Risk, and ethics, are part and parcel of a reflexive research practice.

3.8 – Conclusion

In this chapter I have attempted to explore my choice and use of methods. My decision to use ethnography stems from the research questions. The ethnographic method is designed to provide a holistic rendition of the research field, drawing in all elements of life. The fundamental idea of long-term participant observation has persisted for a century, but what is brought in to the analyses has widened. Rather than seeing the ethnographer as extraneous, ethnographic research now recognises the influence the researcher will have on the field and participants. The Manchester School, and other scholars, widened the purview to include not only what was right in front of us, but to see historical connections and how relevant issues transcend academically constructed borders.

This widening justifies performing research across multiple sites, and necessitates a recognition of how the processes I wish to explore shape me. Capitalising on the reflexive turn in ethnographic fieldwork, I have attempted to be transparent about my identities. My identities and experiences have shaped the research process: from choice of location to selection of organisations. Ethnographic data provides ample scope for building theory, and I have opted to rely on concepts and terminology developed by others[63], and to build on those.

Ethnographic research necessitates lengthy reflection on ethical issues. I have explored how overt and covert research exist on a continuum and the ethical reflection concerns when that continuum is cut. To the extent it is possible, anonymity should be ensured, but as explored above: it is not always possible to guarantee. The ethical decision relates to when the participant should be made aware of the potential loss of anonymity. Decisions concerning ethical conduct also need to be weighed up against risk of harm, and the severity of harm. Rather than simply seeing risk as something concerning participants, or the discipline and wider research community, I also explore how risk towards the researcher has the potential to shape the research.

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[63] Explored in Chapter 2.

Having addressed both theoretical and methodological underpinnings of this thesis, I now move on to exploring the contexts in which I conducted the research. Theory, methods, and context have a reciprocal relationship, and inform each other. Context and theory can result in a particular choice of method and methodology, in this case ethnography, while the chosen approach will further inform the understandings of context and theory. Having argued in the previous chapter about the need for seeing identities and integration processes in context, and keeping in mind a holistic perspective, this chapter has explored how I pursued that. The long-term ethnographic approach allows for exploring issues and concepts in a variety of contexts and immersing oneself fully into the research.

The following two chapters present the contexts in which I conducted the research, and serve to ground the later analyses. Although ethnography situates the research in local contexts, the multi-sited approach necessitates extending our understanding of contexts to multiple levels. The interconnectivity of the world today also means that events or contexts of sufficient importance become relevant to even local contexts. As such, Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 explore both international, national, regional, and local contexts and issues.

Chapter 4 – Contexts of mobility and integration

4.1 – Introduction

Whereas the previous chapters have outlined the contours of this thesis, by exploring the literature, methodology, and methods underpinning it, this chapter provides some context. The purpose of this chapter is to deconstruct statistical categorisations and understandings of migration and integration. This process has been essential to subsequent qualitative analysis in later chapters in terms of understanding and contextualising perspectives on integration processes. Bringing forth the complexity of immigration statistics and categorisations reflects the real-life experiences and understandings of my participants and findings from my fieldwork. While the data chapters reflect bottom-up understandings of *integration*, this chapter challenges top-down understandings, represented by official statistics and commissioned reports, of immigration and *integration*.

I primarily focus on three aspects. Firstly, the demographic aspects of immigration to Norway[64]. Seeing demographic changes over time helps frame my later analyses, as participants draw on their and others recent histories in their understandings of migration and integration and how it has changed over their lifetime. Secondly, the political and bureaucratic context. As was pointed to in Chapter 2, we have to understand both processes of categorisation and identification. In order to answer the research questions, we need to explore the policy environment that helps shape processes of categorisation and *may* impact processes of identification. Thirdly, I explore the significance of certain key events on my fieldwork, such as the increase in asylum seekers in the winter of 2015-2016 and compare the response to that with similar increases in other categories of migration[65].

This chapter will move between different units of analysis as required. For sections, such as policy environment, it is fruitful to compare Norway to its neighbours in order to emphasise the transnational nature of migration and

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[64] It is beyond the remit of this thesis to explore emigration.
[65] Naturally, the statistical measurement of "reasons for migration" is highly problematic, and will be critiqued later in the chapter.

integration policy and processes. For demographic changes it is more relevant to emphasise the changes at the national level and locations that were explored during the fieldwork. Finally, I return to the discursive framework presented in Chapter 2 and demonstrate how it can be used to problematize different migrant categories and critically examine different constructions of "integration". The chapter addresses the question of what are the contexts that shape integration processes and understandings of these processes in Norway.

4.2 – Demographics and (inter)national migration

Castles and Miller (2009) argue that the starting point for understanding integration processes should be the historical experiences of nation-state formation. In other words, understanding how we got to where we are. What is equally important is understanding current experiences and processes of nation-state formation. As argued in Chapter 2, a processual understanding of integration necessitates an acceptance that either: a) there is no end-point; or b) the end-point is continuously shifting and renegotiated. The benefit of exploring the historical contexts and processes of nation-state formation is that it will contribute to our understanding of contemporary features. That being said, there are necessarily limitations to the extent of historical detail that can be covered, or is relevant, in this thesis.

Although we can use historical data to inform analyses in later chapters, we cannot assume this knowledge is commonly held in the wider population. Similarly, as Hopkins, et al., (2018, p. 1) find with regards to information about demographics: 'accurate information [about the size of the immigrant population] does little to affect attitudes toward immigration'. Therefore, we should be mindful that there is a disconnect between perceptions of immigration, historical contexts, and the reality. This is related to attitudes towards immigration although the causal nature of the relationship is complicated and the question of whether perception shapes attitude or vice versa remains open (Hopkins, et al., 2018).

One demonstration of how the relationship between perceptions, attitudes, and reality is influenced lies in how migration is registered, categorised, and presented. Here we look to both official statistics, but also research on immigration. Several scholars in Norway (Brochmann & Hagelund, 2012b; Eide & Simonsen, 2009; Gjerstad, et al., 2015; Hovdelien, 2016; Maagerø & Simonsen, 2008; Ugland, 2018; Eriksen & Sørheim, 1994) uncritically emphasise the "recency" of immigration to Norway. By de-historicizing migration, we lose an important aspect of the processual nature of migration. In particular, we risk phenomenalising one form of migration while privileging and rendering invisible

other forms. Immigration to Norway is not recent, it is the method of measuring and registering immigration that is recent.

Apart from government commissioned reports, academic literature concerning international migration and immigrants mostly appears from the 2000s onwards, with one of the earlier academic works specifically focusing on diversity and migration being Eriksen and Sørheim (1994). This does not mean immigration, and integration processes, have not been topics of discussion, but much of it has been done in politics and media. Much of this falls beyond the purview of this thesis[66]. This slowness in exploring and researching migration and integration processes may be related to the relatively recent diversification of the immigrant population, which is explored in section 4.3.1.

In terms of statistics, we are limited by what is available from Statistics Norway (SSB); hence, the following sections will explore this data with a critical eye. The framing of research and statistics can give superficial insight into how the nation is socially constructed through statistical categories, which are in and of themselves socially constructed. Critically exploring the statistics and research can give us insight into the underlying factors and realities. This is done through challenging the categorisations, but also in expanding our view to include non-immigrant specific data, such as internal migration, settlement patterns, and urbanisation.

At its most rudimentary level, there has been a growth in the immigrant population as registered by SSB (Figure 1), both in terms of sheer numbers, but also as a share of the population. Yet, we have to recognise that SSB are counting individuals whose parents *and* grandparents were not born in Norway (SSB, 2014). Thereby giving rise to the category of "Norwegian-born with immigrant parents" and facilitates the idea of "2nd" or "3rd generation immigrants". This statistical

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[66] For an exploration of the media and immigration, see Eide and Simonsen (2007); for an account of the development of immigration and integration policy, see Christensen, et al., (2006)

simplification, by definition, precludes dual identities, and establishes international migrants as a population that will be considered apart (at least statistically) for three generations. This engenders a lasting impression of immigrants as "Other".

Figure 1 - Immigrant and descendants, 1970-2018 (SSB, 2017a), and immigrants pre-1970 (SSB, 2011)

It also hides groups with more complex backgrounds, which SSB have recently come to recognise and therefore started expanding the categories they report. In their 2018 statistics on the population in Norway, they have included six categories: "Born in Norway with two Norwegian parents", "Immigrants", "Norwegian-born with immigrant parents", "foreign-born with one Norwegian-born parent", "Norwegian-born with one foreign-born parent", and "foreign-born with two Norwegian-born parents". The issue remains that this approach encourages an emphasis on descent and lineage, which, as discussed in Chapter 2, risks leading to an ethnicisation of migration.

Additionally, by focusing on changes in migration post-1970, we run the risk of rendering the nearly 80 000 people living in Norway in 1970 and born in 138 countries (SSB, 2018) other than Norway invisible[67]. They are as important a part of understanding migration and integration in Norway as those who immigrated to Norway post-1970. Two other factors are related to the "recency"-notion: changes in net international migration and policy changes limiting immigration. If one considers net international migration of foreign citizens[68] to/from Norway, it supports the idea of immigration being a "recent" phenomenon (see Figure 2), as the net migration of foreign citizens to Norway steadily increases.

Figure 2 - Net international migration of foreign citizens (1958-2017) (SSB, 2017c)

On the other hand, if we look at changes in the net migration year on year, it paints a clearer picture of how mobility, rather than simply migration, changes over time. What Figure 3 demonstrates is how there is considerably more movement in *and* out of Norway from the mid-1980s onwards[69]. Yet, there is a risk of over-emphasising the impact of international migration. Of equal importance is the changing mobility of the population *within* Norway (Lange, 2017) that has led to an increased internal migration. Processes of urbanisation and centralisation are as much a part of the nation-formation process as immigration and integration processes and need to form part of our understanding and analyses.

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[67] As well as their descendants.
[68] i.e. individuals in possession of a non-Norwegian citizenship at the time of immigration.
[69] The fluctuation indicates a lesser/greater net migration relative to the preceding year, in other words, the greater the values (positively or negatively) means more people are migrating.

Figure 3 - Change in net international migration of foreign citizens, year on year 1958-2017 (SSB, 2017c)

If we consider Figures 4 and 5, we first see that the late-60s/early-70s saw much higher internal migration between municipalities than preceding and subsequent decades up until the consistent increase from the 1990s onwards. Equally important is where this movement is headed: Figure 5 points to increasing urbanisation. We see the change along the urban/rural divide and can note that the late 1960s saw a stark increase in urbanisation. This coincides with the variations in international migration seen in Figure 3. Divorcing the immigration of the 1970s from processes of internal migration results in limiting our understanding of the overall processes of nation formation, problematizing immigration, and homogenising the non-immigrant population.

Figure 4 - Internal migration between municipalities, 1957-2017 (SSB, 2017d)

Figure 5 - Urban/Rural population, 1960-2017 (World Bank, 2018)

Exploring this more closely, Figure 6 paints a picture of sparsely populated areas within municipalities becoming increasingly depopulated, whereas densely populated areas within municipalities grow (Figure 7 and Figure 8)[70]. Figure 9 strengthens this by giving us an impression of just how far some of these internal migrants move, by showing movement between counties and regions. About half of all internal migrations involves crossing a county border, whereas roughly a quarter of the time it also involved a change of region.

Whereas the least and less central municipalities have seen a decline in population or only a very modest increase, this contrasts with the more central municipalities, the immigrant population (at least as it is defined by SSB) has grown across all categories (Figures 10-13). Part of this can be attributed to a 'strong "district policy"' (Grønseth, 2010, p. 22) by the Norwegian state. This can be seen in the emphasis on maintaining local industries, some of which attract and recruit considerable immigrant labour[71], as well as an emphasis on settling refugees in as many municipalities as possible (Norges Offentlige Utredninger, 1986).

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[70] SSB operate with four categories. "Central" is achieved when the physical centre of the population of a municipality is <75 minutes of travel from an urban settlement with a population >50 000 inhabitants. An additional requirement is that the urban settlement in question acts as a regional centre. "Somewhat" means travel of <60minutes to an urban settlement with >15 000 inhabitants. "Less" means travel of <45 minutes to an urban settlement with >5 000 inhabitants. "Least central" municipalities do not fulfil any of these requirements.

[71] For example, on the north-west coast (Sunnmøre) (Busengdal, 2015; Halvorsen & Aschim, 2016)

Figure 6 - Decreasing population in sparsely populated areas of non-central municipalities, 1990-2017 (SSB, 2017e)

Figure 7 - Increasing population in densely populated areas of non-central municipalities, 1990-2017 (SSB, 2017e)

Figure 8 - Increasing population in central municipalities, 1990-2017 (SSB, 2017e)

Figure 9 - Movement between counties as percentage of total internal migration and between regions as percentage of total internal migration, 1957-2017 (SSB, 2017d)

Figure 10 - Total population and Immigrant population in "Least central municipalities", 1990-2017 (SSB, 2017e; 2017a)

Figure 11 - Total population and Immigrant population in "Less central municipalities", 1990-2017 (SSB, 2017e; 2017a)

Figure 12 - Total population and Immigrant population in "Somewhat central municipalities", 1990-2017 (SSB, 2017e; 2017a)

Figure 13 - Total population and Immigrant population in central municipalities, 1990-2017 (SSB, 2017e; 2017a)

What we have in the post-WWII period is not simply an increase in international migration, but a general increase in mobility and migration towards population centres. This is important to keep in mind because it reminds us that Norway is not a static, homogeneous country of sedentary individuals, and we should be careful not to attribute too much weight to international migration when discussing changes to Norwegian society. It is not only international migrants attempting to find their place, but also those migrating internally.

This relates back to an observation by Eckstein (1966): there was significant division between urban and rural populations, and a strong sense of regional identities. In other words, municipalities with increasing populations are not simply encountering a plethora of identities that international migrants possess and continue shaping in a new context, but also internal migrants bringing with them their regional, local, and particular sets of identities. Furthermore, this adds to the complexity of the question of "integration into what?" as we can appreciate the diversity of the non-migrant population. Adding to this, we can point to a substantial body of scholarly research on Norway, such as Barth's edited volume on Northern Norway (Barth, 1963a) and a further 88 Masters' and PhD theses from the University of Oslo between 1957-1994 alone (Nielsen, 1996). We can add to this a host of articles, books[72], and radio and television programmes[73] of both academic and popular science varieties. The important detail is not *what* has been written or said, but the fact that there is a tradition of pursuing definitions and characterisations of Norway and Norwegians, which subsequently informs understandings of Norwegianness.

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[72] Examples include work by Marianne Gullestad (1984; 1989; 1996) and numerous edited volumes (Alghasi, et al., 2012; Alghasi, et al., 2006a; Brox & Gullestad, 1990; Eriksen & Næss, 2011; Lien, et al., 2001; Eriksen & Sørheim, 1994) to name a few.

[73] NRK, the national broadcaster, even produced, in 2018, a five-minute clip called "Typisk norsk" [Typical Norwegian], named after a three-season program from the mid-2000s by the same name, where regional identities, dialects, and the urban/rural divide was given, by Professor Thomas Hylland Eriksen, as central elements of a Norwegian self-understanding and collective identity (NRK, 2018). See also Venås and Skjekkeland (2016) on dialects in Norway.

4.3 – Who, what, where, when, and why? Interrogating migration

Having covered the most general aspects of population mobility, I will disaggregate the international migrants. There are multiple ways of going about this, and I will first address the common question of "where are they from?" (alternatively, "who are they?"). Bearing in mind that we are limited to answering this in terms of nation-state, and unfortunately this results in a loss of complexity and nuance when describing, statistically speaking, people who have immigrated to Norway[74]. The second question usually refers to "why are they here?" or "what made them come?" Despite offering clear categories such as "education", "labour", "refuge", and "family reunification", life is never as neat as simple categories. Add to that the fact that reasons change: someone might come for one reason, but they choose to stay for another, such as one of my participants, Dmitri. Finally, there is the question of "what are they doing here?" Here I will glean what information I can from statistics and available research and highlight where there are shortcomings.

Including a temporal aspect, points to how events impact migration and integration processes over time. This helps highlight patterns and differences, for example pointing to the impact of gender on migration processes. As seen in the next section, there are distinct differences over time that become apparent when factoring in gender. After I have covered all this, it is time to turn to policy changes that have targeted immigrants[75]. This helps tie together the demographic, statistical, and previous research into a cohesive whole that will provide sufficient context for understanding and critically analysing some of the data.

4.3.1 – "Where are they from?"

This section relies on statistical data to give an outline of the immigrant population in Norway. Using statistical data, we are limited by issues of categorisation and ascription: statistical categories tell us little about

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[74] For now, I will omit the generations of people born in Norway with various degrees of relationships to previous generations' country of origin

[75] Although broadly referred to as "integration policy", Norway's Universalist welfare approach means broader policy changes relating to the welfare state and labour market are sometimes relevant.

identification and they are often overly general. For example, SSB often aggregate their data into either the nation-state level or group nation-states together into continental regions. This level of generalisation does not account for regional identifications, which might be more significant at the level of the individual or group, such as with Ali, who highlighted a Kurdish identity, rather than an Iraqi (nation-state) category, in addition to his Norwegian. This becomes especially problematic when considering groups in relation to their attributed reason for immigration, such as when asylum-seekers are granted asylum due to persecution at the hands of the state which they are then identified with. Grønseth (2010), for example, researched immigrants who identified as Tamil, whereas they will be identified as Sri Lankan in statistics, thus over-simplifying immigration from Sri Lanka.

Furthermore, speaking of the size of different categories gives a false sense of stability and homogeneity. As was mentioned above, there is a high degree of mobility: the categories might increase/decrease in size, but it does not tell us about the composition of the category. This can be somewhat mitigated by considering temporal aspects. Firstly, we can consider both emigration and immigration over time, giving us a sense of the mobility of certain groups. Secondly, we can explore the length of their residency[76]. Despite this, we are still limited to categorisation, and aspects of identification have to be gleaned from other research.

Firstly, Norway has immigrants from 211 countries and territories[77], constituting, as of 2017, a population of 724 988 persons, almost 14 per cent of Norway's total population (SSB, 2017f). Of these, two-thirds of immigrants come from only twenty countries. Nonetheless, compared to 1970, when 56 854 immigrants came from 122 countries and territories, and five countries comprised two-thirds, there has been a considerable diversification of the immigrant population. This is as expected, considering the overall increase in mobility pointed out previously. Figure 14 visualizes this changing composition.

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[76] At a national level, which does not consider the processes and dynamics of internal migration following immigration.

[77] SSB counts certain territories such as Macau, Falklands, Puerto Rico, separately.

Certain features stand out and are related to policy developments (explored later in the chapter). Firstly, we see the prevalence of Scandinavian immigrant. This may be due to geographical factors (as neighbouring countries), as well as accessibility in terms of language and culture for immigrants from Sweden and Denmark[78]. This has also been supported by a favourable policy environment which has privileged Nordic immigrants.

Secondly, we see how large-scale arrival of immigrants from certain countries map onto global events. Such as immigrants from Sri Lanka arriving as the civil war and conflicts intensify. Thirdly, by breaking the figure down by gender, it hints at how and why certain groups immigrate to Norway. For example, for many groups, women arrive later than men, which is consistent with women more often registered as arriving due to family reunification.

Finally, certain developments relate directly to policy decisions concerning immigration and issues that impact immigration, such as EU expansion and Norway's relationship to the EU (through EEA and Schengen membership), or the immigration ban that shifted immigration patterns towards refugees and family reunification. These changes are most easily seen over an extended period of time, while we have to recognise that migration extends much further back than presented here.

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[78] Which may, in part, explain the relative absence of immigrants from Finland, as Finnish is linguistically far removed from the Scandinavian languages, although Finland has historically had close ties to Sweden.

70	80	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	94	95	96	97	98	99	00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17
DK	DK	DK	DK	DK	DK	DK	DK	DK	DK	DK	DK	DK	DK	SW	SW	SW	SW	SW	SW	SW	SW	SW	SW	PL	PL	PL	PL	PL	PL	PL	PL	PL	PL
SW	SW	UK	SW	SW	SW	SW	SW	SW	SW	SW	SW	SW	SW	DK	DK	DK	DK	DK	DK	DK	DK	DK	PL	SW	SW	SW	SW	SW	SW	SW	SW	LT	LT
US	US	SW	UK	UK	UK	UK	PK	PK	PK	PK	PK	PK	PK	PK	CS	PK	PK	IQ	PK	IQ	IQ	DK	IQ	DE	DE	DE	DE	LT	LT	LT	SW	SW	SW
DE	UK	US	US	US	PK	PK	UK	UK	UK	UK	VN	BA	BA	BA	BA	PK	CS	IQ	PK	IQ	PK	PK	IQ	DK	IQ	IQ	IQ	LT	DE	SO	SO	SO	SO
UK	DE	PK	PK	PK	US	US	US	VN	VN	VN	UK	VN	VN	VN	VN	BA	BA	BA	BA	BA	SO	SO	PK	DE	DK	SO	SO	IQ	SO	DE	DE	DE	DE
	PK	DE	DE	DE	DE	VN	VN	US	US	US	BA	UK	UK	UK	UK	VN	VN	CS	VN	SO	BA	BA	SO	SO	SO	DK	DK	SO	IQ	IQ	IQ	IQ	IQ
	FI	VN	VN	VN	VN	DE	DE	DE	CS	CS	US	CS	US	IR	IR	UK	IQ	VN	IR	VN	VN	VN	DE	PK	PK	PK	PK	DK	DK	DK	DK	DK	SY
	TR	FI	FI	FI	CL	CL	IR	IR	IR	IR	CS	US	IR	US	DE	IR	UK	IR	SO	IR	IR	IR	BA	BA	BA	IR	LT	PK	PK	PK	PK	PH	PH
		TR	TR	TR	TR	IR	CL	TR	DE	DE	IR	IR	CS	DE	CS	DE	IR	UK	UK	DE	DE	DE	VN	IR	IR	RU	RU	RU	PH	PH	PH	PK	PK
		PL	PL		IR	TR	TR	CL	TR	BA	DE	DE	DE	CS	US	US	DE	DE	DE	UK	UK	PL	IR	VN	VN	BA	IR	PH	RU	RU	RU	ER	ER
		LK	FI	LK	LK	LK	LK	LK	LK	LK	LK	LK	TR	TR	SO	SO	TR	TR	CS	CS	UK	UK	RU	RU	VN	PH	IR	IR	IR	IR	IR	TH	DK
			LK	PL	CS	CS	CL	TR	TR	TR	TR	TR	LK	LK	TR	TR	CS	TR	TR	CS	RU	UK	UK	UK	BA	TH	TH	TH	TH	RU	IR	RU	TH
			CS		PL	PL	CL	CL	PL	PL	PL	FI	IQ	LK	LK	LK	LK	RU	RU	TR	TR	PH	PH	VN	VN	UK	UK	ER	IR	UK	UK	ER	RU
					PL		CL	CL	FI	PL	SO	US	US	US	RU	PL	TR	RS	PH	TH	TH	TH	UK	VN	VN	UK	UK	IR					
						FI	CL	SO	FI	FI	FI	FI	US	LK	LK	TH	TH	TR	TR	UK	VN	VN	UK	UK	AF	AF							
											PL	PL	PL	PH	PH	PH	LK	XK	LT	TR	AF	AF	AF	BA	VN	UK							
													PH	FI	US	TH	LK	XK	LK	XK	AF	TR	TR	ER	AF	AF	ER	TR	TR	ER	AF	BA	RO
																US	US	AF	AF	AF	XK	XK	ER	TR	RO	RO	VN						
																					LK	LK	LK	XK	RO	TR	TR	RO	RO	VN			
																											XK	IN	IN	TR			

Legend (country codes):

SY – Syria
DK – Denmark
SW – Sweden
US – United States
DE – Germany
UK – United Kingdom
PK – Pakistan
FI – Finland
TR – Turkey
VN – Vietnam
LK – Sri Lanka
CL – Chile
IR – Iran
CS – Serbia and Montenegro
PL – Poland
BA – Bosnia and Herzegovina
SO – Somalia
IQ – Iraq
RU – Russia
PH – Philippines
TH – Thailand
AF - Afghanistan
XK - Kosovo
RO – Romania
IN - India
RS - Serbia
ER - Eritrea
LT – Lithuania

Figure 14 - Countries of origin for two-thirds of immigrant population, 1970-2017 (SSB, 2017f)[79]

[79] Countries are ranked in terms of size of population (from largest to smallest). The number of countries included corresponds as closely as possible to a population constituting two-thirds of the immigrant population for each respective year.

Seeing Figure 14 in relation to Figure 1 and Figure 2 at the beginning of this chapter, both the increase and diversification of the immigrant population becomes apparent. Adding a further layer of detail, we can break the above figure down by gender (Figure 15 and Figure 16). Firstly, the immigrant population as a whole is evenly split between the genders, but the composition of the two groups by country of origin differs slightly. Women from certain countries, such as Thailand, the Philippines, and Russia, are not matched by a corresponding male population. As mentioned previously, men have preceded women, such as from India, Sri Lanka, and Iran, which has implications for the perceptions of these groups.

Nonetheless, there are several consistencies. Danish and Swedish are consistently prevalent in the immigrant population but diverge in the mid-2000s when Danes constitute a smaller portion of the immigrant population. Immigrants from the US are also a large portion of the immigrant population until the 90s, whereupon they shrink as proportion of the immigrant population. Furthermore, the "arrival" of certain populations within the ranking is closely related to policy decisions and external events. I explore this in detail below, with regards to "reason for migration". This is perhaps most evident with immigrants from countries ravaged by conflict, such as ex-Yugoslav countries, Sri Lanka, Somalia, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Syria, but also following the enlargement of the EU in 2004, where we shortly after seeing a significant increase in immigrants from Poland and Lithuania, and again following the accession of Romania.

It should be noted that changes in ranking occurs not only if a population increases or decreases, but even if a population remains stable. The ranking is relative to the immigrant population *for that year*.

70	80	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	94	95	96	97	98	99	00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17
DK	DK	DK	DK	DK	DK	DK	DK	DK	DK	DK	DK	DK	DK	SW	SW	SW	SW	SW	SW	SW	SW	SW	SW	PL	PL	PL	PL	PL	PL	PL	PL	PL	PL
SW	US	UK	UK	UK	UK	UK	PK	PK	PK	PK	PK	PK	SW	DK	DK	DK	DK	DK	IQ	IQ	IQ	IQ	PL	SW	SW	SW	SW	SW	SW	LT	LT	LT	LT
US	UK	PK	SW	SW	PK	PK	UK	UK	UK	UK	VN	SW	PK	PK	PK	CS	IQ	IQ	DK	DK	DK	DK	IQ	IQ	IQ	IQ	IQ	LT	LT	SW	SW	SW	SW
DE	SW	SW	PK	PK	SW	SW	SW	VN	VN	VN	UK	VN	VN	VN	UK	PK	PK	PK	PK	PK	PK	PK	DK	DK	DE	DE	DE	DE	DE	SO	SO	SO	SO
UK	PK	US	US	US	US	VN	VN	SW	SW	SW	SW	UK	UK	UK	VN	UK	CS	CS	BA	SO	SO	SO	PK	SO	SO	SO	SO	IQ	SO	DE	DE	DE	SY
PL	DE	VN	VN	VN	VN	US	IR	IR	IR	CS	BA	BA	BA	BA	BA	VN	UK	IR	IR	BA	IR	IR	SO	DE	DK	DK	DK	SO	IQ	IQ	IQ	IQ	DE
	TR	DE	DE	DE	IR	IR	US	US	CS	IR	IR	CS	IR	IR	IR	BA	BA	UK	UK	IR	BA	BA	IR	PK	PK	PK	LT	DK	DK	DK	DK	ER	IQ
	FI	TR	TR	LK	CL	LK	LK	LK	LK	CS	IR	CS	CS	CS	IR	VN	BA	SO	UK	UK	UK	DE	IR	IR	UK	PK	PK	PK	PK	PK	DK	ER	
	VN	FI	FI	TR	TR	CL	TR	TR	US	US	LK	LK	LK	LK	TR	IQ	IR	VN	VN	VN	VN	VN	BA	UK	UK	IR	UK	UK	UK	UK	UK	PK	PK
	IN	IN	IN	LK	TR	CL	CS	TR	TR	US	TR	SO	SO	TR	TR	DE	DE	UK	BA	BA	BA	IR	IR	IR	IR	IR	UK	DK					

Legend / lower rows

PL	IR	DE	DE	CS	CL	CL	BA	TR	US	US	US	DE	DE	TR	TR	DE	DE	CS	PL	VN	VN	VN	VN	AF	AF	AF	AF	ER	IR	AF			
	FI	IN	CS	DE	DE	DE	CL	DE	DE	DE	DE	US	LK	DE	DE	CS	CS	TR	TR	TR	TR	TR	TR	BA	BA	BA	ER	AF	AF	UK			
IN	IN	IN	IN	DE	CL	CL	CL	CL	SO	SO	LK	LK	LK	LK	LK	CS	RS	XK	XK	LT	VN	VN	VN	BA	BA	RO	IR						
IN	IN	SO	SO	SO	IQ	US	US	US	US	US	PL	LK	LK	LK	AF	AF	TR	TR	TR	VN	RO	BA	RO										
CL	CL	AF	AF	AF	AF	LK	XK	XK	XK	RU	TR	VN	TR	BA																				
AF	CL	RU	RU	RU	RU	RU	RU	RU	ER	RU	TR	SY	TR																					
IN	LT	LK	LK	LK	XK	RO	IN	VN	VN																								
ER	IN	XK	RU	IN	IN																													
LV	LV	LV																																

Legend:

TR – Turkey · VN – Vietnam · DK – Denmark · SW – Sweden · LV – Latvia · DE – Germany · IQ – Iraq · PK – Pakistan · FI – Finland · XK – Kosovo · RU – Russia · SO – Somalia · CL – Chile · IR – Iran · RS – Serbia · PL – Poland · AF – Afghanistan · LT – Lithuania · SY – Syria · ER – Eritrea · RO – Romania · US – United States · IN – India · UK – United Kingdom · CS – Serbia and Montenegro · BA – Bosnia and Herzegovina

Figure 15 - Countries of origin for two-thirds of male immigrant population, 1970-2017 (SSB, 2017f)

70	80	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	94	95	96	97	98	99	00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17
SW	DK	DK	DK	DK	DK	DK	DK	DK	DK	DK	DK	DK	SW	SW	SW	SW	SW	SW	SW	SW	SW	SW	SW	SW	SW	PL	PL	PL	PL	PL	PL	PL	PL
DK	SW	SW	SW	SW	SW	SW	SW	SW	SW	SW	SW	SW	DK	DK	DK	DK	DK	DK	DK	DK	DK	DK	DK	PL	PL	SW	SW	SW	SW	SW	SW	SW	SW
US	US	UK	UK	UK	UK	UK	UK	US	PK	PK	PK	BA	BA	PK	PK	PK	PK	PK	PK	PK	PK	PK	DK	DE	TH	PH	PH	PH	PH	PH	PH	PH	PH
DE	UK	US	US	US	US	US	US	UK	US	VN	VN	PK	PK	BA	BA	CS	BA	BA	BA	BA	BA	IQ	IQ	TH	TH	DE	TH	TH	TH	TH	LT	LT	LT
	DE	DE	DE	DE	PK	PK	PK	PK	UK	US	BA	VN	VN	VN	VN	BA	CS	VN	VN	VN	IQ	RU	TH	RU	PH	PH	DE	DE	LT	LT	TH	TH	TH
	FI	PK	PK	PK	DE	DE	DE	VN	VN	UK	UK	UK	UK	UK	DE	VN	VN	CS	DE	IQ	DE	VN	RU	TH	RU	PH	DK	RU	RU	RU	DE	SO	SO	SO
		FI	FI	FI	DE	DE	DE	DE	DE	US	US	US	US	UK	DE	DE	DE	IQ	DE	RU	BA	PL	PK	RU	DK	IQ	SO	SO	DE	DE	DE	DE
		VN	VN	VN	FI	PL	PL	PL	PL	BA	DE	DE	DE	DE	US	UK	UK	IR	SO	SO	SO	VN	SO	DE	IQ	IQ	SO	IQ	RU	RU	RU	RU	RU
CN - China		PL	PL	CL	CL	PH	PH	CS	CS	PL	CS	PL	PL	PL	US	IR	UK	IR	PH	DE	SO	PH	IQ	PK	SO	DK	LT	IQ	IQ	IQ	IQ	IQ
DK –Denmark			PH	PL	FI	CL	CL	PH	PL	CS	PL	PH	PH	PH	IR	PH	PH	PH	IR	TH	DE	BA	SO	SO	PK	PK	DK	DK	DK	DK	PK	PK
SW – Sweden				PH	FI	TR	TR	PH	PH	PH	CS	CS	IR	PH	US	PL	UK	RU	PH	PH	DE	BA	VN	VN	VN	PK	PK	PK	PK	DK	DK
LT – Lithuania				TR	IR	IR	IR	IR	IR	IR	IR	FI	FI	FI	IQ	PL	TH	IR	PL	VN	VN	BA	BA	BA	VN	VN	IR	IR	IR	IR
DE – Germany	XK - Kosovo				CL	TR	TR	TR	TR	FI	CS	PL	PL	SO	TH	PL	PL	IR	IR	IR	IR	IR	LT	IR	IR	VN	VN	VN	ER
SY - Syria	IN - India					FI	FI	TR	TR	LK	SO	US	RU	UK	CS	CS	RS	UK	UK	UK	IR	BA	BA	BA	BA	ER	SY
PK – Pakistan	LK - Sri Lanka	US – United States						LK	TR	IQ	FI	FI	CS	UK	UK	UK	TR	TR	TR	UK	UK	UK	ER	ER	BA	VN
FI – Finland	CL - Chile	UK – United Kingdom								LK	TH	CS	US	TR	TR	TR	LK	XK	XK	TR	TR	ER	AF	RO	RO	BA
TR – Turkey	IR – Iran	PH – Philippines										US	FI	LK	LK	LK	XK	LK	LK	XK	XK	TR	UK	AF	AF	RO
VN – Vietnam	RS - Serbia	BA – Bosnia and Herzegovina													US	US	LT	LK	AF	AF	TR	UK	UK	AF
IQ – Iraq	PL - Poland	RO – Romania														US	US	LK	XK	XK	TR	IN	IN
RU – Russia	SO - Somalia	AF - Afghanistan																RO	CN	TR	UK
ER - Eritrea	TH – Thailand	CS – Serbia and Montenegro																			TR

Figure 16 - Countries of origin for two-thirds of female immigrant population, 1970-2017 (SSB, 2017f)

What the above rankings fail to illustrate is the size of these populations. The below figures (Figures 17-19)[80] are cross-sections for the given years and give some insight into the changing composition of the greater share of the immigrant population. We have already established that the overall populations has both increased and diversified, with some differences between men and women, but one significant change is how the largest group, at times, is significantly larger than the rest. This is noticeable in the overall numbers but becomes more pronounced when looking at genders separately. What we see at the beginning of the period, is how Swedes and Danes constitute up to 40 per cent of the immigrant population regardless of gender, but throughout the 80s and 90s, the relative dominance of the two largest groups (which up until mid-2000s are Swedes and Danes) decreases as the immigrant population diversifies. From 2008 onwards, Poles constitute the largest group (2008 for men, 2010 for women), and it is around this time and onwards a range of research on migration is conducted or starts appearing[81].

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[80] The figures are colour coded to match figures 14-16.
[81] See, for example, Alghasi, et al., (2009; 2012; 2006a), Aagedal (2012a), Eriksen and Næss (2011), Eide and Simonsen (2007), Gjerstad, et al., (2015), Aschim, et al., (2016), Erdal (2016b), Bendixsen, et al., (2015), to name some.

*Figure 17 - Share of total immigrant population (SSB, 2017f)*

*Figure 18 - Share of male immigrant population (SSB, 2017f)*

Figure 19 - Share of female immigrant population (SSB, 2017f)

In order to combat an overly static understanding of migration, we need to explore the mobility/sedentary aspect. This is essential because it points to systemic factors. One way to challenge such assumptions is by exploring statistics pertaining to duration of residency (SSB, 2017g). Unfortunately, this statistic is not available broken down by gender. Figure 20 presents the average duration (in years[82]) of immigrants from the countries in Figure 14, as of 2017. The countries are listed in the same ranked order[83] as in Figure 14, which facilitates comparison.

The higher the average, the more stable that population has been over the measured period. Seen alongside Figure 14, Denmark, Vietnam, and Pakistan's descent in the ranking can be seen as a result of stable populations (average residency of 20+ years) relative to the growth of more recent groups. Immigrants from Poland, for example, although present in the rankings throughout the period, rises to the top from 2008 onwards, which is reflected in the average residency of seven years. Similarly, immigrants from Syria have an average residency of two years yet is the seventh largest group. These averages should not encourage homogenisation of the immigrant population, as there is a massive diversity in length of residency: only two countries (Lithuania and Afghanistan) exhibited multiple gaps in the range of 0-40 years' residency, and then only of immigrants with 30+ years' residency in Norway.

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[82] The values given are rounded to the nearest whole, which is why the bars do not match perfectly with the given value. Duration ranged from "<1 year" to "40+ years"
[83] As of 2017.

Figure 20 - Average duration of residency for two-thirds of immigrant population as of 2017 (SSB, 2017g)

4.3.2 – "Why are they here?" and "What are they doing here?"

The above figures, in particular Figure 20, offer us a transition into the question of "why" immigrants migrate to Norway, and offer a partial insight into the question of "what" they are doing there. Most importantly, it forces us to recognise that the registered reason for immigrating to Norway is not the same as the question of what keeps immigrants in Norway. There is also the question of to what extent the registered reason for immigration is significant beyond descriptive statistics. At a minimum, we can keep in mind that reasons for immigration and statistics feed back into policy development. For example, the Brochmann (I and II) [84]-, Kramer[85]-, Haagensen[86]-, and Danielsen[87]-commissions directly addressed changes in immigration patterns (Norges Offentlige Utredninger, 2011a; 2017; 1986; 1985; 1973). Changes in mobility patterns are not only discussed at a national level, but also seen and discussed in a regional context (Nordic Council of Ministers, 2013).

The first detail we can explore to gives us a better understanding of these issues, is age. The age of the immigrant, whether the individual is an adult or minor, is significant due to the policies and rules it activates[88], as well as for the discourses around immigration and integration processes[89]. Unfortunately, the available data is not as granular as above. Furthermore, SSB omit immigrants from Nordic countries, hence we have no data on two of the largest immigrant groups for the last 40 years. For the period 1990-2017, the majority of non-Nordic immigrants to Norway were in the age group 18-29 years old with under-18s constituting one-fifth (see figure 21). Three-fifths were below the age of 30. As will be explored in Chapter 5, this has skewed the demographics of the Catholic Church in Norway towards younger cohorts.

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[84] For Brochmann-I the focus was labour migration, whereas for Brochmann-II the focus was asylum-seekers and refugees

[85] The Kramer-commission looked at the "adaptation of refugees to Norwegian society".

[86] The Haagensen-commission discussed "young immigrants in Norway"

[87] Exploring labour migration, and subsequently the commission that resulted in the "immigration ban"

[88] UDI (2018b), in their procedures for determining an asylum seeker's age, directly refer to some asylum seekers not having proof of their age and misleading authorities in order to appear as a minor.

[89] In particular with respect to demonising discourses around young, male Muslims (Ezzati, 2011), discourses around immigrant women (Norges Offentlige Utredninger, 2017), or in the press' performance as an "ethnic gatekeeper" (Eide & Simonsen, 2007, p. 17)

Figure 21 - Age groups of non-Nordic immigrants between 1990-2017 (SSB, 2017h)

This points to the majority of non-Nordic immigrants arriving in Norway with the possibility of spending a considerable part of their lifespan in Norway. Figure 20 gives us an impression of how long some immigrants have stayed, but we have to expand it to the whole immigrant population. Figure 22 is a bell curve demonstrating average residency for the entire immigrant population as of 2017, which, *ceteris paribus*, indicates that two-thirds of immigrants will spend somewhere in the range of 6-19 years in Norway[90]. This should not be taken as a prediction, as *context matters*. How long someone remains in Norway is an open question, for both the immigrant and non-immigrant population. After all, as Figure 23 shows, the emigration of Norwegian citizens has increased over time as well. It speaks to a degree of bias when the duration of an immigrant's residency in Norway is measured, but there are no statistics on Norwegian citizens living outwith Norway, and a general dearth of information about this category[91]. It reinforces a notion that Norwegian citizens are sedentary, whereas immigrants are mobile[92].

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[90] Skjerpen, et al., (Skjerpen, et al., 2015) and Pettersen (2013) provide a detailed look at emigration patterns (from Norway) for immigrants. Note, the data did not count above 40 years of residency; hence the right-hand tail in reality will taper more gradually than in the figure.

[91] I struggled to find any data on Norwegians abroad at all. Apart from a Conservative party manifesto promise to strengthen government services for Norwegians living abroad, I only found a Wikipedia article suggesting almost 240 000 Norwegian citizens living abroad (supposedly based on numbers from embassies, consulates, and associations for Norwegians).

[92] I am aware that these two categories are not mutually exclusive, which again speaks to the limitations of the statistical data.

What this reinforces is the notion that large-scale immigration and mobility is a phenomenon that has developed over the last couple of decades. This is also apparent in the observation by both Brochmann and Hagelund (2012b) and Ugland (2018) that Norway is currently in a period of immigration and integration policy reappraisal, brought on by changing migration patterns.


*Figure 22 - Bell curve of average duration of residency for immigrant population (SSB, 2017g)[93]*

Figure 23 - Immigration, Emigration, and Net Migration of Norwegian citizens, 1958-2017 (SSB, 2017i)

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[93] Average=12.7 years, Standard deviation=6.5 years

Having addressed origin, age, length of residency, and gender concerning the non-immigrant population, we can move on to registered reasons. SSB reports six reasons for immigration: labour, family reunification, refuge[94], education, "unknown", and "other"[95]. As with some of the numbers above, we are limited to a period of 1990-2017. We are able to break down "reasons for immigration" by three variables: age categories, gender, and region[96].

Beginning with gender (Figure 24), we notice a considerable difference in the registered reason for immigration: men are three-quarters of immigrants arriving with "work" as reason for immigration, whereas women are two-thirds of all immigrating due to "family reunification". Men constitute a larger share of those arriving with "refuge" as reason, whereas more women than men travel to Norway for "education".

Figure 24 - Reason for immigration for the period 1990-2017, by gender (SSB, 2017h)

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
[94] SSB use "flukt", and the literal translation would be "flight", but I have opted to use "refuge" as it is both a less loaded term and less ambiguous. The Norwegian word for "refugee" is "flyktning", which can also be translated to "fugitive". Hence, I am attempting to be explicit in my translation as to which interpretation I am using.
[95] "Unknown" and "other" constitute 0.6 per cent of registered reasons for the period 1990-2017; hence, I am choosing to omit them from subsequent figures and graphs.
[96] SSB operates with six continental-level regions, as well as two additional categories: Europe (excl. Turkey), Africa, Asia (Incl. Turkey), North America, Central and South America, Oceania, Stateless, and Unknown.

Whereas Figure 24 gives us the overall impression for the period 1990-2017, it is also necessary to see how these categories change over the course of the period (Figure 25). What becomes immediately apparent is how following a spike in "refuge" in 1993 and 1999[97], the subsequent years see an increase in immigrants arriving due to family reunification. The second notable detail is the expected increase in "work" as a reason for immigration following the expansion of the EU in 2004.

Figure 25 - Reason for immigration over time, 1990-2017 (SSB, 2017i)

Keeping in mind Figures 14-16, if we break the above table down by region and gender (Figures 26-29); we can add a layer of understanding to why the composition of the immigrant population has changed over time. Recalling significant historical events and conflicts, it gives us a basis for making assertions about the immigrant population and understanding the source of policy changes, discourses, and activities directed at integration processes.

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[97] There are concomitant with the arrival of large groups from ex-Yugoslav countries, see Figure 14.

Figure 26 - "Work" as reason for immigration, by gender and world region, annually 1990-2017

Figure 27 - "Refuge" as reason for immigration, by gender and world region, annually 1990-2017

Figure 28 - "Family reunification" as reason for immigration, by gender and world region, annually 1990-2017

Figure 29 - "Education" as reason for immigration, by gender and world region, annually 1990-2017

First, Figure 26 makes clear: immigrants from Europe dominate labour migration. Seen in relation to the above figures, we can determine that this is, in large part, due to immigration from Poland and Lithuania. This is supported by UDI[98] (2017a), who report that immigrants from Poland who arrived with "work" as their primary reason are a third of all EU immigrants in Norway for work. Amongst immigrants from Asia, two-thirds of those arriving for work were from India (34 per cent) or Vietnam (27 per cent). In total, Poland, Lithuania, India, and Vietnam represented over ninety per cent of all labour migration in 2016.

In 2016, half of all immigrants in Norway with "Refuge" as a primary reason were from Syria, with Eritrea and Afghanistan making up for the majority of the rest (UDI, 2017a). This is a fact that was particularly salient during the fieldwork period, and the considerable increase in asylum-seekers late 2015 – early 2016 resulted in a drastic increase in integration-oriented activities. This will be discussed in detail in Chapter 7.

Concerning family reunification, there is a significant anomaly with regards to our two sources of information (SSB and UDI): they provide vastly different numbers when disaggregated. There is no clear reason for this. Whereas SSB (2017k) reports 5950 immigrants from Europe due to family reunification, UDI (2017a) reports only 1585. Yet, their total sums do not diverge wildly, with SSB recording 16 732 immigrants for family reunification and UDI reporting 15 580. UDI offer a more comprehensive breakdown; hence I will draw on their figures here[99]. When it comes to family reunification, seven countries make up half of the sample population: Thailand, Syria, Somalia, India, Philippines, Eritrea and Afghanistan. The remainder are divided amongst 91 remaining countries. Disaggregated further, apart from adult women (44 per cent), the largest groups are boys and girls aged 0-5 and adult men (each at 12 per cent).

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[98] Utlendingsdirektoratet – The Norwegian Immigration Authorities
[99] Figure 28 still draws on the figures from SSB, as substituting for the figures from UDI is not possible for the full period and would therefore lead to considerable inconsistencies.

Most countries follow the same gender division illustrated in Figure 24, with women largely constituting two-thirds of the immigrants from family reunification. The exceptions here are Thailand (83 per cent women) and the Philippines (78 per cent women), which explains in part why they appear in Figure 16, whereas men from Thailand and the Philippines do not appear in Figure 15. UDI also tells us that 60 per cent of the women who arrived from Thailand and the Philippines arrived following marriage to a Norwegian citizen. A pertinent reason for mentioning this specifically is that Philippine women are often very visible in Catholic parishes around the country. I return to this in Chapter 5.

Philippine citizens also stand out in the final group, those arriving for "education". A quarter of all non-EU immigrants who arrived for educational reasons were from the Philippines, and a full three-quarters of those came to Norway to work as au pairs[100]. Add to this that there is an overwhelming gender bias towards female au pairs, 98 per cent of au pairs between 2000-2008 were female, and it creates a noteworthy dynamic. Øien (2009) offers an in-depth evaluation of au pairs in Norway. For now, I wish to draw attention to one of her acknowledgements: 'Special thanks go to […] the Office for Migrant Chaplaincies of the Catholic Diocese of Oslo for helping me get in touch with respondents' (Øien, 2009, p. 5). The relationship between Philippine women and the Catholic Church is recognised, which strengthens the justification of this thesis' focus on the role of the Catholic Church and related organisations in integration processes. Another example pointing to this is how Caritas Norway (2018) offers a specialised help centre for au pairs, and is advertised on UDI's web site (UDI, 2018a)[101]. This points to the relationship between government bodies and civil society, and will be explored in Chapter 6.

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[100] Norway is a signatory to the Council of Europe treaty 'European Agreement on "au pair" Placement and Protocol thereto' (1969), which explicitly states 'au pairs belong neither to the student category nor to the worker category but to a special category which has features of both […]'. It is unclear why Norway categorises au pairs under education but may imply a perspective on the au pair system that emphasises the educational component as the work is domestic. Alternatively, the decision was political and allows au pairs to circumvent labour migration laws.
[101] Caritas specifically mentions that the au pair centre is run with support from UDI but is not a part of the Immigration Authorities.

Concluding this section, what becomes apparent is how certain countries dominate the statistics repeatedly. There has been considerable diversification of the immigrant population, as demonstrated through figures 14-19, but there are some consistencies. EU countries, in particular Poland and Lithuania, dominate migration with "work" as the primary reason. Immigrants with "refuge" as the primary reason are, logically, from areas and countries with violent conflict, which in the 90s included several European countries but is today skewed towards North Africa and the Middle East. Family reunification statistics are complicated by the nature of EU rules and registrations of immigration, but family reunification is skewed towards women, and the countries that dominate are related to countries that appear in the "refuge" statistics or married to Norwegian citizens (in the case of Thailand and the Philippines). Finally, the smallest group are those who arrive for "education", which again is skewed towards Philippine women (predominantly working as au pairs), or Chinese and US students.

One of the interesting details presented above has to do with average duration of residency. Seen in relation to annual migration statistics, we see how mobility has increased and populations have demonstrated sedentary tendencies. The length of time different countries have constituted a significant share of the immigrant population, matches closely to their average residency in Norway. The exceptions here are some European countries, such as Germany, the UK, Sweden, and Denmark, where there is a considerable difference in how long they have constituted a significant share of the immigrant population and their average residency.

As will be explored below, the integration processes have shaped, and been shaped by, the changing composition of the immigrant population. Yet, as pointed out, we also need to see this in relation to the changing demographics of Norway as a whole, such as the increasing urbanisation.

4.4 – A policy of change and a change of policy

4.4.1 – The Norwegian welfare state

Understanding the role, behaviour, and perception of the Norwegian welfare state is an important element of understanding integration processes. The goal here is not provide a comprehensive exposition[102], but to highlight relevant aspects of the Norwegian welfare state that contribute to the contextualisation of integration processes. It is important to bear in mind the multi-layered nature of the welfare state, where some services are offered at local, regional, or the national level[103]. Hence, integration processes are, per definition, contextual,multi-layered, and may even be conflicting, as was mentioned in section 2.4.1 and will be shown in chapter 8. Titmuss (1963) provides a succinct starting point:

> All collectively provided services are deliberately designed to meet certain socially recognized 'needs'; they are manifestations, first, of society's will to survive as an organic whole and, secondly, of the expressed wish of all the people to assist the survival of some people.
>
> Titmuss, 1963, p. 39

Integration, in its vaguest sense, becomes the 'socially recognized need', in pursuit of society's ability to 'survive as an organic whole'. I argue, through this thesis, that the 'socially recognized need' is discursively established, warranting a framework which emphasises discourses. The final element of the above quote provides ample space for discussion: what is the expressed wish, how is that wish to be fulfilled? Here we find the tensions between residual and institutional approaches to welfare: the former limiting the commitments of the welfare state to 'marginal and deserving social groups [...] only when the family or the market fails', while the latter 'addresses the entire population, is universalistic [...]' (Esping-Andersen, 1990, p. 20). Welfare chauvinism, referred to in Chapter 2, points to how some may find society's ability to survive contingent upon expressly denying assistance to 'some people'.

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[102] For a historical perspective on the development of the Norwegian welfare state, see Bjørnson (2001). For a contemporary overview, see Sørvoll (2015)

[103] For example in education, where primary schooling is local (municipality), secondary schooling is regional (county), and tertiary education is national (state).

The relationship between the residual and institutional perspective is evident in Bendixsen's (2018) description of a Norwegian humanitarian exceptionalism, although the residualist aspect is reversed: while the universal welfare state (the institutionalist approach) is the norm, any instance of state failure allows for a construction of humanitarian exceptionalism by non-state actors operating in lieu of the state. This development can be traced to the unequal — in the sense that they are often formulated relatively independently of each other — development of general welfare policies and integration policies. As Titmuss observed in the 1950s:

> 'As society grows in scale and complexity, new social needs are created; they overlap with and often accentuate the more classical forms of dependent needs [...] In so far as a society fails to identify, by fact and not by inference, its contemporary and changing social problems it must expects its social conscience and its democratic values to languish'
>
> Titmuss, 1963, p. 226, p. 242

In terms of migration and integration processes, the admonition to avoid inference and guesswork is particularly salient. This is what the below section explores: the development of immigration and integration policy and the attempt the Norwegian state made, through the commissioned reports[104], to base policies on facts and research rather than inference. The above quote also draws attention to the impact of the diversification of the population, as was explored in the above sections.

Esping-Andersen (1990) offers another important insight into the nature and role of the welfare state:

> [it] is not just a mechanism that intervenes in, and possibly corrects, the structure of inequality; it is, in its own right, a system of stratification. It is an active force in the ordering of social relations.
>
> Esping-Andersen, 1990, p. 23

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[104] The commissions usually consist of a range of individuals, from academics, politicians, and public figures to private citizens with relevant experience.

This returns us to the points made in chapter 2 about the nature of categorisation, in particular Table 2, and citizenship. Welfare policy does not only relate to healthcare, employment, pensions, etc., but is inextricably tied to issues of migration and integration. Or, as argued by Arts and Gelissen (2002), the welfare state is 'a complex of legal and organizational features that are systematically interwoven' (p. 139). As is shown below, changes to general welfare policy are occasionally categorised as "liberalising" or restricting immigration and integration policy. The discursive framework of this thesis reminds us of the potential stratification embedded in welfare systems and how they are perceived.

In Norway's social democratic form of a welfare state (Esping-Andersen, 1990), the essential component is the 'fusion of welfare and work' (p. 28), echoed in chapter 7 with the axiom: contribution before benefaction — *'yte for å nyte'*. As is shown throughout this thesis, work/labour/employment is a recurring theme in discussions of integration and migration processes, particularly in the case of Moral Underclass and Social Integrationist Discourses. Exploring, in depth, the interconnections of welfare and integration policy, for example how austerity-rhetoric factors in, is beyond the remit of this thesis.

4.4.2 – Immigration and integration policy changes

The changes in migration patterns described in the previous section have led to, or been caused by, policy changes. The majority of these changes can be traced back to the commissioned reports referenced earlier. Whereas the actual legislative changes are brief and succinct, the reports provide the basis for understanding the changes. The vast majority of the policy changes are founded on functional conceptions of society, and thus overwhelmingly reflect SID and MUD. It is only the last couple of decades where RED appears, which may be in response to the increasing diversification of the immigrant population and experience garnered over the preceding decades. UDI (2017b) offer an overview of changes to immigration policy from the 19th Century up until 2016, and SSB (Cappelen, et al., 2011) provide a statistical analysis of the impact of policy changes on immigration to Norway 1969-2010. For the most part, the emphasis

will be on Norway, but as will be shown, there is also a need to explore aspects of policy borrowing and similarities between the Scandinavian countries, but also Canada.

Some of these policies aim to restrict immigration, about 68 of the 204 rules, directives, and laws enacted since the 19th Century, whereas others aim to ease, or "liberalise"[105], immigration, roughly 88 of the 204. This is according to UDI, and their method of classification is unexplained (UDI, 2017b). Furthermore, some policies target specific populations, groups, or phenomenon, such as a legislation in 2005 that assisted Vietnamese refugees[106] in the Philippines in applying for work- and residency permits in Norway (Lovdata, 2005). On the other hand, UDI have also included general changes to welfare rules under their "liberalising" category, such as the expansion of benefits.

On the other hand, these assistive policies also point to other tendencies, such as privileging specific groups. Legislative changes in 1950[107], 1957, 1979, 1999 target Nordic immigrants, granting them rights and privileges that were *subsequently* afforded other immigrants. The 1979 legislative change granted voting rights in municipal and county elections to Nordic citizens with a minimum of three years residency, which was later expanded in 1983 to apply to all foreign citizens. This expansion of political rights for Nordic citizens occurred again in 1999, granting them the right to vote in municipal and county elections provided they had registered by the end of March during the election year. No similar expansion has been made for other foreign citizens. These changes contribute to privileging certain immigrants and lead to a hierarchisation wherein certain immigrants are more desirable and privileged, or as less of a threat and can therefore be given access to more rights. This relates back to the discussion in Chapter 2 on rights versus duties.

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[105] I am aware of the politically charged nature of the term "liberalise", as it is not only used to describe an easing of restrictions, but also used with moral and political connotations. I will instead refer to "assist", as the policies often aim to ease restrictions, expand protections and rights, or make exceptions to rules.
[106] Specifically those with the status "Remaining Vietnamese National".
[107] Relaxing requirements for citizenship for Nordic citizens

Then there are policies categorised as "liberalising" that are questionably so. Such as the 2005 temporary regulation granting temporary residency to Iraqi citizens, but simultaneously curtailing the right to family reunification, exemplifying what Joppke (2007, p. 19) describes as 'repressive liberalism'. The curtailment attempts to be non-selective as it affects immigrants generally, but simultaneously is obviously related to a specific group. The 1957 immigration law included a requirement for having a work permit but is counted as "liberalising" as the work permit 'does not have to be acquired prior to arriving in the realm' (UDI, 2017b). This is categorised as "liberalising" because it eases a restriction from 1927 that made a pre-approved work permit mandatory. Policies change over time, and changes in response to circumstances and politics. Despite the 1957 "liberalisation", the 1970s saw significant restrictions placed on immigration to Norway (except for Nordic citizens). 1971 made it mandatory to apply for a work- or residency permit in country of origin (or the country where one had resided legally for at least six months), and 1975 saw a temporary ban on work permits (Stortinget, 1976; 1974). Subsequently, all "liberalisations" of immigration policy until the mid-90s related to students, family reunifications, and asylum seekers and refugees: the "temporary" ban on work permits has not been rescinded. Exceptions have been made due to EU/EEA regulations.

This is significant, as it provides some explanation for the composition of the immigrant population in Norway. The question, nonetheless, is "why" these restrictions and "liberalisations" were made. For that, I choose to examine the commissioned policy reports discussing immigration and integration processes from the post-war period, as earlier policy has been superseded and replaced. These reports highlight the relationship between immigration and integration processes, as concerns around integration processes are used to justify immigration controls. Yet, as will be shown, the reports are limited by their scope, and lead to, at best, a partial understanding and discussion.

Firstly, the Danielsen-commission (Norges Offentlige Utredninger, 1973) follows three restrictions on immigration made in 1971: work- and residency permits had

to be made prior to departure, and work permits would only granted upon proof of "suitable lodgings" (UDI, 2017b). These, in turn, were preceded by a government white paper (Stortinget, 1969) that, contrary to what the restrictions would imply, remarked on the low level of immigration to Norway relative to other European countries. The immigrant population in Norway increased from approximately 46 000 to 76 000 (see Figure 1 in section 4.2) between 1950 and 1970, but the white paper emphasises the impact on the labour market, which it considers negligible. Furthermore, it was also dominated by Nordic labour migration due to a 1954 common labour market agreement between Finland, Denmark, Sweden, and Norway. The white paper asserts:

> The government is of the understanding that the immigration politics that Norway has pursued the last years has been correct and should be maintained. From the fundamental viewpoint that international cooperation and international contact and exchange should encounter the least possible restrictions and obstacles and that the individual employee and employer should have the greatest possible freedom to enter into contracts, the Government therefore believes that aliens that have secured work in this country should, as a rule, not be refused a work permit. [...] We have to expect that more foreigners want to live and work in Norway, and that more Norwegians will want to live and work abroad. This development should be considered natural and desirable, and there should, from the Government's side, be put the least possible obstacles in the way of this.
>
> Stortinget, 1969, p. 63-64

The only indication of restrictive sentiments is seen in expressions of a lack of interest in encouraging migration to Norway and an understanding that increased immigration might impact the housing market. Yet, a line merits highlighting: '[...] one must expect that certain problems with adaptation will occur'[108] (Stortinget, 1969, p. 63).

This raises the question of "what happened?" Why suddenly introduce restrictions two years later? Firstly, it was argued as necessary due to restrictions introduced by other European nations: 'The influx Norway now has of job seeking foreigners

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[108] The original reads "tilpassingsproblemer", which can be translated as either "adaptation" or "adjustment".

from remote countries seems to be a result of stricter rules for granting of work permits that have gradually been introduced in other Western European countries' (Norges Offentlige Utredninger, 1973, pp. 142, 147). Again, special emphasis is given to the impact of Swedish and Danish policies' knock-on effect due to Nordic agreements. Norway's 1975 "temporary" ban on labour migration was preceded by a similar ban in 1970 in Denmark.

It is difficult to separate these policy restrictions from racializing tendencies. Firstly, the Danielsen-commission recognises the nature of immigration to Norway over the preceding decades is predominantly Nordic or Western-European, but singles out "remote" countries and immigrants arriving 'under the cover of visa freedoms and under the pretence of being tourists, have succeeded in avoiding refusal at the Nordic perimeter' (Norges Offentlige Utredninger, 1973, p. 146). They make specific mention of 'the spontaneous wave of immigration of, amongst others, Pakistani job seekers' in the first half of 1971 (Norges Offentlige Utredninger, 1973, p. 15). Add to this the report's observation that 'Norwegian employers have largely been reluctant in recruiting foreign workers. The increasing immigration Norway has had the last few years, is in large part due to increasing external pressure from job seeking foreigners' (Norges Offentlige Utredninger, 1973, p. 61). In other words, immigration is already presented as an external, undesirable process, provided it is not Nordic.

It is also revealing to repeat the conceptual definitions the Danielsen-commission relied on. Distinguishing between assimilation, integration, and adaptation, they echo SID and MUD (see Chapter 2) in their emphasis on functionalism and hierarchisation of identities. The tension between permanent and temporary residency, and sedentariness and mobility clearly contrasts assimilation and integration. Assimilation is preferable for permanence and sedentariness, integration for temporariness and mobility.

> By assimilation, the commission understands in this context that a foreigner becomes as alike a Norwegian as possible. An assimilated

foreigner will in most respects be as a Norwegian in body and soul[109], he speaks and thinks as most Norwegians, he has a Norwegian, although not necessarily only Norwegian, social circle, he participates in the Norwegian civic life as a Norwegian, he harbours a desire to be considered Norwegian and is to a large extent so, and he considers Norway his new Fatherland.

[...]

Integration is a far weaker form of incorporation in society than assimilation. By integration, the commission understands it as a foreigner is a recognised and functional part of society without necessarily becoming like societal members in general. He can keep his national identity, his own language, his close connections in the homeland and to a certain extent his homelands customs and patterns of life. He can live in the country without wanting to settle here for good, and he can wish that his children return to the homeland. Nonetheless, he can be a functional part of society and find his place.

[...]

Those initiatives from society's side that are implemented in order to help the foreign worker find their place in the country, the commission will refer to as adaptive measures. The foreign workers in Norway span a range of foreigners with different predispositions and, not least, different desires to adapt. The commission is of the opinion that the Government's goal should be to facilitate offers that can be enjoyed by the individual foreign worker and his closest family in accordance with their needs.

Norges Offentlige Utredninger, 1973, p. 69

As the first significant discussion of immigration and integration processes, the Danielsen-commission sets a tone and introduces policy and language that shapes these processes for the next couple of decades. Particularly in view of several scholars pointing to the 1970s as the period of policy establishment and the 80s and 90s as policy consolidation (Brochmann & Hagelund, 2012b; Ugland, 2018; Christensen, et al., 2006). A minority of members in the commission argued an alternative point that emphasises the responsibility of the nation-state:

Countries have allowed mass immigration without building up the necessary infrastructure to receive the flows – i.e. housing, social institutions, schools, adult education, etc. One cannot correct discrepancies without resorting to public investment of such

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[109] The Norwegian text reads "sinn og skinn", which literally translates to "mind and skin", and though I opted for "body and soul" in the translation I want to draw attention to the literal reference to skin. It might have been used as a simple turn of phrase, for its alliteration, but it stands out when seen in relation to other racializing tendencies.

dimension that it would be exceedingly difficult to achieve political
unity on the initiatives.

Norges Offentlige Utredninger, 1973, p. 72

In other words, the report demonstrates a tension between the three discursive
types presented in the previous chapter. "Assimilation", in the commissions
understanding, strongly homogenises the groups/categories, focuses on the
behaviour of the immigrant, and presents a hierarchical and reified understanding
of identities. "Integration" is conceived as emphasising functionality and identity
is seen as less important. The more holistic, redistributive discourse exemplified
by a minority in the commission emphasises the multi-factorial underlying
processes of inequality. That is not to say the latter is more positive to
immigration, as the minority subsequently emphasise the need to utilise local
labour resources, in this case increasing employment amongst women, to satisfy
needs before resorting to importing labour from abroad. The minority also made
the explicit recommendation of a temporary migration ban, à la the Danish.

As mentioned previously, the minority believes the guidelines for
Norwegian immigration policy should build on a holistic evaluation
of social economics and social considerations. Should there be a
conflict between personal finance[110] and societal considerations, the
former should yield. […] When one investigates conditions closely,
one must admit there has arisen new social problems in our country
because we so far have not really had an immigration policy. We
have had open borders without considering the immigrants' needs.
[…] The minority suggests Norway follows the Danish example and
takes a temporary break from immigration. The suggestion of a
temporary immigration stop might seem drastic, and some, perhaps,
would opine that such a decision would violate international
conventions. However, as far as one knows, Denmark did not meet
any severe reaction from the international community.

Norges Offentlige Utredninger, 1973, p. 73

We have already outlined what happened to the demographics of the immigrant
population following this, so it remains to fill in the blanks. It is telling that the
next commissions deal with refugees and young immigrants and descendants of

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[110] Based on the preceding discussion in the report, I believe this refers to employers and business-owners seeking to recruit immigrant labour and the gains that might yield, rather than individuals.

immigrants. Education-oriented immigration has rarely received attention, barring au pairs; hence, the two remaining categories are family and refuge.

Prior to the next commission, the Hagensen-commission that finished in 1985, half the policy changes following the "temporary immigration ban" were aimed at family reunification. It is perhaps unsurprising that the Hagensen-commission focused on young immigrants and children born in Norway to immigrant parent(s). We can contrast their definition of "integration" with that of the Danielsen-commission. This should provide some indication as to how the official understanding and discourses of integration has changed in the twelve years separating the two reports. The definition is as follows:

> Minority groups and/or individuals are given the opportunity to acquire the knowledge and opportunities that enables them to manage in majority society on equal footing with members of the majority. Integration simultaneously involves minority members being given genuine opportunities to keep and develop (or change) their own culture, including their own language, and that they themselves decide at what rate both processes occur.
> Norges Offentlige Utredninger, 1985, p. 7

Both definitions maintain a functionalist outlook, emphasising functioning in society without necessarily becoming part of it. They attempt to offer immigrants a degree of agency by emphasising integration processes occur at *his* chosen rate: the first commission, in every concept, refers to male immigrants, whereas the latter is gender neutral. A government white paper from 1980 heralded this difference in tone by emphasising the choice of the extent to which the immigrant associates with Norway 'beyond what is necessary to function here' (Stortinget, 1980, p. 6). Alternatively, this is indicative of the onus and responsibility being placed on the individual, absolving the government.

Where the two definitions differ points to some change in understanding. Firstly, the 1973-definition only refers to immigrants "keeping" their customs, national

identity, language, and patterns of life, whereas the 1985-definition opens up for keeping, developing, and changing these aspects – suggesting a more processual outlook. Secondly, the latter definition underlines that it needs to be on 'equal footing' and 'genuine opportunities', recognising the presence of inequalities. This was succinctly noted in the 1980 white paper: 'Tolerance does not seem to be innate' (Stortinget, 1980).

The Kramer-commission, completed one year after the Hagensen-commission, provides some further clarification on perspectives and experiences of integration processes with a particular focus on refugees. Related to the above remark on tolerance, the Kramer-commission remarks on both the 'lack of understanding for people's ability to be multicultural' and 'lack of will amongst Norwegians to accept that it is possible to combine multiple ethnic identities' (Norges Offentlige Utredninger, 1986, pp. 20, 74). In this case being Jewish was constructed as much as an ethnic identity as religious identity, reminiscent of the identity processes discussed in the literature review.

Where the Kramer-commission differs from the previous definitions of integration and assimilation, is in the observation that 'many believe that the two processes are actually two stages to the same process' (Norges Offentlige Utredninger, 1986, p. 22). Assimilation was still defined as loss of identity and becoming indistinguishable from the 'host society', whereas integration was again emphasised as becoming a 'functional part of the host society' (Norges Offentlige Utredninger, 1986, p. 22). The Kramer-commission offers an interesting take on the dispersal policies surrounding refugee settlement in Norway, directly linking it to a means to encourage assimilation rather than integration. They also remark on the novelty of the emphasis on integration rather than assimilation.

The greatest shift in understandings of integration processes and discourses in the realm of policy occurred in the 1995 Moen-commission (Norges Offentlige Utredninger, 1995). A decade on from the previous commissions, Norway's experience with a diversifying population has developed, as has the conceptual repertoire concerning integration processes. Apart from repeating the

functionalist conception of integration, the demographically multicultural idea of Norway is front and centre. Whereas the Kramer-commission suggested Norway was moving in the direction of a multicultural society, the Moen-commission considers it a reality.

The Moen-commission makes a remarkable admission, which gives some insight into the perceived relationship between immigrants and non-immigrants:

> At the same time, we have had a strong tendency to want to overlook or conceal [local] cultural differences. We have rather wanted to portray ourselves as a distinctly homogeneous people, with common values and interest. We have wanted to see the cultural uniformity as an overarching value and employed the educational system as an active component in the homogenisation process. [...] Uniformity has been woven into a complete set of symbols, disguises, and expressions that we have developed cultural competency in mastering.
>
> Norges Offentlige Utredninger, 1995, p. 25

Here we begin to see the contours of a recognition of the ambiguity of the concept "likhet", explored in detail by Lien, et al., (2001) a few years later, and it is concomitant with broader discussions of racism in Norway[111]. The ambiguity becomes apparent in the possible translations: uniformity, sameness, or equality. Myhre (2018) draws attention to historical struggles 'over the contents of the word equality, *likhet*' (p. 69). Lien, et al., (2001, p. 12) classify "likhet" as a 'gatekeeper concept', and its ambiguity therefore becomes important, particularly as the concept of equality and egalitarianism has a powerful position in the Norwegian 'national myth' (Abram, 2018, p. 88). Whether taken as equality or sameness, migrants are nonetheless judged in relation to the hegemonic ideal of white Norwegians. "Likhet" is used to identify and privilege both whiteness and values characterised as "Norwegian". With the diversification of the population described above, "likhet" becomes increasingly challenged from multiple angles, necessitating a critical examination of how discourses relate to difference and diversity, as is done throughout this thesis.

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[111] See in particular Gullestad's (2004) discussion of academic writings on racism in Norway, utilising material by Inger-Lise Lien and Unni Wikan written in the mid-90s.

Gullestad (2002) points to how equality as sameness 'underpins a growing ethnification of national identity' (p. 45), bringing to mind aspects of race and racialisation discussed in chapter 2. Abram (2018) draws a direct line between equality-as-sameness and racist, assimilative, "Norwegianization" policies of the 19th and 20th Century. If taken as "equality", we still have to bear in mind that 'equality is a discourse' (Stråth, 2018, p. 47) that is contingent upon constructions of inequality. These discursive productions, much like the discourses around *integration*, are a part of the greater construction and imagination of the nation.

Notably, equality and inequality can become racialised: 'being white has become a more pronounced dimension of being Norwegian' (Gullestad, 2004, p. 193). This brings to mind the findings from Lynnebakke and Fangen (2011) about the three perceived criteria of "Norwegianness": origin, cultural practice, and citizenship. The absence of race and inclusion of 'cultural practice' is symptomatic of the shift towards a culturalist rhetoric of racism (Gullestad, 2005). While 'likhet' can serve to obscure differences between those seen as Norwegian, it also draws attention to differences between "the Norwegian" and the Other (Gullestad, 2002). In effect, 'likhet', and its attempted definition along origin, cultural practice, and citizenship lines, can be seen as a shorthand for a 'white public space' that strengthens 'racial control practices' in society (Page & Thomas, 1994, p. 111)[112]. 'Likhet' establishes a context and discourse where the non-migrant, white Norwegian is rendered invisible, while the migrant is racialised and marginalised.

What these reports come to represent is the 'complex mixtures of discourses within which racial boundaries are articulated and normalised' (Gullestad, 2005, pp. 27-28). If, as the Moen-commission suggests, uniformity and likeness require cultural competency in order to decode or understand, it echoes the Kramer-commission's findings on the lack of acceptance for multiple identities and the marginalisation of immigrant populations. This marginalisation is not uniform

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[112] See also Hill (1998) for a perceptive analysis on the role of language in the construction of race and white public space.

across all groups, as noted in chapter 2 on differential racializing tendencies and degrees of whiteness (Bonnett, 1998).

This is in part recognised by the Moen-commissions expansion of conceptions of pluralism, and admission of assimilative tendencies despite a discourse of integration: 'At the formal and intentional level, integration policy has opted for integration, but in practice it has often worked assimilative or even segregating' (Norges Offentlige Utredninger, 1995, p. 24). As pointed out in Chapter 2, the concept of "integration" appears in all three discursive models, which points to a need to understand what is implied or meant when concepts are used. Perhaps more importantly is seeing what is then done. Table 6 presents their conceptualisations of pluralism.

Table 6 - Moen-commission's models of pluralism (Norges Offentlige Utredninger, 1995, p. 25)

Apartheid-pluralism	Underground-pluralism	Individualist pluralism/Limited pluralism	Group pluralism/ Full pluralism
Segregation	Intolerant/Hard assimilation	Humanitarian/Soft assimilation	Integration/Incorporation
Suppression of minority cultures	Discrimination of minority cultures	Minority cultures are tolerated	Minority cultures are supported
Differentiated rights for groups	Formal equality at the individual level	Full equality at individual level. At group level, differences are normalised based on the norms of the majority.	Full equality at both individual and group level.
Individual and group rights linked to cultural belonging	Strong pressure to conform	A strong, dominating majority culture provides assimilation pressure.	Cultural differences are actively maintained, but must comply with overarching community
	Minority cultures endure, but as underground cultures		

Comparing the above forms of pluralism to the discursive model in Chapter 2, the Apartheid- and Underground-pluralism clearly match a Moral Underclass Discourse. Both imply a ranking of identities, where society is constituted as fragmented and unwanted characteristics are "Other". The Limited pluralism reflects a Social Integrationist Discourse, in that it de-emphasizes identity and adopts a laissez-faire approach to the entire process: 'The authorities have an indifferent attitude to minority cultures, provided it does not break strongly with majority culture and its rules and norms' (Norges Offentlige Utredninger, 1995, p. 26). The Moen-commission argues integration policy has been so poorly defined and formulated at the national level that local authorities have usually continued assimilative practices or avoided the issue (Norges Offentlige Utredninger, 1995). This is reminiscent of Kymlicka's (1995) argument that the state will promote certain identities and disadvantage others, whether intentionally or through 'benign neglect' (p. 110).

There are strong similarities between the Moen-commission's model of Full Pluralism and treatise on Multiculturalism. There is an emphasis on the importance of protecting both individual and group rights, and the recognition of differences (Modood, 2013; Kymlicka, 1995; Norges Offentlige Utredninger, 1995). The Moen-commission emphasise compliance with an overarching community, whereas Kymlicka warns against allowing groups to practice internal restrictions that limits individuals. Modood (2013) offers a slightly different view in that he expands the understanding of pluralism, or the "multi" part of Multiculturalism. (1) There are differences, (2) based on different social attributes (race, religion, etc.), (3) groups differ, (4) groups constitute themselves and behave differently, and (5) not all members of the same group are 'members in the same way' (Modood, 2013, p. 110). In this sense, it mirrors the Redistributive Discourse.

As of 1995, the Moen-commission argues that despite the desire to pursue Full Pluralism at the political, rhetorical level, the reality has often leaned towards the Limited Pluralism and the other forms of pluralism. In 2011, the discourse shifts slightly, with two commissions, Brochmann-I and Kaldheim-commission, examining welfare and migration, and integration policy respectively. The

Brochmann-I commission posits a central premise: 'In a world of finite resources, internal and external mechanisms [for managing migration] are mutually dependent' (Norges Offentlige Utredninger, 2011a, p. 22). Throughout the report, there is an emphasis on "activation" versus "pacification" of immigrants, underscoring the necessity of employment in both integrating immigrants and sustaining a welfare state. In other words, the discourse emphasises a hierarchical conception of identities, which plays out in the construction of categories and policy applied as discussed in the previous chapter. Repeatedly, the report emphasises the need to raise the level of qualifications and skills amongst immigrants, thereby also establishing a discourse of externalising unwanted characteristics and associating them with immigrants and implies welfare benefits encourage dependency.

The Brochmann-I report demonstrates both SID and MUD characteristics. As discussed in Chapter 2, it is not one or the other; these discourses operate on a continuum. What we do see, is that the "Universalism" the Brochmann-I commission argue underpins the Norwegian welfare system, does not allow for a valorisation of multiple identities, as would be required for the Redistributive Discourse of Exclusion, but instead communicates uniformity. Returning us to the idea of "likhet", with its ability to convey vastly different meanings and implications. It also externalises "unwanted" characteristics from the mainstream and emphasises an assimilationist perspective that focuses on the behaviour of the individual — clear signs of MUD.

The emphasis on qualifications is also skewed towards the Moral Underclass Discourse: Maximova-Mentzoni, et al., (2016) find evidence of systematic devaluation of non-Norwegian education and qualifications within higher education in Norway. This is also emphasised in the Kaldheim-commission (Norges Offentlige Utredninger, 2011b) and Brochmann-II commission (Norges Offentlige Utredninger, 2017). The emphasis on translation and recognition of qualifications is also demonstrated in Chapter 6, amongst extra-ecclesial organisations working with immigrants. This cannot be separated from the policy perspectives of limiting immigration to the extent permissible by international treaties and agreements.

The formulation of the "desirability/undesirability" of categories of immigrants does not stop at the point of immigration but remains relevant in integration processes and contributes to shaping these processes.

The latter of the 2011 commissions directly addresses integration policy and processes: the Kaldheim-commission (Norges Offentlige Utredninger, 2011b). In their own words, they are 'the first commission that has undertaken a holistic assessment of integration policy and integration work in Norway. The suggestions are the first to entail a holistic and coherent integration policy' (Norges Offentlige Utredninger, 2011b, p. 11). Nearly four decades after imposing a "temporary immigration ban", there is a concerted effort to address integration processes. This strengthens the argument that discourses around immigration and integration processes have largely been Social Integrationist or Moral Underclass Discourses: a patchwork discussion on how to mitigate the impact of immigration. Despite the presence of elements of the Redistributive Discourse of Exclusion, that appears merely because of the strong welfare state universalism. There has been little, if any, valorisation of multiple identities within a holistic understanding of society.

Here we can draw on the Multiculturalism-Interculturalism debate[113], as that debate highlights conceptions of integration processes at national and local levels. In particular, I draw attention to some questions posed by Kymlicka:

> Is it better to emphasise bottom-up, local, civil-society-based projects of cultural interaction, as interculturalists imply, and save state-centred projects of redefining multicultural nationhood for later? Or will local projects of intercultural interaction always be fragile in the absence of an explicit state commitment to redefine nationhood?
>
> Kymlicka, 2016, p. 172

Another way of posing those questions is if it is enough that discourses around immigration and integration processes are held at the national level or whether it is necessary to see them at local and particular levels. The crux of this thesis is

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[113] For a detailed exploration of this debate, see Meer, Modood, and Zapata-Barrero (2016)

exploring how Catholicism influences integration processes nationally and locally, and how it compares to other influences: By understanding how groups constitute themselves, and how individuals draw on their identities and perspectives when they interact with different levels such as the local, regional, or national.

The Kaldheim-commission offers an explicit formulation of what "integration" is and should achieve:

> Integration of immigrants is concretely about qualification, education, work, quality of life, and social mobility; influence in democratic processes, participation in civil society; and belonging, respect for differences, and loyalty for mutual values. It is results, i.e. what is accomplished along these dimensions that determines how successful integration is.
>
> Norges Offentlige Utredninger, 2011b, p. 11-12

Where the Brochmann-I commission offers a contrast is in the ideal of universalism in the welfare state, and how that translates into a national integration. The issue for the welfare state becomes how to apply universalism to the particular, and we return to the ambiguity of equality and uniformity. The Kaldheim-commission, on the other hand, conceptualises integration as something to be achieved by or done to immigrants. The Moen-commission observed that despite desiring Full Pluralism, the reality often matches Limited Pluralism or worse. The above quote from the Kaldheim-commission demonstrates this: the conception of society is still functionalist and fragmented.

The Kaldheim-commission aptly demonstrates some of the tensions of the Multiculturalist-Interculturalist debate. Despite emphasising "Better integration", the title of their report, they present three concepts: integration, inclusion, and diversity. Their conceptualisation of "integration" precludes a Redistributive Discourse of Exclusion, as it is markedly Social Integrationist. "Inclusion" is slightly more Redistributive, whereas "Diversity" clearly echoes that discourse:

> [Integration] is about how recently arrived immigrants, as fast as possible, can enter employment and civil society […]. [Inclusion] is about everyone living in Norway having equal opportunities and duties to contribute and participate in the collective […]. [Diversity] refers to all residents[114] in society. The commission believes the goal has to be that all residents should experience belonging, togetherness, or community with Norwegian society. This has to build on loyalty to mutual values and acceptance for diversity and differences. Immigrants have to immerse themselves in and respect the foundation of Norwegian societal life. At the same time, society and the population have to include new residents and respect new differences. Through contact and experience, all residents have to become accustomed to handling differences in a natural manner. Descendants of immigrants can develop identities and ways of life that represent new ways of being Norwegian.
>
> Norges Offentlige Utredninger, 2011b, p.27, 29

Compare this to Meer, et al., (2016) summary of the Multiculturalist and Interculturalist positions:

> […] multiculturalism can simultaneously describe "the political accommodation by the state and/or a dominant group of all minority cultures defined first and foremost by reference to race or ethnicity […]". […] [Interculturalism] assumed diversity is itself a culture.
>
> Meer, et al., 2016, p. 4, 9

On the side of Interculturalists, Cantle (2016, p. 149) remarks: 'The strength of national identity depends to some extent on the powers and responsibilities of the nation-state'. This points to a linkage between a strong, comprehensive welfare system and identity — a fundamental linkage for welfare chauvinism (Bartram, et al., 2014; Keskinen, et al., 2016). Thus, the two commissions highlight different aspects of integration processes in Norway. Whereas the Brochmann-I commission strengthens the link between a Norwegian identity and the welfare system, the Kaldheim-commission presents a move towards seeing diversity as a reality and culture in Norway.

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[114] The Norwegian word "borger" is used, which I have chosen to translate as resident, but can be understood as citizen. The specific word for citizen is "statsborger"; hence, I opted for the broader interpretation of "borger". I highlight this because they could easily have omitted "borger" and it would simply have read "everyone in society". The implication is that these ideals only apply to legal residents.

Tensions between these aspects was recognised and summarised in the Brochmann-II commission: 'The Norwegian welfare model is both a resource and a problem when it comes to integration of immigrants and descendants' (Norges Offentlige Utredninger, 2017, p. 11). Moving in the direction of a Moral Underclass Discourse, the commission strongly homogenises the "native" population: 'Norway has historically been, ethnically and culturally, a relatively homogeneous country' (Norges Offentlige Utredninger, 2017, p. 12). The degree to which the Brochmann-II commission externalises unwanted characteristics, ignores societal inequalities, and draws on stereotypes to establish a hierarchy of identities, is blatant. Take for example the following statements. The first fails to separate between standard of living and quality of life. The second portrays a Norwegian identification and categorisation as the pinnacle. The final statement suggests a causal relationship between immigration and inequality:

> Those who probably have the clearest benefit from immigration are the immigrants themselves. Moving to Norway, for many, will increase their standard of living considerably and quickly. […] Many with immigrant background embrace an identity as Norwegian, but few seize it fully, and many experience their identity as Norwegian is challenged by others who do not see them that way. […] Immigration can therefore be expected to give a direct increase in inequality in Norway […].
>
> Norges Offentlige Utredninger, 2017, p. 26, 138, 151

In conclusion, what this section shows is how despite the awareness of the diversification of the Norwegian population over the last forty years, official policy discourses has developed slowly. The mid-90s demonstrate a move towards a more complex conceptualisation of society and immigration, but despite the move towards a Redistributive Discourse, there is a significant and lasting functionalist approach to integration processes. This is to be expected, as they are policy papers intending to offer suggestions for future policy, but their conceptualisation of immigration and integration processes are significant for the national discourses. What appears to be a significant issue is how a functionalist outlook can strengthen a Moral Underclass Discourse.

4.5 – Nordland, Bodø, and immigration and integration processes

If the discussions around immigration and integration processes at the national level developed slowly, regional ones were slower. Here we see the differential impact of immigration on Norwegian regions, and it becomes necessary to bear in mind the internal migration processes as well as international migration processes. There is a significant dearth of historical material on immigration and integration process discourses with a regional focus, which results in an overwhelmingly contemporary perspective. This section, therefore, will explore the specific demographic details of Nordland, and Bodø, and briefly discuss regional and local policy aspects of integration processes. This allows us to draw some contrasts to the national discourse and policy, and better appreciate the local variations.

As of 2017, there were 242 866 people living in Nordland, the narrow, elongated county that joins mid-Norway to Northern Norway. The county boasts a full quarter of Norway's coast line and is the second largest county by territory. Seventy per cent of Nordland's population are considered to be living in "densely populated" areas[115]. Of the 44 municipalities that make up Nordland County, 24 of them are categorised as "least central"[116], 11 are "less central", eight are "somewhat central", and Bodø just qualifies as "central" with its 51 000 inhabitants. Just over a fifth of the inhabitants in Nordland live in Bodø, the fieldwork site for this thesis, making it twice as large as the next largest municipality, Rana (NFK, 2016). In other words, Nordland, apart from Bodø, can be considered somewhat peripheral and rural, although not inaccessible.

According to SSB (2017i), there were 21 295 immigrants, from 140 countries, living in Nordland in 2017, roughly 9 per cent of the population of the county[117]. Of these, 4384 (21 per cent) lived in Bodø. Table 7 compares the countries of origin

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[115] SSB define a densely populated area as at least 200 people living in an area with a distance of less than 50metres between houses. Compared to other counties, Nordland is the 14th "densely populated" county. The average is 76 per cent of the population in "densely populated" areas.

[116] As previously stated: "Central" is achieved when the physical centre of the population of a municipality is <75 minutes of travel from an urban settlement with a population >50 000 inhabitants. An additional requirement is that the urban settlement in question acts as a regional centre. "Somewhat" means travel of <60minutes to an urban settlement with >15 000 inhabitants. "Less" means travel of <45 minutes to an urban settlement with >5 000 inhabitants. "Least central" municipalities do not fulfil any of these requirements

[117] I have been unable to source data on how many internal migrants there are in Nordland.

in ranked order for the respective geographic unit. I included the national ranking from Figure 14 for comparison.

Bodø	Nordland	National
Poland	Poland (5)	Poland (7)
Somalia	Lithuania (4)	Lithuania (5)
Sweden	Syria (1)	Sweden (14)
Eritrea	Somalia (5)	Somalia (10)
Lithuania	Sweden (15)	Germany (13)
Thailand	Eritrea (3.5)	Iraq (13)
Syria	Thailand (8)	Syria (2)
Russia	Germany (12)	Philippines (10)
Iraq	Russia (9)	Pakistan (22)
Germany	Afghanistan (4)	Eritrea (5)
Philippines	Philippines (9)	Denmark (22)
Afghanistan	Romania (4)	Thailand (10)
Denmark	Iraq (10)	Russia (10)
Ethiopia	Latvia (4)	Iran (15)
Latvia	Denmark (19)	Afghanistan (8)
Romania	*Iran (6)*	*Latvia (5)*
Pakistan	*Ethiopia (4)*	*Ethiopia (9)*
Iran	*Pakistan (8)*	*Romania (5)*

Table 7 - Countries of origin for immigrants, by share of immigrant population (SSB, 2017g)[118]

There is some difference in terms of duration of residency in Norway: it is consistently shorter for immigrants in Nordland. There are two possible explanations: more recently arrived or increased re-migration internationally or nationally. In the former, it raises questions as to why immigrants would travel to Nordland at a slower rate than nationally. This could be related to Nordland's peripheral position geographically and differences in the regional labour markets. This is explored in Chapter 8, in the interview with a county official working on increasing labour migration to Nordland.

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[118] Average duration of residency in years in parentheses. There is no data for average duration of residency at the municipal level. Countries in italics are included because they appear in one of the other columns but are not a part of the sample constituting two-thirds in its respective column.

The latter suggests increased mobility, due to, for example, employment or wellbeing[119]. This is explored in Chapter 7, in analyses of interviews and ethnographic data. It is noticeable that immigrants in Nordland from Somalia, Eritrea, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Ethiopia, likely to be refugees, have markedly shorter residency than at the national level, which might indicate a tendency towards onwards migration[120]. Figure 30 gives a bell curve for duration of residency of all immigrants in Nordland, and it reinforces the argument that the immigrant population in Nordland is to a certain extent more recent than at the national level.

Figure 30 - Duration of residency for immigrant population in Nordland (SSB, 2017g)[121]

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[119] See Grønseth (2010) for a qualitative analysis of Tamil refugees in Northern Norway and internal migration following refugee settlement.
[120] Internal migration in Norway is relatively under-researched, with Rees, et al., (1999) offering the most in-depth analysis. They conclude internal migration dynamics strongly resemble other West European countries, hence we can look to, for example, Boman (2011) or Åslund (2005).
[121] Average: 8.96 years. Standard deviation: 6.29 years (nationally – 12.7 years (average) and 6.5 years (standard deviation)). As with the previous bell curve, the data skews it towards a lower average and shortens the right-hand tail because it does not count above 40 years.

Comparing the municipal, county, and national figures (Table 8), three of the top five countries of origin are shared: Poland, Lithuania, and Somalia. There are variations in the share of immigrant population, but largely the same countries that comprise two-thirds of the immigrant population locally, regionally, and nationally. Certain details stand out, such as the lower share immigrants from Poland constitute in Nordland and Bodø, and the higher share of the immigrant population constituted by immigrants from Somalia.

As immigration from Poland is largely, and primarily, due to labour, their reduced share of the immigrant population in Nordland and Bodø might be tied to the labour market and Nordland's role in the Norwegian economy. The higher share of immigrants from Somalia might be related to Norway's policy on refugee resettlement, which seeks to disperse refugees throughout the country. This is supported by the absence of a significant population of, for example, immigrants from Vietnam in Nordland, as they were more commonly settled in Southern Norway.

Country	Bodø	Nordland	National
Poland	10.7%	10.0%	13.4%
Lithuania	4.9%	6.5%	5.2%
Sweden	5.1%	5.4%	5.0%
Somalia	7.0%	5.9%	4.0%
Germany	3.7%	3.9%	3.4%
Iraq	4.0%	2.1%	3.1%
Syria	4.4%	6.3%	2.9%
Philippines	3.6%	3.4%	2.8%
Pakistan	1.0%	0.5%	2.8%
Eritrea	5.0%	5.4%	2.8%
Denmark	2.1%	1.9%	2.7%
Thailand	4.5%	5.2%	2.6%
Russia	4.2%	3.7%	2.4%
Iran	0.9%	1.2%	2.4%
Afghanistan	3.1%	3.5%	2.2%
Romania	1.5%	3.0%	3.0%
Latvia	1.7%	2.1%	1.4%
Ethiopia	2%	2%	1.1%

Table 8 - Two-thirds of the immigrant population in Bodø, Nordland, and nationally as of 2017 (SSB, 2017f)

The relationship between immigration and the county and municipality administrations, and policy and actions pursued is complicated. Unlike at the national level, where there are commissions, reports, White Papers, and a national press to demonstrate and draw attention to this relationship, this is largely absent at the regional and local level. At the county level, Nordland county administration's efforts have been directed at labour-based migration, whereas the local level has been largely silent. This is discussed in detail in Chapter 8.

Interculturalism posits that contact at the local level can be conducive to breaking down 'traditional and hardened boundaries' (Cantle, 2016, p. 142), although this risks perceiving boundaries as naturally occurring. This is echoed by Steen (2008), writing for IMDi[122], emphasising local factors affecting municipalities' willingness to resettle refugees. He points to the role of the size of the municipality (no effect), unemployment (mixed effect), and scepticism towards "non-western migrants" (negative effect). Contact may contribute to breaking down boundaries, but without state intervention overriding municipalities' unwillingness to resettle refugees, intercultural contact is effectively short-circuited. Furthermore, this perspective homogenises that which is "inside" the boundaries that contact is meant to expose "the other side" to. Kymlicka also warns that there is a risk that this perspective 'consigns control over nationhood to conservative and populist forces' (2016, p. 173). The absence of clear policy and emphasis on immigration and integration processes at the local and county level, I would argue, points to the anxiety about discussions on nationhood (Kymlicka, 2016). As has already been argued above, there has been a strong homogenising tendency at the national level, and, despite the prevalence of regional identities, this raises the bar for challenging national perspectives on integration processes.

Combined with a tendency towards functionalist Social Integrationist Discourses and the laissez-faire tendencies, the local and regional approaches deserve to be scrutinised. Interculturalism emphasises repeatedly that 'everyday engagements between citizens or groups' (Loobuyck, 2016, p. 232) should be encouraged and is where integration processes are the most impacted. As has been pointed out

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[122] IMDi – Integrering- og Mangfoldsdirektoratet – Directorate for Integration and Diversity

above, integration processes occur at multiple levels, and Multiculturalism/Interculturalism's emphases on societal/individual factors and actions are not contradictory. What distinguishes the two approaches is that Multiculturalism entails clear, targeted, and intentional moves towards altering '"operative public values"' (Modood, 2017, p. 6), whereas Interculturalism's emphasis on the local risks absolving the institutions and bodies that govern and embody a significant power, and reduces it to incidental contact. Loobuyck (2016, p. 237) puts it as clearly as 'Multiculturalism should be implemented by the government(s), Interculturalism by the citizens.'

The question then becomes whether we see proof of either Multiculturalism or Interculturalism at the regional and local level. What we can point to, is that Bodø municipality is certainly aware of their increasingly diversified population. On their web page about living in Bodø, they offer information in English, French, Polish, Somali, Russian, Tigrinya, Persian, Arabic, and Spanish (Bodø Kommune, 2017). The question is what led them to choose certain languages over others. Consider, for example, that immigrants from Germany, the Philippines, and Thailand outnumber immigrants from Russia, yet the information is not offered in German, Tagalog, or Thai. It could be related to the average duration of residency of immigrants from these countries and the primary reason for immigration. As shown above, immigration from Thailand and the Philippines is often family reunification following marriage to a Norwegian citizen. Alternatively, these immigrants find information from alternative sources, such as the two Philippine community organisations in Bodø (*Filipino Community* and *Filipino Union*).

The local aspects will be analysed in depth in later chapters, but before concluding I have to draw attention to the arrival of a large number of asylum-seekers late 2015 to early 2016, in the middle of the fieldwork and data collection for this thesis. Firstly, the sudden change in migration patterns caught many nation-states by surprise, and a rhetoric of "crisis" was prevalent throughout Europe. Many governments acted quickly to introduce policies to respond to this, and Norway was no exception.

The discourse and rhetoric in politics and media, local and national, during this period provides important insight into constructions of immigration and integration processes from a diversity of positions. Offering a comprehensive, discursive analysis of national political and media rhetoric is beyond the scope of this thesis, but they informed the findings and analyses and will be drawn upon as they become relevant[123]. What this means for the thesis is that the research was conducted at a time of heightened awareness and increased salience of immigration and integration processes. As such, the interviews and ethnography, based on local contexts, offer a clear counter-narrative to the national policy-based political debates.

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[123] Greussing and Boomgaarden (2017) offer an analysis of the framing of the "refugee crisis" in Austria, and their findings resonate with my fieldwork: 'a predominance of stereotyped interpretations of refugee and asylum issues' (p. 1749)

4.6 – Conclusion

What this chapter has sought to do has been to explore and demonstrate some of the context in which integration processes occur. Leaving discussions of religious aspects to the next chapter, this chapter has focused on the demographic and policy changes in immigration and integration processes over the last few decades. I am not suggesting the last few decades are the only worth exploring, as historical analyses are very enlightening, but it has been beyond the ability of this thesis to extend the analysis further back.

Seeing policy and demographic changes in tandem offers us insight into the relationship between the two. In particular, the discussions in the commissioned reports remind us of how domestic decisions such as immigration control are not independent of outside influences. From the earliest reports, there are direct references to international factors and policy decisions made by neighbouring countries, in particular the Nordic countries[124]. Subsequent reports reflect shifting discourses and are shaped by the realities of alternative migration patterns and demographic changes.

Due to decisions made in the late 1960s and early 1970s with regards to acceptable causes for immigration, and preferred groups, combined with Norwegian welfare ideals[125], the perceptions and construction of "the immigrant" became intrinsically "Other". The policy systems and overarching discourses were only lightly modified the next couple of decades, and a full discussion of what a Plural or Multicultural Norway would entail does not occur until the 1990s. Despite an increasing awareness of integration processes and factors that shape them, policies and discourses do not shift considerably. The focus and goal remains employment.

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[124] For a detailed analysis of the immigration and integration policy relationship between the Scandinavian countries and Canada, see Ugland (2018).

[125] Bendixsen (2018) offers an incisive analysis of the contemporary relationship between Norwegian humanitarian ideals and welfare discourses.

Discourses remain overwhelmingly Social Integrationist, with undercurrents of Moral Underclass elements. Bendixsen (2018) points to Norway's understanding of itself as a champion for humanitarian ideals in how it copes with and relates to categorisation of immigrants. If there is a prideful position on humanitarian positions and behaviour, morality cannot be separated from the discussion. Despite laudable statements about the importance of equality and mutual respect in the Kaldheim-commission (Norges Offentlige Utredninger, 2011b), there is still an emphasis on the superiority of the Norwegian model. This is succinctly demonstrated by Carli (2006, pp. 101-102):

> Another typical thing about being foreign in Norway is the need to constantly underline how good we have it in Norway [...] And those who express some criticism about something about Norwegian society, they are met with "this is what is like in Norway".

The context in which discussions of immigration and integration processes took place start shifting in the 2000s. Perhaps most significantly, there is a fundamental change in labour-oriented migration: the enlargement of the EU alters the mobility patterns over the course of a short period of time, and Norway's population is subsequently further diversified. It is not that there were not Polish or Lithuanian immigrants in Norway prior to their accession to the EU, but their presence was considered inconsequential and the Norwegian system had coped with it.

What occurs in the mid-late 2000s is, to not put too fine a point on it, a rude awakening and challenge to the laissez-faire approach of previous decades. This is evident in the creation of *two* commissions to look into different aspects of immigration and integration processes. The Brochmann-I commission, focusing on the impact of immigration on the welfare system, is repeated in 2016, following another change in mobility patterns resulting in an increase in asylum-seekers. The emphasis remains functional in character, with an insidious moral undertone which is only partially addressed by the Kaldheim-commission.

Narrowing the focus to the regional and local levels, we find that Nordland and Bodø do not differ greatly in terms of demographics. Yet, as a peripheral part of Norway, it captures the in-between position of long-term experience with migration and mobility patterns found in cities, and the lack of experience many local communities have. This is reflected in the absence of clear regional positions on immigration issues, and efforts are largely shaped by the national discourse and policy. Particularly concerning refugee-settlement, where the local administrations have a degree of decision-making freedom, it was not until the heightened awareness of late-2015-early 2016 that local practices were afforded much attention. Subsequently, there was a hunt for "best-practice"[126].

This has provided us with the overarching secular context in which the research was conducted. The next chapter explores how the religious context in Norway has shifted over time, and in particular how the Catholic Church has developed over the course of its recent history in Norway. What will become apparent is the close relationship between immigration and mobility processes and the Catholic Church in Norway. By understanding this, we can more readily analyse the relationship between the Catholic Church and integration processes, and how it plays out at different levels.

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[126] Understood here as a discursive process that challenges and reframes issues and seeks to create new knowledge about them (Bulkeley, 2006).

Chapter 5 – Separation of Church and State, but bringing people together?

5.1 – Introduction

This chapter seeks to introduce the religious and Catholic landscape in Norway. Initially, I will offer an overview of religion in Norway and religious policy, before moving on to an in-depth examination of Catholicism in Norway. As with my discussion on the general Norwegian context, I limit myself to the modern era, touching on the development of the Catholic Church in Norway[127] since it returned to Norway in 1843. In order to fully understand the relationships between migration, transnationalism, and Catholicism, Cruz (2016, p. 25) argues for '[taking] theology seriously', but it is equally important to understand the ecclesiology of the Church. Where the theology helps us understand the "why", ecclesiology can help us understand the "how".

Furthermore, it is essential to distinguish between the theoretical aspects of theology and ecclesiology, and the practical realities within the national, regional, and local settings of the Catholic Church and its concomitant extra-ecclesial organisations. The goal of this chapter is not to offer an exhaustive description of every aspect of the Church, but to offer a series of analyses that help us understand the complex realities of Catholicism, migration, and integration processes. This will allow us to provide a fuller answer to the research question asking how the nature of the Church affects its response to and perception of integration processes.

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[127] Hereafter referred to as the Church.

5.2 – The issue of affiliation and disaffiliation

In broad strokes, Christianity was introduced to Norway in the 11th Century. At the time of the Reformation, Norway was in union with Denmark, and the Danish monarch, Christian the III, declared that Norway and Denmark would become Protestant, Evangelical Lutheran countries. In 1569, Frederick the II of Denmark decreed that persons of non-Lutheran religious convictions were banned from entering Norway (Norges Offentlige Utredninger, 2013, p. 37). These royal decrees laid the groundwork for a religiously homogeneous understanding of Norway.

Modern legal governance of religion in Norway begins with the Constitution of 1814, which reaffirmed Evangelical Lutheranism as the official religion of Norway. The Church of Norway remained the official state church, all persons in government office had to adhere to Evangelical Lutheranism (Lovdata, 1814, p. §93; Norges Offentlige Utredninger, 2013), and religious illiberalism was evidenced by denying Jesuits, monks, and Jews access to the realm (Lovdata, 1814, p. §2).

The religious monopoly of the Church of Norway became increasingly challenged, and concessions were gradually made to other Christian denominations. The passing of *Dissenterloven*[128] in 1845 opened up Norwegian society to Christian denominations, although Jesuits, Jews, and monks were still banned (Rygnestad, 1955). These bans were gradually removed, with Jews granted access to the country in 1851, monks in 1897, and Jesuits[129] in 1956 (Elden, 2017; Hoelseth, 2011; 2013). Full freedom of religion was guaranteed in the Norwegian Constitution in 1964 (Norges Offentlige Utredninger, 2013, p. 19). While not necessarily indicative of popular religiosity, the legal governance of religion in Norway gives us some insight into elite perceptions of religion and their understanding of religion's place in Norwegian society.

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[128] The Law of Dissenters
[129] There had been two attempts previously, in 1897 and 1925, to repeal the ban on Jesuits (Teres, 2013)

Following further changes to the Constitution, the Church of Norway went from being a State Church to a Folk Church (Church of Norway, 2015). Repstad (2002) defines a Folk Church[130] as encompassing a vast majority of the population. Officially, roughly 70 per cent of Norway's population are members of the Church of Norway (SSB, 2017b), although Repstad (2002) posits that religion is only important for 5 to 10 per cent of the population.

What we can glean from a range of sources is that, despite Repstad's claim, Christian nominalism is prevalent (Davie, 1994). In 2008, 80.7 per cent of the population were members of the Norwegian Church (SSB, 2016b), but only 63 per cent of respondents in the World Value Survey (2014) identified as members. In 2017, this had dropped to 71.5 per cent (SSB, 2017b) and 47 per cent (Pew Research Center, 2017). Comparing a governmental and non-governmental source provides some contrast and points to the complexity of secularisation processes.

Norway adheres to an active support of religious societies and confessions, and religion is, at a policy level, seen as conducive to a positive societal development (Norges Offentlige Utredninger, 2013), something which is perfectly compatible with political secularism (Casanova, 2009). An essential aspect of Norwegian religious policy is the principle of equal treatment and funding of religious societies (Lovdata, 2018a, p. §16): the Church of Norway is given a block grant, and other religious societies are given an equivalent amount per registered member[131] (Lovdata, 2017a [1981]). The Church of Norway is seen as preserving cultural heritage as well as offering religious services. In this sense, being a Folk Church extends beyond the tenuous basis of encompassing a majority of the population, a notion which can be increasingly disputed.

Despite fiscal equality, this funding method is principally unequal. Other religious societies receive an equivalent amount, but the symbolic value is different. The

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[130] Bryan Turner (1991) similarly identifies the Church of Scotland as a *Volkskirche* (German for Folk Church), and argues against its capacity to act as a representative, societal voice.

[131] For example, in 2017 the Church of Norway was given a block grant of approximately 2 million Norwegian Kroner, which resulted in other religious societies receiving 536NOK per member (Ministry of Culture, 2017a)

Church of Norway is funded irrespective of its membership, rendering it relatively immune to membership fluctuation, unlike other religious societies. The privileged position of the Church of Norway is aptly exemplified by the Orwellian suggestion from the leader of the Conservative Youth party: atheists should register as members of the Church of Norway in order to defund other religious societies (Friestad, 2016).

This funding policy has received more attention the last couple of years due, in part, to membership fraud perpetrated by the Church. This case, appropriately categorised as a scandal, dominated the media landscape for a while, and internal discussion in the Church the last few years, and has resurfaced as court cases have commenced, been appealed, or finished. As court cases, both civil and criminal, were ongoing at the time of the research, I have confined myself to official documents from the courts, prosecutors, appellants, and government offices. This is in the interest of objectivity, as I consider media reporting and statements from the Church overwhelmingly biased and not conducive to the analysis. As a result of my experience with the Church I am well acquainted with several persons involved in the court cases, none of whom are named in this research without their express consent or through their public statements. Due to the divisive nature of this case, internally in the Diocese, I have had to negotiate a narrow middle-ground in order to not alienate participants. As a result, the following analysis may be read as downplaying the scandalous nature of this case, which is entirely unintentional. The actions of the Church, registering individuals as members without their consent, violated norms of privacy, freedom of religion, and honest reporting to official bodies.

At the crux of the disputed case are the vague formulations of the law concerning religious societies, rendering them susceptible to divergent interpretations. This case is a great example of the complexity of the role of religion in Norway. Funding is allocated per member who is either a Norwegian citizen or a resident of Norway with a valid national ID number, and 'belongs to the religious society' (Lovdata, 2017a [1981], p. §2). Compounding this is the formulation of §9 of the law concerning religious societies (Lovdata, 2017b [1969]) which states that 'The

religious society itself determines by what method enrolment is conducted'. Thus, all that was required in order to obtain funding was a person's national ID number and being officially registered as a religious society.

One of the key grievances from the Catholic Diocese of Oslo[132] is that although roughly seventy per cent of the population are members of the Church of Norway, this does not accurately represent the number of *active* members. Whereas, the Diocese of Oslo contend, they are only able to register 42.7 per cent of all Catholics in Norway (District Court of Oslo, 2017, p. 27), due to the impact of migration on their numbers[133]. In order to acquire a national ID number, the person must be resident for more than 6 months, register at a tax office, have a valid lease or contract for a property longer than 6 months, an employment contract lasting longer than 6 months, or proof of study (The Norwegian Tax Administration, 2017b). Due to temporary contracts and high mobility of migrants who might be Catholic, considerable effort is needed to maintain an updated registry. Where the Church of Norway negotiates members belonging without believing, the Church deals with members believing without belonging (according to the state).

When *Dagbladet*, a national newspaper, published a series of stories of people being registered as members of the Church without their knowledge in the autumn of 2014 (Kristiansen & Sørenes, 2014), more attention was paid to how members were registered in religious societies. One can note, for example, the change in instructions from the Ministry of Culture regarding membership lists and funding applications for religious societies. Instructions from 2014 (Ministry of Culture, 2014) make no mention of criteria for inclusion on the lists.

All subsequent instructions on the same topic specify that 'the concerned must personally, actively and expressly notify or confirm his/her membership of the religious society *in Norway* [emphasis added]' and the registrar must issue a certificate of enrolment (Ministry of Culture, 2015; 2016b; 2017b). The 2017 instruction goes even further in establishing a distinction between a member and

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[132] Hereafter "The Diocese of Oslo".

[133] See also Catholic Diocese of Oslo (2016b; 2017a) for their submissions to the lawsuit and appeal

a funding eligible member (Ministry of Culture, 2017b). This distinction ultimately becomes a discussion of religious affiliation versus legal affiliation, where the Ministry of Culture (2016a, pp. 4-7) argues that religious affiliation is largely irrelevant when considering eligibility for funding.

This distinction and interpretation was upheld by the District Court of Oslo (2017, p. 14), when passing judgement on the lawsuit between the Diocese of Oslo[134] and the Norwegian State. The County Governor of Oslo and Akershus (2015) declared, in June 2015, that the Diocese of Oslo should repay 40.5 million kroner. The decision was upheld by the Ministry of Culture (2016a), at which point the Diocese (2016b) filed a lawsuit in order to overturn the decision. The District Court ruled in favour of the Ministry of Culture, and the Diocese of Oslo (2017a) has appealed the ruling.

In addition to the lawsuit, criminal charges were brought against the Diocese of Oslo, Bishop Eidsvig of Oslo, and the accountant working for the Diocese at the time. The Regional Public Prosecutions office in Oslo dropped the charges against the Bishop, fined the Diocese, and maintained their charges against the accountant in November 2016 (Regional Public Prosecution Office in Oslo, 2016). The Diocese of Oslo challenged the fine and faced the courts along with the accountant in 2017 (Catholic Diocese of Oslo, 2016a). The accountant was acquitted, and the charges against the Diocese reduced to gross oversight, but the implications of these cases on future legislation and policy is unknown.

The above case points to the highly complex role of religion in Norwegian society. The changes in the Church of Norway described above, combined with the diversification of religious and non-religious worldviews in Norway is closely related to migration flows since the 1970s. The religious landscape in Norway has

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[134] Three bodies, The Dioceses of Oslo, Prelature of Trondheim, and the Prelature of Tromsø represent the Church in Norway, and it is necessary to distinguish between them in this case. The Prelature of Tromsø has agreed to repay roughly 5.6 million kroner without challenging the decision (Katolsk.no, 2015; Katolsk.no, 2017b; Grgic, 2015). Bishop Eidsvig of Oslo is responsible for both the Dioceses of Oslo and the Prelature of Trondheim; thus they have conducted themselves similarly.

shifted: The Church of Norway has decreased in membership, perhaps influence as well; other religious societies have flourished (Norges Offentlige Utredninger, 2013). The religious landscape has become more complex, raising questions of secularism as an ideology, when ideas and preconceptions of what religion 'is or does' come to the fore (Casanova, 2009, p. 1051). Seeing secularism as an ideology is inextricably linked to the connections between migration and religion (Leirvik, 2007; Døving, 2009), as the interconnections between different identities, religious, national, and ethnic, are involved. This brings us back to the Discursive framework presented in Chapter 2, where RED points to valorisation, SID to functionalism, and MUD to hierarchisation.

Leirvik (2007) goes as far as labelling Islam, Hinduism, Sikhism, and Buddhism as 'immigrant religions' and linking it directly with immigration from the 1970s onwards. Furthermore, he argues that in order to understand the prevalence of these religions, one should not focus on registered members but also look at others with similar ethnic and cultural origins, thereby assuming a religious affiliation, in effect stereotyping (Leirvik, 2007, pp. 24-25). Døving (2009) similarly states that *immigrant* has been equated with *Muslim*, and that religious identification has surpassed national or ethnic categories in importance. This opens up to the homogenisation of the "native" population, disregarding the heterogeneity of Christian denominations, and simultaneously enables "Othering" and marginalisation along religious lines *in addition* to ethnic or national. These facets, taken together, point to a Moral Underclass Discourse, although the overall image is naturally much more nuanced.

This section has attempted to chart the lie of the land in Norway's religious landscape and some of the notable developments in recent years. The discussion and analysis above is far from exhaustive but has attempted to demonstrate how different religions fit in to the religious landscape and influence perceptions. The Church of Norway and non-affiliation form the basis of Norwegian secularism, in the sense of being the foundations of the unreflexive 'epistemic knowledge regime' and the 'taken-for-granted normal structure' (Casanova, 2009, p. 105) in Norway.

The diversity of the religious field in Norway has broadened beyond Protestant denominations due to migration, where both Catholicism and Islam are pivotal players. Catholicism, subsumed under the Christian term, gives rise to very different responses than Islam. Both challenge the status quo through their association with migration, the Church through the issue of membership and affiliation, and Islam through visibility and perceived distance from the status quo secularism. A more exhaustive comparative analysis would be welcome but falls outwith the scope of this thesis due to time and space constraints. The following section will instead explore Catholicism in Norway in depth and offer the foundation for analysing the data in later chapters.

5.3 – The Catholic Church in Norway – putting the Universal in the Local

In this section, I wish to explore the return and growth of the Church since 1843. The goal is to establish an understanding of the institutional history of the Church in Norway, and how these structures relate to circumstances today. Fundamentally, I find it important to explore how the Church understands itself, and its presence in Norway. Key to this understanding is the notion of the Church being *in* the world, but not *of* the world (Lumen Gentium, 1964, p. 244; Hanvey, 2013). In a subsidiary, and perhaps more worldly sense, the Church is *in* Norway, but not *of* Norway. Though cryptic, it is a useful reminder when investigating the nature of the Church in Norway: even after 174 years, the Catholic Church in Norway negotiates its identity and place in Norway.

Davie (1994, p. 92) notes that the British use the term Roman Catholic to accentuate the 'foreignness of Catholicism', I would argue the term specifies *which form* of Catholicism is meant[135]. The Church is not as unitary as one would believe, and there are several Eastern rites in full communion with the Roman (Latin) Catholic rite, though I will, unless specified otherwise, only be referring to the Roman Catholic Church throughout this thesis. Unsurprisingly, once one looks closely at the Church, it becomes apparent that it is not as unitary as expected. This will be explored in a Norwegian context below, but has been done for Catholics in England by Hornsby-Smith (1984; 1991) and others (Hornsby-Smith, et al., 1982).

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[135] Interestingly, there is a religious group referring to itself as the Nordic Catholic Church, which split from the Church of Norway. One of their priests, Erik Holth, left the Nordic Catholic Church, joined the Church, and currently serves as a chaplain in Bergen. 2nd September 2017 also saw the first ordination of a Ukrainian-Greek Catholic (part of the Oriental/Eastern Catholic rite) priest in Norway. There is also a Syro-Malabar mass celebrated once a month, the priest travels from Rome.

5.3.1 – The return of the Church

Following the Reformation, the Catholic Church only covertly existed in Norway until a royal exemption was granted on the 6th March 1843 to establish a Catholic parish in Oslo (Eidsvig, 1993, p. 162). The parish intended to cater to the needs of foreign dignitaries in Oslo[136]. The nascent Catholic parish in Oslo was named in honour of St. Olav, Norway's patron saint and "Eternal King", a gesture that has since repeated itself in Trondheim and Tønsberg. A gesture which did not go unnoticed or unappreciated, as the poet Wergeland confirms the wisdom of the naming '"with consideration to our sense of nation"' (Eidsvig, 1993, p. 164).

The Catholic Church in Norway was greatly aided, through donations and support, by the Swedish Queen, Josephine of Leuchtenberg, who was a Catholic. As Norway was in a union with Sweden at the time, the endorsement of a monarch went a long way in establishing the Catholic Church as an institution, although Queen Josephine and King Oscar were never crowned in Norway, partly due to Queen Josephine being Catholic.

Bishop Fallize (served from 1887-1922) is perhaps one of the most significant figures in Catholic Church history in Norway, and he left a solid mark (Eidsvig, 2011). One of his goals was to naturalise the Catholic Church in Norway, and key to this was establishing its presence throughout the country. During his tenure, he established eight parishes: Harstad, St. Hallvard in Oslo, Porsgrunn, Kristiansand, Stavanger, Drammen, St. Olav in Trondheim, and Arendal. The most influential aspect of these establishments was the presence of religious sisters, who ran hospitals and schools (Eidsvig, 2011; Eidsvig, 1993; Hadland, 2007). Bishop Fallize also established *St. Olav*, a (still-running) publication that sought to inform Catholics in Norway on a range of issues, both religious and secular. Both priests and religious sisters were often "imported" from abroad, and gradually the Catholic Church in Norway grew.

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[136] In Sweden, the Church was re-established in 1783, with Swedish-born being permitted to be Catholic in 1860. In Denmark, foreign-born Catholics were given permission to practice their faith in 1648, and Danish-born were given this freedom in 1849 (Gran, 1986).

The naturalisation of the Catholic Church in Norway was not a passive process. Most of the work was done by the grass roots, but historical posterity attributes more weight to individuals such as Bishop Fallize. Notable Catholic apologists in Norway, and conversions, in the first half of the 20th Century were Sigrid Undset, the Nobel Laureate author, Lars Eskeland, a prominent public figure (Eidsvig, 1993, pp. 302-306), and Lars Roar Langslet, a politician and former government minister. In the latter half of the 20th Century, members of the congregation of Dominican monks in Oslo have stood on the parapets and promoted Catholicism (Skjeldal, 2014). On the national scene, these figures have gone a long way to put a face to the Church in Norway. Arguably, what is of more importance is the work laid down at the grass roots, or as reported in a periodical in 1899:

> It is indubitably, that if there is in our country a change in the views concerning Catholicism, this is not due to Catholic priests, but primarily due to the work of Catholic nurses.
>
> Eidsvig 2011, p. 26

The project of naturalising the Church was, and is, continuous. During WWII, for example, it was incumbent upon bishops and clergy to demonstrate loyalty to Norway rather than the occupying forces from their countries of birth (Eidsvig, 1993). Unlike other occupied countries that had more native-born clergy, Catholic clergy in Norway at the time were overwhelmingly Dutch or German; the Germans, on the face of it, caught between conflicting loyalties. Eidsvig (1993, pp. 326-327) argues that the understanding of Catholics, in Norway, changed following WWII: Catholics were seen less as a cult, and more as members of a global church. This image of the Church as international and global is considerably reinforced as the demography of the Church changes from the 1970s and onwards, largely due to migration.

The opening of the Church gained momentum with The Second Vatican Council, the incremental democratisation of the Church at parish and diocesan levels, and the growth of the Church in Norway from the 1970s and onwards. Due to the infrastructure of the Church at the time of Vatican II, three bishops represented

around 6000 Catholics, the ability to process and build on the works of Vatican II in the parishes is apparent in most parish histories. Unfortunately, it is beyond the scope of this thesis to explore the minutiae of Vatican IIs impact on Catholics in Norway, but it is fruitful to understand what Vatican II was and entailed for the Church. Suffice to say, there was a massive discursive shift, which at least on the surface moved towards a Redistributive Discourse.

Vatican II was where the Church sought to reshape its image and portray 'itself as a world Church and acted as such' (Pesch, 2014, p. 325). Liturgies were translated into vernacular languages, the priest celebrates the Mass facing the congregation[137], and active participation was encouraged (Pesch, 2014, pp. 100-102; Menzes, 2013). These changes altered what the congregation understood, saw, and expressed. Understood, in the sense that the entirety of the liturgy would be celebrated in a language they spoke, though it took years to translate the Missal[138]. Saw, in the sense that the orientation of the priest not only moved the priest to the other side of the altar, but also occasionally necessitated rebuilding the choir[139]. Expressed, in the sense that the laity were recognised as active participants in the liturgy rather than consumers.

It is difficult to estimate what effect these changes had on the laity in Norway, and it has so far not been explored, such as Hornsby-Smith did with English Catholics (1991). Hence, we cannot decisively establish whether the changes following Vatican II were seen in a positive or negative light, or even if they were paid much attention in Norway.

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[137] The orientation of the celebrant is normally (following Vatican II) *Versus Populum* (facing the congregation), but masses are occasionally celebrated *Ad Orientem* (To the East, where the celebrant faces the same direction as the congregation).

[138] The first official Norwegian Missal was completed in 1982, based on the 1975 *Editio Typica altera* (Tande, 2002). In other words, thirteen years after the 1969 *Missale Romanum*, and seven years after the lightly revised *Editio Typica altera*.

[139] Choir, in the architecural sense, is where the clergy are seated, and the altar and tabernacle are placed.

5.3.2 – Growth of the Church – Shepherd's delight or warning?

Leaving aside broader strokes of history, it is worthwhile to explore some statistics concerning the Church. Firstly, Figure 31 shows us Catholics as a percentage of the population in Norway. Never a large part of the population in Norway, yet the growth over time is notable[140], and appears to increase in line with migration patterns explored in the previous chapter.

Comparatively speaking, the Catholics as a percentage of the population in Norway is roughly comparable to Muslims. Thus, the two religious groups offer fruitful bases for comparison and contrasting experiences of "Othering" and integration processes. Catholics stand out in their share of Christians outside the Church of Norway, where Catholics have gone from representing one in five to representing two in five of Christians outside the Church of Norway. The Church is four times larger than the next denomination, Pentecostals (SSB, 2016d).

Figure 31 - Catholics as percentage of population (SSB, 2016c; Tande, 1993; SSB, 2016d)[141]

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[140] The dip in 2015 is due to the registration-case discussed in section 5.2.
[141] SSBs registration of membership in religious organisations does not extend further back, hence the limited comparison in the figure.

As for the composition of the Catholic population, I find it most useful initially to first differentiate between laypersons, religious sisters, and clergy. Deconstructing the population by nationality, country of birth or ethnicity does not tell us a lot about the structures of the Church and who has the power to shape it. I return to specific demographic aspects later.

Table 9 presents these figures, and what stands out is the change in religious sisters over time and how many priests administer to the Catholic population. The number of priests and religious sisters gives us an indication of the Catholic population that visibly and explicitly worked for Catholic ideals. For example, by the 1940s, there were 23 Catholic hospitals run by religious sisters (Hadland, 2007). Considering these hospitals were spread throughout Norway, their impact on the local communities should not be underestimated.

Table 9 - Catholics, Priests and Sisters in Norway over time (Tande, 1993; Katolsk.no, 2017a)

Year	Catholics	Priests	Sisters	Catholics per Priest	Sr. as % Catholics	Number of parishes
1845	100	1		100		1
1850	100	2		50		1
1860	200	6	2	33	1.0%	3
1870	400	10	5	40	1.3%	4
1880	480	14	17	34	3.5%	6
1890	950	20	54	48	5.7%	9
1900	1969	22	124	90	6.3%	12
1910	2046	25	207	82	10.1%	13
1920	2612	23	288	114	11.0%	14
1930	2630	33	445	80	16.9%	21
1940	3000	45	560	67	18.7%	23
1950	4306	57	550	76	12.8%	23
1960	6229	52	545	120	8.7%	27
1970	9225	70	483	132	5.2%	28
1980	13961	68	369	205	2.6%	28
1990	28155	57	257	494	0.9%	30
1992	31642	66	246	479	0.8%	31
2016	147882	106	125	1395	0.1%	41

The above table only gives a cursory overview of Norway as a whole and does not capture the complexities of local communities and parishes. Per September 2017, there were three bishops[142], 108 priests, eight deacons (six permanent and two transitional), and four lay brothers. Of the 108 priests, roughly, 85 are in "full active service", i.e. have full parish responsibilities or significant chaplaincy duties or pastoral care for large groups[143].

With a registered membership of 155 332, this means there were approximately 1800 Catholics per active priest (Tande, 2017c). To give an accurate impression of the pastoral care provided by the Church, the 85 active priests are the key group to analyse. As the two transitional deacons are due to be ordained in the next 12 months, and are currently on placement in parishes, I will include them in the subsequent analysis.

The Church in the mid-20th Century was small and saturated with clergy and religious sisters. This laid a strong foundation for the Church to develop in subsequent decades. Bearing in mind the context explored in the previous chapter, it operated in a country with a strong sense of nationalism. Prior to WWII, and for a while after, there were noticeable anti-Catholic sentiments, as a Catholic and Norwegian identity were largely considered incompatible. Finally, the naturalisation of the Church benefitted from the changes brought by Vatican II, wherein the Church could develop a Norwegian vernacular expression. This allowed it to situate itself as less conflicting with other identities.

Though the Church is often described as comprised of migrants, this ignores the institutional approach wherein the Church is keenly aware of its role in Norwegian society and its need to relate to a populace and state. The 1970s presents itself as a critical juncture for the Church as well as for broader Norwegian society, as discussed in Chapter 4. Between 1972 and 1992, registered members of the

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[142] Bishop Grgic of the prelature of Tromsø, Bishop Eidsvig of the diocese of Oslo, and Bishop Emeritus Schwenzer of the diocese of Oslo.

[143] I have excluded ordained priests with predominantly monastic responsibilities or are above the retirement age (70 years). There are some priests above the retirement age that continue to have full parish responsibility; they have been counted as "active".

Catholic Church in Norway went from roughly ten thousand to over thirty thousand (see Table 9) (Eidsvig, 1993). Simultaneously, the Church is adjusting to the realities and fallout from Vatican-II.

The mobility patterns explored in the previous chapter give rise to a significant growth, as immigrants with Catholic identities migrate to Norway, often as refugees from dictatorships[144], conflicts and their aftermaths[145]. For example, Vietnamese, Chilean, and Sri Lankan[146] immigrants are well established communities in the Church in Norway. As the Norwegian state looks to its neighbours for input on immigration policy, the Church in the Nordic countries work together at the episcopal level. For more on the Nordic Bishops' Conference, see Gran (1986). Unfortunately, there has been little examination of, or written about it, since. Furthermore, their website is only available in German, pointing to the potential lack of importance or relevance, similar to Shavit and Spengler's (2017) remarks on the European Fatwa Council.

One relevant decision agreed by the Nordic Bishops' Conference, made in the late 1970s, was to *not* create parishes based on ethnicities, and instead resolve to provide pastoral care for Catholic immigrants within existing structures (Gran, 1986). This has had significant repercussions on how parishes have developed and underpinned the shared religious identity while attempting to downplay ethnic identities. The question then becomes what sort of relationship is encouraged between religious and ethnic/national identities: competition or complementarity? In later years, there has been an emphasis on valorising the diversity of ethnic identities rather than subduing them, but this is not without challenges, as explored below.

The only formal foray into immigration and integration politics was a statement, in 1998, on irregular immigrants and their conditions in the Nordic countries (Conferentia Episcopalis Scandiae, 1998). The statement emphasised the

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[144] Such as the Pinochet regime
[145] Such as the Vietnam war
[146] Predominantly Tamil

obligation Catholics have to help their neighbours, even irregular immigrants, and unless the state provided for the immigrants the result would be alternative systems that risk undermining current systems. The statement corresponds significantly to a Redistributive Discourse, emphasising multiple factors involved in facilitating inequality, and simultaneously emphasising the equality of identities and individual worth. This also fits neatly into Bendixsen's (2018) analysis, mentioned in the previous chapter, of the relationship between the welfare state and humanitarian exceptionalism.

The demographic factors have forced a certain degree of introspection for Norwegian-born Catholics. While Catholics in Norway have grappled with what is understood by "Norwegian Catholic" for years[147], I argue that the idea of a "Norwegian Catholic" is seen in light of these changes wrought in the mid-20th Century. Furthermore, the idea of a "Norwegian Catholic" is more a symptom of internal affairs in the Catholic Church in Norway, most prominently the growth in the 1970s and onwards.

Despite the decision to avoid ethnicity-based parishes, a Vietnamese Pastoral care centre was established in 1980 (Gran, 1986), drawing attention to the particular within the universality of the Church. As other equally valid expressions of Catholicism become more prevalent, it challenges the hegemony of the taken-for-granted Norwegian expression. As demands for pastoral care diversify, it moves from a general to a specific form. Providing specialised pastoral care for Vietnamese-born begets the question of what, if any, specialised pastoral care Norwegian-born desire. As this distinction was not salient previously, the "Norwegian Catholic" was synonymous with a general form and therefore enjoyed a hegemonic position.

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[147] I have encountered this discussion repeatedly, and no firm conclusion is ever reached. See Siarkiewicz-Bivand (2017), Bivand (2012), Erdal (2016a), and Helskog (2011)

The bishops, by virtue of their position, contribute to shaping this hegemony. Bishops are appointed through a complicated process that does not exclude nationality or ethnicity as a factor, but it is nigh impossible to ascertain to what extent it influenced the choice. What can be gauged is how Catholics in the country see the appointment. Bishop Gran (1964-1983) was Norwegian-born and can be seen as a further extension of the amalgamation of a Catholic and Norwegian identity, one which Grans predecessor, Bishop Mangers, expressed joy at (Eidsvig, 1993, p. 394). Bishop Gran also featured regularly in the media and wrote regularly about Vatican II and the Bishops Synods in the Diocesan magazine, *St. Olav*. Thus, the face of the Church communicated a Norwegian connection that strengthened the Norwegian pastoral care as the dominant, general form. This is subsequently used to justify arguments that the Church has *become* a migrant church (Hovdelien, 2016), implying it *had become* Norwegian.

Gran's successor, Bishop Schwenzer (1983-2005) oversaw the Diocese of Oslo as Catholics went from representing 0.34 per cent to 1 per cent of Norway's population. In line with the larger demographic changes in Norwegian society, this also affected the composition of Church membership. The largest group continued to be the Norwegian-born Catholics, with 25 per cent of Catholics born in Norway in 1992. Other significant groups were the Polish-born, Vietnamese-born, Chilean-born, and Philippine-born, each accounting for just under ten per cent of the Catholic population. In other words, the Church was already negotiating a plethora of potential national and ethnic identities, in addition to various religious expressions and pastoral care issues.

It has been Bishop Eidsvig (2005-current) who has served as bishop as the Church has doubled in size and Norwegian-born no longer constitute a hegemonic group and has had the greatest challenges in terms of pastoral care. Not only have the Polish-born grown to become the single largest group, there have been significant changes to the previously straightforward classification of Norwegian-born: those born in Norway are automatically counted in this group. In other words, the

Norwegian-born group includes a generation of young Catholics negotiating a range of identities, subject to endogamous and exogamous marriage practices[148].

Bishops make decisions on pastoral care based on factors such as these, and the result is a population of clergy, who look to address those needs. A key aspect of understanding pastoral care is not assuming a pastoral carer, priest or religious brother/sister, as capable of providing pastoral care *only* for their group. Priests provide pastoral care for all Catholics within their parish or chaplaincy irrespective of country of birth. Hence, one can distinguish between a general form of pastoral care and a specific form: A Catholic might attend mass in Norwegian but go to confession in French. The specificity of pastoral care is contingent upon language, tradition, culture, or spirituality.

In order to provide pastoral care, it therefore becomes necessary for a bishop to expand the pool of priests available: from priests capable of celebrating a Tridentine Mass[149] to priests familiar with the Polish tradition of Święconka[150]. Pastoral care has to consider local contexts, and a priest is capable of accommodating a range of specific pastoral demands even though the priest is not familiar with either the language, tradition, culture, or spirituality. If the nearest Polish priest is thousands of miles away, a parishioner can attempt to explain to the local priest what Święconka is and what they want the priest to do. As such, the below analysis of the clergy only serves as an indication of the overall range of training, experience, and languages the Church is capable of providing pastoral care in through their priests.

There are 17 different countries of birth for the 87 active clergy. Nearly two-fifths were born in Poland, a fifth born in Norway, and 15 per cent born in Vietnam. Of those ordained in Norway, 27 in all, two-fifths were born in Vietnam and three-fifths born in Norway. This is notable, as although the Vietnamese-born

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[148] Extending not only to ethnic or national identities, but also religious identities and mixed marriages between a Catholic and non-Catholic partner.
[149] Pre-Vatican II Mass in Latin celebrated from 1570-1962. Still celebrated, but not commonly.
[150] Blessing a basket of food at Easter

represented 7 per cent of Catholics in 1992 and had five priests capable of providing national pastoral care, this percentage has decreased to 3 per cent in 2017 yet they have fifteen priests providing national pastoral care (Vietnamese Pastoral Care Centre, 2017). This reinforces Gran's (1986) claims of the success of the pastoral care centre, but contrasts with the previous refusal to facilitate ethnic parishes. It raises interesting questions of "what if" the Church had done the opposite; how it would have changed the nature of the Church in Norway.

This can be compared to Filipino-born priests, three per cent of the active clergy, while Filipino-born Catholics make up seven per cent of the Catholic population in 2017. Without a specific pastoral care plan, added to what we know about this population based on the demographics from the previous chapter, it raises questions of whether the primary cause/reason for immigration matters, in addition to forms of religiosity: does it matter that the Vietnamese-born were predominantly refugees, the Philippine-born came through family reunification, and the recent Polish-born arrivals are labour immigrants?

The Polish clergy also demonstrate changing conditions in the Church[151]: two-thirds of them arrived after Poland's EU accession. With the growing demand from Lithuanian-born Catholics, there are now two Lithuanian-born priests. Another notable detail are clergy from the African continent[152]: all three have taken up positions in Norway the last two years.

The provision of pastoral care for Catholics comes in many forms and responds to the demands of the parishioners. Hence, the changing composition of the clergy can be seen in connection with the changing make-up of the Catholic population in Norway. The increasing diversity of the clergy, not only in terms of country of birth but also in experience, training, and age, raises a slew of questions that all

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[151] There is a lot of fluctuation in this group; therefore, the total number of active Polish-born priests in Norway is subject to a degree of uncertainty. These numbers represent Polish-born priests *still* active in Norway and who were active at the given point in time.

[152] One priest from DR Congo (arrived November 2016, responsible for French-speaking Catholics); one priest from Nigeria (arrived July 2015, responsible for English-speaking African Catholics); and a transitional deacon from Kenya but ordained in Norway.

point to a shift in the understanding of *how* one is Catholic in Norway today. Cruz (2016, p. 44) points to the intensification of 'Catholicism as a global religion with transnational dimensions', something which is clearly visible within the Church in Norway (Erdal, 2016b).

An important caveat is that although the Church might offer specific forms of pastoral care, this is complicated by geography and access. Not all groups have access to specific pastoral care within their parish, and although priests travel around to mitigate this, there is no guarantee that Catholics will have access to a language-specific pastoral care. There is also the issue of the *quality* of the pastoral care, which is dependent upon the relationship between the clergy and the laity.

Integration processes apply equally to new priests in a parish as it does new parishioners, albeit with different power dynamics. Priests in Norway, on average, serve a parish between 5-7 years, and will move between 3-5 times[153]. The dynamics of clergy allocation is an important, but it is beyond the scope of this thesis to explore it in detail beyond its relevance to integration processes.

Figure 32 is a map of all Catholic churches in the Nordic countries, demonstrating how the distribution of parishes can point to the possibility of the Church, as an institution, having an impact on local integration processes, and where they might have an impact. The map and attached statistics (Table 10), underline how important context is for answering the research questions. Despite historical and cultural similarities between the Nordic countries, they have vastly different premises for accessing parts of their respective populations. The distribution of parishes can also point to differences between the Nordic countries in terms of urbanisation or episcopal decisions of parish establishment.

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[153] Subject to how long they serve in Norway, and if they are incardinated in a Norwegian diocese or prelature.

Sweden	Norway	Denmark	Iceland	Finland
113 053 (1.12%)	155 332 (3.11%)	47 673 (0.82%)	12 901 (3.8%)	14 447 (0.26%)

Table 10 - Catholic populations in the Nordic countries as of 2017 (percentage of total population)

Figure 32 - Catholic Churches in the Nordic countries[154]

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[154] Created by the author by adding markers on a base map, by going through the individual countries' diocesan websites and finding addresses for each parish.

5.3.3 – 'Unity within complex diversity'

Turning from the shepherds to the flock, the next paragraphs explore the composition of the *registered* Catholics along language, country of birth, and age. For nearly three decades, Fr. Claes Tande has presented estimates of the Catholics in Norway and the Diocese of Oslo[155], by their country of birth and language group[156], relying on internal numbers, statistics from the Norwegian Statistics Office (SSB), and the National Registry. After the digitalisation of the internal membership registries in 2005, the statistics report only known Catholics with a national ID number and for whom the Church receives funding.

This leads to a certain discrepancy in the data as recently arrived migrants do not necessarily register for a national ID number, but use a temporary D-number instead[157], as mentioned in the previous section. Table 11 and table 12 are a collation of these estimates. Due to the issues with registration in the period 2011-2015, I have not included estimates from those years. Another issue is that it is difficult to track how the population changes. For example, between May 2018 and October 2018, there were 2000 new registrations, but 1000 de-registrations due to emigration (Tande, 2018). In other words, it is essential to keep in mind the overarching demographic factors explored in the previous chapter with regards to duration of residency.

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[155] The Prelature of Mid-Norway and the Prelature of Northern-Norway are not included in the statistics compiled by Tande for 2006, but the Diocese of Oslo accounts for 90 per cent of the Catholic population.
[156] For the Church in Norway, language group is occasionally more relevant due to pastoral care
[157] D-numbers are intended for migrants working six months or less in Norway (The Norwegian Tax Administration, 2017a)

Table 11 - Membership of the Church by language (Tande, 1993; 2006; 2008; 2010; 2017a)

Language/ language group[158]	1992 (estimated)	2006 (Oslo)	2008	2010	2017	% of Catholic population in 2017
Spanish-speaking	6700	4123	4976	5387	7590	5%
English-speaking	3500	2220	2945	3254	3947	3%
German-Speaking	3400	856	1187	1286	1381	1%
French-Speaking	2650	741	943	1028	1414	1%
Portuguese-Speaking	1200	696	875	992	1583	1%
Other	9950	9232	11603	12858	20466	13%
Norwegian	12000	19584	23862	26616	36188	23%
Polish	4200	3247	7302	12024	60689	39%
Lithuanian		126	226	340	18158	12%
Vietnamese	3200	3226	3587	3674	3916	3%
Total	**46800**	**44051**	**57506**	**67459**	**155332**	

Using country of birth as a proxy for primary language, Table 11 demonstrates how different groups have grown over time. A necessary caveat is that the table does not consider bilingualism and does not allow us to discern when people might be fluent in multiple languages. In other words, although there seems to be a discrepancy between 15 priests offering pastoral care for 3916 Vietnamese-speakers, there is no way to identify Norwegian-born who have Vietnamese-born parents and have Vietnamese as a primary language for pastoral care needs. Furthermore, the languages above are not the only ones the Church offers pastoral care in; they also offer specific pastoral care for Burmese, Tamil, Hungarian, and Slovakian Catholics (subsumed under the *Other* category).

Contrasting language group with country of birth minimises the risks overly homogenising those groups. In order to nuance the above discussion, Table 12 presents the (as of 2017) largest groups by country of birth. The listed countries represent almost 90 per cent of Catholics in Norway, with the remainder contained in *other*. What stands out is the change between 1992 and 2017, where most of the groups have steadily decreased as a share of the Catholic population. Polish-born have gone from 9 per cent in 1992 to 39 per cent in 2017. Lithuanian-born went from a negligible population in 1992, 2006, 2008, and 2010 to comprising 12

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[158] Language-groups represent persons born where the language is the official (*de jure*) or *de facto* language. Where it is impossible to ascertain what language would be spoken, multiple languages are used, or the numbers are relatively small, it has been categorised as *Other*.

per cent of the population in 2017. Norwegian-born and Filipino-born have displayed a similar trend of growing in 2006 and 2008 to shrinking as an overall share in 2017. The *other* category has decreased considerably in its share of the Catholic population but represented 169 countries in 1992 (145 of which numbered less than 100 persons) and represents a range of 188 different countries in 2017 (148 of which numbered less than 100 persons).

Table 12 - Catholics by Country of Birth (Tande, 1993; 2006; 2008; 2010; 2017a)

Country of birth	1992	% in 1992	2006	% in 2006	2008	% in 2008	2010	% in 2010	2017	% in 2017
Poland	4200	9%	3247	7%	7302	13%	12024	18%	60689	39%
Norway	12000	26%	19584	44%	23863	41%	26616	39%	36188	23%
Lithuania		0%	126	0%	226	0%	340	1%	18158	12%
Philippines	3200	7%	4066	9%	5474	10%	6141	9%	10881	7%
Vietnam	3200	7%	3226	7%	3587	6%	3674	5%	3916	3%
Chile	4400	9%	2394	5%	2744	5%	2868	4%	3181	2%
Sri Lanka	1200	3%	1229	3%	1394	2%	1437	2%	1512	1%
Eritrea			194	0%	260	0%	348	1%	1215	1%
Germany	2700	6%	715	2%	1022	2%	1122	2%	1186	1%
Spain	1000	2%	478	1%	543	1%	583	1%	1076	1%
Other	14900	32%	8792	20%	11091	19%	12306	18%	17330	11%
Total	**46800**		**44051**		**57506**		**67459**		**155332**	

The composition of the Catholic population in terms of age adds another layer to the above statistics. In 2016, almost a fifth of registered members in the Church were below the age of 15 (Ministry of Culture, 2017c, pp. 220-221), and the average age of Catholics is 35 (Catholic Diocese of Oslo, 2017c). If we contrast country of birth with age, we can make some pertinent observations. Firstly, Figure 33 shows how the Norwegian-born population ceases to be a dominant share of the Catholic population from age 10. By age 26, the Polish-born Catholics overtake the Norwegian-born until age 69. For Lithuanian-born, a more recent development in demographic changes, these intersections occur at age 29 and 53.

If we contrast country of birth and age as a share of the total Catholic population (Figure 34), we get a different picture. Between the ages of 31 and 59, the Norwegian born represent less of each age category than the other four countries. In other words, it is inconceivable that the younger Norwegian-born population is homogeneous. This points to the importance of Catholic youth work in integration processes, which is explored in the next chapter.

Figure 33 – Country of birth as percentage of age (Catholic Diocese of Oslo, 2017e)

Figure 34 - Country of birth and age as share of the total Catholic population (Catholic Diocese of Oslo, 2017c)

Without comprehensive data on factors such as endogenous and exogenous marriage, the true complexity of the Norwegian-born group will remain, from a statistical perspective, a mystery. Identity is more complicated than simply country of birth, and there is not enough data to statistically explore the Norwegian-born group. Catholic children (born outwith or within Norway) are likely to grow up bilingual (or trilingual in some cases) and with complex attachments to family, Church, school, extra-curricular activities, etc. More of this will be explored in the section on Catholic youth work.

As explored in the previous chapters, there are distinct patterns to labour, refuge, family reunification, and education. With significant parts of the Catholic population immigrating from countries where labour forms a dominant reason for emigration, it makes sense that the Caritas heavily emphasises helping in areas relating to work. Similarly, the dominance of Philippine women amongst Au pairs and family reunification, and their presence in the Church, in part explains Caritas' recent focus on a specialised Au Pair centre. In other words, there are compelling reasons to explore the influence of the Church and religion beyond the institution of the Church itself, and look to closely related organisations, as will be done in the next chapter. With regards to the Church itself, the assumption that specific pastoral care for different languages or groups will fade away as later generations are Norwegian-born is overly simplistic. It ignores the connections between culture, language, and religion that persist over time (Hervieu-Léger, 2000).

A caveat is that these figures only indicate national or diocesan level changes, and it is beyond the scope of this thesis to explore the impact of these changes at every parish. I will explore this in relation to Bodø and St. Eystein in the next chapter. Adding geographic factors and seeing them in context of wider societal factors such as labour markets, can offer more detailed analyses of the different groups. It can also be argued that knowing cause of migration would facilitate further analyses, but this level of detail does not exist within Church records and attempting to aggregate the data from other material is indicative at best.

Furthermore, the above tables and analysis tells us of registered members, not the actual number of Catholics in Norway: not all registered members will be practicing Catholics, and there might be practicing Catholics who are not registered. It is fair to assume the discrepancies in current statistics are minor, due to the recent scrutiny of memberships, as pointed out earlier in this chapter.

Whereas this thesis is concerned with how these structures fit into integration processes, the above discussion relates mostly to the provision of pastoral care. This is because it is important to understand what has shaped Catholic lives, migrant or not, and how these individuals have shaped the institutions and organisations in which they take part. Undoubtedly, the Church will continue to change in response to events the last decades, but this thesis is not concerned with what will change but with what was in place when these events occurred. How do we understand integration processes in light of the above discussion?

Erdal (2016b) describes the nature of the Church in Norway as consisting of 'migrancy, transnationalism and diversity' (p. 261) and looking for 'unity within complex diversity' (p. 264). As such, integration in the Church does not adhere to the notions of demographic superiority one might see in other settings (Erdal, 2016b). Yet, the idea of a religious institution contributing to integration processes situates it in a wider societal context; hence, we can differentiate between tiers of the integration processes: that do not operate independently of each other, as will be demonstrated in later chapters.

5.4 – Conclusions

This chapter has attempted to outline the broader religious landscape in Norway and situating the Church in it. The Church of Norway enjoys a privileged position, as evidenced by the current funding policy, despite the process of disaffiliation where it is increasingly common for the public to not affiliate with any religion. I also briefly discussed how Christian denominations, such as Catholicism, are treated preferentially in the intersections of religion and migration, where for example Islam is seen as more alien.

The Church has changed significantly over the last half century, both centrally and at its peripheries. By highlighting the institutional history of the Church and the privileging certain groups within the Church, we can understand some of the relationships of power. As the Church goes through significant changes from the 1970s and onwards, our understanding of the Church is nuanced by exploring the shifts in demographics, amongst priests and clergy as well as the laity. It allows us to create a framework for understanding the Church's activities in terms of general and specific pastoral care.

The general pastoral care used to be oriented towards Norwegian-born Catholics. As new groups have arrived and requested specific pastoral care, the understanding of general pastoral care has also had to change. Additionally, the increasing complexity of the Norwegian-born group blurs the lines of what might be specific pastoral care for Norwegian-born, as languages, cultures, spiritualties, and religiosities within this group diversify. Ultimately, the above analyses will allow us to better understand what context extra-ecclesial organisations operate in, as will be explored in the next chapter.

Chapter 6 – Integration processes in faith-based settings

6.1 – Introduction

This chapter aims to explore the question of what role faith-based organisations play in integration processes. Drawing on the fieldwork pertaining to the Catholic organisational field, with both Ecclesial structures and Faith-based organisations, I explore how integration processes are shaped and viewed by the different actors. In addition to the discursive model presented in Chapter 2, some additional concepts that become relevant here are institutional isomorphism (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) and Hirschmann's (2004) three Rs of migrant facilitation: Refuge, Resources, and Respectability. What this chapter will show is that the overall integration process is a multi-directional, bumpy, marbled process subject to a multitude of influences at both institutional, group, and individual levels.

This chapter first examines the Church specifically, at the diocesan and parochial[159] level. Offering insight into the relationship between national and local understandings of and approaches to integration processes. Secondly, I explore faith-based organisations such as Caritas Norway and NUK. The Catholic aspect of these organisations ties them to a hierarchical religious power structure that coexists with the, nominally democratic and egalitarian, secular power. The overlap in highly structured organisational fields that 'provide a context in which individual [...] deal rationally with uncertainty and constraint' (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) is a site of negotiation, where the Catholic and non-Catholic organisational fields are occasionally complementary or competing. The remit and mission of these faith-based organisations are slightly different, hence it becomes interesting to explore how changes to their target groups influences the organisation, and how they cope with changing patterns of mobility and diversity.

Whereas the state apparatus comprise distinct levels such as central government, county administrations, local authorities, and citizens; the Catholic Church has its

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[159] In this context, I am use *parochial* as referring to issues relating to the parish, rather than its alternative meaning of having a limited or narrow outlook or scope.

dioceses and bishops[160], vicar generals[161] and episcopal vicars[162], parishes and their pastors[163], and its members. Some of these tiers overlap, whereas others compete, and the relationship between the secular and religious, and within the faith-based organisations is an important element of understanding religious influences on integration processes. Cruz' (2016) typology of Catholicism, Ecclesiological (institutional), Liturgical (ritual), and Missiological (pastoral), encapsulates not only the different tiers, but also indicates the multifaceted nature of the Catholic organisational field. Within each of these fields (ecclesiological, liturgical, and missiological), the different tiers and actors have varying levels of power and responsibility.

With a clear, principal separation between the Catholic Church and Norwegian state, these two bodies have differing goals for integration processes: The Church seeks, first and foremost, integration into its theocratic, ecclesial structure and system, whereas the state is chiefly concerned with integration into *its* structures and values. This is not to say the two are mutually exclusive, but nor are they necessarily mutually inclusive. NUK and Caritas Norway, as Catholic faith-based organisations, inhabit an intermediary space between these two and a key question becomes where they cohere or compete with state secular or religious conceptions of diversity and integration processes.

This ties into the discussion of whether religion is a bridge or barrier to integration into a more extensive society than that of the parochial. Religious participation can be a veneer for cultural reproduction of 'ethnic values' (Connor, 2008, pp. 245-246) and a major fault within a society (Kivisto, 2014), or it can mitigate psychological trauma caused by migration events (Connor, 2012) and be 'places where a common vocabulary and shared set of expectations about rights and responsibilities are worked out' (Levitt, 2004, p. 15). Common to both views is

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[160] Imbued with 'all ordinary, proper, and immediate power which is required for the exercise of his pastoral function' (Code of Canon Law 381 §1) and 'represents his diocese in all its juridic affairs' (Code of Canon Law 393)

[161] 'who is to assist [the bishop] in the governance of the whole diocese' (Code of Canon Law 475 §1)

[162] 'has [power] only offer [sic] the specific part of the territory or the type of affairs or the faithful of a specific rite for which he was appointed' (Code of Canon Law 479 §2)

[163] 'In all juridic affairs the pastor represents the parish […]' (Code of Canon Law 532)

that religion has taken centre stage 'in public discussion about difference, diversity and its "resolution" or management' (Beaman, 2017). What becomes apparent through the data is that NUK and the Church are more oriented towards a Redintegrative discourse, whereas Caritas Norway leans towards a Social Integrationist discourse, which appears to be a result of its mission and goals and distance from the Church.

6.2 – Diocesan processes

Underpinning this section is research question 2a: How does the nature of the Catholic Church affect its response to and perception of integration processes? Despite the transnational, supranational, international characteristics of the Church, it is primarily its relationship to a national context which is of interest here. The justification for this acquiescence to methodological nationalism is, in part, due to a recognition of relationships of power within both the Church and the state, one claiming a monopoly on salvation, the other a monopoly on legitimate use of force. Thus, both institutions wield a degree of power in defining the shape and goal of integration processes, but also the consequences of deviation from this: exclusion from a community[164]. Within each of these communities, there are a plurality of identities, which can either be seen as complementary or conflicting. Ultimately, the Church and the State attempt to manage identities, and this section focuses on how the Church manages these processes.

As described in Chapter 5, the Norwegian state actively supports religious societies and confessions, creating a de facto relationship with the Church where there is an implied trade-off between state funding and the Church encouraging a positive relationship with the State, from an institutional and individual perspective. Within the centralized state, it then becomes essential to identify and categorise peoples' religious affiliations, or non-affiliation, and the responsibility for reporting membership rests on the Church. This is a form of integration that can be understood as *coercive isomorphism* (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983), whereby the secular powers through formal, and informal means, pressure the Church to adapt to its systems. This relationship has been in place, at least, from the return of the Church in the 1840s, resulting in a mutual adaptation to certain parameters that have changed over time. Most importantly, the Church is, to a large extent, subject to the law and jurisdiction of the State. This contributes to establishing a Norwegian form of Catholicism, where the relationship to the State is different than in, for example, Poland, and therefore contributes to shaping its members.

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[164] At least on a formal level, which is not to suggest exclusion does not take place in other tiers or aspects.

There are several ecclesial elements that demonstrate signs of institutional isomorphism, and that can be understood as a form of integration. Firstly, we have the membership fraud case, as presented in Chapter 5, wherein there is a negotiation on the interpretation of divergent rules of membership. The repercussions of this case are that the laws, regulations, and policy become updated, clarified, and applied across all religious institutions. Within Hirschmann's (2004) framework, this relates to the aspects of both *Resources* and *Respectability*, as defined in Chapter 2.

As diocesan access to funding allows them to offer services to their members, and by *not* "playing by the rules", the dioceses impact on the respectability of the members and associated organisations. One informant[165] mentioned how NUK, despite being a separate legal entity subject to controls and checks by a different government department, was explicitly selected for an extra check on its activities and membership registries for which it receives funding. This was later confirmed by the government body writing in its report: 'NUK was this year [2015] selected for control for the fiscal year 2013 due to the media reporting on membership in the Catholic Church' (Fordelingsutvalget, 2016, p. 99). Here we see a direct link between the Church and one of its associated organisations, and how the actions of one may influence the other.

Hirschmann's framework ties into the discursive framework, where a strong emphasis on *resources* at the expense of *respectability,* and vice versa, can be seen as indicative of the discursive models. Herein we find a question: what is more influential on integration processes where the Church plays a part, resources or respectability? Resources can contribute to strengthening services offered by the Church, and concomitantly strengthening the positive impact on migrants' emotional well-being (Connor, 2012); thereby facilitating positive integration processes. Respectability, on the other hand, contains that crucial negotiation of shared values, rights, and responsibilities (Levitt, 2004). Whereas the former can

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[165] Due to concerns of anonymity, I am unable to offer further details on the informant.

lead to a de-emphasis of identity and emphasis on functions, the latter is predicated on discussions of values and identities.

One of the notable outcomes of the membership-case has been a professionalisation of the Diocese of Oslo, and an expansion of the role of the layperson within the administration of the diocese. Throughout my fieldwork, when talking about this case with participants and informants, this professionalisation was seen as both positive and negative. On the one hand, we have a clear instance of coercive isomorphism, causing the Diocese of Oslo to adopt a managerial structure more akin to what is culturally expected (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) in Norway. The culmination of this process is a revised organisational structure that 'is adapted to the current situation for the diocese, the regulations and governmental requirements' (Catholic Diocese of Oslo, 2018).

As an aspect of integration processes, it is arguable whether this shift is voluntary or if it should be seen as a form of assimilation wherein the Church is denied its institutional uniqueness as a transnational, religious institution. Furthermore, though this professionalisation requires new positions to be filled, the tendency towards privileging a Norwegian education and work experience, mentioned in Chapter 4, has also carried over into the diocese. Ultimately, issues around membership caused by increased migration prompted these shifts, but the involvement of migrants, or even lay Catholics in general, has been incredibly limited. The changing structure is likely to have an impact further down the line, and it is too early to tell what that impact will be. For now, this process, prompted by migration, has not been focused on integration of migrants, but rather on structural change.

Another significant part of the ecclesial structure is the priest, who encapsulates the Ecclesial, Liturgical, and Missiological, who moves between the diocesan and pastoral level, and, arguably, is a linchpin for integration processes involving the Church. Their remit is to manage and care for a locally situated community, putting them in a position to shape local and individual integration processes.

Priests neatly encapsulate Hirschmann's three Rs: they control parochial *resources*, provide *refuge* through their liturgical and pastoral work, and can legitimise groups, activities, and individuals and thereby provide *respectability*.

The Diocese of Oslo's professionalisation is a move to mitigate clerical shortcomings by establishing a safety net in matters pertaining to parochial administration. As discussed in Chapter 5, on the nature of clerical "stock" in Norway, with one-fifth of priests born in Norway, many priests will be, initially, unfamiliar with a Norwegian context. We can, keeping in mind the idea of coercive isomorphism, see this as a measure to integrate priests into a "Norwegian" way of doing things, at least as it pertains to administrative and bureaucratic practices.

Yet, with the emphasis on providing pastoral care for specific language groups or nationalities, participants often voiced the concern of "parallel parishes". By ensuring that parishes have access to pastoral care in their own language or form, through either chaplains or itinerant priests, it may undermine integrative efforts to build whole, cohesive communities. For example, with many voicing concerns about Polish priests and Polish parallel parishes, exemplified by conflicts in St. Svithun in Stavanger (Friestad, 2015)[166].

There is also the contrast between official assessments of the Vietnamese Pastoral Care Centre, as mentioned in the previous chapter Bishop Gran offered a positive assessment, whereas Thomas Sivertsen remarked that in the 1980s '*Vietnamese had a reputation of keeping to themselves*'. As is shown below, when discussing NUK, the Vietnamese are now often fundamental to parishes they belong to. What we can infer from this is that, given time, targeted pastoral care may appear fragmenting to begin with, but the autonomy and respect afforded identities and religiosities has an overall positive impact long-term as seen from an institutional perspective. In other words, taking components of the redintegrative discourse,

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[166] The chaplain, who came to Norway following Poland's EU accession (due to anonymity, I am omitting further details), was accused of embezzlement and avoiding customs payments on imported church equipment. The case is currently in the courts. The situation highlighted rifts between the parish as a whole and the Polish part of the parish.

equality of identities and valorisation of diversity, has had a positive result for the Church.

An effective method of demonstrating one's interest in respecting and caring for members, is by acquiring or training individuals to cater to their interests. In the case of the Church, this is most effectively done through the clergy. Through the mechanisms of clerical training, relocation, and acquisition, the bishop can use priests as resources, material and symbolic. Clerical training is a lengthy process, not just in terms of formal training, but also in a long-term formative process in encouraging vocation amongst potential priests. Out of the 124 clergy in Norway, 45 were ordained in Norway. 12 of these are Vietnamese-born, and all bar one were ordained from the 1990s onwards. Despite the prevalence of other groups, the remainder of the priests ordained in Norway are Norwegian born, except for Fr. Kuspys (Ukrainian-born) who serves Catholics of the Eastern Rite and Fr. Opata (Kenyan-born). Encouraging and generating vocations is an informal measurement of the Church's success in its reconstitution and integration processes, as Thomas remarks with regards to the lack of vocations in Bodø:

> *[…] I don't think we've had a single vocation to become a nun from Bodø, nor priestly vocations. In that sense, you can say [the monastery] has failed.*

Relocation allows the bishop to adjust to changing circumstances by decreasing/increasing the presence of clergy in a parish, or by moving priests with particular skills and qualifications around. Relocation can also occur either to resolve a conflict, by removing an ineffective priest, or to make better use of the priest in a different position. It can also be established as a standard practice in order to reduce speculation about causes of relocation when they occur, a popular criticism of the Church being that they conceal criminal activity by priests by relocating them. In many cases, there is only one priest in a parish, so relocation is often a big change for the parish, and for most parishes the addition of a second priest can have an immense impact. In other words, the Church is able to adapt

to relatively sudden changes in demographics faster, by relocating priests, then secular organisations that would have to utilise different methods of acquiring resources, such as through government (local, regional, or national) funding or through voluntary organisations.

The final aspect, clerical acquisition, directly relates to migration. In order to provide pastoral care, the Church needs both a) enough priests and b) the right kind of priests. By the second point, I am referring to priests with the language skills to communicate with members of the laity. This plays into how the Church sees itself as influencing integration processes:

> The Catholic Church in Norway has members from more than 120 nations, and we are effectively a large integration arena with considerable social value that extends beyond our religious functions. We offer, amongst other things, a not inconsiderable language and cultural training.
>
> Catholic Diocese of Oslo (2017b, p. 5)

The critical question here is how and for whom does the Church offer 'language and cultural training'? From an organisational perspective, the Church can only compel clergy as resources, and if two-thirds of the clergy, the ones not educated and ordained in Norway, require language and cultural training themselves, *who* is providing the training? Finally, *why* are they providing it? Rather, where integration-oriented activities were established and developed, it was often under the auspices of Caritas, with Per Wenneberg, at Caritas Norway, emphasising that Caritas recruits volunteers predominantly from the parishes: '*we have ads out on frivillig.no[167] [...] That's one part, but most of it comes through the parishes.*'

In other words, as far as integration processes are concerned, the explicit measures are dependent upon the relationship between the Church and Caritas. In some cases, there is a close, working relationship, but Per highlighted one of the difficulties for Caritas, clerical relocation:

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[167] A website for individuals seeking to volunteer for activities and organisations requiring volunteers.

> *It's a bit of both, some parishes are good, some are bad, not because they're bad, but because priests are changed out, or they're there a relatively short period of time and half a year later there's a new priest who doesn't know what I spoke to the previous one about. I'm not complaining about this personally, but it's not the easiest group to deal with when you have to call a small parish up in Hammerfest, or whatever, and it's half a year since the last call, it's difficult to get a hold of the person, or there's a new priest since last time. So that's a bit challenging, I have to admit.*

Though the Church might be 'a large integration arena', the nature of integration processes within the different areas of that arena vary immensely. As argued above, the structural elements privilege non-migrants (clergy or laypersons), and integration is rarely a conscious goal in and of itself. At the structural level, the focus is consistently on the continuity of Catholicism and its position in Norway, rather than shaping integration processes into a wider Norwegian society. Instead, the Church draws on its relationship to Caritas to effectively claim credit for their work through a shared Catholic identity.

The Church's goal is primarily to integrate migrants into the ecclesial structure, which will allow the Church to make stronger claims vis-a-vis other organisations and institutions. At the diocesan level, the Church looks to acquire and distribute *resources* (through its clergy) and *respectability*, and more intuitively provides *refuge*. The contention here relates to a point made by Hirschmann:

> By *creating* a parallel set of social institutions, immigrants were able to find avenues for social advancement, leadership, community service, and respect [that may not] have been possible in the broader community.
>
> Hirschmann (2004, p. 1229) (emphasis added)

The question of who is creating or shaping these institutions is important, and it is questionable to what extent immigrants in the Church, at a diocesan level, are creating or shaping the social institutions, whether as clergy or laity. There is also the issue of whether or not immigrants *choose* the institutions of the Church due

to a lack of alternatives in the broader community, or because of their identity. In other words, the Church has to open up its structures and institutions to immigrants because they cannot legitimately exclude those who prioritize a Catholic identity. The question then becomes how they view other identities, such as ethnicity or nationality: valorised, de-emphasized, or vilified? If the conflict in Stavanger is anything to go by, there is a risk of, in this case a Polish group, experiencing vilification (Friestad, 2015). This has the potential to spread to other parishes in the same way practices valorising a diversity of identities are.

Concluding this section, the diocesan elements of the Church seem susceptible to coercive isomorphism, thereby gradually mimicking other organisations and institutions. Although this can be seen as a form of structural integration of an *"immigrant Church"*, the process also results in establishing a powerful core within the Church that privileges non-migrants, thereby replicating boundaries to integration. The concepts *resources, refuge*, and *respectability* are useful in framing priorities at the institutional level, where there is tension between *resources* and *respectability*.

Through this top-down perspective, there is reason to doubt the Church's skill and ability in manoeuvring integration processes. Its most effective resource, from a diocesan perspective, is the clergy, but this is governed by issues of pastoral care, not integration processes. Where the two overlap, there is potential for shaping integration processes, but it is always secondary to the pursuit of a well-functioning parish. Where there does appear to be significant potential is in how the Church perceives and responds to other identities. At the diocesan level there is tendency towards a redintegrative discourse that celebrates a plurality of identities *that share a Catholic identity*. This is seen most clearly in news pieces published by the Diocese both online and in their print magazine[168].

There is also a significant link between the Church and Caritas, where the latter's explicit focus on functional integration activities (language and employability

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[168] For example, their series on "My Parish" (Katolsk.no, 2018b) or interviews with individuals that draws attention to diversity within the Catholic population in Norway (St. Olav, 2018)

training) allows the Church to portray itself as a resource-provider in integration processes. It is at this intersection we can see how integration-oriented activities can be limited by diocesan processes of clerical relocation, and the importance of the clergy in facilitating integration processes. This is becoming increasingly recognised within the Church, with it being a focus of its own day-long workshop in 2018, facilitated by a migration and integration scholar (Katolsk.no, 2018a).

6.3 – Parochial processes

Two experiences during my fieldwork provide a quick introduction into parochial integration processes. Both events demonstrate what an initial encounter might look like. In the first, it is my own experience of moving back to Norway after six years abroad. An unfamiliar setting, ignorant of small details such as an old parishioner's claim to a seat, an unfamiliar dialect (in a language I rarely spoke) that put me on my back foot in conversations, and general trepidation around the whole idea of conducting a year-long fieldwork resulting in a visceral sense of insecurity. Mass offered some familiarity, despite the different hymns and psalms, and the insecurity abated slightly until I went to the *kirkekaffe*, where parishioners meet in the parish hall for refreshments and socialising. The size of the congregation was so small that a newcomer such as myself was immediately obvious, and a parishioner immediately greeted me and introduced me.

The latter experience was towards the end of the fieldwork. In this case, it was a young Philippine woman who had recently arrived in Bodø. Unlike when I arrived, there was no *kirkekaffe* that day, and the opportunity to meet other parishioners came down to chance. Having recently married a Bodøværing[169], the husband was aware of a Philippine community centred around the parish and they had shown up hoping to meet Philippine parishioners who could help her feel at home in Bodø.

These two cases demonstrate how a range of identities and circumstances play into integration processes. In order to understand the parochial, local processes at work, this section explores how St. Eystein has developed over time and how it is part of integration processes in the city of Bodø. Whereas the previous section discussed diocesan aspects and its reliance on the clergy, the parochial aspects are inextricably tied to the relationship between the clergy and parishioners. Importantly, parishioners exhibit a much stronger influence on the sense of community and integration processes and demonstrates the limitations and possibilities of clergy as influencers on integration processes.

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[169] The demonym for someone from Bodø

Entering the empty church, I looked around and decided to sit down in the back rows (they were slightly elevated) so I could get a decent view of the church and its parishioners once Mass started. After ten, maybe fifteen, minutes, the next person showed up, an elderly woman. She walked up to where I was sitting and spoke to me, first in a Norwegian, her accent had an unmistakable Irish twang tinted by North Norwegian, but seeing my confused look, she switched to English with a clear Irish accent: you're in my seat. Quickly, and with a sense of embarrassment, shifting to the next seat over, I apologised profusely, in English. She gave me an odd look, asked where I was from, to which I replied that I had just moved to Bodø from Glasgow. Our conversation was curtailed by the arrival of several other parishioners, all of whom seemed to know the old lady next to me. Mass began, and I took part as I normally would, although I did not recognise the hymns and psalms. After the mass, I followed several parishioners down into the cellar, where the church coffee was, and after hesitantly wandering about for a few minutes; I was grabbed hold of by a Filipino woman, Delilah, and invited to sit with her and her husband, Anthony. From there, I was introduced to most of the parishioners and the priest.

Fieldwork notes, August 2015

Following a Sunday mass, I stood outside speaking to Fr. Marek. There was no church coffee due to the parish hall being hired out for an event; hence, most parishioners had gone straight home after mass. Suddenly, Delilah came up to us, with a young Filipino woman in tow. "Fr. Marek! She's new! We need to make sure she's registered". Following shortly behind was Anthony, Delilah's husband, and another man, a Bodøværing, who turned out to be the young woman's husband. Delilah and the young woman switched between English and Tagalog, and then translated to Norwegian, with supplementary comments being made by the husband. They were recently married, on the Philippines, and the young woman had just moved to Norway and they had sought out the parish to find other Filipinos to help her acclimatise. To sort out a registration form, we went to Fr. Marek's house, and put on a pot of coffee. While Delilah, Fr. Marek, and the young woman looked at the form, Anthony, the husband, and I spoke. Asking the husband how he knew of the parish and the Filipino community there, he spoke of growing up in the area and was familiar with the nuns and parish from his childhood. Although he wasn't Catholic, his wife was, and he wanted her to feel at home and figured the Church could help that.

Fieldwork notes, May 2016

6.3.1 – 'the price you pay for growing' – Changes in a northern parish

Several Catholic parishes in Norway have recorded histories, in which a common theme is perseverance. This speaks to challenges Catholics, both clergy and laity, faced, and continue to face, when attempting to practice their faith. Whereas many parishes were established by sending priests and religious sisters to the town or city, or by responding to an existing demand from resident Catholics, St. Eystein was founded by two families being convinced or ordered, depending on who you talk to and view episcopal authority, to move to Bodø. Prefect Wember convinced Harald and Dagny Sivertsen[170] (who had converted to Catholicism during WWII (Katolsk.no, 1997)) to move from Tromsø, and the Jensen family to move from Lofoten, to Bodø (Tromsø Prelature, 2007).

Fr. Walter Huijbregts administered to its 24 parishioners the first year (Eidsvig, 1993) before being moved to Tromsø. Fr. Theodor Rusche, born in Germany, but served as a priest in Norway from 1931 until his death, with a brief absence due to WWII[171], was sent to take over and had a 20-year residency in Bodø (1952-1972). This part of the parish history appears to be a stable period of consolidation, where numbers remained low and consistent (see Table 13), described by Thomas: *50s, 60s, 70s, we were very few; we were four-five families. And, we stuck together [...].* With the arrival of a congregation of Dominican nuns from the Stone Congregation in Staffordshire in 1953 (Tromsø Prelature, 2007; St. Eystein menighet, 2001), the parish was strengthened considerably, if not numerically, then institutionally.

Year	1951	1965	1976	1986	1990	1991	1992	1993	2002	2003	2008	2010	2017
Members	24	21	97	112	123	216	223	284	518	305	365	426	936

Table 13 - St. Eystein 1951-2017[172] (Eidsvig, 1993; Ingebrigtsen, 2001; Müller, 2001; Tande, 1993; 2008; 2010; 2017b)

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[170] Thomas Sivertsen, whom I interviewed, is one of their children
[171] He was arrested by the German Sicherheitsdienst (Security Service) in 1942, and did not return to Norway until 1948 (Katolsk.no, 2006)
[172] The time blocs are uneven due to the range of sources I had to consult to find the figures.

From an integration perspective, the parish would be in the process of staking its claim to space in Bodø. Kivisto (2014, p. 158) points to claims-making as an aspect of multiculturalism, which is responded to by 'dominant society and its political system'. The emphasis here should be on the detail that:

> Indeed, not all of the types of claims necessarily require state action, but rather can often be adequately addressed within the framework of civic society [...]. This is certainly true of accommodation and inclusion.
>
> Kivisto (2014, p. 163)

This can be seen in Thomas recollection that Catholics in Bodø were simultaneously exotic, represented by the nuns, and "nothing special", when regarding parishioners:

> *I was born 1958, to Catholic parents, christened and raised in St. Eystein parish... and apart from 16-17 months in Oslo, I've spent my entire life here [...] What characterised [the early years of the parish]? I think it was exotic, the nuns walking around this little town, with their black and white habits, there was something exotic about it. What should I say... what characterised it? I wouldn't say anything characterised it, quite simply, we blended in and there was nothing special about us.*

Lending to this exoticism, during a public lecture, self-professed local historian Knut Eide recalled seeing a nun skiing and he supposedly exclaimed, "Look, a ghost on skis!" Thomas' sister, Maria-Louise, notes in her chapter, in the book written to celebrate the parish's 50th anniversary, on growing up as a Catholic in the 50s and 60s something similar:

> Outside it could happen that we were subjected to some mild mannered teasing from children of some of the city's Protestants [...] It was worse at school, not because of pupils, but because of one or the other teacher not being quite updated on what the Catholic Church actually stood for [...] As the Sisters got to know people – they got a broad contact surface – the interest for and understanding of the Catholic Church grew.
>
> Sivertsen (2001, pp. 36-37)

As argued above, clergy can have a significant impact on the formation of a parish. In as young a parish as St. Eystein, established 21st September 1951, in as small a community as Bodø, the priest and founding parishioners become integral in shaping the parish. Thomas described the priests of St. Eystein in very different terms:

> *[Fr. Rusche is] the only priest I recognise as my priest [...] He was a mix of fearsome and good-natured [...] He was a good teacher [...]. I don't know what kind, if he had a network outside the parish, I mean, there was a relatively cold front between the Catholic Church and Norwegian Church. The priest in the Lutheran cathedral, he was relatively anti-Catholic [...].*
>
> *Fr. Hartmann was very, quite, extrovert [...], but I think the big difference was that we, the parish became better known in the cityscape [...]. He was well received by the rest of the clergy[173] here in Bodø [...] Fr. Hartmann wasn't the teacher-type, he was a professor-type, he wasn't a teacher-type who did catechesis, most of that was left to the nuns.*
>
> *[...] after Fr. Hartmann died, we got, for the most part, Torbjørn Olsen, and he was here for ten years, an eager beaver. Fantastic guy for building structures and organisation [...] You can say different things about him as a person, he has his strengths and weaknesses, but a cracking priest at getting things to happen, and an enormous network as a Norwegian, so that was really a boost-period for the parish. [...]*
>
> *[Fr. Marek] is no big organizer, but he is a warm and kind person and a great priest to have [...] There are some, not many, who are hoping for another priest. Now, I've spoken to Jessica, and she says we're really lucky to have Fr. Marek, and she's met all the other priests in the region.*

In their parish history book, published in conjunction with St. Eystein's 50th anniversary, Fr. Hartmann is again credited with 'creating many new contacts outwards [...] Not until during his tenure was the Catholic Church in Bodø, in a significant manner, drawn into ecumenical work' (St. Eystein menighet, 2001, p. 76). This presents the first, clear sign of the parish, through its Ecclesial structure, accumulating *bridging* capital: '[encompassing] people across diverse social cleavages' (Putnam, 2000, p. 22). Fr. Hartmann's tenure ran from 1977-1995,

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[173] Here referring to the clergy within the Church of Norway

during which the parish tripled in size largely due to, according to Thomas, migration: *It was around then it started to arrive quite a few Poles […] and we started noticing there was a world outside our wee pond*.

With a further look at the nuns, we can draw on Hirschmann's statement that was highlighted earlier:

> By *creating* a parallel set of social institutions, immigrants were able to find avenues for social advancement, leadership, community service, and respect [that may not] have been possible in the broader community.
>
> Hirschmann (2004, p. 1229) (emphasis added)

The question of whether there were avenues for social advancement, leadership, community service, and respect available to the nuns is interesting. Even if there was, and some of the sisters worked professionally as nurses, teachers, artists, etc., they nonetheless created an important set of bridging social institutions in Bodø. These were not created in parallel to what the broader community offered, but were in fact precursors to what would later be offered through the welfare state and funding:

> *[…] before the municipality created nurseries, the nuns set up a nursery […]. They were the first to start up what we'd call youth work […]. There are still very many today in this city who have very many good memories of that. It left an impression on many of those who grew up in the 60s […]. […] they brought classical ballet […]. They had literature nights […]. [Sr. Ansgar] held art classes […].*
>
> Thomas

> *[…] these English Dominicans, who came in '53, had very little to do. Because there wasn't anything... So, they started a guest house for young women, like what they have at Katarinahjemmet, for students, but that wasn't particularly successful. […] So, a youth club was built, long before there was anything from the city council […]. […] Formally, it wasn't religious […].*
>
> Msgr. Olsen

Seen in its historical context, the successful integration of the nuns, and by extension St. Eystein, in Bodø, is closely linked to their ability to create, not a parallel institution, but an institution that filled a niche in the cityscape. They have been celebrated both with the Bodø Cultural Award in 1971 (House & Beckstrøm, 2001) and placed tenth on a list over the most significant influences on culture in Bodø over its 200 year history (Bodø 2016 & Bodø Nu, 2016, p. 67).

Clearly, the nuns were able to acquire *respectability*, but is it fair to accredit their religion with being the bridge to integration when their activities were not explicitly religious? Their religious foundations and motivations seem unquestionable, which highlights the complexity and difficulty of separating the religious and secular. This is similar to what we find with Caritas, where they take on responsibilities one normally associates with the welfare state in Norway. Importantly, the nuns shaped integration processes in Bodø through their open and inclusive activities, which extended far beyond their Catholic base.

Here we find the juxtaposition of the integration processes surrounding the Church as an institution, and those pertaining to the laity. Certainly, as individuals, the nuns took part in positive, valorising integration processes, but how did their work influence internal processes within the parish. As Thomas notes:

> *[…] I don't think we've had a single vocation to become a nun from Bodø, nor priestly vocations. In that sense, you can say [the monastery] has failed. But, I think it has enriched the parish in other ways than just vocations.*

While the nuns were able to create secular institutions that promoted their integration, their religious institution remained isolated within the Catholic field in the city. At best, then, it seems reasonable to suggest that the benefits to integration processes for the regular parishioner would be mostly due to a spill-over effect from the nuns' respectability and placement within local society.

One of the significant ways in which the parish changed, that can be associated with the change in demographics, is the transition from the English Dominican sisters from the Stone Congregation in England to the Filipino Dominican sisters of our Lady of Remedies in 2007. This shift, according to several informants in and familiar with the parish, occurred due to a couple of reasons. Firstly, due to the lack of new, younger nuns from England who could take over from the ageing nuns. Secondly, in the 80s and 90s, Filipinos came to constitute an increasingly visible part of the congregation, making the reorientation towards the Philippines natural. There are also issues related to the Catholicism of the UK and the Philippines that factor in, as vocational recruitment in the two countries differ, but this is not explored here.

Sr. Cleopatra Moreno, one of first Filipino nuns, writes that in 2001 'the Filipinos make up a considerable group of 20 per cent of our parish' (Moreno, 2001, p. 84). Thomas notes that '*The Filipinos came here either to get married or were already married on the Philippines and then came here, with Norwegian husbands who were not Catholics, so [the parish] expanded, but in an alright way*'. Msgr. Olsen, who took over after Fr. Hartmann in 1995 until 2006, also describes the Filipinos as a strong part of the congregation. Unlike parishes to the south, there has not been a strong presence of Catholic refugees from countries such as Vietnam, Chile, or Sri Lanka. This points to how state processes of refugee re-settlement can impact a parish. Similarly, it demonstrates the role of gender and reason for immigration, if we compare Thomas above remark to his comment on the Polish: *we have a considerable Polish contingency, it's mostly men though, never a good thing when it's only men*. This resonates with the migration context laid out in Chapter 4.

At this point the parish begins to be seen as consisting of multiple parts, with country of birth playing a key role, reflecting both societal and diocesan changes in demographics. It is in the 90s we see the first creation of a formal sub-group within the parish that emphasises *bonding* social capital, 'inward looking and [tending] to reinforce exclusive identities and homogeneous groups' (Putnam, 2000, p. 22), *The Filipino Community in Bodø (FCB)*. The FCB provides all three

of Hirschmann's targets: *refuge,* through its social activities, *resources,* through sharing information and networks, and *respectability,* through the formation of an organisation along Norwegian patterns of organisation with 'detailed organisational statutes, lovingly printed and lovingly acted out' (Eckstein, 1966, p. 26). The FCB provides an interesting case of the relationship between ethnicity and religiosity, as in 2011 it schismed and *The Filipino Union in Bodø* arose as a result. Speaking to a central person in FCB, she attributed part of the schism to the difference in opinion on the centrality of Catholicism in their activities[174], particularly that many activities took place in the parish hall.

The existence of the FCB was often cited as a reason for allowing Polish parishioners to organise themselves. During a discussion between a Filipino parishioner and her daughter, the daughter argued that the Polish wanting to organise their own activities was no different to what the FCB had done, whereas the mother maintained there was a difference. The difference being how the Polish activities sought to affect explicitly religious activities such as catechesis and provide a Polish language alternative. This indicates a distinction between *social* and *religious* motivations. Nor did the Polish have a formal structure, such as the FCB, contributing to some of the scepticism.

In the case of the FCB, religion is clearly secondary to the social, but the social takes place in the parish hall. Msgr. Olsen recalls how:

> *It was especially the Filipinos who stood strong back then; all the parish parties and whatever else there was, then there was a lot of Filipino food, a lot of Filipino games […]*

The coalescence and subsequent dominance of a distinctly Filipino community within the parish has influenced dynamics within the parish. While discussing youth work in the parish with a parishioner, she stressed that activities often come

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[174] Early versions of FCBs constitution put it under the jurisdiction of the Bishop of Tromsø, that one must be Catholic to be a member, and there is a reciprocal agreement that the president of FCB is automatically given a seat on the parish council (Filipino Community in Bodø, 2014).

to be dominated by the Filipino/Norwegian families and if I were to do anything with youth work in the parish, I would have to counteract their "dominance".

Philippine-born Catholics make up 12.2 per cent of St. Eystein, which compared to the national figure makes them slightly over-represented (see Table 14). Polish-born parishioners, on the other hand, comprise 34.9 per cent of the parish. Despite this, there was no comparable level of Polish activity visible in the parish. Asking Fr. Marek about this, he pointed to different traditions and expectations parishioners have of the Church, such as the *kirkekaffe*[175], a post-Mass socialisation, being alien to Polish Catholics. It is worth noting that in parishes that provide specific pastoral care, groups seem to organise themselves more readily. The interesting question then becomes at what point should a parish develop a hands-on approach to managing diversity rather than enforcing unity.

Country of Birth	2008	2010	2012	2017	National (2017)
Norway	44	39.9	26.4	25.4	23
Poland	12	13.4	25.8	34.9	39
Philippines	15	19.7	16.5	12.2	7
Lithuania	<3	<2	6.7	12	12
Germany	4	4.2	2.5	1.3	1

Table 14 - Country of birth (as percentage of parish) in St. Eystein (Tande, 2008; 2010; 2012; Catholic Diocese of Oslo, 2017c)

As the membership Polish-born, as share of membership between 2010 and 2017, more than doubles, St. Eystein is likely to experience significant changes *if* the registered Polish-born Catholics are practicing. Thomas expressed some awareness of this, as with a foreboding tone he remarked '*we have a considerable Polish contingency, it's mostly men though, never a good thing when it's only men*'.

This brings us back to the importance of understandings of views on gender and primary reason for migration. Male-dominated, labour-oriented migration provokes a range of stereotypes, just as female-dominated, family reunification does. As the parish usually has one mass on a Sunday, in Norwegian, the

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[175] *Kirkekaffe* – Church coffee – usually takes place in the parish hall after a Mass and is done with minor variations throughout the country, and often reflects the make-up of the parish through the food that is offered.

opportunities to attend mass are constricted in ways immigrants from more Catholic countries are unfamiliar with. This reminds us to not take for granted that people practice their faith in the same way. All of these points were on display in Thomas' interview:

> *I think it's an enormous advantage that we have a Polish priest, for example, because he has, as is my impression, a good dialogue with the Poles. We've started having Polish mass as well, once a month, not sure Bishop [Grgic] is too excited about that, but… […] Even though it seems segregating, I get it, the primary goal is that people get the spiritual refill they need. That is, primarily, what the Church should do […] Fr. Marek spoke of a conversation with some Poles and asked them why they don't come to church on Sundays, and they replied "no, Father, it's too early, because on Saturdays we drink, and then it is too early to make Mass at 11am" […] That's why the Polish mass is in the evening.*

Contrary to previous decades, where the parish cultivated significant amounts of bridging capital through the priest's ecumenical work, the nuns social and cultural work, and some parishioners acting as Apologists for the Church, the current status seems oriented towards generating bonding capital within the parish. The weakness lies in that the parish has a history and habit of the priest and nuns steering the ship, whereas this is no longer the case. With regards to ecumenical work, Jessica complained that compared to a decade ago, it is difficult to convince parishioners about the importance of ecumenicalism in Bodø. Similarly, the Filipino nuns have been unable to continue the work of the English nuns, instead emphasising cultivating a Filipino diaspora. While granting the Filipino parishioners a measure of dominance within the parish, this was tied to their prevalence. As it shifts to Polish-born and Lithuanian-born, the question is how long the Filipino can retain their social capital before the parish adapts to the recently registered members.

Furthermore, without any overarching strategy from the bishop or diocesan pastoral council[176], priests and parishioners are left to their own devices.

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[176] The Prelature of Tromsø, unlike the Diocese of Oslo, does not have a Diocesan pastoral council, as Bishop Grgić never constituted one following his ordination to bishop.

Combined with the reality of clerical relocations, the risk of founder's syndrome is substantial if activities are not embedded in long-term parishioners or structures. Nor are priests necessarily qualified to formulate development strategies for parishes, as their work is predominantly of a Liturgical or Missiological nature. While providing language-specific liturgical activities or pastoral care may subtly influence individual integration processes in terms of providing *refuge*, without an overarching plan there could be negative repercussions further up the line, such as the dominance of one group. Thomas applied an apt analogy to the growth of the parish and the challenges they face: *That's the price you pay for growing up. Not all your clothes fit anymore*. Continuing that analogy, it seems St. Eystein has not quite found new clothes yet either. Although St. Eystein might have positively contributed to integration processes in the past, it seems confronted with a significant challenge in continuing that work today under vastly different circumstances. Despite this, the challenge was never perceived as a threat, only as potential for the parish to develop.

6.4 – NUK – Norwegians cooking rice and Vietnamese boiling potatoes

The demographics presented in Chapter 5 point to the potential importance of a youth organisation in shaping integration processes amongst Catholics in Norway. As such, this section addresses the relationship between the Church and NUK, from the perspective of youth work. This provides a useful comparison to the final faith-based organisation explored in this chapter, Caritas. Furthermore, NUK demonstrates how young Catholics negotiate multiple identities that cut across religious, ethnic, and national aspects. In other words, NUK offers a unique perspective on integration processes that is often less visible within parochial or diocesan processes.

As a national organisation, NUK has the potential to bring together people from all over the country, irrespective of parish or dioceses. At its inception, in 1947, the goal was to create an organisation that 'could help the young in such a way that they did not feel like, more or less, an insignificant minority' (Bruce, et al., 1997). The creation of the youth association was not a radical idea, as it fit into the pre-existing schema of Catholic associations, but as those associations disappeared, NUK has endured. It also fit into the overall organisational environment in Norway, as Eckstein notes the 'ubiquitous tendency to act through associations' (1966, p. 103) amongst young people in the 1950s and 1960s.

This can be partially attributed to its focus on local parishes, but also to the connection to the diocesan administration and its similarity to other youth organisations. NUK is an excellent example of DiMaggio and Powell's (1983) institutional isomorphism. It has consistently worked with other religious (such as Caritas) and non-religious organisations (such as LNU[177]). Occasionally, these organisations and institutions have had a significant impact on NUK, such as when NUK applied for membership in LNU and had to alter their membership structure in order to obtain membership. This structural change also put NUK in line with governmental requirements for funding (Bruce, et al., 1997). This shift rendered its structure less "Catholic".

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[177] LNU – Landsrådet for Norske Ungdomsorganisasjoner – *National Council of Norwegian Youth Associations*

As an organisation, it is highly susceptible to changing demographics within the Catholic Church, thus presenting a fascinating reflection of how migration has altered the make-up of the Church whilst simultaneously retaining its institutional character and providing a means of inculcating migrants into Norwegian organisational life. Elisabeth, who was an active member of NUK prior to becoming principal of St. Eystein School, put it: *[...] the strength is that you learn the organisational life.* A previous employee at NUK frequently repeated that NUKs strength was its skills in manoeuvring bureaucratic funding processes and facilitating local activities. This was also emphasised by one of the previous chairpersons. The chairperson drew a contrast between the formal bureaucratic format of groups and their internal activities, hence we find a juxtaposition of a "Norwegian" form and "ethnic"[178] expression. This fits into the overall discourse of respecting multiple forms of Catholicism and lowering barriers to interaction.

Keeping in mind demographic data presented in Chapter 5, particularly the size of the under-40 population, and NUKs privileged position as the official youth organisation for the Church in Norway, the current generation of members, and potential members, has the potential to be incredibly heterogeneous, as recognised by the above comments by central members. Several of NUKs chairpersons, and staff, repeated the sentiment that *despite* their low membership[179], usually hovering between 2500-3000 (NUK, 2016), they sought to represent and help *all* young Catholics.

Looking at Diocesan statistics, Catholics in NUKs targeted age range of 0-35 constitute almost 50 per cent of all Catholics. Yet, the majority of its activities are geared towards those aged 8-30, which constitutes roughly 30 per cent. Comparing its actual membership and its potential membership, NUK only accounts for 3.5 per cent (0-35) or 6.6 per cent (8-30) of its target group. Furthermore, within a migration context, NUK deals extensively with descendants

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[178] Polish, Chilean, Tamil, Vietnamese, Norwegian, French, or any form of Catholicism.
[179] Membership is based on annual subscription with three categories of membership: 0-25 years, 26-36 years, and supporting members.

of immigrants, and occasionally those who migrated to Norway at a young age. This raises questions as to the influence NUK might have on individual integration processes, but as the official youth organisation it still wields a lot of power through its representation at diocesan and parochial levels.

As parents often decide, and fund, whether a child or young adult can take part in activities organised under the auspices of NUK, the relationship between NUK and parents is crucial. This was often communicated to camp leaders as a relationship based on trust, where parents trust in NUK was inextricably tied to the experiences the child had at NUKs events. This, in addition to other factors, results in camp organisers consciously building teams that reflect the diversity of the Church both in terms of ethnicity and religiosity. My findings, based on ethnographic data collected over the course of multiple camps and events, suggest NUK draws on a redintegrative discourse that views the Church holistically and considers identities as equal.

The cross-generational aspect makes ethnic identification processes a common undertone in NUK. Thomas recalled that during the 1980s, the Vietnamese had a reputation for sticking to themselves, a reputation it would be safe to say they no longer possess. Elisabeth remarked how, during her time in NUK, she came to appreciate that '[…] *Vietnamese can also speak bergensk and trønder*[180] *[…] Later, I've noticed it when people say, "Oh, it is weird when they speak with a dialect", and I've thought, "Is that so weird?"'* This reflects the complicated relationship between ethnicity and language described in section 2.2.2.

At one of the camps, a Vietnamese leader reprimanded a participant for inappropriate reification of an immigrant/non-immigrant categorisation, telling the participant '*what do you mean she's an immigrant? She's just as much an immigrant as you are; you're Polish, are you not?*' The two participants, and the leader, were all born and raised in Norway. In conversation with a youth leader,

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[180] Dialects from Bergen and Trøndelag

she described the team at a camp she had helped organise as '*basically just Asians, and a token Norwegian*'.

References to ethnicity were commonplace, and when pressed on the issue it was presented as a shorthand for cultural differences and appearance. Ethnicity was often activated to subtly communicate extra information about either the individual or the situation. This echoes broader racializing discourses, but within the context of NUK there were few, if any, negative connotations associated with references to ethnic identities. Even when they could have been construed as such, the tone of conversation was often joking. For example, at one of the camps I attended, one of the Vietnamese leaders remarked '*don't let the Norwegian make the rice*', referring back to my failure at an earlier camp to use a rice cooker. Whereas Lynnebakke and Fangen (2011, p. 148) argue ethnic diversity 'has no natural place in today's understanding of Norwegianness', NUK directly contradicts this. Parental country of birth and appearance might play a key role in 'their self-definition in relation to the Norwegian' (Lynnebakke & Fangen, 2011, p. 148), but the broader discourse around ethnic identification processes is celebratory of diversity rather than constructing it as a threat.

An illustrative case for the relationship between ethnicity, nationality, and religion amongst members in NUK is the pilgrimage to the World Youth Days (WYD) in Kraków. The wealth of data related to WYD is impossible to convey in full within this thesis, but for the purpose of this section, I wish to examine how the diversity spoken of above played out. In particular, this data offers insight into the question of how integration processes play out in a Catholic organisation and how identifications move between ethnic, national, and religious, and how these identifications interact with categorisation processes. In Norway, these processes are framed by a Norwegian context, while during WYD the participants are faced with a different context that may challenge understandings constructed in Norway.

One of the integral parts of the pilgrimage is a component called Days in the Dioceses (DiD), where pilgrims stay with host families in parishes around the host country. In 2016, the group from NUK, tallying 172 pilgrims, were split between six parishes in the diocese of Tarnów. This diocese was chosen due to its connection to Norway: quite a few Polish priests in Norway are from the diocese of Tarnów. Staying with a host family in the town of Żabno, one of the first remarks I got from my host father was '*you [referring to the group] don't look like what I expected*'. It was obvious he was referring to the ethnic makeup of the group. At every level of the organisation, members speak of 'the Vietnamese', 'the Filipino', 'the Norwegians', 'the Poles', etc., with ease. Challenging this discourse is commonly met by the reaction of 'you know what I mean', as well as recognising that members associated with the different groups are often born and raised in Norway. As above, there are narrow conceptions of ethnic identities, but they are rarely situated in a hierarchy rendering one desirable. In these contexts, the Norwegian ethnic identity is not hegemonic, a stark contrast to external contexts.

As Baumann (1999) emphasises, the relationship between religion, ethnicity, and nationality responds to the setting and context. Excessively problematizing these categories leads to a hardening of boundaries, whereas the deep equality advocated by Beaman (2017) is indicative of soft and fluid boundaries. Under conditions of deep equality 'differences disappear […] in the moment of exchange […] as similarity is foregrounded' (Beaman, 2017, p. 12). Internally in NUK, there is overwhelming evidence to indicate soft and porous boundaries. This is not to say ethnicity is a less important identifier or marker of identity, but there is a high degree of fluidity between alternative identities such as national, ethnic, or religious, highlighting how identities are contextual and situational. The openness around ethnic identification allows NUK to provide a degree of *refuge*, where members stand free to assert their ethnic or national identities, under the auspices of an overarching Catholic identity, without risking marginalisation. This might be indicative of what Erdal (2016b, p. 261) characterises as '[…] exploring alternatives to hegemonic approaches to integration as there is no majority within which minorities might integrate'.

Yet, the idea of there being 'no majority', as Erdal suggests, obfuscates systemic power, wherein the Norwegian is privileged as a national identity. WYD Kraków was a microcosm in how different situations could lead to hardening and softening of boundaries along ethnic, national, and religious lines. As a group, NUK strongly emphasised its Norwegian-ness: gifts for host families symbolised Norway, gifts used for trading during the days in Kraków bore symbols of Norway, and a use of Norwegian flags as organizing elements for the group. During the WYD Kraków, there were several instances of NUK attempting to 'reproduce national belonging' (Mæland, 2016, p. 94), such as performances of 'Be for oss, Hellig Olav'[181]. This song is particularly important in the construction of a Norwegian Catholicity, revering St. Olav – *Rex Perpetuus Norvegiae*[182].

Whereas Mæland situates ritual reproduction amongst Catholics in Norway as reproducing non-Norwegian national belonging, creating a specific, national form of *refuge*, NUK emphasises a form of ritual expression it sees as particular to (young) Catholics in Norway and capable of expressing what being a Catholic means to them. Liturgies are ritual acts and fundamental to Catholicism, but can come to be associated with particular groups, as Mæland suggests. At central events in NUK, the tension between these elements lies in the performance of liturgies and spiritual acts: in how they are performed, choice of music, prayers, aesthetics, to orthopraxy[183]. One long-time leader at camps often advocated the position that '*participants should be familiar with the diversity of worship*', although he freely admitted he had his preferences. Participants at events were also adept at identifying the nationality or ethnicity associated with a particular form of worship, referring to a someone as '*being quite Filipino*' despite them having Vietnamese parentage.

Whereas there is fluidity in identification processes internally, identities may harden such as when staying at a school in Kraków. NUK shared the space with a Portuguese group, and tensions between the groups were often attributed to

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[181] 'Pray for us, Holy Olav'
[182] Norway's Eternal King
[183] In the sense of interpretation of the Missal and prescribed behaviour

differences between the two nations. Grievances during the trip were often expressed in terms of 'pushy French' or 'loud Italians', or when there was a Eucharistic Adoration in St. Mary's Basilica[184], with the other Nordic countries, the groups were always identified in terms of their nationality. In other words, nationality trumped possible ethnic composition, and the overarching Catholic identity did little to mitigate this hardening.

The hardening of national identities, from a governmental, zero-sum integration perspective, would be seen as indicative of successful integration, as a Norwegian identity is given a degree of primacy. The question then becomes to what extent, and for how long, can a monolithic conception of a Norwegian national identity persist. In situations, such as WYD, multiple identities are continuously and simultaneously activated, and the resultant hyphenation becomes inevitable[185]. The question then becomes how long it takes for this to bleed over into other spheres of interaction. Here, NUKs role as a *youth* organisation is fundamental, as experiences under the auspices of NUK have the potential of becoming formative, similar to how schools have tremendous potential in inculcating certain values and behaviour.

WYD Kraków gives us some data of further interest: names and naming practices. Drawing on Khosravi (2012), names can influence integration processes through allowing a person to appear '"neutral" and without a racial or ethnic tag' (Khosravi, 2012, p. 76). Names, Khosravi argues, can allow '[passing] (i.e. adopting certain aspects of identity so as to be "unmarked" […]) and covering (i.e. attempting to downplay one's […] identity)' (Khosravi, 2012, p. 78).

In the run-up to the event, I spent a lot of time in NUKs volunteer office. Prominently displayed next to the computer was a pie-chart showing the distribution of Vietnamese surnames[186]. At camps, when registering participants,

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[184] Kościół Mariacki in the main square (Rynek Główny) in Kraków
[185] One example of hyphenation is NOVIS (NOVIS, 2017), a group seeking to increase electoral participation amongst Norwegian-Vietnamese, or NAUY (NAUY, 2017), a career network for the same group.
[186] It was not specified if it pertained to Norway or in Vietnam.

it was not unusual to hear Vietnamese participants asked: *are you a Nguyen, Vu, or Pham?* The question was asked in the same tone of voice you would expect someone to ask if a Norwegian was an "Andersen", "Hansen", "Larsen", or "Olsen". This pertains to surnames, which is markedly different to given names.

By surname, roughly two-fifths of the participants on NUKs WYD pilgrimage could be identified as Vietnamese, but by given names the group is varied. Ten out of the fifty-five (by surname) Vietnamese participants had only a "western/Norwegian" first name, twenty-seven had both a Vietnamese name and "western/Norwegian" first name, whereas eighteen had only a Vietnamese first name. A particular challenge, as the above information is based on what is in their passports, is to know which name the participants prefer to use. Those with only one name were presumed to only answer to that name, but it is difficult to ascertain if this is true in all situations (such as at family-oriented events). Those with both, on the other hand, have a degree of choice in what name they use, and it would often depend upon the person they were talking to. There is no hard and fast rule, and it comes down to a whole range of factors, such as how long you have known the person, how they introduced themselves, their personal preference, or how familiar they think you are with Vietnamese, i.e. how likely you are to be able to pronounce their name accurately, and possibly whether they would prefer to be seen as more Norwegian.

The point I am attempting to make here is not that some Vietnamese are assimilating, whereas others are not, but that there is a process of change in response to a Norwegian context. Furthermore, there has been a gradual change from Thomas' perception that the Vietnamese kept to themselves, through Elisabeth's experience at camp where '*regardless of skin colour, you can speak with a dialect*', up to today, where they are, arguably, essential to the continuity of NUK. What stands out is that what is identified as a Vietnamese presence in NUK is incredibly disproportionate to their share of the Catholic population as a whole, barely 2.5 per cent with an average age of 49 (Catholic Diocese of Oslo, 2017c), demonstrating the limitation of the Church statistics in operating on a country-of-birth categorisation.

What it does indicate is that the generation of Vietnamese who arrived in the 1970s and 1980s, who have had children, pushed their children to take part in NUK. An in-depth discussion, to answer all the questions this raises, extends beyond the scope of this thesis. As it stands, there is evidence pointing towards the emphasis and efforts made towards providing specific pastoral care for Vietnamese refugees through the Vietnamese Pastoral Care Centre, as well as providing local pastoral care through Vietnamese-speaking priests. The question then becomes, if the approach taken with Vietnamese Catholics has been successful by most measurements[187], why did the Church not attempt to replicate it with other groups?

In conclusion, NUK as an organisation bears many hallmarks of being a Norwegian organisation, abiding by Norwegian institutional structures and forms, but is notably Catholic in content. This relationship, between the Norwegian and Catholic, to a certain extent privileges Norwegian performances and understandings of Catholicism. The widening understanding of Catholicism and shifting demographics of NUKs target population is exemplified by the gradual name change of the organisation: from *The Norwegian Catholic Youth Association*, to *Young Norwegian Catholic's Association*, to its current name *Norway's Catholic Youth*.

Within the central levels of the organisation, there is a distinct understanding of the organisation providing access to *resources*, through manoeuvring bureaucratic processes and redistributing funding to local groups. There is also an element of *respectability* in that the organisation purports to represent Catholic youth in Norway, this despite its relatively low membership numbers compared to its potential membership. Naturally, a gargantuan growth would alter the organisation considerably, but its consistent membership might also indicate the boundaries of its appeal and remit.

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[187] Engagement with parochial and diocesan events and processes, vocational recruitment, respectability within the Church, and a host of other informal criteria.

Although there is a focus on providing access to resources, the mission statement emphasises community. Ideally, this should be cultivated locally and reinforced by central events. Hence, NUK also seeks to provide *refuge*. Its strength lies in focusing on youth, which amongst Catholics in Norway will include a large population of youth whose parents immigrated to Norway the last few decades.

In investigating how its members behave in an international context, the World Youth Day, it shines a light on the relationship between their national identity, overwhelmingly Norwegian, ethnicity, tied to their heritage, and their religious identity[188]. In terms of how this impacts integration processes, NUK has provided, and continues to provide, a means of young Catholics (with or without a connection to migration) to shape activities that benefit from an institutional affiliation to a "Norwegian" hegemony. In addition to creating parallel associations for themselves, certain migrant groups, such as the Vietnamese, have become essential parts of pre-existing structures. An important element of this is that the organisation is a voluntary grass-roots organisation; therefore, in its current form it will continue to reflect the target demographic. Its efficacy, and continued existence, relies on remaining relevant, and if it fails in that the organisation will be rendered obsolete.

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[188] For an additional discussion on the relationship between ethnicity and religious identity amongst young Catholics, see Trotter (2013)

6.5 – Caritas – 'to not bake the same cake'

Caritas Norway began its life as Catholic Refugee Effort in 1951, became Catholic Refugee Aid in 1956, and finally turned into Caritas Norway in 1964. The initial work was to offer relief and aid in the post-WWII period, particularly for Catholics from the Czech Republic[189], Poland, and Hungary (Eidsvig, 1993). When it constituted itself as Caritas Norway in 1964, it expanded into other projects and foreign aid. For many years, Caritas Norway operated as a charity organisation with an emphasis on foreign aid projects, whereas over the last five years they have strengthened their domestic work. This domestic work bears many hallmarks of third sector welfare organisations: a non-government, non-profit organisation within an area of welfare (Brown, et al., 2002). With Norway's comprehensive, welfare system, this can include a multitude of activities. For Caritas Norway, the emphasis is mostly on employability and language training.

A fundamental element of Caritas is Catholic social teaching, as laid out in *The Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church*, hereafter simply *The Social Doctrine*. Due to its initial focus on Catholic refugees, and the structure of the Church in Norway at the time, priests often led the work. Such as Fr. Harald Taxt, who led Caritas Norway from 1964 until his death in 1981 and served as episcopal vicar for migrant pastoral care, a position now held by Msgr. Olsen. Fr. Taxt also served on the 1973 commission on immigration policy (*The Danielsen-Commission*) and was the only representative of a charitable organisation (Norges Offentlige Utredninger, 1973). The distance between official Church structures and extra-ecclesial organisations changes over time. In the case of Caritas, it was for a long time to an extent indistinguishable. For a deeper historical overview of Caritas activities, I refer to Mæland's (2016) work.

For the purpose of this thesis, I will focus on how different structures within Caritas influence integration processes today. The first observation is that there are three distinguishable Caritas-structures: parochial, subsidiary, and national. By parochial, I refer to local Caritas groups, loosely organised, and often focused on helping elderly, contributing to the welfare of the parish, and fundraising. By

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[189] Czechoslovakia at the time

subsidiary, I point to the more organised groups such as Caritas Bergen, Caritas Stavanger, Caritas Drammen, and I choose to include NUKs Caritas Committee in this category although I will not be discussing them here. The subsidiary Caritas groups are often separate legal entities, have employees or are highly structured, and provide comprehensive services in language and employability training. These are the organisations that 'make them an appropriate locus for the development of a new welfare paradigm' (Brown, et al., 2002, p. 161), which is explored in their relationship to government bodies.

The final element is Caritas Norway, which operates simultaneously within the greater Oslo region, and is responsible for national coordination. Whereas subsidiary Caritas groups might have contact with local and regional administration, Caritas Norway also has contact with governmental bodies. Furthermore, they often have the responsibility of representing Caritas in international meetings and the media. Although I have made these distinctions, I would add that they are not hard and fixed boundaries. As with the other Catholic organisations, there is a considerable amount of flow between the different levels, both in terms of information but also in terms of people. Due to limited resources, I was unfortunately not able to explore the parochial Caritas groups adequately; therefore, my focus is on the subsidiary and national level. One of the prevailing points was how they focus predominantly on the provision of *resources*, emphasising a social integrationist discourse and functional perspective on integration processes.

In the following paragraphs, I will explore how the nature and structure of Caritas has changed and influences integration processes. Firstly, how the shift was made from parochial to subsidiary, the relationship between paid versus volunteer work, and the role of key persons. Secondly, how the users of their services have changed over time, and how they have responded to those changes. This leads to the third aspect, of what services they offer. Finally, this section will conclude with a discussion of how it all ties into integration processes. What stands out is the relationships the chairmen, and it is noteworthy that they were all men, and coordinators in the subsidiary units have with local administrations, employers,

and other charities. What was often emphasised was the complementarity of their activities, the competition around funding, and the role of personal networks. The subsidiary units reflect an increased professionalisation and targeted activities with a clear integration purpose, but the question still remains of how they influence the processual nature of integration, rather than the prevalent focus on reified and clear-cut boundaries.

All the subsidiary groups transitioned from parochial groups in the space of a few years. Both Gunnar and Trond pointed out how their Caritas groups had gone from being '*a cute, small Caritas group, like a lot of parishes have*' (Gunnar) and '*informal, not a registered association*' (Trond), to registered associations with '*two million kroner in income this year*' (Gunnar) and '*completely unattached from the parish in our activities*' (Trond). Knut gave the impression that Caritas Stavanger was still in this process, emphasising that '*[…] we can, in a way, try to build up the same as they have in Bergen*'. Gunnar, who had agreed to travel to different Caritas groups to help them provide services with '*a bit higher quality*', is indicative of this shift into a professionalisation.

Interestingly, this professionalisation is occurring in parallel with the Diocesan professionalisation, and the dominance of white, adult, Norwegian males in this shift might indicate a step away from grass-roots organisation. Their services shift from being "offered by" the parish and local migrants to "offered for". There is an awareness of this, as both Oslo and Bergen are looking to facilitate self-help groups. In this sense, they echo a welfare state industry model (Brown, et al., 2002), where the emphasis on providing a service leads to vetting and training volunteers or utilising employees.

In Stavanger, they had hired someone for a 30per cent position, in Drammen they had a person paid by the hour, whereas Bergen and Caritas Norway have full-time employees. This is in addition to those working voluntarily in a full-time capacity, such as Trond and Knut. Gunnar emphasised the need for paid employees because '*you can't run these services with only volunteers, it's not possible*' – a near

verbatim echo of a reply Brown, et al., (2002, p. 170) received in their research: 'We've had volunteers in the past but without training they simply can't do the jobs like a professional would'. Key to this was expertise, and Gunnar noted that in order to '[…] *hand out information about the Norwegian labour market, you have to know it'*. The emphasis lay on being able to offer high quality instruction, which required a stability that precludes a dependence on volunteers. Furthermore, it almost automatically excludes anyone with a short residency or limited experience with the Norwegian labour market from contributing. Thereby risking constructing immigrants as passive recipients.

To contrast, in Oslo, Per added that they strongly emphasise that '*[it] is very important that we have people who work voluntarily who understand the Norwegian system and can explain it in different languages, and with a cultural context, and [these volunteers] make up the majority of our work in the info centre'*. This demonstrates a clear difference between the national and subsidiary group, where the national centre in Oslo, unlike the subsidiary groups, has the opportunity and ability to recruit migrants, or individuals with the language skills, to provide assistance for other migrants.

Common to both is a Social Integrationist understanding of integration processes, where they perpetuate the primacy of employment as fundamental to integration processes. Although they exhibit awareness of social, political, and cultural factors as important in constructions of inequality, it is rarely addressed. Naturally, here we distinguish between situations where the different approaches are called for: addressing social, political, and cultural factors is most suited to externally oriented work directed at broader society, conducted at the national level, whereas internally oriented work requires only awareness.

The rise of these chairmen comes down to their skills, experience, and time. Caritas Bergen were consistently praised for their ability to secure employment for those who came to them. Gunnar claimed that in 2015, they managed to get 131 people employed, though he did not specify what kinds of jobs: downplaying

aspects of racialised and segregated employment practices. Per also emphasised the expertise built in Bergen in this particular area. Gunnar admitted that '*[…] I have a good friend who manages a large bus company, so we funnel them through there […]*' and how his previous job helped him get people employment in the taxi business, '*[…] at least 20 asylum seekers [plus] five to ten users from here […]*'.

Similarly, Knut drew on his previous job and the network he built through that, as well as his engagement in local politics in order to '*[…] promote Caritas, and to not least have the right people pointed out […] In that way, politics has opened more doors than if you did not have connections into the political*'. Political connections was actually a weakness in Bergen and Drammen, where Gunnar reluctantly admitted '*[…] it is limited*', and Trond remarked that Drammen municipality were '*[…] negative all the time*', whereas the neighbouring municipality of Nedre Eiker were '*[…] positive towards our work*'. Thus, these individuals exemplify how access to *resources* and *respectability* amongst non-migrants, may be utilised to become a conduit for *resources* and *respectability* to be passed on to migrants.

The subsidiary groups, except NUKs group, but including Caritas Norway, have focused on two services: Norwegian language courses and employment. One of the key features focused on by several of the interviewees was the cost of the course, in the 800kr they charged for the '*equivalent course at Folkeuniversitetet[190] would have cost 5000kr*' (Per, Caritas Norway), and that the main reason for charging anything was to increase commitment amongst the participants. All the interviewees emphasised that in the division of labour amongst voluntary and charitable organisations, in their respective cities, Caritas was the go-to organisation for language courses, even the Labour and Welfare Administration (NAV) direct people to Caritas, suggesting some downloading of responsibility:

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[190] An organisation with the 'aim […] to make leisure courses and further education accessible to all adults, regardless of social background.' (Folkeuniversitetet, 2018)

We are actually at the point where many caseworkers at NAV refer people who come and ask for help to us [...]

Gunnar, Caritas Bergen

[NAV] were very interested that they could redirect job seekers to us, that here they could get Norwegian courses.

Knut, Caritas Stavanger

[...] NAV send people to us, especially those who fall outside [the system].

Trond, Caritas Drammen

We have received funding to, also from NAV, to run our info centre, so it is obvious they see the need for having us. And, in many ways, we are the bridge-builder and communicator between the system and many of... yeah, the visitors.

Per, Caritas Norway

This division of labour indicates that the different Caritas groups have been able to find a niche, albeit at the cost of a government agency abrogating responsibility for a population it should assist under the premise of a universal welfare state. The fact that it is oriented towards labour market integration is not only a response to society demanding it, but also in that, the vast majority of Catholic migrants over the last decade have been migrant labourers. Whereas Caritas historical focus was on refugees, the shift to migrant labourers reflects the shift in Church demographics. The focus on refugees also emphasises labour market integration; hence, Caritas steps in where the government bureaucracy falls short, as evidenced by the close collaboration with NAV.

An important aspect of how voluntary organisations operate in Norway appears to be a division of labour, demonstrating aspects of a market model (Brown, et al., 2002) of highly specialised organisations. It was pointed out how the voluntary and charitable organisations tend to play to their strengths:

We see no reason to, at least not for now, to develop a competing offer, when the structure is already there, and we can focus on what we have built our strength around […] it's sort of how the division of labour has developed on street level here in Oslo […] we focus on work and Norwegian. It's what we do best.

Per, Caritas Norway

[…] it has sort of turned out that when people come to different organisations, they send people looking to learn Norwegian to us.

Trond, Caritas Drammen

[The] other organisations in Bergen send all those looking for work to us […] we work with the other voluntary organisations in Bergen, slash Hordaland, and what we have tried is to, how should we say it, to not bake the same cake. We specialise a bit, so they get this help there, they get that here […] We draw on each other's expertise, if there's something we're not experts in, like law, we go to the Robin Hood House.

Gunnar, Caritas Bergen

It is [very important] for us, here at Caritas where we are few, to know where they can get more help, more help than we can provide. It is important for us to be clear on "what can we contribute with? Where can we direct them?"

Knut, Caritas Stavanger

Despite this complementarity, it was noted how it does get competitive when organisations apply for funding. This raises interesting questions of whether the competition surrounding funding and emphasis on providing specific services engenders a consumerist construction of immigrants using their services, which points to an alternative, 'consumer citizenship' rather than 'active citizenship' (Brown, et al., 2002, p. 172).

Of course, sometimes it feels a bit like a competition, and to a certain extent it is, we're competing for the same funding, right?

Per, Caritas Norway

Not least because there is of course competition when funds are handed out, and we are not the only ones doing good work.

Trond, Caritas Drammen

Competition and complementarity amongst organisations indicates a few points. Firstly, that integration processes are complex and require appropriate measures on different levels and at different times. This allows organisations to operate separately and complement each other. Secondly, because integration processes are often simplified and quantified into measurable components due to policy decisions and an emphasis on results, combined with scarce funding, there is a competition for resources.

Thirdly, religious organisations working within this field often draw on different sub-populations for support: Caritas draws on Catholic resources, the Church City Mission (Kirkens Bymisjon) draws on its connections to the Church of Norway, and Islamic centres that offer language courses appeal to their congregations. Finally, non-state organisations are flexible and adapt to the situation more readily than state actors adapt, indicated by the state's recognition that non-state organisations can complement their activities and are therefore worth funding. Alternatively, it may be a process of state retraction, austerity, or attempt to download responsibility.

In both Bergen and Oslo, the arrival of asylum seekers in the winter of 2015-2016 prompted a development of activities, where the respective Caritas groups initiated contact with and offered their services to asylum reception centres. Partly, this engagement can be traced to Per, who prior to working for Caritas Norway worked for a reception centre and a private company that ran asylum centres. In line with the political rhetoric at the time, there was a lot of focus on the two components Caritas has focused on, work and language, and Caritas Norway and Bergen were seen as capable of providing first contact in that area '*to start the [integration] process as quickly as possible*' (Per, Caritas Norway).

Importantly, this precedes any service provided once asylum seekers are granted asylum and entitled to language training and official assistance. In Bergen, they actively sought out a couple of emergency reception centres in January 2016 and offered their services but emphasised that '*our work doesn't stop when people*

get out of the emergency reception centre' (Gunnar, Caritas Bergen). Max, at Caritas Bergen, also pointed out that their engagement with one of the reception centres was due to a couple of parishioners in St. Paul who work at the reception centre, highlighting the relevance of a Catholic network.

One of Caritas' strengths, as highlighted by the interviewees, was their connection to the Church and an international organisation. This manifested itself in several ways. Generally, they referred to material benefits, such as use of offices or space, but Per also emphasised the importance of networks and legitimacy in the immigration community deriving from the Church being perceived as an immigrant community[191].

> *[…] our strength lies in being a small, flexible organisation that can more easily adapt or react faster […] Caritas is […]considerably larger organisation internationally than nationally […] it is a huge advantage, the massive Caritas network that is out there, for a relatively small organisation like Caritas [Norway] […] That the Catholic community is so obviously an immigrant community is definitely a strength in our migration and integration projects […]*
> Per, Caritas Norway

> *The classroom is partially here, and partially in 'the crypt' under St. Paul's, we use that almost every day except for Fridays […] We have had quite a few volunteers, student from St. Paul Upper Secondary […]*
> Gunnar, Caritas Bergen

> *We are lucky to have a priest who burns for Caritas, and he assists in any way he can. We are lucky there. We are fortunate enough that we are allowed to make use of these facilities, because renting space in Drammen city centre is not cheap [R: I wouldn't imagine it is] No, you won't get anything usable for less than 10-12 000kr a month […] In addition, we can use this place as we see fit.*
> Trond, Caritas Drammen

> *We have an office right around the corner, the cellar under the parsonage […] I think, here in Stavanger, we have made contact with people on Sundays, who we see in church, so… they haven't come to the office as strangers, but we have come to know them through [church]*
> Knut, Caritas Stavanger

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[191] Evidenced by arguments from Hovdelien (2016) and Mæland (2016) emphasising the Church as a "migrant church"

As pointed out at the beginning of this section, the boundaries between parochial and subsidiary Caritas groups is fluid. Despite Trond's initial statement that they were entirely detached from the parish, he later recognised the support they received in terms of facilities and moral support. The professionalisation of the subsidiary Caritas groups does not involve a complete detachment from the parochial structures but does involve Caritas growing into its own. Caritas Bergen did remark that, the relationship with their local parish was not as strong as one would hope:

What is perhaps a disappointment, if I may say it like that, is when we ask for volunteers at St. Paul's, it is difficult. If we were to limit ourselves to Catholics from St. Paul, I think we'd have struggled a bit […] No, well, the parishes, they don't help out. It's not just in Bergen, I hear this around the country, because… the connection between Caritas and the parishes is not as close as in the typically Catholic countries. So, when they have put some money in the collection basket, they feel… [R: job's over?] Yes. I am being nasty now, but it is the truth, this is our reality.

Gunnar, Caritas Bergen

A final point worth highlighting, is where the people who come to the Caritas groups are from, and why they visit Caritas. What stands out is the shift from overwhelmingly male users, to a more balanced gender distribution, and the emphasis on EU/EEA countries.

[People] who came in the good years when it was easy to get a job, but unfortunately over the course of the last couple of years [due to falling oil prices] have become unemployed […] Before, the groups from the different countries were very big, and you could speak your native tongue, it was no problem […] [On the change from male users to increasing female users] During the good times, these petroleum engineers earned well enough for the wife to stay at home with children and such, but [due to the husband's unemployment] they have taken a more active role [in finding work]
Knut, Caritas Stavanger

[The] first half year, we had perhaps 20 participants [in the language course], mainly from Eastern Europe, now we have, over the course of a year, perhaps a hundred, and there is still a prevalence of Eastern Europeans, but the weight has shifted more towards Southern Europe, Arabia, Africa, and South America [...] It has shifted [from male to female] as the weight of the participants has moved towards the Arabic and African world [...]

Trond, Caritas Drammen

Many come from European countries, they know Caritas, which is well known in their home country, in France, in Spain, Italy, Portugal, and Poland [...]. It is the last two years, especially the last year, where the women have started showing up. Some of these women are married to the men who came four years ago [but] others show up on their own [...] it has changed a lot since we opened this place.

Gunnar, Caritas Bergen

We have seen that [shift from male to female users] here as well. More gender balance, but there is still a prevalence of men. Another development is [that] it is mainly labour migrants from Catholic countries who... It was why the info centre was created in the first place, as a direct response to that. We do see another group of users, but they [labour migrants] are still the core group [...]

Per, Caritas Norway (emphasis added)

In understanding how all these elements, illustrated in the above quotes, come together, a useful concept is that of the entrepreneur, as put forth by Fredrik Barth (1963b). In particular, the concept of *niche* is appropriate, in which Caritas takes advantage of the position they occupy in relation to resources, competition, and clients (1963b, p. 9). The resources afforded to Caritas through its personal, parochial, and international connections give them a particular set of *assets* (1963b, p. 9) that allow them to occupy that niche. Though Barth (1963b) applied his concepts to a Northern Norwegian context, many of the elements are similar, allowing Caritas to assume a role as mediator and broker 'where new links are being created between local communities and central or national organisations' (Barth, 1963b, p. 16). In particular, we see the importance of the relationship to the Church, not only on the material level but also the symbolic.

Hirschmann (2004) echoes this in his classification of *resources, refuge,* and *respectability*, and Caritas operates at the national and subsidiary level as entrepreneurial purveyors of their assets, *resources*, within the integration field. As Caritas, generally speaking, seeks to intervene directly in integration processes, the question becomes whether their intervention is positive or negative. In terms of language courses, they appear to offer an attractive alternative to for-profit language schools, and their connection to the Catholic Church gives them access to a large population of migrants as both volunteers and service users.

On the other hand, facilitating employment for migrants is nominally positive, but what are the repercussions if they are only able to facilitate employment into low status, low paid labour? Caritas' assistance might provide a stepping-stone, or it can prove a dead end. There is a distinct risk that Caritas reifies work and ignores unfair structures in society that results in immigrants becoming marginalised. This appears to be a significant limitation of an overly Social Integrationist outlook.

Caritas Bergen and Caritas Norway demonstrate an awareness that there is a value inherent in connecting recently arrived migrants with settled migrants through their nascent self-help groups. Unfortunately, these were not up and running at the time of my data collection. Along with drawing on volunteers with language skills, migrant background, or relevant qualifications, Caritas highlights the viability of a positive path in integration processes. Without a comprehensive longitudinal study of those who utilise Caritas' services, it is not possible to firmly establish their impact on long-term integration processes.

6.6 – Conclusion

Drawing this chapter to a close, I have attempted to explore what the role of the Church and Catholic organisations is in integration processes (research question 2). In order to answer the questions pertaining to this, I have had to examine each organisation's shape and nature, as well as the relationship between them (research question 2.a and 2.b). From diocesan decisions around migrant pastoral care, clerical relocation, developments of a parish, to NUKs work with young Catholics, and Caritas' domestic work. One of the fundamental premises has been that these organisations are subject to institutional isomorphism, and that they gradually come to resemble similar organisations within their fields. Whether it is in terms of bureaucratic regulations, or in institutional norms and practices, all of the above organisations straddle both Norwegian and Catholic identities with undercurrents of a host of identities and practices (research question 2.a.i).

The professionalisation of the Diocese and Caritas raises the question of integration processes of migrants and their descendants: whether they become objects, someone in need of services, or whether they are allowed to be the subject, someone who shapes the processes. In terms of the Diocese and aspects of Caritas work, the former seems more apparent, whereas NUK and parochial processes are more indicative of the latter. Where NUK and St. Eystein are concerned with continuous re-constitution, thereby facilitating a processual perspective on integration, Caritas and the Diocese appear outcome-oriented.

Ultimately, what this chapter has demonstrated is that integration processes are highly complex, multi-directional, bumpy, contextual, situational, and inconsistent. This is not an absolution of responsibility, rather the opposite: if our goal is to understand and positively influence integration processes, we need a deep understanding of local, regional, and national contexts. How St. Eystein impacts integration processes in Bodø ties into how they are perceived locally, the resources they have available, and who they can reach. This chapter provides an in-depth exploration of how diversity is viewed and engaged with, and provides a valuable comparison to organisations in later chapters.

What, then, are the useful conclusions we can draw from this chapter? Firstly, that the organisations presented in this chapter are flexible. They have a capacity to respond to changing conditions rapidly. Secondly, drawing on a common religious identity, these organisations are able to draw on a wide range of resources and authority, from local to transnational. Thirdly, by being apolitical and faith-based, they pursue a mission, religious or secular, irrespective of political climate. Finally, as associational, voluntary organisations, they will reflect their membership; deviations from this, such as the Diocese professionalisation process, become obvious and can be addressed.

Chapter 7 – R is for…

7.1 – Introduction

The focus of this chapter is on cases situated towards the secular end of the religious-secular continuum. As such, the emphasis is on research question 3, questioning how secular organisations and activities in Norway influence integration processes. As explored in the previous chapter, faith-based organisations can provide migrants with refuge, respectability, and resources (Hirschmann, 2004). This chapter, on the other hand, explores these concepts in non-religious settings. Hirschmann argues religious organisations become salient primarily when refuge, resources, and respectability are 'denied in broader society' (Hirschmann, 2004, p. 1229), which implies these three R's can be found elsewhere. This chapter demonstrates how these concepts can be applied beyond Hirschmann's original examples. Furthermore, by doing so it becomes apparent that there is an interconnected element relatively unexplored by Hirschmann: Reciprocity.

The two-way processes of integration necessitate an understanding of how resources, both material and symbolic, do not only pertain to what organisations, religious or secular, can offer a migrant, but also what the migrant can offer them. Similarly, refuge, physical or psychological, relies on relationships where reciprocity offers a lens by which to understand them. Ultimately, respectability is based on relationships of recognition of dignity, skill, or position, whether it is individual, internally in a group, or external in relations with "other groups" (organisational, ethnic, national, or interest-based).

Introducing reciprocity focuses our gaze on active exchanges between individuals, and between groups, but also how these exchanges lead to commitments. Reciprocity, or the absence of it, can help us understand what impact refuge, respectability, and resources have on integration processes.

This chapter will begin with a discussion of the three R's as they appear in my data, before exploring how reciprocity fills in the gaps. I refer to Chapter 2 for a

closer examination of Hirschmann in context of the wider literature. As will be demonstrated through the empirical data, reciprocity forces us to see migrants as active agents in integration processes, rather than passive recipients of resources, respectability, or refuge. The primary objective of this chapter is thus to extend Hirschmann's analysis of the role of religion into the secular, and to improve his model by adding a fourth element that focuses the analysis on relationships.

7.2 – Resources – Material and symbolic

Reorienting our gaze from what religious organisations offer to migrants, what they seek and offer, allows us to expand our application and bring in other organisations and the rest of society. Effectively, it is not the religious nature of the organisation that is important, but their ability to offer resources, refuge, or respectability. The essential aspect is that migrants find these *somewhere*, religious and/or secular.

This section explores the construction and perception of *resources*, how migrants utilise or seek them out. This fact is paramount, as existing resources and circumstances shape how they prioritise and pursue other resources. Resources are not necessarily tangible, such as clothing or money, but can be intangible, such as language, skills, or knowledge. What this section will explore is how migrants utilise non-religious organisations or means in order to obtain resources, or in some cases, how organisations pre-empt explicit requests for resources and provide them in a 'build it and [they] will come'-manner[192].

The latter is exemplified by the activities undertaken by the Red Cross Bodø (RCB) and Refugees Welcome to Bodø (RWTB) in the autumn/winter of 2015. As organisations, they offer two interesting contrasts: RCB, a long established and powerful organisation in terms of resources and respectability it can mobilise, and RWTB, a new, acephalous movement spurred by recent events[193].

Following the arrival of between 50 and 60 asylum seekers at an emergency reception centre in Bodø, and 150 asylum seekers at Saltstraumen (just outside Bodø), RCB and RWTB began providing resources in the form of clothing, toiletries, social activities, and toys for children. RWTB characterised itself as an acephalous movement, springing from locals desire to help the asylum seekers. One of their volunteers, at a town-hall style meeting with RCB, explicitly emphasised their focus on providing tangible resources in the form of clothes, shoes, prams, or toys,

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[192] The original quote, from the 1989 *Field of Dreams* film, is 'build it and *he* will come', but is often misquoted as '[...] they will come'
[193] See for example Selim, et al. (2018) for a discussion of encounters during the "refugee crisis".

and at one point, suitcases for asylum seekers before being relocated to another reception centre. The provision of these resources was predominantly due to the state apparatus, the Norwegian Directorate of Immigration, being absent from local communities, leaving a vacuum which was subsequently filled by RCB and RWTB. The contrast between the government response and local responses is stark, where the generosity of the local response differed from the absence of resources and response, and hostile policy development of the government. The absence of a response extended down to the local government, where a common criticism during meetings was the invisibility of the city council refugee office.

During this period of my fieldwork, what stood out was the strict division of labour and separation of roles the Red Cross and RWTB promoted, similar to the division of labour mentioned by Caritas representatives in the previous chapter. This may be due to the differing natures of the organisations, where RCB is a more traditional charity while RWTB is based on an activism model (Brown, et al., 2002).

This is aptly demonstrated by RCB, which emphasises a residualist form of social amelioration that aims to fill 'gaps in provision' (Brown, et al., 2002, p. 167). Echoing a Social Integrationist Discourse, it results in a narrowing of perspective and activity where identity is de-emphasized in favour of a very narrow construction of inequality. Ultimately, it also includes a functionalist and fragmented conception of society. This was not limited to the design of the activities, but influenced the instructions towards volunteers, encouraging strictly limited involvement and engagement:

> The Red Cross should first and foremost give practical support and show compassion towards recently arrived asylum seekers. A volunteer meets asylum seekers with friendliness and respect. We are neutral and impartial, and will neither offer advice pertaining to their case nor take a position on the asylum case.
> […]
> Volunteers shall not establish personal contact with nor give personal telephone numbers to recently arrived asylum seekers while on assignment from the Red Cross.
> The volunteer only gives assistance while on duty. Assistance ceases when the mission is terminated.
>
> RCB (2015a)

It was reiterated in multiple emails and in person that material donations were to be directed at RWTB. The Red Cross, thus, saw itself as providing more intangible resources such as refuge and compassion (albeit limited), or social resources such as facilitating activities. The key point here is that the provision of resources through RWTB and RCB was not so much a result of demands from the recently arrived asylum seekers, but a mobilisation of the local population *in anticipation* of assumed needs. What the Red Cross volunteers repeatedly emphasised was offering their time *as a resource*, one they saw as more meaningful than simply donating a cash sum or clothing.

Importantly, these resources were, rather spontaneously, provided due to the absence of provision from the central state or the municipal administration. As remarked by Siv, a RCB volunteer:

> we came to work one day [...] read the news and turns out two busloads [of asylum-seekers] were arriving [...] So we turned on a dime and got hold of two fantastic activity leaders [...]. The first weekend it was difficult with respect to what we were responsible for and what we weren't [...]

Thus, several of my "shifts" at the smaller of the two emergency reception centres involved anything from playing cards with children, talking to teenagers and young adults about the Norwegian educational system, to helping the asylum seekers expand their Norwegian vocabulary. This, combined with the newness/inexperience of the volunteers, highlights the general absence of voluntary organisations in the asylum-sector, resulting in a "make it up as you go" approach.

This created a strong limitation on the activities, as they were effectively disbanded once asylum seekers were relocated, or the state asylum system stepped in in the spring of 2016[194]. Inadvertently, this residualist model of

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[194] RWTB all but disappeared apart from occasional requests for clothes, toys, equipment, and such on their Facebook group.

engagement does not engage with systemic issues and reinforces the status quo othering of migrants. By the end of my fieldwork, Red Cross Bodø had shifted its focus to providing a new activity, 'Lån en Bodøværing' – Borrow a Bodøværing, where it was up to the user, migrant labourer or asylum seeker/refugee, to seek out the resource. The activity was located in the public library, and consisted of volunteers making themselves available to migrants, primarily asylum seekers and refugees, and the migrant would "borrow" a local in the manner one would borrow a book. Engendering a consumerist view, this activity emphasises the behaviour of the migrant rather than the wider structures of society and risks reinforcing an activation/passivity framing that marginalises non-participants.

Through establishing this consumerist view, the onus is on where migrants find resources to aid in their socioeconomic mobility. Two avenues for increasing socioeconomic mobility are income and education (Pekkarinen, et al., 2017). Ager and Strang (2008) consider four "markers and means", where employment, housing, education, and health are seen as indicators in gauging integration processes. Of equal importance, is a third, more elusive way of increasing socioeconomic mobility: networking, where we instead draw on aspects of social connection. Ager and Strang (2008) identify three forms of social connection: bonds, between members of a group, bridges, between groups, and links, between individuals and structures of the state. The next paragraphs demonstrate how differing social bridges and bonds open or constrain migrants in mobilisation of resources.

A significant issue is how having immigrated influences the ability to utilize resources such as education[195]. Maximova-Mentzoni, et al. (2016) found that being foreign-born, or foreign-educated, was detrimental to applications for positions in higher education. In particular, they note that 'Norwegian-born candidates may be assessed less strictly when it comes to their profile […] if the applicant is foreign; there is an increased risk that their competency is overlooked or considered irrelevant' (Maximova-Mentzoni, et al., 2016, p. 47). This raises the

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[195] There is also how resources such as income and education shape the act of immigration, but that is beyond the scope of this discussion.

question of how the social bonds of one group impacts the social bridges of other groups. It also reminds us of the issue of categorisation, explored in Chapter 2, where an employer, or the state's, application of a category, regardless of the accuracy of the category, may limit the opportunities available to an immigrant.

The issue of deskilling migrants is particularly salient[196], as both Gunnar and Per from Caritas remark on the non-recognition of skills, marginalisation and labour market segregation of immigrants, and becomes the focus of Knut's work in Stavanger:

> *[…] we point to the jobs Norwegians don't want […] Actually, Norway should be glad these [migrant labourers] come and take the jobs us poncey Norwegians don't want anymore […] a big problem in Norway is that the public sector is all but closed for migrant labourers […]*
>
> Gunnar

> *[…] on the one hand to give a reality check, but to not take away their hope […] we don't want to, to begin with, communicate that there is a segregated labour market, or have an opinion on whether there is or isn't […] it's back to hope and a reality check […]*
>
> Per

> *[…] if they show up with papers from abroad, we […] try to find out what is the equivalent Norwegian education […] because many of those who arrive have certificates and qualifications [and] want to know "what does this mean in Norway", as an electrician, plumber, carpenter, builder […]people can come and have their competencies clarified, so Norwegian employers can see clearly what sort of qualifications they have.*
>
> Knut

This segregation is particularly salient in the service industry, as remarked by Vanessa, a half-Swedish, half-Greek bartender working in Bodø, '*if it's a restaurant or bar, in the service industry, it's almost only Swedes and foreigners*'. Here we see echoes of Guðjónsdóttir and Loftsdóttir (2017) and the desirability and preferential treatment of Nordic immigrants. Reminiscent of Gunnar's remark above, Vanessa also noted how '*there are many [Norwegians] who won't work,*

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[196] See, for example, Siar (2013) for more on deskilling of migrants.

they're a bit lazier like that, and they give their shifts away to the Swedes because they know the Swedes will take them'[197]. Within this setting, being Swedish was a resource that could be used in order to find work, but it remains an open question whether this extends to other industries.

An important element in this particular workplace was that many of the bartenders frequently socialised, and a few of them lived in the nearby hotel, which had the same owner as the bar. Thus, it offered not only socioeconomic resources, but also refuge in the literal sense of providing a roof over their heads. Furthermore, the bar provided a context for developing social bonding, internally amongst bartenders, alongside shaping, for better or worse, social bridging towards as customers. Vanessa described her colleagues and friends, that she '*met through Susan*', as '*an extra family*', but simultaneously remarking that working in a bar took its toll:

> *There has also been some negatives, because I've not been doing well after having had to work nights and evenings, and there have been incidents... where unpleasant people haven't behaved well [...] sometimes there are incidents where you don't want to be friendly, but you have to be.*

Ali, a local politician, provides a contrast to this when speaking of his and his family's, work at a restaurant in Bodø:

> *[...] I think the main reason we [the family] didn't move southwards is this place we're sitting in right now, this restaurant [...] we found work quickly here in Bodø [...] after a year or two, it became more and more. What happened was that we took over this restaurant [...] and we got to know the local population because we had these jobs [...]*

Dmitri, a Russian-born electrical engineer, offers another contrast, where the aspect of bonding, as co-workers, within the workplace is markedly different, as

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[197] For more on young Swedish migrant labourers in Norway, see Tolgensbakk (2015)

it involves simultaneously bridging as migrant/non-migrant. Additionally, there is less bridging involved in the work itself, compared to Vanessa and Ali's regular contact with the local population through their jobs.

> *[…] it wasn't easy to get to know my colleagues [in Molde] […] it was, you could say lonely, in Molde […]. No, I can't say there's much of a difference [in Bodø]. […] I tried, in the beginning, to be with people, but I found out… there, unfortunately, weren't any mutual interests […] If anyone comes and talks, it's after, we have core hours, regular hours, between 8am-4pm, and I regularly work a bit later, to about 5pm, and then, when there are fewer people at work, it's possible to speak to someone.*
>
> Dmitri

Whereas Vanessa's job increasingly became a barrier to staying in Bodø, Ali's experience resulted in stronger ties to the city, and in Dmitri's case the process in Molde was interrupted by lay-offs, requiring him to, basically, start over in Bodø but he drew on his overall experience of living in Norway. This can be seen in their reflections on living in Bodø:

> *No, not live here again, I don't think so. But to visit because I have made friends here, absolutely. I'll do that, a hundred per cent I'll do that. But I don't think there would be a future for me here […] In the end I got fed up with the job, it was only the job I got fed up with, to be honest, and maybe a bit because it feels like I don't have anything left to do here in Bodø.*
>
> Vanessa

> *[…] we see Bodø as our home, our city, and it's in the name, right? "Bo" [live] and "dø" [die], you live here, you die here. That's sort of it…*
>
> Ali

> *But now, in Bodø, I can say I'm more social […] When I came here, to Bodø, after two-three months I decided to adapt to the situation, not that I should change, but adapt to the situation […] You know, I've lived in this country for four years. I have invested a lot time, a lot of work, and a lot of other things […] I'm used to living in Norway, but it is entirely possible, later, some years from now, that I move to another country. It depends.*
>
> Dmitri

There are important differences between these three cases: their mode of entry. Vanessa's sole reason for moving to Norway, and Bodø, was employment, whereas Ali, and his family, came to Norway as political refugees, whilst Dmitri was initially in Norway for educational reasons and later stayed for work. Thus, there are significant differences in their experiences that would influence their bases for social bonding and bridging. Nonetheless, they offer contrasts on the potential of workplaces in shaping social bridging and bonding.

In all cases, youth also functioned as a resource, often in facilitating access to other resources such as language. Ali had access to primary, secondary, and tertiary education in Norway, which would increase his chances of socioeconomic mobility. In the bar, the only employees above the age of 30 were a few of the bouncers, the rest were in their 20s. While working in the bar, this often came up in conversations with the bartenders and customers, that there was 'a type' or 'mould' for who got to work in the bar. Youthfulness, gender, and appearance could be used as resources, giving those who tick the right boxes access to work, albeit only in certain industries. This was echoed in Gunnar's remark that:

> *the labour market wants young, sexy people, they don't want old people like me [...] if you're 55 years old, look a bit worn, come here and don't speak Norwegian, then the prognosis for being able to help you is poor [...] it's like making a river flow uphill [...] the entire bar and club industry is closed for that age group'*

Dmitri, a 26-year-old, used getting a driver's licence, more commonly done at a young age, as a means of practicing Norwegian:

> *[...] I think those two months I spent [taking driving lessons], there were several who noticed an improvement, and... When I was almost done with taking the licence, I met up with a friend from Brøstabotn, from Demas, where I had worked, and he remarked that my Norwegian had improved a lot in the course of the last couple of months. Yeah, in the beginning we [Dmitri and the driving instructor] only talked about driving, "take right here, left here, third exit", but then, especially on long distance driving [...] there was a lot of time to talk. To talk about different topics, and not*

> *just everyday matters, we talked about history, politics, art, film, and diverse topics, and, of course, I repeatedly asked, "what is this called in Norwegian? What is that called?"'*

Naturally, getting your driver's licence is an expense, and up to a point a privilege, that not everyone has access to. Nonetheless, Dmitri maximised the usefulness of the process. While in Bodø, I sat my driving test. During the driving lessons, I found that my driving instructor, Thor, had repeatedly been in the situation described by Dmitri. In particular, he mentioned one student who initially had a translator with her, but Thor found the presence of the translator to be a hindrance and instead used flash cards and images, gradually teaching the student the necessary vocabulary in order to pass the driving test. Although obtaining a driver's licence may be the primary goal, language training becomes a bonus.

In some instances, creative strategies such as the one above, can be seen as a result of a dearth of language training opportunities elsewhere. Dmitri initially came to Norway as a student, and although his course was meant to be taught in English, he noticed that

> *[during an exam] I noticed that the question was formulated differently. I read the English version, and understood every word, but didn't understand what the sentence, the question, meant, and then I looked at the Norwegian version and understood [what they were asking].*

While he attended the University College in Narvik, he mostly taught himself Norwegian, as '*there was no offer [of Norwegian language courses] in the beginning*'. Eventually, the College '*found some money to hire a teacher [...] and had a course, 30 hours, an introductory course*', but that was not until March, almost 8 months into the academic year. Remarking on the timing of the course, '*a bit too late*', and the quality, '*of course 30 hours isn't enough*', Dmitri mused that

I can say I used her [the language instructor], in a fashion [by] talking to her in the break, I showed up early and spoke to her, was the last to leave and walked with her to the exit.

Whereas language training, for Dmitri, required investment of resources, Ali had access to comprehensive language training through his primary and secondary education, and Vanessa had the ability to use Swedish in lieu of Norwegian. With language being incessantly mentioned as the "key" to integration, this was often constructed in a Social Integrationist perspective of facilitating employment. Yet the need for language skills extends beyond employment, such as Dmitri noting that his Norwegian was '*good enough for my employer, but I am not happy with it*'. This speaks to a more expansive view, more akin to a redintegrationist discourse that emphasises a multifactorial approach. In particular, Dmitri echoes the notion of identities being considered equal, and the ability to be able to define yourself. The overwhelming emphasis on nationality was seen as a hindrance:

It is not nationality that defines me, that describes me the most. There are other things, but while nationality is the first point in the description, then I can't say I'm integrated.
Dmitri

A final aspect I wish to explore in this section is that of temporality. Not simply because integration processes take time, but because people utilise time differently. Understanding time as a resource emphasises how it is finite and can shape decisions on integration processes and migration. Such as Vanessa, and the other bartenders, who felt it was *time to leave,* Ali and Dmitri speak of *time invested,* and certain activities and categorisations, such as asylum-seeker, are constructed as *temporary*.

There are also constraints placed on one's time, a large portion of it is spent on activities that are difficult to deprioritise, such as paid labour, family and care work, or biological needs such as sleep. For example, the hours Vanessa had to work in the bar eventually had a negative impact on her well-being, whereas

Dmitri worked a 9-5 job and could spend his evenings in pursuit of other interests. In Dmitri's case, at the time he devoted his time to improving his Norwegian, partially by volunteering for the Red Cross and through continued study:

> I pay for [the course] myself. It is entirely... my Norwegian is good enough for my employer, but I am not happy with it, and that is why I have to improve. Also, I want to continue studying, and take [more education] in Norwegian and in order to do that I have to have passed "Bergenstesten" [...]
>
> I [volunteer] for the Red Cross first and foremost to make new acquaintances, to get to know people, to do something useful, and, again, language. It is good practice.
>
> Dmitri

> [...] I have a dog, so I walk the dog, and then we, I have... [Anna, colleague from the bar], and I have gone dancing, and done other stuff so it's not just work. A bit of exercise, but it's mostly been work and then meeting friends, going to the cinema and stuff [...]
>
> All the Swedes here know each other [R: Do you get together often, do stuff together?] Yeah, a lot of them like fishing, but I don't, I prefer dancing or singing. I also like to spend time by myself when doing stuff, I like being social, but sometimes I need to be by myself and do what I want. Like reading, singing, and stuff [R: What sort of social activities are there...] To do here in Bodø? Mostly, there's going out and... We play a lot of cards, it's become a habit to come here [the bar] and play cards, different card games, then there's bowling. We often go bowling. Go to the cinema, but not as often. Mostly bowling and playing cards and going for walks. [R: Activities where you can talk?] Yes, exactly. And going to a café every once in a while. Which in Swedish we call "going for fika".
>
> Vanessa

This use of time as a resource, either in pursuit of socialisation, or in a sense refuge, or activities that can specifically benefit the migrant in a material sense, is one aspect of temporality in integration processes. Another facet is how non-migrants see their time as a resource or involvement in integration activities as challenges, such as Vigdis Larsen, a deacon in the Church of Norway:

> *[…] I think part of the reason as to why it is difficult for Norwegians to come into contact with refugees in a city, asylum seekers or whatever you want to call them, is because, in a way, it feels like you have to get really involved, you have to go to a family, have a house, clothes, food [to offer], and take them on holiday and all this, you get too involved, so you get a bit shy and anxious […] So creating a meeting space where they [Norwegians and migrants] can get in touch, for a couple of hours, and then they can go home. Here, I think, the Red Cross, as they do at Bodøsjøen [the emergency reception centre], where they had things daily from 5pm to 7pm, "here it's just a matter of showing up, you don't need to know anything, pop the kettle on, talk a bit, and it'll be fine". I think that enticed a lot of people, "Hey, I can try this out".*

Similarly, Michael, the activity manager for the RCB after-school homework group (*Leksehjelpen*), focused on defining and delimiting involvement:

> *I don't know that much, I can't help them [pupils] with homework, but I have the time to organise the activity, and find people who have the time and knowledge to be helpers.*

This returns us to the start of the section, and the guidelines for RCB volunteers at the emergency reception centres: dispassionate and delimited, and to a certain extent utilitarian and pragmatic. Furthermore, it was regularly highlighted how volunteers are often those with more time (pensioners), or those who indirectly benefit, such as students, through the attitude of '*it looks good on your CV*' (Astrid, RCB volunteer).

Finally, adding a temporal understanding helps maintain focus on the processual nature of integration. Time is, in itself, a resource that is used, preserved, and endured in a multitude of ways. It is this expenditure of time that often forms the crux of problematisation of integration issues, where there is a disjuncture in what migrants do with their time, are expected to do with their time, and are capable of doing with their time. This disjunction stems from a rhetoric of fast-tracking and accelerating integration processes, and ties into welfare and austerity discourses.

Language-learning, job orientation, and value dissemination is accelerated, and migrants, especially asylum seekers, are 'asked to make personal human contact at an inhuman speed' (Hochschild, 2012[1983], p. 126) in order to "integrate faster/better". Illustrated neatly by a statement from Kristin Ørmen Johnsen (2017), a Conservative politician: *the journey from being a refugee to an integrated taxpayer has to be as short as possible*. Here the onus is on the individual and incorporates elements of a Moral Underclass Discourse by suggesting a hierarchy (refugee<taxpayer), and implying benefits result in a welfare dependency.

The Norwegian axiom, contribution before benefaction[198], leads to a conflation of labour and education as the ends to, rather than means to, integration. A job, regardless of industry or fit with migrants' skills and qualifications, is not the goal; it should be seen as a step in the integration process, invoking an attitude that migrants should expect to be underemployed, at least until they have "Norwegian qualifications". Combined with the migration patterns explored in Chapter 2, this results in a marginalised and segregated labour market that is at substantial risk of also being racialised.

Employing Hirschmann's (2004) notion of resources has allowed us to explore migrant behaviour in an insightful manner, showing how they seek resources but also utilise resources they are in possession of in managing a day-to-day existence, an integral part of integration processes. The next section focuses on the second of Hirschmann's Rs: Refuge.

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[198] "Yte for å nyte"

7.3 – Refuge – Material and psychological

This section will explore the role and manifestation of refuge in my fieldwork. Refuge can be understood in two ways, material or psychological – 'physical safety as well as […] psychological comfort', as a means of mitigating the 'trauma of migration' which not only carries an emotional or mental strain but also physical strain. (Hirschmann, 2004, pp. 1210, 1229). This is mirrored in Ager and Strang's (2008) model of factors impacting perceptions of quality of life. The Norwegian state provided material refuge for asylum seekers in the form of covering the barest essentials of basic accommodation, and three meals a day through the emergency reception centre. The local municipality had, and took, no part in the business, while the Red Cross stepped in to provide or facilitate a social life that would provide 'psychological benefits' (Hirschmann, 2004, p. 1212).

After walking in near freezing temperatures for half an hour, in whipping winds, and the increasingly familiar darkness, I arrive at Bodøsjøen camping, one of the emergency reception centres where the Red Cross have organised an activity. Hastily thrown together, there has been little information as to what is expected of volunteers. The asylum seekers have been housed in wee cabins, grouped together either by family or age and gender. I've been told to look for a Red Cross banner, which should indicate where the activity will take place. I step into a cramped room with four small couch groups and a small table up against one wall. So far, only a couple of volunteers have arrived, and we introduce ourselves. I'm given a binder with a "contract" and instructions and told to sign. In one corner is a pile of instant waffle-mix, coffee, tea, sugar, and some drawing stuff and games.

Steadily, people show up, and I find myself reacting to how lightly they're dressed considering the weather. After a short while, the room is filled to capacity, with people chatting away, and the other two volunteers making conversation with some of the women. Strongly sweetened tea is by far more popular than coffee, and I find the provision of waffles oddly quaint.

Roughly a third of the 40 people in the room are children, who are left to their own devices. I take a deck of cards and sit down with the children, some as young as 4 years old, and a few in their early teens. Some of the older children speak a bit English, but I struggled to think of a card game that could easily be played by many people without having to explain complicated rules. I settle for a simple approach: I deal cards to everyone around the small table and put down a card, point to the young boy to my left and indicate for him to put a card down. He puts down a higher value card. The next

child puts down a lower value card, and I try to explain, through gestures, that he needs to put down a higher value card. There aren't really any clear rules, but we keep putting down cards, and occasionally I draw in the pile or give it to someone, so they'll have more cards. After ten minutes, the game seems self-sustaining and I pass my cards to a nearby kid who's only been observing so far.

I move on to talking to some of the young men, who seem to be in their twenties, and who have a fair mastery of English. The conversation moves between telling them about Norway, reassuring them that the weather does improve (eventually), and getting to know them. I find it difficult to navigate the conversation, not knowing if, or when, I overstep and ask a sensitive question, or if they expect something in particular from me. I decide to ignore that nagging feeling (insecurity?) and do my best in listening and getting to know them. All the while, I find myself worrying about their future, how their asylum application will go, how the national discourse will portray them, and how my role as a researcher is obscured by the need to simply be a compassionate human being.

Two hours have passed; they leave, and the volunteers write up a wee report, detailing how many were there, gender, age, if anything in particular happened, and tidy up.
Notes after first shift at the emergency reception centre, November 2015

The excerpt offers some insight into the provision of refuge, but circumstances made it nigh impossible to maintain contact and follow this group over time. Due to access (limited by internal RCB rules), relocation (to other reception centres), or deportation, or loss of contact once they entered the regular asylum reception system, I was unable to extend the research further once RCBs activity was terminated in February 2016. Nonetheless, the short period during which this activity ran, draws attention to the emphasis RCB, and many locals, put on friendliness and socialising, key aspects of Ager and Strang's (2008) quality of life model.

Space is also an important element of *Refuge,* whether physical or mental space, such as the communal room where the Red Cross sought to facilitate activities and provide what was often referred to as 'psychosocial first aid'. The intensity and frequency by which the Red Cross initiated activities in emergency reception centres, not just in Bodø but also around the country, can be seen as a way of providing an 'anchor as immigrants must adapt' (Hirschmann, 2004, p. 1211). This

first impression, or anchor, can be significant (Ager & Strang, 2008). For example, one of the children, a 14-year-old, from the emergency reception centre held a 17th May[199] speech, as a part of the official 17th May program, and highlighted how the Red Cross and the activities they organised the first few months were important to him and gave him a positive impression: *Bodø is pleasant with nice people.*

Refuge involves seeking *or* creating a community (or sense of) and necessitates a development of familiarity. This inculcation of *familiarity*, as a core element of refuge, covers both material and psychological aspects. Hirschmann (2004) draws on imagery such as 'drawn to' (p. 1208) or 'gravitate' (p. 1210) when speaking of familiarity and refuge. This language offers some insight, as it allows us to distinguish the migrant, who is actively moving towards (drawn to) the familiar, perhaps in the form of an organisation or informal group, and the group, whose characteristics have the potential to influence the migrant (gravitate). Yet, the language also implies underlying, unconscious processes: in the absence of formal groups or organisations, they might arise because of a coalescence of interests. Such as, the Filipino Society in Bodø, which was the result of Filipinos gradually coming together under the auspices of St. Eystein but establishing itself as separate from the parish.

Drawing further on the idea of gravity, it importantly focuses our attention on aspects of quantity, size, and space. For example, for Dmitri it was different being Russian in Narvik and Bodø, where '*people are used to Russians*' (Narvik) and '*I found, on Facebook, a Norwegian-Russian association*' (Bodø), as opposed to Molde, where '*I tried to get in touch with locals, but they were very suspicious [of me], a bit sceptical*'. Simultaneously, Dmitri '*tried to get into typically Norwegian activities, like hiking*', but the understanding of it as "typically Norwegian" emphasises its unfamiliarity as an activity: resulting in the discovery that '*it was boring to hike, all the time, by yourself*'.

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[199] Norway's national holiday, commemorating the signing of the constitution in 1814.

Contrasted with Vanessa, who immediately found some familiarity and comfort in the ubiquity of Swedes within the bar-industry: *All the Swedes know each other here*. Additionally, the bar itself offered a familiar, shared space where they could meet. Similarly, when Ali came to Norway, '*we were five-six big families from Kurdistan, who came at the same time and ended up in Narvik*'. Again, being given access to a space, the steakhouse, gave them an anchor to Bodø: *[…] I think the main reason we didn't move southwards is this space you and I are sitting in right now, this restaurant*. To a certain extent, this attraction to familiarity was also apparent in the emergency reception centre, where there were cliques structured around whether they came from Egypt, Afghanistan, or Syria.

On the opposite end, dissimilarity or unfamiliarity can increase the mental strain or 'trauma of migration' (Hirschmann, 2004, p. 1210). If one, initially, has a sense of excitement about the migration:

> *I'd never been so far north […] and I figured… Well, see something new and get to know new people*
>
> *Vanessa*

> *When I arrived [in Molde] … The first few days I just walked about and looked, and sort of "ok, lots of flowers, very green, beautiful city and nature". Yeah, but some days later I realised I didn't know anyone, at all.*
>
> *Dmitri*

The excitement is often accompanied by a shock of dissimilarity:

> *And, I panicked, and started crying, and called my parents […] but after a week I enjoyed myself.*
>
> Vanessa

> *In Molde, you know, in Molde there was a bit of… I was in shock for a long time. I moved there, and… it wasn't "one month and I'm fine". No, it took time. The first weeks or months […] I wore "Russian glasses" […] and I was quite passive.*
>
> Dmitri

A key element in both Vanessa and Dmitri's experience is that both migrated as adults, alone, and for different reasons: education (Dmitri) or work (Vanessa), but the reasons for remaining changed. Dmitri went on to obtain work, whereas Vanessa extended her stay in part due to social reasons.

Ali came to Bodø, and Norway, as a young, political refugee, with family, and represents yet another variation of how refuge manifests. While several of the Kurdish families that arrived at the same time moved southwards, Ali's family stayed and '*we went to school here, got friends here, got to know the locals […] That made it more difficult for us to leave Bodø*'. They were given refuge in both a bureaucratic sense of being granted asylum, which entitled them to certain material support, but also found it through involvement with the local community, activities directly related to socializing, and activities not directly related to socializing (Ager & Strang, 2008).

Refuge is often imbued with a sense of acuteness, particularly when linked to the asylum system and the crisis rhetoric of 2015/2016. This prompts a discussion of whether there is a hierarchy in Hirschmann's three Rs. Even if there is a hierarchy, the ranking will shift based on context. Once *Refuge* has been found, *Resources* can be obtained, and perhaps that results in finding *Respectability*. Perhaps *Respectability* facilitates easy access to *Resources*, which in turn leads to *Refuge*. Or, as Ager and Strang (2008, p. 186) put it: '[how] progress with respect to one domain supports progress with respect to another [is] poorly understood'.

Adding context, and by extension a temporal aspect, we can note how priorities shift. Vanessa, for example, experienced an acute need for *Refuge* upon arrival, but had already obtained *Resources* and *Respectability* through her position at the bar, which drastically reduced the time and effort she had to expend to find refuge. The similarities between Sweden and Norway, linguistically and culturally, rendered Bodø familiar, whilst working with peers provided an additional layer of familiarity. Due to the relative stability of her stay, and understanding of it as temporary, her priorities rarely shifted. Ultimately, a desire for more of all three

Rs led her to move back to Sweden: she was offered a job as a teacher, giving her the opportunity to obtain more respectability than working in the bar, and resources through a more stable and predictable job, but returning to the familiar refuge of her home country.

Contrasted with Dmitri's experiences, we can see how there is not only a hierarchy, but also how they overlap. Ager and Strang's (2008) emphasis on the role of housing demonstrates how *refuge* and *respectability* can be linked. While at the University College in Narvik, Dmitri was offered accommodation in an apartment building run by the Best Western Hotel. Despite offering *Refuge*, the accommodation '*compared to the worst student accommodation, it was worse in the Best Western'*. Though it was a blow to his *Respectability*, it was seen as temporary and therefore not necessarily worth the extra effort or strain involved in finding alternative accommodation in a new, unfamiliar city. Similarly, when persistently encountering challenges in attempting to socialise with colleagues, there is a lack of *Refuge* to be found:

> *It wasn't easy to get to know the colleagues [in Molde] […] There was an attempt to organise "lønningspils"[200], but we lost that one. Only three people signed up […] It was, you could say, lonely in Molde […] I can't say there's that big of a difference [in Bodø]. Lunch breaks… I tried, in the beginning, to be with people and… but I found out that, unfortunately, there weren't any shared interests […] If I didn't say keywords, buzzwords like fishing, mountain, or cabin, it became uninteresting for them [the colleagues] […] I get the impression that when you get in touch with people, they're nice, really nice, but you're kept at a distance. Consistently, and firmly. Which is why I was very surprised when you asked if I wanted to go for a pint, I was so surprised I couldn't turn down, say "no", because it doesn't happen often […] There were these colleagues who go fishing or cycling every week, I suggested going for a pint once and they went "yeah, of course, we should", and we never have […] Most Norwegians are difficult to get to know, you can say "hi", and people are friendly and helpful, but when it comes to, if we're talking friendship, I can say I don't have any Norwegian friends. None.*

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[200] Directly translated, "salary pint" – going for a pint on payday

This lack of *Refuge* granted by locals, in Narvik, Molde, and Bodø, results in a damning indictment from Dmitri: *I can say that Mission Integration is completely lost*. Which in turn offers some explanation for why he sought out the Norwegian-Russian association. This is reminiscent of Ager and Strang's (2008) distinction between 'involvement with the ethnic community' and 'involvement with the local community', and its relationship to perceived quality of life.

The lack of *Refuge* found in Molde, prompted Dmitri to consider relocating to somewhere he had friends, and when the redundancies were announced, forcing Dmitri to focus on finding *Resources*, relocation was all but guaranteed. Yet, the desire for *Refuge* was not the determining factor when relocating, a job was, hence the move to Bodø. We see the interplay between *Resources*, *Refuge*, and *Respectability* in Dmitri's everyday encounters, and also how they are weighted differently.

Having explored both *Resources* and *Refuge*, it remains to examine the final component of Hirschmann's model: *Respectability*. Having already touched on it in the latter part of the current section, the next section will break it down further and lead us into the development of a new R, *Reciprocity*.

7.4 – Respectability – Internal and external

Respectability, the final R in Hirschmann's framework, is perhaps the most intangible of the three Rs. In short, Hirschmann (2004, p. 1229) sees respectability as '[…] opportunities for status recognition and social mobility'. Earlier in the article, he notes that:

> [Immigrants] experienced upwards mobility and joined the "respectable" middle class (most of their early immigrant ancestors were probably not respectable in their countries of origin and probably not in the early years after arrival […]).
>
> Hirschmann 2004, p. 1215

Respectability, therefore, is inextricably tied to issues of class, migration, and status. Yet, it is also contingent upon recognition and acceptance. *Respectability* is also negatively linked with the prevalence of intolerance and prejudice (Hirschmann, 2004). By definition, *Respectability* is to be in possession of something worth respecting, of worth, merit, and importance. Critically, it involves a relationship between what you possess and what others recognise.

Now, we can begin to distinguish between two facets of *Respectability*, an internal or external respectability, both of which are strongly linked to individual identification processes. The internal form is tied to *Refuge*, where familiarity, and similarity, facilitates recognition and *Respectability* within an in-group. As Hirschmann (2004, p. 1210) points out, this leads to 'employment in ethnic enclave firms and social pursuits in the company [of those] with similar backgrounds.' The external form is the respect and dignity an individual expects from society, or from an out-group. A lack of the external form can drive a need for the internal form and result in 'sheltered [communities] where immigrants and their families [do] not have to endure the daily insults' (Hirschmann, 2004, p. 1222), tying it to discussions of ghettos and silos[201]. This relationship can be seen in Ali's recounting of his family history and migration:

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[201] See for example OECD (1998)

[…] another thing is how we were received by people in Bodø, who have, without a doubt, contributed to us staying here. If we hadn't been well received here, by the people of Bodø, we would not have thrived here. And, if we hadn't thrived here over a long period of time, no doubt, we would have moved away […] the population of Bodø are, generally, fantastic, very hospitable and open, right? […] Northerners, they're spontaneous, open, and very inclusive […] you have to be accepted by society, that you are different […] I didn't move to Norway because everything was so much better than in Kurdistan, I think what made my father and mother move to Norway, it wasn't welfare, I'm sure of that, because we had food, we had water, we had the essentials in Kurdistan as well. What we didn't have there, which is what every human needs and has a right to, is dignity, freedom, and belonging to a bigger environment, country, society, and people. We didn't have that […] Our language, our identity, our dignity was trampled, day by day.

Yet, recognition and acceptance do not only manifest in as drastic situations as those experienced by Ali, but also occur in mundane encounters. What Ali's experience highlights is the importance of a base level of respectability, the inherent worth of an individual and, in this case, the Kurdish. This underlies every encounter, and can appear in everyday conversations, again echoing Ager and Strang (2008).

For example, Dmitri spoke of how people spoke Norwegian to him as an indicator of their estimation of him:

[…] in Molde, there were some colleagues who didn't speak Norwegian to me, at all [R: Do you know why?] Because they thought that I, as a Russian, was too dumb to speak Norwegian, to understand the Molde-dialect […] I'd reply in Norwegian and he'd continue in English […] a couple of years ago, I was met with toddler-language […] I'm not a toddler, I have the same responsibilities as Norwegians […] but now I feel that people talk to me as they would normally speak.

Language, in the above example, forms a part of *Respectability*, where Dmitri's colleague's refusal to acknowledge Dmitri's efforts was experienced as disrespectful and insulting. Indicating a link between two factors Ager and Strang

(2008) characterise as having distinct distances from each other in impact on perceived quality of life: language and friendliness of local people. Here, language and dialect becomes tied to friendliness and experiences of *respectability*, in terms of the non-native speaker's mastery but also the native speaker's perception of and response to those language skills.

As recognition is a fundamental part of *Respectability*, communication becomes integral, which strengthens the importance of language. This even applies when one is a native speaker of a language, as dialects carry meaning. While working in the bar, I occasionally received hostile reactions to my Oslo-dialect, but once it was established as an Eastern-Oslo (traditionally working class) dialect and not the Western-Oslo (upper class) dialect, there was less hostility. Nonetheless, as a native speaker, I was automatically afforded more respect than, as Vanessa put it '*[…] Poles get to work, either in the kitchen, or with something else because they can't communicate in the same way*'.

Despite language featuring prominently in external *Respectability*, it also features in the internal form, in the same way it is related to *Refuge*: '[….] needs, which are most meaningful when packaged in a familiar *linguistic* and cultural context' (Hirschmann, 2004, pp. 1207-1208) (emphasis added). Thus, when there are languages which are closely related, such as Norwegian and Swedish, '*it's almost the same language*' (Vanessa), there is less of a gap: external *Respectability* and *Refuge* is more accessible. Although language is generally portrayed as a *Resource*, and emphasised as essential for integration, because of its function as a *Resource*, it is equally relevant for *Respectability*.

Language also features in other situations, such as recognition or translation of skills, qualifications, and education. This was encountered in the previous chapter, where an essential aspect of Caritas' work was aiding in this translation process, in addition to their language classes.

As with *Resources* and *Refuge*, age is also a factor in *Respectability*. Hirschmann (2004, p. 1209) argues that migrants can obtain *Respectability* by 'joining one of the already existing subcultures', which can be seen in Vanessa's reflections on working in the pub-industry. Vanessa saw the job as appropriate for her age, but that it was temporary: *I like working here and all that, but it's not exactly what I want to do. I'm 25 now.* Short-term, the job provided a certain *Respectability*, but due to the negative aspects of the job, it was untenable. Whereas Vanessa could easily fit into a youth subculture in the nightlife-industry, Dmitri had few opportunities for obtaining the same respectability in his workplace where he was often younger: *[…] most of them are at least ten years older.*

Dmitri also noted the association between *immigrant* and *refugee/asylum seeker*, and emphasised that the persistent focus on the integration of refugees and asylum seekers risked rendering other immigrants invisible:

> *One night, I was with a friend, he's Ukrainian, and we were standing in Glasshuset[202], it was around 1am, we'd bought burgers and were eating them, and up comes a young man, he was a bit drunk, he asked a question and [when we answered] he heard our foreign pronunciation, and "you're not from Norway? No, I'm from Russia. Are you an asylum seeker? No, I'm an engineer". So, there is this foreigner=asylum seeker. Foreigner=asylum seeker. There are some integration programs in Norway, but they're mostly focused on refugees, but I can tell you, workers, foreign workers, also need help with integration and integrating.*

Thus, the nature and labelling of migrants also impacts on *Respectability*, cutting several ways. The recognised status of refugee affords the migrant certain rights and benefits, but simultaneously situates them as dependent upon the state and society, increasing the risk of removing their agency. Similarly, being a migrant labourer affords the respectability of contributing to society, but with a labour market segregation that disadvantages migrants, the respectability is limited. This process sits on the intersection of racialisation, migrant identification and labelling processes, and *respectability*.

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[202] A shopping arcade in the centre of Bodø

At this point, it is necessary to move the discussion onto "the new R", reciprocity. Where *Resources, Refuge,* and *Respectability* are useful in exploring integration processes, *Reciprocity* ties them all together and provides a holistic view on integration processes by focusing on relationships and interactions.

7.5 – Reciprocity – Giving and receiving

One of the key contributions of this thesis lies in the inclusion of reciprocity to Hirschmann's framework. While he does not explicitly identify the nature of reciprocity when exploring the role of religion in integration processes, it underlies parts of his argument. For example, Hirschmann notes that 'members in many religious bodies, similar to members of a family, do not expect *immediate reciprocity* [...]' (p. 1207)(emphasis added). Later, he argues that 'religious commitments are stronger if a faith expects conformity to principles and enforces obligations by creating a strong sense of community' (p. 1228). These quotes point to the importance of relationships in understanding the behaviour of migrants and religious organisations but can easily be adapted to other scenarios.

For example, in Bloch and McKay's (2015, p. 40) research on employment within ethnic enclaves and businesses: 'Co-ethnic workers are thought to possess desirable characteristics of which solidarity and trust assumed by shared ethnicity features highly'. Familiarity, one of the elements of *Refuge* facilitates a relationship. This is not to suggest that these relationships are perfectly reciprocal, as Bloch and McKay (2015, pp. 40-41) note that 'the enclave can trap workers and prevent the development of social networks seen as crucial for progression'.

The role of *Reciprocity* is easily identified in Hirschmann's (2004) latter discussion of the role of 'immigrant/ethnic churches' by positing the question: who is providing the *Resources, Respectability* and *Refuge* to new immigrants? The nature of the relationship is essential. We can begin by examining the *cause* of the relationship. Thus, it follows logically that there will be different manifestations of reciprocity due to differing modes of entry. Or, as Ali said, '*I think [maintaining an identity] is more important for those who migrate, to Norway, due to political reasons than if someone thinks "I'll move to Norway for a year or two and see how it turns out", and then stay for three-four-five years*'.

Susan, the bar manager, felt her professional relationship to her immigrant colleagues was burdensome due to turnover, requiring a continuous investment of resources in not only training new employees but developing relationships with them. The Swedish bartenders, on the other hand, saw the professional relationship as temporary, thus their investment of in the relationship does not necessarily match expectations from the manager and other long-term employees. The owner of the bar 'equated ["good" workers] with workers from the same ethnic group' (Bloch & McKay, 2015, p. 45), but the relationship between the workers "on the factory floor" is based on reciprocity: covering shifts for each other, helping out, and providing social refuge.

As a contrast, Dmitri initially moved to Narvik for educational reasons but stayed in Norway in order to work. In Norway, one in three migrants who arrive for educational reasons emigrate from Norway after a year, compared to one in five for labour migrants (Pettersen, 2013, p. 70). As with Vanessa, and the other Swedish bartenders, this would lead you to believe that Dmitri is likely to migrate onwards. Yet, once we include other factors, such as his Russian citizenship and time spent in Norway, the relationship to Norway is more than simply that of a professional, work-based relationship:

> *You know, I've lived in this country for four years. I've invested a lot of time, a lot of work, and other stuff. So, for example, a year ago, when I could have left Norway, I though "Yeah, sure, I can move back to Russia, no problem", but yes, there would be problems […] things were more uncertain in Russia than in Norway… I'm used to living in Norway, but it is entirely possible that, in a few years, I'll move to another country, but it depends. If I receive, for example, a job offer. But again, there are bureaucratic problems […] So that uncertainty, it is annoying. Which is why think, if I would, for example, move to another European country, or another country than Russia, I first have to get Norwegian citizenship, then it'll be easier, bureaucratically, mostly bureaucratically […] Life [in Norway] is much more relaxing, for example when you're driving, in traffic, when you're at work, there are almost no places where there is a dress code. Communication is very informal […] with management and colleagues, and teachers at university.*

The differences in the relationships Vanessa and Dmitri have to Norway are shaped by very different experiences. Contrast the quote from Dmitri above with Vanessa's experience:

> *In the beginning, it was really, really cool. But it has been tiring because it's a lot of weekends, or almost every weekend and evening. And there's been a lot of… There have been quite a few incidents, with bothersome, drunk people who've said horrible things […] you see a lot of alcoholism, you see it more easily in small towns because you recognise people. In big cities, there are so many people you don't recognise anyone, but here you know who's who, who's a drug addict, who's an alcoholic, and these things, and it leaves an impression, you feel sad because you know who they are […] I don't think this is a long term job, you can't take it […] At first, I thought I was only going to stay here half a year, but that didn't happen. Yeah, I thought I'd go back [to Sweden], I'd already planned on going back.*

The assumption that migrants are the main beneficiaries of migration, such as in the Brochmann-II commission (Norges Offentlige Utredninger, 2017) discussed in Chapter 4, obscures the two-way relationship. It obscures migrant contributions to society and the costs borne by the migrant, as Vanessa demonstrates above. Expanding our perspective to include *refuge* and *respectability* encourages us to explore other ways relationships are reciprocally maintained and developed.

What the migrant receives from society, in the form of *Resources, Refuge*, and *Respectability*, sets expectations for what the migrant reciprocates, or should reciprocate. There are several sources of these expectations, they might arise internally, from the migrant him/herself, migrant group, or an external actor, such as a state, can formulate them. One need only think of voting, whether it is perceived as a right and privilege, or duty and obligation. Vaguely issued expectations, whether communicated by state, media, or organisations, are akin to Hirschmann's (2004) notion that commitment is strengthened through an expectation of conformity to principles. Yet, this does not prevent migrants from extracting something of value to them from the implicit arrangement, such as Dmitri's reasoning for volunteering for the Red Cross:

I am not a member of the Red Cross, but [a volunteer] primarily to make acquaintances, to get to know people, to be of use, and, again, language. It's good practice. Because, when it comes to, for example, mathematics, which I know well in Russian or English, I realised I don't know it in Norwegian, especially the terminology, [but] I teach myself, I learn new words [...] I think it's useful for me and those who come, who get help. It might be a bit selfish, but since they're getting help and it's useful for them it's not completely selfish.

This is echoed by Hirschmann when he notes that the religious foundation only removes the need for 'immediate reciprocity' (Hirschmann, 2004, p. 1207). Again, we note the importance of temporality. Short-term transactionalism versus long-term reciprocity.

The nature of Vanessa's migration story is rendered invisible, perhaps even inconsequential, due to its transience, but also in part due to the expectation of its invisibility: Nordic migrants are regularly omitted from migration statistics or migration rules. Recalling the discussions on identification and categorisation processes in Chapter 2, it points to how categorisation processes can stunt or limit integration processes.

In a similar vein, we can revisit Dmitri's observation that *'foreigner=asylum seeker'*. Migrant labour is *'left to fend for itself'* (Dmitri), and we can situate this as a disparity in the reciprocal relationship between the migrant and society: migrant labourers are expected to integrate, or simply operate invisibly, and make the effort, but there is little assistance or recognition from society. As Ali remarked:

Unfortunately, both immigrants and Norwegians are not very good at including each other, and that is a challenge. [There] needs to be an understanding that… "yes, we've moved here, this is where we are going to be and, somehow, at some point, we have to become a part of this country, this society". That is it, everything else will fail and lead to suffering for the individual, but it will also be a challenge for all of society. And to make it work, we need to think "yes, both, both minorities and majority have to make the effort". The majority cannot run away from its responsibility [...]

Citizenship, discussed in depth in Chapter 2, is strongly related to the discussion of reciprocity. Damsholt and Aagedal (2012, p. 10) emphasise that the introduction of citizenship ceremonies in Norway was an explicit move to 'not only make [citizenship] a formality and a legal contract, but to imbue it with moral and emotional content'. Here we should keep in mind Jurado's (2008) questioning of the causal relationship between integration processes and citizenship. Particularly in Norway, where naturalisation necessitates relinquishing previous citizenships, it engenders a reified and exclusive conception of identity. It constructs citizenship, and linked identities, as a zero-sum game, as opposed to a dual-citizenship system which has the ability to valorise a diversity of identities and see them in a non—zero-sum perspective. The former is demonstrated by Ali, reflecting on receiving his Norwegian citizenship:

> *It kicked off quite a few thoughts and reflections: What does this mean? This Norwegian citizenship, am I now done with everything to do with Kurdistan? Have I suddenly become Norwegian? Who am I?*

Bearing in mind Marshall's third aspect of citizenship, the social, it is not only about the 'right to a modicum of economic welfare and security' that comes up, but also the duty to contribute to that welfare and, in Ali's case, security. We see an explicit reflection on reciprocity and the relationship between him and the imagined community of Norway. His citizenship came hand in hand with another letter:

> *It didn't take long before another letter arrived, and I was called in for National Service[203] [laughter] and it was "Congratulations, you have been drafted to…" It was… I started thinking, a lot, when I got this letter and was called in for National Service, and "what now?" I'm originally from Northern Iraq and have seen how Saddam Hussein's police and regime acted towards the public, and they weren't the nicest guys in the world. I remember a lot, have experienced a lot, and this led me to question my views on the military, weapons, and National Service. So, I thought about it a lot, and I reached the conclusion that "Yes… When Norway has given us so much […] the least I can do is to give back to this new country".*

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[203] Norway operates with Universal Conscription into what it refers to as Initial Military Service (Førstegangstjeneste), what in the UK was referred to as National Service

His reflections also echo Hochschild's (2012[1983], p. 74) observation that 'gratitude lays the foundation for loyalty'. Admittedly, this is provoked by Ali receiving citizenship while in the age group that gets drafted, something which does not necessarily happen to all naturalised citizens. Norway only introduced Universal Conscription in 2015 (Norwegian Armed Forces, 2016), with citizens aged 19-44 being eligible for conscription. Ali's experience is highly gendered, as even today only 14 per cent of those serving their Initial Military Service are women. Additionally, it is most likely to apply to a small subsection of naturalised citizens, predominantly those who naturalised either under-18 or shortly after turning 18. Even then, there were 71 000 eligible to serve their National Service but only up to 8000 were enrolled in 2015 (Norwegian Armed Forces, 2015).

Though it might only apply to a small population, Ali's trajectory lends some credence to Hirschmann's axiom that higher expectations and stronger obligations will strengthen conformity. After all, Ali went on to serve two contracts with *Forsvarets Innsatsstyrker* (a branch of the Norwegian Territorial Army), and later was called into local politics. The use of "called" in the preceding sentence is deliberate, as Ali spoke of his nascent political career in terms of surprise:

> *[I] was sort of a placeholder [204][…] I think I was forty-something, almost at the bottom of the list. But, after the elections, I got a call and was congratulated on a permanent position on the City Council. Then I thought "Ok, that was probably not what was supposed to…" But, when you've chosen to be on the list, you have to accept that you might get in, that's it. But, that one would get in, from being completely new to politics, and it was the first time I ran […]*

This involvement with the political aspect of citizenship (Marshall, 1950) adds an element of a *duty* to exercise political power. It also draws attention to *how* political citizenship is more than simply voting. Bergh and Bjørklund (2010) attempt to infer the status of integration processes through electoral participation

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[204] In Norwegian, Ali used the term "listefyll", which is difficult to translate, but carries connotations of "simply making up the numbers"

(in local elections) in Norway, but they do not address citizenship or offer any analysis of the relationship between citizenship and political actions such as voting. In Norway, citizenship is a prerequisite for voting in a general election, demonstrating that in some cases citizenship has to precede actions that are seen as significant in integration processes. Simultaneously, Ali, in the quote below, demonstrates how the exercise of political power can feed back into the integration processes, encouraging him to get deeper involved, and strengthen the emotive aspect of citizenship. In other words, echoing Jurado's (2008, p. 16) encouragement that governments should put 'citizenship at the heart of their integration strategies'.

> *When I was on the list [the first time], it was sort of, and I have to be allowed to say this, I hadn't looked into it [...] I knew a bit about SV, but I didn't take that round with myself, as I should have, about "who says what" and "who stands for what" [...] So I joined the Labour party [and they] asked if I wanted to be on the list [...] And I was put in the 43rd spot [...] I got in from the 43rd place and ended up on the 7th [...] And I think, when I have been given that trust, I have to respond, and the answer has to be that I will sit on the City Council again, wholeheartedly and I have to take this, my role as an elected official, seriously, because that is what they have told me I should do.*

As with the citizenship and National Service, there is a trade between trust, confidence, and service. Echoing sentiments of being "called upon" to serve, the impression from the interview was that of a soldier doing his duty.

The reciprocal relationship is influential, as it not only shapes Ali and his loyalties, but the image of the City Council shifts, with the inclusion of a Kurdish-born, naturalised citizen. Or, as Ali put it: *when I moved to Norway, there weren't any adults with minority background in politics or other visible places.* Thus, serving on the City Council is not merely repayment for granted trust, education, work, or respectability, it is also contributing towards the future:

What I hope and believe is that, if, what I have done in politics, or if the time I have been a part of politics, if it has contributed or can contribute to it becoming easier for those who come after us, then I think it will have been very good and positive. And I think "Ok, then you've done something that's ok". And I hope and believe, of course one should be humble, but I hope and believe it can contribute to something positive, both for those who are sceptical to immigrants but also to immigrants… That you… Also immigrants, children with a minority background can see with their own eyes that "yes, you don't have to be 185cm, blond, and be from Lofoten to do well or to get involved with politics". It is possible to get involved in politics even if you come from, have a background from, another country. So, I hope this can contribute to opening the way for others.

Ali

Importantly, Ali emphasised strongly that a politician with a minority, or immigrant, background should not only focus on minority or immigrant issues:

Us with minority background have to take responsibility for the politics that impact us as minorities, but also take responsibility for the politics that concerns the community. When I'm in politics I am as concerned with property tax, I am as concerned with keeping the Armed Forces in Bodø, as I am with integration politics. One shouldn't become a minority-politician.

Rounding off this section, I have sought to demonstrate how integration processes are dependent upon reciprocal relationships. It involves clarifying expectations and demands, whether this clarification is formulated internally by self-reflection or externally through rights and obligations. *Reciprocity* cements the understanding of integration processes as bi-directional, although only one party, the individual, is perpetually defined. The other party can be the state, government, the imagined community, the local community, or organisation. Either party can feel mistreated, disrespected, or unreciprocated, which I would argue lies at the base of negative integration processes. If a state imposes unrealistic expectations on migrants, an employer exploits labourers, migrant communities exist in parallel to other communities, and locals feel privileges bestowed upon migrants are unfair and hasty, all these situations, and many others, are a result of poorly reciprocated relationships.

7.6 – Conclusion

The final sentence of the preceding section might perhaps paint me as a doomsayer, where a well-integrated society is only a distant utopian future; where balanced, equal, and fair relationships govern all interactions. That would be a false conclusion to draw from the chapter. Whereas Hirschmann emphasised *Resources, Refuge* and *Respectability*, these three notions do not adequately and by themselves rely on a relational perspective. Hirschmann constructs all three as objects that can be received, given, or traded, but without emphasising the relationship that governs or influences the space within they are received, given, or traded. Adding *Reciprocity* to the framework forces us to emphasise the relationship, and to explore the nature of both parties. If integration processes are genuinely processual, they are relational, multidirectional, and contextual, which means we have to ask not simply *what* is transferred, but *between whom* and *how*.

As has been argued several times throughout this thesis, there is always the question of *integration into what*? Ultimately, there are always a minimum of two parties: the individual and an amorphous, imagined, *whole*. Whether that whole is a group, local, regional, national, or transnational imagined whole. In the entropic space between these, there can be any number of other actors

Square Pegs into Round Holes

Image 1 - A Heath Robinson machine (Robinson, 1973)

and agents. Akin to a Heath Robinson contraption (see Image 1), or Rube Goldberg machine, what we are attempting to do is to understand how we can achieve a result, integration, by creating a system that will deliver that result. Employment, language, education, affiliation, etc. are building blocks that can be put together in any number of configurations (Ager & Strang, 2008), but Hirschmann provides us with three principles that allow us to understand how these bricks come together.

What I have suggested, by introducing *Reciprocity*, is simply taking a step back and seeing the whole picture. If integration, returning to Image 1, is fitting square pegs into round holes through a bizarre contraption, this does not suggest an impossible task, rather I would emphasise the presence of the pots and pans which have pegs fitted (lower left-hand corner). The process by which the peg is fitted is made possible through an elaborate contraption, and the task might seem hopeless or impossible. Rather than seeing the individual components, the presence of a round hole, the square peg, the gears and pulleys, and what one must assume, engineers, akin to how we look for *Resources, Refuge* and *Respectability*, we should rather take a step back and see how all these elements relate to each other. One might add that there is also the *demand* for fitting square pegs into round holes.

Thus, we also need to consider the demands of those with round-holed pots and pans and the supply of a solution. Exploring *Reciprocity* is seeing the whole picture. If integration is fitting square pegs into round holes, what we are actually looking for is *redintegration*: the restoration of a whole. Similarly, emphasising Hirschmann's three Rs and *Reciprocity* encourages a discourse which is Redintegrative, rather than a Social Integrationist or Moral Underclass Discourse.

Concisely providing an answer to the research question framing this chapter, we see from the analysis that a narrow, Social Integrationist understanding of integration processes does not accurately reflect the understandings of the informants. Rather, the chapter points to the value of a redintegrative discourse, formulated through the notion of reciprocity, that reflects on the multiple causes of inequality and allows for valorisation of multiple identities, and considers cultural, social, political, and economic factors in inequalities and integration processes.

Chapter 8 – Complementary approaches

8.1 – Introduction

Pursuant to the research question exploring the influence of secular organisations and activities, this chapter discusses the relationship between activity organisers, volunteers, and public administrators with regards to integration-oriented activities. As a shorthand, I will refer to this group as *facilitators*, in the sense that they often understood their behaviour as enabling migrants to integrate. As Cantle (2016, p. 142) emphasises '[the] prospect for cohesion and peace [depend] upon the development and *facilitation* of interaction and contact' (emphasis added).

This chapter stands in contrast to the previous. Chapter 7 demonstrated how reciprocity is a key to integration, which is matched by facilitators in this chapter albeit without the emphasis on identities. As with Caritas in Chapter 6, the emphasis is often on language, employability, and employment and echoes priorities set by the nation-state. In other words, we see a distinct presence of SID and emphasis on a fragmented but functional understanding of society. As such, there are elements of complementarity and competition, as we saw with Caritas. While competition is fairly absent, informants reacted to the lack of complementarity, emphasising the potential for cooperation and improvement of the "dugnadsånd"[205] they saw as a prerequisite for positively influencing integration processes.

The relevant interviews for this chapter are with Kirsten Hasvoll, project manager for *Tilflyttingsprosjektet* (the Immigration Project), at *Nordland Fylkeskommune* (Nordland County Municipality, henceforth NFK), Vigdis Larsen, deacon at Rønvik church, and Siv, one of the activity organisers at RCB. These are meso-organisations and institutions that link and mediate between migrants (and

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[205] "Dugnadsånd", loosely translated as dugnad-spirit, draws on the idea of coming together for the good of the community. A dugnad is an activity that aims to improve conditions for a group, be it a football team, marching band, or even society as a whole. Bake-sales, fund raising, and contributing to maintenance (cleaning public areas or washing uniforms/equipment) are common dugnads, while certain events such as TV-aksjonen (a national charity drive, such as the Pudsy Appeal or Red Nose Day in the UK) are also considered dugnads. Fladberg (2017) provides an example of the concept being exploited by an employer to trick his Polish joiners to do work for free. See also Engebrigtsen, et al. (2017).

migrant groups) with parts of the state and the "host" society. Hasvoll's relevance is quite apparent, whereas both Larsen and Siv were individuals I encountered in the course of my fieldwork who were, within their respective organisations, important in the establishment or continuation of integration-oriented activities.

Larsen, along with another deacon from the Church of Norway, established a bi-weekly dinner that is held at *Bodø Voksenopplæring*, the Adult Education centre that is responsible for delivering *Introduksjonsprogrammet*, the Introductory Program for migrants. Siv was one of the individuals working with the Red Cross to establish activities and to recruit other volunteers, but in order to respect her wish for anonymity I am unable to offer more specific details about her and the activities she was involved in.

The core argument of this chapter is that despite echoing state perspectives on integration, emphasising utilitarian aspects such as employment, language, and accommodation, facilitators shift to value- and contact-oriented perspectives following their involvement with integration-oriented activities. This is reminiscent of one of the underlying arguments of Interculturalism. Interculturalism, Zapato-Barrero (2017, p. 13) argues, 'can be seen as a *policy of rebellion of cities* against the state domination of policy' based on proximity and pragmatism.

8.2 – Facilitator perspectives on integration processes

This section will compare and contrast perspectives on integration process as formulated by the state, explored in Chapter 4, and as understood and iterated by facilitators in a small sample of organisations in Bodø. Following a brief repetition of relevant points concerning state perspectives on integration processes, I will explore how these perspectives are echoed and/or challenged by the facilitators.

Lynnebakk and Fangen (2011, p. 148) argue that ethnic diversity 'does not have a natural place in today's popular understanding of Norwegianness'. "Norwegianness", they argue, has three components: origin, practice, and citizenship. This effectively sets up ethnicity, culture, and nationality as determiners of "Norwegianness". This echoed by Brochmann and Hagelund (2012b, pp. 155-156) 'the concept of *multicultural* Norway is shaky for the majority'. Thus, a homogeneous, exclusive construction of "Norwegianness" is juxtaposed with a multicultural challenge, rendering a multicultural, multi-ethnic, or even multi-national[206], conception of "Norwegianness" a challenge or threat (Eide, 2012).

This points to, as Brochmann and Hagelund (2012a) argue, the concept of inequality becoming linked to two new dimensions: ethnicity and immigrant background. Thus, processes of integration become tied to not only immigration and integration policies, but also to the overarching welfare policies. This results, as argued by Bendixsen (2018), in a differentiation of rights, legitimised by the conception of humanitarian exceptionalism as a part of "Norwegianness". Ultimately, this constitutes society as fragmented, with a strong functionalist undertone, whereby anything that does not fit is externalised and necessitates an exceptional response. As will be shown below, this is strengthened by the crisis-rhetoric. As such, systemic issues and societal inequalities are obscured, and identities are rendered inferior to the vague, humanitarian, identity-neutral response.

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[206] Bearing in mind the discussion around dual-citizenship, which the government argued for based on security-issues rather than widening the understanding of "Norwegianness".

Brochmann and Hagelund (2012b, p. 152) distinguish between two aspects of integration processes: 'the general integration project of the welfare state' and 'integration of new immigrants'. This is akin to Joppke's (2012, p. 135) argument that 'labour market structures or the education system are vastly more important for helping or hindering "integration" than any, by nature paltry, "integration policy"'. This serves to reduce integration to a structural and functional form, which confines the discussion to systems and limits the acceptable discourses to those characterised as Social Integrationist or Moral Underclass. Identification processes are seen as secondary to categorisation. Thus, what becomes problematised is not the construction of "Norwegianness", but migrants' (in)ability to conform to it.

Chapter 4 discussed the development of state policy in depth, but it was succinctly characterised by participants at a meeting of the reference group in NFKs Immigration project: laissez-faire. This was followed by the remark that it was ironic that the Minister for Integration, Sylvi Listhaug, did not have a clear policy about integration. One of the purposes of the reference group was to inform local county approaches to integration processes, highlighting the absence of an acceptable policy at a national, central level, and the need to tailor approaches to a local context.

Over the course of the last decades, and particularly recent years, there has developed a distinct hierarchisation within immigration and integration policy and related discussions. This socially constructed, functionalist, reifying hierarchisation is demonstrated by Brochmann and Hagelund (2012b, pp. 205-206): (1) Nordic citizens, (2) Refugees, (3) EEA citizens with employment, (4) Third country (non-Nordic, non-EEA) nationals with employment, (5) Asylum-seekers, and (6) Irregular migrants[207]. This is reflected in wider society, as demonstrated by Guðjónsdóttir and Loftsdóttir (2017) and Friberg and Midtbøen (2018), where

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[207] '[Irregular migrants] refers to all those who cross borders without prior authorization, regardless of their reason, and encompasses asylum seekers as well as undocumented labour migrants' (James & McNevin, 2013, pp. 89-90)

notions of a hierarchy are reflected in hiring practices and individual identification processes. In these cases, rather than the citizenship-oriented hierarchisation of Brochmann and Hagelund, the hierarchies are constructed according to ethnic categorisation and identification. Problematically, neither article problematise or challenge the social construction of these hierarchisations, thereby contributing to the perception of them as natural rather than constructed categories.

Here we can recall the experiences of Vanessa (Nordic), Ali (refugee), and Dmitri (third country national), explored in Chapter 7. These hierarchies echo James and McNevin's (2013, pp. 88-89) distinction between capital-relation immigrants (tourists, students, migrant labour) and 'those who bring risk or unspecifiable outcomes [...] asylum-seekers, refugees, internally displaced persons and the more generic category of irregular migrants', a distinction McDowell (2009, p. 34) referred to as 'venomous'.

These hierarchisations are echoed in Hasvoll's remarks around NFK's immigration project, albeit situating an additional group at the top of the hierarchy, the internal migrant:

> *[...] For many, many years, we have, and still do, tried these "come home"-projects, tempting students to move back, travelled to graduate fairs in Oslo and tried to get students there to move to Nordland, recruiting people from Sweden. They have, in short, not had a lot of luck [...] Not only do we need people, we have to have people. So, we think it is best to go for an inflow from abroad [...] unfortunately, it is still the case that when you talk about immigration everyone thinks we're talking about refugees.*

Hasvoll's remark reflects the socially constructed hierarchisation, where refugees are often viewed as lower on the hierarchy of desirable immigrants, as they are implicitly deskilled and seen as benefactors rather than contributors, whereas Swedes are nearly equivalent to internal migrants. The above quote, as well as other conversations with Hasvoll, suggest an awareness of a Moral Underclass Discourse, as well as a desire to counteract it. As later emphasised by Brochmann

and Hagelund (2012b, p. 218), immigrants are seen 'through the prism of "weak group"' – reminiscent of Bauböck's (1996b, p. 21) observation that immigration has become a 'meta-issue' used to explain social and economic problems. This points to a latent Moral Underclass Discourse that, while homogenising the "native" population, seeing migrants as either resources (labour migrants) or a drain on resources (refugees), or as Hasvoll phrased it 'refugees have an enormous apparatus around them', ignores identification processes, reifies and naturalises identities and categories, and presents unwanted characteristics as distinct from the "majority". This, as argued by Bendixsen (2018), is accompanied, and legitimised, by a notion of humanitarian exceptionalism that, effectively, lets "natives" off the hook in a moral sense.

This view is demonstrated by the Brochmann-II commission on the long-term effects of continued high immigration, explored in Chapter 4, where refugees are seen as burdens on the welfare system:

> Refugees are a particular category amongst immigrants. They are given residency *irrespective of whether or not they want to contribute* to economic growth and development
> NOU (2017, p. 24) (emphasis added)

This also plays out in the Introductory Act (*Introduksjonsloven*), governing the rights and responsibilities of recently arrived migrants, where most rights and obligations are afforded those seen as the weakest or most disadvantaged. This demonstrates how SID and MUD can overlap.

One of the main areas where SID and MUD interconnect is around language. This singular focus is echoed by a wide range of actors and facilitators, but the concomitant emphasis on work results in it being framed within a Social Integrationist Discourse. We see how the state, Caritas (see Chapter 6), and facilitators align in their perspectives on language and work:

> […] Norwegian language training should become more tailored, and it should to a greater extent be tied to work.
>
> NOU (2017, p. 22)

> The answer at present is an active integration policy for new arrivals, with particular emphasis on participation in the labour market
>
> Brochmann and Hagelund (2012b, p. 150)

> *[…] we think Norwegian language training is priority number one, whether you're a refugee, child, adult […] it is probably the area where we've spent the most time and money.*
>
> Hasvoll

> *[…] In the aftermath of [the arrival of asylum-seekers in 2015-2016], language training has appeared […] I think language is the alpha and omega of being integrated. To getting a job, to making friends.*
>
> Siv

Unsurprisingly, Hasvoll echoed the state and emphasised language and labour, but she also reflected that their priorities changed as the project went on. While not an explicit formulation of Interculturalism, it nonetheless demonstrates how policy priorities can change in relation to proximity and pragmatism to local realities. It also demonstrates an awareness of the need to address multiple forms of social exclusion, addressing more than just economic factors:

> *Then we have the important one: free time, volunteering, and democracy. It started out as a… volunteering, integration-bit because we figured that to get people to stay it's important they come along and get to join football teams, learn to swim, those things. Now we have gradually changed perspective, now our perspective is that in order to get them to stay we need to actively include them in processes of democracy, municipal administrations, organisations, to include them as regular members, not just someone to be integrated […] they are so many now that we can't go on without them being represented in different bodies.*

The notion of "self-organisation" echoes a long-held policy position of 'help to self-help' (Brochmann & Hagelund, 2012b, p. 178), which also came up during a debate on Bodø as an international city: one attendee loudly suggested migrants

should self-organise and that the municipality should stop funding 'silly projects'[208]. In practice, this results in a partial abdication of responsibility by the state, where responsibility is passed on to local government, municipal administrations, and individuals (Brochmann & Hagelund, 2012b), laying the groundwork for bottom-up Intercultural approaches to develop. The notion of "self-help" also cultivates an attitude of limited responsibility amongst facilitators:

> *I've always thought that this group [asylum-seekers] is the one we should focus on, of course we should focus on work and integration, but I think they'll go their own community [for that] [...] They should have a huge mosque with plenty of room, so they could have cultural [events], it's a meeting place for them, but [what they have now is] a small place [...]*
>
> Larsen

> *Now they're going into regular asylum centres. Now they have a different apparatus around, then when they were in the emergency reception centres, then they had nothing. Now they have consultants, community workers, they have some money, they're going into adult education [...] So now our activities are the ones we normally offer.*
>
> Siv

Whereas the state prefers a policy of self-help, the informants consistently referred to the apparatus of the state, resulting in a situation where both the state and facilitators put the onus on the migrant. Emphasising the importance of "empowering" the asylum-seekers allows for both RED and MUD, where the dividing line falls on the emphasis on passivity (MUD) versus inequality (RED) as the cause of exclusion. These tensions come out in Siv and Larsen's remarks, where the former echoes MUD and the latter is more indicative of RED:

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[208] Alas, he did not offer concrete examples of what constituted "silly projects" and was not challenged by anyone on that characterisation.

We're working with empowering those living in asylum centres, that they have to get to the activities [...] I think you'll get so much more out of it if you do something yourself, if you take responsibility [...] I think passivity is the root of... I was about to say "evil", but that's a bit over the top, but I think it leads to more passivity, more twiddling thumbs, less initiative, poor health [...]

Siv

[Our activity] has been running for a year, shall we say, so maybe now we'll get some funding, perhaps we can employ someone, a refugee or something, to take care of it.

Larsen

Here, Siv places the responsibility on the migrant and his/her "passivity", whereas Larsen points to the need for funding in order to employ 'a refugee or something' to take over. The issue, according to Larsen, is not the passivity of migrants, but the lack of funding, clearly demonstrating a redintegrationist understanding.

A final note on this, is the use of a 'reference group' during NFKs Immigration Project. Consisting of eight migrants, they served as an advisory group for the Immigration Project (NFK, 2018). Hailing from Poland, Pakistan, Serbia, Russia, Somalia, India, China, and the Philippines (NFK, 2015), their explicit function was to give insight into the lived experiences of immigrants in Norway: 'We have experience of being immigrants in Norway, and we know what has been important for us' (Jelena Budeša in NFK, 2018: 5). Echoing an argument by Carens and Williams (1996, p. 177): 'marginalized groups possess a distinctive political "voice", a distinctive perspective [...] that arises out of the fact that their social and political experience is markedly different from that of relatively dominant groups'. Hasvoll, who managed the project, referred to the group as '*some of the funniest [on the project]*', repeatedly highlighting the work done both internally in the group, as well as public lectures and conferences led by members of the group. In particular, Hasvoll demonstrated a clear redintegrationist approach in that *despite* the group's work '*not being particularly measurable*' it became more of a focus '*than when we started*'.

Hasvoll's redintegrationist perspective was reinforced by her perception of society, equality of identities, and recognition that integration is a process which necessitates a multifactorial approach:

> *We have to get them active in democratic processes in local councils, organisations, as regular members, not just as someone to be integrated […] we can't go on much longer without their representation in different bodies […] there's still very little knowledge in society [about migrants and] I am exasperated at how little people know. […] We have six pillars [in the project] […] Norwegian language training is priority number one […] point number two is education […] number three is housing […] four is targeted recruitment from abroad […] then there's the important one: leisure, volunteering, and democracy […] last pillar is information […].*

Concluding this section, we see how the three discursive models interact. It is possible for facilitators to simultaneously echo state emphases on language and work, characteristic of SID, as well as toeing a fine line between RED and MUD when emphasising empowering migrants. On the one side, empowerment derives from addressing multiple causes of inequality, on the other empowerment is seen as a remedy to "passivity". Ambiguities in facilitator understandings is reflected in the ambiguity of state approaches, where it was seen as inadequate (and requiring a local remedy) or, as will be shown in the next section, entirely lacking.

8.3 – Facilitating migrants

The socially constructed hierarchies mentioned above has a significant impact on facilitator activities. This section will explore how mode of arrival and the responsibility of the welfare state shape both activities and understandings of responsibility in integration processes. According to Dragolov, et al. (2016, p. 11), social cohesion is contingent upon people dealing 'appropriately with diversity'. As such, exploring facilitator perspectives offers insight into this process of "dealing with diversity". As we saw in section 6.5 on Caritas, there is a high degree of specialisation amongst voluntary organisations. What this section demonstrates is how, as Bauböck argues, specialisation contributes to a blindness towards complexity. Effectively, this should predispose facilitators towards SID, but does not preclude elements of RED or MUD in their understandings.

> In a differentiated society, institutions are highly specialized. Their rules correspond to certain roles attributed to individuals. *Specialized institutions are blind to the total complexity of individuals; they perceive them only as agents of those roles fitting into the pattern of their rules.* Institutions thus produce their own internal descriptions of what individuals are for them.
>
> Bauböck (1996a, p. 77) (emphasis added)

Within NFK, Hasvoll emphasised that their focus is relatively indiscriminate with regards to *who* immigrates to Nordland. Their emphasis is merely that they are able to retain immigrants and keep them employed and contributing to the local and regional economy. Despite this, Hasvoll did remark that they are aware of a differentiated system where certain groups are provided for by other institutions:

> *Our perspective isn't to help people [...] we need people to fill many roles [...] We're not very concerned with, we're not at all concerned with why they're here. But we do see that refugees have an enormous apparatus around them, so we're probably directing our efforts at the two other groups you mentioned, the labour migrants and not least the family reunification migrants whom no one is concerned about or registers.*
>
> Hasvoll

Hasvoll disregards NFKs part in providing safety, a stark contrast to Siv's perspective on the role of RCB:

> *We were there to make them [the asylum-seekers] feel safe, that was our goal […] We have had to establish some boundaries, because it has been important to us that this, those who are in on this do it according to Red Cross guidelines […] I think without volunteerism, who knows what these refugees who came to Bodøsjøen and Saltstraumen would have had? […] They had nothing, no money, nothing. And, it was volunteerism that made sure they got anything outside, what was it, four meals a day? […] But, now, they're going into ordinary reception centres. So now, they have an entirely different apparatus around them […]*
>
> Siv

Both Hasvoll and Siv demonstrate a fragmented understanding, as would be expected under SID. Both de-emphasise identity in favour of categorisations that enable them to obscure multiple aspects of inequality in exchange for a focus on a specific task.

Larsen clearly identified multiple approaches to influencing integration processes, as well as recognising the role of identities, hinting at a redintegrationist understanding. She also points to a scepticism towards religious actors, and the perception of religious identities, which can indicate MUD being related to secularisation processes and views on the role of religion in society. Nonetheless, she reinforces the notion of specialisation.

> *It's a big field, should you work politically, maybe the [Norwegian] Church could do that, could you provide food, should it be a sponsor/mentorship-system, the Red Cross was involved too […] We considered [having the activity] in Rønvik church, but we were a bit naive and thought they'd probably not want to come here because it's a church and they're Muslims, most of them, that turned out to be baseless, really, but we didn't know that then […]*
>
> *[asylum-seekers] are the group most suitable for us to work with […] of course we should think about work and integration, but I reckon they'll go to their own milieu… All depending what church or [religious] society they belong to […]*

[…] I noticed that Refugees [Welcome to Bodø], they were a bit sceptical that the Church, they thought, were a bit like "yeah…no…yeah…" Can't remember what it was, but it was a feeling I got. That we shouldn't offend the Muslims, that [RWTB] were a bit… There's a shyness, a sort of scepticism from the others in [volunteerism], who aren't ecclesial, about what the [Norwegian] Church does […] The Red Cross are supposed to be neutral, so the [Norwegian Church] should work more politically, I think. That'd be great.

Larsen

What the above quotes demonstrate is how SID is clearly visible in their understandings, but simultaneously how their remarks also reflect other discourses.

What became apparent in the early winter of 2015 was how opaque state systems and expectations of the state were, as many participants remarked, driving factors in the mobilisation of the local population in Bodø. 70 per cent of reception centres are run by commercial actors, with the remaining 30 per cent split evenly between municipal actors and non-profit organisations (Norges Offentlige Utredninger, 2017, p. 46). Thus, in many cases, one of the most significant actors, asylum reception centres, operate distinctly different from either state actors or the civil society organisations in the sense that reception centres are run as businesses. Under SID, society is viewed as fragmented *but* functional, whereas the situation was quickly seen as dysfunctional, hence the "crisis"-rhetoric. This opens the door for MUD, as was commonly seen in the local newspaper. "Blame" was often attributed either the state, the asylum seekers, or "asylum barons" who were seen to be profiteering off the situation. Elements of this is noticeable in Siv's recollections:

We came to work one day, can't remember which, just a random day, and then we read the news and it turns out there were two or more busses [of asylum-seekers] coming, don't recall exactly, it was intense, we weren't sure about the numbers. No one knew anything! We got in touch with Bodøsjøen Camping, because they'd been told they were going to open an emergency reception centre, without them knowing anything at all […] The first weekend there were some issues concerning what you were responsible for, what you weren't

responsible for [...]. [There's] been poor cooperation with regards to communication, in terms of what information we've received, especially from UDI. [...] I was struck by how little information we received. I mean, you would think this was something you had a contingency plan for, that "if this happens, we do this, and we push these buttons", but there was nothing.

Later, new issues arose when UDI decided to relocate asylum-seekers from the emergency reception centre in Bodø and Saltstraumen northwards, to Storskog, close to the Russian border. This provoked intense reactions from people, culminating in a protest march that objected to the "deportation" of asylum-seekers. Attending the protest, I was struck by how the situation created a juxtaposition between RED and MUD, as speaker after speaker emphasised equality of identities, valorised diversity, and challenged hierarchical categorisations imposed by the state. Larsen provides some reflections around the event that neatly captures notions of responsibility, societal trust, and cohesion, but also questions the motivations of the state's decision to curtail local integration processes:

I recall that I didn't attend the march, that's also something you're taught: I believe I live in a democracy, I'm used to trusting the authorities, I think "they're doing their best and examining things". I want to be there, where I can say, "yes, the authorities will take care of this and they've probably considered everything, and this is why they're doing it" [...]. At the same time, from our perspective, it is incredibly stupid that those who'd been at Bodøsjøen for three months should travel up to Kirkenes and live in worse conditions than now, now that we, the Red Cross had gotten started, kids were starting school, and us in the parish were helping out, so this was horrible [...]. I think it's ridiculous, they [the authorities] could have come here to do the asylum interviews... But then I think maybe they, the authorities, did it so we wouldn't create so much of a riot if they were to be sent directly from Bodø out of the country, then there would have been a bigger insurrection. I don't know, I think it just seems idiotic [...] There's no understanding it, plain and simple, because now they're back, at Tverlandet reception centre [...] Such an awkward way of doing it, and to not have been given a decent explanation for why [...] I think it's difficult when the authorities don't explain anything to us. There's so little information [...]

The notion of "having gotten started" and subsequent disruption ties into central premises of Interculturalism. Cities and local environments are fundamental to 'developing a climate of trust and maintaining social cohesion' (Hepburn & Zapata-Barrero, 2014, p. 5) and cities can be the space of rebellion against the state (Zapata-Barrero, 2017). What Larsen's reflection draws attention to is how trust and distrust of authorities can be observed in moments of rebellion and conflict. This highlights how Interculturalism, as an approach to integration processes, is fragile in the absence of state commitment (Kymlicka, 2016). The deportation protest demonstrates an instance of deep equality, which resonates with Larsen's emphasis on mundane, everyday activities:

> a process enacted and owned by so-called ordinary people in everyday life [...]. It recognizes equality as an achievement of day-to-day interaction [...]. It circulates through micro-processes of individual action and inaction and through group demonstrations of caring [...]. Paradoxically, deep equality is fragile.
> Beaman (2017, p. 16)

The absence of state commitment or involvement was also noted in an evaluation meeting late November 2015, highlighting the absence of state involvement limits local initiatives:

> It is apparent that asylum seekers, the reception centres, municipalities, and volunteers are operating in a vacuum created by UDI. All good endeavours are doing their best without any overarching control or guidance. This creates frustration and insecurity, which renders difficult an effective and good operation for those who want to contribute to the common good.
> Red Cross Bodø (2015c, p. 3)

Hasvoll drew attention to another aspect of insecurity, which prevents the development of contact and a sense of belonging to local communities: casualisation of labour and precarity:

This growth in agencies, particularly geared towards health care and the municipality, we think that's unfortunate. Not because it matters that they are agency workers, but because the local community doesn't get to take part in the development [...] we need to get labour migrants, and not least their spouses, into volunteering. They are needed there, and that is the best way to become a permanent resident.

Hasvoll

Larsen and Siv also reflected insecurity and precarity in their remarks, noting that the result induces a form of paralysis amongst asylum-seekers[209]. They emphasise, as James and McNevin (2013, p. 89), a liminal state, 'suspended in time and space':

I get the impression this group, those without residency, are a group that… they don't have a lot of energy, because they're so stuck in this situation that they can't make themselves do anything. They don't know if they're going to be allowed to remain, should they learn Norwegian today, maybe they have to learn Russian tomorrow, are they going to Germany, and you're left with the impression that they've got enough on their plate as it is. There's so much insecurity! I thought they might be bored to death, and some probably are and would prefer to get to work, but I think most of them are paralyzed, in a way.

Larsen

The kind of inactivity there is at a reception centre, it's only meant as a temporary solution. Originally, they were only supposed to live there for a maximum of six months, for God knows how many years ago, and now they live in the same conditions but could be living there for ten years! So that "brakkesyke", as we call it, it can be hard to fight [...]
If I were in that situation, I would try to make the best of it. I get that it is extremely difficult, sort of, when society doesn't facilitate it: you're in a reception centre for five, ten years and, in a way, you're not allowed to work, you're not allowed… you're not earning money, the kids don't have rights… you don't have the right to anything.

Siv

The awareness of precarity, insecurity, and lack of resources, becomes an important aspect of how facilitators operate. It leads to facilitators drawing on

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[209] For a detailed report on life in Norwegian reception centres, see Andrews, Anvik & Solstad (2014)

their personal and organisational resources and networks. This provides us with insight into how the structure, and agents therein, of Norway as a host society can influence integration processes (Bauböck, 1996a). Facilitators can serve to 'mediate between individuals and [institutions] in a dual sense: by connecting them and coming between them' (Bauböck, 1996a, p. 85). Hasvoll demonstrates a highly functional, albeit fragmented, perspective on society, but this underpins her understanding of a need for a multifactorial approach that includes a range of actors:

> *[The] most important ones are the municipalities [...] then there's NAV, who I would say is the most important single actor [...] just to mention some, it's the individual municipality and business that's the foundation, right? [...] there aren't many employers that take [language teaching] seriously [...]. It's mostly from hand to mouth [...] we haven't been able to get LO[210] along [...] NHO[211] were positive, but don't participate, don't do anything, so... In a way, we can't... We have to include industry, if we were to do anything, we'd have to include industry more, and that is one of the main challenges.*
>
> Hasvoll

What Siv, on the other hand, demonstrates is how some of these resources and networks are only accessible in specific circumstances, such as when events are discursively constructed as crises – drawing on the idea of humanitarian exceptionalism. Siv describes volunteer involvement and engagement as 'very generous' against the implied reference point of the state and national[212]:

> *[...] it's peaks and troughs, I think it's quite easy to forget the ongoing crisis when it's not as acute and not present in your everyday. So, I think you forget very quickly. I think so. But I will say, the way I felt it, where I was, amongst volunteers and in an organisation, I experienced Bodø as a very generous society and generous city.*
> *[...]*

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[210] Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions
[211] Confederation of Norwegian Enterprise
[212] The notion of generosity is problematic, as it creates a power relationship. For a discussion of this from a migrant perspective in Norway, see Carli (2006)

I made some calls and got 2000kr from Rema 1000 to buy food for. That was it. I spoke to a pharmacy that was willing to donate some stuff to us [...] I spoke to Norengros[213] who were very "yeah, of course we'll help", so... It wasn't as much as I thought we would get. I spoke to Bama[214] and they had nothing to offer despite the fact they cooperate closely with the Red Cross [...] I think, if you look at the list of Red Cross' partners, it's a long, long, long list, and I think one's aware of that centrally [...] The more decentralised things are... I'm trying to make connections, to make them aware that [...] they are a cooperating partner [...] I think school and nurseries are important for understanding the Norwegian way of doing things. [...] These organisations work alongside each other, not with each other.

Siv

Larsen also draws on this notion of generosity, but similarly echoes Hasvoll's fragmented conception of society, which Siv characterised as working alongside, not with each other. Where all three differ is in their perception of time and events: Hasvoll demonstrated a processual, continuous perspective, Siv emphasised an acute, crisis perspective, and Larsen referred to a cyclical, "wave" perspective.

So we asked the bishop, or diocese, for money, and this was at the end of the year last year, so there were some leftovers from unused positions, and we got 5000kr, and we had a collection here at an ecumenical service right after new year, there we got 4000kr, and we applied for some more [...] and we've gotten free food from Kiwi, but now they've stopped that... [...]

When they started this "Refugees Welcome to Norway"-group in Bodø [on Facebook] they started on Facebook and got 4000 members, and they called a meeting here in Bodø, at Havet [a hotel], they got to borrow a venue. I tagged along, I thought "we have to come together", and we don't have to do everything but it's important we know what each other are doing. So it was... Those who came to the meeting, there were 4000 "likes", but there were 60 people at the meeting, and it's the same people who've been volunteering all along. It was Norwegian People's Aid, they were at the reception centres, the Red Cross was there, the [Norwegian] Church was there. It was an interesting meeting, but I think these in Refugees [Welcome to Bodø], they had a different impression of this, I thought there'd be lots of people, but that probably sits a bit deeper than a "like". At the same time, I think it was a good feeling, that they were many and had support, especially when it came to

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[213] A wholesaler
[214] A wholesaler for fruit and vegetables

clothes, because people went through their houses and brought lots. And at the time, it was needed, but it must have been overwhelming, they got so much, too much. But, people are quick to... "finally, something useful I can do, and I can bring the old clothes", so it turned out... you can't refuse people, but you would rather they brought themselves, and spoke to... not just dropping off clothes and boxes, and then leave. To get involved... [...]

Now we've been through this, I think... I think if they [asylum-seekers] come now, if we're going to settle [them]... or if there is another wave [of asylum-seekers], or the EU or Schengen decide how to do things, it'll happen again, then I think we're more prepared, now we know, it'll be easier to jump to it [...] Now we've been tried out, so now we're ready for the next round. Yeah... I think it's going to go well, I don't have any... But it was intense, for those who did the most. In a way, it was a service that it kept up for a while.

Larsen

The above quotes demonstrate how they attempt to draw on a wide range of institutions and bodies in order to achieve their goals. The above quotes exemplify one of the core values embedded in the concept of inclusion: working together (Babacan & Babacan, 2013, p. 160). This notion of working together is also an important part of developing social capital that strengthens networks (Putnam, 2000). Hasvoll is critical of the absence of certain groups and actors, suggesting that networks between specialised institutions are highly limited. Adding to that, Siv described a case of working alongside each other and the absence of coordination and bridging efforts, while Larsen points to the normality of the division of labour amongst voluntary organisations by remarking on the surprise of the newest group, RWTB, at the nature of volunteerism in Bodø.

Larsen's statement above also draws attention to the contrast between those who "like" a page on Facebook, those who donate material resources, and those who devote their time. An important factor here is the size of the community (Putnam, 2000), with Bodø demonstrating cross-cutting connections that more easily occur in smaller communities: '*[Bodø] isn't that big a city, that makes it easier*' (Larsen). This contradicts earlier remarks pertaining to the lack of coordination and networks. Yet, here the distinction is again drawn concerning systematic and continuous networks versus spontaneous initiatives.

In conclusion, this section has emphasised that there is a high degree of specialisation in Bodø. The facilitators presented display expectations from the state and focus their efforts where the state falls short. In the case of the county administration, NFK, they emphasise migrant labour and family reunification migrants, in line with their emphasis on growing Nordland's economy. Acting independently of the state, and expressing criticism towards governmental attitudes towards immigration, NFK sought to directly involve migrants in optimising the project. Despite an initial emphasis on material conditions, NFK gradually paid more attention to ensuring migrants' equal participation in civil society, voluntary organisations, and democratic processes through funding initiatives and projects.

This contrasts with Larsen and Siv, representing facilitators in civil society, who directed their efforts primarily at the asylum-seekers, who are often placed towards the bottom in the socially constructed migrant hierarchy. Drawing on networks and social capital, they attempt to facilitate activities that contribute positively to integration processes, through the provision of safe, social spaces, or with material goods. Keeping in mind that this was during the winter, hence the donations of winter attire would allow the asylum seekers a higher degree of freedom of movement thereby reducing the risk of the sense of isolation.

What the next section seeks to explore, in detail, is how facilitator understandings and behaviour manifest in terms of action. Not simply in terms of how they include migrants, but in how they manage volunteers and partners.

8.4 – Managing "the majority"

While Chapter 7 focused on migrants' experiences, this section focuses on the majority-oriented part of voluntary organisations and institutions. Particularly in terms of how the facilitators understand and respond to perceived attitudes and beliefs in the non-migrant population. This forms a central premise of Interculturalism and is the basis of one of the criticisms of it. With Interculturalism emphasising cross-cultural dialogue and contact (Meer, et al., 2016), attempting to break down boundaries (Cantle, 2016), there is nonetheless the risk of contact and dialogue reinforcing barriers and differences (Pettigrew, et al. in Meer, et al., 2016; Loobucyk, 2016). The emphasis on contact and dialogue does not address the context and circumstances of it.

By utilising the discursive framework, we can critically analyse the basis and orientation of dialogue directed at non-migrants. Based on that, we can identify differences and similarities with discourses directed at migrants, and thereby establish a better picture of circumstances and contexts of integration processes.

This section echoes previous research on understandings of Norwegianness, such as Erdal, et al. (2017), Erdal and Strømsø (2016), Lynnebakke and Fangen (2011), where the expansion and negotiation of Norwegianness involves cultural, ethnic, and legal markers, and widening the range of identities considered equal and opening up for a redintegrationist discourse. With Interculturalism's emphasis on culture, it is useful to highlight ethnicity as a complicit factor. As Jenkins (1997, p. 13) remarks: 'ethnicity is centrally concerned with culture'. If the positive effects of contact, according to Interculturalism, is premised on 'equal status between groups' (Loobuyck, 2016, p. 230); this presupposes a redintegrationist approach. While that may be how contact towards migrants is promoted, facilitators similarly have to move their volunteers in the same direction.

Rather than focusing on the "inferior" parties, the migrants, this section addresses how facilitators respond to fears and concerns from the "dominant", non-migrant, population. Contrary to what one would expect from the title of "dominant", or

similar term (majority, native, etc.), the facilitators refer to notions of unpredictability, insecurity, powerlessness, and ignorance amongst the wider population.

The initial move in facilitating contact between migrants and non-migrants is to find or create spaces where contact can occur. In the case of Siv and Larsen, we can identify them as primary facilitators, where both take a hands-on approach to finding or creating these spaces. This contrasts with Hasvoll's project, which targeted businesses and organisations rather than individuals, although they relied on individual migrants to inform their policies, priorities, and approach, the contact was envisioned as happening *out there*.

Siv and Larsen simplified their tasks by setting activities to venues where migrants were guaranteed to be, such as the emergency reception centres and adult education centre, thereby *assuming* the desire for contact amongst migrants. Furthermore, this proactivity gave Siv and Larsen the power to define the nature of the activity and contact. This demonstrates two assumptions: firstly, that contact is likely to have a positive outcome; secondly, that contact is primarily about counteracting migrant passivity, caused by either lack of will or lack of resources, as described in the above section. By inserting themselves into a venue, or situation, Siv and Larsen define the initial premise, and boundaries, of the contact.

This is most visible in the case of activities at the emergency reception centre. RCB defined a daily two-hour slot as the appropriate time for contact. In guidelines issued to the volunteers at the emergency reception centre, the first rule was 'Volunteers shall not establish personal contact with or give personal telephone numbers to recently arrived asylum seekers while on assignment from the Red Cross' (Red Cross Bodø, 2015a). A second document was circulated to volunteers with routines and recommendations and sought to encourage hospitality by euphemistically referring to the asylum seekers as "guests" and the volunteers as "hosts". The document attempted to demonstrate cultural awareness, indicating

the risk of stereotypes or cultural expectations. The rule of wearing the RC vest, effectively a uniform, cements the interaction as one between an active provider and passive recipient.

- Be early – our guests are often there before 18.00 — and it's great if things are ready by then;
- Wear the Red Cross vests lying to the left of the entrance;
- Greet each person, with a look, smile, or greeting. Be mindful that not all shake hands the Norwegian way;
- Be a host, divide your attention, and use time on small and big conversations with those present.
  RCB (2015b)

Although RCB sought to facilitate contact between recently arrived asylum seekers and locals, the instructions point to a relationship which is far from a meeting of groups with equal status, it is between provider and provided. These points were echoed in Siv's reflections. She notes how the interaction is premised on rules and a defined remit, making the contact inherently unequal as the volunteer and RCB assert the power to define every aspect of the contact in a narrow, social integrationist, specialised manner. The RCB is envisioned as addressing a single factor, and then only in a limited capacity.

So, that fell into place fairly quickly, our volunteering-policy, what we should do and shouldn't do, and from that point onwards it worked quite well. [...] We were there to make them feel safe, that was our objective. [...] We've had to... set some limits because it is important to us that this, those involved do it according to Red Cross guidelines. [...] And it's pretty difficult to know, I thought so, when I started out as a volunteer, I thought it was difficult to know how far my mandate as a volunteer extended. I thought "now I can go out and save the world, I'm going to do something good", and I was told "you should not translate papers", "you should not help them contact lawyers", "that is not your responsibility", "you are supposed to be a social provider, you are meant to be a relief, that is what you provide", "you should not be someone who, sort of, helps with these things, someone else will do that". So... I... It's a difficult balancing act.

Larsen, who was familiar with RCBs activities at the emergency reception centre made similar remarks but demonstrated uncertainty as to how to label and categorise the people they sought to help. This could point to uncertainty and insecurity related to a lack of awareness of migrant identification processes, as well as discourses around the legitimacy of claims, labelling and categorisations. The result, as Larsen points to, seems to be limiting and defining contact in a way which privileges the volunteer and provider in the power relationship established through the activity. Particularly in the case of the emergency reception centre, although practical, it drew attention to the mobility/immobility of the volunteers and asylum seekers: volunteers had freedom of movement, while the asylum seekers were, for a variety of reasons, confined to the centre[215].

> *[…] I think part of the reason why it is difficult for Norwegians to get in touch with refugees in a city, asylum seekers or whatever you want to call them, is that in a way it feels like you have to get very involved, you have to, in a way, go into a family, you have to have a house, clothes, food, and bring them on holiday, you get too involved, and you get a bit shy or anxious […] we have to take that seriously. So, to make a meeting place where they can make contact, for two hours, but then they can go home. […] I think that drew out very many. […] we have to take it seriously that people are afraid and sceptical and don't understand what's happening, and that there's no one "out to get them", and we just have to act accordingly.*
>
> Larsen

Furthermore, this tied into the distinctly gendered component in the refugee/asylum seeker-oriented activities. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to explore how this is related to gendering of other aspects of Norwegian society, but it would certainly be an avenue for further research.

> *[…] we're lacking men to be volunteers […] Why it is the case that men don't get engaged… I think it has to do with… a certain shyness […] I don't think it's reluctance, in a way, but… it's about finding good ways to get together […]*
>
> Larsen

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[215] Availability of means of transport, knowledge of local geography, climate, and uncertainty of rules are all factors in the mobility/immobility aspect.

> *We've got a tonne of female volunteers, it's women who sign up… There are of course also men, but not to the same extent as women. There is definitely a gender-disparity […] There are clearly defined tasks, not that I know when they were defined as such, but… the women do this, and the men do that. So… I've come to understand, not that I've experienced it, that it's easier for men if they have a defined task […]. I was at a meeting with some of the reception centres yesterday, and they wondered if one could start a fishing group, and I thought "Yeah, this is something we can go out and recruit men for", because it's very tangible. "Here we need men, or volunteers, who can fish, know what to do with it once it's caught, how to kill it, gut it, what you keep, what you throw". I think that's a great way to get men to volunteer, because simply being a volunteer in the Red Cross is very diffuse […]*
>
> Siv

This gendered division was also apparent in the social and multicultural[216] activities and trainings organised by RCB. Out of 22 participants at a meeting on multicultural work held late January 2016, six were male. A workshop held three weeks later, had between 25-30 participants, and, again, there were only half a dozen men in attendance. Out of 80 recipients of emails organising activities at the emergency reception centre, only a quarter were male. This is reflected in the volunteers' attendance, where out of 8 weeks, and 81 shifts, a man covered only 10 of those shifts. Further to that, three separate individuals covered those 10 shifts. This strengthens the idea that the activities centred on, relatively, unstructured socialisation are a highly gendered activity.

Despite the Interculturalist ideal of intercultural contact between groups of equal status, the reality is often far from it. The gender disparity between the volunteers and the asylum seekers and refugees leads to a complex discourse, where intersectionality becomes key to understanding and analysing the situations. Notions of gender, age, and culture are brought to the fore in Larsen's remark:

> *There are grown men in their 40s, and [my daughter who's 27] is a young woman who's unmarried, and that's what they ask about "why aren't you married?"*

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[216] Certain activities were grouped as "flerkulturell", which translates to multicultural

Naturally, intercultural contact requires these encounters in order to begin the bridging process between cultures. The principle of equal status thus becomes an idealised starting point, an implied premise for contact, rather than describing the contact itself. As Meer, et al., points out: 'differences in status and power relations more broadly mean that dialogue(s) do not proceed on an equal footing' (Meer, et al., 2016, pp. 12-13). Importantly, the contact serves to diversify non-migrants understanding of migrants particularly concerning how labels such as refugee or asylum seeker erase other identities. Contact can facilitate a move to externalising the refugee/asylum seeker label away from the individual, and seeing the label as a result of circumstances (Block, et al., 2013), thereby opening up for a diversity of past and future trajectories (Polzer, 2008; Gifford, 2013).

This was neatly exemplified by a conversation I had with a 21-year old Afghani man, Aron, at the emergency reception centre: he disliked that people often assumed they, the residents at the emergency reception centre, were Syrians, but in fact, there were Egyptians, Afghani *and* Syrians. He spoke of his journey, but he spoke more of what he wanted from his future. He also remarked that he appreciated speaking to a young man, someone his own age.

This encounter demonstrates the need for a gender balance, where certain differences are minimised and allow focus to be put on other differences and similarities. The Red Cross recognise this, as one of their activities, refugee-guides[217], emphasises that the refugee/non-refugee pair should be the same gender, and that they needed male refugee-guides.

RCB also had an International Women's Group and were in the process of creating a parallel International Men's Group. Simultaneously, one participant at a meeting

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[217] "Flyktningguide" – Refugee-guide, seeks to couple a refugee with a volunteer, who is expected to be someone who can introduce the refugee to Norwegian society (although there are no explicit criteria formulated). Again, the activity is confined and limited to regular contact at set intervals for up to a year, after which it is presumed the need has dissipated. The activity had been dormant in Bodø during my fieldwork, and only started up towards the end of my fieldwork, making it unfeasible to include in my research.

raised the gender segregation of activities as a potential *bjørnetjeneste,* something that might seem like a good idea at the time but ultimately is a disservice. The implication was that in order to convey Norway's form of gender equality, there should be activities that include both genders. In particular, this drew on the idea that asylum-seekers were predominantly male, whereas RCB volunteers were women.

The notion of acute versus chronic contributes to what labels we apply and how we understand them. Aron poignantly remarked that the assumption that the refugees arriving were Syrian was unfair considering Afghanistan has suffered a war much longer. This echoes the argument promoted by Hayden (2006), that the discrepancy in the understanding of the refugee label is a result of a series of relationships (inter-state relationships, origin-state to citizen, receiving-state to citizen, receiving-state to non-citizens, and the state's relationship to itself). Finally, the encounter between Aron and myself was impeded by the rules of engagement dictated by the Red Cross. I certainly felt that the Red Cross' "arms-length" approach, by strongly advising against forming close ties, encouraged a passivity, in myself, during the encounters. Underpinning the RC's approach seems to be a form of professionalism and construction of asylum seekers and refugees as vulnerable, in line with their charity-oriented model and emphasis on providing social amelioration (Brown, et al., 2002).

These points relate back to a discussion at one of the organising meetings between voluntary organisations in Bodø, where RCB representatives strongly emphasised the distinction between volunteerism and activism: a volunteer fulfils a formal role; the activist fulfils a personal, often political, desire. The notion of being both was not even considered. This is reminiscent of Bauböck's quote in section 8.3: specialised institutions are blind to the total complexity of individuals. Amongst organisations explored in this chapter, this appears to be the case, as they conform strictly to their remit, and, as Siv noted, 'work alongside each other, not with'.

This raises the question of the nature and quality of the intercultural encounters in their activities, if relationships are to be strictly defined and predetermined to exist only in a two-hour slot, as well as identities being consistently de-emphasised. Leaping ahead, to May 17th 2016, one of the public speeches[218] was held, in Norwegian, by a 14-year-old boy, one of the minors who arrived in November 2015. His honorary mention of RCB's activities at the emergency reception centre echoes Ager and Strang's (2008) findings that friendliness from the settled community is important. What is missing from Ager and Strang is the question of temporality: what does short-term friendliness do for long-term processes? Recalling Siv's comments on generosity in the previous section, the expression of gratitude entails a recognition of a power relationship.

While the Red Cross does not discourage long-term relationships, it does seek to limit it within their activities. The issue then becomes seeing intercultural contact as discrete points of contact, as the RC encourages, or as a process. This does not preclude us from identifying certain points of contact as more significant. Such as the speech from the 14-year-old schoolchild who has lived in Norway for six months or the speech from his counterpart, a teenage girl who came to Norway as a refugee in 2009, who called upon the legacy of national icon Henrik Wergeland: *[He] would have fought for refugees[219]*.

Alternatively, is Siv's description of how volunteerism and attitudes towards crises fluctuating in peaks and troughs more accurate, where the majority of time is spent in a level of indifference? In the absence of first-hand contact, what shapes perceptions amongst the rest of the population? If the media is a significant actor, then Eide and Simonsen's evidence pointing to how the Norwegian press functions as an 'ethnic gatekeeper' (Eide & Simonsen, 2007, p. 17) is significant[220].

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[218] For more on the nature of 17th May speeches, see Buxrud and Fangen (2017), of particular salience is the idea that 'this day forges an arena for intercultural encounters and national identity management' (p. 773).

[219] Wergeland was a vocal critic of the Norwegian Constitution's §2, which barred Jews, Jesuits, and monks from entering Norway.

[220] See Wiggen (2012) on Anti-Immigration rhetoric in Norway post-22 July, and Andersson (2012) on debates around Multiculturalism post-22 July

In conclusion, the discussion of how facilitators understand and relate to non-migrants offers additional insight into how we can understand integration processes. In the short term, their understanding is influenced by the public discourse and engagement, allowing them to facilitate a range of activities, whereas the long-term goal is to maintain and improve upon their activities. This is demonstrated, for example, by the awareness of the lack of male volunteers and the desire to remedy that deficiency. Understanding both "sides" is essential to furthering the understanding of how integration processes take place and inform activities.

What becomes apparent is that the highly specialised nature of the different organisations, combined with the division of labour amongst them, is incapable of engendering contact with a respect for the equality, multiplicity, and complexities of identities. Additionally, they are drawn to hierarchical understandings of identity which are often underpinned by racialised stereotypes.

Whereas the previous chapter emphasised the role of reciprocity, the data presented here encourages a power-relationship between the service-provider/volunteer and the recipient.

8.5 – Conclusions

This chapter has sought to draw attention to how individuals involved in facilitating activities that bring together migrants and non-migrants understand their activities. A key theme for the beginning of the chapter was whether the facilitators presented sought to compliment or compete with state understandings of integration processes and activities, as emphasised in research question 3.

There is a strong sense of complementarity in facilitator emphases and what the state desires, a focus on language and employment. Yet, facilitators are informed by an awareness of where the state is insufficiently involved, such as Hasvoll's emphasis on migrant labourers or family reunification. Although complementary to state efforts, it is understood as "making up for" a lack of concern or efforts from the state. The notion of an all-encompassing welfare state should, according to these facilitators, include adequately addressing the needs of asylum seekers, migrant labourers, and family reunification migrants.

In the case of reference group in the NFK migration project, they additionally criticised the lack of adequate state policy on integration, something we saw in Dmitri's comments in the previous chapter. The securitisation and conflict-oriented approach became apparent during the late winter of 2016, when relocating asylum seekers to another reception centre was framed as "deportation" and is apparent in policy changes such as the proposed changes to dual citizenship.

These perspectives and understandings come together to inform how facilitators approach their jobs, responsibilities, and obligations. In the absence of clear control by the state, they draw on their networks and resources, personal and organisational, in order to mitigate circumstances which are framed as acute or, for lack of a better term, a crisis.

The final section of this chapter also demonstrated how there is an awareness of how activities are gendered. Without necessarily reflecting on how they came to

be gendered, facilitators such as Siv and Larsen incorporate that understanding into how they attempt to recruit or structure activities, such as by attempting to find "male-oriented" activities. Although not framed in the sense of pursuing contact between groups of equal status, their pursuits carry the second meaning of the Norwegian word for Equality (*likhet*)[221] – birds of a feather flock together.

Overall, we find that the division of labour between voluntary organisations, spoken often of by those in Caritas in Chapter 6, results in highly specialised institutions that do not reflect on their or other's identities. Instead, processes of categorisation dominate, and activities are developed with an orientation towards providing a service. Combined with a rhetoric of crisis, the emphasis is then shifted towards material and resource-oriented solutions, contributing to the reification of identities and categories, while simultaneously establishing power-relationships that can contribute to the hierarchisation of identities. The only one who demonstrated consistent elements of a redintegrationist discourse was Hasvoll, who was also the one who had been working most consistently with integration processes for years and had involved migrants on an equal footing in the development of the project.

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[221] See section 4.4 for the discussion of *likhet* as a gatekeeper concept that can imply both equality and similarity.

Chapter 9 – Conclusions

9.1 – Summary

This thesis has analysed how religious and secular organisations can influence integration proceses. As integration processes need to be seen from a holistic perspective, I explored several tiers, ranging from the local to national contexts. A key aspect of emphasising the role of religious organisations is that it necessitates examining the religious-secular relationship. This led to the formulation of three overarching research questions, with supplementary sub-questions:

1. To what extent, and in what ways, do religious and secular identities and identifications influence integration processes?
2. What is the role of the Catholic Church (in Norway) and related institutions in integration processes?
    a. How does the nature of the Catholic Church affect its response to and perception of integration processes?
        i. How do the responses and perceptions of integration processes mirror or diverge from other organisations or institutions, such as the state?
    b. How does the relationship between different Catholic organisations influence integration processes?
3. How do secular organisations and activities in Norway impact integration processes?
    a. How do secular organisations and institutions, and their members, mirror or diverge from each other, and the state, in their understanding of integration processes?

The structure of the thesis was designed to answer these questions in sequence, and by moving from the theoretical to the empirical. Chapter 2 provided the theoretical framework and conceptual clarification, and Chapter 3 explored what methods I used to gather the empirical material. Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 subsequently established the contours that allowed me to situate the findings. Finally, Chapters 6-8 analysed the data and explored the research questions in depth.

The cornerstone of integration processes is identities. My analyses begin with understanding, first and foremost, that identities are multiple, contextual, and relational. Identities have to be distinguished from categories, which are always externally applied to individuals. Hence, it was necessary to examine the relationship between processes of identification and processes of categorisation. Despite the near infinite permutations of identities and categories, I focused on three I evaluated as the most pertinent for this thesis. As the case study focuses on Catholicism and Norway, I judged that religion, ethnicity, and nationality offered the greatest possibilities of answering the research questions. Due to constraints inherent to a PhD thesis (time, space, resources), this necessitated de-emphasising certain identities and categories, such as gender, diaspora, transnationalism, or sexuality.

Key to integration processes are the roles of migrant identities and categorisations. Shaped by processes of leaving, journeying, and arriving, a range of categories are generated and, occasionally, internalised to become, if only temporarily, identities. This ranges from asylum seeker to tourist, with each category and identity implying a different process of categorisation and identification, shaped by different contexts and relationships. This gives rise to a myriad of concepts attempting to describe integration processes. As a result of the fieldwork and extensive literature review, I adapted Levitas' (2005) discursive framework to explore migration and integration processes. This allowed me to step beyond the polysemic and contested meanings and understandings of a range of concepts. Instead, it allows for situating participants understandings of integration processes within their appropriate contexts and in relation to specific situations. Rather than imposing an academic definition on the concept of *integration*, the discursive framework focuses on the understanding and usage of it.

Subsequently, the research questions necessitated exploring theoretical premises for religion's potential influence on integration processes. This had to be seen in relation to secularisation processes. Each of the discursive categories has a reciprocal relationship with religious-secular relationships. If the religious-secular

relationship is conducive to one discursive context, we may see religion influencing integration processes in one way. Whereas a different discursive context may shape religion's influence another way. The discursive framework can also be applied to internal processes within religious organisations, for example by exploring the role of the papacy, the bishops' conferences, individual bishops, or priests. Exploring multiple levels allowed us to see the nuance in understandings of integration processes and how integration processes are influenced. Here Hirschmann's (2004) three Rs (Resources, Refuge, and Respectability) provided some refinement to the discursive framework, and by adding a fourth R, Reciprocity, the thesis established a theoretical basis for understanding integration processes and the role of religion.

With the theoretical framework laid out, in Chapter 3 I explored the methods employed during the fieldwork. Ethnography was the overarching method, characterised by participant observation, interviews, and documentary analysis. Taking place over the course of 14 months, the data collection consisted of an immersive and holistic approach. Exploring both religious and secular organisations, I moved to Bodø, in Northern Norway, and took part in activities in the Catholic parish, St. Eystein, Red Cross Bodø (RCB), and found work at a local bar. In addition to this, I conducted part of the ethnography across multiple locations, such as with Caritas and the Catholic Youth of Norway (NUK).

Having laid out the theoretical and methodological framework, Chapter 4 presented a range of statistical and documentary material in order to establish a context that allows us to analyse the data more fully. As integration processes are inherently about people, demographics play a key part in setting the context. Firstly, I explored how the migrant population grew from the 1970s onwards, with substantial increases in net migration. This occurs alongside an increasing urbanisation, which should not be ignored. Internal factors may have an equal, if not greater, impact on integration processes than immigration. Secondly, I demonstrated the relationship between demographic changes and policy changes, starting in the 1970s. The policy environment has encouraged certain forms of migration: supportive of Nordic migration, willingness to accept refugees, and the

necessity of accepting EU migration as a result of EEA membership. From the 1970s up until the 2000s, the diversification of the migrant population was inextricably linked to asylum seekers, refugees, and the concomitant family reunification. From the mid-2000s, labour migration has had a much larger impact on the composition of the migrant population. The exploration of demographic factors also demonstrated how there are significant differences due to gender, where women dominate immigration categorised as being for "family reunification" and "education", whereas men have dominated the categories of "work" and "refuge".

Shifting the perspective down to a local level, I explored demographic details pertaining to Bodø and Nordland. Contrasting it to the national data showed some variation, most significantly with regards to duration of residency. Unable to distinguish whether it was due to emigration, internal migration, or immigration to Nordland occuring at a slower rate, immigrants in Nordland had a significantly shorter duration of residency when compared to the national level. Despite some awareness of the diversification of the immigrant population at a local and county level, there is an absence of clearly formulated policy, and issues seem to be resolved on an ad-hoc basis.

While Chapter 4 explored the secular context, Chapter 5 examined the religious context in Norway. Firstly by looking at overarching issues of affiliation, disaffiliation, and secularisation, and how elements of the religious landscape have shifted. Utilising the recent membership scandal as an example, I demonstrated how the Catholic-secular relationship in Norway has been highlighted and shifted in recent times. The membership scandal was also an example of how migration flows can alter the internal composition of religious organisations, and the result this change can have on funding policies and understandings of different religions.

The remainder of Chapter 5 was an in-depth look at the Catholic Church in Norway. This was a key element, as this thesis deviates strongly from previous writing on the Catholic Church in Norway that characterises it as an "immigrant church".

Rather, I made the argument that the Church has gradually been shaped to a Norwegian context, giving rise to a hegemonic "Norwegian" Catholicity. What the increase in immigration has brought to the fore is the heterogeneity of the Catholic Church, challenging the hegemonic form. The growth of membership, officially registered or un-registered but practicing, has necessitated acquiring more priests to serve the parishioners. It has also necessitated expanding the provision of pastoral care in multiple languages. This discussion fundamentally shaped the arguments for *how* the Church can influence integration processes. It emphasises the basis on which decisions are made concerning *how* the Church manages this diversity and how it changes.

Chapter 6 furthered this analysis by exploring the fieldwork data. Returning to Hirschmann's three Rs and the discursive framework presented in Chapter 2, I analysed how the Church is capable of influencing integration processes at the diocesan level and the parochial level. At the Diocesan level, we saw how the acquisition and allocation of clergy allows the Church to react to demographic changes. Simultaneously, at the Diocesan level we saw how the relationship with Caritas allowed the Church to emphasise its religious character, which has become more diverse, while claiming credit for work done by Caritas through their shared Catholic identity.

Drawing on extensive participant observation and interviews, I then explored how integration processes are influenced at the parochial level. Here, I demonstrated the impact of clerical allocation on local processes, and how the changes explored at the Diocesan level are experienced locally. In particular, the growth of the parish, and its diversification, has highlighted multiple, overlapping identities that influence the parish. This altered the parish from a small, close-knit community, to a larger body comprised of multiple parts, mirroring the developments at the Diocesan level, albeit at a slower pace.

Finally, Chapter 6 examined the role of faith-based organisations such as NUK and Caritas. As a youth organisation, NUK has significant potential in reaching

descendants of immigrants, and can influence integration processes in a cross-generational aspect. As with the Diocese, there was a strong awareness of diversity, and a similarly strong emphasis on a shared, albeit heterogeneous, Catholic identity. Caritas, on the other hand, exhibited a considerably more functionalist outlook. Unlike the Diocese and NUK, the interviewees from Caritas echoed state understandings of integration processes. This derives, in part, from their reliance on state resources and cooperation/competition with other charitable organisations. Chapter 6 demonstrated the complex religious-secular relationship, and how the different organisations positionality in that relationship contributed to the discursive tendencies.

Chapter 7 continued the analysis of Hirschmann's three Rs, but applied it to non-religious cases. Exploring integration processes from local organisational and migrant perspectives, the chapter demonstrated how adding a fourth R, reciprocity, enhances our understanding. Where Red Cross Bodø and Refugees Welcome To Bodø mirrored a Social Integrationist perspective in their emphasis on the provision of resources and limited responsibility for refuge and respectability, the interviewees emphasised the importance refuge and respectability. Additionally, interviewees' remarks drew attention to how the provision of resources, refuge, and respectability, leads to reciprocity. This draws attention to the discussions of Rights versus Duties in debates around citizenship explored in Chapter 2. Importantly, the addition of reciprocity emphasises a relational perspective more suited to exploring integration processes and is capable of shifting the discourse away from a pure Social Integrationist Discourse.

In Chapter 8, I explored integration processes from the perspectives of non-migrants who are in positions that allow them a greater level of influence on integration-oriented activities. Here, we saw how the absence of clear instructions from a state level is mirrored at the local level, and responses at the local level were seen as mitigating the lack of state efforts. The emphasis on SID was nuanced by aspects of RED and MUD in the sense that the overwhelming emphasis was still on language and work, but there was some variation in whether the onus was on migrant passivity (MUD) or lack of resources (RED). There was a

consistent de-emphasis of identities, with exceptions deriving from prolonged cooperation with migrants in a context where they participated as equals as opposed to as customers/clients.

The final substantive chapter added an analysis of how facilitators and their organisations related to their volunteers. What this highlighted was how organized activities limited and restricted contact between volunteers and migrants. The specialisation of organisations points to a division of labour that allows for a de-emphasis of identities and engenders a transactional approach. This, in turn, furthers hierarchical perspectives where categories are ranked according to perceptions of vulnerability, and reinforce racialised stereotypes. The crisis-rhetoric of 2015-2016 further exacerbated the resource-oriented focus, and the broader societal discourse significantly shaped the activities set up in this time period.

9.2 – Key contributions

This thesis has made four significant contributions to our understanding of integration processes and the role of religious organisations. Firstly, the promotion of exploring integration through a discursive framework. Secondly, demonstrating how understandings of identities can influence integration processes. Thirdly, the expansion of Hirschmann's framework to include a fourth R; reciprocity. Finally, addressing the role of non-migrants and the influences they may have on integration processes.

9.2.1 – Contribution 1 – Integration processes in a discursive framework

The first contribution of this thesis is the appropriation of Levitas' (2005) discursive framework, developed for analyses of social exclusion, to understandings of integration processes. Components of this contribution are a) it allows us to categorise and understand a multitude of concepts pertaining to integration processes; b) it allows for, and clarifies, competing understandings of a concept; c) it reflects broader contexts and situates data in a processual understanding; d) it can be applied to theoretical discussions, political debates, and everyday conversations. The framework forces us to explore the underlying premises of the terminology. It allows us to explore why participants may choose one term over another, as contested keywords have context-specific connotations.

As shown in Chapter 2, the integration and migration field is replete with competing concepts and terminology. In turn, some of these concepts make their way into the vernacular and take on a life of their own, *integration* being the most obvious example. Many concepts derive from specific contexts and have different connotations (see in particular Table 4 and appendix A). For example, *assimilation* has different histories in the US and Europe, as does *multiculturalism*. *Assimilation* ranges from 'benign neglect' (Brazal, 2015c, p. 74) to 'a one-sided process of adaptation' (Castles & Miller, 2009, p. 247). *Assimilation* has also been developed to include the concept of *Segmented Assimilation* (Portes & Zhou, 1993; Wessendorf, 2013; Zhou & Bankston III, 2016), which seeks to nuance the

understanding of *assimilation*. *Multiculturalism* can be both 'cultural enrichment' (Ben-Rafael, 1996, p. 141), a normalisation of diversity (Kymlicka, 2012), and 'political accommodation by the state and/or a dominant group' (Meer, et al., 2016).

This creates a particular kind of conundrum: which concept does a researcher choose that is accurate for the context it is applied to, but simultaneously is interpreted the same way by the wider community of researchers? This was also echoed in the fieldwork, where finer nuances were lost by the fixation on a singular concept. Whereas *integration* (rather, the Norwegian "*integrering*") was a firmly established concept, often contrasted with *inclusion* (Eriksen, 2010), the crisis-rhetoric of 2015-2016 gave rise to *everyday-integration* ("hverdagsintegrering") as an alternative term. Additionally, as Rytter (2018) argues, we need to be highly critical of the uses of *integration*.

Applying a discursive framework represents an innovative, holistic approach that enables a critical perspective on the uses and meanings of *integration*. The discursive framework allows for the application of the same analytical rigour to all aspects of the methodology and the diversity of data. It can be applied equally to government reports and interviews, and irrespective of religious-secular distinctions, as evidenced by the context and data chapters of this thesis. The discursive framework and approach also highlights the processual nature of integration processes, as each discourse points to patterns of understanding and behaviour.

9.2.2 – Contribution 2 – Situating identities at the core of religious organisational aims and integration processes

The second key contribution of this thesis is that it develops a more robust analysis of how Catholic religious organisations influence integration processes in Norway. As much of the discussion on integration processes in Norway has been focused on Islam (Eriksen, 2012; Bangstad, 2014; 2013), Catholicism and Catholic organisations provide different experiences of integration processes. Exploring the

relationship between migration, integration, and the Church in Norway is relatively new, thus many of the studies so far have significantly limited scopes or omissions. Mæland (2016) overwhelmingly focuses on *internal* constructions of the Church, and does not explicitly address the notion of multiple and wider contexts for integration processes. Erdal (2016b), with an emphasis on Polish migrants (in major cities), highlights how the complexity of integration processes in the Church in Norway derives, in part, from the lack of a 'majority within which minorities might integrate', but fails to adequately address the institutional, historical power and legitimacy of a Norwegian Catholicity. Research by Halvorsen and Aschim (2016), and Giskeødegård and Aschim (2016) similarly limited its focus to Polish migrants, albeit in a peripheral Catholic parish on the west coast of Norway; failing to situate the local processes in the greater context, both politically and in relation to central Church aspects. Hovdelien (2016), on the other hand, overwhelmingly focuses on understandings within the core of the Church, omitting local and peripheral aspects.

This thesis, therefore, adds a significant contribution through its exploration of central *and* peripheral aspects, situating Catholic processes within overarching Norwegian societal integration processes, and providing a comparison to secular organisations. Through detailed analysis of several Catholic organisations, I demonstrated how, despite the organisations sharing a Catholic label, there were distinct differences in how they understand and influence integration processes. For the Church itself, at both diocesan and parochial levels, and NUK, the emphasis is on providing pastoral care, a mixture refuge, respectability and resources. Strengthening a Catholic identity and community shapes outlooks on alternative identities, similar to what Garces-Foley (2008) found in her comparison of Catholic and Evangelical integration efforts in the US. As a heterogeneous group, it has several options with regards to managing or responding to multiple identities: de-emphasise, hierarchise, or valorise.

De-emphasis implies an promoting a Catholic identity in favour of competing identities, as Erdal (2016b, p. 284) puts it 'faith is the common denominator'. Historically, this might have been a sustainable approach, as the hegemony of a

Norwegian — albeit pre-Vatican II — form of Catholicism was uncontested. But, as migration has altered the demographics of the Church membership, different Catholicities — legitimised post-Vatican II — have become associated with national and ethnic identities. Where previous analyses fall short is in the almost sensationalist emphasis on Polish migrants. As St. Eystein demonstrated, *despite* the Polish-born population within the parish nearly tripling over a decade, changes to the parish were rarely attributed to the Polish-born. Rather, it was the overall growth of the parish that was emphasised, where Filipino-born were seen as an enduring significant influence on the parish and its activities.

The influence of religious organisations is not confined to how they manage diversity, or 'unity within complex diversity' (Erdal, 2016b, p. 264), as much of the previous research emphasises, but includes how the management of diversity is perceived and fits into other, intersecting, overlapping integration processes. NUK provides a particularly salient demonstration of this in how it operates both within and outwith parishes and the diocese/prelatures. Where the Church is Catholic in form and content, continuously situating itself in a Norwegian context, NUK is Catholic in content, but the form is identical to other youth organisations in Norway. When the Church membership scandal broke, NUK was scrutinised because it was Catholic despite being a separate legal entity (Fordelingsutvalget, 2016). When NUK travels to the World Youth Days, it is a Norwegian group; the ethnic makeup of the group might result in it being considered a diverse group, but it is nonetheless categorised, and identifies, as a Norwegian group. The reciprocal relationship between NUKs local and central activities can have a significant impact on a parish, as seen in St. Eystein.

What the Church and NUK share is how they attempt to manage identities. De-emphasis is not viable, hence there is an attempt to negotiate valorisation and hierarchisation. They are not mutually exclusive, and cut across local and regional processes (parish and diocese), as well as a web of relationships between different identities (ethnic and national). As Garces-Foley (2008, p. 21) argues: 'Catholic integration efforts start and end with the assumption that new immigrants must be allowed to retain their religiocultural traditions [...]'. Effectively, this results

in a predisposition to valorisation of a diversity of ethnic and national identities. This does not suggest hierarchisation does not occur, it clearly does. What my analysis suggests is that hierarchisation is, in the Church centrally and NUK, considered problematic and detrimental.

This is where Caritas deviates, as their goal is not to manage identities, but to provide a service. Other than an association with the Church and a Catholic identity, Caritas is not structured, nor does it operate, distinctly from other voluntary organisations. While the relationship to the Church offers some strengths, their approach to, and influence on, integration processes appears to have more in common with other charities and voluntary organisations than with the Church and NUK. Their domestic work oriented towards integration processes is distinctly Social Integrationist, as opposed to the Church and NUK's inclination to redintegrationist discourses. Their activities rely on de-emphasising identities, and emphasising the role of language and work. Identities are only relevant insofar as it relates to where they are situated in hierarchical constructions of identities, as seen in how the activity coordinators seek to "adjust expecations" of what a migrant can expect to obtain in terms of work. Whereas NUK and the Church have the open-ended goal of growth and absence of conflict, Caritas echoes governmental outlooks on integration processes and emphasise language and work as goals, rather than as means to a goal of an equal society.

9.2.3 – Contribution 3 – Adding Reciprocity to Hirchmann's framework

The third key contribution is the highlighting of reciprocity in integration processes, expanding Hirschmann's (Hirschmann, 2004) framework from three to four Rs. Reciprocity emphasises the relational and contextual nature of integration processes. Adding reciprocity to our understanding of factors in integration processes also contributes to the citizenship discussion in Chapter 2 (in particular Jurado (2008)); demonstrating how we benefit from seeing the relationship as rights *and* duties, rather than rights *versus* duties. The interviews with Dmitri, Vanessa, and Ali demonstrate the complexity of this relationship.

They demonstrate how relationships to workplaces, local communities, as well as to an imagined nation, can shape integration processes. Specifically, how the reciprocal nature of these relationships can have positive or negative influences. All three demonstrated the benefit of a redintegrationist approach to integration processes. An approach that addresses multiple factors that contribute to inequalities, and defies the hierarchisation of identities. Recognising reciprocity enables a discourse that empowers migrants as providers of refuge, resources, and respectability in their own right, and can run counter to Moral Underclass discourses of welfare chauvinism that suggest migrants have 'a tendency to erode the normative consensus on which generous welfare systems depend' (Brochmann & Hagelund, 2012a).

9.2.4 – Contribution 4 – Influencing integration processes for non-migrants and from non-migrant perspectives

The fourth contribution is the insight into how individuals in formal positions within non-Catholic organisations understand and attempt to influence integration processes at a local level. The discursive framework allows us to distinguish *where* and *how* local efforts deviate from national policy and rhetoric. For example in Hasvoll and Larsen's rebuke of governmental approaches that were seen as indicating a Moral Underclass Discourse or simply insufficient. The crisis-rhetoric exacerbated MUD tendencies by implying a failure or dysfunction of the asylum system, at both national and European levels. It also questioned the sustainability of the welfare state, and villified migrants as harming its sustainability, risking strengthening notions of welfare chauvinism (e.g. the Brochmann-II commission) (Freeman, 2009).

What is remarkable is how the disconnect between local and central is apparent twenty years after the issue was identified in the Moen-Commission (Norges Offentlige Utredninger, 1995). Local initiatives started up and developed in the perceived absence of a coherent government response, thereby becoming 'exceptional services that are legitimised and presented as humanitarian services' (Bendixsen, 2018, p. 168). What Siv and Larsen drew attention to in their interviews was how the circumstances and governmental behaviour in 2015-2016 complicated the trust relationship between citizen and state, which can drive

anxiety in society (Papademetriou & Kober, 2012). Hasvoll also referred to anxieties in the non-migrant population and the need to mitigate them.

Thus, an important aspect of their work entailed addressing potential anxiety amongst their volunteers and locals. One outcome is a construction of the local community as "generous", engendering an unequal relationship between migrant and non-migrant that contributes to the hierarchisation of identities that privileges Norwegians. This ties into how activities by the Norwegian Church and Red Cross are often organised in ways that favour or privilege the volunteers; by controlling the context and circumstances of their activities. This may be the reason why, even in 1995, the Moen-commission (section 4.4, in particular Table 6) noted how efforts to influence integration processes never quite achieve Full Pluralism (their term) or redintegration.

These findings provide a contribution to the Multiculturalism-Interculturalism debate, which was touched on in Chapter 2 and Chapter 4. An aspect of Interculturalism, according to Kymlicka (2016, p. 173), is that it attempts to avoid 'triggering anxieties'. What the interviews with Hasvoll, Larsen, and Siv demonstrate are differences in how those anxieties are addressed. On the one hand, they are addressed through controlling and defining parameters of interaction. What the interview with Hasvoll demonstrates, on the other hand, is how, through work with the Reference group, there are multiple causes for those anxieties. Efforts to influence integration processes, therefore, should address multiple factors, rather than simply focusing on language and work, as the organisations emphasising a Social Integrationist Discourse tend to.

9.3 – Implications and recommendations

The above section alludes to multiple potential avenues of further research. These are a few suggestions for where this research can go, all of which suggest further application of the discursive framework. Firstly, more can be done to explore the differences between national, regional, and local discourses of integration processes. This is already touched upon by some scholars, but the research can benefit from a more expansive approach that includes participant observation, interviews, *and* documentary analysis. Secondly, further research comparing different religions can add considerable depth to the analysis. Thirdly, a more comprehensive look at voluntary organisations, faith-based or not, would be fruitful, as this thesis was limited to a local branch. There are already multiple, recent, publications based on the Peace Research Institute in Oslo (PRIO) "NATION" project, which explores constructions of the nation-state and norwegianness from the perspective of school students[222].

Finally, a significant implication for further research is the emphasis on engaging critically with a range of material. This thesis has drawn on a multitude of resources and methods, and has highlighted the need to contextualise the analysis. Engaging critically with both reports *and* statistics draws attention to how processes have developed on one level, while engaging with historical material and contemporary data extends our analysis beyond ahistorical analyses based on a preconceived notion of recency.

I am hesitant to offer definitive recommendations for specific action for the organisations in this thesis, as well as wider policy implications. As integration processes, and discourses, are intricate, multivariate, complicated, and overlapping, I have only pointed to a relationship between the two. Suggesting correlation or causation is, for now, simply beyond the ability of this thesis. It is impossible to ascertain what impact a recommendation would have on integration processes. What I would suggest, on the other hand, is a series of questions that may inform decision-making processes or integration discourses.

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[222] See for example Erdal and Strømsø (2018a; 2018b) or Strømsø (Strømsø, 2018).

1. What does this (action, event, statement, policy, etc.) say about our understandings of identities?

I argued in Chapter 2 that identities are at the core of integration processes. The discursive framework points to three, broadly speaking, approaches to identities: valorisation of a diversity of identities (Redintegrative), de-emphasis (Social integrationist), and hierarchisation (Moral Underclass). These operate on a continuum, and may have their time and place, but an organisation or group seeking to influence integration processes should be aware of the possible implications of choosing one over the other. De-emphasis does not, as argued above, preclude valorisation or hierarchisation, and the latter two may occur in spite of de-emphasis. Similarly, hierarchisation or valorisation may provoke each other, as we saw in the contrast between governmental and local responses to the arrival of refugees in 2015-2016. This leads to the second question.

2. What factor in integration processes does this (action, event, statement, policy, etc.) seek to address?

There is no silver bullet for integration processes. This does not imply that actions geared towards addressing one factor are inadequate, but recognising the limitations of the action may help clarify expectations. This is particularly useful from a Social Integrationist perspective, as it allows organisations to focus their activities on one source of inequality, while also recognising that there are multiple forms of inequality. This is compatible with how the voluntary sector already operates in Norway, with a significant division of labour. Additionally, this may skew the Social Integrationist approach towards a Redintegrationist understanding rather than MUD.

Essential to drawing the greatest benefit from this requires an awareness of the broader spectrum of influences on integration processes. As Gunnar (Caritas Bergen) remarked in Chapter 6: '*what we have tried to do, is to not bake the same cake*'. In order for this to be the case, one needs to know who's baking what. In other words, there needs to be a level of coordination. This opens up one specific recommendation, albeit hardly original as it is already implemented in

some towns and cities: a local government volunteer coordinator that can keep track of and support voluntary organisations and their activities. The absence of this was repeatedly noted in Bodø during the fieldwork, and would in all likelihood contribute positively to integration processes.

3. Are there moral components to this action (event, policy, statement, etc.)?

Perhaps one of the more significant questions, the purpose is to clarify that there are no neutral decisions or actions. We see this in how even a Social Integrationist Discourse can incorporate elements of a Moral Underclass Discourse. Recognising that morality plays a role in integration processes allows us to more clearly recognise which part of the continuum discourse one cuts across. This is also related to the first question pertaining to identities: valorisation and hierarchisation communicate moral positions.

4. How do we understand integration processes? Are they continuous and open-ended, or are they limited and finite?

These questions go to the heart of the subject matter: the constitution and imagination of society. Any attempt to influence integration processes should begin with scrutinising what they are and how they are understood. This underpins the entire discursive framework. If integration processes are seen as limited and finite, the discourses, and resultant action, are confined to Social Integrationist or Moral Underclass Discourses. Society is seen from a functionalist and relatively static perspective, where integration can be measured and considered complete. This underpins the close relationship between SID and MUD, as both rely on functional conceptions of society. The distinction lies in whether one concerns itself with "failures" (MUD) or whether it chooses to ignore/de-emphasise it (SID).

The alternative, open-ended and continuous, allows for a Redintegrationist discourse and understanding. It implies a more holistic understanding of society that opens up for a multifactorial approach. Alongside a Social Integrationist Discourse, it allows an emphasis on a factor while recognising that integration processes are complex. It also encourages a negotiation of where the integration processes lead, and what one seeks to achieve by influencing it.

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Appendix A – Discursive framework – relevant references

Redistributive Discourse of Exclusion (RED)

- Multiculturalism
  - '[Immigrants] should be able to participate as equal in all spheres of society, without being expected to give up their own culture, religion and language, although usually with an expectation of conformity to certain key values' (Castles & Miller, 2009, pp. 247-248);
  - '[Can] include the whole society through its national identity' (Vasta, 2009, p. 30);
  - Normalisation of diversity (Kymlicka, 2012);
  - '[Represents] cultural enrichment' (Ben-Rafael, 1996, p. 141);
  - '[Criticized] because, in concentrating on cultural identity, it has neglected the fundamental problem of the economic and political marginalisation and exploitation' (Turner, 2010, p. 73);
  - '[Arises] in the context of liberal or social democratic egalitarianism and citizenship [and] is different from integration because it recognizes groups, not just individuals' (Modood, 2013, pp. 6, 46);
  - '[A] picture of multiculturalism which is predicated on a stance towards difference as non-intrusive' (Valluvan, 2016, p. 211);
  - '[Refers] to the policy of peaceful co-existence of different cultural communities in one nation-state, with neither intention nor vision of interaction to create a larger community of bonding' (Brazal, 2015b, pp. 47-48);
  - '[The] inclusion of immigrants into the mainstream by respecting their differences and recognising their distinctive cultural practices, religions and languages […] [Multiculturalism is] rights-based' (Zapata-Barrero, 2017, pp. 3, 13);
  - '[Is] about ensuring there is a genuine dialogue and that the minority is allowed to express its point of view' (Modood, 2017, p. 6);
  - '"the political accommodation by the state and/or a dominant group of all minority cultures defined first and foremost by reference to race or ethnicity, and, additionally, but more controversially, by reference to other group-defining characteristics such as nationality, aboriginality, or religion […]"' (Moodod and Meer in Meer, Modood, & Zapata-Barrero, 2016, p. 4);
  - '[Highlights] the problem in the state-sponsored privileging of nationhood, and [the] exclusions this has entailed' (Kymlicka, 2016, pp. 172-173);

- o '[Focuses] on equal rights, recognition and justice [and] can be thought of as a vertical, top-down policy between the state and minority groups' (Loobuyck, 2016, pp. 226, 232);
- o 'An "orientation" to immigration that embraces difference and diversity […] a particular way of identifying how immigrants integrate in the destination country, and how they are expected to integrate' (Bartram, et al., 2014, pp. 102-103);
- o '[A] particular type of normative response [that] means that the state recognises and protects cultural minorities as distinct groups' (Brochmann & Hagelund, 2012a, p. 10)

- Integration
  - o '[Relates] to their social, political and economic participation in the receiving society […] [Only] participation in civic associations and in general cultural discourse can provide proof that integration has been [achieved]' (Bauböck, 1996a, pp. 114, 116);
  - o '[Participation] in societies common institutions, combined with maintenance of group identities and cultural uniqueness' (Eriksen & Sørheim, 1994, p. 92);
  - o '[Equal] opportunities to compete for the same economic outcomes and can participate in civic and political life on the same basis as their native counterparts' (Papademetriou & Kober, 2012, p. 21);
  - o 'For integration to occur, a mutual accommodation is required, involving the acceptance by both dominant and nondominant groups of the right of all groups to live as culturally different people who interact within the same society' (Phinney, et al., 2006, p. 71);
  - o '[Is] a two-way process – it requires the mainstream society to adapt itself to immigrants, just as immigrants must adapt to the mainstream' (Kymlicka, 1995, p. 96);
  - o '[Is] the generic over-arching term of which multiculturalism is a species an so the two terms are on different levels rather than being alternatives' (Modood, 2013, p. 146);
  - o '[Has] been conceptualised as a two-way process which also involves social and cultural transformations in the majority society' (Wessendorf, 2013, pp. 6-7);
  - o '[Entails] rooting out prejudice and discrimination [and] is a long-term intergenerational process' (Brazal, 2015c, p. 79);
  - o '[Predicates] a degree of mutual adaptation and acceptance' (Halvorsen & Aschim, 2016, p. 103);
  - o '[Process] by which immigrants gain social membership and develop the ability to participate in key institutions in the destination country' (Bartram, et al., 2014)

- Accommodation
  - '[Involves] the adaptation of the inserted group to existing conditions, as well as a change in the structure of the larger society and a redefinition of its criteria of cohesion […] characteristics of inserted groups become accepted as distinctions *within* common social positions and membership groups' (Bauböck, 1996a, p. 114);
  - '[Does not] necessarily require state action [but can be] addressed within the framework of civic society' (Kivisto, 2014, p. 163)
- Inclusion
  - '[Arises] from five values: social justice, diversity, choice and opportunity, entitlement to rights and services and working together' (Babacan & Babacan, 2013, p. 160);
  - 'Acquisition of citizenship is linked to social inclusion' (Pittaway, 2013, p. 179);
  - '[Does not] necessarily require state action [but can be] addressed within the framework of civic society' (Kivisto, 2014, p. 163)
- Interculturalism
  - '[…] not only respects difference but creates a space for the interaction of diverse cultural groups within a society' (Brazal, 2015b, pp. 47-48);
  - '[…] contact opportunities between the local population and the minority [group diminishes] tension and prejudice against that group' (Garcia-Muñoz & Neuman, 2012, p. 14);
  - '[Places] more emphasis on a contact-based policy approach […] it also needs to be supplemented by a positive narrative at the societal level to support and sustain the beneficial impact (political, leaders' narratives, the media, schools, etc.)' (Zapata-Barrero, 2017, pp. 2, 9);
  - '[Focuses] on interaction, social cohesion and shared participation on the basis of belonging together […] must involve equal status between groups, norms, supportive of equality, and co-operative rather than competitive intergroup interaction' (Loobuyck, 2016, pp. 226, 230)
- Selective acculturation
  - '[Takes] place when the learning process of both generations is embedded in a co-ethnic community of sufficient size and institutional diversity to slow down the cultural shift and promote partial retention of the parents' home language and norms' (Portes & Rumbaut, 2001, p. 54);

- - '[Occurs] when parents and children learn the language and culture of the host society and, at the same time, retain significant elements of their "original" culture or remain part of their ethnic communities' (Bartram, et al., 2014, p. 10)
- Deep equality
  - '[Is] a vision of equality that transcends law, politics, and social policy, and that relocates equality as a process rather than a definition, and as liver rather than prescribed. It recognises equality as an achievement of day-to-day interaction and is traceable through agonistic respect, recognition of similarity, and a concomitant acceptance of difference, creation of community, and neighbourliness' (Beaman, 2017, p. 16)

Social Integrationist Discourse (SID)

- Enclaves
  - o 'with its pool of low paid and available workers traps these workers in a co-ethnic and mono-linguistic environment, limiting their access to social networks outside of the immediate ethnic community and preventing structural embeddedness into the wider society' (Bloch & McKay, 2015, p. 41);
  - o 'self-employment and employment in ethnic ownership economies are understood to result from disadvantages in the dominant labour market and in resources' (Bartram, et al., 2014, p. 59)
- Segregation
  - o 'preserves the existing social structure by confining inserted individuals or groups within clearly-marked segments […] provides an externalisation of difference' (Bauböck, 1996a, p. 114)
- Segmented Assimilation
  - o '[In Europe] the idea of segmented assimilation has thus been conceptualized in terms of the differentiation and divergence between structural, political, social and cultural integration' (Wessendorf, 2013, p. 7);
  - o 'raises the question of what makes some immigrant groups become susceptible to the downward route and what resources allow others to avoid this course […] the extent to which this strategy is possible also depends on the history of each group and its specific profile of vulnerabilities and resources' (Portes & Zhou, 1993, pp. 82, 96);
  - o 'is built on the central idea that contexts shape assimilation' (Zhou & Bankston III, 2016, p. 73)
- Dissonant acculturation
  - o 'takes place when children's learning of the [local] language and [way of life] and simultaneous loss of the immigrant culture outstrip their parents' (Portes & Rumbaut, 2001, pp. 53-54);
  - o 'occurs when children reject the values and culture of their parents for those of the host society' (Bartram, et al., 2014, p. 10)
- Consonant acculturation
  - o 'where the learning process and gradual abandonment of the home language and culture occur at roughly the same pace across generations' (Portes & Rumbaut, 2001, p. 54);
  - o 'occurs when parents and children simultaneously learn the language and become accommodated to the customs and culture of the host society' (Bartram, et al., 2014, p. 10)

- Incorporation
  - 'the process of becoming incorporated into the new setting requires a sifting and choosing of which aspects of one's cultural background to preserve and which social ties to maintain' (Kivisto, 2014, p. 38)
- Denizens
  - 'people who have become members of and have rights in their adopted countries to a substantial extent – in other words they have gained a *degree* of citizenship – but they are not citizens in a formal status sense' (Bartram, et al., 2014, p. 41)
- Integration
  - 'is usually identified as a matter of concern by politicians, and academic research in this area often seems to echo their concerns; some of this research is funded by governments and then predictably emphasizes issues that can be addressed by governments' (Bartram, et al., 2014, p. 87);
  - '*integration policy*: a development of the means at the disposal of the welfare state to prevent social and economic marginalisation of what, at least initially, have been new, weak groups in society […] measures concerning legally established immigrants that support them during the process of integration into the society and contribute to improving preconditions to enable realisation of their rights' (Brochmann & Hagelund, 2012a, pp. 10, 14)
  - 'dominance of SID in government policy' (Levitas, 2005, p. x);
  - 'in politics the themes for integration have the following order: labour, education, housing, and finally, values' (Døving, 2009, p. 83);
  - 'European governments in general have also neglected to develop integration policies and programmes for the highly skilled, assuming that highly educated and skilled migrants would adjust to a new society without them' (Bartram, et al., 2014, p. 131)

Moral Underclass Discourse (MUD)

- Racism – 'the process whereby social groups categorize other groups as different or inferior on the basis of phenotypical or cultural markers. This process involves the use of economic, social or political power, and generally has the purpose of legitimating exploitation or exclusion of the group so defined […] Minorities may have poor employment situations, low incomes and high rates of impoverishment. This in turn leads to concentration in low-income neighbourhoods and growing residential segregation. The existence of separate and marginal communities is then taken as evidence of failure to integrate, and this in turn is perceived as a threat to the host society.' (Castles & Miller, 2009, pp. 37, 275); 'migrants and refugees have been represented metaphorically as natural catastrophes (*flow, flood, invasion*), against which "we" are presupposed to need to protect ourselves' (Eide & Simonsen, 2009, p. 230); 'Perceived discrimination is positively correlated with [separation] and marginalisation' (Phinney, et al., 2006, p. 113); 'Racism and xenophobia […] provide ideologies that deepen this divide between national and migrant[s] [and] prevent them from uniting' (Brazal, 2015a, p. 10)
- Assimilation – 'immigrants were to be incorporated into society through a one-sided process of adaption' (Castles & Miller, 2009, p. 247); 'coercive inclusion in a dominant culture' (Bauböck, 1996b, p. 9); 'leads to gradual *abolition of difference* […] cultural difference is then redefined as a hierarchy of civilisations […] Failed assimilation therefore prepares the ground for a racist interpretation of cultural distinctions […]' (Bauböck, 1996a, p. 114); 'based on the assumption that difference is harmful and should be abandoned' (Turner, 2010, p. 76); 'An attitude of laissez-faire, or benign neglect vis-à-vis the cultures on the part of the country of immigration, tantamounts to a policy of assimilation' (Brazal, 2015c, p. 74); 'conveys a factual prediction about the final outcome of the encounters between foreign minorities and the native majority and, simultaneously, an assertion of a socially desirable goal […] [forceful assimilationism] delegitimize the culture and the language of [migrants] […] Assimilationism sustains a vision of an integrated society composed of well-behaved citizens who share key values and normative commitments' (Portes & Rumbaut, 2001, pp. 44-45, 273, 276); '[however] defined, is typically a multigenerational process' (Hirschmann, 2004, p. 1211); 'the decline of an ethnic distinction and its corollary cultural and social differences' (Alba & Nee, 2003, p. 11)
- Group Threat Theory – 'predicts that an increase in the size of the minority generates hostile attitudes by the dominant native group toward the minority, either because of competition over scarce resources, or because of the perception that the minority is a symbolic threat to the cultural integrity' (Garcia-Muñoz & Neuman, 2012, pp. 14-15)
- Reactive ethnicity – 'forging a reactive ethnicity in the face of perceived threats, persecution, and exclusion is not uncommon […] Groups subjected to extreme discrimination and derogation of their national origins are likely to embrace them even more fiercely […] is the product of confrontation with an adverse native mainstream' (Portes & Rumbaut, 2001, pp. 148, 187, 284)

- Welfare Chauvinism – '[claims] and policies to reserve welfare benefits for the "native" population; 2) an ethno-nationalist and racializing political agenda' (Keskinen, et al., 2016, p. 321); 'the welfare state does not operate according to fiscal logic alone – it also reinforces (or is intended to reinforce) solidarity. That point raises the question: solidarity *among whom*?' (Bartram, et al., 2014, pp. 43-44); 'immigration has a tendency to erode the normative consensus on which generous welfare systems depend' (Brochmann & Hagelund, 2012a, pp. 2-3); 'Accumulating evidence suggests there are significant negative relationships between both ethnic diversity and the rate and scale of migration and support for welfare state programs, either as measured by public opinion or by public sector spending on welfare programs' (Freeman, 2009, p. 11)
- Passing – '[adopting certain aspects of identity so as to be "unmarked"] and covering (i.e. attempting to downplay one's [identities]) are two common ways of coping with [stigma]' (Khosravi, 2012, p. 78)
- Integration – '"Integration" does not have a universally agreed meaning; indeed it is often used without being defined and is sometimes used (by different people) in ways that can fairly be described as mutually incompatible' (Bartram, et al., 2014, p. 84); 'has become an emic concept used in the media and by the general public and politicians to address specific minorities and their more or less unsatisfactory ways of being and belonging in particular nation-states […] the concept of *integration* implies a specific kind of "problematisation" […] talk of and demands for *integration* in public and political discourse rest on, produce and reproduce specific ideas of the society, the state, the nation and the relationship between majorities and minorities' (Rytter, 2018, p. 2)

Appendix B – Interview participant list

NAME[223]	GENDER	ROLE/OCCUPATION/ASSOCIATION	NATIONALITY
Mgr. Torbjørn Olsen	Male	Episcopal Secretary for Pastoral Care for Migrants in the Catholic Diocese of Oslo, previously priest in St. Eystein Bodø	Norwegian
Vigdis Larsen	Female	Deacon in the Norwegian Church	Norwegian
Siv	Female	Red Cross	Norwegian
Kirsten Hasvoll	Female	Adviser at Nordland County administration	Norwegian
Thomas Sivertsen	Male	Parishioner	Norwegian
Vanessa	Female	Bartender at Borealis	Swedish/Cypriot
Dmitri	Male	Red Cross	Russian
Gunnar Solheimnes	Male	Activity coordinator - Caritas Bergen	Norwegian
Per Wenneberg	Male	Leader for the Domestic section of Caritas Norway	Norwegian
Trond Aaring	Male	Activity coordinator - Caritas Drammen	Norwegian
Knut Maubach	Male	Activity coordinator - Caritas Stavanger	Norwegian
Ali Horori	Male	Local politician	Norwegian
Elisabeth Thielemann	Female	Principal at St. Eystein school	Norwegian

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[223] Italicised names are pseudonyms