

A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THOMAS B. GREENFIELD'S
SUBJECTIVE APPROACH TO THE FIELD OF EDUCATIONAL
ADMINISTRATION IN THE CONTEXT OF AN INTERDISCIPLINARY
INITIATIVE TO THE FIELD, DRAWING ON SOCIOLOGY OF EDUCATION,
ANTHROPOLOGY, PHILOSOPHY AND ORGANISATION THEORY
IN GENERAL.

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SUMMARY

In 1974, at the International Intervisitation Programme (I.I.P.) in Bristol, Thomas B. Greenfield launched a subjective approach to educational administration, with an attack on what he saw as the prevailing systems perspective of the "New Movement", which grew up in the late 1950's and early 1960's centred on the University of Chicago, but drawing inspiration from the work of Herbert Simon.

The resulting subjective/systems debates plunged educational administration into a period of uncertainty, and yet, paradoxically, at the same time, produced an examination of the very philosophical and theoretical bases of the field of educational administration and brought to the forefront of the debate many issues, for example, the role of science in educational administration, the nature of theory, the reality of organisations and the 'right' way to conduct educational research.

The first section provides an overview of events surrounding the Greenfield/Griffiths Debate. It focuses on the period immediately after the I.I.P. Address at Bristol, where Daniel Griffiths' challenges to Greenfield's stance led to what was called the Greenfield/Griffiths Debate. Finally, the critiques of Jean Hills and Donald Willower are considered in the aftermath of the Greenfield/Griffiths Debate. This provides a foundation on which to build the specific debates of the later sections, where comparative and analytical methods are used.

The methodological implications of the way this thesis has attempted critically to analyse the thoughts of various

writers, and to suggest new insights that the author brings to the debate, are considered in the Preface. The writer's physics background has enabled him to provide examples and comparisons from the natural sciences and to clear up what he regards as misconceptions about the nature of science that Greenfield and other contributors exhibit in their work.

Section 2. explores the justificatory philosophical sources which Greenfield and his critics use to buttress their views. Greenfield, for example, draws on the work of Weber, Laing and Hodgkinson, but does so in such a way that makes it difficult to locate his exact philosophical position. Labels such as action theorist, phenomenologist and existentialist, appear only to have limited applicability to Greenfield's stance. Investigations have been undertaken into the philosophies of Husserl and Schutz to try to clarify this position, but in no sense is it claimed that this is a philosophical thesis. Its concern is with educational administration.

Sections 3. and 4. compare Greenfield's 'new perspective' with the so called, 'new directions' in the sociology of education, which, while superficially sharing similarities with the 'new perspective', also indicate underlying fundamental differences in the way the two fields progressed. For instance, although a phenomenological period is claimed by Sarup for the 'new directions' in the sociology of education, on analysis, it does not appear really to have existed, there being, instead, an early push towards neo-Marxist perspectives. Hence, the need to examine neo-Marxist perspectives in both fields in Section 4.

Section 5. discusses the importance of anthropological and ethnographic research methods in educational administration, as a result of their almost inevitable

use, as the only methods available, if research is to remain within subjective approaches.

Section 6. examines ambiguity models such as the 'Garbage Can' model of Cohen, March and Olsen, and the 'loose coupling' of Weick. Such models are often considered to have a sympathy with subjective approaches, in their citation of 'fuzzy' organisational goals and unclear technologies, and notions of 'organised anarchy'. Yet, the thesis shows that this philosophical orientation is much closer to systems perspectives, i.e. goals may be 'fuzzy', but they are still organisational goals, something impossible under Greenfield's subjective approach.

Section 7. examines the concept, 'paradigm' and the idea that the subjective/systems debate has given way to paradigm diversity. However, appeals to Kuhn's scientific notion of paradigm help to reveal inconsistencies in the way the term is applied in educational administration, and to question its appropriateness to the field.

Section 8. examines the INLOGOV Report, (a report by the Institute of Local Government Studies and School of Education, University of Birmingham, on the arrangements of the Education Department of Strathclyde Regional Council), in the light of the various philosophical and theoretical approaches put forward in this thesis, to provide an example of the relevance of such work to a specific educational administration situation, i.e. the arrangements for educational administration in Strathclyde Regional Council's Education Department.

Section 9. attempts to break new ground over the problem of intersubjectivity, the attempt to bridge the gap between subjective and systems approaches. First highlighted in Section 2., this forms a fundamental problem in philosophy, and so, after demonstrating the difficulty

of taking a purely philosophical approach, the writer attempts to take a new direction to the issue by appealing to concepts such as culture, chaos and time irreversibility, to provide new ideas and insights to the problem. The concepts, 'language' and 'communication' from culture, are examined along with the new ideas emerging in the natural sciences on the universality of chaos patterns across discipline boundaries, and the ability of apparent chaos to reveal an intricate fine structure underneath. Finally, drawing on ideas throughout the thesis, the concept of time irreversibility is used to explore the possibility of connections, through the fact that each human consciousness is simultaneously locked into the same time progression.

Section 10. attempts to assess Greenfield's contribution to educational administration by considering, in turn, various concepts usually associated with what many would regard as 'mainstream' educational administration, derived from systems approaches, such as organisation, goal, environment, accountability, leadership, training and research. Finally, an assessment is made of Greenfield's overall impact on the future of educational administration.

PREFACE.

METHODOLOGY.

Parameters of the Debate.

This thesis is primarily a study of a debate within educational administration as it has evolved over the last twenty years.

The work of Thomas B. Greenfield features highly in this work, and while this is not a biographical study of Greenfield, his ideas on a subjective approach to educational administration provide a thread that runs throughout the work.

However, Greenfield has raised issues like the nature of theory, the reality of organisations and the taken-for-granted philosophical assumptions within the traditional field of educational administration. These issues have made it essential to consider other fields of study and disciplines, where parallel problems have appeared, in order to try to seek understanding through comparative study.

Thus fields and disciplines such as sociology of education, anthropology, philosophy and general organisation theory as applied to institutions other than educational establishments have been investigated.

For instance, the parallel developments in the 'new' sociology of education and their consequences have been considered in Section 3. and Section 4., where, in the early 1970's both fields experienced a claimed subjective/phenomenological input. To the writer's knowledge, this forms an original initiative in the thesis.

Section 7. devoted to the concept, 'paradigm' is necessary because the term can be used in many different ways. Until recently, Greenfield has not used the term and does not provide his own definition of the word.

Where is the Data Coming From?

The data for this thesis are primarily works generated within educational administration. Greenfield's 'new perspective' paper, "Theory About Organization: A New Perspective and its Implications for Schools", [in, "Administering Education - International Challenge" (1975), edited by M. Hughes,] forms a central source of citation, for within the confines of twenty six pages Greenfield raises many fundamental sociological, philosophical and theoretical issues, which have application and relevance far outside the confines of educational administration. The work of Daniel Griffiths, Donald Willower and Peter Gronn form central critiques which have provided much data for the debate. The contributors to Boyan's "Handbook of Research on Educational Administration"(1988) Griffiths, Willower, Hughes, Culbertson and Everhart, provide much data for Section 7. where the concept, 'paradigm' is addressed.

The inclusion of philosophy has raised difficult issues of the depth of treatment required.

Problems of Encountering Philosophical Issues.

This is not intended to be a philosophical thesis, nor does the author consider himself equipped to embark upon such a work; he is not a philosopher. The question: "how much do educational administrators need to know about philosophy?" remains problematic. It raises the issue of whether those writing within the subjective/systems and wider paradigmatic debates within educational administration, who draw freely on justificatory philosophical sources to strengthen their arguments, have specific expertise in philosophy.

In the subjective/systems debate, from a philosophical point of view, there is much confusion over the concept, 'phenomenology'. Although initially adopting the term for his stance, Greenfield, after much criticism, appears to use the term less frequently. His approach appears to favour a phenomenology that always respects the subject's view of reality, but other phenomenological writers, such as Schutz, sometimes use the term in a much more interactionist way. However, Section 2., is devoted to the philosophical issues raised by Greenfield and his critics, and data from secondary sources have been used to express the ideas of philosophers such as Husserl, Heidegger, Schutz, Berger, Luckmann and Wittgenstein.

Secondary Sources.

The use of secondary sources for data, the author considers to be justified by the vast area to be covered in addressing philosophical, sociological and theoretical problems within several fields. This has resulted in such sources being taken as starting points for premises, and as such, they have been assumed to be factually correct. However, primary sources predominate when issues

are being drawn from writers who are primarily working within the field of educational administration.

Problems of Citation.

The work draws heavily on citation, which the writer considers to be his evidence. This raises the problem of taking quotations out of context, a problem exacerbated by the practice of comparing a quotation from one author with that of another in order to highlight disagreements or conflicts. However, it is such activity, risky though it may be, that can lead to insights into sometimes subtle differences of orientation between different writers, and the implications these raise for the study of educational administration.

Not only is the work wide academically across fields and disciplines, it is also, of necessity, wide geographically. The fact that the debates are over theoretical, philosophical, and sociological issues within educational administration, as outlined earlier, rather than specific debates within the administration of education in one country, has resulted in the debate being conducted across the English speaking world, with, for instance, Greenfield's (Canadian) work being criticised and supported in the United States, Britain and Australia.

Problems of Interpretation of English across Continents.

When citations are taken across continents, and compared across continents, this raises the question of whether English can be regarded as a universal language within the debate.

The author has not attempted any analysis of the cultural differences in the meaning of language, for example,

between American English and that used on this side of the Atlantic.

The nature of the study aided this decision. With the exception of Section 8., most of the key citations refer to general issues of the study of educational administration, especially when subjective approaches are being considered.

A subjective approach implies a focus on the individual and interpretation of organisations, from his specific viewpoint, involving the meanings he brings to the situation. Greenfield favours a stance that supports the integrity of subjective meaning above any cultural shared meanings, a point to be stressed later in the thesis. This in itself, lends support to the author's decision not to become preoccupied with the problems of cultural interpretations of language, until the ninth section on the meaning of culture. In his opinion, the problems of the cultural interpretations of language mainly arise from specific considerations of administrative systems, for instance, between the U.K. and the U.S.A., rather than consideration of general approaches such as subjective, systems or ambiguity. For example, cultural differences occur between the concept of a headmaster in a British school, who, in spite of his position, is seen as retaining a teaching role, and the concept of a principal in an American school who is seen to be primarily an administrator. On the other hand, the more theoretical concept of a 'Garbage Can' model, within ambiguity approaches to educational administration, while containing the American use of the word 'garbage', is easily interpreted as refuse or household waste and, as such, retains its metaphoric concept of 'dumping' of issues, to be 'processed' at a later time.

A Debate Across the Boundaries of Individual Educational
Administration Units.

In order to address the various issues that commentators on Greenfield's approach have put forward, and to be able to argue across cultural boundaries, with the exception of Section 8., the work has remained outside specific debates about individual administrative systems within localities, (which also, incidentally, supports the citation issue just considered).

Section 8., however, attempts to provide an example of how such theoretical, philosophical and sociological debates, and their relation to other approaches, can have application in criticism of an individual report on the administration of education within a specific local authority. Because it confines itself in this way, with no attempt at comparative studies with other specific administrative systems, in other regions or countries, (this is not a thesis on comparative education,) the author considers that the problem of cultural differences of language interpretation have still been kept to a minimum, even within this section. Although citations from the INLOGOV Report have been used, (the report reviewing the specific administrative arrangements within Strathclyde Regional Council's Education Department,) they have only been compared with citations on general theoretical and philosophical issues, and not with other specific reports on the process of educational administration in other systems, or geographical areas. The intention is to show the extent of the relevance and applicability of the theoretical and philosophical ideas, to a specific situation, and not to become preoccupied with a comparative study of educational administrative systems, which would direct attention away from the subjective/systems debate

and the resulting paradigm diversity, that form the central thrust of this thesis.

The Problems of Trying to Imagine Greenfield's Reaction to Specific Suggestions made by other Commentators.

At various stages within the thesis the author tries to imagine what Greenfield's reaction would be to specific suggestions made by other commentators. This is justified on the grounds that it aids attempts to identify Greenfield's specific subjective orientation and to enable the general debates within educational administration, for instance the concept 'paradigm diversity', to be considered, from his viewpoint. Such attempts have been decided purely on the logical deductions of the actual issues being considered, and it should not be implied that Greenfield would agree with the author's deductions. The writer is merely attempting to see the issues through the eyes of Greenfield's specific subjective orientation, with its emphasis on the integrity of the meanings that the subject brings to a situation.

The Input into the Debate of the Author's Physics Background.

The writer has brought his knowledge of physics to debates which centre on the question of whether educational administration is a science, and whether scientific principles can be applied. He considers that there are various misconceptions about the nature of physics and other natural sciences held by Greenfield and his commentators, and that sometimes appeals to specific ideas, theories and usages in physics, can clarify these misconceptions; for example, the misconception that, at any one time, there can be only one prevailing paradigm

in physics, in other words, one prevailing theoretical explanation of a physical phenomenon, that cannot exist side by side with conflicting paradigms, and can only eventually be overthrown by a new paradigm, with the resulting rejection of the former.

A good example would be the theories of Newtonian and Einsteinian mechanics. The theories of relativity of Einstein extend the knowledge of Mechanics, but Newton's Laws of Motion have become special cases of Einstein's theory, and in many everyday situations, Newtonian mechanics provides satisfactory results to theoretical calculations. It would be wrong to imply that Newtonian mechanics has been rejected in favour of Einsteinian mechanics.

A Field in Confusion.

The writer's physics input will hopefully lend support to the view that the field of educational administration cannot be studied in isolation. Ideas have always arrived from other fields and disciplines, but whereas the ideas from organisation theory tended to assist the debate within systems approaches, those provided by Greenfield have acted as contradictions to the established field and resulted in confusion that still exists today. However, this is the background against which the field now has to try to progress.

SECTION 1.

THE GREENFIELD/GRIFFITHS DEBATE.

The 1950's and 1960's must have been a 'comfortable' time to study educational administration. Classical management theory had provided an apparently solid foundation to the field, based on principles drawn from industrial organisations and also wide accumulated experience. This foundation was based on Taylor's (1911) "Scientific Management" and Fayol's (1916) "Universal Principles Movement", but later analysed and synthesised by Urwick (1943).

The human relations approach had provided the "human touch" by studying organisations in terms of the behaviour of people. However, the purpose behind this approach was to enable people to co-operate and work together for the "good of the organisation", rather than their individual needs and requirements.

Finally, the systems perspective had placed the study of educational administration on an apparently firm scientific footing, with its concept of the study of organisations, as systems, and sub-systems, which are considered to act together to serve the requirements of the organisation. Systems could be scientifically designed to facilitate decision making through an analysis of information, needs and communication networks.

The "New Movement".

By the late 1950's, an approach called by Halpin the "New Movement" had grown up which, based in Chicago, had attempted to incorporate the wisdom of the classical approaches into scientific principles. Kendell and Byrne, in their paper, "Thinking about the Greenfield-Griffiths debate"(1977), explain how the "New Movement" was based on hypothetical and deductive research, viewing educational institutions as social systems. In his 1986 paper, "The Decline and Fall of Science in Educational Administration.", Thomas Greenfield considers that, by 1957, the "New Movement" was dominating thinking within American educational administration.

The think-tank of the "New Movement", advocating scientific approaches to educational administration, produced the systems approach to educational administration. Drawing on parallel developments in organisation theory in the United States, it presented the idea that educational organisations should be viewed as a system of parts which integrate to serve the organisation and allow it to achieve its goals. Through flow charts and diagrams, the structure and communication networks within organisations could be studied in a rational scientific way.

However, this apparently firm scientific footing for the study of educational administration was to be short-lived.

The I.I.P. Address.

In 1974 the British Educational Administration Society (B.E.S.) invited Thomas Greenfield to speak at their International Intervisitation Programme (IIP) at Bristol. Whilst Greenfield's first criticisms were made in 1973,

it was the Bristol address that is generally regarded as having launched his crusade on what he saw as the pre-occupation of educational administration with systems perspectives, based on structural functional philosophy, i.e., that educational organisations consist of a structure of functional parts which faithfully serve the whole in all matters.

Greenfield's alternative was a subjective stance, that focused on the individual within educational organisations, and his or her subjective view of reality. This quickly led to the concept that organisations, including educational organisations, have no objective reality except that which the individual subject perceives to exist.

In his recent work with Peter Ribbins, "Greenfield on Educational Administration: Toward a Humane Science." (1993), Greenfield, while in dialogue with Ribbins, recalls his 1974 IIP Address and its immediate impact. He explains how his address paper had been circulated before he arrived and that this resulted in an "electric tension" that exploded at the address. Greenfield talks of a "whispering campaign" and relates recollection of an interruption by Daniel Griffiths to his answer to a question where he implied that the dominating theorists in the field of educational administration were systems thinkers.

Griffiths had demanded that he name one; to which Greenfield replied, "Talcott Parsons". After the meeting, Greenfield relates that Griffiths suggested that he was "poorly informed" and that "he should read more." Thus began the Greenfield/Griffiths debate.

The "New Perspective".

The views expressed by Greenfield, in his address, were elaborated in his paper, "Theory About Organisation: A New Perspective and its Implication for Schools", which first appeared in "Administering Education, International Challenge"(1975), edited by Meredydd Hughes, and later, in "Approaches to School Management"(1980) edited by T. Bush, R. Glatter, I. Goodey and C. Riches.

Greenfield's "new perspective" led to a subjective approach which questioned the use of systems concepts of organisations in which organisations were viewed as cohesive parts which served the whole, much as the organs of the body of animals serve the whole organism. The "new perspective" also questions the systems concept that organisations interact with, and respond to, their environments and that they have goals to which they can direct themselves.

In his "new perspective" paper Greenfield, at the time, saw himself as putting forward a phenomenological alternative to the systems approach.

Greenfield's Subjective Approach

In putting forward his "phenomenological perspective", (the status of which his critics were later to question), Greenfield was introducing philosophical issues into the heart of the debate within educational administration.

A subjective approach, which questions the nature of reality, implying that any observed reality is that perceived by an individual subject, and as such, is unique to the individual, must also question the nature of knowledge and theory, as these concepts are developed

in the minds of individual subjects. Hence, the hostile reaction at the 1974 IIP conference. Greenfield was exposing the "taken for granted" nature of the "New Movement" and questioning the very foundation and principles on which it was based, implying that there was another way of seeing reality, that the perception of the individual could be the focus of attention, rather than the collective organisation. Once an organisation is perceived as a collection of individuals, and it is acknowledged that each individual may have a different perception, then the concept "organisation" is called into question. Its status reduces to a perceived conception in the mind of an individual. It, therefore, cannot be "real" in an absolute sense.

The Concept "Environment".

The systems concept of an organisation taking account of an environment is also reduced, in Greenfield's "new perspective", to the idea that an environment, being basically people grouped in other organisations, is again a subjective reality. Greenfield discusses this in a later paper, titled "Environment as Subjective Reality"(1983). The concept "theory" is also questioned, as it is in the minds of individuals that theories are created.

The Nature of Theory.

In his "new perspective" paper, Greenfield considers that theory can become a "set of meanings" in the individual mind. However, the point is, if theory can become a "set of meanings"; a set of individual interpretations of events, then can it still retain its explanatory potential? If Greenfield uses the word "set" to imply simply meanings with common characteristics then the explanatory potential

seems weak. However, if the term "set" implies some more complex patterned linkage between the meanings, then the explanatory potential is much stronger.

After the Greenfield/Griffiths Debate.

Although the Greenfield/Griffiths debate raised many issues, such as the nature of organisations, environments, goals and the theories that were to govern them, Peter Gronn, in his work "Rethinking Educational Administration: T.B.Greenfield and his Critics", (1973), considers that the concept of a Greenfield/Griffiths debate can be misleading. For although, in the middle 1970's, in the aftermath of the 1974 address, it was Griffiths who was Greenfield's chief critic, Gronn later considers that, with Griffiths' gradual accommodation of subjective stances, Greenfield's chief critic became Donald Willower.

In Griffiths' paper "Intellectual Turmoil in Educational Administration", Griffiths was acknowledging that, by 1979, educational administration was no longer settled.

However, Gronn does not see Greenfield as simply presenting a subjective approach based on phenomenology.

There is much discussion in his book over the nature of Greenfield's philosophical position. Gronn considers that Greenfield was on a "journey" progressing from the Action theories of Weber, through perhaps a Husserlian phenomenology, never made explicit, to existential ideas, when R.D.Laing is cited in some of his later papers. Section 2. will discuss the nature of Greenfield's philosophical stance through the justificatory philosophical sources he uses to buttress his arguments.

The fact that Greenfield, in his early work, linked phenomenology to Weber's "method of understanding"

(verstehen), implied that he was linking phenomenology with an Action perspective. It is more suitable to refer to Greenfield's "new perspective" as a subjective approach, rather than phenomenological, as this takes into account his progression from Action theory to existential ideas.

The "Newness" of the "New Perspective".

What was new about Greenfield's "new perspective" was the introduction of subjective ideas into the field of educational administration. He opened up the subjective/systems debate within that discipline. This was Greenfield's major contribution, rather than the newness of the ideas themselves, which already existed in organisation theory in general, as exemplified by Silverman's work, "The Theory of Organisations"(1970), where Silverman indicates a phenomenological approach. In fact, Greenfield, in dialogue with Ribbins, in "Greenfield on Educational Administration"(1993), states that he had read Silverman and Weber before the preparation of his 1974 IIP address. So in his IIP address, Greenfield was introducing ideas from subjective action perspective organisation theory into the field of educational administration. It was not the ideas themselves that were new, but the audience to which they were addressed. In Section 3. consideration will be given to the development of Greenfield's "new perspective", and the corresponding development of the "new directions" in the sociology of education, as both proclaim the existence of an early phenomenological stage and both have question marks over the status of the word "new" in their titles.

The Greenfield/Griffiths debate is a term that should only be applied to the immediate aftermath of the 1974 IIP address. When Willower enters the debate in the 1980's, systems approaches have other critics, namely,

the neo-Marxist Critical Theorists.

The three way Classification of Philosophers within Educational Administration.

Peter Ribbins, in his article "Organisation Theory and the Study of Educational Institutions" in "Managing Education"(1985), edited by M.Hughes et. al., considers three philosophical orientations in educational administration, which he puts into the form of a table. He labels them:

1. Consensus assumed (Systems theory "open" "closed" "loosely coupled").
2. Order as empirically contingent (Action theory, "social phenomenology", "ethnomethodology" and "symbolic interactionism").

and finally,

3. Conflict assumed (Marxist theory, critical theory).

The individual appropriateness of his various sub-divisions will be considered in later sections, but the main point considered here, is this three way classification. In his paper, "Re-Forming and Re-Valuing Educational Administration. Whence and when cometh the phoenix?"(1991), Greenfield, in reflecting back on Ribbins' classification, sees them quite clearly as 1. the systems-empiricist, 2. the subjective and 3. the critical or ethno-Marxist.

Critical Theory.

Critical Theory entered educational administration through

the work of Richard Bates in Australia. Bates, who will be considered in detail later, writes both within the "new sociology of education" and educational administration, and it appears that neo-Marxist approaches arrived much earlier in the new sociology of education, another point to be elaborated on later.

Bates defends many of the views of Greenfield and is even regarded by Gronn as being one of Greenfield's allies in the subjective/systems debate. However, there is a clear neo-Marxist impact to Bates' work, through the "Critical Theory of the Frankfurt School". In Section 4. the historical development of "Critical Theory" through the Frankfurt School will be outlined along with its adaptation by Bates to the concerns of educational administration.

The Response of Jean Hills

A detailed critique of Greenfield's 1975 position was undertaken by Jean Hills in "A Critique of Greenfield's 'New Perspective'" (1980).

Hills acknowledges the vast area of human thought over which Greenfield argues his case. Hills implies that all scientists, whether social or natural, would agree with Greenfield that science cannot reveal ultimate reality. This is as clearly true of the natural sciences as the social sciences. Even in physics, for example, theories can only approximate to the real world. The physicist is used to dealing with point objects in frictionless worlds, and does not pretend that such realities actually exist.

Hills also criticises Greenfield for suggesting that organisations can be understood in their concrete totality as a human experience, while stating that it is impossible

to have a unifying theory of organisations. Hills, by his own admission, at one point in his work, is confining himself to a scientific attack on Greenfield's stance and does not appear to accept that Greenfield's position is based on a different philosophical orientation, which questions the reality of socially constructed concepts like organisations. When Greenfield is considering "that organisations can be understood in their concrete totality", this refers to a subjective perception of an organisation, according to Weber's "method of understanding", (verstehen), which honours the integrity of the individual subject experiencing a situation as being "understood", and "real", for him or her. This does not imply that theories connecting individual perceptions are possible.

Hills also considers that the relations among individuals within organisations are real, which again is questionable to Greenfield, as inter-relations within an organisation are seen by Greenfield as social constructs, perceived and created in the minds of individual subjects.

This debate leads on to the nature of social research within educational administration. Greenfield's stance implies that there can only be individual case studies, qualitative research methods, with no attempt at statistical analysis, whereas Hills sees probabilities and statistics, as the best approximation to scientific laws, within a social science applied to educational administration.

Griffiths' Changing Stance.

It was indicated earlier, that by 1979, Griffiths was acknowledging the turmoil in educational administration and starting to accommodate the views of Greenfield within

his own thinking.

In his dialogue with Ribbins, mentioned earlier, Greenfield acknowledges his debt to Griffiths in more recent years, for his help and support in his views, but, as he points out, it was not like that at the start!

Gronn sees Griffiths also as being more accommodating to Greenfield in the 1980's, but considers that Griffiths should be seen as addressing his own problems, rather than being a direct respondent to Greenfield.

This is exemplified by Griffiths' concept of Gestalt switching. This concept, seeing through different spectacles, indicates a back and forth switching of approaches to educational administration to aid understanding, whereas Gronn's interpretation of Greenfield's Gestalt switch is a one-way switch, from systems to subjective approaches, with a corresponding change of commitment, much like a change of religion.

Griffiths, like Greenfield, according to Gronn, was influenced by his experience as an administrator in educational institutions. For Griffiths, this produced sympathies with the ambiguity models of Cohen, March and Olsen and their "Garbage Can" Theory. Gronn sees this sympathy as being linked to Griffiths' experience of the non-rational or informal sides of life as an administrator.

"Garbage Can" Theory, along with Weicks' concept of loose coupling will be discussed in Section 6., where the ambiguity models, and their relation to the subjective approach of Greenfield, will be considered.

The Response of Donald Willower.

Gronn sees Donald Willower as being Greenfield's chief protagonist in more recent times. Willower sees educational administration theory progressing through rigorous scientific enquiry, involving testing of hypotheses and methods involving validification through attempts at falsification. Willower sees science as belonging to a realm of enquiry which differs from ideology and religion. The fact that science itself can have ideological implications, is not manifest in this viewpoint.

Willower sums up Greenfield's stance by seeing it as an appeal for empathy, a sense of personal feelings. He uses this to try and interpret Greenfield's use of the word "understanding", (which comes from Weber's "verstehen"), that is seen by Willower as being at odds with explanation.

Greenfield uses the word "understanding" to indicate a sense of plasticity with another subject's interpretation of the world, rather than understanding as comprehension, which is more allied to the scientific concept of the word. This does not necessarily imply that this respect for another individual's interpretation of a situation indicates that personal feelings are shared, or even acknowledged, as being legitimate.

When Greenfield replies to Willower, in his paper, "The Man Who Comes Back Through The Door In The Wall: Discovering Truth, Discovering Self, Discovering Organisations." (1980), it is clear that Greenfield has a narrow concept of science. Willower is able to attack Greenfield for this, calling his characterisation an extreme scientism, implying that Greenfield considers

that science can only tolerate one theory, one explanation at any point of time. This is clearly not the case. In physics, for example, the concept "wave/particle duality" means that light is sometimes regarded as a wave and sometimes regarded as a particle. When Kuhn's concept of paradigm is considered in Section 7., this notion of conflicting theories in science will be considered in some detail.

Concluding Comments.

Greenfield's IIP Address acted as a watershed in educational administration. In arguing his case for a subjective approach to educational administration, Greenfield raised fundamental issues about the philosophical basis of the field of study of educational administration. His subjective approach, which takes the integrity of the subject's interpretation as its starting point, raises questions about the reality of concepts like organisations, goals and environments, that are "taken for granted" in systems approaches to educational administration, which are based on what Greenfield considers to be positivistic structural-functional thinking.

If an analysis of the aftermath of the IIP Address is to be conducted, then it is essential to consider the philosophical basis on which Greenfield's subjective approach stands, along with those of his critics.

Section 2., with its analysis of the justificatory philosophical sources that Greenfield draws upon in his arguments, is essential to this thesis, because it forms a basis to his philosophical orientation, which colours the way he sees educational administration. Also, because he has highlighted the philosophical foundations of the

various approaches, clear comparison between them requires their philosophical bases to be investigated.

The fact that parallel developments were occurring in the sociology of education, in the early 1970's, makes an analysis of the comparison between this field and educational administration worthwhile and important, and so a comparative study has been undertaken in Section 3.

In his paper, "Organization Theory as Ideology"(1979), Greenfield refers to the work of M.F.D.Young in "Knowledge and Control"(1971), and Bates, who uses Greenfield's work to justify his arguments within a "Critical Theory" approach to educational administration, also writes within the field of the sociology of education along neo-Marxist lines.

This comparison, which has not to the writer's knowledge, been undertaken elsewhere, forms a useful contribution, by highlighting the need for research within subjective approaches to be along ethnographic lines, and provides a link, acknowledged within both fields, to anthropological studies which use ethnomethodological techniques of individual case studies, as the chief form of research method.

So Section 4. extends the parallels between educational administration and sociology of education into the neo-Marxist structural approach, comparing the "Critical Theory" of the Frankfurt School, proposed by Bates in educational administration, with Whitty's neo-Marxist chronological discussion of the "progress" of the "new" sociology of education.

This leads into Section 5., with a consideration of the

anthropological and ethnographic techniques that are implied, as the only research methods available, if subjective approaches are to be applied to educational administration, and yet, paradoxically, are the preferred method of research within the 'new' sociology of education, even taking account of the fact that there is an early push, within that field, into the structural approaches of neo-Marxism. Madan Sarup, in "Marxism and Education"(1978), for instance, talks of the importance of anthropological techniques of an ethnographic nature. Griffiths' preference for ambiguity models, which stress the non-rational side of organisational life, as outlined earlier, makes an analysis of the status of Cohen, March and Olsen's "Garbage Can" Theory and Weick's "loose coupling" ambiguity models, essential, along with a consideration of their place in relation to the subjective approach of Greenfield.

The results of the contribution of all these models, approaches, philosophical orientations, etc., within educational administration, have led people within the field, such as Meredydd Hughes in his contribution to the "Handbook of Research in Educational Administration"(1988), to talk of the present "paradigm diversity". Yet the word "paradigm", itself, poses problems in its use, and does not appear to be clearly defined. Although Greenfield, in his latest work with Ribbins, "Greenfield on Educational Administration"(1993), uses the word "paradigm", he does so in a loose way, probably in response to Ribbins' use of the term, and does not clearly define the word. There is no Greenfield definition of the word "paradigm", and until his recent retrospective analysis of his work, he did not apply the term to his approach. Hence, the need for a clear analysis of the word and its various uses, as is undertaken in Section 7.

So, before reaching the final stages of this thesis, where an example is provided of the use of such theoretical considerations within a specific report on one education authority, and where attempts are made to reconcile the problems of paradigm diversity, by introducing other possible concepts, eg., chaos, culture, intersubjectivity and time irreversibility, it is essential to consider philosophical sources, sociology of education, neo-Marxist approaches, ethnography and anthropology, ambiguity models and the concept "paradigm" as outlined.

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SECTION 2.

THE USE OF JUSTIFICATORY PHILOSOPHICAL SOURCES

IN THE SUBJECTIVE/SYSTEMS DEBATE.

Before proceeding to widen the debate into other disciplines, some consideration will be given to the justificatory philosophical sources used by Greenfield and his critics.

It is clear in Greenfield's writing, that he sees his proposals as offering a different philosophical viewpoint to that of systems theory. What is not so obvious, is how to classify his philosophical standpoint, as in clarifying his position he uses various philosophers and thinkers.

Greenfield and Phenomenology.

It has already been mentioned, in the last section, how Gronn considers that it is inappropriate to think of Greenfield as a phenomenologist, hence the use of the more general label, "subjectivist". One of the reasons is that Gronn claims that Greenfield does not quote Husserl, whom Gronn considers to be the father of phenomenology. However, Husserl's transcendental phenomenology has to be seen, in the present, as just one branch of phenomenological thinking which has been adapted and added to by later generations of phenomenologists, such as Schutz and Berger. Greenfield,

therefore, may, in his early subjective writing, not have considered Husserl's phenomenology appropriate to his stance.

It is difficult to avoid the fact that in the "new perspective" paper Greenfield, (at the time), considered himself to be drawing on phenomenological ideas, as a reading of the paper indicates frequent use of the word phenomenology. Gronn points to Greenfield's progressive abandonment of the term, but it could be argued, that in his "new perspective" paper, he did see himself as putting forward a phenomenological position.

Greenfield and Weber.

It is true, as Gronn says, that Greenfield draws heavily on Max Weber's 'verstehen' work. This is noticeable, even in his later paper, "Environment as Subjective Reality"(1983), where Greenfield is careful to distinguish between Weber's 'verstehen' work, and his work on bureaucracy. He also states how Weber's work is in opposition to systems perspectives:

"Weber stands for the individual and for the subjective understanding of reality in organization. Such a stance places him in opposition to the assumptions of modern organization theory that sees reality in the collectivity and ignores the action of individuals."

(Greenfield 1983 p40)

This does not directly imply that Weber's work is allied to a phenomenological approach, just because it is in opposition to positivistic approaches, based on functional perspectives. However, it is possible to find links between Weber's 'verstehen' work and phenomenology.

Schutz, who is generally regarded as a phenomenologist, drew, according to Wagner, (in "Alfred Schutz: An Intellectual Biography"(1983)), on the work of Max Weber for his sociological viewpoint:

"Max Weber remained the mainstay of Schutz's sociology. At least half of the articles he published in the United States contain quotations from, discussions of aspects of, and references to Weber's writings. He reiterated that Weber had given Sociology the 'central task' of understanding 'the meaning which the actor bestows upon his action', its 'subjective meaning'."

(Wagner 1983 p123)

Weber: a Source of Phenomenological Ideas?

The link between sociology and phenomenology which Schutz provides could explain why, in the new sociology of education, the phenomenological influences come from Schutz, whereas, Greenfield, working in educational administration, is perhaps drawn directly to Max Weber.

Although this will be considered in more detail in the next section, it is interesting to speculate that Greenfield, in his "new perspective" paper, saw Weber as a source of phenomenological ideas, even though, as Gronn states, Weber is not normally regarded in this light. The authors of 'Cultural Analysis', when discussing the phenomenology of Peter Berger, consider that Max Weber has links to phenomenology. They state:

"...whereas Weber's methodology operated out of an incipient and rough-hewn phenomenology, Schutz sought to refine Weber's methodology by clarifying his postulates and developing his concepts. To the degree that Berger depends upon Schutz for this sort of clarification of

the interpretive method of sociology, Berger is the benefactor".

(Wuthnow et.al. (Eds.) 1984 p31)

Greenfield, in his "new perspective" paper, quotes from Silverman with the statement:

"The phenomenological view leads to the concept of organizations as 'invented social reality'.....and to the paradox that, having invented such reality, man is perfectly capable of responding to it as though it were not of his own invention",

(Greenfield in Hughes (Ed) 1975 p81)

and yet, Silverman, in his analysis, in "The Theory of Organisation", under the heading of "The Action Frame of Reference", draws on both Schutz and Berger, as well as Weber's 'verstehen' work.

The Individual Subject: Responsible for his Own Reality?

The above quotation implies, with the use of the word "man" rather than "men", that it is the individual subject who is responsible for responding to organisations as if they are real.

This is the view Greenfield favours, where each person is responsible for their own subjective reality, and comes from Weber. Silverman considers the concept, 'verstehen':

"...it begins with 'the observation and theoretical interpretation of the subjective "states of mind" of actors'. This may take the form of 'the actually intended meaning' for concrete individual action.....(or) the average of, or an approximation to, the actually 'intended meaning'.....More usually, however,

explanations are in terms of ideal - typical actors whom we take to be pursuing certain ends by choosing appropriate means on the basis of a subjective definition of the situation".

(Silverman 1970 p139)

This appears to be straight from Weber, but then, immediately, in the next section, Silverman brings in Schutz's notion of shared ideas which, it could be argued, leads to the possibility of imposition of meanings. Silverman states:

"'It is not even necessary', Schutz argues, 'to reduce human acts to a more or less well known individual actor. To understand them it is sufficient to find typical motives of typical actors which explain the act as a typical one arising out of a typical situation'".

(Silverman 1970 p139)

The Problems of Intersubjectivity.

However, this view has to be contrasted with Wagner's opinion that intersubjectivity has been a fundamental problem both for Husserl and Schutz, and probably remains a difficult one in phenomenology.

On Husserl, Wagner states that the problem of transcendental intersubjectivity:

"...was to be solved within the second volume of Ideen. But Husserl ran into unexpected difficulties when writing it. After long years, he laid it aside unfinished".

(Wagner 1983 p313)

On Schutz, Wagner explains how the problems of

intersubjectivity led to a requirement to step outside transcendental phenomenology. Wagner states that Schutz:

"...wrote in no uncertain terms that phenomenology 'claims to be a philosophy of man in his life-world'.....He left no doubt that the main accent was on the life-worldly basis and not on the constituting agency of the transcendental ego".

(Wagner 1983 pp314-315)

The transcendental phenomenology of Husserl, with its mental directedness, in effect, cuts off the possibility of other subjects, through the idea that each person is responsible for directing their mind towards the perceived world. In "The Great Philosophers"(1987), edited by Bryan Magee, Hubert Dreyfus explains how the phenomenological reduction overcame the problem of the objectivity of the world. However, at the same time, it makes the problem of intersubjectivity manifest.

Intersubjectivity and the Action Frame of Reference.

It could be argued, though, that the Action frame of reference also poses this problem of intersubjectivity. Weber has to start with ideal type typical actors and discusses the meaning of their actions for them.

Rex has taken up this problem and considers the problem of interaction in relation to the unit act:

"Some but by no means all of the theoretical models of unit acts would include as means or conditions of the act the behaviour of other persons. A sociological explanation of the behaviour of these other persons consists in showing that it has a place in terms of the model of the unit act. It should be noticed

that though there may be a valid explanation of the behaviour of these other persons in terms of their own motivation, the relevant point for the sociologist is the role which their behaviour plays in terms of the scheme of action of the hypothetical actor with which the model starts".

(Rex 1961 pp93-94)

One of the main problems with this view of intersubjectivity which, as Rex points out, Weber himself realised, was that it provides an infinite number of starting points for sociological analysis. This, of course, is the problem with intersubjectivity; every individual perception of the world is different. Any real analysis of a social system would have to include every subject's perception of the system at all points in time since, it could be argued, their perceptions may be different, on different occasions.

Greenfield may have favoured an action approach because it does confine itself to observable actions of individuals, and limits itself to trying to understand the meanings behind them. To work at the level of meaning though, as the phenomenologist tries to do, means that there is not even the security of the observable act. People's resulting acts may not always be in agreement with their intentions and the meanings that they brought to the situation to produce these intentions. At a basic level physical conditions could intervene. For instance, someone could intend to pursue the act of pegging out washing, to find that it is impossible because of the strength of the wind.

Transcendental Phenomenology and the Unit Act.

Transcendental phenomenology may solve the problem of the reality of the world, but it only solves this problem

for the subject. An interesting problem would be to try to relate the observed unit act to the phenomenological stance of the subject. Dreyfus considers that it does not matter whether there is a table out there, only that the transcendental phenomenologist considers that there is a table out there. So, can we then deduce that it does not matter whether the transcendental phenomenologist actually observes a unit act, all that matters, is that he took it that he has observed the unit act being committed by another? This may be the experience of the individual, but another subject could interpret the same act differently. This then raises the whole question of the reliability of observing the unit act.

Greenfield, in his "new perspective" paper, is content to accept the fact that one is limited to the subject's interpretation of events. He even sees this as a strength, because he considers that in the natural sciences such subjective interpretations cannot be sought.

He states:

"In Weber's view, then, it is impossible for the cultural sciences to penetrate behind social perception to reach objective social reality. Paradoxically, this limitation on the cultural sciences is also their strength, since it permits them to do what is never possible in the physical sciences: the cultural scientist may enter into and take the viewpoint of the actor whose behaviour is to be explained".

(Greenfield in Hughes (Ed) 1975 pp81-82)

This raises the question, though, of whether this is possible. Can the cultural scientist ever take the viewpoint of the actor? Can one person ever really know, fully, another's viewpoint? Apart from the question of deception, there is the problem of communication between individuals and the roles of languages and images.

Much ethnographic work has to tackle these problems when observational techniques are used in fieldwork. These will be considered in detail, in Section 5., on anthropology and ethnography.

Greenfield and Existentialism.

These limitations of phenomenological and action approaches could have led Greenfield away from Weber's "method of understanding" towards a more existential approach.

Gronn considers how, in his later papers, there is a move towards such an approach:

"The third and final reason why his writings are not to be seen as phenomenological is, as has been suggested, his own progressive abandonment of the term. In fact, the words which start to appear in his writings when R.D.Laing begins to be cited are the words 'existential' and 'existential reality'".

(Gronn 1983 p12)

Indeed, Greenfield sees the problematic nature of his earlier proposals when he quotes from Laing at the start of his "Organization Theory as Ideology"(1979) paper:

"Experience is mysterious, for it is not entirely clear how we come to understand what we do and what is happening to us (c.f. Laing 1967,p17). This article argues, therefore, that the placing of meaning upon experience is an act of enormous importance".

(Greenfield 1979 p97)

In other words, how can we interpret another subject's experience, if that experience is not manifest to the subject themselves.

Laing, in "The Divided Self", refers to what he calls existential phenomenology, where, in an attempt to overcome some of the problems discussed so far, he brings in the existential concept of being-in-the-world. He states:

"Existential phenomenology attempts to characterize the nature of a person's experience of his world and himself. It is not so much an attempt to describe particular objects of his experience as to set all particular experiences within the context of his whole being-in-his-world".

(Laing 1965 p17)

It would seem, then, that an attempt is to be made to overcome problems of individual perception and understanding, by an appeal to the idea that the individual is "immersed" in the world.

Heidegger's Concept of Primordial Coping.

Heidegger, although not himself accepting the label existentialist, did adopt the concept of being-in-the-world in his philosophy as a way of overcoming the problems of Husserl's transcendental phenomenology.

Dreyfus, in "The Great Philosophers" states how Heidegger considered that, often, we are not subjects directing our mental directedness towards objects, but often work at a level of primordial coping, where what we do is automatic to us. This occurs whenever routine repetitive physical tasks are carried out without the requirement for conscious concentrated thought. Heidegger discusses a carpenter's routine hammering of nails in this way.

The Interpretation of Human Experience.

It is questionable whether shared meanings and shared practices could be regarded as our experiences, but this could certainly be one interpretation. Greenfield does not quote from Heidegger. His existential ideas come via Laing. Laing, in the earlier quotation, considered that:

"Existential phenomenology attempts to characterize the nature of a person's experience of his world and himself".

(Laing 1965 p17)

Greenfield picks up this notion of experience and applies it to organisations, in his "Organization Theory as Ideology" paper. He uses the concept to attack systems theory:

"...the argument recognizes the interpretation of human experience as the bedrock upon which human life is built and upon which organization theory should stand. Organization theory, however, usually ignores such mysteries in human life, and it does so at the cost of impoverishing its own insight into people's lives and social reality. In the name of comprehensiveness and simplicity, theory usually oversimplifies the variety and complexity of human experience within organizations".

(Greenfield 1979 p97)

It is not then, the mental directedness of a subject that gives him his meaning, but in his existential sense, it is his experience. The idea of meanings coming through experience represents a more complex notion than all you need is experience, especially if "primordial coping", in Heidegger's sense, is taking place.

The subject's meaning, his way of coping, are internalised through his experiences so that the meanings become transparent to him, in certain circumstances.

To take an "Action" perspective, his action could be automatic like the hammering example, and could not, therefore, necessarily be used to infer, as the action perspective does, the meanings of his actions for him, as he is not aware of the meanings, since they are absorbed in a sub-conscious coping mode. Gronn states, for instance:

"The reference to 'meaning' remains throughout the entirety of his work. But with the introduction of Laing and the term 'existential', 'meaning' becomes wedded to a dimension of feeling or to a notion of 'being'".

(Gronn 1983 p12)

This can be seen in a quotation from one of Greenfield's later works, "Environment as Subjective Reality"(1983):

"In these efforts to exert will in existential reality, the individual - - the one acting against fate, against the universe, or acting purely in response to the spark that gave him life - - that person is likely to seek the assistance of others as a means of ensuring victory, or achievement, or the simple satisfaction that comes from doing something with others".

(Greenfield 1983 p9)

Here, the term 'existential reality' is related to the subject acting against fate and the universe. It could be claimed that fate and the universe refers to the subject's being-in-the-world.

Greenfield and Hodgkinson.

It is noticeable, in Greenfield's more recent paper, "The Decline and Fall of Science in Educational Administration"(1986), that he does not use philosophical sources at all. There are no references to Weber or Laing. In this paper, his main justificatory source is Hodgkinson, a fellow conspirator in the subjectivist debate. This paper focuses on a critique of the "New Movement" in educational administration, based on what Greenfield sees as positivistic science. His main attack focuses on Herbert Simon. Philosophically, this paper is concerned with the way that, in Greenfield's opinion, positivistic science, as it is applied to educational administration, separates facts from values. However, Greenfield's appeals to Hodgkinson show the limitation of a subjective approach. Greenfield states:

"The positivist argument is, however, a powerful one. It reduces all internal states, all perceptions, feelings, and values to epiphenomena, to an unspeakable affect, to an externality that, as Hodgkinson.....points out, 'one can only rebut.....by referring to one's own phenomenological and, therefore, unverifiable experience.....and by taking a position outside the limits of positivist discourse'".

(Greenfield 1986 p60)

Hodgkinson's reference to unverifiable experience, again highlights the problems of a phenomenological stance. The experience which can give meanings to the subject, as discussed earlier, is only experience for that individual. As soon as attempts are made to verify it through intersubjective discussion or actions, it can no longer be the same experience.

Greenfield : Still a Subjectivist?

Later in the paper, Greenfield quotes Hodgkinson in a way that indicates how Greenfield aspires to a philosophical position, where the individual subject is always responsible for his subjective reality, in a way that indicates that meanings cannot be imposed and indicates why, perhaps, even with the introduction of existential ideas, he still favours a stance that attempts to combine Weber's 'verstehen' theory with transcendental phenomenology, in the Husserlian sense, where the focus is still on the individual hypothetical actor and his subjective meanings.

Values.

Greenfield quotes from Hodgkinson when considering the need to acknowledge our values in organisational and administrative affairs. Hodgkinson considers that commitment to values:

"...is, of course, subject to critique from other philosophical positions but all that the proponents of these contending positions can do is to seek to persuade their audience by reason and rhetoric and all the powers at their disposal, that they have the better values. In the end the act of choice is individual; and if free and conscious, then moral".

(Hodgkinson in Greenfield 1986 p64)

The implication, in the last part of the quotation, being that the values we adopt are our individual responsibility. As Hodgkinson points out, in his work, "The Philosophy of Leadership"(1983), values only exist in the minds of individuals:

"We are always inclined to forget that any object in the world such as a gold coin or the Mona Lisa is in truth valueless and worthless save as we go through the phenomenological exercise of imputing value to it".

(Hodgkinson 1983 p31)

and later:

"The world of fact is given, the world of value made.....In the same way it can be argued that all moments, and hence all events, are analytically equivalent. Each is valueless and so, worthless or, paradoxically but literally, priceless. Life is a series of moment - fact - events to which subjectivities impute value. And in principle we can do this freely".

(Hodgkinson 1983 p31)

Again, in the last part of the quotation, we see the focus on the integrity of the individual.

Different Levels of Subjective Reality?

Hodgkinson describes subjective reality in terms of different levels, claiming that, while lower levels may be subject to scientific investigation, the highest levels are inaccessible to other individuals.

Greenfield relates this in his 1983 paper, "Environment as Subjective Reality", where he is already using Hodgkinson as a justificatory phenomenological source. Greenfield states:

"As Hodgkinson.....points out, the highest kind of reality is personal and unique for each individual, though that reality may be said to be composed of lower or more readily verifiable forms of reality. He argues that there is a mingling of elements of the lower

kinds of reality into the ultimate personal reality. But even though there are elements mingled into personal reality that are hard, scientific and verifiable, they will never allow us to control or predict the highest personal reality of the individual from a knowledge of these lower kinds of reality".

(Greenfield 1983 p6)

In this highest level of reality then, Greenfield is preserving his integrity of the subject, from outside interference, it could be argued, almost completely.

The curious point is that, although Gronn claims that Greenfield was moving away from the use of the word 'phenomenological' in his later work, Hodgkinson, Greenfield's later philosophical source, claims in his "Philosophy of Leadership"(1983) work, that Greenfield typifies the adoption of a phenomenological perspective in organisational theory. This all makes locating Greenfield's philosophical position more difficult.

Willower's Philosophical Stance.

A more rigorous attack on Greenfield's subjective stance, in more recent times, has, in Gronn's opinion, come not from Griffiths but from Willower, as indicated in the last section. Some consideration, therefore, needs to be given to Willower's philosophical stance.

Willower discusses philosophical issues in relation to educational administration, for instance, in his paper "Philosophy and the Study of Educational Administration"(1985b), he states:

"A philosophy that is vague on epistemology, or an extreme subjectivism, or transcendentalisms of the sort that have trouble with methodological explication would have difficulty meeting such

a criterion, but it is not otherwise very restrictive. A Deweyan theory of knowledge in which truth is defined as warranted assertibility fits it quite well".

(Willower 1985b p9)

The criterion Willower has in mind is a philosophy that emphasizes communication more than verification; however, the verification concerned should be explicit or public.

His sympathy for Deweyan philosophy is also considered in his contributions to the "Handbook of Research on Educational Administration"(1988), where he states:

"I.....have presented a position that blends instrumentalism, naturalism, and pragmatism. These views have in common an epistemology that recognizes the fallibility of science and seeks warranted assertibility (Dewey, 1938), not certainty".

(Willower in Boyan (Ed) 1988 p742)

The Fallibility of Science.

This fallibility of science, that is incorporated in the philosophy of John Dewey, is considered by Magee in "The Great Philosophers". Magee states, when talking about Dewey:

"He did not see science as a body of reliable and changeless knowledge to which new certainties were being added. He saw it as an activity, the process of finding things out".

(Magee 1987 p293)

Willower is intolerant of Greenfield's attack on extreme scientism, as he sees it in educational administration, because he considers that much educational research is

only too aware of the uncertainties of its findings. However, there do seem to be links in what Magee says about Dewey's philosophy, with Heidegger's concept of 'being-in-the-world'. Magee states that Dewey considered that:

"We are living organisms in an environment in which, above all else, our concern is to survive, and one of the most important survival mechanisms we have.....is knowledge, because it confers understanding of the environment and, through that, a degree of mastery of it. So the fact is we are part of the very stuff and substance of the world we are trying to understand".

(Magee 1987 p293)

Wagner implies that there are links between Dewey's pragmatic philosophy and Schutz's phenomenology, which could, perhaps, suggest another reason why Greenfield is reluctant to enter into Schutzian phenomenology. Wagner considers that:

"Schutz paid sustained attention to John Dewey (1859-1952), the American educator and pragmatic philosopher".

(Wagner 1983 p143)

and later, in analysing action:

"Dewey had started with the pragmatic (in-order-to) motive of action: the "use and enjoyment" of the "objects and materials of the environment".....Schutz placed these considerations into the context of his conception of Man's stance within and toward the social world, which he 'experiences primarily as a field of his actual and possible acts'.....Seeing the world around him as one to be controlled by him, he is 'especially interested in that segment which is in his actual or potential reach'".

(Wagner 1983 p144)

The Philosophy of the Possible.

This concept of actual or potential reach represents part of the stratification of the life world, by Schutz, in the context of space and time.

In Schutz's paper, in "Phenomenology and Sociology", edited by T.Luckmann, the author states:

"The stratification of the world into zones of actual, restorable and obtainable reach already refers to the structure of the life-world according to dimensions of objective temporality and their subjective correlates".

(Schutz in Luckmann (Ed) 1978 p259)

and later:

"All these stratifications belong as unquestionably given to our naive experience of the socialized world. Even the typifications and symbolizations on terms of which we distinguish the several strata of our social world, construe and interpret their contents, determine our action in it and upon it and its action upon us according to all degrees of ability, are predefined as unquestionably given by virtue of the socially conditioned schemata of expression and interpretation prevailing in the group to which we belong and which we used to call the 'culture' of our group".

(Schutz in Luckmann (Ed) 1978 p260)

So we are led into the imposition of meaning by our culture, something which moves away from the individual being responsible for his own subjective reality. Paradoxically then, Schutz's phenomenology, Heidegger's existentialism and Dewey's pragmatism, favoured by Willower, all take us away from an emphasis on the subject

being responsible for making sense of his world.

It may not be a coincidence that Greenfield has refrained from pursuing the philosophical stances outlined above. Although Gronn implies that he shifted towards an existential position, in his later work, he does not appear to quote from Heidegger, and Gronn mentions that there is only one place where Schutz is quoted. It is the appeal to the subject's experience of the world that seems to give Greenfield his radically different way of looking at organisation theory. The problem is, any attempt to elaborate this stance beyond the subjective experience of individuals produces many of the philosophical problems outlined. This has the implication too, that, when it comes to recipes for research in educational administration, one is reduced to biographical case studies of how people interpret the experiences they have within educational administration.

Concluding Comments.

There are indications that Greenfield has drawn throughout his work on phenomenological ideas, even though, perhaps, he has not quoted directly from phenomenological philosophers such as Husserl, Schutz or Berger. Gronn talks about the emergent nature of Greenfield's thinking and, when the philosophical implications of his "new perspective" are considered, it is noticeable how he tends to favour the Action perspective of Weber, because of the emphasis it puts on subjective meaning controlling the behaviour of the individual actor. The problem, as far as educational administration is concerned, is that it is not possible accurately to probe into observed acts of individuals. Under Greenfield's perspective, the individual may be responsible for his (or her) own subjective reality, but that does not mean that he

interprets that reality, using the logical deductive processes of a scientific observer. It also means that the meaning he gives to these interpretations, the significance they have for him, may not be logically related to the interpretations he deduces, and so any attempt to work at the level of meaning must be very speculative.

Greenfield's approach, like other subjective approaches, whether they be action frame, phenomenological or existential, has to cope with the problems of intersubjectivity. Even if it were possible to 'know' completely the subjective meaning of the individual, how could these subjective meanings be accurately related to the subjective meaning of all other individuals? Greenfield tends to avoid this problem by according the highest respect to the subjective meaning of the individual, just as Weber considers that all actions have to be related back to the hypothetical ideal typical actor. The existential concept 'being-in-the-world', with its 'primordial coping', tries to immerse the subject in the world and draw attention away from his interpretive experience.

Greenfield's later preoccupation with values, and the use of Hodgkinson as a justificatory source, enables him to reinforce his subjective position, by appealing to the idea that values are something that come from the individual subjective consciousness, i.e., only a mind can give value to something, to perceive it as good or bad.

In this section, it has been indicated that links can be found between nearly all philosophical positions discussed, such that even Willower's pragmatic approach can be linked, through Dewey and Schutz, to a

phenomenological position. Such links, though, should not undermine the clear distinction between the philosophical orientations that exist. Willower's stance, even though it is of a reflexive scientific nature, that attempts to achieve verification through continuous attempts at subjecting theories to falsification, does not persuade Greenfield that a scientific approach can be valid in educational administration.

Greenfield's philosophical position, which respects the integrity of the subject, can not accept a scientific perspective that tends to focus on the collective, and treat the collective, (in Greenfield's case the organisation), as if it were real. Hence, he continues to attack the justificatory reasoning for a scientific approach to organisations.

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SECTION 3.

A COMPARISON OF GREENFIELD'S SUBJECTIVE APPROACH

WITH THAT OF THE "NEW DIRECTIONS" WITHIN THE

SOCIOLOGY OF EDUCATION.

Greenfield's 'new perspective' was contemporary with the so called 'new directions' in the sociology of education, and it is interesting to consider to what extent they are related. There are certainly superficial similarities. Both have been described as paradigm shifts from the then prevailing perspectives which, in both fields, have been described as positivistic, based on theoretical concepts of structural functionalism. Madan Sarup in "Marxism and Education"(1978), states:

"Positivism is repudiated because it assumes that reality exists unproblematically; it stresses 'scientific' method and statistical measurement, and separates, 'facts' from 'values', 'knowledge' from 'interest'".

(Sarup 1978 p3)

A similar rejection of science appears in Greenfield's paper on the 'new perspective'(1975):

"The systems view assumes that the world is knowable as it is. Although the acquisition of such knowledge requires the intervention

and help of scientists, theorists, and scholars, there exists an ultimate reality which may be discovered by application of the scientific method and similar forms of rational analysis".

(Greenfield in Hughes (Ed) 1975 p79)

Both disciplines have an antagonism to scientific approaches and any concept of statistical analysis. Sharp and Green (1975), in "Education and Social Control", distinguish between two separate approaches. First they identify the structural functional approach, which they consider:

"...has tended to analyse educational structures and processes in terms of their contribution to basic system requirements".

(Sharp and Green 1975 p2)

This, it could be argued, sounds similar to Greenfield's concept of systems perspectives, which he continually attacks. Secondly, Sharp and Green criticise what they describe as positivistic empiricism which, however, has structural functional implications. Such criticism, in the 'new' sociology of education, can be compared with statements by Greenfield in his 'new perspective' paper:

"...an organizational theory based upon understanding rejects the emphasis which much of contemporary social science places upon quantification, more complex mathematical models, and bigger number crunchers in the shape of better and faster computers".

(Greenfield in Hughes (Ed) 1975 p86)

The "Newness" of the Perspectives.

In both fields the initial phases of the paradigm shifts have been described as moves towards phenomenological

perspectives. However, both fields have been criticised for not being new perspectives, but merely extensions of ongoing developments. For instance, Sharp and Green state:

"Recently, the sociology of education in Britain has received a stimulus from various 'phenomenological' approaches. Probably the most useful starting point at which to locate the initiation of these developments is with the Manchester studies".

(Sharp and Green 1975 p11)

referring, here, to the work of Hargreaves and Lacey. Hargreaves' "Social Relations in a Secondary School" (1967), and Lacey's "Hightown Grammar; The School as a Social System" (1970), were also considered by Geoff. Whitty (1985) to have initiated the paradigm shift in the sociology of education.

Sharp and Green consider that Hargreaves and Lacey drew inspiration from American organisational theory, providing yet another link between the field of educational administration and the sociology of education, as it was American organisational theory that Greenfield considers to have influenced the field of educational administration.

While the 'newness' of the 'new directions' in the sociology of education was being questioned, so too, was the 'newness' of Greenfield's 'new perspective'. Thus Peter Gronn (1983) quotes Greenfield's 1978 response to his critics:

"I was wrong to let myself believe that the word 'new' belonged either in my address to the I.I.P. 1974 or in the revision of it that appeared in the proceedings of the conference. What was new was not the ideas in the paper,

but my awareness of them and the audience to which they were addressed."

(Gronn 1983 p13)

Perhaps it is not surprising that the labels 'new', in both fields, would lead to their being attacked for the significance of this word alone. Such labels invite criticism along the lines of the common saying, (in scientific circles).

The theory is not new.
If new, it is not true.
If both new and true,
Then it is not significant!

Phenomenological Pedigrees.

In spite of the common rejection of structural functional positivistic approaches, in both fields, there is a difference, even in the early stages, when one considers the extent to which the perspectives can be regarded as phenomenological. It has already been mentioned how, although Greenfield uses the term phenomenology in his 1975 'new perspective' paper, he later abandons the term, a point highlighted by Gronn, when he suggested that it was inappropriate to think of Greenfield as a phenomenologist.

Geoff. Whitty described "Knowledge and Control" [Young (Ed) 1971] as the first major work of the 'new' sociologists of education, and it was of this publication, that Sarup stated:

"In opposition to a positivist sociology of education, the group.....adopted a phenomenological stance".

(Sarup 1978 pp5-6)

which was to manifest itself in the 'new directions' for the sociology of education.

Intersubjective Approaches.

However, it is possible to detect, even in M.F.D. Young's introduction to the 'new directions' publication, that there is a move towards intersubjective approaches with the stress on "imposition of meanings".

As early as page 2., Young states:

"To begin to move to explanations of how pupils, teachers and knowledge are organized,....existing categories that for parents, teachers, children and many researchers distinguish home from school, learning from play, academic from non-academic, and 'able' or 'bright' from 'dull' or 'stupid', must be conceived of as socially constructed, with some in a position to impose their constructions or meanings on others".

(Young 1971 p2)

This early stress on imposition of meaning, stems from the central concern of the 'new' sociologists to consider the way in which knowledge is socially constructed. They consider that the sociology of education cannot be separated from the sociology of knowledge, as in all thinking about education, knowledge is processed.

In his introduction to "Knowledge and Control", Young suggests that the contributors to the book:

"...are inevitably led to consider, often from widely different perspectives, 'what counts as educational knowledge' as problematic. The implication of this is that one major focus of the sociology of education becomes an enquiry into the social organization of knowledge in

educational institutions. Thus, and this has important implications for the organization of sociological knowledge, sociology of education is no longer conceived as the area of enquiry distinct from the sociology of knowledge".

(Young 1971 p3)

However, it is necessary to be careful not to treat "Knowledge and Control" as presenting a united front. Whitty has stated that there was a 'richness' in the work. Certainly, it could be argued that Esland's paper, "Teaching and Learning as the Organisation of Knowledge", can be considered as more basically phenomenological, than Young's contributions. Esland states:

"The ideas of Schutz, Mead, Berger and others from which this analysis is derived are highly applicable to an understanding of teaching and learning".

(Esland in Young (Ed) 1971 p73)

and in the next paragraph:

"In this kind of phenomenological analysis".

(Esland in Young (Ed) 1971 p73)

indicating, presumably, an analysis based on the ideas of the quoted philosophers.

Later, he admits that:

"...the study has been greatly influenced by the arguments advanced by Berger and Luckmann in 'The Social Construction of Reality' ".....(AND)....."by the work of Alfred Schutz".

(Esland in Young (Ed) 1971 p74)

Whitty considered that Esland and Dale theoretically dominated Esland's early work, in the first course to be produced in the sociology of education for The Open University, "School and Society".

Dale, in his paper, "Phenomenological Perspectives and the Sociology of the School", outlines what he considers to be the phenomenological perspective. He also mentions Silverman, who considered organisations from a phenomenological perspective, quoting the work of Berger and Luckmann. Greenfield also considers Silverman's work, "The Theory of Organisations"(1970). In his 'new perspective' paper, Greenfield states:

"... 'feudalism', and the like, designate certain categories of human inter-action. Hence it is the task of sociology to reduce these concepts to 'understandable' action, that is, without exception, to the actions of participating individual men".

(Greenfield 1979 p102)

Clearly, here, one can see that the individual is still the focus of attention, responsible for his own actions. This has to be contrasted with the views of Esland in his contribution to "Knowledge and Control".

While Greenfield develops a more generally subjective stance that led him to the existential views of R.D.Laing, the 'new' sociologists, concerned as they were with the way knowledge was socially constructed, were led into the imposition of meanings and a more structural stance.

The individual is not the centre of this approach because meaning can be imposed on him and make him behave in certain ways. This idea led to the concept that all who occupy schools, teachers and pupils, can have meanings

imposed on them from the prevailing social structure.

The 'new' sociologists of education see the prevailing structure of the education system as based upon subjects, that are presented as absolute knowledge to pupils in an unproblematical way such that it cannot be questioned. They also see the transmission of this knowledge as buttressing the values, rules and rituals of their contemporary society, which they see as governed by the rules of positivistic science, which presents these values, rituals and rules as logical and rational.

Hence, the early 'new' sociologists considered that it would be possible to change the contemporary situation and bring about political change, by changing teachers' practices from transmission of received knowledge, to a questioning and probing stance. This would be achieved by sensitising teachers to the position that the meanings of society were imposed upon them, without their knowledge; in other words, that they had a false consciousness. Hence, the 'new' sociologists of education, even in their earliest days, presented a stance with political implications.

The Influence of Schutz in the 'New Directions' for the Sociology of Education.

The influence of Schutz is strong on the 'new' sociology of education, in this respect. Esland states:

"In combining the phenomenological insights of Husserl with those of Weber, Schutz deepened the conceptual fields of Verstehen and 'action', and went some way towards establishing a sociology of mind as a subject of central importance in sociology."

(Esland in Young (Ed) 1971 p80)

Whereas, Gronn states that:

"...there is only one place in which Greenfield cites Alfred Schutz".

(Gronn 1983 p11)

Esland's reading of Schutz implies that action is interpreted in the present, the immediate point of time, and is a result of both experience and anticipated consequences, as they are perceived at the time.

He then considers the concept, 'Lebensfeld', the 'life world', which he sees as the individual's 'stock of knowledge', achieved through:

"...the continuing processes of constitution and accommodation".

(Esland in Young (Ed) 1971 p80)

Presumably, the subject constitutes ideas in the mind, mediated by the accommodation of ideas external to the subject's consciousness, which then, forms his stock of knowledge.

This knowledge is not, according to Esland, held in isolation, but is shared with those who inhabit his 'life world'. The emphasis is on experience being achieved, primarily, through association with one's contemporaries in a process that occurs in an immediate present, rather than a near past or future.

Greenfield's reading of Weber's 'method of understanding', which he considers in his paper, "Organization Theory as Ideology"(1979), implies that the subject experiences and anticipates over a period of time, and not in the

instant:

"Weber's method is to create images of reality as actors in social settings understand it and to show how action consistent with these images has consequences - expected or unexpected. Understanding comes from setting the images against each other.

The images may come from different people at one point in time or from different vantage points over time".

(Greenfield 1979 p104)

The question is, to what extent do these images, coming from others, constitute imposed meanings? In the above citation, Greenfield implies that the subject consciously selects and makes rational decisions about the images that he perceives, and that this aids his understanding, even if his consequent actions can have unexpected implications. This has to be contrasted with Esland's reading of Schutz, where the subject's thought processes are mediated by the ideas of others, rather than understanding achieved purely through a selection of images, which are compared side by side.

It is interesting to speculate that the question of whether meanings can be imposed on the subject, or not, could be responsible, in part, for leading the fields off in the different directions already considered.

Schutz's 'Phenomenology'.

Schutz's paper, "Some Structures of the Life-World"(1966), as it appears in "Phenomenology and Sociology"(1978), edited by Thomas Luckmann, considers further this concept of experience and time. He divides the stratification of the world into the zones of actual, restorable and

obtainable reach.

The actual reach covers the senses and bodily responses, such as hearing, seeing and manipulation. The restorable reach, however, only covers that part of the past that can be repeated. The third zone, the obtainable, is that which may come within one's reach in the future. This has to be anticipated in the light of past experience and is conditioned by the concept that the subject assumes such future experience is going to be the same for other individuals, subject to differences, due to their own biographical situation. Schutz states:

"...the problem of the structure of the social world intervenes here in so far as I take it for granted that the world within your actual or restorable reach is, in principle, the world within my potential reach although, on account of my biographical situation, my experiences of it will differ from yours, which correspond to your biographical situation".

(Schutz in Luckmann (Ed) 1978 p259)

The assumption that the individual anticipates that future experience will be the same for him as others, subject only to biographical differences, could be questioned. The subject could, conceivably, anticipate a different interpretation of the experience in the other's mind due to the perceived personality of the other person. It is problematic as to whether the "structure of the social world" would cover perceived personality differences.

Generally, this more elaborate concept of individual perception at one point in time, reaching into the future and past, as it does, starts to point to similarities with Weber's concept of experience over time. Sharp and Green consider that:

"In spite of Weber's search for meaning, (even) he came to see social structures and their regularities as something other than mere constellations of meaning".

(Sharp and Green 1975 p22)

Their argument is that the phenomenologist appears to suggest an extreme form of subjective idealism. They state that:

"...any form of sociological phenomenology which argues for the primacy of the knowing subject necessarily invokes Wittgenstein's argument against an individualistic epistemology and the possibility of private language".

(Sharp and Green 1975 p21)

They suggest that there is another form of phenomenology, stemming from Kant, which accepts Wittgenstein's private language concept, but consider that:

"Both forms of sociological phenomenology are far closer to philosophical idealism than Weber, who is often acknowledged as one of the intellectual forerunners of the movement".

(Sharp and Green 1975 p22)

Later in this work, it is noticeable that such criticism of phenomenological perspectives for philosophic idealism, pave the way for the introduction of Marxist approaches.

The interjection of Wittgenstein's later work in Sharp and Green's debate in the 'new' sociology of education could be compared with Greenfield's quoting of Wittgenstein, in "Organization Theory as Ideology"(1979), where he considers that Wittgenstein offers:

"...metaphors and artistic images as keys to understanding".

(Greenfield 1979 p106)

It is these images that:

"...provide reservoirs of meaning for interpreting our experience".

(Greenfield 1979 p106)

and presumably, then, not private language. The question is, to what extent can private language be considered only to relate to the instant of time it is formulated as verbal thoughts, and not be the subject of recall? In other words, it could be argued that this poses the question: can memory only be stored as images? It is noticeable in Sharp and Green's work that they do not quote from Schutz, as much as Esland does, in his contribution to "Knowledge and Control".

Schutz, Young and Demaine.

The place of Schutz within the 'new' sociology of education has been considered by Jack Demaine in his "Contemporary theories in the Sociology of Education"(1981). Demaine is highly critical of the 'new directions'. He considers that sociological questions, cannot, according to Young, be posed in terms of the social actors involved, but:

"...they can only be posed by taking them as a starting point, that is as the basic data of sociological enquiry which is to discover underlying meanings".

(Demaine 1981 p50)

Demaine is puzzled why sociological enquiry can only take this form and claims that Young gives us his answer, by appealing to the 'social scientific' method of Schutz,

and that this leads to social science becoming:

"...an elaborate but nonetheless speculative realm".

(Demaine 1981 p50)

Later, Demaine considers how Schutz distinguishes between 'socially derived knowledge' and 'socially approved knowledge', the latter being that which receives additional weight because we respect the people giving us the knowledge, so that, such knowledge is often social group knowledge.

Demaine considers, then, that a major flaw with both Schutz and Young's writings:

"...centres on how the authors conceive of the 'imposition of meanings' as taking place. For Schutz 'he who lives in the social world is a free being: his acts proceed from spontaneous activity'....How then is it possible for others to impose on the consciousness of an essentially free human subjectivity?".

(Demaine 1981 p52)

It could be argued that Greenfield would pick up this point as arguing for the complete freedom of the subject's consciousness, adopting a Weberian approach, where the actor's view of subjective reality is such that, meaning cannot be imposed. The subject interprets the world for himself, in a purely interpretive (phenomenological?) approach. Demaine considers that Schutz's answer is that individuals bring it on themselves, by accepting socially approved knowledge, but states:

"If, on the other hand, it is the decision as to who we recognize as competent that is imposed

on us then we are returned to the original question, to which we have no answer in Schutz's formulations".

(Demaine 1981 p52)

In Demaine's conclusion to all this, he claims that the subject is both free to make choices, and yet, at the same time, can have meanings imposed on him; a point he considers also to be a dilemma in Young's work.

Perhaps it is a matter of timing and circumstances. Maybe, sometimes one has freewill, and at other times one does not. The imposition of meaning idea, it could be suggested, provides Young with a useful tool for moving towards a radical perspective.

Young and Radical Change.

It has already been mentioned how Young, in the introduction to "Knowledge and Control", considers imposition of meanings, and in his 1973 paper, "Taking sides against the probable", there is clearly a slant towards radical change. This paper is very mixed, because it also considers the work of Merleau-Ponty; while Maxine Greene is also quoted, regarded by Sarup as epitomizing the phenomenological perspective in the sociology of education. Maxine Greene concedes in her "Landscapes of Learning"(1978), that she is an existential phenomenologist. Greene does not appear to be far, in philosophical terms, from Greenfield's position, quoting from Heidegger and R.D.Laing, both generally considered to be existentialists. However, quotes from Merleau-Ponty and Greene have to be squared, in Young's 1973 paper, with statements such as:

"The lesson of Marx's 11th Thesis on Feuerbach

has not been learnt, 'Philosophers (and here read sociologists) have only interpreted the world.....the point is to change it'".

(Young 1973 p214)

By advocating change, such statements by Young indicate a move towards a more radical position.

Later, Young takes a more clearly neo-Marxist position in his 1977 work with Geoff Whitty, "Society, State and Schooling". In his "Postscript", written with Whitty, it is declared that:

"One of the major arguments of this book has been that any realistic strategy for radical educational change would involve linking the 'politics of the classroom' to the 'politics of the class struggle'".

(Young and Whitty 1977 p269)

and later:

"Teachers have been made dramatically aware that it is not just reactionary or incompetent heads, or the conservatism of examination boards, which constrain their activities, but the material effects of decisions about priorities for expenditure in a capitalist society in crisis".

(Young and Whitty 1977 p269)

Stances Taken Towards Psychological Perspectives.

The next section will consider how neo-Marxist perspectives developed in both the field of the sociology of education and educational administration.

However, there is another area of similarity in the early development of both fields to be considered, and that

is the stance taken towards psychological perspectives. In his paper, "Organization Theory as Ideology"(1979), Greenfield is highly critical of psychological reductionists:

"The psychological reductionists would offer a set of elemental personal characteristics that our genes or Fortune herself distributes to each of us through some inscrutable design. From these elements, one might then extrapolate the individual personality and ultimately the quality of social institutions".

(Greenfield 1979 p102)

He then points out how Weber and Durkheim reject such arguments, by highlighting the fact that the meaning of such presumed psychological elements, or laws based upon them, cannot be deduced without invoking meaning already existing in the social context. Of course, for the 'new' sociologists of education, meaning does already exist in the social context, drawing, as they do, on the work of Schutz who, as indicated earlier, considers that meanings can be imposed upon the subject.

In "Teaching and Learning", Esland distinguishes two different psychological models, a psychometric model, which endows the child with an 'intelligence', and the epistemological model of Piaget and Bruner. Esland states:

"The psychometric model endows the child with an 'intelligence', a capacity of given power within which his thinking develops. He is novitiate in a world of pre-existing, theoretical forms into which he is initiated and which he is expected to reconstitute. The teacher monitors his progress by means of 'objective' evaluation".

(Esland in Young (Ed) 1971 p89)

This is the type of model Greenfield is rejecting in his paper, when he states:

"...while some psychologists might claim that intelligence is operationally and independently defined in the Binet scale, the human sociologist points out that Binet's first step in building the scale was to ask teachers in a Paris school near his laboratory what they thought intelligence was and which of their pupils had it".

(Greenfield 1979 p102)

Later, Greenfield considers that:

"George Herbert Mead's (1934) social psychology provides a rationale in which thinking becomes an internal dialectic whereby the human organism adapts to its environment".

(Greenfield 1979 p103)

This is similar in origin to Esland's epistemological model. This model, according to Esland, is concerned with the way in which the child actively constructs and arranges his knowledge of the world and, as such, is an interpretive approach. Esland considers, unlike Greenfield, that it is not a truly dialectic model because it assumes the social nature of reality construction. In other words, society constructs reality for the individual. The individual does not construct it himself and is not responsible for his own interpretations of reality. However, later Esland considers the importance of this approach for the 'new' sociology of education and outlines its characteristics:

"One of the main features is a preoccupation with subjective experience and its composition, in which man is represented as an active rather

than a passive creature, that is, in the creation of his own objects. It is represented in the psychological theories of Piaget and Bruner, whose epistemology is akin to the dialectic scheme of Mead and Schutz. Their emphasis on the construction of thought forms through sensory and linguistic ordering, and the growth of reflexivity, amount to an incipient phenomenology".

(Esland in Young (Ed) 1971 pp93-94)

Links between Piaget and phenomenology, have also been established by Neil Bolton, in "Piaget and pre-reflective experience", his paper in "Phenomenology and Education"(1978), edited by Curtis and Mays.

There is also a link to the 'new' sociologists through Bernstein. Bernstein's work on 'Linguistic Codes', could be regarded as following a development from the work of Piaget and Bruner, and also, Bernstein's work on boundary maintenance between academic subject departments, is included as a paper in "Knowledge and Control".

Sharp and Green, in "Education and Social Control", argue that phenomenological sociology is mainly concerned with social psychological considerations. They thus call for a requirement for compatibility of theories at the different levels:

"Sociologists, unfortunately, frequently fail to articulate the basic psychological assumptions and theories on which their sociological formulations depend".

(Sharp and Green 1975 p16)

This is somewhat different to Greenfield's position, where everything has to start with the individual self. Theories at the psychological level, and at the collective level of individuals, are not acceptable starting points.

In "Organization Theory as Ideology"(1979), he criticises both levels. Any biological insights into the workings of the human mind seem to be unacceptable with his statement:

"As Goffman points out, physical and biological 'facts' mean little compared to the social rituals we weave around them".

(Greenfield 1979 p103)

Any sociological collective perspective is criticized as follows:

"Mead's concept of the 'generalized other' thus becomes an explanation of how society exists in the human mind. We now need not see man in society, but only society in man. The generalized other is thus only the part of 'me' that expresses other's norms, values, and beliefs".

(Greenfield 1979 p103)

This could be seen as a flaw in Greenfield's phenomenological position. All insights into the workings of the human condition should be invited, which is more in agreement with Sharp and Green's position, that all levels require to be explored. However, their insistence that theories need to be compatible, could be questioned. This insistence puts a heavy burden on any form of analysis and could have the effect of channeling thought along certain lines.

This is surely what the early 'new' sociologists and Greenfield wished to avoid when they considered that sociological enquiry and educational administration had been dominated by one perspective, that of the structural functionalist positivistic position and, presumably, that

people had been channeled, (blinker?), so that they failed to appreciate that they were confined to one way of viewing reality.

Esland and Keddie and their Contributions to "Knowledge and Control".

In the book "Knowledge and Control", there are many contributions, which led Whitty to proclaim that the book possesses a certain richness of ideas. However, it is usually the contributions of Young, Esland and Keddie that are regarded as the contributions based on phenomenological perspectives.

This putting together of the work of Esland and Keddie in "Knowledge and Control" is curious. While Esland's paper is highly theoretical and philosophical, Keddie's paper focuses on particular studies within a school. There does not appear to be any reference to phenomenology or to the work of Alfred Schutz. The emphasis is on the way knowledge is perceived in the school, with condemnation of hierarchical concepts of knowledge, and calls for what counts as knowledge to be seen in its wider social and structural contexts in the community. Such theoretical considerations as these only really begin to appear in the last concluding section.

Bourdieu and his Contributions to "Knowledge and Control".

Works that could be regarded as phenomenological within "Knowledge and Control" are those of Pierre Bourdieu, who with his earlier writing, could well have been an influence on Young, Esland and Keddie.

John Kennett, in an article titled, "The Sociology of

Pierre Bourdieu", provides a useful overview of Bourdieu's ideas. His concept, 'cultural capital' the idea that schools control the recreation of the cultural capital in the next generation, is considered. Kennett states that:

"Bourdieu's main postulates are: firstly, that society is characterized by repression; secondly, that..... there is, diffused within a social space a cultural capital, comparable to economic capital, transmitted by inheritance and invested in order to be cultivated.....thirdly, that the true, as opposed to the apparent nature of the education system functions to discriminate in favour of those who are the inheritors of this cultural capital; fourthly, that the essentialist view of man implicit in common sense representations of school failure as being due to lack of talents, or of social groups as 'having' certain characteristics which make them fit or unfit for success is a mystification....fifthly, that culture has,....a political function".

(Kennett 1973 p238)

Young, writing in his introduction to "Knowledge and Control", says of Bourdieu's paper, "Systems of Education and Systems of Thought":

"Bourdieu draws most of his material from French society, in exploring the way, through the school system, particular classes maintain their dominance by being able to confer cultural legitimacy on certain styles of thought and therefore on certain aspects of reality".

(Young 1971 p12)

Whilst one can see a phenomenological element here, in the concept of construction of reality, we can see the more structural nature of considering why reality is constructed in certain ways.

This is some distance away from Greenfield's "method of

understanding" with emphasis on the self being responsible for his own construction of reality. Bourdieu's other paper in "Knowledge and Control", "Intellectual Field and Creation Project", is concerned with the way what counts as art is legitimized and passed on. Young states, in his introduction, that Bourdieu:

"...suggests the social and economic context for three aspects of the literary and art 'worlds' that are normally taken for granted. (1) The belief in art for art's sake (2) The assumption of the 'public's' incompetence.....(3) The growth of groups of critics who interpret artistic work for the public and give it its legitimacy".

(Young 1971 p10)

Such cultural legitimacy, of a similar nature, is institutionalised in the academic system according to Bourdieu. Young states:

"Bourdieu compares classical music and literature which have unquestioned cultural legitimacy and which are systematically 'taught' in academic curricula, with interior decoration, cookery and cosmetics which are only 'taught' in specialist 'vocational' curricula and for which no 'cultural legitimacy' in terms of aesthetic criteria is claimed".

(Young 1971 p11)

Work of this nature can be seen to be of relevance to the 'new directions' sociologists, with implicit concepts of the social construction of knowledge. That knowledge is not absolute but is a product of socialisation and is often hierarchical in nature. This leads back, of course, to a Schutz style of phenomenology, where meaning, in this case, viewing of art or school curricula, can be imposed on the individual as part of his subjective construction of reality.

In this respect, such work has to be seen as some way from Greenfield's 'new perspective', based on Weberian concepts of understanding. Whitty, in his 1985 paper "Society and School Knowledge", implies that Bourdieu's work is of a structuralist nature, although he sees links with the early phenomenological tradition within the 'new' sociology of education:

"Kuhn points out, the first macro-theorists to be espoused with enthusiasm, particularly by Esland and Dale, were Bowles and Gintis and not, for instance, Bourdieu whose links with the new sociologists had already been established.....and whose developing concerns had somewhat more in common with the earlier tradition".

(Whitty 1985 p24)

Whitty here, is considering the way neo-Marxist positions developed out of the 'new directions' position, so the work of Bowles and Gintis will be considered later, when developments within the field of sociology of education are explored. The last part of the above quote does make the point that Bourdieu's work, according to Whitty, should be seen as close to that of the original concerns of the 'new' sociologists of education as epitomised in "Knowledge and Control".

Bates' Critique.

An overview of the developing debate in the 'new' sociology of education has also been provided by Bates in his paper, "New Developments in the New Sociology of Education"(1980). Bates' views are particularly important to this study because he also has written articles in the field of educational administration. As these tend to be from a Marxist Critical Theory perspective, they will be considered in the next section.

In his paper, mentioned above, he points out the dilemmas of the early formulations and considers that there are four main issues:

"(i) The nature of the epistemological foundations of the New Sociology of Education.

(ii) The adequacy of phenomenology as a basis for structural analysis.

(iii) The stratification of knowledge and the power of elites in determining the curriculum.

(iv) The nature of the political action implied by the New Sociology of Education."

(Bates 1980 p67)

Incredibly, pointing to the work of Clark and Freeman, in "Michael Young's Sociology of Knowledge: Criticisms of Philosophers of Education Reconsidered"(1979), Bates implies that the actual language used by Young was complicated, because he was trying to express himself without using sociological and philosophical knowledge.

Bates' list does imply, yet again, that phenomenology was used as a tool to move into more structural approaches of neo-Marxist design, by suggesting that it overcame the problems of viewing knowledge in a technical rational scientific way, but implying the problematical nature of whether it provided a sufficient basis for structural change. (His second issue in the citation). Such issues, however, are the concern of the next section.

Concluding Comments.

This section has been confined, in the main, to the early work of the 'new' sociologists of education as embodied in "Knowledge and Control". Attempts have been made to try to draw comparisons with Greenfield's 'new

perspective', especially as it appeared in his first main work in this field, "Theory About Organization: A New Perspective and its Implications for Schools".

It was in this early work that a phenomenological perspective was supposed to have been applied to the concerns of the sociology of education. It is clear, however, that this purely phenomenological stance never really existed within the work of the sociologists who were the authors of "Knowledge and Control". The nearest one comes to this stance is in the work of Esland, but, even here, the influence of Schutz has led to a more structuralist approach. Young, certainly, even in his introduction, is already moving away from any purely subjective approach, with his concept of 'imposition of meanings'. So, it is considered, that the phenomenological perspective never really existed within "Knowledge and Control".

What the authors did do was to draw on phenomenological work, for instance, that of Alfred Schutz, Berger and Luckmann, and Maxine Greene, mainly in order to reinforce the argument for a move away from positivistic approaches. Of course, it could be argued that a purely phenomenological perspective never existed within Greenfield's work either, based, as it was in its early stages, on Weber's social action theory. However, while Greenfield remained with a generally subjective stance, this was not the case within the sociology of education, as has been outlined.

The early 'new' sociologists of education were preoccupied with the concept that schools are places where knowledge is 'processed', not merely transmitted. In other words, the idea that any attempt at learning involves the transmission of preconceived political and moral ideas,

that are presented as 'taken for granted', and unquestionable by the educators.

The early structuralist 'imposition of meaning' concept blinded the 'new' sociologists of education to a consideration of the implications of the way knowledge was constructed.

A subjective approach, according to Greenfield, would enable the individual to view 'knowledge' as a subjective reality, something that society constructs, with no meaning, except that which the individual perceives to exist. Hence, the knowledge that one subject perceives may be different from the knowledge others perceive. The 'new' sociology of education, with the idea that knowledge is accepted unquestionably as true, by the prevailing society that presents it, undermines the Greenfield subjective approach concept of the integrity of the subject.

The concept that all knowledge is socially constructed, also poses the question of the base of that knowledge. It presupposes that all knowledge comes from outwith the individual subject; that there is no source of knowledge within the brain of the subject. Reflex actions within the body are an example of knowledge stored within the body's biological structure, passed on genetically and free of social constructs.

The subjective stance of Greenfield, which 'honours' the integrity of the subject, would provide for both this internal innate knowledge and the concept that external knowledge, although not real in an absolute sense, is perceived as real by the subject. The subject may, or may not, perceive social constructions in this external knowledge, but under Greenfield's approach, these

perceptions would be a subjective reality, having no meaning, except that which the subject perceives to exist.

The early push into neo-Marxist perspectives in the 'new directions' sociology of education, removes the integrity of the subject to judge, for him or herself, the 'social trappings' that knowledge may have taken onboard.

The implicit argument of the 'new directions' thinkers is that all except neo-Marxist intellectuals will fail to perceive the conservative nature of much of what counts as knowledge in schools. Yet, the concept that perceives academic knowledge, in other words, school subjects, as hierarchical and elitist, with structures that place one subject above another, also would perceive administrative structures within the school as bureaucratic. These would have elitist levels of management, under this perception, and there would be no scope for the free flow of ideas.

In questioning the reality of all such structures and hierarchies, but in not seeking to impose new ones along neo-Marxist lines, Greenfield's ideas could have aided the 'new' sociology of education. This could have been achieved by extending these ideas from educational administration, into the way knowledge is processed in learning situations within schools, by questioning the basis of the concept that knowledge can be socially constructed, and making that basis problematic. The 'new directions' sociologists could have learned from the educational administration of Greenfield, if they had re-examined their early push into structural concepts and recognised the problematic nature of the source of the very concept, 'the processing of knowledge', which they were attempting to analyse.

The main lesson to be drawn from this consideration, with

respect to the field of educational administration and management, is that Greenfield's ideas, that have had such a profound effect in the field, have to be seen in the context of development of a similar nature, (though certainly not identical), in another educational field of enquiry, namely, the sociology of education. The concerns of managers within schools, for instance, are not that far removed from the concerns of classroom teachers, in respect that both have to deal with conceptions of knowledge, as perceived within a school context.

In Britain, those involved with management within the school are often the same people who are still involved with what counts as knowledge in the classroom, and so the social construction of knowledge, as perceived by the 'new directions', is of importance in both respects of an educationalist's work, because management decisions are usually decisions where knowledge is processed as well.

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SECTION 4.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF NEO-MARXIST PERSPECTIVES WITHIN SOCIOLOGY OF EDUCATION AND EDUCATIONAL ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT.

There are considerable differences between the way neo-Marxist perspectives entered the field of the sociology of education and the way they were introduced into educational administration. As outlined in the last section, it is difficult to tease out a period when there were not neo-Marxist influences within the 'new directions' for the sociology of education. The concept 'imposition of meaning', gave even Young's work in "Knowledge and Control"(1971), a Marxist slant, and made it difficult to establish a phenomenological period within his work.

On the other hand, Greenfield's early work, though not phenomenological in a purist sense, was of a basic subjective nature without any structuralist overtones. In fact, he resists passionately any move in that direction. As was considered in Section 2., Greenfield's work developed from an early social action theory approach, through, perhaps, a phenomenological period not made explicit, into existential approaches based on the work of R.D.Laing.

Neo-Marxist Perspectives within Educational Administration.

To find neo-Marxist perspectives within educational administration one has to look elsewhere. Peter Ribbins, in his article, "Organisation Theory and the Study of Educational Institutions", in "Managing Education"(1985), considers that there are three competing paradigms for the analysis of organisational theory.

Firstly, "Consensus assumed (Systems theory, 'open' 'closed' loosely coupled)". Secondly, "Order as empirically contingent, (Action theory, 'social phenomenology', ethnomethodology and symbolic interactionism)", and finally, "Conflict assumed, (Marxist theory and Critical theory)".

It is his third paradigm then, in which we find Marxist approaches, but he considers that any attempt at a comprehensive critique of the third paradigm seems premature, stating that:

"...although Nash can plausibly claim that currently, the British sociology of education is dominated by Marxist perspectives, until very recently such perspectives have made little impact upon the field of educational management and administration".

(Ribbins in Hughes (Ed) 1985 p254)

He does, however, point to the work of Bates in Australia, and it is there that we can find neo-Marxist perspectives in the form of Critical Theory.

Bates, in his paper "Towards a Critical Practice of Educational Administration"(1982), considers that:

"...it is somewhat surprising that so few links have been made with the work of phenomenologists of organisation theory in education such as Greenfield.....or with the advocates of critical social theory".

(Bates 1982 p8)

Here, Bates is making a comparison with the work of the 'new' sociologists of education and, indeed, is exceptional in producing papers within both sociology of education and educational administration.

However, it is clear in this paper that his sympathies lie with Critical Theory, which he considers to be exemplified by the work of Habermas.

Critical Theory.

Critical Theory is usually associated with the "Institute for Social Research", founded at Frankfurt, often referred to as the Frankfurt School. Its chief proponents, in its early stages, were Horkheimer, Adorno, Fromm and Marcuse.

In "Cultural Analysis"(1984), the authors, (Robert Wuthnow, James Davison Hunter, Albert Bergesen and Edith Kurzweil), explain how Critical Theory emerged in Germany after the First World War. The School, while embracing the Marxist critique of capitalism, re-examined its philosophical foundations in the hope of making it more applicable to the post war situation. They attempted to develop a single theoretical framework in which scientific investigation, and the political implication of these investigations, could be united.

Under this concept, the investigator is required to take his own position in relation to the society into account,

rather than attempting to suppress it in the interests of discovering universal scientific laws.

The authors of "Cultural Analysis" then, suggest that there is a focus on the individual within Critical Theory which makes it less structural than other Marxist perspectives, and, perhaps, has something in common with 'action theory' and phenomenological perspectives. They consider that Critical Theory is concerned with the critical examination of our circumstances, institutions and cultural predispositions and values. It could be claimed that such considerations are also of central importance to subjective approaches in general.

Habermas is often given a special status within the school, with his more recent writing. David Held, in his "Introduction to Critical Theory: Horkheimer to Habermas"(1980), sees Habermas in this light, although others include Habermas in the Frankfurt School.

Generally, Critical Theorists have been concerned with interpretations of why traditional Marxism did not evolve historically in Western democracies, in the way Marx predicted.

Such considerations, as outlined above, put Critical Theory in a slightly different aspect to other neo-Marxist perspectives. Whitty, for instance, in "Sociology and School Knowledge"(1985), considers that, in the sociology of education, there was a period when Marxist approaches were adopted in a very simplistic way, with the acceptance of Bowles and Gintis's political economy. In fact, he considers that:

"...the programme set out in Knowledge and Control.....for studying"....(the detail of

the curriculum)....."was put on one side in the search for a more basic explanation of the nature of capitalist society and the place of schooling within it".

(Whitty 1985 p30)

Retaining Phenomenology.

However Apple, in his paper, "Power and School Knowledge"(1977), advocates that phenomenology is retained within Marxist perspectives:

"One does not throw out social phenomenology here.....One combines it with a more critical social interpretation that looks at the negotiation of identities and meanings in specific institutions like schools as taking place within a context that often determines the parameters of what is negotiable or meaningful".

(Apple 1977 p43)

Critical Theory and the Sociology of Education.

In fact, in this paper, Apple calls for Critical Theory to be applied to the sociology of education along the lines that Bates has suggested, for both sociology of education and educational administration. Apple states:

"I am approaching this topic with a perspective that grows out of a commitment to critical theory.....I want to bracket, to make problematic, the apolitical ways we usually view our own activity as inquirers or researchers".

(Apple 1977 p30)

Later, he quotes Habermas in a way that makes it clear that he is referring to Critical Theory, as it evolved from the Frankfurt School:

"...we need to know, as well, what the relationships are between educational investigations whose analyses and logic depend upon control and certainty and social and educational institutions whose own fundamental interest lies in increasing control and certainty of outcome. It is here that the historical and analytic work of the critical theorists such as Habermas (1971), Schroyer (1973) and Wellmer (1971) would be most helpful".

(Apple 1977 p37)

However, as Whitty has outlined, more elaborate forms of Marxist perspective were not accepted generally at this time, (i.e. in the mid-1970's).

It is here that Whitty points out how Kuhn had suggested that the first macro-theorists to be espoused, particularly by Esland and Dale, were Bowles and Gintis and not Bourdieu, in spite of the earlier links with the 'new' sociologists of education.

Whitty considers that there was an early division between those who concerned themselves with classroom studies of an ethnographic nature, and those who took a more theoretical line.

Anthropology, Ethnography and Phenomenology.

The link between anthropology and phenomenology has been considered by Sarup to be a close one:

"One of the features of the 'new' sociology of education is its use of anthropological studies. I show how anthropology has contributed to the examination of our taken-for-granted suppositions".
(Sarup 1978 p6)

Ethnography appears to be the research arm of anthropology. However, Kathleen Wilcox states, in "Doing the Ethnography of Schooling"(1982), edited by George Spindler:

"Ethnography is not synonymous with participant observation, fieldwork or qualitative research. A thorough understanding of ethnography requires an understanding of the discipline of anthropology as well".

(Wilcox in Spindler (Ed) 1982 p457)

It appears that anthropological studies, using ethnographic techniques, were an inspiration to the 'new' sociologists who progressed along the micro path and provided a new technique for classroom studies.

Whitty is critical of those who followed this path implying that their work lacked theoretical rigour:

"The other direction was followed by those 'who were more interested in the question of what went on in schools' and led to the development of ethnographic techniques for studying classroom interaction. Although there seems no inherent reason why one of these sets of interests should necessarily lead to more theoretically inclined or empirically oriented work than the other, it did seem to be the case that those concerned with the broader issues devoted most of their attention to theoretical debate, while the other group concentrated upon the production of under-theorized classroom ethnographies".

(Whitty 1985 p22)

The whole relation of phenomenology to anthropology and ethnography is a complex one, and, as such, will be considered in detail in the next section. In the above quote, Whitty is showing his sympathies for neo-Marxist perspectives, because it is his theoretical path which is of this nature, and hence gets the 'soft' treatment.

"Correspondence Theory".

Yet, Whitty, in tracing Esland and Dale's move into the macro-stance is critical of the way, in the late 1970's, that the work of Bowles and Gintis was accepted. Whitty refers to this approach as "Correspondence Theory", because of the way it tried to draw simple connections between capital in the economic world, with cultural capital in the educational world.

Qualifications were cultural capital, obtained in educational 'factories' that processed the cultural capital.

Even a move to incorporate Althusserian concepts of "Ideological State Apparatus" does not, in Whitty's opinion, enable neo-Marxist perspectives to escape from a position where the problem of the social construction of knowledge is seen simplistically, as due to the capitalist state structure. Indeed, he considers that it is legitimate to consider such positions as functional, in the sense that they stressed the coercive nature of the state system, such that nothing could be achieved this side of a revolution.

By the turn of the decade, Whitty considers that there was a re-examination, in Marxist circles, of the relation between the state and schooling which implied that there were complex relationships, between the two, with many sites of conflict. It is here, that Whitty considers Gramsci's concept of hegemony as crucial:

"Ideologies were seen to become hegemonic when they made a contribution to the process by which 'commonsense is made to conform to the 'necessities of production'' and to the 'construction of "consent" and a political

order'".

(Whitty 1985 p33)

False Consciousness.

It is at this stage, perhaps, that Whitty has brought us to a position where comparisons can again be made with Critical Theory within educational administration. The link comes through the concept, 'false consciousness'.

Donald Willower, in his paper, "Marxian Critical Theory and Educational Administration"(1985a), has implied that Critical Theorists attempt to explain the fact that Marxist revolution did not unfold in Western democracies by talking about the concept of false consciousness. The ruling class in Western democracies constructed their institutions in such a way that the workers lost sight of their true class consciousness. Willower considers that Critical Theorists attempted to explain this position by talking about false consciousness. The implication is that this is an intellectual form of Marxism. Eyerman, in "False Consciousness and Ideology in Marxist Theory"(1981), states:

"Today, especially in America but to a growing extent in Western Europe as well, it seems collective experience or class itself, can only be produced theoretically, that is, by Marxist intellectuals".

(Eyerman 1981 p236)

Critical Theorists are concerned with the problems of developing 'true' class consciousness, (which they see as the working classes being aware of their inferior status, and wishing to seek revolutionary change,) from the 'false' consciousness that they consider is imposed by the ruling classes. These ideas are used to help explain

why Marxism did not unfold in Western democracies in the way Marx predicted.

The idea that we are all intellectuals and philosophers, is a notion of Gramsci's. Sarup considers that there is a link between phenomenological perspectives and Gramsci's form of Marxism, in the idea that everybody is a philosopher.

Hegemony.

Entwistle, in "Antonio Gramsci: Conservative Schooling for Radical Politics"(1979), states:

"In Gramsci's formulation, hegemonic direction is by moral and intellectual persuasion rather than control by the police, the military, or the coercive power of the law: 'rule by intellectual and moral hegemony is the form of power which gives stability and founds power on wide-ranging consent and acquiescence'".

(Entwistle 1979 p12)

and later:

"...bourgeois hegemony depends upon the 'false consciousness' of the working class".

(Entwistle 1979 p12)

Presumably then, one is led to the paradox that the only people who can see through the false consciousness, are the few Marxist intellectuals, who can form a true class consciousness.

Gramsci's claim is that the working classes cannot become ruling classes through coercion alone but that they must become involved in a counter-hegemonic revolution.

Later, Entwistle questions how schools can have revolutionary potential when they are, presumably, able to manipulate the curriculum to produce false consciousness among the working classes, through their ruling hegemony:

"If schools are a major hegemonic instrument of existing class rule, how can counter-hegemonic change occur except through radical curricular reform and a liberal pedagogy? Do not the schools which already serve the capitalist hegemony succeed in developing a false working-class consciousness through manipulation of the curriculum".

(Entwistle 1979 p16)

C.A.R.E., Phenomenology and Critical Theory.

It is interesting that Whitty's account of the work of the C.A.R.E. group, [Centre for Applied Research in Education at the University of East Anglia,] indicates a link with neo-Marxist approaches in educational administration, through the concept of Critical Theory. Whitty's account also implies a sympathy towards a phenomenological position:

"The strength of most of the writers associated with C.A.R.E. lies in their commitment to the integrity of lived experience and their abiding interest in the subjective interpretations of curricular reality made by teachers and pupils".

(Whitty 1985 p70)

He is generally critical of this position, but points out that some authors, notably Elliot, are moving towards a stance where the curriculum is placed in a broader social context.

It is interesting that Bates, in his paper, "Towards a

Critical Practice of Educational Administration"(1982), while proposing a Critical Theory stance, also shows distinct sympathy with the subjective approaches of Greenfield. In fact, Bates quotes from Greenfield's 1973 paper, "Organizations as Social Inventions: Rethinking Assumptions about Change", to justify his own position:

"In particular, the insistence of critical social theory on the incorporation of discussion over normative issues in practical discourse and its commitment to processes of communication and discussion free from the distorting effects of domination matches well with Greenfield's observation that in the world of everyday life 'what many people seem to want from schools is that schools reflect the values that are central and meaningful in their lives.'"

(Bates 1982 p10)

It seems to be the case then, that in both the sociology of education and educational administration, close links have been developed between subjective approaches, like phenomenology, and neo-Marxist Critical Theory. However, it appears, yet again, that the subjective approach is the tool to justify the neo-Marxist position, even though that position contains contradictions as well. In other words, the adoption of a phenomenological approach leads to the questioning of the perceived prevailing system, which is seen by Critical Theorists as positivistic, that is, based upon taken for granted assumptions about the goodness of democratic and liberal ideas in education, which are presented as logical and unquestionable, because they are based on scientific principles.

However, confinement to a subjective view is not in keeping with the development of change as a collective philosophy requirement, that brings people together in a common programme, in the case of Critical Theorists, the overthrow

of the perceived class structure.

The introduction of Gramsci's concept 'hegemony', itself, poses problems. The fact that Gramsci could see revolutionary potential in a traditional pedagogy, is a paradox in his work.

Hegemony and Looser Connections.

Whitty considers that, although the introduction of hegemony into the sociology of education overcame the charges of functionalism, there were still problems and divisions. The hegemonic approach had replaced economic determinism with:

"...a rather looser process of setting limits and exerting pressures".

(Whitty 1985 p33)

There is the possibility, here, of a link with the ambiguity models in educational administration. Weick considers in, "Educational Organizations as Loosely Coupled Systems"(1976), that, within educational organisations, there is not tight systematic control, but parts of organisations are only loosely coupled:

"More time should be spent examining the possibility that educational organizations are most usefully viewed as loosely coupled systems".

(Weick 1976 p16)

Whitty implies that, as an escape from 'Correspondence Theory', which had been accused of being functional, the hegemonic models provide for looser connections between the:

"...ideological practice in and around the state"

(Whitty 1985 p33)

and the educational system. Weick considered that the systems perspective, often too linked to functionalism, through its philosophical base of structural functionalism, was unsuitable for explaining educational organisations, when he suggested his model of loosely coupled organisations.

Whitty implies that the hegemonic models led to some reunification within the 'new' sociology of education, with a link between classroom studies and a phenomenological, (ethnographic?), focus on meaning, and the neo-Marxist theoretical group. However, he considers that:

"There isa considerable tension within contemporary Marxist theory between the notions of relative autonomy on the one hand and economic determination on the other".

(Whitty 1985 p33)

Concepts of Hegemony.

Whitty's implication, that relative autonomy is linked to hegemonic considerations, suggests a somewhat different interpretation of hegemony than that proposed by Gramsci.

It is the hegemony of the ruling class that is responsible for the false consciousness of the subordinate classes. If Whitty's implication is that those who occupy schools are of a subordinate class, and are affected by false consciousness, then this, according to Gramsci, is a totally socializing influence. The control is subtle, but complete, and there is no room for relative autonomy.

However, Entwistle concedes that Gramsci's concept 'hegemony' is very complex. One of its strengths is that it can adapt and absorb small changes. Whether relative autonomy, in Whitty's sense, can be accommodated within these limits is a debatable question. Whitty implies a loose connexion between the state and the educational system, ideologically, rather than small changes that can be hidden and absorbed.

Hegemony in Educational Administration.

The concept 'hegemony' does not appear so frequently in educational administration. Critical Theory, such as that proposed by Bates, is based on the work of Habermas.

Habermas does not feature the concept 'hegemony' in terms of covert social pressure on one group, or another, to behave in a certain way. The concept of hegemonic influences being achieved by a dominant class, because of the false consciousness of the dominated class, is replaced, in Habermas's thinking, by 'distorted communication'; reflecting the importance of communication in Habermas's thoughts on the nature of culture and society.

The authors of "Cultural Analysis"(1984), make this clear. They consider that:

"Systematically distorted communication is for Habermas.....what false consciousness was for Marx: it prevents the resolution of major social crises".

(Wuthnow et. al. 1984 p224)

and that when systematic distortion occurs:

"...participants assume they have understood one another and have arrived at some consensus, but because of unacknowledged interests they have engaged only in pseudo-communication, and have failed to achieve genuine consensus".

(Wuthnow et. al. 1984 p224)

When the term 'hegemony' appears in writings within the field of educational administration, it is usually used without analysis, in a sloganized way, presumably to produce impact.

For instance, Greenfield states, in "Organization Theory as Ideology"(1979) that he sees system theory and structural functionalist thinking as:

"...the ideological hegemony in administrative studies".

(Greenfield 1979 98)

This, presumably, means that Greenfield sees structural functionalist thinking as 'taken for granted'; as the 'right' way to research and debate educational administration, such that the 'rightness' of the method pervades educational administration, and is presented as unquestionable.

Also Griffiths points out, how Clegg and Dunkerly accuse the:

"'Administrative Science Quarterly' of 'hegemony' in traditional research methodology",

(Griffiths 1979 p44)

Such statements, however, do little to bring out the subtleties of the concept and lead to the sloganized stance

that Entwistle cautions against.

Critical Theory and Wider Influences.

Where it is possible to see a link between the more advanced stages of Whitty's discourse and Critical Theory in educational administration, is through the work of American writers such as Giroux and Wexler.

In his paper, "Towards a Critical Practice of Educational Administration"(1982), Bates questions why links have not been made between the concerns of the 'new' sociology of education and the:

"...advocates of critical social theory....in its....North American application to education. (Giroux, 1981; Foster, 1980(a),1980(b); Wexler, 1976".

(Bates 1982 p8)

In his opinion the:

"...apparent ignorance of the traditional social theory is disappointing because, firstly, the problems at the root of the new sociology of education are also those that preoccupy the critical social theorists and, secondly, because critical social theory appears to have resolved some of the more troubling theoretical difficulties faced by the new sociology of education".

(Bates 1982 p8)

Yet, by 1985, Whitty implies that the descendants of the 'new' sociologists were aware of this work. He states:

"The work we had in mind, which included that of Anyon, Apple, Giroux, Taxel and Wexler.....had

these three characteristics in common. The first distinguishing characteristic lay in its greater openness to a variety of theoretical perspectives at any one time".

(Whitty 1985 p85)

Yet Bates sees close links between the subjective work of Greenfield and Critical Theory. However, the major influence on Bates' work is clearly Habermas. The authors of "Cultural Analysis" point out, though, that Habermas was influenced by many other disciplines, including phenomenology.

It is debatable whether all this accommodation of doctrines leads to an acceptable progression where ideas gradually unfold. It appears, from Whitty's account, that this happened in the early stages of the neo-Marxist critique, where 'Correspondence Theory' was replaced by hegemonic concepts, but the complexity implied by these stages of Critical Theory development implies an inability to see an adequate way forward.

Indeed, paradoxically, it seems the phenomenological approaches, rejected in the early days of the 'new directions', are to be reincorporated within the field of the sociology of education.

Legitimacy and Values.

It is Habermas's work on rationality, legitimacy and motivation that Bates brings to the field of educational administration. However, there is clearly a link, here, with the critical social theory of Taxel, as considered by Whitty, when he is discussing work done by Critical Theorists like Taxel, Giroux and Wexler, on school text books:

(Taxel)....."also emphasizes that cultural practice involves not just the process of reproduction of legitimation, but also the processes of production and creating meanings. The independent work of authors, publishers and editors points to the necessity, in his eyes, of developing an analysis of the 'production of texts' that can integrate with a theory of the reproduction of meanings and values".

(Whitty 1985 p45)

Bates' use of Habermas leads him, also, to a consideration of values:

"The crisis of rationality is rooted in the positivistic separation of fact from value, means from ends, politics from administration, and the exclusion of discourse over ends, values and purposes".

(Bates 1982 p9)

The implications of whether facts can be separated from values forms a topic for consideration in Section 8, when the INLOGOV Report is analysed in the light of the subjective/systems and wider paradigmatic debates. The INLOGOV Report (1989) was prepared for Strathclyde Regional Council by the School of Education, University of Birmingham. In subjecting the Region's Education Department to a detailed overall review it implied that fact could be separated from value. The factual information of the 'learning department', (the Report proposed that the Education Department must 'learn' from all the agencies involved with education in its area), is to be used to add weight to the shared values that the department wishes to promote. This goes against Greenfield's notion that facts and values are intertwined and reinforces Bates' criticism in the last citation. Bates suggests that educational administrators need to

be sensitive to the processes of management of metaphors, rituals and negotiations, which he considers to be the key aspects of the cultural myths of schools. They also need to be:

"...aware of its importance in the processes of rationalisation, legitimation and motivation involved in schooling".

(Bates 1982 p14)

However, neo-Marxists, would also surely be concerned with such issues. Greenfield, in his paper, "The Decline and Fall of Science in Educational Administration"(1986), has more recently focused on values in educational administration, as mentioned in Section 2., and Morgan has considered the role of metaphors in organisational administration, in his paper, "Paradigms, Metaphors, and Puzzle Solving in Organization Theory"(1980), (a main topic for Section7.)

There is nothing unique in what Bates is proposing, but it may be the case, that Greenfield, with his later work, has been influenced by Bates. If this is the case, then Critical Theory is influencing the subjective stance of Greenfield!

Critiques of the neo-Marxist Perspective.

Willower is generally critical of the application of Critical Theory to educational administration, in his "Marxian Critical Theory and Educational Administration"(1985a), because it:

"...incorporates the essential dogmas of Marxism and because it has so little to offer in the way of empirical research".

(Willower 1985a p18)

In a similar way, Whitty's account in "Sociology and School Knowledge", is criticised by Lawton in the "Review Symposium". He implies that Whitty does not consider the American work in the curriculum field that is not neo-Marxist in nature.

Presumably, Lawton considers that Whitty is only focusing on the critical social theory of Taxel, Apple, Giroux, Wexler, etc. Colin Lacey, in his contribution to the symposium, is critical of Whitty's work for only including ideas that support the neo-Marxist cause. He states:

"The methodological limitation of the 'new' sociology of education stems from the way its proponents have dealt with pre-existing work in the field and to some extent later work which does not emerge from adherents or exadherents of the 'new' sociology. The effect is to underemphasise the in school organisation and political constraint affecting reforms of the curriculum and almost write off the research that demonstrates the effects of the intensely individualistic (family-based) competition that characterises all modern educational systems".

(Lacey 1986 p89)

An interesting question would be, to what extent Critical Theory work in educational administration could be viewed in the same light? Bates' calls for work on the underlying myths of school organisation, mentioned earlier, would tend to quell a criticism within the field of Critical Theory and educational administration. Willower, in fact, suggests that critical theorists have produced useful concepts for application to educational administration:

"Some of the ideas of critical theory can be detached from the ideological web that enmeshes them and examined independently of that web. For instance, power, legitimacy, and control are useful concepts to use in attempting to understand what goes on in schools as well as other settings".

(Willower 1985a p17)

Similarly, the concept, 'false consciousness' is useful if it is used to mean conditioning of the mind. There must be situations where people do not act freely, but instead act in a conditioned way, of which they might not be aware.

This could affect decisions in educational administration. For instance, a proposal to cut back on pre-school provision during financial restraint, is routinely carried forward, through conditioning of the mind, into more prosperous times.

However, why should such false consciousness necessarily be replaced by class consciousness? Surely conscious awareness can take other forms, i.e. individual self consciousness, family group awareness, generational peer group awareness, etc?

Concluding Comments.

It is important to consider neo-Marxist perspectives in both educational administration and the sociology of education in order to trace developments within the two fields. The fact that subjective perspectives have been used, by the 'new' sociologists of education, to act as springboards into Marxism, makes it almost impossible to compare the subjective developments in the two fields, without considering the accompanying neo-Marxist

perspectives.

Whitty, in spite of his politically committed writing, has provided an excellent historical account of the development of neo-Marxist perspectives within the sociology of education and has made it possible to compare developments from the early 1970's, with parallel developments within educational administration.

At one point, he makes it clear that he is aware of the work of Bates within educational administration, but his comment indicates a general antagonism towards what he sees as the generally positivistic nature of traditional educational administration theory.

Whitty has indicated that, within the sociology of education, there has been a gradual arrival of Critical Theory perspectives through phenomenology, 'Correspondence Theory' and hegemonic concepts, whereas, in educational administration, Critical Theory appears to have emerged more directly from the subjective stances of Greenfield, although Greenfield himself, does not appear to endorse this progression.

The retaining of systems and subjective stances, and the development of ambiguity models, has produced a resulting paradigm diversity within educational administration. It is possible that there is more consensus about the acceptance of this diversity in educational administration, than within the sociology of education where, perhaps, there is more of a tendency to argue from ideological camps. One thinks of Griffiths' gradual accommodation of Greenfield's values, as indicated within 'Intellectual Turmoil in Educational Administration'(1979), and Sander and Wiggins attempts to assimilate various paradigms in educational administration, in "Cultural Context of

Administrative Theory: In Consideration of a Multidimensional Paradigm"(1985). Bush too, in "Theories of Educational Management"(1986), compares systems, subjective, micro-political and ambiguity models in a balanced way.

These approaches, in educational administration, can be compared with Whitty's account of the way in which the 'new' sociology of education divided into two camps, one basically, a theoretical neo-Marxist approach, and the other, concentrating on ethnographic classroom studies, which Whitty considers to lack theoretical rigour.

Similarly, it is possible to include here, the criticism of Lawton, that Whitty, himself, only considers neo-Marxist approaches in the American literature.

However, concepts such as hegemony and false consciousness, as indicated earlier, can be useful tools in the development of understanding if stripped of their neo-Marxist political commitments and could probably, under these circumstances, find useful applications in educational administration. The hegemonic idea is that subtle social pressure can operate to encourage people to behave in certain ways, without overt compulsion being required; while the proposed concept 'false consciousness' is that operation of the concept occurs through routine conditioned responses, rather than through responses based on critical thought in every situation. For instance, in an administrative situation, a subordinate may be influenced by a hegemony that one 'must get on', and ignore requests to delegate, so that he will be able closely to control his own success in his work. An example of false consciousness was provided earlier in the section, when it was considered that the concept could lead to routine financial restraint within educational

administration, even after the need for a strict budget had passed.

The concept 'hegemony' could also aid an analysis of the interaction of systems and ambiguity models of educational organisation. The systems perspective lays emphasis on the order within an educational organisation. The ambiguity models of Cohen, March and Olsen under 'Garbage Can' theory, and the 'loose coupling' of Weick, (both to be discussed in Section 6.), suggest that there is disorder, or at least apparent disorder, whereby, organisations function as much looser controls and checks.

The concept 'hegemony', with its subtle conditioned control, could contribute to an analysis of the interface between systems and ambiguity models. Bates has highlighted, through Habermas, the importance of ritual. In educational organisations, ritual is an aid to control, if it can be established. Appeals to tradition and bureaucracy within educational organisations, are attempts to establish an unquestionable 'right' to accept control through the structure of the organisation. The time dimension of tradition, i.e. the attitude 'it has always been done this way', aids this 'lack of right to question' concept, and stresses the importance of time continuity. In other words, when there is no break with tradition, the impact of tradition on the organisation is increased. In certain schools, for example, the tradition of wearing school uniform, that has persisted for decades, is used as an argument for the wearing of school uniform to continue. It could be argued, that tradition is a hegemony, a concept of subtle persuasion, which is, perhaps, aided by an innate human predisposition to feel 'comfortable' with conservation and uneasy about change.

Bureaucracy, with its patterns of organisational status,

its concepts of command and delegation, by establishing an ordered pattern, also produces an appeal for stability that could be considered to be hegemonic. The hegemony, again, operates through the subtle pressure that routine can provide for 'ritualised responses of the mind', so that one continues to adopt those stances that routine has provided. This again, is brought about by the innate human condition, to feel comfortable with conformity and uneasy about change, in as much as change requires innovation, critical thought and the taking of risks.

If this is the pattern of systems approaches, then ambiguity models might appear to contradict the existence of these hegemonic controls. Yet, although Weick's 'loose coupling' operates with the concept that organisations are broken down into small units, that link with each other through loose control, there is, with the model, scope for tight coupling within the units.

It could be argued that tight control within units may rely on hegemonic patterns, sustained by ritual, and by established bureaucratic patterns. This is exemplified by the notion of established groups that resist interference from other parts of the organisation. The paradox is that 'hegemony', as subtle social pressure through ritual, can operate at different levels, both to provide cohesion in organisations and, at the same time, to provide barriers between its parts.

It is clear, however, that Greenfield's subjective approach would not accommodate the suggested concept, 'hegemony' as 'subtle social pressure through ritual', even stripped of its neo-Marxist implications. The integrity of the subject, the fact that his interpretations are sacrosanct, would not allow any suggestion that the subject could respond to ritual. Only a Schutzian concept of 'imposition

of meaning' would allow this to occur.

The other 'useful' concept that neo-Marxist ideas have provided, 'false consciousness' as 'routine conditioned responses', would not aid a systems perspective, where decisions are to be made in response to the needs of the organisation. To serve the organisation, wholly and faithfully, would require critical thought and analysis in each situation. Trying to apply 'false consciousness' to ambiguity models would present the same problem.

In the 'Garbage Can' model, the administrator responds to the immediate situation, to leave some problems to resolve themselves, dealing with other situations before they become critical. However, this model stresses the timing of the arrival of problems and solutions, rather than the lack of critical thought.

The administrator is responding to situations under pressure but the model presents this as high critical brain activity rather than the conditioned response that false consciousness would suggest.

It could be argued, however, that it is precisely under these conditions that an administrator could respond in a conditioned way, with routine responses providing a false consciousness that helps the individual to cope, i.e., he may use responses that have 'worked in the past', rather than fresh critical analysis.

Weick's concept, 'loose coupling' would provide situations where false consciousness could be acceptable and others, where it would not fit the model. Where there is tight coupling within organisations, the systems concept, that critical thought is needed faithfully to serve the organisation, would prevent false consciousness under

this model. However, where looser links could be defined, such that there is less organisational responsibility observed, then there is more scope for conditioned response, where routine procedures, that might be counter productive to organisational requirements, could take place.

However, it is clear, as it was with the concept, 'hegemony', that 'false consciousness' as 'routine conditioning of the mind', could not operate under Greenfield's subjective approach, where each individual is responsible for his own interpretation of reality, which, in an organisational context, means that the subject's perceptions of a situation in an organisation are valid as his or her interpretation and must be based on conscious thought which is free, and cannot, therefore, be a conditioned response.

So the concept, 'false consciousness' like 'hegemony', even when its neo-Marxist political implications have been removed, cannot be accommodated within Greenfield's subjective approach.

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SECTION 5.

THE ETHNOGRAPHIC METHODOLOGY OF ANTHROPOLOGY AND ITS APPLICATION TO THE "NEW" SOCIOLOGY OF EDUCATION, ORGANISATION THEORY AND EDUCATIONAL ADMINISTRATION.

In the last section, it became clear, at one point, that a consideration of anthropological and ethnographic approaches could enhance the debate within the field of the sociology of education and, perhaps, provide useful pointers for educational administration.

Sarup, in "Marxism and Education"(1978), considers that there was a clear anthropological and ethnographic influence in the early phenomenological approach to the 'new directions' within the sociology of education.

Social Anthropology and Phenomenology.

The closeness of social anthropology to phenomenology is well documented in the development of phenomenology since Husserl. Thomas Luckmann, in his 'Preface' to "Phenomenology and Sociology"(1978), considers that:

"Aron Gurwitsch, the philosophers Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Alphonse de Waelhens, and

other scholars working in the period between the thirties and the sixties continued the work of Husserl in a critique of empiricist psychology and in reconstructing the philosophical foundations of social science. The biologist - philosopher Helmuth Plessner, who with Max Scheler became one of the founding fathers of modern philosophical anthropology, followed an independent but often parallel path".

(Luckmann 1978 pp11-12)

Bourdieu, in his anthropological work, "Outline of a theory of Practice"(1977), when considering theoretical knowledge, almost views phenomenology as synonymous with ethnomethodology.

Anthropology, Ethnography and Educational Administration.

In educational administration, there are indications that a consideration of a link with anthropology and ethnography could be useful. For instance, Calhoun and Ianni, in their introduction to "The Anthropological Study of Education"(1976), state:

"There is another side to the study of institutional education, however. This is to focus on the nature and operation of the educational institutions themselves. This is probably the largest of the subsections of the current anthropological study of education".

(Calhoun and Ianni 1976 p4)

Also, Sander and Wiggins, in "Cultural Context of Administrative Theory: In Consideration of a Multidimensional Paradigm"(1985), while evaluating their "Cultural Dimension", consider the importance of anthropological approaches of various kinds:

"Although the cultural dimension includes many

aspects and levels, its basic characteristic is its global perspective that makes it possible for culture to take into account the physical, psychological, anthropological, social, and philosophical aspects of human life. In this dimension, the role of the educational administrator is one of coordinating the action of the persons and groups who participate directly or indirectly in the educational process in the community".

(Sander and Wiggins 1985 p112)

Here Sander and Wiggins have captured the essence of the importance of anthropological studies. They probe into the basics of human existence and raise fundamental questions about how the human 'animal' behaves in social situations, including that of being an educational administrator. The links with phenomenology are clear when one thinks of the preoccupation of phenomenology with experiences in the 'Life-world', (Lebensfeld).

Perhaps, the emphasis is different in that the anthropologist/ethnographer focuses on the human animal in the social situation, whereas the phenomenologist gives that 'animal' extra status as a subject, a human consciousness, and tries to see the world through his eyes.

Ethnography as a Methodology.

Delamont and Atkinson, in "The two Traditions in Educational Ethnography: Sociology and Anthropology Compared"(1980), are also concerned with the way that ethnography has been taken up with so much enthusiasm in the sociology of education.

They go on to compare how ethnographic techniques have been applied in Britain and the United States under the

auspices of sociology and anthropology:

"There is an obvious and striking difference between British and American school ethnography. Whereas the American research on schools and classrooms has been conducted primarily by applied anthropologists, that in Britain has been done overwhelmingly by researchers who see themselves as sociologists. It is noticeable that several researchers now working as sociologists were trained as anthropologists, or began work in anthropology departments".

(Delamont and Atkinson 1980 p140)

After stating that they themselves fall into this category, they then interestingly point to the work of Hargreaves, "Social Relations in a Secondary School"(1967), and Lacey's, "Hightown Grammar"(1970), as being studies undertaken at Manchester in a joint department of sociology and anthropology.

In Section 3. it was considered how these works are often claimed to be the forerunners to the 'new directions' in the sociology of education, while Calhoun and Ianni, in their introduction to "The Anthropological Study of Education"(1976), include Lacey's "Hightown Grammar" in an analysis under the heading of, "The Organization of Educational Institutions".

Delamont and Atkinson, while commenting on the Manchester work, state:

"While there was a strong anthropological impetus and an ethnographic approach to this work, it is apparent that the school studies are more strongly sociological in flavour. Since these initial studies both Lacey and Hargreaves have looked increasingly to sociological paradigms such as symbolic interactionism".

(Delamont and Atkinson 1980 p140)

Yet Lacey, in his contribution to "The Anthropological Study of Education"(1976), had stated that, while progress has been made in America to link anthropology and education.

"In Britain, however, the present situation does not as yet allow the writer to talk about even 'a handful of joint appointments in education and anthropology'. To my knowledge there are none. It is still axiomatic that any young anthropologist who wishes to study education within his own culture becomes a sociologist".

(Lacey in Calhoun and Ianni (Eds) 1976 p190)

The Colonial Implications of Anthropology.

Delamont and Atkinson, drawing on a survey by Landman (1978), "Applied anthropology in postcolonial Britain: the present and the prospect," indicate that the label 'applied anthropologist', in Britain, could suffer because of colonial implications. Sol. Tax, the general editor of "The Anthropological Study of Education"(1976), agrees when, in the 'Preface', he states:

"Like most contemporary sciences, anthropology is a product of the European Tradition. Some argue that it is a product of colonialism, with one small and self-interested part of the species dominating the study of the whole".

(Sol. Tax in Calhoun and Ianni (Eds) 1976 p(V)
(Preface))

It is this kind of anthropology that Sarup is probably considering, when he talks about nineteenth century anthropology, to be contrasted with modern social anthropology, with its ethnomethodology. This will be

discussed later in the section, when Sarup's work, in anthropology, within the 'new' sociology of education, is considered.

Educational Ethnography: The Two Traditions.

Whether there are colonial links or not, Delamont and Atkinson make clear the distinction between American and British research. The American work, of an anthropological nature, tends to focus on ethnic groups. Whereas, when discussing the British scene, they say:

"Despite the very visible presence of different ethnic groups in many British schools, this has not been the subject of ethnographic school studies.... Of course, the situations differ as between the two countries. Amongst other things there exist in North America schools which are exclusively Indian, Eskimo and so on, and to that extent, perhaps, may appear to offer more "obvious" research potential".

(Delamont and Atkinson 1980 p145)

It may be the case that it is less controversial to study ethnic groups when they are within one school. There is not the problem of drawing attention to ethnic differences because the study is probably applied to the whole school population, and, even if it is not, will not be seen to be focusing on one group for racial reasons, since all the pupils belong to the same ethnic group. It would be more controversial to select an ethnic minority group out of a school population, with the problems of classification of individuals, and the drawing of attention to ethnic differences which, perhaps, authorities would wish not to be highlighted, because of a risk of racial tensions.

Later, Delamont and Atkinson point out that:

"...the North American anthropologists treat as problematic the juxtaposition and incongruence of cultures, and the school as an arena for such conflict. On the other hand, the actual process of schooling tends to be glossed over. That is, the organisation and day-to-day accomplishment of social life in the schools and classrooms remains implicit".

(Delamont and Atkinson 1980 p147)

Thus, by implication, British studies would be more important to the educational administrator, with the focus on the organisation of the school. The main point Delamont and Atkinson draw out in their paper, though, is that ethnographic approaches have been applied in the name of several theoretical approaches, including anthropology, sociology and even Marxism, as exemplified in the work of Willis, "Learning to Labour"(1977).

Ethnographic Techniques in Organisational Study.

It is perhaps, in this light, that it is legitimate to consider the papers of Van Maanen, "The Fact of Fiction in Organizational Ethnography"(1979), and Gephart, "Status Degradation and Organisational Succession. An Ethnomethodological Approach"(1978), as employing ethnographic techniques in the field of organisational study, rather than being anthropological in nature.

Van Maanen's paper focuses on American Police as an organisation. His intensive fieldwork brings out the problems of interpreting the data.

Gephart's paper, on the other hand, is based on participant observation of the change of a chairman of a student committee, with the author being the deposed chairman. In Gephart's case, it appears that the actual course of events would have occurred anyway, whether or not he had

undertaken the study, as his status as participant was not dependent on his status as an observer. Where, however, a researcher enters a situation as participant observer, this raises issues of interference in the organisation to be studied.

In a similar way, Sarup, in his anthropological chapter within "Marxism and Education"(1978), is very conscious of the importance of respecting the worthwhileness of the native's position in anthropological studies. He is dismissive of presumably traditional (colonial?) anthropological ideas, and adopts an ethnographic approach.

The Deficient/Different Syndrome in Anthropology and Education.

Sarup considers that nineteenth century anthropologists, in studying non-Western cultures, made the false assumption that the primitive adult was equivalent to the civilised child, and quotes Lévy-Bruhl on the point that the primitive mentality was 'pre-logical'. He then claims that the assumptions of 1970's educators were similar when they consider working class children:

"Just as the native is made to feel ashamed of his world and is prescribed a new way of seeing the world by the western anthropologist, so children are prescribed reified forms of knowledge which produce a view of social reality that is mechanistic and deterministic".

(Sarup 1978 p25-26)

The danger is that judgements about the nature of working class children or primitive culture are turned into evaluative statements about their worth.

However, Sarup then considers that modern anthropologists

have overcome this problem, pointing to the work of Nell Keddie, in "Tinker, Tailor, The Myth of Cultural Deprivation"(1973), where anthropological studies were used, by the 'new' sociologists of education, to criticise the idea of working class cultural deprivation.

The Problems of Researcher Influence in Ethnographic Studies.

Sarup considers that ethnographers have made the following contributions to the sociology of education:

"...first, they maintain that categories should not be imposed. An ethnographer does not attempt to impose his views and categories of experience on the phenomena he studies".

(Sarup 1978 p27)

His claim is that this is similar to the position of phenomenological sociologists:

"...who hold that one has to take the role of the actor, see the world from his standpoint".

(Sarup 1978 p27)

Indeed, Delamont and Atkinson (1980) consider the imposition of views to be a problem in some American anthropological work. They point out Vine Deloria's (1973) claim that Indians in America have been influenced by anthropologists.

Whilst it could be argued that views should not be imposed on the subjects under enquiry, there is nothing wrong with bringing outside ideas to the field of enquiry as they may provide extra enlightenment. The point is though, that one must always be aware of the fact that outside

ideas are being introduced to the culture under study. It may be useful sometimes to 'go native' and attempt to adopt the position of the individual in the culture, but there are pitfalls.

Friedrichs and Ludtke in "Participant Observation, Theory and Practice"(1975), consider both aspects:

"The problems involved in the method of participant observation can be most clearly seen when studied within the fields of cultural or social anthropology because they are much more pronounced than in sociology. A constituent property of anthropological observation is the cultural distance between the observer and the foreign culture. Its negative sides include language difficulties and endless material. Its positive quality is the discovery of social routines".

(Friedrichs and Ludtke 1975 p7)

Cognitive Action and Cultural Context.

Sarup also considers that ethnographers have contributed to the sociology of education by maintaining that thought processes are related to the cultural context in which they are developed, and, as such, can only be studied within their own particular environment. He links this to phenomenological theorizing by suggesting that actions too, are dependent on cultural context and should, therefore, be related to the phenomenological meaning of the context, while, at the same time, the cultural context should be interpreted through the same actions.

However, cognitive behaviour and resulting action cannot be regarded as synonymous. Certain thought processes, even within one individual, could lead to different courses of action at different times and in different situations for reasons, both external to the individual, such as

environmental influences, and reasons internal to the individual, such as biological changes within his or her body, for instance, ill health and lack of sleep.

Sarup's third ethnographic contribution is:

"...that people are good at doing what is important to them. They have shown us that societies vary in the kinds of tasks they pose for their members. It follows that people will be good at doing the things that are important to them and that they have occasion to do often. Thus the Kpelle in Nigeria are good at estimating rice, the Subanun of the Philippines at diagnosing diseases and the Puluwat Islanders of the Pacific at navigation".

(Sarup 1978 p28)

This is not remarkable. If a kind of cultural selection operates then those who prosper within the society will tend to be those who are good at doing the important things required by that society.

The question is, to what extent all individuals in the society are good at these tasks? It would be very easy to give the illusion that all were good to an anthropologist because the less able would be less prominent when tasks are being viewed.

Abstract Thinking and Innovative Thinking.

Sarup then discusses in some detail the work of Thomas Gladwin, "East is a Big Bird; Navigation and Logic on Puluwat Atoll"(1970). The main point of relevance in Sarup's work is that the Puluwat islanders have a complex form of navigation that enables them to navigate about the Pacific Ocean for thousands of miles:

Sarup states:

"Their navigation depends upon features of sea and sky and is founded on a system of logic so complex that westerners cannot duplicate it without the use of advanced instruments. Thus what is learnt as 'practical' on Puluwat would be categorized as highly 'theoretical', 'abstract', in one of our naval colleges".

(Sarup 1978 p28)

The point that this raises with Gladwin is that 'abstract' thinking should not be regarded as synonymous with innovative thinking. Sarup picks up this point and relates it to Western working class culture, claiming that the working classes are often perceived as incapable of abstract thought, as being restricted to a 'concrete' style of thinking. He claims further, that both Puluwat islanders and the working class often do not need to be innovative, but that they are capable of it.

He then draws parallels with the work of Robin Horton in "Knowledge and Control", that what is considered as abstract depends on the culture.

In "African Traditional Thought and Western Science", Horton considers that all people try to understand their world by constructing explanatory theories, and that there are links between the traditional African belief system he studied, and Western scientific culture. In both cultures, he claims that there is a quest to place events in a causal context, fuller than common sense can provide, presumably requiring abstract levels of thinking. He states:

"To say of the traditional African thinker that he is interested in supernatural rather than

natural causes makes little more sense, therefore, than to say of the physicist that he is interested in nuclear rather than natural causes. In fact, both are making the same use of theory to transcend the limited vision of natural causes provided by common sense".

(Horton in Young (Ed) 1971 p213)

The term 'supernatural', implies an interest in phenomena that are incapable of explanation using the postulates of natural science. A nuclear physicist, on the other hand, is interested in attempting to explain the observed 'natural' processes of nuclear physics by considering the postulates of natural science. In the one case, the thinker is stepping out of natural processes to build his theory, whereas, in the other case, the thinker remains within the confines of thinking about natural processes. So, it is incorrect to claim that both are making the same use of theory. (The term 'natural' is being used to mean any observable physical process, irrespective of whether it occurs because of the influence of man).

This does not solve the problem, though, of whether innovative thinking takes place in all societies. Horton considers that:

"...once a particular theoretical idiom has been adopted, it tends to direct peoples' attention towards certain kinds of causal linkage and away from others".

(Horton in Young (Ed) 1971 p213)

He explains how most traditional African cultures have adopted a personal idiom as the basis of their attempt to understand the world. This, he claims, leads to a predisposition:

"...towards seeing a nexus between social disturbance and individual affliction".

(Horton in Young(Ed) 1971 p213)

This is exemplified, in African societies, where disease and misfortune are seen as punishment for undermining the solidarity of the social group.

There is however, an implication, that innovative thinking is being impaired through the idea, that the development of a particular theoretical idiom, is regarded as an abstraction because it is above the level of concrete thinking. This, in Horton's view, leads to channeling along certain lines of causal linkage, so that abstract thinking stifles innovative thinking.

Abstract Thinking, Innovative Thinking and Systems Theory.

There does seem to be a link, here, with the concept, 'innovation' in systems organisational theory. Burns and Stalker, in "The Management of Innovation"(1961), contrast two types of organisation, the 'Mechanistic', suited to stable situations, and the 'Organic', suited to situations of change.

The authors claim that the mechanistic management system is characterised by individual tasks that are abstract in nature, while the innovative organic form is characterised by the 'realistic' nature of each individual task. The implication being, again, that abstract thinking is not conducive to innovative thinking. So, on this particular point, systems organisational theory is in agreement with 'new directions' sociology of education!

However, the issue of the nature of relations between abstract theory and innovation is much more complex.

Abstract thinking could enable generalisations to be made because it is possible to rise above the problems of thinking only in certain specific situations. Abstract thinking makes it possible to see patterns of behaviour which can be transposed to other situations and other times. The patterns can be compared with the other concrete situations and their abstractions.

This would provide extra insights which could lead to a new thought process of an innovative nature. There is, however, the question of the extent to which innovative thought is synonymous with inspirational thought. It could be that Horton tends to see a need for simplistic thought to provide inspiration; the idea of an uncluttered mind being free to innovate, preventing the 'causal linkage' mentioned in one of the quotations. It may come down to the ability of the individual to resist channeling, to see all the links for what they are, and to be capable of working both inside and outside the linkages. Such people would be capable of even higher levels of innovative thinking than those confined to innovative thinking from concrete situations. It appears, as Sarup suggests, that notions like 'abstract' and 'theory' are certainly problematic.

The Problems of Trying to Cross Cultural Boundaries.

Sarup has pointed out the difficulties faced by ethnographers in trying to understand other cultures, while Bourdieu, in one of his contributions to "Knowledge and Control", "Systems of Education and Systems of Thought", with an anthropological flavour, considers the dilemma of the ethnologist:

"As a social individual, the ethnologist is on terms of intimacy with his culture and

therefore finds it difficult to think objectively about the patterns governing his own thought, the more completely those patterns have been mastered and have become a part of his make-up - and therefore coextensive and consubstantial with his consciousness - the more impossible is it for him to apply conscious thought to them".

(Bourdieu in Young (Ed) 1971 p190)

Hence, the need to avoid going completely native.

Sarup considers three methods of obtaining data and their co-existing problems, derived from Charles Frake, in "The Diagnosis of Disease among the Subanun of Mindanao", in Nell Keddie (Ed), "Tinker, Tailor the Myth of Cultural Deprivation". Frake labels them, 'the analytic method', 'the perceptual method' and the 'explicit method'.

The analytic method uses entirely the Western logic coding to arrive at the data:

"Second, there is the perceptual method; this is when a disease is named by a native and the observer tries to note the physical symptoms that the native is perceiving. The difficulty with this method is that one does not know what precisely the native is perceiving, and so mistakes can be made".

(Sarup 1978 p31)

Finally, Sarup considers the explicit method, where the native is asked direct questions. The disadvantage of this method, Sarup states, is:

"...that it gives knowledge of the meaning of terms 'in principle' but not of their application in socially defined situations. In other words, knowing an abstract rule is not enough; we have to know 'the rule in use', when and how it is applied in a particular context or on a

particular occasion."

(Sarup 1978 p31)

Sarup considers that Frake's paper reminds us that children learning at school face the same difficulties as the anthropologist in trying to understand a different culture.

The Importance of Time.

One place where educational administration can learn both from anthropology and phenomenology is in the question of the importance of time, in situations.

This was dealt with partly in Section 3. where the phenomenological ideas of Schutz were considered in relation to perceptions of experience over time. Bourdieu, in his anthropological work, "Outline of a Theory of Practice"(1977), considers the question of the importance of time in gift exchange. He also states how science has been made time independent, i.e. the idea that experiments repeated under the same circumstances will produce the same results. He states, in relation to gift exchange:

"In every society it may be observed that, if it is not to constitute an insult, the counter-gift must be deferred and different".

(Bourdieu 1977 p5)

and later:

"Until he has given in return, the receiver is 'obliged', expected to show his gratitude towards his benefactor,.....lest he be accused of ingratitude and stand condemned by "what people say", which is what gives his actions their social meaning".

(Bourdieu 1977 p6)

Hence, the idea of strategy requirement in gift exchange and, indeed, other situations where time is important.

The Implications of Time for Educational Administration.

Now this could have a key implication for educational administration. The educational administrator has to work over time, within time, and does not always have the time to totalize, as Bourdieu says, "to overcome time". Hence, this could be an important indicator that educational administration cannot be treated like a natural science. 'Garbage Can' models, interestingly, stress the importance of time.

Cohen and March, in "Leadership and Ambiguity"(1986), state, in considering 'Garbage Can' processes:

"Such a view of organizational choice focuses attention on the ways in which the meaning of choice changes over time. It calls attention to the strategic effects of timing (in the introduction of choices and problems), the time pattern of available energy, and the impact of organizational structure on these".

(Cohen and March 1986 p81)

'Garbage Can' processes will be considered, in detail, in the next section, but the similarities with Bourdieu's anthropological arrival at the importance of the link between time and strategy, are clearly seen from the above citation.

This could all be linked to Schutz's statement about the philosophical importance of time, to the subject's interpretation of the life-world:

"The stratification of the world into zones of actual, restorable and obtainable reach already refers to the structure of the life-world according to dimensions of objective temporality and their subjective correlates, the phenomena of retention and protention, recall and expectancy, and to the peculiar differentiations of the experience of time which correspond to the manifold dimensions of reality".

(Schutz in Luckmann (Ed) 1978 p259)

The concepts of actual, restorable and obtainable reach were considered in Section 3. where Schutz's phenomenology was discussed.

Some Problems of Applying Ethnographic Approaches to

Organisational Study

Robert Gephart in "Status Degradation and Organisational Succession: An Ethnomethodological Approach"(1978), also draws on the phenomenological ideas of Schutz, for his analysis of the way successors are appointed in organisations. He states, for instance:

"Ethnomethodologists seek first to understand common activities of organizational participants in the language these participants use, that is, the concepts of actors in their daily lives".

(Gephart 1978 p556)

Drawing on the work of Bittner, in "The Concept of Organization"(1974), Gephart outlines an approach that stresses a phenomenological perspective, where the concept, 'organisation' is investigated mainly in terms of the meaning the work has to the individual subjects within the organisation. However, this perspective is limited

to the linguistic activities of the individuals concerned:

"Thus the organization is constituted by linguistic devices and interpretational schemes which members use to make sensible certain conduct, events, and states of affairs and to methodically locate them as falling within the purview of 'the organization'".

(Gephart 1978 p557)

This may be all that can be expected from an ethnomethodological approach. Van Maanen, in "The Fact of Fiction in Organisational Ethnography"(1979), has pointed out the way ethnographers rely, in the main, on data obtained through verbal transaction from informants.

The implication is that the researcher is usually only fortunate enough to witness a few important events and that most of his 'picture' must be built up by what he is 'told'. This leads to many problems of the reliability of informant's information. Van Maanen, in his paper, discusses both lies and evasion. Such problems must question the phenomenological status of such ethnographic work. The subjective views of the individuals, their interpretation of their life-world, can only be hinted at by the most penetrating of ethnographic studies.

However, both the works of Gephart and Van Maanen are useful examples of how ethnographic techniques can be applied to the study of organisations.

In particular, Gephart's work, which studies the succession of chairmen to a graduate students committee, places the ethnomethodological study of an organisation in an educational setting.

Concluding Comments.

Modern ethnographic techniques of anthropology have awakened many disciplines to the problem of trying to study 'alien' cultural contexts. Whether it is a tribal culture in Africa, or a working class culture within the school, the ethnographic techniques have raised many important questions about attempts to cross the cultural divide.

Fundamental issues have been raised with clear implications for educational administration, such as the nature of the link between abstract thinking and innovative thinking, and the importance of time and strategy in the social sciences.

The mechanistic view of organisation, with its stress on abstract thought, restricts thought to certain lines of progression that the abstract logic patterns demand. Under the systems perspective of organisations, where a rigid structure is perceived, although there would be a requirement for complicated administrative patterns of an abstract nature, the willingness to break into new thought patterns, which could possibly affect the existing structure, would, under this perspective, have to be restricted.

More open ambiguity models, as considered in the next section, with concepts of 'loose coupling' and the flexible treatment of problems and decisions, as the 'Garbage Can' model of Cohen, March and Olsen suggests, would be open to more innovative ideas and would be more in sympathy with Burns and Stalker's organic model.

Greenfield, with his stress on the integrity of personal feelings as subjective meaning, perceived by the subject,

and therefore valid, would be likely to be suspicious of abstract thought within educational administration, that might be interpreted as 'logical scientific thought'. However, the concept 'abstract' in terms of artistic creation in painting, would presumably find favour, as the creative interpretations of an individual artist as a subject.

The inspirational side of innovative thought would appeal to Greenfield as the individual interpreting his or her personal environment and responding creatively to it. However, any links between innovative thought and scientific thinking within educational administration would almost certainly be regarded in a negative way by Greenfield. He is hostile to the transposing of ideas from other fields, such as general organisation theory, to educational administration, and any innovational thoughts, along these lines, would not be acceptable to him. The innovation would have to be generated within educational administration, to be acceptable to Greenfield. Hence, a case can be made that Greenfield would neither wholly endorse nor reject, either of Burns and Stalker's categories of 'mechanistic' or 'organic', in terms of their links with abstract and innovative thought respectively. What would clearly be criticised, however, is the attachment of these terms to the concept, 'organisation', in other words, Burns and Stalker's idea that one can conceive of mechanistic organisations and organic organisations. Greenfield, as stated many times, rejects the reality of organisations.

When the 'Garbage Can' ambiguity model of Cohen, March and Olsen is considered in the next section, links will be illustrated between the anthropological aspects of time progression and strategy, and the 'Garbage Can' model. The implications for educational administration will be

further explored in Section 9., so these fundamental issues, raised by anthropological considerations, will be examined in detail later.

This section has also raised the problems associated with the term 'ethnography'. It would appear that it should be regarded as a methodology independent of any discipline, such as sociology, anthropology or educational administration. There is some indication that anthropologists, like Wilcox, wish to supervise the use of the methodology in other disciplines, and see a requirement for it to maintain its anthropological roots, when being applied elsewhere.

The philosophical foundations of ethnographic research do appear to come from phenomenological perspectives, and it is, perhaps, these influences that helped traditional anthropology move away from the 'superior status of the researcher' position, towards the problems of trying to study cultures, or sub-cultures, in a way that does not interfere with the culture itself.

There is an analogy in physics, when the physicist is trying to measure electric current with a meter. As soon as he places the meter in the circuit, he changes the current, as he is no longer measuring the current that was there originally. This appears to be the problem with ethnographic studies. The work of Van Maanen and Gephart has shown how difficult it is to obtain a true picture of what is going on. The mere presence of the observer can attract false information and lead to 'unnatural' behaviour.

The need to respect the integrity of the subject, in Greenfield's subjective approach, prevents even an ethnomethodological approach from being applied to

educational administration research, under his philosophical orientation.

Although Greenfield proposes individual case study as the preferred method of research, such that particular attention is paid to people's innermost feelings, it is questionable whether an ethnographic study would really reach this level.

Ethnomethodology can only observe the actions of individuals and, as such, could be used to research Weber's 'method of understanding' based on the 'action' of individuals. Greenfield's subjective level requires interpretation of these actions for the individual, including his perceptions of reality. It is not clear how participant observation could reach these perceptions without grave risk of misinterpretation.

Van Maanen has pointed out that observation of events of significance is very rare in participant observation. Much information has to be collected 'second hand' by asking individuals about past events. Even though it may be possible to get several accounts of the same events, individuals 'cloud' their recollections with their own preferences, memory abilities and the temptation to mislead the researcher for various reasons, as indicated earlier.

Even when an event is observed by a researcher, his or her own interpretation may influence his or her recorded observation. Hence the difficulty of applying ethnographic techniques to Greenfield's subjective stance. Greenfield suggests case studies, based on feelings of individuals, as the nearest practical research can come to his philosophical orientation.

Phenomenology, with its stress on the importance of the

individual, the need for the individual to construct his own reality, finds sympathy with the ethnographic approach not to interfere. The best, perhaps, the ethnographer can hope for is to be aware of all these problems when conducting his or her research; for instance, the need not to compare the individual views of those under study, the requirement to be as 'invisible' as possible, and yet, sensitive to the needs of the culture. At the same time, views that the researcher brings to the situation can help that researcher to clarify ideas in a way a native of the culture would not be able to do.

The wider experience of the researcher, in many cases, would provide extra insights, as long as he or she realises the source of these insights and adapts them to the situation. However, there is a need to be aware of the problems of misinformation and changed behaviour on the part of the individuals of the culture, and yet, at the same time, realise that even witnessed events can be open to misinterpretation, because the researcher may misjudge their significance within the context of the whole culture.

Ethnographic researchers using observation techniques within an educational organisation have to confront the problem of interpreting a culture which is basically their own. There is the danger of overlooking the significance of events which appear commonplace. Researchers may be used to similar administrative structures, within their own organisation, and may cloud their interpretation, with what they would do in similar situations.

By becoming participant observers, researchers may be able to divorce, more clearly, themselves from their own organisational experiences, by being forced to work within the structure of the organisation under observation, although they could still sub-consciously relate

observations to their own organisational experiences.

However, there is also the danger that by 'interfering with organisational procedures', by being participants, the organisation which the researchers wish, merely to study, will have changed.

Also, the pressure of being participants, especially where the workload is heavy, may interfere with their role as observers and even present problems of conflicting loyalties between their own work, within the organisation, and the responsibilities they have to the observation study programme.

Perhaps, one of the most significant contributions ethnographic studies can make to educational administration is to make researchers within educational administration aware of all these difficulties. In an ideal world, each individual administrator would need to take into account all these research problems, whenever he or she attempts to make a decision; in an attempt to analyse the motives behind the decisions and to develop self awareness of the social situation in which he or she operates. This could be linked to the phenomenological idea that each individual is a philosopher, (may be an ethnographic researcher!), trying to make sense of his or her life-world, and needs therefore, if that 'sense' is to be informed, to be aware of all the problems outlined.

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SECTION 6.

SUBJECTIVE APPROACHES AND AMBIGUITY MODELS:

THE PROBLEMS OF CLASSIFICATION AND THE

ACCOMPANYING PHILOSOPHICAL ISSUES.

In this section, an attempt will be made to consider the relationship of subjective approaches within educational administration to the, so called, ambiguity models. Ambiguity models such as the 'loose coupling' concept of Weick (1976), and the 'Garbage Can' models of Cohen, March and Olsen (1972), have been generated within educational administration. This is unusual and makes them rather unique.

At the same time, they satisfy one of Greenfield's requirements that educational administration theory should come from within educational administration. In his 'new perspective' paper, Greenfield (1975), starts off by criticising systems theory, partly because it has been introduced into education from general systems organisational theory.

Ambiguity models also share links with subjective approaches, in a departure from the structural functional approaches of systems theory, with its emphasis on order and consensus. 'Garbage Can' models focus on the concept, 'organised anarchy'; for instance, Cohen and March state

in "Leadership and Ambiguity: The American College President" (Second Edition):

"The properties of universities as organized anarchies make the garbage can ideas particularly appropriate to an understanding of organizational choice within higher education".

(Cohen and March 1986 p82)

Weick, in his 'loose coupling' paper, even indicates links with phenomenology, with an emphasis on meanings and constructing social reality:

"What kinds of information do loosely coupled systems provide members around which they can organize meanings"?

(Weick 1976 p13)

and later:

"Given the ambiguity of loosely coupled structures, this suggests that there may be increased pressure on members to construct or negotiate some kind of social reality they can live with".

(Weick 1976 p13)

However, one needs to be cautious about the links with phenomenology. The term 'organise meaning', in the first quote, and the statement, "increased pressure on members to construct or negotiate some kind of social reality", from the second, imply an imposition of meanings, almost in the Schutzian sense, as mentioned earlier, when the 'new directions' in the sociology of education were being considered. It was pointed out, in Section 3., that the imposition of meaning could be seen as a departure from a pure subjective approach, where only the individual

is responsible for constructing his social reality.

Weick's statement thus implies conflict, which, whilst not being subjective in the sense considered above, does, like the subjective approaches of Greenfield, imply a departure from the consensus of the traditional approaches of systems theory, as Greenfield considers them, where the parts of the organisation faithfully attempt to serve the whole.

Organisations and Goals.

However, there are other pointers that place ambiguity models within systems theory. 'Garbage Can' models do consider the concept, 'organisational goals'. In these models, goals are "unclear" and "diffuse", but the use of the term indicates that they presumably exist, if only the theory could be devised to detect them. Cohen and March state, for instance, under the heading "Problematic Goals":

"It is difficult to impute a set of goals to the organization that satisfies the standard consistency requirements of theories of choice. The organization appears to operate on a variety of inconsistent and ill-defined preferences".

(Cohen and March 1986 p3)

This, however, has to be contrasted with Greenfield's statement, quoted in "Theories of Educational Management"(1986), by Bush, when subjective approaches to educational management were being considered. Greenfield states:

"What is an organisation that it can have such a thing as a goal?".

(Greenfield (1973) quoted in Bush 1986 p92)

Bush claims that:

"The view that organizations have no existence independent of their members leads on naturally to the assumption that individuals, and not organizations, have objectives".

(Bush 1986 p92)

Greenfield, in his later work, "Environment as Subjective Reality"(1983), appears to accept the use of the word 'goal' in connection with the individual. The term 'goal' is rejected because of its attachment to the term 'organisation' which, under subjective approaches, can only be used in relation to the individuals that comprise the organisation.

It could be argued, that there is almost a difference of philosophy between the two approaches, (subjective and ambiguity), in relation to the concepts, 'goal' and 'organisation'. In spite of arguments that Greenfield's subjective approach is not phenomenological, in the pure sense, (as considered by Gronn (1983) and mentioned in Section 1.), his approach clearly adopts phenomenological concepts such as the ideas of subjective reality. Greenfield's 'new perspective' is often regarded as a paradigm shift, because it questions the whole idea of organisations having a material existence, except that which is perceived by individual members, and, as such, becomes part of their life-world.

On the other hand, the ambiguity models use the term 'organisation' in an unproblematic way, presumably inferring the systems concept, as Greenfield sees it, that organisations do really exist, and have goals, even if they are difficult to detect. Hence, it could be argued

that, philosophically, ambiguity models lie within the realm of systems approaches, on this particular issue of the status of the concepts, 'organisation' and 'goal'.

That ambiguity models work with the concept, 'organisation' can be seen in terms such as 'organised anarchy', and in Weick's concept, 'loose coupling':

"Using educational organizations as a case in point, it is argued that the concept of loose coupling incorporates a surprising number of disparate observations about organizations".

(Weick 1976 p1)

In this quote, it is then 'organisation' that can be loosely coupled. There is no hint that the concept, 'organisation' could be problematic.

The Use of Computers.

Another clear distinction with Greenfield is the willingness to use computers to help in theory building. Cohen and March use computer simulations to test their 'Garbage Can' process, whereas Greenfield is highly critical of the use of computers:

"...an organizational theory based upon understanding rejects the emphasis which much of contemporary social science places upon quantification, more complex mathematical models, and bigger number crunchers in the shape of better and faster computers".

(Greenfield in Hughes (Ed) 1975 p86)

Temporal Considerations.

However, while the ambiguity models adopt scientific tools

such as computers, they are in agreement with Greenfield over the question of the importance of temporal considerations.

In the last section, it was considered how the importance of time provided a link between ethnographic ideas of anthropology, and the ambiguity models within educational administration.

Cohen and March, when considering the "efficiency" of decision processes within 'Garbage Can' models, stress three time concepts, "problem activity", "problem latency", and "decision time":

"...problem activity".....(is)....."...the amount of time unresolved problems are actively attached to choice situations. Problem activity is a rough measure of potential for decision conflict in the organization. It assesses the degree of involvement of problems in choices. The second aspect is problem latency - the amount of time that problems spend activated but not linked to choices. The third aspect is decision time - the persistence of choices".

(Cohen and March 1986 p85)

Greenfield, in his 'new perspective' paper, criticises systems approaches for not considering time:

"Studies have therefore focused largely on the variety of organizational structures and their effects upon people. These structures are usually seen as invariate over time and place".

(Greenfield in Hughes (Ed) 1975 p72)

and later:

"...the aim of scientific investigation is to

understand how that glossing of reality goes on at one time and place and to compare it with what goes on in different times and places".

(Greenfield in Hughes (Ed) 1975 p83)

It is interesting that, while Greenfield is often critical of scientific approaches, he uses the term, 'scientific investigation', in the above quote, in a positive way. This is encouraging and provides a link with Bourdieu's anthropological work, in "Outline of a Theory of Practice"(1977), quoted in the last section, where it was stressed that educational administration is a social science, partly, because it is time dependent. Research experiments cannot be repeated in such a way that they become independent of time, as physics experiments can, but time can be used as a variable and make it possible to use scientific approaches, as Cohen and March do with their computer simulations. The point to appreciate is that the time variable, in physics experiments, can be reproduced because of the possibility of tight control of all the other variables. In educational administration experiments, the variable 'time', can only be used in relation to a specific situation, and is not transferable to other situations, because it is impossible to produce a controlled situation.

Thus Cohen and March's computer simulations, because they are repeatable, (within the computer), can only be approximations to real situations. However, if these allowances are made, then there is no reason why computer simulations cannot make a useful contribution. The key consideration is to be aware of the importance of time. For instance, when Cohen and March consider the idea of 'work load', it could be argued that is linked to time, in as much as load is dependent on the choices having to be made within a certain time.

Organisational Participation.

Another similarity with Greenfield's ideas is the importance of organisational participation. Greenfield criticises systems theory in this respect:

"The common view in organization studies holds that people occupy organizations in somewhat the same way as they inhabit houses. The tenants may change but, apart from wear and tear, the basic structure remains and in some way shapes the behaviour of people within".

(Greenfield in Hughes (Ed) 1975 p72)

Cohen and March consider one of the features of the 'Garbage Can' process is fluid participation, which has a considerable effect on the organisation:

"The participants in the organization vary among themselves in the amount of time and effort they devote to the organization; individual participants vary from one time to another. As a result, standard theories of power and choice seem to be inadequate; and the boundaries of the organization appear to be uncertain and changing".

(Cohen and March 1986 p3)

However, it is possible to detect a difference in philosophy in relation to the question of participants and their relations to the organisation. The quote from Cohen and March indicates that an organisation has a boundary, even if it is unclear and moving, but Greenfield, in his paper, "Environment as Subjective Reality"(1983), implies that the ideas of organisational boundaries, presumably, either with other organisations or the environment, is a fiction, like the concept, 'organisation' itself.

For instance, Greenfield states:

"Environment is simply more people grouped in more organisations".

(Greenfield 1983 p54)

implying, presumably, that there is no difference between organisation / organisation boundary and organisation / environment boundary. Earlier, Greenfield had stated:

"For the most part when people in organisations relate to the world about them, they are not dealing with a cohesive and objective force called the environment but with more people in other organisations".

(Greenfield 1983 p38)

inferring then, that in all situations, it is individuals interacting with individuals.

However, in Cohen and March's case, it appears that the boundaries between organisations are real, even if they are difficult to detect, because of the behaviour of organisational participants. Therefore, under Cohen and March's philosophy, presumably the individuals of the organisation are perceived as crossing real boundaries, as they go from working for an organisation to not working for it, or possibly, transferring effort to another organisation.

These individuals, under the subjective approach, would be merely acting out their subjective reality, and so, whilst they might perceive an organisational boundary, in fact, no natural change in their actual being has taken place, even though they may perceive their efforts as being applied in a different direction.

So, while participants may be important in both Greenfield's subjective approach, and the 'Garbage Can' models of Cohen and March, there is certainly a difference of emphasis, and, probably, an underlying difference in philosophical orientation.

The Location Of Ambiguity Models By Various Writers.

The difficulty of classifying ambiguity models is reflected in the different placings of such models by writers within educational administration and organisational theory. In the next few pages, an attempt will be made to analyse these placings.

Ambiguity Models as Systems Approaches.

Ribbins, in his article, "Organisation Theory and the Study of Educational Institutions", in "Managing Education" (1985), places loose coupling amongst systems models.

His first category is, "Consensus assumed, (Systems theory 'open' 'closed' loosely coupled)", which is to be contrasted with subjective models, and the conflict models such as Marxian Critical Theory.

In a similar way, Morgan, in "Paradigms, Metaphors, and Puzzle Solving in Organization Theory"(1980), places loose coupling within his "Functionalist paradigm" under the heading of "Social system theory" along with "cybernetic system", "population-ecology" and "organism".

However, he does imply a departure from the confines of a simplistic organism theory of organisation, (i.e. the parts serve the whole and are functional to it), and a related emphasis on the mechanistic nature of

organisations, where the organisation is seen as a machine of related parts. He states:

"These metaphors".....(including loose coupling) "create means of seeing organizations and their functioning in ways which elude the traditional mechanical and organismic metaphors.

Yet they can all be used in a functionalist manner, generating modes of theorizing based upon the assumption that the reality of organizational life rests in a network of ontologically real relationships, which are relatively ordered and cohesive. As a result, they may simply develop different approaches toward study of a common paradigm".

(Morgan 1980 p616)

It appears that, here, Morgan is stressing the idea that loose coupling should be seen in terms of a philosophy that regards what happens in organisations as real, and not simply perceived as real by the participants, a point highlighted earlier. He continues:

"The cybernetic, loosely-coupled system, and population-ecology metaphors all have their roots in the natural sciences, and all in one way or another emphasize the idea that organizations can be seen as adaptive systems".

(Morgan 1980 p616)

The cybernetic metaphor, with its emphasis on learning processes through negative feedback, can be seen as an adaptive response to the circumstances of the organisation, and possibly, the population-ecology metaphor, which Morgan says:

"...emphasizes the importance of focusing upon competition and selection in populations of organizations"

(Morgan 1980 p615)

can also be seen as adaptive with ideas of competition and selection. It is questionable whether loose coupled systems can be seen in this light. Adaptation may be easier at sub-organisational level because of the smaller size of the unit concerned. However, the loose coupling between the elements in the organisation could make it more difficult for overall larger adaptation to occur in an organisation that was regarded as loosely coupled. Weick states, for instance:

"...that a loosely coupled system may be a good system for localized adaptation. If all of the elements in a large system are loosely coupled to one another, then any one element can adjust to and modify a local unique contingency without affecting the whole system".

(Weick 1976 pp6-7)

While Morgan states:

"The metaphor of a loosely coupled system,..... specifically attempts to counter the assumptions implicit in mechanical and organismic metaphors that organizations are tidy, efficient, and well-coordinated systems".

(Morgan 1980 p615)

So, if loose coupled organisations are not well coordinated, then overall adaptation would, presumably, be more difficult. Morgan's claim that loose coupling has its roots in the natural sciences would, however, agree with the idea that organisations are real, and so cannot be placed within Greenfield's subjective approach.

Ambiguity Models and a Political Approach.

Sander and Wiggins, in "Cultural Context of Administration Theory: In Consideration of a Multidimensional Paradigm"(1985), place Weick's loose coupling concept in a potentially political framework.

To appreciate this stance it is necessary to consider, briefly, the overall multidimensional paradigm of educational administration that the authors construct. Sander and Wiggins consider four paradigms of educational administration. Firstly, administration for efficiency, which they link to the classical approaches of Fayol, Weber and Taylor. Secondly, administration for effectiveness, which they link to the work of Barnard. Thirdly, administration for responsiveness, which is considered to have the political dimension, and forms the category into which loose coupling falls, and finally, administration for relevance, which appears to contain the subjective approaches, which initially appear to be separated from the ambiguity model of loose coupling. Sander and Wiggins state:

"These four paradigms are defined using the four criteria that have historically been adapted to evaluate and guide the performance of administrative acts: efficiency, effectiveness, responsiveness, and relevance".

(Sander and Wiggins 1985 p98)

Later, the concept, 'responsiveness' is related to a political dimension. The authors state:

"The concept of responsiveness presupposes a real and true commitment to the social objectives and political demands of the community, including its educational system. The materialization of this commitment demands an even greater concrete obligation on the part of the

administration to the life of the community through a philosophy of solidarity and a participatory methodology".

(Sander and Wiggins 1985 p102)

It is this participatory methodology, through which the responsiveness is supposed to operate, that apparently enables tight coupled organisations to be uncoupled. The inference is that administrators adapting a responsive strategy are producing a loose coupled organisation. This would imply that if they adopted other less responsive strategies, the organisation would remain tightly coupled. This does not agree with the idea that loose coupled organisations are a fact. In other words, something the administrator within education has to cope with, not something he can choose to create at will. The ambiguity model ideas of ill defined goals and unclear technology would support the idea that educational administrators do not have the ability to create a tighter system if they wished to do so. Sander and Wiggins point to Weick's idea, that:

"Open systems, characterized as loosely coupled systems, in reality contain elements that range from interrelated to reasonably autonomous components".

(Sander and Wiggins 1985 p102)

The idea that educational systems may contain tightly coupled events, as well as loosely coupled events, does not imply that administrators can decide into which categories to put the events. Weick describes the problems of identifying loose coupled events:

"...if one goes into an organization and watches which parts affect which other parts, he or she will see the tightly coupled parts and the

parts that vary the most. Those parts which vary slightly, infrequently, and aperiodically will be less visible".

(Weick 1976 p9)

However, Sander and Wiggins do make it clear that the concept, 'responsiveness' has been used in different ways:

"To describe the degree of the political commitment of educational administration, some authors employ the concept of relevance instead of responsiveness. However, for the purposes of this discussion, responsiveness is conceived within a political perspective and relevance is reserved for use within a cultural perspective as will be developed in the next section".

(Sander and Wiggins 1985 pl02)

Their cultural perspective can be seen to have subjective implications in the concepts of meaning and perception, and interpretation of individuals, (subjects?), which they relate to the quality of human life.

However, when Sander and Wiggins do develop the concept, 'relevance', within their cultural perspective, there is an implication that political approaches could also be categorised within the cultural perspective.

The authors tie up a subjective approach, concerned with the individual, and a collective political approach. There are parallels here with the approach of neo-Marxists within the 'new' sociology of education, who used subjective approaches to justify a Marxist political approach, (the concern of Sections 3. and 4.). It is possible, then, that loose coupling could find its way into Sander and Wiggins'; 'subjective (cultural) approach'.

Ambiguity Models and a Subjective Approach.

Bolman and Deal, in "Modern Approaches to Understanding and Managing Organizations"(1984), place ambiguity models in their symbolic approach, which appears to resemble most closely the subjective approach of Greenfield. For instance, they consider that it is distinct from their other main approaches, the structural frame, the human resource frame and the political frame, because it does not emphasise rationality. Also, their symbolic approach has an emphasis on meaning for the individual:

"The meaning of an event is determined not simply by what happened but by the ways that humans interpret what happened".

(Bolman and Deal 1984 p150)

This statement indicates an interpretive, (subjective?) approach, and yet, in the next statement, this is clearly allied to an ambiguity model:

"Many of the most significant events and processes in organizations are substantially ambiguous or uncertain".

(Bolman and Deal 1984 p150)

The link comes through the ideas that such an approach evokes myths, rituals and ceremonies within organisations. The authors even see a connection with anthropology:

"Myths, rituals, and ceremonies are often seen as the province of theologians, anthropologists, mystics, and clergy, but those concepts are now being applied to secular organizations".

(Bolman and Deal 1984 p151)

However, it is perhaps in this respect, that the departure from Greenfield's subjective model is more clear, because Bolman and Deal imply that myths can mask the subjective reality of the individual:

"Myths keep us sane - but also dampen our curiosity, distort our images, and misdirect our attention".

(Bolman and Deal 1984 p154)

This would indicate that myths are a first step along the road to imposition of meaning. If myths "dampen our curiosity", and "misdirect our attention", then this would certainly make it easier to impose meanings on the individual, and if our images are distorted, are we not moving in the direction of false consciousness? (One uses the term without confining it to the Marxist notion of class consciousness, as discussed in Section 4.)

Greenfield emphasises the integrity of the subject, for instance, he states:

"...social reality may be construed as images in the mind of men having no necessary or inevitable forms except as man creates them and endows them with reality and authority".

(Greenfield in Hughes (Ed) 1975 p76)

This implies that each individual creates his or her own image and any distortion can only come from within the self, and cannot be imposed by an external myth, which is a social invention.

Also, in his 1979 paper, "Organization Theory as Ideology", Greenfield quotes Weber in a way that reinforces this position:

"Interpretive sociology considers the individual and his action as the basic unit, as its 'atom'.....In this approach, the individual is also the upper limit and the sole carrier of meaningful conduct".

(Weber in Greenfield 1979 p102)

The interpretation of myths that Bolman and Deal provide could be linked to Bates' consideration of myths in Critical Theory. When considering the role of myths in educational administration Bates states:

"Any adequate theory or effective practice of educational administration must necessarily, therefore, be concerned with the nature of the myths that guide the organisational life of schools and with the characteristics of interpersonal life through which such myths are perpetuated and negotiated".

(Bates 1982 p14)

There is a clear indication that myths can be controlling in the statement, "guide the organisational life of schools". So the myths that are supposed to enable individuals to cope with ambiguity can be seen, ironically, to lead to less understanding, in the subjective sense, and possibly, ultimately, to the imposition of meanings.

Philosophically, Bolman and Deal adopt a stance allied to the idea that organisations are real and so, in a sense, place subjective approaches within the philosophical camp of the ambiguity approach.

In combining subjective approaches with ambiguity models Bolman and Deal appear to have placed subjective approaches within the realm that, it has been argued previously, would normally be occupied by ambiguity and systems perspectives; the philosophical point of view that implies

that organisations are real. This can be seen in the following statement:

"The symbolic frame is most applicable in organizations with unclear goals and uncertain technologies".

(Bolman and Deal 1984 p150)

The idea again is that organisations have goals, even if they are difficult to detect. It thus appears that Bolman and Deal's symbolic frame is not really allied to Greenfield's subjective stance and it is this fact that has made it possible to include ambiguity models within such a framework.

Ambiguity Models as a Separate Category.

Bush, in "Theories of Educational Management"(1986), places ambiguity models in a separate category. This is obviously a safe response because it overcomes many of the problems discussed so far. He classifies his "models of educational management" into five categories, namely, Formal, Democratic, Political, Subjective and Ambiguity. His justification for this categorisation is the usefulness of theories within a British context.

However, when Bush criticises ambiguity models he adopts what Greenfield would probably regard as a systems perspective, because he adopts a philosophy which assumes that organisations, their boundaries and their environments, are real. For instance, Bush states:

"Ambiguity models are not suited to stable organizations or to any institutions during periods of stability.....Where institutions are able to maintain relatively impervious boundaries they can exert strong control over

their own activities and processes".

(Bush 1986 p123)

and later:

"The ambiguity perspective is relevant to those institutions which are subject to changes imposed by an increasingly turbulent environment".

(Bush 1986 p123)

These statements indicate that Bush is using the concepts, 'organisation', 'boundary', and 'environment' in an unproblematic way, irrespective of whether he is discussing conditions of relative stability, or turbulent periods. Another of his criticisms is that:

"Ambiguity models offer little practical guidance to leaders in educational institutions".

(Bush 1986 p123)

and later:

"While formal models emphasize the head's leading role in policy-making and democratic models stress the importance of team work, ambiguity models can offer nothing more tangible than unobtrusive management".

(Bush 1986 p124)

The implication being that a model of educational management should enable educational administrators to be able to change their organisation.

The fact that ambiguity models do not provide this service, could be a case for philosophically including them within subjective models. Greenfield is highly critical of ideas that organisational theory should propose the way in which

organisations can be changed.

In their "Preface to the Second Edition", of "Leadership and Ambiguity, The American College President", dated 1986, Cohen and March assess their caution over the question of the failure of their 'Garbage Can' model, to provide guidance for leaders. They imply that the requirements of diffuse unclear technology and unclear goals bring out the best in administrators, requiring them to become flexible and cunning, as they grapple with the organised anarchy. However, there is a human side to their stance:

"...we believe that effective top executives are heroic; but their heroism lies not in their ability to lead their institutions to a pre-chosen destiny, nor in their responsibility for the major successes and failures realized by their institutions, but in their willingness to try to do better in a world where neither the meaning of 'better' nor the route to its realization is clear".

(Cohen and March 1986 pXVII)
(Preface to the Second Edition)

This statement moves closer towards Greenfield's stance with an acknowledgement of the problematic nature of the word, 'better'. The evaluative nature of concepts of 'good' and 'better', linked as they are to the idea of producing the 'right' consequences, are considered by Greenfield, in his 1986 paper, "The Decline and Fall of Science in Educational Administration".

He states, when considering the "science of organisation":

"Such science takes sides in conflicts about the rightness of organizational purposes and about appropriate means for achieving them, but it denies it takes sides and claims to look dispassionately at such reality".

(Greenfield 1986 p63)

In an accompanying "Comment" article to this paper, Mark Holmes considers that Greenfield writes at the level of knowledge and theory, rather than being concerned with value judgements. In contrast, Holmes considers that there should be some concept of good values that should be encouraged in educational administration.

Yet, one of the strengths of Greenfield's stance is that it does not impose values or meaning. The imposition of meanings was considered earlier, (in Section 3.), in the development of the 'new' sociology of education and was seen as a departure from Greenfield's position. A phenomenological stance would normally respect that each individual is responsible for creating his own social reality, and, therefore, forming his own value position.

Cohen and March's implication that it is problematic to consider what might be better, and how a route to it may be achieved, does, on this point, appear to be in agreement with Greenfield's subjective approach.

This more recent writing of Cohen and March, in their preface to the second edition of "Leadership and Ambiguity", could indicate a move away from the philosophical concerns of real organisations, towards a subjective approach as they reevaluate their work. However, they do indicate that they consider their original (1974) work to be basically sound.

A Structuralist Approach to Loose Coupling.

There is an approach, however, that provides a perspective where the philosophical location of ambiguity models could be settled by an appeal to their historical foundations. William Tyler, in his paper, "Loosely Coupled Schools: a structuralist critique"(1987), is highly critical of the way Weick's concept, 'loose coupling' has been taken up by the subjective school, and implies that the concept should be seen as having emerged from a functionalist perspective. In the abstract to his paper, he states:

"The ascendant model of the school in the specialist administrative and organisational literature is the 'loosely coupled' system. There are, however, ambiguities in the way this model has been applied,.....The irony that a model which derives from biological and cybernetic thinking should become a tool of demystification of orthodox functional theory is interesting in itself and perhaps points to a major conceptual weakness in its formulation and application".

(Tyler 1987 p313)

Tyler reinforces the validity of Morgan's thinking that loose coupling can be seen as allied to a cybernetic approach, and, as such, must be seen as a development of systems theory. He is critical of the way the approach has been transferred to a conflict individualistic perspective, (subjective?), and also at attempts to assimilate both the systems and conflict paradigms, which he considers have lost the 'promise' that the loosely coupled models provide.

This structuralist approach is interesting because it draws on Bernstein's ideas of 'collective' and 'integrated' codes, and 'weak' and 'tight' boundary maintenance. Tyler

sees a link with Weick's idea of tight coupling and loose coupling.

The move from closed classrooms to open work areas he allies to the ideas of a move from loose coupling to tight coupling, by stating:

"We may, for example, readily identify the insulated units of the loosely coupled school with an institution patterned according to the principle of the 'collection code'. We may also, by corollary, equate the 'tightly coupled' informal school, with its open plan and lateral lines of communication and personalised systems of surveillance, with that of the 'integrated code'".

Tyler 1987 p320)

Within a British context, the statement conflicts with the fact that there have been more moves to open plan types of classroom structure in the primary school. Yet, it is usually the larger secondary school which is often regarded as more closely resembling the loose coupling of the ambiguity models, because its size makes it more likely to have units which are only loosely attached to each other. Bush considers, for instance:

"Teachers are expected to be responsive to the perceived needs of their pupils rather than operating under the direct supervision of hierarchical superordinates. The requirement that professionals make individual judgements, and do not necessarily act in accordance with managerial prescriptions, leads on to the view that the larger schools and colleges are correctly portrayed as anarchies".

(Bush 1986 p111)

Some answer to this comes from Tyler's distinction between tight coupling in the administrative side of schooling,

and loose coupling between it and the professional teaching work that is done in the schools. His structuralist critique does, however, imply a power base that operates through certification and financial control down to the teaching level.

Tyler's paper is interesting from the point of view that it, again, brings together educational administration and sociology of education. He states, for instance:

"A less desirable effect of the fragmentation of the field of sociology of education in recent years has been the loss of the direction of the classical concerns in the area of school organisation. On the one hand there is the literature of organisation theory which, apart from a few dissident voices (Greenfield, 1980; Bates, 1982), has remained faithful to a functionalist, organismic model of the school. On the other, the burgeoning critical literature of schooling (Apple, 1983; Giroux, 1981) has generally shown nothing but contempt for what is seen as the conservative, reifying and control - oriented tendencies of the regulative model".

(Tyler 1987 p313)

It is clear that he wishes to maintain a perspective that applies structuralist techniques while not following the limited structuralist neo-Marxist approach of the Critical Theorists. It should be realised though, that Bernstein's codes, on which he draws in this paper, appeared in "Knowledge and Control", the 'new directions' for the sociology of education, that, (as it was shown in Sections 3. and 4.), led to the development of neo-Marxist perspectives.

Tyler's structuralist approach can, perhaps, be used to remind us of the fact that loose coupling and the ambiguity model ideas can over stress the 'organised anarchy' idea of educational institutions. As Weick says:

"...despite variations in class size, format, locations, and architecture, the results are still recognized and can be labeled 'schools'. How can such loose assemblages retain sufficient similarity and permanence across time that they can be recognized, labeled, and dealt with?".

(Weick 1976 p2)

The subjective response to this would be that, although we recognise schools for what they are, this is a subjective reality, and the consensus in individual interpretations of schools may be more apparent than real. The way Tyler has been able to use the loose coupling concept for his structuralist approach must indicate, yet again, that loose coupling is philosophically distinct from a subjective approach.

The question of organisation or disorganisation within, for instance, a school, does not undermine the fact that individuals may interpret the perceived amount of organisation/disorganisation in different ways.

Concluding Comments.

The relationship between ambiguity models and the subjective approach of Greenfield, while complex, is critically important to the analysis of Greenfield's 'new perspective'.

The 'Garbage Can' model of Cohen, March and Olsen and the 'loose coupling' ideas, within educational organisations, suggested by Weick, both find affinity with Greenfield's approach in the way they question the stress on order and consensus, which is characteristic of a functional systems perspective.

However, this similarity cannot be allowed to blind researchers to the fundamental differences of philosophical orientation, between ambiguity models and the subjective approach of Greenfield.

Ambiguity models fail to treat the concept, 'organisation' as problematic. Within the models, organisations are treated as 'real', in the sense that they unquestionably exist as entities, which can react to their environments and develop their own goals and strategies.

Under the 'Garbage Can' model, these goals are presented as diffuse and difficult to detect, but the implication is that they exist, and the problem for researchers becomes the developing of techniques to detect them. Greenfield, as indicated in this section, does use the term 'goal', but only in reference to the individual subject. In other words, only a subject can have a goal. Greenfield, may acknowledge that individuals perceive organisations to exist, but the 'true' goals are those of individuals within the subjective reality of the perceived organisation.

Weick implies that loose coupling involves the meanings of individuals, in as much as individuals within an organisation, faced with loosely coupled systems, may try to evoke subjective perceptions of meaning in order to cope with the lack of order and authoritative structures, that the ambiguity model suggests. It is problematic, however, as to whether this negotiation of meanings is a conscious process. It is more likely that any such construction of subjective meanings is a sub-conscious process to cope with the demands of the loose coupling within the organisation. The individual may well perceive such negotiations as functional to the organisation, as an attempt to clarify the structure of the organisation and his or her place within it.

Weick's concept, 'loose coupling' does, however, find sympathies within educational administration. The idea that educational organisations are often loosely linked is in agreement with the idea that, in schools, teachers have much professional autonomy, much freedom to manoeuvre in their daily classroom lives and yet, at the same time, there can be tight coupling with certain aspects, such as funding and certification.

The 'Garbage Can' model of Cohen, March and Olsen also displays much that receives a sympathetic ear within educational administration especially when larger educational institutions, like secondary schools and colleges, are considered. Indeed, the model was developed within the context of American colleges, and the role the president played within each college.

The idea of diffuse goals and unclear technology resembles well the way in which such institutions operate, while the concept that problems are rarely resolved, but are circumvented in processes of 'flight' and 'oversight', so that choices are made without dealing with underlying problems, resembles well ideas of crises management, where survival is the main criterion. The 'Garbage Can' model suggests that some problems do not need to be resolved because they leave a 'choice opportunity' (a time when decisions can be made), before the moment of decision. This is when 'flight' has occurred to avoid the necessity of having to solve a 'problem'.

Under the concept, 'oversight' a choice is made before the problem has manifested itself, which, while making the decision easier for the administrator, does not necessarily mean that the problem will have no affect on the post-decision situation, as presumably, the name

'oversight' implies.

In the 'Garbage Can' model, a 'problem' is best defined as "something that prevents decisions being made!" Cohen and March explain, in "Leadership and Ambiguity: The American College President"(1986), that problems are the concerns of people who interact with the organisation. They include the distribution of money, status and tasks, and other relations between individuals, both within the groups of the organisation and with their own families.

When 'problems' are resolved then 'solutions' have been found, although these are rare events under the 'Garbage Can' model, where individual 'choices' are often made through 'flight' or 'oversight', within the terms of the model.

'Solutions' are considered to exist, but often remain unattached to the corresponding 'problems'. The 'Garbage Cans' are 'choice opportunities', where both 'problems' and 'solutions' are 'dumped', but often the 'problems' and their corresponding 'solutions', are in different 'Garbage Cans', and are 'dumped' and removed at different points of time, such that the speed of 'dumping' and removing, is considered to be an important factor.

One of the main problems with the model, is the reliance on precise meanings of words like 'choice', 'problem', 'decision', 'resolved' and 'solution'. These tend to make the model rather artificial and analytical.

From a subjective point of view, the model could be criticised because individuals may interpret these words in different ways. What is seen as a problem by one individual may not be seen in the same light by another. The precise definition of the word 'problem', in the model,

indicates a philosophical link with systems approaches, as it could be argued that 'problems' are treated as 'real', external to the individual who perceives the problem.

The 'Garbage Can' model is seen as appropriate to large educational organisations because of the property of 'organised anarchy' which Cohen, March and Olsen consider to exist within their institutions. The term 'organised anarchy', however, appears to be a contradiction. While 'anarchy' implies the break down of law and order, the term 'organisation' indicates, certainly under a systems perspective, an ordered system of parts, that serve the whole. The term 'organised anarchy', presumably, tries to reflect the loose ties that exist under conditions of ambiguity within organisations, thus providing links between 'Garbage Can' models and Weick's concept, 'loose coupling'.

However, as indicated earlier, Weick reminds us that, despite loose coupling and ambiguity, schools can still be recognised as schools. Also, the amount of organisation/disorganisation, that the ambiguity models imply, does not undermine the subjective stance, that the amount of organisation/disorganisation is a subjective reality, perceived by individuals, who may, indeed, perceive the dichotomy organisation/disorganisation in different ways, and at different levels.

The fact that ambiguity models evoke sympathies with subjective approaches, with the stress on lack of consensus and order, and yet, at the same time, display different philosophical positions over the nature of organisational concepts, like 'goals', helps to explain the difficulty of locating the relation of ambiguity models to other approaches.

As this section indicates, various writers have placed the models within systems, political, symbolic and structural perspectives, while Bush sees them as a separate category in their own right.

From the considerations of this section, it would appear that Greenfield would not see 'Garbage Can' models and loose coupling as part of his subjective approach, because they fail to treat concepts such as 'organisation', 'goal', and 'environment' as subjective realities, as indicated earlier.

Griffiths, on the other hand, has much sympathy with these models, because they help provide different ways of seeing organisations, and stress the conflict which he has experienced in his own work as an educational administrator.

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SECTION 7.

THE RELATIONSHIP OF GREENFIELD'S "NEW PERSPECTIVE"

TO THE CONCEPTS OF PARADIGM, PARADIGM SHIFT

AND PARADIGM DIVERSITY.

In this section an attempt will be made to consider Greenfield's subjective approach in relation to the word 'paradigm'.

References to paradigm shifts, paradigm diversity and multidimensional paradigms, are in evidence in the recent literature. For instance, in Boyan's "Handbook of Research on Educational Administration"(1988), Culbertson, Griffiths, Hughes, Everhart and Willower address the concept of the paradigm. It is curious, though, that none of these contributors actually refer to Greenfield's approach as a paradigm. It is possible to infer that the introduction of Greenfield's approach at the 1974 IIP Conference marked the beginning of a period of paradigm diversity, and therefore, that Greenfield's approach is a paradigm, but this does not appear to be made explicit.

Greenfield, in his 1975 paper, uses the word 'perspective' and this is the term Hughes uses to refer to Greenfield's contribution. He states:

"At the 1974 IIP, Greenfield (1975) proposed a more fundamental change of perspective that challenged the assumptions of structural-functional and natural-systems theory".

(Hughes in Boyan (Ed.) 1988 p669)

One Paradigm or Many?

In his conclusion he implies that, if there was a paradigm, it would have to be overarching for all perspectives. He states:

"It is natural and inevitable that conflicting perspectives in the discipline of educational administration, whether viewed as turmoil or as ferment, should be reflected in the sub-discipline, and nothing would be gained by seeking to impose a single methodology, theoretical framework, or ideology on the comparative study of educational administration. The variety and richness of the data available, as an international dimension is introduced into research, make it unlikely that an agreed-on orthodoxy of method or paradigm would be other than stultifying".

(Hughes in Boyan (Ed.) 1988 p671)

Willower's use, in his contributions, of the concept, 'paradigm shift' also implies that there can only be one paradigm. He is critical of the idea of paradigm shift but, it could be argued, that if there has been a paradigm shift in educational administration, then this implies that there is a paradigm that has moved to a new position, not that multi-paradigms have been produced. Willower states:

"A word that is used over and over in many of the chapters is the word paradigm; its accessory is, of course, the term paradigm shift".

(Willower in Boyan (Ed.) 1988 p743)

In spite of Willower's statement the term 'paradigm shift' does not appear frequently in the other authors' contributions to the "Handbook" that have been listed earlier. Culbertson, in his chapter does mention shifting norms:

"...scholarship has incessantly responded to the shifting norms of the diverse communities to which professors of educational administration are linked".

(Culbertson in Boyan (Ed.) 1988 p23)

Greenfield's Stance: The Problems of Paradigmatic Classification.

Griffiths in his contribution to the 'Handbook', places Greenfield in Burrell and Morgan's antiorganizational theory paradigm but it is noticeable that he does not use the word 'paradigm' when specifically referring to Greenfield.

He is also critical of Burrell and Morgan's use of the antiorganization theory paradigm because he claims that it is a stance of criticism, not of construction, in educational administration. Yet, an examination of Morgan's paper, "Paradigms, Metaphors and Puzzle Solving"(1980), indicates that it is his interpretive paradigm, and not his radical humanist paradigm, that is closer to Greenfield's stance. For instance, on his interpretive paradigm he states:

"The interpretive paradigm, on the other hand, is based upon the view that the social world has a very precarious ontological status, and that what passes as social reality does not exist in any concrete sense, but is the product of the subjective and inter-subjective experience of individuals".

(Morgan 1980 p608)

While on his radical humanist paradigm, he states:

"The radical humanist is concerned with discovering how humans can link thought and action (praxis) as a means of transcending their alienation".

(Morgan 1980 p609)

This sounds more like Critical Theory than Greenfield's subjective stance. However, Griffiths does at least indirectly link Greenfield's stance to a concept of paradigm.

This is not the case with Everhart, who suggests that there was a period of critical consciousness brought about by the work of Greenfield:

"The early 1970's, however, witnessed a departure from logical positivism and began what Gibson (1979) calls a period of "critical consciousness". The departure started with Greenfield's (1975, 1986) contention that the Theory Movement was now a Procrustean bed into which "the facts" were forced".

(Everhart in Boyan (Ed.) 1988 p709)

Kuhn's Scientific Notion of a Paradigm.

This failure to link Greenfield's approach with a paradigm would be in agreement with Kuhn's scientific notion of a paradigm. Kuhn discusses the idea, in the natural sciences, of how one paradigm after a period of crises or turmoil is replaced with another, which must, somehow, incorporate the puzzle solving abilities of the earlier paradigm. Kuhn states:

"...once it has achieved the status of paradigm, a scientific theory is declared invalid only if an alternate candidate is available to take its place....The decision to reject one paradigm is always simultaneously the decision to accept another".

(Kuhn 1962 p77)

The point is, though, that at any time there can only be one paradigm as, it could be argued, that the new paradigm displaces the old. The concept, 'paradigm diversity' in educational administration implies that there can be many competing paradigms.

This is the position advocated by Morgan with his structure of four paradigms; the Radical Humanist, the Radical Structuralist, the Interpretive and the Functionalist.

One Multi-dimensional Paradigm?

The point is, though, that such attempts to relate and interlock paradigms, as he does, could be seen simply as an attempt to produce one overarching paradigm. Morgan states:

"Each of these four paradigms - functionalist, interpretive, radical-humanist, and radical-structuralist - reflects a network of related schools of thought, differentiated in approach and perspective, but sharing common fundamental assumptions about the nature of reality that they address".

(Morgan 1980 pp607-608)

This is similar to the way Kuhn describes how, in the natural sciences, during a period of normal science, the scientist attempts to accommodate all facts into the prevailing paradigm and that, where anomalies are discovered, much effort is directed to making them fit the prevailing paradigm. It could be argued that Morgan is attempting to force the conflicting perspectives, that he interprets to be in existence, into one overarching paradigm.

Such ideas appear to be occurring, in a much more open way, in Sander and Wiggins concept of a multi-dimensional paradigm for educational administration. They, first of all, talk about four paradigms for educational administration:

"...it is possible to define four different paradigms of educational administration: (1) administration for efficiency, (2) administration for effectiveness, (3) administration for responsiveness, and (4) administration for relevance".

(Sander and Wiggins 1985 p98)

However, later, these are apparently, able to be combined into a multi-dimensional paradigm:

"However, the four paradigms are heuristic elaborations and, as such, may not exist in pure form in real life. In this perspective,

there arises a second solution that concerns itself with the conceptualization of a new paradigm through a theoretical synthesis of practice in educational administration. In fact, this integrating synthesis would constitute a global paradigm, based on the analysis of the similarities and contradictions among the four paradigms".

(Sander and Wiggins 1985 pp105-106)

So Sander and Wiggins appear to be willing to talk about individual paradigms which can be combined into an overall paradigm, with linking components. This further complicates the idea of paradigm diversity and, it could be argued, shows how educational administration is attempting to follow the natural science path of accommodating anomalous ideas into a prevailing structure. Both Morgan, and Sander and Wiggins, construct elaborate interlocking designs for their paradigms which could indicate that they are adopting mathematical scientific concepts in order to integrate their paradigms. It would appear that a scientific approach is being used to accommodate paradigms like Morgan's radical humanist, (which Griffiths relates to Greenfield), or his interpretive (which, as has been indicated earlier, could be regarded as an alternative link to Greenfield), and the administration for relevance of Sander and Wiggins which appears to represent the subjectivist, interpretive approaches that are regarded as criticising scientific methods in educational administration.

Is a Scientific Concept of Paradigm Applicable to Educational Administration?

This raises the whole question of whether a concept like paradigm, that has been developed in respect to the natural sciences, should be taken up by social scientists and applied in their fields.

Willower, in his contribution in the 'Handbook' states that:

"As is well known, the meaning of paradigm in Greek was "pattern, example, or model." However, the word has been commonly used in the social sciences to refer to a theory, as when Parsons....discussed his "four-function paradigm," or to a codified presentation of the main problems, concepts, and relationships in a given theory or area of study".

(Willower in Boyan (Ed.) 1988 p743)

Greenfield's 'new perspective' is probably not a theory as such, since it does not produce an ordered set of concepts and ideas. Neither can it be regarded as a codified presentation of problems and concepts, as, while Greenfield does consider problems with the existing concepts of the 'New Movement', and systems approaches in general, he does not present new concepts that can be integrated into relations with his area of study, which could be regarded as the subjective concerns of the human consciousness. In the last section, it was suggested that Greenfield's perspective is really a different philosophical orientation to that provided by systems theory and, in this respect, is different from many other approaches e.g. ambiguity, political and democratic, where concepts of the 'realness' of theory like goals, environments and organisations are regarded as real, even if they are difficult to understand, or predict, because of their diffuse unclear nature, as in the ambiguity stance.

Masterman's Classification of Natural Science Paradigms.

However, this concept of a philosophical orientation is covered within Kuhn's concepts of paradigm. Margaret

Masterman in her article, 'The Nature of a Paradigm' identifies twenty one different ways in which Kuhn uses the term. However, she considers that it is possible to classify them into three main groupings. First, there are the metaphysical paradigms, which she considers to be philosophical in nature. This seems to be close to what Greenfield is providing with his 'new perspective':

"Kuhn's second main sense of 'paradigm', however, which is given by another group of uses, is a sociological sense. Thus he defines 'paradigm' as a universally recognized scientific achievement".

(Masterman in Lakatos and Musgrave (Eds.) 1970 p65)

Although Masterman refers to this type as sociological paradigms, it would seem that their nature is to define an acknowledgement of new theory in the natural sciences. This would appear to be the way Morgan, and Sander and Wiggins, are applying the words in the sense that, it could be argued, their work consists of attempts at theory building with their 'models' construction of paradigms, which attempt to combine the various different theoretical and philosophical orientations within educational administration. Masterman's third type is where Kuhn uses the notion of paradigm in a very specific, almost practical way:

"Finally, Kuhn uses 'paradigm' in a more concrete way still, as an actual textbook or classic work.....as supplying tools.....as actual instrumentation.... and more psychologically, as a gestalt-figure and as an anomalous pack of cards.....I shall call paradigms of this last sort artefact paradigms or construct paradigms".

(Masterman in Lakatos and Musgrave (Eds.) 1970
p65)

Gestalt Switching.

However, this third type of paradigm, could easily be linked to Greenfield through the concept of Gestalt switching. Kuhn, himself, talks about "ways of seeing":

"...the scientist does not preserve the gestalt subject's freedom to switch back and forth between ways of seeing. Nevertheless, the switch of gestalt, particularly because it is today so familiar, is a useful elementary prototype for what occurs in full-scale paradigm shift".

(Kuhn 1962 p85)

Greenfield talks about fundamentally different ways of looking at social reality:

"The conflicting views on organizations of which I have been speaking represent vastly different ways of looking at social reality".

(Greenfield in Hughes (Ed.) 1975 p76)

Such ideas have also been used by Gronn and Griffiths when referring to the subjective/systems debate:

"In only one place does he"....(Greenfield)...."spell out his a priori sense of 'meaning', and he does so in ways strikingly reminiscent of the phrase 'ways of seeing' which has been used already in this discussion of his work".

(Gronn 1983 p21)

In relation to Griffiths, Gronn states:

"But clearly, Griffiths has moved an extraordinarily long way towards a position of self-awareness and self-reflection which is in the spirit of Greenfield's own questioning and consistent with the Gestalt-switching terminology referred to earlier (i.e. 'ways of seeing')".

(Gronn 1983 p31)

Kuhn implies that in the natural sciences Gestalt switching can only be an aid to discovery, an aid to understanding the nature of a physical, chemical or biological process because, eventually, the scientist has to decide which way of seeing is most appropriate for exploring the phenomena involved. It could be argued that with concepts like wave/particle duality the scientist is, in contemporary times, content to view light both as a wave and as a particle (two ways of seeing) but even here applicability is important. In certain situations e.g. diffraction effects, the wave model is used whereas in other situations e.g. photoelectric effect, the particle model is applied. In educational administration, though, the tendency is to use different ways of seeing simultaneously. For instance, Greenfield's subjective approach focusing, on the individual's subjective interpretation of the organisation, has to be argued, and held up, alongside approaches that view the organisation as being real, and able to operate independently of the individual members that comprise it.

Rules and Puzzle Solving Activities.

Another aspect of the concept of paradigm is its relation to so called puzzle solving activities. Kuhn considers that, when normal science within one paradigm is being undertaken, the activity is that of puzzle solving:

"Bringing a normal research problem to a conclusion is achieving the anticipated in a new way, and it requires the solution of all sorts of complex instrumental, conceptual, and mathematical puzzles".

(Kuhn 1962 p36)

and he claims that:

"A paradigm can,.....even insulate the community from those socially important problems that are not reducible to the puzzle form, because they cannot be stated in terms of the conceptual and instrumental tools the paradigm supplies".

(Kuhn 1962 p37)

Perhaps, it could be claimed that, if Greenfield's approach is a paradigm, it insulates the community, (of subjectivists), from problems associated with viewing organisations as real identities, that have a life of their own, and can react with their environment.

However, Kuhn's notion of puzzle solving also raises the question of whether there are rules to guide the activity. Puzzles, as in mathematical puzzles, jig-saw puzzles and construction puzzles, would normally be confined by some rules. In mathematical puzzles rules are often laid down when the puzzle is posed, e.g. you must make a square by only moving one match. In jig-saw puzzles the way the pieces are laid down and are able to interlock, itself, poses rules, and in construction puzzles, the physical limits of the construction toy itself, limit the way it can be solved, for example, moving a Rubik cube.

Kuhn, when considering puzzles within a paradigm, comes to the conclusion that there are no rules. Masterman has pointed out this problem in Kuhnian construction of

paradigms, in normal science. She states:

"One sign that Kuhn takes seriously the notion that normal science consists of puzzle-solving... is that he immediately, asks himself....'If there is puzzle-solving, where are the rules?'

He is then brought up short....by the fact that, three quarters of the time, there are no rules. Faced with his own inability to find any rules, Kuhn then takes two incompatible ways out. The first....is to assert tough-mindedly that there need not be any rules. The second, characteristically, is to say....that by 'rule' he did not really mean 'rule', but 'preconception', or 'established viewpoint'".

(Masterman in Lakatos and Musgrave (Eds.) 1970 p84)

The rules could be, though, simply the rules of logic. The normal puzzle solving activity of science is confined by logic. Any theory or idea can be developed to explain any phenomena as long as the presenter of that idea follows a logical path.

Paradigm as a 'Family Resemblance'.

However, Kuhn does seem to be preoccupied with the notion of rules. One way round the problem, that he considers, is to use Wittgenstein's notion of 'family resemblance'. This idea is discussed by Magee, in "The Great Philosophers"(1987), in relation to Wittgenstein's thoughts about the meaning of the word 'game'. Magee states:

"A prolonged analysis of the concept of a game.....would show, perhaps surprisingly, that there is no one thing that all games have in common by virtue of which they are games. They have certain features in common with innumerable other human activities - for instance, that they are characteristically learnt from others, and characteristically rule-governed - but of

course these features are not enough to make something a game. And that means that there is no one thing that the word 'game' stands for".

(Magee 1987 pp327-328)

Kuhn considers that, probably, paradigms also exhibit the property of having no specific thing in common. He states:

"For Wittgenstein, in short, games,...are natural families, each constituted by a network of overlapping and criss-cross resemblances....Something of the same sort may very well hold for the various research problems and techniques that arise within a single normal-scientific tradition. What these have in common is not that they satisfy some explicit or even some fully discoverable set of rules and assumptions that gives the tradition its character and its hold upon the scientific mind. Instead, they may relate by resemblance and by modeling to one or another part of the scientific corpus which the community in question already recognizes as among its established achievements."

(Kuhn 1962 pp45-46)

In other words it is more a case of looking for common characteristics within the components of a paradigm, rather than achieving specific rules.

Searle considers how Wittgenstein was aware of the problems of rules, even within the notion of a game. Searle states that:

..."his"....(Wittgenstein's)....."discussion of rules is one of his most important contributions to philosophy. His first observation is that rules do not account for every possible eventuality....There always are many gaps left open by any system of rules. He gives the example of throwing a tennis ball

when you serve. There is no rule that says how high you have to throw it. I suppose that if somebody could throw the ball five miles high, and thus delay tennis games, the authorities would have to make a new rule".

(Searle in Magee 1987 p337)

It could be argued that this implies that rules are not something that exist prior to a game, but are brought in after the game has been invented, to control the game. The rules of a game, to a certain extent, evolve with the game as it becomes more precise and are often linked with attempts to make the game fair. There may be certain ground rules that do appear at the time a game is constructed, but in the case of traditional long existing games, these may often have been simply the physical constraints of the game e.g. goal posts in football. It is when a new way of getting round the rules is discovered by a player that the rules have to be refined, but, as Searle states, pre-existing rules cannot cover every possible eventuality.

In the case of a scientific paradigm, it may be the case that the rules have to evolve with the paradigm in a similar way. The process of seeking resemblances, and using models, may be constructions devised to attempt to formulate rules within the paradigm. However, as mentioned earlier, the basic rules of logic must always apply in the natural sciences, and it could be argued, the rules being considered here are rules of a higher construction, based on logical premises of deduction and procedure.

Masterman has suggested that computer analysis may be able to throw light on these problems, if inexact matching techniques are used. She states:

"Now there are two forms of formal thinking which are relevant to the analysis of main-feature replication; both of these have emerged from the computer sciences. The first of these,....is the mathematics of classification, or of 'clumps'; i.e. the formalization of the process of finding Wittgensteinian families. The second of these,.. is the set of procedures for making a digital computer make an 'inexact match' between two formulae which are highly similar to one another, but not quite the same".

(Masterman in Lakatos and Musgrave (Eds.) 1970 pp85-86)

Applying such techniques in the social sciences would be much more problematic. It has been mentioned elsewhere, how Greenfield is highly critical of computer techniques, while Cohen and March, with their ambiguity models, are in favour of such methods.

Paradigmatic Rules within Educational Administration.

The question of whether there are rules in the paradigms of educational administration is much more problematic. It could be claimed, in Greenfield's subjective stance, that it is a rule that the subjective integrity of the individual, his interpretations of his subjective meanings through his experience, must always be preserved in any postulates that are advanced. On the other hand, when the question of intersubjectivity is considered, there are enormous problems in trying to preserve this rule and, as was considered in Section 2., phenomenologists such as Husserl and Schutz have not successfully overcome this problem. The less rigid concepts of resemblance and modelling, that Kuhn considers, may be more appropriate to the social sciences, including educational administration.

Puzzle solving within the social sciences is probably, of necessity, a looser process. The question of whether basic rules of logic must always apply in the social sciences is also debatable. The presence of value judgements and concepts of right and wrong mean that appeals to logic have to be mediated with the respect for individual rights and beliefs. Also, the presence of irrational behaviour may prevent logical deductions being made in some circumstances. For instance, within a subjective framework the individual may not interpret his experience in a rational way. The requirement that the subject's interpretation of reality must be respected, requires that subjectivists attempt to cope with the idea that such individual interpretations do not follow logical patterns.

Paradigms and Metaphors.

In organisation theory, Morgan, in "Paradigms, Metaphors and Puzzle Solving in Organisation Theory"(1980), relates puzzle solving to paradigms through the concept of 'metaphor'.

This puts an extra stage between the concept, 'paradigm' and the notion of how puzzle solving activities take place within the paradigm. Morgan states:

"Any metatheoretical paradigm or world view may include different schools of thought, which are often different ways of approaching and studying a shared reality or world view (the metaphor level....)"

(Morgan 1980 p607)

In these four interconnected paradigms, functionalist, interpretive, radical humanist and radical structuralist, there are schools of thought at what he describes as the

metaphor level. Hence, loose coupling is regarded as a school of thought, (metaphor), within the functionalist paradigm of organisation theory. The puzzle solving would occur, then, under the metaphor of loose coupling where, presumably, the concept is applied to a particular organisation. This would indicate a difference of order in organisation theory to that of natural science, where the metaphor is constructed to try to solve the problem of the phenomenon, in this case, the organisation being studied. In the natural sciences, under 'normal science' within a paradigm, it would appear that puzzle solving is an activity to try to develop the theory, (metaphor?), that can then successfully be applied to the phenomenon. This perhaps, indicates a fundamental difference between the social sciences and the natural sciences when research is being conducted. The natural scientist is much more confined by possible logical consequences, which enable him to try many differing puzzle solving techniques to see which fit the phenomena. In the social sciences, the researcher would probably make no progress at all unless, paradoxically, he brings some preconceived ideas, (metaphors), to his study.

In Greenfield's case, it could be claimed that he is bringing subjective notions, which cannot be logically proven, to organisation theory within educational administration in order to see if this provides new insights, different from those of a systems approach.

Griffiths' and Bates' Views on Metaphors.

Griffiths also considers the notion of metaphors in relation to educational administration, in his "Handbook" chapter. He mentions the work of Bates, whose Critical Theory approach is buttressed by the concept, 'metaphor'. Bates states:

"A critical analysis of the metaphors that articulate,....our beliefs and actions is, therefore, one powerful way of ensuring that we do not remain trapped within the evidently transparent prison of the fly-bottle".

(Bates 1982 p16)

This reference to the fly-bottle is linked to his earlier citation of Wittgenstein, implying that words can cloud our understanding of situations. Bates considers that:

"It was Wittgenstein (1953) who spoke of the bewitchment of our intelligence by the means of language.....The directions for escape, he insisted, were not to be found in the dictionary but in the world of real experience where the meaning of words is revealed in their use".

(Bates 1982 p14)

His call for analysis of the metaphors we use to interpret educational situations is somewhat different to what Morgan is proposing. Bates appears to imply that the metaphors we use, instead of being aids to understanding, could, in fact, cloud our interpretations, whereas Morgan appears to imply that the use of metaphors is a good thing. For instance, he states:

"Viewing organizations systematically as cybernetic systems, loosely coupled systems, ecological systems, theatres, cultures, political systems, language games, texts, accomplishments, enactments, psychic prisons, instruments of domination, schismatic systems, catastrophes, etc., it is possible to add rich and creative dimensions to organization theory".

(Morgan 1980 p615)

This quotation is cited by Griffiths in his "Handbook"

article and he appears to endorse this position, linking it to gestalt switching ideas. He states:

"At present, organizations are being viewed through many different glasses, and, as a result, new metaphors are being developed. The new metaphors, in turn, change the way people think about organizations".

(Griffiths in Boyan (Ed.) 1988 p47)

Griffiths points out how the prevailing metaphors were, initially, those of positivistic science which, in more recent times, people have reacted against. He points out that:

"The present interest in metaphors springs from a dissatisfaction with the older metaphors, the introduction of paradigms such as the interpretive and radical structuralist into organizational science, and changes in assumptions underlying functionalism, that so far has had the greatest impact on educational administration".

(Griffiths in Boyan (Ed.) 1988 p46)

However, Griffiths' attitude to metaphors reflects, in a way, it could be argued, a logical application of metaphors. The notion of seeing things through different glasses is to be used as a tool in educational administration. Morgan, with his four dimensional paradigm, incorporating various metaphors, seems even to include the concept of metaphors within a logical deductive approach to organisations.

Metaphors and Greenfield.

This does not, however, appear to be the way Greenfield understands the concept of metaphor. His argument seems to be that metaphors, being literary, are almost artistic images to aid subjective understanding, and are in opposition to scientific concepts. In "Organization Theory as Ideology"(1979), he states:

"Wittgenstein and the Bhagavad-Gita show us a vision of the world and action within it. They offer metaphors and artistic images as keys to understanding".

(Greenfield 1979 p106)

and later when referring to these images he states:

"...the symbols of nonrational discourse are not intended to be tested by methods of proof and, paradoxically, this independence of normal scientific truth-making gives them their interpretative power".

(Greenfield 1979 p106)

These various views of the concept, 'metaphors', indicate that the relation of metaphor to paradigms must be more than an interrelated part of a world view as Morgan implies. The question could be posed as to whether, within educational administration, metaphors can exist outside any world view. Could a metaphor be simply an end in itself, a similarity with something outside educational administration, without being linked to a world view, in other words, a philosophical structure implemented within educational administration? Also, does Greenfield's notion of metaphor prevent his 'new perspective' from being paradigmatic because, being non-rational, his metaphors do not link back, in the way Morgan implies,

to Greenfield's world view?

Paradigm Shifts: Internal or External Influences?

Another problem of regarding Greenfield's approach as a paradigm, in the Kuhnian sense, is the fact that Greenfield considers that educational administration theory should be developed within educational administration.

In his 'new perspective' paper, Greenfield states:

"Phenomenologically based research, on the other hand, aims at dealing with the direct experience of people in specific situations".

(Greenfield in Hughes (Ed.) 1975 p85)

There can be no transplanting of theory from other organisations to educational administration, as the systems approach has tended to adopt, through the work of Taylor, Fayol, etc.

However, when Kuhn considers paradigms, he makes it clear that often the beginning of a paradigm shift occurs when someone brings new ideas of a fresh approach to the field. When referring to Dalton's atomic theory, Kuhn states:

"What all of Dalton's accounts omit are the revolutionary effects of applying to chemistry a set of questions and concepts previously restricted to physics and meteorology. That is what Dalton did, and the result was a reorientation toward the field, a reorientation that taught chemists to ask new questions about and to draw new conclusions from old data".

(Kuhn 1962 p138)

So Dalton's breakthrough occurred not because he was a chemist, but because he was not a chemist. The chemical paradigm had shifted as a result of imports from other fields. Paradoxically, Greenfield, by introducing the philosophical concept of subjectivity into educational administration is reducing the scope of educational thinking because of the restrictions of the subjective stance. The new arrival has brought with it its own set of restrictions which, (if allowed to do so), can restrict the whole intellectual basis of the field. For instance, if organisations are not real then there is nothing to study in relation to the concept, 'organisation'. Of course, they could be studied as if they were real and still perhaps preserve the subjectivist stance, at least in part, but generally, the focus under this stance has to be the subjective consciousness of each individual who makes up the organisation, and their interpretations of any organisation that may appear to exist. For instance, Greenfield states:

"...organizations are to be understood in terms of people's beliefs about their behaviour within them. If we are to understand organizations, we must understand what people within them think of as right and proper to do".

(Greenfield in Hughes (Ed.) 1975 p83)

and later:

"It is this process, the placing of meaning upon experience, which shapes what we call our organizations and it is this process which should be the focus of the organization theorist's work".

(Greenfield in Hughes (Ed.) 1975 p96)

The question could be asked, why should the placing of meaning upon experience be the focus of work in organisational studies? System theorists and those who suggest a pragmatic approach, like Willower, do not agree. The restriction of individual paradigmatic influences, (if that is what they are), could provide a strong argument for paradigm diversity within educational administration.

Paradigms as Total World Views.

Generally, as has been considered, the applicability of Kuhn's notion of paradigm to the social sciences is a matter of some debate. Willower states:

"One usage (Kuhn, 1970.....) was to define a paradigm as a universally recognized line of scientific thought, a usage which seems to be favored in the physical and biological sciences. Another definition equates a paradigm with a total world view. This use is found most often in the social sciences, although Kuhn himself had reservations about applying the concept to the social sciences at all".

(Willower in Boyan (Ed.) 1988 p743)

The total world view, the philosophical metaphysical paradigm, that Masterman interprets from Kuhn, appears the most appropriate application to be used in the social sciences; for instance, it could be argued that, although Greenfield has proposed a total world view, the subjectivist stance, he has not provided elaborate theories. There is, though, the problem discussed earlier, of whether there can only be, at any one time, only one paradigm, one world view. This does not appear to be the case, although attempts are being made e.g. Morgan, and Sander and Wiggins to provide the overall world view. Another point, that should not be missed, is that those who have talked about paradigm shifts, are often considered

as breaking away from scientific conceptions, such as those proposed by the "New Movement", and yet, there is the irony that Kuhn's conception of paradigm, from which they have often borrowed the term, is based on concepts within natural science.

The History of Educational Administration.

One way of interpreting the history of educational administration is to say that originally, there was the paradigm of the scholar practitioners, as exemplified by Barnard, with whom Greenfield has much sympathy, because his ideas were based upon practice, which it could be claimed, is not that far away from experience, the term Greenfield prefers.

This paradigm was then in the 1950's and 1960's replaced by the scientific concepts of the "New Movement", exemplified in the work of Simon, of which Greenfield is so highly critical. It could then be argued, that, this approach is now gradually being superceded by subjective paradigms and those of Marxist Critical Theory. Willower however, does not consider that such approaches have had any real impact on educational administration:

"Because they attack a straw man, an obsolete, extremely scientific positivism, subjectivists and Marxian critical theorists in educational administration both appear to believe that a radical change, or in one of their favorite phrases, a paradigm shift, is occurring that will leave (one of?) them triumphant. Both proclaim crisis and the complete collapse of current modes of thought in educational administration. However, mere proclamation, even loud proclamation, does not make something true. In the present case, we have a clear example of wishful thinking, fed in part at

least, by mentalities given to simplistic dichotomies".

(Willower 1985a p19)

Griffiths has noted how most work in educational administration employs positivistic techniques:

"When the view of research and theory is restricted to educational administration, one finds the same kind of theory being espoused as 25 years ago. - positivism, but the research being done is now somewhat less in the positivist mode."

(Griffiths in Boyan (Ed.) 1988 p48)

Cyclical Patterns of Paradigms within Educational Administration?

The challenge, then, of the new paradigms at a practical level may not, in the long run, be successful. However, another way of considering the history of educational administration is to argue, as Culbertson does in his article in the 'Handbook', that there are cyclic patterns in the paradigms. Culbertson points out that Greenfield was not the first to propose phenomenological approaches in educational administration, that he was preceded, 95 years earlier, by Harris:

"Like Greenfield, William Harris, Superintendent of Schools in St. Louis from 1868 to 1880....argued for a phenomenological approach to inquiry. Both Harris and Greenfield stressed that physical and social phenomena differ and that human constructs are more important than sense data. In contrast to Greenfield, however, Harris, contended that a science of education and management was needed and could be achieved....The fact that both Greenfield and Harris could support similar research approaches

and yet differ in the role of science in enquiry is explained by their contrasting concepts of science, concepts linked to the respective intellectual and social contexts of their times".

(Culbertson in Boyan (Ed.) 1988 p3)

It appears then, that any cyclical nature would have to be mediated by the passage of time and the effects this has when the 'new' paradigms are proposed. It could be claimed that a similar situation occurred in physics where, initially, Newton's corpuscular theory of light was found to be inadequate to account for the fact that light travels more slowly through a denser medium, so it was replaced by wave theory, which settled these problems, only to find later, that a particle theory was required to explain the photoelectric effect. The point is, that the modern quantum theory of light incorporates ideas of waves, and is much more sophisticated than Newton's original idea. Similarly, although:

"Greenfield drew upon the long tradition of idealistic thought, as did Harris",

(Culbertson in Boyan (Ed.) 1988 p23)

as Culbertson indicates earlier, he had stated that Harris:

"...contended that many fields, including "phenomenology", would have to be used to build the needed science",

(Culbertson in Boyan (Ed.) 1988 p3)

and later that, Harris:

"...did not reject narrowly defined natural science methods in the study of objects, including the human body; rather, he assigned to speculative reason a higher role in the study

of human institutions and processes than he did to predictive science".

(Culbertson in Boyan (Ed.) 1988 p5)

In other words, Harris' stress on speculative reasoning in educational administration, it could be claimed, was elaborated by Greenfield into the subjective interpretive view of educational administration.

Philosophical and Sociological Inputs into Educational Administration.

Greenfield's elaborated view was possible for him because of the progress in subjective philosophical and sociological thinking that had arisen in the passage of nearly a century. So the cyclical concept of paradigm has to be mediated by the passage of time.

Another way of interpreting the situation would be to say that there has always been paradigm diversity and the fact that it has now surfaced as a prominent phenomenon, may just be a question of prominence in the literature. In other words, Harris' ideas were, perhaps, not as widely appreciated as Greenfield's, nor perhaps, did they receive the same publicity. As Culbertson says:

"Payne and Harris won almost reverential respect from their peers. However, their long-range influence upon the science of education and management was limited. Harris's 1898 book, Psychological Foundations of Education, a monumental intellectual achievement that brought him a Doctor of Philosophy causa honoris from the University of Jena in Germany, came at the end of an era.....Their work predated the existence of full-time professors of educational administration".

(Culbertson in Boyan (Ed.) 1988 p6)

Text Books as Historical Accounts.

An appeal to history also indicates that the replacement of one paradigm with the next, in the natural sciences, is not the smooth transition that science textbooks often project. Kuhn considers how often science textbooks are written in a way that suggests that there has been a gradual evolution of thinking in science, that has taken it from its earliest stages to where we are today. This is not a true reflection of the real situation, however, as he indicates:

"For reasons that are both obvious and highly functional, science textbooks..... refer only to that part of the work of past scientists that can easily be viewed as contributions to the statement and solution of the text's paradigm problems. Partly by selection and partly by distortion, the scientists of earlier ages are implicitly represented as having worked upon the same set of fixed problems and in accordance with the same set of fixed canons that the most recent revolution in scientific theory and method has made seem scientific".

(Kuhn 1962 p137)

Kuhn, then states:

"No wonder that textbooks and the historical tradition they imply have to be rewritten after each scientific revolution".

(Kuhn 1962 p137)

The progressive nature of science would only be preserved, under such conditions, for the new generation of scientists.

Textbook Accounts of Educational Administration.

It is difficult to imagine a textbook on educational administration showing a gradual progression from earlier stages to where we are today. It may have been possible when the "New Movement" held sway, if such ideas could be sold as the culmination of theory in educational administration. The perceived paradigm diversity of the contemporary situation, would not make such an orderly route possible.

Willower, in his "Synthesis and Projection", the last chapter in the "Handbook of Research on Educational Administration", confesses that his title is too grandiose:

"Even though the chapter's originally assigned title has been kept, the title is too pretentious for what will be presented. There will not be much synthesis, and the projections that are made emerge from a crystal ball that is as clouded as any".

(Willower in Boyan (Ed.) 1988 p729)

He also mentions the diversity of theories, ideas and methods, that are included within the pages of the 'Handbook':

"Such diversity leads to a fragmentation wherein various groups of scholars have greatly different interests and dissimilar theoretical vocabularies. Even though they are housed within programs in educational administration, they might have difficulty communicating substantively with one another".

(Willower in Boyan (Ed.) 1988 p730)

However, it could be argued, that a strength of educational administration is that it retains these diversities within

its 'textbooks' and gives a more realistic picture of the development of the field to the newcomer.

Kuhn considers that natural science textbooks do an injustice to newcomers by presenting a unified approach. He states:

"...that is not the way a science develops. Many of the puzzles of contemporary normal science did not exist until after the most recent scientific revolution. Very few of them can be traced back to the historic beginning of the science within which they now occur. Earlier generations pursued their own problems with their own instruments and their own canons of solution".

(Kuhn 1962 pp139-140)

In other words historical information is lost to produce conciseness within the text. This conciseness is, however, often regarded as one of the strengths of the natural sciences; the ability to produce a viewpoint that appears to offer explanation for all natural phenomena observed within its particular field of study. It could be claimed that the historical input of natural science texts serves only as a form of classification. The use of discoverers' names to label theories, concepts and units, has produced some requirement for a brief description of their discoveries within a historical context. In physics, it could be argued that it is quite conceivable to adopt a system where theories, units and concepts were named, say, after different kinds of food, or plants, or Greek gods. The theories would still operate as explanations of observed phenomena, but the new names would not provide any historical links.

Indicating the Reward System.

One of the functions of the historical input to the natural sciences is to provide a clear indication to newcomers of the rewards of discovering new theories, phenomena or relationships. In other words, that one's name can become attached to the discovery and can even be used for a new unit. As Kuhn indicates, there are often distortions and injustices in this process, but the possible recognition is there for the newcomer to appreciate.

Educational administration is, perhaps, too youthful to offer such incentives to newcomers. The likelihood of any theory standing the passage of time seems remote. It is true that 'Garbage Can' theory is linked with Cohen, March and Olsen and 'loose coupling' with Weick, but what status will these theories have in a hundred years time?

Greenfield's 'new perspective' is already beginning to suffer from the incorporation into overarching paradigms, discussed earlier, and it could be argued that this is occurring, perhaps, more quickly say than 'Garbage Can' theory, because it is a philosophical orientation which denounces the use of natural scientific theory within educational administration. This, of course, is another example of the prevalence of attempts to make educational administration adopt the canons of natural science; in spite of Greenfield's approach. Generally, it could be argued, that the controversial nature of much of what is proposed in educational administration makes the retention of a historical perspective within textbooks more appropriate. Providing this historical discourse, gives the newcomer a perception of the controversies and the difficulties with which the field has to grapple.

Concluding Comments.

There are, then, many difficulties in regarding Greenfield's subjective approach as a paradigm. Its lack of a clear theoretical construction makes it difficult to fit the concept of a paradigm as a theory. However, the philosophical orientation, based on the subjective interpretation of the human consciousness, does enable it to be classified as a paradigm, if a paradigm is regarded as a philosophical world view, which was one of the ways Masterman identified Kuhn's use of the concept, 'paradigm'. To see Greenfield's perspective as a competing paradigm, within a discipline of educational administration, where there is paradigm diversity, poses the problem of whether educational administration, as a social science, can accept paradigm diversity, and can be different from the natural sciences, where there is always the prevailing paradigm which only changes, in the Kuhnian sense, with scientific revolutions. Talk of paradigm shifts, however, supports the natural science view that there can only be one paradigm which, presumably, has undergone a 'shift' in orientation. Yet, as outlined in the last section, Bolman and Deal, admittedly discussing organisation theory in general, imply that it is possible to 'flip frames' to look at organisations in different ways. Hughes links their ideas of frames to competing paradigms, implying that paradigms can be used alternately, or even simultaneously, when viewing organisations. There are some links here with Griffiths' concept of viewing organisations through different glasses. These ideas, too, can be linked to Kuhn's concept of a paradigm as a Gestalt, a way of seeing. However, it could be argued that, if a paradigm is a philosophical orientation, or a total world view, then this implies commitment to a philosophical position.

Greenfield's 'new perspective', appears to fit this category with his own writing, although others, like Griffiths, have tried to link his approach to a 'way of seeing'. In other words, it appears that the term 'paradigm' can be applied in different ways and can represent different concepts in the mind of the individual. In the natural sciences, the way textbooks have presented paradigm shifts poses the problem of providing accurate historical discourse, something that educational administration may avoid, if, paradoxically, it never succeeds in reaching a prevailing paradigm stage in the natural science concept of Kuhn.

An alternative view, is to see paradigms within educational administration as almost cyclical in nature. The idea, as Culbertson indicates, that Greenfield re-discovered Harris's phenomenological perspective, must be qualified by the fact that Greenfield's views were elaborated on a more sophisticated sociological and philosophical base in accordance with development in the social sciences generally.

This is, perhaps, quite a feasible line of development for educational administration in the future. In other words, because textbooks may tend to preserve the historical development of the subject, future researchers within educational administration will 'discover' old concepts, but develop them within a future philosophical and sociological context, that will provide insights that at the moment cannot be predicted. Such thoughts would indicate that discussions over the nature of paradigmatic development within educational administration will never be resolved. Apart from the problem of deciding whether a new approach is a paradigm, or a paradigm shift, there will also be the question of whether it is really 'new'. It has been considered, in Section 3., how Greenfield's

'new perspective' was criticised over the question of 'newness' and it would seem to be that, if the cyclical concept of paradigm development prevailed, each re-discovery of concepts, from earlier times, would always be open to this challenge, and would raise the question of whether an approach, to be a paradigm, has to be completely novel. In educational administration, the way ideas are often 'borrowed' from other disciplines would probably indicate that new approaches do not need to be of this nature.

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SECTION 8.

AN ATTEMPTED ANALYSIS OF THE INLOGOV REPORT

(A REPORT PREPARED FOR STRATHCLYDE REGIONAL COUNCIL

BY THE CENTRE FOR EDUCATION MANAGEMENT AND POLICY

STUDIES: UNIVERSITY OF BIRMINGHAM) IN THE LIGHT OF

THE SUBJECTIVE/SYSTEMS AND WIDER PARADIGMATIC DEBATES.

The INLOGOV Report was a report prepared for Strathclyde Regional Council, in March 1989, under the title, "Education in the Community", by the Centre for Education Management and Policy Studies, at the Institute of Local Government Studies (INLOGOV), and the School of Education, University of Birmingham. The Report subjected the Education Department of Strathclyde Regional Council, in Scotland, to a major overall review.

In this section, an attempt will be made to analyse the INLOGOV Report from the point of view of the various theoretical, philosophical and paradigmatic debates which exist in educational administration, providing an example of the importance of these issues, in a specific administrative and managerial context.

Consultation?

The Report tends to focus on consulting and the need to seek information and ideas from administrators, teachers, lecturers, parents and the public in general. For instance, the Report states:

"The Department needs, as a whole, to learn to see the service from the point of view of the parents and the community".

(INLOGOV 1989 Para 4.8 p23)

and later:

"...are staff who serve the public directly valued within the Department? Do the staff welcome parents and members of the community?".

(INLOGOV 1989 Para. 4.10 p23)

At a first glance, this would tend to show sympathies for a subjective stance and an attempt to incorporate the views, (meanings?), of the individual into any policy or management decisions that are made. In the first citation, there is even an implication that Gestalt switching is required, with the need to view the service through the eyes of the parents and the community.

However, there is also an underlying tone in the Report that indicates that such accommodation has to operate within a systematic management structure, (systems perspective?). For example, the Report states:

"Here is a system which will allow policy and financial modelling, the key to strategic management of change. Members and officers can identify and compare the costs of different policy options and monitor their implementation."

(INLOGOV 1989 Para 4.29 pp27-28)

Management and Administration: What's the Difference?

Another problem is the distinction the Report makes between management and administration. These words are often viewed as interchangeable focusing on the ideas that in Britain the term educational management is used, while in North America, it is educational administration that is preferred. For instance, Glatter states in "Approaches to School Management":

"I want to suggest that we in Britain stumbled on the use of the term 'educational management' almost by accident, because of the growth of the subject in Britain at a time when there was increasing interest, training, and research in management in other parts of the public sector and in the private sector. What we were actually doing was no different in essence from what in America was called 'educational administration', namely research and teaching focused on the internal organization of schools and other educational institutions, drawing upon concepts and frameworks developed in a number of social science disciplines".

(Glatter in Bush et. al. 1980 pp26-27)

In referring to the works of Greenfield, Griffiths and Willower, and other North American writers, the term 'administration' is the term that is nearly always found, and is the term that has tended to be used in the earlier sections. This is probably a reflection of the existence in North America of "Professors of Educational Administration" at Universities and other academic centres.

In Britain, the term 'management' tends to be used, for example in Scotland the H.M.I. report, "Learning and Teaching in Scottish Secondary Schools: School Management" (1986), clearly uses the term management, for instance:

"The report describes the growth of current management systems in secondary schools and assesses their principal aspects and the means of support afforded to them by authorities".

(H.M.I. Report 1984 p5)

However, the INLOGOV Report is specific about the differences in the meanings of the terms, and regards this difference as central to its report. It states, for instance:

"The challenge for the Education Department is to change its emphasis from administering to managing the Service.....This is our central conclusion".

(INLOGOV Report 1989 Para 2.1 p11)

and later:

"Administrators seek to implement efficiently within a given framework of rules. Managers create the framework. The administrator responds passively and routinely to an unchanging world. The manager responds actively and innovatively to shape a changing world".

(INLOGOV Report 1989 Para 2.7 p12)

This could be contrasted sharply with Glatter's remit, which he states at the beginning of his article: "Educational 'Policy' and 'Management': One Field or Two?" in "Approaches to School Management":

"...was to defend educational management as a 'proper' subject of study within the broader field of educational administration".

(Glatter in Bush et. al. 1980 p26)

It could be argued that Glatter's remit places administration at a higher level, incorporating the ideas of management, whereas the INLOGOV Report implies that management is the superior activity.

Strategic Management.

The reasons for this distinction, between the terms being central to the INLOGOV Report, is tied up with the emphasis the report places on strategic management at the top level. When proposing a new management structure it is stated:

"The task is to develop Headquarters as a tier of strategic management and the Divisions as a tier of operational management".

(INLOGOV 1989 Para 5.94 p63)

Headquarters is to be responsible for policy planning, quality assurance and public accountability, whereas the Divisions, (the localised administrative units in Strathclyde Region), as far as education is concerned, are to be responsible for implementation plans, monitoring quality and providing support to individual institutions, such as schools and colleges.

Such ideas inevitably create a hierarchy of management tasks. When this is coupled with statements such as:

"A tier of strategic management needs to be introduced into the organisation above the administrative and the operational",

(INLOGOV 1989 Para 5.10 p43)

it could be argued that there are strong implications that administrative tasks are placed below management tasks. At one point, the report implies that it is management activity, not administrative activity, that highlights the importance of information:

"You can't manage without information, it distinguishes the manager from the administrator".

(INLOGOV 1989 Para 4.17 p24)

This is linked to the idea that the strategic management tasks of headquarters require it to become a learning department, receiving information:

"If the education department is to achieve the excellence it properly aspires to it must become a learning organisation. It must become open to and responsive to the expressed needs of the public".

(INLOGOV 1989 Para 4.16 p24)

Central then to strategic management is responsiveness. Headquarters is to respond to the needs of the community through the information it obtains as a learning department.

Responding to the Collective.

This, at first, might appear to show sympathies with the subjective approach and the emphasis on the individual. However, as the Education Department, according to INLOGOV

would only be able to respond to the collective wishes of groups of people within the community, it appears to have a more political implication.

Sander and Wiggins, as mentioned in the last section, consider "Administration for Responsiveness" as one of their paradigms of educational administration. They state:

"The concept of responsiveness presupposes a real and true commitment to the social objectives and political demands of the community, including its educational system.....The interest and concern about responsiveness, as a criterion of the political performance of administration, reveal a capacity of responding and acting based on the social and political demands of the community, including its educational system".

(Sander and Wiggins 1985 pl02)

Accountability.

They also see this as linked to accountability:

"The English term responsiveness, as it arose in the theory of contemporary administrative theory, reflects the capacity of meeting the politically expressed demands of the external community. In other words, responsiveness is the criterion of performance that measures the capacity to produce the solution or response desired by the participants of the larger community. In certain aspects, the concept of responsiveness is associated with that of social responsibility or accountability, according to which administration is obliged to answer for its own acts on the basis of the concerns and priorities of the community".

(Sander and Wiggins 1985 pl01)

The last part of this citation is very close to what INLOGOV is proposing:

"Many believe that public service management should begin by listening to the public and to their expression of needs and should conclude by returning, and negotiating, an account to the public for the quality of what has been achieved. It is such a concern for continually working with, and accounting to, the public which distinguishes the best of contemporary ideas about the pursuit of excellence in public service management in local government".

(INLOGOV 1989 Para 4.59 p36)

Loose Coupling.

This question, of being responsive to the community and accountable to it, is also linked by Sander and Wiggins to the loose coupling of Weick:

"Responsiveness manifested through participatory methodology has the potential effect of uncoupling otherwise tight organizations.... Weick, and Pfeffer and Salancik, view open systems with loose coupling as adaptive, facilitating enactment, and responsive".

(Sander and Wiggins 1985 p102)

At one point, the Report mentions coupling under the title, "Managing in a Political Context":

"...contemporary studies of 'the management of excellence' (in the private sector) define qualities from which managers in the public sector can learn a great deal. Excellent organisations are shaped byloose-tight: control values, monitor performance and devolve the day-to-day".

(INLOGOV 1989 Para 2.9 pp12-13)

This would imply that the loose coupling occurs down a line management structure with the concept of devolving the day-to-day, rather than loose coupling within the

sideways structure of organisations, which is the way it appears to be interpreted when linked to concepts of ambiguity within organisations.

INLOGOV and Ambiguity.

The INLOGOV Report, with its clear concept of promoting excellence within a management system, would not wish to be associated with ambiguity, and yet, as was considered in Section 6., Bush links loose coupling to ambiguity models. He states in his "Theories of Educational Management"(1986):

"Ambiguity models suggest that organizations are characterized by fragmentation. Institutions are broken down into groups which have internal coherence based on common values and goals. Links between the groups are more tenuous and unpredictable. Weick.....uses the term 'loose coupling' to describe relationships between subunits".

(Bush 1986 p110)

The INLOGOV Report, however, stresses common values that are to be all pervasive within the organisation, in its case, Strathclyde Regional Council, Education Department and much stress is placed in the Report on trying to 'sell the stressed values', to all levels of the administrative structure. On the question of loose coupling and responsiveness, Weick states:

"It is conceivable that loosely coupled systems preserve more diversity in responding than do tightly coupled systems, and therefore can adapt to a considerably wider range of changes in the environment than would be true for tightly coupled systems".

(Weick 1976 p7)

Now, INLOGOV stresses that Strathclyde should be responding to changes in the community, (environment?), and that its proposals for strategic management are in response to managing in a time of rapid change:

"The conditions for realising this difficult objective is for Strathclyde's Education Department to establish a new approach to the management of change: developing

*new values of public service and participation.

*a new style of management that provides both strategic leadership and responsiveness to the public locally as well as regionally.

*a modernised organisation".

(INLOGOV 1989 Para 1.31 p10)

There could be an argument that, if the region is to be adaptive and responsive, then there is a greater place for loose coupling than the Report implies. As indicated, the loose coupling occurs, perhaps, between the headquarters and the divisions, as it is the divisions that are to be responsible for routine administration, while headquarters is involved with strategic planning.

Officers Making Political Decisions?

The political implication of responsiveness, that Sander and Wiggins consider, is acknowledged by the authors to be a matter of their own definition:

"...for the purposes of this discussion, responsiveness is conceived within a political perspective",

(Sander and Wiggins 1985 p102)

but if their stance is applied to the INLOGOV Report,

then there is the implication that, in asking managers to respond to the community directly, it is asking them to make political decisions, which, it could be argued, is the function of the elected members of the education committee and not that of paid officials. If, by Education Department they include elected members, then this still does not rule out the possibility that paid officials could become involved in making political decisions. It is probably correct to conclude that reference in the Report to the 'Education Department' and 'headquarters', does infer the committee structure of the elected members to Strathclyde Regional Council, because at the end of the Report proposals are made to reform that structure:

"The organization of committees should focus the attention of members on the strategic leadership of the service as a whole: clarifying values and policy priorities for the management of the service".

(INLOGOV 1989 Para 7.3 p90)

Such proposals have brought criticisms from the Director of Education over the very issue of the fact that the Report is becoming involved in the political process. In his "Implementation Plan" (1989), he states:

"Decisions regarding the committee structure are primarily for members themselves to determine.....There may be a case for having 'strategy' and 'performance' sub-committees. This, however, is a matter for political determination".

("Implementation Plan" 1989 p22)

Political Implications of Strategic Management.

The INLOGOV Report certainly sees the process of strategic management, not simply as a management structure, but

also reaching into the political sphere, which it considers appropriate for it to comment upon.

This partly raises the question again of the difference between administration and management. It would appear that managers are required to become involved in political decision making, whereas routine administrators do not. This again, has the effect of undermining the importance of routine administration.

Clarifying Values.

Not only does the Report become involved in the political process with the recommendation for Education Committee structure reform, it also considers it acceptable to clarify the values that Strathclyde Regional council has put forward in its various reports over recent years.

If Strathclyde Regional Council has shared values, then from a subjective perspective, they are the perceived values of a perceived organisation, and will thus be based on a political consensus and cannot, therefore, be the values of individuals. This implies that a political perspective is being taken by the Report in this matter, from the point of view of a subjective approach.

The Report states:

"Our study has enabled us to distil the values which have informed a number of the interviews and papers we have read and we reflect these back to the Authority. It is, however, the Authority's responsibility to make its vision of public education clear and accountable. We shall describe Strathclyde's educational values and purposes in three categories:

*values of educational purpose.

*values of learning experience.

*values of educational management".

(INLOGOV 1989 Para 3.3 p15)

It would be interesting to speculate what subjectivists would make of this classification. Only shared values, with the political implication they have, could be classified in this way. From a subjective perspective, values, existing only in the perception of the human mind, could be open to misinterpretation in any data collecting attempts and, perhaps, not even being manifest to the subject, who may perceive his or her values in a different way to those of the observer.

Greenfield's more recent justificatory philosophical source, Hodgkinson, makes it clear that he considers that, to be moral, the choice of values must be made only by individuals:

"...all that the proponents of.....contending positions can do is to seek to persuade their audience by reason and rhetoric and all the powers at their disposal, that they have the better values. In the end the act of choice is individual; and if free and conscious, then moral".

(Hodgkinson in Greenfield 1986 p64)

Even though INLOGOV claims that it is the authority's responsibility to clarify its own values, they consider it acceptable to classify what they perceive as the values of the authority.

Organisations with Values?

At one point, the Report uses the word 'organisation' stating, directly, that it can have values. Paragraph

4.1 states:

"Strategic management in a public service organisation is about carrying its values into practice with clear objectives and priorities".

(INLOGOV 1989 Para 4.1 p22)

This statement forms the first paragraph under the heading "The Process of Strategic Management" and, presumably, is regarded as one of the key issues of strategic management. If this is the case, then there is a clear departure from subjective approaches.

Not only has Greenfield argued that organisations only exist in the minds of individuals who perceive them to exist, but also Hodgkinson has implied that it is only an individual mind that can impute value to anything.

"Life is a series of moment-fact-events to which subjectivities impute value".

(Hodgkinson 1983 p31)

This was first cited in Section 2., and indicates the political implication of the Report's assumption about values. If an organisation can have values, these so called shared values can not possibly be shared by everybody. The Report tries to sell itself by implying that if members of an organisation, (real or imaginary!), understand what the values of the organisation are this will mean that they will be fully committed to implementing them. Much stress is placed upon headquarters, where the strategic management is to take place, being a learning department, so that it is aware of what is happening in the community:

"A learning department will need to develop a new style of learning from the public as well as extending its capacity to learn from research and information".

(INLOGOV 1989 Para 4.7 p23)

This, presumably, implies that the process of strategic management is able to make so called shared values acceptable, if they are based on factual knowledge which is highly comprehensive. Much of this would probably be criticised by Greenfield because he would see it as a systems perspective, where an organisation was responding to its environment, (the community).

In his paper, "Environment as Subjective Reality"(1983), it is clear that he regards the concept, 'environment' as only existing in the minds of individuals. This is because he implies that the environment just refers to other people in other organisations. He states:

"For the most part, when people in organisations relate to the world about them they are not dealing with a cohesive and objective force called the environment but with more people in other organisations".

(Greenfield 1983 p38)

Separating Fact from Value.

However, it can also be criticised from a subjective perspective, on the grounds that it tries to separate fact from value. The factual information of the 'learning department' is to be used to add weight to the shared values that the department wishes to promote. Even if it is argued that the 'learning department' will learn values of the community, these values will inevitably be processed as facts to be weighed up and considered against the background of the existing 'shared values'.

Greenfield implies that we should be aware of what is fact and what is value, but that facts and values are intertwined. He criticises the 'scientific' approach of the "New Movement" because it tried to imply that administrators can make rational decisions, free of any moral implication. In his paper, "The Decline and Fall of Science in Educational Administration"(1986), he states:

"If nothing else, we must understand that the new science of administration".....(his subjective perspective)....."will be a science with values and of values".

(Greenfield 1986 p75)

Shared Values: A Political Perspective?

The conception of shared values implies a political perspective, because it emphasizes consensus within a group about particular values, and again, brings up the question of whether managers should be creating policy rather than implementing it. Statements such as:

"A major task for the new management of education in Strathclyde is to reaffirm and clarify its chosen values",

(INLOGOV 1989 Para 3.21 p19)

do not make it clear that the chosen values are those of the Education Committee, rather than professional administrators.

A Cybernetic Approach?

Another way in which the concept of the learning department can be interpreted is that of a cybernetic approach. The concept, 'responsiveness' could be interpreted in this way. Paragraph 4.16 states:

"If the education department is to achieve the excellence it properly aspires to it must become a learning organisation. It must become open to and responsive to the expressed needs of the public. The department will want to know how its services are received by parents and the community. It will want to review and evaluate its achievements".

(INLOGOV 1989 Para 4.16 p24)

The last part of this citation could imply feeding information into the system. Another passage could even suggest that the feedback idea is incorporated into an annual cycle. Under the title, "The Cycle of Strategic Management", the Report states:

"Whether we have been discussing learning from the public, policy planning and budgeting, staff development or performance review we have been describing a cycle in the process of strategic management. The process of clarifying purpose, elaborating guidelines, developing plans and monitoring achievement become the annual routines at the heart of strategic management".

(INLOGOV 1989 Para 4.71 p38)

Morgan, in "Paradigms, Metaphors and Puzzle Solving in Organization Theory"(1980), implies that there is a cybernetic metaphor, which he places within a functionalist paradigm. He states:

"The cybernetic metaphor encourages theorists

to view organizations as patterns of information, and focuses attention upon the way in which states of homeostatic balance can be sustained through learning processes based on negative feedback".

(Morgan 1980 p615)

There is some indication, in the INLOGOV Report, that a balance is to be achieved in the quest for excellence. The requirement to learn from the community, (or environment), to feed relevant information back, is all part of the attempt to produce excellence within the educational system.

Presumably, the learning is to be carried out in an attempt to refine the system, to achieve this excellence. If such a state could be achieved, then has the organisation of education within Strathclyde reached homeostatic balance? It could be claimed that this implies some mediocre concept and that excellence is outwith the possibilities of administrative control. The term certainly is used in a way that does not make it clear whether excellence refers to educational attainment within institutions, or excellence in the running of the administrative process.

For instance, paragraph 4.16, quoted earlier, refers to excellence of the education department at the start of the passage:

"If the education department is to achieve the excellence it properly aspires to",

(INLOGOV 1989 Para 4.16 p24)

but refers to promoting excellence of educational achievement at the end:

"A learning education service will have the confidence to involve the public in....promoting excellence of educational achievement".

(INLOGOV 1989 Para 4.16 p24)

Some clue to this is, perhaps, provided in the following paragraph:

"An Authority.....needs accurate information about what it is actually providing so that gaps can be identified in relation to need as well as information on the quality of provision".

(INLOGOV 1989 Para 4.17 p25)

The feedback into the system involves refining the system to eliminate gaps in provision, as well as the excellence of the service, where it is being provided. The concept of negative feedback could be relevant here, as the gaps, in a sense (minuses), presumably, would be filled (pluses).

The departure from the cybernetic model, perhaps, came in that striving for excellence was, may be, the feature of the system rather than excellence itself and, as such, cannot result in a homeostatic system, because striving implies attempting change.

However, if cybernetic influences can be identified it is interesting that this would, according to Morgan, imply links with a functionalist paradigm, which is often, as considered in earlier sections, tied philosophically to a systems perspective of administration.

INLOGOV and Functionalism.

There is much in the INLOGOV Report that implies functionalist systems perspectives. The concept,

'strategic management', itself, is seen as strong management. At one point, the Report states:

"These controls are powerful. The instruments of strategic management provide the only effective tools for controlling the direction of the service and ensuring its overall coherence in a time of rapid change";

(INLOGOV 1989 Para 5.12 p46)

almost an implication that the system must survive the changes occurring round about it. Also, in spite of the emphasis on participation and shared values being encouraged throughout the service, there are clear indications of line management control within the statements of the Report. For instance, paragraph 5.44 states:

"We recommend that there will be a clear line management relation between H.Q. and Divisions within the new framework. The Divisional Education Officers report to the Director of Education through the Senior Deputes. These senior officials have the authority if necessary to instruct the D.E.O.'s to take a particular course of action".

(INLOGOV 1989 Para 5.44 p52)

This line management outlines the structure of the system between headquarters, where the strategic management occurs, and the Divisions (local areas within Strathclyde Region) where the operational management and administration (using the Report's definition of the term, i.e., routine administration), takes place. INLOGOV states quite clearly, as a recommendation, that:

"...the function for the new Divisions is to concentrate upon the implementation of regional

policy, together with operational management, administration and support to areas and their institutions".

(INLOGOV 1989 Para 5.34 p50)

Again, there is an implication here that the Divisions are where 'true' administration occurs, implementing the policy which has, presumably, been created at headquarters partly by paid officials who in creating policy must be making political decisions.

This is reinforced by the line management statement that Divisional Educational Officers, (D.E.O.s), who in effect are the heads of the Divisions, are directly accountable to Senior Deputies within headquarters.

Structure: the Adaptation of a Systems Concept.

The Report is also clear that it sees the structure of the system as vitally important:

"Structures are important because they establish the principles of organisational working. This means that organisational leaders need, continually, to review the design of their organisation as they alter purpose and direction".

(INLOGOV 1989 Para 5.81 p60)

Here, the concept of structure is linked directly to organisational working, in a way that implies the systems concept of a real organisation, with clear interlocking parts, that serve the whole.

It could be argued that there are traces here of the organismic concept of organisation which Greenfield sees as the epitome of positivistic, (systems), approaches. For instance, in his 'new perspective' paper he states:

"In systems theory, the prevailing image of the organization is that of an organism. Organizations exist; they are observable entities which have a life of their own.....Following the Darwinian logic inherent in their image of the organization, systems theorists....see small, quick-witted, democratic organizations replacing the ponderous, bureaucratic forms now expiring around us".

(Greenfield in Hughes (Ed.) 1975 pp79-80)

It could almost be claimed that INLOGOV is trying to replace a bureaucratic organisation with, if not a smaller, a more cohesive structure of organisation which, through the process of strategic management, would be quick-witted with the concept of concentrating policy decisions at headquarters, while the call for the Education Department to be a learning department and responsive to the community, emphasizes the feeling in Greenfield's statement for democracy.

Staff Control.

Emphasis on control is also exemplified in the Report by its attitude to staffing. It is critical of the existing structure where administrative appointments to the Education Department are made through a personnel

department, whereas teachers and manual staff appointments are made within the Education Department, and proposes that all appointments be made within the Education Department:

"The Education Department should have the same responsibility for all its staff in the field of personnel management".

(INLOGOV 1989 Para 6.5 p77)

This is linked clearly to tighter control of staff. Paragraph 6.7 states:

"Staff would be managed closer to the point of delivery and accountability would be sharpened".

(INLOGOV 1989 Para 6.7 p77)

There is an implication that staff should settle disputes within the Department rather than through trade union activity:

"Education would negotiate more with its own staff. At the moment industrial relations are highly centralized. If personnel management responsibilities were to be delegated to education, then it should take on more responsibility for negotiating with staff, particularly at the divisional level, with the role of the Personnel Department being minimal".

(INLOGOV 1989 Para 6.6 p77)

This could be interpreted as an attempt to prevent the publication of disputes and give an appearance to outsiders of a cohesiveness, (sharing of values?), that perhaps does not exist.

Griffiths saw trade union activity as a counter balance

to systems perspectives on organisations. In "Intellectual Turmoil in Educational Administration"(1979), he states:

"Theories of organizations have been written as though there are no unions....Failure to incorporate unions into organizational theories have caused the theories to be incomplete in that a major influence on the behaviour of both managers and workers has been omitted".

(Griffiths 1979 p47)

In an attempt to reduce industrial relations activity at central level in the settling of disputes, it could be argued that the INLOGOV Report is proposing a tight systems perspective, in terms of personnel control. There is certainly a strong emphasis, in the Report, on accountability and staff appraisal:

"We recommend.....that the Authority and the Department will have to place more emphasis on quality control and assurance, inter alia, by:.....3, 'Implementing a scheme of appraisal, initially for managers within the Department, for professional officials such as advisers, educational psychologists etc., and for promoted teachers and lecturers in schools and colleges:"

(INLOGOV 1989 Para 4.69 p37)

Indications of Looser Control at the Periphery.

However, except perhaps on the question of staff appraisal within schools, such concepts of tight control and systematic approaches, while existing both within and between headquarters and the Divisions, do not appear to apply between Divisional Offices and the level of individual schools and colleges, where the emphasis is on strengthening local autonomy.

The Report may be reflecting the constraints of

contemporary government decisions about school boards, but it appears to endorse such autonomy. This is part of the Report's strategy to achieve the responsiveness it requires in its organisational structure:

"The purpose of our organisational design is to improve the responsiveness of the Service to the needs of children and adults, and parents, employers and the community".

(INLOGOV 1989 Para 5.47 p52)

and in the next paragraph it states:

"This can be achieved we recommend by creating a strong counterpoint at the periphery to the Department: by strengthening the institutions and by strengthening the capacity of an area to identify local needs".

(INLOGOV 1989 Para 5.48 p52)

This is partly to be achieved through Community Forums, which are to have a grant giving capacity:

"We recommend that the Community Forums have a grant giving capacity which can enfranchise users of education in order to encourage greater responsiveness of service providers to the needs of the community".

(INLOGOV 1989 Para 5.71 p57)

Such ideas introduce possibilities for political influence at the local level to individual institutions, but by operating as a social collective of individuals would not imply an individual subjectivist input.

More Indications of Varied Coupling.

The proposal of strengthening the periphery could be analysed from the point of view of organisational coupling. It appears that tight coupling is to operate between headquarters and the Divisions but looser coupling is to operate between the Divisions and the individual schools and colleges. Yet, there is a contradiction here, because, while the hierarchy between headquarters and the Divisions suggests tight coupling the type of managerial responsibility within the Divisions suggests loose coupling.

Could this be an indication that an ambiguity model is appropriate? It was suggested earlier in this section how Weick considered that loose coupling was linked to responsiveness and adaptation to change, a central feature of the INLOGOV Report, but do the Report's attempts to be responsive to changed needs and requirements imply that the model they have constructed, of strategic management and operational management, shows ambiguity over the exact functions and links between the different stages? The concept of coupling could be used to interpret this as being the case, as indicated above.

If there is ambiguity, can this be linked to a subjective approach? Bolman and Deal linked ambiguity models within their symbolic approach, as considered in Section 6. In that section, it was considered that Bolman and Deal's symbolic approach most closely resembled the approach

of Greenfield, because it did not emphasise rationality, and because it had an emphasis on meaning for the individual.

The link between subjective and ambiguity models for Bolman and Deal came through the idea that such approaches involved myths, rituals and ceremonies. However, it was considered earlier how such concepts could mask 'true' subjective meaning, or impose meanings on the individual; a departure from Greenfield's position. INLOGOV may suggest ambiguity over the exact functions and links between different stages of the system but, if this is to be related to subjective approaches, it would be necessary to establish that myths or rituals are involved. The question could be posed as to whether the concept of responsiveness to changed needs and requirements could be linked to the myth of change for change's sake, in other words the myth that change must be good.

However, it would appear that to imply that INLOGOV has subjective sympathies, because it displays some signs of ambiguity, is to endorse a tenuous connection. Many other commentators within educational administration, as indicated in Section 6., do not link subjective approaches with ambiguity models.

Concluding Comments.

The problem of trying to analyse the INLOGOV Report from a theoretical point of view is that it sends out so many conflicting signals. It is possible to find passages that indicate a sympathy with a subjective approach, with suggestions of seeing things from other people's point of view, (Gestalt switching?), and endorsing a participatory theme where the views of the community, (their meanings?), are to be absorbed into the decision

making structure.

The Report places high emphasis on the need for structure, (systems perspective?), and the concept of strategic management operates through a structure that clearly exists between the headquarters, where the strategic management is to take place, and the Divisions, where operational management occurs. The linking of operational management with routine administration also poses the problem of the meanings of the words 'administration' and 'management'. The Report appears to define these words purely for its own ends to help it justify the importance of strategic management. However, the emphasis on the involvement of strategic management with policy decisions raises the question of the political nature of such management, and whether paid officials are being asked to make political decisions. When this is linked to the stress on responsiveness, in the Report, then there is a strong indication that a political perspective is being proposed, within the terms of Sander and Wiggins' classification.

The fact that Sander and Wiggins see responsiveness, tied to a participatory methodology, as able to uncouple tight organisations, is relevant to the INLOGOV Report because, as indicated earlier, evidence can be found of loose coupling between the Divisions and individual institutions, (schools and colleges), and there is evidence of loose coupling between headquarters and the Divisions, over the management tasks involved and yet, tight coupling, (line management), in terms of the hierarchical structure of responsibility. As implied earlier, this could be cited as an indication of ambiguity.

There are indications too of a cybernetic metaphor being

applied, under Morgan's classification, with the striving for excellence through the feedback of information into the system, and the concept of the Education Department being a 'learning department'.

Sympathies with subjective approaches could at first sight appear to be evident with the stress the Report places on values. Closer examination, however, reveals that these values are not the individual values of subjects, but collective values which are, in effect, to be imposed on the departmental staff, although this is disguised through the concept that, if staff understand the values, they will be more likely to accept them.

Shared values inevitably imply more indications of a political perspective, as shared values must be agreed within a group of individuals, and the Report itself considers it acceptable to synthesize the values of the Education Department, from the reports that the Department has produced.

Greenfield would criticise the INLOGOV Report, immediately, on the grounds that it uses the concept, 'organisation' unproblematically, as if organisations are real entities, with a life of their own, and can react to other real organisations, (the environment), around them. There are even indications that organisations are viewed as interlocking parts, that serve the whole, the organismic approach, that Greenfield's critics see as extreme scientism, and not characteristic of a more open systems approach. For instance, Willower attacks Greenfield for his extreme scientism, as indicated in earlier sections.

The need to adapt to change, that the Report proposes, would be criticized by Greenfield, as quick-witted organisations adapting to their environments, in order

to survive and prosper.

As indicated in earlier sections, Greenfield's stance is in many ways unique, because it proposes a different philosophical orientation to the study of organisations, through the concept that all organisational activity must be seen as human constructs, through the eyes of the individual subject. While there may be many conflicting signals sent out by the INLOGOV Report in terms of theoretical approaches to educational administration/management, the underlying philosophy would probably be seen by Greenfield as positivistic and functionalist, and not part of his subjective orientation. It is only Greenfield's approach that stresses the subjective reality of organisations. All other perspectives, including ambiguity models, treat the concept, 'organisations' as real and unproblematic, as indicated in earlier sections.

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SECTION 9.

INTERSUBJECTIVITY, CULTURE, CHAOS AND THE

IRREVERSIBILITY OF TIME: THE WAY AHEAD?

In the preceding sections it has become clear that Greenfield's subjective approach provides new insights into educational administration. For instance, the emphasis on the individual and the attempt to see educational organisations through his meanings and interpretations, brings into focus the problem of the objective reality of organisations.

Yet, at the same time, these new insights are provided at a cost. For instance, his view that organisations can only be studied through the eyes of the individual, the meanings and interpretations he brings to the situation, makes it difficult to carry out studies on individual educational organisations. The emphasis on the subject leads Greenfield, as indicated in earlier sections, to propose ethnographic individual case studies as the direction for research in educational administration, with a criticism of systems approaches, with their emphasis on statistical analysis and computer aided research.

Attempts to bridge the gap between systems approaches and subjective approaches provide difficult challenges in educational administration. The same problem, however,

appears within the justificatory philosophical sources upon which Greenfield draws.

It has been indicated earlier, (Sections 1. and 2.), that Greenfield draws on Weber's 'verstehen' approach, based on the 'method of understanding', which Greenfield originally interpreted as phenomenological, rather than the work of Schutz, who, although regarded as a phenomenologist, attempts to tackle the concept, 'intersubjectivity'.

In "Alfred Schutz: An Intellectual Biography"(1983), Wagner describes how Schutz criticised and elaborated on Husserl's attempts to tackle the problem of intersubjectivity. Wagner states that:

"...he"....(Schutz)....."drew up 'a partial catalogue of the main difficulties.' (1) In transcendental reduction, 'no transcendental community, no transcendental We, is ever established.' Each transcendental ego does constitute the world and all other subjects, but 'just for himself.' (2) The formulation, 'a plurality of transcendental egos', must be put in doubt. The transcendental ego is 'conceivable only in the singular.' The assertion of a transcendental community is problematic.....(3) The 'constitution of transcendental intersubjectivity' is performed by 'I, the meditating philosopher' who, after the transcendental reduction, exists in 'a unique philosophical solitude' yet is also said to perform the transcendental epoché in community with others. How could that be possible?"

(Wagner 1983 p319-320)

Schutz appears to try to approach the problem of intersubjectivity through the concept of the 'life-world'. Wagner states that Schutz considered:

"...that the life-world is 'the basis of meaning of transcendental phenomenology,' while the latter, after having itself cut off from this basis by way of phenomenological reduction, constitutes the 'world' and with it intersubjectivity".

(Wagner 1983 p314)

The philosophical problem is that an individual can only perceive other individuals as similar to himself or herself in terms of being conscious individuals, but can in no way enter these other consciousnesses. The existentialist concept of 'being-in-the-world' tries to overcome this problem by immersing these individual subjective consciousnesses in a shared life-world, presumably in the world of shared experiences.

It has been indicated earlier, (Sections 1. and 2.), that Greenfield does at times move towards an existentialist position, but with his later use of Hodgkinson as indicated in Section 2., he never really appears to fully endorse an existentialist position, perhaps because it represents a departure from the integrity of the subject and his own individual meanings that he brings to a situation.

Culture.

It is possible that the philosophical problems of intersubjectivity in educational administration could be side-stepped through the concept, 'culture'; the idea that, although individual consciousnesses are unique and incapable of combination, they can share something called 'a culture'.

However, this term is also difficult to define. In "Cultural Analysis"(1984), Wuthnow, Davison Hunter, Bergesen and Kurzweil state:

"...culture may be provisionally defined as the symbolic - expressive aspect of human behavior. This definition is sufficiently broad to take account of the verbal utterances, gestures, ceremonial behavior, ideologies, religions, and philosophical systems that are generally associated with the term culture".

(Wuthnow et. al. 1984 p3)

However, the authors of "Cultural Analysis" imply that the analysis of the term has been hindered by seeing it in too much of a subjective way. They consider that:

"...cultural analysis has been inhibited...by... assumptions about the nature of culture itself. These assumptions have relegated culture to the realm of subjective thoughts and feelings held by individuals and have attempted to explain them away rather than identify systematic patterns among the elements of culture itself".

(Wuthnow et. al. 1984 p7)

Such assumptions about the nature of culture clearly do not help culture to be used, as a tool, to bridge the intersubjective gap. However, much later in their final section, they state:

"The advantages of incorporating subjectivity in cultural analysis are not insignificant...Cultural reality, in as much as it is a human phenomenon, is necessarily rooted at some level in human subjectivity. And while culture is clearly analytically distinct from human subjectivity, it profoundly and continuously affects human consciousness".

(Wuthnow et. al. 1984 p242)

The problem, however, as seen with Greenfield's subjective approach, lies in the difficulties of reconciling and accommodating many individual subjective meanings. Wuthnow

et. al. state:

"...a variety of unresolved problems plague the task of incorporating subjectivity into cultural analysis; problems that translate into unqualified disadvantages. Empirically, this general approach argues that access must be gained to the inner ruminations of the actor to determine the subjective intentions in a social situation. These must be reconstructed for each unique social situation in which the actor is involved."

(Wuthnow et. al. 1984 p243)

Culture: Subjective Thoughts and Objective Social Action.

Williams sees two approaches to the study of culture which have failed adequately to address each other's problems. One is a subjective approach which he describes thus:

"Dilthey defined method through the difficult concept of 'verstehen' - a 'sympathetic understanding' or 'intuitive grasp' of human social and cultural forms.....This emphasis passed into the work of Max Weber and thus into one tendency in modern sociology".

(Williams 1981 p15)

Clearly, there is a link here to Greenfield, through the 'method of understanding', 'verstehen', which, through Weber, has formed one of Greenfield's main concepts.

The other approach Williams sees as the concentration on cultural facts through the observation of cultural institutions; in other words, a more objective approach. This forms the other contribution to modern sociology when he states:

"...different ideas were also contributing to

the formation of modern sociology. These stressed the discovery, by the different method of objective observation and recording (often by analogy with the natural sciences), of the laws of social organization".

(Williams 1981 pp15-16)

Like the authors of "Cultural Analysis", Williams sees problems in trying to incorporate 'verstehen', (a subjective approach) into a study of culture. He considers that:

"The method of 'verstehen' could be quite insufficiently explanatory, or could fall back for explanation on a (theoretically circular) 'informing spirit'",

(Williams 1981 p16)

but sees problems too with the 'scientific' method:

"The method of objective observation, while accumulating indispensable empirical data, was often insufficiently conscious of the nature of some of the less tangible cultural processes, of these as elements of history and, crucially, of the effects on observation of the specific social and cultural situation of the observer".

(Williams 1981 p16)

The effects of observers on studies have been considered earlier in the ethnographic and anthropological section, while the 'less tangible cultural process' could link back to the debate that subjective ethnographic techniques provide richness at the expense of systematic rigour.

Hence, according to Williams, culture analysis divides into the subjective/objective dichotomy in much the same way as the subjective/systems debate within educational administration. He states, for instance:

"The study of cultural forms and works continued, by an obvious affinity, to be practised by exponents of 'verstehen'. Elsewhere, within mainstream sociology, the cultural facts which were most amenable to observational analysis were primarily institutions and the cultural 'products' of institutions".

(Williams 1981 p16)

Wuthnow et. al. consider that there may be much to be said for ignoring the subjective implications of culture and focusing on observable manifestations of culture.

They state that:

"While there are certain benefits gained by including the subjective dimension in cultural analysis, much appears to be gained by excluding it from explicit consideration in analysis as well. The primary benefit as far as scientific advancement is concerned is that the elementary units of culture become, by definition, strictly observable".

(Wuthnow et. al. 1984 p246)

So presumably, by focusing on the observable aspects of culture, the ceremonial behaviours, ideologies, religions and philosophical systems in their original definition, (in the first citation by Wuthnow et. al. in this section), scientific advancement becomes possible.

However, it seems that as soon as one does this, one loses any linking concepts that culture may be able to provide between the subjective realm and the objective realm.

Like Williams, it is the relating of culture to the social structure that is seen by the authors of "Cultural Analysis", as the traditional approach to culture through

traditional sociology. They state:

"...cultural analysts have long operated within the framework of a perspective which has sought scientific explanations for cultural phenomena in different configurations of social interaction - the social structure. Indeed the dominant tendency has been to reduce culture - its causes, its form and quality - to social structural considerations".

(Wuthnow et. al. 1984 p247)

Communication and Human Behaviour.

In his work "Culture and Society 1780-1950", (1961), Williams sees a link between communication and the 'experience of men', which could be interpreted in a subjective way to imply subjective experience. If this is the case, then Williams appears to suggest that subjective experience is a necessary pre-condition for communication, which, for changing cultures, can effect 'aspects of activity' which, presumably, forms part of the objective domain visible through direct observation. He states:

"The minds of men are shaped by their whole experience, and the most skilful transmission of material which this experience does not confirm will fail to communicate. Communication is not only transmission; it is also reception and response. In a transitional culture it will be possible for skilful transmission to affect aspects of activity and belief, sometimes decisively. But, confusedly, the whole sum of experience will reassert itself, and inhabit its own world".

(Williams 1961 p301)

The last sentence of the above quotation implies the strength of subjective experience to withstand cultural

transmission.

Wuthnow et. al. also suggest that communication could provide the required link between the subjective and the objective realm. They consider that it is possible:

"...to define communication as an analytic aspect of human behavior from the standpoint of the observer; hence, behavior can be regarded as having expressive qualities whether its intended purpose is primarily communication or not. In these terms cultural analysis becomes the examination of the symbolic - expressive aspect of behavior, whether that behavior is oriented primarily toward the discussion of values or the rational - purposive manipulation of the material world".

(Wuthnow et. al. 1984 p255)

By linking behaviour, something that can be observed for individual subjects, to communication, which has links to the social structure through the system of communication, with the accompanying rituals, ceremonies and practices in the observable objective world, a useful definition for cultural analysis has been provided. However, it is still questionable as to whether the gap between subjective and objective has really been bridged. Behaviour tends to be seen in terms of actions, in as much as both are observable for the individual human subject. Greenfield's approach, however, goes beyond this to the unobservable meanings that the actor brings to a situation. So while defining culture as the 'symbolic - expressive' aspect of human behaviour, (in order to see possible links with the results of the collective behaviour of individual subjects on the social world,) may have bridged the gap at the level of individual actions/consequences for society, it may still leave the problem of intersubjectivity at the level of how the meanings of individual consciousnesses can link with their

resulting social behaviour, (which can be observed.) Whilst in the transcendental phenomenological sense each subject may be an island of common thoughts isolated from all others, as soon as he starts to act on those thoughts he may take into account the action and behaviour of others.

The problem is still to relate the cultural aspects of thought patterns to the cultural aspects of behaviour, with the added problem of whether there is a common cultural aspect between the two different levels of thought and action.

It is possible that this common aspect could be language. While not all thoughts are linguistic, many are, and can thus be linked to verbal behaviour. In as much as language is culturally produced, it is evidence of culture entering into the meanings and interpretations of individual subjects.

Wuthnow et. al. consider its importance. They state:

"Just as formal language exists according to identifiable patterns, so the 'language' of tacit communication in ordinary social life more generally may conform to observable rules. Schutz (and Berger a fortiori) drew on the fact of different styles of language within different contexts as a basis for identifying discrete provinces of meaning".

(Wuthnow et. al. 1984 p262)

It may be that it is the language itself that acts as the cultural transmitter between subject, thought and social action, rather than the system of communication, i.e. speech or the written word. However, the problem of whether culture pervades the interaction between subjects and the subjective meanings they bring to that interaction when non-verbal communication is used, i.e. gestures, images, etc., would remain problematic.

For instance, does culture provide a link between the subjective meanings of an artist which he brings to his picture, and the meanings, (interpretations), that the viewer takes from the picture? Viewing a painting could perhaps, at first sight, be regarded as an ultimate subjective experience, in as much as the viewer probably brings his own subjective meanings to the painting and interprets it for himself.

Yet, at the same time, the artist may influence the meanings of the viewer, even if he does not impose his meanings on him. The artist may intend not to influence the viewer; he may think he is providing an artistic experience that can be interpreted in many different, perhaps conflicting, ways.

However, he may unwittingly communicate cultural patterns to the observer through his painting. It is certainly feasible that culture could pervade non-verbal communication.

Another problem with regarding language as the primary cultural transmitter is the question of what happens when communication cuts across language boundaries, through translation. If a subject communicates through an interpreter to another subject, how much cultural transmission is lost in the translation? Does not the

input of a third subject, the translator, help to block cultural transmission, by providing a mediating influence in the process? Even if both subjects are bilingual, can aspects of culture simply be lost in translation?

From a subjective point of view, the first subject either has to translate his meanings before attempting to communicate them verbally, or rely on the second subject interpreting them through his own translation. All this must cast doubt on whether there can be common cultural aspects between the levels of thought and action. It would seem that a subject must be greatly influenced by the language he normally thinks in and yet, at the same time, it would appear that there are cultural aspects even to non-verbal communication, as indicated.

The notion of intersubjectivity is strengthened through the concept of cultural transmission and the sometimes unwitting influence of one subject or another.

However, in the case of the artist, there is the question of whether his subjective thoughts are linked culturally to his actions in painting the picture. He could produce something different to what he initially intended, especially if the painting was produced over several sittings, and was influenced by subsequent meanings inspired by the contemporary state of the painting. If this is the case, he has failed to communicate his initial subjective meanings to his actions on the canvas.

This could weaken the notion of cultural influence as his initial subjective meanings could be mediated by later subjective meanings, imposed by the physical situation at a later time, (i.e. the state of the painting), which, in turn, affects his consequent actions. His initial intentions, (meanings), with any accompanying cultural

aspects that may permeate them, may be lost. This highlights the problematic nature of trying to bridge the vast gulf between the thought processes of one subject and those of another.

Cultural Boundaries.

The authors of "Cultural Analysis" suggest that progress may be made through the concept of cultural boundaries and what happens at the margins of cultural concepts. They state:

"Regarding culture as an observable aspect of human behavior lays emphasis on the realities of symbolic boundaries. Not only do they exist as conceptual distinctions in person's minds; they are publicly visible in the manner in which social interaction occurs, in discourse, and in tangible objects".

(Wuthnow et. al. 1984 p261)

A link between the subjective and social realm is provided because these boundaries exist in the meanings of individuals, in as much as they perceive them to exist, and also, in the resulting boundaries within the observable culture patterns within society. However, there is always the risk that the perceived boundaries may not correspond with the observed boundaries in society, and that individual subjects may not perceive the observable cultural boundaries in the same way. So called, observable cultural boundaries, that exist within the social structure could be interpreted in different ways. This could certainly be true of the cultural boundaries of status, qualifications, salaries, etc. that might appear in educational organisations. While Wuthnow et. al. stress 'the realities of cultural boundaries', Greenfield would probably question the reality of these boundaries as being

subjective reality. Thus the tacitly accepted cultural boundaries within educational administration, between status levels, qualifications, responsibilities, salaries, etc. just like the concept, 'organisation' itself, could be seen, by Greenfield, to have no meaning except that which individual subjects perceive.

Again, the fact has to be faced that the observable cultural boundaries in the social structure of, say, educational institutions are, to take a subjective approach, simply observed through the eyes of individual subjects.

As indicated earlier, in as much as culture is transmitted through language, the one cultural boundary that may appear to coincide for both subject and the observer is that of a language barrier. If a subject is unable to speak a foreign language, when he visits a country, where that language is almost exclusively spoken, this must seem like a real cultural boundary to him. He has to create subjective meaning out of a reality that may appear incomprehensible to him at first. At this stage the socially observed cultural boundary of language must seem very real, yet the subjectivist may still claim that this reality is apparent reality, seen through the eyes of the subject; that he only perceives the cultural boundary of language. For the subject placed in the situation will, after a while, find ways to communicate through gestures and visual images, providing the possibility of culture transmission through non-verbal communication, yet cultural analysts would probably argue that his success in communicating will be limited, and that the language difference still presents a real culture boundary to him.

So an analysis of cultural boundaries may fail to provide the links between the subjective and the objective domain of the world surrounding the individual subject.

Chaos.

Care needs to be taken in the use of the word 'chaos' to describe the state of educational administration. 'Chaos' in the sense of the conflict produced by lack of agreement is acceptable, for instance, when Greenfield is seen as 'plunging educational administration into chaos' after the 1974 I.I.P. address.

However, it is important to realise that this should not be taken to imply chaos in the sense of randomness. It could be argued that the Greenfield/Griffiths debate and the resulting paradigm diversity that followed, was not random; that clear arguments on both sides were put forward and, as has just been shown in this section over the question of culture, the subjective/objective divide appears often in the social sciences and is not a question of randomness, but a question of the apparent incompatibility of ideas.

Chaos in the sense of randomness, especially as it is now appearing in the natural sciences, to imply an inherent property of nature, cannot be easily extended to the field of educational administration, because of wilful human intervention. This is particularly true of a subjective approach, like Greenfield's, where the emphasis is clearly on subjective meanings, which are to be treated with integrity. This is certainly not a random process, as the individual is responsible for his subjective meanings, the interpretation he brings to a situation.

However, it is possible that the natural science concept of chaos could find application in the 'Garbage Can' model of educational administration.

The 'Garbage Can' Model and Chaos.

It is important to realise that there could be links between 'Garbage Can' models and the notion of chaos that is emerging in the natural sciences. The apparent universality of the application of the mathematics of non-linear equations to the various natural sciences and economics suggests that links with educational administration might be worthy of consideration.

Cohen and March, in their 'Preface to the Second Edition', of "Leadership and Ambiguity"(1986), state:

"First, we do not say and do not believe that university decision processes are chaotic in the sense of exhibiting total disorder. On the contrary, the discussions of organized anarchy and garbage can models of decision making emphasize the existence of considerable order. What makes the processes seem disorderly and confusing is not the absence of order but the fact that the order that we observe is different from that assumed in conventional theories of choice".

(Cohen and March 1986, Preface to the Second Edition pXV)

The notion of chaos in the natural sciences, is also, not of total disorder. Gleick, in "Chaos: Making a New Science"(1988), considers that:

"Chaos has created special techniques of using computers and special kinds of graphic images, pictures that capture a fantastic and delicate structure underlying complexity".

(Gleick 1988 p4)

and later:

"...chaos brought an astonishing message: simple deterministic models could produce what looked like random behavior. The behavior actually had an exquisite fine structure, yet any piece of it seemed indistinguishable from noise".

(Gleick 1988 p79)

The paradox of chaos theory, in the natural sciences, is that randomness and order seem so closely tied, and this tie occurs, not because of the introduction of conditions that cause randomness, but from the system itself. The mathematics of the system that is modelled by non-linear equations produces its own chaos; the chaos is inherent in the natural system being considered and is not due to external factors. To look for 'chaos' in this sense in educational administration, it would be necessary to study a system in isolation.

Cohen and March state:

"A key to understanding the processes within organizations is to view a choice opportunity as a garbage can into which various problems and solutions are dumped by participants".

(Cohen and March 1986 p81)

If the participants, together with their problems and solutions, are part of the system then the 'Garbage Can' model may satisfy this condition. The fact that the 'Garbage Can' model is capable of simulation on computers, also implies a mathematical process that is capable of isolation. Cohen and March state:

"Though the specification of the model is quite simple, the interaction within it is rather complex, so that investigation of the probable behavior of a system fully characterized by the garbage can process and our specifications

requires computer simulation".

(Cohen and March 1986 p90)

Process Rather than State.

The 'Garbage Can' model, capable of simulation on a computer, is a process that evolves over time. The timing of the problems and solutions arriving in the 'Garbage Can', (choice opportunity), effects the operation of the system. Cohen and March state:

"Such a view of organizational choice.....changes over time. It calls attention to the strategic effects of timing (in the introduction of choices and problems)".

(Cohen and March 1986 p81)

The notion of the strategic effects of time were mentioned in Sections 5. and 6., where 'Garbage Can' processes were considered. For this argument, it is important to notice that there is an emphasis on 'process'. Cohen and March consider that:

"The great advantage of trying to see garbage can phenomena together as a process is the possibility that that process can be understood".

(Cohen and March 1986 p91)

This is exactly what chaos theory is seen as, in the natural sciences. Gleick states:

"To some physicists chaos is a science of process rather than state, of becoming rather than being".

(Gleick 1988 p5)

The application of chaos in the natural sciences is always to a system that evolves over time, that is time dependent. Whether it is animal populations, economic systems, weather systems or the workings of the heart, the system is modelled as it evolves over time. When chaos emerges, it emerges over time, and is not present at all times, when modelled by a non-linear equation, where one of the variables is time. It is possible that the computer simulation of the 'Garbage Can' process could rely on non-linear mathematical relationships, and so have the possibility of exhibiting chaos.

Application of the theory requires the system to operate free of effects produced by conscious decisions of individuals.

This does not mean that individuals within the system do not make conscious decisions and act on them, but that the effects on the whole system are not apparent. An economic system obviously entails humans making decisions, but the global effects are not noticeable. (Everybody does not decide to spend all their money next Tuesday!).

If the 'Garbage Can' process is capable of computer simulation it would seem to accommodate this principle. It is difficult to see how individual conscious decisions, that could happen at any moment, and have an infinite nature of varieties, could be programmed into the computer.

It would seem that for educational administration approaches to exhibit the natural science notion of chaos, as mathematically inherent in the system, it must be capable of computer simulation. Other approaches, like systems approaches, may use computers to analyse data from organisations, but this is not the same as computer simulation of a process within an organisation.

The emphasis on the whole process, that chaos theory implies, does not lend itself to application within a subjective perspective, where the emphasis, as indicated many times, is on the subject's meanings and perceptions of a situation.

The Concept, 'Theory'.

Trying to locate Greenfield's subjective approach amongst the background of the ideas and issues of educational administration presents great difficulties. It has been shown in earlier sections that Greenfield's approach stands out because of its different philosophical orientation. Other approaches do not question the reality of organisations even if, as with the ambiguity models, they imply that the manifestations of organisations, i.e. goals, environments and roles are difficult to detect. Subjective approaches also question the nature of theory by suggesting that the concept, 'theory' in the natural sciences, in terms of hypothesizing on the results of research data, is not applicable to educational administration. Greenfield, as considered many times in earlier sections, sees theories as sets of meanings of individual subjects. If the scientific concept of theory is not permissible then some concept of theory is required that is acceptable to all approaches, whatever their philosophical orientation.

The precise definition of the nature of theory is difficult, but Merton, in "Social Theory and Social Structure"(1957), reminds us of its importance. He considers that:

"Like so many words which are bandied about, the word theory threatens to become emptied

of meaning. The very diversity of items to which the word is applied leads to the result that it often obscures rather than creates understanding".

(Merton 1957 p5)

Greenfield tends to focus on theory being developed in individual situations, while systems approaches try to develop more general scientific theories across wider areas. If theory is defined as an attempt to tackle issues which are pervasive over wide areas within educational administration, then it need not imply hypothesis building and testing. The issues of intersubjectivity, complexity and chaos are issues that are pervasive from one particular educational administration context e.g. a particular school, to another, say, a particular college. It could be argued that to try to bridge the intersubjective gap is to imply the scientific notion of theory, in the sense that it is attempting to construct a hypothesis that links the two domains of subjective and objective together. It would seem likely, as indicated in this section, that such attempts fail because they are faced with irreconcilable problems of philosophical orientation.

One is trying to link theoretically, (in the scientific sense), two philosophical positions that, by their very nature, preclude each other's existence. However, if theory is seen as the act of clarifying these issues, in as much as one is considering issues that can pervade all areas of educational administration, and are highly abstract in nature, then it could be argued that one is involved with theoretical matters, (the attempted clarification of abstract issues,) without actual scientific hypothesis building being involved.

In other words, one can be engaged in theoretical matters without actually developing a theory, in the sense of

creating a working scientific hypothesis and, as such, provide a distinction between the word 'theoretical' and the word 'theory'. This could go some way to accommodating Greenfield's subjective position on the nature of theory.

It is also the stance taken to the concept 'theory' in this thesis. This thesis claims to be theoretical in the sense that abstractions from educational administration situations, e.g. the notion of paradigms, metaphors, approaches, (e.g. subjective, systems, ambiguity, neo-Marxist Critical Theory, etc.) and philosophical orientations, have been examined in an attempt to clarify their nature and to look for both links and clear incompatibilities between them.

Taking an interdisciplinary approach and drawing on the fields of sociology of education, anthropology and ethnography, and organisation theory in general, and relating ideas from these fields to educational administration, has reinforced the stance that theoretical issues are being considered through comparative study.

However, Section 8., on the INLOGOV Report, was included to indicate that these issues and ideas can have application in a particular educational administration setting. The notion of theory being put forward in this thesis can be 'practical', in the sense that it has significance for individual educational institutions. For instance, in the case of INLOGOV, the Report examines the procedures of administration and management in a particular local government education department.

This reinforces the point that these issues are important, that they do have application in the day-to-day workings of educational institutions, even if they are often disguised amongst a complexity, (that may be apparent

or real!)), and appear chaotic.

The Implications of Time Irreversibility for the Field of Educational Administration.

In Section 5., the anthropological and ethnographic concept of the importance of time was suggested as being applicable to educational administration. It was pointed out how Bourdieu suggested that natural science overcame the progression of time by making experiments repeatable, so that they could become time independent, capable of repetition at any point of time. Also, through the concept of gift exchange, Bourdieu stressed the strategic effects of timing which, as was pointed out, had application in Cohen, March and Olsen's 'Garbage Can' model of educational administration. They had suggested that, in their model, the strategic effects of timing had application in terms of the time pattern of available energy for dealing with the introduction of choices and problems to the model. This was elaborated in Section 6. into the concept, 'load' i.e. the rate at which problems arrive and are dealt with in the 'Garbage Can' model. Indeed, Cohen and March suggested that as the load increased, so did the way the problems were handled, increasing the use of 'flight' and 'oversight', (Cohen and March's terms defined in Section 6.), which could be seen as evasive action to deal with the load burden.

However, if the strategic effects of timing in the 'Garbage Can' model can be linked to the strategic effects of timing in gift exchange, then there is the possibility of a link between subjective and systems approaches. Gift exchange between one individual and another certainly has an element of intersubjectivity in it, if not subjectivity itself. At the same time, in Section 6., the 'Garbage Can' model, as an ambiguity model, was shown to be linked to systems

approaches in terms of philosophical orientation. So could the importance of time provide the elusive link between the subjective and systems domains?

The Repeatability of Experiments.

If systems approaches are scientific do they exhibit the scientific concept of time independency through the repeatability of experiments? It may appear that it could be possible to construct systems experiments involving organisational goals, etc. that would be repeatable, and perhaps, capable of simulation on a computer, like the 'Garbage Can' model.

In the computer all variables are either controllable or ignored, and the simulation could be re-run at a different point of time, with the same variables, but what happens when the experiment is conducted in a real situation? Suppose an attempt was made to conduct the experiments at two points in time, with all physical variables apparently the same, and even the same people acting out their roles. For example, a planning meeting of an education committee could be re-enacted on two occasions using the same staff and the same outputs of information, policy, etc. There is the problem of the knowledge of the first experiment being carried forward by the participants to the second experiment. There is no going back to the time of the first experiment and, if nothing else, the biological clocks of the actors have moved forward, in other words, in the second experiment they are older!

They are not the same, even if they were able to cleanse their minds of all notions of the first experiment. Clearly, a systems experiment is not repeatable in the exact sense and, in this way, it shows the effects of

the progression of time with subjectivists, like Greenfield, who claim that apparent organisations, as manifested in the subjective reality of individuals, can only be studied individually, one by one, at specific points of time.

Natural Science Experiments: Are They Really Time Independent?

However, are experiments in the natural sciences really time independent? In biology, it is easily seen that an experiment involving the growth of a plant cannot possibly be repeated with the same individual specimen, repetition only being possible with a similar specimen. What is the position with physics experiments? In Section 6., it was suggested that the time variable can be reproduced because of the tight control of all other variables. But tight control is not absolute control, and it comes down to a question of the degree of control, and whether physicists consider that the errors are acceptable.

It may seem that physics experiments are repeatable. For instance, white light passing through a prism was performed by Newton and is repeatable by us today. But what about radiation experiments? In this case an individual source specimen is locked into its own decay pattern with the progress of time. A radioactive decay experiment is only repeatable with another specimen, (just like the plant in the biology experiment). However, it would seem, at first sight, that white light passing through a prism is an experiment that is time independent.

The problem is, how is the experimenter to make sure that the light source at both times is identical? If it is a tungsten filament lamp a slight change in the supply

voltage to the lamp could produce a different spectrum, as the light emitted depends on the temperature of the lamp. If sunlight is used the time of day, (and year), affects the colour of the sunlight as well as atmospheric factors. Then there is the prism. Even if the same specimen is used in both experiments, the molecular configuration could have changed slightly as its temperature will be above absolute zero. So even physics experiments, in an absolute sense, are locked into the progression of time. For all science, there is a link through the progression of time to subjective approaches, which respect that studies are individual, occurring in specific situations and specific points of time.

Can the Subjective Approach and the Systems Approach Share the Same Spatial/Time Universe?

If one imagines the subjectivist trying to interpret the meanings of a perceived organisation at a specific point in time, and simultaneously imagines the systems researcher evaluating the organisation that he regards as real, then both are locked into the same time progression and, in as much as time is real and irreversible, they share a common universe. Suppose an attempt is made to put the two together, to bring the subjective consciousness and the systems consciousness into one individual, then there is a problem.

It could be argued that it is not possible for one consciousness to have simultaneous thought patterns, i.e. one along subjective lines and one along systems lines, as the brain is only capable of having one thought track at any one moment of time.

In Section 2., it was considered how Hodgkinson describes subjective reality in terms of levels which allowed

scientific investigation at lower levels, but not at the highest subjective levels. Greenfield uses this concept to argue for the integrity of the individual subject at the higher levels of subjective reality. Scientific penetration is available into the lower levels of reality, but not the highest levels, that are considered by Greenfield to be uncontrollable and unpredictable. The uniqueness of space/time, as it manifests itself in the individual human consciousness, presents the problem of whether Hodgkinson/Greenfield's levels of reality are capable of simultaneous appreciation within the one subject.

Imposed Meanings and Schutzian Phenomenology.

Greenfield's implication that it is not possible to control these higher levels is at odds with Schutzian phenomenology, as outlined in Sections 2. and 3. In Section 3., it was indicated how Schutz attempts to grapple with this problem by stratifying the Life-world, in the context of space and time, into the zones of actual, restorable and obtainable reach. Schutz places special significance on the actual or potential reach, (that which is happening at present and that which is happening soon enough into the future to be anticipated,) because the subject sees the world as one to be controlled by him, under Schutzian phenomenology and, as such, this present and near future are of crucial importance, because it is in these points of time that the control will manifest itself. Presumably, the past, by definition, can not be controlled, because it is a 'fait accompli' and, as one progresses into the future, prediction becomes progressively more difficult, with a resulting deterioration in controllability.

The point is, that Schutz, with the benefit of his

acceptance of the imposition of meaning, was forced to consider the problems of the space/time instant, and the difficulties it presents for control and thus, imposed meanings.

In Section 4., it was indicated that Schutz saw meaning as evolving over time, and not in the instant, and yet, it was pointed out that Greenfield saw meaning as occurring in the instant. This is a paradox in Greenfield's thinking for, although he classifies different levels of subjective reality, the meanings the subject brings to a situation are perceived in the instant, and would seem to suggest that Greenfield considers it possible to have a simultaneous subjective consciousness at different levels, those that are available to scientific enquiry, and those that are impenetrable.

False Consciousness and Hegemony.

The concept, 'imposed meanings' provides a link to false consciousness, defining the term as 'conditioning of the mind', as indicated in Section 4., where it was indicated that this concept could be useful, if stripped of its neo-Marxist ideological trappings. Such concepts as mass hysteria and charismatic appeal, would indicate that the mind can be conditioned to respond in certain ways outside the normal logical patterns of thought development. It is then possible to contemplate the concept, 'hegemony', discussed in Section 4., as being a useful tool, especially as Habermas sees the term being used, to indicate 'distorted communication'. Habermas sees intersubjective activity resulting in only 'pseudo-communication' with individuals thinking they have understood each other when,

in fact, understanding has not taken place. Such lack of communication could indicate an inability to penetrate the ultimate subjective reality of the other individual, as Greenfield suggests.

The question could be posed as to whether this lack of communication is linked to the inability of the human mind to think at different levels simultaneously. If one is responding in a conditioned way, when communicating with another subject, such that Habermas' 'pseudo-communication' is taking place and one's mind is conditioned through a false consciousness of the situation, then can the mind, at the same time, be responding at a higher level to process these thoughts as if they are true objective reality? In other words, can a subjective input be retained in the mind, at the highest level, while engaging in attempted intersubjective communication? If it is assumed that the mind is incapable of simultaneous thought in the instant of time, then again, it is impossible to link subjective meanings to the imposition of meanings that Habermas' hegemony and Schutzian phenomenology seem to imply.

Time irreversibility has the paradoxical effect of making, even compatible philosophies, incapable of combination within the individual consciousness, at any specific period of time progression.

Implications for Paradigm Diversity.

Such ideas certainly support the idea that paradigm diversity is here to stay. As pointed out in Section 7., it is not clear what is meant by a paradigm. It has been defined as a world view, a metaphor or a philosophical orientation. If paradigms are metaphors, then it raises the question as to whether they are manifested as literary

thoughts, or as images in the mind? Time dependency is involved, in as much as these images, or literary thoughts, evolve over time and provide a question as to whether paradigms are 'born'. Do they evolve out of a flash of inspiration or through longer development of thought patterns? In Section 6., it was considered how there is a distinction between abstract thought and innovative thinking, where it was postulated that abstract thinking, if it was at too complex a level, might inhibit innovative thinking, in as much as an uncluttered mind is freer to innovate.

Then it was pointed out that there is a problem over the extent to which innovative thinking is synonymous with inspirational thought. Horton's 'causal linkage' was discussed, the idea that abstract thinking encourages thinking along certain preconceived, (pre-programmed?), lines of thought and it was indicated that the innovative mind might be able to resist causal linkage if it attempts to work within, outwith and across causal linkages. Such a mind, it was claimed in Section 5., might be capable of higher levels of innovative thinking than those restricted to innovation from concrete situations.

The time dependency of metaphor development depends, then, on whether it evolves out of inspirational thought through innovative thinking that may occur as flashes during a prolonged period of innovative thinking, or whether it is built up out of logical deductions from high levels of abstract thinking, hopefully free of the problems of causal linkage that Horton describes.

If paradigms, however, are philosophical orientations or total world views, then it would appear that they develop over longer periods of time as a result of much social interaction, in a similar way, perhaps, to the

way the Greenfield/Griffiths debate helped to crystallise out the parameters of the subjective approach.

In Section 7., it was indicated that paradigms might be rediscovered over long periods of time, but thought to be new, because the rediscovery would be mediated by the passage of time. As indicated, Greenfield's 'new perspective' could be thought of as a rediscovery of Harris' phenomenological thinking, that Culbertson reminds us about.

The Subjective/Systems Dichotomy.

However, returning to the subjective/systems dichotomy, as indicated earlier in this section, attempts to use the irreversibility of time to link subjective and systems approaches only works within the context of different subjects simultaneously working under the two perspectives. If it is assumed that educational administrators working on the earth are not subject to significant relativistic effects of time, then the uniqueness of the instant of present time, and the problems of simultaneous thought, make the two approaches irreconcilable within the one human consciousness. So the concept, 'irreversibility of time' has to join, intersubjectivity, culture and chaos as only providing very limited success in the attempts to reconcile the subjective and systems approaches.

If one were presenting a legal argument, then the weight of evidence would indicate a guilty verdict, in the case of 'the incompatibility of systems and subjective approaches within educational administration'.

However, as Greenfield reminds us, (Section 2.), proof of incompatibility, or indeed, disproof of compatibility are both problematic. Greenfield indicates this with

the example of the swans. One black swan does not invalidate the premise, "all swans are white" for the swan could be dyed black, or it could have been crossed with another bird to produce a "swan like creature".

In the case of the systems and subjective approaches one has only been able to make a 'case' for their incompatibility. This does not constitute scientific proof, and indicates again that the field of educational administration cannot be seen purely in scientific terms.

Implications for Research, Training and Practice of Educational Administration.

The incompatibility of systems and subjective approaches has, however, created a healthy creative tension in educational administration, that goes back beyond Greenfield's 1974 I.I.P. address. Griffiths and the followers of the "New Movement" provided, in the late 1950's and early 1960's, an intellectual base to the study of educational administration, with their attempt to apply scientific principles of organisation theory to the field. It was this intellectual framework that Greenfield was then able to criticise, and so lead to the present state of paradigm diversity.

In other words, the incompatibility of the ideas of systems and subjective thinking is providing a rich intellectual debate, that has thrown up many important issues and ideas, (as indicated in this thesis), that may not have surfaced without the stimulus of the irreconcilability of the subjective/systems dichotomy.

It would appear that research should continue to be directed at intersubjectivity, if only to see what other ideas may surface.

The task of those wishing to train educational administrators is going to be very exacting, for they will require to introduce the trainees to the debate, and present it as highly significant to their development as administrators. In Section 7., it was considered how textbooks on educational administration would have to adopt a historical perspective, in order to bring the student up to the present day situation. The scientific notion of leaving out all but the most recent paradigm, (as Kuhn suggests scientific textbooks do), would not be appropriate to educational administration because of the present paradigm diversity.

A historical approach is probably the best way of introducing students to the debate, although great care will be required with any attempt to condense this history, in order to tailor it to course requirements.

When the students go out to practice educational administration they will take this knowledge with them which, whilst not obviously having application on their first day in their new post will, perhaps, over the years mingle with their experience, to provide new insights into specific situations they encounter.

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SECTION 10.

GREENFIELD'S CONTRIBUTION TO

EDUCATIONAL ADMINISTRATION.

In this final section, an attempt will be made to assess Greenfield's lasting contribution to educational administration. It is proposed to consider this contribution by reference to particular aspects of what might be regarded as 'mainstream' educational administration.

Such 'mainstream' educational administration concepts, i.e., those that practising educational administrators are most likely to be familiar with, it has to be said, will have been derived from systems theory. One thinks of concepts like 'organisation', 'goal', 'environment', 'accountability', 'leadership', 'resources' and 'training' as forming the key concepts of systems theory.

It is proposed to take each of these concepts in turn and to try to assess what impact, if any, Greenfield has made in these areas, and then to reconsider what Greenfield proposes for future research. Finally, an assessment will be made of the consequences of Greenfield's 'new perspective' for the future of educational administration.

Organisation.

Sections 2. and 6., have indicated the problematical nature of Greenfield's attitude to the concept, 'organisation'. In Sections 1. and 2., it was highlighted that Greenfield sees organisations as a subjective reality, with no 'real' existence, other than that which individual subjects perceive to exist. An organisation is simply a group of individuals who have come together for an overtly common purpose, although there is plenty of scope for conflict and tension under a subjective model.

This is widened in Section 6., on the ambiguity models where Weick's concept, 'loose coupling', highlights the division within organisations, and the 'Garbage Can' models of Cohen, March and Olsen stress that educational organisations can exhibit 'anarchy' in their workings.

However, the ambiguity models still treat the term, 'organisation', unproblematically, as if it is a 'real' concept that exists external to individual subjective perceptions. In other words, it is an entity which is treated as a 'concrete' object of the universe.

Greenfield's main contribution in relation to the concept, 'organisation', is to highlight this problematical nature. In other words, while it could be argued that schools or college buildings are real, in a natural sense, along with all the artefacts inside them, and that people (the subjects) are real, in as much as they have a biological existence, what is not real are the groupings, arrangements, hierarchies, ambitions and, of course, goals of the schools and colleges.

Under Greenfield's perspective, these do not have a material existence in the physical sense, but merely exist

as constraining ideas in the minds of individual subjects, which, although they can be regarded as socially created, in the final analysis, exist as constraints on the behaviour of individuals (subjects). In other words, one is dealing with intangibles, that cannot be detected directly by the senses of the individual subject but are inferred through interpretations of what his or her senses have detected.

Goal.

Greenfield's contribution to the concept, 'goal' is very much a consequence of his attitude towards the concept, 'organisation'. As an organisation is not 'real', but a subjective reality, he questions how it can have a goal. For Greenfield, as indicated in earlier sections, only individuals can have goals. The 'apparent' goals of an organisation are really the goals of individuals within the organisation. As indicated in Section 6., on the ambiguity models, one of the clearest indicators that ambiguity models should not be part of a subjective philosophical orientation is that, while they indicate that organisational goals may be indistinct and ill-defined, the implication is that they exist, if only the appropriate methods could be developed to detect them. Thus Greenfield's main contribution, here, is to stress the problematical nature of organisational goals. Again, he has highlighted the fact that they do not exist in a physical sense and cannot be detected by the senses of human beings. They can only be inferred through the interpretations subjects place upon them.

Systems approaches often discuss the need for organisations to clarify their goals, and to relate them efficiently and effectively to all within the organisation, in order to contribute to the smooth running of the organisation.

This, of course, is linked to the systems approach stress on consensus.

Ambiguity models, on the other hand, in stressing the unclear nature of organisational goals, are in sympathy with the subjective idea that consensus cannot be assumed. The point is, though, that the subjective approach takes this a step further, by implying that clarification of organisational goals would have to become clarification of the goals of individuals within the organisation, to other individuals within the organisation, with all the difficulties of interpretation of meaning, between individual subjects, that this implies. In other words, not only does the goal of a subject have to be clarified in his or her own mind, through his or her own meanings and interpretations, but then these subjective interpretations have to be relayed to another subject, and also be accepted by the receiving subject. Under Greenfield's orientation, (as stressed in Sections 2. and 3.), meanings cannot be imposed on the subject as they can under a Schutzian phenomenology.

In other words, such 'clarification of goals' would impose all the problems of crossing the intersubjective divide that were highlighted in the last section.

Environment.

Greenfield questions the systems idea of an organisation, reacting to its environment, by pointing out that 'environment', is simply more people grouped in other organisations. In other words, when an organisation is seen to be taking account of the environment in which it operates, it is really the case that the subjective meanings of individuals, within the organisation under consideration, are taking account of the subjective

meanings of other individuals, who are not perceived to be part of their own organisation.

The relation of an organisation to its environment also raises questions about the nature of the boundary between the two concepts. If Greenfield's stance is taken, in relation to environments, then the organisation/environment boundary is really an organisation/organisation boundary. However, under Greenfield's subjective approach, since organisations are subjective realities, so must be their boundaries as well.

In other words, an organisational boundary is really a perception in the mind of an individual, who considers that boundary to exist. The systems view encourages organisations to 'clarify their boundaries', as lack of boundary clarification could lead to lack of organisational awareness and control.

Greenfield's approach, on the other hand, would suggest that the precise position of an organisational boundary cannot be determined, simply because different subjects, both within and out with organisations, would perceive it to be in different places, just as the nature of an organisation itself, under a subjective approach, only depends on the perceptions and interpretations of an individual. In other words, it only exists through the eyes of that individual, so that the precise position of a boundary can only exist within the interpretations, (meanings), of one individual subject.

As Greenfield 'honours' the integrity of the subject, i.e., his or her interpretation must be respected as valid, then it follows that the subjective perceptions of a boundary must be valid also. Hence, Greenfield has made a contribution by highlighting the diffuse nature of

boundaries and questioning the possibility of boundary maintenance. In other words, if boundaries cannot be clearly defined, how can initiatives be developed to ensure their continued existence?

Accountability.

Under a systems perspective, the term 'accountability' can be considered to have three interpretations.

Firstly, individuals or groups within an organisation can be asked to explain, (give an account of), their actions to others. This could be to their superiors or to other groups within or outwith the organisation under consideration.

Greenfield's contribution, in this respect, would focus on the fact that giving an account means explaining, or in subjective language, interpreting, one subject's actions to another subject, as under a subjective approach the interpretations of actions can only occur within the brain of individual subjects. Whilst there is scope for misinterpretation, and the individualistic nature of a subjective approach implies that different subjects will interpret in different ways, nonetheless, it would appear that Greenfield would see accountability, rendering an account, as a legitimate exercise.

However, it should be borne in mind that it can only occur at individual to individual level, and that there can be no 'real' concept of group accountability, either to other groups or individuals, as such group accountability could only be a subjective reality, only existing as perceptions in the minds of individuals.

The second aspect of accountability, under a systems

perspective, would be the notion of justification; the idea that to explain actions is not enough. The individual or group, rendering the account, is also expected to justify their actions, to defend them as the 'right' actions to take in a certain situation.

Greenfield's contribution to this concept of accountability would be linked to his ideas on values. Under his subjective perspective, the 'rightness' or 'goodness' of values can only exist in the minds of individual subjects.

Imputing value to something is a subjective process, unique to each individual. Hence, under Greenfield's subjective approach, to give an account at this level would not be possible, because, even at the level of an account from one individual to another, there is the problem of communicating the subjective values of one human consciousness to another; the idea that the 'rightness' of actions, within the subject giving the account, while valid to him or her, cannot be transposed to the receiving subject. In other words, the receiving subject cannot be expected to perceive the 'rightness' of the course of action in the same way.

The third aspect of accountability, under a systems perspective, is where the term also implies some form of corrective action. In other words, after the 'account' has been given, 'remedies' are provided to modify action in the future.

This notion of accountability would clearly not be acceptable to Greenfield, because it implies the notion of imposition of meaning. Even at the level of individual to individual accountability, there is the implication that the person receiving the account is, in some way,

superior to the person giving the account. Either in terms of knowledge or experience of the situation, the receiving person is justifiably able to impose his or her interpretations, (meanings), on the person giving the account, in order that future action is modified. In other words, at the level of meaning behind actions, the account giving subject is expected to adopt new meanings into his or her own interpretations of the subjective reality of organisational procedures with which they are involved.

Whilst such procedures may be acceptable under a Schutzian phenomenology, as indicated many times, imposition of meaning does not form part of Greenfield's orientation.

Leadership.

It is very difficult to tease out a Greenfield position on leadership. At first sight, the fact that Greenfield does not accept imposition of meaning could indicate that his attitude to leadership would be entirely negative.

However, the key point, under the subjective approach of Greenfield, is that the subject should interpret meanings for him or herself.

If leadership is displayed in such a way that subjects are able to interpret the leadership commands, styles, appeals, etc. for themselves, then this may well be more acceptable, under the subjective approach of Greenfield. An emphasis on leadership by example, rather than leadership by command, would probably reinforce this acceptance.

Useful pointers could, perhaps, be provided by the position of ambiguity models. Cohen and March, for instance, in

"Leadership and Ambiguity: The American College President" (1986), suggest that ambiguity models do not undermine the concept, 'leadership' itself, but there are certainly requirements for leaders to become very self-conscious of their style.

They suggest that leaders are required to be heroic, but not in the sense of great military commanders but more in a sense of displaying skills of tact and insight as they grapple with problems. The leadership displayed may need to be unobtrusive but, nevertheless, effective for the organisation.

The development of self-awareness in leaders would be looked upon in a positive way by Greenfield, because it is encouraging the self evaluation, (interpretation of meanings,) within the individual subject who happens to be a leader.

If leaders are aware of their status as subjects, with interpretations of situations and contexts which, while valid to them, under a subjective approach, may not be valid to other subjects, then this is an equally valid interpretation of a subject's situation as a focus on the subordinate subject. In other words, in as much as Greenfield's subjective approach can be thought of as phenomenological, then there is no reason why one should not talk of the phenomenology of the college principal, or headteacher.

If the concept, 'leadership' can be put into such terms, that there is no imposition of meaning, then there is no reason why it should not be seen as a valid concept, under Greenfield's subjective approach.

Resources.

Under a systems perspective, organisational resources would be categorized under the headings, 'materials' and 'human resources'. Materials, in other words, inanimate objects and animals, but not humans, would be regarded as resources by an organisation, if they are of value to the operation of the organisation.

So, in regarding an object as a resource, an organisation is imputing value to a particular artefact. Greenfield would criticise this, because, drawing on the work of Hodgkinson, he would consider that only a subject can impute value to an object. Hodgkinson, who became one of Greenfield's major justificatory philosophical sources, in later work stresses that the value placed on an object is purely a subjective exercise.

While one person may treasure something, another may regard the same object as worthless. Of course, structuralists would claim that the value one places on something is affected greatly by other people's interpretations of its value. Auctions are, perhaps, good examples of situations where such influence is strong, with supply and demand quickly affecting the value of objects.

Subjectivists, on the other hand, would probably claim that, in the final analysis, the decision to bid, taken as it is, in an instant, must come from the subjective consciousness of an individual.

Within an organisation, decisions over materials are often made after lengthy discussion. However, it is true that the different interpretations, (meanings,) of subjects, means there can be much disagreement over priorities when material resources are being ordered. Subjectivists would

claim that this points to the different values that individuals place on the resources.

When attention is turned to human resources, subjectivists, like Greenfield, would point to the fact that human resources focus on the abilities and skills of individuals, with the precise distribution of each of these being peculiar to each individual subject.

When organisations attempt to group people according to these personal attributes, they would be seen by subjectivists as dehumanising, by failing to focus on the talents of each individual.

Training.

Greenfield suggests that educational administrators should be trained by exposing them to total life situations, where they totally take over the life of other vocations. He suggests they become monks, bartenders, bouncers in discos, workers in mental homes, and even that they assume the role of a mental patient.

Greenfield considers that, by immersing themselves in life-experiences, would-be educational administrators will acquire the necessary experience of life to encourage a subjective awareness of the individuals around them, who will have their own interpretations and meanings that they bring to the context of an educational organisation.

'Mainstream' concepts of training, based on systems principles of scientific management, would not be acceptable because they fail to treat as subjective realities the very concepts discussed so far in this section. Presumably, the total socializing influences,

which he suggests for trainee educational administrators, would encourage a development of perception to see these subjective realities for what they are.

As indicated in the earlier section, it is difficult to imagine would-be educational administrators taking up Greenfield's demanding training!

Research.

As indicated many times in this thesis, Greenfield is highly critical of scientific methods of research. His dislike of quantification, statistics, and computer aided research preclude the use of sampling methods.

Such techniques as random sampling or representative group sampling, would not be acceptable, because the researcher is attempting to negate the effect of individuals on research findings, rather than take them into account. Hence, as indicated in Section 5., a subjective approach to research within educational administration must focus on individual case studies, using ethnographic techniques like participant observation.

The various pitfalls of such methods of research were indicated in Section 5., where the problems of misinterpretation and deception were indicated. Greenfield however, could be considered to have made a contribution, simply by focusing attention on the problems of ethnographic based research, although clearly his stance reduces the research options open to those working within educational administration.

The Consequences of Greenfield's 'New Perspective' for
the Future of Educational Administration.

There is no doubt that Greenfield has made the field of educational administration critically aware of the subjective aspects of educational administration.

However, it is more difficult to assess his impact on the future of the field.

In academic circles, Greenfield, as indicated, has been partly responsible for the paradigm diversity which now exists, although there is no doubt that neo-Marxist Critical Theory is also responsible for the conflicting views of the contemporary situation. At a theoretical level, the last section has indicated the difficulty of trying to bridge the gap between subjective and structuralist approaches of various kinds; but no doubt the various debates will continue.

However, at the practical level of the day-to-day workings of educational institutions, the writer has no doubt that much of this theoretical debate will be pushed aside in the interests of expediency.

Educational administration will continue to exist as a field of study, primarily for those who wish to control educational organisations.

Hence, in training, the focus will be on how to control, what can be controlled, and also how to 'limit' the damage when control is not effective. This is what those who pay for training, for example, government organisations, will wish to promote in order to encourage what they see as 'effective' educational administration.

The same will be true for research. Scientific based research, will be considered to provide the 'hard facts' as to what is going on in educational institutions and suggest remedies for 'improving' their performance.

Again, governments providing finance for research, will want to get a 'global view' of what is going on in educational institutions and to see the overall effects of any pilot studies, or initiatives, that they have introduced.

Hence, it is statistics, not individual case studies, that will impress authorities responsible for the provision of education.

Within the actual day-to-day workings of educational institutions, those within educational organisations most likely to be committed to the 'goals' of the organisation, as perceived by government agencies, will be those who hold high office. They, in turn, will be more likely to have control of organisational budgets, and so will favour 'tight' scientific methods, that encourage efficiency through organisational control.

Subjective aspects, that focus on the individual's needs and requirements, are only likely to receive acknowledgment, in as much as they encourage commitment and diligence, in striving to achieve the perceived organisational goals of those in charge.

So, in the training, research and the actual workings of educational institutions, it is the writer's opinion that there will be some in the field who will find it convenient to pretend that Greenfield's 1974 I.I.P. Address never happened. Others will seek to marginalise his

contribution, by seeing it as an interesting theoretical/philosophical debate that, nonetheless, can have, or will have, little impact on the day-to-day workings of educational institutions.

These kinds of stances are most likely to occur where those in the field consider that their political masters are only interested in 'hard' (systems based) training, research and functioning of educational administration.

However, there is no doubt that Greenfield has made a significant contribution to educational administration by raising the intellectual level of debate within the field. His subjective input has forced others, working within the field, to examine the theoretical implications of the various approaches. At the same time, Greenfield has made educational administrators critically aware of the significance of philosophical orientations to educational administration, by drawing on the work of philosophers to justify his subjective approach.

So, while there does not appear to be any final resolution to the problems of conflicting paradigms within educational administration, this should be regarded as a creative 'healthy tension' encouraging the striving for knowledge and understanding within the field.

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