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TOWARDS A GENERAL INTERPRETATION OF THE
EVOLUTION OF STRIKE ACTIONS AND TYPES OF UNIONISM
IN CHILE (1890-1970)

by

CRISOSTOMO PIZARRO

A thesis submitted to the University of Glasgow in
fulfillment of requirements for the Degree of
Doctor in Philosophy in the Faculty of Social Science

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S U M M A R Y

The main purpose of this work is to attempt to understand the significance of strikes in the context of social changes undergone by Chilean society and the possible implications of strike action for the evolution of democratic features in that society.

Although the subject matter of this thesis has already been treated in some studies concerning the history of trade unions, we believe that the sociological interpretation suggested herein complements the knowledge already accumulated by previous historical accounts. As its distinctive contribution, it offers a consistently-based comparison of strike actions and attempts a general understanding of their "conditioning elements".

Strikes will be mainly considered from the point of view of their frequency, the number and diversity of workers involved (magnitude) and their explicit objectives. As a result of the theoretical framework applied in this study, the development of the trade union movement will be seen as having gone through five main stages: first, the period of Isolated Mass Unionism (1890-1915); second, the Stage of Politicization of the Movement (1916-1932; third, the Stage of

Quasi-Governmental Unionism (1933-1945); fourth, the stage of Organizational Integration (1946-1954); and finally, the stage of Politicized and Anti-Government Unionism (1955-1970).

The study of strikes and types of trade unions will clearly show the strong influence of workers' organization and of their demands on the transition of Chilean society from rather exclusive and repressive social, economic and political forms to more democratic ones. This type of influence suggests the importance that these conflicts of interests had for the progress achieved by Chilean society. It also brings out the historically reactionary nature of certain Government policies towards organized labour.

The author hopes to meet the need for a systematic presentation of strike actions in Chile and to present an explanation of their occurrence insofar as this can be described from a sociological analysis. As will be shown in the forthcoming discussion, existing studies do not consider strike actions as their main focus, are very limited in their time-span, or adopt a main analytical perspective which is not sociological but historical. Thus, it seemed to us that in Chile this field of study would be more beneficial from a general attempt at interpretation than from specific and

detailed historical and case studies. In trying to develop a sociological approach it was also felt that in order to arrange and present the data on strikes, some statistical reductions were necessary. Nevertheless, the study of party influences, labour policies and the development of unions naturally lent themselves to a more qualitative type of analysis, although, this is not the main characteristic of the methods employed in this work. It is hoped, therefore, that this thesis may contribute from the perspective of sociological analysis to a cumulative knowledge and a more general understanding of strikes in Chile. If this is accomplished, even to a relatively modest extent, we would hope that the achievement justifies certain simplifications and limitations which have proven inescapable in a work of this type.

I N T R O D U C T I O N

This research attempts to ascertain the nature of the variables responsible for the transformation experienced by our society in the past. It is undertaken in the hope that the information obtained regarding the sources of change may help to bring about the future regeneration of our democratic system.

So far, the contribution of social conflict to the changes experienced by Chilean society during this century has not been fully evaluated. Nevertheless, from a theoretical point of view, it would not be very difficult to agree upon its relevance in explaining social progress. This orientation could find support even in such opposing approaches as those of Marxists and structural functionalists.

In this work, social conflict is seen in terms of its manifestation in wage earners' strikes. Here, the strike is conceived as the workers' belligerent demand to procure a basic set of economic, social and political rights. The author sees the concession of these rights by the Government as a series of steps in the evolution of Chilean society towards a more democratic type of social and political organization. If one wants this process to overcome its current historical problems, it may very well be useful to understand workers' struggles. As this

essay tries to show, they have constituted one of the main conditions that operated in favour of the dynamic exhibited by Chilean society from the beginning of the century to the end of the last decade. The social and political process originating in the seventies is quite different in nature and lies beyond the scope of this particular essay.

Trade union activities in Chile have been the subject-matter of numerous essays. However, the dominant approach used in most of them has been of an historical and descriptive nature based on an essentially discursive mode of interpretation. Outstanding works of this type are, for example, those of Julio Cesar Jobet, Hernan Ramirez Necochea and Jorge Barria.^{1/} Alan Angell has also

- 1. Among the books of J.C. Jobet, the following are good examples of this approach: Desarrollo de Chile en la Primera Mitad del Siglo XX, U. of Chile, Santiago, 1951; Los Precursores del Pensamiento Social en Chile Ed. Universitaria, Santiago, 1955; Luis Emilio Recabarren. Los Orígenes del Movimiento Obrero y el Sindicalismo Chileno. PLA, Santiago, 1955; Ensayo Crítico del Desarrollo Económico-Social de Chile. Ed. Universitaria, Santiago, 1956. The best known works of Ramirez Necochea are: Historia del Movimiento Obrero en Chile, Siglo XIX, Ed. Universitaria, Santiago, 1956; Historia del Imperialismo en Chile, Ed. Austral, Santiago, 1960. Among the works of J. Barria the following could be included in this category: Los Movimientos Sociales de Principios del Siglo XX, Thesis, Instituto Pedagógico, U. of Chile, Santiago, 1956; Los Movimientos Sociales de Chile desde 1910 hasta 1926, Thesis Escuela de Derecho, U. of Chile, 1960, Los Sindicatos de la Gran Minería del Cobre, INSORA, Santiago, 1970; Trayectoria y Estructura del Movimiento Sindical Chileno 1946-1962, INSO 1963; Historia de la CUI, PLA, Santiago, 1971.

approached this field from the point of view of political science and presents the most comprehensive interpretation available on the relationships between trade unions and political parties in Chile.^{2/}

Although there is still an obvious need for further intensive case studies and detailed historical research on strike actions in Chile, it seems to us that despite the limitations of the available sources, a sociological attempt at a general interpretation is also necessary - perhaps even more so. Studies of this type are almost nonexistent. Manuel Barrera's analysis of Perspectiva Histórica de la Huelga Obrera en Chile.^{3/} is one of the few exceptions that contains some discussion of a sociological nature. Thus, in order to contribute to a more general understanding of strike actions, sociological approach to the examination of workers' strikes is herein adopted, covering the period 1890-1970. The very nature of this approach makes it necessary to employ empirical reductions and theoretical abstractions. Thus, by contrast with the wealth and variety of information typical of the historical approach, the idiom of the present

2. Angell A., Politics and the Labour Movement in Chile, Royal Institute of International Affairs, Oxford University Press, London, 1972.

3. See Cuadernos de la Realidad Nacional, No. 9, September, 1971, U.C. Santiago, pp. 119-155.

study is more markedly speculative and generalized, at least in appearance.

The method used to organize the data on strikes, i.e., the study of their aims, frequency, magnitude and nature, consists of very simple statistical reductions and in most cases they are based on a total field which is known, or at least, almost known. Surveys based on samples are not included in this study but are only incidentally mentioned.

The aims pursued by strikes are thus evaluated on the basis of their explicitly stated purposes rather than on the basis of wider opinions offered by participants, or otherwise.

The comparative analysis of strikes among workers of different economic sectors is carried out on the basis of a uniform categorization applied to the entire period. It constitutes a supplement to the more specific and discrete information provided for certain periods or categories of workers.

From the point of view of the conditioning elements of strikes, an effort is made in the approach adopted herein to apply a uniform conceptualization of independent variables responsible for the various trends observed during the period of time examined.

The study of the economic factors conditioning

strikes, compared with the study of strike actions in themselves, lends itself to quantitative rather than qualitative analysis. Therefore, this approach is systematically adopted in our examination of this aspect of the various stages in the evolution of the trade union movement.

However, variables regarding organizational and political factors and particularly the influence of trade unions, political parties and institutions can be better studied from a qualitative point of view. Nevertheless, certain political aspects, such as those referring to the occupational origin of political leaders are quantified in terms of percentage distributions. In addition, when studying the political evolution of the left, two types of statistical coefficients are used: the Spearman and the simple statistical correlation.

The qualitative aspects of this study also emerge from the analysis of a determined number of strikes which are regarded as prototypes of the five periods into which we suggest that strike activities in Chile be divided. The strike-type model, when bringing to light the common factors of the strike activities of each period, also shows the specific features of the strike under analysis.

As will become apparent in the following sections,

the analysis of strikes and of the political and economic elements which condition them is based on both primary and secondary sources. Among the most important primary sources are congressional records, trade-unions Plataformas, biographical dictionaries, official statistics on voting behavior, mining and industrial census, as well as newspaper reports. The secondary sources used were mainly studies already available on the labour movement and relevant political and economic monographs.

A necessary primary source, which was not possible to explore at the time the empirical research for this study was begun (the middle of 1973), is the series of publications of the Labour Department of the Ministry of Labour. Relevant information would have been found in this material, particularly for the most recent periods when more systematic records of labour affairs are kept. However, in order to meet this problem the present work has extensively drawn on seven unpublished theses submitted for university degrees, which compile information based on the official sources for strikes in Chile published by the Labour Department.

At this point, it should be emphasized that this work does not attempt to explain why Chile experienced one or another economic and political development pattern; instead, it is concerned, with how some of them could have

influenced the typical characteristics of strike actions. In other words, the economic and political conditions of strikes are regarded as explanatory factors and not as variables in their own right.

In the following chapter, the characteristics of strikes and their conditioning elements are defined in relation to the preceding sociological discussion. The remaining chapters deal with the various stages suggested for the study of the evolution of the trade union movement. Chapter II refers to the Stage of the Spontaneous and Isolated Social Mass; Chapter III deals with the Process of Politicization of Trade Unions; Chapter IV, with the Stage of Quasi-Governmental Unionism; Chapter V, with the Stage of Organizational Integration of the Trade Union Movement and Chapter VI with the Stage of Anti-Government Politicized Unionism. In Chapter VII an attempt is made to evaluate the more permanent and meaningful conditions of strike actions. As a result, some conclusions are reached regarding the nature of the relationship between strike actions and the process of democratization experienced by Chilean society. The work ends with a statistical appendix which sets out the empirical data supporting the interpretations presented in the preceding chapters.

CHAPTER I

DEFINITIONS AND GENERAL PROPOSITIONS

A. Workers_and_Strike_Actions

The purpose of this work is to study the strike patterns among the Chilean workers, from the beginning of this century up until 1970. According to our general sociological orientation, workers represent the social sector with the greatest potential capacity to generate conflictive action within the capitalist society, a characteristic derived from their objective contradictory position with the capitalist class' interests. This proposition closely adheres to the way in which the labour capital conflict has been interpreted by the mainstream of sociological thinking.

The conflict between workers and capitalists has not been the exclusive object of Marxist analysis. Other currents of contemporary sociological thought have made valuable contributions to the understanding of this problem. Among the classic analysis in this area, those of Durkheim, Weber, Sidney and Beatrice Webb and Perlman are perhaps the most outstanding. Of the more recent contributions proceeding from the so-called industrial and labour sociology, the Oxford School studies on collective bargaining and the well-known Industrial Relations System

approach, deserve particular mention. As we will see ahead, the comparison between Marx, Weber and Durkheim show a common understanding of the class meaning of the labour-capital conflict, although different views are also clear among them as to its origin, forms and appropriate solution.

Durkheim's influence on the Webbs' ideas is clear, specially in the former's concern for combating "abnormal forms of division of labour", representative of which are the workers' conflicts. The Webbs on their part exerted a considerable impact on the Oxford School's interest in bargaining analysis.

Perlman and Dunlop on their part did not emphasize the explanation of the labour conflict in terms of class struggle manifestations, by resorting to either psychosocial explanation or to structural technological features of mature industrial societies, respectively. Nevertheless, they do admit that labour conflicts are common to the formation of industrialized societies. In the conclusions to this research we will also consider the possible scope of certain criticisms of classist reductionism, attributable to the Marxist interpretation of social conflict.

Let us now turn to the analysis of Marx's view on strike actions.

a) Marx' Class in Itself

Marx first put forward his thesis that the proletariat carries out its organization as a class through strikes and what he called "combinations", i.e. the union or association of workers at trade unions, in his work, The___Poverty___of___Philosophy. His proposition is as follows:

The first attempts of workers to associate among themselves take place in the form of combinations. Large-scale industry concentrates in one place a crowd of people unknown to one another. Competition divides their interest. But the maintenance of wages, this common interest which they have against the boss, unites them in a common thought of resistance-combination. Thus, a combination always has a double aim, that of stopping competition among the workers so that they can carry on general competition with the capitalist. If the first aim of resistance was merely the maintenance of wage, combinations at first isolated, constitute themselves into groups as the capitalists in their turn unite for the purpose of repression, and in the face of always united capital, the maintenance of the association becomes more necessary to them than that of wage... In this struggle, a veritable civil war, all the elements necessary for a coming battle unite and develop. Once it has reached this point, the association takes on a political character.^{1/}

1. Karl Marx, The Poverty of Philosophy (1847), International Publisher, New York, 1963; also in Anthony Giddens and David Held, Class, Poverty and Conflict: Classical and Contemporary Debates, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1982, p. 35-36.

Let us look at Marx' distinction between class interest and political struggle:

Economic conditions have first transformed the mass of the people of the country into workers. The combination of capital has created for this mass a common situation, a common interest. This mass is thus, already a class against capital but not yet for itself. In the struggle, of which we have noted only a few phases, this mass becomes united and constitutes itself as a class for itself. But the struggle of class against class is a political struggle.^{2/}

In the Manifesto, a year later, Marx and Engels developed, in greater detail, the various phases of the workers' struggle with capitalism, undertaken first by individual labourers and then by the operators of one trade in one locality. Initially the workers' struggles are directed against the production instruments rather than the capitalist conditions of production, where they attempt at this stage "to restore by force the vanished status of the workmen of the Middle Ages". Nevertheless, the labourers still form no more than an "incoherent mass", divided by competition. When they unite to form more compact bodies, this is not the result of their own active union but the union of the bourgeoisie, and the fight against the enemies of the bourgeoisie "the

2. Idem.

remnants of absolute monarchy, the landowners, the non-industrial bourgeois, the petty bourgeoisie".^{3/}

The development of industry, however, brings about an increase in the number of the proletariat, its degree of concentration and its strength. The proletarian interests and conditions of life are equalized as machinery obliterates labour distinction and reduces wages to the same low level. At the same time, the competition among the bourgeoisie, the commercial crisis derived from this, the resulting wage fluctuation and the increasing precariousness of the workers' livelihood as a consequence of the steady improvement of machinery, creates the situation described by Marx and Engels:

...the collision between individual workmen and individual bourgeois take more and more the character of collisions between two classes. Thereupon the workers begin to form combinations against the bourgeois; they club together in order to keep up the rate of wages; they found permanent associations in order to make provisions beforehand for those occasional revolts. Here and there the contest breaks out into riots...

The real fruit of their battles lies, not in the immediate result, but in the ever

3. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Manifesto of the Communist Party (1848) in Selected Works, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1969, also in Hendrik M. Ruitenbeek: Varieties of Classic Social Theory, E.P. Dutton and Co., Inc. New York, 1983 p. 85.

expanding union of workers. This union is helped on by the improved means of communication that are created by modern industry and that place the workers of different localities in contact with one another. It was just this contact that we need to centralize the numerous local struggles, all of the same character, into one national struggle between classes. But every class struggle is a political struggle.^{4/}

The organization of the proletariat into a class and, as a consequence of this into a party, is seen by Marx and Engels as a precarious status, continually menaced by the competition among workers.^{5/} As was already argued in the German Ideology, class constitution always presupposes that separate individuals "have to carry on a common battle against another class; otherwise they are on hostile terms with each other as competitors".^{6/} Once the class is constituted in the political realm, it obtains a sort of existence independent from the individuals considered to be its members.

The class in its turn achieves an independent existence over against the individuals that so the latter find their conditions of existence predestined and hence have their position in life and their personal development assigned to them by their class,

4. Ibid. pp. 85-86.

5. Idem.

6. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The German Ideology, (1845-6) edited and with introduction by C.J. Arthur London, Lawrence and Wishart, 1970; also included in Anthony Giddens and David Held, op. cit., p. 20.

become subsumed under it. This is the same phenomenon as the subjection of separate individuals to the division of labour and can only be removed by the abolition of private property.^{7/}

In The__Manifesto, the opposition between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat is seen as the modern manifestation of a universal class struggle characterized in yesteryear by the conflicts between free men and slave, patrician and plebeian, lord and serf, guild master and journeyman. There are, nonetheless, very fundamental differences between capitalist class structure and the class structure of the past.

The serf in the period of serfdom raised himself to membership in the Commune, just as the petty bourgeoisie under the yoke of feudal absolutism, managed to develop into a bourgeois. The modern labourer, on the contrary, instead of rising with the progress of industry, sinks deeper and deeper below the conditions of existence of his own class.^{8/}

Later in their analysis, Marx and Engels conclude that the bourgeoisie is unfit to rule because it is incapable

7. Idem.

8. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Manifesto of the Communist Party. op. cit. p. 88.

of assuring an existence to the wage earner, letting him sink into a state of pauperism. Thus, the existence of the bourgeoisie is no longer compatible with society; since its existence and dominance is conditioned by capital formation and growth, which in turn depends on wage-labour. Nevertheless, paradoxically, as large-scale industry promoted by the bourgeoisie itself advances, the workers become less isolated through the formation of associations, thus undermining the bases on which the ruling class produces and appropriates products. "What the bourgeoisie therefore produces, above all, is its own grave diggers. Its fall and the victory of the proletariat are equally inevitable".^{9/}

Class contradiction, as stated in the Preface to a Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy is connected to the very contradiction of the capitalist mode of production characterized by the conflict between the "material productive forces" of society and the existing "relations of production", or in legal terms, the "property relations" that have framed the former's development.^{10/} This conflict is seen in the German Ideology as

9. Ibid. p. 88-89.

10. Preface to a Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy (1859). London, trans S.W. Ryazanskaya, Ed. M. Dobb (London, Lawrence and Wishart, 1971) also in Giddens and Held. op. cit. p.38.

calling forth the class which form the majority of all members of society and from which the consciousness of the necessity of a fundamental revolution, the "Communist consciousness" emanates.11/

The revolutionary role foreseen for the proletariat contrasts with that of other classes such as the lower middle class with its different strata. Marx and Engels analyze this problem in the following terms:

The lower middle class, the small manufacturer, the shopkeeper, the artisan, the peasant, all these fight against the bourgeoisie to save from extinction their existence as a fraction of the middle class. They are, therefore, not revolutionary, but conservative. Nay more, they are reactionary for they try to roll back the wheel of history. If by chance they are revolutionary, they are so, only in view of their impending transfer into the proletariat....12/

The lower strata of the middle class - the small tradespeople, shopkeepers and retired tradesmen generally, the handicraftsmen and peasants - all these sink gradually into the proletariat, partly because their diminutive capital does not suffice for the scale on which modern industry is carried on, and is swamped in the competition with the large capitalists, partly because their specialized skill is rendered worthless by new methods of production. Thus, the proletariat is recruited from all classes of the population.13/

- 11. The German Ideology, op. cit.
12. Manifesto, p. 87.
13. Ibid. p. 84.

The "social scum", for example, thrown off by the lowest layers of the old society, may also become part of the proletarian revolution, but the very nature of their existence condition it more for the role of a "bribed tool of revolutionary intrigue".^{14/} On the other hand, as modern industry advances, sectors of the ruling class may be precipitated into the proletariat, supplying it with "fresh elements of enlightenment and progress".

Finally, in times when the class struggle nears the decisive hour, the process of dissolution going on within the ruling class, in fact, within the whole ranges of old society, assumes such a violent, glaring character, that a small section of the ruling class cuts itself adrift, and joins the revolutionary class, the class that holds the future in its hands. Just as, therefore, at an earlier period, a section of the nobility went over to the bourgeoisie, so now a portion of the bourgeoisie goes over to the proletariat, and in particular, a portion of the bourgeoisie idealists, who have raised themselves to the level of comprehending theoretically the historical movement as a whole.^{15/}

In this framework, the proletariat movement is also conceived as the movement of the immense majority. In effect:

All previous historical movements were movements of minorities or in the interest of

14. Ibid. p. 87.

15. Ibid. pp. 86-87.

minorities. The proletarian movement is the self conscious, independent movement of the immense majority, in the interests of the immense majority. The proletariat cannot stir, cannot raise itself up, without the whole superincumbent strata of official society being sprung into the air.^{16/}

b) Lenin's Analysis of the Petty Bourgeoisie and its
Ambiguous Economic and Political Status

According to Lenin,^{17/} the main structural characteristic of the industrial, agrarian and commercial petty-bourgeoisie is its dual role as worker and exploiter of other workers. As workers in their private or leased establishments, they are subject to the same general conditions of exploitation prevailing in the economy's capitalist organization and thus, tend to take up the interests of the proletariat as their own. Nevertheless, as businessmen, manufacturers or merchants, they

16. Ibid. pp 87-88.

17. This description by Lenin is to be found mainly in What is to be Done (1902) in Selected Works in III Volumes; Volume I, p. 143; Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1970 The State and the Revolution (1917-1918), in volume II, p. 307; One Step Forward Two Steps Backward (1904), Volume I, p. 372; The Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Government (1918); Volume II p. 677; The Proletarian Revolution and The Renegade Kautsky (1918), Volume III, pp. 90-128; Left Wing Communism: An Infantile Disorder (1920), Volume III, p. 373; Left Wing Childness (1920), Volume III, pp. 691-692; First Congress of the Communist International (March, 1919) Volume II, p. 161; The Tax in Kind (1921), Volume III, p. 591.

tend to exploit others for the sake of profit. Hence, as workers they lean towards the proletariat, and as capitalists, they lean towards the bourgeoisie.

The dynamics of large-scale production within the capitalist organization tends to displace the smaller merchants and goods producers in their role as production and distribution regulators. Furthermore, as can be seen in every instance of contemporary revolution, particularly in the French Revolutions during 1848 and 1879, with the conditions produced by revolution and imperialist or civil war, the petty bourgeoisie is shocked by horror and sudden destruction, the excruciating suffering produced by hunger and the economic upheaval. It must search for a way out and save itself, but in doing so, it gives its support to the proletariat one moment and then lapses into periods of desperation the next. However, even after a proletarian victory, during the long period of dictatorship by the same, anarchy, lack of discipline, disorganization and abuse of the small independent merchant tend to infiltrate into the proletariat's class consciousness, becomes extensive and almost spontaneous, capitalism and the bourgeoisie are restored.

The petty bourgeoisie circle influences the tactics of the proletarian party from within the party itself, the state bureaucracy, the economy and the trade unions. Thus, the opportunist illusions of reforming imperialism

nationalism, confidence in universal suffrage and bourgeois parliamentarianism, opposition to state control over production and distribution or anarchic revolutionary extremes or Blanquist pushes, all have the same origin, the unstable economic position of the petty bourgeoisie.

In more general terms, the petty bourgeoisie's vacillation points to a pre-class situation insofar as it is still amorphous, undefined and unconscious. In Lenin's opinion, this is one good reason for classifying the petty bourgeoisie as an element rather than a class. Supporting this is the latter's incapacity for sustained effort as well as united and organized action. As a result, it is unable to act independently assuming the proletariat's or the bourgeoisie's point of view.

The success of the Socialist revolution will depend largely on the proletariat's tactics in dealing with the petty bourgeoisie. The only means available to them for winning over these so-called elements to their cause or reducing their economic importance, are control over production and distribution. These objectives contribute to the evolution of capitalist relationships within industry and in the countryside, thus increasing the size of the proletariat and differentiating the diverse sectors of the peasantry, along with the permanent task of re-educating them.

c) Durkheim's Anomic Division of Labour and
the Conflict Between Labour and Capital.

Emil Durkheim regards the conflict between labour and capital as one of the clearest examples of what he named "abnormal" or "anomic division of labour". "Social solidarity", he insists, exists where there is a normal division of labour, the origin of the labour conflict, therefore, being attributable to the separation occurring between capitalists and workers over a sustained period of time, starting in the Middle Ages, continuing through the fifteenth century and ending in the seventeenth century.^{18/} This latter phase of working-class history is characterized by the birth of "large-scale industry", where the distance between the worker and the employer becomes even greater.^{19/} Here, Durkheim's analysis of the structural sources of conflict does not differ from that of Marx. On the other hand, in small-scale industry where the division of labour is less marked, Durkheim acknowledges the possibility of "relative harmony between workers and employer" and admits that it is only in large-scale industry that this relationship is "in a

18. Emil Durkheim, "The Anomic Division of Labour" in The Division of Labour in Society (1893), translation by George Simpson, The Free Press, New York, Collier-Macmillan Limited, London, 1964, pp. 353-373.

19. Ibid. p. 355.

sickly state".^{20/} Durkheim considers the relevance of large-scale industry in the increasing conflict between labour and capital in the following terms:

As the market extends, great industry appears, but it results in changing the relation of employers and employees. The great strain upon the nervous system and contagious influence of great agglomerations increase the needs of the latter. Machines replace men; manufacturing replaces hard work. The worker is regimented, separated from his family throughout the day. He always lives apart from his employer, etc. These new conditions of industrial life naturally demand a new organization, but as these changes have been accomplished with extreme rapidity, the interests in conflict have not yet had the time to be equilibrated.^{21/}

Where there is a marked division of labour and a lack of solidarity, as in the case of the labour and capital conflict, "it is because the relations of the organs are not regulated, because they are in a state of anomy".^{22/}

Nevertheless, the abnormal or anomic division of labour manifested in the labour-capital conflict is not a necessary consequence of the division of labour but "the effect of an external force".^{23/} This force is a constraint that prevents men from occupying a place

20. Ibid. p. 356.
21. Ibid. p. 370.
22. Ibid. p. 368.
23. Ibid. p. 376.

compatible with their faculties implying, therefore, that labour is not divided spontaneously. Perfect spontaneity is the result of "absolute equality in the external condition of the conflict".^{24/} Durkheim then states that "what really constitutes a constraint is making the conflict itself impossible and refusing to admit the right of combat".^{25/} As the division of labour progresses, there is the possibility of more frequent conflict because of the growing inequality associated to this process. It then becomes necessary to establish "equality in the external conditions of conflict".^{26/} External equality is necessary insofar as its absence compromises "organic solidarity". In the "segmental type of society" where a low division of labour prevails, social cohesion is not threatened by the uneasiness arising from contrary aspirations. Here solidarity is guaranteed by "common faith" and "moral and religious order"^{27/} considered by the people to be sacred. Private disturbances of a transitory nature do not upset this state of awareness.

Moreover, as occupational life is but little developed, disturbances are only intermittent. For all these reasons, they are weakly felt. They occur without trouble ensuing.

24. Ibid. p. 368.

25. Ibid. p. 378.

26. Ibid. p. 379.

27. Ibid. p. 380.

Men even find inequalities not only tolerable but natural.^{28/}

With the progress in the division of labour, another source of solidarity, the "ideal of justice", must be established, producing a sustained reduction in the external conditions of inequality and making men more equal among themselves. This would only allow the differences derived from their functional divisions as determined by their natural abilities. Social Liberty is established as a consequence of social regulations and is not a natural product. As Durkheim states:

Naturally, men are unequal in physical force; naturally, they are placed under external conditions unequally advantageous; domestic life itself, with the heredity of goods that it implies and the inequalities which come from that, is of all the forms of social life, that which depends most strictly on natural causes, and we have just seen that this inequalities are the very negation of liberty. In short, liberty^{29/} is the subordination of external forces to social forces, for it is only in this condition that the latter can freely develop themselves. But this subordination is rather the reverse of natural order.^{30/} It can,

28. Idem.

29. Ibid., p. 387. The underlining is my own.

30. Durkheim's note: "We do not mean that society is outside of nature, if one understands by that the totality of phenomena which obey the law of causality. By the natural order, we mean that which is produced in what is called the state of nature, that is, under the exclusive influence of physical and organic-psychic forces." Idem.

then, realize itself progressively only insofar as man raises himself above things and makes law for them, thus, depriving them of their fortuitous, absurd, amoral character; that is, insofar as he becomes a social being. For he can escape nature only by creating another world where he dominates nature. That world is society.^{31/}

Durkheim's ideal is, then, to render social relations "always more equitable so as to assure the free development of all our socially useful forces."^{32/}

d) Weber's Class Action

What Max Weber called "social action", a consequence of the class situation, is related to general cultural conditions, especially to those of intellectual nature. It has also to do with "the extent of the contrasts that have already evolved, and is specially linked to the transparency of the connections between the causes and the consequences of the class situation".^{33/} For Max Weber, action stemming from a common class situation is by no means a universal phenomenon. Class or social

31. Emil Durkheim, op. cit., pp. 386-387. Once more it is clear that free contract is not in itself sufficient, since it is possible only through a very complex social organization.

32. Ibid. p. 378.

33. Max Weber, "Class, Status and Power" in Economy and Society, (1922) Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich Barkeley, University of California Press Berkeley, 1978; also included in Giddens and Held, op. cit.,

action by members of a class presupposes that:

the contrast of life chances can be felt not as an absolutely given fact to be accepted, but as a resultant from a given number of conditions related to the distribution of property or the structure of the concrete economic order. It is only then that people may react against the classes structure not only through acts of intermittent and irrational protest, but in the form of rational association.^{34/}

The structure of a concrete economic order is the basis upon which the class situation of the modern proletariat arises. A class situation related to the distribution of property could be observed in the urban centres of Antiquity and during the Middle Ages, but in this context the conflict, characteristic of the relationship between labour and capital, did not arise.

The great shift, which has been going on continuously in the past and up to our time, may be summarized....: the struggle in which class situations are effective has progressively shifted from consumption credit toward, first, competitive struggles in the commodity market and then, toward wage disputes on the labour market.^{35/}

For Weber, the trade union is an example of an association that has grown as a result of the class situation

34. Idem.

35. Ibid. p. 64.

of the modern proletariat. Strike action could then be considered class action arising from a class situation. However, the very constitution of a situation of this kind, according to labour, is the initiation of class action. In effect, "class situations emerge only on the basis of class action".^{36/} Nevertheless, not all social actions lead to class situations, for social action that produces class situations is essentially an action among members of different classes.^{37/} According to Weber, social actions directly determining the class situation of the worker and the entrepreneur include the labour market, the commodity market and capitalist enterprise. Nevertheless, he points out:

the existence of a capitalist enterprise presupposes that a very specific kind of social action exists to protect the possession of goods per se, and specially the powers of individuals to dispose, in principle, freely, over the means of production: a certain kind of legal order.^{38/}

Weber's analysis of social action distinguishes, therefore, "essentially similar reactions" that is to say, mass behaviour, from social action taken in a strict sense. A class situation may or may not lead to this

^{36.} Ibid. p. 63.

^{37.} Idem.

^{38.} Ibid. p. 63-64.

kind of behaviour, and quite often only amorphous social action emerges.

Without mentioning what he regards as Marx's views on class action, Weber proceeds to make the following criticism:

that men in the same class situation regularly react in mass actions to such tangible situations as economic ones in the direction of those interests that are most adequate to their average number is an important and after all simple fact for the understanding of historical events. However, this fact must not lead to that kind of pseudo-scientific operation with the concepts of class and class interest which is so frequent these days and which has found its most classic expression in the statement of a talented author, that the individual may be in error concerning his interests but that the class is infallible about its interests.^{39/}

Weber explicitly states that classes are not communities (Gemeinschaft) and that they only represent the probability of a determined social action. Thus, it is possible to speak of a class when:

(1). a number of people have in common a specific causal component in their life chances insofar as (2) this component is represented exclusively by economic interests in the possession of goods and opportunities for income and (3) is represented under the condition of the commodity or labour markets.^{40/}

39. Ibid. p.63.

40. Ibid. p.61.

Property ownership, as well as a lack of it, is the basis of all class situations as long as it represents the specific causal component of classes' typical life chances. Weber and Marx would appear to agree in this regard.

e) The Webbs and the Device of Common Rule

In their examination of workers' action, the British historians, Sidney and Beatrice Webb, place particular emphasis on the formation of the bargaining procedure rather than on the understanding of the class nature of the struggles existing between capital and labour. Nevertheless, their contribution to the development of the so-called Oxford School and to the general analysis of trade unions and collective bargaining is widely acknowledged.

For the Webbs, the activities of organized labour through trade unions are mainly directed toward the establishment of what they call "the device of common rule" and "the device of the restriction of numbers".^{41/} Considering that bargaining power is not equal between employers and employees, the settlement of terms of employment "inevitable tends for mass workers towards the worst possible condition of labour".^{42/} Thus, in order to

41. Sidney and Beatrice Webb, Industrial Democracy, Longmans, Green and Co., London, 1911, p. 560.

42. Ibid. p. 561.

restrict free competition among unequals, there is a tendency for trade unions to introduce common rules. By implementing this rule, the unions are able to establish policies related to wages, work hours, sanitation and safety conditions and all the norms regulating working conditions. Common rule is based on the "Living Wage Doctrine" which pursues the attainment of the worker's right to a civilized and improved standard of living.^{43/} The intensity of a given society's democratic current will depend on the degree of progress it has achieved in scientific knowledge and social cooperation. The more advanced this is, the more universal common rule will become with the role of trade unions in society becoming increasingly accepted and permanent. This doctrine, together with that of "Vested Interests",^{44/} as opposed to class ideologies, is indicative of the rationale of workers' actions. The Vested Interests Doctrine provides the basis for the Device of the "Restriction of Numbers," whereby trade union members limit apprenticeship and entrance into their organization.

Ultimately, devices and their corresponding doctrines limit the dominion of the supply and demand doctrine which trade unions are also ready to follow

43. Idem. See final part of "Precept and Prophecy".

44. Ibid. p. 562.

when the business cycle is at its height.^{45/} In our historical analysis of the Chilean trade unions, we will see how the unions use strike activities to foster the implementation of certain devices. The Webbs' analysis is, therefore, also relevant to the understanding of what we have denominated "the labour status", the main objective of trade union struggles as such.

f) Perlman's Scarce Consciousness of Manual Labour

Selig Perlman may be regarded as one of the most theoretically-minded scholars among America's traditional trade union analysts. Perlman undertakes an historical survey of British, German, Russian and American labour movements, arriving at a supposedly theoretical explanation of the regularities and differences found among them. He argues that there are three factors having a dominant influence on the development of these movements. The first is the demonstrated capacity of the capitalist group to survive as a ruling group. The second factor relates to what he considers to be the role of the intellectuals in the labour movement. The last is the development of the trade union movement's own philosophy. "In order to properly understand the development of the trade

⁴⁵. Ibid. p. 249.

union per se," says Perlman, "one must take into consideration a theory of the "psychology of the working-man."^{46/}

In all, there are three basic economic philosophies; the manual labourer's, the businessmen's and the the intellectual's. What characterizes the psychology of the manual worker is what Perlman calls "scarcity consciousness". The typical manualist is aware of his lack of "native capacity for availing himself of economic opportunities as they lie amidst the complex and ever shifting situations of modern business".^{47/} He would much prefer a secure though modest return, just sufficient to get by. The labour's home grown ideology can be understood only in the light of the working rules of the labour's own institutions.^{48/} Working rules imply job control in the same way that guilds established rules in the Middle Ages as a means of exercising some degree of control over the market.^{49/} Job control assumes overwhelming importance in the psychology of the labour group. The union's virtual ownership of the employment opportunities is accomplished by persistent pressure to extend the number

46. Selig Perlman, A Theory of the Labour Movement, first edition 1928, Mc.Millan Co., New York, reprinted 1979, Porcupine Press Inc., Philadelphia, p. 237.

47. Ibid. p. 239.

48. Ibid. p. 6.

49. Ibid. p. 262.

of job opportunities available to trade union membership.^{50/}

Contrasting with the psychology of the so-called "organic labour group", which goes hand in hand with the development of trade union philosophy, are "the intellectuals' programmes for labour... The intellectual's main characteristic is to "think of labour as an abstract mass in the grip of an abstract force".^{51/}

Perlman points out that although the basis of all intellectualist theories of the labour movement is the concept of a mass being dominated by a force, the intellectuals themselves fall into three categories, depending on what they consider to be the nature of that force. First, there is the Marxian who is a determinist revolutionary and sees the force as material production "seeking to break through the capitalist straight jacket". Then there is the ethical intellectual to whom this force is "the force of labour's own awakened ethical perception". Lastly, there is the efficient intellectual, most notable of which are the Fabians, who see the force as an earnest drive to establish economic order and achieve professionalization and social efficiency.^{52/}

50. Ibid. p. 265 and 269.

51. Ibid. p. 280.

52. Ibid. p. 282-284.

Perlman's analysis of Sidney and Beatrice Webb's contribution to the understanding of British Unionism is of particular interest here. He observes that in their Industrial Democracy written in 1911, the Webbs propose the hypothesis that trade unions have obtained more from the device of the restriction of numbers than from the device of common rule. Furthermore, it is their view that trade unions have become increasingly indifferent as to who gets the jobs, provided the employer observes the union rules regarding wages, hours and other working conditions. Thus, a union that has overcome the major problem of wage control will be more willing to relinquish the rules related to the exclusive rights to job opportunities.^{53/}

Under the newer unionism dominated by common rule, competition for jobs is a free for all, where the best man gets the job, thus considerably contributing to industrial efficiency. By paying less attention to common rule, there is a reduction in the high level of inefficiency and institutional restriction that hinders the fulfillment of wartime needs. It would appear then, that the Webbs have adopted the version characteristically held by the efficiency intellectuals, while at the same time showing the tendency to resort to legal devices

⁵³ Ibid. pp. 295-296.

rather than bargaining procedures between the parties involved. The point made in Industrial Democracy is modified, notes Perlman, by a proposal leading to the broadening of the social insurance system and not by the enactment of the protection rules that the Webbs reassessed in their History of Trade Unions, written in 1920.^{54/} For Perlman, the Webbs were typical representatives of the intellectual efficiency current, for some time at least.

In the analysis of labour and capitalism in America,^{55/} Perlman acknowledges that of the existing options for promoting union interests, bargaining procedures between parties are the most useful. The experience gained through their attempts to use the legislative and political arenas have, in effect, shown America's workers that the way to advance their interests is to negotiate directly with their employers. Strikes of any national relevance are invariably defeated, not only by the political system but more so, by the trade union's own officers. Conservative American philosophy would undoubtedly be in favour of adopting repressive measures against activities aiming to do away with private property and while admitting the regulation of capital and labour

54. Ibid. pp. 295-300.

55. Ibid. pp. 154-233.

relations, the American political system would never allow the system to be reformed. Thus, given the psychology of the workingmen, all that is left to the trade unions is to protect the situation of their membership. In spite of the economic and political differences between American, British and Russian labour movements, the psychology of the workingmen remains the same. Perlman's analysis comes over as a conservative philosophy of trade unions, whose main task is to protect jobs and refrain workers from trying to bring about broader social changes in the prevailing conditions for workers in capitalist societies. It is the intellectuals, whether they be determinist, revolutionary or ethical, who, having reduced labour to an abstract mass in the grips of an abstract force, may try to impose revolutionary programmes on the workers' movement totally alien to the "emotional imagination of the manual worker himself."^{56/}

g) Dunlop's Industrial Relations System

Dunlop's approach to the labour conflict is best understood when one realizes that he places trade union activities within the broader framework of the industrial relations institutions. By adopting Talcott

⁵⁶ Ibid. p. 10.

Parson's system theory to the specific field of industrial relations, Dunlop took the latter to be a subsystem of industrial societies, comparable to other subsystems, such as the economic one, for instance. The relationship of the industrial relations system with society, the economic subsystem and the structure and function of the industrial relations system itself, is the main focus of this approach.^{57/}

Since the subsystems' goal was the system's survival and stability, one of Dunlop's major concerns was the problem of consensus, order and equilibrium, the ends pursued by the system of teleology. Therefore, Industrial conflict is not given the place it, in fact, deserves in industrial society, and the emphasis placed on the study of the system's function eventually precludes the analysis of the order and conflict sources.

In a later work, in association with Kerr and others, Dunlop addresses the problem of workers' conflict in a direct way. The workers' protest tends to reach its peak relatively early in the industrial transformation and declines in its over-manifestation as industrialization reaches its more advanced stages. This appraisal of the workers' conflict contradicts Marx, who "saw the

⁵⁷ J.T. Dunlop, Industrial Relations System, Holt, New York, 1958.

intensity of protest increasing in the course of the capitalism's development".^{58/} This protest is regarded as a universal response to industrialism and not a phenomenon to be automatically linked to the advancement of capitalism.

The nature of the labour problem will depend on the characteristics of the industrial systems which "differs according to the nature and effectiveness of the enterprise organization and of the elite that direct them".^{59/} Different kinds of elite (dynastic middle class and revolutionary) and development stages as well as different economic systems give rise to various industrial relations systems, but all of them fulfill:

at least three major functions: industrial systems defines the relative right and responsibilities of workers, managers and the state, and establishes the power relations between them. Second, it channels and controls the responses of workers and managers to the dislocations and insecurities inherent in the industrializing process; and thirdly it establishes the network of rules both substantive and procedural, which govern the work place and the work community.^{60/}

58. Clark Kerr, Frederick H. Harbison, John T. Dunlop and Charles Haye Mayers, "Industrialism and Industrial Man" in International Labour Review, Vol. 62. No. 3 September, 1968. p. 246.

59. Ibid. p. 244.

60. Ibid. p. 247-8.

When accomplishing these objectives:

The industrial relations system provides a structure and the machinery for the functional relationship between the managers and the managed in any industrialising society. As a system, it is related to the economic system with which it operates.^{61/}

Dunlop and his associates suggest that the peculiarities of the industrial relations system tend to be less relevant as the industrial stages are overcome.

The ideological differences tend to fade; the cultural pattern of the work intermingles and merges. The once vast ideological difference between capitalism and Communism gives way to more pragmatic considerations in the operation of industrial society. Increasingly, the elite all appear in the same line.^{62/}

The forces responsible for this trend, toward uniformity, are identified as technology, the thrust of progress, education, the state and large-scale enterprises.

In advanced industrial society, conflict will persist, but it will take the form of bureaucratic skirmishes rather than class war. War groups will jockey for position over the settling of jurisdictions, the authority to make decisions, the forming of alliances and the granting or withdrawal of support or effort. The greater

61. Idem.

62. Idem.

battles of conflicting parties will be replaced by a myriad of minor contests over comparative details. Labour organization will cease to be part of class movement urging programmes of total reform and become more purely pressure groups representing the occupational interest of their members.

In this emerging worldwide society, industrial man will be subject to great pressure of conformity imposed not only by enterprise management, but also by the state and by his occupational association.^{63/}

h) The Oxford School's Emphasis on
Collective Bargaining.

In recent years the British School of Industrial Relations has considered collective bargaining to be the foremost determinant of union behaviour. This method is regarded as the most commonly used by trade unions to regulate the terms of employment in Great Britain today, particularly after the demise of unilateral regulations. For H.A. Cleggs, it is the structure and attitude of employers' associations and state intervention that provides a structure for collective bargaining, which in turn can explain union density and structure, union government and work place organization, industrial democracy and political action, as well as strike activities. In effect, these variables mainly depend on the particular characteristics of the collective bargaining process

63. Ibid. p. 249.

in question and basically include the extent of bargaining (the proportion of employees covered by it); depth of bargaining (the involvement or otherwise of union officers); the level of bargaining (plant, district, national, and so on); the degree of control over the collective agreement (obligatory standards and machinery for enforcement) and the scope of the agreement (the number of employment aspects covered).^{64/} In Cleggs' propositions, strike activities do not only depend on the characteristics of collective bargaining but also on the variations occurring in industrial democracy, industrial relations legislation, economic variables and the procedures established for handling labour-capital disputes.

In particular, for this research, we have found that the collective bargaining process provides an analytic tool of far greater scope here than the concept of the strike taken in the strict sense. Collective bargaining between the workers and their employers, concerning the terms of employment may or may not lead to conflictive action. On the other hand, the strike is considered to be a tool resorted to by the working class in order to

64. H.A. Cleggs, Trade Unionism under Collective Bargaining: A Theory Based on the Comparison of Six Countries, Blackwell, Oxford, 1976, Chapters 2, 6 and 8.

negotiate working conditions when the conciliatory mechanisms offered by collective bargaining have been unsuccessful. Strike activity may be considered legal or otherwise depending on the legislation in force at the time. Thus, the strike represents an instrument of the workers provided by the law to force negotiations to be undertaken between capital and labour.

i) Capitalist Development and Strike Activities

The main conclusion to be drawn from the analysis in this section is that all the schools of classic and contemporary sociological thought regard the conflict between capital and labour as, perhaps, the most characteristic phenomenon of the development of the capitalist society. It is clear, that the classist connotation of this conflict varies when one compares Marx, Weber, Durkheim, the Webbs, and Perlman. As we previously suggested, differences can also be seen in the analysis of the Oxford School, Dunlop and his followers.

As has already been pointed out, for Marx the origin of class struggles lies in the contradictions existing in the relationship between wage labourers and capitalists. For Durkheim, the lack of solidarity between employers and employees is basically due to the advanced degree of development in the division of labour. In Marx,

the class conflict inherent in the capitalist mode of production can only be resolved through a revolution in this mode of production led by the class of wage earners. The revolutionary potential of the latter is derived from the inability of the capitalist class to assure the appropriate conditions for the wage labourers' material existence. This is related to the very conflict of the capitalist mode of production between productive forces and the production relationship or private property. In Durkheim, the solution to the industrial conflict is to be found in a regulation through which the equality in the external conditions of life, which are more and more necessary, are assured.

This is likely to occur as long as organic solidarity, which takes the place of mechanical solidarity in advanced industrial society, is founded on the ideal of justice.

Weber agrees with Marx in that property relationships are a condition for the existence of classes as determining factors in the typical life chances of different classes. Like Marx, he sustains that the class situation can only emerge on the basis of actions among members of different classes. These actions, on the part of the workers and entrepreneurs, are linked to the labour market, commodity market and capitalist enterprise. Therefore, class actions and class conflicts, also suppose

that the contrast between the causes and the consequences of the class situation should not be considered as an absolute given fact to be accepted. Class conflicts thus suppose rational actions carried out by associations, such as the trade unions. According to Weber, there is no reason to assume, as Marx does, that the class is infallible with regard to its interests, but not its individuals.

In more recent class analysis proposed by the Industrial Relations approach, the concepts of class and class struggle no longer have the explicative value attributed to them by Marx and Weber. The class struggle would, therefore, be reduced to a passing phenomenon concomitant to the early stages of the industrialization process. The relevance of the class struggle would be reduced and there would be no aspirations to revolutionary change. Classes would be substituted by pressure groups. Furthermore, the major ideological differences between communism and capitalism tend to vanish with the appearance of uniformity brought about by technological change.

It is interesting to note the relationship between this "theory of the classless industrial society" and Durkheim's points of view regarding the origin of the industrial conflict as being the lack of regulations concomitant to the transition process from a primitive level of division of labour to a more advanced one. Giddens

calls attention to the fact that Durkheim's point of view may be directly related to Saint-Simon who, apart from coining the very term "industrial society", saw the emergent industrial order as a classless society in the sense of one class of "industrials".^{65/} The "dubious" way Durkheim conceives socialism, i.e. as mainly concerned with regulation of economic life, allows him to declare the labour movement and class struggle as of secondary importance to socialist thought. In his Socialism, Durkheim considers "class war" as "only one of the means by which the economic reorganization of society could result".^{66/}

Our theoretical stance fully coincides with Giddens' in that Durkheim's conception of the class struggle is a very feeble foundation for studying either the economy or the main features of politics in a capitalist society. Unlike Marx, Durkheim suppressed an analysis of the capitalist economy. Although the revolution Marx envisage may not have occurred, his assessment of the class conflict in capitalist societies still remains closer to the reality of contemporary industrial society than

65. Anthony Giddens, "Durkheim, Socialism and Marxism" in Profiles and Critiques in Social Theory, University of California Press. Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1982. p. 121.

66. Emile Durkheim, Socialism, Collier, New York, 1962, p. 58 Quoted in Giddens, *ibid.* p. 120.

Durkheim's. Class conflict is revealed in capitalist societies in two related sites: at the level of capitalist enterprise and at the level of political struggles led by the labour movement against the employers considered as a class. By the:

substantive use of the threat of the collective withdrawal of labour, workers establish themselves as a force to be reckoned with at both sites of conflict.^{67/}

In this way, wage labourers can react to the specificity of their structural position in the capitalist order, i.e. sell their labour in exchange for monetary wages, a completely new feature, inexistent in class relations prevailing in earlier societies. Giddens remarks that only in capitalist societies are class relations established as intrinsic to the labour process.

The fact that capitalism can serve to indicate both a set of economic mechanisms and a type of society as a whole is expressive of this...Capitalism, one might say, is the only society in which the dialectic of forces and relations of production has a broad explanatory power: the only society, in fact, which both has and is a mode of production.^{68/}

^{67.} Ibid. p. 122.

^{68.} Anthony Giddens, "Classes, Capitalism and the State" in Profiles... op. cit., p. 194.

Thus, it may be agreed that the working class, as a necessary consequence of capitalist historical development is the most consistently radical group given its inherent contradiction to the interests of the capitalist class. The former's increased numbers, the degree and nature of its unionization and the extent of its awareness as to its position in the society's economic structure are all factors which can either diminish, eliminate or sharpen its capacity to achieve radical social changes. Nevertheless, the different individual sectors of the working class, particularly the industrial, mining and agricultural labourers, would not have the capacity to develop a particularly elaborate consciousness of all the political, economic and social characteristics of the capitalist society. It is this factor that conditions the full realization of the group's potential for implementing changes in capitalist society, and as a result sheds light on the outstanding importance of the role played by the intelligentsia and the party in this area.

In view of the aforementioned considerations, this study will concentrate mainly on the subject of strike action, i.e. one of the courses of action available to the working class, whereby they may express their inconformity with the working and living conditions prevailing among wage earners under the capitalist regime. This

group's opposition provides more potential, than any other group, for the transformation of society as a whole.

B. Elements Conditioning Strike Actions.

The bulk of existing literature on strikes at the level of empirical research relates either to the analysis of specific events or to statistical aggregate data in which complex political and historical factors are, by and large, not taken into account. Explanations are thus searched on the basis of the unique attributes of the situation being examined or on a too simplistic understanding of the multiple factors conditioning labour conflict.

In attempting to offer a general rationale for the occurrence of strike actions, the historical analysis of capitalist society's evolution would seem to offer greater explanatory value than most microsociological or statistically-oriented approaches made available to us by recent empirical research. Our search for theoretical orientations is dictated by the need to explain the long-term trends exhibited by strike actions and Chilean unionism. The general conceptualization of the ways in which strikes are conditioned in the evolution of capitalist society can be of great help in suggesting approaches to our subject matter. Although we endeavour to arrive at a particularized weighted and empirical view of

the factors conditioning workers' actions, this does not imply that we plan to adopt a casual or functionally quantifiable model, the elaboration of which would not do justice to the complexity of the strike as an event and of the elements conditioning it.

a) Economic Conditioning Elements.

Many authors have stressed the relevance of economic variables in the analysis of the origins of the trade union movement and its pattern of actions. In the evolution of socialism, concern for economic variables is mainly expressed in the work of the founders, as well as in Lenin's concept of socialization of production and work, in the debates of Trotsky and Provossky, and Rosa Luxemburg and Bernstein, in the sense that they deal with the relations between revolutionary behaviour and levels of economic development.

In this study, the analysis of economic variables will be focussed mainly on the effects of the socialization of production and work on the growth of unions and the pattern of strike actions. At a more specific level, we shall consider the association existing between the size of the firm, the level of wages and the incidence of strikes. The analysis of these aspects is clearly relevant to the general interpretation pursued throughout this study.

Socialization of Production and Work

In several of his works, Lenin pointed out that the concept of the socialization of production and work was employed by Marx and Engels when referring to the main structural changes occurring in the organization of the relations of production as these evolve towards the capitalist stage.^{69/} With the emergence of modern industry, the decline of a small-scale production is accompanied by a growing utilization of technology; a trend towards greater concentration of capital; a decrease in the number of capitalists, the specialization and growth of separated industrial branches; the formation of a national market, and the intervention of the state in the process of production, as well as in the distribution of goods and services.

The new economic interdependence, the standardization of goods and the growth of the geographic scale of production gives rise to a unique process of socialized production. This economic phenomenon creates the material

69. V.I. Lenin, What the Friends of the People are and how they Fight the Social Democrats (1894), in SW. op. cit. Volume I, pp. 49, 63, 186 and 463; Draft Programme of the S.D.P. and Explanation (1895-6) in Collected Works, Lawrence and Wishart Ltd. 1936, London Vol. I, pp. 475-477; The Development of Capitalism in Russia (1899) in C. W. Vol. III, pp. 595-600.

basis for the emergence of the national proletariat. These changes in the organization of production could not take place without the emancipation of the serfs; the transformation of the small producers into workers; a high rate of geographical mobility, and a greater density of demographic concentration in industrial, mining and urban centres, all of which make possible the satisfaction of a growing demand for free wage earners. This set of demographic changes constitutes the link between the economic changes and the sociological conditions favouring the emergence of the proletariat. However, this situation only provides a structural opportunity for the social interaction of workers gathered together in the capitalist enterprise.

Trotsky's Understanding of the Special Features of Russia's Historical Development

According to the arguments discussed so far, the revolutionary role assigned to the proletariat would be seriously jeopardized should capitalist development not be advanced enough. This point of view was criticized by Trotsky in his controversial discussion with Pokrovsky on the special features of Russia's historical development. He felt that the seizing of power by the Russian working class would inevitably appear as "a monstrous

denial of Marxism".^{70/} It is hard to understand how the Russian proletariat of the most underdeveloped nation in Europe, had finally come into power. Pokrovsky attempted to provide answers by mechanically applying the Marxist theory and, instead of taking into consideration "live historical forces", he established rigid social categories in a kind of "pseudo-materialistic geometry with a few ready-made cliches".^{71/} Trotsky felt that there was both historical and theoretical justification for the seizure of power by the proletariat and that, in spite of Russia's underdevelopment, a democratic government by the proletariat and the peasantry was possible. Here, Trotsky was opposing the hypothesis that the political hegemony of the proletariat had to be preceded by the political hegemony of the bourgeoisie. A bourgeois democratic republic was always considered to be "the historical school for the proletariat" and any attempt to skip this phase would have been considered sort of an adventure. The question was that if the working class in the West had not seized power, how could the Russian proletariat set himself such a task?^{72/}

70. Leon Trotsky, 1905, Translated by Anya Bostock, Allen Lane The Penguin Press, London, 1972, p. 331.

71. Ibid. pp. 333-334.

72. Ibid. p. 330.

Russia's backward development, under the influence and pressure of the higher culture of the West, lead not to a simple repetition of the Western European historical process, but to a set of fundamentally new features which require independent study.^{73/}

It is interesting to note that:

Russian capitalism did not develop from artisanal trade via the manufacturing workshop to the factory for the reason that European capital, first in the form of trade capital and then in the form of financial and industrial capital, flooded the country at a time when most Russian artisanal trade had not yet separated itself from agriculture.^{74/}

The emergence of the modern capitalist industry in Russia occurred in the context of a completely primitive economic environment. The major role of Western European capitalism in the Russian economy explains the political weakness of the Russian bourgeoisie, which was consequently easy to defeat.

The Russian proletariat did not pass through the school of the Medieval apprentice fraternities, nor was it organized in the age-old tradition of the guild, but was "snatched from the plow and hurled straight into the factory furnace".^{75/} Therefore, it is clear that the

73. Ibid. p. 331.

74. Ibid. p. 339.

75. Ibid. p. 340.

Russian proletariat lacked conservative tradition, rendering it ripe for revolutionary initiative. Despite widespread illiteracy, the absence of organizational know-how and the lack of a cultural and technical educational system, as well as the formidable shortcomings in building a new economy and culture, the Russian working class found at its disposal the "ready-made weapons created by the experience of the Western European proletariat: Marxist theories, trade unions, political parties".^{76/}

Luxemburg an Historical Necessity

In her debate with Bernstein, Luxemburg questions the opposition of reform and revolution, the two moments of the labour movement.^{77/} She also refers to the "socialization of the process of production", as part of the scientific basis of socialism,^{78/} and states that "the point of departure for the realization of socialism lies in the economic relations of capitalist society".^{79/} By contesting the rapidity of the concentration process taking

76. Ibid. pp. 340-342.

77. Rosa Luxemburg, "Social Reform or Revolution" in Dick Howard, ed., Selected Political Writings of Rosa Luxemburg, Monthly Review Press, New York, 1971, p. 53.

78. Ibid. p. 57.

79. Ibid. p. 93.

place in industry, Bernstein was, in fact, denying the existence of these economic factors. Although he used occupational statistics of 1882 and 1895 in Germany, to support his contention:

even in the most favorable cases, his reference to the persistence of middle-size enterprise could not, in the least, weaken the Marxian analysis, because the latter does not presuppose, as a condition, for the realization of socialism, either a definite rate of concentration of industry - that is, a definite delay of the realization of the socialist goal - or...the absolute disappearance of small capitals or the disappearance of the petty bourgeoisie.^{80/}

Other statistics on shareholding societies are also given by Bernstein in an attempt to prove a growth in the capitalist class. However, these statistics only prove a greater extension of the system of shareholding societies, in other words, a:

growing socialization of production within the capitalist form - socialization not only of large but also of middle-size and even small production. Therefore, the extension of shareholding does not contradict Marxist theory but, on the contrary, confirms it emphatically.^{81/}

80. Ibid. p. 94.

81. Ibid. p. 95.

The fact that Luxemburg questions this data and interprets them differently stems from her view that the development of capitalist relations is a "necessity",^{82/} because it is precisely the "anarchy of capitalism"^{83/} that dictates its transitory nature and its eventual collapse.^{84/}

Unlike Luxemburg, Trotsky makes little effort to deny the absence of certain conditioning factors existing in Russian society, but stresses the presence of other "special features" that might have played a more positive role in later socialist development.^{85/}

82. Ibid. p. 98.

83. Idem.

84. Ibid. p. 101.

85. Luxemburg's opinion about the "necessity" of contradictions in the capitalist system has been interpreted as a manifestation of a crisis in orthodox Marxism, supposedly incapable of filling a hiatus that opened in the chain of historical necessity. Luxemburg apparently failed in her attempt at restating a theoretical unit that had broken down in the course of historical events. See Ernest Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy Towards a Radical Democratic Politics, Verso, London, 1985. These authors discuss Luxemburg's argument as far as mass strikes, parties and trade unions is concerned, although this same point of view is also evident from the Luxemburg-Bernstein debate. A closer examination of Laclau and Mouffe's theoretical objections to the classic Marxist analysis of the role of the working class will be presented in the conclusions to this work, after having examined the role of the Chilean working class since its origins.

Some Indicators of the Socialization of Production
and Work: Production Growth, the Volume of
the Labour Force and its Regional Concentration

In order to make operative macroeconomic dimension regarding the socialization of production and work, we will deal herein with the effects of industrial and mineral production-structure and cycles upon the volume of the labour force and its concentration in different branches of economic activity and regions of the country. It is postulated that a relatively isolated and dispersed labour force will be the necessary result of a development pattern which, in its very early stages is confined to a few enclaves. With the diversification and extension of the industrial structure, a tendency for wage-earners to grow and for its members to break away from their original isolation will also develop. Thus, one would expect a mass of largely isolated wage earners to be associated with an enclave economy; a mass in the process of diversification would be associated with the first stages of industrialization; while a more homogeneous and at the same time more extensive mass would be characteristic of the industrially advanced economy. The greater the degree of industrial development the greater the material possibilities for the propagation of trade union organizations and the emergence of

joint actions, such as the strike.

Numerous studies have attempted to measure the way in which the cyclical variations in economic structure affect the growth of the trade unions and their tendency to strike. For example Bernstein's studies of union growth patterns in the United States during the five periods comprised between 1884 and 1944 showed that rapid increases in union growth occurred during periods of social disaster, i.e., both World Wars. During these years, a favourable political climate resulted in executive and legislative agencies lending their support to the unions. Stagnation in union membership from 1956 to early 1960 was, therefore, attributable to the high rate of unemployment prevailing at that time. An increase in the labour force is, thus, one of the three important factors in explaining union growth, the other two being social acceptability of unions and the tendency towards a more homogeneous working population.^{86/}

Barkin has also made the distinctions between depression, which influences workers to organize unions,

86. Irving Bernstein, "Union Growth and Structural Cycles", Industrial Relations Research Association (IRRA), December 1954, pp. 202-231: "The Growth of American Unions 1945-1960" in Walter Fojel and Archie Kleingartner, eds., Contemporary Labour Issues Wodsworth Publishing Co. Inc., California, 1966, pp. 229-239.

and a drop in the employment rate, which causes loss of membership.^{87/} For Bell, the upheaval of the 1930's also caused union growth.^{88/} Shister also admits a tendency for unions to grow during depression or war.^{89/} The depression hypothesis is qualified by Blum, who points out that under different political conditions deep recession may well result in political turns to rightist position and the workers' alienation from the unions.^{90/}

In an attempt to explain the variations in union growth in the United Kingdom, the United States, Australia and Sweden, Bain and Elsheikh looked into retail prices, wages and unemployment as the main variables related to business cycles.^{91/} This effort has been criticized by Richardson as a mechanical, highly aggregative model with questionable analytical proposals.^{92/}

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87. Salomon Barkin, The Decline of the Labour Movement. The Fund for the Republic Inc., California, 1961.
 88. Daniel Bell "Prospects for Union Growth" in Walter Fojel and Archie Kleingartner, op. cit., pp. 225-228.
 89. Joseph Shister, "The Outlook for Union Growth" in The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 350, November 1963, pp. 52-62.
 90. Albert Blum, "Why unions Grow" in Labour History Winter 1968, pp. 39-72. For a detailed analysis of union growth, see Woodrow Ginsburg, "Review of Literature on Union Growth, Government and Structure - 1955-1969" in A Review of Industrial Relations Research. Industrial Relations Research Association, 1970, Vol. I, pp. 207-260.
 91. C.S. Bain and F. Elsheikh, Union Growth and the Business Cycle: An Economic Analysis, Blackwell, Oxford, 1976, pp. 58-70.
 92. R. Richardson, "Trade Union Growth" in British Union of Industrial Relations, 1977, Vol. 15 pp. 279-282.

For the purpose of this work, the trade union is not considered a dependent variable but is dealt with, from a methodological point of view, as merely one of several factors that must be addressed when attempting to understand labour conflicts. Furthermore, it is considered to be an organizational factor, along with pre-union structures, intelligentsia groups, political parties and state policies. Despite the different approach of our work, trade union growth's susceptibility to variations, in accordance with employment trends, has not gone unnoticed.

As far as strike activity is concerned, it is generally agreed that this tends to increase during periods of prosperity due to the employers' reluctance to forego sales and profits because of labour conflict. Under these circumstances, workers are able to press their employers for much more favourable terms than they would hope to get during periods of recession. This hypothesis enjoys a long-standing tradition advanced by Hansen, Yoder, Rees and Sturmthal, Khun, Knowles and Scully, among the most outstanding.^{93/}

93. Hansen, Alvin, "Cycles of Strikes" in American Economic Review, December 11, 1921, pp. 516-521; Yoder Dale, "Economic Changes and Industrial Unrests in the United States" in Journal of Political Economy, No. 481, April 1940, pp. 222-237; K.J.C. Knowles, Strikes: A Study in Industrial Conflict, Blackwell, Oxford, 1952; Albert Rees, "Industrial Conflict and
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Well-Worth mentioning is Sturmtahl's point of view stating that bargaining power, which is manifested in conflictive activity, depends on the availability of skilled labour and elasticity of supply. An excess supply of labour would, therefore, strongly reduce the bargaining power of the workers. For example, the strike would be an ineffective weapon where the people are extremely poor, with thousands of job seekers more than willing to take over the jobs of the strikers. This hypothesis is supported by events occurring during Great Britain's labour movement from 1815 to 1840. It was generally assumed, that there was an abundant supply of unskilled labour during this period, whereby only the working class aristocracy could effectively resort to collective bargaining on wage and working condition issues. The great mass of workers had to resort to

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93. Business fluctuations" in Journal of Political Economy, No. 60, October 1952, pp. 371-382; A. Korhauser, R. Dubin and A.M. Ross, eds., Industrial Conflict, McGraw Hill, New York, 1954; James W. Khun, Bargaining in Grievances Settlement, Columbia 1961; Andrew Weintraub "Prosperity versus Strikes: an Empirical Approach in Industrial and labour Relations Review, No. 191, January, 1966, pp.231-238; Gerald W. Scully, "Business Cycles and Industrial Strike Activity" in Journal of Business, No.441, October 1971, pp. 359-374; and Adolf Sturmtahl and James G. Scoville, eds., The International Labour Movement, Urban University of Illinois Press, 1973 pp. 34-57.

political action, as bargaining on economic issues at company level was precluded. The Luddite movement of 1811-1812, the popular Chartists and the Owenite Movement of 1833-1834 were protagonists of this sort of political action.^{94/}

In light of the experience in Great Britain, Knowles considers that in spite of the negative effects of the fall in economic activity, the workers may still be capable of committing themselves in large-scale strike activities.^{95/} In a more recent study on strikes in the United States between 1954 and 1975, Shalev points out that workers are more likely to strike when they are dissatisfied and feel that strike action would be an effective mechanism to reduce or overcome their discontent.^{96/} From this, we may assume that there are two factors intervening in the tendency to strike. First, a cause for dissatisfaction and, simultaneously, the availability of an efficient means of remedying the original cause of the strike activity.

94. Sturmthal, op. cit. This analysis is based on H.J. Habakkuk, American and British Technology in the Nineteenth Century, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1962.

95. Knowles, op. cit. In our conclusions we will consider once again the work of Knowles, Rees and Kuhn.

96. Michael Shalev, "Trade Unionism and Economic Analysis The case of industrial conflict" in Journal of Labour Research, No. I, Spring 1980, pp. 133-173.

Most of the studies on the influence of the business cycle on strike activity in the United States, since the Second World War, have been based on the statistical analysis of very large amounts of data. In an assessment of this research, Feuille and Wheeler classify these studies as:

post hoc explanations of aggregate strike behaviour which contain some significant variables and some large residuals (that is, unexplained behaviours) and post hoc explanations of strike behaviours in particular circumstances which are highly ideosyncratic and, therefore, of limited generalizability.^{97/}

Another drawback with this type of analysis is its limited statistical validity in that only average results based on multiple regression analysis models were obtained, which are also inadequate to deal with random variations. Furthermore, the analysis is limited to strike actions taking place during the period of negotiation of new contracts. It is clear, that considering the variables favoured by these statistical models, the explanations put forward are restricted solely to economic factors.^{98/}

97. Peter Feuille and Hoyt N. Wheeler, "Will the Real Industrial Conflict Please Stand Up?" in Jack Stieber, et al, eds., U.S. Industrial Relations 1950-1980: A Critical Assessment, Industrial Relations Research Association Series, 1981, p. 267.

98. Ibid. pp. 255-295.

This work aims to overcome this state of affairs, at least partially. Our statistical description of strike activities covers the period from 1890 to 1970 and takes into account almost the entire universe, but no attempt is made to use an econometric model of any kind. Simple statistical descriptions provide the framework for in-depth qualitative case studies considered indicative of both strike activities' general trends and the particular conflict under study in its own right. This is done for all the periods in which we have suggested that strike activities in Chile be divided. No mechanical associations are postulated here between business cycles and union activities. In our historical study of the economic factors conditioning worker's strikes, i.e. economic development in mining, nitrate and copper, industrial and rural activities, a systematic attempt is also made to take into account the influence of pre-union organizations, trade unions, political parties and state policies. Our study shows these to be of particular relevance in explaining strike activity.

Size of the company

As previously mentioned, both Marx and Durkheim consider the size of the enterprise to be very relevant in the formation of trade union organizations and their tendency to strike.

In the empirical work that followed the work done by the classics, the relevance of the size of the enterprise to trade union politics and the workers' propensity to undertake strike action is stressed. The works of Lipset and Blauner are considered specially relevant to this study and will be briefly discussed.

Lipset's Union Democracy.

In this well-known work on democracy and trade unions, Lipset underlines the value of the size of the enterprise as an explanatory factor.^{99/} He states that:

printers in large shops are more active union members than men who work in small shops and that the union's political parties have much greater support in the large shops.^{100/}

The size of the shop affects men's relationship with three important elements - his employer, his union and his shopmates. These relationships help to account for the higher level of political involvement of workers in larger shops as opposed to the small shops where the owner may work and be a union member himself. "In larger

99. Seymour Martin Lipset, Martin Trow and James Coleman, Union Democracy. The International Typographical Union. What Makes Democracy Work in Labour Unions and Other Organizations? Anchor Books Double Day and Co. Inc., New York, 1956.

100. Ibid, p. 170.

shops, management is remote and the union is near, visible and important".^{101/} For Lipset, in the specific case of printers, it is clear:

That the relations among printers on the job in small shops seem to be involuntary to a high degree and do not tend to develop into the close friendships that can function as arenas of political stimulation and discussion. In contrast, the larger shops permit a greater measure of self selection in the informal relations among shopmates on the job and more frequently tend to develop into the kinds of close relations that have consequently for the participants union, political interest and involvement.^{102/}

If the former analysis is refined and different large size shops are considered, the relationship between size and political behaviour is curvilinear rather than linear. In fact:

the highest level of involvement in politics occurs not among men who work in the very largest shops in New York, but rather, among those employing between one hundred to two hundred ITU members.^{103/}

Lipset's propositions concerning the character of workers and owner/management relationships in small workshops

^{101.} Ibid, p. 174.

^{102.} Ibid. p. 220.

^{103.} Ibid. pp. 217-218.

have also been the subject matter of numerous research efforts among which the work of Bain, Ingham and Shumacher are most worthy of note.^{104/}

Blauner's Alienation and Freedom

Blauner regarded technology, division of labour, social organization and economic structure as the key underlying variables explaining the diversification to be found in the modern industrial environment.^{105/} He distinguishes four types of technologies: craft technology as in printing; machine tending technology as in textiles; assembly-line technology as in automobile manufacturing, and continuous process technology as in the

104. See G.S Bain, The Growth of White Collar Unionism, Clarendon Press, 1970, G.K Ingham, Size of Industrial Organization and Worker Behaviour, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1970; Bolton Committee of Enquiry cited in Michael Poole, Theories of Trade Unionism. A Sociology of Industrial Relations, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, revised edition, 1984, pp. 136-137; E.F. Shumacher, Small is Beautiful: A Study of Economics as if People Mattered, Blond and Briggs, London, 1973; E.V. Badstone, "Deference and the Ethos of Small town Capitalism" in M. Bulmer, Ed. Working Class Images of Society, Routledge and Kegan Paul London, 1975, p.104; and J. Curran and J. Stanworth, "Workers Involvement and Social Relations in the Small Firm", Sociological Review 10227, 1979, pp.317-42.

105. Robert Blauner, Alienation and Freedom: The Factory Worker and his Industry, The University of Chicago Press, first published in 1964, third impression, first phoenix edition 1967.

chemical industry. All of these have a significant influence on the size of the enterprise, which in turn affects the division of labour and the social work organization.

Compared to other industries, motor vehicle assembly shows the greatest concentration of large plants and factories. The workers' identification with their companies and their loyalty to them is seriously jeopardized by the socio-technical features which are characteristic of this industry. As Blauner points out, a century ago Karl Marx emphasized that "factories increase the social distance between workers and the management, reduce the workers' loyalty to the enterprise and heighten the potential for class consciousness".^{106/}

The existence of relatively few close-knit functional groups, a compressed wage and skill distribution and the employment insecurity characterizing this industry together, could contribute to a high rate of conflict between automobile workers and capital. Under the circumstances prevailing in this industry:

Social control rests less on consensus and more on the power of management to enforce compliance to the rule system of the factory, a power sometimes effectively counter-vailed by the strong labour union, which has a legitimate mandate to protect certain

106. Ibid. pp.109-110.

interests of the workers.107/

A set of rational standards and rules arise from the conflict of management and workers, making social integration possible in this industry. However, in the textile industry social integration is based on company loyalty, whereas in the printing industry, it is based on the worker's identification with his craft, and in the chemical industry on functional interdependency.108/

On the basis of the general orientations already described, we suggest that there is a positive correlation between the size of the enterprise and the frequency of strike action. Features, such as labour interdependence, typical of the socialization of production and work in an economy at an advanced stage of industrial development, are more likely to occur in large enterprises. The large size of these companies and the opportunity they provide for the interaction of the labour force connected with them facilitate the emergence of labour organizations and their common actions.

Wage Levels.

Another variable which tends to be associated with

107. Ibid. p. 177.

108. Ibid. p. 75.

the emergence of unions and strike activity is the level of wages and its variances over time. Most econometric studies based on Ashenfelter and Johnson's negotiation model-109/ carried out so far have dealt with wages as an exogenous variable explicative of strike activity. Blajer attempts to partly overcome the limitations of this approach by formalizing a simultaneous equation model in order to prove the hypothesis that there is, in fact, feedback as well as a mutual casual relationship between strike activity and the whole process of determining wage levels. By rejecting the nil hypothesis, Blajer was able to prove that strike action in Chile was affected by the rate of inflation, the actual changes in nominal wages and especially by the desired increase in real income.110/

109. Orley Ashenfelter and George E. Johnson, "Bargaining Theory, Trade Unions and Industrial Strike Activity" in American Economic Review, Vol. 59., No.1, March, 1969, pp. 35-49. For an overview of the numerous works pertaining to this line of thought, see Mario I. Blajer, "Actividad Huelguística y Determinación de Salarios bajo Inflación Aguda. Un estudio cuantitativo del caso chileno" in Victor Urquidi and Saul Trejo Reyes, Recursos Humanos. Empleo y Desarrollo en América Latina, Fondo de Cultura Económica, Mexico, 1983 pp. 403-417. This article was first published in Industrial Labour Relations Review, Vol.34, No.3, 1981, pp. 356-364. And Richard B Freeman and James L. Meddoff, What do Unions do? Basic books Inc. Publishers, New York, 1984, pp. 280-281.

110. Mario I. Blajer, op. cit., esp. pp. 408-417.

Even though the correlation between strike activities and wage levels would not, on the basis of the theoretical perspective adopted in this work, be expected to appear as an independent phenomenon, it will nevertheless be examined insofar as the data available so demands. If wage levels isolated from other economic and political variables existed, then one would expect there to be a correlation between the level of income and the incentive to undertake strike activity. However, this hypothesis is not taken up in this study.

The association between wage level and strike activity should be more apparent in large-scale companies. On the one hand, the sociological conditions arising from this type of enterprise make the workers more susceptible to union action and political influence. On the other hand, the benefits received by the workers are greater. If the wage level is taken separately from the rest of the economic and political variables, it may be assumed that the better compensated the workers are for their labour, the less likely they are to become involved in strike activity.

This point may also be more specifically spelled out in Marxist terms. The worker's spontaneous awareness of exploitation in the capitalist enterprise will tend to decrease in the extent to which the monetary gratifications and social benefits he receives are high. If the

ideological factors provided by the unions and the parties which could neutralize the effects of a high level of benefits did not intervene, then it would be logical to expect a negative correlation between high salary status and the propensity to strike. On the contrary, this correlation would be positive in the case of a low-wage levels. Yet from the Marxist analysis' point of view, these correlations would apply to those workers linked to capitalist enterprise. As soon as the link between labourer and enterprise ceases and he joins the ranks of the industrial reserve army, all the sociological conditions developed within the enterprise favouring union and political interaction would vanish. The sense of group belonging engendered by the capitalist enterprise is completely lost when the worker joins the unemployed or becomes one of the irregular or independent workers. lll/

lll. Though this is not the place to enter into a long debate on this issue, it should be mentioned that this point of view, which is closer to an orthodox Marxist position, has been questioned by some neo-Marxist currents of thought. Yet, the empirical research undertaken on the political radicalism of the new groups, not linked to capitalist enterprise has shown little evidence that what these currents predicted has taken place. In dealing with the marginal dwellers in Chile, the "grupo poblacional" of the Interdisciplinary Centre for Urban Development (CIDU), as has already been pointed out by Manuel Castells, have found that
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Hence, the wage variable will be treated in relation to the size of the enterprise. The data on wages will be dealt with differently from the other economic conditioning factors in that it will not be presented in each of the chapters concerning the different steps in the evolution of unionism, but rather, it will be grouped in Chapter V, where the permanent correlations between economic variables and the strike are discussed and where an attempt is made to show the evolution undergone by those economic variables examined in the previous stages.

b) Political Conditioning Elements

Lenin's Spontaneous Consciousness and the Party

On becoming incorporated into the capitalist enterprise, the worker's initial reaction is directed towards the working and living conditions to which he is

cont.

111. the greater proportion of the marginal population does not hold a revolutionary attitude towards bringing about changes in their society. In relation to this discussion, see Manuel Castells, "Movimiento de Pobladores y Lucha de Clases en Chile" in Eure, Vol. III., April 1973, No.7. Jorge Montano's survey of the literature on "Los Pobres de la Ciudad" (The City's Paupers) also suggests that these groups do not exhibit the greatest potential for radical political changes. See his "Las Actitudes Políticas en los Asentamientos Espontaneos" in El Trimestre Político, Mexico, Year 1, No. 1, July-September, 1975.

subjected. According to Lenin, these conditions are major factors in stimulating a spontaneous exploitation consciousness. The economic conditions under which the proletariat lives capacitates him in playing a leading revolutionary role. While assimilating the capitalist urban and industrial culture, not only do the workers become more united, they also become educated, and their latent socialism begins to grow from the struggle practice.^{112/} The workers' political consciousness becomes more acute as his economic situation deteriorates and he becomes more aware of the fact that the interests of the bourgeoisie are completely the opposite of his.^{113/} This experience gradually produces a kind of revolutionary determinism, steadfastness, resolution and readiness in the worker, that will transform him from the object of exploitation into the bourgeoisie's potential grave digger, as Lenin put it, a completely revolutionary class

112. This proposition has been elaborated in Lenin's terms though differently organized and taken from different sources. See The State and Revolution, (1917-1918), in Selected Works, in III Vols. op. cit., Vol. II, p. 304; Greeting to the Hungarian Workers (1919), in SW, Vol. II, pp. 217-218; and Can the Bolshevik Retain Power? (1917) in SW, Vol. II, p. 426.

113. Left Wing Communism, op. cit. p. 387, Lenin's terminology taken from Economics and Politics in the Era of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat (1919), in SW, Vol. III, pp. 296-297.

capable of replacing relations of production.114/

This revolutionary potential arising from the proletariat's struggle for survival fully materializes when the party, "the highest form of proletarian class organization" begins to take shape.115/ For the proletariat to reach full class consciousness, the party must introduce the workers to the theory of socialism. However, this theory is the product of the "philosophic, historical and economic theories" that were elaborated by the "intellectuals that belonged to the bourgeois intelligentsia."116/

The development of the proletariat is, therefore, the result of the interaction between the party and the union. In the labour organization, the proletariat may grow as a class, despite the fact that during the early stages of their development these organizations have a somewhat narrow outlook and a tendency to be non-political.117/

Class struggle does not necessarily lead to class

114. Lenin terms from Greeting to... op. cit., pp.217-218 Nineth Congress of the R.C.P. (March-April, 1920), in SW, Vol. III, Karl Marx, SW, Vol I, p. 54. Report on the Countryside (1919), SW, Vol. III, p. 195.

115. Left-Wing op. cit. p. 373.

116. What is to be Done in SW, Vol. I, p. 143; Draft Programme... op. cit., p. 487; Kausky's term as cited by Lenin freely organized.

117. Idem.

consciousness, nor does class struggle always lead to a socialist consciousness. These conditions evolve "side by side".^{118/} Insofar as the conditions producing the class struggle are the result of the experiences in the life of the proletarian, the conditions producing socialist consciousness are derived from the scientific, historical and philosophical knowledge possessed by a particular section of modern society - the intelligentsia. It is these who must provide the workers with a knowledge of the real workings of the capitalist society, for this knowledge will not appear spontaneously in the class struggle. Thus, socialist consciousness is "something introduced into the proletarian class struggle from outside (Von Aussen Hineingetragen) and not something that arose within it spontaneously (urwuchsig)".^{119/} It is the party's task "to imbue the proletariat (literally saturate the proletariat) with the consciousness of its position and the consciousness of its task".^{120/}

For the purpose of this analysis, we will distinguish between the intelligentsia, i.e. the enlightened elite, and the party itself. The former represents the action of the bourgeois and petty bourgeois and certain working sectors which, although exercising some influence on the

¹¹⁸. Stated in terms of Kautsky by Lenin in Idem.

¹¹⁹. Idem.

¹²⁰. Idem.

labour movement, do not yet constitute a party. The intelligentsia can prepare the ground for the appearance of the party through the spread of ideology, usually the workers' first exposure to a critical set of ideas which attempt to systematize their political, economic and social situation within the capitalist system.

The transition from the intelligentsia groups to a party requires the emergence of a wider, more complex social group with which the workers can co-exist in some sort of nexus. This nexus may find expressions ranging from a mere acceptance of political leadership and the representation of the workers' interests to varying forms of participation in the organizational structure of the party.

The relationship between the elite and the workers does not take place in individual or immediate terms, but through pre-union and union structures. As we will see, in the case of Chile these structures were also encouraged by intellectuals of various ideological orientations. The main determinants of the organizational dynamics of pre-union, union or properly constituted political labour groups are to be found in the actions of agents external to the labour movement or in small self-taught labour groups, which may or may not become mass parties following prolonged organizational ideological action.

The effect and the nature of the activities of the elite in relation to the workers can be observed in the different types of actions carried out by the latter. In the first place, the workers' particularistic orientation may adopt a political meaning only under the influence of the activities of politically enlightened groups. The translation of particularistic orientation into political actions is carried out by the bourgeoisie intelligentsia and politically enlightened workers, and then spread to the mass of workers through various agents. The influence of political groups will be reflected in better organized mass actions on the part of the workers, a situation which will improve as these groups attain a higher development level. In this context the party which presupposes the existence of a basic bureaucratic professional apparatus, has more structural resources available for the control and centralization of mass action than a mere movement led by the elite would have.

Institutional Stability

With regard to functioning of the Chilean political system, we shall confine ourselves to formulating a general proposition on the effects that a situation of relative institutional stability could have on union action. These effects will differentiate from those that

are generated in situations of generalized instability. A full examination of the social origins of the variables pertaining to the stability or instability in the political system goes beyond the scope of this work. As we have pointed out, a study of some features of the economic evolution of mining, industrial and agricultural workers will be undertaken herein. However, the same cannot be done for all their counterparts in the Chilean social structure. The dynamics of class conflict will be mainly examined from the point of view of its manifestation in union activity.

Our argument will be that an unstable situation creates unfavourable conditions for union action. Naturally, a different situation arises if the instability is deliberately created by the labour organizations as a means of satisfying their demands, a circumstance that presupposes an advanced stage of union power. We must bear in mind that in moments of crisis, the political system protects itself by imposing severe restrictions on union action. This may be done by groups which do not normally perform government and administrative functions, and which also suspend the political game which typified the immediately preceding situation.

Labour Policies

Beside the factors previously considered, union

activity may also be conditioned by labour policies. Thus, it is possible to distinguish between the influence of a legal situation in which labour conflict as yet receives no institutional recognition and a situation where labour legislation exists. In situations where there is no labour legislation, the conflictive behaviour of workers is likely to manifest itself in violent incidents, whereas in situations where labour conflict is institutionalized, a settlement through negotiation is more likely. The institutionalization of labour conflict presupposes that the government tolerates it and that its purpose is to regulate rather than repress it. However, it is unlikely that repressive action will disappear altogether, in fact it will probably be exercised whenever the government regards the situation as being critical.

On some occasions the institutionalization of labour conflict goes beyond mere tolerance, even attempting to assimilate the whole or part of the union movement. This situation gives rise to what we have called quasi-governmental unionism, in which there is a trend towards inhibiting strike activities by the workers.

C. Types of Strike Activities

a) Lenin's Classification

Lenin distinguishes between several different types of strikes on the basis of political criterion

which were obviously most relevant. For Lenin, historically, the trade union movement was basically the first form of organization of the working class into syndicated groups in which the frequency and number of worker actions changed noticeably. Isolated uprisings are substituted for a latent or manifested tendency to participate in riots or strikes. The changes in the workers' movements undergoes a development parallel to that of large-scale industry. The greater the capitalist pressure, the greater the need of the workers to resist. The employer is no longer able to face the workers alone, but is forced to form federations with other capitalists and request government assistance. In fact, the entire capitalist class joins forces with the government to overthrow the workers.

Whether the workers' movements manifest themselves in riots, direct struggle against the bourgeoisie and/or the government, its basic content is of an economic nature aiming at alleviating the distress to which their conditions give rise, but which do not abolish that condition, i.e., which do not remove the subjection of labour to capital. These revolts are "more in the nature of outbursts of desperation and vengeance than of a struggle".121/

121. Lenin Draft Programme... op.cit., p. 3.

They are simply "an expression of the resistance of the oppressed".122/

The workers' actions develop into struggle when they become "conscious of the irreconcilable antagonism of their interests to the entire modern political system"123/ no matter how frequent, extended and stubborn they are. Before this conscious element comes to the forefront, even the strikes represent no more than a "class struggle in embryo".124/ Although the strike was an advancement on the riots, it was still only a "purely spontaneous movement".125/ The workers' hostility towards the capitalists in the form of riots or strikes expressed a vague consciousness of their oppression. If the strike is not merely a resistance to a greater exploitation but also a demand to reduce exploitation, the fight continues to be a fight to obtain concessions.

b) Luxemburg's Mass Strike

The analysis of the mass strike made by Rosa Luxemburg in her Mass Strike, Party and Trade Unions126/

122. Lenin, What is to be Done, op. cit., p. 143.

123. Idem.

124. Idem.

125. Idem.

126. Rosa Luxemburg, Mass Strike, Party and Trade Unions (1906) in Dick Howard, ed., Selected Political Writings of Rosa Luxemburg, translated by Dick Howard, Monthly Review Press New York, 1971, pp. 223-270.

is very much related to this kind of discussion In view of the relevance of Luxemburg's concept of strike in this work, it will be fully quoted here:

Political and economic strikes, mass strikes and partial strikes, demonstrative strikes and fighting strikes, general strikes in single branches and general strikes of individual cities, peaceful wage struggles and street massacres, barricade fighting - all these run through one another, next to each other, cross one another, flow in and over one another; it is an eternal moving, changing sea of appearances. And the law of movement of these phenomena is clear. It does not lie in the mass strike itself, not in its technical particularities, but in political and social relation of the forces of the revolution. The mass strike is merely the form of the revolutionary struggle. Every fluctuation in the relations of the contending powers, in the development of the parties and the division of classes, in the position of the counter-revolution, influences the strike action immediately in a thousand invisible and scarcely controllable ways. But the strike action itself hardly ceases for a moment. It merely changes its forms, its dimension and its effect. It is the living pulse-beat of the revolution, and at the same time its most powerfull driving wheel. In one word, the mass strike as the Russian Revolution shows it to us, is not a crafty means discovered by subtle reasoning in order to make the proletarian struggle more effective, but it is the mode of movement of the proletarian mass, the phenomenal form of the proletarian struggle in the revolution.^{127/}

In this definition of mass strike, Rosa Luxemburg

¹²⁷. Ibid. pp. 236-237.

contradicts the anarchist's theory of the general strike as being a means of inaugurating social revolution in contra-distinction to the daily political struggle of the working class. The anarchist's point of view is that the mass strike is the easiest way of promoting social revolution and is based on the assumption that the struggle is a technical option depending merely on one's knowledge and awareness of the situation. It is a "kind of pocket knife which one keeps clasped in his pocket".^{128/} In this sense it is no more than "an abstract and unhistorical point of view".^{129/}

Rosa Luxemburg's analysis of strike activities in Russia during the period 1896 and 1905 shows, instead, that mass strikes cannot merely evolve as the result of a given decision. With this consideration in mind, she arrived at her conception of mass strike, in which she underlines the hypothesis that mass strike is "a totality concept of a whole period of the classes struggle".^{130/} which may last for years and perhaps decades. If this is so, a mass strike cannot be an isolated action.

Luxemburg then undertakes the classification of the

128. Ibid. p. 229.

129. Ibid. p. 228.

130. Ibid. p. 231.

different types of strikes. The first is the purely political - the "demonstrative strike".^{131/} In Luxemburg's analysis, this type of strike is limited to only one city. Another kind of strike is that which she called the "fighting strike",^{132/}, which is for the most part spontaneous and stems from local or accidental causes that have not become generalized. This type of strike tends to transform itself into an economic struggle. For Luxemburg, the demonstrative strike is the first manifestation of the strike as a movement.

Luxemburg places the May Day celebration in an honour position as the first great demonstration of the aegis of the mass struggle.

The fighting strike is "the true bearer of the proletarian action" because:

the economic and political moment cannot be separated from each other. Here too, reality deviates radically from the theoretical schema. The pedantic notion, according to which the pure political mass strike as the most mature and highest stage, is the logical result of the trade unionist general strike, but at the same time kept clearly distinct from it, is fundamentally contradicted by the experience of the Russian Revolution. This is expressed not merely in the historical fact that the mass strikes, beginning with that first great wage

131. Idem.

132. Ibid. p. 238.

struggle of the Petersburg textile workers in 1896-1897, to the last great mass strike in December 1905, passed imperceptibly from the economic to the political so that it is nearly impossible to draw a dividing line between them.^{133/}

An observation of particular relevance for our purposes is that:

every individual instance of great mass strikes repeats, so to speak, in miniature the general history of the Russian mass strikes, beginning with a purely or at least partially trade-union conflict and passing through all the stages to the political demonstration.^{134/}

However, Luxemburg also proposes that:

the movement on the whole does not proceed merely from the economic to the political struggle, but also vice-versa. Each of the great political mass actions, after it has attained its political zenith, breaks up into a mass of economic strikes.^{135/}

This characteristic is generally clear from the analysis of great mass strikes and revolution. The "extension, clarification, and intensification" of the potency of the political struggle has a definite influence on the economic struggle, a movement in the opposite direction being also postulated. A victory in the political struggle encouraged the workers to initiate economic

133. Ibid. p. 240.

134. Idem.

135. Ibid. p. 241.

demands. Simultaneously, in their struggle with the capital, the workers create an "ever fresh reservoir of strength",^{136/} which may serve as the basis for political struggle. Luxemburg summarizes her view on the struggle in this way:

In a word, the economic struggle is that which leads the political struggle from one nodal point to another; the political struggle is that which periodically fertilizes the soil for the economic struggle. Cause and effect here continually change places. Thus, far from being completely separated or even mutually exclusive, as the pedantic scheme sees it, the economic and political moments in the mass strike period form only two interlacing sides of the proletarian class struggle in Russia, and their unity is precisely the mass strike.^{137/}

In order to get at the pure political mass strike, views to the contrary constitute an "artificial logical dissection of the mass strike; then by this dissection, as with any other it will not perceive the phenomenon in its living existence but will kill it altogether".^{138/} With regard to the general relation between mass strike and revolution, it is Luxemburg's opinion that "the mass strike does not produce the revolution but rather, the revolution produces a mass strike".^{139/} It would, therefore,

136. Idem..

137. Idem.

138. Ibid. p. 242.

139. Ibid. p. 244.

be impossible to initiate mass strike simply because there exists the will to do so. Small-scale working class demonstrations may be decided upon by the party but a mass strike cannot be brought about simply because it is the will of the leading parties or because the people are enthusiastic about it. Mass strikes depend on certain unforeseeable historical factors arising spontaneously. Furthermore:

even when the proletariat...plays the leading role, the revolution is not a maneuver executed by the proletariat in the open field; rather it is a struggle in the midst of the unceasing, crashing, crumbling, and displacing of all the social foundations. In short, the elements of spontaneity plays such a prominent role in the mass strikes in Russia, not because the Russian proletariat is "unschooled" but because revolutions allow no one to play schoolmaster to them.^{140/}

The revolutionary conditions arising in Russia for the emergence of the mass strike are inclined to disappear in "the peaceful normal course of the bourgeois society".^{141/} The political struggle then, also takes on the representative form of the bourgeois state and tends to rely on pressures. Economic struggles are mainly dissolved into a multitude of individual struggles

140. Ibid. p. 245.

141. Ibid. p. 252.

within each enterprise and each branch of production.^{142/}
Therefore, one of the party's major tasks is to show that the division between economic and political struggle is unreal in the sense that they are not essentially different but two moments away from a single class struggle.^{143/}

c) Georges Sorel's General Strike

Georges Sorel's point of view, regarding the political scope of strike action is opposite to Lenin's. In view of the importance of this author in so-called revolutionary unionism, we have included a brief account of his conception of the general strike. Sorel considers the union general strike and Marx' catastrophic revolution as "myths", in other words:

groups of images that evoke globally and intuitively, prior to reflexive analysis, the totality of sentiments corresponding to the different manifestations of the war waged by socialism against modern society.^{144/}

The myths that have arisen around the Reform, the

142. Idem.

143. Ibid. pp. 253-270.

144. Georges Sorel, Reflexiones Sobre la Violencia, Editorial la Pleyade, Buenos Aires (n.d.), translated by Luis Alberto Ruiz based on "Reflexions sur la Violence" (eighth French Edition) the English version is ours.

French Revolution and the Mazzinists are just a few examples of systems of images representing new historical forces that could not have given rise to positively revolutionary processes had they been expressed only verbally, or assimilated into the concept of pure utopia, which can only lead to partial reform and may be compared to mere automatic movements.^{145/} Liberal political economy is an example of pure utopia without a myth. However, the myth or "drama" of the general strike refuses to accept the "fabrication" of hypotheses related to future struggles and ways of abolishing capitalism, as occurs with the model of historical narrations.^{146/} If the images of an uncertain future are of a specific kind, they may be extremely effective and have very few drawbacks. This occurs with myths involving the most outstanding tendencies of a group of people, party or class; such strong tendencies, that they are like instincts recurring in every aspect of life, making real the hopes from prompt action on which the reforming of the will is based.^{147/} The details of the myth are unimportant - they may even be unsuccessful - what is real relevant is the general impression or image it invokes.^{148/}

145. Ibid. p. 39.

146. Ibid. p. 25.

147. Ibid. p. 126.

148. Ibid. p. 127.

It may be that the unionists are mistaken in their "fantastic" image of the general strike, but in preparing for a revolution it may be an element of great strength. When seen from this point of view, the general strike is:

the myth into which socialism is completely condensed, that is to say, an array of images capable of instinctively evoking all those sentiments related to different manifestations of the war waged between socialism and modern society. The strike has produced in the proletariat the most noble sentiments, the most profound and moving that it is capable of possessing; the general strike brings us all together as a whole, and by doing so bestows its maximum intensity on each.

On the other hand, when evoking disturbing memories of particular conflicts, it gives intensity and colour to all the details appearing in one's consciousness. Thus, we require an intuition about socialism, which cannot be transmitted well through language. We received it instantly and completely.^{149/}

Under these terms, the general strike undertaken by the proletariat is the major element in establishing revolutionary socialism. All the events of the conflict will then appear in a magnified form, maintaining the idea of catastrophe - the cleavage will be perfect.^{150/} With the possibility of the general strike leading to

149. Ibid. pp. 128-129.

150. Ibid. p. 194.

revolutionary socialism and the regeneration of the world, there should be no hesitation to use any weapon available which might serve to develop to a greater degree the spirit of the class war.

Existing social conditions favour the production of an infinite number of acts of violence, and there has been no hesitation in urging the workers not to refrain from brutality when this might do them service.151/

In order to achieve the "cleavage among classes", the propaganda of the middle classes favouring the application of a mild and gentle method oriented towards achieving social solidarity cannot even be considered, let alone the attempts made to implement it. "The official professors", the "worthy progressive" the "pontiffs of social duty" are afraid of violence because they are:

instinctively inclined to think that any act of violence is a manifestation of a return to barbarism. Peace has always been considered the greatest of blessings and the essential condition of all material progress.152/

Nevertheless, one may question oneself as to whether there is not "a little stupidity in the admiration of our

151. Ibid. p. 195.

152. Ibid. p. 187.

contemporaries for gentle methods", a possibility brought up by "several authors remarkable for their perspicacity and their interest in the ethical side of every question".^{153/} These authors do not seem to have the same fear of violence as do the middle class representatives. For Sorel, there is no doubt that the violence that lead to socialism is morally superior to the solidarity proclaimed by the middle class.

An essential element of socialism is one that opposes the middle class proposal of class solidarity. Anti-patriotism arose in response to a distrust on the part of the proletariat, of the claim made by the middle class that "capitalist society in one great family". Undoubtedly, many well-intentioned people will have to "suffer many blows, many humiliations, and many money losses before they decide to allow socialism to follow its own course".^{154/}

Not only the middle class professionals, clerics and intellectuals, but also the so-called democracy along with the political parties, are enemies of violence. There is no historical experience which justifies the platonic hope that there is a means by which modern states may free themselves from the exploitation

153. Ibid. p. 188.

154. Ibid. p. 196.

characterized by the functioning of political parties. These organizations are, in many respects, the instrument of exploitation of the proletariat. It was Rousseau who demanded that "democracy should not tolerate the existence in its midst of any private association",¹⁵⁵ a reasoning deduced from his knowledge of the republics of the Middle Ages and the role played by politico-criminal associations in that society. Under these circumstances, the only way left open for the proletariat to construct revolutionary socialism is the general strike lead by their own organizations, that is to say, the trade unions.

Gramsci's Hegemony and the Limits of
Syndicalism and the General Strike

Gramsci's criticism of Sorel evolves around the trade unions' and general strikes' limited possibilities as forgers of the "active and constructive phase of the collective will", a task more apt for the "Modern Prince", that is to say, the party. As Gramsci says:

Sorel did not advance from the conception of the ideology-myth to an understanding

¹⁵⁵. Ibid. pp. 206-7.

of the political party, but stopped short at the conception of the trade union. It is true that for Sorel the myth did not find its greatest expression in the union as an organization of a collective will, but in the practical action of the union and of an already operating collective will, practical action whose greater realization was, according to him, the general strike, that is "passive activity", so to speak, of negative and preliminary character (the positive character is provided only by the agreement reached by the associated wills), an activity which does not envisage its own active and constructive phase.^{156/}

From a theoretical and practical point of view, syndicalism would not be able to overcome the shortcomings of "economism":

in that it relates to a subordinate group, which is prevented by this theory from ever becoming dominant of developing beyond the economico-corporative phase in order to raise itself to the phase of ethico-political hegemony in civil society and of domination in the state.^{157/}

The true scope of this critique comes to light when one tries to understand the meaning given by Gramsci to the concept of civil society and the state and their position in the structural and superstructural levels of society. Among the different interpretations of

156. Antonio Gramsci, "The Modern Prince. Essay on the Science of politics in the modern age" in The Modern Prince and Other Writings, International Publisher, New York, ninth printing, 1983, p. 136.

157. Ibid. p. 154.

Gramsci, we have chosen to adopt in this work that of Bobbio, particularly because of his interpretation of the new meaning given to the concepts of civil society and hegemony and their relationship with Marx' and Lenin's interpretations, respectively.^{158/}

For Gramsci, as opposed to Marx, civil society is not the centre of production relations, but the home of ideologies and institutions. Civil society is, in fact, one of the levels in the superstructure. In this respect Gramsci states:

For the moment we can fix two great "floors" of the superstructure: that which can be called "civil society", i.e. all the organizations which are commonly called "private", and that of "political society" or state, which corresponds to the function of "hegemony" which the ruling class exercises over the whole of society and to that of "direct rule" or of command which is expressed in the state and in juridical government.^{159/}

158. As Bob Jessop states, "although the theoretical and political stature of Gramsci is not in doubt, disagreement abounds concerning the exact meaning of his concepts and their interrelations". Among the different interpretations of Gramsci, Jessop pays particular attention to Poulantzas, Mouffe and Mouffe and Laclau. He also puts forward a "methodological critique of new-gramscianism. See his The Capitalist State Marxist Theories and Methods and especially "Hegemony, Force and State Power, "New York University Press, New York and London, 1982, pp. 142-209.

159. Antonio Gramsci, "The Formation of Intellectuals" (1949) in op. cit., p. 124; Gli Intellettuali e L'Organizzazione della Cultura Einaudi Turin, cont. next page.

For Gramsci, civil society is not made up of the whole range of material relationship, but rather of the set of ideological and cultural ones; it does not comprise the whole of commercial and industrial life, as it did for Marx, but rather the whole of society's spiritual and intellectual life. If Marx was right in stating that the civil society is the true home or scenario for the whole of history, then this extension to the meaning of civil society on Gramsci's part implies that history's true home or scenario has changed places.

Bobbio sees the relationship between Marx (and Engels) and Gramsci in the following terms. For both Marx and Gramsci, civil society represents the active, positive moment of historical development. For Hegel this moment was represented by the state. The difference lies in the fact that for Marx this active, positive moment is structural, but for Gramsci it is superstructural. In other words, both placed emphasis on civil

cont.

159. 1949, p. 9. According to Bobbio, there are also parts of Gramsci's work in which civil society is considered as a moment of the State in a broad sense. See Gramsci, Lettere dal Carcere, Einaudi, Turin, 1974, p. 481; Note Sul Machiavelli, Sulla Politica e Sullo Stato Moderno, Einaudi, Torino, 1949, p. 130; Passato e Presente, Einaudi, Turin, 1951 p. 172 and Norberto Bobbio, Gramsci y La Concepción de la Sociedad Civil, Editorial Avance, S.A, La Garratxca, Barcelona 13, 1976 p. 35.

society and not on the state, as Hegel had done, putting an end to the Ius-naturalista tradition. In a sense, they had gotten around Hegel. Marx's modification implies the transition from the superstructural or conditioning moment to the structural or conditioning moment. In Gramsci, the change occurs within the superstructure itself. Thus, the revaluation of civil society is not what Gramsci and Marx have in common but what distinguishes one from the other.^{160/}

The Hegalian civil society that Gramsci has in mind is not the same system of needs, that is to say, the economic relations that was Marx's starting point, but the institutions that regulate this system. As Hegel says: "just as the family", constitutes "the ethical roots of the state that penetrate into civil society," these institutions are "the stable foundations of the state"..., "the corner stones of public liberty".^{161/}

According to Bobbio's interpretation, Gramsci postulates two types of antitheses that explain the differences between structure and superstructure on the one hand, and between civil society and State on the other. The main antithesis exists between structure and

160. Bobbio, op. cit., pp. 35-36.

161. Quotes from Hegel's Philosophie des Rechts taken by Bobbio in op. cit., pp. 38-39.

superstructure. Structure refers to what Gramsci calls the economic moment, whereas superstructure has to do with the ethico-political moment, the moment of freedom. For Gramsci, the superstructural moment is the dominant one, thus inverting the relationship between structure and superstructure as it was conceived by Marx.

Beside this main antithesis, there is a secondary antithesis to be found within the superstructure, involving the relationship between civil society and the State. Civil society is one in which ideologies and institutions are to be found. In this society, movements are not generated by necessity but by liberty. Gramsci sees ideologies not only as posthumous justification of power but also as forces that create and form history and elements that collaborate with power in the construction of a new society. This is the positive moment of the antithesis.

The State, on the other hand, represents the negative moment in that it is the centre from which force is exercised. This interpretation proposed by Gramsci is of particular relevance insofar as it gives the superstructural moment identified with the civil society a very special meaning in the context of the constitution of the new hegemony that the working class must create for the entire popular sector.

Gramsci's point of view on the classless society is

derived from this idea, in other words, the matter of the end of the State pertaining to a different antithesis to the one proposed by Marx. In Gramsci, the class society is that in which the State, as a moment of force or negative moment, opposes the civil society as a positive moment. The disappearance of the State and of classes, results from what Gramsci calls "the absorption of the State by the civil society".^{162/} In Marx, a solution to the dichotomy class society - classless society is to be found in a dialectic movement in which civil society, identified with material relations is revolutionized by a new structural order. The principle of transformation of the class society is one that is situated at a structural level. In the Orthodox Marxist point of view, once the class structure disappears, the state is also eliminated. Gramsci's notion of "historical block" refers to a global historical situation involving both the structural and superstructural elements in both senses. The distinction between "historical blocks" arises from the

162. Machiavelli, op.cit., pp. 94, 128 and 130. In Il Materialismo Storico e La Filosofia di Benedetto Croce, Einaudi Torino, 1948, p.73, the author only mentions the "advent of the political society" and the "advent of the regulated society". On the other hand, in Lettere dal Carcere, op.cit., p.160 the party is described as "the instrument for going from the civil-political society to the 'regulated society' in that it absorbs both, in order to improve them". Cited by Bobbio, op. cit., p. 56.

way in which the antithesis between structure and super-structure is resolved, in other words, from the manner in which the main antithesis is solved. The secondary antithesis, that is, the one that exists between civil society and political society serves to distinguish a progressive "historical block" from a regressive "historical block".

The above-mentioned differences are also useful to distinguish between Lenin and Gramsci's concept of hegemony.^{163/} According to Bobbio, Lenin sees that the moment of force is primary and decisive to the understanding of his notion of hegemony. For Gramsci, hegemony

163. More often than not, authors fail to point out that the term "hegemony" was not part of the language used by Lenin, although it is common in Stalin, who canonized it, so to speak. Lenin preferred to speak of the "leadership" (Rukovodstvo) and "leader" (Rukovodstvo/Ditel). In one of the rare fragments he introduced the term "hegemonic", he meant it to be synonymous with governing. In Gramscian language, hegemony and words derived from it were used later in two writings in 1926, one was a letter to the Soviet Communist Party's Central Committee and the other the unfinished work on the Meridian question, both immediately prior to the Quaderni. Its use was very uncommon in those writings inspired directly by Leninist thought between 1917 and 1924. The term "hegemony" as it is used in the Quaderni and in the letters does not have the same meaning it has in the two writings of 1926 in which it is given the official meaning of the Soviet texts and refers to the alliance between the workers and the peasants. In other words it is used for political leadership. Here the meaning that predominates is that of "cultural leadership". See Bobbio, op. cit., pp. 49-50, 51-52.

also involves the positive moment of cultural leadership. The function of hegemony is not only the formation of a political will capable of creating a new state apparatus and of transforming society but also the elaboration and, therefore, the diffusion, of a new vision of the world. The concept of hegemony is much more extended in Gramsci than in Lenin. The relationship between the moment of force and the moment of cultural leadership is inverted for Gramsci, with the conquest of the state occurring in the context of the civil society.

Cultural leadership in Gramsci is undertaken by diverse cultural entities belonging to the civil society and is not merely a function to be carried out by the party. Furthermore, the function of the party is in fact the propagation of a hegemonic proposal in the entire civil society. Through this cultural activity the state is "absorbed" as a negative moment, i.e. an agent of force and mere political leadership. In Gramsci the State becomes extinct as it is reabsorbed by the civil society and not simply overcome by some structural change or by "political dictatorship".

D. Strike Dimension.

Despite the historic-sociological approach assumed in this section, one cannot help noticing a strong politico-ideological undercurrent. In keeping with our

established aims, we will attempt to distinguish between the different types of strikes that have taken place during the evolution of the Chilean trade union movement, with particular attention to some of the more relevant sociological factors. It is clear that a description of this nature will make it easier to evaluate the political scope of these strikes and their relevance in the evolution of the Chilean trade union movement and the workers' parties in the context of a socialist society in the process of formation.

The strike dimensions which will be examined in detail are their magnitude, frequency, nature and aims. The socio-political elements conditioning strikes will also be considered. The purpose of our analysis of the magnitude of the strike actions is to ascertain their density in terms of the number and diversity of types of works involved. During the earlier periods, a distinction will be made between strike actions according to the activity, sector or combination of sectors affected, the most extensive category being, of course, the general strike. For the subsequent periods the indicators employed varied. Between 1946 and 1954 (a period of retreat from conflict), only a few labour conflict incidents are detected and, therefore, the previous indicators cannot be applied. On the other hand, during the later stages (1955-1970), due to the greater amount and

quality of the data available, it will be possible to use indicators such as man-days lost, and number of persons involved in the strike action.

With regard to the nature of strike actions, the main interest is focussed on the degree of violence to which they gave rise. This particular aspect is clearer during the earlier periods studied, for once the labour conflict becomes institutionalized, it becomes mainly a negotiating lever. Nevertheless, for the later stages, it is possible to distinguish between legal and illegal strikes, i.e. those that conform to and those that go beyond the institutional framework, respectively.

In dealing with the specific strike aims it will be possible to distinguish between specific economic aims and general ones, and between trade union aims and political ones. A distinction may be made between those economic aims referring to labour status and those relating to living conditions. General economic aims refer to conflicts generated by the cost of living, inflation and unemployment. Trade union aims refer mainly to the demand for free labour organization and the right to strike.

Political aims gather together the conflicts generated by the repressive action of the authorities and the workers' demands for a general climate of tolerance for the realization of their activities. The workers'

demonstrations in support of the prevailing constitutionality of the country in the sixties and of certain political process can also be included in this category. Naturally, these distinctions are not meant to imply that conflicts arising from the pursuit of economic and trade union aims lack political motivation.

The strike aims can be distinguished, not only according to their relationship to economic, trade union and political content, but also depending on their degree of radicalism. Thus, in this context it is possible to distinguish between aims involving different degrees of transformation, depending on the complexity of the changes sought. It is also important to distinguish between the objective aims pursued by strikes and the real effects on the workers as seen in terms of their relationship to the social structure as a whole. Finally, one is aware that it is not always easy or even useful to discriminate between strikes with economic content and strikes with trade union and political content. Often, these two aspects are mixed together or are both simultaneously present in the aims pursued by the strike action.

E. An Overview of Relations Between Trade Unionism and the State.

From the point of view of relations between the

State and Trade unions, our study can be interpreted as an examination of the possibilities of evolution of the trade union movement under a democratic regime. The range of political frameworks surrounding Chile's trade union history dealt with herein shares a common affiliation with liberal-democratic forms of political organization. The predominance of this general trend is not contradicted by the absence of true democracy during the first few decades of this century, nor by the authoritarian interregna between 1924 and 1938 and the flagrant violence committed against this political system with the application of the law for Permanent Defence of Democracy during the late 1940's, for example.

In very simplified terms, under the democratic-liberal state with all its imperfections and deviations from what one would consider real freedom of trade union activities, organized workers became stronger than ever before, as they were considered key actors in society's political conflict. A specific feature of Chilean trade unionism's political evolution was the fact that it was granted relative autonomy from the State's labour apparatus. Trade unionism as a sociological phenomenon preceded its own legal institutionalization. This was most apparent with the miners' union and to a lesser degree with the industrial unions. In other Latin American countries, trade unionism became a mass movement only

after its induction by the State. The extension of rural trade unionism in Chile was strongly conditioned by the Christian Democrat government's direct intervention in the countryside. However, due recognition must be given to the contribution of the Communist Party and the Catholic Church later on.

During the evolution of the democratic State in Chile, trade unionism became consolidated as an important political organization inasmuch as its relevance as a political actor within the economic development pattern adopted by the society could be maintained. Thus, during the first few decades of the nation's industrialization based on import substitution policies, the trade unions' strength and its growing political influence were backed by an economic and political process in which the industrial bourgeoisie and the State itself were also actively involved. When the government assumed the role of the modernizing agent of agrarian relations, an analogous phenomenon developed, thus creating the structural conditions for the development of unions among the workers in rural areas.

On analyzing the situation facing trade unions in many countries of Latin America, one is aware of the tremendous influence the national industrialization process and political democratization had on trade union development. The crisis in the trade union movement was

strongly determined by the limitations of our dependent economies in sustaining the distributive growth pattern inherent in the democratic state. In effect, when both the national bourgeoisie and the State became less able to foster industrial expansion towards the production of certain intermediate and capital goods, the structural determinants of the democratic State also began to disappear. New regimes then provided the economic and political conditions consistent with a new development model more and more in keeping with the accumulative needs of the most industrialized countries of the international capitalist system. The difficulties faced by the State in making the more sophisticated stages of the industrialization process viable were solved at the expense of economic independence. Distributive problems arose, conflicting interests had to be suppressed and restraints imposed in the game of politics.

In the democratic State the evolution of the unions also depended upon the extent to which the workers' demands were tolerated as well as on the economy's expansive cycle. In the case of Chile, these were the major determining factors in the unionized workers' economic and social progress.

From the point of view of more general conditioning elements in trade union development, the extent to which this development was dependent on the electoral expansion

of moderate or leftist progressive political forces is worth noting. This phenomenon in turn implied a lengthy struggle against an extremely restrictive electoral system determined to conserve ad hoc the political power enjoyed by traditional groups. Thus, one may observe a very significant historical relationship between the evolution of trade unionism and the development of progressive political forces.

It is clear, therefore, that trade unionism also meant progress in the democratization of the society as a whole. From the point of view of the workers' interest, the society achieved a greater degree of democracy in that it was able to guarantee legal status for labour relations thus curbing arbitrary action on the part of the employer, grant salary and economic rights congruent with the real needs of the workers, provide job opportunities and assure the stability of the same, create social security and welfare systems and legalize the right to unionize and undertake collective bargaining, which included the right to strike.

The evolution undergone by social rights in Chile during the present decade indicates a definite, though gradual, improvement in workers' rights. This process occurred over a period of seventy years, while the political system evolved through different types of

political organizations, each more democratic than the previous.

CHAPTER II

THE STAGE OF SPONTANEOUS ISOLATED MASS UNIONISM

1890-1915

A. Forms of Protests

The comparative scarcity of large-scale conflictive actions and the incipient character of organization are the most outstanding features of the labour movement during this stage. Conflictive activity is mainly limited to the mining industries located in very concentrated geographical areas. Moreover, this activity exhibits a very spontaneous and on-occasion violent character due to the absence of highly developed labour organizations and the embryonic character of political influences.

During this stage, various types of conflicts must be distinguished. Violent incidents are only one example. However, even though these violent incidents were not very frequent, they characterize the entire period because of the significance which they bear.

In effect, between 1890 and 1915 it is possible to discriminate among such diverse forms of protest as violent incidents, strikes, Labour Day celebrations and various movements. All these distinctions are necessary in order to formulate a conceptual outline of forms of

protests, keeping in mind the historical development of the labour movement, and trying to avoid the simplifications and idealized representations to which studies in this area are prone. This classification is based on three criterions: the magnitude, the character, and the degree of organization of the form of protest. The term "incident" refers to forms of protest characterized by violent repression which frequently result in death and injury. A "strike" can either be "sectorial" or "intersectorial". The former term refers to the workers' actions linked to the same type of industrial activity but encompassing diverse strikes taking place at the same time within it, and the latter, to a joint strike by different types of workers. In addition, for certain purposes, we must distinguish the types of strike actions which affect only one work centre. Finally, the term "general strike" refers to the form of protest carried out by all groups of workers in one or several cities or geographic areas. Labour Day celebrations include all May 1st. celebrations. The term "movements" refers to demonstrations, i.e. marches and proclamations of little significance, generally of a spontaneous character.

With the exception of strike actions that occur in a single work centre, the distribution of all these forms of protests is summarized in Table 1, page 106.

TABLE No. 1

FREQUENCY OF STRIKES, GENERAL, SECTORIAL AND INTERSECTORIAL STRIKES
MAY CELEBRATIONS, MOVEMENTS, AND INCIDENTS
(1890 - 1915)

Years	General Strikes	Sectorial Strikes	Inter- sectorial Strikes	May Celebrations	M o v e m e n t s Demon- strations	Meetings	Incidents
1890	-	-	-	-	1	-	-
1898	-	-	-	-	1	-	-
1899	-	-	-	-	1	-	-
1900	-	-	-	1	-	-	-
1901	-	-	1	1	-	1	-
1902	-	4	1	-	1	3	-
1903	1	1	1	1	-	6	1
1904	-	-	-	1	-	1	2
1905	1	1	-	1	2	-	1
1906	1	3	6	1	-	1	2
1907	1	2	2	1	1	1	1
1908	-	2	-	1	-	1	-
1909	-	-	-	1	-	-	-
1910	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1911	1	-	-	1	-	-	-
1912	1	-	-	1	-	-	-
1913	-	-	11	1	-	4	-
1914	-	-	-	1	-	2	-
1915	-	-	-	1	-	-	-
Total	6	13	22	13	7	20	7

Source: Author's classification based on Barría J., Los Movimientos Sociales de Principios del Siglo XX, Unpublished Thesis Pedagógico. U. de Chilo. pp. 113-172 and following.

Note: Strike actions occurring in a single work centre are excluded (See Table 4, p. 126) The coverage of strike herein does not purport to be statistically complete. As already stated, the analysis of strike actions for the first two periods is based on the works of Barría, which cover only the most relevant strikes as they are reported by the press of epoch. For the third period the relevant source is El Mercurio and includes only the most important strikes. The statistics of ILO for the third period and those of the Labour Department for the last one can be regarded as closer to statistical completeness.

A first glance at the data suggests the relatively small significance of the general strike. A more important place is occupied by sectorial and intersectorial strikes, and meetings appear to be the most significant form of action.

The incidents, as a form of protest, deserve particular mention. The incident originated by port workers of Valparaíso in 1903, demanding an increase in wages, resulted in a confrontation between the police and the workers, leaving 50 dead and 200 wounded. Many installations were also burned down.

In 1904 two important incidents took place in the nitrate mines provoking the death of 14 miners. In 1905 the "Semana Roja" (Red Week) occurred in Santiago, when large-scale popular meetings were organized to protest against low wages and the high cost of living. The masses assaulted shops, offices and police stations setting them on fire. This incident left 70 dead and 300 wounded. Furthermore, in 1906, a mine worker participating in a protest demanding higher wages was killed in Coronel.

Two more violent incidents which occurred during this period ought to be mentioned: In 1906 a violent incident took place in Antofagasta, when nitrate miners, dock workers and other groups of workers protested against the abuses and the lack of breaks during the working time;

which resulted in 148 deaths. The other incident took place in the "Escuela de Santa María de Iquique" resulting in the death of 2,000 nitrate miners who were demanding higher wages.^{164/}

In short, this period of the labour movement evolution is marked by the death of nearly 3,000 workers in incidents of this type.

Another way to characterize the various conflict manifestations is to identify the types of jobs which show a higher propensity to strike (See Table 2, page 109).

In this analysis we do not apply the same criterion as in the previous one. Neither the general strike nor the different kinds of "movements" are included herein, since it was not possible to identify the total number of work involved in these cases. We only include sector strikes of several sectors at once, and those involving single work centres. In this respect the activities with a higher conflict propensity are those linked to ports and mining occupations. Particularly important among the former are bargemen, stevedores and customs officers; among the latter the most important are nitrate workers with 27 strikes and coal workers with 19. Copper

^{164.} The incidents of The Escuela Santa María de Iquique have been selected as a typical case of strike activities of the period. See this analysis at the end of this chapter.

TABLE NO. 2

FREQUENCY OF STRIKES BY TYPE OF JOBS
(1890 - 1915)

Years	Rail- road work- ers	Port work- ers	Mi- ners	Local Govern- ment Work- ers	Coach- men(1)	Cons- truc- tion work- ers(2)	Ba- kers	Metal- lur- gical Work- ers	Steam Dri- vers	Print- ters	Lea- ther (3)	Other (4)	Other Manu- Factu- ries(5)	T o t a l
1880	-	1	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4
1898	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
1899	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	1	-	-	1
1900	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
1901	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	3
1902	4	7	3	1	-	1	-	-	1	1	-	2	1	21
1903	-	7	8	-	-	-	1	-	1	-	-	1	-	18
1904	1	3	6	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	10
1905	3	6	8	1	-	1	3	1	1	-	1	1	-	26
1906	2	10	6	1	3	1	1	5	2	3	5	1	5	45
1907	7	12	5	1	7	1	2	9	3	13	8	5	6	79
1908	1	2	2	2	-	2	1	6	1	3	-	8	3	31
1909	2	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	5
1910	1	1	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4
1911	2	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	1	7
1912	2	9	1	-	-	1	-	-	1	-	1	1	1	17
1913	3	9	2	-	-	-	3	2	1	2	2	-	1	25
1914	1	3	1	-	-	-	1	1	-	1	-	-	-	8
1915	-	1	2	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	2	1	-	8
TOTAL	29	75	50	7	10	7	13	25	14	24	21	21	18	314

Source: See source Table No. 1, p. 106,

Note: This table includes only strikes by single place of work, sectorial and intersectorial strikes.

Classification:

- (1) Carriage drivers excluding trolley multicity railroad workers.
- (2) Carpenters, plasterers, painters.
- (3) Shoemakers, tanners, briefcase makers.
- (4) Slaughterhouse workers and commercial actors.
- (5) Glass, breweries, textile, tailors

miners strikes have no significance during this period.

A third place is held by railroad workers. Activities associated with metallurgy occupied the fourth place and typographical workers the fifth. Under the first category, the most outstanding are engine-shop workers, foundry workers and others. In typography the most important are book and newspapers printers. These are followed by shoemakers, leather workers and tanners.

The implications of the former characterization become more evident when the distribution of strikes, according to regions, is studied (See Table 3, page 111). In the nitrate zone there appears to be a frequency of 112 strikes; this includes Mejillones, La Pampa, Iquique, Pisagua, Tocopilla, Taltal, Chanaral and Antofagasta.

The sectorial or intersectorial strike acquires greater importance in these places than in the strikes by single work centres. The latter type has greater importance in Santiago.

In the case of general strikes by regions, out of six that took place during this period, none of them took place in Santiago. Two took place in the nitrate regions and two in Magallanes.

This analysis corroborates the findings in the study of strikes by type of jobs. The highest propensity to strike appears to exist in mining and maritime activities carried out in the northern regions.

I_A_B_L_E_No._3

FREQUENCY OF STRIKES BY REGIONS (1890--1915)

Regions	Number of strikes	Ranking Position
Nitrate region (1)	112	1
Santiago	69	2
Valparaíso (2)	58	3
Coal region (3)	21	4
Concepción	18	5
Punta Arenas	11	6
Coquimbo	6	7
Talcahuano	5	8
Valdivia	3	9
Arica (4)	3	10
Talca	3	11
Linares	2	12
Chillan	2	13
Copper region	2	14
Temuco	1	15
Los Angeles	1	
Tinguiririca	1	
San Carlos	1	
Unknown region	3	
T O T A L	314	

Source: See source Table No. 1, p. 106

Note: This table includes only strikes by single place of work, sectorial and intersectorial strikes.

- (1) Nitrate region: Mejillones, Pampa, Iquique, Pisague, Tocopilla, Taltal, Chanaral, Antofagasta.
- (2) Valparaíso: Valparaíso, Calera.
- (3) Coal region: Lota, Coronel, Lebu the zone as a whole.
- (4) Arica: Arica and Tacna.

B. The Economic Conditioning Elements:--Concentrated Economic Development

According to our previous definitions, Chile's distinctive economic development pattern is that of an enclave-economy developed in the northern mining regions. We can also find, to a lesser extent, development centres in whole sectors linked to the transportation of minerals and other intermediate activities in the North, as well as in Valparaíso. Again to a lesser degree, industrial activities in Santiago and the coal mining industries in the area of Concepción also show clear indications of economic progress.

The trend of Chilean development at this time is perhaps best defined as that of an externally oriented primary economy.

The most dynamic pole of development is the nitrate industry. Nitrate production increases by 70% between 1900 and 1910. There is a very close relationship between this trend and export developments; exports doubled during this period amounting to US\$200 millions in the most recent years.^{165/} This development pattern is also reflected in the migration of workers from Central Regions and, to a lesser extent, from the Norte Chico to

165. Hurtado Carlos, Concentración de la Población y Desarrollo Económico. El Caso Chileno. U. de Chile Instituto de Economía, Santiago Chile. 1966,p.173.

the nitrate regions. The study of the census returns of 1895 and 1907 indicates that during this time the Northern population increased at an annual rate of 65% amounting to 235,000 inhabitants in 1910,-166/ whereas the rate of population growth in Santiago was 30%; the country as a whole increased by only 20%.-167/

The active population working in the nitrate industry doubled from 20,000 in 1901 to 44,000 in 1910. The number of offices employing these workers also increased from 66 in the first year to 100 in the last year.168/ This population was concentrated in no more than five centres, all of them in the provinces of Tarapaca and Antofagasta.169/

There is no information available for the same year regarding the coal mining industry, the second most important mining endeavour of the epoch. Yet we know that at the beginning of the period there were only three mining centres, highly concentrated and close to each other, namely Lautaro, Arauco and Lebu with 3,500 blue-collar workers.170/ Industrial activities were

166. Ibid. p. 144.

167. Ibid. pp. 144 and 146.

168. Idem.

169. Source: Dirección General de Estadísticas, Anuario Estadístico Minería y Metalúrgica (1911-1915) Sociedad Imprenta y Litografía Universo, 1915.

170. Barría J., Los Movimientos Sociales op. cit. p. 10.

mainly concentrated in Santiago and Valparaíso.¹⁷¹ These observations can give us an indication of the degree of regional concentration in the leading economic sectors. This is, in the last analysis, the most influential of the economic conditioning elements affecting workers' propensity to strike.

The conflictive behaviour described above is brought about by the natural interaction of the working masses within firms, which grew as a result of economic development. However, the uneven degree of economic development observed in the period, and its strong concentration in the nitrate regions and in related activities, inhibited the extent of workers' strikes in other provinces and throughout the entire country. The working masses were largely isolated from each other and scattered across the country.

C. Organizational Structure of Protests

It is not a fortuitous finding that where we observe the greatest propensity to strike, we also find a relatively high degree of organizational development. In this respect, it is relevant to examine how the

171. Sociedad de Fomento Fábril, Boletín de la Estadística Industrial, 1-20 (June, 1895, February, 1897),

characteristic of workers' organizations might have affected prevailing forms of workers' protest. At this time, we propose to distinguish three types of organizational structures related to mass behaviour: the mutuales, sociedades_de_resistencia and mancomunales

To be able to examine the way these organizations are related to forms of protest, we will refer to their levels of membership, number of national meetings and the extent to which they develop federative trends.

With regard to membership, all that can be observed is that by the middle of 1900, both mutuales and mancomunales, included approximately 20,000 workers each.^{172/} No similar information is available for the membership of "sociedades de resistencia", though historians have suggested that they were very small. By the end of the period there was data on the considerable growth experienced by Mutuales which come to include about 60,000 workers.^{173/}

All of these organizations were able to hold several types of national meetings; the Congreso Social Obrero,

172. Barria. op. cit., pp. 68, 79.

173. The following authors were consulted to gather historical data on labour organizations, state labour legislation and political parties: Barria, Jorge, all his previously quoted works as well as Breve Historia del Sindicalismo Chileno. INSORA, Santiago, 1967; El Movimiento Obrero en Chile, UTE, 1971; Chile Siglo XX, Ed. PLA, Coleccion Arauco, cont. next page

of the Mutuales, the Convencion of the Sociedades_de_Resistance and the Primer_Encuentro_de_las_Mancomunales. Whereas the Congresos_Mutuales did not develop into a national federation, the Sociedades_de_Resistance did; they became the Federación_de_Trabajadores_de_Chile and the Confederación_del_Gremio_del_Zapatero. The mancomunales were also able to form their Confederación_Mancomunal_de_Trabajadores_de_Chile.

These organizations are related to different types of workers, the mutuales being more influential among manufacturing workers in Santiago; for example, those

cont.

173. Chile 1973; Trayectoria_y_Estructura_del_Movimiento_Sindical_Chileno_1946-1962, INSORA, Publication No. 15, n.d.; Historia_de_la_CUI, Ed. PLA, Chile, 1971; Jobet Julio Cesar, Recabarren_y_los_Origenes_del_Movimiento_Obrero_y_el_Socialismo_Chileno Ed. PLA, 1973, Ensayo_Critico_del Desarrallo_Economico_Social_de_Chile, Ed. U., Santiago, Chile 1956; Teoria_y_Programa_del_Partido_Socialista, Santiago, Chile (n.d.); CTCH, Declaración_de_Principios_y_Estatutos_de_la_CTCH, Folleto, Santiago, Chile, 1943; Alba Victor, Historia_del_Movimiento_Obrero_en_America_Latina, Librerias Mejicanas, Mexico 1964; Marcelo Segall, Desarrollo_del_Capitalismo_en_Chile, Ed. del Pacifico, Santiago Chile, 1953; Arias E. Osvaldo, La_Prensa_Obrera_en_Chile, Thesis Instituto Pedagógico UCH, Santiago, 1953, Chile; Angell Alan, Politics_and_the_Labour_Movement_in_Chile, Oxford University Press, London, 1972, England; Alesandri Arturo, Recuerdos_de_Gobierno, Ed. Nacimiento, Stgo. Chile, 1967, Vol. I II and III, Viñuela, Eduardo, El_Nuevo_Significado_de_la_Seguridad_Social, Thesis of Instituto de Sociología de la UC., Stgo., 1972; Weffort Francisco, Estado_y_Masa, ILPES, Stgo. Chile, 1967; Cabero Alerto, Chile_y_los_Chilenos Ed. Lyceum Stgo, Chile 1948; Donoso, Ricardo, Allesandri_Agitador
cont. next page

linked to printing, inter-city railroad, construction, and handicrafts in general. The other two organizations recruited their membership from different type of workers i.e. they were mainly based on miners; however, while the mancomunales drew their membership from the nitrate industries, the sociedades de resistencia did the same with coal miners.

Notwithstanding these differences, it is not possible to support the view that one or the other organization had a greater control over its workers depending upon the type of work they come from. It is well known that the three organizations took an active and leading part in all important conflicts.

Although there are no great differences among them, as far as their degree of influence on the working class

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
173. y Demoleador 50 Anos de Historia Política de Chile, FCE, Mejico, 1952; Machiavello Varas Santiago, Política Económica Nacional, Ed. Balcells y Co. Stgo. Chile, 1931, Código de Trabajo Republica de Chile, Ed. Jurídica Santiago, Chile, 1970, Oficial Edition approved by the Minister of Justice; Morris J., and Oyanedel R., Afiliación y Finanzas Sindicales en Chile, INSORA, 1962, Imp. Universitaria, Santiago Chile; El Pensamiento de Luis Emilio Recabarren, Ed. Austral, Stgo. Chile, 1971, Recopilación escritos L.E.R.; Leon Echaiz Rene, Evolución Histórica de los Partidos Políticos Chilenos, Ed. Jurídica, Stgo. Chile, 1968; Guillisasti Sergio, Partidos Políticos Chilenos Ed. Nascimento, Stgo., 1964. The same authors have been consulted for the analysis of the following periods.

is concerned, we do find various distinctive characteristics in their organizational models.

When structural-functional division, decision-making processes and the source of authority are examined, it becomes clear that the model of the sociedad de resistencia is the most spontaneous, the least codified, and the least structured. Even though the sociedades de resistencia exhibited a sort of organizational structure in relation to their press and propaganda activities, by and large they lacked an overall organizational framework.

The situation is different when one studies these dimensions in the mancomunales, as shown in the following organizational graph:

Organization...No. 1: Model of Mancomunales.



Source: Derived from Barria J., op. cit. pp. 77-79.

They have four substructures: unions at the base; gremios formed by unions; the congress that groups the former divisions; and the general governing council. The consultative structures, such as the Vigilance Committee and the treasury are also a noticeable feature.^{174/}

The analysis of the other organizational variable mentioned above, i.e., the decision-making process, also verifies the spontaneous character of the Sociedad de Resistencia. A Sociedad de Resistencia does not consult a central authority; its leaders are temporary figures and rotate constantly. If there is any authority at all, it is exercised by local leaders and in a decentralized fashion.

In the case of strikes, the same authority pattern is applied in the decision-making process. In the level of firms, the unions decide to go on strike on the basis of individual voting, without consulting higher or more widely representative authorities. This is not the case with the Mancomunales, which are expected to consult provincial authorities when they decide to go on strike.

Therefore, the rarity of strikes embracing large numbers of industries and regions is related not only to

174. In their work, authors like Barria and Jobet suggest some organizational elements extracted from their organizational manifestos and newspapers.

the scarce degree of economic development, but also to the short existence of Mancomunal type workers' organizations.

As a general characteristic of the period, we can say that all organizations referred to above were just beginning to exert their ideological influence on workers' actions. They only represented the first continued and organized effort to expose workers to a political judgement on the economic and social conditions under which capital and labour relationship took place.

The organizational weakness of groups, such as the Mancomunales and the primitive structural model of Sociedades de Resistencia are, thus, the main variables to which one should resort in trying to explain why strikes did not show a greater degree of organization and a greater magnitude.

When studying the influence of these workers' associations on the character of the strike, one is tempted to propose a positive correlation between Sociedades de Resistencia and violent incidents. Nevertheless, this is not verifiable on the basis of the data available. In fact, in all the important strikes and conflicts recorded, whether violent or not, these societies shared leadership responsibilities with Mancomunales, as well as with Mutuales.

On the other hand, we did not find differences

regarding the aims behind the conflicts. Despite the statements issued by the Sociedades de Resistencia, in favour of a "communist and anarchist" society,^{175/} the analysis of strike objectives reveals few instances of strike-action arising from political conflicts (See Table No. 4, page 122).

D. Political Conditioning Elements

Perhaps, the best way to explain the violent character of protest in this epoch is found in the nature of the mechanism that the state implemented to deal with labour conflicts and in the ideology on which it is based.

The state ideology neither perceived the existence of social problems in general, nor the way in which they were manifested in the working and living conditions of miners, industrial and agricultural workers. The state did not contemplate intervention in social and economic affairs. It restricted its area of competence to the maintenance of domestic order, peace, and public security. When this characterization of the state is taken into account, it is not difficult to explain why the legal status of workers was not in contention as an issue during this period. Whenever social conflicts occurred,

^{175.} Examples of this sort of statement can be found in the anarchist publication mentioned in Chapter III.

T_A_B_L_E__No._4

EXPLICIT AIMS OF STRIKES
(1890-1915)

AIMS	No.	%
SPECIFIC ECONOMIC AIMS		
Referring to their status as workers		
- Wages	218	58.1
- Economic Benefits	24	6.4
- Working Hours	32	8.5
- Working Conditions	17	4.5
- Labour Relations	44	11.5
Referring to their		
- Living Conditions	8	2.1
GENERAL ECONOMIC AIMS	7	2.0
TRADE UNION AIMS	24	6.4
POLITICAL AIMS	2	0.5
TOTAL	376	100.00

Source: See source Table No. 1, p. 106.

Note: A similar study to the one presented herein can be found in H. Barrera's "Perspectiva Histórica de la Huelga Obrera en Chile"; C.R.N. No. 9, September 1971, CEREN, U.C. pp. 119-155.

The table presented herein differs from Barrera's in the type of categories used to classify the data, and in the greater differentiation shown between the main explicit aims of the strikes. In Barrera's study the political aims pursued by strikes are treated as components in the residual category. Finally, it should be pointed out that given the limitation of available sources, it was possible to identify causes for only 89% of the strike actions registered during this period.

A classification of explicit strike aims by economic activities and type of work can be found in Table A-1 in the statistical appendix.

they were controlled by direct repressive measures, due to the absence of an institutional framework to deal with workers' organizations and their activities.

The need for a Labour Bureau to deal with labour statistics and the granting of rights to housing and Sunday rest came about as late as 1907. However, despite these formal acknowledgements, employer-worker relationships continued to be freely administered by the former, without regard to any legal regulation, such as Employment Contracts.

This situation remains unchanged until the twenties and must be regarded as the crucial conditioning element for understanding the workers' propensity to engage in violent incidents.

E. Workers' Aims.

The notorious incidence of violent protests might lead us to believe that they correspond to radical aims pursued by the workers. Nevertheless, if the content of actual demands are closely examined, there is no evidence for such a supposition.

The analysis of the explicit aims pursued by workers is summarized in Table No. 4. on page 122.

The items subsumed under "status as workers" represent more than 50% of the aims pursued by workers. These cases indicate the deteriorating economic situation

of workers during a stage of growing expansion of nitrate activities. This assertion is strengthened if the rest of the workers' aims are considered. Among these are various items which we could designate as complaints against their payment system. Other causes for workers' protest refer to working hours and legal holidays. Workers' demands for miscellaneous improvements in working conditions, such as job security and hygiene are also related under this category. No less important in workers' protests are problems concerned with labour relations, under which the demands to control employers' abuses, arbitrary dismissals, fines, and non-fulfillment of collective agreements head the list.

In total, the strikes motivated by attempts at establishing a more satisfactory status as workers cover 90% of all cases. They demonstrate, not only how underdeveloped the legal institutionalization of labour was at the time, but also the workers' lack of protection against arbitrariness on the part of their employers.

Less frequent than the former are the protests grouped under "living conditions" which relate mainly to health and hygiene and demands for freedom from the truck system.

The less specific workers' demands, those labelled as "general" in Table No. 4 on page 122, comprise the cases in which workers protest against inflation and

unemployment.

The analysis of workers' explicit aims when engaging in strikes leaves no doubt as to what their most stable and frequent orientation was during the period. The search for a minimum recognition for their basic rights as workers was not only an inevitable struggle arising from their working and living conditions; it was also the only way they could protest against society. Neither the need of the workers to organize themselves in unions and their right to act as such, nor does any distinctive political demand emerge at this stage. Workers were just beginning to become exposed to a political critique of society.

F. The Strike at the Escuela Santa María de Iquique in December, 1907 as a Representative Type of the Stage of Spontaneous Isolated Mass Unionism.

a) Introduction

The objective in analyzing this strike is to obtain a more detailed view than that which is possible if only the already existing studies were taken into account^{176/} and thus underline its importance as

176. This event is mentioned in existing literature on the workers' movement and in generalized literature concerning Chile's development, but, until now, there has been no systematic effort to bring to
cont. next page

a prototype of strikes during this period, while at the same time determining its specific characteristics. Newspaper accounts will be used to that end and include reports from El Mercurio the traditional Chilean right-wing newspaper, La Patria, the Liberal Democratic newspaper published in Iquique and articles from the Partido Demócrata's Diario de Los Trabajadores de Tarapaca. Reports prepared by General R. Silva Renard, head of the first zone; Mr. Julio Guzman, the acting intendant and Carlos Eastman, the titular of Tarapaca^{177/}

cont.

176. light its causes and the magnitude of its historical projection, except for the narrations of Dr. Nicolás Palacios, which will be referred to later on. Apart from these, only the most basic elements of this strike are recalled. For example, in Chile un Caso de Desarrollo Frustrado. (Editorial Universitaria, 2nd edition 1962, A. Pinto only mentions the fact that it happened. Barria describes it as a milestone in the ascending spiral of the workers' struggle, prior to its culmination. See his Breve Síntesis Historia del Movimiento Obrero, op. cit. Patricio Manns mentions this strike, but only superficially. See his Breve Historia del Movimiento Obrero, Quimantu, 1972. Finally, the author who gives it most attention is Julio Cesar Jovet, who relates the testimony of his father who had been an eye-witness to the events. See his Ensayo Crítico op.cit.

177. At the time of the strike he resigns and goes to Santiago. A merchant by profession, he was at the same time a counsellor of the Bank of Chile. He was the elected representative for the Limache Zone in 1904. See Diccionario Biográfico de Chile, (Figueroa, Virgilio). Editores Empresa Periodística de Chile issued every two years since 1937 and every three years since 1955. Their reports were made public in the House of Representatives, Special sessions, mainly Thirty-Second, December 30, 1907; Thirty-Third, January 7, 1908; Fortieth, January 10, 1908.

were also examined along with telegrams sent to the authorities of Tarapaca by the Ministry of Interior and comuniqués from the Strike Committee.^{178/} Finally, the eye-witness reports of Dr. Nicolás Palacios published in a newspaper of Valparaíso called El Chileno were examined and used.^{179/}

Based on these sources and proceeding according to the Definitions and General Propositions, an attempt will be made to characterize this strike according to the labour and economic situation in which it develops. The strike will be examined in light of the conflicting movements which immediately precede it, as well as in its magnitude, character and objectives. It will also be studied in terms of specific government labour policies at that time, the type of negotiations that took place and the repression which followed. Inquiry will also be made concerning possible associations between the strike leaders and other political movements. In conclusion, an attempt will be made to demonstrate the importance of this strike as a prototype, representative of the period under analysis.

178. These comuniqués and the three preceding documents were presented in the House of Representatives at Special Session No. 40 on January 10, 1908, pps. 963-968.

179. This text was made available through the courtesy of Hernan Godoy U., a professor at the Catholic University of Santiago's Sociology Institute.

b) The Critical Moment

The strike which culminated during the week of December 13th to the 21st, 1907, in the Escuela Santa María de Iquique was initiated by the nitrate refiners, who formed the most dynamic focal point in the nation's economic development at that time.

The typical organizational model for a nitrate business consisted of foreign ownership with local administrators. Numerous authors affirm the existence of capitalistic production relations, although there are several factors which cast doubts on this hypothesis, such as the practice of paying through vouchers and hiring "by enlistment".^{180/} At any rate, there was undoubtedly a large concentration of workers in industrial-extraction types of labour.

Toward the end of 1907, the existing situation reflected the characteristics of one of so many crisis in the nitrate industry. This situation was broadly debated in congress and in the Santiago newspapers. The existence of a crisis was repeatedly stated. Even President Pedro Montt classified it as the crisis of the national nitrate industry, a lack of credit and capital, the contraction of currency and the devaluation of the

^{180.} In this agreement the worker's obligations were so numerous that it is impossible to talk of free and specific salary relations.

peso.^{181/} On the other hand, the Banco Industrial and the Banco Mobiliario had already gone bankrupt. It was undoubtedly a moment of crisis, most clearly manifested in monetary-financial terms. El Mercurio dedicated several articles and editorial columns to the financial crisis, which it blamed for the crisis in the nitrate industry.^{182/}

The circumstances surrounding the "financial crisis" provide the framework into which the various strike movements developing at the time will be inserted. The nitrate strike was one of many, though certainly the most outstanding.

On December 4th, three hundred workers from the nitrate railroad went on strike when the employers refused to raise wages as agreed when the rate of exchange reached 18 pennies.^{183/} However, according to the sources,^{184/} this conflict was soon overcome. At the same time, the judicial employees of Tarapaca had also requested a salary increase of the President of the Republic.^{185/} Several days later, on December 9th, another strike broke out headed by the shore workers,

181. Published in El Mercurio, December 4, 1907, p. 3.

182. See El Mercurio, December 8 and 9, 1907, p. 3 and 10 in both.

183. El Pueblo Obrero, December 5, 1907, p. 4.

184. Ibid, December 7, 1907, p. 4.

185. El Mercurio, December 11, 1907, p. 5 and December 13 1907, p. 3.

precipitated by the "financial cataclysm".^{186/} This is the same strike mentioned in El Mercurio referring to the "sea people from Iquique and Tocopilla"^{187/} when the majority of the maritime activities were brought to a standstill. Four days later El Mercurio reported another strike. This time, the railroad workers were demanding higher wages.^{188/} The workers of a business called "Aguas Servidas" in Iquique also requested a wage increase.^{189/} The stevedores and boatmen employed by the nitrate businesses requested that they be paid at a fixed rate of 16 pennies. On December 11th, there was a general walk-out in all the nitrate businesses when the bosses refused to pay the requested rate.^{190/} Many other instances of conflict could be mentioned, but a statement made in El Mercurio puts the prevailing state of affairs in a nutshell, "The situation of the working class is steadily worsening".^{191/}

c) The Nitrate Workers

On approximately the 11th of December, 1907, these

186. El Pueblo Obrero, December 10, 1907, p. 4.

187. El Mercurio, December 11, 1907, p. 4.

188. Ibid., December 13, 1907, p. 7.

189. El Pueblo Obrero, December 12, 1907, p. 4.

190. Dr. Nicolas Palacios, "Events in Iquique", a testimony published in the Valparaiso newspaper, El Chileno on the 8th, 9th, 10th, 11th and 12th of February, 1908. As we only have a typed, unpublished copy of the article, the exact page number cannot be determined.

191. El Mercurio, December 14, 1907, p. 5.

disturbances began to mingle with the conflictive events leading to the particular strike herein studied. On the 13th, El Mercurio reported that there were "isolated and insignificant movements" and, on the 14th, that the nitrate strikers were out in Canton Alto and San Antonio, paralyzing eight offices with the participation of approximately 2,400 workers. In the San Lorenzo office another strike was declared when a wage increase for the workers was denied.^{192/} The next day Santa Lucia, was paralyzed and on the 14th news reached headquarters that all the workers planned to descend on Iquique.^{193/}

On December 16th, La Patria reported that the workers had started to arrive on the 13th and that they were staying at the "Hipodromo" where the authorities had supplied them with food and fresh water. On the 15th it was reported that they had been on the point of returning to the plains but had decided to stay. According to one union leader, the workers had decided to remain in the city because Antonio Viera Gallo, with whom they had begun to work out a solution, had "shown his true colors" by referring to the workers as "a bunch of lazy sly

192. El Pueblo Obrero, December 12, 1907, p. 4.

193. Report of the acting government officer, D. Julio Guzmán García, December 26, 1907. In Special Sessions 1907-1908, p. 967-968.

characters".^{194/} Dr. Nicolas Palacios' version states that the workers stayed on because they did not want to return to the plains on flat trucks. Some, 2,000 placard-bearing workers from Alto San Antonio joined them and a rally was improvised in Prat Square, after which they all marched to the government palace and staged another rally.

From the 15th of December on, the number of workers participating in the movement was quite large.^{195/} Meanwhile, the strike had extended to other offices and included workers from Aguas Santa, Rosario de Huara, Puntunchara, Rosita, Josefina, Progreso and Amelia. All of them began marching toward Negreiros. Work was also suspended at the offices in Democracia, Alianza and Canton Alto San Antonio, and the decision to travel to Iquique was made. The conflict arose after the government ordered the railroads be "put out of order" and refused to allow the trains to go up to Iquique,^{196/} thus preventing the workers from travelling towards Iquique.

194. This version was based on declarations made by newspaper reporters of La Patria on December 16, 1907 p. 3, and attributed to an anonymous union leader. Antonio Viera Gallo was a lawyer involved with the authorities of the zone and considered "an outstanding man".

195. Or on the 16th, according to Jovet, op. cit., p.122.

196. Telegram sent to the Ministry of Interior on December 16th.

Specific cases included 80 women who were refused permission to board the train to Iquique in Alto San Antonio, 5,000 workers from nine offices who were initially detained in Pozo Almonte, 3,000 workers who had to remain at the central offices,^{197/} and another 4,000 that had to do the same in Canton Zapigo.^{198/} On December 17th, El Mercurio reported that the "nothern sector", (San Donato, Mapocho, Santiago, Constancia Ramirez, Santa Rosa de Huara and Puntilla) was paralyzed along with eight offices in the Canton de Huara.

Despite the obstacles, the workers managed to arrive in Iquique by different means. Some travelled on foot and others simply took over the trains. One thousand five hundred workers from the office in Lagunas managed to reach their destination having kept guard on the train all night. Another group from San Donato arrived by similar means. Three thousand workers from Huara, 500 from Caleta Buena and 2,000 from Pisagua and Santa Ana arrived on the 19th.-^{199/} The following day 5,000 arrived from different places, as well as another 300 from Caleta Buena who came by boat.^{200/}

For the most part, the workers were virtually forced

197. El Pueblo Obrero, December 18, 1907, p. 1.

198. Ibid., December 19, 1907, p. 2.

199. El Mercurio, December 21, 1907, p. 8. "

200. This data comes from El Pueblo Obrero, which was totally dedicated to reports on the strike of the 18th, 19th and 20th of December, 1907.

to go to Iquique because, apart from closing down the train services, the authorities also ordered both grocery stores and offices to be shut. As Malaquías Concha, the representative of the Democratic Party noted, even if the workers had stayed in their place of work, they would have run out of food.

d) The Extent of the Movement

Although it is difficult to be precise on the actual extent of the movement, it can be stated that the number of those congregated in Iquique was less than the total number of committed workers. An estimate of the true magnitude of the strike can be reached by taking into consideration the branch offices and the number of committed workers coming from the different offices. It is also useful to differentiate between the branches that had workers collaborating in the strike committee and those that did not.

To determine the total number of branch offices in existence, data from the 1907 census was used; and to ratify their participation, data from the two newspapers, La Patria and El Pueblo Obrero, were utilized. However, it should be noted that not all of the offices mentioned in the newspapers were included in the census. Table 5 on page 135 is a summary of statistics related to the strike in the province of Tarapaca, according to available information.

Table No. 5

Partial Estimate of the Branch Offices and
the Workers that Participated in the Strike.
Iarapaca, Province -- December, 1907

Branch Offices		Workers
A. Total	84	43,440 (1)
B. Committed	76	37,141 (2)
a) with recognized delegate	33 (3)	13,543 (4)
b) without recognized delegate	43 (5)	23,598
C. Uncommitted as of December 1st.	16	6,307

Sources and Notes

- (1). Population Census 1907.
- (2). Eight Offices which do not appear in the census are not considered in this figure. Data from twelve offices in Huara was discarded.
- (3). Communiques from the Strike Committee published in La Patria on December 18, 19 and 20, 1907.
- (4). This sum does not include five branch offices which do not appear in the census.
- (5). Thirty-eight offices according to the statistics in La Patria and five from other newspaper sources.

This data, systematized for the first time and, therefore, still subject to future corrections, makes it possible to affirm that we are dealing with a general strike involving all the nitrate workers in the province of Tarapaca, that is to say, a movement involving some 40,000 people. Of the sixteen offices, from which there is no bona_fide data available regarding the participation in the strike, there was another 6,307 people who may or may not have joined the strike later on. This data indicates that the movement reached general strike proportions involving 40,000 committed participants in the offices alone (towns have not been considered). The working class people of Iquique, who were not nitrate workers, also joined the strikers, giving us a fairly clear idea of the enormous magnitude of the movement.

There is yet another indication of the magnitude of the strike that has to do with the concentration of people in the city of Iquique. According to the census of the same year, Iquique originally had a population of 40,171. The normal routine was altered because a sudden increase of approximately 15,000 was registered. To begin with, when the merchants realized the tremendous demands of so many visitors, they began to raise the prices of consumer articles such as sugar and other foods in general, as well as hotels. A large number of workers were left out in the street without food or lodging. The workers' societies, the Veterans of 79, the Great

Maritime Union and some of the commercial hotel owners offered free lodging. A circus tent also provided a place to stay, and some philanthropically inclined individuals were handing out money, bread and cigarettes to the workers.^{201/} The newspaper, El Pueblo Obrero, started coming out every afternoon.

There were rallies and slogan-shouting, and the fire department expressed its concern about the possible outbreak of fires.

The city was permanently under vigilance, greatly limiting, the next-day's commercial and industrial activities, as well as traffic. The banks closed early and the city was patrolled by groups of soldiers and sailors. The "well-to-do" families preferred to leave the city and took refuge in their pleasure crafts on the bay.^{202/} According to the Eastman report, the workers "controlled the city", regulating traffic and giving permissions and written orders.

It is true that there was a certain degree of workers' control due to the fact that the strike situation in Iquique necessarily subordinated some of the other unions to Strike Committees. Access was, of course, restricted to the School of Santa María where the Strike Committee was in "permanent session". Nevertheless, this

201. El Pueblo Obrero, already cited editions, especially December 18 and 19, 1907.

202. El Mercurio, December 21, 1907, p. 8.

was very different from saying that the workers had taken over the city. In synthesis, one may state that the life of the city was structured around the strike, some supported it out of solidarity and others out of fear.

Other data relating to the magnitude of the strike shows that at least 13 other unions in Iquique were integrated into the Strike Committee.^{203/} In Antofogasta, the Ansonia office closed down in solidarity with the strike in Iquique. Shut-downs were also announced in some of the offices of Antofogasta following Iquique's example.^{204/}

Along with the nitrate workers' strike, several other labour disputes developed in the city of Iquique, of which the already mentioned maritime workers' union was a part. The workers of the Fardella shoe factory also started a strike when salary increases were denied.^{205/} The bakers also demanded that agreements reached in previous strikes be respected.^{206/}

e) Nature of the Strike

All of the sources used coincide in their evaluation of the strike. Both those who were in favour and those who were opposed agreed that the movement was

203. El Pueblo Obrero, December 19th, p. 2. "

204. El Mercurio, December 20th and 21st, p.8 both dates.

205. El Pueblo Obrero, December 18, p. 8.

206. El Mercurio, December 21, p. 8.

pacific. El_Pueblo_Obrero.^{207/} for example, stated: "the people have organized themselves and are demonstrating their culture". On December 17th, El_Mercurio referred to the strike in the following manner: "In Iquique, workers who have walked out on their jobs are gathered, but their attitude is tranquil". A day later the same newspaper informed that "10,000 workers respectfully request an improvement in their situation". On the 19th it recognized that "the strike continues tranquil but growing". Two days later, the same appreciation held true; "Public order and tranquility have not been altered, but the movement continues to grow". The workers themselves designated 22 civilians to help keep order.^{208/} The orderliness of the movement can be seen by the simple fact that among the drunks picked up from the streets during the strike, not one was a striker.^{209/} A few bottles of liquor that were circulating among the strikers were given over to the strike authorities.^{210/}

A significant change in the character of the movement can be noted from the 20th of December on. El_Mercurio no longer talked of the workers' tranquility, but rather

207. Ibid. December 18, p.1 and December 17, p. 2.

208. El_Pueblo_Obrero, December 19, p. 2 and also El_Mercurio, December 21, p. 8.

209. Dr. Nicolás Palacios, op. cit.

210. Malaquías Concha's speech in the House of Representatives. Thirty Second Special Session, December 30, 1907, p. 721.

reported that they were roaming around the city and staging rallies. On the 20th, El_Pueblo_Obrero also started to repudiate those who were fomenting demonstrations against the authorities and the nitrate businessmen. This fact is mentioned in detail by Dr. Nicolás Palacios.

Well-dressed individuals on horseback began to appear in different parts of the city inciting violent resistance against the authorities and speaking out against business owners and "all the other tyrants". According to Dr. Nicolás Palacios, these unknown individuals did not find followers, and it was suspected that they were troublemakers sent either by the Secret Police of Santiago or by the merchants of Iquique. Apart from preaching against "all of the tyrants", these individuals called the strikers' attention to the fact that there were numerous jewelry stores in Iquique. La_Patria gave an account of an agreement made by the workers to stage no more rallies until the conflict was solved.^{211/}

This fact was stressed after repression was used against the strikers. General Silva Renard, head of the first zone reported that the people who had gathered in the plaza and the school constituted "the most decided and unruly of all". El_Mercurio referred to some 50% of the most unruly who were listening to slogan-shouting at

^{211.} La_Patria, December 20th, p. 2.

the Hippodrome as the ones responsible for giving the province over to military rule, their petitions having been voiced in such "sour tones".

The information presented herein would appear to indicate that the movement was primarily peaceful, except for the incidents referred to in El Pueblo Obrero the magnitude of which is impossible to determine since the rest of the information available seems to be limited to justifying the repression, as we shall see ahead. For example, the Ministry of Interior stated that the authorities had been initially benevolent, but "there was a point in which the strikes ceased to be respectful and inoffensive, and the authorities felt that there was no alternative but to do what they did".^{212/}

To date, the data compiled shows a change in the character of the strike in its last two days, but not in the way either El Mercurio or the government had initially indicated. There had been confrontations with the political authorities during the last days of the strike, as it seemed that a solution was nowhere in sight and Mr. Eastman, the intendant, as he was called by the workers, had intended to take up with the interests of the owners.

212. Rafael Sotomayor, member of the National Party. Senator from Aconcagua from 1906-1912. Minister of Interior from 25-X-1907 to 29-VIII-1908. See Biography, Labor Parliament Section, National Congress Library.

The workers began to realize that there would be repression, an attitude clearly indicated by their refusal to leave the school to attend a meeting in the Intendencia on December 21st, for fear that they might be taken prisoners.

At this moment one can perceive certain aspects of the strike which transcend purely economic motivations. The workers started to take on truly heroic attitudes. Although they were aware that they could be fired upon, nobody left the school area, not even the Peruvians, Bolivians and Argentinians, later the victims of Chilean troops. Evidence of this heroism is to be found in the texts of some of the speeches made, like the one addressed to the sailors of the Esmeralda which asked, "Do you all want the people of Chile to invoke the memory of a glorious May 21st without remembering the cowardice of December 21st". Or another case where a striker opened his shirt inviting the sailors and soldiers to shoot.^{213/}

f) Objectives

The versions of the miners' petition is exactly as follows:^{214/}

213. Dr. Palacios, op.cit. The Iquique Navy Battle against Peruvians (May 21, 1879).

214. Comuniqué directed to the Association* of Nitrate Owners published as an annex to C. Eastman's report.

Economic: On redeeming vouchers at the change-over to the new system, these shall be accepted at the stipulated rate.^{215/}

The daily wage shall be fixed at the equivalent of 18 pennies. The system of vouchers and tokens will be done away with.

There shall be free trade in the nitrate mining camps to end the speculation in the company stores.

There shall be scales in all company stores in order to verify weights and measures.

The mine entrances and shafts shall be closed with iron gates to prevent accidents.

The families of the workers whose lives are lost in the Shaft shall receive indemnization of five to ten thousand pesos.

On closing down an office, workers shall be granted 10 to 15 days in order to relocate before being laid off.

215. The "Discount rate" (interest) applied to each voucher at the time of payment was 30%; according to M. Concha. Thirty Second Special Session, December 30, 1907, p. 719.

The administrators shall not be permitted to throw slag down the ramps or take advantage of the sodium nitrate gravel without first paying those who gathered it.

Arrangements must be made in order to provide permission for workers to attend evening classes.

Unions: Organizers or leaders of the union cannot be removed. If they are dismissed, they have the right to claim \$300 - \$500 pesos indemnization or lodging for two or three months.

Jorge Barria²¹⁶/ also mentions the construction of cemeteries and hospitals as one of the objectives of the strike, although these requests are not corroborated in any of the petitioning documents available for study. There is still another aspect not found in the strikers' petitions, but which is recorded in both El Pueblo Obrero and in the account of Dr. Nicolas Palacios. An idea promoted by some was that if an agreement could not be reached, the workers should be permitted to migrate South. Dr. Nicolás Palacios even states that the

216. Barria, op. cit.

strikers were going to request a land grant for colonization in southern Chile, but these hopes were frustrated when it was realized that the government preferred to have the lands colonized by foreigners.

g) Political Conditioning Elements:

State Labour Policies

Government policies appear to have been based on an incorrect interpretation of what was happening in view of the fact that the existence of conflicts was considered abnormal. It is interesting to review some of the statements and reflections of the Minister of Interior, who was the government official in charge of dealing with the strike. His general opinion of the social structure can be seen from the following statement:

Around here there is only one social class and if anyone is to be called privileged, it is precisely those who are said to be exploited by others... In our country, more so than in any other, there exists eloquent proof that there are neither oppressors nor oppressed.^{217/}

Obviously, the strike problems were non-existent for him since his own fixed idea of social structure excluded

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217. All of these quotations are taken from his speeches in the House of Representatives regarding the strike, Extraordinary Sessions Thirty-Second and Thirty Third, December 30, 1907; January 2, 1908, see pages 731, 741, 759, 763 and 778.*

the possibility of opposed interest groups and when opposition arose, he considered it to be the fruit of subversive preaching. Even if one were to assume that privileged classes did not exist in society in a statutory sense, the argument would come up to grief with the definition of classes in a strict sense.

Within this ideological framework an attempt was made to repress the conflict. A telegram sent on December 14th gave the following orders:

Proceed immediately against the instigators and promoters of the strike. Above all, you must defend the interests of the property owners. Remember that experience has shown that firm repress is needed from the beginning to prevent even greater disturbances from arising. Public order must be kept regardless of the price.218/

From the moment class struggles were considered intolerable, recourse to repression of the instigators "who give bad example" became inevitable. Thus, it is not difficult to understand why strike leaders were labelled as "delinquents" by the authorities. The Minister of Interior referred to those promoting the strike as "individuals living off exploitation, vice and corruption".219/. For the governmental authority the

218. The telegrams were delivered as antecedents for the discussion in the House of Representatives. Fortieth Special Session, January 10, 1908, p. 963-964.
219. Session, December 30, 1907, p. 737.

strikers' petition was an attack on the owner's property rights, who was free to do as he wished in its interior. From this point of view, the mine owner was the only one considered capable of preserving "virtue" in the mine. Free trade and the elimination of the voucher system had already served as a justification "to ignore others' rights and allow the installation of whorehouses, gambling houses and other enterprises propitiating wanton spending, corruption and disorder".220/

In response to the petition requesting that the exchange rate for payment in pesos be established at 18 pennies, the Minister of Interior stated that: "the only thing that our workers really want is to get the highest possible salary for the least amount of work". His evaluation of the "painful but inevitable outcome" of the conflict is also noteworthy:

We should be immensely grateful to those men (of the armed forces) who did their duty in maintaining order and public tranquility. By impeding this subvive movement they have prevented shame and future international complications from befalling the country and they have saved population of Iquique from assault by a band of thugs, some of the strike leaders being renowned and audacious bandits.221/

220. Session, December 30, 1907, p. 733.

221. Special Sessions, January 2, 1908, p. 764.

Negotiations

The workers, the local authorities and the mine owners had been waiting since December 15th for the Intendent to arrive with government instructions. Upon arrival from Santiago, Eastman declared that he had been granted "complete faculties". The workers' movement then concluded that a capable representative of the government's interests had at last arrived to put an end to the conflict. Nonetheless, once again the presence of the workers in the city of Iquique came into the foreground. Dr. Nicolas Palacios clarifies this aspect as follows:

Since the branch administrators declared that they were unable to resolve what the workers had requested, they agreed to go down to Iquique to deal directly with owners or managers of the nitrate businesses and also air their complaints to the political chief of the province, so that the abuses they had been confronted with might also be made known.222/

It is important to note that immediately upon arrival in Iquique, the workers had entered into a dialogue with the local authorities who were to be their intermediaries. The first days had gone by and they could not reach an agreement with the owners. Thus, their conviction that

222. Dr. Nicolas Palacios, op. cit.

only a high political authority would be able to solve the problem was strengthened. This is clearly indicated by the fact that the Intendant's arrival was welcomed by the workers. In light of these circumstances, the interpretation of this conflict as a staged confrontation between workers and State and a potential political conflict would not be valid.

It is useful to examine different versions of what happened in relation to the workers' reluctance to continue negotiations with the local authorities of the zone. El Pueblo Obrero insisted that a valid agreement could only be reached by negotiating with the official Intendant. According to Dr. Palacios, the Acting Intendant, Julio Guzman and the lawyer, Antonio Viera Gallo had reached an agreement with the workers on Sunday the 15th, that the workers were willing to go back to the plains. Apparently they did not go because the train they were supposed to board only had flat cars. However, the rest of Dr. Palacios' version indicates that it was only a casual agreement. Julio Guzman declared, "As the highest authority in this province, I promise you that your petitions will be accepted".^{223/} Concrete solutions were, in fact, only promises and a working

223. The acting Intendant of Iquique. See La Patria, December 16, 1907, p. 2.

commission would remain in Iquique reviewing the negotiations while the others returned to work.

On the other hand, the business owners, the merchants, the smelters, urban and nitrate railroad representatives and the industrialists in general also felt government intervention was the only solution. They sent a letter to the President of the Republic stating that no solution was possible without currency with a fixed value, i.e. paper money with a lesser degree of fluctuation.²²⁴

The principal problem for the government was keeping order, which meant the use of military force if necessary. For example, when the people from the coast participated and the strike became known, the Blanco Encalada Cruiser left port on the 11th of December and anchored in Iquique on the 14th. That same day, when the participation of Canton Alto and San Antonio became known, 350 soldiers from the Carampanque Battalion were sent to the plains. The Intendant, Carlos Eastman, travelled on the vessel Zenteno, along with the head of the first zone, Gen, Silva Renard, Col. Ledesma who was in charge of the troops, and the chiefs and officials of the zone. Troops from the O'Higgins regiment were also

²²⁴. Published in El Mercurio, December 17th.

dispatched from Caldera.^{225/} The government's primary interest was to prevent possible disorders, whereby it reinforced military strength in the area which included ground regiment in the Blanco Encalada and Zenteno cruisers as well as the steamships Esmeralda and O'Higgins.

A telegram sent on the 16th of December by the Minister of Interior, R. Sotomayor, states the government's interests very clearly:

Adopt preventive measures-proceed to impose a state of seige. Advise the branch offices immediately to prevent the people's arrival in Iquique. Dispatch whatever troops may be needed to impede their arrival, using any means necessary to achieve your objective. The armed forces must keep order at whatever price. The Esmeralda is on her way and more troops are being prepared.

C. Eastman arrived on the Zenteno which dropped anchor at 300 p.m. on December 10th. and "took command". His first order was to pay the workers who had stayed in the plains three pesos for those who were married and two pesos for single workers, but the administrators refused to give out the pay.^{226/} That same day he received some of the workers and listened to their grievances.

225. Ibid., December 11, p. 4; December 14, p. 5 and December 13, pp. 7-8. There were 600 men according to El Pueblo Obrero, and 233 according to Capt. Wilson of the Zenteno.

226. El Pueblo Obrero, January 11, 1908, p. 2.

According to the workers their intention was only to welcome the Intendant and not to negotiate since their petitions had been made known to all through a letter sent to the Nitrate Propaganda Association on the 16th of December.

After seeing the workers, Eastman also met with members of the Nitrate Producers Association, headed by Guillermo Hardie. The businessmen announced that they were willing to improve the situation, but refused to discuss terms under pressure. If they were forced to accede to the workers' demands they would lose "moral authority" in the eyes of the workers. One of the producers' principal demands, therefore, was that the workers go back to the plains. Nevertheless, even if that demand were met "they frankly admitted that if a workers' rebellion such as this were to go unpunished it could bring bad results in the future."227/ It seems that the Englishmen's arguments had a greater influence on Eastman. "Everyone was saying that the Englishmen had won over the sympathies of the Intendant. The workers then began calling him "Mr Eastman".228/

By December 20th, there was no sign of progress in the negotiations. The miners from Pan de Azúcar, Alianza, Buenaventura and La Granja gathered in the Buenaventura Station to try and organize a locomotive on which

227. Dr. Nicolás Palacios, op. cit.

they could go down to Iquique. The troops of the Carampanque Battallion opened fire on the group resulting in seven dead and eleven wounded (20 and 40 according to other reports). The Intendant was informed of these killings by the head of the garrison at La Lagunas.^{229/}

In the interior branch offices, a number of the workers who had promoted the strike were arrested, some of them being placed on navy ships. Pedro Regalado Nunez from Huara and two others who remain unidentified were embarked through Caravanha.

On the dawn of the 21st a state of seige was declared in Iquique, without exceptions:

I have decided and hereby decree that:

1. It is forbidden to be in the city streets or roads of this province in groups of more than six person at any time of the day or night.
2. It is forbidden to be in the streets of this city after eight o'clock at night, unless the person carries written permission from the Intendant's office.

228. Idem.

229. El Pueblo Obrero, December 21st.

3. It is also forbidden to stay or meet in groups of more than six persons.
4. The people from the plains who do not have homes here will stay in the Escuela Santa María and Manuel Mont Square.
5. The sale of alcoholic beverages is absolutely forbidden.
6. The armed forces must ensure that this decree is strictly enforced.^{230/}

"The fact that the Intendant actually overrode the Constitution of the government of Chile was a phenomenon witnessed for the first time in the country".^{231/} According to Malaquías Conchas the decree was "illegal".^{232/} At the same time the telegraph was censored and a bar was issued on the appearance of printed matter or the sale of any newspaper or leaflets.

It is interesting to note the attitudes toward the miners' concentration in town revealed in this decree, since it was believed that this decree would be one of the most efficient means of obliging the workers to return to the plains. Article 6 of this decree, ordering

230. This decree can be found in any of the cited newspapers.

231. Dr. Nicolas Palacios, op. cit.

232. Speech. Thirty-second Special Session, House of Representatives, p. 724-725.

a state of seige is significant because it reveals the civil authority's inability to maintain control and thus, the request that the Armed Forces exercise its coercive power.

It has also been stated that the Intendant has requested ambulances, as well as receiving areas and rooms for the wounded in both the hospital and the lazaretto. Morgue carts were also to be sent.

It was under these circumstances that the Intendant received the strikers for the second time on the morning of Saturday the 21st in an effort to demonstrate that the government wished to settle the conflict. The strikers were offered half the pay raise they had requested. The Englishmen added that they were not interested in the money but that they wanted assurances of their "respect for the property and lives of foreigners" from sacking or looting. In view of this, a proposal was forwarded to establish an arbitrating tribunal. Nonetheless, the Englishmen reiterated that they would accept any terms if the strikers agree to return to the plains. Later the Intendant called the strikers to negotiations through a mutualist called Abdon Díaz. The Strike Committee replied that there were insufficient guarantees to start negotiations due to the state of seige and the recent repression in Buenaventura.

According to Dr. Palacios, 300 strikers requested

that they be sent south on the morning of the 21st because they were married and had to attend to the needs of their wives and small children, but nothing was done.

In view of the above-mentioned circumstances, Dr. Nicolas Palacios' opinion to the effect that "the plan to end the strike by alternative means had already been agreed upon", was well founded. It is clear that El Mercurio's report^{233/} concerning the "sour tone" of the "hotheaded strikers' petitions" having forced the Intendent to hand over the command to the military, was far from the truth and incongruent with the other data gathered on the subject. On December 21st, just after mid-day, Eastman ordered General Renard to take the strikers to the Sports Club.

The Repression

At 13:45 hours, General Silva gathered together in Prat Square, the O'Higgins, Rancagua and Carampanque garrisons, the Costa artillery and the marines from the vessels in port. There was a confrontation with the strikers and the sector was then surrounded by infantry. At 14:30, General Silva, Colonel Ledesma and 100 military police on horseback began to march towards Manuel

²³³. El Pueblo Obrero, December 22, 1907, p. 8.

Montt Square. The colonel approached the committee at the school of Santa María to request the workers to proceed to the Hippodrome as they had no roof over their heads and the danger of innocent people not involved with the movement being injured was greater at the school which was located near the centre of the city.^{234/}

Silva Renard ordered two machine guns be brought from the Esmeralda and a picket be dispatched from the O'Higgins regiment. These were situated in front of the school. Once again the military requested the people leave the area, including the Peruvian and Bolivian consuls who were trying, in vain, to dissociate their people from the conflict. The response of the latter was to insist that their participation was voluntary and that it would be cowardly to betray the Chileans in their hour of need.

Although Brigg and Morales,^{235/} President and Treasurer of the Strike Committee, respectively, suggested the workers leave the area, they flatly refused to do so. Four hundred workers from the Iquique unions then congregated in the plaza encouraging the strikers.^{236/} At the same time, 200 workers withdrew from the group. This was noticed by the strikers. On evaluating the

234. Observation made by Dr. Nicolas Palacios.

235. See later on in the text.

236. Report of the Zenteno's commander, Captain Wilson.

situation, General Silva Renard abandoned the possibility of a cavalry charge with bayonets and at 15:45 hours ordered the picket to open fire at the rooftop of the school where the members of the Council of Directors were. It had never occurred to the Council that they would be fired upon, at most, they thought they would be surrounded and have to surrender because of hunger. Everyone of them, with the exception of Brigg, who pretended to be dead, lost their lives in the hail of bullets.^{237/} According to El Pueblo Obrero, a large white flag was produced.^{238/} Silva Renard, however, maintained that the strikers responded with "shots from revolvers and even rifles," injuring three soldiers and two marines, and killing two horses. El Pueblo Obrero reports more rifle fire and the intervention of the consuls requesting a ceasefire. Silva replied that it was too late and two machine guns of 600 shots each (30 according to Silva) opened fire. The same newspaper reported that two military police on horseback holding lances rode into the school to prevent the strikers from escaping. Forthwith, "six or seven thousand" workers were taken to the Hippodrome, two of them being killed by soldiers' lances on breaking

237. In a speech by Malaquías Concha, Special Session, December 30, p. 727.

238. Dr. Palacios, op. cit. also mentions the appearance of several smaller white flags.

ranks.^{239/}

The events that followed are taken from El Pueblo Obrero as follows. Having gathered the strikers together at the Hippodrome, Silva addressed them saying, "So you were the smart guys who didn't want to leave the school? Be sure you know that I'm the one in charge here".^{240/} He then made them surrender, kneel down and searched them personally but only found a few pen knives and four revolvers, three of which were loaded and none of them showed signs of having been fired.

Silva then called for the office delegates to find out how many people wanted tickets to travel south, but the delegates had all disappeared and nobody had heard from them since. El Mercurio stated that the bosses were already on the warships.^{241/} Approximately one thousand workers were from Iquique and were handed over to the authorities for identification. According to Silva, the rest of them were returned to the Pampa,^{242/} although Malaquías Concha maintains that many of these workers, along with others, migrated to the south or to nearby countries.

That afternoon, 287 bodies were removed from the

239. The expression "six or seven thousand " appears in General Silva's report.

240. El Pueblo Obrero, January 11, 1908, p. 2.

241. December 22, 1907, p. 8.

242. General Silva's report.

plaza and an unknown number were also taken out during the night via a false door of the school. Other workers were gotten rid of in the Hippodrome at dawn by a system commonly known as "quinteo",^{243/} the soldiers who refused to shoot the workers were also eliminated. The more seriously wounded were then taken to Lazareto where most of them died; the survivors were then taken to a hospital with the less badly wounded. Julio César Jobet states that over 2,000 workers, women and children were killed, basing his declaration on the testimony of his father who was a sargent at Carampaque and who counted over 900 bodies being handed over during the first duty.^{244/}

Taking into account what he saw and the accounts of the medical staff and other witnesses, he spoke to Dr. Nicolas Palacios and calculated that there were 585 casualties, although "the exact number will always remain a mystery...as the figures given in official reports are false".^{245/} El Mercurio simply mentions "several dead", reducing the problem to a question of whether or not the repression had been justified.^{246/}

243. With this system one of every five soldiers are picked to be killed, the rest being intimidated.

244. Op. cit., p. 123.

245. General Silva reported 140 dead and Captain Wilson 130.

246. Unfortunately, the details from El Pueblo Obrero are interrupted here as the following page has been torn out.

The Movement Leadership

It is particularly difficult to establish a relationship between this strike and other movements or political parties as the accounts at hand do not provide such type of information. The strike was led by a Strike Committee formed by representatives of the Pampa Union, one delegate per office, and the presidents of the Iquique Workers' Societies. According to El Tarapaca, the Committee was named Comité Central Unido --- Asamblea de Salvación Obrera but La Patria called it Comité Central Unión Pampa Iquique. This Committee held permanent sessions at the Santa María School and was forbidden to move from the premises. Three other groups appear to be linked to this Committee; one of them was an organization of "Helpers for Order", under a delegate; another organization collected funds and changed tokens, under the responsibility of the treasurer; and the third was a commission whose job was to receive and provide lodging for new strikers.

During the period of agitation prior to the strike, the workers published two different proclamations. One was with El Pueblo Obrero calling for a meeting in Zapi-ga on December 15th, and other demonstrations throughout the country. In particular, the aim of this meeting was to complain about the prevailing situation and the tax

applied to meat imported from Argentina. The speeches pronounced during the meeting, published in El_Pueblo Obrero and La_Patria, made no mention of the strike movement.

The other pamphlets that circulated during that period contained a call to the nitrate workers to join the strike movement that was being promoted by the Pampa Union. This movement also organized a demonstration in Iquique on December 15th, the same day that 2,000 workers had gathered together in Alto San Antonio where the following people spoke:

José Brigg: President of the Pampa Union.

José Vera: Unidentified

Oscar Sepúlveda: Liberal-Democratic Representative
According to Nicolas Palacios, this person was a professional orator from Iquique and was repudiated by the assembly.

Mr. Aliaga Palma: Unidentified

Luis Olea: As with Sepúlveda, his participation in the movement was not clear as it was said that he had been in Zapiga.

Miguel Zenteno: A Democrat representing El_Pueblo Obrero

Segundo Ríos: Bakers Society Representative.

The most constant newspaper in publishing the demands of the movement was El_Pueblo_Obrero and during the Strike Committee's discussions the idea of setting up a fund to edit a special workers' bulletin had been abandoned.^{247/} The newspaper first began to promote the Zapiga meeting and then after December 18th it placed itself at the disposition of the movement, suspending its advertising service and bringing out a daily afternoon edition. However, during the week of the 12th to 18th of December there were no editions, perhaps indicating a certain degree of reserve on the part of one sector of the Democrats regarding some aspects of the movement. In actual fact, the only real support this party gave was to stress the 18 penny demand, others being only briefly mentioned or even criticized.

Following the incidents at Buenaventura, El_Pueblo_Obrero rallied the workers with the cry "Everyone to Argentina" and after the massacre at Iquique it cast doubt on the effectiveness of strike action, praised the value of the electoral system, and criticized "the inactiveness of mutual societies".^{248/}

247. During the conflict, a printed sheet called El_Irabajador was published but there seems to be no trace of it. According to El_Mercurio, December 11 1907, p. 7, El_Irabajador belonged to the Joint Organization for Iquique Worker Societies.

248. El_Pueblo_Obrero, January 30, 1908, p. 69.

Perhaps another piece of information that may cast some light on the political side of the movement is that published by El Mercurio on December 22nd in which reference is made to the "hotheaded 50 percent" participating in the disputes originating at the Hippodrome. This would appear to indicate a division in the movement as the strikers' main headquarters was situated at the Santa Maria School. Nevertheless, the information is contradicted once again with Silva Renard's report to the effect that the school and Manuel Montt Square were the movement's main centres. In any event, the Hippodrome group could be the "unknown anarchists" of which Nicolas Palacios spoke and who were explicitly repudiated by El Pueblo Obrero. On the other hand, it was the Minister of Interior's opinion that the strike had been started by the anarchists who had come from Buenos Aires.^{249/} This, however, was not supported by the sources examined herein.

The Leaders

The governing body of the Pampa Union was elected by the Strike Committee and formed by one representative per

249. Idem.

office and the presidents of all the workers' societies in Iquique, with the following elected as its leaders:

President:	José Brigg, President of the Pampa Union
Vice-President:	Luis Olea, leader of the Workers Defense Society
Secretary:	Nicanor Rodríguez Plaza
Assistant Secretary:	Ladislao Cordova
Treasurer:	José Santos Morales

Silva Renard also mentions Manuel Aguirre, or "that fellow Aguirre" as he called him, the representative of The "Redención" Institute. José Brigg was a nitrate mechanic and president of the Pampa Union Mutual Aid Society. It is said that Luis Olea was a Spaniard living in Chile but wanted by the Spanish government in connection with his affiliation with the anarchist movement. Nevertheless, he professed to be an admirer of Alejandro Escobar C., who was considered to be a "humanist".²⁵⁰ There is no biographical information available on Nicanor Rodríguez. All that is known about Ladislao Cordova is that he was a delegate at the San Pablo Office. The only previous information found regarding José Santos Morales

²⁵⁰. Ibid., May 9, 1907, p. 1, August 22, 1907, p. 2.

was that he addressed the Zapiga rally. All in all, this movement was still at the initial stages of development, with an incipient organizational structure and somewhat lacking in political maturity.

h. Conclusions

A strike type model has been used for this part of the work, which was documented with the newspapers of the period, based on the proposed division of the phenomenon into a number of stages. On making a classification of this sort, we are assuming the existence of certain shared features representative of a given stage. This does not necessarily imply that all the events of a certain stage are identical. There are in effect, some features that are peculiar to each event while others are common to the various events of the same stage. Therefore, although the nitrate strike of December, 1907 was a specific incident, it also showed general characteristics linked to spontaneous isolated mass unionism prevailing during the period.

The economy of the period was based on the export of raw materials, particularly nitrate. Mining constituted the most important economic development pole with a high concentration of labourers involved in extracting the mineral and transporting it by railroad and by sea. Frequent depression caused by the irregular demand for

mining products gave rise to more or less spontaneous industrial conflicts in all of these industries, a situation propitiated by the fact that they were mainly concentrated in the Northern zone.

Another feature this movement had in common with others of the same period were its objectives. The workers were protesting against their standard of living which had deteriorated considerably in relation to the rest of society. On examining the workers' twelve listed demands, all but one of them were economic; the exception being a protest against any reprisal taken against the movement's organizers. These types of demands were to be found in all movements of that period referring directly to the conditions under which the workers and their families lived. These were not long-standing movements that hoped to transform the country's economic system or political organization. They were completely spontaneous and their scope was limited to their own immediate needs. Nevertheless, by the end of the strike, the workers had become increasingly aware that the conditions affecting them went far beyond their own particular enclave situation and, in fact, involved the country's economic organization as a whole.

Another characteristic of this strike was the particular severe repression used to quell the movement, which was almost invariably suffocated by force. A possible

explanation for this was the inexperience of the armed forces in dealing with civil disobedience. Almost all disturbances of this kind were handled by the army as if they were at war, the workers being considered the enemy, despite the fact that they were unarmed. However, this repressive violence could perhaps be better explained if one considers the prevailing attitude towards social conflict as being an anomaly generally associated with vandalism and other criminal acts.

Also worth noting here is the extent of this strike which, according to all information gathered on the subject, seems to have been a general strike involving the entire Tarapaca Province, where most of the nitrate offices were located. With the overall stop of activities, the workers began to conglomerate in Iquique and all the trade unions in these cities became affiliated to the strike movement.

Despite the size of this movement, one cannot establish a clear relationship with any specific organization. For any progress to be made in this area, one would have to gather more information on the Pampa Union, which, as mentioned earlier, was a mutual aid society whose president, José Brigg, was also president of the Strike Committee. Despite this coincidence, Abdon Díaz, the major representative of the mutualist movement, was in no way involved in it. Although the democratic publication El Pueblo Obrero also lent its support to the

strike, it did so with certain reservations. As suggested earlier, the anarchist movement failed to figure very prominently in the development of the conflict. All in all, it may be said that we are dealing with an essentially spontaneous independent movement, despite its uncommon size.

With the help of the information gathered here and the analysis carried out on this movement in particular, we have attempted to bring to light the distinguishing factors of this unique historical phenomenon and at the same time identify other elements common to other movements of the period. Because of the nature of the method used herein, any particular fact may be integrated into the whole series of circumstances forming a given stage in history, in this case the spontaneous isolated unionism stage.

i. Appendix:--Participation in the Strike

Offices Affected by the Work Stoppage By December
18th According to La Patria. December 19. 1907

<u>Alto San Antonio</u> (canton)	<u>Negreiros</u> (canton)
Cataluna	Agua Santa
Pirineos	Napried
Condor	Progreso
Esmeralda	Puntunchara

La Perla	
Palmira	<u>Dolores</u> (canton)
Paoso	
Providencia	Aguada
Santa Ana	Angela
Santa Clara	California
Argentina	Camina
Santa Elena	Enriqueta
San Lorenzo	Hervaska
Santa Lucía	Porvenir
San Enrique	Recuerdo
Sabastopol	San Patricio
Cholita	San Francisco
San Pedro	
San Pablo	<u>Catalina</u> (canton)
Alianza	
Pan de Azúcar	Santa Catalina
Aurrera	Santa Rita
Lagunas (South, North, Centre)	Sloga
Carmen Bajo	Unión
Keryma	
Pena Chica	<u>Zapiga</u> (canton)
San Donato	Compañía
La Palma	San Antonio
San Esteban	Aragón
San José	

Huara (canton)

Santiago

Mapocho

Constancia

Others

Pozo Almonte (canton)

Buen Retiro

Reducto

Josefina

Primitiva

Rosario de

Negreiros

Rosita

Democracia

Representatives and Corresponding Offices According to

El Pueblo Obrero, December 18th, p. 2 and

La Patria, December 18th, p. 2

Francisco Ruíz

R. Calderón

Roberto Montero

Luis Muñóz

Juan D. González

A. Allendes

Pedro Sotomayor

Samuel L. Toro

José E. Paz

Luis Cordova

Evaristo Peredo

San Lorenzo

Santa Lucía

San Agustín

Iquique

Esmeralda

La Perla

Santa Clara

Santa Ana

Cataluna

Argentina

Palmira "

Felix Paiva S.	San Pedro y Hanza
José M. Caceres	San Enrique
Arturo Tapia	Cholita
Manuel Quiroz	Sebastopol
Ladislao Cordova	San Pablo
José M. Montenegro	Condor
German Gómez	Pirineo
Pedro A. Aranda	Pozo Almonte
Ignacio Morande	Buen Retiro
Ramon Fernández	Carmen Bajo
Julio Irigoyen	San José

Second list of Delegates and Corresponding Offices
According to La Patria, December 20th.

Cornelio Astrofe	Progreso
Manuel Paniagua	Puntunchara
Francisco Aguayo	Josefina
Alfredo Loyandarize	Abra
José M. Vásquez	Amelia
Eufrano Castro	Rosario de Negreiros
José L. Bossa	Democracia
Jenaro Castillo	Tránsito
Guillermo Saavedra	Rosita
Francisco A. Cerda	Verdugo
Juan Esteban Pondicht	Maruccia "

Carlos Jorquera Vilches	Huara
Guillermo Miranda	Argentina
Nicomedes Romero	Alianza

Leaders of Workers' Groups and other Workers
Promoting the Strike. According to
El Pueblo Obrero. December 21.

Juan Esteban Pondicht	At the head of 3000 workers from Huara (December 19th)
Víctor Cabezas	(Secretary)
Manuel Segundo Gallardo	Arrived with 5000 strikers (December 20th)
Pedro Regalado Núñez	Prisoner in Huara at dawn on December 21st

Union Representatives According to
La Patria. December 18 and
El Pueblo Obrero. December 19. p. 2

Bakers	Ricardo Benavides Abdon Destejo
--------	------------------------------------

Redención Social Studies Centre	Manuel Aguirre
	Carlos Segundo Ríos
Carpenters	Pedro Pavez
	Rodolfo Fermieren
Casual Labourers	Francisco Monterrei
Boatmen	Eduardo Jofre
Painters	Luis Azata
Gas Workers	Rosario Solís
Brick layers	Juan de Dios Castro
Repairmen	Miguel Segundo Silva
	Arturo Espinosa
	Armando Tucas
Cartwrights	Abel R. Cueto
Stevedores	Ventura Ortíz
Cattle dealers and butchers	Agustín Munoz
Tailors	Francisco Sánchez

Helpers for Keeping Order According to
La Patria. December 19th. p. 2 and
El Pueblo Obrero. p. 2

Felix Paiva	(San Pedro and Hanza Office)
	El Pueblo Obrero, p. 2
Ignacio Morales	Unidentified office
Ramon Fernández	"
Roberto Leyton	"

Arturo Segundo Encalada	Unidentified Office
Carlos Castro	"
Ramon L. León	"
Manuel Arias	"
José Vera	"
Ernesto Araya	"
José Segundo Alarcon	"
José Rosa Guerrero	"
José Luis Cordova	"
Senobio Valenzuela	"
Víctor Cerpa	"
Pedro Fernández	"
Guillermo Miranda	"
José M. Caceres	"
Juan Jones	"
Ceferino Molina	"
Fermín Rojas	"

Token_Collectors_According_to
La_Patria._December_19._p.2

Ladislao Cordova (Deputy Secretary)
Francisco Sánchez
Evaristo Peredo
D. Inostroza G.

Fund Raisers According to
El Pueblo Obrero, December 19, p. 2.

José Santos Morales (Treasurer)

Carlos Castro

Roman L. León

Manuel Zarricueta

Reception and Lodging Commission According to
El Pueblo Obrero December 20, p. 1

Pedro Pavez

Roberto Ternicien O

Manuel Videla

Speakers at Zapiga According to
La Patria, December 17, p. 2

José Alday	President of the meeting organizing committee
------------	--

Pedro Segundo Araya	Vice-presidente of the
José Santos Morales	meeting organizing Com- mittee

Rudecindo Segundo Muñoz

María Segovia

Juan Carabantes

Abdon Carrasco

Roberto Pérez

José Luis Olea

Society for the Defense
of the Workers

Martin Rodríguez

Oscar Sepúlveda

Aníbal Mateluna

Manon Calderón

Luís Aranibar

Luís Ponce

Tarapaca Democratic Group,

CHAPTER III

THE POLITICIZATION OF UNIONS (1916-1932)

A. Workers' Conflicts From 1916 to 1926

During this stage we can observe important changes in the characteristics of strikes, as well as in their economic and political conditioning elements. Whereas, the relative frequency of strikes increases for the earlier part of the period (1916-1926); for the latter period (1927-1931) they are almost negligible.

If one wants to understand the workers' withdrawal from conflict activities, one has to relate it to the repressive policies implemented by the government during this stage, to the widespread situation of political anomie for almost a decade, and to the crisis in the nitrate industry and the effects of world depression. Yet, the real fundamental change that appears during this period will come from another type of variable, i.e. the organization of working class parties. These will strengthen their influence on workers' organizations during the stage, a fact that will remain unchanged until the sixties when Christian Democrats will dispute their loyalties.

We will then examine this trend considering first the ways in which strikes manifest themselves.

During this period conflicts in general, as well

as general strikes, are more frequent. In the previous period the regional general strike represented only a small part of the conflicts, whereas during this period it increases to a relatively larger extent.^{251/}

A similar trend is observed in relation to May Day Celebrations. These were not recorded during every year of the prior period, while between 1916 and 1926 they took place consistently. Less important than general strikes in terms of magnitude, sectorial and intersectional strikes also show a higher frequency than in the previous period.

The incidence of violent conflicts is less conspicuous during this period in terms of its effects. In connection with this feature, we must bear in mind that in the previous stage they determined the character of workers' protests as a whole. During this period, only two cases are comparable to the violence known before. These arose from the struggles which took place in the nitrate industries in the early twenties. At San Gregorio, in 1921, 45 workers were killed in a strike motivated by wage demands. A similar incident occurred in the nitrate industries of Iarapaca, Coruna, Pontevedra and Barnechea, in 1925, when 59 miners died as a

251. See Table 6 on p. 180 as compared to table 1 on p. 106.

T A B L E No. 6
FREQUENCY OF STRIKES, GENERAL MAY DAY CELEBRATIONS
AND PARTIAL STRIKES MOVEMENTS
1916 - 1925

Years	GENERAL STRIKES	PARTIAL STRIKES		MAY DAY CELEBRATIONS	M O V E M E N T S		
		Sectorial Strikes	Inter- sectorial Strikes		Demon- strations	Meetings	Incidents
1916	1	2	1	1	-	4	-
1917	-	-	2	1	-	-	-
1918	1	1	-	1	-	1	-
1919	2	3	5	1	2	2	-
1920	4	7	4	1	1	1	3
1921	3	3	1	1	-	3	3
1922	-	4	3	1	-	4	1
1923	-	3	1	1	-	1	1
1924	2	5	-	1	2	3	-
1925	5	5	-	1	1	2	3
Total	18	33	17	10	6	21	11
		50				39	

Source: Table elaborated from J. Barria, Los Movimientos Sociales de Chile desde 1916 to 1926, Unpublished Thesis, U. of Chile. 1960 pp. 209 and Ss. In the analysis of the type of strikes, other sources examined for a cualitative characterization of strikes during this period are mentioned.

Notes: This Table does not include strikes by individual companies. These are presented in Table 7, p. 182.

consequence of their confrontation with policemen controlling the state of siege in the provinces of Tarapaca and Antofagasta.

Table 6 on page 180, shows all the examples of workers' protests during this period, excluding strikes by single places of work.

It becomes apparent, as well, that there is a greater degree of occupational diversification among the groups of workers represented in this period. (See Table 7, page 182.-252/) It is possible to observe several manufacturing industries which were not present in the previous stage. For example, there is evidence of strikes in cement, paper, textiles and tobacco industries. If to the former industries we add food and leather manufacturing, then these type of industries actually show a greater frequency of strikes than the mining industry.

Service workers also show an important participation in strikes. The conflicts involving telephone, electricity and gas company workers are very prominent in this regard.

Mining and maritime activities maintain their relative importance, though miners replaced port workers in

252----- This Table includes only strikes by single place of work. The way Barria describes general strikes and all other forms of workers' protests prevented us from considering them in this classification.

T A B L E No. 7

FREQUENCY OF STRIKES BY TYPE OF WORKERS
(1916 - 1926)

Type of Workers	Y E A R S											TOTAL
	1916	1917	1918	1919	1920	1921	1922	1923	1924	1925	1926	
Railroad	-	1	-	2	7	3	-	-	5	2	2	24
Port workers (1)	4	6	3	7	19	8	2	4	4	6	1	65
Miners	6	2	3	14	16	9	7	10	11	11	2	94
Local Government	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	1	-	1	-	3
Transportation (2)	1	1	2	3	-	2	-	2	3	3	2	18
Construction workers (3)	-	2	-	3	2	7	2	6	5	5	-	37
Shoemakers	-	3	1	1	2	1	2	4	2	2	1	19
Bakers	-	-	-	4	2	5	2	-	1	-	-	14
Metal workers(4)	2	-	-	3	-	2	2	1	1	8	-	21
Printing workers	-	-	2	3	1	4	5	1	3	7	1	27
Food workers	-	-	-	9	1	5	-	3	1	1	-	20
Textile workers	-	-	-	5	2	2	1	5	3	4	-	22
Peasantry	-	-	-	-	-	8	1	1	3	3	-	16
Others(5)	-	-	-	3	-	3	1	4	3	1	-	15
Teachers	-	-	1	-	-	-	1	-	1	1	1	5
Glass workers	1	-	-	2	1	-	1	1	-	2	-	8
Students	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	1	2
Delivery Men	-	1	-	-	-	-	1	2	-	2	-	6
FOCH	1	-	1	2	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	5
Tobacco	-	-	-	1	-	1	1	1	-	-	-	4
Machanics	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	2	1	-	4
Furniture	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	2	1	-	4
Service workers	-	-	-	4	2	1	1	1	2	6	1	18
Others(6)	1	-	-	1	-	2	-	1	2	4	-	11
T O T A L	18	16	13	73	55	64	31	52	54	74	11	461

Source: Ibid.

(1) Includes the following: loading, Shipyard workers, dockers.

(2) Includes the workers and carriage drivers.

(3) Includes carpenters: plasterers, painters.

(4) Includes foundry workers, workshop workers, horseshoes workers.

(5) Includes workers linked to hardware, paving stone cement and non-identified activities.

(6) Includes mainly commerce employees and frozen storage workers.

Source: Author's classification based on data compiled by Barría, Los Movimientos Sociales de Chile, desde 1910 hasta 1926. Unpublished thesis. Escuela de Derecho. U. de Chile. 1960, pp.209 and following.

the first rank of frequency of strike action. Within the mining industries, large copper companies make their appearance in strikes for the first time. The distribution of strikes among mining industries is separately examined in Table 8 on page 184.

Occupations linked to transportation, particularly those in inter-city railroads (State railroads) maintain their former relative position.

Although the frequency-ranking by regions has not changed, the total for Santiago is close to that of the Nitrate regions and the same moves away from that of Valparaiso (See Table 9, page 185 as compared to table 3, page 111). In general it is also clear that strike actions show a wider geographical dispersion.

When strike frequency by regions is considered in relation to general strikes, the ranking of the previous period changes. (See table 10, page 186). In fact, where as the nitrate regions now shares second place with Valparaiso, Santiago gets the first place. An important instance of a large-scale demonstration at the end of this period is the Paro General of 1926, when workers protested against the character of Labour legislation, general living conditions of the working class and the political climate of intolerance.

T A B L E No. 8

FREQUENCY OF STRIKES IN MINING INDUSTRIES
(1916--1925)

Year	Copper(1)	Coal	Nitrate	Other	Total
1916	2	3	1	-	6
1917	1	-	1	-	2
1918	-	2	1	-	3
1919	3	1	10	-	14
1920	1	8	7	-	16
1921	-	5	4	-	9
1922	-	6	1	-	7
1923	-	4	5	1	10
1924	1	4	5	1	11
1925	1	1	12	-	14
TOTAL	9	34	47	2	92

Source: See source Table 7, p. 182.

(1) Of the nine, seven took place in large-scale copper mining (L.C.M.).

T A B L E No. 9
STRIKE FREQUENCY BY REGIONS 1916-1925

Regions	Number of strikes	Place in the Ranking
Nitrate region (1)	146	1
Santiago (2)	130	2
Valparaíso (3)	76	3
Concepción (4)	41	4
Coal region (5)	30	5
Magallanes (6)	17	6
Copper region (7)	10	7
Agricultural region (8)	10	8
Valdivia (9)	8	9
Arica	6	10
San Antonio	6	11
Talca	6	12
Rancagua	4	13
Calera	4	14
The entire country	2	15
Coquimbo	2	16
Los Andes	1	-
Los Angeles	1	-
Temuco	1	-
Calera	1	-
Vallenar	1	-
North	1	-
Santiago to Orsono	1	-
Serena to Curio	1	-
Others	6	-
TOTAL	518	-

Source: See source Table 7, p. 182

Note: This table includes only strikes by single place of work, sectorial and intersectorial strikes.

(1) Nitrate region: Antofagasta, Pisagua, Taltal, Iquique, Pampa Buena, Mejillones, Caleta Junin, Tocopilla, Caleta Coloso, Canton y Toco, Tarapaca.

(2) Santiago: includes Santiago, San Bernardo, Puente Alto

(3) Valparaíso: Valparaíso, Viña, Limache, Quilpue, Concón, Quillota.

(4) Concepción: Concepción, Talcahuano, Tome, Penco.

(5) Coal region: Lebu, Curanilahue, Lota, Lirquen, Coronel, Schwager, Puchoco, the zone as a whole

(6) Magallanes: Magallanes, Puerto Natales, Tierra del Fuego, Punta Arenas.

(7) Copper region: Sewell, Chuquicamata, Chagre-Catemu, El Teniente, Potrerillo.

(8) Agricultural region: Melipilla, Lo Chena, San Javier, Tinguirica, Chimbarongo, Other places.

(9) Valdivia: Valdivia, Corral.

T_A_B_L_E__No._10

FREQUENCY OF GENERAL STRIKES, MAY DAY CELEBRATIONS
MOVEMENTS AND INCIDENTS BY REGIONS
(1916-1925)

Regions	General Strikes	May Day Celebrations	Movements and Incidents
Nitrate region	5	19	10
Chuquicamata	-	2	-
Tatal	-	2	-
Tarapaca	-	1	-
Coquimbo	-	2	-
Valparaíso	5	6	3
Santiago	11	6	19
Rancagua	-	-	1
Lota	-	1	1
Concepción	2	6	1
Talcahuano	1	4	1
Magallanes	-	3	1
Talca	-	1	-
Valdivia	-	2	-
Viña del Mar	-	1	1
Calera	-	1	-
Punta Arenas	1	1	-
Coal region	-	1	-
Pampa to Puerto			
Montt	-	-	1
All the Country	-	3	1
TOTAL	25	62	40

Source: See source Table 7, p. 182.

Note: This table takes into account the number of places in which May Day is celebrated. This is the reason why these figures are larger than those given in Table No. 6, p. 180.

B. Economic Conditioning Elements of Strikes

Until 1925:

Industrial Diversification

The analysis of the economic development pattern will demonstrate that during this period working masses are diversified according to the characteristics of industrial growth.

The greater frequency of actions relates to the economic changes experienced in the first decade of the century.

The import substitution process and the introduction of new industrial sectors, translated into the growth of non-traditional economic activities such as ceramic and glass manufacturing and metallurgy; there is also a lower rate of growth in food, tobacco and other traditional manufacturies. Nevertheless, as a whole, industry grew at a 2.4% annual rate between 1918 and 1924-25.-253/

In comparative terms, the mining industry grows at the greatest annual rate. (3.5%). The contribution of copper to this rate is in itself high. Its production increases from 52,000 tons in 1915 to 192,000 in 1925 and to 220,000 in 1939.254/

On the contrary, nitrate remains a stagnant activity,

253. Muñoz, O., El Crecimiento Industrial de Chile. 1914-1965, Universidad de Chile, Instituto de Economía, 2da. Edición, 1971, p. 38.

254. Hurtado C. Op. cit. pp. 155-156.

undergoing a significant crisis in 1915 and 1919. Nitrate recovers the 1910 level of production only in 1925. Between this year and 1930 production never exceeded a million tons.^{255/}

The production growth affected the number of workers employed in mining and manufacturing industries up to 1925. Thus, the nitrate industry work force, increases to 60,785 in 1925 starting from 53,470 in 1916. Workers linked to the coal industry increased from 9,247 to 14,738 during the same period. Large-scale copper mining doubled its initial figure of 8,908 workers in 1920.^{256/} This increase in the working population took place in a limited number of provinces. In nitrate activities 41% of blue-collar workers were concentrated in Tarapaca and approximately 33% in Antofagasta.

A lesser degree of concentration is observable in regions like Taltal, Tocopilla and Aguas Blancas. As far as coal workers is concerned, the greatest percentage of them lived in Concepción and Arauco (Lota, Coronel and Curanilahue).

On the other hand, 80% of copper workers were employed in the industries of "El Teniente" and "Chuquicamata", located in the provinces of O'Higgins and

255. Idem.

256. Table 17, on p. 343.

Antofagasta.^{257/}

Another economic conditioning element of strike actions is the size of firms. In this respect, it was only possible to examine the copper and coal industries. As is shown in Table 17, on page 345, ninety percent (90%) of the workplaces (centros de trabajo) employed more than one hundred workers. This conditioning element would reinforce the assumed effect of the observable regional concentration on workers' propensity to engage in strike actions.

The regional concentration may also be correlated with the economic determinants of those strike actions which occurred in the industries of Santiago. As has been already noted, the capital ranked first in regional general strikes. This change in ranking has to do with the production growth which was greater in Santiago than in the rest of the country. This development is also manifested by the fact that 50% (10,000) of all new employment offered by those firms which employed five or more workers were concentrated in the Capital. By the end of the period, industry employed 72,375 blue-collar workers; most of them working in Santiago.^{258/}

The growing concentration of the working mass in certain provinces and the large number of employees in

257. Idem.

258. Idem.

firms, particularly in the mining industry are, therefore, the main economic conditioning elements affecting workers' propensity to strike.

C. The Evolution of Organizations Until 1925

The evolution experienced by workers' organizations also conditioned the features of strike actions described above. For instance, the Mutuales eventually came to include about 100,000 handicraft workers apart from some industrial workers and public employees. All of them formed the "Confederación Nacional Mutualista" during this period.


Though the Mancomunales, known now as "Federación Obrera de Chile" (FOCH), did not grow as much as the Mutuales, they numbered 80,000 workers in 1921. They were also able to hold national meetings on no less than six occasions. The provincial organizations of Antofagasta, Valparaíso, Santiago and Concepción also met twice. They finally held a Rural Workers' Convention.^{259/} During this period they also agreed to join the International Third, thus forming a direct link with Moscow. Another relevant activity undertaken by FOCH during this period was its participation in the "Junta de Asalariados de Chile".

259. Barria, Los Movimientos Sociales de Chile Desde op. cit.

The FOCH's small social base, consisting of coal and nitrate miners was extended to include various workers linked with leather, furniture and metallurgical manufacturing as well as with the inter-city railroad.^{260/}

The growing complexity of FOCH is also reflected in its new structural divisions summarized in the following organizational graph.^{261/}

Organization No. 2: Model of FOCH



In 1921, due to its high level of activism, separate councils were set up in each of the following sectors: food, mining, transportation, construction, manufacturing and public services.

With regard to the decision-making processes, FOCH retains the centralized conception that characterized the organizational model of the Mancomunales. Therefore,

260. This group left the FOCH in 1922 because of ideological differences and organized the "Federación Obrera Ferroviaria".

261. Organizational Model of FOCH. See in this regard "Estatutos de La Federación Obrera de Chile", n.d.

decisions concerning strikes are made by both federal councils and the executive board.

During this period, FOCH began to express a socialist ideology. This is revealed in its public manifestos on the "defence of the workers against capitalist exploitation" and the "need to conquer working class freedom" by means of "abolishing the unbearable capitalist industrial and commercial organization". The FOCH believed that in order to obtain political power it was necessary to "intensify the class struggle", to "abolish private property" and to "unite the proletariat nationally and internationally".^{262/}

The anarchist organizations of the previous period, i.e. the Sociedades de Resistencia, formed the "Federación Obrera Regional de Chile" (FORCH) and also formed the International World Workers (IWW). The first had great influence on port workers and to a lesser degree on shoemakers and printers.

The IWW Chilean branch held national meetings during this period. Its structural model involved three main types of structures: base departments, administrative councils at city level and a general administrative council at the summit. Nevertheless, this type of

262. This type of statement is frequently expressed in El Despertar de Los Trabajadores, one of the leading publications of FOCH and the Partido Obrero Socialista (POS). It lasted from 1912 to February 1927.

organization does not correspond to any greater centralization of the decision-making process. As in the Sociedades de Resistencia, the most powerful structures are the basic organizations. Thus, strikes are still decided by them without consulting the high authorities.

IWW's anarchist ideology becomes evident during this period. Manifests stressing the development of workers' institutions to destroy the capitalist regime, to overthrow church and state, to "abolish the regime of wages" and "to institute anarchist communism", are common during this period.^{263/}

The evolution of workers' organizations and political ideologies suggested above is mainly manifested as has been already seen in the larger extent of strike actions and the lesser frequency of violent incidents.

D. Political Conditioning Elements:

Enlightened Elites and Parties^{264/}

Between 1916 and 1931 we can distinguish several

263. Examples of this type of formulations are clearly found in Acción Directa Santiago 1920-1926; and later on in El Obrero. Manifiesto. Iquique. 1925.

264. Most of the information used in this section was provided by Professor Barriá, who permitted us to inspect some of his unpublished material and relevant sources. Also very useful were López, Osvaldo Diccionario Biográfico Obrero de Chile. Santiago. 1912-1923; Arias Escobedo, La Prensa Obrera en Chile (1900-1930). Universidad de Chile. Chillan 1970 and Fuentes J. and Cortez Lia, Diccionario Político de Chile. Ed Orbe. Santiago de Chile 1967.

different new trends. Nevertheless, the most outstanding characteristics of the period are the emergence of working class parties and the workers' ideological progress. This aspect was mainly the result of the action of small groups of socialist intellectuals and self-taught workers. During this period, workers were exposed to a process of politicization which prepared them to lead the political and economic actions of their own class. Thus, the parties of the left recruited, not only their rank and file members from the working class, but also several of their leaders.

Among the founders of left-wing groups, we could mention many workers, but we will only describe some of them. Most of the leaders of working class parties came from the old "Partido Demócrata". The "Partido Obrero Socialista" (POS) was founded in 1912 and later on, the Communist (C.P) (1922) and the Socialist Parties (S.P) (1933) made their appearance.

Among these leaders were a number of very prominent workers such as the following:

Luis Emilio Recabarran (POS, C.P.). He worked as a printer, journalist and editor. He was also elected Deputy for Antofagasta (1906, 1921-1924). He must be regarded as the most important leader of the workers' political and economic movement.

Carlos Alberto Martínez (POS, S.P.), A printer and journalist elected Deputy for Santiago (1933-1937, 1937-1941). Senator for Tarapaca and Antofagasta (1937-1941) and for Aconcagua and Valparaíso (1945-1949, 1949-1955). Finally, he was appointed Minister during the Socialist Republic.

Manuel Hidalgo (POS, C.P., S.P.), a goldsmith who led the "Congreso Social Obrero" of 1910. He was also elected to the local government of Santiago between 1913 and 1924. Senator for Tarapaca and Antofagasta (1926-1934, 1933-1937), Minister of Public Works during the Popular Front and presidential candidate of a Communist Party (Trotskyist Wing) in 1931.

Elías Lafferte (POS., C.P.), nitrate miner, actor and printer, elected senator for Tarapaca and Antofagasta (1937-1945) and presidential candidate of the Communist Party (official wing) in 1931).

Carlos Contreras Labarca, Lawyer for workers' union and newspapers, elected Deputy for Pisagua and Tarapaca (1925-1930) and

Arica, Pisagua and Iquique (1937-1941); senator for Santiago in (1941-1949) and Valparaíso, Osorno, Llanquihue, Chile, Aysen and Magallanes (between 1961-1969). He was also Minister of Public Works in the Popular Front Administrations.

Ramon Sepúlveda Leal, (C.P.), shoemaker, elected as Deputy for Valparaíso, Quillota, Limache and Casablanca in 1926-1930 and 1930-1932.

Bernardo Ibañez, (C.P., S.P.), teacher, general secretary of the "Asociación de Maestros" (1913), founder of the teachers' union (1935), general secretary of CTCH (1939) elected Deputy for Valparaíso and Quillota (1941-1945) and presidential candidate in 1946.

Bernardo Araya, (C.P.) State Railroad worker, president of CTCH and Deputy from Antofagasta, Tocopilla and Taltal.

Lindorfo Alarcon, (C.P.) lawyer for Mangomunales, elected Deputy from Antofagasta, Taltal and Tocopilla (1909-1912, 1912-1915).

Juan Chacón Corona (C.P.) nitrate miner and glass worker elected Deputy for Valparaíso in 1941-1945.

The analysis of these leaders' backgrounds shows the preponderance of workers among them. Out of ten, there are two lawyers, one teacher, two nitrate miners, two printers, one railroad worker and one shoemaker, i.e., three professionals and seven workers. As already said, these leaders were very active in supporting workers' organizations of the first period and the confederations that succeeded them. The most important evidence of their activities can be found in their journalistic publications. During this period and the previous one, it is possible to identify fifteen periodicals which were consistently published for at least one year. They include: La Igualdad, Santiago, 1894-1896, La Democracia, Santiago, 1899-1901, El Defensor de la Clase Proletaria, Iquique, 1902-1904, La Voz del Obrero, Taltal, 1902-1917, El Proletario, Tocopilla, 1904-1935; La Reforma, Santiago, 1906-1908, El Pueblo Obrero, Iquique, 1906-1910.

All these publications express a predominantly economic and particularistic type of demand. After 1912 when the POS is founded, the workers' press shows a greater awareness of the general conditions of working-class existence under a capitalist order. Among the most

politically-oriented newspapers or publications we may mention El Socialista, Valparaíso, 1915-1918, Accion Obrera, Santiago, 1916, La Aurora Roja, Pisagua, 1917, La Aurora, Taltal, 1919, La Bandera Roja, Santiago, 1919, La Jornada, Schwager, 1920, Libertad, Concepción, 1921 and La Verdad Coquimbo, 1921.

These ideological activities must be regarded as the most relevant contribution of the political elites to the development of workers' organizations. The anarchist groups, who had begun to exercise their ideological influence through Sociedades de Resistencia, also published many newspapers. Their best known periodicals were El Siglo, Santiago, 1901, La Agitación, Santiago, 1901-1903, La Luz, 1901-1908, El Faro, 1902-1903, El Alba, Santiago, 1905-1906, El Oprimido, Santiago, 1906. El Primero de Mayo, Iquique, 1907-1908, El Productor, Santiago, 1912-1913, La Batalla, Santiago, 1912-1916, Luz y Defensa, Santiago, 1914, Acción Obrera, Antofagasta, 1914 La Defensa, Iquique, 1916, La Voz del Marino, Punta Arenas, 1917, Unión Gremial, Antofagasta, 1917, Verba Roja Valparaíso 1918-1927, Acción Sindical, Antofagasta 1920, Acción Directa, Santiago, 1920-1926, El Productor, Iquique, 1921-1923, El Proletario, Talca, 1921- 1923, El Obrero Metalurgico, Valparaíso, 1924-1926, El Irabajo, Punta Arenas, 1925-1926, La Voz del Pueblo, Concepción, 1925. Unión Sindical, Valparaíso, 1925.

Regarding the anarchist leaders, a distinctive feature is the conspicuous role played by foreigners. The Spaniards, Casimiro Barrios, Manuel Peña and Ramiro Yunasayol; the Italians Lombardi, Quadri and Loggia, and the Peruvian Julio Rebosio are very well-known in this regard. In 1918, during the Parliamentary Republic Conservatives, Liberals, Radicals and Nationalists forbade foreigners to come to Chile if they came "to disturb social order, practice violence or spread ideas contrary to the unity of the nation".^{265/}

Workers' participation in the leadership of the anarchist movement was as important as that already examined in the Socialist and Communist Parties. During this period, and the previous one, it is possible to identify a majority of workers among twenty such leaders.

A characteristic selection would be the following leaders of the Sociedades de Resistencia:

Alejandro Escobar; one of the few anarchist professionals; studied in the Escuela de Artes y Oficios and was a very influential

265. Law Nos. 3.,346. Ramírez, N., also suggest that foreigners were important more widely than in the anarchist movement. He says that three hundred Communists came to Chile after the Paris Commune. See his "Tuvo Influencia Primera Internacional en Chile?" in Principios September-October, 1969.

journalist during the early period.

Luis Olea; a journalist; an outstanding leader in the events of Santa María de Iquique (1907); later on he was required to leave the country.

Mango Ezpinosa; metalworker; well-known as one of the leaders of the strike of 1903 in Santiago. He was also General Secretary of "Union Socialista" and journalist of El Rebelde and El Acrata".

Marcos Yanez; watchmaker and journalist of La Luz, and La Agitación.

José del Carmen Moscoso; printer and the leader of the El Acrata group.

Belarmino Orellana and J.M. Cadiz; two other important leaders who worked as cabinetmakers.

Eugenio Sagredo; another leader who worked as a printer.

The outstanding figures during the Federative period

of anarchist thinking are Juan Gandulfo, Alfredo Demaria and Oscar Schnake (he also became one of the leaders of Socialist Party). Augusto Pinto, Pedro N. Arratia, Juan Mondaca, Alberto Ballofet and Benjamin Piña, who also held important positions in the IWW, were all workers in the strict definition of the word.

In the subsequent federative stage of anarchism, i.e., during the period of the Confederación General del Trabajo (C.G.T.) Luis Meredie the journalist of "Tribuna Literaria" and Ortuzar are well-known figures.

As has been shown, in terms of occupational origins, the anarchist leaders do not present great differences from the socialists of the Mancomunales. Their main differences consisted in their ideological orientation and the greater role performed by foreign leaders in the anarchist movement. The repressive policies implemented by governments against anarchist leaders, as well as their ideological inhibitions against forming party structures must have been decisive in determining the relatively small influence which they exercise in the subsequent periods.

The Partido Demócrata, another popular organization, founded in 1886 was also largely influenced by workers. Among them we may mention the tanner, Bonifacio Veas, the tin-smith, Senon Torrealba, the tailor, Antemio Gutierrez the engine-driver, Eduardo Ventoso, the shoemaker

Nolasco Cardenas, and the printer, Pedro Araya. All of them became deputies during the first decade of the 20th Century and Senon Torrealba was presidential candidate in the 1905 elections.

Although some of the leaders of this party were to adopt a socialist outlook only during the first decade of the new century, their democratic ideological commitment and propaganda activities must have meant a radical critique of society at that time.^{266/}

Therefore, the evolution of workers' organizations and their political awareness, as revealed in their propaganda activities, are determined in the last analysis by the influences they received from Democratic, Communist, Socialist and Anarchist leaders. Socialist and anarchist ideologies were, of course, very mixed during the first period and until the birth of the Socialist party in 1912. They were not, in the first instance elaborated by the national leaders themselves, but learned from international influences. Yet their political role must not be disregarded, particularly if we consider the important role played by workers in their

266. López has calculated that 55 different types of publications were sponsored by the Partido Democrático, op. cit. Chapter 1.

diffusion.^{267/}

There is another aspect of workers' actions that is specifically related to the ideological activities of such elites. This is, the greater frequency of political aims in workers' strikes during this second stage. As we can observe in Table No. 11 on page 204, they represent 7.7% of total strikes. In the previous period they were only 0.5%. Political aims refer to workers' protests against the government's repressive policies and to legislation which workers consider detrimental to their interests.

Other explicit aims more frequently observed during this period are those relating to the right to organize trade unions and to strike. This type of aims, compared to those under "status as workers" would reveal a clearer awareness on the part of workers of their potential power as an organized group.

A detailed analysis of explicit strike aims by types of workers is presented in Table A-2.

As suggested in the introduction, the greater frequency of political and trade-union aims which is revealed in workers strike actions during the period under

267. Among the authors most frequently quoted by anarchist and socialist publications are: Kropotkine, Bakunin, Gorki, Proudhon, Marx, Engels, Lenin, Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kramenef and Bujarin.

T_A_B_L_E__No._11

EXPLICIT STRIKE AIMS(1)

(1916-1925)

AIMS	No.	%
SPECIFIC ECONOMIC AIMS		
Referring to their status as workers		
- Wages	276	36.5
- Economic Benefits	39	5.1
- Working Hours	77	10.1
- Working Conditions	57	7.5
- Labour Relations	100	13.2
Referring to their		
- Living Conditions	20	2.6
GENERAL ECONOMIC AIMS	12	1.6
TRADE UNION AIMS	119	15.7
POLITICAL AIMS	58	7.7
TOTAL	758	100.0

(1) Source: See source Table 7, p. 182.

analysis, also corresponds to the political and ideological development of enlightened groups of workers organized in the Anarchist movement and the Democratic, Communist and Socialist parties. Since these groups were the only ones linked to the emerging working class, there can be little doubt as to the strong association suggested between the evolution of political aims in the workers' struggle and the ideological role performed by these enlightened elites.

The New Labour Policies: State Liberalization and Institutionalization of Conflicts

During this decade, certain policies aiming at a greater degree of state intervention in economic and social life were adopted. These were regarded as a way to restore the weakened capacity of the state as a central power. This situation had originated in the conflicts that characterized the period of the Parliamentary Republic.^{268/}

^{268.} After the revolution of 1891, the country was divided into regions and local government increased its functions diminishing the sphere of competence of central government. See C. Pizarro, La Revolución de 1891 (La Modernización). Ediciones Universitarias, Valparaíso, 1970. pp. 33-34.

The new government orientations were revealed in the adoption of various policies directed toward labour. For example, the government elected in 1920 made some explicit effort to regulate capital - labour relations.

From the workers' point of view, the most important change was the recognition of the right to form unions. These could be formed in firms that employed at least 25 workers. In the case of some professionals or craftsmen, this requisite could be fulfilled by gathering workers from different firms. Once 55% of the workers agreed on organizing a Union, it was compulsory for blue-collar workers to be affiliated to it. White-collar workers, on their part, could refuse outright to join any Union. In the first instance, the unions' functions were limited to representing the workers' interests in the discussion of Pliegos de Peticiones (economic and social demands presented to employers). They also represented workers in the bargaining mechanisms, i.e., those known as Junta de Conciliación and Arbitraje. If workers and employer did not reach an agreement through the latter mechanism, workers could decide to initiate strike actions. In order to do this, it was necessary to secure the agreement of 75% of them.

At the federative level, the law accepted only blue-collar organizations belonging to the same sector, or

groups of employees of the same craft or profession. In any case, federations were not allowed to undertake therepresentation of the trade unions' economic and social demands.

This legislation actually discouraged many workers from becoming unionized, particularly those linked to smaller firms, some independent craftsmen and workers with non-permanent jobs. Public employees were not even given the right to unionize and the situation of rural workers was very ambiguous.^{269/} Again, regulations regarding union finances and the habitual identification of the government with the employers' interests also helped to limit the growth of unions. Arturo Allesandri Palma, the main author of this Labour Legislation, expressly stated that it was enacted because

"It was time...to make some concession so as to keep peace and order. There are always blind minds unable to understand that timely evolution is the effective remedy to avoid revolution and collapse".^{270/}

Those who best understood the reasons for adopting a

269. See Section B, Chapter Six.

270. Allesandri's words in his letter to Moises Poblete, Derecho del Trabajo y la Seguridad Social en Chile Ed. Jurídica, Santiago, 1949, p. 20.

framework of labour legislation^{271/} regarded it as an instrument to control the conflictive workers' actions.

The new liberal administration also established certain institutions to cope with the workers' problems. Thus, the Inspección del Trabajo was created to enforce labour legislation. The Ministry of Health, Hygiene and Social Security, the Office of Social Security for Railroad Workers and the Caja de Empleados Particulares were also formed in an attempt to intervene in the solution of some of the problems related to conditions of life and employment among the workers.

At this time, the government regards itself either as an arbiter of the conflicts between capital and labour, or as a protector. Important indications in this latter sense are provided by the publication of laws regarding Sunday rest, industrial injuries, juvenile employment,

271. See in this regard Morris S. Elites, Intellectuals and Consensus. New York, 1966; and Angell, op.cit. Part 1.4. Several surveys of attitudes, published in the sixties refer to the favourable attitudes of entrepreneurs to the prevailing labour legislation and their simultaneous disapproval of actions actually undertaken by the unions. See in this respect the summary presented in C. Pizarro. The Chilean Managerial Elite. Singapore Project Conference (Mimeo). February 1975. Lastly, contrary to what one could expect, an important number of industrial workers do not regard entrepreneurs as their greatest enemies. See on this aspect., Nazar Víctor, Imagen Sociológica del Obrero Industrial Chileno, thesis U. de Ch. 1967.

workers' compulsory social security, compensation for occupational risk and the eight-hour working day.^{272/}

These changes must be related to the permanent conflicts among dominant political factions and to the workers' struggles to obtain their basic rights.

However, it is not possible to say that all workers were in favour of labour legislation. The rejection of such legislation by anarchists and the early reluctance of the Communist Party in accepting the new laws are well-known in this respect.^{273/}

Alessandri's attitude towards the liberalization of labour policies was not acceptable to the conservative groups which lost the 1920 presidential elections. In effect, labour legislation, which was presented to Congress in 1921, was only passed in 1924, and then as a part of a larger package of laws. An important part of these laws consisted in the authorization of improved wages for the military: only the direct pressure that the military exerted on the Congress was also effective in securing the enactment of the labour legislation.

The institutionalization of labour legislation in its turn affects the prevailing forms of workers' protests. Although violent incidents become less frequent at this

272. Laws Nos. 2851, 3170, 3186, 3371, 4053, 4055, 4056.

273. See Morris, *idem.* and Angell, *idem.*

stage, something which certainly reflects the adaptation of workers to new institutional conditioning elements, the full effect of the new labour institutions on the workers' conflictive actions will be better ascertained in the forthcoming periods.

E. Political Conditioning Elements of the Pause in Strike Activities Following 1925.

If one regards the new legislation as indicating a greater tolerance on the part of governments towards the workers' demands, one could also expect a greater frequency of strike actions. Nevertheless, from 1926 to the end of this period, no such trend is apparent.

An element that explains this phenomenon is the discrepancy existing between institutional changes and the actual government policies which make this type of change void. Another determinant factor of the workers' withdrawal from conflictive activities was the general disequilibrium of the political system of which special mention is made in the next section.

Alessandri's second administration (1925) adopted repressive measures against nitrate miners in Tarapaca, Coruna, Prontevdra and Barnechea districts, which rendered the new formal labour institutions ineffective. As a matter of fact, during this time, the trade unions and their leaders are subjected to severe forms of

repression. Although the EOCH tried to recover from this situation in 1931, its efforts yield no practical results.

In this period, the only organizational development to be observed is that backed by the Ibañez administration and represented by the Confederación Republicana de Acción Cívica de Obreros y Empleados de Chile (CRAC). It grouped together the workers affiliated to the Unión de Empleados de Chile (UECH) and to some Mutuales. The traditional leaders of the working class linked to Communist and Anarchist groups were expressly excluded from the CRAC.

The UECH and Mutuales defined themselves as "gremialistas" and as non-political organizations. However they were rather vague in their general political orientation. The UECH leaders and the Mutuales, who regarded themselves as "apolitical" were given 19 seats in the "Congreso Termal" organized by Ibañez in 1930.-274/

The life of the "CRAC" was as long as that of the administration which sustained it and to which it gave its unconditional loyalty.

Ibañez' repressive policies against traditional unionists and the CRAC's para-governmental stand must be

274. The candidates to this congress were elected by Ibañez and the traditional parties at Termas de Chillan.

viewed as the main political elements conditioning the suspension of the workers' strike actions.

F. Political Elements Conditioning Trade Union Inactivity: A Situation of Political Instability (1925-1932)

Despite the new legislation, the governments in power at the end of this period enacted a set of regulations aiming at strengthening their means of controlling public order. We have already noted how in 1918, during the Parliamentary Republic, a law had been passed forbidding foreigners to engage in political activities.^{275/}

All the obstacles that we have discussed concerning the workers' organization and activities, must be viewed in relation to the recurrent political crises that distinguished the Parliamentary Republic. This situation, which was not, in the last analysis, overcome by Alessandri's administration, must be interpreted as the the origin of eventual military intervention. "El Ruido de Sables" of September, 1924 was, therefore, an initial attempt at re-establishing the traditional order by now severely disrupted. From the year in which Alessandri had to leave the presidency, until his electoral return

²⁷⁵ See Law No. 3,346.

in 1932, the country experienced a situation of political
desequilibrium.276/

Among the most prominent alterations of the rules

276. A full chronology of this confusing period of Chilean history would be as follows: September 18, 1924 Military coup d'etat by young military officers (actually led by rightist factions), known as Ruido de Sables; January 23, 1925: Coup led by officers linked to free masonry and leftist liberalism. They asked Alessandri to return to Chile; March 20, 1925: Alessandri takes power again and Ibañez is appointed as Minister of War; October 10, 1925: Alessandri resigns as a consequence of Ibañez' refusal to leave his post. Luis Barros Borgoño assumes the Vice-presidency; December 23, 1925: Emiliano Figueroa obtains the presidency of the Republic. Ibañez is appointed as Vice-President in February, 1927; May 4, 1927: Figueroa resigns; May 22, 1927: Ibañez is elected in a spurious contest in which his nominal opponent Elias Lafferte is expelled from the country; July 26, 1931: Ibañez is overthrown by militaries and partly because of students' protests. The Military movement on this occasion is led by General Bartolome Blanche, who becomes Vice-President and J. Montero is appointed as Minister of Home Affairs; October 4, 1931: Montero assumes the Presidency with the support of Radical and Conservative Parties; June 4, 1932: Coup d'etat led by Comodoro Marmaduke Grove, backed by Air Force, middle-class groups and unions, installs the so-called Socialist Republic; June 13, 1932: a new coup d'etat puts an end to the presidency of C. Davila (first President of the Socialist Republic) and appoints R. Merino a moderate leader; June 16, 1932: A Junta Civil takes over power and gives middle-class groups influential government posts; July 8, 1932: Davila re-assumes the presidency and represses Leftist Groups; September 13, 1932: A rightist coup d'etat led by General Blanche takes place in order "to bring the country back to democracy"; October 2, 1932: Blanche under pressure from rightist groups transfers power to the President of the Supreme Court; October 3, 1932: Popular elections give the presidency to Alessandri, who is backed by Radicals, some Conservative factions and liberals.

governing the previous political order, in particular, two stand out: the military movement of 1924 and the events which led to the rise of Ibañez as the key political figure until 1931. The conservative group led by General Blanche, which eventually overthrew Ibañez, is replaced by socialist-minded groups who attempted to establish the so-called "Socialist Republic".^{277/}

The general disequilibrium which distinguished this period reflects the cleavages existing between the oligarchical groups electorally defeated by Alessandri in 1920 and the Liberal factions of the dominant political

276.-

Source: Joxe Alain, Las Fuerzas Armadas en el Sistema Político Chileno, Ed. Universitaria, Santiago. pp. 55-74. Donoso, Ricardo, Alessandri, Agitador y Demoledor 50 Años de Historia Política de Chile: F.C.E. Buenos Aires. Mexico. 1st. Edition 1957.

277. A movement doomed to failure due to both, the inadequate economic, as well as organizational development of the working class. Norbert Lechner has also pointed to the ideological weakness of the socialist movement. For a general interpretation of this period see his La Democracia en Chile, Ediciones Signo, B.A. 1970, pp. 45-60. Detailed accounts of this period are those of Thomas J.R. "The Socialist Republic of Chile" in Journal of Interamerican Studies, April, 1964 and his "The Evolution of a Chilean Socialist: Marmaduke Grove", in Hispanic American Historical Review (42) February 1967. Another study dealing with this period is that of Hugo Zemelman's El Movimiento Popular Chileno y el Sistema de Alianzas en la Década del 30, in Enzo Felleto, Eduardo Ruiz and Hugo Zemelman, Genesis del Proceso Político Chileno. Empresa Editora Nacional Quimantu Ltd., 1971, pp. 33-118. This work greatly emphasizes the political role played by petit bourgeois elements in socialist groups.

groups. Military intervention is best understood in terms of the concept of Bonapartism developed in the classic Marxist analysis;^{278/} thus, the main objective of this intervention must be regarded as an effort to assist traditional political stability. The interpretation of those events in terms of a movement of the middle groups, which has been suggested by some authors, would seem to imply more radical changes than those which actually took place.^{279/} Therefore, we can say with difficulty that this situation was the result of any working class strategy designed to gain government control. All the most relevant political conflicts took place within the limits of the "block in power" in which some middle sectors could, indeed, perform important roles. Nevertheless, they did not embrace the working class representatives.

In a situation of general political disturbance, unions were prevented from engaging in economic, as well as political protests. This came about because the

278. See K. Marx, "The Eighteen Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte", "The Civil War in France", "The Class Struggle in France (1848-1850)" in Marx K. and Engels F. Selected Works. Lawrence and Wishart. London 1968.

279. Examples of this type are the works of Donoso R., Historia de Chile Eudeba. Baires 1963, Edwards. A., La Fronda Aristocrática. Editorial del Pacifico. Santiago, 1966, Jobet. J.C. Ensayo Crítico. op. cit.

repression of workers' actions was perceived as a necessary condition for the restoration of lost stability. Nevertheless, in spite of the working class' extremely circumscribed role in the scene of power, an important part of the cleavages existing among the dominant classes was determined by their different views as to what should be done about the demands formulated by unions.

The workers' withdrawal from conflictive activities during this time is thus closely correlated with the situation of political instability that distinguished the period.

G. Economic Conditioning Elements:--The Crisis of the Nitrate Industry and the World Depression.

The workers' inactivity in strikes, during the period 1925-1926 and half way through the next period, was also conditioned by the world depression and the nitrate crisis which began to take place on the eve of 1930.

Both the adoption of synthetic nitrates and the world economic crisis caused a fall in nitrate exports. While in 1928 three million tons of nitrate were produced, production did not exceed one million tons in 1931.^{280/} A similar trend took place in the copper

^{280.} Hurtado C., op. cit., p. 155.

production which dropped from 300,000 tons in 1928 to 200,000 during the last year of that period.^{281/} The fall in production caused mass unemployment. The number of nitrate workers decreased from 60,000 in 1928 to 16,000 in 1931 and 8,000 in 1932.^{282/} The number of workers employed in the copper industry was reduced from 16,000 in 1925 to 12,000 in 1931 and to 5,000 in 1932 and 1933. There was a reduction in coal mining workers from 14,500 in 1925 to 9,500 in 1931.^{283/}

Although we do not have similar information for the working population in the manufacturing industry, the rate of production is an indirect indication of the trend towards unemployment. This underwent a fall of 25.6% between 1929 and 1931.

If the production and unemployment figures are interpreted in relation to the unstable political situation described above, we are in a position to understand why workers withdrew from conflictive activities during this period.

In fact, the dispersal of the labour force linked to the export sector, i.e., the nitrate industry and transportation, deprived the labour movement of its most politically committed leaders. The removal of the objective

281. Idem.

282. Idem.

283. Data on coal and copper. Ibid. p. 195.

possibilities for workers' interaction within the capitalist enterprise and the repressive policies that distinguished these years of political instability reinforced each other as elements conditioning the workers' retreat from conflictive activities. The last relevant instance of a disposition on the workers' part to demonstrate against their worsening working and living conditions took place in 1926, when the military intervention was not yet well established. In fact, this happened a little later - in 1927 - during the Ibañez administration. This government outlawed and persecuted traditional working class leaders and organizations.

H. The Hunger Rallies of August and September, 1919. Representative of the First Stage of Trade Union Politicization (1916-1925).

a) Introduction

As mentioned earlier, between 1926 and 1932 the signs of labour conflict tended to disappear almost completely due to the control exerted over the trade union movement during the period of economic crisis and generalized political disequilibrium. In dealing with the subject of strike activity, we have chosen the movement commonly known as "los mitines de hambre" as characteristic of the first stage of trade union politicization. These rallies took place throughout the country

on August 29, 1919, culminating in a general strike led by the FOCH in Santiago starting September 3rd. While the hunger rallies are our main concern, the general strike will also be mentioned with particular reference made to those characteristics differentiating it from other similar movements.

Information on this subject has been gathered from the major journalistic sources of the period, which include El Mercurio, the Chilean traditional right-wing newspaper (July, August and September, 1919), Las Ultimas Noticias (August, and September, 1919), an afternoon edition belonging to El Mercurio, and La Nación the government newspaper (July, August and September, 1919), all of Santiago and Númen, the Student Federation of Chile (FECH) periodical (June to December, 1919). The 27th to 54th ordinary sessions of the House of Representatives held from July 10th to August 12th, during which period the discussions centered around the so-called "subsistence law", were also consulted.

It is interesting to note that during this period there were no workers' periodical in Santiago. The publication produced by the "Gran Federación Obrera de Chile" called Federación Obrera had been suspended in 1916 reappearing in 1921, after the federation had been more or less restructured. Certain anarchist newspapers and pamphlets like Verba Roja or Surco were also being distributed. These, however, only reproduced articles

from foreign newspapers or the ideas of anarchic thinkers, mainly European, and only very rarely attempted to address the country's actual situation. During the "twenties", after the hunger rallies, the situation began to change. The Númen was the only Santiago newspaper that represented or at least was supposed to represent the workers. Its directors' ideology led them to take up "the cause of the proletariat". The workers' page of this newspaper was, in fact, written by the workers, so one may safely assume that Númen effectively represented them and was not merely an ideological option offered by its directors.

Of the secondary sources, the most valuable text on this period is Jorge Barriá's degree dissertation^{284/} a truly exhaustive work on the period containing information on all major movements occurring at the time. A large amount of empirical data is gathered together in this work and presented in such a way so as to preserve its authenticity. These documents have made possible

 284. See Los Movimientos Sociales en Chile desde... op. cit. Another useful work is Aníbal Pinto's book, Chile, un caso de Desarrollo Frustrado, op. cit. This covers the general framework within which these movements developed. The work of Julio Cesar Jobet, Ensayo Crítico sobre el Desarrollo Económico Social de Chile, op. cit., offers information on the characteristics of the period apart from much varied data on the major trends of the workers movement.

the location of declarations by the FOCH and the AOAN (Asamblea Obrera de Alimentación Nacional), as well as others that would normally have been difficult to find as they were very dispersed. Workers' newspapers existed in other areas outside the capital; i.e., El Despertar de los Trabajadores in the Nitrate Pampa, La Comuna in Valparaíso and Adelante in Talcahuano. These dailies are used as reference in the section on hunger rallies, in Professor Barriá's.

b) The Circumstances Surrounding the
Hunger Rallies

The period in question is characterized by the decline of the so-called "outward development model". As the country's level of economic activity was mainly based on the export of nitrate, when this sector began to feel the effects of the crisis on its external demand, overall economic activity was affected, which logically included the jobs of the great mass of wage earners.

The major workers' demonstrations during mid 1918, can be mainly attributed to the circumstances surrounding the crisis in the nitrate sector, which forced the companies to lay-off large numbers of workers who set off southward in the hope of finding work. However, jobs were very hard to find and masses of workers began to roam the streets of Santiago forming a vast army of beggars.

The end of the war in Europe worsened the crisis. With the devastation of most of the European economy, the exportation of local products, and in particular, food-stuffs, caused both export and local prices to shoot up severely affecting the working class. This state of affairs created what is commonly referred to as the post-war crisis.

The economic crisis had repercussions in the political scene due to parliamentary inefficiency and the President's inability to take action. By this time, the workers' parties had managed to consolidate their basic structure and organization, which allowed them continuity of action and their expanded influence in a growing number of labour organizations.

These circumstances provided the scenario for the series of strike movements that arose during that period. Linked directly to this situation were the bakers' strikes in Concepción, the tobacco workers' strikes in Santiago, the telegraph workers' strikes also in Santiago and many others. It is within this framework that the hunger rallies should be contemplated.

It is not surprising then, that these trade union conflicts should have brought about a questioning of the current parliamentary regime and that, consequently, demands that had started off being purely unionist, tended to become political in the course of events.

c) The Hunger Rallies

It is not easy to precisely determine at what point during this period these movements began. Even if this were possible to determine, one could not dissociate them from the constant agitation by workers' organizations. From this point of view, it could be said that the movements of this period were not simply the isolated outbursts that had characterised the conflictive activity of the previous period. As the hunger rallies were motivated by inflationary crisis and more or less generalized unemployment from approximately mid-1918 on, prior to the rallies of late August, 1919, the workers' movements had been forced to undertake constant agitation and the organization of their movement. All focuses of discontent could, therefore, be voiced through the workers' organizations within the "Asamblea Obrera de Alimentación Nacional", which will be hereafter referred to as the AOAN.^{285/}

Prior to August 29, 1919, this organization was responsible for several meetings, one on November 22, 1918 and another on February 7, 1919-^{286/} The first of these was repressed and the latter failed to take place because

285. An account of this organization is to be found in the section dedicated to managing the movement.

286. El Mercurio, November 23, 1918, pp. 3, 17 and 18; February 6, 1919, p. 15.

of the government order prohibiting public meetings. The AOAN also organized the May Day Celebrations that same year, as well as an open congress the previous March.^{287/} In actual fact, the AOAN became the real leader of the movement of the masses from the time of its creation in 1918. For a whole month prior to the celebrations on August 29th, the AOAN also managed to stage one rally per week in Santiago and in other parts of the country.

d) Extent of the Movement

Of the social sectors brought together by the AOAN during the strike, the most noteworthy were the unemployed nitrate workers, different trade part-time workers, teachers and various middle-class groups represented by the Middle Class Federation. From August 11th to 24th, the "Sociedad Nacional de Agricultura" also participated in the assembly. The list of organizations that joined the rallies on August 29th included 80 different organizations from trade unions to political. The number of participants is even greater if one considers that many of the organizations were made up of several smaller ones, such as the FOCH, for example, the "Federación de Sociedades Católicas" or the "Unión de Elaboradores de Maderas", among others^{288/}

287. Barría, op. cit., p. 118.

288. La Nación, August 11, 1919, p. 11, August 17, 1919, p. 13 and August 21, 1919, p. 3.

This points to the fact that the movement was basically urban. It developed mainly in the cities, integrating activities and sectors characteristic of the area. This last aspect is relevant inasmuch as the AOAN's capacity to mobilize the workers was largely conditioned by the degree to which the movement was able to go beyond the limits of certain specific or partial demands and become the spokesman for a heterogeneous group of city workers to which must also be added the floating population that congregated in the city during the nitrate crisis.

The magnitude of this movement is clearly indicated by the fact that it was active throughout most cities of the country. Demonstrations were held in Iquique (Nitrate Pampa), Copiapo, Caldera, Antofagasta, Chuquicamata Mejillones, Valparaíso, Vina, Quillota, Los Andes, Rancagua, San Rosendo, Temuco, Concepción, Talcahuano and Puerto Montt^{289/}. This alone is sufficient to show that we are dealing with a very large movement. Not only was it vast in numbers, but it also required considerable organizational efforts, which is obvious from its simultaneous activities throughout the country.

Unfortunately, the primary sources of information do

²⁸⁹ Ibid., August 30, 1919, pp. 10-11; El Mercurio, August 31, 1919, p. 25.

not provide specific data on the number of participants involved in the movement. The only known fact is that in Santiago, the rally "was several blocks long" and required eight grandstands to cover the whole demonstration^{290/} For example, Barriá talks of "thousands of workers marching for hours",^{291/} while Jobet mentions 100,000 demonstrators.^{292/} Nevertheless, the magnitude of the movement can be appreciated when considering that on the 29th, the rally was preceded by four others (one per week) held simultaneously in different parts of Santiago. We are clearly dealing with a movement covering many social sectors and manifesting great continuity and tenacity.

e) Nature of the Movement

The hunger rallies that took place in Santiago were accompanied by a generalized suspension of all other activities. Despite this, the movement was pacifistic it was more than a mere outburst to bring about a forceful confrontation with the authorities. It was a continuous organizational effort oriented towards the attainment of a more or less lasting solution to labour problems.

290. La Nación, August 30, 1919, pp. 10-11; El Mercurio, August 30, 1919, p. 19.

291. Barriá, op. cit., p. 263.

292. Ibid. p. 137.

Thus, the movement of the 29th was a silent march which culminated in various speeches and talks between the leaders, the President and his government. After this, the demonstration dispersed, but the agitation continued, ending in a general strike four days later. The only violent act associated with the demonstrations was a bomb explosion that went off during the night. The poet, González Vera, ventured to say in Númen that the mechanism was supposed to be let off during the demonstration but, as the affair was so peaceful, the bomb was abandoned in the Alameda where it went off by itself.^{293/}

From the nature of the rallies, it is clear that the government took a much more sympathetic, less violent stand. This is clearly illustrated by the government's attitude when faced with the strike called for by the FOCH as a sequel to the demonstrations. This strike was, in fact, a general strike that lasted from 3rd to 6th September and shows the organizational and political continuity that had begun to manifest itself in the workers' movement of that period.

On September 2nd, shortly after the hunger rallies, the FOCH called for a general strike in support of the beer industry workers who had been out of work since

293. See Númen, September 6, 1919, p. 3; La Nación, August 30, 1919, p. 11 and August 31, 1919, p. 6; and El Mercurio, September 2, 1919, p. 18.

August 14th.-294/ The first to join the movement were the railroad workers, but soon after both tram and taxi services were paralyzed,295/ with which communication in the city was almost totally interrupted. Later the bakers, newspaper vendors and major commercial firms like Gath and Chavez,296/ also joined the movement. Finally the AOAN called its members to strike, and the FECH did the same after the "Universidad Popular Lastarria" was closed down.297/

The strike aims were derived from a much broader base than just the beer industry workers' strike, and were laid down in the petition of August 29th elaborated by the FOCH and endorsed by the AOAN on September 4th.

During the strike the army was kept on the alert in order to prevent disorder. Its main task was to assure the bread supply, and drive the trams, and not the repression of the workers.298/ With the newspaper vendors' strike, the members of the editorial staff and other employees of El Mercurio and Las Ultimas Noticias took

294. See Ibid., August 17, 1919 p. 20 and La Nación August 14, 1919, p. 12.

295. La Nación, August 14, 1919, p. 12; Las Ultimas Noticias, September 3, 1919, p. 1.

296. Las Ultimas Noticias, September 4, 1919, p. 4, September 6, 1919, p. 1.

297. Ibid., September 5, 1919, p. 1, September 6, 1919, p. 1.

298. Ibid., September 4, 1919, p. 1.

over the task of distributing their publication.^{299/}
Finally, the strike came to an end, conciliation and arbitration councils were set up and the workers returned to their jobs.^{300/}

Of particular interest is the public statement issued by the Strike Committee on September 7th, the day after the strike ended - which said:

The journalists of the oligarchy... have tried to make this beautiful gesture of proletariat solidarity look like the prelude to a "mob revolt" bringing days of terror and fear ... they saw in our strike preparations the threat of a revolution. Nothing could be further from the minds of the workers... By declaring a general strike, the FOCH was, in fact, accepting the challenge to the government and the working classes by the manager of Cerveceria Unidas, who was unaware of the scope of the Yáñez decree and refused to agree to arbitration to solve the conflict initiated by the workers exploited by the beer trust.^{301/}

This statement virtually sums up the nature of the conflict and it would be superfluous to add anything further, except that the strike did not propose violence as a means to an end. However, the workers' unrest did not stop there, but continued late that same month with the

299. Ibid., September 6, 1919, p. 1.

300. El Mercurio, September 7, 1919, p. 18.

301. Published in Adelante (Talcahuano, September 12 and 13, 1919) quoted by Barria, op. cit., pp. 264-269.

workers' housing rallies. There would seem to be continuity in the workers' agitation, evidenced by the fact that the movement went far beyond isolated workers' demands. Thus, one can safely say that the strikes were part of a continuum.

f) Aims of the Movement.

The bulletin presented to the government by the AOAN was used as reference in the analysis of the movement's aims.^{302/} This bulletin gives a clear analysis of the overall situation. Here, the causes for the costs of living increase are related to the characteristics of the prevailing political regime. To this effect, the introduction to the petition contains a criticism of the parliamentary system and states that the people want a responsible and authoritative government. The crisis in the parliamentary regime was derived from electoral power obtained through bribery on the part of the leaders and the venality of those being lead, whereby it was concluded that a presidential regime should be established. Below are some of the important parts of the workers' document:^{303/}

302. Segundo Memorial de la Asamblea Obrera de la Alimentación Nacional a S.E. el Presidente de la República, presented on February 7th at the rally on August 29, 1919. Published in La Nación, August 29 1919, p. 1 and El Mercurio, August 28, 1919, p.19.

303. Idem.

The disinterest with which the government has up until recently attended our petitions is due to the fact that seats in the Congress are, with very few exceptions bought and the representatives of the people do not represent anything other than their own money or interests. Furthermore, apart from resorting to corruption, those in power have an attitude and are organized in a way that inhibits all possible progress and is the epitome of egotistical behaviour...

It is, therefore essential that we adapt the government to our true republican nature and civic education, so that we may march towards a presidential system with the electoral freedom that we fought for and won during the revolution of '91 and having been purified by the elimination of bribery; thus let the Executive name its ministers and govern the state; let us decentralize power; let the government indicate the general direction national policy must take; let the police force protect the rights of the people and the judicial power provide the guide lines for the establishing and protection of individual rights.

It is obvious then that electoral power obtained in this way through bribery on the part of the leaders and the vanality of those being lead - two crimes against the nation can only produce fruit that is poisoned by vice and money used to prostitute our citizens; let this power, therefore, be given through the true vote of the people.

The main points covered in the petition were

1. The promotion of national production.
2. The administration of food supply at a national level so as to improve production and regulate intermediaries, creating an official body responsible for administering the country's food.

3. Improvement in the workers' economic situation.
4. The stabilization of the exchange rate.

Beside these petitions, the bulletins contained what the AOAN considered "urgent issues":

1. Prompt action regarding the motion put forward by Mr. Manuel Rivas Vicuna to begin promoting production.
2. The introduction of a law creating a national administrative body for food-stuffs in the way indicated in the bulletin.
3. The stabilization of the international exchange and the establishment of the local currency at the current rate to eventually reach 18 d.
4. Reforms to the current tariffs, lowering the cost of transporting basic commodities and increasing that for luxury or noxious goods.
5. Property subdivision and the establishment of an agricultural code.
6. The approval of an obligatory primary education project dispatched by the House of Representatives.

7. Prompt attention to the petitions regarding the nitrate zone.
8. Respect for the legal and constitutional rights of the country's citizens and the immediate dispatch of a technical commission to the nitrate zone with sufficient authority to propose a solution to the economic and social problem of the area.
9. Settlement of the National Colonization Law.304/

Two further points pertaining to a previous bulletin should also be added to this list. They refer to:

The suppression of fishing concessions.

Attention to the National Colonization Law pending in the House of Representative since 1910.-305/

In addition to these demands, there were others concerning regional interests, like those of the fishermen

304. Idem.
305. Idem.

at Concepción, the nitrate workers and the workers in the province of Magallanes. Part of the bulletin was dedicated to each one of these points.

Every one of the points in the petition that have been mentioned were dealt with in this extensive bulletin. Surprisingly, not only did the petitions cover the entire general situation, they were also able to transcend the classification of a mere "petition" to become a series of recommendations for state action elaborated with great detail. Each point was developed in such a way as to include the measures the government should implement and the laws that should be approved.

The abovementioned features offer a means of integrating the diverse interests represented in the AOAN's action. These features form a whole when viewed from the perspective of the high cost of living and the representation of the problems of each sector, inasmuch as these were related to the problems of the nation. In other words, the AOAN expressed the diverse interests of the workers and managed to unite them in political terms.

The most outstanding aspect of this petition was that the workers' suggested solutions were integrated into a national framework and included measures related to general policy, such as the creation of a central bank.

While the proposed goals were based mainly on an economic diagnosis and were, in fact, economic in nature,

they were still presented at a political level. Consequently, it can be said that their well-defined petition also included demands concerning citizen's legal and constitutional rights. However, it must be admitted that these rights were not elaborated upon in view of the workers' confidence in the country's democratic process; nor did trade union aims appear in the petition.

g) Political Conditioning factors:

The Manner in Which the Movement was Conducted.

As we have repeatedly mentioned throughout this work, the movement represents the most diverse interests. The AOAN was formed during mid-1918 by initiative of the FOCH's First Federal Council (railroad workers).^{306/} However, as we know, it grew into a much broader social movement, bringing together as part of a single front, a series of different groups of wage earners struggling to keep up with the high cost of living. Among these, several different unionist movements may be distinguished.^{307/} First, there was the FOCH which, with its federal councils, closely adhered to the AOAN. The FOCH

306. Barria, op. cit., p. 117.

307. The analysis of the members is based on the lists appearing in the Appendix and which were obtained from data on AOAN affiliations published by the Santiago Press. The exact sources are to be found in the Appendix.

was basically in the hands of the Socialist Workers Party. The FECH, made up mainly of anarchist-oriented intellectuals, was also represented in the AOAN. Also participating was the shoemakers and tailors federation, both known to be anarchist organizations, the Workers Social Congress, formed from the affiliation of the old mutual associations and representing the passive unionist philosophy, and the National Food Council, a conservative Catholic institution. The "Federación de la Clase Media" which called itself "apolitical", decided to join the organizing committee after it had announced that it shared the same problems as the working class.^{308/} The political organizations that formed part of the organizing committee were the "Partido Obrero Socialista" (POS), "La Agrupación Democrática de Santiago", "El Centro de Propaganda Radical", "El Centro Liberal" and "La Asamblea de Propaganda Conservadora".

The number and variety of political and unionists organizations participating in the AOAN made its administration somewhat difficult. The fact that the President of the AOAN was a member of the POS and the FOCH Executive Committee did not mean that the organization followed the same political tendencies. In practice, this

^{308.} El Mercurio, July 21, 1919, p. 15.

assembly had considerable capacity for action. On reviewing the list of speakers at the meeting of August 29th, one can find representatives of the most diverse tendencies. The agreement adopted by the assembly guaranteeing "freedom of speech for its members allowed autonomous expression without affecting the movement's essential unity.^{309/}

This feature was closely related to the social representativity the movement hoped to achieve and which constituted the basis for its legitimacy before the government. It is important to note, that even the newspapers that usually supported the government found room for the organization's declarations. Even the government did not refuse to negotiate with its representatives. The authorities recognized this movement as representative of legitimate demands and not the perpetrator of subversive activity. Parliamentary discussions also reveal this perception of the movement and always refer to it with great respect.

Since neither the POS nor the FOCH possessed a clearly defined socialistic ideology, it was easier for there to be a more general consensus. As mentioned earlier,

³⁰⁹ Ibid., August 10, 1919, p. 13, August 5, 1919 p. 13, and especially August 2, 1919, p. 16 and July 29, 1919, p. 15

the definition of the FOCH in 1919 was not particularly radical, as can be seen in the petition. For example, in the petition, the criticism of the political system did not come from any anti-state revolutionary opposition, but was rather the affirmation of the functional limitations of a more democratic regime. The essence of the system was not questioned. This political attitude explains the support given by the AOAN to those parliamentarians whose proposals "favoured the people" and the constant references to procedural problems hampering the smooth functioning of a regime that was not considered the expression of a radically deficient system.^{310/}

However, during the period in question, the FOCH started to become progressively more radical until it finally outgrew its role as a mutual aid society and became incorporated into the Internacional Roja de Sindicatos. The milestones of this change were the conventions of 1916, 1917, 1919 and particularly 1921. The POS began to impose itself on the gathering and the "collaborationist" position was the target of criticism.^{311/} In 1921, the POS became affiliated to the international trade union and it changed its nomenclature to Communist Party.

This process did not go unnoticed by certain sectors

310. La Nación, August 29, 1919, p. 1; AOAN^m Bulletin to the Government.

311. Barría, op. cit., pp. 119-148.

of the oligarchy who saw in this transformation one of the central characteristics of the movement. On August 21st, La Nación's editorial mentions "an economic issue that has begun to change into a social one".^{312/} After the great rally on the 29th, El Mercurio pointed out in its editorial that the only disrupting element of the event was the behaviour of an "anarchic, revolutionary element" and classified its members as intellectuals who "show the same mental perturbation seen in other countries. They aroused the people and offer them courses of action they had never thought of before". Therefore, concluded the author, "these noxious intellectual elements should not be allowed to work unchecked, with their poison brought from abroad that they wish to inoculate into the blood of their own country".^{313/}

Inherent in these reactions, a two-sided attitude can be discerned. On the one hand, there is the desire to control the movement and, on the other, the disqualification and repression of that same movement the moment it is considered dangerous.^{314/}

^{312.} La Nación, August 21, 1919, p. 3.

^{313.} See El Mercurio, September 2, 1919, p. 3.

^{314.} However, repression could not be resorted to in one full swoop as it had been during the previous period. The importance of the workers' movement was such that the authorities were forced to employ repression in different fields and in different ways such as lay-offs, arrests, dismissals, exile, etc. Traditional direct action could no longer be used except as a last resort.

Undoubtedly, this type of reaction is closely related to the FOCH's role in managing the movements at a national level. It is, therefore, significant that the major speaker at Concepción was Arturo Labbe and at Antofagasta, Luis Emilio Recabarren, both well-known leaders of the FOCH. Thus, it was this organization that endowed the movements with simultaneity and ideological orientation.

One of the major problems that emerged during the evolution of the demonstrations was the change undergone by the FOCH during this period. A major dispute arose internally between those more inclined towards an anarchist philosophy and the more orthodox communists. Francisco Pezoa, worker and poet, refers to the great problem the FOCH poses for the workers insomuch as it is a "routine, peaceful and disoriented" organization but with very real possibilities for progress. He states that the FOCH has been unable to satisfy:

the ambitions of the most willing workers in the class struggle due to the fact that it had been unable to obtain the support of such strong radical unionist organizations as the shoemakers, printing workers and tailors federations, etc.^{315/}

Thus, the problem of ideology began to present itself as

315. Númen. July 5, 1919 p. 7.

one of the major aspects of the trade union movement of this period and was manifested in the conflict that developed between the different political organizations trying to gain control. Although initially this conflict involved all the different political trends of the era, it was eventually reduced to disputes between workers' political organizations and groups of intellectuals defining themselves ideologically as pro-workers.

h) Conclusions

The period between 1916 and 1925, corresponding to the first stage of trade union politicization is characterized by a clear increase in the frequency of political strikes, which represented 7.7% of all strikes. This is a relatively low figure if considered out of context, but its importance is clear if the previous period in which the number of political strikes amounted to only 0.5% is considered. The comparison of the two figures allows us to point out the increased relevance of political objectives in the activities of the period.

This politicization process is attributable to the increasingly lasting organizational and intellectual influence of political groups on workers' organizations. During this period, the conflicts were driven by a central force capable of conceptualizing individual conflicts in such a way so as to transcend the particular motive of each strike or movement and place it in a more

general political frame of reference. This feature was to give continuity to the workers' movement during the period in question.

Thus, the purely unionist course of action was overcome as a result of the initiative of the movement itself. The politicization of the trade union leaders over this period is particularly clear, some of them occupying important political positions in the years that followed. In the meantime, the "mutualista" movement began to lose ground and the ideological dispute was taken up between the socialists and the anarchist movement.

In the particular case of the movement that arose as a result of the hunger rallies, it is important to stress once more its extremely broad ideological base as being one of its most important characteristics.

i) Appendix: List of Rally Participants.

List of Speakers at the Rally of August 29th.
According to La Nación, August 29, 1919 and
El Mercurio, August 28, 29 and 30, 1919.

Head Speaker

Speakers

Gabino Ureta

Emilio Tizzoni Lincuan
Honorio Garrido (Shoemakers
Union)
Clemente Díaz Vera (POS)

Agustín Torrealba

Antonio Orrego Barrios
(Middle-Class Federation)
Carlos Vergara Bravo
Fernando Azocar
(Shoemakers Union)

Manuel Videla Ibañez
(Middle-Class
Federation)

Moises Montoya

Manuel Martín
(Middle-Class
Federation)

Humberto Cuevas
(Middle-Class
Federation)
Carlos Sepúlveda
(Shoemakers
Federation)

Oscar Fontecilla
(Radical Party)

Luis Avalos
Augusto Pinto (Anarchist)
Julio Moya (Santa Filomena
Association)
Domingo Fuentes (National
Food Council)
Moises Espina
(Radical Party)

Juan Gandulfo
Manuel Hidalgo (POS)
Enrique Cornejo (FOCH)

Pedro Ugalde
Luis A. Troncoso
Víctor Gutierrez (FOCH)
Alfonso Sepúlveda (Tanners
Federation)
Juan Bautista Soto (Magallanes
Workers' Federation)
Santiago Labarca (FECH)

Committee Members at the National Workers Food Assembly.
According to La Nación August 29, 1919 (p. 1)

President	Carlos Alberto Martínez (Leader of POS, FOCH and Mutual Asso- ciations)
Vice-President	Santiago Labarca (FECH)
Treasurer	Luis Ramírez
Secretaries	Evaristo Ríos (POS) Pedro Goycolea Juan Bautista Soto (Magallanes Workers Federation) Galileo Urzua

Organizations Supporting the
National Workers Food Assembly Petition
According to La Nación August 30, 1919 (p. 10)

Chilean Labour Federation
Executive Committee
27 federations according to area
Territorial Councils (from Mejillones to Magallanes)

National Food Council
(See also La Nación August 22, 1919, (p. 10)

National Union
Federation of Catholic Societies
Catholic Union
Catholic Teachers Society
Independence Association
Chacabuco Union
May 21st Union
Melchor Concha Union
Work League
Recoleta Association
Santa Filomena Foundation
Home and Country
Carlos Walter (Association)
Andacollo Union
Santiago Union
National Labour Confederation Union
Holy Family Society
Camilo Ortuzar Union
League of the Cross
Chile Union
Conservative Workers Club
Ñuñoa Union
Moises Castillo Union
San José Workers Society
Heart of Mary Workers Circle
Christopher Columbus Union
Arturo Prat Circle

Primary School Teachers Federation
(See La Nación August 22, 1919, (p. 10)
Mutual Societies Workers Social Congress

National Education Association
Chile Students Federation
Secondary Students Federation
La Union Craftsman's Society
Army Factory and Apprenticeship Society
Equality and Work Society
Shoe and Cabinet Makers Federation
Tanners Federal Union
Printing Workers Federation
Drivers Union
Bernardo O'Higgins Society
Food Merchants Society
Manuel Rodriguez Society

18th September Society
Watchmakers and Engravers Fraternity
Tronmongers and Locksmiths Union
Railway Workers Trade Union
Typesetters Union
National Farming Cooperative
Union is Strength
Painters Federation
Bakers Federation
Bakers Union
Carpenters Union
Bricklayers and Plasterers Union
Camilo Henriquez Society
Shoemakers Trade Union
People's House
La Estrella de lo Espejo Society
El Carmen Local Improvement Society

Organizations Participating in the
Organizing Committee at the Rally.
According to La Nación August 30, 1919, p. 10)

National Primary Teachers League
Agricultural Society
National League Against Alcoholism
National Teachers Society
Middle Class Federation
National Catholic Students Association
Medical Society
Retired Officers Circle
Bank Employees Society
Chilean Midwives Union
Conservative Propaganda Assembly
Liberal Union
Santiago Democratic Group
Radical Propaganda Centre
Socialist Workers Party
Union is Strength Plumbers and Panelbeaters Society
Tailors Federation
Central Market Merchants
La Igualdad Carriage Drivers
Nataniel Yanez Society
El Progreso Society

AOAN Press Commission.
According to Nùmen July 12, 1919, (p. 7)

Santiago Labarca
Evaristo Molina

Luis Correa Ramírez
Carlos A. Martínez
Miguel Vergara
Evaristo Ríos
Julio Valiente
Augusto Pinto
Luis G. Huidobro
Carlos A. Sepúlveda
Francisco Pezoa
Antonio Rodríguez
Ezio Prestironi
Juan Bautista Soto
Mariano Rivas

CHAPTER IV

QUASI-GOVERNMENTAL UNIONISM (1933-1945)

A. The Repression of Conflict and the Strengthening of Workers' Organizations

As we know, the pause in strike actions begins with the events of 1925, when many nitrate miners lost their lives as a result of the repressive government actions. This situation changes in 1938, when the Popular Front wins the presidency of the Republic. We will observe once again many instances of strike actions led by the oldest trade unions. Among the conditions preparing the new developments, the liberalization of state policies begun in 1932, when Alessandri's return to the presidency, holds a prominent place. The labour legislation of 1924 is now put into practice for the first time, and the country simultaneously recovers from its previous political instability.

Alessandri's administration does not tolerate strikes, but at the same time does not oppose workers' organizations. These circumstances favourably condition the re-emergence of strike actions during the period of the Popular Front. During the first years of this government, workers' leaders will also participate in some administrative functions. It is this participation

that characterizes these years as representative of a period of quasi-governmental unionism.

The return of institutional stability, which is a distinctive feature of Alessandri's second administration was not followed by a period of strike activity. This fact is the consequence of the open operation of repressive policies, which lasted until 1938.

Two conspicuous instances can be exepcted from the general inactivity regarding strikes. There is the case of the railroad workers who demonstrated in 1932 in support of the "Socialist Republic" and protested again in 1935. A year earlier primary teachers led some public demonstrations on behalf of economic and social demands.

An absence of strikes is not necessarily identical to a total inactivity on the part of workers' organizations. As a matter of fact, in 1936, Socialist and Communist leaders organized the Confederación de Trabajadores de Chile (CTCH), which united the FOCH, the UECH, the Confederación de Sindicatos Industriales and the Confederación Nacional de Sindicatos. On the other hand, the anarchist organizations, i.e., the IWW and the FOCH, united since 1931 in the Confederación General de Trabajadores (CGT), showed no activity at this time. Despite the prevailing restrictions on union activities, the CTCH organization suggests that repression of this

type is not necessarily effective in inhibiting all spheres of workers' behavior. Alessandri's policies could discourage strike action but did not prevent organizational growth.

B. The Popular Front and the Return of Conflicts
(1938-1945)

Contrary to what has been shown to be a major characteristic of the previous period, during the present one, workers will demonstrate a high propensity to strike.

The historial sources available for these years do not allow us to use the same type of measures suggested in previous stages of our enquiry. Moreover, the figures available are not in agreement as to the number of strikes.^{315/}

Notwithstanding these limitations, it is still possible to understand the main features of union activities

315. Two hundred one (201) strikes were identified during this period. This number is not consistent with that presented in ILO, "Anuario de Estadísticas del Trabajo" Our main sources in this period are: Stambuck Juana Los Movimientos Sociales Durante el Frente Popular, Thesis, U. Técnica (n.d.) and daily issues of El Mercurio from December, 1938 to December, 1950. Unfortunately, for this period there are no studies available similar to those of Jorge Barria's which we used to cover the strike actions of previous periods. Thus, the table on the explicit strike aims is based on the reports of El Mercurio which only take into account the more important strike actions by workers during this period.

at this time. We will observe within the mining industries, that during this period, the workers employed in the copper industries show the highest propensity to strike. In this respect, in the second stage of our enquiry these workers were less important than nitrate and coal miners and in the first one, they did not exhibit strike activities at all.

A summary of strike-frequency in mining and industry between 1938 and 1945 is available in the next tables (Table 12, page 251 and Table 13, page 252).

On the basis of the figures given in these tables, mining workers exhibit a lesser propensity to strike than industrial workers considered as a whole.

The differences between ILO's information and our other sources in relation to the number of strikes is particularly important in 1943 and 1945, when ILO figures are much more higher than the others. This difference must be related to the procedure used in recording strikes. We only classify as strikes those actions that were mentioned as such by the press during the period.^{316/}

Although classification by regions was not possible for this period, in the same terms as were used for earlier periods, we know that there are no important

316. Idem.

T A B L E No. 12

FREQUENCY OF STRIKES IN MINING INDUSTRIES

(1938 - 1945)

Year	Copper	Nitrate	Coal	Cement	Lime	Gold	Non- Identified	T o t a l
1938	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	3
1939	2	-	-	-	-	-	1	3
1940	-	2	1	-	1	-	-	3
1941	2	2	-	-	-	-	3	7
1942	2	3	-	-	-	-	1	7
1943	1	-	1	1	-	1	2	6
1944	2	1	1	1	-	-	2	7
1945	5	6	4	3	1	-	1	20
TOTAL	17	14	7	5	2	1	10	56

Source: Classification based on data compiled by Stambuck op. cit., and Reports El Mercurio from 1938 to 1945.

T A B L E No. 13

NUMBER OF STRIKE ACTIONS BY TYPES OF ACTIVITY

(1938 - 1945)

	Y E A R S								TOTAL
	1938	1939	1940	1941	1942	1943	1944	1945	
Railroad workers	-	-	-	1	-	-	1	3	5
Port workers	2	-	-	-	1	2	1	3	9
Transportation workers	-	-	-	2	3	-	-	-	5
Miners	3	3	3	7	7	6	7	20	56
Construction workers	3	2	1	3	4	4	1	-	18
Leather workers	-	1	-	1	-	2	1	2	7
Bakers	-	1	1	1	1	-	-	-	4
Metal workers	3	3	1	2	-	1	-	-	10
Printing workers	-	-	2	2	2	-	-	1	9
Food workers	2	-	1	2	3	-	-	1	9
Textile workers	-	2	1	1	1	-	-	-	5
Peasantry	-	1	4	3	5	1	1	2	17
Service workers	-	-	-	1	4	1	3	5	14
Other manufacturers(1)	3	1	3	2	-	1	2	4	16
Teachers	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1
Glass workers	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	2
Tailoring	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	2
Others(2)	2	2	3	1	3	3	1	-	15
TOTAL	19	17	19	29	34	22	19	43	204

Source: Classification based on data compiled by Stambuck, op. cit. and Reports of El Mercurio for the corresponding years.

- (1) Includes workers linked to: Manufacturing of windows, doors, furniture, pharmacy, ceramic paving stones and matches.
- (2) Works linked to: commerce, frozen-storage, oil and zoo workers.

alterations in previous ranking.

In relation to the magnitude or extent of strike action, in Table 14 on page 254, we can observe large-scale demonstrations of industrial strength which were unknown in the previous stages.

Given the importance it had at the time, among them we may distinguish that of the coal miners during the second year of the Popular Front's Administration.

This lasted five months and 18,000 strikers participated in it. In 1945 there were also two mining workers strikes; one in Antofagasta, involving 30,000 nitrate workers and port workers and the other in the coal region with 25,000 protesters.

This new dimension of strike action relates to the workers' efforts to organize themselves along national lines. This was possible because the country's industrialization process began to affect sectors of the economy which were not developed. The government was also tolerant towards union activities and by now the working class political parties had been spreading their ideological influences throughout the country for some time. These elements are thus linked to the emergence of a new dimension in workers' strike actions and conflicts. They, therefore, provide the explanation for the decline of the isolated and spontaneous type of unionism that characterized previous years.

I_A_B_L_E__No._14

NUMBER_OF_STRIKE_ACTIONS_AND_NUMBER_OF_STRIKES
(1932_-_1945)

YEARS	STRIKES	STRIKERS
1932	6	600
1933	10	748
1934	13	3,100
1935	30	5,433
1936	20	7,758
1937	21	3,029
1938	15	11,373
1939	26	10,923
1940	45	18,810
1941	31	2,931
1942	19	2,740
1943	127	48,729
1944	60	26,281
1945	512	80,341
Total	935	222,796

Source: I.L.O. "Anuario de Estadísticas del Trabajo" IX and X edition. Montreal, Ginebra 1947 -1949, pp. 254-6.

C. The Economic Conditioning Elements:--Industrial Development

The crisis which we observed at the beginning of the period is now succeeded by a growth in industrial production. This increased at an annual rate of 5.7% between 1930-1931 - 1937-1938 and at a proportion of 8.5% between 1937-1938 - 1944-1945, i.e. during the period of the Popular Front.^{317/}

Mining as a whole increased at an annual rate of 5% between 1932-1945.-^{318/} Among the mining industries, copper grew 8%, nitrate, 1.5% and coal, 4.7%-^{319/}

In relation to economic development, the expansion of public expenditure is also notable. This increased at an annual rate of 1.7% between 1932-1938 and 6% between 1938 and 1945. This figure is an important indicator of the growing role of the state in the economic process.^{320/}

If one considers now the effects of industrial growth on the increase of the labour force, it is clear that from the turning-point of the previous stage, i.e., 1925, up to the beginning of the Popular Front administration, the number of blue-collar workers increased from

317. Muñoz O., op. cit., p. 38.

318. Ballesteros and Davis, op. cit., p. 163-164.

319. For nitrate and coal see Idem.

320. Idem.

72,000 to 146,000.-321/

The expansion of the labour force mainly affected Santiago, Valparaíso and Concepción. Industrial growth did not bring radical change in the size of industrial firms; these continued as small as they were before. In fact, in 1937 only 10% of the firms employed 20 or more blue-collar workers.322/

In relation to mining industries, Table 17, on page 343 shows that only copper consistently increased until 1937 whereas coal and nitrate decreased.

At any rate, coal and copper growth during the twenties resulted in a greater concentration of working masses in a small number of regions. Ninety percent of coal workers settled in the province of Concepción. On the other hand copper miners were mainly located in El Teniente, (province of O'Higgins) Chuquicamata and Petrerillos (province of Antofagasta).323/

The large size of mining companies observed in previous periods increased at the end of the thirties when all firms employed more than 100 workers.324/

321. See Table 17, on p. 343.

322. Idem.

323. For copper: Oficina General de Estadística, Anuario Estadístico de Chile, Minería, Sociedad Imprenta y Litografía Universo, 1939, Vol. 4. For coal and nitrate: Dirección General de Estadísticas, Anuario Estadístico de Chile, Minería e Industria, Sociedad Imprenta y Litografía Universo, 1940.

324. See Table 17, p. 343.

Although there is no information on the growth of the labour force in public services, for the years analysed in this section, we know that their rate of increase was high. While in 1930 they represented only 7.6% of the active population of the country, by 1952 this figure had risen to 33%.^{325/} A general distinctive feature of the Popular Front administration was in fact, as already suggested, a greater capability on the part of the state to increase public expenditure.^{326/} This would in its turn favour both the establishment of an industrial bourgeoisie^{327/} and the diversification of the working class. From the point of view of the subject-matter of this work, it is also relevant to emphasize that the latter consequence, which would result in a decrease in the trend of growth of manual workers^{328/} at the same time created, the material-economic basis for the evolution of public employees and their national organizations. Indications of this development are given at the end of the following section.

325. Ballesteros and Davis, op. cit., p. 163-164.

326. See footnote No. 320.

327. See in this regard, A.M. Arriagada, La Creación de la Corporación de Fomento de la Producción. Thesis Instituto de Sociología. U. Católica. Santiago, Chile October 1976 and Marcello Cavarozzi. The Government and the Industrial Bourgeoisie in Chile (1938-1964). University of California, Berkeley. Ph. D. 1976. Political Science.

328. See Chapter V, Section B and Tables A-4 and A-5

D. Political Elements Conditioning Conflicts:-
Government Tolerance and Institutional Changes
(1938--1945)

Even though the communists only participated in the first two cabinets of González Videla, i.e. in 1946 and 1947, the Socialists not having taken part since 1942, the period starting from the beginning of the Pedro Aguirre Cerda government up until 1945 could be considered very tolerant towards workers' organizations. The strike movements that started in 1945 leading to a general work stoppage in January, 1946 marked an end of the popular front that had begun with Pedro Aguirre Cerda.

For a more in-depth understanding of the general political framework in which trade union activity developed over this period, it is necessary to examine the political composition of the ministries responsible for the policy adopted by the Front. When the Popular Front government was organized, the Communist Party refused to form part of the ministry allegedly for tactical reasons related to the government's image. However, this argument did not prevent its members from accepting a number of advisory and consulate posts. On the other hand, the Socialist Party took part in the Ministries of Promotion, Land and Health, a position approved at its Fifth Congress from 1-4 December. The rest of the positions were distributed between the National Democratic Party (NDP) and six Radicals (See Table 15, page 259).

T A B L E No. 15
THE POPULAR FRONT AND DEMOCRATIC ALLIANCE CABINET (1938 - 1948)

	CP	SP	RP	SRP	NDP	FAL	LIB	CONS	AAFF	P
President										
Pedro Aguirre Cerda (RP)										
December 24, 1938	-	3	6	-	2	-	-	-	-	-
June 10, 1941	-	3	1	1	2	-	-	-	-	4
Vice-president										
Jerónimo Méndez (RP)	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3
October 6, 1941	-	3	3	1	2	-	-	-	-	3
November 21, 1941	-	3	4	1	2	-	-	-	-	2
President										
Juan Antonio Ríos (RP)										
April 2, 1942	-	3	6	-	2	-	-	1	-	-
October 21, 1942	-	3	4	-	1	-	1	-	1	2
February 4, 1943	-	-	6	-	1	-	1	-	-	4
May 4, 1943	-	-	7	-	1	-	1	-	-	3
June 7, 1947	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	-	2	8
September 1, 1943	-	-	5	-	1	-	3	-	1	2
October 6, 1944	-	-	2	-	1	-	-	-	1	8
May 14, 1945	-	-	6	-	2	1	-	-	1	2
Vice-president										
Alfredo Duhalde (RP)										
January 28, 1946	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	2
February 3, 1946	-	4	3	-	1	-	-	-	3	1
September 6, 1946	-	-	5	-	1	-	-	-	1	5
President										
Gabriel González V. (RP)										
November 3, 1946	3	-	6	-	-	-	3	-	-	-
January 10, 1947	3	-	5	-	1	-	3	-	-	-
April 16, 1947	-	-	11	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
August 2, 1947	-	-	1	-	2	-	-	-	2	7
July 7, 1948	-	-	3	-	2	-	2	2	1	2

Sources: Jorge Barría, Cuadro Cronológico de la Historia del Sindicalismo en Chile(n.d)Diccionario Biográfico de Chile, 5th Edition 1944 and 1956-1958, Jorge Fuentes and Lia Cortes, Diccionario Político de Chile 1819-1966, Editorial Orbe, Santiago, 1967 Avaria Valencia, Anales de la Republica, Vol 1, Imprenta Universitaria, Santiago, 1951. The editions of El Mercurio and El Siglo corresponding to the dates of the changes in government administration were also consulted

Notes: CP: Communist Party; SP: Socialist Party; RP: Radical Party; SRP: Socialist Radical Party; NDP: National Democratic Party; FAL: Falange LIB PAR: Liberal Party; CS: Conservative Party; AAFF: Armed Forces; P: Technical, professional (lawyer, engineer, doctor) apolitical.

This figure shows the political composition of the different cabinets during the period in question. The figures shown in each column refer to the number of posts held by each party. No difference has been made with regard to the importance of each Ministerial Post. The dates correspond to the moment in which the cabinet's political composition was altered. Changes of persons from the same political party have not been taken into account, nor have the changes in vice-president in cases when the cabinet has remained the same.

During the period herein considered, both the President and the Minister of Interior were Radicals, except for the times when members of the armed forces occupied the Ministry of Interior's post.

By the end of the first year of this administration, major disagreements arose between those socialists who wished to continue to collaborate with the government in power and those with non-conformist tendencies who eventually decided to withdraw in April, 1941 to form a Workers Socialist Party.

Apart from the previous dispute, in November of that same year relations were broken between the two popular parties. This state of affairs had become obvious at approximately mid-year when, during a strike called for by the draughtsmen's union, the movement was divided into those who supported the strike and those who agreed with the government's position to the effect that the strike was illegal. The conflict between the two parties became so acute that the Socialist Party gave its support to a rightist project declaring the Communist Party illegal. Pedro Aguirre Cerda vetoed the initiative and saved the party from this fate. Thus, when parliamentary elections were called that year, the Popular Front was divided, with the Communist Party presenting an independent list of candidates.

On the other hand, in June of that same year, a crisis arose between the government and the Radical Party

during which its ministers withdrew from the government. The five who resigned were replaced by a Radical Socialist and four independent professionals.

With the death of Pedro Aguirre Cerda in November, 1941, the Popular Front, as he had envisaged it, no longer existed. The Communist Party attempted to revive it under the name "Alianza Demócrata de Chile" with considerable success, as the Radical candidate in the presidential elections had the support of the new Front in which Radical and Socialist Parties also participated. The presidential candidacy of Oscar Schnake decided upon at the Congress of the Socialist Party in November was postponed and support given to the postulation of the Radical, J.A. Ríos. On April 2, 1942, Ríos began his presidential term with a government composed of Radicals, Socialists, Democrats and Liberals.

This situation changed somewhat in October, when two radical ministries were replaced by two professionals with no political association. However, a major change occurred in February, 1943, when the Socialists withdrew from direct participation in ministerial functions. This decision had been adopted in an attempt to unite the party that had been sharply divided into government collaborators lead by Grove and non-conformists with Salvador Allende at their head. Despite all efforts in this direction, the Socialist Party broke up in June, 1944 with the

formation of the Partido Socialista Auténtico led by Grove.

Between February, 1943 and February, 1946, after the Socialists had stopped participating, six different cabinets followed whose composition was a reflection of the conflicts between the government as such and its main party, the Radical. During this period the Ministry of Interior was in the hands of the armed forces on three occasions and on several other occasions attempts were made to install "independent" professionals.

By late 1945 and early 1946 the relationship between the government, on the one hand, and the trade unionist and political organizations on the other was under considerable strain. This culminated in a general strike ordered by the CTCH, with the support of the Socialist and Communist Parties. The strike brought about a serious crisis in the government which resulted in the Socialists coming into ministerial positions, with the exclusion of the Communist Party which had been its ally during the strike and had been in favour of a democratic alliance.

In September, 1946 the cabinet was altered and the Socialists excluded. During the course of that same month, Gabriel González Videla had been elected after the death of J. A. Ríos. This election had provoked a division of the Socialist Party into three different currents

the first of which supported Duhalde. When Duhalde decided to withdraw in favour of Fernando Alessandri, the Socialist Party fraction that had supported him decided to put up Barnardo Ibañez as their candidate. Fernando Alessandri, however, continued to receive the support of the "Partido Socialista Auténtico". The last fraction joined Gabriel González Videla with the Radicals and the Communists.

In November, 1946, when González Videla assumed power, the Communist Party contributed to the formation of a new cabinet together with Radicals and Liberals. The Socialists, on the other hand, did not take up any ministry. Just a few months later the cabinet was to change once more when, due to the progress made by the Communists in the municipal elections of March, 1947, the Liberal Party made all its ministers resign. In April, González Videla then decided to withdraw the Communists in order to form an almost exclusively Radical government. In August this cabinet was modified once again with a majority of independents and the armed forces in the Minister of Interior.

In July, 1948, approximately one year later, President González V. formed a new cabinet with the representation of several different parties including members of the Radical, Democrat, Conservative and Liberal Parties. With this sort of "political concentration" the foundations had been laid for the introduction of a law for the

Permanent Defence of Democracy. On September 3rd, the Communist Party was declared illegal, its leaders persecuted and its sympathizers erased from the electoral roll.

Despite its commitment to the Popular Front, until 1945, the "Confederación de Trabajadores de Chile" did not altogether oppose the protests of its members. As is already known, this kind of pro-state unionism took place after an inactive phase of the trade union movement. Thus the leaders of the movement were unable to hold back the unions' demands which had been restrained for almost a decade.

The Communist Party fully committed to the "anti-fascist" struggle promoted by the Soviet Union at a world level was not always sympathetic to strike action, as it was viewed as a possible threat to the administration which they considered well on the way to democracy. Although the Socialist Party, on the other hand, participated to a greater extent in ministerial affairs, it was not reluctant to support the workers' demands.

All things considered, whatever the political motives behind either group of leaders, their most lasting attitude was to attempt to deal with workers' demands within the limits imposed on them by their affiliation with the cause of the Popular Front. This divided loyalty gave rise to problems that were not always satisfactorily solved and which had repercussions on the

unity of the workers themselves and their trade union organizations.

An analysis of strikes' explicit aims during the Popular Front (See Table 16, page 304) shows that the political radicalism practiced by the workers' organizations did not surpass the transformation goals already set by the Popular Front. The source of the industrial conflicts of the period was very closely related to fundamental demands. If one compares the number of demands referring to labour issues during this period as opposed to previous ones, one can clearly see the conciliatory nature of the trade union movement's participation in the Popular Front.^{329/} Another subject of considerable importance to be revealed in the analysis of the typical strike is the CTCH's struggle for democracy. Nevertheless, the way in which this is viewed is far removed from what one would consider a radical demand. The government's relatively tolerant attitude towards the workers' strike action is reflected in the improvement of the labour legislation of 1924 with the introduction of the Labour Code of 1931.

The Labour Code dealt with both individual and collective work and salaries agreements. All those mechanisms that had been at the State's disposal, but had been

^{329/} See Tables Nos. 4, p. 122; 11, p. 204 and 16, p.304.

only partially used even during the second Alessandri administration from 1932 to 1938, were from then on interpreted as being in favour of the workers.

During the Popular Front administration, certain other laws were passed to benefit the wage earner and some of the working sectors. Among these benefits mention should be made concerning the elimination of bribery in granting official recognition of union and mutual association; work compensation according to the years of service for workers of the private and municipal railroad and the Santiago sewerage system; improved economic conditions for private employees and the incorporation of the same into a pension scheme, which also included insurance representatives, public transportation drivers and notary workers.^{330/}

The government's benevolent attitude towards the workers lead to a considerable increase in the number affiliated to the government confederation, which had 300,000 members by 1941. Two major employee organizations were also established during this period. The "Agrupación Nacional de Empleados Civiles del Estado" was formed in 1943 and two years later the "Asociación Nacional de Empleados Semifiscales (ANES)", representing employees from semi-state and social security

³³⁰ Law Nos. 6.618, 6.686, 7.390, 7.147, 7.295, 8.032 and 7.869, respectively.

institutions came into existence. In general, from 1938-1945, when the Popular Front acted as such, trade unions' organizational and conflictive capacities showed outstanding progress.

E. Organizational Conditioning Elements: The "Confederación de Trabajadores de Chile (CTCH)" (1936)

a. Introduction

Given the importance of this new workers' organization in the evolution of trade unionism in the country in general and in recognition of its role during the Popular Front, we feel it is particularly appropriate to dedicate a special section of this work to its formation, major demands and the type of action it undertook. This analysis can be useful in reaching an understanding of the organizational conditioning elements of the conflictive activity during the period. Previous historical accounts of the workers' movements do not offer any in-depth knowledge of this subject, despite its importance. In contrast, much attention has been given to the CUT analysis. Jorge Barriá, for example, dedicated only four pages of his Historia del Movimiento Obrero to the CTCH and in no other studies does he deal with the subject, except in Historia de la CUI where he covers the period after the break.^{331/} Luis Vitale's History of

^{331.} Barriá, Jorge, Historia del Movimiento Obrero, op. cit.

Workers' Movement makes some very sharp observations on the CTCH, but except for the inclusion of the second Declaración de Principios de la Federación, he does not provide any more empirical data.^{332/} Julio Cesar Jobet fails to mention the subject in his work on the development of Chile.^{333/} This state of affairs has made it necessary to undertake our own analysis in this work based on information provided by the newspaper, La Hora (Radical Party's newspaper). The decision to rely mainly on this source was taken after having examined other alternative sources, such as La Opinión (Socialist), El Siglo (Communist), El Mercurio, El Frente Popular, and El Imparcial. In short, we consider La Hora to be the most complete and appropriate source of information on the outstanding characteristics of the CTCH.

It was found that the CTCH's own publications were somewhat irregular. The publication Unidad was examined, but it only came out once, on May 1, 1938. The most frequent newspaper was CTCH, which was published quite regularly every month from June, 1939 until late 1940. It reappeared again in 1943 and lasted until 1952.

The period being analyzed extends from the time the CTCH was founded in 1936 until it broke up in January,

332. Vitale, Luis, Esbozo de la Historia del Movimiento Obrero, Ediciones POB, 1962.

333. Jobet, Julio César, Ensayo Crítico del Desarrollo Económico y Social de Chile, op. cit.

1946. Attempts to subdivide this period have not been very successful because, as will be seen, this organization shows sort of a continuity that makes it difficult to mark any real qualitatively different stages in its development. This continuity may be seen in the organization's public statements. Of course, the sources from which these declarations were taken make no mention of the internal discussions prior to the publication of each document, a knowledge of which would have made it much easier to detect major changes. For example, this is the case with the CTCH's presence in the Popular Front, the discussion on which had begun around 1940 and was also taken up at the Second Congress in 1943. This discussion is hardly mentioned in the documents analyzed. The unavailability of the official records of these Congress sessions made it virtually impossible to recover these debates. The 1943 Congress could be considered the marking point between one period and the other, but no data has been found to support a division of this kind.

b. Creation and Organization of the "Confederación de Trabajadores de Chile" 334/

The CTCH was founded late in December, 1936.

334. An informative though incomplete account is to be found in "Como se Genero la CTCH", published by CI~~CH~~, September 10, 1943, p. 3.

However, its more immediate organizational background goes back to February of that same year, when a railroad workers' strike was called for economic reasons and interpreted at the time as an antigovernment protest. The government employed every kind of repression at its disposal, including the deportation of Elias Lafferte and Víctor González, the two main leaders of the movement.

During the course of the strike, the "Comando Unico Obrero" was created, where all the organizations that supported the "Frente Relacionador Unico Ferroviario" were brought together. Of this group, the most important members were the "Federación Obrera de Chile", the "Confederación Nacional Sindical" and "El Comité Unico de la Construcción".^{335/}

After the strike, the group became "El Frente Sindical" and requested that other national organizations join. Among those joining the front were: "La Unión de Profesores", "La Liga de Campesinos Pobres" and "La Asociación Sindical de Empleados de Chile".^{336/} This front was the major actor in maintaining the unity of the trade union movement and operated as a central body prior to the Unification Congress, where it was decided which name the future unionist organization was going to

^{335.} See La Hora, December 25, 1936, p. 8.

^{336.} El Mercurio, December 26, 1936, p. 26; and La Opinión, December 24, 1936, p. 2.

adopt.^{337/}

The height of the unification process was the Unification Congress held on 25th/27th December, 1936, which hoped for the establishment of a single permanent central workers' organization and its acknowledgement as such by the workers, entrepreneurs and the government. The unification attempt encountered no resistance from previous workers' organizations which, in fact, supported this process. The FOCH decided to withdraw as a workers' organization and called on its members to join the new body.^{338/} The "Confederación Nacional de Sindicatos Legales" also adopted this decision^{339/}.

The magnitude of the effort involved can be appreciated in the number and variety of speakers who intervened at the inauguration. With the equitable representation of all national and regional organizations present at the meeting, it meant that 22 speakers took the rostrum.^{340/} Among them were representatives of the Communist Party, the Socialist Party and the "Confederación General de Trabajadores Anarcosindicalista". Also participating were representatives of the "Union de Profesores", the "Confederación Nacional and Sindicatos Legales" and

337. La Hora, December 22, 1936, p. 11.

338. La Opinión, December 24, 1936, p. 4; La Hora, December 24, 1936, p. 11 and December 25, 1936, p. 8

339. La Hora, February 27, 1937, p. 6.

340. Ibid. December 25, 1936, p. 8; La Opinión, December 26, pp. 1 and 3

the "Liga de Campesinos Pobres", among others.^{341/}

All these organizations continued to participate in the confederation with the exception of the anarchist-unionists who, while acknowledging the importance of unity within the trade union movement preferred to "retain their autonomy", as they put it, and strive for unity of action as opposed to sustained structural commitments.^{342/} This point was to be the subject of considerable debate within the CTCH.

The CTCH's initial managing body had as its Secretary General, a Socialist and as its Assistant Secretary, a Communist. Apart from Juan Díaz M., the Secretary General, there were four other Socialist representatives. Among them was Pablo López, who at that stage belonged to the Communist left, but during 1937 joined the Socialist Party together with a fair number of his group. Salvador Ocampo from the Communist Party was the Assistant Secretary General and there was also a representative from the Radical Party. The political affiliations of the other five members of the board are unknown.

With the election of this board, a conflict arose which was to persist throughout the period in question, namely between Socialists and Communists. Salvador

341. Ibid. December 27, 1936, p. 8, December 28, p. 4; La Opinión, December 30, 1936, p. 4

342. Ibid. December 25, 1936, p. 8; El Mercurio, December 27, 1936, p. 38

Ocampo's election as Secretary General was achieved by a very small majority of one. As the Congress was unable to reach an agreement in this respect, the candidate decided to withdraw in favour of the Socialist, thus preserving the incipient unity of the organization.^{343/}

After the Congress, the CTCH began a phase of organizational homogenization and clarification which virtually inhibited altogether any other type of action. This stage was characterized by the formation of the managing body and the definition of posts and functions, the incorporation of as many labour organizations as possible^{344/} and the specification of its objectives. To this effect, the organization's demands were determined and laid down in a plan for immediate action together with the declaration of principles.^{345/}

The characteristics of this phase can be very clearly seen in the CTCH's response to the CGT's invitation to call for a general strike in protest against the Internal Security Law. The most outstanding points were the following:

3. The board has decided to:

^{343.} Ibid., December 28, 1936, p. 4.

^{344.} See La Opinión, entire month of January, 1937.

^{345.} Ibid., and La Hora between February 19th-28th, 1937

a) form unions by industries and establish in professional and technical organizations the basis for the proletariat, the employees and the peasant farmers.

b) provide these sectors with an awareness of their responsibility to the cause so that their struggles are transformed into victories.

4. We cannot call for strike action without previous preparation and organization, as this would be harmful to the organizational growth of the workers.

During this same organizational phase, a Provincial Assembly of the CTCH was established for Santiago. The national managing body then became the Executive Committee and agreed to constitute a National Directive Council (CDN) with the federations that participated at the Congress for Trade Union Unity and others joining later on.^{346/} Eventually, this whole organizational consolidation process culminated in a reorganization plan, which was the responsibility of a commission led by those in charge of organization issues within the Confederation. This commission took up the task of establishing industrial federations by provinces and undertook a national census.^{347/} The Plan adopted by the commission was an organizational model that, with very few alterations, was to be maintained throughout the entire period the CTCH existed.

346. La Hora, February 24, 1937, p.11.
347. Idem.

The CTCH's next managing body was elected at its First Congress in 1939. Two lists of candidates were presented at these elections; the first led by the Socialist, Bernardo Ibañez and the second by the Communist, Salvador Ocampo. The Congress elected a managing body of fifteen members, eleven Socialists and four Communists.

The managing body was challenged by the members of the minority as they argued that the group elected was not proportional to the lists. A solution to the problem was found by creating a second managing body with sixteen members, six from the minority list, which forced one of the members of the other list to resign. Once more, the posts of Secretary General and Assistant Secretary remained in the hands of a Socialist and a Communist, respectively (Ibañez and Ocampo).^{348/}

The next managing body was elected at the Second Congress in 1943 with no problems of representativity. The surprise factor at this event was the election to the board of a member of a new party, La Falange. The number of Socialists and Communists was maintained in the proportion agreed upon, as the number of participants increased to seventeen.^{349/}

348. An account of this conflict is to be found in La Hora, from August 1, 1939 to October 26, 1939.

349. CTCH, October 23, 1943, p. 1.

In 1943 several new commissions were created to deal with the economic problem, the intention being to involve as many "personalities" as possible from outside the CTCH. Thus, the "Comisión de Legislación Social" was formed with the participation of Salvador Allende G., at that time Secretary General of the Socialist Party. Also elected as President of the "Comisión de Alimentación y Vestuario" was the former senator of the Falange, Rafael Agustín Gumucio.^{350/}

c. The Demands

The fact that the CTCH was a central labour organization obliged it to formulate those proposals that were representative of all the demands of the workers' movement at that period. On addressing the CTCH repertoire, all the categories utilized in other parts of this thesis to classify the demands of the more specific movements can be used. The CTCH's demands can be seen in the following publications:

Tabla del Congreso Constituyente^{351/}

Programa de Acción Inmediata^{352/}

^{350.} Ibid., November 7, 1944, p. 5.

^{351.} See La Opinión, December 25, 1936, p. 3.

^{352.} See Ibid., December 28, 1936, pp. 1 and 2.

Acuerdos del Congreso Constituyente-353/

Reivindicaciones Pendientes del Proletariado Chileno354/

Reivindicaciones de la Clase Trabajadora bajo el Gobierno del Frente Popular355/

Plan de Acción Inmediata Propuesta al II Congreso356/

Plan de Acción Inmediata de 1945 -357/

Perhaps the most representative of the CTCH documents in this respect is the "Plan de Acción Inmediata" annexed to the Declaration of Principles, in which the CTCH put forward:

Economic Demands: Improved living, health and work conditions and wages allowing ample satisfaction of the material and cultural needs of the individual and his family. A fair correlation between wages and the cost of life. Trade union control over pension schemes.

Cultural Demands: Greater emphasis on providing free government education to the whole working class, oriented towards technical activities. A broad reading and writing campaign. The creation of means of cultural diffusion of all kinds.

Social Demands: Defence of the freedom established in the constitution, guaranteeing the free development of the human personality. Defense of present legislation favouring the workers and the passing of new laws for improving living and working conditions.358/

353. See Ibid., December 27, 1936, pp. 1 and 3.

354. See La Hora, April 10, 1939, p. 13.

355. See CTCH, December 9, 1940, p. 1.

356. See Ibid., September 10, 1943, p. 7.

357. See Ibid., August 22, 1945, p. 3.

358. Idem.

The main difference between one document and the other is to be found in the degree of specificity of the demands stated therein. Thus, for example, during the time of the Popular Front, the demands were formulated with direct reference to the Front's program and included suggested measures the government could take. As the effects of World War II began to be felt, specific points related to the defence of the democratic regime against fascism were included in the demands. Other plans submitted undertake the task of bringing the proletariat's demand up-to-date in light of the specific circumstances prevailing at the time.

d. CTCH Action

On addressing the subject of demands, it is important to also refer to the way in which the CTCH dealt with them. The action taken by the CTCH may be approached from the point of view of individual campaigns. When the CTCH took up the demands of any of the working class sectors, the corresponding action took the form of a systematic campaign. Thus, for example, there were campaigns for housing, solidarity with Republican Spain, social legislation, against alcoholism and gambling and in support of strike movements. Each problem that arose was dealt with through a campaign of agitation, propaganda and mobilization.

The campaign would commence on instructions from the CTCH's National Management Council (CDN-CTCH) and expressed in a manifesto or communique in which the individual demands were presented in relation with some other more general economic or social problems. The campaign was developed through the press media with the intervention of provincial or local representatives and the participation of organizations not permanently affiliated to the CTCH, but which had a direct relation with the demand being aired.

The climax of the campaign occurred with a general meeting where the different bodies stated the conclusions reached after the campaign was over. From this moment on the campaign lost intensity but its subject matter was kept pending within the repertoire of CTCH demands and could be reactivated at any given moment.

These campaigns were not limited solely to organized popular sectors. The most outstanding of these cases were those campaigns dedicated to food and housing which took place in 1937.-359/ In the first of these the aim was to reach a broad section of the population whose buying power had been reduced because of inflation. The culmination of this campaign was the hunger rally on the

359. For information on the food campaign see La Hora, March 25, 1937 to May 2, 1937. For the housing Campaign see La Hora from December 22, 1937 to June 26, 1938.

1st of May. The second, was intended to reach the sectors that were not homeowners, particularly those living in tenement buildings.

Perhaps the most outstanding campaign for unionized workers worth mentioning is that related with social legislation and the Labour Code. The issue was not strictly limited to one campaign as it was one that concerned the CTCH through the entire period. One can in fact distinguish between a series of "sub-campaigns" within the whole continuum of the demands for social legislation. The mobilization methods varied according to the prevailing circumstances. Thus, in the face of blatant violations, a kind of mobilization was begun which took into account the immediate issue, but also addressed some of the more permanent demands. This was the case of the demonstrations in August and September of 1937, brought about in reaction to the attack on the unionized nitrate workers of Mopochó and Humberstone on the part of the Tarapaca superintendent and the provincial labour inspectors.^{360/} In other cases, however, the campaign went no further than a straight forward protest, like when there was opposition to the imposition of income tax.^{361/} On the other hand, there appears to have been a close relationship between the action taken in this

360. See La Hora, August 26, 1937, p. 11.

361. Ibid., July 22, 1937, p. 13.

area and the CTCH's attitude towards the Government. The social legislation campaigns were inevitably combined with requests for audiences and meetings with the Minister of Labour.

This sort of relationship with the Government was very much the result of the importance the labour movement gave to the Labour Code, which was considered as an achievement on the part of the proletariat towards the progressive democratization of society. Furthermore when the state labour organizations rejected the petitions of the trade union movement or attempted to avoid applying labour legislation to the latter, they were looked upon as enemies of democracy.

Nevertheless, the opposition mentioned herein was not directed completely towards the State or the political system but was rather more of a protest against partial defects, due in some instances, to bad faith or arbitrariness. This situation is particularly clear in light of the personalized nature of the criticism, although the degree of personalization varied depending on the amount of popularity among the workers of the person leading the organization at the centre of the campaign activity. Many of these were considered "enemies". This was not the case of Bernardo Leighton who, while occupying the post of Minister of Labour, was greatly esteemed among the workers, an attitude which persisted even after he declared the constitution of one trade

union illegal.^{362/}

The CTCH invariably attempted to centralize all conflicts. It would intervene to try and find a solution and would ask for the support of other Labour organizations as the conflict grew or prolonged. Through this type of action, it attempted to legitimize itself on two fronts: on the one hand, before the workers as a central organization capable of supporting their demands and helping achieve an effective solution, and on the other, before the Government as the sole representative of the workers and effective mediator. Among the cases characteristic of this type of action on the part of the CTCH there was the support given to the Franke construction workers' strike, its intervention in the bakers' conflict^{363/} and its participation in the miners' strike at Braden Copper Company in El Teniente. The latter strike began on July 7, 1938 and was considered to be the "the longest legal strike to date".^{364/} The CTCH acted by giving immediate moral and economic support to the movement placing a plasterers strike that had been called out during that same period in second place. The CTCH attempted to act as mediator between the Executive and

362. See La Hora, November 25, 1937, p. 11 and October 29 1937, p. 11.

363. For information on Constructora Franke, see La Hora, January 23 and 25, 1937, p. 4; and on bakers, see La Hora, October 2, 1937, p. 1.

364. Ibid., July 16, 1938, p. 1.

the striking workers, but this clashed with the intentions of President Alessandri who, at the time of the final discussions refused to see the CTCH's representatives.^{365/} At the meeting an agreement was reached whereby the President of the Republic promised to approach the Braden company personally. Although the CTCH did not fully agree with the proposal, it was accepted by the majority of the workers involved in the conflict.^{366/}

It was not until July that the confederation finally decided to intervene in the plasterers' conflict after its participation in the miners' strike concluded altogether. It set itself up as the mediator between the "Unión de Resistencia" of the plasterers and the labour authorities,^{367/} but it was unsuccessful in its attempts and the plasterers manifested their intention to call out a general strike in the sector.^{368/} Although the CTCH was originally in favour of the idea, it soon retracted and proposed to continue with non-strike action.^{369/} Thus, despite the plasterers' wishes to the contrary, the confederation continued to search for a solution and even tried to negotiate with the company management on its own hoping in the meantime that things

^{365.} Idem.

^{366.} Ibid., July 16th and 18th, 1938, p. 5.

^{367.} Ibid., July 29, 1938, p. 16; and July 30, p. 16.

^{368.} Ibid., from August 1st to 8th, 1938.

^{369.} Ibid., August 10th, 11th and 16th, 1938.

would calm down enough in order to propose the arbitration.^{370/}

A brief look at these conflicts clearly shows the attitude of the CTCH concerning its position in dealing with labour conflicts in that it attempted to legitimate itself before the workers and the Government. Its role of mediator was founded on the high esteem in which the social legislation was held by the workers and the firm belief that conflicts could be negotiated within the framework laid down in the Labour Code.

While the Popular Front government was in power, the CTCH intervention was frequent. During this period it enjoyed massive support from the people, and it was recognized by the government. However, it was never legally sanctioned. A communique sent by a CTCH delegate during a conflict at Potrerillos was very indicative of this attitude. Here it was explained that:

In the hope that economic aims should not contribute to the undermining of the government, the miners of Potrerillos have decided to end the issue and accept the gains already made.

On ending the conflict, the workers reiterate their profound confidence and faith in the government of Pedro Aguirre Cerda.^{371/}

^{370.} Idem.

^{371.} Ibid., March 27, 1939, p. 16.

e. The CTCH and its relationship with the
Government and the Popular Front

The actions of the CTCH in search of a solution to the conflicts cannot be merely explained in terms of unionist motives. It should be kept in mind that the working class had intended to give its full support to the Popular Front government, a commitment which necessarily meant curbing or even eliminating some of its demands. However, this attitude could have given rise to the advantage being taken of the labour sector on the part of the employees. With regard to this point, Salvador Ocampo stated:

It is not our intention to provoke even the least industrial nor political disturbance in these instances. But we will not allow the employers to take advantage of this instance and abuse the workers.^{372/}

During the draughtmen's strike in 1940, Bernardo Ibañez also attempted to establish this attitude. He took into consideration the history of the Chilean people's movement from when it began until the time of the Popular Front. He analyzed the triumph that this had meant, while at the same time recalling its inefficiencies.

³⁷² Ibid., April 14, 1939, p. 15.

This long preamble culminated in a general conclusion regarding the strike, considered to be the most important weapon in defence of the working class. A general strike was usually a political measure taken against governments considered to be enemies of the people. The Popular Front government, on the other hand, was the government of the people "even though it may not have responded to the workers' demands through the workings of a fully-fledged socialist system.^{373/}

The CTCH's general view of the Popular Front was made very clear in the notice of its First Congress in which it sustained that:

The Government of the Popular Front, to whose formation we have contributed has opened up much broader prospects for the working class.

From a government that once persecuted and imprisoned has arisen one that guarantees freedom of expression, the right to hold gatherings and the fulfilment of trade union laws.

This has contributed to the triumph of democracy over oligarchy that would have propitiated fascism and crushed the people.

The working class must take care to safeguard the democratic form of government that has been achieved and modify those procedures that are harmful to the workers.

The CTCH must be acknowledged as the sole central trade union organization of the country's proletariat.

³⁷³ CICH., No. 7, May 1, 1940, p. 5.

Fair everyday demands must find immediate, exact and just solutions and not bureaucratic arrangements that can be evaded by the employers.^{374/}

This document is particularly clear with regard to CTCH's position concerning the Popular Front government led by Pedro Aguirre Cerda.

The pro-governmental stance of workers' movements is better understood if one takes into account the underlying struggle between the government that was an expression of democracy and an oligarchy ready to favour fascist forms of government. The attitude of the CTCH towards the presidential candidacy of Juan Antonio Ríos made it clear that support for the democratic regime was one of the most important motivations behind its actions. Although the workers were somewhat sceptical as to what Juan A. Ríos had to offer them, they decided to give him their undivided support under the slogan "only retrograders join up with fascism".^{375/} This affiliation with the democratic regime was to imply more restraint in the CTCH's demands for "integral socialism", more emphasis being placed on a "more just order". Similarly, the importance that had previously been placed on the class

374. See La Hora, May 4, 1939, p. 15.

375. Ibid., January 29, 1939, p. 15.

struggle was reduced in the light of the need to reaffirm the unity of all "progressives" against fascism.^{376/} The attenuation of the classist issue left the CTCH open to criticism on the part of the anarchists who branded it as "just one more party in the political undercurrent".^{377/}

The CTCH decided to associate itself with the Popular Front in accordance with the mandate of its Constitutive Congress.^{378/} This decision came into effect in July, 1937.-^{379/} The reasons for its incorporation into the Popular Front were expressed by the national leader Isidoro Godoy in the announcement for the First Congress.^{380/} The importance the organized workers' movement gave to the democratic regime during that period can be seen here.

All of the workers' movement actions during this period and those that followed were characterized by a particular attitude towards democracy. The traditional idea the workers' movement had of democracy had been that of

376. Vitale, Luis, op. cit., pp. 19 and 20.

377. See La Hora, May 19, 1937.

378. Stated by B. Ibañez, Comisión Publicaciones CICH, December 14, 1946.

379. See La Hora from June 7th to July 30th, 1937.

380. I. Godoy's discourse was published in La Hora on September 13, 1937, p. 13.

an instrument of oppression used by one class against another, a way in which the bourgeoisie could dominate the proletariat. During this period this idea was modified as democracy was no longer used as an instrument of repression and was seen as a victory for the proletariat. In the above-mentioned discourse, Godoy states:

Our stance is to defend democracy, our alliance with all the progressive sectors of Chilean society in no way implies that we have abandoned our socialist and revolutionary points of view. But the struggle for socialism is at present closely related to the defense of democracy against fascism.³⁸¹

The CTCH's stay in the Popular Front was subject to its ups and downs. From the very start it was integrated with all the rights of a political party and participated with a quota of 60 delegates (of a total of 970) at the Leftist Convention in which Pedro Aguirre Cerda was proclaimed presidential candidate.³⁸² The CTCH fully participated in the campaign in support of the candidacy organizing meetings and providing speakers. At the time of the First Congress in 1939, the Popular Front was at its height and there was nothing to indicate that it would not continue to remain in power. However, in 1940 things got difficult for the Front as there was the

381. Discourse of I. Godoy, mentioned previously.

382. See La Hora, from January 10th to April 18th, 1938.

threat of the withdrawal of both the Radical and the Socialist Parties. Under these difficult circumstances the CTCH decided to reaffirm its presence within the Front and continue its unifying task. Despite the dispute created by the draughtsmen's strike that year, the CTCH sustained its position within the Front in order to prevent action from the Right designed to cause a division in the people's movement. However, the support given by the Popular Front to the workers continued to be a major cause for debate within the CTCH. The criticism of the left-wing fractions within the Popular Front asserted that the latter had not fulfilled its promises to the workers and that the CTCH should, therefore, withdraw its support. B. Ibañez' report to the 1940 conference reflects the difficult moments the labour movement was going through. He stated that:

Our enemies are powerful and our faltering friends attack us from all sides and all that we have to defend ourselves is our unity.^{383/}

In this same report the CTCH's presence in the Popular Front was reaffirmed. It was also acknowledged that the way in which the CTCH was integrated in the Front should be clearly defined, together with its class

383. Report of B. Ibañez at the First^w Conference of the CTCH in September, 1940.

autonomy and the nature of the government. Nevertheless, the discussion regarding the Popular Front government had not been resolved yet, as was to be seen with the CTCH's decision to remain in the government coalition. In view of the fact that this decision was a Constitutive Congress mandate and was reaffirmed at the First Congress, the issue should have been left until the following congress. From 1941-42 the Front took on a new form and was succeeded by the so-called "Alianza Democrática" to which the CTCH associated itself in view of the fact that the alliance had adopted the same program as the Popular Front.

The whole problem of the CTCH's attitude towards the Popular Front and its internal discussions was in fact a reflection of a more permanent debate that had been going on among the movement's major political leaders.

f. The Communist-Socialist Conflict and its
Influence on the CTCH

More often than not the positive influence of the traditional Left on the workers' movement was neutralized by the conflicts that arose within the major workers' parties and the open rivalry between them.

In the Socialist Party, for example, the internal conflicts became frequent and serious and were essentially a consequence of the party's origins. It must be

remembered that this party was formed by the union of four different groups and that between 1937 and 1948 three new socialist-oriented groups also joined: the "La Unión Socialista" in 1943, the "Partido Socialista de Los Trabajadores" in 1944 and the "Partido Socialista de Chile" in 1948.-384/

The rivalry between the Socialists and the Communists stemmed from the ambitions of both parties to gain hegemonic control over the movement. In addition to this, there were also ideological differences which were frequently manifested in opposing points of view on national and international political issues. During the previous period the different reactions of the two parties towards the new labour legislation are well-known. Unlike the Socialist Party, the Communists rejected the legal trade union organization, partly due to the action of its Trotskyist wing. This situation began to change during the period in question when the Socialist Party adopted an uncompromising leftist stance concerning principles and a marked pragmatism in the realm of concrete political activity. The Communist Party, on the other hand, given its loyalty to the fight for democracy against fascism, mainly the result of its affiliation with the

384. See Chelen, A., Trayectoria del Socialismo. Apuntes para una Historia Crítica del Socialismo Chileno, Ed. Austral, Argentina, 1967; Donoso, Ricardo, op. cit.

Tercera International, generally speaking showed considerable tolerance towards "progressive" movements. Unfortunately, this attitude did not help very much towards the creation of a better, more lasting relationship with the Socialist Party.

During this period the rivalry between the two worsened. Whilst the Socialists favoured the idea of a "Frente Unico", the Communists supported the thesis of a "Frente Nacional".^{385/} The Communists advocated the participation of the "democratic" and "progressive" bourgeoisie in a broad political movement directed by the workers and the intellectuals. The Socialists refused to accept an alliance of this kind. However, despite this, they eventually gave their support to the Radical Party candidate, Pedro Aguirre Cerda during the presidential elections of 1938, thus renouncing the possibility of presenting their own candidate, Marmeduque Grove, the Socialist Republic leader during its first stage.^{386/}

385. In 1933 the Communists' position was different and in fact more close to the Socialists' opinion of the Front. This may be seen in Resolución del Comité Central de Agosto que aprueba las Decisiones de la Conferencia Nacional de julio de 1933. In this document the Communists accuse Grove, the Socialists Republic leader of being a petty-bourgeois and a reformist who believed that Socialism can be built on the basis of a parliamentary system. See seccion 11, La Situación Nacional.

386. This might be regarded as the only Socialist oriented stage of the period, i.e. from June 4-16, 1932. Thus, the following stage, until September 13th, would not show this orientation. See footnote 277 p. 214.

Although the Socialists' views on the Front changed, they continued to be the major cause of conflict with the Communists. Another contributing factor was the Socialists' attitude towards the international dependence of the Chilean Communist Party. In 1933, when the major Socialist groups at the time met to form the Socialist Party, they explicitly rejected all affiliations to the Tercera Internacional. The dependence of the Chilean Communists on instructions from abroad could be seen from the frequent tactical changes occurring within the party. In 1939, for example, the Communists posed a serious threat to democratic groups following the pact entered into by Hitler and the Soviet Union. There was a change in attitude once more when Hitler broke the pact. With the death of Pedro Aguirre Cerda, these differences reached a climax. After four years of collaboration with Aguirre Cerda, the Socialists' relationship with the Front gradually began to cool down. By then they were somewhat more disposed to support the action and the demands of the CTCH, as they did during the general strike in January, 1946, when Juan A. Ríos was subrogated for Vice-President Duhalde. Although the Communists did not have a representative in the Popular Front's Ministry, they were generally reluctant to lend their support to actions and movements that by and large would have been harmful to the regime's stability. This attitude was a reflection of their general orientation towards the defense of the democratic system,

which for them meant the Popular Front. The Communists did not participate in the administration in power after the strike of 1946, being more inclined to openly support the CTCH's demands against the government. This brought about new and irreconcilable differences between them and the Socialists, as will be seen in the following section on the strike of 1946. Here, two examples of strike characteristics of the Aguirre Cerda term will be shown. Following this, the strike of January, 1946 will be examined, an event which marked the break up of the CTCH and the resumption of the traditional opposition that had characterized the trade union movement until the appearance of the Popular Front.

F. The Bakers and Match Company Strikes of January and February, 1940: Two Strikes Representative of Conflictive Activity during the First Sub-period of the Popular Front (1938-1942)

a. The Bakers' Strike

As we have mentioned before, no specific works are available providing detailed information on the strike movements that arose in the country. This information is particularly scarce for the period the Popular Front was in power. Therefore, it has been necessary to resort exclusively to the newspapers published during the first term of 1940, i.e. El Mercurio, La Nación, the

government's newspaper, La_Hora, the Radical Party's Newspaper and La_Opinión, the Socialist newspaper of the era. In dealing with these particular strikes, we will address the subject of economic and political conditioning factors, strike aims, their magnitude and characteristics, as in previous cases.

One of the strikes that best illustrates the particular features of the strikes occurring during the first part of the Popular Front's term is the bakers' strike of 1940. This illegal conflict began early in the morning of January 6th and culminated on January 13th.-387/ It involved workers from 76 of the 115 existing bakeries which had refused to pay the Christmas bonus due to more than 1,000 workers.388/ The bread delivery workers also supported the strikers.389/

The main aim of the movement was to obtain the Christmas bonus, job protection and legal rights for the union leaders. When the strike began on the 6th, the workers stated their objectives and met with the Minister of Labour, who requested a meeting that same day with

387. See La_Opinión, January 7, 1940, p. 8; El_Mercurio, January 6, 1940, p. 13; and January 13, 1940, p. 17.

388. La_Opinión, January 6, 1940, p. 4; and "Declaración del Secretario General de la Junta de Panificadores de Chile" published in La_Opinión, January 8, 1940, p. 3.

389. Ibid., January 7, 1940, p. 25.

the General Labour Inspector and the industrialists involved.^{390/} The industrialists argued that although traditionally this bonus had been paid, it was no longer necessary after the introduction of the Labour Code, which had compensated for it with paid holidays, guaranteed wages and certain other concessions given by the industry.^{391/} In light of these arguments, the bakers' petition was considered illegal.

The movement continued from one meeting to the next, where these proposals were voiced.^{392/} On January 8th the general bakery workers' assembly ratified the movement with the understanding that it would be limited to those bakeries where the bonus had not been paid.^{393/}

On January 11th, the State took a stand and the Minister of Agriculture announced that the strike had been declared illegal.^{394/} Meanwhile, several bakery workers were arrested and accused of willful damage to private property.^{395/} The next day the "Junta Central de Panificadores" repeated its threat to call out a general strike if a solution to the conflict was not found.^{396/} The solution was found that same day when, in deference

390. El Mercurio, January 7, 1940, p. 25.

391. Ibid., January 7, 1940, p. 25.

392. Ibid., January 8, 1940, p. 16.

393. Ibid., January 9, 1940, p. 9.

394. Ibid., January 12, 1940, p. 13.

395. Ibid.

396. La Opinion, January 12, 1940, p. 1.

to the President of the Republic, the industrialists handed over a sum of money to the public treasury through the superintendent, to be distributed among the striking workers.^{397/} The question as to whether or not the strikers' petition was legal was not made clear and was left to be dealt with the next time petitions were made.^{398/}

It should be pointed out that the "Junta Central de Los Panificadores" was not affiliated to the CTCH, which placed the Federation's Radio Hour at its disposal on January 10th. Carlos Godoy, president of the bakers' organization, was able to explain the basic principles of the movement through this media. With regard to the political management of the strike, as such, the presence of the Socialist Representative, Hipólito Verdugo, was outstanding due to his role in obtaining the release of the bakers held in custody.^{399/} His presence during the other stages of the movement was much less apparent.

b. The Match Company Workers' Strike

Another strike characteristic during this period was that of the match company. Although there are certain

397. El Mercurio, January 13, 1940, p. 17: and La Opinión January 13, 1940, p. 3.

398. La Opinión, January 14, 1940, p. 4.

399. El Mercurio, January 12, 1940, p. 13, La Opinión, January 12, 1940.

similarities between this and the bakers' strike, there are some major differences which may be of help in reaching a better understanding of the conflictive activity during the period.

In this case, the strike was legal and lasted from January 12th to February 16, 1940 with the participation of 6,000 workers from the Rengo and Talca match factories. Although the strike began on February 3rd, the antecedents to the movement go back to January 10th, when the Secretary of the CTCH in Rengo went to Santiago to inform the confederation's National Executive Committee and the Ministry of Promotion of the situation of the match company workers who had decided to go on strike three days later.^{400/}

At the assembly held on January 10th, the decision as to whether or not to strike was the subject of considerable debate, but the workers stood firm in their resolution. However, at the request of the Governor and as a demonstration of confidence towards Pedro Aguirre Cerda, the President of the Republic, they agreed to postpone the movement until January 31st. When this time elapsed, the conflict had not yet been solved and on February 2nd, the workers decided to go on strike.^{401/} The conflict

400. La Hora, January 11, 1940, p. 16; La Opinion January 10, 1940, p. 8.

401. La Opinion, February 3, 1940, p. 8.

finally ended on February 16th after the workers were granted increased benefits.^{402/} Actually, it was the State that lost with this solution as it had reduced the amount of taxes that the match company had to pay.^{403/}

The main objective pursued by the strikers were economic, as in the case of the previous example, i.e. to obtain a wage increase for blue-collar workers and other employees in the industry. Although the discussion about this increase also involved the company's monopoly, the latter was only relevant in the general framework of strike action and not specifically to this particular movement.

Like the baker's strike, this agreement was negotiated with the intervention of the workers, the industrialists and the State. The workers wanted a wage increase and the industrialists were willing to give it to them if the State authorized an increase in the price of matches. The State intervened through the CTCH, the Price Commission, the Cabinet Council and the labour authorities.^{404/} The opinion of the state authorities was that the wage increase should be paid with the company's profits and not through a rise in the price of the goods it produced, a position which ultimately prevailed.

402. Ibid., February 17, 1940, p. 4.

403. Ibid., February 15, 1940, p. 3.

404. Ibid., February 8, 1940, p. 4.

The CTCH's intervention was important in this issue because, despite its participation in the Sate, it was always in control of the movement and fulfilled an outstanding role as mediator between the workers and the State.

c. Conclusions

The most important characteristic of the period was the tendency to institutionalize the conflict, a phenomenon that resulted in less repression and a tendency towards more permanent negotiation between workers and industrialists. Seen from this point of view, the strike is simply the ultimate expression of a conflict tolerated by society. This can be observed in the above-mentioned case: the strike did not solve the basic problem nor were all the workers' aims fulfilled, instead, it brought to light the characteristics of a longer standing struggle of which it was merely a part.

The sustained negotiation of a conflict also required the existence of a workers' organization capable of continued action. In this sense, it is perhaps justified to talk of the decline of spontaneous trade unionism. The origins of organized trade unionism were to be found during Alessandri's term when the trade movement strike activities were at an ebb. Despite harsh repression whenever strike action was attempted, workers' organizations were formed and began to grow. The existence of a

strong workers' organization was to later constitute a fundamental precursor to the institutionalization of the conflict.

The major workers' organization of the period, the "Confederación de Trabajadores de Chile", was intimately related to the existence of the Popular Front. The confederation was formed in 1936, after the Popular Front was established, eventually breaking up in 1946 when the people's government had failed, giving rise to the Democratic Alliance. Without exaggeration, one could safely say that the CTCH was an essential part of the Popular Front. It was integrated into the Front with the same rights as any political party, it attended every political and electoral event and also participated in state administration of institutions like the CORFO, the People's Housing Bureau, the Commissariat for Basic Foodstuff and Prices as well as other state agencies.

Due to this integration, the popular parties attempted to subordinate the interests of the workers' movement to more general political interests inherent in the front-popular alliance. During the period of quasi-governmental unionism, the political side of the movement was conducted in such a way as to prevent conflicts from ending in strikes and thus, maintain the desired "social peace". Strikes were, therefore, brief and generally very peaceful, their aims being of limited scope and almost always of an economic nature. One must remember

that political strikes constituted only one percent of all strikes during that period (See Table 16, page 304).

Despite the CTCH's working relationship with the government, it was still unable to prevent all conflictive manifestations. Nevertheless, these strikes were limited to small concerns and their objectives were mainly economic.

One of the most important characteristics of the Popular Front administration was, therefore, the determined effort to keep the society free from strike activities. The Communist representative, Reinaldo Núñez, who also represented the metal workers and who was a CTCH leader, noted that the union leaders had taken great pains to conduct the conflicts such as to avoid strikes. As he said, "90% of the worker-employer conflicts were solved through an agreement reached between the two parties".⁴⁰⁵ However, those conflicts that reached the strike action stage were kept within the guidelines stipulated in the Labour Code as we have observed in the cases analyzed.

Efforts to keep the conflicts within the framework of the provisions made in the Labour Code brought about a considerable increase in state intervention in the negotiation process. This began with a discussion of the demands between the workers and the employers. If no

⁴⁰⁵ Ordinary Sessions of the House of Representatives, July 22, 1941, p. 122.

T_A_B_L_E__No._16
EXPLICIT STRIKE AIMS
(1938--1945)

AIMS	No.	%
SPECIFIC ECONOMIC		
Referring to labour		
- Salary	137	71.1
- Economic Benefits	10	5.5
- Working Hours	7	2.8
- Working conditions	7	2.8
- Work relations	24	12.6
Referring to		
- Living conditions	3	1.6
GENERAL ECONOMIC	2	1.0
UNIONIST	3	1.6
POLITICAL(1)	2	1.0
TOTAL	195	100.0

Source: See source Table No 13, p. 252.

(1) These refer specifically to protests against laws not in the interests of the workers. For the distribution of aims according to the different economic activities, see table A-3 of the statistic appendix. Of the total number of strikes detected during this period and shown in Table 13, p. 252, the causes of only 75% of them have been determined.

agreement was reached, the issue went on to a conciliation board or arbitration tribunal made up largely of representatives of the Labour Inspection Department and of the Labour Ministry itself. Due to the workers' confidence in the results of state intervention, it was expected that the State would act favourably on their behalf or, in the worst of cases, that it would not act in detriment of their interests. This attitude is illustrated by the postponement of the strike in Rengo and the bakers' talks with the Minister of Labour. Thus, the State became the arbitrator in all conflicts, a position it also enjoyed thanks to the trade union movement's determination to avoid conflicts.

G. The General Strike of January 30, 1940 During the Fall of the Popular Front (1945-1952)

a. Introduction

Most of the data used in the analysis of this movement was taken from newspapers and other documents of the period. We cannot sufficiently stress the importance this information had for this study as no specific work on this subject was available. The publications consulted were El Mercurio, El Diario Ilustrado, El Imparcial (a tabloid published by El Diario Ilustrado - all of them right-wing oriented), La Hora (the Radical Party's newspaper), El Siglo (published by the Communist Party) and La Opinión, (the Socialist Party daily).

During the previous sub-period, the tendency to inhibit strike action led to the accumulation of tensions within the unions, particularly in those movements whose interests had been seriously affected or where the legitimacy of their demands had been questioned. The problems arising as a result of the conflicts and the Front's reluctance to tolerate this sort of action resulted in successive disputes within the CTCH between those who supported the workers and those who did not. The Socialist and Communist Parties's respective positions depended on their relationship with the Front at the time.

The nitrate miners' strike which began on January 17, 1946 and ended late that month in a general strike was a good example of this situation. The movement was started by the nitrate company workers in Tarapaca and Antofagasta (COSATAN) at the Humberstone and Mapocho offices. Later, workers from other offices joined, increasing the total number of workers committed to the movement to approximately 10,000. The reasons given by the workers for going on strike was the rise in the price of grocery items, thus violating a previous agreement with the union. According to the COSATAN, there was no violation. During the days that followed, new demands were added to the list. There were allegations that the heavy metal workers' wage scale had not been respected. Payment was demanded for days not worked during a

previous strike and there were complaints about health and safety conditions. Nonetheless, the principal demand was the price of goods at the foodmarkets.^{406/}

Several days before, President Juan Antonio Ríos had taken advantage of the holiday period to recover from his recurrent jaundice, leaving the government in the hands of Vice-President Duhalde.^{407/} The Duhalde government intervened in the strike on January 22nd by issuing a declaration to the effect that it would not tolerate illegal strikes. The nitrate workers' strike was classified as illegal and the conflictive area was immediately declared an Emergency Zone and subject to the authority of the Defense Ministry.^{408/} It came as a surprise when the offices at Humberstone, Mapocho and Victoria were taken over by the Army and the rest of the Pampa was covered by security forces. At the same time it was decided to deprive the Humberstone and Mapocho unions of their legal status, the fulfillment of this measure implying the closure of several union premises. Despite the emergency zone, military occupation and unions without

406. The account of this conflict was based on the declaration of the "Federación Industrial Minera de Chile", published in El Siglo on January 26, p. 3. This version was compared with newspapers' accounts and found to agree.

407. See La Opinión, January 18, 1946, p.1 or other newspapers of the same date.

408. The respective documents were published in El Mercurio, January 23, 1946, p. 13.

legal standing, negotiations continued. The workers who participated in the movement were fired and their contracts rescinded on the grounds that the strike was illegal. In view of the deterioration in the situation of the nitrate workers' unions, the CTCH decided to intervene and sent a delegation to the zone accompanied by a high official from the Labour Ministry.

The major issues covered in the negotiations were:

1. That the decision to deprive the unions of their legal status be revoked.
2. That the troops occupying the nitrate mining area be withdrawn.
3. That the company guarantee there would be no reprisals.
4. That the price of goods at the foodmarkets be lowered.^{409/}

No agreement was reached on any of these points. The position adopted by the government was, therefore, extremely important in view of the uncompromising attitude of the employers. This conflict, in particular, went no further than this and the movement developed without incident until February 8th. What is important here is that the only possibility of reaching a favourable solution to the strike was to take it to a national level.

409. El Imparcial, January 28, 1946, p. 3.

Events in the North were to be of particular significance to the CTCH.

On the 28th, two days before the general strike was to begin, the CTCH called for a meeting in Santiago to be held after working hours in the Plaza Bulnes. The meeting place was crowded with workers and a large number of armed soldiers, who cordoned off the rostrum in order to prevent possible disturbances. Other soldiers on horseback began to clear a sector that had been declared a military enclosure. The demonstrators were cleared by the soldiers on horseback who used batons, a manoeuvre that was repeated several times despite protests from the demonstrators. Certain Communist representatives approached the officers to explain that the meeting had been authorized in the area that the soldiers were trying to clear, but they were also trampled and one of them, Andrés Escobar Díaz, was badly injured.

Amid protests and beatings, the soldiers began to retreat and the meeting started. Nevertheless, one striker insisted on clearing the area and the protests became a battle. The soldiers drew their swords. In the commotion one of the horses fell to the ground and the rest of the soldiers went to rescue their fallen companion.410/

410. This incident was published only in El Mercurio,
January 29, 1946, p. 1.

At this point a gun battle broke out, the origin of which is unsure. El Imparcial^{411/} talks of confusion on the part of the soldiers, which coincides with the version of El Mercurio describing the atmosphere as worked up. According to the soldiers' commanding officer, Guillermo Galindo, his men were attacked with stones and blades when they tried to clear the area, then later on with firearms. The soldiers were, therefore, obliged to return the fire.^{412/} El Siglo referred to the incident as a premeditated provocation for which the government was totally responsible and suggested that the soldiers that had been injured had been shot by their own companions due to the confusion that reigned.^{413/}

The shooting lasted for five minutes, until the arrival of Commander Galindo; the casualties amounted to six dead and more than 80 wounded.^{414/} Several of the demonstrators raced over to the pools of blood and dipped the banners they were carrying into it. Despite the

411. Ibid., Editorial January 29, 1956, p. 5.

412. Ibid., p. 1.

413. El Mercurio, January 29, 1946, Editorial, p. 1, El Siglo, pp. 1, 2 and 3; January 30, 1946, Editorial pp. 2, 3 and 4; February 1, 1946, p. 5.

414. El Mercurio vaguely mentioned 5 dead (January 29, 1946), p. 1), El Siglo reported 8 (January 29, 1946), p. 1), two of which were unidentified; the day of the funeral, only six caskets appeared in the photograph. There is very little discrepancy in the number of wounded. The number of dead soldiers was stated as 5 and one dying making a total of six. See El Mercurio, January 29, 1946, p. 7.

repression, the demonstrators refused to disperse and the meeting was held anyway, followed by a march through the centre of the city.

Meanwhile, the government declared martial law throughout the country, began arresting Communist agitators and installed military officers as ministers in the cabinet. Ministers Eduardo Frei (Falangist) and Enrique Arriagada (Authentic Socialist Party) resigned from their posts in the Public Works and Justice Departments, respectively. The government was subsequently repudiated by all of the parties in the Popular Front.

The general strike of January 30, 1946, that followed the previous incidents was the only strike called by the CTCH and was, in fact, indicative of the state of mind of the workers' movement and the definite breakdown of the pro-government union movement. Shortly after the strike the CTCH broke up, its members splitting into two fractions, one of which was Socialist and recognized by the government and the other Communist and declared illegal. With this the unions that had formed the central core of the movement, dispersed.

b. Magnitude of the Strike

Judging from the newspapers of the period, there is no doubt that the movement in question was of general strike proportions. The railroad was paralyzed along with other public transportation and the city took on "a

holiday atmosphere", as El Mercurio described it.^{415/} It is clear that all of the workers affiliated to the CTCH were committed to the movement, as the resolution to strike was passed unanimously. Since the decision to strike was adopted in January 26th, there was still a four-day margin for distributing information and making other preparations. It should be stressed that when we said "all the workers", we did not include the peasant workers who were not as highly organized and who were not associated to the CTCH.

c) Nature of the Strike

Despite the events of the previous two days, the strike was extremely peaceful, like "a holiday", as El Mercurio put it,^{416/} although there was the possibility of the movement becoming violent with the funeral, of the victims of January 28th. The attendance at the funeral was massive, the blood stained banners were held high and there were firely speeches. For example, César Godoy Urrutia is reported to have said that "just one drop of working class blood is worth more than all the filthy, corrupt blood of the oligarchy".^{417/}

^{415.} January 31, 1946, p. 9.

^{416.} Idem.

^{417.} See Godoy Urrutia's participation in the speech at the funeral of the January 28th victims. El Siglo, January 31, 1946, p. 8.

Nonetheless, there was no violence at the funeral, a fact stressed by El Siglo as proof that the events of the previous Monday had been due to police provocation.

d) Strike Aims

The strike was motivated by economic, unionist and political aims, and its development is clear from the various CTCH statements. The first communique was issued on January 24th and concerned the government's attitude towards the nitrate workers' strike.^{418/} The declaration stated that:

1. The revocation of the nitrate unions' legal status is anti-democratic as these unions are fighting to maintain the democratic regime against the provocation of a reactionary campaign.
2. This procedure shows a marked contrast with the behavior of the CTCH, which had been willing to solve the conflict the way agreed upon in a meeting with the Vice-President.
3. It was with this in mind that representatives of the CTCH and the government went to the troubled zone and proposed to the workers a solution to the conflict.
4. The government, however, failed to keep

418. The different statements made by the CTCH and mentioned with regard to this point were taken from El Siglo, the only newspaper that published the complete version. Partial comparison with other sources failed to show discrepancies.

its promise of not withdrawing the legal status of the unions in question.

5. This shows the present cabinet's weakness and conciliatory attitude towards anti-worker and reactionary elements, causing the government to lose prestige and undermining its democratic foundations.
6. By handing over the conflict to the Ministry for Defense this body's specific functions were being modified, the act representing an attack on democratic institutions' right to act freely.
7. The mobilization of fully armed troops was a stark contrast to the calm of the the workers and only served to cause profound uneasiness among the public and uncalled-for alarm abroad.^{419/}

The CTCH agreed to call for:

1. Unity within the trade union movement and the defense on the part of the workers, of their organization and their social achievements, and
2. permanent readiness on the part of the federations, provincial councils and unions, so as to be able to take whatever measure was deemed necessary to fulfill the previous point.^{420/}

The attitude of the CTCH was to oppose the government

⁴¹⁹. Ibid., January 25, 1946, pp. 1 and 3.

⁴²⁰. These are not literal versions of the communiques but summaries which nevertheless respect the meaning of the statements.

and it was ready to take action should the government not change its stance. As a result, two days later, in a six-point communique, the CTCH called for a general strike.^{421/} By this time the situation between the CTCH and the government had become very tense, the latter having forbidden the publication of any information concerning the nitrate conflict.

The causes for the strike the CTCH had been "forced to order" were the following:

1. A general weariness of the people, whose economic and social problems had not been solved according to interests of the country's majority, which they themselves constituted.
2. Uncontrolled increases in the cost of basic articles, skyrocketing of housing prices caused by speculators, worker provocation by employers, disregard of arbitration rulings, job uncertainty and constant evasion by employers of existing legislation. With this, the government elected by the people and systematically

⁴²¹ Ibid., January 27, 1946, p. 5.

backed by them, adopted a self-defeating violent, anti-worker attitude that was completely unjustified.

3. The cancelation of the legal status of the two unions in the north and the threat of the same happening to others. This meant that the government was siding with the reactionaries and turning its back on the workers.
4. The call for a withdrawal of the armed forces and the elimination of repression every time the workers manifested their inconformity. The government had to be the mediator and a good one at that.
5. The government's anti-worker behavior. This was the main reason for the strike which was designed to force the government to respect the workers' right to organize themselves, voice their demands and go on strike.
6. The hope on the part of the CTCH's National Council for a change in government attitude which not only involved restoring the legal status of the nitrate workers' unions but also making a serious attempt to solve all the country's problems.

Although the strike aims were economic, union and political, the unions hoped to find solutions in measures that could be implemented by the government. This attitude was a remnant of the pro-government unionism of the previous period when there was a reluctance to believe that the government would foresake the workers or not fulfill their demands after having been restrained during ten years for the sake of social peace and a lasting solution to their problems.

A more detailed version of these aims is contained in the 12-point memorandum the CTCH delivered to vice-president Duhalde on the day of the strike. As in the previous document, the political aims were superimposed over the immediate economic and union ones and eventually became the major aims of the strike. Thus, point 2 is the most relevant as it indicates the need to constitute a left-wing civil cabinet. As a result of the strike the workers' movement was virtually disbanded, precisely because some considered the political aims to have been fulfilled and others did not.

The content of the memorandum is as follows:422/

1. Immediate lifting of martial law and re-establishment of all constitutional guarantees.

422--------. Ibid., January 31, 1946, p. 4.

2. Constitution of a left-wing civil government that would find a solution to the people's problems, public chastisement of those responsible for the Plaza Bulnes Massacre.
3. Government compensation for the families of the Plaza Bulnes victims.
4. Immediate restoration of the legal status of the nitrate workers' unions.
5. Reconsideration of the cabinet's decision on-the-facto conflicts.
6. Abolition of the Emergency Law allowing emergency zones to be established. The immediate cessation of Armed Forces interventions in labour conflicts
7. Application of drastic measures against those establishments provoking conflicts among the workers by refusing to fulfill labour agreements and arbitration rulings by arbitrary lay-offs and unfulfilment of the Industrial Hygiene and Safety Regulations.
8. The immediate withdrawal of "La Compañía Salitrera de Tarapaca y Antofagasta's" suit against the unions on the grounds that it constitute a political challenge to the democratic regime and trade union organization.
9. Incorporation of all the workers of the Tarapaca and Antofagasta nitrate companies without reprisals being taken.
10. The breaking off of relations between the Chilean government and that of Franco in Spain and Farrell in Argentina, with the cessation of all deliveries of nitrate and coal to these countries.
11. The withdrawal of the Labour Minister's illegal circular prohibiting the unionization of farm workers. w
12. Control over sudden price hikes and speculation with foodstuffs.

This memorandum incorporated into the original petition the movement's latest demands arising after the events at Bulnes Plaza. However, there is a definite development in political objectives here, for what was being called for was more than just a mere change in the government's attitude - mechanisms were established whereby the government would be in a position to provide a solution to the problems of the people. Furthermore, point No. 10. contains a manifestation of international solidarity.

e) Latter Development of the Movement.

Having presented their demands to the Vice-President of the Republic and after the 24-hour strike action had been completed, the workers returned to their jobs, with the exception of the nitrate workers who continued with their movement. In Santiago, El Imparcial said, "the city of Santiago recovered its usual atmosphere with all activities going back to normal".^{423/} The CTCH sent out a communique on the night of the 30th congratulating its affiliates on their exemplary conduct during the strike and announcing the suspension of general strike action and its intentions to continue studying the problems expressed in the petition, while taking advantage of every opportunity to fulfill these objectives.

^{423.} El Imparcial, January 31, 1946, p. 1.

Lastly, it declared its refusal to accept any kind of reprisal whatsoever.^{424/}

Meanwhile, the nitrate workers' situation began to get difficult due to the lack of economic resources needed to prolong their action. As a result they were forced to call for solidarity on the part of the rest of the country's workers. In Santiago things were settled, at least from a political point of view, when Duhalde's invitation to the Socialists to form part of his cabinet was accepted. The Communists declared the act a betrayal of the Socialist Party in view of the fact that Duhalde did not agree with the Popular Alliance Program.^{425/} The incident, in fact, caused a split in the CTCH itself, for among those who supported the ministry was Bernardo Ibañez, President of the CTCH and of the Socialist Party. After February 4th, all CTCH communiques published in El Siglo were signed by the "stand-in president", Bernardo Araya, a Communist activist who had previously been vice-president.

The civil cabinet's announcement calling an end to the strike did not satisfy the Communist Party nor the Radical Party which subsequently decided to continue the

424. See El Siglo, January 31, 1946. p. 5.

425. Ibid., February 3, 1946, p. 5, also the Editorial on p. 9 or the Communist Party Political Commission's Declaration in Ibid., February 4, 1946, p. 3.

strike from February 2nd, reaching general strike proportions by February 4th. This action, however, failed to gain the general consensus of the CTCH Council, as the Socialists refused to support it. They did, in fact, have serious doubts and the following day, i.e. February 3rd, joined forces with the government, declaring the strike to be a purely political issue initiated by the Communist Party.

The strike continued, however, and everyday it was announced that new organizations had joined in support, although the movement never reached the level of a total strike. The action continued until February 8th, with gradual increases in the number of supporters joining it. Other newspapers like El_Mercurio, El_Imparcial and even La_Opinión saw the strike as a complete failure, although there was concern over the length of time it had lasted. The strike was virtually limited to those unions that supported the policies of the Communist and Radical Parties within the CTCH, and, therefore, served to strengthen these unionist sectors. In other words, all agreed that the strike was effective for the nitrate and coal workers.

The objectives stated were the same as for the general strike for, as we mentioned before, it was the solution given to these points that the Communist Party did not agree with. Thus, although not incorporated into the explicit aims, the main reason for the strike was

the repudiation of the "socialist betrayal".^{426/}

The strike itself was influenced by the presence of part of the CTCH within the government giving more weight to the government's action to end the strike. Action was taken against the newspaper El Siglo and the instigators of the strike were held under arrest, particularly the Communist Trade Union leaders. By February 8th, the non-governmental CTCH and nitrate workers' strike had been suspended. From this moment on, future conflicts were to show these very same characteristics, that is, on the one hand, quasi-governmental, and on the other brief illegal strikes amidst a big anti-communist campaign. In overall, it was the Communists who came out of this strike better off, as they had gained experience in agitation and autonomous management of strike action, while measuring the strength of those adversaries, they might have been likely to influence later on.^{427/}

f) Political and Organizational Conditioning

Factors: The Communist-Socialist Conflict
and the CTCH

Full understanding of the behaviour of the CTCH would require an in-depth study of the strategies and

426. See particularly the "Denuncia de la Comisión Política del Partido Comunista" published in El Siglo February 4, 1946, p. 3.

427. Ibid., Editorials, February 8th and 9th 1946, p. 5 in both cases.

political tactics of the different parties that comprised it. One thing is certain, however, and that is its extreme dependence upon the general guidelines dictated by the strongest parties, a fact that clearly indicates the politicization of the trade union movement inasmuch as it was progressively more influenced by political parties. Nevertheless, it would be impossible to go into any depth with regard to the strategies of the different parties and we will, therefore, limit ourselves to the observation of the attitudes assumed by them during the conflicts described herein.

The question as to whether or not the nitrate unions' strike was legal is a subject for debate. In this case, the different parties should in fact have made a stand on the grounds of its legitimacy rather than its legality. However, the stance of all left-wing parties, with the exception of the Communist Party, was conditioned by the government's action in depriving the unions of their legal status. The Communist Party declared its support for the strike right from the beginning, without reserves, as can be seen in information taken from its newspaper, El Siglo. The rest of the parties of the Democratic Alliance as can be seen in La Opinión of January 22nd through 29th did not give their support to the unionist movement until the Duhalde government decided to withdraw their legal status.

The measure was severely criticized by all parties including the President's. At its convention in Valdivia, the Radical Party voted to repudiate the government's measure and the cabinet. The Socialist Party also opposed the measure and the Communist Party took advantage of the situation and used its solidarity with the workers in the north, to propose changes in the State's administrative process.^{428/} After the repressive action of January 28th, this view was also shared by all the parties in the Popular Front, as can be seen in point No. 2 of the memorandum sent by the CTCH to the government on January 30th requesting that a left-wing civil government be instated.

The political aims of the strike were designed precisely to bring about changes in the government in favour of a left-wing civil cabinet. This would appear to have been the major objective, for the strike was suspended after Duhalde announced his willingness to form a Democratic Alliance civil cabinet (ex-Popular Front). The Alliance and the Falange then met to discuss the plan to be implemented by the future government. The most

428. Ibid., January 28, 1946, Editorial, p. 5 The Communist Party had given its support to the movement since the beginning and both the presidential candidate, Elías Laffertte and Senator Pablo Neruda had arrived at the zone to "offer their services to the nitrate workers". The CASATAN "refused to let them enter the offices under the pretext that these were "foreign ground". For this reason the meetings were held on the open pampa.

outstanding aspects of this plan were the following:

1. Derogation of the supreme order declaring the country in a state of emergency.
2. Derogation of the supreme orders declaring the zones of worker conflict in a state of emergency.
3. Restoration of the legal status of the Humberstone and Mapocho trade unions in the Tarapaca province.
4. Freedom for political prisoners and those detained during the incidents occurring as a result of the current social movement.
5. Prompt and fair solution to the problems affecting the working class.
6. Responsible, prompt and complete investigation into the unfortunate events of the Bulnes Plaza, with due punishment for those found guilty.
7. Lowering of prices of basic foodstuffs.
8. Prevention of unfair eviction on the part of landlords.
9. Fulfillment of the Democratic Alliance Plan of Action.^{429/}

The CTCH adhered to the cabinet's program to "return to constitutional normalcy" as it catered to most, if not all, of its aspirations.

That same day negotiations began between Duhalde

^{429/} Ibid., February 2, 1946, p. 4.

and the parties of the Democratic Alliance, the Democrat, Radical, Communist, Authentic Socialist and Falange. Duhalde refused to accept the idea of a civil government and agreed to only some of the aspects of the plan presented by these parties. It was during this negotiation that essential differences between the various parties came to light, since some of them were willing to join forces with the government if the latter agreed to give way on certain points, such as 1, 2 and 3. The other points were discussed at length, for although the government had apparently agreed to fulfill them, certain parties felt this was not the case. For example, with regard to point 6 concerning events at Bulnes Plaza, the government considered this already fulfilled with the declaration to the effect that military justice had been initiated. The Communist Party, however, felt that a people's court should have been set up. The same sort of problem arose during the discussion of other points and on January 30th talks broke down and the Socialist Party was called to the government.^{430/}

Serious debate followed between the parties and within each of them. In the Radical Party, for example, the Olivarria fraction was willing to go to the

⁴³⁰. See La Opinion, February 1st and 2nd, 1948, p. 1.

government on any conditions, which occurred later on, but the National Executive Committee, on the other hand, did not hold the same views. The Socialist Party was divided by three different viewpoints: there was that of Juan B. Rossetti who wanted to go to the government anyway; Álvarez Villablanca⁴³¹/ led the group that was willing to go to the government only if the party controlled key ministries; and lastly, there was the group that sustained that the party should not go to the government at all. The Communist Party was adamant that the cabinet should be civil with the participation of all the parties in the alliance. It insisted that the plan proposed by the alliance be fulfilled and that the only way to do so was not through conciliation but by going "out into the streets with the people".

However, the course of events dictated a victory for the "conciliators" who, on February 2nd, formed a government with Radicals, Democrats, Socialists and the military. This cabinet put an end to martial law, restored the nitrate unions their legal status and took certain economic measures in favour of the masses, such as a cut in the price of milk.

The Communist Party considered the formation of this

⁴³¹. Alternate Secretary General.

cabinet virtually an act of treason, for it had meant the break-up* of the democratic alliance. The party then called for the strike to continue as not all of the goals had been fulfilled. The call to strike was very warmly received by the other members of the CTCH and was given the support of several other groups.^{432/} The strike was doomed to failure due to the government's opposition which, with the cooperation of the Socialist section of the CTCH, initiated harsh action against strikes and illegal strike action. Thus, the editorial section of La Opinión on February 11th announced "the breakdown of the Communist Manoeuvre".

Most certainly, the strike's unsuccessful attempt to change the course of political events was due to a lack of ideological accord between the sectors criticizing the government. The Socialist Party, for example, refused to agree to any sort of arrangement with either the Popular Alliance or involving the participation of the Falangists and Democrats with the Communist Party. This stance lead inevitably to a schism within the left-wing which ultimately had profound consequences - the Socialist Party later gave its support to the Law in Defense of Democracy.

^{432.} "Strike to continue until victory won" were the main headlines in El Siglo, February 7, 1946.

The Socialist Party rejected all agreements with the Democratic Alliance as it considered that the latter worked within a very limited electoral frame of reference that served only the aspirations of Communism. The Socialist Party's objection to the Communist Party at this point had already been made clear in its views on the Front, mentioned previously. Early in 1946, the Socialist Party once more stressed that:

In view of the Communist Party's provocation the Socialist Party will not allow itself to be subject to the former's indications from abroad and refuses to be an instrument in fulfilling its policies.

The behaviour of the Communists ... responds to the deliberate intention to disrupt the political environment and create an atmosphere of irreconcilable hate within the heart of the working class.

This conduct is the result of the frustration of having failed in its reactionary rally for national unity, repudiated unanimously by the popular classes.

This attitude is largely responsible for the division within the working sector, the defeat of the Left in the Parliamentary elections in March and the current chaos in the debate on the Democratic Alliance.^{433/}

With this, the Socialist Party once more condemned the Communist strategy, a stance that was also motivated, as pointed out by Álvarez Villablanca, the Socialist

433. See *La Opinión*, January 17, 1946, pp. 1, 3, 4 and 8.

Party substitute Secretary General, by the fact that the Socialists:

refused to accept the utilization of the unions to exert pressure upon the President of the Republic to include Communist ministers in this cabinet.^{434/}

This statement clearly indicates the impossibility of achieving unity of left-wing policies, an observation also made very succinctly in the editorial section of La Opinión that same day. The overall conclusion about the political scene at this moment was the inevitable "definitive" rupture of relations between the Socialist and the Communist Parties.^{435/}

434. Idem.

435. La Opinión, January 20, 1947, pp. 11 and 12 published its report to the Fifth Special General Convention of the Socialist Party in which it stated, "The whole of the Communist Party's policy revolves around the interests of the USSR both at home and abroad. The interests of the Chilean working class are not taken into consideration at all. Communist action in this area has, therefore, been absolutely non-existent. The Socialist Party is dedicated first and foremost to the interests and the needs of the Chilean people and the less fortunate in particular. Under no circumstances will these concerns be subject to any foreign interests whatsoever. Under these circumstances, therefore, would it be possible to reach a settlement with a party like this? That would be ridiculous. Neither could reconciliation be possible, nor could we live together. In the same way that American democracy managed to defeat Nazism, it must now also fight against Communism."

The major conflict between the two parties was essentially a question of differences in doctrine. While the Communist Party advocated "national unity against fascism", the Socialists were in favour of a "third front" or "people's social economic front".^{436/} Generally speaking, it would appear to have been a conflict between an "international proletariat" position held at all costs by the Communists and a more nationalistic stance on the part of the Socialists. The other parties remained at the margin of this ideological dispute and joined either one side or the other, according to considerations of a different sort.

The impact of this dissension on the trade union movement was almost immediate due to the CTCH's extreme dependence on the dominant parties' influence and its lack of power enough to assume an independent position in the debate. With this the movement was divided into two fractions, an official-socialist wing and an illegal communist one.

Without wishing to pass judgment on either of these positions, it is important to point out that both were to have considerable weight in the development of the leftist movement during the following decade and, more important, on the trade union movement which, lacking a single political course to follow fell into a state of

^{436.} See La Opinión, January 17, 1946, editorial, p. 3.

disunion and eventual dispersion that was only overcome partly with the creation of the "Central Unica de Trabajadores" (CUT).

g) Conclusions

The political circumstances surrounding the strike were characterized by a fairly strong political alliance of broad objectives, but which after a few years began to become unpopular as a result of its governing strategies. The Communist Party's attempts to achieve supremacy within the alliance by undertaking profound change was not approved of by the majority of the parties forming the Democratic Alliance nor by the Socialists, which objected to it outright. This brought about a momentary isolation of Communists. During the course of the year, the Communist Party managed to bridge these differences somewhat, eventually forming part of the coalition that enabled Gabriel González to reach the presidency and even participating in his first cabinet.

This last event to a certain extent marked the end of Communist isolation, which had begun with their insistence on an independent, anti-fascist position and had lead them to organize a strike on their own, put forward their own presidential candidate and then got left out of the cabinet formed after the general strike of January 30th.

The period studied herein marks the end of spontaneous

unionism, as the movement from here on became subject to the norms of the Labour Code. The type of unionism that arose was characterized by its subordination to the administrative activities of the Popular Front's political alliance with the resulting failure to develop as an autonomous political movement. Strike action during this period was legal and revolved around economic issues or those to do with work conditions. There were only two political strikes during this time, representing only one percent of the total.

Nevertheless, a movement of this kind inevitably begins to harbour many contradictions made evident the moment a strike was called to express the people's "desesperación" at not having been provided with a solution to their problems. The political solution to this situation was confronted with two major options, i.e. either continue to control the popular movement through a basically negotiating and pragmatic course of action, or go ahead with profound changes in the movement implying massive mobilization of the unions and of the working class in general. The major disputes that arose between the Communist and the Socialist Parties originated in the process of trying to work out these options and determine their adequate formulation and viability. These conflicts caused the breakup of the CTCH, leaving the trade union movement without unified leadership, a situation from which it managed to recover only after many years.

CHATER V
THE STAGE OF NATIONAL INTEGRATION
OF UNIONISM.(1946-1954)

A. Recess from Conflictive Activity and
Organizational Integration.

The period of conflictive activity that distinguished the first years of the Popular Front is followed by a stage of the workers' withdrawal from strike activity.

The Populist coalition between the Radical Party and working class parties came to an end in the administration of Gabriel González Videla. The repressive policies applied since 1946 are then suspended during the first two years of Ibañez's presidency (1952-1954). It is precisely during this temporary phase of tolerance that the distinctive development of the new period takes place. This is the formation of the "Central Unica de Trabajadores de Chile" (CUT), in 1953. This is the most prominent fact in the evolution of Chilean unionism and, therefore, we have characterized all these years as those of the national organization or integration of unionism.

The tolerant attitudes towards labour organizations and their actions changed in 1945 when quasi-governmental unionism became exhausted as a result of the rejection of Populist policies by workers. Differences

between communists and socialists are also brought to the fore this year, seriously affecting the main workers' federation, the CTCH. By and large, the positive influence of traditional working class parties on workers' organizations was lessened, if not nullified, by these disputes between the most important working class parties. Yet this was not a mere conflict of power but also an ideological one, embracing national as well as international issues. We already know that the two parties did not react in the same way in relation to new labour legislation.

The end of the Populist coalition carries with it the suppression of wage benefits previously given to workers and particularly to white-collar workers who had been granted real indexation of minimum wages. Although this benefit had existed since Alessandri's second administration it was only implemented during the first years of the Popular Front.

The new situation also led to repressive actions against Communist and some Socialist leaders and to the adoption of the Law for the Defence of Democracy (1948). The publication of certain norms on rural unionization was no real breach with the general trend against labour. These norms made it very difficult for rural workers to form unions and did not accept their right to strike.^{437/}

^{437/} We will deal in detail with rural unionism in the next sections.

The operation of the Law for the Defence of Democracy and the general stance of government towards workers once again produced a situation of inactivity on the part of unions. The law forbade oral and written action by C.P. and other groups "aiming at introducing in the Republic a regime opposed to Democracy" or to "the national sovereignty"^{438/} Thus, union meetings and demonstrations were regarded as unlawful acts tending to jeopardize the political regime or the normal development of productive activities. In practice this law meant the destruction of the upper echelons of unions as well as the effective proscription of vast sectors of organized labour. Therefore, it is understandable that between 1946 and 1954 there were no more than a dozen labour demonstrations of all kinds. Notable among these is the general protest against the increase of public transportation fares led by the Student Federation of the University of Chile in 1949. Private employees and Chuquicamata miners' movements also protested against the project aimed at freezing their wages in 1950. The other instance of workers' public action was the Marcha General del Hambre in 1951.

These examples show that workers' protests during periods of repression are still likely to occur, insofar as the government does not resort to its total capability

^{438/} Law No. 8,987, September, 1948.

to control conflictive actions by labour organizations. As suggested in the first chapter, given a situation of workers' grievances, their capacity to engage in conflictive action is a function both of the degree of repression and of the strength of unions. In previous periods, there are also instances of the workers' disposition to strike unless they were completely prevented from doing so by the government imposed policies. In the first stage, after the incidents of Santa María de Iquique in 1907, there was a pause in industrial conflict due to the persecution directed against union leaders. In 1925, when Alessandri returned to power, another phase of abstention from strikes is inaugurated due to the extent of the repressive policies that were adopted.

What these situations have in common is that they correspond to a low degree of development of workers' organizations. When workers' organizations reach a high degree of organizational strength, the repressive government policies are not necessarily effective in inhibiting the workers' capacity for conflictive actions. This phenomenon is illustrated from 1954 onwards, when workers united into the "Central Unica de Trabajadores" (CUT).

During the period under analysis there were some instances that constituted an exception to the repression climate. In fact, the government actually decreed some benefits to workers, such as those related to the

grading of white and blue-collar workers, a minimum wage system for white-collar workers, and differentials for seniority. White-collar unions, not controlled by Communist leaders were, at the same time, notably less affected by the policies enacted against workers' organizations. In contrast to the treatment of traditional working class groups, in 1948 white-collar employees in private concerns could even organize a national confederation, the "Confederación de Empleados Particulares de Chile" (CEPCH). During the next decade the leaders of this organization will play a relevant role in shaping the "Comisión Nacional de Unidad Sindical" (CNUS) which must be regarded as the original nucleus of what was to be known later as the "Central Unica de Trabajadores" (CUT). CNUS was to come to embrace all organized workers existing in Chile up to that time.

After a year of organization CNUS was transformed into CUT (1953). From now on, the ideological debate inside the CUT took place, not only among leftist groups but also among Radicals and Falangists. The historical trends towards the workers' integration which could overcome both repressive policies, and situations of political confusion were to reach their culminating phase during this period. Anarchist, Communist and Socialist traditions, strongly linked to the old mining working class, were also to make their contribution to the

formation of CNUS. These traditionally leftist groups joined with the new teachers' and employees' organizations, where Radicals and Falangists were more influential. These new organizations, which had been formed in the last two decades, resulted from the country's industrial diversification and the growth of the state, described in an earlier section.

During the first two years of Ibañez's administration some social policies were adopted. The Law for the Defence of Democracy was not actually implemented. During this period of relative tolerance the government decreed minimum wages for rural workers in 1953 and three years later the same was done for industrial blue-collar workers. The government also made provision for compulsory Social Security Benefits and passed regulations on Maternity Benefits and Disability Payments, as well as the establishment of the Social Security and National Health Services.

The organization of CUT, despite the continuing legal existence of the Law for the Defence of Democracy, demonstrates once again that the development of workers' organizations does not depend on formal institutions per se, whether they are repressive or not, but on the class-orientation and political stance of governments. The converse is also true. Our examination of earlier periods has also shown that the labour legislation of 1925 did not prevent Alessandri from using violence against

workers. The existing institutional framework for organised labour was to be activated in practice only during the Popular Front period, and then only until 1945. In 1946, even though González did not have the Law for the Defence of Democracy at his disposal, he initiated a new period of repression. An analysis of rural unions would also evidence how the administration of the Christian Democrats was able to encourage unionism during 1964, 1965 and 1966, employing the legislation of 1947, although this was not particularly well-adapted to that purpose. The new law on rural unionization would be enacted only in 1967.

B. The Economic Conditioning Elements: The Extension of Development

During this period, the process of industrialization reached new sectors of the economy, therefore lessening the geographical discontinuity that characterized the economy based on the mining enclaves.

The process of import-substitutions, begun as early as 1930, is consolidated during these years leading to the emergence of new working masses linked to industrial activities. As a matter of fact, industry grew at a 5% annual rate between 1944-1945.-439/ This trend is even greater among non-traditional branches such as metallurgy

439. Muñoz O., op. cit., p. 38.

and chemistry.^{440/} The rates of growth are stronger in Santiago and thus, its total population increases by 30% between 1940 and 1952.-^{441/}

The mining industry, on the contrary decreases at an annual rate of 0.9% the only exception being copper production which shows an annual increase of 2.7%.-^{442/} Nevertheless, the public sector, particularly services, still grows at higher rates (6%).-^{443/} The most prominent impact of this trend is the growth of the white-collar sector. From 1940 to the end of the period covered by this study (1970), white-collar workers increased in absolute figures to almost 400,000. Details of this growth can be seen in Table A-4 of the appendix. If these figures are compared with the decline of the blue-collar population, as shown in Table A-5, we will realize that they represent a countervailing trend.

The effects of the economic development described above on the regional concentration of the working population are not particularly different during this period from those of the previous years. In industry, as has already been suggested, the growth tended to concentrate

440. At the end of this period metallurgy and food industries employ 19% of the manufacturing labour force and produce 20% of the total industrial production.

441. Hurtado C., op. cit., p. 172.

442. Instituto de Economía, Desarrollo Económico de Chile, 1940-1956. Ed. Universitaria, Santiago, 1956, p. 154.

443. Ibid.

mainly in Santiago, and in the mining provinces the degree of regional dispersion remains unaltered. Thus, the coal and copper working population is distributed among three provinces and nitrate workers between two. In the size of mining firms there are no important changes (See Table 17, page 343). At all stages, all such firms employ at least one hundred workers (with some exceptions among nitrate companies). These characteristics of the country's economic development are, therefore, important elements conditioning the national organization of unionism.

Another element conditioning those strike activities which will arise at the beginning of the coming period is inflation, which rose between 1946 and 1954 at an annual rate of 27.7%. Over the last two years of this period the rate was 57%.^{-444/}

C. Some Recurrent Associations between the Economic Variables and Strike Activities.

The relations between economic variables and strike activities will not be dealt with in our analysis of the remaining periods, since the information previously given is sufficient to present a clear idea of how these factors operate in the long run.

It is convenient, therefore, to bring out now the

444. Banco Central de Chile, Memoria, 1955, with data of Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas for corresponding years.

T A B L E No. 17
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF VARIOUS MEASURES PERTAINING TO THE DEGREE OF LABOUR
CONCENTRATION FOR THE YEARS INDICATED FOR SOME OF THE PERIODS STUDIED

Mining Activi- ties (Years)	% of concerns with more than 100 workers	Geographical spread by number of mining provinces	Total employed population (workers)
COPPER			
1920	98.4	7	8,908
1925	100.0	6	16,169
1937	100.0	3	19,075
1960	100.0	3	12,802
COAL			
1926	98.2	4	9,247
1925	99.4	4	14,738
1938	100.0	4	12,186
1960	100.0	3	17,307
NITRATE			
1910	n.i.a.(1)	2	43,535
1916	n.i.a.	2	53,470
1925	n.i.a.	2	60,785
1938	n.i.a.	2	19,012
1960	n.i.a.	2	12,417
Industrial activities (Years)	Percentage of concerns with more than 20 people	Total employed population over the entire country, (mainly in Santiago, Valparaíso, Concepción)	
1925	n.i.a.	72,375	
1937	10.4	146,237	
1957	32.1	216,605	
1967	29.2	214,567	

(1) No information available (n.i.a)

NOTE: Industrial Activities 1937-1967: only blue collar workers are included. Years 1957 includes both while-collar and blue-collar workers.

SOURCE: Copper: Years 1920, 1925 and 1937 data computed from the Dirección General de Estadísticas, Anuario Estadístico de Chile, Minería y Metalurgia, Sociedad Imprenta y Litografía Universo. For the year 1960, CODELCO, Gerencia de Relaciones Industriales, Boletín Estadístico No. 1.

Coal: Years 1961-1938 ibid to copper. For 1960 Dirección de Estadísticas y Censos, Anuario de Minería, 1960.

Nitrate: For 1910, Dirección General de Estadísticas, Anuario Estadístico Minería y Metalurgia (1911-1915) Sociedad Imprenta y Litografía Universo, 1915 for 1916, Dirección General de Estadísticas, Sinopsis Estadísticas, Sociedad Imprenta y Litografía Universo, 1921. For 1925 and 1938 Dirección General de Estadísticas, Anuario Estadístico de Chile, Minería y Metalurgia, Soc. Imprenta y Litografía Universo 1926 and 1940. For 1960 the same as coal for that year.

Industry: Year 1925, Oficina Central de Estadísticas, Anuario Estadístico Industrial y Manufactura, Sociedad Imprenta y Litografía Universo, Vol. IX, 1927. For years 1937, 1957 and 1967, census returns.

most commonly recurrent relations between economic variables and the workers' strike activities.

A first permanent relationship observed in all the foregoing stages is that which exists between the magnitude or extent of strike activities and the diversification of economic development. This element, also represents a condition for the evolution of the national general strike which will be described in the next stage of our enquiry.

Another distinctive feature is the positive association obtained between the frequency of strike activities and the degrees of regional concentration of the working population.

At a micro-level of analysis, a recurrent relation was found between workers' propensity to strike and the size of firms. This relation was obtained independently of the country's overall degree of economic development.

The higher frequency of strikes in regions with a high concentration of industries and in large-size firms has to do with the fact that, under these conditions, unions can be more easily formed and political influences can have greater effects.

It was also observed that large-size firms tend to pay their workers higher salaries. This situation can be illustrated for several years of the current period. For instance, in 1947 mining companies and public services i.e., the largest firms, are also those which occupy the

first position in the ranking of salaries (See Table A-6) If we look at the earliest periods, we will see that in 1907, for example, the largest nitrate companies, on the average, paid wages almost 70% higher than those paid to workers in the same industry in Atacama, Coquimbo and Aconcagua. The former companies paid wages 60% higher than those paid by industries in Santiago.^{445/} The same relationship can be observed during the second period, between 1919 and 1924, as shown in Table A-7.

This association is also present during the period of quasi-governmental unionism, except in 1945, when workers of some printing shops, much smaller than mining companies and public services, were able to obtain higher wages (See Table A-8). The relation between the scale of the firm and the level of wages is again evident during the most recent decade. This is clearly shown in the situation of workers in large copper mining industries.^{446/} Another work of an econometric character has demonstrated that the foregoing relationship obtains as a general characteristic in Chilean firms, within the industrial sectors.^{447/} What is of interest here is

445. See Jobet J. C., Ensayo Crítico del Desarrollo Económico-social de Chile op. cit.

446. See Souza Paulo M., "Diferenciales de Sueldos y Salarios: Causas y Proyecciones" en Panorama Económico No. 262, July 1971.

447. See Meller Patricio, "Indicadores Económico-descriptivos de los Establecimientos Industriales Chilenos", 1967. "Instituto de Economía", "Universidad Católica de Chile," Documento de Trabajo No.36.

the general verification of the fact that large-scale firms do pay the highest wages to their workers. This association is the result of the prominent economic position these firms have in relation to the country's economy. This was the situation of nitrate companies until the second period studied and that of the copper industries during the sixties. Because of the importance of their production to state revenues, these industries are more vulnerable to workers' actions and, therefore, strikes tend to be more effective than in enterprises whose production is of a lesser impact.

If these arguments are taken into account, wage levels per se are not enough to explain the propensity of workers to initiate strike activities. On that view, as long as increases in wages measure the extension of economic benefits to the worker, we could expect higher paid workers to exhibit a lesser propensity to initiate strike actions. What explains the frequency of strikes among high paid workers is the association of this characteristic with the economic importance of certain firms and the greater effect that union and political influences can have in these large-size firms compared to those of a smaller size where there may even be special legal impediments to the organization of these unions.

CHAPTER VI
THE STAGE OF POLITICIZED AND
ANTI-GOVERNMENT UNIONISM (1954-1970)

A. General Characterization of Strike Activities.

During these years, the most distinctive features of strike actions are the appearance of national general strikes and the growth of rural unionism. In addition to these trends, we will also observe a politicization process of union struggles and frequent conflict instances that go beyond government control. Yet this analysis will suggest that workers did not aim at radical political objectives through their strike activities. Their political strategy was implemented through different types of actions led by working class parties. These were concentrated on their electoral struggles aimed at capturing key power structures, such as the Presidency of the Republic and control of the National Congress.

During the sixties the political aims pursued by leftist groups become evident. Indeed, they came very close to their full implementation. Unions played an important part in the political growth of leftist groups. In this regard, we will examine the correlations existing in Chile between the electoral evolution

of the left and the relative importance of unions in certain regions, as is shown in the distribution of votes by province.

The interrelationship between the political struggle of the left and the development of workers' organization, make it possible to distinguish this period as one of anti-government politicized unionism.

An important feature of this period is the relatively new and increasingly frequent occurrence of workers' national general strikes.

In the previous periods there were also some instances of strike actions comparable to those occurring now. In this respect, one might mention the Asamblea de Alimentación Nacional (1918-1919), and the Paro General of 1926, when workers at large protested against the living conditions of wage earners, the persecution of their leaders, and the inadequacy of labour laws on social security, welfare and the length of the working day. In 1936 state railroad workers also led a large-scale strike. Later on, when Communists and Socialists left the Populist entente, the workers under the leadership of the coal miners participated in mass demonstrations. The main demands formulated by workers in these cases were related not only to wages and living conditions but also to the government repressive policies.

During the sixties, general strikes will become more

clearly related to political aims and will exhibit both a greater frequency and a scale unknown in previous experiences. As a matter of fact, from 1954 to 1970, general strikes recur annually and in 1960 and 1964 they occurred twice in the same year.^{448/}

The other distinctive feature of this period is the eruption of social conflict in the countryside and the growth of rural unions. Because of the especial relevance of this phenomenon, it will be analysed in detail later. For the moment, in order to present a general characterization of this decade, we may merely observe that strike activities in the countryside represented the largest category of total strike activities as compared to mining and manufacturing. This situation is clearly apparent even if one relies on the lowest estimates of strikes in the countryside. The frequency of strike actions for three periods of the decade is shown in Table 18, on page 350.

According to Table 19 on page 351, where strikes are presented in a less aggregate way, manufacturing industry follows agriculture in frequency of strikes; the third place is occupied by the construction industry followed by transportation and mining.

^w
448. The explicit aims of general strikes will be studied in the next section.

T_A_B_L_E___No___18

STRIKES_BY_BRANCH_OF_ACTIVITIES_FOR_THREE_PERIODS
(1960--1969)

	1960-64	1965-66	1967-69
Agriculture	54(97)	508(736)	1,821(2,742)
Mining	285	162	396
Manufacturing	642	324	1,364

Source: Compiled on the basis of source Table No. 19 on p. 351.

Note: The data indicated in parenthesis are probably more accurate as they were compiled by renown specialists in this field. However, for reasons of consistency of sources, figures from Table 19 on p. 351, are also used.

Data for 1960-64 have been quoted from Affonso A., "Sindicato Campesino, Agente de Cambio" en Cuadernos de la Realidad Nacional, No.5, September, 1970. CEREN. U.S. p.130.

Data for 1965-66 have been quoted from Klein E., in Orientaciones de la Presión Campesina. Escuela de Sociología. U.C. 1965, p. 25.

Data for 1967-69 have been quoted from ICIRA, Diagnóstico de la Reforma Agraria. November, 1970; June 1972.

T A B L E No. 19
DISTRIBUTION OF LEGAL AND ILLEGAL STRIKES AND NUMBER OF
PARTICIPANTS INVOLVED PER BRANCH OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY
(1961 - 1971)

		B R A N C H O F E C O N O M Y									TOTAL
		Agri- culture	Mining	Manu- factur- ing	Cons- truc- tion	Power Supply (2)	Com- merce	Trans- porta- tion	Ser- vices	Others	
1961	Strikers	1,115	60,529	39,222	21,353	960	1,572	23,213	3,489	-	151,453
	Strikes	14	85	503	148	1	12	67	5	-	835
1962	(1)										
1963	Strikers	991	45,827	22,656	20,509	7,210	3,158	11,827	12,156	-	124,334
	Strikes	15	112	135	129	21	12	86	132	-	642
1964	Strikers	3,996	33,353	25,371	17,240	8,714	1,173	17,601	6,894	-	114,343
	Strikes	25	85	104	112	18	4	62	23	-	433
1965	Strikers	10,152	60,999	47,491	25,315	20,033	868	47,147	10,325	1,859	234,189
	Strikes	161	116	158	172	35	9	106	25	10	792
1966	Strikers	27,030	27,093	31,011	14,534	7,164	2,452	6,581	24,802	-	140,667
	Strikes	347	46	162	122	9	10	35	6	-	737
1967	Strikers	49,410	73,038	103,090	29,432	18,290	6,391	26,737	8,599	-	314,987
	Strikes	763	166	912	127	49	56	77	27	-	2,177
1968	Strikers	30,324	52,827	51,110	15,212	9,161	6,688	36,767	1,271	-	203,360
	Strikes	277	104	215	95	41	29	132	20	-	913
1969	Strikers	45,482	71,951	37,082	14,139	19,780	5,665	33,668	15,520	32,119	271,406
	Strikes	305	126	237	74	30	27	143	34	1	977
1970	Strikers	57,210	92,799	62,765	17,255	18,357	10,583	50,738	10,610	65,344	396,711
	Strikes	476	147	305	107	47	19	145	53	4	1,303
1971	Strikers	58,944	20,544	50,191	23,191	1,670	7,208	65,378	16,588	2,079	245,793
	Strikes	1,050	125	421	234	19	91	269	126	4	2,339
Total Strikers		84,672	583,959	469,989	208,180	111,339	47,758	319,254	110,254	112,401	2,201,259
Strikes		3,433	1,112	3,152	1,320	270	269	1,122	451	19	11,148

(1) No data available for 1962.

(2) Includes water, lighting and electricity.

SOURCES: Data compiled from University Students' Thesis.

- Fernández Drey, Las Huelgas en Chile en 1966, su Magnitud y sus Causas.
- Brady Smith, Cecilia, Análisis de las Huelgas en Chile, 1964.
- Betancourt Labarca, Julio, Las Huelgas en Chile 1965.
- Pizarro Hofer, Oscar, Magnitud y Causas de las Huelgas en Chile, 1961.
- Fuenzalida Polanco, Ricardo, Datos Básicos Socio-Económicos de Huelgas, Chile, 1968.
- Marino Paulino, Camso Las Huelgas en Chile en 1963: Magnitud y Causas, Santiago 1969.
- Cornejo Gangas, Luz Elena, Las Huelgas en el Año 1967, su Magnitud, sus Causas y sus Efectos en la Actividad Económica del País, Santiago, 1969

These are based on the Report of Labour Records whose main sources are reports on strikes by the Police (Partes de Carabineros). Special reports on some strikes were also issued by Local Labour Inspectors. These reports are to be regarded as the official sources.

* These papers are available for perusal in the library of INSORA.

In mining industries, a very important position is held by the workers of large copper companies (Gran Minería del Cobre (GMC)), who also showed a high propensity to initiate strike activities during our second period. Nevertheless, only in the sixties were they able to obtain a privileged status, after half a century of struggles. The conflictive activities of these workers will be analysed in detail in the following sections. At this stage we will only anticipate that discussion by observing that their strikes represented, on average, 10% of strikes in all mining industries.

If we compare strike actions in mining with those occurring in the other sectors of the country's economy, we may observe, as is already known, that strikes are more frequent in manufacturing industries. This comparison is also apparent from table No. 19 on page 351. If the number of strikers is compared, mining industries stand higher than manufacturing, with 24% of strikers as an average for the decade. As we can see in Table 19 on page 351, manufacturing shows a greater number of strikers only in 1967 and 1971. In contrast, agriculture moves down to third place, when this indicator is used.

Another measure of strike activities is the number of man/days lost resulting from them. These figures are shown in Table No. 20 on page 353. Manufacturing occupies the first place here with 40% followed by mining

I A B L E No. 20
NUMBER OF MAN/DAYS OF WORK LOST DUE
TO LEGAL AND ILLEGAL STRIKES PER BRANCH OF ACTIVITIES
(1961 - 1971)
(In Thousands)

Year	B R A N C H O F A C T I V I T I E S									
	Agricul- ture	Mining	Manufac- turing	Cons- truction	Power Supply	Commerce	Trans- port	Services	Others	
1961	4	613	828	92	4	2	105	15	-	
1962(1)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
1963	1	282	129	91	9	5	26	42	-	
1964	12	290	320	34	11	2	48	30	-	
1965	43	768	771	126	27	6	164	21	6	
1966	209	168	438	97	9	56	24	49	-	
1967	293	365	1,111	87	24	54	171	148	-	
1968	118	366	969	62	17	43	284	8	-	
1969	148	154	448	66	32	17	46	29	32	
1970	314	658	645	67	21	30	115	17	59	
1971	323	95	433	156	4	75	115	48	2	
TOTAL	1,465	3,759	6,092	878	158	290	1,098	405	99	

Source: Data compiled from same sources indicated in Table No. 19, p. 351.

(1) No available data for this year.

with 26% and agriculture with 10%. Since this indicator takes into account the length of the conflict and the number of participants, it must be regarded as a better measure of strike actions than those described above.

The other general feature of the strike activities during this period is clearly illustrated in Table A-9. In this Table we will find clear indications of the greater frequency of illegal strikes in comparison with the number of legal strikes, which diminish in importance by 50% during the decade for which we have information. This frequency of illegal strikes (See Table No. 21, page 355) is related to the propensity to engage in conflicts on the part of non institutionalized groups.

If the number of legal and illegal strikes occurred between 1961 and 1968 is considered, we can observe a greater frequency among white-collar unions (see Table No. 21, page 355).

However, this trend is reversed if we observe the number of strikers (see Table No. 22, page 356). On this basis blue-collar unions show larger number of workers engaged in legal or illegal strike actions than white-collar unions. The third position is held by non-unionized groups and the fourth by rural unions.

Another feature of this period worth mentioning is the participation in conflictive actions by public employees. During these years, government employees and

T A B L E No. 21

TYPES OF UNIONS INVOLVED IN STRIKES

(1961-1968)

Year	L e g a l S t r i k e s Types of Unions				I l l e g a l S t r i k e s Types of Unions			
	Blue- Collar	White- Collar	Non- Union- ized groups	Agri- cul- ture	Blue- Collar	White- Collar	Non- Union- ized groups	Agri- cul- ture
1961	30	378	22	-	93	-	119	-
1963	35	52	2	-	137	150	266	-
1964	34	29	21	-	118	80	167	-
1965	78	36	20	-	219	156	263	-
1966	52	36	33	-	129	75	388	-
1967	155	628	95	362	187	155	205	-
1968	105	61	37	19	175	183	199	-
Total	489	1220	230	381	1058	799	1607	-

Source: Same as Table No. 19, p. 351.

T A B L E No. 22

TYPES OF STRIKE ACTION

TYPES OF UNIONS AND NUMBER OF STRIKERS

(1961 - 1968)

Year	L e g a l S t r i k e s				I l l e g a l S t r i k e			
	Types of Unions				Types of Unions			
	Blue- Collar	White- Collar	Non- Union- ized groups	Agri- cul- ture	Blue- Collar	White- Collar	Non- Union- ized groups	Agri- cul- ture
1961 (1)	19,206	12,545	697	-	66,267	43,889	8,849	-
1962 (2)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1963	17,925	2,680	41	-	51,974	35,466	16,248	-
1964	11,685	5,703	2,007	-	46,361	26,595	21,568	425
1965 (3)	29,988	5,003	1,179	-	87,249	65,437	21,541	-
1966	11,234	10,718	1,839	-	27,365	15,568	21,774	-
1967 (4)	34,744	19,732	-	10,198	46,160	36,413	-	26,005
1968	38,613	15,493	-	2,064	51,658	61,471	-	21,842
Total	163,395	71,874	5,763	12,262	377,034	284,839	89,980	48,272

Source: Thesis quoted in Table 19, p. 351.

- (1) No available data.
- (2) Total includes legal and illegal strikes plus regional strikes.
- (3) Total includes legal and illegal strikes plus regional strikes.
- (4) No available data.

related agencies engaged in various forms of stoppages (Paros) or illegal strikes. This figure is approximately 31% of the total engaged in such activity observed for the period. In terms of the total number of strikes, they amounted to 19%. This percentage increases to 22% when comparisons are based on the number of man-days lost.^{449/}

B. The Growth of Unionization and Strike Action in the Countryside.

In this analysis the peasants represent the last group to organize itself into unions and engage in strike actions comparable to those observed among mining and industrial workers. The study of this new development illustrates the relevance of certain political elements for the progress of unionism. The rapid and massive growth shown by rural unions during the sixties was greatly enhanced by the ruling Party's efforts to organize rural workers.^{450/}

In order to show the similarities and the differences existing between the growth of rural unionization and

449. See sources identified in Table 19 on p. 351 and Jorge Carvallo, La Relación Laboral y el Conflicto del Trabajo, 1961-1970, Thesis, U. de Ch. 1974.

450. A discussion on the bearing of the Christian Democrat Administration on peasants' organizations is presented in Section F. Political Conditioning Elements: State intervention in the countryside.

that of unions among ~~m~~ s and industrial workers, we will describe some distinctive features of their organization and the explicit ~~ims~~ of the strikes in which they engaged.

a) Organizational Growth and Aims Pursued in
Strike Actions (1960-1966).

Before the publication of Law No. 8811 on rural unionization in 1947, peasant unrest was far from negligible. Between 1916 and 1925, as has been recorded, there were a great number of strikes in agricultural regions such as Melipilla, Lo Chena, San Javier, Tingiririca, Chimbarongo. Together, they occupied the eighth place in the regional ranking of strike frequency as shown in Table 9, on page 185.

Between 1938 and 1948 Loverman has calculated that there were four hundred instances in which peasants manifested their grievances through pliegos de peticiones.^{451/} Nevertheless, among all earlier instances of peasant unrest, the events of Ranquil in upper Bio Bio in 1934 stand out because of the degree of violence and the magnitude of the affair. On this occasion, the peasants withstood attempts by the national police to curb their

451. Loverman Brian, "El Campesino Chileno le Escribe a su Presidente". ICIRA. 1971. See Presentación.

resistance against being dispossessed of their lands. 1,500 peasants are reported to have participated in a full-scale armed struggle that resulted in a huge number of deaths.^{452/}

In the context of this history, in 1947 the law was passed on rural unions which, in the final analysis, discouraged the organization of peasants rather than enhance it. Although it acknowledged the peasants' right to unionize within the limits of each farm (fundo) it required the fulfillment of conditions mostly uncommon among the various categories of peasants. There was to be a group of at least twenty workers permanently engaged in the one fundo. In addition to this, 10 out of the 20 workers were expected to know how to read and write. Those groups which passed these tests and could organize into unions were allowed to make economic demands only during certain specified periods of the year. Their right to strike was not legally admitted.^{453/} In the beginning of the

452. Affonso Almiro, Gómez Sergio, Klein Emilio, and Ramirez, Pablo. "Movimiento Campesino Chileno". ICIRA 1970. Two volumes, pp. 26-30. Loverman regards this event as a "localized peasant uprising in a conventional sense rather than an attack or a challenge to the existing system of property" See his Struggle in the Countryside. Politics and Rural Labour in Chile, 1919-1973 Indiana University Press. Bloomington and London 1976, p.174.

453. The legal status of rural unions was very contradictory until the publication of the labour code in 1931. Although the general law on unionization cont. next page.

sixties this law was still in full operation.

It is not difficult to understand, therefore, why during the existence of this law, only a small number of unions were organized. In 1961 for instance, there were 22 rural unions comprising 1,831 rural workers.^{454/} Most of the strikes undertaken by rural unions during the first years of the sixties were aimed at minor benefits. Nevertheless in eight cases they petitioned for land as well. This type of aim is also revealed in five instances of "tomas".^{455/}

Despite the existing legal restrictions on the unionization of rural workers, the Christian Democrats encouraged workers' organizations in the countryside, creating to this effect the "Instituto de Desarrollo Agropecuario" (INDAP).

cont.

453. (Law No. 4.057), did not expressly prevent rural unionization, law number 4.503 on written labour contracts did so. But despite legal ambiguities Loverman reports actual cases of peasant unionization during the first year of the thirties. See his struggle in.....op.cit. We have also mentioned that during the second period FOCH held a convention in which peasants took part.

454. See "Comité Interamericano de Desarrollo Agrícola (CIDA)", Chile: Tenencia de la Tierra y Desarrollo Socio-económico del Sector Agrario, Talleres Graficos Hispano Suiza Ltda., 1966 Santiago, p. 34.

455. See Affonso et al op. cit. p. 130 and ICIRA "Trayectoria y Estructura del Movimiento Campesino Chileno" documento 68 n.d.

To the efforts of the Christian Democrats (C.D.) towards organizing rural workers, it is necessary to add those of the Federación Campesino Indígena, linked to the Communist Party, and that of the Catholic Church through the Unión de Campesinos Cristianos (UCC), the Asociación Nacional de Organizaciones Campesinas (ANOC) and the Movimiento Campesino Independiente (MCI). The Movimiento de Liberación Campesina (MONALICA), which was organized during Frei's electoral campaign, was also influential in the development of rural unions.

The Federación Nacional Campesina e Indígena (May, 1961) grouped together the various communist associations existing at that time, i.e., the Federación Industrial de Trabajadores Agrícolas, the Asociación Nacional Indígena de Chile. Socialists contributed to the new "federación" through their Frente de Trabajadores de la Tierra. The UCC (1960) had a different organizational origin. It came from the Departamento Campesino de Acción Sindical de Chile (ASICH), a non-communist organization. ANOC which was founded two years later, also proceeded from a church sponsored institution, i.e., the Instituto de Educación Rural. NIC and MONALICA were conceived as electoral groups to gather peasant support for Frei's electoral campaign. Two years later, these two were to be grouped in the Federación Triunfo Campesino. *

This organizational activity was not followed by any

radical transformation in the aims which rural workers pursued by their conflictive actions. The majority of their conflicts continued to consist of wage and economic demands, questions concerning the regulations on unionization, and improvements in their living conditions. During 1965 and 1966 most rural workers' strikes took place in the central valley. According to the lowest estimate these amount to 508. All of them lasted a few days and were caused by the employers' refusal to implement previous collective agreements. There was only one instance when workers demanded land. There are a few other instances elsewhere of this type of demand in the form of ten tomas led by Mapuche Indians. Nevertheless, when tomas are initiated by wage earners they do not reveal radical aims 456/

b) Organizational Growth and Aims Pursued in
Peasants Actions (1967-1970)

In 1967, the C.D. administration was to introduce certain law reforms on rural unionization which existed since 1947. According to the new law, the territorial base for the information of unions was enlarged to the Comuna. This made possible the organization of unions

456. See Klein E., "Orientaciones..." op. cit., p. 25.

which would gather together workers belonging to different fundos, although the minimum number of workers required to organize a union was increased to 100, under special circumstances it was also possible to reduce this number to 25. Furthermore, the right of rural workers to strike was now legally recognized.

Despite differences of detail between our sources regarding the unionization of peasants, it is clearly demonstrated by all of them that such unions underwent a considerable growth after the enactment of the new law of 1967-457/.

While at the beginning of the sixties there were no more than 22 unions with 1,800 workers by 1969-1970 there were 400 with more than 100,000 peasants.458/ Half of these unions belonged to the Confederación Triunfo

457. The differences in question results from the application of different methods of calculation. For example, it makes a great difference whether they include unions which are not yet legally recognized. Another factor of importance in this respect is the period of the year to which these calculations relate. See CIDA, Chile: Tendencia... op. cit., Sexto Mensaje del Presidente Frei, and Affonso. A., Iravectoria... op. cit. The lowest estimates are given by Belmar G. Tendencias de la Afiliación Legal no Agrícola en Chile por Ramas de Actividades Económicas, 1956-1968. Thesis Ingeniería Comercial, Universidad de Chile, Santiago 1971. The highest estimates are those of ASICH, see Menges C. Peasant Organizations on Politics in Chile, 1968, quoted in Angell A. op. cit., Appendix I.

458. See President Allende's Message to the National Congress, 1973 p. 1004.

Campeño led by the C.D.P.; 30% of them belonged to the marxist federation. The rest of the unions were associated with the Federación Libertad.^{459/}

Together with these organizational features we may also observe some changes in the character of peasant actions. The type of action known as the toma acquired a greater frequency. Whereas in 1967 there were around ten instances of tomas they increased to 26 in 1968 and 456 in 1970.-^{460/}

For these years there is no information on the objectives of tomas similar to that presented by Klein for 1963-1966. Nevertheless, tomas undertaken in order to seize land tended to be systematically discouraged by the Christian Democrats when they took place in fundos which were not included in the expropriations programme.^{461/} This government wanted to implement a process of Agrarian reform within the limits of law but did not reject unlawful actions by the peasants when they fitted into its plans.

The aims pursued in the workers' strike actions in

459. In 1964 UCC and ANOC formed the Confederation Libertad; the marxist federation adopted the name of Confederación Ranguil.

460. Klein E., Antecedentes para el Estudio de Conflictos Colectivos en el Campo. ICIRA, 1972.

461. See in this regard Senator Rafael Moreno's speech Diario de Sesiones del Senado. Mayo 31, 1972. 5th Session. p. 9.

this sector are not altered. 90% of the 1,821 strikes of 1969 are of an economic character and do not aim at radical changes in agrarian structures.^{462/} Land demands would represent, according to different sources, between 3% and 6% of total strike activities.^{463/}

According to the information on strikes presented above, it is not possible to conclude that peasants' struggles were aiming at the transformation of the property system. Nevertheless, the actions they were capable of initiating and the growth undergone by their organizations during these years are clear indicators of the emergence of a new stage in their overall development as workers. In later sections we will further consider the conditions that make these changes possible.

C. The Workers' Conflicts in Large-Scale Copper Mining Enterprises.

Another group of workers who participated to a notable degree in the conflicts of the period are those belonging to large-scale copper mining enterprises. This group stands in a better position compared to other

462. This is the lowest estimation, see Table 18 on p.350
463. Bengoa J. Movilización Campesino, Análisis y Perspectiva en Sociedad y Desarrollo No.3, July-September, p.64, 1972 and ICIRA, Diagnóstico...op.cit.

groups of workers in terms of wages level,^{464/} system of indexation, social benefits, bargaining mechanism and the general development of their system of industrial relations.^{465/} Some of the blue-collar workers of the copper industry of El Teniente figure among the first dozen unions that were legally organized at the end of 1925.-^{466/} At the national organization level, the Confederación Nacional de Trabajadores del Cobre has been in operation since the early fifties. Their organizational development was largely enhanced by the strategic position of these workers in the country's economy and the importance of Communist and Socialist leadership among them.^{467/} Together, all those factors resulted in

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464. See in this regard, Souza Paulo, "Diferenciales de Sueldos y Salarios: Causas y Proyecciones" in Panorama Económico op. cit., Laws of Reajustes de Sueldos y Salarios (1965-1970) ODEPLAN, Plan de la Economía Nacional 1961-1976. Antecedentes Sobre el Desarrollo Chileno 1960-1971. Sgo. 1971.
465. Estatutos de los Trabajadores de Gran Minería del Cobre, Barria Jorge, Los Sindicatos op. cit., p.132-134, Bitar Sergio and Pizarro C. "El Conflicto de el Teniente de 1973" (Reserved Paper CEPLAN 1974).
466. Ministry of Labour, Departamento de Organizaciones Sindicales Archivos. A complete list of unions by year of legal recognition was prepared for this research presenting data from 1925 until 1940.
467. Trends of elections by unions in El Salvador, Potrillo, El Teniente and Chiquicamata are available for various years in Alaluf Isaac, Los Trabajadores de la Gran Minería del Cobre en el Proceso de Toma de Decisiones. (Appendix) Unpublished Mimeo. Santiago 1976. An older study of the orientation of the vote among miners is Petras J. Zeitlin M. "Miners and Agrarian Radicalism" in A. Journal of Sociology. August, 1967. See also Barria op. cit. and Bitar and Pizarro op. cit.

their great capacity to initiate struggles aiming at the establishment of a relatively privileged status for themselves.

The status achieved by these workers is thus the outcome of the conflicts they had been able to wage from the early stages^{468/} of unionism until the sixties.

Their participation in the total strike activities of mining industries increased from 17.6% in 1961 to 28.5% in 1965 (See Table 23, page 368).

During this decade, G.M.C. strikers are even more prominent. In 1963 and 1965 they represented 30 of the total strikers in the mining industry (See Table 24, page 369).--^{469/}

The proportion of large-scale copper mining workers who participated in strikes represented almost 100% of the active population of that industry. The same figure for mining, as a whole, only averages 54% for a period of eight years. In manufacturing industries, the total strikers represented 6% of the relevant active population (See Table 25, page 370).

A more detailed view of the conflictive activities of G.M.C. workers can be obtained by distinguishing among

468. See in this regard Tables Nos. 8 on p. 184 and 12 on p. 251. Frequency of strikes in mining industries (1916-1925; 1938-1945).

469. Only years for which information is available.

T_A_B_L_E__No._23

FREQUENCY_OF_STRIKES__IN_MINING_INDUSTRY
(1961__1965)

Year	GMC	%	Other Mining	%	TOTAL
1961	15	17.6	70	82.3	85
1962	16	17.2	77	82.8	93
1963	18	16.1	94	83.9	112
1964	25	29.4	60	70.6	85
1965	33	28.5	83	71.5	116

Source: CODELCO Sección Relaciones Industriales, various Bulletins. Thesis, op.cit., for 1962: Barrera, op.cit. p.147.

T A B L E No. 24

NUMBER OF STRIKERS IN MINING
INDUSTRY FOR TWO COMPARABLE YEARS

Year	G M C	%	Other mining	%	TOTAL
1963	14,160	30.09	31,667	69.10	45,827
1965	18,933	31.04	42,965	68.96	60,998

Source: Ibid.

T A B L E No. 25

STRIKERS AND STRIKES IN MINING AND MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES

(1961 - 1968)

Year	M I N I N G				M A N U F A C T U R I N G			
	Active Population	Number Strikes	Number strikers	%(1)	Active Population	Number Strikes	Number Strikers	%(1)
1961	94,900	85	60,529	63.8	439,700	503	39,922	8.92
1963	88,700	112	45,827	51.7	464,500	135	22,656	4.87
1964	91,700	85	33,353	36.4	477,900	104	25,371	5.31
1965	93,400	116	60,998	65.3	506,700	158	47,491	9.37
1966	93,600	46	27,093	29.0	527,700	162	31,011	5.87
1967	94,000	166	73,038	77.7	543,500	127	29,432	5.50
1968	94,500	104	52,827	55.9	544,600	95	15,212	2.79
Total	650,800	714	353,665	-	3,495,600	1,284	210,395	-
Average	92,971	102	50,524	54.3	499,371	183	30,056	6.02

Source: Ibid.

- (1) The percent corresponds to the portion of strikers in the active population.
Active population includes only white and blue-collar workers.

general stoppages ordered by the Confederación de Trabajadores del Cobre, general strikes by company, solidarity stoppages, and partial stoppages by places of work (centros de trabajo). The last are the most frequent, followed by general strikes, solidarity strikes and general stoppages (See Table 26, page 372).

While examining the distribution of general strikes, it is possible to observe that contrary to the pattern that prevails in the remaining sectors, in large-scale copper industry legal strikes predominate, a situation resulting from the predisposition of these workers to present their demands via the full range of the mechanisms available in their bargaining system. Most of the conflicts (See table 27, page 373) originate in the workers' failure to reach an agreement during the bargaining processes. Other less frequent causes relate to workers' participation in the profits of the industry (1 case) and to the dismissal of workers (1 case). Only in these two instances were workers' demands not given the normal bargaining treatment through the institutions devised to this effect. Only in one of these cases did the workers engage in conflictive activity giving rise to an illegal strike. In every other case a solution was negotiated. Workers in this group also reacted against the projected law on their working situations (Estatuto Legal) and to the draft law on the "nationalization" of mining industry

T_A_B_L_E__No._26
 FREQUENCY_OF_CONFLICTS_IN_LARGE_COPPER_MINING_INDUSTRY
 (1955--1959)

Year	CNTC	General Strikes by Mining Complex				Par- tial stop- page	T o t a l
		Chu- qui- mata	Sal- va- dor	Te- nien- te	Soli- darity Strike		
1955	1	-	-	-	-	10	11
1956	-	-	-	-	-	11	11
1957	-	-	-	1	-	19	20
1958	-	1	-	-	-	8	9
1959	-	-	-	1	-	12	13
1960	-	1	1	-	-	9	11
1961	-	-	1	-	-	14	15
1962	-	-	1	1	1	13	16
1963	-	-	1	1	-	16	18
1964	-	-	1	1	-	23	25
1965	1	-	-	-	-	32	33
1966	-	1	1	1	1	-	4
1967	-	-	1	-	-	19	20
1968	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1969	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
TOTAL	2	3	7	7	2	361	382

Sources: CODELCO, Sección Relaciones Industriales various bulletins: Barría Los Sindicatos de la Gran Minería del Cobre, INSORA, Santiago, 1970 pp.132-142. CODELCO bulletins were used for the total, Barría's data for details regarding general stoppages ordered by CNTC, general strikes and solidarity strikes. Figures on partial stoppages are estimated as residuals to complete the total of movements.

Note: Under CNTC we classified general stoppages: Under general strikes by mining complex are included the strikes that arise after the failure of bargaining processes (Company's rejection of Pliego de Peticiones). The solidarity strike is an illegal action taken by the confederations associated with the CNT in order to support another confederation involved in conflict. Partial stoppages comprise sectorial and short interruptions of work by limited numbers of workers, acting outside unions' structure. The issues raised on these occasions usually relate to working conditions.

T A B L E No 27
CAUSES OF MAIN CONFLICTS IN GMC
(1951--1966) (1)

Year 1951	Mine All	Days on Strike	Causes Economic demands (<u>Pliegos</u> <u>de Peticiones</u>)
1955		23	Copper workers status
1957	El Teniente	13	Economic demands
1958	Chuquimata	50	Economic demands
1959	El Teniente	28	Economic demands
1960	Chiquicamata	42	Economic demands
	El Salvador	24	Economic demands
1961	El Salvador	30	Economic demands
1962	All	30	Solidarity (Legal in El Salvador)
1963	El Salvador, El Teniente	3	Dismissals
1964	El Teniente, El Salvador	20	Profit sharing
1965	All	37	Copper nationalization
1966	El Teniente	71	Economic demands
1966	El Salvador	54	Solidarity of El Teniente
1966	Chuquicamata	2	Solidarity of El Teniente

SOURCE: Data based on CODELCO Sección de Relaciones Industriales 1955-1966 and Barria, Los Sind-
catos op. cit. 132-139.

- (1) CODELCO's figures are not always consistent. Stop pages are not always clearly identified. We have only included general stoppages. Furthermore, no distinction is made in these figures between legal or illegal strikes.

by resorting to general stoppages of almost a month each. In both cases these workers felt that their exceptional situation was under threat and thus were ready to struggle.

The magnitude of the conflicts in large copper mining industries can be appreciated by observing the numbers of man/day work lost. This figure amounted to 3,293,672 between 1955-1969 (see Table 28, page 375). For mining as a whole this figure was 3,757,910. In terms of production lost due to conflicts, it amounted to 174,860 tons i.e. 7% of the total production for the same years.^{470/}

As a general conclusion to this section we may emphasize that the most distinctive features of the conflicts of this decade are related to the following events: the promotion of the growth of rural unions; the new found propensity to initiate strikes exhibited by peasants, public employees and non unionized groups; the greater frequency of national general strikes; and the increasing lack of capacity on the government's part to control the workers' actions. In Section E and the following sections we suggest an interpretation of the general

470. CODELCO Sección Relaciones Industriales (Information with no identification) and F. French R., and Tironi E., El Cobre en el Desarrollo Nacional, Ed. Nueva Universidad 1974.

T A B L E _ _ _ N o . _ _ _ 28

MAN/DAYS OF WORK LOST
DUE TO STRIKES IN LARGE-SCALE COPPER MINING INDUSTRY
(1955 _ _ _ 1969)

Mineral	Number of Strikes	Days Lost	Man/days of work lost
Ghuquicamata	3	94	658,407
El Salvador	7	233	958,595
El Teniente	7	222	1,676,670
TOTAL	17	549	3,293,672

Source: CODELCO Sección de Relaciones Industriales (Information with no identification).

political elements conditioning these observed strike patterns.

D. Organizational Conditioning Elements:

The CUT and the General Strike.

In the course of this work, strike actions have been regarded as our main descriptive variable. It has been our aim to fully understand their most commonly-recurring patterns, by observing their organizational determinants.

It has been shown' in relation to previous periods' how influential workers' organization are for the definition of strike aims and for the magnitude which they attain. During the earliest stages of the workers' movement, the organizational function was performed by the Mutuales, Sociedades de Resistencia and Mancomunales. The struggles led by these organizations gave rise to legal unions and thereafter to the large workers' confederations of the thirties.

During the sixties, the organizational function is to be taken up by the largest group so far known, the CUT, which makes it possible for workers to unite in a single structure and to undertake the most all-embracing form of action of which they are capable, i.e. the general strike. The CUT represents all kinds of workers' organizations, i.e. unions proper, public service (Gremios),

and voluntary associations of non-active workers.^{471/}
This organization is also related, through informal links to political parties of the left and centre.

The degree of the workers' direct participation in the CUT is conditioned by the problem of dues which are very difficult to collect, not only because of the disadvantageous economic position of workers, but also because there are legal problems involved in deducting them from the workers' salaries. The CUT is not legally empowered to ask employers to collect the dues. This also contributes to hindering the development of a bureaucratic or even professional structure. Besides, the fact that workers on the Executive Committee find it impossible to devote their full time to their organization, also discourages the operation of an efficient leadership.^{472/}

The largest proportion of workers grouped in the CUT are from the blue-collar sectors. In the Third National Congress, they represented more than 50% of its

471. CUT structure is based on unions at local level, which may be organized into larger geographical groups and by sectors of the economy. Geographical groupings, are organized at the level of departamentos provinces and the country as a whole. Sectorial groupings can comprise unions of a whole sector (such as the textile industry or mining) or only unions of large-scale copper mining concerns or certain unions in the textile unions of the textile industry. See Barria, Irayectoria op. cit.

472. See Barria, Irayectoria, op. cit.

membership.^{473/}

The number of unions, federations and organizations affiliated to this organization was 3,600 in 1968; these represented 340,000 workers.^{474/} Since, the number of workers affiliated to trade unions in that year was 368,000, (See Table A-10) it is clear that most of them belonged to CUT. This almost-universal coverage must be seen in relation to an absolute rise in the number of unionized workers. At the end of the twenties, existing unions only include 40,000 workers,^{475/} a figure which increased to 193,000 by 1942 and to 289,000 during the fifties.^{476/} Thus the growth exhibited between this decade and 1968 represented a considerable change.^{477/}

If one regards unionization in relation to the active population of blue-collar, white-collar and independent workers, this proportion would have increased from 2.7% by the end of the twenties to 32% during the

473. 55% of 2,200 delegates. Ibid., p. 188.

474. See Barria J., Trayectoria... op. cit. p. 191, and Historia... op. cit., p. 145.

475. See Dirección del Trabajo. Depto. Organizaciones Sindicales, Dic. 4, 1972.

476. See Alan Angell op. cit. p. 54.

477. The figure of 368,000 unionized workers by 1968 is based on Belmar Gonzalo, Tendencias de la Afiliación Legal no Agrícola en Chile por Ramas de Actividad Económica, (1956-1968). Commercial Engineering Thesis. This figure would be greater if rural unions were included. See Table 10 in the Statistical Appendix.

sixties.^{478/} In this figure we have included Gremios or Asociaciones of State Employees.^{479/}

The estimated proportion of 32% of unionized active population was calculated by excluding the following occupational categories from the total active population: Empleadas Domésticas, rural workers and those classified by the census as dependent on householder's income. If we were able to ascertain which groups really have the capacity to form unions, the percentage figure would be even greater. In order to define these groups it would be necessary to discount the members of armed forces, the labour force under 18 years of age and the workers employed by small-scale enterprises, employing less than 25 workers.^{480/}

The size of firms, which was very relevant in explaining the frequency of strikes, is also important for the relative capacity of workers in certain industries

478. Calculation based on Hurtado C. op. cit. pp. 178-179 and ODEPLAN. Población Ocupada por Sectores Económicos 1960-1970.

479. This number amounts to 208,000 in 1967. See Clotario Blest in Punto Final March 26, 1968 as quoted in Angell op. cit. p. 53. Although state employees were forbidden to unionize by labour code and administrative regulations, they nevertheless managed to form associations or Uniones or Gremiales within the terms of Civil Law. Furthermore, certain legal dispositions allowed them to make economic demands during working hours.

480. Clotario Blest estimates a group of 450,000 people formed by armed force members, employers and the labour force under 18 years old. Quoted by Angell op. cit.

to organize unions. In table 29 on page 381, we show that the largest unions belong to Public Services, such as gas, electricity, water and telephone as well as mining industries. In manufacturing, due to the small size of the majority of the firms, it is not possible to find a great percentage of large unions. According to the 1967 census, only 29% of the manufacturing firms employed more than 20 workers.

There is also an important growth of unionization in some mining industries among which large-scale copper companies have a prominent position. Between 1956 and 1968 unionization in copper, lead, zinc, mercury, manganese and small gold-mining industries increased from 20,000 to 27,000 members (See Table A-11) and large-scale copper mining represented 87% of this growth. These figures are based on the estimated percentage of the large-scale copper industry labour force actually affiliated (See Table A-12). The difference that remains between this figure and the total figure for unionization is attributable to the unionization of the median and small-scale copper industry labour force and of the lead, zinc, mercury, manganese and small copper-mining industries workers (See Tables A-14 and A-15). In the coal and nitrate industries, unionization does not grow. (cf. Table A-11)

In absolute terms, the contribution of the manufacturing industries to the growth of unionization is greater

T_A_B_L_E__No._29

DISTRIBUTION OF TRADE UNIONS ACCORDING TO
THE NUMBER OF AFFILIATED WORKERS, 1963

Sector	NUMBER OF MEMBERS		
	25 to 99 %	100 to 324 %	More than 325 %
Mining	55.3	28.0	16.6
Public Services	60.0	24.2	15.7
Manufacturing	70.0	23.9	6.0

Source: Calculated on data compiled by Belmar G., Ten-
dencies... op._cit.

than that of mining. Thus, if all the sectors' contribution to the growth of unionization is considered, manufacturing holds the first place. It represented 45% of the total workers affiliated in 1968, followed by the mining industries with 15% and by the Transportation Commerce and Communication with 9% (See Tables A-10 and A-11).

From the point of view of the proportion of the active population of the various sectors actually unionized, the large-scale copper industry holds the first position with 90% (See Table A-12), followed by mining as a whole with 61% and by manufacturing with 36% (See Table A-16).⁴⁸¹

With regard to rural unionization, it has already been indicated that by the end of Frei's administration, it amounted to 100,000 workers. This figure would represent 17% of the active countryside population excluding employers, Empleadas Domésticas and householders' dependents. As in the case of small industrial firms it is very difficult to ascertain the number of rural workers kept from unionization because of characteristics of their work. Nevertheless, we know that most of the unionized workers in the countryside belong to the category of permanent workers; this is clear from the

481. Figures consistent with those quoted by Angell, op. cit. p. 46, although slightly different in detail.

research done on the provinces of Nuble and Talca.^{482/}

If we consider the grand total of unionized workers in comparison with the active population, the result is a percentage of 29, i.e., almost one third of all the active workers of the country are actually organized into unions. This figure is slightly lower than that given above when the comparisons did not take into account the degree of rural workers' unionization.

E. Political Conditioning Elements of Strike Actions:
The Government Labour Policies.

In relation to the general political framework of workers' action it is useful to distinguish between the period extending from the latter half of the 1950s to 1964 and the years 1965-1970. During the first of these periods the government labour policies tended to repress workers' organizations and demands. For example, in 1954 when Ibañez was still in the presidency, the CUT leaders were prosecuted under the Law for the Defence of Democracy. Thereafter, in 1955 and in 1956, some of them were even sent into internal exile. Four years later,

482. See Brevis P. and Pizarro C., Los Sindicatos Agrícolas y el Proceso de Reforma Agraria en la Década del Sesenta, CEPLAN, Document No. 47, August, 1975. The main research on this regard is that of Marin Juan C. "Asalariados Rurales en Chile", in Revista Latinoamericana de Sociología, No.2, 1968.

this time by means of a new law, that of Seguridad__Interior__del_Estado, the government again applied repressive measures against union leaders. Economic policies also affect the labour position and can severely condition the range of actions open to labour movements, as happened between 1959 and 1962, when Alessandri's administration tried to implement a policy of economic stabilization. This was highly prejudicial to workers' interests, particularly because of the high rates of inflation then prevailing. We have already seen that this situation pre-disposed workers to strike during those years.

The general attitude of these governments towards labour did not prevent them from the enactment of a set of regulations which were, to some extent, favourable to workers. However, these had a very limited impact: examples are the laws relating to social security, indexation of pensions and the incorporation of artists into the Caja__de_Empleados_Particulares.^{483/} These types of measures are common in all governments. In effect, Frei resorted to similar legislation in relation to the mechanics and drugstore workers, whose legal status was redefined.^{484/} Instead of restraining workers from conflictive behaviour, the negative attitude towards labour of

483. Law Nos. 15467, 10986, 15386 and 15478 respectively.

484. Laws Nos. 16386 and 16344.

the Ibañez and Alessandri administrations, led them, as never before, to engage in general strikes.

From 1964 onward it is apparent how workers, despite the short term economic benefits given to them by governments, are still prepared to oppose them on clearly defined political grounds. Under the Christian Democrat administration, some important changes will be observed with regard to the orientation of labour policies. Workers' wages are indexed, from 1965 to 1970, according to actual inflation rates, i.e. by a factor of 100%. Moreover, minimum wages were raised and rural workers' minimum wages brought up to the level of industrial workers. From the point of view of the state labour apparatus, the Under-Secretariat of Labour was restructured and the National Employment Office and Labour Institute were founded. Other benefits decreed by this administration were related to job-security, (Inamovilidad)^{485/} occupational diseases and industrial accidents,^{486/} pensioners' medical care^{487/} and norms for workers' participation in nationalized enterprises.^{488/} Despite all the economic and social benefits given to workers, the CUT left-wing leaders did not support the

485. Law No. 16455.

486. Law No. 16744.

487. Law No. 16781.

488. Law No. 17256.

Christian Democrat administration. The Christian Democrats, on their part, tried to organize three workers' associations in order to dispute the traditional prominence of working-class parties among trade unions. El Comando Nacional de Trabajadores, El Movimiento Unitario de Trabajadores de Chile and La Unión de Chile were set up, for that purpose, although the last-named was rejected by Christian Democrat Unionists, because it was regarded as a right-wing organization. The proposal of the Christian Democrats for voluntary unionization is another form in which this dispute is revealed. The CUT leaders' opposition to Christian Democrats must be seen in relation to these government attempts at winning the workers' political loyalty. The worsening of the relations between the CUT and this government was manifested by the fact that CUT leaders were prosecuted in 1966 and 1967 and internally exiled in the latter year.

In cases like the above-mentioned, it is difficult to determine the differences between union actions and political ones because workers' struggles are necessarily defined in relation to the wider political context of their society. The relationships existing between unionism and politics will again be shown in a later section, this time at the level of electoral contests.

For the moment, we turn to the analysis of another element which conditioned the behaviour of unions during this period.

F. Political Conditioning Elements:
State Intervention in the Countryside.

The changes observed in rural unionism are related to the general social, political, and economic transformations brought about by the agrarian reform process. This process, in turn, relates to the Christian Democratic administration's definition of social participation and to its political conflict with right-wing traditional parties. In the specific area of agrarian changes, left-wing political parties did not oppose Christian Democrat policies, since both groups were committed to diminishing the control exerted by Conservative and Liberal groups over rural areas. This fact can be singled out as a condition enhancing the growth of rural unions and the high propensity they show to engage in strike activities.

As part of the general transformation brought about in the countryside, in 1965 agricultural minimum wages were made compulsory throughout the country and in 1967 they became comparable with industrial wages. Moreover, the benefits paid in currency increased their proportion exceeding, in 1969, three times the proportion constituted by Regalías.^{489/}

Agricultural wages increased by 50% between 1964 and

489. See Ramírez Pablo, Cambios en la Forma de Pago a la Mano de Obra Agrícola, ICIRA, 1968.

1967.-490/ Nevertheless, the changes in land-ownership only favoured the sector of permanent workers (Inquilinos). The law made it clear that among potential beneficiaries, those who had been longer in the holdings should be preferred to others.

The fact that rural wage earners did not pursue radical changes in agrarian structures is related to the type of social relations between peasants and patrones prevailing in the countryside when agrarian reform began to be implemented. The interchanges between these groups were not yet as specific and limited as those prevailing in industries. By and large their reciprocal links were still perceived as a community of interests and life; a situation which also implied the prevalence of hierarchical relations between the participants.491/

Specific interchanges, such as those stated in an agreement or contract are likely to lead to a greater awareness of the distinctive nature of the interests of the parties involved in such a relationship. This relation which is best represented by the treatment given to

490. See Echevarría E., Política de Precios y Redistribución del Ingreso, CEPLAN, Bienestar y Pobreza, 1974, pp. 241-289.

491. See Lehman, David, Hacia un Análisis de la Conciencia de los Campesinos, ICIRA (n.d.) Our own approach emphasizes types of social relations rather than elements pertaining to definition of workers' consciousness. In this regard it is more closely related to the study of Urzua, Raul, La Demanda Campesina, Ediciones Nueva Universidad, 1969.

labour relations in capitalist industrial firms began to be fully developed in the countryside only during the implementation of agrarian reform.

Admittedly, the struggles of the sixties carried out by some peasant sectors, directed as they are at securing a definition of their status as workers, can be regarded as a manifestation of growing consciousness of the specific content of their interests as individual workers. Nevertheless, these struggles do not necessarily indicate any sharper perception of their status as part of a larger social group. For this to develop there also needed to take place a heightening of their self-definition as a distinctive social group, which would go far beyond the particularistic orientatations of separate sectors of workers.

During the process of change induced by agrarian reform policies, the development of a group consciousness, or a trade union consciousness is also favoured in the countryside. Even though it does not correspond to that of the interests of the working class as a whole, this consciousness presupposes a greater awareness of their organizational strength, than that required to advance their labouring status. Trade unions' perceptions of their own interests may not coincide with the realization that their interests as workers are in opposition to those of their employers. The evolution of a class consciousness implies, in fact, the workers' capacity to

define themselves as political actors in their national society and, therefore, as able to further their interest as a class.

If the foregoing distinctions are considered, it could be admitted that for rural workers, the sixties represented a period of transition from a pre-contractual status to a contractual one, and to a growing consciousness of their need to organize into unions. Only with regard to Mapuche Indians are there some indications of actions aiming at a change in the property system.^{492/} These actions may involve a greater potential for radical changes than those which aim at improving living and working conditions, but do not affect the structural position of labour in capitalistic society. When Mapuche Indians acted in this sense they were always backed by the Marxist Federation, and they always claimed that they only wanted to restore the right of property, of which they had been deprived.

Various comparative and historical studies suggest that among the peasantry, a greater propensity to engage in conflict over property is more likely to occur among small holders and tenants than among wage earners.^{493/}

492. See Section B. Growth of Unionization and Strike Action in the Countryside, (a) and (b)."

493. Urzua, La Demanda.....op. cit., He concludes this from his empirical research on small farmers, Jornaleros and Inquilinos in the provinces of Central
cont. next page

This relation would obtain, to the extent that the former groups hold, a less subordinated position in agrarian class structures than that accorded to wage earners. Therefore, the most frequent conflicts would be originated by ownership rivalries between small farmers or tenants on the one hand, and landlords on the other. However, the greater predisposition of small farmers to engage in ownership conflict during the period preceding the agrarian reform are likely to diminish or even to be transformed into conservative stances once the new forms of land ownership and land tenure are established.

Nevertheless, to ascertain the actual degree of political radicalism implied in small farmers' disputes over property, it would be necessary to assess the impact of these conflicts on traditional agrarian structures and their overall political motivations.

Among rural wage earners who had never held the status of small farmers, as the Mapuches had done, those who were more permanently linked to the farms (the Inguillinos) would both organize unions and participate in

cont.

493. Chile. He also summarizes evidence in this regard coming from studies undertaken in other South American countries. A more general framing of this proposition is made by Barrington Moore in his study of the origins of modern structures. See his Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, Beacon Press 1967.

strikes to a greater degree than those who were only temporary workers. However, as shown in Section B of this chapter, most of these did not show a high propensity to initiate conflicts over property. Yet, after 1970 these less organized groups, which also had more limited struggle experience were to take part in radical conflicts. This is very indicative of the great relevance of political influences for the development of workers' behaviour.

During the sixties, the main source of the changes undergone in the countryside comes from the state which consistently increases its institutional capacity to implement agrarian policies.

While the Servicio Agrícola Ganadero (SAG), The Instituto de Desarrollo Agropecuario (INDAP) and the Corporación de Reforma Agraria (CORA) employed 3,107 people in 1964, this figure increased to 8,333 in 1970.-494/

By the end of the decade there were altogether sixteen national organizations working with various peasant groups: seven government agencies, two belonging to the universities, one to the Catholic Church, and four to political parties and private groups. Despite the lack of coordination and sometimes the low quality of this influence, the socialization process at which it was aimed

494. Data, obtained directly from these institutions, the sources are not identified by them.

implied a positive effect on rural workers who had formerly stood aloof and distrustful in relation to national society.^{495/} For a long time state-peasant interchanges were mediated by land-owners.^{496/} Because of this, and given the character of peasants' traditional interchanges with urban representatives, (i.e. either merchants or traditional politicians),^{497/} the new set of relations, developed through these new institutions, which were aimed at the transformation of their situation, led to a relative improvement in their overall position in society. Furthermore, thanks to the growth of their own organizations, they were also beginning to develop their own leadership. Research on rural union leaders demonstrates that most of them actually belonged to the peasantry, a situation which did not exist before.^{498/}

The role played by peasants themselves in the changes undergone in the countryside has not yet been fully evaluated. However, it is very difficult to support the view that they played the most outstanding part as compared to

495. See S. Barraclough and Fernández, Diagnóstico de la Reforma Agraria Chilena, Siglo XXI Editores, Mexico.

496. Ibid.

497. See in this regard Lehman. op. cit., and Charles Nisbet on the characteristic rules applied to small and medium size farmers in the financial market. See El Mercado de Crédito no Institucional de Chile Rural. Cuadernos de Economía, No. 10 U. Católica, Dic. 1966.

498. Gómez Affonso, and others, Movimiento... op. cit. pp. 170-171.

that played by external agents. The peasants' objective living and working conditions cut them off from a direct consciousness of their structural position and to this extent disabled them from leading the transformation of the countryside themselves.

The agrarian policies of the Christian Democrats, which led to the growth of rural unionism were in their turn, part of a wider political strategy, aiming at contesting the rural electoral strength of right-wing traditional parties. The rural provinces were defined as potentially decisive in altering the prevailing distribution of power. On the other hand, Christian Democrat agrarian policies also sought to undermine some of the economic sources of the power of those parties further to the right.

The political struggle between the ruling party and right-wing groups resulted in the improvement of the social and economic status of the peasants, an improvement which would at the same time condition further changes in their orientation towards society. Some of these changes will be revealed in the conflicts they are able to carry out in the period which begins in 1970.

G. Politicization in Historical Perspective:

Trade Unions' Strategy

In our analysis of strikers' explicit aims, a distinction has been made between those relating to

workers' status, and those referring to the right to form unions and to strike. Distinctions were also made between general economic aims and political aims. These latter tended to pursue a general climate of tolerance for unions, their leaders, and the political parties representing their interests.

Although the foregoing classification seems to us as a useful approach for the purpose of this work, there are instances in which these distinctions are not possible, because a single strike may pursue various aims at the same time.^{499/}

The explicit strikes' aims must also be distinguished from the political consequences resulting from their actual accomplishment. This distinction will be useful in ascertaining the effects of strikes on the overall position of workers in society.

With these considerations in mind, we are now in a position to examine CUT general strikes, and Plataformas de Lucha and their effects.

In Table 30 on page 396 the causes of general strikes are presented. Out of 12 strikes, five show a distinctively economic orientation, i.e., workers demanded the

499. A simplification which we would hope to avoid in classifying strike objectives is the one which Rosa Luxemburg called the "pedantic scheme". See our discussion of Luxemburg's mass strike in Chapter 1-C

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EXPLICIT CAUSES OF GENERAL STRIKES
FROM THE FOUNDATIONS OF CUT TO 1970 (1)

Period	Year	Number	Causes
Ibañez	1954	1	Wage legislation Repression against CUT's President; Inflation Law of "Inamovilidad" (job stability); Law Defense of Democracy.
	1955	1	Id.
	1956	1	Projected law on wage freezing and liberalization of prices.
Alessandri	1960	2	Indexation of wages. Solidarity with Cuban Revolution.
	1962	1	Inflation.
	1964	2	Indexation of wages.
Frei	1966	1	Events at El Salvador.
	1967	1	Indexation of wages.
	1969	1	Defense of constitution against rightist groups attempts at coup (Tacnazo).
	1970	1	Support of left-wing groups electoral candidate.
T o t a l		12	

Sources: Table based on information compiled by Barrera, Perspectiva op. cit. and Barria's Los Sindicatos, op. cit., and Historia de la CUT, PLA Editions, Santiago, 1971.

- (1) We have regarded as general strikes those mentioned as such by the three sources and the stoppage of 1969 to oppose the unsuccessful barracks revolt.

indexation of wages and other economic benefits and opposed projected laws for freezing wages and the liberalization of prices. Any results which the satisfaction of these demands might bring about for the workers' incorporation into the larger national society are only of minor significance. In effect, workers will not radically change their position in society as a consequence of the implementation of their demands on this level.

The narrow significance of workers' demands is also revealed by an examination of the CUT's Plataformas de Lucha from 1953 to 1967, (See Table 31, p. 398). The implementation of the political, social and economic rights whose recognition they are demanding would result in no more than the concession of minimal benefits and some degree of social participation. Workers' explicit aspirations do not go beyond the establishment of better wages, the guarantee of job security and the institutionalization of housing facilities, health and educational services, and union rights. Table A-17, shows that this type of demand is also prevalent in unions Pliegos de Peticiones. Thus, workers' aspirations as they are revealed in the CUT's Plataformas, as well as in the explicit aims pursued by them in strikes, and in workers' Pliegos de Peticiones do not exceed a minimum repertoire of social, political and economic rights. The study of the workers' aspirations in the past, as they can be

TABLE No. 31
WORKERS' DEMANDS AS THEY APPEAR IN THE "PLATAFORMA"
(1953 - 1967)

Type	Content	Frequency (1)	Political consequences	
			Minimum integration	Greater integration
Related to status as workers	Indexation of wages, pension. Old age benefits	9	Implementation of basic economic rights	
	Leveling of family allowances	4		
	Law on job	4		
	Minimum salary for blue-collar workers	3		
	One month's compensatory per year	3		
	Anti-Inflation Laws	2		
	Suppression on taxes on wages	2		
	Adherence to regulations on working hours	1		
Related to union organization	Legal unionization for rural workers and state employees	3	Allow participation leading to organized action as a group	
	Legal recognition of workers' organization	2		
Related to economic and social benefits	Control of Prices and Inflation	6	Obtain slight benefit to the class	Extend workers' participation in health, education and housing benefits
	Leveling of social security	3		
	Housing Programmes	2		
	Health Programmes	1		
	Literacy Programmes	1		
	New "Código del Trabajo"	1		
Related to political conditions	Derogation of Law for the Defence of Democracy	3	Obtain recognition for their right to act on behalf of their interests	
	Suppression of repressive Laws	2		

Note: (1) As they are mentioned in The Plataformas.

Sources: CUT Acuerdos y Resoluciones del Congreso Constituyente. (1953); Resoluciones de la Huelga General del 17 de Mayo de 1954. Acuerdo de las Conferencias Nacionales (May 1954, February 1957, February 1959, December 1960, January 1962, April 1965) Acuerdos de dos Congresos Nacionales Ordinarios (August, 1957; December, 1959; August, 1965) CUT. CEP. CH. Plataforma de

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inferred from the Plataformas of federations such as the FOCH, the IWW and the CTCH, also show this type of minimal demands. (See Table 32, page 400).

Nevertheless, among the strikes of the 1954-70 period, we can also observe conflict instances in which political aims are pursued.

Under this category are the two occasions in which CUT went on strike in order to suspend the implementation of the Law for the Defence of Democracy, the instance in which they felt their long-term interests to be threatened by an active military movement, and their further involvement in strikes to foster the electoral campaign of the working-class representatives.

The first two instances demonstrate the workers' support to the leaders of working-class parties. Though, in the long run, the satisfaction of these demands might lead to radical political consequences, their immediate effects do not. The workers' strike against an attempted rebellion by military groups is indicative of their interest in defending a given political structure which they regard as useful in the advancement of their objectives. Another instance in which workers explicitly disclose their political orientations is their demonstration in support of the Cuban Revolution. Finally, there are three strikes in which political, economic and trade-union rights are issues at the same time. These are the

TABLE No. 32
WORKERS' DEMANDS AS THEY APPEAR IN THE "PLATAFORMAS"
OF FOCH, IWW AND CTCH

Type	FOCH Content	IWW Content	CTCH Content
Related to Status as workers	Improvement of wages Reduction of working hours Legislation on working conditions Minimum wage Law on industrial injuries	Repeal of the piecework system Adoption of replacement system to absorb unemployment Repeal of prevailing system of work hiring Obligation of the Employers to provide Tools and equipment Derogation of "Codigo del Trabajo" Suppression of the system of individual agreements between workers and employers	Improvement of wages Better working conditions Adherence to labour regulations
Related to union organization	Right to union organization Formation of consumer co-operatives		Adherence to union Legislation end of repression

Note: Due to the limitations of the sources, it was not possible to take into account the frequency of these demands.

Sources: See in CTCH, Declaración de Principios y Estatutos 1943. Memoria del Consejo Directivo Nacional del Primer Congreso, 1939;
 IWW Plataformas in Anarchists Newspapers already mentioned in the preceding chapter and on FOCH's characteristics type of demands see Recabarren, L.E. Beneficios Inmediatos del Gramialismo, a pamphlet published in 1921.

strikes in protest against the repression of CUT leaders and the strike of solidarity with the workers of El Salvador which originally arose out of the presentation of workers' economic demands.

The foregoing analysis shows the shortcomings of the distinctions made among various types of strikes and discourages us from automatically identifying workers' political strikes with radical political orientations, and workers' economic strikes with merely particularistic orientations.

Workers were clearly aware of the limited potential of strikes in furthering social changes, and they had ample experience of the repressive means employed by the government to discourage them from conflictive behaviour in general. These factors must have been very influential in the development of a different strategy to advance their political objectives. The distinctive features of strike actions cannot be interpreted, therefore, as evidence of a lack of political commitments on the part on the worker. Their political ambitions have already been pointed out in relation to earlier periods, and in the next section we will return to the point. Political commitments are revealed among the leading groups of the trade-union movement as well as among rank and file members. In this regard, Angell has pointed out that the Communist Party in particular:

was not operating in a working class unfamiliar with or hostile to its ideas. Even if union groups disputed bitterly in the early years, there were at least certain shared assumptions: of opposition to the capitalist system; of the desirability of united action; of the need for workers to seek their own salvation (even if this is modified by the formation of political parties, they are still parties of the working class); of arbitrary treatment by the State of a common class situation.⁵⁰⁰/

For this reason the prevailing workers' demands pattern cannot be used to support the proposition that they were in fact indifferent to politics and that, therefore, it was the dissident bourgeois or a radicalized petite bourgeoisie intelligentsia which used workers' organizations to advance other interests than their own.

Some features of the Communist and Socialist parties' leadership do, in fact, undergo a change after the thirties and we will comment in the following sections on the probable effects of this on working class political strategy.

The Political Strategy

The scarce figuration of radical demands in the union movement struggle would reveal the preeminence of other means to this aim, rather than the inexistence of

⁵⁰⁰. Angell, op. cit. p. 39.

political pretention. It is what can properly be denominated as a political strategy for obtaining power in the country's executive and legislative system through the electoral conflict. The political strategy and the union strategy would constitute the historical way chosen by the workers' movement and its leadership in search of political power. One of the remaining sections will be dedicated to this aspect, once the politicization of the union movement and the participation of the workers' sectors in the left-wing leadership has been shown. From the very beginning of the organization of Chilean workers, it is possible to find a close bond between political parties and union movement. This situation exists, even in organizations self-classified as "gremialistas", such as the Mutuales, at the beginning of the century. These kept a clear relation with the only party of the epoch, the Democratic.

"Anarchist-communist" oriented resistance societies, in which foreign workers' leaders had a great participation are a clear example of the historical bond between trade unions' evolution and political evolution. The mancomunales, which represented the workers' autochthonous socialist reply to the obstacles they faced in their progress as a social class, are another example of the politicization process in the workers' organization. All posterior history which took place in the federative

organizations during the twenties and thirties and the political characteristics of the CUT's leadership which will be subsequently seen, will only confirm this original stand.

Although, to a lesser extent than other latinamerican countries, the immigration of european workers⁵⁰¹/ with a high degree of political conscience and acting in a very early stage of the country's economic development, contributed to the formation of political groups between the mining trade unions, port workers and independent workers. Much before the Russian Revolution of the Seventeenth, as has been demonstrated in previous sections, the self-taught socialist oriented chilean workers proceeding from the Democratic Party, initiated a process of political formation of wide scope between the mining workers. From a structural point of view and without going into sociological and biografical origins underlying the political socialization process, it may be argued that the precocious political conscience observed in the organized chilean workers is strongly conditioned by the difficient performance of the national economy and its direct impact on the mining and industrial workers' situation, as well as the lack of legal protection

501. See Hernán Ramírez Necochea, "Tuvo Influencia la Primera Internacional en Chile", in Principios, op. cit.

for the working class until the late twenties and finally the repeated instances of repression to which it was subjected. In this sense, the unions' politicization process in Chile holds some resemblance with the evolution of the European Labour Movement.

Unlike the american tradition^{502/}, both in Chile and in Europe^{503/}, the marxist, socialist and anarchists influence on the workers' trade unions gained force in the framework of a society with strong class division and marked legal differences among the social groups in civil and political rights. In the chilean case this

502.----- The influence of the methodist religion and the adaptation of Marxism to british constitutionalism as a result of Fabianism, granted the british unionism a less radical but more missionary than political tone. See E.J. Hobshawn, Labouring Men London, Weindenfeld and Nicolson, 1964, Selig Perlman, A Theory of the Labour Movement, op.cit. Paul Malles, Draft Paper on Certain European Trade Union Movements and their Relation with Social Democratic Parties. Florence Italy, International Confederation of Free Trade Union, United Nations Economic and Social Commissions East West Seminar, May 24-30, 1959, G. D. H. Cole, History of Socialist Thought Vol. 5 London MacMillan, 1953-1960. A more recent work on this matter is Stanley Pierson Marxism and the Origin of British Socialism: The Struggle for a New Consciousness. Ithaca, N. Y., Cornell University Press 1973.

503. The lack of a feudal and corporative tradition in U. S. A weakens the importance of acute class struggles in the origins of capitalism. This phenomenon was favoured by the high growth capacity of the economy and the early liberalization of the political institutions. The right to vote had been granted in this country prior to the Civil War. On the other hand, the high heterogeneity of
cont. next page

influence results even more relevant in an economic context with a lesser degree of dynamism than that exhibited by the original capitalist countries and within a political system much more excluding than the continental.^{504/}

The politicization of Chilean trade unions hold close relation with the character of the state's intervention in economy. As is known, in Chile, almost all economic relations between employers and employees are subject to general legal definitions. Hence, strategic decisions are not found in the enterprise but rather in the political system. On the other hand, given the imposed legal limitations of the federations and confederations to represent unions belonging to a single industry or a whole sector of economic activity during the bargaining process, the lack of united pressure through politics had left the workers completely divided among themselves. As had been said, the collective bargaining process in Chile

cont.

503. European immigration resulted in serious ethnical and cultural obstacles to the rapid extension of workers' unionization. This acquired a massive spread only after the crisis of the thirties. See Everett M. Kassalow, Trade Unions and Industrial Relations. An International Comparison, Radom House N. York, 1969.

504. Once again, in Great Britain, in contrast with the violent changes in the political institutions which affected Europe as a result of the French Revolution of 1789, the democratic evolution of the political system was slow and gradual. See Kassalow, op. cit.

is assumed by each individual union and its results cannot surpass the limits of the implied enterprise.

The Political Control of Unionism and its Class Character

In the course of this analysis it has become apparent that the leaders of workers' organizations are also the leaders of working class parties. Up until the forties the leadership of workers' organizations was disputed among Communist, Socialist Marxist and Anarchist elites. The hegemony of leftist groups was observed in the activities of Sociedades de Resistencia and Mancomunales and, therefore, in the IWW, the FOCH and the C.G.T.CH. All these groups formed the CUT during the fifties.

In this decade, the exclusive influence of leftist groups on workers began to be threatened by the actions of a new political group, i.e. the Christian Democrats, or part of whom had left the Conservative Party in the late thirties.^{505/}

^{505/} This fraction was known as the "Falange Nacional" at that time. A thorough analysis of the relationships between political parties and the CUT and unions in general is presented by Angell in the book already quoted. The present rather brief treatment of some of the dimensions of these relationships is only intended as an illustration of the essentially political character of the CUT, and relies substantially on Angell.

When the political affiliation of delegates to the CUT Congresses is studied, we can observe that in their constituent congress, Christian Democrats represented 6.3% of the delegates. The same percentage corresponds to the Radicals. Nevertheless, the largest group, by an overwhelming margin, some 50% of the total, belonged to the Communists and Socialists.

The predominance of these groups tends to increase in subsequent congresses, while that of Independent and Anarchist delegates declines almost to a vanishing point. In Table 33 on page 409, we reproduce data illustrating these trends.

If we examine the political affiliations of the CUT Executive members, we arrive at the same conclusion; i.e., a well established Communist and Socialist hegemony and a growing importance of Christian Democrats up to 1962. In Table 34 on page 410, we show the trends from 1953 to 1968.

The drastic change observed in the number of Christian Democrat delegates and in their representation in the executive after 1962 are not indicative of a reduction in their voting strength. In fact, during these years, they partially withdrew from elections for external political reasons. Instances of total withdrawal are also illustrated in the Christian Democrats' and Radicals' executive representation for 1959. The latter

I_A_B_L_E__No._33

POLITICAL AFFILIATION OF DELEGATES TO CUI CONGRESS
(percentages)

Party	1953	1957	1959	1962	1965	1968
Communist	21.3	39.9	44.7	31.1	42.3	45.5
Socialist(1)	25.3	25.9	28.1	28.4	33.1	24.6
Radical	6.3	9.0	4.1	6.2	4.8	8.1
Christian						
Democrat	6.3	14.7	14.6	17.9	11.9	10.2
Anarchist	7.9	2.2	2.0	2.0	-	1.4(2)
Independent	6.6	-	-	-	0.5	-
Others(3)	25.6	8.8	5.0	12.9	7.2	9.4

(1) All socialist tendencies are grouped together here.

(2) Corresponds to MIR votes.

(3) Non-Classified information.

Sources: Data as compiled in Angell, op. cit. p. 218. Our presentation differs in relation to grouping.

T A B L E No. 34

CUT EXECUTIVE POLITICAL AFFILIATION

(Number of Councillors)

Political Affiliation	1 9 5 3		1 9 5 7		1 9 5 9		1 9 6 2		1 9 6 5		1 9 6 8	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Communist	5	20.0	10	33.3	12	57.1	6	40.0	11	55.0	14	50.0
Socialist(1)	10	40.0	11	36.6	8	38.0	5	33.0	9	45.0	8	28.5
Radical	2	8.0	4	13.3	-	-	1	6.6	-	-	2	7.1
Christian Democrat	2	8.0	4	13.3	-	-	3	20.0	-	-	3	10.7
Anarchist	3	12.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1(2)	3.5
Independent	3	12.0	1	3.3	1	4.7	15	-	-	-	-	-
TOTAL	25	100.0	30	100.0	21	100.0	15	100.0	20	100.0	28	100.0

(1) All tendencies are grouped together here.

(2) Corresponds to MIR votes.

Source: 1953-1963, El Siglo cited by Barría J., Trayectoria... op. cit., 346. 1965-1968
Angell, A., op. cit., p. 217.

party was to abandon the CUT altogether for three years in 1965 precisely because of its differences with the Communists and Socialists.

The variations observed in the votes obtained by delegates tend to reflect political disputes among parties, culminating in electoral withdrawals, partial or total, rather than actual major changes in the parties' influences among workers. Discord within the CUT due to political tensions among the parties is not negligible. For instance, in the 1965 Congress, Christian Democrat representatives charged the CUT's Executive of opposing Frei's administration simply on political grounds. In 1967, the group of the Socialist leader Raul Ampuero⁴ was banned from executive rights and duties as a result of rivalries among Socialist cliques. There are also cases in which ideology as such, stands out as the main origin of division within the CUT. In 1957 and 1959 for example, the Christian Democrats argued that the CUT's declaration of Principles did not grant them political and religious freedom. In 1967, the Socialists considered that the documents published by the CUT commissions did not reflect an anti-imperialist view.

The foregoing account reveals how insignificant politically independent unions have been in our country and at the same time suggests the importance given by political groups to controlling labour organizations. In this

respect, it is particularly important to point out that for the traditional left, control over the unions is both the natural way to exercise political influence on the mass of workers, and the best available training ground to enable key figures to reach conspicuous political position in the country's political apparatus. Chapter III, Section D, shows that in the thirties, many union leaders went on to occupy parliamentary and ministerial positions, and some even became candidates for the Presidency of the Republic.

We now turn to an examination of all the Communist and Socialist deputies who participated in elections between 1937 and 1969. The available data shows that, of the total number of working-class deputies elected, i.e., 65 deputies, 71% had been union leaders at local or national levels, and came precisely from those sectors of the working class with the greatest union tradition. Out of the 65, 19 leaders come from the nitrate industry, 15 from railroad, 9 from the industrial sector, 6 from maritime activities, 5 from the coal industry and 5 from the copper industry (See Table 35, page 413). When all the deputies from these parties are gathered according to occupations, this group of members of working-class origin is still the most numerous single group.

Table No. 35 on page 413 shows the occupational distribution of these political leaders. It could also be

TABLE No. 35
OCCUPATION OF COMMUNIST AND SOCIALIST DEPUTIES
(1937 - 1973)

Period	University-educated occupations			Intermediate occupation(1)			Poets, writers, artists			Small entrepreneurs, merchants, small medium size farm entrepreneurs			State and Private Employees			Manual workers(2)			No data Avail-able To
	CP		Total	CP		Total	CP		Total	CP		Total	CP		Total	CP		Total	
	SP	Total		SP	Total		SP	Total		SP	Total		SP	Total		SP	Total		
1937-41	2	4	6	2	1	3	1	2	3	2	-	2	-	-	-	2	3	5	1
1941-45	1	3	4	1	3	4	-	1	1	-	2	2	-	1	1	8	4	12	7
1945-49	2	2	4	2	-	2	1	-	1	1	1	2	-	-	-	5	2	7	6
1949-53	-	4	4	-	2	2	-	2	2	-	1	1	-	-	1	1	3	4	-
1953-57	12	12	12	1	3	4	-	1	2	-	-	-	-	4	4	-	7	7	-
1957-61	2	2	4	1	3	4	-	-	-	1	-	1	-	2	2	-	4	4	1
1961-65	3	4	7	4	1	5	-	1	1	1	-	1	1	1	2	5	4	9	1
1966-69	3	3	6	6	3	9	1	-	1	1	-	1	-	2	2	6	5	11	2
1969-73	4	7	11	2	1	3	-	-	-	2	3	5	1	2	3	5	1	6	8
Total	58			5			10			15			15			65			2

1/ This category comprises all the skilled occupations. Primary teachers and accountants are also included.

2/ This category comprises blue-collar workers as well as all manual workers in general, whether associated with a particular firm or not.

Sources : Table based on Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional, Sección Labor Parlamentaria Fichas Biográficas. Figueroa, Virgil Diccionario Biográfico de Chile. Editores Empresa Periodística de Chile. (1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 10th, 11th, 12th, 13th, 14th). Editions issued every two years since 1937 and every three years since 1973. Valenciana Avaria L. Anales de la República, Volume II. Imprenta Universitaria, 1951, Santiago, Chile.

interpreted as an indicator of the social class background of traditional left-wing leaders.

Out of the 224 socialist and communist deputies of the last four decades, 29% come from a working class background, 26% joined the parliamentary career from graduate professional positions, among which the most frequent are lawyers, medical doctors, journalists, and engineers. However, the intermediate professionals represent only 15.6% of the total. Most of the members of this group are primary school teachers. Another group that played an important role until the fifties, were the artists, poets and writers. However, they never represented more than 4% of the left-wing deputies. Small industrialists, merchants, and small and medium sized farm entrepreneurs had a slightly greater importance and represented about 6%. Public and private white-collar employees had a similar representation.

When we compare the forties with the last decade, it becomes evident that while the university-educated professional sector grows in its total participation, the working-class group diminishes. The latter group appears to occupy its strongest position during the first half of the forties, whereas the professional group occupies this position during the first period of the fifties and in the last elections of the sixties.

In general, the non-professional sector, including

both blue and white-collar workers, is quantitatively inferior to the other two important groups considered together i.e. "intelligentsia" (made up of university educated professionals, those with intermediate qualifications, and artists) and the petite bourgeoisie associated with industry, agriculture and commerce.

In order to ascertain the degree and form in which the decline in numbers of the working-class sector implies a qualitatively less significant role for this sector in the traditional parties, further research in the field would be needed. Yet it is important to point out that, from the forties onwards, its contribution is less relevant than that exhibited during the first stages of the labour movement and during the formation of left political organizations.

It must be borne in mind that before the time of the Popular Front the most prominent political positions within the traditional left were habitually taken by working-class elements. Already in 1905 the popular forces presented Torrealba, a gasfitter, as a candidate for the Presidency of the Republic. Luis Emilio Recabarren, a typographer, was also a Presidential candidate in 1920. Manuel Hidalgo, a gold craftsman and the nitrate worker and actor, Elías Lafferte, were put forth as presidential candidates by different Communist Party factions in 1931; and the elementary school teacher

Bernardo Ibañez, was candidate on behalf of the Socialist Party in 1946. The forties represent the beginning of the end of purely working-class dominance in the leadership of the left and the emergence of a petite-bourgeoisie leadership.

However, the above description of these trends does not include all the required coordinates to constitute a suitable definition of the social class background of these political groups. Ideological orientation is also of primary importance in formulating such a definition. The adoption of a socialist ideology by groups which do not have a working-class background, represents after all, a form of identification with the working-class. The ideological role fulfilled by intellectual elements is in its turn, an indispensable contribution in enabling the working-class to achieve full political consciousness.

The pertinent question is, to what extent the typical living situations of the various sectors of the petite-bourgeoisie could affect the overall strategy of the left-wing political movement. On this point, it is worth recalling Lenins' analysis previously offered on the contradictory character of the small or medium size agricultural, industrial or commercial entrepreneur. These groups simultaneously share the features of the entrepreneur who hires labour, and the features of the hired

labourer; accordingly, they will react differently, as capitalist or as workers, depending upon the specific situations they have to confront. Their position lacks the sharpness of definition either of the bourgeoisie or of the proletariat, whose economic interests are clearly delineated. On the other hand, the isolation and individualism at their working situation, may induce them to reject the measure of social control and bureaucracy, which any political group has to develop in order to become a mass party.

However, it would seem that the major source of contradictions experienced by the working class parties, would come from the intellectual elements. The role of these groups in the party organization is important because they are the main carriers of the Party's ideology. As a general sociological category, the intellectuals exhibit a double class situation. Normally their living standards are sort of a bourgeois, but at the same time they sell their labour in a market. The intellectuals' typical working conditions make them evolve an individualistic character. This is the end product of working in isolation or in small groups, and also the result of their almost exclusive commitment to individual fulfillment.

From the ideology point of view, the party reaches its plenitude thanks to the influences of these elements,

but they may also pass on to the party experiences resulting from their distinctive working and living conditions. These are the main anomalies which can arise within the labour parties and become so important as to profoundly affect their subsequent political evolution. Unfortunately, in this study we are unable to determine in an empirical way the real implications of these influences. Nevertheless it seemed worthwhile to suggest, at least, the lines on which a theoretical argument might be developed.

The Role of Unions in the Electoral Evolution of
Left-Wing Parties and the
Process of Basic Democratization.

We have observed that the Union movement did not fulfill a radical role in terms of the political demands made upon the state, insofar as these are articulated in the explicit aims pursued in strike actions. Nevertheless if their significance is evaluated in terms of the general democratization of the political system entailed by the electoral evolution of the Chilean Left, the original conclusion must be re-examined.

The political aspirations of the Chilean Left began to be manifested very early, by union and pre-union organizations, even before left-wing parties were organized.

The only popular party existing during the first decade of the present century, the Partido Demócrata, supported a presidential candidate as early as 1905 and the same group supported parliamentary candidates a year later, winning 8.1% of the votes and obtaining the election of seven deputies.^{506/} In that same year, Luis Emilio Recabarren was deprived of his legitimate right to sit as a deputy, notwithstanding the fact of having been elected, because he upheld ideas which were regarded as extremely radical.

The leaders who formed the "Partido Obrero Socialista de Chile (POS)" in 1912 emerged as a result of divisions within the "Partido Demócrata". The POS presented candidates for Parliament in 1915, 1918 and 1921, electing two deputies in each of the last two years.^{507/}

The emerging left-wing's political ambitions encounter many obstacles resulting from the prevailing electoral system of the time. At the beginning of the twenties only 40% of the 898,000 potential electors were registered.^{508/} In addition, the electoral mechanism

506. El Mercurio of Santiago and Valparaíso corresponding to the period.

507. Ibid.

508. This and the foregoing data pertaining to elections are based on Cruz Cocke Ricardo, Geografía Electoral de Chile. Editorial del Pacífico S.A. 1952, ILPES, Antecedentes Cuantitativos Referentes al Desarrollo de América Latina, 1966.

was subjected to ad_hoc electoral principles which, on the pretext of preventing the proliferation of small parties, openly favoured the large traditional parties. These principles involved the application of double electoral criterion, according to which the small electoral constituencies based their elections on a simple majority and the large ones on a proportional representation.^{509/}

On the other hand, joint party lists were issued and the final election was based on their order of precedence rather than on the preferences manifested by the electorate. These mechanisms responded to the traditional parties' need to reduce the number of votes lost in those constituencies where candidates used to get more than the required number of votes and could, therefore, pass the surplus on to their allies who needed them. The number of votes cast which could not be used by the small parties were always greater than those lost by large parties

509. Cruz Cocke in his op. cit., points out that this electoral system was originally created in Belgium and subsequently imposed in Chile. Its purpose was "to defend the electoral interest of the Belgian right". The author (D'Hondt) formulated his system on an empirical principle: that the rural electors generally voted for the right and the urban ones for the left. p. 61. The mechanics of this system imply that, the distribution of voting results (Cifra Repartidora) is defined by a party quotient: the number of votes by parties divided by the general national vote and multiplied by the total number of seats available for distribution. The application of this system makes it possible for a party to elect a deputy with 1,500 votes while another may require 3,500.

because of the former more limited possibilities of establishing electoral alliance.

For example, in this way, the Falange Nacional lost 45% of its votes in 1941; 54% in 1945, and 73% in 1949, whereas the losses of all the right-wing parties did not surpass 19% in the first year, 6% in the second and 11% in the last.^{510/} The Socialist and Communist parties were also great losers but in lesser proportion than the Falange, as an average for those years.

In addition to the features referred to earlier, one must mention the control of the electoral body exercised by allowing electoral register to be open for only two hours during the first eight days of the month. Moreover through the application of the Law for the Permanent Defence of Democracy, those labelled as Communists were eliminated from the electoral registers. The number of people affected by this has been estimated between 25,000 and 35,000.-^{511/}

Another feature of the system consisted in the control of the ballots by the parties themselves, which made electoral fraud easier. Finally, fixing the number of deputies per region according to the census of 1930, gave rise to a great distortion in favour of the agrarian

⁵¹⁰. Based on Ibid.

⁵¹¹. Boron Atilio, Est. ELCP No.17.

provinces. Naturally this made it possible to elect a greater number of parliamentarians from the provinces controlled by the right than from the urban centres. The population of the cities greatly exceeded the figures indicated in that Census. For example, in 1953 Santiago should have elected 58 deputies according to the principle of one deputy per 30,000 inhabitants, but could only elect 33.

The prevailing rules in the electoral game represented an obstacle to the advancement of political forces with a capacity to democratize the system. Given the significance of the electoral struggle for the attainment of control over the key decision-making structures of society, the antidemocratic, oligarchic and reactionary character of the political system is perhaps better reflected in the features of the electoral system than anywhere else.

The desperate attempts of the right to preserve political power are modified only in the late fifties and early sixties with the establishment of an official ballot, compulsory electoral registration, the system of proportional distribution of vote, the redistribution of number of deputies per regions and the inclusion of women in the electorate.

The net effect of these reforms, encouraged by left-wing parties and Christian Democrats resulted in the

widening of the electoral base. Until the mid-fifties, the percentages of the electorate registered was never greater than 45% of the potential electorate; however, after this time, the total proportion of the electorate registered steadily increased, reaching 73% in the presidential election of 1970. Similarly, voting abstentions amounted to more than 50% of those registered at the beginning of the twenties but decreased to half that figure at the beginning of the fifties and to no more than 17% in 1970. This expansion of the electoral base also meant the increasing prominence of centre and left-wing forces and consequently the decline of the right.

In order to examine these evolutionary trends and to see how they are associated with the growth of left-wing parties, we will study elections to the chamber of deputies from 1937 to 1969. This data will show the provinces in which the left grows and whether or not this growth corresponds to those places where there are highly developed union structures.


The available data does not make it possible to study these trends at constituency level. On the other hand the returns for presidential elections prevent the identification of votes by parties given the electoral alliances formed for this purpose. Senate elections are based on territorial limits which are greater than the provinces. For all these reasons the elections for the chamber of deputies serve the purpose of this research best.

The graph on the following page (p. 425) shows the electoral trends for the entire country during four decades. From this, it is possible to appreciate that the right-wing parties continue their electoral growth until the end of the forties reaching their culminating position by the mid-forties, at the same time the repressive campaign against the Communist Party is initiated. In the following decade these parties begin to decline until the reorganization of Liberal and Conservative Parties are joined together, giving rise to the Partido Nacional. Subsequently this combination picks up again in 1969. This trend is associated with the electoral evolution of the Christian Democratic Party.

In 1941, the C.D. gradually initiated its electoral take-off, and increased its votes at an extraordinary rate in the following two decades. The simple correlation coefficient between the voting of both parties is negative and significant (-0.98), which shows that the growth of the C.D. was probably based on the absorption of right-wing votes.^{512/} On the other hand, the radical

512. This coefficient measures the opposite or equal co-variation of the two political groupings throughout the country in the elections for deputies between 1932 and 1969. This coefficient is 95% significant when it reaches 0.64% for the C.D. and 0.60% for the rest. Naturally when a smaller number of elections are included, these values increase. The critical values were determined on the basis of the T test.

GRAPH NO. 1
TRENDS IN THE ELECTION OF DEPUTIES FOR THE WHOLE COUNTRY 1932-69 (1)



SOURCE: Data quoted from Dirección del Registro Electoral for every year.

(1) Votes for parties are counted without regard to the internal divisions of parties. These are important in the case of Liberal and Socialist parties.

(2) The Communist Party did not register votes for 1949 and 1957 because during these years it was outlawed.

Party obtains its greatest number of votes in the late forties, precisely when the C.P. is eliminated from the electoral registers. The contingent of voters who thus became available was probably absorbed by the Radical Party and to a lesser extent the C.D., since the S.P. also shows a decline in the elections of 1949. If until the fifties there were divergent voting trends between the R.P. and the right, afterwards, they tend to disappear. The voting trends of the Radical Party move in the same direction as those of the Liberal and Conservative Parties in 1953, 1957 and 1961. Using the simple correlation coefficient, we find that until the last election they co-vary by 0.72 in the same direction, which represents a value very close to 95% significance.

The electoral growth of the left-wing parties before 1945 and subsequently during the sixties, bears no relation to the voting trends of the right. The available figures show that there is no correlation between the C.P. and the right-wing groups. The values for the simple correlation coefficient between votes cast for the right and the S.P. drop even more sharply in the elections between 1937 and 1969, ultimately, its value is virtually nil. These trends would suggest the independent movement and composition of the votes corresponding to the right and to the left.

Neither the left-wing groups nor the C.D. exhibit any significant correlation with the course of the Radical trend. Moreover, the correlation between the C.D. and the two left-wing parties is insignificant. Therefore, it is possible to infer from the general trends that the electoral contingents corresponding to the right and the C.D. are not the same as those of the left-wing parties, and that of the years analysed. The C.D. is the only group that grows at the expense of the right in significant statistical terms. The growth of this party and that of the left-wing groups are not associated in significant statistical terms with the Radical Party's fall in electoral support.

We now turn to an electoral analysis by provinces. With reference to whether in provinces with greater union development the non-traditional forces, particularly the left, receive relatively stronger support than their national averages, the data reveal the following situation.

Table No. 36 on page 428, compares national with provincial rates of support, and reveals that the right-wing parties substantially retain higher electoral percentages in the agrarian provinces of O'Higgins and Valparaíso than in the rest of the country for the two periods indicated. On the other hand, these provinces are precisely those which are located in the fourth, fifth and seventh

T A B L E No. 36
AVERAGE VOTE FOR PARTIES IN THE ENTIRE COUNTRY AND SELECTED PROVINCES
(1932 - 1969)

	National Voting Average	Average Votes in Some Provinces(1)										Agrarian Provinces (7th.)(2)				
		Antofagasta (1st.)	Atacama (2nd)	Concepción (3rd.)	O'Higgins (4th.)	Valparaíso (5th.)	Santiago (6th.)									
	32-37 61-69	32-57 61-69	32-57 61-69	32-57 61-69	32-57 61-69	32-57 61-69	32-57 61-69	32-57 61-69	32-57 61-69	32-57 61-69	32-57 61-69	32-57 61-69				
Liberal Party	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-				
Conservative Party	34.0	18.7	17.3	10.9	24.9	9.3	28.0	16.1	49.7	21.8	36.5	22.9	32.5	22.5	45.4	26.8
Radical Party	20.8	15.9	22.8	22.0	42.0	25.4	24.1	18.0	11.3	9.7	17.0	11.3	15.7	11.6	22.8	19.1
Christian Dem. Party	4.4	29.1	12.1	24.5	10.8	29.1	2.5	27.4	6.7	26.4	3.6	33.2	5.4	31.3	2.1	27.8
Socialist Party	15.3	25.0	28.9	37.1	12.9	33.2	18.8	32.6	14.7	29.5	18.1	23.5	19.7	25.5	7.6	14.4
Communist Party	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

(1) This arrangement of provinces aims at suggesting their historical importance of trade unions. It might be criticized as a static disposition of places which should necessarily vary at different points in time. Since our criterion is an historical one, it seemed to us a plausible approach. What the first four provinces were to miners' unions (nitrate, coal and copper respectively), the fifth one was to Port Workers. In qualitative terms, Santiago lagged behind Valparaíso.

(2) Agrarian regions are defined as those where more than 50% of the active population are employed in agriculture. These are: Colchagua, Curico, Maule, Linares, Nuble, Malleco, Cautin, Chiloe. Classification taken from Urs Muller's "La Voz de las Cifras", Cuadernos de la Realidad Nacional, No. 14, October, 1972.

place respectively, according to their degree of trade union development. In those provinces occupying the foremost places in trade-union development, such as Antofagasta and Concepción, the left-wing parties achieve a relatively greater number of votes than in the rest of the country. A similar trend emerges in the provinces of Santiago and Valparaíso, even though they have a lesser degree of trade-union development than those previously mentioned. The Radical Party also appears to be favoured in terms of voting percentages in provinces with major union development such as Antofagasta, Atacama and Concepción. The same trend, however, also appears in agrarian provinces with little trade union development. The data also shows a rather volatile situation in provincial voting trends in the case of the C.D.P.; it increased in all the provinces, with extraordinarily high percentages during the second period in comparison with the first. The foregoing examination reveals a permanent correlation between the left-wing votes and those provinces with more developed trade union organizations, whereas the opposite is true for the right-wing parties.

Next we will see whether it is possible to establish a statistical correlation among parties in relation to their ranking place in the votes obtained in the provinces in each one of the elections for deputies between 1932 and 1969. These calculations are based on the

Spearman coefficient^{513/} and are shown in the Table 37, on page 431.

These calculations corroborate the expected negative relationship between left-wing and right-wing parties as far as the provincial sources of their votes are concerned. In five out of the ten elections considered, the values registered by the coefficient are statistically significant: -0.75% in 1937, -0.78% in 1953, -0.89% in 1957, -0.82% in 1965, and -0.85% in 1969. These results are consistent with our hypothesis concerning the general political effects of trade union development on the provinces in terms of the left-wing orientation of voting trends. The same would apply, *Mutatis Mutandis* to the right-wing parties in the agrarian provinces and those with a lower degree of union development. The electoral positions of these groups are reversed when provinces with different degree of union development are considered.

The correlations of the C.D.P. with the left are significant before the sixties and during this period as well. From the elections of 1937 until the late fifties

⁵¹³-----
This coefficient detects the coincidence or divergence in the ranking of votes obtained by any two parties in mining, industrial and agrarian provinces. This coefficient is significant when it reaches a value of 0.71.

I_A_B_L_A__No._37

SPEARMAN COEFFICIENT FOR THE FOLLOWING PROVINCES:
 ANTOFAGASTA, ATACAMA, O'HIGGINS, VALPARAISO,
 SANTIAGO, CONCEPCION, AND AGRARIAN PROVINCES
 Parties compared(1)

Years	RW-R	RW-CD	RW-LW	R-LW	CD-LW	R-CD
1932(2)	-0.70	-	+0.20	-0.30	-	-
1937	+0.15	-	-0.75	-0.42	-	-
1941(3)	-0.14	-0.21	-0.64	-0.57	+0.72	-0.85
1945	-0.39	+0.24	-0.53	-0.43	+0.31	-0.42
1949	-0.57	-0.57	-0.60	-0.21	+0.90	-0.07
1953	-0.75	-0.53	-0.78	+0.75	+0.15	+0.36
1957	-0.89	-0.53	-0.89	+0.75	+0.47	+0.40
1961	-0.39	+0.25	-0.46	+0.07	-0.78	+0.43
1965	-0.60	+0.25	-0.82	+0.36	-0.35	-0.53
1969	-0.61	+0.68	-0.85	+0.44	-0.78	-0.65

Source: "Dirección de Registro Electoral."

(1) Key: RW = Right-wing (Liberal + Conservative Parties)
 R = Radical Party
 CD = Christian Democrat Party
 LW = Left-wing (Socialist + Communist Parties)

(2) Valparaíso and O'Higgins are not considered in 1932 because in that year they were not independent electoral districts. By 1932 the Christian Democratic Party had not been formed.

(3) C.D. (Falange Nacional in this year).

Note: Enzo Faletto and Eduardo Ruiz, using the Pierson coefficient and working on the voting data for only one year (1969) arrive at conclusions with ours. Unfortunately they do not explain at what point the values of the variable become statistically meaningful. See his "Conflicto Político y Estructura Social" in Chile Hoy (Pinto et. al) Siglo XXI, 1970, pp. 213-255.

both groups recruited in the same provinces and their ranking places were almost the same, which would suggest that they had a similar influence over specific electoral groups. Nevertheless, during the sixties, their relations are significantly negative: -0.78 in 1961 and 1969, reflecting a differentiation of their electoral bases.

Finally, the use of the Spearman coefficient shows what has already become apparent in the simple correlations: that the Radical Party probably weakened their relation with the electoral base characteristic of rightist groups, even more than it was weakened already, by recruiting the C.P. contingent during the period of repression.

The foregoing analysis has shown the stability of both right-wing and left-wing voting in provinces with the lowest and highest degree of union development. The use of the Spearman coefficient has also shown that the association is also statistically significant throughout all the provinces analysed.

H. The General Strike of July 7, 1955 as Typical of Conflictive Activity during the Stage of Political Anti-Government Unionism

a) Introduction

This period has already been examined by

Manuel Barrera,⁵¹⁴/ Marcela Noe,⁵¹⁵/ and Jorge Barria.⁵¹⁶ Although Barria has, in fact, dealt with some of the aspects we consider particularly relevant for developing the "strike-type" approach adopted herein, the main sources of information used in our analysis are El Mercurio, El Debate, a liberal newspaper opposed to the Ibañez administration, El Siglo, which was officially recognized as the Communist Party newspaper as the party itself had been outlawed during the period in question, and La Calle, the Popular Socialist Party publication.

Of the general strikes called by the CUT from the time it was founded until 1970, that of July 7, 1955 has been selected as a typical example of the strike activity of the period even though it occurred in the very early stages of politicized anti-government unionism. Clearly shown herein is the high degree of politicization reached by the working class, their persistent search for a more politically tolerant climate, the basically economic nature of their demands and the peaceful way in which they carried out their activities. Here too we may find disputes occurring between the party leaders

514. Barrera, Manuel, "Perspective Histórica de la Huelga Obrera en Chile" in Cuadernos de la Realidad Nacional, op. cit.

515. Noe, Marcela, "La CUT, orientacaiones de su acción historica" in Cuadernos de la Realidad Nacional, No. 8, June, 1971.

516. Barria, Jorge, Historia de la CUT, op. cit.

within the workers' confederation.

Early in 1955, just before the strike occurred, the CUT began a campaign to obtain wage increases for all the workers in an attempt to counteract the negative effects of inflation on their purchasing power. This campaign was instrumental in bringing together the unions involved in the movement that later ended in the strike.^{517/} The workers' difficult situation during the Carlos Ibañez government created the conditions under which the movement was to develop. This situation affected numerous groups of both blue and white-collar workers and gave rise to a continuous state of unrest. Late in June, 1955 the Chilean Banking Federation threatened to go on strike if the Executive went ahead with the proposed legislation detrimental to their interests.^{518/} Several days later, strikes were called in the London and South American Banks and in Huachipato.^{519/} Meanwhile in Chuquicamata conflicts also prevailed and the workers eventually decided to strike.^{520/}

The small movements just mentioned, along with many others too numerous to deal with herein, gradually began

517. Information on the campaign and the trade unions that joined it is to be found in El Siglo, May 1st to July 2, 1955.

518. El Debate, June 24, 1955, p. 32.

519. Ibid., June 28, 1955, p. 16; and El Siglo July 25th, p. 3.

520. Ibid., June 23, 1955, p. 16.

to converge, ending in the July 7th strike. The event which really began to bring the workers together was the general wage increase campaign. During this period, practically all the workers' assembly included this demand among their other petitions. Diverse economic, union and political objectives began to take shape and in their pursuit the nation's unionized workers and many non-organized ones decided to unite. Before examining the scope of the movement, we will first turn to its aims.

b) Strike Aims

The final version of the strike's aims was approved by the Federations' Council and following the session was read by Clotario Blest at a press conference. The document contained the following demands:

1. Slow down the rising cost of basic goods and rents;
2. Wage bonus compensation for blue-collar workers as well as rural workers from the public and private sectors;
3. Accelerate legislation regarding the basic wage for blue-collar workers;
4. Unified scale for state workers taking into consideration the benefits previously obtained by other sectors and

using the basic wage of the white-collar workers at the Santiago department as the lower end of the scale.

5. Employment stability for both urban and rural workers;
6. Abolition of the law for the "Permanent Defense of Democracy";
7. Pension funds equal to salaries paid to in-service workers;
8. An independent pension scheme for private sector workers with direct union representation in the pension scheme council;
9. Improvement of public transportation but maintaining established fares;
10. Equal family allowances for all working sectors;
11. Derogation of Law No. 8811 on the unionization of rural workers and the introduction of a new one fostering rural worker organizations;
12. Institution of the "Bread Corporation" with representation from state authorities, industrial workers and the consumers.^{521/}

521. Aims as stated by El Siglo, July 4, 1955, p. 5.

As can be seen from this list, eight of the demands were of an economic nature, three relate to working conditions and one to political demands, viz. the derogation of the "Law for the Permanent Defence of Democracy". However, these only form part of the workers' more comprehensive understanding of the country's situation. The CUT disclosed its political point of view in a memorandum sent to the President under the following terms:

Our country's present critical situation is not a fiction, nor is it the result of any intention on our part to create opposition to any government in particular. It is a stark reality that can be seen in all Chilean wage earners' homes. Nor does it arise from any lack of natural resources but rather stems from the aggravation of the evils of the capitalist system, one of which is the inflationary process, accentuating more and more the disequilibrium existing between the very wealthy and those who have nothing but their brains and muscle to make a living. The present administration's economic policy favours only the capitalist sector at the expense of greater impoverishing the wage earning sector. It is imperative that measures be adopted aimed at a redistribution of national income, in turn creating the foundation for substantial structural change in our economic regime. To avoid the indexation of salaries becoming a mere illusion, it is absolutely necessary for this measure to be financed by direct taxes on the profits of national and foreign monopolies, large estates and commercial enterprises.⁵²²

⁵²² Ibid., July 5, 1955, p. 3. Similar arguments are to be found in CUT leader Bernardo Araya's arguments in favour of wage increases published in an interview in El Siglo, June 28, 1955, p. 2. See also the list of demands published in Ibid. June 18, 1955, p. 5; June 23, 1955, p. 3; and June 27, 1955, p. 5.

If one examines the General Strike aims in light of this type of argument, it is clear that these demands are much more than items on workers' list of grievances and constitute part of an overall political stance. This is corroborated in the CUT President, Clotario Best's assessment of the workers' movement:

The CUT's mid-term and fundamental aims concern the restructuring of the country's economy, i.e. agrarian reform, nationalization of our raw materials industries, trade with all the countries of the world, a credit system specifically designed for production and guidance for the workers and their direct participation in the State's economic institutions.⁵²³/

One cannot deny that the mid-term political objectives behind the CUT's actions are to be found herein, despite the fact that these demands are not included in the organization's immediate aims. Furthermore, the CUT leadership made no attempt to hide its socialist orientation.

c) Magnitude of the Movement

The specific aims of the movement, on the other hand, revolved around a much less radical demand capable of bringing together all those wage earners suffering

523. Clotario Blest's interview in Ibid., July 12, 1955
p. 2.

from the impact of a continuously worsening inflationary process in a mutual cause. It was this problem that formed the basis for the general work stoppage of July, 1955. On contemplating the extent of the movement, Clotario Blest drew attention to the participation of all the federations and confederations affiliated to the CUT, particularly certain independent organizations, such as non-confederated trade unions and the retail traders. The only exception worth noting was the Copper Workers Confederation which could not join the strike but offered its "enthusiastic support" to the movement, as Blest put it.^{524/}

According to El_Siglo, the only newspaper that made any estimates as to the extent of the stoppage, the number of workers involved reached 1,551,566.-^{525/} No specific sources were given to support this. However, some time later El_Siglo published information from police sources stating that 90% of the country's workers, i.e. 1,200,000 wage earners, had joined.^{526/} Other information examined did not contain figures, their records of the event being purely qualitative, though tending to coincide with the above-mentioned estimates. El_Mercurio, for instance, reports that:

⁵²⁴ Interview with Clotario Blest published in El_Siglo, July 12, 1955, p. 2.

⁵²⁵ Ibid., July 1, 1955, p. 1.

⁵²⁶ Ibid., July 8, 1955, p. 1.

The absence of public transportation vehicles, whether state or privately owned, the closing of night clubs and printing and press agencies, the darkened milk bars with their metal curtains drawn and the absence of the usual nightly activities instilled a calm and serenity not seen in the city for a long time. The streets downtown were virtually abandoned revealing a city whose vital rhythm had been subdued and come to a complete stop.^{527/}

El Debate, while still committed to ignore the CUT's real role in the stoppage, openly recognized that the movement had reached truly massive proportions. It stated that:

The unanimous support of the workers... far exceeded the results intended by the CUT - the nation had wished to express its weariness and discontent and would have done so with or without instructions from Clotario Blest at the Central Workers' Union.^{528/}

On the basis of the above-mentioned evidence it is clear that we are dealing with a massive mobilization in which the majority of the country's wage earners took part as well as many other sectors not affiliated to the CUT, whether unionized or not.

d) Nature of the Strike

In analyzing the Chilean workers' movement, the

527. El Mercurio, July 8, 1955, p. 1.

528. El Debate, July 8, 1955, p. 1.

direction taken by its main organizing body and the agreements entered into by its Federations Council and National Directors Council must to be taken into careful consideration. As part of a general plan designed to improve the workers' economic situation, in mid-June the CUT's Federations Council agreed to:

Undertake a mass repudiation of the high cost of living, thus notifying the government of the people's refusal to continue to accept the prevailing economic situation in the future, but without implying any determination on the part of the working class to take immediate direct action.^{529/}

In a later agreement, the National Directors Council's decision to call a mass repudiation meeting was modified. A work stoppage intended as a warning was opted for, with undefined duration. Through this agreement the CUT:

advises the government that the people are no longer willing to accept more price hikes and will resort to direct action to avoid them in the future. A national work stoppage will begin as a warning, the duration of which being subject to the attitude adopted by the government in relation to the petitions presented to the President.^{530/}

529. Federations Council Agreements. To be found in E1 Siglo, June 18, 1955, p. 5.

530. National Council of Directors of the CUT Agreement. in Ibid., June 23, 1955, p. 3.

Following the decision to carry out the strike, a debate arose as to the time it was to last. The Communists, Socialists, Radicals and Falangists insisted that a limit be set, while the Popular Socialists and the Anarchists sustained that it should be indefinite.^{531/} Also under consideration was the possibility of taking the stoppage to "its ultimate consequences". Although nothing was said as to what this actually meant, it apparently referred to provoking the fall of the government. With the Federations Council and National Council Director's rejection of this proposition, those who had been in favour of it called a strike on July 1st, a week before the general strike on July 7th.

All in all the movement was fairly tranquil, although not completely exempt from certain acts of violence. On the morning of July 1st, a fire broke out at the San Eugenio workshops. El Siglo pointed out that the accident could hardly have been caused by the strikers as the military had already taken over the business by that time.^{532/} However, during the days that followed, a soldier received a bullet wound in his head while trying to intervene when stones were being thrown at a bus. It was never determined where the bullet had come from.^{533/}

531. Ibid., June 30, 1955, p. 5. For more details on this subject see section on the development of the strike.

532. Ibid., July 2, 1955, p. 3 and 8.

533. El Debate, July 4, 1955, p. 16.

In light of this, the government decided to intervene, declaring the areas with the highest workers population, Atacama, Antofagasta, Santiago, O'Higgins and the districts of Valparaíso, Quillota, Concepción, Yumbel, Tome, Coronel and Talcahuano, emergency zones.^{534/} Despite the action taken, the military were not hostile towards the workers as the strike was basically a peaceful one. The Minister of Interior declared that in his opinion the strike was merely an expression of the workers' economic demands and not a revolutionary movement.^{535/}

On July 7th, a majority voted to call a general 24-hour work stoppage, but the peaceful course of events observed up until then remained unaltered with only one violent incident being reported by El Debate. Soldiers had attempted to disband a demonstration being held in a working suburb of Santiago and had provoked a scuffle in which six of the soldiers were injured. The police managed to subdue the demonstrators, arresting 30 of the workers. However, no other sources make any mention of this incident.

Following the July 7th stoppage, the transportation

534. Ibid., July 1, 1955, p. 1.

535. Statements by Osvaldo Koch in El Mercurio, July 1, 1955, p. 25, El Debate, July 8, 1955, p. 1.

workers also stopped for a few days, a situation congruent with the CUT's policy which aimed to merely "warn" the government. The national 24-hour stoppage was consequently suspended:

However, if the government within a period of no more than 10 days fails to completely satisfy the workers' demands made known to the whole nation and to the government itself, it has been decided to call out a strike of indefinite duration as from July 18th.-536/

The above was taken from the CUT agreement and clearly states its conformity with the strike's original aim. However, the attitude of the workers' movement in the future was to become subject to government actions.

Initially, President Ibañez had attempted to create a division in the movement by calling a "semi-official" meeting with certain chosen union leaders. The CUT's reply to this proposition was a blunt refusal on the grounds that if the President wished to talk to the CUT he had to consult all of its leaders and not just some of them.537/ Notwithstanding this reply, Ibañez managed to arrange an interview with the leaders of the Chilean Maritime Confederation (CMC), who explained to him the basic demands of the strike. Both the Valparaíso branch

536. National Council of Directors of the CUT statement, El Siglo, July 8, 1955, p. 2.

537. El Debate, July 1, 1955, p. 1.

of the CUT, as well as its National Council of Directors classified this mediation attempt as non-representative and insisted on the President seeing all the CUT leaders together.^{538/}

Ibañez finally agreed to converse with the CUT leaders regarding the problems in question and the establishing of commissions aimed at reaching a solution.^{539/} The government's change of attitude was mainly due to pressure placed upon it by large sectors of the population. Ibañez himself publicly acknowledged this by pointing out that:

I did not invite you... because I do not recognize the CUT, but as everybody else does, parliament, the politicians, I do not wish to remain isolated or to be left out.^{540/}

This statement reveals no radical change in the President's attitude, only a conciliatory stance. With this meeting the CUT hoped to find a peaceful solution to the problems voiced during the strike and to neutralize the sectors that had intended to prolong the stoppage indefinitely. Although the only concrete result obtained from the talks was the suspension of a hike in transportation fares, on July 18th instead of initiating a work stoppage

538. El Siglo, July 3, 1955, p. 1.

539. See El Siglo, July 12, 1955, p. 1.

540. Ibid.

lasting indefinitely, various commissions began working on solutions to the workers demands, a measure agreed upon at the talks with the President. It is clear therefore, that the CUT never intended to disrupt social stability with its movement but rather to advance in its search for peaceful solutions to the workers' demands.

e) The Movement Leadership

An analysis of the development of this movement requires a careful look at the CUT's leading body, which was made up of representatives of the different moderate and leftist parties as well as some independent leaders. The CUT's President, Clotario Blest, a very well-known workers' leader, was independent, his Vice-President, a Popular Socialist, his general secretary a Chilean Socialist and his Under-Secretary a Dissident Socialist. Among his counsellors were five Communists (from the Popular National Front), two Chilean Socialists, three Popular Socialists, two Dissident Socialists, Two Falangists, Two Radicals, three Anarchist-Unionists and two independent representatives.^{541/}

Despite its political heterogeneity, there was general agreement within the CUT regarding its objectives. The major cause for disagreement was the decision as to

541. According to Barria, J., Historia de la CUI op. cit.

the way the work stoppage should be carried out. On this particular point there was a clash between those favouring a more legalistic line, i.e. the Communists, Chilean Socialists, Falangists and Radicals, and others inclined towards an insurrectional-type line, formed by the Popular Socialists and the Anarchists.⁵⁴² This difference of opinion was manifested particularly in each side's attitude towards the duration of the strike. While the "legalists" wanted this to be a warning action lasting only 24-hours, the "insurrectionalists" favoured an indefinite work stoppage. Consequently, the National Directors' Council agreed on a 24-hour strike with a fairly narrow margin of 18 votes to 12.-^{543/}

In view of their defeat, the Popular Socialist Party decided to call their own strike with the support of those organizations in which it had a strong influence, that is, the Industrial Railway Federation of Chile, the Santiago Watt Machinist and Stokers Federation, the State Collective Transport Company and the Chilean Maritime Confederation.^{544/} Thus, on July 1st almost all transport activities were paralyzed.^{545/} The independent strike action on the part of the transportation

542. See Barriá, op. cit., pp. 72-73.

543. See El Debate, June 30, 1955, p. 16.

544. See El Siglo, June 28, 1955, p. 1; June 30, 1955, p. 5; and July 1, 1955, p. 1 and 5.

545. Ibid., July 2, 1955, p. 8.

workers revealed a difference of opinion only on the duration of the movement since their basic demands remained exactly the same, except for certain petitions specific to their union. However, they continued to support all actions organized by the CUT including the 24-hour strike on July 7th, which was taken up as part of their own unlimited strike.^{546/}

Despite the defeat of those in favour of an indefinite stoppage, their contribution to the CUT still continued to be very important. So much so, that it was agreed that the 24-hour strike would be a prelude to a much bigger movement in the form of a work stoppage of undefined duration should the Executive not accede to the workers' petitions. On evaluating the results obtained by the July 7th stoppage, the majority of the workers agreed to return to work with a view towards reinitiating the action ten days later if the government failed to comply with their demands.^{547/} The CUT National Directors' Council decided to suspend the general strike as they considered that the Executive had agreed to form the technical commissions considered to be an effective means of reaching a solution.^{548/}

546. Ibid., July 2, 1955, p. 5.

547. CUT National Directors' Council statement published in Ibid., July 8, 1955, p. 2.

548. Ibid., July 18, 1955, p. 2; and Barria, op. cit. p. 76.

This stance was congruent with the CUT's decision to maintain the working class movement united and independent of any coup attempts, a course of action frequently considered on the part of both leftist and rightist groups during those years. It was the union's intention to strengthen the working class to the point to where it could improve its political position. The strike was, therefore, seen as only one stage in a longer-term process. In his political evaluation of the strike, the Communist leader, Luis Corvalan, stated that:

The nationwide stoppage of July 7th has opened a new horizon of unforeseen prospects for the peoples' movement, invigorating the workers and the country in general in their struggle for national liberation. By marching forward together with anti-imperialist and antifeudal objectives in common, we will be able to win more decisive battles.

The people do not expect the present government to undertake radical reform in solving their problems. This is a task reserved for the working class, the whole country together with the progressive political sectors.^{549/}

f) Conclusions

Perhaps the most important observation that can be made from our examination of the Chilean workers' movement is the very advanced degree of politicization

⁵⁴⁹ Ibid., July 10th, p. 8.

acquired by the trade union movement during the period in question and which became more and more obvious as time went by. The union movement was determined to foster radical solutions to its traditional demands through political action undertaken by the working class itself. This stance gradually developed into the conscious search for another political alternative in the form of a people's government. No in-depth solutions were expected from the government in power, but this did not prevent the union movement from agitating to make their economic and union demands heard. The strike and other conflictive action in general eventually complemented their own political action taken against the prevailing system.

The manner in which the union movement evolved during this period, undeniably makes it the most advanced stage of politicized anti-government unionism. Although the Communists and Socialists' ideological differences were not aired at the time of the strike, it would be very erroneous to assume that they had altogether disappeared. On the contrary, they continued to be expressed and in fact became a major limiting factor for the central union movement and for the whole working class political strategy.

I) The Copper Workers' Movement and the General Strike of March 15, 1966 as Typical Examples of the General Strikes of the Period

a) Introduction

Almost ten years later, the CUT called a general strike that was to show even more clearly the extent to which the trade union movement had become politicized. As usual, during this period the demands that motivated the strike actions were of an economic or union nature, as was the case of the March 15, 1966 general strike. However, the more complex demands and broader scope of a strike on the part of a small sector of the workers brought to light the basically political motivation behind the workers' actions, a motivation clearly underlying the rationale of the conflicts organized by the CUT during the period in question.

b) The El Teniente Strike and the Events at El Salvador

From late 1965 on, strike activities in the copper industry began to grow. In November of that same year there was a general strike by the copper workers who demanded that their economic and social petitions be taken into account in the sector's new legislation. After January 1, 1966, a legal strike was called by the workers at the Braden Copper Company, El Teniente,

demanding wage increases. This conflict continued until March without any agreement since all offers presented were rejected by the company's eight unions. In view of this, on March 1st. the Copper Workers Confederation agreed to call a general strike in the entire sector in solidarity with the workers at El Teniente, a move that was accepted by all the workers affiliated to the confederation. The agitation that had begun in the copper mining industry threatened to extend itself to other workers' groups from the time the CUT menaced with undertaking partial strike action in an attempt to reach a satisfactory solution to the El Teniente workers' problems.⁵⁵⁰

The government found the workers' attitude "inexplicable" as the latter remained firm in their petitions formulated in January, despite the offers of a special series of readjustments involving wage increases equivalent to the real rise in the cost of living, an offer which constituted an exception to the government's general wage policy. The offer, in fact, implied a wage increase of 150% but was rejected by the workers as the demands made by the eight unions involved contemplated a 280% increase. Having reached a dead end in the negotiations, the government decided to allow the company to

⁵⁵⁰. El Mercurio, March 2, 1966, p. 19.

handle the conflict exclusively, stating that it would not hesitate to classify the strikes called out in solidarity with the copper workers illegal and declare the mining area an emergency zone placing it under military jurisdiction.⁵⁵¹/ This attitude on the part of the government had made itself felt earlier with the arrest and conviction of the CUT's Secretary General after one of his speeches considered to be an attempt against the safety of the nation.⁵⁵²/ Following this, the government proceeded to detain seven other union leaders from the mineral fields at El Salvador, Potrerillos and the Port of Barquitos; eight others also being sought for the same reason. The rest of the union leaders were also threatened with having their contracts rescinded.⁵⁵³/

Meanwhile, the solidarity strikes continued in the copper fields, except in Chuquicamata where the strike did not hold out. The miners at El Teniente decided to stage a march on foot to Santiago, but were prevented from doing so when a State of Emergency was declared in the major copper mining regions.⁵⁵⁴/

551. El Mercurio, March 2, 1966, p. 21.

552. Ibid., March 1, 1966, p. 13.

553. Ibid., March 3rd and 5th, 1966, p. 1, in both editions.

554. Ibid., March 8, 1966, p. 12; El Siglo, March 16, 1966 p. 8.

The extent of the work stoppage forced the government to insist on work being resumed again in view of the fact that the strikes had been declared illegal as they affected strategic activities of the economy. To this end the government was prepared to resort to military interventions.^{555/} One group of workers refused to go back to work and gathered together at the union headquarters in El Salvador. Colonel M. Pinochet, who was in charge of carrying out the government's order, decided to evacuate the premises using all the force at his disposal. The gun battle that ensued resulted in eight dead and several wounded. The workers considered the operation to be a premeditated provocation, whereas the military responded that they had only guarded from an attack by the strikers with batons and revolvers. In support of the military version is a leg wound inflicted on one of the army captains. On the other hand, this version is contradicted by the workers who insist that the injury was caused by the captain's own weapon when he struggled with the strikers. The strikers added that they only used sticks and stones to defend themselves and that the premises were attacked with tear gas bombs, 70 empty canisters having been collected up

⁵⁵⁵ El Mercurio, March 9, 1966, p. 23, published the return to work order.

afterwards.^{556/}

This work is not intended to determine the precise events occurring at the time. The descriptions given herein are meant to show the attitude adopted by the government and how this eventually lead to an incident of this kind. For the purpose of this study it is more important to point out the reasons why the government acted in this manner. A later speech by the President is particularly revealing:

What these people intend is not to improve the workers' lot but rather to determine the authority of the State and overthrow the government.^{557/}

As the strike movement was thus considered subversive, it was consequently treated as such. The strike negotiations went on for two months, far exceeding the normal limits. The President took this postponement to be a sign of union oligarchy authoritarianism which also explained the twenty odd conflicts that had occurred in the copper fields over the last year. The government interpreted the movement as a political one, for as the

556. Ibid., March 13, 1966, p. 33; and El Siglo, from March 12th to 20th. Details of these versions are to be found in the Sesiones Extraordinarias del Senado 1965-66, pp. 4428-4660.

557. Speech by Eduardo Frei transmitted by radio to the nation on March 11th and published in El Mercurio, March 12th, p. 1.

President stated:

I waited a long time.....but I did so, purposely waiting for the public to realize just how far these truly oligarchic unions would go... When they realized that they had lost the battle and that the workers had gone back to their jobs, they brought about this very bitter incident. Before the Nation I denounce those leaders who have incited this group of workers to rebellion against the legally constituted authority.558/

The arguments that the left put forward during the discussions at the Special Session of the Senate did not take up the accusation of subversion, but rather were limited to discuss legal arguments. It is somewhat strange that during this strike the Popular Action Front did nothing to defend the legitimacy of its acts, despite the essentially peaceful motives behind the initial activities leading up to the violent confrontation.

c) The General Strike and Politicization

Despite the rationale of the actors involved, as can be seen from the special sessions of the Senate, it is obvious that the results of the movement affected the government politically. As in many other cases, it is important to keep in mind the need to distinguish between

558. Ibid. p. 20

the motivations and both explicit and underlying aims of the conflict and its observable effects. With the strike that followed the earlier events, the political motivations behind the action of the workers became very clear.

Following events at El Salvador, the CUT called a general 24-hour strike.^{559/} which was to coincide with the last day of the 48 hour strike that has been called previously by the Copper Workers Confederation. On referring to the confrontation it was said:

The CUT calls on the workers to protest against this cowardly, criminal murder and to pay just tribute to those who fell in El Salvador.^{560/}

559. Estimates as to the magnitude of the strike have caused a certain amount of disagreement. The government, for example calculated that around 40,000 workers were involved, whereas the CUT insisted that some 200,000 were affiliated to it. The statements by the Secretary General of the CUT that appeared in El Mercurio reported that the number of workers had amounted to approximately 100,000. This figure was reached considering the number of members affiliated to the 20 federations that gave their support to the strike, that is to say, 50% of the federations associated with the Central Union. The federations participating came from the nitrate, coal, bakers, leather and shoes as well as municipal and health workers sectors. The federations joining only partially included textile metal, railroad, construction and copper workers. See Ibid., March 16, 1966 and El Siglo, March 17; also Barria, Historia de la CUT, op. cit., pp. 130-131.

560. El Siglo, March 12, 1966, p. 1.

The CUT demanded fair compensation for the families of the dead and the injured; that those responsible for the massacre be punished; and a solution to the conflict at El Teniente as well as freedom for the union leaders held under arrest.

However, not all of the workers' demands were contained in the petition. At a meeting at the conclusion of the strike, the President of the CUT pointed out that the document was also a protest against the "strong hand" policy the government had announced it would use, and which was classified as a policy catering to the interests of the Right. The main objective of the CUT's demands was then directed against a policy that it defined as "repressive" in detriment of the workers. Instead, the "strong hand" policy should be turned against the exploiters. When seen from this point of view, the strike goes beyond the limits of a mere demonstration of economic and union solidarity to become a direct criticism of an even broader problem involving the assumed orientation of government policy. A clear sense of class distinction is made here in that one sector of the population is labelled the "exploiter" and beneficiary of the government's economic policy. In this case, we are clearly dealing with a political strike situated within the framework of politicized, anti-government unionism.

After its defeat at the polls in 1964, the Popular

Action Front began to rally its forces in pursuit of its more general political objectives. The CUT, which followed the major parties of the front, reflected in one way or another the tendencies of the Leftists political groups. The proven viability of the Cuban revolution and the evidence so close to home of the difficulties of achieving "development and justice" through capitalism gave rise to renewed efforts to create an ideological alternative in the form of a peoples' socialism. The Christian Democrats' electoral triumphs had also stimulated political competition. Although mainly affecting the electoral power of the Right in the 1964 presidential election, during later elections, Christian Democrats also managed to penetrate fairly deep into the popular sectors.

After more than a year of the Christian Democrats being in power, the Communist Party had come to view the latter's policy as an alternative that could be adapted in a truer socialistic sense. The Socialists, on the other hand, considered the Christian Democrats' reforms to be no more than a new-capitalist alternative that could only be improved upon via a revolutionary upheaval and they, therefore, rejected the Communist decision to opt for continuity. Other leftist factions, however, could see no other alternative but to resort to "conspiracy"

Discussions of this nature were stimulated thanks to the transformations undertaken by the Christian Democrats and helped air the major tendencies of the Chilean Left. The trade union movement could not avoid becoming involved in this form of introspection revealing the advantages and disadvantages of the change which would eventually lead to the stage dominated by the "Unidad Popular".

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSIONS

A. The Most Permanent Political and Economic Conditions of Strikes in Chile Between 1890 and 1970.

After examining eighty years of strike actions and their relations with pre-union and union structures, in the context of the economic and political development pattern followed by Chilean society, it would be appropriate to suggest a few general conclusions.

These conclusions refer, of course, to strike actions, the key dependent variable of this work. We will distinguish the economic and political conditions most consistently associated with them, and their consequences for the democratization of Chilean society.

The necessary dependence of strikes upon some form of development, whatever its rate, sector or region, appears to be one of the stable features in all the periods examined in this work. From the period when nitrate was an outstanding pole of growth, during the first stage of the union movement development up to the relative modernization of the Chilean countryside, in the latest stage, it is possible to find indications of this

phenomenon. This relationship between development and strike actions, suggests that the concomitant conditions of economic growth, in terms of employment, concentration of the wage earning mass, and labour stability, constitute the most propitious elements for union actions. The examination of the period corresponding to the nitrate crisis, during the economic recession of 1930, shows that when these characteristics are absent or substantially weakened, the objective possibilities for the development of any common action undertaken by workers are also weakened.

The effects of economic development are not equally apparent in every one of the sectors associated with it. It is possible to find important differences among the various sectors of the Chilean peasantry, which do not apply to those wage earners who are involved in the growth of the mining and industrial sectors.

We can detect important differences between Mapuche Indians and agricultural wage earners in terms of the explicit aims pursued in their strike actions. During the initial stages of the agrarian reform process, the former group always presented economic types of demands entailing a greater potential transformation of the rural social structure than those presented by the latter, i.e., Inquilinos, Voluntarios and Afueros. The Mapuches went on strike in support of demands for land in a much greater proportion than the rest. These demands would restore

to them the property rights of which they had been deprived in the past, for at one point they had held the position of small farmers. This particular sector of agrarian society has demonstrated to be more liable to engage in conflictive actions entailing a certain degree of radicalism than the wage earners' sector. Probably, this is because the latter had been more profoundly subjected to the old agrarian structure and, therefore, have not yet formed a consciousness reflecting their specific interests. Moreover, their cultural underdevelopment, their degree of political and natural isolation and the presence of the patron as a mediator with all sources of power and culture made the development of behaviour and organizations with the capacity to transform their working and living situation very difficult. It is precisely in this group that the union and party influences are probably most required in order that they may become aware of their overall political situation.

To more fully understand the characteristics of trade union action at the mining and textile leadership level, during the stages of union development, it is also important to consider the factor of independence within the social structure of society.

In effect, when the main leaders of the labour movement were identified, it was possible to show how a large number of them belonged to occupations with a relative

degree of autonomy; for example shoemakers, jewellers, carpenters, and furniture workers as well as others working on their own. Generally speaking, it is possible to argue that the lower the degree of dependence of certain labour sectors and occupations upon the main power structure of society, the greater their possibilities for embarking upon union and political actions with a radical content.

Nevertheless, union actions and particularly strikes can only achieve the kind of magnitude observed in the regional and national general strikes, when the great mass of wage earners take part in them. These latter form associations, and their associations grow parallel with the introduction and further development of large-scale firms. In this context, the present work has demonstrated that among wage earners, those with the greatest propensity to strike actions are linked to the nitrate and coal mining industries in the past, and to the copper industries more recently.

These workers differ from the others because they are employed in large-scale firms which in turn are concentrated in a limited number of provinces. These conditions operate as material factors which facilitate union interaction and political influence. Because of the strategic character of their production, these firms are in a position to pay their workers the highest wages

and are, at the same time, the most vulnerable to strike action. These characteristics came to favour frequent recourse to strike action by the workers of these companies.

In brief, the conditioning elements presented in the introduction have been shown to be pertinent in explaining why certain characteristics of economic development and of individual firms determine periods of restraint from strike action in Chile, why strikes acquire a greater or lesser magnitude and in what type of industries they appear to be more frequent.

Nevertheless, in producing periods of restraint upon strike action, the influences of political variables have demonstrated to be more important than those of an economic origin. Only during the crisis of the nitrate industry have they both coincided, and in this instance the effect of recession and the political repression of strikes reinforce each other. This took place between 1932 and 1938. In the Chilean case the degree of tolerance to unionism shown by successive governments is the most important political conditioning elements affecting their propensity to strike; the precise state of union legislation, and the political stability or instability of the system appear to be of secondary importance. Thus, in 1925, even though labour legislation was formally enacted, this was never implemented in practice as shown

in the affairs of Coruna, Pontevedra and Barnechea. During that year, contrary to what was expected, a pause in strike activity is initiated which lasts until 1938. While the period 1925-1932 was marked by a situation of political instability produced by the military intervention, the next period (1932-1938) was characterized by a more stable situation. Yet the difference in circumstances between the two periods was not manifested at the level of strike action. Some form of strike activities would have been expected to become common during the second period, given the general political stability of the time. Nevertheless, the favourable conditions for this were neutralized by the repression police of strikes applied by the government. This attitude had been even more severe during the period 1925-1932, when even the development of labour unions at the purely organizational level was inhibited.

During this period, the suspension of all strike action was perceived as a sine qua non for the return to normality; during the second period from 1932 to 1938, it was seen as a condition for the preservation of the recently established order. Some action was tolerated during this latter period, and was reflected in the growth of legal unionism and later on in the appearance of confederations, such as the Confederación General de Trabajadores de Chile (C.G.T.H) and the Confederación de

Trabajadores de Chile (C.T.CH), in other words, the repression of this latter period was not so severe so as to prevent the growth of some union structures.

The relevance of a climate of tolerance or intolerance for strike actions or their absence can also be appreciated in all the subsequent periods. Thus, the popular Front granted freedom to unionize and to strike until 1945; from 1947 until 1950 González initiated a policy aimed at repressing unions and unionizations, relying on the law for the Permanent Defence of Democracy, and securing another pause in the incidence of strike actions. In the years preceding 1954, under Ibañez there is a return to free unionization and this begins a period of general strikes. Except on two occasions, when he sued CUT leaders, Frei also encouraged a climate of tolerance which made possible the growth of rural unionism.

This analysis shows that the state of labour legislation has been irrelevant to the implementation of the actual labour policies followed by these governments. Thus, from 1946 onwards, even before the law for the Permanent Defence of Democracy had come into effect, González persecuted the main leaders of the labour movement; between 1952 and 1954 Ibañez ignored that law in defining his government as being "friendly" to the workers; and Frei encouraged rural unionization during the first years in spite of the 1947 legislation which discouraged

it. Government attitudes towards the working class, made apparent through tolerant or intolerant policies towards its demands and their conflictive actions, are the most relevant political conditioning element for understanding the propensity to strike or its absence. Nevertheless, given a relative degree of tolerance even against the background of a general climate of repression, and given a situation of workers' grievances, there still exists a chance that workers, no matter how exceptional, may engage in conflictive behaviour.

The conflictive actions that develop during the periods of repression originate in grievances which can be either political, economic or both at the same time. For instance, in 1926 all workers reacted against the worsening living conditions of wage earners, the inadequacy of labour legislation and the persecution of their leaders. In 1934 elementary school teachers demonstrated because of economic and social demands, and in 1935-1936 the railroad workers' national strike originated partly because of government persecution and partly because of its reluctance to satisfy their economic and social demands. In 1949, all workers and students opposed an increase in public transportation fares, and in 1950 they did the same in relation to the projected law which aimed at freezing their wages. In 1951 they organized the Marcha General Del Hambre.

Therefore, if the government policies, although regressive in principle, do not reach a particularly severe degree of repression, workers are likely to engage in demonstrations aimed at improving their general economic situation as well as their political situation.

However, the degree of organizational strength and extent of membership of workers' organizations can alter the expected effects of government attitudes towards labour. Thus, once the CUT was formed the occasions when Ibañez, Alessandri and Frei laid aside their tolerance in labour affairs to prosecute top labour leaders did not deter workers from engaging in general strikes. In contrast to previous epochs, when as a general trend almost all strike actions were inhibited by all forms of repression, now, given their increased organizational power, workers henceforth retain the capacity to strike whenever they perceive government actions as a threat to their interests.

With regard to the development of union power, it is possible to argue that it follows a dialectical growth pattern, i.e., at the end of each period of repression and restraint upon strike actions an extraordinary organic growth, far superior to the previous one, becomes evident. It must be borne in mind that this can be clearly observed during the periods 1925 to 1938, and 1946 to 1952, with the emergence of the G.G.T.CH, the

C.T.CH. and the CUT. This growth demonstrates that there is no necessary coincidence between a pause in activity at the strike actions level and any similar inhibition at the organizational growth level.

The influence of political parties are also very important as an element in explaining strikes, but according to our initial propositions they would explain not so much strikes in themselves as the orientations and forms assumed by strike actions on the part of the unions controlled by one or the other groups. Nevertheless, since these differences are not observable in the strikes examined herein, the main effect of the party would seem to lie at the level of ideological differences. These are not clearly discerned in any obvious and consistent way at the strike actions level though they are clear enough in the case of the Mapuche strike, in which a major influence exercised by the Marxist federation becomes evident. On the whole, union and strike actions by workers of all kinds have received the permanent support of all left-wing political groups, and can be, in fact, the end product of deliberations and negotiations among such groups. For this reason the differences between the main parties are much more significantly expressed at the level of overall political strategies. In the case of strikes, in particular, the differences between the parties are subordinated to a concern for the

effectiveness of workers' actions.

Another outstanding feature which emerges from this work is the difference between the political conditions leading to the rise of mining and industrial unions and those leading to the emergence of the peasants' unions. While the latter join in massive strike actions in the later stages of the labour movement, and are supported by the actions of the ruling party, the former do so in the earlier stages of the movement, and from a position of government opposition, with the exception of the CTCH, some members of which participated for a while in the Popular Front government. The identification of the labour movement with the government is always a cause for a great increase in union membership as shown in the case of the CTCH, and the CRAC (which some authors refuse to admit as an authentic expression of trade-union activity), and in the case of C.D. oriented confederations which managed to group together the greater part of the peasants' unions during the Frei administration. During this government a new organization parallel to CUT is also formed, which attempts to challenge CUT's political influence on the labour movement.

The growth of quasi-governmental unionism cannot be explained only in terms of the co-option of workers to certain government tasks. This type of unionization rests on a solid economic and clientelistic base which

the state is in a position to secure.^{561/}

B. The Relevance of these Findings to Comparative Research

Although this project was not conceived as a piece of comparative research, it would be useful to link some of its main findings to previous research in the field of strike actions.

In doing this any attempt at revising the discussion already summarized in Chapter I, on the section devoted to our discussion on the Socialization of Production and Work from page 50 to 62 is made. Thus, let us now point out that one of the findings suggested by this study, and one which is also consistently shown by other researches is the high propensity to engage in conflictive activities exhibited by miners and port workers. Kerr and Siegel,^{562/} in their study of strikes in eleven countries, have related this trend to the distinctive character of these industries, the degree of occupational differentiation among workers, their degree of geographical

561. A survey which presents a discussion of the relationship between class structures and clientelistic pattern is available in Flynn Peter, "Class clientelism, and coercion: some mechanisms of Internal Dependency and Control" in the Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics. Vol.XII, July 1974, Number 2, pp.133-156.

562. See their Inter-Industry Propensity to Strike in Karnhauser et. al. op. cit. pp. 189-212.

and social isolation, and their group cohesion. These conditioning elements are, in fact, very similar to those suggested in our study, which were summarized under the concept of an isolated and spontaneous work force and its corresponding type of action. In evaluating Kerr and Siegel's conclusions, Eldrige has emphasized that in the "case of mining maritime and long-sharing work their theories is at its strongest, since these activities have, over an extended period of time in different countries, contained workers who might reasonably be identified as being in a structural position of cohesive mass-segregation".^{563/} For the Chilean instance, it has been shown that this is the case from 1890 to the thirties precisely when the economic development pattern begins to present a greater degree of geographical and industrial differentiation.

In relation to mining industries, there are also other findings in the comparative literature, which are relevant to the characteristics shown by the Chilean copper miners. This industry, following a different development pattern from coal and nitrate did keep a significant position even during the last period described in this work. Contrary to what has been found by Ross and Hartman in their study of fifteen countries from 1900 to

563. Eldrige J.E.T. Industrial Disputes Routledge and Kegan, London, 1968, p. 37.

1956, copper miners, in spite of having completed their struggle for existence, recognition and security and for integration in their national economies, and despite having developed a "bargaining machinery" did not show a withdrawal pattern from conflictive activities.^{564/}

Our research has demonstrated that these workers were able to engage in many and varied types of industrial disputes. Furthermore, contrary to the suggestion of these authors who consider work stoppages as decreasing in frequency once a stage of advanced bargaining structure has been reached, among Chilean copper miners, stoppages are still the most frequent industrial conflicts.

This general association between the integration of unions with society and the "withering away" of industrial conflict has also been discussed by other authors. For instance, Dubin has analysed the steel strike of 1959 in U.S.A. This strike accounted for forty two of sixty nine million man/days lost through strikes and took place despite the fact that this industry has one of the most developed bargaining mechanisms.^{565/}

This industry on the other hand, like large-scale copper mining in Chile, holds a strategic position in the

564. Ross A. M. and Hartman P.T. Changing Patterns in Industrial Conflict. Wiley. New York. 1960.

565. Dubin R. A Theory of "Conflict and Power in Union-management Relations" in Industrial and Labour Relations Review. Vol.13, July, 1960, pp. 501-518.

national economy - a factor which enhances the effectiveness of strikes.

The conflict pattern in this Chilean industry is more positively related to some of the features observed by Knowles in coal mining industries after the second World War. Knowles shows that these workers changed their means of exerting pressures, resorting more to absenteeism than to strike actions.^{566/} Similarly, Chilean copper miners make more use of partial stoppages than of total strikes as their weapons in obtaining satisfaction for their demands. Thus, the use of one or another type of action as a means of pressure, depends on the specific characteristics of the industry. Then the less frequency of strike actions in some industries must not be identified with the "withering away" of industrial dispute as Ross and Hartman suggest. Hyman has also summarized the similar findings of Scott for the same industry and corroborate those of Knowles. This pattern is found as well in American Manufacturing Industry and British Motor Industry.^{567/}

566. Knowles K. J. J. C. Strikes: A Study in Industrial Conflict. op. cit.

567. Hyman, R., Strikes, 3rd Ed., Fontana 1984. Scott. W. H., Mumford E., McGivering I.C., and Kirby, J.M., Coal and Conflict. Liverpool University Press. Liverpool, 1967; The Work on American Manufacturing Industry is that of Sayles, L.R. The Behaviour of Industrial Work Group. Wiley. New York, 1958; Turner, H.A. Clac G, and Roberts G., Labour Relation in the Motor Industry Allen and Unwin. London, 1967.

If we turn now to more general strike action patterns, our conclusions are also consistent with some of the findings shown by other studies.

In discussing the thesis on the "withering away" of strikes, Khun has observed that over the period 1941-1959 there is not enough evidence of a long-term decline in short strikes in the U.S.A., but rather a tendency for these to increase in periods of increased economic activity.^{568/} Examining strike trends in the light of British experience, Knowles has argued that the trend for strikes to increase in frequency relates to the workers' feeling that when profits and employment are rising the "prospects of forcing concessions seem better and the possible penalties of failure seem less".^{569/} He adds that "there is some tendency for big strikes to breakout during downswing when the union decides on full-scale resistance to money wage reduction until the deepening the slumps inhibits further action".^{570/}

In the Chilean case there are also examples which resemble the cases described by Khun and Knowles. For example, the events of Santa María de Iquique in 1907, those of San Gregorio in 1920 and Pontevedra and Barnechea in 1925 resulted from the workers' attempts to

568. Khun James W., Bargaining in Grievance Settlement.
Columbia, New York, 1961.

569. Knowles. op. cit. p. 310.

570. Ibid. p. 311.

stop the deterioration of their living and working conditions. Nevertheless, after these events took place, a period of retreat from conflictive behaviour was inaugurated due to the general economic situation of the nitrate industry. This pattern was much more pronounced when the world depression and the nitrate crisis that followed made it impossible for workers to keep their jobs and the labour force was, therefore, dispersed.

Rees A. has also found a correspondence between strike cycles and the business cycle: a correspondence which is interpreted in terms of the "strategic advantages" that rising employment and improving business offer to workers.⁵⁷¹/

On the other hand, when interpreting the effects of a situation of extended and recurrent unemployment which would characterize the Chilean "Surplus" population,

571. His study is based on the analysis of the number of strikes taking place in U.S.A. between 1915 and 1950. Until 1938 he found a high correlation whereas from 1938 to 1950 this was not as high. Explaining the "strategic advantages" mentioned above he said that..."the employer's reluctance to lose his share of the expanding market and his observation of rising wages elsewhere lower resistance to unions demands. His ability to replace strikes with non-strikes diminishes as employment rises, and the strikers have an increased chance of obtaining employment elsewhere if the employer succeeds in replacing them. If the expansion produces a rising cost of living workers will protest in firms where wage lag behind this rise". See his "Industrial Conflicts and Business Fluctuations". op. cit. p. 218.

Laclau has suggested that it might contribute to the furthering of workers' general awareness of the political impediments to their progress.^{572/} Whatever this increased awareness may be, it is still very difficult for it to find expression at the level of observable behavior due to the diminished capacity of workers to interact under such unfavorable circumstances.^{573/}

The opposite trend, i.e. that in which the rise of employment opportunities and wage levels tends to further strike activity, is clearly illustrated by the strikes that characterized the period of the agrarian reform during the sixties, by the organizational evolution shown by the unions of the public sector during the period of the Radical Party administration, when the state apparatus was greatly expanded, and by the protest of nitrate miners before 1907 and the industrial conflicts among large-scale copper mining workers from our second period onwards.

C. The Strike and the Process of Democratization of Chilean society.

The evolution of the workers' struggle throughout

⁵⁷² Laclau E. "Modos de Producción, Sistema Económico y Población Excedente" in Revista Latino Americana de Sociología, July, 1969.

⁵⁷³ This point has also been made by Salvali Michell in "Impasse for Italian Capitalism" in New Left Review November-December, 1972.

the stages presented herein, also help to bring about important changes in Chilean society in its evolution towards more democratic forms of social and political organization. In effect, the workers' incorporation in society, through the regulation of contractual relations, the establishment of wage benefits, social security and health rights, and the promotion of certain labour strata to white-collar status, has been directly and clearly achieved as a consequence of workers' strikes.

One of the most outstanding features of this process of democratization is the gradual character of its evolution in all its forms. Thus, the employment contract assumes a fully adequate character only with the legislation formulated by Frei, laying down the conditions for termination and guaranteeing job security. Nevertheless, this fully happens half a century after the laying down of norms regarding the eight-hour working day, and the status of collective agreements in 1924. The formal determination of minimum industrial and agricultural wages is established under the Ibañez administration during the fifties, a quarter of a century after the publication of the labour code which constituted the first attempt at regulating the remuneration of blue-collar and white-collar workers.^{574/} Nevertheless, the legislation on

574. Only after seven years of the publication of this legal body minimal wages were decreed for white-collars.

agricultural wages is only completed between 1965 and 1970 when it is finally applied throughout the country and becomes comparable to the minimum industrial wage.

The same trend is observable in the evolution of laws regarding social security and health. This starts in 1906, with the law protecting workers against industrial accidents, and the prohibition of child labour. It develops under all the subsequent regimes until 1970, as it is extended to various white-collar and blue-collar groups and their relatives, and not only covers occupational risks but also grants some groups the right to preventive medical care and treatment during illness. Important events to point out in this context are the creation of compulsory social security for workers in 1924, and the creation of the social security service and the national health service, in 1952.

The process of incorporating certain workers in the white-collar category reveals a slow evolution, which starts during the Popular Front in 1947, with some occupations such as public transportation, insurance agents, and the notary offices employees and continues until Frei, with various other activities being granted the same status.

The significance of this last type of incorporation is very particular and, therefore cannot be compared with the previous examples, which even though very limited

forms of social integration in themselves, did involve a vast body of wage earners. Contrary to the examples, the re-grading mechanism modifies the position in the occupational structure of those favoured by it, and thus, it may even change their identification with the groups they came from, thereby developing new aspirations, and new social and political loyalties. Far from fully satisfying the workers' demands, all these achievements represent only part of the explicit canvassed needs not yet satisfied for all the workers organized in unions by the end of the sixties. It must also be pointed out that the workers' demands for better wages were only satisfied during the Popular Front before 1945, and also during the Frei's administration, where they granted genuine indexation of wages. In brief, it can be said, that as far as their social and economic demands are concerned the workers' achievements did not go beyond the level of basic integration. Moreover, it is necessary to be aware of the fact that the legal acknowledgement of these rights did not always entail their full implementation in practice.

The workers' legal right to organize into unions and to strike constitute another basic form of social integration which differs from all the former examples, and which has a greater significance for the transformation operating in the situation of the wage earning masses.

These achievements begin in 1924 and are completed in 1967 with the legislation allowing the peasantry to organize into unions.

As already pointed out, the legislation of 1947 did not have a great deal of significance for union development in the countryside. The peasant groups most subjected to oligarchic domination were those which took the longest time to overcome the prevailing obstacles to their incorporation into society. The action of external political agents was as necessary for these groups as it had been for industrial and mining workers; it may even have been more necessary in their case. Generally speaking, the influence of political parties cannot be ignored in the evolutionary process of unions, mainly because they are the principal promoters of the fundamental transformation of Chilean society in its prolonged progress towards democracy. They made possible the ending of the electoral blockade imposed on progressive political forces.

So far, the history of trade-union achievements described is also the history of the progress made by left-wing and centre parties without whose participation in the electoral contest and subsequent growth, not even the most basic form of workers' incorporation into society could have been registered.

These political groups supported by the working

masses, began their struggle to win a place in the political contest long ago. This particular dimension of the democratization process begins in 1874 and reaches a decisive milestone in 1925, when the right to vote is granted to all those over 21 years of age, without the former requirements consisting in the possession of properties or inclusion in those groups paying the highest taxes; the process is further carried out with the reforms of 1952, 1958 and 1962 already mentioned. The ending of the institutional blockade on those political forces which have the capacity to transform society, involved a widening of the electoral base which reaches its highest peak during the sixties. This same process is marked by the decline of the right-wing vote and the growth of the C.P., S.P. and C.D.P. which together were able to obtain more than 50% of the electoral votes. The workers' trade unions fulfilled a very important role in this context as a source of support for the new progressive trend and as sources of influence over the electorate in those provinces where they achieved their greatest development.

To summarize: the trade union movement and its capacity for strike actions, must be considered as one of the strategic agents responsible for the democratic changes observable in Chilean society between 1890 and 1970.

Thus, the analysis made so far brings out the

unquestionable historical value of social conflict and particularly the role played by strike actions in achieving some of the most important democratic transformations of contemporary chilean society.

D. Class Struggles and Popular Democratic Struggles:
Class Theory and Contemporary History.

The intrinsic association between class struggles and democratic progress, a major historical finding of this research, would seem to contradict the sharp distinction between class struggle and popular struggle offered by Laclau and Mouffe in some of their recent appraisals of Marxist class theory. Laclau attempts to distinguish between the concept of "people" and that of class, insisting that the intelligibility of the people depends on the understanding of the political and ideological relationships that characterize domination and not merely on the contradictions found in production on which definition of classes is based. The contradiction inherent in people can be seen in the relationship between the power block and those who are dominated by it.^{575/} The

575. Ernesto Laclau, Política e Ideologia -- Na Teoria Marxista, Capitalismo, Fascismo, e Populismo. Translation into Portuguese from Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory. Paz e Terra, 1978, pp. 112, 114 and 172.

popular struggle, as opposed to class struggle, is based on a "democratic ideology", that is, a universe of symbols and values by which the different sectors of the dominated people become aware of their identity as antagonists of the power block.^{576/}

Therefore, not all contradictions are class contradictions nor are all the contradictions of the working class, class contradictions insofar as it is also part of the people. Furthermore, in the very same relationship between popular democratic ideology and class ideology, one may perceive the struggle of the working class to establish its hegemony over the rest of the popular sector.

Popular democratic ideology generally tends to appear traditionally as being based upon a class ideology, often of the most varied kind.^{577/} Despite their elementary nature, popular traditions make up a whole structure of meaning of even greater consistency and durability than social structure itself.^{578/} When dealing with the

576. I have not taken up the terms "interpellation" and popular subject used constantly by Laclau and taken directly from Althusser. According to Laclau, one of the major and more specific contributions of Althusser's analysis lies in the idea that the basic function of the ideology is the constitution of individuals as subjects, in other words, as agents who live the relationship with the existing material conditions as if they were the determining autonomous principle of this relationship. See Laclau, op. cit., pp. 106-107.

577. Ibid. p. 173.

578. Ibid. p. 174.

peasant war in Germany, Engels points out that plebeians had no rights, privileges nor possessions, and therefore, no liable assets nor contact with established institutions. However, for this same reason, the people's opposition could not be limited to the struggle against feudalism and the privileged bourgeoisie, for they had already gone further, "at least in their imagination, than the rising modern bourgeois society".^{579/} A group that has been deprived of absolutely all property begins to question the institutions' points of view and ideas common to all class societies. Thus, it is clear that we are dealing with a contradiction that is not strictly speaking a class contradiction, but one involving the masses and the state, or the power block and those dominated by it.

In a later work, in conjunction with Mouffe, Laclau develops even further his idea of democracy as "the field of popular action". The main actors in the confrontations occurring in Europe between 1789 and 1848 were the people, as plebeians rather than as the populus.^{580/} The

579. Engels, The Peasant War in Germany, quote by Laclau op. cit. p. 174.

580. In order to obtain a better understanding of the difference between the plebeians and the people, one must remember that in patrician-plebeian order in the Roman Republic, the latter began their struggle for democracy by participating in a relatively small number of institutions, such as the tribunes and the centurian comitia. It was
cont. next page.

masses that took over the barricades in France in 1789 and 1848, the Chartist agitation in England and the mobilizations of Mazzini and Garibaldi in Italy, all illustrate this phenomenon. After the prolonged reaction of 1850, when more popular demonstrations arose, the main actors had changed; they were the unions and the social democratic parties first in Germany and England and then in the rest of Europe.⁵⁸¹/

cont.

580. through these institutions that better living conditions were sought along with certain civil rights, such as the iustae nuptiae between plebeians and patricians and the right to citizenship. According to some, the distinctive feature of the plebeians lay in that their ethnic origin was different from that of the patricians. Others are of the opinion that the differences were essentially socio-economic, the plebeians typically being identified with peasants, artisans, clients and proletarians. The populus, on the other hand represented a sector of the senatus populesque romanus. It was guided by the tribunes, was capable of attaining consulship, could vote through the comitia, was armed in the legions, was the holder of civil rights and organized through its democratic party. In the later stages of its evolution, during the principality and the fall of the Western Roman Empire, these characteristics changed considerably. Generally speaking, during the principality the role of popular institutions grew less important, but with the fall of the Roman Empire they extended to all the "barbarians" occupying the imperial dominions. The feudal commune populi, successor of the original commune and based in the city, was to lead once more to the formation of a popular party founded on the corporative economic association of owners (magistri) and workers. It was the former however, which held all the power. This outline was based on the contributions of Roberto Bonini and Paola Collira to the Diccionario de Política, directed by Norberto Bobio and Nicola Matteucci, 2 Vols., Siglo XXI, Mexico, Spain, Argentina, Colombia, pp. 1358-1360, 1436-1443.

581. Laclau and Mouffe, op. cit., p. 156.

During the political struggles in Europe in the Nineteenth Century, when state and nation began to identify themselves with each other, new popular subjects linked to the initial stages of capitalist industrialization and represented or directly associated with the workers' parties, began to appear in the political scene. The amorphous nature of the people began to give way to a rational and class solidarity politics. Laclau points out that the workers, however, were unable to cover all of the sectors of society as an historic agent. The growing institutional complexity of the capitalist society was to lead to the separation of the popular sectors and their division into corporations.^{582/}

Subordinate relationships in which an agent is subject to the decision of others, develop into relationships of dominance when they are perceived as illegitimate ones. Democratic arguments then provide the basis for different kinds of resistance against subordination and for the struggle against inequality.^{583/} This may be observed from the French Revolution which was the first to establish the power of the people as its legitimizing principal, and also in the Chartist movement's demands for universal suffrage. In the case of the socialist

^{582.} Ibid, pp. 149-150.

^{583.} Ibid, pp. 153-154.

movement, the demand for political equality became the demand for economic equality. This extension of the egalitarian demand was no more than the application of Toqueville's assumption that

It is impossible to believe that equality will not finally penetrate as much into the political world as into other domains. It is not possible to conceive of men as eternally unequal among themselves on one point, and equal on others: at a certain moment they will come to be equal on all points.^{584/}

The expansion of the democratic principle of equality is associated with other phenomena also accompanying the development of advanced capitalist societies. New forms of subordination are generated by the "comodification" of a whole range of social relationships previously untouched by the market into which the entire society has been transformed.

Society's subordination to capital is no longer limited to the labour market, it now extends to culture, recreation, illness, education, sex and even death.^{585/} Another instance of subordination giving rise to potentially antagonistic dominance relationships and consequently to increasing demands for equality occur with the emergence of the Keynesian welfare state. The occupation

584. A de Toqueville, De la Democratie en Amerique, Paris 1981. Vol. 1, p. 115. Cited by Laclau and Mouffe, op. cit. p. 156.

585. Ibid, p. 159.

of the new areas by the state has not gone hand in hand with the democratization of society.

Lastly, the trend towards the homogenization of social life has brought about a proliferation of particularism as an expression of the search for autonomy, individualism and identity, which new rightist political philosophies have been quick to recognize. Commodification, bureaucratization and homogenization are all conflict areas that are fired by ideologies based on the concepts of equality and liberty and are, therefore, potentially revolutionary in terms of the expansion of the popular democratic struggle. On this basis, many different types of struggles could evolve, for example, urban, ecological anti-authoritarian, anti-establishment, feminist, racist, ethnic, regional and that of the sexual minority. Not all of these may be defined as class struggles in the strict sense, although one cannot deny their underlying classist nature derived from the universalization of commodification.

Under the conditions prevailing in advanced societies the change agents are fragmented and their specific discourses, although dispersed, are essentially equivalent. In the authors opinion, there should be no privileged positions and, therefore, no one would be more endowed ontologically than others nor predestined to subordinate all discourses to his own as a condition for the

emancipation of those who are being subordinated. The working class should integrate its popular democratic discourse to that of class. By definition, the democratic discourse is constructive, changing, pluralistic and a promotor of autonomy. It would not accept an aprioristic permanent nucleus, nor the supreme guarantee of its organizational nature, in other words, a "totalitarian" principle based on a privileged and immutable class, party or value.^{586/}

However, popular democratic ideology is more an expression of subversion that in itself is insufficient to become the nucleus around which society may be reconstructed.^{587/} The popular democratic struggle is, in essence, a strategy of opposition and the rejection of domination, which indicates the need for "a positive and constructive" strategy. The positive and the negative would not be stated theoretically beforehand as both compose an area of "contradictory tension which constitutes the specificity of the different political conjunctures".^{588/} Should this condition be specified, however, the result would give rise to an hegemonic principle, that is, a proposal for a "pluralistic, radical democracy". Its radical nature would necessarily have a socialist dimension in the abolition of capitalist production.

586. Ibid. esp. pp. 131-144 and 166-168.

587. Ibid. p. 188.

588. Ibid. p. 189.

the source of universal comodification and, therefore, of subordination and potential domination. However, the elimination of all capitalist production would not necessarily imply the end of all forms of inequality. This notion of hegemonic articulation would overcome the obstacles which, from the time of Lenin and Gramsci, have prevented a full understanding of the revolutionary potential of the popular democratic struggle.^{589/}

Laclau and Mouffe's proposal is based on a critical revision of the attempts of orthodox Marxism to fill the void that the principle of historic necessity was unable to do. History was to reveal the unexpected. The loss of the unity, totality and identity qualities theoretically adscribed to the working class concept called for a new principle lying the bases for radical constructing political initiatives. The search for this principle gave rise to the concept of hegemony.^{590/} This search is inherent in the spontaneousness of the mass strike of Luxemburg,^{591/} Kautsky's party,^{592/} later taking up by Lenin, the unionist myth of the general strike in Sorel,^{593/} the specificities of capitalism's development in Russia to be found in Trotsky in his debate with

589. Ibid. pp. 192-3.

590. Ibid. p. 7.

591. Ibid. pp. 8-13 (See also our Ch. I-C.b.).

592. Ibid. pp. 19-23. (See also our Ch.I-B.b).

593. Ibid. pp. 36-42. (See also our Ch. I-C.c).

Pokrovsky. The hegemony of the proletariat and the class alliance in Lenin are all also oriented to fulfill the void unforeseen by the theory.^{594/} Whether moderate or otherwise, insofar as these solutions were unable to free themselves of classist essentialism, they in fact remained orthodox and produced only desarticulated dichotomies, side-by-side but untouched. Economism thus produced a proliferation of dualism like necessity-spontaneity, political interest-economic interests, liberty-determinism, science-ethics, the individual-the collectivity, causality-teleology, and the like.^{595/} It was Gramsci who, partly based on Sorel and surpassing Lenin's concept of hegemony, began to question determinism, although in the end he was unable to offer any improvement on the established ontological foundations. Both Laclau and Mouffe considered his position to be incoherent and ambiguous.^{596/} According to these authors, one of the constitutive characteristics of Marxist thought has been the destruction of the idea of the people as an amorphous mass or an undefined category.^{597/}

 594. The apocalyptic and prophetic configurations of Labriola, the role of intellectual power in Otto Bauer and the evolutionist idealism in Bernstein also indulge in this search. See Ibid. pp. 25-26 and our Ch. I. in the section on Trotsky's Understanding on the special features of Russia's Historical development as well as our review of Lenin Analysis included in Ch.I.pp.11-13, 66-71 and 73-75

595. Ibid. p. 14.

596. Ibid. pp. 69-70.

597. Ibid. p. 63.

the concrete is reduced to the abstract. Diverse subject positions are reduced to manifestations of a single position; the plurality of differences is either reduced or rejected as contingent; the sense of the present is revealed through its location in a priori succession of stages. It is precisely because the concrete is in this way reduced to the abstract, that history, society and social agents have for orthodoxy, an essence which operates as their principle of unification. And as this essence is not immediately visible, it is necessary to distinguish between a surface or appearance of society and an underlying reality to which the ultimate sense of every concrete presence must necessarily be referred, whatever the level of complexity in the system of mediations.^{598/}

It is the hegemony concept that would emerge in a situation dominated by fragmentation and the indeterminate articulation between different struggles and subjects, each with different positions. A socialist solution could be the answer, but after having withdrawn the notion of necessity.^{599/}

The rebuilding of a fragmented unit would occur then, not only as a result of an inexorable future classist manifestation but also as the probable outcome of an articulated political struggle. Should the working class manage to utilize the plurality of "corporativist" struggles to make common democratic demands, it would be thanks to their political initiative and not to any supposedly privileged structural position.

598. Ibid. pp. 21-22.

599. Ibid. p. 13 (See also our Ch. I-B. a).

The hegemonic subject is a class subject only in the sense that, on the basis of class positions, a certain hegemonic formation is practically articulated; but, in that case we are dealing with concrete workers and not with the entelechy constituted by their historical interest".^{600/}

More recent attempts have been made by Braverman to reconstruct the unit through the so-called "deskilling" of the workers, which would in turn bring about a homogenization of proletarianization and then political struggles against the system.^{601/} However, he would not break completely with the previous notion that the laws of capital accumulation are determining factors against which the workers are impotent.^{602/} The controversy brought about by Poulantzas' attempts to define the concept of working class in an advanced capitalist society also occurs within the framework of economism in that it is an attempt to establish that the economic interests of certain classes are necessarily, and more or less directly, bound to socialism and the struggle against capitalism.^{603/} For Poulantzas the determining characteristic of the working class is derived from direct intervention

^{600.} Ibid, p. 65.

^{601.} Harry Braverman, Labour and Monopoly Capital. Monthly Review Press New York, 1974.

^{602.} Laclau and Mouffe, op. cit., pp. 81-85. A similar criticism may also be found in Anthony Giddens, "Power and Dialectics of Control and Class Structuration" in Profiles and Critiques on Social Theory, op. cit. p. 197-213.

^{603.} Laclau and Mouffe op. cit. pp. 81-85.

in the production of use values.^{604/} For Carchedi, the link between the "proletariat" and socialist policy is to be found by determining who carries out the functions of the collective worker.^{605/} Wright establishes multiple criterion for defining the working class, which exists where there is no control over investments, the accumulation process, the physical means of production and the work force.^{606/} In each case, the problem boils down to the question of who occupies the strategic position in the economy. For orthodox Marxists, this means the dominant level in capitalist society.^{607/}

Laclau's and Mouffe's objection to the economicist classist interpretation of the problems of the subjects of change and their relationship with socialist strategy are just one angle from which an epistemological critique of the analysis of the advanced capitalist societies may be made, where the economic level is given major importance as an explanatory element. Though their theoretical background differs, Giddens and Bobbio, among others,

604. Nicos Poulantzas, Les Classes Sociales dans le Capitalisme Aujourd'hui, Seuil, 1974, p. 231.

605. Guglielmo Carchedi, "The new Middle Class" in Economy and Society, Vol. 4, No. 1, 1975, p. 47.

606. Olin Wright, Class Crisis and the State, New Left Books, 1978, pp. 61-83.

607. See also Chantal Mouffe, "Clase Obrera, Hegemonia y Socialismo" in CEDEP, Socialismo y Participación, Peru, 1982, NO. 17, pp. 23-34.

also stress this type of limitation, particularly with regard to the lack of a Marxist political theory.

At any rate, the preeminence of the economic level as an explanatory source of class formation and struggles is found on a round and indisputable fact: the capitalist society is the only society in which classes are an intrinsic part of the labour process. As Giddens pointed out: capitalist society is the only society which is, at the same time, a mode of production and has a mode of production.^{608/} "This fact involves being both for and against Marx".^{609/} In effect, even though one admits the rudimentary and insufficient nature of Marx's political writings, one should not ignore his point of view on the explanatory value of capital-wage relations. The existence of "empty spaces" in Marx's political theory makes politics an "impotent" level in terms of generating societal knowledge. Politics is subject to explanation, but it does not explain too much. This is profoundly related to the antipolitical bias of the nineteenth century "that the State is subordinated to society and that, consequently, politics can be explained, or more accurately explained away, by reference to more deeply layered social phenomena".^{610/}

608. See his "Classes, Capitalism and the State" Profiles and Critiques in Social Theory op. cit. p.194

609. Idem.

610. Anthony Giddens, "Classical Theory and the Origins of Modern Sociology" in his op. cit. p. 57

Bobbio links Marx's political vacuum to primacy given to the conquer of power and thus, to the treatment of the party as being more important to this effect than the State. This is related to Marx's conviction that once the power is conquered by the working class, the State is bound to wither away sooner or later.⁶¹¹

Nevertheless, if Laclau and Mouffe's work is taken literally, it could be interpreted as a dichotomy involving class struggle and popular democratic struggle. This interpretation, however, has very little to do with the history of the labour movement in Chile, nor in Europe and America. In his criticism of T.H. Marshall's evolutionist point of view expounded in Citizenship and Social Class, Giddens points out that industrial citizenship or citizens' economic rights are not just an extension of general civil rights. The separation of economic from the political has tended, as is typical in capitalist society, to direct the conflict into which the labour organizations become involved, into two related forms. In each of these forms citizens' rights have been, and

611. Norberto Bobbio "Existe uma Doutrina Marxista do Estado?" In Norberto Bobbio, Masimo Boffa, Umberto Cerroni, Valentino Gerratana, Pietro Ingrao, Giuseppe Vacca e Outros in O Marxismo e o Estado. Graal.Biblioteca de Ciencias Sociais Rio de Janeiro 1979, pp. 13-33, translated from original Il Marxismo e lo Stato. Mondoperario. Edizioni Avanti, S.P.A. 1976, Roma, Italia.

still are, the focus of class conflict.^{612/} The formation of socialist labour parties has traditionally been oriented politically towards obtaining universal suffrage and establishing what Marshall calls, the welfare state. In actual fact, the real motivation would appear to be a combination of civil and political rights.

From an economic point of view, however, the situation differs due to the separation of economic and political issues. With the formation of the capitalist society, "the worker who walked through the door of the company gave up all control over the production process".^{613/} Giddens' argument may be summed up as follows:

It would be more correct to say that class conflicts have been a means of extending citizens' rights, than to say that citizens' rights have mitigated the division of classes.^{614/}

Citizens' rights, as seen by Marshall are a mixed blessing. On the one hand, they are "levers of the struggle to extend the range of human freedom", but on the other they are "sparking-points of conflict".^{615/} Neither the separation between class and people nor between class struggle and popular democratic struggle *proposed 6*

612. "Class Division, Class Conflict and Citizenship" in Anthony Giddens, op. cit., p. 174

613. Idem.

614. Idem

615. Ibid, pp. 174-175

Laclau and Mouffe are free of the limitations Giddens attributed to Marshall's divisions and those of other Marxist authors, although for different reasons, in the sense that they failed to stress that democratic or citizens rights could be achieved in substantial degree only through class struggle.^{616/}

Many Marxists have been dismissive of the part played by the labour movement in transforming what Macpherson calls the "liberal" state of the Nineteenth Century into the "liberal democratic" state of the twentieth.^{617/}

Failure to recognize the role of the labour movement in the democratization process in capitalist society not only means

to ignore the long term battles the workers have had to conduct in most countries to attain political and welfare rights, but...
(to) treat workers as mere dupes of the system.^{618/}

Another aspect that may be misinterpreted by a too literal reading of Laclau's proposal is the actual scope that the liberal European revolutions may have had from the workers' point of view. Let us recall the act drawn up in France from March 2-17, 1791, whereby the guilds

^{616.} Ibid, p. 1671.

^{617.} Anthony Giddens, "Power and the Dialectic of Control and Class Structuration" in op. cit., p. 211.

^{618.} Idem. See also Giddens, "Durkheim, Socialism and Marxism" in op. cit., p. 126.

were abolished and industry was proclaimed. This was immediately followed in June, 1791 by another bill, the Chapelier Act, which provided the legal framework for the development of capitalist relationships and which remained virtually unchanged for almost a hundred years. The liberal individualistic ideals of the legislators of the French Revolution were clearly voiced in this act. The daily wage was to be determined "by free and mutual agreement" between the worker and his employer. Beneath the formal equality granted by the revolution, there lay very real economic and social inequality.

The act of April 12, 1803, on the workbook, Articles 1780 and 1781 of the Civil Code regulating contracts and Articles 414 and 146 of the Penal Code, provide clear evidence of two basic principles contradictory to the acknowledgement of labour organizations, i.e. political individualism and the rejection of intermediaries, as understood by Rousseau, and laissez faire, whereby the ideal economic situation was considered possible only through the freedom of individual interests as formulated by Smith in his book on the nature and causes of the Nation's wealth.^{619/} Both the ideology and the legislation of the French Revolution were adopted by Belgium,

619. See Guy Caire, Freedom of Association and Economic Development, International Labour Office, Geneva, 1977, pp. 32-36.

Holland, Luxemburg, Scandinavia and several states of the German Confederation and in fact almost all the European countries took, with some modifications, the precepts of the Napoleonic Code regarding labour associations.⁶²⁰/ It would be unrealistic to try and sustain such a flattering point of view of the immediate revolutionary scope of the French Revolution for the working class. The same applies to Marshall's opinion on the evolution of economic rights into political rights.

Freeman and Medoff's conclusions on the historic importance of working class organizations in reducing economic and social inequality in the United States are also consistent with Gidden's view's on the role played by the working class in the democratization process and our point of view regarding the positive relationship between class struggle and democratization in Chile. The very large and extremely varied amount of empirical evidence offered by these two authors in their study is worthy of noting as perhaps the best example among the American economists of the quantitative use of data to back up their hypotheses. The more important references include the Annual Survey of the Manufacturer covering selected years from 1849 to 1942 and between 50,000 to

620. Idem.

70,000 establishments, Current Population Survey, which includes monthly surveys from 1943 to 1976 on approximately 100,000 individuals, Expenditures for Employee Consumption and Industry Wage Survey. All in all, thirteen sources of data with very broad coverage are used in this study.^{621/}

As a detailed coverage of the conclusions obtained in this work is impossible here, we will only refer to those aspects of most relevance to our own objectives. The results of the survey on the North American unions contrasts strongly with the prevailing conservative view of unions' negative role in reducing wage differences, favouring employment, increasing productivity and promoting democratic management in the firm and the universalization of their legal demands. The work precisely shows how important the American unions have been in achieving these very same aims and contributing to the improvement of the economic and social system as whole. The analysis shows that:

The unions are associated with greater efficiency in most settlements, reduce overall earnings inequality, and contribute to,

621. Richard B. Freeman and James L. Medoff, What do Unions do? Basic Books Inc. Publishers, New York, 1984, appendix, general sources analyzed, pp. 253-259.

rather than detract from, economic and economic and political freedom.^{622/}

Contrary to the unions' views as corporate groups representing the interests of a reduced number of individuals, the study shows that almost all the success attained in the history of the North American trade unions has been in the areas of general labour and social goals that benefit workers as a whole rather than unionist.^{623/}

If one examines the role of class organizations in light of the historical data available, one cannot consider it to be merely corporative. Our historical examination of the relevance of workers' unions in the process of democratization in Chilean society undoubtedly confirms this.

E. Final Comments, Methodology, History and Prospects

Perhaps it is worthwhile to attempt a critical assessment of the main characteristics of our approach in light of our preceding discussion. Although our guiding concepts and propositions are useful in grasping some dimensions of the field under study, in the final

^{622.} Ibid. p. 19.

^{623.} Ibid. p. 22.

analysis, they proved insufficient to cope with a phenomenon which revealed itself to be more complex and variable than we could assume at the beginning of this research. Therefore, in a sense we would like to suggest the bearing of our findings for our own initial theoretical assumptions. We would like to address these remarks to two main problems: the problem of stage-typology as the result of the "conjunction" of historical variables and the problem of the relationships between the working class and the political elites.

In constructing our stage typology a first methodological criterion applied consisted in distinguishing types of strikes and unions according to the objective changes observable in the behaviour of the relevant variables. During the period 1891 to 1915, the most distinctive aim of the workers' demands was the establishment of a status in society for labour. At the same time, the most outstanding, although not the most frequent character of workers' protests was the high degree of violence they involved. Another specific picture of this period was the major role played by workers linked to the nitrate enclave. Thus, we suggested that it might be possible to distinguish this period as a stage corresponding to an isolated, spontaneous and violent type of unionism. This characterization changes in subsequent years as a consequence of a number of changes ascertainable at the

level of the political variables conditioning strike actions and workers' organizations. Following this kind of reasoning, we went on to distinguish the five pertinent stages discussed in this work. The implicit methodological rationale of this procedure is to suggest qualitative changes according to the manifest changes exhibited by the variables pertaining to the strike dimensions and/or to their conditioning elements.

The main problem that may arise in the application of this procedure is that, if no account is taken of the general historical circumstances in which strike actions are framed, the typological derivations based only in the behavior observed of the relevant variables can lead us to a misunderstanding of the real meaning of workers' actions. Therefore, the fact that workers did not manifest their political demands during the earlier periods, through strike actions and as the distinctive features of such actions, should not induce us to assume that they lacked political motivation when engaging in strikes. As a matter of fact, the early leadership of workers, with the exception of the Partido Democrata was consistently committed to radical political ends, though this feature could not reveal itself at the workers' action level. A better explanation of the limits of strike action is the overall position of workers in the society of that time and the fact that the establishment of a meaningful social status for the worker

itself meant, during this period, a relatively radical political change.

This is an unavoidable area of methodological difficulty of the kind which arises when quantitative and qualitative types of analysis are combined in the study of a relatively lengthy historical period. However, we tried to minimize this difficulty to a certain extent, by distinguishing between the explicit strike aims and workers' broader motivations and by resorting to general economic and political variables to suggest elements conditioning strikes.

Another methodological operation implicit in our stage-typology in the assertion of qualitative changes on the basis of our observation of quantitative changes. This is best exemplified in the transition from an enclave type of economy to a step of homogenous industrialization of the country's economy. The impact of these changes on workers' behavior is not discernible only in a greater number of conflicts but also and mainly in a new quality which they came to possess, i.e. their degree of integration and organization. The emergence of the general strike is not the direct result of a greater number of strikes. The transformation of quantity into quality is effected by the actions of the elites. Nevertheless, they would not have been able to organize the general strike if economic material changes had not also taken place.

As far as the relationship between the working class and political elites is concerned, it has become apparent in this work, the extent to which we have relied on the Leninist Theory of the party which in its turn owes much to Kautsky. Yet, the role played by the bourgeois and the petite bourgeois elements external to the working class is not, in fact, as decisive as this theory would suggest. In practice, until the forties working class political leadership is conspicuously performed by workers, although admittedly this situation will change after the period of the Popular Front. It is necessary, therefore, to assess the specific sociological, ideological and economic conditions under which one or another type of leadership is likely to prevail - a subject of enquiry on its own right, and one which would require further theoretical as well as empirical research.

Finally, we would like to mention another recurrent problem of approach disclosed in this work and one which would seem to be relevant to the prospects for any change in the characteristics of present-day Chile. This has to do with the degree of freedom to initiate political changes available to the working class under present structural constraints. As repeatedly suggested by this work, in the past, the labour movement has always been able to re-emerge from the periods of inactivity and disorganization to which it was subjected by repressive

policies, as soon as the structural rigidities became less strong and permitted some degree of freedom. It will seem that the history of the labour movement is dialectically patterned so as to be capable of recovering more strongly when the objective economic and political limits to its fulfillment are weakened by the inner contradictions of those systems that can maintain their existence only at the expense of the life and dignity of large numbers of citizens. If the lessons and experiences of the past can survive in working class consciousness, despite the objective circumstances, or better yet, because of them, there is still some hope for better days.

TABLES_IN_THE_STATISTICAL_APPENDIX

- A-1 : EXPLICIT STRIKES ACTIONS AIMS 1890-1915.
- A-2 : EXPLICIT STRIKES ACTIONS AIMS 1916-1925.
- A-3 : EXPLICIT STRIKES ACTIONS AIMS 1938-1945.
- A-4 : FLUCTUATIONS IN NUMBER OF WHITE-COLLAR WORKERS BY BRANCHES OF THE ECONOMY (1940 - 1970).
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- A-6 : RANKING OF WAGE-RATES IN MINING AND OTHER BRANCHES OF THE ECONOMY 1947.
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- A-15: GMC PARTICIPATION IN THE NON-FERROUS MINING AND IN TOTAL AFFILIATION 1956-1968.
- A-16: ACTIVE POPULATION AND UNIONIZATION IN MINING GMC AND MANUFACTURING 1960-1968.
- A-17: DEMANDS FORMULATED IN THE PLIEGOS_DE_PETICIONES.

Cont.

TABLE No. A-1
EXPLICIT STRIKE ACTION AIMS 1890-1915

	R.	P.	M.	M.	C.	C.	B.	M.	R.	P.	LW	O	O I	T
	R.	o	i	u	a	n	k	e	y.	r	e	t	t	n
	W	t	e	c	s	e	a	W	n	t	k	e	e	a
	o	r	r	G	h	t.	r	l	o	t	h	e	r	s
	k	o	s	o	m	s	l	r	e	r	(1)	t	(5)	
	e	r		v	e	W	u	k	r	r				
	r	k		T.	n	o	r	g	r					
	s	e		E	(1)	k	i	s						
A I M S	s	r		m		e	s							
	s	s		p.		r	t	s						
Specific Economic aims related to living conditions														
15. Hygiene and housing conditions...	-	1	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3
16. Against freedom of commerce.....	-	-	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4
17. Establishment and/or maintenance of schools and libraries.....	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
General Economic aims														
18. Response to economic situation, inflation, unemployment.....	1	2	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	7
Aims related to Labour Organization														
19. Freedom of association, meetings and Press.....	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2
20. Legal recognition of organization and its representatives....	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
21. Employer's harassment of labour organization and its leaders....	1	2	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	4
22. Solidarity and support.....	2	9	2	-	-	-	-	1	2	2	-	-	-	18
Aims related to Political Aspects														
23. Against government repressive measures.....	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
24. Against laws and/or public measures damaging to worker's interest.....	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1

Definitions: 1) Carriage drivers, excluding tram workers and inter-city railroad worker
2) Construction building workers in general
3) Leather (i.e. tannery workers, commerce, actors, newsmen, etc.)
4) Other (i.e. slaughter house workers, commerce, actors, newsmen, etc.)
5) Other manufactures: glass, breweries, textiles, tailoring, tec.

Source: The classification of the data on this table is the authors, based on Jorge Barria's work, Los Movimientos Sociales de Principios del Siglo XX: Pedagogico Universidad de Chile, 1953.

TABLE No. A-1

EXPLICIT STRIKE ACTION AIMS 1890-1915

	R R.	P o r t W o r k e r s	M i n n e r k e r s	M u n. G o v e r n m e n t E m p. p.	C o n c h m e n (1)	C o n s t. W o r k e r s (2)	B a n k s l i b r a r i e s	M e t a l l u r g i s t s	R y. W o r k e r s	P r i n t e r s	L W O t h e r s (4)	O t h e r s (5)	O I n d u s t r i a l M a n u f a c t u r e r s	T o t a l (5)	
A I M S															
<u>Specific Economic Aims related to status</u>															
<u>Wages</u>															
1. Wage increases.....	20	42	32	1	5	3	13	11	12	18	19	7	14	197	
2. Against compulsory deductions....	2	1	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	1	10	
3. Non-payment of wages due.....	3	3	1	1	1	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	11	
<u>Economic Benefits</u>															
4. Against the truck system.....	1	8	8	-	-	-	2	1	-	-	-	-	-	20	
5. Additional payments overtime allowance.....	1	1	1	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	
<u>Working Hours</u>															
6. Less working hours, fulfillment of work regulations.....	5	5	4	-	1	1	1	2	2	3	3	-	4	31	
7. Half day on Saturday, holidays, night work.....	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	
8. Security at work.....	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	
9. Hygiene at work.....	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
10. Work systems and conditions.....	2	5	2	1	1	-	-	-	3	-	1	1	-	16	
<u>Labour Relations</u>															
11. Against abuse, arbitrary treatment, dismissals.....	3	6	9	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	-	-	-	20	
12. System of fines and its application.....	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	1	5	
13. Against dismissals or pro rehiring of dismissed personal.....	1	3	4	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	2	1	-	12	
14. Fulfillment of agreements and contracts.....	3	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	7	

CONT.

TABLE No. A-2

EXPLICIT STRIKE ACTIONS AIMS 1916-1925

	R.	P.	M.	H.	T.	C.	S.	B.	H.	P.	G.	T.	A.	G.	H.	T.	C.	O.	T.	S.	S.	O.	A.	T.	
	W.	o.	r.	W.	o.	r.	k.	o.	r.	k.	o.	r.	l.	o.	r.	k.	o.	r.	k.	o.	r.	k.	o.	r.	k.
	s.	r.	k.	s.	p.	e.	r.	s.	s.	s.	s.	s.	s.	s.	s.	s.	s.	s.	s.	s.	s.	s.	s.	s.	
A I M S																									
Specific Economic Aims related to Status as Workers																									
Wages																									
1. Wage increases.....	11	28	37	3	5	26	9	11	16	25	16	17	7	4	-	4	2	8	2	5	17	2	1	256	
2. Against compulsory deductions.	3	2	4	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	11	
3. Non-payment of wages due.....	-	1	5	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	9	
Economic Benefits																									
4. Against the truck system.....	1	7	4	1	-	2	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	1	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	19	
5. Additional Payments overtime, allowance.....	6	1	5	-	-	1	2	-	-	1	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	20	
Working Hours																									
6. Less working hours, fulfill-work regulations.....	3	4	10	-	3	11	1	1	5	2	7	7	2	2	-	-	-	6	-	-	3	-	1	68	
7. Half-day on Saturday, holidays, night work.....	-	2	1	-	-	1	-	3	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	9	
8. Security at work and work conditions.....	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	
9. Hygiene at work.....	-	-	2	-	-	-	1	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	
10. Work system and conditions....	10	9	14	-	4	2	-	-	2	-	2	-	3	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	51	
Labour Relations																									
11. Against abuse, arbitrary treatment, dismissals.....	2	1	11	-	-	2	1	1	1	1	2	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	1	-	-	24	
12. System of fines and its application.....	2	1	-	-	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	1	-	-	-	12	
13. Against dismissals or pro referring of dismissed personnel...	2	3	16	-	1	5	3	-	1	-	3	2	2	1	-	-	1	2	-	-	4	-	3	49	
14. Fulfillment of agreements and contracts.....	-	3	6	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	1	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	15	

CONT.

Cont.

TABLE No. A-2

EXPLICIT STRIKE ACTIONS AIMS 1916-1925

A I M S	R. R.	P. o. r. k. e. r. s.	M. f. u. n. d. a. t. i. o. n. s.	M. u. n. i. v. e. r. s. i. t. i. e. s.	T. e. a. c. h. e. r. s.	C. o. n. s. t. i. t. u. t. i. o. n. s.	S. h. o. o. l. s.	B. a. s. i. c. e. d. i. c. a. t. o. r. i. a. n. s.	M. e. m. b. e. r. s.	P. r. o. f. e. s. s. i. o. n. a. l. s.	G. r. a. d. u. a. t. e. s.	A. g. r. i. c. u. l. t. u. r. a. l. s.	M. a. c. h. a. n. i. f. i. c. a. t. o. r. s.	T. o. b. a. c. c. o. n. s. u. m. e. r. s.	C. a. r. p. e. n. s. e. r. s.	O. t. h. e. r. s.	T. e. a. c. h. e. r. s.	S. u. p. v. i. s. o. r. s.	S. e. r. v. i. c. e. s.	O. t. h. e. r. s.	A. t. t. e. n. d. e. e. r. s.	T. o. t. a. l.	
<u>Specific Economic aims related to living conditions</u>																							
15. Hygiene and housing conditions.....	1	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	7
16. Against freedom of commerce.....	-	1	11	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	12
17. Establishment and/or maintenance of schools and libraries.....	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
<u>General Economic aims</u>																							
18. Response to economic situation, inflation unemployment.....	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	11	12	
<u>Aims related to labour organization</u>																							
19. Freedom of association meetings and press.....	-	2	8	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	14	
20. Legal recognition of organization and its representatives.....	3	6	9	1	1	3	2	-	3	1	2	6	3	1	-	-	3	1	-	1	-	1	47
21. Employer's harassment of labour organization and its leaders.....	-	3	13	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	5	3	1	1	-	-	3	-	-	1	1	4	32
22. Solidarity and support.....	2	8	6	-	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	4	26
<u>Aims related to Political Aspects</u>																							
23. Against government repressive measures.....	2	6	11	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	2	-	-	1	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	13	38
24. Against laws and/or public measures damaging to worker's interest.....	-	2	5	-	2	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	8	20

SOURCE: Classification of the reasons is our own. Taken from J. Barría, "Los Movimientos Sociales en Chile desde 1910 hasta 1926". Memoria: Derecho Universidad de Chile, 1960.

EXPLICIT STRIKE ACTIONS AIMS
1938-1945

Cont.

Cont.

TABLE No. A-3

EXPLICIT STRIKE ACTIONS AIMS
1939-1950

A I M S	R	P	M	T	C	T	B	M	P	F	T	O	A	S	T	O	N	T
	R.	P.	M.	T.	C.	T.	B.	M.	P.	F.	T.	O.	A.	S.	T.	O.	N.	T.
	o	f	r	o	a	s	e	r	o	e	t	g	e	e	t	o	t	
	W	t	e	n	s	n	e	a	n	d	t	e	v	c	e	D	a	
	o	r	s.	t.	e	r	i	t	s	r	V	i	h	r	e	1		
	r	W	s	r	s	r	s	e	t	V	o	c	e	(5)	t			
	k	o	W	W	s	W	r	u	o	M	r	e	r		a			
	e	r	o	o	(2)	o	s	f	r	a	k	s						
	r	k	r	r		k	f	k	n	e	(4)							
	s	e	k	k		k	s	e	u	r								
	r	e	e	e		e	(3)	r	f	s								
	s	r	r	s		s	s	(5)										
						(1)												1.
17. Establishment and/or main- tenance of schools and libraries.....	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	2	
<u>General Economic aims</u>																		
18. Response to economic sit- uation, inflation unem- ployment.....	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	3	
<u>Aims related to labour organizations</u>																		
19. Freedom of association meetings and press.....	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	2	
20. Legal recognition of organization and its representatives.....	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
21. Employer's harassment of labour organization and its leaders.....	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	3	
22. Solidarity and support.....	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
<u>Aims related to Political Aspects</u>																		
23. Against government repressive measures.....	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	
24. Against laws and/or public measures damaging to work- er's interest.....	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	

Source: J. Stambuck's. Los Movimientos Sociales durante el Frente Popular. Thesis Universidad Técnica.
El Mercurio (daily issues from December, 1950)

- Note: 1) Construction building workers in general.
2) Leather: shoemakers, tanners and briefcase workers.
3) Foodstuffs: condensed milk factory, grinders, bakers, breweries, fruits.
4) Services: Water, gas, public assistance, bankers, post offices, telgraphs, Hotel Management.
5) Other Manufacturing: elevators, explosives, doors and windows, furniture, pharmacy, carbide, sacks, ceramics, tiles, matches, funerals.
6) Others: commercial firms, cold rooms, zoos, gas (4)

T A B L E No. A-4
 FLUCTUATIONS IN NUMBER OF WHITE-COLLAR
 WORKERS BY BRANCHES OF THE ECONOMY
 1940-1970

Falling Number	Census 1940	Census 1970
Agriculture	50,281	26,760
Total	50,281	26,760

Increasing Numbers	Census 1940	Census 1970
Manufacturing	22,852	99,340
Commerce	40,869	87,000
Services	85,948	346,360
Transport	43,289	80,720
Total	192,958	613,320

N u m b e r	Census 1940	Census 1970
Falling	50,281	26,760
Increasing	192,958	613,320
Total	243,239	640,080
Total census 1940		243,239
Total Increase		396,841

Source: Census for the years indicated.

I_A_B_L_E__A-5

FLUCTUATIONS IN NUMBER OF BLUE-COLLAR WORKERS BY BRANCH OF ECONOMY (1940-1970)

Falling Numbers	C e n s u s	
	1940	1970
Agriculture	409,337	314,580
Services	267,135	238,240
Total	676,472	552,820

Increasing Numbers	C e n s u s	
	1940	1970
Manufacturing	184,702	221,700
Commerce	23,481	54,380
Transport and Communication	36,167	38,140
Total	244,350	314,220

Drop in Size	C e n s u s	
	1940	1970
Total Falling Numbers	676,472	552,820
Total Increasing Numbers	244,350	314,220
Total	920,822	867,040
Less Total Census 1970	867,040	
Total Drop in Size	53,782	

Sources : Census for the years indicated

T_A_B_L_E__A-6

RANKING OF WAGE-RATES IN MINING AND
OTHER BRANCHES OF THE ECONOMY
1947

Branches	Monthly Wage-Rates	R
Mining		
Copper	2,689,69	1
Coal	2,248,40	4
Nitrate	1,752,70	9
Intercity Railroad (1)	2,738,23	2
Shoemakers (2)	-	-
Tanners (2)	1,884,90	8
Metalurgy (1)	1,943,01	7
Printing (1)	2,180,71	5
Textiles (2)	2,057,40	6
Post Office (1)	-	-
Glass Workers (1)	1,543,46	11
Matches (2)	1,650,00	10
Electricity (2)	2,555,10	3

Source : Dirección de Estadísticas y Censos. Imprenta y Litografía Universo. Anuario Estadístico de Chile, Minería e Industria (1947), Anuario de Industrias (1947), Anuario de Finanzas, Bancos y Cajas Sociales (1947)

Notes : (1) Monthly salaries were computed from yearly salaries
(2) Monthly salaries were computed from daily salaries.
R = Place occupied in the overall ranking.

TABLE No. A-7
RANKING OF WAGES-RATES IN MINING AND OTHER ACTIVITIES. (1919 - 1924)
IN PESOS EACH YEAR

Activities	1919		1920		1921		1922		1923		1924	
	Salaries	R	Salaries	R	Salaries	R	Salaries	R	Salaries	R	Salaries	R
Mining												
Copper	178.79	4	211.43	1	236.43	3	248.56	1	276.14	2	314.96	1
Coal	253.87	1	180.93	3	291.75	1	234.26	3	250.25	3	292.20	3
Nitrate	209.81	2	-	-	256.84	2	248.35	2	281.231	1	300.10	2
Maritimes												
Stenedores	155.38	6	166.79	7	157.53	10	162.84	9	175.33	7	110.75	20
Transportation												
Body work and garages	133.64	10	147.18	10	154.91	11	174.49	7	193.13	5	225.20	6
Shoemakers												
Shoe factory	103.19	16	112.26	14	121.88	15	144.58	11	148.99	11	153.15	13
Bakers	-	-	186.15	2	203.18	4	210.85	4	-	-	251.20	4
Metalurgy												
Wealding	135.84	9	152.60	9	162.33	8	160.43	10	170.60	9	182.80	8
Horseshoe factory	-	-	-	-	-	-	144.34	12	153.06	10	159.97	11
Mastery	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Printing												
Printing and book balnding	148.70	7	169.17	5	185.57	5	179.75	6	201.67	4	224.08	7
Food												
Mill	89.34	18	17.60	19	110.84	18	109.80	20	112.90	20	134.18	17
Cracker factory	84.86	19	17.16	20	85.00	21	115.73	17	123.50	17	140.72	14
Noodles factory	111.42	14	123.14	12	138.15	13	122.37	15	129.49	13	158.68	12
Meats and fish factory	95.98	17	46.20	18	73.26	22	82.84	23	-	-	-	-
Textile												
Wool and cotton factory	84.71	20	91.24	16	91.26	20	95.14	22	103.47	21	109.00	21
Silk factory	123.43	12	89.59	17	116.02	16	103.92	21	127.82	14	138.75	15
Cloths and cashmires factory	84.86	19	116.02	13	122.30	14	139.93	13	129.67	12	122.75	18
Manufacturing												
Cement Fact.	175.66	5	175.20	4	175.86	6	184.49	5	119.81	18	164.72	10
Ceramic Fac.	121.02	13	133.25	11	139.29	12	134.73	14	173.71	8	177.02	9
Porcelin Fac.	111.41	15	162.31	8	162.31	9	118.36	16	124.10	16	108.35	22
Glass Fact.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Bottles	181.91	3	105.10	15	105.10	19	114.44	19	126.97	15	136.18	16
Tabaco	124.46	11	113.32	13	113.32	17	115.38	18	117.70	19	112.78	19
Furniture	137.67	8	168.60	6	162.44	7	164.13	8	184.88	6	235.87	5

Source: For mining activities: Dirección de Estadísticas de Chile, Anuario Estadístico de Chile Minería, Imprenta y Litografía Universo, años correspondientes.

For the others activities: dirección General de Estadísticas, Anuario estadístico de Chile y Anuario de Industrias, Imprenta y Litografía Universo, años correspondientes.

Note: R: Ranking wages.

TABLE No. A-8

RANKING OF WAGE-RATES IN MINING AND OTHER ACTIVITIES
(1941 - 1945)
(In pesos of each year)

Activities	1941		1942		1943		1944		1945	
	Salaries	R	Salaries	R	Salaries	R	Salaries	R	Salaries	R
<u>MINING</u>										
Copper	914.84	1	1,069.05	3	1,348.09	3	1,521.13	2	1,466.78	5
Coal	790.33	3	980.59	4	1,462.17	1	1,543.20	1	1,063.16	2
Nitrate	840.93	2	940.90	6	1,067.61	6	1,172.52	3	1,229.86	8
<u>OTHER ACTIVITIES</u>										
Railroads(1)	754.30	4	1,189.79	2	1,206.00	5	-	-	-	-
Shoemakers(2)	691.50	6	777	8	987.79	7	-	-	1,307.16	7
Tanners	621.60	8	777.90	7	899.60	9	-	-	1,589.41	3
Metalurgies(1)	551.59	9	750.03	9	936.41	8	-	-	1,262.53	9
Printing(1)	726.08	5	953.71	5	1,242.24	4	-	-	1,672.24	1
Textile(3)	653.10	7	652.80	10	1,441.42	2	-	-	1,396.20	6
Post Offices(1)	302.38	11	1,571.50	1	-	-	-	-	-	-
Glass Workers(1)	423.69	10	617.31	11	779.79	10	-	-	1,146.36	10
Matches(2)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,015.80	11
Electricity(2)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,498.50	4

Sources: For Mining: "Dirección de Estadísticas de Chile", Anuario Estadístico de Chile, Minería, Imprenta y Litografía Universo, años correspondientes.

For the others activities: Dirección de Estadísticas, Anuario de Industrias y Anuario de Finanzas y Bancos y Cajas Sociales, Imprenta y litografía Universo, años correspondientes.

- Notes: (1) Monthly salaries calculated on the basis of the yearly salaries paid to all Blue-Collar workers of the sector.
 (2) Calculated on the basis of daily salaries.
 (3) Monthly salaries for 1941-2-5 were computed on the basis of daily salaries. Monthly salaries for 1943 computed from yearly total of salaries paid to all Blue-Collar workers of the sector.

R = Place occupied in the overall ranking of salaries.

I_A_B_L_E__A-2

LEGAL AND ILEGAL STRIKES FROM 1961 to 1971

YEARS	LEGAL	ILEGAL
1961	430	405
1962(1)	-	-
1963	89	553
1964	64	369
1965	134	638
1966	121	592
1967	1,240	894
1968	222	691
1969	206	771
1970	218	1,085
1971	178	2,161

Source: Same sources indicated in Table 19, p. 351.

(1) No information available for 1962.

TABLE A-10

TOTAL TRADE UNION AND MEMBERS DISTRIBUTED BY LARGE DIVISIONS OF ECONOMIC
ACTIVITIES AND TENDENCY INDEX

		1956	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968
													(1)	
1. Mining	Union	187	173	167	177	149	145	146	150	152	168	192	205	225
	Memb.	71,656	66,787	66,988	69,196	63,434	57,969	56,283	55,463	55,738	60,394	60,319	60,845	61,804
2. Manufacturing Industry	Union	979	975	845	931	810	773	754	757	768	831	1,190	1,465	1,624
	Memb.	131,256	126,533	121,251	123,096	114,860	113,363	113,435	115,154	120,434	130,401	162,173	180,441	192,282
3. Public Service	Union	38	38	38	36	33	33	34	36	38	41	53	62	68
	Memb.	8,441	8,712	8,878	9,486	8,439	9,222	8,992	10,730	10,484	11,973	12,457	13,165	14,832
4. Construction	Union	92	97	91	34	71	69	66	67	68	73	114	129	136
	Memb.	7,226	7,170	5,917	6,856	6,845	6,495	6,184	6,459	7,653	8,746	13,108	13,557	14,324
5. Commerce	Union	124	117	115	112	89	86	82	86	84	91	136	166	202
	Memb.	9,045	8,535	8,202	8,067	6,651	7,013	6,764	7,271	7,271	8,860	13,605	20,448	19,804
6. Transportation storage, communication	Union	190	191	185	185	160	161	162	163	169	185	214	239	261
	Memb.	22,232	21,775	20,691	21,437	16,682	17,035	16,970	17,714	18,653	18,552	21,101	23,412	23,315
7. Financing Service	Union	130	126	116	85	37	35	33	36	39	45	64	79	91
	Memb.	13,081	12,756	11,857	10,028	3,755	2,754	2,514	3,545	3,964	4,605	6,114	7,082	8,796
8. Civil Service	Union	170	169	164	157	118	117	164	120	123	138	185	220	248
	Memb.	21,722	20,242	20,398	19,074	12,895	12,643	12,155	13,318	14,030	15,763	19,981	23,057	25,656
9. Zone syndicate the EE. PP.	Union	54	55	54	55	53	53	55	58	59	57	63	63	65
	Memb.	3,975	3,994	4,040	3,753	3,445	3,801	4,089	4,435	4,663	4,905	4,837	4,918	5,804
10. Non-specified activities	Union	4	3	3	3	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0
	Memb.	137	137	141	131	28	23	23	23	0	0	0	0	0
Total affiliation	Union	1,968	1,944	1,781	1,825	1,521	1,473	1,447	1,474	1,500	1,629	2,211	2,628	2,920
	Memb.	289,371	276,646	268,363	271,132	237,034	230,338	227,409	234,112	243,439	274,199	313,695	382,925	368,617
Index	Union	100	100	96	93	78	76	75	77	78	84	111	130	146
	Memb.	100	96	93	93	82	80	78	81	84	91	109	119	129

SOURCE: Gonzalo Belmar Fagalde, *Tendencias de la Afiliación Legal no Agrícola en Chile por Ramas de Actividad Económica, 1956-1968*. Memoria de Ingeniería Comercial Universidad de Chile cuadro 1, Santiago 1971. Data pertaining to patron syndicate and agriculture sector were eliminated from the memory of this work.

Note: Electricity, gas and wates are included in public services. Banks, insurances building, are including financial services and people social services, expanding services and personal services are included in services.

TABLE A-11

MINING TRADE UNIONS AND MEMBERS
1956-1968

		1956	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968
Mining coal	T. Union	32	30	27	27	21	24	24	26	26	26	29	30	31
	Member	22,295	21,202	21,920	21,020	19,545	18,382	16,185	15,385	14,827	14,845	14,190	14,643	14,857
Petroleum	T. Union	11	12	12	13	13	13	11	11	10	11	15	15	18
	Member	1,170	1,224	1,026	1,006	997	994	838	935	797	855	985	1,070	1,206
Extr. Iron Mining	T. Union	11	13	14	21	19	19	24	29	32	38	44	48	53
	Member	2,287	2,785	2,799	4,530	3,897	3,672	4,321	4,243	5,669	8,142	7,864	7,952	7,422
Extr. non-ferrous Mining	T. Union	64	54	56	59	48	49	48	47	48	54	61	66	74
	Member	20,191	18,713	19,422	21,297	20,300	20,242	20,816	21,302	21,429	23,640	24,385	25,466	27,591
Ext. nitrate	T. Union	66	62	57	57	49	41	40	39	38	41	44	49	53
	Member	25,271	22,419	21,729	21,296	19,012	15,172	14,651	14,310	13,716	13,802	13,767	13,017	12,706
Extr. Other Mining	T. Union	8	9	8	7	3	3	3	2	3	3	4	5	6
	Member	893	863	541*	541	186	201	201	174	204	175	420	511	594
Total mining	T. Union	192	180	174	184	153	149	150	154	157	173	197	213	235
	Member	72,007	67,206	67,437	63,938	58,663	58,663	57,072	56,347	56,642	61,459	61,610	62,659	64,376

Source: Ibid.

Note: Due to the limitation of our source, the patron syndicates cannot be disregarded in these note. Nevertheless, only in 1959 and 1960 these syndicates present a relatively high participation. See this Table in comparison with preceding table. Non-ferrous minerals include copper mining, small-medium and large-scale lead, zinc, magnese, mercury and small-scale gold mining and other small-scale metallurgy industries.

T.A.B.L.E. No. A-12

ACTIVE POPULATION AND ESTIMATED UNIONIZATION IN GMC: 1956-1968

Years	Active Population in GMC			Estimated Unionization		
	Blue Collar	White Collar	Total	Blue Workers	White Collar	Total
1956	13,385	3,757	17,142	13,385	2,306 (0.55) (1)	15,691 (0.91) (2)
1957	13,605	4,121	17,726	13,605	2,402 (0.58)	16,007 (0.90)
1958	13,130	4,366	17,496	13,130	2,595 (0.59)	15,725 (0.89)
1959	12,938	4,675	17,613	12,938	3,330 (0.71)	16,268 (0.92)
1960	12,802	4,642	17,444	12,802	3,263 (0.70)	16,065 (0.92)
1961	13,836	4,818	1,654	13,836	3,402 (0.70)	17,238 (0.92)
1962	12,918	4,772	17,690	12,918	3,514 (0.73)	16,432 (0.92)
1963	13,276	4,973	18,249	13,276	3,844 (0.77)	17,120 (0.93)
1964	13,409	5,478	18,887	13,409	4,126 (0.75)	17,535 (0.92)
1965	13,338	6,000	19,346	13,338	4,721 (0.78)	18,059 (0.93)
1966	12,062	7,005	19,067	12,062	5,334 (0.76)	17,396 (0.91)
1967	12,720	7,761	20,481	12,720	5,746 (0.74)	18,446 (0.90)
1968	13,575	8,446	22,021	13,575	6,262 (0.74)	19,837 (0.90)

Source: Information on active proportional population by CODELCO, "Gerencia de Relaciones Industriales", 1974.

Data on unionization elaborated from the Minister of Labour and INSORA, (see Table A-13).

Note: (1) See note below.

(2) Total rate of unionization.

Unfortunately, there is no official statistical information on the unionization in GMC for which reason we have estimated it. In various interviews with CODELCO executives the Minister of Labour, INSORA professors and CNTC leaders, it was stated that the union elections reached practically all its members. See Table A-13 regarding number of members who participated in the elections.

The distribution of the unionized population among employees and workers is done, taking into account that in the case of the latter, it is obligatory to belong to the union in all GMC work centres. This means, that once a worker starts to work in one of the GMC companies he automatically becomes a member of the union. For this reason, all the active population, under the workers category, belong to the union. In the case of employees, membership is not obligatory.

TABLE A-13

SIC WORKERS PARTICIPATING IN TRADE UNION ELECTIONS
1944-1973

Syndicate	1944	1945	1946	1947	1948	1949	1950	1951	1952	1953	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	
INDUSTRIAL																															
Blue-Collar	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4,700	4,861	4,840	4,804	4,747	4,747	4,747	4,728	4,708	4,256	3,904	4,044	4,044	3,035	2,035	3,005	-	4,407	
Chuquicamata	98	95	73	71	82	87	81	81	73	75	75	78	84	89	89	93	93	65	38	36	34	30	33	33	33	54	64	69	63	-	
Antofagasta	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	260	261	263	235	223	220	221	238	256	153	137	197	168	166	197	-	158	
Tocopilla	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Esquillo	-	-	662	220	190	175	156	150	143	181	169	156	180	223	220	267	155	244	157	161	166	173	173	173	169	176	179	181	-	-	
Tirador	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	740	909	1,400	1,721	1,500	1,500	1,971	2,002	2,552	1,945	2,042	2,091	2,115	2,139	-	
Potrerillo	-	-	1,286	1,286	1,155	1,486	915	1,102	1,106	1,172	1,192	1,172	1,300	1,257	1,257	1,215	890	665	665	665	665	667	716	716	914	914	914	914	914	-	
Cora Pascal	-	-	371	342	345	301	330	415	500	457	338	315	219	243	231	261	268	276	276	245	245	254	245	314	314	314	314	314	313	-	-
Patagonia	-	-	1,465	1,549	1,501	1,462	1,400	1,400	1,445	1,600	1,693	1,430	1,325	1,170	1,245	1,216	1,392	1,332	1,191	1,109	1,041	1,041	1,041	1,041	1,010	1,032	1,051	1,092	-	-	
La Estora	-	-	836	820	830	929	840	890	900	910	948	1,099	958	863	903	941	960	979	979	939	919	939	959	959	959	1,004	1,125	1,246	1,487	1,642	1,797
Sevelli y Mina	-	-	5,500	4,562	3,300	3,720	3,400	3,500	3,600	3,000	3,000	2,980	2,880	3,263	3,066	2,869	2,722	2,722	2,945	2,945	3,097	2,794	2,794	3,781	3,589	3,394	3,006	-	-	-	
Llante	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	165	175	170	156	210	200	189	200	195	200	240	240	246	242	242	237	-	-	-
EMPLOYEES																															
PROFESSIONS	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	969	1,020	1,187	1,354	1,290	1,307	1,319	1,398	1,473	1,766	2,059	2,354	2,354	3,863	3,863	3,863	-	4,285	
White-Collar	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	48	48	40	32	33	34	36	41	45	50	55	58	60	-	-	-
Chuquicamata	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	60	62	64	62	64	69	98	135	137	144	153	162	164	-	-	-
Antofagasta	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	296	296	440	649	549	678	707	752	883	931	1,066	1,127	1,171	1,336	1,418	1,500	-	-	-
Tocopilla	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	315	330	200	396	396	458	520	596	596	673	777	803	953	975	996	1,092	-	-	-
Potrerillos	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	64	64	64	63	63	78	94	120	120	146	146	146	177	180	201	222	-	-	-
Antigua	-	-	115	125	257	321	291	316	320	390	268	269	263	315	330	420	421	422	414	463	512	562	562	562	588	833	977	1,265	-	-	-
Cora Pascal	-	-	85	81	89	79	77	79	82	95	79	67	54	62	64	63	63	78	94	120	120	146	146	146	177	180	201	222	-	-	-
Sevelli y Mina	-	-	548	520	509	480	493	530	454	479	466	410	356	402	416	430	425	420	421	422	414	463	512	562	562	588	833	977	1,265	-	-
Caletones	-	-	68	44	75	92	97	95	91	80	79	85	81	73	76	84	88	93	103	106	133	153	153	146	261	296	330	454	-	-	-
Chuquicamata	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
El Teniente	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Totals	8,715	8,167	8,880	9,005	9,326	8,888	8,459	8,379	8,314	8,155	7,697	7,330	14,213	14,578	14,444	15,946	16,011	16,260	16,113	16,401	16,564	17,275	17,099	18,254	19,441	20,451	20,763	21,378	-	-	-

Source: Official Register, Department of Social Organizations, Labour Bureau Complemented by data from INSORA's archives.

Note : Data before 1956 incomplete
Previous electoral trends used to calculate results in years when no elections took place.
Incomplete data available for years 1972 and 1973.

TABLE A-14

ACTIVE POPULATION ON NON FERROUS AND PARTICIPATION OF THE LARGE-SCALE COPPER MINING

Mining	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	Mean
Large-scale copper mining	17,690	18,249	18,887	19,345	19,067	20,481	22,021	19,392
Medium-scale copper mining	7,862	9,622	10,557	10,836	13,803	12,816	10,682	10,940
Small-scale copper mining	-	3,960	4,661	5,283	4,965	3,878	3,402	4,350
Lead and zinc	166	201	220	283	235	209	205	217
Mercury mining	-	53	69	85	73	68	77	71
Manganese mining	550	613	595	325	258	244	244	376
Small-scale copper mining	-	-	47	23	11	14	30	25
Small-scale mining other metals	-	212	-	-	-	-	-	212
Total	26,268	32,910	35,235	36,181	38,412	37,710	36,661	35,591
Participation in percentage of the large-scale copper mining represented in percentage	67.3	55.4	53.6	53.5	49.6	54.3	60.1	54.5

Source: Table elaborated in information later from the Mining Ministry, Anuario de Minería and information given by Ministry of Industrial Relations of CODELCO, this last source is for the active population in G.M.C.

Note: No available information before a 1962

T_A_B_L_E__A-15

GMC PARTICIPATION IN THE NON-FERROUS MINING,
AND IN TOTAL UNIONIZATION
(PERCENTAGES)

YEARS	GMC PARTICIPATION IN THE UNIONIZATION		
	NON-FERROUS MINING	MINING	TOTAL
1956	77	22	4.7
1957	85	24	5.0
1958	81	23	5.1
1959	81	24	5.6
1960	86	27	6.4
1961	87	30	6.8
1962	84	31	6.8
1963	84	32	6.7
1964	84	32	6.5
1965	79	31	6.3
1966	76	30	5.2
1967	78	32	5.1
1968	77	33	5.0

Source: Tables A-10, A-11 and A-12 of this appendix.

TABLE A-16

ACTIVE POPULATION(1) AND UNIONIZATION IN MINING GMC AND
MANUFACTURING 1960-1968

Years	M i n i n g			G. M. C.			M a n u f a c t u r i n g		
	Active Popu- lation	Union- ized Popu- lation	Unioni- zation Rate	Active Popu- lation	Union- ized Popu- lation	Unioni- zation Rate	Active Popu- lation	Union- ized Popu- lation	Unioni- zation Rate
1960	92.5	63.9	0.69	17.4	16.0	0.92	412.6	115.8	0.28
1961	94.9	58.7	0.62	18.6	17.2	0.92	439.7	114.3	0.26
1962	91.7	57.1	0.62	17.6	16.4	0.92	450.4	112.4	0.25
1963	88.7	56.3	0.63	18.2	17.1	0.93	464.5	115.9	0.25
1964	91.7	56.6	0.62	18.8	17.5	0.92	477.9	121.0	0.25
1965	93.4	61.5	0.66	19.3	18.0	0.93	506.7	131.0	0.26
1966	93.6	61.6	0.66	19.0	17.3	0.91	527.7	163.0	0.31
1967	94.0	62.7	0.67	20.4	18.4	0.90	534.5	181.4	0.34
1968	94.5	64.4	0.68	22.0	19.8	0.90	544.6	193.4	0.36
Average	92.8	60.3	0.65	19.0	17.5	0.92	484.3	138.7	0.29

Source: Table based on ODEPLAN, Población ocupada por sectores económicos 1960-1970; and Tables A-10, A-11 and A-12.

(1) Expressed in thousands and provided in 100.

cont.

I_A_B_L_E_A-17

DEMANDS FORMULATED IN THE PLIEGOS DE PETICIONES

Demands	No. Of Demands
11.- Sports contribution	6
12.- Tombs, Life insurance	3
13.- Housing: improvement, construction	5
14.- Scholarships for workers or families	4
<u>Working Hours</u>	
1.- Set working days	6
2.- Tolerance in justified delays	3
3.- Coffee Breaks	1
4.- Emergency schedule	2
5.- Vacation	2
6.- Holidays	4
7.- Vacations; increases, progressive	45
<u>Working Conditions.</u>	
1.- Improvement in premises, machinery and/or food	23
2.- Transportation facilities for: accident, death, work transportation	5
3.- Headquarters	22
4.- Insurance company/policy for tools	6
<u>Working Relations.</u>	
1.- Immovability for extra time or duration of conflict	11
2.- Workers and employees classifications	10
3.- Promotion system	14
4.- Summary system	2
5.- Size of Personnel	6
6.- Raises for years of work	2
7.- Copy of employment contract for employees	3
8.- Good treatment on the part of the supervisors	2
9.- Death leaves	6
10.- Recognition of sick or accident leaves	33

cont.

I-A-B-L-E-A-17

DEMANDS FORMULATED IN THE PLIEGOS DE PETICIONES

Demands	No. Of Demands
<u>Remunerations</u>	
Increase in wages and/or salaries	71
<u>Other economic benefits</u>	
1.- Readjustments: payment system	16
2.- Fringe benefits	22
3.- Increases: commissions, percentages, utility participation	14
4.- Loans, system, granting and condonation	10
5.- Prices, especial facilities in personnel purchases	7
6.- Limited grocery store prices, casino	5
7.- Prices and different bonus	12
8.- Charges for: night, Sunday and holidays overtime	29
9.- Designation for: years, resignation or lay-off, work accidents, incapacity, dangerous jobs, transportation, food, use of tools and diets	91
10.- Christmas bonus, new years and legal holidays	93
11.- Vacations	14
12.- Pay during stoppage, bad weather, etc.	9
13.- Bonus: new improvements	52
14.- Indemnification: better uses	25
<u>Social Benefits.</u>	
1.- Birth allowance	41
2.- School allowance	40
3.- Military allowance	30
4.- Marriage allowance	15
5.- Lodging or rental allowance	13
6.- Medical dental, hospitalization, sickness allowance	11
7.- Death allowance	49
8.- Summer home; vacation site, yearly outing	7
9.- Collective vacations	2
10.- Medical dental and or social servies	8

cont.

cont.

I_A_B_L_E_A-17

DEMANDS FORMULATED IN THE PLIEGOS DE PETICIONES

Demands	No. Of Demands
<u>Labour Organization</u>	
1.- Assistance syndicate library	1
2.- Permits to syndicate leaders	17
3.- Quota discount	11
4.- Recognition of syndicate delegates	14
<u>Collective Covenants:-</u>	
1.- Enforcement throughout the company	22
2.- Retroactive effectiveness	63
3.- Maintenance of prior benefits	50
4.- Non-repression	23
5.- Covenants for all branch companies	3
6.- Compliance with legal agreements/dispositions	13

Source: Elaborated with information taken from Fernando Onfray, "El Conflicto Colectivo, Algunos Aspectos Prácticos", INSORA, Santiago, Mimeo, 1966, pp. 41-46.

Sample: 74 pliegos recognized by the "Juntas de Conciliación de Santiago", on 1965.

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