Solidarity, the Network and the History of Workers' Self-Management from the Gdańsk Agreement to Shock Therapy

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Abstract

Poland has a fascinating modern history, and the importance of studying history cannot be over-stated. Jeremey Black and Donald MacRaild argued that: "History is part of our culture; it is something we all share and no individual or group owns it" (Black & MacRaild 2000: 23). This PhD thesis is an empirical research project in the field of modern Polish history. The thesis focuses on Solidarity, the Network and the idea of workers' self-management. In addition, the thesis is based on an in-depth analysis of Solidarity archival material. The Solidarity trade union was born in August 1980 after talks between the communist government and strike leaders at the Gdańsk Lenin Shipyards. In 1981 a group called the Network (Sieć) rose up, due to cooperation between Poland's great industrial factory plants. The Network grew out of Solidarity; it was made up of Solidarity activists, and the group acted as an economic partner to the union. The Network was the base of a grass-roots, nationwide workers' self-management movement. Solidarity and the self-management movement were crushed by the imposition of Martial Law in December 1981. Solidarity revived itself immediately, and the union created an underground society. The Network also revived in the underground, and it continued to promote self-management activity where this was possible. When Solidarity regained its legal status in April 1989, workers' self-management no longer had the same importance in the union. Solidarity's new politico-economic strategy focused on free markets, foreign investment and privatisation.

This research project begins with the strikes on the Baltic Coast in 1980. The project ends in July 1990, when the Solidarity-backed government of Tadeusz Mazowiecki enacted a privatisation law. The Mazowiecki government decided to transform the property ownership structure through a centralised privatisation process, which was a blow for supporters of workers' self-management. This PhD thesis provides new insight into the evolution of the Solidarity union from 1980-1990 by analysing the fate of workers' self-management. This project also examines the role of the Network throughout the 1980s. There is analysis of the important link between workers' self-management and the core ideas of Solidarity. In addition, the link between political and economic reform is an important theme in this research project. The Network was aware that authentic workers' self-management required reforms to the authoritarian political system. Workers' self-management competed against other politico-economic ideas during the 1980s in Poland. The outcome of this competition between different reform concepts has shaped modern-day Polish politics, economics and society.

CONTENTS

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Author's declaration

I declare that, except where explicit reference is made to the contribution of others, this thesis is the result of my own work and has not been submitted for any other degree at the University of Glasgow or any other institution.

Signature:

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Abbreviations

CFTU: Committee of Free Trade Unions

COMECON: Council for Mutual Economic Assistance

ECS: Europejskie Centrum Solidarności – European Solidarity Centre

KIK: Kluby Inteligencji Katolickiej - Clubs of Independent Catholic Intellectuals

KK: Komisja Krajowa – National Commission

KKP: Krajowa Komisja Porozumiewawcza – National Coordinating Commission

KKW: Krajowa Komisja Wykonawcza – National Executive Commission

KO: Komitety Obywatelskie – Citizens' Committees

KPN: Konfederacja Polski Niepodległej - Confederation of Independent Poland

KSC: Komitety Samoobrony Chłopskiej - Farmers' Self-Defence Committees

KSR: Konferencji Samorządu Robotniczego – Workers' Self-Management Conferences

MKS: Międzyzakładowy Komitet Strajkowy – Inter-Factory Strike Committee

MKZ: Międzyzakładowy Komitet Założycielski – Inter-Factory Trade Union Founding Committee

OKP: Obywatelski Klub Parlamentarny – Citizens' Parliamentary Club

OPSZ: Ośrodek Prac Społeczno-Zawodowych – Centre for Social and Professional Work

PRL: Polska Rzeczpospolita Ludowa – People's Republic of Poland

PZPR: Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza – Polish United Workers' Party

RKK: Regionalna Komisja Koordynacyjna – Regional Coordination Commission

ROPCiO: Ruch Obrony Praw Człowieka i Obywatela - Movement for the Defence of Human and Civil Rights

RKS: Regionalny Komitet Strajkowy – Regional Strike Committee

SD: Stronnictwo Demokratyczne - Democratic Party

SGPiS: Szkoła Główna Planowania i Statystyki – Warsaw School of Economics

SKS: Studencki Komitet Solidarności - Students' Solidarity Committee

TKK: Tymczasowa Komisja Koordynacyjna – Temporary Coordination Commission

TKZ: Tajna Komisja Zakładowa – Secret Factory Commission

WRON: Wojskowa Rada Ocalenia Narodowego - Military Council for National Salvation

ZOMO: Zmotoryzowane Odwody Milicji Obywatelskiej – Motorised Reserves of Paramilitary Police

ZSL: Zjednoczone Stronnictwo Ludowe - United People's Party

A note on translations

This PhD thesis includes many translations from Polish sources and interviews. In some cases literal Polish-English translations were not possible, due to the differences in the grammatical structure of the two languages. Nevertheless, I have endeavoured to produce translations that are as faithful as possible to the original Polish sources. Where I have translated the names of Polish groups and organisations, for the information of the reader, I have often provided the Polish version in brackets.

Chapter 1: Introduction

Solidarity, the Network and workers' self-management

This is the first English-language research project on Solidarity and workers' self-management to be based on archival research in Poland. This is also the first original research project to analyse the role and activities of the Network throughout the 1980s. The thesis is based on research conducted at three archives in Poland. The research project draws on archival materials that have not previously been used during research on Solidarity and workers' self-management, including the minutes of Solidarity leadership meetings in 1989. In addition, the research draws on primary sources available online through the official Solidarity website and the Encyklopedia Solidarności archival database. This project also used important English and Polish language secondary sources, which helped to shape the original research and provided extra details about Solidarity and workers' self-management. Furthermore, expert interviews were carried out with Staniszław Handzlik, Jacek Merkel and Edward Nowak, who were former members of Solidarity and the Network. The interviews supplemented the archival research by providing personal accounts of union and workers' self-management activities during the 1980s in Poland.

The research project has two fundamental aims:

(i) to investigate the role and development of workers' self-management in the Solidarity union from 1980-1990

(ii) to examine the activities of the Network from 1980-1990

This PhD thesis addresses the following research questions:

1. How and why was the Network created?

   Why did the group promote workers' self-management? What were the disagreements in Solidarity about workers' self-management?

2. How did workers' self-management fit with the core ideas of Solidarity?

What did the Network propose in the Social Enterprise Bill? Why was the Network unhappy with the workers' self-management laws in September 1981?

3. How did Solidarity and the Network evolve during military rule?

What kind of workers' self-management activity took place in the underground?

4. What happened to the idea of workers' self-management in 1989-90?

Did the ideas of the Network still have any influence in Solidarity at the end of the 1980s?

Poland in the Soviet bloc

Poland did not exist as a nation state for one hundred and twenty-three years after it was partitioned by Russia, Austria and Prussia in 1795. Polish partisans engaged in various struggles for national independence during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, such as the January Uprising in 1863. These struggles were heroic, but they resulted in bloodshed and defeat. The outbreak of World War I turned the Polish lands into an international battleground (Davies 2005: 279). Germany and Austria-Hungary suffered defeat in the war, and Russia was in chaos after the fall of the Tsar in 1917. This enabled Poland to come back into existence as a nation state in November 1918. Poland's independence lasted for two decades, until it was invaded by Germany and Russia upon the outbreak of World War II in September 1939. Poland suffered greatly during the war; Warsaw was destroyed, with ninety-five percent of its buildings in ruins, and the population of Poland was reduced by six million (Davies 2005: 344). From 1945-47 Russia turned Poland into a satellite state of the Soviet Union (Prażmowska 2010: 167, 168). The Polish People's Republic (PRL Polska Rzeczpospolita Ludowa) was an authoritarian communist state, ruled by the Polish United Workers' Party - Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza (PZPR). The Soviets installed Bolesław Bierut as President of the PRL and First Secretary of the PZPR. The communist government nationalised enterprises and introduced forced collectivisation of agricultural lands (Davies 2005: 424, 426, 435). The government repressed the Church, but the Church used its prestige and popularity to retain an important role in society. Davies pointed out that: "The Roman Catholic Church remained the sole bastion of independent thought and action" (Davies 2005: 460). Opposition to the communist regime was forbidden, but this did

not prevent outbreaks of protest. The communist regime experienced political crises during protests in 1956, 1968 and 1970-71. The opposition intellectuals Jacek Kuroń and Karol Modzelewski wrote a book entitled *An Open Letter to the Party* (1969), in which they critiqued the system of government in Poland. They pointed out that: "the Party elite is…….the power elite; all decisions relating to state power are made by it" (Kuroń & Modzelewski 1969: 7). The Party was organised on a hierarchical basis; decisions and orders were handed down from above. Scholars have referred to officials in the party-state power elite as the nomenklatura. Norman Davies explained that:

> It was an axiom of Soviet practice that every position of authority in every sphere of public life must be held by persons dependent on the grace and favour of the ruling Party. All state and Party officials were subject to rigorous hierarchical discipline, akin to that of an army. Their higher ranks formed a closed elite enjoying monopoly power with sole access to the fixed list of the most influential and remunerative appointments-the nomenklatura (Davies 2005: 476-477).

The PZPR pretended to preside over a democratic system, but this was far from the truth. Kuroń and Modzelewski explained that: "Elections to the Sejm and National Councils become fictitious, with only one list of candidates drawn up by the 'top' and a lack of any real differences in the programmes of the PZPR and the satellite parties (United Peasant Party and Democratic Party)" (Kuroń & Modzelewski 1969: 7). The prohibition on organising other political parties was guarded by the entire state apparatus of power and force, including the administration, police and state prosecutors. Trade unions were an obedient organ of the state (Kuroń & Modzelewski 1969: 6, 8). Moreover, the nomenklatura was the ruling class, and it controlled the means of production (Kuroń & Modzelewski 1969: 15). Up until the mid-1950s, the PZPR built the foundations of modern industry in Poland. In 1956 the apparatus of industrial production was three times larger than in 1949 (Kuroń & Modzelewski 1969: 27). Poland developed many branches of industry, such as chemicals, machine tools, electronics and armaments; these industries hardly existed before the war (Davies 2005: 447). Kuroń and Modzelewski noted that: "In the course of industrialisation, there was a mass migration of available labour from the countryside to the new industries, a rapid numerical growth of the working class, the technical and professional intelligentsia, and a very rapid expansion of the technocratic cadres" (Kuroń & Modzelewski 1969: 26). The Soviet economic system succeeded in transforming Poland from a predominantly agricultural country into a modern industrial state (Morawski 1987: 109). Poland thus developed an industrial working class. Norman Davies explained that: "In 1971, people dependent on industrial employment accounted for 42 percent of the population; those

dependent on agriculture for 29.5 percent; town-dwellers for 52.7 percent…….In contrast to earlier periods, the population of Poland was predominantly urban, and industrial" (Davies 2005: 447). However, the Soviet economic system was flawed and inefficient, which led to various crises throughout the Soviet bloc. Kuroń and Modzelewski explained that the 1950s witnessed an international crisis for Stalinism, which was "the first phase of a general crisis of the bureaucratic dictatorship" (Kuroń & Modzelewski 1969: 43). This crisis resulted in revolutionary acts, including the June 1953 demonstration in Berlin, and the June 1956 strike at the Cegielski steelworks in Poznań (Kuroń & Modzelewski 1969: 44).

Post-war strike action and the creation of Solidarność

In post-war Poland workers steadily discovered a new sense of independent identity and they became more militant (Ascherson 1981: 136). On 28th June 1956, workers from steel and machine factories in Poznań (including the Cegielski steelworks) protested against their rates of pay. The striking workers were attacked by the army, and over seventy workers were killed (Prażmowska 2010: 184). In the ensuing political crisis, Władysław Gomułka became the new PZPR First Secretary. Gomułka sought to make a break from hard-line Stalinist policies (Prażmowska 2010: 185). However, he did not introduce fundamental reforms to the authoritarian communist system. The drive for economic self-sufficiency was not successful, and the Party bureaucracy continued to enjoy many privileges (Davies 2005: 441). Students and intellectuals became disillusioned with the Gomułka regime. Moreover, there had been a split in the PZPR since the death of Stalin in 1953. Some younger Party members believed in reform, whereas hard-liners such as General Mieczsyław Moczar did not want any liberalisation of the communist system. In March 1968, Moczar's militia attacked students who were protesting in Warsaw against the closure of a theatre performance (the Mickiewicz classic *Forefather's Eve*) (Davies 2005: 441, 442). Gomułka maintained his position as First Secretary after the fifth Congress of the PZPR in November 1968, but his regime was struggling. Gomułka would not survive the next crisis in Poland, which occurred on the Baltic Coast in 1970 (Kemp-Welch 2008: 183).

The Baltic Coast working-class was the product of a migration from eastern and central Poland to the new industries in Gdańsk and Szczecin (Laba 1991: 115, 116). On 11th December 1970, the Gomułka government completed plans for large and immediate food price increases (Laba 1991: 18). At this time, almost half of a Polish worker's income was

allocated for food. Workers in Gdańsk went out on strike to protest against the food price rises. Soldiers brutally crushed the strikes, resulting in some fatalities among workers. There were strikes in Gdynia where soldiers opened fire on workers, again causing fatalities (Laba 1991: 53). Workers' protests followed by state suppression took place in the other major shipbuilding city on the Baltic Coast - the Warski Shipyard in Szczecin. By 19th December, the general strike had spread up and down the coastal provinces, engulfing every major city and involving workers in most enterprises. Furthermore, demonstrations or strikes took place in factories in Wrocław, Poznań, Kraków, Warsaw, Lublin and Białystok (Laba 1991: 70). Workers in Szczecin created an Inter-Factory Strike Committee (MKS Międzyzakładowy Komitet Strajkowy), which was a union of all employees against the state, and the core of their programme was the demand for free trade unions, independent of the Party. Laba believed that: "Among the Baltic working class, a new world had come into focus" (Laba 1991: 57, 64). A Warski Shipyard worker named Stanisław Wądołowski would later become a vice-chairman of national Solidarity. He said the suppression of the workers on 17th December in Szczecin left a big impression on him: "Up until then I wasn't interested in politics, I returned home that night tremendously upset" (Laba 1991: 64). Furthermore, in February 1971 strikes took place in Łódź, which was Poland's second largest city. Women worked in the Łódź cotton mills, where the strike tradition dated back to 1892 and the 1905 uprising against Russia (Singer 1981: 178-179). In response to the strikes in 1971, the government cancelled the price increases from December 1970. Daniel Singer's interpretation of these events was that: "the fighting strikers of the Baltic and the stubborn women of Łódź had gained the right to challenge their government's economic policy.....Poland would never be quite the same" (Singer 1981: 179-180).

Amongst the ruling communist parties of Central and Eastern Europe, it was the PZPR that experienced the greatest problems in maintaining political supremacy and coping with the pressures for change (Lewis 1990: 24). The workers' movement was an attempt to build a democratic project as an answer to the contradictions and crises in communist Poland. The Gomułka and Gierek governments failed to create stable economic growth and increase the standard of living for the majority of Poles (Laba 1991: 11, 17). By the mid-1970s, nearly one-third of the Polish industrial workforce was under twenty-four, and nearly half of all students in higher education were workers or of worker origin (Ascherson 1981: 136). Polish workers carried out another revolutionary act against the communist regime in 1976. Nationwide strikes followed sudden and massive food price rises in June. The Workers'

Defence Committee (KOR Komitet Obrony Robotników) formed in September 1976 in order to help the workers facing trial after the savage suppression of the strikes and protests at Radom and the Ursus plant near Warsaw. KOR was made up of a wide-ranging group of intellectuals, including Jacek Kuroń and Adam Michnik (Hayden 1994: 14). KOR started a periodical called *Robotnik* (The Worker) as an educational tool for workers and to inspire future activists. Lech Wałęsa argued that 1976 was a turning point in Gdańsk and elsewhere (Wałęsa 1987: 97). This is because new organisations appeared that were independent of the Party. High school students did not suffer from the fear which gripped university students, who had suffered reprisals, expulsions from university and blacklisting for jobs (Wałęsa 1987: 97, 98). Young people in Gdańsk created an opposition movement called the Young Poland Movement (RMP Ruch Młodej Polski), which exercised considerable influence. This name came from an artistic current that promoted the best of Polish culture. Aleksander Hall became the leader of RMP, and he was helped by the intellectual activist Bogdan Borusewicz (Wałęsa 1987: 97).

Timothy Garton Ash affirmed that the most important place for the pre-history of Solidarity was Gdańsk. In April 1978 in Gdańsk, a group of people cooperating with KOR formed the Founding Committee of Free Trade Unions of the Coast (Komitet Założycielski Wolnych Zwiazków Zawodowych Wybrzeża), which is often referred to by scholars as the Committee of Free Trade Unions (CFTU). This committee was a meeting-point of intellectual opposition and disaffected workers (Garton Ash 2002: 365). Jerome Karabel argued that CFTU was a direct precursor of Solidarity (Karabel 1993: 30). The earliest members of CFTU included those who led the Gdańsk Lenin Shipyards strike in August 1980: Bogdan Borusewicz, Andrzej Gwiadza, Bogdan Lis, Alina Pieńkowska and Lech Wałęsa (Garton Ash 2002: 26). Frequent and amicable contacts between KOR and CFTU had a profound impact on both organisations. In its activities and publications, KOR had a lot in common with the professionals and worker activists who created CFTU (Payerhin 1996: 209, 210). The Committee of Free Trade Unions produced its own small edition of *Robotnik* (*Robotnik Wybrzeża* - The Worker on the Coast), which they distributed at factory gates and outside churches after Mass. In September 1979, *Robotnik Wybrzeża* published a 'Charter of Workers' Rights', setting out many demands that were made in summer 1980: better wages, shorter working hours, promotion by merit, and independent trade unions (Garton Ash 2002: 26). Furthermore, a rural opposition movement took organised form in 1978, with a spontaneous campaign against advance payments demanded by the state for an old-age

pension scheme. Beginning in the poorer eastern districts of Poland, a scattering of farmers self-defence committees appeared, often supported by village priests and assisted by advice and publicity from KOR (Ascherson 1981: 140). A particular centre of resistance was the village of Zbrosza Duża, south of Warsaw. In 1979 farmers' centres for knowledge appeared, which were unofficial colleges organising debates on farmers' grievances and courses on the history of rural politics in Poland (Ascherson 1981: 140). Opposition to the communist government was thus becoming stronger in the countryside as well as in industrial urban areas.

The culmination of Poland's post-war history of protest was the creation of Solidarity. The insurrection of 1980 was geographically and socially more encompassing than in 1970 (Laba 1991: 95). In July 1980 the communist government once again tried to raise food prices. The reaction to this was a wave of rolling strikes that continued in various parts of the country, including Warsaw and Lublin, for forty-five days (Kennedy 1987: 661; Laba 1991: 104; Wałęsa 1987: 116). On 14th August, the Gdańsk Lenin Shipyards initiated a sit-down strike. The Paris Commune Shipyards in Gdynia struck the following day, and the Warski Shipyards in Szczecin followed two days later. In addition, numerous factory plants struck in support all over Poland. Workers in Gdańsk formed an Inter-Factory Strike Committee (MKS) in order that workers in different enterprises and towns could coordinate their action. In addition, Inter-Factory Strike Committees emerged in Wrocław, Bydgoszcz, Wałbyrzych and Upper Silesia (Garton Ash 2002: 294; Laba 1991: 104). Workers in Warsaw were often striking in solidarity. Big factories, having attained their demands, struck on behalf of smaller and weaker groups of workers and also in solidarity with the strikes on the Baltic Coast (Kennedy 1987: 662). The Gdańsk MKS wrote a Twenty-One Point Programme, with which one hundred and fifty-six factories were affiliated by 18th August (Laba 1991: 95). Point one demanded a free and independent trade union; point three demanded freedoms of expression and publication; and point sixteen demanded improved health services (21 Postulatów z 17 sierpnia 1980 roku, http://www.solidarnosc.org.pl/21-postulatow). By the end of August, there were also Inter-Factory Strike Committees (MKS) in Szczecin (including over two hundred enterprises), and smaller MKS in Wrocław and Ebląg (Staniszkis 1984: 7).

The government accepted the Gdańsk MKS twenty-one demands, and the Gdańsk Agreement was signed on 31st August 1980. This date marked the creation of the independent trade union Solidarność (Laba 1991: 105). Wałęsa stated that: "SOLIDARITY was born at that precise moment when the shipyard strike evolved from a local success in the shipyard, to a strike in support of other factories and business enterprises, large and small, in need of our protection: moral reasons impelled us toward solidarity with our neighbours and co-workers in every line of endeavour" (Wałęsa 1987: 123). Hundreds of sets of demands were written by workforces in coastal factories during the August 1980 strikes. When former Solidarity activist Adam Michnik wrote about the July-August 1980 strikes, he paid tribute to the work of intellectuals, and to workers who cooperated with them in the CFTU: "Here we should pay homage to the organisers of the Free Trade Unions of the Coast and the editors of *Robotnik.* It was they who worked out and popularised the idea of workers' self-organisation and demands, and it is to them, to a large extent, that we owe the implementation of worker demands and the peaceful progress of the strikes" (Michnik 1985: 105). There were also agreements between workers and the government in Szczecin (signed on 30th August 1980) and Jastrzębie (3rd September 1980). These agreements were focused on working conditions, food prices and pay (Biernacki, www.wszechnica.solidarnosc.org.pl/?page_id=165). In September 1980, Inter-Factory Strike Committees (MKS) transformed themselves into Inter-Factory Union Founding Committees (MKZ Międzyzakładowy Komitet Założycielski). On 17th September representatives of regional MKZs from throughout Poland met in Gdańsk; they created a national leadership for Solidarity. The MKZ representatives elected Lech Wałęsa as chairman of the National Coordinating Commission (KKP Krajowa Komisja Porozumiewawcza), which contained one representative from each regional MKZ. At the beginning of October 1980, about forty MKZ were represented in the National Coordinating Commission (Biernacki, www.wszechnica.solidarnosc.org.pl/?page_id=167).

Solidarity's leaders, as they emerged in autumn 1980, were mostly in their twenties or thirties. They were often skilled workers with families (MacShane 1981: 27, 28, 75). Lech Wałęsa was born during the Nazi occupation in the village of Popow between Gdańsk and Warsaw. He received vocational training in a state school in nearby Lipno and had a Catholic upbringing (Bank 1981: 2). Upon the birth of Solidarity, Wałęsa was a thirty-six year old electrician in Gdańsk. He worked at the Lenin Shipyards from 1967-1976, when he was fired for criticising the management and communist trade unions (Łątkowska et al. 2016:

http://encyklopedia-solidarnosci.pl/wiki/index.php?title=Lech_Wałęsa, 2016). Jacek Merkel (twenty-five years old) worked as an engineer in the construction office at the Gdańsk Lenin Shipyards, and he was a member of the Gdańsk MKZ. Merkel was the co-founder of the Network (Jacek Merkel interview 2013). Zbigniew Bujak (twenty-five years old) was an engineer at the Ursus tractor plant in Warsaw. From 1978 Bujak distributed independent publications including *Robotnik*, and in 1980 he became chair of the Mazowsze MKZ and a member of the KKP (Łątkowska & Borowski 2016: http://encyklopedia-solidarnosci.pl/wiki/index.php?title=Zbigniew_Bujak). Jacek Kuroń (forty-six years old) was a history graduate from the University of Warsaw. He advised the Gdańsk MKZ and the KKP (Łątkowska & Borowski 2016: http://www.encyklopedia-solidarnosci.pl/wiki/index.php?title=Jacek_Kuroń). Bogdan Boruszewicz (thirty-one years old) was a history graduate from the Catholic University of Lublin. He joint-authored the Gdańsk MKS twenty-one demands, and he was a member of the Gdańsk MKZ (Laba 1991: 11, 113). Edward Nowak (twenty-nine years old) worked as an electrical engineer at the Huta im. Lenina steelworks in Nowa Huta on the outskirts of Kraków, and he was the co-founder of Solidarity in Nowa Huta (Edward Nowak interview 2013). Staniszław Handzlik (thirty-seven years old) worked as a technician at Huta im. Lenina, and he was elected as the leader of Solidarity in his department (steel processing) (Staniszław Handzlik interview 2013). As noted above, Handzlik, Merkel and Nowak were interviewed for this PhD project.

When the August 1980 strike began in the Gdańsk Shipyards, the Committee of Free Trade Unions (CFTU) had three founding members and several dozen sympathisers. By the end of the year, Solidarity neared ten million members (Laba 1991: 105). The Huta im. Lenina plant in Kraków employed thirty-nine thousand workers in 1980, of whom ten thousand were PZPR members. Ninety-six percent of the workforce at Huta im. Lenina joined Solidarity (Staniszław Handzlik interview 2013). Solidarity began as a trade union and rapidly developed into a nationwide social movement. A social movement has the potential to transform the cultural order of society, creating new meanings and interpretations (Kuczyński & Nowak 1988: 133, 135). Jacek Kurczewski argued that Solidarity offered its members "a new, independent and self-governing environment which they can call their own. Within this environment new patterns of thinking and conduct evolve" (Kurczewski 2006: 113). Moreover, Denis MacShane explained how Solidarity was a new kind of trade union: "Before 1939, Polish trade unions were a disastrous mixture of Socialist, Communist, Catholic and Jewish unions split.....on craft, industrial and regional lines, and always under

tremendous pressure from the reactionary pre-war Polish governments" (MacShane 1981: 67). Solidarity was different because the union organised itself on a territorial basis, rather than according to trades, branches of industry or professions (Matynia 2001: 929). Workers in a town or region all joined the same union, and this created a sense of unity (MacShane 1981: 67). Solidarity activists were not purely concerned with developments in their profession, but their focus was on community concerns, such as public transportation and food distribution (Bank 1981: 7).

The core of Solidarity was workers in big industrial plants in the major cities. This is where Solidarity was born, and this remained the heart of the union. Factory plants heavily involved in Solidarity included ZM Ursus (Warsaw), Huta im. Lenina (Nowa Huta-Kraków), WSK Świdnik (Lublin), the Wujek Mine (Katowice), the Katowice Steelworks, the Gdańsk Lenin Shipyards, the Warski Shipyards (Szczecin), Cegielski Steelworks (Poznań), and Pafawag railway factory (Wrocław) (*Information Centre for Polish Affairs*, News Bulletin No. 16/84 1984: 18). After August 1980 agricultural workers and craftsmen joined industrial workers as trade union members (*Information Centre for Polish Affairs*, News Bulletin, No. 17/83 1983: 3). In March 1981, The Nationwide Independent Self-Governing Trade Union of Individual Farmers (Solidarność Rolników Indywidualnych) was established in Poznań. Civic organisations also began to emerge, including the Movement for the Defence of Human and Civil Rights (ROPCiO), the Farmers' Self-Defence Committees (KSC) and the Students' Solidarity Committee (SKS) (Matynia 2001: 923). There also developed a mass movement for self-government. During the sixteen months of legal Solidarity activity from August 1980 to December 1981, there was an explosion of enthusiasm in Polish society (Edward Nowak ECS interview 2008). Various social and professional groups organised themselves in new forms of independent activity, including students, lawyers, academics, journalists, artists, writers and more (Kurowski, *Tygodnik Solidarność* 1981a: 5). Even in the Citizens' Militia (Milicja Obywatelska) trade union founding committees were created in Warsaw, Lublin, Katowice, and elsewhere (Być Milicjantem w PRL 1981: 3-4, Gdańsk KK archive: collection: IKZD, folder: KPP NSZZ Solidarność_IKZD_ZZ funckonariuszy MO_Skargi_konflikt w kopalni Szczygłowice).

Solidarity sought to improve working conditions, create a more free and democratic society, and restore some dignity to the lives of Polish people (Staniszkis 1981: 208). Everywhere

the Solidarity offensive went in the same direction, seeking to ensure authentic joint-participation in shaping national life, self-government and autonomy, and the building of true socialism - instead of a socialist facade in an authoritarian system (Osiatyński, *Tygodnik Solidarność* 1981: 10). Solidarity and the government regularly engaged in negotiations about matters including pay, working conditions and civil liberties. Moreover, Polish workers had a continued willingness to go out on strike in order for their voices to be heard. For example, a general strike took place in Bielsko-Biała in January 1981 about local government corruption. In addition, there was a general strike in Jelenia Góra in February 1981 about privileges given to local security service and police employees (Garton Ash 1991: 149). In August 1981 there were hunger marches in Warsaw and several other cities, protesting against food shortages and ration cuts (Garton Ash 1991: 204). Top level talks between the government and Solidarity broke down in mid-August 1981. Garton Ash marked this as "the beginning of the end" for government-Solidarity talks (Garton Ash 1991: 206). In addition, Garton Ash described the situation in Poland in mid-September 1981: "another tidal wave of strikes and protests began to spread across the land……In Żyradów, some twelve thousand textile workers – mostly women – occupied their factories to demand better food supplies. By the end of the month the sulphur mines of Tarnobrzeg were out too. It was estimated that there were disputes in half of Poland's forty-nine Provinces" (Garton Ash 1991: 259-260).

In September-October 1981, the Solidarity First National Congress took place in Gdańsk. There were four candidates to be chair of a new leadership body called the National Commission (Komisja Krajowa): Lech Wałęsa, Andrzej Gwiadza, Jan Rulewski and Marian Jurczyk. The delegates at the National Congress elected Wałęsa, as he was the person with whom workers in Solidarity most identified themselves (Jacek Merkel 2013 interview). Of the eight hundred and ninety-six delegates at the National Congress, forty-seven percent came from workers' families, thirty-three percent from the intelligentsia, fifteen percent from farmers' families, and five percent had a rural-worker or artisan background (Kaliski 2006: 101). The Congress defined a Solidarity Programme, which included the following statement: "The roots of the present crisis lie deep in the economic and political system, as well as in the government's economic policy, which has disregarded the fundamental interests of society, blocked all attempts at reform and squandered a huge amount of foreign loans" (Program NSZZ Solidarność 1981: 7, www.solidarnosc.org.pl/dok/wp-

content/uploads/2012/09/I-KZD-uchwala-programowa.pdf). Solidarity devoted much energy to the question of how to end the economic crisis.

Workers' self-management and economic reform in post-war Poland

A precedent existed for workers' self-management activity in post-war Polish history, as it was implemented by PRL governments in 1945-48 and 1956-58. There is no generally agreed definition for the idea of workers' self-management – often referred to simply as self-management (Rosner 2006: 55). Nevertheless, it is possible to identify certain defining characteristics of workers' self-management. Workers participate in the management of enterprises, such as by exercising influence over production and sales decisions (Bugaj & Jakubowicz, *Tygodnik Solidarność* 1981: 5). Workers' self-management entails an economic system that is based on independent, self-governing and self-financing enterprises. This means that there are limits on the power of the state, which may exert influence through various regulations (including environmental protection) and economic instruments (prices, taxes and interest rates), but the state cannot arbitrarily impose its will on enterprises. In addition, workers' self-management requires enterprises to operate according to democratic principles. In a self-managing enterprise, the most powerful body is a council of workers' representatives. The workers' council makes decisions about planning, strategy and how profits are to be used. The workers' council also holds the enterprise director to account, and the council has the power to hire and fire the director.

Witold Morawski believed that applying workers' self-management allows further understanding of economic life, and further realises the requirements of socialist ideology by bringing democratic principles into the economy (Morawski 1973: 8, 173). Workers' self-management is a rejection of the principle that society is divided between 'managers' and 'the managed', i.e. a rejection of the division between an enlightened elite who are skilled in fixing economic and social aims, and the masses who carry out these aims. Morawski argued that the application of workers' self-management leads to an increase in the 'consciousness' of the working-class because their work becomes more fulfilling and they are involved in decisions about production, distribution and working conditions (Morawski 1973: 25, 28). Workers' self-management has been implemented in various countries over the last century, from Europe to Latin America. The nature of workers' self-management has differed in each of the countries in which it has been applied, depending on factors such

as the state of the social environment, the system of management and planning in industry, and the principles for the functioning of the economy and state (Morawski 1973: 30). Some countries created more authentic systems of self-management than others. In the mid-1950s in Yugoslavia, the system of self-management implemented by Josip Tito was not authentic. This is because a one-party political system is not compatible with the creation of a democratic economic system with independent enterprises (Rosner 2006: 58). In Chile during the early 1970s, the democratic regime of Salvador Allende introduced workers' self-management. James Petras and Henry Veltmeyer argued that in Chile: "The system of WSM defended the factories from closure, protected workers' employment and vastly improved the social conditions of work. Most importantly, it raised workers' political consciousness" (Petras & Veltmeyer 2003: 18).

The theoretical origins of workers' self-management are in Marxism-Leninism at the beginning of the nineteenth century (Morawski 1973: 7). Petras and Veltmeyer explained that: "Historically, workers' self-management has been a centre-piece of the socialist project, dating back to Karl Marx's famous statement that 'workers emancipation can only be accomplished by the workers themselves'" (Petras & Veltmeyer 2003: 16). The classics of Marxism-Leninism foresaw the future political and economic system being based on collective government and the withering away of the central state apparatus (Morawski 1973: 11). This line of thinking can be termed anarcho-syndicalism, and it influenced the self-management movement in Poland. Originally, the syndicalist tradition was developed in the workers' movement in Western Europe (Morawski 1973: 17). The first self-managed organisations appeared in England and France in the first half of the nineteenth century; they were inspired by classic socialist ideas and the management of the cooperatives was democratically elected (Rosner 2006: 56). Furthermore, Menachem Rosner argued that: "A major step toward the theoretical development of self-management was the short-lived experience of the Paris Commune in 1871" (Rosner 2006: 56). This council elected by Paris citizens set up workers' associations to take over companies, and it lasted for ten months (Johnson 1996: 5). Rosner also pointed out that after World War I, there were efforts to establish self-management in Germany, Italy and Hungary (Rosner 2006: 56). Furthermore, Petras and Veltmeyer argued that workers' self-management can be applied in capitalist countries: "Potentially WSM is a truly liberating experience, both in terms of freeing workers from capitalist abuse and insecurity and in providing them with the freedom to create new forms of social relations of production and distribution" (Petras & Veltmeyer

2003: 16). There exist contemporary examples of workers' self-management, such as the Mondragon group of cooperatives, which are in the Basque region of Spain. The management of the whole group is based on representative democracy, and the group consists of almost two hundred cooperatives of different types, such as industrial, educational and agricultural groups (Rosner 2006: 60). - This example of self-management activity shows that the concept does not draw solely from socialist thought. The Mondragon group has its ideological origins in Catholic social and economic justice teachings (Petras & Veltmeyer 2003: 16).

In Poland workers' self-management started quickly after the end of the Nazi occupation in 1945. Deserted factory plants were taken over by workers aiming to protect them against destruction and vandalism (Jermakowicz 1983: 16). Workers acted out of necessity; they set in motion production for the needs of soldiers and civilians. During this transitional period of self-management activity, workers exercised full power in factories. The post-war factory councils (rady zakładowe) helped to restart Polish industry (Biezenski 1994: 59, 61). Post-war self-management activity drew in large part on the traditions of Soviet workers' councils (rady robotnicze) and the workers' councils from the Zagłębia region in 1918 (Jermakowicz 1983: 16). A February 1945 decree gave rady zakładowe rights to exercise control and supervision over enterprise activities, as well as joint-decision rights on many economic and social matters (Jermakowicz 1983: 17). However, at the end of the 1940s, there was a gradual centralisation of enterprise management. Kuroń and Modzelewski explained that: "1949……..marks the end of the period of reconstruction and the consolidation of economic, social and political conditions into the system of bureaucratic dictatorship" (Kuroń & Modzelewski 1969: 20). A decree in October 1950 about state enterprises made no reference to workers' participation in management. During the years 1950-55, intensive industrialisation took place, and an ordered system of economic management dominated enterprises (Jermakowicz 1983: 19, 22-23). In 1956 Poland witnessed political upheaval following the death of Bolesław Bierut and the protests in Poznań. Władysław Gomułka resurfaced in Party circles in summer 1956; he was a member of the Polish Workers' Party during World War II, but he had been cut off from elite communist circles since 1948. In October 1956, Gomułka became the new PZPR First Secretary, thereby ending the short reign of Edward Ochab. Gomułka wanted to make a break from the extreme repression of the Stalinist era (Davies 2005: 429, 438, 439; Prażmowska 2010: 184). Moreover, Polish people wanted reforms and there was a grass-roots desire for pluralism in the political and

economic systems. From April to December 1956 about four hundred new youth organisations appeared, and many discussion clubs also formed. Workers played an active role in discussions about economic reform, and the theme of workers' self-management came to the fore (Jermakowicz 1983: 23, 27).

Workers' councils (rady robotnicze) appeared spontaneously in many factory plants throughout Poland, and they were arenas for revolutionary debate (Ascherson 1981: 72). This was an authentic, grass-roots workers' movement, and workers' councils were drawn entirely from elections by workers (Warunki powoływanie i funkcjonowanie rad pracowniczych 1981: 1, Kraków archive: Archiwum 1 III, volume 098, folder 2). From April to December 1956 about three thousand workers' councils were elected. The rady robotnicze carried out fundamental managerial tasks, such as organisational reforms - aiming to increase the effectiveness of economic activity (Jermakowicz 1983: 33). On 19th November 1956 the Polish parliament (Sejm) passed a law to regulate the activity of workers' councils. The law established that workers' councils and enterprise directors were to share power in enterprises. In addition, workers' councils were to deal with matters including how to carry out the plans imposed by central government (Jermakowicz 1983: 25). The self-management law was accompanied by other economic reforms, including the transition to principles of profit and the self-financing of factory plants (Styczyński, *Tygodnik Solidarność* 1981: 10). The workers' councils had wide support, first and foremost from Polish economists, as well as from other groups of intellectuals, some factions of young Party members and older workers' activists (Styczyński, *Tygodnik Solidarność* 1981: 10).

The activity of workers' councils had a real impact, resulting in an increase in pay and bonuses, an increase in efficiency, and reduced consumption of materials and resources (Warunki powoływanie i funkcjonowanie rad pracowniczych 1981: 1, Kraków archive: 1 III, tom 098, 2). Numerous factory councils succeeded in liquidating the deficits of their enterprises and thus turned over a profit. In the first half of 1957 at the Warsaw Motorcycle Factory (Warszawska Fabryka Motocykli), there was a profit of twenty-three million złoty, in contrast to a twenty-four million złoty deficit in 1956 (Styczyński, *Tygodnik Solidarność* 1981: 10). However, the economic reforms in 1956-58 did not end in success. The Gomułka regime met with a lot of distrust within the PZPR, as well as in the state and economic apparatuses. There was also hostility about the reforms in Poland from countries belonging

to the Soviet trading bloc (COMECON) (Jermakowicz 1983: 27). On 20th December 1958, parliament passed a law bringing in Workers' Self-Management Conferences (KSR Konferencji Samorządu Robotniczego), which caused the demise of workers' councils (Warunki powoływanie i funkcjonowanie rad pracowniczych 1981: 1, Kraków archive: 1 III, tom 098, 2). The KSR included representatives of the PZPR executive and they had a very hierarchical structure. The competencies of the KSR were far less than those of the workers' councils in 1956-58 (Warunki powoływanie i funkcjonowanie rad pracowniczych 1981: 1. Kraków archive: 1 III, 098, 2). The nomenklatura became the dominant force in the economy.

In 1970 a change in government once again led to abortive attempts at economic reform. Edward Gierek became PZPR First Secretary in December 1970, after the protests on the Baltic Coast. Gierek undertook massive foreign borrowing, which partly financed new investments in Western technology. From 1970-77, Poland borrowed about twenty billion dollars from Western governments and banks (Sachs 1993: 26). After a rapid growth of the national income and consumption in 1971-78, Poland entered a long period of economic crisis, with a huge and growing foreign debt (Balcerowicz 1995: 291). The huge amount of foreign borrowing produced almost no increase in Poland's exports to Western markets, and so the loans could not be repaid (Eyal, Szelényi & Townsley 1998: 32). The main cause of the failed attempts at economic reform in 1956-58 and in the early 1970s was the nomenklatura. The hostility of the communist power apparatus to reform is explained in a draft Solidarity programme thesis, which was written by Solidarity activists in the build-up to the First National Congress: "there exist social forces against reform, for whom the interests of the economy and its efficiency recede into secondary importance in relation to concerns that reform will reduce the range of their powers and limit their privileges related to this" (Założenia ideowo-programowe i kierunki polityki społecznego-gospodarczej 1981: 8, Gdańsk KK archive: IKZD, zaimplementowane). In addition, Stark & Bruszt noted how economic reforms in the communist system always failed: "these were always *partial* reforms. Firms were granted limited, never complete, autonomy. Because of this partial character, enterprise directors could always keep one hand in the state's pockets, and state bureaucracies were always ready to 'correct distortions'" (Stark & Bruszt 1998: 116). Maria Nowojczyk pointed out how the failing economic system generated political crises. The Gierek government did not survive the political turmoil caused by the creation of Solidarity in 1980 (Nawojczyk 1994: 317-318).

At a late night session of the PZPR Central Committee on 5th September 1980, Gierek was forced to stand down as First Secretary. Stanisław Kania became the new leader of the PZPR (Chodorowski 1992: 8). At the beginning of the 1980s, production in many factory plants had stopped and radical reform was required. The draft Solidarity programme thesis described the economic system in Poland: "The entirety of economic decisions have been monopolised by the central plan, which gives orders to individual enterprises concerning what, how much and how to manufacture, and it allocates tightly restricted means of production to enterprises. This is called economic management by an ordered distribution system [system nakazowo-rozdzielczy]" (Założenia ideowo-programowe i kierunki polityki społecznego-gospodarczej 1981: 7, Gdańsk KK archive: IKZD, zaimplementowane). Morawski noted that: "The system had a life of its own and soon came to dominate all economic life. Instead of central planning, there was central administration" (Morawski 1987: 86). The draft Solidarity programme thesis also stated that: "Our country is going through a deep economic crisis. This is displayed mainly by the huge and growing disproportion between the supply of goods and demand, and it occurs in all areas of the economy. This crisis did not appear in recent months or recent years, but it arose gradually over the course of a decade" (Założenia ideowo-programowe i kierunki polityki społecznego-gospodarczej 1981: 6, Gdańsk KK archive: IKZD VII IKZD, zaimplementowane).

Poland needed to implement fundamental politico-economic reforms. The term 'politico-economic' reform is often used in this thesis to recognise the porous border between the fields of politics and economics. Witold Morawski argued that: "Political reform is a *sine qua non* of economic reform" (Morawski 1987: 110). In their *Open Letter to the Party*, Kuroń and Modzelewski noted that: "Workers' self-rule in an enterprise……requires full workers' democracy in the state" (Kuroń & Modzelewski 1969: 23). Workers' self-management activity in 1956 led to calls for autonomous local governments and a stronger role for the Sejm in government policy decisions (Styczyński, *Tygodnik Solidarność* 1981: 10). In 1980-81, the Network also pushed for political reforms. Marcin Chodorowski argued that: "The Network from the first days of its existence was shrouded in a cloud of mystery" (Chodorowski 1992: 10). Chapter 4 of this PhD thesis unveils the mystery of the Network by analysing how the group came into existence.

Chapter overview

Chapter 2 of this PhD thesis is the literature review. The Solidarity literature has focused on topics including the revival of civil society, the role of the Catholic Church, and whether workers or intellectuals led Solidarity. The chapter explains how the research conducted to date on the ideas in Solidarity has often focused on ideas of 'truth' and 'hope'. The chapter notes that there is only a small amount of research on workers' self-management, mostly about the early Solidarity era. Chapter 3 examines the methodology for this PhD thesis. The chapter explains how this project was based on archival research in Poland. This was supplemented by the use of online resources, interviews and secondary sources. In addition, the analysis of sources drew from qualitative approaches to social science research, which have long been influential in historical research. The methodology chapter also addresses the issue of carrying out interviews in a foreign language, and there is a consideration of research ethics.

Chapter 4 of this PhD thesis is the first empirical chapter, and it charts the rise of workers' self-management during the legal Solidarity period. There is an examination of how the Network formed. The chapter notes that there were tensions between the Network and Solidarity. There is reference to the emergence of a rival group to the Network, which was called the Lublin Group. The chapter analyses events at the Solidarity First National Congress, which took place while the Sejm passed laws on workers' self-management. Chapter 5 is the second empirical chapter, and it analyses workers' self-management activity during the underground Solidarity period. This chapter covers the period from December 1981 to the strikes in spring and summer 1988. There is reference to how the Network revived in the underground, although its activities were much reduced. In addition, there is analysis of how Solidarity's politico-economic strategy evolved in the underground, and the debates about this strategy. Chapter 6 is the third empirical chapter, and it investigates workers' self-management during the early part of the politico-economic transformation, from the Round Table talks in February-April 1989 to the Privatisation Law in July 1990. There is analysis of the Round Table Agreement, particularly in relation to the Economy and Social Policy Group. The chapter examines how Solidarity's identity evolved in 1989-1990. There is recognition of the continued link between political and economic reform in Poland. There is also a focus on the evolution of Solidarity's politico-economic strategy in 1989-1990. The idea of self-government retained its importance in Solidarity, but workers' self-management was no longer a key idea in the union. The chapter places the fate of workers'

self-management in the wider context of events in Solidarity and the new Poland. New liberal economic policies were on the rise, such as foreign investment and privatisation. The chapter examines the question of how to reform property ownership in the new Poland. In addition, there is an analysis of whether the ideas of the Network still had an influence in Solidarity. Finally, Chapter 7 is the Conclusion. The chapter provides answers to the research questions, and there is discussion of the legacy of Solidarity and further possibilities for research.

Chapter 2: Literature Review

Introduction

The Solidarity trade union has generated a vast literature. Many scholars have studied the union because it is intimately related to key events in modern European history. The Solidarity literature has recognised how the union revived civil society in Poland. Cooperation between workers and intellectuals led to the creation of new forms of social activity. People began to think more freely and critically, and Solidarity developed independent publishing and educational activities. Union activists organised classes about Polish history, and Polish people drew inspiration from the past generations of independence fighters. A major debate in the literature concerned whether workers or intellectuals led Solidarity. The 'traditional' interpretation is that intellectuals created the foundations for the union; whereas the 'revisionist' interpretation argues that working-class protest action created Solidarity. This PhD project adopts the perspective of scholars including Ascherson (1987), who moved beyond the traditional/revisionist dichotomy by arguing that workers and intellectuals led Solidarity in partnership. In addition, scholars have noted there was a broad spectrum of ideas in Solidarity, including a radical element in the union. The literature has highlighted the union's mythical status, and the importance of ideas such as 'hope' and 'truth'. Polish people were also inspired by patriotic and religious ideas, due to Poland's insurrectionary tradition and Catholic heritage. This PhD project moves beyond patriotic and religious ideas, as well as abstract ideas about hope and truth, in order to focus on concrete politico-economic strategy.

The Solidarity literature lacks a focus on: the role of activists in rural areas, the role of women, and workers' self-management. Only a very small portion of the Solidarity literature is about self-management, which was an important idea in the union. Most of the literature on self-management is written in Polish and concerns the early Solidarity period in 1980-81. The Solidarity literature has recognised how the union began to focus on its economic strategy in 1981. This project rejects the assertion made by scholars including Barker (1986) that intellectuals imposed the idea of self-management on workers. The self-management movement rose up from the grass-roots activity of workers in factory plants throughout Poland. Moreover, workers' self-management proved to be a controversial subject in Solidarity, and there was some tension between the Solidarity leadership and the Network.

This PhD research carries out further investigation of the debates about self-management within Solidarity, as well as between Solidarity and the government. Furthermore, David Ost and Stuart Shields belong to a school of thought arguing that Solidarity evolved from a workers' movement in 1980-81 towards a more elite movement promoting free market economics in 1989-90. Ost (2005) noted a change in the nature of the Polish opposition after 1981, and he analysed class struggles during the post-communist period. Shields (2003, 2004) used a neo-Gramscian perspective to analyse how Poland became involved in transnational processes of production and class formation. Ost and Shields referred to workers' self-management, but it was not a major theme in their research. This PhD project was influenced by the work of Ost and Shields, but adopts a new perspective by linking the evolution of Solidarity to the fate of workers' self-management.

The ideas and strands in Solidarity

Wałęsa once described Solidarity as "the tree of Polish hope" (Wałęsa 1990: 3). This image of Solidarity as representing a better future was a key feature of the union. Łódź Regional Solidarity believed that:

> Solidarity has remained for millions of Poles the authentic representation of their interests as working people; it has remained the carrier of their aspirations and guarantor of expected democratic changes. The Chair of Solidarity, Lech Wałęsa, and the democratically-elected leaderships at all levels still have the moral right and duty to speak on behalf of the union and Polish working people (Łódź Regional Temporary Executive of Solidarity 1986: 18).

The communist regime presented a distorted view of Polish history and society. In contrast, Solidarity stood for honesty and freedom of expression. Gerald Beyer pointed out that Father Jerzy Popiełuszko paid for his commitment to truth with his life. Popiełuszko believed that valuing one's own human dignity rests on whether or not one "stands by the truth in every situation, even if it costs dearly" (Beyer 2007: 223). In addition, a Gdańsk Regional Solidarity committee stated that: "We renounce violence in our struggle although we reserve the right to resist. But we put our trust above all in the strength of the truth" (Gdańsk Region Solidarity 1986: 24). Furthermore, Solidarity used national and religious symbols. During the strike in Gdańsk in August 1980, the striking workers created a symbolic atmosphere. A wooden cross, erected on the spot where protesting shipyard workers were shot and killed in 1970, was covered in flowers and religious and patriotic inscriptions (Kubik 1994: 1). Many factories had images of the Polish Pope tacked upon the walls (Laba 1991: 84). Flowers were ever-present in the union's décor, and they symbolised the attachment of Solidarity to non-

violent political struggle (Kubik 1994: 227). Timothy Garton Ash believed that: "Solidarity gave people hope, hope and a sense of purpose. It gave them something to live for" (Garton Ash 2002: 294). In some ways Solidarity gained a mythical status. Tom Keenoy argued that the Poles, with their immensely powerful commitment to nationalism and a culture infused with the sacred traditions of Roman Catholicism, seemed to be particularly susceptible to social myths (Keenoy 1983: 29). Father Józef Tischner described the word 'solidarity' in a mythical way: "Solidarity is born out of goodwill and awakens the goodwill in human beings. It is like a warm ray of sun; wherever the ray falls, it leaves a warmth that radiates spontaneously" (Tischner 1984: 3).

Maryjane Osa argued that a first wave of literature on Solidarity included serious journalistic accounts, such as books by Neal Ascherson and Timothy Garton Ash (Osa 2003: 5). Osa stated that: "The bottom line is that no clear understanding of Solidarity, in terms of its political or theoretical import, emerged from the initial journalistic and academic discussions" (Osa 2003: 7). A second wave of literature appeared in the early 1990s, including David Ost and Jan Kubik (Osa 2003: 7). Osa believed that: "none of the second-wave authors systematically considers the effects of religion and/or social heterogeneity on movement development" (Osa 2003: 10). Osa has carried out an analysis of Solidarity from the perspective of social movement theory. Social movement theory includes a focus on: interaction between competing groups, ideology, cycles of protest, and master frames that perform a 'macro-coordination' function by connecting organisations and movements throughout a cycle of protest (Osa 1997: 346, 348; Osa 2003: 17, 20). Osa explained that: "I identify three protest waves that peaked in 1956, 1968, and 1980. I explain why the first two waves failed to create a broad-based social movement and why the third wave yielded the famous Solidarity movement" (Osa 2003: 4). Osa conceptualised the emergence of social movements as the temporal unfolding of historical patterns of contentious politics (Osa 1997: 341). Charles Tilly and Sidney Tarrow created the concept of contentious politics, and they argued that Solidarity's success resulted from the expansion of the oppositional domain in the years following 1956 (Tilly & Tarrow 2007: 116). In 1957 Cardinal Wyszyński inaugurated 'the Great Novena of the Millennium', a nine year programme leading up to the Church's celebration of one thousand years of Polish Catholicism. The Great Novena of the Millennium established a symbolic and tactical paradigm for contention - a master frame (Osa 1997: 351; Osa 2003: 66, 67). Osa paid attention to the role of ideas in creating a protest

movement, and her engagement with social movement theory provided a new perspective on Solidarity.

Father Józef Tischner was also interested in the role of ideas in Solidarity: "Usually, concepts lend themselves to a relatively easy definition, whereas ideas remain to some extent undefined. Ideas are more models of things than expressions of their actual state" (Tischner 1984: 5). Tischner argued that at each stage of history, it is necessary to define an idea that expresses concrete democracy. Tischner recognised that there were core ideas in Solidarity that united all the different social groups, such as the idea of 'human dignity':

> In the past, independence was such an idea in this country. Do we have such an idea today?
>
> It seems so. The idea of human dignity has become an idea of 'concrete democracy'. Everyone feels this idea in one's own way, but the idea is basically held in common.....Today, everybody finds within himself a sense of dignity, workers, farmers, intellectuals and scientists. The idea of dignity is the background for all concrete hopes (Tischner 1984: 43).

Daniel Singer wrote about the need to unite all the groups in Solidarity: "In order to rally a real opposition the movement will have to produce a project, presenting a global alternative, and link it at the same time with concrete, down-to-earth proposals affecting the everyday life of the people.....What will it give the workers beyond the right to strike? What control will workers have over their own work?" (Singer 1981: 152). Singer felt that at the beginning of the 1980s, the Polish labour movement "has not yet found its bearings. It is still groping toward a project and searching for an ideology" (Singer 1981: 232). No scholars have managed to define the ideology of Solidarity because the union contained such a broad range of ideas, and the dominant ideas in the movement shifted over time. Singer analysed Solidarity from a socialist perspective. He argued that Solidarity was similar to a Marxist movement, but he admitted that the union was not headed by convinced Marxists, nor probably interpreted in this fashion by the participants (Singer 1981: 232). A. Walicki argued that Solidarity had no consistent ideology, and on the subconscious level it was much more socialist than on the conscious level (Walicki 1984: 12). David Ost believed that the consensus within Poland saw Solidarity as being on the left of politics (Ost 1990: 7, 14). This is debatable because the broadness and complexity of Solidarity made it hard to classify the union in conventional terms as being on the left or right of politics. It was not possible to define precisely the ideology of Solidarity, and this contributed to the union's mythical

status. Tom Keenoy believed that to explain the social myth is to destroy it (Keenoy 1983: 28).

The workers' self-management movement was one of the various strands of thought in Solidarity. The Solidarity literature has recognised that there was also a nationalist current and a religious current. The main nationalist grouping in Solidarity was the Confederation of Independent Poland (KPN), and a major Catholic group was the Clubs of Independent Catholic Intellectuals (KIK). Moreover, there was a radical element that developed within Solidarity towards the end of 1981, but it never came to dominate the union. This radical current was nationalist, populist, richly decorated with religious symbols, and it may be compared to the most nationalistic elements of Józef Piłsudski's regime in the 1920s (Michnik 1985: 90). The prominent Solidarity activist Adam Michnik was concerned by the radical current in Solidarity: "the most important conflict, the original idea of Solidarity was set against the populist-totalitarian tendency, whose screaming drowned out every proposed strategic initiative. It sprang from poverty, hysteria, and demagoguery: its followers spouted slogans about 'true Poles'" (Michnik 1985: 90). Jadwiga Staniszkis argued that in general terms two tendencies developed in Solidarity: the pragmatic orientation and the fundamentalist orientation (Staniszkis 1984: 23). The pragmatists were willing to negotiate with the communist authorities to achieve reform, whereas the fundamentalists sought change through more radical strike action. Staniszkis argued that the fundamentalist position was often taken by the grass-roots worker members of Solidarity (Staniszkis 1984: 24).

The broad range of groups and strands in the union inevitably led to some disagreements. Scholars who have highlighted the tensions within Solidarity include Alain Touraine et al. (1983), Robert Biezenski (1996) and Shana Penn (2005). There were disagreements in Solidarity about the leadership of Wałęsa; some activists felt that he was too moderate to lead the union. Wałęsa wrote that a few days after the start of the strike at the Gdańsk Shipyards in August 1980: "Anna Walentynowicz [a crane operator who had been fired by management] had come to see me, as a friend, with a concrete proposal: I was to offer my resignation from the presidency of the MKZ. According to her.....the MKZ needed someone like Andrzej Gwiadza, Jacek Kuroń, or Modzelewski" (Wałęsa 1987: 148-149). Wałęsa explained that according to Walentynowicz: "I was too weak, not 'revolutionary' enough in my demands, too soft in my dealings with the authorities. And it wasn't only her

idea: she had behind her a small influential group, all members of the original Free Trade Union movement" (Wałęsa 1987: 148-149). Adam Michnik was similar to Wałęsa in that he favoured a moderate approach. Michnik believed that the main idea of Solidarity was to achieve a 'Self-Governing Republic', and he wanted this to be achieved peacefully (Michnik 1985: 90). Michnik did not want Solidarity to seize power, and he argued that: "Above all, social changes follow from a confrontation of different moralities and visions of social order" (Michnik 1985: 86, 87).

Despite the differences between the various strands in Solidarity, all members of the union wanted fundamental reforms in Poland. The Solidarity literature has explained that many Polish people did not have enough food, and conditions of work in the factories were terrible. Wałęsa described conditions of work in the Gdańsk Lenin Shipyards:

> Gdańsk Shipyard had become a large-scale enterprise by 1960. Yet it lacked the most elementary accommodations for workers, such as proper lockers, changing rooms, or lavatories.....There wasn't even a workers' cafeteria until the mid-1970s.
>
> By the early 1960s, most of the shipyard workers suffered from stomach ailments, a situation that was more or less inevitable.....You can't imagine how humiliating these working conditions were (Wałęsa 1987: 44, 45).

Solidarity sought to rise above the political divisions that were prevalent in Poland and in the entire Eastern bloc (Wałęsa 1987: 151). Solidarity was united by its opposition to the communist government, whose policies were destroying the economy and natural environment. Moreover, in the same way that Solidarity had moderate and radical currents, the PZPR contained reformers and hard-liners. Stefan Bratkowski was a known advocate of Party reforms, and he chaired the Polish Journalists Association (Stowarzyszenie Dziennikarzy Polskich). Bratkowski addressed an open letter to Party members, which drew a hostile response from the Ninth Plenum of the PZPR Central Committee at the end of March 1981 (Raina 1985: 210). The Warsaw 80 Club for Creative Party Intelligentsia, established in December 1980, opposed any reforms. The Club was a forum for orthodox Marxists, and it supporters included Tadeusz Grabski and Stefan Olszowski (Raina 1985: 208). The hard-line faction in the PZPR wanted to preserve the authoritarian political system and centrally directed economy. In contrast, Solidarity wanted liberal democracy, local self-government and market reform (Garton Ash 2002: 352). It would take time however, for Solidarity to define a detailed politic-economic programme.

The strategic turn towards workers' self-management

Solidarity adopted workers' self-management as part of its politico-economic strategy due to a change in the identity and strategy of the union. In the beginning Solidarity concentrated on consolidating the free and independent trade unions (Morawski 1982: 179). Jadwiga Staniszkis defined the early Solidarity period as a 'self-limiting revolution'. - This was a radical wave of protest, but the protest had to be limited in order that the government did not resort to repression, as it did in 1956 and 1970 (Staniszkis 1984: 18). Staniszkis argued that: "Another characteristic feature of this initial period was a lack of ideology due to the tactical silence on the part of the self-limiting revolution" (Staniszkis 1984: 19). Włodzimierz Pankόw described the first phase of Solidarity activity as the syndical or union phase (Pańków 1987: 120). This initial stage of Solidarity's development finished with the so-called Warsaw Agreement on 31st March 1981 (Staniszkis 1984: 19). This agreement followed the Bydgoszcz crisis, in which policemen had badly beaten Solidarity activists who were trying to organise a rural Solidarity movement. The grass-roots of Solidarity wanted to engage in a general strike, and they felt let down by the Solidarity leadership, who negotiated a compromise with the government. Touraine et al. described the March 1981 crisis in Bydgoszcz by writing that: "At a moment when it [Solidarity] had reached its greatest strength, it was for the first time confronted with its own limits and experienced its first serious internal conflicts" (Touraine et al. 1983: 69). During the first phase of Solidarity's existence, there was a predominant unwillingness to engage the union in workers' self-management activity (Łabędź 2006: 290). According to Kuisz, this unwillingness resulted from workers' experiences in post-war Poland, which had given them a dislike of big official institutions, politics and cooperation with the government - even at the lowest level (Kuisz 2009: 243). The second stage of Solidarity's development was an identity crisis (Staniszkis 1984: 17). Solidarity moved away from its roots as a protest movement, and it sought to negotiate with the government in order to achieve political and economic reform. Pankόw described this new phase of Solidarity activity as the economic phase (Pańków 1987: 120). Morawski agreed that Solidarity began to think about economic reform (Morawski 1982: 179). In addition, scholars have noted that the theme of workers' self-management became more evident in the union (Barker 1986: 94; Kuisz 2009: 277; Łabędź 2006: 290; Touraine et al. 1983: 84).

After the initial period of uncertainty, Solidarity began to openly support workers' self-management (Kuisz 2009: 277). Morawski explained that: "in the spring.....of 1981 we note

the common belief that factory self-management was a must, even though opinions were still divided on the urgency of that issue" (Morawski 1982: 179). The Solidarity leadership on the National Coordinating Commission (KKP) asked scholars at the OPSZ research centre (Ośrodek Prac Społeczno-Zawodowych) to prepare a project that would develop the position of the union on workers' self-management. In this way, the leadership of Solidarity was moving from general declarations to concrete planning for self-management (Jakubowicz 1988: 110). Szymon Jakubowicz pointed out that Solidarity's strategic turn towards workers' self-management took place in two plenary meetings of the KKP: in the days 24th-26th July and 10th-11th August 1981 (Jakubowicz 1988: 111). Jacek Kuroń was involved in these meetings, and he believed that the communist government was not in a position to govern. It was necessary therefore to try to build a new system. Kuroń advocated support for the self-management movement, which could present a credible programme for getting out of the economic crisis (Jakubowicz 1988: 112). During one debate Kuroń said that: "we must build a new governing organisation. It should not be a party but a movement of workers' self-management, which would rule over the whole economy, the regions' economic administration, and individual enterprises" (Hyclak 1987: 131). On 26th July 1981, the KKP passed a resolution, which set out the strategic turn of Solidarity in the direction of workers' self-management (Jakubowicz 1988: 115).

The decision to pursue workers' self-management activity did not receive universal backing in Solidarity (Jakubowicz 1988: 116, 125). For example, Jan Rulewski, a member of the KKP, expressed opposition to workers' self-management (Jakubowicz 1988: 112, 118). Miklós Mitrovits pointed out that the influential Solidarity advisor Jan Olszewski was also against self-management; Olszewski called the concept downright utopian (Mitrovits 2010: 167-168). In addition, Robert Biezenski noted that there were tensions between the Solidarity leadership and the Network (Biezenski 1994: 81, 82). According to Marcin Chodorowski: "from the beginning Solidarity viewed the Network with suspicion" (Chodorowski 1992: 18). The Network did not have a fully-defined status in the structure of Solidarity. There was thus concern about the Network transforming into a new organisation, independent from the union (Chodorowski 1992: 19).

The Solidarity literature has noted that there were also disputes about self-management between the government and Solidarity. In summer 1981, Solidarity entered negotiations

with the government about self-management laws. At that time, compromise seemed very desirable. Colin Barker argued that the economic reform proposals of the Network were not very different to those of reformers in the communist regime (Barker 1986: 97, 99). Jarosław Kuisz explained that on 28th July 1981 the Krakow newspaper *Gazeta Krakowska* published the two competing self-management bills: the government bill and the Network bill. Kuisz referred to Helena Lazar, who emphasised that both projects had many ideas in common and proposed many of the same solutions (Kuisz 2009: 272). Lazar also identified differences between the government and Network projects, with the principle of ownership being the key difference (Kuisz 2009: 272). In addition, Morawski pointed out that the government bill proposed a decentralisation of management, but enterprises were to remain directly subordinate to the central authorities (Morawski 1987: 91). The negotiations between Solidarity, the Network and the government led to laws on State Enterprises and Workers' Self-Management in September 1981. Jack Bielasiak noted that these compromise laws gave rise to great controversy, because many Solidarity members wanted the reforms to be more far-reaching (Bielasiak 1989: 290). Pankόw agreed that self-management activists were disappointed with the laws (Pańków 1987: 123). However, Jermakowicz and Chodorowski took a more positive perspective on the self-management laws. Jermakowicz argued that the 1981 laws gave workers' councils much more power than the law from November 1956 (Jermakowicz 1983: 36). Chodorowski asserted: "Personally I am convinced that despite everything the Network achieved success. Although its bill was not passed by the Sejm, it started off a nationwide discussion on the theme of self-management and its place in the enterprise" (Chodorowski 1992: 48).

The workers' self-management laws were passed three months before the declaration of Martial Law. There has been little research on workers' self-management during the underground Solidarity period. Most of the research on Solidarity and self-management covers a shorter time frame. For example, Chodorowski (1992) and Jakubowicz (1988) studied self-management during the legal Solidarity period in 1980-81. The work of Marek Dąbrowski (1990) addressed workers' self-management and ownership reform in Poland, but it does not go deep into the details of the self-management movement in Poland. Dąbrowski has a special focus on economic reform in socialist and capitalist economies. In the same vein as this PhD project, Łabędź (2006) and Mitrovits (2010) analyse Solidarity and self-management throughout the 1980s. However, this PhD research is distinct from the work of Łabędź and Mitrovits. This is due firstly to the focus on the role and activities of the

Network throughout the 1980s, and secondly the analysis of the relationship between Solidarity and workers' self-management.

Was self-management important for workers?

There have been debates among scholars about the role of workers' self-management in the Solidarity union. Some scholars (Jan Olszewski in Jakubowicz 1988; Barker 1986; Biezenski 1994) have argued that only intellectuals and activists were interested in workers' self-management, and they forced the idea upon the grass-roots of Solidarity. Colin Barker stated: "The self-management movement, especially the Network, involved the activists and full-time officials of Solidarity much more than the rank and file....." (Barker 1986: 102). Intellectuals believed that decentralisation and workers' participation was needed to overcome the problems of the declining Polish command economy (Barker 1986: 95). The Solidarity activist and lawyer Jan Olszewski asserted that workers' self-management was thought up by intellectuals, and workers did not show interest in the idea (Jakubowicz 1988: 125). Robert Biezenski argued that intellectuals took advantage of workers' protests to push forward their own interests. He believed the initial drive behind self-management came from the technical intelligentsia (Biezenski 1994: 59). Kazimierz Kloc and Tadeusz Kowalik also doubted workers' interest in self-management (Kuisz 2009: 242). Kowalik believed that the Gdańsk Agreement demand for economic reform based on workers' self-management did not come from workers. He argued that self-management was supported by the majority of advisors to the Gdańsk MKS from the Tadeusz Mazowiecki group and also by two government advisers - Antoni Rajkiewicz and Janusz Pajestka (Kuisz 2009: 242). Jadwiga Staniszkis also questioned the importance of workers' self-management in Solidarity. Staniszkis argued that the Solidarity KKP mainly adopted self-management in order to respond to the government's charge that it did not have a concrete plan to get out of the economic crisis. According to Staniszkis, Solidarity promoted self-management in order to build a more positive image of the union, rather than because it fully supported the idea (Staniszkis 1984: 27). Biezenski believed that: "Far from instigating the samorząd initiative, Solidarity was only dragged slowly and reluctantly into the issue" (Biezenski 1994: 70). Furthermore, it can be argued that developments in relation to workers' councils in 1981 repeated what had happened in 1956-58. Hyclak argued that in this earlier experiment with workers' self-management, many workers' councils became dominated by intellectuals (Hyclak 1987: 129). Biezenski stated that in 1981 the technical intelligentsia took on the

leading positions in the workers' councils, and the administrative intelligentsia came to the fore in the factory and regional Solidarity councils (Biezenski 1994: 69).

On the other side of the argument, scholars have argued that workers' self-management was a grass-roots movement, supported by workers throughout the country. Bielasiak believed that: "Grass-roots backing provided the self-management movement with considerable momentum, culminating in attempts to form workers' councils without waiting for the appropriate legislation" (Bielasiak 1989: 289). Furthermore, Morawski declared that the conception in summer 1981 for self-management reform was "a grass-roots movement in favour of a democratic, comprehensive and radical economic reform" (Morawski 1982: 180). Chodorowski argued that in the Solidarity leadership at the end of June 1981, the idea of self-management had as many supporters as opponents; but there were strong signs that creating self-management bodies would enjoy ever greater support among the grass-roots of the union (Chodorowski 1992: 17). Pankόw agreed with Chodorowski that there were some doubts about self-management in the Solidarity leadership, but union activists in the workplace believed that gaining increased enterprise independence could unite workers (Pankόw 1987: 122). In addition, Mitrovits pointed out that the Network was organised around the grass-roots of the union, and its co-founders were members of the Gdańsk Inter-Factory Union Founding Committee (MKZ) (Mitrovits 2010: 166). This PhD project adheres to the school of thought promoting workers' self-management as an authentic, grass-roots movement of Polish workers.

Did workers or intellectuals lead Solidarity?

A major debate in the literature has revolved around whether workers or intellectuals led the Solidarity union. Daniel Singer pointed out that the intelligentsia is a vague term: "In Tsarist times it referred to the educated, who were a rare commodity, and it had a moral connotation. Its members were assumed to be socially committed, striving in some way to change the shape of things" (Singer 1981: 108). In addition, Denis MacShane explained that: "in Poland the phrase intelligentsia or 'intellectuals' embraced a much broader section of society, stretching well beyond the ivory tower academic associations of the words in English. The Polish intelligentsia included teachers, lawyers, other members of the liberal professions, writers, film-makers, journalists, economists and sociologists" (MacShane 1981: 52). Some

studies analysing the origins of Solidarity affirm that intellectuals, especially those associated with the Workers' Defence Committee (KOR), contributed to the creation of the opposition movement. Such studies include Jan Józef Lipski (1985), David Ost (1990) and Nina Witoszek (2007) (Payerhin 1996: 186). The principal argument of these scholars was that there existed a causal linkage between the activities of intellectuals in the democratic opposition during the late 1970s and the emergence of an independent trade union movement by 1980 (Ost 1990: 10; Payerhin 1996: 186). Nina Witoszek argued that it was largely thanks to KOR's broad information network, such as the periodical *Robotnik* and high quality journals like *Krytyka*, that the image of resistance as a solidarity movement was established in the public consciousness (Witoszek 2007: 225). Witoszek also believed that Pope John Paul II played a crucial role in reinforcing KOR's definition of solidarity as a struggle for human dignity (Witoszek 2007: 225).

On the other side of the argument, there is a group of researchers, aided by a syndicalist current within former Solidarity itself, who have denied KOR a significant role in the development of workers' 'consciousness' before the creation of Solidarity. These scholars argued that intellectuals at best provided technical advice and propagated workers' demands (Payerhin 1996: 187). A key point of these 'revisionist' scholars, such as Roman Laba (1991) and Laurence Goodwyn (1991), is that Solidarity did not emerge either in Warsaw, the major stronghold of KOR and the Polish intelligentsia, or in Lublin - a city with two universities located well within the reach of KOR's influence (Karabel 1993: 25, 29). Laba and Goodwyn pointed out that the Warsaw region, which was the locus of a large industrial working class, did not generate a single Inter-Factory Strike Committee (MKS) during the strike wave of July and August 1980 (Karabel 1993: 42). Laba believed that the main characteristics of Solidarity were created autonomously by Polish workers during the strikes in 1970, six years before the creation of KOR and ten years before the rise of Solidarity (Laba 1991: 11, 113). In addition, Laba argued that the origin of Solidarity was regional, among the shipyard workers of the Baltic Coast. Laba stated there were various sociological factors that explained why coastal workers have played a key role in Polish workers' struggles. For example, in the coastal region, there was the presence of immigrants from Poland's eastern borderlands, with their keen sense of Soviet domination (Laba 1991: 115, 116). A. Walicki agreed with the revisionist interpretation, as he argued that the creation of Solidarity was the achievement of workers, led by their own, grass-roots natural leaders (Walicki 1984: 11). The perspective of this PhD project is that both the traditional and revisionist interpretations

are largely correct. The point that these interpretations miss is that workers and intellectuals led the Solidarity union in partnership. Scholars including Neal Ascherson (1987) have recognised how workers and intellectuals engaged in cooperation, which did not happen during the protests in 1968 and 1970-71 (Ascherson 1987: 178). There are various examples throughout the empirical chapters of cooperation between workers and intellectuals. Empirical chapter two analyses the creation of underground union structures, which involved workers and intellectuals acting in partnership.

The revival of civil society

Cooperation between workers and intellectuals aided the revival of civil society in Poland. Michael Carpenter argued that: "civil society refers to the overlapping, autonomous, and voluntary social groups, organisations, and institutions that exist in a pluralist society" (Carpenter 1999: 333). Dahrendorf stated that it was vital to create a civil society: "The creative chaos of organisations, associations and institutions is not easily built, and should perhaps not be the task of deliberative construction at all....The key question is how to fill the gap between the state and the people with activities which by their autonomy create social sources of power" (Dahrendorf 1990, in Neuber 1993: 517). The Stalinist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe forbade civil societies because they sought to control all spheres of life. But in Poland there was an increasing desire for a new kind of society with more freedom of expression and association. Polish society needed to unite, rather than succumb to the social divisions prevalent in previous times of crisis. Adam Michnik quoted the views of the former Polish leader Józef Piłsudski on the intelligentsia in Poland: "They are like hysterical young women who cannot bear hearing glass scratched but who put up with having their faces slapped" (Michnik 1985: 210). Piłsudski called for intellectuals to end their self-isolation: "They should publish illegal newspapers and give illegal lectures. They should become involved in the workers' movement and be society's tutor" (Michnik 1985: 211). Three decades after Piłsudski left office, there were still divisions between workers and intellectuals. In 1968 workers did not join intellectuals and students in protesting against the communist regime. There even existed a lack of solidarity among workers in Gdańsk during the strikes in 1970 (Wałęsa 1987: 81).

Polish society gradually evolved and there developed a higher level of social cohesion. Neal Ascherson explained that intellectuals learnt lessons from past failures, and the student protests in 1968 caused them to think about their role in society:

> One consequence was the end of the assumption, dating back to the Romantic period of revolution in the early nineteenth century, that the function of intellectuals was to formulate and lead the protests of the nation in times of peril.....And when intellectual opposition revived again, nearly ten years later, it took a very different form: more conservative, more influenced by history, above all looking to the Catholic Church for moral guidance and protection. Forsaking old claims, this new opposition saw its duty as assisting and servicing working-class protest rather than attempting to lead it (Ascherson 1987: 178).

Intellectuals and workers began to work together and they knew it was in both of their interests to reform the communist system. Wojciech Lasocki worked at the Ursus plant in Warsaw. In an interview with Katarzyna Bachanowska at the Solidarity National Congress, he explained that: "The Union appeared because workers and the intelligentsia managed to look at each other with a friendly eye" (Bachanowska 1981, Gdańsk KK archive: IKZD, IKZD materiały_do publikacji_wywiady). In addition, Zbigniew Malinowski, who was chair of the MKZ at the Huta Baildon factory, argued that: "There would be no Solidarity in Poland if we had not created it all together. That is why we did not succeed in 1956, 1968, 1970 and 1976, because these were always local conflicts, which were carried out by only one group" (Bachanowska 1981, Gdańsk KK archive: IKZD, IKZD materiały_do publikacji_wywiady). Polish people realised the possibility of common action, and it was the coming together of workers, intellectuals and the Church that for the first time seriously threatened the Party's dominance (Hayden 1994: 12; Kubik 1994: 180).

The most important intellectual group in the creation of Solidarity was the Workers' Defence Committee (KOR). After the release of the last prisoners from the Radom and Ursus protests in 1976, KOR's project was re-valued and the organisation transformed itself into the Committee of Social Self-Defence (KSS-KOR). Jan Józef Lipski was a member of KOR and he wrote: "KOR believed firmly that among the necessary conditions for any future independence were national reintegration and solidarity;.....and enormous educational work in all social strata, designed to deepen the knowledge of national, European, and world history, together with an understanding of the contemporary world" (Lipski 1985: 77). KOR drew from a variety of sources and traditions, including Poland's Christian tradition. Even those in KOR who were not religious generally accepted the importance of Poland's

Christian heritage (Lipski 1985: 75). From the beginning KOR was a friendship community which crossed generational, spiritual and ethnic boundaries. There were eminent intellectuals and lawyers who were World War II veterans, such as Edward Lipiński; the 1968 student protest generation, who were people in their thirties with a dissident reputation such as Adam Michnik, Antoni Macierewicz and Jan Lityński; and there was Halina Mikołajska, a famous actress. KOR brought together socialists, agnostics and Catholics (Witoszek 2007: 220). KOR helped to stimulate civil society and create new centres of social activity (Lipski 1985: 62, 64). KOR also disseminated a wide range of ideas. The professed ultimate goal of KOR was parliamentary democracy and the independence of Poland (Payerhin 1996: 190). Apart from KOR, there were many other associations of intellectuals (Zuzowski 1993: 511). The Young Poland Movement (RMP) propagated an outspoken romantic variety of nationalism in the pages of its underground publications including *Bratniak* (Walicki 1984: 5). Polish people became conscious of national and religious traditions that had been ignored or suppressed in the official discourse of the PRL (Kubik 1994: 180). Jan Kubik argued that this national and religious heritage came from four major sources: the Polish independence tradition; the linking of Polish nationhood with Christianity; the democratic reforms of the late eighteenth century and the interwar republic; and the new tradition of Polish workers' martyrdom - predominately from the December 1970 killing of workers in Gdańsk (Kubik 1994: 180).

When the strikes broke out in the Lenin Shipyards in August 1980, Bronisław Geremek and Tadeusz Mazowiecki went to Gdańsk to give the striking workers a written message of support from sixty-two Warsaw intellectuals. Mazowiecki and Geremek were asked to stay in order to help workers prepare for negotiations with the government (Touraine et al. 1983: 73-4). The team of intellectual advisers that settled in Gdańsk also included: Andrzej Wielowieyski, who was on the editorial team of the periodical *Więź*; Waldemar Kuczyński and Tadeusz Kowalik (both economists); the sociologist Jadwiga Staniszkis; and Bogdan Cywiński (editor of the Catholic periodical *Znak* in Kraków) (Ascherson 1981: 156, 220). The experts made a crucial contribution, including advising workers on the formal conventions of labour negotiations (Wałęsa 1987: 133). Furthermore, A. Walicki quoted from Friedrich Engels, who argued that: "in order to be able to fight one needs first a soil to stand on, air, light, and space. Otherwise all is idle chatter" (Walicki 1984: 11). The Solidarity union sought to create a soil to stand on for the Polish people by giving them a true understanding of their history. In Nowa Huta during the days of legal Solidarity, Adam

Michnik, Jan Lityński and Konrad Bielinski became advisers to the Solidarity committee at the steelworks. Many independent publications were brought to the foundry and people learned the truth about 1956, 1968, 1970 and 1976 (Radio Free Europe Research, Polish Samizdat Extracts/2C 1985: 5).

Solidarity activists promoted education as an important part of the new civil society, and they established the so-called 'flying universities'. The flying universities were originally set up during the Nazi occupation in order to teach subjects including Polish language and history (Penn 2005: 72). Polish people began to take a keen interest in education even before the creation of Solidarity. The events of 1980-81 were preceded by a long period of increasing popularity for the classics of Polish romantic literature (Walicki 1984: 5). In addition, in the 1977-78 academic year a group of intellectuals created a flying university, which took the form of a series of lectures on topics ranging from the history of literature to modern political philosophy and economics. This activity broke the official government monopoly over higher education (Kubik 1994: 156). The sixteen months of legal Solidarity saw a flourishing of educational activity. Shana Penn wrote about the activity of the intellectual Barbara Labuda in Wrocław: "The union training centre she organised became a model for thirty-six such workers' universities, called *wszechnica*, which sprouted across the country. While Solidarity was legal, the workers' wszechnicas were extremely popular because they satisfied a pervasive desire for education" (Penn 2005: 72).

The mainstream of Solidarity did not seek to challenge the Party's control of the state apparatus, and Ost referred to this strategy as "anti-politics" - a concept invented by the Hungarian dissident George Konrád. "Anti-politics is not a negation of politics, but a relocation of the political public from state to society" (Ost 1990: 16). A report by a group of intellectuals on the Helsinki Committee concluded that during its legal existence, Solidarity did not work against the regime in most cases, but rather in spite of the regime, or aside from the regime (Matynia 2001: 928). There developed an alternative opposition movement called the Orange Alternative. They were a new generation of activists, and their form of protest was street action (Penn 2005: 263). The origins of the Orange Alternative were at the University of Wrocław, and they brought some fun to the streets. They wore colourful clothing (often orange or red); they had posters, masks, gremlin hats, and sarcastic banners such as "Love the People's Police!" and "Long life to the Undercover Agents"

(Misztal 1992: 62). There were also common plays, dances and chants. The Orange Alternative was not part of Solidarity, but it was an expression of the flourishing civil society (Misztal 1992: 62). Furthermore, Solidarity tried to preserve some independent centres of social activity during military rule. The underground leadership of Solidarity opted for a 'long march' opposition strategy, which meant building up an independent society in the underground (Penn 2005: 194). In an interview in 1985, the former Solidarity spokesperson Janusz Onyskiewicz said that: "What we are trying to do is release culture and education from the grip of the authorities. It can only be done by developing a parallel education, a parallel culture" (Harris 1985: 4). A. Walicki argued that the greatest achievement of the opposition intelligentsia was to be found in the creation of a vibrant cultural scene (Walicki 1984: 14). In the church complex in Warsaw's Zytnia Street, there were regular art exhibitions, film shows, discussion groups and lectures. Solidarity also financed scholarships in science and the arts (Harris 1985: 4).

Solidarity succeeded in creating quasi-state structures in the underground, which drew from the tradition of past Polish opposition movements. For example, during the 1863 January Uprising, the Polish fighters were supported by an underground state, which ran central and local government, foreign policy, a press and an arms industry (Ascherson 1987: 29). In addition, the clandestine organisation of the Polish Socialist Party (PPS) in Russian Poland was a precursor to the operations of Solidarity. Ascherson stated that the PPS "was the biggest left-wing movement in the Polish lands, drawing its support largely from the big workforces of the factories and mines.....the PPS developed a collective genius for conspirational organisation and publishing.....*Robotnik* was distributed by a network of party members, students and even Polish soldiers in the Russian army" (Ascherson 1987: 36). *Robotnik,* edited by Józef Piłsudski, was the clandestine newspaper of the PPS. The paper called for social justice and it circulated to tens of thousands of Poles throughout the Russian empire and beyond (Ascherson 1987: 10). The Solidarity intellectuals in KOR thus payed their respects to previous generations when they named their periodical *Robotnik*.

Polish history and the insurrectionary tradition

The Solidarity literature has acknowledged that in order to understand Solidarity, it is necessary to be aware of Poland's history. Peter Brock explained that Poland at the end of

the sixteenth century was a multilingual empire controlled by the gentry, and a sense of national consciousness was confined almost exclusively to this privileged class (Brock 1981: 28, 29). Poland developed a cultural tradition of Gentry or Nobility Democracy during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. This democracy was guaranteed by an equality of rights of all noblemen, including the poorest (Frentzel-Zagorska 1985: 83). Solidarity fought for democracy in Poland, and the union drew inspiration from the nation's democratic tradition. There was a famous constitution passed in Poland on 3rd May 1791, which gave rights to town citizens and the peasantry (Ascherson 1987: 23). This constitution sought to establish a democratic constitutional monarchy, and its architect was Hugo Kołłątaj. Krystyna Olszer argued that: "The socio-political and moral rebirth of Poland toward the end of the XVIII century, at a moment when she was being partitioned among Russia, Austria, and Prussia, is largely the work of Kołłątaj" (Olszer 1981: 44). Father Józef Tischner wrote about the spirit of the 1791 constitution: "Our beginnings were there. To break the bonds with those beginnings means to betray" (Tischner 1984: 95). After the fall of the once great and powerful Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, Polish history consisted of constant struggles for independence (Frentzel-Zagorska 1985: 83). In the nineteenth century, the Polish-speaking peasant masses slowly developed an awareness of the Polish nation and a non-noble intelligentsia also developed national consciousness (Brock 1981: 29, 39). Michnik reflected upon the behaviour of Polish people in the second half of the nineteenth century. Poles preserved the national language, culture, customs and traditions in their homes, as well as during meetings with family and friends (Michnik 1985: 206). Michnik argued that: "all this gave rise to a certain type of patriotism and a unique sort of patriot. This patriot manifested his Polish heritage by eating the traditional borscht and singing carols" (Michnik 1985: 206).

The Solidarity literature has revealed how the union drew inspiration from Poland's tradition of national insurrection, such as the armed uprisings in 1830 and 1863 against the Russians. The former Solidarity activist Helena Łuczywo, quoted in Penn, believed that: "Poles have a great sense of history. Poles feel history. We know lots of things, as if we had sucked them with our mothers' milk" (Penn 2005: 165). W.J. Stankiewicz argued that: "insurrectionary tradition has been part of the continuous, relentless struggle for independence and liberty by which the Polish identity.....has been shaped and reaffirmed since the days of the partitions" (Stankiewicz 1981: 13). Poland regained independence in 1918, but the following three decades were defined by political instability and war. After World War II, Poland

existed as a nation but did not possess sovereignty. A key part of Solidarity was a national awakening as people rejected communist propaganda. Adam Michnik argued that: "Uncovering lies about the past frequently allows us to discover our own identity. A key to the past can unlock many of the myths being created today. This is what happened with me" (Michnik 1985: 202).

Solidarity inherited knowledge about how to organise strikes and formulate demands. The post-war tradition of anti-communist struggle provided inspiration to Solidarity, as is illustrated in the Solidarity Programme from the First National Congress: "This social and moral protest did not arise overnight. It inherited the blood of the workers killed in Poznań in 1956 and on the Baltic Coast in December 1970. It inherited the student revolt in 1968, the suffering of the Radom and Ursus workers in 1976.....Our union rose from these struggles and will remain faithful to them" (Program NSZZ Solidarność 1981: 3, http://www.solidarnosc.org.pl/dok/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/I-KZD-uchwala-programowa.pdf). The Catholic Church helped Polish people remember their national traditions. Father Jożef Tischner served as Solidarity's unofficial chaplain, and he referred to both history and religion in his sermons. During one sermon in Kraków he analysed the word 'solidarity': "Each of us feels awesome gravity of meaning within this word. Bearing this weight we stand today on Waweł hill among the tombs of the Piasts and the Jagiellons, by the ashes of Mickiewicz and Słowacki, in front of the altar of the Son of God" (Tischner 1984: 2).

Solidarity and Poland's Christian heritage

The Solidarity literature has shown how the Catholic Church played an important role in the union. Scholars who have highlighted the role of the Church in Solidarity include Leszek Kołakowski (1979), John Bank (1981), Peter Brock (1981), Alexander Tomsky (1982), Janina Frentzel-Zagorska (1985), Adam Michnik (1985), Maryjane Osa (1997, 2003), Elzbieta Matynia (2001) and Guglielmo Meardi (2005). However, there have been a few dissenting voices concerning the importance of the Church in Solidarity. John Stanley (2010) criticised the Church for having some contacts with the communist regime (Stanley 2010: 142). In July 1981, Józef Glemp succeeded Stefan Wyszyński as Archbishop of Gniezno and Warsaw, as well as Primate of Poland (Stanley 2010: 137). Glemp regularly cautioned

Solidarity to resist the temptation to stage public protests (Penn 2005: 195). In addition, Staniszkis believed that: "Solidarity's Church advisers do not seem interested in the idea of self-government, preferring a more hierarchical order and having no wish for a social revolution" (Staniszkis 1982: 24).

The view of this PhD project adheres to the academic consensus that the Church played an important role in the Solidarity union. Throughout history Polish people drew strength from their religious traditions. Brock argued that during the partitions: "In Prussia and Russia (though not in Austrian Galicia) religion played a significant role in identifying the Polish countryfolk with the nation" (Brock 1981: 41). In the same way that Polish people suffered repression, this also happened to the Church. During World War II, thousands of clergy, nuns and monks were killed, and Church property was destroyed (Osa 2003: 32). The Soviet regime wanted to hide Poland's Christian heritage, which dates back to the tenth century. Stefan Wyszyński was placed under house arrest from 1953-56, and Catholic educational and charitable organisations were closed down (Osa 2003: 32). Leszek Kołakowski argued that the Catholic Church adapted to the circumstances of operating in a Soviet country (Kołakowski 1979: 335). Władysław Gomułka liberated Cardinal Wyszyński and negotiated a Church-state agreement with him (Osa 2003: 43). Kołakowski explained that: "Once it was no longer able to rely on its highly privileged cultural position of the pre-war period, Christianity made a great effort to survive under duress by using only its moral and intellectual resources.....It produced a new generation of intellectuals - open-minded, intelligent and tolerant" (Kołakowski 1979: 338). The independent Catholic press was not able to print what it wanted to, but in contrast to the communists, it did not lie (Kołakowski 1979: 338).

The patriotic and national symbols widely used by Solidarity were strongly connected with religious symbols. This may have been a way to distinguish Polish society's patriotism from the official patriotism connected with communist symbols (Frentzel-Zagorska 1985: 92). Alexander Tomsky argued that: "The Church in Poland is not only a spiritual force but also a national institution, a rallying point in times of crisis. Judging by all historical precedents, it is almost indestructible for it is too deeply interwoven within the fabric of everyday life" (Tomsky 1982: 11). The election of Pope John Paul II helped Polish people to embrace their Catholic heritage. Tischner believed that: "The vision of John Paul II became a part of the

Polish conscience" (Tischner 1984: 90). Pope John Paul II's visit to Poland in 1979 was a papal journey to honour the martyr St. Stanisław, who had been killed by a Polish King nine hundred years before. The Pope spoke in a literary Polish which had not been heard from official platforms for a generation (Ascherson 1981: 141, 142). The Pope's visit also showed that the authorities no longer had a monopoly on the organisation of large public events, as church authorities and parish volunteers handled planning, publicity and crowd control (Matynia 2001: 924; Osa 2003: 141).

In 1980 Cardinal Wyszyński was in his eightieth year, but still infinitely the most powerful spiritual authority within Poland (Ascherson 1981: 24). Wyszyński created a new religious nationalism, detached from partisan politics, a nationalism that made the very existence of the nation dependent on the Church and her royal, divine Protectress, the Virgin Mary, Queen of Poland (Osa 1997: 353). Father Tischner argued that there was a profound difference, but no contradiction between Christian principles and the socialist ethos that was espoused by workers in the early days of Solidarity (Tischner 1984: 48, 49). Solidarity claimed that it was not connected to any outside group or organisation. John Bank referred to an official document in which Solidarity declared that the union: "identifies with no ideology and no religion" (Bank 1981: 6). Solidarity declared itself to be secular, but the union acknowledged Christian values to be the foundation of European culture (Bank 1981: 6). Officially Solidarity was not politically related to the Church, nor did it take the Catholic social doctrine as part of its programme (Bank 1981: 6). Nevertheless, Solidarity and the Catholic Church worked together closely.

The Church helped grass-roots Solidarity activists to give aid to those in need. Ascherson argued that the influence of the Church increased enormously after the imposition of Martial Law (Ascherson 1987: 226). In parish church communities, people were able to give each other support, collect food and money for their detained relatives and send letters to them (Tomsky 1982: 11). The chair of Solidarity in the Ursus factory plant believed that: "The only strength that we can rely on in this difficult time is that of the Catholic Church. It is essential, therefore, to cooperate fully with the Church, especially in organising help for those who have been arrested, laid off work, those in hiding and all those who are being prosecuted" (*Polish Solidarity Campaign News*, January 1982: 6). Many important events in Nowa Huta took place in churches. In 1985 *Radio Free Europe Research* reported that on

the Kalinowe estate in Nowa Huta, a group of steelworkers were helping build a church (*Radio Free Europe Research*, Polish Samizdat Extracts/2C 1985: 5). In addition, a Solidarity activist at the Wedel chocolate and candy factory in Warsaw said that: "Masses such as those said by Father Popiełuszko are magnificent and badly needed.....May the Lord grant us more of such priests" (*Radio Free Europe Research*, Polish Samizdat Extracts/2A 1985: 6). The Church and Pope John Paul II understood Poland's insurrectionary tradition and Polish people's desire for more freedom. Father Tischner wrote in his book *The Spirit of Solidarity* that: "the popes know what history is.....The popes have a duty to remind us of what is indestructible, so that people and nations might tie their fates with what lasts" (Tischner 1984: 90). Polish women also played an important role in the country's insurrectionary tradition and in Solidarity, but their role has not been well documented in the literature.

The sacrifices of Polish women

During the Solidarity opposition era, there was a lack of women in the union leadership on the national and regional levels. Women were also under-represented at the Solidarity First National Congress. Only sixty-nine of eight hundred and eighty-one delegates at the Congress were women (Penn 2005: 62). Women were regarded as playing a supporting role in Polish society, and the model for this was the cultural icon of the Matka Polka (Polish Mother), which first appeared in a poem by Romantic poet Adam Mickiewicz (Penn 2005: 15-16). The sacrifices made by women throughout Polish history formed a part of Poland's struggle for national independence. Shana Penn argued that: "each Polish insurrection also had a supporting cast of wives, mothers, and sisters, who kept the fight alive, passed around (and often wrote) the movement's manifestos, supported the men, and fought the enemy on a multiplicity of fronts" (Penn 2005: xiii). Women played a role in the 1794 insurrection against the three imperial powers. Polish women were also among the rebel fighters during the 1830-31 and 1863 uprisings; they were active partisans during the two World wars; and they worked in the opposition under communist rule (Penn 2005: 241-242). The sacrifices of previous generations in Poland included how mothers and grandmothers suffered while keeping faith in the idea of a free Polish state. Eva Stachniak has written about women in communist Poland: "I lived my life surrounded by women in mourning, women who had outlived their husbands, their children, their loves.....They wanted me to know that all their loss was a sacrifice I have to remember and respect" (Stachniak 1995: 75-76). Stachniak

believed that: "There is something inescapable about sacrifice in Polish culture. In our world we were told that men gave their lives for Poland, and women sacrificed themselves for their families. This sacrifice was a source of pride, a tower of strength, the very fabric of life" (Stachniak 1995: 75-76).

Padraic Kenney argued that scholars have paid attention to identities of nation and class in European communist states, but there has been a lack of focus on gender identity (Kenney 1999: 401). Kenney has explained how women protesters played an important role in Polish opposition to communism. In September 1947, the women workers of the I.K. Poznański cotton mill (later called Marchlewski mill) in Łódź carried out a strike that virtually shut down the city's textile industry for two weeks (Kenney 1999: 415). The strike was about management's attempts to reform work practices and pay. The female strikers manipulated the communist authorities' perception of them as helpless women. The PZPR was fearful of the women strikers, and the police found it impossible to identify strike leaders (Kenney 1999: 415-417). Furthermore, the inability of the PZPR to deal with women's demands greatly contributed to the state's problems in the 1970s and 1980s (Kenney 1999: 401). The Polish opposition in the 1970s focused mainly on human rights and the battle for national sovereignty. This did not represent the voice of workers in all its variety (Kenney 1999: 407). The Polish opposition was falling in line with the communists' division between the public and private spheres, whereby it was not acceptable to protest about matters in the private sphere, such as the family and household (Kenney 1999: 407-408). Women protesters brought matters from the private sphere into the public (political) sphere, and the communist authorities did not know how to deal with this (Kenney 1999: 414-415). On 10th February 1971, the Marchlewski cotton mill in Łódź went on strike over pay and price rises, and in the following days the strike spread to other textile mills and related factories (Kenney 1999: 410). These workers were in industries traditionally staffed by women. The regime gave in to the protests and cancelled price rises, whereas it had weathered the violent protests in the shipyards of the Baltic Coast in December 1970. In February 1971, the women protesters confronted the regime with a new language of protest (Kenney 1999: 410). Kenney explained that the women strikers "held fast to certain values rights – the right to be fed, or at least the right to equal access to food……...It was precisely the 'unstructured' nature of the strike that forced the regime's reversal, as the Party had difficulty both talking with the strikers and understanding their motives" (411).

The backstage and leadership roles that many women played in Solidarity have been forgotten in public memory (Pearce 2009: 168, 169). In 1980 the first feminist group began their secret meetings at the University of Warsaw (Stachniak 1995: 69). In summer 1981, Solidarity faced an identity crisis and Poland was suffering from supply bottlenecks and food shortages. Solidarity turned to the women of Łódź for help. In Łódź there were meat shortages and the prices of staple goods were going up sharply (Kenney 1999: 418). On 30th July 1981, women carried out a 'hunger march' in the city, echoed by smaller marches in other cities (mostly textile centres) throughout central Poland. With their hunger marchers, the women protesters put forward demands in the private sphere, and just like in 1971 the women pursued a new language of protest (Kenney 1999: 418, 425). In July 1981, the women of Łódź used the image of motherhood by marching with their baby strollers as they demanded an end to food shortages (Kenney 1999: 425). In response to the communist state's refusal to allow freedom of association, women protesters in 1947, 1971 and 1981 pursued new, unexpected forms of activism, which the government did not know how to deal with (Kenney 1999: 425). Furthermore, Shana Penn explained that women played a crucial role in underground Solidarity. A secret meeting took place just after the declaration of Martial Law. On 15th December 1981, seven women met in an apartment in Żolibórz, a northern district of Warsaw, and they began plotting to save Solidarity. The seven women were Helena Łuczywo, Joanna Szczęsna, Anna Dodziuk, Anna Bikont, Zofia Bydlińska, Małgorzata Pawlicka and Ewa Kulik (Penn 2005: 109). They realised that Solidarity needed a new decentralised structure, because the union's hierarchical chain of command would not work in the underground. They also knew how important it was for them to spread information in order to keep Solidarity alive. The seven women conspirators decided to remain anonymous, and they wanted to salvage the inspiring image of working-class heroes fighting for freedom (Penn 2005: 142, 143). Ewa Kulik made contact with several Solidarity leaders, including Zbigniew Bujak and Wiktor Kulerski, and she arranged places where they could live in secret. Penn wrote that: "By New Year's Eve, she [Kulik] and the six other women had completed preparations for the men to return to Warsaw to head the underground" (Penn 2005: 147). During the underground period, women kept the printing presses and other activities going while the men were in jail. The most important clandestine periodical - *Tygodnik Mazowsze* - was edited by a women-only board (Meardi 2005: 274). Women played a valuable role during the Solidarity opposition era. When Solidarity officially came back into the open in 1989, the union was no longer the same workers' movement that rose up in August 1980.

The rise of liberal economics

When Solidarity arose as a Baltic coast trade union, it demanded free trade unions and improved working conditions. However, scholars including Eyal, Szelényi & Townsley (1998), Stuart Shields (2003, 2004) and David Ost (2005) have argued that workers' rights was no longer a defining theme in Solidarity at the end of the 1980s. Gil Eyal, Iván Szelényi & Eleanor Townsley described the evolution of intellectual thought in Central Europe. They argued that in the nineteenth century, Central European intellectuals believed their task was to promote the ideals of bourgeois society. At the beginning of the twentieth century, intellectuals turned increasingly to right and left-wing radicalisms. Later in the century, in the face of Stalinist censorship, intellectuals slowly rediscovered bourgeois liberalism (Eyal, Szelényi & Townsley 1998: 11). After Martial Law in Poland, General Jaruzelski attempted to co-opt the technocratic intelligentsia into the power elite, successfully promoting a semi-private sector, and tolerating a large underground economy (Eyal, Szelényi & Townsley 1998: 31). By the end of the communist period, dissidents had joined forces with the technocratic fraction of the communist ruling elite in a commitment to transform the socialist economy and build capitalism (Eyal, Szelényi & Townsley 1998: 11).

David Stark and László Bruszt have also charted the rise of economic liberalism. Stark and Bruszt believed that in the 1970s and 1980s, conceptions for economic reform in Central Europe were dominated by a search for the correct balance between central planning and market reform (Stark & Bruszt 1998: 52). They argued that there was a change of approach in 1989, when privatisation became the dominant reform conception: "Whereas previous debates had addressed questions of how to *reform* the economic mechanism of state socialism, the new efforts sought to *transform* the fundamental institutions and property relations of these societies" (Stark & Bruszt 1998: 52). Stark and Bruszt identify Gdańsk as the birthplace of Polish neo-liberalism (Stark & Bruszt 1998: 94). They argued that: "During the mid-1980s.....a group of young private businessmen and young provincial intellectuals in Gdańsk formed a Liberal Club and at its meetings began reading and discussing major theoretical statements on property rights" (Stark & Bruszt 1998: 94). Krzysztof Łabędź also pointed to the mid-1980s as an ideological turning point. He believed at this time there was a slow move away from the programme agreed at the First National

Congress, which was based on improving working conditions and real societal ownership over the means of production (Łabędź 2006: 303).

Stuart Shields argued that it is important to focus on the international arena when analysing the rise of free market economics in Poland. Shields noted the rise of a new social formation in the global political economy (Shields 2003: 226). Through increasing transnational ownership, finance and production capital provided a material base for the emergence of a transnational capitalist class, which included government and business elites and international financial institutions (Shields 2003: 227). Shields explained that this transnational capitalist class made connections with intellectual and bureaucratic elites in Poland. In the 1970s, many well-connected young Polish academics obtained grants to participate in exchanges with Western universities. They began to acquire real knowledge of capitalist society. In the 1980s, a distinctive intellectual and entrepreneurial group championed economic liberalism (Shields 2003: 229). Ost affirmed that the strength of the working-class declined in Solidarity. His view on the evolution of the union was that: "unlike in 1980-81, Solidarity no longer made labour issues a key part of its program, aside from the right of independent trade unions to exist" (Ost 2005: 43). Ost argued that what happened theoretically in the 1980s is crucial for what happened practically after 1989 (Ost 2005: 38). He stated that a new intellectual consensus emerged among the Solidarity leaders: democracy was grounded not in an active citizenry, as had been argued from the mid-70s through to 1981, but in private property and a free market (Ost 2005: 42). Shields and Ost asserted that the Polish neo-liberals aimed to introduce their reforms without the direct participation of the general population (Ost 2005: 43, 53; Shields 2003: 230). In late 1988, Solidarity leader Lech Wałęsa created the Citizens' Committee (Komitet Obywatelski) as the union's direct political arm, and it was led almost exclusively by the union's leading liberal intellectuals (Ost 2005: 34, 35). Ost argued that Solidarity's intellectual leaders took advantage of workers' protests in 1988. The protests forced the government into negotiations, and Solidarity's leaders were able to pave the way for the liberal economic system that they desired (Ost 2005: 44-47). John Stanley and Michal Zielinski also noted how Solidarity had evolved by 1989 (Stanley 2010: 150; Zielinski 1996: 64). Zielinski believed that in February 1989 the Polish opposition went into the Round Table negotiations united under right-wing neo-liberal banners (Zielinski 1996: 64). Stanley argued that Wałęsa was no longer in favour of building a powerful union to protect the rights of workers (Stanley 2010: 150).

On 17th April 1989, a provincial court in Warsaw registered Solidarity, thus re-legalising the union. The new leaders of Poland, including Lech Wałęsa, Bronisław Geremek, Adam Michnik and Jacek Kuroń, turned to Jeffrey Sachs and Leszek Balcerowicz for help in creating a new economy. Balcerowicz was appointed Deputy Prime Minister for Economy, and he prepared a neo-liberal economic programme (Shields 2004 141). The new Solidarity-backed government planned ownership reforms based around privatisation. Ost pointed out that Solidarity resisted the new government's quick attempts at privatisation. The union did not want to transfer control of enterprises to the existing management from the old elite (Ost 2005: 153). Ost argued that: "Indeed, this was the one policy area where Solidarity unions in the workplace rejected the lead of the former Solidarity leaders in the government" (Ost 2005: 153). Shields also noted that there was much debate about the privatisation law, which was passed in July 1990 (Shields 2004: 141). Shields believed that it was a great paradox of the Polish transition that a movement so clearly defined by the principles of self-management and the self-liberation of civil society actually implemented the radical neo-liberal reform package of the Balcerowicz Plan, so-called 'shock therapy' (Shields 2003: 225).

Conclusion

The Solidarity literature has acknowledged how free market economics rose to prominence in the union at the end of the 1980s. The Balcerowicz Programme was more focused on privatisation than workers' self-management. There has been a small amount of literature on Solidarity and workers' self-management. In 1981 Solidarity adopted self-management as a politico-economic strategy for escaping from the economic crisis. The literature has recognised that Solidarity had a somewhat difficult relationship with self-management, as it was not universally popular in the union. There has been little research on workers' self-management during the underground Solidarity period. Most of the research on Solidarity and self-management covers a shorter time frame. For example, Chodorowski (1992) and Jakubowicz (1988) studied self-management in the legal Solidarity era in 1980-81. Łabędź (2006) and Mitrovits (2010) studied Solidarity and self-management throughout the 1980s, but this PhD research is distinct from their work. This project has more of a focus on the Network and linking the fate of self-management to the evolution of Solidarity. Workers' self-management was an important idea in Solidarity, which has not always been recognised

in the literature. Scholars have often focused on religious and patriotic ideas in Solidarity, as well as the ideas of hope and truth. The Solidarity literature has acknowledged the role played by the Catholic Church. The Church helped to organise help for victims of government repression, and it was linked to independent publications. The Workers' Defence Committee (KOR) also encouraged people to publish their ideas, which helped to revive civil society in Poland. A major debate in the literature has been whether workers or intellectuals led the union. In fact, both the traditional and revisionist interpretations are largely correct, as workers and intellectuals led Solidarity in partnership. Workers, intellectuals and the Church came together to create new centres of social activity, which called into question the authoritarian one-party system.

Chapter 3: Methodology

Research design

The main research method for my PhD thesis was archival research in Poland. I also used three further research methods: online research, interviews and secondary sources. I carried out archival research at archives in Gdańsk and Kraków. My online research allowed me to access further primary sources, for example through the Encyklopedia Solidarności online database. The work of scholars including Marcin Chodorowski (1992), Władysław Jermakowicz (1983) and Witold Morawski (1973, 1982 & 1987) helped to shape my original research. I learnt about workers' self-management by reading their work, and I identified areas open for further research. I carried out expert interviews with three former prominent members of Solidarity and the Network. This gave me some valuable personal insight into the development of the workers' self-management movement. I used more than one research method in order to construct a more complete picture of Solidarity, the Network and workers' self-management. Using a variety of sources generates more powerful insights than using only one type of source (Jordanova 2000: 101).

Richard Evans wrote about the eminent historian E.H. Carr and how it was important for historians to examine context: "Carr thought, rightly, that it was the job of historians to study whatever part of the past they chose to examine in the context of both what came before and after it, and the interconnections between their subject and its wider context" (Evans 2001: xli). My PhD thesis refers to past events that were significant for Solidarity, such as the protests in Poznań in 1956 and on the Baltic Coast in 1970-71. In addition, qualitative approaches to social science research have exerted an influence over historical research for many years. I drew on assumptions from a research paradigm called interpretivism. I was also influenced by qualitative approaches to data analysis when I examined my sources.

Research philosophy

Historians have been receptive to social science theories about the nature of the social world (ontology) and how to gain knowledge (epistemology) (Black & MacRaild 2000: 4). The interpretivist research paradigm states that the social world is constituted in part by people's ideas and perceptions. The early development of interpretivist ideas now associated with

qualitative research can be linked to the writing of Immanuel Kant, who in 1781 published his *Critique of Pure Reason*. Kant argued that there are ways of knowing about the world other than direct observation. He proposed that perception relates not only to the senses but to human interpretations of what our senses tell us (Ritchie & Lewis 2003: 6). The philosopher Max Weber (1864-1920) also contributed towards the interpretivist paradigm, as he argued that in the study of the social world, the aim is to understand subjectively meaningful experiences (Ritchie & Lewis 2003: 7). Furthermore, Henn et al. argued that: "we human beings do not passively respond to what is going on around us. Instead, we have the capacity to think through different courses of action, and respond (or not as the case may be) on the basis of interpretations and ideas" (Henn, Weinstein & Foard 2009: 15). E.H. Carr argued that it is important to think about the ideas of historical actors. Carr believed that: "History cannot be written unless the historian can achieve some kind of contact with the mind of those about whom he is writing" (Carr 2001: 19). I attempted to achieve this kind of empathy during my research. For example, I thought about the perspective of those who authored Solidarity documents in the archives (strike bulletins, letters, policy statements, reports etc.). In addition, my PhD research draws on the interpretivist premise that it is possible to analyse phenomena that cannot be physically observed. My research on Solidarity involved analysing the idea of workers' self-management. I could not directly observe all aspects of how this idea rose up in 1981; I had to think about the collective actions and understandings of Polish workers. I also could not directly observe all aspects of how Solidarity's identity evolved during the 1980s. - I researched this theme by examining the actions of Solidarity and the shared ideas of Solidarity activists.

In *What is History?* (first published in 1961) E.H. Carr argued that the resemblances in method between history and the natural sciences are greater than the differences (Davies in Carr 2001: 1v). Carr believed that: "history, like the natural sciences, is concerned not as is sometimes supposed with unique events but with the interaction between the unique and the general" (Davies 2001: lxi). - This is an important point for my PhD research. I relate workers' self-management to the general context of the Solidarity opposition movement. I also relate the fate of Solidarity to the international political context, i.e. Poland's status as a satellite state in the Soviet bloc. Carr's classic book started off an important debate about the nature of history and historiography. Aviezer Tucker wrote about historiography and he defined it by drawing from Langlois & Seignbos (1926) and Elton (1969): "Historians do not observe historical events. Historiography is not a study of the past as such, but of the

present effects (traces, remains, etc.) of the past. Historiography is the art of reasoning from traces to facts. Historians begin with the evidence, because it is present, the past is forever inaccessible" (Tucker 2004: 93). The traces and remains of the past are primary sources (Marwick 1993: 199). Moreover, Tucker pointed out some important developments in historical research; he argued that the nineteenth century German historian Leopold von Ranke was the paradigm founder of historiography (Tucker 2004: 54). Tucker explained that: "Ranke's upbringing brought him under the influence of the three disciplines that exported their cognitive values, theories, and methods to historiography" (Tucker 2004: 73). These three disciplines were biblical criticism, classical philology and comparative linguistics (Tucker 2004: 74). In addition, G.P. Gooch noted that Ranke insisted on historians studying primary sources: "the papers and correspondence of the actors themselves and those with immediate contact with the events they describe" (Gooch 1959: 97). In the archives, I searched for the papers and correspondence of important figures in Solidarity, as well as documents written by grass-roots Solidarity activists in factory plants throughout Poland.

Historians often accept that their own assumptions and views impact upon their research. When historians study primary sources, they already have ideas in their minds – assumptions about why events occurred, the role of different actors, the identities of social groups involved, and so on (Jordanova 2000: 63). It is important for me to state how personal views shaped my PhD research. I admit a sympathetic bias towards the Solidarity trade union, and I have a negative view of the Polish People's Republic government. My interest in workers' self-management meant that I focused more on Solidarity's politico-economic policy, and I focused less on the union's social and cultural policies. Jordanova argued that historical inquiry is moulded by our political beliefs and values, which is good as it gives energy to historical writings (Jordanova 2000: 2). Jordanova stated that: "The common polarisation of objectivity and subjectivity is unfortunate……The historian's path lies somewhere in between: it combines open recognition that we are interested parties in our studies with a clear sense of how to make the resulting knowledge as judicious as possible" (Jordanova 2000: 94). Historians also aim to make their work as accurate as possible. Carr asserted that his first answer "to the question, What is History?, is that it is a continuous process of interaction between the historian and his facts, an unending dialogue between present and past" (Carr 2001: 24). I undertook a dialogue between present and past by analysing archival documents and working out their contents, accuracy, relationship to other sources, and building up a complete picture of Solidarity, the Network and workers' self-management.

Archival research

The heart of my research focused on primary sources. I carried out research at three archives, one in Kraków and the other two in Gdańsk. Practically all of the sources I examined in the archives were written in Polish. Ludmilla Jordanova argued that: "There is no substitute for reading sources in their original language. Each language has its own flavour deriving from its grammar, the history and size of its vocabulary, and its historical traditions. Picking up these resonances is an important part of historical work" (Jordanova 2000: 182). The pace of my research in the archives increased over time, as I gained more expertise in Polish language and vocabulary. Moreover, Geoffrey Elton argued that research must be a broad-fronted attack upon all relevant material (Elton 1969: 88). I searched carefully in the archives for all documents that were relevant for my PhD project. I looked for documents on Solidarity's politico-economic strategy in order to understand how workers' self-management fitted into the union's programme. I looked for materials published by the Network, so I could examine the development of the self-management movement. I wanted to find documents illustrating the debates within Solidarity and the Network concerning politico-economic policy and workers' self-management. I also searched for documents from individual factory plants in order to analyse self-management at the grass-roots level.

Aviezer Tucker noted that: "Historians always seek groups of documents as evidence. A text that is not corroborated by comparison with other evidence is of little value or interest to historians" (Tucker 2004: 259). My archival research enabled me to analyse and compare a wide range of Solidarity documents in order to build up a deep understanding of the union and workers' self-management. Alan Bryman draws from Scott when pointing out how there exist different kinds of documents: "J. Scott (1990) has usefully distinguished between personal documents and official documents and has further classified the latter in terms of private as opposed to state documents" (Bryman 2012: 543-544). I found different types of documents in the archives including: official government documents; information bulletins from local, regional and national trade union bodies; and private correspondence between Solidarity activists. I analysed how specific events were described in different documents. The archival documents were often written by: the Network, Solidarity national and regional leadership bodies, Solidarity political and economic committees, Solidarity factory plant bodies, and academic groups.

I was aware of the need to establish the authenticity, credibility and meaning of archival documents (Bryman 2012: 544). Carr argued that documents need to be processed by the historian in order to make sense of them (Carr 2001: 10). I always checked who published and authored documents. I came across a few documents authored by members of the communist government, who were inevitably hostile to Solidarity. For example, in the Kraków archive I found a document from 1981 entitled 'Tezy projektu ustawy o samorządzie załogi przedsiębiorstwa państwowego', which was the government's bill on workers' self-management, written by a committee called Zespół X. Not all documents in the archives had named authors, especially documents published during the underground Solidarity period. It was sometimes necessary for authors to protect their identities from the communist authorities. The lack of a stated author did not invalidate the significance of a document, as these documents often contained useful and reliable information. In addition, there were some archival documents that did not have titles. For the purpose of referencing, I created titles for these documents, and they appear in quotation marks in the bibliography. There were also a few cases of documents not having a precise date of publication. In these cases, it was possible to work out roughly, or sometimes precisely, when they were published due to the information in the documents. For example, in the Kraków archive there was a Network statement from 1981 about additions to the Social Enterprise Bill. - No precise publication date was displayed on this document, but it was possible to work out from its contents that it was published in July or August 1981.

I undertook exploratory research visits to three institutions in Warsaw: Archiwum Akt Nowych (AAN), Archiwum Senatu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, and the Biblioteka Narodowa (National Library). These three institutions have some relevant resources for my PhD research. For example, the AAN archive has various Solidarity publications and workers' self-management documents from the Mazowsze and Łodź regions. The Senate archive has reports on politico-economic policy published by the Solidarity leadership in the late 1980s. The National Library has various underground Solidarity periodicals including *Informator*, *Krytyka* and *Solidarność Walcząca*. I decided that the archival resources available in Kraków and Gdańsk were the most useful for my PhD research. Gaining access to the archives in Kraków and Gdańsk was very straightforward, as all the archivists were very welcoming and helpful. Some of the most significant primary sources for my research from the Kraków and Gdańsk archives are detailed below and in Appendix 2.

Fundacja Centrum Dokumentacji Czynu Niepodległościowego in Kraków

This was the first archive in which I researched, from October to December 2012. This archive is an independent organisation and it has links with the Jagiellonian University. The archive is situated just outside the city centre on aleja Adama Mickiewicza. Kraków is in the Małopolska region, which was one of the most active centres of Solidarity activity. In addition, one of the so-called 'cornerstones' of the Network was the Nowa Huta steelworks (Huta im. Lenina) on the outskirts of Kraków. The archive has an online search engine that helped me to find various documents. I also spoke with the archivists about the materials that I was looking for, and I made use of their study area.

I used resources in the Kraków archive for my first empirical chapter about the rise of workers' self-management. The Kraków archive had extensive collections on Solidarity including books, periodicals, and documents written by Solidarity committees and factory plant bodies. I studied materials in the Małopolska Solidarity collection (Archiwum 1 III-Archiwum NSZZ Solidarność Małopolska). One of the volumes in this collection was Volume 021 Programme Section of Małopolska Solidarity Regional Management (Zarząd region Małopolska. Sekcja Programowa). The volume included work carried out by academics on economic reform and workers' self-management. In addition, the volume contained a report from a seminar on workers' self-management, attended by Solidarity representatives from throughout Poland. This report revealed debates in Solidarity about self-management. Also in the Małopolska Solidarity collection, I examined Volume 098 The Network of Leading Industrial Factory Plants (Sieć bezpośredniej współpracy między organizacjami związkowymi wiodących zakładów pracy). The Network volume included the group's Social Enterprise Bill, which was the heart of the Network project for workers' self-management. There was also an interview with Jerzy Milewski, the co-founder of the Network. The documents in the Network volume showed how the group developed its position on economic reform and why the group opposed the government's policies. The Network volume included statements from meetings of the group's representatives, which displayed how cooperation developed between different regions. Furthermore, the Network volume included documents produced by the communist government and its supporters in society, which were useful for understanding the competing conceptions for self-management. The Network volume also contained statements from the Lublin Group, which

showed their distinct conception for workers' self-management. Details of some of the most significant documents in the Kraków archive are provided in Appendix 2.

Komisja Krajowa (KK) archive in Gdańsk

In March 2013, I went to Gdańsk for a four month period of archival research. The KK archive is at the headquarters of the present-day Solidarity trade union. This large building is located in the city centre on Wały Piastowskie. The archive has a study area where I was able to read and analyse documents. While I did my research at the archive, the archivists were still organising and cataloguing all their resources. When writing my empirical chapters, I have given as precise references as possible, which would be good enough for anyone to return to the archives and find the relevant materials.

The KK archive holds arguably the most extensive collections of Solidarity materials anywhere in Poland. I used materials from this archive in my first and third empirical chapters. The materials in the archive included: books and periodicals; documents from the United Nations and international trade union groups; strike bulletins from Polish factories; and official agreements between the PRL government and Solidarity. For my first empirical chapter, I studied the collection on the Solidarity First National Congress (IKZD VII IKZD). This collection featured information bulletins about events at the Congress, including debates on workers' self-management and the self-management laws. For my third empirical chapter on the politico-economic transformation in 1989-90, I used a collection entitled 'Prezydium KKW'. This collection included full copies of the Round Table Agreements. The Prezydium KKW collection also contained records of discussions in the various Groups and Sub-Groups at the Round Table talks. I studied discussions from the Economy and Social Policy Group, and the Mining, Agriculture and Health Sub-Groups. This offered an insight into disagreements between the government and Solidarity sides during the Round Table, including about workers' self-management. Furthermore, a collection entitled 'Krajowa Komisja Wykonawcza' contained documents about the competing projects for ownership transformation in 1989-90, including workers' share ownership. In a collection entitled 'Krajowa Komisja Wykonawcza NSZZ Solidarność', there were minutes from meetings of the Solidarity leadership in the KKW and KKW Presidium. - The archivist recommended this to me as a very original source, which was only available at the KK archive. Indeed the minutes from the KKW meetings proved to be a key source, as they

presented decisions and debates at the highest level of Solidarity, including about politico-economic reform and workers' self-management. Finally, I used materials from a collection called 'Solidarność Region Gdański, Dział Informacji'. This collection included documents about the formation of a new workers' self-management movement in 1989. (See Appendix 2 for significant documents in the KK archive).

Europejskie Centrum Solidarności (ECS) archive in Gdańsk

During my PhD fieldwork in Gdańsk, I also researched at the ECS archive. The Europejskie Centrum Solidarności is a cultural institution and it has received funding from the European Union. The ECS and its archive are now located in a new building on Plac Solidarności, very close to the Solidarity trade union headquarters. When I researched at the ECS archive, it was situated in a building close to the famous Gate number 2 of the Gdańsk Lenin Shipyards.

I used resources from the ECS archive for my second empirical chapter on workers' self-management during the underground Solidarity period. The ECS archive had a lot of documents from the underground period. For example, the archive included personal correspondence between the leaders of underground Solidarity. The ECS archive contained statements and communiqués by underground Solidarity bodies at the local, regional and national level. These sources revealed how underground Solidarity was structured and how the union came back to life after the imposition of military rule. In addition, the sources illustrated the aims and activities of underground Solidarity. There was also information about the role of the Network during the underground period. (See Appendix 2 for significant documents in the ECS archive).

Solidarity publications

A key source during my PhD research were the newspapers affiliated to Solidarity. *Tygodnik Solidarność* (Solidarity Weekly) was the official Solidarity newspaper, and I analysed articles from this paper for my first and third empirical chapters. The paper was published by the KKP during the period of open activity in 1980-81, and its editors included Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Bogdan Cywiński and Waldemar Kuczyński. *Tygodnik Solidarność* resumed publication in June 1989, and a new editorial team was appointed in October 1989, which included Jarosław Kacyzński and Maciej Zalewski. The KK archive holds all the issues of

Tygodnik Solidarność. The paper included articles on Polish history, politics, economics, society and literature. *Tygodnik Solidarność* gave a key insight into events in Solidarity and the union's politico-economic policy. There were articles about Solidarity's opposition to the communist economic system. There was information about the strength of the economic bureaucracy and how the communist workers' self-management system was not authentic. There were also information bulletins on union activities throughout Poland, and interviews with leading figures in Solidarity. The articles in 1989-90 contained discussion about the key questions for the future of the Polish economy, including privatisation and reform of the ownership structure. *Tygodnik Solidarność* featured articles written by experts in politics, economics and sociology who advised Solidarity, including Ryszard Bugaj, Szymon Jakubowicz, Stefan Kurowski, Jan Mujżel, Andrzej Rychard and Jadwiga Staniszkis. (See Appendix 2 for significant articles in *Tygodnik Solidarność*).

Tygodnik Mazowsze was another Solidarity newspaper that proved crucial for my PhD research. The first issue was published on 11th February 1982 and it continued until the end of the Round Table talks in April 1989 (Pronobis 1989: 25). All the issues of the newspaper are available online through the Encyklopedia Solidarności archival database (www.encyklopedia-solidarnosci.pl). Key figures in the founding of *Tygodnik Mazowsze* included members of the intellectual group KOR and Anna Kruczkowska-Bikont, a lecturer at Warsaw University. Those who served as editors of the paper included Anna Dodziuk, Wojciech Kamiński, Anna Bikont and Joanna Szczęsna. *Tygodnik Mazowsze* was the most successful underground publication. It provided a wide range of information and presented first hand Solidarity's stance on current issues. An average edition of the paper numbered an estimated fifty thousand copies and it was read far beyond the Mazowsze (metropolitan Warsaw) region (*Information Centre for Polish Affairs*, News Bulletin No. 16/84 1984: 19; Pronobis 1989: 26-27). *Tygodnik Mazowsze* naturally had a bias towards events in the Mazowsze region. Nevertheless, there were articles written by activists from other regions, and there were reports on events outside of the Mazowsze region. I examined articles written by some of the leading figures in Solidarity, including Lech Wałęsa, Zbigniew Bujak and Jacek Kuroń. Bujak contributed articles while he was in hiding from the communist authorities. The articles in *Tygodnik Mazowsze* helped me to understand how workers' self-management activity evolved during the seven years of military rule. (See Appendix 2 for significant articles in *Tygodnik Mazowsze*). Furthermore, I studied other Solidarity newspapers during my research at the KK archive. For example, I studied *Solidarność*

(published in Gdańsk) and *KOS* (published by the Komitet Oporu Społecznego in Szczecin). These publications included information about the activities of Solidarity and the Network in the underground. I also made use of English-language publications from the 1980s. *Radio Free Europe Research* and *Polish Solidarity Campaign News* (published in London) contained information from underground Solidarity about its structure and operations.

Online research, interviews and secondary sources

These three research methods made a valuable addition to my research in archives. I found some very useful resources online. There are some important documents available through the official Solidarity trade union website (www.solidarność.org.pl). - I gained access to the Gdańsk Shipyards Twenty-One Demands and the Gdańsk Agreement, both from August 1980. I also gained access to the Solidarity Programme from the First National Congress. I used the official Dziennik Ustaw website (dziennikustaw.gov.pl) to view the full text of Polish laws, such as the workers' self-management laws from September 1981 and the privatisation law from July 1990. In addition, my analysis of English and Polish language secondary sources helped to shape my PhD thesis by revealing areas that were open for further research. Ludmilla Jordanova argued that: "the use of secondary sources is as vital as primary ones" (Jordanova 2000: 102). I regarded secondary sources as books and journal articles written years after the events they are describing. In contrast, primary sources were written at the time of the events in question. The work of scholars including Marek Dąbrowski, Jarosław Kuisz and Witold Morawski gave me important insights about Solidarity and workers' self-management. They revealed how self-management was an important reform idea in Poland and how it generated controversy in Solidarity.

I carried out expert interviews with Staniszław Handzlik, Jacek Merkel and Edward Nowak. The interviews took place in 2013 in Gdańsk and Kraków. I gained access to my interviewees through the directors at the archives where I studied. The archive directors gave me the contact details of a few former Solidarity members. I initially contacted two of my interviewees by email, and I contacted my other interviewee by phone. I told them that I was researching Solidarity and workers' self-management, and I expressed an interest in interviewing them. There were other people who I contacted, but they did not respond to me. I therefore did not contact them again, because I did not want to pressure people into giving me interviews. I preferred to interview people who were keen to speak with me. The ECS

film archive contained hours of interview footage with my three interviewees, which served as excellent preparation for the interviews. I gained information about their personal backgrounds and their involvement with Solidarity and the Network.

The interviews provided me with a completely different type of information than I found in the archives. Rather than reading documents from factory plants or Solidarity leadership bodies, I listened to first-hand accounts of events in Poland throughout the 1980s. Jordanova argued that: "A person speaking to a historian of their own experience generates an especially direct kind of evidence, which is all the more valued if it comes from those who were not previously considered significant historical actors" (Jordanova 2000: 53). The Solidarity literature has given plenty of recognition to union leaders including Lech Wałęsa and Zbigniew Bujak. However, there were many other individuals, including my interviewees, who worked hard for Solidarity and sacrificed their freedom during military rule. David Silverman referred to the views of Bridget Byrne, who argued that: "qualitative interviewing has been particularly attractive to researchers who want to explore voices and experiences which they believe have been ignored, misrepresented or suppressed in the past" (Silverman 2006: 114). This point has some significance for my research project, which analyses an aspect of Solidarity that has sometimes been ignored in the Solidarity literature. The format for my interviews was semi-structured. I wanted a free flow of communication between interviewer and interviewee, but I also needed some structure to the interviews (Silverman 2006: 110). Solidarity was very diverse and complex, and I wanted our main focus to remain on workers' self-management. Furthermore, a semi-structured approach enabled me to ask follow-up questions. There were moments when my interviewees made certain insights about Solidarity and the Network, and I needed the flexibility to question them about this, rather than sticking rigidly to a planned list of questions (Fielding & Thomas 2001: 124).

I asked my interviewees about why they became involved in self-management activity and about the relationship between Solidarity and the Network. In addition, I wanted to find out their views on how self-management activity evolved over the 1980s. (See Appendix 1 for a list of my interview questions). I gained knowledge about Solidarity and workers' self-management through understanding the experiences and views of my interviewees. Moreover, thirty years has gone by since many of the events that I discussed with my

interviewees. This raised the issue of whether my interviewees could remember important details about Solidarity and workers' self-management. It is obvious that my interviewees could not remember everything. Nevertheless, I found that they were able to remember important events from the 1980s, as this was a very memorable time in their lives. I compared the accounts of my interviewees with documents from the archives in order to build up an accurate picture of Solidarity and workers' self-management activity. One of my interviewees noted that his point of view today is different from his engagement with Solidarity in the 1980s. He admitted that he sees events from that time slightly through the prism of his experiences in the following thirty years. Nevertheless, he felt it was best to describe events from the 1980s as he viewed them at the time. I conducted my interviews in Polish, and it was very helpful that my interviewees gave permission to record the interviews. I thus had the opportunity to make sure I understood everything correctly. I explained to my interviewees that I am writing up my thesis in English, and therefore I would translate any quotes into English. One of my interviewees pointed out that translation can slightly change the emphasis of what someone is saying. However, he also noted that this was splitting hairs, and so he was happy for me to translate his quotes.

Analysis of sources

Geoffrey Elton argued that the two uncertainties of the historian – lack of knowledge and the need to select – have their cure in the proper practice of scholarship and research (Elton 1969: 84). Truth is the product of understanding what the evidence says and how it fits together (Elton 1969: 109). My analysis of source materials from archives and online research was influenced by qualitative approaches to research. A key element of qualitative research is data analysis that is open to emergent concepts and ideas (Ritchie & Lewis 2003: 3, 5). Most approaches to qualitative data analysis, including grounded theory and content analysis, involve the search for themes (Bryman 2012: 578). I drew from qualitative content analysis by searching for key themes in my sources. I also drew from ethnographic content analysis, which entails movement back and forth between defining themes before research and allowing themes to emerge during research (Bryman 2012: 557, 559). Bryman explained that general approaches to qualitative data analysis "are often described as *iterative* – that is, there is a repetitive interplay between the collection and analysis of data. This means that analysis starts after some of the data have been collected, and the implications of that analysis then shape the next steps in the data-collection process" (Bryman 2012: 566). E.H. Carr seemed to adopt an iterative approach for his historical research. Carr liked to begin writing

after looking at some important sources, and then reading and writing would go on simultaneously. Carr felt that the more he wrote, the more he knew what he was looking for (Carr 2001: 23). I adopted an iterative approach to my research and analysis, as they took place in parallel. After my first period of fieldwork in Kraków, I returned to the UK to focus on analysing my sources, before returning to Poland for a new period of fieldwork in Gdańsk.

Before I began my fieldwork, I identified three key themes for keeping in mind while analysing documents. These themes were: (i) workers' self-management; (ii) Solidarity's politico-economic strategy; (iii) the link between political and economic reform. As I proceeded with my collection and analysis of sources, I identified other key themes: (i) the changing identity of Solidarity; (ii) the emergence of workers' ownership in 1989-90; (iii) how the ideas of the Network maintained an influence in Solidarity throughout the 1980s; (iv) how far Solidarity was involved in politics (this theme has already been researched by other scholars, but it proved to be relevant for my research). These key themes were extremely helpful for structuring my writing. When analysing archival and online documents, I made notes on the information in the document, as well as the perspective of the author. I also made notes about information relating to one of my key themes or research questions. I transformed my fieldwork notes into detailed chapter plans, which provided the basis for my empirical chapters. Each empirical chapter is divided up into different themes/sub-headings in order to make my arguments clear. Within each theme/sub-heading, there is generally a chronological flow to events.

Ethics

Research always requires careful consideration of ethical issues. My primary concern was to carry out my interviews according to good ethical practice. I did not need to take any particular measures in relation to my own well-being. I was always researching in a safe environment. The archivists were friendly to me, as were my three interviewees. I had to keep in mind that I was representing the University of Glasgow, and so it was important for my behaviour in the archives and during interviews to reflect positively on the university. Before starting my fieldwork, I submitted an ethics approval form to the university, and I was given ethical approval to carry out research in Poland. Martin Bulmer argued that: "Ethics is a matter of principled sensitivity to the rights of others. Being ethical limits the choices we can make in the pursuit of truth" (Bulmer 2001: 45). I did not come across any

problematic ethical issues during my archival research. The archivists always gave me full access to their catalogue of documents, and I asked for the documents that interested me. If I wanted copies of any of the documents, I always asked for permission. I was not seeking access to any controversial or secret documents, such as records of which Solidarity members cooperated with the secret police. Moreover, secrecy and deception played no part in my research. Bulmer believed that: "In certain highly exceptional circumstances, deception may be justified by the context in which research is carried out" (Bulmer 2001: 56). There was no need or justification for any covert methods during my PhD research.

When I contacted my interviewees, I informed them about the subject of my research. We also spoke about my research before each interview, in order to make sure that my interviewees were fully informed about my PhD project. Moreover, Tim May argued that recording interviews has advantages and disadvantages, as some people may not be comfortable talking while being recorded (May 2001: 137). Before each interview, I asked my interviewees if I could do a voice recording of the interview, which they all agreed to. I also asked for permission to quote them in my work, and I offered to leave out their names if they preferred. They were all happy for me to quote them in my work by name. Roger Homan pointed out that it is necessary to avoid questions in interviews that could cause offence or distress (Homan 1991: 161). I did my utmost to avoid such questions. During the 1980s my interviewees were all imprisoned by the communist authorities, which was undoubtedly a very difficult time for them. They all mentioned to me during our interviews that they were imprisoned, but I did not ask any follow-up questions about this, because it was not relevant for my research on workers' self-management. Furthermore, I have a responsibility to keep the interview recordings confidential. I saved the recordings on my own personal external hard drive. I also saved them onto my computer at home, which is password-protected. The recordings are not saved onto any university computer. Homan noted that: "For subjects and investigators there are risks of strain or harm both during the research process and in the aftermath of publication" (Homan 1991: 160). One of my interviewees requested that I consult with him about any quotes or references to him in my thesis. His view was that even with good intentions on both sides, mistakes can be made. After the interview, I wrote up a transcript in Polish, which I then sent to him. He was happy that I recorded his views correctly, and he was very appreciative of my efforts to produce an accurate transcript.

Conclusion

My main research method was archival research in Poland. I found a wide range of very useful sources in the archives including: statements by Solidarity national and regional leadership bodies; statements and policy proposals from the Network; information bulletins from factory plants throughout Poland; and agreements signed by the government and Solidarity. In the Komisja Krajowa archive in Gdańsk, I found Solidarity newspapers and periodicals. The Solidarity publications, such as *Tygodnik Solidarność*, were a very valuable source. They contained articles written by leading members of Solidarity, and they reflected upon the key events of the time. I used the Encyklopedia Solidarności online archival database in order to access *Tygodnik Mazowsze*, which was the most important Solidarity publication during the underground period. Online research was a useful supplement to my archival work. The official Solidarity website gives access to important documents including the Solidarity Programme from the First National Congress. I also used the official Dziennik Ustaw website, which allows access to the full texts of Polish laws. Furthermore, I conducted three expert interviews with former members of Solidarity and the Network. I compared the accounts of my interviewees with the information I obtained in archival documents. The interviews gave me a different kind of insight into Solidarity. I gained personal accounts about life during legal and underground union activity, and I learned about my interviewee's motivation for pursuing workers' self-management. I prepared very well for the interviews by watching interview footage from the ECS film archive. In addition, I gained valuable insights about Solidarity and workers' self-management from studying English and Polish language secondary sources.

Qualitative approaches to social science research have proved influential for many historians. I was influenced by the interpretivist research paradigm, which asserts that the social world is constituted in part by shared ideas and understandings. I also accepted that there is a subjective element to my research. In addition, I drew from qualitative approaches to data analysis. I defined key themes to help analyse my sources, and my research had an iterative nature, as the collection and analysis of my sources took place in parallel. Finally, I was determined to carry out my research according to good ethical standards. I treated my interviewees with respect, and they were happy for me to quote them in my thesis.

Chapter 4: The Rise of Workers' Self-Management

Introduction

This first empirical chapter charts the rise of workers' self-management during the legal Solidarity period, which started with the birth of the union on 31st August 1980 and ended with the imposition of Martial Law in December 1981. Solidarity was determined to solve the economic crisis in Poland. The agreements from Gdańsk, Szczecin and Jastrzębie in August and September 1980 laid the groundwork for large-scale economic reforms. The Gdańsk Agreement included a basis for renewed workers' self-management activity. In early 1981 some of Poland's great industrial factory plants began to cooperate with each other, and they decided to pursue workers' self-management. This chapter includes a focus on the formation of the Network of leading factory plants in April 1981 (Warunki powoływanie i funkcjonowanie rad pracowniczych 1981: 2, Kraków archive: Archiwum 1 III, volume 098, folder 2). The Network had a somewhat complicated relationship with Solidarity. Nevertheless, there was an important link between Solidarity and workers' self-management. The self-management movement grew out of Solidarity, and it was related to the core ideas of the union, including free trade unions, democracy and cooperation. The Network focused on economic reform, but it also wanted political reform. Solidarity initially did not want any involvement in politics, but the union realised that in order to effect change in Poland, it had to engage in politics.

Workers' self-management was regarded in some quarters as a kind of 'third way' idea, promoting an economic system in between socialism and capitalism. The self-management movement wanted to destroy the power of the nomenklatura, who exercised power according to their own interests, rather than those of society. The centrepiece of the Network's project was the Social Enterprise Bill. This bill was made up of sixty articles about the implementation of workers' self-management. Moreover, the Network faced competition from a rival self-management group called the Lublin Group (Grupa Lubelska). This group proposed a more radical self-management strategy. The Lublin Group also believed in socialist economic planning, whereas the Network wanted market reform. Furthermore, in summer 1981 the government sent its own workers' self-management bill to parliament. The government bill outlined a more limited version of self-management than the Network bill. The State Enterprises and Workers' Self-Management Laws were passed in September 1981,

in between the two rounds of the Solidarity First National Congress. Many delegates at the Solidarity Congress were not happy about the self-management laws, as they preserved the government's dominant role in the economy. In addition, the Solidarity Congress defined an official programme for the union. The Congress delegates did not adopt the Network's economic plan, but some of the group's ideas were evident in the Solidarity Programme.

The creation of the Network

Solidarity succeeded in organising strikes in the summer of 1980, but strike action was not effective in creating political, economic and social renewal (Szczepański, *Tygodnik Solidarność* 1981: 3). The trade union rights gained in August 1980 were also not enough for workers to improve their economic situation (Kuczyński, *Tygodnik Solidarność* 1981a: 3). Jerzy Milewski was a scholar at the Polish Academy of Sciences in Gdańsk. He recognised that Solidarity needed to engage in the construction of a new political, economic and social order, thereby destroying the old communist structures. Solidarity did not want to carry out this task because it was already over-burdened (Piekarski 1981: 2, Kraków archive: 1 III, volume 098, 1). In 1981 pressure from Solidarity members and the stance of the government forced Solidarity to deal with an ever greater number of tasks, such as the protection of workers, de facto joint-management of enterprises, and it was clear that Solidarity would have to become involved in looking after food supplies. The union was being given tasks that were beyond its capabilities and entitlements, and this put Solidarity in a very difficult position (Kuczyński, *Tygodnik Solidarność* 1981b: 3). Solidarity needed an economic partner, and this task was taken up by the Network.

The Network was a voluntary grouping of major industrial factory plants in Poland. Jerzy Milewski and Jacek Merkel (an engineer at the Gdańsk Shipyards) were the joint initiators of the Network. Jerzy Milewski went to the Gdańsk Shipyards as a representative of the scientific community, and he wanted to help workers in any way that he could. Milewski held discussions with workers, which overlapped with an important debate taking place in Solidarity about the issue of free Saturdays (Jacek Merkel interview 2013). Number twenty-one of the demands from the Gdańsk Shipyards MKS on 17th August 1980 was for Saturdays free from work. In January 1981 the moment came for the first free Saturday, and nobody knew whether to go to work or not. No decision was taken on free Saturdays at the central union level. Jacek Merkel argued that the Solidarity leadership was not always skilled in

assessing what was important to workers (Jacek Merkel interview 2013). In addition, there were problems resulting from the inexperience of Solidarity activists and out-dated work practices (Piekarski 1981: 5, Kraków archive: 1 III, volume 098, 1). Milewski believed that: "At that time Polish people still had the deeply instilled principle that instructions come from above. Chaos reigned and a lot of factory plants, especially small ones, telephoned the Gdańsk Shipyards and asked this question: 'are you going to work this Saturday or not? Because if you are not going, we will stay at home'. The Shipyards had nobody to call" (Jak powstała Sieć 1981, Gdańsk KK archive: collection: IKZD, folder: IKZD materiały_do publikacji_wywiady). The issue of free Saturdays was resolved by a government-Solidarity compromise at the end of January 1981. Solidarity agreed that one Saturday every month would still be a working day (Garton Ash 2002: 143-144). Moreover, Milewski observed that there was the same phenomenon taking place throughout Poland. There was a great industrial plant in each region to which other plants looked for guidance, such as the Huta im. Lenina steelworks in Kraków, the Wujek mine in Katowice, and the Warski Shipyards in Szczecin. Merkel and Milewski decided to establish contacts with these leading factory plants to propose cooperation between them (Jacek Merkel 2008, Archiwum Filmowe Europejskiego Centrum Solidarności (ECS) - Dział Notacji i Realizacji Filmowych; Jacek Merkel interview 2013). Workers in the Gdańsk Shipyards supported this initiative as they were keen to make contacts and share experiences with workers elsewhere (Informacje o powstaniu, działalności i celach Sieci Zakładów Wiodących NSZZ Solidarność 1981, Kraków archive: 1 III, volume 098, 1).

Milewski and Merkel made their first attempt at establishing new contacts in Rzeszów and then: "At the end of March, we went to Szczecin, Poznań, Wrocław, Katowice and Kraków, to the biggest factories in these towns, and we received acceptance of our idea" (Jak powstała Sieć 1981, Gdańsk KK archive: IKZD, IKZD materiały_do publikacji_wywiady). On 14th-15th April 1981, there was a meeting in the Gdańsk Shipyards, attended by representatives of ten large factory plants. They decided to form the Network of leading factory plants (Sieć wiodących zakładów pracy). The base of the Network was the trade union factory commissions (komisja zakładowa) in the so-called 'cornerstone' (oczko) factories. – These were the major factory plants in each region (województwa), according to the old administrative provinces from 1945-75 (Jak powstała Sieć 1981, Gdańsk KK archive: IKZD, IKZD materiały_do publikacji_wywiady). Factories were designated as 'cornerstones' as a result of their location, size and the activeness of their union factory commission (Piekarski

1981: 5, Kraków, 1 III, volume 098, 1). Overall there emerged seventeen cornerstone factory plants in the Network, including: Huta im. Lenina, PZL communications plant in Rzeszów, Cegielski steelworks in Poznań, ZMTK railway repair plant in Bydgoszcz, Pafawag railway carriage factory in Wrocław, Fasty cotton plant in Białystok, and Ursus mechanics plant in Warsaw (Uczestniczy sieci bezposredniej współpracy między organizacjami zakładowymi NSZZ Solidarność wiodących zakładów pracy regionów 1981, Kraków archive: 1 III, volume 098, 1). All of the factory plants participating in the Network cooperated with other factories in their regions. The influence of the Network thus reached the whole country (Informacje o powstaniu, działalności i celach Sieci 1981, Kraków archive: 1 III, volume 098, 1).

Jerzy Milewski argued that: "It was necessary to find a body that would create a new model for society and then implement it. This is the aim of the Network, which I would call an ideological aim" (Piekarski 1981: 5, Kraków archive: 1 III, volume 098, 1). The Network held discussions about what was vitally important for their factories and workers, and the idea of workers' self-management came to the fore (Jacek Merkel ECS interview 2008). This reform idea was part of working-class tradition and it had a precedent in Polish history. Self-management activities had already begun in factory plants in October 1980 (Jermakowicz 1983: 36). If workers' self-management bodies could take charge of the means of production, this would relieve Solidarity from dealing with many economic matters, thereby allowing the union to concentrate on protecting workers' interests (Kuczyński, *Tygodnik Solidarność* 1981b: 3). Hans Szyc from the Gdańsk Shipyards was a founding member of the Network, and he believed that the group was about understanding, consultation and providing information (Sieć statement and additions to the Social Enterprise Bill 1981: 7, Kraków archive: 1 III, volume 098, 1). The Network did not make resolutions, but the work that it drew up was treated as a recommendation for the factory commissions participating in the group (Informacje o powstaniu, działalności i celach Sieci 1981, Kraków archive: 1 III, volume 098, 1). The organisational activity of the Network was based on regular meetings (once or twice weekly), in which groups of workers drew up Network positions on current issues such as collective work arrangements and workers' self-management (Informacje o powstaniu, działalności i celach Sieci 1981, Kraków archive: 1 III, volume 098, 1). The Network was not part of the Solidarity governing bodies and it did not have an executive body (Informacje o powstaniu, działalności i celach Sieci 1981, Kraków archive: 1 III, volume 098, 1). Workers' self-management was the first theme taken into consideration by

the Network; it turned out to be such a big and important theme that it came to dominate the group's work. The Network wanted self-management to be initiated from the grass-roots (Jacek Merkel interview 2013; Piekarski 1981: 2, Kraków archive: 1 III, volume 098, 1).

The Network gave rise to a workers' self-management movement; thus a movement within the Solidarity movement. The group encouraged the formation of workers' self-management founding committees (komitety założycielskie samorządu pracowniczego), which were to be followed by the establishment of workers' councils (rady pracownicze) (Informacje o powstaniu, działalności i celach Sieci 1981, Kraków archive: 1 III, volume 098, 1). In January 1981 a research team from the Gdańsk inter-factory trade union founding committee (MKZ Międzyzakładowy Komitet Założycielski) produced a policy statement on self-management. They reported that there existed among enterprise staff a strong aspiration for joint management of factories (Dlaczego wybieramy rady pracownicze? 1981: 1, Kraków archive: 1 III, volume 021). In addition, the Polish Economic Society (Polskie Towarzystwo Ekonomiczne) organised a conference on enterprises and self-management, and they stated that: "One of the premises for the organisation of this conference is taking into consideration in discussions on reform the experiences which have arisen as a result of the grass-roots, spontaneous processes of self-management being created in enterprises" (Polskie Towarzystwo Ekonomiczne. Oddział Warszawski 1981: 2, Kraków archive: 1 III, volume 021). The workers' self-management movement carried with it great hopes (Kuczyński, *Tygodnik Solidarność* 1981a: 3). Enterprises drew up their own self-management statutes and appointed temporary, or sometimes permanent, self-management bodies (Przedsiębiorstwo społeczne 1981: 20, Kraków archive: 1 III, volume 098, 1). By March 1981, about three hundred factories had elected workers' councils. From March to July, a further seven hundred factories elected workers' councils (Jermakowicz 1983: 36). Furthermore, a steel industry association formed in order to develop self-management beyond individual enterprises (Zrzeszenie a samodzielność i samorządność przedsiębiorstw 1981: 3, Kraków archive: 1 III, volume 098, 2). There were ninety-one plants involved in this association, including Huta im. Lenina, Huta Katowice and Zastal in Zielona Góra (Produceni wyrobów hutniczych 1981: 1-4, Kraków archive: 1 III, volume 098, 2). The association sought to organise production in the steel industry in order to meet the needs of the national economy, taking into consideration the import and export of goods. There was also a desire to improve working conditions for the three hundred thousand workers in the steel and iron industries (Zrzeszenie a samodzielność i samorządność przedsiębiorstw 1981:

3, 6, Kraków archive: 1 III, volume 098, 2). The Network took courage from the successful post-war experiments with workers' self-management: "It is only workers' self-management that has succeeded in the hardest of times" (Przedsiębiorstwo społeczne 1981: 47, Kraków archive: 1 III, volume 098, 1).

Tensions in Solidarity

The Network's project for workers' self-management aroused a lot of interest from society, as well as a lot of emotions, controversy and questions (Materiały Ogólnopolskiego Spotkania Samorządów Pracowniczych 1981: 2, Kraków archive: 1 III, volume 098, 2). Solidarity activists including Jan Rulewski (a member of the KKP) thought that Solidarity should not engage with economics, because it was a union and the economy was a matter of government. Rulewski argued that Solidarity's task was to concentrate on defending working people (Edward Nowak interview 2013). Moreover, on 18th March 1981 a seminar on workers' self-management took place at the Rosa Luksemburg lamp factory in Warsaw. The reason for the seminar was to define the position of Solidarity on self-management, and the first speaker was the prominent Solidarity activist Bronisław Geremek. He recognised that in many enterprises Solidarity members already participated in workers' self-management, but he admitted there were some arguments against self-management. For example, there was concern about how tasks and responsibilities would be divided between the Solidarity union and workers' self-management, and some people were worried that self-management would have a negative influence on the role and importance of Solidarity (Sprawozdanie. Z seminarium nt. samorządu pracowniczego 1981: 1, 2, Kraków archive: 1 III, volume 098, 2). In addition, there was a general concern in Solidarity about the government using self-management as a means to crush the independent trade union. Communist propaganda also created anxiety that self-management bodies would try to create a capitalist-style economy, which would be against the interests of working people (Edward Nowak ECS interview 2008).

During discussions at the self-management seminar in Warsaw, the representative from the Bydgoszcz MKZ took a position against workers' self-management. He argued that it was not possible to pursue self-management until economic reform was introduced. Otherwise a new self-management initiative would be dominated by the communist government, which would be a repetition of the Workers' Self-Management Conferences (KSR) from the

Gomułka era. A second representative from Bydgoszcz stated that ninety-five percent of workers in the city were against self-management (Sprawozdanie. Z seminarium nt. samorządu pracowniczego 1981: 5, Kraków archive: 1 III, volume 098, 2). In addition, the representative from the Wrocław MKZ expressed many doubts about the need for self-management at that time. For example, self-management could take powers away from Solidarity (Sprawozdanie. Z seminarium nt. samorządu pracowniczego 1981: 4, Kraków archive: 1 III, volume 098, 2). A statement from the Wrocław MKZ announced that the creation of self-management would be justified only after the fulfilment of certain conditions. These conditions were the passing of a law on workers' self-management, and an enterprise law to guarantee the independence of production, service and trade enterprises (Wrocław MKZ statement 1981: 1-2, Kraków archive: 1 III, volume 098, 2). On the other side of the debate, the representative from the Łódź MKZ said that the region had drawn up a self-management statute, and on this basis individual enterprises were creating workers' self-management (Sprawozdanie. Z seminarium nt. samorządu pracowniczego 1981: 4, Kraków archive: 1 III, volume 098, 2). In addition, the MKZ representative from the Świętokrzyski region said that workers' self-management was already being introduced in the region (Sprawozdanie. Z seminarium nt. samorządu pracowniczego 1981: 4, Kraków archive: 1 III, volume 098, 2). Representatives from the Ebląg MKZ and the Huta Katowice factory gave their support to the creation of workers' self-management (Sprawozdanie. Z seminarium nt. samorządu pracowniczego 1981: 4, Kraków archive: 1 III, volume 098, 2). Furthermore, Jerzy Strzelecki from the Mazowsze region announced the results of a study into workers' self-management. He reported that sixty-eight percent of factory plants in the study were in favour of self-management (Sprawozdanie. Z seminarium nt. samorządu pracowniczego 1981: 5, Kraków archive: 1 III, volume 098, 2). The Warsaw seminar revealed that self-management was not universally popular, but there was support for workers' self-management in many places. At Huta im. Lenina in Kraków, lots of people from all departments were involved in self-management. Edward Nowak led self-management activity in this factory plant, and he explained that there was no conflict at the steelworks. Solidarity and self-management worked towards the same goals: "At Huta im. Lenina we were singing from the same hymn sheet" (Edward Nowak ECS interview 2008).

The self-management movement grew out of Solidarity, and it therefore shared a key characteristic with the union: all political orientations were present and there existed some internal tensions. For example, in the Network there was Stefan Kurowski, who had a

capitalist orientation, and Ryszard Bugaj believed in socialism (Jacek Merkel interview 2013). During the first meeting of the Network in April 1981, to which Lech Wałęsa accepted an invitation, there was some discord. Before the meeting, Wałęsa had no idea that Solidarity was engaged in workers' self-management activity. Wałęsa was uncertain about the idea, which reflected how many people felt in Solidarity. He became aware though, that a great number of people were involved in self-management and it was being carried out sensibly. Wałęsa made a statement in support of self-management (Jacek Merkel interview 2013). Jerzy Milewski explained how Wałęsa made an impact at the meeting:

> The discussion was severe, but Wałęsa arrived and he convinced people that there was a need to humanise work and it was necessary to have self-management. Everyone was agreed on this: the creation of self-management could be an effective method of taking power away from the nomenklatura, destroying the system of controlled distribution, and it must operate in all factories - especially the largest ones (Piekarski 1981: 3-4, Kraków archive: 1 III, volume 098, 1).

Also at this meeting, the Network issued a statement in support of the Katowice Association of the Coal Mining Industry, which was protesting at government pressure to work on free Saturdays. The miners were being offered extra meat rations in return for additional work, which was forbidden in the 1980 government-society agreements. The Network delegates stated that: "we are convinced that the time for bribes and primitive dividing of society is finished forever" (Sieć komunikat 1981, Kraków archive: 1 III, volume 098, 1). As time passed the Network became more influential, but the group did not win over all Solidarity members (Jacek Merkel interview 2013). The Network advisor Szymon Jakubowicz argued that the majority of inter-factory union founding committees (MKZs) were in favour of authentic workers' self-management. Although he accepted that there were regional MKZs who did not want to express an opinion concerning a self-management law, and this was also probably the consensus within the Solidarity leadership on the KKP (Jakubowicz, *Tygodnik Solidarność* 1981: 6).

The link between Solidarity and workers' self-management

The Network knew that workers' self-management could only arise with the initiative and support of Solidarity (Przedsiębiorstwo społeczne 1981: 45. Kraków archive: 1 III, volume 098, 1). On 28th May 1981, the Solidarity leadership on the National Coordinating Commission (KKP) officially accepted the existence of the Network and recognised the group as a consultation body of the union (Kuisz 2009: 258; Informacje o powstaniu, działalności i celach Sieci 1981, Kraków archive: 1 III, volume 098, 1). The Network had

no desire to threaten the unity of Solidarity (Jacek Merkel interview 2013). The leading figures in the Network were Milewski, Merkel and Andrzej Milczanowski, who was a union adviser at the Szczecin Shipyards. They established from the beginning that the Network must not be perceived as a competitor to the Solidarity leadership. Merkel knew that Solidarity had to remain united: "Our unity is our strength" (Jacek Merkel 2013 interview). The initiative behind the Network came from the Gdańsk Lenin Shipyards, the same factory that witnessed the birth of the Solidarity union. The core of Solidarity was the workers in the big factory plants, and this was also the core of the Network (Kurowski, *Tygodnik Solidarność* 1981a: 5). Moreover, Solidarity believed in a pluralistic society, where there would exist various forums for independent social activity. Workers' self-management founding committees were one such centre of independent activity. The proposed regulations for a founding committee at a steel repair plant in Kraków stated that the founding committee must engage in its activity independently from state organs, enterprise administration, social organisations, trade unions and political organisations (Regulamin Komitetu Założcielskiego Samorządu Pracowniczego 1981: 1, Kraków archive: 1 III, volume 098, 2). Moreover, councils appeared not only in industry but in many areas of life, including agriculture (Kuczyński, *Tygodnik Solidarność* 1981a: 3). Workers' self-management was linked to the idea of rural self-government, as Solidarity wanted both workers and farmers to take charge of their own affairs.

The Solidarity union sought to increase public participation in Polish social and economic life. Point six of the Gdańsk Shipyards twenty-one demands called for action to escape from the economic crisis, including: "enabling all circles and social strata to take part in discussions of the reform programme" (21 Postulatów z 17 sierpnia 1980 roku, www.solidarnosc.org.pl/21-postulatow). Workers' self-management activity led to increased public participation in the economy. The draft statutes for workers' self-management from the Gdańsk Shipyards declared that every worker in the enterprise was a member of self-management (Projekt Statutu Samorządu Pracowniczego Stoczni Gdańskiej 1981: 2, Kraków archive: 1 III, volume 098, 2). In addition, the self-management movement reflected Solidarity's drive for cooperation in society. The Network enabled workers to communicate with each other and exchange experiences on a local, regional and national scale (Bugaj & Jakubowicz, *Tygodnik Solidarność* 1981: 5). Moreover, the Gdańsk Agreement from 31st August 1980 contained a basis for workers' self-management activity: "The economic reform should be based on the substantially increased independence of

enterprises and on the real participation of workers' self-management in managing enterprises" (Protokół Porozumienia Gdańskiego 1980: 5, www.wszechnica.solidarnosc.org.pl/?page_id=344). The Network saw itself as an economic partner to free trade unions (Przedsiębiorstwo społeczne 1981: 13, 45, Kraków archive: 1 III, volume 098, 1). In a social enterprise, the trade union would fulfil all the traditional union tasks, such as dealing with matters of pay, conditions of work, and protection of workers' interests (Kuczyński, *Tygodnik Solidarność* 1981b: 3). All self-management decisions concerning the role of the trade union would be taken through negotiation between the workers' council and trade union factory commission (Kuczyński, *Tygodnik Solidarność* 1981b: 3). Furthermore, the Network wanted a system of social security to accompany economic reforms. This also reflected the core ideas in Solidarity, as the union always sought to protect vulnerable groups in society. The Network believed the social welfare system should include compensation for any increased costs of living, an employment policy and family benefits (Przedsiębiorstwo społeczne 1981: 7, Kraków archive: 1 III, volume 098, 1).

When Solidarity formed, the union declared that it would not become involved in politics (Ost 1990: 1). However, Solidarity was not able to maintain this stance. The nature of the Polish communist system forced Solidarity into politics. The authoritarian communist state had brought politics into all aspects of life, especially the economy (Siciński 1981, Kraków archive: 1 III, volume 098, 2). Jacek Merkel and Jerzy Milewski believed workers' self-management could limit the influence of the nomenklatura over the economy (Jacek Merkel interview 2013). The PRL government had always given important posts in enterprises to members of the nomenklatura. A key demand of the self-management movement was for workers councils to hire and fire enterprise directors (Jakubowicz, *Tygodnik Solidarność* 1981: 7). The Network wanted workers to hold enterprise directors to account and evaluate their work (Edward Nowak interview 2013). Edward Nowak explained that: "we wanted to separate politics from the economy" (Edward Nowak interview 2013). Nowak belonged to a working group at Huta im. Lenina called the Komisja Robotnicza Hutników (KRH). Mirosław Dzielski advised the KRH, and he taught Nowak to think in a different way about economics. Instead of thinking about how to improve state socialism, Nowak started to think about taking the state away from the communists and creating a new state (Edward Nowak ECS interview 2008). Nowak believed in building democracy and pushing it into as many areas of life as possible, including the economy, culture, education and communities (Edward Nowak interview 2013). Nowak and the Network understood that without reform

of the political system, there could be no real reform in Poland: "the evil is residing in the political system" (Edward Nowak ECS interview 2008). The scholar Witold Morawski also recognised how politics and economics were linked (Morawski 1982: 197). Morawski wrote that for economic reform to be effective, people must have the right to participate in society and elect their representatives. Morawski argued that in order to achieve social progress, it is necessary to have institutions in which social values and interests can be freely debated (Morawski 1982: 197). The main focus of the Network was economics, but the group understood that Poland needed wider social and political reform (Edward Nowak ECS interview 2008). Jerzy Milewski stated that: "It is not possible to achieve workers' self-management in a one-party system" (Piekarski 1981: 6).

Solidarity enabled millions of people to practice democracy through elections to local, regional and national union structures. The Network wanted to create independent, self-governing, self-financing enterprises, which reflected the democratic principles of Solidarity. The Network called for democratic elections to self-management bodies. According to the Network's vision, the following bodies would manage enterprises: the workers' council, the general meeting of the staff (involving staff delegates), the auxiliary self-management body, and the enterprise director (Kuczyński, *Tygodnik Solidarność* 1981b: 3). In the communist economic system, the highest level of management was the enterprise director. In a social enterprise, the enterprise staff, acting through their representative bodies, would be the highest level of management (Kotłowski & Ziemianin, *Portowiec* 1981: 5). The workers' council would be the most important self-management body, and its responsibilities were to include making decisions about plans, structures, regulations, employment policy, and import/export agreements (Kuczyński, *Tygodnik Solidarność* 1981b: 3). The Network also believed in direct democracy. This was reflected in a call from the Gdańsk Shipyards factory commission for the most important decisions, of crucial importance to the enterprise, to be taken by all workers in a referendum (Stanowisko NSZZ Solidarność Stoczni Gdańskiej w sprawie utworzenie Samorządu Pracowniczego 1981: 1, Kraków archive: 1 III, volume 098, 2). In addition, workers' self-management enabled enterprises to establish democratic accountability. The Gdańsk Shipyards factory commission stated that self-management bodies were to take full responsibility for decisions in front of the enterprise staff and society (Stanowisko NSZZ Solidarność Stoczni Gdańskiej w sprawie utworzenie Samorządu Pracowniczego 1981: 2, Kraków archive: 1 III, volume 098, 2).

The Network wanted parliament to control the activity of government, as the group believed in democratic socialism, rather than authoritarian communism. The Network believed crucial national economic decisions, such as concerning social programmes and taxes, should be taken by parliament. The second meeting of Network national representatives took place on 11th-13th May 1981 at Huta im. Lenina, and it was attended by delegates from fifteen of the cornerstone factories. The Network communiqué from this meeting called on Solidarity factory commissions to meet with members of parliament and encourage them to represent the will of society (Komunikat nr 3 1981: 1,3, Kraków archive: 1 III, volume 098, 1). In addition, the Network pushed for electoral reform in order to make parliament more representative of society (Przedsiębiorstwo społeczne 1981: 10, Kraków archive: 1 III, volume 098, 1; Komunikat nr 3 1981: 2, Kraków archive: 1 III, volume 098, 1). The Network wanted to bring to life the democratic elements in the PRL constitution, which is shown by the group sending its self-management bill to the Sejm (Piekarski 1981: 4, Kraków archive: 1 III, volume 098, 1). Furthermore, late in 1981 the Network prepared its own political project about the creation of an electoral law for national councils (rady narodowe), which were a local government structure (Edward Nowak ECS interview 2008). It was natural for the Network to move onto this project for territorial self-government - this was the political equivalent of self-government in factory plants. Nowak and Milewski believed in going a step further and founding a Polish workers' party (Polska Partia Pracy), but they did not have time to develop this project (Edward Nowak interview 2013).

Solidarity believed that part of its purpose was to revive Polish national pride. Supporters of workers' self-management believed that their movement could help revive national spirit and improve morale. They believed their movement would not only create money, but also concern for the fate of workplaces around the country. Kuczyński pointed out that this citizens' motivation was very important for economic activity, because Poland was too poor to provide material incentives on a large scale (Kuczyński, *Tygodnik Solidarność* 1981a: 3). The Economic Law Group (Zespół Prawa Gospodarczego) at the Jagiellonian University, which included Edward Nowak, also highlighted the importance of self-management in relation to motivation. The research group believed that workers would be more motivated if they could treat enterprise property as their own (Centrum Obywatelskich Inicjatyw Ustawodawczych 1981: section 2, page 8, Kraków archive: 1 III, volume 021). A project published by the Armatur factory plant in Kraków asserted that the PRL economic system

had damaged the consciousness of workers. Enterprises had been governed by people brought in from the outside, and this reduced workers' sense of responsibility and duty. This is turn reduced discipline, causing social and economic demoralisation (Projekt nowych zasad funkcjonowania przedsiębiorstw przemysłowych 1981: 3, Kraków archive: 1 III, volume 021).

The workers' self-management movement wanted workers to take pride in what they were doing. The Gdańsk Shipyards draft self-management statutes called on workers to permanently improve their professional qualifications. These draft self-management statutes also called for the proper use of machines, equipment, tools, materials, energy, and in general the effective use of time at work (Projekt Statutu Samorządu Pracowniczego Stoczni Gdańskiej 1981: 2, 3, Kraków archive: 1 III, volume 098, 2). A self-management guide from Częstochowa encouraged workers not to join in any corrupt practices and to remind themselves: "Jestem Polakiem" (I am a Pole) (Poradnik dla Samorządu: 8, Kraków archive: 1 III, volume 098, 2). This self-management guide also stated that enterprises must no longer lend financial subsidies or transport resources to people or institutions that had nothing to do with the production process. Staniszław Handzlik agreed with the Częstochowa self-management activists that there was a nobility in the workplace, who gained extra resources (Poradnik dla Samorządu: 4, Kraków archive: 1 III, volume 098, 2). Handzlik pointed out that one of the workers' demands at Huta im. Lenina was for the release of information concerning who had received luxurious goods or holiday trips (Staniszław Handzlik ECS interview 2008). In some respects, there was a bandit style economy in the PRL, as corrupt bureaucrats engaged in practices such as seizing land for minimal compensation (Poradnik dla Samorządu: 8, Kraków archive: 1 III, volume 098, 2). The Network aimed to dismantle the centrally-controlled distribution system for directing the national economy, which was the main cause of waste and corruption (Poradnik dla Samorządu: 4, Kraków archive: 1 III, volume 098, 2).

The Social Enterprise Bill and economic reform

The Network began work on a bill for workers' self-management in May 1981. The bill was prepared with complete openness, and many people in the Network learnt about the economy, management, finance and taxes (Edward Nowak interview 2013). The Network delegated a small team of five or six people to prepare the bill. They were from cornerstone

factory plants, and they were aided by experts, including Bronisław Ziemianin from Szczecin (Edward Nowak ECS interview 2008). The Network bill was written up in Poznań at meetings of the Cegielski steelworks factory commission from 1st-3rd June 1981. On 11th June, the Network handed in their bill to parliament (*Sieć* statement and additions to the Social Enterprise Bill 1981: 14, Kraków archive: 1 III, volume 098, 1). Also drawn up at the beginning of June were projects for a self-management statute, electoral law for self-management bodies, and proposed regulations for self-management founding committees (Materiały Ogólnopolskiego Spotkania Samorządów Pracowniczych 1981: 4, Kraków archive: 1 III, volume 098, 2). The Network thus established firm foundations for the workers' self-management movement. Workers in many factory plants drew up statutes based on the Network bill (Informacja nr 2 1981: 1, Kraków archive: 1 III, volume 098, 2). Furthermore, the Network bill obtained wide support from society as a basis for the structural rebuilding of the Polish economy. The bill quickly gained the support of representatives from one thousand industrial plants throughout Poland (Kuisz 2009: 257, 258; Informacje o powstaniu, działalności i celach Sieci 1981, Kraków archive: 1 III, volume 098, 1). The Economic Law Group at the Jagiellonian University gave special recognition to the Network bill. This research group included academic experts on law and economics, as well as representatives from important enterprises in Kraków and elsewhere, and the group was led by Professor Staniszław Włódyki. The research group recognised that the factory plants in the Network represented huge economic potential and a significant proportion of workers in Polish industry (Centrum Obywatelskich Inicjatyw Ustawodawczych 1981: section 2, page 3, Kraków archive: 1 III, volume 021).

The heart of the Network bill was the concept of the 'social enterprise'. This concept was a breakthrough moment in the work of the group (Szczepański, *Tygodnik Solidarność* 1981: 3). The Network's Social Enterprise Bill stated that: "The social enterprise is the basis for the organisation of the national economy; it leads independent economic activity, and it is equipped with legal rights. These rights include organising the enterprise staff, making use of national property and managing enterprises through self-management bodies" (Przedsiębiorstwo społeczne 1981: 35, Kraków archive: 1 III, volume 098, 1). In August 1981, Mazowsze region Solidarity published a policy document drawn up by groups supporting workers' self-management, including the Network, the Lublin Group and the Społeczny Komitet d/s Reformy Gospodarczej (Social Committee for Economic Reform). These self-management groups affirmed that the conception of the social enterprise was in

full accordance with the constitution of the People's Republic of Poland (PRL). They pointed out that Article five of the constitution stated: "The PRL.....reinforces social ownership as the main basis for the economic strength of the country and national well-being" (Materiały Ogólnopolskiego Spotkania Samorządów Pracowniczych 1981: 2, Kraków archive: 1 III, volume 098, 2). Jacek Merkel was a major influence on the Network, and his philosophy was that Solidarity and the Network should take advantage of Poland's system of laws (Jacek Merkel ECS interview 2008). The PRL constitution contained a basis for workers' self-management. Article Thirteen of the constitution stated: "the staff of enterprises are to participate in management" (Jacek Merkel ECS interview 2008; Uwagi w sprawie niektórych problemów związanych z tworzeniem samorządu pracowniczego przedsiębiorstw 1981: 1, Kraków archive: 1 III, volume 098, 2).

The Gdańsk Shipyards union factory commission believed that the social ownership of the means of production was the basic premise of the socialist system, which meant that factories belonged to workers and the land to farmers (Stanowisko NSZZ Solidarność Stoczni Gdańskiej w sprawie utworzenie Samorządu Pracowniczego 1981: 1, 2, Kraków archive: 1 III, volume 098, 2). The Shipyards factory commission also believed that workers carried the burden of responsibility for the fate of the country (Stanowisko NSZZ Solidarność Stoczni Gdańskiej w sprawie utworzenie Samorządu Pracowniczego 1981: 1, 2, Kraków archive: 1 III, volume 098, 2). In addition, this factory commission stated that workers' self-management was the most important factor for achieving effective economic reform. They called for 'authentic' workers' self-management, in contrast to the limited and inadequate self-management in the communist system (Stanowisko NSZZ Solidarność Stoczni Gdańskiej w sprawie utworzenie Samorządu Pracowniczego 1981: 2, Kraków archive: 1 III, volume 098, 2). Furthermore, Edmund Kotłowski and Bronisław Ziemianin wrote an article about the Social Enterprise Bill in the periodical *Portowiec*, and they explained that:

> The bill for a social enterprise gives rise to two kinds of state enterprise; namely the traditional understanding of a state enterprise as well as the social enterprise. The first group is made up of only those enterprises such as banks, communications, energy as well as companies tied to the ministry of justice and national defence. All of the remaining state enterprises, which are operating according to the principles of the decree from 1950, will become social enterprises (Kotłowski & Ziemianin, *Portowiec* 1981: 5).

The Network conception for economic reform thus involved the creation of more flexible management structures, rather than the rigid communist system. The Network recognised that it was not possible to have full workers' self-management in certain enterprises

concerning national defence and the provision of vital services. These sorts of enterprises would have more state involvement, but workers' self-management would still operate to a certain degree (Kotłowski & Ziemianin, *Portowiec* 1981: 5).

The Network wanted to increase the independence of enterprises. According to the Wrocław MKZ, the essence of an independent enterprise included the freedom to make decisions on: what to produce, how much to produce, how to use technology, where to buy resources and materials, and the prices for goods (Wrocław MKZ statement 1981: 1-2, Kraków archive: 1 III, volume 098, 2). The Network's vision was for the social enterprise to be the main type of enterprise in the reformed economy. In addition, there would be cooperatives, joint-stock companies, communal enterprises and state enterprises. Enterprises could therefore be privately owned or have mixed ownership. The term 'social enterprise' (przedsiębiorstwo społeczne) was adopted to distinguish an enterprise managed by workers' self-management from state, cooperative and private enterprises. The term also had a symbolic meaning to underline that the owner of the means of production should be society, not the state (Materiały Ogólnopolskiego Spotkania Samorządów Pracowniczych 1981: 2, Kraków archive: 1 III, volume 098, 2). In addition, the Network defined workers' self-management as 'samorząd pracowniczy', rather than the term that had been used previously, which was 'samorząd robotniczy'. This was done in order to express the principle of integrating social groups. The term 'pracownik' included workers in many different professions, whereas 'robotnik' referred to a narrower group of workers in industrial enterprises (Materiały Ogólnopolskiego Spotkania Samorządów Pracowniczych 1981: 2, Kraków archive: 1 III, volume 098, 2).

After concentrating on workers' self-management, the Network went one step further by looking into economic reform. In the early days of the Network, representatives from different factory plants were not able to agree about economic reform. However, as more meetings took place, the group was close to uniting the different points of view (Szczepański, *Tygodnik Solidarność* 1981: 3). During 1981 members of the Network including Jacek Merkel met with Leszek Balcerowicz, who would go on to become Finance Minister in the first post-communist government. In 1981 Balcerowicz belonged to the PZPR, and he was part of the official communist association of economists (Polskie Towarzystwo Ekonomiczne). The Network's cooperation with Balcerowicz brought the group into contact

with the intellectual communist economic cadre (Jacek Merkel interview 2013; Edward Nowak ECS interview 2008). Balcerowicz played a very important role in terms of the economic philosophy of the Network, and he had already been working on economic reform. A year or two before the creation of the Network, Balcerowicz organised a seminar at a Warsaw university (Szkoła Główna Planowania i Statystyki) about how to reform the economic system. Balcerowicz knew that for an economic transformation to succeed, reform on a massive scale was required. Otherwise, reforms could later be reversed (Edward Nowak ECS interview 2008). Balcerowicz and his team created the foundations for what they referred to as 'The New Economic Order'. - This was a complete conception for economic reform, whose major features included: independent, self-managing and self-financing enterprises, a new bank law, and the free flow of money.

The Balcerowicz team and the Network proposed revolutionary changes that would completely transform the economic system (Edward Nowak ECS interview 2008). The Network prepared other draft laws apart from the Social Enterprise Bill. For example, the group prepared bills about taxes, the National Bank of Poland, and economic activity (Edward Nowak interview 2013). Furthermore, the Network believed it was essential to initiate a price reform by introducing a market mechanism, because the communist price system took no account of supply and demand. The Network also wanted to strengthen the Polish złoty and make it convertible. This would allow Poland to integrate with the world economy, rather than trading only with the Soviet bloc on unfavourable terms (Komunikat nr 3 1981: 2, 3, Kraków archive: 1 III, volume 098, 1). The Network's drive for market reform received widespread support in Poland. For example, the Economic Law Group in Kraków also believed in market reform. They looked into how to increase the ability of enterprises to adapt in a flexible manner to market conditions and guarantee their profitability (Centrum Obywatelskich Inicjatyw Ustawodawczych 1981: section 1, page 2, Kraków archive: 1 III, volume 021).

The Network believed its economic project would lead to a rise in living standards, an improved market mechanism and an increase in purchasing power (Przedsiębiorstwo społeczne 1981: 12, Kraków archive: 1 III, volume 098, 1). However, the Network knew that a transition to a new economy would result in some hardship in society, due to factors such as an increase in unemployment, price changes and the self-financing of enterprises

(Komunikat nr 3 1981: 3, Kraków archive: 1 III, volume 098, 1). Edward Nowak was aware that difficult reforms were necessary at Huta im. Lenina: "I knew already in 1981 that it will be necessary to carry out many changes. Unfortunately many workers will have to leave, we have to reduce the amount of property we have. We have to begin operating in an open market, search for export and not restrict ourselves only to Poland and the Soviet Union" (Edward Nowak interview 2013). Moreover, in 1981 the Network did not promote a complete transformation to capitalism, as this was utopian in Poland's political situation at the time (Jacek Merkel interview 2013). The Network project was regarded in some quarters as a 'third way' between socialism and capitalism (Edward Nowak interview 2013). Paweł Roman argued that workers' self-management was a kind of compromise between a capitalist-private enterprise and socialist principles – which were still popular in Poland (Roman 1986: 19).

The Lublin Group and a more radical strategy

The Network was not the only group that promoted the idea of workers' self-management. On 13th July 1981, a new group formed in Lublin, called the Grupa Robocza na rzecz Międzyregionalnej Inicjatywy Współpracy Samorządów Pracowniczych; otherwise known as the Lublin Group (Grupa Lubelska). The group identified the same cause as the Network for the crisis in society: the bureaucratised system of political and economic power (Strajk czynny 1981, Gdańsk KK archive: IKZD, KKP NSZZ Solidarność_IKZD_Dok dotczące wydarzeń bydgoskich_sytuacja strajkowa). The Lublin Group supported the aims of the Network, but it was more radical in its strategy and economic policy. The group was composed of members of workers' councils, workers' self-management founding committees, union factory commissions and Solidarity regional managements from throughout Poland (Apel 1981, Kraków archive: 1 III, volume 098, 2). The Lublin Group wanted to speed up the creation of workers' self-management. The group was similar to the Network in that it believed Poland's largest factory plants should cooperate with each other and lead the drive for reform (Stanowisko Grupy Roboczej na rzecz Międzyregionalnej Inicjatywy Współpracy Samorządów Pracowniczych w sprawie aktualnych problemów ruchu samorządowego 1981: 2, Kraków archive: 1 III, volume 098, 2). The group also shared with the Network a desire to establish an economic order corresponding to the needs of working people (Uchwała 1981, Kraków archive: 1 III, volume 098, 2). The Lublin Group identified with the principles of Solidarity, as it sought to act through consultation and cooperation (Apel 1981, Kraków archive: 1 III, volume 098, 2). The fundamental aim of the

Lublin Group was to achieve a gathering of regional self-management representatives, which would agree on a form of self-management cooperation (Apel 1981, Kraków archive: 1 III, volume 098, 2). The Lublin Group supported the Network's key project - the Social Enterprise Bill. In a statement in August 1981, the Lublin Group called on the Sejm to pass a law for social enterprises, as well as laws on trade unions, the banking system, planning and the economic-financial system of enterprises (Stanowisko Grupy Roboczej na rzecz Międzyregionalnej Inicjatywy Współpracy Samorządów Pracowniczych 1981: 1, 2. Kraków archive: 1 III, volume 098, 2). The Lublin Group was more open in its criticism of the government than the Network. The group criticised the slow pace of work by government and parliamentary committees, and it highlighted the fundamental discrepancy between government economic projects and the expectations of society (Stanowisko Grupy Roboczej na rzecz Międzyregionalnej Inicjatywy Współpracy Samorządów Pracowniczych 1981: 1, Kraków archive: 1 III, volume 098, 2).

The Lublin Group placed more emphasis on central economic decision-making than the Network. A research team from the Wrocław University of Economics, which included Professor Zygmunt Bartosik, agreed with the Lublin Group on the need for central economic planning (Propozycja Reformy Gospodarczej 1981: 2, Kraków archive: 1 III, volume 021). In contrast, there was no reference in the Social Enterprise Bill to a role for planning in the reformed economic system (Przedsiębiorstwo społeczne 1981, Kraków archive: 1 III, volume 098, 1). In addition, the Lublin Group aimed to create a second parliamentary chamber, which would possess complete economic power (Stanowisko Grupy Roboczej na rzecz Międzyregionalnej Inicjatywy Współpracy Samorządów Pracowniczych 1981: 2, Kraków archive: 1 III, volume 098, 2). The Network debated the idea of a new parliamentary chamber. A Network statement, published in May 1981 after the second meeting of national self-management representatives, called for the creation of a second parliamentary chamber, which would be a Workers' Self-Management Chamber (Izba Samorządów) (Komunikat nr 3 1981: 1, Kraków archive: 1 III, volume 098, 1). However, this idea was not included in the Social Enterprise Bill. The Network was always more in favour of grass-roots economic activity, rather than centralised economic decision making. Arguments took place between the Network and Lublin Group – whose members included Gregorz Palka, Jerzy Kropiwnicki and Andrzej Słowik (all Solidarity members from the Łódź region). Merkel argued that the ideas of the Lublin Group contained elements of Trotskyism, and they regarded self-management as "a quintessential development of humankind" (Jacek Merkel

ECS interview 2008). In contrast, the Network regarded self-management as a compromise with the socialist system, rather than an ideal-type solution. Edward Nowak says that the idea of workers' self-management was: "to try to take control of the economy but not destroy the system" (Edward Nowak interview 2013).

The Lublin Group was less willing to compromise, and the group supported the Trotskyist idea of the 'active strike' (strajk czynny). Merkel explained that the Lublin Group "believed Solidarity must seize power in a factory plant, replacing the management…....and taking charge of the functioning of the enterprise" (Jacek Merkel interview 2013). Supporters of the Lublin Group presented their concept of the active strike in a paper at the Solidarity National Congress. They argued that the sit-in strike, in the passive manner that it had been applied by Solidarity, was a double-edged sword. This is because it interrupted the production of material goods, and in certain conditions it limited the possibilities of meeting the needs of society (Strajk czynny 1981, Gdańsk KK archive: IKZD, KKP NSZZ Solidarność_IKZD_Dok dotczące wydarzeń bydgoskich_sytuacja strajkowa). The Lublin Group argued that: "Solidarity cannot give up on the possibility of undertaking a strike battle" (Strajk czynny 1981, Gdańsk KK archive). The difference between a passive strike and an active strike was: after a short break in production (a passive strike), the strike committee orders its renewal, keeping control of production and the economic activity of the enterprise. In addition, the Lublin Group explained that: "after the end of the strike, power in the enterprise, in contrast to the passive strike, no longer returns to the hands of those who exercised it up until then, but is transferred to a workers' self-management body" (Strajk czynny 1981, Gdańsk KK archive). The Lublin Group was thus more radical in its plans for implementing workers' self-management, and the group wanted to integrate production activity with the needs of farming. The Lublin Group also called for immediate action to disband communist unions, associations and enterprise administration, giving way to voluntary cooperation and trade agreements among self-managing enterprises (Stanowisko Grupy Roboczej na rzecz Międzyregionalnej Inicjatywy Współpracy Samorządów Pracowniczych 1981: 2, Kraków archive: 1 III, volume 098, 2). Furthermore, the Lublin Group demanded that the powers of the government, ministries and Council of State (Rada Państwa) be radically limited and passed to society (Stanowisko Grupy Roboczej na rzecz Międzyregionalnej Inicjatywy Współpracy Samorządów Pracowniczych 1981: 1, Kraków archive: 1 III, volume 098, 2).

The Network was more related to the 'pragmatist' trend in Solidarity, as its demands were not as radical. Jacek Merkel argued that the idea of an active strike was naïve and dangerous, as it took no account of the reality of Poland's political situation. Merkel pointed out that the Russians were in charge, and they could intervene militarily in Poland if they felt reforms were going too far (Jacek Merkel interview 2013). Merkel explained that his caution in the face of Poland's Cold War situation was shared by Leszek Balcerowicz and Lech Wałęsa (Jacek Merkel interview 2013). In a speech at the Solidarity Congress, Wałęsa said that: "I am fully aware that this battle is very hard, and should we act rashly our chance for victory is minimal.....We underestimate our partner [the Soviet-backed government]. We fail to notice that they can starve us out very simply and quickly. Therefore let us not treat them lightly" (Wałęsa speech 1981, Gdańsk KK archive: IKZD, KKP IZjazd Delegatów_Dokumenty_Informacje dot. Działaczy NSZZ S_Tłumaczenia). Towards the end of the sixteen months of legal Solidarity activity, a radical current was very much in evidence in the self-management movement, and generally in Solidarity (Jacek Merkel interview 2013). The Lublin Group was the radical current in the self-management movement, and its membership stretched well beyond Lublin. For example, as well as the members from Łódź, there was Henryk Cudejko from Lower Silesia, Jerzy Dyner and Andrzej Miłkowski from Warsaw, Jan Brodzki from Płock and Henryk Sawicki from Katowice. However, the group did not have such a large membership as that of the Network. The Lublin Group did not have support in the important Solidarity region of Małopolska (Chodorowski 1992: 21; Lista imienna członków grupy roboczej 1981, Kraków archive: 1 III, volume 098, 2). In contrast, the influence of the Network reached all areas of Poland. In summer 1981, the Network and Solidarity took part in negotiations with the government about workers' self-management. The Lublin Group was not involved, as it did not share the Network's willingness to compromise and use Polish laws and institutions.

The PRL government and workers' self-management laws

The Network was not able to implement economic reform alone. Waldemar Kuczyński argued that the economic recovery could not purely be carried out from above, or purely from the grass-roots (Kuczyński, *Tygodnik Solidarność* 1981a: 3). The Network needed to cooperate with the government in order to implement reforms. However, a Network communiqué from July 1981 noted it was becoming clear that the government did not intend to introduce reform. The fragmented progress that had been achieved was almost exclusively down to strikes or the pressure of Solidarity declaring strikes (Komunikat nr 3 1981: 2,

Kraków archive: 1 III, volume 098, 1). The Network believed that the government was worried about the following matters: political reform, workers' self-management, the removal of the nomenklatura, and a formalisation of the PZPR's role in the state. The view of the Network was that the government wanted a clear strengthening of the centralised politico-economic system (Przedsiębiorstwo społeczne 1981: 12, Kraków archive: 1 III, volume 098, 1). The Network had no confidence in any government plan for getting out of the economic crisis (Przedsiębiorstwo społeczne 1981: 13, Kraków archive: 1 III, volume 098, 1). Nevertheless, it was not possible to treat the communist government as a completely unified actor, as there were members of the governing PZPR class who believed in reform. Kuczyński wrote in July 1981 that the self-management movement may be able to find some allies in the government (Kuczyński, *Tygodnik Solidarność* 1981a: 3). Also in July 1981, Edmund Kotłowski and Bronisław Ziemianin wrote that: "In recent days, the central press has reported that the conception of workers' self-management, expressed by Solidarity's legal experts, has support from some members of the Legislative Council of the Council of Ministers" (Kotłowski & Ziemianin, *Portowiec* 1981: 5).

The Network's project for a social enterprise went into competition with the government's bill on workers' self-management. The government bill, officially presented as representing society, was submitted to parliament in June 1981 (Kuisz 2009: 261). The government self-management bill was prepared by a group called Zespół X, which was part of the parliamentary sub-committee for economic reform (Komisja d/s reformy gospodarczej). The government bill included the statement that: "The strengthening of the position of workers' self-management by at the same time increasing enterprise independence is an essential premise for the success of the planned economic reform" (Uzasadnienie project ustawy o samorządzie załogi przedsiębiorstwa państwowego 1981: 2, Kraków archive: 1 III, volume 098, 2). This was an empty statement though, as the bill made it clear that the government had a more restricted understanding of self-management. The government bill asserted that: "Participation in management does not mean the taking over of management by the staff and their bodies" (Uzasadnienie project ustawy o samorządzie załogi przedsiębiorstwa państwowego 1981: 1, Kraków archive: 1 III, volume 098, 2). Furthermore, the Network project was attacked at the Ninth Congress of the PZPR in July 1981. As a result of instructions from the PZPR Central Committee, bitter criticism of the conception of the social enterprise and the activity of the Network began to appear in the mass media

(Materiały Ogólnopolskiego Spotkania Samorządów Pracowniczych 1981: 2, Kraków archive: 1 III, volume 098, 2).

The Network bill was criticised for being contradictory to the constitution of the PRL and threatening the systemic basis of the country (Sieć statement and additions to the Social Enterprise Bill 1981: 11, Kraków archive: 1 III, volume 098, 1). The response of the Network to this accusation was: "the basic systemic principle of our country is social ownership of the means of production, which is stated in the Gdańsk Agreement and in the statutes of Solidarity. The Network project is in accordance with this principle" (Sieć statement and additions to the Social Enterprise Bill 1981: 11, Kraków archive: 1 III, volume 098, 1). The PZPR also criticised the Network for proposing a move away from ownership by society towards group ownership (Sieć statement and additions to the Social Enterprise Bill 1981: 11, Kraków archive: 1 III, volume 098, 1). The Network explained that their project would not create group ownership because the enterprise staff would not be the owners of the enterprise; rather they would manage the enterprise (Sieć statement and additions to the Social Enterprise Bill 1981: 11-12, Kraków archive: 1 III, volume 098, 1). Furthermore, the government criticised the Network project for not ensuring that the interests of society would be represented (Sieć statement and additions to the Social Enterprise Bill 1981: 12, Kraków archive: 1 III, volume 098, 1). The Network pointed out that their project ensured cooperation and consultation between many groups in society. According to the Social Enterprise Bill, the enterprise founding body (a government ministry, or a state/local administration body) must create a preparatory team including representatives from: the ministry of finance, banks, trade unions, national councils, environmental organisations and research organisations (Sieć statement and additions to the Social Enterprise Bill 1981: 12, Kraków archive: 1 III, volume 098, 1).

The Network argued that the fundamental difference between its project and the government project was their different means for protecting the interests of society. The government project maintained the procedure of ministries nominating enterprise directors. In addition, founding bodies were to be given close control over the enterprise, thereby preventing authentic workers' self-management (Sieć statement and additions to the Social Enterprise Bill 1981: 12, 13, Kraków archive: 1 III, volume 098, 1). In contrast, the Network project foresaw the state playing a reduced role in enterprises; the state would no longer be all-

powerful (Kuczyński, *Tygodnik Solidarność* 1981b: 3). The government declared that the Social Enterprise Bill would incapacitate the state in terms of socio-economic policy (Sieć statement and additions to the Social Enterprise Bill 1981: 12, Kraków archive: 1 III, volume 098, 1). The Network responded that the incapacity of the state was a result of the broken communist economy, not the proposals of the Network (Sieć statement and additions to the Social Enterprise Bill 1981: 13, Kraków archive: 1 III, volume 098, 1). The Network believed the state should no longer be allowed to make arbitrary decisions (Przedsiębiorstwo społeczne 1981: 10, 11, Kraków archive: 1 III, volume 098, 1). In addition, the Network wanted to ensure that state organs could only interfere in the internal affairs of an enterprise through an act of parliament (Sieć statement and additions to the Social Enterprise Bill 1981: 10, Kraków archive: 1 III, volume 098, 1). The Network's vision for the role of the state was to: fix certain prices, manage the finance and credit system, make laws, enter into binding agreements with social enterprises, fix taxes and duties, and manage the economic infrastructure - such as railways and the power industry (Sieć statement and additions to the Social Enterprise Bill 1981: 12, 13, Kraków archive: 1 III, volume 098, 1). Furthermore, decisions on prices would not be carried out solely by the state, but also by enterprises (Przedsiębiorstwo społeczne 1981: 40, Kraków archive: 1 III, volume 098, 1). This was important because the setting of prices was an emotive issue in Poland. Price increases by the communist government had set off spontaneous strike waves in recent history, such as on the Baltic coast in 1970-71.

In July and August 1981, delegates from the Network, Solidarity KKP and the research centre OPSZ participated in sessions of the parliamentary sub-committee dealing with bills for state enterprises and workers' self-management (Maleszka 1981, Kraków archive: 1 III, volume 098, 2; Informacje o powstaniu, działalności i celach Sieci 1981, Kraków archive: 1 III, volume 098, 1). The Sejm appointed Professor Adam Łopatka as chairman of this sub-committee (Komisja d/s reformy gospodarczej), which finished its work on 9th September 1981 (Dalsze losy projektu ustawy o samorządzie 1981, Gdańsk KK archive: IKZD, IKZD materiały_do publikacji_wywiady; Raina 1985: 391). Nowak says that: "in a certain sense, we lost" (Edward Nowak ECS interview 2008). This is because the government inevitably chose to adopt its self-management bill, rather than the Network bill. On 25th September 1981, parliament passed laws on State Enterprises and Workers' Self-Management. This was the day before the start of the second round of the Solidarity National Congress. The Network wanted enterprises to gain independence from the state, but the laws did not allow for this.

Article 54 of the State Enterprises Law gave the state the power to impose tasks on enterprises, if this was necessary for national defence or to meet Poland's international obligations. The nature of these tasks was not specified in the law, meaning the state was free to impose whatever it wanted on enterprises (*Dziennik Ustaw*, Nr. 24, poz. 122: 270). The self-management laws did not grant workers' councils the powers to make all decisions concerning production, sales and profits, as the Network had wanted. Nevertheless, workers' councils were granted a degree of autonomy and some powers in various areas of enterprise activity. The Workers' Self-Management Law stated that the capacities of workers' councils included: "1) adoption and amendment of the annual plan of an enterprise……5) agreeing on the creation of or entering into enterprise associations……..8) adoption of resolutions with respect to changes in the direction of enterprise activities" (*Dziennik Ustaw*, Nr. 24, poz. 123: 273). Workers' councils were also entitled to adopt the annual report and approve the financial balance of enterprises. Workers' councils were allowed to make resolutions about matters of investment, the construction of housing and social buildings, and how profits were to be used. Also, a workers' council had the power to pass work regulations, and it could advise on the selling off of essential enterprise machines and equipment (*Dziennik Ustaw*, Nr. 24, poz. 123: 273). Article 28 of the Workers' Self-Management Law stated that: "The workers' council has the right to control the whole activity of the enterprise, with special consideration for the rational management of enterprise property" (*Dziennik Ustaw*, Nr. 24, poz. 123: 273).

Even though the Network's bill was not adopted by parliament, the group managed to exert some influence on the self-management laws. The Network also succeeded in creating huge interest in workers' self-management (Edward Nowak ECS interview 2008). The Social Enterprise Bill was a great success of the Network's organic, organised, systematic and intellectual style of activity (Jacek Merkel interview 2013). Szymon Jakubowicz was an expert advisor to the KKP, an associate of the Network, and he took part in the government-Solidarity negotiations on self-management. In an interview at the Solidarity Congress, he gave his view on the self-management laws:

> These laws are not good, but they are better than those the government handed in to the Sejm. Thanks to the resolution from the Solidarity Congress, the huge pressure from society and the work of the Network, we succeeded in pressing for changes to the laws, which work out to the advantage of workers' self-management. The competencies of workers' councils were broadened (Szymon Jakubowicz interview 1981, Gdańsk KK archive: IKZD, IKZD materiały_do publikacji_wywiady).

The self-management laws opened up the possibility that workers' councils would appoint and dismiss directors in many enterprises. However, in enterprises classed as vitally important to the economy, such as defence and public utility companies, directors were to be appointed by the founding body (Uchwała 50/81, Gdańsk KK archive: IKZD, Uchwały). The government had wanted all enterprise directors to be appointed by founding bodies, and it took a Sejm rebellion to prevent this from happening. This rebellion occurred when parliament was summoned in order to adopt the self-management laws. The PZPR parliamentary club received instructions that they should remove the special provision about founding bodies appointing directors in enterprises of vital national importance (Szymon Jakubowicz interview 1981, Gdańsk KK archive: IKZD, IKZD materiały_do publikacji_wywiady). The government sought to pave the way for founding bodies, i.e. the state, to hire and fire directors in all enterprises, thereby significantly weakening workers' self-management. The Network organised a rebellion, which involved one hundred and five posłowie (Sejm deputies), and this pressure forced the government to back down (Jacek Merkel interview 2013). The Sejm rebellion illustrated how the ideas of the Network penetrated even into the PZPR (Szymon Jakubowicz interview 1981, Gdańsk KK archive: IKZD, IKZD materiały_do publikacji_wywiady). Ryszard Reiff, a member of the Council of State (Rada Państwa), was one of the Sejm deputies who came out against the government's proposals (Ryszard Reiff interview 1981, Gdańsk KK archive: IKZD, IKZD materiały_do publikacji_wywiady). Overall, the self-management laws were a mixed success for the Network. The Social Enterprise Bill was not adopted by parliament, but the Network extracted some concessions from the government, and workers' councils gained some power and influence over enterprise activities.

The Solidarity First National Congress

The Solidarity First National Congress (I Krajowy Zjazd Delegatów) took place in the Olivia conference hall in Gdańsk. Eight hundred and ninety-six delegates attended the Congress, which took place over two rounds: 5th-10th September and 26th September-7th October 1981. A resolution on workers' self-management, adopted by the Congress on 8th September, included the following: "The delegates at the First National Congress of Solidarity call upon union members and all workers to defend workers' self-management" (Uchwała 16/81 1981, Gdańsk KK archive: IKZD, Uchwały). The KKP Presidium adopted a new self-management resolution in between the two rounds of the Congress, in response to the government calling together parliament on 22nd September. This new resolution provoked discord during the

second round of the Congress, and workers' self-management once again proved to be a controversial subject in Solidarity. The Network and many delegates at the Solidarity Congress believed that the KKP gave too much away when it compromised with the government over the self-management laws. The KKP did not insist that workers' councils should appoint directors in all enterprises not classed as vitally important to the economy. The KKP agreed that either the workers' council or the founding body would appoint directors in these enterprises (Chodorowski 1992: 44, 47; Uchwała 50/81, Gdańsk KK archive: IKZD, Uchwały). In addition, there were questions about how the new KKP resolution was adopted when not all Presidium members were present, and how the resolution was based to a large degree on the opinions of experts (Grzelak & Rybicki 1981, Gdańsk KK archive: IKZD, IKZD materiały_do publikacji_wywiady). Zbigniew Iwanów, who was vice-chairman of Toruń regional Solidarity, felt that the KKP Presidium's new self-management resolution went against democratic decision-making (Iwanów speech 1981, Gdańsk KK archive: IKZD, KKP IZjazd Delegatów_Dokumenty_Informacje dot. Działaczy NSZZ S_Tłumaczenia). In addition, a statement from a publishing group in Kraków (Wydawnictwo Literackie) expressed disapproval towards the union negotiator Mieczysław Gil. They believed his position on self-management was too close to theses put forward at the third plenary session of the PZPR Central Committee (Kraków factory commission 1981, Kraków archive: 1 III, volume 021).

The delegates at the Solidarity Congress disapproved of the KKP's actions and the self-management laws (Raina 1985: 393). In addition, many Solidarity factory commissions and regions expressed concern about the self-management laws (Szymon Jakubowicz interview 1981, Gdańsk KK archive: IKZD, IKZD materiały_do publikacji_wywiady). R. Krawczyk was a guest at the Solidarity Congress and an activist in the Social Committee for Economic Reform, which was part of the self-management movement. Krawczyk admitted that: "the self-management movement is deeply disappointed with the passing of laws in this form" (Społeczny Komitet Reformy Gospodarczej 1981, Gdańsk KK archive: IKZD, *IKZD* materiały_do publikacji_wywiady). Edward Nowak was also unhappy with the self-management laws, and he was disappointed that the KKP did not give its full support to workers' self-management (Edward Nowak ECS interview 2008). During a press conference at the Solidarity Congress, Nowak said that: "we are not prepared for what is being imposed on us. The Network project was not accepted in full by the KKP. When it came to battle, we were not sure of receiving support from the union" (Konferencja prasowa 1981, Gdańsk KK

archive: IKZD, IKZD materiały_do publikacji_wywiady). The Network had no intention of competing with Solidarity, but Nowak believes the KKP were afraid of the Network (Edward Nowak interview 2013). In response to the self-management laws, Nowak and his colleagues at Huta im. Lenina did not create a permanent workers' council. Instead, they continued with a temporary workers' self-management founding committee, which they wanted to keep independent from the communist system (Edward Nowak ECS interview 2008). Delegates at the Solidarity Congress issued a resolution on 3rd October 1981 calling for important changes to the laws. For example, Solidarity wanted to change the regulations allowing founding bodies (the state) to impose specific tasks on state enterprises (Uchwała w sprawie Ustaw o samorządzie załogi przedsiębiorstwa państwowego oraz przedsiębiorstwach państwowych 1981: 1, Kraków archive: 1 III, volume 098, 2).

Workers' self-management was not the only difficult issue during the second round of the Congress, as the delegates held discussions about an economic programme for Solidarity (Edward Nowak ECS interview 2008). As noted above, the Network cooperated with Leszek Balcerowicz and his team to prepare an economic reform programme, which they presented to the Solidarity Congress. The Network tried to gather support for their programme, but they did not succeed (Edward Nowak ECS interview 2008). The official Solidarity Programme was signed on the last day of the Congress and it was called Samorządna Rzeczpospolita (Self-Governing Republic). The third part of the Solidarity Programme focused on economic reform, and it was supplemented by an annexe containing reform proposals to be discussed further by the union (Edward Nowak interview 2013). The economic programme of Professor Stefan Kurowski (called Program Alternatywny) was included in this annexe. Kurowski's economic programme received support from Lublin Group activists including Grzegorz Pałka, and from the Konfederacja Polski Niepodległej - an anti-communist political party founded by Leszek Moczulski (Plan Gospodarczej KPN 1981, Gdańsk KK archive: IKZD, IKZD materiały_do publikacji_wywiady). The basic goal of Kurowski's Program Alternatywny was to achieve a fast rise in material production on the basis of existing production infrastructure and employment. This would bring a swift end to the economic decline, and then increase living standards for working people and the whole of society. Kurowski argued that it was necessary to give the economy a strong first impulse. This first impulse had to come mainly from Poland's already existing resources, by way of a new allocation of productive assets in the course of a radical economic conversion (Aneks do Uchwały Programowej I Krajowego Zjazdu Delegatów 1981: 4,

www.solidarnosc.org.pl/dok/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/I-KZD-uchwala-programowa-aneks.pdf). Nowak argued that Kurowski put forward a seemingly attractive economic plan, but it was an empty programme (Edward Nowak ECS interview 2008).

The Network did not receive full support from the KKP or the Solidarity Congress, but the group's ideas were evident in the Solidarity Programme. For example, the Programme stated that: "the basic organisational unit of the economy should be the social enterprise, managed by employees represented through the workers' council" (Program NSZZ Solidarność 1981: 8, www.solidarnosc.org.pl/dok/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/I-KZD-uchwala-programowa.pdf). The Solidarity Programme also called for the enterprise director to be hired and fired by the workers' council, and there was recognition that: "The activity of the Network has initiated a broad self-management movement" (Program NSZZ Solidarność 1981: 8, www.solidarnosc.org.pl/dok/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/I-KZD-uchwala-programowa.pdf). Thesis twenty of the Solidarity Programme stated that: "Authentic workers' self-management will be the base of the Self-Governing Republic" (Program NSZZ Solidarność 1981: 29, www.solidarnosc.org.pl/dok/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/I-KZD-uchwala-programowa.pdf). In addition, in the annexe to the third part of the Programme, there was an economic reform proposal written by activists including Ryszard Bugaj, Zbigniew Janas and Waldemar Kuczyński. This proposal asserted that: "The union lays great hopes on the initiatives of self-management bodies and union factory commissions in aid of streamlining production and saving materials" (Aneks do Uchwały Programowej I Krajowego Zjazdu Delegatów 1981: 9, www.solidarnosc.org.pl/dok/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/I-KZD-uchwala-programowa-aneks.pdf). The idea of workers' self-management was thus an important theme during the Solidarity National Congress.

The Solidarity Programme stayed true to the core ideas of the union, which were established during the strikes and government-society agreements in August-September 1980. Solidarity always sought to protect vulnerable groups and thesis six of the Programme affirmed that: "While remembering everyone, the Union pays particular attention to the poorest" (Program NSZZ Solidarność 1981: 13, www.solidarnosc.org.pl/dok/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/I-KZD-uchwala-programowa.pdf). In addition, the Solidarity Programme stated that: "The purpose of economic and social reforms must be not only improvements in material conditions, but also the development of society's culture and education. We want not only

to eat, but also to live in a worthy and enlightened way" (Program NSZZ Solidarność 1981: 37, www.solidarnosc.org.pl/dok/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/I-KZD-uchwala-programowa.pdf; Raina 1985: 353). Furthermore, after the Solidarity Congress, the Network moved away from economics and engaged in social and political projects. At Huta im. Lenina, the Network became interested in physical education, sport and tourism. The Network wanted to deal with safety at work – more in intellectual terms rather than traditional union terms. The last meeting of the Network took place on 11th December 1981; a couple of days later the group's new projects were abruptly halted by the declaration of Martial Law (Edward Nowak ECS interview 2008).

Conclusion

Poland began the 1980s in the midst of an economic crisis. The economy was based on a centralised system of ordered distribution, which served the interests of the nomenklatura rather than those of society. In early 1981 cooperation began between some of Poland's great industrial factory plants. They formed the Network, and this group decided to pursue workers' self-management as a basis for economic reform in Poland. The Network sought to play the role of an economic partner to Solidarity, and the group became the heart of a grass-roots workers' self-management movement. Solidarity was a trade union and nationwide social movement. Solidarity contained all political orientations, and it was therefore difficult to unite the views of its members on any given topic. The recent memory of the KSR turned some Solidarity activists away from self-management. However, the idea of workers' self-management was related to the core ideas of Solidarity; it was the economic counterpart to the political idea of territorial self-government. There was also a basis for renewing self-management activity in the founding text of Solidarity, which was the Gdańsk Agreement of 31st August 1980. The Network supported the creation of free trade unions - demand number one from the Gdańsk Shipyards MKS. The activity of the Network formed part of the Solidarity drive for Polish people to take pride in their country and their work. In addition, the Network reflected the democratic principles of Solidarity, and the group knew that political and economic reform were linked. There could no real economic reform without changes to the political system. Solidarity initially resolved to stay out of politics, but this proved to be impossible. The authoritarian nature of the communist system brought politics into all aspects of life. Furthermore, the Network sought to bring to life the democratic elements in the Polish constitution. The group wanted parliament to express the will of the people and exercise control over the government.

The centrepiece of the Network project was the Social Enterprise Bill. This bill sought to create independent, self-governing and self-financing enterprises. The bill sought to establish the principle of the social ownership of the means of production, rather than state ownership. The Network sent its bill to parliament in June 1981. By this time many enterprises were already electing self-management founding committees and workers' councils. After engaging with workers' self-management, the Network went a step further by focusing on economic reform. The Network wanted to introduce a market mechanism for setting prices and create diverse forms of enterprise ownership, including cooperatives and joint-stock companies. However, there were tensions within the self-management movement. A rival self-management group emerged called the Lublin Group. This group was more radical than the Network. The Lublin Group believed in the active strike, whereby workers would take over all activities in enterprises. The Network also faced competition from a government self-management bill. The Network took part in government-Solidarity negotiations about workers' self-management laws. The government wanted to maintain the state's dominant role in the economy; whereas the Network wanted the state to play a reduced role. The KKP did not give its full backing to the Network's project. There was tension as the KKP perceived the Network as a rival. The government predictably decided to base the self-management laws on its own bill. The Network though, managed to secure some concessions. For example, founding bodies were mainly to appoint directors in enterprises that were vital to the interests of society, such as defence and public utility companies. The State Enterprises and Workers' Self-Management Laws did not create authentic self-management, but they granted some independence to enterprises. The laws were passed in late September 1981, in between the two rounds of the Solidarity National Congress.

The complicated dynamics in Solidarity made it hard for the union to define a programme. The Network hoped that its economic programme would win the backing of the Solidarity Congress. This was not to be, as the Solidarity delegates chose a rival programme by Professor Stefan Kurowski. However, the Network's ideas still held influence in Solidarity, as the official Solidarity Programme made reference to workers' self-management. The core ideas of Solidarity from the Baltic Coast strikes in August 1980 were also evident in the Solidarity Programme. For example, the Programme demanded improved working conditions and social welfare. The Programme called for the creation of a Self-Governing

Republic: “Pluralism of social, political and cultural ideas should be the basis of democracy in the Self-Governing Republic” (Program NSZZ Solidarność 1981: 28, www.solidarnosc.org.pl/dok/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/I-KZD-uchwala-programowa.pdf). After the Solidarity Congress, the Network began work on projects of a more social and political nature. However, the group did not have much time to make progress with these new projects. Andrzej Mazur, who was an editor of the Łódź based political periodical *Aspekt*, made telling remarks at the Solidarity Congress. He noted how it was difficult for Solidarity to build up an independent society, as this could create conflict with the state: “I do not believe that society could organise itself next to the state, it will sooner or later have to come into conflict with the state” (Interview with Mazur and Ostoja-Owsiany 1981, Gdańsk KK archive: IKZD, IKZD materiały_do publikacji_wywiady). This conflict broke out with the imposition of military rule in December 1981.

Chapter 5: Workers' Self-Management in the Underground

Introduction

The second empirical chapter analyses workers' self-management during the underground Solidarity period. The chapter focuses on events from the imposition of Martial Law in December 1981 to the strikes in summer 1988 – which forced the government into official negotiations with Solidarity. The onset of military rule had a massive impact on Solidarity and the self-management movement. Solidarity had to adapt to the repressive political climate. There was no longer the issue of how far to engage in politics, as Solidarity was outlawed. Moreover, Solidarity faced some familiar problems, such as trying to define a strategy and programme. The official programme from the Solidarity National Congress needed adapting to account for the harsh realities of military rule. During Martial Law, the identity of Solidarity evolved, and it became an underground trade union and social movement. Nevertheless, this chapter recognises how there was continuity in Solidarity in some significant respects. For example, the union continued to focus on the important link between political and economic reform. Also, the core democratic and self-governing ideas in Solidarity remained during the underground period. Solidarity developed the concept of the 'underground society', which helped the union to survive and in some ways to thrive during military rule.

The Network revived itself in the underground, although its activities were more limited in scope. This was a partial revival of the Network, as it was no longer a flourishing nationwide movement. In the early period of military rule, Solidarity's predominant strategy was to boycott the communist government's self-management structures. As time passed however, Solidarity adopted a new self-management strategy. In factory plants that were not dominated by Communist Party (PZPR) loyalists, there was an attempt to use self-management structures for opposition activity. Workers' self-management in the underground thus became a means for keeping Solidarity alive. Furthermore, the mid-1980s saw a general shift in Solidarity's strategy. The Solidarity-led opposition movement partially came out into the open. As Solidarity and its politico-economic strategy evolved over the 1980s, this inevitably impacted on the self-management movement.

Martial Law

The declaration of Martial Law in Poland must be understood in relation to Poland's position as a country in the Soviet bloc. Solidarity was a free trade union pushing for the liberalisation of political and economic life in Poland, which clashed with the authoritarian political model of the Soviet Union. Already in October 1980, the Polish military began top secret preparations for Martial Law. A plan for implementing Martial Law was approved in November 1980, and then kept on hold (Kemp-Welch 2008: 279). The imposition of Martial Law on the night of 13th December 1981 brought an end to the sixteen month period of legal Solidarity activity. The head of the military, General Wojciech Jaruzelski, became President of Poland and he put in place a twenty-one man Military Council for National Salvation (WRON Wojskowa Rada Ocalenia Narodowego). Army generals and commissars took control of ministries and most of the large state-owned enterprises. Solidarity was suspended, and then outlawed in November 1982 (Lis 1984: 1, Gdańsk ECS archive; Penn 2005: 93). Attempts at protests during the imposition of Martial Law were defeated. For example, from 13th-19th December 1981, sit-in strikes were in force in most large plants in the Wrocław (Lower Silesia) region. These strikes were brutally crushed by the paramilitary police (ZOMO) and soldiers. At the Wujek mine in Katowice, the ZOMO (Zmotoryzowane Odwody Milicji Obywatelskiej) carried out their most brutal action. The ambulances which left from the mine were stopped, and the police threw wounded miners in the snow and forced the ambulances to leave empty (*Polish Solidarity Campaign News* 1982c: 6). Furthermore, WRON issued decrees that wiped out the gains made by Solidarity. Before Martial Law, reforms to the political system, education and economic management had been drawn up in negotiations with the government, and then passed into law. WRON suspended civil rights and banned all public gatherings as well as the distribution of printed material and printing equipment (Lis 1984: 4-5, Gdańsk ECS archive; Penn 2005: 93).

The military government put thousands of Solidarity activists in prisons and internment camps (Documents of the Second National Congress 1990: 16). The majority of the Solidarity national leadership and a substantial proportion of its regional and local leadership were interned (*Polish Solidarity Campaign News* 1982a: 7). Jacek Kuroń wrote from his cell in Warsaw's Białołęka prison that: "Society is in a state of war" (Kuroń, *Tygodnik Mazowsze* 1982: 3). He stated: "We have a classic occupation, with the censorship of correspondence, a curfew, mass raids, searches, arrests, prison sentences by military courts....." (Kuroń, *Tygodnik Mazowsze* 1982: 3). Most Solidarity activists at liberty went into hiding, eg.

Zbigniew Bujak (head of Warsaw region), Zbigniew Romaszewski (member of Warsaw region executive), Wiktor Kulerski (deputy-head of Warsaw region), and Zbigniew Janas (leader of Solidarity at Ursus tractor factory) (*Polish Solidarity Campaign News* 1982b: 5). The Temporary Coordination Commission (TKK Tymczasowa Komisja Koordynacyjna) was the leadership group of underground Solidarity. It was created in April 1982 and it kept faith with the peaceful and democratic ideas from 1980-81. The main aims of the TKK were to: restore legal Solidarity activity; restore authentic self-government; free interned and arrested political prisoners; and reach a government-society agreement (Oświadczenie ws 1 i 3 maja 1983, Gdańsk ECS archive, folder: TKK, sub-folder TKK 1983; W rocznicę Sierpnia ’80, *Tygodnik Mazowsze* 1982: 1). A TKK protest statement in September 1982 declared that: “It was possible to intern our leaders, but it is not possible to intern a nation. It is also not possible to intern an idea” (Protest Prawda o rocznicy-Bydgoszcz IX 1982: 2, Gdańsk ECS archive: TKK, TKK 1982).

In July 1983, the government officially suspended Martial Law, but this was not a sincere act. The leadership of underground Solidarity described it as a propaganda gesture (Dokumenty TKK and RKK: 1, Gdańsk ECS archive: TKK, TKK 1983). The limitations to civil and workers’ rights were maintained, and new emergency laws subordinated all areas of social life to the government. In autumn 1983, a communiqué from underground Solidarity in Gdańsk reported that despite it being two months after the official end of Martial Law, there were still arrests and political trials in the region. For example, Staniszław Jarosz, Marian Świtek and Roman Polcyn from the management of the Port Gdański enterprise faced trial at a court in Gdynia (komunikat ws aresztowan, Gdańsk ECS archive, TKK, RKK 1983). Furthermore, the government delivered major blows to science, education and the creative arts by practically abolishing the independence and self-governance of higher education and civil associations. Science and education were subordinated to the government’s doctrinal interests. There was also a drastic limitation to workers’ self-management (Dokumenty TKK and RKK: 1, Gdańsk ECS archive: TKK, TKK 1983). The self-governance and independence of hundreds of factory plants was limited or abolished by classifying them as: enterprises of fundamental importance (1400 enterprises); enterprises carrying out combat programmes (430 enterprises); and public utility enterprises (Po stronie społeczeństwa, *Tygodnik Mazowsze* 1983: 4).

The State Enterprises and Workers' Self-Management Laws from September 1981 did not fully meet the expectations of workers, but they did give self-management bodies some capacities in the management of enterprises, and they enabled a limited degree of economic self-government (Stanowisko ws wznowienia działalności samorządów pracowniczych w warunkach stanu wojennego, *Tygodnik Mazowsze* 1982: 2). The imposition of Martial Law created a confused legal situation concerning workers' self-management. In legal terms, workers' councils could appoint directors in many enterprises that were not classed as vitally important to the economy. However, in reality the restrictions imposed on society and the economy by military rule made it extremely rare for workers' councils to appoint enterprise directors. The PZPR was able to appoint its allies as directors, and the nomenklatura was therefore able to maintain its influence over the economy (Stanowisko ws wznowienia działalności samorządów pracowniczych w warunkach stanu wojennego, *Tygodnik Mazowsze* 1982: 2). As noted above in Chapter 4, workers' councils were entitled to deal with some production issues, including: managing building repairs, organising inter-department accounting, employment policy, and small investments and innovations that could be financed with factory plant funds. Other domains of activity for workers' councils were social, pay and accommodation matters, such as awarding prizes and allocating flats. Workers' councils were also entitled to approve all decisions of the director concerning division of profits (Co nam zostało z reform, *Tygodnik Mazowsze* 1984b: 1; *Dziennik Ustaw* Nr. 24, poz. 123: 273; Raport o samorządach 1985: 3; Sytuacja w zakładach regionu 1983: 4; W Obronie Samorządu, *Tygodnik Mazowsze* 1984: 4). However, workers' councils were often unable to use the powers granted to them by law. After the 'official' end of Martial Law in July 1983, the government enacted emergency laws, which ensured that limits remained on the powers of workers' councils. These emergency laws gave the state administration the right to dissolve self-management bodies (Raport o samorządach 1985: 3). There was a common practice of scaling back the role of workers' councils to that of the infamous KSR - imposed in 1958 (Komunikat Sieci, *Komitet Oporu Społecznego* 1985a: 2). The government used self-management to make it easier for unpopular decisions to be taken. The government also used self-management to give the illusion of social consultation, and to pass on responsibility for the economic situation (M.K., *Komitet Oporu Społecznego* 1985: 4).

Solidarity originally became interested in workers' self-management as a means to tackle the economic crisis. There had been a crisis since 1976, and after the introduction of Martial

Law this turned into a catastrophe. An ever greater proportion of society was plunging into poverty (Janas et al., *Solidarność* 1984: 6). Moreover, the government's aggressive military armament policies damaged the economy, as did the development of the paramilitary police and the secret police (SB Służba Bezpieczeństwa) (Janas et al., *Solidarność* 1984: 6). Tax income for Poland's armaments grew by thirteen percent in 1982 from 5.5 billion to 6.25 billion dollars, despite the eight percent fall in national income (Tajny raport komisji planowania, *Tygodnik Mazowsze* 1983: 1). The repressive apparatus in Poland was very strong, but this did not prevent Solidarity from reviving itself in the underground.

The rise of an underground movement

Solidarity began to revive itself immediately after the declaration of Martial Law, but the union changed in character. In the 1980-81 period, Solidarity faced the question of how far to engage in politics. This was no longer an issue after December 1981, as the union lost its legal status and political rights. Martial Law crushed Solidarity when it was very strong, and the union would never again come close to a membership of ten million people. During the seven years of military rule, there was a change in the balance of Solidarity as a trade union/social movement. It became much harder for Solidarity to engage in union activity, and thus Solidarity became more of a social movement. Moreover, Maciej Poleski questioned whether underground Solidarity had any features of a trade union: "Solidarity - we must still repeat this - is not a political party or trade union, but an independent movement of all society" (Poleski, *Tygodnik Mazowsze* 1982: 2).

Underground Solidarity was stronger in urban areas, where the social composition of the union was most diverse. Solidarity had less influence in the central Baltic coast region (dominated by small industrial plants and state farms) and in the provincial region outside of Warsaw (Bujak, *Tygodnik Mazowsze* 1983: 2; Meardi 2005: 268). The TKK initially included representatives from the four most active and best organised regional centres of resistance, which were Gdańsk, Kraków, Wrocław and Warsaw (Michnik 1985: 83; Sabbat-Swidlicka, *Radio Free Europe Research* 1983: 2, 3). There were other regional Solidarity centres active throughout Poland, including Białystok, Bydgoszcz, Częstochowa and Western Pomerania. Information gathered from underground Solidarity in August 1982 noted that underground local union branches were starting to appear, as were underground structures in Silesia and Łódź (Jak zorganizowała się Solidarność w okresie stanu

wojennego, *Tygodnik Mazowsze* 1982: 1). During the repressive climate of Martial Law, it was inevitable that Solidarity would take some time to organise itself in the underground. Solidarity gradually became more organised and it began to engage in more union activity. A Solidarity activist from the WSK Hydral plant in Wrocław explained how he looked up to the leaders of national and regional Solidarity: "For our factory plant activity, the authority of the RKS and TKK has a fundamental importance. I believe that those few people, wanted by the police, as they sign their own names at the bottom of documents that express the views of us all - they are, I do not hesitate to use this description - heroes" (Jestem pewien zwycięstwa Solidarności, *Tygodnik Mazowsze* 1984: 4). The TKK wrote a programme document in June 1984, which was authored by Bogdan Lis, and he stated that: "Solidarity always aimed to limit itself to the role of a trade union. But conditions in the totalitarian system often forced Solidarity to go beyond purely union matters" (Lis 1984: 4, Gdańsk ECS archive). Lis argued that during Martial Law: "the activities of the Union are concentrated on a permanent fight in defence against the all-embracing influence of the totalitarian state in various areas of social life" (Lis 1984: 4, Gdańsk ECS archive).

Solidarity's strategy in the underground

There was a debate concerning what strategy Solidarity should purse in the underground. This proved to be a recurring issue in the union, as there were also debates about strategy in 1980-81 (the literature review chapter noted the debate between pragmatists and fundamentalists). In 1982 Jacek Kuroń wrote from his Białołęka prison cell about a forceful strategy for underground Solidarity. Kuroń had always advocated the principle of non-violence, but he felt that this principle was no longer relevant. He believed that the best option for the opposition was to overthrow the military occupation through collective action (Kuroń, *Tygodnik Mazowsze* 1982: 3). Zbigniew Bujak was the symbolic leader of Solidarity during Martial Law, as he was the best known activist to evade capture (Hayden 1994: 78). Bujak paid respect to Kuroń as an exceptional educator and expert on social phenomena, but Bujak did not agree with the fundamental theses from Kuroń's Białołęka text (Bujak, *Tygodnik Mazowsze* 1982a: 4). Bujak believed that it was inadvisable to create Kuroń's conception for an opposition movement capable of overthrowing the occupation. Bujak pointed to the police-military structure of the state, which was well adapted to working out and eliminating such organisations. According to Bujak, a social explosion was not inevitable. He argued: "there was a general awareness in society that an outburst would not solve any of Poland's problems, but on the contrary would create a great threat of both the

use of the most brutal form of internal forces, as well as intervention from abroad" (Bujak, *Tygodnik Mazowsze* 1982a: 4). Moreover, Kuroń believed that the strength of the government's repressive apparatus meant that underground Solidarity should organise around a central level and show full discipline to the centre (Kuroń, *Tygodnik Mazowsze* 1982: 3). In contrast, Bujak was in favour of a strongly decentralised movement, applying many different methods of activity. Only such a movement - undefined and varied - would be elusive and difficult to defeat (Bujak, *Tygodnik Mazowsze* 1982a: 4). Wiktor Kulerski agreed with Bujak that there should not be a central organisation, but rather a movement with various layers of organisation, de-centralised and informal (Kulerski, *Tygodnik Mazowsze* 1982: 4). Bujak explained that the Mazowsze region underground leadership "defended itself against attempts at centralisation and hierarchy. The independence of all union cells, all groups of people.....constitutes the strength of our region" (Bujak, *Tygodnik Mazowsze* 1983: 2).

Solidarity decided to adopt the conception of a peaceful, decentralised and varied underground movement. Individual union structures were characterised by far-reaching independence and autonomy (Lis 1984: 6-7, Gdańsk ECS archive). Solidarity organised membership at the grass-roots level on an informal basis. This mass opposition movement was based first and foremost on union factory plant cells, which were called secret factory commissions (TKZ Tajna Komisja Zakładowa). A TKK document noted that: "Activists devoted to the cause are managing thousands of secret factory plant union cells that are carrying out statutory tasks" (Dokumenty TKK and RKK: 1, Gdańsk ECS archive: TKK, TKK 1983). The activities of the Solidarity cells included helping victims of repression and collecting union dues. The majority of TKZs also carried out economic activity, including selling stamps and photographs. TKZs existed in practically all industrial plants, and they were accompanied by inter-factory agreements among representatives of different TKZs. In addition, there were often structures at the regional level, such as Regional Coordination Commissions (RKK Regionalna Komisja Koordynacyjna) and Regional Strike Committees (RKS Regionalny Komitet Strajkowy) (Lis 1984: 6-7, Gdańsk ECS archive; Sytuacja w zakładach regionu, *Tygodnik Mazowsze* 1983: 1).

The TKK reported that the number of people regularly paying union dues varied from factory to factory. In major plants, the number varied from ten percent to fifty percent of the pre-December 1981 Solidarity membership; in smaller enterprises, where there was often less

repression from the security services, it was as high as fifty to seventy percent (*Information Centre for Polish Affairs*, News Bulletin No. 16/84 1984: 16, 17; Jak zorganizowała się Solidarność w okresie stanu wojennego, *Tygodnik Mazowsze* 1982: 1). Underground union factory commissions (TKZs) organised the collection of union dues among trusted people in factory plants. The union dues were only a small amount of money, and Solidarity activists would not openly canvass for members; they would wait until people came to them with money (Sytuacja w zakładach regionu, *Tygodnik Mazowsze* 1983: 1). Moreover, the large factory plants remained an important focus of Solidarity activity, and they were key to the identity of the union. In the underground, each of the great industrial plants carried out its own opposition activity and took part in the actions of the region (*Information Centre for Polish Affairs*, News Bulletin No. 16/84 1984: 18). The number of people actively engaged in union activity was at least a few tens of thousands, but many more people supported underground Solidarity. The TKK stated that: "at least one million people are directly involved in union activities such as reading publications, paying union dues, and providing benefits and legal aid" (*Information Centre for Polish Affairs*, News Bulletin No. 16/84 1984: 18).

Zbigniew Bujak believed that underground Solidarity was exerting an influence on political life: "the government is pretending that the union does not exist, but tactically it must take its existence into account in each important move" (Wywiad z Zbigniewem Bujakiem, *Tygodnik Mazowsze* 1983: 1). On the political map of Poland, two states appeared. One had already existed for a long time: the apparatus of power and force, supported by the police state and its collaborators. The other was Solidarity's underground structures (Opór, *Tygodnik Mazowsze* 1982: 1). The two states inevitably came into conflict. According to the Polish Helsinki Committee, which researched abuses of law and order, from December 1981 to March 1985 at least seventy-eight people were killed by the police and security services. Thousands more were interned, imprisoned and beaten (Garton Ash 2002: 367). Despite the intensive efforts of the SB, it did not manage to break up Solidarity's regional managements or inter-factory agreements (Przeciw Zniechęceniu, *Tygodnik Mazowsze* 1983: 1). A TKK document noted: "The government has not broken the spirit of societal resistance" (Dokumenty TKK and RKK: 1, Gdańsk ECS archive: TKK, TKK 1983). A Solidarity activist writing in *Tygodnik Mazowsze* argued that: "Social self-defence is the method of battle that most severely threatens the essence of the system" (Nie Zaniechać Oporu, *Tygodnik Mazowsze* 1984: 1). There were factory plants in which the government stopped

seeing any worth in repression because it was only causing ever greater resistance (Opór, *Tygodnik Mazowsze* 1982: 1).

One of the strategies used by underground Solidarity was the boycott of Communist Party (PZPR) institutions. This strategy succeeded in undermining societal support for PZPR workplace and social initiatives. In November 1982, the communist regime founded factory plant union organisations (Zakładowe Organizacje Związkowe). Lech Wałęsa declared that Solidarity supporters who had honour and responsibility would not sign up to the new unions (Świat pracy musi być solidarny, *Tygodnik Mazowsze* 1983: 1). Figures concerning individual factory plants (where they were available) showed that the regime unions did not go beyond ten to fifteen percent of the active workforce. While in some smaller factory plants attempts to establish new unions were completely unsuccessful. In comparison, Solidarity included eighty to ninety percent of workers during its legal activity in 1980-81. The majority of members of the regime's new unions were part of the nomenklatura or members of PZPR bodies (Lis 1984: 13-14, Gdańsk ECS archive). The regime trade unions had more success in the central Baltic coast region than in the so-called niespokojny (protest) provinces, such as Gdańsk, Wrocław, Kraków, Poznań and Warsaw (U Spokojnych Sąsiadów, *Solidarność* 1984: 5). In general, the regime's trade unions were not many in number, and they were completely isolated from their workplace communities (Przeciw Zniechęceniu, *Tygodnik Mazowsze* 1983: 1).

There were Solidarity activists, based mainly in Gdańsk and Wrocław, who believed in an 'instant change' strategy, whereby Solidarity would organise strikes all over the country to force the government into making compromises (Penn 2005: 193). In 1982 the TKK issued an appeal for all Solidarity cells to organise peaceful demonstrations on 31st August, which marked the union's two year anniversary (W rocznicę Sierpnia '80, *Tygodnik Mazowsze* 1982: 1). Polish people responded to this appeal, and there were mass street demonstrations in dozens of towns throughout Poland. There were organised and spontaneous parades, people came together at mass, and at places of remembrance people left flowers. In places where the police did not intervene, the demonstrations were peaceful. But in general the ZOMO attacked mercilessly, and there were fatalities in Lublin, Wrocław, Gdańsk and Kraków (Oświadczenie 1982: 1; Solidarność jest i będzie, *Tygodnik Mazowsze* 1982: 2). It was clear by the end of 1982 that the 'instant change' strategy would not work. Solidarity

was unable to organise mass strikes, such as the TKK's failed bid to organise a general strike on 10th November 1982 (Penn 2005: 193, 194; Poleski, *Tygodnik Mazowsze* 1982: 2). The police state created fear among activists, and the TKK knew that demonstrators could be attacked, beaten, poisoned with gas, arrested, tortured and sentenced (Lis 1984: 5, Gdańsk ECS archive).

In 1983-84, the TKK realised that it had to change strategy: "Many brief protest strikes were organised during Martial Law. Such forms of protest have now been temporarily abandoned because of the threat of severe reprisals against strike participants and organisers" (*Information Centre for Polish Affairs*, News Bulletin No. 16/84 1984: 16). Demonstrations thus became rare; they only took place on special occasions, including on 1st May (international labour day), 31st August (the birth of Solidarity) and 13th December (the imposition of Martial Law) (Lis 1984: 5, Gdańsk ECS archive). The activities of Solidarity became focused on creating structures and forms of activity that had to last not months, but years (Przeciw Zniechęceniu, *Tygodnik Mazowsze* 1983: 1). Bujak referred to this as the 'war of position' strategy (List do Zbyszka Bujaka 1982: 5, Gdańsk ECS archive). There was a recognition in Solidarity that the fight for free trade unions may take years of long, arduous work, demanding the activity of a significant portion of society (Bujak, *Tygodnik Mazowsze* 1982a: 4). A Solidarity activist writing anonymously in *Tygodnik Mazowsze* expressed support for pursuing a long-term strategy:

> each underground activity, independent from its effectiveness, distracts the enemy's forces and its police, which no longer know who to investigate and who to repress……In this way we ourselves are broadening the extent of actual freedom. But what is most important, bonds between people are created, the battle ethos, we gain knowledge about our talents and skills. Any activity, especially mass activity, even when it is modest creates huge capital, which we must permanently protect. There is no place today for asking about the time of victory. It is necessary basically to get used to everyday life in the opposition (Jeszcze jeden program dzisiaj…., *Tygodnik Mazowsze* 1984: 1).

The underground society

Solidarity developed a coherent underground strategy, and the union also wanted to establish a new programme for rebuilding political, economic and social life in Poland. The search for a programme was another recurring issue for Solidarity. A Solidarity activist writing anonymously in *Tygodnik Mazowsze* believed that this search was sometimes a manipulation by the communist government. The PRL government liked to accuse Solidarity activists of

saying only ‘no’ and proposing nothing to society and the country (Jeszcze jeden program dzisiaj…., *Tygodnik Mazowsze* 1984: 1). This activist felt Solidarity was somewhat easily pushed into a classification of having no programme: “They take away from us the right to legal activity, drive us into the underground, aim the barrels of tanks and guns at us, and they say: ‘make a programme!’” (Jeszcze jeden program dzisiaj…., *Tygodnik Mazowsze* 1984: 1). However, this Solidarity activist recognised that the search for a programme immediately after the imposition of military rule came from a spontaneous and authentic call within Solidarity (Jeszcze jeden program dzisiaj…., *Tygodnik Mazowsze* 1984: 1). Solidarity in the underground continued to search for compromise and agreement, which had been a characteristic of the union in 1980-81. The TKK believed that only a government-society compromise could enable Poland to escape from crisis. Moreover, the Solidarity Programme from the First National Congress retained an important influence in the union, but it needed adapting for the repressive conditions of military rule. Bujak wrote in *Tygodnik Mazowsze* in 1982 that the activity of the TKK and Solidarity could be described more as organising discussion of a programme, rather than creating a programme - this task stood in front of them (Bujak, *Tygodnik Mazowsze* 1982c: 1).

The TKK and regional union managements initiated work in programmatic groups, and the concept of the ‘underground society’ (społeczeństwo niezależne) crystallised (Bujak, Lis et al., *Tygodnik Mazowsze* 1983: 2). The TKK produced a few documents in the period 1982-84 that constitute the programme for underground Solidarity. In July 1982 the TKK published the preliminary foundations for an underground Solidarity programme; this document was authored by Zbigniew Bujak, Władysław Frasyniuk, Władysław Hardek, Bogdan Lis and Eugeniusz Szumiejko (Bujak, Frasyniuk et al., *Tygodnik Mazowsze* 1982: 1-2). The June 1984 TKK programme document stated that: “The basic demands of Solidarity are: to free all political prisoners and introduce union pluralism on the factory plant level” (Lis 1984: 16-17). The aim of underground Solidarity was to create organised groups in factory plants and professions - such as teaching, law and medicine (Bujak, Frasyniuk et al., *Tygodnik Mazowsze* 1982: 1). Solidarity thus sought to build structures of social life independent from the government. The union was supported in this task by independent groups of craftsmen, students and farmers. By summer 1982 Solidarity established contact with rural Solidarity in the regions of Rzeszów, Małopolska, Lublin and Białystok (Jak zorganizowała się Solidarność w okresie stanu wojennego, *Tygodnik Mazowsze* 1982: 1). In addition, workers at the Lenin steelworks in Nowa Huta developed

contacts with farmers. Steelworkers went out into the country and helped on farms, and farmers supplied potatoes, carrots, onions and apples at very low prices (Radio Free Europe Research, Polish Samizdat Extracts/2C 1985: 4). Wiktor Kulerski believed that an underground society could lead to the slow disintegration of the communist system and society gradually regaining influence over its fate. According to Kulerski:

> [the underground society] should lead to a situation in which the government controls empty shops but not the market, the employment of workers but not how they make their living, the state mass media but not the circulation of information, printing houses but not the publishing movement, the post and telephone network but not communication, education but not learning. This kind of independent society can in time lead to the authorities controlling only the police and a handful of avowed collaborators (Kulerski, *Tygodnik Mazowsze* 1982: 4).

Underground Solidarity created an independent circulation of information and communication through underground press, radio and publishing (TKK Oświadczenie ws. form i metod działania 1982: 1, Gdańsk ECS archive). In summer 1982, the Solidarity press agency *Informacja Solidarności* was aware of roughly two hundred and fifty different publications in the underground press. The region producing the most publications was Mazowze with fifty-six, Lower Silesia had thirty-one, Małopolska had twenty-five, and Gdańsk had ten (Jak zorganizowała się Solidarność w okresie stanu wojennego, *Tygodnik Mazowsze* 1982: 1). One example of an underground publication was the news bulletin *Z Dnia na Dzień*, published by the Regional Strike Committee of the Lower Silesia region. Its run was about twenty thousand copies and it reached factories in Wrocław and larger towns in the region (Polish Solidarity Campaign News 1982: 4). Witold Pronobis argued that the main function of the underground press was to break the government's monopoly over information (Pronobis 1989: 25). Secret factory plant commissions (TKZs) produced their own publications. Even if they were published rarely and not of high quality, they really buoyed up the morale of workers (Sytuacja w zakładach regionu, *Tygodnik Mazowsze* 1983: 1). In the Wrocław region, factory plant information bulletins included: *Iskra Wolności* from the Pilmet farming plant; *Hydralek* from PZL Hydral industrial plant; *U Nas* from Polar domestic appliances plant; and *Victoria* was a joint-publication by factory plants including Fadroma (Wrocławskie Zakłady Pracy, *Tygodnik Mazowsze* 1983: 4). In 1983 the boss of the *Tygodnik Mazowsze* factory plant information network believed that thirty to fifty percent of workers in the Mazowsze region read the underground press (Sytuacja w zakładach regionu, *Tygodnik Mazowsze* 1983: 1). He explained why workers really cared about the independent press:

> In order to be informed, to know what is happening. It is also a desire to participate; for this reason people read their factory plant newspaper with excitement, even if it does not contain much. Everyone really cares about the information, and activists about instructions, explanations on why we exist and why we are doing all this. There are factory plants where the underground press is read officially in production halls. This is indeed fear being overcome (Sytuacja w zakładach regionu, *Tygodnik Mazowsze* 1983: 1).

The concept of the underground society proved to be a success. Independent publishing and education proved crucial. A Solidarity activist wrote that the underground publishing movement "shapes the consciousness of a generation that will decide the nature of the future Poland" (Przeciw Zniechęceniu, *Tygodnik Mazowsze* 1983: 1). There were hundreds of independent publishers, as well as various independent centres of science, education and culture (Dokumenty TKK and RKK: 1, Gdańsk ECS archive: TKK, TKK 1983). Underground books in circulation included: literary classics; history books; commentaries on politics, economics, philosophy and sociology; and literary criticism of Polish and foreign authors. The underground society also ran classes for school pupils, students and workers (Lis 1984: 9-10, Gdańsk ECS archive). Tadeusz Mazowiecki, who would later become Prime Minister, wrote from his prison cell that it was vital for the future of Polish culture and identity that people understand the truth about their nation. He believed that the fate of Poland's collective life was to be decided by whether people saved the great value that was constituted in August 1980 by the solidarity of workers (Internowani, *Tygodnik Mazowsze* 1982: 2). Adam Michnik believed in the importance of underground publications, and he looked back into history to highlight this:

> The Polish Socialist Party, which he [Józef Piłsudski] led, sought to train Poles in the spirit of independence. How was this done? By the newspaper. By the free, independent, uncensored printed word. A society in captivity must produce an illegal literature because it must know the truth about itself, see an unfalsified picture of itself, hear its own genuine voice. The existence of illegal literature is a prerequisite for the fight against captivity of the spirit (Michnik 1985: 207).

The period 1983-85 saw a flourishing of structures in the underground, and underground Solidarity became professional in its operations (Edward Nowak ECS interview 2008). Underground activity developed in many forms, including theatre, exhibitions and protests. As Solidarity had hoped, people from many different professions and backgrounds became involved in the underground. Solidarity cells were active in nearly all universities and research institutions, and also in many schools and hospitals (Edward Nowak ECS interview

2008). When Michnik was released from prison in 1984, he was very impressed with the development of underground Solidarity: "What I saw after my release exceeded not just my expectations but even my dreams. I found that the people of Solidarity were wise, determined, ready for a long struggle. They possessed clear vision" (Michnik 1985: 85). Michnik praised the wide scope of Polish autonomy that existed outside of the state structures (Michnik 1985: 85). Furthermore, Zbigniew Bujak believed that the boycott of elections and building independent structures were steps on the path to a sovereign society and state (Wywiad z Zbigniewem Bujakiem, *Tygodnik Mazowsze* 1983: 1). An article in *Głos Wolny* in May 1984 affirmed that the TKK was calling for a boycott of the June elections to the Rady Narodowe (national councils) (Wybory-bez nas!: 1, Gdańsk ECS archive: TKK, TKK 1984). A TKK statement in July 1985 also called for a boycott of elections, scheduled for October, to the Sejm (Odezwa: 1, Gdańsk ECS archive, TKK, TKK 1985).

Solidarity still wanted major reforms of the state and economy in Poland, and the link between political and economic reform remained an important theme in the underground period. Adam Michnik and Janusz Onyszkiewicz wrote a letter to Bujak, in which they explained how there was an overwhelming view that the key to getting out of the economic crisis lay in political solutions. Michnik and Onyszkiewicz believed only this could be the premise for overcoming economic catastrophe, ending Martial Law and returning to social peace (List do Zbyszka Bujaka 1982: 1, Gdańsk ECS archive). Bujak also understood the link between politics and economics. He argued that: "The introduction of Martial Law finally proved that an independent trade union cannot operate in an undemocratic country. In order to rebuild an independent trade union, we must first and foremost achieve democratic principles for the functioning of the state" (Wywiad z Zbigniewem Bujakiem, *Tygodnik Mazowsze* 1983: 2). In addition, a Solidarity economist writing anonymously in *Tygodnik Mazowsze* asserted that the key to getting the economy out of crisis was to have a government with political authenticity. He/she stated that only a government accepted authentically by the majority of society, and at the same time effectively controlled by society, could possess an essential attribute - trust (Dylematy polskiego krysysu u progu 1983 roku, *Tygodnik Mazowsze* 1983: 3). Furthermore, Bujak believed that political reform should include territorial self-government, and in the economic sphere there should be improvements to workers' self-management (Bujak, *Tygodnik Mazowsze* 1982b: 1). The

nationwide structures of the Network were torn apart by the imposition of Martial Law, but the idea of self-management stayed alive in the underground.

Military rule and workers' self-management

The Network took time to revive in the underground. The first stage of economic reform activity in 1980-81 had ended, as Solidarity's possibilities for action in the economic sphere were hugely restricted by military rule. At the final meeting of the Network on 11th December 1981, the group was aware that the government may decide to impose military rule. One activist correctly predicted that if this happened, it would not be possible to achieve economic reform (Edward Nowak interview 2013). Edward Nowak noted that: "When Martial Law was imposed, we felt it was our duty to go into the underground and continue our activity. But it was hard to imagine how we could actively pursue economic activity" (Edward Nowak interview 2013). Upon the declaration of Martial Law, the key members of the Network went into hiding or were arrested. After December 1981, there was no longer a nationwide workers' self-management movement based on seventeen 'cornerstone' factory plants. Nevertheless, the idea of workers' self-management did not disappear. In July 1982 the TKK made a policy statement on workers' self-management, which asserted that self-management could not operate without the freedom of political and economic life. The TKK declared that the conditions for the revival of self-management included: freeing interned and imprisoned activists, free trade unions and democratic elections to workers' councils (Stanowisko ws wznowienia działalności samorządów pracowniczych w warunkach stanu wojennego, *Tygodnik Mazowsze* 1982: 2). In addition, a TKK statement in November 1982 argued that a government-society agreement could only create suitable conditions for getting the country out of the economic crisis on the condition that political guarantees would include restoring full self-governance to enterprises (Oświadczenie Tymczasowej Komisji Koordynacyjnej, *Tygodnik Mazowsze* 1982: 1). Further evidence that the idea of workers' self-management still carried influence was an appeal to the Sejm in April 1983. Economists, sociologists and lawyers of various political orientations appealed for all regulations, decrees and decisions that were contrary to the September 1981 self-management laws to be repealed. Signatories to the appeal included the lawyer Ludwik Bar, and Solidarity activists Ryszard Bugaj and Jan Mujżel (Po stronie społeczeństwa, *Tygodnik Mazowsze* 1983: 4).

In the early period of military rule, the vast majority of Solidarity activists rejected the renewal of self-management activity. This happened for various reasons, including a lack of belief in the possibility for positive action in the repressive political climate. There was also a belief in passive resistance as the best strategy in response to Martial Law. Therefore, many Solidarity activists did not want to participate in the weakened self-management structures (Wielicki, *Komitet Oporu Społecznego* 1985: 4). An information bulletin in October 1983 from the ZWUT telecommunications factory in Warsaw reported that apathy prevailed and nobody wanted to be involved in self-management; workers were afraid and they kept to themselves (W Zakładach Pracy Mazowsza. ZWUT, *Tygodnik Mazowsze* 1983: 4). Throughout Poland workers' self-management elections were usually controlled by PZPR-backed enterprise management.

Solidarity's strategy during the early period of military rule was to boycott workers' self-management. For example, in the self-management elections at a Warsaw energy plant in 1983, only fifteen percent of workers returned valid ballot papers (Zakład Energetyczny Warszawa-Miasto, *Tygodnik Mazowsze* 1983: 4). In addition, an information bulletin in *Tygodnik Mazowsze* reported that self-management in the Wrocław region was not operating, as workers believed that the government's limited version of self-management was a fictional organisation. In the elections to the workers' council at the Elwro electronics plant in Wrocław, a huge majority of the staff did not return their ballot cards or crossed out everything on the card (Wrocławskie Zakłady Pracy, *Tygodnik Mazowsze* 1983: 4). In January 1983, the workers' council resigned at the Zelos picture tube factory in Piaseczno (a town near Warsaw) because government restrictions meant that it did not possess any capacities and its decisions were not recognised by management (W Zakładach Pracy Mazowsza, *Tygodnik Mazowsze* 1983: 1). Solidarity's self-management strategy reflected the close link between workers' self-management and the Solidarity union. Solidarity did not want involvement in PZPR institutions, and therefore the union decided to boycott the communist regime's self-management structures.

Revival of the Network

In general, workers abided by Solidarity's boycott strategy, but it is important to note that there was not a complete boycott of self-management activity. Some underground Solidarity factory commissions (TKZs) decided to back self-management, and this resulted in a few

cases of success. There were factory plants in which self-management bodies undertook independent activity, enabling them to exert an influence over pay, bonuses and job protection (Bujak, *Tygodnik Mazowsze* 1983: 1; Samorząd, *Tygodnik Mazowsze* 1983: 4). In the Polcolor factory plant in Piaseczno, from February to June 1982, the director tried several times to diminish the role of self-management, but the workers' council stood firm and took the position that incomplete self-management activity was out of the question (Solidarność w Polcolorze, *Tygodnik Mazowsze* 1982: 4). After a year of military rule, there began a debate in Solidarity about whether a boycott was the best strategy in relation to workers' self-management. A letter from the Wrocław activist Eugeniusz Szumiejko, dated 16th April 1982, revealed some in the Solidarity underground believed that a basis for activity could be the structure of the Network (List Eugeniusz Szumiejki z 16.4.82: 3, Gdańsk ECS archive). In addition, an information bulletin from summer 1982 in *Tygodnik Mazowsze* stated the view of workers from a cable factory in Kraków. The workers thought that it was hard to believe a boycott of self-management would be good for Solidarity and its supporters in the long-term (Robotnicy o samorządzie, *Tygodnik Mazowsze* 1982: 1). Józef Pinior, who was chair of the Lower Silesia Regional Strike Committee (RKS), called for improvements in underground union and self-management structures (Z Ostatniej Chwili, *Tygodnik Mazowsze* 1982: 4). Furthermore, the Network started to revive in the underground. In October 1982, Solidarity at Huta im. Lenina in Kraków began making efforts to regenerate the Network. Permanent contacts were established among a number of steel factory plants including: Huta Warszawa, Huta Katowice, Huta Częstochowie, Baildon in Katowice and Skawina in Kraków (W Skrócie, *Tygodnik Mazowsze* 1983: 1).

There was a division of opinion in factory plants about whether to resume self-management activity. There were numerous arguments against, including concern about the limited possibilities for action. Solidarity knew there was little or no prospect of self-management bodies gaining powers such as appointing the enterprise director or deciding on the enterprise development strategy. There was also the risk of the government manipulating self-management activity, such as by throwing responsibility for the economic crisis onto self-management bodies (Samorząd: czy wznawiać działalność?, *Tygodnik Mazowsze* 1983: 1). The boycott of self-management was effective in many factories, and it contributed to the unity and organisation of workers (Dylematy polskiego krysysu u progu 1983 roku, *Tygodnik Mazowsze* 1983: 3). On the other side of the argument, Lech Wałęsa stated that independent self-management bodies should exist as an important organ of workers'

democracy (Lech Wałęsa 16 XII, *Tygodnik Mazowsze* 1983: 2). Wałęsa believed that workers' self-management was an institution gained through the engagement of thousands of people. Wałęsa viewed self-management as distinguished among other forms of authentic social activity from before Martial Law, and he thought it had preserved several elements of this authenticity in the underground (Wałęsa, *Tygodnik Mazowsze* 1984: 2). Solidarity made the decision to change strategy and adopt a more active approach towards workers' self-management. In January 1983 the TKK defined a programme of activity for the union in the socio-political conditions of the time. The union's underground leadership called on activists in factory plants to fight for Solidarity's existence using all possible forms of pressure. This included using workers' self-management where there was a possibility for action to protect working conditions and defend against repression (Bujak, Lis et al., *Tygodnik Mazowsze* 1983: 2). As noted above, there were already a few cases of success when workers backed self-management, and the TKK wanted to build on this wherever possible. The TKK acknowledged that in factory plants where some independent self-management activity was not possible, the best strategy was for workers to continue the boycott (Bujak, Lis et al., *Tygodnik Mazowsze* 1983: 2).

Solidarity activists and advisers supported the view of the TKK that factory plants should explore the resumption of self-management activity where its composition could be authentic and representative (Samorząd: czy wznawiać działalność?, *Tygodnik Mazowsze* 1983: 1). In 1983 there was thus a shift in Solidarity's self-management strategy, which reflected a general shift in the strategy of underground Solidarity. The union believed it should try to carry out independent activity in those official institutions whose goal was to meet the authentic needs of society. Although Solidarity had to be careful that this activity would not give credibility to the government's dictatorship and propaganda (Samorząd: czy wznawiać działalność?, *Tygodnik Mazowsze* 1983: 1). The idea of using official institutions where possible reflected the approach of Jacek Merkel in 1981. One of Merkel's influences on the Network was to ensure they used Polish legal tools and institutions to broaden the boundaries of people's freedoms (Jacek Merkel interview 2013). Moreover, the State Enterprises and Workers' Self-Management Laws from September 1981 - despite many limitations and reinterpretations due to Martial Law - constituted some kind of protection for workers' self-management (Co nam zostało z reform, *Tygodnik Mazowsze* 1984b: 1; W Obronie Samorządu, *Tygodnik Mazowsze* 1984: 4). Józef Pinior supported Solidarity's strategic shift, as he wanted Solidarity to link underground activity to certain legal activity

(Z Ostatniej Chwili, *Tygodnik Mazowsze* 1982: 4). A member of the workers' council at a factory plant in the Mazowsze region stated that: "For me self-management is a form of legal political opposition" (W Obronie Samorządu, *Tygodnik Mazowsze* 1984: 4).

The periodical *Solidarność* obtained a confidential government letter, which revealed how self-management structures were used for opposition activity. The Department of Organisation and Control sent out a letter on 21st June 1983 stating that sixty-five enterprises in the maritime economy were committed to creating self-management. In forty-eight of these enterprises, self-management was already in operation. The government letter noted concern about some activities in workers' councils, including: motions about pay increases, the suspension of workers' councils as a form of protest, and the use of enterprise radio to stir up protest. There was also reference to certain social and political activities that would normally be done by a trade union (Samorządy, *Solidarność* 1984: 5). In places throughout Poland where workers' self-management bodies were active, they became dominated to a large degree by Solidarity activists. Workers' self-management activity in the underground became intertwined with union activity. It was not possible to exert any real influence over production activity. Nevertheless, workers' councils watched over the distribution of bonuses and tried to prevent favourable treatment towards people working closely with the enterprise director and PZPR (Lis 1984: 13, Gdańsk ECS archive). Workers' councils dealt with social matters, and they tried to influence pay and working conditions. Well-organised workers' councils, such as at the Huta Warszawa plant, tried to establish their own press and radio broadcasts (Sytuacja w zakładach region, *Tygodnik Mazowsze* 1983: 4). This self-management activity was supported by the underground version of the Network.

A meeting of the TKK in December 1983 discussed the reactivation of the Network, and it was decided that the group would continue in the same course of action as before Martial Law (Janas et al., *Tygodnik Mazowsze* 1984: 6; Lis 1984: 8, Gdańsk ECS archive). However, the Network carried out its activities on a smaller scale than in 1981 (Edward Nowak ECS interview 2008). The Network in the underground was a working group that aided underground Solidarity. The new, more limited Network engaged in some underground economic activity (Edward Nowak interview 2013). The TKK stated that the main interest of the Network was researching the social minimum (Lis 1984: 8, Gdańsk ECS archive). This was a continuation of its work from 1981 concerning the minimum income that Polish

families required to meet the costs of living. In an interview in 1983, Zbigiew Bujak stated that: "For the fight against the fall in living standards we will need figures such as……..the social minimum, the biological minimum. Studies on this theme are in the preparatory stage. We are counting here on help from the Network - rebuilding with new principles and new people - which will advise the TKK and prepare materials for factory plants" (Wywiad z Zbigniewem Bujakiem, *Tygodnik Mazowsze* 1983: 3). The Network held a meeting about its work on the social minimum in March 1984, and the group was still represented in some of the great industrial factory plants. This meeting was attended by representatives from Huta im. Lenina, KWK Wujek, Huta Katowice, Fadroma and ZM Ursus (Janas et al., *Tygodnik Mazowsze* 1984: 4). During military rule, the activities and aims of Solidarity and the Network complemented each other. The Network formed a small part of Solidarity's underground society.

Underground Solidarity still believed in the creation of a Self-Governing Republic, which would include self-governing enterprises. In addition, the Network still believed in the key principle of Solidarity, which was to restore free trade unions (Komunikat Sieci, *Komitet Oporu Społecznego* 1985a: 2). In an article in *Tygodnik Mazowsze*, Lech Wałęsa wrote that: "Of course a self-managing system will only be able to operate effectively when it will have support in a strong union movement" (Lech Wałęsa 16 XII, *Tygodnik Mazowsze* 1983: 2). A member of the workers' council at a large factory plant in the Mazowsze region explained how self-management and union activity were intertwined:

> From my experiences, self-management has a chance of being active when it is created by a group of people with real authority among the workforce…….The majority of these people will be former Solidarity activists. Self-management activity gives them the opportunity to maintain their old organisational ties behind a new façade. Solidarity activists who cannot or do not want to engage in underground activity will be able to carry out the same union tasks as before 13th December 1981 (W Obronie Samorządu, *Tygodnik Mazowsze* 1984: 4).

There was no doubt that the presence of Solidarity activists in self-management bodies really mobilised the workforce (W Obronie Samorządu, *Tygodnik Mazowsze* 1984: 4). In 1984 at the Tewa electronics plant in Warsaw, the workforce elected a workers' council in which there was a decisive majority of Solidarity members (Zakłady Pracy Mazowsza, *Tygodnik Mazowsze* 1984: 4). During military rule, workers' councils fulfilled the role of legally functioning bodies of secret Solidarity factory commissions (TKZs) (W Obronie Samorządu, *Tygodnik Mazowsze* 1984: 4).

An information bulletin in *Tygodnik Mazowsze* in March 1984 showed how workers at the Olimpia factory in Łódź strongly supported self-management. Ninety-five workers at the factory protested against the falsification of elections to the new workers' council, including by sending a letter to the government and Sejm (W Zakładach Pracy Regionu Łódźkiego, *Tygodnik Mazowsze* 1984: 4). In January 1985 the Network published a communiqué to inform workers that self-management elections were due to be held in factories throughout the country. The Network wanted workers to take these elections very seriously, especially to those positions deciding on important social matters (Komunikat Sieci, *Komitet Oporu Społecznego* 1985a: 2). The idea of workers' self-management gradually gained momentum in underground Solidarity. Piotr Wielicki wrote in the underground periodical *Komitet Oporu Społecznego* (KOS) in February 1985 that after three years of indifference, self-management once again became a subject of interest for the independent press (Wielicki, *Komitet Oporu Społecznego* 1985: 4). The editors of *Solidarność* also noted a revival of interest from workers and Solidarity in self-management (U Spokojnych Sąsiadów, *Solidarność* 1984: 5). Wielicki noted how there were some authoritative figures in Solidarity who joined in work for self-management, such as the Wrocław activist Władysław Frasyniuk and Henryk Wujec from Mazowsze (Wielicki, *Komitet Oporu Społecznego* 1985: 4). In an interview in 1985, Wujec said that Solidarity had established itself in the underground, and it was now time to adopt a new strategy for defending workers: "I see two different paths for activity. One is through TKZs, which is difficult, but we cannot give this up, and the second is through workers' self-management. The self-management path seems to me at the present time to be more convenient. It is legal and gives the opportunity to draw in a big group of people" (Szansa dla samorządów, *Tygodnik Mazowsze* 1985: 1). Many Solidarity activists agreed with Wujec on the need to search for new means of action, including workers' self-management activity (Wielicki, *Komitet Oporu Społecznego* 1985: 4).

In Warsaw about five hundred factory plants were allowed to have self-management bodies. In ten percent of these factories, self-management operated in an authentic manner, including at two of Warsaw's great industrial plants – FSO automobile factory and Huta Warszawa (Szansa dla samorządów 1985: 2). Independent self-management bodies appeared not only in big cities such as Warsaw, Wrocław and Kraków, but also in smaller towns including Częstochowa, Kielce and Września (Wujec 1986: 3). A report about self-management activity, published in November 1985 in *Tygodnik Mazowsze*, stated that workers' councils

existed in six thousand, four hundred enterprises out of seven thousand, three hundred entitled to have them (Raport o samorządach, *Tygodnik Mazowsze* 1985: 3). Stanisław Kujawa worked in a Warsaw television factory plant, and he got involved in self-management in 1986 with his colleague Andrzej Wieczorek. Kujawa affirmed that they did many valuable activities in the workers' council, such as history courses, holiday camps for kids and distribution of books (Mieszczanek, *Tygodnik Solidarność* 1989: 6). Furthermore, Kujawa explained that from 1986-89, self-management did quite well in fulfilling the role of a union. Kujawa and his colleagues were able to set in motion their first pay rise, as they looked through the enterprise accounts and found one hundred and ninety million złoty unaccounted for. At one point, they were even able to fire the seven-man directorial team, which is noteworthy as it was part of the Network's vision in 1981 for workers' councils to have such powers (Mieszczanek, *Tygodnik Solidarność* 1989: 6).

Solidarity's politico-economic strategy in the underground

During the sixteen months of legal Solidarity and the following period of underground activity, a huge number of people became very interested in the economy (Edward Nowak interview 2008). Solidarity in the underground retained its focus on politico-economic reform and ending the economic crisis (W sprawie gospodarki, *Solidarność* 1984: 2). The PRL government implemented a partial economic reform in 1981-82. This reform was intended to decentralise economic decision-making, but it failed to invigorate the economy (Lipton & Sachs 1990: 106). David Lipton and Jeffrey Sachs argued that: "decentralisation actually increased bureaucratic bargaining, as direct central control was replaced with a plethora of indirect policy instruments that came to be exercised with growing arbitrariness. Enterprises bargained for credits, subsidies, tax reliefs, and access to foreign exchange. The rules in each of these areas changed so frequently that in practice there were no rules" (Lipton & Sachs 1990: 109). The government published hundreds of decrees, which led to new regulations being adopted every day at lower levels of government. This legislative production also resulted from the government's concern to prevent both authentic workers' self-management and the operation of market mechanisms (Po co tyle ustaw?, *Tygodnik Mazowsze* 1982: 4).

Underground Solidarity was concerned about the terrible incompetence of many levels of government. The government made no attempt to carry out even those elements of reform

on which there had been government-Solidarity agreement in 1980-81. The TKK complained that: "the economic administration display passivity in matters such as solving the issues of housing, protection of the environment or stimulating export, and they continuously interfere - contrary to the principles of reform - in the decisions of enterprises, which in general solely increases the chaos" (Uzasadnienie Stanowiska, *Tygodnik Mazowsze* 1983: 2). There was also a general pattern of enterprise income not covering expenditures. Budgetary subsidies were in place for mining, the steel industry and foreign trade (Dylematy polskiego krysysu u progu 1983 roku, *Tygodnik Mazowsze* 1983: 1,3). In 1979-82, industrial production in Poland fell by one-third. During 1982 real wages and per capita consumption fell sharply, to about fifteen percent below the 1978 levels (Lipton & Sachs 1990: 103, 104). Lipton and Sachs drew on data from the IMF, which stated that in 1982 consumer prices increased by 100% and real wages decreased by 28% (Lipton & Sachs 1990: 105). Demand for manufactured and consumer goods significantly exceeded supply, especially in the areas of clothing and consumer durables (Dylematy polskiego krysysu u progu 1983 roku, *Tygodnik Mazowsze* 1983: 1). Poland also suffered from serious shortages of meat and other foods, and food production was supported by subsidies. Agriculture was not able to feed the nation because resources were drained by Poland's economic relations with the Soviet Union (Dylematy polskiego krysysu u progu 1983 roku, *Tygodnik Mazowsze* 1983: 1,3).

Trade patterns instituted by the Soviet Union induced its satellite states to develop large industries to process Soviet raw materials, and then export goods to the Soviet Union (Lipton & Sachs 1990: 82). Józef Pinior (a leader of underground Solidarity in Lower Silesia) believed that the economic agreements signed during Martial Law would lead to Poland becoming a colony - a source of cheap labour and factories for exploitation by the USSR (Z Ostatniej Chwili, *Tygodnik Mazowsze* 1982: 4). Documents obtained by *Tygodnik Mazowsze* from the government's planning commission illustrated how export to the Soviet bloc countries was unprofitable. In the first half of 1983, export trade resulted in Poland paying out twenty-five billion złoty (thirty-two percent of goods were sold at a loss). It was completely unprofitable for Poland to export farming products, light industry products and metallurgical goods (Tajny raport komisji planowania, *Tygodnik Mazowsze* 1983: 1). In the same vein as Pinior, leaders of underground Solidarity including Zbigniew Bujak and Bogdan Lis believed that the way the USSR used Poland's economic potential was taking on features of colonial exploitation. The predatory economy in mining led to the deaths of workers, as well as the devastation of mines and Poland's raw materials. The exploitation of

the Polish economy had terrible effects on the natural environment (Bujak, Lis et al., *Tygodnik Mazowsze* 1983: 2).

Lech Wałęsa argued that: "I believe that the fundamental cause of the [economic] crisis is the government party-state economic apparatus, i.e. un-controlled and un-limited government" (Wałęsa, *Tygodnik Mazowsze* 1984: 2). Solidarity wanted to limit the government's power over the economy, which was a theme promoted by the Network in 1981. An economic statement from the TKK in 1983, drawn up on the basis of studies by the TKK's economic advisors, stated that: "All government activity has been subordinated to restoring the rule of so-called real socialism and strengthening the absolute domination - of no longer even the communist party, but of a narrow group wielding power through the instruments of force" (Uzasadnienie Stanowiska, *Tygodnik Mazowsze* 1983: 1). Solidarity highlighted the injustices of the PRL economic system. In 1983 a Solidarity activist at the ZWUT telecommunications plant in Warsaw explained how the enterprise management were given a twenty-five percent export bonus, compared to three percent for the average worker. These bonuses were calculated in relation to their basic salaries, which further exacerbated the wide differential in earnings between management and workers (W Zakładach Pracy Mazowsza. ZWUT, *Tygodnik Mazowsze* 1983: 4). Furthermore, Solidarity wanted to reduce corruption in the PRL economic system. There existed various special systems of 'rationing' the distribution of high quality goods. The government apparatus and its clients derived personal benefits from this. They also benefited from material privileges in relation to pay, housing, health services, holidays and foreign trips (Uzasadnienie Stanowiska, *Tygodnik Mazowsze* 1983: 2). One of the methods used by government unions for recruiting members was to organise the distribution of scarce and sought-after goods, including luxury food products, washing machines and fridges (Lis 1984: 14, Gdańsk ECS archive). In March 1984 self-management bodies in the Mazowsze region complained about how a few hundred cars were given out for free each year. This was done for a so-called research programme (theoretically people had to check out the installation of a new component in the car). In reality, these cars were handed out on a permanent basis to workers in ministries, communist associations and the police (W Zakładach Pracy Mazowsza, *Tygodnik Mazowsze* 1984: 6).

Solidarity opposed many of the government's economic policies, such as inward investment from the COMECON countries, as well as requisition and collectivisation in agriculture (Kiedy i jak koniec wojny, *Tygodnik Mazowsze* 1982: 2). In 1981 the Network proposed introducing some market elements into the economy, and underground Solidarity was still interested in this idea. A Solidarity economist writing in 1983 suggested that market reforms would bring the following benefits: balance demand and supply; break up monopolistic structures in industry, trade and banking; and allow investment from domestic and foreign private capital. In addition, the economist noted that market reforms would develop the non-state sector (Dylematy polskiego krysysu u progu 1983 roku, *Tygodnik Mazowsze* 1983: 1, 3). Solidarity wanted the introduction of privileges for the private sector (Kiedy i jak koniec wojny, *Tygodnik Mazowsze* 1982: 2). In 1981 the Network advocated the development of the private sector and the creation of diverse forms of ownership. In the underground period, ownership reform was still part of Solidarity's politico-economic programme (Kiedy i jak koniec wojny, *Tygodnik Mazowsze* 1982: 2). The TKK published a programme in January 1983, which included a call for the means of production to be owned by society, ensuring workers' participation in dividing up the income of a factory plant (Bujak, Lis et al., *Tygodnik Mazowsze* 1983: 1).

Solidarity believed Poland should move away from the COMECON trading bloc and towards Western economic integration. Poland was caught in a vicious circle in relation to foreign trade. It was not possible to increase Polish export production because there was a lack of imported parts, resources and materials from the West; and Poland was unable to increase its imports because there was shortage of foreign currency from exports (W, *Tygodnik Mazowsze* 1982: 1). Martial Law ended economic relations with the West, but Solidarity was aware that a Solidarity-government agreement would open the door to renewed relations with Western economies. Solidarity believed that a renewal of economic ties with the West could enable some overseas employment opportunities, foreign investment in Poland, and a solution to the debt problem (Kiedy i jak koniec wojny, *Tygodnik Mazowsze* 1982: 2). Józef Pinior explained that economic exchange with the West had previously enabled Poland to buy the newest technologies and enter into the circulation of international trade (Z Ostatniej Chwili, *Tygodnik Mazowsze* 1982: 4). However, Solidarity was wary about pushing too hard for market reform and Western economic integration. For example, Solidarity knew that International Monetary Fund (IMF) structural adjustments could lead to a restriction of consumption and welfare benefits, price rises, and closure of

unprofitable factory plants (Kiedy i jak koniec wojny, *Tygodnik Mazowsze* 1982: 2). Moreover, there were social and political barriers preventing market reforms; mainly Poland's relations with the Soviet Union (Dylematy polskiego krysysu u progu 1983 roku, *Tygodnik Mazowsze* 1983: 3). Ownership and market reforms were hard goals to pursue during military rule, but the time for these policies would come.

Victory in the 'war of position'

Zbigniew Bujak wrote in 1982 that lying ahead of Solidarity was the fight for carrying out activity in the open, and the union must find forms of activity to enable this (Bujak, *Tygodnik Mazowsze* 1982c: 1). In the early years of military rule, it was not possible to create new conceptions and forms of activity, but circumstances changed in the middle of the 1980s (Edward Nowak interview 2013). For example, Lech Wałęsa won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1983. Władysław Frasyniuk explained the significance of this award in an open letter from Barczewo prison: "This event clearly strengthened the position of the leader of our union in relation to the regime, and his current activity, harmonised with the work of the TKK is becoming the symbol of the connection between open activity and the underground" (List otwarty, *Tygodnik Mazowsze* 1984: 2). The actions of Edward Nowak reflected Solidarity's strategic turn towards more open activity. In the mid-1980s, Nowak observed that Polish people became frustrated with underground Solidarity. The years of underground activity caused people to be tired from all the demonstrations, dismissals from work, internments and prison terms. Nowak and his colleagues realised that using only the conspiracy method of activity was not effective (Edward Nowak interview 2013). Nowak spent three months in prison in 1985, and during this time he decided it was time for a new kind of opposition activity (Edward Nowak ECS interview 2008). In 1986 Nowak drew up a conception for reform called 'wejście na jawność' (way to openness) (Edward Nowak ECS interview 2008). Nowak and his colleagues, including Staniszław Handzlik, began once again to think about the economy (Edward Nowak interview 2013). Poland joined the IMF in 1986, which increased hopes for economic reform. Moreover, Nowak believed the underground education and publishing movement should continue, but there should also be some new activity in the open. This resulted in Nowak and his colleagues writing letters and petitions to the authorities. They held meetings where they openly expressed their views, and they organised an international human rights conference. Open activity took place throughout Poland, including in Warsaw, Gdańsk and Wrocław (Edward Nowak interview 2013). At a press conference in September 1986, Bujak announced that Warsaw region Solidarity would

now operate in the open (Konferencja Prasowa 1986: 1). Solidarity developed structures in the open, in addition to those already existing in the underground, and there were structures operating somewhere in between the two (Edward Nowak interview 2013). Workers' councils were a structure that operated in between the open and underground arenas. It was legal for workers' councils to exist, but as noted above, in some cases workers' councils were used for opposition activity.

By 1987 the communist regime was in decline, and some opposition activity even took place in the PZPR and army (Edward Nowak interview 2013). Solidarity decided to bring its leadership structures out into the open (Documents of the Second National Congress 1990: 8). In October 1987 the TKK disbanded and it was replaced by the overtly functioning National Executive Commission (KKW Krajowa Komisja Wykonawcza). The KKW was chaired by Lech Wałęsa, and comprised all of the members of the TKK and leading activists from regional Solidarity organisations, including Zbigniew Bujak and Władysław Frasyniuk (Komunikat TKK w KKW: 1, Gdańsk ECS archive: TKK, TKK 1987; Documents of the Second National Congress 1990: 8). The first statement of the KKW on 25th October 1987 declared that there was a widespread desire for Poland to become democratic and the economy to function according to market principles (Komunikat TKK w KKW: 1, Gdańsk ECS archive: TKK, TKK 1987). Solidarity had always believed in achieving progress through negotiations with the government. However, the Solidarity programme document in 1984 stated that the possibility of a new formal government-society agreement seemed illusory, even impossible (Lis 1984: 16, Gdańsk ECS archive). In the late 1980s though, underground Solidarity gained momentum and strengthened its position in relation to the communist government. This culminated in a strike wave in 1988, after the government announced price rises (Garton Ash 2002: 370). In April and May 1988, a wave of strikes occurred in several large enterprises throughout Poland, including at Huta im. Lenina in Kraków (Documents of the Second National Congress 1990: 8). Another wave of strikes broke out at the end of August, which included: the mines in Silesia, the steel industry in Warsaw, the port in Szczecin, the Cegielski plant in Poznań, the railway repair factory in Wrocław, and the Gdańsk Lenin Shipyards (RKK Komunikat nr 3, Gdansk ECS archive: TKK, RKK 1988). Workers' self-management bodies took part in this opposition activity, including the workers' council at the Stocznia Remontowa (shipyards repair factory) in Gdańsk. At the end of August 1988, the Stocznia Remontowa workers' council declared that Solidarity had been re-activated on its terrain, with about two thousand members (RKK

Komunikat nr 10, Gdańsk ECS archive: TKK, RKK 1988). The government was under severe pressure, and at the beginning of September 1988 it was agreed that government-Solidarity talks would take place in the very near future (Documents of the Second National Congress 1990: 8).

Conclusion

The identity and strategy of Solidarity evolved as a result of the repressive political environment of Martial Law. The Solidarity union endured many hardships during the seven years of military rule, but it survived and in some ways flourished in the underground. The underground society was a success, and opposition activity included a focus on educational activity and cultural traditions. A resolution from the Solidarity Second National Congress declared that: "It was culture that assured our survival in times of partitions and war. During the Martial Law period independent culture was an essential element in keeping up social resistance" (Documents of the Second National Congress 1990: 34). The union promoted cooperation in Polish society, and underground Solidarity involved a community of people with different views, education and professions all coming together (Edward Nowak ECS interview 2008). Solidarity developed structures outside of the communist system, such as independent publishing and educational groups.

The fate of workers' self-management was inextricably linked to Solidarity. In the early period of military rule, Solidarity organised a boycott of self-management activity. In 1983 the union decided to change its general strategy. Solidarity decided to use state institutions in cases where some independent activity was possible. This opened the way for ending the boycott of workers' self-management. The Network came back to life during the underground period, although its activities were smaller in scale than in 1981. The group still promoted workers' self-management, and it aided underground Solidarity by researching the social minimum. The idea of workers' self-management gradually became more popular in underground Solidarity. Workers' councils took action where possible to defend the interests of workers, such as by watching over the distribution of bonuses, and dealing with pay and social matters. Workers' self-management became intertwined with underground union activity. Workers' councils were used as arenas for Solidarity to conduct a legal form of opposition activity. Solidarity took another strategic turn in 1986-87 by bringing some of its activities into the open. There were also activities, including in workers'

councils, which took place in between the open and underground domains. Workers' councils were involved in the strikes in summer 1988 that brought victory for Solidarity in its long-term 'war of position'. The authority of the government was falling away, and the PZPR leadership agreed to negotiate the end of communist rule.

Chapter 6: Workers' Self-Management during the Politico-Economic Transformation in 1989-90

Introduction

The third empirical chapter analyses Solidarity and workers' self-management from the Round Table talks in February-April 1989 to the privatisation law in July 1990. The changing international political and strategic situation enabled Solidarity to gain in strength, at the expense of the Polish United Workers' Party (PZPR). Gorbachev was willing to allow reform in Central and Eastern Europe, and his one genuine ally among the leaders of these states was General Jaruzelski (Kemp-Welch 2008: 361, 362). It is important to understand how international politics impacted on the course of domestic politics in Poland, which in turn affected Solidarity and the fate of workers' self-management. Solidarity was re-legalised following the Round Table talks, and there began a process of political and economic transformation in Poland. In 1989-90 it was uncertain whether self-management would form part of Solidarity's politico-economic strategy. The fate of workers' self-management would be decided by how Solidarity evolved during the rapid pace of events following the Round Table. The beginnings of democracy in Poland opened up all options for economic policy, and Poland's new leaders opted for a market economy. The rise of market economics brought liberalisation and privatisation to the forefront of economic policy. The Network ceased to exist after the Round Table talks. Nevertheless, a new self-management movement rose up, which promoted the idea of workers' share ownership. The new self-management movement drew inspiration from the Network, such as the awareness of how political and economic reform were linked. Moreover, ideas from the Network continued to have an influence on the politico-economic strategy of Solidarity. The idea of workers' self-management was not as strong as in 1981, but the idea stayed alive due to the link between self-management and the core ideas of Solidarity. The ideas that were of key importance to the union in 1980-81, such as free trade unions and democracy, were not forgotten. Solidarity remained true to its origins as a trade union on the Baltic Coast.

A new political era and the loss of a generation

The Round Table talks heralded the start of a new political era in Poland and a new chapter for the Solidarity union. The Round Table negotiations were held from 6th February to 5th

April 1989 at the Namiestnikowski Palace in Warsaw, and they were attended by a few hundred representatives of various political and social forces in Poland. The two opposing camps at the negotiations were classed as the Solidarity-opposition side and the government-coalition side. There were only two official meetings at the Round Table in the Column Hall, which were attended by fifty-five delegates (twenty-nine from the government-coalition and twenty-six from the Solidarity-opposition) and also three observers from the Catholic Church. The negotiations were undertaken in smaller groups at which delegates to the Round Table were joined by experts in the relevant area (Osiatyński 1996: 30). Delegates from the government side included Janusz Reykowski, Władysław Baka (joint-chair of the Economy and Social Policy Group) and Stanisław Śliwiński. Delegates from the Solidarity side included Bronisław Geremek, Witold Trzeciakowski (joint-chair of the Economy and Social Policy Group) and Zbigniew Bujak. The Economy and Social Policy Group (Zespół do spraw Gospodarki i Polityki Społecznej) contained eighteen delegates from the Solidarity side. This economic delegation was composed of: members of the KKW and Solidarity regional leaderships (including Bujak and Mieczysław Gil); Solidarity advisors and experts (including Ryszard Bugaj and Tomasz Stankiewicz); and the self-management activist Andrzej Wieczorek (Stolik gospodarczy, *Tygodnik Mazowsze* 1989: 4). The Solidarity-led opposition made a series of agreements with the government. Agreements were reached on political reform, economic reform, social policy, union pluralism, and essential changes in various areas of life in Poland. There were also records noting divergent views and conflicting demands. The introduction to the Round Table Agreements noted that: "These agreements are an honest search for anti-crisis and reform programmes" (Wstęp 1989: 2, Gdańsk KK archive, collection: Prezydium KKW, folder: Porozumienia Okrągłego Stołu).

The Round Table talks took place in an uncertain international strategic situation. It was not clear how events in the Soviet Union were going to unfold, but Soviet intervention in Poland's internal affairs was no longer considered an option in Moscow (Prażmowska 2010: 229). Jacek Kuroń supported the Round Table negotiations. The previous chapter noted that after the imposition of Martial Law, Kuroń believed an armed struggle against Soviet rule may be necessary. His view had changed at the end of the 1980s. Kuroń wrote an article in *Tygodnik Mazowsze* in March 1989 in which he opposed an armed revolution, and he stated that this type of revolution would cause ever more ruin in Poland (Kuroń, *Tygodnik Mazowsze* 1989: 1). Kuroń asserted that: "Our duty is to try the process in which all of society will organise itself and change the system gradually" (Kuroń, *Tygodnik Mazowsze*

1989: 1). As a result of the Round Table Agreements, partially free elections were announced for June 1989. The Political Reform Group at the Round Table stated that: "This is the beginning of the path to parliamentary democracy. The task of the parliament to be chosen in the June elections is to create a new, democratic constitution and a new, democratic electoral law" (Zespół d.s. Reform Polityczynch 1989: 4, Gdańsk KK archive: Prezydium KKW, Porozumienia Okrągłego Stołu). Solidarity Citizens' Committees (KO Komitety Obywatelskie) organised Solidarity candidates for the parliamentary elections. Thirty-five percent of the seats in the Sejm and all of the seats in the newly created Senate (Senat) were freely elected. After the two rounds of voting, Solidarity candidates won all of the freely contested seats in the Sejm, and they won all but one of seats in the Senate (Kemp-Welch 2008: 404-405). The greatest electoral support for Solidarity came in the south-east, Wrocław, Gdańsk and Warsaw (Prezydium KKW 16th June 1989: 5, 7, Gdańsk KK archive: Krajowa Komisja Wykonawcza NSZZ Solidarność, Protokóły Prezydium KKW 16.6.1989-5.12.89). The Citizens' Parliamentary Club (OKP Obywatelski Klub Parlamentarny) formed as a grouping of Solidarity-backed candidates in parliament and its president was Bronisław Geremek. Moreover, by June 1989 Solidarity's National Executive Commission (KKW) had thirty-six members, who included Jacek Kuroń, Adam Michnik, Bogdan Borusewicz and Jacek Merkel (Kamiński 2016: www.encyklopedia-solidarnosci.pl/wiki/index.php?title=T02337_KKW_„S"). At a meeting of the KKW Presidium on 16th June 1989, Stefan Jurczak said that Poland had obtained thirty-five percent democracy (the thirty-five percent of freely elected seats in the Sejm), but at the grass-roots there was full democracy. This was because local Citizens' Committees (KO) had established themselves well (Prezydium KKW 16th June 1989: 5, 7, Gdańsk KK archive: Krajowa Komisja Wykonawcza NSZZ Solidarność, Protokóły Prezydium KKW 16.6.1989-5.12.89). Solidarity had gained experience in democracy from the sixteen months of legal activity in 1980-81, which served the union well as the political transformation gathered pace (Jacek Merkel interview 2013).

Staniszław Handzlik described the elections on 4th June 1989 as "the beginning of the end of communism" (Staniszław Handzlik interview 2013). In 1989-90 other communist regimes began to fall in Central and Eastern Europe, such as in East Germany, Czechoslovakia and Romania (Kemp-Welch 2008: 423, 424, 426). In Poland, the communists were counting on remaining in government for a while in the political system established by the Round Table Agreements. However, Poland's political and strategic

situation was evolving rapidly and events overtook the communists. After the June 1989 elections, the PZPR had such a lack of authority in the nation that they were not able to form a stable government (Documents of the Second National Congress 1990: 9). In a meeting of the KKW Presidium, Jacek Kuroń pointed out that the PZPR was divided; for example there was a conflict between General Wojciech Jaruzelski and Prime Minister Czesław Kiszczak. At the same meeting, Bronisław Geremek said that the Sejm was growing in importance, and the Senate was blocking the communist government's plans (Prezydium KKW 8th August 1989: 8, 10, Gdańsk KK archive: Krajowa Komisja Wykonawcza NSZZ Solidarność, Protokóły Prezydium KKW 16.6.1989-5.12.89). The communists had to step down and the Solidarity-led opposition were invited to form a government. The OKP was able to achieve a majority in parliament as it entered into alliance with the United People's Party (ZSL) and Democratic Party (SD), which had been long-time satellite parties of the PZPR (Prażmowska 2010: 230). The former Solidarity advisor Tadeusz Mazowiecki became Prime Minister on 24th August 1989. For ministers in his government Mazowiecki chose people from the Solidarity-led opposition and from other political orientations, including communists (Documents of the Second National Congress 1990: 9). General Jaruzelski remained President of Poland. The Mazowiecki government foresaw much greater changes than had been agreed a few months earlier at the Round Table. The new government wanted Poland to establish a parliamentary democracy, a market economy and Polish independence (Documents of the Second National Congress 1990: 9, 10). The Mazowiecki government received the support of the Solidarity union. Solidarity took advantage of its legal status and the new freedoms in Polish society. Union cells were reorganised or rebuilt in almost all enterprises and institutions throughout the country. There were also elections to union posts at the enterprise and regional levels (Documents of the Second National Congress 1990: 10).

Edward Nowak and other former Network members knew that without reform of the political system, there could be no real economic reform. The reforms proposed by the Network at the beginning of the decade were now achievable in the new Poland. Edward Nowak explained that: "In 1989 when the partially free elections took place, followed by the formation of the Mazowiecki government, we returned to these ideas of a Self-Governing Republic. We had a programme on paper, in our heads, and in our hearts. Martial Law delayed the reforms, but the reforms had to happen for Poland to develop" (Edward Nowak interview 2013). Nowak became a minister in the Mazowiecki government. He argued that the seven years of military rule caused Poland to go backwards at least twenty years in terms

of economic development. In effect, Martial Law caused Poland to lose a generation. The economic situation in 1989 was much worse than in 1981 (Edward Nowak ECS interview 2008). The level of production was lower than in the years 1979-82, while per capita national income was about ninety-five percent of the level in 1978. Poland was terribly indebted at home and abroad (Staniszkis, *Tygodnik Solidarność* 1989: 11; Urbański, *Tygodnik Solidarność* 1989a: 5). According to Staniszław Handzlik, all the communists left Poland was debts, which at the end of military rule amounted to almost thirty billion dollars (Staniszław Handzlik interview 2013). In addition, one third of the population was living below the social minimum (Kaczyński & Szczepański, *Tygodnik Solidarność* 1989: 9). Władysław Frasyniuk argued that workers were in nineteenth century, obsolete factories, with the culture and organisation of work at a nineteenth century level (Kaczyński & Szczepański, *Tygodnik Solidarność* 1989: 8). At a meeting of the KKW in November 1989, Jacek Merkel said that the government had to quicken the pace of economic reform, and Poland had to exit from socialism (Prezydium KKW 28th November 1989: 5, Gdańsk KK archive: Krajowa Komisja Wykonawcza NSZZ Solidarność, Protokóły Prezydium KKW 16.6.1989-5.12.89). In addition, a draft programme on the future of Solidarity, written in December 1989 by the union Programme Commission in the Mazowsze region, stated that radical economic change was the only option in order to give the country a future (Boni, *Tygodnik Solidarność* 1989: 21).

In October 1989 Mieczysław Gil (a leading Solidarity activist from Kraków) described the contemporary situation in Poland as evolutionary-revolutionary (KKW 6th October 1989: 9, Gdańsk KK archive: Krajowa Komisja Wykonawcza NSZZ Solidarność, Protokóły Prezydium KKW 16.6.1989-5.12.89). This is because revolutionary changes were taking place in the political sphere, but these changes were evolving gradually through the Round Table talks and a new Solidarity-backed government; rather than the instant overthrow of the communist power structure. At a meeting of the KKW Presidium in 1989, Jarosław Kaczyńki argued that after the appointment of the Mazowiecki government, groups connected with the previous regime held onto the hope that the course of events could still be reversed (Prezydium KKW 17th October 1989: 8, Gdańsk KK archive: Krajowa Komisja Wykonawcza NSZZ Solidarność, Protokóły Prezydium KKW 16.6.1989-5.12.89). Lena Kolarska-Bobińska and Andrzej Rychard wrote in June 1989 that "there are still powerful forces trying to maintain the system that has existed up until now, i.e. the system of centralised planning" (Kolarska-Bobińska & Rychard, *Tygodnik Solidarność* 1989: 7).

There were circles of middle and low level officials in the power apparatus whose position and privilege would be damaged by breaking the political and economic monopoly of the PZPR (Kolarska-Bobińska & Rychard, *Tygodnik Solidarność* 1989: 7). In 1989 Solidarity once again had to operate in very difficult circumstances. Four decades of communist rule left Poland with a ruined economy, huge debt, technological backwardness and a political vacuum (Documents of the Second National Congress 1990: 31). Solidarity needed to define a new programme to deal with these challenges. In 1981 workers' self-management formed an important part of Solidarity's politico-economic programme. The new Solidarity-backed government again had the option of pursuing self-management activity. After the Round Table negotiations, the State Enterprises and Workers' Self-Management laws from September 1981 came back into effect, and thus employee-elected councils gained influence in the management of enterprises (Oblicki, *Tygodnik Solidarność* 1990: 14; Ost 2005: 211). However, the fate of workers' self-management was uncertain in the new Poland, as free market economic ideas were gaining ground.

The new Solidarity and a politico-economic programme

Solidarity often had to deal with tensions inside the union. This was once again the case in 1989 when workers' councils were able to resume their involvement in enterprise management. For example, a worker at the steel factory in Stalowa Wola (Huta Stalowa Wola) pointed out that their workers' council sometimes came into conflict with the factory plant Solidarity union over matters of common concern, such as calculating the social fund, establishing principles of pay, and deciding on the organisation of work. Conflict was always possible because the trade union had to focus on the protection of workers' interests, whereas the workers' council had to focus on the overall interests of the enterprise (Gutkowska, *Komitet Oporu Społecznego* 1989: 10). There were also tensions between different generations in the new Solidarity. Władysław Frasyniuk recognised that there was some conflict between activists from before Martial Law and the new post-Round Table activists (Prezydium KKW, 16th June 1989: 11, Gdańsk KK archive: Krajowa Komisja Wykonawcza NSZZ Solidarność, Protokóły Prezydium KKW 16.6.1989-5.12.89). A member of the workers' council at Huta Stalowa Wola expressed concern about the young activists in Solidarity who were pushing people to strike (Gutkowska, *Komitet Oporu Społecznego* 1989: 10). At a meeting of the KKW in August 1989, Andrzej Celiński said that a huge divergence of opinions was emerging in Solidarity, and the union leaders were avoiding discussion on this subject (Prezydium KKW 8th August 1989: 12, Gdańsk KK archive:

Krajowa Komisja Wykonawcza NSZZ Solidarność, Protokóły Prezydium KKW 16.6.1989-5.12.89). Furthermore, at the same KKW meeting, Jacek Kuroń said there was a prevailing social dissatisfaction with the activity of the union and OKP. Kuroń stated that the idyll of 1980 was over; people's demands were escalating and Solidarity was bearing full responsibility for what was happening in the country (Prezydium KKW 8th August 1989: 9, Gdańsk KK archive). Frasyniuk argued that people had a feeling of hopelessness, and this was causing apathy. Solidarity and Lech Wałęsa were losing popularity, including in the countryside (Prezydium KKW 8th August 1989: 11, Gdańsk KK archive). One of the costs of entering into coalition with the PZPR satellite parties was a split between Solidarity and Rural Solidarity (Solidarność Rolników Indywidualnych) (KKW 8th September 1989: 7, Gdańsk KK archive: Krajowa Komisja Wykonawcza NSZZ Solidarność, Protokóły Prezydium KKW 16.6.1989-5.12.89). In the rapidly evolving political situation, Solidarity needed to define a politico-economic programme that would unite its membership.

During the sixteen months of legal Solidarity, as well as during the underground period, it had not been easy for the union to define its programme, especially concerning the economy. In July 1989 at a KKW economic seminar in Gdańsk, Mirosław Mironowicz, head of the KKW Politico-Economic Office, stated that Solidarity did not yet possess a well worked out economic programme (Koncepcje wyjścia z kryzysu gospodarczego w świetle przekształceń struktury własności 1989: 1, Gdańsk KK archive, Krajowa Komisja Wykonawcza, Biuro Szkoleń KKW). In 1989 there were questions about how Poland should progress towards a market economy and how to break the state monopoly over ownership (Bujalski, *Tygodnik Solidarność* 1989: 22). In their article in *Tygodnik Solidarność* in June 1989, Lena Kolarska-Bobińska and Andrzej Rychard asked the question of whether large factory plants should be privatised, or only small and medium size plants (Kolarska-Bobińska & Rychard, *Tygodnik Solidarność* 1989: 7). Moreover, Lech Kaczyński believed that the biggest economic problem was how much prices were rising - in such a short time period and on such a large scale (Prezydium KKW 5th October 1989: 11, Gdańsk KK archive: Krajowa Komisja Wykonawcza NSZZ Solidarność, Protokóły Prezydium KKW 16.6.1989-5.12.89). Ryszard Bugaj argued that the essential problem was introducing market prices into a situation where there existed a surplus of demand (KKW 6th October 1989: 9, Gdańsk KK archive: Krajowa Komisja Wykonawcza NSZZ Solidarność, Protokóły Prezydium KKW 16.6.1989-5.12.89). Furthermore, Bogdan Borusewicz felt that the government was adopting too severe economic measures in its efforts to adapt to the requirements of the International Monetary

Fund (IMF) (KKW 6th October 1989: 10, Gdańsk KK archive). The process of political reform meant that Solidarity had more options than ever for its economic policy. However, this reform process again raised the question of how far Solidarity would become involved in politics.

The new Solidarity and the question of politics

In July 1989 Mieczysław Gil called for Solidarity to draw up a position on the basic issues. This was because Solidarity had not carried out any union politics for five months; instead the union had been engaged in the high politics of the Round Table talks and parliamentary elections (KKW 20th July 1989: 8, Gdańsk KK archive: Krajowa Komisja Wykonawcza NSZZ Solidarność, Protokóły Prezydium KKW 16.6.1989-5.12.89). The question concerning to what extent Solidarity should be involved in politics was another recurring issue for the union. In 1980-81 Solidarity struggled to define itself in relation to the political sphere. The union had intended to stay out of politics, but this proved to be impossible. The new Solidarity found the question of entering into politics just as difficult. At a meeting of the KKW Presidium in October 1989, Lech Kaczyński argued that the union was pursuing a policy of abdication by moving away from the idea that Solidarity was a political entity. He said this type of thinking was naive (Prezydium KKW 17th October 1989: 10, Gdańsk KK archive: Krajowa Komisja Wykonawcza NSZZ Solidarność, Protokóły Prezydium KKW 16.6.1989-5.12.89). Mieczysław Gil argued that Solidarity should become a new form of trade union. He stated that eight hundred thousand people from the nomenklatura were still working, and thus Solidarity had to undertake political activity to remove them (KKW 6th October 1989: 9, Gdańsk KK archive: Krajowa Komisja Wykonawcza NSZZ Solidarność, Protokóły Prezydium KKW 16.6.1989-5.12.89). Nevertheless, some prominent Solidarity figures did not want the union to be involved in politics. Ryszard Brzuzy (a Solidarity activist from Bełchatów) believed that: "The union is only the union; political affairs are for the Sejm and Senat - we go there to avoid doing politics in the factory plant" (Kaczyński & Szczepański, *Tygodnik Solidarność* 1989: 9). Frasyniuk disagreed, as he felt that politics was not just taking place in parliament; it was also occurring in factory plants, where workers were fighting against the nomenklatura (Kaczyński & Szczepański, *Tygodnik Solidarność* 1989: 9). However, Brzuzy believed that Solidarity's engagement in politics had damaged the union at the mine where he worked. Brzuzy described how in February 1989 they had a protest involving eight thousand workers. When they decided to end the strike, in order not to disturb the Round Table negotiations, the union's popularity markedly

decreased, and workers said that the union was too involved with politics (Kaczyński & Szczepański, *Tygodnik Solidarność* 1989: 8). In the end, Solidarity's participation in politics was unavoidable. Solidarity led opposition activity, and so the drive for reform could have been interrupted if the union had refused any involvement in the June 1989 elections.

The new Solidarity faced the question of how far it would enter into politics. Citizens' Committees (KO) had formed in order to support Solidarity candidates during the elections, and the union had to decide whether the KO should continue as a political branch of Solidarity. At a meeting of the KKW Presidium in June 1989, there was disagreement about what to do with the KO. Janusz Pałubicki proposed dissolving the KO, and Lech Wałęsa agreed. Wałęsa felt that the KO had already achieved the goal that it was created for, and if the regional structures of the KO were not dissolved, or subordinated to Solidarity, there would be a clash of power between the union and the KO. However, Henryk Wujek reported that at a meeting of regional KO leaders in Warsaw, the majority were in favour of maintaining the movement (Prezydium KKW 16th June 1989: 5-10, Gdańsk KK archive: Krajowa Komisja Wykonawcza NSZZ Solidarność, Protokóły Prezydium KKW 16.6.1989-5.12.89). Jarosław Kaczyński believed that there was a drive from society for creating the KO. He said that Solidarity did not have the right to oppose this, and the union should support the movement (Prezydium KKW 19th September 1989: 6-7, Gdańsk KK archive: Krajowa Komisja Wykonawcza NSZZ Solidarność, Protokóły Prezydium KKW 16.6.1989-5.12.89). At a joint meeting of the KKW and OKP in September 1989, Bronisław Geremek argued that the leaders of Solidarity should participate in the KO, at least symbolically. He pointed out that the movement was growing out of Solidarity (Prezydia KKW & OKP, and KKW general members 26th September 1989: 2, Gdańsk KK archive: Krajowa Komisja Wykonawcza NSZZ Solidarność, Protokóły Prezydium KKW 16.6.1989-5.12.89). In September 1989 there were about three hundred local and regional KO, and they were dedicated to: building local self-government, preparing for self-government elections and cultural matters (Prezydia KKW & OKP, and KKW general members 26th September 1989: 2, Gdańsk KK archive). Lech Kaczyński believed that the activity of the KO would lead to the creation of a Solidarity political party (Prezydium KKW 5th October 1989: 2, Gdańsk KK archive: Krajowa Komisja Wykonawcza NSZZ Solidarność, Protokóły Prezydium KKW 16.6.1989-5.12.89). It turned out that the KO had already played their role, and their importance steadily declined (Glenn 2001: 203-204).

After the formation of the first post-communist government, Solidarity had to decide how closely to work with the administration of Tadeusz Mazowiecki. Michał Boni, who was a leading Solidarity activist in the Mazowsze region, believed that the union should support the government's plan for reform (Boni, *Tygodnik Solidarność* 1989: 21). Broadly speaking, Solidarity did back the Mazowiecki government, but it was hard to balance their support for the government with the desire to defend the interests of workers (KKW 8th September 1989: 6, Gdańsk KK archive: Krajowa Komisja Wykonawcza NSZZ Solidarność, Protokóły Prezydium KKW 16.6.1989-5.12.89). For example, at a meeting of the KKW Presidium in October 1989, Andrzej Milczanowski was critical of how much prices had risen, and he wanted the KKW to publish a statement to this effect (Prezydium KKW 5th October 1989: 9, Gdańsk KK archive: Krajowa Komisja Wykonawcza NSZZ Solidarność, Protokóły Prezydium KKW 16.6.1989-5.12.89). In addition, Lech Kaczyński highlighted the problem of serious shortages in the food market. He proposed demanding an explanation from the government, because it was hard to accept the standard of living falling by fifty percent (Prezydium KKW 5th October 1989: 10, Gdańsk KK archive). At the same KKW meeting, Bogdan Borusewicz expressed mixed feelings on this matter, and he was not sure whether the KKW should distance itself from the government. He believed that the most important work for the government was to balance the budget deficit, and unfortunately this entailed lowering living standards. Borusewicz was not aware of any other possible policy conception (Prezydium KKW 5th October 1989: 9, Gdańsk KK archive). Bogdan Lis pointed out that the government had only been in office for twenty days, and he believed it was too early to push it up against the wall. However, he felt that Solidarity should indicate its autonomy, or the union would be perceived as one group with the government (Prezydium KKW 5th October 1989: 10, Gdańsk KK archive).

In December 1989, Solidarity held consultations with the government about its plans for reform. Borusewicz was not happy about these consultations taking place, because he believed Solidarity had to retain the possibility of withdrawing support from the government's programme (Prezydium KKW 19th December 1989: 4, Gdańsk KK archive: Krajowa Komisja Wykonawcza NSZZ Solidarność, Protokóły Prezydium KKW 16.6.1989-5.12.89). At a meeting of the KKW Presidium on 19th December 1989, there was a split concerning their position on the government's reform programme. In the end, it was decided by majority decision to send an unofficial letter to Mazowiecki expressing the disapproval of the KKW at the government's economic policy proposals (Prezydium KKW 19th

December 1989: 5, Gdańsk KK archive). There was thus some conflict between Solidarity and the Citizens' Parliamentary Club (OKP). Grażyna Staniszewska argued that the KKW and OKP should be partners (KKW 8th September 1989: 9, Gdańsk KK archive: Krajowa Komisja Wykonawcza NSZZ Solidarność, Protokóły Prezydium KKW 16.6.1989-5.12.89). Borusewicz also believed that it was important for the union leadership and Solidarity parliamentary deputies to cooperate (Prezydium KKW 19th September 1989: 4, Gdańsk KK archive: Krajowa Komisja Wykonawcza NSZZ Solidarność, Protokóły Prezydium KKW 16.6.1989-5.12.89). The new Solidarity thus engaged in politics to a certain extent, as had been the case in 1980-81, although the political climate was much changed at the end of the decade. Solidarity was also much changed, as the union evolved over the course of the 1980s. Lech Kaczyński posed the question of whether the KKW needed to fulfil the role of a social movement, as Solidarity had done throughout its existence (KKW 8th September 1989: 4, Gdańsk KK archive: Krajowa Komisja Wykonawcza NSZZ Solidarność, Protokóły Prezydium KKW 16.6.1989-5.12.89).

The identity of the new Solidarity

In the 1980-81 period of legal activity, Solidarity was a trade union and mass social movement. In 1989 though, it was more apt to describe Solidarity as a trade union with some features of a social movement. In an editorial discussion in *Tygodnik Solidarność* on 9th June 1989, Mieczysław Gil said that:

> People are still asking me, what is Solidarity? A social movement, a political movement or a trade union? I reply that Solidarity is society's hope for changing practically everything in the country. What is holding people back? These seven years of suppressing the union, presenting it as a destructive force. This influences the silent section of the population, who withdraw in every situation of conflict, when strikes or riots are breaking out, because this could result in danger (Kaczyński & Szczepański, *Tygodnik Solidarność* 1989: 9).

The years of military rule eroded Solidarity's membership. In 1981 there were ten million members, but in 1989 Solidarity had 2.8 million members (Prezydium KKW 8th August 1989: 13, Gdańsk KK archive: Krajowa Komisja Wykonawcza NSZZ Solidarność, Protokóły Prezydium KKW 16.6.1989-5.12.89). At a meeting of the KKW Presidium in August 1989, Lech Kaczyński said the Solidarity membership was much lower than their expectations. He was pessimistic about whether Solidarity as a trade union had a future (Prezydium KKW 8th August 1989: 13, Gdańsk KK archive: Krajowa Komisja Wykonawcza NSZZ Solidarność, Protokóły Prezydium KKW 16.6.1989-5.12.89). Solidarity did still have

a future. Władysław Frasyniuk believed that: "Solidarity is this: the strongest standing in defence of those who are weaker" (Kaczyński & Szczepański, *Tygodnik Solidarność* 1989: 8). Solidarity had traditionally engaged in two different roles: fighting for workers' interests and fighting for Polish culture and identity. Andrzej Urbański argued that this two-part role became the fundamental ideology of Solidarity - which was a nationwide movement, rather than a class or interest movement (Urbański, *Tygodnik Solidarność* 1989b: 22).

After the Round Table Agreements, it was no longer necessary for all independent social, educational and cultural activities to be organised through Solidarity structures. Nevertheless, Solidarity retained some features of a social movement. For example, at a meeting of the KKW Presidium in October 1989, there was a proposal for the Solidarity regions to take joint action concerning the expanding number of people in poverty (Prezydium KKW 5th October 1989: 11, Gdańsk KK archive: Krajowa Komisja Wykonawcza NSZZ Solidarność, Protokóły Prezydium KKW 16.6.1989-5.12.89). At the Solidarity Second National Congress, the delegates chose to continue to define Solidarity as a trade union and a social movement (Documents of the Second National Congress 1990: 10). Furthermore, at a meeting of the KKW Presidium in August 1989, Wałęsa said that they must create the right climate for a strong union to emerge (Prezydium KKW 8th August 1989: 8, Gdańsk KK archive: Krajowa Komisja Wykonawcza NSZZ Solidarność, Krajowa Komisja Wykonawcza NSZZ Solidarność, Protokóły Prezydium KKW 16.6.1989-5.12.89). Staniszław Kujawa argued that a strong Solidarity in factory plants was vital for maintaining a vibrant civil society (Mieszczanek, *Tygodnik Solidarność* 1989: 7). Moreover, an important shift in the identity of Solidarity concerned the union undertaking economic activity. At a meeting of the KKW Presidium in August 1989, Jacek Merkel raised the issue of Solidarity engaging in economic activity, and in October 1989 he proposed that they create a Solidarity foundation. The foundation would not make a profit of its own accord, and its purpose was to enable the economic activity of factory plant union commissions (Prezydium KKW 29th August 1989: 11; Prezydium KKW 17th October 1989: 6, 7, Gdańsk KK archive: Krajowa Komisja Wykonawcza NSZZ Solidarność, Krajowa Komisja Wykonawcza NSZZ Solidarność, Protokóły Prezydium KKW 16.6.1989-5.12.89). Merkel was appointed as the chair of the Solidarity foundation at a KKW meeting in November 1989 (KKW 8th November 1989: 8, Gdańsk KK archive: Krajowa Komisja Wykonawcza NSZZ Solidarność, Protokóły Prezydium KKW 16.6.1989-5.12.89).

Michał Boni believed that the relationship of Solidarity to economic reform would be the strongest factor in shaping its new identity (Boni, *Tygodnik Solidarność* 1989: 21). Lesław Werpachowski was chief of the training department in Podbeskidzie regional Solidarity. In an interview with Paweł Bujalski, he argued that the task of changing the ownership structure fell to Solidarity. This task required strong pressure from the grass-roots, and it was only Solidarity that could defeat the conservative forces (Bujalski, *Tygodnik Solidarność* 1989: 22). Solidarity wanted to ensure union involvement in the running of enterprises. At a meeting of the KKW Presidium in December 1989, Bogdan Borusewicz reported that a part of the Gdańsk Shipyards was becoming a company, and its supervisory board was made up only of directors. He argued that Solidarity had to create some guarantees, or trade unions would not have any influence in the enterprise (Prezydium KKW 5th December 1989: 3, Gdańsk KK archive: Krajowa Komisja Wykonawcza NSZZ Solidarność, Protokóły Prezydium KKW 16.6.1989-5.12.89). However, there was some disagreement about the role the union should play in this new Gdańsk Shipyards venture. Lech Kaczyński and Bogdan Lis were against union representation on supervisory boards, as this would bring about negative consequences concerning Western capital (Prezydium KKW 5th December 1989: 3, Gdańsk KK archive). In contrast, Władysław Frasyniuk believed that Solidarity must have some economic rights. He asserted that there should be a law to guarantee the right of trade unions to have influence in enterprises, such as a union representative on supervisory boards (Prezydium KKW 5th December 1989: 3, Gdańsk KK archive). Alojzy Pietrzyk supported Frasyniuk. He argued that if Solidarity lost factory plants, it would become a discussion club and not a trade union (Prezydium KKW 5th December 1989: 3, Gdańsk KK archive). Solidarity was in favour of a market economy, but the union wanted to retain some economic influence, rather than give free rein to the 'invisible hand' of the market. In 1981 the Network had called for workers to become joint-managers of factory plants, but in the new Poland the possibility arose of workers becoming joint-owners.

The rise of free market economics

In 1981 the Network argued in favour of bringing market elements into the Polish economy. The Network's ideas on market reform had a lasting impact, as they were still in evidence at the end of the decade. Solidarity's position on economic reform at the Round Table was a compromise between the liberals in its ranks such as Bronisław Geremek, who opted for full marketization and privatisation of the economy, and social democrats such as Andrzej Wiecorzek and Henryk Wujec, who wanted a certain level of state interference in

macroeconomic matters (Stolik gospodarczy, *Tygodnik Mazowsze* 1989: 4). Władysław Frasyniuk pointed out that by comparing the 1980 August Agreements with the Round Table Agreements, it is possible to see a difference in epochs (Kaczyński & Szczepański, *Tygodnik Solidarność* 1989: 9). The 1980 agreements involved compromises with the powerful communist government. In 1989 the communists were in a position of weakness, and Solidarity was able to push harder for reforms. The foundations for the construction of a market economy were laid at the Round Table. The Round Table Agreements stated that supporting competition and efficiency required, among other things, the creation of a stock exchange no later than the beginning of 1991 (Zespół d.s. Gospodarki i Polityki Społecznej 1989: 20-21, Gdańsk KK archive: Prezydium KKW, Porozumienia Okrągłego Stołu). During the Round Table negotiations, the demands of the Solidarity side included a limitation on administration interference in the activity of enterprises, which had been advocated by the Network in 1981 (Stolik gospodarczy, *Tygodnik Mazowsze* 1989: 4). The Network's proposals had also included an anti-monopoly policy and price reform through the introduction of a market mechanism (Sieć statement and additions to the Social Enterprise Bill 1981: 14, Kraków archive: 1 III, tom 098, 1). The Round Table Agreements declared that monopolies were to be abolished and prices shaped by the relationship of supply and demand (Zespół d.s. Gospodarki i Polityki Społecznej 1989: 4, Gdańsk KK archive: Prezydium KKW, Porozumienia Okrągłego Stołu). Furthermore, at a press conference during the Round Table talks, Professor Witold Trzeciakowski, head of the Solidarity economic delegation, argued that the results of the proceedings in the Economy and Social Policy Group were dependent on negotiations in the political and union groups (Stolik gospodarczy, *Tygodnik Mazowsze* 1989: 4). Leading figures in Solidarity were thus still aware of the important link between political and economic reform, which had always been promoted by the Network.

When Tadeusz Mazowiecki took office as Prime Minister in August 1989, he was not able to present any thesis on the coalition government's politico-economic programme. He said that he did not believe in rushing the construction of a programme. It was inevitable though, that Poland would embrace market economics in order to break with the communist past (Prezydia KKW & OKP 20th August 1989: 3, Gdańsk KK archive: Krajowa Komisja Wykonawcza NSZZ Solidarność, Krajowa Komisja Wykonawcza NSZZ Solidarność, Protokóły Prezydium KKW 16.6.1989-5.12.89). Mazowiecki appointed Leszek Balcerowicz as Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance. As noted in Chapter 4,

Balcerowicz and his team worked on elements of market reform with the Network in 1981. During Martial Law Balcerowicz withdrew from public debate and focused on his academic research. He gained the conviction that there was no sense in reforming the communist system; Poland had to introduce capitalism (Jacek Merkel interview 2013). Edward Nowak was elected to parliament in the June 1989 elections. He became a member of a special government commission preparing a package of reforms that became known as the Balcerowicz Plan (Edward Nowak ECS interview 2008). In addition, Jeffrey Sachs was a key figure in the preparations for economic reform. He was an American scholar and he worked with Solidarity leaders including Lech Wałęsa, Bronisław Geremek, Adam Michnik and Jacek Kuroń on Poland's reform strategy (Sachs 1993: 43). In the summer and autumn of 1989, Balcerowicz and his governmental team prepared a radical economic reform in order for Poland to jump to a market economy (Sachs 1993: 43).

In 1981 the Network proposed currency convertibility in order to further Poland's international economic integration. This reform idea was still influential in 1989. Poland's changing international and domestic political situation meant that the Mazowiecki government was able to look towards the international economy. It was agreed at the Round Table that: "A shared aim of the participants at the Round Table is for the healing of the national economy and closer links with the world economy" (Zespół d.s. Gospodarki i Polityki Społecznej 1989: 24, Gdańsk KK archive: Prezydium KKW, Porozumienia Okrągłego Stołu). Pushing for foreign investment in Poland was not a realistic option for the Network in 1981, but this became an important part of economic reform in 1989. At the Round Table talks, The Economy and Social Policy Group stated that the transformation process would be conducive to greater interest from Western investors in placing their capital in Poland (Zespół d.s. Gospodarki i Polityki Społecznej 1989: 24, Gdańsk KK archive). It was agreed at the Round Table that the basis for the normalisation of financial relations with the West could be an IMF adjustment programme, or other programme agreed with international financial institutions (IFIs) and creditors (Zespół d.s. Gospodarki i Polityki Społecznej 1989: 25, Gdańsk KK archive). Solidarity's office in Brussels advocated a programme that would tie foreign aid to structural changes in the Polish economy, thereby opening it up to the world economy (Prezydium KKW 16th June 1989: 18, Gdańsk KK archive: Krajowa Komisja Wykonawcza NSZZ Solidarność, Krajowa Komisja Wykonawcza NSZZ Solidarność, Protokóły Prezydium KKW 16.6.1989-5.12.89). However, there was not universal agreement in Solidarity about market economics.

The proposals of Jeffrey Sachs for a big jump to the market and international economic integration were fashionable, but Marek Gruchelski proposed an alternative economic policy. Gruchelski saw a danger in the fate of the economy being decided outside of Poland. He believed that Poland should carry out reform on its own, without blindly bringing in Western capital (Prezydium KKW 29th August 1989: 7-8, Gdańsk KK archive: Krajowa Komisja Wykonawcza NSZZ Solidarność, Protokóły Prezydium KKW 16.6.1989-5.12.89). Nevertheless, the vast majority of people in Solidarity believed in establishing a market economy. This was reflected in the decisions taken by the new Solidarity-backed government. Balcerowicz planned 'shock therapy' for the Polish economy, which meant that a series of reforms would be introduced together as a 'big bang' transformation to a market economy. There was thus a drive to proceed quickly with reforms. Macieja and Simberowicz wrote in *Tygodnik Solidarność* in January 1990 that: "Lech Wałęsa, the government and parliament unanimously agree that *periculum in mora* [there is danger in delay]" (Macieja & Simbierowicz, *Tygodnik Solidarność* 1990: 4).

The idea of shock therapy built on work carried out by Balcerowicz in cooperation with the Network in 1981. Balcerowicz had argued at that time for reform on a massive scale, in order to ensure a successful economic transformation. Without mass reforms, the process could be reversed later on by conservative forces (Edward Nowak ECS interview 2008). Jeffrey Sachs argued that: "The 'shock therapy' was not something applied as an intellectual construct by Polish technocrats or foreign advisors, and still less something imposed on Poland by the IMF, which was not even present at the formative stages of the programme. The radical reforms resonated with the new democratic leaders, as well as with the economic needs of society" (Sachs 1993: 42). In December 1989, Jacek Merkel attended a consultative meeting with the government about its economic programme. Balcerowicz argued that an anti-inflation drive was essential; without this, hyperinflation would begin in January. Poland had to escape from the economic crisis quickly, or not at all (Prezydium KKW, Gdańsk KK, 19th December 1989: 3). Balcerowicz stated that the government had to stabilise the prices of basic goods, raise the exchange rate, and balance the budget. In addition, there must be a strict ratio of pay to price rises (Prezydium KKW, Gdańsk KK, 19th December 1989: 3). Sejm proceedings from 27th-29th December 1989 involved debating and voting on eleven bills. These bills concerned economic reform and protection for society against some of the harsher effects from economic restructuring. The bills passed into law on 1st January 1990,

thereby establishing a new economic order in Poland (Macieja & Simbierowicz, *Tygodnik Solidarność* 1990: 4). One of the laws passed was on banking, which enabled foreign banks to establish themselves in Poland (*Dziennik Ustaw* 1989, Nr. 74 poz. 439: 1120). A law on credits set out provisions for treating all economic sectors equally (*Dziennik Ustaw* 1989, Nr. 74, poz. 440: 1122). A foreign currency law was passed, and a law about economic activity involving foreign entities (Macieja & Simbierowicz, *Tygodnik Solidarność* 1990: 4). There was also liberalisation of the price and trade systems, and new financial institutions were created (Berg & Blanchard 1994: 52; Bruno 1994: 24).

Workers' self-management was down but not out

Workers' self-management was not an important part of the new Solidarity's politico-economic strategy, and the Network no longer existed to promote the idea. In the underground, the Network was a small part of the underground society, but the group did not come back to life after the end of military rule. Workers' self-management was the key feature of the Network project in 1981. Authentic self-management was never implemented, due to the communists' tight control of the economy throughout the 1980s. The Network programme had planned for economic reform in a socialist economy, but socialism was falling away fast in 1989. In an interview in June 1989, Staniszław Kujawa said that: "I think self-management has played its role. What role does it have to play now - I do not know; this will become clear" (Mieszczanek, *Tygodnik Solidarność* 1989: 6). Although workers' self-management was no longer at the forefront of economic reform, the idea still had some support in Polish society. Workers' self-management was not ideally suited to a market economy, but it could still potentially play a role in Poland's new economic order.

The National Self-Government Forum (Krajowy Forum Samorządu Załogi) and the Gdańsk Self-Government Club (Gdański Klub Samorządu) supported workers' self-management. The second meeting of the Self-Government Forum took place in January 1989 at the Dolmel factory plant in Wrocław, and it was attended by representatives of workers' councils and their guests. An accompanying event to the Forum was the first general meeting of the Association of Workers' Self-Management Activists (Stowarzyszenie Działaczy Samorządu Pracowniczego), during which Andrzej Wieczorek was elected chairman (Dorota 1989: 2). Wieczorek worked in a Warsaw television factory plant, and as noted above he represented Solidarity at the Round Table. The Solidarity-opposition side at the Round Table wanted to

create the conditions for the free organisation of the self-management movement. They called for the activity of the Association of Workers' Self-Management Activists to be supported in order to further the cause of authentic workers' self-government (Zespół d.s. Gospodarki i Polityki Społecznej 1989: 17, Gdańsk KK archive: Prezydium KKW, Porozumienia Okrągłego Stołu). The Association was linked to self-management centres in Gdańsk, Szczecin, Poznań, Wrocław and Warsaw (Krankowski & Kaczmarek 1988, Gdańsk KK archive: Solidarność Region Gdański, Dział Informacji, Zrzeszenie Kaszubsko-Pomorskie). The Association did not operate on such a large scale as the Network in 1981, but its activities showed how self-management still had support in Poland.

The Gdańsk Self-Government Club called on self-management supporters to present a comprehensive reform project, including changes in the political, economic and legal domains (Krankowski & Kaczmarek 1988, Gdańsk KK archive). In the same vein as the Network, the new self-management movement knew how political and economic reform were linked. The main resolution from the second meeting of the National Self-Government Forum stated that the fate of self-management depended on a democratic environment (Dorota, *Tygodnik Mazowsze* 1989: 2). The Gdańsk Self-Government Club designed its own bill on the Self-Governing Enterprise (Przedsiębiorstwo Samorządowe). The Club were thus conducting the same type of activity as the Network, which drew up draft laws in 1981. The Self-Governing Enterprise Bill drew on ideas from the Network's Social Enterprise Bill. For example, a self-governing enterprise was to be self-financing, and the workers' council was to make decisions including the appointment and dismissal of the enterprise director (Koncepcje wyjścia z kryzysu gospodarczego w świetle przekształceń struktury własności 1989: 10-11, Gdańsk KK archive: Krajowa Komisja Wykonawcza, Biuro Szkoleń KKW).

Workers' self-management had some support in Solidarity parliamentary circles. At a meeting of the KKW in September 1989, Antoni Stawikowski said that after the Citizens' Committee was dissolved in Toruń, a workers' self-government movement appeared at the parliamentary office (KKW 8th September 1989: 7, Gdańsk KK archive: Krajowa Komisja Wykonawcza NSZZ Solidarność, Protokóły Prezydium KKW 16.6.1989-5.12.89). In addition, Władysław Frasyniuk still supported workers' self-management in 1989. Frasyniuk however, foresaw a different kind of self-management activity. He believed Solidarity, rather than workers' councils, should joint-manage enterprises (Kaczyński &

Szczepański, *Tygodnik Solidarność* 1989: 8). Ryszard Szymański disagreed with this conception of self-management; he advocated self-management as separate from the union (Kaczyński & Szczepański, *Tygodnik Solidarność* 1989: 8, 9). The Network had wanted self-management to be separate from the union, but the group always promoted cooperation between workers' councils and Solidarity. After the Round Table talks, the union and workers' council at Huta im. Lenina in Kraków (one of the former 'cornerstones' of the Network) once again worked in partnership (Staniszław Handzlik interview 2013).

At the Round Table, there was even some support from the government side for self-management, as had been the case in 1981. Władysław Baka, head of the government's economic delegation, was in favour of economic self-government; in contrast to Mieczysław Wilczek (Minister of Industry) who was against trade unions and self-government (Stolik gospodarczy, *Tygodnik Mazowsze* 1989: 4). The agreements from the Round Table Economy and Social Policy Group stated that the transformation leading to a new economic order must include the development of self-government and workers' participation (Zespół d.s. Gospodarki i Polityki Społecznej 1989: 15, Gdańsk KK archive: Prezydium KKW, Porozumienia Okrągłego Stołu). The Solidarity-opposition side wanted to create national workers' self-management representation, which was an idea debated by the Network in 1981 (Zespół d.s. Gospodarki i Polityki Społecznej 1989: 17, Gdańsk KK archive). The Economy and Social Policy Group demanded the removal of the direct and indirect limitations to the capacities of workers' self-management, which were introduced during Martial Law (Zespół d.s. Gospodarki i Polityki Społecznej 1989: 16, Gdańsk KK archive). The Economy and Social Policy Group also wanted to create the legal basis to ensure staff authentic forms of participation in the management of: research and development institutes, companies with communal ownership, Polish national railways (PKP), the Polish national airline (LOT) and airports (Zespół d.s. Gospodarki i Polityki Społecznej 1989: 17, Gdańsk KK archive).

The Health Sub-Group at the Round Table also supported workers' self-management. Participants in this sub-group from the Solidarity side included Ewa Wolak and Edmund Wnuk-Lipiński. The Solidarity side criticised a government project for reform of the health service because there were no clear guidelines on self-management. In the end the government's project was completely rejected. Those representing Solidarity felt that

without self-management being given full entitlements, it was not possible to reform the health service (Informacja nr 26 1989: 2, Gdańsk KK archive: Prezydium KKW, Porozumienie Okrągłego Stołu. Komitet organizacyjny do okrągłego stołu przy przewodniczących Lechu Wałęsie. Informacje). Furthermore, in the Mining Sub-Group (Podzespół do spraw Górnictwa) there was a disagreement between the government and Solidarity sides. The Solidarity-opposition side believed that brown coal mines should not have the status of public utility companies, thereby restricting the capacities of self-management bodies in these enterprises (Podzespół d.s. Górnictwa 1989: 2, Gdańsk KK archive: Prezydium KKW, Porozumienia Okrągłego Stołu). The Economy and Social Policy Group appointed groups of experts to look into reform of the mining industry. The experts were to be guided by the fundamental principles of economic reform in Poland, which entailed the creation of self-financing, independent mining enterprises and authentic workers' self-government. The Network had always advocated this type of independent enterprise.

In 1981 the Network wanted to restrict the number of enterprises defined in the self-management laws as being of vital economic importance (thereby limiting the capacities of self-management bodies). This idea still resonated in Solidarity, and it was agreed at the Round Table to reduce by at least half the number of enterprises classed as vitally important (Zespół d.s. Gospodarki i Polityki Społecznej 1989: 17, Gdańsk KK archive: Prezydium KKW, Porozumienia Okrągłego Stołu). In addition, the Solidarity-opposition side called for a law about the stabilisation of the national economy from 24th February 1989 to be repealed. This law made enterprise directors dependent on state bodies, which is something the Network fought against (Zespół d.s. Gospodarki i Polityki Społecznej 1989: 16, Gdańsk KK archive). The Gdańsk Self-Government Club and the National Self-Government Forum also opposed the February 1989 law. The Self-Government Forum described it as another government attempt to return to the Stalinist model of centralised economic management (Dorota 1989: 2).

The transformation to a new economic order required abolishing the system of ordered distribution and limiting the role of the state. The Round Table Agreement established that the state was only to shape policy through exercising certain economic instruments, as the Network proposed in 1981 (Zespół d.s. Gospodarki i Polityki Społecznej 1989: 15, Gdańsk

KK archive: Prezydium KKW, Porozumienia Okrągłego Stołu). At the Round Table, it was agreed that state interference in enterprises would be limited to essential regulation, such as the protection of working conditions, the natural environment and health (Zespół d.s. Gospodarki i Polityki Społecznej 1989: 20, Gdańsk KK archive). Furthermore, the Solidarity side made comments on a new version of the government 'social contract' project. Jan Mujżel (a professor in the economic institute of the Polish Academy of Sciences) asked why the abolition of administration interference in setting prices was to be pushed back for years, because this was crucial for the operation of the market mechanism (Informacja nr 24 1989: 2, Gdańsk KK archive: Prezydium KKW, Porozumienie Okrągłego Stołu. Komitet organizacyjny do okrągłego stołu przy przewodniczących Lechu Wałęsie. Informacje). Ryszard Bugaj wanted to know why the social contract project made no mention of the de-politicisation of enterprises and the abolition of the nomenklatura (Informacja nr 24 1989: 2, Gdańsk KK archive). The Network had always fought against the privileges of the nomenklatura. The Solidarity-opposition side argued that abolishing the nomenklatura system was a condition for the success of the political and economic reforms, and an essential factor in the mobilisation of society (Zespół d.s. Reform Polityczynch 1989: 4, Gdańsk KK archive: Prezydium KKW, Porozumienia Okrągłego Stołu).

The government-coalition side at the Round Table did not agree to abolish the nomenklatura, as this privileged class was made up of the government's allies. The Solidarity-opposition side wanted to prevent the nomenklatura from exerting influence over appointments to management positions in enterprises; the government side did not support this Solidarity demand (Zespół d.s. Gospodarki i Polityki Społecznej 1989: 22, Gdańsk KK archive: Prezydium KKW, Porozumienia Okrągłego Stołu). In an interview in April 1989, Staniszław Kujawa described how the level of middle management at his Warsaw television plant was still populated by people from the Stalinist era. He said that his colleagues from the workers' council often suggested to the director who should be fired, but these people would mobilise their contacts in society in order to keep their jobs (Mieszczanek, *Tygodnik Solidarność* 1989: 7). Furthermore, Solidarity was worried about a negative feature of the communist apparatus fading away: the appearance of nomenklatura companies. This economic activity was not being driven by the market, but rather by the nomenklatura taking advantage of their positions to gain control of state assets (Staniszkis, *Tygodnik Solidarność* 1989: 11). Maciej Jankowski called this phenomenon 'red capitalism'. He said that the nomenklatura was transforming into capitalists without capital (Kaczyński & Szczepański, *Tygodnik*

Solidarność 1989: 8). Some employees of the state administration were moving national property into cooperatives and social organisations. At a meeting of the KKW Presidium in October 1989, it was decided that this nomenklatura practice must be stopped. The KKW issued a demand to ensure the return of all property that had been appropriated (land, flats, cars etc.) (Prezydium KKW 24th October 1989, Gdańsk KK archive: Prezydium KKW, Protokóły Prezydium KKW 16.6.1989-5.12.89). Bogdan Lis argued that Solidarity should call for the liquidation of nomenklatura companies (Prezydium KKW 5th October 1989: 11, Gdańsk KK archive: Prezydium KKW, Protokóły Prezydium KKW 16.6.1989-5.12.89). Jankowski believed that Solidarity was the sole organised social force who could stand up to the nomenklatura (Kaczyński & Szczepański, *Tygodnik Solidarność* 1989: 8). Solidarity wanted to ensure that the nomenklatura would not transform from being the dominant class in the communist system to a dominant capitalist class.

The Round Table Agreements stated that the selection of management in factory plants should be carried out according to criteria of expert competency (Zespół d.s. Gospodarki i Polityki Społecznej 1989: 15, Gdańsk KK archive: Prezydium KKW, Porozumienia Okrągłego Stołu). This was an important point, and it can be traced to the Gdańsk Shipyards MKS twenty-one demands, as well as to the Network. The Round Table Agreements also demanded that the freedom to choose an enterprise director and his/her deputies must not be limited by opinions or recommendations from social and political organisations (Zespół d.s. Gospodarki i Polityki Społecznej 1989: 22, Gdańsk KK archive: Prezydium KKW, Porozumienia Okrągłego Stołu). This again shows the lasting impact of the Network's ideas, as the group wanted to prevent social and political organisations from exerting influence in enterprises. In addition, the Network always fought against privileges and corruption in the economy. In the Agriculture Sub-Group at the Round Table (Podzespół ds. Rolnictwa), the Solidarity side expressed regret that no agreement was reached on abolishing companies with economic privileges. This concerned companies such as Igloopol, which was a farming and industrial factory plant in Dębica. The director was Edward Brzostowski, and he obtained particular privileges and allowances because he was a junior minister in the agricultural ministry (Informacja nr 25 1989: 7, Gdańsk KK archive: Prezydium KKW, Porozumienie Okrągłego Stołu. Komitet organizacyjny do okrągłego stołu przy przewodniczących Lechu Wałęsie. Informacje).

At a meeting of the KKW Presidium in September 1989, Jacek Merkel argued that the next field of conflict between Solidarity and the PZPR would be in factory plants. At the steel plant in Stalowa Wola, Ryszard Szymański said that the directors were giving themselves bonuses of about two hundred thousand złoty. Szymański and his Solidarity colleagues protested, and the directors agreed to reduce their bonuses (Kaczyński & Szczepański, *Tygodnik Solidarność* 1989: 8). Władysław Frasyniuk believed that Solidarity now had the chance to fight for truly independent enterprises (Prezydium KKW 19th September 1989: 5, Gdańsk KK archive: Prezydium KKW, Protokóły Prezydium KKW 16.6.1989-5.12.89). Solidarity still valued the reform ideas promoted by the Network in 1980-81, such as: the creation of market mechanisms (eg. for the price system); the restriction of state intervention to shaping policy through economic instruments (taxes, credits, environmental regulations etc.); the removal of privileges from the nomenklatura; and an end to corruption. It is important to note that the Network was one source of these reform proposals. Market reforms and the removal of the nomenklatura were also promoted by other groups in Poland, such as Leszek Balcerowicz and his colleagues, and foreign economic advisors, including David Lipton and Jeffrey Sachs (Balcerowicz 1992: 11-14; Lipton & Sachs 1990: 100). Lipton and Sachs believed that Poland and the other Central and East European states needed to: "create market competition, based on the deregulation of prices, free trade, the full liberalisation of the private sector, and the de-monopolisation of the state sector" (Lipton & Sachs 1990: 100). The Round Table Agreements in Poland led to a weakening of political domination over the economy, which had been a key feature of Stalinism and the Soviet system (Kolarska-Bobińska & Rychard, *Tygodnik Solidarność* 1989: 7). A major question for the Solidarity-backed government of Tadeusz Mazowiecki was who would become the owners of national property in the new economic system.

Ownership reform and workers' share ownership

On 28th July 1989, the KKW's Politico-Economic Office and Training Office organised a seminar in Gdańsk on the transformation of ownership structures in various economic reform projects. The participants in the discussions included representatives from at least a dozen Solidarity regions. During this seminar, Mirosław Mironowicz, head of the KKW Politico-Economic Office, said that: "The fundamental economic problem, on which depends the possibility of Poland escaping from economic crisis, is not changing the form of *management* of the national economy, but changing the form of *ownership* of national property" (Koncepcje wyjścia z kryzysu gospodarczego w świetle przekształceń struktury

własności 1989: 1, Gdańsk KK archive: Krajowa Komisja Wykonawcza, Biuro Szkoleń KKW). The Network recommended ownership reforms in 1981, as the group proposed the creation of cooperatives, joint-stock companies and communal enterprises. At the Round Table, the Solidarity side argued for a constitutional separation between communal property and state ownership, which would bring an end to the communist system of universal state ownership (Grupa Robocza d.s. Samorządu Territorialnego Załącznik nr 2 1989, Gdańsk KK archive: Prezydium KKW, Porozumienia Okrągłego Stołu). Furthermore, in discussions on economic reform, the question arose of whether workers could become property owners. This went a step further than what the Network proposed in 1981. In 1989 the idea of workers' share ownership (akcjonariat pracowniczy) gained prominence. Workers' share ownership, often referred to as workers' ownership (własność pracownicza), has certain features in common with workers' self-management. Both ideas promote workers' control and influence over enterprise activities. Workers' ownership can be viewed as a new version of workers' self-management. However, it is important to note that workers' ownership does not always lead to employees gaining more influence in their enterprises. Jacek Tittenbrun explained that workers' ownership may not result in workers gaining real ownership of capital; instead workers may only gain nominal ownership of capital in privatised companies (Tittenbrun 2005: 2). - This occurs when shares are unevenly distributed between enterprise management and workers, thereby giving management much greater dividend income as well as key decision-making powers (Tittenbrun 2005: 2-4).

Poland had a history of workers' self-management activity, and this was also true for workers' ownership. The idea of workers' share ownership emerged at the start of the twentieth century, among other places in Poland, England and France. In 1912 the Gazolina enterprise was founded in Lwów, and it was a workers' share ownership enterprise (Gadomski, *Tygodnik Solidarność* 1989: 15). In an article in *Tygodnik Solidarność* in October 1989, Stefan Kurowski described the idea of workers' ownership as a means of achieving social justice in an individualist capitalist system (Kurowski, *Tygodnik Solidarność* 1989: 14). At the Solidarity First National Congress in 1981, Kurowski had put forward a rival economic programme to that of the Network. In 1989 though, Kurowski was on the same side as many self-management activists in advocating workers' ownership. Kurowski believed that: "the idea of workers' ownership is worth supporting as an attempt to find that Third Way between socialist collectivism and monopolistic capitalism by respecting the principles of private ownership and individual freedom" (Kurowski, *Tygodnik*

Solidarność 1989: 14). In 1989 the Self-Governing Enterprise Bill foresaw workers buying shares in their enterprises (Koncepcje wyjścia z kryzysu gospodarczego w świetle przekształceń struktury własności 1989: 11, Gdańsk KK archive: Krajowa Komisja Wykonawcza, Biuro Szkoleń KKW). This bill drew on ideas from the Network's social enterprise project, but it also took into account the new possibilities for economic activity, i.e. the prospect of workers gaining ownership rights in their enterprises. Moreover, a conception for workers' share ownership was developed in the Economics of Industrial Enterprises department (Katedra Ekonomiki Przedsiębiorstw Przemysłowych) at the Warsaw School of Economics (SGPiS). The SGPiS conception for workers' share ownership involved workers owning their factory plant, or a significant part of it, and there would be measures undertaken towards the creation of a stock market (Górski 1989: 5, Gdańsk KK archive: Biuro Organizacyjne KKW, prasa krajowa–gospodarka polska–wycinki prasowe). Furthermore, the most important theme during discussions at the second meeting of the National Self-Government Forum was the proposed changes to ownership structures in the future model of the economy. Participants at the Forum decided markedly in favour of societal ownership, making workers the joint-owners of their factory plants (Dorota, *Tygodnik Mazowsze* 1989: 2).

The Round Table Agreement set Poland on course for large-scale privatisation. The Agriculture Sub-Group at the Round Table called for the far-reaching privatisation of agriculture as an essential condition for improving the farming industry and creating a market in the buying and selling of food products. It was also recommended that some processing plants, shops and servicing plants should be sold to the private sector (Podzespół ds. Rolnictwa 1989: 4, Gdańsk KK archive: Prezydium KKW, Porozumienia Okrągłego Stołu). Jacek Merkel believed it was necessary to create an office for re-privatisation, subordinate to the Sejm (Prezydium KKW 19th December 1989: 3, Gdańsk KK archive: Prezydium KKW, Protokóły Prezydium KKW 16.6.1989-5.12.89). Lech Wałęsa argued that the fundamental tasks of Prime Minister Mazowiecki included carrying out privatisation and finally enabling people from the town and countryside to become property owners (Prezydium KKW 19th September 1989: 3, Gdańsk KK archive: Prezydium KKW, Protokóły Prezydium KKW 16.6.1989-5.12.89).

The new self-management movement supported ownership reform through a combination of privatisation and societal ownership. In an article in *Tygodnik Solidarność* in December 1989, the union adviser Jadwiga Staniszkis noted that supporters of workers' self-management in the Solidarity parliamentary club (OKP) were backing privatisation in the form of workers' share ownership (Staniszkis, *Tygodnik Solidarność* 1989: 11). The economist and Solidarity expert Jan Szomburg wanted privatisation and individual ownership rights. Szomburg and Janusz Lewandowski came up with a conception for introducing share vouchers and giving them out to all employees. The vouchers would be used to buy shares on the stock market. This would create widespread ownership and a mass capital market (Koncepcje wyjścia z kryzysu gospodarczego w świetle przekształceń struktury własności 1989: 6, Gdańsk KK archive: Krajowa Komisja Wykonawcza, Biuro Szkoleń KKW). In October 1989, Krzysztof Ludwiniak visited Poland to study the possibility of setting up an investment bank, which would be involved in financing workers' share ownership. Ludwiniak was director of international operations for a company called ESOP-services (Gadomski, *Tygodnik Solidarność* 1989: 15). In an interview published in *Tygodnik Solidarność*, Ludwiniak said that many Western companies were interested in investing in Poland. He also pointed out that the American government was giving about a hundred million dollars of support to the Polish private sector (Gadomski, *Tygodnik Solidarność* 1989: 15). The question of how to proceed with privatisation was a really difficult one for Solidarity and the government (Jacek Merkel interview 2013).

Krzysztof Lis was a government minister, and he was appointed head of a special department dealing with ownership transformation called the Agencja d.s. Przekształceń Własnościowych, which was linked to the Ministry of Finance. On 2nd March 1990, he attended an open meeting of Mazowsze region Solidarity, which turned into a bitter dispute about how to privatise Polish enterprises. The position of Solidarity in this matter was still crystallising. Professor Jan Mujżel argued that the procedure for ownership transformation should be democratic, and he backed workers' share ownership (Kowalczyk, *Tygodnik Solidarność* 1990: 14). Michał Boni, the leader of Mazowsze region Solidarity, argued against workers' ownership (Kowalczyk, *Tygodnik Solidarność* 1990: 14). There were also discussions about the privatisation bill prepared by Lis, which had already been sent to the Sejm (Oblicki, *Tygodnik Solidarność* 1990: 14). The conception for privatisation in this bill gave ownership rights to the state Treasury (Skarb Państwa). Enterprises were to be transformed into joint-stock companies, in which all shares would be owned by the Treasury,

until the time came for making shares available to private buyers (Oblicki, *Tygodnik Solidarność* 1990: 14). Solidarity activists pointed out that this form of privatisation would mean that workers lose their influence over enterprise management. Lis defended himself by saying that enterprises were the property of the state, not the workers in an enterprise (Kowalczyk, *Tygodnik Solidarność* 1990: 14). This was a revealing statement, and it showed that the Ministry of Finance believed in a centralised conception for privatisation. The view of Lis that the state owned all enterprises was not universally accepted. Marcin Oblicki argued that the September 1981 State Enterprises and Workers' Self-Management laws gave some ownership rights to staff representatives in enterprises (Oblicki, *Tygodnik Solidarność* 1990: 14). Oblicki's interpretation of the self-management laws is questionable, but he correctly observed that the state of ownership laws was confused (*Dziennik Ustaw* Nr. 24, poz. 123, p.271-275; Oblicki, *Tygodnik Solidarność* 1990: 14).

The government conception for privatisation foresaw that shares would be made available to private buyers, and Poland's finance industry would buy them up. However, there was not only opposition to the government privatisation plan from self-management activists, but also from financial circles. For example, Waldemar Szczepanek was chair of the Tebos company and organiser of the first capital market in Poland. He argued that: "Privatisation does not need state supervision" (Oblicki, *Tygodnik Solidarność* 1990: 14). At the Solidarity Second National Congress in April 1990, the union did not outline its own conception for privatisation. Nevertheless, Solidarity demanded the prompt transfer of state assets to other ownership models. The union believed that economic reform should lead to diverse forms of ownership, and workers should have the opportunity to become shareholders (Documents of the Second National Congress 1990: 19). On 13th July 1990 the Mazowiecki government enacted a law on the Privatisation of State Enterprises. This established a centralised process for privatisation, rather than the authentic social ownership that self-management activists were hoping for. The law stated that enterprises could be privatised through transformation into private companies or liquidation – whereby enterprises (or parts of them) could be sold off (*Dziennik Ustaw*, Nr. 51, poz. 298: 695-700). In 1981 the Network did not succeed in passing its Social Enterprise Bill through parliament, and the 1990 privatisation law was another disappointment for the self-management movement. Nevertheless, in the same way as the 1981 self-management laws were not a complete disappointment, neither was the 1990 privatisation law. – This law offered some scope for workers to gain ownership rights in enterprises. Article 24 of the law stated that in companies transformed from state enterprises,

workers could buy up to twenty percent of the shares belonging to the Treasury at preferential rates. Workers could buy further shares at the general rate (*Dziennik Ustaw*, Nr. 51, poz. 298: 697). The Mazowiecki government did not forget about the rights of workers, as the core ideas of Solidarity were still alive.

The core ideas of Solidarity

The core ideas of Solidarity were: free trade unions, democracy, self-government, workers' rights and social welfare. These ideas still had an important influence in Solidarity during the politico-economic transformation in 1989-90. The ideas of the Network also endured, as they were related to Solidarity's core ideas. Solidarity always wanted to protect vulnerable and disadvantaged groups. During the underground period, the Network supported Solidarity's social welfare activities by researching the social minimum. One of the Network's last communiqués was published on 28th January 1989, and it was the group's seventeenth study on prices (Komunikat Sieci, *Tygodnik Mazowsze* 1989: 2). In 1989-90, Solidarity knew that the transformation to a market economy would entail costs to society. At the KKW seminar on ownership transformation in July 1989, Jan Szomburg stated that these social costs would result from the necessity of displacing the means of production (the liquidation of inefficient enterprises) (Koncepcje wyjścia z kryzysu gospodarczego w świetle przekształceń struktury własności 1989: 6, Gdańsk KK archive: Krajowa Komisja Wykonawcza, Biuro Szkoleń KKW). At a meeting of the KKW Presidium in August 1989, Jacek Merkel said that if Solidarity wanted radical reform, some unemployment was inevitable. Lech Kaczyński agreed that they had to push through reforms that would hit some social groups hard (Prezydium KKW 29th August 1989: 7, Gdańsk KK archive: Prezydium KKW, Protokóły Prezydium KKW 16.6.1989-5.12.89).

Jacek Merkel believed that Solidarity had to adapt to the new politico-economic situation in Poland and look at its task as a union in a different way (Prezydium KKW 29th August 1989: 9, Gdańsk KK archive). Merkel argued that one of the tasks for the new Solidarity foundation could be to deal with unemployment; he also pressed for the government to create unemployment benefits (Prezydium KKW 17th October 1989: 8, Gdańsk KK archive: Prezydium KKW, Protokóły Prezydium KKW 16.6.1989-5.12.89). Jan Szomburg called for the creation of a social aid programme, as well as the retraining of workers - this opened up a domain of activity for the new Solidarity (Koncepcje wyjścia z kryzysu gospodarczego w

świetle przekształceń struktury własności 1989: 6, Gdańsk KK archive: Krajowa Komisja Wykonawcza, Biuro Szkoleń KKW). Solidarity thus wanted a social market economy, with the state offering some protection to society. At the Round Table, representatives of the Solidarity side in the Agriculture Sub-Group argued that the market system should not be given free rein in setting prices. It was necessary to reconstruct a self-governing system, de-monopolise foreign trade, and introduce economic protections - for example, minimum prices guaranteeing stable relations between the prices of farm produce and the costs of production (T.K., *Komitet Oporu Społecznego* 1989: 6). After the formation of the Mazowiecki government, in the Economic Committee of the Council of Ministers, there were disagreements about important details of economic policy. Labour Minister Jacek Kuroń supported a Work Fund project, which would support the unemployed, as well as enable re-training of dismissed workers. Balcerowicz was against the idea though, as the Treasury did not have enough money (Urbański, *Tygodnik Solidarność* 1989a: 5).

Poland's lack of financial resources meant that people suffered during shock therapy (Staniszław Handzlik interview 2013). For example, farmers found life very difficult because they had been heavily regulated by the state, and then suddenly they had to deal with the free market (Jacek Merkel interview 2013). At a meeting of the KKW Presidium in October 1989, Andrzej Milczanowski pointed out how a large number of people were living in poverty (Prezydium KKW 5th October 1989: 11, Gdańsk KK archive: Prezydium KKW, Protokóły Prezydium KKW 16.6.1989-5.12.89). In addition, at a KKW meeting in December 1989, Janusz Pałubicki expressed concern that the government was not doing enough planning for social welfare (Prezydium KKW 19th December 1989: 4, Gdańsk KK archive: Prezydium KKW, Protokóły Prezydium KKW 16.6.1989-5.12.89). Solidarity took action to deal with the social costs of market reforms. For example, Ryszard Szymański explained that at his steel plant in Stalowa Wola, Solidarity helped workers to fight for subsistence allowances from the social fund (Kaczyński & Szczepański, *Tygodnik Solidarność* 1989: 8). The desire to help those in need was ever-present in Solidarity.

A key part of Solidarity's programme was always the idea of territorial self-government (samorząd territorialny). Workers' self-management was the economic counterpart to territorial self-government. Thesis twenty-one of the Solidarity Programme from the First National Congress called for territorial self-government (Program NSZZ Solidarność 1981:

30, www.solidarnosc.org.pl/dok/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/I-KZD-uchwala-programowa.pdf). In 1989 the beginnings of democracy in Poland offered more opportunities for devolving powers to regions and localities. There was a Working Group on Territorial Self-Government at the Round Table (Grupa Robocza do spraw Samorządu Terytorialnego). This working group called for action to: "set up territorial self-government and guarantee in the constitution the right of local communities to self-government" (Grupa Robocza d.s. Samorządu Terytorialnego 1989: 1, Gdańsk KK archive: Prezydium KKW, Porozumienia Okrągłego Stołu). The position of the government-coalition side at the Round Table was that executive and governing bodies of territorial self-government were to remain as local state administration bodies, at least for a transitional period. In contrast, the Solidarity-opposition side did not want state organs to maintain their powers; local self-government bodies should independently carry out both governing functions and economic activity (Grupa Robocza d.s. Samorządu Terytorialnego 1989: 1, Gdańsk KK archive: Prezydium KKW, Porozumienia Okrągłego Stołu). Solidarity also argued for territorial self-government in agriculture. The Agriculture Sub-Group agreed that the needs of the countryside required the creation of a legal, organisational and economic basis for real territorial self-government (Informacja nr 25 1989: 7, Gdańsk KK archive: Prezydium KKW, Porozumienie Okrągłego Stołu. Komitet organizacyjny do okrągłego stołu przy przewodniczących Lechu Wałęsie. Informacje).

Solidarity always attached great importance to political reform. The Political Reform Group at the Round Table acknowledged that an important stage of political evolution was taking place, such as the realisation of union pluralism - number one of the twenty-one demands from the Gdańsk Shipyards (Zespół d.s. Reform Polityczynch 1989: 3, Gdańsk KK archive: Prezydium KKW, Porozumienia Okrągłego Stołu). At the Round Table, Solidarity also expressed its support for political pluralism and freedom of expression - demand number three from the Gdańsk Shipyards (Zespół d.s. Reform Polityczynch 1989: 1, Gdańsk KK archive). Solidarity still believed in the key points from the government-society agreements in August and September 1980. There was agreement at the Round Table that there should be a five day working week in the mining industry, as was stated in the Jastrzębie Agreement (Protokół Porozumień i Rozbieżności 1989: 1, Gdańsk KK archive: Prezydium KKW, Porozumienia Okrągłego Stołu). Furthermore, the new Solidarity paid attention to social and cultural matters, which had always been important to the union. At the Huta Stalowa Wola plant, Solidarity organised sporting events and cultural trips (Kaczyński & Szczepański

1989: 8). The programme from the Second National Congress affirmed that: "Solidarność fully appreciates the role of culture and education in preserving and enriching our national identity" (Documents of the Second National Congress 1990: 26).

Conclusion

Solidarity evolved in the late 1980s due to changes in Poland's political and strategic situation. It is necessary to understand the evolution of Solidarity in order to explain the fate of workers' self-management. The identity of Solidarity shifted, and it became a trade union, with some features of a social movement. When Solidarity was re-legalised, the union faced some familiar problems. Solidarity had to define a programme to unite its diverse membership. The union also had to decide how far it would become involved in politics. Solidarity created Citizens' Committees (KO) and organised candidates in the partially-free elections of June 1989. Solidarity backed the formation of the first post-communist government, led by former union advisor Tadeusz Mazowiecki. However, Solidarity was careful not to identify itself too closely with the new government, as the union wanted to maintain an independent position. The Mazowiecki government planned a radical economic reform programme, which was implemented by Finance Minister Leszek Balcerowicz. He introduced the 'shock therapy' programme in January 1990 in order for the economy to transform from socialism to capitalism. Free market economics was an attractive option for the new leaders of Poland, in order to break with the communist past. Balcerowicz introduced reforms including liberalisation of the price system, currency convertibility and banking reform.

The idea of workers' self-management was not ideally suited to Poland's new economic environment. The Network's conception of self-management was designed for a socialist economy, and it did not become a key part of the new Solidarity's politico-economic strategy. Nevertheless, workers' self-management still had some support in Solidarity. The idea was in evidence at the Round Table negotiations, where the Solidarity side demanded the removal of restrictions to self-management, which were imposed during military rule. The Network ceased to exist after the Round Table talks, but the group's ideas left an impact on Solidarity. For example, Solidarity still wanted to abolish the nomenklatura and limit state interference in the economy. Moreover, a new self-management movement rose from the ashes of the Network. The Association of Workers' Self-Management Activists was

chaired by Andrzej Wieczorek, a Solidarity representative at the Round Table. This Association was not such a mass self-management movement as the Network in 1981, but it was active in the major Solidarity regions of Warsaw, Wrocław and Gdańsk. The Gdańsk Self-Government Club drew up a Self-Governing Enterprise Bill, which drew on ideas from the Network's Social Enterprise Bill. Workers' self-management activists promoted a new idea in response to the changing economic environment: workers' share ownership. This idea reflected the increased focus in Poland on who would own enterprises, rather than how they were to be managed. Privatisation and ownership reform were amongst the most important issues facing the Mazowiecki government. Solidarity did not define its own conception for privatisation, although the union expressed support for workers becoming joint-owners of enterprises. Workers' share ownership gained support from some quarters in Solidarity and the 'contract' Sejm as a means for transforming the ownership structure. The Mazowiecki government did not adopt workers' share ownership as the basis for ownership reform. The government passed a privatisation law in July 1990; this began a centralised privatisation process, whereby the Treasury took ownership of enterprises, until they could be sold to private investors. Nevertheless, workers were given the right to become shareholders in their enterprises.

Solidarity knew that Poland needed market reforms, but the union was not willing to completely embrace the free market. In 1981 the Network was an economic partner to Solidarity, and the group carried out a grass-roots, cooperative style of activity. This kind of grass-roots activism to promote workers' rights, solidarity and social welfare was still present in the union at the end of the decade. In addition, Solidarity still promoted self-government, democracy, and Polish culture and traditions. The independent activities of Solidarity throughout the 1980s, in the open and the underground, laid the foundations for a new Poland. However, David Ost's view of Solidarity in the late 1980s was that: "unlike in 1980-81, Solidarity no longer made labour issues a key part of its programme, aside from the right of independent trade unions to exist" (Ost 2005: 43). This is a bit too harsh on Solidarity, as the union did not forget about its core ideas from the strikes in summer 1980 and the First National Congress in 1981.

Chapter 7: Conclusion

A new insight into Solidarity, the Network and workers' self-management

This research project made three key findings: (i) the evolving identity and politico-economic strategy of Solidarity led to changes in the strength and nature of the workers' self-management movement; (ii) workers' self-management and the Network made a lasting impact on Solidarity; (iii) the idea of workers' ownership developed in 1989-90. This idea had certain features in common with workers' self-management, and it was better suited to the new politico-economic environment.

Poland has been justifiably championed by political leaders and scholars as a post-Soviet success story because the country transformed peacefully into a democracy and market economy. However, scholars including David Ost (2005) and Stuart Shields (2003, 2004) have looked more critically at the Polish transformation. They identify political and economic problems in post-Soviet Poland, which have their origins during the Solidarity opposition era in the 1980s. This PhD thesis was influenced by the work of Ost and Shields, but this project adds a new perspective. Ost and Shields argued that Solidarity was no longer a workers' movement in 1989-90. This project accepts that Solidarity evolved, and the union had a different identity and strategy at the end of the decade. Nevertheless, Solidarity retained features of a workers' movement, and the core ideas from 1980-81 still mattered to the union.

Poland and the Solidarity union

For hundreds of years until 1945 Poland was a country of many nationalities and religions, and there were wide economic disparities among the population. In 1945 Poland's borders changed and the country became much more homogenous. In addition, the population were all in the same economic situation; they earnt low wages and the government controlled prices (Jacek Merkel interview 2013). The creation of Solidarity was the culmination of Poland's post-war history of protest. Poland was in a long-term cycle whereby a strike outbreak led to a change at the top of the PZPR, which happened in 1956, 1971 and 1980. The strikes were caused by disillusionment with the political system and weak national economy. Reform attempts by Władysław Gomułka and Edward Gierek failed. Gomułka

hoped to replicate the years of immediate post-war growth through policies such as encouraging migration from the countryside to towns and open access to education. However, these policies were not enough without wider reforms to the politico-economic system. Gomułka and Gierek were not able to implement fundamental reforms due to Poland's strategic position as a Soviet satellite state and the nature of the communist system – with the nomenklatura opposing any threat to its privileged status. The contradictions in the communist system made further crises inevitable. In 1980 workers throughout Poland seized their chance to act against a government with weakened authority. The demands of Solidarity for better working conditions and more political freedom resonated throughout Polish society. Solidarity was a new kind of trade union and social movement. Solidarity did not resemble a political party because it was not competing for formal political power and it took a long time for the union to define a detailed programme.

Workers' self-management gained support in Solidarity as a basis for economic reform, and it had a precedent in post-war Polish history. There were certain features of the earlier attempts at self-management reform that re-surfaced in the Solidarity era. For example, the self-management experiment in 1956-58 created an uncertain legal situation. The 1956 self-management law co-existed with the decree on state enterprises from October 1950. – This decree outlined the dominant leadership role of the enterprise director (Jermakowicz 1983: 29). After the 1956 self-management law, the division of powers between the director and workers' council was a source of many conflicts (Jermakowicz 1983: 25). Throughout the 1980s there were also disputes and legal complexities concerning workers' self-management. The 1981 self-management laws were subordinated to military rule legislation. Then after the Round Table talks, the self-management laws came back into existence. Furthermore, in 1956 the self-management laws were accompanied by other economic reforms, and there were calls for political reform (Styczyński, *Tygodnik Solidarność* 1981: 10). In 1981 the self-management movement also wanted further politico-economic reforms. The Network was not calling for revolutionary changes, as the group's conception of workers' self-management was a compromise with the communist system.

Research questions and answers

1. How and why was the Network created?

   Why did the group promote workers' self-management? What were the disagreements in Solidarity about workers' self-management?

The Network formed due to a grass-roots desire among workers to share information and cooperate with each other. This cooperation began on a local level in Gdańsk, before developing on a national scale. The issue of free Saturdays started off talks between factories in Gdańsk. When the time came for the first free Saturday, workers from smaller factories asked the Gdańsk Lenin Shipyards for guidance on whether or not they should go to work. Jerzy Milewski, who was a scholar at the Polska Akademia Nauk, recognised the Gdańsk Shipyards held a position of authority in the Pomerania region. He believed that this was true throughout Poland; there was a great industrial plant in each region that other factories looked to for guidance. Milewski was the co-founder of the Network, along with Jacek Merkel, who worked in the construction office at the Gdańsk Shipyards. In early 1981 they travelled to great factory plants in different parts of Poland to present their idea for developing mutual contacts and cooperation. The vision of Milewski and Merkel was well received throughout the country, and this led to the creation of the Network in April 1981. The first meeting of the group took place in the Gdańsk Shipyards, and it was attended by representatives of ten factory plants. The group soon expanded to include seventeen factories, one from each of the old administrative regions. These great factory plants were known as the 'cornerstones' (oczek) of the Network. The group needed a focus for action, and discussions were held about what was vitally important for factories and workers. This is when the idea of workers' self-management came to the fore. The Network became the base of a nationwide self-management movement. Self-management was often viewed as a kind of 'third way' solution, between communism and capitalism. Workers' self-management made a real impact on Solidarity, but the idea was not universally popular in the union. There was a concern that self-management bodies could compete with Solidarity for influence. In addition, some workers had a bad memory of self-management from the Workers' Self-Management Conferences (KSR), which was an authoritarian system of self-management, imposed by the Gomułka government in 1958. The Solidarity leadership on the National Coordinating Commission (KKP) gave lukewarm support to the self-management movement.

2. How did workers' self-management fit with the core ideas of Solidarity?

What did the Network propose in the Social Enterprise Bill? Why was the Network unhappy with the workers' self-management laws in September 1981?

The idea of workers' self-management gained a lot of support because it was related to the core ideas of the Solidarity union. Solidarity wanted to increase public participation in the economy and society. Workers' self-management activity enabled workers to become more involved in their workplaces and to discuss economic reform. In addition, Solidarity wanted to increase cooperation throughout Polish society. The Network promoted cooperation between workers in different industries and regions. The group engaged in a cooperative style of work, as the Network had no executive body. The self-management movement was also linked to Solidarity's goal of reviving Polish national spirit. Self-management activists believed that workers' participation in management would improve motivation and discipline at work, and they encouraged workers to take pride in what they were doing. Moreover, in order to achieve authentic workers' self-management, it was necessary to create a more democratic political system. The workers' self-management movement was aware of the inextricable link between political and economic reform. Factory plants involved with the Network held democratic elections to workers' councils. In addition, the Network called for enterprise directors to be elected by workers' councils, rather than appointed by the PZPR. Towards the end of the sixteen months of legal Solidarity activity, the Network began to focus on political reform. The Network planned a project for the creation of an electoral law to national councils.

The centrepiece of the Network project was the Social Enterprise Bill, which the group handed in to the Sejm in June 1981. This bill received widespread support in factory plants throughout the country. The bill aimed to create social enterprises, managed by workers' councils, as the basis for a reformed national economy. This would bring about true social ownership of the means of production, in contrast to the state ownership that had dominated the Polish economy since 1950. The Network promoted other economic reforms along with self-management. For example, the group believed in introducing some market elements into the economy through reform of the price structure and making the złoty convertible. However, there were some tensions within the self-management movement. The Network was faced with a rival self-management group. The Lublin Group backed some of the Network's ideas, but it adopted a more radical strategy. The Lublin Group promoted the

concept of the 'active strike', in contrast to the passive 'sit-in' strike favoured by Solidarity. During an 'active strike', workers would take control of production and economic activity in an enterprise. The Lublin Group did not want to compromise with the communist government. In contrast, the Network was willing to compromise, and the group took part in discussions with the PRL government about workers' self-management laws. In September 1981, the Sejm passed laws on State Enterprises and Workers' Self-Management. The Network was not happy with these laws, as they did not establish authentic workers' self-management. The government rushed the laws through parliament in between the two rounds of the Solidarity National Congress. The Network extracted some concessions from the government, but many economic powers remained concentrated in the hands of the state. The Network did not succeed in passing its Social Enterprise Bill into law, but the group created huge interest in the subject of workers' self-management. The ideas of the Network were evident in the official Solidarity Programme.

3. How did Solidarity and the Network evolve during military rule?

What kind of workers' self-management activity took place in the underground?

The imposition of Martial Law on the night of 13th December 1981 crushed the workers' self-management movement. Solidarity revived itself immediately in the underground, but it took longer for the Network to make a comeback. The predominant focus of the Network had always been on economic activity, but this kind of activity became much harder when the government imposed military control on Polish politics, the economy and society. The fate of the Network was intimately bound to that of Solidarity. The Solidarity union was the heart of the opposition movement against communist rule in Poland. When Solidarity was at its height during the sixteen months of legal activity, the Network gained much strength and support. When Solidarity was repressed after December 1981, the Network became much weaker. Solidarity changed in character after the imposition of military rule, and this in turn caused changes to the Network. Solidarity no longer had the option of participating in public life. The union decided to create an underground society; thus a society outside of communist institutions and structures. The underground society was a success, as Solidarity built a dense network of communications, publications and educational activity. The underground society undermined the government's monopoly over information. Underground publications took the form of news bulletins, newspapers and periodicals. They were produced by individual factories, elected Solidarity committees and groups of

intellectuals. The themes covered in the underground press were diverse. As well as information bulletins, there were monthly and quarterly publications about theoretical and social topics. Polish people learnt about Poland's democratic tradition and the past struggles for national independence.

After Solidarity established its underground society, the union decided that it could try to use state institutions for its own independent activity. This opened up the possibility of renewing self-management activity. New laws and decrees accompanying military rule had given the government full control over enterprises and workers' councils. Therefore, in the early stage of military rule, the predominant Solidarity strategy was to boycott self-management activity. Solidarity decided to adjust its self-management strategy. In factory plants where the communists held a firm grip, the boycott of self-management was to be maintained. However, in factory plants where some independent activity was possible, Solidarity realised that workers' councils could be used to defend the interests of workers. In addition, there was a renewed interest in self-management among workers and in the underground press. This led to the revival of the Network in December 1983 at a meeting of the Temporary Coordination Commission (TKK). The Network though, was no longer a nationwide self-management movement; it was a working group in aid of underground Solidarity. Self-management activity became intertwined with union activity, as workers' councils were often used as a means for carrying out opposition activity and keeping Solidarity alive. Workers' councils also dealt with social matters, pay and working conditions. In the mid-1980s Polish people became tired of all opposition activity taking place in the underground. Solidarity therefore decided to carry out some activity in the open. For example, Edward Nowak and his colleagues in Kraków held meetings where they freely expressed their views. Solidarity henceforth had structures in the underground and the open, as well as structures operating in between these two domains. Workers' councils operated partially in the open and partially underground. The communists allowed workers' councils to exist, and the opposition took advantage of this where possible to defend workers and guard against corruption in enterprises. Solidarity achieved victory in its long-term 'war of position' against the communist dictatorship. Solidarity endured much repression and hardship during the years of military rule, but in the end the union achieved a remarkable victory. Following a strike wave in spring and summer 1988, the government agreed to hold negotiations with Solidarity.

4. What happened to the idea of workers' self-management in 1989-90?

Did the ideas of the Network still have any influence in Solidarity at the end of the 1980s?

A period of evolutionary-revolutionary change occured following the Round Table talks. Partially free elections took place in June 1989. These elections were the de facto end of military rule. Solidarity evolved rapidly during the politico-economic transformation in 1989-90. Solidarity had always been more than a trade union, and this was still true when it was re-legalised in April 1989. The Second National Congress still defined Solidarity as both a trade union and social movement. Moreover, Solidarity faced some familiar problems, such as defining a politico-economic programme and deciding how far to become involved in politics. Solidarity was mostly supportive of the first post-communist government, which was led by former leading figures in the union, such as Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki. The changing international and domestic political situations finally allowed Poland to pursue real economic reform. The new Minister of Finance Leszek Balcerowicz planned a radical market reform programme, which was implemented on 1st January 1990. In 1981, the Network regarded workers' self-management as a means to reform the economy without destroying the communist system. In 1989-90 the major question was no longer how to manage enterprises, but rather how to transform the property ownership structure. Workers' self-management was thus no longer as relevant in economic reform debates among the new leaders of Poland. Nevertheless, the idea of self-management still had some support in Solidarity. There was reference to workers' self-management at the Round Table; the Solidarity side pushed for increased self-management in areas including the health service and mining.

Workers' self-management and other ideas promoted by the Network still had an influence on Solidarity's politico-economic strategy. For example, in 1989-90 Solidarity wanted to reduce the economic powers of the state and abolish the nomenklatura, which were reforms proposed by the Network in 1981. The Network ceased to exist in 1989, but a new self-management movement formed called the Association of Workers' Self-Management Activists, which was linked to self-management centres in Gdańsk, Szczecin, Poznań, Wrocław and Warsaw. The Gdańsk Self-Government Club proposed a Self-Governing Enterprise Bill. This bill drew on ideas from the Network's Social Enterprise Bill, such as granting workers' councils the power to appoint and dismiss enterprise directors. Furthermore, supporters of workers' self-management began to promote a new, related idea

– workers' share ownership. This idea can be viewed as an updated version of workers' self-management, as it was more suited to the new politico-economic situation in Poland. Workers' ownership involved making workers the joint-owners of enterprises. However, the Mazowiecki government did not want to base their ownership reform strategy on workers' ownership. The government adopted a privatisation law, whereby the Treasury would take ownership of companies transformed from state enterprises. The July 1990 privatisation law was a defeat for the new workers' self-management movement. This was the same fate as that suffered by the Network in 1981, when its bill was not adopted by the Sejm. Nevertheless, workers' self-management and the ideas of the Network had a lasting impact on Solidarity because they were closely related to the core ideas of the union. Solidarity evolved over the 1980s, but it always fought for free trade unions, democracy, self-government, workers' rights and social welfare. Solidarity did not forget about its origins as a Baltic Coast trade union, founded to support workers against the injustices of the communist system.

Postscript and further research

When Solidarity was re-legalised in 1989, one of the union's former sources of strength became a source of weakness. The various strands in the union added to its strength throughout the 1980s, as groups with different beliefs united against the communist regime. As the communist regime crumbled in 1989-90, the differing viewpoints in Solidarity came out into the open. Former allies began to compete against each other. For example, during the presidential election campaign of autumn 1990, Tadeusz Mazowiecki stood for President against Lech Wałęsa; the Warsaw intellectual against the Gdańsk worker (Garton Ash 2002: 375). Furthermore, privatisation continued to be an important and difficult question. The future of the great industrial plants became uncertain after the fall of communism. These factory plants would no longer be supported through large state subsidies and the 'correction' (manipulation) of economic plans. Staniszław Handzlik worked at Huta im. Lenina in Kraków, and in 1990 he helped prepare a Solidarity report on the Polish steel industry, which included at least a dozen factory plants. The report highlighted how the Polish steel industry employed three times more people and used three times more energy than the steel industries of Western countries. The conclusion of the report was that the Polish steel industry required restructuring. The report provoked much discussion, and workers were concerned about privatisation and losing their jobs (Staniszław Handzlik interview 2013). Some steel plants were privatised, but discussions about the ownership of Huta im. Lenina lasted many years.

Workers were resistant to enterprises like Huta im. Lenina or the Gdańsk Lenin Shipyards being sold off, as they felt that these great industrial plants were Polish national property. Huta im. Lenina was finally sold off in 2005 to the Mittal Steel Company (Staniszław Handzlik interview 2013). This PhD project included a focus on the Huta im. Lenina steelworks, as two of the interviewees worked there, and it was one of the former 'cornerstones' of the Network. Moreover, the fate of the steel industry is currently a difficult issue in the United Kingdom. The Polish steel industry faced problems in the 1990s as it was not competitive on international markets, and this is currently the case for the UK steel industry.

A major privatisation strategy during the post-communist years was the creation of enterprises owned by the state Treasury, as was outlined in the July 1990 privatisation law (Ost 2005: 154). Another major privatisation strategy was liquidation, which could take place through the state leasing an enterprise's assets to the employees. This created employee-owned enterprises, in which the managerial cadre held the majority of shares (Ost 2005: 154). Through to 2003, two thousand and sixty-two state enterprises were liquidated, of which one thousand, three hundred and fifty-seven were leased to their employees (Tittenbrun 2005: 7). Jacek Merkel pointed out that this form of privatisation could be seen as "an echo of workers' self-management" (Jacek Merkel interview 2013). The ZNTK railway repair factory in Bydgoszcz (one of the Network's 'cornerstone' factories) became an employee-owned enterprise, and it now manufactures trams and trains. In addition, the shipyards repair factory (Stocznia Remontowa) in Gdańsk is a successful enterprise where the managerial cadre took charge after privatisation (Jacek Merkel interview 2013). However, there was only a distant echo of workers' self-management in the privatisation process in Poland. Many managers, due to their high salaries and financial resources, were in a position to acquire substantial blocs of shares in newly privatised enterprises (Tittenbrun 2005: 4). Exbud in Kielce, Kabel in Kraków and the Irena glass-works in Inowrocław were privatised in 1990, and workers in these firms acquired shares. As was set forth in the rules of the 1990 privatisation law, workers acquired shares at a discount price (20% of shares in an enterprise could be sold to its employees at a discount rate of 50%) (Tittenbrun 2005: 3). Workers in the above three enterprises gained what Tittenbrun referred to as only nominal ownership of capital, rather than real ownership of capital that comes about from owning shares of great market value or substantial dividend income (Tittenbrun 2005: 2). The average dividend income of workers at Irena in 1991 was 280,000 złoty; this made up only

a small portion of employee's annual income. In contrast, at the Exbud construction company, the 12 % of shares acquired by the president had a market value of 48 billion złoty (Tittenbrun 2005: 4). At Metalzbyt in 1993, the president owned 28.5% of the company's equity capital. The value of this shareholding (654 million złoty) was worth many times the average annual wage at the enterprise (4.5 million złoty) (Tittenbrun 2005: 7). The Polish version of workers ownership did not enable workers to play the pivotal role in the privatisation process that self-management activists were hoping for.

Workers' self-management seemed to be caught between the old Poland and the new Poland. It was not implemented in the old Poland, as the communist power apparatus controlled production and ownership. In 1989-90 the new government focused on liberalisation and opening up to foreign investment, which could have been more difficult if workers were given substantial powers in enterprises. The interests of workers were likely to focus on higher wages and keeping their jobs. In contrast, the Polish government knew that unprofitable enterprises would have to close if Poland was going to compete in international markets, rather than the distorted markets of the Soviet Union. Leaders of Poland and other countries in Central and Eastern Europe received advice from international financial institutions and economic experts that free market economics was the only solution to the problems left behind by communism. In certain respects, the systemic transformations in Central and Eastern Europe were treated as an exact science; whereby these countries could copy the institutions and structures of Western Europe in order to achieve prosperity and rising standards of living (Stark & Bruszt 1998: 5, 80). Poland's post-communist transformation has been a big success in many ways. Poland is a liberal democracy, with membership of the European Union and the largest economy in Central Europe – GDP is $534.3 billion (www.worldbank.org/en/country/poland/overview). The politico-economic transformation though, was not a success in every way. Polish people suffered during shock therapy. Poland lost the Soviet market for its goods, and some enterprises went bankrupt as they could not cope in the free market (Staniszław Handzlik interview 2013). Poland opened up to Western goods and investment, but initially Western markets were not opened up for Polish goods (Ost 2005: 69). Farmers also found it hard to cope with the free market. They organised protests in 1990, demanding higher prices for food and lower rates of interest for government credits (Prażmowska 2010: 235).

Political economy is a fascinating subject for study. Politics and economics overlap in many ways, as they both concern how wealth is to be created and how to provide public goods to society. In the free market capitalist model, economic power lies predominantly with financial capital, rather than industrial capital. In addition, ownership structures and the activities of enterprises are globalised, as international investors buy shares in enterprises. Shock therapy in Poland was a pure form of free market economics. Poland needed private enterprise, but free market economics was not the only or 'natural' politico-economic strategy. The perspective of this research project is that politico-economic strategy is not an exact science. Free market economics was chosen in Poland due to an alignment of influential domestic and international groups in favour of this strategy (Shields 2003: 229). The free market model of capitalism that dominates the United States and European Union is far from an unqualified success. Economic growth is curently sluggish, wealth is unevenly distributed, and there is a lack of social cohesion in many countries – arguably manifested in the United Kingdom by the decision to leave the EU. The idea of workers' self-management is linked to a social democratic model of capitalism. This model can be put into practice, as displayed by the activities of cooperative enterprises, such as the Mondragon Corporation in Spain - where there is authentic workers' participation in enterprise management. This kind of politico-economic strategy could still be an option for Poland and other countries. A social democratic model of capitalism entails the state playing more of a role to regulate markets, enforce tax rules and provide public goods. I believe this to be a positive policy conception in a world economy still suffering from the effects of the 2008 financial crisis.

After a PhD project is finished, there are always possibilities for further research. For this project there were obvious restrictions on people available for interview. Jerzy Milewski played a crucial role in the creation of the workers' self-management movement, but he was no longer alive when the empirical research was undertaken. The Solidarity union generated a huge quantity of documents, which are held in archives in Poland and elsewhere. There are also hundreds of different Solidarity publications. A further historical research project could analyse the development of workers' self-management during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The origins of the idea are found in the classic socialist texts, and research could examine the first examples of self-managing factories and communities. In addition, a further research project could analyse privatisation and ownership reform in Poland during the 1990s. There could be analysis of the how different forms of privatisation

impacted on the economy, enterprises and workers. In order to understand modern-day Poland, it is necessary to learn about the Solidarity trade union. Historical research enables us to better understand present circumstances and the possibilities for change. Solidarity was a remarkable opposition movement, and it led the country to national sovereignty and freedom. One of the many positive features of this evolutionary revolution was its peaceful nature. Previous national uprisings and strike movements ended in bloodshed. Solidarity's long struggle brought about change through negotiations and the election of new government to transform the country and bring in a new era.

Appendices

Appendix 1: Interview questions

I conducted semi-structured interviews. The following was my planned list of questions, and there was some freedom to discuss other related topics.

1. Why did you become interested in workers' self-management?
2. Was self-management an important idea in Solidarity?
3. Did the self-management movement arise from grass-roots activity?
4. Were there disagreements in Solidarity about workers' self-management?
5. How did the Solidarity leadership view self-management?
6. Were there disagreements within the self-management movement?
7. What happened to workers' self-management in the underground?
8. What were the activities of the Network during military rule?
9. What happened to workers' self-management during the politico-economic transformation in 1989-90?
10. How did self-management fit into debates about reform of enterprise ownership in the new Poland?

Appendix 2: Archival Documents

Fundacja Centrum Dokumentacji Czynu Niepodległościowego in Kraków

Important documents in the Małopolska Solidarity collection include:

Title	Description
Centrum Obywatelskich Inicjatyw Ustawodawczych (1981), Volume 021	On the initiative of the Centre for Citizens Legislative Initiatives, a policy document drawn up by a research group (*Zespół Prawa Gospodarczego*) based at the Jagiellonian University in Kraków. The policy document concerned the legal regulation of state enterprises and the participation of staff in their management. The research group included academic experts on law and economics, as well as representatives from important enterprises in Kraków and elsewhere. The group worked under the leadership of Professor Staniszław Włódyki, who was director of the Economic Law department at the Jagiellonian University. Edward Nowak from Huta im. Lenina was a member of the group. The group also included Dr M. Kulesza from the University of Warsaw and Professor M. Tyczka from the Adam Mickiewicz University of Poznań.
Propozycja Reformy Gospodarczej (1981), Volume 021	An economic reform proposal from a research team at the Wrocław University of Economics. The research team included Prof. Zygmunt Bartosik, Prof. Władysław Bukistyński, Prof. Zdzisław Hellwig and Prof. Bolesław Winiarski. Their economic reform proposal was supported in a public discussion by dozens of academics at the university and a number of renowned economics experts.

Sprawozdanie. Z seminarium nt. samorządu pracowniczego (1981), Volume 098	A report from a seminar on workers' self-management in March 1981 at the Rosa Luksemburg factory plant in Warsaw, attended by Solidarity representatives from throughout Poland.
Przedsiębiorstwo Społeczne (1981), Volume 098	The Network's Social Enterprise Bill, published following a Network meeting in Katowice at the Wujek coal mine and detailing the group's conception for workers' self-management.
Informacja na temat powstania i działalności Rady Robotniczej w Fabryce Samochodów Małolitrażowych zakład w Tychach (1981), Volume 098	A policy statement from a communist self-management body at a car factory in Tychy, reflecting the views of the PRL government.
Jerzy Milewski o Sieci Wiodących Zakładów Pracy (1981), Volume 098	An interview with Jerzy Milewski, the co-founder of the Network.
Komunikat nr 3 (1981), Volume 098	A communiqué from the second meeting of Network representatives, which took place on 11th-13th May 1981 at the Huta im. Lenina plant in Kraków. There were delegations from 15 of the 'cornerstone' factory plants.
Dla Komisji Zakładowych Przedsiębiorstw Państwowych (1981), Volume 098	A statement from the founding committee of workers' self-management at Huta im. Lenina about the first meeting for self-management representatives from the Małopolska region. The planned themes for discussion were: the initiatives of Sieć, the development of the workers' self-management movement, and drawing up forms of cooperation for workers' self-management bodies in the Małopolska region.
Informacja nr 2 (1981), Volume 098	A statement published by the workers' self-management founding committee at the Gdańsk Lenin Shipyards.

Uchwały. I Walne Zebranie Delegatów NSZZ Solidarność region Małopolska (1981), Volume 098	Resolutions from the first general meeting of Solidarity delegates in the Małopolska region.
Ordynacja wyborcza do rad pracowniczych. Projekt (1981), Volume 098	This is a Solidarity project about electoral law for workers' councils, published in Gdynia.
Stanowisko Grupy Roboczej na rzecz Międzyregionalnej Inicjatywy Współpracy Samorządów Pracowniczych w sprawie aktualnych problemów ruchu samorządowego (1981), Volume 098	A statement by the Lublin Group on current problems in the self-management movement.
Uchwała w sprawie Ustaw o samorządzie załogi przedsiębiorstwa państwowego oraz przedsiębiorstwach państwowych (1981), Volume 098	A Solidarity resolution published in October 1981 after the workers' self-management laws.

Komisja Krajowa archive in Gdańsk

Important documents in the KK archive include:

Title	Description
*"Szymon Jakubowicz interview" (1981), Collection: IKZD VII IKZD	An interview with Jakubowicz at the First National Congress. He was an expert advisor to the KKP, an associate of Sieć, and he took part in the government-Solidarity negotiations on self-management.
Konferencja prasowa (1981), Collection: IKZD VII IKZD	A report of a press conference at the Solidarity Congress, including Edward Nowak speaking about the self-management laws.
Założenia ideowo-programowe i kierunki polityki społecznego-gospodarczej (1981), Collection: IKZD VII IKZD	A thesis prepared by Solidarity activists in the lead up to the First National Congress, containing ideas for the union's programme.
Strajk czynny (1981), Collection: IKZD VII IKZD	A discussion paper on the 'active strike', which was a radical conception for workers' self-management activity.
Być Milicjantem w PRL (1981), Collection: IKZD VII IKZD	A report on the formation of self-governing committees in the police.
Zrzeszenie Kaszubsko-Pomorskie (1988), Collection: Solidarność Region Gdański, Dział Informacji	A statement from the Gdańsk Self-Management Club on the programmatic activity of workers' self-management.
Porozumenia Okrągłego Stołu (1989), Collection: Prezydium KKW	The Round Table Agreements, signed at the Namiestnikowski Palace in Warsaw on 5th April 1989.
Informacja nr 24 (1989), Collection: Prezydium KKW	A record of discussions in the Round Table Economy and Social Policy Group.
Koncepcje wyjścia z kryzysu gospodarczego w świetle przekształceń	A report from a seminar on 28th July 1989 in Gdańsk, organised by the KKW on the

struktury własności (1989), Collection: Krajowa Komisja Wykonawcza NSZZ Solidarność	transformation of ownership structures in Poland. Participants in the discussions included representatives from at least a dozen Solidarity regions. The report also includes fragments from bills by the government and the Gdańsk Self-Management Club.
Protokóły Prezydium KKW (1989), Collection: Krajowa Komisja Wykonawcza NSZZ Solidarność	Minutes from meetings of the Solidarity leadership on the KKW. These minutes detail debates at the highest level of the union on matters including the role of Citizens' Committees and privatisation.

*****I created a title for this un-titled document.

Europejskie Centrum Solidarności archive in Gdańsk

Important documents in the ECS archive include:

Title	Description
List do Zbyszka Bujaka (1982)	A letter signed by Adam Michnik and Janusz Onyszkiewicz to Zbigniew Bujak about the development of an 'underground society'.
Solidarność BI wydanie specjalne lipiec 1982 (1982)	A statement from the regional leadership of underground Solidarity in Gdańsk about covert union structures in factory plants.
NSZZ Solidarność na tle sytuacji politycznej, gospodarczej i społecznej polski roku 1984 (1984)	A programme document written by the underground Solidarity leadership in the TKK about the union's activities and the role of the Network.
Komunikat TKK w KKW (1987)	A communiqué about the re-structuring of the underground Solidarity leadership.

RKK Komunikat nr 3 (1988)	A communiqué about strikes in Silesia, Szczecin, Poznań, Wrocław, Warsaw and Gdańsk.

Solidarity publications

Important articles in *Tygodnik Solidarność* include:

Title	Description
U Źródeł Samorządu Robotniczego. Precedens czy niewypał (1981)	Article written by Władysław Styczyński on workers' self-management in Poland in 1956-57.
Samorząd musi rządzic (1981)	Ryszard Bugaj & Symon Jakubowicz presented the position of the Solidarity leadership concerning workers' councils.
Wartości Ideowe (1981)	Stefan Kurowski wrote about self-government, including in the area of production in enterprises.
Ruch Gospodarczej Naprawy (1981)	Waldemar Kuczyński on the creation of workers' councils in industry and other areas of social life.
Sieć zakładów wiodących (1981)	Jarosław Szczepański on the creation of the Network and the concept of the 'social enterprise'.
Czym jest, czym ma być NSZZ Solidarność? (1989)	An editorial discussion, authored by Kaczyński & Szczepański, with participants including Władysław Frasyniuk, Mieczysław Gil and Tadeusz Mazowiecki about the identity of the new Solidarity.
Nowa mapa konflictów (1989)	Jadwiga Staniszkis on the politico-economic situation in Poland, including the deep recession.

Skok (1989)	Interview by Anna Mieszczanek with Staniszław Kujawa, vice-president of the workers' council at a Warsaw television factory plant.
Idea właśności pracowniczej (1989)	Stefan Kurowski on the idea of workers' share ownership, which aimed at achieving social justice within the confines of an individualist capitalist system.
Rząd w Sejmie (1990)	Dorota Macieja & Sygmunt Simbierowicz wrote about Sejm proceedings from 27th-29th December 1989 involving eleven bills, which introduced a new economic order in Poland.

Important articles in *Tygodnik Mazowsze* include:

Title	**Description**
Walka Pozycyjna (1982)	Article written by Zbigniew Bujak promoting the battle for position (walka pozycyjna) underground strategy.
Jak zorganizowała się Solidarność w okresie stanu wojennego (1982)	Information about underground regional Solidarity structures.
Tezy o Wyjściu z sytuacji bez wyjścia (1982)	Jacek Kuroń writing from Białołęka prison about the strategy for underground Solidarity.
Tajny raport komisji planowania (1983)	An analysis of documents from the government planning commission (Komisja Planowania).
Solidarność Dziś. Oświadczenie Programowe Tymcasowej Komisji Koordynacyjnej NSZZ Solidarność (1983)	A TKK statement written by Zbigniew Bujak and Bogdan Lis on a programme of activity for the union in the present socio-political conditions.

Uzasadnienie Stanowiska (1983)	An economic statement from the TKK on the basis of studies by the TKK's economic advisors.
Jestem pewien zwycięstwa Solidarności (1984)	An interview with a Solidarity activist at the WSK Hydral plant in Wrocław.
Reaktywowanie Sieci (1984)	An information bulletin about the re-activation of the Network in the underground.
Lech Wałęsa: W sprawie gospodarki narodowej i samorządu pracowniczego (1984)	Lech Wałęsa on the politico-economic situation and workers' self-management.
Uwłaszczenie załogi czy nomenklatury? (1989)	Article by 'Dorota' about the second National Workers' Self-Management Forum (Krajowy Forum Samorządu Załogi), which took place in Wrocław at the Dolmel plant.

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