

Leon Trotsky and World War One: August 1914-March 1917

by

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Abstract

This thesis is the first full account of Trotsky's writings penned between August 1914 and March 1917. The source material used is almost exclusively primary, both published and archival, some of which is examined here for the first time. Each of Trotsky's concerns as a thinker and publicist is illustrated, and each debate followed to its conclusion.

The main findings of this thesis are as follows. Trotsky's analysis of the causes of the war and his programmatic response to it were logical and consistent. Second, although he hoped to unite all internationalists around his war programme, differences of opinion with the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks meant that his plans on this issue remained unfulfilled. Third, Trotsky's major concern of the First World War period was to combat social-patriotism, i.e., socialists who argued that it was the proletariat's duty to defend its respective homelands.

Finally, several areas for further investigation which arise out of this thesis are suggested.

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CHAPTER ONE

Switzerland

1.1 From Vienna to Switzerland

On the 19th of July 1914 Germany declared war on Russia. Trotsky was in Vienna and on the following day he went to the Wienzeille in order to question socialist deputies on the likely position of Russian émigrés. There he met Fritz Adler who informed him that the Austrian government had just issued an order to its citizens to be on the look-out for suspicious foreigners who should then be reported to the police. Trotsky then travelled with Fritz's father, Victor, to the head of the Austrian political police to ask for his advice. He was informed that an order for the arrest and internment of all Serbs and Russians living in Austria would possibly be issued on the next day:

It follows then that you recommend departure?

Certainly, and the quicker the better.

Alright...tomorrow I'll go to Switzerland with my family.

Well, it would be better to do this today.¹

The above conversation took place at three o'clock in the afternoon. At 6.10 p.m. Trotsky and his family were on a train bound for Switzerland, that 'temporary political watch-tower from which several Russian Marxists reviewed the development of those unprecedented events.'²

1.2 The Diary in Zurich

Safe in Zurich Trotsky noted his first reactions to the events occurring immediately after the outbreak of the First World War in his diary; a literary form he often employed when in difficult circumstances:

after two to three weeks, when the French and German newspapers in Zurich gave a complete picture of the total political and moral catastrophe of official socialism, the diary was a substitute for a critical and political pamphlet.³

In the 1914 diary Trotsky did not concern himself with elaborating an explanation of the causes for the outbreak of the war. At this point he focussed on the collapse of the Second International.

Referring to the 'collapse' of internationalism Trotsky stressed that this did not spring out of a vacuum. In the entry for the 10th of August he noted that the question of the danger of war was raised in the Second International every three years. During the discussions of this issue disagreements had only arisen around the problems of how to hinder war efforts and, if war actually started, how to prevent 'backward' elements from obeying mobilisation orders and how to break the war 'with the heads of the ruling classes.' However, when war looked likely the German Social-Democrat Party had entered into secret negotiations with its government; the French establishment had convinced its Socialist Party of its peace loving nature; and Austrian Social-Democrats had announced Austro-Hungary's ultimatum to Serbia to be justified. When the hostilities began German socialists in the Reichstag voted for an extra five million in war credits and Austro-Hungarian comrades became intoxicated with nationalism. For Trotsky,

It is absolutely clear that what happened was not simply mistakes, or isolated opportunistic steps, or 'awkward' declarations from the floors of parliaments, or the votes of the Grand-Duchy Social-Democrats for the budget, or the experiments of French ministerism, or the degeneracy of several leaders - what happened was the collapse of the International in the most crucial epoch, *in relation to which all the foregoing work was only a preparation.*⁴

Elaborating upon this theme on the 12th of August Trotsky highlighted Austrian Social-Democracy to illustrate his general point that national contradictions were long ago evident in the Second International. He cited Victor Adler as describing the International Department in Brussels as 'decorative', and remembered an earlier article against the chauvinistic tendencies of the Austrian Social-Democratic newspaper *Arbeiter Zeitung*, which he had felt compelled to write and publish in the *Neue Zeitung*. He labelled Adler's statement 'short-sighted' in that in a multi-national country such as Austria, the

external policy of the Austro-German Social-Democrats would always have internal repercussions:

One cannot separate the 'German idea' and the 'German spirit' from the 'Slav' idea as the *Arbeiter Zeitung* did everywhere and at the same time unite the German workers with the Slavs. One cannot day-in day-out slight the Serbs as 'horsethieves' and expect to unite the German workers with the Austrian South-Slavs.⁵

It was the above form of nationalistic spirit which, for Trotsky, had directly led to socialists backing the war efforts of their home governments:

The Social-Democratic deputy Ellenbogen said at a mass meeting in Vienna: 'We are faithful to the German nation in good times and bad, in peace and in war'...As a result of this policy the party split onto different national groupings, and at the moment of war the German Social-Democrats of Austria appeared as a subsidiary detachment of the monarchy.⁶

For Trotsky, what was true of Austrian Social-Democracy was also true of its equivalent across Western Europe. Thus, for instance, Bebel of the German Social-Democratic Party, 'at some point promised to put a gun on his shoulder for the defence of the fatherland against tsarism.'⁷ And, according to Trotsky, the only distinguishing feature of German Social-Democracy was that it kept its formal affiliation to internationalism hidden better than any other Western Social-Democratic party.⁸

However, forever the revolutionary optimist, Trotsky did not fall into a mood of absolute despair. Indeed, he viewed the generally positive reactions to the outbreak of war and the collapse of the Second International as temporary phenomenon.

Trotsky explained initial feelings of joy by reference to the fact that, for the workers, war arrives as a break from a routine of life which is one of insufferable hell. Moreover, war brings with it promises of change for the better. However, for Trotsky, the feelings of the masses would go through the following general pattern of rise and fall: the first months of the war are a period of hope; this stage is soon concluded and followed by worry as the material hardships imposed by war begin

to be felt; then news of the first 'blessed victories' renews hopes and spirits; this tide of joy is then dissipated by a return of the hardships of war. The accumulative effect of dashed hopes and privations can then create a situation which leads to a revolution:

War often brings about revolution. This is not so much because the war was unsuccessful in a state sense, as because the war did not satisfy all expectations.⁹

Furthermore, Trotsky noted several developments which put the prospects for socialist revolution into a healthy light.

First, with reference to Germany, in the entry for the 15th August, Trotsky reacted to the unconfirmed news that Liebknecht had been killed in an anti-war demonstration in Berlin by writing that Liebknecht had saved the honour and pride of German Social-Democracy. Then on 17 August, Mol'kenbur told Trotsky that in the discussions on tactics to be adopted in the Reichstag during the vote on the war credits, 36, one-third of those present, had voted for a rejection and 15 had abstained. Hence, the decision to go to the Reichstag and support the government had been passed by a few votes only. For Trotsky, the 'shameful character' of the German SPD's war vote of 4 August had not been removed by the objections of the 36. But, he said,

the figures for the groups inside the fraction are in themselves very suggestive for the future: what upset could the vote [for war credits] have brought forth among the masses if, even within the fraction, the most opportunistic part of the party, almost half of the members were against it.¹⁰

Furthermore, according to Trotsky, the war would break the link between the German proletariat on the one side, and its Social-Democratic organisations on the other. This was a positive development since the latter had become influenced by bourgeois opinion. According to the diarist, bourgeois influence had stemmed from the nature of German Social-Democratic parliamentarianism, i.e., the creation of a bureaucracy which had daily contact with the leading representatives of bourgeois society. This, in turn, had created an atmosphere of compromise which had inevitably reflected on the consciousness of the workers' representatives, making them susceptible to bourgeois suggestions. For Trotsky, the consequence of

this process was that in the epoch leading-up to the First World War the German masses had received neither an international perspective, nor a revolutionary temper, from their representatives. However, mobilisation

mechanically and moreover at one blow rips the workers from productive and organisational cages: from foremen, trade unions, political organisations and so on...putting and uniting them in the new fiery and iron cages of regiments, brigades, divisions...¹¹

Second, in a discussion of his homeland's prospects Trotsky predicted that Russia would not withstand the pressures of war for long. Dismissing the notion that the Russian army had put itself to rights after the Russo-Japanese War of 1905, Trotsky turned to an evaluation of the current condition of the constituent parts of Russia's armed forces. To begin with he noted that the Russian peasant had broken with patriarchal passivism. The events of the 1905 revolution had, he said, awakened a new personality in the Russian peasant: a personality which, given continual economic growth in the countryside could have taken an individualistic bent, thus providing a support for a bourgeois order; but, under the reality of economic uncertainty and 'shocks', was still far from bourgeois norms and, as such, not a reliable ally. Then the growing numbers of workers and national minority groups as a percentage of the army provided a further force for instability. In particular, Trotsky pointed to the strikes in St. Petersburg on the eve of the war, mentioning their 'revolutionary character, and argued that the workers would carry their hatred of the Russian ruling classes into the army. And, once there, he predicted that the proletariat would recognise its class enemy in the officer corps; a group which, he said, had become an integral part of Russia's ruling elite, distinguished for its 'embezzlement, nepotism and terrible indifference.' For Trotsky, this had all the makings of an explosive situation:

From all of this there flows an inevitable, awful disintegration which, in its turn, unleashes the revolutionary energy of the people. Hence one cannot exclude the possibility that we will be returning to the homeland before the year is out.¹²

Third, Trotsky thought that socialist planning would grow out of the economic dislocation caused by the war. He reached this conclusion through an analysis of a debate taking place in Switzerland over how to guarantee the supply of essential foodstuffs for the duration of the hostilities. Switzerland was not self-sufficient, supplying only one quarter of its domestic consumer market. On the 12th August 1914 the Zurich Social-Democratic newspaper *Volksrecht* proposed the requisition of all grain and potatoes. These would then be distributed through canton and communal organs. Finance was to come from the state bank, which would act as a mediator between the state and the agricultural sector. Describing this as only one step towards the distribution of essentials Trotsky continued,

The more war introduces chaos into international economic relations, the more it disorganises production and the means of communication, the more one has to distribute the available staple foodstuffs ahead of time and wisely. But one can only produce and distribute in a wise and economic manner on socialist beginnings...Humanity will not be destroyed under the smoke of the militarism's wreckage. It scrambles out of this and enters on to the real road. Beginning with a concern about the planned distribution of potatoes, it moves toward a socialist organisation of production.¹³

Finally, Trotsky retained his revolutionary optimism, derived from his belief in Marxism and the proletariat. This is best illustrated by the following spirited, polemical entry of 11th August 1914:

One cannot doubt that even in the course of the next few months the European proletariat will raise its head and show that the European revolution lives under European militarism. Only the awakening of the revolutionary socialist movement, which should immediately take-on a very energetic form, can lay the basis for a new International. One should not doubt that it will be created through profound internal struggles, which will not only throw off many old elements from socialism but will also widen its base, recasting its political appearance. In any case, socialism will not be forced to begin from the beginning. The Third International will, in a principled sense, mark a return to the First International,

but from the springboard of the organisational-educational conquests of the Second International.

The coming years will be an epoch of socialist revolution. Only the revolutionary awakening of the proletariat can stop this war, otherwise it...will last until the total exhaustion of the world, throwing our civilisation back by several decades...¹⁴

1.3 **The War and the International**

The diary in Zurich also served as a notebook for the writing of Trotsky's first pamphlet of the war - *The War and the International*. Despite some overlap between the two texts, the latter is distinguished from the former in that one finds less talk of the death of the Second International and more material relating to the war-aims of the Great Powers. Indeed, for Trotsky,

The exposure of diplomatic trickery, cheating and knavery is one of the most important functions of socialist political agitation.¹⁵

In a discussion of perceptions of the war as one of 'liberation' or 'defence', Trotsky argued that each of the belligerents viewed the hostilities from the standpoint of the power interests of the state. Thus, for example, for Austria-Hungary the war was necessary as a way of holding a multi-national state intact in the face of ethnic nationalism:

Austria-Hungary [as] a state organisation...is identical with the Hapsburg monarchy...Since Austria-Hungary is surrounded on all sides by states composed of the same races as within its borders...[it] is compelled to extinguish the hearthfire that kindles their political leanings - the independent kingdom of Serbia.¹⁶

In turn, Austrian action was sanctioned by Germany which, for several reasons, needed to preserve the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. Most notably, the Austro-Hungarian monarchy provided an ideological support to a German society dominated by the Junker class. Added to this, the Austro-Hungarian army acted as a reserve military contingent to Germany's disputes with the Entente.

Trotsky highlighted Germany's anti-democratic political structures to ridicule the notion of Germany waging a war of liberation against Russian despotism. This argument was used as a justification for

involvement in the war by German Social-Democracy but Trotsky countered that Russia's autocracy would be preserved by a German victory. This was because Russia was necessary to the Junkers in much the same way as Austria-Hungary, i.e., tsarism, as a form of government, was essentially the same as that of Germany's:

the existence of tsarism strengthens the Hohenzollern monarchy and the Junker oligarchy since, if there were no tsarism, German absolutism would face Europe as the last mainstay of feudal barbarism.¹⁷

German imperialists also had one more reason for propping-up Nicholas II: since tsarism was inefficient in carrying-out its administrative and governmental tasks, Russia was prevented from developing into a real rival to German expansion. Thus, reasoned Trotsky, in swallowing the 'liberation myth' German Social-Democracy had been totally fooled into accepting the claims of German war propaganda. It was, he stated, Germany's intention to retain tsarism as a political structure after German economic hegemony had been established through victory in battle. The real targets of German aggression were the more developed and dangerous competitors - France and Britain. A successful conclusion to the war for the Central Powers would, according to Trotsky, pave the way for an alliance of the anti-democratic forces of Germany, Austria-Hungary and Russia; an alliance which would 'mean a period of the darkest reaction in Europe and the whole world.'¹⁸

Revealing the real reasons for the causes of World War One in terms of state-power interests followed from Trotsky's general analysis why hostilities had broken out. He traced the origins of the war to 'the imperialist antagonisms between the capitalist states.'¹⁹ By 'imperialist antagonisms' Trotsky meant a situation in which colonies were necessary for the further capitalist development of the advanced nations, but there were no more areas remaining 'free' for colonisation. Thus, 'there was nothing left for these states except to grab colonies from each other.'¹⁹ He cited from the recently published works of Arthur Dix and George Irmer as evidence of Germany's imperialist ambition to become the dominant world state power. In order to achieve this Germany had to destroy the British economy. In turn, Britain had

entered the war not so much as a point of principle over Belgium neutrality, as a German victory there would threaten British domination of the sea.²¹

Trotsky presented his most theoretical exposition of the underpinnings of imperialist rivalry in the Preface to *War and the International*. This was Trotsky's first formulation of the causes of the war in terms of 'a revolt of the forces of production against the political form of nation and state.'²² According to Trotsky, capitalism had transformed the world economy into 'one economic workshop'.²³ This, in turn, demanded international political structures to reflect the nature of the economic base. One can see how this approach is in harmony with the base/superstructure model of society, outlined by Marx in his Preface to *A Contribution to a Critique of Political Economy*.²⁴ But, Trotsky objected, it was not in the nature of capitalism for this task to be solved by peaceful, organised cooperation across national boundaries. Rather, the capitalist response was to fight for hegemony on the world market. Hence, the current imperialist rivalry in which the question on the order of the day was: 'which country is by this war to be transformed from a Great Power into the World Power [?]'²⁵ However, for Trotsky, it was already impossible for a single capitalist country to establish a hegemonic position over the world's productive forces. In short, the war was a last gamble on behalf of a system which could not resolve its own internal contradictions which had developed to the full.²⁶ The destruction and chaos introduced by the war would, he predicted, lead to economic collapse:

The economic rivalry under the banner of militarism is accompanied by robbery and destruction which violate the elementary principles of human economy. World production revolts not only against the confusion produced by national and state divisions but also against the capitalist economic organisations, which has now turned into barbarous disorganisation and chaos.²⁷

For Trotsky, the only solution to the current crisis was proletarian revolution and socialism. The tasks for socialism were to overcome the nature of imperialism and to make good the inadequacies of capitalism. To begin with, there had to be a socialist organisation of the

world economy. In order to attain this the international proletariat would have to establish what the national capitalist state could not; namely, a harmonisation of political forms with productive forces, i.e., an international political order. To this end, Trotsky advanced the idea of a 'republican United States of Europe, as the foundation of the United States of the World.'²⁸ At this point Trotsky did not say why Europe should be the foundation rather than Africa, America or Australia and so on, but he did stress that the Russian revolution would be 'an integral part' of the European revolution. Of course, Trotsky had emphasised that the Russian revolution could only survive if a wider European revolution came to its aid in *Results and Prospects*. However, in this earlier work of 1906 this point was made through an argument based on necessity, i.e., the contradictions facing a workers' government in a predominantly peasant country could only be overcome if help was received from the victorious proletariat of the advanced West. Now Trotsky related this link between revolution in Russia and in France, Britain and Germany to the creation of a republican United States of Europe, the urgency of which flowed out of the revolt of the productive forces against the limitations of national boundaries.

A final point of note in the *War and the International* is that imperialism is viewed as a source both of working-class support for the imperialist state and of eventual working-class rebellion. Initially the workers back their home government in its imperialist designs as this meets the immediate needs of their economic position: the more successful the imperialist ambitions of the capitalist state, the more wealth in that society; some of which would go to the workers. When the imperialist state engages in war, however, the chance arises that the workers will revolt because of the hardships imposed by the military situation. Most notably, the violent behaviour of the imperialist competitors acts as lesson to the working-class. Any former allegiance to bourgeois legality would, Trotsky stated, be smashed:

Is it not clear that all these circumstances must bring about a profound change in the mental attitude of the working class, curing them radically of the hypnosis of legality in which a period of political stagnation expresses itself?...the terrible poverty that

prevails during this War and will continue after its close, will be of a sort to force the masses to violate many a bourgeois law.²⁹

For socialists to win over the workers to their side during the then current hostilities Trotsky recommended them to adopt the slogan of Peace.³⁰

1.4 Conclusion

Trotsky's stay in Switzerland was brought to a close by an invitation he received from the Ukrainian newspaper *Kievskaya Mysl'* to work as its war correspondent in France. Although he spent less than three months in neutral Switzerland he could leave for Paris feeling that he had made several accomplishments. He had formulated his response to three very important questions: Why had the Second International collapsed?; What had caused the war?; and, finally, What slogans should socialists advance to reunite the proletariat around a revolutionary programme of action? Most importantly, he had arranged for his pamphlet *War and the International* to be translated and published in German.³¹ Trotsky thought this to be of supreme importance, especially given that the German Social-Democratic movement had been the most powerful section of the Second International. In later years Trotsky remained proud of the fact that he had been sentenced by a German court for the contents of his Zurich pamphlet.³² The ideas expressed in it will also feature in subsequent chapters, which examine the articles penned by Trotsky while a resident of Paris during World War One.

Notes

1. L. Trotskii, *Voina i Revolyutsiya*, Vol. 1, Petrograd, 1922, p 40.
2. Ibid., p 9.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid., p 51.
5. Ibid., p 52.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid., p 48.
10. Ibid., p 65.
11. Ibid., pp 67-68.
12. Ibid., p 57. In an April 1922 footnote Trotsky explained the failure of this prediction by an underestimation of the role of the intelligentsia which gave tsarism some 'stability'. However, he insisted that its role 'only delayed the disintegration. In essentials our analysis was confirmed by events. The difference was only in time.' (Ibid).
13. Ibid., pp 58-59.
14. Ibid., p 53.
15. L. Trotsky, *War and the International*, 1971, p 34.
16. Ibid., pp 11-12.
17. Ibid., p 18.
18. Ibid., p 24.
19. Ibid., p 39.
20. Ibid., p 76.
21. Ibid., pp 28-29.
22. Ibid., p vii.
23. Ibid.
24. 'In the social production of their existence, men inevitably enter into definite relations, which are independent of their will, namely relations of production appropriate to a given stage in the development of their material forces of production. The

totality of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, upon which arises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions the general processes of social, political and intellectual life...At a certain stage of development, the material productive forces of society come into conflict with the existing relations of production or...with the property relations within the framework of which they have operated hitherto. From forms of development of productive forces these relations turn into their fetters. The changes in the economic foundation lead sooner or later to the transformation of the whole immense superstructure.' (K. Marx, Preface to *A Contribution to a Critique of Political Economy*, Moscow, 1970, pp 20-21.)

25. Trotsky, *War and the International*, p vii.
26. Ibid., p x.
27. Ibid., p viii.
28. Ibid., p x.
29. Ibid., p 73.
30. Ibid., p 75.
31. The translation was not, however, completed without difficulties. In a letter to Mandel and Platten of 4 November 1914 Trotsky recounted that Kotsiolek, the main translator of *War and the International*, was demanding that the pamphlet be printed with his name on the title page as translator and that he receive the correct royalties. Trotsky objected to the first request on two grounds. First, Kotsiolek's translation had been far from perfect and both himself and especially Professor Ragaz had had to make many revisions. Second, 'it would look as if I had written and published the brochure in Russian and for a Russian readership and Comrade Kotsiolek had now translated it for a German readership. It is clear that if this were the case the brochure would lose much of its appeal for the public and many of them would be put off buying it. It would be absolutely inadmissible to hinder the aims of the brochure in this way.' With reference to the second request Trotsky said that he had

already paid Kotsiolek eighty francs, and that he did not oppose Kotsiolek receiving royalties out of any future profits the pamphlet might make. As a compromise solution to the first problem Trotsky suggested that at the end of the text the following reference to Kotsiolek should appear: 'Translated into the German from the original Russian by M. Kotsiolek.' ('Pis'mo L. Trotskogo Mandelu i F. Plattenu po povodu intsidenta s M. Kotsiolekom pri perevode broshyury avtora na nemetskii yazyk', RTsKhIDNI, F. 451, O 1, D. 89).

32. See, for example, L. Trotskii, *Moya Zhizn'*, Moscow, 1991, p 236.

CHAPTER TWO

Trotsky & *Kievskaya Mysl'*

2.1 From Switzerland to Paris

On the 19th of November 1914 Trotsky crossed the French border as war correspondent for the newspaper *Kievskaya Mysl'*. He subsequently summarised his initial impressions of the situation he found in Paris in several texts: first, in 1917 in a series of articles taken 'from a notebook' and published in the Russian émigré newspaper *Novyi Mir'*. These articles were then reprinted by Trotsky, with some additions, in *War and the Revolution*, issued in 1922. Finally, Trotsky included a brief account of his arrival in Paris in his autobiography of the late 1920s, *My Life*. These sources are interesting when juxtaposed, as Trotsky took some sections from the 1917 and 1922 texts and placed them unaltered in his autobiography. Other parts were changed or omitted altogether. One can illustrate this process with the example of Trotsky's explanations of why he accepted the job offer from *Kievskaya Mysl'*. In *War and Revolution* he wrote that 'I accepted *Kievskaya Mysl'*'s offer the more willingly as it gave me the possibility to become better acquainted with France's political life in that critical epoch.'¹ Later, in *My Life*, Trotsky changed the account of his motivation to a 'chance to get closer to war.'²

Whatever the real reason for his acceptance, Trotsky, according to his reminiscences, discovered a subdued Paris:

Paris was sad. The hotels stood empty...There were many women in black everywhere...Children played at war and many of them had been dressed in military uniforms by their mothers. Wounded convalescents with fresh crosses on their chests walked the streets. Old men...talked respectfully and ingratiatingly with them. There were many of those uncompromising supporters of 'war to the finish' who walked the streets then: too young for military service in 1870 and now too old...³

Trotsky describes the mood in his hotel during a Zeppelin attack. Arriving there after walking through the streets during a black-out, in

which he had witnessed a searchlight pointing to the sky from the Eiffel Tower, he found the guests sitting by candles reading, talking, or playing cards. Later the alarm bells rang to signal that the raid was over. Those who had bothered to go to the cellars returned to their floor. Trotsky laconically recounts that, 'on the next day the newspapers said on which part of the town the bombs had fallen and how many people had died.'⁴

However, even when painting such a sombre picture Trotsky did not permit the possibility of workers' unrest to slip totally from view:

the cafes closed towards eight o'clock on an evening. 'What explains the last measure,' I asked people in the know, - 'It's very simple: General Gallieni, the Governor of Paris, does not want the public to gather there. In such an epoch as ours cafes, for the working class who are occupied during the day, can easily become centres for the expression of criticism and dissatisfaction.'⁵

Trotsky was, though, particularly pessimistic about the state of French politics. He spoke of the possibility of a Bonapartist coup d'etat when Joffre's authority stood on the highest possible level after the German attack had been repulsed at Marne. However, for a Bonapartist uprising one needs a Bonapart and, according to Trotsky, 'never had mediocrity reigned so brightly in the Third Republic as at that tragic time.'⁶ For Trotsky, the most prominent politician was Aristide Briand, an 'instigator of bribery and corruption, the clearest mockery of a "great", "national", "liberating war".'⁷ Among the Russian émigrés Trotsky met the light of patriotism shining brightly. The Russian workers in Paris were 'disorientated and confused.'⁸ In his summary of these impressions we find Trotsky at his bleakest:

Individual opposition elements were scattered about here and there, but they showed almost no signs of life. It seemed as if there were no gleams of a better future.⁹

2.2 Trotsky as War Correspondent for *Kievskaya Mysl'*.

Trotsky had previously worked as a war correspondent for *Kievskaya Mysl'* during the Balkan Wars:

At the time of the Balkan Wars, when the imperialist mood had still not captured wide petty-bourgeois circles, including the intelligentsia, I was able on the pages of *Kievskaya Mysl'* to conduct an open struggle against the raids and crimes of the union of diplomats in the Balkans and against that neo-Slav imperialism on the soil of which the Kadet opposition signed an agreement with the third of June monarchy.¹⁰

In *The Prophet Armed* Isaac Deutscher pointed out that Trotsky's writings have either been ignored or given attention depending upon the extent to which they were bound up with his political fortunes.¹¹ He further claimed that if this situation had not been so, then Trotsky would have been given a place in literature on the basis of his contributions for the newspaper *Kievskaya Mysl'* during the First World War.¹² However, although Deutscher was right to draw attention to the *Kievskaya Mysl'* articles, he provided only a brief exposition of these writings.¹³ Moreover, Deutscher's evaluation of the nature of these texts is at variance with that given by Trotsky himself. This difference of opinion has, not surprisingly, been ignored by subsequent Trotsky biographers. After all, Deutscher himself did not realise that his own interpretation was at variance with Trotsky's.¹⁴ This has meant that Trotsky's own view of his writings for the newspaper *Kievskaya Mysl'* during World War One has been overlooked in scholarly accounts of his life; Deutscher's version standing alone as 'orthodoxy'. The rest of this chapter has two aims. First, to fill the lacuna left by Deutscher's exposition. Second, to evaluate the conflicting interpretations of author and biographer.

2.3 Trotsky, Deutscher and *Kievskaya Mysl'*

In the 1922 introduction to *War and Revolution* Trotsky explained why a non-Marxist publication such as *Kievskaya Mysl'* should have hired a Marxist. This he did with reference to the social, political and economic structure of Kiev.¹⁵ According to Trotsky, Kiev had a weak industry and this meant that the class struggle did not take on such an open form there as in places like Petrograd. This, in turn, resulted in a gentry-intelligentsia led democratic opposition movement. This movement

acquired a radical element in response to Tsarist political oppression which, in the Kievan context, had the additional burden of measures directed against nationalities:

This explains the general policy of the editors, who associated themselves neither with Social-Democracy nor with the working class, to set aside a very wide space for Marxist contributors and allow them to explain events, especially foreign, even from a social-revolutionary point of view.¹⁶

From November 1914 to December 1916 Trotsky wrote a total of sixteen articles for *Kievskaya Mysl'*. By the end of this period the newspaper had, according to Trotsky, 'under the pressure of bourgeois social opinion and the prods of social-patriotic contributors gone over to patriotism, aspiring only to preserve "allusions of the great homeland."' ¹⁷

One thus learns that Trotsky was able to continue to work for the newspaper, which had previously hired him at the time of the Balkan Wars, until it changed its character.

Isaac Deutscher, however, makes no such distinction in the nature of the newspaper as it developed over time. Deutscher highlights two particular constraints which Trotsky had placed upon his reportage by becoming an employee of *Kievskaya Mysl'*. First, the newspaper supported the war and this meant that,

Trotsky could tell his readers in Russia only half the truth as he saw it, that half which somehow fitted in with official Russian policy. He tried on occasion to tell it in such a manner that the shrewd reader should guess the suppressed half of the story.¹⁸

This view could be used to explain Trotsky's later reluctance to elaborate on his contributions for *Kievskaya Mysl'* in his autobiography, *My Life*. In *My Life* Trotsky focused exclusively upon his work for the political newspapers *Golos* and *Nashe Slovo*.¹⁹ If Deutscher's view is correct then Trotsky's omission would be understandable. After all, why bother with a series of articles, written for a newspaper over which one had no editorial control, which did not reflect the full range of one's views?²⁰

However, Deutscher's commentary is true of only a tiny proportion of Trotsky's articles. For example, 'The Bosnian Volunteer'

(14.12.1914) does end on an enigmatic note: 'You say that the war has deeper reasons? Certainly, one does not doubt this.'²¹ But on other occasions there is no room for doubt on the author's exact intended meaning. Thus, for example, in 'The Seventh Infantry Regiment in the Belgium Epic' (4&6.3.1915) it is argued that the positions of the pro- and anti-German sections of the Belgian bourgeoisie had nothing to do with the rights of nations, but everything to do with the rights of property:

Could one allow the Germans through Belgium? Nobody permitted this, apart from small commercial and industrial circles who were directly dependent upon German capital. For the peasantry and for the petty-bourgeoisie the issue was absolutely clear: one could not allow the Germans. Certainly this was not because it was contrary to international law but because a German army entering Belgium would not want to leave it. Moreover, an army on the march grabs and ruins everything that it comes across. One had to fight.²²

The economic interests underpinning military action were further illustrated in 'Two Armies' (4.12.1914). Here Trotsky argued that, initially, Germany did not want to attack France and Belgium. These countries posed no economic threat to Germany and Germans could even admire certain aspects of the French 'character'. However, 'sad necessity' dictated the military defeat of France and Belgium in the struggle against 'the deadly enemy of German imperialism, England...one had to defeat France to get to England, and the shortest path to the heart of France was through Belgium.'²³

Moreover, if Trotsky did not always engage in explicit Marxist analysis, he was still able to bring Marxist conclusions to the attention of the reader. For example, in 'From whence it came' (22.3.1915) he highlighted the futility of individual terrorism in the struggle to liberate a nation.²⁴ The division between mental and manual labour under capitalism was criticised in 'War and Technology' (21.12.1915). Trotsky pointed out that the development of the machinery of war takes place in the intellectual atmosphere of laboratories and this deprives research of the actual and real physical test of action, something which happens comparatively rarely:

If the exclusiveness of the division between mental and manual labour shows itself to be strongly negative in all contemporary production, then it shows itself to be directly fatal in the military sphere where arms are applied only in the comparatively short period of war.²⁵

According to Trotsky, one thus enters a situation in which the beginning of a campaign is characterised by the failure of technology going through its first real test. In the course of the war technical problems are continually solved until a full success rate has been achieved by its conclusion. A new period of peace then condemns military inventiveness to return to the laboratory where it is once again subject to the limitations of the division between mental and manual labour. The smooth operation of the best developed technology by the end of one war is totally outdated by the time of the next. Indeed, the article ends by suggesting that the nature of modern technology would like wars to occur more frequently: 'Is one not brought to the conclusion that war happens too rarely for present-day technology?'²⁶

'All Roads Lead to Rome' (20.1.1915) serves to illustrate the futility of religious belief. The article outlines the desires of Catholics of various countries to receive the Pope's blessing for their campaign of national defence. However, the Pope's response is shown to be a series of political manoeuvres with two basic 'unholy' intentions. First, to secure the role of broker in any future peace negotiations for the Pope. Second, to attain maximum advantage in such negotiations for the papacy: 'in such a way universal neutrality is turned into a tool of political bargaining.'²⁷

The primacy of social conflict was the subject of Trotsky's first article of 20 November 1914. Here he discussed the war as a political moratorium; a temporary suspension of national contradictions which would once again resurface. He presented this thought through an analysis of Austria-Hungary, although his underlying idea could easily be generalised as true for many countries. He begins by describing a patriotic demonstration outside the War Ministry in Vienna on 2nd August and asking what made people behave in this way. After all, Austria-Hungary, unlike Switzerland and the United States, had not successfully solved the problem of nationality in a multi-national state.

The Swiss population might be split in loyalty towards France and Germany, but if either country attacked Switzerland then all cantons would rush to its defence. For Trotsky, this was due to the fact that life in Switzerland offered so many advantages. The same could not be said of Austria-Hungary. Formed as a central-European defence against Turkey, the Austro-Hungarian state had not yet fallen prey to the centrifugal tendencies that had destroyed Turkey for two negative reasons: the weaknesses of the various nationalities and the strength of reactionary forces. Furthermore, this situation also prevented Austria-Hungary from becoming another Switzerland:

It is true that capitalism brings about a meeting of tendencies to economic unification. But the capitalist development of Austria, exhausted by landowners and militarism, developed very slowly. A real exit for the Danube peoples onto the great historical road would be the reconstruction of their state structure on the Swiss model: not only would this make Austria-Hungary invulnerable, it would also turn it into a focus of overwhelming attraction for all those national fragments spread along its periphery. But the cultural backwardness of a large part of the population and especially those reactionary historical forces which today are still the bearers of the Austro-Hungarian state stand as obstacles to the path of regeneration. Hence the national chaos which forms the internal life of the Danube monarchy.²⁸

In the absence of positive feelings towards the state Trotsky focused on two factors in explaining the rise of patriotic feelings. First, war breaks the normal routines of life. In such a worrying situation the state - armed from head to foot - seems to be the most stable institution to which one can turn for comfort. Second, in the immense changes which war causes people hope for the better, the state becomes the repository of these hopes. However, Trotsky made it clear that this harmony between the population and the state would only be temporary. His warning to patriots and to any supporters of the existing order was clear; national and social contradictions would return:

In relation to the first epoch of the war placing one's hopes on radical, national and social movements...was, at root, unfounded when the government, even while shaking completely from

centrifugal forces which it had only managed to suppress mechanically, immediately became master of the situation...Mobilisation and the declaration of war appear to wipe all national and social contradictions in the country from the face of the earth. But this is only an historical adjournment, a political moratorium. The promissory note has been rewritten for a new time, but they will still have to pay for it...²⁹

In the biographical essay 'Jean Jaurès' (12.7.1915) Trotsky clearly delineated reformist and revolutionary approaches to the solution of social conflict. Reformism is shown to be a compromise with the bourgeoisie which had not been able to prevent neither the exploitation of the workers nor the outbreak of war. However, according to Trotsky, the war amounted to a break with the previous era of conservatism and reform. The future belonged to revolution:

The working classes, in the last decades grasping the idea of socialism, are only now in the terrible ordeals of war acquiring a revolutionary temper. We are entering a period of unprecedented revolutionary tremors. From out of its ranks new organisations will be advanced by the masses and new leaders will stand at its head...When the European revolution turns to the liquidation of the war it, along the way, will also open the secret of Jaurès' death to us.³⁰

Even in seemingly neutral, factual accounts Trotsky managed to include something related to Marxism. For instance, the problem of class is raised in the short biography of the commander-in-chief of the British forces, Sir John French. Ireland, French's place of birth, is referred to as that place where 'landlords rule over an emaciated country like demi-gods, where in the ruling strata there reigns a most conducive atmosphere for raising military leaders of the old "heroic" type.'³¹

In 'Two Armies' Trotsky compared the economic and social origins of the German and French armies and how this affected their respective strategies. For Trotsky, the German army possessed the mightier technology, a reflection of Germany's higher level of capitalist development: '...in the last analysis war techniques are dependent upon a country's general technical-industrial development.'³² However,

militarism is not only technology, but also the skill of humans who control the machinery. According to Trotsky, Germany also had an advantage in the field of human resources. This was in two senses. First, again as a result of its industrial development, Germany had a greater quantity of workers who, as a class, were 'not only more intelligent and more able to adapt to conditions than peasants, but had greater powers of endurance.'³³ A second, and more important factor, was the German officer class; a united group whose whole lives and thoughts were dedicated to the practice of war. German social development had, for Trotsky, been characterised by a lack of revolutionary traditions and the late development of a strong and independent bourgeoisie. The tasks of capitalist development had therefore been handed to the Junkers:

The liberal bourgeoisie did not go beyond the boundaries of a 'loyal opposition', forever commissioning the Junkers to bring order into the capitalist society and spreading its military might. Finally, when capitalist development placed new tasks of a world character before the German bourgeoisie it, as before, commissioned the Junkers united around the monarchy to lead the military nation.³⁴

This, in turn, led to the development of an offensive strategy:

All German strategy was built on attack. This corresponds to the basic conditions of Germany's social development: to the rapid growth of the population and richness on the one hand and to the backward state structure on the other. The German Junkers have a "will to power" and in directing this will the nation provides the highest technology and qualified human material.³⁵

France, according to Trotsky, had a totally different tradition and had thus developed a different strategy. Formed through a series of revolutionary periods France's petty-bourgeois republican régime did not consider itself to be compatible with the foundation of a standing army. However, the petty-bourgeois radicals thought one needed some type of army to guarantee order. So, an army was retained but in conditions of disputes over which exact form its military organisation should take and without the status of the German army. Thus, there arose a situation which Jaurès called 'the bastard regime', in which old

and new forms collided and neutralised each other. The former French major Drian is cited as comparing a German army united in the spirit of attack and a French army whose officers were split in a struggle between monarchists and masons. Furthermore, Drian declared that the masons had separated the state and the church and had thus deprived the French army of the psychological cement of religion. For Trotsky, all of this had the consequence that France developed a defensive strategy which corresponded to its social structure:

The country's petty-bourgeois and strongly conservative economic structure did not permit imperialist desires on a world scale. A halting population growth demanded caution in relation to human material.³⁶

The second constraint which Deutscher pinpoints follows on from the first. As *Kievskaya Mysl'* supported official Russian policy Trotsky was forced to focus upon a critique of Germany:

in his articles he had to tack about cautiously to avoid a breach with the paper. The Kievan editor was only too glad to publish the Paris correspondent's denunciations of German imperialism, but his criticisms of the Entente were unwelcome.³⁷

However, Trotsky did write about the problems of the Entente and in such a way that could not have been particularly reassuring for those who supported it. Moreover, the newspaper did publish these contributions. For instance, the 'Japanese Question' (6.1.1915) portrays a desperate France in dispute over whether it should enlist Japanese help in the immense task of forcing German troops from its territory. The problems facing the French government were not only related to how much compensation they would have to give to Japan and if they could afford it, but also concerned the fact that they did not have total control over this issue. Apart from inability to meet any demands that Japan might set, there existed only two paths for any Japanese forces travelling to Europe: by land across Russia and by sea under British protection. However, 'Japan has formal ties only with Britain and...it is precisely Britain who is less than others interested in quickening the pace of military operations.'³⁸ Moreover, if Trotsky did have a bias, then he also gave an explicit warning to his readers to be wary of war reports for this very reason:

The correspondent himself is not objective. He is a passionate agent in this drama: a national wire between the battle and society. He aims to cheer up his own people and to terrorise the enemy. Correspondents paint their judgements, conclusions and factual accounts in certain colours.³⁹

Furthermore, if the role of the First World War correspondents was to boost national morale then Trotsky certainly did not fulfil his duties. Morale could hardly have been increased by the following description of a war-weary Europe after 12 months of hostilities:

I remembered clearly that cold autumn morning when I arrived in France from Switzerland. Then the war was still new...people were a lot more generous than they are now. In the past months everybody has become poorer in money, enthusiasm and hopes - the rich mourn. Then, in that autumn...everyone spoke anxiously about the winter campaign and of hopes for a great spring offensive...Winter and spring came and now summer is already rushing towards autumn. Once again people in wagons and in families talk anxiously about the coming winter.⁴⁰

In several articles Trotsky wrote moving accounts of the horrors of war, both for civilians and for soldiers. In, for example, 'The Seventh Infantry Regiment in the Belgium Epic' the military career of a Belgian law student, De Baer, provides the background against which Trotsky presents a brilliant exposition of human lives thrown into turmoil by the fall of Belgium. The article begins by portraying the university town of Leuven - small, quiet, provincial. There the happy, moderately hard working De Baer studied law. The war caught him totally unawares; at that time procrastinating over whether to join the ruling clerics or the liberal opposition. However, at this stage confidence was high that, together with the French, the Belgians would reach Berlin in several weeks. These illusions were soon shattered in the face of rapid German victories. In depicting De Baer's first taste of battle and a defeated army on the retreat, Trotsky vividly illustrates the cruelties of war. During the hostilities around the town of Aerskot De Baer stumbles across a dead woman: 'both breasts were cut off, below the stomach was a gaping wound.'⁴¹ Over the next months the regiment retreated, engaged on several occasions with the enemy, was promised rest and

then immediately recalled to battle, and was even once victorious. In retreat the army was in confusion, feeling shame for what they were leaving behind:

A stream of retreating army mixed with a whirlpool of people full of desperation...Women roamed the town carrying children...An old woman, loudly wailing, pushed an armchair with an old paralysed man in it...Children ran between the soldiers ranks, crying and searching for their parents..."Colonel!", cried a grey clean-shaven old man..., "you are leaving us to the tyranny of the Germans!" The colonel...silently moved ahead.⁴²

For De Baer his personal fate had fallen along with that of his country. What use would a knowledge of Belgian law be in a country dominated by Germany? However, this mood was soon to be replaced by one of self-preservation. Surviving while his comrades fell De Baer was tortured by the thought of whether he would be one part of that group of people who survived war without a scratch: his life was ruled by this 'law of statistics.' This turned out to be the case but, in the meantime, he was a witness to the dehumanising experience of war. As a law-student De Baer was twice called-upon to defend soldiers accused of a breach of discipline. One of those he defended (Ekkhaut) was acquitted and later befriended De Baer in the trenches. At night it was cold and while the soldiers slept, anxiously awaiting a German attack, Ekkhaut would carefully cover De Baer with half of his clothes. On the dawn of their last day in the trenches in Izer, De Baer was suddenly awoken by the familiar sound of attack. He sensed a movement to his right and he recoiled in horror: 'under the shared clothes lay Ekkhaut's motionless body: the bullet had entered right between his eyes leaving a small accurate hole.'⁴³ The craters left by enemy shells would be modified into graves by the same shovels that had dug the trenches. When the Germans attacked De Baer shot mechanically at a seemingly mechanic procession of bodies moving towards him: 'it did not have anything tragic in itself because there was already nothing human in it.'⁴⁴ After losing his glasses in battle De Baer was sent to a military hospital. There it was discovered that he was too short-sighted for military service and he was discharged. The dead bodies, danger and filth of the trenches were behind him. Trotsky

stressed the futility of war in reporting the final reward that De Baer received for his courage: 'A new life started for De Baer. He roamed without connections, almost dishevelled and always hungry...'⁴⁵

Trench warfare was a new phenomenon and Trotsky devoted several (negative) articles to this subject. In 'Fortresses or Trenches?' (1.10.1915) he addressed the question of whether the trenches had replaced the medieval fortresses of old. Reviewing opinions both for and against, Trotsky argued that modern warfare had rendered fortresses anachronistic in two ways. First, as witnessed in Northern France and Belgium, it was able to reduce them to rubble. Second, one needed large stocks of shells to protect a fortress. Trenches also demanded huge quantities of shells, but from the attacking side only. Trotsky painted a picture of future wars in which underground defences would play an even greater role: 'a refuge, warehouses, workshops, electrical stations...spread along a wide space...not open to heavy enemy artillery fire.'⁴⁶ In the meantime, the triumph of the trenches was so clear that both militarists and pacifists worshipped them:

One [pacifist], apparently Swiss, arrived at the happy thought that one could abolish war if one strengthened the state borders with trenches protected by mighty electrical currents. The poor golden pacifist who seeks refuge in the trenches!⁴⁷

In 'The Trenches' (20.9.1915) Trotsky moved from a macro-analysis of the general role of trenches in war to a micro-view of the everyday life of the soldiers in them. This experience is portrayed as one of physical and mental monstrosity. The trenches are described as 'decisive boundaries, the smallest crossing of which by either side is paid for with numerous victims.'⁴⁸ Constructed from whatever material at hand ('tree trunks...haversacks filled with earth, greatcoats of dead Germans'⁴⁹) the trenches become an underground 'temporary sanctuary.'⁵⁰ Trotsky answered the cries of the French press that the Germans had forced the French into 'disgusting dumps' by stressing that soldiers from all nations shared a similar experience: 'the originality of the national genius is still safeguarded by one field: the French sit in the trenches like the Germans, like the Russians, like the Italians.'⁵¹ Arriving at the trenches the soldier enters the zone of military danger,

his closest contact with the enemy. This in itself induces order into the ranks; all thoughts are of self-preservation:

Here, in the trenches, there is very little thought about the general tasks of the war and, although this may seem paradoxical, even less about the enemy. Certainly the enemy trenches which send death...are always at the centre of the soldier's attention. But here he thinks not about Germany, not about the Emperors's plans, not of German exports, not of the historical enemy - he thinks of the pieces of lead or metal from which one has to save oneself and return the compliment to the enemy trenches...The enemy lives the same life, experiences common events with the same feelings...In incessant struggle they imitate one another: raising periscope against periscope, grenade against grenade...Equally uncertain whom destiny promises to blow-up first.⁵²

The trenches and the war become so intertwined that the removal of the former leads to the cessation of the latter. For example, Trotsky quotes from a Russian volunteer's letter - written at the time of the July floods - which reports how all soldiers, as if in silent agreement, did not fire at each other. It was only after the common task of pumping out the water and returning to the trenches had been completed that the war resumed.

The trenches are also the means by which the soldier orientates himself. After a period of time and increasing familiarity the soldier looks upon the trench 'not only as a defence, but also as a flat.'⁵³ If enemy fire is not too heavy then one company can occupy the same trench for a long period and life becomes regulated. For each soldier this underground life induces feelings of isolation. According to Trotsky, these feelings are expressed in two ways. First, a process already observed in barracks, prisons and boarding-houses. The soldiers develop their own language to describe old and new phenomena as they appear to them from the point of view of their own trench. Fresh soldiers from the latest levy are called 'Marie-Louise'; the biggest enemy shells are labelled 'pots' and so on. Second, the soldiers become self-centred and feel themselves to be cut-off from civilian life. Letters from home awaken half-forgotten thoughts and anxieties. However, the trenches soon recapture their thoughts and domestic

concerns are blotted out. Trotsky follows a group of soldiers home on leave to illustrate the extent of the psychological effects of trench warfare on the soldier to the reader:

In the family, in the home village...despite all joy at not meeting danger they do not feel right. There is no longer that former equanimity between them and home. Psychological contact is not immediately renewed...The four days soon pass...the returning soldiers meet their comrades. They chatter about leave but the trenches have already captured their thoughts. They talk about them, remember and foresee. Isolation absorbs them more psychologically than they are physically entrapped in it.⁵⁴

Trotsky often focussed upon the psychological effects of war. His article entitled 'The Psychological Mysteries of the War' (11.9.1915) is perhaps his strongest attack on the futility of the then current events. He argues that individuals had had no control over the origins of the war. Indeed, people had struggled to come to terms with a reality thrust upon them:

...great events do not arise from the springs of consciousness but, on the contrary, events arise from the combinations, mutual actions and intersections of great objective historical forces, only later forcing our inert, lazy psychology...to accommodate itself to them. All the united voices of guns and rifles cry out this fact in the fate of contemporary culture and nations in general...The war came without their knowledge and against their consciousness: it revealed itself to them and subordinated to itself not only the whole material-social life in all of its complexity but also the nation's spirit of survival, separate social groups, small collectives and individuals, the feelings and thoughts of the rulers and the ruled...workers' organisations and universities, mothers and lovers.⁵⁵

According to Trotsky, all of this amounted to nothing less than the waste of a whole generation of creative talent:

Current events have...placed the question of those degenerations, which have occurred and are occurring in the psychological light of the European nations, its most lively and artistic generation which is presently entrapped in...divisions...and

through barracks, depots, camps, and trenches go through all the stages which bring them closer to the focus of contemporary events: to physical clashes with the enemy, attacks, defence, retreat, so that part of one's cadres can be crossed-out from the books of the living and the other part, through medical textbooks, field hospitals and homes for convalescents again return to society blinded, armless and legless...⁵⁶

2.4 Conclusion

Trotsky's articles for *Kievskaya Mysl'* not only covered a wide range of topics - war and technology, religion, psychology, biography, the origins of history etc. - they were also rich in anti-war sentiment. Moreover, he was able to write from a Marxist perspective. It is true that Trotsky published his more overtly political and polemical writings on, for example, social-patriotism among 'Left' groupings in *Golos* and *Nashe Slovo*; but then such articles were more suited to the nature of those newspapers. A survey of his contributions published in *Kievskaya Mysl'* support Trotsky's own claim that he was able to write freely for the newspaper until it went totally over to the side of patriotism, rather than Deutscher's account of a Trotsky continually forced into half-truths. The next chapter will examine what effect, if any, the censor in Paris had upon Trotsky's writings for the Russian internationalist press published in the French capital.

However, before moving on, it is worth noting that Trotsky's work as war reporter for *Kievskaya Mysl'* was also significant for his future career as military commander. It is true the Trotsky's first stint as war correspondent for the Ukrainian newspaper of 1912-13 afforded him better opportunities to become acquainted with war; in 1914 *Kievskaya Mysl'* did not demand that he accompany the army to the front, nor were war correspondents permitted to do so by the authorities. However, he was able to visit Marseilles, Menton, Boulogne and Calais where he spoke with British and Belgian soldiers about their experiences of battle.⁵⁷ It was this knowledge of war and its participants which was later used by the founder and leader of the Red Army in the Russian Civil War.

Notes

1. L. Trotskii, *Voina i Revolyutsiya*, Vol. 1, Petrograd, 1922, pp 10-11.
2. L. Trotskii, *Moya zhizn'*, Moscow, 1991, p 237.
3. Trotskii, Op. cit., p 157.
4. Ibid., p 158.
5. Ibid., p 157.
6. Ibid., p 159.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid., p 11.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid., p 10.
11. I. Deutscher, *The Prophet Armed*, Oxford, 1954, p 230.
12. Ibid.
13. For Deutscher's exposition see, *The Prophet Armed*, pp 227-232.
14. Thus, Deutscher does not refer to the text where Trotsky expounds his view on his contributions to *Kievskaya Mysl'*. If Deutscher had been aware of Trotsky's view then surely he would have referred to it. The following Trotsky biographers do not provide an exposition of the *Kievskaya Mysl'* articles: J. Carmichael, *Trotsky: An Appreciation of his Life*, London, 1975; T. Cliff, *Trotsky 1879-1917. Towards October*, London, 1989; I. Howe, *Trotsky*, (Sussex, 1978); B. Knei-Paz, *The Social and Political Thought of Leon Trotsky*, Oxford, 1978; R. Segal, *The Tragedy of Leon Trotsky*, Harmondsworth, 1983; and R. Wistrich, *Trotsky: Fate of a Revolutionary*, London, 1979. A recent Soviet biography, by Dmitri Volkogonov, repeats Deutscher's interpretation but without any exposition of the *Kievskaya Mysl'* writings as supporting evidence: "It is true that Trotsky was forced to display maximum shrewdness: *Kievskaya Mysl'* was for the war, for war until victory. It willingly published critical articles of Germany and unwillingly, with cuts, those that referred to the Entente." (D. Volkogonov, 'Lev Trotskii.

Politicheskii portret.', *Oktyabr'*, 6, 1991, p 159.)

Pierre Broué, who also provides no exposition of Trotsky's *Kievskaya Mysl'* articles, claims that the intervention of the censor meant that Trotsky's war reportage for the Kievan newspaper was not serious: '...his calling as a press correspondent did not absorb him completely, in so far as his employer gave in quite to the pressures of the censorship and in practice absolved him from the task of writing serious articles which would not have any chance of being published.' (P. Broué, *Trotsky*, Paris, 1988, p 147). However, Trotsky never complained that his articles for *Kievskaya Mysl'* had been censored.

15. Trotskii, *Voina i Revolyutsiya*, Vol. 1, p 10. Yu. V. Got'e's diary of 1918, recently reprinted by *Voprosy istorii*, contains the following interesting reference to Trotsky's gathering of the *Kievskaya Mysl'* articles for publication in *Voina i Revolyutsiya*: '7/20 April. Yesterday there appeared in the Museum a person of short height, with a Southern accent and a turned-up nose who, it turned out, was Mrs Trotsky. She wished to receive *Kievskaya Mysl'* for 1915 and 1916 for her 'husband'; she was very polite. I informed her that certain formalities were necessary to which she agreed. She appeared today, well dressed but tastelessly, in a car with a soldier who stood to attention before her. She received her *Kievskaya Mysl'* in return for a letter, 'To Citizen Librarian of the Rumyantsev Museum, Professor Yu. V. Got'e' in which, with all the bourgeois conventions such as 'I have the honour to request' and 'I beg you to accept my assurance', Mr Trotsky asked about the issuing of journals to him (as in the original) for no longer than two weeks.' (Yu. V. Got'e, 'Moi zametki', *Voprosy istorii*, 11, 1991, p 151.)
16. Trotskii, *Ibid.*
17. *Ibid.*, p 11.
18. Deutscher, *The Prophet Armed*, p 228.
19. Trotskii, *Moya zhizn'*, pp 237 ff.
20. This version becomes even more appealing when one considers the context in which Trotsky wrote his autobiography. By the end of the 1920s his main concern was to show his Leninist

pedigree. His work for *Golos* and *Nashe Slovo* had a direct bearing on this, whereas his writings for *Kievskaya Mysl'* did not.

21. L. Trotskii, 'Bosnyak-volonter', *Evropa v Voine, Sochineniya*, Vol. 9, Moscow, 1927, p 17.
22. "'Sed'moi pekhotnyi" v bel'giskoi epopee', *Ibid.*, p 10. See also 'On the North-West' (12.7.1915) in which the idea that the war was about the right of nations is rejected through a discussion of Italy: "The nation and the War! But, sir, this is your all-European mistake when you talk of the Italian nation. There is no Italian nation." ('Na severo-zapad', *Ibid.*, p 23).
23. 'Dve armii', *Ibid.*, p 7.
24. 'Otkuda poshlo?', *Ibid.*, pp 49-58.
25. 'Voina i tekhnika', *Ibid.*, p 190.
26. 'Voina i tekhnika', *Ibid.*, p 191.
27. 'Vse dorogi vedut v Rim', *Ibid.*, p 20.
28. 'Politicheskii moratorium', *Ibid.*, p 5.
29. 'Politicheskii moratorium', *Ibid.*, pp 5-6.
30. L. Trotskii, 'Zhan' Zhores', *Gody velikago pereloma. (Lyudi staroi i novoi epokh')*, Moscow, 1919, pp 128-129. Trotsky also raised the issues of reformism, revolution and internationalism in several other biographical pieces. See, for example, 'Rakovsky and Kolarov' (23.10.1915), ('Kh. Rakovskii i V. Kolarov', *Ibid.*, pp 60-65); 'Ledebour and Hoffman' (25.10.1915) ('Ledebur', Hoffman', *Ibid.*, pp 78-83); and Trotsky's final contribution to *Kievskaya Mysl'* 'An Epoch is Passing' (22.12.1915) ('Otkhodit' epokha', *Ibid.*, pp 143-151). Given that these articles appeared towards the end of Trotsky's work for the Kievan newspaper Deutscher's conclusion that 'he [Trotsky] confined himself more and more to reportage and strictly military surveys' (Deutscher, *The Prophet Armed*, p 228) does not appear to be convincing.
31. Trotskii, 'French', *Evropa v Voine*, p 27.
32. 'Dve armii', *Ibid.*, p. 8.
33. *Ibid.*, p 9.
34. *Ibid.*, p 11.
35. *Ibid.*, p 13.

36. Ibid.
37. Deutscher, *The Prophet Armed*, pp 227-228.
38. Trotskii, "'Yaponskii" vopros', *Evropa v Voine*, p 33.
39. 'Psikhologicheskie zagadki voiny', Ibid., p 247.
40. 'Na severo-zapad', Ibid., p 26.
41. "'Sed'moi pekhotnyi" v bel'giskoi epopee', Ibid., p 61.
42. Ibid., p 64.
43. Ibid., p 71.
44. Ibid., p 69.
45. Ibid., p 74.
46. 'Krepost' ili transheya?', Ibid., p 195.
47. Ibid., p 196. In the sentence preceding the beginning of this quote, 'The triumph of the trench is so obvious that not only specialists of militarism bow down before it but also - and this might appear as paradoxical at first sight - pacifists.' (Ibid.) Deutscher mistranslated 'trench' as 'the French'. In his attempt to make sense of why Trotsky should have used 'the French' in this context Deutscher totally changed the meaning of Trotsky's article. He did this by relating 'the French' to the Maginot Line and inserting the words 'in defence' into his translation to make the passage concur with his reading: 'In a sarcastic aside he [Trotsky - IDT] dismissed in advance the illusion of the Maginot Line as it was beginning to emerge from the French experience in World War I. "The triumph of the French [in defence] is so evident that not only military experts bow to it, but also...pacifists."' (Deutscher, *The Prophet Armed*, p 229).
48. 'Transheya', *Evropa v Voine*, p 196.
49. Ibid., p 197.
50. Ibid.
51. Ibid.
52. Ibid., pp 200-202.
53. Ibid., p 198.
54. Ibid., pp 202-203.
55. 'Psikhologicheskie zagadki voiny', Ibid., p 245. The absence of the conscious control of events by individuals was also mentioned by Trotsky in 'Otkhodit' epokha', Trotskii, *Gody*

velikago pereloma, p 148.

56. 'Psikhologicheskie zagadki voiny', *Evropa v Voine*, p 245.

57. Broué, Trotsky, p 147.

CHAPTER THREE

Trotsky and the Censor in Paris during World War One

3.1 Introduction

On the 12th of November 1914 Leon Trotsky crossed the French border as war correspondent for the newspaper *Kievskaya Mysl'*. However, the vast majority of his journalistic writings of his stay in Paris during World War One did not appear in the Ukrainian publication, but in *Golos* and its successors, *Nashe Slovo* and *Nachalo*; socialist newspapers produced by Russian émigrés residing in the French capital. *Nashe Slovo* contains the richest store of Trotsky's writings of this period: it survived longer than its predecessor and successor, and its production coincided with Trotsky's time in Paris.

In *The Prophet Armed* Trotsky's most famous and most influential biographer gave the following account of *Nashe Slovo*:

Nashe Slovo began to appear on 29 January 1915. This was a modest sheet of two, rarely four, pages abundantly strewn with white spaces marking the censor's deletions, and yet packed with news and comment. The paper was constantly in danger of being killed off by the censor and by its own poverty.¹

Deutscher's emphasis upon the censor's far from helpful interference followed Trotsky's own interpretation. In the introduction to *War and Revolution*, for example, Trotsky mentioned two particular difficulties in the production of a radical Russian newspaper in war time France; first fiscal and second the censor:

The newspaper was published with great material and technical difficulties. Before the issue of the first number there were approximately 30 francs in Antonov's and Manuil'skii's 'cash register'. It goes without saying that not one so-called common sensical man could have believed that one could have published a daily revolutionary newspaper with this basic 'capital'; especially in conditions of war, chauvinist fury and the censor's brutality.²

In turn, when Trotsky came to write his autobiography at the end of the 1920s he said of *Nashe Slovo*, 'under the blows of deficit and the censor, disappearing and soon appearing under a new name, the newspaper survived in the course of 2 years, i.e., until the 1917 February Revolution.'³ And thus the matter has stood until this day; Deutscher's and Trotsky's claims about the censor have not been examined.

However, some of the articles which were completely or partly censored when they were sent for approval were later published in fuller form when the two volume *War and Revolution* was issued in Moscow and Petrograd between 1922-1924. When Trotsky gathered his writings of the First World War period he obviously checked their contents for suitability of publication. It was most likely during this task that he seized the opportunity of filling in some of the gaps left by the censor's white marks. This was probably a hit and miss process. Trotsky was proud of his excellent memory,⁴ but even he could not reconstruct all of the censored articles as exact reproductions of their original. When one compares the versions published in *War and Revolution* against *Nashe Slovo* one can see that the text subsequently inserted by Trotsky is not equal to that removed by the censor.

However, despite the fact that Trotsky's reconstructions are not as accurate as one would like, his efforts do enable us to do several things. First, we learn what Trotsky wanted to say to his readership at the time but was prevented from doing so. Second, we can check whether the censor cut certain themes consistently. We thus enter the mind of the censor and discover what he considered to be 'sensitive' subjects. Third, because Trotsky left some articles in their cut versions, we can see if we can make any sense of what remains. This should lead us to draw some conclusions about the overall effectiveness of the censor, and thus test Deutscher's and Trotsky's 'orthodoxy'.

3.2 Trotsky and the Censor

The governments of warring nations not surprisingly like to ensure that only the most optimistic reports of military operations reach the civilian

population and soldiers in combat. The fact that this consideration ranked high on the censor's list of sensitive subjects can be deduced from the alterations made to several of Trotsky's pessimistic evaluations of the state of the war.

In, 'The Key to the Position', for example, the censor cut the statement that the Russian assault on the Galician front would not alter the general stalemate.⁵ Moreover, the censor was so keen to avoid any recognition that Europe had fallen into a hopeless situation that he deleted sentences expressing this thought, even when their absence did not prevent the essential point from being made. Thus, in the same contribution, Trotsky discussed the possibility of American intervention as the deciding factor, guaranteeing the victory of one side over the other. At the outset of this section the censor cut the thought that the European powers were turning to America in self-recognition of their own powerlessness:

[In consciousness of that terrible dead-end into which the war has gone], in the past few months the ruling groups and parties of Europe have again concentrated their gaze on America.⁶

Trotsky then explained why America would not involve itself in the war by reference to the profits American capital was making: 'Europe is breaking-up and America is enriching itself.'⁷ However when, in the concluding sentences, he summarised this argument by linking it to a Europe floundering in a hopeless blood bath, the censor once again reached for his eraser:

[while the American bourgeoisie has the opportunity of warming its hands on Europe's bones it will not alter its attitude. 'The key to the position' in America? But in the meanwhile it thinks that the most advantageous position for it is supporting the bloody European dead-end.]⁸

In other instances the censor seemed more perturbed by the strength of the language employed than by the message Trotsky was attempting to express. In 'A Year of War' the censor revealed his sensitiveness to harsh critiques of capitalism's responsibility for Europe's hopeless military situation. It was the use of the word dead-end (*tupik*) that the censor most objected to:

On the Gallipoli peninsula, as on the new Austro-Italian front, the line of the trenches was immediately designated [as a line of military hopelessness]...In this picture [brought about by the blind automanism of capitalist forces and the conscious dishonourableness of the ruling classes]...[The European strategic situation gives a mechanical expression of that historical dead-end into which the capitalist forces have driven themselves].⁹

Nevertheless, despite these cuts, Trotsky was still able to put across his less than optimistic appraisal of the state of the war and his moral condemnation of the ruling class:

In this picture...there are no decisive points of support which, from the military point of view, would permit one to connect any plans and hopes for a decisive victory for one of the sides. Even if the European ruling forces had as much historical good will as they do evil, then even then they would be powerless to resolve by their means those problems which brought about the war.¹⁰

If the censor was unreceptive to overtly harsh condemnations of the war situation, he was also careful to avoid allowing discussion of the likely spoils of the war to appear in print. This applied at a general as well as at a specific level. Thus, in an appraisal of the group centred around *Nasha Zarya*, the censor cut Trotsky's sarcastic response to the claim that the Entente was fighting for the most worthy aims:

One has to find that group of powers whose victory would be more beneficial for world development. So judge the authors of the document analysed by us. [Such a group of powers turns out, by a fortuitous concurrence of circumstances, to be the 'Western democracies' in struggle with the 'Junker monarchies.' Tsarism? It acts as a subsidiary force of democracy]...This...is the official French point of view...Theoretically and politically this is a return to the most banal ideological democratism - without social flesh, without historical perspectives, and without a trace of the materialist dialectic.¹¹

A reader of the above passage would not have known what view Trotsky was criticising. In a report of Milyukov's visit to Paris of May 1916 Trotsky was prevented from referring to negotiations between the

Entente powers concerning Russia's claims to Constantinople, the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles:

[April 1915 remains as a memorable date in Russian history, for in this month our relations with the allies about the Straits were precisely regulated: in the world struggle the East was put aside to our advantage (nous a été assigné comme domaine)]¹²

The fact that France was allied to Russia and Great Britain also had consequences for what the censor would look for when he checked an article for publication. The French censor was keen to expunge any remarks which may have caused embarrassment to people engaged in the leading posts of the Allied governments. In 'Wonders the Wise did not dream of' an accusation that the Russian ambassador in Paris had had a hand in the appearance of an announcement in *Intransigent* attacking *Nashe Slovo* was appropriately cut.¹³ On other occasions the censor removed references to the '[ungovernable appetite of Tsarist diplomacy]';¹⁴ and while the censor was happy to see Trotsky criticise the imperialism of the Central Powers, he did not permit similar remarks about Russia: 'If Austro-Germany seizes Poland, this is imperialism by them; [if Russia seizes Galicia or Armenia, this is national liberation of the oppressed.]'¹⁵

The censor's alterations did not protect only Russia. On two occasions Trotsky's remarks concerning Lloyd-George did not appear in print. The first time Trotsky was discussing accusations that the Russian socialists in Paris were panGermanists: '[But see we are not for Syria and we are not for Constantinople. But see we are not with Lloyd-George and we are not with Plekhanov.]'¹⁶ On the second occasion Trotsky's prognosis of the overthrow of Lloyd-George in the wake of the Dublin Uprising was deleted:

The historical role of the Irish proletariat is only beginning...[This rebellion from now on will not fade away. On the contrary, it finds a response across the whole of Great Britain...Lloyd-George's executions will be severely revenged by those same workers who Henderson now attempts to chain to the bloody wheels of imperialism.]¹⁷

This, of course, left France itself and the censor's patriotism was an undoubted criterion for resolving what to erase. The censor twice

deleted uncomplimentary references to 'bourgeois France' helping tsarism to crush the 1905 Russian revolution.¹⁸ However, the censor objected most of all to any critique of the French government during the war. Thus, for instance, in 'A Convent of Confusion and Hopelessness' the censor removed the following appraisal of the sorry state of French democracy:

[However, the historical development of the last decades has finally undermined the social foundation of democracy. Imperialism is not compatible with it. And because it is stronger than it, it has ravaged it. The formal universal general rights give us a parliament, parliament gives us a ministry; but the ministry has now fallen into the mess of secret diplomatic obligations, the bank's influence and the will of finance capital, which showed its political face at the elections, reigns. Clemenceau is not happy with the powerless parliament.]¹⁹

But in the light of Clemenceau's then opposition to the French government for its poor conduct of war policy, Trotsky's portrayal of Clemenceau as an opportunist was allowed to appear in *Nashe Slovo*:

The utopian thought that capitalist imperialism should subordinate itself to the democratic regime is, however, completely alien to the 'Jacobin' Clemenceau. He wants to preserve only a democratic shell, the rejection of which would be too risky an experiment for the French bourgeoisie, and at the same time he attempts to use the parliamentary mechanism for a struggle with the excesses or deficiencies of militarism.²⁰

The censor's desire to protect the French government's image of a government of national unity impinged upon Trotsky's account of Longuetism. The Longuetists derived their name from Jean Longue (1876-1938), son of Charles Longue and Jenny Marx, editor of *Le Populaire* and leader of the pacifist minority of the French Socialist Party. The censor was quite content for Trotsky's critique of Longuetism to see the light of day, but the Longuetists' demand for French Socialist Party leaders to resign from their ministerial portfolios was kept in the dark:

Hence the necessity for the Longuetists to advance a new programme. [Now they insist - with that indecisiveness that

composes their nature - on the exit of socialists from the composition of the French government. However] undoubtedly logic and thoroughness is not on the side of the Longuetists; a party which supports the war and participates in the union sacrée has no principled foundations to refuse to serve in the government.²¹

In making the above alteration the censor managed to publicise the view of the French Socialist Party leadership without affording a similar service to the Longuetists; work he must have been proud of.

During the First World War contact between citizens of the warring nations was outlawed. This meant that any socialist in Paris who wanted to report efforts to retain links with comrades in the Central Powers would most likely collide with restrictions to be imposed by the censor. This was certainly behind the prohibition placed upon any immediate reference to the Zimmerwald Conference of September 1915, while one of Trotsky's reports on the proceedings of the Second Zimmerwald Conference was also censored.²² Although it was possible to mention Zimmerwald by name by October 1915, in the summer of 1916 the censor was still attempting to ensure that only negative accounts of Zimmerwald appeared in *Nashe Slovo*. He did this by cutting any specific piece of information Trotsky might want to pass on to the reader while leaving Trotsky's general position intact. Thus, Trotsky's use of Karl Liebknecht's campaign against social-patriotism on both sides of the Rhine was cut from his rejoinder of August 1916 to representations of Zimmerwald as 'Pan-German intrigue'.²³ This did not discourage Trotsky from submitting further articles in which he continued to struggle against patriotic misrepresentations of Zimmerwald, but the censor once again deleted direct reference to Liebknecht as supporting evidence:

As soon as Liebknecht was locked-up...the servile spirits of the established Entente socialists decided that the hour had come to use Liebknecht's name for a struggle against his ideas on the soil of the Entente itself....[How they lie about the restrained as about the dead...Is this really not clear? Liebknecht himself struggles with the enemy above all in his own country. Liebknecht is ours and not yours.]²⁴

Thus the censor consistently cut several themes from Trotsky's writings. Their list contains no real surprises: the Entente in a hopeless military situation, negotiations between Entente diplomats on what they expected from a successful conclusion to the war, unflattering accounts of high politics in the Entente countries, and the activities of a united international Marxist leadership. However, the fact that the censor often deleted only the most outspoken of Trotsky's statements, while overlooking others which expressed the same thought in a more restrained language, suggests that the censor's regime was not as harsh as it could have been. Moreover, the censor's alterations were probably made less effective by the fact that the readership knew that he checked the paper. On several occasions Trotsky wrote accounts of his battles with the censor.

For instance, in an article of August 1915 Trotsky began by declaring that now Russian setbacks in Galicia, Poland and the Baltic had become general knowledge, perhaps the censor would permit him to explain why the Russians had not been so successful. After all, he pointed out that he had predicted this outcome but had been silenced by the censor: 'the privilege of free judgement is utilised only by those who foresaw nothing and understood nothing.'²⁵

In an (admittedly censored) contribution of October 1915, Trotsky argued that the censor's work could not blot-out the significance of the Zimmerwald Conference.²⁶ In any case, Trotsky's reports from Zimmerwald had already appeared in *Nashe Slovo* under the cloaked heading of 'From a Notebook'.²⁷ In January 1916 the censor kept only his protection of the French Socialist Party from Trotsky's pen secret when Trotsky listed his grievances against the censor's deletions:

We have been prevented from distressing not only French ministers but also Russian governors. [Moreover: the censor took the French Socialist Party under his protection], and only recently we were not allowed to speak of the ideological banality of that socialism which Pierre Renaudel heads. We are nearly always not able to print the Social-Democratic deputies' speeches in the Duma, in the course of several weeks we could not mention the name Zimmerwald, and now we are not able to publish the resolutions of the Foreign Section of our party...In all of those

cases when the censor may have had doubts he decided against us: what is the sense of standing on ceremony with an émigré newspaper published in the Russian language!²⁸

At least the reader could become very well acquainted with most of the topics he was not supposed to know of!

Furthermore, Trotsky twice published articles under the rubric of censorship. In 'There is still a censor in Paris!' he reported that the French government liked to profess that there was no censorship in Paris, only a 'special regime' for the press. He conceded that there may have been some justification for this view. After all, pieces had been published which contained such revelations as Russian bureaucrats taking bribes, the fact that Russian Jews were not living in heaven on earth, that Alexander III was not a republican and so on. However, the censor had only just rejected two large articles and this should serve as warning to all that, 'under a special regime things are just the same as under a censor.'²⁹ Trotsky enjoyed the freedom not only to complain of his lack of freedom, he was also permitted to write a critical account of the arbitrariness of the censor's judgement. In an article of September 1916 the censor was teased with the following questions:

Can one say that the All-General Conference of Labour is feeling the 'dizziness of nationalism'? We have written this dozens of times. Now we are suddenly stopped from speaking of this. What happened? The *Temps* which, it seems, should be sufficiently loyal writes of the necessity to renew the political struggle - in particular the struggle against royalism, conducting at the time of war tireless agitation 'for the phantom of the past'. Can one in view of this say that the struggle of Bonnet Rouge against *Action Francaise* is the forerunner to the battle of a new republican 'concentration' against a royalist reaction? It appears that one can. But yesterday we were not allowed to say this. What does this mean? What happened, Mr Censor!³⁰

Trotsky was quite right to point out that the censor sometimes objected to material which he had previously passed. Occasionally the censor's apparent arbitrariness could be explained by the wider context in which Trotsky submitted his articles. In the light of heightened

attention on the working class during the 1 May celebrations, for example, the censor became more sensitive to revolutionary appeals to the masses. Thus, Trotsky's article '1st May 1916' is full of white spaces inserted by the censor, with Zimmerwald again falling victim to the censor's prejudices:

[In this time there occurred the conference in Zimmerwald which was possible only thanks to the awakening of revolutionary indignation on the left-wing of the official parties and which gave this process banners and a first organisational form...The publicists and theoreticians of the International applied all of their efforts to lower socialist thought to the level of its political role.] The previous May 1st [was the lowest point in this process of decline, fall and betrayal...bourgeois society was able to take the class organisations of the proletariat captive. This was revealed in such a scale and form that nobody expected...For part of the socialist leaders frightened by events pacifism means self-imposed exile and a wait and see passiveness. For the masses pacifism means a moments reflection, a stage on the path from slave patriotism to international action...We have become stronger. In the coming year we will be stronger than we are now. Nothing and nobody can delay the growth of our strength].³¹

Perhaps the most telling evidence for evaluating the effect the censor had on distorting the meaning of Trotsky's writings is an examination of the articles censored in *Nashe Slovo*, which appeared in their censored form when they were reprinted in later publications. Can one make any sense of these articles? Are they devoid of any material which might have hurt the sensibilities of a patriot supporting the war? The answer to the first question is 'yes' and to the second 'no'.

In several censored pieces Trotsky's critique of the ruling classes as cynical and hypocritical manages to reach the reader. In 'On the beginnings of Reciprocity' Trotsky began by recounting Wilhelm II's offer to Nicholas II: Russian prisoners held in German camps would be allowed to celebrate their monarch's name-day if a reciprocal right were bestowed upon German prisoners in Russian camps. The censor deleted Trotsky's concluding sentences, but the Russian

revolutionary's disgust at the niceties of the monarchical club while their respective subjects suffered remained:

On the beginnings of reciprocity! The German and Russian human meat is blown up and destroyed by shells, frozen in cold filth and falling to pieces; but the holy flame of monarchical enthusiasm, despite everything, is carefully upheld in the hearts of the armoured priests in Berlin and in Petrograd.³²

The censor removed twenty lines of text from 'A Law of Mechanics'.³³ However, it would be hard to claim that the missing sentences would have made any radical difference to the article's meaning. In the context of a relatively small contribution, Trotsky makes his point. At the outset he reminds the reader that press censorship during the Balkan War had led many to doubt the apparent war aim of 'peasant democracy'. Clemenceau is then presented as a man who objected to press censorship - he changed the name of his newspaper from *L'Homme libre* to *L'Homme enchaîné* as a protest against censorship - while remaining silent when *Golos* was closed. Clemenceau's apparent hypocrisy is explained by his position as a politician: eventually he wants to gain power so cannot afford the luxury of general principles. However, even when acting under dubious political motivations Clemenceau could still be perspicacious. Thus, in a recent article he had raised the issue of the likely reaction of returning soldiers, discovering what the state of affairs had been at home while they had been fighting for freedom. Clemenceau warned of the law of mechanics which states that resistance grows as applied pressure increases. Trotsky pointed out that Clemenceau was hoping that this 'law of mechanics' would one day transfer power into his hands; but he had provided a useful service in foreseeing a 'catastrophic upheaval in the mood of the people'.³⁴ The implication was clear; the prerequisites for revolution were in the offing.

Twenty sentences were also cut from 'Stages', published in *Nashe Slovo* of 6 July 1916, but Trotsky was still able to express his views on a number of sensitive issues; including, the hopelessness of the present war and of the incompatibility of social-patriotism with the interests of

the working class. The rest of the article was devoted to a review of the growing successes gained by the revolutionary section of the international proletarian movement; from the first to the second Zimmerwald Conferences and onwards to the establishment of a Third International.³⁵

In 'On what the French Press is silent about' Trotsky discussed Stürmer's programme for Poland.³⁶ Although the censor cut over thirty-five sentences from this two-column article, Trotsky's rejection of the Russian Foreign Minister's plans for a united Poland under Russian protection is clear.

Finally, despite censorship in 'Wager on the Strong' this article stands as an open assault on notions of the First World War as a war of liberation. The fate of small nations (Belgium, Serbia, Turkey, Bulgaria, Roumania, Greece and Portugal) is likened to the fate of small businesses crushed in the competition between large trusts:

In the field of international relations capitalism carries-over those methods by which it 'regulates' the internal economic life of a separate nation. The path of competition is the systematic destruction of small and middle enterprises and the domination of large capital. The world competition of capitalist forces means the systematic subordination of small, middle and backward nations to the large and largest capitalist powers....The 'liberation' of Belgium does not stand as an independent aim. In the further course of the war, as after it, Belgium will enter as an integral and subordinate part of the great play of the capitalist giants.³⁷

Hardly an inspiring picture for those engaged in a war to free Belgium.

3.3 Conclusion

Although Trotsky's Paris writings for *Golos* and its successors did not always appear in the exact form that he may have wished, one cannot say that the censor was particularly 'brutal' when he doctored Trotsky's work. Out of a plethora of articles submitted for approval between November 1914 and December 1916 only three were rejected outright.³⁸ One can read the partially censored articles without feeling that Trotsky's revolutionary socialism was being too heavily repressed

or, even worse, being turned into reactionary social-patriotism. From a comparison of partially censored contributions against their fuller versions one discovers that Trotsky managed to say most of what he wanted to say, if not always in the language he wanted to employ. Trotsky himself was even able to reprint one of his partially censored articles in its censored form as an illustration of the theory of permanent revolution as he conceived of it during the First World War when the book *Results and Prospects* was issued in Moscow in 1919.³⁹ As the following several chapters will show, his contributions to the radical Russian émigré press in Paris during World War One are a rich source for discovering his views on a whole range of issues as the 'war to end all wars' was being fought.

Notes

1. I. Deutscher, *The Prophet Armed*, Oxford, 1954, p 220.
2. L. Trotskii, *Voina i Revolyutsiya*, Vol. 1, Petrograd, 1922, p 12.
3. L. Trotskii, *Moya zhizn'*, Moscow, 1991, p 237.
4. Ibid., p 19.
5. cf. -: 'Klyuch' k' pozitsii', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 138, 15 June 1916, p 1 & *Voina i Revolyutsiya*, Vol. 1, p 197. cf. also, -: 'Voennyi krizis' i politicheskaya perspektivy. II Porazheniya i revolyutsiya', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 179, 1 September 1915, p 1 & Trotskii, *Voina i Revolyutsiya*, Vol. 1, p 249.
6. Ibid. In this and in subsequent quotations text in [] did not appear in *Nashe Slovo*.
7. -: 'Klyuch' k' pozitsii'.
8. cf. -: 'Klyuch' k' pozitsii' and Trotskii, *Voina i Revolyutsiya*, Vol. 1, p 197.
9. cf. -: 'God' voiny', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 156, 4 August 1915, p 1 & L. Trotskii, *Voina i Revolyutsiya*, Vol. 2, Moscow, 1924, p 93.
10. -: 'God' voiny'.
11. cf. N. Trotskii, 'Nekriticheskii otsenka kriticheskoi epokhi. II Legenda "bor'by za demokratiyu"', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 35, 10 March 1915, p 1 & Trotskii, *Voina i Revolyutsiya*, Vol. 1, p 316.
12. cf. -: 'So slavyanskim' aktsentom' i ulybkoi na slavyanskikh' gubakh'', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 121, 24 May 1916, p 1 & L. Trotskii, *Sochineniya, Evrope v Voine*, Vol. 9, Moscow, 1927, p 168.
13. Trotskii, *Voina i Revolyutsiya*, Vol. 2, p 321.
14. cf. -: 'Voennyya tainy i politicheskaya misterii', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 217, 17 October 1915, p 1 & Trotskii, *Voina i Revolyutsiya*, Vol. 1, p 169.
15. cf. -: 'Ironicheskii shchelchok' istorii', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 73, 26 March 1916, p 1 & Trotskii, *Sochineniya*, Vol. 9, p 165.
16. cf. N.T., 'Vremya nynche takovskoe', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 54, 1 April 1915, p 1 & Trotskii, *Voina i Revolyutsiya*, Vol. 2, p 314.
17. cf. -: 'K' Dublinskim' itogam'', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 154, 4 July 1916,

- p 1 & Trotskii, *Voina i Revolyutsiya*, Vol. 1, p 193.
18. cf. -: 'Voennyi krizis' i politicheskiya perspektivy. I. Prichiny krizisa', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 174, 26 August 1915, p 1 & Trotskii, *Voina i Revolyutsiya*, Vol. 1, p 246; & N.T., 'Vpechatleniya i obobshcheniya g. Milyukova', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 193, 23 August 1916, p 1 & Trotskii, *Voina i Revolyutsiya*, Vol. 1, p 288.
 19. cf. -: 'Konvent' rasteryannosti i bezsiliya', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 167, 18 August 1915, p 1 & Trotskii, *Voina i Revolyutsiya*, Vol. 1, p 240.
 20. -: 'Konvent' rasteryannosti i bezsiliya'.
 21. cf. -: 'Proekt' deklaratsii', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 182, 8 August 1916, p 1 & Trotskii, *Voina i Revolyutsiya*, Vol. 2, pp 216-217. cf. also -: 'Frantsuzskii i nemetskii sotsial-patriotizm', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 212, 14 September 1916, p 1 & Trotskii, *Voina i Revolyutsiya*, Vol. 2, p 226.
 22. -: 'Vtorya tsimmerval'dskaya konferentsiya', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 111, 12 May 1916, pp 1-2.
 23. cf. N. T., 'Vpechatleniya i obobshcheniya g. Milyukova', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 194, 24 August 1916, p 1 & Trotskii, *Voina i Revolyutsiya*, Vol. 1, p 290.
 24. cf. -: 'V' atmosphere neustoichivnosti i rastleniya', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 207, 8 September 1916, p 1 & Trotskii, *Voina i Revolyutsiya*, Vol. 1, pp 209-210.
 25. -: 'Voennyi krizis' i politicheskiya perspektivy'.
 26. -: 'Ona byla, konferentsiya v Tsimmerval'de', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 218, 19 October 1915, p 1.
 27. See, for example, N. T., 'Nashi gruppirovki [iz' zapisnoi knizhki]', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 209, 6 October 1915, p 1; N. T., 'Nemetskaya S-D oppositsiya [iz' zapisnoi knizhki]', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 210, 7 October 1915, p 1; N. T., 'Rossiskaya sektsiya internatsionalistov' [iz' zapisnoi knizhki]', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 212, 9 October 1915, p 1; and N. T., 'Osnovnye tezisy [iz' zapisnoi knizhki]', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 215, 13 October 1915, p 1 & No. 216, 14 October 1915, p 1.
 28. cf. -: 'Vtoroi novyi god', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 1, 1 January 1916, p 1 & Trotskii, *Voina i Revolyutsiya*, Vol 2, p 100.
 29. Al'fa, 'Est' eshche tsenzura v' Parizhe', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 43, 20 February 1916, p 1.

30. -:, 'Novyi tsenzurnyi rezhim', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 212, 14 September 1916, p 1.
31. cf. -:, 'Pervoe maya', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 102, 1 May 1916, p 1 & Trotskii, *Voina i Revolyutsiya*, Vol. 2, pp 102-104.
32. Al'fa, 'Na nachalakh' vzaimnosti', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 276, 28 December 1915, p 2.
33. Al'fa, 'Zakon mekhaniki', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 114, 16 May 1916, p 3.
34. Ibid.
35. -:, 'Etapy', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 156, 6 July 1916, p 1.
36. -:, 'O chem molchit frantsuzskaya press. K' sud'be Pol'shii', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 189, 18 August 1916, p 1.
37. -:, 'Stavka na sil'nykh', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 204, 5 September 1916, p 1.
38. N. Trotskii, 'Nekriticheskii otsenka kriticheskoi epokhi. III. Politicheskie vyvod', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 41, 17 March 1915, p 1; T, "", *Nashe Slovo*, No. 102, 1 June 1915, p. 2; & Al'fa, "", *Nashe Slovo*, No. 46, 24 February 1916, p 1.
39. cf. N. Trotskii, 'Osnovnye voprosy. I. Bor'ba za vlast', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 217, 17 October 1915, pp 2-3 & L. Trotskii, *Itogi i perspektivy*, Moscow, 1919, Chap. X.

CHAPTER FOUR

Trotsky, Lenin & the Bolsheviks, August 1914-March 1917

4.1 Introduction

In 'The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte' Karl Marx wrote that the 'tradition of the dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the minds of the living'.¹ Marx's view is particularly pertinent to the political biography of Leon Trotsky (1879-1940). Trotsky's pre-1917 relations with Lenin and the Bolshevik fraction of the RSDLP were to haunt him after he joined the Bolsheviks in 1917. This was especially true during the disputes which surrounded the struggle to be Lenin's successor. For the overriding consideration of the protagonists was to present themselves as closer to Lenin than anyone else. In these circumstances the nature of an individual's history with Lenin was a factor of supreme importance. It was in the interests of each to construct a picture of harmony between themselves and Lenin, and to accentuate disharmony between others and Lenin.

Those Bolsheviks who wished to oppose Trotsky had a rich store of material from which they could draw upon: starting with the spilt between Lenin and Trotsky at the Second Congress of the RSDLP of 1903, and ending with disagreements between the two during the years of Bolshevik rule. Stalin and his supporters did not waste this opportunity and attacked Trotsky for his anti-Leninism and non-Bolshevism. In turn, Trotsky responded by defending his Leninist pedigree.

The use of Leninism as a criterion of correctness also left its mark on subsequent writings by historians of this period. In Trotsky's case this has resulted in some historians writing accounts of a strong line of demarcation between Lenin and Trotsky.² Others interpret relations between the two as those of a gradual convergence. Disputes are explained away or softened by references to circumstances which were made irrelevant by the 1917 Revolution.³ The suspicion remains, however, that whatever the interpretation, an honest evaluation of

documents has not been the overriding consideration in reaching conclusions. This is for several reasons. First, until recently, Soviet historians were limited either in access to documents or to what they could publish openly.⁴ Second, Trotsky is a figure who arouses political passions and many Western interpreters have written their accounts more from a political point of view than from any other.⁵ Third, translations of many of Trotsky's writings have been long available and this has permitted several non-Russian reading researchers to produce biographies of Trotsky, but without the ability to incorporate obscure, untranslated and often crucial documents into their versions.⁶

Of course these remarks do not apply to all historians who have addressed this topic in the recent period. Brian Pearce, for example, has written an excellent piece on one aspect of the subject-matter of this chapter.⁷ However, this chapter differs from Pearce's contribution in two respects. To begin with, its focus is wider than the issue of 'revolutionary defeatism in Lenin and Trotsky'. Indeed, the current work will present the first full account of relations between Trotsky, Lenin and the Bolsheviks from the outbreak of war in August 1914 to the March Revolution of 1917 in Russia. Furthermore, although Pearce noted Trotsky's difficulties post-1924 in presenting his pre-October relations with Lenin, he gave no account of how this sensitive topic was approached in the very first years of Bolshevik rule. In contrast, this chapter will illustrate how the actual content of the polemics which raged between Trotsky and Lenin and the Bolsheviks during World War One became obscured first by the Bolsheviks in collaboration and then in dispute, and how, in turn, these distorted positions entered the accounts of historians writing on the 1914-1917 period. It is therefore both a history and a historiographical analysis of its topic.

4.2 Trotsky, Lenin and the Bolsheviks, August 1914-March 1917

During the war the main forums for communication between Russian Social-Democrats continued to be the publication and distribution of newspapers, journals and pamphlets. This form of intercourse was obviously complicated by conditions of war. However, apart from

circulation and financial problems, Russian socialists enjoyed a relatively free environment for the pursual of debates. The Bolsheviks published *Sotsial'Demokrat'*, *Kommunist'* and *Sbornik Sotsial'Demokrata* in neutral Switzerland; *Novyi Mir* was produced in America; and even in Paris, where Trotsky wrote for *Golos*, *Nashe Slovo* and *Nachalo*, the censor was not particularly concerned by the appearance of articles contributing to polemics raging between various fractions of Russian Social-Democracy; especially as they were of interest to a minority audience and written in a foreign language.⁸

Russian Social-Democrats were already split along fractional lines at the outbreak of World War One. In the months prior to August 1914 Trotsky had continued his campaign for unity, most notably in the journal *Bor'ba*.⁹ Events of such magnitude as war can interrupt a settled pattern of debate and throw people and groups into alliances which, up until that point, they would not have seriously considered. Thus, an opportunity arose for a realliance of Russian Social-Democratic fractions around a common programme on the war.

Trotsky outlined his political response to the war in a series of four articles of January and February 1915, published in *Golos* and *Nashe Slovo*. Here he continued his analysis of the war as a revolt of the productive forces against the narrow confines of state boundaries, which he had first argued in the Preface to *War and the International*. According to Trotsky, one had to have a clear understanding of the causes and nature of the then world conflict in order to construct a viable political programme. It was of no use to merely call for peace; one had to have real solutions which could act as a rallying call for revolutionary action for a just peace:

It is absolutely naive to say that we should not complicate our struggle for peace with slogans of a wider character. We would not want a peace in which Belgium, Northern France...etc went to the victorious country and thus becoming a source of new catastrophe. We are not intending to remove the questions of Poland, Alsace-Lorraine and Serbia from the order of the day - we want to resolve them. We do not believe these solutions can come through the forces of militarism, and we express this disbelief in our demands for a cessation of the war. To call for

peace while sweeping its programme aside would be a call for a step back, in to the blind alley. Precisely therefore such a political posture is powerless to win over to its side that enthusiasm, that heroism, that ability to self-sacrifice which is now being exploited by militarism.¹⁰

For Trotsky, the war was being fought across two geographical centres which were situated at different stages of historical development. In South-Eastern Europe - Russia, Austria and the Balkans - the main issue was the creation of nationally independent, stable states as a prerequisite for capitalism. This area was thus beset by problems of the first stage of bourgeois development. In Western Europe - Britain, France and Germany - the nation state had been created over the previous three centuries. These countries were grappling with the major problem of the final stage of imperialist development: the need to abolish artificial state boundaries. The productive forces demanded the extension of the economic base. In terms of the policies of the Great Powers of the day this meant one of two things: either victory and domination by Britain or by Germany. Trotsky realised that Britain was allied to France, but he asserted that the antagonism between Britain and Germany was 'the basic moving force of the present war.'¹¹ He argued that Britain and France had been united by the 'German danger', but he also claimed that perceptions of this danger were rooted in different concerns. France's main worry, due to its 'halting population growth and extreme slow-down in the tempo of economic development',¹² was to preserve its existing position on the world market and as a world power. Britain's interest was to ensure that no continental power, France or Germany, became so powerful in Europe so as to be able to launch an attack on British expansion, which was to be achieved on the basis of its colonial acquisitions. According to Trotsky, Germany pursued the most aggressive foreign policy at that time as this corresponded to the condition of its industry, the most quickly developing in Europe. In this way the expansionary plans of Britain and Germany lay at the heart of the world conflict:

capitalism saturated in the framework of the national state and the rebellion of the productive forces against this framework,

aspiring to a greater and greater widening of the economic base to the inclusion of backward peoples into the sphere of economic activity of the national mother country, is the essence of the imperialist policy of the great powers. The collision of national imperialists brought about the present war.¹³

For Trotsky, the combination of tasks of different historical origin gave the then present war its peculiar character. Specifically, this situation gave rise to the possibility of illusions being held about the war. The struggles of the advanced countries could be seen as part of the ostensibly liberating struggle for national independence taking place in the backward countries. However, Trotsky argued that the dominating factor was the concerns of the Great Powers. He recognised the importance of the national pretensions of, for example, Serbia and Belgium as playing an important part in the conflict, but he also perceived them as secondary issues. Thus, Serbia and Belgium had become involved in the war only because they were geographically situated on the map of the expansionary plans of the Great Powers. Moreover, the peoples struggling for national independence could not follow the route taken by the advanced nations when they faced tasks of a similar nature. The nation state was already an anachronism. For example, Trotsky claimed that each Balkan nation had too narrow a base for economic development. Even an enlarged Serbia would mean that other nationalities would fall into dependence upon Germany, Russia or even Serbia itself, and this could only give rise to a prospect of further 'liberation' conflicts. For Trotsky, the only answer to the peculiar combination of tasks of a pre-capitalist nature in an environment dominated by the needs of the final imperialist stage of capitalism was the enlarged state form of a Federative Balkan Republic.

According to Trotsky, the establishment of a Federative Balkan Republic would have several significant advantages. First, it would answer the need of a wide territorial base for economic development. Second, it would be a democratic state structure in which various nationalities would be able to express their individuality without threatening the cultural requirements of others. Trotsky combined these two points thus: 'It neutralises nationalism in the economic sense,

freeing economic development from dependence up on the distribution of separate ethnic groups on the map of Europe.¹⁴ Finally, the Federative Balkan Republic would be better equipped to defend the interests of the Balkan peoples from possible aggression from Russia or Germany.

Trotsky also argued for the establishment of a transnational state structure, specifically a Republican United States of Europe, for Western Europe. In this area the interests of further economic development demanded an integrated economy organised under a single European state. Obviously, Trotsky did not see national problems as particularly pressing in West Europe as in South-Eastern Europe; his case for a United States of Europe remained at the level of economic considerations. For Trotsky, this urgent task could be realised in one of two ways. First, German imperialists had planned the forceful unification of Europe under their domination. Trotsky acknowledged that this represented a genuine attempt to resolve an issue that had to be resolved; it was a 'progressive historical need refracted, however, through the junker-militaristic, reactionary-caste state apparatus of Germany.'¹⁵ However, this attempt was bound to fail. One could not bring about the cohabitation and cooperation of peoples through militarism. Furthermore, what chance had plans for a Europe under the tutelage of the Central Empire when this Empire itself was disintegrating?: 'The wonderful professor-junker-stock-market utopia is the plan to turn the whole of Europe into a new Austria-Hungary at the same time as the old Austria-Hungary is being ripped to pieces.'¹⁶ Second, the European proletariat could arise and create an all-European dictatorship of the proletariat in the form of a Republican United States of Europe. For Trotsky, not only was this the only way to achieve the desired goal, but the preconditions for it had been prepared by the very process which demanded the formation of a United States of Europe:

Destroying the framework of the national state as too narrow for the development of productive forces, the war also destroys them as a base for social revolution...In our time the problem of social revolution stands before us if not as a world problem in the direct and immediate sense of the word, then in any case as a

European problem. In present circumstances all proletarian movements in their very first steps will inevitably aspire to expand the framework of their national limitness and in the parallel movements of the proletariat of other countries seek to find a guarantee of their own success.¹⁷

Thus, Trotsky's analysis and prognosis envisaged a struggle for peace under the slogans of the creation of two federative republican state structures; the first in the Balkans and the second across Europe. In his concluding remarks in the final article he did add however that the responsibility for the further economic development of backward regions would rest upon the United States of Europe.¹⁸

While Trotsky was expounding his views Lenin and the Bolsheviks were publishing their reaction to the war in their newspaper *Sotsial'Demokrat*, issuing their first manifesto of the war in number 33 of 1 November 1914.

This manifesto shared several assumptions of Trotsky's writings of the time. First, the war was characterised as a struggle of the advanced imperialist nations for markets in which the dynastic interests of the backward nations were also involved. Second, and probably most important from Trotsky's point of view, the manifesto called for the formation of a Republican United States of Europe as the 'immediate political slogan of European Social-Democracy.'¹⁹ Like Trotsky, the manifesto distinguished between 'proletarian' and 'bourgeois' versions of a United States of Europe, declaring that:

the formation of a Republican United States of Europe, distinct from the bourgeoisie which is prepared to 'promise' whatever is demanded if only to include the proletariat in the general chauvinist group. Social-Democracy will explain the falsehood and the foolishness of this slogan without the revolutionary overthrow of the German, Austrian and Russian monarchies.²⁰

However, the manifesto also departed from Trotsky's analysis in several ways. First, it expanded the basic aims of the war from pure imperialist antagonisms to a desire to 'distract the attention of the working masses from the internal political crises of Russia, Germany, Britain and other countries.'²¹ Second, although *Sotsial'Demokrat* viewed the battle as one of the British and French bourgeoisie against

their German counterparts, no distinction was made between British and French interests. For *Sotsial'Demokrat'* both countries wished to 'seize German colonies and ruin the competition of a nation distinguished by more rapid economic development.'²² Third, and here begins what were to be the most significant differences, the manifesto made no mention of a struggle for peace with a defined peace programme. Instead, *Sotsial'Demokrat'* called for 'turning the imperialist war into a civil war',²³ and referred to a resolution of the 1912 Basel Conference as authority for the correctness of this stance. Fourth, the manifesto considered the defeat of one of the two warring camps from the perspective of whose defeat would be the most useful for socialism. The conclusion reached was that,

for us, Russian Social-Democrats, there can be no doubt that from the point of view of the workingclass and the labouring masses of all peoples of Russia the least evil would be the defeat of the tsarist monarchy, the most reactionary and barbaric government, oppressing the highest quantity of nations and the greatest mass of population of Europe and Asia.²⁴

Finally, *Sotsial'Demokrat'* did not call for the establishment of a Republican United States in the Balkans as well as in Europe. For *Sotsial'Demokrat'*, the main cleavage was between advanced and backward countries. Socialists in backward countries were told to struggle for the defeat of their governments in order to introduce democratic changes: 'democratic republics (with full equal rights and self-determination of all nations), the confiscation of landowners' land and the eight-hour working day.'²⁵ It would be the task of socialists in the advanced countries to bring about the defeat of their country so as to stage a socialist revolution:

in all advanced countries the war places as the first slogan a socialist revolution, which becomes more urgent the more the difficulties of the war are put upon the shoulders of the proletariat, and the more active its role should become in the rebuilding of Europe after the horrors of modern 'patriotic' barbarism in conditions of massive technical successes of large capital.²⁶

The Bolsheviks were to return to the issue of their programmatic response to the war at the Conference of the Foreign Section of the

RSDLP, held in Bern between 14-19 February 1915. The resolutions of this Conference widened the differences between the Bolsheviks and Trotsky; most notably, the notion of a 'United States of Europe' was omitted. The only idea advanced under the resolution 'Slogans of Revolutionary Social-Democracy' was that of 'turning the imperialist war into a civil war', and five points of action were listed as the first steps needed to attain this goal.²⁷ Moreover, *Nashe Slovo* was not very favourably reviewed in the resolution 'Relations to other Parties and Groups':

elements grouping around *Nashe Slovo* vacillate between platonic empathy to internationalism and aspirations of unity at any cost with *Nasha Zarya* and the Organisational Committee.²⁸

At this stage, i.e., between November 1914 and the end of February 1915, both Trotsky and Lenin and the Bolsheviks developed their programmes knowing the stances adopted by the other. In early November 1914 Eintracht, a section of the Swiss Social-Democratic Party, held a meeting in a large hall in Zurich. Trotsky attended and delivered a speech, although when he subsequently made reference to this meeting in two of his published writings he did not expound upon its contents.²⁹ However, Lenin was also present and his notes made at the conference were published in volume 14 of *Leninskii sbornik* (1930). These notes enable us to reconstruct some of the themes addressed by Trotsky's speech. First, he declared his solidarity with Eintracht's resolution, which called for a struggle to end the war with the aim of implementing a 'peace programme' - i.e., no forced annexations, no war indemnities, the right of nations to self-determination and a United States of Europe free of standing armies, secret diplomacy and feudal castes.³⁰ He then considered the relationship between his insistence on the necessity of a struggle for peace and the resolution of the 1912 Basel Conference. For Trotsky, there was no contradiction between the two:

in order to begin the war of the German proletariat against the German bourgeoisie one has first to end the war of the German proletariat with the French proletariat. The first slogan for a civil war is an end to the imperialist war.³¹

Lenin highlighted this section of his notes with a square bracket down the left-hand side and labelled Trotsky's argument 'sophistic'.³² Further in his notes he commented, 'Let the speaker declare his opposition to the Basel Conference.'³³ Later, when writing of S. Vainshtein's view that little separated the positions of Lenin and Trotsky, Lenin registered his contempt by writing of 'rebellious anarchism' (Trotsky) and 'scientific socialism' (Lenin).³⁴

However, Trotsky also made somewhat of a favourable impression on Lenin. Thus, for example, when Trotsky announced his disagreements with Kautsky Lenin wrote of a 'firmer tone and more profound considerations.'³⁵ Moreover, when M. Ratner declared his intention to argue against Trotsky Lenin found his tone to be 'demagogic and very distasteful.'³⁶

Indeed, at the beginning of 1915 the idea of cooperation between Trotsky and *Nashe Slovo* on the one side and Lenin and *Sotsial'Demokrat* on the other was broached. The cause was the decision to call a conference of socialist parties of the Entente countries, to be held in London in February 1915 and organised by the Belgian social-patriot Vandervelde.³⁷

The initiator of the correspondence was the editorial board of *Nashe Slovo*, who approached the Bolshevik Central Committee and the Menshevik Organisational Committee, among others, in an attempt to forge an anti-social-patriotic bloc. The full text of this approach was not published in the newspaper, and the editors of volume 17 of *Leninskii sbornik* (1931) claim that the Institute of Marxism-Leninism does not possess a copy of *Nashe Slovo*'s letter.³⁸ We are thus forced to rely upon references made to the letter to learn of its contents. From Lenin's reply, written in Bern on 9th February 1915, we discover its date and basic intentions:

In your letter of 6th February you propose a plan of struggle with 'official social-patriotism' to us regarding the London Conference of socialists of the 'allied countries' of the Entente.³⁹

Lenin responded favourably, declaring that he accepted the offer of joint action 'with pleasure.'⁴⁰ He then stressed the necessity of utilising all opportunities of conducting this struggle and outlined a draft declaration on the London Conference, to be signed by *Sotsial'Demokrat* and

Nashe Slovo. The draft declaration announced the present war to be an imperialist war, a product of an age in which the bourgeois state in national boundaries had outlived its time. Lenin listed an eight-point programme of action, which was intended to fulfil the Basel resolution: 1) the break-up of national blocs in all countries; 2) a call to workers of all countries to use political and economic means to struggle against their own bourgeois governments; 3) a harsh condemnation of all voting for war credits; 4) socialists should leave the governments of Belgium and France, and it should be recognised that joining governments and voting for war credits is as big a betrayal of socialism as that perpetrated by German and Austrian Social-Democracy at the outbreak of war; 5) the formation of an international committee for agitation of the idea of revolutionary mass action against one's own government; 6) all attempts at the establishment of fraternal relations between the soldiers of warring countries should be supported; 7) women socialists of warring countries should strengthen their efforts to propagandise the aforementioned points; and 8) Russian Social-Democracy should be supported in its struggle against tsarism. The letter from *Nashe Slovo* must also have mentioned the possibility of teaming-up with the Bund and the Organisational Committee, as Lenin felt it necessary to warn that they stood for 'official social-patriotism.' However, he also asked to be kept informed of how these organisations responded to *Nashe Slovo's* suggestions.

Thus, the overall tone of Lenin's reply was positive, and he even went so far as to make concrete suggestions for continuing along the path of cooperation. However, this positive tone was at odds with the pessimism he expressed on the likelihood of the success of the *Nashe Slovo* project in a letter to A. Shlyapnikov of 11 February 1915:

We answered *Nashe Slovo* that we are happy with its suggestion and we sent our draft declaration. Hopes for agreement with them are small, for Aksel'rod, it is said, is in Paris and Aksel'rod is a social-chauvinist, hoping to reconcile Germanofiles and Francofiles on the soil of social-chauvinism. We will see which is dearer to *Nashe Slovo* - anti-chauvinism or Aksel'rod's friendship.⁴¹

In the meantime, *Nashe Slovo* published three separate declarations on the London Conference. The first was signed by Martov on behalf of the Organisational Committee and Lapinski representing the Polish Socialist Party.⁴² This statement criticised the calling of the London Conference for several reasons. First, it was a mistake to invite socialists on the basis of their nationality, a criteria underpinned by imperialist assumptions: 'We refuse to recognise the principle of grouping the proletariat along the lines of the temporary coincidence of the interests of their class enemies.'⁴³ Second, by limiting invitations to a select group the organisers were accepting and strengthening the splits in the Second International which had occurred at the outbreak of the war. Third, only an internationalist stance, considering the views of socialists of all countries, could restore the International. For Martov and Lapinski, socialists had to avoid aligning themselves with any of the warring nations in order to pursue a socialist policy of exposing the imperialist roots of the war, and to struggle for peace. It was only in this way, the authors were convinced, that socialists could guarantee for themselves an influence on determining the conditions of a future peace. They requested that delegates at the London Conference should refrain from passing any resolutions which could only play into the hands of the class enemy. In a footnote to the declaration, which appeared after the Conference had ended, Martov and Lapinski announced that they would have voted against the resolutions eventually adopted by the meeting.

The second declaration to be published was that elaborated by *Nashe Slovo* itself, in the form of a mandate accepted at a meeting of the editorial board of 13 February 1915. This seven-point programme was censored when it appeared in the newspaper; half of point two and all of point six were lost.⁴⁴ However, Lenin and other socialists had access to the full text which was published in *Berner Tagwacht* of 20 February 1915, and later translated into Russian from the German in Volume 17 of *Leninskii sbornik*.⁴⁵ *Nashe Slovo* also declared the London Conference a betrayal of the principles of socialist internationalism, and called for socialists to attend the Conference so as to call for a conference of socialists of all countries. Then, using the contents of Lenin's letter to the editorial board, a programme of action

was listed not in order to turn the imperialist war into a civil war but as part of a struggle to end the war.⁴⁶

Third, in *Nashe Slovo* of 4 March 1915, the declaration of the Bolshevik Central Committee was published. This text was also censored; points 2-4 and the concluding sentences were blank. The declaration began by pointing out that the London Conference was supposed to be for socialists from Belgium, Britain, France and Russia, but Russian Social-Democrats had not been invited to attend. The hope was then expressed that Russian Social-Democracy's hostility to the Conference had been made clear to delegates gathering in London; otherwise 'we would have grounds for accusing you of a misrepresentation of the truth.'⁴⁷ The Central Committee made demands similar to those outlined in their letter to *Nashe Slovo* which had then been used by *Nashe Slovo* itself: the immediate withdrawal of socialists from governments; a condemnation of voting for war credits; and, finally, the recognition that Austrian and German Social-Democracy had committed terrible crimes against socialism and the International, and that Belgian and French socialists had hardly acted any better.

Nashe Slovo followed the publication of these declarations with an article enlightening readers on the steps it had taken to coordinate the actions of Russian socialists on the London Conference.⁴⁸ An editorial outlined its intentions in approaching the Bolshevik Central Committee and the Menshevik Organisational Committee thus:

Not long before the Conference the editorial board of our newspaper sent to representatives of our party in the International Socialist Bureau, Aksel'rod and Lenin, letters in which it was proposed to them that in the interest of struggle with 'official social-patriotism' steps should be taken to ensure that no accidental invitations could be sent to a social-patriot to speak on behalf of Russian Social-Democracy not expressing the views of the RSDLP, and that any invitation to the Conference should go through official representatives of our party in the International Socialist Bureau. Our offer, obviously, also proposed a coordination of action of internationalist elements of Russian Social-Democratic delegates.⁴⁹

Readers were then informed that both Aksel'rod and Lenin had agreed to coordinate activities, and that the basic points of Comrade Lenin's draft declaration had been incorporated into *Nashe Slovo's* mandate. The editorial concluded with a confident statement of the success of the *Nashe Slovo* initiative to date:

In this way we see that maintaining an internationalist socialist position, unifying Social-Democratic internationalists of all fractions - a stable base for joint revolutionary action is created and we express our deep belief that the coordination of action of all revolutionary internationalist elements of Russian Social-Democracy is not only possible and desired but also strongly necessary.⁵⁰

This optimistic mood was also reflected in an article of 18 March 1915, 'Where is the majority?'⁵¹ This editorial took issue with Plekhanov's assertion that a majority of Russian workers and socialists supported his patriotic stance on the war. *Nashe Slovo* reported that Plekhanov had spoken of two pieces of evidence which he thought confirmed his belief. First, Martov had declared that his own supporters did not share his views on the war. Second, Lenin had published a worker's letter which stated that the Russian proletariat did not wish to hear talk of Russia's defeat. These two points were then dismissed as insufficient grounds for drawing such a conclusion. First, it was pointed out that Martov was speaking of the editorial board of *Nasha Zarya*; a group which did not represent a majority of Russian workers and which had no organisational base. Second, it was argued that just because workers did not wish to support Russia's defeat they wanted instead to support a victory of the Entente. It was claimed that Russian socialists could disagree over the correctness of the call for Russia's defeat and all the same unite around the issue of opposing social-patriotism; a possibility which was in fact occurring. The editorial listed the party groups (including the Bolshevik Central Committee, the Menshevik Organisational Committee and the Bund) which occupied a position hostile to Plekhanov; while a footnote highlighted the fact that different tendencies had united around *Nashe Slovo's* initiative at the London Conference. Two further processes of unification around points of view opposed to Plekhanov's were mentioned: first in Petersburg and

second among Social-Democratic deputies in the State Duma. The editorial concluded that the only way in which Russian Social-Democracy could prevent one single voice from claiming to represent the movement as a whole was for fractional groups to unite around a stand against social-patriotism.

It was this article, combined with *Nashe Slovo's* evaluation of the negotiations surrounding the London Conference, that Lenin found objectionable. In his reply to *Nashe Slovo* Lenin had stated that he considered the Organisational Committee to be social-patriots. Now *Nashe Slovo* was claiming that he was agreeing to join a coalition of which arch social-patriot Aksel'rod was to be a member. Moreover, he was probably annoyed that *Nashe Slovo*, with its claim of having incorporated the fundamental points of his draft declaration into its programme, appeared to be pulling the ground for his party's own individual stance from under its feet. Indeed, to be fair to *Nashe Slovo*, its mandate and Lenin's draft project were very similar in content and in the language employed to express that content. However, afraid of being steamrollered into an alliance of which he wanted no participation in, Lenin went onto the offensive.

On 23 March 1915 Lenin sent a letter to the editorial board of *Nashe Slovo*.⁵² He began by expressing support for the idea of the unification of all Social-Democratic internationalists. However, he also pointed out that there had to be sufficient ideological agreement to make unification possible. In order to discover whether this condition existed Lenin asked for clarification of *Nashe Slovo's* position on several points. First, he stated that one had to struggle against Plekhanov and Aleksinskii not through declarations, but through real work in which one clearly understood that, in order to qualify as an organisation, one needed to have had years of contact with the masses and not simply issue a newspaper. Second, Lenin questioned why *Nashe Slovo* had included the Bund in its list of internationalists. After all, he argued, their newspaper the *Informatsionnyi Listok* undoubtedly stands on the point of view of German chauvinism.⁵³ Third, he claimed that one could not consider any supporter of an 'amnesty', i.e., that socialists should regroup after the war without accusations of guilt against one another, an internationalist:

No concessions, no agreements with Kautsky and the Organisational Committee are absolutely not permissible. The most decisive struggle against the theory of 'amnesty' is the *conditio sine qua non* of internationalism...And here we ask - is there agreement between us on this crucial question?⁵⁴

Why, Lenin continued, did *Nashe Slovo* think that the Organisational Committee was internationalist? Was it not obvious from its most prominent representative Aksel'rod, for example, that it was full of chauvinists? Lenin did not rule out further cooperation with *Nashe Slovo*, but he emphasised that, 'We will be very glad to receive a full and clear answer on all of these questions from you. Then it will be possible to think of the future.'⁵⁵

These sentiments were expressed in a slightly harsher tone in the article 'On the topic of the London Conference', published in *Sotsial'Demokrat* of 29 March 1915.⁵⁶ Here Lenin emphasised the fact that he had labelled the Bund and the Organisational Committee social-patriots in his letter of 9 February 1915 to *Nashe Slovo*: 'Why does *Nashe Slovo* lie to itself and to others, keeping silent on this in its editorial of issue 32?'⁵⁷ Furthermore, in an attempt to take control of the negotiations and to preserve his party's distinctive stance, Lenin stressed differences between his draft project and *Nashe Slovo's* declaration:

Why keep quiet on the fact that in our draft project we also spoke of the betrayal of German Social-Democrats? *Nashe Slovo's* declaration left out this important 'fundamental' point; neither we nor Comrade Maksimovich accepted this declaration nor are we able to agree to it. Therefore, united action between us and the Organisational Committee did not happen. Why then does *Nashe Slovo* fool itself and others, believing that there is a base for united action?⁵⁸

In this (public) article Lenin made it absolutely clear that if there was to be joint action, then it would be a case of *Nashe Slovo* coming to share *Sotsial'Demokrat's* position and not vice versa: 'It remains only to express the desire that from vacillations between 'platonic empathy with internationalism' and reconciliation with social-chauvinism *Nashe Slovo* moves to a more determined position.'⁵⁹

In reply to Lenin's letter of 21 March 1915, the editorial board of *Nashe Slovo* defended its inclusion of the Organisational Committee and the Bund in the ranks of internationalists.⁶⁰ For *Nashe Slovo*, all of the groups to which it had appealed were united in their opposition to the war and it was this fact that, in its opinion, enabled joint action. Moreover, *Nashe Slovo* argued that it was possible to exaggerate differences and in this way fall into the trap of condemning internationalists as social-patriots. So, for example, it would be correct to say that the Organisational Committee was wrong in its view of the newspaper *Nasha Zarya*; but, at the same time, it would be incorrect to conclude from this that the Organisational Committee supported social-chauvinism. According to *Nashe Slovo*, *Sotsial'Demokrat* had also made this mistake in its evaluation of the Duma fraction as social-chauvinist: '[the Duma fraction] did not balk at excluding Man'kov from its ranks because of his militaristic speech.'⁶¹ Furthermore, *Nashe Slovo* continued, it was possible for undoubted internationalists to be unsure about crucial matters: 'witness (including *Sotsial'Demokrat*) the uncertain position in relation to the slogan of struggle for peace, under the banner of which all activity of internationalists is now taking place.'⁶² Finally, on the issue of an amnesty, *Nashe Slovo* stated that it was against the reformation of the International based on the principle of mutual forgiveness for nationalist positions occupied during the war. However, at the same time, *Nashe Slovo* argued that it did not want to exclude cooperation with any group at too early a stage:

....it would have been a mistake, in the beginning of the war when both Liebknecht and Rühle were one with the rest of the majority of German Social-Democracy, to have called for an abyss between them and us and to have built our party tactics on this call...we find that the fraction of the revolutionary minority which we, the internationalists, now constitute should resolve questions of the preservation of party unity or its converse, sacrificing it, from the point of view of expediency, i.e., depending upon what type of organisational form will guarantee us the most influence over the course of the class movement in each separate case.⁶³

Nashe Slovo concluded by expressing the hope that its letter would remove any doubts which the Central Committee had had on the

viability of further cooperation. However, we have no record of a response from the Central Committee to *Nashe Slovo*. Indeed, we cannot even say for certain when *Nashe Slovo* replied to Lenin's letter of 23 March 1915; the editors to Volume 17 of *Leninskii sbornik* dated *Nashe Slovo*'s letter 'after 25 March.'⁶⁴ What we can say is that Trotsky blamed Lenin for the breakdown of the negotiations and for harming the cause of internationalism. The following is from his letter to Radek of 8 June 1915:

The meeting which *Nashe Slovo* proposed (Ts.K, O.K. and NS) could have played an important role now. The internationalists would have been the decisive force and the vacillating O.K. would have been forced to subordinate itself...Lenin destroyed this meeting. Why? From pure fractional considerations, not allowing collective authority into that place which he reserved for his own personal authority, seeing in himself, in the last analysis, the axis of world history. This is a terribly egocentric person...and this terrible egocentricism causes us no less difficulties than the Menshevik's vacillations.⁶⁵

The next development of note was an offer from the Central Committee to Trotsky of cooperation on its new journal *Kommunist'*, the first (double) issue of which appeared in August 1915. No copy of this offer has ever been published so we have to guess the time of its composition and reconstruct its contents from Trotsky's response which appeared in *Nashe Slovo* of 4 June 1915.⁶⁶ The Central Committee's offer was probably made sometime towards the end of May 1915. This date is the most likely as the Central Committee included a copy of its introduction for the new journal, which was dated 20 May 1915 when it was published later that year.⁶⁷ Assuming that Trotsky would not leave this letter without a reply for a long time, such a dating would also fall nicely into the timescale of Trotsky's printed reply of early June 1915.

In the 'Open Letter to the editorial board of the journal *Kommunist'* Trotsky declined the offer of participation for several reasons. First, he highlighted serious programmatic differences between himself and the Bolsheviks: the Central Committees's rejection of the slogan struggle for peace; the Bolshevik's espousal of the defeat of Russia as the

'lesser evil' which, for Trotsky, shared the same methodological grounds as social-patriotism; and, finally, Trotsky did not agree with the way in which the Bolsheviks delineated social-patriotism in organisational terms. Second, Trotsky claimed that these differences in themselves would not be an obstacle to cooperation if the Bolsheviks were establishing an open discussion journal. However, for Trotsky, *Kommunist* was 'sad evidence of the fact that you subordinate your struggle against social-patriotism to considerations and aims for which I in any circumstances do not consider myself to have the right to take responsibility for.'⁶⁸ Most annoying for Trotsky was the fact that in its introduction to *Kommunist* the editorial board had included a list of those people and groups which it considered to share a stance of opposition to social-patriotism; a list which included the five deputies who had been sent to prison in Russia but which excluded Trotsky and *Nashe Slovo*. According to Trotsky, this list represented 'a decisive distortion of the real state of affairs from the point of view of fractional perspectives.'⁶⁹ After all, he pointed out, the views of the five condemned Social-Democratic deputies were the same as the Social-Democrats remaining in the Duma. If there was any lack of revolutionary clarity in the first statements issued by Social-Democratic deputies then, for Trotsky, this was the responsibility of all deputies - both in and out of prison. Moreover, recent speeches by Social-Democratic representatives in the Duma were a 'rebuff to all attempts to introduce social-patriotic depravity into the ranks of the masses.'⁷⁰ The fact that the Bolsheviks could ignore the Social-Democrats in the Duma while welcoming Monat and the Independent British Socialists into their ranks merely testified to the fact that their conclusions were drawn 'neither by the demands of political clarity nor in the interests of the International [but] in those interests which they call forth and which I cannot support.'⁷¹ Trotsky concluded by stating that in actual fact *Nashe Slovo* was closer to the Bolsheviks than any of the groups named in *Kommunist*. For Trotsky, one could conclude one of two things from this: 'you keep silent about [*Nashe Slovo*] because of considerations of a non-principled character; and if not then it looks as though you have no allies in the International.'⁷²

Trotsky's unequivocal reply, based upon the differences which clearly separated him from the Bolsheviks at that time, raises the question 'Why did the Central Committee appeal to Trotsky?' There are several possible reasons for this.

First, there had long existed the suspicion in the Bolshevik camp that Trotsky's calls for unity were a form of 'non-fractional fractionalism', i.e., a device to strengthen Trotsky's own influence in Russian Social-Democracy. This could be demonstrated if Trotsky were to turn down an offer of cooperation from the Central Committee. Second, some Bolsheviks may have looked upon Trotsky as occupying the most internationalist stance of all in the *Nashe Slovo* editorial board. They had no doubt followed his dispute with Larin concerning Trotsky's relation to the Organisational Committee,⁷³ and they may have desired to push Trotsky, through participation in the production of *Kommunist*', further into the Bolshevik camp. Third, if Trotsky was perceived as being closer to the Bolsheviks than to anyone else in his views and as being the main figure behind *Nashe Slovo*, then coopting Trotsky could have been seen as a way of increasing Bolshevik influence over a daily newspaper - something the Bolsheviks were not producing but clearly wanted to produce.⁷⁴ Thus, there might have been tensions among Bolsheviks - between those supportive and dismissive of Trotsky. Trotsky's response to a letter sent directly to him could provide evidence for the validity of the views of one side or the other, and in this way end what might have been (or threatened to be) a long running dispute. Certainly this was the claim made in *Kommunist*' itself when it was issued in August 1915. In a footnote to his article 'Russian Social-Democracy and Russian Social Chauvinism'⁷⁵ Zinoviev described the events surrounding the offer to Trotsky as a successful and amusing 'experiment':

Regarding the letter Trotsky involuntarily gave the editorial board of *Kommunist*' several minutes of real mirth. Part of our editorial board had predicted Trotsky's pompous vacuously-phrased answer to other editorial colleagues word for word. (Trotsky, like Turgenev's well-known hero, is even silent in vacuous phrases)...The result of the 'demonstration' was supremely transparent. After Trotsky's open letter it became clear to all that

it was more important to him to be allied to the liquidationist Organisational Committee than to Russian internationalists.⁷⁶

Whatever the reason, or combination of reasons, for the Central Committee's approach Trotsky was certainly annoyed. On the day following the publication of his 'Open Letter' he further attacked the views of *Sotsial'Demokrat* in the third instalment of a series of articles published between 15 May and 24 July 1915 under the heading of 'Our Position.'⁷⁷ In earlier contributions to this series Trotsky had criticised *Sotsial'Demokrat* for its opposition to the slogan struggle for peace:

Parliamentary declarations of various socialists of various countries, international women's conferences and so on testifies to the huge role of the slogan 'struggle for peace' in mobilising the left and what a huge political mistake was made, and to a significant degree continues to be made, by *Sotsial'Demokrat* attempting to put this slogan in the camp of pacifists and papists.⁷⁸

Now Trotsky turned his attention to the problems of splits and unity among Russian Social-Democrats. In particular, he answered *Sotsial'Demokrat*'s accusation that *Nashe Slovo* was not drawing the necessary conclusions from a struggle against social-patriotism, i.e., a split with the Organisational Committee. For Trotsky, internationalists should remain within organisational structures, even if they were in the minority, in order to win people over to the side of internationalism: 'Split is not our slogan but the winning of organisations as such.'⁷⁹ He highlighted the cases of Liebknecht, Monat and the Independent Labour Party as examples of people and organisations who had remained within old groupings to win them over to their aims. However, at the same time as rejecting the 'artificial splits' proposed by *Sotsial'Demokrat*, Trotsky stated that splits were permissible in certain circumstances. For instance, he wrote that splits should arise from the process of struggle for internationalism itself. However, in such cases 'the proletariat should realise the necessity of split as a political conclusion and the responsibility for it on those who now use discipline in service of the class enemy.'⁸⁰

In the fourth, and final, instalment of 'Our Position' Trotsky applied his general arguments on unity and splits to the specific case of

Russian Social-Democracy.⁸¹ He began by distinguishing Russian Social-Democracy from its Western European equivalent. For instance, he pointed out that Russian socialists had split into organisational fractions long before the war during disagreements over specifically Russian issues (most notably the nature of any forthcoming Russian revolution), whereas German socialists coexisted within one broad organisation. According to Trotsky, stances adopted on the war had led to a regrouping in Russian socialism which, as elsewhere, had cut across old allegiances. However, so strong was the tradition of ideological and organisational fracture that, among Russian socialists, three groups had survived into the war: *Sotsial'Demokrat'*, the August Bloc, and *Nashe Slovo*.⁸² For Trotsky, several dire consequences for the cause of internationalism in Russia followed from this situation. First, the proletariat had been thrown into confusion by the outbreak of the war and organisational disunity only added to this confusion. Second, although internationalists were objectively closer in their outlook to one another than to anyone else, various organisational interests mitigated against a general coming together in order to speak with one voice, i.e., negotiations for unity tended to be swamped by a struggle for the dominance of one's own organisation. For Trotsky, the urgent task was to unite all internationalists (here Trotsky mentioned the Organisational Committee, the Central Committee and *Nashe Slovo*) so that henceforth there would be two identifiable groups in Russian socialism: Social-Democrats and social-patriots. He illustrated how this could be achieved through a scenario of the possible unification of three proletarian organisations in Petrograd: the Petrograd Committee, the Unification Group, and the Initiative Group. Those people who supported the merger of the three organisations into one were urged to remain within their current organisation and argue their case. If this was done Trotsky hoped that the Initiative and Unification groups would become more decisive in their campaign against social-patriotism and the Petrograd Committee would free itself of fractional arrogance. In this way the three groups would converge politically and this would provide the prerequisite for their reformation into one organisational structure. By not calling for the formation of a fourth 'progressive' fraction Trotsky claimed that he was refuting the

accusations of 'organisational platform' and 'non-fractional fractionalism' made by *Sotsial'Demokrat* and the August Bloc. Despite a lack of success to date Trotsky saw the future as belonging to his position:

We have taken upon ourselves the initiative to call, appealing to the 'leaders', for the joint elaboration of a common effective platform of the internationalist majority of Russian Social-Democracy. So far there have been no practical results from our efforts. But we do not intend to despair. The ideological logic of this attempt penetrates a lot deeper than the official leaders. In the same direction there acts the far mightier logic of the situation itself. We shall repeat our attempt and no doubt more than once. Tomorrow we shall meet face to face at an international gathering of internationalists. We hope that it will....bring us together and make easier our further coming together in the framework of Russian Social-Democracy. Working in this direction we do not doubt of the vitality of this position - far both from ideological-political formlessness and from organisational-fractional absolutism.⁸³

However, Trotsky's arguments cut no ice with the Bolsheviks. For Zinoviev, for example, Trotsky's plans for unity were doomed to failure because his political platform was the most,

idealess and unprincipled ever to have existed in Russian Social-Democracy. Taking a piece from the liquidationists and a piece from the Pravdists, 'to worm oneself' between the Central Committee and the Organisational Committee - in this consists the simple philosophy of 'Trotskyism'. It is absolutely clear that no-one can look at this system with respect.⁸⁴

Zinoviev argued that one had to avoid eclecticism if one wanted to remain a socialist. Thus, Russian Social-Democracy had passed the test of the outbreak of war because the Bolshevik Central Committee had pursued a policy of splitting from revisionists over the course of many years. The retention of ideological purity in the past had enabled the Central Committee to occupy a principled position against social-chauvinism. Trotsky's policy of reconciliation of all tendencies within Russian Social-Democracy could only lead to the burying of Russian

socialism, in the same way as socialism had been buried with the triumph of opportunism in Western Europe:

Opportunists reduced Social-Democracy to the level of a national liberal workers' party. Now the question is should we assimilate the social-chauvinists, can one somehow cohabitate with social-chauvinists in one party; or is our feeling of socialist self-preservation still so alive in us that we can muster enough strength to split with bourgeois corrupters of socialism and walk along our own path? The issue is should there or should there not be socialism.⁸⁵

Zinoviev cited several facts which illustrated Trotsky's support of opportunism and social-chauvinism. First, Trotsky located the collapse of the Second International solely to the peculiarity of the previous epoch.⁸⁶ For Zinoviev, this was a one-sided and confused formulation of the issue. After all, Trotsky had said nothing of the nature of opportunism as such. Why should Trotsky omit any reference of the ideological side of the matter? Because, Zinoviev answered, his call for the formation of a single party from various tendencies was a cover for the pursual of his political intention of reconciliation with social-chauvinism. Second, despite his espousal of the permissibility of split when political expediency demanded, after a year of war Trotsky had still not split from Russian social-chauvinists. Third, Trotsky insisted that there were no differences which separated the five sentenced Social-Democratic deputies from the rest of the Duma fraction. How could this be, asked Zinoviev, when Chkheidze and others rejected everything that the five stood for? Did Trotsky not know that Chkheidze supported the line of the social-chauvinist publication *Nasha Zarya*? Was Trotsky unaware of Chkheidze's participation in meetings at which the question of how best to supply the army was discussed? Was Trotsky blind to the fact that Man'kov had been expelled because his open avowal of social-chauvinism was harmful to a cause which needed to hide its true intentions so as not to alienate workers? Had Trotsky not read Plekhanov's patriotic justification of Chkheidze's refusal to vote for war credits: that one could not give money to a government unfit to ensure the defence of the homeland? Did Trotsky really not know why tsarism itself had distinguished the five for 'special'

treatment? According to Zinoviev, Trotsky knew all of this but he lied because he was 'chained to the Organisational Committee and to social-chauvinism like a convict to a wheelbarrow.'⁸⁷ The attack on Trotsky concluded with a prediction of the subsumption of Trotsky's brand of eclecticism under full-blown social-chauvinism:

At the present moment, under the influence of an optical illusion, it is possible that Trotsky's newspaper appears to be an organ of a particular, independent direction. In order to create a newspaper of *Nashe Slovo's* type in Paris one need not have any connections with the Russian workers' movement. When the matter comes to a serious struggle before the masses in Russia then it will once again become clear that we have only two serious independent platforms: our party and the party which forms *Nasha Zarya*, behind which Trotskyism will always be forced to keep up with.⁸⁸

Lenin also went on to the offensive against Trotsky at this time, most notably in two articles which appeared in *Sotsial'Demokrat'* of 26 July 1915. In 'On the defeat of one's own government in the Imperialist War' Lenin declared defeatism to be the axiom of a revolutionary class during a reactionary war.⁸⁹ Trotsky was labelled a 'hopeless servant of the social-chauvinists' for his claim that defeatism shared the same methodological grounds as social-patriotism.⁹⁰ Lenin argued that the Bern Resolution had made the issue absolutely clear, even for people like Trotsky who lacked the ability to think: 'the proletariat should desire the defeat of their own government in *all* imperialist countries.'⁹¹ For Lenin, Trotsky's views were expressed in the same 'puffed-up phrases by which [he] always justifies opportunism.'⁹² This analysis of Trotsky as social-chauvinist was pursued by Lenin in 'On the state of affairs in Russian Social-Democracy.'⁹³ Here Lenin listed three groups which coexisted in *Nashe Slovo*: first, two editors who were close to *Sotsial'Demokrat'*; second, Martov and the *okisty*; and, finally, Trotsky who 'as always does not agree with the social-chauvinists but is in all practicalities at one with them (thanks, by the way, to 'lucky mediator' - it seems as though this is how to call it in diplomatic language? - Chkhaidze's fraction).'⁹⁴

Trotsky did not respond directly to either of Lenin's articles. However, in early September 1915 he published what was his fullest case against defeatism to date.⁹⁵ He acknowledged that Russian Social-Democrats had agreed even before the hostilities that Russian engagement in a war would fatally weaken its state order. However, he also pointed out that none of the Russian socialists had called for war as a means to further the cause of revolution. According to Trotsky, they had not done so for several very good reasons. First, war becomes a substitute path to revolution only when there is no class able to act as a revolutionary force; a condition not met in the Russian context. Second, war is too uncertain a factor to place at the centre of one's strategy; it could give the necessary push to revolution but one had no guarantees that one could then stop the war. Third, the consequences of war and defeat are a disrupted and often ruined economy; not the best starting-point for a new revolutionary order. Fourth, the defeat of one country presupposes the victory and strengthening of another, and 'we do not know of such a European social and state organism in the strengthening of which the European proletariat would be interested; and, at the same time, we in no way assign Russia the role of an elected state whose interests should be subordinated to the interests of the development of other European peoples.'⁹⁶ Finally, military defeat, as well as stirring a population to action, can also paralyse a nation and 'perhaps in first place the revolutionary movement of the proletariat.'⁹⁷

So, relations between Trotsky and the Bolsheviks were far from the state of harmony which Trotsky hoped would be achieved at a meeting of internationalists to take place in Zimmerwald, starting on 5 September 1915. In his first reports from Zimmerwald which, because of restrictions imposed by the censor, appeared in *Nashe Slovo* of early October 1915 Trotsky devoted several articles to an evaluation of the activities of Lenin and the Bolsheviks.

In 'Our Groupings' Trotsky reported how the Bolsheviks, together with the Polish Opposition, held a pre-conference meeting to decide on a joint programme.⁹⁸ The article began with the claim that Lenin was isolated in his views from the others in attendance. According to Trotsky, Lenin had argued that the slogan struggle for peace had no

revolutionary content. However, he 'did not succeed in attracting the support of any of the participants.'⁹⁹ The reader was then informed that the 'Leninist tendency' put forward two documents in draft form: a tactical resolution and an appeal to the masses. The tactical resolution consisted of a denunciation of the war as an imperialist war; a condemnation of Kautsky and of the notion of 'civil peace'; the demand for a struggle for peace and for a break with legalism. Trotsky welcomed this resolution, viewing it as 'whole number of "retreats" from the point of view of *Sotsial'Demokrat*'; arguing that to the extent that this represented a move towards *Nashe Slovo*'s position there was now an absence of 'all that demarcates the position of *Sotsial'Demokrat*' from the positions of *Golos* and *Nashe Slovo*'.¹⁰⁰ He also emphasised the fact, in block letters, that if *Sotsial'Demokrat* was to continue to adopt a more internationalist stance then it would be forced to abandon its fractionalist position:

We can only a hundred times note with satisfaction that IN SO FAR AS THE GROUP SOTSIALDEMOKRAT ENTERS ONTO THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA IT WILL BE FORCED TO A GREATER OR LESSER EXTENT TO THROW TO ONE SIDE THAT SECTIONALIST LANGUAGE UNDER THE HELP OF WHICH IT HAS ATTEMPTED TO ARTIFICIALLY SPLIT RUSSIAN INTERNATIONALISTS.¹⁰¹

After expressing regret that the tactical resolution was defeated when it was put to the vote, Trotsky expressed a cautionary note: the slogan of struggle for peace had not been written into the resolution in a sufficiently decisive and principled manner. For Trotsky, 'the social revolutionary political perspectives were formulated with too confused and superficial features and so on.'¹⁰²

Three days later Trotsky published an article which painted a far more pessimistic picture of Lenin's machinations. Events occurring on the eve of the conference illustrated just how far a mood of hostility had set in between the two. In 'The Russian Section of the Internationalists' Trotsky recounted how Lenin had tried to prevent *Nashe Slovo* from having its own representative at the conference.¹⁰³ According to Trotsky's report Lenin had argued that since half of the editorial board of *Nashe Slovo* belonged to the Organisational Committee there was

no need for a separate place to be set aside for *Nashe Slovo*. Lenin also claimed that this had already been agreed with the Organisational Committee. The Organisational Committee objected and stated that they had never concluded such an 'agreement'; while Trotsky attacked Lenin's assertion of the links between *Nashe Slovo* and the Organisational Committee - had not *Sotsial'Demokrat* itself written that the Organisational Committee had decided to boycott *Nashe Slovo*? Lenin dropped his proposal amid all of this wrangling, but there was obviously no love lost between Lenin and Trotsky; the latter claiming that the proposal would have been rejected if it had been put to the vote.

In this and in other articles written from the Zimmerwald Conference Trotsky proudly defended the achievements and 'non-fractional' stance of *Nashe Slovo*. Thus, for example, he emphasised that it was now entering its second year of existence, continuing to play a crucial role as an organ used by revolutionary internationalists struggling in the Balkans, Russia, Italy and especially in Germany where the fact that *Nashe Slovo* (unlike other socialist publications produced in neutral countries) was produced in Entente-aligned France had special significance.¹⁰⁴

In 'Basic Theses' Trotsky reported the steps taken which led to the adoption of the Zimmerwald Manifesto.¹⁰⁵ Lenin put forward a resolution which called for the adoption of a programme of struggle to launch a civil war against imperialist governments. Trotsky criticised this plan as ignoring the need first of all to unite the proletariat against a war which was exhausting vital human and technical resources: 'So that the German proletariat should want to turn their cannons 42 against the class enemy they should first of all desire not to turn them on their class brothers.'¹⁰⁶ He acknowledged that Lenin considered Trotsky's espousal of a struggle for peace as a half-retreat to pacifism but, for Trotsky, it was exactly this that made Lenin's position 'sectionalist.' Furthermore, Trotsky argued that the Leninists were inconsistent in their evaluation of pacifism; sometimes correctly identifying it as a desire to ensure that war would not occur again while retaining capitalism and, at others, calling pacifism part of the 'revolutionary-class struggle for peace as a central task of the

moment.¹⁰⁷ However, Lenin's proposal was rejected. A Commission of the Conference asked Grimm and the 'representative from *Nashe Slovo*' to elaborate a programme acceptable to all. This was done and passed unanimously. The Leninists attempted to attach an amendment to the Manifesto, criticising Kautsky's position and approving Liebknecht's. This was also rejected as a personification of views taken by various German socialists and thus deemed inappropriate for a document bearing a general appeal. Trotsky made it clear that he was not satisfied with the Manifesto. For him, it did not outline a full programme of peace and its relation to a revolutionary struggle. From this he concluded that the Manifesto had a pacifist tone which, given the critical and not creative mood which existed among parties dominated by social-patriotic leaderships, he accepted as an inevitable compromise. Nevertheless, Trotsky viewed the Manifesto as a step forward in the right direction at a time when many socialist parties were still in a state of crisis after their recent capitulations.

Lenin also produced his own version of what had happened at Zimmerwald. He seized this opportunity to continue his struggle against Trotsky. *Sotsial'Demokrat* No 45-46 of 11 October 1915 carried the Zimmerwald resolution in full on its front page, with Lenin's signature of approval on behalf of the Russian delegation.¹⁰⁸ However, in several articles in the same issue Lenin and his comrades stressed that the first 'internationalist' conference of the war had not issued a true internationalist manifesto. Zimmerwald was evaluated in a manner similar to Trotsky's: it was a necessary compromise which would eventually lead to the victory of a real revolutionary Marxist appraisal of the then current events.¹⁰⁹ However, Trotsky and the Bolsheviks differed over the meaning of a real Marxist approach. In a back-page report of the activities of the 'also-internationalists' at Zimmerwald Trotsky was criticised for his opposition to Radek's theses of a struggle against opportunism and the centre and for mass revolutionary activity.¹¹⁰ The report claimed that French and German delegates were the first to object to Radek's views. Trotsky then supported them, declaring that he did not know what Radek meant by 'mass revolutionary activity.' *Sotsial'Demokrat* retorted by saying that Trotsky's 'revolutionary activity' never went beyond the idea of voting

on war credits. Although it was admitted that Trotsky had voted for Lenin's resolutions to be submitted to the commission which would elaborate a common statement, the *Nashe Slovo* correspondent was described as having 'struggled with all his might against a revolutionary Marxist appraisal of issues.'¹¹¹

The same issue of *Sotsial'Demokrat* contained one further assault on Trotsky's views. In 'The War and the Revolutionary Crisis in Russia' Zinoviev criticised Trotsky's evaluation of the nature of the coming revolution in Russia.¹¹² In a series of articles entitled 'Military Catastrophe and Political Perspectives' Trotsky had argued that recent changes in Russian society meant that the proletariat was the only class willing and able to carry out a revolution.¹¹³ The peasantry had become even more stratified and conservative, and the proletariat could hope to attract only proletarian and semi-proletarian elements from peasant ranks. For Trotsky, the revolution would not only be proletarian in content but also in form, i.e., it would be a socialist revolution. According to Zinoviev, Trotsky's schema ignored the importance of Russia's bourgeois-democratic movements as well as underestimating the peasant's potential to play a revolutionary role. Furthermore, he argued that Trotsky was wrong to call for a socialist revolution in Russia. Zinoviev repeated the view outlined in *Sotsial'Demokrat*'s manifesto of November 1914: in backward countries, including Russia, there should be a democratic revolution; socialist revolution was possible only in the advanced countries of Western Europe.

Trotsky responded to only one of the above articles. He summarised the criticisms of his actions at Zimmerwald in an article in *Nashe Slovo* of 5 November 1915.¹¹⁴ *Sotsial'Demokrat*'s version of events was objected to as a distortion of what had really happened. After all, Trotsky had stated that he considered the Manifesto to be deficient from a revolutionary Marxist point of view. More over, elaborating the Manifesto in conjunction with Grimm hardly amounted to a full-blown struggle against Marxism. Trotsky also responded to an 'extremist' critique of Zimmerwald advanced by the Dutch tribunist.¹¹⁵ He wrote that it was easy to preserve one's purity when one had the support of five hundred people in a country that was not involved in the war and

which would not become a centre of revolutionary activity. The point was, however, that if one remained in the confines of one's own fraction one lost a sense of perspective of what could possibly be achieved at any particular moment. Trotsky added that one could have written of Zimmerwald as a capitulation to social-chauvinism in Paris. He used this thought as a background against which he ridiculed Zinoviev:

In mood it would be in the same tone by which Zinoviev writes his articles (Zinoviev, as is well-known always writes one and the same article) and would not have been distinguished from Zinoviev's article - well, apart from a better literary style!¹¹⁶

By the end of November 1915 both Lenin and Trotsky were levelling criticisms at the other but over different issues. Lenin chose to concentrate on the differing perceptions of what type of revolution would occur in Russia. Trotsky had once again stated his case for the establishment of a socialist workers' government in a polemical article directed against Aksel'rod and the Organisational Committee.¹¹⁷ Lenin seized the opportunity to express his view on the debate and went on to the offensive against Trotsky.¹¹⁸ His main criticism was that Trotsky was blind to the crucial role of the peasantry in a revolution which would lead to a 'revolutionary democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry.'¹¹⁹ For Lenin, Trotsky's arguments could only help the cause of liberal politics in Russia which 'by "denying" the role of the peasantry understand a disinclination to urge the peasantry to revolution !'

Trotsky, however, was still focussing his attention on how the Zimmerwald Manifesto was produced, in two articles in which the author polemicised with Martov.¹²⁰ The dispute centred around Martov's evaluation of Trotsky's reportage of the Zimmerwald Conference. For Martov, Trotsky had been wrong to identify three groups at the conference: the extremists (Lenin) who called for a civil war; the right (Ledebur) who demanded peace but without any clear plan of how to achieve it and who refused to condemn social nationalism; and the centre (*Nashe Slovo*) who put forward the slogan struggle for peace which would act as a rallying call for the revolutionary mobilisation of the proletariat. Trotsky defended his

classification of the various political tendencies at the conference and included a damning characterisation of Lenin and the Bolsheviks:

misunderstanding of the significance of the slogan struggle for peace as a slogan of mass proletarian struggle; subordinating questions of political action to questions of organisational splitting; hostile relations to those who do not share the basic principles of their political programme and to those who do not bow down before all points of their sectionalist programme. If this group was the more organisationally formed then this would fully correspond to its tendency of exclusion.¹²¹

However, as well as presenting the Bolsheviks as a closely knit sectionalist group Trotsky also pinpointed friction within the Bolshevik camp. In particular, he (once again) claimed that Lenin was out of step with his supporters. Thus, he pointed out that Lenin had initially refused to sign the Zimmerwald Manifesto unless it was amended. Then Lenin backtracked and signed. For Trotsky, the message was obvious: 'even [Lenin's] closest friends were not prepared to go that far down the path of sectionalism.'¹²²

Trotsky's insistence of the sectional nature of Lenin's politics was not only based upon his experiences at Zimmerwald. At some point in 1915 Trotsky resigned from his membership of the Internationalist Club in Paris because he thought it run by Lenin's extremist sectionalists. In 1921 Tanya Lyudvinskaya, the secretary of the Paris section of the Bolshevik fraction during the First World War, sent a copy of Trotsky's letter of resignation to Istpart. In her covering letter she informed the Party historians that the Club was established by the Paris section of the RSDLP(b) with the intention of 'uniting all groups occupying an internationalist position on the war.'¹²³ She dates Trotsky's letter at May or June 1915, but it was clearly written after Zimmerwald. Thus, Louis Sinclair's dating of December 1915 is probably the more accurate.¹²⁴

In the letter Trotsky claimed that the Paris Club could not fulfil its aim of uniting internationalists since it clearly was a sectionalist organisation. After all, he pointed out, the Club's practice of passing resolutions would inevitably alienate some comrades. Thus, the resolutions which were passed, 'receiving a completely accidental

majority', supported the Zimmerwald extremists and this meant that Trotsky had to resign:

Since I did not agree with the behaviour of the Leninist delegation at the Zimmerwald Conference; since I supported the Leninist delegation at the conference only in so far as its basic line corresponded in general with the line of revolutionary internationalism and with all my energy struggled against it in so far as it attempted - true, unsuccessfully - to place its sectionalist, fractionalist, extremist stamp on the conference, even threatening not to sign the conference manifesto - then naturally, not uniting with the Leninists in Zimmerwald, I am even less able to unite with them through the auspices of the Paris Club.¹²⁵

For Trotsky, the fact that the majority of the Club's members supported Lenin's resolutions at Zimmerwald without even considering those of other groups' 'even more illustrates the fractional character of the Club's decisions.'¹²⁶ In his concluding remarks Trotsky stressed that the reasons for his resignation were principled, and not sour grapes.

In November and December 1915 Lenin and Trotsky made conflicting claims about which of their programmes was receiving most support among the Petrograd workers. They were given this opportunity by the tsarist government which, in the summer of 1915, decided to allow the workers to elect their representatives to the War-Industries Committees. The elections were held in September 1915.¹²⁷ In *Sotsial'Demokrat'* of 20 November 1915 Zinoviev reported that the Bolsheviks had gained a majority of ten votes, i.e., ninety against the social-chauvinists' eighty. He informed the reader that, in the election campaign, *Nashe Slovo* and Trotsky had whitewashed the social-chauvinists, labelling their publication *Utro* 'internationalist.' However, according to Zinoviev, Trotsky had paid the consequent price. With no clear policy of his own Trotsky

again turned out to be a dead-end. There is simply no place for him among the workers' movement in Russia. Either you are with Chkheidze and this means with Plekhanov and Guchkov or you are with the RSDLP and this means against Chkheidze. Life itself places the question in this way.¹²⁸

In his rejoinder to Zinoviev Trotsky did not claim the ninety internationalists for himself. He said that nobody had exact information regarding the ideological-fractional breakdown of the internationalist majority. However, it was clear the Mensheviks and the internationalist minority of the narodniks had been counted in the ninety. Trotsky admitted that the Bolsheviks were a significant group among the worker deputies, but even they had not supported specific slogans advanced by *Sotsial'Demokrat*. On the contrary,

There was a repetition only on a much larger scale, and not at the start but in the fifteenth month of the war, of that which occurred at the trial of the five S-D deputies: the defeatist slogan, i.e., nationalism turned inside out, was rejected not by 'chauvinists' and 'government lackeys', as *Sotsial'Demokrat* labels all its opponents, but by the whole revolutionary-internationalist vanguard of the Russian proletariat. We hope therefore that *Sotsial'Demokrat* will not force us to return to this sad ideological and political confusion.¹²⁹

Whatever misgivings Trotsky had about the compromise which lay at the centre of the Zimmerwald Manifesto, he clearly viewed it as more of a success for his position than for the Leninists. In a series of articles published in *Nashe Slovo* between 29 January and 13 April 1916 Trotsky attempted to fill what he saw as the main lacuna left by Zimmerwald: the absence of a detailed programme of peace. In the first instalment Trotsky repeated his view that the Leninists had been forced to give ground at Zimmerwald:

Opponents of the struggle for peace (Leninists) capitulated at the Conference without a struggle: they could not but see that the movement arises everywhere under the slogan struggle for peace.¹³⁰

Lenin's alternative to struggle for peace of turning the war into a civil war was then dismissed as 'putting the question abstractly-extremely and not revolutionary politically.'¹³¹

A central component of Trotsky's peace programme was the need to establish a United States of Europe. In their first Manifesto of the war the Central Committee had also expressed support for this idea. Lenin had then divided the United States of Europe into a political and an

economic aspect. He accepted the term politically but he also said that it must be evaluated more fully from the point of view of economics. He then came out against the slogan both politically and economically. Trotsky discussed the developments in Lenin's position in the fourth and fifth contributions to 'A Programme of Peace.'

First, he examined the arguments expounded in a footnote to Zinoviev's and Lenin's brochure *Socialism and the War*, published in the Summer of 1915. Here Zinoviev and Lenin stated that:

In No. 44 of the central organ of our party, *Sotsial'Demokrat*, there appeared an editorial article in which the economic incorrectness of the slogan 'United States of Europe' was illustrated. Either this is a demand which is unrealisable under capitalism, proposing the establishment of a regulated world economy with the division of colonies, spheres of influence and so on between separate states. Or this slogan is reactionary, signifying a temporary alliance of the great powers of Europe for the more successful exploitation of the colonies and for robbing the more quickly developing Japan and America.¹³²

Trotsky dismissed these arguments as an 'administrative dispatch' written in a 'telegraph style.'¹³³ He used the example of industrial trusts to illustrate how the two Bolsheviks had concentrated on only one (reactionary) side of the issue. He pointed out that trusts were also a means to more exploitation. However, to stop one's analysis at this point could be done 'only by a Chelyabinsk narodnik.'¹³⁴ Marxists also viewed trusts as a progressive measure in that they would be utilised as part of a future socialist organisation of production. Trotsky hoped that, 'the authors of the aforementioned brochure themselves make from this analogy the necessary conclusions in applying them to the United States of Europe.'¹³⁵

Trotsky devoted a whole article to a consideration of Lenin's arguments which he had expounded against the slogan of a United States of Europe in *Sotsial'Demokrat* of 23 August 1915.¹³⁶ Here Lenin rejected the United States of Europe for two reasons: 'first because it combines with socialism; and second, because it can lead to the incorrect thought of the impossibility of the victory of socialism in one country and of the relation of this country to the rest.'¹³⁷ Trotsky

criticised Lenin's objections on four grounds: logical, logistical, methodological and empirical.¹³⁸

Trotsky likened Lenin's view that the United States of Europe would be combined with socialism and therefore any talk of it in the present could only give rise to the aforementioned illusions to the reason why the Dutch tribunist rejected the slogan of the rights of nations to self-determination, i.e., that this problem would be resolved under socialism and any mention of it now could only create the impression that it could be resolved under capitalism.¹³⁹ He also pointed out that Lenin did think that the nationality problem was a task for the then present epoch. According to Trotsky, Lenin was left in the contradictory position of assigning the national democratic demarcation of states to imperialism while denying that imperialism could bring about the democratic unification of states, i.e., a United States. For Trotsky, 'such a picture is absurd whether one takes it politically, economically or synthetically.'¹⁴⁰

Trotsky's second objection to Lenin's critique of a United States of Europe was that Lenin had ignored an important logistical consideration, i.e., he had leaped over the bridge which linked the present (capitalism) to the future (socialism). In assigning the United States of Europe to the future Lenin, according to Trotsky, had omitted social revolution. And, for Trotsky, 'the European Republican Federation is the state instrument of social revolution and outside this it turns into a democratic abstraction.'¹⁴¹ In other words, the formation of a United States of Europe was the means by which the coming revolution would realise itself, so to ignore the slogan of a United States of Europe meant that one was out of step with reality and left with an empty and meaningless analysis.

Trotsky linked Lenin's logistical error to his methodological shortcomings. Thus, for instance, he characterised Lenin as a thinker in whom 'revolutionary democratism and socialist dogma live side by side without ever having been amalgamated into a living Marxist whole.'¹⁴² On the issue of Lenin's thoughts on the issue of the rights of nations to self-determination, Trotsky saw the victory of the revolutionary democrat over the socialist doctrinaire; the latter 'did not have time to express his doubts regarding the realisation of self-determination on a capitalist basis.'¹⁴³

Trotsky's final assault on Lenin went right to the heart of their differing perceptions of the nature of the epoch and of the coming revolution. Lenin had stated that the time when socialism was only a European problem had disappeared into the past, never to return. For Lenin, uneven political and economic development meant that a socialist revolution would occur first in one or in several states. There would then follow a whole epoch of struggle in which the remaining capitalist states would be conquered until the establishment of a United States of the World. Lenin did not predict where or when this process would begin, but he emphasised that one could not separate out Europe as a special entity in itself.¹⁴⁴ In response, Trotsky outlined a diametrically opposed scenario. While he accepted Lenin's assertion of a law of uneven development under capitalism which 'it is useful and necessary to repeat'; he also insisted that 'in comparison with Africa or Asia, all of these countries are a capitalist 'Europe' ripe for socialist revolution.'¹⁴⁵ Ultimately, Trotsky viewed Lenin's worry of the impermissibility of a successful revolution taking place in one country under Trotsky's outlook as sharing the same theoretical ground as social-patriotism:

To look at the perspective of social revolution in the framework of the nation state would be to fall victim to the same national limitness which is the essence of social-patriotism....One should not forget that in social-patriotism there is that vulgar reformism and national revolutionary messianism which thinks that its state....is the one to lead humanity into socialism. If the victory of socialism was possible in the limits of one more prepared nation this messianism, connected with the idea of national defence, would have its relative historical justification. But in actual fact it does not have this. Struggling for the preservation of the national base of the social revolution by such methods which undermine the international ties of the proletariat means to undermine the revolution which has to start on a national basis, but which cannot stop on it under the present economic and military political interdependency of the European states, never before revealed with such force as precisely in this war. This interdependency, which will immediately and directly condition the coordination of

action of the European proletariat in revolution, is given expression by the slogan of a United States of Europe.¹⁴⁶

In the midst of all this wrangling one further attempt was made to bring Trotsky and Lenin together. The mediator was Henrietta Roland Holst who wanted Lenin and Trotsky to contribute to the journal *Vorbote*, two issues of which were published in January and April of 1916. Trotsky replied to Holst's offer after he had received the first number of the journal.¹⁴⁷ He refused to be in any way connected with the journal as it stood. Trotsky's main objection was that Holst wanted the journal to be a coalition journal, whereas in reality it was firmly in the hands of the Leninists. As such the journal was notable mainly for its paucity of content, for 'Russian extremism is the product of an amorphous and uncultured social environment where the first historical movement of the proletariat naturally demands a simplification and vulgarisation of theory and politics.'¹⁴⁸ Furthermore, Trotsky excluded the possibility of bringing the Leninists over to the side of cooperation. After all, he pointed out, had they not criticised Holst's (the coeditor's) contribution for its opposition to the Dutch extremists? According to Trotsky, he 'knew this public too well to be surprised by anything.'¹⁴⁹ For Trotsky, the journal's base was far too narrow for it to be able to attract wide support and to be successful:

I do not think that such a journal can group around itself serious forces in the sphere of the German and French workers' movements. I know too well with what contempt they referred to the leaflet of the Zimmerwald Left here in order not to have any doubts about this. In the last analysis you should not forget that the Leninists do not have - and in my view cannot have - any supporters either in Germany or in France or in Britain. The Russian and Dutch extremists together cannot found the International.¹⁵⁰

Trotsky was to refer to his disagreements with Lenin and the Central Committee one more time on the pages of *Nashe Slovo* before the newspaper was closed by the French police on 15 September 1916. This concerned Lenin's assertion in *Sotsial'Demokrat'* No. 50 that there were no differences separating Chkheidze from the social-patriotic newspaper *Prizyv*.

Trotsky can rant against our fractionalism, hiding by these rantings (the old recipe of Turgenev's...hero!) of his supposed non-fractional 'appearance' that some so and so from Chkheidze's fraction 'agrees' with Trotsky and swears his leftism and internationalism and so on. But fact remains fact. There is no hint of serious political differences not only between the O.K. and Chkheidze's fraction but also between both these institutions and...*Prizyv*.¹⁵¹

In the first instalment of 'Our Duma Fraction', which appeared in March 1916, Trotsky criticised Chkheidze for not making it clear that imperialists and social-patriots were guilty of propagating a 'defencist' ideology.¹⁵² However, at the same time he praised the deputy for disrobing social-patriotism, and he cited the following extract from Chkheidze's speech: 'what for them [the social-patriots] is holy is lying and deceitful.'¹⁵³ In view of this Trotsky claimed that it was simply nonsense to equate the two. One month later Trotsky was far more critical of the Social-Democratic fraction, claiming that the deputies were 'passive internationalists.'¹⁵⁴ This more damning appraisal was further developed in September 1916. Here Trotsky labelled Chkheidze's call for the setting up of mutual aid organisations as a response to high prices as 'deplorable.'¹⁵⁵ However, Lenin was not overly impressed with Trotsky's critique of Chkheidze:

Nashe Slovo and Trotsky....have more and more been forced by the pressure of facts to struggle against the O[rganisational] C[ommittee] and Chkheidze....but to this day they have not yet uttered the decisive words. Unity or split with Chkheidze's faction. They are still afraid to think of this!¹⁵⁶

After being deported from France to Spain at the end of October 1916 Trotsky's circumstances were not conducive to the steady production of polemical articles. He was to regain contact with a readily available forum for the expression of his views only after he landed in New York on 13 January 1917. There he quickly became involved with the publication of the Russian émigré journal *Novyi Mir*, edited by Bukharin, Kollontai and Volodarsky. His attention was soon to be absorbed by the news of the outbreak of the March Revolution in

Russia and he wrote no articles in which he directly polemicised with Lenin and the Central Committee.

However, this does not mean that hostility between the two had in any way receded. Thus, for example, in a letter of 17 February 1917 to Kollontai we learn of Lenin's continuing contempt for Trotsky. Kollontai must have informed Lenin that Trotsky had attempted to forge an alliance against Bukharin:

It was just as wonderful to learn from you of N. I. Bukharin's and Pavlov's victory in *Novyi Mir*...as it was sad news of Trotsky's bloc with the right for a struggle against N. I. Bukharin...- left phrases and a bloc with the right against the whole left!! One has to unmask him (by you) although with a short letter in S-D!¹⁵⁷

So, despite attempts at the establishment of cooperation relations between Trotsky and Lenin and the Bolsheviks from the August of 1914 to the March of 1917 remained fraught with suspicion and hostility. This mood seems to have continued right up to the time of Trotsky joining the Bolshevik Party. After all, during the negotiations between the Bolsheviks and the Inter-Districters Trotsky stipulated that, 'I cannot call myself a Bolshevik.'¹⁵⁸

The subsequent problem for Trotsky was how to represent these war time relations when he came to compose his collected works around the beginning of the 1920s, i.e., when he was a member of the Bolshevik government.

4.3 Conclusion: Trotsky, the Bolsheviks and post-revolutionary historiography

The first post-revolutionary reference made by Trotsky to his First World War disputes with Lenin was in the Introduction, first written in 1919 and then revised in 1922, to the first volume of *War and Revolution*.¹⁵⁹ Here Trotsky did two things. First, he acknowledged that *Nashe Slovo* and *Sotsial'Demokrat'* had adopted different stances during the war. However, he limited these disagreements to three: *Nashe Slovo* rejected defeatism; *Sotsial'Demokrat'* rejected the slogan of struggle for peace and supported the notion of civil war; and, finally, *Nashe Slovo* declared that the coming revolution would be a

socialist revolution whereas *Sotsial'Demokrat'* insisted that it would be a 'democratic' dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry.¹⁶⁰ Thus, he made no mention of the disputes concerning the United States of Europe and those centring around accusations of fractionalism. Second, Trotsky claimed that *Nashe Slovo* and *Sotsial'Demokrat'* were poles apart at the outset of the war and then gradually moved closer together. Credit for this convergence was given to *Sotsial'Demokrat'*, whose criticism:

was...undoubtedly correct and helped the left-wing of the editorial board to oust Martov and in this way give the newspaper, after the Zimmerwald Conference, a more defined and irreconcilable character.¹⁶¹

Of course, the pattern of relations between Trotsky and the Bolshevik Central Committee had not followed the curve which Trotsky drew in the above scenario. In fact, there had been initial agreement on the need to establish a United States of Europe; then negotiations of joint action during the London Conference; and after this the onset of a stable course of opposition and occasional acrimonious outbursts. However, in *War and Revolution* Trotsky constructed a picture of increasing harmonisation in two ways.

First, as Bukharin pointed out in the mid-1920s, he simply left out most of the articles in which he had polemicised with Lenin and the Bolsheviks.¹⁶²

Second, Trotsky falsified other articles to make them conform to his convergence thesis. For example, in Volume 2 of *War and Revolution* one finds an article entitled 'Conclusions', ending a section devoted to the Zimmerwald Conference and claiming to be from *Nashe Slovo* of 3 and 6 October 1915.¹⁶³ The impression is given that 'Conclusions' is a coherent article spread over two issues of the newspaper. It begins by talking of a pre-conference Bolshevik meeting and throughout the piece one reads 'meeting' as signifying that reference is still being made to this gathering of Bolsheviks. The evaluation of the meeting is very favourable and it is claimed that the differences between *Nashe Slovo* and *Sotsial'Demokrat'* had been eliminated. However, 'Conclusions' was in fact made-up from two separate and unconnected reports; one (discussed above) in which Trotsky noted that

Sotsial'Demokrat' was moving closer to *Nashe Slovo* but significant differences remained, and another in which Trotsky presented a glowing account of the success of Zimmerwald in general.¹⁶⁴ Trotsky also changed the whole thrust of his original analysis of some convergence between *Nashe Slovo* and *Sotsial'Demokrat'* by omitting crucial sentences when he merged the two articles to form 'Conclusions.' The first paragraph of 'Conclusions' ends with the claim that Lenin had 'showed that the slogan of struggle for peace was deprived of revolutionary content.'¹⁶⁵ The subsequent sentence in the original that Lenin had not attracted any support was simply cut; as was the text in block capitals in which Trotsky had emphasised that *Sotsial'Demokrat'* would have to abandon its fractionalism if it were to adopt an even more internationalist position, together with the footnote which stated that the Bolsheviks had not formulated the slogan struggle for peace in a sufficiently decisive way. Thus, from the 1924 text one would think that Trotsky had recognised Lenin's persuasiveness in October 1915!

When Trotsky falsified his writings of the First World War his sensitivity extended beyond Lenin. Thus, for instance, in a piece entitled 'Dutch Extremists' he dropped the paragraph where he had ridiculed Zinoviev for his vacuousness and poor prose style.¹⁶⁶

At this stage Trotsky's endeavours to present past disputes in a more favourable light received some backing from his Bolshevik colleagues. When Zinoviev gathered his war time writings for publication in the fifth volume of his collected works he cut his more taunting references to Trotsky. For example, the claim that the Bolsheviks had written to Trotsky offering cooperation on *Kommunist'* as part of an 'experiment' did not appear in the reprint of 'Russian Social-Democracy and Russian Social-Chauvinism.'¹⁶⁷ Zinoviev did retain the part of this article which was very critical of Trotsky, but he added an explanatory footnote which stated that:

During the war L. D. Trotsky attempted to occupy an intermediary position and 'reconcile' the Central Committee and the social-chauvinists, advancing his usual view on the necessity of patience in relations towards each other. The events of the war pushed him more and more to the left. None the less the

characterisation of his position during the war remains true and factual.¹⁶⁸

This equilibrium was upset by Trotsky's publication of his essay 'Lessons of October', used as an introduction to volume 3 of his collected works.¹⁶⁹ This essay became a contentious issue as it was interpreted as part of a Trotsky campaign to become the new leader of the party and state.¹⁷⁰ Trotsky had not referred to the First World War in this essay, but this did not prevent this period from being brought into the remit of the debate. Many leading figures in the party wrote rejoinders to Trotsky's 'Lessons of October'. In their contributions to the debate Kamenev and Bukharin gave expositions of the disputes which raged between Trotsky and the Central Committee during the war.¹⁷¹ These accounts highlighted the issues of civil war or struggle for peace, defeatism, unity with Chkheidze, the Zimmerwald Left and the role of the peasantry in the Russian Revolution; and this approach was to become the standard version of Stalinist historiography.

Trotsky returned to the positions taken by Russian socialists during the First World War in *My Life*, *History of the Russian Revolution* and in *The Stalin School of Falsification*, all of which stressed the gradual convergence of Lenin's and Trotsky's views. In his autobiography, for example, Trotsky claimed that the 'secondary, in essence, disagreements which still separated myself from Lenin in Zimmerwald disappeared into nothing in the coming months.'¹⁷² Both *My Life* and the *History* state that, by April 1917, only Lenin and Trotsky shared the same evaluation of the future development of the Russian Revolution - the former expounding his view in his famous April Theses and the latter in his articles of March 1917 in *Novyi Mir*.¹⁷³

In this way the ground was laid for the approaches subsequently adopted by historians of this period. Deutscher followed Trotsky's interpretation and his willingness to do so must be set against a generally accepted view of the falsity of Stalinist historiography. Indeed, given the nature of Stalinist oppression one can well understand Deutscher's inclination to believe Trotsky; as one can well understand Soviet historians repeating the views taken by Trotsky's protagonists following the publication of 'Lessons of October'. Now, in the aftermath of the most full-blown process of deStalinization to have occurred in the

former Soviet Union, one can witness a further twist of the tale. For now some Russian historians accept Trotsky's version of events. Thus, for example, Pantsov argues that the analyses produced by Trotsky and Lenin in March/April 1917 are 'obviously identical.'¹⁷⁴ However, an examination of the documents written during the First World War reveals a story of almost continuous opposition between Trotsky and Lenin and the Bolsheviks.

The next chapter will examine whether Trotsky was able to establish and maintain better relations with the Menshevik section of the RSDLP.

Notes

1. K. Marx, *Surveys from Exile*, Translated by Ben Fowkes, Harmondsworth, 1973, p 146.
2. This is most notable in accounts characteristic of Stalinist historiography. See, for example, A. N. Atsarkin & A. T. Barulina, *Bor'ba Bolshevikov za osushchestvlenie leninskoi programmy po voprosam voyna, mir i revolyutsii*, Moscow, 1963; E. D. Chermenskii, *Rossiia v period imperialisticheskoi voyny. Vtoraya revolyutsiia v Rossii (1914-Mart' 1917)*, Moscow, 1957; P. A. Satyukov, *Bolshevistskaya pechat' v period imperialisticheskoi voyny i vtoroi revolyutsii v Rossii*, Moscow, 1951; S. V. Shestakov, *Istoriografiia deiatel'nosti bol'shevistskoi partii v period pervoi mirovoi voyny i fevral'skoi revolyutsii*, Moscow, 1977; and V. V. Zaplatkin, *Bor'ba V. I. Lenina protiv 'Imperialisticheskogo ekonomizma'*, Moscow, 1967.
3. See, for example, I. Deutscher, *The Prophet Armed*, Oxford, 1954, pp 218 ff.
4. For the reemergence of Trotsky studies in the Soviet Union under Gorbachev see I. D. Thatcher, 'Recent Soviet Writings on Leon Trotsky', *Coexistence*, 27, 1990, pp 141-167, and I. D. Thatcher, 'Soviet Writings on Leon Trotsky: An Update', *Coexistence*, 29, 1992, pp 73-96.
5. See, for example, T. Cliff, *Trotsky. Towards October*, London, 1989; T. Cliff, *Trotsky. The sword of the Revolution*, London, 1990; T. Cliff, *Trotsky. Fighting the rising Stalinist bureaucracy*, London, 1991; and K. Mavrikis, *On Trotskyism*, London, 1976. For an outline of approaches to Trotsky see M. Cox, 'Trotsky and His Interpreters; or, Will the Real Leon Trotsky Please Stand Up?', *The Russian Review*, Vol. 51, January 1992, pp 84-102, and David S. Law, 'Studies on Trotsky', *Journal of Communist Studies*, Vol. 2, March 1986, pp 83-90.
6. See, for example, D. Hallas, *Trotsky's Marxism*, London, 1979; I. Howe, *Trotsky*, Sussex, 1978; R. Segal, *The Tragedy of Leon*

Trotsky, Harmondsworth, 1983; and R. S. Wistrich, *Trotsky*, London, 1979.

7. B. Pearce, "Lenin versus Trotsky on "Revolutionary Defeatism"", *Study Group on the Russian Revolution Sbornik*, 13, 1987, pp 16-30.
8. For an analysis of the impact of the censor's cuts on Trotsky's Paris journalism of 1914-16 see Ian D. Thatcher, 'Trotsky and the Censor in Paris during World War One', *European History Quarterly*, forthcoming and the third chapter of this thesis.
9. For an account of Trotsky's involvement in *Bor'ba* see I. D. Thatcher, 'Trotsky and Bor'ba', *The Historical Journal*, 4, 1993, forthcoming.
10. N. Trotskii, 'Nash' politicheskii lozung', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 22, 23 February 1915, p 1.
11. N. Trotskii, 'Nash' politicheskii lozung', *Golos*, No. 108, 17 January 1915, p 1.
12. Ibid.
13. N. Trotskii, 'Nash' politicheskii lozung', *Golos*, No. 106, 15 January 1915, p 1.
14. N. Trotskii, 'Nash' politicheskii lozung', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 23, 24 February 1915, p 1.
15. N. Trotskii, 'Nash' politicheskii lozung', *Golos*, No. 108, p 2.
16. N. Trotskii, 'Nash' politicheskii lozung', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 23, p 1.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid.
19. 'Voina i Rossiskaya Sotsial'demokratiya', *Sotsial'Demokrat*', No. 33, 1 November 1914, p 1.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid.
27. -:, 'Konferentsiya zagranichnykh sektiis RSDRP', *Sotsial'Demokrat*', No. 40, 29 March 1915, p 2. The five points

were as follows: 1) the unconditional refusal to vote for war credits and immediate withdrawal from bourgeois governments; 2) total split with the policy of 'civil peace'; 3) the creation of illegal organisations where governments and the bourgeoisie declare a military situation and remove constitutional freedoms; 4) to support the brotherhood of soldiers of warring nations in the trenches and in the theatre of war in general; 5) to support all types of revolutionary mass demonstrations in general.

28. Ibid.
29. Trotsky's printed remarks on Eintracht's resolution are not consistent. In the first of 1917 he says that Eintracht's Executive Committee penned the resolution and just made a speech in support of it, whereas in his autobiography (1929) he claims authorship for himself. Cf. N. Trotskii, 'Za dva s' polovinoi goda voiny v' Evrope', *Novyi Mir*, No. 928, 6 March 1917, p 4 and L. Trotskii, *Moya zhizn'*, Moscow, 1991, pp 233-234.
30. For the full text of Eintracht's resolution see 'Der Krieg und die Aufgabe der Internationale', *Volksrecht*, 15 October 1914, pp 1-2.
31. 'Material k referatu <<Voine i Sotsial-Demokratii>>', *Leninskii sbornik*, Vol. 14, Moscow, 1930, p 139.
32. Ibid.
33. Ibid.
34. Ibid., p 142.
35. Ibid., p 139.
36. Ibid., p 140.
37. Ya. G. Temkin, *Lenin i mezhdunarodnaya sotsial-demokratiya*, Moscow, 1968, p 115.
38. *Leninskii sbornik*, Vol. 17, Moscow, 1931, p 198.
39. Ibid., p 195.
40. Loc cit.
41. V. I. Lenin 'A. G. Shlyapnikovu', *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii*, Vol. 49, Moscow, 1978, p 64. At the same time one should note that Trotsky himself was still wary of Lenin's 'machinations.' Thus, for example, in an undated letter to Radek, which was obviously written after *Nashe Slovo* had received Lenin's theses on the

London Conference, Trotsky said: 'You asked me about Lenin's politics. Here is my opinion. To begin with Lenin made an attempt to unite with Martov against the non-fractionalists and the liquidationists. When he again became convinced that Martov is too tightly tied to his fraction he made an attempt, through *Nashe Slovo*, to unite with the non-fractionalists against Martov...We will relate to all Lenin's steps thus: isolate ourselves completely from all those motives of a 'fractional character' which guide him and concentrate exclusively on his political steps. So we warmly welcomed his declaration, including a large section of it in our declaration, and we will act in a similar way in the future...we will not participate in organisational games for a preventive struggle against possible opponents, and especially for the artificial fabrication of these opponents.' (RTsKhIDNI, F. 325, O. 1, D. 394)

42. -: 'K materialam' Londonskoi konferentsii', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 20, 20 February 1915, p 1.
43. Ibid.
44. -: 'K materialam' Londonskoi konferentsii', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 26, 27 February 1915, p 1.
45. *Leninskii sbornik*, Vol. 17, pp 199-200.
46. -: 'K materialam Londonskoi konferentsii', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 30, 4 March 1915, p 1.
47. Ibid.
48. -: 'K materialam Londonskoi konferentsii. K' edinstvu deistvii', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 32, 6 March 1915, p 1.
49. Ibid.
50. Ibid. This call for unity was also advanced in two articles by Voinov'. See Voinov', 'Ob' edinstve', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 32, 6 March 1915, p 1 and *Nashe Slovo*, No. 33, 7 March 1915 p 1.
51. -: 'Gde bol'shinstvo?', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 42, 18 March 1915, p 1.
52. 'Pis'mo TsK RSDRP - Redaktsii Nashego Slova', *Leninskii sbornik*, Vol. 17, pp 201-203.
53. Ibid., p 202.
54. Ibid.
55. Ibid., p 203.

56. -:, 'Po povodu Londonskoi Konferentsii', *Sotsial'Demokrat*', No. 40, 29 March 1915, p 1.
57. Ibid.
58. Ibid.
59. Ibid.
60. 'Pis'mo Redaktsii Nashego Slova - TsK RSDRP', *Leninskii sbornik*, Vol. 17, pp 204-206.
61. Ibid., p 205.
62. Ibid.
63. Ibid., p 206.
64. Ibid., p 204.
65. RTsKhIDNI, F. 325, O. 1, D. 394.
66. N. Trotskii, 'Otkrytoe pis'mo v' redaktsiyu zhurnala *Kommunist*', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 105, 4 June 1915, pp 1-2.
67. *Kommunist*', Nos. 1-2, August 1915, p 3.
68. N. Trotskii, 'Otkrytoe pis'mo...', p 1.
69. Ibid.
70. Ibid.
71. Ibid, p 2.
72. Ibid.
73. On 13 February 1915 Trotsky published a statement in which he corrected Larin for his assertion that Trotsky, along with Plekhanov and Aksel'rod, was responsible for the policy of the Organisational Committee. Trotsky announced that he did not carry any more responsibility for the Organisational Committee than for any other part of the party. He also said that he had not participated in publications of the Organisational Committee since 1913 and had twice refused to act as a delegate for the Organisational Committee - first in the International Socialist Bureau and second at the London Conference. (N. Trotskii, 'Zayavlenie', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 14, 13 February 1915, p 1) Twelve days later *Nashe Slovo* published several amendments to Trotsky's statement, submitted by the Organisational Committee. Their letter claimed that Larin's confusion of where to place Trotsky organisationally was understandable in view of that fact that Trotsky himself had not declared his opposition to the

August Bloc, including the group *Bor'ba*. Furthermore, the Organisational Committee pointed out that they had never invited Trotsky to carry their mandate to the London Conference; a certain comrade had asked Trotsky, but on his own initiative. (Zagranichnyi Sekretariat O.K., 'Pis'mo v' Redaktsiyu', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 24, 25 February 1915, p 2)

Trotsky never directly answered the Organisational Committee's queries and therefore the question of his exact allegiances remained open. This is not the interpretation followed by Deutscher. For Deutscher, Trotsky's statement amounted to a 'repudiation of the August Bloc... [his] first step on the road that was to lead him to the Bolshevik Party.' (Deutscher, *The Prophet Armed*, p 219. Deutscher's view has since been copied by T. Cliff - right down to repeating Deutscher's mistake in dating the statement 14 February 1915. See, Cliff, *Trotsky. Towards October*, p 193) However, on other occasions Trotsky pointed out that he did not bear full responsibility for the views expressed by *Nashe Slovo* - but Deutscher never concluded from this that Trotsky had broken with *Nashe Slovo*. (See, for example, *Nashe Slovo*, No. 106, 6 May 1916, p 2. Here Trotsky denied Larin's assertion that *Nashe Slovo* was published by Trotsky. He also added to his anti-Larin comments of 13 February 1915: 'Readers should note that whatever Larin says is in need of a check-up.' N. Trotskii, 'Nuzhdatsya v' proverke', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 106, 6 May 1916.)

74. Witness Lenin's desires to have a frequently issued publication during the negotiations to set up *Kommunist*'. See, for example, the resolution 'TsO i novaya gazeta', *KPSS v rezolyutsiyakh i resheniyakh s'ezdov, konferentsii i plenumov TsK*, Moscow, Vol. 1, 1983, p 474.
75. G. Zinov'ev, 'Rossiskaya sotsial-demokratiya i Russkii sotsial-shovinizm', *Kommunist*', Nos. 1- 2, August 1915, pp 102-154
76. Ibid., p 146. From Lenin's letters to Zinoviev of July 1915 we learn that the editorial board did vote on whether to approach Trotsky. (V. I. Lenin, *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii*, Vol. 49, pp 86-

89) Lenin and Zinoviev voted against but were obviously defeated. The notes to volume 49 of Lenin's collected works claim that Pyatkov and Bosh sent the invitation to Trotsky. (Ibid., p 501, n 100). Zinoviev had wanted to mention these disputes within the editorial board in his article to be published in *Kommunist'*, but Lenin insisted that he cut this information: 'Guests have convinced me that to speak of our disagreements in the editorial board of *Kommunist'* (that you and I voted against Trotsky) in press is not worth it. They are right. Expunge!!' (Ibid, pp 87-88) Hence the possibility remains that Zinoviev constructed the experiment theory *post factum*.

77. -: 'Nasha pozitsiya', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 89, 15 May 1915, p 1; No. 100, 29 May 1915, pp 1-2; No. 106, 5 June 1915 p 1 ; No. 107, 6 June 1915, p 1; No.146, 23 July 1915, p 1; and No. 147, 24 July 1915, p 1. In a letter to Radek of 13 May 1915 Trotsky informed the former that, 'The day after tomorrow there begins in *Nashe Slovo* a series of articles under the heading of 'Our Position'. These articles, written by me, will appear as editorials. In them there is a rejection of both Lenin's barbarous splitting and the social-patriot s'and Aksel'rod's political concealment.' (RTsKhIDNI, F. 325, O. 1, D. 394).
78. -:, 'Nasha pozitsiya', No. 100, p 1.
79. -:, 'Nasha pozitsiya', No. 106, p 1.
80. Ibid.
81. -:, 'Nasha pozitsiya', Nos. 146 & 147.
82. -:, 'Nasha pozitsiya', No. 146, p 1. This was the first time that Trotsky had differentiated *Nashe Slovo* from the August Bloc. Previous to this, he had maintained that sections of the August Bloc, specifically the members of the group *Bor'ba*, considered by Trotsky to be an independent organisation but according to the Organisational Committee part of the August Bloc (see fn. 73), were supporters of *Nashe Slovo*. See N. Trotskii, 'Diversii', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 137, 11 July 1915, p 2.
83. -:, 'Nasha pozitsiya', No. 147, p 1.
84. G. Zinov'ev, 'Rossiskaya sotsial-demokratiya i Russkii sotsial-shovinizm', p 141.

85. Ibid, p 144.
86. Trotsky stated this view in 'Nasha pozitsiya', No. 89, p 1.
87. G. Zinov'ev, Op. cit, p 145.
88. Ibid, p 146. Lenin carefully edited Zinoviev's articles to ensure that they conveyed a sufficiently anti-Trotsky message. Thus, for example, in his notes to Zinoviev's 'Pacifism or Marxism' Lenin changed the phrase 'one demand is lawless' as it 'smells of a concession to Trotsky'; and added a sentence which said that 'Trotsky and the O[rganisational] C[ommittee] put themselves on the level of popes.' *Leninskii sbornik*, Vol. 39, Moscow, 1980, p 149.
89. -:, 'O porazhenii svoego pravitel'stva v' imperialistskoi voine', *Sotsial'Demokrat*', No. 43, 26 July 1915, p 1.
90. Ibid.
91. Ibid.
92. Ibid.
93. -:, 'O polozhenii del' v' Rossiiskoi Sots-Dem-Tii', *Sotsial'Demokrat*', No. 43, 26 July 1915, pp 1-2.
94. Ibid, p 1. Here Lenin had I. Bezrabortnyii and Anton' Gla'skii in mind. (see 'K' organizatsionnomu voprosu', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 107, 6 June 1915, pp 1-2). Deutscher suggests that Manuilskii, Lozovskii and Lunacharskii were the 'almost Bolsheviks' on *Nashe Slovo* (see Deutscher, *The Prophet Armed*, p 224). Trotsky polemicised with Lozovskii on two occasions in *Nashe Slovo*. In April 1916 they clashed over the appropriate response to Camille Huysmans's attempts to convoke a meeting of the International Socialist Bureau in the Hague. Lozovskii insisted that Zimmerwaldists should attend. After all, he pointed out, Zimmerwald had not declared itself a Third International, but had the goal of winning the existing from within. He therefore recommended a list of demands to be taken to the Hague by Zimmerwaldists with the aim of achieving their aims; in the event of non-attendance, he claimed Huysmans would be able to declare the Zimmerwaldists 'splitters' and the International Socialist Bureau, a mighty organisation, his own. Trotsky, on the other hand, thought the main duty of revolutionary

internationalists consisted of clearly counterposing Zimmerwald to Hague so that the proletariat could make a choice between the two. He preferred to leave the issue of tactics aside until it became clear whether Huysmans's plans would get off the ground or not. By declaring his hand ahead of time, Trotsky thought Lozovskii was confusing the proletariat. (See A. Lozovskii, 'Tsimmervald i Gaaga', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 96, 22 April 1916, pp 1-2 and -, 'Dva printsipa. Po povodu stati' t. A. Lozovskago', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 97, 23 April 1916, p 1. Deutscher manages to misrepresent Lozovskii's and Trotsky's views on this matter. See Deutscher, *The Prophet Armed*, p 235). Then, in August 1916, Lozovskii and Trotsky argued over *Nashe Slovo*'s anti-Longuetist resolution to the *Comité pour la Reprise des Relations Internationales*. (See -, 'V' komitete dlya vosstanovleniya internats svyazei', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 188, 17 August 1916, p 1; A. Lozovskii, 'Po povodu odnoi deklaratsii', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 189, 18 August 1916, p 1 ; and 'Ot' Redaktsii', *Ibid.*, pp 1-2).

95. -: 'Voennyi krizis' i politicheskaya perspektivy. II. Porazheniya i revolyutsiya', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 179, 1 September 1915, p 1; No. 180, 2 September 1915, p 1.
96. *Ibid.*, No. 179, p 1.
97. *Ibid.*, No. 180, p 1.
98. N. T., 'Nashi gruppirovki [iz' zapisnoi knizhki]', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 209, 6 October 1915, p 1.
99. *Ibid.*
100. *Ibid.*
101. *Ibid.*
102. *Ibid.*
103. N. T., 'Rossiskaya sektsiya internatsionalistov [iz' zapisnoi knizhki]', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 212, 9 October 1915, p 1.
104. *Ibid.* It is obvious that Trotsky was referring to the fact that the Central Committee produced their publications in neutral Switzerland.
105. N.T., 'Osnovnye tezisy [iz' zapisnoi knizhki]', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 215, 13 October 1915, p 1; No. 216, 14 October 1915, p 1.

106. Ibid, No. 215, p 1.
107. Ibid.
108. -: 'Mezhduranodnaya sotsialisticheskaya konferentsiya v' tsimmerval'de', *Sotsial'Demokrat*', No. 45-46, 11 October 1915, p 1.
109. See, for example, -: 'Pervyi shag', Ibid., p 2; -: 'Pervaya mezhduranodnaya konferentsiya', Ibid., pp 2-3.
110. -: 'Nashe russkie tozhe-internatsionalisti na internatsional'noi konferentsii', Ibid, p 4.
111. Ibid.
112. -: 'Voina i revolyutsionnyi krizis' v' Rossii', Ibid., pp 1-2.
113. -: 'Voennyy krizis' i politicheskaya perspektivy. III. Sotsial'naya sily Rossiskoi revolyutsii', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 181, 3 September 1915, p 1; -: 'Voennyy krizis' i politicheskaya perspektivy. IV. Natsional'nyi ili internatsional'nyi kurs?', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 182, 4 September 1915, p 1.
114. N. T., 'K' Tsimmerval'dskoi konferentsii. III', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 232, 5 November 1915, p 2.
115. N. T., 'K' Tsimmerval'dskoi konferentsii. IV', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 244, 19 November 1915, p 1.
116. Ibid.
117. N. Trotskii, 'Osnovnye voprosy', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 217, 17 October 1915, pp 2-3.
118. -: 'O dvukh liniyakh revolyutsii', *Sotsial'Demokrat*', No. 48, 20 November 1915, p 1.
119. Ibid.
120. N. Trotskii, 'Pod' bremenem' ob'ektivizma', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 248, 24 November 1915, pp 1-2; No. 249, 25 November 1915, pp 1-2.
121. Ibid., No. 248, 24 November 1915, p 1.
122. Ibid., p 2.
123. RTsKhIDNI, F. 325, O. 1, D. 444.
124. L. Sinclair, *Trotsky: A Bibliography*, Aldershot, 1989, p 72.
125. RTsKhIDNI, Op. Cit.
126. Ibid.
127. For a good analysis of the events surrounding the election of worker representatives to the War-Industries Committees see,

Robert B. McKean, *St Petersburg Between the Revolutions*, New Haven and London, 1990, pp 380-385.

128. -:, 'Nasha pobeda', *Sotsial'Demokrat*', No. 48, 20 November 1915, p 2.
129. -:, 'Fakti i vyvody (eshche o petrogradskikh' vyborakh')', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 270, 19 December 1915, p 1.
130. N. Trotskii, 'Programma mira. 1. Nuzhna-li programma mira?', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 24, 29 January 1916, p 1.
131. Ibid.
132. G. Zinov'ev and N. Lenin, *Sotsializm' i voina*, Geneva, 1915, p 40.
133. N. Trotskii, 'Programma mira. IV. Soedinennye shtaty Evropy', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 29, 4 February 1916, p 2.
134. Ibid.
135. Ibid.
136. -:, 'O lozunge soedinennykh shtatov Evropy', *Sotsial'Demokrat*', No. 44, 23 August 1915, p 2.
137. Ibid.
138. N. Trotskii, 'Programma mira. V. Pozitsiya "Sotsialdemokrata"', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 86, 11 April 1916, pp 1-2, No. 87, 12 April 1916, pp 1-2.
139. Ibid., No. 86, p 2.
140. Ibid.
141. Ibid., No. 87, p 1.
142. Ibid.
143. Ibid.
144. -:, 'O lozunge soedinennykh shtatov Evropy'.
145. N. Trotskii, 'Programma mira...', No. 87, p 2.
146. Ibid.
147. L. J. van Rossum, 'Ein unverffentlichter brief Trockijs von anfang 1916', *International Review of Social History*, Vol XIV, 1969, p 256.
148. Ibid., p 258.
149. Ibid.
150. Ibid., p 257. For further evidence of Trotsky's view of *Vorbote* as a Leninist fractional publication see his letter to Radek in RTsKhIDNI, F. 325, O. 1, D. 394 and his correspondence with D. B.

Ryazanov in Ibid., F. 325, O. 1, D. 396 & F. 325, O. 1, D. 399. Lenin was probably quite satisfied that Trotsky had declined Holst's offer of cooperation. After all, in a letter to Holst of 8 March 1916 he had outlined his differences with Trotsky regarding unity with Chkheidze (V. I. Lenin, *Polnoe Sobranie Sochinenii*, Vol. 49, pp 191-192); while in a letter to I. F. Armand of 15 January 1916 he exclaimed that 'Trotsky has lost still one more ally!!' (Ibid., p 174). Indeed, Lenin had consistently stressed his opposition to Trotsky on a number of issues in his personal correspondence from the beginning of the war onwards. See, for example, 'A. G. Shlyapnikovu' (28 November 1914, Ibid., pp 36-37); 'G. Gorteru' (5 May 1915, Ibid., pp 74-75); 'G. E. Zinov'evu' (After 11 July 1915, Ibid., pp 91-93; 'D. Vainkopu' (After 24 July 1915, Ibid., pp 104-106); 'A. M. Kollantai' (August 1915, Ibid, pp 117-118); 'A. G. Shlyapnikovu', (23 August 1915, Ibid., pp 132-134; 'A. G. Shlapnikovu' (September 1915, Ibid., pp 141-142); 'G. E. Zinov'evu' (August 1916, Ibid., pp 288- 289); 'A. G. Shlyapnikovu' (After 3 October 1916, Ibid, pp 298-302); and 'A. M. Kollantai' (17 March 1917, pp 401-403). See also, 'A. Shlyapnikovu' (January 1915, *Leninskii sbornik*, Vol. 2, Moscow, 1914, p 216); 'A. Kollantai', (July 1915, Ibid., p 231); and 'A. Kollantai' (Summer 1915, Ibid, p 235).

151. -:, 'Est-li svoye liniya u O.K. i u fraktsii Chkheidze?', *Sotsial'Demokrat*, No. 50, 18 February 1916, p 2.
152. -: 'Nasha Dumskaya fraktsiya', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 77, 31 March 1916, p 1.
153. Ibid.
154. -: 'Nasha Dumskaya fraktsiya. 1. revolyutsionnaya i passivno-vyzhidatel'naya politika', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 94, 20 April 1916, p 1. However, this did not mean that Trotsky saw himself as now sharing Lenin's view of the Duma fraction. Thus, for example, in the second instalment of 'Our Duma Fraction' Trotsky defended *Nashe Slovo* from Martov's accusation that 'the fraction has gained one more enemy which does not balk at using Leninist methods to struggle against it.' (cited in -: 'Nasha Dumskaya fraktsiya. 2. "druz'ya" i "vragi" dumskoi fraktsii',

- Nashe Slovo*, No. 95, 21 April 1916, pp 1-2).
155. -: 'Poezdka deputata Chkheidze', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 203, 3 September 1916, pp 1-2. See also, -: 'K' poezdke deputata Chkheidze', *Nachalo*, No. 29, 3 November 1916, p 1.
156. N. Lenin 'Fraktsiya Chkheidze i eya rol', *Sbornik' Sotsial'Demokrata*, No. 2, December 1916, p 69.
157. V. I. Lenin, 'A. Kollontai', *Leninskii sbornik*, Vol. 2, p 282. See also Lenin's letter to Armand of 17 February 1917 (V. I. Lenin, *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii*, Vol. 49, p 390). From Lenin's letter to Armand of 22 January 1917 we learn that Trotsky had written to Lenin. Trotsky never referred to this letter in his later writings. We do, however, know Lenin's feelings: 'Trotsky sent a stupid letter: we will not publish or answer him.' (V. I. Lenin, *Ibid.*, p 374). In his autobiography Trotsky tried to discredit Kollontai's letter to Lenin thus: 'In the New York period nothing was revolutionary enough for her. She corresponded with Lenin. Interpreting facts and ideas through the prism of her then ultra-leftism Kollontai provided Lenin with information from America, in particular about my activities. In Lenin's letters of reply one can come across echoes of this consciously mischievous information.' (L. Trotskii, *Moya zhizn'*, pp 265-266).
158. *Leninskii sbornik*, Vol. 4, Moscow, 1925, p 303.
159. L. Trotskii, *Voina i Revolyutsiya*, Vol. 1, Petrograd, 1922, pp. 7-29.
160. *Ibid.*, pp 25-26.
161. *Ibid.*, p 25.
162. N. I. Bukharin, *K Voprosu O Trotskizme*, Moscow, 1925, p 53. Thus notable by their absence were: 'Nash' politicheskii lozung'; 'Otkrytoe pis'mo v' redaktsiyu zhurnala *Kommunist*'; 'Nasha pozitsiya'; 'Diversii'; 'Rossiskaya sektsiya internatsionalistov [iz' zapisnoi knizhki]; 'K' Tsimmerval'dskoi konferentsii. III'; 'Pod' bremenem' ob'ektivizma'; 'Programma mira. V. Pozitsiya *Sotsialdemokrata*'; and 'Nash Dumskaya fraktsiya' (No. 77).
163. L. Trotskii, 'Vyvody', *Voina i Revolyutsiya*, Vol. 2, Moscow, 1924, pp 55-59.
164. N. T., 'Vpechatleniya [iz' zapisnoi knizhki]', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 207,

- 3 October 1915, p 1; N. T., 'Nashi gruppirovki [iz' zapisnoi knizhki]', No. 209.
165. L. Trotskii, Op. cit., p 55. Cf. also N. T., 'Osnovy tezisy [iz' zapisnoi knizhki]', No. 215 & L. Trotskii, *Voina i Revolyutsiya*, Vol. 2, p 49. In the latter text Trotsky cut the sentence in [] from the original: 'in *Sotsial-Demokrat's* project, as in all of its platform, the slogan of peace figured not as the main cry of the proletariat at the present moment, mobilising against militarism and chauvinism, but as a semi retreat of pure revolutionary spirit to pacifist human fruit. [This is one of the features which gave its position a sectionist-grotesque character].' Also omitted was the footnote in which Trotsky had criticised the Leninists for inconsistency in their understanding of pacifism.
166. Ibid., p 62.
167. G. Zinov'ev, *Sochineniya*, Vol. 5, Moscow, 1924, pp 105-211.
168. Ibid., p 211 n 17.
169. L. Trotskii, *Sochineniya*, Vol. 3, Part 1, Moscow, nd, pp XI-LXVII.
170. See, for example, L. Kamenev, 'Leninizm ili Trotskizm', in L. D. Trotskii, *Uroki Oktyabrya*, St. Petersburg, 1991, p 187; I. Stalin, 'Trotskizm ili Leninizm', in Ibid., p 206; G. Zinov'ev, 'Bol'shevizm ili Trotskizm?', in Ibid., p 213; and E. Kviring, 'Lenin, zagovorshchichestvo, Oktyabr', in Ibid., p 269.
171. L. Kamenev, 'Leninizm ili Trotskizm', pp 148-151; N. Bukharin, 'Kak ne nuzhno pisat' istoriyu Oktyabrya?', in L. Trotskii, *Uroki Oktyabrya*, pp 313-318. Trotsky responded to the charge that he opposed Lenin during the First World War in a letter of 27 October 1927 to IstPart. This source became well-known in the West when Trotsky included it in *The Stalin School of Falsification*. In the letter, without mentioning that he had altered some of the original articles, he pointed to the collection *Voina i Revolyutsiya* as evidence of his 'Leninism' during World War One: 'The reviews of *War and Revolution* in all of the party press - Russian and foreign - a dozen and a thousand times showed that looking at my work during the war as a whole, one has to admit and understand that my differences with Lenin had a secondary character, and that my basic line was revolutionary

which all the time brought me closer to Bolshevism, not only in words but also in reality.' (L. Trotskii, *Stalinskaya Shkola Fal'sifikatsii*, Moscow, 1990, p 15). Trotsky even cited cases from the early process of the dressing-up of past disputes to serve the then current political purpose of presenting a united Bolshevik face as genuine accounts of the past. (See, for instance, his quote of the following extract from the notes to volume 14 of the first (1921) edition of Lenin's collected works, 'From the beginning of the imperialist war [Trotskii] occupied a clear internationalist position', in L. Trotskii, *Stalinskaya Shkola Fal'sifikatsii*, p 15).

172. L. Trotskii, *Moya zhizn'*, pp 244-245.
173. L. Trotskii, *Moya zhizn'*, p 318; L. Trotskii, *Istoriya Russkoi Revolyutsii*, Vol. 1, Berlin, 1931, p 522. In his 1927 letter to IstPart he was not so bold: 'I participated together with Bolsheviks on the editorial board of *Novyi Mir*, where I gave a Leninist evaluation of the first stages of the February Revolution.' (L. Trotskii, *Stalinskaya Shkola Fal'sifikatsii*, p 14). Trotsky's claim of the identity of his and Lenin's analyses is in fact quite spurious. To cite just a few examples: for Trotsky the March Revolution had resulted in a shift of power to an evil imperialist bourgeoisie, whereas for Lenin Russia had become the freest country out of all the warring nations; Trotsky spoke of the need to create a workers' government, whereas Lenin emphasised the role of the peasantry and so on. For an account of the polemical underpinnings of Trotsky's *Istoriya* see James D. White, 'Trotsky's *History of the Russian Revolution*', *Journal of Trotsky Studies*, 1, 1993, pp 1-18.
174. A. V. Pantsov, '<<Demon revolyutsii>> ili proletarskii revolyutsioner?', *Politicheskie issledovaniya*, 1991, No. 1, p 91.

CHAPTER FIVE

Trotsky and the Mensheviks

At the outbreak of World War One the leading Mensheviks found themselves on various sides of the new military frontiers, and did not have a central organ through which they could inform each other of their respective responses to the war. They could, however, communicate by mail, not all of which was confiscated by the military censorship.¹ In 1924 the Russian Revolutionary Archive in Berlin published Aksel'rod's and Martov's letters. This correspondence enables us to trace Martov's efforts to orientate himself in the new environment of war.

He first of all worried about the fate of comrades spread across Europe, mentioning Uritskii, Semkovskii and Trotsky,² and was not himself happy at being trapped in Paris. First of all he was devoid of any means of support and, furthermore, he felt there was nothing for him to do there. Above all, he wanted to go to Zurich and discuss matters with Aksel'rod. *Vorwärts*, the newspaper of the German Social-Democratic Party, continued to reach Paris, but reading of its support of the vote for the war credits only convinced him that German comrades had 'brought shame upon the banner of Marxism and in a scandalous manner ended their hegemony in international socialism.'³ For Martov, only the Mensheviks possessed the personnel versed in Marxism to save the honour of revolutionary socialism. In letters to Aksel'rod he soon raised the issue of how and with whose participation a journal could be established. The possibility of working with Plekhanov and Lenin was broached and dismissed, Martov declaring that 'I would prefer if we, the Mensheviks, spoke for ourselves.'⁴ He insisted that only a combative publication could answer the needs of the moment: 'we have to try to exert a moral influence on the Russian public abroad, in order to prevent it from falling into despair and disappointment with social-democracy, under the impression of the sinful fall of the latter. For this, we need to seize a harsh tone of struggle against illusions and opportunism of both a German and Slavonic origin.'⁵ Indeed, Martov had the chance to fulfil this aim when he was asked to take overall

control of the recently formed Russian internationalist newspaper *Golos* but, as he himself admitted, he let this opportunity slip through his hands:

Golos, it seems, is everywhere considered as my organ. This is not altogether comfortable, since a fair amount of stupidity appears in it. In actual fact I lost the opportunity of taking it under my control. It was founded by unemployed printers and they asked me to lead it. At that time I was convinced that with the censorship it would be impossible to say anything and I declined. Then the printers called for a first meeting and matters progressed little by little. Now we have to consider the 'rights acquired' by the *vperedist* Ivan Bezrabortnii, one 'party-bolshevik' and not one of the best liquidationists. Therefore one cannot rule out the possibility that, for example, Lenin will not be called upon to cooperate and so on.⁶

Martov also considered *Golos* to be 'amateurish', and this low opinion of *Golos's* 'professionalism' not doubt played its role in his refusal to become editor in chief. At the same time, however, it did not prevent him from submitting several articles.

In contributions to *Golos* in September, October and November 1914 Martov consistently pursued an anti-war stance. He derided attempts to present the war as a 'war to end all wars', or as a 'just war' on behalf of any of the belligerents, as ideological justifications of the bourgeoisie's aggressive intentions. Wars, he made clear, would occur as long as capitalism existed. In one piece he highlighted a declaration of a group of Russian industrialists, published in *Promyshlennosti i Torgovli*, that a clash of Russian and German economic interests had brought forth the current world conflict, as evidence of imperialism's guilt for the war. Martov was particularly appalled by 'comrades' who argued that the war was, for some, a 'war of defence' which could be condoned on socialist principles, or that it was necessary to declare a 'civil peace' for the duration of the hostilities. It was in this connection that he on several occasions polemicised with Plekhanov, rejecting the 'Father of Russian Marxism's' case that an analysis guided by economic determinism should lead one to support Russia's war effort, and wrote an obituary notice on *Vorwärts*, which had renounced class

struggle while the war lasted. Contrary to the German newspaper, Martov insisted that class struggle on an international basis in order to wrest power from the bourgeoisie was the only way to resolve the problems which had led to war; the first slogan of this struggle, he thought, should be 'peace'. Finally, he publicised the activities of the Mensheviks in the Duma and one Serbian socialist who had voted against the war credits, welcomed the first signs of anti-war sentiment voiced by Liebknecht in Germany, the Italian party's resolutions to keep Italy neutral, and the attempts of the Dutch and Swiss parties to restore ties between socialists situated on both sides of the war zones, to stress that not all Marxists had capitulated before the 'social-chauvinist' fury.⁷

These writings earned Martov Lenin's guarded praise; the latter declaring that 'Martov, if one judges by the Parisian *Golos*, is holding-up very well...rebuffing German and French chauvinism...but he is afraid to declare open war against all international opportunism and its "mighty" defender, the "centre" of German Social Democracy.'⁸ Although Martov did not mention all of the arguments that Trotsky was employing in the first months of the war, the United States of Europe being one notable absence for example, Trotsky himself could not but have been impressed by Martov's 'internationalism'. Indeed, Deutscher claims that Trotsky 'rejoiced' at the prospect of a bloc with Martov and Lenin around a common response to the war.⁹ Be that as it may, only one month passed after Trotsky's arrival in Paris in mid-November 1914 before his relations with Martov became strained.

The cause of the breakdown in relations was Martov's response to several chauvinist announcements made by his Menshevik colleagues. To begin with the Menshevik-liquidationist broadsheet *Nasha Zarya* published contributions which backed Russia in the war. One of its correspondents, G. Cherevanin, for example, held German militarism to account for causing the war and urged Germany's 'defeat'.¹⁰ Then *Sotsial'Demokrat* of 5 December 1914 published the reply sent to Vandervelde by a Menshevik-liquidationist group in St. Petersburg. In August 1914 the Belgian socialist minister had appealed to Russian comrades not to hinder their country's war efforts which were of vital importance, he said, to the Entente's cause.¹¹ The St. Petersburg

Menshevik-liquidationists assured Vandervelde that they viewed him and Belgian's workers as conducting a 'just cause of self-defence against those dangers from the aggressive policy of the Prussian Junkers which threaten democratic freedom and the proletariat's liberating mission.'¹² They hoped that German Social-Democracy, the 'mighty vanguard of the international proletariat', would participate in the fight against Prussian militarism, and regretted that 'Russian conditions' deprived them of the chance to join a war ministry. Despite this, and despite the fact that they had to guarantee that tsarism did not become the centre of European reaction, the Menshevik-liquidationists said that, in their work, they would comply with Vandervelde's request. In return, they asked the Belgian minister to oppose the war if it ever became transformed into a means for territorial expansion from the side of the Entente. In an editorial supplement to this document *Sotsial'Demokrat* commented that the Menshevik-liquidationists, as a tendency, had declared itself to be social-chauvinist: 'Martov's voice against chauvinism,' it claimed, 'now stands alone among the liquidationists.'¹³ Finally, there appeared in *Golos* itself a summary of Aksel'rod's stance on the war, compiled from an interview he had given to *Bremer Bürger-Zeitung*, a German left-radical publication, and a conversation with *Golos's* (Menshevik) correspondent R. Grigor'ev.¹⁴ Aksel'rod expressed his amazement that some socialists had rejected the defensive/aggressive war distinction under a condemnation of the current conflict as 'imperialist' on both sides. He accepted that not one of the warring fractions represented 'progress' which, he maintained, was vested in the international proletariat struggling for peace. Furthermore, he did not doubt that each imperialist country had had an interest in attack. But, he said, this did not mean that in the concrete conditions of the events that had led to war one could not distinguish 'relative guilt'. And, viewed from this perspective, Germany had acted first and therefore was the aggressor. Aksel'rod urged the application of relativism in two more instances. First, he explained the various national Social-Democratic positive responses to mobilisation orders as a reflection of a level of social development in which each separate proletariat was still infected with fears for 'its' homeland. Hence, he argued, one could not condemn the German proletariat any more than

one could blame the Belgian workers for taking up arms in their country's defence. After pointing out that 'explanation does not equal justification', he highlighted the tactics which each section of the International should have adopted after war had been declared, taking into account relative guilt for causing the war and the existence of national feelings among the workers. German socialists should have admitted that the war was 'adventurism' on behalf of its ruling classes and abstained during the vote on war credits. The French party, on the other hand, had a duty to vote for the war budget but should have added that while supporting France in its hour of need, the French Socialist Party did not want its country used as a bulwark to Russian absolutism. Finally, judging the most desirable outcome to the war, Aksel'rod argued that one had to distinguish one type of defeat from another. The total destruction of one country would be disastrous since it would obstruct economic progress and result in new conflicts. A mild defeat for Russia would not, contrary to Plekhanov, mean total enslavement by Germany, but the establishment of a democratic order.

Martov was certainly placed in an awkward situation by these developments. On the one hand he did not want to admit that, three months after the hostilities had begun, he was isolated among a fraction to which he had belonged since 1903. To do so would, he felt, play into the hands of the Bolsheviks, a fraction with whom he had disagreements over the war and other issues. Why then break from a group on an issue which would most likely disappear along with the war itself when there were other points at issue? On the other hand, Martov could not deny that there existed real differences between his own recent writings and those of the St. Petersburg liquidationists and his old friend Aksel'rod. A whole range of questions now confronted Martov, most notably, could unity in Menshevik ranks be maintained despite opposing views on the war or would the fraction split into hostile camps?; if a split was to occur who would be left in control of the fraction - himself or the Petersburg group?; finally how would this affect his standing in *Golos*? After all, the Mensheviks had still not organised their own publication and Martov did not want to be left without any means of propagating his thoughts. In the end he decided to pursue a dual

strategy: on the one hand, to play down the extent of disagreement among the Mensheviks, in this way trying to counter Lenin's efforts to force him to split from his friends, and, on the other, to stress the internationalist element in Menshevik thinking, in this way attempting to placate his colleagues on *Golos*.

In a letter to *Golos* entitled 'On my supposed isolation' Martov claimed that *Sotsial'Demokrat* was in cynical fashion trying to make fractional gain out of the tragedy of the current world conflict.¹⁵ The Bolshevik publication knew, he said, that it was lying when it wrote of Martov's isolation. After all, had not Aksel'rod and two (unnamed) Menshevik collaborators on *Golos* spoken out against chauvinism? As far as the 'Petersburg statement' was concerned Martov also thought it contradictory and confused but, he wondered, what else could one expect from people both isolated from émigré leaders and confronted with the pro-war announcements of such authorities as Plekhanov, Guesde and Vandervelde? Moreover, Martov argued that one had to focus upon all aspects of the Petersburg document. If one did this, one would discover not only points to criticise but some statements to praise as well. For Martov, the Petersburg liquidationists had given at least three indications of their non-chauvinism: (1) they had not connected 'Prussian militarism' to a demand for Germany's defeat but to the activities of the German proletariat; (2) social-chauvinists would not call German Social-Democracy 'mighty'; and (3) they were clearly anti-tsarist and this was not a trait associated with chauvinism. Martov corrected *Sotsial'Demokrat* for stating that the Petersburg group constituted a Menshevik tendency; the reply to Vandervelde had not been sanctioned by the Duma fraction or by the Organisational Committee. Finally, although he admitted that he had no exact information about the situation in Russia, Martov said that he was convinced that one would be able to find comrades there who shared his views.

Martov's rejoinder probably satisfied his immediate demands as leader of the Mensheviks. Indeed, he could even claim some success. He continued to be closely involved in the production of *Golos*, and P. B. Aksel'rod's name was not removed from the list of participants which appeared on the front page of each issue of *Golos* from 25 November

1914 onwards.¹⁶ However, he did not escape from this incident unscathed. In an editorial comment on Martov's letter to *Sotsial'Demokrat* his colleagues denied that his defence had saved the Petersburg liquidationists from the charge of social-chauvinism. They argued that the call 'not to oppose the war' was the logical outcome of the views expounded by the social-chauvinists Plekhanov, Guesde and Vandervelde and not by internationalists of the *Golos* mould. Yes, the liquidationists had warned of tsarism becoming a centre of reaction but, asked *Golos*, would not calling a halt to revolutionary activity at a time when the state was armed to the teeth only bring this possibility closer to realisation? *Golos* agreed with Martov that 'fractional obsessions' should not cloud one's view of contemporary standpoints, but was not Martov himself guilty of this when he evaluated his own group's statements? In conclusion, *Golos* stated that the times demanded that people apply the clearest critical acumen and, in this particular case, this meant issuing a rejection of the liquidationist's chauvinism.

Martov's attempt to find a compromise solution to his difficulties not only earned him a public rebuff from *Golos*, it also soured his personal relations with Trotsky. During December 1914 Martov fulfilled his desire to travel to Switzerland to converse with Mensheviks in permanent residence there. He returned to Paris at the beginning of January 1915 armed with propositions that Aksel'rod and other Mensheviks in Zurich should join *Golos's* editorial board, and that Trotsky should contribute to a planned Menshevik publication. From a letter to Aksel'rod of 9 January 1915 we learn that Martov encountered Trotsky's hostility on two issues. Trotsky felt Martov was not splitting from *Nasha Zarya* out of 'fractional considerations' and that his Zurich colleagues wanted to turn *Golos* into an exclusively Menshevik broadsheet. Then, on a more personal matter, he was convinced that Martov had conspired to arrange a less than desirable reviewer for his pamphlet *War and the International*:

I have even not reached agreement with any of the proposed contributors to our sbornik because upon my return I encountered opposition from Trotsky on another point - the supposed pretensions of the people in Zurich to make *Golos* a

'fractional organ'. He drew this conclusion out of Zurich's proposition for an agreement between the group and the editorial board and the corresponding inclusion of the former into the latter. During the first conversation with him on this matter he made me lose all patience and I said a few harsh things to him. I therefore decided to delay talk of the *sbornik* until our relations have softened a little. This happens from time to time. In conversation he reproached me for not breaking with *Nasha Zarya* out of fractional bias, even though it now stands on a Plekhanovite position. But this is only the half of it. Even worse, he thinks I engaged in some kind of intrigue, that I encouraged Zolov to write an article about his book in Grimm's newspaper. I thought that I had rendered him a service but it turns out that he was offended that Grimm himself did not pen the review...and with a sincerity that almost touched me, convinced me that I had hit upon Zolov so that a committed liquidationist and not some Leninist would write about his brochure and, in this way, out of fractional considerations, any initiative on Grimm's behalf would be forestalled. I see that you are shaking your shoulders, reading this rubbish. To be fair to Trotsky it has got to be said that I myself put this idea into his head, for in a fit of temper I said to him: if Zolov had not written the review, Grimm would not have written it but, in all likelihood, Grisha Zinov'ev who would have sworn at you for the slogan of peace and so on. This was an argument about whether Zolov had done Trotsky a good turn and Trotsky decided that I had let my machiavellian thoughts slip out. In a word, once again I will have to walk around him like one walks around a table with a china ornament on it.¹⁷

Trotsky's differences with Martov were not kept within the confines of personal meetings, they also spilled over into *Golos's* editorial board meetings. The fact that Trotsky and Martov did not see eye to eye at these gatherings has long been recognised.¹⁸ Less well-known, however, are the articles over which the two clashed. Some examples of these disputed texts can be gathered from Martov's correspondence. Further in the letter of 9 January quoted above, for instance, we find the following account of the threats and compromises

which accompanied the penning of *Golos's* editorial on the Copenhagen Conference, attended by Dutch and Scandinavian socialists on 16-17 January 1915:

In number 100 of *Golos* you can read an address, sent in name of 'editors and coworkers' to Copenhagen. The censored spots revealed Russia's annexionist policy and explained the slogan of peace. This text which was first of all worked out by a *vpredist* and myself was, under the pretext of a 'supplement', radically changed from top to bottom with Trotsky's support against other members of the commission...I had to come face to face with a completely simple and simple-minded understanding of the crisis which we are living through and break a lance over every word. Finally I had to threaten not to give my signature after they had wasted all my efforts, putting in place of an explanation of the confusion in the proletariat by the psychology of the previous period hackneyed phrases about the reformism in which the workers were raised. My 'ultimatum' led to a toning down of this section.¹⁹

Even when the two agreed over something, joint action proved to be impossible. When news of the intention to hold a conference of socialists of the Entente countries in London became known, for example, Martov drew-up a three point programme which he intended to take to this gathering.²⁰ In a letter to Aksel'rod of 21 January 1915, Martov recounted how he had asked Larin to obtain official invitations for the proposed event in London so that three representatives of the Menshevik Organisational Committee could attend: himself, Aksel'rod and Trotsky. He then went on to say that despite the fact that he approved Martov's programme, Trotsky refused to go to London as part of a delegation of the Organisational Committee. The extent to which 'fractional considerations' played a crucial role in this instance is clear from Martov's commentary upon this affair:

In the finish he [Trotsky] said that, in an emergency, he could be the representative of the group *Bor'ba* as part of the OC delegation, as was the case in Brussels, with the right to conduct a separate line...I answered that on a joint mandate I could not accept these reservations for Trotsky and that therefore I would

ensure that a mandate was issued to us without Trotsky. I think that no other outcome was possible, although his presence might have been useful; but, on second thoughts, even this is under doubt if he, for example, took it into his head there, if only to emphasise his independence and 'reconciliationness', to reach agreement with Lenin.²¹

The next opportunity for Trotsky to cooperate with Martov came during the negotiations to start a new newspaper after *Golos* was closed by the French authorities on 18 January 1915. At this time Martov was still trying to include the Zurich Mensheviks on the projected editorial board and Trotsky, worried that he would find himself in a minority among the Mensheviks and bound to them by the formal rules of editorial unity, at first refused to join *Golos's* replacement, *Nashe Slovo*. As is clear from Martov's letter to Aksel'rod of 1 February 1915, this did not prevent Trotsky from attempting to limit the Mensheviks' influence in *Nashe Slovo* from the 'outside':

Instead of *Golos* *Nashe Slovo* has begun to appear. I agreed to join its editorial board, whence I was invited to go along with Trotsky; the latter refused on the grounds that he was busy at the moment, but, in actual fact, he does not want to tie-up his hands. I am convinced of this at the moment, seeing how he influences the non-Menshevik part of the editorial board...terrorising them with the prospect of being swallowed-up by our threesome...He acts so that if we are not able to manoeuvre he, with the best intentions, will achieve a split in the editorial board and the newspaper will loose any 'unification' significance.²²

The ground for Trotsky's eventual cooption onto *Nashe Slovo's* editorial board was most probably laid by Martov's renunciation of *Nasha Zarya's* chauvinist line, published in the very first issue of *Nashe Slovo*.²³ After all, Trotsky would be unlikely to join a publication that associated itself with chauvinism, even if it did so negatively by not printing a critique of *Nasha Zarya*. The appearance of Martov's 'announcement' at this time can probably be explained by the following factors. First, Martov had resisted making a public statement against *Nasha Zarya* while he had no backing from Menshevik colleagues. To do this alone would be to admit that Lenin was right. However, by 29

January 1915 Martov had received a letter from fellow Menshevik Dan in which the latter also expressed his opposition to *Nasha Zarya*. Martov published Dan's letter alongside his statement in *Nashe Slovo*, and he did so to stress Menshevik unity on this point. Second, Martov's colleagues on *Nashe Slovo* were most likely pushing him to make an anti-*Nasha Zarya* announcement in *Nashe Slovo*. This would hopefully stop Lenin from accusing *Nashe Slovo* of harbouring closet-chauvinists, and ease relations with Trotsky who, as Martov himself recognised, had friends on *Nashe Slovo*'s editorial board. Forced into action by various pressures, Martov admitted that he was torn with anguish when he made his anti-*Nasha Zarya* statement. On the one hand, he wanted to make his opposition to something he did not believe in clear; on the other, he did not want to damage the standing of the Menshevik fraction. Not least, would his public remarks not be used by Trotsky?:

I made this 'splitting' with a great 'anguish' in my soul, for I foresee that, as a result, from one side the group which has been most united in spirit up to this point will split and, from another, I am aware that on each step all of these symptoms of disintegration are exploited and will be exploited to an even greater degree by the specialists in disrobing 'fractionalism' who, in actual fact, slyly use even a great world tragedy and catastrophe to tiny fractional advantages. Now Antid Oto [Trotsky] engages in this. With him (he is here) I should (preserving, as far as possible, good personal relations) keep myself constantly on guard.²⁴

If Martov hoped that he could limit the amount of antagonism between sections of *Nashe Slovo* and parts of the Menshevik fraction from appearing on the pages of the former, in part by keeping on good terms with Trotsky, he was to be sorely disappointed. Although he could claim the occasional victory, in the coming months it was Trotsky's views which more and more came to dominate in *Nashe Slovo*.

On 13 February 1915 Trotsky distanced himself from the Organisational Committee by issuing a statement in which he denied that he bore any more responsibility for the policies of the Organisational Committee than for any other section of the party.²⁵

Then, at the beginning of March, Trotsky published a two-part critical evaluation of *Nasha Zarya's* commentary upon the Copenhagen Conference, which appeared in the first issue of the Organisational Committee's newly established *Izvestiya*. In the first part of this critique Trotsky focussed upon *Nasha Zarya's* claim that, since the proletariat had proved itself unable to prevent the current war, socialists had to support the side whose victory would bring most benefit to economic and political progress, i.e., the Entente. For Trotsky, this view was based upon a misunderstanding of the conditions in which the workers would engage in revolutionary activity. He reconstructed the logic of the *Nasha Zarya* group thus: the Second International overestimated the strength of the working class as a factor in international relations. Therefore the masses would have to throw their weight behind one of the great power blocs as a supplementary force. Contrary to this, Trotsky argued that the proletariat had underestimated its strength in the pre-war epoch. This, he thought, was quite natural for what was a time of 'mighty world reaction' for, 'revolutionary self-sufficiency...awakens and is strengthened during epoches of instability which put the oppressed class in such a situation out of which there is no other exit apart from the path of revolution.'²⁶ And, according to Trotsky, the war was creating conditions ripe for violent class struggle. This explained why the revolutionary internationalists, unlike *Nasha Zarya*, urged the proletariat to free itself of national-state consciousness and to pursue its own, social-revolutionary policy. In the second instalment Trotsky took issue with *Nasha Zarya's* perception of the Entente forces as most embodying progress out of the warring coalitions. He made it clear that the war was not a clash of political forms, democratic (Entente) versus feudal (Central Powers), but a battle for colonies between capitalist nations. In thinking otherwise *Nasha Zarya* had simply accepted imperialist propaganda:

One of the most important ideological means for putting the whole democratic state organisation at the service of imperialist aims is the idea, the myth, the legend that the war is conducted 'for democracy against militarism'. Adopting this legend the group of Petersburg liquidationists, like *Nasha Zarya's* editorial

board, can only blank out minds, easing the work of social forces deadly hostile to socialism and democracy.²⁷

During April 1915 Martov was able to claim limited success in his battles on *Nashe Slovo*. On the negative side, Trotsky gained a majority to delay the publication of Martov's reply to Radek's censure of the Menshevik I. Izvol'skaya for belonging to a fraction which did not conduct a decisive struggle with social-patriotism in its own ranks.²⁸ After this dispute Martov, in a letter to Semkovskii, wrote that it was once again 'impossible to approach Trotsky.'²⁹ On a more positive note, he did ensure that, in a declaration on fractions within Russian Social-Democracy, *Nashe Slovo* stated that it did not consider itself a separate group and that, while it recognised that old alignments were still in force, it would maintain good relations with all those who held an internationalist position, irrespective of fractional alignment.³⁰ This victory, however, proved to be short lived. The following months not only saw *Nashe Slovo* in dispute with Aksel'rod but, through polemics with the Organisational Committee's *Izvestiya*, with the whole Menshevik fraction as well.

In a conversation with *Nashe Slovo*, which appeared over two issues of the Paris publication in May 1915, Aksel'rod outlined his latest thoughts on the war. He began by stating that the war had revealed that nationalism and internationalism were two mutually exclusive principles. According to Aksel'rod, the Second International had proven inadequate to the task of preventing the outbreak of hostilities because nationalism had been dominant within it. For him, it followed that only an internationalisation of the tactics of the workers' movement would guarantee that this would not reoccur. And, looking forward to this prospect, Aksel'rod thought that the current divisions around questions connected with the war would not determine who would stand where: 'I cannot imagine Plekhanov in the opposing conservative camp after the war...I agree with criticism of *Nasha Zarya's* current line in relation to the war, but I consider the attempt to harden these differences into fractions as, to put it mildly, premature.'³¹ It was from this perspective that Aksel'rod rejected Lenin's 'fanatical splitting', insisting instead that social-chauvinists should also be invited to any gathering intended to unify Russian social-democrats. Only in this instance, reasoned

Aksel'rod, would it become clear if social-chauvinists and internationalists had already formed two hostile camps. On the war, Aksel'rod said that he disagreed with Lenin's call for Russia's defeat; the best outcome would be 'neither victory nor defeat' for all sides.³²

It was left to Trotsky to spell out *Nashe Slovo's* differences with Aksel'rod, in the form of an unsigned editorial comment upon the Menshevik's remarks. Trotsky noted his agreement with Aksel'rod in so far as the latter counterposed nationalism and internationalism, and rejected splitting without just cause. But, for Trotsky, Aksel'rod took his concern over Lenin's manoeuvres to such an extent, that he refused to raise the issue of the irreconcilability of internationalism and social-chauvinism as this would lead to the decomposition of the old groupings in Russian Social-Democracy. In turn, Trotsky pointed out, this left Aksel'rod in the contradictory position of opposing the only means by which his call for the internationalisation of the workers' movement could be realised, i.e., a clear split of internationalists from social-chauvinists. Furthermore, in light of Aksel'rod's acceptance that nationalism and internationalism were two hostile principles, Trotsky puzzled over Aksel'rod's desire to maintain contact with Plekhanov. Whether the 'Father of Russian Marxism' returned to the fold or not was, Trotsky stated, irrelevant. Plekhanov's current position was chauvinistic and confusing the workers and it was the clear obligation of revolutionary internationalists to oppose him. Finally, Trotsky objected to Aksel'rod's view that social-chauvinists should be invited to a unification conference along with internationalists. According to Trotsky, this would only complicate the process of fractional realignment and hinder the struggle against social-chauvinism: 'so that the irreconcilable ideological-political demarcation from the social-patriots in all groups...is not accompanied by the preservation, and even the complication of party chaos, it is necessary that an ideological and actual unification of internationalists of all fractions takes place parallel with this process.'³³

At the same time as the above dispute with Aksel'rod appeared, *Nashe Slovo* began to issue a series of editorial articles, penned by Trotsky under the title of 'Our Position', which examined how the issues raised by the war affected the old groups in Russian socialism. Their

central message that the outbreak of the war had opened a new era which demanded a realignment of social-democrats into new blocs, internationalist versus social-patriots, was a direct challenge to Martov's and Aksel'rod's attempts to preserve the Menshevik's ideological and organisational integrity.

The first instalment began by conceding some ground to Martov and Aksel'rod; it was admitted that not all of the issues of the pre-war era had since disappeared. However, Trotsky argued that such remnants had been radically transformed. Most notably, reformism and revolution now stood as two clearly opposed tactical and programmatic principles: the former had turned into social-imperialism, 'expecting a new set of social reforms from military victories', while the latter, which in the pre-war reformist era had been compelled to develop its possibilist features, had come to signify a struggle for power by the proletariat. It was with these changes in mind that *Nashe Slovo* considered a regrouping of forces into 'revolutionary internationalists' versus 'social-chauvinists' as progressive, since this 'corresponds with new tasks of world importance...the attempt to preserve the former ideological-organisational groups, ignoring the question of the relation to the central facts of the epoch, war and imperialism, is profoundly reactionary and doomed to failure.'³⁴

In the second article of this series Trotsky rejected Aksel'rod's contention that one's relation to the war would not determine one's post-war politics. It was in this connection that Aksel'rod hoped that he would one day once again join hands with Plekhanov. For Trotsky, the contrary was true. An individual's war programme 'not only determines the direction of political activity at the present moment (support the war or struggle against it), but also to a significant degree pre-determines those groups which will finally take shape after the war.'³⁵ He justified this remark with the claim that association with militarism during the present hostilities would fatally infect an individual with a social-chauvinist, national consciousness. In the remainder of this contribution Trotsky outlined three current approaches to the war which, given the inevitable disintegration of the centre, one could reduce to two: social-chauvinist and revolutionary-internationalist.

In the third instalment of 'Our Position' Trotsky outlined how *Nashe Slovo's* policy on unity and splits was unique. The previous chapter of this thesis noted how Trotsky responded to *Sotsial'Demokrat's* critique that *Nashe Slovo* was not decisive enough in splitting from social-chauvinists. In this section he also tackled the Organisational Committee's accusation that *Nashe Slovo* was pursuing a splitting policy, both in Russian Social Democracy and in the International. Although it was unlikely that either side would be satisfied with his reply, Trotsky presented his newspaper's case thus. It was against artificial splits, hence the dispute with *Sotsial'Demokrat'*, but, at the same time, unlike the Organisational Committee, it was not prepared to avoid an open struggle against social-patriotism out of a fear that this would lead to a split. It was this sin that Trotsky thought the Menshevik Ionov guilty of when the latter argued for unity among the old groupings in Russian socialism in the first issue of *Izvestiya*. Trotsky highlighted two harmful consequences of Ionov's view. First, it helped the social-patriots in their work of confusing the proletariat. One example of this was Aksel'rod's refusal to admit that *Nasha Zarya's* stance on the war entailed a rejection of a revolutionary struggle against tsarism. Second, it hindered those sections of the Organisational Committee which genuinely held an internationalist position from conquering their fraction from within. If internationalists were to follow Ionov's advice in current circumstances, Trotsky concluded, they would be committing political suicide:

We cannot together with Comrade Ionov close our eyes to the fact that in the old socialist parties the majority is not with us but with the social-patriots: from this it follows that the key to unity and organisational discipline is also in their hands. If the internationalists, the persecuted minority, voluntarily limited the field of their activity to unity and discipline at any price, they would beforehand place the fate of their struggle in dependence upon the organisational liberalism of the social-patriots.³⁶

The appearance of the above warning of the dangers inherent in the Menshevik's stance on unity in *Nashe Slovo* of 5 and 6 June 1915 gave Ionov's colleague, Semkovskii, just enough time to pen a rejoinder for the second number of the Organisational Committee's *Izvestiya*,

issued on 14 June. Entitled 'Demagoguery and Discrimination' Semkovskii's note protested against Trotsky's 'polemical-discriminatory style [which] obviously has the aim of forming a third "nonfractional" fraction.'³⁷ This response probably made little impression on Trotsky. After all, it only confirmed his presentation of the accusations of fractionalism levelled at him and *Nashe Slovo* by the Organisational Committee. However, Semkovskii's note did cause some upset in Menshevik ranks. In a letter to Aksel'rod of 30 June 1915, for example, Martov argued that Semkovskii was overestimating Trotsky's potential to harm the Menshevik fraction. Moreover, Martov disagreed with the logical conclusion of his colleague's case: his resignation from *Nashe Slovo* and the closing of Menshevik ranks into their own fraction. He thought it more important to retain links with the audience among which Trotsky was conducting his 'disorganising tactics', and pointed out that the untimely appearance of Semkovskii's note had rendered Martov's plans for *Nashe Slovo* to publish a compromise resolution on the Organisational Committee impossible.³⁸ In their turn Aksel'rod and Semkovskii thought Martov was making too many concessions by remaining within *Nashe Slovo*, and at one point Aksel'rod even threatened to quit the Organisational Committee's secretariat because of his disagreements with Martov on this point.³⁹

Although Martov was proved right and *Nashe Slovo* did not publish a conciliatory statement on the Organisational Committee, he did manage to achieve a 'civil peace' on the editorial board. It was agreed that the continuation of Trotsky's series 'Our Position' would, for the time being, be suspended. This 'civil peace' was soon broken, however, when Gri'gorev' sent a letter to *Nashe Slovo* protesting at the Paris publication's 'persecution' of the Organisational Committee for its supposed lack of energy in exposing social-patriotism in its ranks. Why level such charges only at the Organisational Committee, Gri'gorev' asked, when the Bolshevik Central Committee and the group Bor'ba, to which Trotsky belonged, also housed social-patriots in their ranks? He concluded that *Nashe Slovo's* selectivity on this matter aroused the suspicion that it was engaging in 'nonfractional fractionalism of the recent past.'⁴⁰

Nashe Slovo published two replies to Gri'gorev'; one from the editorial board and one from Trotsky. The former pointed out that it was aware of social-patriotism in, for example, the Bolshevik fraction. However, it had focussed its attention on social-patriotism in the Organisational Committee as it was precisely among the Mensheviks that social-patriotism had the most influence and was doing the most harm: 'Does Gri'gorev' think that the statements of individual Bolsheviks have the same effect as *Nasha Zarya*, one of the most influential sections of the August Bloc? Certainly not.'⁴¹ In response to the accusation of 'nonfractional fractionalism' the editors stated that *Nashe Slovo's* stance was independent of all fractions and it was precisely this that enabled it to construct a critical response to the crisis facing the International and Russian Social-Democracy. In his reply to Gri'gorev' Trotsky repeated his view that the Foreign Section of the Organisational Committee had deliberately tried to mislead others by claiming that the Petersburg liquidationists had not repudiated a revolutionary struggle against tsarism. He admitted that one of the members of Bor'ba, An', was currently spreading social-patriotic propaganda. But, he pointed out, fellow members of Bor'ba both in and out of Russia were criticising An'. Therefore Gri'gorev' was quite wrong to consider An' within Bor'ba as a case analogous to the Petersburg liquidationists within the Organisational Committee: 'We absolutely refuse to comprehend in what sense An's individual sin, which in the sphere of his activities immediately met with a decisive rebuff, can be placed on the same level as the political activity of the Petersburg group, which over the head of its organisation communicated with the Belgian patriotic minister Vandervelde...and, unfortunately, did not receive in the sphere of its activities that rebuff which it had won itself full rights for.'⁴²

The question of *Nashe Slovo's* relation to the Organisational Committee was not exhausted by the above exchange between Gri'gorev' and the Paris newspaper and Trotsky. In the same issue of *Nashe Slovo* Martov attempted to dampen the flames of the polemic between *Nashe Slovo* and *Izvestiya*. He began by trying to clear-up any misunderstanding that the two publications were engaging in fractional warfare. He pointed out that *Nashe Slovo* provided a forum

for internationalists of all fractions who occupied a similar anti-war position. Thus *Nashe Slovo's* aim was not to replace old fractions, but to provide an outlet for all those who opposed nationalism during the war. Hence, while *Nashe Slovo* would criticise individual documents as and when it saw fit, it would not conduct a consistent campaign against groups as if it itself formed a fraction. For Martov, the recent polemic between *Nashe Slovo* and *Izvestiya* was one example of a localised dispute. The fact that the two publications agreed on most issues surrounding the war meant that current disagreements could soon be forgotten and friendly relations reestablished.⁴³

However, Martov did not meet with the support of his fellow editors. In an editorial reply his colleagues pointed out how his statement diverged from the real aims of *Nashe Slovo*. Contrary to Martov, *Nashe Slovo* did have its own 'general-political inter-party position'. Moreover, *Nashe Slovo* thought its programme would form a focus around which a new unification of Russian social-democrats would occur, replacing the pre-war divisions. This belief, they made plain, issued from a conviction that the war had opened a new era in which the ground was being pulled from under the feet of the old fractions. Furthermore, *Nashe Slovo* saw its programme as hastening this process. Had Martov forgotten the editorial of issue 85 which had made these points clear and which he had helped to elaborate?⁴⁴ It was *Nashe Slovo's* intention to continue its work and 'if the historically formed fractions attempt to avoid this, this is not our guilt but their sorrow.'⁴⁵

One might have thought that Martov would resign from *Nashe Slovo* after the latter had spelled-out its intention to replace the old fractions, including Martov's Mensheviks. However, in a letter to Semkovskii he expressed his satisfaction that his differences with some of *Nashe Slovo's* co-editors had been made public, declaring that 'our hands have been untied'.⁴⁶ Perhaps he then took his colleagues' advice and re-read *Nashe Slovo's* editorial of issue 85, for he soon penned a letter in which he cited from this same text, drawing support for his interpretation of the Paris publication's aims.⁴⁷ For Martov, the crucial section of issue 85 was that which read, 'Accepting that the fractional...groups which formed in the previous epoch are at the

present moment the only point at which internationalists can come together, *Nashe Slovo* thinks its task of unifying internationalists excludes subordination to any one fraction, as it excludes the artificial unification of its supporters into a special fraction, politically opposing old groups.⁴⁸ From this paragraph Martov could justify both the existence of his fraction and his cooperation on *Nashe Slovo*. He warned against those who wished to use the crisis in socialism brought about by the war to the advantage of old fractions, including former 'non-fractional fractionalists'. Only the flexible formula which he had highlighted could, he argued, enable the joint activity of all internationalists.

If Martov intended the above letter to be the first shots in an open battle for control of *Nashe Slovo*, it soon became apparent that he had lost. Much to Martov's chagrin⁴⁹ Trotsky's series of editorials 'Our Position' began to reappear, not only as a continuation of a series but also as an editorial response to Martov. Here Trotsky did not deny that pre-war divisions among Russian social-democrats had retained their significance. On the contrary, he admitted that ideological and organisational affiliations, held over the course of many years, could not but be carried-over into the new epoch opened by the war. However, he pinpointed two harmful consequences of internationalists failing to overcome fractional allegiances during the war. One the one hand, disagreements with social-patriots in one's own ranks could be avoided in the interests of unity and, on the other, the activities of internationalists of other fractions could be ignored as one claimed exclusive rights to 'internationalism' for one's own fraction. Trotsky obviously had Martov in mind when he spoke of the former danger and *Sotsial'Demokrat* in view when he mentioned the latter. He reiterated *Nashe Slovo's* aim of overcoming old fractions by bringing internationalists together of all organisational origins, and threw the following warning at Martov:

In so far as *Nashe Slovo* attempts to express new ideological inquiries about socialism, tearing the old groups up, it becomes the object of accusations of 'splitting' and is suspected of fractional intrigue. For the dispersion of these suspicions we can recommend nothing other than what we have done until today,

i.e., to further the irreconcilable struggle against social-nationalism and socialist eclecticism.⁵⁰

Following his defeat on *Nashe Slovo* Martov resolved to join Aksel'rod in Switzerland, to where he travelled in August 1915. His biographer, Israel Getzler, does not connect these two events, merely asserting that 'by August 1915 [Martov] had been practically squeezed out [of *Nashe Slovo*].'⁵¹ A different picture emerges from Alfred Rosmer's reminiscences of Paris during World War One: 'Pretty vehement controversies brought him [Martov] into conflict with Trotsky, after which he decided to settle in Switzerland.'⁵² Certainly relations deteriorated so far that the two tried to score points against each other in an exchange of insults which took place whenever they met,⁵³ and, in a letter to Aksel'rod penned at the end of July, Martov admitted that the disputes in *Nashe Slovo* were having a far from beneficial influence on his health:

Eternal worries about how to earn a couple of francs has lowered by ability to work terribly and I am not even able to use the single source of making money to its fullest extent - *Vorwärts*; but, by the way, perhaps the eternal troubles with *Nashe Slovo* have hindered me to an even greater degree, ruining my nerves and from, time to time, making an invalid out of me.⁵⁴

Martov's defeat and retreat to Switzerland did not mean that disputes between Trotsky and the Mensheviks ceased to appear in *Nashe Slovo*. On the contrary, as early as mid-September 1915 *Nashe Slovo* published a three-part article by Martynov, in which the Menshevik criticised Trotsky's 'peace programme'. For Martynov, the appearance of Trotsky's 'Our Political Slogan' in *Nashe Slovo* of 23 and 24 February 1915 marked a turning-point in the Paris newspaper's understanding of the possibilities for realising socialism as a consequence of the changes brought about by the war. In 'Our Political Slogan' Trotsky stated that the war signified a new era of historical development which contained two options for humanity: either it could continue to live under capitalism, with the inevitability of new wars, or the proletariat could consciously seize state power to establish socialism. He added that the objective prerequisites for the latter option were already to hand; it only remained for socialist agitators to make

the proletariat aware of its tasks. It was with this agitational purpose in mind that Trotsky argued that calling for an end to the war as a return to the *status quo ante* ('Peace without annexations') was reactionary, for only a revolutionary socialist peace programme in the form of a United States of Europe, resolving the economic and nationalities problems which had caused the war, would be able to convince the proletariat that it could fulfil its duty, conquering state power and declaring its peace to the peoples of Europe.⁵⁵ Previous to this, Martynov pointed out, *Nashe Slovo* had claimed that a resolution of the nationalities problem could not be expected from the war. At best the bankruptcy of militarism and of the bourgeois classes would be revealed to the proletariat who, in this way, would learn an important lesson: 'Europe can only pull itself out of this vicious circle by overcoming imperialism, i.e., by liquidating capitalism.'⁵⁶ For Martynov, different perceptions of the meaning of 'the new epoch opened by the war' underpinned two radically different expectations of what could be achieved through the war: one, modest, which predicted a positive lesson for the workers, instilling in them a knowledge necessary if they were to respond to socialist agitation; the other, high, which foresaw the proletariat seizing state power and resolving economic and cultural problems through its peace programme. In his contributions to *Nashe Slovo* Martynov showed why he did not envisage any concrete and positive political structures being brought about by the end of the war.

It was not that he disagreed with Trotsky's case for a United States of Europe, an idea which he had admired since Kautsky first formulated it in 1908. Nor did he object to the notion that capitalism had 'objectively' ripened for a transition to socialism. This, he thought, had been amply illustrated by the way capitalism had adapted to military conditions. His problem with Trotsky's analysis was that it reduced a 'historical epoch' to a 'historical moment'. Citing Martov as supporting evidence, Martynov stated that the subjective requirements for a realisation of socialism - a complete break with nationalism, capitalist ideology and traditions, i.e., the internationalisation of the workers' movement - could only be attained over the course of several stages of the *post-war* era. Trotsky, on the other hand, thought 'beginning with a struggle for an ending of the war the revolutionary mobilisation of the mass may

conclude with the conquest of political power by the proletariat.⁵⁷ By telescoping a whole period of time into a single moment in this way, Martynov argued that Trotsky had ignored the complexities involved in guaranteeing the subjective aspect of his programme, and was thus left with unrealisable expectations. Thus, for example, the establishment of a United States of Europe demanded a certain level of consciousness and organisation from the proletariat, and 'as the collapse of the Second International has shown we still need to create them.'⁵⁸ Furthermore, Martynov highlighted two ways in which Trotsky had misunderstood the significance of ending the war under the banners 'Neither victory nor defeat' and 'No forced annexations'. Trotsky considered these slogans a hollow return to the pre-1914 situation which had caused the war, and as based upon a belief in the 'weakness of militarism multiplied by our weakness.'⁵⁹ But, countered Martynov, if the proletariat managed to call a halt to the war before the victory of one side or before a general exhaustion had set in, not only would the workers have saved thousands of lives, they would also have prevented a greedy peace, increasing the strength of reaction on one side and desires for revenge on the other. And, he added, how could these huge victories be taken as a sign of weakness? Next, Martynov attacked Trotsky's conception of the *status quo ante*:

Of course a peace without annexations would be a return to the past in the sense of state boundaries, but the correlation of class forces would have radically altered inside each state to the advantage of the proletariat. When each proletariat is convinced that the gold promised it by its imperialists is a lie, this is a huge conquest for socialism for the proletariat realises that imperialism is its hostile enemy.⁶⁰

This returned Martynov to the nub of his dispute with Trotsky. The former thought that the best one could hope for from the war was a positive change in the workers' consciousness. This would be but the first stage of a long process of preparing them for socialism. Hence, the negative slogans of 'Peace without annexations' and 'Neither victory nor defeat' were most appropriate for the current stage of the proletariat's development. The latter viewed the advanced workers, at least, ready to lead the proletariat to construct a United States of

Europe. For Martynov, however, Trotsky had miscalculated the nature of the epoch and the condition of the workers. He predicted that Trotsky and his over-ambitious programme, out of step with reality, would be isolated from the workers for a long time to come.

Trotsky was brought face to face with his Menshevik adversaries at the Zimmerwald Conference, a gathering of international socialists held from 5 to 8 September 1915. In one of his reports from Zimmerwald Trotsky wrote that Aksel'rod, delivering a speech on behalf of the Organisational Committee, had delineated two approaches adopted by Russian social-democrats to the war: one, supported by a minority, called for Russia's defeat; the other, backed by the overwhelming majority, including *Nasha Zarya* and the speaker, demanded the convoking of a Constituent Assembly which would take Russia out of the war. Trotsky then dismissed the slogan of a Constituent Assembly as 'covering irreconcilable differences in relation to the war and the absolute contradictory nature of the tactics which flow out of this.'⁶¹

In a subsequent letter to *Nashe Slovo* Aksel'rod did not dispute Trotsky's concluding comments on the political consequences of his remarks since, he pointed out, the Paris correspondent had not accurately presented what he had actually said in Zimmerwald.⁶² He admitted that he had highlighted two basic approaches to the war adopted by Russian social-democrats, but these had been: (1) internationalists struggling for peace as a way of ending the war and restoring the International; and (2) nationalists such as the German centre. Furthermore, contrary to Trotsky's report, he had deliberately avoided mentioning the issue of defeatism as he did not want to stress issues over which internationalists disagreed at what was a unification conference. Devoid of any exact figures of who was holding what opinion in Russia, Aksel'rod claimed that he did not say, and could not have said, that a majority in the homeland backed the call for a Constituent Assembly. He had mentioned that the Foreign Section of the Organisational Committee had sent a proclamation to Russia which demanded the convocation of a Constituent Assembly, and it was in this context that he had expressed a hope that this document would meet with a warm response among the overwhelming majority. Finally,

Aksel'rod confirmed that he had placed *Nasha Zarya* in the internationalist camp.

In 'A reply to P. B. Aksel'rod' Trotsky accepted the Menshevik's factual corrections to his initial report adding, however, that these qualifications only confirmed his original analysis of the dire consequences of Aksel'rod's views. Here Trotsky had in mind his opponent's reiteration that *Nasha Zarya* was one with the internationalists. How could this be, asked Trotsky, when the Menshevik publication differed from the latter on several key issues? Thus, *Nasha Zarya* approved the French Socialist Party's pro-war stance whereas internationalists condemned it as deadly hostile to socialism; *Nasha Zarya* in its reply to Vandervelde had agreed not to hinder the Entente's 'just war', in this way rejecting the internationalist's revolutionary struggle against tsarism. Hence, concluded Trotsky,

I wrote that "It is clear that with such a posing of the question the slogan of a Constituent Assembly can in the present moment play only one role: covering irreconcilable differences in relation to the war and the absolute contradictory nature of the tactics which flow out of this." Aksel'rod's objections wholly support in all essentials the warnings that I expressed. It remains for me to be comforted by the fact that my real sins on secondary matters indirectly acted to bring out clarity in the main issue.⁶³

Martov's relation to *Nasha Zarya's* successor, *Nashe Delo*, was at the centre of Trotsky's next confrontation with a representative of the Menshevik fraction. This dispute grew out of Lozovskii's request, in the form of an open letter in *Nashe Slovo*, to Volonter and Veshnev to repudiate Aleksinskii's assertion, made in *Sovremennyi Mir*, that they had opposed *Nashe Slovo's* 'Germanophilism' during editorial board meetings.⁶⁴ Veshnev obliged, although he protested against the polemical tone of Lozovskii's letter.⁶⁵ After receiving no reply from Volonter, Lozovskii addressed another open letter to him, in which he suggested that Volonter's differences with *Nashe Slovo* over organisational issues had now spilled over into ideological-political matters:

The fact that we now have ideological-political differences should be clear from the fact that you considered it possible, without any

qualification, to write on the pages of the fighting organs of the Russian social-patriots together with Maslov, Levitskii and other homeland patriots whose writings are deeply hostile to *Nashe Slovo's* internationalism. Is it possible for a...coworker of *Nashe Slovo* to remain silent when...*Sovremennyi Mir'* hauls the newspaper over the coals?... Is it possible to write in *Nashe Delo*, in this way laying a bridge between internationalism and social-patriotism at the same time as, as you know, *Nashe Slovo* considers the gulf between these two variants of socialism to be unbridgable and all types of joint literary activity inadmissible?⁶⁶

Volonter may have been unmoved by Lozovskii's open letters, but they certainly aroused Martov's indignation. In a letter to *Nashe Slovo* he said that he was surprised by Lozovskii's reference to *Nashe Delo*.⁶⁷ After all, anyone reading Lozovskii's letters would think that *Nashe Slovo* had banned its contributors from appearing in *Nashe Delo* when, in actual fact, Martov knew that this was not the case. He once again reminded *Nashe Slovo* of its editorial of issue 85 which stated that the Paris newspaper was against the break-up of old fractions at any cost, and that comrades could remain within old organisations on the condition that they could propagate internationalist principles. This, he claimed, was the case with Volonter's contributions to numbers 3 and 4 of *Nashe Delo* which had been opened-up to opponents of the idea of 'self-defence'. Martov also pointed out that he had warned his co-editors on *Nashe Slovo* of his intention to write an anti-social-patriotic article for *Nashe Delo*, which, because of censorship, had not appeared, and had not been censured at the time. Was it not the case, Martov asked, that *Nashe Slovo* itself had published contributions from known social-patriots (Deich, Leder, Borisov and Aleksinskii)?; and, was it not also true that *Nashe Slovo's* writers had worked alongside social-patriots in socialist (*Sovremennyi Mir*, *Sovremennik'*, *Novyi Mir*) and non-socialist newspapers (*Vestnik Evropy*, *Kievskaya Mysl'*)?

On the following day an editorial comment on Martov's letter, penned by Trotsky, appeared in *Nashe Slovo*. This conceded Martov's point that no formal resolution banning him, or any other person, from submitting articles to *Nashe Delo* had ever been passed. At the same time, however, Martov was reminded that five of the seven editors had

expressed their individual opposition to his plans because, as in fact turned out to be the case, they thought that the censor would rush to the defence of the 'fighting organ of Russian social-nationalism.' In these circumstances Martov's (muted) contribution to *Nashe Delo* could only serve as a smoke-screen, both for *Nashe Delo* itself and for all 'intermediary, swaying or unprincipled elements.' This point was elaborated upon through a distinction between cooperation for bourgeois and social-patriot publications. *Nashe Slovo* argued that Martov had confused matters by placing *Vestnik Evropy* and *Kievskaya Mysl'* on the same level as *Nashe Delo*. In actual fact the former publications belonged to a tradition which had long ago differentiated itself from Marxism. Hence it would be impossible to conclude from socialists working for the bourgeois press that the former had entered into an alliance with the latter. But, since social-nationalism was an outgrowth of social-democracy which had still not clearly separated itself from Marxism, the joint activity of internationalists with social-patriots in social-patriotic publications could only have several detrimental consequences: 'introduce confusion into minds, hold-up the necessary and salutary process of splitting and blunt the revolutionary vigilance of the advanced workers.' Then, *Nashe Slovo* objected to the way in which Martov had used its statement that it was against splits at any price to justify joint political work with social-patriots. The Paris newspaper's stance, it pointed out, meant that internationalists and social-patriots could coexist in one organisation for a certain period and under certain conditions, most notably if internationalists could conduct an open struggle with social-patriots to force the masses to choose between the two. And, in this battle for influence, *Nashe Slovo* insisted, internationalists could only pursue their own line in their own publications: 'one has to do battle with the enemy on shared territory, but one cannot to battle with it with a shared weapon.' Finally, *Nashe Slovo* stated that one could not compare the appearance of an occasional social-patriotic article on its pages with Martov's work for *Nashe Delo*. To begin with most instances of the former had occurred in the first months of the war when rival tendencies were in the process of forming and, on top of this, when such cases had been repeated in the recent period, they had been

accompanied by editorials to illustrate the impossibility of cooperation with social-patriots. In its conclusion *Nashe Slovo* told Martov that he had recently signed the Zimmerwald Manifesto, whose signatories were obliged to conduct an irreconcilable struggle with social-patriotism. For this, 'internationalists have to bring *their* ranks closer together, to create *their* organs and *their* support base for revolutionary activity.'⁶⁸

Martov kept this dispute alight by sending an article of reply to *Nashe Slovo*.⁶⁹ Here he thanked *Nashe Slovo* for accepting that Lozovskii had had no grounds for condemning Volonter. On his own account he stated that he had ignored the objections raised by his coeditors to his planned cooperation on *Nashe Delo*, since he suspected that they rejected this publication, the successor to *Nasha Zarya*, out of fractional considerations. These suspicions had then been confirmed by *Nashe Slovo's* characterisation of *Nashe Delo* as the 'fighting organ of Russian social-nationalism' when, in actual fact, it was a discussion paper. After remarking the point that he was criticising social-patriotism in his contributions to *Nashe Delo*, he reminded his Parisian colleagues that no resolution obliging comrades to do battle against defencist ideology had been taken at Zimmerwald; indeed, Lenin's resolution condemning *Nasha Zarya* had been rejected. In hounding Martov and other Mensheviks for putting the case for internationalism from the pages of *Nashe Delo*, he warned *Nashe Slovo* that it was not uniting internationalists, but setting them against one another.

The introduction of the idea that *Nashe Slovo* was working against the fulfilment of its stated aim of bringing internationalists together raised the temper of the debate. In its comment on Martov's defence of his participation on *Nashe Delo*, once again penned by Trotsky, *Nashe Slovo* not only repeated its view that *Nashe Delo* was a social-patriotic publication which internationalists had to criticise to the fullest extent, it also accused Martov of trying to turn the Menshevik fraction into a social-patriotic centre. Of course, *Nashe Slovo* pointed out, Martov found it easier to write for *Nashe Delo* once he had discounted the views of his five colleagues. However, that the latter were not motivated by fractional concerns was evident from the fact that Martov had had to

ignore his own revolutionary-Menshevik internationalists. Thus, for example, a recent resolution of a group of London revolutionary-Mensheviks argued for a 'merciless struggle with social-patriots (Plekhanov, *Nashe Delo*, etc)'. After defending its statement that Zimmerwald had obliged its signatories to conduct an irreconcilable struggle with social-patriots, *Nashe Slovo* told Martov that his 'internal-fractional policies' could not keep the Paris newspaper and the revolutionary-Mensheviks apart. In effect a battle for the Menshevik fraction itself was declared:

We do not doubt that..in the ranks of the worker-Mensheviks there are hundreds of revolutionary cadres for whom ties with revolutionary internationalists of all fractions are more dear than purely-fractional, politically-reactionary ties with the staff of social-patriots from *Nashe Delo*...These Menshevik-revolutionaries cannot be separated from us, just as we cannot be separated from them: we fulfil one and the same business. To their judgement, and to the judgement of the general opinion of all internationalists, we give the drawn-out conflict between Martov and our editorial board.⁷⁰

In the midst of the above conflict Trotsky and Martov also clashed over their respective accounts of the Zimmerwald conference. This dispute started when Martov protested against Trotsky's 'subjective' reportage of what had actually taken place in the Swiss village between 5-8 September 1915. He claimed that a reader guided by Trotsky's journalism would conclude that three groups had battled for influence at Zimmerwald: the left, the centre and the right. These distinctions would, he said, be familiar to anyone with a knowledge of the history of Russian Social-Democracy. However, although the Russian delegates at Zimmerwald had made important contributions, Martov emphasised that this gathering of internationalists had not repeated a set Russian pattern. In actual fact, the conference had divided into two groups: one made-up of 8 delegates, led by Lenin, who urged the participants to declare themselves to be the beginnings of a Third International; and another, the majority, who thought that they had gathered to plan a struggle for peace as the starting-point for the restoration of the Second International. The only other debate at the conference,

whether German Social-Democracy should be condemned, also witnessed a minority/majority split; the former headed by Ledebour who said 'no' and the latter who answered 'yes'. According to Martov, Trotsky had created a third fraction by splitting the majority, most notably by portraying the Organisational Committee as a right-wing group, opposed by a centre majority headed by *Nashe Slovo*. Thus, on the issue of a struggle for peace, for example, Trotsky said that *Nashe Slovo* thought of this as a revolutionary-class tactic whereas Aksel'rod and his cohorts thought of it in non-class struggle terms. In reality, as was evident from the Organisational Committee's suggested amendment to the Zimmerwald Manifesto, not discussed at the conference because of a lack of time, the Mensheviks viewed a struggle for peace as a first step in the new era of sharpening class contradictions, to which the conference participants should apply all their efforts to turn into a second step. Hence the Mensheviks had been at one with the majority on this matter, and this explained why *Nashe Slovo's* 'splitting gestures...did not work: the third tendency did not happen.'⁷¹ Finally, Martov argued that Aksel'rod and Trotsky had shared the same opinion on the issue of German Social-Democracy at Zimmerwald, although they approached the matter from different starting-points. But, he regretted, Trotsky's subjectivism had turned Aksel'rod's passing remark that German comrades were more worthy of condemnation than their French and Belgian counterparts into a whole tendency which the conference had supposedly rejected.

In his defence, published over two issues of *Nashe Slovo*, Trotsky turned Martov's accusation on its head: if he had suffered from too much subjectivism, Martov had written under 'the burden of objectivity'. This became clear, he said, if one compared Martov's perceptions of what had happened at Zimmerwald with what had actually occurred. Trotsky began by correcting Martov's definition of the extremist group. They were unique not because they demanded the establishment of a Third International, but because they wanted to turn the war into a civil war. He then outlined the points which separated the revolutionary from the pacifist internationalists, the most important of which was that the former thought of a struggle for peace as a revolutionary demand, opposing the proletariat to the whole of bourgeois society and to social-

patriotism, while the latter rejected revolutionary methods of struggle out of hand. In presenting matters in this way Trotsky argued that he had not simply viewed international socialism through the prism of a well-established divisions among Russian socialists. Indeed, he asked whether, 'our homeland groups in their basic political lines are not a national refraction of international socialist tendencies?'⁷² After all, the three groups which he had noted were evident in all European countries. In Germany, for example, one found the equivalent of the Russian passive internationalists (Martov and the Organisational Committee) in the fraction in the Reichstag, of the extremists (Lenin and the Central Committee) in the group Lichtstrahlen, and of the revolutionary internationalists (*Nashe Slovo*) in Liebknecht and his comrades. Hence it was no accident that three draft declarations were submitted for consideration at Zimmerwald, each one of which represented an individual tendency; just as it was no accident that it was Trotsky who had been asked to pen a final version as it was his group, which included, among others, Rakovsky, Grimm and Henrietta Roland Holst, which had guaranteed that anything at all was achieved at Zimmerwald. Furthermore, Trotsky claimed that he and his supporters had quarrelled with the passive internationalists, Ledebour, Moragi, Aksel'rod and others, on all the major points of discussion. Why then had Martov lumped the two groups together? This question returned Trotsky to the nature of Martov's 'objectivity', which reflected, he said, the Menshevik fraction itself, equally composed of opponents and supporters of *Nashe Delo*. Martov did not wish to upset this balance, and it was this desire which explained his insistence that two forces, internationalists and extremists, had clashed at Zimmerwald:

Martov's position...which enables him to see the watershed between Marxism and extremism, at the same time forces him not to note the watershed between revolutionary Marxism and passive internationalism. But, with Martov's permission, this watershed does not disappear when somebody, wishing to preserve a spiritual equilibrium, does not note it. For however mighty Martov's objectivity, the objectivity of political development is mightier.⁷³

The dispute about what had happened at Zimmerwald carried over into the New Year when, in January 1916, *Nashe Slovo* published Martov's reply to Trotsky's reply.⁷⁴ Here Martov questioned each of Trotsky's factual corrections, made in 'Under the burden of objectivity'. To begin with he asked *Nashe Slovo* to name the points over which Trotsky had clashed with Aksel'rod, for he did not know of any. He then threw the notion that Zimmerwald had been a victory for Trotsky into doubt. After all, the final manifesto made no mention of the struggle for peace growing over into a conquest of state power by the proletariat, just as there was no reference to a general battle with social-patriotism in the section condemning French and German Social-Democracy. Finally, Martov asserted that Trotsky had falsely put comrades into a group of 'revolutionary internationalists'. Grimm, for example, had recognised that there were two groups at Zimmerwald: one of eight headed by Lenin and another composed from the rest. In conclusion, Martov asked why, if he was so absorbed by fractional intrigue, had one of the extremists, Radek, supported his proposed amendment to the manifesto?

In what was to be the final word on this affair in *Nashe Slovo*, Trotsky declined the opportunity to, in turn, show the falsity of each of Martov's assertions. 'To take the mosaic apart stone by stone would,' he declared, 'be a misuse of the readers' and of the newspaper's time.' Instead, he would continue to critically analyse the positions of the three groups, extremists, revolutionary and passive internationalists, 'rooted in the conditions of life and activities of the socialist parties in the epoch through which we are living',⁷⁵ as they emerged on individual issues as time went by.

Trotsky's first opportunity to fulfil his promise came soon after the conclusion of his 'Zimmerwald debate' with Martov. In the second instalment of his 'Peace Programme', which began to appear in *Nashe Slovo* from 29 January 1916, for example, Trotsky contested Martynov's belief that the only sensible slogan under which the proletariat should struggle to end the war was 'Peace without Annexations'. Here, he said that he agreed with Martynov's view that huge efforts on behalf of the proletariat would be required to prevent territorial conquests being attained from the current world conflict.

However, it was for this very reason, he stated, that the proletariat should not limit itself to Martynov's 'minimal programme':

a decisive struggle of the proletariat directed against imperialist pretensions, whatever slogan it is conducted under, will weaken the ruling classes and strengthen the proletariat. But out of this it does not follow that in its struggle the proletariat should place before itself the political aim of returning to the old map of Europe and not advance its own programme of state and national relations, answering the basic tendencies of economic development, the revolutionary character of the epoch and the socialist interests of the proletariat.⁷⁶

And in later parts of this series Trotsky made it clear that a proletarian peace programme had to include the demand for the establishment of a United States of Europe.⁷⁷ When he examined opposition to the inclusion of a United States of Europe in a proletarian peace programme, Trotsky focussed mainly upon the objections put forward by Lenin. He did, though, make the following comment upon Martynov's 'passive-possibilist' critique:

Comrade Martynov moves us from an 'abstract', i.e., from a social-revolutionary, posing of the question to 'concrete' and 'realisable' tasks under the banner of a peace without annexations. We saw that an *actual* realisation of a peace without annexations would demand from the proletariat such revolutionary power under which it would not be able to limit itself to the conservative-negative programme of *status quo ante*.⁷⁸

In what was to be his last dispute with the Mensheviks while working as a journalist in Paris, it became clear to all that Trotsky and *Nashe Slovo*, on one side, and Martov and the Organisational Committee's *Izvestiya*, on the other, had irreversibly parted company. This polemic surrounded the election of worker representatives to the War-Industries Committees, bodies created to help conduct Russia's war effort, which took place in September 1915. In his first reports of these elections Trotsky recounted how candidates standing on behalf of the Organisational Committee and the August Bloc, despite holding viewpoints ranging from 'Plekhanovite to eclectic-internationalist',

were, as a group, defencists. Hence, he concluded, the Organisational Committee and the August Bloc had joined the social-patriotic camp.⁷⁹

In the third issue of its *Izvestiya*, the Organisational Committee argued that Trotsky had failed to stress the real differences current among various sections of the August Bloc. According to the Organisational Committee, one could identify four groups among the worker representatives on the War-Industries Committees: (1) an insignificant number of Plekhanovite nationalists; (2) opportunists, who wanted to join forces with bourgeois opponents of tsarism; (3) the majority which aspired to oppose bourgeois organisations with the organised force of the proletariat; and (4) internationalists who had stood for election under the banner of a struggle for peace. And since, the Organisational Committee concluded, it and the elected Menshevik Dan supported the internationalist section, it was a nonsense for anyone to label them defencists and social-patriots.

Trotsky subjected the Organisational Committee's self-defence to ruthless criticism in the long-running series of articles 'Social-Patriotism in Russia', which appeared in *Nashe Slovo* between 10 February and 15 March 1916.⁸⁰ Here he stated that for *Izvestiya's* claims to have any base in reality, there should be evidence of anti-defencist statements being issued from meetings of the War-Industries Committees. In actual fact, as was clear from the latest pronouncements of the Petrograd and Moscow groups, 'the political position of the workers' groups in the War-Industries Committees is a completely defined expression of a social-patriotic character.'⁸¹ According to Trotsky, the leader of the August Bloc in Russia was not the fictitious Menshevik-internationalist Dan, but the social-patriot Gvozdev. If one examined the various viewpoints outlined by *Izvestiya*, he argued, one would conclude that they all collapsed into social-patriotism. About the Plekhanovite social-nationalists there could be no argument. The opportunists, thinking it possible to gain reforms on the basis of capitalist society, had quite naturally sought an alliance with the bourgeoisie. However, Trotsky noted, in the present epoch opportunism 'is forced to follow the bourgeoisie into nationalism and imperialism', i.e., like Gvozdev, be a social-patriot. The politics of the third tendency, to use the War-Industries Committees as an

organisation through which one could struggle with the bourgeoisie was, Trotsky stated, ruled out by the nature of the War-Industries Committees themselves. In other words, the exponents of 'organisationally exploiting' the War-Industries Committees would be swallowed-up by the social-patriots and forced to serve the latter. As regards the final tendency discerned by the Organisational Committee, the internationalists, Trotsky argued that their tactic did not make sense. After all, he asked, how could one struggle for peace in a body that did not resolve questions of war and peace? The only possible way in which the War-Industries Committees could have been used for agitational purposes, Trotsky pointed out, was if the internationalists had attended one meeting, only to declare their opposition to defensive organisations. This, he said, would have answered the revolutionary policy of cutting all ties with the social-patriots. However, Dan demanded that internationalists remain within the committees for national defence and this, for Trotsky, meant 'rejecting the revolutionary mobilisation of the mass against the war.' The Organisational Committee's stance was so pernicious, according to Trotsky, since worker opposition to the War-Industries Committees depended upon internationalists remaining true to their principles: 'if bourgeois nationalism had met, in the form of all leading Social-Democratic groups and centres, a solid phalanx of internationalists...it would have stumbled across insurmountable class disbelief and its approach would have concluded in a sad fiasco.'⁸² In not recognising that its 'internationalists' had played a crucial support role to the outright social-patriots of the Gvozdev mould, Trotsky accused the Organisational Committee of penning a 'literary mockery of political facts.'

In a reply to Trotsky, Martov claimed that *Nashe Slovo* had engaged in its own form of subterfuge in its coverage of the events surrounding the War-Industries Committees.⁸³ In particular it had, he said, remained silent on the activities of the Petrograd Unification Group. At first sight this appeared puzzling. After all, articles on the Unification Group, which *Nashe Slovo* thought of as its own fraction, often used to appear on the pages of the Paris publication. Why then had this group not been mentioned in relation to the War-Industries Committees?

Because, Martov answered, the Unification Group had split over the issue of the worker elections, some calling for a boycott but most demanding participation. And, he added, the leader of the latter fraction, as he had learnt from *Sotsial'Demokrat'*, was none other than Gvozdev!⁸⁴ Furthermore, not only had *Nashe Slovo* remained silent on the Unification Group it had, Martov stated, out of the same fractional considerations, falsely equated the Organisational Committee and social-patriotism. In order to refute this equation he cited from, among other documents, a proclamation issued by the Initiative Group of Social-Democratic Mensheviks. This justified participation in the War-Industries Committees on the grounds that they provided a platform from which workers' demands could be advanced. Moreover, the Initiative Group declared that it had fulfilled its election promise of entering the War-Industries Committees 'not to join the cause of defence..but to struggle for peace, freedom and socialism.' This corresponded, Martov said, to a distinction which *Nashe Slovo* had not discerned. Comrades in Petersburg had been elected to save Russia, i.e., repulse the enemy and liberate the country from tsarism. In Moscow, on the other hand, the workers had elected candidates on a purely defensive platform. According to Martov, one could characterise 'defending Russia' as social-patriotism, but not the notion of 'saving Russia'. In the light of this evidence, he concluded that only those who consciously wished to distort facts could present the Organisational Committee as social-patriots.

In his reply to Martov, Trotsky asserted that the Menshevik leader had not followed his own advice of saying 'what is'. To begin with, it was wrong to claim that *Nashe Slovo* had at one time often printed articles on the Unification Group. This would have been impossible, according to Trotsky, since news of its activities reached Paris only very occasionally. It was equally false to say that the Unification Group had not featured in *Nashe Slovo's* analysis of the elections to the War-Industries Committees. On no less than two occasions its correspondent Boretskii had, for example, criticised the Unification Group for not adopting a sufficiently firm stance against social-patriotism.⁸⁵ Similarly, Martov had misled the reader by declaring that *Nashe Slovo* had ignored the information concerning Gvozdev's

allegiance contained in *Sotsial'Demokrat*. In actual fact, Trotsky pointed out, a full editorial had been dedicated to this matter, in which *Nashe Slovo* had correctly transmitted the news that Gvozdev was a former member of the Unification Group.⁸⁶ He then told Martov that he had read the Initiative Group's proclamation and had correctly identified it as social-patriotic in content. After all, it recommended participation in the War-Industries Committees on a defencist basis. This programme had, he said, most recently found expression in the defencist resolutions of the War-Industries Congress. Trotsky's main words of advice to Martov were as follows:

before advancing new accusations against us on the basis of...indirect evidence it would be better to make enquiries at our offices by letter: it is possible that this would spare Martov from new...negligence and more importantly spare the pages of *Nashe Slovo* from polemics which can cause no good at all.⁸⁷

Ten days later *Nashe Slovo* reprinted Martov's statement, originally issued in the Organisational Committee's *Izvestiya*, in which he declared that he was following Ber's example and resigning from *Nashe Slovo*'s editorial board. Martov explained that he had not taken this step while there was a 'slim chance that the majority of the editorial board would agree on some form of organisational control able to guarantee the minority from at least the worst excesses of fractional intrigue.'⁸⁸ However, his colleagues' refusal to satisfy this request had removed any 'moral and political responsibility' that could be laid at Martov's door for the direction of *Nashe Slovo*.

Trotsky responded to Martov's resignation on behalf of the whole editorial board in the same issue of *Nashe Slovo* in which Martov's statement appeared. He began by questioning Martov's assertion that Ber had left *Nashe Slovo* at an earlier date for much the same reasons that had motivated Martov himself. After all, he said, although Ber had had disputes with the majority of his editorial colleagues, these differences had been accurately represented in *Nashe Slovo*. It was for this reason that Ber had not once levelled the accusation of fractional intrigue at his co-editors. Indeed, when Martov had demanded a resolution on organisational control he had been opposed by, among others, Ber and several leading Menshevik internationalists. For

Trotsky, Martov's formal resignation from *Nashe Slovo* would have no influence on the policy of the latter since over the previous year the two had clearly parted company. Thus, for example, when *Nashe Slovo* had criticised the Organisational Committee for harbouring social-patriots, Martov spoke of the Paris newspaper's 'fractionalism'. Similarly, Martov had opposed *Nashe Slovo* on a whole series of other points, including: (1) the publication of a critique of Aksel'rod's views which provided a support for social-patriotism; (2) the characterisation of *Nashe Delo* as the ideological base of social-patriotism; (3) the call to Menshevik internationalists to join like-minded colleagues of other fractions in an open struggle against social-patriots serving on the War-Industries Committees; and (4) the distinction between passive internationalism and social-revolutionary internationalism. In his concluding remarks Trotsky expressed no regret that Martov had formally broken all ties with *Nashe Slovo*. Rather he declared that the battle for influence over the Menshevik internationalists would continue:

If Comrade Martov at the height of a struggle with social-patriotism considers it necessary to remove from himself the very 'hint' of moral (!) responsibility for the only Russian internationalist daily newspaper in which he enjoyed unlimited rights to criticise the views of the editorial majority, then we on our behalf declare that not for one minute will we remove from ourselves the obligation of moral and political responsibility which falls on us, as a non-fractional newspaper, for the ideological struggle and political work of the revolutionary Mensheviks.⁸⁹

The question of the loyalties of the Menshevik internationalists lay at the centre of Trotsky's next article on the War-Industries Committees. In the article 'Without Substance', published in *Nashe Slovo* of 4 May 1916, Trotsky reported that opposition to the Organisational Committee's defence of participation in the War-Industries Committees was coming from within Menshevik ranks in Russia. His evidence was taken from the fourth issue of the Organisational Committee's own *Izvestiya*, in which there had appeared a letter from Mensheviks in Petersburg. The parts of this letter cited by Trotsky made several points, most notably, from Trotsky's point of view, that Menshevik

workers were not defencists and that if the Organisational Committee did not adopt an anti-defencist line, the Petersburg Mensheviks themselves would have to split from their defencist colleagues. The Petersburg Mensheviks also expressed their conviction that as soon as the Menshevik's leaders declared their opposition to defencism, social-patriots would suffer a total defeat. While he welcomed the demands made upon the Organisational Committee, Trotsky puzzled over *Izvestiya's* editorial comment on this letter from Petersburg which, it claimed, confirmed its earlier view that leading circles of the August Bloc had been forced to take-up a defencist position because of pressure from below. For Trotsky, 'irony itself is disarmed when faced with this unseen and unheard-of confusion.'⁹⁰

Documents issued by Menshevik groups in Russia and published in *Izvestiya* also provided the material for Trotsky's next comment on 'internationalism' in the War-Industries Committees. On this occasion, however, the Paris correspondent could find no points of agreement between himself and the Russian Mensheviks.⁹¹ According to Trotsky the two declarations which had appeared in the fifth number of *Izvestiya*, the first signed by the Petersburg Initiative Group and the Moscow Social-Democratic Group and the second only by the former, were examples of the way in which workers were brought to serve the interests of the imperialist state. Ostensibly, he pointed out, both documents proclaimed their allegiance to Zimmerwald. They then went on to say, however, that a revolution in Russia could occur only if the proletariat joined forces with the bourgeoisie. Therefore internationalists, while refusing to accept responsibility for the war, should join the War-Industries Committees as part of the campaign to link-up with the bourgeois opposition to tsarism. For Trotsky, this train of reasoning was faulty at several junctures. First, it misunderstood the nature of the bourgeois opposition which was not revolutionary, but a means to 'discipline the people's consciousness and subordinate it to the imperialist band-master.'⁹² By insisting on a bloc with the bourgeoisie one would, Trotsky said, have to follow them and stand on imperialist soil. This was the mechanism, identified by Trotsky, through which the proletariat was tied to the imperialist state. Those workers who were not willing to serve the bourgeoisie under the openly social-

nationalist Plekhanovite banner, would most likely do so under the leadership of 'Zimmerwaldists': 'Just as the liberal opposition is needed by the imperialist bloc for taming...the bourgeois nation, so war-industrial "internationalism" is necessary for politically taming the workers.'⁹³ Second, the Moscow and Petersburg Mensheviks had not understood what Zimmerwald stood for, for this conference had placed the success of the Russian revolution in dependence not upon the bourgeoisie, but upon the international proletariat. The only possible tactic which followed-on from this proposition, argued Trotsky, was an independent class policy constructed in a spirit of open hostility to the bourgeoisie. Viewed from this perspective, he concluded, one had to break with bourgeois organs of defence and abandon the War-Industries Committees.

In what was to be his final piece on the War-Industries Committees dispute, marking the end of his last clash with the Mensheviks while working for *Nashe Slovo*, Trotsky first summarised his differences with the Organisational Committee on this issue. Trotsky thought that 'internationalists' who participated in the War-Industries Committees were committing themselves, and the workers who followed them, to a social-patriotic stance. Only opposition to the War-Industries Committees could, he argued, 'become an important moment in the development of internationalist tactics.' The Organisational Committee, on the other hand, as was clear from Martov's article in *Nashe Slovo* of 8 April 1916 (discussed above), did not think that participants in the War-Industries Committees were *a priori* defencists. Trotsky then highlighted that not all members of the Organisational Committee had been consistent in their statements on the elections to the War-Industries Committees. In a document issued in Berne in February 1916, for example, Martov had written that, 'More than 100,000 workers in Petersburg voted against participation in the War-Industries Committees, in this way refusing to take any responsibility for the war upon themselves.' Subsequently, in *Nashe Slovo*, this self same Martov had claimed that in Petersburg candidates had stood for Russia's saviour, and not its defence, as part of a justification for participation in the War-Industries Committees! One more example of Menshevik duplicity was brought to the readers' attention to bring home the main

message of this article. Here Trotsky focused upon the brochure *Kriegs und Friedensprobleme der Arbeiterklasse*, recently issued by the Mensheviks to enlighten foreign comrades of their approach to the current problems facing Social-Democracy. It was the brochure's structure that most offended Trotsky. It began with a reprint of the draft manifesto submitted by the Organisational Committee and the Polish Socialist Party to the Kienthal Conference of 24-30 April 1916 which, for Trotsky, gave a 'sufficiently confused' exposition of Zimmerwald's response to the war.⁹⁴ However, this draft manifesto had attached to it the declarations of the Petersburg and Moscow Mensheviks which called for cooperation with the bourgeoisie. If, he said, the Mensheviks had wanted to inform comrades of the real nature of their programmatic response to current issues, the appeals of the Petersburg and Moscow groups should have been placed at the front and not the back of the brochure. The fact that they had not done so, he concluded, suited the Organisational Committee's task of hiding its social-patriotic interior with an internationalist exterior:

We assert that not one foreign internationalist, acquainted with the first part of the document, would guess that its authors recommend entering organs of national defence with the intention of coordinating political action with the imperialist bourgeoisie...from the point of view of *political truth* there is no name for such a method of informing foreign comrades...this method inevitably follows on from the official-semi-official politics of the August Bloc which has two faces: one put on, international-Zimmerwaldist, and the other natural - Gvozdevist.⁹⁵

5.1 Conclusion

There is a certain amount of irony in Trotsky's disputes with the Mensheviks while he was resident in Paris during World War One. His call for the unification of internationalists of all fractions, for example, was opposed on two fronts: from the Bolsheviks for not being decisive enough and from the Mensheviks for being too hasty and too radical; although both Bolsheviks and Mensheviks agreed that Trotsky was engaging in 'non-fractional fractionalism'. A perception shared by

Bolsheviks and Mensheviks also underpinned their disagreement with Trotsky on another matter, that of the United States of Europe. Both fractions argued that Trotsky, in calling for the establishment of this transnational state structure as a way of ending the war, was compressing a historical epoch into a historical moment. Leaving these ironies to one side, however, Trotsky's main bone of contention with the Mensheviks' Organisational Committee was that its internationalism was passive, i.e., it did not recognise the need for an open and complete break of all ties with social-patriots. For Trotsky, passive internationalism was particularly harmful since it herded workers, who under a different leadership would have engaged in revolutionary activity, into the social-patriotic pen. The next chapter will examine Trotsky's relations with the outright, and not masked, social-patriots who also found themselves in Paris during the First World War.

Notes

1. For example in a letter of 19 August 1914 Martov congratulated Aksel'rod for writing a letter in French because, 'only letters written in French have a chance of getting into Switzerland.' (*Pis'ma P. B Aksel'roda i Yu. O. Martova*, Berlin, 1924, p 298).
2. Ibid., p 299.
3. Ibid., p 300.
4. Ibid., p 303.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid., p 306.
7. This summary of Martov's views was constructed from the following: 'Otkrytoe pis'mo L. Martova k' Gustava Erve', *Golos*, No. 12, 25 September 1914, p 1; L. M., 'Mir!', *Golos*, No. 19, 3 October 1914, p 1; L. Martov, 'K' pozitsii angliskikh' sotsialistov'', *Golos*, No. 21, 6 October 1914, p 1; L. M., 'Mirologiya "poslednei voyny"', *Golos*, No. 22, 8 October 1914, , p 1; L. M., 'Umer' "Vorwaerts"', *Golos*, No. 23, 9 October 1914, pp 1-2; L. M., 'Promyshlenniki i voina', *Golos*, No. 34, 22 October 1914, p 1; L. Martov, 'A Marksa ostav'te v' pokoe...', *Golos*, No. 35, 23 October 1914, p 1; L. M., 'Voina i Ital'yanskii sotsialisty', *Golos*, No. 37, 25 October 1914, p 1; L. Martov, 'Sryvayut'...!', *Golos*, No. 40, 29 October 1914, p 1; L. Martov, 'Voina i t. Plekhanov'', *Golos*, No. 41, 30 October 1914, pp 1-2; and L. M., 'V' dobryi chas'!', *Golos*, No. 43, 1 November 1914, p 1.
8. -, 'Polozhenie i zadachi sotsialisticheskogo internatsionala', *Sotsial'Demokrat*', No. 33, 1 November 1914, p 2. It is interesting to note that in Soviet books on this period historians mention only the positive side of Lenin's evaluation of Martov. See, for example, Ya. G. Temkin, *Lenin i mezhdunarodnaya sotsial-demokratiya*, Moscow, 1968, pp 41-42. See also P. Pomper, *Lenin, Trotsky and Stalin*, New York, 1990, p 241.
9. I. Deutscher, *The Prophet Armed*, London, 1954, p 216. Deutscher most likely overestimated Trotsky's enthusiasm for a bloc with

Martov. After all, in the entry of 26 August 1914 in the diary he kept in Zurich Trotsky penned the following critique of Martov's explanation of Social-Democracy's recent 'capitulation': 'at a general meeting of Russian Social-Democrats the Menshevik M[artov] read a report about the International during the war. His attempt to explain the capitulation of Social-Democracy as an unexpected and accidental step brought forth by an all-general "panic" was to the highest degree untenable...In other words: since an all-general panic reigned the Social-Democrats also panicked. This explanation is simply pleonasm...a whole series of other forces acted and acts: governments, diplomats, general staffs, banks, bourgeois parties and the bourgeois press. In the chaos of mobilisation and war all of these forces conduct their policy which flows out of their interests and relies on all of their preparatory work.' (L. Trotskii, *Voina i Revolyutsiya*, Vol. 1, Petrograd, 1922, pp 65-66).

10. Cited in -: 'Polozhenie i zadachi sotsialisticheskogo internatsionala'.
11. Temkin, *Lenin i mezhdunarodnaya sotsial-demokratiya*, p 40.
12. 'S. Peterburg', *Sotsial'Demokrat*', No. 34, 5 December 1914, p 2.
13. 'Ot' redaktsii', *Sotsial'Demokrat*', No. 34, 5 December 1914, p 2.
14. Raf. Grigor'ev, 'P. B. Aksel'rod' ob' internatsionale i voine', *Golos*, No. 86, 22 December 1914, p 1; & Raf. Grigor'ev, 'P. B. Aksel'rod' ob' internatsionale i voine. (okonchanie).', *Golos*, No. 87, 23 December 1914, p 1.
15. L. Martov', 'O moem' mnimom' "odinodestve". (Pis'mo v redaktsiyu)', *Golos*, No. 87, 23 December 1914, p 2.
16. The full list of names was as follows: P. B. Aksel'rod', Astrov', I. Bezrabortnyi [Manuilsky - IDT] , I. Ber', Vasil'ev', A. Voinov' [Lunacharsky - IDT], Volonter' (M. Pavlovich'), L. Vladimirov', A. Gal'skii, Raf. Grigor'ev', K. Zalevskii [Zalewski - IDT], Kanaev', I. Klimov', A. Kolontai, A. Lozovskii, V. Maiskii, V. Mandel'berg', L. Martov', Martynov', Ya. Master', M. N. P-skii [Pokrovskii - IDT] , N. Trotskii, Tsanev', G. Ts-ich', and many others. *Golos*, No. 63, 25 November 1914, p 1.
17. *Pis'ma P. B. Aksel'roda i Yu. O. Martova*, p 309. In his account of

these disputes Deutscher makes two factual errors. First, he claims that Lenin thought that Martov's and Aksel'rod's 'internationalism' did not concur with the rest of the Menshevik fraction's social-chauvinism when, in actual fact, Lenin said that Martov stood alone. Second, without saying that Martov's reference to Zinoviev was made in connection with the dispute between Martov and Trotsky over the reviewer for Trotsky's pamphlet, Deutscher concludes that, 'Martov resorted to a well-tested stratagem: he tried to "frighten" Trotsky (as Martov himself put it), telling him that if he were to break with the Mensheviks he would place himself at the mercy of the Bolsheviks and "deliver himself into the hands of Grisha Zinoviev", now Lenin's chief assistant in Switzerland. But the bogey was not as effective as it used to be; and Martov related that he had to approach Trotsky with smooth diplomacy and to treat him "like a little china statuette."' (*The Prophet Armed*, p 218). Deutscher's confusion on this point is really quite remarkable.

18. See, for example, Deutscher, *The Prophet Armed*, p 224; I. Getzler, *Martov*, Cambridge, 1967, p 141.
19. *Pis'ma P. B. Aksel'roda i Yu. O. Martova*, p 310. For a brief account of the background to and proceedings of the Copenhagen Conference see, for example, M. Fainsod, *International Socialism and the World War*, New York, 1973, pp 46-47. For *Golos's* statement to the Copenhagen Conference see, -, 'Sotsialisticheskoi konferentsii v' Kopengagene. Ot' redaktsii i sotrudnikov' "Golosa'", *Golos*, No. 100, 8 January 1915, pp 1-2.
20. The three points of Martov's programme were as follows: '1) to agitate for peace against 'war to the finish'; 2) against the "national bloc"; 3) a categorical declaration about the necessity to continue the struggle of international socialism against the tsarist reaction.' (*Pis'ma Aksel'roda i Martova*, p 315). Martov did not succeed in receiving an invitation to attend the London Conference. For the various declarations on this event and *Nashe Slovo's* attempts to build a united response from the various sections of the RSDLP see the previous chapter of this thesis.
21. *Pis'ma Aksel'roda i Martova*, pp 315-316.

22. Ibid., p 319.
23. For Martov's rejection of the chauvinist line published in *Nasha Zarya*, Nos. 7-9, 1914, see L. Martov, 'Zayavlenie', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 1, 29 January 1915, p 1. For Martov's dilemmas over whether to publish Dan's letter or not see his letters to Dan of 9 February and 11 March 1915 in *Pis'ma Aksel'roda i Martova*, pp 320ff.
24. Ibid., p 321.
25. N. Trotskii, 'Zayavlenie', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 14, 13 February 1915, p 1. For the debates which surrounded this statement see fn. 73 of the previous chapter of this thesis. The extent to which Trotsky remained unconvinced by Martov's anti-*Nasha Zarya* statement can be gaged from his letter to Radek of 6 February 1915. Here he stated that Martov would not be able to break with the semi-social-patriotic Organisational Committee which, in turn, could not break with the social-patriotic *Nasha Zarya*. See RTSKhIDNI, F. 325, O. 1, D. 394.
26. N. Trotskii, 'Nekriticheskaya otsenka kriticheskoi epokhi. I. Slabost' ili neuverennaya v' sebe sila?', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 28, 1 March 1915, p 1.
27. N. Trotskii, 'Nekriticheskaya otsenka kriticheskoi epokhi. II Legenda "bor'by za demokratiyu"', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 35, 10 March 1915, p 1.
28. The chronology of this dispute was as follows. First, Izvol'skaya praised Parabellum (Radek) for arguing that internationalists in German social-democracy should not split from the SPD but win the organisation from within. (I. Izvol'skaya, 'Germanskaya oppositsiya o raskole', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 75, 27 April 1915, p 1). Radek then submitted a 'Necessary Addition' to Izvol'skaya's piece, in which he stated that while his views had been presented in an objective manner, he hoped that Izvol'skaya herself would follow his advice and adopt a more irreconcilable stance against social-patriots in Menshevik ranks. (see, Parabellum, 'Neobkhodimoe dopolnenie', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 84, 8 May 1915, p 2). In his (delayed) reply Martov claimed that Menshevik social-patriots had been condemned in a sufficiently clear and open way. After all, he said, the former literary group *Nasha Zarya* and An'

had been censured by the Organisational Committee and its Foreign Secretariat for social-patriotism. (see, L. Martov', 'Napadenie tov. Parabelluma. (Pis'mo v' redaktsiyu)', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 87, 12 May 1915, p 2).

29. *Pis'ma Aksel'roda i Martova*, p 334.
30. -:, 'Rezolyutsiya, prinyataya sobraniem' redaktsii i kollegi Parizhskikh' sotrudnikov' "Nashego Slova"', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 85, 9 May 1915, p 1.
31. -:., 'Iz' besedy s' P. B. Aksel'rodom'. O nashikh raznoglasiyakh'', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 87, 12 May 1915, p 1.
32. A., 'Iz' besedy s' P. B. Aksel'rodom'. O nashikh raznoglasiyakh'. II.', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 90, 16 May 1915, p 2.
33. 'Ot' Redaktsii', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 90, 16 May 1915, p 2.
34. -:, 'Nasha Pozitsiya. I Raspad' i pererozhdenie starikh' gruppirovok' v' sotsializme', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 89, 15 May 1915, p 1.
35. -:, 'Nasha Pozitsiya. II Noviya gruppirovoki v' sotsializme', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 100, 29 May 1915, p 1.
36. -:, 'Nasha Pozitsiya. III Raskol' i edinstvo (okonchanie tret'ei stat'i)', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 107, 6 June 1915, p 1.
37. Cited in *Pis'ma Aksel'roda i Martova*, p 339.
38. Ibid., p 342.
39. Ibid., pp 337 & 339.
40. Gaf. Gri'gorev', 'Pis'mo v' redaktsiyu', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 137, 11 July 1915, p 2.
41. 'Ot' redaktsii', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 137, 11 July 1915, p 2.
42. N. Trotskii, 'Diversii', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 137, 11 July 1915, p 2.
43. L. Martov', 'Po povodu odnoi polemiki. (Pis'mo v' redaktsiyu)', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 137, 11 July 1915, pp 2-3.
44. -:, 'Rezolyutsiya, prinyataya sobraniem' redaktsii i kollegi Parizhskikh' sotrudnikov' "Nashego Slova"'. ,
45. 'Ot' redaktsii', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 137, 11 July 1915, p 3.
46. *Pis'ma Aksel'roda i Martova*, p 344.
47. L. Martov', 'Pis'mo v' redaktsiyu', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 144, 21 July 1915, p 2.
48. -:, 'Rezolyutsiya, prinyataya sobraniem' redaktsii i kollegi

- Parizhskikh' sotrudnikov' "Nashego Slova".
49. *Pis'ma Aksel'roda i Martova*, p 344.
 50. -:, 'Nasha Pozitsiya. 4. Nashi fraktsii i zadachi russkikh' internatsionalistov' (okonchanie)', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 147, 24 July 1915, p 1.
 51. Getzler, *Martov*, p 141.
 52. Alfred Rosmer, 'Trotsky in Paris During World War 1', *The New International*, September-October 1950, p 269.
 53. 'Now Trotskii uses the news only just received by him that Kollantai warmly supports *Kommunist*' against us, drawing out of this the conclusion: among the Mensheviks themselves there are elements who, even more than *Nashe Slovo*, support "splitters"...Uritskii's and Zurabov's involvement in Parvus's epic will be very useful to humble Trotsky's arrogance.' (*Pis'ma Aksel'roda i Martova*, pp 344-345).
 54. *Ibid.*, p 347.
 55. N. Trotskii, 'Nash' politicheskii lozung', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 22, 23 February 1915, p 1; N. Trotskii, 'Nash' politicheskii lozung' (okonchanie)', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 23, 24 February 1915, p 1.
 56. -:, "'Porochnyi krug'", *Nashe Slovo*, No. 7, 5 February 1915, p 1.
 57. -:, 'Nasha Pozitsiya. II Noviya gruppirovoki...'
 58. A. Martynov', 'Ot' abstraktsii k' konkretnoi deistvitel'nosti. II. Lozung' "Soedinennykh' shtatov' Evropy'", *Nashe Slovo*, No. 192, 16 September 1915, p 2.
 59. -:, 'Nash' politicheskii lozung'.
 60. A. Martynov', 'Ot' abstraktsii k' konkretnoi deistvitel'nosti. III. Lozung' "ni pobedy, ni porazheniya!'", *Nashe Slovo*, No. 193, 17 September 1915, p 1.
 61. N. T., 'Rossiskaya sektsiya internatsionalistov'. (iz' zapisnoi knizhki)', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 212, 9 October 1915, p 1.
 62. P. Aksel'rod', 'K' konferentsii v' tsimmerval'de. 1. Pis'mo v' redaktsiyu', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 225, 27 October 1915, p 1.
 63. N. T., 'K' konferentsii v' tsimmerval'de. 2. Otvet' P. B. Aksel'rodu', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 225, 27 October 1915, p 2.
 64. A. Lozovskii, 'Vopros' tt. Volonteru i Veshnevu', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 169, 20 August 1915, p 2.

65. Ibid.
66. A. Lozovskii, 'Sovmestimo-li? (Dva voprosa t. Volonteru)', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 188, 11 September 1915, p 2.
67. L. Martov', 'Pis'mo v redaktsiyu', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 235, 9 November 1915, p 2.
68. -: 'O sovместnykh' vystupleniyakh' s' sots-patriotami. (Po povodu "Pis'ma t. Martova")', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 236, 10 November 1915, p 2.
69. L. Martov', 'Po povodu moikh' "sovместnykh' vystuplenii"', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 263, 11 December 1915, p 2.
70. -: 'Sotrudnichestvo s sotsial'-patriotami. (Otvet' t. Martovu)', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 264, 12 December 1915, p 2.
71. L. Martov', 'Sliskom mnogo sub'ektivizma. (Po povodu konferentsii)', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 247, 23 November 1915, p 2. For Trotsky's original outline of the three groups at Zimmerwald see N. T., 'Nashi gruppirovki [iz' zapisnoi knizhki]', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 209, 6 October 1915, p 1. In this article Trotsky claimed that he had illustrated that there were three groups at Zimmerwald, whereas Aksel'rod incorrectly perceived only two.
72. N. Trotskii, 'Pod' bremenem' ob'ektivizma. I', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 248, 24 November 1915, p 1.
73. N. Trotskii, 'Pod' bremenem' ob'ektivizma. II', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 249, 25 November 1915, p 2.
74. L. Martov', 'V' sherengu! (tsimmerval'dskaya konferentsiya i gruppirovki na nei)', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 4, 6 January 1916, pp 1-2; L. Martov', 'V' sherengu! (tsimmerval'dskaya konferentsiya i gruppirovki na nei) (okonchanie)', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 5, 7 January 1916, pp 1-2.
75. N. T., 'Vokrug' Tsimmerval'da. (po povodu stat'i t. Martova)', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 10, 13 January 1916, p 1. Trotsky did, however, summarise how his evaluation of the groups which had emerged at Zimmerwald clashed with Martov's in N. Trotskii, 'Programma mira. VI. Patsifistskoe i revolyutsionnoe otnoshenie k' programma mira', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 88, 13 April 1916, pp 1-2. In this article Trotsky rejected Martov's assertion that at Zimmerwald it was agreed that the struggle against the war was only the starting-

- point of a renewal of class conflict.
76. N. Trotskii, 'Programma Mira. II "Mir bez' anneksii" i status quo ante', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 25, 30 January 1916, p 2.
 77. N. Trotskii, 'Programma Mira. IV Soedinennye Shtaty Evropy', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 29, 4 February 1916, pp 1-2.
 78. N. Trotskii, 'Programma Mira. V Pozitsiya "Sotsialdemokrata"', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 86, 11 April 1916, p 2.
 79. See, for example, -:, 'Fakty i vyvody. (eshche o petrogradskikh vyborakh)', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 270, 19 December 1915, p 1; -:, 'Politicheskie shtreikbrekhery: Novye "vybory" v' voenno-promyshlennyi Komitet', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 277, 29 December 1915, p 1 ; and -:, 'Tsimmerval'd' ili gvozdevshchina?', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 11, 14 January 1916, p 1.
 80. -:, 'Sotsial'-patriotizm' v' Rossii. I Ikh' "pobeda"', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 34, 10 February 1916, p 1; -:, 'Sotsial'-patriotizm' v' Rossii. I Ikh' "pobeda" (okonchanie)', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 35, 11 February 1916, p 1; -:, 'Sotsial'-patriotizm' v' Rossii. II "Timy gor'kikh' istin' nam' dorzhe nas' vozvyshayushchii obman'", *Nashe Slovo*, No. 53, 3 March 1916, pp 1-2; -:, 'Sotsial'-patriotizm' v' Rossii. III "Voенно-promyshlennye" sots-dem-ty i ikh' gruppirovki', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 54, 4 March 1916, p 1; -:, 'Sotsial'-patriotizm' v' Rossii. IV Klass' i partiya, massy i vozhd'i', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 62, 14 March 1916, p 1; -:, 'Sotsial'-patriotizm' v' Rossii. V Neobkhodimo izolirovat' sotsialpatrioticheskii shtab'', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 63, 15 March 1916, p 1.
 81. -:, 'Sotsial'-patriotizm'...II "Timy...'
 82. -:, 'Sotsial'-patriotizm'...V Neobkhodimo...'
 83. L. Martov', 'To, chto est', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 84, 8 April 1916, pp 1-2.
 84. Martov is here referring to: -:, 'Rabochie i voenno-promyshlenniye komitety. (Pis'mo iz' Peterburga), *Sotsial'Demokrat'*, No. 50, 18 February 1916, pp 1-2.
 85. Trotsky is here referring to: -:, 'Vesti iz' Rossii', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 7, 9 January 1916, p 2; & M. Boretskii, 'Iz' besed' s' Plekhanovtrem' iz' Rossii', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 47, 25 February 1916, pp 1-2.
 86. Trotsky is here referring to: -:, 'K' voprosu o nashikh' gruppirovkakh'', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 68, 21 March 1916, p 1.

87. -:, 'Logika plokhogo polozheniya. (Otvet' t. Martovu)', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 85, 9 April 1916, p 2.
88. L. M., 'Zayavlenie tov. Martova', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 93, 19 April 1916, p 1.
89. -:, 'Po povodu "zayavlenie" tov. Martova', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 93, 19 April 1916, p 2.
90. -:, 'Bez' sterzhnya', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 104, 4 May 1916, p 1.
91. -:, 'Korennoe raskhozhdenie. I. Politicheskiya osnovy voenno-promyshlennago "internatsionalizma"', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 165, 19 July 1916, p 1; -:, 'Korennoe raskhozhdenie. II. Dve isklyuchayushchiya drug druga takticheskiya linii', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 166, 20 July 1916, p 1.
92. -:, 'Korennoe raskhozhdenie...', No. 166.
93. Ibid.
94. For an English translation of this draft manifesto see O. H. Gankin & H. H. Fisher, *The Bolsheviki and the World War*, Stanford, 1940, pp 429-433.
95. -:, 'Dva litsa', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 174, 29 July 1916, p 1.

CHAPTER SIX

Trotsky & Russian Social-Patriotism in Paris

6.1 Introduction

If Trotsky's polemics with the Bolsheviks, on the one hand, and his disputes with the Mensheviks, on the other, showed that he had no monopoly on a Russian Social-Democratic response to the war, then the existence of a group of Russian social-patriots in Paris prevented Trotsky from laying claim to be the voice of Russian émigré opinion in the French capital. In a collection of articles issued in Paris in 1915 a selection of Russian social-patriots outlined a core set of beliefs to which they all adhered: Germany, by attacking Serbia and breaking Belgium neutrality, was responsible for the war; a German victory would be harmful for democracy; a German victory would hold Russian economic development back and would therefore be contrary to the best interests of the Russian proletariat; and, finally, one had to join the struggle to defeat Germany.¹

Prominent members of this group included journalists working for the newspaper *Novosti*, Yakovlev (attached to *Novoe Vremya*), Belorussov (a correspondent for *Russkii Vedomosti*) and the editorial board of *Prizyv*, a weekly newspaper which began to appear from the autumn of 1915.² This chapter will examine Trotsky's critical responses to the outpourings of his social-patriotic compatriots .

6.2 Trotsky and the Russian Social-Patriots in Paris

Trotsky's first skirmish with a representative of the social-patriotic circle in Paris followed Aleksinskii's citation of a section of Trotsky's pamphlet *War and the International* in the final instalment of a series of articles entitled 'War and Socialism'.³ In these writings Aleksinskii criticised German Social-Democracy's support of the German war effort, and in making this point he quoted the following lines from Trotsky's just published work:

In his interesting essay (in Lausanne) Comrade Trotsky told of the announcement made by one of the members of the Central Committee of the German Social-Democratic Party who, in conversation with Trotsky, explained the poor behaviour of leading circles of this party at the beginning of the war by a highly simple consideration: if we had spoken against the war the government would have confiscated our party funds! Certainly readers will understand that it is not even worth examining this pretext since a Social-Democratic Workers' Party concludes and should conclude its tactics from class (*klassovikh*) interests and not from...those of the kitty (*kassovikh*).

I have been similarly forced to stop on these reasons with which several comrades 'explain' and justify the behaviour of German Social-Democracy.⁴

Thus, in his article Aleksinskii cited Trotsky as the source of a German comrade's views, and then stated that he had been forced to reject other such attempts to whitewash German Social-democracy by several other (unnamed) socialists. His report of the contents of Trotsky's pamphlet seems just and accurate. After all, in *War and the International* Trotsky wrote,

Perhaps never before had the spirit of organisational inertia dominated so freely in German Social-Democracy as in the past few years which directly preceded the great catastrophe; and there can be no doubt that the question of preserving the organisation - the kitty, the workers' houses, the printing presses - played a very large role in determining the position of the fraction in the Reichstag in relation to the war. The first argument which I heard from one of the leading German comrades (Mol'kenbur) reads: 'if we had acted otherwise we would have doomed our organisation to death.'⁵

However, in his 'Necessary Correction' of 25 November 1914 Trotsky insisted that, contrary to Aleksinskii, he had not explained German Social-Democracy's backing of the German government out of a concern for its funds and that he had not used this explanation to justify the German Social-Democratic Party. To begin with, Trotsky pointed out that in the self same pamphlet from which Aleksinskii had quoted he

had told the German socialist that, 'You have killed the authority of German Social-Democracy and you have killed the International'; and, as Trotsky highlighted, 'this does not look like a "justification"'.⁶ Finally, in an obvious dig at Aleksinskii 's approval of French and Belgium socialists' calls for a self-defence of their countries' frontiers, Trotsky said that he had also truthfully characterised those shameless semi-patriots who used their attacks on German Social-Democracy as an excuse to concoct a 'patriotic mixture of France...and Petrograd under the internationalist flag'.⁷

The Swiss town of Lausanne also featured in the series of events which led to Trotsky's first critical response to the views of the most famous Russian social-patriot residing in the French capital, Plekhanov. *Golos* readers had been able to acquaint themselves with Plekhanov's view of the war from N.K's report of a speech Plekhanov delivered to a gathering of socialists of October 19 14 in Lausanne.⁸

Plekhanov blamed Germany for bringing Europe to war. He pointed out that on the eve of hostilities even German Social-Democratic leaders had accepted this. However, these self same German socialists had then failed in their duty to oppose the designs of German militarism. On the contrary they had justified German actions under the slogan 'each nation has a right to existence.' Plekhanov labelled this a 'laughable' position. How could German socialists seek refuge in this slogan while denying Belgium that very right ? He also dismissed the argument that German Social-Democrats had to support their government as it was defending itself from tsarism: 'everyone knows that the German crown was one of the strongest bulwarks of tsarism'.⁹ For Plekhanov, one could explain the out and out opportunism of German Social-Democracy by its disregard for principles and by its concern to follow the mood of the masses:

German Social-Democracy did not find the internal strength to struggle with chauvinism and preferred to sacrifice principles than to sacrifice its influence over the masses, if only provisionally.¹⁰

One illustration of the German party's carelessness in the theoretical realm was the German radicals' explanation of their vote for the war credits by a desire to preserve party unity. Plekhanov claimed

that he was against splits, but not at the expense of principles. Recent German events pointed to the sorry state of affairs that inattention to theory could lead: *Arbeiterzeitung* had abandoned class politics for the politics of race. The extent of Plekhanov's disgust for German Social-Democracy was evident from his demand that radical changes would have to be undertaken in the German SDP before one could reestablish ties with it.

Plekhanov's condemnation of German socialists was matched by his fervent support of socialists who had voted for and even joined the war time governments in the Entente countries. According to Plekhanov, Russian, French and Belgium socialists had a duty to uphold their respective countries' defences as they were acting under the principle of self-defence. Previous socialist conferences had stipulated that socialists could join bourgeois ministries in exceptional circumstances and, asked Plekhanov, were not the then current events 'exceptional'? Furthermore, he defended socialists who were attempting to win over neutral countries to the side of the Entente. Plekhanov argued that proletarian diplomacy should urge all to fight against those guilty of infringing justice: 'If one is happy that the war passes one by then this is not an international policy but a policy of narrow-nationalism.'¹¹

Five days after the appearance of N.K.'s report *Golos* published one of Plekhanov's letters, which had first appeared in *Justice* of 15 October 1914.¹² Here Plekhanov located the origins of the war in Germany's desire for economic supremacy. He argued that a German victory would undermine Russia's base for economic development and, 'since economic evolution is the base of social and political evolution Russia, in the case of her defeat, would lose all or almost all possibility of finishing tsarism.'¹³ In his conclusion, Plekhanov called upon the socialist world not to be fooled by the trickery of the German general staff. If the Entente lost, the whole progress of Western Europe would take a backward step.

Trotsky responded to Plekhanov's case after the 'father of Russian Marxism' had developed his views in the pamphlet *O voine*, published in Paris in 1914.¹⁴ For Trotsky, Plekhanov's writings were the saddest testimony to the recent socialist disintegration. Although he agreed

with Plekhanov's condemnation of German Social-Democracy, he argued that Plekhanov had added nothing to what had already been said in the Russian socialist press. Moreover, Plekhanov's explanation of the follow the mood of the German electorate was dismissed as a non-explanation. According to Trotsky, one could not be surprised by this, for Plekhanov and German Social-Democracy shared the same presuppositions:

Both there and here the criterion is not the social-revolutionary tasks of the international proletariat but the interests of national capitalism from the point of view of a national workers' policy.¹⁵

The rest of Trotsky's article was devoted to a critique of Plekhanov's distinction between Germany's offensive war and Russia's defensive war. He did this by examining Plekhanov's view of Austria-Hungary's and Russia's respective Balkan policies. According to Plekhanov, Austria-Hungary had broken the European peace by attacking Serbia, whereas Russia had to support Serbia so as not to lose all influence in the Balkan peninsular. Trotsky attempted to discredit Plekhanov's perception of a less rapacious tsarist diplomacy by pointing to Russia's appalling record of interference in the Balkans. First, Romanian, Bulgarian and Serbian Social-Democrats distinguished between Hapsburg and tsarist policy only by labelling the latter's approach more 'dishonourable and dangerous.'¹⁶ Second, one could easily construct a list of Russia's cynical and self-interested acts in the Balkans, including: in 1876 Bosnia and Herzegovnia had been conceded to Austria in return for Austrian neutrality in the event of a Russo-Turkish war; Russian endeavours to turn Bulgaria into its satrap had led to the formation of an anti-Russian party in Bulgaria; in 1908-09 Russia pushed Serbia into a war with Austria and then betrayed the Balkan nation and so on. Trotsky hoped that the Balkan peoples had a better memory than Plekhanov. Finally, Trotsky claimed that Russia had entered the war not out of a concern for Serbia's independence but to use the Serbian cause to gain Galicia. Had Plekhanov not considered a scenario in which, 'tsarist diplomacy would give Serbia to the Hapsburgs as it gave gave Bosnia 38 years ago in exchange for Galicia, without which tsarism will not go home?'¹⁷

In his conclusion Trotsky returned to Plekhanov's argument which he had considered at the outset of the article, that Austria had pushed Russia into war. He accepted Plekhanov's reference to *Vorwärts's* account of German aggression on the eve of the war as evidence of German recognition of German guilt. However, Trotsky asserted that one could consider Plekhanov's use of the German newspaper on the same level as one would evaluate German exploitation of Russian socialists' struggle against tsarism:

From *Vorwärts's* forewarning about German diplomacy Plekhanov sophistically pulls-out a justification of Russian diplomacy, representing it in a letter to Bulgarian socialists as a defence of Serbia and as a protection of 'simple laws of morality and law.' What distinguishes Plekhanov from the *current Vorwärts* which exploits our struggle against tsarism for a justification of the movements of German imperialism? Absolutely nothing! One aim and one method!¹⁸

During April 1915 Trotsky wrote several articles in which he complained of slander which was being hurled at *Nashe Slovo* and its friends by the Russian social-patriots. The first shots of this particular battle were fired in a report, written under the pseudonym Iks' and published in *Novosti*, of Trotsky's paper 'Pan-Germanism and the War' which he delivered to the Society of Russian Engineers. Iks' cited Trotsky as saying that, 'Is it not absurd to assert that Pan-Germanism is the exclusive ideology of a small group of Prussian Junkers'; to which Iks' replied:

Perhaps it would be less absurd to assert that Pan-Germanism is the ideology of N. Trotsky and a small group of Russian Social-Democrats who are 'so obliged to German Social-Democracy' and German political science.¹⁹

Trotsky responded to Iks's report in 'The times now are such' of 1 April 1915. He called *Novosti* a 'gutter newspaper' and ridiculed the train of logic which characterised *Nashe Slovo* as a Pan-Germanist publication thus:

in our window there really shines a suspicious light. Writing and collecting articles in which there is no humiliation of the German people and no separating off of the German culture, in which lies

and reaction are denounced irrespective of national and state boundaries....The matter is clear: Pan-Germanists!²⁰

Trotsky also informed the reader that he had received a letter from a certain Mr Bek-Allaev who had accused *Nashe Slovo* of publishing itself on German money and of having a Jewish editor. Allaev's evidence was *Nashe Slovo's* thesis that recent Russian success at the Austrian fortress town of Przemyśl did not give her a strategic advantage.²¹ Trotsky rejected the possibility of engaging in a discussion over tactics with Allaev. The charge of a Jewish editor could easily be refuted as the author of the aforementioned war report had a more Russian name than Allaev himself and, in any case, the *Nashe Slovo* war correspondent was a former officer in the Russian army. Trotsky ended the article by reminding Allaev, or the people who were instructing Allaev, that 'although the times now are such, criminal punishments for slander have still not been repealed.'²²

If Trotsky hoped that his threat of legal action would put an end to this matter, he was soon to be disappointed. Two days later *Novosti* carried two responses to 'The times now are such'.²³ In a short letter to *Novosti* L. M. Glezer' revealed that he was 'Iks'. He stated that Trotsky's article of 1 April was an 'unworthy, disorderly literary denunciation' and that it was beneath his dignity to refute the insinuations contained therein. *Novosti's* editorial board added that as it respected language it would ignore N. T. 's use of the words 'gutter newspaper' and that it would not enter into such polemics.

In a short note in *Nashe Slovo* of 9 April Trotsky responded to Glezer' and *Novosti*. He denied that his 1 April contribution to the debate had contained any insinuations; after all, 'Iks' wrote that the Engineers' Society had organised a Pan-Germanist talk.' Trotsky ridiculed Glezer's revelation of his true identity as 'the exchange of one political and literary nonentity for another.' He then addressed *Novosti's* self-defence from the charge of being a 'gutter-newspaper'. How else could one classify a publication which had, first, in war time France published an 'account' of Trotsky's Pan-Germanism and, then, permitted the 'informer' to write of N. T.'s 'disorderliness' when the latter had refuted charges of Pan-Germanism? Trotsky concluded, 'Nasty

beginning Mr Social-Patriots! Worrying about the fate of European democracy while in the meantime covering-up dirty tricks.'²⁴

The acrimonious tone of the exchanges between Trotsky and the Russian social-patriots continued into the next dispute. This arose after Aleksinskii, when welcoming *Novosti's* new editor, indirectly labelled *Nashe Slovo* a defeatist publication:

I consider that now, during such important events as war, mutual support and cooperation of those elements among Social-Democrats and Social-Revolutionaries who take-up similar positions on the war and who do not share the profoundly mistaken, in my view, ideas of *Zhizn'* and *Nashe Slovo* etc, to be extremely necessary. This cooperation is the more necessary given that in Russia the majority of conscious peasants and workers occupy our position which, for the sake of brevity, I call anti-defeatist.²⁵

In his reply Trotsky denied that *Nashe Slovo* had ever recommended German domination to the Russian people.²⁶ On the contrary, he asked Aleksinskii if defeatism was a label which would be better applied to his views; after all, did the Russian social-patriots not urge the German people to support Russia's war effort? Trotsky acknowledged that Aleksinskii had included *Nashe Slovo* in the defeatist camp for the sake of simplicity, but he also differentiated between two sorts of simplicity; one quite useful and the other worse than stealing. Aleksinskii's simplicity fell into the latter category since he had invented *Nashe Slovo's* stance on the war. According to Trotsky, the only title that Aleksinskii was earning for himself was that of a 'distortionist.'

The final outburst of hostilities of April 1915 once again brought Trotsky into dispute with Aleksinskii. On this occasion the polemics surrounded Trotsky's evaluation of Rakovsky's visit to Italy. In the article 'A Sytinist "little man" on Rakovsky', published in *Nashe Slovo* of 17 April, Trotsky defended the Romanian socialist from Amfiteatrov's claim that Rakovsky had gone to Italy to disseminate German propaganda.²⁷ Trotsky pointed out that Amfiteatrov had made his claim despite his assertion to the contrary that Rakovsky was not of the right type to be entrusted with an official mission. Trotsky informed the

reader that Rakovsky had travelled to Italy as a socialist hoping to convince other socialists to oppose any moves for Italian and Romanian intervention in the war ; a mission which, according to Trotsky, well-suited Rakovsky's character:

What Rakovsky's 'type' is is well-known to the International. This is a man who for two decades has stood under revolutionary banners, who has close connections with Russian, French, Bulgarian and Romanian socialism, who gives his exceptional energy and - we will allow ourselves to say this also! - his money to the cause of the liberation of the proletariat.

Amfiteatrovshchina's glue does not stick to Rakovsky.²⁸

Aleksinskii, however, took exception to Trotsky's portrait of Rakovsky. In a letter to *Nashe Slovo's* editorial board, which appeared in the newspaper on 25 April together with Trotsky's reply,²⁹ the Russian social-patriot said that Trotsky had committed two factual errors. First, one could not say that Rakovsky was closely connected to Russian Social-Democracy as he was not, and never had been, a member of either the RSDLP or the S-R Party. Second, the only material assistance which Rakovsky had afforded Russian socialism was in the publication of Trotsky's *Pravda* and at the then current moment in the production of *Nashe Slovo*. For Aleksinskii, this did not give Trotsky the right to claim a special relationship between Rakovsky and Russian socialism. Indeed, the latter could not be held responsible for Rakovsky's Italian 'mission.'

Trotsky's thoughts on Aleksinskii's letter were expressed by the title of his rejoinder, 'To the Slanderers!' In turn, Trotsky called Aleksinskii to account for his 'facts.' He denied that he had ever written that Rakovsky had made donations to Russian socialism. Indeed, his original statement (quoted above) was that Rakovsky had given material support to the 'cause of the liberation of the proletariat.' Several aspects of Rakovsky's biography which clearly illustrated the Romanian socialist's history of close cooperation with Russian socialism were then highlighted: he was a member of the Liberation of Labour Group which predated the RSDLP; in the 1890s he lived in St. Petersburg as a Marxist propagandist; outlawed from Russia as a foreigner he participated in the Foreign Section of the RSDLP and

wrote for *Iskra* and so on. According to Trotsky, Aleksinskii was driven to falsification of the biography of one of the first Russian socialists out of 'base "patriotic" slander.'³⁰ Relying on the belief that some of the mud thrown at Rakovsky by Amfiteatrov and others was still sticking, Aleksinskii had avoided saying anything on the central issue of why Rakovsky had made his trip to Italy. At the same time Aleksinskii insinuated that *Nashe Slovo* received money from the German treasury via Rakovsky. For Trotsky, shamelessness and cowardice guided Aleksinskii's hand. In a particularly merciless conclusion he condemned Aleksinskii as a man who had joined Russian Social-Democracy on the high wave of 1905 and then deserted it, leaving him to the fate of all turncoats:

socialist turncoats morally disarm themselves and in the struggle for self-belief they are forced to snatch at the most poisonous and dishonourable tools of our class enemies. Aleksinskii's 'Announcement' is far from being the last word on this path. And above all this is not Aleksinskii's last word. There is no turning-back from the path onto which he stepped. From slander to degradation and from degradation to slander he will move along a preordained orbit as irrefutable evidence of the fact that the cause which he serves is not only rotten, but also hopeless.³¹

The next dispute between Trotsky and one of the Russian social-patriots, this time with Plekhanov, also had slander as a dominant issue. It followed the appearance of the collection of articles *Voina*. This prompted Trotsky to write an 'Open Letter to Comrade Plekhanov',³² published in *Nashe Slovo* of 18 July 1915. The fact that Trotsky addressed the letter to Plekhanov seems strange as in it he polemicised primarily with Aleksinskii.

In his contribution to *Voina* Aleksinskii poured scorn upon *Nashe Slovo's* claim to represent majority opinion among Russian workers.³³ He asked how a majority of the Russian proletariat could gather around a newspaper whose contributors could not agree with each other or, indeed, even in themselves? Thus, he pointed out that on the leading issue of German Social-Democracy's vote for the war credits there existed at least three opinions among the *Nashe Slovo* camp: Larin refused to condemn the German comrades; Trotsky sought to

condemn and justify at the same time; whereas M.K. rejected any attempt to condone the German Social-Democrats outright and called Larin a Germanophile. Moreover, Martov at first accepted the idea of Russia's defeat and then rejected it. Furthermore, Voinov and Trotsky were conducting a struggle against patriotism in *Nashe Slovo* while their friends and soul mates Lunacharsky and Antid-Oto [Trotsky's pseudonym] were writing heart-rendering accounts of 'German atrocities' and of the heroic exploits of Entente soldiers in *Kievskaya Mysl'*. Finally, there were some examples of Russian publicists, most notably K. Zalewski, who wrote one thing for *Nashe Slovo* and another for patriotic newspapers:

K. Zalewski writes one thing for *Nashe Slovo* and something completely different for *Vestnik Evropy*. Each of these 'saviours of the International' are divided not only among themselves but even inside themselves. Voinov and Trotsky go in one direction and Antid-Oto, Lunacharsky and brothers run in the opposite direction. How can a 'majority' of the proletariat follow them?³⁴

In his 'Open Letter' Trotsky limited his objections to what he found most offensive in Aleksinskii's article. He claimed that Aleksinskii had accused him of writing for *Nashe Slovo* 'as an internationalist and irreconcilable opponent of social-patriotism but in the legal press, under a different name, as a patriot.'³⁵ Indeed, in a footnote to his contribution to *Voina* Aleksinskii had included Trotsky's name in a list of hypocrites who tailored their articles to suit the particular ideological leanings of different publications. He began by rejecting in advance any argument which would claim that the censor should be held responsible for any apparent duplicity. For Aleksinskii, a censor could remove sentences but not force a comrade to write something contrary to his true beliefs. He then went on to question why the editorial boards of the Russian radical press allowed this duplicity to continue:

One should note that I am interested not so much with the people here - Zalewski, Voinov and Trotsky - as with the editorial boards of those organs who **knowing** of their indecent hypocrisy open their pages to their literary somersaults. Previously such things were impermissible in the Russian left press.³⁶

Trotsky said that he would ignore the facts that Aleksinskii had disclosed the real identity of pseudonyms which put his article into the category of 'information' against people, and that Aleksinskii had not cited any evidence to support his view of Trotsky, as well as the charge of hypocrisy itself since the denunciation had come from Aleksinskii; a man who had slandered Rakovsky and Romanian Social-Democracy, who had made insinuations regarding *Nashe Slovo's* sources of funding and who had misquoted Martov. For Trotsky, 'One cannot even speak of seeking common ground in questions of political morals and literary honour with this professional.'³⁷ Trotsky then turned to Plekhanov and challenged him to declare openly and directly whether he agreed with Aleksinskii. He closed the letter with the promise that if Plekhanov came out in support of Aleksinskii then he, Trotsky, would find evidence for readers to decide what they had in front of them: 'political hypocrisy on the one side or shameless slander on the other.'³⁸

Plekhanov did not reply to Trotsky's 'Open Letter' and he continued to publicise his view that socialists were duty bound to support the war effort against the Central Powers. In late September and October 1915 Trotsky wrote several articles in which he touched upon his disagreements with Plekhanov.

His report of Rakovsky's analysis of the Russian social-patriots afforded him another opportunity to present a critique of Plekhanov's views.³⁹ Trotsky's article took the form of extracts from Rakovsky's introduction to a new French edition of his brochure *Socialism and the War*. Here, Rakovsky discussed Plekhanov's belief that Balkan socialists who urged neutrality upon their governments were in fact supporting the Central Powers. Plekhanov illustrated his case by a simple analogy: if one remains passive while one man strangles another then at minimum one shows no solidarity with the victim and at maximum one has helped the choker. Furthermore, a group of Russian social-patriots from the Plekhanov camp had censured the socialists of the neutral countries for condoning their governments' use of neutrality to serve class ends. In other words, neutral countries were exploiting their neutrality to conclude outrageous trade deals. Rakovsky answered this point first. He stated that one had to distinguish between

government neutrality and socialist neutrality; the first was passive and provisional, the latter principled and conclusive. Government neutrality was based upon greed and self-interest and if this stance changed to interference in the war, this too would be calculated on this criteria and not out of a concern for Belgium's independence. Rakovsky reminded Plekhanov that war was a bourgeois means to serve bourgeois ends. He therefore rejected Plekhanov's argument that neutrality was tantamount to assisting the Central Powers. Did the father of Russian Marxism not realise that in the war to save Belgium's neutrality Galicia and Turkey could be brought under Russia's control? Rakovsky affirmed his belief in Belgium's right to independence, but insisted that this had to be achieved through socialist means. Any call to the working class to join a bourgeois army to enter a bourgeois war could only expose the working class to the danger of becoming tools in the hands of the bourgeoisie and this, in turn, could only weaken socialism. For Rakovsky, Plekhanov had forgotten his earlier teachings on the nonsense of bourgeois wars of liberation; a lesson which he, Rakovsky, had learnt better than the master.

Gustav Hevré's demands for a fourth assault on Bulgaria's banks on the Black Sea prompted Trotsky to write an amusing retort in *Nashe Slovo* of 7 October.⁴⁰ According to Trotsky's report, Hevré thought that the attack should be led by Russian soldiers carrying icons. He wondered whether Hevré had been inspired by the experience of the Russo-Japanese War, in which the Russian army had marched into battle bearing icons. At that time the icons had not reached the hearts of the Japanese soldiers, but Trotsky was sure that it would be different with the Orthodox Bulgarians. In this instance a sufficient quantity of icons corresponding to the Bulgarian soul should make-up for any short-fall in ammunitions. However, he also warned that the liberating nature of the war should be expressed side-by-side with its religious counterpart. For Trotsky, the French army should be headed by the Declaration of the Rights of Man, the British army by Magna Carta and, finally, a volunteer section of Russian social-patriots should be armed with Plekhanov's appeals to Bulgarian Social-Democrats. He affirmed his belief that that this particular mixture of icons, republican declarations and Plekhanovised Kantianism would not only meet the

skilful combination of arms which was the essence of the then current warfare, but also gain completely fascinating results!

Later in the same month Trotsky returned his attention to what should lead the Russian army into battle. He reported that Clemenceau had rejected the idea of icons and put forward the notion that Nicholas II should issue the 'charge' call from the front of his troops. Trotsky teased the Russian social-patriots with the following challenge:

The question, in our opinion, is very serious: popes with icons or Nicholas II? We consider *Prizyv's* further silence on this matter to be absolutely inadmissible. Its voice should be heard at this critical hour!⁴¹

In between his deliberations on Hevré's and Clemenceau's thoughts on the Russian army Trotsky appealed one more time to Plekhanov, on this occasion with a request to 'Leave us in Peace!'⁴² He pointed out that Plekhanov's stance on the war contradicted all of his previously held views. Trotsky maintained that one could explain the deluge of Plekhanov's recent writings by a desire to achieve two aims. First, the 'father of Russian Marxism' wanted his articles to create as much evil and confusion as possible so that his spiritual downfall would be the less noticeable. Second, Plekhanov hoped that the ever increasing unruliness of his pronouncements on the war would smother the protest of his own weakening political conscience. For Trotsky, Plekhanov was prepared to use any means to gain solace by winning over others to his point of view. Plekhanov's recent call to the Russian Social-Democrat deputy Bur'yanov to oppose the rest of the fraction and vote for the war credits as any other vote would constitute a 'betrayal' was highlighted as an example of Plekhanov's typical form of counter-attack: 'when Social-Democrats accuse you of abetting those forces which prepared the war you do not justify or defend but throw back in reply an accusation of betrayal!'⁴³

Moreover, Trotsky claimed that the readiness of bourgeois proprietors to publish Plekhanov's utterances in their newspapers did not derive from the power of Plekhanov's thoughts in themselves. On the contrary, the elder statesman of Russian Marxism's platitudes were serving several useful functions for the bourgeoisie. To begin with, Plekhanov had retained some of his reputation and influence as the

leading representative of Russian Marxism and was therefore an effective tool in gathering workers' support for the war: 'what confusion in the minds of young workers only just affected by socialism!'⁴⁴ Furthermore, those people who had abandoned socialism several years previously could now celebrate the arrival of the most famous convert to date: 'what a victory for all of those....who even at the beginning of the counter-revolution had sold their swords and for those turncoats of the latest "patriotic" levy.'⁴⁵ Finally, the liberal and democratic intelligentsia could compare themselves to Plekhanov and conclude that they were not such bad people after all, since:

they are not so spiritually meagre, not so morally base for in their own name they would never be brave enough to demand that socialists betray themselves and slander them for....betrayal.⁴⁶

According to Trotsky, the time was not right to engage in psychological studies, otherwise one could look upon Plekhanov's fall from grace as a useful moral lesson for others. Faced with the revolting sight of a founding father intoxicated from chauvinism and spiritually drained, Trotsky advised all those Russian Social-Democrats remaining true to the socialist cause to send the same message to Plekhanov:

Whether you are peaceful or not, this is all the same to us. But we ask you now and for always to leave us in peace!⁴⁷

The last conflict of 1915 concerned Belorussov's decisions taken over the distribution of a fund for Russians residing in the French capital. In an article of 13 November Trotsky stated that he had felt compelled to pen a rejoinder to Belorussov after reading that the Russian social-patriot had refused to give money to 'unpatriotic' Russian artists. He asked how Belorussov had discovered the political allegiances of the Russian artists. Had he conducted individual interviews or had he relied on hearsay? Furthermore, had the money been donated on the condition that only patriots would be its recipients? For Trotsky,

It is sufficient to put these questions to realise that Belorussov did not care about justifying his actions, giving them a just basis. He added such incredibly stupidity to moral cynicism that one has to say: it's unbelievable!⁴⁸

Trotsky wrote a follow-up piece on Belorussov and the fund in his final contribution to *Nashe Slovo* of 1915.⁴⁹ He informed the reader that Belorussov had turned the management of the fund over to the editorial board of *Russkii Vedomosti*. Since then, certain monies had been granted to individual artists whose names had appeared on an earlier list of artists in need, drawn-up by the artistic community itself. Trotsky posed three questions. First, did those artists who were accepting money not feel that they were insulting the dignity of the whole artistic community? Second, should not all of the artists meet and resolve the issue? Finally, should not the Literary Society, chaired by V. K. Aganov, meet to discuss and condemn Belorussov for his role in the affair? In this way Trotsky hoped not only that the scandal would be ended, but also Belorussov's social and moral standing.

The issue of Russian social-patriotism was not absent from Trotsky's writings for long. Indeed, he devoted his New Year review of 1 January 1916 to an analysis of several Russian social-patriots.⁵⁰ The tone of this piece was very sarcastic, with Plekhanov and Aleksinskii among the main targets. During his then recent writings Plekhanov had adopted a particular interpretation of Marx's relation to Kant. In the 'Inaugural Address of the International Working Men's Association' Marx underpinned his perception of a correct proletarian foreign policy with 'simple laws of morals and justice.'⁵¹ According to Plekhanov, the right of nations to self-determination ranked as one of the most important of these 'simple laws'. Indeed, in applying these principles to the then current war Plekhanov concluded not only that socialists had to fight against those countries which had broken the laws, i.e., Germany and its allies, but also that socialist revolution would prove impossible if socialists did not uphold morality and law:

the proletariat....cannot liberate itself from the capitalist yoke without recognising the right of each nation to self-determination. The necessary condition for the overthrow of this yoke, the unification of the proletariat of all countries, becomes possible only to the extent that it recognises the right of each separate people to self-determination....German professors and lecturers love to read 'lectures' on the theme of 'Kant and Marx.' But not one of them has read a lecture about how the **economics** of the

new society was united with the 'foreign policy of the proletariat' as recommended by Marx....international socialists should shout louder than anyone else against the oppressors and they should insist more energetically than anyone else on a 'foreign policy' based on simple laws of morality and law.⁵²

Trotsky labelled Plekhanov's use of Kant to justify tsarist diplomacy, 'a real discovery.'⁵³ He pointed out that Plekhanov had completed this feat as Russian soldiers were expected to seize the birth place of the German philosopher, a fact which 'could not but inspire the young Russian social-patriotic thought.'⁵⁴ Trotsky argued that since that time the centre of tsarism's attention had shifted from the Balkans to Persia, and this had brought with it a need to seek an ideological prop for Russian expansion in that part of the world:

we await from the Plekhanov school the development of the theme that the occupation of Persia is necessary for world moral equilibrium to counterbalance the occupation of Belgium.⁵⁵

Trotsky suggested that Vladimir Lyakhov (1869-1919), a colonel who in 1906 had crushed a democratic uprising in Northern Iran, could now be represented as the guardian of 'Rights and Justice.' For Trotsky, 'material facts are nothing without the spiritualisation of their ideas.'⁵⁶

One paragraph of Trotsky's article was given over to a characterisation of Aleksinskii. Aleksinskii was placed on the opposing pole of social-patriotism to Plekhanov's since he held the same regard for moral laws as the Tartars had held for the criminal code. However, in spite of this divergence from Plekhanov's approach Trotsky thought that one could not exclude Aleksinskii from the list of social-patriotic literature for, 'without him all our Russian social-patriotic literature would appear insipid, like a Petrushka without its own special smell.'⁵⁷

On the first day of February 1916 Trotsky reported that the last of his three suggestions regarding the 'Belorussov' affair had been acted upon. The Literary Society had censured Belorussov. However, he also said that a current rumour was claiming that Aleksinskii was a member of the Literary Society. Trotsky dismissed the rumour as a misunderstanding:

At one time the Society welcomed Liebknecht. It is not possible that this welcome issued from an organisation which adopted

Aleksinskii. It is not possible that in censuring Belorussov, who is not one of its members, the Society would not first sweep-out the rubbish from its own ranks. This is why we regard the rumour of Aleksinskii's continuing membership of the Society, which seriously relates to questions of political morals, to be a pure misunderstanding.⁵⁸

Later in the same month Trotsky's commentary upon Plekhanov's writings touched upon Russian domestic politics. In an article in *Prizyv* of 5 February 1916 Plekhanov considered Khvostov's, the then Russian Minister of Internal Affairs, utterance that Russian people should 'produce shrapnel, prepare ammunition, but be spared from government orders.'⁵⁹ For Plekhanov, Khvostov's words - delivered to a meeting of the War-Industries Committee of 8 December 1915 - were a typical example of the Russian government's unacceptable arrogance. Khvostov clearly expected loyalty and service from the Russian people and was prepared to concede nothing by way of political reform in return. Plekhanov made his disgust for Khvostov's remarks clear, and looked forward to the day when Russia would liberate itself from its reactionary political order. However, in his article he expressed concern that Khvostov's indifference might lend credibility to defeatist agitation that was being conducted among the Russian workers. Plekhanov represented the defeatist argument thus:

One has to quickly abandon those organisations, the participants of which resolve the work of producing shrapnel but are not permitted to pass judgements about the state of their country.⁶⁰

Plekhanov argued that if the workers followed the defeatists' advice, Russia's capacity for self-defence would be weakened and the likelihood of her military collapse would increase. He then posed the problem of who would benefit from Russia's defeat. Not, he replied, the forces struggling for a democratic Russia but reactionaries of Khvostov's persuasion. For, according to Plekhanov, any proletarian policy based upon a free Russia issuing from her defeat in the war was deeply mistaken:

From the very outset of this current war I did not cease to believe that our reactionaries absolutely did not desire the defeat of Germany because in its emperor they saw the most trusted

support of European reaction. Events have shown that I was right....Victorious over Russia in the present war Germany with all its huge forces would place a government in our country that would be the most advantageous to Germany's interests. And what type of government could be more advantageous than a government of the Black Hundreds?⁶¹

Thus, concluded Plekhanov, only the extreme right, knowing the consequences such an act would entail, would welcome en masse desertion of the War-Industries Committees by Russia's workers. The duty of all those interested in the introduction of politically progressive measures was therefore clear: to remain firm in one's support of Russia's war effort.

In his rejoinder to Plekhanov's article Trotsky doubted the assumption that Khvostov and his cohorts would rejoice at the sight of workers abandoning Russia's defences. After all, argued Trotsky, it was Khvostov who had recommended that Plekhanov's manifesto calling upon the workers to elect representatives to the War-Industries Committees be distributed, and it was the Russian Minister of the Interior who had helped Kuz'ma Gvozdev to falsify the will of the Petrograd workers. For Trotsky, Plekhanov's dissatisfaction at Khvostov's arrogance was a reflection of the founder of Russian Marxism's real relation to Khvostov; while Plekhanov was prepared to accept the appointment of right-wing candidates to ministerial posts as this signified the defeat of the revolutionary internationalists, he could not go along with the more extreme statements made by right-wing statesmen. Indeed, Trotsky claimed that the particular balance that Plekhanov was attempting to strike at that time did not demand that he should approve every comment issued by ministers of Khvostov's calibre:

'Walk apart but live together!' - this is the strategic principle which Plekhanov transfers into his new period when he helps reaction be revolutionary.⁶²

V. Buslaev's enthusiastic account of a recent session of the State Duma, published in *Prizyv* of 11 March 1916, provoked a critical response from Trotsky. Buslaev highlighted the Progressive Bloc's demands, put forward in an elaborate programme which called, among

other things, for a political and religious amnesty and Polish autonomy, as evidence of 'what a mighty lever healthy national feelings are in the country's political awakening.'⁶³ He recounted how the Progressives had stuck to their guns in the face of harsh criticism from Goremykin and soothing noises from Stümer; sufficient grounds for Buslaev' to claim 'how quickly the bourgeois opposition in Russia matures under the influence of all-national expectations.'⁶⁴ The most striking feature of recent political events, according to Buslaev', was the support given to the opposition by right-wing previously pro-government thinkers: 'We are not used to Milyukov's criticism being given constant support...by Purishkevich and for the right nationalist Polovtsev to speak against the government.'⁶⁵ He fired a shot at 'sad doctrinaires and spent revolutionaries [who] hurriedly declare that in the period of the imperialist economy the time for national revolution has irretrievably passed.'; pointing out that historical progress did not follow the rules of these newborn Marxist cosmopolitans: 'we should know and understand that Russia is on the eve of great events...the living organism of a great people...is not able to restrain itself in the chains of the reactionary schemas of this cosmopolitanism. Living Russia is liberating itself and it calls to itself all those who are alive!'⁶⁶

In his reply to Buslaev' Trotsky gave a very different evaluation of the Russian bourgeoisie. The Russian social-patriot's hopes upon the bourgeois classes as a political force were misplaced, wrote Trotsky, because the Russian bourgeoisie did not want to take power: 'the central idea of this bourgeoisie, as the recent Kadet conference once again confirmed, is a *will to victory and not a will to power*.'⁶⁷ In turn, its obsession with victory was derived from its connections with imperialism and the military-monarchical regime. According to Trotsky, the bourgeoisie wanted the Prussification of the Russian state order and it was this desire which lay behind its then opposition to Nicholas II's government: 'Its opposition...is not affected, but the content of this opposition is limited, by the whole objective position of the bourgeoisie, to pressurising the bureaucratic monarchy into...pulling itself together, purifying itself, putting its affairs in order...in a word, *Prussification*.'⁶⁸ If power was to be rested from the old régime then, for Trotsky, it could be rested only by the proletariat. He predicted that if the proletariat

should decide to seize power 'the bourgeoisie would fatally appear on the side of the old order.'⁶⁹ In his conclusion, Trotsky imitated Buslaev's final thoughts. The social-patriot claimed that history had a shock for the Marxists; Trotsky foresaw history preparing a particular smack on the nose for Buslaev': 'the total historical mission of our social-patriotic Germans is to help the Russian bourgeoisie reach - alas! alas! - the German state order in that moment when its radical destruction is being prepared in Germany itself.'⁷⁰

Trotsky stressed the links between the social-patriots in Paris and the régime in Russia in his first of May reflections of 1916. He cited Khvostov's approval of Plekhanov's Autumn 1915 Manifesto to the Russian workers as evidence of a Khvostov-Plekhanov Bloc. For Trotsky, 'the combination of Khvostov and Plekhanov (and think of this for one minute as a fresh fact!) is one of the most fantastic aspects of the whole contemporary Russian fantastica.'⁷¹ At a time when even the Kadets were complaining about censorship directed against their speeches, Trotsky reported that the Russian authorities broadcast *Prizyv's* calls for a successful defence of Russia as freely as the outpourings of the police department. He praised the Russian social-patriots in Paris for having the musical ability of turning the tune of the International into a hymn to Khvostov. However, if one judged *Prizyv* from the point of view of honour then one had to condemn Plekhanov et al outright: 'we do not think that one could create anything more loathsome.'⁷²

In 'Two magnitudes, separately equal to a third...' Trotsky discussed Plekhanov's problem in building an International. The elder statesman of Russian Marxism could lay claim to allies in France (Hevré), Britain (Hyndman) and Italy (Mussolini) but what, asked Trotsky, of Germany? The issue could be sidestepped if Plekhanov followed Adolf Smith's advice that the International should be drawn from the free countries of the Entente, thus excluding Hohenz¹⁶ö¹⁷ren Germany. Trotsky claimed that Plekhanov would not engage himself in the difficult task of constructing a conception of freedom which would include Tashkent but exclude Berlin. However, a possible solution had been offered by Hevré, a man who Plekhanov had promoted to the status of 'comrade' after the French socialist rejected his earlier unpatriotic views to support France

in the war.⁷³ According to Trotsky, Hevré was arguing that the future for socialism in western Europe lay in the promotion of national socialist parties. In Germany Hevré thought that Südekum should head this party since, 'it should be united with the left bourgeois parties and with their help establish a parliamentary régime in Germany.'⁷⁴ Thus, Hevré maintained that his ally in Germany was Südekum. For Trotsky, because Plekhanov had named Hevré his comrade one could follow the mathematical principle that 'two magnitudes separately equal to a third are equal between themselves' to conclude that Plekhanov's German comrade would be Südekum. He said that he had previously guessed at this outcome, but now his guesswork had found its confirmation in mathematics.

The attitude of *Prizyv's* editorial board to high-level diplomatic links between France and Russia formed the background to the appearance of Trotsky's article 'Why we did not mention Plekhanov' in *Nashe Slovo* of 21 May 1916.⁷⁵ In *Prizyv's* editorial comment on Albert Thomas's visit to Nicholas II, the censor had removed all but a reprint of the official communiqué of Thomas's trip to Russia.⁷⁶ Five days later an unsigned article in *Nashe Slovo* ridiculed *Prizyv's* annoyance - deduced from the censor's intervention - at the French minister's presence at the Russian court. *Nashe Slovo* pointed out that the republicans Avksent'ev, Lyubimov, Argunov and Bunakov had managed to show their political allegiances by printing 'his majesty the emperor' in lower case letters. However, it also asked the editors if their advanced years had really taught them so little. After all, *Prizyv* supported the Entente's cause and urged socialists to join war time ministries. Did the social-patriotic publication really think that republican ministers would avoid meeting their autocratically-governed allies when common war aims had to be discussed? Moreover, *Nashe Slovo* claimed that the censor had rendered *Prizyv* a useful service; the headline and the editorial board's signature remained as testimony of republican disquiet at the French government's personal contact with the tsar, but they had been spared from making their specific grievances public. Finally, a popular proverb was offered to *Prizyv* by way of advice: 'one has to take the rough with the smooth.'⁷⁷

In 'Why we did not mention Plekhanov' Trotsky noted that several attentive readers had said that Plekhanov was not listed in *Nashe Slovo's* naming of *Prizyv's* republican-minded editors. In an imaginary dialogue conducted between two *Nashe Slovo* readers Trotsky illustrated a hidden motive which may have lain behind *Nashe Slovo's* omission. One of the readers claims that Plekhanov was not named out of a desire to protect a fellow Marxist:

It is true that they....named Lyubimov who is also a 'Marxist', but from the aforementioned point of view he is harmless for if he compromises something it is only him himself. But Plekhanov was not named. And Aleksinskii was not named. At this point our perspicacious Philistine (and that is exactly what we are dealing with) immediately feels jubilant: one has caught *Nashe Slovo* harbouring Plekhanov!

But this is pure rubbish, exclaims, say, another reader....When has *Nashe Slovo* indulged Marxist social-patriots? When has it harboured Plekhanov?...

Yes....but about Plekhanov not a whisper. This is not easy....⁷⁸

Trotsky cut the conversation short at this juncture and resolved the point at issue. *Nashe Slovo's* motives for not mentioning Plekhanov were much simpler and a lot more subtle than the wise Philistine supposed. Before expounding upon this, Trotsky said that Aleksinskii had also been omitted as part of a general policy of avoiding his name as often as possible out of considerations of a 'literary-sanitary nature.'⁷⁹ The silence surrounding Plekhanov was due to reasons of a more profound nature. When *Nashe Slovo's* editors had surmised *Prizyv's* hurt republican feelings they had decided that Plekhanov did not rank among the offended, for 'he is not inclined to falsify a conscience-stricken republicanism; his "trade" is straight-forward patriotism.'⁸⁰ Trotsky concluded that the wise Philistine could learn an important lesson from this tale:

That is how the affair stands....Political criticism, like so much else in our complex life, demands differentiation. And if it is necessary to discover unity in variety then one has to be able to observe variety in unity. So there, Mr. wise Philistine!⁸¹

Russian military success on the Austrian front brought a jubilant response from Boris Voronov. In 'The front has been broken ', which appeared in *Prizyv* of 17 June 1916,⁸² he argued that the heroic efforts of the Russian soldiers had scuppered the recent declarations of several groups hostile to Russia's cause. To begin with, the supposition underpinning Zimmerwald's call for the cessation of the war, i.e., no side would emerge victorious from the general stalemate, had been refuted. The Organisational Committee's prediction that Russia would collapse from the pressures of war after one year of hostilities had similarly been disproved. Furthermore, the German general Staff's confidence that Russia would not be able to launch an offensive attack had evaporated; the Central Powers had lost the military initiative. Voronov looked forward to the day when the fall of the German monarch would pull the symbolic ground from under the tsar's feet. According to Voronov, a Russian victory would signal the death-knell of tsarism: 'Breaking the Austrian front and breaking the Zimmerwald front the Russian soldiers take us closer to our desired outcome to the war and to Russia' s internal freedom.'⁸³

Trotsky responded to Voronov's analysis of the consequences of recent Russian victories over the Austrians in 'Arguments from the hoof.'⁸⁴ He did not call Voronov by name, but stated that *Prizyv* was quite wrong to claim that Zimmerwald connected its politics to the strategic manoeuvres of the then warring nations. Zimmerwald rooted its tactics in the interrelation of forces between the revolutionary proletariat and the capitalist imperialism, and the movements of the Russian soldiers could not undermine this approach. *Prizyv's* damning conclusion about Zimmerwald was dismissed as 'clearly absurd.' Trotsky explained the social-patriotic newspaper's willingness to engage in discussions about socialism with reference to the personal biographies of its contributors, several of whom had at one time considered socialist ideas and tasks. However, the conclusions reached on the basis of a past interest in socialism obviously exceeded their authors' intelligence. For Trotsky, if the whole intellectual baggage of the Russian social-patriots could be placed upon a Cossack horse, Zimmerwald's position 'cannot be shattered by an argument from the hoof.'⁸⁵

If the articles surrounding Thomas's visit to Russia gave cause for Trotsky to express his low opinion of Aleksinskii, the 'Dmitriev affair' provided the best opportunity to date for a resounding dismissal of the Russian social-patriot. In May 1916 a campaign had been launched by Yakovlev and Belorussov to remove Dmitriev from his post as chairman of the Foreign Press Syndicate.⁸⁶ The main rallying call of the campaign was Dmitriev's Germanophilism in view of his editorship of *Parizhskii Vestnik*; a publication which, according to Yakovlev and his supporters, had conducted pro-German propaganda on the eve of the war. On 10 August 1916 the Foreign Journalists Society met to discuss the case against Dmitriev and found that it had no basis in fact. This judgement was then confirmed at meetings of the 11 August 1916 of the Society of Russian Journalists in Paris and the Foreign Press Syndicate. The Society of Russian Journalists in Paris highlighted Aleksinskii as having played the most dishonourable role of all in the Dmitriev affair.

Trotsky retold the events surrounding the Dmitriev affair in the article 'A Story with a Moral', which appeared in *Nashe Slovo* of 13 August. Here Trotsky was concerned most of all in pinpointing the leading and supporting players in the drama. He claimed that Yakovlev and Jean d'Arc (*Russkii Vedomosti*) were the 'real organisers.' Bateaut, a French journalist, was recruited to broaden the ethnic base of the accusers, 'so that in the eyes of foreign correspondents the affair would not have been immediately laid bare as the intrigue of kind Russian colleagues.'⁸⁷ Aleksinskii had been instructed to make the accusations as wide as possible so that Dmitriev could be kept under suspicion of Germanophilism for as long as possible. Meanwhile, Trotsky pointed out that Belorussov had written for *Parizhskii Vestnik* so when Aleksinskii said that this journal had been financed from German funds, 'Belorussov had to quickly inform himself: I myself received German money from Dmitriev.'⁸⁸ For Trotsky, the classification of the social-patriot scandal mongers into generals and foot-soldiers was instructive as it showed how they were prepared to do a dirty work if they thought it served their cause. In his concluding paragraph Trotsky sprung what was perhaps the most scandalous aspect of the whole business upon the reader. He asked why Dmitriev

had not raised a clamour in his employer's newspaper *Rech* in self-defence against what was, after all, groundless slander? According to Trotsky, Dmitriev's silence was due to his willingness to subordinate himself to the same patriotic cause which had motivated Aleksinskii:

for that business which *Rech* serves, Milyukov and Dmitriev himself and Aleksinskii are in the highest degree essential. And if on the basis of a common affair there falls upon them some secondary harm which corresponds to the objective nature of the affair and to the subjective nature of the participants, then they all consider this an inevitable wound in the process of holy cooperation. And in the meantime this is the main moral of the story.⁸⁹

In 'Vandervelde, *Nashe Slovo* and *Vorwärts*' Trotsky defended the accuracy of his newspaper's informants after D. S., writing in *Prizyv*, had questioned the veracity of an earlier *Nashe Slovo* scoop. The origin of this exchange was a short note which appeared in *Nashe Slovo* of 4 July 1916.⁹⁰ This unsigned piece reported of an incident which had prevented Emile Vandervelde from making a speech to soldiers at the front. *Nashe Slovo* claimed that the Belgium minister had been thrown into so much confusion by a Belgium soldier's reference to the contradiction between Vandervelde's then current views and those which he had held previous to the war, that he abandoned his platform without saying one word. This story was then picked-up by other newspapers which repeated it on their pages. *Prizyv* commented on the story only after one of the newspapers that had reprinted *Nashe Slovo's* coup had then published a disclaimer. D.S. quoted the German newspaper *Vorwärts* of 26 July, where it was stated that information received from Amsterdam had shown that *Nashe Slovo's* story was 'devoid of all basis in fact. We regret that we have been misled by this usually well-informed list.'⁹¹ D. S. then challenged *Nashe Slovo* to declare its mistake to its readers.

Trotsky took up this challenge, but not in the manner dictated by D. S. On the contrary, he asked why *Vorwärts* had taken its Amsterdam source at face value. In order to refute *Nashe Slovo's* article one would have to have done two things: first conduct a survey among Belgium soldiers and second question Vandervelde himself. The first option was

declared to be impossible, but Trotsky stressed the good credentials of the Belgium soldier who had given the story to *Nashe Slovo*: the soldier shared Vandervelde's views on the war and would not want to embarrass his minister by making something up. Moreover, he claimed that it was most likely Vandervelde who was hiding behind the anonymous informer from Amsterdam; Vandervelde could not be seen to have open contact with a German newspaper. Furthermore, in his final paragraph Trotsky highlighted a reprint of one of Vandervelde's speeches in the previous day's *Le Petit Parisien* as further evidence for *Nashe Slovo*'s version of events. In his address Vandervelde spoke of the high personal qualities of the French soldiers. For Trotsky,

Vandervelde....was recommending Belgium soldiers to be like the French; modest and satisfied with the quantity of bread, wine and me at that King Albert's quartermaster supplies them. One wonders whether one will find among his forced listeners that socialist who advised the former chairman of the International to chose alleys for his future oratorical excursions.⁹²

Nashe Slovo resurrected the Dmitriev affair when, in issue 208 of 9 September 1916, it published the resolutions of the three aforementioned societies.⁹³ On the following day Trotsky submitted the first of two articles in which he focussed upon Aleksinskii's actions in the Dmitriev affair.

In the first of these commentaries, '*Prizyv* and its Aleksinskii', Trotsky pointed out that Aleksinskii's contributions to a German journal before the war had not prevented him from levelling a similar accusation at Dmitriev.⁹⁴ Indeed, Aleksinskii's articles were so powerful in their pro-German stance that 'the censor has not allowed us to cite even one passage from them.'⁹⁵ Moreover, Trotsky claimed that it was Aleksinskii who, after being co-opted as a leading actor in the Dmitriev affair, had carried the accusations to such a level that the 'evil-blackmail character of the whole campaign became clear to all.'⁹⁶ Furthermore, one could gauge the extent of Aleksinskii's disgraceful behaviour as it was his fellow bourgeois-journalists who had condemned him and not his ideological enemies. But, Trotsky noted in his conclusion, *Prizyv* had not uttered one word about Aleksinskii's actions:

The slanderous Aleksinskii continues his work as the most trusted brother-in-arms of Plekhanov, Avksent'ev, Bunakov, Voronov, Argunov and Lyubimov.⁹⁷

In the very next issue of *Nashe Slovo* Trotsky reversed the wording of the headline of his first commentary in order to examine the Dmitriev affair from the point of view of 'Aleksinskii and his *Prizyv*.'⁹⁸ Here Trotsky wondered why Aleksinskii, more than one month after the three press societies had censured him, had not written a self-defence on the pages of *Prizyv*. According to Trotsky, the answer to this conundrum was his editorial colleagues' desire to avoid implicating themselves in the affair. After all, if they permitted Aleksinskii to conduct his counter-attack from the pages of *Prizyv* they would be exposing themselves to charges of abetting. It was their refusal to back him which, claimed Trotsky, prevented Aleksinskii from issuing his own appeal. What could Aleksinskii say in such an appeal, apart from the following?:

his closest friends Avksent'ev, Voronov, Bunakov, Lyubimov, Argunov and Plekhanov had refused him support and refuge on such a matter which in other spheres a man's political life and death depends.⁹⁹

For Trotsky the heart of the matter was clear. Aleksinskii and the rest of *Prizyv*'s editorial board were united in a common though hostile 'agreement with an ineffaceable censure.'¹⁰⁰

6.3 Conclusion

These were to be Trotsky's last words on the Russian social-patriots in Paris before *Nashe Slovo* was banned. His disagreements with Plekhanov and his supporters were clear; the former condemned the war as national capitalism's futile attempt to meet the demand of the productive forces to expand beyond the limits of the nation state through military conquest, whereas the latter accepted that, for some, the war was justified and just. The polemics which raged between the two sides reflected their different approaches to the war, but they also moved beyond them into insults. The fact that the exchanges sometimes approached the level of 'gutter journalism' was an indicator of the passion which each side invested in the debates, and of how

much they thought was at stake. In short, Trotsky and the social-patriots were fighting for influence over the workers. According to Trotsky, the social-patriots could lead the masses only into the camp of the class enemy. It was for this reason that, as a revolutionary socialist, he thought the propaganda war against *Prizyv* and *Novosti* to be of supreme importance. His urgent concern to oppose social-patriotism will also feature in the next chapter, which deals with Trotsky's analysis of Russian domestic politics in his Paris writings.

Notes

1. *Voina: sbornik statei*, Paris, 1915, p 4.
2. The members of *Prizyv*'s editorial board were Avksent'ev, Bunakov, Voronov, Lyubimov and Plekhanov. Sixty issues of the newspaper appeared from 1 October 1915 to 31 March 1917.
3. G. Aleksinskii, 'Voina i sotsializm', *Golos*, No. 55, 15 November 1914, p 1; No. 56, 17 November 1914, p 1; No. 57, 18 November 1914, p 1; and No. 58, 19 November 1914, p 1.
4. Aleksinskii, 'Voina i sotsializm', No. 58.
5. L. Trotskii, *Voina i Revolyutsiya*, Vol 1, Petrograd, 1922, p 141. Extracts from Trotsky's brochure appeared in *Golos*. See, N. Trotskii, 'Voina i Internatsional', *Golos*, No. 59, 20 November 1914, p 1; N. Trotskii, 'Voina i Internatsional', *Golos*, No. 60, 21 November 1914, p. 1; and N. Trotskii, 'Voina i Internatsional' II', *Golos*, No. 79, 13 December 1914, p 1.
6. N. Trotskii, 'Neobkhodimaya popravka', *Golos*, No. 63, 25 November 1914, p 1.
7. Ibid.
8. N. K., 'Vozhdi S-D o voine', *Golos*, No. 31, 18 October 1914, p 1; N. K., 'Vozhdi S-D o voine', *Golos*, No. 32, 20 October 1914, p 1.
9. N. K., 'Vozhdi S-D o voine', No. 31.
10. Ibid.
11. N. K., 'Vozhdi S-D o voine', No. 32. Lenin's critique of Plekhanov's views was summarised in N. K., 'Vozhdi S-D o voine', *Golos*, No. 33, 21 October 1914, p. 1. For a summary of the views contained in Lenin's pamphlet *The Proletariat and the War* see N. K., 'Vozhdi Russkoi S-D o voine', *Golos*, No. 37, 25 October 1914, p 1 and N. K., 'Vozhdi Russkoi S-D o voine', *Golos*, No. 38, 27 October 1914, p 1.
12. 'Pis'mo Plekhanova', *Golos*, No. 37, 25 October 1914, pp 1-2.
13. Ibid, p 1.
14. N. Trotskii, 'Pechal'nyi dokument'. G. Plekhanov' o voine', *Golos*, No. 93, 30 December 1914, pp 1-2.

15. Ibid.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid.
19. Iks', 'Khronika. Referat N. Trotskago', *Novosti*, No. 195, 23 March 1915, p 2.
20. N. T., 'Vremya nynche takovskoe', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 54, 1 April 1915, p 1.
21. -.; 'Voenneya zametki. K' sdache Przhemyshlya', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 51, 28 March 1915, p 2.
22. N. T., 'Vremya nynche takovskoe'.
23. 'Pis'mo v' redaktsiyu', *Novosti*, No. 203, 3 April 1915, p 2.
24. N. T., 'Nekhorosho-s'!', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 60, 9 April 1915, p 2.
25. G. Aleksinskii, 'Mnimye internatsionalisti', *Novosti*, No. 210, 13 April 1915, p 1.
26. Al'fa, 'Porazhenchestvo i iskazhenchestvo', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 66, 16 April 1915, p 2. This was not the end of this dispute. Four days later Aleksinskii, writing in *Novosti*, produced a quote from *Golos* of 30 October 1914 as evidence of defeatism in the *Nashe Slovo* camp. At the same time he noted Al'fa's rejection of defeatism 'with joy', but claimed 'an individual rejection does not deprive me of the right to look at the current [*Nashe Slovo*] tendency as "defeatist", for "defeatism"...is the essence of the leading exponents of this direction [*Nashe Slovo*]' (G. Aleksinskii, "'Porazhentsi' i 'Otrechentsi'", *Novosti*, No. 216, 20 April 1915, p 2). In the aptly named 'It continues' Martov objected to Aleksinskii's of his *Golos* article. He claimed that in his contribution of October 1914 he was repeating an idea he had held since 1907: that only through a successful aggressive war could 'official Russia avoid revolution and gain for itself the possibility of a "Prussian-German" path of development.' This was why he desired Russia to be 'unsuccessful' in the then current war. Martov wrote that this was not the same as defeatism. After all, *Golos* and *Nashe Slovo* were quite clear that, 'from the point of view of the interests of democracy one should desire the "unsuccess" of the imperialist aspirations of all

- countries and not the "defeat" of any one of them.' (L. Martov, 'Prodolzhaet', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 72, 23 April 1915, pp 1-2). The last word, however, belonged to Aleksinskii. In 'Two Words' he welcomed Martov's denunciation of defeatism and said that he was prepared to take any amount of abuse from Martov as long as the latter at the same time rejected defeatism: 'The great social utility of these public rejections of defeatism will entail a small harm which causes - not me but himself - Martov to lower himself to petty wrangling.' (G. Aleksinskii, 'Dva Slovo', *Novosti*, No. 222, 27 April 1915, p 1).
27. N. Trotskii, 'Sytinskii "malyi" o Rakovskom', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 67, 17 April 1915, p 1.
 28. Ibid.
 29. G. Aleksinskii, 'Pis'mo v' redaktsiyu', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 74, 25 April 1915, p 2; -, 'Klevetnikam!', Ibid, pp 1-2.
 30. -, 'Klevetnikam!'
 31. Ibid.
 32. N. Trotskii, 'Otkrytoe pis'mo t. Plekhanovu', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 142, 18 July 1915, pp 1-2.
 33. G. Aleksinskii, 'S' kem' bol'shinstvo', *Voina: sbornik statei*, pp 97-106.
 34. Ibid., p 102. Antid Oto was, of course, the pseudonym used by Trotsky for his articles in *Kievskaya Mysl'*. For an analysis of Trotsky's articles penned for the Ukrainian newspaper during World War One see I. D. Thatcher, 'Trotsky and *Kievskaya Mysl'*', *Irish Slavonic Studies*, 13, 1993, forthcoming and the second chapter of this thesis.
 35. Trotskii, 'Otkrytoe pis'mo t. Plekhanovu', p 1.
 36. Aleksinskii, 'S' kem' bol'shinstvo', p 102.
 37. Trotskii, 'Otkrytoe pis'mo t. Plekhanovu', p 2.
 38. Ibid.
 39. -, 'Rakovskii o russkikh' sots-patriotakh', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 204, 30 September 1915, p 1.
 40. Al'fa, 'Les Russes D'Abord!', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 210, 7 October 1915, p 2.
 41. A, 'Slovo za Prizyvom', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 224, 26 October 1915.

42. -; 'Ostav'te nas' v' pokoe', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 216, 14 October 1915, p 1.
43. Ibid.
44. Ibid.
45. Ibid.
46. Ibid.
47. Ibid.
48. Postoronni, 'Neveroyatno! (Pis'mo v' redaktsiyu)', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 239, 13 November 1915, p 2.
49. Postoronni, 'Itak?', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 277, 29 December 1915, p 2.
50. Al'fa, 'Ikh' literatura. Vmesto novogodnyago obzora', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 1, 1 January 1916, p 2.
51. K. Marx, *The First International and After*, David Fernbach (ed), Harmondsworth, 1974, p 81.
52. G. Plekhanov, 'Eshche o voine', *Voina: sbornik statei*, p 23.
53. Al'fa, 'Ikh' literatura'.
54. Ibid.
55. Ibid.
56. Ibid.
57. Ibid. In this same article other members of *Prizyv's* editorial board (Avksent'ev, Voronov, Argunov and Bunakov) were labelled Gogolian 'Tyapkin-Lyapkin' characters. Trotsky said one had to avoid polemicising with L. Deich, a Russian social-patriot living in America, since he would only remind *Nashe Slovo* that he had mastered and rejected the theory of surplus value while it was still having its nappies changed.
58. Postoronni, 'Eto nedorazumenie!', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 26, 1 February 1916, p 2.
59. G. Plekhanov, 'Oboran strany, reaktsiya i interesy trudyashchagosya naseleniya', *Prizyv*, No. 19, 5 February 1916, pp 1-2.
60. Ibid, p 1.
61. Ibid, p 2.
62. Al'fa, 'Plekhanov' o Khvostove', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 35, 11 February 1916, p 2.

63. V. Buslaev', 'Zhivaya Rossiya', *Prizyv*, No. 24, 11 March 1916, p 1.
64. Ibid.
65. Ibid., p 2.
66. Ibid.
67. -, 'Ironicheskii shchelshok' istorii', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 73, 26 March 1916, p 1.
68. Ibid.
69. Ibid.
70. Ibid. In the article 'To the End' Trotsky's polemics with *Prizyv* had centred around a different social class in Russia, the peasantry. Here Trotsky's main focus of criticism was a report in *The Times* in which there had appeared an account of the prosperity then being enjoyed by the Russian peasant. A similar claim about the condition of the Russian countryside had also been made by Prince Trubetskii in his analysis of why Russia's victory in the war was guaranteed. Trotsky mentioned that Trubetskii, as well as Khvostov and *Prizyv*, shared the British correspondent's views. Thus Trotsky attempted to discredit the social-patriotic publication along with representatives of Russia's then ruling classes. In actual fact, Aleksinskii had disputed Trubetskii's views as leading to complacency, whereas one had to mobilise the people to win what was a people's war. For the various articles see: G. Aleksinskii, 'Zalog' pobedy', *Prizyv*, No. 19, 5 February 1916, pp 3-4; -, 'The Temper of Russia', *The Times*, 12 February 1916, p 5; Al'fa, 'Zhuskobu', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 40, 17 February 1916, p 2. For further reports of the less than ideal state prevailing in Russian villages at that time see, -, 'Shokolad' upletayut', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 36, 12 February 1916, p 2 and -, 'Kuda uzh' tut' shokolad'', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 37, 13 February 1916, p 2.
71. Al'fa, 'Fantastika. Pervomaiskiya razmyshleniya.', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 102, 1 May 1916.
72. Ibid.
73. See, for example, G. Plekhanov, 'Sotsialisty i golosovaniye voennykh' kreditov', *Prizyv*, No. 17, 22 January 1916, p 6.
74. Al'fa, 'Dve velichiny., porozn' ravnye tret'ei...', *Nashe Slovo*, No.

- 114, 16 May 1916, p 4. Trotsky's argument was obviously intended to tease Plekhanov. After all, Plekhanov had clearly criticised Südekum as a German-Austrian Social-Democratic imperialist. See, for example, G. Plekhanov, 'Internatsionalisty, da tolko s' drugoi storony', *Prizyv*, No. 21, 19 February 1916, p 4.
75. -:, 'Pochemu ne nazvali Plekhanova', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 119, 21 May 1916, p 2.
76. Redaktsiya Prizyva, 'Al'bert Toma v tsarskom' sele', *Prizyv*, No. 33, 13 May 1916, pp 1-2.
77. -:, 'Perepolokh' v' redaktsii Prizyva', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 116, 18 May 1916, p 2.
78. -:, 'Pochemu ne nazvali Plekhanova'
79. Ibid.
80. Ibid.
81. Ibid.
82. V. Voronov', 'Front' prorvan'', *Prizyv*, No. 38, 17 June 1916, pp 1-2.
83. Ibid, p 2.
84. -:, 'Argument' ot' kopyta', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 150, 29 June 1916, p 1.
85. Ibid.
86. -:, 'Prigovor' nad' Aleksinskim'', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 208, 9 September 1916, pp 1-2.
87. N. T., 'Istoriya s moral'yu', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 187, 13 August 1916, p 1.
88. Ibid.
89. Ibid.
90. -:, 'Neudobstva novoi professii', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 154, 4 July 1916, p 2.
91. D. S., 'Osedomiteli', *Prizyv*, No. 46, 12 August 1916, p 8.
92. -:, 'Vandervel'd', *Nashe Slovo* and *Vorwärts*', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 192, 22 August 1916, p 1.
93. 'Tri prigovora', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 208, 9 September 1916, p 2.
94. -:, 'Prizyv' i ego Aleksinskii', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 209, 10 September 1916, p 2.
95. Ibid.

96. Ibid.
97. Ibid.
98. -.; 'Ale ksinskii goPrizyv', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 210, 12 September 1916, p 2.
99. Ibid.
100. Ibid.

CHAPTER SEVEN

Trotsky and Russian Domestic Politics

7.1 Introduction

In his recent (1992) political biography of Leon Trotsky the Russian historian Dmitrii Volkogonov presents Trotsky as becoming progressively alienated from the specific problems of his homeland while in exile.¹ This view cannot be sustained by an examination of Trotsky's Paris writings during World War One. Although he subsequently explained his acceptance of *Kievskaya Mysl'*'s invitation to work as its war correspondent in Paris as an opportunity to become better acquainted with French domestic politics, developments in Russia's internal affairs were a constant source of attention. This chapter will examine Trotsky's writings on his homeland thematically, i.e., liberalism, the government and, finally, the battle between social-patriotism and social-democracy among the workers. Each section follows Trotsky's thoughts as they developed chronologically. Although the material has been divided in this way for the purpose of exposition, the connections which Trotsky traced between these various political strains will be stressed; most notably, how social-patriotism, through liberalism, formed one link in a chain which tied the workers to the existing political order and marshalled them behind Russia's war efforts.

7.2 Liberalism

The various sections of the Russian liberal movement were presented with an opportunity to announce their response to Germany's declaration of war at a one-day session of the Duma called for 26 July 1914. At this 'historic' sitting the respective leaders of the Octobrist, Progressist and Kadet fractions stepped forward and declared their allegiance to the Russian government at a time of national need. For most liberals these statements represented a sharp reversal of recent policy. The leader of the Kadets, Pavel Milyukov, for example, had continued to publicise his opposition to a European conflict as late as

mid-July.² However, motivated by a mixture of patriotic sentiment and self-interest the liberals helped turn the Duma session into what Milyukov described as 'a grandiose expression of national unity.'³

Trotsky went onto the offensive against Russian liberalism in only his fourth contribution to *Golos* of 12 December 1914.⁴ This article ridiculed Milyukov's view of the war, expressed in an interview with an Italian newspaper, as a battle for the destruction of militarism and the strengthening of democracy. Trotsky stated that this idea had been repeated many times and by people of different political persuasions. At the then current moment, he stated with irony, it was comforting to hear Milyukov's confirmation of Russia's preparedness, in spite of financial difficulties, to join the struggle for democracy at a time when parliamentary Britain and republican France were too weak to carry out this task. After expressing confusion over whether the perception of Russia's liberating role belonged originally to Milyukov or to Nicholas II, Trotsky asked how the programme of the end of militarism and the establishment of democracy would be implemented? Milyukov's statement that 'victorious democracy would disarm both the belligerent and the neutral countries' could only be understood as an invitation to France and Britain to declare war on Russia. Or, teased Trotsky, was Milyukov including Russia on the list of victorious democratic countries by the same method which Sobakevich had included Elizabeth Vorob'ya as a member of the male sex? It was this uncomfortable conclusion which, Trotsky speculated, forced the Kadet leader to turn the conversation to the deficiencies of Russia's internal political order.

According to Milyukov, the Russian people were dissatisfied with the existing political structures. This dissatisfaction was expressed on the eve of the war through a series of mass strikes, and had most recently found an outlet in the war against Germany. Trotsky interpreted this as evidence of reaction's use of the war as a diversion behind which it could hide its own weaknesses, though he pointed out that the government had not been able to fool all of the people. Social-Democratic workers and deputies were attempting to expose the government's lies. Indeed, *Golos* itself had not sprung out of a vacuum, but represented views held by many inside Russia. However, it was clear that Milyukov supported the government swindlers, a reflection of

'the modest historical role of Russian liberalism [which] consists precisely of this!'⁵

The article was not devoid of any agreement between the Russian revolutionary and the Russian liberal. Trotsky conceded Milyukov's argument that a country conducting a war in the name of democracy was obliged to pass democratic reforms. The problem for the *Golos* correspondent, however, was that Russia was not battling for democracy: 'There is no doubt that the conquest of Galicia, Persia, Armenia, Constantinople and the Straits spurs on the development of Russian capitalism. But it is not democracy but war-like imperialism which triumphs on this basis.'⁶ Milyukov's trump card - the assertion that victory over Germany would abolish drunkenness - was rejected as Russian masters were currently drinking denaturalised spirit and varnish.

At this point Trotsky reported that he had not exhausted Milyukov's interview but he already felt uneasy after holding the reader at Russian liberalism's political level for so long. According to Trotsky, the then current epoch would be represented by future historians as an age not only of barbarism and foolishness but also of stupidity and hypocrisy. And since the true nature of tsarism was so obvious, Russian liberalism had to expend so much energy on hypocrisy and stupidity in representing Russia's 'liberating mission'. In his concluding paragraph Trotsky expressed his disdain for Milyukov by drawing a parallel between the Kadet leader and Gregus, a secret police agent who had tortured prisoners in Riga after the 1905 revolution:

Previously he had responsibility for the torture chamber leadership and for burning the heels of imprisoned democrats with state candles. And now...with the same state candles in hand he is called upon to play the role of the torch bearer of democracy. The people have a right to peace and freedom from militarism. Gregus will give them both, murdering by the democratic list.⁷

In the summer and autumn of 1915 the Russian government, faced with shortages of weapons and ammunition and demands for an increased role for society in the administration of the war effort in the wake of a series of Russian military set-backs which started with the

retreat of May 1915 from Galicia, established a series of committees which included members outwith the bureaucratic structures. The first of these new organisations, the Special Commission on Defence of the Country, was introduced in July 1915 and had responsibility for mobilising the nation's industrial economy for war. Soon pressure mounted for the principle to be extended to other areas. Trotsky commented on the calls for the setting-up of military-society committees, for the 'mobilisation of industry' and the 'organisation of society's forces', in an article of 22 July 1915. He informed his Parisian readership that the tasks, composition and powers of these proposed bodies were as yet undefined. Nevertheless, the idea of encouraging society to play a more active role in directing the struggle against the enemy already formed the 'politics of "the rear"' of the bourgeois opposition, a strategy supported by the social-patriots:

in so far as the bourgeois opposition shows signs of life it remains totally on patriotic soil. While the exceptionally weak mobilisation of society's forces is taking place in the name of a stronger 'national defence,' one would be able to say that Guchkov and Milyukov had learnt political plagiarism from Plekhanov, if only Plekhanov's whole position was not a sorry loan from Guchkov's and Milyukov's fund.⁸

Trotsky pointed out that the idea of the Special Commission had been taken from Britain. However, there were good reasons why one could not expect huge results from its application in the Russian context. Britain had a mighty and modern capitalist economy combined with a flexible democratic state structure. But even in this favourable environment the results achieved so far had not matched original expectations. What hope then the Russian variant, which included plans to build a railway network, new factories and educate new technocrats? For Trotsky this programme, as the Russian government well-knew, was a 'pure Utopia'. Why then take this initiative? According to Trotsky, the government wanted to transfer direct economic responsibility for the war effort to the propertied classes who had earlier accepted political responsibility. In return the propertied classes had neither demanded nor been promised political power. In actual fact what was occurring was an artificial coming together between the

propertied classes and the government, with the former talking of trust as though the disappointments of the post-1905 constitutional experiments had never happened.

Following on from this analysis Trotsky issued several warnings to the liberals, including one aside in which he once again linked liberalism and social-patriotism. First, the ministries had handed responsibility for their obligations to 'committees of national defence' only as a ploy to better protect the concentration of power in the ministries' hands, i.e., the committees could be blamed for any mistakes in policy while policy decisions continued to be taken by the ministries themselves. Moreover, the liberals were cutting themselves off from any room for manoeuvre. On the one hand Milyukov could not demand a new session of the Duma since in such a sitting he could not call the government to account; rather, Milyukov himself would be questioned for his trust in the government. On the other hand, the Kadet leader could not insist that the military-society committees should take over the full tasks of the ministries, for

the Kadet Party would close for itself that last crack in which it currently conducts its opposition: between the policies of the state and its material-technical resources and methods. This is the very same crack into which Plekhanov and other of our social-patriots are attempting to bury the politics of the party of the proletariat.⁹

According to Trotsky, the tasks of ideological and material criticism of the then governmental régime lay more heavily upon the Russian proletariat than at any other time.

Highlighting the hopelessness of the liberal programme was the intention of Trotsky's article of 18 August 1915.¹⁰ This piece examined the links between the Russian liberals and the French republicans. According to Trotsky's report, the Russian democrats were inspired by Clemenceau's and Hevré's view that republican democracy guaranteed the triumph of the peoples' will over both stagnant bureaucracy and selfish capitalist cliques. He argued that the Russian liberals were so enthused by their French counterparts that they had forgotten to call for ministerial responsibility, a basic principle without which parliamentary control can be but formal. Moreover, Trotsky

highlighted several reasons why the Russian liberals should not be so enamoured with the French experience. The result of the 1792 revolution in France had not been the victory of democracy over capitalist imperialism, but the use of the former to check the excesses of the latter; an outcome in which even tsarism could find nothing objectionable. However, the hopes that even the French 'democratic' order could be achieved in Russia through the war alliance with Britain and France introducing democracy into tsarism were groundless.

To begin with, Russia had had no 1792 so that there were no democratic institutions in existence when tsarism entered the imperialist age. In this sense, 'Russian imperialism came too early, or Russian parliamentarianism too late.'¹¹ Whatever the case, for Trotsky, the Western liberal democratic option was not available for Russia. Milyukov and Guchkov had worked in governmental committees for several years and had not managed to achieve any influence over the course of events. Thus, for example, Milyukov had accused the War Ministry of tricking the Duma and threatened court action, but this amounted to nothing more than an 'oratorical gesture.' For Trotsky, the social force of the coming revolution was the Russian proletariat, and it did not link its fate with a successful outcome to the war. He characterised the Duma as a 'convent of confusion and impotence.' If anything positive was to emerge from this situation, then 'the confusion of the rulers would have to be overcome in the decisiveness and strength of those who are ruled and those who are fooled.'¹²

The process of the increasing failure of liberal politics was analysed by Trotsky in the aptly-named article, 'Events are proceeding by their own course'.¹³ On the 22 August 1915 a group of liberals issued a statement of the newly formed Progressive Bloc which, among other things, called for the establishment of a government of national unity to lead Russia to victory.¹⁴ Right-wing groups and publications immediately protested against the Progressive Bloc and called upon the government to disperse the Duma. The tsar, urged on by his conservative prime minister Goremykin, duly complied, closing the Duma on the 3 September 1915 because of the prevailing 'state of emergency'. According to Trotsky, the government had organised right-wing opposition to the Progressive Bloc, in the form of Black

Hundred Congresses in Petrograd and so on , so as to give itself a pretext for shutting the troublesome Duma. In turn, it thought that the call should come from 'society' since a simple government-led initiative would arouse too much opposition from the liberals. In actual fact, Trotsky pointed out, the government need not have worried itself. The liberal coalition had disintegrated at the first sight of the Black Hundred meetings:

Those attached to the 'centre' bloc in the State Duma - and forming this centre was the greatest victory of the Milyukov strategy! - immediately moved to the right and after the Black Hundred Congresses issued ambiguous announcements from which only one thing was clear: the residents of Peterhof could sleep peacefully.¹⁵

For Trotsky, the uselessness of the liberals had become apparent so quickly that a whole series of Black Hundred meetings, organised by the bureaucracy, were left with nothing to do. In these circumstances they became arenas for sacked ministers to plot against their successors. In the meantime events were progressing by their own course: the national economy had lost millions of good workers to the war effort; the war itself was dislocating the economy and means of communication; prices were rising and the money presses were working flat out; the government was corrupt. Trotsky issued one more warning to the liberals: 'if the Progressive Bloc is pacified by the government today, tomorrow is preparing a rude awakening for them.'¹⁶

In May 1916 Trotsky was given the opportunity to take a closer look at the leader of the Kadet party when Milyukov visited Paris.¹⁷ A sarcastic and critical account of Milyukov's programme duly appeared in *Nashe Slovo*. At the outset of his report Trotsky belittled the status of the Russian liberal's trip. Milyukov had come to Paris to strengthen ties between the Allies only a few weeks after Russia had sustained the embarrassment of having been excluded from an Allied economic conference. The fact that Russia's standing continued to be low among her allies could be gauged from the fact that Milyukov's first interview appeared not in the official *Temps* nor even in the semi-official *Matin*, but in the 'reactionary-radical-anti-Semitic-blackmailing publication

Oeuvre'.¹⁸ Trotsky then proceeded to discredit Milyukov's thoughts, partly through portraying Milyukov's performance in the interview in the worst possible light.

Thus, the *Oeuvre* reporter apparently embarrassed the Kadet leader when, in response to Milyukov's assertion that the Russian army was ready and equipped to attack and only awaiting orders, he asked why such orders had not been given? After all, in view of the Austrian attack on the Italian front was not the then current moment just right for a counter-attack? Trotsky pointed out that Milyukov felt no need to answer this question, he merely asserted that the French government would no doubt be delighted to hear of the Russian army's healthy condition; an assertion the French government would hardly deny.

Trotsky reported that Milyukov became much more animated when he spoke of his hopes and desires for Russia's spoils from the war: a victorious Russia should receive open access to the Straits. This would not only enable a further development of the Russian economy, it would also resolve the Eastern Question for Britain and France. Milyukov was asked how these very practical reasons related to notions of the war as a struggle for the principles of national self-determination and the rule of law? He dismissed this question as based upon a 'romanticism...[which] disappeared from politics long ago'; anybody who looked upon the war as a defensive war did so out of ignorance. It could have been argued that Milyukov himself had earlier played a significant role in encouraging people to their 'ignorance'. After all, in December 1914 Trotsky had criticised Milyukov for his then view of the war as a struggle for democracy. However, Trotsky only hinted at this contradiction between the Kadet leader's former and current position by inserting an exclamation mark in the following citation from the interview: 'They fooled themselves (ils s'imaginaient!) that the war had a purely defensive character...'¹⁹

The explicit line of attack that Trotsky adopted in this article was to construct an unflattering comparison of Milyukov with Bethman-Hollweg. He intervened his factual account of the interview to say that Milyukov's anti-romanticism sounded very much like Bethman-Hollweg's justification for Germany's march through Belgium on its way to the sea: 'We have forgotten about sentimentality'. However, wrote

Trotsky, the Russian liberal need not concern himself with sharing the same ideological ground as his German opponent. One important feature differentiated Milyukov from Bethman-Hollweg; the former did not know when to stop talking. For example, Milyukov suggested that British phlegmatic determination to withstand the demands of war could be explained by the fortunate psychological effects of the German Zeppelins. For Trotsky, this stupidity was evidence enough that Milyukov had understood that romanticism had disappeared from politics, but that he had not grasped the fact that realism does not consist of publicly stating all political demands.

Milyukov arrived back in Russia on 17 June 1916, just in time to participate in the remaining few days of the latest session of the Duma, prorogued by Nicholas II on 20 June. Trotsky analysed the gap between expectations of a more powerful and active Duma and the supplementary role that it was to play in 'Disappointments and Worries', published in *Nashe Slovo* of 21 June 1916.²⁰ He began by outlining the reasons why one might have looked forward to a more influential Duma. To begin with, did Milyukov's recent trips to the Allied countries not signify the Kadet leader's seniority in the governmental order? Surely only a leading state actor would have been entrusted with such a vital mission. Furthermore, did the fact that Milyukov represented the Duma not reflect the importance of the representative institution? Finally, the Russian army was successfully advancing on the Galician front. The liberal's view was that victory would bring democratic reforms in its trail. Was the then current moment, when the War-Industries Committees were being praised for their role in recent Russian victories, not the time when one could expect the liberal's policy to begin to pay dividend? Perhaps, but Trotsky argued that the reverse was in fact happening.

The government had preceded the opening of the Duma by passing a series of laws relating to the running of the war economy. According to Trotsky, these measures were introduced to illustrate that the government could manage without the intervention of representatives from society. The right-wing had been mobilised to call for the Duma to be closed as an irrelevancy. The reaction of the liberal member of the War-Industries Committees, Guchkov, was to complain that times were

hard. Thus, the liberal forecast of greater democracy following victory was being falsified. However, for Trotsky, the liberals were not so much stupefied by the obvious failure of their strategy, but were in fact helping the government to crush a source of shared concern. Three hurriedly prepared pieces of social legislation (sickness payments for workers fulfilling ministries' orders, inspectors for women workers in factories, and rest periods for goods workers) were evidence of the liberal's and the government's desire to pacify the workers. In response, Trotsky called upon Social-Democrats to urge the workers to have no confidence in liberal social reformism and then to organise the workers' disbelief in revolutionary activity.

Trotsky presented one of his most damning critiques of Russian liberalism in 'Lessons of the last Duma session' of 12 July 1916.²¹ He characterised the parliament's proceedings as reeking of the smell of the politically dead bodies of the Progressive Bloc. To illustrate this point he focused upon the limited nature of the Progressive Bloc's demands on the peasant question. According to Trotsky, the peasants had been squeezed by the war effort to such an extent that the government was fearful of any signs of discontent from that quarter. In these circumstances winning concessions for the peasants should have proved a relatively easy task. However, the Progressive Bloc had merely suggested the removal of certain peasant inequalities before the law, on the basis that this was the only realistic proposal that one could expect the tsar's government to approve. For Trotsky, the Progressive Bloc's approach to the peasant question was typical of its approach in general: one had to tailor one's demands to suit the expectations of the monarchy, the bureaucracy and the nobility. Furthermore, this approach explained why the liberals had failed to use the peasants' inequality before the law to attack a whole series of other groups' inequalities before the law, i.e., the nationalities, people of various faiths and the Jews. It was this failure that made the bankruptcy of liberal politics all too obvious:

If history, our personal history for the past ten years has revealed anything beyond all doubt it is the absolute futility of placing one's hopes and trust on the democratic-opposition growth of Russian liberalism. Standing openly and demonstratively on the path of

imperialist cooperation with the monarchy and making this cooperation the basis of all its policies, liberalism only completes the

whole of its preceding evolution as prepared by the national and international conditions of its development. The liberal opposition is just as little able to depart from its imperialist foundations as it is able to develop some kind of energetic opposition to it.²²

Milyukov's trips to the Allied countries once again became the subject of Trotsky's attention in an article spread over two issues of *Nashe Slovo* of August 1916.²³ The Paris correspondent was replying to Milyukov's impressions of his experiences abroad which had appeared in the Russian liberal newspaper *Rech*. Trotsky claimed that Milyukov's work bore the usual hallmarks of a liberal pen, mainly impudence and stupidity. However, on this occasion, the Russian liberal's remarks were worth analysing as they contained some curious facts and generalisations.

The first instalment focussed upon Milyukov's account of his conversations with the French socialists Renaudel and Longuet. Trotsky illustrated how the Kadet tailored his remarks to reassure his co-conversationalists. For example, when Renaudel asked about Russian pretensions on the Straits, Poland and Persia he was not reminded of his 'naivety'. Rather, Milyukov used the style of the French Socialist Party's pacifism to stress that Russia was not an imperialist country. After all, had not Milyukov himself supported pacifism at speeches given both before and during the war? Against a background of pacifist pronouncements surely the issue of Russian expansion pales into a triviality? Evidently not so for Trotsky.

Another instance of Milyukov's duplicity was highlighted by Trotsky in his commentary on the Cadet's account of a discussion on whether the survival of tsarism was linked to Russia's winning the war. Milyukov had argued that a fundamental distinction separated the two issues: reaction could be changed in a decade whereas the outcome of the war would determine the fate of many future generations. Therefore, according to Milyukov, one's view of tsarism need not be connected in any way with one's hopes for Russian military success. One could support the war effort in the knowledge that one was fighting for the

well-being of many future generations, and then deal with tsarism in a relatively short period of time after victory had been guaranteed. Furthermore, the failure of defeatism in 1905 had revealed the hopelessness of this tactic not only to the liberal, but also to the narodnik and Marxist intelligentsia. For Milyukov, various sections of the intelligentsia had learnt that problems like Poland, Persia and the Straits were the product of a foreign policy constructed over generations and then handed to the present state actors from the past. Hence, foreign policy could continue over decades while tsarism could be removed over the course of one decade. Trotsky was not impressed by Milyukov's use of time to support his approval of Russia's war aims. According to Trotsky, the Russian liberal had constructed an argument which allowed a combination of revolutionary action against tsarism with a defence of Russia in the war only to please his left-wing company. After all, Milyukov had expressed his real view of the relation between defeatism and revolution in the State Duma. There Milyukov had pronounced that if victory could only be achieved through revolution then he would renounce victory. So much for the concerns of future generations taking priority! For Trotsky, Milyukov understood that even a revolution which overthrew tsarism and guaranteed victory, thus strengthening the position of the bourgeoisie, would soon develop into a full-blown proletarian revolution. This, of course, would mean the death of liberalism. It was for these reasons that Milyukov would do anything to avoid revolution:

Twelve years ago Milyukov called for defeatism as it gave a push to revolution. Now he would be prepared to accept defeat if only to run away from revolution. But the Russian liberal said nothing of this historical u-turn to his French company.²⁴

The second instalment of 'The generalisations and impressions of Mr Milyukov' examined the liberal's exposition of how the Zimmerwald Conference had been organised. According to Trotsky's report, Milyukov claimed that Longuet had first to be defeated in France before left-wing groups there could call for an internationalist socialist gathering. Syndicalists had then joined-up with the official Italian Socialist Party and had attracted the support of minority groups in Paris and London. The aim of an international gathering was finally achieved

through the auspices of German Social-Democracy. Trotsky pinpointed several inaccuracies in Milyukov's version of events. To begin with, the left-wing in French politics began their activities while Longuet was still a minister. Moreover, Zimmerwald had not taken place through the medium of German Social-Democracy as a whole. On the contrary, the German party, like the French, was split. In both parties the right opposed the idea of Zimmerwald as an initiative of the revolutionary left. In using the notion of the important role played by German Social-Democracy Milyukov, according to Trotsky, was merely repeating a critique of Zimmerwald as 'Pan-German intrigue', i.e., a critique based upon 'ignorance and stupidity'.

Trotsky was more impressed by Milyukov's understanding of the fractions within French socialism: the right majority, the Longuetist minority and the Zimmerwaldists. Milyukov noted that the minority had recently abandoned its support of the majority, and called upon the International Socialist Bureau to investigate the possibility of renewing ties between the various sections of the Second International. However, Milyukov stated that there was no need for concern over the apparent fall in the right's popularity. The minority still voted for the war credits and continued to serve in war cabinets. Moreover, the Zimmerwaldists had been forced to vote for the minority rather than having sufficient strength to put forward their own demands; an immediate recall of all sections of the International which were to be first of all cleansed of nationalism.

For Trotsky, Milyukov had correctly analysed the dangers of Longuetism. By voting with the minority the Zimmerwaldists had only defeated themselves. In this way Longuetism was 'a new link in a complex chain attaching the working masses to the existing régime';²⁵ the French equivalent of social-patriotism in Russia. However, Trotsky claimed that the credit for Milyukov's acumen could not be laid at the Kadet leader's own door. When in Paris Milyukov had received copies of *Golos* and *Nashe Slovo* and his analysis of fractions in French socialism was taken straight from the pages of these newspapers. But, there was one notable exception. Milyukov had omitted to inform his readership that Longuetism had to be created both as a reflection of a swing to the left among the working masses and as an attempt to

contain the growing revolutionary mood. And, continued Trotsky, Milyukov had a very good reason for concealing the real cause of Longuetism; he could not expose the anti-proletarian, pro-government nature of Longuetism for 'he was afraid of weakening the pedagogical force of his French impressions upon the Russian workers' movement...'²⁶

In what was to be his final contribution about Russian liberalism on the pages of *Nashe Slovo*, Trotsky analysed the Kadet moderate Chelnokov's remarks concerning which political force was best suited to implement the liberal reform programme. According to Trotsky's report Chelnokov, the chairman of the Moscow All-Russian Union of Towns, thought a conservative government could pass reforms of a liberal nature and retain the trust of society and leading political circles, whereas a liberal administration attempting to pass the very same reforms would soon be swamped with requests that it would be unable to fulfil. For Trotsky, it would not be difficult to show the flaws in Chelnokov's logic: a conservative Cabinet would be conservative by nature and act accordingly. However, such an illustration would be pointless if one thought that by it one could convert Chelnokov to opposition to Russian conservatism. The *Nashe Slovo* correspondent argued that the Moscow city politician had constructed his case not out of ignorance of the real state of affairs, but out of an awareness of the common imperialist interests of the liberal bourgeoisie and the bureaucratic-monarchical state.

According to Trotsky, Chelnokov and his ilk knew that the monarchy could not adequately defend their imperialist interests and that the monarchy would not surrender its hold on power. This situation was not a problem for Russian liberalism, as it was prepared to help the monarchy acquire the new skills it needed without demanding political power. Hence, Chelnokov's insistence that the reins of government were best left in the hands of the traditional bureaucracy. Of course liberals would protest if they thought that they were being taken too much for granted by their conservative allies. However, those people who interpreted such liberal protests as a real move to overthrow the government were harbouring illusions which could only help to prop up the old régime. In this way Trotsky highlighted a chain which linked first

liberalism and then, through its acceptance of 'liberal opposition', social-patriotism to the conservative ministry (Stümer):

Creating (not so much for himself as for others) 'illusions' on Stümer's account, Chelnokov continues to serve the basic interests of his class in the current epoch. Creating illusions for themselves on Chelnokovists' (*Chelnokovikh*) account and for their 'struggle for power' tomorrow, opportunists in the workers' movement betray the working class to the bourgeoisie.²⁷

The following sections of this chapter will examine the two links of the above chain that have not been looked at thus far, namely Trotsky's writings on the government and on social-patriotism.

7.3 The Government

From the outset of the war Trotsky condemned the Russian government as one of a group of imperialist nations pursuing interests opposed to those of the international proletariat.²⁸ However, it was only in April 1915 that he devoted a full article to the war-time régime in Russia, in which he placed the suspension of the constitution in an international setting. He pointed out that even the countries of age-old parliamentarianism had taken this step. But, he argued, one could single out Russia since in other countries political parties had supported their governments by voluntarily declaring allegiance to 'national unity', whereas in Russia the government itself had put an end to the unrestrained functioning of political groups. Having freed themselves of parliamentary criticism Trotsky claimed that all governments had become regulatory bodies supplying the war effort from the national economy; a process which involved breaking rules normally governing economic life. For Trotsky, the Russian government also stood out from other administrations in this process since it caused more dislocation and more disruption than that taking place elsewhere. In turn this did not bode well either for the condition of the Russian economy as time progressed, or for the likelihood of continuing social acquiescence with government policy:

the military-field state economy feverishly undermines its own basis and the longer the war lasts the more it goes into a blind

alley...But the longer the war lasts and the more uncertain its outcome becomes, the more often the rulers should look into the state purse and the more anxiously should the propertied classes...ask themselves: does the bureaucracy really know where and why it is leading the country?²⁹

However, Trotsky concluded that faced with such questions and criticism the government would not consider relinquishing any of its newly discovered freedom from parliamentary and societal control.

If Trotsky was not able to be optimistic about the possibility of a new regime in Russia in the near future, then he was able to write a humorous account of a recent ministerial reshuffle, one of a series of the government's 'liberalisation' measures in response to Russia's recent military set-backs, in an article of 24 June 1915. At that time Nicholas II sacked the then Minister of the Interior, Nicholas Maklakov, and replaced him with Nicholas Shcherbatov. Among a number of other new appointees Katenin was given responsibility for the press. Trotsky assessed the likely course events would take under Shcherbatov and Katenin, basing his judgements upon the two men's biographies. He informed the reader that the new Minister of the Interior had previously occupied the post of Director of the State Stud, a fact which gave reason for optimism. After all, horses demanded regularity and order in the provision of food and water. One could only hope that Shcherbatov would preserve his skills learnt among the horses after being transferred to the larger human stable of Russia; although Trotsky declined to make a precise forecast. Katenin, on the other hand, did not share Shcherbatov's sound training and experience. This had become evident in the way that he had responded to questions concerning his approach to the press. Thus, Katenin freely admitted that he had no knowledge of the press but announced that he intended to protect the honourable publications and discard the rest. This left the problem of how to differentiate the honourable from the dishonourable, to which Katenin had replied: 'I will treat the press in the same way as the press treats me.'³⁰ It was this answer, Trotsky claimed, in which the difference between the two new ministers was most clearly revealed. Shcherbatov knew that one treats horses not as they treat you but in accordance with their nature as horses. For Trotsky, the lesson was

clear: 'one went through the serious stable school, but the other obviously needs to be sent to the stables for the completion of his state service.'³¹

In his next commentary upon developments in his homeland Trotsky once again used the form of political profile. This time the victim was Alexander Khvostov, who became Minister of the Interior as a replacement to Shcherbatov after the tsar had managed to weather the political storms of August 1915.³² For Trotsky, the latest reshuffle indicated the extent to which Nicholas II intended to dig his trenches on the home front after the German advance on the Eastern front had ground to a halt. Khvostov was a well-known reactionary, and his appointment made a mockery of recent liberal calls for a ministry enjoying popular support. After all, Khvostov had helped to crush worker uprisings in 1905 and it was expected that he would deal with similar stirrings in a similar way. Hardly a promising prospect for the majority of Russia's population! In turn, liberal acquiescence in the face of Khvostov's appointment revealed how little the government had to worry itself of sustained opposition from that quarter. Indeed, for Trotsky, Khvostov's promotion would enter the history books as 'a symbol of the relationship between the monarchy and the patriotic bourgeoisie.'³³

Trotsky discovered further confirmation for his view of an increase of reactionary forces in Russia following military successes, most notably at the Turkish fortress city of Erzurum, in an article of 27 July 1916.³⁴ On this occasion he examined the appointment of Boris Stümer as Prime Minister and Makarov, the former Minister of the Interior sacked in the spring of 1915 during public outcry at the rapid advance of the German Army, as Minister of Justice. He began by placating French worries that Stümer, who had also taken over the post of Foreign Minister from Sazonov, would pursue a different line in Russian foreign policy. Trotsky assured the French people that, despite his German name, Stümer would call for battle until the Germans had been routed. The cause of the most recent cabinet reshuffle was the respective minister's approach to Russia's internal political order. Sazonov, unlike Stümer, thought the Duma a useful body, if only as an additional source of information and influence. It was true, Trotsky conceded, that

Stümer called the Duma before dispersing it; as was the fact that the new Prime Minister had been accused by leading figures, in a letter to the tsar, of conspiring with the left to overthrow the monarchy in the name of national defence. Trotsky claimed that such accusations were clearly exaggerated; Stümer's premiership represented a swing to the right of the political pendulum. In turn, the pendulum had swung, or had been enabled to swing, because enough forces had been gathered for the offensive on the Austrian front, which had resulted in several victories for the Russian forces led by General Brusilov. For Trotsky, the view that Russia's 'internal Germans' would be defeated along with Germany had been dealt another blow.

In the very next issue of *Nashe Slovo* Trotsky's appraisal of Stümer seemed to have undergone a rapid change. In 'Two Telegrams' Stümer appears not as a die-hard monarchist, but as a politician willing to sacrifice absolutism.³⁵ Trotsky informed the reader that, contrary to expectations, Stümer had not begun his time in office by calling a press conference or by receiving Entente envoys. To date, Stümer had exchanged telegrams only with Briand, his French counterpart. In this correspondence Stümer had confirmed that both countries were engaged in a 'great task' without specifying in what this task consisted. In trying to fill this lacuna Trotsky brought two facts to the reader's attention. First, the Petrograd correspondent of the French newspaper *Journal* had been told by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that Stümer had been appointed Prime Minister and Foreign Minister since, at a Peace Conference, it would be necessary to connect Russia's external and internal affairs; a task made easier if one person had overall responsibility. Second, not long ago the Russian Finance Minister, Bark, had visited Western Europe in the search for financial aid. In Britain and France he had received the reply that loans were available in America, but in order to receive them the Russian government would have to announce a more enlightened Jewish policy. The reason for Stümer's occupation of the two top governmental posts was now obvious, as was his best wishes for Briand's health from God in the carrying-out of their 'great task'.

When Trotsky next took up his pen to write about the Russian government during the First World War he was under an order, issued

by the French authorities, to leave Paris. *Nashe Slovo* had been banned two weeks earlier, on the 15 September 1916. However, in the six weeks it took to find Trotsky a new home, the *Nashe Slovo* group was able to start a new newspaper, *Nachalo*; two of Trotsky's contributions to which while he was still in Paris contained attacks on the Russian government.

The first of these, written under his new pseudonym En', assessed the amount of corruption which permeated the Russian administrative structure. Trotsky illustrated his point through an examination of the twists and turns which the careers of several leading state officials had taken. He began with a short synopsis of the recently deceased General Dumbadze (1851-1916). As governor of Yalta he had terrorised the local people until complaints about him reached such a level that he was sacked in 1910. However, a friend of Nicholas II, Dumbadze was reappointed and reigned until 'he was worn out by administration.'³⁶ The second figure sketched by Trotsky was General Komissarov, who had been sacked as governor of the Rostov region after letters of complaint about him had been received in the Ministry of the Interior from local people. Trotsky advised Komissarov not to despair for his career; he could take comfort from the life of the infamous I. I. Vostorgov (1867-1918). Vostorgov was well-known as a priest and corrupt officer of state who, nevertheless, was tipped to become a bishop. Finally, Trotsky suggested a process of alienation from the regime to a corrupt member of it through which an individual could proceed. He first mentioned the case of Mansevich-Manuilov (Maska) who had been hired as a collegiate assessor and was currently in prison for embezzling 100 000 roubles.³⁷ At the end of the article he then spoke of V. Burtsev. Burtsev was a former narodnik who had fled abroad. By the time of the First World War, however, Burtsev's views had undergone a profound change and he was an ardent patriot. With support from Entente governments he was allowed back into Russia where, according to Trotsky's report, he was working in museums. Trotsky wondered what he might be doing in that branch of the state service, 'perhaps he is studying the deposit there of Manusevich-Maska's trousers.'³⁸

In what was to be his last contribution on the Russian government to *Nachalo* while resident in France, Trotsky disputed Gavas's, the official telegraph agency of the French government, view of a rapid growth of liberal influence in the Russian administration.³⁹ This article was partially censored, but the Russian revolutionary's message was preserved. In response to Gavas Trotsky asked how could a Cabinet which was considering hiring V. M. Purishkevich (1870-1920), a monarchist reactionary and member of the Black Hundreds, be classified as liberal? Furthermore, Stümer was attempting to crush the influence of the liberal Chelnokov by enfranchising the clergy for the upcoming elections to the Moscow City Duma. After establishing the 'hard course' adopted by the current regime, Trotsky noted a flaw; namely, different ministers were proposing conflicting solutions to the problem of price rises and shortages on items of basic necessity. In line with farmers' interests the Agricultural Minister, Bobrinsky, was calling for no government intervention to lower prices. He was opposed by the War Minister, Shuvaev, who wanted the army to be supplied with cheap bread. When the latter course was adopted rumours circulated that Bobrinsky had decided to take a rest and would soon be replaced. Trotsky pointed out that conflict among top members of the Cabinet was harmful for the 'hard course'. In the meantime, calls were being made for the immediate convocation of the Duma. Thus, Trotsky's writings on the Russian government ended with an analysis of another looming Cabinet crisis, the mechanics of which he had outlined in his first article on the Russian state order of April 1915.

7.4 The Workers' Movement: Social-Patriotism versus Social-Democracy

In the third and fourth instalments of a series of articles published under the heading 'War Crisis and Political Perspectives', Trotsky outlined why the Russian proletariat was the crucial social force which would determine the future domestic political order. For Trotsky, this fact had already been revealed by the failed 1905 revolution, in which 'the main moving force of the revolution had been the proletariat.'⁴⁰ The intervening years had witnessed developments which, according

to Trotsky, had only reinforced the proletariat's position. A period of economic boom had enriched the large-capital bourgeoisie while killing off its petty- and middle- counterparts. At the same time the proletariat had grown in numbers, was more concentrated in the newer and larger factories, and more advanced in consciousness and organisation. The peasantry, on the other hand, remained a culturally backward and dispersed mass; the workers could hope to win over only proletarian and semi-proletarian elements from the countryside.

According to Trotsky, the further polarisation of the Russian social structure between 1905-15 had also entailed consequences for the political positions adopted by some groups. Most notably, the bourgeoisie had gone from opposition to the government in 1905 to backing the government's campaign for victory in World War One. Similarly, the liberal press, whose ambiguous stance in 1905 had encouraged the masses' revolutionary feelings, was currently attempting to channel the proletariat's dissatisfaction into an alliance with the ruling orders. In this way the bourgeoisie, Trotsky argued, formed a buffer between the monarchy at one end of society and the proletariat at the other. Given that a revolutionary transformation of Russian society could only be brought about by the proletariat, the crucial question for Trotsky was, 'Who would exert most influence over the masses?' The message emanating from the bourgeoisie was clear, but one could also distinguish two main strains of Social- Democratic thought.

There were those socialists, social-patriots, who thought that the petty-town bourgeoisie, the intelligentsia and the peasantry could play a revolutionary role. Their programme approved the war and called for participation in 'organisations for victory', with the intention of creating a broad base of support which, after the war, would press for radical political change. In the Duma the social-patriots were represented by Man'kov and Kerensky. However, there were also those socialists, revolutionary internationalists, who were unique in agitating among the proletariat for peace and revolution. The revolutionary internationalist perceived the Russian revolution as part of a wider European phenomenon:

only the international socialist revolution can form that situation and advance those forces under the help of which the revolutionary struggle of the Russian proletariat can be conducted to the end. And the converse: the revolutionary struggle of the Russian proletariat...is an important factor in the interrelation of European social forces and gives a mighty push to the revolutionary advance of the European proletariat on the basis of capitalist society.⁴¹

After outlining the social-patriotic and revolutionary internationalist approaches, Trotsky did not have to wait too long before having an opportunity to comment on the battle between these two sections of the socialist camp. Between November and December 1915 he wrote two articles concerning the elections which took place among the Petrograd workers to decide who should represent them on the recently formed War-Industries Committees; organisations concerned with war production.⁴² The first of these articles, which appeared six weeks after the first elections of September 1915, claimed that the revolutionary internationalists had shown themselves to be the stronger force. In declaring that the 'national defencist' position had been 'routed', Trotsky no doubt had in mind figures which had already appeared in *Nashe Slovo* showing that workers at ninety large factories had voted against participation in the War-Industries Committees, while eighty-one had voted for.⁴³ In conditions which were more favourable to the social-patriots - the continuing German advance was arousing basic instincts of self-preservation and the bourgeois press was raging about the 'Tuetonic danger' - he claimed that the Petrograd workers had emerged from a difficult political test 'with honour'. However, he did not overlook the fact that a significant section of Petrograd's workers, between one-quarter and one-third, had voted for participation in the War-Industrial Committees and therefore for national defencism. The question Trotsky posed was, 'Why?'

He pointed out that the social-patriots themselves were surprised by the outcome: 'without organisation, without traditions, almost without Duma representatives, without the authority of a party. And suddenly: several hundreds of thousands of votes! Where from?'⁴⁴ He answered by pointing to several sources. To begin with, those workers who were

under the spell of bourgeois ideology had united under the banner hoisted by Plekhanov, *Prizyv* and *Nashe Delo*. Then there was the bourgeois reserve army of ideologically indifferent workers who, when threatened by external danger, would support the cause of national defence. To this second group one could add a section of the qualified work force who were making more money than usual under the 'mobilisation of industry'. In short, the social-patriot constituency was made-up from opportunistic elements most likely to take the line of least resistance. This trend in Russian Social-Democracy, lacking a history of organisation and political authority, had, in turn, been able to attract this constituency because the state machine and the bourgeois press had been at its service; or rather, claimed Trotsky, the former had come to the service of the latter:

Social-patriotism turned-out to be the most handy political instrument in the hands of the ruling classes and the state power for the ideological-political subordination of the backward workers to itself.⁴⁵

In order to illustrate the usefulness of the social-patriots to the government he argued that, alone, the ruling circles would have been able to win-over thousands of workers and not tens of thousands. Trotsky insisted that one could draw only one conclusion when dealing with the 'political tool' of the proletariat's class enemies: 'we cannot limit our struggle with [the social-patriots] by any organisational bonds with them; a struggle which should be and will be taken to the finish!'⁴⁶

After being elected, the workers' representatives had to meet and decide whether to nominate individuals from their ranks to serve on the central organs of the War-Industries Committees. This second round of voting took place toward the end of November 1915, and Trotsky published his commentary upon these debates roughly one month later. He described what had occurred as a new chapter in the history of social-patriotic shame. In making this charge Trotsky had in mind Gvozdev's behaviour at an electoral meeting of 29 November. Gvozdev, leader of the social-patriotic bloc, was a leading exponent of worker participation in the cause of national self-defence. Naturally, he wanted the meeting of workers' representatives to proceed with the nominations. In this he was opposed by the ninety revolutionary

internationalists. It was what Gvozdev did to overcome this opposition that so enraged Trotsky. Gvozdev declared that one deputy was in attendance under false pretences. When the revolutionary internationalists abandoned the hall in protest at this 'informer's act', Gvozdev organised the election of ten workers' representatives to the Central War-Industries Committee and a further six to supplementary committees. For Trotsky, this amounted to a falsification of the will of the Petrograd proletariat; a will which Trotsky obviously felt amounted to a mandate not to proceed with further elections to War-Industries Committees after the election of the ninety revolutionary internationalists. He defined the social-patriot's action as an 'evil form of political strikebreaking' which permitted only one of two responses: 'either fellow-travelling and empathy, or an implacable and urgent organisational rebuff.'⁴⁷

An advert in the newspaper *Nash Golos* promoting an edition of social-patriotic author's essays to be published in the near future in Petrograd provided the pretext for Trotsky's next writing on social-patriotism in Russia. *Nash Golos* announced that the work would be drawn from a list of over nineteen contributors, each of whom supported the idea of self-defence; an idea which would also be used as the book's title. Trotsky reproduced this information in *Nashe Slovo* before adding several comments. First, the proposed publication showed how energetically the social patriots were arguing their case. Second, L. Sedov was on the list of intended contributors. His participation belied the notion that there existed a left-wing group within the newspaper *Nashe Delo*. If such a group did exist then Sedov should have opposed the idea of Self-Defence. Third, An's proposed participation was illustrative of how new disagreements had replaced the old. Previously, An' had rejected the arguments of his now co-contributors as 'opportunistic'. At this point, Trotsky introduced the lesson which he had drawn from his analysis of the elections to the War-Industries Committees, one had to wage a propaganda war against social-patriotism: 'The more An' has rendered service to the workers' movement, and especially the Caucasian, the greater his authority and the more decisive the struggle with An' and the social-patriots should be.'⁴⁸

When *Self-Defence* appeared in Petrograd in 1916, copies must have circulated outwith Russia. Trotsky published his thoughts on this book in two articles in *Nashe Slovo*, the first of which one could describe as a book review.⁴⁹ His intention was to discredit social-patriotism and its calls for an alliance with the liberals.

L. Sedov's chapter, 'Yesterday - Today - Tomorrow', did not appear in *Self-Defence*, 'due to circumstances beyond the control of the editorial board.'⁵⁰ However, Trotsky claimed that Sedov's spirit had not been erased along with his writing. After all, a *Forw^erd* did say that the authors, despite differences of opinion on specific issues, were united in their belief that internationalism and the defence of Russia were not mutually exclusive ideas.⁵¹ In actual fact, claimed Trotsky, the authors disagreed not only among themselves but even with themselves. Before embarking upon an examination of each chapter by way of a series of brief extracts, 'so that the reader can feel the overall "spirit" of the collection', Trotsky characterised the arguments put forward by all as, 'banal and superficial...united by capitulation before the bourgeois nation and the class state.'⁵²

Self-Defence was introduced by Vera Zasulich's essay 'On the War'.⁵³ In the light of her undoubted contributions to the workers' movement in Russia, Trotsky said that he wished he could just remain silent about her participation in *Self-Defence*. However, now she was 'a political enemy against whom one has to conduct an irreconcilable struggle.'⁵⁴ He then recreated Zasulich's argument thus: she desired as total a defeat of Germany as possible, not only out of feelings for her homeland but also because of a concern for Western democracy; finally, in its merciless pursuit of victory Germany had aroused in her indignation and disgust. In the space available to him Trotsky had not reproduced Zasulich's arguments faithfully. Thus, for instance, her desire for Germany's defeat was not caused by a concern for Western democracy as Western democracy per se, but because the 'death or even weakening of Western democracy by what is a mighty country anyway, led by semi-absolutist Prussian Junkers, would be a huge loss for the present and a threat for the future, for that future to which the proletariat aspires.'⁵⁵

Trotsky described the next contributor, A. Potresov, as the 'Gvozdev' of the whole collection. He said that Potresov saw the idea of the homeland as having caused the collapse of the Second International. At the same time, wrote Trotsky, Potresov was not counterposing the idea of the homeland to internationalism. The proletariat was merely protecting the riches created by it in its 'homeland'. Russia still had to reach the stage of patriotism; when she had done so she would become a part of Europe. Patriotism means that a citizen lays down his possessions at the homeland's altar. Trotsky concluded his exposition of Potresov's article by citing the social-patriot's final sentence: 'Through patriotism - there is no other path - into the kingdom of brotherhood and equality!'⁵⁶ What Trotsky did not do, however, was to report either why Potresov considered patriotism a necessary stage on the path to internationalism, or the distinction Potresov made between bourgeois patriotism and proletarian patriotism. According to Potresov, capitalist development not only brought with it an ever-increasing class division in society, it also entailed the transformation of each individual into a citizen. In turn, it was this feeling of citizenship which formed the basis for patriotism, i.e., one feels part of a whole, irrespective of one's hatred of other parts of the whole:

we are not always inclined to turn our attention to another aspect of capitalist development, that the stratification of society is accompanied not only by an ever-increasing intensity of class struggle but also along side this there occurs a transformation of society - the transformation of the ordinary person into a citizen...the more active hatred to a section [of society] the more one feels love towards the whole, an active love which composes patriotism.⁵⁷

Furthermore, since capitalist development is uneven and since the concept of 'citizenship' is concomitant upon capitalist development, various nations will have different degrees of citizenship and hence of patriotism at any given moment. Moreover, as it develops patriotism takes various forms; specifically, there emerges an 'aggressive bourgeois patriotism' which is prepared to interfere with another country's interests in pursuit of its own, and a 'proletarian-democratic

patriotism' which espouses the right of each to protect their achievements without harming others. The Second International had collapsed at the outset of the war because the development of patriotism into a mass proletarian-democratic consciousness had not gone far enough. However, Potresov was confident that one day the ground would be sufficiently strong for true internationalism to become a reality. Internationalism would grow out of patriotism, a process that was unfolding at the then current moment:

internationalism is the further development of patriotism, laid to a great extent in those same thoughts and feelings which were at first strengthened in the process of the crystallisation of the citizen within each whole....The war not only realises the force of citizenship accumulated by centuries of development in national-state boundaries, together with this it also brings about the first serious cracks in these boundaries of citizenship and at the same time lays the first stones of that fundament, on which will be built buildings by aware and conscious masses, not unwillingly as the case up until now, but by the distributed creative wills of internationalism.⁵⁸

In his presentation of Ivan Kubikov's chapter, 'The Working Class and National Feelings',⁵⁹ Trotsky focused on the emotional aspect of Kubikov's case. In particular, he emphasised Kubikov's citation of a line of poetry, 'Be kind in one's rags and the homeland will cry', to illustrate the use of emotive reasoning by social-patriots. However, there was another side to Kubikov's analysis which went unreported in Trotsky's review. For Kubikov, the proletariat of each country did not, as Marx claimed in 1848, have nothing to lose but its chains. In the sixty-plus years since Marx and Engels penned the *Communist Manifesto*, the European proletariat had made significant material, cultural and organisational gains. Moreover, these gains had been achieved in the framework of the nation-state. Hence the desire of each country's proletariat to defend its gains from possible seizure by hostile forces from outwith its own lands.

For P. Maslov, the most advanced capitalist countries exploit those less well advanced by pursuing a particular trade policy. Thus, for instance, Britain ensured that Ireland and India became markets for

Britain's industrial goods and not competitors not by political oppression, but through its trade policy. This is why the United States had to achieve economic independence from Britain by overturning the latter's trade policy as a precondition for the development of American industry. Maslov' claimed that even before the war Germany was making a profit from its trade with Russia, even though the tsar's government was pursuing a protectionist policy. However, German capital wanted to make super-profits, which it thought it could achieve through the imposition of certain economic policies after victory in war: 'At whose expense could this advantage be gained? Clearly, at the expense of the defeated country. It is also clear that the extraction of this super-profit should reflect on the economic development of the exploited country.'⁶⁰ Maslov' cited current Germany policy in occupied Poland to illustrate how indigenous industry was being stripped not only to satisfy Germany's war needs, but for the 'demands of German industry.'⁶¹ Moreover, the German government was pressurising Polish workers to move to Germany to supply the demand for labour-power there. In this way, claimed Maslov', a common interest to repulse German aggression had arisen among the Polish bourgeoisie, anxious to protect its property, and the Polish workers, concerned about their jobs and rights in their homeland. In light of these conditions, socialists who insisted that the outcome of the war was of no interest to them were poor defenders of the interests of the working class.

Although Trotsky did not mention why, for Maslov', control over trade policy was so important, he did give an accurate summary of Maslov's views thus: 'the Germans threaten the Russian trade system and hence Russian industry and hence the Russian proletariat.'⁶² He then correctly quoted a section of Maslov's chapter in which the social-patriot expressed regret that the leaders of the German working class had supported the attempt to destroy Russian industry which could be saved only by giving Germany's army an 'appropriate rebuff.' Maslov's insistence that democrats were obliged to ensure that any peace should be conducted on the basis of 'mutual concessions in possible economic relations, under which one country does not exploit another',⁶³ however, went unreported.

In his contribution K. Dmitriev' examined the special demands faced by backward countries during wars such as the First World War.⁶⁴ For example, whereas an advanced country can redirect resources normally spent on repairs and reinvestment, a backward country is forced to support production for war by reducing output intended for consumer production: 'Here is the basic reason why the rear is now facing the threatening phantom of goods shortages: industry and in part agriculture is not strong enough to serve the normal demands of the rear and the sharply growing demands of the army.'⁶⁵ In the Russian context the effect of the war on the consumer was being aggravated, according to Dmitriev', by the government's financial policy. By printing more money the government had devalued the rouble by thirty per cent, the cost of which was to be met by purchasers of goods, i.e., hired labour. For Dmitriev' one had to try to minimise the hardships of war at the rear, since at the then current moment there existed a close connection between the situation at home and the situation at the rear: 'material and spiritual hardships of the rear are now transmitted with lightning speed to the front where they react on the army's situation and mood.'⁶⁶ The problem for backward Russia was therefore clear: how to meet the overwhelming production demands of the First World War without removing too many resources from the domestic market. Dmitriev's solution was the rational use of the country's resources which could only be achieved by the intervention of the society's democratic forces to organise the war effort. Furthermore, the intervention of democratic forces was all the more urgent for Dmitriev', since it was only by pursuing this strategy that democracy could guarantee for itself an influence over the post-war settlement. Hence his conclusion, ripped from its context and quoted without comment by Trotsky: 'Through the defence of the country to the free world, a mutual guaranteeing of the people's interests of the negotiating sides - such now can be the only slogan of Russian democracy.'⁶⁷

From An's essay, 'Marxism and Radicalism', Trotsky cited the following extract which he ridiculed first by inserting an incredulous '(listen!)':

All Marxist parties in Europe approached the war from the point of view of economic development, i.e., they remained on Marxist soil. But (listen!) since each of them considered their country to be defending itself, naturally, they all, considering the International's regulations, seized arms;⁶⁸ and then by using An's nationality to throw the question of Russia constituting a 'country' into doubt:

And since An' considers his country to be defending itself (To An', as a Caucasian, it is absolutely clear that neither in Persia nor in Armenia has Russia's 'defence' been carried through to the end) then, 'following the International's regulations' An' gives a call to arms.⁶⁹

In the first instance Trotsky's critique rests upon an apparent flaw in An's logic. After all, why should concerns about economic development lead Marxists who considered their country to be defending itself to support the war effort? An' had answered this question thus. As societies develop from feudalism they experience two different stages of development; first a stage of general political liberation and then an era of social struggle. In the first stage the proletariat will unite with the bourgeoisie to throw off the feudal yoke, in the second the two classes will stand opposed to each other. At the outset of World War One Western Europe had already entered the second 'social' stage while Russia was still in the first. This explains the approach of social-democrats in the West for whom,

questions of victory or defeat are questions of the strengthening or weakening of the proletarian movement, for the destruction by arms of the economic fundament, on which history has formed and reinforced the country in question, destroys the basis of the class struggle and holds back the economic development of the whole society in general.⁷⁰

However, An' went on to say, and Trotsky omitted this from his report, that not all social-democrats in the West had had the right to call their country 'defencist': 'The mistake was committed not in the placing of the question but in its solution: one part of the International imagined their state to be defencist whereas it was aggressive, the initiator of the war.'⁷¹

In the second instance, when An's call to arms was declared to be part and parcel of his belief in the link between defence and economic development, Trotsky simply distorted the meaning of An's article. In actual fact, An' connected the Russian proletariat's support for Russia's war effort to the Russian bourgeoisie's linkage of its political demands with the defence of Russia in the war:

In any case the advocates of 'using' propagate victory, making converts among previous opponents, and this leads to the usual result - to the political and organisational inactivity of the proletariat which is not able to connect its political demands with the demands of the moment. Political leadership goes to the bourgeoisie whose awakening opens a new era in the Russian liberation movement. Only it is able to connect a necessary political renewal with the necessity to defend the country from foreign invasion and in this way discover a deep response from all sections of society. Even the proletariat begins to stir under the sound of the bourgeois alarm-bell and responds to its speeches.⁷²

If Trotsky had presented a more accurate reconstruction of An's views, he would of opened the more complex can of worms of the political and social stages of a move away from feudalism and the implications of this for one's political programme for war-torn backward Russia.

Vladimir Vol'skii presented the homeland as the only possible unit in which both culture and the workers' movement could develop. For him the slogan 'the proletariat has no homeland' meant that the proletariat should not, for example, organise itself for a seizure of power in the homeland; a proposition which 'has nothing in common with Marxism.'⁷³ According to Vol'skii the Stuttgart Conference of 1907 recognised the nation as the 'treasure house' of human progress, and that each nation had an inalienable right to defend itself from outside aggression. Trotsky chose not to review Vol'skii's thoughts on the homeland. Instead, he focussed upon the social-patriot's critique of a left-wing deputy who, in the Duma, had asked the following questions: 'What do you, supporters of self-defence, demand of the working class? Does it not tire itself out working in the factories, does it not carry all of the hardships of war and does it not die on the field of battle?'⁷⁴

Trotsky summarised Vol'skii's response thus: one also has to give one's intellectual and moral forces. This set-up Trotsky's critique of Vol'skii, a punch-line which rests upon a disbelief in the social-patriot's cheek: 'In other words, for us it is not enough that the proletariat gives its body to militarism - we also demand its spirit.'⁷⁵

However, in order to achieve this effect Trotsky had to distort Vol'skii's argument. The latter had not called upon the proletariat to apply its intellectual and moral force in the war effort because its physical sufferings were not enough. Vol'skii thought it was foolish to frame the question in this way to begin with. For him the left-wing deputy's questions were premised upon a view of the proletariat as cannon-fodder. In actual fact the proletariat is more than its body, it has a heart and brains which, in the then present war, were of crucial importance in organising the country's defence:

If there appears a force of four to five million fighters whose firm and long wall stretches from the Baltic to the Black Sea then the collective will and strength of the whole people is expressed in that force. If the millions of fighters quiver then this testifies to the weakness of the whole people.⁷⁶

Trotsky dealt with the next two authors, Evgeniy Maevskii and V. Levitskii, in one paragraph. Of these he said they were destined to write of 'general-national' tasks till their dying days. For Maevskii the First World War had placed before Russia the tasks of guaranteeing its independence and of democratising its political system. These tasks, according to Maevskii, could be fulfilled only by an alliance of democratic workers and the bourgeois opposition. However, at the then current moment the bourgeoisie and especially its leaders, Milyukov and Chelnokov, thought that it could act as a mighty force on its own. In so thinking, Maevskii argued that they were repeating the mistake of judgement committed by the advanced workers in 1905. Then, the workers had rejected the bourgeoisie as weak and viewed themselves as the only effective political force. And, of course, the 1905 Revolution had failed. The urgent task for Maevskii was the creation of an alliance between the workers and the bourgeois opposition. He described the bourgeoisie's current policy of keeping themselves cut off from the workers as 'the bourgeoisie in a blind alley.'⁷⁷ Trotsky

began his appraisal of Maevskii at this point in Maevskii's argument, labelling it as 'the freshest of his discoveries.'⁷⁸ Maevskii concluded that the proletariat should lead the bourgeoisie out of its blind alley; a conclusion which Trotsky ridiculed by inserting an exclamation mark in the following quote from Maevskii's article: 'Workers' democracy, and this is in its interest for (!) this is in the interests of the country's defence, should save the bourgeois opposition from this situation.'⁷⁹

Trotsky did not report Levitskii's view that only an alliance of the bourgeois opposition with the workers could save Russia in the war and reform its political system, nor did he retrace Levitskii's account of how the proletariat and the bourgeoisie had progressively organised themselves in the face of political, economic and military failures, and how these two as yet uncoordinated organisations would inevitably merge into one. He did, however, quote from Levitskii's final paragraph; making no comment other than informing the reader that the emphasis was not his:

Only a movement which has tasks of an **all-national** character, which embraces **different** classes in society, which undergoes a rise in citizenship to match the extent of the tasks can take Russia out of those external and internal difficulties in which it now finds itself. (author's emphasis)⁸⁰

In his contribution A. P. Bibik used the image of a Russian proletariat dressed in Hamlet's cloak to describe their condition as they resolved the question 'to be or not to be.' Bibik constructed an imaginary dialogue to illustrate how Hamlet's cloak was discarded as the decision to fight for Russia's victory in the war was reached. Trotsky exposed two aspects of Bibik's article to his humour and his doubts. First he recounted Bibik's assertion that once it was clear that German Social-Democracy had backed the Prussian Junkers, French and Belgium workers had resolved to meet the German army 'not carrying olive-branches in their hands.'⁸¹ Trotsky showed his scorn for Bibik's use of words by adding,

(As is well known the Prussian Junkers offer all Bibiks the choice of picking their clothes, white or 'defensive' and arming themselves according to taste, with olive-branches or with rifles).⁸²

Then, in response to Bibik's claim that workers' collectives had eventually closed ranks and concluded that, 'Russian workers also have a Homeland and this Homeland is in danger',⁸³ Trotsky asked, 'Who are these workers' collectives which gathered around a Homeland with capital letters?'⁸⁴ He said that Bibik had not expanded upon this point. However, Trotsky did inform the reader of the Organisational Committee's recent remarks on Bibik: 'Comrade Bibik is one of the leading workers of the Menshevik wing, and his conversion to 'defencism' cannot remain without an influence';⁸⁵ thus implying that it was more a case of Bibik trying to convince the workers to throw off Hamlet's cloak than workers discarding this piece of Shakespearian clothing of their own accord.

The twelfth and final essay in *Self-Defence* was V. L'vov-Rogachevskii's 'How it was then'.⁸⁶ Here L'vov-Rogachevskii compared the then current 'Homeland War' with its predecessor of 1812. For L'vov-Rogachevskii 1812 started a period of national rebirth and renewal which unfortunately did not last for long. However, he was convinced that the national awakening of which he was a witness would be more permanent and lead to the 'total Europeanisation and democratisation of Russia, for this is in the interests of the whole of democratic Europe'.⁸⁷ In his review Trotsky did not reconstruct L'vov-Rogachevskii's historical analogy. He simply quoted the social-patriot's call for each 'peaceful man' to 'Stand-up in the name of the country's saviour!'⁸⁸

Trotsky summed-up his review of *Self-Defence* with several thoughts, some of them intended to poke fun and some serious. He began with the former. He claimed that after reading the wealth of literary sources contained in *Self-Defence* - 'some foolish, some formal' - one could not help sensing 'a wave of condescension to the phraseology of the French social-patriots';⁸⁹ and he quoted from a speech made by Hevré to illustrate that 'political acoustics...do not take offence'.⁹⁰ On a more serious note Trotsky recalled Potresov's and L'vov-Rogachevskii's calls for sacrifices to be made for the defence of the homeland. He threw their belief of Russia's democratisation following a successful defence effort in the war into doubt by conjuring up the silhouette of a policeman informing the social-patriots: 'You are

honourable although a bit pushy, but don't shout in vain, we ourselves shall do the awakening!'⁹¹

Trotsky was to return to the themes contained in *Self-Defence* less than two weeks later, when he published an article under the heading 'Self-Defence. Training to be a Patriot?'⁹² He criticised Maslov and others for accepting the pro-war stance adopted by the socialist parties of Britain, France, Australia and Belgium as the correct socialist response to the then current events: 'When did we, the Russian Marxists, consider the politics of the British and Australian bourgeoisie to be a form of class independence? Did not Maslov himself repeat a dozen times the explanation of the ideological dependence of the British proletariat upon the oldest and mightiest bourgeoisie?'⁹³ However, the main target of Trotsky's attack was Potresov's assertion that 'internationalism is the further development of patriotism.'⁹⁴ For Trotsky, Potresov had in effect constructed a pattern of historical development from a stupid parochialism through patriotism to international socialism. And, wrote Trotsky, it would follow from Potresov's schema that Russian Social-Democracy had arrived too early, 'a historical abortion.' After all, Potresov himself had said that Russia was just entering the second 'patriotic' stage. In order to refute Potresov's understanding of the historical process Trotsky reformulated the social-patriot's stages as a production chain, 'from supply through manufacture to the factory.'⁹⁵ He argued that, viewed from this perspective, the peculiarity of Russia's development became clear, for

European factories began to conquer Russia sooner than Russia's 'natural' development had reached not only manufacture but also European supply. Following on from this Russia's industrial backwardness - in current conditions of world economic development - is expressed...in the extremely concentrated character of Russian industry.⁹⁶

Furthermore, Trotsky claimed that this peculiarity of economic development had political and social consequences. Specifically, the Russian worker was dragged out of his state of 'stupid parochialism' not through patriotism but by exploitation in the work place. Hence, the worker acquires class consciousness and not patriotism, and 'this

awakening of a sharpening of class antagonism on the very first step does not give him a further acquaintance with the homeland map painted in a patriotic colour.⁹⁷ For Trotsky, Potresov was merely repeating the slogans put forward at an earlier time by Peter Struve. However, he highlighted one important difference. Struve had attempted to win over the Marxist intelligentsia to the liberal opposition which was taking its first timid "'non-class" steps'; whereas 'Potresov issues his call in 1916, at a time of European war, to socialist workers to join the camp of the patriotic opposition which is led by imperialist capital.'⁹⁸ He pointed out that the Marxist intelligentsia had told Struve to 'get lost', and he recommended the revolutionary workers to give a similar response to Potresov.

Indeed, in an article published nine days later in *Nashe Slovo* Trotsky praised the Social-Democratic fraction in the Duma, on this occasion represented by Chkheidze, for exposing a social-patriotic approach as 'rubbish'. In Russia at that time Trotsky viewed the Duma as 'the only place from which one can clearly and unambiguously put the masses on guard against social-patriotic seduction, broadcast in a whole number of legal publications.'⁹⁹ The social-patriotic newspaper *Prizyv* also reported on Chkheidze's speech but in a way that did not please Trotsky. According to Trotsky, *Prizyv* had claimed that the Social-Democratic deputy had not supported Zimmerwald in his speech in the Duma.¹⁰⁰ Trotsky disputed this evaluation, pointing out that Chkheidze had both welcomed the call of 'struggle for peace' issued by the Zimmerwald Manifesto and placed the social-patriotic war slogans into the category of 'lies and hypocrisy'. On the other hand, he did criticise Chkheidze for not unfolding the Zimmerwald banner to its fullest extent, but nevertheless insisted that 'one cannot identify Chkheidze's moderate anti-militarism with *Prizyv's* social-militarism.'¹⁰¹ For Trotsky, the biggest flaw in Chkheidze's speech was the Duma representative's refusal to declare open hostility to the War-Industries Committees out of a concern for colleagues who were participating in the organs of 'self-defence'. He wrote that Chkheidze's stance on this issue seriously weakened the rebuff to social-patriotism.

However, in a continuation of this article published in the next issue of *Nashe Slovo* Trotsky noted a recent development which could only

help the demarcation of social-patriotism from revolutionary socialism. The social-patriotic deputies Bur'yakov and Man'kov, recently elected to the Duma and both social-patriotic 'turncoats', had attacked Chkheidze and had used quotations from Aleksinskii, Avksent'ev and other leading social-patriots in their attack. For Trotsky the Social-Democratic deputies should take up the challenge and make the appropriate response. The social-patriots were nothing but one link in a chain tying the proletariat to its class enemies:

Comrade deputies!...You would be able to ignore Bur'yakov but behind his back stands Gvozdev and behind Gvozdev's back stands Potresov and Plekhanov and behind their backs the imperialist bourgeoisie. You should openly declare to the Russian proletariat that social-patriotism is the deadly enemy of its historical mission. You should advance slogans not only flowing directly out of Zimmerwald but also [slogans] clearly formulated at the last Zimmerwald meeting: 'Abandon the War-Industries Committees!' You should throw to one side all those connections which hamper you to openly oppose Zimmerwald to Gvozdevism. This is the only way to break the disbelief accumulating in the advanced workers to you...This is the only path in Russia to concentrate the proletarian struggle under the banner of the Third International!¹⁰²

Trotsky issued the above call on 1 April 1916. His tone became even more urgent in an article published just nineteen days later. On a positive note, he claimed that the Social-Democratic fraction in the Duma had not fallen prey to the sins of social-patriotism, i.e., Chkheidze and his followers did not think that the best way to achieve a transformation of Russian society was to accept the war and push for a national revolution through criticism of the government's conduct of the war. However, Trotsky then distinguished two tactics which could be adopted by socialists after they had rejected social-patriotism: first, a 'revolutionary mobilisation of the proletariat against the war, entailing a complete break of all relations with the Progressive Bloc'; and, second, a 'passive wait-and-see' policy, 'not moving in a social-patriotic direction but not finding in itself, in Liebknecht expression, "the desire or the courage to give revolutionary slogans to the proletariat"'.¹⁰³ And,

for Trotsky, the problem with the Duma fraction was that it moved 'between the two alternatives with a clear tendency towards passive internationalism.' It was a lack of a clear conception of international-revolutionary perspectives, of the dependence of the Russian proletariat's struggle against bourgeois imperialism upon the correlation of class forces across the whole of Europe which, wrote Trotsky, explained the 'politically vague speeches of our fraction and the passive wait-and-see character of its internationalism.' Given the emphasis that Trotsky had placed upon the Duma fraction as the main disseminators of revolutionary socialism among the Russian proletariat, his concluding words of advice were quite in place: the Social-Democrats in the Duma had to break all ties with the social-patriots, otherwise they faced placing themselves into a 'totally hopeless situation.'

When, however, Trotsky next took up his pen to write of Chkheidze he was not able to say that his advice had been followed. In 'Deputy Chkheidze's Tour' Trotsky reported how the Social-Democratic deputy, on a trip to Georgia and sharing a platform with a priest and a colonel, had advised the local population to form self-help groups and cooperatives to fight rising prices in the countryside. The meeting then unanimously passed a resolution calling the local population to order. Trotsky said that there was nothing objectionable in Chkheidze's advice to increase self-activity and not to seek solutions to the economic crisis in episodic acts of violence and the raiding of shops. However, he also pointed out that the dreaded government minister Khvostov had recommended similar measures. Hence, Chkheidze had merely repeated official slogans and this was not the responsibility of a Social-Democratic orator! For Trotsky, Chkheidze should have explained to the people that one could not solve the disorganisation caused by the war by seeking refuge in cooperatives; one had to revolt against the basic cause of high prices and those responsible for creating this situation. An opportunity to put the slogans of Zimmerwald into the minds of the people had been lost. At this point Trotsky posed the question of whether Chkheidze had spoken along these lines but the bourgeois press, from which he had taken his information, had falsified the Social-Democrat's arguments. Unfortunately, claimed

Trotsky, several facts undermined such an interpretation. To begin with, Chkheidze had spoken alongside a priest and a colonel; this would not have been possible if he had polemicised against the war. Second, after a revolutionary-socialist speech the crowd would hardly have approved a resolution calling the people to order. Finally, Chkheidze would not have been allowed to make further appeals in places suffering from high prices if he had really acted as a revolutionary socialist. No, said Trotsky, Chkheidze had played the role of a kind-hearted liberal, attempting to calm a situation before the governor calmed it by other means. Once Chkheidze had welcomed Karl Liebknecht's parliamentary opposition to the war. But, Trotsky pointed out, Liebknecht had not recommended cooperatives to the people but the slogans 'Down with the War' and 'Down with the Government', for which he had been sentenced to terms of imprisonment. Trotsky said that not everyone was obliged to equal Liebknecht's decisiveness and bravery. However, he concluded that 'those with Liebknecht's and Zimmerwald's banner are not able to compromise this banner with impunity.'¹⁰⁴

Thus, in what was to be his last article on the battle between social-patriotism and revolutionary-socialism in the Russian workers' movement while in Paris Trotsky could not have been in good spirits. At the same time as he was writing of the disgrace of social-patriotism in Paris through Aleksinskii's antics, he was forced to report of Chkheidze's increasing espousal of a social-patriotic platform. Social-patriotic practice in Russia was obviously proving to be made of sterner stuff than its ideological counterparts in the French capital.

7.5 Conclusion

The findings of this chapter can be summarised as follows. In his writings on Russia in his Paris writings during World War One, Trotsky noted a chain, from social-patriotism through liberalism to the government, which tied the proletariat to the war aims of the government and thus strengthening the latter. He considered the liberal strategy of democratic reforms following military success to be mistaken. Contrary to liberal expectations, advances made by Russian

soldiers had brought a shift to the right in politics. Indeed, Trotsky's articles on the government attempted to show how the monarchists were increasing their influence in the running of the country, although to the detriment of efficiency and coherence of policy. Furthermore, for Trotsky the liberals were not serious contenders for power. In actual fact the liberals wanted a more efficient authoritarian political system which would answer the needs of capitalist development in Russia, i.e., the Prussification of the state order. Faced with a revolutionary situation the liberals would back the old régime.

Given that he thought that the proletariat was the only class which could transform Russia's political system and given that he dismissed liberalism in the Russian context as an ideological prop of the monarchy, Trotsky was most concerned that the social-patriots, who accepted the liberals tactics and called for a worker-liberal alliance, should be opposed in their attempts to win support among the workers. This concern explains his attempts to establish the social-patriotic-liberal-government chain so that it should be clear to all, and to criticise the outpourings of the social-patriots to alert the workers.

However, by the time of his expulsion from Paris his urgent calls to Chkheidze to adopt a firmer stance against the social-patriots had not been heeded. On the contrary, it looked as though Chkheidze, who as leader of the Social-Democratic fraction in the Duma headed the most important medium for the dissemination of revolutionary propaganda among the workers, was moving towards social -patriotism.

By the autumn of 1916 the following picture of Russian domestic politics, constructed from Trotsky's journalism, emerges: a government in disarray, a bankrupt though vociferous liberalism and leading Social-Democrats taking up social-patriotism. It was not a scenario that Trotsky himself would have wished for.

In the next chapter we shall establish whether Trotsky discovered more promising developments in the European workers' movement.

Notes

1. Dmitrii Volkogonov, *Trotskii. Politicheskii portret*, Vol. 1, Moscow, 1992, p 96.
2. For an exposition and explanation of the various turns in Milyukov's approach to foreign policy from 1913 to the immediate outbreak of war see T. Riha, *A Russian European: Paul Miliukov in Russian Politics*, Notre Dame 1969, pp 205-218.
3. For an account of why the liberals issued a patriotic response to the war see R. Pearson, *The Russian Moderates and the Crisis of Tsarism 1914-17*, London, 1977, pp 16-19.
4. N. Trotskii, 'Gregus' po demokraticeskomu spisku', *Golos*, No. 76, 10 December 1914, pp 1-2.
5. Ibid., p 1.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid., p 2.
8. -: 'Politika "tyla"', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 145, 22 July 1915, p 1.
9. Ibid.
10. -: 'Konvent' rasteryannosti i bessiliya', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 167, 18 August 1915, p 1.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid.
13. -: 'Sobytiya idut' svoim' cheredom'', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 10, 13 January 1916, p 1.
14. The declaration of the Progressive Bloc was as follows: 'The undersigned are representatives of fractions and groups of the State Duma and the State Council. We believe that only a powerful, stable and active government can lead the homeland to victory. Such a government can only be one which depends upon the trust of the people and which is able to organise the active cooperation of all citizens. We have unanimously concluded that this important and urgent task of the formation of such a government cannot be realised without fulfilling the following conditions:

1. The formation of a united government from figures who have the trust of the people and who agree with the lawful institutions to fulfil a certain programme in the coming period.
2. The decisive change of the mode of management based upon mistrust of society's self-activity used until today. In particular:
 - a. Management to be based in law.
 - b. The removal of dual-power military and civil governments in matters not having a direct relation to the conduct of military operations.
 - c. The renewal of the composition of local administration.
 - d. A rational and thorough policy directed towards the preservation of internal peace and the elimination of conflict between nationalities and between classes. For the realisation of such a policy the following measures should be taken both in management and in law:
 1. on the path to an enlightened monarch the ending of legal proceedings for purely political and religious crimes which should not be a criminal offence; the liberation from punishment and the restoration of rights, including the right to participate in elections to the state Duma, in country and town institutions and so on, for people imprisoned for these crimes; the mitigation of the sentence of those remaining condemned for political and religious crimes excluding spies and traitors;
 2. The return of those exiled for causes of a political and religious nature;
 3. The complete and absolute ending of persecution on whatever grounds for belief. The abolition of the circulars, put in a limited and distorted sense in the decree of 17 April 1905;
 4. The resolution of the Russo-Polish question, in particular: the abolition of the restriction placed upon Poles to live anywhere in Russia; the urgent elaboration and passing into law of autonomy for tsarist Poland; the reexamination of the laws on Polish landownership;
 5. A start to be made on the abolition of limitations placed upon the Jews in law, in particular, the abolition of the settlements, the easing of entrance into educational institutions, the abolition

of restrictions to election into professions, and the restoration of the Jewish press;

6. A conciliatory policy on the Finnish question, in particular personal changes in the administration and the senate and the ending of persecution of officials;

7. The restoration of the little Russian press, the urgent examination of the matter of the Galician residents held under guard and exiled. The liberation of those subject to persecution when innocent;

8. The restoration of professional unions and the ending of persecution of workers' representatives held under suspicion of membership of illegal parties; the restoration of the workers' press;

9. The agreement of the government with lawful institutions to the urgent completion of:

a: all laws having a close relation to national defence, supplying the army, security for the wounded, arranging participation for refugees and of other matters directly related to the war;

b: the following programme of laws directed to organising the country for victory and supporting civil harmony: the peasants to have equal rights with other estates, the introduction of district councils, changing the town law of 1890, the introduction of council institutions in the outskirts, in Siberia, in Archangel, the Don region, the Caucuses and so on, laws on cooperatives, laws on holidays for trade workers, improvement of conditions for post-telegraph workers, guarantee of rights for land and town congresses and unions, a law on inspections, the introduction of civil courts in those districts where their introduction was halted for financial reasons, the passing of a law in which the carrying-out of the above-mentioned programme is guaranteed.

This programme is signed by: from the Progressive Group of Nationalists - Sir V. Bobrinskii, from the Centre fraction - V. L'vov, from Land-Octobrists - I. Dmitryukov, from the group Union of 17 October - S. Shidlovskii, from the Progressive fraction - I. Efremov, from the fraction People's Freedom, P.

Milyukov, from the group of members of the State Council, V. Meller-Zakomel'skii, D. Grimm. (Translated from L. Trotskii, *Sochineniya*, Vol. 9, Moscow, 1927, pp 383-385). For an analysis of the events leading to the formation of the Progressive Bloc and of its ultimate failure see Pearson, *The Russian Moderates*, pp 39-64.

15. -:, 'Sobytiya idut'...
16. Ibid.
17. For an account of Milyukov's activities during his visit to Russia's allies see Riha, *A Russian European*, pp 250-254 & Pearson, *The Russian Moderates*, pp 92-93.
18. -:, 'So slavyanskim' aktsentom' i ulybkoi na slavynskikh' gubakh", *Nashe Slovo*, No. 121, 24 May 1916, p 1.
19. Ibid.
20. -:, 'Razochovaniya i bespokoistva', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 143, 21 June 1916, p 1.
21. -:, 'Uroki poslednei dumskoi sessii', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 161, 12 July 1916, p 1.
22. Ibid. For an account of peasant and Jewish dissatisfaction with the politics of the Progressive Bloc at this time see Pearson, *The Russian Moderates*, pp 94-96.
23. N. T., 'Vpechatleniya i obobshcheniya g. Milyukova. 1. Pobeda i svoboda', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 193, 23 August 1916, p 1 & N. T., 'Vpechatleniya i obobshcheniya g. Milyukova. 2. Tsimmerval'dtsy i longetisty', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 194, 24 August 1916, p 1.
24. N. T., 'Vpechatleniya i obobshcheniya g. Milyukova. 1. Pobeda i svoboda'. Trotsky is referring to the following statement made by Milyukov during a debate in the Duma on 4 March 1916: 'I cannot be sure that the government will lead us to defeat. We are afraid of it and wish to prevent it. But I know that a revolution in Russia will, without fail, lead us to defeat, and no wonder our enemy so desires it. Were I told that organising Russia for victory meant organising it for revolution I would say: better leave her, for the duration of the war, as she was, unorganised.' (cited in Riha, *A Russian European*, p 248).

25. N. T., 'Vpechatleniya i obobshcheniya g. Milyukova. 2. Tsimmerval'dtsy i longetisty'
26. Ibid.
27. -:, "'Bor'ba za vlast'". Progressivno-kadetskaya Moskva i ministerstvo Shtyumera', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 197, 27 August 1916, p 1.
28. See, for example, L. Trotskii, *Voina i Revolyutsiya*, Petrograd, 1922, p 76.
29. -:, 'Va-bank', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 77, 29 April 1915, p 1.
30. Al'fa., 'Pervyi shag' sdelan', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 122, 24 June 1915, p 2.
31. Ibid.
32. For the details of this crisis and the events leading to Khvostov's appointment see, R. Pipes, *The Russian Revolution, 1899-1919*, London, 1990, pp 223-228.
33. -:, 'Khvostov!', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 227, 29 October 1915, p 1. For a further unflattering account of Khvostov see -:, 'Svoim' poryadkom', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 232, 5 November 1915, p 1. In articles of April and May 1916 Trotsky claimed that the fantastical nature of Russia's domestic affairs reached new heights under Khvostov, to the extent that only a combination of Shchedrin, Poe and Poprishchin could adequately describe Khvostov's rule. See, -:, 'Otechestvennoe...', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 89, 14 April 1916, p 1 & Al'fa, 'Fantastika. Pervomaitskiy razmyshleniya', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 102, 1 May 1916, pp 2-3.
34. -:, 'Ravnenie po Makarovu', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 172, 27 July 1916, p 1.
35. -:, 'Dve telegrammy', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 173, 28 July 1916, p 1.
36. En', 'Rodnyya teni', *Nachalo*, No. 1, 30 September 1916, p 1.
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid.
39. -:, 'Iz'yan' v' tverdom' kurse', *Nachalo*, No. 11, 12 October 1916, p 1.
40. -:, 'Voennaya krizis' i politicheskiya perspektivy. III. Sotsial'nyia sily rossiiskoi revolyutsii', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 181, 3 September 1915, p 1.

41. -:, 'Voennaya krizis' i politicheskiya perspektivy. IV. Natsional'nyi ili internatsional'nyi kurs?', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 182, 4 September 1915, p 1.
42. For an excellent account of the events leading to the formation of the War-Industries Committees see, Robert B. McKean, *St. Petersburg Between the Revolutions*, New Haven, 1990, pp 430ff. For an exposition of the events surrounding the elections among the workers to the War-Industries Committees see *Ibid.*, pp 380 ff.
43. -:, 'Petrogradskii proletariat', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 229, 31 October 1915, p 1.
44. -:, 'Nuzhno sdelat' vse vyvody', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 237, 11 November 1915, p 1.
45. *Ibid.*
46. *Ibid.*
47. -:, 'Politicheskie shtreikbrekhery. Novye "vybory" v' voenno-promyshlennyy komitet', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 277, 29 December 1915, p 1. Trotsky may not have received a full and accurate version of what happened at the meeting of electors. His account is similar, but differs in important respects to that given by Robert B. McKean. He informs us that at the first meeting of electors, held on 27 September 1915, the Bolsheviks 'smuggled in two of their leaders, Bogdatian-Bogdat'ev and Zalezhsii, using the mandates of two Putilov delegates without their permission.' (McKean, *St. Petersburg...*, p 383). When Gvozdev discovered the Bolshevik's foul play he petitioned the Central War-Industries Committee to arrange a second electoral meeting, which took place on 29 November. However, the Bolsheviks decided to attend the meeting only to denounce it and then walk out. This they duly did and the 109 left behind 'proceeded to elect ten representatives to the TsVKP (all were Mensheviks) and six to the Petrograd War-Industries Committee (three Mensheviks and three SRs).' (McKean, *Ibid.*, p 384).
48. N. T., 'Sbornik' "Samozashchita", *Nashe Slovo*, No. 13, 16 January 1916, p 2.
49. N. Trotskii, "Samozashchita". I. "bude nuzhno", *Nashe Slovo*, No.

- 58, 9 March, 1916, pp 1-2.
50. *Samozashchita. Marksistskii sbornik'*, Petrograd, 1916, p 57.
51. *Samozashchita...*, 'Predislovie'. Cited in Trotsky, "'Samozashchita'. I...", p 1.
52. Trotsky, "'Samozashchita'. I...", p 1.
53. V. I. Zasulich', 'O voine', *Samozashchita...*, pp 1-4.
54. Trotsky, Op. cit.
55. Zasulich, 'O voine', p 1.
56. A. N. Potresov', 'O patriotizm' i o mezhduranodnosti', *Samozashchita...*, p 21. Cited in Trotsky, "'Samozashchita'. I...", p 2.
57. Potresov, 'O patriotizm' i o mezhduranodnosti', pp 6-7.
58. Ibid, pp 11-13.
59. I. Kubikov', 'Rabochii klass' i natsional'noe chuvstvo', *Samozashchita...*, pp 22-28.
60. P. Maslov', 'Ekonomicheskoe znachenie voyny dlya Rossii', *Samozashchita...*, p 32.
61. Ibid, p 34.
62. Trotsky, "'Samozashchita'. I...", p 2.
63. Maslov', 'Ekonomicheskoe znachenie..', p 35.
64. K. Dmitriev', 'Narodnoe khozyaistvo v' nachale vtorogo goda voyny', *Samozashchita...*, pp 42-56.
65. Ibid., p 52.
66. Ibid., p 43.
67. Ibid., p 56. Cited in Trotsky, "'Samozashchita'. I...", p 2.
68. Trotsky, "'Samozashchita'. I...", p 2. For the original text see An', 'Marksizm' i radikalizm'', *Samozashchita...*, p 77.
69. Ibid.
70. An', 'Marksizm i radikalizm'', p 74.
71. Ibid., p 77.
72. Ibid.
73. V. Vol'skii, 'Zametki po povodu voyny', *Samozashchita...*, p 83.
74. Trotsky, "'Samozashchita'. I...", p 2. First cited in Vol'skii, 'Zametki po povodu...', p 88.
75. Ibid.
76. Vol'skii, 'Zametki po povodu...', p 89.
77. E. Maevskii, 'Tsenzovaya Rossiya i demokratiya', *Samozashchita...*,

- p 107.
78. Trotskii, Op. cit.
 79. Ibid. For the original text see Maevskii, 'Tsenzovaya Rossiya...', p 107.
 80. Ibid. For the original text see, V. Levitskii, 'Organizatsiya obshchestvennykh' sil' i zashchita strany', *Samozashchita...*, p 120.
 81. A. P. Bibik', 'V' plashche Gamleta', *Samozashchita...*, p 121.
 82. Trotskii, Op. cit.
 83. Bibik', 'V' plashche Gamleta', p 126.
 84. Trotskii, Op. cit.
 85. Ibid.
 86. V. L'vov-Rogachevskii, 'Kak' bylo togda', *Samozashchita...*, pp 128-141.
 87. Ibid., p 140.
 88. Trotskii, "'Samozashchita'. I...', p 2. For the original text see L'vov-Rogachevskii, 'Kak' bylo togda', p 141.
 89. Ibid.
 90. Loc. cit.
 91. Loc. cit.
 92. N. Trotskii, "'Samozashchita'. II. Na vyuchku k' patriotizmu?', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 69, 22 March 1916, p 1.
 93. Ibid.
 94. See fn 58.
 95. Trotskii, Op. cit.
 96. Ibid.
 97. Ibid.
 98. Ibid.
 99. -:, 'Nasha dumskaya fraktsiya I', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 77, 31 March 1916, p 1.
 100. Trotsky did not give an accurate account of *Prizyv's* view of Chkheidze. Thus in his analysis N. N-ev' quoted Chkheidze as saying that he would support the Progressive Bloc when it opposed the government and expose it when it concluded agreements with the government. N. N-ev' urged Chkheidze to abandon this position and throw his total support behind the

Progressive Bloc. After all, N. N-ev' pointed out, the Progressive Bloc had declared that it would have no further dealings with the old régime. (N. N-ev', 'K poslednei cherty', *Prizyv*, No. 26, 25 March 1916, pp 1-2.) In the next issue of *Prizyv* A. Lyubimov' criticised Chkheidze's position thus: 'It is clear that Chkheidze does not deny national tasks, that he does not believe in permanent or in social revolution for Russia and yet he does not recognise defence as one of the national tasks, and it is in this that the root of all his confusion and all his contradictions lie.' (A. Lyubimov', 'Burzhnaznaya oppozitsiya i tsimmervald'skie putaniki', *Prizyv*, No. 27, 1 April 1916, p 2.)

101. -:, Op. cit.
102. -:, 'Nasha dumskaya fraktsiya II', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 78, 1 April 1916, p 1.
103. -:, 'Nasha dumskaya fraktsiya. I. Revolyutsionnaya i passivno-vyzhidatel'naya politika', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 94, 20 April 1916, p 1.
104. -:, 'Poezdka deputata Chkheidze', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 203, 3 September 1916, p 2. See also, -:, 'K' poezdke deputata Chkheidze', *Nachalo*, No. 29, 3 November 1916, p 1.

CHAPTER EIGHT

Trotsky and European Social-Democracy

8.1 Trotsky and German Social-Democracy

In his writings on German Social-Democracy Trotsky discerned the same split between social-imperialists, passive centrists and revolutionary internationalists which characterised the Russian workers' movement. The German Social-Democratic Party's vote for the war credits crushed many socialists' hopes that unity among the parties of the Second International would put a rapid halt to imperialist hostilities. Trotsky thought that the Second International lay in ruins, and he looked for signs of international solidarity, i.e., a Marxist analysis of the then current events shared by socialists of all nationalities. If such unity was extant this would provide not only a basis for the rebirth of the International on new and firmer foundations, but also hope and inspiration for revolutionary activists of the Trotsky mould. It is not surprising, therefore, to find Trotsky again and again emphasising the activities and growing influence of the revolutionary left in Germany.

The title of one of Trotsky's first articles on German Social-Democracy, 'There are still Social-Democrats in the World', was taken from a lead article in the February 1915 issue of *Lichtstrahlen*. The fact that Trotsky borrowed from the radical German publication in this way is not accidental; it was the overriding concern of those wishing to overcome the recent socialist 'disgrace'. The bulk of this article was composed of extracts from a *Lichtstrahlen* editorial, in which German comrades praised the Russian socialists for their stance on the London Conference: that socialists should not group themselves according to the divisions among the warring nations but, on the contrary, should reveal the true imperialist nature of the then World War. After citing *Lichtstrahlen's* pleasure that there were still some socialists who knew their true duty, Trotsky returned the compliment:

Never before...have the activities of socialists in one country depended to such a degree upon socialist politics in other countries as now. The growth of feelings of international solidarity

and the struggle for peace can develop only parallelly in all countries sucked into this bloody whirlpool...the Russian revolutionary Social-Democrats give the support of their policy not to German imperialism....but to its deadly enemy, in the form of the internationalist wing of German Social-Democracy. In turn, the struggle of the latter is for us a vital support in our struggle against 'Entente' reaction.¹

A review of the first issue of Rosa Luxemburg's and Franz Mehring's journal *Internationale* provided an opportunity for a further commentary upon the battle between social-nationalism and internationalism in the German workers' movement. Trotsky reported Luxemburg's critique of Kautsky's passive waiting for an end to the war, as well as her response to the idea that the International engages in class struggle during peace and defends the nation when it is at war, i.e., class struggle is the proletariat's response to economic and political oppression by the bourgeoisie and that this oppression increases during wars. After all, reasoned Luxemburg, how else was one to interpret the war dictatorship? Was not the socialist duty to oppose oppression? Furthermore, it was a mistake to think that one could easily switch from the tactics of class struggle to class reconciliation without harming the movement: 'either the International remains a heap of ruins also after the war or its restoration begins on the soil of class struggle,' and the first step in the direction of the latter, for Trotsky and for Luxemburg, was 'a struggle for a quick end to the war'; i.e., international socialist agitation *during* the war. In the course of 1915 the annexation question became central in German politics. German war successes increasingly placed the possibility of a 'German peace' on the order of the day. However, the German Social-Democratic fraction's support of the war effort was based upon the notion that Germany was conducting a defensive war, and it restated its anti-annexationist stance in the Reichstag. For Trotsky this was not enough and he approvingly reported Rosa Luxemburg's critique that one had to abandon social-imperialism altogether. From Clara Zetkin's contribution Trotsky reproduced the author's call for a struggle for peace with, in spite of or even against the German party's leadership. Finally, he recounted Franz Mehring's view that the pro-war stance

adopted by the German SPD leadership, despite their attempts to underpin this policy with quotes from Marx and Engels, was the logical consequence of their abandonment of the tenets of scientific socialism in the pre-war era. The review ended by underlining the central message: 'Against this self-deception, against this sad, cowardly and fraudulent method of scientific socialism for aims which are its deadly enemies Franz Mehring calls for a merciless struggle under the banner of Marxism. One has to clearly show that we and they are of a *different spirit* !'²

In the pre-war years and beyond Karl Kautsky was one of the leading theoreticians in the German Social-Democratic movement. Although not a member of the Reichstag, he had been invited to the meeting of deputies of August 13 1914 at which tactics for the following day's vote on the war credits were discussed.³ *Golos'* readers had a chance to acquaint themselves with Kautsky's views on the war from the publication of his article 'Prospects of Peace', which appeared over two issues of the Paris newspaper in early October 1914. Here Kautsky asked what would constitute a good and lasting peace? He based his answer, independence of nation states and an increase of democracy, upon a particular view of the relationship between production, politics and the nation. From one direction, 'the more citizens are connected by one language, the more intensive economic, political and spiritual life develops'; from another, the 'participation of the lower classes in spiritual and political life grows as a result of contemporary production.' According to Kautsky, these processes led to the strengthening of each nationality and this was why they could develop peacefully only within the boundaries of a distinct nation state:

In the nation state both these tendencies unite and strengthen each other. In a state of nationalities they oppose each other hostilely, inter-ethnic conflict inside the state grows and this reacts unfavourably upon economic and political processes...Hence it would be harmful if in the present war nation states used victory to attach other states to themselves and in this way turn themselves into a state of nationalities.⁴

He looked forward to Poland, the Baltic region and Finland gaining their independence from Russia's defeat as examples of developments

that would correspond to the requirements of democracy and progress. The German Social-Democrat was also optimistic about the post-war world order. He envisioned a scenario in which the causes of the First World War would be removed. For Kautsky, the war had issued from an arms race which had transformed Europe into two hostile camps. Disarmament at the conclusion of the war could result from a staged process: first, the defeated countries would be disarmed by the victors, then the former would benefit economically from disarmament, in turn the latter would lose the desire to rearm as they were faced with the evidence of economic advantages to be derived from disarmament, coupled with an absence of military threat from the economically successful disarmed states. In this way Social-Democracy in the victor countries would be given a 'solid basis for a successful struggle for disarmament'. Kautsky foresaw opposition to disarmament coming from the war-industrial bourgeoisie only but he predicted that even they, swamped with orders for the reconstruction of a ravaged infrastructure, would not be so concerned. However, Kautsky was clear that Social-Democracy would have to wait for the war to end before it could discover how it could best act to secure a desirable peace. He was, though, still optimistic: 'Under the pressure of war we can achieve that which previously seemed unattainable...even the mightiest states have to consider public opinion. In peace discussions the ruling classes often disagree over the terms. This opens a space for the consideration of public opinion in places where previously this was thought impossible.'⁵

It was not until June 1915 that Trotsky commented upon Kautsky's war-time position. He wrote a lengthy review, issued over three numbers of *Nashe Slovo*, of the German socialist's thoughts, written at the request of Bulgarian Social-Democrats and published in the Bulgarian *Novoe Vremya*, upon Plekhanov's brochure *On the War*. At the outset Trotsky adopted a somewhat favourable tone, noting that Kautsky had given a healthy corrective to Plekhanov's statement that the German Social-Democrats had believed in the notion of proletarian action to prevent a war in the pre-war era. On the contrary, 'The German Marxists, and above all Bebel, at all national and international congresses where this issue was raised most decisively rejected the

idea of a general strike in response to a government's call for mobilisation as utopian.⁶ But the Russian and the German Marxists soon parted company. Trotsky stated that Kautsky's defence of Haase's reading of the declaration of 4 August in favour of war credits as that of the fraction and not of Haase himself had been demolished by Haase's recent refusal to read the latest patriotic declaration of the Social-Democratic Reichstag fraction. In the light of this Trotsky claimed that Haase's earlier behaviour was explicable only by 'a shortage of bravery or a shortage of acumen. Kautsky's defence is little able to help Haase, it only reveals through a particular issue the total formlessness and internal contradictions of that position which Kautsky himself occupies.'⁷ The first instalment concluded with a critique of Kautsky's contention that *Vorwärts* changed from an anti-war to a pro-war stance because of the demands placed upon it by the censorship. While he did not offer his own explanation for *Vorwärts's* about turn, Trotsky said that one could not blame the censor: 'If the military situation can hinder the press from telling the workers the whole truth then, as we know from our own personal experience, it is not able to force lies. When the military situation demands such a 'sacrifice', a socialist newspaper should have the bravery to sacrifice itself.'⁸ Since the fatal days of August 1914, however, Trotsky reported that both Haase and *Vorwärts* had moved to the left. Against this background, Kautsky's defence of outdated 1914 behaviour could only belittle this shift and confuse the international proletariat.

The second part of the trilogy of articles on 'Kautsky on Plekhanov' focused upon the German socialist's analysis of the war. From Trotsky's report the reader learned that Kautsky rejected the belief that social-patriots of all nationalities shared, namely that the victory of their homeland was in the best interests of international socialism. For Kautsky, all of the warring countries had equivalent economic and moral forces; a situation which entailed two particular consequences: first, one had no reason to suppose that the victory of any one country taken separately would be most advantageous and, second, the proletariat was deprived of any criteria for singling out its national government for defeat. Indeed, it was the strength of feeling for the homeland among the proletariat that had forced Social-Democratic

parties across Europe to support their governments' war programmes. However, since the correlation of forces was such that no nation could expect to emerge victorious, Kautsky declared that a speedy peace should be concluded on social-democratic principles, i.e., on the basis of agreement and not force. Kautsky expressed the hope that Plekhanov would join him in his call for peace.

Trotsky began his final instalment with the claim that Kautsky's theoretical position was not as sad as Plekhanov's but the latter's political position was clearer. He then belittled Kautsky for his lack of critical acumen. For example, Trotsky contended that one could not explain the behaviour of the Social-Democratic parties at the outset of the war with reference to the sudden nationalist mood of the masses; rather one had to examine the policy of possibilism within national boundaries 'which characterised the whole class movement of the proletariat in the preceding epoch.' He admitted that, of course, one had to consider the mood of the masses but nevertheless insisted that Social-Democrats should not capitulate before the workers: 'if it does not have sufficient strength to prevent mutual destruction, this does not mean that it has the right to sanction it.' The urgency of this last point was becoming more and more apparent for Trotsky since, as even Kautsky himself had recognised, the proletariat was increasingly aware of the fact that the war was hopeless from a military point of view. As each worker realised this Trotsky predicted that he would turn his anger on those responsible for the war. He argued that, in turn, Social-Democracy would be able to use this anger only to the extent that it had an independent revolutionary policy. This led to what, for Trotsky, was surely Kautsky's greatest crime: the German socialist acknowledged that the ruling classes were becoming more and more isolated but he refused to advocate proletarian action until after the war was over. For the impatient Trotsky this was not good enough:

The preservation of civil peace or a decisive break with the raving bourgeois 'nation'?...Here is the question which as before Kautsky does not answer in his article on Plekhanov...we want to struggle during the war so as not to appear bankrupt after the war...in a situation unique for its drama, when the whole future of

socialism is at stake, Kautsky does not give one piece of advice or one statement which we could meet with pleasure.⁹

By the end of 1914 Liebknecht decided to break party unity in the Reichstag and vote against the second war credits bill of 3 December. He subsequently explained his action by a desire to provide a rallying-point for anti-war forces in Germany. In May 1915 the 'Left Opposition' issued its own manifesto, under the title 'The chief enemy is in one's own country', a copy of which was reprinted in *Nashe Slovo*. This document commented upon Italy's recent entry into the war, decrying the attempts of the German regime to depict Italy as a betrayer. Had not the German government received ample evidence of Italy's displeasure of Austria's ultimatum to Serbia? Was it not Austria's ultimatum which had brought antagonism between Austro-Germany and Italy over supremacy in the Balkans to a head? The manifesto claimed that in the war-hysteria manoeuvres of the Italian imperialists, the German and Austrian regimes were merely observing the mirror image of their own recent behaviour. For the German Left Opposition, it was the imperialists of each country who had responsibility for the then bloody war and it was against these people that the international proletariat should struggle. Italian socialists who were campaigning against their country's involvement in the war were applauded for their bravery and for setting the appropriate example:

An international class struggle of the proletariat against international imperialist destruction - such now is the socialist precept at this crucial hour. The chief enemy of each people is in their own country...Unite for international class struggle against the deals of secret diplomacy, against imperialism, against the war, for peace in a socialist spirit! The chief enemy is in one's own country!¹⁰

In the middle of 'The chief enemy is in one's own country' the following claim was made of German war aims:

In March of this year the path to peace could have been laid. Britain extended its hand - but a desire for gain forced the German imperialists to turn it down. Hopes of attempts to conclude peace were totally dashed by German imperialists interested in making colonial acquisitions on a large scale, in

annexing Belgium and French Lorraine, by the capitalists of large sea-fairing companies and by the businessmen of German heavy industry.¹¹

In the context of German politics of the First World War this statement had the makings of a political scandal. After all, on August 4 1914 Haase, speaking on behalf of the Social-Democratic deputies in the Reichstag, declared: 'We need to secure the culture and the independence of our country...As soon as the purpose of security is fulfilled and the enemy inclined to peace, the war shall be brought to an end by a peace which will make possible the amity of neighbouring peoples...Guided by these principles we agree to the proposed loan.'¹² If the German radicals were correct in their accusations, then at minimum the party leadership would have to abandon any pretence of Germany's 'defensive' war; an admission that could prove decisive in the current battle for control of the party. In the article 'The German Opposition and the German Diplomacy' Trotsky reported on the political fallout of this aspect of the German radicals' case. The official newspaper *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* denied that the German government had rejected peace negotiations out of a desire to make new conquests, claiming to the contrary that there was no wish for peace in Paris or in London. A letter had then been published in *Berner Tagwacht* of 17 June in which its author outlined no less than three separate sets of secret peace negotiations, each of which had foundered because of the German government's insistence that it make territorial gains. Trotsky cited an article from *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* of 24 April which claimed that it would be folly for Germany to abandon its advantageous military position in order to conclude an inappropriate peace, and he also highlighted Bethmann-Hollweg's assertion of May 1915 that Germany's Eastern borders should be extended and that Belgium should join a German customs union. It was Trotsky's hope that if the governments of the warring nations could be shown to have aggressive war aims, if 'defencist' propaganda which formed the basis of 'civil peace' between socialist parties and their national governments could be proved false, then internationalist opposition to the war in socialist parties and among the proletariat would grow. Hence his statement that,

Such are the revelations (*razoblacheniya*) which issue from the circles of the German S-D opposition which conducts an irreconcilable struggle with its government. We do not have sufficient information to decide whether the claims made here about secret diplomatic steps are in fact true. But as material for an orientation, the information they convey is very instructive.¹³

Hot on the heels of the declaration of the left, the 'centre' of German Social-Democracy issued its own response to the 'annexationist' question in a document entitled 'The Demand of the Hour'. Signed by Bernstein, Haase and Kautsky the manifesto made clear the centre's dissatisfaction with the recent annexationist demands of Bethmann-Hollweg. It stated its continuing support for the statement of 4 August 1914, namely that the war should secure Germany's safety and then be put to an end. The three leading figures of German Social-Democracy called upon the SPD to conduct a campaign for a peace of understanding, although they avoided any mention of a need to engage in class struggle. For Trotsky, the politics of the centre, while further to the left than that of the right 'social-imperialists', acted as a bulwark to the latter. This was because the centre rejected class struggle and, in his eyes, this was the defining feature of Marxist strategy. In this sense the centre in Germany was playing the same role as that played by the 'passive internationalists' in Russian politics. He made these points on the pages of *Nashe Slovo* through a report of *Lichtstrahlen's*, the one remaining left journal in Germany, comments upon 'The Demands of the Hour'. For *Lichtstrahlen*, by preaching patience in the face of the 'excesses' of both right and left, the centre was holding back a process of ideological clarification which the left thought was taking place among the masses the more imperialist appetites were being revealed. It was for reasons of this sort that the *Lichtstrahlen* argued that one could not struggle against the right without at the same time engaging in a battle against the centre: 'this is a struggle for the application of Marxist principles to the current historical epoch, a struggle for the unification of all of the party's left elements, a section of which, under the influence of Kautsky's authority, swings between the left and the right, in words speaking against the right but in practice supporting it.'¹⁴ At the same time

Trotsky acknowledged that the centre's critique was worrying for the right, especially as it was signed by such well-known figures. Indeed, the government was so disturbed that it suspended the *Leipziger Volkszeitung* for publishing 'The Demand of the Hour'. Credit for the centre's shift leftwards was given to the German radicals who had 'helped Kautsky leave the state of tranquil quietism which he had occupied since the start of the war.'¹⁵ However, according to Trotsky, the consequences of the centre's stances were more destructive than constructive. He drew the appropriate conclusion:

the struggle of the left with the centre in Germany is still far from saying its final word. The working masses will more and more break out of the tutelage of the idealess centre, carrying with them many and many leaders, the more decisive and principled the left conducts its critical and agitational work.¹⁵

A dispute between *Nashe Slovo* and a member of the Central Committee of the Bund, Vladimir Kosovskii (1868-1941), formed the background to Trotsky's next commentary on the German Social-Democracy. The origins of this conflict lay in the publication of two of Kosovskii's articles in May 1915, one in *Zukunft* (not available for check) and the other in the Bund's *Informatsionnyi Listok*. In the latter piece, which aroused the most indignation in the *Nashe Slovo* camp, Kosovskii examined the issue of how to reestablish the Second International. Unlike Trotsky, Kosovskii did not think that the Second International had been dealt a mortal blow by the behaviour of the national socialist parties upon the outbreak of the war. According to Kosovskii the socialist parties had committed errors in August 1914, but he insisted that these were perfectly understandable in the context of the unprecedented difficulties which these parties faced. Moreover, he claimed that 'the further course of the workers' movement' would turn the socialist parties of the Second International back on to the right path. In this way, 'the International...[will]...be reestablished from those elements from which it has always been composed.'¹⁷ He highlighted the continuous shift leftwards among the German Social-Democrats as an example of a process of self-criticism correcting a party's programme. He also said that this process was not taking place simultaneously in all parties, and drew a distinction between the French

and the German parties: the latter was quite clearly abandoning the 'German' myth of the war as a war of liberation from Russian aggression, a myth that was quite hard to swallow in Germany given the ruling Junker class's recent history of affording material support to tsarism; in contrast, French socialists remained bound within the long established (and mistaken) view of the French Republic liberating Europe from tyranny and were fervently supporting the French war effort. Indeed, pro-war hysteria had even grown in France since August 1914: French socialists were using growing anti-war sentiments in Germany as evidence of the disintegration of Germany from within to spur French soldiers on. Kosovskii urged French socialists to follow the example of their German comrades. In his view one had to overcome the gulf of distrust which had opened-up between socialists after the outbreak of hostilities not by organising events like the London Conference, but by uniting socialists of all countries in opposition to the war: '*Our task is to aspire to a quick ending of the war and the conclusion of a peace without annexations. All socialist parties could unite around this peace formula.*'¹⁸ The final myth dissected by Kosovskii was that of the Russian Social-Democrats themselves who thought that they could 'save the "rotten" ("social-chauvinist") West.' He argued that the slogan advanced by Russian 'real' socialists, i.e., 'on the one hand new splits and on the other new unifications', was simply the application of the old Russian policy of splits on an all-European scale. He thought the notion that a new International could be formed from 'Social-Democratic internationalists' was a nonsense because there was no adequate definition of what constituted a 'Social-Democratic internationalist'. Indeed, for Kosovskii, this deficiency was not accidental because it lay at the heart of the policy of splits:

Splitting along all directions, once and for all turning their backs on all those who do not wish to turn the International into a sectionalist clique, they cannot but end-up with a unification formula which is not worth twopence...Such is the way that the homeland splitters think of the 'Third' International. If this method achieves anything at all, then it will be only a sad clique, sect, a caricature of the International, devoid of all influence and significance.¹⁹

In an unsigned editorial of 22 May 1915 *Nashe Slovo* responded to this direct attack upon its campaign to unite socialist internationalists in a new, Third International. It began by denying that the *whole* of German Social-Democracy had abandoned the August 4 policy. Was not Mehring and his supporters calling the party leaders and press the 'corrupters'? By painting an over-optimistic picture of the extent of the anti-war mood gripping German Social-Democracy *Nashe Slovo* claimed that Kosovskii was 'drawing a veil over the disgraceful behaviour of the German Social-Democrats.' It then disputed Kosovskii's characterisation of the Russian socialists, pointing out that *Nashe Slovo* was not for splits. Instead, the Paris publication called for the winning of the old organisations from within by those who held an internationalist position: 'Kosovskii rejects the notion that we look for a criteria to restore the International in ideology (internationalism). Kosovskii has a type of organisational fetishism (unity at all costs) which is the obverse side of organisational nihilism (split at all costs). Organisational fetishism is not our path and without the application of a criteria of internationalism the International will not be restored.'²⁰

Kosovskii was able to defend his position from the pages of *Nashe Slovo*, which published his letter to the editorial board on 14 July 1915. Here Kosovskii reiterated his belief that German Social-Democracy was being self-critical in a way that the French variant was not. In his turn he accused *Nashe Slovo* of overstating its case: it was wrong, for example, when in issue 47 it claimed that German Social-Democrats were calling the war a war of liberation for the Poles from the tsar while defending Junkers who burned Polish villages. According to Kosovskii, *Nashe Slovo's* scaremongering about the Second International contained a potentially disastrous consequence, namely the end of any hopes for socialism: 'If we say without foundation that the main parties of the International are in disarray and that social-imperialism and social-chauvinism reign everywhere, then we are also saying that the masses have also been taken over by decay and that our cause is hopeless, for the official parties express the mood of the masses. We discredit internationalism and put off people who would otherwise come over to our side.' The member of the Bund's Central Committee also denied that he had ignored the ideological issue. On the contrary,

his point was that the 'old socialist parties...cannot abandon Marxism. This is guaranteed by the further class struggles of the proletariat which stand behind them. What will unite these parties and what acts as a security for the preservation of socialist unity is precisely a general Marxist ideology.'²¹ This brought Kosovskii to the nub of his disagreement with *Nashe Slovo*: he thought that one could restore the International on its old foundations while the Paris publication did not.

It was at this point that Trotsky resolved that the time had come for him to add his polemical skills to the debate. In 'Without measure' he ridiculed Kosovskii's non-understanding of what constituted an internationalist policy: 'if voting for war credits...and renouncing class struggle, desolving one's policy into the policy of the leading Junker national bloc, if all of this, in Kosovskii's view, is not rendering a political service to imperialism, then in general we speak in different languages.' He agreed with Kosovskii that a process of self-criticism was occurring within the German Social-Democratic Party, but he accused Kosovskii of having no analysis of the *dynamics* of this process. For Trotsky, Kosovskii had missed out the central issue of from where the self-criticism was coming. His answer was out of the internationalist left-wing struggling against the centre and the party hierarchy. Hence the vital issue was: 'On whose side to you stand?' In response to Kosovskii's claim that *Nashe Slovo's* case against him was harmful to the cause of socialism, Trotsky countered that only an internationalist policy, abandoning the reactionary features of the ideology of the Second International, coming from the entrails of the old parties could guarantee a future for socialism. If the main point at issue was who could best restore the International, Trotsky was quite clear where his sympathies lay:

we foresee...that the structures of the national blocs will fatally come crashing down on the heads of those who first constructed them. The task is to arm the working masses by this time with a clear consciousness of its revolutionary aims. This is our task, the left wing in the International. If we seek unification then it is not to form 'sects'...but in order immediately to give an international scale to our struggle with nationalism in all areas of the 'old' parties and proletarian organisations.²²

Trotsky often liked to make his points through biographical sketches. In 'Haase-Ebert-David' he charted the state of German Social-Democracy by following the handing-on of the task of reading the German Social-Democratic fraction's declaration in favour of war credits during successive sessions of the Reichstag. For Trotsky, the fact that men of less and less stature had stepped forward to fulfil this demeaning task was evidence of a certain 'equilibrium...established between people and ideas.' Moreover, David's leadership of the Reichstag fraction would have two beneficial consequences. First, the 'small skinny fellow with the manners of a provincial diplomat' clearly illustrated the depths to which German Social-Democracy had sunk. Second, and more importantly, revolutionary internationalism could not be compromised by David's headship since the latter was a known reformist. Indeed, according to Trotsky, 'the *political* triumph of David is our *ideological* triumph, for the symbolic sequence of the leaders of German Social-Democracy on to the Reichstag gives a personalised, physical expression to the idea that the principles of an independent class policy of the proletariat is incompatible with the principles of social-nationalism.' He bemoaned the then current left's inactivity, but predicted that Liebknecht's lone voice of opposition would one day 'have the last laugh.'²³

One of Trotsky's reports from the Zimmerwald Conference focussed upon the actions of the German delegation. This article highlighted the important results to be gained from a consistent application of Internationalist principles. He stated that the German delegation at Zimmerwald was composed of abstainers in the war credit votes, i.e., those people who left Liebknecht on his own. Ledebour's justification for abstaining, the preservation of party unity, was recounted, but Trotsky labelled abstaining as a 'passive reconciliation with "civil peace"...[which] demoralises the proletariat.'²⁴ After reiterating the tactics which should be followed in Germany as elsewhere, the take over of the SPD by the left through a campaign from within, Trotsky reported that the abstainers conceded some ground during the conference debates on the German Social-Democracy: Ledebour had abandoned his insistence that the SPD should not be censured for its votes on the war credits. Trotsky claimed a victory that was all but

complete; while the German delegation would not accept a formal obligation to oppose the government in future budget votes in the Reichstag it did see that it was morally correct to do so.

A series of articles penned by Bukvoed' under the heading 'Mehring on wars', published over four issues of *Nashe Slovo*, prompted Trotsky to write a rejoinder on the state of affairs among the left of German Social-Democracy. The last three of Bukvoed's contributions examined Mehring's analysis of wars dating back to the eighteenth-century. Trotsky had no major disagreements with the main conclusions reached through this exposition: war is an intrinsic element of class societies employed to settle issues which cannot be resolved peacefully and that war is a double-edged weapon upon which social-democrats cannot build their tactics.²⁵ However, in the first instalment Bukvoed' set the scene for his subsequent pieces by outlining various responses which socialists had taken to the war, including the distinction between an offensive/defensive war and calling for the defeat of one's own government as the 'lesser evil'. He pointed out that at the outbreak of the war even Liebknecht had fallen in behind the fraction in the Reichstag, and he furthermore claimed that the left opposition which had eventually crystallised against the policy of 4 August was disintegrating:

The opposition, which grows with every day, in German Social-Democracy is composed from the most multifaceted elements. It is wonderful to think that its extreme left-wing forms a group which attempted to publish its own organ in Germany, the *Internationale*, now already dead...[but] even among the contributors to this journal there are sufficiently well-formed differences. These appear with special clarity as soon as different elements of this opposition come into direct contact with representatives of the so-called extreme left in Russian Social-Democracy, i.e., with the Leninist group, which plays a unique, if involuntary, role of... litmus paper.²⁶

It was this last claim that Trotsky found objectionable. Writing in *Nashe Slovo* on the day following the conclusion of Bukvoed's series of articles he declared that, notwithstanding philosophical-historical and tactical disputes which are 'possible and even inevitable', the German

left opposition was united around a programme of 'political action', one example of which was the document 'The main enemy is in one's own country'. He regretted that Liebknecht had not immediately adopted a revolutionary-socialist stance on the war in August 1914, but stated that fifteen months later Liebknecht's name was 'synonymous with socialist bravery'. After distinguishing the revolutionary left (those who 'conduct now in Germany a brave struggle against "civil peace", disrobe the hypocritical ideology of "national defence", break down the barriers of legality and call the masses against the war and the ruling classes') from the passive-pacifists (Kautsky, Bernstein, Haase) Trotsky issued the following battle cry: 'Hand in hand with those [left] elements we have begun and will conduct further work towards the creation of a Third International!'²⁷

In December 1915 the Social-Democratic deputy Scheidemann met the German chancellor to discuss Germany's war aims. This meeting resulted in Bethmann-Hollweg's most annexationist statement to date, backed by Scheidemann. The left-centre in German Social-Democracy was appalled. It was willing to follow party policy on the war effort, but only as long as it was fought to secure Germany's territorial integrity. Faced with openly annexationist pronouncements from the leaders of the government and of the SPD twenty left-centre deputies felt justified in breaking party unity on the war credits. On 22 December 1915 they voted against the credits rather than abstaining as they had done in March and August. Rosa Luxemburg was not ecstatic by the left-centre's shift leftwards. For her, its opposition was grounded in a notion of the war as a war of defence, it was just that now Germany's borders were secure it should make the first move to end the war, whereas the left opposed the war as an imperialist war. Trotsky's analysis of the declaration of the twenty, which appeared in *Nashe Slovo* on 28 December, followed Luxemburg's critique on this point. He announced that the declaration had not 'placed the issue of the "war" policy of Social-Democracy on a necessary principled basis',²⁸ and he regretted the fact that the French social-patriots could only gain ammunition for their support of France's war of 'self-defence' from the declaration's evaluation of Germany's then strategic advantages. However, Trotsky's explanation of the left-centre's move to the left gave grounds

for the expression of his revolutionary optimism. According to the *Nashe Slovo* correspondent, it was Zimmerwald, the pressure issuing from the masses and the logic of events which had pushed the twenty from abstention to open opposition. The tide had turned and was clearly flowing in the direction of Zimmerwald which now had new supporters within the Reichstag; the vote was not a single 'episode' but an 'important date in the rebirth of socialism.'

Two special events of very different natures gave Trotsky reason to pen hagiographics of Franz Mehring and Rosa Luxemburg, two of the leading figures on the German left. Franz Mehring was 70 on 27 February 1916 and Trotsky paid tribute to Mehring's talents as historian and publicist of the German workers' movement. However with no doubt an eye to, among others, Plekhanov, he stated that it was not for past services that he was now raising his hat to Mehring. More importantly, the 'old man' of the German movement had passed the test of the outbreak of the war, he had opposed the policy of 4 August in the journal *Internationale*, and in these ways 'provided invaluable support for the awakening opposition on the left wing which is now the genuine bearer of the honour of the German proletariat.' Rosa Luxemburg had been arrested on 18 February 1915 for her anti-war pronouncements and activity. She was released on 22 January 1916, commenting 'I have returned to "freedom" with a tremendous appetite for work.'²⁹ Trotsky welcomed her back to the 'new class struggle' and ended his tribute on a political point, expressed emotionally: 'In the persons of Franz Mehring and Rosa Luxemburg we greet the spiritual kernel of the revolutionary German opposition with which we are linked by an indissoluble brotherhood in arms.'³⁰

At the beginning of April 1916 Trotsky commented upon the most recent vote on the budget, held in the Reichstag on 24 March, at which the centre for the second time voted against the government. In the months leading up to April the German left had further defined its position as a separate fraction. On New Years Day 1916 a group of left delegates meeting at Liebknecht's law office voted to adhere to the document, produced by Rosa Luxemburg for presentation at the Zimmerwald Conference, as part of a campaign, in Liebknecht's words, 'to recapture the party upwards through mass rebellion.'³¹

Liebknecht thought that the centre would either have to go over to the left or join the right or face the prospect of getting crushed in the clash of the two extremes; a fate which Trotsky often assigned to the centre of Russian politics.³² In 'Towards the Split in the Social-Democratic Fraction in the Reichstag' Trotsky retained his earlier critique of the centre as 'socialist pacifists'. He did, however, review the significance of the centre vote from a new standpoint. He began by claiming that in the decade preceding 1914 Europe had experienced two parallel processes: a massive development of the productive forces and an equalisation of the forms and methods of struggle of the workers' movement in Britain, Germany and France, i.e., a growth of parliamentarianism and centrally organised trade unions. The most notable consequence of the equalisation of the conditions and methods of workers' struggles was the formation of a single psychology, namely limited, national-reactionary responses from proletarian organisations. This did though take various forms in different countries. In Germany, for example, the workers were hypnotised by the notion of workers' democracy within their own organisations, whereas in France the proletariat was hypnotised by the idea of the French Republic and the traditions of 1789. Nevertheless the rapid appearance of social-patriotism in workers' organisations in all the warring countries grew of this shared psychology, rooted in the nature of the previous epoch. Trotsky noted that Russian, Italian and Balkan socialists had remained truer to internationalism, but he thought that the efforts of the internationalists would be for nought unless German Social-Democracy threw off the heritage of 'organisational fetishism': 'Only a profound internal upheaval in German Social-Democracy can really guarantee the creation of a centralised revolutionary International, just as only the capture of power by the proletariat in Germany, the mighty citadel of capitalism and militarism, can secure the victory of the socialist revolution in Europe.' It was from this stance, an insistence of the importance of German Social-Democracy for the success of the socialist movement as a whole, that Trotsky interpreted the splits in the Reichstag fraction, including the pacifist centre, as an important step towards a real rebirth of international socialism: 'Before the German

proletariat there henceforth stands two fractions, forcing it in the fire of events to make a choice and relieving it from automated discipline, a tool of imperialist reaction. Only through an ending of organisational routine will the German proletariat move to the unity and discipline of *revolutionary activity*. The split in the fraction is an important stage on this path.³³

Issues concerning the International were central to Trotsky's following contribution on the German Social-Democracy, this time examining 'K. Kautsky on the International.' This article translated in full Karl Kautsky's letter, published in *Berner Tagwacht*, in which the German socialist replied to a left-radical critique of his war time positions. Kautsky reasserted his belief that the International was weaker during wars than during peace, although he emphasised that this did not mean that the International had to lie low until peace was concluded: 'The International should reawaken itself for a new life and for new activities as soon as opportunities for action for peace are revealed.'³⁴ Kautsky's letter also touched upon other issues, most notably his qualification to the notion that the war was exclusively an imperialist war, but it was his statements on the International that aroused Trotsky's commentary. For the *Nashe Slovo* correspondent Kautsky's position could only lead social-democrats into a 'blind alley'. In order to overcome the forces of militarism the International would have to be at the height of its powers. Why, then, ask the organisation of the international proletariat to struggle for peace at a time when it was at its weakest? Trotsky then focussed upon another 'weak' side to Kautsky's case, i.e., the German socialist limited his perception of a struggle for peace to calls by socialist parties for a peace without annexations. He pointed out that such agreement had already been reached in the resolutions of the Copenhagen, London and Vienna conferences, and explained their lack of effect through the absence of what was missing from Kautsky's analysis; linking these demands to a programme of action. It was at this point that Trotsky turned Kautsky on his head. For Trotsky, it was the Second International, precisely the organisation formed during peace, that had proven itself to be weak whereas then, during the war, a new International was taking shape that would show itself to be an instrument of revolution. After labelling

Kautsky's then opposition to outright social-patriotism a 'half-way house' which alerted the workers to official falsehoods while not taking them to the logical conclusion of revolutionary action, Trotsky urged the left radicals to continue their campaign against Kautsky's 'procrastinating pacifism'.

Thus far Trotsky's analysis of the struggles between the social-patriots, the centre and the left in German Social-Democracy had focussed upon the balance of forces, their likely future development and the consequences of this for the workers' movement. In an article entitled 'Höglund and Liebknecht' he reported on the response of the ruling classes to the ever-increasing crystallisation of the left. On 1 May 1916 Liebknecht was arrested for shouting 'Down with the government, down with the war' in the middle of the Potsdamerplatz in Berlin. Trotsky placed this arrest in the context of a series of similar measures taken against revolutionary internationalists in several countries. In Sweden Höglund, member of parliament, was arrested along with two other members of the Swedish left opposition, Heden and Oljedund, for calling upon workers to go out on a general strike if Sweden abandoned its neutrality; John MacLean received a long term of imprisonment in April 1916 for his anti-war activity in Scotland; and, finally, in Ireland the seven men who signed the declaration of Irish independence during the 1916 Easter rebellion were shot. For Trotsky, all of these measures were but a foretaste of the 'future policy of the whole European bourgeoisie in the approaching epoch of revolutionary upheavals.'³⁵ In the meantime Höglund and Liebknecht were the heroes of the then forming Third International.

Trotsky examined Liebknecht's trial from another perspective in 'Karl Liebknecht'. He noted that the German socialist had received the minimum sentence possible for his 'crime', but rejected in advance any thought that the court had been lenient. Liebknecht had agreed with all the charges against him and had even attempted to antagonise the court. What then explained the minimum sentence? According to Trotsky, the state machine did not want to make a martyr out of Liebknecht: 'in Germany, where the awakening of the mightiest of social classes is at stake, one has to measure out repression in doses so as not to hasten the process of the accumulation of revolutionary

passion.'³⁶ However, pointing to the political strike which had been called as response to Liebknecht's sentencing on 28 June, Trotsky declared that Liebknecht's imprisonment could not divert events from taking their 'natural course of development.' The name on the banner of the workers' movement was now Liebknecht, who Trotsky claimed as his 'closest ally.'

Trotsky's final report on the German Social-Democracy in *Nashe Slovo* before he was exiled from France consisted of a reprint of an article which had appeared in the second issue of the Bremen publication *Arbeiterpolitik*. Entitled 'Amongst the German Opposition' this piece serves as a convenient concluding summary of this section on Trotsky's views on developments in the German workers' movement while he was resident in Paris.³⁷ It outlined the different nature of the centre's and the left's opposition to Scheidemann's support of Germany's war efforts: the former 'pacifist' and 'half-hearted', the latter 'revolutionary' and 'principled'. Trotsky warned the left not to join-up with the centre which, due to its uncertainty, would always remain within the orbit of the right. Dismissing accusations of 'sectionalism' that had been levelled against the left, Trotsky reemphasised his basic position: strict adherence to principles was necessary for firm action which would win the day, and the organisations, from below and from within.

8.2 Trotsky and Austrian Social-Democracy

From 1907 until 1914 Trotsky, after having a request to settle in Berlin refused, set up home in Vienna. There he met with the leading lights of Austrian Social-Democracy, Victor and Fritz Adler, Rudolf Hilferding and Otto Bauer. At the outbreak of the war the behaviour of the Austrian party could have been no less disappointing to Trotsky than that of its German counterpart. It immediately approved the SPD's vote of August 4. Nevertheless, he for long remained silent on the Austrian SPOe, publishing his first article on this party in *Nashe Slovo* of 21 May 1916. His quiescence can be put down to several possible reasons. Just as the internal contradictions besetting Austria could have been seen as secondary to Germany's mightier and faster developing

economy and society, the SPOe could have been viewed as an adjunct of its 'big Brother'. Another and more prosaic possibility is that there was little material for journalistic accounts of Austrian developments. The Austrian parliament was prorogued in the spring of 1914 and was not summoned until May 1917. Hence there was no crisis on war credits, the subject matter of much of Trotsky's reportage of the German Social-Democracy, in the Austrian party. Furthermore, the party press supported the German SPD vote *en bloc*, *Arbeiter-Zeitung* declaring 4 August 'a day of the proudest and most powerful exaltation of the German spirit',³⁸ and Trotsky loved nothing better than a *clash* of fractions before entering the fray. Indeed, it was a shift in outlook of *Arbeiter-Zeitung* that prompted him to write a report for *Nashe Slovo*.

In the piece 'In Austria' Trotsky gave a brief exposition of the first two issues of *Arbeiter-Zeitung* of May 1916. As background information he sketched the character of the newspaper before the war; it was the most 'German national socialist newspaper...[which]...was always ready to defend the "German" interests and the German character of Vienna from Czech "encroachment"'. Now, though, the newspaper was devoid of triumphant German nationalism. A lead article of 2 May spoke of a hopeless military situation for both of the warring camps, and reported a widespread desire for peace. A further contribution painted a sorry picture of the then current economic situation, claiming that only time would tell whether capitalism would survive the dislocation caused by the war. While reports of this kind were obviously welcome to Trotsky, he derided the Austrian party for not drawing the necessary political conclusions. Thus, the SPOe had not constructed a political programme of action centring on a struggle for peace to answer the desire for an end to the war. For Trotsky, passiveness was tantamount to social-patriotism which meant support for the ruling classes. The crime of the Austrian party was that it was the 'most passive' of all social-patriotic parties: 'it would be hard to think of another policy which was directed to such an extent on blunting the proletariat, suppressing all initiative in it, cooling all protest, as the policy of Austrian Social-Democracy.'³⁹ Trotsky concluded this article in typical fashion with a call to the Austrian opposition to liberate the proletariat from the

shackles of official party policy of 'weakness, passiveness and disintegration'.

The link between analysis and practice also featured in Trotsky's next piece on the Austrian Social-Democrats. He praised the latter for their theoretical ability which 'approached Marxism'. In this instance he focussed upon two recent articles from *Arbeiter-Zeitung* in which the Austrian publication showed that the war was preparing the ground for a future socialist order. First, the ravage caused by the then world conflict had placed the socialist goals of peace and labour on the agenda; then the experience of war had knocked parochialism out of people, thus ushering a new internationalist spirit; and, finally, the might of the war technology had revealed what a centralised, mass organisation of production could achieve. In short, *Arbeiter-Zeitung* predicted that the post-war order would be an 'epoch of social spirit.' Of course Trotsky could agree with much of this analysis. He approvingly summarised *Arbeiter-Zeitung's* view of the war as 'forming in its entrails a revolutionary generation and placing it face to face with the tasks of a socialist organisation of society.' However, he regretted the fact that true to the traditions of the Austrian party, the leadership retained an outdated and reactionary policy: 'the voice of Austrian Social-Democracy sounds as if from a coffin before a political dock in which a generation of the proletariat going through the war do not sit.'⁴⁰

In his next writing on the *Arbeiter-Zeitung* Trotsky had not a hint of praise for the Austrian publication. On this occasion he analysed the Vienna newspaper's strong approval of Italian socialists who, until the last moment, had called for their country to remain neutral in the war. At first sight one would think that the *Nashe Slovo* correspondent would have nothing but praise for *Arbeiter-Zeitung's* stance. But, reasoned Trotsky, more sinister motivations lay behind *Arbeiter-Zeitung's* new found 'internationalism'. *Arbeiter-Zeitung* had done nothing less than use Italian socialist opposition to Italy's entry into the war as evidence of Italy's ruling class's aggressiveness, a crucial plank in the 'defensive' lie propagated by the Austro-German military machine. Furthermore, Trotsky pointed out that such hypocrisy was not limited to Austro-German social-patriotic publications. He highlighted *L'Humanité* as

Arbeiter-Zeitung's French soul mate. It was using the radical German newspaper *Leipziger Volkszeitung's* denunciations of the German ruling class so that its French counterparts could 'shine radiantly before the auditorium of the French proletariat.' This left Trotsky with the rather depressing question of 'which of them is better?'⁴¹

When opposition to the Austrian government did manifest itself in an open and dramatic way it came as something of a surprise to Trotsky. In October 1916 Fritz Adler, editor of *Kampf* and a left radical, demonstrated his hatred of the war and the government waging it by killing the Austrian Prime Minister Baron Stürgkh. The question Trotsky posed was: What made Adler resort to a terrorist act? After all Adler, as a Marxist, did not believe that a 'well directed bullet can cut the Gordian knot of great historical problems.' According to Trotsky the key to understanding Adler's act lay in the relations internal to Austrian Social-Democracy itself. Purchasers of *Nashe Slovo* had read of Trotsky's frustration with the SPOe, able to produce clear analysis but incapable of taking firm political action. How much greater must this frustration have been felt by a radical living in the midst of indifference and inactivity. The son of the 'father' of the Austrian movement knew all too well the bureaucrats and careerists who had risen to dominate the party during the parliamentary regime which had preceded the First World War in Austria. It was these people who had rejected his 'Zimmerwald' resolution presented to a meeting of the SPOe's national council in March 1916. The pressure of demanding action to save socialism from bearing responsibility for the war and finding only a shrugging of shoulders from the leadership reached such a point that Adler resolved to make a dramatic gesture. For Trotsky one could have nothing but admiration: 'Like a heroic pointsman on a railroad who opens his veins and warns of danger with a handkerchief soaked in his own blood Fritz Adler turned himself, his life into a signal bomb before the face of a fooled and lifeless working class...This means that the heart of this unhappy humanity still beats if, among its sons, there is such an errant knight!'⁴²

8.3 Trotsky and French Social-Democracy

Opposition to their government's war effort was understandably weak among French socialists. It was after all German soldiers who had invaded France, and whatever analysis was current of 'shared' imperialist guilt for the war it did not hold much attraction in a country where most people accepted that they were fighting a 'war of defence'. This did not prevent Trotsky from using his journalistic powers to argue for a revolutionary programme of action against the war in France.

His first clash with a French social-patriotic publication was in a 'Letter to the Editorial Board of *L'Humanité*'. It was in *L'Humanité* that an adversary familiar to Trotsky, Aleksinskii, had described Parvus as an 'agent-provocateur on a salary of the German and Turkish governments'.⁴³ He had gone on to say that even *Nashe Slovo* had warned others to have nothing to do with Parvus. Trotsky felt compelled to pen a reply not because he was against critiques of the German thinker. He opposed Parvus's war time position and had described the inspirer of the theory of permanent revolution as 'politically dead'.⁴⁴ What Trotsky objected to was the insinuation that *Nashe Slovo* also thought Parvus to be a German agent, and he declared that no evidence existed to support such a view. If *Nashe Slovo* advised a boycott of Parvus's institute in Copenhagen, it did so only because Parvus was subordinating socialism to the aims of militarism and the class state.

Trotsky's dispute with *L'Humanité* did nothing to enlighten readers of the condition of what worried Trotsky most in other countries, that of the *union sacrée*. He seized the opportunity presented by a ministerial crisis to claim a future for revolutionary socialism in France. During 1915 the French army was on the offensive, a tactic which led to great losses for little gain. By October 1915 a mixture of growing opposition within and outwith the government brought about the fall of the Viviani cabinet. In 'The Essence of the Crisis' Trotsky did not deny that poor military performance played a large role in Viviani's fall. There was though a more important and instructive aspect to this affair. For Trotsky the recent political events 'expressed the basic contradictions...of French radicalism in the current imperialist epoch'.⁴⁵

In brief, the French radicals, whose constituency was primarily made up of petty bourgeois elements, were powerless before the forces of imperialist finance capital. It was these latter, in the form of the large capitalists, which decided matters of policy. Indeed, socialist deputies were allowed to occupy ministerial posts during the war out of pragmatic considerations, they served as a useful control lever over the people at a time of great hardships. Conservative dailies continued to appear while the radical press had disappeared or lost its teeth. What further evidence did one need that the imperialists were in control? For Trotsky, France needed to find socialists who would not sacrifice themselves to the *union sacrée* but those who would overcome all obstacles to achieve what they wanted.

One month later Trotsky stressed the extent to which the ruling class in France did not have control of events. In 'Without a programme, without perspectives, without control' he speculated that no programmatic changes would result from Briand's appointment to head the government. In part Trotsky related the inertia of French politics to the condition of its parliamentarianism which had no new reserves of people or ideas. Most at blame, however, was the failings of the European ruling classes, of which the French was only a representative example, which had lost all control over events:

The powerful Prussian feudalists act now under the same pressure of the forming situation as the indecisive petty bourgeois French lawyers...The trenches, cannons, battle ships, thousands of armed people....these are the factors which automatically push historical events ahead along a path, the end of which more clearly signifies for everyone a dead-end. The ruling orders make gestures...but they long ago lost all control over the course of events.

Nashe Slovo readers could at least be comforted by their correspondent's concluding words that 'history is calling other forces to take control in their hands.'⁴⁶

However, when voices opposed to the war began to be heard with increasing frequency in the French Socialist Party they were not of a sort that pleased Trotsky. It was none other than Karl Marx's grandson, Jean Longuet, who led an opposition group in the parliamentary party.

His disaffection with the war issued from pacifist principles which he expounded in *Le Populaire*, a weekly newspaper which he also edited. At a meeting of the Socialist Party's national council of April 1916 Longuet and his supporters mustered over thirty per cent of the votes cast. From August 1916 until the time of his expulsion from France Trotsky again and again advised revolutionary Marxists why and how they should wage a campaign against 'Longuetism'.

In his first article on this theme Trotsky looked at Longuet's plans to restore the International. The French pacifist had called for a meeting of socialists of Entente countries as a first step towards a conference of socialists of all nationalities. Trotsky asked why such a hopeless scheme had been proposed. After all, the Italian, Russian, British, Serbian and Portuguese parties all supported Zimmerwald and would hardly attend an exclusively Entente affair. For Trotsky, it was clear that the Longuetists were playing a role common to all purely parliamentary oppositions: linked to the masses and to government policy they 'use the uninformed masses and advance consciously-fictive means with one aim: to win time.'⁴⁷ To this Trotsky retorted that at that moment this was tantamount to 'wasting time' and for this no condemnation could be sufficiently harsh.

Following the conclusion of the Zimmerwald conference of September 1915, the French delegates Merrheim and Bourderon organised a *Comité pour la Reprise des Relations Internationales* in Paris. Trotsky had close ties with Merrheim and in August 1916 he sent a draft declaration to the *Comité*. In this document Trotsky outlined why Zimmerwaldists should have no truck with Longuetists. He pointed out that the Longuetist parliamentary group still voted for the war credits, thus failing a crucial litmus test for internationalism. For Trotsky, the Longuetists were playing such a pernicious role in French politics that he employed conspiracy theory to explain their existence: Longuetism was necessary as an outlet for the expression of opposition to Renaudel's uncompromising support of the war while holding this opposition within the boundaries of official party policy. It was for this reason that Trotsky perceived the Longuetists to be the most dangerous species of social-patriots for they attempted to 'calm the workers' agitated socialist conscience through secondary concessions

and in this way divert them from an actual struggle against the war.⁴⁸ Hence the urgent task was to disrobe the Longuetists' lies and to speak real revolutionary language to the workers. Trotsky urged the *Comité* to take these tasks upon itself. Just over one week later he was able to report that, despite objections from some syndicalists, the *Nashe Slovo* resolution was passed by the *Comité*.⁴⁹

Not everyone was overjoyed by the *Comité's* acceptance of the need to struggle against Longuetism. In an interesting letter published along with a reply from the editors A. Lozovskii, for example, criticised *Nashe Slovo's* declaration even though he himself was a left critic of the centre.⁵⁰ Lozovskii argued that the declaration made three basic errors. It incorrectly categorised the *Confédération Général du Travail* as the equivalent of Longuetism in the syndicalist movement; in actual fact the *Confédération* clearly backed Renaudel's out and out patriotism. Second, *Nashe Slovo* was wrong to say that the Longuetists were consciously trying to fool the workers. While he accepted that the centre was not sufficiently internationalist, Lozovskii viewed its shortcomings as an objective consequence of its politics which were sincerely held. By insisting upon the subjective motivation of the centre *Nashe Slovo* was complicating relations between the Zimmerwaldists and the centre when the latter, and especially its left wing, could become tomorrow's ally. Finally, Lozovskii questioned the tactic of sending a resolution to the *Comité* as a means of combating Longuetism. To begin with the *Comité* was dominated by syndicalists who would pass as many anti-Longuetist resolutions as were sent, but who were themselves even less revolutionary socialist than the centre. He then stated that tactical resolutions were not the best way to achieve agitational aims. *Nashe Slovo* should have invited Longuetists to a gathering of socialists to debate its declaration and only then urged the meeting to pass a resolution.

In its reply *Nashe Slovo* accused Lozovskii of committing the worst of political crimes, that of underestimating the enemy. In the case of Longuetism the consequences of this crime were magnified since its tactic depended upon goodwill towards it for success: 'for the Longuetists ambiguity is an important tool in their political struggles; for Zimmerwaldists ambiguity means death or more precisely dissolving

into Longuetism.⁵¹ *Nashe Slovo* announced that it was not against a public debate with Longuetists, but one had to define one's relation to them beforehand, and this is precisely what its resolution had achieved. A clear statement of the shortcomings of Longuetism and the necessity to combat them was now extant. One only had to have the bravery not to be diverted from these tasks.

On the day that he received his expulsion order from France the concluding part of Trotsky's analysis of 'French and German Social-Patriotism' appeared in *Nashe Slovo*. In the first contribution Trotsky was concerned to establish the stable and anti-revolutionary nature of Longuetist politics. He argued that the Longuetists mixture of support for the war while calling for socialists not to accept ministerial posts should not be confused as a group in transition to a left position. Rather the Longuetists thought of their strategy as long-term which would accrue several advantages for socialists. They would back their country's war effort but avoid both responsibility for any mistakes and being assimilated into a national bloc. In retaining a distinct socialist identity in this way the ground would be prepared for future electoral success inside France, and lead to the quick restoration of the International which would be able to bring its weight to bear upon a peace settlement. Trotsky not only thought the Longuetists inconsistent - how could one vote money to a government which one considered unfit to join? - he also declared that the Longuetist programme shared the aims as Renaudel and the right:

*Supporting the Socialist Party in the war as a tool to discipline the mass in the interests and under the control of the capitalist state and using this work in the interests of strengthening or, at minimum, holding the political-parliamentary position of the party itself - such are the tasks general to Renaudel and Longue.*⁵²

The second and concluding article focused upon the assumptions common to the Longuetists and to German social-patriots.⁵³ According to Trotsky both groups thought the war should be conducted to safeguard their countries' independence and were in favour of a peace without annexations. At the then current moment the Longuetists were even able to point to their German counterparts as an illustration of what French socialists would gain by refusing ministerial posts:

Scheidemann had been able to attend the Hague conference because this in no way bound the German government. After pointing out that the Longuetists and Scheidemann also shared antipathy towards Liebknecht, Trotsky outlined two scenarios in which he illustrated why an internationalist perspective was worth retaining. In a pessimistic picture he argued that if the crisis in the workers' movement proved protracted, only revolutionary internationalism could present a principled explanation of events to workers. If, on the other hand, an optimistic option was to happen, if the workers were to arise in anger at their worsening condition, the revolutionary internationalists would be immediately able to occupy a vanguard role. Unfortunately for Trotsky, at the time of writing he was very much in the midst of the former variant.

8.4 Trotsky and British Socialism

Trotsky wrote very little about events in Britain, this despite the fact that the socialist movement there was beset by the same social-chauvinist-centre-left splits upon which he commented in other movements.⁵⁴ There can be no doubt that although he presented no full analysis of the correlation of forces in the British workers' movement Trotsky felt that the left wing of the British Socialist Party, John MacLean and associates, and its publications, *Justice* and *The Call*, his allies in Britain.

In a piece examined above, for instance, he noted MacLean's imprisonment of April 1916, and in an article on the 1916 Easter Uprising in Ireland he referred to the Glaswegian socialist as the leader of a revolutionary upsurge in Scotland: 'Scottish soldiers broke the Dublin barricades. But in Scotland itself the coal miners are uniting around the red banner raised by MacLean and his friends.'

This was Trotsky's only commentary upon the Easter Uprising and it contained an analysis of class forces and revolutionary perspectives in backward Ireland reminiscent of that produced by Trotsky for his own country. Thus, to the extent that an Irish trade-industrial bourgeoisie had formed since the turn of the century it was 'anti-proletarian' and subordinate to British imperialism; the peasants were backward and

isolated, governed by 'stupid farm egoism'; finally, the proletariat, the only revolutionary force, had to be won over to revolutionary internationalism from 'national enthusiasts' and limited trade-unionism. Viewing the events in Dublin as evidence of a transition from the agrarian 'national' upheavals of previous times to the era of international 'socialist revolutions' Trotsky welcomed the Easter Uprising as evidence that 'the historical role of the Irish proletariat is only just beginning.'⁵⁵

There are several possible reasons for Trotsky's reticence in commenting upon British developments. *Nashe Slovo* received reports from Britain from, amongst others, G. V. Chicherin, and Trotsky probably agreed with these analyses. Furthermore, he had not been in Britain for many years and felt better qualified, or more stimulated, to write about countries and people of which he had personal knowledge. He had not met, nor would he ever meet, John MacLean, whereas he knew Kautsky, Plekhanov, Adler and so on. Certainly the 'personal factor', in this case Christain Rakovsky and time spent in the Balkans as a reporter for *Kievskaya Mysl'* during the Balkan wars, was present in Trotsky's writings upon developments in the Balkans.

8.5 Trotsky and Balkan Social-Democracy

Trotsky had formulated his solution to the ethnic tensions rife in the Balkans, the creation of a Balkan federative republic, while working as a reporter there during the pre-1914 Balkan Wars.⁵⁶ He carried this analysis into his First World War writings and in several theoretical articles attempted to show why transnational state structures would ensure peaceful economic, political and cultural development.

Trotsky thought the nation and the state to be two distinct entities. The former was a lasting source and bearer of culture, most noticeably through language, while the latter was a temporary phenomenon constructed for economic reasons. At some point in history the interests of economic progress brought the capitalist state into existence. However, by the start of the First World War economic forces had outgrown the limits of the national state. Hence Trotsky's argument that the real source of the war was not external aggression

from one state against another, as the social-patriots and exponents of the 'defence of the homeland' insisted, but demands of economic progress *inside* the state. According to Trotsky, even if the war led the map of Europe to be redrawn so that state structures coincided with ethnic groups, new conflicts would inevitably arise: 'An independent Hungary or Bohemia or Poland would seek a path to the sea by breaking the rights of other nationalities just as Italy seeks it at the expense of the Serbs or the Serbs at the expense of the Albanians.'⁵⁷ For Trotsky, the only possible solution to these problems was to guarantee the independence of the nation, vital for cultural survival and growth, and a wider market, essential for economic well-being, through the establishment of transnational democratic states. Furthermore these goals could only be reached through socialism:

Destroying the very basis of the economy the present imperialist war, which is illuminated and supplemented by spiritual impoverishment or by the fraudulent national idea, is the most convincing expression of that dead-end into which the development of bourgeois society has gone. Only socialism, which should economically neutralise the nation, uniting humanity in lasting cooperation; which frees the world economy from the grip of the nation and in this way liberating national culture from the grip of nations' economic competition - only socialism gives a way out from the contradictions which now open-up before us as a terrible threat to the whole of human culture.⁵⁸

In his journalism on the Balkan Social-Democracy Trotsky focused upon individuals who shared his analysis as a way of propagating their case. During his sojourns around the Balkans Trotsky met and became friends with the old founder of Romanian socialism, Dobrodjanu Gerea. Trotsky celebrated Gerea's fortieth birthday with an anniversary article in *Nashe Slovo*.⁵⁹ Here he commended the former leader of Romanian Social-Democracy for his theoretical acumen, expressed with particular clarity in the book *Neo-Serfdom*. Finally, Trotsky stressed the connection between scientific socialism and correct practice by noting Gerea's battle against Romanian imperialism and for the establishment of a Balkan democratic federation.

In a two-part article entitled 'In the Balkans' he illustrated the hopeless intrigues of both the Balkan bourgeoisie, who wanted to use the strategic weaknesses of the great powers to aid capitalist development in the Balkans for their own gain, on the one hand and the great powers, who wanted to seize territory in the Balkans under the guise of fighting for the liberation of oppressed peoples, on the other. He cited the Bulgarian Social-Democratic publication *Novoe Vremya* which had highlighted the impossibility of the Balkan peoples deciding which side to back in the war: opting for the Entente would result in domination by Russia and Italy, deciding for the Central Powers rule from Berlin and Vienna. Trotsky called upon his Bulgarian, Romanian and Serbian comrades to continue broadcasting such beliefs, firm in the conviction that one day this would ease the transition to socialism: 'Now, in these bloody fumes, let this programme preserve a predominantly propaganda character - in a revolutionary epoch it will be realised the quicker the sooner now it wears out all other programmes and illusions and the deeper Social-Democracy strengthens the authority of its political and moral bravery in the consciousness of the Balkan peoples.'⁶⁰

As the war dragged on and on without signs that one of the warring fractions held or would hold a decisive strategic advantage in the near future, a struggle to win over neutral countries became increasingly intensive. In October 1915 Germany succeeded in attracting Bulgaria to its side in return for a promise that it would receive territory in Macedonia lost to Serbia during the Balkan Wars. Bulgaria duly attacked Serbia on 14 October. Trotsky examined the response this elicited among Bulgarian socialists in 'Bulgarian Social-Democracy and the War.' Once again he found a split between social-patriots who, guided by 'national' interests, supported the intervention. However, for the Bulgarian social-patriots this led to a particular somersault, they had been forced to abandon their previously held Russophile philosophy. The revolutionary-socialists, on the other hand, had faced no such dilemma. Although their publications had been suppressed they had preserved their belief in socialism and in a democratic federative Balkan republic. In what was very much an article intended to strengthen the spirit of the faithful Trotsky expressed his conviction

that, 'we do not for one minute doubt their revolutionary bravery and belief in socialism; that together with them - over the trenches which currently separate us - we are convinced in a future revolutionary uprising in which we and they will find our true place!'⁶¹

In an earlier chapter it was noted how Trotsky cited Rakovsky's critique of the Russian social-patriots as further ammunition in his battle with this group. On several occasions he also referred to the exploits of his old friend on specifically Balkan affairs. Trotsky received Rakovsky's introduction to the Balkan socialist's brochure *Socialism and the War* in manuscript form and in *Nashe Slovo* of 5 October 1915 he reproduced several extracts from it.⁶² These citations made several points, most notably that a federative Balkan republic could only be achieved through the class struggle of the proletariat, and that judging the war with 'offensive' and 'defensive' criteria meant using imperialist categories.

In 1916 pressure was increasingly applied upon Romania to join the war. This she duly did in August 1916 when, in return for a promise of land in Transylvania, she sided with the Entente. Rakovsky's arrest and subsequent conditional release following his participation in strikes in Galicia in June 1916 provided Trotsky with an opportunity to comment upon developments in Romania.⁶³ He praised Rakovsky's 'revolutionary internationalism' and presented a brief analysis of Romanian society. Despite the weak development of Romanian industry Trotsky claimed that the 'young and energetic' proletariat was the most strategically powerful class in a country of 'dark peasant masses' and parasitic ruling cliques. He argued that these latter had allowed Romanian socialists to conduct anti-war agitation while they wanted Romania to remain neutral. Indeed for a while the socialists even served as a convenient counter pressure to pro-Entente activists. However, a point was reached at which socialist agitation became inconvenient for a government which was considering a more active role in the war. Hence Rakovsky's arrest. The lesson Trotsky extracted from these events was the closer governments moved towards declaring war, the clearer the distinction between revolutionary socialists, who would be sent to goal, and social-patriots, who would join war ministries, would become.

8.6 Conclusion

Trotsky's journalism on European Social-Democracy during his time in Paris in World War One sought to make the following points: August 1914 marked a significant turning-point in history, it signalled the end of the Second International and the epoch of reformism from which it grew; in order to prepare themselves and the proletariat for the coming epoch of revolutionary upheavals Marxist internationalists should propagate their ideas independent of all right social-imperialists and their centrist cohorts; Marxist internationalists, in arguing their own line, should remain within existing parties in order to win them from within; and, finally, a Third International would have to be established to guide communists in their struggle to establish transnational federative republics.

In his recent biography of Trotsky the Russian historian Dmitrii Volkogonov views Trotsky as a cosmopolitan, absorbed with non-Russian affairs.⁶⁴ However, when one compares the volume and nature of Trotsky's writings on Russian domestic politics and his polemics with the various branches of Russian Social-Democracy with his articles on pan-European affairs, it becomes evident that he wrote more, and felt on surer ground, when commenting upon the former.

Although Trotsky himself had great faith in the power of the pen it would be true to say that he observed and followed events rather than moulded them. It would be difficult to claim any great influence for his journalism upon European developments, even in the socialist parties. His articles stressed a core set of beliefs, as is to be expected from a task which had a predominantly propaganda character. In the circumstances he could hardly do anything else. Faced with a situation in which most socialists supported their countries' war efforts, he was fighting a rearguard battle.

The next chapter examines Trotsky's activities after his expulsion from France to Spain.

Notes

1. -:, 'Eshche est' na svete sotsial'demokraty', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 53, 31 March 1915, p 1.
2. -:, "'Oni - drugovo dukha'", *Nashe Slovo*, No. 113, 13 June 1915, p 1.
3. For an excellent exposition of Kautsky's views during the First World War see Massimo Salvadori, *Karl Kautsky and the Socialist Revolution, 1880-1938*, London, 1979, espec. pp 181 ff.
4. 'Perspektivy mira. St. Karla Kautskago', *Golos*', No. 18, 2 October 1914, p 1.
5. 'Perspektivy mira. St. Karla Kautskago (okonchanie)', *Golos*', No. 19, 3 October 1914, p 2.
6. -:, 'Kautskii o Plekhanove. I', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 116, 17 June 1915, p 1.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
9. -:, 'Kautskii o Plekhanove. III', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 118, 19 June 1915, p 1.
10. 'Vozzvanie nemetskikh' internatsionalistov'', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 104, 3 June 1915, p 1.
11. Ibid.
12. Cited in A. Joseph Berlau, *The German Social Democratic Party 1914-1921*, New York, 1949, p 75.
13. -:, 'Nemetskaya oppositsiya i nemetskaya diplomatiya', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 121, 23 June 1915, p 1.
14. Cited in -:, "'Levaya" i "tsentra" v nemetskoi sots-dem', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 137, 11 July 1915, p 1.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid.
17. Vl. Kosovskii, 'Kak' vozstanovit' internatsional'', *Informatsionnyi Listok*', No. 8, May 1915, p 5.
18. Ibid., p 6.
19. Ibid., p 5.

20. "'Staromodnyi masshtab'", *Nashe Slovo*, No. 95, 22 May 1915, p 1.
21. Vl. Kosovskii, 'Pis'mo v' redaktsiyu', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 137, 14 July 1915, p 4.
22. -:, 'Bez' masshtaba', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 141, 17 July 1915, p 1.
23. -:, 'Gaaze-Ebert'-David' !', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 175, 27 August 1915, p 1.
24. N. T., 'Nemetskaya S-D oppozitsiya (iz' zapisnoi knizhki)', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 210, 7 October 1915, p 1.
25. See Bukvoed', 'Mering' o voine'. II.', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 239, 13 November 1915, p 1; Id., 'Mering' o voine (okonchanie vtoroi stat'i).', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 240, 14 November 1915, pp 1-2; and Id., 'Mering' o voine. III', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 241, 16 November 1915, pp 1-2.
26. Id., 'Mering' o voine. I.', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 238, 12 November 1915, p 2.
27. -:, 'Gruppirovki v' nemetskoi sots-dem. (Po povodu stat'i t. Bukvoeda)', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 242, 17 November 1915, p 1.
28. -:, 'Deklaratsiya dvadtsati', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 276, 28 December 1915, p 1.
29. Cited in Peter Nettl, *Rosa Luxemburg*, Oxford, 1969, p 395. Nettl's book contains an excellent chapter on Rosa Luxemburg's war time activities.
30. Redaktsiya, 'Privet' F. Meringu i R. Lyuksemburg' !', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 53, 3 March, 1916, p 1.
31. Cited in Nettl, Op. cit., p 397. Nettl's work includes a copy of Rosa Luxemburg's appeal to Zimmerwald on pp 392-94.
32. See, for example, Trotsky's analysis of Russian liberalism in his 'Open Letter to Professor P. N. Milyukov' (translated and edited by Ian D. Thatcher), *Revolutionary Russia*, Vol. 3, No. 2, 1990, pp 224-238.
33. -:, 'Novaya glava' (K raskolu s-d fraktsii reikhstaga)', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 79, 2 April 1916, p 1.
34. Cited in -:, 'K. Kautskii ob' Internatsionale', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 98, 26 April 1916, p 1.
35. -:, 'Kheglund' i Libknekht'', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 106, 6 May 1916, p

- 1.
36. -:, 'Karl' Libknekht", *Nashe Slovo*, No. 152, 1 July 1916, p 1.
37. -:, 'Sredi germanskoi oppozitsii. Sektanstvo ili neobkhodimoe vyyasnenie', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 177, 2 August 1916, p 1. Trotsky did, however, write several reports of the Reichkonferenz of the German Social-Democracy held in September 1916 for *Nashe Slovo's* successor, *Nachalo*. His analysis of this event followed the distinction between social-imperialists (Scheidemann), passive centre oppositionists (Haase) and revolutionary internationalists (Liebknecht) which he had established in earlier writings on the German Social-Democracy (discussed above). For Trotsky's reports on the Reichkonferenz of September 1916 see -:, 'Imperializm' i sotsializm", *Nachalo*, No. 6, 6 October 1916, p ; -:, 'Imperializm' i sotsializm' (Po povodu germanskoi s-d konferentsii) I', *Nachalo*, No. 15, 17 October 1916, p ; -:, 'Imperializm' i sotsializm' (Po povodu germanskoi s-d konferentsii) II', *Nachalo*, No. 16, 18 October 1916; and -:, 'Imperializm' i sotsializm'. bor'ba za respubliku v' Germanii', *Nachalo*, No. 21, 24 October 1916, p .
38. Cited in S. F. Kissin, *War and the Marxists*, London, 1988, p 178.
39. -:, 'V' Austrii', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 119, 21 May 1916, p 1.
40. -:, 'Iz' ideinoi zhizni Austriiskoi sots-dem', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 130, 4 June 1916, p 1.
41. -:, 'Kto iz' nikh' luchshe?', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 146, 24 June 1916, p 1.
42. -:, 'Frits' Adler", *Nachalo*, No. 22, 25 October 1916, p 1. In a short note to the 1924 edition of *Voina i Revolyutsiya*, in which this piece was reprinted, Trotsky took Adler's recent opposition to the Third International into account to reinterpret the Austrian assassin's intentions: 'He used his authority as a terrorist to act as a brake upon the proletariat's revolution' (L. Trotskii, *Voina i Revolyutsiya*, Vol. 2, Moscow, 1924, p 293).
43. Cited in N. Trotskii, 'Pis'mo v' Redaktsiyu "L'Humanité"', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 208, 5 October 1915, p 1.
44. N. Trotskii, 'Parvus', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 15, 14 February 1915, p 1.
45. -:, 'Sushchnost' krizisa', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 228, 30 October 1915, p

- 1.
46. -; 'Bez' programmy, bez' perspektiv, bez' kontrolya', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 233 , 6 November 1915, p 1.
47. -; 'Po adresu Longetistov', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 187 , 13 August 1916, p 1.
48. -; 'Proekt' deklaratsii', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 182, 8 August 1916, p 1.
49. -; 'V' komitete dlya vosstanovleniya internats svyazei', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 188, 17 August 1916, p 1.
50. A. Lozovskii, 'Po povodu odnoi deklaratsii', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 189, 18 August 1916, p 1.
51. 'Ot' Redaktsii', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 189, 18 August 1916, p 2.
52. -; 'Frantsuzskii i nemetskii sotsial-patriotizm'. chem' sushchnost' ppozitsii" longetistov?', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 212, 14 September 1916, p 1.
53. -; 'Frantsuzskii i nemetskii sotsial-patriotizm'. II. Longetizm' i nemetskoe "bol'shinstvo", *Nashe Slovo*, No. 213, 15 September 1916, p 1.
54. For a brief and useful account of the spits in British socialism during the war see Kissin, *War and the Marxists*, pp 198-208.
55. -; 'K' Dublinskim' itogam", *Nashe Slovo*, No. 154, 4 July 1916, p 1. See also Trotsky's critique of Renaudel's sympathetic account of British action in Ireland in -; 'Clémence !', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 110, 11 May 1916, p 1.
56. See, for example, 'Novaya Turtsiya', *Kievskaya Mysl'*, No. 3, 3 January 1909; 'Balkanskii vopros i sotsial-demokratii', *Pravda*, No. 15, 1 August 1910; 'Nikola Pashich', *Kievskaya Mysl'*, No. 349, 17 December 1912; 'Vokrug Voiny', *Kievskaya Mysl'*, No. 295, 24 October 1912; 'Bolgariya i russkaya diplomatiya', *Dyen*, No. 38, 9 November 1912; and 'Bukharetskii mir', *Kievskaya Mysl'*, No. 206, 28 July 1913.
57. N. Trotskii, 'Natsiya i khozyaistvo. I', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 130, 3 July 1915, p 1.
58. -; 'Imperializm' i natsional'naya ideya', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 82, 6 May 1915, p 1.
59. N. T., 'Privet' tov. Dobrodzhanu-Gerea', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 100, 29 May 1915, p 3.

60. -.; 'Na Balkanakh. II', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 143, 20 July, 1915, p 1.
61. -.; 'Bolgarskaya sots-dem i voina', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 214, 12 October 1915, p 1.
62. -.; 'Rakovskii o sotsial'-patriotakh'', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 208, 5 October 1915, p 1.
63. -.; 'Khristyu Rakovskii', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 154, 4 July 1916, p 1.
64. Dmitrii Volkogonov, *Trotskii. Politicheskii portret*, Vol. 1, Moscow, 1992, p 96.

CHAPTER NINE

Spain

The fullest account of the several months that Trotsky spent in Spain appeared in *Krasnaya nov'* of July 1922 and January 1926. In these issues the Russian journal published extracts from Trotsky's notebooks, in which he kept a record of events from his expulsion from France to his arrival in New York. These extracts were then reprinted in volume nine of Trotsky's collected works, *Europe at War* (1927), and were subsequently used as the basis of chapter 21, 'Through Spain', of his autobiography *My Life* (1930). In these texts Trotsky recounts the day he spent in San Sebastian, 'where I was delighted by the sea but appalled by the prices'; his rapid departure to Madrid where, after seven days of freedom, he was arrested; his then transfer to Cadiz where, under police surveillance, he was permitted to wander about the town until his fate was sealed: he was to remain in Spain until he could board a boat bound for America. On 20 December he travelled to Barcelona from whence, reunited with his family, on 25 December, he set sail for New York.

Trotsky's 'Spanish interlude' was neither the most comfortable, nor the most exciting, of his life. He could not speak or read Spanish, and several times complained that a Spaniard's knowledge of foreign languages did not extend beyond the question 'Parlez vous francais?'¹ He found the pace of life in Madrid 'lazy', the city 'provincial', the people devoid of 'entrepreneurship, just as in their eyes there is no concentration.'² His main enjoyment was derived from visits to Madrid's museums, 'temples of art', but in the copy work of the young Spanish artists who also frequented the museums he saw no evidence of any current Spanish artistic talent. From Paris he received the address of a 'French socialist-internationalist Depre', a director of an insurance society, with whom he made contact. Depre found Trotsky lodgings, in general working as his 'agent' in Spain: he informed him of the state of Spanish socialism, 'totally under the influence of French social-patriotism. Serious syndicalist opposition in Barcelona',³ took Trotsky food in prison and conducted a campaign on his behalf in the Spanish

socialist press. In prison in Madrid Trotsky mused upon the cruel blow which fate had dealt him:

how did I end-up in prison in Madrid? I did not expect this. True, I was exiled from France. But I lived in Madrid as on a railway platform waiting my train, corresponding with Grimm and Serrati about going to Switzerland via Italy, walking in the museums...a million miles removed from the Spanish police and justice. If one takes into account that this is my first time in Spain...not knowing Spanish, not seeing anyone apart from Depre, not attending any meetings, my arrest is revealed in all its absurdity.⁴

Trotsky's transferral to Cadiz did not bring about any great reversal in his fortunes. Although no longer in prison he was constantly annoyed by his police escort, of whom he penned a damning characterisation: 'It would be difficult to imagine anything more stupid and rotten than this subject. He reads poorly in Spanish, is inarticulate, smokes, spits, smirks at all approaching women, winks, waves goodbye and does not give me any peace.'⁵ He described Cadiz as even more backward than Spain in general, writing in a letter to Depre that 'Cadiz is a town of scientific and literary chastity truly touching - some centuries after Gutenberg!'⁶ and requesting that he send him some books. In the local library Trotsky did discover a store of one German and two dozen French books, all of which had been attacked by book worms! He made notes on Spanish history from early nineteenth-century edition French books, regretting that the masses were prevented from learning of the crimes of the forefathers of the contemporary ruling elites:

the people learn little from history because they do not know it. It reaches them - to the extent that it reaches them at all - through distorted school legends, national and religious holidays and in the lies of the official press. Historical facts which should enlighten the people become, on the contrary, a tool for its further duping.⁷

Indeed, after emerging from an empty museum and being struck by the noisy behaviour of the 'democratic public' on a pier, he commented that 'gigantic jacks will be needed to raise the culture of the mass.'⁸

Readers of *Nachalo*, the newspaper which had been formed to replace the now banned *Nashe Slovo*,⁹ were kept informed of Trotsky's

whereabouts. *Nachalo* of 5 November 1916, for example, carried Trotsky's best wishes to his friends in France from Spain.¹⁰ A short note in *Nachalo* of 18 November was completely censored, but from its headline people would know that 'N. Trotsky is in Cadiz'.¹¹ Eventually the Paris publication was able to present a fuller version of its correspondent's recent experiences when, on 30 November, it translated a piece on Trotsky which had appeared in *El Socialista*, the newspaper of the Spanish Socialist Party.¹² This informed its readers of Trotsky's arrest by the police in Madrid, and of the efforts of Spanish socialists to attain his release. An editorial supplement to the translation said that Trotsky had spent three days in the Madrid prison before being sent to Cadiz. *Nachalo* noted that it was thanks to the interference of Spanish comrades that Trotsky had not immediately been sent to Havana upon arrival in the Spanish port, allowed instead to await a boat for New York, but warned that *El Socialista* bore all responsibility for writing of Trotsky as a 'pacifist'.¹³

Trotsky was able to maintain contact with his editorial colleagues in Paris, and his first report of his 'Spanish impressions' appeared in *Nachalo* at the beginning of December. Although sent from Cadiz, this article focussed mainly upon the events surrounding his stay in Madrid. After hinting that it was the intrigues of international diplomacy that lay behind his imprisonment,¹⁴ Trotsky recounted that when he had asked the Spanish police to explain that cause of his arrest he received the reply, 'Your ideas are too advanced for Spain'. He protested in vain that he had not expounded his views either at meetings or in print in Spain. Of the prison regime Trotsky was at first surprised that one could pay for a better cell and conditions, but he soon came to see the sense of this arrangement: 'Why establish a fictive equality before a harsh regime in society which is totally constructed on class inequality? Moreover, giving privileges to those arrested in the paying part of the prison, the wise administration helps the state budget which in Spain, as is well-known, is more in need of help than in any other place.'¹⁵ From prison Trotsky sent a letter to the Minister of Internal Affairs complaining of the injustice he was suffering.¹⁶

It was on the road to Cadiz that he had earlier suspicions confirmed: the French authorities had telegraphed their Spanish counterparts

warning of a dangerous 'anarcho-terrorist' who had entered Spain via San Sebastian.¹⁷ In Cadiz he avoided being sent to Havana, where he was sure he would be arrested upon arrival, through the intervention of the republican deputy Castrovido. There was one further aspect of his meetings with the Prefect in Cadiz which worried Trotsky. In a letter to Depre he said that the Prefect used a translator from the German consul to communicate with him. 'But,' he warned, 'if by any chance my enemies learn of this "fact" they will be able to use it after their own fashion.'¹⁸ In a light-hearted P.S. to his article in *Nachalo* he took the necessary preventive action: 'P. S. Because the Cadiz Prefect does not speak in a foreign language he invited some German as a translator. Then it turned out that this German is a secretary of the German consul. For the information of the agents and chiefs from *Prizyv*!'¹⁹

Trotsky's concern that he would become the subject of scandalous articles back in Paris because of the 'German connection' was not unfounded. Indeed, his next, and last, contribution to *Nachalo* was a response to a commentary upon his exile from France by the newspaper *L'Action Socialiste*, a translation of which appeared in *Nachalo* of 26 November. *L'Action Socialiste* objected to the way in which the closure of *Nashe Slovo* and Trotsky's expulsion had received sympathetic treatment in several French publications, and even among some deputies in the National Council. Were people not aware that the 'brave' *Nashe Slovo* had afforded material assistance to the Germans with the aim of bringing about Russia's defeat? Did they not know of Trotsky's true character, most notably revealed in his dealings with Guesde, Sembat and Thomas?:

This person [Trotsky] at the outset of the war wrote a quick tempered brochure in support of the Entente. Then this person was seen roaming about Guesde's and Sembat's anterior, supplied with a letter of recommendation from Plekhanov, in order to receive permission to go to the front as a correspondent of a Russian journal. As soon as this request was granted this person...poured pure insults over Guesde, Sembat and Thomas.²⁰

Articles defending *Nashe Slovo* and Trotsky from *L'Action Socialiste's* critique subsequently appeared in *Nachalo*.²¹ Trotsky's

own defence was printed in issue 74 of 27 December.²² He expressed puzzlement at the relevance of some of his adversary's statements: why should a professional journalist not appeal to ministers with a request to visit the front?; did journalists not have to visit interiors in order to seek appointments? However, his main objection was that he had never sent a request of any sort to Guesde and Sembat. Indeed, he had seen the former only once, from the window of a comrade's flat, and the latter never. He then explained how, when in Zurich, he had requested a letter of introduction from Plekhanov to Guesde should he ever need to turn to the latter for help. But, after discovering the views that both men had adopted after the start of the war, he resolved not to use Plekhanov's letter, even ripping it up and recounting this episode only to Martov and Vladimirov.²³ In conclusion he recommended that people read the extracts of his German brochure which had been published in *Nashe Slovo* to discover what 'material assistance' he had attempted to afford Germany.

Thus, although Trotsky described his Spanish episode as 'non-political' he remained at the centre of controversy both in Spain and in France. In February 1917 *Nachalo* answered readers requests for information about Trotsky and his family by printing short notices of their safe arrival in New York, and the warm welcome given to them by representatives of socialist groups, including the editors of *Novyi Mir*.²⁴ Trotsky once again found a Russian socialist publication in which he could expound his views.

Notes

1. L. Trotskii, *Evropa v Voine*, Moscow, 1927, p 267.
2. Ibid., p 263.
3. Ibid., p 265.
4. Ibid., pp 271-272.
5. Ibid., pp 289-290. At the same time Trotsky did favourably compare the friendly, attentive, but lax, regime of one of his Spanish police 'minders' with the professional attentiveness of the French secret police. (see Trotskii, *Evropa v Voine*, pp 293-294).
6. 'Twenty Letters of Leon Trotsky', *The Socialist*, 24 July 1919, p 280.
7. Trotskii, Op. cit., p 312
8. Ibid., p 305.
9. Trotsky wrote a satirical piece on the banning of *Nashe Slovo* under his new pseudonym of En' for *Nachalo*. See: En', 'Prestuplenie i nakazanie', *Nachalo*, No. 2, 1 October 1916, p 1.
10. -:, 'Privet' druž'yam', *Nachalo*, No. 31, 5 November 1916, p 1.
11. -:, 'N. Trotskii v' kadikse', *Nachalo*, No. 42, 18 November 1916, p 1.
12. -:, 'O tov. TROTSKOM', *Nachalo*, No. 52, 30 November 1916, p 1.
13. Trotsky had written a critique of pacifism which appeared in *Nashe Slovo* of 1 and 2 of September 1916. (-:, 'Garantii mira. (K' kharakteristike patsifizma) I.', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 201, 1 September 1916, pp 1-2 & -:, 'Garantii mira. (K' kharakteristike patsifizma) II.', *Nashe Slovo*, No. 202, 2 September 1916, p 1). Here he distinguished two varieties of pacifism: one, bourgeois, which argued that a lasting peace could be constructed on the basis of capitalism through international law; and another, socialist, which accepted that wars were a product of capitalist contradictions but thought it possible to regulate relations between imperialist countries through arbitration courts and disarmament programmes until the arrival of socialism. Trotsky

rejected both bourgeois and socialist pacifism as 'utopian': 'no treaties and no arbitration courts can, however, stop the growth of the productive forces, their onslaught on the framework of the national state and the desire of the latter to widen the arena of exploitation for national capital with the help of militarism.' In conclusion Trotsky cited from a resolution of the Kienthal Conference which spoke of the illusions of pacifism and which insisted that peace could only be guaranteed through the establishment of socialism. (For this resolution from Kienthal see 'The Attitude of the Proletariat toward the Question of Peace. [Resolution of the Kienthal Conference]', Olga Hess Gankin & H. H. Fisher, *The Bolsheviks and the World War*, Stanford, 1940, pp 421-424).

14. In his notebook in prison Trotsky speculated that it was French pressure on Spain, then in dependence upon the Entente, which had led to his arrest. In turn, the demands of tsarist diplomacy lay behind France's actions. Trotsky thought that he was being held in prison to prepare his transfer to a Russian court and resolved to start a campaign in the press via Depre. (see Trotskii, *Evropa v Voine*, pp 279-280). In a letter to Depre of 29 November Trotsky claimed that tsarist agents had planted copies of *Nashe Slovo* on Russian soldiers who had killed their colonel at Marsailles to justify his expulsion from France. (see 'Twenty Letters of Leon Trotsky', *The Socialist*, 31 July 1919, p 288).
15. En', 'Ispanskiya "vpechatelniya". Pochti-arabskaya skazka', *Nachalo*, No. 54, 2 December 1916, p 1.
16. For a copy of this letter see Trotskii, *Evropa v voine*, pp 274-276.
17. This was also propagated by certain sections of the Spanish press. In a letter to Depre of 13 November Trotsky recommended that legal action be undertaken against the Spanish conservative paper *Accion* which had labelled Trotsky a 'terrorist'. (see 'Twenty Letters of Leon Trotsky', *The Socialist*, July 24 1919).
18. 'Twenty Letters of Leon Trotsky', Ibid.
19. En', Op. cit, p 2.
20. Cited in -:, "'Sotsialisticheskoe deistvie'", *Nachalo*, No. 49, 26

November 1916, p 1. In a letter of 9 December Trotsky speculated that his old enemy Aleksinskii was the author of the unsigned article in *L'Action Socialiste*. (see 'Twenty Letters of Leon Trotsky', *The Socialist*, 7 August 1919, p 296).

21. See, for example, -:, 'Po povodu gnusnostei "Action Socialiste"', *Nachalo*, No. 59, 8 December 1916, p 1; -:, 'V' zashchitu odnogo izganannika', *Nachalo*, No. 67, 17 December 1916, p 1.
22. N. Trotskii, 'Vnusheniya "khefov"', otkroveniia "akhentov'", *Nachalo*, No. 74, 27 December 1916, p 1.
23. Vladimiorov sent a letter to *Nachalo* confirming Trotsky's version of events, claiming that other matters had prevented him from revealing the falsity of *L'Action Socialiste's* claims earlier. See L. Vladimirov', 'Pismo v' Redaktsiyu', *Nachalo*, No. 75, 28 December 1916, p 2.
24. See, for example, -:, 'Tov. Trotskii v' N'yu-Iorke', *Nachalo*, No. 108, 6 February 1917, p 2; -:, 'Tov. Trotskii v' N'yu-Iorke', *Nachalo*, No. 116, 16 February 1916, p 1. The latter piece was partially censored.

CHAPTER TEN

America

The boat which carried Trotsky and his family out of Spain pulled into New York harbour in the early hours of 14 January 1917. The Bronsteins' arrival was not unexpected. From Cadiz Trotsky sent letters to the editors of the New York émigré socialist newspaper, *Novyi Mir*, informing them of the outcome of his Spanish episode. On 6th December 1916 *Novyi Mir* passed on to its readers the news which it had received from one of Trotsky's most recent communications: he was to be expelled from Spain and was intending to come to New York, America's port of call for many European immigrants.¹ Upon safe arrival, *Novyi Mir* gave him a warm welcome, declaring that 'America has acquired a mainstay fighter of the revolutionary International.'² In his autobiography Trotsky described his occupation in the United States as that of a 'revolutionary socialist'.³ Indeed, twenty-four hours after setting foot on American soil his first article appeared in *Novyi Mir*.

In 'Long live Struggle!' Trotsky outlined how the war had transformed Europe into an 'arresting company' in which tsarist methods of censorship and oppression reigned on both sides of the trenches. However, alongside this, he noted that, from the point of view of a revolutionary socialist, changes of a more optimistic character had also taken place. Most importantly, in response to the most bloody and shameful war in history, the masses were increasingly becoming discontented and more and more acquiring a critical analysis. The Europe that he had recently left was, he felt, ripe for upheaval: 'the combination of concentrated hatred with critical thoughts is terrible for today's rulers of Europe for it means revolution.'⁴ One might have thought that a professional revolutionary would be loath to leave this situation behind. Would not landing in America mean the loss both of an opportunity to lead a revolution and of the analysis appropriate to it? But Trotsky's move to the 'sufficiently old New World' did not lead him to abandon the views which he had formed in Paris. He assured his American readership that the United States faced the same 'problems,

dangers and obligations' to be found in Europe. He could thus enter the fray of American socialism fully equipped to do battle.

One of his first opportunities to enlighten an American audience of what lay in store for them was during a speech of 25 January to an international meeting of welcome, in which he expounded upon the connection between war and revolution. Trotsky delivered many talks in New York, the vast majority of which remained unpublished. We are therefore fortunate that Trotsky included the text of his 25 January lecture in *War and Revolution*. He argued that one could now trace several consequences of the outbreak of war which, taken together, were leading to revolutionary upheavals. To begin with, societies had become more and more split into two hostile camps, 'the rich had become richer and the poor poorer.' Added to this, state coffers across Europe were now empty, thus excluding the possibility of the ruling classes acquiescing the masses with further social reforms; 'people are becoming poorer not only materially but also in illusions.' Expanding upon this latter point, Trotsky discerned a new and, from his point of view, exciting 'mental state'. Individuals, he claimed, were no longer dominated by routine and were prepared to be daring; in other words, they had acquired the qualities of revolutionaries. Finally there was an international group of socialist saviours - Liebknecht in Germany, MacLean in Britain, Höglund in Sweden, Rakovsky in Romania and so on - which, faced with the hostility of bourgeois institutions and the betrayal of former comrades, had for long been in the minority but would soon be leading the discontented majority to revolution. At the outset of his speech Trotsky compared an America rich in material goods, although sold for 'outrageous prices', with an impoverished Europe, and he worried whether his native continent would survive. His concluding remarks were more optimistic: 'The coming epoch will be an epoch of social revolution. I carried this conviction out of a Europe ravaged, burnt and drained. Here, in America, I welcome you under the banner of the coming social revolution!'⁵

Trotsky wrote a lengthy account of the last two and a half years of his life in Europe which appeared over several issues, spread over several months, of *Novyi Mir*.⁶ Published under the subheading 'From a Diary', these articles were a mixture of autobiographical incident,

biographical sketches and social and political commentary. The first category included, for instance, a transcript of Trotsky's conversation of August 1914 with the head of the police in Vienna after which he decided to catch the first train to Zurich; being trapped in a street in Paris during a Zeppelin attack and so on. The figures who found themselves in the second category could not have been flattered by what Trotsky wrote of them. Briand, for example, was described as a 'past master in the art of wire-pulling, a trafficker in the lost souls of the French Parliament, an instigator of bribery and corruption.' The final category, social and political commentary, consisted of Trotsky's thoughts on the effects of the war and on various socialists' responses to it. He mentioned meeting a Serbian revolutionary who had been involved in the plans to assassinate Archduke Ferdinand. He recounted the young man's despair at his country's then fate as a pawn in the diplomatic manoeuvres of the great powers, in this story highlighting the imperialist nature of the war. His description of Vienna after Ferdinand's death was full of hatred for the 'bourgeois press' which had 'set about the task of working up the popular feelings'. At the same time he regretted that this 'irrefutable proof of the moral degeneration of bourgeois society' had been obscured by influential socialists who had come out in support of the war. Unfortunately, Trotsky claimed, the betrayal of socialism by socialists, while a surprise for many, was not unexpected for him. During his stay in Vienna from 1907-14 he had had ample opportunity to acquaint himself with the 'purely chauvinistic nature' of *Arbeiterzeitung's* editorials on international affairs. What shock, then, the Austrian party's patriotic response to its government's war declaration? Although Trotsky said that he did not expect Plekhanov to go so far as an exponent of national militarism, he stated that in the pre-war era he already had reason to suspect Plekhanov's internationalism: 'in 1913, when I was at Bucharest, Rakovsky told me that just at the time of the Russo-Japanese war, Plekhanov had assured him...that in his opinion the idea that socialism should..."work for national defeat"...was an importation into the party that had been brought about by the Hebrew intellectuals.'⁷ In Austria, Switzerland and France Trotsky witnessed the same split between the social-patriotic right, the passive centre which acted as an appendage to the right, and

the minority international left. He stressed the wide gulf which separated the latter from the others, writing that 'social-patriotism debases men morally and mentally,' and left the reader in no doubt as to the seriousness of the battle between social-patriotism and internationalism. The war had brought forth hopes which it could not fulfil and the resulting disillusionment of the masses could only be used to the advantage of revolution if socialists remained true to their faith.

Trotsky drew upon his diary, on this occasion written during a train journey across France, for his next contribution to *Novyi Mir*. Entitled 'In a French Carriage' this two-part article was similar in its portrayal of the realities of war to the war sketches which he had written for *Kievskaya Mysl'*. The first instalment begins with the train entering Lyon station. Immediately the habits of the trenches were on view for all to see: a group of naked soldiers stood washing themselves on the platform. The reader was then brought into closer acquaintance with life in the trenches through the experiences of a French miner-syndicalist with whom Trotsky conversed *en route*. The miner reported that most soldiers in the trenches were of peasant origin. Industrial workers were engaged in war production, while the petty bourgeoisie became officers or joined organisations in the rear. He then described the psychological difficulties trench warfare brought peasants, used to life above ground with a full horizon in view. The miners, at least, worked below ground even in peace time, and were familiar with the dangers of explosives and poisonous gasses. However, the one aspect of the war which was new to all - whether miners, peasants, soldiers, officers, French or Germans - was the scope and character of battle: 'The most awful thing is the uninterrupted firing of hundreds of different guns. Each sound is terrible after its own fashion and all, devoid of tempo and rhythm, come together in an undescribable and unbearable crashing...from which one cannot escape...you are led to a state verging on madness.'⁸

In the second and final section of 'In a French Carriage' Trotsky focussed upon the positive psychological consequences of trench warfare. On the train he noticed the movement of thousands of people of all nationalities. He contrasted this to the pre-war era in which, on the one hand the industrial workers had come to occupy the most

important strategic position in the economies of the advanced nations; and, on the other, old social classes, peasants and the petty bourgeoisie, characterised by a limited outlook and suspicion of all that was new, had retained a leading influence in social and political matters. Since August 1914, however, peasants who had not been in a town for decades had visited several in the course of several months. Trotsky expressed his conviction that this upheaval could not but create a psychological transformation. Specifically, he claimed that the war was destroying 'traditional fetishisms'.⁹ The post-war world would be inhabited by a new human type, full of criticism and daring, ready to introduce rationalism in production, politics and economics. This, of course, meant socialism.

The articles which Trotsky produced from his diary for *Novyi Mir* could not have brought much comfort either to a government considering declaring war or to those who would have to go forth and fight. However, at the time of the appearance of Trotsky's 'war notes' it was becoming increasingly likely that America would enter the then world conflict. At the end of January 1917 the German government announced it was going to engage in unrestricted submarine warfare from February 1. It took this decision in the hope that Britain would be starved into submission. At the same time, however, it meant breaking the terms of American neutrality.¹⁰ Interventionists immediately called upon President Wilson to declare war on Germany. In the hope that the Kaiser could be persuaded to change his mind, Wilson at first opted for severing diplomatic relations with Germany, which he announced on 3 February. Several days following this announcement the first of a series of articles in which Trotsky examined the growing tensions in America through the prism of his European experiences appeared in *Novyi Mir*.

In 'A Repetition of things past', for example, Trotsky claimed that America, a country without its own traditions and ideology, had many times provided a home for ideas which had exhausted themselves in Europe. Previously this had involved political and religious ideas; now it was the legend of a 'war of liberation'. He advised Americans to read the European newspapers of late July and early August 1914. From these sources they would gain an understanding of the aims of the

patriotic campaign that the American press was currently waging. Namely, the press barons had to convince the people that its government was concerned about 'freedom' and 'justice' and that it was reacting to the aggressive acts of others. At first this 'preparatory work for war' would hold out the possibility of a peaceful resolution to the crisis, publicising the good intentions of the home government in humble terms. Only when the plans for mobilisation were complete would 'the devilish chauvinistic music' be played to its fullest extent. It was by proceeding in this way that Trotsky claimed the government and the press hoped awkward questions concerning the real reasons for American intervention would be avoided:

And how about the war deliveries which the German submarines threaten? And what of the billions of profit falling with a Europe bleeding to death?...Who is able to speak of this at a time of great national enthusiasm! If the New York stock market is prepared for great sacrifices (the people will bear them) then, it goes without saying, that this is not in the name of contemptible money, but in the cause of a great truth...how to call it? - morals. It is not the fault of the stock market if, in serving eternal justice, it receives 100% and more in profit!¹¹

The response he demanded from American socialists and advanced workers was to raise the 'mighty melody of the International'.

One of the main messages which Trotsky had propagated in Europe was that the tune of the International had not only to be 'mighty' but also 'pure'. In other words, socialists had to hold an internationalist position and have no truck with social-patriotism. Trotsky repeated this message to American colleagues through the pages of *Novyi Mir*. In 'In the school of war',¹² for instance, he recounted how the honour of socialism had been saved in Europe by, among others, Liebknecht, MacLean and Rakovsky. He held up the Italian party as an example of how influence over the masses could be retained and strengthened if socialists occupied an anti-war position. The question facing American socialists was: Would they accept the lessons to be learnt from Europe? In a subsequent article Trotsky stated that the authority of the Second International could not be cited as a justification for socialists advocating the cause of national self-defence. At pre-war meetings

Kautsky, described as the 'leading theoretician' of the Second International, rejected national self-defence along with the notions of 'defensive' and 'aggressive' wars in disputes with Bebel. Trotsky admitted that, if one studied the formal resolutions of the Second International, one would come across contradictory statements. However, the Basel Congress of 1912, called specifically to discuss a proper socialist response to war, was unequivocal: 'preserve between yourselves inseverable ties during war, fight together for its hasty conclusion and use the growing war crisis and dissatisfaction of the mass to speedily overthrow the capitalist order'.¹³ Finally, in 'Two Warring Camps', Trotsky highlighted the pitfalls of Longuetist tactics, i.e., to be 'simultaneously for the capitalist homeland and for the proletariat',¹⁴ to show that social-patriotism and revolutionary internationalism were two mutually exclusive principles.¹⁵

Trotsky did not limit himself to pointing out the lessons which recent events in the European socialist movement held for American socialists. In New York he actively engaged in polemics with local organisations for the application of a revolutionary socialist perspective. In a commentary upon a recent anti-war meeting held in the Carnegie Hall, for example, he criticised the Socialist Party for organising this with a pacifist group 'The Friends of Peace'. From an 'organisational-political' point of view, he argued, it was not expedient to share a platform with pacifists. After all, pacifists were well-known as people who would publicise their opposition to war until it was declared, after which they would announce their 'patriotism' and encourage the masses to conduct the war to a successful conclusion in the name of 'peace and justice'. By standing alongside pacifists, if only temporarily, Trotsky stated that the masses would be brought into confusion at a time when 'clear class consciousness' was urgently necessary. Moreover, he claimed the mood of the Carnegie Hall gathering, overwhelmingly revolutionary socialist, had been weakened 'both psychologically and politically' as two resolutions, one pacifist and one socialist, were unanimously accepted by the same show of hands; anyone reconstructing the meeting's atmosphere from the resolutions would be led astray. Some good had, however, come out of the meeting. Trotsky welcomed the socialist resolution's insistence that

American intervention in the war would 'only serve the egoistic interests of the capitalists of this country...to feed upon the unfortunate war in Europe', and that the proletariat should 'apply all the means at its disposal against the attempt to involve America in the war.'¹⁶ The duty of Socialist Party leaders to vote against war credits and to call for revolutionary action against the war campaign had now been made clear. For Trotsky, one had to ensure that they carried-out this 'great obligation'.

It was, however, events at the bottom of the Socialist Party's structure which brought forth Trotsky's next rebuke to social-patriotism in the American socialist movement. In a short note in *Novyi Mir* he recounted how, while attending a Socialist Party branch meeting, Anna Ingberman cited Klara Zetkin, the German left revolutionary, in support of the view that socialists could join government-led military organisations.¹⁷ Trotsky stated that Ingberman had every right to draw upon Scheidemann, Plekhanov and Vandervelde to achieve her aims but it would be better if she left Zetkin, currently serving a term of imprisonment for anti-war activities, in peace. Ingberman then sent a letter protesting Trotsky's report which, along with his reply, was published in *Novyi Mir* of 16 February.

Ingberman disputed Trotsky's version of events, declaring that 'in aspiring to show his knightly feelings for Klara Zetkin, comrade Trotsky completely forgot what actually occurred at the meeting.' In actual fact, she claimed, nobody had opposed the proposition that it was inadmissible for socialists to voluntarily sign-up for the army and navy. What was discussed was the issue of whether comrade doctors and nurses who served in the Red Cross should be excluded from the party. It was in this context that she had repeated Zetkin's words to her that, 'my husband and my son, doctors, will certainly join a medical organisation: this is our duty', not with the intention of throwing Zetkin's internationalism into doubt, but to show that one could participate in the Red Cross and hold party membership. To Trotsky's claim that Zetkin is 'one of us' Ingberman retorted: 'It is possible to not be with you, comrade Trotsky, and all the same remain a true internationalist.'¹⁸

Trotsky countered Ingberman's letter with the claim that she had missed the central issue of the status of the Red Cross, which she

obviously accepted as a neutral body. However, he advised that if one turned to the source from which Zetkin's view of this organisation could be revealed, the journal of the German left, *Internationale*, a different picture would emerge. This publication clearly stated that socialists should afford assistance to wounded soldiers through their own and not state organisations, of which the Red Cross was one of many.¹⁹ Thus, even if one accepted Ingerman's story, she still had no right to cite Zetkin. In his conclusion Trotsky responded to Ingerman's accusation that he was claiming internationalism for himself. He stated that before this issue could be resolved Ingerman would have to declare her internationalist principles. As matters stood she was an 'intermediary element' which had 'cited a personal conversation with Zetkin in defence of a tendency to which Zetkin herself is irreconcilably hostile.'²⁰

If Trotsky viewed the Red Cross as part of the imperialist war machine one can well imagine the disgust he must have felt for the Council of National Defence and its Advisory Commission. These bodies had been created by Congress in August 1916 to coordinate industries and resources for national security and to prepare for their application in the event of war. The Advisory Commission had a series of sub-committees, one of which, the Labour Committee headed by Samuel Gompers, had responsibility for, among other things, drawing up plans to enrol skilled labour in industrial reserves and to suggest adjustments to employment problems to guarantee uninterrupted war work.²¹ Trotsky analysed Gompers and his Committee in 'A Sheep's Constitution'. He condemned Gompers as a social-patriot who was attempting to put a whole generation of the proletariat at the service of militarism. Of course, he pointed out, Gompers claimed that the interests of the workers would be protected by the Council of National Defence - capital would bear the burdens of war and so on. But, asked Trotsky, what guarantee could Gompers offer that these promises would be honoured? Trotsky himself foresaw a very different scenario: 'with the first practical collision with the unions the ruling classes of this country will say the same thing to them as the British, German and French ruling classes said in similar circumstances: "the defence of the homeland, on your own admission, is the first duty of the proletariat; in

this case in fulfilling this duty you do not have the right to make demands". Gompersism, defined by Trotsky as the 'desire to achieve for the proletariat a 'beneficial' industrial constitution on the basis of the immunity of capitalist exploitation', was labelled the deadly enemy of the proletariat against which each internationalist should struggle with all his might. Fortunately, according to Trotsky, conditions had never been better for winning the workers over from Gompersism, for during war the bourgeoisie would not be able to afford the reforms with which they pacified the workers at times of peace. He predicted that the gap between expectations of a better life and the poverty which war would bring would create minds receptive to revolutionary propaganda. Socialists could use this to their advantage only if they repeated the following messages: 'No concessions to the state, to militarism and to patriotism. No deals with Gompersism.'²²

As part of the struggle for revolutionary internationalism Trotsky himself engaged in polemics with the newspapers *Forverts*, *Russkii Golos*, and *Russkoe Slovo*.

Forverts was a powerful Jewish daily with a circulation of 150,000 by 1917. It was edited by Abraham Cahan and had in its own ten storey high building overlooking the heart of New York's Jewish quarter.²³ The paper gave Trotsky an enthusiastic welcome when he arrived in New York and he contributed four articles to it over the course of January and February. The publication of a fifth piece, ironically enough as it turned out on social-patriotism, was prevented when Trotsky broke with the newspaper at the beginning of March. Joseph Nedava, basing his account upon a conversation with David Shub in New York in July 1969, gives the following version of the dispute:

The incident was brought about by the State Department's exposure, on March 1, 1917, of a German plot to embroil Mexico in the war against the United States, promising to Mexico the return of New Mexico and parts of California as a prize. The disclosure aroused the wrath of even the pro-German *Forward* [*Forverts*], which then printed on the front page an announcement that 'if Germany can really commit such an idiotic move of diplomacy, then every citizen of America will fight to the last drop of his blood to protect the great American republic.' A

few hours after the publication of this statement, Trotsky stormed into Cahan's office on East Broadway, and an angry exchange of words passed between them. Trotsky then severed his connection with *Forward*.²⁴

If Trotsky did go to Cahan's office, he left behind his article, for when he opened his campaign against *Forverts* from the pages of *Novyi Mir* on 6 March, he demanded the return of his manuscript.²⁵ He immediately sought to qualify his earlier cooperation with *Forverts*, announcing that he always knew that this publication was not fully internationalist. He had, he claimed, contributed articles to it as this was appropriate to the discussion nature of January and February and, in any case, colleagues who knew the paper better than he and who translated sections of it for him had advised him to do so. However, the increasing displays of hostility between Germany and the United States, together with *Forverts* statement that Americans should fight to the last drop of blood, had changed the situation. Trotsky thought that the proletariat should struggle against the imperialist homeland and he therefore stood on the other side of the barricade to *Forverts*. To avoid the possible confusion that he shared an analysis with the Jewish daily he requested that publication of his piece be stopped and the manuscript returned.²⁶

In a subsequent note in *Novyi Mir* Trotsky reported that he had received numerous letters from Jewish workers approving his stand against *Forverts*. He pointed to these letters, and the anti-'national defence' resolutions of a local party branch meeting, as evidence that *Forverts* had lost touch with its readers' views. Encamped within its ten storey headquarters he accused the Jewish newspaper of establishing a dictatorship over its readership, of not reporting the latest party decisions which were obviously uncomfortable for it, and of social-patriotic betrayal. For Trotsky the time had come for a 'cleansing of the ranks'.²⁷ He urged Jewish workers to recapture their newspaper and expel Cahan from the party, assuring them that in these tasks they could rely on the full support of *Novyi Mir*.²⁸

During his conflict with the Jewish daily Trotsky several times mentioned his reliance upon friends to translate from Yiddish into Russian. He had no such difficulties in the campaign he waged against

the 'non-party' newspapers produced for New York's Russian colony, *Russkii Golos* and *Russkoe Slovo*. His first commentary upon these publications highlighted their differing points of view on the likelihood of American intervention in the war. Ivan Okuntsov, writing in *Russkii Golos*, thought that opposition from Wall Street would keep America neutral, whereas Dymov, a correspondent of *Russkoe Golos*, thought that pressure from the same source, which had made super-profits from the 'blood of the people', would lead America into battle. Trotsky said that, however comforting Okuntsov's view was, he had to agree with Dymov. This left him with only one 'reader's difficulty'. An editorial of the self same issue of *Russkoe Slovo* in which Dymov's article appeared viewed America's entry into the war not as a desire to make more money, but as a 'guarantee of progress'. 'Why,' concluded Trotsky, 'had the editorial and the correspondent agreed to lead their public into confusion?'²⁹

When Trotsky next took up his pen to write of his 'non-party' protagonists it was not to accuse them of bewildering their readership, but of 'indecenty'. The cause of Trotsky's charge was the appearance of adverts, placed in *Russkii Golos* and *Russkoe Slovo* by the New York Council of National Defence, urging citizens to add their name to a petition to be sent to President Wilson recommending American intervention. Previously, he noted, neither of these newspapers had joined in the efforts to whip the population into a patriotic fury; they knew that the Russian colony did not want war. What had made the newspapers change their track, Trotsky claimed, was money: 'In such critical moments one gets to know the real value of people, ideas, parties and publications...when gold was added to the ideological preparation of the people *Russkoe Slovo* and *Russkii Golos* found their place.'³⁰

When America eventually officially entered World War I on 6 April 1917 Trotsky had already left America. Before his departure had had, however, written critical analyses both of the reasons for America's intervention and of its likely consequences.

In his address of war to the American people President Wilson declared, 'The present German submarine warfare against commerce is a warfare against mankind. The world must be made safe for

democracy.'³¹ Seizing upon these words Trotsky, in an article in *Novyi Mir*, stated that if one took them at face value America should have long ago declared war on Britain for its blockade of Austria-Germany. What prevented this step from being taken, according to Trotsky, was that it would have resulted in the loss of the Entente orders for war supplies from which American industry was making super-profits. In turn, Wilson was so upset by the recent German blockade not because it violated any principles, but because it effectively put a halt to Entente orders without replacing them with their equivalent from Berlin. America was now deprived of all war trade and its profits. This left her in a position of real neutrality which, Trotsky argued, she could not sustain because since August 1914 her industry had been increasingly and then finally restructured to serve military demands. It had, in other words, become a war economy. He then dismissed the possibility that American soldiers could change the military situation in Europe, pointing out that if the mightiest (British) fleet in the world could not guarantee a free passage for goods then nothing could. For him, it was the bosses of finance capital and their interests which dictated American foreign policy and, at the then current moment, this meant war: 'a colossal new market will immediately be opened for American ammunition factory bosses in America itself...they need a "national danger" so as to be able to place the tower of Babel of war industry on the shoulders of the American people.'³²

At the same time as laying bare the profit motives which demanded war, in other articles in *Novyi Mir* Trotsky argued that the real winner from American intervention would not be the capitalist bosses, but revolution. When he summarised his New York experiences in his autobiography Trotsky mentioned the conveniences in his flat (including electric lights, a bath and telephone) that Europeans were unused to.³³ In one of his comments upon daily life in New York at that time, however, he wrote a moving description of the effects of the drudgery, out of which American capital built its achievements, suffered by ordinary people. He noted, during a rush hour ride on the metro, a humble and depressed crowd whose only solace lay in chewing gum.³⁴ The war, he predicted in other writings, would show the proletariat that only they, through social revolution, could resolve the problems that

beset capitalism and which had led to America's entry into World War One.³⁵ He advised all socialists to 'prepare the soldiers for revolution!'³⁶

After Nicholas II's abdication of the Russian throne in March 1917 anyone seeking confirmation of the link Trotsky constructed between war and revolution had a ready and current example to hand. Events in Russia continued to occupy Trotsky while he was in New York both before, but especially after, the collapse of the monarchy.

He submitted two articles to *Novyi Mir* on Russia prior to Nicholas's fall from power. The first was to commemorate the twelfth anniversary of Bloody Sunday. Calling revolutionary anniversaries days for 'great study' as well as for remembrance, Trotsky enumerated the lessons to be learnt from the events of 1905: the proletariat was the only revolutionary class in Russia and all calls for it to cooperate with the bourgeoisie were a hopeless utopia.³⁷ In his second pre-revolution piece on Russia he highlighted the tsar's cynical view of the Duma, and the latter's willingness to fulfil its masters needs. He achieved this primarily through an imaginary conversation between a Russian and foreign diplomat, in which the former stated that the tsar would recall the Duma so as to receive another foreign loan, upon the receipt of which the Russian parliament would once again be closed. 'Thus,' Trotsky remarked without further comment, 'Russian politics marches along the path of progress.'³⁸

Three points had for long been part of Trotsky's analysis of the course a revolutionary upheaval in Russia would take: first, it would be led by the proletariat; second, its policies would be socialist in content; and, third, it would call forth, either by inspiration or by force of arms, a spate of revolutions across the whole of Europe. During World War One Trotsky modified this analysis somewhat, adding that the United States of Europe would be the state form through which the European revolution would realise itself, and that revolution would occur first of all in Germany.³⁹ News of the fall of tsarism obviously confounded Trotsky's last prediction, but for the most part he was able to retain his prognoses for interpreting the events taking place in his homeland.

According to Trotsky, it was street demonstrations by the workers, eventually backed by the army, that had brought about the tsar's

abdication. The bourgeoisie, led by his old antagonist Professor Milyukov, had not wanted the monarchy to fall. On the contrary, he claimed, the liberals looked to the tsar as the most trustful defender of property against the proletariat, and to the institution of monarchy as the form of government best suited to conduct an imperialist foreign policy. For Trotsky, the liberals had been *forced* to form a Provisional Government by two pressures, one external and the other internal. From outside the country the British, French and American money markets had told the Russian bourgeoisie to assume power because they did not want Nicholas II to conclude a separate peace with Germany, and the bourgeoisie was the only group that would continue the war. Then, the bourgeoisie itself was afraid that its responsibility for the war would be revealed if a workers' government called a halt to the hostilities. However, Trotsky argued that the bourgeoisie could not retain power for long. The fall of the Provisional Government was guaranteed because it could not satisfy the people's demands for peace, bread and land. He noted that a workers' committee had already been formed to 'protest at the liberals attempts to misappropriate the revolution and betray the people to the monarchy',⁴⁰ and he called upon it to wrest total control in its hands to take Russia out of the war and to resolve the agrarian question. For Trotsky any other outcome would mean that the revolution had failed, since only a 'Revolutionary Workers' Government...will be able to secure the fate of the revolution and the working class.' In turn he looked to the establishment of a revolutionary workers' government in Russia as an example for the German proletariat to follow. Otherwise, he worried, Wilhelm II would use the Russian proletariat's backing of its bourgeoisie to rekindle the German workers' enthusiasm for war. He raised the possibility of revolution not spreading from one country to another only to dismiss it. Revolution would leap from Russia to Germany either by example or by triumphant Russian workers liberating their German comrades by force of arms; or it would jump from Germany to Russia by the same means. Trotsky was so convinced that the whole of Europe was simmering with discontent, that 'the war has turned the whole of Europe into a powder-keg of social revolution',⁴¹ that he was prepared for all eventualities.

10.1 Conclusion

It was in this buoyant mood that Trotsky and his family set sail from New York for Russia on 27 March 1917.⁴² He could look back upon his time in America with a certain amount of satisfaction. He had argued for a revolutionary socialist analysis of and response to current events in print and at a host of meetings.⁴³ On the other hand his campaign against social-patriotism had not stopped America entering the war, but Trotsky must have realised that his journalism could not do this. Besides, he now welcomed war as a harbinger of revolution, without, of course, recommending defeatism!

No, Trotsky's biggest disappointments lay in the future. We now know that his hopes for a pan-European revolutionary government in the form of a United States of Europe were not realised. The German workers did not manage to seize power, despite the fact that the Bolsheviks overturned the Provisional Government in November 1917, and despite Trotsky's efforts to reveal the imperialist nature of the war through his 'no peace, no war' strategy during the peace negotiations with the Kaiser's government. It was perhaps quite fitting that the man who had argued that the proletariat needed to halt the war before it could turn cannons against the class enemy should have negotiated Russia's exit from World War One. However, this thesis has focussed upon Trotsky's thoughts and activities while he was a revolutionary in exile and the story of how, why and in what context his association with the 'war to end all wars' came to an end lies beyond the scope of this present study.

Notes

1. -:, 'Trotskii vyslan' iz' ispanii, sobiraetsya v' N'yu-Iorke', *Novyi Mir*, No. 851, 6 December 1916, p 1.
2. -:, 'Tov. Trotskii v' N'yu-Iorke', *Novyi Mir*, No. 885, 15 January 1917, p 1.
3. L. Trotskii, *Moya zhizn'*, Moscow, 1991, p 262.
4. N. Trotskii, 'Da zdravstvuet' bor'ba!', *Novyi Mir*, No. 886, 16 January 1917, p 4.
5. L. Trotskii, 'Pod znamenem sotsial'noi revolyutsii. (Rech' na internatsional'nom n'yu-Iorckskom "mitinge vstrechi" 25 Yanvary 1917 g.)', *Voina i Revolyutsiya*, Vol. 2, Moscow, 1924, p 368.
6. N. Trotskii, 'Za dva s' polovinoi goda voyny v' Evrope (iz' dnevnika). I. Serbskie terroristy i frantsuzskie "osvoboditeli" - Venskiya nastroyeniya v' pervyie dni voyny', *Novyi Mir*, No. 895, 26 January 1917, p 4; N. Trotskii, 'Za dva...II. Nastroyeniya v' avstriiskoi s-d - Viktor' Adler' - Ot'ezde v' Tsyurikh', *Novyi Mir*, No. 903, 5 February 1917, p 2; Lev' N. Trotskii, 'Za dva...III. "predatel'stvo nemtsev" - Plekhanov' - Greilikh', *Novyi Mir*, No. 914, 17 February 1917, p 4; Lev' N. Trotskii, 'Za dva... IV. Shveitsurskaya sotsialdemokratya - "Gryutli" - "Eintrakt" - Frits' Platten' - Nemetskaya broshyura "Voina i Internatsional'" - Sotsialisticheskaya pripiska k' shtatu', *Novyi Mir*, No. 928, 6 March 1917, p 4; Lev' N. Trotskii, 'Za dva...V. Pereezde vo Frantsie - Parizh' - Viviani - Zhofre - Brian' - Klemanso', *Novyi Mir*, No. 943, 22 March 1917, p 4. Trotsky gave his version of how tsarist diplomacy had had him exiled from France in Lev' N. Trotskii, 'Tsarizm na respublikanskoi pochve. I', *Novyi Mir*, No. 908, 10 February 1917, p 4 and Lev' N. Trotskii, 'Tsarizm na respublikanskoi pochve. II', *Novyi Mir*, No. 909, 12 February 1917, p 4.
7. In a subsequent note in *Novyi Mir* Trotsky said that he had received a letter in which he was asked why he had remained

silent on Plekhanov's social-nationalism when he first learned of it from Rakovsky in 1913? In reply Trotsky pointed to the state of affairs in the pre-war era. In public Plekhanov either spoke the language of internationalism or said nothing at all. In such circumstances what basis would the public have had for believing Trotsky's revelations based on a personal conversation? It was Plekhanov's current post-war stance that made Trotsky's revelation possible: 'If now I considered it possible to cite these personal observations, it was only because they supplement Plekhanov's current public excesses and to a certain degree add to them a psychological key.' (Lev' N. Trotskii, 'Na zaprosy chitatelei. O Plekhanove', *Novyi Mir*, No. 926, 3 March 1917, p 4).

8. N. Trotskii, 'Vo frantsuzskom vagone. (Razgovory i razmyshleniya). I', *Novyi Mir*, No. 900, 1 February 1917, p 3. Two days later Trotsky presented another depressing account of trench warfare when he reproduced the letter of a Russian volunteer serving in the French army. See Al'fa, 'Dokumenty voiny', *Novyi Mir*, No. 902, 3 February 1917, p 4.
9. N. Trotskii, 'Vo frantsuzskom vagone. (Razgovory i razmyshleniya). II', *Novyi Mir*, No. 901, 2 February 1917, p 4.
10. For an account of America's neutrality in the war and the events which led it to enter the First World War see, for example, John Whiteclay Chambers II, *The Tyranny of Change: America in the Progressive Era, 1900-1917*, New York, 1980, pp 199-228.
11. N. Trotskii, 'Povtorenie proidennago', *Novyi Mir*, No. 905, 7 February 1917, p 4.
12. N. Trotskii, 'V' shkole voiny', *Novyi Mir*, No. 904, 6 February 1917, p 4.
13. Lev' N. Trotskii, 'Chto govoril International o zashchite otechestva?', *Novyi Mir*, No. 922, 27 February 1917, p 4.
14. Lev' N. Trotskii, 'Dva voyuyushchikh lagerya', *Novyi Mir*, No. 930, 8 March 1917, p 4.
15. Trotsky also made this point in the article 'One has to Choose the Path'. Here, however, he illustrated how social-patriotism leads to a rejection of revolutionary socialism not so much through the

example of recent European experience, as through a comparison of social-patriotism with other movements (Christianity, the Reformation, liberalism and democracy) which had began as a protest on behalf of the oppressed and ended as tools of the oppressors. See Lev' N. Trotskii, 'Nuzhno vybirat' put'', *Novyi Mir*, No. 919, 23 February 1917, p 4.

16. Cited in -: 'Bol'shoe obyazatel'stvo. (Po povodu rezolyutsii mitinga v' Karnegi Goll')', *Novyi Mir*, No. 906, 8 February 1917, p 3. For Trotsky's response to the pacifist Hillquit's charge that Trotsky had no right to advise others to pursue revolutionary tactics since Trotsky himself had not been prepared to stay in Russia to do likewise see, 'Revolutsionnyi tsenz Khilkvita. (Pis'mo v redaktsiyu "N.-Y. Volkszeitung")', Trotskii, *Voina i Revolyutsiya*, Vol. 2, pp 381-383.
17. Lev' N. Trotskii, 'Karlu Tsetkin' lushche im' ostavit' v pokoe. (Pis'mo v' redaktsiyu)', *Novyi Mir*, No. 910, 13 February 1917, p 4.
18. Anna Ingerman', 'Iz' za chego shum' tov. Trotskii?', *Novyi Mir*, No. 913, 16 February 1917, p 3.
19. In *Novyi Mir* of 3 March 1917 Trotsky replied to a letter that he had received from Mary Ragoz. Ragoz asked Trotsky what assistance could international socialists afford the war wounded when, as far as she knew, there were only two doctors among the group of Russian socialists in America, and none among the Finnish section. In light of this she wondered whether it would not be better to view the Red Cross as a neutral organisation, like a library or a tram. Trotsky stated that he was not proposing that internationalists should *replace* the Red Cross with their own body. He knew that the movement did not have the resources to achieve this, and even if it did the state would not permit this 'just as it does not give soldiers a free choice between state and private doctors.' As matters stood the Red Cross had as its aim healing the sick so as to ensure their speedy return to the front and this was why socialists could not participate in it. On the issue of what socialists could do to aid the wounded was to publicise soldiers' rights, maintain ties with

- comrade soldiers sending them books and tobacco; in this way preserving their *socialist* spirit. (See, Lev' N. Trotskii, 'Na zaprosy chitatelei. O Krasnom' Krete', *Novyi Mir*, No. 926, 3 March 1917, p 4).
20. L. Trotskii, 'A vse-taki Klaru Tsetkin' naprasno trevozhte!', *Novyi Mir*, No. 913, 16 February 1917, p 3.
 21. For an exposition of the origins of the Council for National Defence, its Advisory Council and Gompers role in them see B. Mandel, *Samuel Gompers*, Ohio, 1963, pp 364ff.
 22. -:, 'Baran'ya konstitutsiya. (Konferentsiya Gompersa i Ko)', *Novyi Mir*, No. 936, 15 March 1917, p 4.
 23. For an account of the American Jewish workers' movement and *Forverts's* place in it see, for example, Arthur A. Goren, *New York Jews and the Quest for Community*, New York, 1970; Irving Howe, *The Immigrant Jews of New York*, London, 1976; and Nora Levin, *Jewish Socialist Movements, 1871-1917*, London, 1978.
 24. Joseph Nedava, *Trotsky and the Jews*, (Philadelphia, 1971), p 26.
 25. Lev' N. Trotskii, 'Obshchei pochvy s' "Forvertsom" U Nas' Net", *Novyi Mir*, No. 928, 6 March 1917, p 4 . On the following day Trotsky likened *Forverts's* change from a pro- to an anti-German stance to the dilemma of a German bourgeois proprietor who until 3 February had published pro-German articles, but after this date found it expedient to argue for the American cause. See Al'fa, 'Kto otgadaet?', *Novyi Mir*, No. 929, 7 March 1917, p 4.
 26. On 9 March Trotsky reported that *Forverts* was claiming that somebody had mistranslated its editorial of 1 March for Trotsky. Trotsky's response is illustrated by the heading of his reply to *Forverts*: 'It's Untrue!'. See L.N.T., 'Nepravda!', *Novyi Mir*, No. 931, 9 March 1917, p 3. Given Trotsky's Jewish origins it may at first sight appear strange that he needed somebody to translate from Yiddish into Russian for him. However, from his autobiography we discover that Trotsky did not learn to speak Yiddish at home (his father spoke a mixture of Ukrainian/Russian) and he must of gained only the slightest knowledge of Hebrew from his brief period of study of the bible in Hebrew. (see Trotskii, *Moya zhizn'*,

pp 38, 54, 56). For an alternative view, i.e., that Trotsky knew Yiddish well and could easily communicate in it, see Nedava, *Trotsky and the Jews*, pp 35-37. Here Nedava claims that Trotsky hid his knowledge of Yiddish when he came to write his autobiography since he wanted to stress that he was a citizen of the world: 'As he never considered himself a son of the Pale of Settlement, but rather a true citizen of the world, he naturally could not admit to ever having shown interest in learning the language of the Pale.'

27. -; 'Neobkhodimo ochishchenie riadov; rol' "Forvertsa" v' evreiskom' rabochem dvizhenii', *Novyi Mir*, No. 935, 14 March 1917, p 4.
28. Trotsky commented on Cahan's activities one more time in *Novyi Mir* when, to mark Cahan's speech at a meeting in Madison Square Garden, he argued that the editor of *Forverts* had no revolutionary credentials. He labelled Cahan's comment in *Forverts* that Russia was not ripe for a republic and his telegram of welcome to Milyukov as an 'impudent call to the Russian proletariat and an insult to the Russian revolution.' See -; 'G-n Kagan', kak' istolkovatel' russkoi revolyutsii pered' rabochimi N'yu Iorka', *Novyi Mir*, No. 941, 20 March 1917, p 4. When Trotsky came to write of his time in New York in his autobiography he did not mention his initial cooperation with *Forverts*, giving only a negative characterisation of the Jewish daily newspaper. (Trotskii, *Moya zhizn'*, p 268)
29. Al'fa, 'Zatrudneniya chitatelya', *Novyi Mir*, No. 931, 9 March 1917, p 4.
30. Al'fa, 'Obrabotka i pozolota', *Novyi Mir*, No. 937, 16 March 1917, p 4.
31. Cited in Whiteclay Chambers II, *The Tyranny of Change*, p 221. In 'Through the Window' Trotsky described the scene, witnessed while staring out of *Novyi Mir's* office window, of an old man picking his way through a litter bin and selecting some mouldy bread, and wondered how President Wilson would explain how the old man's rights and dignity were being defended by the war. (See Al'fa, 'U okna', *Novyi Mir*, No. 926, 3 March 1917, p 3).

32. Lev' N. Trotskii, 'Dlya chego Amerike voina?', *Novyi Mir*, No. 931, 9 March 1917, p 4.
33. Trotskii, *Moya zhizn'*, p 263.
34. Al'fa, 'Zhvachka', *Novyi Mir*, No. 932, 10 March 1917, p 4.
35. -:, 'Voina i revolyutsii', *Novyi Mir*, No. 943, 22 March 1917, p . In 'Sober Thoughts' Trotsky noted the mayor 's inadequate response to the problem of rising prices brought about by the war crisis. He warned the mayor that when hungry mothers protest it is not only mayors who lose their jobs. (See Al'fa, 'Trezvyaya mysli', *Novyi Mir*, No. 928, 6 March 1917, p 4).
36. -:, 'Gotov'te soldat' revolyutsii', *Novyi Mir*, No. 930, 8 March 1917, p 4.
37. N. Trotskii, 'Uroki velikago goda. 9 yanvarya 1905 - 9 yanvarya 1917g', *Novyi Mir*, No. 890, 20 January 1917, p 4.
38. Al'fa, 'Opyat' otkryli dumu', *Novyi Mir*, No. 930, 8 March 1917, p 4.
39. For an exposition of Trotsky's views on these issues as they developed from 1905 onwards see Ian D. Thatcher, 'Uneven and Combined Development', *Revolutionary Russia*, 2, 1991, pp 235-258.
40. Lev' N. Trotskii, 'Dva litsa. (Vnutrenniya sily russkoi revolyutsii)', *Novyi Mir*, No. 938, 17 March 1917, p 4 .
41. Lev' N. Trotskii, 'Ot' kogo i kak' zashchishchat' revolyutsiyu?', *Novyi Mir*, No. 942, 21 March 1917, p 4 . For Trotsky's analysis of Europe on the verge of revolution see also Lev' N. Trotskii, 'Nespokoino v' Evrope', *Novyi Mir*, No. 936, 15 March 1917, p 4 and -:, 'Pod' znamenem' kommuny', *Novyi Mir*, No. 938, 17 March 1917, p 4. For further articles by Trotsky on Russia after the March revolution which were summarised but not directly quoted from in the main text of this chapter see, Lev' N. Trotskii, 'U poroga revolyutsii', *Novyi Mir*, No. 934, 13 March 1917, p 4; -:, 'Revolutsiya v' Rossii', *Novyi Mir*, No. 937, 16 March 1917, p 4; Lev' N. Trotskii, 'Narostayushchii konflikt'. (Vnutrenniya sily revolyutsii)', *Novyi Mir*, No. 940, 19 March 1917, p 4; and -:, 'Voina ili mir'? (Vnutrenniya sily revolyutsii)', *Novyi Mir*, No. 941, 20 March 1917, p 4. For an account of how Trotsky

attempted to use his 1917 articles in *Novyi Mir* to argue that only he and Lenin had shared the same analysis of the further development of the Russian revolution when he wrote his *Istoriya Russkoi Revolyutsii* (1931) see James D. White, 'Trotsky's *History of the Russian Revolution*', *Journal of Trotsky Studies*, 1, 1993, pp 1-18.

42. *Novyi Mir* announced Trotsky's departure for Russia in -; 'Ot'ezd tovarishchii', *Novyi Mir*, No. 949, 28 March 1917, p 1. For Trotsky's account of the difficulties he encountered at the Russian embassy in New York in obtaining a passport see, Al'fa, 'V' Russkom' konsul'stve', *Novyi Mir*, No. 944, 23 March 1917, p 4.
43. Giving lectures was also a convenient way of raising money. Draper says that while in New York Trotsky gave 'no fewer than thirty-five lectures...at ten dollars a lecture' (T. Draper, *The Roots of American Communism*, New York, 1957, p 77). See 'Leon Trotsky: A First World War Bibliography' of this thesis for a listing of these lectures.

Conclusion

Trotsky's programmatic response to the outbreak of World War One was the logical outcome of his analysis of the causes of the then current hostilities. For him, the war was imperialist, by which he meant an attempt by the leading capitalist powers to acquire dominance on the world market through militarism. He argued that the imperialist powers were motivated by a desire to facilitate the further development of the productive forces which, according to Trotsky, needed to break-out of the limits set upon them by the nation state. He thus recognised that, amongst others, Britain and Germany were seeking to fulfil a historically progressive task. However, he rejected the notion that any one of the belligerent capitalist powers could attain its goal. In part the evidence for his view was there for all to see: the war had turned into one of bloody attrition, resulting in thousands of deaths and a massive expenditure of resources, but without any sign that one power would emerge the clear victor.

For Trotsky, it was left to the international proletariat to establish transnational state structures in the form of a Balkan Federative Republic and a United States of Europe, as the first step towards the setting-up of a United World Republic. These transnational governmental institutions were, he thought, the only means by which both the productive forces could develop in a planned, harmonious manner on a world scale, and the needs of different cultural groups for free expression could be satisfied. He thought this programme realistic because, at the time of writing, he perceived the nation state to be an anachronism and capitalism as struggling with tasks which it could not resolve. This left the proletariat, the only class whose common interests spanned state boundaries, as the natural international force able to resolve the productive problems facing humanity.

If the proletariat did not seize power Trotsky foresaw a period a further capitalist crisis and acts of military aggression. But the whole thrust of his analysis, not to mention his Marxist optimism, led him to reject this possibility. In part he thought the experience of war itself was preparing the masses for revolution, both practically and psychologically. Added to this, he genuinely believed that the war had opened a new epoch in human history, in which the reformism which

had polluted the workers' movement pre-1914 would be removed from the tactics of a new and revolutionary Third International. It was this latter body which, he claimed, would provide the necessary slogans and leadership. It was for these reasons, because he perceived a revolutionary situation as current, that propagating a clear and revolutionary policy to the workers remained his central concern. Hence the fervour with which he entered into battle with the social-patriots, i.e., socialists who backed their government's war efforts, in this way encouraging the masses to sacrifice themselves for the class enemy. Indeed, it would be true to say that the struggle with social-patriotism absorbed Trotsky's attention more than any other issue raised by World War One.

Of course, Trotsky suffered many set-backs and encountered strong opposition to his programme, even within the 'internationalist' camp. Most notably, he did not succeed in uniting internationalist elements of all fractions around his analysis of the war. Although the Bolsheviks, Mensheviks, and Trotsky all levelled accusations of fractional intrigue at one another, the fact that they did not join forces is mainly to be explained by reasons other than established fractional loyalties. This is not to deny the importance of the distrust which, for example, Martov felt for Lenin as a result of pre-war disputes. However, in the last analysis Trotsky's call for unification was not realised because the leaders of each fraction held their own position on the war. Thus, for instance, Lenin thought that the imperialist war should be turned into a civil war and he refused to accept anyone who did not hold this view as a member of the internationalist camp. Hence his polemics with, and dismissal of, Trotsky. In turn Trotsky and Martov understood the significance of the slogan struggle for peace in very different ways; the former seeing it as a means to mobilise the masses for the immediate conquest of state power under the leadership of the Third International, the latter as the first step of many on the path to the renewal of class conflict under the auspices of a reunited Second International.

This thesis has given the first full exposition of Trotsky's writings penned between August 1914 and March 1917. It would be surprising if debates long forgotten had not been uncovered and new material

discovered. It would also be unfair to criticise too much the works of previous historians who focussed upon this subject at a general level, or as part of wider studies, for not covering every aspect of the material set out in this thesis. However, it should be noted that several standard works have not fared too well out of the scrutiny imposed upon them by this thesis. Most notably, Deutscher's biography of Trotsky has been shown to be suspect at several points, including translation errors which led him, for example, to misrepresent Lozovskii's and Trotsky's responses to the moves to call for a session of the International Bureau at the Hague in the spring of 1916. Then, in his biography of Martov, Getzler does not mention the dilemmas faced by Martov in dealing with differences in the Menshevik camp, and how this complicated his relations with Trotsky. That said, within the limits imposed by a thesis, the present author found it impossible to explore every avenue of investigation stumbled upon during the current research. The main topics touched upon in this work but which, to my mind, should be explored further are as follows.

First, what role did Trotsky really play at the Zimmerwald Conference? Martov's assertion that Trotsky had not been so influential at this gathering of thirty-eight internationalists was noted, but it would be interesting to locate all accounts of this meeting, no doubt written in several languages by many authors, to compare their respective versions. Second, what was the exact balance of forces within *Golos* and *Nashe Slovo* and who held the upper hand and when? Third, how extensive was the range of opinions on the war within the Menshevik fraction and how seriously did these ever threaten a split? Fourth, who exactly composed the August Bloc and at what point, if any, can we talk with certainty of its final disintegration? Finally, what was the balance of forces on *Novyi Mir's* editorial board, and what relations really existed between Trotsky and the other Russian Social-Democratic Party émigrés in New York between January and March 1917?

Leon Trotsky: A First World War Bibliography

Each Trotsky researcher owes a tremendous debt of gratitude to Louis Sinclair (1909-1990). Work on the present thesis began by tracking down the articles written by Trotsky from August 1914 to March 1917 listed in the first volume of Louis's *Leon Trotsky: A Bibliography*. However, for several reasons Louis's listing is far from complete. To begin with Louis himself could not read Russian, although he could decipher Cyrillic script. Hence, whenever possible, he relied upon French translations (Louis was fluent in French) as a guide to what was available in Russian. This meant that the flaws in the French versions went straight into Louis's work. Most notably, the French edition of Trotsky's articles penned during the First World War is a translation of the 1920s Russian volume of Trotsky's collected works, which, as we have seen, was altered by Trotsky himself. Second, Louis did not have the opportunity to delve into the then closed Party archives in Moscow. Thus, Trotsky's letters to, among others, Radek, found in the former Party archives in Moscow and used in this thesis, remained unknown to Louis. The location of these materials also upsets the traditional view that Trotsky managed to take all of his writings out of the USSR when he was exiled at the end of the 1920s. Finally, Louis could not read reports published in the Russian émigré press of forthcoming talks, some of which were delivered by Trotsky. Hence, for example, he was not able to include the dates and topics of Trotsky's lectures which he gave while in New York, most of which were advertised in *Novyi Mir*.

The following first section of this bibliography sets out to correct some of the errors to be found in Louis's listing. The form of presentation is that established by Louis, i.e., from left to right beginning with date [year/month/day], followed by author's mark (if any), title, translation of title, place and date of publication, and then reprints and translations. However, there are also several significant differences. Contrary to Louis's style, all entries are listed in strict chronological order. For example, series of articles are not grouped together under the date of the first instalment, but listed as they appeared. This has several advantages. First, all subtitles are listed with each instalment, and this gives the reader a clue to the content of

each contribution. Second, individual instalments were treated as such by Trotsky, and he included some and omitted others when he came to compile his collected works. Louis's style masks this process, and gives the impression that each part of a series was included in the collected works. Third, each individual instalment was treated as such by the censor. In the following it is stated whether each entry was subject to partial or complete censorship. The form in which partially or completely censored articles were reprinted is also noted, as is any significant change of title. Finally, only articles, letters and lectures which have a published reference between August 1914-March 1917, or a specific reference to an archive, are included. The issue of notes penned during the period of this thesis at a later date are treated as first publications and hence as lying outwith the remit of this bibliography. In this way we construct a clear picture of what information became available when and to whom; issues of central concern to the historian. Several entries appear here for the first time as 'new discoveries'. Any typographical mistakes in the original have been preserved, but are not reproduced in the translation of titles. The main list of abbreviations and codes used is as follows:

'KM' - *Kievskaya Mysl'*

'NS' - *Nashe Slovo*

'Nach' - *Nachalo*

'NM' (NY) - *Novyi Mir* (New York)

RTsKhIDNI - Rossiiskogo Tsentra ^{po} Khraneniya ⁱ Izucheniya
Dokumentov Noveishei Istorii

190000(1, 2, 3, 10) - L. D. Trotskii, *Gody velikago pereloma*,
Moscow, 1919.

220000(3)ff - L. D. Trotskii, *Voina i Revolyutsiya*, Vol. 1, Petrograd,
1922 & Id.: Vol. 2, Moscow & Petrograd, 1924.

270000(1) - L. D. Trotskii, *Evropa v Voine*, Moscow, 1927.

740118(1) - Léon Trotsky, *La guerre et la révolution*, 2 Vols., Paris,
1974.

The source of all other codes and abbreviations can be found in L. Sinclair, *Leon Trotsky: A Bibliography*, 2 Vols., Aldershot, 1989.

1. Leon Trotsky

- 140000(1) DER KRIEG UND DIE INTERNATIONAL
[Trans Ger]
- 141015(1) 'Der Krieg und die Aufgabe der Internationale'
('Volksrecht', 15.X.14)
- 141104(1) [Pis'mo L. Trotskogo Mandelu i F. Plattenu po
povodu intsidenta s M. Kotsiolekom pri perevode
broshyury avtora na nemetskii yazyk (L. D.
Trotsky's letter to Mandel and Platten concerning
the incident with M. Kotsiolek about the
translation of the author's brochure into German)]
(RTsKhIDNI, F. 451, O 1, D. 89)
- 141120(1) Politicheskii moratorium (A political moratorium)
('KM', (328), 28.XI.14)
Repr : 190000(1); 270000(1)
- 141120(2) N. Trotskii: Voina i Internatsional' (War and the
International)
('Golos', (59), 20.XI.14)
- 141121(1) N. Trotskii: Voina i Internatsional' (okonchanie)
(War and the International (conclusion))
('Golos', (60), 21.XI.14)
- 141124(1) N. Trotskii: Verno li? (Is it true?)
('Golos', (62), 24.XI.1914)
Repr : 220000(3)ff
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
- 141125(1) N. Trotskii: Neobkhodimaya popravka (A
necessary correction)
('Golos', (63), 25.XI.14)
- 141127(1) N. Trotskii: Proletariat' v' voine (The proletariat in
the war)
('Golos', (65), 27.XI.14)

- 141128(1) N. Trotskii: Proletariat' v' voine (okonchanie) (The proletariat in the war (conclusion)) ('Golos', (66), 28.XI.14)
[Part censored in 'Golos']
- 141210(1) Dve armii (The two armies) ('KM', (334), 4.XII.14)
Repr : 190000(2); 270000(1)
- 141213(1) N. Trotskii: Voina i Internatsional' II (War and the International II) ('Golos', (79), 13.XII.14)
- 141214(1) -: Gregus' po demokraticeskomu spisku (Gregus according to the democratic list) ('Golos', (76), 10.XII.14)
Repr : 220000(3)ff; 270000(1)
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
- 141230(1) N. Trotskii: Pechal'nyi dokument' G. Plekhanov' o voine (A sad document G. Plekhanov on the war) ('Golos', (93), 30.XII.14)
Repr : 220000(3)
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
- 150000(1) [letters to Radek]
(RTsKhIDNI F.325, O.1, D.394)
- 150000(2) Pis'mo L. D. Trotskogo v pravlenie kluba internatsionalistov o motivakh svoego vykhoda iz nego (L. D. Trotsky's letter to the management of the Internationalist Club on the motives of his resignation)
(RTsKhIDNI F.325, O. 1, D. 394)
- 150102(1) [letter to Radek]
(RTsKhIDNI F.325, O. 1, D. 394)
- 150106(1) "Yaponskii" vopros (The "Japanese" question) ('KM', (6), 6.I.15)
Repr : 270000(1)
- 150108(1) N. Trotskii: K 100-mu nom 'Golosa' (The 100th issue of 'Golos')

- ('Golos', (100), 8.I.15)
Repr : 220000(3)ff
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
- 150113(1) French
('KM', (13), 13.I.15)
Repr : 270000(1)
- 150115(1) N. Trotskii: Nash' politicheskii lozung' I (Our political slogan I)
('Golos', (106), 15.I.15)
- 150115(2) [letter to Radek]
(RTsKhIDNI F. 325, O. 1, D. 394)
- 150117(1) N. Trotskii: Nash' politicheskii lozung' II (Our political slogan II)
('Golos', (108), 17.I.15)
- 150120(1) Vse dorogi vedut v Rim (All roads lead to Rome)
('KM', (20), 20.I.15)
Repr : 270000(1)
- 150206(1) [letter to Radek]
(RTSKhIDNI F.325, O. 1, D. 394)
- 150213(1) N. Trotskii: Zayavlenie (A statement)
('NS', (14), 13.II.15)
- 150214(1) N. Trotskii: Parvus'
('NS', (15), 14.II.15)
Repr : 190000(10)
Trans: Fr 'Vérité(M), (II.67), 15.II.15)
- 150223(1) N. Trotskii: Nash' politicheskii lozung' (Our Political Slogan)
('NS', (22), 23.II.15)
- 150224(1) N. Trotskii: Nash' politicheskii lozung' (okonchanie) (Our political slogan (conclusion))
('NS', (23), 24.II.15)
- 150301(1) N. Trotskii: Nekriticheskii otsenka kriticheskoi epokhi. 1. Slabost' ili neuverennaya v' sebe sila?

- (An uncritical assessment of a critical epoch. 1. Weakness or a lack of belief in one's own strength?)
(*'NS'*, (28), 1.III.15)
Repr : 220000(1)ff
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
- 150304(1) "Sedmoi pekhotnyi" v belgiiskoi epopee (The "7th infantry" in the Belgian epich)
(*'KM'*, (63), 4.III.15)
Repr : 190000(1); 270000(1)
- 150306(1) "Sedmoi pekhotnyi" v belgiiskoi epopee (The "7th infantry" in the Belgian epich)
(*'KM'*, (65), 6.III.15)
Repr : 190000(1); 270000(1)
- 150310(1) N. Trotskii: Nekriticheskii otsenka kriticheskoi epokhi. II Legenda "bor'by za demokratiyu" (An uncritical assessment of a critical epoch. II The legend "a struggle for democracy")
(*'NS'*, (35), 10.III.15)
[Part censored in *'NS'*]
Repr : 220000(3)ff [in uncensored form]
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
- 150317(1) N. Trotskii: Nekriticheskii otsenka kriticheskoi epokhi. III Politicheskii vyvod' (An uncritical assessment of a critical epoch. III Political conclusions)
(*'NS'*, (41), 17.III.15)
[Completely censored in *'NS'*]
- 150320(1) [A lecture Pangermanizm' i voina (PanGermanism and the war)]
(*'NS'*, (38), 13.III.15)
(*'NS'*, (39), 14.III.15)
(*'NS'*, (40), 16.III.15)
(*'NS'*, (41), 17.III.15)
(*'NS'*, (42), 18.III.15)
(*'NS'*, (43), 19.III.15)
(*'NS'*, (44), 20.III.15)

- 150322(1) Otkuda poshlo? (From where did it come?)
('KM', (81), 22.III.15)
Repr : 270000(1)
- 150325(1) -: Petrogradskie royalisty i frantsuzskaya
respublika (Petrograd royalists and the French
republic)
('NS', (48), 25.III.15)
[Part censored in 'NS']
Repr : 220000(3) [not all censored gaps filled in
reprint]
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
- 150331(1) -: Eshche est' na svete sotsial'demokraty (There
are still Social-Democrats in the world)
('NS', (53), 31.III.15)
Repr : 220000(3)
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
- 150401(1) N.T.: Vremya nynche takovskoe (The times now
are such)
('NS', (54), 1.IV.15)
[Part censored in 'NS']
Repr : 220000(3) [in uncensored form]
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
- 150409(1) Guerre d'usure (A war of attrition)
('NS', (60), 9.IV.15)
- 150409(2) N.T.: Nekhorosho-s'! (It's not good!)
('NS', (60), 9.IV.15)
- 150411(1) -: Do kontsa! (To the finish!)
('NS', (62), 11.IV.15)
Repr : 220000(3)
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
- 150416(1) Al'fa: Porazhenchestvo i iskazhestvo (Defeatism
and distortion)
('NS', (66), 16.IV.15)
- 150417(1) N. Trotskii: Sytinskii "mayli" o Rakovskom' (A
Sytinist "little man" on Rakovsky)
('NS', (67), 17.IV.15)

- Repr : 190000(10); 220000(3)ff
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
- 150425(1) -: Klevetnikam! (To the slanderers!)
('NS', (74), 25.IV.15)
Repr : 220000(3)ff
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
- 150429(1) -: Va-bank! (Stake one's all!)
('NS', (77), 29.IV.15)
Repr : 220000(3)ff; 270000(1)
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
- 150501(1) N.Trotskii:1890-1915
('NS', (79), 1.V.15)
Repr : 220000(3)ff
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
- 150505(1) N. Trotskii: Kommentarii k' telegramme t. Kh.
Rakovskago (Commentary on Comrade Rakovsky's
telegram)
('NS', (81), 5.V.15)
Repr : 220000(3)ff
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
- 150506(1) -: Imperializm' i natsional'naya ideya
(Imperialism and the national idea)
('NS', (82), 5.V.15)
Repr : 220000(3)ff; 270000(1)
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
- 150513(1) [letter to Radek]
(RTsKhIDNI, F. 325, O. 1, D. 394)
- 150515(1)
starikh' -: Nasha Pozitsiya. I Raspad' i pererozhdenie
gruppirovok' v' sotsializme (Our Position. I The
disintegration and regeneration of the old
groupings in socialism)
('NS', (89), 15.V.15)
Repr : 220000(3)ff
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
- 150516(1) Ot' Redaktsii (From the editors)
('NS', (90), 16.V.15)

- Repr : 220000(3) [under title: P. B. Aksel'rod i
sotsial-patriotizm (P. B. Axelrod and
social-patriotism)]
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
- 150529(1) -: Nasha Pozitsiya. II Noviya gruppirovki v'
sotsializme (Our Position. II New groups in
socialism)
('NS', (100), 29.V.15)
[part censored in 'NS']
Repr : 220000(3)ff [in uncensored form]
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
- 150529(2) N.T.: Privet' tov. Dobrodzhanu-Gerea (Greetings to
Comrade Dobrodjanu-Gherea)
('NS', (100), 29.V.15)
Repr : 220000(3)ff; 260000(17)
Trans: Eng 720000(25)
Fr 740118(1)
Sp 810000(4)
- 150601(1) T.:
('NS', (102), 1.VI.15)
[article completely censored]
- 150604(1) N. Trotskii: Otkrytoe pis'mo v' redaktsiyu zhurnala
'Kommunist' (An open letter to the editorial board
of the journal 'Kommunist')
('NS', (105), 4.VI.15)
Trans: Am Gankin & Fisher
- 150605(1) -: Nasha Pozitsiya. III Raskol' i edinstvo (Our
Position. III Splits and unity)
('NS', (106), 5.VI.16)
Repr : 220000(3)ff
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
- 150606(1) -: Nasha Pozitsiya. III Raskol' i edinstvo
(okonchanie tret'ei stat'i) (Our Position. III Splits
and unity (conclusion of the third article))
('NS', (107), 6.VI.16)
Repr : 220000(3)ff
Trans: Fr 740118(1)

- 150608(1) [letter to Radek]
(RTsKhIDNI F. 325, O. 1, D. 394)
- 150613(1) :- "oni - drugogo dukha" ("They are of a different spirit")
('NS', (113), 13.VI.15)
Repr : 220000(3)ff
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
- 150616(1) [letter to Radek]
(RTsKhIDNI F. 325, O. 1, D. 394)
- 150617(1) -: Kautskii o Plekhanove I (Kautsky on Plekhanov I)
('NS', (116), 17.VI.15)
Repr : 220000(3)ff
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
- 150618(1) -: Kautskii o Plekhanove II (Kautsky on Plekhanov II)
('NS', (117), 18.VI.15)
Repr : 220000(3)ff
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
- 150619(1) -: Kautskii o Plekhanove III (Kautsky on Plekhanov III)
('NS', (118), 19.VI.15)
Repr : 220000(3)ff
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
- 150623(1) -: Nemetskaya oppositsiya i nemetskaya diplomatiya (The German Opposition and German Diplomacy)
('NS', (121), 23.VI.15)
Repr : 270000(1)
- 150624(1) Al'fa: Pervyi shag' sdelan' (The first step has been taken)
('NS', (122), 24.VI.15)
Repr : 220000(3)ff; 260000(17)
Trans: Fr 740118(1)

- 150703(1) N. Trotskii: Natsiya i khozyastvo I (The nation and the economy I)
('NS', (130), 3.VII.15)
Repr : 270000(1)
Trans: Eng 'Int', (III.4), Summer '74; 'Marxist Review', (2), I-II, '73
Jap 'Trotsky Studies', (1), Autumn 91
- 150709(1) N. Trotskii: Natsiya i khozyastvo II (The nation and the economy II)
('NS', (135), 9.VII.15)
Repr : 270000(1)
Trans: Eng 'Int', (III.4), Summer '74; 'Marxist Review', (2), I-II, '73
Jap 'Trotsky Studies', (1), Autumn 91
- 150711(1) -: "Levaya" i "tsentra" v nemetskoi sots-dem ("Left" and "Centre" in German Social-Democracy)
('NS', (137), 11.VII.15)
Repr : 220000(3)ff
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
- 150711(2) N. Trotskii: Diversii (Pis'mo v' redaktsiyu) (Acts of sabotage (A letter to the editors))
('NS', (137), 11.VII.15)
- 150712(1) Na severo-zapad (In the North-West)
('KM', (191), 12.VII.15)
Repr : 270000(1)
- 150717(1) -: Bez' masshtaba (Without measure)
('NS', (141), 17.VII.15)
Repr : 220000(3)ff
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
- 150717(2) Zhan Zhores (Jean Jaurès)
('KM', (196), 17.VII.15)
Repr : 190000(10); 260000(17)
Trans: Eng 720000(25); 'Keep Left', V, VI, '70
Fr 670300(1)ff
Hol 'NTijd', (XXI.2), II.16
Sp 810000(4)

- 150718(1) N. Trotskii: Otkrytoe pis'mo t. Plekhanovu (An open letter to Comrade Plekhanov) ('NS', (142), 18.VII.15)
- 150718(2) -: Na Balkanakh' I (In the Balkans I) ('NS', (142), 18.VII.15)
Repr : 220000(3)ff
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
- 150720(1) -: Na Balkanakh' II (In the Balkans II) ('NS', (143), 20.VII.15)
Repr : 220000(3)ff
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
- 150722(1) -: Politika "tyla" (Politics "of the rear") ('NS', (145), 22.VII.15)
Repr : 220000(3)ff; 270000(1)
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
- 150723(1) -: Nasha Pozitsiya. 4. Nashi fraktsii i zadachi russkikh' internatsionalistov' (Our Position. 4 Our fraction and the tasks of the Russian internationalists) ('NS', (146), 23.VII.15)
- 150724(1) -: Nasha Pozitsiya. 4. Nashi fraktsii i zadachi russkikh' internatsionalistov' (okonchanie) (Our Position. 4 Our fraction and the tasks of the Russian internationalists (conclusion)) ('NS', (147), 24.VII.15)
- 150804(1) -: God' voyny (A year of war) ('NS', (156), 4.VIII.15)
Repr : 190000(2); 220000(3)ff; 270000(1)
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
- 150815(1) Al'fa: Malen'kii fel'eton. Ne v' ochered (A little satire. Not in order) ('NS', (166), 15.VIII.15)
Repr : 270000(1)
- 150818(1) -: Konvent' rasteryannosti i bessiliya (A convention of confusion and impotence) ('NS', (167), 18.VIII.15)

- [Part censored in 'NS']
Repr : 220000(3)ff; 270000(1) [in uncensored form]
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
- 150826(1) -: Voennyyi krizis' i politicheskaya perspektivy. I Prichiny krizisa (The war crisis and political perspectives. I The reasons for the crisis) ('NS'), (174), 26.VIII.15)
[Part censored in 'NS']
Repr: 220000(3)ff [under title Voennyyi katastrofa i politicheskie perspektivy (The war catastrophe and political perspectives) in uncensored form]
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
- 150827(1) -: Gaaze - Ebert' - David'! (Hasse, Ebert and David!) ('NS', (175), 27.VIII.15)
Repr : 190000(10); 260000(17)
Trans: Eng 720000(25)
Sp 810000(4)
- 150901(1) -: Voennyyi krizis' i politicheskaya perspektivy. II Porazhenie i revolyutsiya (The war crisis and political perspectives. II Defeat and revolution) ('NS'), (179), 1.IX.15)
[Part censored in 'NS']
Repr: 220000(3)ff [under title Voennyyi katastrofa i politicheskie perspektivy (The war catastrophe and political perspectives) in uncensored form]
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
- 150902(1) -: Voennyyi krizis' i politicheskaya perspektivy. II Porazhenie i revolyutsiya (okonchanie) (The war crisis and political perspectives. II Defeat and revolution (conclusion)) ('NS'), (180), 2.IX.15)
[Part censored in 'NS']
Repr: 220000(3)ff [under title Voennyyi katastrofa i politicheskie perspektivy (The war catastrophe and political perspectives) in uncensored form]
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
- 150903(1) -: Voennyyi krizis' i politicheskaya perspektivy. IIISotsial'naya sila Rossiskoi revolyutsii (The war

- crisis and political perspectives. III The social forces of the Russian Revolution) ('NS'), (181), 3.IX.15)
Repr: 220000(3)ff [under title Voennyi katastrofa i politicheskie perspektivy (The war catastrophe and political perspectives)]
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
- 150904(1) -: Voennyi krizis' i politicheskaya perspektivy. IV Natsional'nyi ili internatsional'nyi kurs'? (The war crisis and political perspectives. IV A national or international course?) ('NS'), (182), 4.IX.15)
Repr: 220000(3)ff [under title Voennyi katastrofa i politicheskie perspektivy (The war catastrophe and political perspectives)]
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
- 150911(1) Psikhologicheskie zagadki voyny (Psychological mysteries of the war) ('KM', (152), 11.IX.15)
Repr : 190000(2); 270000(1)
- 150920(1) Transheya (The trenches) ('KM', (261), 20.IX.15)
Repr : 190000(2); 270000(1)
- 150921(1) Transheya (The trenches) ('KM', (262), 21.IX.15)
Repr : 190000(2); 270000(1)
- 150930(1) -: Rakovskii o russkikh' sots-patriotakh' (Rakovsky on the Russian social-patriots) ('NS', (204), 30.IX.15)
Repr : 220000(3)ff
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
- 151001(1) Krepost ili transheya? (Fortress or trenches?) ('KM', (306), 1.X.15)
Repr : 190000(2); 270000(1)
- 151003(1) N.T.: Vpechatleniya (iz' zapisnoi knizhki) (Impressions (From a notebook))

- ('NS', (207), 3.X.15)
Repr : 220000(3)ff [under the title 'Vyvody'
(Conclusions) with some textual changes]
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
- 151005(1) N. Trotskii: Pis'mo v' redaktsiyu "l'Humanité" (A
letter to the editorial board of "l'Humanité")
('NS', (208), 5.X.15)
- 151006(1) N.T.: Nashi gruppirovki (iz' zapisnoi knizhki) (Our
groupings (From a notebook))
('NS', (209), 6.X.15)
Repr : 220000(3)ff [under the title 'Vyvody'
(Conclusions) with some textual changes]
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
- 151007(1) Al'fa: "Les Russes d'abord!" ("The Russian way!")
('NS', (210), 7.X.15)
Repr : 270000(1)
- 151007(2) N.T.: Nemetskaya S-D oppozitsiya (iz' zapisnoi
knizhki) (The German Social-Democratic
Opposition (From a notebook))
('NS', (210), 7.X.15)
- 151009(1) N.T.: Rossiskaya sektsiya internatsionalistov' (iz'
zapisnoi knizhki) (The Russian section of the
Internationalists (From a notebook))
('NS', (212), 9.X.15)
- 151012(1) -: Bolgarskaya sots.-dem i voina (Bulgarian
Social-Democracy and the war)
('NS', (214), 12.X.15)
Repr : 220000(3)ff
Trans: 740118(1)
- 151013(1) N.T.: Osnovnye tezisyy (iz' zapisnoi knizhki) (Basic
Theses (From a notebook))
('NS', (215), 13.X.15)
Repr : 220000(3)ff [under title Raboty
konferentsii (The work of the conference) with
cuts]
Trans: Fr 740118(1)

- 151014(1) N.T.: Osnovnye tezisy (iz' zapisnoi knizhki) (okonchanie) (Basic Theses (From a notebook) (conclusion)) ('NS', (216), 14.X.15)
Repr : 220000(3)ff [under title Raboty konferentsii (The work of the conference)]
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
- 151014(2) -: Ostav'te nas' v' pokoe! (Leave us in peace!) ('NS', (216), 14.X.15)
Repr : 190000(10); 260000(17)
Trans: Eng 720000(25)
Sp 810000(4)
- 151017(1) -: Neobkhodimaya popravka (A necessary correction) ('NS', (217), 17.X.15)
- 151017(2) N.Trotskii: Osnovnye voprosy I. Bor'ba za vlast' (Basic problems I. The struggle for power) ('NS', (217), 17.X.15)
[Part censored in 'NS']
Repr : 190000(6); 220000(12) [in censored form]
Trans: Eng 210000(39)
Fr 730000(7); 'InfOuv', (662), 19-26.VI.74
Ger 670000(6)
It 760900(2)
- 151017(3) -: Voennyya tainy i politicheskiya misterii (War secrets and political mysteries) ('NS', (217), 17.X.15)
[Part censored in 'NS']
Repr : 220000(3)ff [in uncensored form]
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
- 151019(1) -: Ona byla, konferentsiya v Tsimmerval'de! (It was, the conference in Zimmerwald!) ('NS', (218), 19.X.15)
[Part censored in 'NS']
Repr : 220000(3)ff [in censored form]
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
- 151022(1) N.T.: Konferentsiya v' Tsimmerval'de (The

- conference at Zimmerwald)
('NS', (221), 22.X.15)
Repr : 220000(3)ff [under title Glavnye
fakticheskie dannye o konferentsii (The main
factual information about the conference)]
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
- 151023(1) Kh. Rakovskii i V. Kolarov (Ch. Rakovsky and V.
Kolarov)
('KM', (294), 23.X.15)
Repr : 190000(10); 220000(3)ff; 260000(17)
Trans: Eng 720000(25)
Fr 740118(1)
Sp 810000(4)
- 151025(1) Ledebur - Goffman (Ledebour - Hoffman)
('KM', (296), 25.X.15)
Repr : 190000(10); 220000(3)ff; 260000(17)
Trans: Eng 720000(25)
Fr 740118(1)
Sp 810000(4)
- 151026(1) A.: Zametki chitatelya. Umu Nepostizhimo. Slovo za
"Prizyvom"! (Readers Notes. It's inconceivable. A
Word for "Prizyv"!)
('NS', (224), 26.X.15)
Repr : 220000(3)ff; 270000(1)
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
- 151027(1) N.T.: K' konferentsii v' tsimmerval'de. 2. Otvet' P.
B. Aksel'rodu (On the conference in Zimmerwald.
2. A Reply to P. B. Axelrod)
('NS', (225), 27.X.15)
Repr : 190000(10); 220000(3)ff;
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
- 151029(1) -: Khvostov!
('NS', (227), 29.X.15)
Repr : 190000(10); 260000(17)
- 151030(1) -: Gall'eni (Gallieni)
('NS', (228), 30.X.15)
Repr : 220000(3)
Trans: Fr 740118(1)

- 151030(2) -: Sushchnost' krizisa (The essence of the crisis)
('NS', (228), 30.X.15)
Repr : 220000(3)ff
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
- 151031(1) N.T.: K' Tsimmerval'dskoi konferentsii I (On the
Zimmerwald Conference I)
('NS', (229), 31.X.15)
Repr : 220000(3)ff [under title Avstriitsy i
Tsimmerval'd (The Austrians and Zimmerwald)]
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
- 151105(1) N.T.: K' Tsimmerval'dskoi konferentsii II & III (On
the Zimmerwald Conference II & III)
('NS', (232), 5.XI.15)
- 151105(2) -: Svoim' poryadkom' (In their own order)
('NS', (232), 5.XI.15)
Repr : 220000(3)ff; 270000(1)
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
- 151106(1) -: Bez' programmy, bez' perspektiv, bez' kontrolya
(Without a programme, without perspectives and
without control)
('NS', (233), 6.XI.15)
Repr : 220000(3)ff
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
- 151110(1) -: O sovместnykh' vystupleniyakh' s' sots-
patriotami. (Po povodu "Pis'ma t. Martova") (On
joint activity with the social-patriots (On "Comrade
Martov's Letter"))
('NS', (236), 10.XI.15)
Repr : 220000(3)ff
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
- 151111(1) -: Nuzhno sdelat' vse vyvody (K' vyboram'
rabochikh' v' voenno-promyshlennyyi komitet')
(All conclusions must be drawn (On the election of
workers to the War-Industries Committee))
('NS', (237), 11.XI.15)
Repr : 220000(3)ff
Trans: Fr 740118(1)

- 151113(1) Postoronni: Neveroyatno! (Pis'mo v' redaktsiyu) (It's unbelievable! (A letter to the editors)) ('NS', (239), 13.XI.15)
- 151117(1) -: Gruppirovki v' nemetskoi sots-dem (Po povodu stat'i t. Bukvoeda) (Groupings in the German Social-Democracy (On Comrade Bukvoed's article)) ('NS', (242), 17.XI.15)
Repr : 220000(3)ff
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
- 151119(1) N.T.: K' tsimmerval'dskoi konferentsii IV (On the Zimmerwald Conference IV) ('NS', (244), 19.XI.15)
Repr : 220000(3)ff [under title Gollandskie ekstremisty (The Dutch extremists) with cuts]
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
- 151119(2) Postoronni: Akh', vot' ono chto! (Pis'mo v' redaktsiyu) (Alas, but there it is! (A letter to the editors)) ('NS', (244), 19.XI.15)
Repr : 220000(3)ff
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
- 151124(1) N. Trotskii: Pod' bremenem' ob'ektivizma. I (Under the burden of objectivity. I) ('NS', (248), 24.XI.15)
- 151125(1) N. Trotskii: Pod' bremenem' ob'ektivizma. II (Under the burden of objectivity. II) ('NS', (249), 25.XI.15)
- 151127(1) Al'fa: Zametki chitatelya. Sbivaemyi s' tolku chestnyi evropeets'. Rasshirenie vlasti Al'berta Toma. "budem' dumat'!... (Readers notes. Bewildering honourable Europeans. An extension of Albert Thomas's power. "We will think on it"!...) ('NS', (251), 27. XI.15)
Repr : 220000(3)ff
Trans: Fr 740118(1)

- 151128(1) N.T.: "Vpered'" ("Forward")
('NS', (252), 28.XI.15)
- 151130(1) N.T.: Chto eto za informator'? (What type of
informer is this?)
('NS', (253), 30.XI.15)
- 151203(1) -: Byli i ostaemsya krasnymi (We were and
remain Reds)
('NS', (256), 3.XII.15)
Repr : 220000(3)ff
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
- 151205(1) Postoronni: 79, rue de Grenelle (79 Grenelle
Street)
('NS', (258), 5.XII.15)
[Part censored in 'NS']
Repr : 220000(3)ff [with changes]
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
- 151212(1) -: Sotrudnichestvo s sotsial'-patriotami. (Otvet' t.
Martovu) (Cooperation with social-patriots. (A
reply to Comrade Martov))
('NS', (264), 12.XII.15)
Repr : 220000(3)ff
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
- 151218(1) -: Chudesa, kotoryya ne snilis' mudretsam'.
Podkhod' protiv "Nashego Slovo" (Wonders, which
the wise did not dream of. An approach against
"Nashe Slovo")
('NS', (269), 18.XII.15)
[Part censored in 'NS']
Repr : 220000(3)ff [in uncensored form]
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
- 151219(1) -: Fakti i vyvody (eshche o petrogradskikh'
vyborakh') (Facts and Conclusions. (Once more on
the Petrograd elections))
('NS', (270), 19.XII.15)
Repr : 220000(3)ff
Trans: Fr 740118(1)

- 151221(1) Voina i tekhnika (War and technology)
('KM', (353), 21.XII.15)
Repr : 190000(2); 270000(1)
- 151225(1) N. Trotskii: Ni su'ektivizma, ni fatalizma! (Neither
subjectivism, nor fatalism!)
('NS', (275), 25.XII.15)
Repr : 220000(3)ff
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
- 151228(1) -: Deklaratsiya dvadtsati (The decalration of the
twenty)
('NS', (276), 28.XII.15)
Repr : 220000(3)ff
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
- 151228(2) Al'fa: Na nachalakh' vzyamnosti (On the beginnings
of reciprocity)
('NS', (276), 28.XII.15)
[Part censored in 'NS']
Repr : 270001(1) [in censored form]
- 151229(1) -: Politicheskie shtreikbrekhery. Novye "vybory"
v' voenno-promyshlennyyi Komitet' (Political
strikebreaking. New "elections" to the War-
Industries Committee)
('NS', (277), 29.XII.15)
Repr : 220000(3)ff
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
- 151229(2) Postoronni: Itak'? (So?)
('NS', (277), 29.XII.15)
[Part censored in 'NS']
- 160000(1) [letters to D. B. Ryazanov]
RTsKhIDNI, F. 325, O. 1, D. 399
- 160000(2) [postcards to D. B. Ryazanov]
RTsKhIDNI, F. 325, O. 1, D. 399
- 160000(3) [letters to D. B. Ryazanov]
RTsKhIDNI, F. 325, O. 1, D. 396

- 160101(1) Otkhodit epokha (An epoch is passing)
('KM', (1), 1.I.16)
Repr : 190000(1); 220000(3) ff; 260000(17)
Trans: Eng 720000(25)
Fr 670306(1)ff; 740118(1); 'BulCom',
(IV.52)
Sp 810000(4)
- 160101(2) -: K' novomu godu (Towards the New Year)
('NS', (1), 1.I.16)
[Part censored in 'NS']
Repr : 270000(1) [in censored form]
- 160101(3) -: Vtoroi novyi god'
('NS', (1), 1.I.16)
[Part censored in 'NS']
Repr : 220000(3)ff; [in uncensored form]
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
- 160101(4) Al'fa: Ikh' literature (Vmesto novogodnyago
obzora) (Their literature (Instead of a New Year's
review))
('NS', (1), 1.I.16)
Repr : 220000(3)ff; 270000(1)
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
- 160106(1) N. Trotskii: Sotsializma i sotsial-natsionalizm
(Socialism and social-nationalism)
('NM'(NY), (564), 6.I.16)
- 160107(1) N. Trotskii: Sotsializma i sotsial-natsionalizm
(Socialism and social-nationalism)
('NM'(NY), (565), 7.I.16)
- 160111(1) N. Trotskii: Sotsializma i sotsial-natsionalizm
(Socialism and social-nationalism)
('NM'(NY), (568), 11.I.16)
- 160112(1) N. Trotskii: Sotsializma i sotsial-natsionalizm
(Socialism and social-nationalism)
('NM'(NY), (569), 12.I.16)

- 160113(1) -: Sobytiya idut' svoim' cheredom' (Events proceed by their own course)
('NS', (10), 13.I.16)
Repr : 270000(1)
- 160113(2) N.T.: Vokrug' Tsimmerval'da (po povodu stat'i t. Martova) (Around Zimmerwald (On Comrade Martov's article))
('NS', (10), 13.I.16)
- 160114(1) -: Tsimmerval'd' ili gvozdevshchina? (Zimmerwald or Gvozdevism?)
('NS', (11), 14.I.16)
Repr : 220000(3)ff
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
- 160116(1) N.T.: Sbornik' "Samozashchita" (The collection "Self-Defence")
('NS', (13), 16.I.16)
- 160125(1) -: Ikh' perspektivy (Their prospects)
('NS', (20), 25.I.16)
Repr : 270000(1)
- 160129(1) N. Trotskii: Programma mira. I. Nuzhna-li programma mira? (A Programme of Peace. I. Do we need a programme of peace?)
('NS', (24), 29.I.16)
- 160130(1) N. Trotskii: Programma mira. II. "Mir' bez' anneksii" i status quo ante (A Programme of Peace. II. "A peace without annexations" and the status quo ante)
('NS', (25), 30.I.16)
- 160200(1) [letter to H. Roland-Holst]
(Van Rossum)
Trans: Eng 'Spokesman', (4), VI.70
- 160201(1) Postoronni: Eto nedorazumenie! (This is a misunderstanding!)
('NS', (26), 1.II.16)

- 160203(1) N. Trotskii: Programma mira. III. Pravo natsii na samoopredelenie (A Programme of Peace. III. The right of nations to self-determination) ('NS', (28), 3.II.16)
- 160204(1) N. Trotskii: Programma mira. IV. Soedinennye Shtaty Evropy (A Programme of Peace. IV. United States of Europe) ('NS', (29), 4.II.16)
- 160208(1) Al'fa: "Narodnaya Mysl'" ("People's Thought") ('NS', (32), 8.II.16)
Repr : 220000(3)ff; 270000(1)
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
- 160210(1) -: Sotsial'-patriotizm' v' Rossii. I. Ikh' "pobeda" (Social-patriotism in Russia. I. Their "victory") ('NS', (34), 10.II.16)
Repr : 220000(3)ff
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
- 160211(1) -: Sotsial'-patriotizm' v' Rossii. I. Ikh' "pobeda" (okonchanie) (Social-patriotism in Russia. I. Their "victory" (conclusion)) ('NS', (35), 11.II.16)
Repr : 220000(3)ff
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
- 160211(2) Al'fa: Plekhanov' o Khvostove (Plekhanov on Khvostov) ('NS', (35), 11.II.16)
Repr : 220000(3)ff; 270000(1)
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
- 160215(1) [letter to D. B. Ryazanov]
(RTsKhIDNI, F. 325, O. 1, D. 399)
- 160216(1) N. Trotskii: Informator' nashelsya! (The informer has been found!) ('NS', (39), 16.II.16)
- 160217(1) Al'fa: Zhuskobu (To the finish!) ('NS', (40), 17.II.16)
Repr : 220000(3)ff; 270000(1)

Trans: Fr 740118(1)

- 160220(1) Al'fa: "Est' eshche tsenzura v' Parizhe" (There's still a censor in Paris")
('NS', (43), 20.II.16)
Repr : 220000(3)ff
Trans: 740118(1)
- 160224(1) Al'fa:
('NS', (46), 24.II.16)
[Completely censored in 'NS']
- 160303(1) -: Sotsial'-patriotizm' v' Rossii. II. "Timy gor'kikh' istin' nam' dorozhe nas vozvyshayushchii obman'" (Social-patriotism in Russia. II. "The bitter truth is more precious to us than [y]our domineering fraud")
('NS', (53), 3.III.16)
Repr : 220000(3)ff
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
- 160303(2) Redaktsiya: Pirvet' F. Meringu i R. Lyuksemberg' (Editorial: Greetings to F. Mehring and R. Luxemburg)
('NS', (53), 3.III.16)
Repr : 190000(10); 260000(17)
Trans: Eng 720000(25)
Sp 810000(4)
- 160304(1) -: Sotsial'-patriotizm' v' Rossii. III. "Voenno-promyshlennyye" sots-dem-ty i ikh' gruppirovki (Social-patriotism in Russia. III. "War-Industrial Social-Democracy and their groupings)
('NS', (54), 4.III.16)
Repr : 220000(3)ff
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
- 160305(1) -: Ot' "istoshcheniya" - k' "dvizheniyu" (From "attrition" - to "movement")
('NS', (55), 5.III.16)
Repr : 220000(3)ff
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
- 160307(1) -: Amnistiya - da ne s' toi storony (Amnesty, yes

- not from that side)
(*'NS'*, (56), 7.III.16)
Repr : 270000(1)
- 160309(1) N. Trotskii: "Samozashchita" I. "bude nuzhno"
("Self-Defence" I. "It will be necessary")
(*'NS'*, (58), 9.III.16)
Repr : 190000(10); 220000(3)ff
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
- 160314(1) -: Sotsial'-patriotizm' v' Rossii. IV. Klass' i partiya,
massy i vozhdi (Social-patriotism in Russia. IV.
Class and party, masses and leaders)
(*'NS'*, (62), 14.III.16)
Repr : 220000(3)ff
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
- 160315(1) -: Sotsial'-patriotizm' v' Rossii. V. Neobkhodimo
izolirovat' sotsialpatrioticheskii shtab
(Social-patriotism in Russia. V. It is necessary to
isolate the social-patriotic staff)
(*'NS'*, (63), 15.III.16)
Repr : 220000(3)ff
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
- 160322(1) N. Trotskii: "Samozashchita" 2. Na vyuchku k'
patriotizma? ("Self-Defence" 2. Training to be a
patriot?)
(*'NS'*, (69), 22.III.16)
Repr : 190000(10); 220000(3)ff
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
- 160324(1) -: Ne polnaya, no simmetriya (Not completeness
but symmetry)
(*'NS'*, (71), 24.III.16)
Repr : 190000(10); 220000(3)ff
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
- 160325(1) -: Po to storonu Vozgez' (On that side of the Vosges)
(*'NS'*, (72), 25.III.16)
Repr : 220000(3)ff; 270000(1)
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
- 160326(1) -: Ironicheskii shchelchok' istorii (An ironical fillip

- of history)
('NS', (73), 26.III.16)
[Part censored in 'NS']
Repr : 220000(3)ff; 270000(1) [in uncensored form]
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
- 160331(1) -: Nasha dumskaya fraktsiya I (Our Duma fraction I)
 ('NS', (77), 31.III.16)
- 160401(1) -: Nasha dumskaya fraktsiya II (Our Duma fraction II)
 ('NS', (78), 1.IV.16)
 [Part censored in 'NS']
- 160402(1) -: Novaya glava' (K raskolu s-d fraktsii reikhstaga) (A new chapter. Towards the split of the Social-Democratic fraction in the Reichstag)
 ('NS', (79), 2.IV.16)
 Repr : 220000(3)ff [under subheading only]
 Trans: Fr 740118(1)
- 160409(1) -: Logika plokhogo polozheniya (Otvet' t. Martovu) (The logic of a bad situation. (A reply to Comrade Martov))
 ('NS', (85), 9.IV.16)
 Repr : 220000(3)ff
 Trans: Fr 740118(1)
- 160411(1) N. Trotskii: Programma mira. V Pozitsiya "Sotsialdemokrata" (A programme of peace. V. The position of "Socialdemokrat")
 ('NS', (86), 11.IV.16)
- 160412(1) N. Trotskii: Programma mira. V Pozitsiya "Sotsialdemokrata" (okonchanie) (A programme of peace. V. The position of "Socialdemokrat" (conclusion))
 ('NS', (87), 12.IV.16)
- 160413(1) N. Trotskii: Programma mira. VI. Patsifistskoe i revolyutsionne otnosheniye k' programma mira (A programme of peace. VI. Pacifist and

- revolutionary relations to the programme of peace)
(*'NS'*, (88), 13.IV.16)
[Part censored in *'NS'*]
- 160414(1) -: Otechestvennoe... (Homelanders...)
(*'NS'*, (89), 14.IV.16)
Repr : 220000(3)ff; 260000(17)
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
- 160419(1) -: Po povodu "zayavlenie" tov. Martova (On
Comrade Martov's "Declaration")
(*'NS'*, (93), 19.IV.16)
- 160420(1) -: Nasha Dumskaya fraktsiya. 1. revolyutsionnaya
i pasivno-vyzhidatel'naya politika (Our Duma
fraction. 1. Revolutionary and passive-wait-and-
see policies)
(*'NS'*, (94), 20.IV.16)
Repr : 220000(3)ff
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
- 160421(1) -: Nasha Dumskaya fraktsiya. 2. "druzh'ya" i
"vragi" dumskoi fraktsii (Our Duma fraction. 2.
"Friends" and "enemies" of the Duma fraction)
(*'NS'*, (95), 21.IV.16)
- 160423(1) -: Dva printsipa. Po povodu stat'i t. A. Lozovskago
(Two principles. On Lozovskii's article)
(*'NS'*, (97), 23.IV.16)
- 160426(1) -: K. Kautskii ob' Internatsionale (K. Kautsky on
the International)
(*'NS'*, (98), 26.IV.16)
Repr : 220000(3)ff
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
- 160501(1) Al'fa: Fantastika Pervoimaiskiia razmyshleniya
(Fantastika May Day reflections)
(*'NS'*, (102), 1.V.16)
Repr : 190000(10); 220000(3)ff; 260000(17)
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
- 160501(2) -: Pervoe maya (1st of May)

- ('NS', (102), 1.V.16)
[Part censored in 'NS']
Repr : 220000(3)ff [in uncensored form]
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
- 160504(1) -: Bez' sterzhnya (Without substance)
('NS', (104), 4.V.16)
Repr : 220000(3)ff
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
- 160506(1) -: Kheglund' i Libknekht' (Hoeglund and
Liebknecht)
('NS', (106), 6.V.16)
Repr : 190000(10)
- 160506(2) N. Trotskii: Nuzhdatsya v' proverke (It is in need
of verification)
('NS', (106), 6.V.16)
- 160510(1) -: V' bor'be za tretii Internatsional' (In the
struggle for a Third International)
('NS', (109), 10.V.16)
Repr : 220000(3)ff
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
- 160511(1) -: Clémence! (Clemency!)
('NS', (110), 11.V.16)
[Part censored in 'NS']
Repr : 220000(3)ff [under title "Miloserdiya!"
("Clemency!") in uncensored form]
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
- 160512(1) -: Vtoraya tsimmerval'dskaya konferentsiya (The
second Zimmerwald Conference)
('NS', (111), 11.V.16)
[Part censored in 'NS']
- 160516(1) Al'fa: Zametki chitateli. "Zakon Mekhaniki"
(Readers notes. "A law of mechanics")
('NS', (114), 16.V.16)
[Part censored in 'NS']
Repr : 220000(3)ff [in censored form]
Trans: Fr 740118(1)

- 160516(2) Al'fa: Zametki chitateli. Servantes' i Svift'. Dve velichiny, porozn' ravnyya tret'ei... (Readers notes. Cervantes and Swift. Two magnitudes separately equal to a third...)
(*'NS'*, (114), 16.V.16)
Repr : 220000(3)ff; 270000(1)
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
- 160516(3) -: Parizh', 16 Maya (Paris, 16 May)
(*'NS'*, (114), 16.V.16)
[Part censored in *'NS'*]
Repr : 220000(3)ff [under title Yubilei "Nashego Slova" ("Nashe Slovo's" jubilee) in uncensored form]
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
- 160521(1) -: Pochemu ne nazvali Plekhanova (Why we did not mention Plekhanov)
(*'NS'*, (119), 21.V.16)
Repr : 220000(3)ff
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
- 160521(2) -: V' Austrii (In Austria)
(*'NS'*, (119), 21.V.16)
Repr : 220000(3)ff
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
- 160524(1) -: So slavyanskim' aktsentom' i ulybkoi na slavyanskikh' gubakh' (With a Slavonic accent and a smile on Slavonic lips)
(*'NS'*, (121), 24.V.16)
[Part censored in *'NS'*]
Repr : 190000(10); 270000(1)ff [not all censored gaps filled in reprint]
- 160527(1) -: Nedomoganie (Lethargy)
(*'NS'*, (124), 27.V.16)
[Part censored in *'NS'*]
Repr : 220000(3)ff [not all censored gaps filled in reprint]
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
- 160604(1) -: Voennyya zametki: "Voina v voine" (War notes: "War on war")

- ('NS', (130), 4.VI.16)
Repr : 220000(3)ff
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
- 160604(2) -: Iz' ideinoi zhizni Austriiskoi sots-dem (From the ideological life of Austrian Social-Democracy)
('NS', (130), 4.VI.16)
Repr : 220000(3)ff [under title Epokha "obshchestvennogo dukha" (An epoch of "public spirit")]
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
- 160615(1) -: Klyuch' k' pozitsii (The key to the situation)
('NS', (138), 15.VI.16)
[Part censored in 'NS']
Repr : 220000(3)ff; 270000(1) [in uncensored form]
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
- 160621(1) -: Razocharovaniya i bespokoistva (Disappointments and worries)
('NS', (143), 21.VI.16)
Repr : 220000(3)ff
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
- 160624(1) -: Kto iz' nikh' luchshe? (Which of them is better?)
('NS', (146), 24.VI.16)
Repr : 220000(3)ff
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
- 160629(1) -: Argument ot' kopyta (An argument from the hoof)
('NS', (150), 29.VI.16)
Repr : 220000(3)ff
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
- 160701(1) -: Karl' Libknecht' (Karl Liebknecht)
('NS', (152), 1.VII.16)
Repr : 190000(10)
- 160704(1) -: K' dublinskim' itogam' (Towards the Dublin results)
('NS', (154), 4.VII.16)
[Part censored in 'NS']

Repr : 220000(3)ff [in uncensored form]
Trans: Eng 740000(22); 'Lace Curtain', [1970];
'Workers Press', 16.VI.70; "RCL", (3), [1973]
Fr 740118(1)

- 160704(2) -: Khristyu Rakovskii (To Christain Rakovsky)
('NS', (154), 4.VII.16)
Repr : 190000(10); 220000(3)ff
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
- 160706(1) -: Etapy (Stages)
('NS', (156), 6.VII.16)
[Part censored in 'NS']
- 160712(1) -: Uroki poslednei dumskoi sessii (Lessons of the
last Duma session)
('NS', (161), 12.VII.16)
Repr : 220000(3)ff
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
- 160713(1) -: Vokrug' natsional'nago printsipa (Around the
national principle)
('NS', (162), 13.VII.16)
Repr : 220000(3)ff; 270000(1)
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
- 160719(1) -: Korennoe raskhozhdenie. I. Politicheskiya
osnovy voenno-promyshlennago
"internatsionalizma" (Radical differences. I The
political underpinnings of War-Industrial
"internationalism")
('NS', (165), 19.VII.16)
Repr : 220000(3)ff
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
- 160720(1) -: Korennoe raskhozhdenie. II. Dve
isklyuchayushchiya drug druga takticheskiya linii
(Radical differences. II Two mutually exclusive
tactical lines)
('NS', (166), 20.VII.16)
Repr : 220000(3)ff
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
- 160727(1) N.T: Pamyati D. M. Gertsensteina (In memory of D.

- M. Herzenstein)
(*'NS'*, (172), 27.VII.16)
Repr : 260000(17)
- 160727(2) -: Ravnenie po Makarovu (Lining up with
Makarov)
(*'NS'*, (172), 27.VII.16)
Repr : 220000(3)ff; 270000(1)
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
- 160728(1) -: Dve telegrammy (Two telegrams)
(*'NS'*, (173), 28.VII.16)
Repr : 220000(3)ff; 270000(1)
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
- 160729(1) -: Dva litsa (Two faces)
(*'NS'*, (174), 29.VII.16)
Repr : 220000(3)ff
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
- 160802(1) -: Sredi germanskoi oppozitsii. Sektanstvo ili
neobkhodimoe vyyasnenie (In the midst of the
German opposition. Sectionalism or a necessary
clarification)
(*'NS'*, (177), 2.VIII.16)
- 160803(1) -: Sredi germanskoi sots-dem oppozitsii. (In the
midst of the German Social-Democratic opposition)
(*'NS'*, (178), 3.VIII.16)
- 160803(2) Al'fa: Nash' konkurs' (Our Competition)
(*'NS'*, (178), 3.VIII.16)
Repr : 220000(3)ff
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
- 160803(1) N. T.: Gustav' Ekhshtein' (Gustave Eckstein)
(*'NS'*, (178), 3.VIII.16)
Repr : 260000(17)
Trans: Eng 720000(25)
 Sp 810000(4)
- 160804(1) -: Dva goda (Two years)
(*'NS'*, (179), 4.VIII.16)
[Part censored in *'NS'*]

- Repr : 220000(3)ff; 270000(1) [not all censored gaps filled in reprint]
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
- 160804(2) -: Sredi germanskoi sots-dem oppozitsii (okonchanie) (In the midst of the German Social-Democratic opposition (conclusion)) ('NS', (179), 4.VIII.16)
- 160806(1) -: "Sud'ba idei" ("The fate of an idea") ('NS', (181), 6.VIII.16)
Repr : 220000(3)ff; 270000(1)
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
- 160808(1) -: Proekt' deklaratsii (Draft declaration) ('NS', (182), 8.VIII.16)
[Part censored in 'NS']
Repr : 220000(3)ff [in uncensored form under title Deklaratsiya, vnesennaya v Komitet dlya vosstanovleniya internatsional'nykh svyazei (Declaration sent to the Comité pour la reprise des relations internationales)]
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
- 160813(1) -: Po adresu Longuetistov' (For the attention of the Longuetists) ('NS', (187), 13.VIII.16)
Repr : 220000(3)ff [under title Manevry longuetistov (Longuetist'a manoeuvres)]
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
- 160813(2) N. T.: Istoriya s moraliyu. "Delo" g. E. Dmitreva (A Story with a moral. The "Affair" of Mr. E. Dmitrev) ('NS', (187), 13.VIII.16)
Repr : 220000(3)ff
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
- 160817(1) -: V' komitete dlya vosstanovleniya internats svyazei (At the Comité pour la reprise des relations internationales) ('NS', (188), 17.VIII.16)
Repr : 220000(3)ff
Trans: Fr 740118(1)

- 160818(1) -: O chem molchit frantsuzskaya press. K' sud'be Pol'shii (What the French press is silent about. Towards Poland's fate) ('NS', (189), 18.VIII.16)
- 160818(2) Ot' Redaktsii (From the editors) ('NS', (189), 18.VIII.16)
Repr : 220000(3)ff [under title Kak borot'sya s longetizmom? (How to struggle against Longuetism?)]
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
- 160820(1) -: Konferentsiya neitralnykh' tenei (A conference of neutral shadows) ('NS', (191), 20.VIII.16)
Repr : 220000(3)ff
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
- 160822(1) -: Vandelve'l'de', "Nashe Slovo", i "Vorwärts" (Vandervelde, "Nashe Slovo", and "Vorwärts") ('NS', (192), 22.VIII.16)
Repr : 220000(3)ff
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
- 160822(2) N. Trotskii: Strategiya i sotsialisticheskaya politika (Strategy and socialist policy) ('NS', (192), 22.VIII.16)
[Part censored in 'NS']
Repr : 220000(3)ff [in uncensored form]
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
- 160823(1) N. T.: Vpechatleniya i obobshcheniya g. Milyukova. 1 Pobeda i svoboda (The impressions and generalisations of Mr. Milyukov. 1 Victory and freedom) ('NS', (193), 23.VIII.16)
[Part censored in 'NS']
Repr : 220000(3)ff [in uncensored form]
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
- 160824(1) N. T.: Vpechatleniya i obobshcheniya g. Milyukova. 2 Tsimmerval'dtsy i longetisty (The impressions and generalisations of Mr. Milyukov. 2 Zimmerwaldists and Longuetists)

- ('NS', (194), 24.VIII.16)
[Part censored in 'NS']
Repr : 220000(3)ff [in uncensored form]
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
- 160826(1) [letter to the Editor]
Trans: Fr 'Ce qu'il faut dire, 26.VIII.16
- 160827(1) -: "Bor'ba za valst'". Progressivno-kadetskaya
Moskva i ministerstvo Shtyumera ("Struggle for
power. Progressive-Kadet Moscow and Stümer's
minstry)
('NS', 197), 27.VIII.16)
Repr : 220000(3)ff
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
- 160901(1) -: "Garantii mira" (K' kharakteristike patsifizma)
I ("A guarantee of peace" (Towards a
characterisation of pacifism) I)
('NS', (201), 1.IX.16)
Repr : 220000(3)ff
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
- 160902(1) -: "Garantii mira" (K kharakteristike patsifizma)
II ("A guarantee of peace" (Towards a
characterisation of pacifism) II)
('NS', (202), 2.IX.16)
Repr : 220000(3)ff
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
- 160903(1) -: Poezdka deputata Chkheidze (Deputy
Chkheidze's tour)
('NS', (203), 3.IX.16)
Repr : 220000(3)ff
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
- 160905(1) -: Stavka na siln'ykh' (Betting on the strong)
('NS', (204), 5.IX.16)
[Part censored in 'NS']
Repr : 270000(1) [in censored form]
- 160907(1) -: "Solidnye argumenty" ("Solid arguments")
('NS', (206), 7.IX.16)
Repr : 220000(3)ff; 270000(1)

Trans: Fr 740118(1)

- 160908(1) -: V' atmosphere neustoichivnosti i rastleniya (In
an atmosphere of instability and depravity)
(*'NS'*, (207), 8.IX.16)
[Part censored in *'NS'*]
Repr : 220000(3)ff [in uncensored form]
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
- 160910(1) 'Prizyv' i ego Aleksinskii ('Prizyv' and its
Aleksinskii)
(*'NS'*, (209), 10.IX.16)
Repr : 220000(3)ff
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
- 160912(1) Ale ksinskii go'Prizyv'' (Aleksinskii and his
'Prizyv')
(*'NS'*, (210), 12.IX.16)
Repr : 220000(3)ff
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
- 160914(1) -: Novyi tsenzurnyi rezhim' (A new censor regime)
(*'NS'*, (212), 14.IX.16)
Repr : 220000(3)ff
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
- 160914(2) -: Frantsuzskii i nemetskii sotsial-patriotizm'
chem' sushchnost' ppozitsii" longetistov'? (French
and German social-patriotism. I In what does the
opposition of the Longuetists consist of?)
(*'NS'*, (212), 14.IX.16)
[Part censored in *'NS'*]
Repr : 220000(3)ff [in uncensored form]
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
- 160915(1) -: Frantsuzskii i nemetskii sotsial-patriotizm' II.
Longetizm' i nemetskoe "bol'shinstvo" (French and
German social-patriotism II Longuetism and the
German "majority")
(*'NS'*, (213), 15.IX.16)
Repr : 220000(3)ff
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
- 160930(1) En': Rodnyya teni (Homeland shadows)

- ('Nach', (1), 30.IX.16)
Repr : 220000(3)ff
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
- 161001(1) En': Prestupleniya i nakazanie (Crime and Punishment)
('Nach', (2), 1.X.16)
[Part censored in 'Nach']
- 161006(1) -: Imperializm' i sotsializm' (Imperialism and socialism)
('Nach', (6), 6.X.16)
Repr : 220000(3)ff [with changes]
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
- 161012(1) -: Izyan' v' tverdom' kurse (The flaw in the hard way)
('Nach', (11), 12.X.16)
[Part censored in 'Nach']
Repr : 220000(3)ff [in censored form]
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
- 161017(1) -: Imperializm' i sotsializm' I (Po povodu germanskoi s-d konferentsii) (Imperialism and socialism I (On the German Social-Democratic Conference))
('Nach', (15), 17.X.16)
Repr : 220000(3)ff [under title Soyuznik - ne edinomyshlennik (Allies - not like-minded thinkers)]
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
- 161018(1) -: Imperializm' i sotsializm' I (Po povodu germanskoi s-d konferentsii) (Imperialism and socialism II (On the German Social-Democratic Conference))
('Nach', (16), 18.X.16)
Repr : 220000(3)ff [under title Budushchee za spartakovtsami (The future belongs to the Spartacists)]
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
- 161022(1) En': Negodyai (A scoundrel)
('Nach', (20), 22.X.16)

Repr : 220000(3)ff; 260000(17)

Trans: Eng 720000(25)

Fr 740118(1)

Sp 810000(4)

- 161024(1) -: Imperializm' i sotsializm'. bor'ba za respubliku
v' Germanii (Imperialism and socialism. The
struggle for a republic in Germany)
(*'Nach'*, (21), 24.X.16)
Repr : 220000(3)ff [under title Za respubliku ili za
sotsializm? (For a republic or for socialism?)]
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
- 161025(1) -: Frits' Adler' (Fritz Adler)
(*'Nach'*, (22), 25.X.16)
Repr : 220000(3)ff; 260000(17)
Trans: Eng 720000(25)
Fr 740118(1)
Sp 810000(4)
- 161102(1) [letter to the Editor of *'Avanti'* in Italian]
(RTsKhIDNI, F.325, O. 1, D. 401)
- 161103(1) -: K' poezdke deputata Chkheidze (Towards deputy
Chkheidze's tour)
(*'Nach'*, (29), 3.XI.16)
Repr : 220000(3)ff [under title Eshche o poezdke
deputata Chkheidze (More on deputy Chkheidze's
tour)]
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
- 161105(1) -: Privet' druž'yam' (Greetings to friends)
(*'Nach'*, (31), 5.XI.16)
- 161118(1) -: N.Trotskii v' kadikse (N. Trotsky is in Cadix)
(*'Nach'*, (42), 18.XI.16)
[Completely censored in *'Nach'*]
- 161202(1) En': Ispanskaya "vpechatelniya". Pochti-arabskaya
skazka (Spanish "impressions". Almost an Arabian
tale)
(*'Nach'*, (54), 2.XII.16)
Repr : 220000(3)ff; 270000(1)

Trans: Fr 740118(1)

- 161206 - : Tov. Trotskii vyslan' iz' ispanii, sobiraetsya v' N'yu-Iorke (Comrade Trotsky has been exiled from Spain and is intending to come to New York) ('NM' (NY), (851), 6.XII.16)
- 161227(1) N. Trotskii: Vnusheniya "khefov'", otkroveniia "akhentov'" (The "chief's" suggestions, the "agent's" revelations) ('Nach', (74), 27.XII.16)
Repr : 220000(3)ff; 270000(1); 'Krasnaya nov', (7), 1922
Trans: Am 'Living Age', 23.XI & 9.XII.22
Fr 740118(1); 'Revue Mondiale' (150,151), 15.X & 1.XI.22
- 170115(1) - : Tov. Trotskii v' N'yu-Iorke (Comrade Trotsky is in New York) ('NM' (NY), (885), 15.I.17)
- 170115(2) [Interview] ('The Call')
- 170116(1) [Interview] ('Jewish Daily Forward', 16.I.17)
- 170116(2) [Interview] ('The Call')
- 170116(3) N. Trotskii: Da zdravstvuet' bor'ba! (Long live struggle!) ('NM' (NY), (886), 16.I.17)
Repr : 220000(3)ff
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
- 170120(1) N. Trotskii: Uroki velikago goda. 9 yanvarya 1905-9 yanvarya 1917g (Lessons of a great year. 9 January 1905- 9 January 1917) ('NM' (NY), (890), 20.I.17)
Repr : 220000(3)ff
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
Eng 'Journal of Trotsky Studies', (I), VII.93.

- 170125(1) [Speech at a meeting in New York]
 ('NM' (NY), (890), 20.I.17)
 ('NM' (NY), (892), 23.I.17)
 ('NM' (NY), (893), 24.I.17)
 ('NM' (NY), (894), 25.I.17)
 Repr : 220000(3)ff [under title Pod znamenem
 sotsial'noi revolyutsii (Under the banner of the
 social revolution)]
 Trans: Fr 740118(1)
- 170126(1) N. Trotskii: Za dva s' polovinoi goda voiny v'
 Evrope (iz' dnevnika) I. Serbskie terroristy i
 frantsuzskie "osvoboditeli" - Venskiya nastroeniya
 v' pervyie dni voiny (For two and a half years of
 war in Europe (From a diary) I Serbian terrorists
 and the French "liberators" - The mood in Vienna
 in the first days of war)
 ('NM' (NY), (895), 26.I.17)
 Repr: 190000(10); 220000(3); 270000(1)
 Trans: Am 180000(3)
 Cz [190000(62)]
 Fr 740118(1)
- 170130(1) [How [Tsar] Nicholas operates in free France]
 ('Jewish Daily Forward', 30.I.17)
- 170201(1) [The Russian government commits provocations in
 France]
 ('Jewish Daily Forward', 1.II.17)
- 170201(1) N. Trotskii: 'Vo frantsuzskom vagone. (Razgovory i
 razmyshleniya). I' (In a French railway carriage.
 (Conversations and Ruminations) I)
 ('NM' (NY), (900), 1.II.17)
- 170202(1) [lecture in New York 'Rossiya i voina' (Russia and
 the war)]
 ('NM' (NY), (899), 31.I.17)
 ('NM' (NY), (900), 1.II.17)
 ('NM' (NY), (901), 2.II.17)
- 170202(2) N. Trotskii: 'Vo frantsuzskom vagone. (Razgovory i
 razmyshleniya). II' (In a French railway carriage.
 (Conversations and Ruminations) II)

- ('NM' (NY), (901), 2.II.17)
- 170203(1) Al'fa: Dokumenty voiny (War documents)
('NM' (NY), (902), 3.II.17)
- 170205(1) N. Trotskii: Za dva s' polovinoi goda voiny v' Evrope (iz' dnevnika) II. Nastroeniya v' avstriiskoi s-d - Viktor' Adler' - Ot'ezde v' Tsurikh' (For two and a half years of war in Europe (From a diary) II. The mood in Austrian Social-Democracy - Victor Adler - Departure for Zurich)
('NM' (NY), (903), 5.II.17)
Repr: 190000(10); 220000(3); 270000(1)
Trans: Am 180000(3)
Cz [190000(62)]
Eng 720000(25)
Fr 740118(1)
Sp 810000(4)
- 170206(1) N. Trotskii: V' shkole voiny (In the school of war)
('NM' (NY), (904), 6.II.17)
Repr : 220000(3)ff
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
- 170206(2) -: Tov. Trotskii v' N'yu-Iorke (Comrade Trotsky in New York)
('Nach', (108), 6.II.17)
- 170207(1) N. Trotskii: Povtorenie proidennago (A repetition of things past)
('NM' (NY), (905), 7.II.17)
Repr : 220000(3)ff; 270000(1)
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
- 170208(1) -: Bol'shoe obyazatel'stvo (Po povodu rezolyutsii mitinga v' Karnegi Goll) (A great obligation (Concerning the resolution of the meeting in Carnegie Hall))
('NM' (NY), (906), 8.II.17)
Repr : 220000(3)ff
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
- 170208(2) [Speech at an anti-war meeting in New York]
('NM' (NY), (904), 6.II.17)

- ('NM' (NY), (905), 7.II.17)
 ('NM' (NY), (906), 8.II.17)
- 170210(1) Lev' N. Trotskii: Tsarizm na respublikanskoi
 pochve. I(Tsarism on republican soil. I)
 ('NM' (NY), (908), 10.II.17)
 Repr : 220000(3)ff
 Trans: Fr 740118(1)
- 170212(1) Lev' N. Trotskii: Tsarizm na respublikanskoi
 pochve. II (Tsarism on republican soil. II)
 ('NM' (NY), (909), 12.II.17)
 Repr : 220000(3)ff
 Trans: Fr 740118(1)
- 170213(1) Lev' N. Trotskii: Karlu Tsetkin' lushche im' ostavit'
 v pokoe (Pis'mo v' redaktsiyu) (It would be better
 if they left Klara Zetkin in peace (Letter to the
 Editors))
 ('NM' (NY), (910), 13.II.17)
 Repr : 220000(3)ff
 Trans: Fr 740118(1)
- 170215(1) [What will American workers get from the war?]
 ('Jewish Daily Forward', 15.II.17)
- 170215(2) [Speech at an anti-war meeting in New York]
 ('NM' (NY), (912), 15.II.17)
- 170216(1) L. Trotskii: A vse-taki Karlu Tsetkin' naprasno
 trevozhite! (And all the same you have disturbed
 Klara Zetkin for nothing!)
 ('NM' (NY), (913), 16.II.17)
 Repr : 220000(3)ff
 Trans: Fr 740118(1)
- 170216(2) -: Tov. Trotskii v' N'yu-lorke (Comrade Trotsky in
 New York)
 ('Nach', (116), 16.II.17)
 [Part censord in 'Nach']
- 170217(1) N. Trotskii: Za dva s' polovinoi goda voiny v'
 Evrope (iz' dnevnika) III. "predatel'stvo nemtsev"
 - Plekhanov' - Greilikh (For two and a half years

of war in Europe (From a diary) III. "The betrayal of the Germans" - Plekhanov - Greulich)

('NM' (NY), (914), 17.II.17)

Repr : 190000(10); 220000(3); 270000(1)

Trans: Am 180000(3)

Cz [190000(62)]

Fr 740118(1)

- 170220(1) [Lecture in New York in German 'Priblizit' li vmeshatel'stvo Soed. Shtatov' konets voyny?' (Will American intervention bring the end of the war any closer?)]
('NM' (NY), 20.II.17)

- 170223(1) Lev' N. Trotskii: Nuzhno vybirat' put' (One has to choose the path)
('NM' (NY), (919), 23.II.17)
('Jewish Daily Forward', 23.II.17)
Repr : 220000(3)ff
Trans: Fr 740118(1)

- 170225(1) [Speech at a meeting in New York to celebrate women's day]
('NM' (NY), (918), 22.II.17)
('NM' (NY), (919), 23.II.17)
('NM' (NY), (920), 24.II.17)

- 170225(2) [Speech at a meeting in Philadelphia]
('NM' (NY), (912), 15.II.17)
('NM' (NY), (917), 21.II.17)
('NM' (NY), (918), 22.II.17)
('NM' (NY), (919), 23.II.17)
('NM' (NY), (920), 24.II.17)

- 170227(1) Lev' N. Trotskii: Chto govoril Internatsional o zashchite otechestva? (What did the International say about the defence of the homeland?)
('NM' (NY), (922), 27.II.17)
Repr : 220000(3)ff
Trans: Fr 740118(1)

- 170300(1) Zeier pazifism un user pazifism Wi azoy der burgeoiser pazifism fihrt zu militarizm
('Zunkunft', III.17)

- 170302(1) [Lecture in New York 'Tsimmerval'd i kintal'
(Zimmerwald and Kienthal)
('NM' (NY), (924), 1.III.17)
('NM', (NY), (925), 2.III.17)
- 170303(1) Lev' N. Trotskii: Na zaprosy chitateli. O Krasnom'
Kreste. O Plehkanove (On readers' requests. About
the Red Cross. About Plekhanov)
('NM' (NY), (926), 3.III.17)
Repr : 220000(3)ff
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
- 170303(2) Al'fa: U okna (At the window)
('NM' (NY), (926), 3.III.17)
Repr : 270000(1)
- 170304(1) [Speech at a meeting in Newark in German]
('NM' (NY), 28.II.17)
- 170306(1) [Lecture to Jewish section of the American
Socialist Party in New York 'Rabochoe dvizhene
Evropy vo vremya voyny' (The European workers'
movement during the war)]
('NM' (NY), (927), 5.III.17)
('NM' (NY), (928), 6.III.17)
- 170306(2) [Lecture to Jewish section of the American
Socialist Party in the Bronx, New York 'Voina i
Internatsional'(War and the International)
('NM' (NY), (928), 6.III.17)
- 170306(3) Lev' N. Trotskii: Obshchei pochvy s' "Forvertsom"
U Nas' Net' (There is no common soil between us
and 'Forverts')
('NM' (NY), (928), 6.III.17)
Repr : 220000(3)ff
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
- 170306(4) Al'fa: Trezvyia mysli (Sobering thoughts)
('NM' (NY), (928), 6.III.17)
- 170306(5) N. Trotskii: Za dva s' polovinoi goda voyny v'
Evrope (iz' dnevnika) IV. Shveitsurskaya

sotsialdemokratya - "Gryutli" - "Eintracht" - Frits' Platten' - Nemetskaya broshyura "Voina i Internatsional'" - Sotsialisticheskaya pripiska k' shtatu (For two and a half years of war in Europe (From a diary) IV. Swiss Social-Democracy - "Greutli" - "Eintracht" - Fritz Platten - German brochure "War and the International" - Socialist appendages to the General Staff)

('NM' (NY), (928), 6.III.17)

Repr: 190000(10); 220000(3); 270000(1)

Trans: Am 180000(3)

Cz [190000(62)]

Fr 740118(1)

170307(1)

Al'fa: Kto otgadaet? (Who can guess?)

('NM' (NY), (929), 7.III.17)

Repr: 270000(1)

170308(1)

-: Gotov'ye soldat' revolyutsii (Prepare the soldiers for revolution)

('NM' (NY), (930), 8.III.17)

Repr: 220000(3)ff

Trans: Fr 740118(1)

170308(2)

Lev' N. Trotskii: Dva voyuyushchikh lagerya (Two warring camps)

('NM' (NY), (930), 8.III.17)

Repr: 220000(3)ff

Trans: Fr 740118(1)

170308(3)

Al'fa: Opyat' otkryli dumu (They have opened the Duma once again)

('NM' (NY), (930), 8.III.17)

Repr: 220000(3)ff

Trans: Fr 740118(1)

Eng 'Journal of Trotsky Studies', (1), VII.93

170309(1)

Lev' N. Trotskii: Dlya chego Amerike voina? (What is the war to America?)

('NM' (NY), (931), 9.III.17)

Repr: 220000(3)ff; 270000(1)

Trans: Fr 740118(1)

170309(2)

Al'fa: Zatrudneniya chitatelya (Readers'

- difficulties)
(*'NM'* (NY), (931), 9.III.17)
Repr : 270000(1)
- 170309(3) L.N.T.: Nepravda! (Untrue!)
(*'NM'* (NY), (931), 9.III.17)
Repr : 220000(3)ff
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
- 170310(1) Al'fa: Zhvachka (Chewing gum)
(*'NM'* (NY), (932), 10.III.17)
- 170311(1) [Speech at a branch meeting of the Russian section
of the American Socialist Party in Newark]
(*'NM'* (NY), (923), 28.II.17)
(*'NM'* (NY), (931), 9.III.17)
(*'NM'* (NY), (932), 10.III.17)
- 170313(1) Lev' N. Trotskii: U poroga revolyutsii (On the
threshold of revolution)
(*'NM'* (NY), (934), 13.III.17)
Repr : 220000(3)ff
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
Jap 'Trotsky Studies', (5), Autumn 92
Eng 'Journal of Trotsky Studies', (1), VII.93
- 170313(2) Al'fa: Pravosudie na kryshe (Justice on the roof)
(*'NM'* (NY), (934), 13.III.17)
- 170314(1) [Lecture to a meeting in aid of victims of the
Russian revolution 'Revolutsionnyya traditsii i
perspektivy' (Revolutionary traditions and
perspectives)]
(*'NM'* (NY), (933), 12.III.17)
(*'NM'* (NY), (934), 13.III.17)
(*'NM'* (NY), (935), 14.III.17)
- 170314(2) -: Neobkhodimo ochishchenie riadov; rol'
"Forvertsa" v' evreiskom rabochem dvizhenii (A
necessary cleansing of the ranks; the role of
"Forverts" in the Jewish workers' movement)
(*'NM'* (NY), (935), 14.III.17)
Repr : 220000(3)ff
Trans: Fr 740118(1)

- 170315(1) - : Baran'ya konstitutsiya. (Konferentsiya Gompersa i Ko) (A sheep's constiution. Gompers & Co.'s conference))
('NM' (NY), (936), 15.III.17)
Repr : 220000(3)ff
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
- 170315(2) Lev' N. Trotskii: Nespokoino v' Evrope (Unrest in Europe)
('NM' (NY), (936), 15.III.17)
Repr : 220000(3)ff
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
- 170316(1) - : Revolyutsiya v' Rossii (Revolution in Russia)
('NM' (NY), (937), 16.III.17)
Repr : 220000(3)ff
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
Eng 'Journal of Trotsky Studies', (1), VII.93
- 170316(2) Al'fa: Obrabotka i pozolota (Processing and gilding)
('NM' (NY), (937), 16.III.17)
Repr : 270000(1)
- 170317(1) - : Pod' znamenem' kommuny (Under the banner of the Commune)
('NM' (NY), (938), 17.III.17)
Repr : 220000(3)ff
Trans: Am 'NMil', 21.III.36; 701200(1)ff
Eng 'WIN', II-III.46; 550900(1)
Sin 510000(1)
Fr 580000(7); 740118(1)
- 170317(2) Lev' N. Trotskii: Dva litsa. (Vnutrenniya sily russkoi revolyutsii) (Two faces. The internal forces of the Russian revolution)
('NM' (NY), (938), 17.III.17)
Repr : 220000(3)ff
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
Jap 'Trotsky Studies', (5), Autumn 92
Eng 'Journal of Trotsky Studies', (1), VII.93
- 170318(1) [Speech to a meeting of the Jewish section of the

- American Socialist Party in the Bronx, New York in memory of the Paris Commune]
('NM' (NY), (938), 17.III.17)
- 170319(1) Lev' N. Trotskii: Narostayushchii konflikt (Vnutrenniya sily revolyutsii) (The growing conflict (The internal forces of the revolution))
('NM' (NY), (940), 19.III.17)
Repr : 220000(3)ff
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
Jap 'Trotsky Studies', (5), Autumn 92
Eng 'Journal of Trotsky Studies', (1), VII.93
- 170320(1) [Speech to a meeting on the Russian revolution in New York]
('NM' (NY), (938), 17.III.17)
('NM' (NY), (940), 19.III.17)
('NM' (NY), (941), 20.III.17)
('NM' (NY), (943), 22.III.17)
- 170320(2) -: Voina ili mir'? (Vnutrenniya sily revolyutsii) (War or Peace? (The internal forces of the revolution))
('NM' (NY), (941), 20.III.17)
Repr : 220000(3)ff
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
Jap 'Trotsky Studies', (5), Autumn 92
Eng 'Journal of Trotsky Studies', (1), VII.93
- 170320(3) -: G-n Kagan', kak istolkovatel' russkoi revolyutsii pered' rabochimi N'yu Iorka (Mr Cahan as a commentator on the Russian revolution to the workers of New York)
('NM' (NY), (941), 20.III.17)
Repr : 220000(3)ff
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
- 170321(1) Lev' N. Trotskii: Ot' kogo i kak' zashchishchat' revolyutsii? (From whom and how to defend the revolution?)
('NM' (NY), (942), 21.III.17)
Repr : 220000(3)ff
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
Jap 'Trotsky Studies', (5), Autumn 92

Eng 'Journal of Trotsky Studies', (1), VII.93

- 170322(1) -: Voina i revolyutsii (War and revolution)
('NM' (NY), (943), 22.III.17)
Repr : 220000(3)ff; 270000(1)
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
- 170322(2) -: Kto izmenniki? (Who are the traitors?)
('NM' (NY), (943), 22.III.17)
- 170322(3) N. Trotskii: Za dva s' polovinoi goda voiny v'
Evrope (iz' dnevnika) V. Pereezde vo Frantsie -
Parizh' - Viviani - Zhofre - Brian' - Klemanso (For
two and a half years of war in Europe (From a
diary) V. Move to France - Paris - Viviani - Joffre
- Briand - Clemenceau)
('NM' (NY), (943), 22.III.17)
Repr: 190000(10); 220000(3); 270000(1)
Trans : Am 180000(3)
 Cz [190000(62)]
 Fr 740118(1)
- 170323(1) Al'fa: V' Russkom' konsul'stve (At the Russian
Embassy)
('NM' (NY), (944), 23.III.17)
- 170324(1) [Farewell speech at a concert and ball in aid of the
Russian revolution]
('NM' (NY), (942), 21.III.17)
('NM' (NY), (943), 22.III.17)
('NM' (NY), (944), 23.III.17)
('NM' (NY), (945), 24.III.17)
- 170325(1) [Lecture to a meeting in Philadelphia 'Russkaya
revolyutsiya' (The Russian revolution)]
('NM' (NY), (944), 23.III.17)
('NM' (NY), (945), 24.III.17)
- 170325(2) [Lecture to a meeting in aid of the Russian
revolution]
('NM' (NY), (946), 25.III.17)
- 170326(1) [Lecture to a meeting in honour of L. D. Trotsky,
organised by the German Federation of the

American Socialist Party]
('NM' (NY), (946), 25.III.17)

170328(1)

Ot'ezd tovarishchii (The departure of several
comrades)
('NM' (NY), (949), 28.III.17)

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 Moscow, 1931.

[Aksel'rod, P]

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 nashikh raznoglasiyakh", *Nashe*
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 nashikh raznoglasiyakh'. II.',
Nashe Slovo, No. 90, 16 May 1915,
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