SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS POSED BY SQUATTER SETTLEMENTS AND POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS IN EGYPT: AN INTEGRATED FRAMEWORK

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ABSTRACT

Socio-economic characteristics and environmental problems posed by squatter settlements and possible solutions in Egypt: An integrated framework.

The objective of this thesis is to assess the mechanisms involved in efficient and successful upgrading of slum and squatter settlements in Egypt. After examining the general origins of these areas, the socio-economic characteristics, the articulations of land supply, the governmental attitudes and responses, it focuses on the concept of 'self-help' which directs the formation and upgrading of these areas. The in-depth analysis examines and addresses two points. The first concerns the major domestic factors which influence this problem in Egypt- namely, the quality of political and economic climate; the equity of developmental policies; the applicability of urban planning and housing standards and the efficiency of the institutions concerned.

The second is a case study of a squatter area in Aswan where a mutual co-operation and 'self-help' upgrading scheme has been ambitiously carried out by three partners: The residents of the area, the Egyptian government and the German government. The project aims at involving both the target group and the institutions concerned to work collectively in achieving sustainable development of the institutional performance, the socio-economic and legal status of the residents, and the physical environment of the area. Theoretical and empirical models have been utilised to examine the impact of land security and socio-economic status on the physical conditions of housing.

The thesis asserts that the 'self-help' housing in the case area represents a positive organisation. It mobilises a human labour force hitherto redundant or under-utilised. Squatter housing processes and their economy employ a substantial amount of the national inputs which, in turn, reduce external debts by lowering the overall national demands for inputs. It draws constructive conclusions about the bases required for sound upgrading that can grant replicability elsewhere in the future. These include: efficient institutions structured so as to design long-term goals and work hand-in-hand with the target beneficiaries; participation and 'self-help' processes, which can contribute to the development of collective consciousness aiming on long-term community-action programme; self-financing, to grant the independence of the project, the sustainability and the self-administration of the target group.

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INTRODUCTION

There can be few more important issues than that of housing for the poor and deprived millions living in developing countries. To them it means more than 'shelter' for it provides the secure base from which they can pursue their activities, and ensure their own survival. The formation of slum and squatter settlements represents the people's effort to bridge the gap between rural and urban community living. In some major cities, the doubling rate of these communities, which can both serve and thwart development, is less than 10 years. The rapid influx of unskilled and semi-skilled labour into the major urban regions makes demands on the urban structure which have rarely occurred in past centuries. These demands are quantitative with respect to increasing population densities and qualitative such as housing, water, sewers, roads and community services.

The problem centres on the urban groups who cannot gain access to the formal market for land and housing because they cannot afford to. The extent of exclusion varies according to circumstances. As conditions worsen, more and more people appear unable to afford housing and are, in this context, considered poor. On the other hand, as conditions improve many low-income families may indeed gain access to decent housing. Slums and squatter settlements contain the very poor, casual labours who can usually only afford to rent rooms and shacks, as well as the not-so-poor, self-employed tradesmen who may own their houses and let rooms to others.

A rich variety of arrangements of access to land for housing the poor has come into being in the cities of the Third World, resulting in the creation of large numbers of informal areas. The majority of these settlements are created illegally, they are the outcome of planned and premeditated processes of coalitions of economic and political interests. This issue is important in so far as these informal practices continue to provide the great majority of the low-income housing stock, while official attempts to provide housing fail to compete with illegal arrangements on any significant scale.

Action on land and housing for and by the urban poor may be motivated by a variety of concerns which need not necessarily be mutually consistent. These may range from a genuine charitable concern for the reduction of visible human suffering to a concern for order and cleanliness in the city. They may be voiced by radical community organisers stressing the right of the poor to stay in the city and their right to share in its wealth, or by military rulers wishing to prevent street riots and insurrections. The issue may be adopted by politicians appealing for votes in squatter settlements, or by industrialists wishing to keep the cost of housing low so that wages can remain low.

In a similar vein, resistance to action on land for housing the poor may come from different quarters. It may originate from land-owning groups who see their control over land endangered, from middle-income groups who feel that they should be ahead of the poor in the housing queue, or from radicals who see such measures as subduing the revolutionary zeal of the masses. There is, however, a general consensus that the housing conditions of the urban poor are unsatisfactory and that past action to ameliorate them has been largely ineffective.

Informal housing areas are often considered to be self-built settlements. In fact, the self-help concept goes far beyond housing schemes. It refers also to employment, welfare, community facilities and infrastructure (Hake 1977). Self-help may involve individual as well as group inputs and corresponds to a system of production, financing, and maintenance in which a significant part is organised and carried out by that person or group. In brief, self-help housing is the approach whereby the user is an active and effective part of the whole, or part, of the housing process (Turner 1976: 140).

Based on governments' responses towards housing deficiency and deficits, self-help processes may occur at three levels: The first occurs when governments adopt anti-slum formation policies. They introduce regressive administrative rules and/or implement developmental housing projects that can reduce urban growth and accommodate the urban poor. In contrast, governments may adopt a *laissez-faire* attitude and let low-income people build their houses by themselves. The second level arises after the formation of slum and squatter settlements. Variety of socio-political and economic factors direct the governments to adopt either reactionary palliative measures of forcible repatriation and slum clearance, or genuine remedial policies such as urban upgrading and 'careful urban renewal' with peoples' participation.

In Egypt, rapid growth of informal housing has become a major problem the Egyptian government faces. About 81% of total houses which have been built during the period 1970-1981 in the Great Cairo Region G.C.R. were informal. Due to the high cost of the flats offered either by the private sector or the government, a certain class of people occupies governmental land illegally and builds ramshackle houses using any available and cheap materials without any permission or licence from the city councils. Although these areas suffer from several social and economic problems they have certain potential which influences the economic stability of the cities.

Some short-sighted political leaders see slum and squatter settlements as an atrocious cancer which should be eradicated. They ignore the socio-economic structure of these areas, and see upgrading as a tool to gain political support only before elections. Consequently, squatters mistrust them and become unwilling to upgrade their dwelling

and living environment. They fear losing their scarce savings unless they acquire a secure tenureship.

Various upgrading theories present different approaches to solve these problems but experience shows that the planning and implementation process from above, whether done by the state, or any other funding authority fails if it is without the participation of the intended beneficiaries or the target group. Without community involvement, maintenance of provided services and social infrastructure cannot be granted. Hence, upgrading schemes should assist the community to identify and articulate their needs and priorities. Meanwhile, urban upgrading based on community involvement cannot succeed in a climate of institutional inefficiency and lack of experience.

This study focuses on upgrading of informal housing in Egypt generally and specifically in Aswan. Once the situation has been ascertained, analysis shifts to the external factors examining the legal status, the institutional framework, the role of agencies concerned and the planning and housing standards which direct the development. All these explain the actions of participation and are also influenced by a spectrum of internal factors- such as community organisations, ethnicity, lifestyle and people- which all shape the final objectives and behaviour of the community. A detailed case study of the Tabya serves to illustrate the interrelationships between the formal planning processes and the daily experience of residents, and to pinpoint those obstacles that constrain the most efficient use of public and private resources to improve housing. The work ends with reflections on facets which need attention if regularisation policies are to be effective in Egypt.

1- Review of definitions :

The term 'low-income housing' is used in general accounts to cover all types of housing for the poor in cities of developing countries. The most ubiquitous sign of rapid urbanisation is, however, the 'slum', 'squatter settlements' or 'informal housing'. Such dwelling types also go under a wide variety of other descriptions, among them are 'spontaneous settlements', 'uncontrolled', 'popular', 'marginal', 'peripheral', 'transitional', 'informal', 'illegal', 'irregular', 'makeshift', 'unplanned', 'cancer', 'eyesores' and 'self-built'.

All these terms, and others, are commonly used by officials, the media, in the literature or within the reports issued by the UN and the World Bank. Such variations in definitions is due to different prospects of the viewers. An objective view should consider the diversity of culture, social and physical environment within Third World cities. While there is agreement in the literature about some terms, others are still questionable and cause a lot of confusion (Table 1.1). These terms are presented and analysed here in an attempt to narrow this gap and to come up with specific terms which convey them into common apprehension.

1.1- Implications:

The terms 'uncontrolled', 'transitional' and 'marginal' were used in United Nations reports until 1976 in an attempt to eliminate the pejorative implications of 'slum' and 'squatter settlements'. To call a settlement 'uncontrolled' implies official control but ignores the important organisational controls exercised within many squatter communities. Distribution of available services, employment, rents, and in some cases, planning and building, are all examples of unofficial but meaningful autonomous controls.

In 1976, United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs published the first review of 'World Housing Survey WHS 1974' (UN 1976). The report recognised that these areas can provide a vehicle for gradual social change and a potentially improvable type of shelter which the newcomer to the city can afford. The terms 'slums' and 'squatter settlements' are used in the survey in the belief that they are well known although there was little disagreement regarding the definition of 'slum' as: "areas of authorised, usually older, housing which are deteriorating in the sense of being unserviced, overcrowded and dilapidated". No general definition of 'squatter settlement' is proposed in WHS 74; by way of examples it is explained that *barriadas* (Peru), *favelas* (Brazil), *colonias proletarias* (Mexico), *gecekondu* (Turkey), *bustee* (India), *shanty towns* (English-Speaking Africa), *katchi abadis* (Pakistan), etc., etc. are squatter settlements. It is understood that squatter settlements are sub-standard with respect to dwellings,

respect to dwellings, infrastructure and develop through invasion of public or private lands. Several countries contributing to WHS 74 found it is difficult, or irrelevant for practical purposes, to distinguish between 'slum' and 'squatter settlement'; in WHS 74, statistics and general parlance, the two categories are therefore often combined. Thus WHS 74 codified a conception of Third World housing expressed in the dichotomy 'conventional' versus 'slum/squatter', which still colours both popular and professional thinking.

In a more recent publication by the United Nations Centre for Human Settlement the characteristics of squatter settlements are detailed: "Squatter settlements are also referred to as spontaneous settlements, in reference to the absence of government aid and control; uncontrolled settlements, in reference to their lack of regulation; shanty towns, in reference to the poor quality of construction; popular settlements, in recognition of the fact that they are inhabited by low-income people; marginal settlements, in reference to the role their inhabitants are assumed to play in urban society and to their location within the city; and transitional settlements, as an expression of the positive view that they can, over time, become consolidated and permanent settlements. Squatter settlements share one distinguishing feature: they are built on land that does not belong to those who build the houses. The land is invaded by them, sometimes by individuals or small groups, and sometimes as result of collective action" (UN1986: 15).

On the other hand, authors have different definitions regarding urban settlements which are built by low income people. For example Dietz (1980), based on experience in Peru, distinguishes between slums and squatter settlements basically according to land tenure and the different consequences of it, which are likely to be common features in other countries: "But what factors distinguish these two types of dwelling environments? The most obvious, and also the most crucial for understanding participatory differences, is land tenure. Housing in a *tugurio* is rental slums- most migrants from provincial areas first moved into Lima's low-income, rental slums, referred to generally as *'tugurios'* - whereas housing in the squatter settlement is individually owned, a distinction with far-reaching consequences. In the first place, the *tugurio* slum normally represents a static or decaying environment. Few owners of slum housing make efforts to improve their properties, since such improvement may bring on an increase in taxes. Moreover, the demand of low-income housing in Lima is so extreme that a complaining tenant can be told to leave if he feels conditions are unacceptable. But the squatter settlement is basically a low-income residential environment in which individual heads of families do not rent their land or houses. To say, however, that they own their land fully and legally is hardly true; often land titles are provisional or missing altogether, and promised titles have frequently been delayed interminably. The major point, nevertheless, is that the

squatters live in permanent settlements, where they avoid rental payments and all of the contractual landlord-tenant burdens" (Dietz 1980: 36).

Regarding the government's recognition, Dietz believes that squatter settlements constitute an officially recognised universe. Governments make a variety of efforts to control, co-opt, and otherwise manipulate this potentially valuable urban mass, with the overall result that the squatters occupy a prominent position for any regime or candidate. On the other hand, the slums accord little attention for at least two major reasons: residents are not compelled to stay there and they are not illegal. Many have living conditions far worse than those of the squatter settlements, but only minimal notice is paid by any government.

Another major difference exists which is related to community organisation, Dietz thinks that squatter settlements generally have some form of local community-wide organisation. Although the details of such associations widely vary from one community to another, the mere existence of such an organisation distinguishes squatter settlements from slums, where any sense of community or belongings is infrequent at best. In contrast, the inability and lack of opportunity to organise themselves, and the resultant absence of government resources has effectively negated most attempts by the urban poor in the slums to gain access to political goods and services (Dietz 1980: 38).

On the other hand, there are other groups of authors and experts who do not concern themselves too much about the definitions of these areas but devote much attention to the comprehensive implications of just a term. They appreciate the vast achievements of low- and very low-income people who are actually building most homes and neighbourhoods in many developing countries. As Turner (1988) explains:

> "Some years ago, when almost all politicians and professionals regarded urban settlements built by low-income people as 'slums', 'eyesores', 'cancers' and so on, two Englishmen were standing on a hillside overlooking a huge '*barriada*', or self-organised and rapidly developing squatter settlement, on the outskirts of Lima, Peru. One Englishman was myself, an architect in the process of being de-schooled and re-educated by the experience of working with these city builders. The other was a visiting Minister of the British Government, who had asked for a guided tour, to see for himself what he had heard about such settlements. Working with the '*barriada*' builders had already taught me much of what I know about housing and local development, and they have affirmed my faith in the immense capabilities of people, however poor they may be. I naïvely expected the visiting Minister to be as encouraged as I was by the sight of so many people doing so much with so little. But the Minister was appalled. He viewed it as a monstrous slum, threatening civilisation itself, while I

Turner's fundamental concept is a dichotomy: 'heteronomy/autonomy', which is established in terms of production system (small-scale vs. large-scale) and in terms of political-administrative system (centralisation vs. decentralisation). According to WHS 74 "a system is loosely defined as any group of interrelated factors which produces a distinguishable product" and "the product of the housing system is housing and housing related services". Third World housing systems are characterised, according to WHS 74, by the articulation 'conventional/squatter': a simple dichotomy. The defining characteristics of 'squatter' are extralegal land occupation and sub-standard physical quality. Thus, the dichotomy is primarily established along legal-administrative lines. Turner replaced the dichotomy 'conventional/squatter' by 'heteronomy/autonomy', so that both 'squatter' and small-scale 'conventional' are included, in the 'autonomous' category.

The other important term used often by some governments for self-built housing areas is 'the informal housing sector'. This system comprises permanent settlement formation on unserviced land and extralegal housing production within limits set by the investment capacity of households and small entrepreneurs without access to credit facilities. The informal system also comprises a rental sector, but not a real estate market. In fact, the so-called 'informal' housing sector is highly organised by informal developers and the settlers themselves. It provides an essential but flexible means of establishing shelter for the urban poor. Because occupation of the land on which housing is established is often in some sense illegal from the government's point of view, residents often suffer from considerable insecurity of tenure and face problems in achieving permitted access to urban infrastructure (Findlay 1994: 181). Settlers usually solve this problem by constructing buildings at night and make illegal extensions to connect them informally to the existing infrastructure network of the city which is already overloaded. Municipalities are either indifferent or some of their employees are bribed to help.

However, informal housing does not necessarily imply low housing quality or deteriorating infrastructure network. It may involve quite substantial investments by the residents. It is likely that some residents of informal housing areas are middle-income strata. They occupy government-owned land when they cannot find any other decent houses to suit their needs and affordability. Such residents remain illegal settlers and part of the so-called informal sector simply because construction takes place without planning permission; property transfers are not registered; and building codes and regulations are not applied. While Gilbert and Gugler (1982) believe that there is no simple answer to define these settlements, they disagree with Drakakis Smith (1981) that "the most acceptable definitions rest on the illegality of occupation of land, house or both". In similar vein, they disagree with Leeds (1969: 44) that the only uniform identifying characteristics are their illegal and unordered origins by accretitive or organised invasion

and, because of their origin, their continued juridically ambiguous status as settlements. They believe that "Such definitions include uneasily the frequent case of the poor purchasing the land on which they construct their dwellings. While the purchase itself normally follows legal procedures, such land often lacks planning permission from the urban authorities because of its inadequate services, physical layout, ownership characteristics, or its location beyond the urban perimeter".

Table 1.1: Definitions' review of urban settlements built by low-income people

Term	Legal status	House tenure	Permanency on the land	Physical condition
Slum settlements	WHS: authorised areas	Juppenlatz; Dietz: rented	Drakakis: permanent	Brett: deterioration Juppenlatz: squalor Drakakis: substandard
Squatter settlements	Habitat: invaded land Gilbert: invaded or purchased Drakakis: juridical	Dietz: owned Drakakis: purchased or rented	Dietz: permanent Drakakis: no security	Gilbert: various interpretation Turner: improving
Uncontrolled settlements	Habitat: lack of regulation	–	–	–
Informal settlements	Marcussen: extra legal Findlay: informal developers and the settlers themselves	Marcussen: includes rented houses	Marcussen; Findlay: permanent	–
Transitional settlements	–	–	Habitat: permanent	–
Marginal settlements	–	–	–	–

Table 1.1: Continued

Term	Inhabitants' stratum	Socio-economic features	Population density	Location within the city	Governmental aid
Slum settlements	Gilbert: deprived	Dietz: lack of self-organisation	WHS: over crowded	–	Dietz: absence, little attention
Squatter settlements	Gilbert: poor	Turner: heteronomy /autonomy	Turner: out of control	Juppenlatz: any site on which they can enjoy tenure security	Habitat: absence Dietz: variety of efforts
Popular settlements	Habitat: low-income	–	–	–	–
Informal settlements	Findlay: middle-income	Turner: small-scale vs. large-scale	–	–	–
Transitional settlements	–	Habitat: consolidation	–	–	–
Marginal settlements	–	Habitat: have a role in the society	–	At city's fringes	–

1.2- Conclusion:

The dividing line of formal/informal, legal/illegal and standard/substandard are nomenclatures which are in any case subject to the spectator and depend on one's own situation in relation to economic, legal, technical, architectural and physical norms. The proliferation of the new land supply articulations has appeared when poor strata had no other option of housing themselves.

Terms which have been attached to describe either urban settlements which are built by low-income people, or any other deteriorated housing area, regardless the legal status, can be classified in three categories. First, are 'impartial terms'. They explain genuine characteristics and reflect authentic features of the settlement. Second, 'erroneous terms'. They are inaccurate and misleading since they give the wrong image about the real characteristics of the settlement. Furthermore, they are subjective and ethnocentric rather than objective. The third category are 'equivalent terms'. They are similar in meaning to some of the 'impartial terms', but they may include incorrect implications to a certain extent.

First, 'impartial terms' reflect certain features of the target housing area. They bring an outsider's perception to the insider's view without any bias, distortion or inappropriate judging. A cluster consisting of more than one impartial term can be used to describe a specific area. The variety of terms employed points to important characteristics of such settlements, namely their extreme diversity with regard to qualitative criteria such as formulation, physical fabric, ethnicity, social cohesion, etc.; quantitative criteria such as economic context, densities, urban rates, cost of construction, etc.; and finally, geographical criteria such as location within the city. 'Impartial terms' used to describe different characteristics of deteriorating socio-physical conditions of various settlements are as follows: 'Slum'; 'squatter'; 'informal'; 'transitional' and 'marginal' (Table 1.2).

Table 1.2: Major characteristics of 'Impartial Terms'

Term	Major characteristics
Slum settlements	Decaying social and urban fabric, lack of any appropriate physical infrastructure and negative impact of that on the environment of individuals.
Squatter settlements	Continuous attempts of the settlers to improve their living conditions. Socio-economic consolidation.
Informal settlements	Illegal land occupation and/or absence of planning and building permissions.
Transitional settlements	Offered as transit housing stage; state involvement by offering land or shelters; often considered as quasi-legal and settlers remain on the land.
Marginal settlements	Geographic location at the periphery.

However, it is important to emphasise the main implication of each term. In the context of physical condition, 'slum' implies deteriorated and decaying urban fabric, lack of any appropriate physical infrastructure and negative influence of that on the hygienic circumstances of the individuals. 'Squatter' implies continuous attempts of the settlers to improve their living conditions. Terms 'informal', 'transitional' and 'marginal' do not necessarily imply any decaying or improving physical condition.

'Squatter' implies social consolidation, solidarity, effective occupations or employment and therefore, positive political involvement in terms of socio-economic and political status. 'Slum', in contrast, implies ethnicity, social fragmentation, minor or no jobs and therefore, passive political influence. Terms 'informal', 'transitional' and 'marginal' do not necessarily imply any specific characteristics within the same context.

In the context of legal status, 'informal' implies either illegal land occupation or illegal process of planning and construction. 'Informality' should not necessarily imply any specific physical or socio-economic and political conditions. An area can be formal but slum. Many of low-income state housing in Egypt are examples of the inhuman physical conditions although they are legal. Slum formal or quasi-formal areas should inherit as concern as informal since our worry is basically about humanitarian affairs.

Origin of the area is expressed in the term 'transitional', which implies State intervention to accommodate specific target groups in a predetermined area because of certain causes, e.g. after clearance scheme, disaster, hazard or a war. 'Transitional' settlements can be formal, quasi-legal, slum or squatter. They are often 'geographically' marginal.

'Marginal' explains the spatial location of an area within the urban zone. It should only imply the marginal location of the mentioned area at the periphery of a city and not any socio-economic or political marginality unless word 'economic' is attached. Consequently, a 'marginal' settlement can be slum, squatter, formal or informal. Further more, an area can be defined as 'central' as well. The geographic location gives an immediate image about its land monetary value.

Secondly, 'erroneous terms' include 'spontaneous', 'unplanned', 'irregular', 'cancer', 'eyesores', 'urban squalor', etc. If terms 'spontaneous', 'unplanned' and 'irregular' refer to the mood of organisation or the typology of housing, therewith they are misleading. These areas are built in well organised and premeditated manner to avoid eviction. Although housing typology may contradict standards, it is genuine considering the manner which was use by settlers to amalgamate all possible materials and techniques. It is a situation of 'vernacular vs. inefficient modern standards'. Other terms such as 'cancer' and 'eyesore', are not only antagonistic but also extravagant and unprofessional.

Finally, 'equivalent terms' are 'shanty towns', 'makeshift', 'illegal', 'uncontrolled', 'peripheral', 'popular', 'self-built', 'auto-construction', 'self-help' and 'low-income housing'. (Table 1.3) reveals each one of them and its equivalent. The term 'self-help' and its equivalents are inadequate without more specifications. It is argued that although self-help is a vital substance, it is common that squatters contract help from skilled neighbours who can lay the foundations and do other critical work (Gilbert and Gugler 1982: 88). In fact, self-help should involve a wider prospect. It can be interpreted as self-construction or payment for knowledgable local skills.

Table 1.3: Equivalent terms

Term	Equivalent impartial terms	Special consideration
Shanty towns or makeshift	Slum	Emphasis on the deteriorating physical environment
Illegal or uncontrolled	Informal	Absence of municipal control
Peripheral	Marginal	Strictly geographical rather economic context
Self-built, auto-construction, self-help or popular	Can be slum, squatter, informal, transitional or marginal	Friendly terms to make the phenomenon acceptable
Low-income housing	All	Very extensive term

The final conclusion is that more than one 'impartial term' should be used to define an area entirely. An area, for instance, can be defined as 'slum', 'informal' and 'marginal', or 'squatter', 'formal', 'transitional' and 'marginal', etc. These definitions give an immediate impression about the physical condition, socio-economic environment, legal status, state intervention and mood of formulation and finally the geographic location of a mentioned area. Within this work, the term 'popular settlements' is used extensively to indicate various clusters of impartial terms. Otherwise, when a particular condition is meant, the specific term which defines the case will be used.

2- The origins of popular settlements:

The world housing survey (UN 1976) documented a dramatic deficiency of housing facilities in developing countries. Rates of authorised or conventional dwelling construction were found to vary between two and five dwellings per 1,000 inhabitants and should be constructed to meet housing needs. Consequently an increasing percentage of the population- in big cities typically between 30 and 50 per cent at the time of the survey- were accommodated in slums and squatter settlements.

The inability of conventional housing programmes to meet housing needs follows from the way such programmes concentrate the use of resources and the problems this causes, when a large section of a country's population does not yet have standard shelter. The size of the housing stock itself partly determines the savings available for conventional construction. In a country with a large stock, mortgage and rent payments usually provide the bulk savings that pay for new units. Governmental subsidies supplement this, and the subsidies come from taxes, which, like mortgage and rent payments, are paid mainly by families who already have housing. Such countries typically build five to ten houses a year per thousand population (Burns and Grebler 1977: 5). Countries with relatively small housing stocks, with the greatest need, build new units at an annual rate in the range of two to four per thousand population. The funds from mortgage and rent payments, supplemented by subsidies, will not support more than this. The strategy of conventional construction, which is to collect and concentrate from dozens of families with housing, to extent credit or finance subsidies to build a single new house, inevitably means long waiting lists and people having to find shelter in slums and squatter neighbourhoods.

By the early 1970s, orthodox housing policies emphasising public sector-sponsored construction programmes of finished dwelling units for poor urban families came under stress in many developing countries. The collapse of confidence in the ability of government agencies to solve the 'housing problem' through the rapid development of 'low-cost' housing estates was largely due to their actual performance. While official housing statistics documented mounting shelter deficits, housing agencies were delivering too few units too expensively, and often failing to reach or retain their user target groups.

In contrast with the poor performance of the state sector, numerous empirical studies documented the vitality of the owner-managed, popular housing sector which actually houses a large proportion of low-and middle-income families. Often operating under adverse economic, legal and institutional conditions, poor urban families, artisans and small contractors were responsible for the development and gradual improvement of some 30-80 per cent of new additions to the housing stock in the growing cities of developing

countries from 1960/1980. This housing activity not only 'solved' the existing shelter needs of a sizeable segment of low-and lower-middle income groups, but had a substantial macroeconomic impact on the various informal sector activities associated with housing.

'Resourcefulness' became the most commonly used adjective to describe the popular or informal housing sector, and the case for absorbing popular efforts into, rather than excluding them from overall housing strategy was forcefully argued by Turner (1976: 175): "in an economy of scarcity, the mass of common people, though poor, possess the bulk of the nation's human and material resources for housing". The convergence of these two, almost universally observed experiences, the evident failures of public housing agencies to respond to the low-income housing need via conventional housing development and the recognition of the positive contribution that low-income families can make in developing their own housing solutions, led to the formulation of a new housing policy paradigm - evolutionary housing strategies. This approach attempts to strike a balance between public resources allocation in the housing sector and the mobilisation of family and community resources. Typically, the governments' contribution will be a building site (or the granting of a title or lease on already occupied areas), infrastructure, credit, and perhaps technical assistance for house improvement, while the responsibility for shelter construction is shifted to the domain of the individual family. The purpose of the evolutionary housing strategy is to support housing development, that is a continuous improvement of the housing stock starting from very low levels of material quality, instead of promoting the construction of finished dwellings in a single construction period (Skinner and Rodell 1983).

When rural-urban migration first triggered urban growth, the almost universal response was to construct public housing estates on cheap peripheral land. Whilst dwellings in these projects conformed to high standards of construction and service provision, they were far too expensive for the households intended and required such heavy subsidies that they were unable to meet more than a nominal proportion of total housing demand. The inevitable outcome of this mismatch in demand and supply was the growth of squatter settlements and increased densities in existing low-income areas. By 1970 these accommodated 46% of the population in Mexico city, 60% in Ankara, 33% in Calcutta, 90% in Addis Ababa and as much as 81% in Cairo. Such areas were growing at a much faster rate than the formally planned parts of cities (Payne 1984: 2). However, there is manifold sequence of reasons which are behind the formation and growth of squatter settlements in the developing countries. The main origins are the population increase, uneven development- which results in increasing rural-urban migration- and institutions which cannot cope with the speed of growth to break it down. These origins are presented and analysed here.

2.1- Population increase:

The increase in population growth of the 20th century is the single most important factor distinguishing present from past urbanisation. While Europe was urbanising, national population growth rates were typically around 0.5 percent a year. In contrast, the rates for developing countries today are usually between 2.5 and 3.0 percent a year. These much higher growth rates have resulted in both large absolute population movements to cities and larger natural population increases within cities. The consequent pressure to provide employment and services to large numbers of people has led to a type of urbanisation that is qualitatively different and requires different policy responses.

The Fifth Session of 'the United Nations Commission on Human Settlements' (UNCHS 1982), focused attention on the challenge of urbanisation in the developing countries. The immense task of providing shelter, services and infrastructure for the 1000 million additional people who will inhabit Third World cities by the year 2000 was emphasised. This increase is estimated at more than 1 million people every week (Payne 1984), as well as for rapidly increasing rural population (Table 2.1).

Table 2.1: Major developing areas: Demographic characteristics

Area	Estimated population (rural and urban) (millions)			Annual population growth rate (%)		Urban population annual growth rate(%)	
	1960	1990	2000	1960-90	90-2000	1960-90	90-2000
Sub-Saharan Africa	210	500	690	2.8	3.2	5.2	5.3
Arab States	120	270	340	2.7	2.6	4.6	3.9
South Asia	600	1200	1500	2.3	2.2	3.9	4.1
Asia, Oceania	930	1660	1920	2.0	1.5	3.9	4.4
Latin America, the Caribbean	210	440	530	2.4	1.9	3.7	2.5
Least developed countries	210	440	590	2.5	3.0	5.3	5.8
All developing countries	2070	4070	4980	2.3	2.0	4.0	4.0
Industrial countries	950	1210	1270	0.8	0.5	1.4	0.8
World	3020	5280	6250	1.8	1.7	2.9	2.8

Source: UNDP 1991: indicators, tables 20 and 21

On the other hand, the relentless growth of urban cities is inevitable and irreversible. Standing at 2.4 billion in 1990, the world's urban population will rise to 3.2 billion in 2000 and 5.5 billion in 2025. The developing countries' share of these (63% in 1990) will rise to 71% in 2000 and 80% in 2025 (Davidson and Fritchi 1993: 209).

Figure 4.1: **Major developing areas- Urban population annual growth rate**



These much higher growth rates have resulted in both large absolute population movements to cities and larger natural population increases within cities. The consequent pressure to provide employment and services to large numbers of people has led to a type of urbanisation that is qualitatively different and requires different policy responses. The first factor to consider is the extent of housing demand. This is so vast that it is difficult to quantify. A World Bank study has projected that the number of cities with a population over a million will increase from 90 in 1975 to about 300 by the year 2000, whilst many smaller cities will also grow rapidly; in fact many medium-sized cities are already growing faster in percentage terms than the metropolitan centres and there are, of course, more of them. The major problem of rapid population growth in the developing countries is that it is inextricably linked to poverty. There are about 1.2 billion poor people in the developing countries, a figure estimated to rise to 1.3 billion by 2000 and probably 1.5 billion by 2025. Asia has the largest number of poor people, 500 million, but there is an increasing concentration of poverty in Africa. It is estimated that Africa's share of the world's poor will rise from 30% in 1991 to 40% by 2000, overtaking Asia (UNDP 1991).

The intense pressure which this puts upon urban land and housing resources is intensified still further when the 'nature' of demand is taken into account. Since the 1950s the proportion of low-income households to total urban population has risen steadily, so that the vast majority of people currently have little in the way of capital or incomes with which to obtain a prebuilt and officially approved dwelling. With the private construction industry generally unwilling to accept the high risks and low profits of building for the urban poor, greater responsibility has been placed upon government agencies concerned with housing and urban development (Payne 1984). However, it is clear that the problem will be with us for some time and is likely to get worse.

2.2- Uneven development:

Uneven distribution of resources in either the urban or rural areas can distort the pattern and efficiency of the urbanisation process. Poor distribution of land in rural areas can result in a premature or excessive movement of the population to urban areas. Similarly, the concentration of assets in urban areas can tilt the demand for and production of urban goods and services so seriously toward high income consumers that providing absolutely necessary goods for the poor rural dwellers is neglected. Uneven development results in a continuous stimulus for migration. In most regions, the low-income migrant has been found to share rental accommodation during the early stages of job-seeking and adaptation to urban life. Progression from a rural to an urban existence may have been gradual or abrupt, with the initial accommodation in the city being found in the deteriorated areas of the urban core or in a pre-established squatter settlement. The rent paid by the migrant is commonly a very high percentage of his income; and this factor, combined with the probable instability of his source of income which threatens his ability to pay rent at all, stimulates him to seek a situation where he/she is not at the mercy of a landlord. Once established in the urban area- a process that may take several years- he may join an organised 'invasion' of vacant land (UN 1976: 30).

However, the obvious and logical fact was expressed before by Turner and Mangin (1967) that people possess immense resources but many of them are wasted because of poor planning, and almost completely ignored by governments which have very few of their own. The private sector have no market to speak of for houses for lower-income people and governments are inevitably very poor. Hence, the people and their settlements begin to be seen as a major resource for solving their own problems; not as a problem so much as a solution.

a) Urban bias:

Many urban problems in developing countries can be traced to the early wrong assumption that development requires forced industrialisation to reduce the need for imports, and that there is nothing wrong with policies strongly biased against agriculture since this was not a leading sector. Through industrial protection policies, many countries turn the terms of trade against agriculture. A large percentage of tax revenues and international loans are spent on industrial development and services in urban areas. Favouritism or protection of large-scale manufacturing as part of an 'import-substitution' strategy penalises agriculture in two ways. First, it raises the price of industrial versus agricultural goods in the domestic market. Second, the artificially high exchange rate which is part of the protection package reduces the receipts in terms of domestic currency from a given volume of agricultural exports thus discouraging agricultural expansion.

Nevertheless, urban areas would benefit greatly from encouragement of agriculture, particularly in the more rural economies. Only with rapid agricultural growth can the rural sector absorb the share of rural population increase at reasonable income levels.

Growing rural incomes might be expected to inhibit migration when it is economically feasible for rural population to extend and modernise their business, at least to some extent, although counter-examples abound, such as the high rate of urbanisation in Mexico during its agricultural growth period and the historical urbanisation of the new developed countries. What is more certain is that rural poverty and the consequent downward pressure that migration and potential migration exerts on urban wage rates would be lessened. Dynamic urban areas would still attract people, perhaps just as many or even more, but only to the extent that they could compete for labour against relatively high earning opportunities in rural areas. The urban problem, *per se,* might remain largely unchanged, but the urban poverty housing problems would be relieved. A dynamic agriculture will also stimulate local demand for urban-produced goods and services, leading to greater absorption of labour. Because agricultural incomes are spread over a wider space, their rapid growth might help to decentralise urban growth by promoting the growth of smaller towns to cater to local rural demands.

The employment characteristics of developing countries provide one of the principal distinguishing features between urbanisation in the developed and developing countries. In the former, urban development was accompanied by a pronounced shift from agriculture to manufacturing occupations with a subsequent increase in tertiary employment. There is scant evidence to support the existence of such a process in the Third World. Castells (1977) has argued that urbanisation in the third world is not the result of industrialisation *per se* but of the process of industrialisation in advanced capitalist counties. As a result, urbanisation in the Third World is accompanied by increased industrial output but not by increasing industrial employment. Local elites push dependent development for their own benefit. Mehmet (1978) has argued that economic planning in developing countries is intended to maximise investment returns rather than expand or generate employment incomes. In addition to increasing the degree of relative and absolute poverty, this policy also resulted in reduced employment opportunities (Drakakis-Smith 1981: 21).

A report of human development by UNDP 1991, has proved that in the highly indebted middle-income countries and in Africa, the terms of trade have worsened by almost 25 percentage points over the past decade. The plight of the least developed countries in trade is even worse. Their share in world exports declining by two-thirds, from 1.5% to 0.5%, between 1965 and 1988. For 77% of the world's people- in the south- who earn only 15% of the world's income the external shocks and deteriorating terms of trade have

been devastating (UNDP 1991: 4). It is therefore obvious that the greater part of money spent in urban areas cannot be repaid just out of money earned through urban and industrial development. It means that the people who benefit directly from development which is often brought about by loans are not the ones who contribute to the repayment of the loans. The largest proportion of the loans are spent in, or for, the urban areas, but the largest proportion of the interest charges are met through the efforts of the farmers.

Urban bias in some cases is enormous. Most poor people in Asia and Africa live in rural areas. Even in more urbanised regions in Latin America and Arab States, a substantial proportion of the poor are rural. In most countries, those who live in the countryside typically earn 25% to 50% less than those in the towns and cities. The contrasts seem especially marked in Africa, where the agricultural crisis has resulted in falling incomes from cash crops, reduced food production and increased malnutrition. Other forms of disparities are aggravated by imbalances in the delivery of social services and infrastructure. In one-third of the developing countries, rural people are only half as likely to be covered by health services as those in the urban areas. Even then, they are likely only to have simple clinics, compared with the modern hospitals to be found in the towns and cities. Education services, too, are much less adequate for rural children. Literacy rates in rural Africa and Asia are, as a result, typically less than half those of urban areas (UNDP 1991: 16, 26).

Table 2.2: Major developing areas: Rural-Urban gap

Area	Rural population (%) of total 1990	Rural population with access to services (%) 1985-88			Urban population with access to services (%) 1985-88			Rural-Urban disparity		
		Health	Water	Sewage	Health	Water	Sewage	Health	Water	Sewage
Sub-Saharan Africa	69	37	26	18	72	74	60	51	35	31
Arab States	47	57	46	–	97	94	–	59	49	–
South Asia	73	–	46	–	–	75	34	–	61	–
Asia & Oceania	66	–	60	51	–	79	65	–	76	78
Latin America, the Caribbean	28	42	56	26	82	88	78	52	63	33
Least developed countries	80	35	27	17	90	50	50	39	55	34
All developing countries	63	44	50	27	88	81	60	50	62	45

Source: UNDP 1991- Table 24- (-- Data unknown).

A similar contrast is evident for safe water and sanitation. In Sub-Saharan Africa, for example, only an estimated 26% of rural dwellers have access to safe water, compared with 74% for those who live in urban areas (Table 2.2). By making urban areas more attractive, it is argued, such government actions have encouraged migration to the towns to the point where social costs exceed gains.

2.3- Institutions:

Institutional bureaucracy which cannot cope with the speed of informal housing formation is a major stimulus for the problem. The expansion of the bureaucracy runs well ahead of it rationalisation and it soon becomes as much an obstacle to development as an instrument of it. Housing deficit cannot be solved by a state machine that proved highly susceptible to all the typical bureaucratic pathologies and an unresponsiveness to constituents. Many developing countries suffer from elite bias and corruption development. Civilian technocrats and professionals are recruited chiefly from upper-and middle-class families based on wealth, friendships or family name and not on the basis of education, skills and experience. The final bureaucratic team is unsuitable for, and atypical of, a country undergoing a phase of state-building. It retains an administrative style, preoccupied with control and proves better at the concentration of power rather than motivation and mobilisation of officials needed to set development going from below as well as above.

a) Elite bias:

Within the cities themselves there is an additional bias towards a small elite whose political and/or economic position allows it to select the type of economic and urban development which brings maximum benefit to itself, giving rise to a wide discrepancy in household incomes and huge levels of unemployment. The neglect of the political background to economic development has discredited several theories on typology of urbanisation and informal housing growth. Elite bias started during the colonial period of many developing countries and encouraged selective labour migration into the towns. The physical evidence of this selectivity can be seen in the present townscapes of North Africa where the sizeable elite foreign population had, prior to independence, built extensive modern residential quarters whilst restricting the indigenous migrants to the decaying popular old quarters (Drakakis-Smith 1981: 13).

Contemporary elite bias is widespread in the context of a variety of urban planning experiences in the developing countries cities. Roads are realigned on General Plans and upgrading schemes to protect elite properties. Land-sale priority on a new 'low-income' subdivision scheme is often given to influential persons, while poor people are desperate for a shelter. The introduction of services or their maintenance are speeded up in the case of better-off strata. Contemporary local elite consists of the upper classes, decision-makers and politicians. Civil servants are obliged to satisfy this elite since their jobs depend upon their blessing. They bend the rules freely for its benefits, while poor people should offer them bribes or gifts to get a similar service.

Schenk (1989) explains another form of discrepancy where a religious belief projects a moral inequality between higher and lower castes in which ritual inequality is expressed by socio-economic inequality. Meanwhile, lower strata are dependent upon, and protected by, upper strata in a form of patron-clientelism. Extreme poverty and scarcity tend to reinforce these vertical relations of bondage, and upward mobility is blocked by the system of entrenched social stratification and daily dependence. Patron-clientelism may also involve a voluntary reciprocal relationship between social unequals in which loyalty is traded by the weaker in exchange for resources from the stronger (Lowder 1989). Politicians may promise squatters to allocate public services in their settlements in exchange for votes. Another common example is when a municipal official extends services for illegally built house in exchange for a personal benefit from the householder, while the same services are completely blocked for other urban informal squatters.

Lowder (1989) draws attention to another form of elite bias where a systematic organisation of nepotism is widespread and, she argues, that patron-clientelism can be preferable to nepotism. While the former may offer some benefits and security to less advantaged groups involving a relationship between two parties, the latter not only advances the interests of a particular group, but also concentrates power in a few hands which may pervade a society to such an extent that it can only be challenged by exogenous forces. Undoubtedly, nepotism weakens institutional performance by employing or promoting individuals, who are underqualified and incompetent, and making them in charge of decision-making just because they have a blood tie with the employer. Nepotism networks may also extend to favour loyal friends rather than experienced professionals, so that the employer can grant their personal devotion regardless the quality of their production. This is a major problem in many developing countries especially when a military regime reigns or when the state is still on the process towards a democratic system. Underqualified decision-makers are co-opted by the state in exchange for their faithfulness. Subsequently, they appoint inexperienced petitioners to be in charge of urban planning who fail to promote any appropriate developmental policies. Hence, elites are loath to thrust authority on those below them and those below are unaccustomed to accept responsibility.

b) Corruption:

The impact that corruption may have upon the process of development in Third World countries is still questionable. Less-advantaged groups, in terms of socio-political and economic status, can benefit from such a practice. They lose scarce savings in bribing officials but, in turn, they gain essential access to services that they lacked for long time. In most developing countries, institutions in charge with urban planning are underequiped

and therefore, they have little to do with helping the poor and more to do with controlling, for example, state-land and infrastructure extentions (Gilbert and Ward 1985).

In this climate, the argument is that 'soft' practices and informal normative systems underlying the actions of officials might be highly rational in many developing societies. The 'actual' rules of bureaucracy behaviour may be more 'innovative' and appropriate than the 'official' ones to some particular local conditions (Myrdal 1968). Greater social benefits may be derived from 'soft' practices and circumvention of the rules. It not only 'humanises' the workings of bureaucracy, provides a way through red tape and opportunities for face-to-face interaction (Left 1964), but fulfils needs of particular groups, offers an alternative to political violence, and it may promote growth where it involves high-level public servants who reinvest their spoils compared with lower-level functionaries who spend on consumption (Nye 1967). On the other hand, corrupt practice is often interpreted as having regressive distributional consequences (Wade 1985). It intensifies and extends existing relations of exploitation, dependency, and stunted life-chances for the majority of the urban poor (Ward 1989). Furthermore, it subverts resources away from the poor, acts against the wider interest, and undermines legitimacy (Szeftel 1983).

2.4- Conclusion:

The city is no longer an exclusive residential neighbourhood for the cultural and political elite; it is now the poor who determine a great part of the physical growth and character of the city. In the absence of urban economic policies and control, squatter settlements bear the brunt of accelerating rural-urban migration and city growth. Market economies of the Third World are rapidly transforming land into a commodity which can be freely bought and sold.

Transactions in the land market in general, and in the urban land market in particular, increasingly reflect economic relationships between persons and groups rather than social relationships. Participation in the land market is largely restricted to those sectors of the economy where capital is concentrated on people and groups that can obtain access to finance capital. People with low earnings and small savings who cannot obtain access to such capital are largely barred.

Yet in the majority of developing countries, the urban land market does not operate as a free market. It is subject to varying degrees of control over land use, to regulations governing land transfer, to restrictions on development rights, to compulsory acquisition and to taxation. Government controls are, in turn, subject to political pressures by different groups with interests in using land and benefiting from land transactions. These groups naturally contain urban residents in a variety of roles: as workers, as citizens, as members of organisations, and as participants in economic transactions.

Thus, as political power shifts from one group of interests to another, significant changes in the structure and operations of land markets can and do occur. It is through active participation adequate land for housing the poor can be initiated, consolidated and sustained. Governments must recognise that housing is one of the principal means through which national development policies and programmes may be achieved. However, this requires that this sector forms part of national 'human settlement' or 'urbanisation' policies and programmes, based on the distribution of population and related economic and social activities throughout the national territory.

3- Analysis of the problem:

The evidence suggests that there is a strong positive relationship between security of tenure and levels of investment in house improvement. Infrastructure improvement can take place illegally by the residents themselves or legally by the government, but it will not generate any further investments in housing without specific increases in the tenureship security. They can also lead to false expectations of tenurial security, and people may still be evicted even after improvements in infrastructure have taken place. The degree of improvement and consolidation of houses in slums and squatter settlements varies greatly. Some residents improve their dwellings more than others who are too poor to improve their houses at all, regardless of the level of tenurial security. Variations in the level of improvement tend to depend on cultural constraints as well.

Action related to land tenure is necessarily political and requires an understanding of the conditions under which changes in tenure are likely to take place. The evidence suggests that the pursuit of land tenure for the urban poor is not restricted to any particular ideology, and can be undertaken by grassroots community organisers as well as by military dictatorships. Finally, while the pursuit of land tenure for the poor by politicians is easily understandable, the administrative machinery required to effect a massive tenure change programme requires a degree of control over the bureaucracy which may be missing in most developing countries.

In addition to administrative complications, there are various side effects to the granting of tenure which must be confronted. Some of the more obvious examples are: Lack of any incentive on the part of the residents to pay for the land or for infrastructure improvements once de facto tenure has been established; invasion of legalised areas by higher income groups and the displacement of poorer people, especially tenants; and further squatting as a result of blanket promises of secure tenure.

On the other hand, the magnitude of the problems of the socio-economic and political environment of the urban poor in popular settlements obviously affects the physical framework of their life. Elements such as housing condition and infrastructure are therefore closely linked to incomes and give rise to a related set of informal sector features designed to satisfy minimum needs at minimum cost. For the urban poor, therefore, accommodation is inextricably linked to other aspects of their daily existence. Housing provision and acquisition are part of the overall development process of the individual, the group and the city. They are not just an extension of land use planning, but an element in a matrix of manifold criteria which interact to satisfy human needs.

3.1- Land supply and legal status :

The mechanism of land supply for low-income house builders in developing countries and its emerging transformation, characterise the *social articulation* of the supply mechanism. As urban property becomes not merely a place to settle, but an asset of considerable value, its supply will reflect the laws of financial investment and return, rather than social justice and equity. The concept of 'social articulation' refers to the practice through which prospective house builders get access to land in urban areas. The concrete articulation of land supply for the urban poor is quite specific to different countries and cities; these articulations tend to change over time, reflecting in both economic and political terms the consolidation of the commodity nature of urban land.

Three terms are commonly used in the literature to describe forms of land supply for the urban poor: 'non-commercial', 'commercial' and 'state' articulations. They are presented, analysed and reclassified here (Figure 3.1). Upgrading schemes are different, being based on the legal condition of the land, as will be presented when discussing the promotion of urban development for these areas.

Figure 3.1: **Mechanisms of land supply**



a) Non-commercialised articulation of land supply :

The supply of land through *non-commercial* articulation refers to situations where those who build on it either do not pay for its ownership or use right or, if they do, the payment is a 'voluntary gift' according to social customs. In other words, land in a non-commercialised articulation of supply does not have a monetary transfer price; even if people are expected to pay something, it is in accordance with the 'worth' of the person and not the 'worth' of land. The articulation of land supply through non-commercial means includes four forms: customary land, abandoned properties, marginal land and government land reserves.

Customary land:

The first wave of rapid urban growth in some developing countries occurred when large land areas within and around the cities were neither in the hands of individual owners nor those of commercial entrepreneurs. In many countries of Africa and in the Pacific, tribes and ethnic communities retained their customary right to use and administer their traditional village land and allocate it according to prevailing social customs. While the term 'customary land' has been almost exclusively used in the African continent, 'temple land' is included under this category in Asia, as are various 'communal land' holdings in Pakistan, Indonesia, the Middle East and North Africa in general. This category of land is largely absent in Latin America (Angel 1983).

In most cases customary land cannot be alienated or commercialised, and access to buildings plots (or other use) is restricted to members of the community, without payment. However, as more and more migrants arrive in the city searching for accommodation, customary land becomes a potential opportunity for popular settlement development. First, people belonging to the same tribal, ethnic or religious community living in other villages and regions of the country could ask for temporary or permanent building plots on the basis of their distant affiliation with the urban community. Later, casual friends from the city or tenants of the already established residents could also apply. Thus, access to customary land becomes more open to other poor families of the city although, at least in the first stages of growth, it is still controlled by the local tribal hierarchy.

Abandoned properties:

In some cities the non-commercialised articulation of land supply for popular settlements was facilitated either because property owners disappeared or the political situation was such that they could not resist squatting or, in the case of government land, the

repressive/administrative apparatus of the state had collapsed. Wars of independence, violent religious or ethnic upheavals, revolutions, hazard disasters, and the establishment of the state apparatus by social groups having no political experience of exercising state power, are the contexts within which popular settlements can evolve on abandoned properties. There are specific conditions under which the non-commercialised articulation of abandoned properties may become a significant land supply for popular settlements: First, social or political upheavals may displace landowners or curtail their ability to defend property; second, a newly emerging state apparatus, being weak and preoccupied with fields of power consolidation, ignores the status of urban land; third, land over which previous owners have lost control is not appropriated immediately by other entrepreneurial groups, which treat it as a real estate asset.

It is evident that the supply of abandoned properties for popular settlement development, though it may be significant in some cities at times, is a conjuncture phenomenon. New governments are keen on establishing 'law and order' and to end the arbitrary appropriation of properties. Initially it may be political parties or movements associated with the state which take the task of controlling popular access to abandoned properties, but eventually the state assumes control.

Marginal land:

In the past, many popular settlements have grown, been bulldozed away, and grown again on land not suitable for housing. In fact, the image of squatters on banks, marsh land, steep slopes, railway and road rights-of-way has dominated professional discussions about low-income housing, despite the fact that there has been a significant supply of other types of land for popular development, as discussed above.

Settlements on marginal land may appear for three reasons, all as by-products of commercial articulation of urban land supply: First, when no land supply articulated through the non-commercial and administrative access mechanisms is available in the city, those who cannot pay for land at all (not even for the cheapest rents) have no other option than to seek out parcels where nobody else wants to build. Second, is the access to central area employment opportunities. Even when free or cheap land is available at the urban fringe, the cost of transportation and commuting may be prohibitively high for those of the urban poor who earn a living from casual employment. If, for topographic or land use planning reasons, marginal land exists near the inner city, it becomes a strategic location for popular settlement development. Third, when a more serious threat to the use of marginal land for popular settlements comes from the state. With the increased efficiency of implementing master plans, stricter zoning by-laws and building regulations are enforced, the formation of new informal settlements is blocked and evictions from

those already established take place. The massive 'cleaning programmes' of Dacca, New Delhi, Jakarta, Manila, Colombo and within other cities are examples of the assertive behaviour of some urban administrators when dealing with the urban poor, whose only option of housing is on marginal land. By the time the areas have been settled by a 'critical mass' of families, they will be transformed into pockets of 'petty landlordism' where newcomers have to purchase shares in the plots; this leads to an intricate hierarchy of ownership and tenant patterns both for dwellings and land as well.

Government land reserves:

Colonial penetration into the traditional land tenure system in developing countries was largely achieved through the process of alienation of native land. The colonial power bought, traded or conquered land and territories, which in turn passed to the 'guardianship' of the state. Later, part of it was sold or leased to the colonial settlers to facilitate the growth of plantation economies, crop production, city development and commerce, but a substantial portion remained in the domain of the state. The special character of this alienated land which, after independence, passed into the hands of the new government, is that it usually comprises vast tracts with no particular designation for use, is unimproved, and often not even surveyed. The actual laws regulating the tenure and disposal of government land reserves vary from one country to another, but the sheer size of these land holdings, the lack of legitimate or obvious usefulness and the difficulty in policing meant that the transformation of those areas in an urban fringe into popular settlements could proceed in a fairly uniform way. Vast land in Sudan, Morocco, Algiers; all land in Tanzania and Mozambique; non-cultivated land in Peru, Venezuela, Turkey, and the fringe desert land in Karachi are typical examples of nominal state control of land.

The transformation of government land reserves into popular settlements has occurred both through 'organised invasions' and 'spontaneous encroachments'. In the former case, families living in (inner city) rented accommodation, working together in factories, or belonging to various kinds of ethnic/religious associations, organised themselves and looked for a site to occupy. Despite the legal ambiguities of tenure definition, the organisers of invasions knew that the appropriation of land is illegal and therefore sought political support, bribed officials or used national holidays for the date of invasion as a protection against immediate eviction.

Popular settlements also grew on government land reserves by a more spontaneous process of 'encroachment'. The initial nucleus may have been camps set up by construction workers or migrant families who needed land for vegetable gardens or people working in nearby factories. In an organised invasion families relied on their substantial numbers to protect the appropriated land; the encroachment process required that the

occupation remained undetected, hence, the usually small initial numbers and flimsy construction.

Undoubtedly, the non-commercialised articulation of government land reserves for the development of popular settlements was a significant source of land supply - where it existed. There are three tendencies for change in current mechanisms of articulation, whose significance is again different depending on the city. The first two tendencies of change may take place after the formation of popular settlements as there will be further land supply based on either 'commercial' or 'non-commercial' articulations. The third tendency of change may take place before the formation of any popular settlements.

First, people who have settled already conduct further occupation of land surrounding their areas and subdivide it in order to offer new plots for their relatives, sons, daughters and new comers based on customary practice. Second, areas which have been already occupied soon assume the character of the commercial land market, as people who occupy plots sell or further subdivide them. This market develops once land invasion had occurred and has been tacitly accepted by the authorities; the people who had bought plots in the settlements once the invasion was fait accompli far outnumbered the original invaders (Durand-Lasserve 1990).

Third, the illegal subdivision by commercial and political entrepreneurs before popular invasion. Major popular areas, housing several hundreds of thousands of inhabitants, have been created by informal subdivision of government land by private persons. The main characteristics of the system are: 1) Protection against eviction is guaranteed by leaders, who in their turn obtain protection from politicians and/or key-persons in the administration; 2) the layout of this type of settlement has been planned through the leaders, who mostly also organise the provision of some basic facilities, such as water supply and transport; 3) settlers have to buy their plots with money. Often, the first settlers pay only a nominal price, depending on location. Over time, the settlement gets inhabited, and prices of plots rise, particularly of the potentially commercial plots which the leaders have reserved along the main roads.

b) Commercial articulation of land supply:

The commercial articulation of land supply refers to the land market where land has a monetary transfer price. It is established by supply-demand equilibrium and access to building plots is regulated by paying capacity. An important character of commercial articulation is that owners can defend their property, for it is not land but land ownership which commands a price.

The articulation of land supply through the market mechanism may take three forms: mini plots, land rental and substandard subdivision. Settlers who sell mini plots capitalise on their urban assets as a once-and-for-all transaction, often using the money to invest in better houses or buy land in more secure settlements. The objective of landowners in the land rental system, on the other hand, is to generate a flow of income from the property until the plot could be sold or developed for more profitable use. The case of substandard subdivision represents a consolidated business activity where vacant parcels of land are bought, assembled into larger estates and subdivided into uniform plots, usually without infrastructure.

Mini plots:

The opportunistic fragmentation of land within existing popular settlements has been the principal mechanism for their densification and perhaps a major source of finance for the original settlers to improve their housing situation. When the supply of vacant land for new popular settlements is restricted or only available at distant locations, the purchase of mini plots in existing settlements may be the only means available for newly-formed poor households to start construction. This market can be highly inflationary and sometimes speculative. Yet, in some ways, it is merely a pathetic wheeling-dealing among the poor, conditioned by poverty. For those who sell parts of their plots to pay debts, improve their house, or provide a wedding dowry must endure, as a consequence, greater crowding; and those who buy land in exiting popular settlements purchase a degree of security of tenure which is not available in newer settlements.

Even in its commercial articulation, 'mini-plot' development has a considerable advantage for unorganised low-income house builders over the other two types of commercial provision of land, for it is the poor who benefit by selling land. There is also a wide margin of negotiation between sellers and buyers as to the size of the plot, terms of payment and the price itself. And here, the numerical growth of the settlement by owner-builders enhances the neighbourhood's bargaining strength to maintain or improve their security of tenure and to pressure for services.

This outcome, however, is not necessarily the only development trajectory of popular settlement growth articulated through the commercialisation of mini plots. As densities increase and long-term tenure security remains uncertain, many owner builders may turn their property into rented accommodation using the income from renters to establish new housing in more secure locations. The brutal environment of rented slums with thugs as rent collectors is a too familiar phenomenon in many cities of developing countries.

Land rental:

If 'mini-plot' development represents the most elementary form of petty enterpreneurship of small landowners, the 'land rental' system offers the possibility of illicit property development for large landowners who anticipate that their land holdings can ultimately be sold for urban uses yielding higher returns than popular housing.

Substandard subdivision:

Subdivision of land into regular but unserviced plots for low-income home builders is a relatively new form of popular settlement development, though an increasing phenomenon in the fringe areas of Third World cities. The process is characterised by the following: The lots are purchased from persons who have a conventional title. Unofficial title is given to the purchaser, often in the form of instalment contract with a promise of recordable title at the end of the payment period. However, the division of land has not been approved as a subdivision by proper authorities and consequently, the urban services required in conventional subdivisions are normally partially or completely lacking and the housing is constructed by the purchasers without an official building permit.

Commercial subdivision is rarely carried out by the original landowner, perhaps with the exception of relatively small or exceptionally large property holdings. Rather, the system is dominated by an emerging commercial entrepreneur strata of 'property developers' who seek out parcels of vacant land, assemble it for suitable project sizes and parcel it. Informal subdivisions are likely to be the land supply mechanism for middle-class participation in popular settlement development, rather than a more secure housing development option for the urban poor (Baross 1983).

The commercial articulation of land supply in the form of land subdivision may play an important, but transitionary role in popular settlement development, for it is the very logic of the land market that, ultimately, price them out of reach of the low-income sector. Land inflation, partially accelerated by illegal land subdivision, will make the plots offered by 'pirate' developers too expensive for the poor to afford. Middle class housing demand and new industrial land development also compete for land on the urban fringe, the location where illegal land subdivision has generally taken place. And finally, the most serious

competition comes from the corporate private development sector, which effectively employs the strategy of assembling vacant land well before urban pressure makes itself felt. True, corporate strategy will only work if it can secure a collaboration with the state and urban administration, the former to defend the right of holding vacant land against organised invasion or gradual encroachment, and the latter to design master plans which deny development approval for land controlled by the corporate sector.

In Egypt, private developers and speculators buy massive inherited agricultural lands adjacent to the urban zones and illegally transform them into building use. Parcels are subdivided into small plots and sold to the needy poor without any services for speculative purposes.

c) State articulation of land supply:

The third form of articulation includes state involvement. This refers to the capacity of the state to acquire and dispose of land, change its form of tenure or regulate its use and development. The contribution of governments to the supply of land for popular settlements takes three forms: 'non-commercial state *ad hoc* supply', 'semi-administrative commercial supply', and 'commercial projects'.

Non-commercial state *ad-hoc* supply:

Based on 'non-commercialised' mechanisms, in a few cases the state uses, on an *ad hoc* basis, 'government land reserves' to initiate popular settlements. In Egypt, Peru and other countries a large number of migrants were 'directed' to certain sites for 'temporary' free accommodation because of an industrial boom, hazards or wars. Most of these areas, though are by now consolidated and rudimentary serviced, remain popular neighbourhoods. Governments often lose the ability to control or direct the growth of these areas.

Semi-administrated commercial supply:

Based on 'commercial' bases, this form of land supply is similar to the concept of sites and services. State's housing agencies opt for using vacant government land for project's sites rather than entering into the commercial land market or, alternatively, governments may simply survey these areas and allocate unserviced plots for a nominal fee to settlers. The latter case is the most common form of land supply for the urban poor and rural-urban migrants within the popular settlements in Egypt. Families are given the legal right to occupy this government building land on a leasehold basis, and it is envisaged that at a later stage these areas will be upgraded. The settlers do not feel secure enough to invest any money to improve the physical conditions of these settlements.

Subsidised commercial projects:

As the terminology indicates, administrated articulation in the form of projects implies a series of well defined schemes in the urban area which are released or sold to specific 'target groups' for owner-built housing development. Sites and services schemes designed to meet the capacity of urban poor to pay are examples of 'commercial projects' land supply.

State intervention may also include rules which affect in the urban land market, releasing for popular settlement development land which otherwise would remain vacant or designated for other urban uses. The 'Land Ceiling Act' in India would fall into this category, as well as the acts of land nationalisation in Zambia, Tanzania and Mozambique, and the law of 'Urban Land Reform' in Nicaragua. Legislation and decrees legalising previously unauthorised land occupations by low-income house builders, such as the ones which in 1958 legalised *gecekondus* in Turkey, or the series of decrees which provided legitimacy, government support and produced a list of officially designated settlements in Lima in 1961 (Dietz 1980: 37). Such rules are perhaps the most significant and sweeping form of state articulation of land supply for popular settlements (Baross 1983: 203).

3.2- Socio-economic environment:

Rapid urban growth in the developing countries has put the city, as a physical and functional entity, under severe pressure. Resources and opportunities have proved inadequate to cope with the population influx and serious socio-economic problems have emerged. For decision makers, the core problem is the inability of the city to meet, in conventional terms, the need for employment and shelter. The large numbers employed in the tertiary or service sector and housed in popular settlements are frequently cited in support of this argument. Almost inevitably, such problems are associated with migrants, who are commonly considered to be marginal urban residents in all senses of the word- spatially, they are often located at the city's periphery- and socially, they seem tenuously linked to its economy and culture. As a consequence, these settlements are viewed with some suspicion by the authorities as housing for politically unpredictable and unstable groups.

Lewis (1961) has stressed that poverty is not only a state of economic deprivation, of disorganisation, or of the absence of something. It is also something positive in the sense that it has a structure, a rationale, and defence mechanisms without which the poor could hardly carry on. It is a way of life, remarkably stable and persistent, passed down from generation to generation along family lines. The 'culture of poverty', a phrase he coined, has its own modalities and distinctive social and psychological consequences for its members. It is a dynamic factor which affects participation in the larger national culture and becomes a subculture of its own.

For many developing countries the culture of poverty comes into being in a variety of historical contexts. Most commonly it develops when a stratified socio-economic system is breaking down or is being replaced by another, in Egypt and many other developing countries, through the transition from feudalism to socialism and later to capitalism, or during the industrial boom elsewhere. Sometimes it results from imperial conquest after which the conquered are maintained in a servile status which may continue for many generations. It also occurs in the process of detribalisation when the tribal migrants to the cities develop a 'courtyard culture' remarkably similar to that of their rural origins.

To a certain extent, the culture of poverty has some universal characteristics which transcend regional, rural-urban, and even national differences. The similarities are in family structure, interpersonal relations, time orientations, value systems, spending patterns, and the sense of community in lower-class settlements which are often the societies of squatters.

This population is characterised by a relatively higher death rate, lower life expectancy, a higher proportion of individuals in the younger age groups; members are only partially integrated into national institutions or political parties at best; most of the poor have a very low level of education, often do not receive any medical care, maternity, or senior citizen benefits and they make very little use of the city services.

The economic traits which are most characteristic of the culture of poverty include the constant struggle for survival, unemployment and underemployment, low wages, a miscellany of unskilled occupations, child labour, the absence of savings, a chronic shortage of cash, the absence of food reserves in the home, the pawning of personal goods, borrowing from local money lenders, the use of second hand clothing and furniture.

Although the concept of 'culture of poverty' had achieved widespread popularity, the ideas that the poor remain poor because they are poor and they lack aspiration and the power to improve their life are still questionable. Perlman strongly disagrees with this concept. She believes that poverty serves as a vehicle for interpreting the social reality in a form which serves the social interests of those in power. "In short, they have the aspiration of the bourgeoisie, the perseverance of pioneers, and the values of patriots. What they do not have is an opportunity to fulfil their aspirations." (Perlman 1976: 234). The question is who should give them this opportunity? In the housing context, this tends to mean that only the governments are capable of helping the poor to help themselves.

Urban poor respond sensibly and rationally to the choices and opportunities open to them in their housing situation. While they contribute at times to their own poverty, the basic causes of that poverty are beyond their control. Tuner (1976) has shown that the poor understand more clearly the role that housing plays in their lives and they always struggle to consolidate their housing. However, examples of various popular settlements in Third World cities reveal that while there are slum areas where people are trapped in social problems and a decaying urban fabric, other areas are continuously improving their living conditions. In essence, a generalisation cannot help to understand the mechanism of each area.

There are particular factors which steer the socio-economic environment of popular settlements and consequently the political influence and physical condition of their life. The first factor to consider is internal, at the level of the settlement itself, which is the degree of social cohesion between the residents which ranges from fragmented to consolidated and solidarity. Hence, structural representation, social control, self-administration and possibility for sound co-operation vary at settlement levels.

The second factor is external, the degree of social integration with the native urban dwellers at the city level is also influential. There might be segregation and alienation, or interaction and assimilation. The last factor to consider is the system and mechanism of the informal economy of the inhabitants in the popular settlements. It is the interrelation between all these factors that affects the standard of life of the squatters , their ability to improve their areas and to participate effectively in a potential upgrading scheme.

a) Social structure and cohesion:

There are two extreme positions affecting the social cohesion and relationships that may arise in a popular settlement that is formed by different groups, though it is important to recognise that these are polarised positions which tend to be less absolute. The first results in fragmentation because of maintaining strict identities which discourage social integration. Rural-urban migration has been identified as a major generator of ethnic clusters. Many contemporary migrant studies have identified a greater or lesser degree of ethnic clustering especially when migrants settle in popular settlements. In this case, each ethnic group lives in congestion, segregated from any other group. There may be solidarity among members of each individual group but they do not deal with any other group. The second possibility occurs when there is natural co-operation and interaction between all different ethnic groups in the settlement as they have the same target of improving the living environment (Figure 3.2).

Ethnicity and fragmentation:

'Ethnic' groups can be defined as "population groups maintaining a particular identity based on racial, religious, linguistic or cultural status, on tribe, sub-tribe or family, or on region, town or village of origin. 'Ethnicity' is therefore used as a broad concept, embracing differences in identity based on several different criteria, although in many cases more than one of these criteria contribute to the sense of ethnic identity" (Greenshields 1980: 120). Meanwhile, ethnicity is defined as "the attribute of membership in a group set off by racial, territorial, economic, religious, cultural, aesthetic, or linguistic uniqueness. However, like any other form of social identity, it is essentially subjective, a sense of social belonging and ultimate loyalty" De Vos (1982: 3).

In popular settlements ethnic clusters may appear as a result of a coincidence between socio-economic status and ethnic identity of squatters or migrants. Other ethnic clusters appear as a result of a sharp distinction in ethnic identity between the inhabitants of the receiving town and the surrounding countryside. Two processes in particular have been identified as a generating and sustaining such clusters. One is the help given by established inhabitants in finding homes for immigrant relatives and friends near their own dwellings, and the second is the maintenance of ethnic solidarity as a form of migrant

adjustment to urban life. However established, ethnic clusters, far from being static features, as might be expected if they are merely the physical expression of a social system, can expand or contract, or shift their location within the city, at least when they are not rigidly delimited or apartheid.

Solidarity and consolidation:

For some ethnic groups who share the same daily problems, being poor encourages a closeness beyond mere sociability, for crises arise frequently enough to form strong patterns of neighbouring and consolation. Mutual aid consists largely of contributions of food, money, or service upon the death of a household member, or the happier celebration of a marriage in their own community centres, constructed basically for gathering, ceremony and consolation. Shared poverty also encourages family members to remain in the settlement during their leisure hours, for there is rarely money enough to partake of entertainment elsewhere. As a consequence, large numbers of residents, especially men and children, hang around the streets or go to the community centre, finding their entertainment in small drinking and play groups.

Although each ethnic group may have its own community centre, leaders of each group are wise enough to realise that fragmentation is not the way to solve their daily problems. They visit other leaders in their centres and ensure communication aiming to establish an environment of peace and solidarity to confront any local riot or daily problem.

Figure 3.2:

Socio-economic factors



b) Community self-management and types of co-operation:

When the inhabitants of a popular settlement are consolidated, their natural leaders will be able to establish self-management and legitimise an organisation by forming an elected 'community development association' represents all members of the settlement. This association should be registered within a governmental body in order to obtain the legal status which enables it to contact the municipality to express their demands and show willingness to co-operate.

Through organising themselves, low-income people in popular settlements can make substantial improvements to their housing and environment. Organising permits the community to mobilise and use all their available resources, as well as obtaining support from the government. Locally appropriate solutions can be found to local problems when people themselves are in control. In other settlements where people do not organise and are isolated from one another, no improvement will take place. Organisation gives people the confidence and security to start improving their settlement. At a later stage, obtaining land titles is a fruitful result which increases people's security and encourage them to carry on investing and improving (Turner 1976).

Official community development associations (CDAs) or community-based organisations (CBOs) can play various roles at all levels such as the society, institutions and executive authorities or politicians, and they can co-operate with the concerned non governmental organisations (NGOs). Community-based organisations are distinguished by the important fact that they are self-organised by local residents, whereas NGOs are organised by outsiders, usually from higher-income social strata based in major cities and often by foreigners. CBOs can federate and provide the same kinds of services as do NGOs organised by outsiders (UNCHS 1987).

Through the co-operation between NGOs and CBOs, inhabitants can build up the necessary political pressure to counter opposing interests. Meanwhile, in a climate of social solidarity NGOs can assist people and their own CBOs in two vital ways: First, by helping people to organise and articulate their demands, to assess their own resources, to plan and implement their own programmes and to manage and maintain their own houses and neighbourhoods. Second, acting as mediators between people and their CBOs in their negotiations with the commercial enterprises and government agencies (Turner 1988: 16).

c) Degree of social integration with native urban dwellers:

Ethnic clusters have a tendency to disintegrate. This has been identified as part of the movement towards a new social organisation based on socio-economic class status, and has been regarded as more characteristic of the wealthier sections of the population. In fact, the degree of the consolidation of the popular settlement society plays an important role in improving the image of the community by its native urban neighbours.

Segregation and alienation:

The types of social relationships formed by temporary and permanent migrants of the popular settlements are quite distinct. Temporary migrants and friable ethnic groups seldom make friends outside their own kind. They are reluctant to join urban-based organisations, or even to be affiliated with any CBOs or workers' unions.

A number of characteristics of migrant and native urban populations can be identified which favour segregation rather than integration in the city, especially when the consequences of internal social fragmentation are taking place. Stimulus of segregation is twofold: First, some squatters or migrants are ill-equipped in terms of their educational and occupational skills to adapt to the urban system. This factor results in a sheer lack of awareness about the necessity of maintaining the surrounding physical environment and, on the other hand, how to start any small-scale enterprise. It restricts the direction of daily interaction between the settlement and the city to only one way, from the settlement to the city. Native urban dwellers have no reason to go to the settlement and even believe that it is unsafe to pass through this area. Secondly, the structure and social processes of urban systems do not necessarily operate in favour of migrant integration.

Interaction and assimilation:

The desire of many migrants to become accepted urbanites is very great. Migrants who have made the city their permanent home wish to adopt new behaviour patterns. They often search for more satisfactory accommodation. Migrants who are successful in their work subsequently invest some of their earnings in improving their homes (Nelson 1976). In certain cities, squatter settlements have become respectable suburbs despite their initially unplanned and ill-serviced character.

Time spent in the city does not in itself result in migrant assimilation. Specific characteristics both at the level of the individual and of the group favour rapid assimilation. Research has shown that high educational attainment and high socio-economic status amongst migrants are key variables encouraging assimilation. Medium or

high education of women results in a comprehensive awareness about health, environment, and housing conditions even though they are not built of rich materials.

Many migrants are not, and may never be, assimilated within the modern sector, in the sense that they may retain characteristics distinctive from those of the native population. Nevertheless, even involvement in the informal sector causes change in the life-styles of migrant workers so that they begin to lose their rural characteristics. Their limited contact with the complex economic systems of the city acts as a physical catalyst bringing changes in their life-style which distinguish them irrevocably from rural people.

Ultimately the most important factor restricting the integration of migrants and influencing the attitude of rural persons towards the urban environment, is the ability of migrants to find suitable employment. The long-term satisfaction or dissatisfaction of migrants with city life will be a function of the levels of occupational and social mobility which they experience (Findlay 1980: 66).

d) Structure and mechanisms of the informal economy:

In recent years the concept of the informal sector has become an important analytical tool in urban studies in developing countries, generating considerable debate on its content, character and on the implications it raises *vis-a-vis* policy issues. This term arose in the early 1970s, mainly as an attempt to deal conceptually with the so-called 'underemployment', 'disguised unemployment', 'the traditional sector', 'the bazaar economy', 'the unorganised sector', and 'sub-proletarian occupations'. Various types of squatters' economic activities within the informal sector are frequently described by civil servants as 'street occupations', 'parasitic occupations', and 'unproductive activities' (Bromley 1988: 161). In fact the term 'informal sector' is too closely identified with illegality, often in a grossly unjust legal system, and all too often is assumed to be synonymous with poverty.

However, the International Labour Office defined the informal sector by its ease of entry, reliance on indigenous resources, family ownership of enterprises, small scale of operations, labour-intensive and adapted technology, skill acquired outside the formal school system, and unregulated and competitive markets (ILO 1972: 6). On the other hand the formal sector is seen as the renumerated, large-scale, capital-intensive and wage-earning sector (Nelson 1988: 184). Nonetheless, ILO policy has sought to encourage governments to stimulate informal-sector activities rather than to harass them out of existence (Moser 1978).

The occupational status of a squatter, who is often a migrant, first describes his ability to earn a living for himself and his family, and secondly serves as a surrogate measure of his

social status relative to persons born in the city and relative to other migrants. Migration is not only associated with the selective demographic transfer of the rural population to the city, but it is also linked with the selective channelling of population into specific occupational and social categories. Some migrants succeed in establishing themselves as small merchants or artisans having small scale reputable workshops in the same settlement and, therefore, some native urban dwellers come especially to them.

It is asserted that the majority of migrants have their hopes dashed as they move from a situation of underemployment in the agricultural sector to one of underemployment in the urban economy. Migration may have increased their physical proximity to the national core, but in economic terms their transfer has been from the periphery of the rural economy to that of the urban economy. Although rural migrants may have been frustrated in their attempts to rise to higher positions, they have been willing to maintain their lowly position in the urban hierarchy. Even squatter migrants working at the lowest occupational levels consider themselves to be better off than had they remained in the villages of origin or pursued a nomadic existence.

4- Governmental policies towards popular settlements:

Action on land and housing for and by the urban poor may be motivated by a variety of concerns which need not necessarily be mutually consistent. Governmental attitude and perceptions may range from an outright support and genuine charitable concern for the reduction of visible human suffering, to an extreme hostility and suppression leading to a concern for order and cleanliness in the city. They may be voiced by radical community organisers stressing the right of the poor to stay in the city and their right to share in its wealth, or by military rulers wishing to prevent street riots and insurrections. The issue may be adopted by politicians appealing for votes in squatter settlements, or by industrialists wishing to keep the cost of housing low so that wages can remain low. However, governments' policies vary from one time to another and from one country to another according to the political and economic policies that each country follows.

There are four main policies either to avoid the formation of popular settlements or to find a solution for the existing ones. Governments may adopt one or more of these policies. The first policy is to prevent the formation and growth of popular settlements within anti-slum initiatives policies. It includes either administrative prevention measures ('out-country migration' encouragement, internal control on the rural-urban migration), or housing projects (new towns, low-cost estate housing, sites and services). The second policy is dignified by the term *laissez-faire,* which implies indifference for a deliberate purpose. After the formation of popular settlements, government responses may take the form of either reactionary palliatives (forcible repatriation, slum clearance), or genuine remedies, such as urban upgrading or 'careful urban renewal' schemes.

4.1- Anti-slum initiatives policies:

If low-income groups can obtain cheap and suitable units in a new housing project, e.g. low-cost estate housing, sites and services or new towns, this will prevent the formation of popular settlements and limit the size of the existing ones- though it may also stimulate rural-urban migration in a climate of uneven development. In reality, most Third World governments suffer from numerous economic crises which hinder implementing such housing projects. They are not able to carry out any comprehensive development policies which can offer appropriate houses in both quantitative and qualitative terms. To overcome this deficit, many governments launch, in addition, specific regressive administrative rules and policies aiming at controlling the growth of urban centres and large cities in particular. Thus, anti-slum initiatives may include both administrative and developmental measures.

a) Regressive administrative prevention:

Many governments have adopted policies aimed at reducing urban population growth by encouraging and facilitating 'out-country migration' and/or imposing new strict rules to control the internal rural-urban migration, usually named 'migrant interceptors' programmes. These policies are best described as 'regressive' measures because they do not genuinely solve the causes of the problem but try to lessen the negative effects.

'Out-country migration' encouragement:

When employment opportunities are locally limited, migration to cities will increase. Some governments confront this problem by encouraging 'out-country migration' as a prevention measure aimed at stemming or deflecting the steady movement of people into large metropolises promoting popular settlements. This policy is short-sighted and has little chance of success. Its immediate effect is the loss of many young and skilled workers, whilst in the long term the returning migrants, whatever their original birthplace, usually settle into the tertiary sector of main cities and if they return to their original birthplace, they occupy another area illegally and build a house with substantial materials.

Migration out of the country *per se* has been encouraged in many developing countries in an attempt to reduce the pressure on large cities. This tendency has been particularly marked in certain ex-colonial territories where out-migration has been directed mainly towards the former colonial power, e.g. Indians and Pakistanis to the U.K. and Algerians to France. Some other developing countries encourage out-migration towards the oil-rich countries, e.g. Egyptians and Philippines to the Arab Gulf countries. They have sent millions of skilled and unskilled labour and their remittances have provided much-needed hard currency. On the other hand, this migration has drained the home countries of skilled labour needed for development, and from previous investments in human capital.

Rural-urban migration interception:

Internal controls on urban migration growth have been launched by some developing countries. They are much more direct and primarily consist of restricting access to the cities to those who have a guaranteed job and/or a residence. The restrictions aim at preventing long-term urban settlement by the migrants and in that, a variety of health controls, residential obligations and permits are employed.

Some developing countries impose stringent migration controls to prevent the situation from deteriorating further. In 1970, the local government of Jakarta adopted a system requiring all migrants to obtain a 'residence card' in order to remain in the city. Migrants had to prove that they had a job, accommodation and permission from their previous

neighbourhood council to leave, as well as making a deposit equal to the return fare to their point of origin. The system stimulated widespread corruption from selling these cards (Drakakis-Smith 1981: 119). Several proposals for a 'pass system' have also been put forward, but evidence has proved that they are almost impossible to operate. Administratively it is very difficult to enforce, and it creates numerous opportunities for corruption.

b) Housing projects:

Programmes under this policy have been applied widely in Third World cities. While all of them aim at solving housing problems, few have proved to be effective measures to prevent squatting and informal housing processes. Hardoy and Satterthwaite (1989) explain that more than 30 nations have adopted such programmes in small and intermediate urban centres in the last 15 years to serve national political goals, to support local or regional development, or to exploit some natural resources via new land colonisation programmes. They usually go under names such as, 'satellites', 'secondary cities', 'intermediate' and 'medium size' cities for new towns; 'low-income housing', 'State-housing' and 'public housing' for low-cost estate housing; and sites and services projects.

New towns and satellites:

The concept of new town development has had wide repercussions throughout the developing countries. In most instances its primary function has been seen as a catalyst for regional development. In this sense it has fused with the wider concept of growth pole theory and become a major force in regional planning, occasionally peaking in the form of new capital city development projects as in Brazil and Pakistan. The suitability of these concepts and their practical achievements within developing countries is a separate issue which varies from one country to another. However, it would be true to state that in general one of the major motivations in new town planning- decongestion from overcrowded and over concentrated urban centres and therefore avert the promotion of squatter settlements- has not received adequate attention from planners and decision makers in developing countries. This is not to say that no new towns have attempted to fulfil such a role, but in general it has been less important than the growth pole function and far less successful. Most new towns in developing countries have tended to be located far too close to the original city to act as a counter-attraction for both migrants and existing populations.

In other cases, new towns are planned but no real action is taken to start the process of implementation. Because these areas are nearby existing cities, informal urban growth will take place ignoring the original plan because of the absence of local government

control. Furthermore, some new towns in developing countries are built without a genuine economic base to attract new residents to start new small-scale projects, therefore, they remain abandoned for a long time and the cost of such wasted investment is high. In Egypt, for instance, the growing problems of the metropolis have being tackled by an ambitious resettlement programme that the Egyptian government started in the 1970s. The programme aimed on deconcentration by directing and accommodating the growth of over-congested cities in nearby satellites and new towns on the desert land. Cairo was declared saturated and new satellites on the fringes were erected (such as Six of October, Fifteenth of May and El-Obour) and within a radius of 50-80 kilometres (Tenth of Ramadan, Sadat City). It was expected that this would broaden the spatial basis for economic activities, relieve population pressure and induce migration towards non-arable land in the metropolitan regions of Cairo and Alexandria. At the country level, 12 new towns and satellites have already been constructed with a total cost of £E2.7 billions (£5.1 millions), and another 12 will be implemented by 2000 offering a total of 120 thousand new jobs, particularly through 1650 new factories (El-Ahram 7/10/1992).

From the cost-benefit point of view, the public investment needed to implement these new towns would required almost 40% of the total national budget allocated for urban infrastructure and public utilities until the year 2000. In fact, to get 14 million people to live in these new towns, the government would have to create new economic bases and businesses which can offer at least 2.3 million new jobs (presuming one job per family and considering the average family-size in Egypt is now 6 persons/family). Moreover, the new towns will only accommodate around 10% of the expected national population growth by 2000, leaving the formation and growth of the informal housing at their usual rates. This policy cannot be considered as a 'preventive measure' since it has proved inadequate to cope with the pressure of housing needs and demands. Deserted new towns and satellites are sarcastically called 'ghost towns' in Egypt.

Low-cost estate housing:

The main concern seems to be to house as many of the low-income strata as cheaply as possible to prevent any promotion or further growth of popular settlements. Such large-scale estate housing has often not been totally satisfactory because of three distinct factors- their location within the city; the planning layout of the estates as a whole; and the design of individual blocks and units. The most influential factor in estate location is undoubtedly the availability and cost of land. This encompasses both its lack of development and the legal problem of acquisition. With regard to the latter, few cities have extensive government ownership of land. In most instances, urban land is in complicated systems of private ownership which, together with the weak expropriation

legislation, make the acquisition of suitable development sites very expensive and time consuming.

At planning levels, there is little evidence that serious research or investment has gone into estate planning. Community facilities are rarely considered and this is particularly true of retail marketing services. Many large-scale housing estates for low-income people in developing countries are characterised by chaotic clusters of illegal vendors. The blocks themselves are often difficult for many residents to accept culturally, particularly if they are recent arrivals in the city. There is little evidence to show that such estates promote community interaction or neighbourliness, especially in multi-stories blocks (Walter 1978). Although the provision of complete houses is convenient for most governments because it has political advantages and less controlled responsibilities, it also raises problems. Units have a very high cost. To be effective, the public sector's delivery system needs to have vast financial resources, management, and technical expertise. The output is usually small, so it can only serve a small number of families (Lim 1977). Public housing is more susceptible to financial, administrative, and physical breakdown (Turner 1976: 98). The policy of providing complete houses usually fails both in the strength of the commitment given and the kind of strategy adopted (Blitzer 1981: 12).

In Egypt, the government's first response to the urban crisis was to turn to the public sector to build low-cost estate housing. Housing policy favoured public-funded construction of rental flats by private contractors and attempted to foster the development of co-operative housing construction by providing capital through a parastatal tender to housing co-operatives. These public housing projects could not meet either the increasing demands from new families or their physical and social demands. Ultimately they represented an unacceptable subsidy burden for the government. Table 4.1 shows the sheer inadequacy of the proposed number of new flats needed and the actual number of new families. Whilst the number of new families that will be formed between 1995 and 2000, for instance, are estimated at 2,465 million, the government proposed that 628 thousand new flats should be constructed, only 25% of the actual housing demand (NCSCR 1985, GOHBPR 1976).

Table 4.1: Egypt- Number of new families compared to new flats needed

Factors	**1985-1990**	**1990-1995**	**1995-2000**
No. new flats proposed (thousands)	498	546	628
No. new families (thousands)	1577	1803	2465

Source: No. of flats, NCSCR 1985: 62; No. new families, GOHBPR 1976

The actual number of units constructed during the period 1985-1995 in both urban cities and new towns was 1,584 million. This figure was not only less than the number of new

families at the same period but also 92 thousand units out this figure are abandoned flats within the new towns (El-Ahram 10/5/1994). Actually, other families were accommodated either on illegal land, in multi-family extended houses, land sub-division projects or in flats built by the private sector.

In general, the planning and implementation of most government-sponsored housing projects are slow processes, because of personpower constraints in the planning organisation and government regulations concerning plan approval, tendering procedures, construction supervision and disbursement of funds. At a time of high interest rates and rising construction costs, delays in this process tend to be extremely costly. For instance, if construction costs increase by 20% per annum and the interest rate is 15% per annum, a delay of one year midway during construction could easily lead to a 17-18 percent increase in overall construction costs.

A survey of public programmes' experience in providing shelter in both developing and developed countries shows more failures than successes. Although the experience varies from country to country, most of failure can be attributed to the following factors. Housing standards are too high, especially in developing countries, in relation to the poor's affordability. This has resulted in very large subsidies and only a few people benefited from housing programmes. Second, governments have been either inefficient or politically unable to collect rents. Third, shelter units have been too far from sources of employment and often lacked complementary social infrastructure. Finally, little effort has been made to understand how poor people live and how to integrate them actively and effectively in the provision of their own shelter (World Bank 1980: 36).

Sites and services projects:

In a conventional housing project, a contractor completes the investment before families move in. The eventual occupants may pay up to a quarter of the investment costs with a down payment, in the case of housing sold on mortgage and hire-purchase contracts. But most of the initial finance necessarily comes from other sources. Then, as the residents repay their loans or pay rent, they provide a small part of the funds needed every year to build a house for some other family. Both the initial savings for down payments and the subsequent, periodical instalments depend on the physical availability of completed houses. Sites and services concept differs from conventional housing in two ways. First, families who move into a sites and services neighbourhood either get just land and installed water connection in a minimum project, or these with other utilities and a core house in an expensive project. Whatever the type of sites and services, it means a degree of gradual construction of infrastructure or houses, or both, with a significant amount of total investment left until after occupancy.

Second, families in sites and services invest directly in their own housing, rather than pay for something decided and provided by someone else. Self-help, the direct investment by families, can take place the form of either labour of family members and friends or purchased materials and hired labour, or a combination of both. Also, in some cases the project agency offers a group of skilled labours who were trained by the project and therefore charge less than the average market price. This variety of forms of self-help distinguishes sites and services not only from conventional construction, but also from what we might call conventional self-help, in which mainly family or project labour replaces real market paid labour in an otherwise conventional construction process. Self-help in sites and services comes closer to its most common form, as seen in the complete planning and organisation of housing production by families in squatter settlements, where the functions of planning and financing are at least as important as family labour. There is a common impression that both gradual construction and self-help reduce housing costs, and this is why a housing agency, with a given budget, can settle more families in sites and services than in conventional housing estates.

Sites and services housing agencies have four main tools for planning self-help projects. First, is the help to construct core houses and implementing infrastructure networks. Second, are regulations, in the form of norms and of lease and purchase agreements that stipulate what and when families should build. Third, is technical assistance (e.g. demonstration houses, house plans, training in building skills and supervision). And fourth, is credit and access to building materials via loans, grants and building stores with preferential prices and rations of scarce or local materials. Plans for sites and services integrate these tools into a system for implementation.

4.2- Laissez-faire:

The meagre investment policies of most governments in the developing countries are often dignified by the term *laissez-faire,* implying non-interference for a deliberate purpose. Urban authorities adopt a policy of inaction in the hope that the migrants, whom they consider to be the cause of the housing problem, will eventually return to the rural areas where they are assumed to originate. Many reasons have been suggested for the widespread government apathy towards urban housing problems. Although some developing countries have changed this policy, the arguments are worth closer scrutiny. Government policy may ignore the growth of popular settlements in order to keep a pool of labour available at minimum cost (Harms 1976).

Another suggestion is that fear of the latent political power of the squatters forestalled any reaction to their acquisition of large tracts of land. Meanwhile, they are voters and potential sources of unrest, which might encourage the need for legitimisation of their

presence. The administrative difficulties and operational confusion which characterise the great majority of cities in the developing countries are additional stimulus to launch a *laissez-faire* attitude. The sheer lack of information is one of the most crucial factors, not only of reliable statistics but also of basic cadastral maps. The planning system is characterised by a total shortage of knowledge in such vital areas as demographic and occupational structure or land use.

Typically, planning information appears to be sought more for political than for planning purposes. Even when planning information is available, effective use of the material is frequently hindered by political corruption or electoral gimmickry. Nominal improvement of squatter settlements or partial recognition of tenure both figure prominently in the vote-catching tactics of almost every political group in developing countries. Special agencies are set up and disbanded almost overnight as a result of fluctuations in political fortunes, so that the roles and responsibilities of each organisation towards housing provision become increasingly confused (Drakakis-Smith 1981: 114).

Operational confusion is frequently compounded in developing countries by a lack of spatial synchronisation between the real and officially designated extent of many urban areas since "the boundaries of local government and planning authorities have been slow to respond to fundamental changes in urban configuration" (World Bank 1972: 49). The lack of data, administrative conflict and delays, the isolation of planners from policy-makers, all combine to convert enthusiasm, efficiency and pragmatism into the apathetic and indifferent characteristics of too many developing countries.

4.3- Reactionary palliatives:

In cities where migration controls have not been enforced or have failed to reduce migration flows, the most common reactionary response has been the forcible repatriation or relocation of 'surplus' urban population either to rural areas or to the urban fringes. Slum clearance programmes have been carried out by many governments. The authorities concerned usually claim that the squatters or pavement dwellers removed in this way disfigure the city and act as a drag on the urban economy, but in most instances the main reason for the operation is the desire to obtain more land for 'progressive' and profitable development projects. Slum clearance and squatter relocation programmes only squander scarce resources on replacing existing dwellings and the poor simply moved to other parts of the cities. The mechanisms of eviction and relocation vary considerably.

a) Forcible repatriation:

One of the most simple measures is the implementation of vagrancy laws. Under this system, individuals without formal employment may be ousted from the city. Although welfare officials may arrange for transport back to home villages, the majority of those convicted quickly return back to the city.

b) Slum clearance:

Not all palliative measures relate to individuals. The most frequent response of this nature is the wholesale demolition of slum and informal settlements. Many governments became increasingly worried about the rapid growth of slum areas and they simply bulldozed these areas. No doubt, this action aimed at offering land for profitable commercial developments and those displaced by slum clearance rarely received accommodation on a redeveloped site, even where this was promised.

Without rehousing:

Slum residents may be evicted *en masse* beyond the city boundaries with no provision for rehousing or employment. This process is usually undertaken to acquire building land, but on some occasions it is done simply to improve the 'image' of the city concerned. In Jakarta, for example, it has been alleged that prior to the arrival of eminent foreign dignitaries, the pavement dwellers, are "seized by the police, dumped into trucks, and taken to places outside the city where they are left on streets or roads" (Suparlan 1974: 51). Few eviction schemes have a long-term effect on population movement to the city. Most families eventually return and resume squatting, frequently in the place from which they are originally cleared.

Rural relocation:

Ostensibly more reasonable in comparison with straightforward eviction, is the practice of relocation to prepared reception sites in rural areas. Whilst more humane in character, such schemes are nevertheless reactionary because they are based on the mistaken premises that the migrants can return to, and resettle in, an agrarian lifestyle. Great care is usually taken over the selection and preparation of the site and the resettled squatter is given as much help as possible. However, even with careful organisation there has been little success in counteracting the economic lure of the city, and wholesale abandonment has been characteristic of such schemes.

Relocation to the city fringes:

Real estate interests may pressure governments to displace the squatters- in most cases to the outskirts of cities - in order to use the land for more profitable development or to raise the value of existing development and secure land ownership for the rich. Furthermore, in displacing squatter settlements governments have interests of their own from which derives the search for 'respectable face' (national pride, tourism, etc.). The most viable alternative in the face of high land costs in the central city is for relocation housing reception to be constructed on the urban periphery where land is undeveloped, less expensive and relatively easy for the government to acquire. However, such relocation frequently causes severe economic problems for the relocated residents, most of whom have close socio-economic ties to the inner city. For various reasons, relocation to the urban fringes usually results in a reduction in household income so that estates are often slow to fill and are characterised by families in rental difficulties.

4.4- Genuine remedial policies:

The failure of conventional housing and inefficient 'anti-slum initiatives administrative measures' have resulted in the adoption of some developing countries to the concept of upgrading. They recognised that slum and informal housing are a permanent feature which requires permanent solutions and not just 'stop-gap' measures. Several genuine remedial policies have been world-wide undertaken on an increasingly wide scale.

a) Urban upgrading:

The need to upgrade the large and increasing numbers of slum and squatter settlements has become recognised by many governments because of the following advantages: it preserves existing economic systems and opportunities for those most in need, the urban poor; it preserves a low-cost housing system, usually at advantageous locations, thus enabling the inhabitants to retain the maximum disposable income; it preserves a community which has many internal linkages to safeguard the interests of the individual family and the group. The alternative to upgrading is relocation in one form or another: this is socially disruptive and by usually being to a much less favourable location, results in higher transport costs and less access to informal employment opportunities (Martin 1983).

Upgrading is practised for a wide variety of reasons. Undoubtedly one reason is that it 'solves' the housing problem by transforming 'illegal' dwellings into 'legal' ones, thus improving the housing statistics. In the same way, it also helps to defuse political agitation for improved housing by slum and squatter dwellers. These are general concepts

that might loom large in political decision-making of developing countries' governments. However, official recognition also exposes the dwellers to market forces; many are tempted to sell out their plots and start the whole process over again elsewhere.

b) 'Careful urban renewal':

Some developed and developing countries have carried out 'careful urban renewal' policies which are specifically directed at the interests of local people. Through an integrated concept of comprehensive development, careful urban renewal projects aim to improve the existing housing stock besides the other urban upgrading schemes of social and physical improvement. In the early eighties this meant a complete reversal of decades of urban renewal practice: formerly policy was made by financial institutions responsible for redevelopment throughout reactionary programmes of clearance and reconstruction. This change in direction was only achieved by political pressure from local people and the commitment of experts.

A multi-layered process of information, advice and co-operative decision-making replaced the early system by which preconceived plans were pushed through. A prerequisite of the changed procedure is that conflicts must be aired in public and resolved peacefully, and all decisions are taken and discussed communally. Careful urban renewal is based on collective democracy, not on measures pushed through from 'above'. Careful urban renewal needs concrete knowledge of the realities of each housing problem, and this can only be provided by people living in the target area. It also needs a suitable framework, without which it is impossible to accommodate demands from the area itself.

5- The concept of self-help:

Self-help is the oldest approach of people to supply the basic need for 'housing'. The variety of ways in which families can build their own houses, with and without aid, technical assistance, hidden or direct subsidies, governmental support, tools or machines, etc, make it difficult to define self-help housing (UN 1974: 10). The term concerns not only the construction processes but also self-planning and the management of resources, self-contracting of skilled labour and self-provision of utilities through institutions or governments. In brief, self-help housing is the approach whereby the user is an active and effective part of the whole, or part, of the housing process (Turner 1976: 140).

Self-help concept goes far beyond housing schemes. It refers also to employment, welfare, community facilities and infrastructure (Hake 1977). Self-help may involve individual as well as group inputs and corresponds to a system of production, financing, and maintenance in which a significant part is organised and carried out by that person or group. Usually it involves an incursion into functions that would normally be the responsibility of the public or private sectors but they are either unable, or unwilling, to provide that service. Only occasionally does self-help result from a genuine act or wish on the part of the individual or groups to build their own house (Ward 1982: 7).

Self-help processes may take place at three levels: The first occurs when governments let low-income people build their houses by themselves. After the formation of popular settlements, when governments recognise the necessity of improving these settlements for socio-political and economic reasons, the second level arises and includes genuine remedial policies of urban upgrading, or 'careful urban renewal' projects based on self-help and peoples' participation. The last level of self-help takes place when governments adopt anti-slum formation policies and introduce 'sites and services' schemes in which target groups participate in the planning and implementation processes.

Two different viewpoints are attached to the self-help approach, the Liberal approach and the Marxist approach. The best-known promoter of the first is Turner. Many of Turner's ideas are based on what he observed in autonomous settlements, where, informally or illegally, squatters formed popular settlements and controlled large parts of the housing process. What Turner proposed is that, instead of threatening the existing efforts of squatters, governments should respect and support them (Turner 1969;1976; 1988; 1994). Turner coined the term 'viable housing policy' for housing policy that relies on the self-help approaches during the formation processes of popular settlements, urban upgrading, or sites and services projects (Turner 1976).

Housing activities were classified into three sets of operations- planning, construction and management- in which three sets of actors were involved: users (popular sector), suppliers (private and commercial sector), and regulators (public sector and government). These three sets of actors have very different interests: use-values predominate for users, profit maximisation for the private sector, and the maintenance of public order for government. The relationship among these three groups can be understood in terms of autonomous or heteronomous systems, which are basically incompatible.

Bureaucratic and heteronomous systems are based on hierarchical structures and centralised, large-scale technology; they produce objects of high quality at great cost, but with a low use-value. As they supply institutionally-defined products to institutionally-defined consumers they cannot accommodate the necessary complexity and variability of housing needs. In general, the housing provided by such systems is badly matched with the needs of its users. Moreover, the ability to match housing supply and demand would seem to be inversely proportional to the degree of heteronomy in the system. The long-term productivity of heteronomous systems diminishes as they consume capital resources, and construction and maintenance costs spiral through their disproportionate dependence on borrowed capital. The end product is "aesthetically hideous, socially alienating and technically incompetent architecture" (Turner 1976: 49).

Autonomous systems on the other hand are locally self-governing and although they produce objects of extremely varied standards, these products are generally low cost and of high use-value. Housing that is produced by such systems is admirably adjusted to the needs of the users, it is not socially alienating, and productivity increases over the long-term, as capital is generated through the investment of household income in the dwelling environment. The essential characteristic of autonomous systems is user-control; the role of central administration should be limited to ensuring local and personal access to the appropriate technologies, land and credit (Turner 1976: 67).

The second viewpoint is the 'Marxist approach'. They have severely attacked self-help housing recommendations and the arguments upon which they are based. One of Turner's main Marxist critics is Burgess, who aims to demonstrate that what Turner proposes in fact boils down to "the economic and ideological means necessary for the maintenance of the *status quo* and the general conditions for capitalist development". Burgess argues that self-help is doomed to failure because it cannot accommodate self-help housing as a commodity in a system in which the capitalist mode of production is dominant (Burgess 1982).

The general sort of criticisms posed by Marxists are varied. First, self-help allows labour to be exploited twice over- first at work, then in the construction of the home. Moreover,

it maintains the *status quo* and retards necessary structural change; it underwrites low wages, insofar as access to low-cost shelter reduces the wage level required for subsistence. Furthermore, it is too optimistic, and far from offering a 'freedom to build' as Turner and Fichter (1972) argue, it is the only alternative the poor have (Harms 1976). Its romanticism obscures the real suffering experienced; self-help becomes a blueprint for its continuance as governments adopt a *laissez-faire* policy. It simply provides a short-term 'breathing space' and presents no long-term solution: indeed it rationalises poverty (Figure 5.1).

Figure 5.1: Self-help processes during formation of popular settlements:



5.1- Self-help concept during formation of popular settlements:

Governments of developing countries have found that they are unable to meet their housing deficits, that are assessed in terms of the number of housing units required to meet future demand, as well as the existing backlog of families living in sub-standard accommodation. Following Western planning principles and techniques, some low-cost housing projects are constructed by governments, yet all too often their success has been limited. The majority of the poor simply cannot afford the repayments or rent for 'social interest' housing, as it is frequently called. The irregular nature of their incomes from one week to the next means that any system that demands regular payments is unsuitable and liable to massive defaulting.

This failure- though some would argue it has been a mixed blessing- has resulted in an ever-expanding proportion of the population being thrown back upon its own resources concerning housing provision. In many developing countries that has taken one of the articulations of land supply, discussed in chapter 3, to meet their demands. During the formation of self-build popular settlements, squatters erect a provisional shelter which, depending upon the opportunities that they are given, they hope to be able to improve gradually as their resources allow (Abrams 1964).

a) Liberals' and Marxists' viewpoints:

Popular settlements are viewed positively by liberals since they improve over time. Pampa de Comas, a squatter invasion on the outskirts of Lima documented by Turner (1963), began initially with houses made out of straw matting which were used to stake a claim. Soon after, a boundary wall was constructed to define property limits as well as to provide protection against trespassers and amelioration against the semi-arid climate. Years later, in co-operation with government agencies, services were installed, streets paved or improved and individual dwellings constructed to a level commensurate with the household's needs and economic capabilities.

It was held that squatters could improve homes in their free or underemployed time. Even when surplus incomes did not cover the purchase of construction materials, minor improvements which required labour only could always be undertaken. Faced with limited opportunities for socio-economic mobility elsewhere, the squatter settlements provided the household with the vehicle of upward mobility. Costs were minimal and economic improvement was manifest by improvement *in situ;* views were often magnificent, and the environment was in some respects more healthy for children- compared with the traffic hazards and pollution dangers of downtown tenements- from whence many had come (Turner 1969: 510).

These findings were corroborated and extended, as additional evidence emerged from other Latin American cities. In Africa and Asia also a fresh look was taken at self-help approach. Although there appeared to be less opportunity for self-help home improvements (Dwyer 1975), occasionally, where income levels were higher and government prohibition less extreme, some popular settlements were upgraded (Martin 1977; Van der Linden 1977).

On the other hand, Marxists see the processes of self-help during formation of popular settlements as a stimulus for the petty-commodity form of housing which is structurally conditioned by its relationship with the dominant capitalist mode of production. In some aspects, the petty-commodity production of housing displays its precapitalist elements- not only in terms of the capitalist production of housing goods and services for exchange, and the informal marketing and rental of land and housing, but also in terms of the duplication of capitalist interest at the informal level. These can take the form of professional invaders, false developers and speculators, political organisers of invasions (informal estate agents), loan-sharks providing credit for construction (informal finance capitalists) and a whole range of intermediaries involved in the complex subcontractual work relations within the urban and national scales (Burgess 1982: 87).

The Marxist's critique has pointed out that the processes of uncontrolled urban growth and peripheral squatting have not met with as much disapproval as is commonly believed. Popular settlements allow a large, permanent industrial reserve army of labour to be cheaply installed in the cities. They also minimise housing and land costs and provide an opportunity to extend family budgets through landlordism and horticulture. The reduction of food and housing costs reduces pressure for wage increase. Popular settlements also give some measure of political stability as they allow for owner-occupancy and the establishment of patron-client relations on a large and organised scale. They also permit tokenism, as a form of distributing goodwill and allow the State or local political parties to get the credit for the unpaid labours of the settlers on public service provision or even on their own homes (Burgess 1982: 89).

Burgess argues that there would seem to be little hope that Turner's policies could be carried out on the scale and in the manner that he considers to be critical to their success. There is a greater likelihood that they will be used on a limited scale to further petty-commodity interests in ways that are not detrimental to the general maintenance of capitalist modes of production. If Turner's policies are implemented on the scale and within those conditions of production, there will be the most drastic and deleterious consequences for low-income groups (Burgess 1982: 90).

The spectre of the atrocious housing conditions of Calcutta serve constantly as a reminder of that the differences with Latin American cases were often greater than the similarities (Dwyer 1975; Piel 1976). Popular settlements are viewed negatively as physically precarious and spawned social pathologies such as alcoholism, drug addiction, prostitution, theft and violence. Analogies often refer to them as a creeping cancer, urban sores or "... a fungus attached to and growing out of the carapace of the city" (Juppenlatz 1970: 5).

5.2- Self-help during urban upgrading:

Two levels of self-help may be defined during urban upgrading or careful urban renewal projects. At its most simple, upgrading refers to specific and largely unrelated actions in which an individual or groups takes partial responsibility for organising and carrying through the installation of a particular work, such as improving and financing their homes, an infrastructure network, services and maintaining an object. It is here that most emphasis has so far been placed- how to stimulate squatters or low-income strata to improve their living environment, either by self finance or with the assistance of an external agency? What is the potential for technical assistance and the use of prefabricated structure? How can basic standards and provisions be ensured? What financing arrangements ought to be established to allow access to schemes for the low-income groups? How can the sustainability of self-management and improvement after withdrawing of the external agency be ensured?

At a second and more complex level, the group may involve itself in several actions integrated vertically and aim at transforming the local social and economic structure in a dramatic way. For example, this would occur when the group not only improves or reconstructs their dwellings but also produces the basic local material- bricks, tiles, elements of roofs and infrastructure etc.. In this way housing becomes a means of stimulating the local economic structure, though this incursion into other areas of production and distribution will almost certainly raise objections from vested interest groups. There has been a growth of the emphasis placed upon self-determination and autonomy of control by housing users (*Ekistics* 1976; Turner 1976).

a) The policy context of self-help during upgrading projects:

There are a host of reasons why community participation can be deemed desirable in self-help projects either from the point of view of the squatters or the assisting project agency. Some of the main benefits the residents may perceive in participation are: the reduction of project costs and, therefore, of the repayments they have to make and ensuring that the improvements which are made correspond to their priorities (proper participation should include the planning stage). Ensuring that the links with a CBO or CDA persist after the withdrawal of the official agency; the chance of establishing some local autonomy in development with reduced dependence on outside agencies. Participation provides the basis for local community politicians and foster patronage relationships with city politicians.

The governmental agency, whether it runs the project itself or in co-operation with a foreign donor, may benefit from: the saving of the agency's scarce personpower resources

and thus expenses by having a CBO to undertake tasks it would otherwise have to do itself (especially in labour and maintenance) and the promotion of social development by increasing local self-reliance. In addition, it may make political capital, by demonstrating that the people and the government are working hand-in-hand, and increase political and social control by co-opting a strong but manipulable community leadership. The efficiency of project implementation may be maximised by giving the CBO those functions which it can often fulfil better than the project agency (e.g. determining what local improvement priorities are, persuading residents to participate and policing collective activities); and by ensuring that through establishing a strong CBO or CDA, the project area continues to develop even after the withdrawal of the project agency, the organisation will determine and undertake new projects which it will be able to implement and manage largely on its own (Skinner 1983: 126).

5.3- Self-help during sites and services:

The most important factor in the context of self-help during sites and services projects is the economic dimension. It can be initiated in groups by those people who find that the conventional housing provided in the market is too expensive in relation to their income. The relation between income and prevailing housing cost is the crucial factor to be considered in sites and services projects by self-help. In self-help housing part of the scarce but necessary cash income is substituted by the builder's own labour.

It is usually assumed that sites and services areas are particularly resistant to collective participation because residents are strangers. They have had no experience of co-operation with one another to build up trust, and their initial concern will be to construct a satisfactory house. There are different types of sites and services project and therefore, the self-help approach should be designed to fit each.

5.4- Constraints of self-help approach in upgrading and sites and services programmes:

Of course, not all the apparent advantages of self-help and community participation programmes will be felt equally by all governments, planning agencies and residents, but there do seem to be sufficient reasons to make participation an attractive *prima facie* proposition. Where it is seen that the agency needs to reduce its expenses and that the provision of affordable housing, community facilities and infrastructure for the poor is dependent upon this, the emphasis of the argument will be to convince residents that their co-operation and ideas will enable planners to produce plans which are for the community's benefit. It is then a moral obligation for residents to assist the 'experts'.

It might also be argued that participation will eradicate the marginal character of a settlement's residents by transforming them into 'solid citizens' working for planners who

have the welfare of the poor at heart. The disadvantages of participation seen in this way are to perpetuate an unequal relationship between the agency and residents with participation facilitating the implementation of projects, rather than genuinely seeking to increase the decision-making power of the poor.

While participation may appear desirable, it is an area in which many countries have little experience. This is reflected in the lack of suitable personnel (e.g. social workers and community organisers), and the working approaches of professional staff who have been trained in conventional housing techniques which involve little, if any, popular participation, and have little idea how to incorporate it in their planning. Probably one of the biggest mistakes made in self-help programmes has been the attempt to undertake them with essentially the same type of staff as would deal with conventional housing projects. Self-help programmes are different and require special approaches to confront the different problems involved.

The introduction of new personnel, and the attempt to understand local social organisation and cope with residents' problems and objections throughout the life of the project, implies spending considerable time on interviews, meetings, demonstrations, and so on. Obtaining peoples' views, determining their priorities, explaining the project to them, training them in certain project tasks, and dealing with problems which arise in the participatory exercise, are only some of the time consuming elements which a self-help project will impose on the agency.

Therefore it must be accepted that participation demands time and patience. Specific difficulties might include the resistance of contractors, hired for some special tasks, to working with self-help labour; the uncertainty of completing projects 'on time', and the reliability which can be placed upon residents undertaking their tasks fully or with sufficient competence. This need not prevent participation being sought, but it can make planners hesitant about entering what is a new and risky field.

The nature of the government concerned is of crucial importance. It may consider popular organisation as endangering to its political control and, therefore, either eliminate participation completely, or restrict it to very small project elements which allow participation in construction but leaves aside the wider social and economic spheres. Furthermore, a government closely tied to construction and building materials manufacturing interests will subordinate participation to those interests. So, for example, where materials standards are set so high that they can only be met by formal sector producers, there is no scope for the participation of the informal sector or groups of residents producing and developing their own local materials.

5.5- Conclusion:

The conclusion is that most of the urban poor are loosely tied into a vicious circle of low capital, low training, shortage of remunerative work opportunities, and low incomes. Governments of developing countries not only do not offer enough housing schemes for them but also very often attack the third system economy. In this climate, the number of options urban poor have in order to erect quite reasonable housing and environmental conditions by self-help are very limited.

There is a wide gap between the theories of liberals and Marxists and practice (Figure 5.1). On one hand, the positive view of liberals of self-help popular settlements cannot be generalised. It reflects the shining part of the coin but in many cases the reality of environmental conditions of popular settlements is so atrocious that many governments, knowing this deficiency, believe that clearance is the only solution to these areas and then they are in a dilemma as to how and where they can resettle the displaced.

Although liberals do not deny the responsibility of governments to assimilate the self-help approach in urban upgrading and sites and services projects, government guidelines are still needed during formation of popular settlements to deal with the matrix of criteria which influence housing for the poor.

On the other hand, Marxist-oriented critics have tried to explain low-income self-help housing as a logic, as a response to the capitalist system. In fact, if, as Marxists suggest, self-help housing benefits the dominant classes, and is functional to the capitalist system in so many ways, then why do governments try to curb the formation and growth of popular settlements? Gilbert and Gugler (1982: 113) asked another question: "If spontaneous settlements have been so useful to the rich, why have the World Bank and the United Nations had to sell the idea of sites-and-services programmes?". Precisely, the State may introduce self-help as an economic instrument of crisis management, with the intention of reducing public expenditure on housing and shifting the cost of reproduction of labour power from the socially produced surplus to that of the individual labourer (privatisation of the housing issue) (Harms 1982: 20).

However, it is generally agreed that the optimum contribution governments can make, when they are not able to go along with the increasing demand for housing for the urban poor, is to offer land sub-division projects (World Bank 1978). These planning schemes are especially necessary for the government lands which have fast informal housing growth.

Governments can offer plots at cheap prices and on an instalment system. Such schemes should include the peoples' participation in all planning and architectural design processes including the encouragement of local materials production. At a later stage governments can supply these areas with the physical infrastructure and construct community facilities in specific earmarked plots with community involvement.

6- Egypt, historical background:

Housing programmes and urban planning policies have seen dramatic change in Egypt over the last four decades. During this span Egypt witnessed severe transformation of the political economy that was of major importance, not only for the daily life of the Egyptians but also for the international situation in the Middle East as well. The forty three years from 1952 to 1995 were punctuated by one massive Revolution, two major wars, one popular demonstration, two riots and religious fundamentalist terrorism. Each one of these events reflects the socio-economic and political environment at its time. Urban development programmes were affected either positively or negatively by these events. On the one hand, some of these events were the origins of the formation of popular settlements in Egypt. On the other hand, others stimulated the government to upgrade popular settlements.

On June 23rd, 1952, Nasser and the Free Officers led the country to a revolution that ended centuries of colonisation and overturned the monarchy of King Faruk. The Revolution swept a small group of military officers- including Nasser and Sadat- into power and transformed the polity and the socio-economic structure rapidly into a socialist system. On June 6th, 1967, Egypt was defeated in an unequal war with Israel, that did not last for long time but resulted in the occupation of Sinai, on the east bank of the Suez Canal. Thousands of Egyptians moved from their lands in the canal zone to other urban centres in Delta area. Three days later several million people poured into the streets in a popular demonstration to call President Nasser back to power, after he had resigned in the wake of Egypt's defeat in the war.

In 1973, President Sadat concentrated all efforts and resources on the military. He planned the initiative and the start of another war for limited objectives. Egypt gained a significant measure of success. On October 6th, 1973, the Egyptians rid themselves of the acute sense of inferiority, which had burdened them since the defeat of 1967, with the crossing of the Suez Canal. By October 16th, Sadat claimed that Egypt was fighting both the Israelis and the Americans, who were flying their supplies. The Israelis regained the initiative and carved out a 'salient' on the West Bank of the Canal which put Egypt's armies to the east in jeopardy. Although Sadat accepted the terms of a cease-fire, Egypt later had gained political capital and was in a better position to start peace negotiations. The impact of the Arab-Israeli conflict on the urban process was that cities of the Suez Canal zone, such as Ismailia, were damaged and evacuated for 7 years (Table 6.1). Thus people squatted twice, first when they moved to other cities in the Delta area, predominantly to Cairo, and second when some of them returned back after the war after selling their other illegal house (Figure 6.1).

Figure 6.1 **Egypt- Major cities**



Table 6.1: Egypt- Demographic characteristics of Suez Canal cities 1960-1986

City	Population (thousands)			% Change	
	1960	1976	1986	1960-1976	1976-1986
Ismailia	116	146	212	1.6%	4.6%
Port Said	245	263	399	0.5%	5.2%
Suez	206	194	326	-0.3%	6.9%

Source: Fahmy 1990- Table 1

The first riot was on January 19th-20th, 1977. Several hundred thousands of people poured into the streets in an effort to put Sadat out of power after the government had tried to raise the prices of basic subsidised consumer goods. When the military restored

order by the morning of the next day, Egypt had been shaken to its very core. For two full days Egypt had witnessed its worst riots from Aswan to Alexandria. They were known as the 'bread riots' or 'food riots' because it was the slum poor who lit them. The government backed down on the price increases and never again attempted any radical cuts in this social 'safety net' for the poor; fear of popular reaction henceforth became a deterrent to further major capitalist economic reforms.

In February 1986, police conscripts rioted in Cairo. This riot emphasised two points in particular to President Mubarak's government. The first was that tensions over economic inequality simmer beneath the surface and that as the economy continues to struggle, these could break out again. It was the urban poor of popular settlements conscripted by the police who revolted. The second point emphasised that the next time, those who revolt might be civilians and suppression by the army might have wider consequences for civil unrest. The last event that took place during the last four decades is the rise of religious fundamentalism. Sadat's assassination in October 1981 prompted a massive outpouring of contemplation, speculation and exaggeration about the power of radical religion in all its forms in Egypt. However, it is well known now that members of this movement come from poor housing areas. The poor environment of popular settlements and the climate of social repression have enticed many squatters to join the fundamental movement.

However, the above events reveal that the socio-political and economic changes in Egypt correspond to three phases. The first one was during President Nasser, 1952-1970. The second change was during President Sadat, 1970-1981, and the last one started when President Mubarak was swept into the power after the assassination of Sadat. Those three periods witnessed policies that resulted in various urban planning programmes in Egypt. The impact of these changes are discussed and analysed here.

6.1- Governmental policies after the Revolution: 1952-70:

President Nasser's government policies (1952-1970) focused on national economic and social development. Politically, Nasser developed his ideas on non-alignment and turned away from the West. This in turn opened the door to the Soviet Union and reinforced moves towards establishing a massive public sector. The main infrastructure projects established with Soviet aid- e.g. the High Dam and Kima fertiliser factory in Aswan, the Helwan steel works south of Cairo, and many clothes factories in El-Mehalla and in the newly established Shubra El-Kheima- had been serious efforts to increase social benefits and to enact policies aimed to greater equality in the distribution of income and an expansion of some goods and services. Such projects resulted in rapid rural urban migration either to construct or to work in them (Table 6.2). Although Nasser's government implemented a number of housing estate projects, these were not enough. Governmental land occupation was the only option for many migrants' accommodation. Formation of most popular settlements in Egypt took place during the industrial boom after the Revolution .

Table 6.2: Egypt- Rapid growth under the industrial development 1952-1970

City	Population (thousands)			% increase 1947-1960	% increase 1960-1970
	1947	1960	1970		
Cairo	2091	3346	4961	3.7%	4.0%
Alexandria	919	1513	2032	3.9%	3.0%
El-Mehalla	116	172	255	3.1%	4.1%
Giza	66	250	711	10.8%	11.0%
Aswan	26	48	202	4.7%	15.4%
Shubra El-Kheima	00	60	253	0.0%	15.5%

Source: Abu-Lughod 1965

Meanwhile, there was much inequality in land tenure in the rural areas. In 1952, about 2000 or so owners held 20% of the land, while more than two million held just 13%. Nasser's government introduced the first economic plan for 1952/53- 1959/60 together with the first series of laws to reduce the maximum holdings of landowners. The limit was first set at 200 acre (84 hectare); then in 1961 at 100 acre (42 hectare), and finally in 1969 at 50 acre (21 hectare).

Such dividing of the agricultural properties and redistribution among the peasants has increased the number of new owners who were originally from lower income strata.

Social justice was desirable but, the new poor land owners had little land and much underused family labour. They tended to complement any extra development resources received with much more labour than did large farmers. Therefore, poor farmers had many children to help in farming instead of paid labour. At the same time, increasing numbers of the rural migrants moved to urban areas to join the massive industrial development. The final result was both population increase and a high rate of rural-urban migration. Table 6.3 reveals the sharply increasing rate of population growth from 1.79% in 1947 to 2.37% in 1960. On the other hand, due to rural-urban migration, the percentage of rural population decreased from 67.5% in 1947 to 59.5% in 1966.

Table 6.3: Egypt- Population increase and demographic characteristics: 1937-1966

Year	Population (millions)	Growth rate	Urban population	Rural population
1937	15,933	1.13%	28.2%	71.8%
1947	19,022	1.79%	33.5%	67.5%
1960	26,085	2.37%	37.4%	62.6%
1966	30,076	2.53%	40.5%	59.5%

Source: Central Agency for Public Mobilisation and Statistics CAPMAS 1986

Growth in population was one factor that had a deep effect during Nasser's government. The population has been stubbornly defiant of reform campaigns led by the government and other organisations. Cairo's population, for instance, has more than doubled from 2 million in 1947 to nearly 5 million in the 1970 census. Settlements of rural migrants proliferated around the urban fringe of many cities such as Cairo, Alexandria and Aswan while the modern sections of the cities were becoming Egyptianised. The number of foreigners, which had increased exponentially during the colonial period 1880-1952, to for example 16% of Cairo's population in 1907, began to decline steadily after the abolition of the Capitulations[1] in 1936. Following the Revolution, the number of resident foreigners declined precipitously, and since 1961 it has been negligible. Departing foreigners were replaced by Egyptians in the new urban neighbourhoods. International architecture remained the accepted building style but subtle characteristics of the traditional urban fabric reappeared in various forms. Mixed land uses were introduced, as lower floors of apartment buildings were converted to shops and offices.

Furthermore, the government issued number of new rent laws that discouraged any further housing investments. Law 199/1952 decreased rents by 15%. Law 55/1958 decreased rents by 20% again. In 1961, Law 168 again decreased the rent by 2% but the government

[1] A series of legal concessions that had historically given non-Egyptians often a dominating level of power and influence in the mixed municipal councils established under the British.

exempted houses which had got a 20% rent reduction before from paying land taxes, *Awayd*, which were 13.7% of the rent value at that time. The final result was a huge gap between the real cost of construction and the rent expected which exacerbated the housing deficit. Landlords became reluctant to construct any more houses and estate housing could not cope with the housing demand, which led to considerable informal squatting.

Although the economic concepts of the free officers were rudimentary, after an unrewarding effort to cajole free enterprise into speeding up development, they moved fairly quickly towards centralisation and trying to eliminate the most obvious inequalities. Some of the actions taken were rough and the dogmatic sequestration of private property did much to sap the energies of the private sector. Nasser's policy reduced the private sector without abolishing it. It nationalised or controlled much economic activity without changing some very basic economic relations (Cooper 1982:17).

Egypt has adopted a form of semi-populist, state capitalist, developmentalist nationalism- a common form in the Third World. In that form, the state dominates the economy, but is unable to transform it either into a non-capitalist form or into a dynamic capitalist one. The dual failure renders the form of economic organisation rather unstable and opens it to a perpetual oscillation between various mixes of state and non-state in the economic structure. Groups and individuals are rendered dependent on the state for the conduct of their housing and economic activities. This dependence creates a vesting of interests in the state which alters the class structure, class interests and political activities in the society .

6.2- Governmental policies 1970-1981:

Sadat had two basic political objectives. He sought to maintain the power needed to complete and sustain the changes in Egypt's global role and economic structure he had initiated. He also sought to accommodate, without jeopardising this power, the growing pressures for political freedom issuing from a more polarised, pluralised society. He needed a way of satisfying the participatory expectations of his bourgeois constituency in particular. He also wanted to provide a safety valve for elements on the left which had parted company with the regime over de-Nasserisation and ones on the right which, repressed under Nasser, were now being permitted to re-emerge to balance the left. In a word, Sadat sought to adapt the authoritarian state to the growing social and ideological pluralisation of the political arena. Over time, Sadat was faced with a growing reaction against his policies from both ends of the political spectrum. His effort to contain threats, yet avoid resorting to full-scale repression, took the form of an alternate tightening and relaxation of controls and constant policy innovations by which the President sought to stay a step ahead of his opponents.

Sadat used the political capital won in the war and the opportunities created by it to transform Egypt's foreign policy and economic strategy. In the *October Paper*, the document setting forth his intended post-war strategy, he stressed continuity as much as change. In practice, his subsequent reversal of Nasser's priorities was of the magnitude of a 'counter-revolution' from above. Global forces played the most immediate role in the shaping of Sadat's course after October. His attempt to manipulate them produced a foreign policy opening to the West and a corresponding economic of 'open door' policy- *Infitah*- which altered the balance of power in state and society, permitting a virtual 'restoration' of the bourgeoisie and attracted foreign investment (Hinnebusch 1985).

There have been fluctuations between centralisation and the free market, and the latter has led to the emergence of several thousand 'fat cats' or millionaires; but Egypt's economy essentially remains an inert mass full of unexplored potential and resistant to change. The 'fat cats', *nouveaux riches*, were not shy about showing off their wealth, with all its Western trappings. This contrasted sharply with the poverty found in many areas of the country. Luxury and poverty could lie like the 'smooth cheek by the unshaven jowl'. Such social disparities inevitably led to urban and socio-political problems in different directions.

On the one hand, the inequalities stirred up were exploited by Muslim fundamentalists, which in turn has had its effect on both the official political system and on those groups which work outside it. At a more complicated level, there has been the political challenge of the class which became rich as a result of *Infitah*. At the centre has been the extent of financial corruption. The twin ills of *Infitah* were both high inflation rates and corruption. "If we are not capable of putting an end to corruption" or controlling "unbearable increases" in prices, declared Sadat, "we are in trouble" (Hinnebusch 1985: 64).

The construction industry was perhaps the most powerful segment of the business bourgeoisie under Sadat. Housing rent control pitted construction and real estate interests against the wider public and put the government in the middle. Rent was traditionally controlled, but was evaded on new apartments by requiring new tenants to pay 'key' money obviously out of reach of the poor. The housing committee of parliament began to push for the abolition of the law against key money since it could not be enforced. By the end of the 1970s the Ministry of Housing, long virtually a colony of the construction industry, adopted a *laissez-faire* approach, calling for an end to rent control as allegedly the cause of the housing shortage. It wanted the government to leave housing to the private sector and encourage it by tax and customs exemptions. These initiatives meant that they would only increase the availability of housing for the rich while inflicting major hardship on poor and modest income tenants.

Housing scarcity became a crisis by the seventies. From 1960 to 1975, new households were formed at a rate of 90,000 each year, but new housing units at a rate of only 28,000. The proportion of the population without proper housing grew from 21.7% in 1970 to 31.9% in 1977 and the shortage reached 1.5 million units in 1979. *Infitah* only worsened matters. The influx of workers, returning from Arab rich countries with money, and foreigners raised demand. It set off a luxury building boom driving up the costs of real estate and materials. All this sparked a surge in the rents and prices of all housing which made fortunes for a few and put housing beyond the reach of many. Evasion of rent control became the norm: landlords charged large fees for the right to rent (key money), kept flats off the market waiting for the rich or foreigners, or took to selling them at exorbitant prices, and conspired to oust tenants from rent controlled buildings so they could sell the land at a big profit.

In spite of rent control laws (199/1952; 55/1958; 168/1961; and 49/1977), the rent of a new four-room apartment increased six times between 1960 and 1979 (Waterbury 1976: 94). The private sector was unwilling to construct low-cost estate housing. For the poor, for whom the housing crisis translated into life in popular settlements, and for the middle class for whom it meant postponed marriages and endless frustration, this policy offered no likely relief.

An atrocious figure was that, by 1976, residents accommodated in the 'City of the Dead' in Cairo governorate reached 163,281 persons (CAPMAS 1976). Overlooked by the Muqattam Hills, east of Cairo, the city is a complex of vaults and tombs in which people live with the dead. The tomb houses which were built for caretakers or for relatives visiting graves are now occupied by the poor as permanent homes on the eastern edge of Cairo (Brunn and Williams 1983). In an attempt to solve the housing crisis for the poor, in 1977 the government started to sell estate housing units instead of renting them. In that attempt, 90% of land and flat cost up to a maximum amount of £E8000 was offered as a loan for the new tenant at a subsidised interest rate of 4% (Law 49/1977).

The reaction of the poor during the 'food riots' in January, 1977 was the most significant challenge to Sadat's policies. The dimensions and violence of these disturbances were unprecedented since the 1952 revolution. Beginning as demonstrations by workers in Helwan's new factories and students in Cairo, the protests were soon joined by the slum poor and spread to Alexandria and provincial towns from one end of Egypt to the other (Shukri 1978: 345).

6.3- Governmental remedial policies 1981-date:

The Egyptian economy continued to experience a slowdown in growth, with real GDP rising by only about 1 percent in the fiscal year of 1990, far below the rate of population growth (over 2.5 percent). The deficits in the balance of payment and in the government's budget showed some improvement as a result of a robust recovery of nonoil exports and restrictive budgetary expenditures. Revenue-raising measures were also launched, as the government implemented a wide range of fiscal measures, including upward adjustment of petroleum and electricity prices and increases in taxes. In March 1990, the government began the implementation of its economic-reform and structural-adjustment programme that focused on: a) stabilisation to restore macroeconomic balance and reduce inflation, b) structural adjustment to stimulate and sustain medium-term and long-term growth, and c) accelerated implementation of current social policies to minimise the effect of economic reforms on the poor. While this last-named focus was supported by a $140 million credit from the International Development Association (IDA) for the establishment of an emergency social fund, the programme as whole was supported in 1991 by a standby arrangement from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and a $300 million World Bank structural-adjustment loan 1996/2011 (The World Bank 1991: 129).

The effects of the Gulf crisis on Egypt were severe. Losses of export markets and workers' remittances, as well as declines in receipts from tourism and Suez Canal fees for 1990 and 1991 were estimated by the World Bank and the IMF to total more than 35% of Egypt's exports of goods and non factor services. The budgetary impact was smaller, as the most negative effects were felt in the private sector (tourism and workers' remittances); in contrast, some revenue gains actually accrued to the government from increased receipts from the state petroleum company. There was also a significant increase in international financial support to Egypt. Some of this exceptional financial support, resulting from deliberations of the Gulf Crisis Financial Co-ordination Group, included debt forgiveness by a number of Arab countries, as well as by the Paris Club of official creditors. The total external debt was $46 billion in 1989/90. In 1990/91 the external debt fell back to $35 billion as a result of the cancellation by the United States of the military debt ($6.6 million) and the cancellation of debts by some Arab countries. After the meeting of the Paris Club in May 1991, another part of the debt was cancelled, bringing the current debt down to $29 billion (ECSC 1994: 4).

The rate of economic growth shows that the Egyptian economy is in crisis: it stood at 7.5% a year between 1981 and 1985, 3.2% between 1986 and 1989, and 2.3% in 1992. The average rates of growth in the different sectors were 2.5% in agriculture, 4.3% in industry and 6.3% in the tertiary sector between 1980 and 1990 (The global coalition for

Africa 1992). The Egyptian economy has become a 'payment economy' as the trends in various production sectors show a marked decline in agriculture, slight growth in the industrial sector and a high rate of growth in the tertiary sector.

Moreover, the Egyptian economy is marked by a low and declining savings capacity: it was 15.2% in 1980, 4.8% in 1990 and 7% in 1991. The value of investments has also declined: from 27.5% of GDP in 1980 to 20.4% in 1991, despite the Egyptian economy having been open to foreign investment since the mid 1970s. Foreign investment amounted to $541 million in 1980, $1289 in 1985, $124 million in 1990 and $136 million in 1991 (ECSC 1994). Decline in investment, low savings capacity, drop in the economic growth rate, large external debt, rising unemployment (estimated at 30%), high rate of inflation, food deficit, drop in exports- such are the characteristics of the Egyptian economy today.

7- Formation of popular settlements in Egypt:

Most of Egypt's rapid urbanisation has taken place outside governmental planning and building controls. Popular settlements in Egypt provide essential access to employment opportunities and housing for low-income families, but they lack both social and physical infrastructure. Thus residents of these areas are deprived of a healthy environment and basic urban services. Urban development and the process of urbanisation in Egypt are facing manifold challenges due to geographical constraints. The inhabited and cultivated area of the country forms only 4% of the total land area where almost 99% of the population live. The rate of urban growth is estimated at 4% per annum in many Egyptian cities. It is largely uncontrolled and situated in the scarce and valuable agricultural zones which are rapidly decreasing in the Nile Delta and Valley. In 1900 the ratio of arable land/person was 0.2 hectare; by 1970 it had shrunk to 0.08 of a hectare. The 1979 Housing Plan estimated that some 60,000 feddans (25,210 ha.) of agricultural land were lost annually due to urbanisation. It has been predicted that 20% of total arable land will be lost by the year 2000 (Abt 1982: 34)

The need for housing in urban areas is one of the most pressing problems in Egypt. In the past, and since the early 60s, the Egyptian Government has taken upon itself the responsibility of providing low-income housing. As the population rapidly grew at rates between 2.4-2.8% annually, the government became less and less capable of satisfying housing demand. The result was an enormous gap between housing provision and housing demand. In the meantime, the population in the Greater Cairo Region (G.C.R), which forms the biggest metropolitan area anywhere in the African continent or the Middle East, reached 10.631 million in 1986 and it is likely to reach 16.092 million by the year 2000 (UN 1993: 98). Spontaneous migration forms 20-30% of this growth. The informal urban development process is the most vital and dynamic force in the delivery of land and housing in Egypt. Statistics reveal that some 84% of the new housing units being built today in GCR originated from a development process which is labelled as 'informal housing' by the government (Abt 1982).

Origins of popular settlements in Egypt are similar to those that have been presented and analysed elsewhere. High population increase, which overtakes development programmes, is the first reason behind the fast formation and growth of popular settlements. Uneven development including urban and regional bias is the second reason. The third reason is institutional weakness in the housing sector. Inefficiency of the laws concerning planning and popular settlements is the last major reason.

7.1- Population increase and urbanisation:

The Egyptian population is growing at an annual rate of about 2.7%, which means there is an additional one million inhabitants every eight months. Figure 7.1 shows the tremendous population growth in Egypt only for 26 years from 1960 until the last official census of 1986. During that period the population increased by more than 22 million which equalled Egypt's total population until year1947 (CAPMAS 1986).

Figure 7.1: Egypt- Rural and urban population growth



According to the most recent estimation about population increase in Egypt, 'The Sex and Age Distribution of the World Populations', (UN 1994: 331) it is expected that, based on a medium variant projection, the population in Egypt will reach about 69 million in 2000 and 117 million by 2050, more than double the population of 1986 (Table 7.1).

Table 7.1: Egypt- Population forecast until the year 2050

Year	1995	2000	2010	2020	2030	2040	2050
Population	62,931	69,146	81,490	92,015	102,254	110,577	117,389

Source: UN, Department of Economic and Social Information and Policy Analysis, Population Division 1994: 331

Figure 7.2: Egypt- population forecast



However, the target Plan of the Ministry of Population and Family in Egypt is to decrease the current birth rate from 3.9 children per family to 2.5 children per family and therefore the annual population growth rate would decline to 1.5%. If that is achieved, the population of Egypt would 'only' reach 65 million by 2000 (El-Ahram 29/4/94).

The urban spatial distribution and the lack of economic resources to keep pace with demographic growth are the most challenging problems to the process of socio-economic development in Egypt. The urbanisation process is multifaceted. Whereas the medium-sized towns are growing steadily, cities of the Greater Cairo Region (G.C.R) have grown at tremendous rates. Cairo city grew at a rate of 4.72% during the period 1937-47, and at 4.14% from 1960-66. During the period 1966-1986, the growth rate of Cairo city declined to 1.77% because of out-country migration, and the preference of its residents to migrate to other cities of G.C.R such as Giza, Shubra El-Khema and to the new towns and satellites. However, this migration took place within the region, G.C.R, while the industrial development resulted in increasing population growth rates in Giza and Shubra El-Khema. Whilst it was at 6.51% between 1960-1966 and at 7.58% between 1966-76 in Giza, it was at 9.97% and 8.17% at the same periods in Shubra El-Khema. Approximately 40% of the total Egyptian urban population are living in Cairo, at an average density of 800 inhabitants/hectare, the peak figure reaching as much as 1200/hectare (GOPP 1985).

7.2- Uneven development:

Rapid urban growth in Egypt is only partly due to migration, as natural increase accounts for more than 70% of the growth of metropolitan regions. However, migration is still a significant factor because the rural regions are already so overpopulated that they cannot accommodate a growing population in economic or social terms. Also, the opportunities in regional centres cannot compete with the metropolitan areas of Cairo and Alexandria. They are only temporary stations within the migration process because they rarely offer job opportunities to migrants. Hence, migrants proceed to the urban agglomerations where the concentration of industries and public and private services are most likely to allow their integration.

a) Regional and urban bias:

The disadvantage of Upper Egypt and rural areas is particularly dramatic. The regional differentials in both household income and per capita income show that Cairo and Alexandria have the highest incomes and rural Upper Egypt the lowest. The differences are much sharper with respect to per capita income because family sizes are correspondingly higher in the poorer areas (table 7.2).

Table 7.2: Egypt- Total annual household income (£E), per capita income (£E) and household size by region

Region	Average household income	Average per capita income	Average household size
Cairo & Alexandria	909	192	5.4
Lower Egypt-urban	814	159	5.7
Upper Egypt-urban	756	142	6.1
Lower Egypt- rural	682	111	6.5
Upper Egypt-rural	518	92	6.1
Average	717	134	6.0

Source: CAPMAS and the World Bank 1983: 13; table 3.1

Rural-Upper Egypt has about half the per capita income of Cairo and Alexandria. In spite of the fact that price levels differ by region, these figures give an idea about the ability to buy many commodities which have the same price over the country, such as construction materials. Migration from Upper to Lower Egypt in general and to cities of G.C.R in particular are the result of this regional bias. Migration reached its peak in the mid 1970s because of the industrial boom in Lower Egypt during that period. Table 7.3 reveals that

while the net migration rate into Cairo governorate reached 28.13% in 1976, it was (-8.24%) out of Souhag for instance.

Table 7.3: Egypt- Net migration rates of some governorates in 1976

Governorate	% In-migration	% Out-migration	% Net-migration
Lower Egypt:			
Cairo	38.31	10.18	28.13
Giza*	15.77	2.91	12.86
Alexandria	12.02	2.17	9.32
Kalubia	6.11	4.02	2.09
Upper Egypt:			
Souhag	0.60	8.84	-8.24
Qina	0.68	6.56	-5.88
Assuit	1.02	6.20	-5.18
Mynia	0.88	3.08	-2.20

Source: NCSCR 1985: 144

*Giza is a governorate in the G.C.R although administratively it is the first governorate in Upper Egypt.

Figure 7.3: Egypt- Net migration rates of some governorates



Urban bias against agricultural development resulted in the desire of many land owners to raise capital by selling their land. The history and development of the agricultural sector reflect the crisis that farmers had to face. The agricultural sector experienced a great deal

of negative state intervention in its production and marketing from 1950s until the mid 1980s, when the reform and the new economic policies actually began to be put into implementation. A report by the European Commission (ECSC 1994:77) points out the negative state intervention and the variety of forms they took: "A monopoly on the sale of agricultural inputs (seed, fertilisers and pesticides); setting the prices of the main agricultural products or of so-called 'strategic' crops. The prices set by the state were much lower than the international prices; a monopoly on the import and export of agricultural products; determination of crop rotation and the areas to be planted with the strategic crops; subsidies on agricultural inputs and agricultural credits and a monopoly on the latter; and control of agricultural co-operatives".

Urban bias against agricultural development policies resulted in major distortion in the agricultural sector as follows: poor use, wastage and diversion of agricultural inputs; reduction in areas under wheat and cotton- the main products controlled by the state- in favour of other crops; stagnation in yields of the main crops; subsidies an increasing burden on the budget deficit; increased imports and lower exports resulted in a growing agricultural trade deficit. The final results were increase in the food deficit and therefore small farmers have given up and agricultural labour emigrated to urban centres and oil-rich countries.

Contrary to the phenomenon of land invasions and squatting in other developing countries, the informal housing in Egypt often starts with the formal transaction of selling agricultural land. Farmers either sell the plots to 'developers' or to owner-builder families directly. This step in itself is not illegal. Several protective regulations, such as law No.107 of 1973, prohibit the change of land use and the unlicensed subdivision of agricultural properties and unauthorised building construction. It is the violation of these laws, for the sake of faster and cheaper land development, which gives the informal housing process its illegal character (Steinberg 1990: 113).

7.3- Institutions:

According to the urban planning law (3/1982), municipalities are responsible for urban planning and local development schemes for existing cities and towns. That is basically applied at three main planning stages: the Structure Plan, the General Planning, and the Detailed Planning, including some specific planning subjects such as land subdivision schemes and urban upgrading plans. For all Egyptian cities and towns, engineering departments within municipalities are also responsible for land sale and management via the land properties unit *(El-Amlak).* Building permissions, alignment, and monitoring of the constructions are the responsibility of the disciplinary unit *(El-Tanzeem);* while design, supervision of all infrastructure and utilities' work are overseen by the utilities unit *(El-Marafek).*

The legal framework of urban planning law in Egypt leaves sufficient space for municipalities themselves to prepare and adjust the technical planning process in coordination with the local political decision-makers and the final approval of the General Organisation for Physical Planning (GOPP). They have to arrange public participation sessions for specific local discussions and public hearings. Throughout the process, the course of planning should be discussed with all political and administrative bodies in order to achieve a common understanding of the problems identified, the strategies proposed and the actions required. Municipalities cannot fulfil all these tasks efficiently because the staff are not qualified and they are not able to get enough co-operation and information from all other institutions concerned with urban development in general. Therefor the whole institutional mechanism needs to perform at a high level to plan and achieve applicable urban strategies to solve the housing deficiencies of the poor.

In fact, institutions in Egypt suffer from many chronic bureaucratic failings. Over centralisation and low fixed salaries are the basic two problems in Egypt. While over centralisation has resulted in formulating a *pro forma* system, low fixed salaries has yielded widespread corruption, lack of qualified and experienced staff and continuous seeking for a second job. The impact of these factors on the institutional performance are over staffing and dead-wood, scarcity of information and institutional confusion, elite bias, patron-clientalism and nepotism.

Bureaucratic delinquency and negligence are the direct outcome from such a climate. It takes different forms, including red-tape, inertia, inefficiency, indiscipline and lack of initiative. Thus municipalities have become 'white elephant' institutions working in a chaotic system and therefore unable to elaborate or implement any sustainable urban development strategies (Figure 7.4).

There is no hope of achieving any successful and comprehensive urban development plans to introduce decent house for the poor without raising the quality of institutional performance in Egypt. The causes of the under performance of Egyptian institutions in general and the problems which disable the municipalities in particular are worth diagnosing and analysing in-depth.

Figure 7.4: **Egypt- Institutional problems**



a) lack of qualified and experienced staff at municipalities:

At present, the mostly underequipped and inexperienced local administrations in municipalities are hardly capable of setting up any plan or even implementing and controlling what has been planned. The Egyptian planners and engineers charged with the elaboration of the general and detailed planning in municipalities are inexperienced and newly graduated. The type of expertise required for a general plan for large cities is that of senior technical personnel with good training and long experience. The experienced planners have emigrated to the rich Arab countries or are working for the private sector, attracted by the higher salaries offered.

To overcome this deficiency, GOPP was assigned the task of preparing the plans for Egyptian cities. Out of more than 150 cities and towns in Egypt, GOPP managed to prepare general plans for about 15 since it has been established. Most of these plans were done in co-operation with international donors such as GTZ (Germany), IAURIF (France), ODA (UK), and USAID (USA). Furthermore, municipalities in many of these cities are not able to embark on any further detailed planning or specific action proposals. Although the urban planning law allows municipalities to ask private consultancy offices to prepare general detailed plans, the limited budget available for urban planning schemes from the central government prevents the practice.

b) Bureaucratic pathology and negligence:

In this environment, it is scarcely surprising that the middle and lower ranks of the state machine are plagued by costly pathologies. These pathologies had their roots in the Nasser era. They seemed to take on a new order of magnitude since the *Infitah*. The failure of leadership was undoubtedly decisive: a corrupt elite can hardly provide administrative leadership or fail to demoralise many honest officials at lower levels. There are institutional problems when even top officials lack instruments to energise and control those below them. The system has become largely *pro-forma,* incapable of rewarding the efficient or penalising underperformers. The twin ills of overstaffing and dead-wood also contribute to bureaucratic pathology. In offices with numerous excess employees charged with the same job, nobody cares to take responsibility; therefore directors cannot differentiate between the efficient and inefficient.

Red-tape, inertia, inefficiency, indiscipline and lack of initiative are common features to the bureaucracy in the governmental bodies concerned with urban planning in Egypt. The spirit of negligence is rife in the state machine. The officials who come to work at ten o'clock and leave at one, and spend their time reading newspapers are the typical face of *Ihmal* (negligence).

Although the government employs thousands of surplus employees, citizens have to wait a long time to conduct business in public offices and municipalities. The deterioration of utilities and public streets is pervasive; heaps of garbage clutter the streets, broken sewage and water pipes remain unrepaired for a long time and manholes are left uncovered. Governmental land at city fringes is neither protected nor planned for low-income people by staff of municipalities. They are reluctant, and/or disqualified, to survey and plan new extension areas for housing; meanwhile, poor people occupy public lands illegally and construct a perimeter and a room within two nights.

In fact, low fixed salaries, in a climate of inflation (more that 20%) and conspicuous consumption, erode employee motivation and prompt them to hold two jobs. Most of municipal employees earn another income from a second job. While engineers work evening-shifts at private offices, technicians and inspectors work in carpentry, electrical and plumbing work, painting, and taxi-driving. Although the second job may bring in three times as much as the official one, they do not prefer to leave the governmental job since it offers free health care, insurance, pension and social prestige.

c) Scarcity of information and institutional confusion:

The bureaucracy suffers from a scarcity of information, systematic files and data banks which enable the preparation of urban planning schemes, policies and to monitor performance. Confusion among concerned governmental institutions has led to insufficient housing plans. While the national housing committee estimated the need at 2.692 million in the period 1980-2000 (The Egyptian Consultative Council, Report No.20, 1983), NCSCR, (1985), proposed that 2.154 million new flats be constructed.

The informal housing units built between 1966 and 1976 in Egypt were estimated as 77% of all new housing units. Observed intercensal changes of housing stocks during that period were compared to permit registration data throughout Egypt. This figure was estimated by subtracting recorded legal units from the change in housing stock. Further breakdowns in that study suggested the urban and rural proportions of informal housing to be 77.4% and 74.6% respectively (GOHBPR/World Bank 1981). Such figures were criticised in another study which argued that replacement of losses from the housing stock through demolition, conversions to other uses, etc. were not taken into account. New urban and rural informal constructions built during the same period were recalculated to be 81% and 89% respectively. In addition, the study estimated that the percentage of informal units built between 1970 and 1981 in Cairo and Beni Suef were 84% and 91% respectively. The total percentages of informal housing were estimated to be 62% of all housing in Cairo and 87% of Beni Suef (Abt 1982: 31).

While techniques used by GOHBPR and Abt resulted in remarkably close results and both recommended upgrading policies, more recently Cairo and Beni Suef governorates have come up with enormously lower estimations and other contradictory policies. In a report introduced to the House of Parliament, the percentages of informal population for the same two governorates were estimated to be 36% and 31%. Furthermore, it was proposed to clear 12 areas in Cairo, 4 in Giza and 9 in Alexandria governorates (Egyptian Parliament 1993: 4) (see Appendix 1).

d) Over centralisation:

Centralisation is widely practised in Egypt at two levels, the central government's control, and the governorate's authority and governor's control. In spite of the attempts towards decentralisation, the central government still has tight control over the local-government system. About 80% of local resources come from central-government grants (UNCHS 1993: 141) and therefore, the administration has been granted the power to impose its decisions upon the local leaders. Central government sets housing policies, and allocates funds to the governorates, provincial administration with wide delegated authority from the central government. The governorates are responsible for selecting sites and implementing projects, but they have little freedom in how to use the funds. This fact precludes the establishment of any meaningful system of autonomy or local initiative.

Although local administration- government- law (145/1988), describes extensively the power conferred upon local administration units, the central government has the power to oppose any decision made by the local units, which may interfere with its own policy. The law also gives the President of the Republic the power to interfere should the national interest be at stake.

Equally, according to the same law, the three levels of local units and councils are at governorate, city, and village level. The law allows the governorate's authorities to review all the decisions or measures which might have been taken by local authorities. For instance, the governorate's council has the power to supervise other councils' activities inside the governorate. In case of need, a right of veto can oppose measures that might seem illegal. The final result is that most local councils act as registry offices for the decisions of the governorate's authorities rather than as assemblies where decisions are debated.

In addition, because governors are freely appointed and dismissed by the Head of the State, they always try to satisfy the central government rather than the demands of local councils. Although the law considers governors as the key-people in the local government framework and empowers them for many decisions, they may in turn, misuse this power because of personal interest, lack of experience or indecisiveness. They control the

chairman of each executive committee, appoint or dismiss him and they have the right to reject any decision taken by the local councils if it contradicts the plan. Governors may also repeal the local councils 'in case of need'.

Many urban plans done in Egypt have been kept in drawers without any actions for implementation just because governors were indecisive and hesitated to approve them. In spite of the fact that plans should be presented and approved first by the local councils, directors of urban planning units cannot skip the verbal permission of the governors to present the plans to the local councils.

Many examples reveal the negative impact of concentrating power in one person in each governorate. Other examples prove the positive effect of experienced and decisive governors in speeding up urban projects. While the General Plan and legal framework of Tanta city, designed in co-operation with GTZ (1986), failed to implement the development concept for *El-Gannabeya* area, *Tal El-Haddadin,* because the governor refused to accept the concept of gradual upgrading and urban renewal of existing popular settlements, the interest and willingness of Ismailia's governor in improving the existing housing stock, permitted Ismailia's Master Plan and upgrading projects to proceed in co-operation with ODA (1976). In essence, the whole system of local government is only tolerated. This is the result both of legislation and planning practice.

e) Corruption:

Low and stagnant governmental salaries make employees ever more vulnerable to corruption. Corruption is wide spread in municipalities. When officials of state stores divert subsidised construction materials to the black market, the public is forced to subsidise the fortunes of black marketeers and fewer commodities are available for the needy poor. When building inspectors take bribes to neglect the building code and buildings collapse, the public is deprived of a basic security; when they take them to declare a sound building unsafe so the owner can sell the property on the booming real estate market, they deprive ordinary people of a place to live.

Some staff are bribed in land tenure departments to enable some better-off people to 'jump the queue' and buy a plot in a new land sub-division project, or to ignore the illegal occupation of state-owned land by a wealthy person. Some engineers of building permission departments deliberately practise red-tape in order to force the clients to ask them to prepare the design or to modify it, so they can get some cash. Staff in charge of giving final licences are bribed to give their approval. Inspectors are bribed to allow bribers to change the pre-approved design during implementation. At utilities departments, some staff are bribed to make illegal connections of water and sewage for a landlord with an out of date licence. Workers and skills ignore broken lines until they get

illegal 'speed' money. If residents want the garbage to be collected regularly, they better pay the cleaners of the municipalities.

Deliberate actions to force an outcome other than that aimed at by state policy are corrupt. When poor people are obliged to bribe the underpaid junior official, whose multitude of minor transactions are not easily monitored by government assessors, bribery will function as an additional tax or 'service charge'. Otherwise, services and resources are diverted away from the needy poor (Lowder 1989: 125). Although corrupt influence may 'speed' implementation so that it may short-circuit bottlenecks, and it can offer cheaper options, it will always tend to favour the 'haves' rather than the 'have nots'- particularly where the stakes are larger (Johnston 1989). Corruption, if on a pettier scale, is no less detrimental to bureaucratic effectiveness. The treasury and the public are dependent on the state for welfare services or legal protection.

There are many shades of corruption. Certainly the elite benefit both in the short and long term. But, under conditions of extreme scarcity the poor, too, may benefit at least in terms of day-to-day survival. The unanswerable question is- who can be blamed, the briber or the beriberi, when a deprived resident in an 'illegally-occupied land' desperately bribes an underpaid civil servant to get illegal infrastructure connections, or to shut his eyes while a new poor comer starts the process of informality? In the short term, the poor person was exploited twice. First, when the government could not offer him a cheap plot to build a shelter, and second, when he lost his scarce money in a bribe for a basic service. In the long term, he managed to give his plot a degree of legality until an upgrading scheme could take place. On the other hand, in the short term, the poor civil servant earned some support for his life, but in the long, he lost his integrity and self-respect. In fact, it is the whole society that has lost in both, the short and long run. Sadly enough, it is the chaotic institutional system in Egypt which is to be blamed !

f) Elite bias:

Housing supply became directed largely to satisfy the demand of better-off people, while lower-income people, even those fully employed in formal sector industry, were unable to obtain housing and services at prices they could afford. The physical impact of these combined factors is seen in increased over-crowding, with concomitant stress on popular settlements' development, typically without access to sufficient, if any, infrastructure and other services.

The government's role is limited to the 'formal' sector. It involves control of the location and design of all houses in urban areas and the regulation of the supply of subsidised building materials. Government directly builds some 10-15% of the current annual housing units in the form of public housing, and it also controls rents of private dwellings.

Subsidised building materials are only available to those building to full standard in official subdivisions. Low-cost land supply and subsidised materials are controlled by a systematic organisation of patron-clientelism. Consequently, only middle- or upper-income groups can afford the land costs involved in this form of provision and thus the chance for low-income groups to buy a plot in a new subdivision scheme or to receive subsidised materials is absolutely blocked.

7.4- Critique of Urban Planning and Housing Laws:

Whilst urban planning law has been extended superficially to cover the situation of popular settlements (Article 69, decree 600/82: Districts' Renewal), other laws concerning planning, housing and administration have not mentioned the case of popular settlements at all. The deficiency of these laws has led to the formation of popular settlements, since the regulations and standards are not designed to meet the ability and demands of the urban poor. Standards of both urban planning law and construction codes law are designed basically for the massive construction projects of the rich strata.

In popular settlements, development standards are not observed either for land subdivision or building construction and that leads to cheaper solutions for developers and residents alike. When the government started to improve some popular settlements in Egypt, it was quite obvious that these laws are not, administratively and technically, able to introduce any efficient or sufficient frame work and solutions for the staff, either in the municipalities or in the Ministry of Housing, in charge of upgrading.

Many articles of laws associated with low-income housing are inappropriate at three levels. First, economically, the standards are set too high to permit the best use of scarce urban lands. For the perspective of low-income people, a plot means providing an incentive for investment and saving. It means gradual expansion, growth, changes and adaptability according to family needs and resources. It provides an opportunity to incorporate income earning support in the residential environment, such as shops, workshops and rental units.

Second, environmentally, the regulations, which are copied from western standards, do not meet the physical needs in design for such hot areas and the traditional Arabic city structure. Third, culturally, laws discourage the classical structure of the Egyptian house, with its central courtyard for privacy and social function, in favour of an outward-oriented apartment block. The final product of these regulations is not similar to the traditional urban morphology where clear and strong relationships among residents are recognisable.

There are basically five laws with executive regulations regarding land, housing, urban development and local administration in Egypt. Four of these laws affect the process of popular settlement formation and possible upgrading: 'Urban Planning Law No. 3/1982 including executive regulation decree No. 600/1982'; 'Building Codes Law No. 106/1976 and decree 237/1977'; 'Landlord-tenant Relationship Law No.136/1981'; and 'Local Administration Law No. 43/1979 including amendment Nos. 50/81, 168/81, 26/82 and 145/88'. The fifth law is concerned with new construction and sites and services schemes in new communities beyond city borders 'The New Communities Law No. 143/1979'.

There are massive number of Laws and Executive Regulations that planners should consider during any planning endeavour, in addition to many suppressions and amendments.

An analysis of the particular regulation's articles of only two of the above laws, the urban planning law and building codes law, that indicate some legal planning and housing deficit regarding popular settlements, are presented here. These articles are questionable. The analysis points out the legal basis of each, analyses their deficiency and, finally proposes executive regulations to amend or supplement the existing laws. It does not discuss all relevant detailed planning aspects, nor are the recommendations intended to be conclusive, but it provides the basis for future discussion to propose reasonable and realistic regulations.

a) Urban Planning Law:

First, according to the urban planning law, gross population density is determined at two levels. In towns and villages surrounded by agricultural land or natural limits to expansion, it should not exceed 150 persons/fed (312 persons/hectare). In towns and villages of new urban communities created in desert areas, the density should be at the maximum rate of 100 persons/fed (238 persons/hectare). These proportions exclude cemeteries, burial places, agricultural and desert land as well as water surfaces (Article 26, decree 600/1982).

It is necessary to modify the law to avoid confusion and misunderstanding by stressing that population densities may differ considerably according to the area referred to. They should be indicated for the entire town, or only for a town district, or even for a specific land use of an area. Thus, the area which is referred to, especially in the case of urban upgrading, has to be indicated in addition to the number of persons. Furthermore, the densities will differ if the entire area concerned is considered, the 'gross density', or if specific uses, such as open spaces etc., are excluded from the calculation and to give the 'net density'. In most Egyptian cities, the upper limit of net population densities at block level reaches 1000:1500 pers./fed (2500:3000 pers./ha) without exceeding the legally required average of gross density (GOPP 1985: 5). Target net density is an important constraint while preparing urban upgrading schemes for popular settlements.

Second, according to the urban planning law, the minimum width of local streets including the pavements is unrealistic. While the average width of streets in popular settlements is 4m, the minimum width allowed by the law is 10m (Art. 43/f, decree 600/82). In a recent decree, no construction work is allowed on any public or private road that is less than 6m wide (Art. 71, decree 78/93, building codes law). This contradiction

not only results in much confusion among urban planners in Egypt but also that width is inapplicable in upgrading schemes.

Partial demolition of existing buildings to meet these widths is almost impossible, especially if the houses are built with a concrete skeleton. On the other hand, the traffic principles allow for a minimum width of a local road of less than 10m for low-income new communities. A two-lane road with 2.25m for each lane and pavements of 1m each will lead to a total width of 6.5m (Figure 7.5). This width just allows two-way traffic, without car parking, or one-way traffic plus car parking- both of which will be sufficient for popular settlements even for a future prospect. If, due to special circumstances, two-way traffic plus car parking is essential, the minimum width reaches 8.3m by adding a 1.8m parking lane to the above mentioned 6.5m road (Figure 7.5). For areas of urban upgrading, a width of 4.5m or 6m is absolutely enough for the demand of popular settlements' residents (Figure 7.5).

Alternatively, as the width of a road also depends on the height of its adjacent buildings, the width may be determined as not less than one half of the average of the existing buildings' heights in case of upgrading. A provision to give planners the authority and space to decide about the optimum width based on each case is essential.

Figure 7.5: Egypt- Urban planning law, Right-of-way

Existing regulations, minimum road width
Decree 600/82. Art. 43/f .



Min. local one-way road,
proposed for new areas.



Local road, proposed for new
areas.Future prospect.



Local road, proposed for
new areas.Future prospect



Local roads, proposed for upgrading schemes.
4.5m or 6 m wide are suitable for popular settlements'
requirements. Flexiblity in decision is essential.





Third, the minimum plot size allowed in land subdivision schemes is set, inadvertently, against the affordability of the low-income strata. Decree 600/1982 Art.45 determines the width of plots allocated for residential use as a minmum of 10m measured along the building front line, while the depth of the plot should not exceed twofold its width. Accordingly, Art. 43/e reveals "... dangerous crossroads where the distance between the road axes is less than 60m should be avoided" (Figure 7.6). This minimum plot width strongly contradicts reality. In popular settlements, plot widths are very often between 3-6m wide. Such a standard implies prohibitive investment in land and construction for low-income families because they cannot afford to buy a 200m² plot.

Figure 7.6: **Egypt- Urban planning law, Plot sizes**

Existing regulations:
min. w: 10m
d<2w

Implications:



Recommendations:
min. 26.5m distance between crossroads.



This becomes evident when the implications of this standard are analysed. Small plot sizes usually found in lower-income areas are about 40m² in old central areas and rarely over 90m². In addition, there is contradiction for Art.43/e attempts to grant against distances between crossroads of less than 60m. If the width of a local road is 10m and the total depth of two plots back to back is 40m, the distance between crossroads is only 50m in this case. Alternatively, a typical block design with 10m wide roads will result in a plot depth of 25m. This depth is more than twofold the width and results in a minimum plot size of 250 m² (Figure 7.6). Such a situation may be dealt with by pedestrian paths separating blocks, but this solution imposes design criteria that may not be favourable in every case.

In fact, the law leaves scope for lower plot width limits in agricultural land and new low-income areas: "For considerations connected with preservation of agricultural land in

rural zones, economic housing projects or labour housing, the local unit concerned may permit a lower minimum limit provided that a decree is issued by the governor concerned" (Art. 45, decree 600/82). It is proposed that special considerations must be made, in addition, for upgrading schemes of existing residential areas where plots are less than the limits prescribed.

For new low-income areas, where these exceptions are subject to the discretion of municipalities, it is proposed to clear these exceptions in order to reduce contradictory demands to a common denominator. Minimum plot size can be 6m wide and 10m deep for residential use or 7m wide and 12.5m deep for mixed use plots. With regard to distance between crossroads, it is proposed that 26.5m between the axes of roads be imposed as a minimum- assuming road widths are 6.5m (Figure 7.6).

Fourth, Article 13, (paragraph C, law 3/82), limits plot coverage: "In the parcelled out areas, the built area must not exceed 60% of the total area. Uncovered parts of a building- such as balconies, staircases and entrances- are permitted to occupy an additional maximum equivalent to 10% of the area occupied by the building proper. However, the authorities in charge may grant permission in certain quarters to exceed the 60% consisting of the area of the building proper".

The 60% limitation is to create healthy and secure environment by admitting ventilation and the entry of the sun's rays into the housing units as much as possible (decree 600/82, art. 23). This desirable standard, however, contradicts reality and its causes. In popular settlements, plot coverage ranges between 80% and 90%. The causes of this development are primarily results of rapid population growth and scarcity of urban land.

An executive regulation is proposed to reduce contradictory demands to a common denominator: 'Plot coverage may be up to a maximum of 80% in low and medium-income residential areas and in upgrading schemes; this percentage includes all supplementary buildings, such as sheds, store rooms etc'. This means that in any case a minimum of 20% of the plot has to remain as private open apace (Figure 7.7). Increasing land prices make construction and acquisition profitable only if high densities can be achieved.

Figure 7.7: **Egypt- Urban planning law, Plot coverage**



Last, land subdivision laws demand that 33% of the land is set aside for public uses, while in popular settlements it is reduced to between fifteen and twenty percent. Further, land use standards require spatial separation of residential and industrial areas, whereas small workshops and residential uses are integrated in popular settlements.

On the other hand, the application procedure for obtaining a subdivision permit is too expensive and time consuming to make it worthwhile to go through legal channels. Subdividers must hire an architect or planner to prepare plans to be submitted to municipalities. Planning and syndication fees range from 10% of project costs for small projects to 2% for large projects. In addition, they have to handle seven copies of 1/1000 maps for both land surveying and the initial subdivision plan (Art. 33).

The municipality has to decide within two months either to accept this initial plan or to reject it. In order to obtain the final permit, another seven copies of the final plans and many other requirements should be submitted within a year of the initial approval (Art. 36). Due to absence of cities' General Plans and lack of experience, the review process usually takes six months or more and there is no guarantee that permission will be granted in the end. Subdividers would rather risk going ahead illegally than to have to go through the bureaucratic maze of application and confirmation.

b) Building Codes Law:

The Building codes law (No. 106/1976, executive decree 237/1977), including its amendment in 1993, also has many rules that cannot be applied or followed in popular settlements. First, buildings height is determined in the law as follows: "In the case of buildings to be constructed on both sides of either a public or a private road, the total height of the building facade constructed at the road limit shall not exceed one and quarter times the distance between the two limits (edges) of the road..." (Art. 81, decree 600/82). This limitation seems to be rather luxurious with regard to land consumption. It also contradicts reality and the traditional type of building in Arabic cities.

The ratio of building heights to widths of roads has always been lower than the above-mentioned new regulation. Sun protection used to be more important than penetration, even though ventilation was desired and not avoided by narrow alleys. Residents usually follow the concept of a 'core unit' in popular settlements. They build one floor when they first settle and they add new floors to accommodate their extended family at a later stage. The final product is a 'multi-generation extended house'. In addition, increasing the allowed height in existing residential areas means maximising the use of existing infrastructure network, rather than implementing a completely new network elsewhere for a new development area.

It is proposed that a maximum height of building facade at one and half times the distance between the two limits (edges) of the road be allowed. This ratio will permit the construction of 3 floors in a street of 6m wide, while the ratio of 1.25 yields a height of 7.5m. This height cannot grant a three floors building. It means only two floors of 6m total hight and wasting 1.5m, or an uneconomic two floors at a total height of 7.5m. It is essential that the allowed height be subject to the view of urban planners in charge in urban upgrading of popular settlements.

Second, applicant must submit thirteen different requirements in order to get a building permit. Three copies of all drawings should include all architectural and civil designs, heating and ventilation systems, parking, soil studies and a report from a consultant engineer (Decree 78 1993: Art. 51). It is obvious that these requirements and the cost of an architectural office are far above the affordability of the poor.

8- Articulations of land supply in Egypt:

Egypt experienced governmental take-over of local property that was fragmented during the colonial period. While most African land in the newly independent countries is described as 'customary land', articulations of land supply in Egypt are different. The state owns all desert land outside city fringes and vast areas inside. Other land within city borders is the private property of individuals, factories or corporations. State-owned land can be assigned to users, sold, preempted by the army or invaded by the poor to transform it into popular settlements.

In order to obtain a legal house in Egypt, it must be in an officially approved subdivision which enables an owner to register the land legally. In addition, a building permission must be taken to register the building officially and, consequently, to be serviced with infrastructure connections. The term 'informal housing' is widely used by the government in Egypt. They view these areas as illegal housing which are built in contravention of the urban planning law and building codes. Because informal housing exists outside the law, it is excluded from the formal processes of land and building registration and therefore, outside of the official statistics available in municipalities. While the ownership is clear and beneficiaries are well known in private property lands, fragmentation of 'State-owned' land among several ministries and governmental institutions makes control and management of land almost impossible.

Forms of land supply in popular settlements take different articulations based on the land's ownership, nature and monetary value. However, there are two basic types of possession of land which, in turn, lead to various articulations of supply for the urban poor. First, is the 'State-owned' land either within city borders or outside. Second, are the private properties including agricultural land and part of urban zone. State-owned land is the most common source of land supply for the poor. It can be occupied illegally through one of the 'non-commercialised' articulations, including government land reserves and tendencies of change in the mechanism, or used by the State to supply deprived people with land either through 'non-commercial *ad hoc* supply' or 'semi-administrated commercial' bases. On the other hand, private properties are often divided illegally, specially in agricultural areas, and sold or rented to the poor on a commercial basis (Figure 8.1).

Figure 8.1: **Egypt: Mechanisms of land supply**



8.1- State-owned land:

Whilst most 'State-owned' land in Upper Egypt belongs to the Ministries of Irrigation, Power, Defence and Supreme Council of Antiquities, most lands in Lower Egypt belong to the Ministries of Agriculture, Transportation and Endowments. Apart from these properties, State-owned lands within city borders are the responsibility of municipalities to protect and develop. While some Ministries, such as Defence and Irrigation, are able to protect their lands from any informal occupation, other institutions are not. Furthermore, division of ownership makes it extremely difficult for municipalities to map land ownership in each city.

The majority of informal growth in Egypt takes place on State-owned land. Large areas within many cities are examples of informal squatting on State-owned land, e.g. Mansheit Nasser, Helwan and El-Tebbin in Cairo; El-Salaam and Abu Atwa in Ismailia, the Nasriya and Tabya in Aswan and many other areas.

a) Non-commercial articulation:

Low income people and rural-urban migrants often move to the peripheries of the Egyptian cities to find land to settle. The squatters have neither applied for a building permit, as they are building on land outside the cities' building cordon, nor are they building according to by-laws and regulations. These newly developed areas have been called 'informal housing' by the government. Non-commercial articulation may take the form of 'government land reserves' or tendencies of change in 'non-commercialised articulation'.

Government land reserves:

'Non-commercialised' articulation for land supply under 'government land reserves' takes the form of 'organised invasion' or 'spontaneous encroachments'. The state is involved in encouraging these processes. When Official authorities allocate few housing plots and services at city peripheries without planning the adjacent vacant areas, they do not leave any other option for the new urban poor but spreading illegally onto this land.

'Spontaneous encroachments' take place when the State erects scattered buildings or low-cost estate housing for its official employees and blue collars on the peripheral areas. Although these residential areas are constructed out of the main urban core, they are on arterial roads to gain access to the city services. The development initiation attracts aliens, new poor employees besides new generations of the existing residents. They all start a new process of individual encroachment elsewhere.

'Organised invasion', on the contrary, accompanies the processes of State-construction of major services within or close to existing popular settlement, improving sanitary conditions, or constructing an arterial road on city borders. Poor settlers move into suburban areas demanding better services, new work and land so that they can rent their other houses. As a result, they move from over crowded central location onto less livable but new parts of the city. They consolidate forming social groups, move into State-owned land, occupy vacant plots and construct new houses illegally but in well planned and premeditated manners. 'Organised invasion' is a common form of land supply in Egypt, stimulated by transportation and infrastructure extensions, new factories and new development areas.

Tendencies of change:

As soon as popular settlements are established, further 'commercial' land supply will take place. It is formalised, to a certain extent, due to the force of market practices which were previously confined to the capitalist and commercial land submarkets. Although 'commercialised' articulations are more likely to occur, new housing supply may also take the form of 'non-commercial' articulations based on social relationships.

After the formation of a popular settlements, demand for housing rises, speculators get involved, and increasing land subdivision grows illegally. While existing settlers supply their extended families or social groups with a plot based on 'customary land' mechanisms, small developers and speculators subdivide surrounding areas and supply comers with new plots. Nonetheless, many urban poor move from inner crowded and rented houses to these new informal areas. They aim at changing their status from tenants into owner occupiers. Once the settlements are established, laws are virtually impossible to enforce. Even when a citation is made early after the subdivision, it is difficult to remove people who have bought parcels and constructed houses.

Settlers often extend their houses vertically when land prices rise rapidly. After constructing a minimum shelter they gradually complete the building- a ground floor first and eventually 2 or 3 new floors. The new flats can be rented out, sold, or gifted to their adult children when they get married.

b) State articulation:

To confront increasing demands on land because of new large industrial project or urgent requirements for shelter after an evacuation scheme or natural hazard, the government often introduces quasi-legal solutions or administrative measures to supply evacuated people quickly with a land. Socially, the government attempts to carry out its responsibility and satisfy people affected by a disaster or migrated seeking for a job and

thus gain political advantage. Physically, this development is best described as a 'patchwork' as it does not offer a decent house or a new plot in an appropriate developmental framework.

Non-commercial state *ad-hoc* supply:

When the government is not able to offer enough new houses for evacuated residents or after disasters, it allows people to squat or simply surveys an area and authorises people to build with a promise of land titles at a later stage. The families who acquire plots in this articulation have high confidence in their tenure security not only because they received official titles but also they are sure that the government will not evacuate them again and so they grow illegally while the government only watches.

Vast Nubian areas in Aswan are examples of this form of land supply. The inhabitants abandoned their homeland gradually prior to implementing three national schemes- the two heightenings of the old Dam (1912, 1933), and the construction of the new High Dam resulting in the formation of lake Nasser (1960s)- which submerged their land completely. The houses which have been constructed to resettle about 16 thousand families living in the Nubia (1960 Census) were not suitable in quantitative and qualitative terms. Hence, they set up new villages on hills near to the river and similar to their original environment.

The problem of this land supply centres on its recent consequences. Although the government offered free land titles to the residents on an *ad-hoc* basis, fast growth and further land management take place illegally now on the adjacent State-owned land. Local representatives and politicians often play an important role to back up the residents against any State interventions either to control or direct the planning mechanisms there, though it rarely occurs. They always argue that they were victimised once and they will never allow it again. The State decision-makers prefer to gain political capital and maintain the *status quo*.

Semi-administrated commercial supply:

Called the 'Hekr', this type is one of the most common articulations of land supply for low-income groups in Egypt. For many years, the government used to conduct a simple survey of a vacant area at the city fringes and permit people to built houses, usually without planning directions. Householders pay an annual nominal fee to the municipalities for the use of land and acquire temporary leasehold permission. Of course this limited security does not encourage leaseholders to construct a substantial house and therefore they built ramshackle houses with minimal investment. The product of this articulation is the formation of massive squatter areas in many Egyptian cities lacking both adequate infrastructure networks and community services. Nevertheless, settlers were not advised

to earmark some plots to construct services in a future upgrading scheme. Although this form of land supply has been recently terminated, the government has not yet proposed any solutions for the several thousands of existing plots. Leaseholds still pay the annual fee but they always fear possible evacuation (The government intends to clear 81 areas in Egypt, El-Ahram 6/5/1994; see Appendix 1).

Large areas in the Suez Canal zone, for example, are hekr land. The population was evacuated for seven years prior to the 1973 war and the front line cities suffered from severe damage after the war. Quick rehabilitation works started soon after. Unsurprisingly, the government could not accommodate all returning families and therefore the hekr concept suited the case. A figure reflecting the significance of hekr plots, arises from the Ismailia upgrading project where more than 10 thousands hekr plots have been legally defined, just within three out of the total 13 target areas (Ismailia- UPC 1988).

Other example arises from Aswan. Due to the industrial boom and the construction of the High Dam, the population increased sharply from 48,000 in 1960 to 145,000 in 1976 (GOPP 1986) leading to a severe shortage of housing. The government followed a *laissez-faire* attitude and accepted squatting. After a simple survey, some poor new comers were offered plots on planned areas while an overwhelming proportion occupied adjacent unplanned areas. Eventually, residents of both areas were registered and offered hekr lease titles. A recent survey reveals that near 50% of popular settlements in Aswan are categorised under hekr leasehold and yet are growing fast illegally (UDLMU 1992).

Practically speaking, the concept of hekr seems peculiar but actually, it is an ideal solution for problems that originated basically because of institutional confusion. Similar to the concept of 'sites and services', the 'hekr development' mechanism could have been an excellent example for potential 'citizens-government' co-operation. In fact, the practice was obstructed by lack of appropriate planning and planners. Cancellation of hekr law is not the solution, in fact reinforcement of such a concept with efficient planning tools and proper legal framework can introduce a genuine approach to help the urban poor to help themselves.

8.2- Private property:

Private agricultural land allocated at the periphery of the Egyptian cities, as well as some parts of private urban land, are attractive to poor people who desperately want to find a shelter within the climate of housing deficit and the decline of profitability of rental housing in the early sixties. The initial development of most popular settlements areas in Egypt is established by private developers with the covert involvement of the state.

a) Commercial articulation:

Agricultural land is valuable because of its accessibility to various services, its relatively low price, and the high demand from the rural migrants and urban poor to settle in a place provides them with an easy access to job opportunities. The process of popular settlements formulation and growth on private properties takes the form of 'commercial articulations' of land supply. Speculators, promoters and private developers are also involved for a variety of reasons.

Although Urban Planning Law (3/82, Art. 2) emphasises one of the most important goals of the national urban policy that "it is prohibited to set up any buildings on agricultural land, or to take any measures concerning the parcelling out of these lands", the informal subdivision and urbanisation processes, specially in Delta zone and many cities along the river valley, start with the formal transaction of selling the agricultural land. Land subdivision offices and speculators enter the process.

Substandard subdivision:

The economy was transformed by the land reform law; agricultural land was distributed by the government to small landlords. Those lands, close to the big urban centres or located at the periphery of the city boundaries, are carefully observed by private developers. They buy large areas for speculative purposes. They first buy the whole property or part of it from the farmers or the owner-family. The second step takes place after the price of the land has risen two or three times. They survey and map the property, design an elementary road network, subdivide land into small parcels for building purposes and sell them to the low income groups on an individual basis.

As the first step in itself is not illegal, most speculators prefer to risk possible conflicts with the authorities during the second step without fearing the relatively low fines. Although the authorities can penalise subdividers, house builders and the small contractors, such a contingency almost never arises. Henceforth, the desire of informal builders and speculators to transform agricultural properties and exploit assets is encouraged.

Another round of law circumvention takes place after subdividing the land illegally and constructing a house without a licence. In order to acquire a legitimate house- at a request of the client to get a quasi-registration of the land title- the land subdivider brings a case of open debt to court. The case will go into the papers, the debt will get repaid, receipts will be issued, and the final ownership transfer will get a quasi-legal, if nevertheless rather formal character (Abt 1982).

Land rental:

Landlords, who acquired a piece of land from the government or inherited it, usually rent their plots to peasants for farming purposes. By the time it becomes a derelict area adjacent to the grown urban zone with unfavourable farming conditions, its monetary value increases. Landlords, in conjunction with the renters, prefer to gain more capital by selling a non profitable farming area to individual developers and split the price up between themselves (Soliman 1987).

In fact, profiting from the transaction of undeveloped land is a major speculative activity. Landlords deliberately neglect maintaining their agricultural land when urban growth comes fast towards it. They expect to be inside the official urban borders which entitles them, if it is derelict, to subdivide it for construction purposes. It requires very basic skill and yet can become an investment opportunity for a long queue of the urban poor.

9- Case study: The Tabya area, Aswan:

The Tabya, located exactly in the heart of Aswan city, can be considered as a model of the common features of popular settlements in the city of Aswan. Its socio-economic characteristics, diversity of ethnic groups, forms of land supply and legal status, housing mechanism, architectural trends, urban patterns and physical infrastructure network are all ideal examples to explain and reflect the specific circumstances of popular settlements in Aswan. There are manifold problems and constraints within the area that make urban upgrading and community involvement a problematic issue.

Location in the middle of Aswan's centre is a major constraint, as the monetary value of the land is very high. There are various ethnic groups in the area, and whilst families of each ethnic group are nucleated and congregated in a solidarity, various groups are socially and spatially segregated. Moreover, some of those are not socially assimilated by other urban dwellers of Aswan, who avoid passing through the area due to the economic activities practised which have a negative impact on the environment.

Another constraint is economic. Tabya's settlers still practice their rural or Bedouin life style. The land use map of the area reveals the integration of economic activities- e.g. animal courtyards, byres, shops and workshops- with the residential plots. Earnings from these activities form the fundamental subsistence of the residents (Plate 9.1).

The Tabya is an 'informal/squatter' area. It suffers from absence of land tenure security, lack of infrastructure supply, deteriorating environmental and housing conditions, inadequate community facilities, lack of initiatives, and indifference of the institutions concerned.

In 1991, a pilot upgrading scheme was proposed to the area. Design work started at once, but concrete implementation took place three years later (1994-date). It is a mutual co-operation and self-help project involving: the residents of the area, the Egyptian government, and the German government.

The objective of this case study is to examine the area in terms of its land supply and legal status, socio-economic and physical environment, and the institutional attitude towards popular settlements. This is the position from which all upgrading must start and as such, the aim that influences both the shape which regularisation can take and the seeds which will determine its success.

The main goals are to identify those aspects of the regularisation projects- which have been most successful in the case study where the life condition of 10,000 inhabitants is

gradually improving and the institutions concerned have been energised- and to analyse factors that articulated that success.

It is difficult to assess objectively the success of the project activities since it is still in operation, but lessons gained from analysing the squatters' survival and the institutional mechanisms during the planning phase and two years of implementation are most remarkable. Those are the key-issues of guidelines required to make a sound urban upgrading process possible elsewhere in Aswan.

Plate 9.1: Tabya- Panoramic view, March 1991

9.1- Tabya selection and objectives:

The first remodelling plan for the Tabya took place in 1979 when the Aswan City Council (ACC) designed an inappropriate regularisation plan; it relied upon the inefficient regulations of the urban planning law, as analysed in chapter 7, and did not consider the existing housing stock. The final production was unrealistic and could not be implemented subsequently (Figure 9.1).

In 1991, the Tabya was selected for a sound upgrading on the recommendations of the Aswan General Plan, which identified it as an area for densification after upgrading. The other area to be nominated as an 'Action Area' for urgent improvement was the Nasryia. Both "offer potential for reasonable improvement and thus absorption capacities for future population increase". In Tabya "Further detailed investigations could lead to vertical densification for both residential use as well as extension of the town centre" (GOPP; GTZ 1986:24).

First, a demonstration project was executed in the Nasriya where some 50,000 inhabitants used to live without any basic social or physical infrastructure. The Nasriya upgrading project (1987-date) is also a mutual co-operation scheme which aims to demonstrate that the comprehensive improvement of existing housing stock in so-called informal settlements is not an impossible task but requires collective efforts and to work in conjunction with the community. The Nasriya project has supplied the area with an infrastructure network and basic community facilities.

Following the success of the Nasriya, the Tabya upgrading project is more ambitious, being concerned with not only upgrading a squatter settlement but also the capacity of the institutional bodies concerned. Henceforth, the Tabya scheme, in contrast to the Nasriya, does not only mobilise the target group to participate in all processes of planning, decision making and implementation, but also penetrates the institutions concerned within the ACC to reactivate and integrate them into the planning processes to execute sound upgrading.

a) Specific targets of upgrading and community participation:

Two main objectives of the Tabya project are: first, to assist the community to articulate their priorities and to improve and extend their houses, infrastructure and community facilities through an effective participation plan. Secondly, to strengthen the capabilities of the local governmental bodies in charge of urban development to improve the existing housing stock involving the community. The project's goals include: Improvement and extension of the existing technical infrastructure; rehabilitation of the socio-economic

structure; establishment and operation of a revolving housing loan fund; legalisation and regularisation of land ownership and rights' security; and enhancement of community organisation and self-administration. The indicator to measure the project's success after the end of its operation is expressed as: "ACC's capacity to implement and sustain upgrading schemes has been enhanced" (ZOOP/GTZ 1991).

To achieve such goals, the German Agency for Technical Co-operatiopn (GTZ) assisted Aswan Governorate to establish an Urban Development and Land Management Unit (UDLMU) within the Housing Directorate to undertake all aspects of urban planning for Aswan in general. They both co-operated in 1991 in designing the urban upgrading plan for the Tabya. This aimed to make the ACC aware of the plan, since they were the official body in charge of executing the upgrading according to the urban planning law (3/1982). In June, 1991, the appraisal report was compiled which included the overall programme, proposed activities and the budget of the project (Lewin and Eiweida: 1991). The comprehensive plan is flexible but combines various activities associated with community development, including physical, socio-cultural and economic development. The specific targets are expressed as follows:

Institutional and legal targets:

- Legalisation and security of land tenureship through an affordable land sale programme.
- Establishment of a special fund for upgrading, generated from the revenue of land sale.
- Introducing appropriate standards for exemption from the existing housing and planning laws but with the support of the local council.
- Establishment of an accessible site-office to undertake daily decision-making and supplying it with trained municipal staff to be a nucleus for further upgrading schemes.

Socio-economic and cultural targets:

- Strengthening of community organisation, self-administration and reliance of the society.
- Cross-subsidisation of land prices by encouraging investing in residential and commercial uses with a special focus on small investors from either inside or outside the area.
- Creation of a revolving housing fund to assist the households to improve and extend their houses.
- Establishment of a vocational training programme for the growing young and potentially unemployed inhabitants.
- Expanding local skills to facilitate the creation of small contractors, who could take a central and active role in house improvement and reconstruction schemes within the area.
- Establishment of social programmes within the community centres.

- Improvement and extension of schools, clinics, community centres, markets, open spaces and playgrounds.

Physical and environmental targets:

- Regularising of the street platt of the area to offer better access for traffic and emergency services.

- Improvement and extension of the existing infrastructure networks.

- Urban densification of the area to utilise the new utilities and justifying the increasing land values.

- Improvement and extension of the existing housing stock.

- Improvement of the waste-disposal system.

Figure 9.1: Tabya- 1979 Plan



9.2- The fieldwork methodology:

The work started with collecting the secondary data available for the area. Afterwards, a comprehensive survey took place at three levels: Area, plot, and household. The primary data utilised in this study are the product of five surveys (Table 9.1). First was the 'direct observation' of the area recommended for upgrading in the General Plan. The aim was to understand the general structure and problems of the area. Several 'informal' meetings took place in the community centres to find local representative organisations and key-figures who could participate in introducing the project agency and in developing the plans. This work was followed by a survey aimed to create an up-to-date 1/1000 map for the area.

Two secondary sources of information were used in its production: The national aerial survey of 1986, (at a scale of 1/2500) and the municipal land survey of 1979 (at the scale of 1/1000). While the former was more recent and easier to update, it did not show the division of blocks into plots. The later was older but the details were at plot level. It was necessary to work on a detailed map to ease the transfer of all data collected at plot level.

Subsequent fieldwork consisted of a 'detailed occupants survey' for each plot in the area. It was conducted in two stages, including a visual survey to obtain physical data for each plot, and a personal interview survey. As there were no official names for the local streets nor block numbers, it was essential to create a system of numbering in order to form a data base for the area. Meanwhile, the study area was divided into three sections to facilitate data gathering. Although this was based on the direction of the main local streets in the area, which yielded three sections equal in size, it is coterminous with the geographical segregation of three main ethnic groups. Field reconnaissance survey observed that the residents of the area name these sections after the three tribes which have settled there originally. Thus, the three sections are the Halayla (section A), Sudanese (section B) and Beshariya (section C). The social survey revealed that these three original tribes are now intermixed with other tribes.

The fourth survey took place after the plot data were recorded and tabulated. Two hundred sample householders were interviewed based on a simple random basis from a proportionally stratified sampling of the various ethnic groups, housing conditions, dwelling area and family size. Household characteristics and data were collected via personal interviews by means of questionnaires. The interviewees figured out their average income and any additional contribution they might get. Furthermore, they prioritised the urgent upgrading activities needed for the area and the improvements required for their dwellings including an estimation of the cost. Key persons from each

community arranged the meetings, introduced surveyors and explained the targets of the scheme.

Table 9.1: Tabya- methods of primary data collection

	Area structure and function -Survey no.1-	Plot data (Physical) -Survey no.2-	Plot data (Detailed) -Survey no.3-	Household status -Survey no.4-	Household status -Survey no.5-
Method of data collection	Direct observation	Field measurement (Visual survey)	Personal interview	Personal interview	Personal interview
Type of probability sampling	Total enumeration	Complete cluster sampling	Complete cluster sampling	Simple random samples from proportionally stratified sampling	Simple random samples from a specific social group
Objectives	-Field reconnaissance -Function of the area - Life style and sort of daily activities	-Land use -No. of floors -Plot condition -Materials of construction	-Legal status -Date and size of construction -Infrastructure connections -Demographic characteristics	-Housing loan demands -Income and additional supports -Priorities and cost estimations	-To examine the degree of social segregation of Beshariya tribe
No. of pre-test samples	-	68	68	10	3
Person power	3	6	10	4	1
Time duration	20 days	14 days	21 days	7 days	3 days
No. of final samples	All the area	1980 plots	1980 plots	200 Head of households	20 Head of households

Special attention was given to the priorities of the residents to improve their living conditions and therefore they prioritised their requirements through additional two phases of workshops and surveys. The first was in January 1990, when the GTZ hired a consultant office to carry out a specific survey on the 'Needs Assessment of the Tabya Residents' (EQI: 1990). Afterwards, a major workshop took place in March 1990, where key-persons representing each group of the Tabya residents met the influential officials who would contribute on the processes of decision-making. The meeting was organised by the GTZ using the special technique of 'Objectives Oriented Project Planning- ZOOP'. It aimed at involving the target groups with the project agency and decision-makers so that they all could determine the main problems of the area, objectives of the project, envisaged activities and the priorities, responsibilities, time schedule, and vital assumptions.

During the summer of 1993, the last survey was carried out in order to examine the degree of social segregation in the area. One of the most consolidated ethnic groups in the area was selected and twenty sample householders were interviewed by means of questionnaires.

However, two aims were targeted before proceeding to collect data from the area; collection of essential information and broad description to enable the committee to design the project's programme and, secondly, to embark on a statistical analysis to examine the area by specifying and comparing various patterns of the land status. While the project's committee designed the programme in a flexible manner to grant modification prior to the operation, the second purpose has not been initiated. It is now at a stage to permit statistical analysis. The independent variables are land ownership, ethnicity and occupancy rate, while the dependent variables are infrastructure connections and housing fabric and conditions. A statistical analysis package (Statistica) has been extensively used for the quantitative analysis of the primary data collected.

9.3- Area structure and characteristics:

The Tabya area (Fort in Arabic) forms part of the old city which is bounded by the 1930 cordon line (Figure 9.2). The settlement remained at the periphery of Aswan until the 1960s when the population of the city grew to 128,000 (GOPP 1986: 3). The urban zone was dramatically extended South and East of the area prior to the implementation of the High Dam. The Tabya is currently bounded by formal residential areas to the North, and the railway to the East. The Southern border is an arterial road linking the Eastern boundary of the city with the main road along the River Nile, and the Eastern border comprises of a collector road and a number of community facilities (Figure 9.3).

The processes and structure of settlement in the area are worth distinctive consideration. The first settlement within the Tabya took place many years ago when some families of the Beshariya and Ababda nomadic tribes emigrated from their origin homeland in the South Eastern desert, North of the Egypt-Sudan border, to Aswan city. Severe drought, famine and locust plagues forced increasing numbers of them to migrate in groups at that time (EQI 1990). They moved with their tents and settled first on the hill surrounding the Fort (now Badr Mosque). An old man explained the reason of selecting this place was that they were able to breathe pure air and see the sky. After the drought, some people returned to the mountains while other remained in the area. It is the third or fourth generation who currently live in the area, so the last two were born in Tabya as well.

The Beshariya and Ababda tribes now comprise only 11.3% of the total population. The majority of other residents settled in the area during 1950s and 1960s prior to the construction of the High Dam. The area currently consists of eight different tribes or places of origin (Table 9.2).

Table 9.2: Tabya- Ethnic composition of the population

Tribe/origin	**% of households**
Saiydah	49.4
Aswanis	14.9
Beshariya & Ababda	11.3
Halayla	9.6
Sudanese	6.5
Halab	4.2
Nubians	3.6
Masaleeb	0.5

The second movement into the area took place during the 1930s when the Halayla and Masaleeb tribes came over and squatted on a hill surrounding the old Fort. While the Halayla tribe came from Esna and Kom-Ombo cities, north of Aswan city, and moved to improve their living conditions, the Masaleeb used to be deprived families with no rights and moved to work in simple trades such as shoe-cleaning and begging. In the 1960s, the

government cleared their area and deconstructed the Fort to build a large mosque surrounded with a steps green area. The municipality rehoused most of the settlers in a new state-build blocks which neither fitted the socio-economic demands of the people nor their lifestyle. Unsurprisingly, soon after, most of them returned back to the area, squatted illegally downhill and rented out the other unsuitable blocks.

During the 1950s-60s many rural Aswanis and migrants from Upper Egypt (Saiydah) arrived from the northern cities and governorates of Aswan. Rural migrants were pushed from their homelands after the decline of agriculture preferring to embark on any employment or small business, especially during the construction of the High Dam.



Figure 9.2- Tabya- Location in Aswan

Figure 9.3- Tabya- Site boundaries



a) Demographic data:

The area occupies a site of 115 acres (48 hectares) gross area and 74 acres (31 hectares) net. Hence, the built up area comprises 64.3% of the total area. Survey (no.3) revealed a population of 9,941 inhabitants in 1991, which had been estimated at 6,510 inhabitants in 1986 (RPO 1986). That indicates an annual growth rate of nearly 7%, and densities amounting to 205 persons/ha gross and 319 persons/ha net. Low densities are due to the fact that 95% of the residential plots consist of only one floor (Plate 9.2). Nevertheless, the Tabya includes mixed land uses; e.g. an agricultural area, many community facilities and public institutions which are used by all city residents and not just Tabya's settlers (Plate 9.3) The built-up area comprises a total of 121 blocks from which 107 blocks are residential. They are irregularly shaped with an average size of 1545m² and 16 plots/block. Average size of family varies between 6.0 persons in 'section A' and 5.3 persons in 'section C'. Consequently, average plot density varies between 7.0-5.6 persons/plot, and the average occupancy rate between 2.7-1.8 person/room respectively (Table 9.3). The majority of household heads (77%) are married, 12% are single, and 11% are widows. While nearly half of those interviewed (survey no. 4) have 1-3 children and 23.5% have 4 or more, 27% have no children at all.

Table 9.3: Tabya- Demographic data

Data	Section (A)		Section (B)		Section (C)		Total	
	Total	% area	Total	% area	Total	% area	Total	%
Area (hectare)	13.4	28	12.9	26	22.4	46	48.7	100
No. of Blocks	27	22	29	24	65	54	121	100
Average size of block (m^2)	2151		1315		1396		1545	
No. of plots	658	33	538	27	784	40	1980	100
Average no. of plots/block.	24		19		12		16	
No. of residential plots	563	35	432	26	636	39	1631	100
Average size of plot (m^2)	91		75		118		97.7	
No. of families	656	38	417	24	671	38	1744	
Average no. of families/ residential plot	1.17		1		1.06		1.07	
No. of persons	3937	40	2430	24	3574	36	9941	100
Average no. of persons/ family	6		5.8		5.3		5.7	
Average no. of persons/ residential plot	7		5.6		5.6		6.1	
Population density / hectare	295		189		160		205	
No. rooms	1476	34	942	21	1990	45	4408	100
Average no. of rooms/ residential plot	2.6		2.2		3.1		2.7	
Average no. of persons/ room (occupancy rate)	2.7		2.6		1.8		2.3	

Source: Lewin and Eiweida 1991: 7



Plate 9.2: Tabya- Low net density

b) Socio-economic characteristics:

The simple random survey interviewed head of households 'HOH' (survey no. 4), indicates that the average age is 46 years, and some 46.5% are between 37-56 years old. Meanwhile, the employment status indicates that the majority of them are self-employed and the average monthly income ranges between £E76-150 (£1=£E5.2 in 1991). The data provided indicate that the Tabya's income corresponds to the average income in Aswan. Nearly two-thirds of the HOHs (63.5%) belong to the lower income strata and the rest can be considered lower to middle-income earners (Table 9.4). The relatively high share of female head of households, who are most probably widows, suggests that they are supported by adult off-spring or other members of the extended family. This also corresponds to the other data on monthly contribution (survey no. 4), which indicate that 31% of the HOHs depend on monthly contributions from household members.

Table 9.4: Tabya- Head of households employment and income

Employment & income structure	% Householders
Employment status:	
Self-employed	43.5
Employee	33.5
Housewife	13.5
Retired	6.5
Monthly income 'HOH' (£E):	
Less than 75	20.0
76-150	43.5
151-225	17.0
226-300	12.0
More than 300	7.0
Monthly contribution of other members:	
Nothing	69.0
1-50	8.5
51-100	14.0
101-150	3.5
More than 151	5.0

Source: Household Status- Survey no.4: 1991

Although the Tabya is basically a residential area, its favourable location has attracted a substantial number of varied commercial and productive enterprises. The 'informal sector' is capable of building and does build small-scale enterprise suited to their needs and within their income capacity, notwithstanding the shortage of labour and the scarcity of building materials. It is obvious that various households supplement their income by breeding livestock as well as other small enterprises (Table 9.5), but such occasional income is difficult to quantify.

The residents consider their plots as a sound investment which provide them with tangible returns besides being a shelter. A room in a plot can be rented, converted into a shop,

workshop or small coffee-shop (Figure 9.4). Most dwellings of the area consist of a residential zone and an open space for animals. Better-off people have separate animal courtyards adjacent to their residential plots (Plate 9.4). While the Halayla in section A have byres and the Beshariya in section C have camels and sheep courtyards, many courtyards with goats and chickens are found within section B (Plate 9.5). However, the study area contains a total of 348 units of different economic activities, of which 105 are either workshops or animal courtyards (Table 9.5). The economic traits which are most characteristic of the 'culture of poverty' are expressed in the Tabya in terms of its process into detribalisation. The tribal migrants have developed a 'courtyard culture' similar to their rural or Bedouin origins.

Some 40% of the resident population are active in the labour force. About 18% of total plots are small enterprises where owners work with the help of their son or daughter. While sons assist their fathers in a workshop, shop, or in a coffeeshop, daughters help mothers in animal breeding or milk productions (Plate 9.6). A final figure of residents working within the area itself was estimated as 800 persons (2.5 persons/unit).

Table 9.5: Tabya- Economic activities

Type of activity	Section A		Section B		Section C		Total	
	Total	%	Total	%	Total		Total	%
Shops:								
- Grocery	06	21%	12	41%	11	38%	29	100%
- Coffee-shop	0	0%	5	56%	4	44%	9	100%
- Other	54	41%	34	26%	43	33%	131	100%
% of the total section plots:	60	9%	51	9%	58	7%	169	8%
- Animal courtyards	11	17%	18	28%	35	55%	64	100%
- Storage	15	20%	23	31%	36	49%	74	100%
% of the total section plots:	26	4%	41	8%	71	9%	138	7%
Workshops:								
- Carpentry	3	23%	2	15%	8	62%	13	100%
- Blacksmith	1	10%	2	18%	8	72%	11	100%
Ironing	2	40%	3	60%	0	0%	05	100%
- Tailor	4	50%	2	25%	2	25%	08	100%
- Bikes' repair	0	0%	2	50%	2	50%	04	100%
% of the total section plots:	10	2%	11	2%	20	3%	41	2%
Total	**96**	**15%**	**103**	**19%**	**149**	**19%**	**348**	**18%**

Source: Plot Data, Physical Survey no.2- 1991

The rest of the labour force work outside the area. Those from section A work in trade, delivering milk and temporary construction works. Most of section B work in transporting

goods or people by donkey carts, horse drawn carriage, and a few have a small vehicle or taxi. Simple random interviews with Beshariya households (survey no.5) reveal that 45% of workers are employed as watchman, drivers or guides and quarrymen in the Southern East desert. Some 25% work in the sheep, coal, spices or herbs trade, while 20% work as shepherds. Nevertheless, 20% of those interviewed earn another income by trading in addition to their main jobs as employees. They deal with their nomadic relatives to exchange commodities such as sugar, coffee and flour with camels, sheep and herbs. They sell these goods each Thursday during the weekly market of the area.

Extensive commercial activities take place in this weekly market. It was recognised during the 'direct observation survey' that deals include merchants and buyers from northern villages to Aswan besides many urban dwellers (Plate 9.7). Merchants come on Wednesday evening and stay overnight on the pavement to reserve part of the main spine in section C (Figure 9.5). Other retail dealers buy goods from the nearby wholesale market to sell them in the same market.

It is remarkable that the various activities of the market are highly interdependent and are not 'foot-loose' activities. Part of the market is assigned to Beshariya dealers for camels and sheep in conjunction with a small market for straw, hay and knives. Another part is taken for birds, seeds and accompanied with equipment needed for breeding (Plate 9.8). On the boundary of the market, trading of spare parts for carriages is an appendage to the donkeys' market (Plate 9.9). Finally, dealers of vegetables, fruits and home-made cheese occupy another local road of the main spine. Carriages are available to transfer any goods and many young men are around the market waiting to carry lighter weights on their shoulders. Of course all these heavy activities completely block the street to any motorised traffic (Plate 9.10).

Figure 9.4- Tabya- Existing land use- economic activities



Plate 9.3: Tabya- Mixed land uses.
Aswan General hospital, agricultural area and housing uses

Plate 9.4: Tabya- Variety of uses of open spaces.
Camels, open-air coffee-shop, stone storage and area assigned for the weekly market

Plate 9.5: Tabya- Economic activities
Goat and sheep breeding in open spaces

Plate 9.6: Tabya- Self-employed residents.
Cheese makers and dealers

Figure 9.5- Tabya- Existing land use



Plate 9.7: Tabya- The weekly market.
Traveller and local dealers

Plate 9.8: Tabya- The weekly market.
Fowl dealers

Plate 9.9: Tabya- The weekly market: donkey dealers.

Plate 9.10: Tabya- Roads blocked by the market.
Carriages available to transfer heavy goods

9.4- Analysis and conceptions:

Internal differentiation of income among the residents created a wide range of interest and scaling of priorities. In general, the households interviewed put land security as their highest priority, followed by amelioration of sewage and water networks including house connections; house improvement and extension; introduction of a garbage disposal system; improvement and extension of community centres; and finally extension of health care, education and employment services (survey no. 4). Meanwhile, data collected on the priorities and aspirations of households indicate various assessments from each section of residents and also differences between men and women (Table 9.6).

Table 9.6: Tabya- HOHs priority ssessments

Section A		Section B		Section C	
Men	**Women**	**Men**	**Women**	**Men**	**Women**
- Land tenure - Housing - Community facilities - Sewage - Garbage - Water - Electricity - Education - Child care - Employment	- Housing - Employment - Garbage - Sewage - Water - Health care	- Community facilities - Land tenure - Sewage - Water - Electricity - Employment - Subsidised food - Education	- Land tenure - Employment - Sewage - Water - Electricity - Health - Education	- Land tenure - Subsidised food - Employment - Health	- Sewage - Employment - Education - Health

Source: Household Status- Survey no.4: 1991

a) Land security:

It was a *sine qua non* for successful upgrading in the Tabya that land tenure would be legalised and secured since laws ban any municipal provision for illegal areas. Dwelling units in Tabya can be legally classified into four categorises. The first are constructed on illegally-occupied land and consequently, are without a building permit. Then there are leaseholds dwellings *(Hekr),* which also lack building permission. Even dwellings constructed on legally-owned land may lack building permits, or the owners construct illegal extensions which do not adhere to the building codes. Lastly, there are legally-owned and constructed dwellings.

The first two categories comprise 72% of the total plots of the area. They are viewed as informal by the municipality, though the second is quasi-legal. The first category is considered to have the highest degree of informality. Most of these dwellings appear to be illegal by virtue of the settlers having failed to register the plots as hekr when the municipality surveyed the area in 1979. Meanwhile, settlers of newly occupied plots and the other unregistered plots cannot legalise their status due to the cancellation of the hekr

system. Moreover, both categories are deprived of any legal municipal services and are under constant threat of being eradicated.

Henceforth, occupiers feel insecure and do not invest much to improve their housing. The physical condition of rented units is even worse. The illegal or quasi-legal land status discouraged the builder-'owner'- from constructing a substantial house and subsequently, the renter is unwilling/unable to upgrade it. According to the results of the survey, more than 38.5% of the total plots are rented from an original hekr or illegal landlord (Table 9.7).

Table 9.7: Tabya- Land tenure

Status	Section A		Section B		Section C		Total	
	No. of plots	%	No. of plots	%	No. of plots	%	Total	%
Hekr/Illegal								
- Owner occupied	274	48%	92	20%	208	32%	574	34%
- Rented	283	49%	212	47%	155	23%	650	38%
Total	557	97%	304	67%	363	55%	1224	72%
Private								
- Owner occupied	15	2.8%	74	16%	172	26%	261	16%
- Rented	1	0.2%	78	17%	124	19%	203	12%
Total	16	3%	152	33%	296	45%	464	28%

Source: Plot Data, Detailed Survey no.3- 1991

Illegal householders claimed they were hekr owners when they replied to the question of land status during the pre-test survey. Since this question could not be expected to elicit reliable answers, it was essential to refer to the municipal list of hekr households to cross-reference the information. On the other hand, the list revealed another vital problem: some of the hekr owners hold more than one plot in the area (50 owners hold 172 plots and one of them holds up to 20 plots). They pay nominal fees and rent these plots to families at a higher rent than the median family income for the area. Moreover, some other hekr owners hold only one plot but with an area exceeding 200m² (42 owners hold 42 plots with an average area of 384m²/plot). It is clear now that the 1979 process of hekr ownership registration was done in a chaotic manner without enough rules to protect the state-owned land and the poor settlers from speculators.

Land sale plan:

There were extreme controversies about appropriate land prices between the ACC on one hand and the target group supported by the UDLMU on the other hand. While the

residents proposed a price of not more than £E25, the ACC considered that such a low price might stimulate further speculation by the households. Hence, a specific committee within the ACC, in charge of 'state-land' pricing, applied three different levels of prices- £E80, £E100 and £E120/m^2- according to the plot's location, e.g. on wider streets and at sites with commercial potential. Meanwhile, two types of payment were introduced: one payment of the full amount with a 10% discount, or a minimum down-payment of a 25% followed by monthly instalments over a maximum of 5 years at 3% interest.

In fact, this pricing was an 'opportunity cost' ranging at about half of the real market price, but the payment system was higher than the affordability of the households. As a result, the land-sale programme went very slowly until the Governor agreed in 1994 to reduce the down-payment to 10% and extend the payback period up to 10 years. Meanwhile, it has been announced that the land-sale programme would operate only for three years which has encouraged the residents to buy.

The first beneficiaries targeted are the actual registered leaseholders, or their adult descendants, who regularly pay hekr rent to the state. If the plot is rented, and the landlord is not willing to buy, the renter will have second priority after presenting a declaration of consent from the leaseholder in which the transfer of the property is stated. The project decided not to take part in this last process and handed it completely to the community leaders.

The new plot boundaries have been defined in the replanning proposal, which provides the basis for selling the land to the occupants. The plot is surveyed and compared to the registered leased area and the new proposed alignments before the applicants acquire an initial land title. The final freehold is delayed until project conditions are met (buyers should implement all required house improvements and pay the total number of purchase and housing loan instalments).

b) Socio-economic development and community facilities:

Although there are not enough public facilities in Tabya area, access to the existing services is equal to all. Land status does not affect accessibility to services. In fact, this equality can be seen in the mixed land status within the area. Once public services are constructed, laws and religions ban any discrimination. Free educational and health services should be accessible to every one. Of course disparity in provision of a proper service still exists because of overcrowding and different attitudes among civil servants. Meanwhile, all public services in the Tabya are in bad condition and need urgent improvement.

Two types of service-supply are associated with the Tabya; government-supply which targets all the city residents (three public schools, one general hospital, one youth centre, and four mosques), or community-supply which is built either by CBOs (seven community centres) or private voluntary organisations (PVOs) (one health centre). The residents prefer their own-built facilities, though they are limited in quantitative and qualitative terms.

Education:

There are two preparatory schools with 36 classrooms and one secondary school for girls with 10 classrooms. They are used by the Tabya's residents and its nearby vicinities as well. Classrooms designed for a maximum capacity of 36 pupils are overcrowded with 50 pupils. Laboratories, vocational training rooms and libraries have been converted into classrooms to cope with the increasing number of pupils. The final result is twofold; buildings are deteriorating fast, and the pupils do not acquire efficient education.

Health facilities:

Besides the Aswan general hospital, South East of the Tabya, there is a PVO- the Red Crescent Association- which provides casual health care, family planning, and first-aid services at the city level. In fact, residents of the area rely widely on the herbal medicine and limited clinics available at two community centres. The women prefer local midwives for childbirth and gynaecological related aspects.

Community centres:

The area comprises 7 community centres from which only three are formally registered at the Ministry of Social Affairs and therefore they are recognised as CBOs. They were instituted in the late 1960s and each now comprises an average of 200 associates. Registration is costly and requires multiform bureaucratic procedures. However, all centres are ethnically-based and provide their members with various social services, e.g. weddings, three day consolation after funerals, conflict arbitration, and accommodation for short-term visitors. Registered centres provide in addition basic medical care, child care, vocational training and literacy programmes.

Only the Halayla people did not succeed in constructing their respective centre. After they had embarked on construction, the structure was destroyed by a speculator who claimed the lease of the plot and won the case. All centres are in a medium or bad condition due to the soil condition, poor construction, and lack of maintenance. Some of them can be upgraded and extended, while others have to be utterly rehabilitated.

Community development plan:

Survey of the people's priorities and discussions with the local officials of education, health, and social affairs provided the project with a tangible framework for the envisaged activities for improvement and extension. The project aims at improving the existing services and introducing new facilities at both centralised and decentralised levels. At the central level, the physical structure of the youth centre has been improved and extended to include new functions, such as a library, fine arts and vocational training. Meanwhile, a new 19 class secondary school and a 'woman and child activities centre' have been executed successfully.

Due to the lack of any large spaces in the Tabya, the new 'woman activities centre' has been positioned within the premises of the youth centre in section A, and the new school has replaced a putrid green area in section C. The 'woman activities centre' aims at generating socio-economic development activities and consequently additional incomes for the residents of the area with a conspicuous focus on the women. Therefore, a concrete vocational training programme for the growing young and potentially unemployed inhabitants has been established. The building comprises a small-scale workshop for sport clothes, a kindergarten, rooms for vocational training and the proposed CDA, and the project's site office.

On the other hand, the project supports each community centre to serve decentrally as a focal point for people's mobilisation and participation, and as a nucleus for attainable socio-economic activities and community development. The improvement plan proceeds as follows. The community centre is surveyed, representatives express their demands, a new design is prepared and discussed, construction materials are supplied in phases, and then skilled members in each centre carry out the implementation work under supervision of the project's architect. The project proposes new socio-economic development functions for each community centre and therefore, the new design considers how to support them with new rooms for vocational training, women's activities, child care and literacy programmes, medical care and first-aid, and general meetings.

c) House improvement:

The plot survey reveals a deteriorating housing environment particularly among hekr plots. Some dwellings have neither separate toilet facilities nor a separate kitchen. Because of the shortage of space, there is no separate area for cooking, eating and bathing. The dwellings are poorly ventilated and overcrowded. Although a few dwellings are connected to the main water distribution network (46%), families are likely to store water in their houses because of irregular water supply or poor water pressure. The average plot

is not connected to the public sewage system (83%). It is infested with a variety of pests, predominantly flies and cockroaches, and the family is likely to use insecticides on a daily basis.

Most dwellings were built by the owner and his family or hired local labours. Residents provided shelter for their immediate and extended family. These housing types are usually built by low to lower middle income groups primarily to meet immediate shelter needs rather than for investment in rental units, though the later do exist. Housing typology in the Tabya reflects the urban adaptation of rural and Bedouin types of design and morphology (Plate 9.11). Most of the dwellings are traditional style; built of adobe, rammed earth and timber (45%). While only 15% can be classified as 'modern' since the main structure is made of concrete, 40% are 'intermediate' where mud or cement is used as mortar for the stone (Table 9.8). Consequently, an overwhelming proportion of the dwellings have been categorised as 'fair' or need repairing (64%). On the other hand, bad dwellings are difficult to repair and therefore some 15% of the total dwellings must be rehabilitated (Figure 9.6). In fact, the expansion swelling soil affects the foundation badly, causing a lot of wall cracks especially in the corners (Plate 9.12).

Table 9.8: Tabya- Dwelling fabric and conditions

Type	Section A		Section B		Section C		Total	
	No. of plots	%	No. of plots	%	No. of plots	%	Total no. of plots	%
Concrete	81	12%	65	12%	160	20%	306	15%
Stone	292	45%	233	43%	259	33%	784	40%
Adobe	285	43%	240	45%	365	47%	890	45%
Total	658	100	538	100	784	100	1980	100
Good	65	10%	86	16%	263	34%	414	21%
Fair	489	74%	388	72%	403	51%	1280	64%
Bad	98	15%	57	11%	95	12%	250	13%
Derelict	6	1%	7	1%	23	3%	36	2%
Total	658	100	538	100	784	100	1980	100

Source: Plot Data, Detailed Survey no.3- 1991

Hekr plots are more likely to follow the traditional fabric and design (Figure 9.7). In addition, hekr plots are more likely to be in poor condition (Figure 9.8). On the other hand, high occupancy rates had a negative impact on the housing condition (Figure 9.9).

Plate 9.11: Tabya- Urban morphology and the decline of consolidation.

Plate 9.12: Tabya- Deteriorating housing conditions and the impact of the soil on the walls. Sudanese community centre and a workshop/resid. plot.

Figure 9.6- Tabya- Housing conditions



Figure 9.7- Tabya- Housing fabric by tenure







Figure 9.8- Tabya- Housing conditions by tenure







Figure 9.9- Tabya- Housing conditions by occupancy rate



Nevertheless, it was necessary to comprehend the exact plot sizes in the area to determine the total budget required for the revolving housing fund, and to price the land after computing the affordability of the average householder to buy such a size. Dwelling units are built on a plot averaging 85m² though 47% are less than 75m² and 23% are more than 125m² (Table 9.8).

Table 9.8: Tabya- Hekr plot sizes

Plot size (m²)	No. of plots	% of total plots	% Cumulative
25 or less	59	7%	7%
26-50	166	19%	26%
51-75	180	21%	47%
76-100	154	18%	65%
101-150	163	20%	85%
151-200	55	6%	91%
201-300	46	5%	96%
301 or more	30	4%	100%
Total	**863**	**100%**	

Source: Plot Data, Detailed Survey no.3- 1991

House improvement plan:

Five selected plots had been surveyed and redesigned to estimate the average cost of improvement or rehabilitation work (Figures 9.10:12). The average cost of improvement was estimated at £E7800, where labour accounted for 25% leaving £E5000 for the construction materials. Reconstruction work costs even higher, estimated at £E12,500; just the construction materials would cost £E8800.

In fact, these figures were above the affordability of the average resident. Therefore, a 'housing revolving fund' has been established to assist households with an average loan of £E3,000 at 6% interest rate, and 5 years payback period, making an average of £E60 monthly instalment. The amount depends on the plot size, architectural estimation for the work recommended, and the payment capacity of the householder. Borrowers get loans in a form of construction materials in phases to grant fulfilling the provided designs.

All households who buy their plots and show zealousness in improving their houses are eligible to receive the project's assistance. House improvement is a 'self-help' process. The residents acquire new designs, easy building permission procedures, free supervision, and loans on request, but they execute it themselves. A cheap model for core-housing has been specifically designed for the residents who need to reconstruct their dwellings. The design includes a separate multi-purpose courtyard, and can be implemented on phases based on the affordability of the residents (Figures 9.13; 14).

Figure 9.10- Tabya- Housing designs- example 'section A'



Figure 9.11- Tabya- Housing designs- example 'section B'



Figure 9.12- Tabya- Housing designs- example 'section C'



Figure 9.13- Tabya- Proposed core-house, phase one



Figure 9.14- Tabya- Proposed core-house, phase two



Plan



Façade

d) Infrastructure supply:

Rapid, undirected urbanisation is having deteriorating effects on the infrastructure in Aswan city in general. Growth of popular settlements was not taken into consideration and therefore the capacity of the networks has been overloaded. Moreover, for the Tabya area, precise information on the existing network was not available in the ACC which also lacked up-to-date maps and data. To overcome this deficiency, a physical survey had to be done. Surveyors followed the locations of manholes and valve chambers in order to draw the existing network. They had to dig cavities in specific positions, to check the width of pipes. Afterwards, the total number of plots connected to these networks was established by means of interviewing the households (survey no.3) (Table 9.9).

Table 9.9: Tabya- Infrastructure connections

Service	Section A		Section B		Section C		Total	
	No. of connected plots	%	No. of connected plots	%	No. of connected plots	%	Total	%
Water	322	37%	220	25%	343	38%	886	100
% of the total section	51%		43%		45%			46%
Sewage	89	26%	77	22%	177	52%	343	100
% of the total section	14%		15%		23%			17%
Electricity	497	36%	334	24%	564	40%	1395	100
% of the total section	76%		62%		72%			70%

Source: Plot Data, Detailed Survey no.3- 1991

Illegal and hekr plots are not permitted to obtain legal connections. It is very likely to find unconnected plots although there is a secondary water or sewerage line in front of them. Many households implement illegal connections which burden the system with excessive load over the designed pressure for the city. Moreover, households do not pay the fees for their connection and use. However, statistical analysis reveals strong association between infrastructure connections, including the illegal connections, and the hekr tenure (Figure 9.15)

Figure 9.15- Tabya- Infrastructure connections by Tenure







Water:

The total existing network in the area amounts to 4230m; although this figure is relatively close to the total length required (6000m), most of this network is deteriorating since it has been extended piecemeal individually and not according to a sensibly designed plan. Better-off households hire a municipal technician to show the position of valves and joints, and a plumber to extend a connection illegally. The final network forms a 'tree distribution' system instead of a proper 'closed loop' system. If any damage occurs to the main pipe, the rest of the network will not be supplied (Figure 9.16).

Figure 9.16: Piecemeal water extensions



Closed loops network

-Appropriate pressure
-Hierarchical diameters
-Alternative joints in case of damage

Tree distribution network

-No hierarchy within the self-extended part
-Less pressure
-More likely to suffer frequent cuts in service

According to the field survey, 46.1% of total plots are connected to the network (Table 9.9). The percentage is pretty high for such an informal area as the Tabya because over 60% of house connections are illegal. While private ownership represents only 2.8% of total plots in section A, for instance, the percentage of plots connected to water is up to 50.6%. This high rate implies that a high proportion are illegally connected to the network since their informal land status does not allow them a supply.

The survey results indicate a low probability of being connected if the land is hekr or illegal (Figure 9.15). Officials are well aware of illegal tapping but have difficulty in controlling this activity since it takes place at night or on holidays when households know

the chance of being noticed is minor. Other residents, who cannot afford to hire workers or to pay the legal fee, depend upon a few public taps within the area, a pump installed by an individual or a tap in a mosque. They are more likely to carry water containers themselves than to hire vendors.

Waste-water:

The sewerage network amounts to 60% of that needed for the area. This high percentage is due to the central location of Tabya and the necessity of laying services through it in order to join different parts of the city. In spite of this fact, plot connections to the network comprise only 18% of the total in the study area (Table 9.9). An overwhelming percentage of households cannot afford to pay over £E300 for a connection and construction of a manhole. Instead, they construct a primitive pit latrine or a septic tank. They keep the use of water to a minimum in order to reduce rates of porosity into both the groundwater and the expansion swelling soil underneath the foundations. On the other hand, poor households cannot afford to hire a municipal truck to empty tanks frequently. They often dump waste water into small open ditches in the streets. Two $6m^3$ tanks are provided by the municipality at the boundaries of the area, where very few people can use them because of their far location and the limited capacity.

Moreover, a new booster station must be constructed within the area due to it being at a lower level than the main treatment station of the city. All other pumping stations within Aswan city are already overloaded. Consequently, many public facilities, e.g. Aswan General Hospital, repeatedly drain their sewage without any treatment into a flood-water canal east of the area which is already polluted by the waste-water of the Kima fertiliser factory. Henceforth, high infant mortality and health risks are partly attributable to the inadequate sewage system.

The survey results reveal a significant correlation and a strong inverse association between hekr land status and the likelihood of being connected to the network (Figure 9.15).

Electricity:

Not surprisingly, the percentage of electricity connections is high since existing laws urge municipalities, for security reasons, to light all streets in both formal and informal areas (Table 9.9). Municipalities contract the Public Authority for Electricity who in turn hire subcontractors via bids. Cables are extended, transformers are constructed and light posts are erected, individuals are allowed to apply for a connection from any existing distribution point within a 250m radius. Although the installation requests a clear title, any evidence to prove that the applicant owns or rents that plot can be sufficient. Other

illegal households seek an exemption signed by an M.P. The last option is to extend a connection illegally from a neighbour and share the cost.

Electricity is not a cheap service in Egypt and therefore the government does not mind the increasing number of consumers regardless of their legal status. As a result, high electricity bills are a constant complaint from both formal and informal households. The government has recently introduced a new accumulative system to enable consumers to pay less if they use less power. Supporting this, statistical analysis does not reveal any significant correlation between type of land ownership and the likelihood of obtaining a connection either from the network or a neighbour.

Infrastructure supply plan:

Settlers of the Tabya are very concerned with the increasing pollution and deteriorating health environment. Most of the residents listed infrastructure connections on top of their priorities (EQI; ZOOP 1990). The proposed water and sewerage supply aimed at cost saving by minimising the extent of excavation and maximising the utilisation of the existing network. The layout was co-ordinated with the design of circulation, housing layout and the target density. The initial plan proposed a 'self-help' execution for network excavation, pipe laying and on-plot supply. That has been recently modified by retaining community participation only at plot-supply level. In 1992, the State initiated a pilot 'government-supply' programme to supply the main streets in some squatter settlements with the basic infrastructure. The project agency decided to include the Tabya within this programme for two reasons; to lessen household encumbrances, and to advance the area with progressive 'government-recognition'. This decision was also accepted by the society.

Execution started in 1994 and it is scheduled to be completed by the end of 1996, including implementation of a new sewerage booster station. Since the government-supply was limited only to straight streets with a minimum width of 6m, narrower streets and alleys (40% of the area) are implemented with self-help together with the new layout's implementation. The project informs households about the designed depths, marks the widths of trenches and supplies cutting tools and pipes. Then residents of each street are responsible for excavation work and laying the pipes themselves. The project supervises the work and implements all sewage manholes and water chambers. If some households cannot carry out this work themselves, they either get help from their neighbours or pay to have the work done. The work is a self-administrated process and the project director rarely gets involved.

Nonetheless, a considerable amount of plot development is undertaken by the households themselves. Commencement of the processes of land-purchase is a precondition to

obtaining legal house connections. After applying to the site-office, the house will be examined and a design will be drawn by an engineer. Sewage connection costs about £E300 including implementing a manhole and a line between the house and the main network. Similarly, water connection costs £E280 to install a water meter, a valve, and the line extension. In Egypt, sewage and water are almost a free service. Households pay a nominal monthly tax for water, based on their consumption, including 25% of this amount as tax for sewage. The total average of both services is £E10. The government has recently started to establish a new apparatus to deal basically with water and sewage utilities. It is planned to lift utilities' subsidisation gradually.

Unlike water and sewage, electricity is not a free service. Installation occurs within two months of application and costs around £E150. The average consumption cost reaches up to £E50 per month depending on the equipment available in the house, though there is not much. The residents are aware of this high cost and utilise it carefully. However, small loans of £E700 are available for infrastructure connections.

e)Solid waste:

There are very few official points for garbage collection supplied by the municipality; the average is between three to six large bins for each section of the area. The ACC subcontracts the collection of solid waste from different parts of the city; subcontractors refuse to include popular settlements in their zones of services. They argue that residents are unable to pay a fee of £E1.5/month and that the areas are not easily accessible to their vehicles (EQI 1992). In practice, most of the residents in the Tabya use waste organic materials to feed their animals, or as a fuel for their traditional adobe ovens. Other inorganic refuse such as sand, dust and stones, are dumped into any derelict plot or on wasteland in wider streets (Plate 9.13). Wood, aluminium and plastic or tin containers are stored on the roofs to be recycled by the households themselves (Plate 9.14).

In fact, the ACC lacks an appropriate system of refuse disposal for the whole city of Aswan. It has been a major problem for both formal and informal settlements. Entrepreneurs frequently fail to achieve reasonable profits every year. They claim that officials of ACC do not fulfil their obligations and therefore they always break their contracts before the losses accumulate.



Plate 9.13: Tabya- Rubble dumped in open spaces

Plate 9.14: Tabya- Materials stored on the roofs for recycling

f) Replanning proposal:

The replanning proposal aims at rationalising the existing street pattern to obtain the most efficient use of land. The plan defines three elements: Roads network and new planning lines within which realigned block boundaries allow reasonable circulation and a minimum of demolition; proposed land use; and implementation strategy of plot/block improvement and reconstruction (Wernicke 1991).

The proposed plan is based on the following criteria:

- Partial or entire plot demolition is limited to only derelict or bad condition, mud or stone structures, low density and one floor plots.

- The transportation network is hierarchical, keeps external traffic out of the area and provides a safe means of vehicular and pedestrian circulation.

- An efficient land use plan allows restructuring and strengthening of the existing functions of the area without forcing any changes.

- The implementation strategy is based on 'Careful Urban Renewal' which defines levels of upgrading and means of participation.

Accordingly, the demolition proposed in the new plan is less than 5% of the total built-up area and the road network plans include four levels of circulation (Figure 9.17):

- Local streets/distributors have widths of carriageway ranging from 8 to 12m compatible with various traffic demands and future prospects. They provide vehicular circulation between neighbourhoods which is required for the residents economic activities. Repaving will take place after implementing the infrastructure network.

- Access streets are to link the above roads and provide adequate access for emergency services. Rights-of-way for each street range from 6 to 8m, and they will acquire compacting and levelling after house connections.

- Semi-private areas *(Hara)* which serve as multi-purpose communal spaces. The width varies according to the existing situation aiming at providing direct access to plots and circulation between blocks. Pedestrians and surrounding residents are given priority.

- Green areas and neighbourhood uses are supplied when width of pavements allows. Special trees will be planted to offer shade and to absorb the ground water which affects the soil negatively.

Nevertheless, the proposal has introduced 41 new plots with a total area of 7341m^2. A limited number, located on important streets, are earmarked to escalate their price before selling them as 'concession plots' by auction and giving the advantage to the surrounding residents. That will generate a substantial emolument for the internal cross-subsidy. Other plots are used either to compensate households whose plots are targeted for demolition, or as temporary accommodation for those who are reconstructing their houses (Figure 9.18). Some wastelands have already been transformed into open spaces or community facilities.

An alternative location is proposed for the weekly market which grants safe and sufficient space for the users and the flow of traffic on the local street (Figure 9.19).

j) Budget:

The Tabya upgrading project is designed to be a self-financing scheme where revenue from land sales is used to provide basic infrastructure and services through a special fund. It was appreciated that even self-financing projects require some capital to get started and therefore the German government allocated DM418,500 (£E930,000 in 1991) grant to be basically used for site preparation, technical assistance and establishing the revolving housing fund. Meanwhile, the Egyptian government's share amounted to £E2,039,000. A substantial part of this share is generated from the land sale programme. On the other hand, the result of participation of the residents in the execution is translated into a monetary share estimated at £E960,000; that makes the total budget of the project near £E4 millions.

Figure 9.17: Tabya- Roads network



Figure 9.18- Tabya- Replanning- example



Figure 9.19- Tabya- Proposed land use



9.5- Constraints:

The Tabya project, aimed at involving both an established population and existing operational institutions, appreciated that the execution of such a comprehensive scheme with public participation must consider internal and external, 'objective' and 'subjective' criteria. Whilst some of the 'objective' factors were determined within the Aswan General Plan, the priorities of the target group had not been questioned before. Hence, the project planned to prioritise this component through a number of 'public hearings' attended by both representatives of the society and the officials in charge. Secondly, 'subjective' factors, emanating from the project's staff, decision makers and the heterogeneous target groups, were considered as inevitable determinate in the success of the project. On one hand, some officials and decision makers viewed the project costly because of the extra administrative procedures and expected delays. Most of the project staff were sceptical of this new experience; they have been trained in conventional housing techniques which involve little, if any, community participation. On the other hand, different groups in the area, mistrusting the government, were anxious to start the project but worried that discrimination might occur. This was the climate when the project started.

a) Institutions:

Government policies toward popular settlements reflect the political attitudes of the government and the decision-makers which comprise it. Relations between the ACC and the target group of the Tabya can be best described as ambivalent even after starting the project. The ACC was known for its inefficiency, complexity and the predominance of pressure lobbies. On the other hand, the local council was supposed to be the only channel through which the residents can exercise some influence on local politics and programmes via their representatives. In reality, there was not any representation for the Tabya within the local council. In fact, most of the residents did not even know to which municipal district they belonged (survey no. 5).

Urban management deficits of the ACC and other previous institutions were the basic cause of Tabya's formation and the current deterioration of physical conditions. First of all, confusion between the ACC and the Ministry of Health, over who was responsible for land management, was the major reason that neither was able to protect the land or to develop it after it was inhabited. Large parts of the area, especially in section A, belong to the Ministry of Health since they used to form part of Aswan's cemeteries area until the beginning of this century. Consequently, the ACC could not consider the area their responsibility and they neither transferred the ownership nor made any effort to legalise or improve the area. When settlement first occurred, neither institution reacted and therefore the area grew fast.

When the UDLMU tried to initiate a reasonable plan in conjunction with the GTZ in 1991, they were faced with many institutional problems. There was not any suitable base map at 1/1000 or 1/500 scale on which to elaborate a detailed upgrading plan. There was little secondary data available about the area and municipal officials in charge were unqualified/unwilling to conduct any professional survey. Low fixed salaries and lack of reasonable incentives discouraged them from carrying out such a scheme. They had second jobs and were not subject to efficient administrative control during working time. In addition, the limited budgets allocated for urban studies had not enabled them to conduct similar schemes before and consequently, they lacked adequate experience.

To overcome this deficiency the UDLMU hired some experienced sociologists and surveyors from the Regional Planning Office, on short-term contracts, and the upgrading plan was designed by the UDLMU in co-operation with the GTZ. After the agreement had been signed, the Mayor established a new office from well-selected members in the municipality to be in charge with the UDLMU to design the detailed planning of upgrading. The work went according to the schedule until it was time to get the final approval when another institutional problem arose.

Strong opposition from the local council of Aswan governorate was expressed against using some land of section A for state housing units. Their plan proposed to evacuate this area and move the residents to temporary accommodation in a new state housing project. They rejected this part of the project although the whole of Tabya had been listed as one of the targeted areas for upgrading within the last 1992/2000 government programme for upgrading in Egypt. This debate postponed the approval of the project for one and a half years. The opposition built their argument around 'national pride'. They argued that the land use type of section A, which includes byres and courtyards, does not concur with the 'respectable and civilised image' of Aswan as a touristic city. Furthermore, they argued that the increasing monetary value of such central land should promote vertical extension to accommodate a greater number of residential flats, rather than one floor of slum housing.

In fact, the main reason for that resistance was the desire to obtain more land for 'progressive' and profitable development projects for the sake of the natives. They viewed the residents of The Tabya as helpless, indolent, steeped in rural mores which required the hegemony of the middle classes. Meanwhile, the lack of any effective representation of the Tabya residents within the local council made the members of the council feel that they had the welfare of those poor 'solid citizens' at heart. They ignored the fact that such a relocation frequently causes severe economic problems for the relocated residents. Halayla people, for instance, have had close economic ties to the inner city and a relocation to the city fringes would result in a reduction in household income.

On the other hand, the residents' perception was profound and effective. During the first public hearing attended by the Governor, residents of the area expressed their rejection assertively. It took time for the Governor to diminish their protest and he promised that any decision would be in their favour. It is obvious that slum clearance and squatter relocation programmes only squander scarce resources on replacing existing dwellings.

The project was scheduled to start in 1992 but the above institutional obstacles delayed its implementation for three years. This affected the perception of the German side negatively. It is a co-operation project where every partner should fulfil his obligations. They invested extensively in the planning and training phase, allocated their share and consequently could not justify any delay. They appreciated that it was a local control project where decisions should not be dictated by the aid agency. This comprehension rescued the project from being cancelled during such a period.

b) Heterogeneity:

The other constraint to consider is that the residents were far from being homogeneous. The settlement contained not only a wide range of income groups but different tribes and ethnic groups as well. Movements to the area were made *en masse* and by individual persons and families over a long period of time. *En masse* movements were due to either a dramatic change in nature or an official decree of clearance and rehousing. Individual movements took place later as a result of urban bias when families moved to the area looking for better living condition. Patterns of settlement and consolidation proceeded according to territorial origins or kinship. Immigrated groups developed segregated quarters which took on the names of former places of residence.

The impact of the tribal distribution and employment status is evident on their total monthly income. While 90% of the HOHs interviewed in section C earn less than £E150/month, the percentage is 53% in 'section B' and only 43% in section A (Table 9.10). The indicator is significant. The residents of section A are less likely to have legal tenure than other residents of the area and are less likely to live at reasonable occupancy rates. They are also less likely to live in appropriate housing conditions (Figures 9.20 to 23), but they successfully run substantial economic activities which support them with high monthly incomes so that they record the highest average income in the area.

On the other hand, statistical analysis does not reveal any significant relationship between infrastructure connections and ethnicity/section (Figure 9.24). The residents of section A extended illegal house connections to their plots despite their illegal land status (compare figure 9.20 to 9.24). Hence, economic stability played an important role enabling the residents to get illegal access to the services. Therefore, it was the threat of being

evacuated which hindered the residents of section A from investing in their house improvements and it was not any economic reason.

Table 9.10: Tabya- Total monthly income of the HOHs per section

Total monthly income	Section A		Section B		Section C		Total	
	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%
Less than 75	6	9%	3	5%	31	41%	40	20%
76 - 150	23	34%	27	48%	37	49%	87	43%
151 - 225	17	25%	11	20%	6	8%	34	17%
226- 300	13	19%	11	20%	1	1%	25	13%
More than 300	9	13%	4	7%	1	1%	14	7%
Total	68	100	56	100	76	100	200	100

Source: Household Status- Survey no.4: 1991

Figure 9.20- Tabya- Tenureship by ethnicity/section



Figure 9.21- Tabya- Occupancy rate by ethnicity/section



Figure 9.22- Tabya- Housing fabric by ethnicity/section







Figure 9.23- Tabya- Housing conditions by ethnicity/section







Figure 9.24- Tabya- Infrastructure connections by ethnicity/section







Spatial segregation among the different tribes in the area, which was observed during the first field reconnaissance (survey no.1), was examined by interviewing samples from section C (survey no. 5) and through a number of informal meetings with various tribes which took place in their community centres. The survey aimed at examining the degree of social segregation of the Beshariya, as a sample case from the area, and analysing the nature of social links between the individuals in that section and the surrounding groups. Random householders stratified from various age strata were interviewed. This allowed the verification of the strength of the phenomenon between generations.

The survey revealed many factors to be considered during the planning and execution processes. Tribal groups, who migrated from the same origin and congregated together, had little contact with other ethnic groups (90% ignore other tribes who live in the area). Furthermore, they prefered to live among members of the same tribe in the future (100% reject to be mixed with other tribes). They are not willing to live with neighbours from other tribes, preferring to have separate plots with private courtyards. An important indicator is that those who will be temporary re-accommodated in new plots prefer to live within their tribal boundaries.

Although the survey indicated a high proportion of social segregation among different tribes of the area, the strength of the phenomenon was diminishing through the new generations (the age strata of 27-53 are more likely to integrate than those of 54-80 years old). The implication is positive; younger people are willing to break their social isolation if they get a little assistance from the project (Table 9.11).

Table 9.11: Tabya- Social segregation indicators

Indicators	Total (%)	(%) classified by age	
		27-53	54-80
Education:			
- Secondary	35%	35%	0%
- Preparatory	5%	5%	0%
- Literate	25%	5%	20%
- Illiterate	35%	5%	30%
Homeland:			
- The Eastern desert	55%	15%	40%
- Born in the Tabya	45%	35%	10%
Spouse:			
- Cousin	80%	30%	50%
- From the same tribe	20%	10%	10%
Place of the marriage ceremony:			
- In their community centre	60%	40%	20%
- In their homeland	40%	10%	30%
Work of the wife:			
- Housewife	100%	50%	50%
- Participated in any previous training course	0%	0%	0%
Children:			
- Keen on educating them	75%	60%	15%
- Not keen	25%	0%	25%
Girls education:			
- Keen	70%	45%	25%
- Refusal	5%	0%	5%
- Neutral	25%	5%	20%
Children's spare time:			
- With their relatives in the area	40%	20%	20%
- Assisting their parents	20%	5%	15%
- In the Youth centre or with colleagues from out-side the area	15%	10%	5%
- No children	25%	15%	10%
Family:			
Participated in any collective work:			
- Yes	30%	15%	15%
Significant friends:			
- From the same tribe	75%	30%	45%
- Same tribe and out-side	25%	20%	5%
Spending feast and holidays:			
- With relatives within the area	85%	35%	50%
- With relatives or friends within or outside the area	15%	15%	0%
Socio-political indicators:			
Reasons for lack of infrastructure:			
- Governmental *Laissez-faire*	45%	25%	20%
- Because they lack representation	5%	5%	0%
- Does not know	50%	20%	30%
Relationships with the municipality:			
- No communications (or do not know which district he/she belongs to)	100%	50%	50%
Familiarity with the other tribes :			
- Knows them well	10%	5%	5%
- Does not know	90%	30%	60%
Solving conflicts:			
- Social control and via heads of the tribe	100%	50%	50%

Cont'd

Indicators	Total (%)	(%) classified by age	
		27-53	54-80
Preferences:			
Houses:			
- Separate plot	100%	50%	50%
- Multi-storey	0%	0%	0%
A courtyard within the plot:			
- Yes	100%	50%	50%
Neighbours preferred :			
- From the same tribe	100%	50%	50%
Location of the new service centre			
- Within their specific area	55%	25%	30%
- Any place within the Tabya as long it is accessible	45%	25%	20%

Source: Household Status- Survey no. 5: 1993

However, the existence of ethnic formation and segregation is not a characteristic feature of a 'religion-oriented urban organisation'. Socio-economic ties urge ethnic groups to congregate separately. Then, strict practice and misinterpretation of the Islamic rules lead together to a particular cultural background and customs which progressively discourage social links with other tribes. In the Tabya, two main factors form the basis for a closed circle of segregation, namely cultural and social factors. Most of the households interviewed (60%) did not have access to school education. Accordingly, they remained away from a 'broad cultural feedback' and became isolated within their spatial limits. Second, the social habits and customs encouraged the young men to marry their cousins (78%) or from their relatives (22%).

These factors reduce the potential opportunity for a weakening of ethnicity. Marriage celebration is limited to the same tribe because it takes place only at their community centre (67%) or in the homelands (33%) unlike other urban dwellers who hire places designed especially for such an occasion (Plate 9.15). All those interviewed discouraged their wives from working or attending training courses. Consequently, up to 33% were not keen on educating their children (all of them come from the higher age strata), and 25% either disapproved of or are neutral to girls' education.

A small percentage of interviewees (30%) had participated before in collective work which indicates a lack of initiatives even at the tribal level. Nonetheless, 75% have their closest friends from the same tribe, and 85% spend feasts and holidays with their relatives within the area. Thus, they are unlikely to be open to a wider society (Plate 9.16).

Plate 9.15: Tabya- Beshariya community centre

Plate 9.16: Tabya- Gathering of Beshariya members after the market

On the other hand, socio-political indicators are worth especial attention. While half of those interviewed could not explain why the area lacked infrastructure, 45% blamed it on governmental *laissez-faire* policies, and only 5% were aware that lack of representation was the major reason. None of the interviewees had dealt before with the municipality, and an overwhelming proportion of them did not even know to which administrative district they belonged.

In practice, heterogeneity caused a dilemma in terms of the 'ethics of upgrading'. Should the project attempt integration of groups which have traditionally chosen to remain separate, or should it capitalise on the internal cohesion of each group separately? Each decision has some positive and some negative impacts. This question was highly considered as a factor which might mitigate against collective participation. While utilising internal division as a stimulus for each group to perform better than others, as a competition, this might badly affect the integration and social solidarity of the society. The project is keen now to encourage collective work whenever specific activities or decisions require common agreement of all groups, for example the new alignment plan or the new location of the weekly market. The project clearly states that collective efforts are necessary and calls for a public meeting.

10- Conclusions:

The case study raises a number of lessons for replicability. It proves that urban squatters do care about their living conditions and they are not indifferent or apathetic. They are aware and ceaselessly willing to be involved in the processes of planning, decision-making, and implementation if they trust the institution or the project agency concerned. Second, comprehensive upgrading is a problematic approach. Various activities are interdependent and strongly linked, and target goals require performing at widely separated levels. Ambitious objectives are desirable, but actual practice needs belief, patience, and experience from the institutions concerned; collective-work from the target population; and understanding from the potential foreign donor. On the other hand, practical lessons disclose forms of ethically-contradictory behaviour by the project agency to speed the process of accomplishing successful upgrading. However, the following lessons are crucial for replicability.

10.1- Lessons from the case study:

Land-related issues:

- Lack of land tenure security is a major concern amongst the informal population. It not only creates a feeling of insecurity but also prevents residents from improving their houses, using substantial materials during construction, and obtaining legal infrastructure connections.

- Giving land sale priority to the registered leaseholders works as a safeguard against speculation which is an obvious risk when plots are sold below the market price.

- Landlords of hekr plots have proved that they are not willing to buy their plots. The rents they earn are far less than the cost of buying the land. Meanwhile, tenants pay frozen rents being protected by a series of inappropriate and restrictive rent laws which hinder any reasonable rent increase in the future. Landlords cannot dispose of their houses as long as the tenants intend to live in them, and protection against eviction is totally guaranteed. Hence, a proposal to sell the plots to the tenants after submitting the landlord approval is an attempt to correct this discrepancy. In practice, tenants will meet landlords and pay a fair amount of key money to get a declaration of consent. Absent leaseholders of empty, derelict or rented out plots, who do not pay leases and cannot be reached, are a minor problem as they can be expropriated.

- 'Delayed freehold' tenure is ethically questionable, but it guarantees the fulfilment of the project conditions.

Social-related issues:

- Absence of a unified legal organisation or a CDA representing different groups of the area, undoubtedly obstructs the speed of execution. The project agency has to assist the community to establish such a representation as soon as possible.

- Consolidated ethnic groups are more likely to acquire access to legal or illegal infrastructure before starting an upgrading project, and they are more receptive later to a pilot phase being conducted within their area.

- It is a double-edged sword to use the social fragmentation of a society to create competition. A pilot phase can incite less enthusiastic groups to participate effectively in new tasks on the one hand, but it may also cause a rejection or envy among different tribes on the other hand. The project agency should carefully involve all key-figures in decision-making processes and offer equal assistance to various heterogeneous groups.

Budget and financing:

- The total cost of self-financing projects should not exceed the payment capacity of the residents. The major constraint is to minimise the cost and grant the recuperation of investments. It is hardly possible to redeem the entire investment from the beneficiaries, and excessive subsidies will not contribute to the future acceptability and replicability of such a scheme as well.

- Long-term payback loans will require either subsidisation or high interest rates. The former jeopardises replicability and the latter overloads borrowers with extra financial obligations to keep pace with the current inflation rate- more than 20% in Egypt.

- Operating a land-sale programme 'initially' for a limited period encourages households to raise the money required to buy their plots. This may put more pressure on them, but it is fundamental for the success of cross-subsidy schemes.

- Tying up housing loans with the necessity of acquiring a legal land title encourages leasehold and illegal occupants to buy their plots.

- 'Earmarked concession plots' can generate substantial amount of income for the self-subsidy projects. All vacant plots must be surveyed and protected against any further illegal occupation.

Administrative:

- Establishing an accessible site-office encourages the target population to be involved effectively, though first meetings should take place in the society's community centres to 'break the ice'.

- State-supply of infrastructure without an appropriate plan for development and peoples' participation affects further attempts to mobilise the community to participate. The residents consider this recognition brings an end to a long period of uncertainty; they become sure that the government will not clear the area; and consequently they lose their willingness to buy the land. This risk is a crucial factor for self-subsidy projects since it jeopardises the chances of self-financing and obtaining a constant cash flow.

- Step by step materials supply during house improvement processes grants fulfilling the project's conditions and following the designs provided.

Donors:

- Donors should not provide significant financial incentives to civil servants which can not be sustained after the end of their assistance programmes. It is harmful to stop giving incentives at the end of a donor-assisted project, as it discourages civil servants from pursuing their responsibilities effectively. Instead, donors should assist local governments to establish a new financial system which can grant local and sustainable incentives for rewarding the efficient and penalising underperformers.

Flexibility:

- Flexibility of upgrading plans allows unforeseen modifications and grants fast progress. When the government launched the implementation of the main infrastructure networks in the Tabya, as a part of the overall plan for many areas in Aswan, many advantages were gained. This fulfilled a substantial part of the Egyptian government's share in the agreement, saved time , gave State-recognition and level of legality by accepting the project's proposal for block realignments, and intensified peoples' efforts and savings on land-acquisition and improvement of housing and community facilities.

10.2- Overall implications:

Current development policies and housing mechanism have proved to limit options open to the urban poor to acquire decent houses. Hence, they either rent a housing unit in a formal or an informal area, or encroach on State-owned land or the invaluable agricultural zones. The conclusion is apparent; planning policies to direct, control, and upgrade the growing popular settlements need to be practical and realistic. A number of factors must be taken into account for this approach to be successful.

Governance:

- First, it must be recognised that consciousness raising is needed to enhance the consensus that development is served by an integrated process of political and economic stability, good governance and popular participation. That requires investment in people, reliance on market forces, concern for the environment, and the vigour of the private sector.

- The outcome of low-cost estate housing policies and expectations is that most of the low-income strata cannot afford formal housing. The government, too, lacks the resources to provide decent housing for everybody and therefore there is no legal shelter for a large portion of urban dwellers. The result is that large areas in cities are developed without official approval or directions. The urban areas extend where illegal subdivision or squatting happens to take place.

- Meanwhile, it is fairly obvious that the strategy of constructing new communities on desert land alone is nowhere sufficient to meet the demands for housing and employment; special emphasis must be placed on alternatives to develop and improve the existing cities and towns. Smaller elements of the existing settlement hierarchy must be strengthened, so that they can perform the functions of urban centres, e.g. providing housing, public services and employment in manufacturing industries for the otherwise migrating population.

- Uneven development and urban bias block the opportunities for active human labour in the countryside and transform them into a redundant labour force. Thus, rural migration is directed towards the already over-congested and saturated urban centres.

Finance:

- Lack of capital is exacerbated by directing much of the available resources towards the new communities which require high per-capita funding for development; lack of mechanisms to tap private sector sources including individual savings; policies which

neglect cost recovery issues and favour subsidies. Low service tariffs, low interest rates for loans, rent controls, and other subsidies are combined to make the housing finance sector uneconomic. Thus, inputs of fresh public capital served simply to operate and maintain current levels of services, and led also to the construction of new housing and services.

- Housing budgets to fund fully-serviced projects with very high per capita production costs for low-income beneficiaries must be directed towards planning and providing new sites and services schemes. While that minimises housing investments, it maximises the technical assistance for target groups, e.g. introduction of appropriate local materials, traditional designs and methods of construction.

- Rent control rules have proved to be inadequate and need to be corrected as soon as possible.

- Adequate budgets have to be allocated for personnel training, equipment and encouraging incentives system in municipalities. Meanwhile, a proper financing strategy must be designed to overcome the following deficiency: absence of development strategies and appropriate programmes; absence of up-dated mapping and information system; lack of infrastructure planning, operation and maintenance programmes and finally, shortage of crucial equipment required for services extension and maintenance.

Land/Planning:

- The emergence and growth of substandard subdivisions and encroachments upon State-owned land are the natural outcome of inefficient regulations and weak administrative control and mechanisms. Furthermore, speculation is prevalent as it replaces the absence of legal development channels that can satisfy the demands of the poor in cultural and physical terms.

- The Government is faced with difficulties of assuring consistency and co-ordination between several laws concerning urban development as a whole besides the deficiency of many rules. A rethinking of a unified legal framework for effective planning is urgently needed. Similar regulations can be combined; contradictory regulations can be amended and inappropriate ones must be modified. Proposed laws must consider the physical and cultural demands of the low-income groups.

- Local materials used for traditional construction are always rejected by the housing law. It is assumed that they do not fulfil the common standards which are, in fact, set so high that they can only be met by formal sector procedures. Hence, state construction is closely

tied to limited building materials controlled by manufacturing interests. Traditional participation cannot cope with such interests.

- Use of local materials must start immediately including more support to research centres to develop efficient and cheap methods of construction.

- Congruous models of upgrading must be presented and discussed with different institutions concerned in an effort to escalate their professional capacity for upgrading.

Administration:

- Municipal officials are suited at their best to carrying out technical tasks and administering rules, but repeatedly prove far less capable of generating the motivation and changing attitudes which are required to embark on the real social changes they are entrusted with. Therefore, immediate restructuring must take place to solve problems of institutional pathologies and bureaucratic red tape.

- Co-ordination among institutions concerned with planning needs strengthening.

Appendix 1:

El Ahram (Official newspaper), 15/1/94

It is reported that the aerial survey of the informal housing areas has been accomplished for four governorates: Cairo, Giza, Aswan, and Kalubia. The governmental entities that involved in informal housing upgrading have announced that the governmental plan is to get over the issue by 1998 in Cairo. The plan is to improve 68 areas and to clear another 11areas in Cairo. The 92/93 fiscal annum has seen expenditure of 660,2 million pounds towards upgrading projects, of which are 106 millions for Cairo.

El Ahram, 1/4/94

Work for the fourth stage in the government's plan for informal housing upgrading is to start in April 1994 in four governorates. The governorates are Kalubia, Giza, Assuit and Souhag. The third stage had the allocated 229.6 million pounds with an extra support of 45.8 million pounds. The third stage involved upgrading the main infrastructures of the involved areas. The first stage had 106 million pounds and the second stage had 183.9 million pounds. Henceforth, the total cost of the four phases is 565,3 million pounds. The total amount needed for upgrading all the informal areas available on the national level is estimated to be about 3.5 billion pounds. Informal areas are 79 in Cairo, 32 in Giza, 60 in Kalubia and 40 areas in Alexandria.

El Ahram, 14/4/94

It has been announced that the total amounts of money allocated for upgrading the informal housing areas has reached 600 million pounds according to the governorates' needs.

El Ahram, 29/4/94

In a report written by Sami Metwaly about the issue of informal housing, the issue has been referred to as an incompatible phenomenon with Egypt's history and present trends. It is seen as a prominent issue in the House of Parliament. The reasons of having this phenomenon is thought to be the bureaucratic procedures by which such problem is handled and tackled on all fronts, primarily administrative processes. Another prominent problem is the city cordons which have not been modified for over 60 years to keep pace with fast urbanisation. Increasing rate of migration from rural areas to big cities is a major contributor to the problem. Rural-urban migration is due to lack of jobs and activities held around villages and small communities. "There are 434 informal housing areas in Egypt characterised by poverty; lack of facilities, planning and utilities; high rates of illiteracy, crime and drug dealing; and marginal economic activities. Fundamental terrorism has been recently protected within these areas. The plan is drawn at three levels, clearance of the areas which cannot be upgraded, replanning and infrastructure supply for newly

formulated areas outside city borders, and finally upgrading of areas inside the cordons that they have been deteriorating. Clearance programme has been already in process and funds are already allocated for other areas" (Minister of Local Administration 1994). The governorates that suffer mostly from increasing number of informal areas are Cairo, Giza, Port Said and Suez, with a portion of 15.9% of the total inhabitants living in these governorates. Next governorates that follow are mainly in Upper Egypt with a ratio up to 13% of total population. While borders governorates have 9.9%, Lower Egypt governorates have 6.6%. The governorates that were reported to have the least percent of occupation are Monofia 2.1%, Qina 2.6%, El Wadi El Gadid 2,1%, Damitta 2,6%, Faiyum 2.9%, and Sharquia 3,8%.

El Ahram, 15/8/94

The government announced the dedication towards the issue of informal housing. The total amount of budget allocated for the problem is 3.8 million pounds. The expected date to accomplish the plan is the beginning of 1997. A central environmental project for cleaning throughout all the governorates has started with 49 million pounds as a starting fund. The programme involves the choice of each governorate to select certain number of action areas within its premises every year to help focusing and accomplishing.

El Ahram, 6/5/94

It has been announced that the current plan for upgrading informal housing includes the allocation of 4 billion pounds. Upper Egypt's regions will get 51% of the total budget in an attempt to decrease the migration from such areas into the bigger cities. While residents of informal housing areas in Upper Egypt amounts to 1,6 million inhabitants, there are some 5,6 million informal inhabitants in Lower Egypt. Nation wise, the total number of areas that are targeted for upgrading is 880 from which 81 areas will be completely demolished because no services can be extended to them. Targeted areas for clearance are shanties build of tin and rigid carton. The governmental plan for the fiscal year 1994/95 includes 700 million pounds for upgrading.

El Ahram, 21/5/94

It is announced that 75.3 million pounds has been allocated for 8 governorates. This amount constitutes the fourth stage of an upgrading program for the informal housing areas. This leads to a total of 656 million pounds of upgrading programs since it started. The involved governorates are Cairo (13,775 million), Giza (14 million), Kalubia (7,5 million), Bani Suef (5 million), Faium (8,8 million), Souhag (3,199 million), Qina (14,231 million), and Aswan (9 million). In addition, it is worth mentioning that another three governorates will finish the third phase in June with the following allocated cost: Alexandria (26,887 million), Assuit (23 million), and Mynia (6,3 million).

El Ahram, 20/2/95

Cairo governorate has finished planning upgrading and demolishing of 80 informal housing areas in Cairo. Clearance of 12 areas will include moving the inhabitants to newly developed areas fully equipped with various facilities. The whole scheme will cost about 80 million pounds. The areas involved are 33 in Helwan, 22 in the eastern Cairo, 4 in the western Cairo, and 9 in the Northern Cairo. This is considered one stage of a project with total costs of about 550 million pounds. Associated in the project is demolishing 12 informal housing areas cannot be supplied with infrastructure. Some 16 thousands families will be relocated in new flats with total cost of 154 million pounds. On the other hand, a different type of Informal housing, that need improvement of its existing services, will be also addressed. They consist of 21 area in Ein Shams, El Zawia, City centre, gamaliya, El-Darb El-Ahmar, Bab El Shaeria, Abdeen, Boulak, and west of Waylee. Development cost is 66 million pounds.

El Ahram 28/3/1995

A program is currently set up to upgrade all the informal housing areas in Cairo and to demolishing areas that can not be upgraded. "The programme aims to ease suffering of the residents and to allow suitable conditions to keep peace and order in these areas. The informal areas have been sectored to 80 sections with appropriate priorities. The expenditure allocated is 1.5 billion pounds. Areas targeted for demolishing are 12 areas since they are not suitable for upgrading. Number of buildings for demolishing amounts to 6153 where some 15,484 thousands families live. The inhabitants will be relocated in suitable housing areas. Upgraded areas will have facilities and utilities attached to economical activities and new markets to have their independence" (The Governor of Cairo 1995).

El Ahram, 14/7/95

It was announced that the upgrading of 78 areas has been completed out of the 434 that is planned to upgraded starting from May 1993. The total amount of investment so far was reported to be one 1.321 billion pounds. The informal housing areas include 4 in Alexandria, 29 in Assuit, 36 in Souhag, 3 in Qina, and 6 in Aswan. It is worth noting that 51% of the resources has been spent in Upper Egypt even though it constitutes 32% of the population.

El Ahram, 21/7/95

It is reported that an amount of investments amounts to 964.3 million pounds has been allocated for informal housing areas projects, of which are 220.7 million pounds for sewage related projects, 220.3 millions for drinking water projects, 219 millions for electricity, 196 millions for roads paving, 84.7 millions for public cleanliness and related equipment, and 23.8 millions for environmental improvement.

El Ahram, 13/10/95

The execution rate of upgrading projects in the informal housing areas has been reported to be 124% in the first annual quarter of 1995. Some 82,6 million pounds have been invested already in upgrading and 66.08 million pounds are allocated for coming schemes. That leads to a total amount of 1.83 billion pounds invested in upgrading projects so far. Budgets invested in implementation amount to 20.5 million in Cairo, 11.7 in Giza, 16.5 in Kalubia, 6.1 in Alexandria, 2.2 in Bani Suef, 10 in Faiyum, 2.3 in Assuit, 5.2 in Souhag, 4 in Qina, 3 in Aswan, and 1 million pounds in Mynia.

Appendix 2:

All Sects	No. plots	Ethnicity	No. roads	No. families	No. rooms	Occupancy	Ownership			Infrastructure Connections					Plots' condition						Materials of construction					
		Section				rate	Habr	%	Owned	%	Water	%	Sewage	%	Electr.	%	Good	%	Need rep.	%	Bad/Ruined	%	Ruined	%	Concretes	%	Stone	%	Adobe	%
Block 1	68	A	194	36	49	3.96	63	93%	5	7%	15	22%	1	1%	21	31%	22	32%	45	66%	0	0%	1	1%	15	22%	32	47%	21	31%
Block 2	18	A	128	22	36	3.58	18	100%	0	0%	5	28%	0	0%	14	78%	0	0%	10	56%	8	44%	0	0%	0	0%	2	11%	16	89%
Block 3	3	A	15	4	6	2.50	3	100%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	3	100%	0	0%	0	0%	3	100%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	2	67%
Block 4	36	A	211	41	71	2.97	36	100%	0	0%	11	31%	0	0%	29	81%	1	3%	29	81%	5	14%	1	3%	2	6%	3	8%	31	86%
Block 5	49	A	310	54	113	2.74	49	100%	0	0%	31	63%	9	18%	46	94%	5	10%	36	73%	8	16%	0	0%	5	10%	13	27%	31	63%
Block 6	35	A	234	48	97	2.41	35	100%	0	0%	28	80%	16	46%	29	83%	2	6%	30	86%	3	9%	0	0%	3	9%	19	54%	13	37%
Block 7	28	A	127	29	48	2.85	26	100%	0	0%	10	38%	0	0%	14	54%	1	4%	11	42%	13	50%	1	4%	1	4%	24	92%	1	4%
Block 8	19	A	92	18	36	2.56	19	100%	0	0%	9	47%	1	5%	16	84%	0	0%	18	95%	1	5%	0	0%	3	16%	10	53%	6	32%
Block 9	15	A	81	14	28	2.89	15	100%	0	0%	7	47%	1	7%	12	80%	2	13%	10	67%	3	20%	0	0%	2	13%	9	60%	4	27%
Block 10	19	A	97	16	27	3.59	19	100%	0	0%	9	47%	7	37%	16	84%	2	11%	16	84%	1	5%	0	0%	9	47%	4	21%	6	32%
Block 11	30	A	165	28	49	3.37	30	100%	0	0%	14	47%	2	7%	24	80%	2	7%	17	57%	10	33%	1	3%	4	13%	9	30%	17	57%
Block 12	28	A	108	30	52	2.08	28	100%	0	0%	14	50%	2	7%	25	89%	0	0%	21	75%	7	25%	0	0%	3	11%	16	57%	9	32%
Block 13	23	A	128	25	47	2.72	23	100%	0	0%	10	43%	4	17%	16	70%	4	17%	16	70%	2	9%	1	4%	1	4%	13	57%	9	39%
Block 14	46	A	269	50	97	2.77	46	100%	0	0%	22	48%	6	13%	40	87%	0	0%	39	85%	7	15%	0	0%	0	0%	39	85%	7	15%
Block 15	35	A	197	33	78	2.53	35	100%	0	0%	22	63%	12	34%	28	80%	3	9%	28	80%	3	9%	1	3%	2	6%	15	43%	18	51%
Block 16	17	A	76	16	39	1.95	17	100%	0	0%	14	82%	2	12%	16	94%	0	0%	15	88%	2	12%	0	0%	0	0%	10	59%	7	41%
Block 17	56	A	305	61	113	2.70	56	100%	0	0%	30	54%	7	13%	50	89%	5	9%	44	79%	7	13%	0	0%	7	13%	24	43%	25	45%
Block 18	19	A	128	22	44	2.80	19	100%	0	0%	8	42%	0	0%	16	84%	0	0%	17	89%	2	11%	0	0%	6	32%	8	42%	5	26%
Block 19	5	A	30	4	15	2.00	5	100%	0	0%	2	40%	0	0%	3	60%	0	0%	4	80%	1	20%	0	0%	0	0%	2	40%	3	60%
Block 20	5	A	37	5	14	2.64	5	100%	0	0%	3	60%	0	0%	5	100%	0	0%	5	100%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	3	60%	2	40%
Block 21	11	A	62	11	26	2.38	11	100%	0	0%	6	55%	1	9%	8	73%	2	18%	8	73%	1	9%	0	0%	3	27%	5	45%	3	27%
Block 22	2	A	13	0	12	1.08	2	100%	0	0%	1	50%	0	0%	1	50%	1	50%	1	50%	0	0%	0	0%	1	50%	1	50%	0	0%
Block 23	4	A	22	3	9	2.44	4	100%	0	0%	2	50%	1	25%	2	50%	1	25%	3	75%	0	0%	0	0%	1	25%	3	75%	0	0%
Block 24	19	A	132	23	36	3.67	19	100%	0	0%	10	53%	5	26%	17	89%	0	0%	17	89%	2	11%	0	0%	0	0%	11	58%	8	42%
Block 25	5	A	16	3	4	4.00	5	100%	0	0%	1	20%	0	0%	2	40%	0	0%	2	40%	3	60%	0	0%	0	0%	2	40%	3	60%
Block 26	26	A	158	30	57	2.77	26	100%	0	0%	20	77%	8	31%	20	77%	2	8%	23	88%	1	4%	0	0%	1	4%	3	12%	22	85%
Block 27	28	A	119	25	57	2.09	27	96%	1	4%	15	54%	4	14%	21	75%	0	0%	23	82%	5	18%	0	0%	0	0%	12	43%	16	57%
Block 28	4	B	23	3	8	2.88	4	100%	0	0%	2	50%	1	25%	3	75%	0	0%	3	75%	1	25%	0	0%	0	0%	1	25%	3	75%
Block 29	8	B	60	9	14	4.29	8	100%	0	0%	3	38%	0	0%	7	88%	0	0%	6	75%	2	25%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	8	100%
Block 30	11	B	35	6	12	2.92	11	100%	0	0%	2	18%	2	18%	7	64%	0	0%	8	73%	3	27%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	11	100%
Block 31	14	B	92	16	36	2.56	14	100%	0	0%	8	57%	3	21%	11	79%	0	0%	9	64%	5	36%	0	0%	0	0%	8	57%	6	43%
Block 32	10	B	27	6	15	1.80	8	80%	2	20%	4	40%	2	20%	7	70%	0	0%	8	80%	2	20%	0	0%	0	0%	5	50%	5	50%
Block 33	36	B	131	26	55	2.38	32	89%	4	11%	10	28%	3	8%	27	75%	4	11%	21	58%	9	25%	2	6%	7	19%	17	47%	12	33%
Block 34	18	B	51	6	23	2.22	18	100%	0	0%	3	17%	1	6%	11	61%	1	6%	7	39%	9	50%	1	6%	0	0%	10	56%	8	44%
Block 35	40	B	138	26	55	2.51	36	90%	4	10%	19	48%	5	13%	23	58%	3	8%	34	85%	3	8%	0	0%	3	8%	31	78%	6	15%
Block 36	16	B	78	15	34	2.29	16	100%	0	0%	10	63%	3	19%	13	81%	1	6%	13	81%	2	13%	0	0%	0	0%	11	69%	5	31%
Block 37	5	B	32	6	23	1.39	5	100%	0	0%	3	60%	1	20%	4	80%	1	20%	4	80%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	5	100%	0	0%
Block 38	23	B	119	26	59	2.02	1	4%	22	96%	18	78%	6	26%	20	87%	9	39%	12	52%	2	9%	0	0%	6	26%	14	61%	3	13%
Block 39	39	B	277	46	100	2.77	4	10%	35	90%	30	77%	13	33%	36	92%	5	13%	32	82%	2	5%	0	0%	9	23%	12	31%	18	46%
Block 40	13	B	46	9	20	2.30	2	15%	11	85%	9	69%	0	0%	10	77%	0	0%	13	100%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	11	85%	2	15%
Block 41	73	B	440	79	190	2.32	14	19%	59	81%	46	63%	25	34%	0	0%	30	41%	40	55%	3	4%	0	0%	23	32%	26	36%	24	33%
Block 42	25	B	98	22	28	3.50	23	92%	2	8%	7	28%	1	4%	18	72%	0	0%	25	100%	0	0%	0	0%	2	8%	13	52%	10	40%
Block 43	49	B	316	40	81	3.80	39	80%	10	20%	8	16%	4	8%	41	84%	0	0%	43	88%	6	12%	0	0%	2	4%	5	10%	42	86%
Block 44	13	B	21	3	6	3.50	12	92%	1	8%	0	0%	0	0%	9	69%	2	15%	8	62%	2	15%	0	0%	0	0%	9	69%	4	31%
Block 45	13	B	49	7	21	2.33	9	69%	4	31%	0	0%	0	0%	7	54%	3	23%	6	46%	2	15%	2	15%	0	0%	7	54%	6	46%
Block 46	21	B	32	8	18	1.78	21	100%	0	0%	2	10%	1	5%	12	57%	2	10%	15	71%	4	19%	0	0%	0	0%	12	57%	9	43%
Block 47	23	B	65	13	27	2.41	23	100%	0	0%	5	22%	1	4%	12	52%	1	4%	18	78%	2	9%	2	9%	1	4%	8	35%	14	61%
Block 48	16	B	63	13	24	2.63	16	100%	0	0%	6	38%	0	0%	11	69%	1	6%	14	88%	1	6%	0	0%	0	0%	7	44%	9	56%
Block 49	8	B	38	8	14	2.71	8	100%	0	0%	2	25%	0	0%	7	88%	0	0%	8	100%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	8	100%
Block 50	11	B	50	9	26	1.92	11	100%	0	0%	3	27%	1	9%	9	82%	1	9%	10	91%	0	0%	0	0%	1	9%	1	9%	9	82%
Block 51	19	B	79	10	27	2.93	19	100%	0	0%	5	26%	0	0%	12	63%	2	11%	17	89%	0	0%	0	0%	3	16%	4	21%	12	63%
Block 52	13	B	70	13	26	2.69	13	100%	0	0%	5	38%	1	8%	12	92%	2	15%	11	85%	0	0%	0	0%	1	8%	6	46%	6	46%
Block 53	4	B	4	4	4	1.00	1	25%	3	75%	2	50%	1	25%	4	100%	3	75%	1	25%	0	0%	0	0%	3	75%	1	25%	0	0%
Block 54	8	C	20	4	6	3.33	7	88%	1	13%	3	38%	1	13%	5	63%	2	25%	1	13%	0	0%	5	63%	1	13%	1	13%	6	75%
Block 55	12	C	30	9	16	1.88	6	50%	6	50%	0	0%	0	0%	6	50%	0	0%	7	58%	5	42%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	12	100%
Block 56	8	C	22	8	18	1.22	7	88%	1	13%	4	50%	2	25%	7	88%	5	63%	3	38%	0	0%	0	0%	1	13%	5	63%	2	25%
Block 57	20	C	88	19	31	2.84	20	100%	0	0%	6	30%	2	10%	12	60%	1	5%	16	80%	3	15%	0	0%	2	10%	2	10%	16	80%
Block 58	18	C	66	17	24	2.75	18	100%	0	0%	5	28%	0	0%	10	56%	3	17%	13	72%	2	11%	0	0%	2	11%	7	39%	9	50%

All Secs.	No. plots	Ethnicity/	No. resds	No. families	No. rooms	Occupancy	Ownership				Infrastructure Connections						Plots' condition								Materials of construction					
		Section				rate	Hsir	%	Owned	%	Water	%	Sewage	%	Electer.	%	Good	%	Need rep.	%	Bad/Ruined	%	Ruined	%	Concrete	%	Stone	%	Adobe	%
Block 59	4	C	7	2	26	0.27	3	75%	1	25%	1	25%	1	25%	4	100%	1	25%	3	75%	0	0%	0	0%	1	25%	3	75%	0	0%
Block 60	10	C	47	10	30	1.57	0	0%	10	100%	10	100%	10	100%	10	100%	10	100%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	10	100%	0	0%	0	0%
Block 61	10	C	39	8	30	1.30	0	0%	10	100%	10	100%	10	100%	10	100%	10	100%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	10	100%	0	0%	0	0%
Block 62	40	C	191	28	114	1.68	11	28%	29	73%	26	65%	15	38%	32	80%	21	53%	18	45%	1	3%	0	0%	17	43%	16	40%	7	18%
Block 63	22	C	90	22	40	2.25	16	73%	6	27%	6	27%	5	23%	16	73%	10	45%	11	50%	1	5%	0	0%	3	14%	10	45%	9	41%
Block 64	5	C	23	6	17	1.35	0	0%	5	100%	5	100%	4	80%	5	100%	5	100%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	2	40%	3	60%	0	0%
Block 65	29	C	144	26	65	2.22	3	10%	26	90%	11	38%	7	24%	20	69%	8	28%	18	62%	3	10%	0	0%	4	14%	6	21%	19	66%
Block 66	14	C	153	31	77	1.99	0	0%	14	100%	12	86%	12	86%	12	86%	14	100%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	8	57%	6	43%	0	0%
Block 67	9	C	71	12	69	1.03	1	11%	8	89%	6	67%	5	56%	7	78%	8	89%	1	11%	0	0%	0	0%	6	67%	2	22%	1	11%
Block 68	2	C	10	1	3	3.33	0	0%	2	100%	1	50%	1	50%	1	50%	1	50%	1	50%	1	50%	0	0%	1	50%	1	50%	0	0%
Block 69	24	C	150	25	64	2.34	5	21%	19	79%	13	54%	8	33%	18	75%	10	42%	10	42%	3	13%	0	0%	6	25%	9	38%	9	38%
Block 70	22	C	116	21	52	2.23	7	32%	15	68%	13	59%	11	50%	13	59%	17	77%	5	23%	0	0%	0	0%	9	41%	12	55%	1	5%
Block 71	35	C	179	36	69	2.59	25	71%	10	29%	19	54%	8	23%	25	71%	8	23%	26	74%	1	3%	0	0%	15	43%	13	37%	7	20%
Block 72	22	C	99	21	47	2.11	22	100%	0	0%	9	41%	1	5%	16	73%	0	0%	22	100%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	3	14%	19	86%
Block 73	9	C	19	4	9	2.11	8	89%	1	11%	3	33%	0	0%	4	44%	0	0%	8	89%	1	11%	0	0%	0	0%	4	44%	5	56%
Block 74	11	C	49	7	14	3.50	11	100%	0	0%	6	55%	0	0%	9	82%	2	18%	7	64%	2	18%	0	0%	0	0%	5	45%	6	55%
Block 75	20	C	87	17	46	1.89	19	95%	1	5%	14	70%	0	0%	16	80%	0	0%	14	70%	6	30%	0	0%	1	5%	2	10%	17	85%
Block 76	5	C	18	1	9	2.00	5	100%	0	0%	3	60%	0	0%	4	80%	0	0%	5	100%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	5	100%	0	0%
Block 77	32	C	327	57	131	2.50	0	0%	32	100%	20	63%	13	41%	32	100%	25	78%	5	16%	2	6%	0	0%	14	44%	13	41%	5	16%
Block 78	1	C	7	1	2	3.50	0	0%	1	100%	1	100%	1	100%	1	100%	1	100%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	1	100%	0	0%	0	0%
Block 79	56	C	256	45	108	2.37	6	11%	50	89%	13	23%	0	0%	36	64%	1	2%	43	77%	11	20%	1	2%	0	0%	36	64%	20	36%
Block 80	9	C	41	8	26	1.58	8	89%	1	11%	4	44%	0	0%	6	67%	4	44%	5	56%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	9	100%
Block 81	17	C	58	12	26	2.23	15	88%	2	12%	4	24%	0	0%	9	53%	3	18%	11	65%	3	18%	0	0%	0	0%	2	12%	15	88%
Block 82	8	C	20	5	7	2.86	8	100%	0	0%	2	25%	0	0%	4	50%	0	0%	4	50%	4	50%	0	0%	1	13%	0	0%	7	88%
Block 83	28	C	129	27	49	2.63	28	100%	0	0%	6	21%	2	7%	21	75%	4	14%	17	61%	4	14%	3	11%	2	7%	2	7%	24	86%
Block 84	2	C	2	2	2	1.00	2	100%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	2	100%	0	0%	0	0%	2	100%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	2	100%
Block 85	15	C	58	15	27	2.15	14	93%	1	7%	5	33%	0	0%	8	53%	3	20%	10	67%	2	13%	0	0%	1	7%	10	67%	4	27%
Block 86	13	C	46	10	20	2.30	13	100%	0	0%	3	23%	1	8%	6	46%	1	8%	9	69%	3	23%	0	0%	1	8%	3	23%	9	69%
Block 87	4	C	17	2	4	4.25	4	100%	0	0%	1	25%	0	0%	3	75%	0	0%	1	25%	3	75%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	4	100%
Block 88	20	C	59	16	29	2.03	20	100%	0	0%	6	30%	0	0%	16	80%	4	20%	14	70%	2	10%	0	0%	0	0%	2	10%	18	90%
Block 89	4	C	22	3	9	2.44	4	100%	0	0%	2	50%	0	0%	2	50%	1	25%	1	25%	2	50%	0	0%	0	0%	1	25%	3	75%
Block 90	26	C	142	29	62	2.29	26	100%	0	0%	7	27%	0	0%	23	88%	0	0%	18	69%	8	31%	0	0%	0	0%	8	31%	18	69%
Block 91	20	C	81	16	39	2.08	20	100%	0	0%	4	20%	1	5%	15	75%	2	10%	11	55%	7	35%	0	0%	0	0%	3	15%	17	85%
Block 92	3	C	8	3	5	1.60	3	100%	0	0%	2	67%	0	0%	3	100%	0	0%	3	100%	0	0%	0	0%	1	33%	2	67%	0	0%
Block 93	14	C	31	5	9	3.44	14	100%	0	0%	4	29%	1	7%	7	50%	1	7%	10	71%	3	21%	0	0%	1	7%	4	29%	9	64%
Block 94	10	C	40	8	15	2.67	10	100%	0	0%	2	20%	0	0%	5	50%	0	0%	2	20%	8	80%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	10	100%
Block 95	23	C	119	24	40	2.98	23	100%	0	0%	6	26%	0	0%	19	83%	4	17%	13	57%	6	26%	0	0%	0	0%	3	13%	20	87%
Block 96	16	C	69	11	19	3.63	6	38%	10	63%	5	31%	0	0%	14	88%	2	13%	10	63%	4	25%	0	0%	0	0%	2	13%	14	88%
Block 97	2	C	2	2	2	1.00	1	50%	1	50%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	2	100%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	2	100%
Block 98	17	C	50	10	22	2.27	17	100%	0	0%	4	24%	2	12%	11	65%	2	12%	8	47%	7	41%	0	0%	1	6%	10	59%	6	35%
Block 99	8	C	25	7	20	1.25	8	100%	0	0%	5	63%	3	38%	7	88%	4	50%	3	38%	0	0%	1	13%	0	0%	4	50%	4	50%
Block 100	7	C	7	7	7	1.00	7	100%	0	0%	3	43%	2	29%	7	100%	7	100%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	3	43%	4	57%	0	0%
Block 101	10	C	46	10	20	2.30	0	0%	10	100%	10	100%	10	100%	10	100%	10	100%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	10	100%	0	0%	0	0%
Block 102	10	C	43	10	20	2.15	0	0%	10	100%	10	100%	10	100%	10	100%	10	100%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	10	100%	0	0%	0	0%
Block 103	10	C	52	10	20	2.60	0	0%	10	100%	10	100%	10	100%	10	100%	10	100%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	10	100%	0	0%	0	0%
Block 104	10	C	44	10	20	2.20	0	0%	10	100%	10	100%	10	100%	10	100%	10	100%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	10	100%	0	0%	0	0%
Block 105	10	C	36	10	20	1.80	0	0%	10	100%	10	100%	10	100%	10	100%	10	100%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	10	100%	0	0%	0	0%
Block 106	3	C	4	1	5	0.80	3	100%	0	0%	2	67%	2	67%	2	67%	1	33%	2	67%	0	0%	0	0%	1	33%	2	67%	0	0%
Block 107	9	C	66	11	22	3.00	9	100%	0	0%	4	44%	3	33%	7	78%	2	22%	6	67%	1	11%	0	0%	1	11%	5	56%	3	33%
Total Blocks	1948		9508	1802	3889	2.44484	1472	76%	476	24%	882	45%	348	18%	1405	72%	384	20%	1269	65%	271	14%	23	1%	307	16%	747	38%	893	46%

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