

SCHOLASTIC ELEMENTS IN RABELAIS' THOUGHT

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ALBAN JOHN KRAILSHEIMER

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## INTRODUCTION

The genesis of this study was the simple title 'Rabelais Franciscain', with which M. Gilson made one of his rare but always invaluable incursions into literature. So much has been written of Rabelais' relations with the humanists, with the Reformers, with the Court, that one is apt to forget that whatever influences these milieux had on him---and nobody denies that it was considerable---it came second in time, if not necessarily in importance, to a Scholastic education of some sort. In case one is tempted to dismiss the years spent in the OFM as a mere formality, an acte de présence with only the most superficial participation in Scholastic ways, there is the testimony of an expert to make one hesitate:

(1) "Pas une d'elles (les expressions dont il use) qui ne porte et qui ne prouve la survivance d'un théologien fort compétent chez l'auteur de 'Pantagruel'." It is plainly unreasonable to assume that this knowledge of theology came from anywhere but the order in which Rabelais was successively novice, professed religious and priest, and Gilson's further arguments are unanswerable. Rabelais at Fontenay could not have escaped a study of Scholastic philosophy and theology, with his intellect and temperament it is hardly likely that he would ~~have~~ been content with the bare minimum of set books, nor that the Franciscan spirit in its widest sense should have failed to mark him. Gilson's premisses are our own, and the present work seeks to illustrate, however inadequately, this truth which most critics have admitted but few have even begun to investigate.

The tendency has been to see in Frère Jan the accredited representative of monastic ways in Rabelais' book, and consequently to concentrate on his "matiere

(2)

de bréviaire" and tales of life in the cloister by way of exemplifying the influences of Rabelais' own "années de moinage". Such an attitude can easily lead to a complete misunderstanding of the facts. In the first place, Frère Jan is a Benedictine, and the stories he tells usually concern his own order. Rabelais, it is true, had spent some years in the habit of St. Benedict, and on his tours of inspection with Geoffroi d'Estissac had good opportunities for collecting material about life in the monasteries of his day. In fact, the sort of anecdote (e.g. "la caballe monastique") which has so often been linked with Rabelais' personal experience belongs to the common fund of monastic stories current in the Middle Ages and 16C. To take an extreme example, it has never been suggested that Chaucer's studies of monks, friars and nuns owes anything to personal experience within the walls. Much of this monastic material is therefore irrelevant to the present purpose. Rabelais' tales of Cordeliers fall into the same category; Marguerite de Navarre is a contemporary witness to their wide diffusion. Again, the references to Divine Office, to Mass, to Scripture are more often than not no echo of "années de moinage", but commonplaces of an age when the Church was at least as familiar as the cinema to-day. The many notes on Rabelais' parodies of Scholastic terms and methods do, on the other hand, affect the issue, but approach it in a negative way which the facts do not justify. If the usual thesis is accepted, that, by the time he came to write, Rabelais' attitude to Scholasticism was completely hostile, any survivals of its teaching

must be considered involuntary and thus particularly significant. At the same time, in non-controversial matters (Natural Science, for instance) there was no clear alternative to Scholasticism, and attempts to treat any survivals of his early instruction in these fields as mere parody are misplaced.

Convinced that Gilson had pointed the way to a profitable field of research, we found almost at once that a major obstacle, so often denounced by him, lay across the path. This is the deep-rooted feeling---it is by now more instinctive than rational---that the idea 'Scholastic' demands an antithesis, like 'ancient and modern', that 'Scholastic' and 'mediaeval' are vague synonyms in the history of thought, that one can draw lines more or less neatly to mark the boundaries between what is Scholastic and what is not. It is no part of the present intention to undertake a general or even partial reevaluation of the Renaissance in France, though it is impossible to avoid stating arguments which must eventually lead to conclusions about it. The historical fact remains that Rabelais lived and worked in the first half of the 16C, and no amount of label-shifting would justify including him in a course of mediaeval studies. On the other hand, there is everything to be said for including a course of mediaeval studies in any approach to Rabelais. No myth has died harder than that which makes out that the Middle Ages combined total ignorance of Classical authors with indifference to any ideas dating back to a pre-Christian era. Recent studies<sup>3</sup> have traced an impressive continuity of Platonism in the West, depending not

on garbled versions at second or third hand, but on original texts. From Arab and Greek sources alike had been brought into Latin not only Aristotle but much else besides of ancient learning. The great revival of legal studies in the IIC had led to the formulation of Canon Law, which ruled in Paris, but no less to the schools of Civil Law at Bologna and later at Orleans. As for the popular conception that Columbus opened up new horizons in men's minds as well as on the map, M. Atkinson<sup>4</sup> has shown how false it is for our period, and for anyone who doubts mediaeval knowledge or curiosity about foreign parts there is a fascinating field of study in the Mandevilles and the Haytons, in the missionary and diplomatic reports which abound from the I3C onwards.

On the score of knowledge and range of interests, the straight antithesis between Middle Ages and Renaissance has little or no meaning, and with few exceptions, one cannot be certain that a given idea appearing in the I6C has not passed through some mediaeval intermediary. When it comes to texts the position is rather different, and the early history of printing enables most Classical quotations to be traced with reasonable certainty. Some authors, like Plutarch and Lucian, had for one reason or another not been generally familiar to the Middle Ages, and one of the first results of the Classical Renaissance was the proliferation of compendia and anthologies of adages, sentences, anecdotes and so on from such authors, with which a respectable façade of Classical erudition could be applied to the most unassuming work. Another popular formula, that the Renaissance

marked the "laicisation of culture", whatever its ultimate validity, does conceal a truth of some importance; among learned men the relationship between the Church and learning, or religion and philosophy, did undergo a certain change at this time. It does not mean, however, that sacred and profane can be separated in a study such as this.

Rejecting any a priori theories as to what might be Scholastic or not in Rabelais' thought, it has seemed best to deal in principle with all its aspects, on the assumption that Scholastic influence may be found anywhere. By Scholastic, we mean the official teaching of the Church as represented by the chief doctors from---say---the 13C on, regardless of their order or (as in such cases as Ockham) their personal standing, and more specifically the teaching within the OFM in Rabelais' time. The whole range of subjects, whether doctrinal or not, is considered to fall within the Scholastic system. The word has not been used as a virtual alternative to Aristotelian or Thomist, and while neo-Platonists from Dionysius on are usually called by that name, those of their doctrines which have been assimilated into some official system have been accounted Scholastic. Having just denounced readymade antitheses, it would be unseemly to propose any more, but it may be said that in general such words as 'Classical', 'pagan', 'Protestant' have been contrasted with 'Scholastic' in this study, though in no absolute sense.

There has inevitably been a tendency to exaggerate the picture, to assume the maximum amount of Scholastic influence and to minimise others. This may,



however, help to demonstrate the dangers of concentrating on non-Scholastic <sup>influences</sup> ~~solutions~~, often with remarkable subtlety, when a simpler solution lies close at hand. As a guide, we have tried to imagine how Rabelais' work would have struck a reader of---say ---the time of Jean de Meung. On that basis the work would be expected to reflect some anachronisms both of knowledge and opinions, but if our initial hypothesis is correct, it should ask the same questions as the I3C, without necessarily giving the same answers. If such an imaginary mediaeval criterion is objectionable, it may at least be defended as a change from the modern yardstick, which has not infrequently been applied with unsatisfactory results.

Such an approach poses a question of definition which is, as already mentioned, beyond the scope of this work: what was the difference between Scholastic and non-Scholastic in the first half of the I6C? How much of Scholasticism remains in Erasmus and Luther? Or, to come nearer Rabelais in time and place, in Dolet or des Periers, Scève or even Marguerite? The answer to such problems demands a major work, a continuation of Renaudet's 'Préréforme et Humanisme', a prelude to the 'Elizabethan World-Picture' of Tillyard. Here no judgement is attempted as to how far Rabelais is typical of his age, how far conclusions about him are valid for others. The impossibility of generalising with confidence about the I6C is well illustrated by the three men who, in the same year, 1529, were attending lectures in the University of Paris in various capacities, each of them typical of the century in the sense that he belongs

to it more obviously than to any other. Between Calvin, Loyola and Rabelais there is perhaps a common factor to be found, but its formulation would take much ingenuity. If Rabelais had been less extraordinary it might be easier to pin a label on him, but the analysis which follows aims at considering him as he is, not as it would suit literary historians to classify him.

In undertaking this task there are two questions to be answered, one dependent on the other: what was the true nature of Rabelais' thought, and how far does it betray Scholastic influences? The first question is by far the more difficult. The form of the work itself offers every obstacle to a final interpretation, the satire and allegory, the dialogue form, the variations between the books, the quantity of borrowed material, all make it more difficult to seize the real thought behind what was, in any case, often meant to be no more than a work of imagination and running commentary on questions of the moment.

The problem really resolves itself into a progressive enquiry; first to discover from the allusions as well as explicit statements in the text the extent of Rabelais' knowledge, then to find out how much of it he deploys, and in what way, and finally what opinions he offers on it. It follows from this that his views on contemporary events and abuses as such do not concern us here, except for the bearing they may have on general theories and principles. It is therefore particularly hard to combine what one might call programme texts, deliberately aiming at a specific ~~XX~~ subject of topical interest, with the half-

hidden texts in which ideas are unconsciously revealed. Episodes such as Thélème, the Pan story, Rondibilis' advice, Gargantua's letter, are of primary importance for discovering Rabelais' intentions, because in such passages he is catching the reader's eye with opinions designed to impress. The extraordinary fame of the Thélème episode, the only part of Rabelais' work directly known by a vast number of otherwise well-educated people, is a cautionary example of what distortion can result from more or less fortuitous circumstances; in this case the absence of obscene language, which makes the text suitable for any class of reader, and an easily remembered formula, "Fay ce que voudras", whose meaning is so deceptively obvious. Failing reliable contemporary testimony as to Rabelais' beliefs, one can only try to measure the impact on the 16<sup>th</sup> reader of the book and assume it to correspond with Rabelais' intentions, and presumably beliefs. In non-controversial matters, where it is just a question of knowledge, the difficulty does not arise.

Several methods of conducting this enquiry suggest themselves, and as usual the choice between them is not the least of the problems to be solved. One could follow Gilson's example in picking out texts throughout the work which seem to have some reference to Scholasticism, and write appropriate notes on them, giving possible sources and interpretations. A summary of the results would then put in perspective Rabelais' positive debt to Scholasticism. Apart from requiring a detailed knowledge of Scholasticism beyond the reach of all but the most expert, this method has

the disadvantage of offering no general picture of Rabelais' thought, which includes elements quite distinct from Scholasticism.

Another method, the most usual, is to choose conventional chapter headings under which the mere & obvious texts can be dealt with critically, with suitable comparisons from contemporary events or writers, Classical or Scholastic authorities. This undoubtedly produces the most aesthetically satisfying result, and is probably the best method for a general study of Rabelais. The disadvantages are that such a method cannot go into great detail (the previous one can) since the easy flow of comment which is its chief attraction suffers when individual words and phrases have to be given the same weight as whole episodes, and also that it is bound to include much which does not concern our enquiry.

A third method, with features of the other two, is that which we have chosen, despite some serious drawbacks. In an attempt to get behind the satire and allegory to the mental habits beneath, we have chosen conventional chapter headings, under which all relevant texts, long or short, have been grouped and then ~~and then~~ analysed as objectively as possible. There are great disadvantages to this method; to be perfect it should be exhaustive, which would make this study far too long and much more tedious; as it depends on the unpredictable material available, the entries under different headings are inevitably uneven in quantity and quality, and by taking brief texts on their own there is a danger of falsifying Rabelais' meaning. There is, besides, an aesthetically unpleasing effect in all 'scissors and paste' methods,

enhanced when the victim is <sup>an</sup> author as entertaining and popular as Rabelais. Nevertheless, the end to which these means are proposed is a worthy and a necessary one, and there is no equally sure way of catching Rabelais off guard, thus revealing his mental habits. One unexpected and encouraging illustration of this is in the large number of repetitions of phrases and examples which came to light as soon as the § groupings began to take shape. This in itself is valuable evidence for which one would normally look to a philological study. Another advantage for the present enquiry is that negative evidence is more easily revealed by such a method. Odd gaps in knowledge or comment are only betrayed by accident, but are often as significant as positive evidence. The temptation to apply statistical methods has at times been too strong to resist altogether, but as a general rule such an application of scientific criteria to a work which seems in some ways the antithesis of all scientific composition has not been stressed. One unavoidable result of our method is that the same text has often to do multiple duty, but in the nature of things this is likely to happen with such a writer as Rabelais.

The divisions of this work have been dictated solely by convenience, but though as arbitrary as most can be justified a posteriori in that they reproduce the main headings of Scholastic thought, with modifications imposed by the nature of Rabelais' book. The first group of chapters deals with the hierarchy of the Universe, from God, through man to the elements of matter, considering the nature and

functions of each as revealed in Rabelais' work. The next group examines particular aspects of man's life, religious, philosophical, social, and concludes with a chapter on the actual characters of the work as examples of mankind. These two groups together attempt to answer the first question; what was Rabelais' thought? The minor of our syllogism is provided by two chapters, one dealing summarily with the treatment of Classical authors in Rabelais, the other giving as comprehensive a picture as possible of the background with which Rabelais' years as a Franciscan is assumed to have made him familiar. The conclusion sets the findings of the first part against those of the second, and offers a tentative estimate of their relationship.

During the first part of this study a certain number of Scholastic and other references are made as they occur, but the main intention is to set forth as continuous and coherent a picture of Rabelais' thought as the available material permits. Comment can obviously not be avoided altogether, but so far as it can be done, we have tried to conduct an objective enquiry, of which the findings would still have value, regardless of the constructions placed upon them here. With the sole exception of the Pan story, unique in some respects, no search for exact sources has been attempted. We believe, indeed, that any efforts in that direction are misplaced, since a vast body of Scholastic thought and writing was a common quarry for innumerable commentators and even original thinkers, whom one cannot hope to identify with certainty. What we have constantly had to bear in mind is that

Rabelais' text is too vague and general in the majority of cases to justify any detailed excursus into Scholastic origins. All criticism of this kind runs the risk of showing the traditional outcome to mountainous labour, and none more than where Rabelais is concerned. For this reason, though Rabelais may have had only passing acquaintance with the text of St. Thomas, we have not hesitated to quote from it, more accessible than that of Scotus, for general opinions to which most Scholastics of all shades would have subscribed.

Because they are not usually helpful to this enquiry, the many allegories and satirical chapters whose meaning is still in dispute have not been considered in any detail. For the same reason, every effort has been made to avoid polemic for its own sake. There are inevitably many points on which we disagree with other critics, but unless they directly touch the problems under review by proposing an accepted opinion contrary to our own, they have generally not been mentioned. It is fortunate from this point of view that the field of the present work has not been over-cultivated by others.

There is one important and deliberate omission from this study; nothing has been said of Rabelais' medical training and knowledge. The subject has been dealt with several times by experts,<sup>5</sup> and it is not likely that any novel contribution could be made by a layman. Although Rabelais' medical studies must have brought him into contact with many Scholastic theories, especially on scientific subjects, they came a good many years after his initial Scholastic

training and cannot therefore be regarded as a primary source of knowledge. There is no doubt that such theories as had been adopted by the medical authorities of the day (e.g. the microcosm) won thereby a privileged position in Rabelais' eyes, acquiring a new respectability independent of their Scholastic origin. For this reason it has seemed pointless to include Rabelais' views on physiology, anatomy &c. which accord perfectly well with Scholastic teaching but whose appearance in his work is almost certainly due to a later period in his life. The limits of what Rabelais' thought owed to medicine can be defined clearly enough, and the omission should not affect our main conclusions.

Ideally each edition of the respective books should have been studied separately, and the changes carefully noted. While this has been done in the more vital cases, it has not been adopted as a general principle simply for reasons of length. The latest edition of each book has been followed, and the QL of 1548 also taken into account. For convenience page references are given to the one volume edition of Rabelais' works in the Pléiade series, whose text has been reproduced as faithfully as possible. It goes without saying that the great Lefranc edition has been consulted for the first three books, and that of Marichal for the QL, but no attempt has been made at textual emendation. The CL has been considered in a separate chapter, as its authenticity is still so controversial, and no conclusions have been drawn which rely one way or the other on its status.



## CHAPTER ONE

## GOD

Supreme in the hierarchy of Rabelais' universe is God, and it is logically with God that any examination of Rabelais' world-picture must begin. Ignoring for the present any specifically doctrinal questions, we find a surprisingly detailed conception of God in the work. There is hardly a page where the name of God is not, in a Mosaic sense, taken in vain, and with this we are obviously not concerned. There are besides innumerable references to God in various contexts, illuminating in themselves, but mentioning 'Dieu' only without any particular attribute, and these too are of no immediate concern. In this chapter we shall deal only with the definitions of God, of which there are two given actually as definitions, and with his names, of which more than a dozen occur in the four books, sometimes alone and sometimes combined with one or more others. More than a literary habit is at stake in the choice of God's names. The 16C had seen, if anything, an increase in the interest shown from the earliest times in Dionysius' work on the Divine Names, translated early in the century by Lefèvre d'Étaples.

The first of these definitions comes in the TL (XIII/393): "---ceste infinie et intellectuelle sphere, le centre de laquelle est en chascun lieu de l'univers, la circonferance point (c'est Dieu selon la doctrine de Hermes Trismegistus) à laquelle rien ne advient, rien ne passe, rien ne dechet, tous temps sont presens---". The context is a long exposition by Pantagruel, always Rabelais' most reliable witness, of divination by dreams, which he explains by

the participation of the soul during sleep "de sa prime et divine origine", and the contemplation of the sphere just described. Coming as it does in an unusually detailed and coherent chapter, the definition carries even more weight than if it were isolated. That it was found striking is certain; the author of the CL, Rabelais or another, repeats it ~~X~~ almost identically (but without the attribution to Hermes) in the final chapter, and M. Lefranc<sup>(1)</sup> quotes other 16C instances of the same ~~XX~~ definition. The question of source can probably never be solved in this case, and as usual Lefranc argues more brilliantly than convincingly. The only certain facts are that the definition is not by Hermes, but is first found in the pseudo-Hermetic and anonymous 13C 'Liber XXIV Philosophorum', quoted by Alain de Lille and used thereafter by very many authors,<sup>(2)</sup> including notably SS. Thomas and Bonaventura, and Cusa, usually giving Hermes as their source. The most economical hypothesis is that Rabelais saw the comparison in Bonaventura,<sup>(3)</sup> if not in other Scholastic authors as well, while still a member of the order which derived its chief spiritual nourishment from the Seraphic Doctor. On what occasion, if any, this quotation was recalled to Rabelais' mind is surely irrelevant; its Scholastic ancestry is so large and well-established that attempts to explain Rabelais' version in the same way as that of Marguerite ignore completely their respective backgrounds. Apart from the fascinating, but quite otiose, speculation as to its source, this definition of Rabelais' is extremely interesting in itself. The neo-Platonic inspiration

hardly needs the pseudo-authority of Hermes for us to recognise it. God's place outside space and time, his independence of matter, his omniscience, all come out from this comparison of the sphere. The definition is, of course, incomplete in that it makes no mention of God's active powers, and for this very reason it is especially interesting in this book of action.

The other definition is less complicated and more obviously Christian. Arriving at the island of Papimanie, Pantagruel and his companions are asked: "L'avez-vous veu?", referring to "Celluy qui est", who is shown subsequently to be the Pope. Once more it is Pantagruel himself who speaks: "Celluy qui est par nostre theologicque doctrine est Dieu. Et en tel mot se declaira à Moses. Oncques certes ne le veismes, et n'est visible à ealz corporels." No ingenious arguments or painstaking research are necessary to prove the outstanding importance of this definition for the Scholastics. To-day perhaps no more than a familiar quotation from Exodus, for the 16C as for the whole Middle Ages "Celluy qui est" would at once be recognised as the mainspring of Scholastic philosophy. A curious coincidence, but one of a kind extremely frequent in Rabelais, is that only a couple of pages further on Homenaz, Bishop of Papimanie, quotes another text from Exodus and immediately afterwards the Delphic inscription "EI", subject of one of Plutarch's dialogues. That Rabelais consciously or unconsciously put these ontological texts so near is the strongest indication of a deeply rooted training in Scholastic philosophy. (4) Since the "EI" quotation is

passed without comment from either side, it is not possible to judge how far Rabelais wished to draw attention to one of his fundamental beliefs, the continuity and identity of pagan and Christian (or Jewish) ideas, but it is legitimate to note the coincidence for future reference.

These two definitions, one from each of the TL and QL, have nothing necessarily in common, but are perfectly consistent with each other. It remains to see how far the various names and attributes accorded to God throughout the work fit in with these definitions. <sup>(1)</sup> Statistics can be used to demonstrate almost anything, and no finality is claimed for these which follow, but they do at least show a remarkable degree of consistency. God is called 'bon' about 11 times in the work, 'seigneur' or 'souverain' the same number of times, both results to be expected, but more surprising is the fact that 'servateur' occurs no less than 12 times, about half of them referring to Christ, as well as 'sauveur' (2) and 'conservateur' (2). An odd detail is that 'Gargantua' is the only book in which 'sauveur' is to be found and 'servateur' not. More than half the instances of 'servateur' are in the QL. Next in order of frequency is 'createur' (or 'plasmateur'), found 8 times evenly spread through the work, and found also in the minor works of the early period. Other names are 'eternel' (3), 'protecteur' (3), 'juste' (3), 'grand' (5), 'tout puissant, omnipotent' (3), and such particular titles as 'dateur de tous biens' (3), 'le Dieu Sabaoth', 'le tres hault Dieu des cieulx'. This not inconsiderable list is mildly surprising in itself.

in view of the general tone of Rabelais' work and the fact that his age was hardly one in which incursions into theology could be undertaken lightheartedly.

The most evident feature of this catalogue is that attributes of essence are far outnumbered by attributes of activity. Indeed, 'bon, grand eternal', with a single mention of 'vivant', are about the only ones, and the first two are often linked with an active name. The contrast with the two definitions just quoted comes from the complementary, not the contradictory, nature of the list.

Much the most interesting title of all is 'servateur', for which Rabelais clearly had a marked predilection. The word is very rare in French (Cotgrave does not even give it and he knew his Rabelais well) and is an obvious Latinism. In Latin, however, the word is also restricted in use. Mediaeval and contemporary Church Latin used either 'Salvator' (whence the usual French 'sauveur') or 'conservator' (found Gallicised in Rabelais). To find the word used at all frequently one must either go back to Classical Latin or to the works of those humanists who tried to imitate it. The linguistic authorities equate the word with the Greek  $\Sigma\Omega\tau\eta\rho$ , but theologically this is not much help. At least six times Rabelais uses the word of Christ (and as we have seen avoids 'sauveur'). A very fine shade of meaning is suggested by the one instance of (QL. LXIV/743) 'le bon Dieu, nostre Createur, Servateur, Conservateur', and elsewhere the idea of preservation rather than of salvation seems to be indicated. Rabelais' choice of the word is doubtless

prompted by his desire to use Classical instead of mediaeval forms, and was very probably encouraged by some such humanist practise as that recommended by Budé (apparently following Gregory Nazianzen):<sup>(6)</sup> "Jesus autem ipse Christus numquam sine praefatione Servatoris hominum a nobis appellandus." Polydore Vergil goes even further in a not wholly accurate statement of etymology.<sup>(7)</sup> "Jesus, id est servator, et Christus, hoc est rex." Unfortunately the ideas which this Classical word has to express are foreign to its history, and despite such statements as these we are left with only a partial theory of Rabelais' attitude. On balance it looks as though eternal salvation was more in his mind than just preservation from earthly ills, either of which meanings the word could bear.

The frequent incidence of 'seigneur, souverain, roy' (altogether equalling 'servateur') is not strange, and the context (often political) as well as the form of Rabelais' <sup>work</sup> <sub>λ</sub> modelled on the romans de chevalerie, account for it. More interesting is 'createur', of which the theological and philosophical significance cannot be overlooked. In fact, 'createur' and 'servateur' together (a combination found three times in the work) supply the active complement of the ontological definitions. It is particularly in 'Gargantua', the most unequivocally Evangelical of all the books, that the creative power of God is emphasised, and we find such phrases as (VI/46) "à Dieu rien n'est impossible", (XX/83) "Dieu seul peult faire choses infinies", (XL/I42) "Dieu nous faict en telle ferme et telle fin---que faict un potier ses vaisseaulx", with similar expressions in the minor works of the period. It is not

suggested for a moment that any doctrinal, or rather sectarian, significance is to be attached to this emphasis, but simply that Rabelais at a period of some religious fervour (which Calvin seems to confirm in the famous passage from 'De Scandalis') was particularly conscious of the creative power of God, certainly a revelation he did not owe to the Reformers.

In all these names there are surprising stresses and surprising omissions. God as Father of all is not mentioned, though there are two references (Garg. LVII/186) "Dieu par son cher fils" and (Pant. VIII/225) "Dieu le Père"; God as truth is never mentioned (this is very odd; cf. chapter on Spirits), though his omniscience is brought out by the definition of the sphere. Taken as a purely factual record over so long a period (1532-1552) in so many contexts and usually unpremeditated, these names show a considerable degree of consistency, and seem to tally more closely with a constant attitude of mind than with a random selection. (8)

Though the Trinity itself is nowhere mentioned--outside purely religious writings one would hardly expect it--Our Lord is mentioned several times and the Holy Spirit at least once. The greatest number of references is in 'Gargantua'. Three come together in the chapter which discusses white as a symbol of joy (X/56): "la Transfiguration de Nostre Seigneur" and "la Resurrection & du Sauveur et son Ascension". Frère Jan in a sincere and by no means farcical speech recalls Our Lord's seizure by the Jews in the garden, Gargantua himself, in the last chapter (LVIII/186), speaks of: "celluy qui tousjours tendra au

but au blanc que Dieu, par son cher filz, nous a prefix!" In addition the first editions of 'Gargantua' include a mention not repeated in later ones (VI/44): "Dieu (c'est Nostre Sauveur) dict en l'Evangile Jean. 16. ---" where the phrasing is interesting as applied to Christ. In 'Pantagruel' (the only reference is in the famous letter of Gargantua to his son (VIII/225): "l'heure du jugement final, quand Jesus-Christ aura rendu à Dieu le père son royaume ---", and this has been fully commented on by Gilson.<sup>(9)</sup> To the same period belongs the Almanach for 1535 where we read (930): "vous convient souhaiter (comme S. Pol disoit Philipp. 1: Cupio dissolvi et esse cum Christo) que vos asmes soient hors mises cette chartre tenebreuse du corps terrien et jointes à Jesus le Christ." All these references of the early period are either quotations or paraphrases from Scripture, and reflect the same phase of religious preoccupation which also produced the texts on God's creative power. The significance of these texts is not great, except in that they show the most normal orthodoxy, and all we can say from them is that Rabelais gives every sign of having been a devout Christian at the time.

Very different is the tone of the TL and QL. By then Scriptural quotations tended to be taken as a shibboleth of the now established Reform, and St. Paul in particular was a dangerous authority. Friendly references to the Reform (that at least of Geneva) are quite absent, replaced by one or two pointed attacks. With the crystallisation of the religious situation into two powerful opposing factions, Rabelais' earlier fervour gives way to caution, if not disill-



usi<sup>o</sup>ment. All the more valuable are the rare indications of his thoughts concerning Christ. In the QL there is a completely anodyne reference to little Zacchaeus, who wished to see (Prol./547) "Nostre benoist Servateur autour de Hierusalème", with a gibe at the supposed relics of Zacchaeus, alias S. Sylvain, preserved at S. Ayl near Orleans. Apart from this there seem to be only two references to Christ, one in each book. By one of those coincidences which it is almost axiomatic to demand in Rabelais, the two references deal with the same problem, but are so widely separated that the connexion must be assumed to lie only in Rabelais' sub-conscious mind. In the TL the question arises of consulting oracles for advice in Panurge's marital problems. The erudite Epistemon gives a list of some of the better known oracles of antiquity and comments (XXIV/437): "Mais vous sçavez que tous sont devenus plus mutz que poissons depuys la venue de celluy roy servateur en quel ont prins fin tous oracles et toutes propheties." There will be more to say in a later chapter about the oracles and their silence, but the point here is that this is the first time that we find Rabelais linking Christianity and paganism. Christ, "celluy roy servateur", is a historical figure, not the hero of a particular religion's devotional chronicles. At his coming the pagan oracles and the Jewish prophets alike lost their raison d'être and were silent. The idea that the Christian era fulfilled and supplanted the pagan era, with all that was best in it, is not original, nor even a discovery of the Renaissance. The earliest, and in the 16C recently re-pep-

ularised treatment of this theme is in Eusebius' 'Praeparatio Evangelica', whose choice of texts is quite parallel with Rabelais' own and from whom he may have derived more than textual borrowing. The Thomist adaptation of Aristotle is also built primarily on such an assumption. This single sentence is more significant and suggestive of a personal philosophy than all the previous texts just mentioned. What confers on it quite unique importance is its relationship to another text published some six years later---the Pan chapter which marks in many ways the highest point of Rabelais' thought.

The Pan story will be examined in another chapter on its many implications, but in its direct bearing on Rabelais' ideas about Christ something may be said of it here. The titles used (XXVIII/640) are "celluy grand Servateur des fidèles", "nostre unique Servateur", "le grand Pasteur"<sup>(10)</sup> and the eloquent elaboration of the name Pan: "le nostre tout, tout ce que sommes, tout ce que vivons, tout ce que avons, tout ce que esperons est luy, en luy, de luy, par luy," There are two points relevant to the present question. First is the greatly expanded but essentially similar treatment of the theme just seen in the TL of the continuity between pagan and Christian eras, whereby a pagan author (Plutarch) is quoted as providing unwitting testimony of the historicity of the Gospels. The other lies in the unusually devout apostrophe to Our Lord. The place of Christ in the universe is affirmed here in philosophical, not religious, terms, and brings out the transition effected in Rabelais' thought between the first two and second two books.

If the religious fervour is less evident in the second period, such passages as this show that the deepest intellectual foundations now underlie Rabelais' faith, where it may be suspected a more partisan spirit had earlier prevailed. At all events, this chapter of the QL blends all the elements to be found scattered elsewhere into a carefully reflected attitude to Christ: The use of pagan authors, even of pagan religions, in confirming the universality of Christ's power, the historical concord between the Gospels and independent pagan witnesses, finally the supreme place of Christ in the existence of those who profess his faith.

For the sake of completeness, the single mention of the Holy Spirit should also be recorded. That there is but one reference is not very strange; even in religious contexts, the third person of the Trinity, by definition the most abstract, is seldom mentioned. It is not altogether unexpected that this reference should come during a religious discussion in 'Gargantua'. Frère Jan's presence has prompted a debate on monks, whom Gargantua declares quite useless in the world. He denies that even if they did pray as they should their prayers would be of any use: (XL/141) "Tous vrais christians---en tous lieux, en tous temps, prient Dieu et l'Esperit prie et interpelle pour iceulx, et Dieu les prent en grace." The attack on monasticism and intercessory prayer is unmistakably partisan, but the same cannot very <sup>well</sup> be said of the rôle assigned to the Spirit, which appears perfectly orthodox (and Pauline).

Several other aspects of Rabelais' theology do

not properly belong to this chapter, and will be considered in others. What may be called the ways of God to man, his Providence and grace, with the question of will, as well as the ways of man to God, in prayer and reverence, are more conveniently treated under the separate headings 'Providence' and 'Religion'. If general conclusions can be drawn from these scattered texts about God, first of all must come their consistency. Emphasis changes in a man's work, just as it does in his life, and the 20 years of Rabelais' literary output saw changes of the most fundamental nature in the life of all civilised Europe, let alone of his own. Nevertheless, such contrasts as there are seem to spring from complementary, not contradictory ideas. The development of the work, to be seen in its very style, is most clearly towards a more intellectual position in the later books, and a continued use of earlier expressions would thus be more strange than the modifications which do in fact exist. At the same time, the previous marked preoccupation with simple Scriptural ~~XXXXX~~ ideas cannot reasonably be assumed to have disappeared from Rabelais' mind because or when it disappeared from his work. Here, as in almost every case to be studied, the pattern is of a synthesis, rejecting nothing once uttered and always striking roots deeper into the subsoil of philosophy. In the two definitions of God, in the two parallel texts about Christ, the TL and QL are exactly similar, and amplify in exactly the same way the more direct and Scriptural texts of the first two books and the contemporary minor works. There is not one instance in any of the four books where

one text concerning God conflicts with another, not one where haphazard composition betrays itself, and on these grounds alone it can be claimed that Rabelais' thought was complete, coherent and consistent throughout the years of his literary activity. To what extent this thought can be proved continuous with his training as a novice and priest, friar and monk, is more controversial, but, in the absence of any contrary evidence, it may at least be postulated that Rabelais' views on the Godhead as seen in his work are based on his Scholastic training and represent no important departure from it.

CHAPTER TWO  
THE SPIRIT WORLD

Nature could never abhor a vacuum more than did the philosophers of the ancient world. The detailed and complex hierarchy of beings which they set up between God and man was no fruit of idle speculation, but the expression of a fundamental law governing their mental operations. When the more precise doctrines of Christianity replaced the hospitable syntheses of paganism, this law continued to operate and in the main the only development is one of terminology. With the curious atmosphere of the Renaissance, the law still obtained and only a fresh confusion of terminology marked the new fashion for things antique, practised by those whose closer heritage was more persistently in their minds than their protests of disavowal suggest. A priori it can be asserted that all Rabelais could learn in addition to normal Scholastic teaching on spirits would be detail, either historical or verbal, and no new principles whatever need<sup>to</sup> be postulated. To a Classical scholar coming upon Scholasticism, the problem is quite different, but the case must be rare and is not that of Rabelais. As far as the work, though most probably not the personal philosophy, of Rabelais is concerned, the first two books show a conception of the spirit world in line with popular beliefs of the time and with only infrequent hints of a systematic philosophy underlying it. Not unnaturally, the evil spirits play a more prominent part than the good; contemporary speech too quoted devils at least as often as God.

Typical of purely popular, even farcical (in a

dramatic sense) notions are the references in the last chapter of 'Pantagruel', announcing the forthcoming attractions (XXXIV/333): "comment Pantagruel combatit contre les diables et fist brusler cinq chambres d'enfer---et getta Proserpine au feu, et rompit quatre dentz à Lucifer et une corne au cul." The mixture of Classical and Biblical mythology was an old mediaeval popular tradition. In similarly popular vein, though nearer realism than romance, is the scene in 'Gargantua' where Gymnaste is challenged by the enemy captain (XXXV/126): "Agios ho Theos. Si tu es de Dieu, sy parle! Si tu es del'Aultre, sy t'en va!" and having thrown the enemy into confusion, he makes them flee crying: "c'est un lutin ou un diable ainsi deguisé. Ab hostile maligno libera nos, Domine." Panurge uses the same formula of exorcism with more success (Pant. XIV/251): "Mais je fis le signe de la croix, criant: Agyos athanatos, ho Theos! Et nul ne venoit." These amateur attempts at exorcism need not be taken as unduly exaggerated for literary purposes; the evil eye is still a potent enough fear in many places to this day. The incidents are entertaining illustrations of contemporary superstition, but no more than that on the intellectual plane.

Still popular, but now quite serious, are the words of Grandgousier to the pilgrims returning from their journey to placate St. Sebastian. He attacks those who attribute evil powers (in this case plagues) to particular saints, saying (Garg. XLV/153): "Blasphément- ilz en ceste faç, en les justes et saintz de Dieu qu'ilz les font semblables aux diables qui ne font que mal entre les humains, comme Homère escript que

la peste fut mise en l'oust des Gregeys par Apelle, et comme les poetes feignent un grand tas de Vejoves et dieux malfaisans?" Here something like a thought can be seen behind the words; the appeal to pagan authors for confirmation of a purely Christian argument is not fortuitous, and, as we know, will form the basis for much of the theory in the TL and QL.

Several other references to devils belong to popular tradition and add nothing to this study.<sup>(1)</sup> Of a more erudite nature are such statements as this quotation from Ficino<sup>(2)</sup> (Garg. X/57): "Plus dict que en forme leonine ont esté diables souvent veuz, lesquelz à la presence d'un coq blanc soubdainement sont disparuz." Another, of Scholastic inspiration, is when Panurge asks (Pant. XVIII/274): "Y-et-il homme tant sçavant que sont les diables?" --- Non, vrayement (dist Pantagruel) sans grace divine especiale."<sup>(3)</sup> This last is the most interesting so far, partly because Pantagruel is normally the mouthpiece for Rabelais' own views, and partly because of the systematic thought it presupposes. The ministers of evil, as spirits, are higher in the plane of knowledge than men, who can, however, on occasion draw on help from God to overcome them.

Two more references from 'Gargantua' are equally promising. In the very first chapter a theme is stated which Rabelais was still embroidering twenty years later (I/30): "les diables (ce sont les calumnieurs et caffars)." This parenthesis, prompted originally on philological grounds, must have appealed to him, and may eventually have coloured his thought on the subject of evil. In this instance, the inclusion of



"caffars" indicates the jeu de mets, and the context is not really diabelological. Deeply embedded in his philosophy, though, is Rabelais' next mention of the idea. Ulrich Gallet concludes his Ciceronian harangue to Picrochole by enumerating the possible motives for his aggression, of which the last is (XXXI/II6): "si l'esperit calumniateur, tentant à mal te tirer, eust par fallaces espèces et phantasmes ludificatoires mis en ton entendement que envers toy eussions fait choses non dignes de nostre ancienne amitié--". The mechanics of this deception have been fully explained by Gilson,<sup>(4)</sup> and there is no need to dwell further here on the very technical Scholastic doctrines represented. The idea which recurs is that of the devil, "l'esperit calumniateur", deceiving, not compelling man against his will, but falsifying the evidence presented to the will by the understanding.

The information about angels in the first two books is much more sketchy, and amounts to little more than passing mentions. Pantagruel in his prayer before battle calls on God (Pant. XXIX/313): "qui as mille milliers de centaines de millions de legions d'anges duquel le moindre peut occire tous les humains et tourner le ciel et la terre à son plaisir, comme jadis bien apparut en l'armée de Senaccherib." With allowances for gigantic arithmetic, the words are substantially these of the Bible.<sup>(5)</sup> There is another Biblical reference in 'Gargantua' (X/57) when Raphael's appearance before Tobias is quoted to illustrate a point quite irrelevant here. This particular book seems to have appealed to Rabelais, who quotes the same chapter again in the TL (XVII/407) and a little

earlier, in the Almanach for 1533X, had quoted ch. XII. Finally, for the sake of a complete record, mention may be made of Grandgousier's parting words to the pilgrims (XL/154): "Vous aurez la garde de Dieu, des anges et des saintz avecques vous." As far as angels are concerned, Rabelais in his first period shows the most orthodox views, but is apparently not very interested in the intricate problems involved.

With the TL a very much fuller picture begins to take shape. From the first words of the book, with the dedicatory poem "A l'esprit de la royne de Navarre" the unseen world plays a prominent part. Antique and Christian demonology appear side by side, until in the QL a whole group of chapters is given over to a synthesis at once incredibly complex and infinitely suggestive.

The hierarchy of evil spirits includes, not unnaturally, some of the popular elements from the earlier books. The lively episode of Papefigue introduces us to the mediaeval world of demon-king and ~~XXXXXXXX~~ imps apprentice, with certain topical accretions. Lucifer gives permission for his junior assistant to visit the island (QL, XLVI/684), a little later we read of his varied diet, of his "plein chapitre" and other personal details. All this belongs to the world of mediaeval imagery, the picturesque details in glass and stone, in MS illumination, as well as to the popular theatre. It would, however, be a mistake to dismiss it outright like the similar references at the end of 'Pantagruel'. Not so very long before, Luther's reputed encounter with the devil in person had not been generally treated as pure fantasy, and

even when Lucifer was a figure of fun, his existence was not called in doubt.

More philosophical is an explanation of how things in themselves indifferent are right or wrong; Pantagruel says (TL.VII/374): "---bien, si bonne est, et par le esprit monde reiglée l'affection; mal, si hors aequité par l'esprit maling est l'affection depravée." A few chapters further on he uses a similar idea, disagreeing with Panurge's interpretation of the Sibylle's words (XIX/416): "L'esprit maling vous seduyt, mais ecoutez."

The idea of deception (intellectual and thence moral) is the most frequently found of those connected with the works of darkness. An interesting text comes at the end of Pantagruel's extremely erudite discourse on dreams (TL.XIV/402): "souvent l'ange de Sathan se transfigure en ange de lumière, <sup>(6)</sup>---l'ange maling et seducteur au commencement resjouist l'homme, enfin le laisse perturbé, fasché et perplex." Here the idea of "seduction" is linked with the notion of a Satanic hierarchy, practising deception by assuming the guise of their angelic counterparts. As so often in Rabelais, the idea lingered, and the same Pauline text is quoted again, this time by Epistemen in connexion with the record of Brideye (XLIV/507): "la fraulde du Calumniateur infernal, lequel souvent se transfigure en messagier de lumière" The deception is this time attributed to the Devil himself, and not just to one of his emissaries, but the idea is the same. Two verbal points may be noted from the comparison of these two texts:--"l'ange" becomes "messagier", and "Sathan" "Calumniateur". The difference

is purely a verbal one, but in the case of the second marks so strong a personal predilection on the part of Rabelais, that, as already suggested, it may eventually have coloured his thought.

We have already seen in 'Gargantua' that the jeu de mots on 'diable' was originally literary, and the QL gives two more examples of deliberate emphasis laid on the philological aspect. In the Ancien Prologue there is a long development which may explain this emphasis (755):

"Si ---entendez les calumnieateurs de mes escripts, plus aptement les pourrez-vous nommer diables. Car en grec calumnie est dictediabole. Voyez combien attestable est davant Dieu et des anges, ce vice dict calumnie (c'est quand on impugne le bienfait, quand on mesdict des choses bonnes) que par iceluy non par autre, quoyque plusieurs sembleroient plus enormes, sont les diables d'enfer nommez et appellez."

There follows much more about these personal enemies of Rabelais whom he continues to call "diables". In an age when philology and religion were so closely linked, and equally dangerous for deviationists, there would be nothing strange in Rabelais taking the 'calumnie-diabole' equation just as seriously as appears from this text. As one might expect, a second direct reference to the Greek origin of the word is to be found, in the dedicatory Epitre to Odet de Chatillon of some four years later, again in connexion with his enemies (542): "l'esprit calumnieateur, c'est Δικβολη."

The Devil himself appears once more in the TL, during a discussion on dice. Pantagruel says (XI/386): "Le maudict livre du Passetemps des dez feut, long temps a, inventé par le Calumnieateur ennemy; en Achaie ---faisoit jadis, de present en plusieurs lieux fait

maintes simples asmes errer et en ses lacz tomber." Of the knuckle-bones he adds: "Ce sont hamessons par lesquelz le Calumniateur tire les simples asmes à perdition eternelle." A facetious reference a moment later by Panurge to the apocryphal 'Liber de patria diabolerum' by Merlin Coccaie brings out the difference between the serious and the comic. Pantagruel's examples from pagan ages of the Devil's wiles are, of course, perfectly consistent with Christian teaching; Satan has been the same through the ages, and no new devil came to take his place at the time of the Christian revelation.

All these texts concern calumny or deception, or both, and since they are not related in context nor concentrated in any one part of the work may reasonably be taken as the expression of Rabelais' mature thought on the subject of evil. The most striking fact is the absence of any idea of sin as such, and the emphasis on the intellectual process by which men are impelled to do wrong. Falsification of motives, representation of evil inspiration as good, exploitation of simple souls, are so many ways in which the Devil does his work. The responsibility for erring is thrown squarely on the shoulders of men, who by vigilance can always outwit the forces of evil. Any suggestion that sin is predestined or outside man's control is completely inconsistent with what Rabelais says. He seems to be quite clear, however, that the powers of darkness are organised and that those who fall receive due punishment, though not necessarily in the popular Hell of 'Pantagruel'.

A rather specialised addition to the hierarchy

of evil is Antichrist, whose appearance is only fleeting but not without interest. As they leave Her Trippa, Panurge rails at the (TL.XXV/444) "sorcier au diable, enchanteur de l'Antichrist". A whole litany of Frere Jan's virile attribute follows, and then Frere Jan himself says (XXVI/447): "L'Antichrist est desja né, ce m'a l'en dict. Vray est qu'il ne faict enceres que esgratigner sa nourrisse et ses gouvernantes, et ne monstre enceres les thesaures, car il est enceres petit." It looks almost certainly as though Panurge's outburst had led Rabelais to add the second reference, which derives from the Scholastic tradition. The name was familiar enough as a term of abuse,<sup>(7)</sup> but the more recondite doctrines concerning the coming of Antichrist were hardly common property. The acquaintance with occult writers demonstrated by the chapter on Her Trippa was no doubt the occasion of Rabelais' temporary interest in this odd apocalyptic figure, but he would not have to go outside his own Order of Miners to find Roger Bacon seriously speculating as to the direction of Antichrist's eventual coming.<sup>(8)</sup>

Of the lesser ministers of the evil one, there are several mentions on a par with those of the earlier books, popular or farcical. To this category belongs the first part of Panurge's long protestation after Raminagrobis' dangerous words. All the old favourites are there, Preserpine, Lucifer, Demiourgon and much embroidery on well known diabolical themes besides. One phrase is worth noting as an example of Rabelais' constant habit of repetition (XXIII/430): "Je les oy (diablès) desja soy pelaudans et entrebattans en diables à qui humera l'asme

raminagrâbidicque, et qui premier, de brec en bouc, la portea à messer Lucifer." In the QL the Papefigue episode, already quoted, offers some more diabolology of this kind, including this phrase (XLVI/687): "(Lucifer) promist double paye et notable appoinctement à quiconque luy en apporterait une (asme de caffard) de brec en bouc." No significance attaches to these repetitions ~~repetitions~~ as regards their contents, but the fact that they so frequently occur is the strongest argument in favour of a static reservoir of ideas from which Rabelais drew over a period of years.

Panurge's discourse does not remain on this popular level, and towards the end he shows himself something of a connoisseur in diabolology. To be exact, he speaks of the time when he studied at Toledo, where (XXIII/433): "le Reverend Père en diable Picatris, recteur de la faculté diabolologique, nous disoit que naturellement les diables craignent la splendeur des espées aussi bien que la lueur du soleil." Examples from the Classics, from recent history, from "les massoretz et caballistes" follow in support of this theory. Panurge goes on:

"Car, parlant en vraye diabolologie de Tolete, je confesse que les diables vrayement ne peuvent par ~~XXX~~ coups d'espée mourir; mais je maintiens scelen la dicta diabolobgie qu'ilz peuvent pâtir solution de continuité, comme si tu couppeis de travers avecques ton bragmard une flambe de feu ardent ou une grosse et obscure fumée. Et crient comme diables à ce sentement de solution, laquelle leurs est dolereuse en diable."

He next describes the clamour and din of the battlefield:

"Mais le grand effroy et vacarme principal provient du dueil et ulement des diables, qui là gwestans pelle-melle les psœuvres asmes des blessés, reçoivent

coups d'espee à l'improviste et pâtissent solution en la continuité de leurs substances aérées et invisibles---."

Another echo of this comes in the Papefigue story, which ends thus (689): "Le diable, voyant l'énorme solution de continuité en toutes dimensions, s'escria: 'Mahon, Demiourgon, Megère, Alecto, Proserpine, il ne me tient pas!'" Apparently even when it is only anticipated, nothing is more frightening to devils than "solution de continuité". At all events, the verbal similarities between the two unrelated episodes are sufficiently close to suggest that Rabelais' Teledan authority was still in his mind half a dozen years later.

Which particular authority he had before him for this chapter is not very important; the doctrines were by no means confined to students of the occult. In St. Thomas Rabelais would have found<sup>(9)</sup>: "Daemenes, secundum Apuleium, sunt corpora aerea, animo passivo, mente rationalis, tempore aeterna." The essential details of Teledan diabolology are all there; "substances aérées et invisibles", immune from death by the sword because "tempore aeterna", and liable to pain and "solution de continuité" because "animo passivo". If an author so relatively indifferent to the niceties of diabolology as St. Thomas quotes these basic details, there is no need to look beyond standard Scholastic doctrine for the original thought in Rabelais' chapters, though the more recondite details no doubt came from later reading. Anyone trained in Scholastic ways would find no new ideas in Rabelais' exposition, and even if it is deliberately adapted for comic effect, the arguments and facts



contained in it would have won general acceptance. The question of Rabelais' personal beliefs on this, as on so many other subjects, must remain interesting but insoluble.

Far more involved than the nature of evil spirits is that of the good ones, and the change between the very cursory notices of the first two books and the others with their technically bewildering richness is at once obvious. Only in the case of angels can continuity be dimly seen running through the work. Two mentions of angels have already been noted in connexion with Satan---where the deception of the Devil clothing himself in the armour of light is exposed. The first of these contrasts the respective effects of the good and evil spirits (TL.XIV/402): "l'ange bening et consolateur, appareissant à l'homme, l'espevante au commencement, le console en la fin, le rend content et satisfait." The second (TL.XLIV/507) gives "messagier de lumière" instead of "ange" and thus points out once more Rabelais' fondness for changing between Greek, Latin and French synonyms. A third angelic reference comes from Pantagruel, who comments upon an anecdote of Alexander the Great refusing to hear an undistinguished adviser (TL.XVI/407): "Et peut-être que celluy homme esteit ange, c'est à dire messagier de Dieu envoyé, comme feut Raphael à Thobie." The philological parenthesis is typical, and the choice of an example is also interesting. The only other specific instance of angelic apparition to be found in the work has already been mentioned (in 'Gargantua') and is exactly the same as this. It is true that the book of Tobit

was not doctrinally dangerous, and being of an attractive literary and dramatic quality was more appreciated in the Middle Ages and 16C than other more edifying books of the Bible, but it is at least worthy of note that Gabriel, the angel of the Annunciation, and Michael, captain of the heavenly host, were certainly as well known as Raphael, and are yet not chosen for either of Rabelais' examples.

These three texts are all perfectly straightforward, and all drawn from Scripture. Of a very different character are those which follow. From the TL onwards Rabelais seems to delight in syntheses between ancient and modern, Classical and Christian, at first sight quite haphazard, but on closer inspection revealing a definite intention. It is idle to look for clearcut, logical method in Rabelais, but it is not too much to give him credit for broad consistency when this can reasonably be proved.

Introduced with the angels of darkness and light to fill the gap between God and man, come the figures of later Classical demonology, the daemones, heroes, genii. It is unlikely that Rabelais went further than Plutarch for his information, and that imprecise author's complexity does not help to produce those qualities of clarity without which demonology becomes more fanciful invention than real philosophy.

Typical of Rabelais' more mature attitude is the first text on the subject, from the first chapter of the TL (354): "De faict Hesiede en sa Hierarchie colloque les bons daemons (appelez-les, si voulez, anges ou genies) comme moyens et mediateurs des dieux et homes, superieurs des homes, inferieurs des dieux.

Et pour ce que par leurs mains nous adviennent les richesses et biens au ciel et sont continuellement envers nous bienfaisans, tousjours du mal nous prae-servans, les dict estre en office de reys, comme bien tousjours faire, jamais mal, estant acq̃e unicquement royal."

The quotation is in fact from Plutarch, who rather frequently invokes the authority of Hesiod. Most interesting for the light it throws on Rabelais' thought is the parenthesis "appelez-les---". Neither Hesiod nor Plutarch would, of course, have used the Christian (and Hebrew) notion of angels to explain their text, and the word "genies" supplies a Roman equivalent which adds nothing to the original but brings out the purpose of Rabelais' comment. For him the Christian truth is absolute, under no circumstances to be questioned or modified, but that is no reason for rejecting pagan ideas which appear fundamentally the same, and need only appropriate philological notes before they can be included in a general synthesis of thought extending on both sides of the Incarnation. The parenthesis may have seemed to Rabelais necessary as well as being a literary embellishment, because the Greek word 'daemon' had taken on a standard meaning from NT days, perpetuated in Latin and still current in modern French and English. A single example of this usage is a remark by Gargantua in the TL, speaking of the parents concerned in clandestine marriages (XLVIII/519): "Ilz, toutesfois, tant sent de craincte du Daemonet supersticesite espris---." The epithet 'ben' applied to a daemon would seem to all but the most learned

quite as paradoxical as, for instance, 'ben diable', but for Plutarch, and Plato before him, the daemons were spirits good or bad according to their nature. Both 'ange' and 'genie' can be equally qualified as evil, but otherwise are terms as generic as 'daemon'. The particular definition of daemons as intermediaries given here was basic for Plutarch, who seems to have been inspired by a text from the 'Symposium'<sup>(10)</sup>. The last of the functions ('du mal nous praeservent') is similar to the Christian idea of guardian angels, who in effect obviate the necessity for direct divine intervention in human affairs. One recalls the words of the Tempter in the wilderness:<sup>(11)</sup> "to give his angels charge over thee---."

The next text of this kind introduces a new element, the hardest of all to resolve satisfactorily. It comes in a very serious speech of Pantagruel concerning the gift of prophecy traditionally vouchsafed to dying men (TL. XXI/424): "---aussi les anges, les heroes, les bons daemons (selon la doctrine des platoniques) voyans les humains prochains de mort comme de pertres seur et salutaire---les saluent, les consolent, parlent avecques eulx et jã commencent leurs communicquer art de divination."

We knew already that the office of the "anges benigns" is to console, and here they are shown revealing the secrets of future things to men. The list now adds "heroes" to the previous one. "Les platoniques" seems once more to be Plutarch, or, of course, a modern Platonist commentator like Ficino, and "anges" is therefore an addition by Rabelais or another modern hand, made in the same sense as that of the

previous text. The idea of dying men having the power to prophesy had been acknowledged by others than the Platonists: "<sup>(12)</sup>Anima vicina mortis cognoscit aliqua futura ex revelatione vel ex impressione causarum naturalium, non autem propria virtute." Granted the earlier identification of "anges" and "bons daemons", the idea is normal enough, but the exact place of heroes is not easy to determine and can only be surmised after comparing one or two other texts.

The third occasion on which angels appear in unusual company is a crucial one for Rabelais' philosophy. Pantagruel and his companions have been having a long and serious discussion on immortality and kindred subjects, and the last words Pantagruel speaks before telling the great story of Pan and ending the discussion are these (QL. XXVII/639): "Je croy que toutes ames intellectives sont exemptes des cizeaulx de Atropes. Toutes sont immortelles: anges, daemons, et humaines." Coming as it does between two quotations from Plutarch, this phrase looks more like a personal profession of faith than most in Rabelais, and though the idea was naturally a common one, the exact choice of expressions suggests for once that Rabelais was relying on no external authority as a screen for his own belief. For Scholastic philosophy, angels were, like men, endowed with an 'anima intellectiva' as against the 'animae sensitivae' or 'vegetivae' of lower creatures. Similarly, daemones for the Classical authors (and indeed demons for the Christians) shared the same nature. The brevity of this particular text makes it problematic whether "daemons" is here meant

generically to cover both good and bad alike, or whether for once Rabelais is using the word in its more usual Scholastic sense. The preceding chapters give every indication that the first is the case, and that the phrase means in effect 'spirits, Christian or pagan, and human beings.' Though Rabelais' mind was anything but tidy, it must have seemed illogical to him that at least the good spirits of the pre-Christian world, neither denied nor even discussed by Scholastic thinkers, should have any different sort of existence from the eternal angels of Christianity. From a purely philosophical point of view, Platonian or Aristotelian spirits could be defined like any other part of creation and theological complications are secondary to intellectual unity.

This latter point is borne out by another text, from a purely pagan context. Panurge's famous praise of debt is to be taken no more seriously than anything else Panurge says, but it seems to bear witness to considerable erudition on Rabelais' part. With the cessation of debts, says Panurge (TL. III/363): "Juppiter---suspendera toutes les intelligences, dieux, dieulx, daemons, genies, heroes, diables, terre, mer, tous elemens." Though the devils are a little unexpected in this company, the angels are this time absent, and also, rather oddly, men. Just what heroes are meant to be is still not clear.

The Macraeon chapters bring a solution a little nearer, but not without adding their own complications. When Pantagruel discusses with the Macrobe about the island to which they have come, he hears (QL. XXVI/634): "En ceste obscure forest que voyez---est l'hab-

itation des Daemons et Heroes, lesquels sont devenus vieulx, et croyens---que hier en soit mort quelqu'un." Pantagruel pursues the topic, using the same simile of the candle as Plutarch, from whom the whole episode is taken, and gives as his own view: "Tout le temps qu'elles (les asmes nobles et insignes) habitent leurs corps est leur demeure pacifique---sus l'heure de leur discession---." There follows an account of the troubles noted abroad at that time. Pantagruel's words already help to clear up the confusion about heroes, and his precise choice of the word 'discession' in place of the Macrobian's 'mort' and 'trespas' is a variation not solely due to literary considerations. Still more helpful is the title of the chapter, "le Manier et Discession des Heroes". If the "Daemons" are not mentioned in the title it is extremely probable that it is because Rabelais (though not his source Plutarch) identified them here with 'heroes' and used the two words together without intending to describe two different classes of beings. However that may be, it is quite certain that daemons as such were not Rabelais' concern in this, the most considerable group of chapters in the whole work, where he sets forth what are unmistakably his own views on the subject of heroes. The titles of the following chapters demonstrate this at once; (XXVII) "Comment Pantagruel raisonne sus la discession des asmes heroïques", (XXVIII) "Comment Pantagruel raconte une piteyable histoire touchant le trespas des heroes." Nothing shows more clearly than this the difference between Rabelais' somewhat uncritical citation of Classical authorities and his definitive personal

philosophy. In the case of the "bens daemens" he supplied his own interpretation ("anges et genies"), here in the case of heroes he gives two examples as well as an explanation---Guillaume du Bellay and Pan.

As a later chapter is devoted to the story of Pan and the section preceding it, it is more convenient not to anticipate here, even at the risk of some incoherence. It can, however, be said that after several unsatisfactory instances of Rabelais' use of the word 'heroes', these chapters show that he finally had a perfectly clear conception of what he meant. For present purposes, the essential point is that Pantagruel (and by implication Rabelais) conceived heroes as having bodies plus souls of unusual excellence, which at some given moment are separated from the body, and in the words of Pantagruel (XXVII/637): "telles venerables ames laisseront leurs corps et la terre." Their future destination is also known: "les cieulx benevoles comme joyeux de la <sup>nouvelle</sup> reception de ces beates ames." Not only is this doctrine no longer vague, it is not even strikingly unorthodox. From it emerges a distinction which the Macrobian words do not necessarily belie---the daemons, like angels and genii, are pure spirits, while the heroes are at least temporarily endowed with a body. At last the synthesis begins to take on some recognisable shape, though it would be dishonest to pretend that the simplification is complete.

One last example from this section of the QL illustrates very well the difference between Rabelais' attitude to quoted authority and his own belief. Questioned by Frere Jan on the subject of immortality,



Pantagruel quotes (or rather, paraphrases) Plutarch again, who in his turn quotes Pindar, Hesiod and the Stoics. One of the sentences begins (XXVII/639): "Quant aux semi-dieux, Panes, Satyres, Sylvains, ~~Aegypanes~~, Folletz, Nymphes, Herces et Daemons---" and says their age is 9720 years. Frère Jan very reasonably exclaims: "Ce n'est point matière de breviaire. Je n'en croy sinon ce que vous playra." To this Pantagruel answers with his opinion already quoted: "Je croy que toutes asmes intellectives---sont immortelles---." The list of demi-gods and so on, enlarged from the original which only spoke of Naiads, is not taken seriously even by Frère Jan, and it would be a waste of time to seek in it any personal beliefs of Rabelais. It is a pity that other remarks are not provided with an equally reliable touchstone.

If this disposes moderately well of the herces, there remain the genii to be accounted for, and they present less difficulty. The equation of genii with angels and good daemons has already been quoted, and with that in mind it is possible to make further identifications. The learned Epistemon gives the key in a remark to Panurge about prophecy (TL.XXIV/437): "Aulcuns Platoniques disent que qui peut veoir son Genius peut entendre ses destinées. Je ne comprends pas bien leur discipline, et ne suys d'advis que y adhaerez." Jamblichus and Servius apparently advance this theory, but it is clearly enough in the tradition of Plutarch, with his famous accounts of genii in the 'Lives', so extensively used in 16C literature. The Genius is in this instance the personal spirit or daemon, not a general intermediary between God and man.

The same idea comes again in a special and celebrated connexion---the daemon of Socrates. Mentioned by Plato, this daemon inspired Plutarch to write a treatise with that title ('De Genie'). In Rabelais' day it must have been the best known of all Classical examples, as the prestige of Socrates, never wholly dimmed during the Middle Ages, had reached new brilliance at the time of the Renaissance. Rabelais twice refers to it, using the Greek 'daemon' instead of the Latin 'genius', but without doubt intending no distinction of meaning between the two.

The first text is a passing reference in a comic context. Nazdecabre, the deaf mute called in for consultation on Panurge's problem, has just sneezed, and Pantagruel says (TL.XX/421): "Cestuy esternuement (selon la doctrine de Terpsion) est le daemon socraticque---" The authority of Terpsion is misleading, as the whole sentence, including his name, is a literal translation from the dialogue of Plutarch just mentioned. It would entail a break with his usual habits of mind had not Rabelais subsequently recalled this interesting theory, and in the QL we find it again. This time the companions are debating whether to land on the island of Ganabin, when Pantagruel says (LVI/746):

"Je sens en mon asme retraction urgente, comme si feust une voix de loing ouye, laquelle me dict que ne y deibvons descendre. Toutes et quantes foys qu'en mon esprit j'ay tel mouvement senty, je me suis trouvé en heur, refusant et laissant la part dont il me retiroit, au contraire en heur pareil me suys trouvé, suyvant la part qu'il me pouloit, et jamais ne m'en repenty.  
-C'est (dist Epistemon) comme le Daemon de Socrates, tant celebre entre les Academiques."

The mechanics of this inner voice attributed to

Socrates and attested by several witnesses is thus explained by Pantagruel,<sup>(14)</sup> but it is perhaps significant that not he but Epistemon makes the comparison, the more so as the TL shows Pantagruel perfectly well aware of Socrates' reputed voice. Maybe Pantagruel took his inner prompting to be divine, directly or indirectly, but as the conversation stands one can only speculate.

So far the examples given of genii are director, virtually direct, borrowings from the Classics, and but for a fortunate coincidence we should have to be satisfied with that. As it is, in the 'Sciomachie', a very official and formal piece of writing which barely goes beyond description of events, one very helpful phrase occurs. The Sciomachie was part of the official celebrations held in Rome by Cardinal du Bellay on the occasion of the birth of a son to Henri II in 1550. Rabelais begins his account by speaking of the exact and circumstantial rumour of the birth, which apparently without any rational explanation circulated in Rome on the very same day, though it was seven days before official news reached the city from France. Rabelais comments (935): "Est un point sus lequel les Platoniques ont fondé la participation de divinité ès dieux tutelaires, lesquels nos theologiens appellent anges gardians." The 'dieux tutelaires' include almost certainly the genii and Socratic daemon mentioned elsewhere, and the typical parenthesis of "nos theologiens" supplies the final link in the chain. From the first text in the TL we know that genii are the same as angels and good daemons, and from this we now learn that they perform

the particular function of looking after one individual or group, which orthodox theologians attribute to guardian angels. "Angeli custodiant particulares homines, Arcangeli provincias, Principatus totam naturam humanam, Virtutes corpora, Potestates supra daemones, sed Dominationes supra bonos spiritus habent custodiam." <sup>(15)</sup> Complex as Plutarch's demonology may be, these words of Dionysius (here quoted from St. Thomas, but familiar to all Scholastics) show that the theory of guardian angels was still more intricate.

The ideas of Rabelais are admittedly not clearcut nor at first sight very systematic, but this investigation into his demonology reveals once more the basic consistency of all his thought, and shows too his constant preoccupation in the later books: to achieve some viable synthesis between Classical and Christian authorities. In every case Rabelais somewhere gives an indication of his own views, either by direct comment (as in the equation of "anges" and "bons daemons") or by implicit comparison (as in the case of du Bellay and the heroes). As it stands Rabelais' interpretation of the spirit world seems to be as follows; first come the angels, pure spirits and messengers of God on specific occasions, and normally understood in a Christian context. To these correspond in the non-Christian world the daemons, distinguishable like angels as good or evil, but always (with a single exception) taken by Rabelais to be good. Strictly speaking, both angels and daemons are generic terms for all the inhabitants of the spirit world, but generally Rabelais seems to treat angels at least as ranking higher than the next in the hierarchy,

the genii, the Socratic daemons, or the "dieux tutelaires" of the 'Sciomachie'. The distinction between Latin 'genius' and Greek 'daemon' corresponds to a limitation in function of the genii, which is quite inexact philologically, but which Rabelais finds convenient. These special functions do not affect the nature of genii, Socratic daemons and the rest, who are equally pure spirits. It does, though, allow the pagan conception of a personal spirit to be correlated with the Christian idea of guardian angels, without bringing in the uneasy question of divine (in a Christian sense) intervention which the associations of the word 'ange' might suggest.

Next come the heroes, who after some vague and general references are firmly enough defined as human souls of exceptional merit,<sup>(16)</sup> and as such endowed with a body of flesh and blood. Rabelais' cautious treatment of the Macrobe's speech (from Plutarch) compared with the eloquent account of du Bellay's death shows that in this case experience weighed more with him than Classical authority. It would be asking too much to look for explanatory texts on each of the many problems raised by Rabelais' scattered philosophy and here we can only hazard a guess at a rapprochement which might have been made. In an early text Grandgousier speaks of "les justes et saintz de Dieu" as opposed to "les diables", and it could be that had Rabelais ever thought out seriously his attitude to the Christian teaching on saints, he would have found it similar to his notions of heroes in general and du Bellay in particular.

This philosophy may be compared with that of

Hesiod as quoted by Plutarch: <sup>(17)</sup> "Primum Deos, mox Daemones, multos et bonos, deinde Heroes, postremo homines---" The hierarchy is plainly the same as Rabelais' with the primary change of monotheism for polytheism. The ideas, however, which follow in Plutarch's text diverge widely from Rabelais: "---ex hominibus in heroes praestantiores animi, ex heroibus in Daemones mutantur: ex Daemonibus autem animi perquam paucâ---divinitatem consequantur." There is no doubt that this thoroughgoing metempsychosis was entirely unacceptable to Rabelais, with the sole exception of the first transition. In quoting from his many sources, Rabelais gives the impression of offering the widest variety of doctrines in a quite indiscriminating way, but these passages in which his personal comments appear are sufficiently numerous to offset this impression. The method of assimilating as much Classical thought as possible into a mind well versed in Scholastic ways produces its own characteristic results.

Another comparison may help to assess the importance of Rabelais' early training in its application to Classical ideas on demonology. The famous poem by Ronsard, 'l'Hymne des Daimons', gives a good idea of how the themes discussed in this chapter are presented by an author who had a thorough Classical grounding but no more theology than was common to all educated men of the time. M. Cohen, who has edited Ronsard's works, considers: <sup>(18)</sup>

"Tout l'hymne est de nouveau d'inspiration plus médiévale qu'antique et rappelle les imaginations qu'ont peintes un Jérôme Bosch et un Breughel le vieux. Cependant influence de Michel Psellos (XIe.S.) Sur la puissance des démons, traduit en Latin par Marsile Ficin."

A good case could be made out for laying down as axiomatic that all Renaissance literature is in one sense "d'inspiration plus médiévale qu'antique", but there are limits to everything and a brief description of Ronsard's work may clarify the perspective.

The poet begins with an account of creation:

"Il(l'Eternel)peupla de poissons les abysmes de  
l'onde,  
D'hommes la terre,et l'air de Daimons,et les cieux  
D'AnGES,a celle fin qu'il n'y eust point de lieux  
Vuides en l'Univers---

Next are described the angels:"sans corps","francs de passions,non plus que luy(Dieu) ne meurent" and "qui cognoissent les ans tant passéz que futurs." All this is ordinary mediaeval teaching,and in line with what Rabelais says.

The Daimons follow:

"En l'estage de l'air dessous la lune espars,  
Tousjours remply de vents,de foudres et d'erages,  
Il logea les Daimons au milieu des nuages,"

The rest of the poem deals in great detail with the Daimons,their nature(bodies of air or fire),their ability to assume endless variety of shapes,their power to terrify men.Their intermediary status is made clear:

"Ils sont participans de Dieu et des humains:  
De Dieu comme immortels,des hommes comme pleins  
De toutes passions;"

Ronsard does not take the word in an exclusively bad sense any more than Rabelais:"Et sent bons ou mauvais tout ainsi qu'ils s'affectent." The good ones act as messengers from God and carry back our prayers to him (this is a theory of Plutarch);they show us in dreams:"De nos biens,de nos maux les signes veritables.D'eux vient la prophetie)))".There follow some Classical examples and then an impressive pic-

ture of the evil Daimons' activity. Numerous examples from mythology, Classical, Celtic, Germanic and other, show how versatile the Daimons are in land and sea, mountains and rivers, assuming infinitely varied names and guises, on occasion predicting the future. Against them there is only one remedy:

"-----ils craignent les couteaux,  
Et tremblant vent fuyant s'ils voyent une espée,  
De peur de ne sentir leur liaison coupée."

"Solution de continuité" is easily recognised in this less sonorous phrase. A few lines on Ronsard remembers another remedy:

"Mais si quelcun les tence au nom du ~~MIN~~Très -  
Puissant,  
Ils vont hurlant, criant, tremblant et fremissant,  
Et forcéz sont contraints d'abandonner la place."

These few extracts show that most of Ronsard's ideas are concerned with evil spirits, though he distinguishes more than once between good and bad Daimons within the various categories, and that most of Rabelais' theories about angels, devils, daemons and genii come into the poem somewhere. In effect, the poem is a comprehensive catalogue of everything Ronsard could remember about Daimons, arranged in fairly logical sequence by effects, elements and so on, but without the slightest attempt at synthesis. The introductory lines on the order of creation are soon forgotten in the artistic confusion of what follows, and there is no sign of one theory appealing more to Ronsard than another. His personal experience (e.g. in fighting off the Daimons with a sword) is given no more emphasis than the improbable stories from Norway. Quantitatively it is true that the poem contains more that is contemporary or non-Classical than not, and a few lines are mediaeval in their sketchy philosophy, but



if we admit with A. Cohen that Ronsard is here more mediaeval than antique, we must insist that mediaeval is not a synonym for Scholastic.

In Ronsard we find exactly what we do not find in Rabelais: an uncritical, if poetically excellent, selection of theories and legends with no philosophy to act as touchstone. Had the examples chosen come from antique sources, instead of from different popular mythologies, the balance would have swung almost entirely in favour of antique inspiration, except for the first and last few definitely Christian lines. The conclusion from all this is that a highly intelligent and cultured man like Ronsard, dealing with much the same material, contrary to all expectations leaves a far less coherent picture than Rabelais, who was consciously trying to express in terms of deeply rooted training the antique doctrines which came his way. Ronsard lacks a 'fil conducteur', and if Rabelais often seems to have lost his, he is always searching to pick it up afresh.

Considering that the original Pantagruel was a Celtic amp, causing thirst in his victims, it is remarkable how insignificant a place is occupied in the work by the various sprites, goblins, fairies and the rest of popular tradition in demonology. Rabelais' attitude to the naive animism of the people, who saw devils or spirits in every natural feature or phenomenon, affords a most striking contrast with Ronsard's poem. The reasons for this contrast are best left for a more general discussion, but to them must belong his Scholastic training. <sup>(19)</sup>

## CHAPTER THREE

PAN

The group of chapters in the QL immediately following the end of the partial edition has an exceptional interest for the study of Rabelais' thought. As a body of text, this section is as substantial as the Pantagruelion or Gaster chapters, which are equally homogeneous, or as the central consultations in the TL; the chapters deal with questions of fundamental importance, which the others do not; they represent the latest known state of Rabelais' mind on these problems, and even if the CL is claimed as authentic, it could be only a little later in composition; above all the sources for these chapters are comparatively easy to determine, or at least discuss, because the greater part is a close imitation of Plutarch and the comments interspersed throughout can be more satisfactorily accepted as Rabelais' own than is usually the case. The main questions at issue are closely related, and in discussing them it is impossible not to repeat some of what has been said elsewhere. Immortality, the meaning of comets and similar portents, the connexion between this world and the next, and finally a personal interpretation of the basic truth of Christianity are the issues treated in these chapters, and it need hardly be stressed that the latter alone demands the most rigorous examination if any convincing statement of Rabelais' religious views is to be made. The final chapter, on Pan, cannot be properly understood out of its context, and it is first necessary to trace the signs which lead to it.

A literary analysis provides some serious reason

for thinking that these particular problems of the QL had been in Rabelais' mind when he was writing the TL, and that he sketched a tentative approach there which bears some striking resemblance to the final version of the QL. To what extent the TL anticipates the QL, or the QL remembers the TL, it is impossible to say, but a common pattern can be established. In ch. XXI of the TL, in the series of consultations discussed by Pantagruel and tried by Panurge, the suggestion is made that Panurge should seek advice from a dying man, and better still, a dying poet. Pantagruel quotes the legend of the swan's song, and then the XX theory that poets, like swans under the special protection of Apollo, are also endowed in their last hours with the gift of prophecy. Leaving the realms of mythology, Pantagruel says: "J'ay dadventaige souvent ouy dire que tout homme vieulx, decrepit et près de sa fin, facilement divine des cas advenir." The reason for this is no longer fanciful but philosophical. Using the graphic simile of the mariners at sea watched by those on shore, Pantagruel continues:

"aussi les anges, les heroes, les bons dammons

(selon la doctrine des platoniques) voyans les humains prochains de mort comme de port très seur et salutaire, port de repous et de tranquillité hors les troubles et sollicitudes terriennes, les saluent, les conseilent, parlent avecques eulx et ja commencent leurs communiquer art de divination."

Some critics seem to think that "les platoniques" refers to the 'Phaedo', but Plutarch in 'De Genie' (ch. XXIV) has a very similar passage, and Rabelais may equally well have been thinking of this, though the whole chapter has reminiscences of the 'Phaedo'. Wherever Rabelais took his text, the idea is common to all

Platonists, and as an explanation of one form of prophecy may be compared with Rabelais' equally Platonic theory of dreams, where direct participation in God's wisdom rather than the mediation of spirits is made the cause of prophecy. In the previous chapter St. Thomas' text has been quoted: <sup>(1)</sup>"Anima vicina mortis cognoscit aliqua futura---", and it can be seen that the fact and to some extent the explanation stated by Rabelais is not in this instance a marked break with Scholastic tradition. The spirits, angels and even demons for the Scholastics, daemones and heroes for the pagans, and all of them for Rabelais, were generally admitted to know future contingents, and therefore their communication of this knowledge to these souls so shortly to become pure spirits presented no serious doctrinal difficulty.

The following paragraph is already a strong indication that something more than abstract philosophical speculation is at stake. Pantagruel quotes some Biblical and Classical examples of his thesis, and then:

"seulement vous veulx ramenteveir le docte et preux chevallier Guillaume du Bellay---lequel on mont de Tarare mourut -- l'an 1543---. Les treys et quatre heures avant son decès il employa en parolles vigoureuses, en sens tranquil et serain, nous præ disant ce que depuys part avous veu, part attendons a venir---."

The confident expectation that the rest of Langey's prophecy would be fulfilled was all the more remarkable for the absence of any sign or hint at the time which might have led them to expect the events predicted. We know that Langey made a deep impression on those with whom he came into contact, and contemporary historians like Sleidan, <sup>(2)</sup> as well as his more

recent biographer, M. Bourilly, agree about his outstanding qualities. Rabelais, as Langey's physician, was intimately concerned with his patron's last hours, and was with his fellow-doctor Taphenon responsible for preparing the body for burial. This, as well as the provision made for Rabelais in Langey's will and his continued service in the family with Jean, the Cardinal du Bellay, explain the apparently gratuitous reference only in part. A man's death is not the most suitable subject for eulogy prompted by motives of self-interest, and the opening chapters of the TL would have offered a far better occasion for this kind of ingratiating. Every piece of evidence supports the belief that Rabelais was genuinely affected by this incident, that he took it very seriously and that he expected his readers to do the same. It is one of the rare moments in the work when Rabelais allows his personal, as distinct from polemical, feelings to come to light, and would be notable for that reason if for no other.

The final section of this chapter is the death-bed scene of Raminagrobis, the old poet. This may have some foundation in fact, but is written with an obvious bias. The scene begins with a direct reference to the 'Phaedo' (the white cock promised to Aesculapius by Socrates in his dying words) and ends with a reminiscence of two of Erasmus' Colloquia.<sup>(3)</sup> The tone is pointedly Evangelical, but besides this partisan note, Raminagrobis' death is that of a perfectly devout Christian, who happens to resent the intrusion of the rival Mendicants.

The pattern of the whole chapter is thus tripartite;

beginning with the enunciation of a philosophical, in fact Platonic, theory, going on with the first-hand example of du Bellay and finishing with the model of a Christian death. The link between the sections is the gift of prophecy vouchsafed to dying men from the spirits in the other world.

A second text in the TL is no more than a brief reference, but is so apposite to the similarity noted between the two books that it may be quoted here. On the way back from Raminagrobis, Panurge seeks the advice of Epistemon. The learned scholar makes two suggestions in a halfhearted way. The first (XXIV/437) has been quoted in the previous chapter: "qui peut veoir son Genius peut entendre ses destinees", which looks like another echo of 'De Genie', and the second is that Panurge should visit some oracle, of which a long list is then given. Epistemon ends: "Mais vous sçavez que tous sont devenus plus mutz que poissons de puis la venue de celluy roy servateur, en quel ont prins fin tous oracles et toutes propheties." Panurge caps this with a suggestion that they should visit "les isles Ogygies", where a race of prophets lives and where Saturn lies bound. This last reference is, from its form, taken from Plutarch's 'De Facie', but in slightly altered terms appears also in 'De Defectu', whose title is echoed by Epistemon's words just quoted. Presented with a purely pagan problem, Rabelais characteristically gives it a Christian interpretation. The evidence is too slight to conclude whether Rabelais' comment is meant to be personal, or follows consciously the long and respectable line of authorities beginning with Eusebius' 'Praeparatio

Evangelica', who linked the prophecies of the pagan world with Christian doctrine. The idea was a common-place in the Middle Ages, when the Sibylls took their place in Church art beside the OT prophets and Virgil's Messianic Eclogue won him near membership of the Church. Rabelais and his readers would take it for granted, but it is a little unexpected to find the flood of Classical erudition in the chapter thus interrupted.

In the QL all these elements are blended into the Macraean episode, and a textual comparison is revealing both for the light it throws on Rabelais' methods of composition and for the mental habits it suggests. The partial edition finishes with the great storm, with no hint of what is to follow, and it has been shown that the 1552 edition gives an account of the tempest even closer to that of Erasmus' 'Naufragium'. This is not, however, its only literary parallel; at the end of the tempest Epistemon cries (XXII/625): "je voy terre, je voy port, je voy grand nombre de gens sus le havre!" When they land, Pantagruel (XXV/632): "ne voulut partir du mole que tous ses gens feussent en terre." The subsequent details given by the Macrobe show that this is indeed "port très seur, hers les troubles et sollicitudes terriennes," and if they are not actually there to greet the travellers, "Daemons et Heroes" are not far away in the forest. Except for the angels (hardly suitable company in this context) there is no detail of the nautical simile in the TL omitted from this description. The coincidence, if it is no more than that, is certainly striking, and not very easily explained. What follows.

makes it more unlikely that the resemblance to the TL is purely fortuitous. The theme of the TL passage is the communication between the spirit and human worlds which accounts for the power of dying men to prophesy; the theme of the QL is the communication between the two worlds, again effected on the occasion of death, this time through natural phenomena, storms, comets and so on. After the Macrobe has described the island and his opinions concerning the death of heroes, Pantagruel elaborates the argument with the simile of the candle, and then Epistemon refers briefly to the death of Guillaume du Bellay.

The mention of this incident is enough to attract our attention, but this time it is no more than a footnote to Pantagruel's words "eversions des republicques", which result from the death of these "ames nobles et insignes". Pantagruel proceeds to give a catalogue of Classical examples before reverting to the main theme in the next chapter. Here he says (XXVII/636): "aulcunes telles amestant sont nobles, precieuses et heroiques, que de leur deslogement et trespas nous est certains jours davant donnée signification des cieulx." These signs are then described as "comètes et apparitions meteores". It is, he says, as if a last chance were being given to men on earth to take counsel of these great souls. He concludes:

"C'est que, pour declairer la terre et gens terriens n'estre dignes de la presence, compaignie et fruition de telles insignes ames, l'estonnent et espaventent par prodiges, portentes, monstres et aultres precedens signes forméz contre tout ordre de nature. Ce que veismes plusieurs jours avant le departement de celle tant illustre, genereuse et heroique ame du docte et preux chevalier de Langey, auquel vous avez parle."



The tale is taken up by Epistemon, who recalls the portents seen before Langey's death, lists the witnesses, including Rabelais himself, and ends: "teus pensans----que les cieulx le repetoient comme à eulx deu par proprieté naturelle." Just as in the TL, the recent example of Langey's death is cited in support of a general philosophical theory; this time the personal touch is underlined by Rabelais' own signature as a present witness.

The reference in the TL and the first brief reference in the QL are capable of a rational interpretation, and could conceivably be attributed to a sincere or interested desire of Rabelais to flatter the family of his late patron. We know from various sources <sup>(8)</sup> that the du Bellays had an extremely efficient intelligence service, mainly in Germany, of which Rabelais must have been aware, and in which he may even have served while in Metz, and this would explain in large measure the apparently inspired prophecies which came to be fulfilled. Again, the situation in Piedmont was so very delicate (and so mismanaged by Langey's predecessor, Montjehan) that the sudden death of the only man who seems really to have controlled it would naturally account for the reversal of French fortunes in that theatre, and to some extent elsewhere. Knowing these political facts, not familiar to the general public, Rabelais may be imagined as colouring them slightly with hints of supernatural influence in order to impress his readers. There would be no compelling answer to this rationalist explanation but for the third and last reference to Langey's death. In every way this outweighs the other two in importance and authority. Unfortunately there seems

to be no contemporary confirmation of Rabelais' report, but it is hardly credible that he would list so many independent witnesses if his account of the portents were untrue. Indeed, if it were untrue, far from winning the favour of the du Bellay family, Rabelais would be offering them a grave affront. Failing historical corroboration, it seems reasonable to accept the fact of the portents, whatever they may have been. This being so, the deep impression produced on Rabelais at once appears in its true light. The facts of prophecy and French reverses are open to rational explanation, as has just been shown, but the portents are emphatically not to be interpreted in these terms. The belief in portents of this kind and their significance was so universal <sup>(6)</sup> that no special explanation need be looked for in Rabelais' case. Having linked the "prodiges horribles" with the death of Langey, Rabelais drew the natural conclusion from the philosophical theory with which he begins this section. What must have seemed to him a direct confirmation of the theory quoted from Plutarch gave that theory a quite unique value in his system.

The serious tone of the debate is enhanced by the memory of Langey, but the last speech of Pantagruel overshadows everything else in Rabelais for its direct and unequivocal answer to two fundamental questions; the immortality of the soul and the relationship of Christianity to paganism. Even to approach such problems was risky and to expound unusual views could be fatal. To give unusual views for any other motive than personal conviction would have been foolishly provocative, and it can safely be assumed that Rabelais

is speaking for himself in these striking lines.

Leaving for a moment the question of signs and portents, Pantagruel, at Frère Jan's request, gives the views on immortality, first of various Classical authorities, as quoted by Plutarch, and then his own:

"Je croy que toutes asmes intellectives sont exemptes des cizeaulx de Atropos. Toutes sont immortelles; anges, daemons et humaines. Je vous diray toutesfoys une histoire bien estrange, mais escripte et asceurée par plusieurs doctes et sçavans historiographes, à ce propous."

The story is, of course, that of Pan's death, which Rabelais interprets as relating to Christ. This is the final point of similarity with the TL: a Platonic (or neo-Platonic) theory in each case concerning death and its attendant phenomena, the case of Langey's death used in each as a particular example, in the TL a Christian death, in the QL the Christian death. The associated details of the storm and so on bring out still more forcibly what may have begun as a literary, but seems to have ended as a philosophical reminiscence. The second passage quoted from the TL is equally reminiscent of the corresponding passage in the QL, the Pan chapter. "Celluy roy servateur" becomes "celluy grand servateur des fideles", the theme of silent oracles in the TL is balanced by the whole chapter of Plutarch's 'De Defectu' quoted here, and, most strange, Panurge's remark about Saturn and "les isles Ogygies" with which the TL chapter ends is the passage immediately following (in slightly different form) the Pan legend in 'De Defectu'. Its total omission from the Macraeon group of chapters, in which the smallest details of Plutarch's accounts appear, could be explained by the assumption that

Rabelais only knew the relevant passage of Plutarch at second-hand, which is almost certainly not the case in view of his known enthusiasm for Plutarch and other quotations from the same ~~XX~~ dialogue. We have suggested elsewhere <sup>(7)</sup> that the immediate source of these chapters is Postel, who also omits the Saturn reference, but at the same time the possibility cannot be overlooked that Rabelais deliberately left out the passage to avoid repeating what he had already said in a similar context in the TL.

This literary parallel has been studied in some detail, because if it is accepted as valid it proves a preoccupation of some duration on Rabelais' part with the particular problems enumerated, and suggests a link between his Classical erudition, his ~~X~~ personal experience with Langey and his Christian (not to say, Scholastic) upbringing. As a pattern of the synthesis which, as far as can be ascertained from the work, represents Rabelais' thought, this is of the greatest value. The relative importance of the three factors is the central point of our enquiry, and therefore the place of the Pan chapter in the development of these themes is of capital importance for any attempt at evaluation. Failure to admit anything like a coherent system of thought in Rabelais over a period of years invalidates this contention, but all evidence does point to the existence of such a system.

Rabelais' treatment of texts from 'De Defectu' is illuminating in itself. His ch. XXV, with the description of the island, is a close paraphrase of ch. XVII in Plutarch, altered only in that Plutarch's traveller arrives before the storm; Rabelais' ch. XXVI

continues Plutarch's ch. XVIII, with the explanation of the storm and the simile of the candle, omitting Plutarch's final sentence about Saturn. At the end of ch. XXVII Rabelais returns to Plutarch, quoting his ch. XIX on the Stoics. So far Rabelais has not changed Plutarch's order, but his next words refer back, quoting Plutarch by name, to ch. XI, whence he quotes the views of Aeneas and Hesiod, considerably elaborated by him with gratuitous Classical erudition. Postel, or some unknown author, could have provided Rabelais with the requisite quotations, and Postel actually gives them in the same order, but that does not explain the situation of the Pan story, last in Rabelais' arrangement and ch. XVII in Plutarch. All the other authors who use Plutarch maintain his arrangement, yet here we have Rabelais deliberately changing this order for reasons of his own. The most obvious explanation is that Rabelais wished to grade the subjects of his text in ascending order of importance; first, the Classical writer beloved of the 16C, then the recent and celebrated Langey, finally Christ. The common theme is the effect on nature of the death of great men, supported in turn by Plutarch, by living witnesses and by the NT. Plutarch's theme, on the other hand, is, in this part of the dialogue, the immortality of daemons, which becomes a purely secondary one for Rabelais, who naturally could not have expressed an open mind on the subject like Plutarch, and who anyhow had long since decided his belief. The composition of these chapters, so (so) homogenous in their thought and expression, shows the greatest care in selecting and arranging material of a varied nature.

The Pan story is introduced by a "toutesfoys" which poses a minor problem. On the face of it, the word seems to indicate an exception to the rule of immortality just stated by Pantagruel, and if so apparently implies that Pan-Christ was mortal. There is something similar in Plutarch, where the story is used to attack a previous speaker, who claims that daemons are immortal, but this does not altogether satisfactorily explain Rabelais' text. Since signs in nature and not immortality provide the theme which Rabelais wished to state, he does not bother to explain the apparent contradiction. All the other cases observed of these portents concerned the passing of a great man's soul from the world of matter to the world of spirits, a transition from one part of the created universe to another. In the case of Christ alone, the transition was from the world of matter to the infinite, eternal dwelling-place whence he had come; the created universe no longer included as a part him who is its whole. If something like this were in Rabelais' mind, it would explain the "toutesfoys" as introducing an exception to the rule, but one which Rabelais knew to be unique and which thus does not disprove the rule.

In the actual relating of the story, Rabelais makes one small alteration which is in fact decisive for his interpretation. To the original  $\kappa\alpha\iota \mu\epsilon\gamma\alpha\varsigma$  he adds the one word "Dieu"---"Pan le grand Dieu"---and at a stroke makes his presentation of the story different from the normal tradition. His comments at the end of the tale follow more naturally after this simple addition. First he offers his interpretation of Pan

as "celluy grand Servateur des fidèles", with a barely veiled gibe at his enemies "les pontifes, docteurs, presbtres et moines de la ley mosaicque". Then he shows how the word "πᾶν" applies particularly well to Christ "veu qu'il est le nostre tout, tout ce que sommes, tout ce que vivons, tout ce qu'esperons est luy, en luy, de luy, par luy." Postel before him had already made the philological point in his interpretation of Pan as Christ, and it is sufficiently obvious to have occurred to others, though not in this particular context.

As well as the word's etymological significance, Pan was also the name of the shepherd god, more exactly demi-god, and this is the next variation on Rabelais' main theme: "Le bon Pan, le grand pasteur, qui, comme atteste le bergier passioné Corydon, non seulement a en amour et affection ses brebis, mais aussi ses bergiers." The references to Virgil and St. John fit in well with this Christian treatment of pagan legend. It is curious that "Panes" are listed as demi-gods in the chapter preceding this, and the confusion of the All and shepherd god ~~XXX~~ is less admissible on that account. Another curious coincidence, noted earlier, is that one of the mediaeval ~~X~~ meanings for 'servator' (whence "servateur") given by du Cange is 'paster gregarius', which gives a double link with the idea of the good shepherd.

The third sentence brings back the central theme of this whole section of chapters: "A la mort duquel feurent plaincts, souspirs, effroys et lamentations en toute la machine de l'univers, cieulx, terre, mer, enfers." The real point of the chapter is thus made

clear, and the Pan story becomes the final, crowning illustration of the theory of portents. The exceptional nature of Christ's death is shown by the universal mourning, including even the heavens, which in other cases are described as "joyeux à la nouvelle reception de ces beates asmes." They too were losing the greatest soul ever to be parted from its body. *Pantagruel* ends with a chronological justification of his theory: "A ceste miene interpretation compète le temps, car cestuy très-ben, très-grand Pan, nostre unique Servateur, mourut lèz Hierusalem, regnant en Rome Tibère Caesar." The authority for the natural phenomena (eclipses &c.) at the time of the Passion was quite unimpeachable, and had long been a favourite point de départ for Christian apologists. The historical identity of these phenomena with similar ones reported by more or less contemporary pagan writers had an obvious propaganda value which had been fully exploited.

The four features of Rabelais' interpretation--- All, shepherd, universal mourning, chronology---are all to be found in other authors in similar connexions, but seldom if ever combined in just this way. The first assumption, that 'Pan' for the Greeks could bear a monotheistic interpretation, was a typical product of the enthusiastic philology of the Renaissance and continued for a century or two to inspire similar comments. One of the great drawbacks for those who wished to reinstate the philosophers of Greece and Rome in the honourable position from which their paganism debarred them was their obvious and notorious polytheism. If Plato was 'divine' for the Middle Ages it was because a vague sort of monotheism could be read into his then known works, and more partic-



ularly because the neo-Platonists with their trinity of the One, the Word, the World-Soul came so near Christian theology. Rediscovery of the Platonic corpus led to a new attempt to Christianise Plato, not in the same sense or with the same object as St. Thomas' baptism of Aristotle, but in the spirit of comparative religion. By the end of the 17C, Ralph Cudworth,<sup>(9)</sup> following Rabelais' interpretation of Pan as Christ, actually quotes the end of the 'Phaedrus', where Socrates prays to Pan, as proof of the monotheism of the Greeks, or at least of Socrates. Though the context of this dialogue makes it clear beyond doubt that a local woodland deity is in question, the less critical humanists of the 16C would have been even more easily misled than Cudworth. Such a misconception of Greek religion was also assisted by late Classical writers, whose authority in the 16C was quite disproportionate to their real importance.

6/ Thus Macrobius, a specially appropriate author for this dialogue with "le bon Macrobe", writes:<sup>(10)</sup> "Hunc deum (sc. Pan) Arcades colunt appellantes τον της ύλης κυριον, non silvarum dominum sed universae substantiae materialis dominatorem significari volentes, cuius materiae vis universorum corporum, seu illa divina sive terrena, componit essentiam." Following Macrobius, the early encyclopaedist Isidore of Seville, who was quoted and copied throughout the Middle Ages, writes: <sup>(11)</sup>

"Pan dicunt Graeci, Latini Silvianus: deum rusticorum, quem in naturae similitudinem formaverunt: unde et Pan dictus est, id est omne. Fingunt enim eum ex universali elementorum specie---caprinas ungulas habet, ut soliditatem terrae ostendat quem volunt rerum et totius naturae Deum; unde Pan quasi omnia dicunt."

This is far from the lofty monotheism later ascribed to Socrates, but contains the germs of an idea which could quite easily be developed into something like Rabelais' "nostre tout". The true significance of Pan for the Greeks is really irrelevant, as Rabelais and his contemporaries lacked the critical apparatus necessary for deciding the question, and these quotations show that the standard late Classical and then mediaeval conception of Pan included the philological as well as the pastoral interpretations.

The next point, the idea of the good shepherd, was naturally a commonplace, made familiar in poetry through Virgil and applied freely in a metaphorical sense. Marguerite de Navarre calls her dead brother <sup>(12)</sup> "le grand Pan" and shows him mourned by his shepherds; the author of the CL, paraphrasing his original (probably Lucian) describes Pan as (XXXIX/889): "homme horrible et monstrueux" with his animal members "homme hardi, courageux, hasardeux et facile à entrer en courroux." Thus the purely pagan traditions of the satyr-like Pan existed in literature side by side with the sublimated good shepherd based on Christian teaching.

The lamentations of the story have been variously explained, depending on an author's ~~general~~ general interpretation. Thus Ficino does not diverge very far from Plutarch: <sup>(13)</sup> "testantur enim ex multis prodigiis quae suis temporibus contigerunt, Pana magnum daem~~onem~~onem, aliosque multos daemones eiulasse primum, deinde etiam obiisse." Agrippa <sup>(14)</sup> quotes this verbatim in his turn. Those writers who were primarily interested in the nature of daemons naturally tended to emphasise

this Classical evidence of their mortality. An extension of this principle led to the use made by Christian apologists of the story. For Eusebius, the pagans themselves provided unwitting but adequate testimony to the falseness of their own religion and the truth of the Christian revelation. For him, Pan was a well known pagan god whose death as related by Plutarch coincided with the work of Christ in ridding the world of evil spirits. He writes: <sup>(15)</sup>

"So far Plutarch. But it is important to note the time at which he says the death of the daemon took place. For it was the time of Tiberius in which our Saviour, making his sojourn among men, is recorded to have been ridding human life from daemons of every kind: so that there were some of them now kneeling before him and beseeching him not to deliver them over to the Tartarus that awaited them. You have therefore the date of the overthrow of the daemons, of which there was no record at any other time."

This became the traditional interpretation, and one which Rabelais had every opportunity of knowing. <sup>(16)</sup> The translation made by George of Trebizond in 1470 was widely read, and shortly before the QL a Greek edition was published by Henri Estienne. Petrus Crinitus <sup>(17)</sup> was one of the authors who quoted the story from Eusebius and gave Eusebius' comment at the end. From a Christian point of view, the confirmation of a known feature of Christ's ministry, the expulsion of demons, by external sources was valuable in itself, when so few external witnesses were to hand. It is still not certain who first proposed the identification of Christ and Pan, but whether it was Postel, as seems very likely, or someone else, the reason for the shift of emphasis must be sought in a slightly different interpretation of the lamentations combined

with the historical event under the reign of Tiberius.

Nearest and yet contrary to Rabelais' interpretation comes Pedro Mexia, who gives more data than Rabelais for concluding the same thing and then offers a completely opposite explanation. He is concerned, like Eusebius, to show that pagan gods and oracles all failed at Christ's coming, and he gives an interesting and rather free version of the Pan story to prove his point. For him, as for Eusebius, but more explicitly, Pan is "el grande demonio, el Dios Pan" and "el gran diablo Pan", while a final remark explains "Porque Pan llamaban ellos al dios de los pastores." What gives Mexia's version a special interest here is his next passage. Continuing the exposition of his main theory, pagan testimony to Christ's presence on earth, he speaks of the heavenly portents, eclipses, earthquakes and the rest observed at Christ's death both by the Evangelists and by pagans. He quotes Josephus, and then gives the famous story of Dionysius the pseudo-Areopagite, who is described as a learned astrologer commenting on the phenomena: "Either the frame of the world shall be dissolved, either the God of nature presently suffereth----for which cause ----the sages of Athens strangely disturbed did to be built incontinently an altar to the God unknown (Acts XVII.22-23)." This clue to Rabelais' text is made more helpful still by an editorial comment of Juan Cromberger, giving the authority of Petrus Comestor (Scol. Hist. cap. XVII), Jacques Lefèvre at the end of his commentary on Sacrobosco's 'De Sphaera', Erasmus' commentary on Matt, XVII, and also Bede, Origen and Augustine. Earlier in the chapter Paulus Oresius,

Eutropius, Eusebius and St. Jerome are all cited as well.

This precious list of sources enables us at once to reconstruct Rabelais' most probable scheme of composition. An additional comparison makes this even clearer. The only two authors who seem to have proposed Rabelais' interpretation before him are Postel and Bigot. Postel's chapter heading tells us what to expect: "De substantiis separatis, sive daemonibus, geniis &c." and his whole chapter is on these lines. After telling the Pan story, he writes:

"Haec Plutarchus: quae multiplicem daemonam experientiam, substantiarumque separatarum demonstrant; tum vero manifesto fidem faciunt de morte Jesu Christi, qua tum contremuerunt infernus, ubique daemones sunt profligati et afflicti. Sed non est admittendum, quod hac infert ex eo, mortales daemones esse."

It is this latter idea which leads him to his conclusion:

"sed quis corpore magnus ille  $\tau\alpha\upsilon$  universi arbiter moriebatur, sentiebant suam profligationem futuram----ltaque nec peterant validiora testimonia de tempore mortis Christi, nec de substantiis separatis adferri. Nulli alii quam Christo certe omnium rerum moderatori, instauratori et arbitro  $\tau\upsilon\ \tau\alpha\upsilon\tau\alpha$  vocabulum competit."

What brings Postel to his interpretation is his desire to prove, like Rabelais, that "teutes asmes intellectives sent immortelles: anges daemons et humaines", and in explaining away the apparent exception (cf. Rabelais' "teutesfoys") he uses the identification of Pan and Christ based on philological grounds. Once having made the identification, he uses it again, in 'De Orbis' and also in 'De Etruriae' as one of the "externa testimonia de morte Jesu Christi".

Exactly the same approach is used by Bigot, who quotes the Pan story to illustrate the theme of oracles and spirits foretelling the future, and gives the same philological explanation of 'Pan'.<sup>(12)</sup> Referring back to his text, he speaks later on in his book of "afflictiones lamentaque daemonum Thami," showing his affinity with the traditional theory of Eusebius, Ficine and the others. In Bigot's case, the 'externa testimonia' are quite secondary to the idea of daemons' immortality.<sup>(12)</sup>

This comparison brings out very well the particular bias Rabelais gives to the story. In his context intellectual immortality is a subsidiary issue, and though the Pan story has a direct and obvious bearing on this theme, Rabelais' complete silence regarding the nature of Thamus' voice, the identity of the mourners on shore and their relationship to Pan, makes the chapter relatively insignificant as a contribution to demonology. As a further example of the cause and effect observed at the tempest and at Langey's death, however, it follows quite naturally and needs no more comment than Rabelais has given it. What he has done in effect is to combine Postel's (rather than Bigot's) philological identification of Pan-Christ with the historical evidence of the Passion as given, for instance, in Mexia, though not necessarily from that author. The link is the remark attributed to Dionysius, and as soon as one sees this and the philological interpretation side by side the solution to the whole problem becomes evident.<sup>(13)</sup>

Checking the sources given in Mexia, we find Petrus Comestor writing of the earthquakes &c. which followed the Passion:<sup>(14)</sup> "Dionysius dixit quod Deus naturae patiebatur." Sacrobosco (John of Holywood) adds to this<sup>(15)</sup>

the story of the altar to the unknown God; Lefèvre in his commentary on Sacrobosco uses the same words;<sup>(16)</sup> the French translation of Sacrobosco by Jehan Leys (1546) gives "ou le Dieu de Nature souffre---". Besides these, Vincent de Beauvais, perhaps the greatest of mediaeval encyclopaedists, gives the whole story, together with the unknown God; in his chapter on eclipses,<sup>(17)</sup> Pierre d'Ailly writes<sup>(18)</sup> "aut deus naturae patitur, aut totius machina mundi destruitur"; most interesting of all, Michael Scot in his commentary on Sacrobosco adds at the end:<sup>(19)</sup> "Dicebant (sc. Athenienses) enim quod creatum compatiebatur suo creatori dedicantes eos aras deo dubioso suo ignoto." It is worth adding that in Sacrobosco and all the commentaries on his work, this text comes in a very conspicuous place at the very end of the book, as a crowning example of previous theories.

This impressive list of Scholastic authorities could easily be enlarged, and the origin of the story in the 'Legenda Aurea' undoubtedly explains its wide diffusion. An early (130)<sup>(20)</sup> Franciscan book of exempla of Irish provenance quotes the story, and even more convincing proof from the same order of its universal familiarity is the fact that Michel Menot<sup>(21)</sup> quotes precisely the same words of Dionysius in each of his Passions preached at Tours (1508) and Paris (1517). The special honour paid in France to St. Denis, identified in the Middle Ages with the Dionysius of the legend, perhaps increased still more the general use of his words in sermons for the people as well as in treatises for the learned. It can therefore be stated without any hesitation that Rabelais could not possibly have been ignorant of these words, or indeed

have forgotten them, so constant is their repetition. In every version of the story Dionysius' words include the phrase "Deus naturae" and in French "Dieu de nature". Now this, as we have seen from Isidore, was a standard definition of Pan, "totius naturae deus", and would easily evoke the name of Pan in a man who was currently interested in Plutarch's story. The substitution in Dionysius' exclamation of 'Pan' for 'deus naturae' is simple, and at once gives the identification Pan-Christ, supported both by philological and astrological arguments. The second part of Dionysius' exclamation is equally conclusive; for him and all those who quoted him, "totius machina mundiX destruitur" is the only alternative explanation of the phenomena they observe, and exactly this phrase, "toute la machine de l'univers", comes in Rabelais, where Postel and Bigot had dwelt on the daemons' lamentations.

Another point is equally relevant. Rabelais' point de départ for these chapters was the effect on nature, the signs and portents, connected with the passing of great souls, and from this point of view he would have been led to the Dionysius story by almost any mediaeval treatise on astronomy and meteorology. He could equally well have been led to the same result by starting from a study of 'externa testimonia'. Petrus Comestor brings in the portents following the Passion in just this way, and this was the regular Scholastic approach to the historicity of the Gospels. Eusebius, whose 'Praeparatio Evangelica' has already been mentioned, was even better known as an ecclesiastical historian, and most of the authors quoted



above refer to him by name in this capacity. In his great chronological survey, 'Chronicorum Canonum', translated by St. Jerome, the following entry comes under A.D. 32: (32)

"Jesus-Christus secundum Prophetias, quae de eo fuerunt prolocutae, ad passionem venit anno Tiberii XVIII: quo tempore etiam in aliis Ethnicorum commentariis haec ad verbum scripta reperimus:

'Solis facta defectio: Bithynia terra motu concussa, et in urbe Nicaea aedes plurimae corruerunt.' Quae omnia his congruunt, quae in passione Salvatoris acciderunt."

Further similar references follow from Josephus, Phlegon and others, thus from the earliest times the main proof that Christ's death did happen under Tiberius was directly associated with the Gospel account of the portents seen at the time of the Passion. History and meteorology are inseparable in this matter, and no one with the slightest interest in either subject could fail sooner or later to be reminded of Dionysius' words.

Seen in this light, Rabelais' presentation of the story can be more adequately judged. The probability is overwhelming that he knew either from Postel, Bigot or some so far unidentified author that Pan could be identified with Christ; it is very likely that he knew also the older interpretation of Eusebius, again either directly or through some intermediary like Crinitus, and preferred the other, no doubt attracted by the philological approach. At the same time, the theme of meteorological phenomena would make him more attentive to that aspect of the Passion than to the vaguer theme of demonology, and any reflection on these lines could not fail to remind him of Dionysius' words. The very appropriate definition of Pan

as the god of nature fits in even better with Rabelais' context than the more general idea of the All, and gives him a direct link with the historical events under Tiberius. Though Rabelais goes against Eusebius' traditional interpretation of Pan, in other respects he is closer to the Scholastic tradition than any of his immediate predecessors. Mexia's mention of Dionysius (which may not originally have been his own) shows that the connexion was one that came naturally to a writer of wide interests, and it is indeed difficult to find a really satisfactory explanation of Rabelais' text which excludes the hypothesis put forward above.

The constant pattern of Rabelais' thought, which starting from a Christian education seeks to incorporate as much as possible of Classical philosophy, is nowhere more clearly seen than here. It comes as something of a shock to preconceived notions of the Renaissance attitude to find that the Middle Ages had never ceased to follow Eusebius in making use of every pagan author who could be made to further the cause of Christian apologetics. To the Greeks, that is to Dionysius, a monotheistic idea is attributed before there can be any question of direct contact with the Apostles, and by extension it is easy to see how the idea of grace coming as readily to Ethnic as to Hebrew prophets could develop. The importance of pagan historians is often pointed out by Rabelais, (cf. Gargantua's letter) in a humanist sense, but here he uses Plutarch just as the Scholastics would have done. If he uses philology to support his interpretation, he is only following in the line of Isidore and his Etymologies. In quoting the phenomena

of the Passion he is citing the example best known in all Scholastic treatises on meteorology and kindred subjects. Even the juxtaposition of Virgil and St. John is the sign of a humanism which did not wait for the 16C before it came to full maturity. While it would be absurd to deny that this chapter, like those preceding it, is typical of the Renaissance outlook, it is no less absurd to forget that in not a few respects the Renaissance outlook had already existed for some centuries. One may go even further and say that the eulogy of Langey and his death are no more the signs of man's reawakening interest in man than the Pan chapter, and that this too would have aroused no flicker of surprise in the mediaeval reader. Rabelais' emancipation from the habits of mediaeval and Scholastic thought must be sought elsewhere than in these chapters on such fundamental subjects. (33)

## CHAPTER FOUR

MAN

Somewhere between the Lord of creation of some modern thought and the 'roseau pensant' of Pascal comes man as Rabelais conceived him. Since the word 'humanism' is one of those automatically associated with Rabelais, it can do no harm to look for more details before giving the word yet another connotation. If it is true that 'animal rationalis' remained the standard definition of man from Greek times to Descartes and later, it is equally true that no mediaeval thinker would have hesitated to give the essential definition of man as a being endowed with an immortal soul. 'Animal rationalis' accounts for this life, immortal soul for the other. It requires a constant and conscious effort of will to realise that, for the mediaeval, and largely for the 16C, thinker, the other world was not merely more important than this 'sub specie aeternitatis', but at least as real, and for not a few philosophers more real. It is therefore logical, and even inescapable, to begin looking at Rabelais' idea of man where he himself would have begun---with his soul.

Rare to the point of freakishness were those who in Rabelais' day genuinely held a materialist view of the soul. Its immortality, though understood in various ways, was not a truth seriously denied by any considerable body of people. Even such a man as Delet, technically condemned for casting doubt on the soul's immortality, was actually innocent of that crime, whatever his private thoughts might have been. In Rabelais the life to come is certainly not jumped, and glimpses of it vary from the purely popular to

the profoundly philosophical.

Traditional and typical of ordinary beliefs is the speech of Gargantua when he has lost his wife in childbirth (Pant. III/204): "Ma femme est morte--- elle est bien, elle est en paradis pour le moins, si mieulx ne est: elle prie Dieu pour nous---." The average 16C reader would recognise his own conception of an afterlife in these words, naive and anthropomorphic. The reductio ad absurdum of this approach to the afterlife is to be found in Epistemon's visit to the underworld (Pant. XXX). Some critics have ~~XXXX~~ insisted on the sinister meaning of this episode, allegedly ridiculing the doctrine of immortality, Lazarus' resuscitation and much besides, but to do so is to condemn much of the mediaeval drama which the Church quite willingly sponsored.

It is not difficult to detect the changed tone in Gargantua's famous letter to his son. To the reader who had smiled at Epistemon's account, it would never occur that this letter could be anything but serious. It is not possible, or even relevant, to know Rabelais' personal motives in setting out these views, but there can be no doubt as to the impression they made. M. Gilson has easily shown the perfectly orthodox nature of these ideas, and the point needs to be stressed no more. Gargantua's concern is with the world below, but the whole tenor of his letter shows that the guaranteed immortality of the soul is the background to these reflections on human life. Greatest of God's gifts is immortality, promised for the soul and possible even in this transitory life in one sense (Pant. VIII/224) "perpetuer son nom et semence". Our first

parents suffered pain of death for their sin, but death only of their bodies, and Gargantua is splendidly eloquent on the mitigation which even this punishment has undergone: "Quand mon esme laissera ceste habitation humaine, je ne me reputeray totalement mourir, ains passer d'un lieu en aultre, attendu que en toy et par toy je demeure en mon image visible en ce monde---." It is the last words which matter. Only a man firmly convinced of the prize of immortality awaiting him in the other world would derive comfort from the thought of his image persisting in this. In his closing words he reminds his son again "ceste vieest transitoire---"; to stress the fleeting nature of this life unless there is hope of a life to come is absurd in such an enthusiastic exhortation to study; to deny to all but legitimate fathers a taste of immortality quite inconsistent with the fervent submission to God and his word. That individual survival, rather than the collective soul of Averroes, is in Rabelais' mind can hardly be doubted. The insistence on family continuity, several times repeated in the work, is evidence in itself that any surrender of personality was abhorrent to Rabelais.

The theme of immortality (and of Judgement Day) was evidently linked in Rabelais' mind at the time with particular texts from the Bible. To the Pauline references of Gargantua's letter we may add another from the roughly contemporaneous Almanach for 1535 (930): "veus convient souhaiter (come S. Pol disoit Phillip. I---) que vos asmes soient hors mises ceste chartre tenebreuse du corps terrien et jointes a Jesus le Christ. Lors cesseront toutes passions, affections et imperfections humaines---."

The theme is not confined to the earlier period, where there is every evidence of unusual religious preoccupation, and less Scriptural but more detailed references to it come in the TL and QL. Raminagrobis on his deathbed, for all his dislike of the Friars, is no impious mocker. He looks forward<sup>to</sup> (TL.XXI/426): "le bien et felicité que le bon Dieu a præparé à ses fidèles et esleuz en l'aulture vie et estat de immortalité." These sober words can be compared with Panurge's long variations on the diabolological theme, where the intention to parody is unmistakable.

In the QL the question is debated at greater length, this time without nominal reference to Christian teaching, and the conclusions are stated unequivocally in philosophical terms. The discussion with the Macrobe has already been treated in some detail, but two quotations from it are appropriate here. Speaking of Langey's death, Epistemon describes the attendant signs and concludes (XXVII/638): "Tous pensans---que de brief seroit France privée d'un tant parfait---chevalier---et que les cieulx le repetoient comme à eulx deu par propriété naturelle." The phraseology is Classical, and the context quite general, but there is no mistaking the implication that du Bellay at least was to enjoy individual survival. The second remark has already been mentioned, and is admittedly made to carry a heavy load of argument in our study, but for reasons stated elsewhere it appears to have exceptional authority.: "Je croy (dist Pantagruel) que toutes asmes intellectives sont ~~XXXX~~ exemptes des cizeaulx de Atrepos. Toutes sont immortelles: anges, daemons et humaines." This formal affirmation of bel-

ief in immortality remains Rabelais' last word on the subject, unless the authenticity of the CL is ever established. Whatever his religious views at the time it is impossible to overlook his acceptance of this doctrine from a philosophical point of view. From his first book to his last, the immortality, indeed the personal immortality, of the soul remains a cardinal tenet in Rabelais' philosophy.

The nature of this immortal soul is of some importance, and fortunately a long and closely reasoned passage gives some clues to Rabelais' ideas about this. By no more than a literary coincidence, this passage is anticipated by an absolutely casual remark of Grandgousier about his growing son (Garg. XIV/69):

"son entendement participe en quelque divinité."

Expanded, this phrase recurs in Pantagruel's discussion on dreams in the TL. The Platonism of the speech is much overlaid by the Classical references following, but the spirit is not affected (XIII/393):

"nostre asme, lorsque le corps dort----s'esbat et reveoit sa patrie qui est le ciel. De là receoit participation insigne de sa prime et divine origine, et en contemplation de ceste infinie et intellectuelle sphère----(c'est Dieu---)note non seulement les choses passées et en mouvemens inférieurs, mais aussi les futures, et les raportent à son corps et par les sens et organes d'icelluy les exposant aux amis, est dicte vaticinatrice et prophète. Vray est quelle ne les raporte en telle syncerité comme les avoit veues, obstant l'imperfection et fragilité des sens corporelz---."

The essential ~~XXXXXXXX~~ elements of Platonic psychology are all there; the divine origin of the soul, its temporary attachment to the body and its dependence on this imperfect body for communicating with others. A moment later Pantagruel ends his speech:



"aussi ne peult l'homme recepvoir divinité et art de vaticiner, sinon lorsque la partie qui en luy plus est divine (c'est *Nous*, et *Mens*) soit coye, tranquille, paisible, non occupée ne distraicte par passions et affections foraines."

There is a confusion, apparently conscious, between the meaning given to "divine" at the beginning and end respectively of this passage. "Sa divine origine" means divine in the usual sense of 'connected with God', as the parenthesis "c'est Dieu" makes clear, but in the other phrase "divinité" is used in the sense of 'Divination' to equal "art de vaticiner", while "la partie---divine" must be taken to include both these senses. In fact, the single word 'divin', with its philological development, is a resume of Pantagruel's theory of prophecy. For him, the divine spark of Platonic psychology confers on each soul the potential gift of temporary participation in the divine omniscience and thus of prophecy. The spiritual vision may suffer in relying on the fallible organs of the body for expression, but such distortion results from the mixed nature of earthly life, not from any defect in the soul. As for the typically bilingual parenthesis "c'est *Nous*, et *Mens*", the complex distinctions between *Nous* - *ψυχη* - *πνευμα* were a feature of later Platonists like Plutarch, and were in the 16C the subject of dispute between Averreists and orthodox. <sup>(4)</sup>

Continuing his instructions to Panurge, Pantagruel dwells on the importance of suitable nourishment for anyone seeking to dream prophetically. If too hungry "les vènes --- retirent en bas cestuy esprit vaguabond, negligent du traictement de son nourisson et hoste naturel, qui est le corps." This could, as Gilson suggests, <sup>(3)</sup> be a precise medical reference to

one of the three "spiritus vagi", but it might equally well be a more vague allusion, like "animula vagula blandula, hospes comesque corporis." In any case, the meaning is clearly that bodily discomfort brings the soul back from "contemplation des choses celestes". The next paragraph seems to support the second interpretation: "l'esprit ne receoit les formes de divination par songes si le corps est inquieté et trouble par les vapeurs et fumées des viandes precedentes, à cause de la sympathie, laquelle est entre eulx deux indissoluble." The next words resume the argument of the preceding paragraph and define the relationship between body and soul. The frequent changes in terminology, varying according to the author being quoted, make the distinction between 'asma-Νους et Mens-esprit' far from clear, but the continuity of the passage encourages a broad rather than a precise reading.

Elsewhere, on the subject of folly, Pantagruel says:

(TL. XXXVII/484) X

"aussi faut-il, pour davant icelles (sc. Intelligences motrices) saige estre: je diz saige et prae-  
~~XXXXXXXX~~ sage par aspiration divine et apte à recevoir benefice de divination, se oublier soy-mesmes, issir hors de soy-mesmes, vuider ses sens de toute terrienne affection, purger son esprit de toute humaine sollicitude et mettre tout en nonchaleir."

The play on 'divine-divination' reappears, and the injunctions to clear "l'esprit" are exactly parallel with the sentence quoted above "non occupee ne distraicte par affections foraines." For all the confusion of his language, Rabelais' thought is consistent and even, if regarded closely enough, reasonably clear.

The connexion between body and soul is mentioned in quite a different context in the Q.L. Writing to his father, Pantagruel says (IV/570): "comme à tous

accidens en ceste vie transitoire non doubtéz ne  
 soubsonnéz, nos sens et facultéz animales pâtissent  
 plus enormes et impotentes perturbations (voÿre jus-  
 ques à en estre souvent l'asme deseparée du corps---)"  
 "La sympathie indissoluble" between body and soul  
 was a fact of which Rabelais was always aware.

Besides the immortal soul and its powers of div-  
 ination, there are other mental processes of a more  
 practical nature with which Rabelais shows himself  
 familiar. The letter just quoted goes on to state the  
 mechanics of memory: "et facilement acquiesçoys en  
 la deulce recordation de vostre auguste majesté, esc-  
 ripte ---en posterior ventricule de mon cerveau,  
 souvent au vif me la representant en sa propre et naïve  
 figure." More technical and extended is the discourse  
 of Rondibilis on (TL.XXXI/464): "la forme d'un homme  
 attentif à quelque estude." The operation of "sens  
 commun, de l'imagination et apprehension, de la rati-  
 ocination et resolution, de la memoire et recordation"  
 assured by the supply of "espritz" coming from "le  
 retz admirable", and ultimately from the heart, where  
 "espritz vitaulx" have become "animaulx", is all exp-  
 lained, as Gilson shows,<sup>(4)</sup> in the language of contempo-  
 rary medicine.

This technical language, being that of his chosen  
 profession, Rabelais uses throughout the book with  
 obvious pleasure. In 'Gargentua', Picrochole's illus-  
 sions are supposed due to (XXXI/II6) "fallaces espèces  
 et phantasmes ludicatoryres mis en ton entendement".  
 In the chapter on dreams in the TL, Pantagruel conc-  
 ludes by referring to the two gates of dreams, of  
 which the ivery one (XIII/398) "empesche la pehetr-

ation des espritz visifz et reception des espèces visibles",<sup>(1)</sup> and numerous other examples could be produced in the same sense. When he was writing of the mind and its operations, Rabelais was demonstrating professional opinions and had no need to rely on other authors.

The borderline of metaphysics once crossed, the same knowledge and the same language applied equally to the brain and its processes as to the body. The inferior nature of the body, material and corruptible, is never called in question. Gargantua in his letter sounds the note which echoes through the work (Pant. VIII/225): "la meindre partie de moy, qui est le corps, ----et la meilleure, qui est l'asme." The effects of corporeal bonds on the soul have already been seen in the chapter on dreams, and in no single passage is there an example of the body being exalted to equal, let alone rival, the mind (or soul). For Rabelais, as for the Scholastics,<sup>(2)</sup> "intellectivum principium, id est anima, est propria hominis forma." This was no abstract philosophical axiom, but a fundamental belief governing the affairs of everyday life. Granted the natural inferiority of the body, Rabelais, as a doctor, if for no other reason, did not despise it, and indeed saw in its mechanism a source of wonder.

His knowledge of physiology and allied subjects has been amply discussed by others, and there is no point in repeating their findings here. From the comparatively simple details of Gargantua's birth to the intricacies of Panurge's praise of debt, the work abounds in physiological and anatomical references. The microcosm as expounded by Panurge is described

by Gilson<sup>(7)</sup> as "un résumé incroyablement dense, et toute-fois d'un mouvement admirable, de toute la physiologie médiévale: leur commentaire intégral formerait un 'De usu partium corporis humani' au complet." Such a judgement needs no elaboration here.

As for the preservation of health, Rabelais as doctor joins with Rabelais as author to claim the therapeutic properties of his book. In several of the Prologues, and in the Dedication to Cardinal de Chastillon, he refers to these properties, in the latter actually giving a philosophical explanation (541): "par transfusion des espritz serains ou tenebreux, aeréz et terrestres, joyeux ou melancoliques du medecin en la personne du malade." Since it is our task to make the most of this transitory life, bodily health is a duty no less than spiritual welfare, and the balance between the two is brought out through all the work. Rabelais' Platonism does not reach the extremes of mysticism which ignores earthly things, but his cult of health equally rejects the debased Epicureanism with which his name is so often linked in the popular imagination. These questions are best left over for closer discussion; it is enough to note here that Rabelais' conception of man firmly welds his immortal soul and his mortal body in exactly the same relationship as that held by the Scholastics. ¶ The place of man in the universal hierarchy is central and in the higher section of intellectual beings subordinate. The details of Rabelais' demonology show how many and of what kind were the beings which linked man with God, the supreme spiritual essence. The other aspect, which shows man lord of finite creation, is

best seen in Panurge's praise of the braguette, an unexpected treasury of ideas. (TL.VIII/377): "Nature crea l'homme nud, tendre, fragile, sans armes ne offensives ne defensives----comme animant ----né à jouissance mirificque de tous ~~Xi~~fructz et plantes vegetables, animant né à domination pacificque sus toutes bestes." The end of the "premier aage d'or" broke up this idyll, and man "voulant sa première jouissance maintenir et sa première domination continuer---eut nécessité sey armer de nouveau." The ability of man to profit from created things is the theme of the last two chapters of the TL, extolling the inestimable benefits of Pantagruelien. This dream of progress can be, has been, exaggerated, but serves none the less as a reminder that Rabelais' was a universal outlook in a very real sense, more so than our own, since eternity and heaven marked the upper limits of his system where cautious theories of relativity mark ours. Whether or not Rabelais believed that man could ever become "maître et possesseur de la nature", he certainly did not believe this the most desirable end of human endeavour, if the evidence of the work has any validity. The supernatural world is too important for Rabelais to be content with easier but more limited conquests here below.

A final detail of Rabelais' attitude to man (as opposed to woman) is probably more psychological than philosophical, but may be mentioned. In marked contrast to his treatment of mothers, Rabelais goes out of his way to stress the joys of fatherhood, more exactly of legitimate fatherhood. An early and typical example of this is to be found in Gargantua's I letter,

but many others can be found throughout the work. Even the ignoble Panurge finds this a cogent reason for marrying, seeing Gargantua's attitude to Pantagruel (TL.IX/382). Relations between the giants themselves show exceptional, perhaps exaggerated, affection between father and son, and our knowledge of Rabelais' family history tends to confirm that he had an equal dynastic consciousness in real life. As a priest, albeit irregular, he was denied this joy for himself, and his work quite possibly reflects some of his frustration as well as his filial affection for his own father. With these directly psychological factors is what seems to be a philosophical belief, that continuity of generations is the sort of immortality on earth mentioned by Gargantua in his letter, and that this continuity is the special responsibility of the father. For Rabelais as for the Scholastics, who, it is relevant to note, were also celibate, man meant 'vir' rather than 'homo', and it is not only the question of perpetuating a family which explains this outlook. The feeling that woman was an afterthought in the scheme of things was, of course, encouraged by theology, but apart from anti-feminism, a completely self-sufficient attitude to man existed as a matter of course at a time when men for centuries had held a virtual monopoly of thought.

Various aspects of man's activities, in society, religion and so on, belong to other chapters. In this one an attempt has been made to collect such information on the nature of man as Rabelais offers. From this point of view, even admitting the Platonic bias, there is little sign of innovation. Soul, mind and body receive their appropriate treatment, and the

resultant conception of man shows a balanced, and on the whole detailed, interpretation of doctrines familiar to the Middle Ages and orthodox Scholasticism.

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## CHAPTER FIVE

WOMAN

All human beings are rational animals, a definition which, as Descartes pointed out, is not susceptible of gradation, but it is not stretching a point unduly to allot woman a separate place in the hierarchy of creatures, nor would Rabelais have hesitated to admit such an arrangement. All critics have drawn attention to the virtual absence of female figures from the work, even from the TL, where the nominal theme is marriage, and it is therefore with rather limited material that one must undertake the reconstruction of Rabelais' thought on the subject. A man's attitude to woman more than to anything else will always in the last analysis be conditioned by his experience, whatever his a priori philosophy may be, and in the case of Rabelais due weight must be given to some of the few known facts about his private life. In the case of Rabelais, too, a traditional attitude was available readymade in the models he had chosen to continue, and indeed he could scarcely have ignored this tradition. The TL raises special problems, and the polemic atmosphere with which, rightly or wrongly, it is generally associated could equally not fail to decide Rabelais' attitude to an appreciable extent. With all these provisos, it is still possible to speculate about the philosophical basis on which Rabelais supported his instinctive reactions to women, in the hope that a not unreasonable case can be made out.

The first two books hint at some deep-seated psychological cause for Rabelais' later attitude to women. Woman as mother might be expected to receive some-

what less offhand treatment than is in fact the case. A facetious phrase in 'Gargantua' probably contains more truth than at first sight appears. On the young giant's return to his home (XXVII/131): "Supplementum Supplementi Chronicorum dictæ que Gargamelle y mourut de joye. Je n'en sçay rien de ma part, et bien peu me soucie ny d'elle ny d'aulture." Gargamelle plays virtually no part in the book except to give birth somewhat unconventionally to her son, and her summary disposal in the words just quoted is almost an afterthought, for she had long since been forgotten. It is natural to set beside this the mother of Pantagruel, Badebec, and her treatment at Rabelais' hands. She (in date of publication, though not in the story, preceding Gargamelle) disappears without delay in giving birth to her son. Gargantua's alternate grief at her loss and joy at having a son are a little less discourteous than the dismissal of his own mother, but even he wastes no more time than necessary on conventional mourning. After only a few minutes he cries (Pant. III/204): "Seigneur Dieu, faut-il que je me contriste encores?" and after expressing his impatience with fast forgotten tears, concludes: "Il me fault penser d'en trouver une aulture." These two rather disobliging references to motherhood, coupled with the absence of any compensating texts elsewhere, have led to much conjecture about Rabelais' own family. Next to nothing is known of his mother as a person, but it has been rather ingeniously inferred that references to her brother (Frapin in the Ancien Prologue to the QL) and Angers, where he lived, may be connected with the old story of Rabelais' entry into religion with the

Franciscans at la Baumette, near Angers. The theory is tempting, but no proof of any sort has yet been produced. It certainly seems as if Rabelais' mother played very little part in his early life, but to go further would be vain guesswork.

There is, however, a faint hint of another factor underlying this attitude to motherhood, and for this rather more convincing arguments can be adduced. A most happy discovery---or rather, rapprochement---now makes it possible to see one interpretation of the account of Gargantua's birth which may very likely have occurred to the I6C reader. M. Remigereau<sup>(4)</sup> has shown that the philosophical identification of Christ with the Logos, or Verbe, led quite naturally to a theory of the Incarnation operated through the Virgin's ear: "le thème de la conception auriculaire avait tout lieu de passer ainsi en motif de plaisanterie banale." Proclus seems to have been the originator of this theory, and Benaventura among others reproduced it. In the OFM, which clung fiercely to the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception against much opposition, birth and kindred subjects were likely to be debated with more fervour than in other circles, and to give this philosophical wrangling a farcically obstetric twist may have been Rabelais' way of registering a protest against his early training.

This seems to be borne out by a remark in the following chapter, where Rabelais says (Garg. VII/47): "Les docteurs scotistes ayent affirmé que sa mère l'alaita---" with suitably copious draughts, but "a esté la proposition declairée mammalement scandaleuse, des pitoyables oreilles offensive, et sentent

de loing heresie." The mention of "docteurs scotistes" and the parody of the Sorbonnical formula of condemnation suggests more than a rather pointless joke. The Virgin's breast figures largely in mediaeval discussion---it will be recalled that St. Bernard was said to have had a vision in which he was refreshed by Our Lady from her own breast--and the Scotists were constantly defending their master's views on Our Lady, her purity and other qualities, so that another indirect assault on certain aspects of Franciscan Mariology may well be intended here. With or without family reasons for indifference to mothers as such, Rabelais would beyond doubt have been occupied at some time in his Franciscan days in the most arid discussions of Mariolatry, from a polemic as well as a devotional standpoint, and this must have irritated him like all the other dialectical abuses he attacks. In a negative way this is a contributory factor to his philosophy on woman which deserves a place of some importance.

Since 'Pantagruel' was written before 'Gargantua', the question of the latter's relations with women had already been decided before Rabelais came to write it. However, apart from the fact that he was married to Badebec long enough to have a son by her, to all appearances an only child, Gargantua's career as a husband seems to have been brief. Before marriage there was an indeterminate period of sowing wild oats, but even this did not last very long. We are told that under the régime of his sophist masters, Gargantua and his company (XXII/90): "après soupper---- allaient voir les garces <sup>d'</sup>entour, et petitz bancquetz

parmy, collations et arrièrè collations", but the enlightened new régime changed all that (XXIII/97): "quelquefois alloient visiter les compagnies des gens lettrés, ou de gens qui eussent veu pays estrange."

Pantagruel, child of the New Learning, had not the excuse of bad teachers for bad behaviour, and the only one of his exploits recorded sounds perfectly decorous (Pant. XXIII/291): "Pantagruel receut d'une dame de Paris (laquelle avoit entretenue ~~XXXX~~ bonne espace de temps) unes lettres---." Having deciphered its reproachful message (XXIV/293): "---luy souvint comment à son despartir n'avoit dict adieu à la dame, et s'en contristoit, et volontiers feust retourné à Paris pour faire sa paix avec elle---", but Epistemon brááá-ly recalls him to the task in hand and they set sail to defend their homeland. This casual concession to the tradition of chivalry in Pantagruel's case, and inferential attacks on mediaeval ~~Emerals~~ in Gargantua's, are all that Rabelais permits himself in the way of feminine diversion.

Panurge's exploits, and Frère Jan's implied deeds, are in purely popular vein and need no mention here. As far as Rabelais' own life is concerned, his reticence on the subject of women and love is clearly bound up with his own indiscretions in Paris, whence at least two material witnesses, and in Lyon, where the little Théodule did not survive to embarrass his father. These details of direct psychological interest are of equal importance in considering the more intellectual approach of the TL, but while they may be the final cause of the later views, it would be a mistake to suppose them also the proximate or total

cause. Nothing will be said of the emancipation of women in Thélème, and the apparent equality they enjoy there, because the whole episode is subject to the most careful provisos and largely inconsistent even with the context in which it appears.

The views of the TL concern almost exclusively women as wives, and since personal experience could hardly help Rabelais in this, more theorising appears than in other contexts. The fruit of Pantagruel's upbringing can be seen at the end of the book, when after long discussions about Panurge's problem, Gargantua asks his son his own intentions: (XLVIII/516): "Père (dist Pantagruel) n'y avois-je pensé; de tout ce negoce, je m'en deportoys sus vostre bonne volonté et paternel commendement." With such a disinterested referee, the preceding discussions can be fairly impartial. One of Pantagruel's earlier remarks is interesting; answering Panurge's query about the instruction in Deuteronomy that newly wed husbands should enjoy exemption from military service for a year, Pantagruel gives his opinion and ends by supposing the husband killed and the widow marrying again (VI/371): "les fecondes, à ceulx qui voudroient multiplier en enfans; les brehaignes, à ceulx qui n'en appeteroient, et les prendroient pour leurs vertus, sçavoir, bonnes graces, seulement en consolation domesticque et entretenement de mesnaige." This is a well balanced and typical ~~typical~~ picture of 16C ideas about women. Panurge's retort that second marriages are condemned by "les prescheurs de Varesnes" and "Frere Enguainnant" is a direct reference to the established teaching, and shows Panurge in the role he usually adopts

usually in the T<sup>h</sup> and QL of mouthpiece for orthodox and reactionary ideas. We may compare a sermon by Menot:<sup>(2)</sup> "Persona volens manere in viduitate, sciat perfectiorem esse statum illum quam alium---quanto auro est preciosius argento, tanto status virginitatis est statu viduitate, et quanto argento est pretiosius plumbo, tanto viduitas est pretiosior et dignior statu matrimonio."

The various consultations which occupy the major part of the TL add little or nothing to an understanding of Rabelais' philosophy concerning women, until the central and most serious section where Hippothadée and Rondibilis give their views and the others discuss them. Hippothadée adopts a marked Pauline tone in his speeches, at the time a broad hint of Evangelical sympathies, but nothing he says is at all unorthodox or so exaggerated as to be ridiculous. For him the most worthy woman is (XXX/461): "celle qui plus s'efforce avecques Dieu se y fermer en bonne grace et conformer aux meurs de son mary." Comparing a wife to the moon, whose only light is that reflected by the sun, he concludes: "Ainsi serez-vous à vostre femme en patron et exemplaire de vertus et honesteté." Morally speaking in fact, a woman is inferior because dependent on her husband for the inspiration of virtue. This was not at variance with received teaching:<sup>(3)</sup> "In mulieribus non est sufficiens robur mentis ad hoc ut concupiscentiis resistant" and "Mulier non dicitur continens nec incontinenens quia raro habet firmum iudicium rationis propter debilitatem complexionis."

After hearing part of Treuillogan's advice, Hippothadée compares it with the words of St. Paul (XXXV/478): "ceulx qui sont mariéz soient comme non mariéz",

which Pantagruel interprets: "femme avoir est l'avoir à usage tel que Nature la créa, qui est pour l'ayde, esbatement et société de l'homme---." This reasoned answer puts woman below man, not as a matter of practical inferiority but as a law of nature. A text from St. Thomas gives one reason for this attitude: <sup>(4)</sup> "Imago Dei, secundum principale eius, i. e. secundum naturam intellectualem, est tam in viro quam in muliere, sed quoad secundarium, sc. principium et finem, est tantum in viro." From a religious point of view, woman's inferiority to man was no disgrace, simply established fact. On man devolved the responsibility for woman's moral conduct. To find Rabelais putting such views as these into the mouth of one of his more serious characters makes us suspect that his own considered opinion was not far short of this. Here indeed the voice of personal experience and the half-conscious prejudices of childhood cannot be found distorting serious reflection.

Before coming to Rondibilis' opinions, which are at once the most lengthy and the most telling of the attacks on woman, there is little else to add. Hippothadée joins a dialogue on the theme "les femmes appètent ordinairement choses défendues" to give as his opinion (XXXIII/472): "aucuns de nos docteurs disent que la première femme du monde-----à peine eust jamais entré en tentation de manger le fruit de tout sçavoir, s'il ne luy eust esté défendu. Qu'ainsi soit, considérez comment le Tentateur cauteleux luy remembra on premier mot la defense sus ce faicte, comme voulant inferer: 'Il t'est défendu, tu en doibs donc manger ou tu ne serois pas femme.'" Such words



coming from him carry more weight than the similar examples of Carpalim and Penocrates, but the only serious lesson to be drawn is that women are not subject to the straightforward rule of reason as men are.

This fundamental axiom is the base of all the arguments, religious, medical, even facetious, in these chapters, and the whole of Rendibilis' verdict on women is therefore particularly significant for the general argument as well as in itself. The doctor deals satisfactorily with Panurge's first question, and coming to the other: "Seray-je point cocu?", gives a long discourse on the nature of woman. Ideas from the pseudo-Hippocrates and Plutarch are followed by the views of Plato, apparently via Tiraqueau's 'De Legibus Connubialibus' (XXXII/467):

"Quand je diz femme, je diz un sexe tant fragil, tant variable, tant muable, tant inconstant et imperfect, que Nature me semble---s'estre esguarée de ce bon sens par lequel elle avoit créé et formé toutes choses quand elle a basti la femme. Et ---ne sçay à quoy me resouldre, sinon que, forgeant la femme, elle a eu esgard à la sociale delectation de l'homme et à la perpetuité de l'espèce humaine plus qu'à la perfection de l'individuale muliebrite. Certes Platon ne sçait en quel ranc il les deibve colloquer, ou des animaux raisonnables, ou des bestes brutes. Car Nature leur a dedans le corps posé en lieu secret et intestin un animal---."

There follows a long description of this animal, quoting Plato and Galen, and showing how it tyrannises all the physical life of woman.

Here, more brutally expressed, are the two purposes for which alone Pantagruel considered a wife suited; as for single women, they are implicitly condemned as anti-natural. The quotation from Plato is offset

to some extent by Rondibilis' concluding remarks: "petite ne est la louange des preudes femmes, lesquelles ont vescu pudiquement et sans blasme, et ont eu la vertus de ranger cestuy effrene animal à l'obeissance de raison." Here the argument is expressed in its simplest form; human beings are rational animals, that is distinguished from "les bestes brutes" only by their faculty of reason; woman, though of the human species and thus endowed with reason, is not in control of herself when the inner animal takes over, and is temporarily denied the use of reason; her distinguishing attribute is thus at any time and for any period liable to be eclipsed, so that in practise she does not then differ from the animals who never have the use of reason. Based on physiology, this judgement is quite exceptionally damaging to woman, since it is reasoned clearly and regularly from premisses which were not in those days easily challenged. The saving clause at the end of Rondibilis' attack is the exception that proves the rule; any vigorous application of reason, like that of "les preudes femmes", can reassert the higher nature of woman, and the fact that they do not on the whole apply that faculty is tantamount to an abdication of their reason. Purely physical means can never subdue the clamorous animal except for a while, nor could this be expected since the problem is to redeem woman from the bonds of animal passion for and through the exercise of a higher form of activity.

The form and arrangement of the attack are carefully planned to secure the maximum effect, and the anti-climax is saved only by the Bridoye episode,

which in fact changes the theme, though originally intended to continue it. The periodic comments of Pantagruel during the earlier consultations are either non-committal or, like those quoted above, concerned in a general way with woman's proper place, not her nature. With Hippothadée the idea of woman's duty is continued, but some comment on her nature is added from a religious point of view, and in the spirit of charity. The teaching of the Church, of the Bible, as Hippothadée might say, recognises the moral dependence of woman, not to the extent of denying her individual personality, but by putting responsibility for her conduct on man. Like a child who has not yet attained the age of reason, a woman can develop only the virtues and vices presented by the example of man. To Rondibilis falls the task of defining woman coldly and scientifically as a creature, not as a person, and no mitigation of the sentence can be expected in the name of charity. He is not even concerned primarily with woman as wife, despite the context, and her duties are not examined. For him marriage and other relations with woman can only be understood by reference to her essential nature; granted that nature, there is little room for speculation concerning these relationships. The quotation from Plato is interesting for more than one reason, even if it is through Tiraqueau. It was precisely the revival of Platonism, and especially interest in the 'Symposium', which had given new impetus to the eternal debate on feminism, and it is faintly ironical to find Rabelais using the other side's favourite author to deliver the most damning indictment of all. A point not generally

appreciated to-day, or in Rabelais' time, is that the description of the animal which takes control of woman is only the second half of a section which begins by describing the same phenomenon in man. It has recently been suggested<sup>(s)</sup> that Rabelais' suppression of this first phrase was deliberate, "perhaps a private joke", and even that it invalidates the subsequent attack on woman. This can hardly be the case, as Rabelais must have been perfectly well aware that very few readers could or would check his reference, and that any quotation from Plato carried great weight at the time.

From the point of view of the present study, Rabelais' choice of text provides a useful testimony. In quoting from the 'Timaeus' he used the best known of the two or three dialogues or fragments of Plato which were generally available during the Middle Ages. The obscurities and inconsistencies of this dialogue notwithstanding, it exercised an influence far greater than any other Platonic work until the Renaissance. A slight hint that Rabelais was not relying entirely on Tiraqueau, but may have had the 'Timaeus' directly in mind, is provided in a reference a few pages later to a comparatively unimportant fact in the dialogue, the counting of the guests. Whether or not he had recently been reading the 'Timaeus', it was this dialogue more than any other which his Scholastic training would have made known to him. As for the actual attack of Rondibilis (and Plato) we have just seen that a challenge to woman's claim to be rational in the same sense as man, struck at the very roots of sex equality, and, if successful,

afforded no opportunity of reply, since it at once put woman in a position of permanent inferiority. Superior to the animals in that she is endowed with reason, even if that faculty is often subordinated to lower forces, woman has no more rights than responsibility, both limited by the facts of her nature.

As a postscript to the question of woman and marriage, Gargantua's speech at the end of the TL is interesting. The attack on Canon Law, which makes clandestine marriages possible, is reminiscent of Erasmus, and the speech offers one of the few examples in Rabelais of that appreciation of the mother's point of view displayed quite often in Erasmus. The father retains his position of absolute superiority, but his wife is several times associated with him in the description of parental reactions to losing their daughter to some unscrupulous adventurer. The most emotional sentence is at the end (XLVIII/519):

"Et restent en leurs maisons privéés de leurs filles tant aimées, le père maudissant le jour et heure de ses nopces, la mère regrettant que n'estoit avortée en tel triste et malheureux enfantement; et en pleurs et lamentations finent leurs vie~~X~~, laquelle estoit de raison finir en joye et bon traictement de icelles."

This speech, though, adds nothing to the personal dignity of woman; it is a defence of the family, of the name and lineage of the father, and the daughter, unfortunate victim of the abuse, is considered solely from the parents' point of view, a priceless possession but not a person in her own right. Sons too owe obedience to their fathers, but as men they have rights as well as duties.

If all the feminist discussion of the TL is obvi-

ously consistent with Rabelais' personal experience, and also with the scanty hints of the first two books, these account only for the reasons, not the basis, of the final judgement. All the arguments of the TL are those which the anti-feminists of the Middle Ages had at their disposal, and in his attitude Rabelais marks no departure from the tradition of his immediate Scholastic predecessors. Even in the more instinctive texts of the earlier books, there is more than a hint of negative influence exerted by mediaeval teaching. On **EM** this question Rabelais probably stands as near his early training as on any other. The judgement<sup>(6)</sup> that the TL might be considered a popularisation of Erasmus' attitude to marriage and woman, and that "Rabelais' ideas on women would then be not so much mediaeval as early Victorian", has an immediately appealing quality as a formula, but it does not stand up to closer scrutiny. Early Victorian and mediaeval are not readymade antitheses, but if one must opt for one or the other, the case for mediaeval still seems the more convincing.

## CHAPTER SIX

ANIMALS AND PLANTS

The role of the animal and vegetable kingdoms in Rabelais' work is surprising only in its great diversity and richness. No deep thought need be presumed to account for the frequent mention of animals and plants, but if only from a quantitative point of view these cannot be passed over in any such comprehensive survey of his outlook as is being attempted here.

In a work where strands of thought have to be picked up and woven together as best they may, nothing is insignificant in the final fabric, however trifling in itself. The first thing which strikes one in collating some of the references to animals is that they do not fall into one or two categories, such as metaphors or learned facts, but spring from quite a number of different sources. Any divisions of such disparate material are bound to be arbitrary, but not necessarily useless, and it is convenient to look at Rabelais' menagerie under several different headings.

Those references which derive directly or indirectly from Rabelais' models ('les Grandes Chroniques', Folengo &c.) obviously tell us least about his thought. Several of these purely popular themes occur in the early books, and domestic animals play the leading part. The whole of ch. XII of 'Gargantua' is full of horse-lere, though actual animals have nothing to do with it, the giant mare of ch. XVI belongs to popular tradition and performs the recognised feats. Earlier on in his childhood the cows who supplied Gargantua with milk and the oxen who drew his perambulator are particularised with Chinoisais origins, a reminder

of Rabelais' own youth in the country. In 'Pantagruel' much the same sort of thing is to be seen. The infant Pantagruel too has his cows for milk, and the revolting mishap which befalls one of them recalls (IV/204) in case one is apt to forget that awareness of animal suffering is a modern invention, and localised at that. It is interesting that two of the liveliest episodes in which Panurge figures both introduce packs of dogs; in the first when he flees from the burning Turkish prison he is pursued by 1311 dogs (XIV/253), from whom he only just escapes, and in the second (XXII/287) he makes use of dogs to accomplish his shameful revenge on the proud lady of Paris. The choice of animal may not be accidental, and it is easier to associate Panurge with dogs than with the knightly horses and falcons of his master. These early books have other animal episodes in similar popular vein, notably horses being slaughtered in battle, which are on the whole not a feature of the later books. One illustrious exception must be made for Panurge's sheep, or, as they are first presented, "les meutons de Dindenault". This lively incident, borrowed from Folengo, has always appealed to popular taste, and somehow seems less brutal than the others. In this connexion, the description of the bullbaiting in the 'Sciomachie' gives a very good idea of the taste of Rabelais and his contemporaries in this matter. Such treatment of animal motifs recalls the teeming can-asses and miniatures, the stone capitals and stained glass of the Middle Ages, where every manifestation of life, from God to the lowliest creature, found a proper place. The mediaeval inspiration of this type



of reference need not be emphasised, and will hardly be contested.

Equally popular and mediaeval in origin are Rabelais' fabliaux. "Le lion et le renard" does not so much anticipate la Fontaine as look back to the 'Roman de Renart' and other mediaeval fabliaux. Another charming fantasy in the same style is "les guays et les pies" (QL. Ancien Prol), and "l'Asne et le Roussin" (CL. VII) though in disputed territory is more probably by Rabelais than any other part of the CL, and is too in the best fabliau tradition.

Corresponding to these mediaeval animals are a number of Classical ones, whose mention is prompted by literary considerations more than anything else. The metamorphoses of Jupiter (TL. XIII/391), the white cock of Socrates' last words (TL. XXI/425), the tortoise which caused Aeschylus' death (QL. XVII/6II), all these and similar references are the counterpart to the mediaeval animals noted above. They are much more stylised and much more what one comes to expect in authors consciously imitating the Classical manner.

More deliberate and less formalistic are the comparisons and turns of phrase in which Rabelais draws on animals for literary effect. In his praise of debt Panurge reaches the highest levels of eloquence (TL?II/358): "les obscures forests, tesnières de loups, de sangliers, de renards" sounded a more realistic note in the 16C than to-day. The grain stores are threatened with "calamité de mulotz, le deschet des greniers et la mangeaille des charrantons et mourrins." Pantagruel discussing the effect of an empty stomach on the soul, speaks of the hungry

philosopher (TL.XIII/395): "Au tour de luy aboyent les chiens, uillent les loups, rugient les lions, hannisent les chevaulx, barrient les elephans, sifflent les serpens, braisient les asnes, sonnent les cigalles, lamentent les tourterelles --- car la faim estoit au corps." A little later he speaks of the earthbound soul: "comme si l'oizeau, sus le poing estant, vouloit en l'aer son vol prendre et incontinent par les longes seroit plus bas deprimé." The language of falconry is used many times in all the books, and a special section could be devoted to it. Panurge uses it as well, also on the subject of fasting (TL.XV/403):

"Ainsi font les faulconniers. Quand ilz ont peu leurs oiseaux, ils ne les font voler sus leurs gorges; ilz les laissent enduire sus la perche." The older generation is equally fond of this kind of comparison; hearing the Pyrrhenist Trouillogan, Gargantua says (TL.XXXVI/482): "Vrayement on pourra aorenant prendre les lions par les jubes, les chevaulx par les crins, les beufs par les cornes, les bufles par le museau, les loups par la queue, les chevres par la barbe, les oiseaux par les pæds; mais ja ne seront telz philosophes par leurs parolles pris."

The first appearance of Andouilles is the occasion for more zoology. Pantagruel thinks they may be (QL.XXXV/657): "escurieux, belettes, martres ou hermines." Perhaps the comparison Rabelais liked best was that of the monkey, which he uses at least five times. In 'Gargantua' (XL/140) there is the extended comparison between monks and monkeys (a pity that the jeu de mots is not possible in French) taken from Erasmus; seeing the grimaces of the Sibylle of Panzoult, Pan-

urge says (TL.XVII/4II) "à quelle fin fredonne-elle des babines comme un singe demembrant escrevisses?" Jupiter in the QL (Prol./555-"contournant sa teste comme un cinge qui avale pillules, feist un mergue"; the works of Antiphysie seem admirable to her (XXXII/650) "comme vous sçavez ès cingesses semblent leurs petitz cinges plus beaux que chose du monde"; Panurge is described bursting up from the hold (LXVII/747) "remuant les babines comme un cinge qui cherche poulz en teste." This choice of imagery is revealing in a psychological sense, as it is necessarily personal and more likely to reflect mental background than quotations or imitations of other models.

Leaving the more literary side of this question, there remain a considerable number of references which can reasonably be called scientific. In these Rabelais is airing his knowledge, whether Classical or genuinely zoological, partly for effect and partly no doubt for its own sake. Particular instances of this abound, and a selection serves to illustrate the point. Already in 'Gargantua' the improbable stories from distant lands had caught Rabelais' attention. Pleading the veracity of his description of the giant mare, he says (XVII/74): "Si de ce vous esmerveillez, esmerveillez-vous davantage de la queue des beliers de Surie, èsquelz fault (si Tenaud dist vray) affuster une charette au cul pour la porter, tant elle est longue et pesante." More famous is the belief (TL.XXI/423) "les cycnes---ne chantent jamais sinon quand ilz approchent de leur mort." Picturesque, if improbable, is the story of the "bonasses de Paeonie", on which the BD furnishes a long note: "Animal de Paeonie,

de la grandeur d'un taureau, mais plus trappe, lequel, chassé et pressé, fiante loing de 4 pas et plus. Par tel moyen se saulve, bruslant de son fiant le poil des chiens qui le prochassent."

Apart from such isolated facts of natural history, scattered through the books, there is a growing tendency culminating in the QL to pile up the information in great detail. An early example of this is the list of Carpalim's booty from 'Pantagruel' (XXVI/298), consisting of 14 different items, but this is modest compared to some of the kyrielles which follow. Epistemon, for example, reads a short lecture on entomology to Panurge to prove the innocence of Raminagrobis' words, and brings in (TL.XXI/429) "pusses, punaises, cirons, mouches, culices---ascarides, lumbriques et vermes dedans le corps---dracconneaulx grivoléz que les Arabes appellent meden." Her Trippa's repertoire of the occult includes a large selection of animals, whole or in parts. (TL.XXV) Almost wilfully technical is the list of reptiles, lifted from Avicenna, which Eusthenes declares immune from his saliva (QL.LXIV/741). The peak of zoological erudition is reached in the Gaster chapters. The litany "et tout pour la trippe" introduces a lively collection of birds, beasts and fishes, all performing feats of great energy at Gaster's behest. The immense culinary catalogues of ch.LIX-LX are more reminiscent of the zoo than the kitchen, and Natural History really comes into its own in the succeeding chapters. Plutarch's unlikely method of stopping a herd of goats in full flight precedes an orgy of similar tales, mostly from Pliny. The Echineis, woodpeckers, deer, elephants, bulls, vipers, lions, cocks, follow one another in an incredible parade of strange

facts, almost a reductio ad absurdum of encyclopaedic knowledge.

The general effect of this substantial section is more that of painting than of literature; the canvas of a Bosch, or perhaps the stone of some Gothic cathedral are almost better media for such a riot of life than the pages of a book. It is certain that the zoological theme, progressively more marked through the QL, receives its final development in this tremendous ebullition of animal themes, corresponding exactly to the Pantagruelion chapters of the TL, to which we shall turn later. It is not desire to parade Classical erudition which provokes this outburst, the "tout pour la trippe" section and the list of foods is in no way bookish, yet no less impressive than the science of the final chapter.

There is at the beginning of the QL a phrase which foreshadows these Gaster chapters, and may well be an expression of Rabelais' own current preoccupations. At the end of his letter to his father, Pantagruel writes (IV/572): "Vous asceurant que les nouveaultez d'animaulx, de plantes, d'oyzeaulx, de pierreries que trouver pourray et recouvrer en toute nostre peregrination, toutes je vous porteray---." In point of fact, except for the tarande and unicorns despatched with this letter, the only other exotic specimen sent back is the beatload of Andeuilles, but the author's interest never flags, as we have seen, in introducing themes from Natural History. An element which is particularly notable in the QL is that of personal observation, and for an understanding of Rabelais' general outlook this provides a valuable addition. In

the letter mentioned above, there is a description of unicorns and the "tarandes" (probably reindeer) compared respectively with lambs and kittens in their docility, a detail which sounds like the voice of remembered experience. Earlier the author himself had compared the tarande to a chamelon, in that it too could change colour. Of the chamelon he says "je l'ay veu couleur changer" and gives details of the changes, referring to turkeys and "asnes de Meung" to press the point. That Rabelais' mind was engrossed by actual experience when he wrote seems proved by the continuation of the same theme into the next chapter. Explaining the nature of the Chelidoine, he says: "C'est un poisson grand comme un dar de Loyre, tout charnu, sans esquames, ayant aesles cartilagineuses (quelles sont es souriz chaulves) fort longues et larges, moyennans lesquelles je l'ay souvent veu voler une toyse au-dessus l'eau, plus d'un traict d'arc. A Marseille on le nomme lendele." The last sentence probably gives the clue to the source of Rabelais' knowledge. A moment later comes the long description of the carrier-pigeon, "le gozal", which also suggests first-hand acquaintance.

There are other indications of personal interest in animals. In Epistemon's story of the Amiens monk, Bernard Lardon, on a visit to Florence, the careful dating of the episode (adjusted from "12 years ago" in 1548 to "about 20" in 1552) strongly suggests a personal memory of the (XI/591) "lions et afriquanés (ainsi nommez-vous, ce me semble, ce qu'ilz appellent tygres) pres le beffroy, pareillement voyans les porczespicz et austruches en palais du seigneur Philippes

Strossy." The zoo of Cleberg at Lyon must also have been known to Rabelais, even if the account of it in the CL cannot be proved authentic. Perhaps personal again is the comment on the *Physiote* (XXXV/656): "Pantagruel n'en tint compte, car aultres assez pareilz, voyre enceres plus enormes, avoit veu en l'Ocean Gallique." though the locality is a little doubtful. The apparition of Mardigras seems to have stirred in Rabelais memories of past travels; his crimson plumage is likened to (XLI/674): "un phoeniceptere, qui en Languegoth est appele flammant." It can hardly be a coincidence that the mention of the monster's goose-like feet recalls "la reine Pedauque" at Toulouse. One could extend the list indefinitely, but it is already long enough to show the vivacity and variety of Rabelais' observations.

To finish the procession of animals there are three in a privileged position who deserve a place. These are the three pets mentioned by name: Gargantua's little dog Kyne (TL. XXXV/477-, named after that of Tobias, "le grand chat Rodilardus", whose painful attachment to Paurge concludes the QL, and "le geai de Frapin---son Geitrou" (QL. Ancien Prel.). No more than names, these three yet hint at a familiarity with creatures not confined to books or even scientific observation.

Great though his interest in the animal kingdom may have been, Rabelais was of his time in putting the animals firmly in their place. Such an extravaganza as the arguments in Montaigne's 'Apologie de Raymond Sebond' is unthinkable in Rabelais, for whom the Scholastic distinction between reason and unreason remained

absolute. Quoting Plato on woman, Rabelais is stating the common view when he differentiates between (TL. XXXII/467) "les animaulx raisennables et les bestes brutes", and gives Aristotele's classic definition: "tout ce qui de soy meut est dict animal." Reason is man's inalienable heritage, and that which places an eternal gap between him and the animals. The inferiority of animals is not confined to this alone, for we read that man is (TL. VIII/377) "animant né à domination pacifique sus toutes bestes", and when the golden age of peace ended with rebellion against man, "L'homme doncques, voulant sa première jouissance maintenir et sa première domination continuer, non aussi povant soy commedement passer au service de plusieurs animaulx, eut nécessité soy armer de nouveau." This is sound Scholastic teaching: "Omnia animalia sunt subjecta homini, vel totaliter, ut mansueta, vel in parte, ut alia, sed non omnia obediunt ei propter peccatum." Man is the centre of Rabelais' universe, but this does not preclude interest in the lesser creatures of whom he makes use.

Less striking, because less dynamic, is the treatment of the vegetable kingdom, but this is in its way as revealing as the animal examples. The sentence just ~~XXX~~ quoted, about man's state in the golden age, begins: "(Nature) créa l'homme---comme animant, non plante, comme animant (diz-je) né à paix, non à guerre, animant né à jouissance de tous fruictz et plantes vegetables---" and goes on to explain how, after the Fall, "la terre commença à produire orties, chardons, espines et telle autre manière de rebellion contre l'homme entre les vegetables." Panurge does not indicate the measures



taken by man to reconquer the vegetable kingdom, corresponding to his taking up arms against the animals, but presumably botanical skill was an indispensable remedy. On this subject we are comparatively well informed about Rabelais' attitude. The education of Gargantua laid great stress on botanical studies, partly but not entirely from a medical point of view, and we have direct evidence of Rabelais' own interest in his letters to Geoffroi d'Estissac, written in the same period as 'Gargantua'. The first letter which we have begins at once with a reference to the (987) "graines de Naples pour vos sallades", and the third contains detailed instructions about sewing. Also from the same period is the dedication to Jean du Bellay of the 'Topographia antiquae Romae', where he notes (983): "Plantas autem nullas, sed nec animantia ulla habet Italia, quae non ante nobis et visa essent et nota. Unicam platanum vidimus---." Evidently Rabelais' voyages to Italy, at any rate the early ones, were inspired with the same general curiosity as that of Pantagruel in the QL, and botany especially is a subject which appeals to him.

As far as literary references to botany are concerned, the TL gives the same impression of current preoccupation as the QL for zoology. Mentions, both scattered and concentrated, are frequent enough throughout the book to point to some special interest on the author's part. A few examples taken as they occur in the book show the diversity of knowledge in this field. In the first chapter the newly conquered people are compared among other things to "un arbre nouvellement planté." Panurge in his praise of the braguette

turns to the vegetable kingdom for support (VIII/376) "Voyez comment nature, veulent les plantes, arbres, arbrisseaulx, herbes et zoophytes, une fois par elle crééz, perpetuer---arma leurs germes et semences---. L'exemple est manifeste en poix, febvres, faseolz, noix, alberges, cotton, colocynthes, bleus, pavot, citrons, chas-taignes, toutes plantes ---." If this appears a somewhat academic approach to botany, the countryman comes out in Pantagruel's recommendation to Panurge before sending him away to dream (XIII/396): "Vous mangerez bonnes poyres crustumenies, et berguamottes, une pome de court penau, quelques pruneaulx de Tours, quelques cerizes de mon verger." Small details in the Sibylle episode are insignificant except as proof of Rabelais' minute powers of description. The hut is beneath (XVII/409) "un grand et ample chataignier", the Sibylle throws on the fire "demy fagot de bruière et un rameau de laurier sec", for her prophecy she has recourse to "un sycomore antique". Professional is the tone of Rensibilis' enumeration of anti-aphrodisiac drugs (XXXI/462): "nymphaea heraclia, amerine, saule, cheñeve, periclymenos, tamarix, vitex, mandragore, ciguë, orchis le petit---."

Like the Gaster chapters in the QL, which resume a tendency visible throughout the book with their catalogue of animals (and, indeed, of plants too) the Pantagruelien chapters form the grand finale of the botanic themes running through the TL. The mass of information expounded in these chapters is too great to be quoted at all; it derives largely from Classical sources, Pliny, Theophrastus and others, but Rabelais' own observations are not lacking. The whole composition

of this section bears witness to a more than superficial acquaintance with plants, even if some Classical errors are uncritically reproduced. The amazing etymologies proposed are in the best tradition of Isidore, and there is more on the same low level.

There is no need to quote further examples, of which there are so many. These few show that whether for literary effect or pure erudition, Rabelais draws widely on his obviously respectable knowledge of botany and zoology. At first sight the mere mention of animals and plants in a work notoriously encyclopaedic in its range of interests does not seem a very fruitful field for an enquiry into the author's mental outlook, but in sheer quantity these allusions make one cautious of taking them for granted. When every allowance has been made the facts cannot be dismissed as self-explanatory. Rabelais the successor of the mediaeval writers of romans and fabliaux gives us the broad and farcical animal stories of which the first two books contain the greatest number; Rabelais the countryman gives us surprisingly little about farmyard animals, and while the vine receives its due measure of respect, his botany goes far beyond the interests of the cultivator; Rabelais the encyclopaedic reader does not spare us catalogues of every kind, in which botany and zoology are well represented; when all this has been said there is a great residue of texts for which no immediate explanation offers itself. Gilson makes a remark which should be more widely known; speaking of Albert the Great he says: <sup>(1)</sup> "Albert s'est jeté sur tout le savoir gréco-arabe avec le jeyeux appetit d'un colesse de bonne humeur---

Il y avait du pantagruélisme dans son cas, ou, plutôt, il y aura de l'albertinisme dans l'idéal pantagruélique du savoir." Such a penetrating judgement can only receive grateful acknowledgement; it is not capable of improvement.

If that is, indeed, one of the most important explanations of the interest shown by Rabelais in Natural History, more particularly in his practise of direct observation, Rabelais, and Albert too, are in a long and unbroken line of encyclopaedists, producers and consumers, stretching from Isidore of Seville through Vincent of Beauvais to the vernacular writers of the later Middle Ages. A still greater, though anonymous line, is that of the artists in stone, paint and glass who filled every cranny and margin with the glories of bird, beast and flower, real and imaginary, to make the visual masterpieces of the mediæval centuries. This universal consciousness of living things, stemming upward from the craftsmen, must be taken into account in seeking an explanation of Rabelais' outlook. There is in his case an additional factor, which cannot have been without importance, and which is specially relevant to his use of animal comparisons and illustrations. As a Franciscan Rabelais must have been in contact, even if unconsciously, with the founder's unique tradition of love for all creatures, and we know from extant documents that contemporary Franciscan preachers made free use of themes from Natural History for their sermons. As a hearer, and very probably preacher too, Rabelais almost certainly received early instruction in this tradition of his order. This may fairly be added to his personal interest in natural things as lying at the root of much that followed in the later years of his literary period.

## CHAPTER SEVEN

COSMOLOGY AND PHYSICS

In his treatment of physics Rabelais had little choice but to follow accepted theories. Teaching about the earth and stars, about the world of matter and its processes naturally varied from expert to expert but in its outlines the science of physics remained substantially the same throughout the Middle Ages, and to a great extent even to the time of Descartes. Thus it is not so much a question of evaluating the opinions repeated by Rabelais, of sifting and collating his texts in the search for underlying assumptions, but rather of seeing the extent of his knowledge as revealed in his book. It goes without saying that many of the mediaeval notions about physics which seem abstruse and erudite to-day were then as commonplace as the acceptance of heliocentricity and the nuclear theory to-day, so that it is in particular details that any specialised knowledge must be sought.

Before the universe took the shape it now has, it was in a state of total disorganisation. The horrors of the tempest provoke Rabelais' heartcry (QL. XVIII/614): "Croyez que ce nous sembloit estre l'antique Chaos, onquel estoient feu, air, mer, terre, tous les elemens en refractaire confusion." A second reference is prompted by a Scholastic maxim (QL. LXII/733): "pour eviter vacuité (laquelle n'est tolerée en nature; plus-toust seroit la machine de l'univers, ciel, air, terre, mer reduicte en l'antique chaos, qu'il advint vacuité en lieu du monde)." Yet another variation on the same theme comes in the Pan chapter (XXVIII/641): "A la

mort auquel feurent plaincts---en toute la machine de l'Univers, cieulx, terre, mer, enfers." In each of these three references, the universe is seen from a slightly different point of view, according to the context. In the first the idea is that the very world of matter is being decomposed into its original elements; in the second, "ciel" takes the place of "feu", perhaps as giving a better picture of the settled pattern of the "machine de l'univers" threatened with disintegration; in the third the context is theological, in fact Scriptural, and the idea is of the 'mansions' of the universe, with their respective inhabitants, more than of its basic components.

The neutral, pagan idea of creation from chaos, which was brute matter, not a void, is not left alone by Rabelais, and at least two further texts supply the additional Christian idea of a creation ex nihilo. Of these the most conclusive is an early one, from the 'Pantagrueline Prognostication' of 1533(920): "Dieu le createur---sans la maintenance et gouvernement auquel toutes choses seroient en un moment reduictes à neant, comme de neant elles ont esté par luy produictes en leur estre." The two cardinal doctrines of creation ex nihilo and the continued conservation of the world are here stated clearly. A proof that this particular Scholastic idea was still in Rabelais' mind a dozen years later is to be found in Panurge's praise of debt. Extolling the merits of his action in creating debts and thus creditors, Panurge says (TL.III/361): "en ceste seule qualite' je me reputois auguste, reverend et redoutable, que, sus l'opinion de tous philosophes (qui disent rien de

de rien n'estre faict)rien ne tenent ne matière première estoye facteur et createur." Gilson<sup>(2)</sup> has shown how accurate a summary of the Scholastic theory of creation this is, with its reference to "ex nihilo nihil fit", to "materia prima" and the distinction between 'facere' and 'creare'. The fact that Plutarch too reproduces the same idea<sup>(4)</sup> is not really relevant; apart from anything else, genuine creation ex nihilo was not an idea with which Plutarch would have been familiar, while all the readers of Rabelais would. It is interesting that the original of this theory is quoted (in Greek) in a work of about the same time as the 'Prognostication'. In his dedication to Tiraqueau of Manardi's letters (971), Rabelais gives the text from Aristotle's Categories which lies behind all this doctrine. The order of creation, then, from chaos to organised matter, and from nothing to chaos, is given full weight in various parts of Rabelais' work.

Once having established the world as it is, God provided certain natural laws according to which the work of creation proceeds indefinitely. Some of these laws are mentioned by Rabelais in sufficient detail to show that he had an adequate grasp of the principles involved. The most detailed is another passage from the praise of debt, also commented on by Gilson<sup>(3)</sup>

(III/363): "Entre les elemens ne sera symbolisation alternation ne transmutation aulcune; car l'un ne se reputera obligé a l'autre: il ne luy avoit rien presté. De terre ne sera faicte eau; l'eau en aer ne sera transmuee, de l'aer ne sera faict feu; le feu n'eschauffera la terre. La terre ne produira que monstres---."

The allusions are to the qualities (hot, cold, wet, dry) asserted in the elements and to the necessity of their harmonious interaction for the regular funct-

tioning of the world of matter. Failing this harmony, the course of nature is upset and unnatural, or monstrous, phenomena occur.

Panurge in the Physetere episode comes back to his erudition (QL. XXXIII/653): "Ne veus ay-je assez exposé la transmutation des elemens et le facile symbole qui est entre roust et bouilly, entre bouilly et rousty?" Earlier, in Gargantua's letter, the same idea appears in a theological context (Pant. VIII/225): "car alors (sc. Judgement Day) cesseront toutes generations et corruptions, et seront les elemens hors de leurs transmutations continues, veu que---toutes choses seront reduictes a leur fin et periode." The teleology of the last phrase is repeated in a semi-facetious context in the QL (Ancien Prol 3755): "toutes choses sublunaires ont leur fin et periode." ~~teleology-of-the-last-phrase-is-repeated~~ Classical idea of a world eternal as far as the moon and transitory below it was adopted by mediaeval philosophers and combined with certain theological doctrines to explain particular problems (e.g. the habitation and longevity of spirits).

The other ideas mentioned in Gargantua's phrase concern the transmutation of elements, already noted, and generation and corruption. This too refers to an important Scholastic doctrine and recurs in several other connexions. One such reference is farcical in context, but not as meaningless as it may seem to modern readers (Pant. XXVIII/304): "du pet qu'il fit (sc. Pantagruel) la terre trembla---duquel avec l'air corrompu engendra plus de cinquante et troys mille petitz hommes." Corruption was recognised as one of



the means of generation, and though Rabelais' application of the principle is obviously absurd, the principle in itself was perfectly well established.<sup>(4)</sup> Exactly the same idea comes into the Pantagruelion chapters. The wondrous herb includes among its properties (TL.LI/529): "le jus d'icelle, exprimé et distillé dedans les aureilles, tue toute espèce de vermine qui y seroit né par putrefaction---." Finally, the poor peasant of Papefigue quotes the same principle to explain his first victory over the apprentice imp (QL.LXVI/685): "Le grain que voyez en terre est mort et corrompu, la corruption d'icelluy a esté generation de l'autre que me avez veu vendre." All these texts taken together give a good idea of the physical world as it was seen throughout the Middle Ages and into the 16C.

Similar hints of Rabelais' early grounding in Scholastic science are scattered through the book. Two early examples from 'Pantagruel' have been noted by Gilson<sup>(5)</sup> (II/200): "les oyzeaulx tumbans de l'air par faulte de rosée" and "le Philosophe mouvant la question pourquoy c'est que l'eau de la mer est salée---", the latter a direct reference to Scholastic terminology and methods of teaching. One further example from the QL (repeated oddly enough in the CL) shows that the habit persisted (QL.XLIII/679 and CL.XLVII/912): "vent en essentielle definition n'est autre chose que air flottant et undoyant." The science which Rabelais would have learned from his first masters was, as has been said, virtually the only one available, but it is none the less interesting to see how small details of style and thought betray

his considerable familiarity with these traditional doctrines. He was, of course, writing for people who would at once recognise the quotation or reference, and he takes evident pleasure in displaying his knowledge at every opportunity.

Astronomy, and its allied science astrology, deal with that part of the universe where the earthly rule of change and decay does not run. In his letter Gargantua expressly recommends to his son the study of astronomy, but bids him reject "l'astrologie divinatrice". Similar fulminations against judicial astrology appear in other parts of the work, and also, more pointedly, in the Almanachs and other minor works, but it should not be supposed from that that Rabelais had no use for normal astrology, the linking of earthly events with heavenly signs, which had a legitimate field of its own among the sciences.

Among the planets, the moon occupied a place of special interest, since it was nearest the earth and played an important part in various metaphysical theories. Plutarch, for example, wrote a dialogue 'De Facie in Luna' and in his demonology the moon has a particular role. The one fact about the moon which seems to have struck Rabelais was its reflected light. There are four references to this in the TL alone. Pantagruel describing the soul's participation in the "intellectuale sphere" says (XIII/394): "comme la lune recevant du soleil sa lumière, ne nous la communique telle, tant lucide, tant pure, tant vive, et ardente comme l'avoit receue." Later both Hippothadée and Rondibilis compare woman to the moon. The theologian says (XXX/461): "Voyez comment la lune ne prent

lumière ne de Mercure, ne de Jupiter, ne de Mars, ne d'autre planette ou estoille qui soyt en ciel; elle n'en receoit que du soleil, son mary, et de luy ~~XX~~ n'en receoit point plus qu'il luy en donne par son infusion et aspectz." The doctor is more uncomplimentary (XXXII/467): "Le naturel des femmes nous est figuré par la lune---comme la lune en conjunction du soleil n'apparoist en ciel ne en terre, mais en son opposition, estant au plus du soleil esloignée, reluist en sa plenitude et apparoist toute, notamment en temps de noct." This last text seems to be modelled on Plutarch,<sup>(6)</sup> and the frequent allusions to that author and his ideas in the TL and QL may well explain the immediate cause of Rabelais' lunar similes. In the last passage, full of astronomical wisdom, Panurge says in his praise of debt (II/363): "La lune restera sanglante et tenebreuse; à quel propous luy departiroit le soleil sa lumiere?" This same passage gives a complete list---not in order---of the planets known to the ancient world: Saturn, Jupiter, Mars, Sun, Venus, Mercury, Moon.

Another astronomical reference of which Rabelais is seemingly very fond is to the Intelligences, variously called "motrices" and "celestes". Their function in the Cosmos is best seen in a phrase which Frère Jan addresses to Panurge, who in the TL constitutes himself something of an authority on Scholastic philosophy and is thus hoist with his own petard (XXVIII/454): "puysqu'ainsi t'est predestiné (sc. estre cocu) voudroys-tu faire retrograder les planètes? demancher toutes les sphaeres celestes? proposer erreur aux Intelligences motrices?" The connexion between the

three is such that a disturbance of one affects the others directly. In the mediaeval (Aristotelian) cosmology the planets and stars were fixed to concentric crystal spheres, turned on their appropriate courses by the Intelligences, who thus continue on a secondary level the work of God, the Prime Mover, who originally set the whole universe in motion. The pagans had endowed these planets and stars with souls, and to make clear that a principle of movement only was involved the Scholastics used the term 'Intelligences'.<sup>(?)</sup> Tempted perhaps by no more than the sonority of the phrase, Rabelais uses it several times. (TL. I/353) "Obtestans tous les cieulx et intelligences motrices" X, (XXXVII/484) "Quoyque fat soit, il en l'estimation des Intelligences caelestes---", (XLIV/507) "l'aspect benevole des cieulx et faveur des Intelligences motrices." The references to "cieulx" in the plural are, of course, also based on Aristotelian cosmology. The earthly sky is not the one in question (the nature of this is recalled in the birds falling down "faulx de rosee") but the hierarchy of heavens (cf. the phrase 'seventh heaven'), the spheres on which stars and planets move. The music of the spheres is also mentioned, by Panurge (TL. IV/365) "Quelle harmonie sera parmy les reguliers mouvemens des cieulx!"

The regular movement just mentioned is apparently another of the ideas attractive to Rabelais, who speaks of it more than once. The nature of the movement is indicated in the apologue of Physie and Antiphysie (QL. XXXII/650): "~~circuler~~ circulairement en rouant, estoit la forme competente et parfaicte allure retirante à quelque portion de divinite, par laquelle les cieulx et toutes choses eternelles sont ainsi

contournées."The last part of the sentence is a statement, where the rest is an argument, and the theory enunciated is the simplest and most traditional of Classical astronomy. In this context, "les choses éternelles" are all those bodies lying above the sublunar division. The idea of the circular motion of the planets was not seriously disputed until a generation after Rabelais' death, when Kepler's ellipse theory changed the whole course of astronomy. An indirect reference to the immutable and eternal circular movement of the heavens is suggested in Pantagruel's rather complicated discourse on "manière de haulser le temps." Hercules succeeded in performing this feat, but too violently (QL.LXV/744): "De mode que par cestuy excessif haulsement de temps advint au Ciel nouveau mouvement de titubation et trepidation tant controvers et desbatu entre les folz astrologues." Any departure from normal circularity would naturally make the astrologers seek some special significance. Among other mentions, one of the most interesting is in a very early work by Rabelais, a poem addressed to Jean Beuchet, written while Rabelais was still in the OSB(985):

"Non pas qu'au vray nous croyons que les astres,  
 Qui sont reigléz, permanens en leurs âtres,  
 Ayent devoyé de leur vray mouvement."

Without seeking any deep significance in these texts spread over so long a period, one may fairly note as interesting any signs that a particular idea came more readily to Rabelais' mind than another.

The most notable exception to Rabelais' condemnation of astrology is his attitude, common to the Renaissance as to the Middle Ages, towards comets and their significance. These heavenly bodies caused much

embarrassment to ancient scientists, because in their case it was virtually impossible to 'save the phenomena'. Comets, irregular in appearance and course (as they thought) could not by definition belong to the supralunar world of eternal circular motion, but if they belonged to the sublunar world, the difficulty arose that some of them were manifestly further away than the moon. In the end theory triumphed, as always, over observation, and comets were sited in the sublunar world, no longer ranking as heavenly bodies, their significance could reasonably be linked with events on earth, in quite a different way from the obscure determinism of planetary influence, as traced by the astrologers. This explains why there is no inconsistency between Rabelais' attacks on "les folz astrologues" and his own explanation of comets, retailed in the episode of the Macraeons. Pantagruel puts it most clearly (QL. XXVI/635): "les cieulx benevoles comme joyeux de la nouvelle reception de ces beates asmes, avant leur ~~XXXX~~ decès semblent faire feux de joye par telz cometes et apparitions meteores, lesquelles veulent les cieulx estre aux humains pour prognostic certain---que dedans peu de jours telles venerables asmes laisseront leurs corps et la terre."

The comets are here shown to be signs, not causes, of the events which follow; the cause is in fact, in this case, the death of a hero. It is interesting to compare Rabelais' list of the happenings attendant on the appearance of comets as listed by Rabelais and by a Scholastic author, commenting Aristotle. Rabelais writes: "Grands troublemens en l'air, tenèbres, fouldres, gresles; en terre, concussion, tremblemens,

estonnemens; en mer, fortunat et tempeste, avecques lamentations des peuples, mutations des religions, transpors des royaumes et eversions des republicques." Pierre Tartaret, a leading Scotist of Rabelais' youth, writes: <sup>(8)</sup> "futurum malum---siccitates et ventos---terraemetum---destructiones fructuum---mutationem legum et plurium sectarum---mutationes regum et translationes regnorum." That there was a common source is sufficiently obvious.

Many more texts on the subject could be cited, especially from the Almanachs, but as these lesser works were written to parody astrology, they are less revealing for Rabelais' general outlook than the mentions inserted in passing in the roman. It is always such passing references which point most reliably to Rabelais' mental habits as distinct from his momentary preoccupations.

A subject closely connected with this cosmology is geography, where a priori theory continued to rival and often overshadow observed fact. Much has been written of Rabelais' knowledge of contemporary geography, and it has been shown clearly enough that in the later books he took an intelligent interest in the odd facts of discovery which came his way. While one can only admit this as proved fact, the other side of the picture has on the whole been neglected, so that the surviving influence of Classical and mediæval geography has tended to be overlooked in favour of the more striking contemporary allusions. A most serious authority on 16C geography comes to the conclusion that the new discoveries had remarkably little influence for one or even two generations after they

had been announced. M. Atkinson considers that Rabelais was quite content with the faulty and inaccurate information on foreign parts then available: "Pour ce qui est des nouveaux faits et de la nouvelle expérience apportée d'outremer Rabelais était de son temps."

The itinerary followed by Pantagruel on his way home from Paris, the route to the Oracle and the real or imagined exactitude of the voyage in the QL are not relevant to the present study, and Atkinson's judgement is all that need effectively be said on these points. Topical allusion is natural in a book such as Rabelais', but it cannot be expected to provide a background either for the author or his readers. The faits divers of the 1552 Prologue to the QL, the incidental mentions of Herm, Sark, Inchkeith are so many conscious displays of contemporary general knowledge, not terms of reference familiar to all. An illustration of this is the geographical motif as presented in 'Pantagruel' and 'Gargantua' respectively. In the earlier book Rabelais devotes a few lines to the homeward route of Pantagruel, given with no more comment than a railway timetable; in 'Gargantua' a whole chapter (XXXIII) is devoted to Picrochole's dream of conquest, ranging over all the world. The world in question, though, is not that of "les nouveaux horizons", but the mediaeval world of Europe, Asia and Africa, and at that only the nearer regions of the two latter continents. The dialogue is inspired probably by Lucian, and Rabelais has brought it up to date with details on the Northern lands, the Muscovites and so on, but the new discov-



eries in the Far East, Africa and America are ignored. We can be sure that if Rabelais had thought these details would enhance the artistry of his chapter they would not have been omitted. For him, and for his readers, the world was that of Picrochole, the well documented world of the Middle Ages.

Two passing references bring out perhaps equally well the conservatism of Rabelais' geography, and his real attitude to those new facts of which we know him to have been aware. Frere Jan teases Panurge about his greying hair (TL.XXVII/450): "Ta barbe par les distinctions du gris, du blanc, du tanné et du noir, me semble une mappemonde. Reguarde icy; voylà Asie, icy sont Tigris et Euphrates; Voylà Afrique; icy est la montagne de la Lune. Voids-tu les paluz du Nil? Ça est Europe. Voids-tu Theleme? Ce toupet icy tout blanc sont les mons Hyperborées." Panurge retorts with: "Va on pays de Souisse et consydere le lac de Wunderberlich, à quatre lœues de Berne, tirant vers Sion." In the other, Pantagruel remarks (TL.XLVI/512): "J'engage mon honneur, chose plus grande ne scaurois-je, fussé-je dominateur unique et pacifique en Europe, Afrique et Asie." Familiar names and places, real or legendary, come to Rabelais' mind when he thinks about geography. The world of the Classics and the Middle Ages remains his own, as indeed one would expect.

Even in such a group of chapters as those about Pantagruelion, often hailed as Rabelais' dream of progress, the same thing can be seen. Writing of the marvellous discoveries already made or to come, Rabelais says (TL.LI/531): X

"Taprobana a veu lappie; Java a veu les mons Ripheés;

Phebol voyra Thelème; les Islandoys et Engronelands boyront Euphrates----par l'usaige de cestuy benedict Pantagruelion, les peuples arcticques, en plein aspect des Antarcticques, franchir la mer Athlanticque; passer les deux tropicques, volter sous la zone torride, mesurer tout le Zodiaque, s'esbatre sous l'æquinocial, avoir l'un et l'autre pôle en veue à fleur de leur orizon."

In a passage of pure fantasy like the second sentence, it is still to the well known facts of Scholastic geography that Rabelais turns, not to the real discoveries, already half a century old.

An object lesson of this kind can be drawn from the QL, the geographical book par excellence of the four. After the details of the route to the Oracle, modelled on the performances and projects of the 16C French navigators, Rabelais gives this opinion (I/564): "telle route de fortune feut suivie par ces Indiens qui navigèrent en Germanie, et feurent honorablement traictéz par le roy des Suèdes---comme descrivent Cor, Nepos, Pomp. Mela et Pline après eulx." The authority of the ancient world is invoked to justify the most modern attempts at discovery, because the fact of repetition through the centuries was a surer guarantee to Rabelais and his contemporaries than even the first-hand (and garbled) accounts of travellers. The rapprochements between Panigon and Donnaconna, the Ennasin and Eskimos, the Paro lles Geleés and Atlantic icebergs, have been ingeniously presented, <sup>(10)</sup> but even if they are admitted without reserve, they show no more than the most casual and piecemeal acquaintance with the new voyages, while the passages quoted above bear witness to a thorough knowledge of standard a priori geography, and, moreover, to a predilection for familiar references rather than the vague and doubtful allusions read by many into the QL.

In this same QL is a reminder that Jacques Cartier may have been topical but was certainly not found more credible than the Mandevilles of the Middle Ages. Just after the episode of the Parolles Gelees, the party lands on Gaster's island, where (LVII/717): "trouvâmes le dessus au mons tant plaisant, tant fertile, tant salubre et délicieux, que je pensoys estre le vray Jardin et Paradis terrestre, de la situation auquel tant disputent et labourent les bons theologiens." Despite these disputes, nobody denied the existence of this Paradis Terrestre, which is to be found marked on maps of the period. In the TL, Panurge also speaks of it, in his lecture en diabolology (XXIII/434): "pourquoy les diables n'entrent jamais en Paradis terrestre." As Gilson<sup>(\*)</sup> has pointed out, the present tense is due to the belief that the Paradis continued to exist, though as inaccessible to men as to devils.

The chapter on Ouy-Dire (XXXI) in the CL, whether by Rabelais or not, certainly expresses his own attitude to travellers' tales, and incidentally shows equal respect for Cartier and Herodotus. The quantitative approach to knowledge, applied to all its branches, is that of Rabelais with regard to geography. The more people who quote the same story, the more likely it is to be true, therefore the antiquity of any given authority will, in the end, always be the deciding factor. Before we credit Rabelais with extraordinary prescience in forecasting, for instance, world aviation, as some critics have done, it is well to make sure that he has not once again been prophesying by the exhumation of ancient wisdom.

## CHAPTER EIGHT

NATURE

Behind creatures and the larger world of matter with its physical laws stands a conception of Nature herself, in her relationship to the created world, to man and to God. It is a truism that every age has its own conception of Nature, but it is still only too easy to read into Rabelais and the I6C in general such sentiments as our own intellectual climate would produce. Religion on the one hand and science on the other are probably always the most potent factors in determining an attitude to Nature, and failing a clear definition---which it would be hardly reasonable to expect---one can only look for answers to specific questions; what Nature permits or forbids, what she can do and cannot do. By selecting the widest possible variety of Rabelais' use of the words 'Nature' and 'naturel' it is possible to reconstruct some of their main associations in his mind.

The natural function on which Rabelais has most to say is generation. A number of texts from the TL deal with this subject from various points of view, and while the nominal theme of Panurge's marriage explains Rabelais' particular interest here, his emphasis on fertility seems due to more than merely literary considerations. The very first page of the TL contains an enthusiastic description of the fertility of the Utopians, such that: "au bout de chascun neuvième mois sept enfans pour le moins, que masles que femelles, naissoient par chascun mariage---." The first mention of marriage, just

before Panurge gets the flea in his ear, is in the question (TL.VI/371): "pourquoy les nouveaulx mariéz estoient exempts d'aller en guerre (pour la première année) X?", to which Pantagruel replies:

"Scelon mon jugement c'estoit affin que pour la première année ilz jouissent de leurs amours à plaisir, vacassent à production de lignaige et feissent provision de heritiers. Ainsi pour le moins si l'année seconde estoient en guerre occis, leurs noms et armes restast en leurs enfans."

This principle is expanded in Panurge's praise of the braguette (VIII/376):

"Voyez comment nature, veulent les plantes et arbres, arbrisseaulx, herbes et zoophytes, une fois par elle crééz, perpetuer et durer en toute succession de temps sans jamais depeXrir les espèces, encores que les individuz perissent, curieusement arme leurs germes et semences, ès quelles consiste celle perpetuité."

Nature here appears as the fertile mother of the created world, producing and conserving. Man too falls within her kingdom:

"Ainsi ne pourveut Nature à la perpetuite de l'humain genre, ains créa l'homme nud, tendre, fragil----" but later comes to his rescue: "considerez comment nature l'inspira soy armer, et quelle partie de son corps il commença premier armer, Ce feut la couille."

The necessity for this is stated a little later:

"la teste perdue, ne perit que la personne; les couilles perdues periroit toute humaine nature. C'est ce que meut le guallant Cl. Galen, lib. I de spermate, à bravement conclure que mieulx (c'est à dire moins mal) seroit point de cœur n'avoir, que point n'avoir de genitoires. Car là consiste, comme en un sacre repositoire, le germe conservatif de l'humain lignaige."

This whole chapter, with its extreme materialism, is a little suspect as coming from Panurge, not usually a character to be taken too seriously. However such an eulogy of the genitalia need not be

regarded as either unusual or absurd for its day. The only point to remember is that Panurge at the beginning of the TL demonstrates his new found mastery of Scholastic philosophy, and any bias his ideas may have is more likely to be mediaeval than Renaissance. In this instance he is echoing a recurrent strain of mediaeval profane literature, based however on the teaching of the Schools. Père G. Paré, O.P., has shown in his study of the 'Roman de la Rose' how close are the ties between Jean de Meung and the Schools in this matter where one might expect to find their greatest divergence. Jean de Meung extols the organs with "force de generacion", he too dwells on the preservation of human continuity through children replacing their parents, in his book too the Aristotelian principle "generation unius corruptio alterius" is much in evidence. The attitude of the 'Roman de la Rose' towards the organs of reproduction, "les œuvres men père (Dieu)", is compared by Paré with that of SS. Albert and Thomas, both of whom taught that sexual intercourse is essentially good insofar as it fulfils a divine intention, and that if they help to ensure the perpetuation of the species even the carnal pleasures of sex are not necessarily reprehensible. If one is inclined to think of mediaeval figures like Jean de Meung (or the Wife of Bath) as glorying in man's lower nature in opposition to ecclesiastical doctrines, it is only their extreme conclusions, not their fundamental premisses, which make them so. From a finalistic point of view Panurge's sentiments are orthodox enough, and even if their pres-

entation is buresque in part, his words are more effectively counterbalanced elsewhere in the book than is the case with Jean de Meung.

The idea of generation succeeding generation is not for long forgotten. After the dialogue which follows the braguette chapter, the last reason Panurge puts forward for marrying has a familiar ring (IX/382): "Je n'aurois jamais autrement filz ne filles legitimes èsquelz j'eusse espoir mon nom et armes perpetuer; èsquelz je puisse laisser mes heritaiges et acquests." A picturesque repetition of the same theme ends Panurge's lengthy apostrophe to Frère Jan (XXVI/447):

"Et suys d'avis que dorenavant en tout mon Salmigendoys, quand on voudra par justice executer quelque malfaicteur, un jour ou deux davant on le fasse brisgoutter en onocrotale, si bien que en tous ses vases spermaticques ne reste de quoy protraire un Y gregois. Chose si precieuse ne doibt estre follement perdue! Par advantage engendrera-il un homme. Ainsi mourra-il sans regret, laissant homme pour homme."

Even for Panurge paillardise, of which Rabelais has been so freely accused, has a teleological justification (one can hardly say a moral one) which lifts it out of the category of mere indulgence. The natural dynastic instinct of the previous quotation is rather a counsel of perfection; failing legitimate offspring, man can still find justification and consolation "laissant homme pour homme." It is hard not to recall Rabelais' personal experience in this matter and wonder how much consolation he derived from his three (or more) children. This seems to be a case where philosophical conviction is stronger than a psychological inclination.

Rondibilis sounds a scientific note in the discussion of Nature's fertility. The third of his remedies against the sting of concupiscence is (XXX/463)

"par labour assidu. Car en icelluy est faicte si si grande dissolution du corps que le sang n'a temps, ne loisir, ne faculté de rendre celle resudation seminale et superfluite de la tierce concoction. Nature particulièrement se la reserve comme trop plus necessaire à la conservation de son individu, qu'à la multiplication de l'espèce et genre humain."

Desirable as may be the conservation of the individual, the continuity of the species must always take first place. Rondibilis gives point to this at the end of the same chapter: "si (Panurge) rencontre femme de semblable temperature ilz engendreront ensemble enfans dignes de quelque monarchie transpontine. Le plus toust sera le meilleur, s'il veut voir ses enfans pourveuz."

To the views of Pantagruel, Panurge and Rondibilis, may be added those of Gargantua in the same book. Speaking to his son about clandestine marriages, the old king attacks the abuse in Erasmian terms. For him, these criminals deprive their victims, the parents, of (XLVIII/518): "ceste bien et felicite de mariage, que d'eulx ilz veissent naistre lignaige rapportant et haereditant, non moins aux meurs de leurs peres et meres que à leurs biens, meubles et haeritages." These words recall those of a dozen years before (Pant. VIII/224):

"Entre les dons, graces et prerogatives desquelles Dieu a endouayré et aorné l'humaine nature à son commencement, celle me semble singulière et excellente par laquelle elle peut en estat mortel acquerir espèce d'immortalité et, en decours de vie transitoire, perpetuer son nom et semence; ce que est faict par lignée yssue de nous en mariage legitime!"



Even after so long a time, Gargantua, and his author, are consistent with themselves. These two remarks of his are the most effective counterblast to the more extreme theories of Panurge. Given the difference between the characters of Panurge and the giants, their respective views on the subject are more similar than one might expect. Between Panurge's purely materialistic finalism and Gargantua's religious patriarchy there is no contradiction; one is the complement of the other and both insist on the fertility principle on which human and all other life depends.

If the idea of continuity is best seen in human beings, Nature's creative work in the lower orders of animals, plants and so on is not neglected and throws some useful light on Rabelais' views. An early remark by Panurge illustrates Nature's powers (Pant. XXI/293): "La vostre (beauté) est tant excellente, tant singulière, tant celeste, que je crois que Nature l'a mise en vous comme un parragon pour nous donner entendre combien elle peut faire quand elle veut employer toute sa puissance et tout son sçavoir." Equally trite is Panurge's exclamation in his praise of debt (TL. IV/365): "O comment Nature se y delectera en ses œuvres et productions." These two texts remind us as far as they go that Nature is conceived as a productive force on her own account. Nature, too, decides the form and utility of her works. Pantagruel says (TL. XVI/407): "Nature me semble non sans cause nous avoir formé aureilles ouvertes, n'y appousant porte ne clousture aulcune, comme a fait ès œilz, langue et autres issues du corps." More explicit is Rondibilis' remark (XXXII/467):

"Nature me semble (parlant en tout honneur et reverence) s'estre esguarée de ce bon sens par lequel elle avoit créé et formé toutes choses, quand elle a basti la femme." He can only conclude that this is because: "elle a eu esgard à la sociale delectation de l'homme et à la perpetuité de l'espece humaine plus qu'à la perfection de l'individuale muliebrité." Pantagruel expresses a similar idea, already quoted (XXXV/478): "femme avoir est l'avoir à usaige tel que Nature la créa, qui est pour l'ayde, esbatement et société de l'homme." From these two speakers Nature appears responsible for the form and existence of all created things, and the previous themes of finalism and fertility are also reasserted.

Nature's activity among humbler things can be judged from two examples (TL.XLIX/522): "Tant l'a chérie (Pantagruelion) Nature, qu'elle l'a dotée en ses feuilles de ces deux nombres impars (sc. 5 & 7) tant divins et mysterieux," and (QL.LIX/721): "l'industrie de Nature appert merveilleuse en l'esbatement qu'elle semble avoir prins formant les coquilles de la mer." These, and many other texts, could be misleading if taken by themselves, Nature's auto-not being discussed, but it cannot be assumed that Rabelais' evident consciousness of her wonderful works led him to forget her supreme master. Her industry, ingenuity, fecundity are the principles which explain the shape of things, including ourselves, but to stop at that and credit Rabelais with a sort of Rousseauësesque naturalism before the event is to put the Middle Ages in the same category.

The place of Nature was so much taken for granted that no mediaeval person could seriously regard her as a possible rival to the spiritual powers, let alone to God. To quote Paré again:<sup>a)</sup> "Nature est vicaire de Dieu", and though subordinate to him her laws must be obeyed: "déroger aux lois de la Nature ce sera désobeir à Dieu lui-même."

The so-called laws of Nature (as distinct from natural laws) explain the principles governing her creative and formative activity. The Aristotelian concept of the 'natures' of things and the modern conception implied in the word 'unnatural' are fundamental parts of Renaissance as they had been of mediaeval thought. In an a priori system which admitted of innumerable exceptions, miracles and monsters represented one way of trying to save both theory and phenomena. It was useless to pretend that Nature's laws were never to be broken when hagiology on the one hand and observation on the other proved the contrary. The references to this natural order vary from the merely facetious to the technical and are very numerous. Typical of the facetious sort is this parody of Scholasticism (Garg. VIII/49): "Lors commença le monde attacher les chaussees au pourpoint, et non le pourpoint aux chaussees, car c'est chose contre nature, comme amplement a declairé Olkam sus les Exponibles de M. Haultchaussade." Serious, to the point that the most extreme philosophical beliefs have been read into it, is the comment on the rule of Thelème from the same book (LVII/181): "gens libères, bien néz, bien instructz, conversans en compaignies honnestes,

ont par nature un instinct et aguillon, qui tous-  
 jours les pousse à faictz vertueux et retire de  
 vice, lequ<sup>el</sup> ilz nommoient honneur." Even if these  
 words are taken at their face-value, and much of  
 the Thélème episode is of highly controversial  
 significance, they cannot be explained by naturalism  
 in a modern sense. <sup>(3)</sup> Nothing could be more explicitly  
 contrary to the idea of the noble savage, or even  
 to an overwhelming optimism regarding human nature,  
 than these detailed conditions---free estate, good  
 family, with the best environment not only in chil-  
 dhood but throughout adult life. If men and women  
 under such Utopian conditions did not manifest  
 "un instinct et aguillon" there would be no hope  
 for mankind. The ethical implications of this chap-  
 ter do not affect the present issue; it is enough  
 to realise that "nature" as read in this context  
 is as far as could be from indicating 'human nature'  
 in a general sense.

Panurge in his praise of debt uses the natural  
 order to reinforce his argument (TL.III/364): "Si que  
 chose plus facile en nature seroit nourrir en l'aer  
 les poissons, paistre les cerfs au fond de l'Ocean,  
 que supporter ceste truandaille de monde qui rien  
 ne preste." The maintenance of each creature in its  
 appropriate, its 'natural', sphere is one of Nature's  
 chief functions. The operation of a normal process  
 of chemistry is equally a function of Nature (XIII/  
 397): "Car ceste ferveur naturelle, laquelle abonde  
 ès fruictz nouveaulx et laquelle par son ebullition  
 facilement evapore ès parties animales---." The  
 daily rhythm of our lives is dictated too by the

ordinances of Nature (XV/403): "Nature a faict le jour pour soy exercer, pour travailler et vacquer chascun en sa negociation, et pour ce plus aptement faire, elle nous fournit la chandelle, c'est la claire et joyeuse lumière du soleil. Au soir elle commence nous la tollir---." Our bodies function in a regular fashion according to the intentions of Nature, ever mindful of her duty to perpetuate the species. Rondibilis describes the effect of anti-aphrodisiac drugs (XXXI/462): "(ilz) glassent et mortifient le germe prolificque, ou dissipent les espritz qui le doibvoient conduire aux lieux destinés par nature." In this instance, the natural effects of the drugs act against the natural processes of the body, and it is man who reverses the usual order by bringing the two opposites together. As in the text from Théleme, Nature's activity is not exclusively physical, or at least has moral repercussions. Rondibilis again, inveighing against the feminine character, says (XXIII/468): "Si Nature ne leur eust arreusé le front d'un peu de honte, vous les voyriez comme forcenées courir l'aiguillette." In this sense, as in Théleme, natural impulses are not animal impulses, or natural in the modern sense. A good example of real animal instinct is to be seen in the gozal's description (QL. III/568): "Vous sçavez qu'il n'est vel que de pigeon, quand il a œufz ou petitz, pour l'obstinée sollicitude en luy par nature posée de recourir et secourir ses pigeonneaulx." The preservation of the species once more lies behind a fact of Natural History.

On the universal scale, Nature is no less active.

One of the wonderful properties of Pantagruelion is to facilitate travel(TL.LI/631): "Icelle moyen-nant, sont les nations que nature sembloit tenir absconces, impermeables, et incogneues, à nous venues, nous à elles." Higher still in the scale are the effects produced at the death of heroes(QL.XXVII/637): "(les cielz) espovantent par prodiges, portentes, monstres et aultres precedens signes forméz contre tout ordre de nature," but the heavens too have their nature, superior to that which rules the earth: "les cieulx le (Langey) repetoient comme à eulx deu par propriété naturelle." Here we are almost in the realm of miracles, seeing the intervention of a power greater than any we can understand, but one ruled nevertheless as part of the Cosmos in just the same way as earthly Nature. The universe is not haphazard, and apparent exceptions can be explained by reference to the supreme purpose governing all creation. Sub specie aeternitatis even Antiphysis has a place. In his apologue of Physis and Antiphysis, Rabelais gives a description of Nature, which though not his own seems to represent all that he thought about her(XXXII/650): "Physis(c'est Nature) en sa première portée enfanta Beaulté et Harmonie sans copulation charnelle, comme de soy-mesmes est grandement feconde et fertile." As we have seen, the main themes of fecundity and harmony recur constantly in Rabelais' work.

Most of the laws of Nature mentioned by Rabelais have already been discussed in another chapter, but two in which Nature is specifically named bring out the idea of harmony just quoted(Garg.XXIII/90):

"Nature ne endure mutations soubdaines sans grande violence", and the famous (QL.LXII/733) "Vacuité n'est tolérée en Nature." There is almost an idea of permission implied in the formulation of these laws which suggests a personification of Nature, like the 'Dame Nature' of the Middle Ages.

These last two laws are a reminder that the powers of Nature are not unlimited, and that though supreme in her own sphere, she is only "vicaire de Dieu". God comes first from all eternity and his primacy is absolute (Garg.XX/83): "Les articles de Paris chantent que Dieu seul peult faire choses infinies, Nature rien ne faict immortel, car elle met fin et periode à toutes choses par elle produictes, car omnia orta cadunt." The mocking tone of the reference is directed at the doctors, not the doctrine; no other could have been advanced without mortal danger, even if a serious alternative had existed. The eternity of the world, it is true, was still held by Averroists, but unless Rabelais' personal beliefs were utterly at variance with those expressed in his book, there is no trace ~~XXXX~~ of such a philosophy in him.

Besides the ultimate power of God, other limitations are imposed on Nature, who unlike her Lord and Creator is not perfect. We have already seen that Rondibilis considers the production of women one of Nature's rare mistakes, and Bridoye refers to a legal codification of natural error (TL.XXXIX/490): "par disposition de droit, les imperfections de Nature ne doibvent estre imputees à crime---. Et qui autrement feroit non l'homme accuseroit

mais Nature." The whole episode of Pantagruelion is concerned with Nature's limitations, this time in comparison with the ingenuity of man, Arts and sciences, material progress of every kind, depend in the last analysis on the raw materials supplied by Nature, but can only be developed by man and his reason. In the QL, the Gaster episode tells much the same story, but ranges even more widely (LVII/718): "Gaster mesmes es animalx brutaulx apprent ars desniées de Nature"; lacking reason, the lower creatures can yet devise expedients to supplement what Nature has given them. Gaster is described as (LXI/730) "noble maistre des arts" and his way of life thus: "par institution de Nature pain avecques ses appenaiges luy a esté <sup>pour provision</sup> adjuge et aliment adjoincte cette benediction du ciel que pour pain trouver et garder rien ne luy defauldroit." This division of activity between Nature and heaven is very interesting, and corresponds with Aristotelian and mediaeval views on art (in its widest sense) and Nature. The <sup>(4)</sup> end of the same chapter gives another example of the same idea; of artillery, Rabelais writes: "Nature mesmes s'est esbahie et s'est confessée vaincue par art." The conquest of Nature by art is the main lesson of both the Pantagruelion and Gaster episodes; it is the proper and necessary complement to the eulogies of Nature as creator and ruler of things. God is tacitly recognised in the background all the time, but these two episodes put man too explicitly in his proper place vis-à-vis Nature.

While these two episodes implicitly point the distinction between reason and Nature, it is practical



rather than pure reason which is exemplified. The more abstract distinction is, however, made in an interesting text which comes just before the Pantagruelion episode, and though an allusion rather than a definition conveys a perfectly clear meaning. Gargantua ends his diatribe against clandestine marriages by exculpating those who revenge themselves on the conniving priests. The point de départ is legal; the avengers have found themselves brought to justice by the other priests (TL.XLVIII/519):

"Mais ne en æquité naturelle, ne en droict de gens, ne en loy imperiale quelconques, n'a esté trouvée rubricque, paragraphe, point ne tiltre par lequel fut poine ou torture à tel faict interminée, raison obsistante, nature repugnante. Car homme vertueux ou monde ne est, qui naturellement et par raison plus ne soit en son sens perturbé, oyant les nouvelles du rapt, diffame et deshonneur de sa fille, que de sa mort. Ores est qu'un chascun trouvant le meurtrier sus le faict de homicide----le peut par raison, le doibt par nature occire sus l'inst nt---."

Even for Rabelais, the triple repetition of "nature et raison" is unusual, and emphasises the importance of the point he is making. The *jus naturalis* referred to in the first sentence belongs properly to ethics, but the three other mentions suggest the respective functions of Nature and reason in human behaviour. The promptings of Nature are ratified in this case by reason, but in other cases, to prevent murder, for example, committed in a fit of anger, reason can and must check Nature. As this is the only occurrence in Rabelais of this particular idea, it is unfortunately not possible to make any comparisons, but the force of Gargantua's words is such that they must be taken seriously. The limitation

of Nature they imply is in fact more important than that put forth at greater length in the Pantagruelion<sup>or Gaster</sup> chapters.

Two texts from the CL conveniently resume these limitations in the power of Nature, and whether authentic or not are worth quoting for the remarkably concise way in which they cover what has just been said. On the method of dividing heritages, Editus says (IV/780): "comme raison le veult, nature l'ordonne, et Dieu le commande." The distinction between the three is precise and formal. A little further on comes this note (IX/795): "Vray est comme en toutes choses (Dieu excepté) advient quelquefois erreur. Nature mesmes n'en est exempte, quand elle product choses monstrueuses et animaulx difformes." Rabelais' philosophy of Nature is in line with mediaeval tradition both in praising her wonders and in setting very firm limits to her power. It may be doubtful whether he wrote the two texts just quoted but there can be no doubt that he agreed with their sentiments.

It is interesting to compare the remarks of Rabelais, mostly disconnected and scattered throughout the roman, with the detailed theories of the 'Roman de la Rose' as Paré has analysed them: (5)

"Ordonnées à la fécondité, les lois de la nature revêtent un caractère de nécessité---Il y a un ordre de causes secondes; il y a une Nature constituée de l'ensemble organisée des natures."

On Nature's limitations, Jean de Meung is as clear as Rabelais: (6)

"Nature est puissante et féconde sans doute. Elle est la source de toute vie et de toute beauté. L'homme a reçu d'elle toutes les ressources dont il dispose. Et pourtant sa vertu n'est pas

si grande qu'elle puisse lui donner la raison---  
 Il est difficile d'affirmer plus clairement la  
 la dépendance de l'homme à l'égard de Dieu, tout  
 en reconnaissant ses droits de nature. C'est  
 l'homme tel qu'il apparaît dans les œuvres  
 des grands scolastiques du moyen âge, l'homme en  
 possession de tous ses moyens de nature et cepe-  
 ndant orienté vers Dieu."

Paré's comments on his text are so appropriate  
 to ours that it is hard to stop quoting him. Perhaps  
 even more effective than textual rapprochements,  
 between Rabelais and Scholastic authors are these  
 views expressed in a work of literature whose Schol-  
 astic sources cannot be doubted. Most of Paré's  
 remarks need no modification to be applied to Rab-  
 elais; this in itself is a striking testimony to the  
 wealth of doctrine to be quarried in his work and  
 to the persistence of Scholastic ideas over so  
 long a period.

CHAPTER NINE  
RELIGION

The nature of Rabelais' religion remains the most controversial problem to be faced among so many others which prevent a true understanding of his proper significance. Evidence from his personal life, attacks from Rome, attacks from Geneva, the personal protection of two cardinals, the personal enmity of a third; there is at once too much and too little material to provide a solution both convincing and impartial. Even the great contribution of M. Febvre has only cleared some of the ground; the theories of Lefranc which he so effectively refutes are not worthy of so painstaking an examination. Political and personal repercussions intervene to prevent us forming even a general opinion of what Rabelais' contemporaries thought about his religion. Comparison with other authors tends often to confuse the issue; their credentials too must be examined. Besides, as Febvre so rightly says, what Rabelais throws out in passing can hardly be expected to provide an unequivocal confession of faith in an age when professional theologians saw their own reasoned arguments subjected to endless debate. Whether Rabelais was ever in the Protestant camp, and if so for how long, whether his work is a true expression of his feelings, what the ordinary 16C reader (if there was one) really thought of passages which puzzle us, these are not questions which we shall attempt to answer here. Following the method used in other chapters, we shall try to collate Rabelais' views on religion under various arbitrary but convenient headings, see what picture results

and look specially for any shift of emphasis between the first two and last two books. Here more than anywhere else it is essential to note the mouth into which remarks are put; for the I6C reader this point was probably decisive.

Fundamental in any religious discussion of the day was the attitude to faith and works. On the matter of faith Rabelais says little enough, and that extremely tenuous. In the first editions of 'Gargantua' Rabelais calls upon his readers to believe in the giant's marvellous nativity (VI/45n.) "pour ce qu'il y a nulle apparence---Car les Sorbonistes disent que foy est argument des choses de nulle apparence." This definition, Pauline in origin, was used too by Erasmus, but was not one generally accepted by theologians because of its context, and was presumably withdrawn from later editions for reasons of prudence. Far more significant, and the subject of continued debate, is the phrase in Gargantua's letter (Pant. VIII/228): "foy formée de charité." Whatever the precise inspiration of these words, it has been conclusively shown that idea and expression alike are Scholastic,<sup>(4)</sup> and Rabelais at least can have had no doubt as to its meaning. Among the prayers recited each night by Gargantua comes an act of faith (XXIII/97) "ratifiant leur foy envers luy (Dieu)". Just before the battle with the Dipsodes Pantagruel in his turn affirms his faith (Pant. XXVIII/306): "---mets tout ton espoir en Dieu, et il ne te delaissera point; car de moy--- je n'espère en ma force ny en mon industrie, mais toute ma fiance est en Dieu, mon protecteur, lequel

jamais ne delaisse ceux qui en luy ont mis leur  
 espoir et pensée." These are commonplace remarks,  
 and will support no close theological scrutiny, but  
 they show the explicit, and, to all appearances, serious  
 faith of the giants in the first two books. The  
 absence of such references from the TL and QL proves  
 nothing by itself, as other indications are not lack-  
 ing to show that the giants have had no change of  
 heart. One text in the TL mentions faith in a slight-  
 ly different sense, but is very relevant. Pantagruel  
 says (XXIX/456): "l'occupation principale, voyre  
 unique et totale des bons theologiens estre empl-  
 oictee par faictz, par dictz, par escriptz a extirper  
 les erreurs et heresies---et planter profondement  
 es cueurs humains la vraye et vive foy catholique."  
 Lest any suspicion of irony should attach to the  
 last word, we have the extremely orthodox, if mildly  
 Evangelical, utterances of Hippothadée to reassure  
 us. "Catholique" had not the paradoxically restr-  
 ictive sense it has to-day, but it is interesting  
 to compare the last mention of the word with Pant-  
 agruel's speech of many years before (Pant. XXIX/312)  
 "---ton (Dieu) negoce propre qui est la foy; car en  
 tel affaire tu ne veulx coadjuteur, sinon de con-  
 fession catholique, et service de ta parolle---"  
 and his final vow: "je feray prescher ton saint  
 Evangile purement---." The Evangelical sympathies  
 of Rabelais---and Hippothadée---must be reconciled  
 with his claim for the universality of the true  
 faith. The exclusiveness of Geneva, uncompromising  
 and clearly permanent, may well have been the final  
 disillusionment which led Rabelais to pick on  
 "imposteur de Genève" as Calvin's damning title.

Except for the single phrase "foy formée de charité", there is no statement about the relationship between faith and works. The superstitious abuses condemned in the first two books are those condemned by Erasmus, Luther, Calvin, but no less by the more progressive leaders of the Counter-Reformation. Gargantua's devotional life under the old régime is rightly mocked for failing to match quality with quantity (Garg. XXI/85): "Là (à l'église) oyoit 26 ou 30 messes---Au partir de l'église, on luy amenoit sur une traine à beufz un faratz de patenestres de Saint Claude---en disoit plus que seze hermites." Panurge's advances on the lady of Paris include the filching of her beads and liberal use of holy water. The same Panurge (Pant. XXI/284) "à tous les troncs baisoit les relicques" and obtained profit both spiritual (in indulgences) and financial.

Pilgrimages are the object of special attention, and Grandgousier condemns them as (Garg. XLV/154) "ouieux et inutilles voyages", but it is remarkable that the reason for his anger is the superstitious abuse which made saints responsible for evils. On the broader subject of devotional pilgrimages, Rabelais is silent; more silent than his master Erasmus, who poured some of his most acid scorn on the shrines of Canterbury and Walsingham. By implication Rabelais may be supposed to have disapproved of all pilgrimages, but in fact he selects the point of his attack so skilfully that the most orthodox could only admit that he was right. Similarly when Rabelais attacks monks and friars he chooses particular abuses, condemned too by the unimpeachably orthodox; their ignorance, their idleness, their gluttony, their

their mumbling of prayers, their lechery, venality and social uselessness. Rabelais knew well enough that the prescriptions of St. Benedict's and St. Francis' rules were formal in attacking and trying to prevent just such abuses. He knew, too, that his former Abbey of Maillezais had contributed decisively to the drainage and protection of the surrounding land; that the whole face of Europe had been changed by the immense labours of Benedictines and Cistercians turning wildernesses into fertile pastures; that the very existence of his beloved ancient MSS had been assured by the unremitting industry of monastic scribes and librarians. Even the Friars, whom he seems to detest most of all, had made possible the growth of every university in Europe, and in the case of the Dominicans had by their statutes dedicated themselves from the first to the cause of learning. The 16C picture of the regular orders was not a bright one, though in France the gloom was pierced by notable shafts of light, but the spirit of all monasticism lies in its ideals as set forth in the Rules, not in malpractises, however widespread at any given time. Former Franciscan and former Benedictine, secular canon and, till his death, beneficed priest, Rabelais may have had personal reasons for knowing and hating the religious life, but a reasoned and explicit attack on monastic ideals and principles, as distinct from practise, is not to be found in his work. There is, of course, Thélème with its parody of monastic vows and institutions, but one can no more imagine Rabelais being content with such a life than Frère Jan, the nominal



founder. A comparison with Erasmus' famous dialogue "Militi et Carthusiani" shows how far Rabelais is from presenting a real picture (or criticism) of monastic life.

Fasting is another practise Rabelais seems to have disliked, in the same way ~~that~~ he hates the incessant bellringing, but his attacks are not sensational (Part. XXI/282): "ces dolens contemplatifz, amoureux de karesme, lesquelz point à la chair ne touchent", is typical. Antipathy to the Church's rule of fasting, indeed to any inconvenient discipline, is as old as the rule, but is hardly a serious argument. All these points, pilgrimages, fasting, pardons, monastic abuses, mechanical devotions, have an obvious propaganda value, and in the explosive atmosphere of the 1530's were something of a manifesto, but they do not touch the essentials of doctrine, nor on the whole of the individual questions involved. "Jusques au feu exclusivement" is very much the motto of this first Rabelais.

The TL and QL mark in every way an evolution from the earlier books, but critics have perhaps been too anxious to see a break in thought. There are fewer direct battle-cries, it is true, but those that there are seem familiar. Pantagruel speaks of (TL. XIII/395): "les escriptz de ces hermites jeus-neurs----estre fades, jejunes et de mauvaïse salive comme estoient leurs corps lorsqu'ilz composoient." Quaresmeprenant is the personification of certain works, the incarnation of fasting (QL. XXIX/642): "foisonnant en pardons, indulgences et stations, homme de bien, bon catholic et de grande devotion."

Homenaz, Bishop of Papimanie, tells the travellers that if they wish to see the sacred book (XLIX/694): "il vous conviendra, par avant, trois jours jeuner et regulierement connesser." These attacks or merely gibes directed at fasting have gone a long way to make Rabelais' reputation as a self-indulgent glutton. The scathing quotation from St. Paul which introduces the detailed and explicit chapters on the Gastro-latres is conveniently forgotten for the purpose of such theories. Fasting or overeating in such contexts as these are more matters of taste than belief, the natural reaction of a man who holds that "mediocrité est en toutes choses louable".

Panurge in the later books is the champion of an orthodoxy which even the Sorbonne would have found embarrassing. On the way back from Raminagrobis it is Panurge, not Frère Jan, who talks of heresy and charity (TL. XXIII/430): "Retournons l'admonester de son salut. --- Ce sera oeuvre charitable à nous faicte." When the ship laden with religious going to the Council of Chesil passes them, it is Panurge who sends them food and (QL. XVIII/613): "deux mille beaulx angelotz pour les asmes des trespasés." This is perhaps a mild satire on almsgiving, particularly for the souls of the faithful departed, but how then to explain the same action by Pantagruel, not only at Papefiguière but also at Papimanie? At the first (XLVII/689): "Pantagruel donna au tronc de la fabricque de l'Ecclise dix huit mille royaulx d'or, en contemplation de la pauvreté du peuple et calamité au lieu." At the other he gives (LIV/711): "neuf pieces de drap d'or fringe sus fringe pour estre appousées

au d'avant de la fenestre ferrée, feist emplir le tronc de la reparation et fabricque tout de doubles escuz au sabot," and leaves a marriage gift for each of the attendants. The impartiality of Pantagruel is in accordance with his character, but we note that his gifts, even to the poverty-stricken Papefigues, are for the Church. If the Papefigues are meant, as some critics hold, to portray the unfortunate Vaudois, the liberality is rather restrained. It is surely wisest to look for no hidden meaning in the actions of Panurge or Pantagruel; almsgiving in itself is taken for granted, the motives depend on the giver.

One small theological reference would not have escaped Rabelais' contemporaries: Homenaz prays to his "Dieu decretaliarche" (LIII/700): "Donne ordre que ces precieux œuvres de supererogation, ces beaulx pardons au besoigne nous faillent." The works of supererogation, and the teaching connected with them, may not have been dear to Rabelais, but the mere fact that Homenaz, a caricature of ultramontane orthodoxy, speaks of them is not enough to constitute an attack.

The difficulty is always the same; Rabelais says just enough for us to guess at his real meaning, but never, or hardly ever, enough to commit himself outright. The extremists on both sides knew well enough what the current shibboleths were, but a man could be a perfectly sincere Catholic and still not be offended, for instance, by the character of Homenaz and his exaggerated words. The best and surest guide to the thought of the TL and QL where

controversial matters are concerned is the attitude of Pantagruel. Often absent, as for instance from the Raminagrobis incident, more often than not silent, he is the author of the very few remarks and deeds to which we can pin Rabelais; for the rest it is always "jusques au feu exclusivement."

Ø Of all the works necessary for salvation, first for an orthodox believer come the sacraments, and Rabelais' views on the subject would be carefully noted by his enemies in both camps. Once again the harvest is meagre and much less significant than has sometimes been claimed. Baptism is taken for granted, just like civil registration of birth today, but Rabelais' comment shows more than social conventionality (Garg. VII/47): "Gargantua feust porté sus les fonts et baptisé, comme est le coutume des bons christiens." The sacrament of Penance has certain associations which make it particularly vulnerable to satire, and Rabelais does not hesitate to exploit these. The victims of Frere Jan's defence of the Abbey vineyard cry (XXVII/109): "Confession! Confession! Confiteor! Miserere! In manus!" The prior and monks come out, attracted by the cries, and :  
 "En) confessèrent quelques ungs. Mais, cependent que les prebstres se amusoient à confesser, les petits mainetons coururent au lieu où estoit Frère Jan---." The whole scene is one of high fantasy, and as a satire of confession is mild enough. When the shri-ven try to escape Frère Jan: "les assommoit de coups, disant: 'Ceulx-cy sont confès et repentans, et ont gaigné les pardons; ilz s'en vont en Paradis, aussy dreict comme une faucille---.'" Frivolous, even irre-

verent, this may be, but neither the speaker nor the context allow a serious interpretation. It is Frère Jan again who misinterprets a canonical injunction (XLIII/145):

"Vous me sãmblez les prescheurs decretalistes, qui disent que quiconques voyra son prochain en dangier de mort, il le doibt, sus peine d'excommunication trisulce, plustoust admonnester de soy confesser et mettre en estat de grace que de luy ayder. quand doncques je les voiray tombéz en la rivièrre et prestz d'estre noyéz, en lieu de les aller querir et bailler la main, je leur feray un beau et long sermon de contemptu mundi et fuga seculi---."

In the QL this chance remark of the monk comes unexpectedly to life. Panurge, the superstitiously orthodox Panurge of the later books, has just succeeded in drowning the sheep and the merchants after them (VIII/582): "les preschoit eloquentement, comme si feust un petit frère Olivier Maillard ou un second frère Jan Bourgeoys; leurs remonstrant par lieux de rhetoricque les misères de ce monde, le bien et l'heur de l'autre vie----."

The only other sacrament of which there is any mention in the first two books is the Mass, and strictly speaking that is not mentioned as a sacrament but as a service. The Communion is quite neglected in Rabelais' satire, just as we knew that it played a secondary part in contemporary devotional life. The Mass was for the clergy a daily duty to perform, for the laity a social occasion with obligatory attendance. Gargantua hears 26 or 30 Masses a day under the old régime of his Scholastic tutors because the normal sized noble or prince would hear one or two; Frère Jan is "beau desbrideur de messes"

because a mass for him is like a parade for a soldier, so much time to be passed as swiftly as possible; Panurge plays his practical joke on the Cordelier during the "messe des Messieurs" because it is then that the greatest number will see him; he waylays his prospective victim, the lady of Paris, at Mass because highborn ladies attended daily. The familiarity of the service had not in the first half of the 16C been tempered with the mystery and devotion which a later age has brought, and in the contexts in which these references occur few would see grave cause for scandal.

As for other services, canonical hours figure largely in all four books in one form or another, never very serious. They were for Rabelais, as for all priests regular or secular, a daily task whose performance became more perfunctory and tedious as personal piety decreased. At the best of times, such exercises can easily degenerate into mechanical repetition, "mocquedieu, non oraison", and Rabelais had good reason to know how meaningless Divine Office can be.

The burial service is another, like Baptism, which was as automatic in the 16C as a death certificate to-day. Gargantua is quite content to have his wife put to rest in the old traditional way (Pant. III/204): "ouyt la letanie et les Mementos des presbtres qui portoient sa femme en terre." In all this Rabelais shows himself typical of the age, familiar with the Church and its ceremonies to a degree we can hardly realise and able to bring sacred things into the most scabrous contexts. He was certainly

not writing a work of piety, either for Rome or (before the event) Geneva, but nor was he in this at any rate glorifying impiety.

With the later books the considerable toning-down of the popular element entails automatically a reduction in the number of references to everyday life. Besides, the academic atmosphere of much of the TL and the exotic setting of the QL are more remote than the countryside round Chinon or the quartier Latin. There are the usual references to canonical hours, "soupe de primes", "la caballe monastique" at Matins, but on the whole the sacraments and services of the Church are less in evidence. Panurge's tale of Sœur Hessue makes fun of the seal of the confessional (TL.XIX/419): "Trop enorme eust este le peché reveler sa confession, et trop detestable devant Dieu et les anges," but Pantagruel's impatient comment does not, as it stands, apply to this at all. In any case, the secrecy of confession must be admitted as desirable even by those who disapprove of the practise. In Panurge's suggestion that they should return to Raminagrobis, confession is not mentioned as such, though Frère Jan is there in case of need, but the expression (XXIII/430) "Nous le induirons à contrition de son peché, à requerir pardon ès dictz tant beats pères," hints at the idea. Later, in the QL, it is Panurge who finds himself before Frère Jan in the position of the victims of Seuillé. During the storm it is Panurge alone who cries (XIX/617): "Frère Jan, mon père, mon amy, confession! Me voyez-cy à genoulx! Confiteor! Vostre sainte benediction!" and repeats his

plea for confession several times, while the monk curses and swears as vehemently as he labours to help the crew. Homenaz, as we have seen, prescribes fasting and careful confession before the sacred books can be displayed, but in the neighbouring island of Papefiguière, hereditary enemy of Papimanie, they seem to follow a familiar ritual (XLVII/688): "A bonne heure du matin, le laboureur s'estoit très bien confessé, avoit communié comme bon catholique et, par le conseil du curé, s'estoit au plonge caché dedans le benoistier---." This seems to be the only direct reference to Communion in any of the books, and tells us very little. No doubt the "bon catholicque" is as ironic as the similar expression applied to Quaresmeprenant, no doubt the elaborate precautions of the peasant, following the advice of his curé, are meant to contrast comically with the crude but effective expedient of his wife, no doubt their years of being "esclaves et tributaires" to the Papimanes had left them no choice in their form of worship, but the whole anecdote is so exactly in the popular mediaeval tradition that it seems over ingenious to seek for more than passing topical allusions. Perhaps Rabelais was thinking of the Vaudois, but not for very long. Beyond the desolation of the country, resulting from its defiance of papal authority, there is nothing concrete to seize upon in this episode, certainly nothing doctrinal. Lastly, when they land in Papimanie, the travellers are at once conducted to the Church, where Homanaz says (XLIX/695) "une messe basse et seiche" because it is past noon, but the only comments are facetious ones from Panurge and Frère Jan;



Pantagruel and the others seem to accept the arrangement quite as a matter of course.

Baptism, Penance, Communion; the few references are not very informative nor very different between the first two and last two books. The only other sacrament to be discussed specifically is Matrimony. In Gargantua's harangue to his son at the end of the TL, he strongly condemns clandestine marriages and blames the conniving priests even more than the parties concerned. This, though, is no attack on marriage as an institution, quite the contrary, and if Gargantua condemns the priests who permit the abuse, it is certain that he would not regard a normal marriage as regular unless performed by a priest. There was, indeed, no alternative, and the Basche story gives a good idea of the form and character of the ceremony (XII/595): "Vous, messire Oudart, ne faillez y comparoistre en vostre beau supellis et estolle, avecques l'eaue beniste, comme pour les fiancer." The second time the ceremony itself is described (XIV/601): "par Oudart feurent sus les fiancéz dictz motz mystérieux, touchées les mains, la mariée baisée, tous asperséz d'eaue beniste," and a third time as well (602): "Oudart, revestu sacerdotalement, les prend par les mains, les interroge de leurs vouldoirs, leurs donne sa benediction sans espargne d'eaue beniste." The readers would recognise all the details of a wedding at the local château, religious and profane details alike, but the solemnity of the marriage service is not what is mocked. This is not even a church wedding, not even a Nuptial Mass, and as a presentation of the service is as factual and taken for

granted as those of Baptism and burial in 'Pantagruel'. Extreme Unction may be considered mentioned by default in the episode of Raminagrobis, who sends off the Friars obviously without receiving any sacrament from them, though he may well have received the last consolations from his parish-priest, like his prototype in Erasmus.<sup>(3)</sup> In any case there is too little to build up any convincing theories. Neither Confirmation nor Ordination is mentioned at all, but these are not likely to figure largely in literature at any time.

One remark from the CL, which has an authentic ring about it, seems to resume Rabelais' ideas about the functions of a priest. Protesting at Panurge's cowardice and the general refusal to land and attack the Chats Fourrés, Frère Jan exclaims (XV/807): "Donques vous m'avez compaignon pris pour en cestuy voyage messe chanter et confesser? Pasques de sole! le premier qui n'y viendra aura en penitence soy comme lasche et meschant jecter au parfond de la mer en deduction des peines au purgatoire." There is never any mention of another priest aboard (Rabelais himself is "monsieur l'abstracteur", presumably a doctor) and Frère Jan is the one to whom Panurge turns during the storm, so we may assume that the office of chaplain was not exercised very thoroughly during the voyage. All the same, Frère Jan is a priest, a monk who refused from the first to unfrack himself and he knows that his profession can always be recalled "pour messes chanter et confesser" whether he accepts or not. Priests, doctors, lawyers, all need particular qualifications to practise their own

calling and for Rabelais Mass and confession were professional duties no more and no less than judgement and healing. The casual familiarity of a professional, albeit retired, seems a more likely explanation of the references to sacraments and services in all the books than the partisan, let alone atheist, intentions which have been attributed to Rabelais. As propaganda these texts are of minimal value; far too cautious to convince, as background they are entirely appropriate to the realistic picture of the whole work.

Except for a few general remarks about faith, most of this evidence concerning Rabelais' religion is more negative than positive. Quite different is the treatment of prayer, on which he has a good deal to say. The occasions as well as the form of these prayers are interesting. Gargantua in his new system of education learns to pray each morning and evening (Garg. XVIII/91): "se adonnoit à reverer, adorer, prier et supplier le bon Dieu," on rising, and before retiring: "Si prioient Dieu le createur, en l'adorant, et ratifiant leur foy envers luy, et, le glorifiant de sa bonté immense et luy rendant grace de tout le temps passé, se recommandoient à sa divine clemence pour tout l'advenir." Grandgousier prays too; when he hears the news of Picrochole's aggression he calls on God (XXVIII/III): "mon Dieu, mon Sauveur, ayde-moy, inspire-moy, conseille-moy à ce qu'est de faire! --- Bon Dieu, tu congnois mon courage, car à toy rien ne peut estre celé ---." and follows up his prayer with genuine efforts at a peaceful solution. On his son's return, \_\_\_\_\_

Grandgousier takes part in a discussion with Frère Jan and the others on monks, and the subject of prayer comes up. Gargantua, apostle of the new order, condemns monks as useless, but his more conservative father interposes mildly (XL/140): "Voyre, mais ilz prient Dieu pour nous;" Gargantua denies this saying that the monks' mumbling is: "Mocquedieu non oraison, mais ainsi leur ayde Dieu s'ilz prient pour nous, et non par paour de perdre leurs miches et soupes grasses. Tous vrays christains, de tous estatz, en tous lieux, en tous temps, prient Dieu, et l'Esperit prie et interpelle pour iceulx, et Dieu les prent en grace." This formal statement, of Pauline origin, about the nature of prayer is important not so much for the Evangelical sentiment as for the light it throws on subsequent incidents. In his letter to Pantagruel (chronologically though not literarily before these texts) Gargantua gives thanks to God for the gift of his son, and says (Pant. VIII/225): "Continuellemnt requerons à Dieu qu'il efface nos pechés." Thanksgiving and penitence are joined by supplication when Pantagruel in his turn prays before the battle (~~XXXIX/183~~<sup>313</sup>): "s'il te plaist à ceste heure me estre en ayde, comme en toy seul est ma totale confiance et espoir, je te fais vœu---." The solemn and dignified tone of this prayer is striking but not so exaggerated that any suspicion of parody is aroused.

These early habits of the giants persist in the later books, if anything more noticeably. Advising Panurge on his marriage, Pantagruel says (TL.X/383): "Il se y convient mettre à l'aventure, les œilz

bandéz, baisant la tæste et se recommandant a Dieu au demourant----." Hippothadée repeats the same advice (XXX/461): "Et continuellement implorerez la grace de Dieu à vostre protection." Epistemon suggests that Bridoye's record may have been so good because (XLIV/508): "se recommanderoit humblement à Dieu le juste juge, invocqueroit à son ayde la grace celeste, se desporterait en l'esprit sacro-sainct du hazard et perplexité de sentence definitive---."

The QL has even more examples, beginning with the Prologue (547): "J'ai cestuy espoir en Dieu qu'il oyra nos prieres, veue la ferme foy en laquelle nous les faisons, et accomplira nostre soubhayt, attendu qu'il est mediocre." The references to the O.T. and N.T. which follow are, it is true, offset by the apologue of Couillatris, but the context is by no means comic. The voyagers recive a pious send-off (I/560): "Pantagruel, prenent congé au bon Gargantua son père, icelluy bien priant (comme en l'Eglise primitive estoit louable coustume entre les saints christians) pour le prospère naviguaige de son filz et toute sa compaignie---." On board Pantagruel exhorts his fellow-travellers (562): "sus l'argument de navigation, laquelle finie, feut haut et clair faicte prière à Dieu---Après l'oraison feut melodieusement chanté le psaulme du saint roy David---." The prayer and psalm were shared by the citizens of Thelasse, who also joined in the drinking afterwards. It has been pointed out that the proceedings are similar to those of an Evangelical meeting of those days, and the deliberate quotation of Marot's setting for Ps. CXIV would not

to attract attention when it was well known that the Sorbonne had condemned it. Nevertheless, the form of service---address, public prayer, psalm in French--- is not in itself reprehensible, and Rabelais took no very serious risks in thus describing it. An unmistakable sign of where his sympathies lay, this incident is still not one to 'epater les bourgeois' of the 16C.

Another example of a public act of worship is towards the end of the QL, when the wind finally springs up (LXIV/741): "Dont tous chanterent divers cantiques à la louange du très hault Dieu des cielz." Perhaps, even probably, these were more vernacular hymns as used by the Evangelicals, but the simple fact of the common thanksgiving is all that can be noted with certainty.

In his letter home Pantagruel adopts the same tone as his father earlier (V/572): "Au reste, j'ay ceste confiance en la commiseration et ayde de Nostre Seigneur----," and "aydant Dieu Nostre Seigneur, lequel je prie en sa sainte grace vous conserver."

The crisis of the storm is inevitably the occasion for much praying of various kinds. Panurge's plea for confession, his soon forgotten vows and his appeal to God and the Virgin must be judged in comparison with the behaviour of the others. Pantagruel begins (XIX/616): "prealablement avoir imploré l'ayde du grand Dieu Servateur et faicte oraison publique en fervente devotion, par l'advis du pilote tenoit l'arbre fort et ferme." The order of his actions is instructive; he does as much as anyone to save the ship by his exertions, but first he

prays and---presumably---leads the "oraison publicque". As the storm rises in violence Panurge's frantic appeals continue, but Pantagruel himself cries (XX/621) "le bon Dieu Servateur nous soyt en ayde!", and the master-pilot, Jamet Brahier, who is a better judge of the situation than anyone else, bids: "Chascun pense de son asme et se mette en devotion, n'esperans ayde que par miracle des Cieulx!" When all hope seems lost (XXI/623): "Alors feut ouye une piteuse exclamation de Pantagruel, disant à haulte voix: 'Seigneur Dieu, sauve-nous: nous perissons! Non toutesfoys adviegne selon nos affections, mais ta sainte volonté soit faicte!'" When land finally comes into sight, it is Pantagruel who thinks to say (XXII/627): "Il n'est ceans mort personne: Dieu servateur en soit eternellement loué!" Epistemon finds an opportunity before they land to give his views on prayer (XXIII/628): "(Dieu) fault incessamment implorer, invocquer, prier, requerir, supplier. Mais là ne fault faire but et bourne: de nostre part convient pareillement nous evertuer, et, comme dict le saint Envoyé, estre cooperateurs avecques luy." This, as we have seen, is what everyone but Panurge has done. Prayer comes first in any emergency, but action must follow.

Two other passages of the QL are a little unexpected. Coming to the island of the Papefigues, the travellers do not want to spend long there (XLV/683): "Seulement pour prendre de l'eau beniste et à Dieu nous recommander, entrasmes une petite chapelle près le havre---En la chapelle entréz et prenens de l'eau beniste---." Granted that the French psalm

appears a clear enough indication of Evangelical sympathies, to be consistent one must give equal weight to this unquestionably orthodox action. While the development of the story shows that the holy water plays a part, Pantagruel is there in person and holy water is taken by the company as a whole, so that the authority of this episode is hardly less than that of the other. An impartial picture must include both black and white, however inconvenient to a priori theories. The other passage is so unexpected that at first sight one looks for a misprint, but however odd, it seems to be what Rabelais intended. After the meal and the end of the coldrums, Panurge of all people says (LXV/743): "Sans point de faulte nous doibvons bien louer le bon Dieu, nostre Createur, Servateur, Conservateur, qui par ce bon pain, par ce bon vin et frays, par ces bonnes viandes nous guerist de telles perturbations, tant du corps comme de l'asme---." The titles given to God, and the tone, to all appearances perfectly reverent, come indeed strangely from the ignoble Panurge, even if his courteous salutation of the "concilipètes" and his gift towards Masses for the dead show that in externals he could conform to the accepted behaviour of the age.

All these texts concerning prayer in its various aspects give a vivid picture of a society in which prayer, whether of thanksgiving or supplication, is a constant practise. Gargantua, Pantagruel, Hippothadée, Epistemon, Panurge, pray at different times, and of the whole company it is only Frere Jan who shows no inclination to pray except in oaths, and



once, perhaps, as a soporific for Gargantua. The occasions of public prayer in the QL, the landfall to take holy water and commend themselves to God, the pilot's cry during the storm, when one has made every allowance for imitation (notably of Erasmus' 'Naufragium'), for satire disguised or open, for partisan motives, all reveal an exceptional emphasis on prayer in all its forms. Febvre aptly turns Lefranc's expression "paratonnerre" <sup>(?)</sup> against him in connexion with the oratories at Theleme, but Theleme is a set piece, deliberately put out as a manifesto of progress and meant to catch the eye. It is quite otherwise with these texts from the QL, almost casual, mostly quite gratuitous. To explain them by motives of prudence is to overlook the flagrant imprudence of the attacks on Calvin, the caricature of Rome, the satire of Quaresmeprenant, which the enemies of Rabelais would notice and remember, while in all probability they would miss the passing references to piety. Whatever his deeper motives may have been, and there seems no reason for not taking the facts at their face-value, his readers were familiar with piety to a greater extent than we are to-day, and without a definite lead from the author would have accepted it as part of Pantgruelism. In the light of what evidence there is it seems most logical to conclude that the sentiments of the first two books, particularly Gargantua's remark "tous christians prient Dieu---", mean exactly what they say and are continued into the TL (where the context makes them less obvious) and the QL. Such a theory has at least the merit

of obeying the principle of parsimony.

Since the religious content of the first two books has been studied intensively by all critics, and the issues more or less clarified (if not agreed) it is perhaps ~~XXXX~~ useful to examine more carefully the TL and QL, which are still considered by recent critics to mark a break-away into rationalism or worse. Febvre complains of the "dilette" of the TL in religious references, and while this is not altogether just, it is true that the QL is much ~~X~~ richer. As a point of method it is surely safe to assume that the views of the QL, if consistent with those of the first two, are likely to be equally consistent with those of the TL, which for literary reasons apart from any others is not quite like the rest in form, and therefore in content.

In the matter of Scriptural studies, the QL begins almost aggressively. The 1552 Prologue begins, like that of 1548, with "Dieu en soit eternellement loué", and goes on: "Dieu, auquel je revère la sacrosainte parolle de bonnes nouvelles; c'est l'Evangile." A quotation from St. Luke is followed by a mention of Galen "quoyque quelque sentiment il eust des sacres Bibles---." The next page tells the readers "Discourez par les sacrées Bibles---" and quotes St. Luke again. Pantagruel's address in the first chapter is "toute auctorisée des propous extraictz de la Sainte Escripture, sus l'argument de navigation." The Bible comes up again in the Papefigue episode, when the peasant tells the devil (XLVI/685) "C'est pourquoy estes maudict en l'Evangile," which annoys the devil, who explains on the next page why

the Gospel is a touchy subject: "depuys quelques années ilz (sc. escholiers) ont avecques leurs études aujoinct les saints Bibles; et pour ceste cause plus n'en pouvons au diable l'un tirer." Actual quotations or paraphrases from Scripture are also frequent. In this point at any rate, admittedly not the most important, the QL continues its predecessors.

More relevant to the charge of rationalism is the way in which relations between man and God are treated in the TL and QL. The more mature attitude of Pantagruel is early reflected in his reverence for God, and his consequent disapproval of a certain type of humour. Panurge tells the story (probably borrowed from Erasmus) of Sœur Fessue, to which Pantagruel replies (TL, XIX/419): "Vous jà ne m'en ferez rire. Je sçay assez que toute moinerie moins crainct les commandements de Dieu transgresser que leurs statutz provinciaulx." The dry rebuke is a reminder that Pantagruel, like Rabelais, has grown older. A silence of particular significance is that of Pantagruel with regard to Raminagrobis. Having recommended the visit in the first place, he stays away and we never hear his views on the poet's supposed heresy or on Panurge's superstitious fears of damnation. One word from Pantagruel on this episode could well have been decisive, as Rabelais must have realised, and the hero is thus kept prudently in the background till the danger is past. Solemn and impressive are Pantagruel's words on marriage (XXXV/478): "n'avoir femme est---pour elle ne contaminer celle unique et supreme affection que doibt l'homme à Dieu." This is unequivocal

enough, the more so as the context is more serious than usual Gargantua's presence lending dignity to the occasion. Pantagruel once more, pleading for Bridoye before the Court of Myrelingues, sounds a solemn note (XLIII/505): "Et me semble qu'il y a je ne sçay quoy de Dieu---lequel, comme sçavez, veult souvent sa gloire apparostre en l'hebetation des sages, en la depression des puissans et en l'erection des simples et humbles." This echo of Magnificat fits in particularly well with the broad outline of Rabelais' religion, not so aristocratic as his philosophy.

The QL carries on these themes, and stresses them so much that it is impossible to overlook them. Already in the 1548 Prologue there is the phrase (757): "le plaisir et passetemps joyeux, sans offense de Dieu, du Roy ne d'autre---oyans---la lecture de ces livres joyeux." The Epistle to Cardinal de Chatillon takes up this idea again (541): "le malade resjouir sans offense de Dieu," and on the next page he protests that in his book there are: "de folastreries joyeuses, hors l'offense de Dieu, et du Roy, prou." The 1552 Prologue maintains the note of joyous reverence (545): "tel est le vouloir au très bon, très grand Dieu, on quel je acquiesce, auquel je obtempère---," and ends in the same strain: (559) "et de qui estes-vous appris ainsi discourir et parler de la puissance et prae-destination de Dieu, paouvres gens? Paix! st, st, st! humiliez-vous devant sa sacrée face et reconnoissez vos imperfections." Joy and reverence are not incompatible, Rabelais would seem to say, but one must observe

the conventions. Twice in the QL Pantagruel criticises a story for transgressing his limits of propriety. After the Basché story, harmless enough at first sight, he says (XVI/606): "Ceste narration sembleroit joyeuse ne feust que davant nos œilz fault la craincte de Dieu continuellement avoir." Against a pleasantry of Frère Jan his reaction is much more violent (L/696): "Quand telz contes vous nous ferez, soyez recordz d'apporter un bassin; peu s'en fault que ne rende ma gorge. User ainsi du sacre nom de Dieu en choses tant ordes et abhominables! Fy! j'en diz fy! Si dedans vostre moynerie est tel abus de parolles en usage, laissez-le là, ne le transportez hors les cloistres." It is interesting that in the very next chapter it is Epistemon who can no longer control himself because (LI/700): "Ceste farce me a desbondé le boyau cullier," while Pantagruel makes no protest at Homenaz' extravagances and says very little at all. In his own followers he tolerates no impiety, but as Homenaz' guest, he no doubt feels obliged to observe the normal courtesies. His attitude is shown also in a remark made when the storm has ended (XXII/626): "Ores, si chose est en ceste vie à craindre après l'offense de Dieu, je ne veulx dire que soit la mort." The phrase "l'offense de Dieu", and the idea as well, return so often to Rabelais' pen that they can hardly be accidental. The most likely explanation is that he was particularly sensitive, and on the defensive, to the charges of impiety levelled against him by his enemies, chief among whom he names "les maniacles Pistoletz, les demoniacles Calvins, les enraigez Futherebes."

The 'paratonnerre' theory will always attract support among those who insist on Rabelais' atheism, but as a theory it suffers from the modest position of so many alleged 'paratonnerres'. The chapters which stand out, which leave the most lasting impression, are those where one would expect to find Rabelais defending himself. The Prologues and the dedicatory Epistle to Chatillon can fairly be regarded as suitable for exhibitions of prudence, but Pantagruel's brief censures of these three stories, his remarks about "l'offense de Dieu" need a careful reader to notice them. A man whose watchword was prudence would not have risked the Pan story in such a book, and would have avoided, for instance, Panurge's very risky devotions during and after the storm. If it was Rabelais' sensitivity, as we have suggested, it was the sensitivity of a man who feels himself innocent, a man who genuinely wished to escape the feeling of guilt which these attacks had engendered. One need not believe that Rabelais was devout, it would be perverse to attempt to prove such a thing, but there is justification for believing that he was serious in his intention of writing only joyeuses folastreries."

With such a wealth of texts on various aspects of religion, faith, practise and the rest, it is interesting to see how very insignificant is the place of sin, in a doctrinal sense, and almost as much that of salvation. Odd references to sin occur, of course, when the devil or his ministers come on the scene (the Papefigue devil says: "Je voys tenter au gaillard peché de luxure les nobles nonnains -")

but the more serious characters have remarkably little to say about it. In his letter Gargantua writes (Pant.VIII/225): "laquelle mienne conversation a esté, moyennant l'ayde et grace divine, non sans peché, je le confesse (car nous pechons tous et continuellement requerons à Dieu qu'il efface noz pechés) mais sans reproche." This follows what seems to be the only reference to original sin anywhere in the book, "le peché de nos premiers parens" and the pain of death which resulted. For the rest, Gargantua and his son speak on various occasions of "craincte de Dieu", "offense de Dieu", and confess their own weaknesses and need for divine guidance, but sin and salvation are not subjects they discuss (the discussion on immortality in the QL is quite distinct from salvation).

On the other hand, other characters in the TL and QL have one or two observations of interest. In his story of Sœur Fessue, Panurge makes the nun say (XX/419): "craignant demourer en peché et estat de damnation, de paour que ne feusse de mort soubdaine prævenue, je me confessay---." Raminagrobis is sure that he is saved (XII/426): "goustant le bien et felicité que le bon Dieu a præparé à ses fidèles et esleuz en l'aulture vie et estat d'immortalité"; Panurge, though, is tormented by scruples (XXII/427): "est-il, Frère Jan, par ta foy, en estat de salvation?---Il pêche vilainement, il blasphème contre la religion." A little later Panurge says (XXIII/430): "Retournons l'admonnester de son salut---au moins, s'il perd le corps et la vie, qu'il ne damne son asme." It is Panurge yet

again in the QL who alone of the company goes out of his way to ingratiate himself with the shiploads of monks(XVIII/613): "ayant recommandé le salut de son asme à leurs devotes prières et menuz suffrages---." Homenaz' attack on the heretics reminds Panurge of his experience with Raminagrobis. Homenaz becomes quite vindictive as he lists the penalties due to these wretches(L/697): "non seulement leurs corps et de leurs enfans et parens aultres occire, mais aussi leurs asmes damner au parfond de la plus ardente chaudière qui soit en Enfer." About the only mention of salvation that is not suspect for one reason or another is that of Jamet Bراهيم during the tempest(XX/621): "Chascun pense de son asme et se mette en devotion---." Even if one adds the references to Judgement Day in earlier works, the total is still a meagre one considering the importance of the subject. Gargantua's letter refers to the Last Judgement, the Almanach for 1535 speaks of(929): "vos amses hors mises ceste chartre tenebreuse au corps terrien et jointes à Jesus le Christ," otherwise there are no texts worth mentioning.

With the burning problem of Faith and Works, that of Sin and Salvation was probably the most controversial of the day, and remembering how little Rabelais has to say about the first, his equal reticence about the second is perhaps not so surprising. Gargantua's letter remains the main source for most of the serious theology in the first two books, and try as one may, Rabelais cannot easily be pinned down in any of the other passages. Febvre's



conclusion seems singularly appropriate: "Ainsi chaque créature, debout devant Dieu son Créateur, répond de ses fautes et pour ses fautes, directement. Le salut, c'est œuvre individuelle: affirmation d'accent tout moderne." Whether or not the last words are justified, the rest seems to express very accurately the reasons for Rabelais' apparent indifference to salvation, as to confession and intercessory prayer. Panurge, the one character who consistently shirks every kind of responsibility, is precisely the one who shows himself most concerned with all these problems---and who makes least real effort. Because an idea is defended by an unworthy character it is not necessarily to be regarded as equally unworthy, and in some of the cases quoted in this chapter it is clearly not the deed but the motive of Panurge which is criticised.

Before abuses one need not hesitate; superstitious pilgrimages, indulgences, invocation of saints and other similar practises are condemned outright by the author or the giants. The difficulty arises when, as with the sacraments, none of the texts gives any reliable statement of Rabelais' views. Confession was abused; Panurge alone is the champion of confession. The Last Sacrament was abused by predatory Friars; Raminagrobis fulminates against the abuse. Matrimony was abused; Gargantua condemns the guilty priests. Communion has one single, very cautious mention, and yet whatever party Rabelais favoured he must have had definite views on this of all the sacraments. The more one goes impartially into the question of what Rabelais really meant his readers

to think of his religion (to guess at his private faith is pointless) the more evasive his answers seem to be. The nature of the difficulty appears very clearly from the 'Sciomachie'. Describing a scele performed at Rome before numerous Cardinals and Roman dignitaries, Rabelais tells how two clowns ran on to the mock battlefield, and went to the two corpses lying there <sup>(945)</sup> "l'un ~~XXXX~~ les admonestoit de leur salut, les confessoit et absolvoit comme gens morts pour la foy---." When the spectators saw that the supposed corpses were only straw figures: "dont fut grande risée entre les spectateurs." To be as orthodox as Rome---or as heretical as Geneva---mockery of the sacraments is hardly a valid criterion.

For the type of book he was writing, it was natural that abuses and superstitions should be ridiculed rather than that ordinary virtues should be depicted or extraordinary virtues extolled. It is only a trifling point, and may be no more than fortuitous, but throughout the work in all the disobliging references to the different monastic orders, the Carthusians are conspicuously absent. No order took a less active part in the life of the outside world, none carried fasting and asceticism to greater extremes, and had Rabelais really wanted to make his point against monastic institutions he could have chosen no better example. In fact he is silent, and silent where Erasmus had been eloquent. Public unfamiliarity with the Order cannot be the reason, the Colloquia alone dispose of that explanation, but simply the fact that where there is no abuse, the case with the Carthusians, there is no attack.

Striking a balance between the positive and negative aspects of Rabelais' religion, as it appears from this enquiry, it seems that while he condemned every abuse, a clear picture of his views on the sacraments and priesthood can just not be derived from the material at our disposal. In the matter of works, the less essential practises are satirised or condemned, on the principle that Pharisaism is not true religion even when sincere, but certain major works are prominent in his scheme---preaching, helping the needy, studying the Bible. Prayer plays an outstanding part in Rabelais' book, and is always the free and spontaneous communication between man and God, in public or private, whether for thanksgiving, supplication or acts of faith and contrition. There is no preoccupation with sin, and on the whole it seems fair to see behind Rabelais' caution a rejection of the principle of confession, as passing responsibility for forgiveness to another man, even if delegated by divine institution, and of the principle of intercessory prayer for similar reasons. Reverence, especially verbal, is emphasised; theological problems such as the nature of faith and conditions of salvation almost ignored.

Nothing has been said here of the favourite questions of miracles, Hell, blasphemy and others, because none of the evidence adduced on those grounds to prove Rabelais' atheism or incredulity carries the slightest conviction except to those already convinced. Febvre has dealt at length and in detail with these secondary problems and at best they offer proof only of literary influences. Even if one admits with Febvre that there is enough in the

text to justify talk of Erasmanian influence, this must remain only a partial answer to the question of Rabelais' religion, as Febvre himself admits in discussing the limits to which one can draw the parallel.

Two considerations prevent a final summing-up here: Rabelais' natural theology has been studied separately in another chapter, and there is so much on the important questions of Providence, fate, free will, grace, that these too are more conveniently dealt with on their own. As a way of life, one may say that Rabelais' positive religion entailed a constant awareness of God and eternity, with all the stress laid, as Febvre says, on the individual's responsibility for his own salvation and for his personal relationship to God. Sacred things are not to be mocked, whatever one may think of Rabelais' fulfilment of his own precept, but no man-made doctrine or institution must ever be allowed to challenge the supremacy of God or his word. In the only text that is at all helpful, Rabelais seems to admit that theologians, at least "les bons theologiens", have a definite place in his system. The question of authority to interpret Scripture is not discussed anywhere else, though the falsehoods of the "cafards", "les massoretz et caballistes" is frequently denounced, and Calvin's imposture is frequently but with equal violence.

When all has been said, one cannot escape the fact that Rabelais' whole life was spent in one ecclesiastical circle after another, at Fontenay,

at Maillezais, probably at the Hotel St. Denis in Paris, in Rome with Cardinal du Bellay; the intervals at Lyon, Turin, Metz are only intervals. This lifetime of religion at close quarters explains many of the later antipathies, but it is well to consider whether the habits of worship and thought inculcated from his youth may not have left positive traces as important in the religion of his later life as the undeniable influences of Erasmus and, perhaps, Luther. As one says the two names, exactly the same reflection comes up concerning them as well; monastic training in even the most lax of houses does not pass away without leaving a trace. While fully subscribing to Febvre's contention that Rabelais was a Christian in the fullest sense of the word, we should hesitate before denying him the name of Catholic as well. (r)

truly known, compares with the very different opinions on Predestination of the later books. My final judgment on Rabelais' opinions on Calvinism, or the true nature of Protestantism must

## CHAPTER TEN

## PROVIDENCE, FATE AND FREE

WILL

A subject in which Rabelais displayed constant interest in all his works, major and minor, is astrology. It is here that philosophy and religion most often clash in his work, for his attitude to such problems as Providence, Free Will and Grace in the religious sphere inevitably decide his treatment of philosophical questions like pseudo-scientific determinism. Perhaps the most important single question in the study of Greek religious thought is that of Fate, and for all their imperfect understanding of the ancient world, the 16C humanists could hardly fail to notice discrepancies between this pagan idea and the more commonly received doctrines concerning man's freedom and God's omniscience which theologians had been debating for centuries. By the latter part of Rabelais' literary life, Calvin had given the whole question an acutely topical importance, and it is interesting to see how Rabelais' ideas on astrology, as expressed in the works written before Calvin's doctrine had become generally known, compare with the few but significant opinions on Predestination of the later books. Any final judgement on Rabelais' optimism or pessimism, on the true nature of Pantagruelism must depend essentially on proper appreciation of these factors.

Primacy in Rabelais' system goes to God's absolute power; his will cannot in any way be modified by creatures, as numerous texts emphasise. Directly

linked with supremacy of God's will is the idea that men have no right to try and read the secrets of this will. The more formal texts on this come, as might be expected, from the works on astrology. This sentence from the 'Pantagrueline Prognostication' is of capital importance (920):

"Et ne aura Saturne, ne Mars, ne Jupiter, ne autre planete, certes non les anges, ny les saints, ny les hommes, ny les diables, vertuz, efficace, ne influence aucunes, si Dieu de son bon plaisir ne leur donne; comme dict Avicenne: que les causes secondes n'ont influence ne action aucune, si la cause première n'y influe."

The authority of Avicenna is beside the point--- Rabelais quotes all the Arabs he can think of in this particular opusculc---but the philosophical justification for thus rejecting planetary influence is of primary importance. The autonomy of second causes is the only basis on which astrology can claim any degree of infallibility, and this formal denial explains the substance of Rabelais' attacks. The fragment from the Almanach for 1533 emphasises God's will still more (928): "Mais ce sont secrets du conseil estroit du Roy eternal, qui tout ce qui est et qui se fait mouere à son franc arbitre et bon plaisir. Lesquels vaut mieux taire et les adorer en silence---." Quotations from Tobias and the Psalms to this effect are followed by a reference to the Lord's Prayer:

"Dont, en tous cas, il nous convient humilier et le prier, ainsi que nous a enseigne Jesus-Christ Nostre Seigneur, que soit fait, non ce que nous souhaitons et demandons, mais ce que luy plaist **XX** et qu'il a estably devant que les cieulx fussent formez, seulement que en tout et par tout son glorieux nom soit sanctifié, remettans le par-dessus ès ephemerides eternelles, lesquelles n'est licite à homme mortel traicter ou cognoistre."

The Almanach for 1535 repeats just the same ideas (930):

"Reste doncquesque---nous deportons de ceste curieuse inquisition au gouvernement et decret invariable de Dieu tout puissant, qui tout a créé et dispensé selon son sacre arbitre; supplions et requierons sa sainte volenté estre continuellement parfaite tant au ciel comme en la terre.

The omnipotence of God, fiat tua voluntas, and the unseemliness of trying to pierce the divine secrets are the three basic notions of these texts. As evidence of Rabelais' thought they are of very qualified value; written against astrology, their form and the nature of their attack are largely predetermined; appearing under the author's own name and destined for wider public, their sincerity can be called in question, and these texts must be treated with reserve except when the opinions of the roman conform. There are, however, several indications in the four books of a state of mind persisting in this respect.

From 'Gargantua' come the words (VI/62): "Mais si le vouloir de Dieu tel eust esté, diriez-vous qu'il ne l'eust pu faire?---je vous diz que à Dieu rien n'est impossible." The context, of strange births, is facetious, but the idea is certainly not. In a different sense, God's will is invoked by Grandgousier praying at the news of Picrochole's invasion (XVIII/III): "Donne-moy et pouvoir et ~~se~~voir le rendre au joug de ton saint vouloir par bonne discipline." Grandgousier again speaks about God's will in answer to Frère Jan's question about noses (XL/142): "Parce que ainsi Dieu l'a voulu, lequel nous faict en telle forme et telle fin, selon son divin arbitre, que faict un potier ses vaisseaulx." There



is nothing to add to this from 'Pantagruel', but with the TL these ideas appear again. While Rabelais condemns astrology, which tries to make the will of God to an earthly measure, and regulate it by the course of the stars, he does not reject prophecy and foreknowledge of future events. There is no contradiction in this attitude, as the exposition on dreams completely safeguards God's omnipotence in this matter and at the same time explains Rabelais' conception of the future. The famous "intellectuale sphære" is the text in question (XIII/394): "A laquelle rien ne sçavient, rien ne passe, rien ne dechet, tous temps sont presens---." The last phrase is an exact description of God's relationship to time, and explains that participation by men in divine knowledge in no way limits God's will,<sup>(4)</sup> since such participation is itself limited by the imperfection of man's mixed nature.

A fuller treatment of foreknowledge occurs in Hippothadée's advice to Panurge. Here the phrase "si Dieu plaist" is admittedly exploited for its comic possibilities, but there is no parody of the thought behind it. The theologian tells Panurge that he will not be cocu "si Dieu plaist" (XXX/459), and replies to Panurge's sarcastic protests with an energetic defence of his words: "Est-ce con-  
 sition blasphemè ou scandaleuse?--- N'est-ce mettre exception canonique à toutes nos entreprises, et tout ce que proposons remettre à ce que sera disposé par sa sainte volonté, tant es cieulx comme en la terre?" He denies that this is a question of which the answer is hidden: "en la chambre de ses très

sainctz plaisirs. Le bon Dieu nous a faâct ce bien qu'il nous les a reveléz, annoncéz, declairéz et apertement descriptz par les ~~XXXXXXXX~~ sacres bibles." The word of God, "la Parolle", is his will, and while the Bible can obviously not provide for individual cases, it is the general expression of God's will concerning human behaviour and thus a reliable guide in all contingent events which involve a moral problem. Rabelais is careful not to give as his own opinion a third interesting text from the TL. Epistemon puts forward his theory to explain the success of Bridoye's judgements by dice (XLIV/508): "les Talmudistes disent en sort nestre mal & aulcun contenu, seulement par sort estre, en anxieté et doute des humains, manifestée la volonté divine." This explanation, whatever Rabelais may have thought of it, preserves the supremacy of first causes even in an instance as trivial as this.

The QL carries on the same thread. The first page of the Prologue has two references to God's will; speaking of his readers' health, Rabelais says: "Dieu en soit eternellement loué et (si telle est sa sacre volonté) y soiez long~~tem~~ent maintenez," and the reason for his own is: "tel est le vouloir du très bon, très grand Dieu." The end of this Prologue admonishes those who try to interpret God's will their own way (559): "Et de qui estez-vous apprens ainsi discourir et parler de la puissance et prædestination de Dieu, paouvres gens?" The two themes of God's supreme will and man's inability to know it are those stressed in the minor works of nearly 20 years before.

The tempest shows this attitude to God's will in action. At the worst moment Pantagruel cries out (XXI/623): "Non toutesfoys advieigne scelon nos affections, mais ta sainte volonté soit faicte!" From first to last, "fiat tua voluntas" seems to be the great prayer of Rabelais and his heroes. After the storm, Epistemon delivers a little homily on death, in which he combines this motif with appropriate Classical allusions (XXIII/628): "Je consydere que si vrayement ~~XXX~~ mourir est (comme est) de necessité fatale, --- en telle ou telle heure, en telle ou telle façon mourir est en la sainte volonté de Dieu." Even when he leaves the second causes to work out their effects by determining the moment of a man's death, God's supremacy is decisive to the last. Home-naz, too, with his papocentric theology, has something to say of God's eternal purpose (LIII/707): "ceux qui par divine prescience et eterne prædestination adonné se sont à l'estude des saintes Decretales."

These quotations vary considerably in context and not all of them are serious, but they do show a quite striking conformity between 3 of the 4 books (there is not enough evidence to include 'Pantagruel') and the minor works first quoted. The constant emphasis on divine will and the temerity of men who take on themselves to predict it extends further than the rather limited field of astrology. The persistence of the "fiat tua voluntas" theme can be linked with other ideas of Rabelais, and what Febvre has called "cet étrange quietisme", so little in keeping with Rabelais' gospel of action, is probably not so very much out of place after all.

How far Lutheran influence may be responsible is another question, and one whose answer had better await more complete information.

Though there is very little explicit information as to what Rabelais thought about the theological doctrine of Predestination, there is no doubt from the few texts that do exist that Calvin's interpretation was abhorrent to him. The addition made to the 1542 edition of the Prologue to 'Pantagruel' can hardly mean anything else; (190) the insertion of "predestinateurs et amposteurs" between "abuseurs et seucteurs." The famous attack on Calvin in the QL as "imposteur de Genève" seems to be an echo of this theme. Then there is the text already cited from the end of the Prologue to the QL, seemingly written more in sorrow than in anger, condemning the temerity of those who presume to read God's predestination. The remark of Homenaz quoted above on "divine prescience et eterne predestination" is a perfectly orthodox reference to two accepted notions whose interpretation alone caused dissension. On the one or two other occasions when Rabelais speaks of predestination it is not at all in a theological connexion, and the adjective is used as an alternative to some other expression meaning just 'fated', though a gibe at Calvin would naturally occur to many readers for whom the word had become a shibboleth. Thus Panurge makes free use of the word in his discussion on marriage (TL. XX~~222~~/423): jamais homme n'eut en femme et en chevaux heur tel que m'est predestiné."; again of his cocuage <sup>he</sup> he says that all his advisers so far have

told him (XXVIII/451) "qu'il m'est ainsi præ destiné des cieulx! Frère Jan takes him up on this and repeats the phrase before reciting his litany which ends (454): "puysqu'ainsi t'est præ destiné, voudrois-tu faire retrograder les planètes?", with other celestial consequences which in this context show clearly that predestination is the work of the Fates, planets or some other secondary power, not God. Curiously enough it is Panurge again who uses the word in the QL (XIX/618): "Estoit-ce icy que de perir nous estoit predestiné?". In these cases the word is quite independent of its current theological implications.

A cognate problem is that of Grace and election, and though Rabelais has more to say on this than on Predestination, the exceptionally technical nature of the problem no doubt accounts for the very general tone of his remarks. One of the most exact of all the references states the relationship between man's free will and divine grace, but it is probably relevant to note that Grandgousier, progressive but more cautious than his son, is the writer; of Picrochole's aggression he says (Garg. XXXI/II2): "Dont j'ay cogneu que Dieu eternal l'a laissé au gouvernail de son franc arbitre et propre sens, qui ne peult estre que meschant sy par grace divine n'est continuellement guidé, ---" The same sentiment had already been attributed to the pen of his son two years earlier (Pant. VIII/225): "laquelle mienne conversation a esté, moyennant l'ayde et grace divine, non sans peché mais sans reproche." With Picrochole the withholding of grace was the cause of his error, with Gargantua its bestowal kept him in the path

of righteousness. The same letter closes with a remark which Gargantua re-echoes more than once: "les graces que Dieu te a données, icelles ne reçoipz en vain." Mindful of his father's words, Pantagruel replies to Thaumaste's invitation to debate (XVIII/272): "Seigneur, des graces que Dieu m'a donné je ne voudroyes denier à personne en despartir à mon pouvoir; car tout bien vient de luy---." Even to Panurge's facetious question in the same chapter "Y a-t-il homme tant sçavant que sont les diables?", Pantagruel replies quite seriously: "Non, vrayement, sans grace divine especiale."

These few remarks are far from indicating an obsession, but they all come from the giants and therefore cannot be ignored, and show moreover a remarkable degree of consistency with one another. The TL adds a little more to the picture. On his deathbed Raminagrobis uses a word very seldom found in Rabelais, perhaps because of its disagreeable polemical associations; "elu". He says that (XXI/426): "le bien et felicité que le bon Dieu a préparé à ses fideles et esleuz en l'aultre vie" is the object of his last meditations. The scene is brief, Panurge's comments absolutely farcical and Pantagruel is not there to give an authoritative opinion, so that it is impossible to say how far the old poet represents Rabelais' views and sympathies. The implied doctrine of election (and Raminagrobis' assumption that he is one of the elect) is not discussed, let alone approved by anyone else and one can do no more than register its brief appearance.

The advice of Hippothadée comes into a very different category, preceded as it is by Pantagruel's express defence of the "bons theologiens", given in his presence and at his invitation, and contested by no one save Panurge. Grace occurs frequently in Hippothadée's speeches, beginning with the Pauline charge (XXX/459): "Avez-vous de Dieu le don et grace speciale de continence?" He goes on in a most eloquent strain to explain his cautious answer to Panurge's second question: "N'est-ce nous declairer tous dependre de sa benignité, rien sans luy n'estre, rien ne valoir, rien ne pouvoir, si sa sainte grace n'est sus nous infuse?" Later he says that the ideal wife should be: "aymant complaire à Dieu par foy, et observation de ses saintz commandemens, craignant l'offenser et perdre sa grace par default de foy et transgression de sa divine loy", and "qui s'efforce avecques Dieu soy former en bonne grace." The whole speech ends with the injunction: "Et continuellement implorerez la grace de Dieu à vostre protection." From a theologian, and one of evidently Pauline inspiration, this insistence on grace is not really surprising, but its concentration into a relatively short chapter enhances its effect.

Two references in the Bridoye episode carry on the theme. Pantagruel accounts for Bridoye's good record thus (XLIII/505): "Et me semble qu'il y a je ne sçay quoy de Dieu qui a faict---qu'a ces jugemens de sort toutes les precedentes sentences ayent esté trouveés bonnes---." The "je ne sçay quoy" can hardly be anything but grace in this context. Epistemon is more explicit in his opinions

and says (XLIV/508): "(Bridoye) invocqueroit à son ayde la grace celeste." Gargantua's farewell speech to his son begins (XLVIII/516): "Je loue Dieu, filz très cher, qui vous conserve en desirs vertueux," and his letter in the QL explains that his paternal affection is enhanced (III/569): "par l'esgard et reverence des graces particulières en toy par election divine posées." At every step man's natural weakness is strengthened by divine grace, and one text after another brings out the continual dependence of man on God. If that were all it might not be unreasonable to wonder whether some form of quietism may not lie at the root of Rabelais' outlook. The counterpoise can come only from free will, and his views on this are therefore vital.

The number of unambiguous texts is disappointingly small, and virtually all those that count are from 'Gargantua'. In more than one connexion one can observe a disproportionate interest in this book compared with the others, and whether the reason be external (e.g. propaganda) or internal (a personal religious crisis) the emphasis on fundamental problems is a fact. Prayer, free will, pilgrimages, monastic principles are given far more serious attention in 'Gargantua' than elsewhere.

The distinction between 'arbitre', 'vouloir' and 'volonté' is preserved by Rabelais, but for convenience the texts which follow are given in the order in which they appear in the book. Rabelais speaks early on about (IX/53): "les tyrans qui veulent leur arbitre tenir lieu de raison". The next mention, in fact, concerns a particular tyrant, Picrochole, of



whom Grandgousier writes, as we have already seen (XXIX/II2): "Dieu eternal l'a laissé au gouvernail de son franc arbitre et propre sens, qui ne peult estre que meschant sy par grace divine n'est continuellement guidé." Ulrich Gallet addresses Picrochole in the next chapter (but one) (XXXI/II6): "rien n'est ny saint, ny sacre à ceulx qui se sont emancipéz de Dieu et Raison pour suyvre leurs affections perverses." Here the antitheses of the first two texts are resumed, a tyrant's will on the one hand and on the other God and reason. Gargantua in his harangue to the vanquished makes use of "arbitre" in just the same way. By the people of the Canarries, defeated by his father, (L/I65): "feut decreté par consentement unanime que l'on effereroit entièrement leurs terres, dommainnes et royaulme à en faire selon nostre arbitre." As Gargantua and his father walk in the ways of God, their 'arbitre' is not like that of the tyrants mentioned above, but on the contrary leads them to outstanding magnanimity. A little later in the same harangue, Gargantua speaks of his father: "consyderant le franc vouloir et simplicité des Canarriens," and of the increasingly large tribute paid by them "de franc vouloir." This neatly marks the distinction between 'arbitre', the instrument of decision, and 'vouloir', the general faculty of will. Gargantua also declares "sans mon vouloir---estoit faicte ceste guerre."

By an accident of context all these texts have a political bearing, but the Thélème episode shows a wider, and more famous, use of the same ideas. The

distinction between 'arbitre' and 'vouloir' appears in two texts (LVI/178): "Les dames, au commencement de la fondation, se habilloient à leur plaisir et arbitre. Depuis, feuren reforméez par leur franc vouloir---." The other is probably the best known serious remark in Rabelais (LVII/181): "Toute leur vie estoit employée non par loix, statuz ou reigles, mais selon leur vouloir et franc arbitre," and, as everyone knows, their sole rule was: "Fay ce que voudras." Since there is no mention of grace (or, except for the private oratories of religion) in the Thélème episode, this looks on the face of it like a complete contradiction of the phrase about free will in Grandgousier's letter. In fact there need be no inconsistency if the cardinal point be admitted that Rabelais is not always obliged to say everything he has in mind. Because he does not speak here of grace, it does not mean that, even for the moment, he has forgotten about it, and it is much more probable that this text conforms with the others than that it opposes them.

It is Pantagruel who makes the distinction between 'arbitre' and 'volunté' in the TL, oddly enough in a conversation with his father which recalls very closely the Erasmian inspiration of the early books. Discussing the question of his marriage, he says (XLVIII/516): "je m'en deportoys sus vostre bonne volunté et paternel commendement," and a few lines further on: "Je n'ay jamais entendu que--- ayt esté en arbitre des enfans soy marier, non consentants, voulens et promouvens leurs pères, mères et parens prochains. Tous legislatureurs ont ès enfans ceste liberté tollue, ès parens l'ont réservée."

The parental relationship between God and man has obvious analogies with this conception of liberty.

Only one other remark of the TL is worth quoting, and it is interesting as reflecting the more precisely formulated Pantagrueism of the later books. Pantagrue asks about Panurge's proposed marriage (X/383): "N'estez-vous asceuré de vostre vouloir? Le point principal y gist; tout le reste est fortuit et dependent des fatales dispositions du ciel." Our wills alone are completely in our power and once we have made them firm we can do no more to regulate our lives.

The comparative absence of discussion on human will, good or bad, free or restricted, does not mean that 'Gargantua' is the only book not indifferent to the question; it is simply approached in the others from a different angle. The point is no longer the relationship between man's will and God, in any case a dangerous topic for prolonged debate, but between man and fate, and it is this formulation of the question which leads directly to the idea of Pantagrueism, "le stoicisme gai". The real theme of the first part of the TL is, as has often been pointed out, not so much marriage as the various methods of divination used to explore the question. Since all divination presupposes some degree of determinism (as against pure chance) the direction of Rabelais' approach led him naturally to consider man's position regarding fate. The two early definitions of Pantagrueism in the Prologue and ch. II of the TL stress the good humour of a philosophy which "toutes choses prenoit en bonne partie", but

the Prologue to the QL adds a more specific detail "certaine gayeté d'esprit, conficte en mespris des choses fortuites." Pantagruel's advice to Panurge obviously refers to this; pure chance, "les choses fortuites", is beyond our control or prediction and we are therefore better to ignore it altogether in deciding our attitude to life. Homenaz himself is something of a Pantagruelist despite all, for he claims for the reader of the Decretals (LI/700): "contemnement asceuré de toutes choses fortuites et terrestres."

Besides blind hazard, fate in the sense of necessity must enter into man's calculations and here scorn alone will not suffice. Pantagruel speaks of everything beside our wills as being "fortuit et dependent des fatales dispositions du ciel", and with this remark he recalls the standard Aristotelian doctrine of hazard as modified by the Schools. Paré calls this conception of chance: <sup>(2)</sup> "l'intersection de deux causalités dont aucune fin ne détermine la rencontre", but strictly speaking, "pour le philosophe chrétien il n'y a du hasard que par rapport aux causes secondes." "Les fatales dispositions du ciel" are not only haphazard, however, and the many texts quoted in this chapter which oppose various aspects of judicial astrology must be completed by those few which indicate how far astrology can be relied upon at all.

Grandgousier's letter to his son has been quoted already in connexion with free will and grace, but it begins with what looks like quite a different tone (XXIX/112): "Puisque telle est ceste fatale

destinée que par iceulx soye inquieté ès quelz plus je me repousoye." Gallet in his speech asks Picrochole (XXXI/II5): "Sont-ce fatales destinées ou influences des astres qui veulent mettre fin à tes ayses et repous?" and says: "Mais sy ainsi estoit phée et deust ores ton heur et repos prendre fin---." Without the rest of the context, which contains the Christian references already noted, these remarks look exactly like the determinism of the astrologers whom Rabelais so often condemns, but one must be careful to make the distinction which we have seen Rabelais put in the mouth of Avicenna. Nobody in the Middle Ages really doubted, as Paré says, that "Il y a dans le monde des causes nécessaires. De ce nombre sont les corps célestes. Ils effectuent toujours leurs rotations selon les mêmes lois et exercent constamment des influences de même nature sur le monde sublunaire." Gilson states a general truth thus: <sup>(4)</sup> "La volonté libre de l'homme mise à part, les philosophes et les théologiens s'accordent pour admettre un déterminisme astrologique universel." Grandgousier and Gallet, and Rabelais behind them, are offering as explanations of Picrochole's conduct something universally accepted as a fact. Free will, aided by grace as Rabelais insists, or chance can break the regularity of this determinism, which is otherwise a law of nature like generation and corruption.

The theme comes up again in the TL. In his praise of the braguette, Panurge, newly proud of his philosophical knowledge, describes the end of the golden age (VIII/377): "presque tous animaux par fatales

disposition se emancipèrent de luy (l'homme)". This comes in a purely pagan context but could apply equally well to Scholastic teaching. The juxtaposition of pagan and Christian ideas comes in a remark from Epistemon, commenting on Bridoye's case (XLIV/507): "Conjecturalement je refererois cestuy heur de jugement en l'aspect benevole des cieulx et faveur des Intelligences motrices." An exceedingly complicated sentence follows, which, without its parentheses, says: "lesquelles---remueroient et tourneroient les aez---," but in between comes the reference quoted earlier to Bridoye invoking divine aid and guidance. In this case we are clearly in the realm of second causes, autonomous up to a point but never finally responsible for a man's life.

A burlesque presentation of the familiar Greek poetic (as distinct from philosophical) view of fate, can be seen in the agitated complaints of the "Dieux Olympicques" faced with the marvels of Pantagruelion (LI/531): "(Pantagruel) sera de brief marié, de sa femme aura enfans. A ceste destinée ne povons-nous contrevénir, car elle est passée par les mains et fuseaux des sœurs fatales, filles de Necessité." Facetious as the passage is, it very well brings out the fundamental difference between the polytheism of the Greeks and the theology of Christianity. For the Greeks, poets and philosophers alike, God or the Gods were variously defined, but were always subject to the blind laws of Fate, superior to them all. A similarly burlesque treatment has already been mentioned, when Frère Jan speaks of the consequences should Panurge try to contravene what is

already "prædestiné" (XXVIII/454): "voudrois-tu faire retrograder les planètes?---defiller les  $\times$  pelotons des Parces?" The idea is the same in the two texts; natural laws are made not to be broken, and if the course of the heavens is set to ensure Pantagruel's marriage or Panurge's cocuage God alone can alter it.

Epistemon it is who once more gives the pagan theory with a Christian adaptation, just after the storm in the *Quintessence* (XXIII/628): "Je consyère que si vrayement mourir est (comme est) de nécessité fatale et inevitable en telle ou telle heure, en telle ou telle façon mourir est en la sainte volonté de Dieu." The passage has already been used to illustrate Rabelais' constant emphasis on the omnipotence of God's will, and this time it is interesting to see how the autonomy of natural laws is preserved so that it can be reconciled with Christianity. Our bodies are, in fact, the part that death affects, our corruptible and temporary homes, and it is in conformity with mediaeval physical theories to admit the influence of the heavens on the world of matter, but wherever the soul has to be reckoned with God's intervention has to be foreseen, in this instance to decide the manner of human death. The expression "fatale nécessité" is, of course, Classical but the sense of Epistemon's remarks makes it probable that Rabelais was just deliberately using words which were out of favour with the Schools because of their fatalistic associations, while not really diverging from normal teaching on the subject. As *Paré* puts it: <sup>(4)</sup> "Le destin est devenu l'

orare au monde prévu par un Dieu qui le connaît-- Saint Augustin avait déjà appliqué au destin un sens analogue: la volonté même de Dieu prescrivant à la nature des lois qu'elle doit suivre et sauvegardant la liberté humaine." Unless one gives Rabelais credit for understanding ordinary teaching on fate and Providence, such statements as that by Epistemon are virtually meaningless.

Two more texts from the QL show how widely Rabelais' use of the idea of fate extended, from the conventionally literary to the deeply philosophical. A little later in the conversation after the storm Panurge is told by Frère Jan that he had no need of fear (XXIV/630): "Car tes destinées fatales ne sont à périr en eau." The jest (used in a similar context at the beginning of 'The Tempest') is richly developed, but rests none the less on the same pseudo-scientific theory as the remarks quoted above. The world of matter, with its elemental compounds, is in every respect subject to fixed laws (though not necessarily predictable ones) so that the ultimate end of Panurge's body must like any other material substance be predetermined in accordance with these laws. The last example is the affirmation by Pantagruel of his belief (XXVII/639): "Je croy que toutes âmes intellectives sont exemptes des cizeaulx de Atropos." The expression is no doubt is chosen no doubt mainly as a literary embellishment (the ED tells us that it means no more than "la Mort"), but it serves to remind us too that the personified Classical Fates had been replaced in Christian thinking by divinely ordained laws, and



restricted in their activity to the world of matter. God alone has power over souls and the rule of the Fates is rejected rightly in Pantagruel's striking phrase.

Rabelais' dislike of astrology is explained equally as much by these texts on fate as by the works dealing directly with astrology, and few of his ideas are more coherent or forceful than these. Above all the absolute supremacy of God as first cause, Creator, Preserver, Providence must be guaranteed and respected. God's will and his grace are the factors which dominate all human affairs, all the affairs of the created universe. In all this man's place is humble before God but not unworthy in the world. His will is free, he can choose good or evil, and with God's grace he will have the power to do right. For anyone who held so firmly the doctrine of personal responsibility for salvation (and in this we fully endorse Fevre's view) no diminution of man's freedom could reasonably be tolerated.

Finally Rabelais recognises as a philosophical fact that God has set up a chain of second causes which produce genuine but not independent effects, and that he has pre-ordained the course of creation from all eternity. In the minor works he quotes the doctrine of second causes from Avicenna, and elsewhere stresses that all these things are in the inscrutable will of God. This is really the point at issue between the astrologers, or rather the judicial astrologers, on the one hand and on the other the orthodox philosophers and theologians.

Not for the first time we find Rabelais on the side of the angels. By temperament he seems to have been allergic to the idea of determinism, and by religious conviction this antipathy was increased by his violent revulsion against those who presumed to lay down God's laws in their own name. Rabelais, one can be sure, would have made the same objection against Descartes' determinism as did Pascal. Whether the attempt was to prescribe the effects of celestial influences or to interpret God's election of the just and unjust, Rabelais utterly condemns it. Man and God are on two different planes of existence and understanding; it is neither our business nor our right to penetrate his secrets. There is, moreover, an additional factor in Rabelais' case which may be decisive; his frequent allusions to "fiat tua voluntas" either implicitly or explicitly entail a submission to God's will which any attempt to forecast that will must nullify. If a man wants to know the future, it is not only for curiosity but so that he can try to circumvent his destiny, and this would seem still more reprehensible to Rabelais than the temerity of the merely inquisitive. The whole point of the long examination of various methods of divination is that all those tried are ridiculed in their practise, while the examples of successful prophecy are such that no man-made enquiry, but a communication vouchsafed from above, accounts for them. The historic case of Langey, whose virtue Rabelais so eloquently extols, shows the gulf which separates prophecy from astrology. As a key to his ethics, these views are also significant. Submission to the will of God and ind-

ference to the hazards of second causes is Rab-  
elais' message; such an attitude is already half-  
way to deciding the moral code of any I6C thinker.

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CHAPTER ELEVEN

ETHICS AND POLITICS

Apart from the more or less obvious royal and patriotic propaganda with which much of Rabelais' work is filled, there are certain more fundamental ideas about ethics, public and private, to be found, especially in the later books. In the sense that all ethics for the Christian are ultimately linked with religious belief, it is true that Rabelais' views on the duty of man to God form an integral part of his moral outlook, but it is convenient, and not unduly difficult, to make a distinction between religion and ethics which corresponds with a similar division in the text.

Such serious moral thinking as there is in the first two books barely goes beyond the Scriptural injunction "love God---and thy neighbour as thyself." Thus the closing lines of Gargantua's letter to his son specifically remind him of his duty (VIII/228): "---il te convient servir, aymer et craindre Dieu.---Soys serviable à tous tes prochains et les ayme comme toy-mesmes." Although there is a good deal of political thought in the two books, problems of personal ethics do not really arise, partly because of the traditional framework on which the books are built and partly also because Rabelais was not yet seriously concerned with ethics. Thélème is a good example of the very rudimentary approach to moral questions. Besides the question of human nature and free will, discussed in the previous chapter, the inscription on the gates suggests a very summary judgement between the sheep and the

goats; summary, because like the similar passage in 'Aucassin et Nicolette' it is dictated by taste (and tradition) rather than principle. Moreover, the brazenly immoral character of Panurge evidently ran away with its author at the beginning, and this perhaps indicates more clearly than anything else how far were serious moral ideas from Rabelais' mind when he composed the first two books. For these reasons, the ethics of these books hardly repay study, except in the political sphere, and while this is a pity from the point of view of tracing the historical development of Rabelais' outlook, the later books offer some compensations.

After man's duty to God, which includes the religious concept of sin, man's duty to himself, not necessarily dependent on any religious teaching, is the starting point for practical ethics and decides in large measure the wider question of man's duty to his neighbour. In the TL and GL a handful of texts gives some idea of the qualities which Rabelais considered desirable. Pride of place inevitably goes to those making up Pantagruelism, of which the three definitions provide an adequate picture. From the Prologue to the TL comes the first (349): "une forme specificque---moiennant laquelle jamais en mauvaise partie ne prendront choses quelconques ilz cognoistront sourdre de bon, franc et total courage." The second refers to the hero himself (II/357): "toutes choses prenoit en bonne partie, tout acte interpretoit à bien, jamais ne se tourmentoit, jamais ne se scandalisoit; aussi eust-il esté bien forissu du deificque manoir de raison--"

car tous les biens que le ciel couvre et que la terre contient---ne sont dignes d'esmouvoir nos affections et troubler nos sens et espritz." The last and best known is from the Prologue to the QL(545): "certeine gayeté d'esprit conficte en mespris des choses fortuites" ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~ It is this last definition, incidentally, which Homenaz echoes in his praise of the Decretals through which men can attain(LII/700): "contemnement asceuré de toutes choses fortuites et terrestres."

The two essential features of this Pantagrueism are neatly complementary: inwardly, a mild contemptus mundi, or at any rate an indifference to material and contingent issues, outwardly, an optimistic view of human actions and tolerance towards everything save ad liberate malice. The scorn of fortune's caprices and earthly goods entails no sort of asceticism or even austerity, and only makes sense when seen against the eternal background as supplied by Rabelais' religious views. Stoic as it stands, this way of life has closer affinities with the generous Platonism of such a Stoic as Cicero than the more austere doctrines of a Seneca or a Marcus Aurelius, but on the existing evidence there is little to be gained from using any proprietary labels.

Amplifying the first part of this philosophy, there is throughout a strong emphasis on the power of reason over passions (in the strict sense), coupled with a highly developed sense of individual responsibility. Pantagrue is quite explicit on one important moral issue (TL.VII/374): "nos cours et penseés qui est l'officine de tout bien et tout mal." Later, after the first series of consultat-

ions, Pantagruel gives as his opinion that also offered by Raminagrobis (XXIX/456): "en l'entreprise de mariage chascun doit estre arbitre de ses propres pensées et de soy-mesmes conseil prendre." The power of reason and each man's responsibility for using it properly is balanced by the equal moral responsibility for each to implement his decisions. Pantagruel's condemnation of Panurge's conduct during the storm is on just these lines (QL.XIII/626): "Si paour il a eu---pourveu que on reste il se feust evertué je ne l'en estime un pelet moins." Epistemon repeats his leader's words in describing the duty of the individual faced with danger (XXIII/628): "de nostre part convient pareillement evertuer, et comme dict le saint Envoyé, estre cooperateurs avecques luy (Dieu)." The chain of personal duty from mind to body is thus established firmly, if not in very great detail.

With regard to the second part of Pantagruelism, a phrase which Rabelais uses at least three times in fairly serious contexts seems to reinforce his optimism and partly explain its nature. Epistemon proposes as an answer to the question of Bridoye's continued good fortune, that he had won the favour of the Intelligences motrices (TL.XLIV/507): "en contemplation de la simplicité et affection sincère au juge Bridoye"; very similar is Rabelais' comment on the little Zacchæus, whom God allowed to see Our Lord because of his (QL.Prol/548): "sincère et mediocre affectation"; while the first phrase is repeated literally by Pantagruel explaining to the Macrobe how they escaped destruction in the storm

(XXV/633): "le hault Servateur avoit eu esgard a la simplicité et sincère affection de ses gens." The theme of simplicity is a frequent one throughout the work, and more than once Rabelais describes how Satan abuses simple souls to their damnation. It is already a long step towards optimism to regard the evil in human actions as largely due to ignorance. As for the sincerity in the examples just quoted, Rabelais seems to rate this second only to positive virtue. Elsewhere he quotes with approval the verses from Magnificat "He hath exalted the humble and meek", and whether his source was primarily Scriptural or not, this idea seems an integral part of his moral outlook. Malice is not indeed identified with cleverness in Rabelais' eyes, but he has something of a bias in favour of humble ignorance where superior wisdom is not attainable. Good intentions are essential, whether realised or not, and one of the basic elements of Pantagruelism is to presume goodwill as far as possible and to cast no blame on shortcomings of performance.

Naturally enough these views on the individual's duty to himself are closely bound up with the conception of how other people should be treated. What we have just called the external aspect of Pantagruelism is a part of this second problem, and probably the essential part, but there are various details to add for a complete picture. One or two general remarks provide the background for more specific texts. Thus Pantagruel cuts short Panurge's praise of debt with a quotation (TL.V/369): "Rien (dict le saint Envoyé) à personne ne doibvez, fors amour et dilection mutuelle," and follows with



similarly relevant comment: "Et suys d'opinion que ne erroient les Perses, estimans le second vice estre mentir, le premier estre de voir. Car debtes et mensonges sont ordinairement ensemble ralliez." He continues with a quotation from Plato's 'Laws', describing how one may legitimately allow a neighbour to draw from one's own well only when he has tried his own and failed to find water, and ends: "Ainsi est-ce grande vergouigne, tousjours, en tous lieux, a'un chascun emprunter, plus toust que travailler et gaigner." This very outspoken attitude may be compared with Panurge's own illustration of Justice Commutative (II/358): "en achaptant cher (je diz a credit), vendant a bon marche (je diz argent comptant)," which precedes it by a few pages. Though the immediate context is financial, at least material, Pantagruel's words are of much wider application in the sphere of morals. It is interesting that lies, which Rabelais specially abhorred as we have seen in the chapter on Spirits, are linked with debt as the chief vices. Debt is nothing more or less than the shifting of responsibility, in this case for honest toil or trading, from oneself to another, and the constant emphasis on personal responsibility in all spheres of action explains the violence of Pantagruel's attack.

The counterpart to this particular text is curiously enough one of the comparatively few where Rabelais mentions the Stoics as a school. Writing back to his father from Medamothi, Pantagruel alludes to the Stoic belief concerning gifts (IV/571): "troys parties estre en benefice; l'une au donnant, l'autre

au recepvant, la tierce du recompensant; et le recepvant très bien recompenser le donnant quand il accepte volontiers le bienfaict et le retient en soubvenance perpetuelle; comme, au rebours, le recepvant estre le plus ingrat au monde, qui mespriseroit et oublieroit le benefice." Gratitude, in fact, is ample repayment, and by no means valueless because it costs nothing. To this Stoic maxim may be joined another, more commonplace, attributed to Seneca, perhaps the most popular of all Classical moralists for the 16C (TL. IX/380): "ce qu'à aultruy tu auras faict, soys certain que aultruy te fera," which Rantagruel uses to jolt Panurge's conscience. Frere Jan evidently regards this as an eminently just arrangement, for, speaking of the Friars whom Panurge is defending against the heretical attacks of Raminagrobis, he says (XXII/428): "Ilz mesdisent de tout le monde; si tout le monde mesdit a'eulx, je n'y pretenus aucun interest." Apart from this example, the eye for an eye principle is not much in evidence in the work.

The duty of children to their parents, and more specifically of each of the giants to his father, is a frequent and important theme which needs no further illustration here. The unquestioning obedience, as well as genuine affection, shown between each pair of father and son, instructs by example rather than precept, but one passage better than any other expresses Rabelais' attitude on the subject. Before launching into his long and violent attack on those concerned in clandestine marriages, Gargantua hears his own son submit unconditionally

to paternal authority ((XLVIII/517): "Plus toust prie Dieu à vos pieds veu royde mort en vostre desplaisir, que sans vostre plaisir estre veu vif marié." There is no need either to enlarge here on the reciprocal duties of husband and wife, except to reiterate that the subordinate position of the wife is to some extent mitigated by the recognition both of a husband's responsibilities and of a wife's capacity for making the life of her husband more congenial.

More precise details are to be found in an examination of the evils which Rabelais selects for **attack**. Twice he expresses his disapproval of flogging boys (QL.XXI/624): "Si par fouetter paouvres petitz enfanz, escholliers innocents, les pedagogues sont damnéz---," and Pantagruel's angry (XLVIII/691): "Si ne desistez fouetter ces enfanz, je m'en retourne!" Putting aside possible memories of his own schooldays, and perhaps the influence of Erasmus, this dislike of corporal punishment (by no means universal at that time) accords well enough with Rabelais' general antipathy to exploitation of the weak by the strong.

On the intellectual plane, the same reaction can be seen with regard to the exploitation of simplicity and ignorance (LVIII/720): "Ilz (les Engastrimythes) estoient divinateurs, enchanteurs et abuseurs du simple peuple." The same formulae reappear several times in similar contexts. Calumny is a vice of which quite a lot has already been said, and Rabelais' habitual use of "Calumnieur" for 'Devil' speaks for itself. His definition of calumny as

given in the Ancien Prologue to the QL shows that it is directly contrary to the practise of Pantagruelism (755): "c'est quand on impugne le bienfaict, quand on mesdict des choses bonnes."

Turning to the actual classes of people Rabelais condemns, the catalogue is traditional and obvious. This comment on the depraved habits of the Romans may be compared with his letters to Geoffroi d'Estissac, full of the contemporary misdeeds of the city (QL.XII/593): "A Rome gens infiniz guaignent leur vie à empoisonner, à battre et à tuer." The realities of Renaissance Italy fell rather short of its splendid ideals. The same chapter (on the Chiquanous) gives the enemies of the nobles (and of Rabelais) as "moine, prestre, usurier ou advocat." The inscription on the gate of Theleme also excludes hypocrites, in the context meaning monks and clergy, lawyers and usurers, adding jealous husbands and sufferers from the pox. The devil of Papefigue goes off to tempt (QL.XLV/684): "les nobles nonnains de Pettesec, les cagotz et briffaulx aussi," and: "les pillars chiquanous, desguyseurs de proces, notaires faulsaies, advocatz prevaricateurs," all of whom, however, have willingly succumbed before he arrives. Lucifer adds to the list (XLVI/686): "marchands usufriers, apothecaires faulsaies, billonneurs, adulterateurs de marchandises," and later, deceitful serving-maids. Personal dislike and traditional unpopularity go a long way to account for these attacks, easily paralleled in other authors of the day, but it is interesting that their moral basis seems in each case to be connected with the twin

vices denounced by Pantagruel: falsehood and debt. The monks and clergy are upbraided above all for their hypocrisy, for the vices which their habit fails to conceal, the lawyers for their dishonesty and exploitation of the legal ignorance of their clients, usurers for profiting from others without labouring themselves, traders for deception. Abuse of trust, exploitation of human simplicity and goodwill are the constant targets of Rabelais' shafts. Other vices and classes of evildoer are castigated from time to time, but hypocrites, lawyers and usurers come in for much the greatest number of attacks,

Rabelais deals with most of the Seven Deadly Sins; Lechery, in the person of Panurge, and to some extent of Frère Jan, is not painted in flattering colours; Gluttony is severely condemned in the Gastrolatres, whose God is their belly; both Anger and Covetousness are expressly contrary to Pantagruelism, but are not much emphasised in the work except in the person of Picrochole, symbol of the one and victim of the other; Pride is the exact opposite of that simplicity which Rabelais so often praises; Sloth is just what Frère Jan condemns in his former brethren, and later in Panurge; Envy is the besetting sin of Antiphysis, and thus of her unlovely offspring, the Calumniateurs. There is nothing particularly novel or interesting in Rabelais' treatment of these sins as such, and it cannot be said that he notably attenuates or emphasises any of them. The most personal element is that dislike of falsehood and exploitation exemplified in so many of the episodes and, from a positive standpoint, the insistence on personal responsibility for ones

actions.

In the public sphere, ethics concern law and government. In his aversion to Canon Law, or more precisely to its contemporary abuse, Rabelais was at one with all the humanists and the royalist cause as well. The long and detailed attack on the Decretals is so obviously intended as propaganda that the theory underlying it is obscured; similarly the Baisecul and Bridoye episodes are both complimentary to some aspects of Civil Law but cannot as they stand be taken to represent Rabelais' real opinions regarding the nature of laws. A formal profession of his belief in the natural origin of laws comes in the Baisecul episode, when Pantagruel is railing at the ignorance and dishonesty of contemporary legists (X/ 238): "Veu que ces loix sont extirpées du milieu de philosophie morale et naturelle, comment l'entendront ces folz qui ont, par Dieu, moins étudié en philosophie que ma mule?" Equally vital to their understanding are: "les lettres de humanité et cognoissance des antiquitez et histoire." The speech of Epistemon at the end of the Bridoye episode makes a similar distinction between jurisprudence and justice, and mentions with particular disapproval the authority of Tribonian (TL. XLIV/508): "homme mescreant, infidèle, barbare, tant maling, tant pervers, tant avare et inique, qu'il vendoit les loix, les edictz---à la partie plus offrante." Though Bridoye himself does not accuse his colleagues on the bench of such flagrant venality, he recognises the dominant role played by money in the administration of the law (XLIII/500): "Comme

vous aultres, Messieurs, semblablement les sergens, huissiers-----sugsants bien fort et continuellement les bourses des parties, engendrent à leurs procès teste, pieds,-----." This fact, true for all ages, is the reason for the innumerable attacks on lawyers throughout literature in general and Rabelais' work in particular, but it is no more an indictment of legal theory than the satire on the Decretals is a serious denial of the Church's right to temporal dues from the state.

The only text which goes to the heart of legal theory is that in which Gargantua describes to his son the shameful practise whereby children can be married without their parents' consent. Pantagruel says first (XLVIII/517): "Je n'ay jamais entendu que par loy aulcune, feust sacre, feust profane et barbare, ayt esté en arbitre des enfans soy marier non consentans, voulens et promouvens leurs peères, mères et parens prochains." This is the point de depart for Gargantua's attack on "tant malignes et barbariques loigs", made by the clergy for their own advantage and to the detriment of the married pair: "qui est cause suffisante pour les rendre suspectes comme iniques et fraudulentés." The idea that the sanction of a law should be in the benefit to the subject and not to the legislator alone is clearly important. After the long diatribe against clandestine marriages, Gargantua tells how those who avenged themselves by killing the guilty priests were brought to justice by other priests, demanding of the secular arm exemplary punishment fro the murders: "Mais ne en æquité naturelle, ne en droict des gens, ne en loy imperiale quelconques, n'a esté

trouvée rubricque, paragraphe, point, ne titre par lequel fut poine et torture à tel faict interminée, raison obsistante, nature repugnante." He continues: "Ores est qu'un chascun, trouvant le meurtrier sus le faict de homicide en la personne de sa fille, iniquement et de guet-à-pens, le doibt par nature, le peut par raison occire sus l'instant, et n'en sera par justice apprehendé." The connexion between reason, nature and justice is crucial, and seems to point genuinely enough to Rabelais' own conception of the law. The successive antitheses are illuminating; "loy sacre" is law based on divine authority, the Decalogue for instance; "loy prophane et barbare" is purely human law. This again has successive stages, 'jus naturale' or "æquite naturelle", 'jus gentium' or "droict des gens", and finally the codified law of the Roman Empire, 'jus civile' or "loy imperiale". The choice of terms is precise---æquite, droict, loy---and explains exactly whence Rabelais derived the authority of formal laws. As for the moral basis of jus naturale and jus gentium, the triple repetition of "nature--raison" provides the answer. The claims of nature and reason are paramount and laws must conform if justice is to be done. The original tripartite division of law belongs to Justinians's Digest, where it is attributed to Ulpian,<sup>(2)</sup> and was classic throughout the Middle Ages. Rabelais' emphasis on nature and reason in determining the course of justice is exactly that of the Scholastics. St. Thomas says: <sup>(3)</sup>

"But in human affairs a thing is said to be just when it accordis aright with the rule of reason: and as we have already seen the first



rule of reason is the Natural law. Thus all humanly enacted laws are in accordance with the rules of reason to the extent that they derive from the Natural law. And if a human law is at variance in any particular with the Natural law, it is no longer legal, but rather a corruption of law."

The interpretation of what accords with nature and reason inevitably varies with individuals, but it is highly interesting to find the exact arguments used by Rabelais against the iniquitous marriage law of the Church supplied by so distinguished a Scholastic. It is further suggestive that Aquinas writes elsewhere quite firmly: <sup>(4)</sup> "Matrimonium clandestinum prohibetur, non quia sit contra essentialia matrimonii, sed quia causat multa mala."

The resultant conclusion is that an unjust law is no law, a legal system which only exacts dues without rendering justice is not legal; taken on this basis the satire of both Canon and Civil law is clearly enough explained. Once more Rabelais' most revolutionary ideas turn out on closer inspection to be founded on the purest orthodoxy. It is worthy of note that despite the great stress laid on God's will throughout the work, the appeal in this speech of Gargantua is not to the inscrutable justice of God but to the twin guides of man, nature and reason. In default of further evidence, there seems no reason to doubt that Gargantua is here voicing Rabelais' own views.

Built on this traditional theory of law is Rabelais' notion of government. The ideal rulers are, of course, the giants and their conduct of affairs can be taken as representing Rabelais' opinions

on the subject. Particularly in the later books an attempt to justify French policy seems to lie behind some of the fiction, and it is certain that Rabelais' experiences in Piedmont with Guillaume du Bellay profoundly influenced his political thinking.

Rabelais recognises man's duty to the body politic in Pantagruel's exposition of "marie et non marie". As a social animal, man must not (TL. XXXV/478): "laisser les offices qu'il doit naturellement à sa patrie, à la republicque, à ses amys, ne mettre en nonchaloir ses estudes et negoces, pour continuellement à sa femme complaire." These social duties are made secondary to the love of God,<sup>(5)</sup> and the word "naturellement" is thus significant. Similarly, the subjects of Pantagruel (TL. I/352): "plus toust defauleroient de vie corporelle que de ceste première et unique subjection naturellement due à leur prince." This same appeal to nature recalls Gargantua's speech cited above, and Rabelais' solid belief in the traditional conception of natural law.

The loyalty of the giants' subjects in all the books sometimes parallels expression of loyalty to the King of France, as for example Frère Jan's contempt for the "fuyarts de Pavie" and Basché's preference (TL. XIII/600): "endurere cent coups de masse sus le heaulme au service de nostre tant bon roy qu'estre une foys cité par ces maistres Chiquanous," nor is the parallel an accident. For their part the kings must earn loyalty and Rabelais' picture of the giants' rule is indeed attractive. The rustic and patriarchal government of Grandgou-

sier comes near enough the ideal of the small feudal lord, and the feudal contract is alluded to by the king himself (Garg. XXVIII/III): "il fault que---je preigne la lance et la masse pour secourir et garantir mes pauvres subjectz. La raison le veult ainsi, car de leur labour je suis entretenu et de leur sueur je suis nourry." Even when the scale of action expands in the TL from local to provincial administration, the ideal remains one of personal rule. All the giants have a council whom they consult. Just after Grangousier's reluctant assumption of responsibility for the defence of his people, "feist convocquer son conseil." In the TL there is a glimpse of Gargantua coming out of his council and holding ((XLVIII/516): "deux gros pacquets de requestes respondues et memoires de respondre." Pantagruel too has a council, and when he has to decide his course of action with the Anacouilles (QL. XXXVI/660): "Pantagruel assembla son conseil pour sommairement leurs avis entendre----" and when he has given his opinion: "la resolution au conseil feut quen tout evenement ilz se tiendront sus leurs gardes." Monarchs, and as such solely responsible for their actions, the giants do not act according to whim or as dictators, though nothing approaching democratic government was ever in Rabelais' mind. They are not like the tyrants "qui veulent leur arbitre tenir lieu de raison." Such tyrants as there are in the book (e.g. Tiberius, Nero and Herod in QL. LXXVI) fill Pantagruel (and Rabelais) with horror; force unsupported by right is for him a travesty of sovereignty. Once more the theme of personal responsi-

bility predominates in this view of kingship, once again reason, and not will alone, is the mainspring of man's behaviour.

A detail of some interest is the relationship between ruler and legislature as illustrated by Pantagruel's conduct on certain occasions.<sup>(6)</sup> When he is consulted in the case of Baisecul v. Humesvesne it is as a private person, who has won a considerable reputation for learning, and his attitude to the court is accordingly very different from that of the TL, when he appears before the Parlement of Brelingues. Invited by the President of the court to listen to the hearing of Bridoye's defence, Pantagruel remains silent throughout, and when Trinquamelle invites his opinion makes no attempt to impose his rank. The context speaks of the Parlement as "sovereign" and there is no reason to suppose that the marquisate of Brelingues was a fief of Gargantua, though close contact between the two is evidently of longstanding. However, Pantagruel is a superior ruler and could obviously have ensured the fulfillment of his wishes by the threat of force if necessary, or even as due to him for past services rendered. In fact, he acts with remarkable modesty, protesting that he has no judicial authority and submitting not a judgement but a plea on behalf of Bridoye. Having lodged his plea, he withdraws respectfully to join his companions, who have been left outside, and goes home.

A curious incident is that of the Chiquanous. Pantagruel has already expressed his disapproval of the Basché story, in which the servants of the

law are roughly handled, but when the travellers land and treat the Chiquanous to a drubbing, it is a mild surprise to read (XVI/608): "Pantagruel estoit resté en sa nauf et ja' faisoit sonner la retraicte." The sequel of this episode is that of the Chats Fourrés in the CL, more probably by Rabelais himself than any other part of the book, and it is noteworthy that Pantagruel again takes no part in the conflict with the law. In these two cases there is no question of respecting the law even when unjust, let alone condoning the injustice; Pantagruel simply avoids a clash. These incidents, after all, do not take place in his own kingdom, and as a legislator, or at least a future legislator, he is in a particularly vulnerable position should he interfere with the laws of others, however iniquitous. If strictly speaking, Pantagruel is above the law, *solutus legibus*, he has too much sense of responsibility to go openly against it. This seems to be the lesson of these episodes and it certainly enhances the dignity of kingship as Rabelais portrays it.

Finally in the sphere of politics comes the question of international relations. Here patriotism and support for French against Imperial policy are ruling factors, but that does not alter the fact that the same moral arguments were used by both sides to prove the righteousness of their cause; it is the nature of these arguments which concerns us here. The tone of the first two books is unmistakably that of the humanists like Erasmus who utterly condemned war as inimical to culture

and for whom pacifism was stronger than patriotism. Rabelais, always a good Frenchman, never took the same detached attitude as Erasmus, who owned loyalty to no country, least of all his native Holland, and the fervour of the TL Prologue is already foreshadowed in one or two passages in the early books, though in a more subdued tone. It is hardly necessary to say that aggression is condemned in the strongest terms, as it always has been through the centuries, not least by the aggressors themselves. The development of the Picrocholine war shows that this was no mere lip-service in Rabelais' case. When Picrochole undertakes his first punitive expedition, actually unjustified but motivated by the injury suffered deservedly by his people, Grandgousier does not at once take up arms, not even in self-defence. First he sends his ambassador to remonstrate with Picrochole in the name of reason, then although (XXXII/117): "sembla à son conseil que en toute force il se doibvoit defenare", he sends substantial reparations in kind and cash to Marquet, and only when all these efforts have failed does he resign himself to a defensive war.

At the end of the war, with victory achieved, Gargantua delivers a harangue to the vanquished enemy in which he not only reiterates the humanitarian sentiments expressed by Gallet earlier, but puts them into practise. We have already seen Toucqueaillon sent back from captivity with a message from Grandgousier to his king (XLVI/155):

"Le temps n'est plus d'ainsi conquerer les royaumes avecques dommage de son prochain

frère christian. Ceste imitation des anciens Hercules, Alexandres, Hannibalz, Scipions, Cesars et autres telz est contraire à la profession, de l'Evangile, par laquelle nous est commandé garder, saulver, regir et administrer chascun ses pays et terres, non hostilement envahir les autres---."

Such arguments as these, based on Scripture, were used by Joan of Arc against the English invaders, and similar motives inspired the preachers of the Crusades, whose task was as much to stop the leaders of Christendom from fighting among themselves as to range them against the infidel. When at the conclusion of hostilities the enemy is treated so magnanimously that only a handful of culprits receive any punishment at all, Rabelais ensures that the lesson shall not be lost by referring directly to: "les autres roys et empereurs, voyre qui se font nommer catholicques." By a curious irony, it was Charles V who undertook the abortive Crusade to North Africa, while François I was earning his title ~~Solennent negociations with the Sultan's alliance,~~ but we are here concerned with Rabelais' theory, not historical fact.

Closely bound up with this attitude to war is another commonplace of international propoganda in all ages---the sanctity of alliances, which all states admit and which the aggressors inevitably accuse their victims of breaking. The greater part of Gallet's harangue is on this theme, and one of Grandgousier's main grievances is that a former ally should have attacked him without warning. The prompt and effective support of all his other allies and vassals gives a faithful picture of the old feudal idea in operation and contrasts with the

faithlessness of Picrochole. Contracts and alliances are not merely legal devices but morally binding, and indeed sacred.

The apparent change in the TL is striking but not genuinely contradictory. Once the giants in the first two books have embarked on their defensive wars, Rabelais describes the military operations with enthusiasm. It is true that Gargantua's letter denounces the invention of artillery as inspired by the Devil, but his own exploits make use of all the ruses and stratagems of war. The TL Prologue shows the author fired with admiration for things military, and reflects his feelings when the brothers du Bellay were busy with the defence of Paris and Turin. Even this praise of war is preceded by carefully chosen phrases (345): "part à la fortification de sa patrie, et la défendre, part au repoulement des ennemis, et les offendre." Only a defensive war can be just, and the joys of conquest for its own sake play not even a fictional role in Rabelais' work. Imperialism (in more senses than one) was an idea he utterly rejected.

The first chapter of the TL, which continues the narrative of 'Pantagruel' and belongs to the original scheme of the book, brings out the continuing moral bias of Rabelais' political views. Just like Gargantua's harangue to the vanquished, this chapter insists on the need for humane treatment of conquered peoples as against the ruthless repression (I/354): "d- certains esprits tyranniques à leur dam et deshonneur." The long series of Classical references which follows emphasise the duty



of a king to treat his new subjects with justice, magnanimity and peace.

"Et plus en heur ne peult le conquerant regner soit roy, soit prince ou philosophe, que faisant Justice à Vertus succeder. Sa vertu est apparue en la victoire et conqueste, sa justice appar-oistra en ce que par la volonté et bonne affection au peuple donnera loys, publiera edictz, establira religions, fera droict à un chascun--."

It is not the views of Plutarch or Virgil which are the models for the chapter, but the conduct of Langey in Piedmont. If Rabelais had wanted theory to support this practise, however, he had no need to go back to the Classics; the Scholastics would have taught him no other lesson.

The last example in the work is the Andouilles episode in the QL, which shows that Rabelais' views on international relations had remained constant through 20 years, despite (or because of) his wide experience of practical diplomacy in the meantime. When Pantagruel first hears of the conflict between the Andouilles and Quaresmeprenant he at once offers to mediate (XXIV/657): "si voyez que par quelque honeste moyen puissions fin à ceste guerre mettre et ensemble les reconcilier, donnez m'en advis. Je m'y emploiray de bien bon cœur et n'y espargneray au mien pour contemperer et amodier les conditions controverses entre les deux parties." He learns that an abortive attempt at mediation has already been made by Xenomanes. Later, when every indication warns them that the Andouilles are likely to take hostile action, Pantagruel gives his orders to the company (XXXVII/664): "leur feist une briefve remonstrance à ce qu'ilz eusse.t à soy monstrier vertueux

au combat, si par cas estoient constraintz (car encores ne pouvoit-il croire que les Andouilles feussent si traistresses) avecques defense de commencer le hourt." The parenthesis shows Pantagruel faithful to his philosophy of never thinking evil of anyone, and the final clause insists again that only a defensive battle is legitimate.

The theme of alliances also recurs, and when the two armies are face to face Pantagruel sends Gymnaste to ask why (XLI/672): "elles vouloient sans defiance guerroyer contre leurs anys antiques," and he cries out: "Tous tenons de hardigras vostre antique confædere." At the end the situation described in Gargantua's earlier harangue about the Canarriens is repeated when the queen of the Andouilles offers homage on feudal terms, together with substantial tribute (XLII/676): "Pantagruel remercia gratieusement la royne, pardonna toute l'offense, refuse l'offre qu'elle avoit faict et luy donna un beau petit cousteau parguoyz." Even in this episode of high fantasy, the serious theories are not forgotten and Rabelais is consistent to the last.

It should be remembered that though Rabelais acts often enough as apologist for royal policy, this did not by any means conform to the standards represented in the book, nor could he have seriously believed that it did. The appalling massacre of the Vaudois (despite du Bellay's urgent and repeated pleas), the extremely cavalier ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ treatment of du Bellay himself by an ungrateful sovereign, the constant attempts by French diplomats (inclu-

uing the du Bellay brothers) to foment discontent and rebellion among the princes of Germany, both Catholic and Protestant, against Charles V, whom none could deny to be their rightful lord, are only three examples of behaviour perfectly familiar to Rabelais and diametrically opposed to the principles of his fictional hero. The apologetic purpose of the book is important, but not to the exclusion of independent views on political morality. The very phrase 'political morality' prejudices the issue, but not without cause.

In private ethics Rabelais had definite and constant theories regarding personal responsibility, tolerance of ignorance but not of evil, and of well-doing as well as right-thinking. In the wider sphere of public ethics these ideas are applied with equal force, and the conception of natural law outlined in Gargantua's speech in the TL forms the essential link between the two spheres. This conception of an absolute standard of justice, whereby actual laws can be judged by the light of reason, at once puts all human relationships, private, public, national, international, in the same perspective and enables us with propriety to speak of political morality. The appeal to nature and reason in Gargantua's speech was probably intended to set off the virtues of Roman Civil law, based on these ideas, against the iniquities of later Canon law. All the same, the earlier appeal to the Gospels (in Grandgousier's charge to Toucquedillon) shows that, unless a hidden change took place in Rabelais' attitude between the two dates, the synthesis of sacred and

profane authority underlying his legal concepts was essentially that of Scholastic theory (if not practise). It is natural to find the king bound on his higher plane by exactly the same moral code as the individual, with heightened powers heightening responsibility. Reason for the individual, council for the monarch, must be the guiding principles of all actions. Both must assume the best of others until proved wrong, private falsehood and political duplicity are to be shunned above all else. In international relations still the same rules obtain; a treaty of alliance is as sacred as a man's word of honour, defence is the only legitimate motive for hostile action. The king and his advisers as leaders of the people are responsible for the conduct of affairs and they alone must pay the penalty for wrongdoing, not their innocent and misled subjects.

None of these ideas is peculiar to Rabelais, nor even the relative emphasis laid upon them, but they are on the whole old-fashioned for an age when real modernity was sought in the works of Classical antiquity. One very marked feature of the whole system is that there is no trace of the exaggerated voluntarism of the Nominalists with whose doctrines Rabelais must have had some acquaintance, however transitory, and not necessarily in his Franciscan days. Equally alien to his thought is the idea of expediency taught by Macchiavelli and assiduously practised by more than one ruler. Granted that the evidence is deplorably sketchy, every sign points to an idealised form of feudal monarchy as being

very much what Rabelais had in mind. If for no other reason, the directly personal responsibility of the ruler favoured such a conception. The moral, religious and social background of feudalism comes indeed nearer to the reality of Rabelais' fictional states than the background of Renaissance France, let alone Italy, or even the Classical period in which he sometimes seems to see the Golden Age. (7)

CHAPTER TWELVE  
EPISTEMOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY

In a sense the whole roman de Pantagruel is concerned with education. The first two books deal with the initial studies of their heroes, and the latter two with what one might call the post-graduate application of these studies. From this point of view the authenticity of the CL is a question of major importance, and if the spirit of its final chapter can ever be shown to derive from Rabelais himself, a very suitable conclusion to the whole work is thus provided. All learning is the pursuit of truth, whether in an absolute or relative sense, and Rabelais' attitude to the methods of his day is directly dependent on his broader conception of truth, which the latter books do something to illustrate. For personal as well as polemical reasons Rabelais' treatment of these questions shows a considerable evolution between the two groups of books, and whatever arbitrary divisions one cares to adopt the chronological distinction cannot be ignored.

The first two books are notable for their sustained and detailed attack on the Sorbonne and all it stood for, an attack which the transparent alterations of the 1542 edition do nothing to attenuate. The library of St. Victor and similar gibes scattered through the two books are plainly inspired by polemical motives, and perhaps a certain amount of personal rancour as well. There is little or no philosophical significance in these details; the ideas and persons are for the most part those which all humanists disliked. The Reuchlin affair and the

Dominicans concerned figure largely in the catalogue at St. Victor, though no longer topical, most of the Franciscan authors find a place, but not, significantly, either Bonaventura or the founder himself, and the best known opponents of progress àike Beda and le Quercu are not spared. The active hostility of these groups is sufficient reason for Rabelais' attitude, but, personalities apart, he devotes some space to criticising their methods. The whole Janotus episode is a direct and obvious satire of pedantry and obscurantism at the Sorbonne, but it is at the same time precisely the sort of satire one would expect from a critical and intelligent student, mediaeval or modern. Not logic or Latin, but bad logic and bad Latin are the butts of Rabelais' shafts. Janotus is the fossilised pedant which any system is likely to produce eventually, and he is no more typical of Scholasticism than of any other obsolete system. Thaumaste is a very different character, and the purport of his episode much more damaging than the other. He is neither a fool nor a pedant, and comes in all sincerity to learn from Pantagruel. What is ridiculed in these chapters is the whole system of solemn disputation, the essential feature of Scholastic instruction. The broad farce of the episode comes from the assumption that Thaumaste takes seriously the gestures which Panurge and the reader know to be absurd. There is an undertone of anarchy in this, as in other scenes where the deplorable Panurge scores over characters whose worth is never in question.

While one must not take the Thaumaste episode

too seriously, two remarks of the Englishman express without any doubt Rabelais' own views. (XVIII/271): "Je ne veulx disputer pro et contra, comme font ces sotz sophistes de ceste ville et de ailleurs," which Pantagruel applauds, saying that the proposed disputation by signs wil put them: "hors de ces frapemens de mains que font les badaulx sophistes quand on argue, alors qu'on est au bon de l'argument." The second time Thaumaste says (275): "Et au regard de disputer par contention, je ne le veulx faire; aussi est-ce chose trop vile, et le laisse à ces maraulx sophistes lesquelz en leurs disputations ne cherchent verite mais contradiction et debat."

Milder, but to the same effect, is the comment on Gargantua's feelings when he has lost his wife and gained a son (Pant. III/203): "D'un costé et d'autre il avoit argumens sophisticques, qui le suffoquoient, car il les faisoit très bien in modo et figura; mais il ne les pouvoit souldre." Rabelais' objection to the Scholastic disputation is the common one, that it proves only which disputant is the more skilful in argument. As a means of arriving at truth, Rabelais could never have accepted it and he seems to have had no use for it even as a mental exercise. The fervent study of gloss and commentary was equally anathema to him and dear to the Schools. Personal opinions often at three or four removes from the original text brought the reader no nearer the truth than disputes, and provided a tedious and aesthetically arid study.

Rabelais' answer to Scholastic methods is his famous theory of education, set out in Gargantua's



letter to his son, and the actual programme accomplished a generation earlier by Gargantua himself. Insofar as all humanism in the 16C had concealed but persistent roots in the Middle Ages, it would not be hard to point out close parallels between Rabelais' ideas and those of a mediaeval thinker, St. Albert, for example, but it would be idle to deny that the education of both the giants is far removed from contemporary Scholastic practise. The main features of these programmes are well enough known--- for Gargantua, personal piety, physical fitness, oral instruction and object lessons from field studies and so on, for Pantagruel, the same piety, philological training to enable study in all subjects, sacred and profane arts and sciences, in the original texts with encyclopaedic knowledge as the goal. The intellectual attitude typified by Pantagruel's proposed education is still quantitative first, qualitative second. The humanists of Rabelais' generation had not lost mediaeval habits of mind, even if they applied them in rather a different direction.

Much more illuminating for our purpose than these conscious and obvious comments on the pursuit of knowledge, are the remarks scattered all through the work which bear witness to the persistence of technical Scholastic notions in Rabelais' mental background, and reveal more clearly than anything else the degree to which he depended on ideas learned in his youth. Some of these remarks on epistemology have already been quoted in other connexions. There is the coincidence of Grandgousier's remark about his son (Garg. XIV/69): "je congnois que son entende-

Platonic theory of knowledge (reminiscence and participation in divine omniscience) as shown in the chapter on dreams, and the Aristotelian "nihil in intellectu quod non prius in sensu". Rabelais is no more explicit here than he is on similar questions, but he seems to have room for both theories, the sensible in what concerns the material world and the spiritual for metaphysical truths. Such a synthesis is typical of his general habits, and since Pyrrhonism is clearly rejected in the Trouillogan episode, no alternative solution would be very likely.

Whatever Rabelais' later reading may have been, he cannot have escaped a grounding in Aristotelian philosophy during his Franciscan training, and the references to these studies are by no means all derogatory. The long and rather tiresome disquisition on the significance of white and blue begins with a quotation from the 'Topics' (Garg. 3/55): "Aristoteles dict que, supposant deux choses contraires en leur espèce---si vous les coulevez en telle façon qu'une contraire d'une espèce convaincra raisonnablement l'un contraire d'une autre, il est consequent que l'autre contraire compete avec des l'autre raison," and this is elaborated at some length. Towards the end of the same chapter, Rabelais writes: "Si demandez comment par couleur blanche nature nous induict entendre joye et liesse, je vous reponds que l'analogie et conformite est telle."

Besides the many burlesque uses of Scholastic terminology, there are some examples which seem to come almost naturally to Rabelais' pen. Thus (11/201): "Le Philosophe raconte en aduvent la quest-

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Besides the many burlesque uses of Scholastic terminology, there are some examples which seem to come almost naturally to Rabelais' pen. Thus (II/201): "Le Philosophe raconte en mouvant la quest-

ion, pourquoi c'est que l'eau de la mer est salée---" is only one example of many which could be cited.

A very late reminiscence of Aristotelian learning comes at the end of the QL, when Pantagruel says to Ponocrates (LXIII/737): "Par le decret des subtilz philosophes peripateticques nous est enseigne que tous problèmes, toutes questions, tous doutes proposés doibvent estre certains, clairs et intelligibles." The "subtilz" seems to recall the Scotist teachers under whom Rabelais probably suffered, and the remark may stem from memories of personal training in logic. Another odd item of logic is Pantagruel's rejection of the theory of a "langage naturel". (TL.XIX/417): "les voix, comme disent les dialecticiens, ne signifient naturellement mais à plaisir." If it is clear that the arid formalism of later Scholastic logic repelled Rabelais, these few references (with others not quoted) show that his training in this field had left some positive traces.

Besides the terms of formal logic, Rabelais shows himself familiar with the essential notions of Aristotelian philosophy and, what is more, appropriates them to his own use. The great problem of matter and form was not one in which he intended to become involved (QL.XI/592): "Il veult dire (respondit Epistemon) formes suyvantes la matiere. Ainsi les nomme Averrois. --- Je vous diray (respondit Pantagruel) sans au problème proposé respondre, car il est un peu chatouilleux, et à peine y toucheriez-vous sans vous espiner." The individuating factor in this composition was not necessarily a dangerous subject. Immediately before Epistemon's remark just

quoted, Rhizotome asks whether the attraction of monks to kitchens is due to : "quelque vertu latente et propriété spécifique absconse dedans les marmites---," and we have already seen that Pantagruelism is defined as (TL.Prol/349): "une forme spécifique et propriété individuelle---." Nature's role is to perpetuate her creatures (TL.VIII/376): "sans jamais ceperir les espèces, encores que les individuz perissent." In these examples, Rabelais uses Scholastic terms in such a way as to suggest his acceptance and understanding of the ideas behind them. His own mental equipment seems to include the division of matter and form, the arrangement by species and genera, and even the technical Scotist theory of individuation.

These indications, however slight, are useful to set against the Platonic references which occur rather frequently in the later books. Apart from particular references like the chapter on dreams, the 'Timaeus' (via Tiraqueau) for opinions on women, and numerous examples of neo-Platonic demonology from Plutarch, the theory to which Rabelais most often refers is naturally enough that of Ideas. The word 'idées' is evidently one which appealed to Rabelais for itself (like 'Servateur'), and some examples of the way in which he uses it may help to define the limits of his Platonism. In Panurge's praise of debt, just after a mention (TL.III/363): "de celle grande asme de l'univers, laquelle selon les Academicques toutes choses vivifie," comes: "representez-vous en esprit serain l'idée et forme de quelque monde." A little later, the ideal world

envisaged by him is compared to (IV/366): "l'idée des regions olympiques ès quelles toutes autres vertus cessent." Pantagruel speaks of real married happiness as (X/383): "(semblant) reluire quelque idée et representation des joyes de paradis," and he himself is described (LI/528): "l'idée et exemplaire de toute joyeuse perfection."

At Medamothi Epistemon buys a tapestry (QL.II/565): "onquel estoient au vif poinctes les Idées de Platon et les Atomes de Epicurus," which the BD explains as (761): "espèces et formes invisibles imaginées par Platon." At the end of the battle with the Andouilles, the monster which appears is described as (XLII/676): "l'Idée de Mardi gras." When Homenaz produces his sacred relic, he says to the travellers (L/696): "que vous semble de ceste image?" and goes on to explain that it is "l'idée de celluy Dieu de bien en terre," and a moment later "le portraict," while the chapter heading calls the relic "l'archetype d'un Pape." In this one context "idée" is used to describe a pictorial likeness as an alternative to "image, portraict, archetype."

A similar, but less obviously material, reference is a quotation from Petron (actually Plutarch) who believed in a plurality of worlds, in the centre of which he placed (LV/713): "le Manoir de Verité et le habiter les Parolles, les Idées, les Exemplaires et protraictz de toutes choses passées et futures." This gives "exemplaires et protraictz" again as synonyms for "idées", as it seems, and though the text is rather obscure, one might perhaps add

"parolles" as well. These eight examples from the TL and QL are representative and typical of Rabelais' treatment of Platonism. It is interesting to compare them with two from St. Thomas:<sup>(1)</sup> "Idea est forma exemplaris, qua res fiunt et cognoscuntur, quae est in mente artificis," and more concisely<sup>(2)</sup> "Idea graece, forma latina dicitur." Except for Rabelais' last text, in any case a quotation, none of the others is in fact specifically Platonic, and in two cases "idée" is not used in a philosophical sense at all, but merely as an erudite alternative to 'image'. Compared with his precise use of terms like 'forme spécifique', Rabelais' use of "idée" seems due to little more than literary preference, prompted by philological motives. There is no justification for assuming that he had any other view of matter and form than that taught by his Scholastic masters, and there is no text which shows conclusively that he had adopted more than a few of Plato's metaphysical doctrines to supplement or replace the original Aristotelian grounding.

Without challenging in any way Rabelais' predilection for Plato in all metaphysical matters, his practical, as distinct from technical, examples of epistemology are solidly based on the theory of knowledge entering the mind through the senses. Reference has already been made to the programme of Gargantua's education, in which field studies, visits to craftsmen and specialists, object lessons of all kinds are given considerably more weight than book learning. Pantagruel's actual education is limited to academic studies in the first book,

but Panurge makes in this connexion an important remark at the end of the TL, when a voyage to the Dive Bouteille is proposed (XLVII/514): "Je vous ay longtemps cogneu amateur de peregrinite et desirant tousjours veoir et tousjours aprenare." The operative word is "longtemps", as it shows that book learning did not long remain Pantagruel's main preoccupation.

The letter and gifts sent back from Medamothi are practical illustrations of this interest in knowledge for its own sake, and Pantagruel's words to the Macrobe reinforce the same impression (XXV/633): "Une et seule cause les avoit en mer mis, scavoir est studieux desir de veoir, apprendre, cognoistre, visiter l'oracle de Bacuc---." <sup>Maricnal</sup> M. Atkinson quotes <sup>(s)</sup> this, without the last phrase (but, as he says, the suppression is perfectly legitimate) as describing Rabelais' general attitude; a not implausible case could be made for separating the last phrase from the three preceding verbs on linguistic grounds as well.

In each of the episodes (e.g. Macraeons, Quaresme-prenant, Andouilles) it is Pantagruel who makes a searching enquiry into the nature and customs of the place, and he usually has some opinion of his own to add to the newly-won information. Even in the midst of travelling, however, he still draws copiously from his store of book learning. While Rabelais attaches due importance to the intellectual stimulus of new experiences and surroundings, he certainly never intended these purely practical measures to take the place of study, and Classical rather than modern study at that, even in geography.



Wisdom may, indeed must, be personally attained, but knowledge in the last analysis is for Rabelais a question of authority more than of experience. One recalls his own medical studies, his pride in presenting a philologically superior text, without doubt a greater achievement in his eyes than the anatomical dissections for which modern science would be more inclined to honour him.

The question of authority in Rabelais' epistemology is really more important than any of the aspects so far considered. In point of method we have seen that there are not many indications of a technical nature, but those few which have any significance most probably reflect his Scholastic training. His philosophical language, when he uses it, is precise and accurate, and he understands the main problems of which he makes mention. His Platonism is extremely eclectic on the technical side, and his use of the word 'idée' suggests propaganda rather than conviction. Though the texts relevant to this subject are scanty and not of first importance, they are worth noting above all for their counterbalance to the more obvious and familiar attacks on Scholasticism. In correcting an impression of unqualified hostility to things mediaeval, the slightest evidence is of value, and taken as a whole the texts quoted add up to a not inconsiderable testimony. More important to Rabelais' outlook but less relevant to the present study is the stress he lays on direct observation and experience, during and after the years devoted to formal education.

There remains the overriding question 'pourquoi?'

to set beside the 'comment?', and on this more than any other consideration depends our assessment of Rabelais' position vis-à-vis the Middle Ages. The question of whether or not Christianity comes first in Rabelais' ideas is still hotly disputed. Even those who claim that he was an atheist do not deny that religion of an unequivocally Christian kind, and with definite Evangelical tendencies, takes the first place in the education of both the giants. Whatever sinister motives may be imputed to Rabelais in this, the fact remains, and must have convinced many more contemporaries that it meant what it said than the partisans of his atheism seem to allow. As regards the later books, opinions are even more divided, and the brutal truth remains that no proof will ever persuade either the believers in Rabelais' atheism or his Christianity to change their opinions.

Some attempt has been made in other chapters to set out the arguments for believing that Rabelais was a Christian in the strict sense of the word, both in the TL and QL, or, more exactly, that the impression given by the text is Christian, whatever secret views the author may have held. Febvre has done an immense service to 16C students by stating so forcibly that incredulity, though going scepticism, is just not feasible in Rabelais' time, and that some positive alternative to Christianity must be supplied to support any charge of deviation. On the basis of what has been said earlier we believe that Rabelais was a Christian at all times, and that being so, held the truth of the Christian revelation to be absolute in the face of any

rational attacks.

The immediate corollary of this is that the Scriptures (and possibly more besides) take precedence over all other sources of wisdom; a Christian who believes he has an immortal soul, as Rabelais did, has both religious and philosophical reasons for holding spiritual wisdom to be supreme. The Platonising tendencies of the two later books only reinforce the initial conclusion: the truth, spiritual wisdom, derives from and is of God, either personally (e.g. by dreams and prophetic revelation) or through the Scriptures. If this is accepted, it necessarily follows that all other knowledge is of a lower order, having reference either to intellectual things or material objects subordinated to their creator. The fact of subordination is not all, however, and for the 16C thinker the teleological conclusion inevitably follows. That any learning is always better than ignorance <sup>(4)</sup> was almost a self-evident truth for men of an age which would have been astonished and puzzled by Pope's 'Essay on Man', and if pressed for a reason they would point to the essentially hierarchic arrangement of all things, whereby knowledge of even the humblest is a stepping-stone towards knowledge of God, man's *raison d'être* on earth. It is, of course, true that many Christian scholars may not have sought consciously to explain the eternal significance of their academic studies, but without denying their religion they could not logically offer another answer. The 'double truth' fiction is a case in point.

Thus far Rabelais may be said to subscribe to

the notion 'philosophia theologiae ancilla', though his interpretation of theology certainly did not identify it with the faculty represented by the Sorbonne. In a broad sense these views were common to all Christians, Catholic or Protestant, but in Ebelais' case an additional factor is of great importance: the place of pagan authors. For many of the Reformers the Catholic Church's greatest betrayal of the Christian truth was its acceptance of contaminating pagan philosophy, particularly Plato and Aristotle, but in that they were only following the party of extreme orthodoxy, represented in earlier times by SS. Peter Damian and Bernard, for whom all pagan writing was immoral in itself. The mass of opinion, Catholic and Reformed, accepted the possibility of reconciling the best in paganism with Christianity. Erasmus' "Sancte Socrate, ora pro nobis", shocks only in its form; for centuries before Erasmus Plato had been "the divine Plato", and Eusebius speaks of him as "a kind of Greek Moses". The Platonic trinity had from the earliest times been assimilated to the Christian one, and the work of St. Thomas in 'baptising' Aristotle was only the logical extension of a process which had been going on for centuries. Except for extremists, it was generally agreed throughout the Middle Ages that the Classical world (of which they considered themselves the direct continuation) had a considerable contribution to make to Christian culture. The educational and doctrinal developments of the later Middle Ages never wholly caused the rejection of that principle, but subordinated to the growing and fatal

cultivation of dialectic. For the generation of Erasmus and Bude, the great revival of Classical learning in no way replaced Christianity, which remained the touchstone of all truth. Even "Sancte Socrate" did not stop Erasmus criticising the Church for admitting so many pagan ideas into its theology. For him, as for Rabelais, there was only one truth, which was Christianity together with as much of pagan wisdom as could be fitted into a Christian framework.

The exaggerated cult of Classicism, of which Rabelais is visibly an exponent, must be seen in the light of all this. Plutarch, Plato, an unbaptised Aristotle are preferred to the exclusion of all Scholastic authors, and in Rabelais' book even to the exclusion of the Fathers, but their authority is never set against that of Christianity. In all matters of faith---God, angels, man's soul---where a clash is possible, Rabelais makes no attempt to present two points of view; in all such cases synthesis is the remedy applied. In all other matters affecting human affairs, law, science, arts, doctrinal questions could be avoided, so that the fundamental principle of a unique and Christian truth remained intact. What Rabelais rejected was what might be called institutional authority, authority sanctioned by Popes or other human agencies, and lacking any intrinsic validity. What he accepted was the authority conferred by the tradition of centuries, by constant repetition and quotation. The element of human compulsion represented by Scholastic authority was probably a deciding factor in causing Rabelais to reject it. The fact of disagreement between all Classical writers, which so

influenced Descartes, was no deterrent to Rabelais, for whom synthesis was the cure for all ills.

The attitude of Roger Bacon is worth comparing with Rabelais': "<sup>(7)</sup>Viri tam boni et tam sapientes sicut Pythagoras, Socrates, Plato et Aristoteles, et alii zelatores maximi sapientiae receperunt a Deo speciales illuminationes quibus intellexerunt multa de Deo." The unity of truth was stated by St. Thomas, as by so many other Scholastics: "<sup>(8)</sup>Sapientia est tantum una, licet scientiae sint multae," and again: "<sup>(9)</sup>"Sapientia qua formaliter sapientes sumus est quaedam participatio divinae sapientiae, quae Deus est." Most important, perhaps, is his prescription for the attainment of truth: "<sup>(10)</sup>Homo pertingit ad cognitionem veritatis tripliciter: sc. capiendo a Deo, ab homine et per studium: primo est necessarium oratio, secundo auditus, tertio meditatio." So long as the three elements are preserved mediaeval thought is continued in its essentials; the balance of evidence is conducive to the belief that Rabelais accepted this triple way to truth. There is the actual scheme of Gargantua's education, in which the same ideas can be seen, and the conduct of Pantagruel in the CL especially. "Car tous philosophes et saiges anti-ques, pour bien surement et plaisamment parfaire le chemin de cognoissance divine et chasse de sapience ont estime' deux choses necessaires: guyde de Dieu et compaygnie d'homme" Whether by Rabelais or not, these final words of the CL express aptly the ruling principles of his epistemology. In the broad scheme of his philosophy, Rabelais puts the human wisdom of the ancient world only beneath the divine wisdom

of the Bible. Where he most decisively parts company with the Scholastics is in his refusal to admit the binding value of human efforts to interpret the divineword(except by philology)and his substitution for such efforts of a closer study of pagan wisdom. Wherever here is truth it must come from God, wherever there is truth it must lead to God; such are the inseparable hinges on which turns Rabelais' theory of knowledge, and thus far he seems to look back rather than forward.

CHAPTER THIRTEEN  
 MAN AS SEEN IN THE  
 CHARACTERS

While all the theories and opinions expressed about man in general must carry great weight when it comes to assessing Rabelais' philosophy, a work of fiction such as his offers other, and perhaps more compelling, criteria. The actual characters of the work, with their strength and weakness, regarded above all through the eye of the uncritical reader who is not seeking to moralise, are what must in the last analysis constitute ones impression of Rabelais' humanism. The comic style of the work, as well as the epic strain, inevitably distort the types of personality for literary effect, but without a norm no comedy is effective and it is seldom hard to decide what Rabelais distorts and what he upholds.

Allowing for the fact that a major change of emphasis occurs after the first two books, when the gigantic theme is virtually abandoned, Pantagruel, Gargantua and Grandgousier stand in a privileged position in every sense. Not only are they above all criticism, but their example is meant to be followed. Near them is another group of characters, some fairly prominent, others merely episodic, who are also not criticised, but who for one reason or another are not held up as examples for all to follow. While Langey almost certainly belongs with the giants, the second group includes such characters as Epistemon, Hippothadée, Rondibilis, Gallet, Triquamelle, Panigon, the Macrobe and others. To all of



these respect is shown, and from their individual characteristics certain positive conclusions can be drawn. Another group consists of those who, though sympathiques on balance, are shown with obvious weaknesses, and who are certainly not meant to be imitated except in their particular redeeming virtue. Raminagrobis, Basché and Frère Jan are among this company, and all in all it is probably with them that Panurge must be counted, though this is open to doubt. If these characters are less virtuous than those mentioned before, they certainly gain in humanity, and it may be that they are the most significant of all for an appreciation of Rabelais' views. Last, and most numerous, come all the characters major and minor, who represent Rabelais' personal parade of human folly. Like the crowded canvas of Erasmus, Rabelais' work teems with figures of every kind: Maître Tubal Holoferene, Janotus, Thaumaste, the Limousin, Trouillogan, Her Trippa, Homenez, the Sibyll of Panzoult, Picrochole, the pilgrims, jostle one another in their antics, intellectual, political, religious, magical and the rest, which all go to show the follies of which man is so readily capable. Even with these, condemnation is not complete; ignorance is their greatest sin. For a perfectly symmetrical picture there should be some examples of absolute evil to balance the ideals of perfection, but, in fact, with the sole and uncertainly reliable exception of the CL, particularly the Isle Sonnante, such characters do not appear in Rabelais' book. There are many references to evildoers---hints at the iniquity of Charles V, sinister gibes at the

Sorbonne, memories of ancient tyrants, like Nero and Tiberius---but unless one includes such fantastic creatures as Loup-Garou, none takes shape as a living character. There is no individual villain, even if there is much dark villainy behind the scenes, inspired indeed by Satan, of whom we hear quite a lot, though he never appears in person.

Naturally such categories as these are wholly artificial, and correspond only roughly with Rabelais' method of composition, but they help one to assess the relative importance of various qualities, good or bad, of human nature as portrayed in the work. Such a division is perhaps most justifiable on the grounds that it shades out the differences between the giants and the others, which at first sight is apt to be confusing. A detailed analysis of these groups of characters is probably the best way to set forth clearly the impressions given of Rabelais' humanism, and thus to decide its most likely sources, or at least its nearest affinities.

In the case of the giants, and to some extent other characters as well, a distinction must be made between the first two books and the others. In the first books everything about Grandgousier, Gargantua and Pantagruel is gigantic, their physical and intellectual stature no less than their moral qualities. The traditional model from which Rabelais was working inevitably casts an air of unreality over these fairytale figures, who cover an army with their tongues, pick up church-bells like rattles and swallow men with a gulp, but to this traditional source Rabelais adds so much realistic detail about life at La Devinière, that the giants live equally

on the human and superhuman planes. Allowing for the difference in their age and situations, the three have much in common. Grandgousier plays very much the same role of aged ruler as his son in the I; the two heirs apparent differ more in their upbringing than their characters. The first and most obvious feature of these three models is that they belong to an essentially aristocratic conception of society. On closer inspection, it seems that a definitely feudal idea underlies these portraits, and not a conception of a centralised monarchy. The political references to France and the Empire are unambiguous, and in a general sense François I and Charles V can be identified respectively with the giants and their enemies. At the same time, 'Gargantua' in particular shows very clearly that the theory is national while the practise is local. Grandgousier recognises his feudal obligations to his people (XXVIII/III): "Il fault que---je preigne la lance et la masse pour secourir et garantir mes pauvres subjectz. La raison le veult ainsi, car de leur labour je suis entretenu et de leur sueuer je suis nourry, moy, mes enfans et ma famille." Before the battle with Loup-Garou, Pantagruel calls on God's help and promises (Pant. XXIX/313): "par toutes contrées, tant de ce pays d'Utopie que de ailleurs, où je auray puissance et auctorité, je feray prescher ton saint Evangile purement---", but his grandfather recalls less epically how he dealt with the 'cafard' at Cinais (Garg. XLV/153): "depuis ce temps caphart quelconques n'est auzé entrer en mes terres, et m'esbahys si vostre roy les laisse prescher par

son royaume telz scandales." The factual picture before Rabelais is of the Chinonais, the theory applies to France, to Christendom, but is no more than theory. That being so, one should expect the archaism which is always typical of provincial or rural ways, and in this light the feudalism of the giants seems quite natural. Though aristocratic, their world is patriarchal rather than courtly. Placed above their subjects by birth, the giants confirm their superiority by merit. Their relations with their subjects are inspired by the friendly spirit of country life, not the refined formality of the court. Mutual obligations govern their existence in the normal way of feudalism.

At home all three giants are shown as simple and unaffected, in fact as country gentlemen, not great kings. Their rule is firm but tolerant. The affair of the fouaces is typical; Grandgousier's people are defended with all their king's might, but not until full restitution has been offered and refused. Prisoners are treated generously, but the 'war criminals' are awarded due punishment (in fact, corrective training). In battle the giants are 'preux', in Paris Gargantua and his son show themselves as 'doctes', everywhere they are devout. Courtliness is not much in evidence, though Pantagruel respects the conventions sufficiently to have serious qualms at leaving his lady in Paris without a farewell. Bons viveurs as they all are, the three giants are free from the vices of the flesh (at least after Gargantua's change of régime). They command respect in every way and show themselves

models of chivalrous virtues which are more human than gigantic.

There is no difficulty in matching their more sensational exploits with those of their legendary models, and this does not really tell us very much about Rabelais' humanism. A more useful comparison is between Rabelais' heroes in their human role and some of the historical figures of previous ages. The qualities which appealed to men in the Middle Ages varied according to individual taste and individual centuries, but as a generalisation 'the mediaeval man' is not so meaningless as most and can at least be effectively contrasted with what is generally understood by 'Renaissance man'. There are not a few portraits of single heroes in mediaeval literature; excluding straightforward hagiography, there is Jocelyn's Abbot Samson, Gerald of Wales by himself, the great warriors and princes like Gaston Phebus and Boucicault, but none is more specifically and exactly mediaeval than Joinville's St. Louis. In every material respect the comparison with the giants is admissible, and this single example may be more convincing than a multiplicity of others.

The famous picture of St. Louis dispensing justice beneath the oak at Vincennes (so famous that it finds a place even in the small Larousse's brief account) is exactly that of Gergantua or his father in their own direct, paternal rule. It is historically true that St. Louis strengthened the administrative organs of government and obviously could not, if he had wanted to, fail to delegate powers to others, but the feature on which Joinville insists and which

caught the mediaeval imagination is that of direct rule. With this goes direct responsibility, and if Rabelais concentrated on this in his portrait of kingship we must not assume that he ignored the need for administrative bodies under the king. In the administrative field, again, Joinville lays much stress on the concern of St. Louis for his subjects' welfare and his supervision of the royal officers. He seems indeed to have overstated the case with regard to Estienne Boileau in his attempt to demonstrate the king's enlightened government. In St. Louis' dealings with foreign powers, the very generous treaty with England, which aroused much chauvinist opposition in France, is given by Joinville as an example of the king's wisdom. These details may be fairly compared with the giants' treatment of their own conquered enemies (even if allusions to Charles V are also intended) and to the first chapter of the TL. The martial exploits of St. Louis during the Crusade are, as one might expect, entirely worthy of him, combining skill with valour, and are perhaps the least distinctive feature of the account. In this the giants, St. Louis and the epic heroes all inevitably have similar experiences to which they react in similar ways.

In the religious sphere the comparison is particularly interesting. Joinville wrote after the canonisation of St. Louis, and not unnaturally selected incidents to illustrate the nature of that sanctity. The king's interest in religion was fostered from childhood by his mother, he was probably a Tertiary of that same order to which Rabelais

would later belong, and the intensity of his religious life was unusual even for an age when attendance at religious services was a necessary and frequent part of every nobleman's routine. His religious life was regarded by his contemporaries as more ideal than normal, and it is therefore instructive to compare the revised system of education followed by Gargantua, in which devotional exercises play a part certainly more prominent than was usual in Rabelais' day. Granted that St. Louis follows the orthodox routine of Canonical Hours, Masses and so on, while Gargantua's prayers have an aggressively Evangelical stamp, they have in common that they practise an exceptional degree of piety, genuine and not mechanical, in the midst of all their manifold activities.

One particular incident affords a striking parallel between the heroes of Joinville and Rabelais. On the way from the Holy Land, the Crusaders' fleet ran upon rocks, from which they hardly hoped to be saved. Joinville describes <sup>a)</sup> how he found the king, deep in prayer before the reserved Sacrament, preparing for death. The king makes no attempt to direct operations, and indeed says that in such matters the experts are to be followed, but he shows no trace of the panic which mediaeval seafarers so often exhibited. Pantagruel is no sailor-king either, and admits after the storm that he thinks it folly to navigate unnecessarily, but like St. Louis he sets an example of piety at the approach of danger, he devoutly commends his soul to God and shows no trace of fear. Pantagruel, however, improves on St.

Louis' conduct and by his personal exertions saves the company from shipwreck. Joinville---himself no lover of the sea---is content to show his hero brave and devout in the face of danger, and it is significant that Rabelais insists equally on Pantagruel's piety and on his energetic actions.

St. Louis' moral attitude towards the Crusaders is another point which Joinville adduces as proof~~X~~ of the king's exceptional qualities. In an army of notorious immorality it was hard to impose any absolute moral standards, and yet we find St. Louis delivering summary judgement against those convicted of theft, fornication and other crimes. In the same way, the disreputable practises of Panurge and Frère Jan would probably bring a smile rather than censure from most 16C readers, but we find Rabelais gratuitously making Pantagruel reprove his companions for their excessive faults.

St. Louis' campaign against gambling and blasphemy is well known. Apart from Joinville's account, we see that Gringoire, a generation before Rabelais, devotes a whole episode to these details in his dramatic 'Vie S. Louis'.<sup>(2)</sup> Precisely the same repugnance is shown by Pantagruel to these activities. One of the incidents which Joinville repeats several times to illustrate the king's sanctity is that in which he refuses to countenance financial dishonesty even with the Saracens; the same scrupulous attitude to money is shown by Pantagruel in condemning Panurge's praise of debt.

The various foundations of St. Louis, the religious houses, the charitable institutions, most of



all the Sorbonne, at first sight contrast directly with Rabelais' known antipathy to the religious orders and to the Sorbonne, and yet in the 13C the Mendicants were the vanguard of a learning as solid and triumphantly new as any that came in the 16C. The infant Sorbonne was for St. Louis what Gargantua's printing-press was for him, the friars for him were 'les bons prescheurs evangeliques' through whom religion might be rejuvenated throughout his realm. The deformation of 13C institutions by succeeding centuries obscures the point that Joinville considered so important; that the king fostered with every means the cause of religion and godly learning, regarding the religious and intellectual progress of his subjects as his own responsibility. Admittedly, all enlightened monarchs in all ages have done the same, but the fundamental similarity between St. Louis and the giants remains closer than, for instance, that between François I and his saintly ancestor.

This comparison with St. Louis has been studied at some length because Joinville's biography is certainly the best example of the mediaeval ideal of a king, saint and warrior, seen from a historical, not a literary or imaginative point of view. Charlemagne, of course, enjoyed a similar reputation, indeed shows many points of similarity with St. Louis, and other mediaeval figures may embody the qualities extolled by Joinville, but none is so essentially a national figure as St. Louis, and therefore none is more suitable for testing the continuity of outlook which we are trying to prove in Rabelais.

It is not for a moment suggested that Rabelais modelled his heroes on Joinville, though he cannot have failed to know the salient features of the king's life as repeated in numerous chronicles; all that we have tried to show is that a man writing in the 13 and early 14C selected basically the same qualities to illustrate the exceptional character of his hero as Rabelais, composing a work of fiction more than two centuries later. Naturally many of the same qualities are admired in every age, but even a detailed comparison between St. Louis and Pantagruel (and to a lesser extent the other giants) shows a remarkable similarity, not easily paralleled elsewhere.

This point is emphasised by considering the brief reference to Langey in Rabelais' work. Here we have to deal with a historical figure, acknowledged by friend and foe alike to possess exceptional qualities. Rabelais' mention of the "chevalier preux et docte" and the "asme heroique", with the little we know of his relations with Langey, suggest that his respect and admiration were of the same kind as Sleidan's<sup>(3)</sup>, for whom Langey was above all criticism. There is no doubt that experiences with Langey in Piedmont are the direct inspiration for the opening chapter of the TL, and other episodes (the proposed mediation between the Andouilles and Quaresmeprenant, Papefigue and others) may also be distantly based on actual fact in which Langey was involved. The outstanding position of Langey in the long discussion on immortality is the surest guide to Rabelais' feelings on the subject, but despite all this one cannot put him in the same class as

Pantagruel, "l'idée et exemplaire de toute joyeuse perfection", even though no other character comes so near. The reason is immediately apparent; Langey is the type of perfect gentleman, noble warrior and astute diplomat, but he fails to reach the highest place for the very good reason that he was always subject to orders from above, however great his personal responsibility. From that fact it is only a step to see why Rabelais could not take his portrait of perfection from real life around him; he must have known as well as we do that in the matter of virtue Langey far outshone his king, and since Charles V, the only possible other candidate, was the great enemy, his choice had to range elsewhere. Only a king, with the mystical prestige inherent in that office, could serve as the ideal, but one need not hesitate to put Langey in the highest place his birth will allow. Tolerance and wisdom in government, courage and skill in warfare, patience and honesty in diplomacy, generosity and breadth of culture, and, not least, a moral rectitude which led him to ruin himself by paying for the import of corn into Piedmont in time of famine, and to intercede at some risk to himself in favour of the unfortunate Vaudois, such qualities are typical of the best men of the Renaissance, but more still of the chivalrous concepts of the Middle Ages. Guillaume du Bellay, more than his brother Jean, follows a traditional pattern honoured already for centuries.

There may be some legitimate hesitation as to Langey's exact place in this scheme of things, but

there need be none regarding the next group of characters. Kings come first, to be models for all their subjects, and a viceroy quite properly comes next, but after that there is no question of setting up models above other men. All the other characters in the work show man as he is, not as he ought to be. Some are too episodic to be of any great value to the present study. "Le bon roy saint Panigon" is mentioned, as it seems, quite gratuitously, since he does virtually nothing but offer hospitality, and unless contemporaries could have recognised more readily than we a definite allusion, there seems little point in selecting such a lay figure for particular praise. The Macrobe similarly is treated with respect by Pantagruel, apparently because of his venerable age and bearing, but also perhaps to lend force to the arguments put in his mouth by Plutarch. Trinquamelle has been plausibly identified with Tiraqueau, but, as far as the book goes, stands only for the good and conscientious judge. Gallet is another personage drawn, it seems, from life and typifies the faithful counsellor and ambassador of his king. If these rather shadowy characters have any significance, it is above all to remind us that in Rabelais' work there is a middle way between idealism and satire.

Three members of this group with a recognisable individuality of their own are Epistemon, Hippothadée and Rondibilis. These last two appear together on the same occasion and play comparable roles. One is "bon theologien", the other a good doctor, and but for Pantagruel's brief introductory remarks

about one being married and the other celibate, we know nothing more about them. Once more fiction has been linked with fact to identify the two, but this does not help very much. The point is that neither of the two is criticised, except by Panurge, and that they may therefore be taken to exemplify qualities which Rabelais did not wish to ridicule in his book (or in fact either, probably). The theologian is old and above the world, his text is Pauline, he lives his religion. His acquiescence in God's will and his recognition that men and women have responsibilities no less than rights are substantially the views of Pantagruel. The doctor seems to speak more clearly with the voice of Rabelais himself. His learning is Classical, his religion is health, and nothing but professional competence matters in assessing his advice. His commendation of the "preudes femmes" is one of the few non-medical sentences in his speeches, for the rest he shows a professional detachment towards human problems, until the moment when he pockets Panurge's fee. Scientific learning (that is, Classical erudition) seems to be the chief justification for the respect shown to Rondibilis.

Epistemon is the most complete of the three, and in many ways a rather puzzling character. When he makes his first appearance, at Pantagruel's meeting with Panurge, Epistemon is no more than one of a company whose Greek names explain their characters--- Eusthenes, Carpalim, Rhizotome---and at first he hardly distinguishes himself as a personality apart from the others, mere symbols. On appropriate occa-

~~Epistemon~~ Epistemon he lives up to his name 'knowing, skilful', and supplies erudite information, helps with the trap by which the enemy horsemen are destroyed, translates the Hebrew inscription on the ring sent to Pantagruel by the lady of Paris and so on. A passing remark during a discussion on the treatment to be accorded to the enemy's women shows him no more averse to carnal pleasures than the others, but the only incident in which he plays a major part is his miraculous healing after decapitation and his subsequent account of Hades. Even in this he is no more than the mouthpiece for Rabelais' own satire. Except for this last incident, it needs very careful reflection to produce any picture at all of Epistemon as portrayed in 'Pantagruel'.

With the TL and QL all this changes completely. With Frère Jan and Pantagruel himself, Epistemon is the only one of the original company to be asked for advice in Panurge's predicament. While the others fade away into utter insignificance, he takes shape as a real person increasingly interesting as the book progresses. His original role of the erudite scholar is maintained; his reappearance in the TL is with a quotation from the Bible, and his comment is seldom lacking in any learned discussion. To this he adds a notably critical attitude towards some of the episodes which the others accept more readily. He is much more openly incredulous (or intolerant) than Pantagruel; he doubts the wisdom of going to the Sibylle of Panzoult, despite Pantagruel's encouragement; chosen once more to accompany Panurge, this time with Frère Jan, to Raminagrobis, he rid-

icules Panurge's panic and denies that the old poet meant any discourtesy to the Friars, more to humour Panurge than anything else he suggests the visit to Her Trippa, but only after scornfully rejecting Panurge's own proposal to visit the "Isles Ogygies" (TL.XXIV/437): "c'est abus trop evident et fable trop fabuleux." Asked for his personal advice, Epsitemon mentions Platonic theories, but admits that he does not recommend Panurge to follow them as he does not understand them himself and "ily a de l'abus beaucoup." He is equally sceptical about oracles, and rather unexpectedly amid a wealth of Classical references speaks of "celluy roy servateur" at whose coming all oracles fell silent. This positive statement of his Christianity comes as quite a contrast to his other remarks, which one could call almost rationalist in spirit and definitely Classical. He gives little more hint of his religious views until the QL, when after the storm he reminds Panurge of the Pauline exhortation to cooperate with God. He too, alone of the company, finds the rhapsodies of Homenaz on the Decretals so intolerable that he has to go out for relief, which suggests a more complex psychology than at appears at first. His conduct during the actual storm is also apparently contradictory; he initiates the very academic discussion on wills at the height of the danger, but when the worst is over he is seen to have a hand badly cut because he had grasped a cable too vigorously. Pedantic as he often is, he is a man of action when necessary. Though far less open minded than Pantagruel, he does not extend

his critical attitude to the truths of Christianity.

The later development of his character gives every sign of being connected in some way with an actual model, just as Pantagruel's own qualities more than once recall Langey, and additional significance is given to Epistemon's character by some apparently gratuitous personal details. Already in the TL he declares himself the personal friend of Bridoye, in whose son, a student at Toulouse, he takes a special interest. It is he who goes to fetch Bridoye and discovers his misfortune, and after Pantagruel's intervention it is he who makes the longest comment. He defends Bridoye for his moral rectitude and criticises the legal system. It is Epistemon again who claims to have been at the comedy in which Rabelais himself acted at Montpellier. In the QL he describes his (and obviously Rabelais') visit to Italy some 20 years before, with the incident of Frere Lardon from Amiens. Later he recalls a specific incident at Saintes with Briand Vallée, du Douhet, a friend of Rabelais who died in 1544. Most interesting is the choice of Epistemon to describe the last moments of Langey, at which we know Rabelais to have been present. None of the others is so closely identified with events in which Rabelais himself took part, and if present evidence can prove nothing, there are some grounds for considering whether in fact Epistemon may be taken to represent the author. In this connexion, it may be significant that the incidents in which he plays a part, except for Langey's death, belong to the period when Rabelais was in Languedoc, already in the distant past at the time



of composition. Certainly the mixture of erudition and action, Classical and Christian, with its strongly critical vein, is in line with all we know of Rabelais character. Nothing in Epistemon is very obviously censured, though his erudition seems at times to be overstressed, and it is hard to decide how far Rabelais approves of his character, the more so if one considers the possibility of a self-portrait. One thing seems certain: Epistemon is no abstraction, like the giants, nor primarily representative of a class of men, like Hippothadée or Rondibilis, but a real person. He belongs more essentially to the first generation of the Renaissance than any of the others so far discussed, and any attempt to explain him in terms of traditional inspiration can only be misdirected.

With the group we have called 'sympathique', the weaknesses and the virtues are more evenly balanced, indeed the weaknesses are often the cause of our sympathy for a particular character. The bluff feudal lord Basché is very likable, but the disapproval of his rough justice expressed by both Pantagruel and Epistemon is important. Basché is generous and friendly to his dependents, loyal to his king and on good terms with his chaplain, but jealous of his noble rights and implacable towards the perversion of law practised by the prior and his like. In the particular instance described by Panurge, our sympathies are on Basché's side, but his primitive ideas of how to administer justice do not in themselves command much support. (4)

Raminagrobis is in some ways similar. Previous

remarks suggest that his past may have been slightly disreputable, but his edifying death is the impression that remains with us. The scarcely veiled attacks on the Mendicants (pace Epistemon) takes much of its force from the contrast between their material preoccupations and the old poet's spiritual fervour.

Erucoye, Epistemon's old friend, is a little pathetic in his dotage, but his good qualities as stated by Pantagruel and Epistemon certainly outweigh his curious judicial procedure.

In these three cases of minor figures, redeeming features are emphasised so that the general faults of the characters are forgotten. It is no more than a coincidence that all the three are men of an older generation, and that their virtues like their faults are traditional and familiar, but it serves to emphasise that part of Rabelais' inspiration which had its roots in the past.

In Frère Jan this tendency can be seen most clearly. His vices are the traditional monastic ones--- ignorance, lechery, gluttony---but his chief virtue is that which his companions declare distinguishes him from his religious brethren, he is active and energetic. Indeed, in the later books this is the only ~~salvage~~ <sup>salvage</sup> side to his character to receive any notice. His conviviality, his lack of prejudice ("il n'est point bigot"), his nonchalant observance of religious ~~of religious~~ duties, which are all the subjects of praise in 'Gargantua', compare very unfavourably with the sober habits of his new master in the later books. More than once he is reproved for his faults, and if he continues to hold our

sympathy it is because he errs through no malice, but through very human weaknesses, and above all because his courage and resource never fail him.

If he has any true religious feeling it is hard to see any trace of it in Rabelais' portrait (except perhaps for his early reference to the iniquity of those who betrayed Our Lord). His language is as free and easy as that of many mediaeval ecclesiastics, and if the subjects of his blasphemy and irreverence are more often than not inessentials of the faith, every indication is that religion is for him an atavistic paganism overlaid with the completely formal and non-sacred "matière de breviaire".

Pantagruel is patient with him as a companion who can be relied on for help and good fellowship at all times, but for his short comings in themselves no excuse is offered. As an antithesis of a monk, Frère Jan is no longer effective when he begins to incur criticism; if he is more likable than his brethren, with their alleged hypocrisy, their killjoy attitude, their social uselessness, it cannot fairly be claimed that he is in any sense better than they. As we have seen, deceit, including hypocrisy, is for Rabelais chief of all the deadly sins, and on that score alone Frère Jan, honest in every respect, escapes the worst condemnation, but he no longer occupies the favoured place with Pantagruel which seemed to be his with Gargantua. Frère Jan seems to come as near the margin of what can be tolerated as any of Rabelais' characters, and as an example of human weakness he is finally saved only by his positive virtues, energy and honesty, both essential to Rabelais' notion of a worthy character.

After Pantagruel himself, no character receives such detailed attention as Panurge, who more than once steps into first place, and yet the mass of information about him does not permit of a finally satisfactory estimate of this complex being. The development of his character from the almost heroic role in 'Pantagruel' to his melodramatic discomfiture at the end of the QL has been noted by most critics, and the reasons, literary and psychological, put forward to explain it are on the whole convincing. The obvious pleasure of the author in recounting the shameful exploits of Panurge in the first book is more than compensated by the many rebukes levelled at his head in the TL and QL. In fact the complete immunity from reprisal which Panurge's cynical independence ensures at first is at once removed from him early in the TL when he gets the flea in his ear. Thereafter he is himself open to all the misfortunes of his erstwhile victims, with the added penalty of an uneasy conscience and anticipation of punishment well deserved. Like Frère Jan, Panurge is prone to all fleshly vices, unlike the monk he cannot be excused on grounds of ignorance, he is so full of wiles and malice. If he has the slightest feeling for others he shows no sign of it in the book; he is neither honest nor courageous; he is lazy and superstitious; where Frère Jan's gospel in time of danger is expressed in action, Panurge seeks refuge in meaningless acts of external piety, which he promptly repudiates when the danger is over.

All this is familiar to every reader of Rabelais,

but from it must be drawn the conclusions which will decide the final attitude to Rabelais' humanism. No one can hesitate to accept the giants as ideals, representing virtues which Rabelais regarded as sovereign, and the other characters, with their respective qualities, seem to belong to a reasonably normal outlook on life based on observation. With the character of Panurge there can be so many alternatives; to some extent he is a foil for Pantagruel's virtues, for instance in the opening chapters of the TL, but the progressively retiring role of Pantagruel makes the need for such a foil less imperative; to some extent he is a rascal whose very shamelessness is endearing, and whose exploits are in a long popular tradition, but this is clearly only a part of the truth. The projected voyage to the Oracle would have given many writers the chance of converting Panurge from his evil ways at last, but nothing could be further from Rabelais' mind than such a moral intention. Panurge is too bad to stand for the average sinner, yet not bad enough to be dismissed as a thoroughgoing villain incapable of redemption. He is in fact redeemed by Pantagruel's continued toleration of him, though one cannot say how effectively, as the story stops too soon. His exaggerated orthodoxy serves a certain satirical purpose, but his worthlessness is the measure of how deceptive such satire can be.

Panurge is simply not typical of any one class, he is neither Iago nor Eulenspiegel, neither finally humiliated nor triumphant. There is in his character much of Villon, of Patelin, of Thersites too, and

he is certainly not on the side of progress, but it would be idle to deny a certain actuality in his personality which owes no more to the Middle Ages than to any other period. The crux of the problem is the absence of a final verdict on Panurge, indeed a hint of hesitation on Rabelais' part to deliver such a judgement. At one time or another nearly all the other characters pass a moral judgement on Panurge, who remains impenitent. Perhaps the most satisfactory conclusion at which one can arrive is that in a work of infinite shades and variations, Panurge offers a fairly constant standard of immorality against which the others can be compared, and which none the less remains too undistinguished to merit the name or opprobrium of evil.

The peculiarly enigmatic character of Panurge seems even more so when compared with the other characters who are cast in the rôle of butts for Rabelais' wit. The parade of folly is perennial; as is fitting, false learning and empty pedantry are well represented by Jenotus, Tubal, the Limousin, Her Trippa, Trouillogan; Thaumaste is a genuine and sincere scholar, but his credulity qualifies him for admission to these ranks. Homenaz is too genial in his pomposity, except for his brief outburst against rebels and heretics, to be called evil rather than foolish. Picrochole is the victim alike of his humours and his vanity, flattered by his advisers. None of these, not even Picrochole, is coldly malicious like Panurge, and yet it is undeniable that they occupy a position much less favourable than

his. Rabelais seems to prefer a knave to a fool, at least in literature, or to be more precise, he finds that folly is more monotonous than knavery and soon tires of its individual representation. In his choice of victims Rabelais is naturally not without polemical intentions, so that the Sorbonne and Ultramontanes inevitably bulk large in the catalogue, but the caricatures are again perennial---for every age, the previous generation has its quota of snuffling pedants. From the moral point of view it should perhaps be added that all these kinds of folly are, theoretically, amenable to education and are far from presenting a gloomy picture of the human race.

The absence of thoroughly evil characters has already been mentioned, and links up with what has just been said. It is true that there are in literature, as in life, few unmitigated villains, but in Rabelais there are virtually none. The tyrants of old, Nero and Herod, the reactionary tyrants of his own day, the Sorbonne and the Inquisition, are only mentioned, none appears in person---until the CL. That is not to say that Rabelais was unwilling to admit the presence of evil, not restrained by his theme from introducing it had he wished, for it would have given Pantagruel the opportunity of a good and heroic triumph. There seems no immediately obvious explanation of this particular fact, though literary rather than psychological motives are probably behind it, but it has the effect of making Panurge the most sinful character in the book. This, in its turn, seems to support the common

view that Rabelais' book breathes a genial optimism, very different from the supposed obsession of the Middle Ages (not to mention Luther) with the sinfulness of man, but this is an illusion. Because evil is thrust into the background it is not forgotten, nor is Panurge a pretty picture of the humanist's man that some would have us see in Rabelais. The backcloth is moreover well filled with evil designs; the prohibitions on the gates of Thélème, most of the Prologues, Gargantua's speech on clandestine marriages are a few examples of this. Besides the great number of fools whose misdeeds can eventually be corrected by good learning, there is in Rabelais a hard core of evil, against which no remedy save that of brute force is proposed. His book has after all no explicitly moral purpose, though it is full of moral implications.

Nothing has been said here of the various allegorical figures, Quaresmeprenant, Gaster and the rest, who play so large a part in the QL. They belong rather to the field of theoretical ethics than to its practical illustration, and they represent individuals no more than the old virtues and vices of the morality plays. Nor has any attempt been made to examine an exhaustively list of the many characters who make a brief, though sometimes significant, appearance. The score or so mentioned above are typical of the broader picture. Striking is the predominantly Christian (in a formal sense) complexion of the scene; some are shown as specifically Evangelical, some as specifically Scholastic, but nearly all form part of a contemporary religious background. With



hardly any exception the characters who are favourably mentioned give verbal evidence of piety (the most notable exception is Rondibilis) and the others mostly belong to a society of which the form, if not the spirit, is conventionally Christian. Not a few of the characters are deliberately archaic, whereas very few stand for anything which in the 16C could reasonably be called modern. Neither in the extent of their wisdom or their folly, their virtues or their vices, do the characters as a body stand out from the tradition of previous centuries. The giants stand out in every sense above the others, but as exceptional men they seem to follow the example of St. Louis rather than of Plutarch's heroes.

The general view of man is certainly not one of despair, but no more is it the unbounded optimism of the chapters on Thelème and Pantagruelion. The limitations of humanity are constantly stressed as a fact, and sometimes as a reproach, and it cannot be said that the example of Pantagruel comes any nearer the attainment of ordinary man as the book progresses. By the side of the more ambitious humanist manifestoes to be found in several parts of the work, one must set these facts as being equally relevant to the impression acquired by a 16C reader, and perhaps to the personal belief of Rabelais as well. Man remains a creature full of imperfections, subject to the will of God and helpless without divine grace, with potentialities for good and evil alike. He can improve himself through education, and in this the wisdom of his pagan ancestors is to be respected, though not to the exclusion of his Christian heritage, which must always take first place.

## CHAPTER FOURTEEN

## LE CINQUIEME LIVRE

It is no part of the present work to try once more to assess the precise degree of authenticity of the last and posthumous book of Rabelais' roman. (") However, there are few critics who deny that whole chapters are in large measure consistent in style and content with the preceding books, and it seems only logical to round off this enquiry by applying just the same principles to the CL as to the others. It is not practical to examine each chapter or episode separately, and to analyse the texts quoted according to their distribution in the book could only be misleading in the present state of our knowledge. In fact nearly all the main headings already discussed are applicable to this book, and only those chapters which are known to be close borrowings (e.g. from 'le Songe de Poliphile') prove quite barren. Of course, the mere fact that the intellectual background of the CL can or cannot be compared with that of the other four proves nothing final about its authenticity; if anyone but Rabelais had written the book, it goes without saying that his background must have been very similar for the question of authenticity to be raised at all, and from that point of view no new results can be expected from such a method as this. It is regrettable, but at present inevitable, that no confirmation of earlier theories can legitimately be sought from this book; its opinions can only be stated to echo certain ideas, or, if such is the case, to conflict with them.

In none of the books are there so few serious references to God as in this. The only titles used at all are "Père paterne", "seigneur" and "souverain", each once. As against this, the definition given in the TL is repeated here in a serious context; Bacuc takes leave of the pilgrims with these words (XLVII/910): "Allez, amys, en protection de ceste sphære intellectuelle, de laquelle en tous lieux est le centre et n'a en aucun circonference, que nous appellons Dieu." The only other references to God's nature ~~are~~<sup>is</sup> in an earlier remark of Bacuc (XLII/901): "ne dictes que à Dieu rien soit impossible--- Onques (respondis-je) ne fust dict de nous; nous mentenons qu'il est tout puissant." It must be said that except for the chapters of the Isle Sonnante the CL is notably pagan and mythological in its atmosphere, partly at least owing to the very undigested state of its borrowings from Classical or pseudo-Classical sources, and this accounts for the paucity of references to God.

Much the same can be said of the spirit world, which is well enough represented by lists of pagan demi-gods, satyrs and so on, but all quite indiscriminately included without comment or explanation. Two of the former diabolical themes recur, however, in the early chapters; the Order of S. Michel is described as wearing as badge "Le trophée d'un calumnieur" (V/783), actually the defeat of the Devil by the Archangel, and there is the familiar disapproval of gambling (X/796): "par le monde peu de joueurs sont qui ne soient invocateurs des diables (sc. les 20 diables de hasart tant recoutéz en

noz pays)". None of the other mentions is at all interesting, and the crowded world of daemons, heroes, angels and the like is comparatively depopulated in the last book.

Psychology is no more prominent than diabolology, but one or two texts are worth noting. Despite Rabelais' very extensive borrowing from Plutarch, the doctrine of metempsychosis is almost ignored except in the CL. Panurge alludes to it as held (XIII/804) by "Pithagoras, premier amateur de sapience", and says to the Chats Fourrés: "Si vous estiez hommes--- après vostre mort, selon son opinion, vos asmes entre- roient en corps de cossons---." By a procedure very familiar in the first four books, this doctrine is mentioned again in the following chapter by Frère Jan (XIV/805): "Les asmes d'iceulx, selon l'opinion de Grippeminault, après leur mort sont entréz es sangliers, cerfz---et autres telz animaux." This tells us nothing concerning Rabelais' opinion on metempsychosis, though there is not the slightest reason for supposing that he took it seriously, but it is interesting to note that what was a major omission in the other books is supplied in this. Another remark towards the end of the book recalls some of the discussions of the TL; the guiding lantern explains why the priest of Jupiter would not have passed beneath the arch of vines (XXXIV/878):

"Car y passant, auroit le vin (ce sont les raisins) au-dessus de la teste et sembleroit estre comme mestressé et dominé ~~par~~ du vin, pour signifier que les pontifes et tous personnaiges qui s'aou- nent et deoient en contemplation des choses divines doibvent en tranquillité leurs espritz maintenir, hors toute perturbation de sens, laque- elle plus est manifestée en yvroignerye qu'en autre passion."

Medical knowledge is not forgotten in this any more than in the other books. The chapters on the Quinte contain a discussion of some of the cures effected by the Dame's officers (XXI) and a discussion on the origin of Lent awells on physiological details (XXIX/857): "(Caresme) la saison quant la chaleur naturelle sort au centre du corps auquel s'estoit contenue durant les fredures et l'yver---." A parenthesis in a sentence by Bacbuc, concerning the fountain of the temple, again recalls a characteristic procedure (XLII/899): "Par la seule figure lymaciale que voyés bipartiente, ensemble une quintuple infoliation mobile à chacune rencontre interieure (telle qu'est en la vène cave en lieu qu'elle entre le dextre ventriculle au cueur) est ceste sacrée fontaine escoulée."

If, as has been said, the Dame de la Quinte is the only female character to play any important or creditable role in the five books, she can hardly at that be counted as a woman. In fact, there is little about women in the CL, apart from the usual disobliging references to nuns and other scabrous stories. The association of the moon with women has already been remarked, and Frère Jan reminds us of it (XXXIV/879):

"en la Revelation feut, comme chose admirable, veue une femme ayant la lune sous les pieds; c'estoit, comme m'a exposé Bogot, pour signifier qu'elle n'estoit de la race et nature des autres, qui toutes ont au rebours la lune en teste et par consequent le serveau toujours lunaticq." In its misogyny the last book follows its predecessors.

The references to the animal and vegetable kingdoms show a greater interest in those subjects than

the others so far mentioned. They were more widely known than more abstract ones, it is true, but there are certain indications from the way the theme is handled which cannot fail to recall the earlier books. The very definition of animals found in the PL is repeated (XXVI/844): "Les chemins y sont animeulx (sc. Isle des Oues) sy vray est la sentence d'Aristoteles, disant l'argument invincible d'un animant estre s'il se meut de soy-mesmes---." The anecdote of "le baudet et le roussin" is in the same popular tradition as the earlier fabliau "le renard et le lion", and it is interesting to see the ass of Philémon reappearing (VII) after his first entry in the QL (XVII). Old friends, too, are the two physetères who provide a brief but dramatic diversion (XVIII/821), curiously enough in the same paragraph which brings in again the Andouilles, on whose island the first physetère was dismembered.

Equally reminiscent is the use of an animal--or rather insect--simile in the first two chapters. Pantagruel ~~recalls~~<sup>compares</sup> the incessant bellringing of the Isle Sonnante to a method of recalling bees (I/773): "Je doute que la quelque compaignie d'abeilles ayt commencé prendre vol en l'air, pour lesquelles revocquer ce voisinage fait ce tremblement de poilles, chaderons---." In the next chapter, ~~ditus~~<sup>ditus compares</sup> the mendicants to the drones (II/777): "Tout ainsy toutesfois qu'entre les abeilles hantent les frelons, qui rien ne font fors tout manger et tout gaster, ainsi---estoit adolé grand nombre de Cagotz---." The old poet Raminagrobis, and Erasmus before him, had also drawn on the insect world to describe the

Friars, Again in the following chapter, *ditus* comes back to the bees (III/778): "des Clergaulx naissent les Prestregaulxet Monogaulx sans compagnie charnelle, comme se fait entre les abeilles." This train of thought is very typical of the earlier books, where one mention almost invariably begets another. It may be quite unconnected with these three texts, but it is interesting to find bees appearing once again (from the 'Georgics', like the first reference) in the Oracle itself (XLV/903): "de la sacrée Bouteille yssoit ung bruit tel que font les abeilles naissantes de la chair d'un jeune thoreau occis et accoustre selon l'art et invention d'Aristeus."

The bird motif of the Isle Somante gives in itself ample opportunity for references to "atural History, genuine or fantastic, and another whole chapter (XXX) on the Pays de Satin is entirely devoted to this theme. The treatment in this chapter is very much the same as the *Medamothi* and *Gaster* episodes in the *QL*, with the same personal reminiscences (of Lyon and Ligugé), the same unicorn and chamelon, as well as other improbable creatures from Pliny and elsewhere.

Plants are not neglected in this last book, and the indifferent chapter on the Isle des Ferrements (borrowed from the equally indifferent 'Navigations de Panurge') is embellished with a quotation from Theophrastus, comparing trees to men (IX/794): "elles ont la teste, c'est le tronc, en bas---", followed by a typical list "leurs racines, caudices, gommes, nodulles." The institution of Lent gives Epistemon a chance to air his botanical and medical knowledge

(XXIX/857): "viandes plus exitantes la personne à lubricité---; febves, poix, phazeoulx, chiches, oignons, noix, huictres, harens, salleures, garons, sallades, toutes composees d'herbes veneriques, comme eruse, nascitord, targon, cresson, berle, responce, pavot cornu, hobellon, figues, riz, raisins."

This list of Natural History references is not exhaustive, but has been selected to show that the same interest in the subject is reproduced in the CL and that the knowledge is used in much the same way as in other books. It is therefore not surprising that the theme of Nature herself should also recall, sometimes textually, the earlier books. The functions and limitations of Nature are well expressed in two phrases already quoted: Euitus, speaking of the families too numerous to survive without sending some members into religion, says (IV/780): "qui à tous part feroit de l'heritage comme raison le veult, nature l'ordonne, et Dieu le commande, la maison seroit dissipée", and the other (IX/795): "Vray est comme en toutes choses (Dieu excepté) advient quelquefois erreur. Nature mesmes n'en est pas exempte, quand elle produict choses monstrueuses et animaux difformes." That sentiment had already been applied by Rondibilis to explain the otherwise incomprehensible creation of woman, and the other text strongly recalls the antitheses in Gargantua's speech between Nature and reason, as affecting Canon law on marriage. An additional aspect comes out in the episode of the Quinte, when Dame Entelechie speaks of (XXIII/834): "Nature, ma royne". Entelechy is, in fact, a law of Nature, supreme as a law, but



still subject to the legislator, Nature herself.

Other standard ideas about Nature come out in in this book; her infinite variety (II/776) "par l'ordre de nature (comme toutes choses varient)"; her liking for certain numbers, already referred to in connexion with Pantagruelion (XLII/898) "forme heptagone (c'est nombre fort aymé de Nature)"; the mysterious law of magnetism (cf. Gaster episode) (XXXVII/855) "Par donc la rapacité et violence de l'aymant les lames d'acier, par occulte et admirable institution de nature, pastissoient cestuy mouvement."

In the fabliau of the ass and horse there is a subtle distinction between the respective acts of God and Nature; the horse says to the ass (VII/788): "Dieu t'a créé pour le service des humains---nous autres, que Nature a produictz pour la guerre---", while the ass says to himself a little later: "Nature ne m'a produict que pour l'ayde des pauvres gens." The choice of the words "créé" and "produict" is hardly accidental, and though Nature is elsewhere spoken of as creating, properly speaking that is the function of God alone. This same fabliau is an excellent example of Nature laying down a creature's proper station, to leave which is 'unnatural'. One omission from this picture of Nature is the great emphasis laid on her fertility in the other books, as on procreation in general, though Panurge and Frère Jan are always there to make sure that the subject of sex shall not be forgotten.

In the field of physics and cosmology there is not a great deal. The last chapter of the book contains a scientific explanation by Baçbuc of the

working of the elements(XLVII/912):

"Par la rarefaction de nostre eau dedans enclose, intervenant la chaleur des corps superieurs et ferveur de la mer sallée, ainsi qu'est la naturelle transmutation des elemens, vous sera air ceuans tres salubre engendré, lequel de vent clair, serain, delicieulx vous servira; car vent n'est que air flottant et undoyant."

These ideas are familiar enough from the earlier books and express scientific commonplaces of the day. The definition of wind has already been noted.

By a suggestive coincidence, of a kind very common in Rabelais, the reference to the important law of generation and corruption in this book seems to be an echo of the same passage in St. Paul which suggested the reference to the same law in the Pape figure episode. In the CL, Frère Jan says of the Chats Fourres(XIV/805): "Ilz doncques de corruptions vivent, en generations perissent", in which Boulenger for one sees a reference to I. Cor. XV. 42: "So also is the resurrection of the dead. It is sown in corruption; it is raised in incorruption"; while in the QL the peasant says(XLVI/685): "Le grain que voyez en terre est mort et corrompu, la corruption de icelluy a esté generation de l'autre," which is similar to verse 36 of the same chapter: "Thou fool, that which thou sowest is not quickened except it die."

For the rest, none of the scientific allusions in the book is particularly interesting. Three astronomical references are worth mentioning; first Plato's famous music of the spheres(XVIII/821): "harmonie peu moinaire que celle des astres rotans, laquelle dist Platon avoir par quelques nuictz ouye en dormant,"

an erroneous attribution found also in the TL; then the movement of the planets is described, similar to the roads of the Isle des Odes (XVI/846): "errans à la semblance des planettes, autres chemins passans, chemins croisans, chemins traversans"; last, in the same chapter, a surely unconscious allusion to the recently developed system of Copernicus: "Pantagruel nous dist que, selon son jugement, Philo, Aristacus et Seleucus avoient en icelle isle autrefois philosophe et prins opinion d'affirmer la terre veritablement autour des polles se mouvoir, non le ciel, encores qu'il nous semble le contraire estre verité." It is instructive to see the reaction of the author (one would like to be able to say Rabelais) to what was to be the new theory, which he may have known to be current, and which he rejects as a hallucination like the moving roads. Equally instructive is the cautious, even sceptical attitude to the modern geographers classed with Herodotus and Hayton the Armenian (XXXI/866): "et tout pour Ouy-Dire." If Rabelais is the true author of this part of the CL, the more extravagant claims for his progressive outlook in science need to be revised.

The religious questions brought up in this book are not so easy to decide as in the others. The circumstances of publication, so long after Rabelais' death and unmistakably intended as Protestant propaganda, make the more extreme views suspect to some degree, but the existing evidence makes it illegitimate, indeed impossible, to point to ad hoc insertions by whoever gave the book to be published. The most immediately striking change from the

other books is the violent, bitter and detailed satire on the religious orders in the Isle Sonnante. The comparatively good-humoured irony of Papimanie is far from the vehement tone of these chapters, where monastic and ecclesiastical institutions are sometimes savagely attacked. It is true that none of the arguments is new---idleness, lechery, cupidity ---and that a specially virulent attack is directed against the mendicants, always the favourite target, but the distinctive feature of the whole episode is its bitterness and almost logical detail. The very acid comment by Editus, on the mothers of the land of Tropiciteulx, if really by Rabelais, suggests very strongly a personal rancour (IV/780): "Je m'esbahis comment les mères de par là les portent neuf mois dans leurs flancs, veu qu'en leur maison elles ne les peuvent pastir neuf ans, non pas sept le plus souvent." So much of Rabelais' psychology would be explained if we knew that those words applied to him.

Even a subtle casuist could find no loophole of escape for the religious orders in these chapters, as there certainly is in the other books, and as they stand they represent an indictment of the religious life in all its phases. The unedifying episode of the Frères Fredons is infinitely less damaging, because openly farcical and restricted in scope. A remark of Frère Jan, though not inconsistent with his character in the other books, reinforces the impression that the priesthood as such is under fire (XV/807): "Doncques vous m'avez <sup>compagnon</sup> pris pour en cestuy voyage messe chanter et confesser?"

Probably no more than facetious, an odd remark at the end of a particularly pointless passage of the *Isle des Ferrements* adds to the generally negative impression of the book (IX/795): "C'est belle chose croire en Dieu."

Despite the effect of these negative passages, there are one or two positive ones which sound the same note as that of the earlier books. The *Apedeftes* episode begins with a familiar phrase (XVI/812): "Après que le bon Pantagruel eut fait les prières et remercié le Seigneur de l'avoir sauvé de si grand danger---." A curious sentence, found only in the MS, again sounds a positive note. At the end of the *Isle des Odes* (XXVI/847): "nous fut dict que Panigon sus ses derniers jours s'estoit en ung hermitaige d'icelle isle retiré et vivoit en grand sainteté et vraye foy catholique, sans concupiscence, sans affection, sans vice, en innocence, son prochain ayant comme soy-mesmes et Dieu sur toutes choses; paratant faisoit-il plusieurs beaulx miracles." Some historical allusion is surely intended, but on the face of it the sentence seems a perfectly serious statement of religious principles, and in any event must have seemed that to many 16C readers. Most positive of all, and contrasting strongly with the opening chapters, are the last, especially when Bacbuc speaks. Of institutional religion there is no hint, but from the solemn recommendation of the company to "ceste sphere intellectuelle", and from the statement that for true knowledge the two indispensable factors are "guyde de Dieu et compaygnie de homme" a very real religious belief seems to

emerge, markedly similar to that of the earlier books.

This very mixed and inconclusive collection of texts is not exactly <sup>self-</sup>contradictory, but one has the impression of incoherence which composition over a long period would explain. It seems almost incredible that all, or even the greater part, of the book could have been composed at the same time by the same person, whether Rabelais or another. An additional factor which makes the religious content hard to assess is the very subordinate role played by Pantagruel, on whom we come to rely more and more in the other books as Rabelais' authentic mouthpiece.

The questions of grace, free will and so on which had naturally followed on the other religious themes of the early books are conspicuously absent. A few astrological references are to be found (III/778): "telle estoit l'institution première et fatale destinée des astres," (IV/782): "par vertus de certaines constellations celestes," (XI/799): "par conjunction des planettes malefiques," and these are as ironic as those which occur so frequently in the other books. There is, however, no definite line in this book, and it is pointless to speculate why.

Allusions to formal philosophical terms, especially those of the Schools, are reasonably numerous, but follow no clear pattern. Leaving aside the chapters on the Quinte, naturally full of philosophical terms, there is still quite a varied selection in the book. The papal succession is described in Scholastic terms (III/778): "Il y a en ceste espèce unite

individuelle avecques perpetuité de succession, ne plus ne moins qu'un Phoenix d'Arabie." Though the question of succession did not arise, the argels of ~~fact~~ ism provided another well known example of a species formed by a single individual. One of the very few instances in the CL of a procedure common to the others is the description of the Isle de Cassade as (X/795): "vraye idée de Fontainebleau". Another rare example of a traditional pleasantry is Frère Jan's pun (XV/808): "mais parlons un peu par escot, docteur subtil." Other mediaeval figures are mentioned in various contexts, but none of the references is significant. Though Cornelius Agrippa reappears in this book as Hans Cotiral, the only reference to the occult which does not seem premeditated is Frère Jan's remark, when Faurge observes that the Frères Frecons forbear to process back into church by the door they had left (XXVII/850): "Ceste finesse est extraicte d'occulte philosophie---." As for the Quinte episode, the intrusion of Hebrew accompanies the familiar lists (XX/827): "categories, abstractions, secondes intentions---entités, metempsychoses, transcendants prolepsies." "rather more meaningful is a reference to logic (XXII/833): "Plus nous fut dict que chose esloignée ne leur sembloit estre deux contradictoires vrayes en forme, en mode, en figure et en tems, chose pour laquelle les sophistes de Paris plustoust se feroient desbaptiser que la confesser."

As for the nature of true knowledge and the means of attaining it, the whole final episode of the Oracle is concerned with these problems. The

interpretation of the allegory is not strictly relevant to the present purpose, but it seems to reject any form of dogmatic philosophy in favour of a subjective approach. How near it comes to scepticism is a difficult question. More helpful than the Oracle itself are Bacbuc's closing words, which must represent the mature philosophy of their author, and are not inconsistent with what we know of Rabelais' own thought. After his reference to "guyde de Dieu et compaignie de homme", Bacbuc gives some examples of the latter and concludes (XLVII/911): "Infaliblement aussi trouveront (sc. philosophes) tout le savoir et d'eulx et de leurs predecesseurs à peine estre la minime partie de ce qui est, et ne le sçavent." This sounds more like a personally acquired outlook than the influence of any particular school of thought.

The few observations on morals reproduce most of the essential ideas of the other books. Stoic maxims reappear (XVIII/819): "La sentence du philosophe (sc. Epictete) qui commandoit soubstenir et abstenir, c'est à dire temporiser", (XXVII/850): "la sentence de Ciceron et des Academiques, lesquels veulent Vertus preceder, Fortune suyvre", and the words of Bacbuc, which recall the sentiments expressed in Pantagruel's letter from Medamothi (XLVII/909): "nous établissons le bien souverain non en prendre et recevoir, mais en eslargir et donner." More particular examples occur mostly in the Isle Sonnante chapters. When Panurge exhibits his usual cowardice at the Chats Fourrés, Frère Jan taunts him (XV/808): "bon cœur et franc, accompagné de



mains paralytiques," (MS reading) which is just the complaint of Pantagruel and Epistemon after the storm in the CL ("nous faut evertuer").

The list of evil-doers has not changed either, and is substantially that of the gates of Theleme and of Papefigue (XI/799): "l'imposture des caphars, heretiques, faulx prophètes, la malignité des usuriers, faulx monnoyeurs, rogneurs de testons, l'ignorance et imprudence des medecins, chirurgiens, apothicaires, la perversité des femmes adulteres, venefiques, infanticides---," and immediately before these often quoted malefactors are two other classes whose misdeeds are attacked no less often: "les abus de la cour rommaine, les tyrannies des roys et princes terriens." This catalogue is a negative one, since it is recited by the doorkeeper at the guichet, for whom the evils of the world are not attributable to these causes but to the unspeakable iniquity of the Chats Fourrés, the lawyers who are unfailingly attacked in all the books. There is no reference of any importance to politics in the CL, except the fact already mentioned that Pantagruel avoids conflict with the Chats Fourrés by staying in his ship, as he did in the Chiquanous episode.

This brief summary of the CL gives some idea of its range of subjects and treatment. There is much less metaphysical thought than in the other books, but most of the ideas scattered through the book recall the more fully developed notions of the earlier ones. There are apparent discrepancies in composition, especially between the Isle Sonnante chapters and the final episode of the Oracle, and if

there were more relevant texts, one would expect them to reveal more, not less, inconsistency. For all that the intellectual background of the book as revealed by its references as well as its ideas is largely that of Rabelais as we see it in the first four books. Only by the most painstaking examination of all evidence, stylistic, linguistic and philosophical, can any serious appreciation of the CL emerge from the welter of conflicting theories. The evidence is too scanty to prove anything, but it is at least consistent with the theory of Rabelais' partial authorship.

## CHAPTER FIFTEEN

A. AUTHORITIES--CLASSICAL

Whatever may be the final assessment between Scholasticism and Humanism respectively as influences in Rabelais' work and thought, it is hardly open to doubt that Rabelais himself wished to demonstrate to the full his proud title to the name of Humanist, and consequently to play down as much as possible the Scholastic training for which he professed so much contempt. In fact, hardly any Scholastics are quoted by name except for purposes of ridicule; Nicholas of Cusa and Nicholas of Lyra are mentioned in passing, Duns Scotus, Ockham and Pierre d'Ailly are openly mocked. In the next chapter some attempt will be made to discuss the Scholastic sources from which Rabelais most probably drew; here it is enough to make the distinction, absolute and incontrovertible, between what Rabelais considered his authorities, the texts of antiquity, and what at best he might have admitted as influences, that is the works of the Schoolmen.

The 16C attitude towards authority and originality alike are so strikingly different from our own that it is only too easy to misinterpret the use made of Classical writers by such a man as Rabelais. What seemed dishonesty, or at least laziness, to-day was universal practise then; plagiarism was no vice in an age when a man's erudition was measured by the quantity, not the quality, of his references. The importance of the innumerable compilations of *Antiquae Lectiones*, especially Erasmus' *Adages*

and Apothegmata, cannot easily be overrated, but it must at the same time be remembered that all men of letters were equally aware of the short cuts available to those who wished to use them. Serious deception was not a possible, let alone a plausible, motive for having recourse to second-hand knowledge.

All this is of obvious and major importance in trying to decide what impression of himself Rabelais wished to convey, a question hardly less vital than that of his real learning. There are in effect three problems in this connexion, not necessarily independent of one another; first, what authors are actually named in quotations; second, what references or quotations are made without naming the author, either because they were so familiar as to need no explanation, or because of a deliberately esoteric appeal to the learned; third, what sources, direct or indirect, can most probably be suggested for given texts. For several reasons it would be misleading to offer precise statistics based on a straightforward count throughout the work; some references are wholly spurious, some apparently the result of a genuine error of memory, and some, in fact very many, too vague to be ascribed with certainty to a particular author.

With these reservations, some interesting details emerge from a general survey of quotations and references scattered through the four books. In each book the name most frequently mentioned is that of Plato, quoted at least twice as often as any other author. One or two of these references are incorrect or very general, but the intention is unmistakable; not only in the TL with its opening Platonic invoc-

ation, but in all the work Rabelais seeks to impress his readers with his enthusiastic Platonism. It is all the more striking that the two authors who are next on the list, named about equally often and between them just rivalling Plato's record, are Hippocrates and Galen, who for professional reasons might be expected to occupy a place of honour in a book by a Doctor of Medicine. The only other authors with anything like the same degree of prominence are again hardly unexpected---Pliny, Cicero and Aristotle. Besides Pliny's moral reflections, his great authority in Natural History explains his place in a work where all branches of that subject receive special attention, and as for the other two, they had been throughout the Middle Ages the leading authorities in Latin and Greek respectively.

Leaving aside the two medical authors, it will be seen that Greece and Rome are equally represented, and that no departure from tradition is marked by this choice apart from the overwhelming preponderance of Platonism. No account has been taken of the poets, especially Homer, Ovid, Virgil, Horace, whose contributions are mainly literary and very much what one would expect from a man with pretensions to Classical learning. Probably the most surprising thing about these results is that they offer no surprises. If the frequency of Plato's name is changed for that of Aristotle, the broad picture is one which mediaeval scholars would have found very familiar.

The special case of the brief Declaration in the QL is also worth noting; the explanations are

mainly linguistic and parade rather more obviously than usual the author's satisfaction at his own erudition, but the results are much as before. Cicero is quoted 7 times, with specific mention of 6 of his works, while Pliny runs him a close second. The remaining authors are a numerous and mixed collection, as they are in the four books themselves, and include all the main and many of the minor authorities. In a commentary on language the prominence of Cicero and Pliny is entirely natural, one the recognised master of Latin style, the other an unequalled authority on scientific and technical terms. As before, high authority is invoked for somewhat disproportionate ends: Cicero for the use of "St, st, st" to impose silence, Pliny for an explanation of leap year.

The minor works add very little, since their quotations are mostly either Scriptural or burlesque, but it is interesting to see in one of them, the Almanach for 1535, a reproduction in miniature of the distribution throughout the main work--the O.T. and N.T. are each quoted twice, and Plato twice, with Aristotle and Hippocrates once each, all in the space of two pages.

The impression conveyed by all this must be supplemented by the equally important catalogue of authors less frequently cited. Plutarch, Strabo and Herodotus occur several times, especially in the two later books, but Lucian, with whose spirit Rabelais is so often identified, is hardly mentioned at all by name. There are literally dozens of other authorities, genuine or spurious, many of whom occur

only in long lists culled from some index, but their effect is cumulative and was certainly intended by Rabelais to increase respect for his erudition. Some, like Cato, Hesiod or Heraclitus, sound so imposing that Rabelais omits to quote his real and always second-hand source, others, like Petron, are so obscure (if even real) that their presence too is impressive until we discover that their only extant fragments are preserved by Plutarch or some equally accessible author. The argument by quantity, referred to so often before, is that most dear to Rabelais, as to most of his contemporaries, and explains the multiplicity of references, often trivial or even superfluous, in which he so clearly delights. There is a very definite method, however, in the presentation of this mass of knowledge. The great emphasis on Plato is in the nature of a manifesto, the numerous references to Galen and Hippocrates are meant as professional self-advertisement, while the others, Cicero, Pliny, Aristotle, are indispensable foundations for any Classical culture, stylistic and scientific. The comparatively small number of references to Plutarch can be quite easily explained if one realises that a large number of the quotations from other authors (including Plato) are taken from Plutarch, while the very modest position of Lucian, quite out of proportion to his real importance as a source, may well be due to reasons of prudence, since his reputation for impiety was widespread in the 16c.

At the next stage, those identifiable references or quotations to which Rabelais attaches no name, the question of trying to convey an impression is

obviously less relevant, though still not negligible. The most immediately striking fact here is that<sup>in</sup> the TL and QL alone Plutarch is quoted at least as often as Plato (by name or not) in all the books put together. Even this is only part of the picture, for in the QL, for example, a whole group of chapters, culminating in the 'an story, embody paraphrases and even literal translations of two whole chapters from Plutarch.<sup>a)</sup> In such a case the source must have been familiar to many readers, but there are many others where another author's name disguises the true debt to Plutarch. Something similar, though on half the scale, is true of Valerius, whose name is mentioned about as often as not, and who in his turn supplies abundant material for whole episodes like Pentagruelion and Gaster. If these direct borrowings can be established with reasonable certainty, the inspiration of Lucian is much less explicit but comes next after that of Plutarch and Valerius. Plutarch has shown how many phrases, allusions and general ideas can be traced more or less convincingly to Lucian, on whom a whole episode, 'icrochole's dream of conquest, seems to be modelled. Apart from these three, and Cicero, to whom Rabelais does not always acknowledge his debt, it is hard to be sure from which of several possible sources Rabelais drew his material. Once again no account is taken of the poets, most of the numerous quotations from whom had been common property for centuries. Besides all these, there is no reason to suppose that Rabelais' readers could place his allusions with any more certainty than modern scholars when it comes



to deciding between the rival claims of several minor authors.

This section must inevitably be curtailed, otherwise one is forced back on unjustified speculation, but the addition of Plutarch, Pliny and Lucian as anonymous contributors completely alters the appearance of the previous list. Plutarch and Plato now tie for honours, with Pliny close behind, while the others gain hardly anything from the addition of anonymous references, except for Cicero, who still fails to approach the leaders. What this means in effect is significant; Plato and Aristotle are almost invariably quoted by name and not infrequently at second-hand, Galen and Hippocrates, the twin pillars of medical wisdom, are also quoted by name in nearly every case, but unlike the first two, apparently always first-hand and not infrequently from memory. Only Cicero of the great authors does not always figure by name, but many of the quotations from his works are known to be indirect. The deliberate and remarkable effacement of Plutarch's authority is no accident, but completely consistent with Rabelais' obvious intention of appealing wherever possible to the great authors of antiquity, in the mediaeval sense of auctores, as against mere commentators or historians like Plutarch. The fact that this appeal to the primary authorities is often purely specious does not alter the situation. Plutarch, the favourite author of so many 16C writers, is the most conspicuous absentee from the mediaeval list of leading authorities and is precisely the one whose name is least emphasised by Rabelais.

The last question is infinitely more difficult to answer with anything more than a high degree of probability. The work of M. Plattard,<sup>(13)</sup> though over 40 years old, must still serve as a basis for any enquiry into Rabelais' humanistic sources, an enquiry which lies outside the scope of the present study. Taken in conjunction with such special studies as those of Thuasne<sup>(14)</sup> and the numerous articles in RER and elsewhere, Plattard's conclusions put into its proper perspective the impression of vast erudition which Rabelais' work at first sight tends to produce. The comparatively small number of spurious references and mistakes needs no further comment. The larger question is to know how far to take Rabelais' erudition at its face-value and how far to explain it by his judicious use of the innumerable and voluminous compendia at his disposal. That he made extensive use of these collections is no longer a matter for any doubt, but Plattard has shown how cautious one must be in explaining any particular display of erudition simply in terms of borrowing from any one book:<sup>(15)</sup> "Nous ne relevons pas dans son œuvre de séries d'exemples ou de cas singuliers qu'il ait constitué lui-même de toutes pièces, mais nous n'en trouvons pas non plus qu'il n'ait grossies et enrichies." The works of Caelius Rhodiginus, Ravisius Textor, Baptista Fulgosa and, above all, Erasmus, contain a high proportion of Rabelais' erudition, while the more original works of such men as Budé and Agrippa are full of detailed references of the kind which Rabelais could, and did, annex for his own use. At the same time

Classical writers like Aulus Gellius and Plutarch are a treasure house of other mens' wealth. Besides these contemporary and antique sources, Rabelais had access to early Christian apologists like Eusebius, to whom we owe an astonishing number of Classical fragments preserved by them alone, as well as very long texts from Classical authors followed by a Christian commentary, in itself a fruitful and provocative form of literature for such a writer as Rabelais. For particular questions, as those of dreams and marriage, Rabelais seems to have drawn from contemporary treatises, in these two cases J.C. Scaliger and Tiraqueau, and every new discovery concerning Rabelais' sources puts a new intermediary between him and the original sources of antiquity.

That is not to say that Rabelais had not read the authors whose names he quotes with such pride, but for the purposes of his book it has been shown, for instance, that his professed and recognised enthusiasm for Plato did not stop him from going to Erasmus or Plutarch or any other convenient source for his quotations. The comic effect of much of his erudition corresponds with Rabelais' intentions and one must not be surprised if he chooses the most economical way of achieving this effect. If Rabelais says nothing by way of acknowledgement to his second-hand sources (C. Rhodiginus, it is true, is twice quoted in connexion with a ventriloquist) this is neither unusual nor ungrateful; authors, not compilers, are quoted, the others expect and receive no acknowledgement for the work they make available to all.

The greatest difficulty which arises from this is not so much the determining of a particular source for a text, really of secondary importance, but the possibility that opinions and comments following the text may also come from some source other than Rabelais himself. The Fan legend is a case in point and only one of many. Plattard's conclusions may appropriately be recalled: "6)

"les moralistes et philosophes lui fournissent moins d'idées et de théories que de sentences et d'exemples: leur contribution à son œuvre ne diffère point, pour une grande part, de l'érudition qu'il emprunte aux grammairiens anciens et modernes, aux recueils d'adages, de 'mots dorés' et d'apothegmes."

If one admits this hardly contestable statement, the risk of assuming Rabelais' expressed opinions to be his own is increased by the impossibility of ascribing them to identifiable authors, with whose system Rabelais' can be compared.

Even when we have allowed for borrowing on the most generous scale, the residue of genuine erudition left in Rabelais' work bears out the many contemporary tributes to his learning from such weighty men as Bude' and Tiraqueau. This brief discussion of the impression he tries to convey by his selection of authors to be named or to remain anonymous, and his method of compilation from second-hand sources, shows Rabelais to have been both a scholar and an opportunist, profiting by skill in extracting impressive authorities from easily accessible catalogues to give an impression of erudition at once more extensive and of a somewhat different nature from what is really the case. There remains

the important question raised by Plattard's statement quoted above; if Rabelais uses the moralists and philosophers more for examples than for ideas and theories, what attitude does he adopt towards these ideas and theories on the occasions when he cannot avoid them? The other question, whence do his own ideas derive?, is best left to a separate chapter.

Of the six authors most frequently quoted, three, Pliny, Galen and Hippocrates, are more concerned with phenomena than ideas, while the other three, Plato, Plutarch and Cicero, deal with systems of thought. As for Aristotle, he can hardly be treated outside the context of Scholasticism, because we know that Rabelais had become acquainted with the Scholastic interpretation of Aristotle long before he studied that author on his own account; he cannot therefore be regarded in the same light as the others. From the authors just mentioned, all the main tenets of both Platonism proper and Stoicism must have come to Rabelais' notice, whatever other sources he used. We know that much of Cicero, and to a lesser extent Plutarch, came to Rabelais second-hand from 16<sup>th</sup> compilations, but it is fair to assume that the philosophical problems they raised were familiar to him in the original. In view of the great emphasis ~~XX~~ on Plato and Platonism in the work, it is particularly important to see what becomes of the main doctrines of that system at his hands. Plattard's judgement is not an encouraging start for such an enquiry: "Rien dans son roman n'indique qu'il ait étudié avec une ferveur particulière

celui que tous les ~~philosophes~~ humanistes contemporains eussent appelé, comme lui, 'le prince des philosophes'." As far as Rabelais' text goes, the quotations from the 'Republic', 'Symposium', 'Phaedo' and 'Timaeus' do not even prove that Rabelais had read the books in question, but unless it is admitted that his studies included at least these four, his professions of Platonism, apparently confirmed by evidence external to the roman, must be dismissed as mere bluff. It is true, of course, that any number of Platonic theories of a general kind in Rabelais' work can be, and probably are to be, explained by indirect influences, notably Erasmus, but that is not at present the point at issue. From whatever sources he finally selected the doctrines reflected in his work, it must remain a fundamental hypothesis of Rabelaisian criticism that he had at least made contact at some time with the original text, so that any deviations from it cannot be regarded as accidental and demand an explanation.

Superficially the most obvious concession to Platonism is the dialogue form to be found in all the books, especially the TL, where the detailed discussion of particular problems lends itself very well to the Socratic method. It would be unwise to push the resemblance too far; the dialogue form had become popular in the 16C apart from any Platonising tendency, and Erasmus' Colloquia alone are enough to account for Rabelais' literary choice. All the same, in a revolt against all Scholastic influences, the first victim is naturally formal logic, and literary preferences apart, it is probably

safe to assume that Rabelais accepted the Platonic pattern as the best means of exposition and discussion.

More fundamental to the system of Plato is his epistemology, and here literary questions are definitely subordinated to philosophical ones. Two great doctrines are concerned --- that of Ideas and that of reminiscence. Once again any revolt against orthodox Scholasticism would tend to encourage those theories which challenged Aristotle's authority in this field, but the situation is somewhat complicated by the Augustinian strain which always characterised Franciscan (as opposed to Dominican) thought. Even this strain, however, had undergone the rigid formalising influence of the Schools, and Rabelais' attitude to Platonic idealism in the original cannot have been unaffected by the contrast it made with his official studies. In fact he goes out of his way to use the word 'idée' as often as possible, and in such a way as to suggest polemical rather than philosophical motives. It is one thing to use a technical term and quite another to understand it, and in the chapter on Rabelais' philosophy we have seen that his idealism is Platonic more in its expression than its content. He may well have accepted and understood the doctrine, but it cannot be claimed that the evidence of the book provides any strong indication that this was the case. While the theory as such is not distorted or misrepresented, its deeper implications seem on the face of it to have escaped Rabelais. The two later books in particular present such a detailed picture of vigorous

empiricism that the contemplation of eternal truths though not ignored is quite secondary.

The doctrine of reminiscence, with its cognate teaching about the soul's immortality and divine origin, receives a very different treatment. It was for one thing self-contained in a way in which the other was not and its implications could be considered independently. The TL, with its many chapters on divination, afforded an excellent opportunity for Rabelais to state his views on the subject and it is quite striking to see how far he goes in appreciating and understanding this theory. The long speech of Pantagruel on dreams (including the "intellectuale sphære"), the discussion of dying men as prophets, and, in the QL, the discussion on immortality, all show a thorough grasp of the problems involved and a consistency altogether lacking in the treatment of Ideas. Granted the limited context of these discussions, they are still examples of genuine Platonic theories being incorporated into Rabelais' work, intelligently and sympathetically.

The doctrine of immortality in itself (that is, considered without reference to theories of knowledge) is an essential feature of Platonism, but one which no Christian could approach with an open mind. Since neither the Church nor the temper of the age permitted much latitude in this basic matter, it goes without saying that the views on immortality expressed in the 'Phaedo', though distinctively Platonic, could be adopted without indicating any necessary Platonic influence. It happens that Rabelais refers directly to the 'Phaedo' in this



connexion, but it is infinitely more likely that his beliefs about the soul came to him from traditionally Christian sources and were just not affected by subsequent acquaintance with Plato. No doubt Rabelais like so many of his contemporaries, as well as men of the Middle Ages, was glad to establish the conformity of the 'divin Platon' with Christian teaching, but there can be no question as to which took precedence in his mind.

A much more cogent argument in favour of Platonic influence can be based on the relationship described between body and soul, which has a prominent place in the later books. Here again, Christian doctrine necessarily prevented full freedom of speculation, unless, like Pomponazzi and Siger before him, the speculator was able to resort to some sort of 'double truth' defence, but within the circle of absolute orthodoxy there was still plenty of room for manoeuvre. Already in Plato's works there is a strong tendency to regard the body as a temporary and restrictive abode for the soul, which can and should even in this life seek liberty through contemplation, dreams and so on. This tendency became preponderant in the neo-Platonists, Christian and pagan, and gave powerful inspiration to a mysticism based on the belief that the body is a hindrance to spiritual perfection. The Manichean excesses in this direction show one logical outcome of such a view, but far more common was the type of spirituality which became the hallmark of 16C Platonism and was exemplified in Marguerite of Navarre and her group. Those for whom technical problems of

philosophy, whether epistemology or even ethics, presented small interest found in this spiritual bias the main attraction of Platonism, and Rabelais shows throughout his work that no other Platonic doctrine appealed to him so much. It is relevant to recall that Plato himself offered no incentive for the type of asceticism which succeeding generations of Christians regarded as necessary for subduing the lower instincts of the body, and in the 'Republic', for instance, lays much stress on physical fitness. Socrates was himself, as we know, of exceptionally robust physique, and while indifferent to bodily pleasures could on occasion show that he had no cause to fear their domination. Such later Platonists as Marguerite tend to stress devotional activity to the exclusion of the body, and it is interesting to see how Rabelais was able to combine a faithful representation of Platonic spirituality with a balanced outlook on the body, essential to his medical profession and at the same time perfectly consistent with genuine Platonism. The resultant balance may not be due to Plato at all, but is important as showing that Rabelais' enthusiasm for spirituality is tempered by a moderation which is more Platonic than neo-Platonic.

The remaining elements of Plato's metaphysics, theology and demonology, are reflected in Rabelais, but all that comes out of the first is a solitary reference ("l'intellectuale sphære") which is mediaeval, and in the other there is no doubt that it is the more highly developed version of Plutarch which Rabelais follows. As far as it goes, then, it

may be said that Rabelais is in sympathy with the broad outlines of Plato's metaphysics, whose theories he reproduces very faithfully in some cases, though at other times his familiarity with them appears somewhat superficial. When we turn to more concrete questions the results are a little different.

On the subject of love and the relationship between the sexes in general, Plato has a good deal to say, not all of it consistent. The 'Symposium' offered in its Androgynæ myth a fruitful source of much pseudo-Platonism among the poets of the 16C, and from a direct reference Rabelais shows himself familiar with the theory (Garg. VIII). Nowhere in his work, however, is there the slightest concession to the romantic conception of love suggested by it. Ironically enough, it is another Platonic dialogue, the 'Timæus', which furnishes Rabelais (or at least Rondibilis) with his most effective anti-feminist weapon, though double-edged, as has recently been shown. (6)

Neither the neglect of the 'Symposium' nor the telling but almost certainly second-hand reference to the 'Timæus' is so significant as the treatment of the 'Republic'. Rabelais goes out of his way in the first two books to quote from this dialogue by name, and it seems very likely that he had it in mind when he came to compose the chapters on Thélème. There, as in the 'Republic', high-born women enjoy rights equal (indeed, almost superior) to their male companions, but this equality is short-lived and never comes nearer repetition than Hippothaudee's respect for a wife's rights, Rondibilis'

grudging admission that a few "preudes femmes" must be excepted from the general condemnation deserved by their sex, and perhaps Gargantua's thought for wives and daughters in his speech on marriage at the end of the TL. These later examples fall far short of the principle of equality laid down in the 'Republic' and accepted at Thelème. This equality, based on social, not spiritual, values, is no less essential a part of Plato's ideal state than the theory of the family into which it fits. The communal possession of mates---one can hardly say wives---the complete disruption of the family by the immediate separation of parents from their children, henceforth to be bound to each other by no ties at all, and the consequent dictatorship of the state over all human relationships are the essential features of this ideal society; the first few pages of the 'Timaeus' which resume the argument of the previous day (i.e. of the 'Republic') make this quite clear. Rabelais' constant emphasis on filial duty, on the significance of heredity and all family ties is completely at variance with such ideas, and he had every reason to reject them, but nowhere is there any hint that he had come across these theories or intends to refute them. This omission almost amounts to positively negative evidence, and makes at least very suspect Rabelais' professed enthusiasm for the 'Republic'.

In the four dialogues chosen for study, the chief remaining theory, expounded at greatest length in the 'Timaeus', is the cosmology. This need not be dealt with in any detail here. Aristotle had begun

the process of criticism which continued unceasingly throughout the Middle Ages, when for so long the 'Timaeus' was regarded as all the Plato to be known, or at any rate to be seriously considered. There are certainly references to its theories in Rabelais---to the World-Soul, for example---but none which had not been examined and re-examined by scores of commentators, and as far as cosmology is concerned, anything Platonic in Rabelais is certainly not directly due to Plato.

Perhaps as important as all these factors put together is the person of Socrates. Erasmus had set the fashion with his "Sancte Socrates, ora pro nobis", and those who had grown weary of Aristotle's impersonal authority, not to speak of its handling by the Schoolmen, quite naturally turned with delight to a figure as human and inspiring as Plato's , master. There are several features of his character which reappear in that of Pantagruel; his indifference to women, to bodily harshness, his ability to drink more heavily than any of his companions or not at all, his contempt for all this world could offer him in comparison with the joys which awaited him hereafter, his special antipathy for the Sophists who deceived the unlearned and brought the name of philosophy into disrepute; all these qualities are not peculiar to Socrates, and belong to a type of hero not uncommon in the ancient world. Despite the resemblances, the comparison between Socrates and Pantagruel can be pushed too far; Pantagruel is as much Alexander the great captain as Socrates the great philosopher. It may, however, be well to consider two small points of detail from

the later books which suggest that the person of Socrates was to the fore in Rabelais' mind. First is the edifying death of Raminagrobis, which though explicitly Christian, even Evangelical, is preceded by direct allusions to the 'Phaedo'; second, the two mentions of the "demon de Socrates", which in the QL Pantagruel admits having himself. Other pointers, such as Pantagruel's leadership of the discussions in the TL and QL, are less precise, but all in all the influence of Socrates' character can be argued as strongly as that of any more abstract Platonic theories, such as that of Ideas. Even the allusion to Socrates as a Silenus box, though borrowed from Erasmus, stands in so prominent a position at the very beginning of the Prologue to 'Gargantua' as to lend support to this theory.

All these considerations taken together suggest some reservations about Rabelais' Platonism. To describe it as 'eclectic', like that of a Ficino, begs the question by assuming a deliberate selection based on adequate knowledge. At the same time, the omissions noted from the main works are less probably due to ignorance than to reliance on intermediary sources. If these omissions were really deliberate, the emphasis on "idées" and the bare mention of the World-Soul, the acceptance of the sexual equality proposed in the 'Republic' (at least for Thélème) and complete absence of comment on the more radical theory of society, offer paradoxes hardly compatible with a genuine Platonism. There are several hints pointing to a solution of the problem. The frequent citations of Plutarch and

Cicero, both generous borrowers from Plato, the marked interest in the person of Socrates, the emphasis on the spiritual rather than the epistemological side of Platonism, all indicate the same line of approach. Relations between the Academy and Stoa had always been close, and the description of Socrates as the <sup>(4)</sup> "patron saint of all Stoics" may show the way to putting Rabelais' Platonism in a truer perspective. Laguet's happy phrase "un stoïcisme gai" was originally applied to one side of Rabelais' philosophy, the active philosophy of Pantagruelism, "mespris des choses fortuites", but it can in fact be greatly extended. The moral significance of Stoicism often overshadows the rest of its doctrines, and one is apt to forget that for a considerable period Stoicism was a complete and vigorous system, constantly evolving, which incorporated, and even on occasion challenged ideas of Plato and Aristotle.

The moral theories of Stoicism were more or less common to all its writers, and Rabelais seems to have found them mostly in Plutarch and Cicero, whose teaching he reproduces and accepts on many important points. In our chapters on Ethics and on Providence an attempt has been made to establish the pattern of Rabelais' thought in these matters and link it where appropriate with Stoic principles. It is now time to ask whether his Platonic metaphysics and admiration of Socrates should not be explained by reference to the same source.

To go no further than Cicero, whom Rabelais must have known outside the compendia of the 16C, a combination of Stoic ethics with Platonic metaphysics

appears in all his main works. Cicero constantly supports Platonic theories while professing general acceptance of the Stoic position, and in cosmology and physics, for instance, he offers no solution alien to Platonism. Perhaps it is going too far to say that 'Stoic' was almost as general a term in Cicero's time as 'Christian' in the Middle Ages, but the difference between extreme rigorists like Seneca and Marcus Aurelius on the one hand and more liberal thinkers like Cicero on the other can still be accommodated under the same general heading. Cicero's adaptation of Platonism offered an example which succeeding generations of Stoics, then of Christians, were not slow to follow. The synthesis between the Stoic ethic, with its characteristic conception of nature and law, and Platonic metaphysics was enduring and popular. In such a synthesis the position of Socrates is obviously central, and could lead the enquiring mind equally well to either aspect of the system. The 16C saw a revival of much ancient thought disentangled from the mediaeval commentaries, and in this revival Plato and the Stoics held a leading place. Some of the humanists left Stoicism as it was, others deliberately adapted it to Christianity with more or less success. In this process Platonism played a vital role: "(le platonisme) est en quelque sorte l'intermédiaire qui permettra une adaptation plus complète du stoïcisme au christianisme."

The avidity of 16C writers (and readers) for moral sentences made the works of Cicero and Plutarch immensely popular. The parade of heroes in Plutarch,



the moral and political reflections of a great statesman like Cicero, the practical ethic of the Stoic Emperor Marcus Aurelius, would always appeal to the general public more than the abstract theories which lay behind them. That Rabelais should have followed the practise of his age in quarrying extensively from these authors is entirely natural. The reason for the comparative prominence of Socrates and the misleadingly exact references to the 'Republic' is surely to be found in the fact that practical moralists used practical texts. Indeed, when one reads 'De Officiis', 'De Senectute', 'De Natura Deorum', 'Somnium Scipionis', there seems to be more and more cause to consider Rabelais' Platonism (in his book at any rate) as pre-selected---even pre-digested. The strong neo-Platonic element in his demonology comes beyond all doubt from Plutarch, so that applying Ockham's razor to the question, a good case could be made for limiting Rabelais' Platonism solely to what he had found in Cicero and Plutarch, ignoring for the moment possible Scholastic intermediaries. It is noteworthy, for example, that Cicero's enthusiasm for Plato does not prevent him abandoning the communistic theory of society for a family feeling no less ardent than Rabelais' own.

This rather lengthy analysis is only intended to show how little direct acquaintance with Plato need be assumed from Rabelais' work. It does not mean that he followed Cicero or Plutarch to the letter any more than Plato---he has no use for the theory of metempsychosis, essential to Plutarch,

and less still for Cicero's prim attitude towards natural functions<sup>(1)</sup>--nor that he had no intermediaries to interpret these authors in their turn. What he says of heroic souls is very obviously in line with Stoic teaching, and his attitude to Nature and law may profitably be compared with Stoic ideas, but the mediaeval assimilation of these ideas was so thorough that there is no point in conducting another detailed enquiry into Rabelais' treatment of Stoicism. Any attempt to fix a permanent label on Rabelais, be it 'Stoic', 'Platonic' or anything else can lead only to infinite regress, and is not at all helpful. Most fruitless of all is the kind of criticism which points out that Pantagruel's "mespris des choses fortuites" is foreshadowed in Budé's title 'De Contemptu Rerum Fortuitarum'.<sup>(2)</sup> There is no reason to suppose that Budé, any more than Epictetus or any other Stoic, was the only begetter of so commonplace an idea. When notions so general are in the air, it is dangerous to expect precise and tidy attributions. The one thing that can be stated with assurance is that Rabelais wished his ideas to be associated with Classical sources as distinguished as possible, regardless of their immediate provenance and regardless very often of their intrinsic triviality.

In his relations with Platonism, so proudly proclaimed throughout the work, as with Stoicism, equally influential if less publicised, Rabelais shows an eclecticism founded on what seems to be no more than the principle of economy, and therefore quite different from that of a Ficino or a Budé. We are

not here concerned with his personal philosophy, only with his treatment of original texts, and the difference is fundamental. Plato and Platonists, Cicero and Stoics, are named in the work for reasons of prestige, independently of what they say, and the most convenient source for the greatest number of doctrines is always that which he chooses. The fundamental system of thought underlying the work inevitably modifies the impact of these borrowed texts and ideas. As Plattard rightly says, Rabelais goes to his Classical authors not for ideas but for examples. This seems to explain the apparent contradiction between Rabelais' reputation for learning and his actual performance. The perusal of Plato's works is no light task, even apart from any linguistic difficulties, and there is no inconsistency in supposing Rabelais unable or unwilling to find examples from his own reading as convenient to his purpose as those which he could extract from more accessible intermediaries. If, as he claims, and as in any case seems so probable, Rabelais' main object in his roman is to please, it would serve no useful purpose to be a purist in selecting quotations. From what has just been said, it appears most unlikely that Rabelais was indebted to Classical authors for his mental habits, though one need not question his familiarity with their works. The main thing is that the authorities are there to answer by name in his work, and if they do no more than signify *acte de présence*, that is because Rabelais wanted them to do no more.

B. AUTHORITIES---SCRIPTURAL

As an authority in a special sense, the Bible must be considered in the same way as the sources of Classical antiquity. The use of Scriptural authority was, of course, nothing new, either in serious or in comic works, but any account of Rabelais' methods would be incomplete without an examination of the way in which he treated sacred texts. The subject has already been dealt with by Plattard with his customary thoroughness.<sup>(3)</sup> Many of his conclusions have been familiar for a long time, especially Rabelais' predilection for St Paul, but a close analysis of Scriptural references from Plattard's list (one or two are too vague to be included, and at least one is omitted by Plattard, no doubt inadvertently) is still surprisingly revealing.

The number of references is remarkably stable through the four books; some 22 each in 'Gargantua' and 'Pantagruel', 25 in the more erudite TL, and a rather unexpected drop to 19 in the QL. The CL does not concern us here, but in fact, as Plattard points out, is exceptionally barren of such references, with only 8 in all. Very interesting is an analysis of the parts of Scripture which Rabelais chooses for inclusion in his work. A large number, probably the majority, of the Scriptural references are either facetious or positively disrespectful in their particular context, while a smaller number, none the less considerable, are perfectly serious, or at any rate with no suggestion of irreverence. To the latter category belong, as one would expect, the quotations from St. Paul, hardly any of them open to mockery,

and the greater number of other N.T. references. These together come to about 30, of which 10 each occur in the first two books alone. Mention has already been made more than once of the markedly religious atmosphere of 'Gargantua', and in this book alone of the four N.T. (and thus serious) references outnumber those from the O.T. by two to one. The Psalms have been treated separately throughout, since, although strictly speaking Scriptural, they were better known in their daily context of "matière de Breviaire". Even in 'Pantagruel', where religion is somewhat less prominent, N.T. and O.T. references are about equal. In the two other books the O.T. is quoted much more often than the N.T. One point which has engaged the attention of all commentators is that when later editions suppressed certain references (mostly N.T.) apparently to avoid giving offence gratuitously, the three which seem supremely blasphemous to modern readers are left in; three of Our Lord's words on the Cross occur in facetious, even unseemly contexts---"lama sabachthani" in 'Pantagruel', "Sitio" in 'Gargantua' and the final cry "Consummatum est" in the TL. Nothing could more effectively warn us against applying modern standards of reverence to Rabelais. Most of the other N.T. references are comparatively anodyne, the illustrations of "albus", probably from a concordance as Plattard shows, the incident of Zacchaeus and so on. These are used in exactly the same way as Classical texts, to provide examples and high authority for particular observations.

The Psalms are treated very differently, and since

Frère Jan is so often the one to proclaim some familiar verse with his warcry "matière de breviaire" the primarily comic effect hardly needs emphasising. Whether it be tags like "ad te levavi" or "jusqu'aux vitulos", a lengthy jest like Lasdaller's exposition of the Psalm CXXIII or simply the chanting of Marot's setting to "Hors d'Egypte", the Psalms are not used to confer authority on a particular statement, nor to illustrate Rabelais' erudition, but as a source of texts, serious or comic, which would be almost as familiar to his readers as a popular refrain. This very familiarity makes the question of irreverence hardly applicable, though the Reformers at least could not approve the bad taste which they were bound to see in such use of sacred texts.

The rest of the O.T. (including 5 references from the Apocrypha, all from Tobias) accounts for the greatest number of Rabelais' Scriptural references, some 44 in all. Very few of these are used in any but a facetious way, but obvious and deliberate irreverence is rare. For this reason it is particularly interesting to see from what parts of the Bible Rabelais most often selects his texts. With the sole exception of 'Gargantua' (exceptional in several ways when it comes to religion) these nearly all come from the Pentateuch, and especially Genesis. Most of the others come from the Books of Solomon (Proverbs or Ecclesiastes), or from Kings; there is hardly a single reference to a prophetic book, though Daniel and Isaiah come in once each. The usual application of these texts is either to

support some purely erudite piece of information, especially in the TL, where Leviticus, Deuteronomy and Numbers are invoked as authorities for Jewish customs, or to amuse, with such stories as Adam and Eve or the Flood. The early books of the O.T. are naturally those which can be regarded as less intimately bound up with the essentials of the Christian faith, and which at the same time had provided innumerable themes for popular art and drama throughout the Middle Ages. In this way it can be said that Rabelais used the O.T. for two distinct purposes, both of which apply equally to his use of Classical authors; for authoritative support of learned information and as a source of semi-mythology. In this connexion, the three mentions of Tobias (quoted again in the Almanach for 1535) bear out Rabelais' interest in those books which tell a story, and which for that reason had become most familiar in the Middle Ages.

Flattard's conclusions can scarcely be challenged after all these years; despite the number and variety of Scriptural references in Rabelais, it cannot be said that he shows more than normal professional knowledge for a man whose adult life was mainly spent in ecclesiastical company. The two or three mentions of Iyra, and to the "caballistes et massoretz" suggest that memories of Scriptural glosses were still with him, but the single passage where the version of Erasmus seems to be specifically invoked is not enough evidence of any close or scientific study of the Bible on Rabelais' part. All in his adequate but undistinguished knowledge

of the Bible and the liberties he took with it, Rabelais remains in the old tradition: "dans les facéties dont le texte biblique est le thème, il ne dépasse pas en audace les docteurs et moines des générations précédentes."

This is not the place to return to a discussion of Rabelais' religious motives for treating Scripture as he did, but considering the Bible in the same way as the other authorities, Plato for instance, the conclusion is inescapable that he wished his readers to form a certain impression which closer scrutiny seems to belie. Much of the Biblical atmosphere derives from absolute commonplaces, notably from Genesis and the Psalms, many of the more erudite references may quite well be due to a concordance, and, making the most generous allowances, there is no evidence from his work that Rabelais had any knowledge at all of a very substantial part of the O.T. The Bible had always been accepted as the supreme authority, and the revival of Biblical studies brought about by such men as Erasmus made it impossible for Rabelais to maintain his position as a man of learning without calling frequently on Biblical allusions. Despite this, the evidence shows on balance that the Bible was for him an authority rather than an influence, with the important exception of the Pauline Epistles, which he seems to have studied with some care and which can properly be considered both as an authority to quote and an influence to inspire.

In his admirable conclusion to the article quoted above, Plattard points out the complete absence of



Patristic references in Rabelais' work. At first sight, the omission, which we may well believe extended to his reading as to his writing, is a little surprising in one who professed such admiration for Erasmus, editor of a monumental series of Patristic works. The explanation of this apparent contradiction can almost certainly be seen in the way he treated his Classical and Biblical sources. His first aim in quoting, whether by name or not, was to impress, and all indications are that he used the simplest and most economical means at his disposal in every case to achieve this end. Compilations, concordances, indexes, second-hand sources like Plutarch, are all used in preference to the original texts. Moreover Rabelais' normal reading would keep him in touch with these sources, whereas with the Fathers a new and ponderous mass of material awaited him, unless he were content to rely on the Scholastic works which served preachers and popular theologians. This latter course ran counter to his intention of appearing the enlightened humanist apart from any intrinsic antipathy it may have aroused in him. It is probably for these reasons that Augustine, Jerome, Amrose and the rest do not figure in the work. This is not to say that Rabelais has escaped the considerable element of Patristic learning embodied in every Scholastic work of any substance; this will be discussed in the next chapter, but is quite distinct from a study of the Fathers for themselves. To put the matter in its simplest form, Rabelais does not call upon the Fathers because the possible increase in prestige which might accrue from doing so was heavily outweighed by the certain extra burden of work it would entail.

INFLUENCES

So far in this study we have been concerned mainly with external evidence, explicit statements of what Rabelais thought on the one hand and where he claimed to find that thought on the other. In examining the various aspects of his thought resemblances to Scholastic ideas as seen in general texts have naturally been pointed out. The question of source can be and occasionally has been indicated in some cases, but broadly speaking all one can usefully do is to point out fundamental trends of thought common to Rabelais and Scholastics in general. In dealing with Classical and Scriptural authorities the nature of the problem emerges with greatest clarity; Rabelais knew very well which authors he used, directly or indirectly, for providing the examples, maxims, opinions and so on which fill his work with the spirit of erudition. He is only too glad to tell us their names (not always very exactly) and we can fairly take it that he continued to read Classical literature throughout his life. It would be absurd to deny that these authors influenced Rabelais, or that such humanists as Erasmus and Bude' did so, and were the case of Rabelais that of the last two writers that influence might be admitted as preponderant, although with reservations. Historical facts, scanty as they are, force us to consider the problem differently, and it is the purpose of this chapter to justify the assumptions made elsewhere in so far as they can be justified at all.

The great majority of critics dealing with the "années de moilage" have been content to point out the references to monks in Rabelais' work, in fact mostly those concerned with Frère Jan and the OSB. Gilson is the notable exception, with one or two others, for whom "le sel franciscain" is an important element in Rabelais' humour. What does not seem to have been attempted so far is to consider Rabelais as a Friar Minor, undergoing the training appropriate to his house, taking orders and sharing, however unwillingly or unworthily, in the traditions of a great line of saints and scholars, no less than of hypocrites and pedants. "Le sel franciscain" was there, of course, so were "les subtilités des docteurs scotistes", but little as we know of 16C French monastic training, certain other elements can be quite safely added.

It is almost certain that we shall never know what Rabelais and his contemporaries in the OFM studied if they never got as far as the University. This alone should warn us off the search for textual sources, but in every Franciscan community there must have been three distinct elements, of varying importance according to time and place, often overlapping each other, but each essential to the teaching of the order: the formal element, consisting of logic and such parts of philosophy, natural and otherwise, as might be prescribed together with theology, the mystical element, peculiarly developed in the OFM, and the pastoral element, as exemplified in sermons, works of popular devotion and the like. The first two are learned and technical, the third,

based on them, is of popular application and concerns also points of style and even the "sel franciscain".

The two great doctors of the order, Scotus and Bonaventura, so different in spirit as to appear almost opposed, represent the first two elements, and a man of Rabelais's temperament and ability could not have failed to become acquainted with the Seraphic Doctor in the intervals of being irritated by the Subtle one. It is very unlikely that Scotus would have been studied simply in the original, and we have chosen the 160 commentary of Tartaret as typical of the sort of presentation with which Rabelais would have been familiar. After the eclipse of Brulefer,<sup>(1)</sup> "Pierre Tartaret, du diocèse de Lausanne, recteur de l'Université en 1490, --- devenait le représentant le plus autorisé du scotisme parisien," and though he was a secular and Fontenay may well have preferred some other, perhaps local, version of Scotus, it seems reasonable to take him as an example of late Scholasticism.<sup>(2)</sup> The question of whether Rabelais knew St. Thomas or doctors of orders other than his own does not really arise; Scotism was sufficiently in the ascendency during the presumed time of Rabelais' noviciate to ensure that some form of it would be the party line in all controversial matters.

In the field of mysticism the question is a little different. The formal philosophical and theological works of Scotus were commented and glossed upon interminably, but Bonaventura's mystical works did not lend themselves to the same treatment. Though there is nowhere a mention of Bonaventura or an

idea peculiar to him in Rabelais' work, it would be a serious defect of method to ignore such a potentially important influence. In this connexion, though he is as much popular as mystical, the person of St. Francis himself cannot be disregarded.

The third sphere of influence is at first sight the most rewarding. Franciscan preachers were universally famous in the 16C, and when Henri Estienne seeks examples of modern corruption he turns to three Minors of a previous generation as the most eloquent and typical. Of these three, the two French Friars, Olivier Maillard and Michel Menot, as well as the equally famous Brulefer, were living either in fact or very recent memory at the time when Rabelais himself must have been learning how to preach. The similarity of style, expression and even thought is so striking as to impress the reader at once. While the resemblance is undeniable, and highly important, it only makes sense against the much less superficial background of a common Franciscan tradition. As an example of these sermons we have chosen that most accessible, and incidentally nearest in date to Rabelais' Franciscan days, the selection from Menot published in a modern edition.

It is as well to make the point at this stage that such a tidy division of elements in Franciscan teaching is only valid for a given instance, in this case a French house of the Observance in the first part of the 16C. Though all Franciscans have something in common, ultimately deriving from their founder, probably no order has had internal divergencies of so radical a nature, not only in its formal thought,

but in its attitude to formal thought at all, and in its very way of life. The seeds of discord were sown already before the founder's death, and the numerous different branches of the Franciscan family which still exist to-day testify to their permanent nature. Without going into details of Franciscan history, it is enough to remember that St. Francis not only was not an intellectual, but was anti-intellectual, and expressly opposed to participation by his brethren in academic pursuits; that his view of poverty soon proved incompatible with the administrative needs of a widespread and growing order; that the affair of the Spirituals, and the passing, but damaging, association with Joachimite ideas, left scars which were long in healing. On the intellectual side the lack of uniformity is again radical. The conversion of Alexander of Hales and the order's subsequent entry into the University world was only the beginning of a new series of antinomies. Besides the tradition of ignorance derived from the founder, the venerable line of Augustinian thought and newer systems more closely approaching Aristotle existed side by side in the OFM long after St. Thomas had become the accepted master of the other great teaching order, the OP. The impression of incoherence, which the brevity of this chapter inevitably enhances, corresponds quite faithfully with the very disparate elements which can be loosely grouped together under the heading 'Franciscan'.

This is no place for a detailed discussion of Scotism or its later developments, even without the question of our competence, and in a sense it hardly

matters what answers Scotus gave to particular questions, since Rabelais is nowhere concerned with a direct quotation from Scotus. Two factors stand out as specially relevant to this study: the form in which Scotism was presented in Rabelais' day and the questions debated with particular emphasis in disputes with other orders. The first is not peculiar to the O.F.M., though perhaps even more marked there than elsewhere, but the second is essentially what distinguishes a Franciscan from any other kind of training.

As an example of presentation, Tartaret could hardly be bettered. If perfection of symmetry made for perfection of spirit his commentaries would be more famous than they are, but as it is they only mark an obscure stage in the later history of Scholasticism. One volume of his, republished in 1514, is probably typical. The first part consists of an exposition of the 'Summulae Logicales' of Petrus Hispanus, with special reference to Scotus' commentary on the same work, in 87 large folii, followed by an extremely efficient index. Near the beginning Petrus writes a phrase which might have been Tartaret's personal motto: "Dialectica est ars artium, scientia scientiarum, ad omnium methodorum principia viam habens."

The form of the work is the set form for all disputations, written or oral, but exceptionally regular--Sciendum 1.2.3. then Arguitur 1.2.3., conclusio, contra 1.2.3., conclusio. This pattern is repeated rigidly throughout the entire book, dealing in turn with the nature of words and the parts of

logic, ending with sophisms and logical problems. Periodically diagrams break the rhythm, quite oppressive after a short time, and the human hand, for instance, is used to illustrate the successive moments in time of a thing's existence. Quite apart from the problems themselves, it is inconceivable that such a discipline could have failed to leave a permanent mark on anyone subjected to it in his formative years. This is followed by a commentary on Porphyry's 'Isagoge' and Aristotle's works on logic, again with copious marginal references to Scotus. Except that the place of 'arguitur' is taken by 'dubitatur', the same pattern continues for a full 10 folia. A short text from Aristotle with a long explanation introduces each 'queritur'.

The third, and for us most interesting, part of the volume is the commentary on Aristotle's Natural Philosophy and Metaphysics, running into 118 folia with a detailed table of questions discussed as well as an alphabetical index. The debt to Scotus is even more explicitly owned: "Quaestiones admodum subtiles et utiles, cum medulla totius materiae artium quattuor librorum sententiarum et quotlibetorum doctoris subtilis Scoti in suis locis quotitate." That this was considered in its own day more significant than the preceding two parts is indicated by a brief and elegant dedication. In this literary merit is claimed for the author (by the publisher) and disobliging reference made to: "Ciceronis simiae, quos scite Tatarumastiges appellitaveris." who would be happy to see perish "opera omnia philosophorum latinorum---extra Picum, Barbarum, Politi-



anum, Marsilium iunioresque aliquot." No doubt Rab-  
 elais would have been proud to count himself among  
 the "aliquot". Here once more the rigid pattern is  
 followed, trilogies of 'sciencia', trilogies of 'dubi-  
 tanda' and their inexorable conclusions. Within this  
 main framework, each division is again sub-divided  
 into a varying number of arguments, all formally  
 proposed, opposed and finally judged. The name of  
 Scotus comes on most pages, and his views are prob-  
 ably repeated still more often without acknowleag-  
 ement. On the whole, not very many other authorities  
 are mentioned by name; all those whom Aristotle  
 himself quotes and discusses are, of course, included,  
 and some of the Arab commentators on particular  
 points of physics, Avicenna and Averroes in 'De  
 Generatione', Albumasar in 'De Meteoris'. Very few  
 references to other Scholastics are made by name,  
 and where the author is not depending on Scotus  
 he seems content to let his opinions stand as his  
 own. In fairness to Tartaret, he seems to set out  
 a remarkably wide variety of arguments and examples  
 in connexion with each problem under discussion,  
 and a number of diagrams illustrate points of geo-  
 metry, astronomy &c very clearly. His work is not  
 easy to judge to-day, when the best of mediaeval  
 science has no more than a historical interest,  
 but it has the merit of being formally systematic  
 and clear, though aesthetically most unattractive.  
 As for the ideas expounded, they are naturally not  
 meant to be original, and seem neither better nor  
 worse than those of his day so far as we can judge  
 from an inexperienced inspection.

The volume ends, almost as an afterthought, with a commentary on Aristotle's Ethics, of only 20 folii, with no index but the usual references to Scotus. This completes Tartaret's presentation of the works of Aristotle, which includes lengthy discussions on all the branches of knowledge, ranging from logic through physics and metaphysics to ethics. In its content the book is a comprehensive exposition of the main subjects of Scholastic thought and instruction at the time of Rabelais' noviciate, and probably represents a more complete picture than most young friars would know. The striking thing about Tartaret is the unfailing regularity with which he follows the same rhythmic pattern on every page of his work, whatever the subject under discussion. Under such circumstances the question of style is almost irrelevant; there is no room for elegance and wit, or even devotion, where no deviation from the pattern is permissible. Each subject is examined with scrupulous care, both sides of every minor question considered, all arguments reduced to syllogisms and the section only closed when an authoritative conclusion makes further debate impossible. The effect of such a discipline on a rebellious and original mind must be violent, and there is clearly little room for compromise.

This work of Tartaret gives a good idea of the form in which Scotist ideas were presented, and indeed claims to incorporate all the essentials of Scotus' great commentaries on the Sentences. Some account of Scotism as such must now be attempted, and in this connexion it is as important to the present purpose

to see which questions were debated as to study the answers proposed. It is fortunately irrelevant whether particular texts whose authenticity is still in dispute were by Scotus or not, since in Rabelais' time they would be taught if sufficiently important in themselves.

The basis of Scotus' thought is his attitude to being, which he regards as the proper study of metaphysics, but in an absolute sense, not by analogies. For him 'l'univocité de l'être', applying to God as to creatures, was fundamental. God for him was being par excellence, infinite, necessary and first in the order of being. Neither the Thomist view, whereby creatures have only an existence analogous to God's, nor the Augustinian, which taught the participation of creatures in the divine Ideas, which they somehow reflected, was acceptable to Scotus in his insistence that 'esse' means the same whenever it is used. An immediate consequence of this was the Scotist theory of the will, without which his system would easily have developed into some form of monism or pantheism: <sup>(3)</sup> "Dans une doctrine qui se fonde sur l'être univoque, et non sur des actes analogiques d'exister, il faut faire intervenir un acte séparateur pour assurer la contingence du possible." This was the divine will, "le décret d'une suprême liberté."

The immediate effects of this are far-reaching; the causal links in the created world cease to have a character of necessity, and all other causes than the first, God, lose their autonomy, existing only by an act of God's will. The obvious impossibility for

unaided reason to reconcile God's unlimited freedom and power with any such degree of autonomy in secondary causes as to make physics intelligible as recognised by Scotus, whose confidence in reason was strictly subordinated to the paramount claims of revelation. In the moral world exactly similar effects can be seen; good works do not in themselves necessarily ensure a man's salvation, since their acceptability in each case depends entirely on God's will. Predestination is thus wholly gratuitous, God having willed that the way to beatitude is through charity grants that virtue to the elect, but freely and not in accordance with any external law dictating his choice. On the highest level, Scotus makes his position perfectly clear; the eternal truths are decreed by God and wholly dependent on his will. <sup>(4)</sup> "Réserve faite au principe de contradiction et de son immutabilité, la volonté de Dieu est donc maîtresse absolue au choix et de la combinaison des essences; elle n'est pas soumise à la règle du bien, c'est au contraire la règle du bien qui lui est soumise."

These views so summarily stated may suggest a voluntarism tending towards anarchy, but nothing could be further from the truth. In physics, while refusing to admit that God is in any way bound by the natures of things to maintain a particular order, Scotus is quite prepared to admit that such an order exists. Similarly the economy of salvation is quite beyond our understanding, but God, who by definition is good and just, cannot, without contradicting his own essence, commit an injustice. In the highest realm of abstraction, his power is limited by logical possibility, so that a square circle is

an absurdity which no unpredictable caprice of omnipotence can produce.

The primacy of God's will with regard to everything created is accompanied by a similar relationship to his understanding. The essences of possible things are thought by God independently of his will, but only actualised by that will acting freely. In man the primacy of the will is easier to follow, and is explicitly stated and explained: <sup>(5)</sup> "la fin suprême de l'homme est dans l'amour, c'est à dire dans la volonté", an idea going back to Dionysius and beyond. Since the object of the will is the good, it is superior to the understanding whose object is the true. It is true that the will acts on <sup>(6)</sup> "les motifs tirés de l'entendement", but "elle demeure libre dans son adhésion au motif." Gilson quotes a striking text from Scotus to show how firm were his ideas on this: <sup>(7)</sup> "Nihil aliud a voluntate est causa totalis volitionis in voluntate." The final decision is always with the will, since only by concentrating our attention on a given thought (like Descartes' "ferme et constante résolution") can the thought become clear enough to have a compelling effect on the will.

This extremely important doctrine of the will differs from Thomist teaching, which gave primacy to the understanding, and is in line with the older Franciscan tradition, deriving from still older sources, for which love, 'caritas', was the supreme object of man.

Another typical Scotist theory, equally opposed to Thomism and equally consistent with Franciscan

tradition is that of hylemorphism. For Scotus the mark of the creature was matter, not necessarily determined quantitatively. Angels, who for St. Thomas were pure spirits, free from all matter, were invested by Scotus with matter, though without quantitative determination, and this view was the subject of much debate between the rival schools of thought. As the OFM retained the theory against opposition it may well have been still in Rabelais' day a favourite subject of debate. The apocryphal question of how many angels could dance on the point of a pin illustrates the sort of subtle arguments to which it might give rise.

In the case of man the theory again ran counter to Thomist teaching, according to which man is a substance composed of matter, the body, united with a form, the soul, neither complete without the other. Scotus alters this solution by saying that the body has a form of its own (*corporeitas*) and the soul matter (like that of the angels) before their union. The technical implications of this are many but they amount to making the soul less dependent on the body (and, of course, vice versa) than in Thomism. This in turn suggests the climate of Augustinian and Platonic rather than Aristotelian thought. One critic has indeed suggested that this hylemorphism may originally derive from the 'Timaeus', where the World-Soul is thus composed. <sup>(8)</sup>

However that may be, Scotist epistemology shows clear enough traces of these antecedents. Like other Franciscans, Scotus combines the theories of Plato and Aristotle, where St. Thomas had tended to follow

the latter.<sup>(9)</sup> "La cause totale de l'intellection est faite de deux causes partielles, l'objet et l'âme", or, as Gilson puts it,<sup>(10)</sup> "toute connaissance requiert une origine sensible, mais les données sensibles ne sont pas tout le contenu de la connaissance ni ce qui en garantit la solidité." Neither the earlier Augustinian view, the theory of illumination held by Bonaventura, nor the Aristotelian "nihil in intellectu quod non prius in sensu" was accepted as satisfactory by Scotus. Though he accepts the logic of Aristotle, and makes science depend on the syllogism, his attitude in metaphysics is reminiscent of an older tradition:<sup>(11)</sup> "l'intellect humain devrait pouvoir s'en passer (sc. du sensible) et le métaphysicien doit tout faire pour s'en passer." It will be seen that a Franciscan had reason to know the epistemology of both Plato and Aristotle.

The final and most characteristic doctrine of Scotus follows from his hylemorphism. For St. Thomas, matter is the individuating principle in things, but for Scotus, refusing to see in matter a mere 'esse in potentia' waiting to be joined to a form, this solution was unacceptable. He wished to reassert the place of the individual in epistemology, where it had come to be regarded as the negation of a particular universal knowledge. For him<sup>(12)</sup> the notion of a mere negation is insufficient to constitute individuality. The individual as such exists by virtue of something positive which makes it just exactly what it is and nothing else. This positive entity he calls the haecceitas.<sup>(13)</sup> This is the "réalité dernière" of nature, and is adæquæ alike to matter,

form and their union to constitute the final full individuation of each. It is not in itself fully intelligible, but even so represents a serious attempt to solve the problem of the universals by rehabilitating the individual, with important implications for later philosophy. There is here again a latent suspicion of anarchy, with <sup>(14)</sup> "ces éléments discrets vont on ne voit pas au tout qu'ils forment un système," but Scotus never developed his thought in that direction, nor is there any reason to suppose he would have done so. Such an emphasis on the value of the individual must be regarded as a major factor in the teaching of Scotism.

This emphasis on the individual, together with the primacy of the will, leads logically to a view of personal responsibility which must colour all ethical thinking. In fact Scotus has very little to say about ethics, in common with many Scholastics who doubted the feasibility of an independent ethic for the Christian, but the implication remains strong in his teaching. In politics very brief texts give a tantalising sketch of a social contract, and an explicit rejection of the communist theories of the 'Republic' in favour of Aristotle's more conventional conception of society. <sup>(15)</sup>

Finally one should mention the great controversy over the Immaculate Conception, which Scotus defended against sustained attacks from the OP. It is not perhaps of prime importance in theology or even devotion, but the debate engendered so much heat that a disproportionate emphasis on the doctrine may well have formed part of Franciscan teaching even in Rebelais' day.



These are the main features of Scotism, and the minimum which any course of study could reasonably be expected to include, though there are other points both interesting and important in themselves, but not relevant to the present study. They could all be expected to figure in the form and content of later Franciscan philosophy. There is, however, another body of doctrine no less typical of the order and equally important. The recognition of Scotus as Doctor Ordinis in no way dethroned Bonaventura, and the tradition to which he was heir is not dead even to-day. After Alexander of Hales, the first Franciscan doctor, Bonaventura was nearest in time to St. Francis, and one soon realises how near he was in spirit as well. Most of his philosophical doctrines were rejected or modified by Scotus, but it may be wise to take into account the possible influence they may have had on anyone seeking alternatives to Scotism which would still be within the official teaching of the order. Gilson sums up very well the preference of the Bonaventuran school for certain doctrines which help <sup>(16)</sup> "sauvegarder les droits de Dieu." First, that illumination is necessary for men to grasp first principles, then "dans l'ordre de la nature l'école franciscaine incline vers les solutions qui n'assujettissent pas trop étroitement l'âme au corps qu'elle anime, et qui n'exagèrent pas l'efficacité accordée aux causes secondes dans leurs opérations"; from this follows a preference for the plurality of forms <sup>(17)</sup> "qui déchargent l'âme humaine des plus basses besognes dont l'aristotélisme entendait la grever," and for "raisons séminales"

which deprive second causes of creative power, reserved solely for God. Finally, Gilson says, when these doctrines had been left behind in the course of time, the one that survived in all Franciscan thought was that: "qui subordonne en nous la connaissance à l'amour et l'intelligence à la volonté."

§ It is this last doctrine alone which really concerns our study of Bonaventura, whose mystic spirit survived even where his formal philosophy did not, and remained a natural complement to Scotism. Some idea of the place occupied by mysticism in Bonaventura's thought can be gathered from Gilson's statement: "Toute la pensée bonaventurienne est concentrée dans 'l'itinéraire de l'âme à Dieu', dont les sept chapitres condensent la matière de plusieurs volumes." One can scarcely imagine that any young priest with the least spark of religious fervour would fail to become acquainted with a work so comparatively short and so different from the drier fare of logic and debate.

The framework of the book is based on St. Francis' ecstatic vision on Monte Alverna, where he received the Stigmata, and the six wings of the seraph are taken by Bonaventura as symbolising the successive stages of the soul's ascent to God. These stages are, like the wings, in pairs. The first two start from the realm of nature, seeking to contemplate God "per vestigia eius in universo", and then "XXX in vestigiis suis in hoc sensibili mundo." These two chapters deal very briefly with a characteristic feature of Bonaventura's thought, the vast and complex system of analogies between natural and supernatural things which he sometimes carries to extraordinary

lengths. The second chapter contains an interesting reference to the macrocosm entering the microcosm (man) through the senses, and also an identification of the 'intelligentiae' of the philosophers (Rabelais' "Intelligences motrices") with the angels of Christian theology. At this early stage we already see dim images, or vestiges, as he calls them, of the divine nature; thus the images engendered by things in man's mind are compared to the generation of the Son from the Father.

The next two stages are in the soul itself. First "per suam (sc. Deus) imaginem naturalibus potentiis insignitam", where the soul becomes conscious that it is made in God's image by seeing in its own processes analogies with God's nature; thus the three faculties of 'memoria' (which includes past and present, and future knowledge) 'intelligentia' and 'voluntas' reflect the relationship between the Father, the Word and the Spirit. In the second of the pair, "in sua imagine rationis gratuitis reformata", man can see his soul restored to its original likeness with God through the grace and mediation of Christ. Here Bonaventura shows how sense preoccupations must no longer be allowed to keep us back from our journey towards God.

In the last pair come contemplation "divinae unitatis per eius nomen primum, quod est esse". In this ch. V, the most interesting for us, we read "contingit contemplari Deum---extra nos per vestigium, intra nos per imaginem, et supra nos per lumen." Shortly afterwards come successively the "ego sum qui sum" text from Exodus and the definition of

God as "sphaera intelligibilis, cuius centrum est ubique et circumferentia nusquam." The last stage accessible to reason is contemplation "Beatissimae Trinitatis in eius nomine, quod est bonum." There, faced with the abyss between man's finite and God's infinite nature there seems no way of completing the journey, but the bridge is always there---Christ, God and Man, mediator and Redeemer.

A seventh chapter sets the mystical crown on the work of reason: "De excessu mentali, et mystico, in quo requies datur intellectui, effectu totaliter in Deum per excessum transeunte." This concludes on a note of the deepest devotion and spiritual exaltation, and Bonaventura makes it clear that the human reason can go so far and no further, allowing us only to embark on the initial stages of the pilgrimage which 'caritas' alone can help us complete.

Side by side with the Christian and devotional implications of Bonaventura's mysticism, it is easy enough to see the Platonic ~~elements~~ elements which had inspired mystics (and not only Christian ones) for centuries. The search for higher truth underlying the distorted and shadowy world of created things, the inward search through self-knowledge for this same truth, even the contemplation of God in his twin attributes of existence and goodness, are features of all neo-Platonism. Obviously the final leap, the mediation of Christ, is the cornerstone of Bonaventura's whole system and at the same time the element most alien to the Platonic tradition.

It is precisely this step which brings Bonaventura closest to the founder of the order, whose

own mysticism pervaded Franciscan thought to a remarkable degree. The extraordinary devotion of St. Francis to his 'Dame Poverty' is well known, and equally well known is the rapidity with which the OFM took its place among other property-owning orders. Many attempts have been made to return to the primitive observance, and in Rabelais' own time the foundations of the Minims at the end of the 15C and the Capuchins at the beginning of the 16C show that there were always forces within the order faithful to the founder's prescriptions. It would, however, be pointless to claim that love of poverty was generally a potent inspiration in the Order in the 16C, though on suitable occasions it provided an obvious theme for sermons and devotions.

More lasting and more vital was St. Francis' attitude to Our Lord, to which we have just referred. A most interesting and perspicacious judgement is worth quoting here: "<sup>(1)</sup>S. Benoît, tout occupé de la présence au Créateur, semble avoir eu un culte plus prononcé pour Dieu le Père, S. Ignace, homme à la fois de feu et de prudence, est l'envoyé au Saint-Esprit. S. François est un vivant brasier d'amour qui se consume devant le Fils et le Verbe fait chair---" The writer who quotes this goes on: "De là cette dévotion singulière pour la Vierge, le Crucifix, le Saint-Sacrement et tout ce qui rappelle les mystères du Verbe. La vie entière du saint et les traditions de son Ordre sont pleines de cet idéal." This special devotion to Christ, no longer, as the same writer puts it, the king enthroned in majesty of Romanesque tympana, but Man and God, this

is quite certainly the outstanding fact of St. Francis' life, and that which beyond all doubt must have influenced every novice who gave more than a passing thought to his religious vocation. The Stigmata of St. Francis is the most celebrated instance of his own devotion, and focusses attention on the intensely personal nature of his Christianity. Few of Rabelais' contemporaries could have shared this devotion to anything like the same degree, but equally few could have failed to make some contact with a belief which brought Christ into man's daily life.

Directly stemming from this is another characteristic Franciscan element; the hagiology of which the 'Liber de Conformitate---' <sup>(16)</sup> is the most famous example. When Henri Estienne sought material to demonstrate the radical impiety of the Catholic Church, he picked out this book for a special attack. The merits and demerits of this fundamentally pious but unrestrained comparison between St. Francis and Our Lord are obvious enough, but the mere fact that new versions continued to appear long after Protestant polemicists had lampooned it is clear enough proof that the OFM approved and even encouraged the book. This can hardly have been excluded from the shortest of Franciscan reading-lists. From every direction the devotional tradition of the order led to Christ, neither the Logos of philosophy nor the Sovereign of art, but Christ the man in whose ministry and sufferings the Christian can try to share.

The other great feature of St. Francis' life is probably the best known of all---his unusual and universal love of nature in every manifestation.

The Canticle to the Sun, the preaching to the birds and the invocation of Sister Death are commonplaces of popular hagiology. Though it is hard to assess how far they may have influenced others for whom no such intimacy with nature was ever possible, there is no doubt that the tradition lived on in the order, where it would appeal specially to the simpler brethren. Bonaventura, as we have seen, made the study of nature and its 'vestiges' of God the first step in spiritual development, and in a different way both Roger Bacon and Ramon Lull showed as much enthusiasm as aptitude for unravelling the secrets of nature. From a philosophical point of view, therefore, it may be reasonable to admit some influence on Franciscan thought of St. Francis' love of creatures.

In another connexion we have quoted Gilson's remark concerning the Pantagruelism of St. Albert, and here we must add St. Francis himself to the list of Pantagruelists before the event. According to his biographer, Thomas of Celano, Francis used to say: (21)  
 "Le plus sûr moyen de déjouer les mille ruses de notre ennemi, c'est de posséder la joie spirituelle--- Aussi le serviteur de Dieu qui sent le trouble envahir son âme devra prier de suite et implorer le Père céleste jusqu'à ce que cette joie céleste lui ait été rendue." Numerous examples of his personal gaiety are known, and this is undoubtedly more than the usual spiritual contentment to be sought by all Christians. One has only to read the Rule of St. Benedict (ch. VI), so very human in most respects, to find that mirth was definitely not encouraged in the cloister. Again it is impossible to say how far

this tradition of the founder's personality influenced life in the order by Rabelais' time, but it may well be that the famous 'sel franciscain' was a by-product of just this.

By a striking coincidence, the biographer just quoted is famous in his own right as the author of a work as far removed as possible from all gaiety. It was Thomas of Celano who took up the Biblical and other themes already familiar in the Middle Ages and made of them the superb 'Dies Irae'. In the atmosphere prevailing in the first half of the 16C, it is likely that this great hymn came nearer to expressing Franciscan feelings than the light-hearted joy of the founder. One can imagine what effect such a work could produce on an impressionable reader, but fascinating as speculation would be, there is unfortunately no evidence to justify indulging it in Rabelais' case.

With St. Francis the popular element is already present with the mystical, and the sermons and devotional literature of the OFM from the 'Fioretti' onwards owe more to his spirit than to the order's philosophers. Fevre's attractive picture of Frère François Rabelais going off one Sunday to preach to some rural community is, in the present state of our knowledge, no more than imagination. There is probably no historical problem less likely of solution than that of how a member of a given order passed his daily life in the 16C. When the Rule is strictly observed there is not much difficulty, when its infractions are sufficiently flagrant publicity usually exposes them, but neither of these situations seems to have obtained at Fontenay,



and we can probably never hope to know what pastoral duties, if any, the brethren there undertook. There is, however, no doubt that sermons would play a notable part in their lives, and that they both listened to them and, if priests, studied how to deliver them. The work of <sup>Mauro</sup> ~~Rabelais~~, which Rabelais may even have known from the pulpit, resumes to a marked degree the different strains of Franciscan thought just outlined, together with the common fund of belief and tradition which all alike had shared throughout the Middle Ages and up to the changes of the mid 16C.

It so happens that the form in which these sermons have come down to us emphasises their intellectual affiliations more clearly than a verbatim report would have done. It is clear that not only the stage directions to the preacher ('clama', 'sed de hoc sobrie' &c) but also a certain number of the erudite references of the written version were not delivered as such to the public. It shows, therefore, quite unmistakably the sources at the disposal of any competent preacher of Rabelais' time. Statistics in this case are less likely to mislead than usual, since they represent a deliberate and not a random or hurried selection of authors. Patristic sources are referred to directly about 120 times, Franciscan authors about 100, seculars and members of other orders about 50, equalling in this the total of the main representatives of Classical learning, Juvenal, Ovid, Seneca and Aristotle. Even this gives only a partial picture; individual totals are still more revealing. The eight authors quoted most

frequently are Augustine(47), Bonaventura(32), Scotus and Gregory(26), Alexander of Hales and Bernard(22) and Aquinas (18). The three Fathers (with John Chrysostom, who comes next, but some way behind) are not unexpected authorities, famous as they all are for their sermons and homilies, The most striking thing is the remarkable loyalty to Franciscan authors, approached indeed only by St. Thomas and St. Bernard. In a field of such vague conjecture as that of what 16C training in the OFM was, this is positive evidence of a most valuable kind that members of the order learned above all from their illustrious predecessors. It is particularly interesting that as late as Menot's time, the two earlier doctors, Alexander and Bonaventura, enjoy between them an authority vastly greater than that of Scotus, let alone Ockham, who is barely mentioned.

It would be an exhausting, and perhaps impossible, task to make a similar census of other Franciscan preachers contemporary with Menot, and in the absence of any such conclusive data one must <sup>not</sup> rely too much on generalisations from a single particular. Nevertheless, Menot had great personal influence, and it seems absolutely reasonable to suppose that his selection (or perhaps that of his reporter) is representative of an important body of the order in France at that time. It is at least significant that a very similar selection appears to have been made by the famous Olivier Maillera a generation earlier. <sup>(21)</sup>

Besides these theological and philosophical quotations there is a mass of references to Canon,

and sometimes Civil, law, in keeping with the common practise of expounding either a theological or a legal point as part of a sermon. (23)

It is hard to specify the exact use made in the sermons of all these authorities. Very often their name is added almost gratuitously to a perfectly commonplace remark; Aristotle is quoted on the very first page for the opinion "dies est latio solis super terram". Most often, with Bonaventura, for instance, it is to support a particular interpretation of Scripture or furnish a definition of a theological problem. The collection of sermons we have chosen consists of three Lenten series, one preached at Tours and two at Paris, and only reproduced in part, but they are sufficiently numerous as it is to give a good idea of the preacher's habits. His discussion of specific problems of theology is on the same lines as that of Tartaret, described earlier, and he goes to great lengths to expound the weightiest authorities for and against a given solution before giving his conclusion. While his hearers, all lay and, from the context, predominantly feminine on many occasions, are not spared theological technicalities, not to mention compelling syllogisms, the argument is reinforced by vivid comparisons of a familiar and sometimes trivial nature. It is abundantly clear from what has been written about mediæval sermons from the 12C onwards that, while form was fairly rigid, content was of supreme importance (24) so that expression and style were completely subordinated to it. Thus in order to provide his hearers with arguments which even the least learned could

follow, Menot goes to the kitchen, the farmyard, the fields, and adapts his language accordingly. The important thing is that in sermons destined for the laity learned and familiar elements are combined more or less equally, so that it is in the highest degree probable that any change in the ratio required for a more learned audience would stress the intellectual and not the homely elements. Henri Estienne is typical of a line of critics still extant to-day who for one purpose or another pick out the less reputable sections of mediaeval sermons and ignore the rest, less sensational but more significant. If Maillard, Menot, Brulefer and the rest were free with their language, and if that is a cause for scandal, it must not be forgotten that for them this was only one means to an end, served equally well in different circumstances by recourse to the solemn weight of authority.

As far as doctrine is concerned these sermons seem to follow very closely in a tradition going far back into the Middle Ages. It is noteworthy that Christ is the central figure of all the devotion, much more so than God the Father, let alone the Holy Spirit, and while any Lenten course is bound to lead up to a deep consideration of the Passion and Resurrection, these give the impression of concentrating more than usual on the person of Our Lord. The two Passions, preached at some years interval at Tours and Paris respectively, inevitably attract the most attention, whether from a literary or religious point of view, and for all their crudity have a remarkable force. Every detail of the long

agony is considered, all the episodes, even those of which the Gospels give no more than a hint, are minutely and vividly analysed. All the minor actors and the scenes of each incident are made intensely real, and together with the deep devotional fervour of each sermon is a meticulous account of the central fact of Christianity in historical terms. It is particularly significant for our study that in each of the sermons Menot quotes pagan testimony: <sup>(125)</sup> "Monsieur Saint Denis estant à Athènes, voyant l'eclipse au soleil a l'heure de midy, va dire: 'Vel tota machina mundi destruitur vel Deus naturae patitur.'" The Paris sermon quotes just the same words, preceded by more meteorological details. The editor's note says: "D'après la légende (sc. aorée) ce propos aurait été tenu, non pas par Denys, mais par les philosophes athéniens, témoins du prodige." We have already mentioned its occurrence in a 13C Franciscan book of exempla, and it seems very likely that it was found in more Passiontide sermons than not.

An interesting detail of the Paris Passion is suggestive of wider extension. Speaking of the soldiers at Calvary, Menot says: <sup>(126)</sup> "super vestem eius sortem mittentes. Tunc impletus est illud (Ps. XXI): 'Diviserunt sibi vestimenta mea et super vestem meam miserunt sortem.' Nota de ludo taxillorum." This last direction to the preacher brings into an unexpected light the universal detestation of gambling, ranging from the prohibition of St. Louis in history to that of Gargantua in fiction.

It is hard to pin down to specifically Franciscan influences Menot's attitude to Christ. His emphasis

on Our Lord's person is very marked, but without a satisfactory basis of comparison one cannot judge how far it was exceptional. His verbal reverence is constant to our "Creator, Dominus ac Redemptor" and there can be no question of his religion putting any belief or practise on the same level as adoration of Our Lord. In one curious passage he refers to a theory that Our Lord's wounds numbered exactly 5490, not, as one might expect, of Franciscan origin, but from the 'Vita Christi' by Ludolph of Saxony, a Carthusian. (27)

Though Menot makes very little of the theme of the 'Liber de Conformitate', it is clear from Estienne that other members of the order were less cautious. In fact, the two chief Franciscan saints, Francis and Antony of Padua, are hardly mentioned at all by Menot, and are certainly in no way elevated to receive worship. This is in keeping with his completely impartial tone; the Franciscan ideal of poverty is often and warmly extolled, edifying stories are told of Friars (the conversion of Alexander of Hales is a favourite), but in castigating the faults of unworthy brethren Menot makes no exception for his own order.

Between his worship of Our Lord and normal respect for the array of saints, Menot shows a particular devotion for Our Lady, which is frequently manifest in passages addressed directly to his female hearers. This is quite usual, as is his attitude to another popular saint of the Middle Ages, Mary Magdalene. The two sermons he devotes to her display an eloquence, and perhaps a fervour too, which can rarely have been equalled in that field. The opportunity to

press home an argument ad hominem--more precisely, ad feminam--was too good to be missed, but there are signs that Menot may have had a personal devotion for this saint. He seems to have been impressed by the relic of her head at St. Maximin, but does not say whether he had also been to Vézelay. Her cult is directly connected with the preoccupation of Menot--and, if we are to believe Estienne of his confrères--with sins of the flesh. Stews, seductions of innocent girls, adultery and even over-indulgence within the legal bonds of wedlock are condemned in the strongest terms in one sermon after another. Though he specifies Tours as a place of exceptional iniquity, the place obviously varied with the preacher and the moment. There seems no doubt that any specially invited preacher (as a friar had to be) would pay special attention to sexual behaviour.

There is no great theological significance in this condemnation of a perennial state of affairs, nor in the other vices reproved by Menot. He gives as: <sup>(18)</sup> "mestiers grandement prejudiciables et dommageables à la povre asme" these "l'estat de gendarmerie, advocasserie, pratique, notaires, marchands de chevaux, courratiers, menteurs, paillardes," --- only the horse-copers are absent from Rabelais' similar catalogues. As Neve says, however, it is not only the stock abuses of all time that Menot censures, but also: "les maux dont son époque souffrait à l'état aigu, la vénalité des charges, le cumul des bénéfices ecclésiastiques, le népotisme, le relâchement des mœurs et de la discipline, sont dénoncés par lui sans aucun ménagement." As an example of Menot's "aucun ménagement"

we may quote from one of his sermons describing a visit to Hell: "Ecce, fuerunt multi papa, uammati ad omnes demones, episcopi, iudices, consilarii et de toute telle manière de billon." If the language is similar, the intention is certainly not to be confused with that of a contemporary like Gringoire, whose attacks on the Pope and 'papularise' are frankly political. This, too, is more clearly a case of a Franciscan (or at least, a Mendicant) attitude, since the seculars were for the most part too involved in the practises condemned to speak against them from the pulpit, unless it were to impute the same iniquity to the Frāiars.

With the attacks on gambling, usury and legal abuses Menot joins a throng of protesters, lay and religious, and only repeats arguments familiar for centuries. His guiding principle, as individual sermons show, is a warm sympathy for the poor and oppressed, especially those exploited by the injustice of the law or by financial extortion. This sphere, least intellectual of all, is that in which it is easiest to find resemblances between Menot and Rabelais, some quite startling. It is a matter for serious consideration whether the attacks on abuses in Rabelais' work could not have been delivered substantially as they stand from a Franciscan pulpit. Menot's position of authority in the administration of the order is a guarantee that his orthodoxy was never in question.

In his picture of contemporary religious life, Menot gives a few indications of the normal standard of devotion, a subject of exceptional complexity



and difficulty in any age. His attitude to the Sacraments is interesting. Baptism is hardly mentioned, indeed it was so automatic that its deeper religious meaning was easily lost to sight. Confirmation and Ordination are ignored. Extreme Unction is mentioned once ~~or~~ twice, but only to emphasise the urgency of making a Christian death, fortified by the rites of the Church, as against the all too common pre-occupation of family and dependents with financial matters. As is to be expected in sermons so often addressed directly to the women members of the congregation, a fairly frequent topic is matrimony, but admitted as a necessary evil and not really from a sacramental point of view. Like Frère Enguerrant, but with less picturesque emphasis, is not disapproved of second marriages: (30)

"Persona volens manere in viduitate, sciat perfectiorem esse statum illum quam aliam---quanto aurum est preciosius argento, tanto status virginitatis nobilior est statu viduitate. Et quanto argentum pretiosius est plumbo, tanto viduitas est pretiosior ac dignior statu matrimoniale."

As has been said above, even conjugal relations are subjected by Menot to a discipline no less unnatural for being based on many pronouncements by doctors of theology. Menot, like the company of the TL, has no high opinion of woman at all, unless it be in a state of religion, and himself tells a charming anecdote worthy of Rabelais of a female penitent who found it impossible to carry out the penance prescribed for her excessive gossiping---that she should keep silence for as long as it took her to say one rosary: (31) "Quam difficile est silere, numquam sumam penitentiam silentii."

Naturally enough in a Lenten series, the chief stress is laid upon the necessity of making adequate preparation for the Easter Communion, and in particular of a good confession beforehand. By modern standards the Communion itself plays a very secondary role, and it is hard to realise how much Catholic practise has changed in this matter since the Council of Trent. The Lateran Council which enjoined the faithful as an obligation that they should communicate (and confess) in their own parish at least once a year, was not regarded as laying down a minimum so much as a norm. Menot speaks: <sup>(32)</sup> "De homine qui fecit Pascha extra parochiam suam, quia si fecisset in parochia sua fuisset coactus recipere uxorem, ~~et~~ reversus est ad meretricem et adhuc stabit ita toto anno, nescio quid dicam." If this is put forward as a hypothetical case, the context makes it clear that it is founded on fact.

Other texts show that the Easter Communion was received by all as an inescapable necessity, sometimes regardless of the spiritual state of the recipient: <sup>(33)</sup> "Sunt aliqui et aliquae in parochiis vestris qui dominica (sc. Easter) recipient Corpus in tali statu, quod forte non esset eis tantum malum si diabolus strangularet eos coram omnibus." Again, in the first week of Lent, he asks his hearers: <sup>(34)</sup> "Sunt ne in societate qui determinaverunt confiteri in vigilia Pasche et communicare sequenti die, ieiunare anno futuro et non isto anno? Car ceste caresme est trop fascheuse." Allowing for preacher's licence, it seems that Communion meant for the mass of the people a duty to be performed annually at Easter,

no more nor less significant than Baptism and incurring the same social (as distinct from spiritual) inconvenience if neglected.

On the other hand, one sermon after another speaks of the necessity of a good confession, and repentance is the main theme of many of them. Typical is this charge: <sup>(35)</sup>

"Stabitis per annum sine confessione, et in fine anni exitis per 4 horas 'à confesse', et tamen omnium recordari non poteritis---multa retinebitis et non confitebitur nisi que velitis quod presbyter sciat---Volo dicere quod impossibile est quod persona que a medio anno non fuit confessa sit secure."

The mere fact that Menot found it necessary to condemn such infrequent confession shows that the practise must have been relatively common. By and large it is true to say that of all the Sacraments Penance is that on which Menot has most to say, and, more important, which he stresses as most necessary for a healthy spiritual life and salvation hereafter.

It follows from this particular bias that he goes to some lengths to impress on his hearers not only the rewards promised to the elect, but the punishments to be suffered by the damned. Angels and demons play a constant and energetic part in his scheme of things, and direct allusions prove that mediaeval drama was the source of some of his imagery (though, of course, the influence worked in both directions). Specially striking is a sermon on the need for repentance, describing the sinner's last moments: <sup>(36)</sup> "Secu cum venit mors, la farce est jouée, deposita sunt vestimenta et ornamenta. C'est la fin du jeu. O quand le jeu sera fini et quod deponentur vestimenta, bufones (i.e. demones) erunt circa te."

The devil and his minions appear in many guises. One recalls a favourite theme of Rabelais: "Et diabolus apparuit ei (Simon Stylites) in forma angeli relucantis," and also in several animal and human shapes. Menot's naturally vivid style, combined with a fertile imagination, must have impressed even his more sophisticated hearers with misgiving. His firm belief in the supernatural extended to miracles of every kind, and in this as in his acceptance of very dubious relics as authentic, he shows the continuing credulity of the Middle Ages.

A final point is Menot's style, and in particular his choice of imagery. There is nothing Scholastic about his language or choice of familiar similes, but in one respect he shows a close affinity with those who composed the mediaeval encyclopaedias and bestiaries. A quite astonishing number and variety of animals come into his sermons in one way or another. Some extended similes, like the Carnival bull in Paris, parading decked out through the streets only to be slaughtered still wearing all his finery, and the very lively magpie-hunt, come more than once, and there can be hardly a single sermon without a reference to some animal. Some of these (Basilic, Coquatrix) are of learned origin, from some encyclopaedia or work on Natural History, but very many are apparently derived from personal observation and interest. In the primarily rural atmosphere of the Middle Ages such references to animals are less surprising, and in any case the philosophers had established that the lower orders of creation are a useful step and guide to higher truths, so that Natural History was not out of place even in learned

sermons. In 160 Paris and Tours the rural element is less pronounced, though the tradition lived on. This may be a case of St. Francis' own spirit influencing Renot, or it may simply be a coincidence, but the mere volume of texts is such as to demand consideration.

This is far from giving a complete analysis of Renot's work, let alone of the possible influence of Franciscan preachers in general, but from these very diverse elements can be composed certain well-defined themes, all of which must have been familiar to any member of the order whether as listener or preacher.

One more source of influence cannot be omitted, though one can only speculate on details. The popular devotional literature of the time would have been represented in greater or lesser degree in the reading-matter available in religious houses. From the end of the 150 the influence of Lefèvre and his associates had been very great in spreading mystical ideas in learned circles. Through them, Cusa, Dionysius, and other neo-Platonists had become widely known in intellectual milieux, and there is every reason to believe that such works would have come Rabelais' way. It seems, however, infinitely more probable that he would have made contact with this type of work outside the cloister, for example through his cultured friends at Fontenay. Within the monastery itself there would have been the usual collection of works of popular hagiology and devotion, such, for instance, as Maillara had written in the early years of the century, but their influence

is very uncertain in the case of any individual friar, all the more with one like Rabelais. The one outstanding devotional book which was frequently reprinted at the time and must therefore have been in continuing demand was the 'Imitatio Christi', often ascribed at that time to Gerson, for whom all Gallicans had the warmest sympathy, apart from his putative authorship. In a realm of total conjecture it is less unsure than anything else that Rabelais would have known this book, and it is not unduly fanciful to suppose that it may have made an impression of some importance. Certainly the personal religion of the 'Imitatio' and its direct approach to Christ are on the one hand very much what would appeal to a man of Rabelais' temperament, and on the other a great contrast to the spirit of the Schools, though by no means to the tradition of Franciscan mysticism. There is no shred of evidence to justify further speculation, but if it can be admitted that Rabelais ever had any religious impulses at all, such a book as this, which he can reasonably be assumed to have known, would have met his needs to a considerable degree.

By including possible, as distinct from highly probable, formative influences this list could be extended indefinitely, but really to no purpose. What has been considered represents a minimum, but in what proportions the particular components may have been present in Rabelais' training there seems no means of ever knowing.

After such an account of the main lines of Franciscan teaching in Rabelais' day, one is bound to ask whether such teaching could adequately explain

mental habits touching all major problems. To this question the answer can only be affirmative. From the point of view of a working method, Scholastic logic was what Rabelais would have had to learn first, and thoroughly. If he disliked that method, and rejected it at the first opportunity, one must consider what alternatives were available, and how effective they were. In natural sciences the material was not lacking, in the form of commentaries on Aristotle's work for example, embracing every field of human knowledge. If Rabelais had been sufficiently interested at that time he had access to all this, and possibly also to the more specialised work done by Franciscans like Roger Bacon and Ramon Lull, though this is no more than a possibility. Speculation about the sciences is likely to prove the least fruitful, since, acting again on the principle of parsimony, Rabelais' known medical studies would include all that mattered in science, and this, of course, would be no less Scholastic than anything learned in the cloister. In philosophy, metaphysics and epistemology, a very highly developed and characteristic body of doctrine was an inescapable part of the teaching, and its prominence in Menot's popular sermons suggests how much importance the OFM attached to its own theories. The same is true of theology, mystical or otherwise; every major question had an authoritative solution reached after detailed discussion or meditation.

On the spiritual side there was plenty of nourishment at hand, and no need to go beyond the walls for theory, whatever may have been true of practise. The Scotist emphasis on the individual, Bonaventura's

picture of the inner life of the soul, Francis' ecstatic devotion to Christ, and the reiteration of that central theme by all writers of the order, are of incalculable importance in shaping all these elements.

Lastly the factor which in quantity, if not in quality, is preponderant, the rough Franciscan style, "le sel franciscain", the tradition of the unlearned Poverello, the special sympathy for the humble, must all be given due weight in conditioning the outlook of a Friar Minor. Together with these specifically Franciscan features, those common to the general mediaeval outlook must be added---the particular attitude to certain sins and classes of society, to the Sacraments and practises of religion, the devotion to Our Lady, the acceptance of relics and miracles. These last are not so much what Rabelais may <sup>be</sup> supposed to have believed as the background which he knew his readers to possess.

The whole offers a system of great complexity and richness, and to replace it wholly, mainly or even in part by another is clearly not easy. In our conclusion we shall try to see how far Rabelais in his book reflects these influences and what substitutes he could have chosen, taking into account the findings of the chapter on 'Authorities'.



CONCLUSION

The argument from quantity, for which we have so often criticised Rabelais, is unfortunately that on which we have principally to rely in forming a final estimate of his thought. His views on any one subject are seldom sufficiently developed to prove anything conclusive, but taken together, his views on the wide range of subjects examined here do offer solid evidence of a particular mental background. Moreover, although there is often an insufficient depth of texts to permit complete reconstruction of his opinions, there is hardly any subject on which fundamental theories are lacking. The first conclusion to be drawn from this enquiry is that Rabelais's thought is not haphazard, nor even hazy, but is revealed in the work as selective and consistent. Within the limits of a work written for entertainment, it is astonishing to find such a comprehensive framework, at times supporting a not inconsiderable superstructure. If our chapter on God is of necessity disappointingly brief, the succeeding chapters on Spirits and Pan are fuller than one might have expected; if no more than the bare essentials of Ethics and Politics are discussed, detailed views on religion add up to a picture of some significance. The headings chosen for our chapters were originally more or less arbitrary, corresponding to the main subjects on which Rabelais might be expected to have views, but as the work progressed some expansions and contractions were necessary to deal appropriately with the available material. As it stands, therefore, this study is a rough guide

to Rabelais, background both in the titles and lengths of the respective chapters.

The hierarchical conception of the Universe is very marked in Rabelais, and is the first indication of a systematic mental attitude. From God through man to the elements of matter Rabelais classifies all things in a definite scale. He has something to say on the nature and functions of God, spirits, man and woman, animals and plants, the heavenly bodies, the world of matter and of nature herself. All these opinions are scattered through the four books, mostly in disconnected form, and show quite clearly that Rabelais is using terms of reference familiar to himself, and presumably to his readers, and not stating odd opinions as they come to him without system or comment. Within the divisions of the Universe which Rabelais recognises, we have indicated from time to time Scholastic texts which may invite comparison, and we may now summarise our findings.

Rabelais' two definitions of God are deeply rooted in Scholasticism; the "celluy qui est" is without exaggeration the most fundamental single text in Scholastic thought, and the "intellectuale sphære" comes from the heart of that neo-platonism which infiltrated into the works of every mediaeval century from Brigena to Cusa. The names of God to which Rabelais gives special prominence show, on the other hand, a remarkable consistency in stressing his active attributes---especially "Createur" and "Servateur"---and other texts bring out fully his goodness, omnipotence and omniscience. Considering that the majority of these ideas come from the briefest

texts, widely distributed throughout the work, the resultant picture is a surprisingly complete presentation of Rabelais's theology, which though naturally less detailed conforms in every material respect with Scholastic teaching.

The rare mentions of Our Lord, and the Pan chapter in particular, have been examined in some detail and linked up with the mediaeval texts they seem to continue in tradition. The historicity of Christ, Saviour and Lord of mankind, is unequivocally proclaimed. Even the Holy Spirit appears in a single but basic text, so that, contrary to all expectations, all three persons of the Trinity are represented in the work, and by ideas which though not exclusively Scholastic were contained in all Scholastic teaching.

Rabelais's demonology is perhaps his furthest excursion into personal interpretation, and exceptionally valuable for that reason. The three or four works of Plutarch ('De Facie', 'De Genio', 'De Defectu', 'De Iside'), from which virtually all the Classical side of Rabelais's demonology seems to come, is combined with references to angels, all from Scripture, and to devils, from a variety of sources, Scriptural, Scholastic, popular. The theory underlying the intricate synthesis is Scholastic, and the different examples used are interpreted in the light of received Scholastic teaching. The Toledo diabolology, though farcical in context, is entirely Scholastic, and the descriptions of communications between the spirit-world and our own, though mostly Platonic in origin, had been adopted by the Schools. One rather surprising fact is that the works of pseudo-Dionysius

on angels, which one would expect to have appealed to Rabelais, are nowhere mentioned nor is their influence anywhere apparent.

In his treatment of the human soul, most detailed in the TL, Rabelais makes such extensive use of Platonic theories quoted from non-Scholastic sources that one begins to wonder whether any Scholastic influence can underlie it at all. Behind the impressive Platonic façade, however, some more familiar notions can be perceived. When Pantagruel makes formal profession of his belief in the immortality of the soul, it is in Aristotelian, not Platonic, terms, the doctrine of dying souls being endowed with the gift of prophecy had passed into Scholastic teaching, so had the theory of dreams and the soul's return to its first home. The relationship of soul to body, which the pagan and then the Christian neo-Platonists had developed into a mystical system, was a commonplace centuries before the Renaissance took hold of it. In this case the influence of contemporary Platonism on Rabelais is obvious and decisive, but there is no need for that reason to overlook the Scholastic channels through which these ideas, though not these examples, came in the first place.

Rabelais' attitude to women we still believe in the face of the most recent criticism to be essentially mediaeval. His inspiration may have been derived from personal experience, from philosophical or legal theories, from popular tradition, or possibly from contemporary polemics, and it is probable that all of these played their part, but the resultant

judgement on woman, her nature and place in society, is certainly mediaeval, and in its careful use of rational arguments, Scholastic.

Already in the chapter on Nature we have made fairly detailed reference to the similar themes in the 'Roman de la Rose' discussed by Paré. It is doubtful whether Rabelais could, had he wished so, have avoided Scholastic teaching on a subject which had been so radically changed by Christianity. He has many Classical references to Nature and her works, but enough texts to show that mediaeval doctrines prevail. In his physics Rabelais had little option but to follow standard teaching. The elements and their different processes, the nature and movement of the heavenly bodies, the meaning of comets and many other similar topics of no direct doctrinal significance had been treated by Scholastic and Classical authors alike. In the same way, plants and animals had been studied in whichever presentation was the most convenient, Classical, Arab or Christian, and encyclopedic enthusiasm was always purely quantitative. On this point the 'albertinisme' of Pantagruel has already been mentioned, and on the score of Natural Sciences in general Rabelais can be included in a long line reaching back through the Middle Ages to antiquity.

Ethics is a subject on which Rabelais has comparatively little to say. His debt to the Stoics is probably as real as it is apparent, and apart from obvious commonplaces his moral outlook does not seem to owe much to the Scholastics, whose treatment of Ethics was in any case overshadowed by

religious considerations. His Politics, on the other hand, are a curious mixture of idealised feudalism and Roman jurisprudence, which corresponds much more closely with mediaeval ideas than its application to contemporary affairs would seem to suggest. His aversion to Canon law does not prevent him from knowing it, apparently quite well, and it must not be forgotten that the arguments of the Papimanie episode are no less Scholastic for being offensive to Rome. Gallican legists had been arguing on similar lines for a very long time.

Last on the intellectual side there is no need to stress that all Rabelais' views on logic, epistemology and kindred subjects are directly affected by Scholastic teaching, either by consciously opposing it or by unconsciously following it. When he talks of matter and form, species and individuals, ideas and phantasmata, Rabelais is using the same language in the same way as his masters.

When it comes to religion the question of Scholastic influence is somewhat different. Even the most ardent Reformers, if they had any learning, had to deal with Scholastic teaching, if only to refute it. First, perhaps, among the new doctrines was the need to go directly to the Scriptures, source of all the essential articles of the Christian faith, but nothing could be more foolish than to suppose even the most reactionary of Scholastics indifferent to the reading of Scripture. Scholastics and Reformers differed in their attitude to interpreting the Bible, and consequently in their attitude to allowing all the faithful access to it. Rabelais' use of

Scripture is often ostentatiously Evangelical, in a polemical sense, but there is more than one passage where he uses the Bible in just the same way as the preachers and writers of the Middle Ages; for instance, the examples of whiteness in a serious context, and Lasdaller's exposition of the Psalm in a comic one. Though his heroes devote much time to Scriptural study, there is no suggestion that every man is competent to interpret the Holy Word according to his lights.

On the subject of prayer and reverence it is the practise, not the theory, of his former brethren that Rabelais condemns, and his own case illustrates the divergencies which may exist between the two. His attitude to the Sacraments depends in the first instance on Scholastic teaching defining them, and after considering all the evidence available in his work, the extent and limits of his criticism seem to correspond fairly well with the sort of picture presented by Menot. Points of doctrine, like grace and free will, faith and works, are discussed only incidentally, but using Scholastic terms and, as far as one can judge from the material, following Scholastic lines. Rabelais' views on monasticism have been seen to be deceptive, in that they barely face the real issue, and except for the denial that intercessory prayer has any efficacy are more concerned with practical abuses than theories or ideas.

All in all, the picture of religion presented in Rabelais' work, whether it coincides with his private belief or not, owes more to Scholasticism than any other influence, sometimes expressed in negative

reactions, sometimes in unexpected concurrences. In the sense that Jean de Meung's attacks on certain aspects of Scholasticism can be called Scholastic as well as mediaeval, the views of Rabelais on religion may also be said to be Scholastic, and not merely in popular tradition.

If we may sum up in a rather sweeping generalisation, it may be said that wherever there is a system and pattern in Rabelais' thought, philosophical or religious, it can be accounted for by Scholastic influence, and that there are remarkably few subjects on which material is so scanty that no system can be discerned. What we have been loosely calling Scholastic was more or less common to all mediaeval teaching, and if the generalisation is to have any historical justification, it must be demonstrated in addition that Rabelais' mental habits reflect specifically Franciscan influences, since the particular form of training he received had certain well-defined characteristics, which the preceding chapter has attempted to describe. How far such a demonstration can be convincing on the evidence as it stands must remain a matter of opinion. Our intention is not so much to prove a thesis as to conduct an enquiry, or at least show what questions must be satisfactorily answered before any thesis can be stated with confidence. If it were not a known historical fact that Rabelais had been a member of the OFM, it is most unlikely that anything in his work alone could ever lead to more than a strong suspicion of that possibility, but that is not the point; since the fact is so, it is entirely legitimate to look in Rabelais' work for the teaching of the order



to be reflected.

The strong negative influence of the rigidly formal presentation of Scotism need not be considered again. As a psychological and literary factor it is probably as important as any of the more positive influences. His reactions against Franciscan Mariology and love of poverty are only contributory, not decisive factors, but these too deserve a place in any serious psychological study. On the positive side, the emphasis in Scotism on angelology, <sup>due to</sup> ~~and~~ the characteristic doctrine of hylemorphism which the order had to defend against its rivals, is a very likely contributory factor to the keen interest and unusually detailed thought with which Rabelais approaches the subject of the spirit-world. The occult writers with whom he seems to have had a passing acquaintance, Agrippa at least, show a very different attitude to the same problems, and while Ficino comes nearer Rabelais' position, there is no reason to suppose him <sup>or his</sup> ~~or his~~ followers responsible for Rabelais' original interest.

More than these interesting, but admittedly vague, affinities, there are two doctrines essential to Scotism and of great importance in Rabelais as well. The primacy of the will, and the haecceitas theory, following a preoccupation with the problem of individuation, are the hallmarks of Scotism and are to be found again in Rabelais free from vagueness. For Scotus, God's will is absolute and inscrutable, limited only by logical possibility, and not subject to any anthropomorphic interpretations of divine justice. This, as we have seen, is a constantly recu-

rent theme in Rabelais, and largely motivates his attacks on astrologers. His almost fierce defence of God's absolute power leads him to explicit condemnation of the Calvinist theory of predestination, and comes at times near the 'quietism' mentioned by Fevre.

In man the same is true; Rabelais insists on the right use of reason, but makes the will the instrument of responsibility in several texts which contrast at first sight with the tendency to intellectualism of the TL. In fact the primacy of the will, human and divine, is so strongly marked in Rabelais' thought that it seems unreasonable to ascribe it primarily to anything but Scotist influence.

The question of individuation, even apart from a textual reference to Scotus' theory, seems also to have exercised a profound influence on Rabelais. The vivid portraits of even minor characters may be primarily due to Rabelais' exceptional literary gifts, but there is a moral emphasis on the individual distinct from this. Throughout the work there is a marked preference for the individual rather than the universal, in both characters and phenomena. In the case of the human characters, this emphasis is far from that sort of individualism, the desire for personal glory, so often associated with the Renaissance, especially in Italy. It is tantalising that the authenticity of the CL is so uncertain that we cannot know whether the message of the Oracle is a genuine expression of Rabelais' belief in a subjective truth, but it can certainly be said that the later Franciscan tradition from Scotus onwards was peculiarly favourable to such a development.

If Scotism, which we know to have been antipathetic to Rabelais, influenced him in these ways, it is only to be expected that the other side of Franciscan teaching, that of Bonaventura, being more congenial to him, would be reflected in his work. This indeed appears in several respects to be the case. The very deep Franciscan devotion to the person of Christ, and the conscious striving to follow in his footsteps, is a clue to Rabelais' religion, though only in the Pan chapter are the indications compelling. The very personal religion of which this is the core is, however, just that of the giants. Usually to support charges of Rabelais' 'atheism', critics have sometimes taken Pentagruel to be a parody of Our Lord, and though this is a perilous path to follow, the extended comparison between St. Francis and Our Lord was, as mentioned in the last chapter, universally known in the OFM, so that the possibility cannot be dismissed of a conscious or unconscious reminiscence of this lying behind some of Pentagruel's conduct, notably in the storm. The parody theory as such is hardly worth refuting.

Another side of Bonaventura's teaching is of obvious and decisive importance. By preserving the older Augustinian tradition in the face of Aristotelian encroachments, Bonaventura bequeathed to later generations of Franciscans a body of doctrine essentially favourable to Platonism and containing not a few of its features. The mysticism which believed in the possibility of union between God and the soul, in the necessity of rising above the body and the hindrance of the senses, must be fully taken

into account when one looks for the sources of Rabelais' Platonism. The spirituality of Bonaventure need not necessarily have awakened a very fervent response in Rabelais, but there is every reason to suppose that he early found in it a satisfying alternative to the arid formalism of Scotus. It must also be remembered that while intellectual influences mark a man permanently, it is a matter of common experience that one can go through a period of affective influence, even with considerable fervour, only to grow out of it later. Much undoubtedly remains after such an experience, but it is not from a man's mature character that one can assess the strength of these earlier affective influences. For this reason it may well be that we are understating the debt to Bonaventure. In any case, when his humanist friends at Montenay initiated him into the study of their Plato, Rabelais was taking another step on a path already familiar, not breaking fresh ground. As far as his metaphysics are concerned, Rabelais may be said to have derived positive and lasting impetus from his Franciscan teaching.

A possibility that deserves serious consideration is that Pantagruelism may be related to the peculiarly Franciscan notion of 'caritas'. What little real emotion there is in Rabelais' work comes most often from Pantagruel; it is he who weeps great tears after telling the Pan story, who cries out in anger and disgust at Frère Jan's anecdote of the "jambe de Dieu", and who shows such warmth of affection for his father. As the prototype, "l'idée et exemplaire", of the Pantagruelist, the hero clearly exhibits

the qualities which Rabelais considered the most desirable. His guiding principle is, in a word, goodwill. He always thinks the best of everyone till malice is proved, we see him tolerant of his companions' faults until they go too far by sinning against God, and with all the people he meets Pantagruel is distinguished by a tolerance and courtesy which his companions often fail to match. In a Christian prince, and a hero proclaimed as an ideal, this is not altogether unexpected conduct, but it is also the result of a general principle, meant to have the widest application. The side of Pantagruelism expressed in the formula 'de contemptu rerum fortuitarum' is only half of it, "le stoicisme gai", and the other aspect is no less important. It is certainly true that the behaviour of the OFM to people in general and to Rabelais in particular fell painfully short of the founder's ideal, but it is none the less true that the ideal lived on in a specifically Franciscan doctrine. That the same teaching is in the N.T. is no argument against Franciscan influence. In this connexion it is interesting to recall how all critics contrast the bitterness of the CL with the essential goodwill of the other four books.

In the Biblical sense, Pantagruel is really an example of a man who "loves God and his neighbour as himself", but there is more to it than this. St. Francis, as we know, used to style himself 'God's jester', and alone of the great religious orders the OFM had what one might call an official tradition of gaiety. The N.T. itself does not supply this element, and it is in the highest degree probable that the cheerful love of St. Francis for his

fellow-men played its part in the final formulation of Pantagruelism. Of the saint's feeling of kinship with all created things, there is no echo in Rabelais, but none the less the interest in natural things so often mentioned is a step in that direction, and one incidentally beyond which few later Franciscans went.

If these are the main doctrines which resemble certain aspects of Rabelais' thought, there are other, more nebulous, influences which closely correspond to ideas in his work, but whose presence in his training can only be asserted as a possibility. The scientific tradition of the order, and such personalities as Roger Bacon and Ramon Lull, could, given local conditions have escaped Rabelais' notice altogether (though Gargantua knows enough about Lull to condemn his system in his letter), but could equally well have sown the seeds which led him much later, after his transfer to the OSE, to take up medicine. Another Franciscan activity which Rabelais' work, especially the QL, calls to mind is the lively organisation of foreign missions, which took Franciscans to the furthest corners of the earth and produced some of the most famous of mediaeval travellers' tales. Only the OP came near to rivalling the OFM in this field, and it is a reasonable conjecture that a man with such a taste for the exotic as Rabelais may have found an early stimulus in the chronicle of some adventurous friar.

Finally there is the literary aspect, already discussed by Gilson, which could well form the subject of a separate and exhaustive study. Salimbene,

whom Gilson cites, is an early example of one who could combine serious themes (e.g. his portrait of St. Louis) with a full measure of 'sel franciscain'. From the preachers of his own and the preceding generation Rabelais seems to have profited considerably. Their popular appeal was long and well-established, and in his desire to write something that would sell well, Rabelais was safe to follow their example. The cheap books, 'Grandes Chroniques' and the like, come far behind both Rabelais and these sermons in variety and vivacity of style, and since it can reasonably be assumed that Rabelais, for a time at least, expected to follow the career of a monk, it is time that honour was paid to his true literary antecedents.

The selection of Estienne gives for polemic reasons a disproportionate amount of 'sel franciscain', but even so the freedom of thought and language, the homeliness and even triviality of illustrations, and the incongruous juxtaposition of sacred and profane are only less in quantity, not in degree, than he represents. The oral style of Rabelais has often been noted and contrasts strongly with what one can presume to be his normal literary style as shown in the letters and 'Sciomachie'. Without disputing his own gifts as a writer, his debt to others in this oral style may be fully acknowledged, and there should be no hesitation in attributing to these Franciscan sermons a primary share in forming it. It should be stressed that it is in just the element which makes these sermons <sup>not only</sup> ~~mediaeval~~ but Scholastic that Rabelais' debt appears; the farces,

the popular prose and verse tales of the Middle Ages all contributed to shape the style of Rabelais and of the 'Grandes Chroniques', but it is only in the sermons that we find that peculiar blend of learned and lewd, sacred and comic, not to say scabrous.

If each of these points taken separately could be disposed of by a reasoned attack, together they present an argument which has more than just plausibility. It is perfectly true that a man need not have been a Franciscan for him to emphasise the primacy of the will and at the same time incline to Platonic mysticism, to show enthusiasm for Natural Sciences and foreign parts, to echo almost textually the sermons of the order and to have a philosophy of life reminiscent of St. Francis. If nothing but the "clair et distinct" would do, there are few conclusions of Rabelaisian criticism which would survive, but as it is, a high degree of probability is the most to which one can aspire. Under these circumstances we would conclude not only that Rabelais' thought shows the influence of Scholastic training, but that the specific influence of the OFM is also recognisable.

Unless the influence of Rabelais' Franciscan years is accepted as decisive for the subsequent formation of his mental background, some other source or sources must be found to account for it. As soon as one tries to find the alternative the nature of the problem becomes at once apparent. His Classical reading is quite certainly not a foundation, however impressive it may be as a superstructure,



and for all his vaunted Platonism, neither this nor Stoicism does more than provide illustrious names in support of general ideas. From the point of view of technique in satire and storytelling the influence of such authors as Plutarch and Lucian is very great, but still only a secondary development of something already existing.

A more promising field might seem to be the humanist authors, through whom in any case so much of the work's Classical erudition seems to come. Erasmus and Budé are the two authors with whom Rabelais is known to have had contact and whom he admired immensely. The literary debt to Erasmus is very considerable, and certain developments of ideas are almost certainly inspired by him, but when it comes to tracing in Rabelais a comprehensive system borrowed from Erasmus, one is forced to give up the attempt. Granted, Erasmus' N.T. Christianity, his Classical scholarship, his contempt for the Middle Ages, are all in Rabelais, but the imagination has to be unduly stretched to see how Pantagruelism can owe anything to a man in whom goodwill and "stoicisme gai" are so conspicuously lacking. Since Bohatec's work we know much more about Budé, but if we accept his conclusion and admit Rabelais to be an echo of Budé similar difficulties arise; the theme of 'De Contemptu' and its Christian adaptation of Stoicism are in Rabelais, and---what Bohatec does not but could claim---the title 'De Transitu Hellenismi' is of equal significance to Rabelais' later thought. On the other hand, Budé's high seriousness and absence of universal curiosity (for all his versatility in Classical erudition) leave fundamental aspects of

Rabelais' thought unexplained. Budé comes nearer than Erasmus to fulfilling the requirements, and his personal intervention into Rabelais' life at a comparatively early date makes him a fruitful source of study. Such points as the position of Christ in his theology, and his insistence on the title 'servator', of which Rabelais was to make such constant use, as well as his political interests, show interesting and suggestive affinities with Rabelais, but his influence is still inadequate either in quantity or quality to account wholly for the system of Rabelais' thought. As for other humanists, Postel, Bigot, des Periers, for instance, they all had personal relations, direct or indirect, with Rabelais and probably account for the presence of individual ideas in his mind, but even the sum total of all their influence fails to produce the combination we have seen in Rabelais.

As medicine has deliberately been omitted from this enquiry for reasons stated earlier, it may be well to mention it briefly now, before once more dismissing it. Even assuming that Rabelais came to his medical studies either ignorant or forgetful of all Scholastic teaching, the instruction of the medical schools incorporated more than physiology and medicine; psychology, botany, even astronomy were all connected with medicine, and in each of these Scholastic doctrines would be taught together with any accessible and relevant Arab and Classical texts (which the Schools had in any case long since used). There can be no question of medical studies supplying anything like a comprehensive system or one independent of Scholasticism.

The remaining alternative is the Reform, but it is in the highest degree unlikely that this exercised more than the most limited influence on Rabelais' thought. Moore's careful study of Luther's influence in France shows only passing resemblances in the field of religion, and in other spheres the question simply does not arise. With Calvin there was probably personal contact, and certainly indirect contact, but the only influence on which one can seize is negative. Lefèvre and his school may have contributed something, again perhaps by personal contact, but again the sum total of all their influence is clearly of only minor importance.

The extreme argument against Scholastic influence being decisive is at once the most common and the most telling. According to this Rabelais "prenait son bien où il le trouvait", and combined in an amorphous but artistic synthesis all the ideas which came his way. It is certainly true that a non-Scholastic source can be proposed for almost any one of the ideas in Rabelais, but this argument depends on the same factor as our own; if Rabelais has no recognisable system for selecting and adapting his material, the amorphous synthesis theory will have the last word, but if, as we believe, there is such a system the argument is untenable. The principle of economy (Ockham's razor) favours our conclusion that the training which Rabelais is known to have had is both sufficient and suitable to account for the formation of his mental habits, which persisted with minor modifications throughout his life. Beneath the bewildering mass of quotations,

allusions, allegories, mixtures of style and thought, we believe there is a guiding method. Rabelais was not an original thinker, and even if some of the confusion in his work may be ascribed to artistic planning, it is hard to believe that he was a very clear one. Despite this an order can be seen, and innumerable indications show that his mind ran on fixed lines, probably unknown to him, which explain the many repetitions noted in the work. Few men have such mental self-discipline that they can forsake a rigid and comprehensive system, acquired in formative years from masters endowed with great authority, and form for themselves a new one from friends, books, meditation or anything else, nor was Rabelais such a man.

Subsequent investigations may prove some of our conclusions to be false, and they are put forward in no spirit of dogmatism, but it is equally probable that a more thorough and expert search of Scholastic authors than we can attempt will reveal even closer affinities than those suggested here. At all events there is a serious need for sustained enquiry into this source of influence at a time when the richest discoveries are being made in the field of contemporary and Classical influences. Such new investigations might well start from the suggestive fact that Rabelais is described by Wadding, official historian of the OFM, as "Scriptor Ordinis."

NOTES

No attempt has been made to give anything like exhaustive references to Scholastic works with which Rabelais' text may invite comparison. There is no need to define Scholastic or mediaeval thought on most subjects, and the majority of Rabelais' texts are self-explanatory. Our quotations from St. Thomas' 'Summa Theologica' have deliberately been selected from the index volume, with no other purpose than to give a convenient and accessible formulation of ideas with which all Scholastics were familiar. Thomism as such is not in question, any more than it probably was for Rabelais. No textual references to St. Thomas are, therefore, given, but only the key word in the index with the number of each quotation under that heading. The most cursory glance at such an index suggests innumerable other texts which could be quoted as relevant, but which we have preferred not to give for reasons stated in the Introduction.

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INTRODUCTION

1. E. Gilson--'Idées et Lettres', p.231. See also p.200.
2. An early exception is L. Thuasne--'Etudes sur Rabelais', ch.1 'les sources monastiques du roman', but he does not develop the point very far. His other work, 'Villon et Rabelais', is very unconvincing.
3. R. Klibansky--'The Continuity of the Platonic Tradition'.
4. G. Atkinson--'Les Nouveaux Horizons de la Renaissance Française'.
5. Beginning with F. Brémond in 1879--'Rabelais Médecin' and Dr. Ledouble--'Rabelais Anatomiste et Physiologiste'. Also, more recently, Gilson on the

references in the TL in 'R.H.F.'.

CHAP. I---GOD

1. A.Lefranc--'Grands Ecrivains de la Renaissance Française', p.174 et seq.
  2. G.Paré--'Le Roman de la Rose et la Scolastique Courtoise', pp.184-5, and Gilson--'Philosophie au Moyen Age', p.231.
  3. Bonaventura--'Itinerarium mentis---', ch.v.
  4. Cf. Gilson's Gifford Lectures ('L'ESprit de la Phil. Méd.') where he quotes (ch.ii) these texts side by side in a discussion of the basic importance of the 'Ego sum' theme to the whole mediaeval concept of existence.
  5. Cf. L.Febvre--'la Religion de Rabelais', pp. 260-265. Neither the method nor the conclusions are quite the same as ours. *See Appx. 'B'.*
  6. Quoted J.Bchatec--'Budé und Calvin', p.54.
  7. 'De Inventoribus Rerum', lib.IV, p224.
  8. It is interesting to compare this with a similar list compiled from Scève's 'Microcosme' by V.L. Saulnier and reproduced in his 'Maurice Scève! The Holy Spirit is mentioned once, the Son five times, and the following names of God are found:-
- |                  |   |                       |   |
|------------------|---|-----------------------|---|
| tout connaissant | 1 | vivant éternel        | 2 |
| designateur      | 1 | architecteur          | 1 |
| ouvrier          | 1 | plasmateur            | 1 |
| createur         | 4 | auteur de tout savoir | 1 |
| Dieu ayment      | 1 | juge                  | 1 |
9. 'Idées et Lettres', p.231.
  10. Du Cange gives as one of the meanings of 'servator' in mediaeval Latin 'pastor gregarius'. Though we cannot say how common the usage was, Rabelais may well have had the connexion in mind.

CHAP. II---SPIRIT WORLD

1. E.g. 'Garg.'XXVI/130--"Les diables ont passé pour en emporter les asmes damnées."
2. According to Boulenger, from 'Procli de Sacrificio'.
3. Cf. St.Thomas(ed.Venice 1775):"Daemones cognoscunt futura contingentia" and "Boni angeli revelant aliqua daemonibus."(Daemon 15,12).
4. 'Idées et Lettres',p.207.
5. 2.Chron.xxxii.
6. 2.Cor.xi.14.
7. Cf.QL.V/575--"O lunettes de l'Antichrist".
8. 'Part of Opus Tertium',pp.II-12(Brit.Soc of Franciscan Studies vol.IV).
9. St.Thomas--Daemon I.
10. G.Soury--'la Démonologie de Plutarque',p.20.
11. Luke iv.10.
12. St.Thomas--Futura 9.
13. Cf."My genius was rebuked,as it is said Mark Antony's was by Caesar---"(Macbeth,III,1)
14. and Plutarch.
15. St.Thomas--Angeli 577.
16. Cf.id.--"Heroes, id est manes, sunt animae defunctorum".(Heroes).
17. 'De Defectu'trans. A.Turnèbe--'Opera Omnia' vol.II,p.79.The same page gives a parenthesis after the word 'Daemones'(Latine Lares aut Genii dicuntur).
18. 'Œuvres',ed.de la Meleide vol.IIp.167,notes pp.1065-6.
19. Another comparison shows that one of Rabelais' oldest friends had gone in the same path as Rabelais. Amaury Bouchard, in a charming and elegant MS dedicated to François I--'De l'Excellence et Immortalité de l'Asme,extract non seulement au Timée de Platon--', shows an eclecticism reminiscent of Ficino.Zoroaster

is frequently quoted (in Greek), as are all the Classical neo-Platonists, and Pico, Ficino, Cusa, but also SS. Augustine, Jerome and Thomas. On p. 26 he writes: "les autres platoniques qui disent que selon les meurs et conditions les âmes prennent leurs anges lesquelz aucuns deulx appellent genios", and a little ~~later~~ earlier he says "aultant de legions de ses anges qu'ilz appellent daemones". Apart from these and other verbal similarities with Rabelais, the whole tone of the work recalls the Classical side of Rabelais' synthesis, and the daemon of Socrates is amply discussed (p. 80), but Bouchard makes no incursions into mediaeval diabolology. Mutual influence between friends of such long standing is reasonably certain, but accounts only for a part of Rabelais' system. The work seems to date from 1531-3, but resumes a subject they must have discussed long before. See also H. Busson--'les Sources du Rationalisme au XVIe', pp. 174-8.

#### CHAP. III---PAN

1. St. Thomas--'Futura' 5
2. J. Sleidan---'Commentaires---' (French trans.) lib. XV. p. 552.
3. Erasmus--'Funus' and 'Cheron'.
4. Cf. C. V. Langlois--'Connaissance de Nature au M. A.', p. 71, where he quotes the tradition that St. Paul regretted that Virgil was already dead for: "Quam te," inquit, "redididissim/Si te vivum invenissem"
5. Publisher's note at end of Bigot's 'Christ. Phil. Praeludium', and V. L. Bourilly--'G. du Bellay' passim.
6. Sleidan op. cit p. 566 and p. 749.



7. 'H.&R.' 1951, p. 187.
8. 'French Studies' 1948, 2.
9. R. Cudworth--'Intellectual System of the Universe' (1678) ed. with notes by Mosheim (London 1845) vol. 1, p. 585, n. 1.
10. Macrobius--'Saturnalia' 1/xxii, 2 (Teubner).
11. Isidore---'Liber Etymologicarum' lib. 1, 81 (Migne P. L. 82, p. 325, col. 390).
12. 'Comedie sur le Trespas du Roy' (1547).
13. Ficino--'Theol. Platonica' lib. X, ch. 11, pp. 147-8
14. Agrippa--'De Occulta Phil.' lib. III, ch. xvi, p. 241.
15. Eusebius--'Praeparatio Evangelica' lib. V, ch. xvii, p. 206.
16. Despite S. Reinach's contrary opinion (quoted by Boulenger) in 'Cultes, Mythes, Religions', vol. III pp. 1-13 (1913).
17. P. Crinitus--'De Honesta Disciplina' lib. XIV, ch. 111, p. 215 (1504).
18. P. Mexia--'Silva de varia Leccion' Pt. II, ch. xxxiiii.
19. G. Postel--'De Orbis' lib. I, ch. vii, p. 51; see also I/xii.
20. id.---'De Etruria' p. 57 (Florence 1551)
21. G. Bigot--'Christ. Phil. Prael.' lib. IX, p. 442.
22. Bigot finds himself in some embarrassment as a result of his quotation, and in his Epilogue to the reader tries to justify his excessive use of demonology (p. 535).
23. Louis Karl seems to have realised the connexion but does not develop his theory--'Sur la Mort de Pan sans Rebelais' in 'Mélanges Picot' (1913).
24. P. Comestor--'Hist Scol.' ch. clxxv.
25. J. de Sacrobosco--'De Sphaera' lib. IV at end.

26. J. Lefèvre d'Étapes--'Comm. de Sphaera'(1506)  
lib. IV, ch. xix, et end.
27. Vincent de Beauvais--'Speculum Naturae', lib.  
III, ch. vii (on eclipses).
28. Pierre d'Ailly--'Comm. de Sphaera' qu. 14 ad 2. corr.
29. Michel Scot--'Comm. De Sacrobosco', last words.
30. 'Liber Exemplorum', p. 3 (Brit. Soc. Fran. Studies I).
31. Michel Menot--'Sermons Choisis', pp. 193, 517.
32. Eusebius--'Chronicorum Canonum' lib. post. (Latin  
trans. St. Jerome, Basle 1529).
33. A Danish specialist in folklore has examined  
the Pan legend in European and particularly Scand-  
inavian folklore. She concludes that the legend is  
of purely Germanic (or Celtic-Germanic) origin, and  
says that Plutarch's version shows that:

"germansk sagnoverlevering i hvert fald i dette  
tilfælde er kommet ind i romerriget og har for-  
bundet sig med antike overlevering om guden Pan,  
der før øvrigt ikke har anden tilknytning til  
dødsbudskabssagnet end den, at han er en natur-  
mystisk gua ligesom de vætter, sagnet overalt i  
den germanske overlevering er knyttet til."

In other words, the Pan legend as Rebelais knew it  
really belonged to the same old Celtic mythology  
as the original Panagruel, and only took on its  
Classical form because Pan, God of Nature, came nearer  
than any other Classical deity to the nature-spirit  
of the Germanic or Celtic version. This is another  
refutation of Reinach's commonly accepted theory of  
Levantine origin, and does not really affect our study,  
but it is interesting to see a popular myth come  
back in this learned form in what had started out as  
a popular book. See--'Sagnet om den store Pans Død',  
by Inger Eberg.

## CHAP. IV---MAN

1. In his translation of the 'Axiochus'.
2. The Isle de Ruach may be an allusion to this. The contemporary Averroists made much of the Hebrew 'ruach-~~anima~~-anima' and Rabelais may have been thinking of this when he wrote "ils ne vivent que de vent".
3. 'R.H.F.' p.83, n.14.
4. Id. p.86, n.22, 23.
5. Id. p.83, n.15, and 'Idées et Lettres'.
6. St. Thomas--Anima 41.
7. 'R.H.F.' p.79, n.13.

## CHAP. V---WOMAN

1. In 'Etudes Linguistiques' 1947, quoted by Saulnier--'10 Années--sur Rabelais' in 'H. & R.' 1949.
2. op.cit. p.112.
3. St. Thomas--Mulier 18 and 6.
4. Id.--Imago 33.
5. M.A. Screech--'Rabelais, de Billon ~~et~~ Erasmus' in 'H. & R.' 1951.
6. Ibid.

## CHAP. VI---ANIMALS &amp;c.

1. St. Thomas--Animalia 63.
2. Gilson--'La Phil. au M.A.' p.504.

## CHAP. VII---COSMOLOGY AND PHYSICS

1. 'R.H.F.' n.7.
2. 'De Usuria', according to Beulenger.
3. 'R.H.F.' n.11.
4. 'Idées et Lettres' p.208.
5. Id. p.213.

6. 'Praecepta Matrimonialia', according to Boulenger.
7. 'R.H.F.' n.2.
8. P. Tartaret--'Comm. in Aristot.' Physics, fo. 82c. dub. 2.
9. Atkinson--op. cit. p. 311.
10. A. Lefranc--'les Navigations de Pentagruel' passim.
11. 'R.H.F.' n. 19. Cf. also M. Letts--'Sir John Mandeville'.

#### CHAP. VIII---NATURE

1. Paré--op. cit. p. 151 seq.
2. Id. p. 198.
3. A. Tilley--'Studies in the French Renaissance'
4. Besides Paré's references, Vincent de Beauvais has a whole chapter on this subject in his 'Spec. Nat.'
5. Paré---op. cit. p. 154.
6. Id. p. 201.

#### CHAP. IX---RELIGION

1. Heb. xi. I., see Lefranc edition.
2. Giæon--'Idées et Lettres' p. 214.
3. Cf. 'Fusus'.
4. Cf. also Febvre--op. cit. p. 265, for other examples of the giants praying.
5. Ibid.
6. Cf. Bigot's strange scruples in his Epilogue. The story was known to be dangerous.
7. Febvre--op. cit. p. 276.
8. As all critics have dealt at length with this question it is impossible to give even a representative selection of references. The most important contributions from the respective partisans of atheism and Christianity remain those of Lefranc and Febvre.

A middle view is that of M. Mann, for whom Rabelais follows Erasmus and his *Philosophia Christiana*: "uncode moral plutôt qu'une doctrine". Even if critics could agree on what Rabelais said and meant, the difficulty of assessing it reliably in terms of 16C reactions are well illustrated by A. de Beatis' 'Voyage au Cardinal d'Aragon' (1517-8), where the very different standards of piety in different countries at the same time is vividly described.

#### CHAP. X---PROVIDENCE &c.

1. Pare (op. cit. p. 110) quotes Boethius and St. Thomas to show how: "les scolastiques voient dans la notion d'éternité l'application ultime de la prescience divine." In this Rabelais follows his old masters.

2. *Id.* p. 91.

3. *Ibid.* quoting Gilson--'l'Esprit de la Phil. Méd.' vol. II, pp. 163-4.

4. *Id.* p. 93.

#### CHAP. XI---ETHICS AND POLITICS

1. *St. Thomas Aquinas* Ch. vi, on Paradise and Hell.

2. *De Ente et Essentia*--'Natural Law'.

3. Quoted *id.* pp. 42-3.

4. St. Thomas--*Matrimonium* 33.

5. Cf. Cicero--'De Officiis' ch. vii.

6. Cf. R. Marichal--'Rabelais et la Réforme de la Justice' p. 185 ('H. & R.' 1952) for a most helpful note on the changes in the QL between 1548 and 1552 eds. to put Pantagruel "au-dessus de l'humanité courante."

7. *D'Entrevues* ed, of 'St. Thomas' Political Writings' is also useful as giving the philosophical rather than juridical attitude of the M.A. to these problems.

## CHAP. XII---PHILOSOPHY

1. St. Thomas--Idea 1
2. Id.--Idea 3
3. Introduction to QL, p. XXIII, n. 4.
4. Cusa showed (after St. Paul) that on the highest level the two were the same---'De Docta Ignorantia'--- but this does not affect the issue.
5. Eusebius--'Praep. Evan.'.
6. Cf. Gilson--'Héloïse et Abelard', especially essay on 'M.A. et Naturalisme'.
7. 'Opus Tertium', quoted Harris--'Duns Scotus', vol. I, p. 125, n. 1
8. St. Thomas--Sapientia 15.
9. Id.--Sapientia 1.
10. Id.--Veritas 27.

## CHAP. XIII---CHARACTERS

1. Joinville--'Vie S. Louis' p. 310 (ed. de la Pléiade).
2. P. Gringoire--'Vie S. Louis', lib. VII
3. Sleidan op. cit (see under PAN, n. 2.)
4. See Marichal--'R. et la Réforme de la Justice' for an explanation of this.
5. Cf. Gilson on Salimbene (in 'Idées et Lettres') and Estienne passim.

## CHAP. XIV---CINQUIÈME LIVRE

1. L. Sainéan's study remains one of the best for this very unsatisfactory problem--'Problèmes Littéraires du XVIe.'

## CHAP. XV---AUTHORITIES

1. 'De Defectu'.
2. The figures are very approx.--Plutarch(23), Plato(22), Pliny(21), Cicero(15), Hippocrates(11), Galen(10), Aristotle(9).

3. J. Plattard--'L'Œuvre de Rabelais'.
4. Ibid. p.275.
4. 'Etudes sur Rabelais'.
6. Ibid. p.266.
7. Ibid. p.225.
8. M.A.Screech op.cit.
9. B.Russell--'History of Western Phil.'p.276.
10. L?Zanta--'La Renaissance du Stoicisme',p.135.
11. 'De Officiis' chs.xxix,xxxv.
12. J.Behatec--op.cit.p.116.
13. RER 1910--'L'Écriture Sainte dans Rabelais'.
14. Ibid. p.339.

#### CHAP.XVI---INFLUENCES

1. A.Renaudet--'Préréforme et Humanisme'p.95 and passim for a picture of Franciscan doctrines and trends at this time.
2. He finds a place in the Library of St.Victor as well.
3. Gilson--'La Phil. au M.A.'p.598.
4. Ibid. p.599.
5. E.Bréhier--'La Phil. au M.A.'p.385.
6. Ibid.
7. Op.cit. p.601.
8. Harris op.cit.vol.II,p.79 seq.
9. Bréhier op.cit. p.386.
10. 'S.François d'Assise'p.169(art.'la Phil. Franciscaine')
11. Gilson--'La Phil au M.A.'p.604.
12. Harris op.cit.vol II p.94.
13. Bréhier op.cit. p.390.
14. Ibid. p.391.
15. Harris op.cit.vol.II,p.354,n.2.

16. 'S.François' art.cit. p.158.
17. Ibid. p.159.
18. Ibid. p.152.
19. P.Exupère in 'Mélanges Ascétiques',quoted  
D.Tardi--'Poesie Franciscaine de Langue Latine'  
p.206 of 'S.François'.
20. See article in same volume.'Liber de Confor-  
mitate' was composed by Bartholomew of Pisa 1390.
21. Id. p.200.
22. On Maillara,see Renaudet op.cit.p.164.
23. See 'Idées et Lettres' for an article on  
'M.Menot et la Technique du sermon méu.'
24. Lecoy de la marche--'La Chaire Fr, au M.A.'
25. 'Sermons Choisis'p.XXX.193.
26. Id.p.513.
27. Id. p.174.
28. Id. p.xv.
29. Id. p.67.
30. Id. p.112.
31. Id.p.200.
32. Id. p.215.
33. Id. p.171.
34. Id. p.35.
35. Id. p.135.
36. Id. p.60.
37. Id. p.14.

#### CONCLUSION

I. The views of Febvre, Mann and others on the influence of Erasmus, and Bohatec's on that of Bude, all deserve careful consideration in any general work on Rabelais. Here we are only concerned with his primary sources, which must have antedated these, important as they are to a study of his early years.



## APPENDIX A

## HISTORICAL NOTE ON 'LES ANNEES

## DE MOINAGE'

It is perhaps desirable to recall the almost total absence of contemporary evidence as to what Rabelais and his brethren in the OFM actually did at Fontenay and other houses outside Paris. The various laudatory remarks made about him by his humanist friends, either in letters or dedications, contrast his learning with the ignorance of his brethren in the OFM, but this does not help much. The few shreds of positive evidence come from the Latin and Greek letters written by Budé to Amy and later to Rabelais himself. Not all of Budé's letters seem to have survived, and on the other side only one from Rabelais. Very little work has been done on this correspondence since the early years of the century.

In the first Latin letter<sup>1)</sup> to Amy (probably of 1519), Budé regrets that the cares and duties of Amy's profession keep him from "cultu literarum bonarum," but envies him his life "procul a tumultu securam." The next letter<sup>2)</sup> (the first having apparently failed to reach Amy) speaks of the religious life once again: "ut memini, parente tuo faceres, ut in istam socialitatem cares nomen primum, ac inde profiteres---", and this when Amy was already advanced in studies. He seems to have been one of the 'Tropiteulx' mentioned in the Cl, and Rabelais had this sad example before him, if indeed his own fate was not the same. In this letter Budé goes to some lengths to praise the religious life "vestrae illae ~~paiae~~ sodalitates", and says that the vows by which a

frier gives up "civitas, cognatio, libertas" should make the convents "velut seminaria animarum beatarum, a providentia utique instituta ad supplementum coelestium exercituum, quondam per superbiam luculenter imminutorum". The end of the letter (in Greek) speaks of Amy's mathematical and religious studies, and praises Aristotle in human and scientific subjects, "non item in aeternis et coelestibus", recommending however translations of the Metaphysics by Eessarion and Argyropoulos. There is no hint in the letter that Rabelais is sharing these studies of Amy, though later letters alluding to their friendship and common devotion to learning make it extremely probable. At all events, this is precious as direct evidence of an influence which Rabelais came under very soon if he was not already under it.

Eudé's later letters, mostly in Greek, show less enthusiasm for the religious life, or, at least, its contemporary practise, and long letters both to Amy and Rabelais trace the campaign being waged by the mendicants against the New Learning. One to Amy <sup>(3)</sup> speaks of the leaders of the order "imperitiam superstitiose observantes sub nomine orthodoxae disciplinae", and of the attacks made in the Sorbonne against Erasmus by <sup>(4)</sup> "praesertim sodalitatium mendicantium theologi, qui vero vestrae sunt multo magis quam alii." As a result of these attacks, he says, they hope to stamp out Greek studies completely. Again, it is only a hint, but if the Paris theologians of the OFM could secure from the authorities at Fontenay such prompt obedience to their directive of confiscating Greek books, it is probable that

on the positive side their particular school of teaching (then predominantly Scotist) would also be followed at Fontenay. It is largely on this assumption of fairly close contact between Paris and Fontenay that we have decided not to consider Nominalism at all, taking also into account other external evidence and the fact that Ockham is mentioned only in passing in Rabelais' work, and his doctrines do not seem to figure at all, while the references to Scotism are comparatively numerous.

The following letter<sup>(5)</sup> (to Rabelais) expresses alarm at the persecution of progressively minded persons, and at the confiscation of Rabelais' books, but, Budé says: "accepi a quodam elegantiorum ipsius sodalitatis, et honestatis observatorum, vobisque reditas fuisse delicias nostras, libros inquam," and that the friends were restored "in priorem libertatem et tranquillitatem". Both the 'elegantior' confrère and the 'prior' freedom suggest that life in the OFM was not normally one of unmitigated harshness, but one would like to know more about the relations between humanists, especially Budé, and members of religious orders.<sup>(6)</sup>

It is doubtful whether these letters would yield much more, but these few hints are at least suggestive and worth bearing in mind.

This is perhaps an appropriate place to add that the possibility of OSB influences has been considered and rejected. Rabelais was already a priest on his transfer from the OFM, and this together with his obviously privileged position with his Abbot-Bishop makes it virtually certain that no one was in

position to impose any further Scholastic training upon him. In any case an enquiry into OSB influence would be quite fruitless in the present state of historical knowledge. The OSB had no ~~specific~~ <sup>specific</sup> school of theology or philosophy, though St. Anselm has always enjoyed a special prestige, its teaching was eclectic to a degree, with each monastery more or less independent, and the little we know of life at Maillezais on the monastic side is more than discouraging to any enquiry. <sup>a)</sup>

1. 'Epist. Latinae' p.267.
2. Id. p.301.
3. 'Epist. Graecae' p.134.
4. Id. p.137.
5. Id. p.142
6. See Renaudet--'Préréforme et Humanisme' for an account of doctrines taught in Paris at this time.
7. Lacurie--'Hist. de Maillezais'.

## APPENDIX B

## THE NAMES OF GOD IN THE WORK

	Garg.	Pant.	TL	QL	TOTAL
bon	2		5	4	11
eternel	2			1	3
salvateur	2				2
servateur		1	4	7	12
conservateur		1		1	2
protecteur		2	1		3
seigneur	1	4	1	3	9
roy			1		1
souverain	1	1			2
createur, plasmateur	2	3	2	1	8
grand	1		2	2	5
tout-puissant and omnipotent		3			3
juste	2		1		3

No account is taken here of the differences between editions, nor do the figures claim to be infallibly accurate, but they show the basis for our conclusions in chap. I.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

Works which have been used only for isolated quotations are not included. Where the title is not self-explanatory, the particular connexion in which a work has been found useful is indicated. Standard Classical texts (Plato, Cicero &c.) have not been included, nor have the large number of works on Rabelais with which any student is bound to be familiar, but of which only very few have been found to give positive help. The majority of works listed have been used to form a background picture of the Middle Ages and 16C without which no comparisons are possible. It goes without saying that numerous alternatives could be found for providing equally useful terms of reference.

Unless otherwise stated books in English are published in London, and those in French in Paris.

No separate references are given to the 'Revue des Etudes Rabelaisiennes' (RER) and its successors, now 'Humanisme et Renaissance' (H. & R.), which are naturally indispensable.

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(in Migne. Patr. Lat. 82)

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2. ST. BONAVENTURA--Itinerarium Mentis in Deum  
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6. NICHOLAS OF CUSA--De la Docte ignorance (ed. and trans. E. Molinier 1930)
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11. LE ROMAN DE LA ROSE (Soc. des Anciens Textes, ed. E. Langlois 1914)

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12. H. C. AGRIPPA--De Occulta Phil. (Antwerp 1531)  
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