

Mohammad Tewfik Ramzi, M.A.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICAL THOUGHT
AND PRACTICE IN ISLĀM

1-232 A.H. = 622-847 A.D.

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ABBREVIATIONS.

'Asākīr	Ibn 'Asākīr: <u>History.</u>
'Asr.	A.F. Rifā'ī: <u>'Asr al-Ma'mūn.</u>
b.	Ibn.
B.	Banū.
Bal'amī	Al-Bal'amī: <u>Chronique du Tabarī.</u>
Bukh.	Al-BuKhārī: <u>Traditions.</u>
<u>EB</u>	<u>Encyclopaedia Britannica.</u>
<u>EI</u>	<u>Encyclopaedia of Islām.</u>
<u>ERE</u>	Hastings: <u>Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics.</u>
<u>ESS</u>	<u>Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences.</u>
Fakhri	Ibn al-Tiqṭaqah: <u>Histoire du Khalifat...</u>
Fida	Abu 'l-Fidā' : <u>Annales Muslemici.</u>
Haikal. <u>HM</u>	M.H. Haikal: <u>Hayah Muhammad.</u>
" <u>AB</u>	" " : <u>Abū Bakr.</u>
" <u>'U</u>	" " : <u>Al-Fārūq 'Umar.</u>
<u>HH</u>	<u>Historians History of the World.</u>
<u>Hish.</u>	Ibn Hishām: <u>Sīrah...</u> (Biography of the Prophet.)
Hitti. <u>HA</u>	P.K. Hitti: <u>History of the Arabs.</u>
'Iqd.	Ibn 'Abd Rabbih: <u>al-'Iqd al-farīd.</u>
<u>JE</u>	<u>Jewish Encyclopaedia.</u>
<u>Khald. H</u>	Ibn Khaldūn: <u>History.</u>
<u>Khald. P</u>	" " : <u>Mugaddimah</u> (Prolegomena).
Lane	E.W. Lane : <u>Arabic-English Lexicon.</u>

<u>LHA</u>	Nicholson: <u>Literary History of the Arabs.</u>
<u>LHP</u>	Browne : <u>Literary History of Persia.</u>
<u>Lisān</u>	<u>Lisan al-ʿArab.</u> (Lexicon).
<u>M.</u>	Muhammad.
<u>Marg. M</u>	.Margoliouth: <u>Mohammed and the Rise of Islām.</u>
<u>Mas. M</u>	Al-Masʿūdī: <u>Murūj al-ḡhahab.</u>
<u>Milal</u>	Al-Shahrastānī: <u>al-milal wa 'l-niḥal.</u>
<u>Muir. LM</u>	Muir: <u>Life of Mohamad.</u>
<u>Qur.</u>	<u>Qur'ān.</u>
<u>Sa'd</u>	Ibn Sa'd: <u>Ṭabaqāt...</u>
<u>Ṭab.</u>	Al-Ṭabarī: <u>Annales.</u>
<u>Ṭab. taf.</u>	" " : <u>tafsīr al-Qur'ān.</u> (Exegesis).
<u>Tāj.</u>	<u>Tāj al-ʿarūs.</u> (Lexicon).
<u>Wafayāt</u>	Ibn Khallikān: <u>wafayāt al-aʿyān.</u> (Biography).
<u>Ya'qūbī</u>	Al-Ya'qūbī: <u>History.</u>

J O U R N A L S .

<u>BLSOL</u>	Bulletin: London School of Oriental
<u>HJ</u>	Hibbert Journal.
<u>IC</u>	Islamic Culture.
<u>JA</u>	Journal Asiatique.
<u>JRAS</u>	Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society.
<u>MW</u>	Moslem World.
<u>TGUOS</u>	Transactions of the Glasgow University Oriental Society.

Transliteration and notes.

The system of transliteration adopted here is that recommended by the Royal Asiatic Society (JRAS, 1928, part I.) The hamzah is marked by an ' , and the 'ayn is marked by an ʿ .

Some words now common in the English language, though incorrectly transliterated, have been left in their usual form; e.g. Mecca and Medina.

The nominative form of the word "Abū" is adhered to throughout; e.g. ʿAlī b. Abū Tālib, and Muʿāwiyah b. Abū Sufyān.

The plural of many Arabic words is formed by adding the letter "s" to the original singular; e.g. Muhājirs, hadīths, and imāms.

The Qur'ānic references are quoted from the versions current in Muslim States. These occasionally differ from the European texts of the same book (Flügel's edition in particular).

In the Ḥadīth the number of the kitāb is given first, followed by the number of the bāb. If Krehl's edition is used, the figure between brackets should be of help as it identifies the volume and page in which the particular ḥadīth may be found. Thus Bukh. 63:9 (iii:8), means kitāb 63, bāb 9 of any edition of Bukhārī; in Krehl's edition this tradition is found in volume iii, page 8.

The notes appropriate to each chapter are given at its conclusion. The bibliography contains full reference to the books consulted.

I N T R O D U C T I O N .

In this thesis an attempt is made to examine political theory and its practice in Islām. The survey begins with the Hijrah or emigration of the Prophet Muhammad from Mecca to Medina in 622 A.D., and ends with the close of the first century of the 'Abbāsīd caliphate in 232/847. It thus covers the four most important stages in the development of the Muslim Empire, namely: the politico-religious rule of the Prophet, the reign of the Orthodox Caliphs, the Umayyad dynasty, and the golden age of the 'Abbāsīds. We shall, therefore, observe the growth of a State from infancy to full manhood.

By theory is meant the principles of government enunciated in the Qur'ān, the Hadīth or traditions attributed to the Prophet, and the views of the learned among the Muslims. By practice we mean the way in which the rulers actually conducted the affairs of State. There is reason to believe that the difference between thought and action in the political history of Islām is immense. While in theory religion is the primary motive of the behaviour of all believers in Allah, the practical application of the noble and lofty ideals embodied in Islām has on the whole been sadly disappointing. As Arbuthnot says, "the Muhammadan religion may be regarded as creating in theory the purest democracy in existence... but in practice the ways of the world are different." (1) It is this particular relationship that we shall endeavour

to test and expound in the following pages.

With few exceptions, political considerations derived from the worst kinds of blind lust for power outweighed the religious. The fundamentals of belief and worship changed but little all through the different periods of Islām, but the management of government varied greatly in the course of time and was subject to the influence of men. The successes and failures of the Muslim Empire were not adventitious, rather they were the result of causes amenable to investigation and account. The Muslims founded an empire because they followed the path of imperial races. When they weakened in energy and resolution their empire was lost and they gave way to more determined and ambitious people.

The method of argument followed here is partly Muslim and partly objective. The first is by no means the anti-thesis of the second; but since each has a particular field and approach, the division seems necessary. Religion is primarily a matter of conviction and is established on belief; philosophy on the other hand, is essentially the outcome of critical, systematic, and rational thinking. Both aspects have their contribution to the life of Islām.

Our task, then, is to discover whether, and if so, under what conditions, the political side of Muslim history could be attributed to premeditated thought. We shall try to find out whether the Prophet had established his plans for

the government of his people on rational grounds, or just followed his intuitive faculties in all matters temporal and spiritual. We also want to decide whether his successors - who could not strictly speaking lay claims to divine inspiration - had a political aim well thought out and carefully constructed, or just followed in the steps of their prophet. Since the Muslim State was a reality in the history of the world, and continued vigorously for at least four centuries, it would be necessary to assess how it functioned, and judge whether it kept its structure intact as a result of conscious efforts to keep it alive, or whether it continued its course through the original momentum of the first wave of conquests in the name of Allah and Islām.

To all Muslims the Qur'ān and the Hadīth are the main springs of guidance in all matters. These two sources are considered as direct and indirect revelation^s of God. This attitude, though exaggerated, is not wholly unreasonable; for had it not been for Islām as a religion none of the other aspects of civilisation built on that foundation could have originated. As Prof. Browne says, "it was undoubtedly to Islam, that simple yet majestic creed of which no unprejudiced student can ignore the grandeur, that they owed the splendid part which they were destined to play in the history of civilisation." (2)

The Muslims believe that the Qur'an is the revealed

word of God to His Prophet Muḥammad. Be that as it may, for the purposes of the present work which is not directly concerned with religious issues, we submit that the Qur'ān is the oldest extant record of the revelations of the Prophet. There is reason to suppose that the chances of forged insertions by interested parties in its text are remote. From another angle the Qur'ān gives an accurate account of the knowledge and views of Muḥammad. It stands to reason that, since he argued with his opponents in an attempt to convert them to his side, he must have understood well and mastered the teachings embodied in the book he was arguing from. The opinions expressed in the Qur'ān can, therefore, be considered as the bases of all knowledge possessed by the Prophet. If at any time there is divergence of views between the Qur'ān and the Tradition, the first must invariably be accepted as the most accurate representation of Muḥammadan beliefs.

The value of the Hadīth as a source of information concerning the life and ideas of the Prophet is now open to serious doubt. Scholarly research has shown that the Tradition has definitely been subjected to fraudulent fabrications to serve particular factional ends. Besides, it should be borne in mind that, while the Qur'ān was recorded during the lifetime of the Prophet, the collections of tradition were of a much later date. That lapse of time must have contributed to undermining the authenticity of this record. The men who

transmitted the sayings of the Prophet were quite aware of the great authority attached to the dicta of Muhammad. It is probable that, through piety and good intentions, they justified to themselves the fabrication of some hadīths. All parties seemingly availed themselves of the opportunity. The result was that contradictory pronouncements were attributed to Muhammad; and hence the difficulty of accepting one version and rejecting another. But we cannot, however, agree with Dr. Khadduri that, "forgery has reduced its (the Hadīth's) importance to zero value, as it is impossible, in spite of the efforts of Muslim and al-Bukhārī to know the genuine from the forged hadīth." (3) The criterion is surely the Qur'ān itself. The hadīths which contradict the established principles of the Book may safely be dismissed as fabrications. Similarly traditions containing prophecy or forecast may also be ignored.

On certain questions, the Qur'ān has been clear and definite. This is particularly the case in matters of belief and worship. The other issues have been decided by inference and deduction. The Muslims think that Islām is not only a religion but a way of life; and hence there are no strict divisions between sacred and secular affairs. This viewpoint should not be condemned as confounding the spiritual with the temporal; rather it should be looked upon as an asset, for the truth is that man acts as a whole and not in

parts. The real difficulty arose from subjecting every problem to the test of religion as interpreted by the theologians; in other words, the theologians invested themselves with the authority to settle all questions whether or not these fell within their domain of knowledge and concern. The result of this outlook was that Islām became static instead of being dynamic and progressive. While other people and institutions advanced and adapted themselves to their time and circumstances, Muslim organisations were handicapped and shackled. Although that was not the real essence of Islām, it was at least its traditional practice.

Three ways of approach have been tried in discussing the subject, namely: (a) the Qur'ān and the Tradition, (b) the expressed opinions of the lawyers and jurisconsults, and (c) the analysis of the important pronouncements of the caliphs, and the different ideas held by the various parties. The following chapters are intended to cover that ground.

There are, however, two difficulties, namely: (a) the adequate translation into English of certain Arabic technical terms, and (b) the discussion of Muslim political thought independently of religion.

(a) It seems to us that the translation of some Arabic words into English demands more than finding equivalents in the latter language. For example, the translation of sharī'ah and fiqh into law and jurisprudence in the sense in which these words are understood in English is insufficient. Even

the definition of Goldziher quoted in chapter iii of this thesis, is not comprehensive enough to cover the whole field so as to convey the real essence of the Muslim notion of jurisprudence. For fiqh is not directly concerned with "all aspects of religious, political, and social life," as Goldziher maintains. It does not deal with these as such, but only in so far as they have a bearing on religion. Fiqh, therefore, is principally understanding and erudition of religion. In the course of this work we shall try to explain the meaning of the important terms which are relevant to our subject. But we think, nevertheless, that a fuller examination and expounding of the numerous technical phrases and terms pertaining to Muslim law, jurisprudence and politics can be the subject of an independent work.

(b) The theoretical study of politics in the western sense of the word falls within the scope of philosophy. But in Islām neither politics as a theoretical undertaking, nor philosophy as a branch of knowledge has an important place. The subject matter of politics has been treated by the faqīhs or jurisconsults, while the study of philosophy has on the whole been discouraged. It should be remembered that thinkers of renown like Ibn Khaldūn and al-Māwardī, were not sociologists or political philosophers but jurists who treated society and the State within the framework of religion. (4) For example, in his prolegomena, Ibn Khaldūn definitely

condemns philosophy and maintains that it contradicts the sharī'ah. (5) And although he devotes some of his energy to political discussions of a philosophical nature he does not include politics among the mental sciences, and advises the 'ulamā' or Muslim savants to keep away from its investigation. (6) The acceptance of religion as the sole criterion has been prevalent in Islām from its earliest stages and has been maintained throughout its history. There may be justification for accepting the view that the Arabs were not philosophically inclined, owing to the fact that most philosophers of distinction in Islām were not Arabs in origin. As Hajjī Khalīfah bluntly asserts: "the Arabs have not been prepared by nature for philosophy except in very rare cases." (7)

It is also worthy of note that within the whole period surveyed here we do not know of any authors devoted to the pursuit of political philosophy. The exception that tends to confirm this impression is that of Ibn Abū 'l-Rabi'. He wrote a book on politics in the early part of the third century of the Hijrah, and called it sulūk al-mālik fī tadbīr al-mamālik or "The Way of the Ruler in the Government of Kingdoms." (8) But even this point is not generally conceded; for Brockelmann argues that the book is of a later date. (9)

Besides the usual sources of fiqh and sharī'ah, abundant material on the nature of political thought in Islām may

be found in historical and literary works. Those writers have reflected ably the current thoughts in their own times. But their main service has been the preservation to posterity of the important pronouncements and opinions of the influential leaders. The value of these records is enhanced because the writers themselves were seemingly insufficiently alive to the inherent political character of those statements. The analysis of some important speeches by rulers has been attempted here.

The conclusions reached from the present investigation are mainly these:-

(1) Neither from the Qur'ān nor the Tradition can one establish a definite method for the conduct of the State. The Qur'ānic injunctions are general in character, and the relevant hadīths are so detailed and exact that they reveal at once the groups in whose favour those hadīths had been fabricated.

(2) The opinions of the theologians and juriconsults reflect their own points of view. They should not, therefore, be looked upon as patterns for the ideal Muslim State.

(3) A new conception of the relation between religion and the State is possible and necessary. The subjection of the latter to the former is fallaciously based and unwarranted. The Qur'ānic contention is that the thoughts and actions of

rulers and ruled should fall within the ethical code of Islām. As long as men observe the principles of justice and charity they can safely adopt any system of politics suitable for the requirements of their time and circumstances.

(4) The Muslim State is not static but dynamic. It is definitely amenable to modification and change; besides, it has an organic nature derived from, and expressed in the life of the people.

(5) Aristocracy and not democracy seems to be the nearest possible realisation of the Qur'anic State.

In practice autocracy or despotism of the supreme ruler prevailed throughout the whole period under examination. But this despotism varied in character and it thus became possible for students of politics to distinguish the features of government under different rulers and dynasties.

(a) The Prophet Muḥammad governed as an autocrat or an absolute ruler. From the nature of his Apostolic office he was an interpreter of the divine law, and a law-maker in his own right.

(b) The Orthodox Caliphs were supreme political rulers deriving their sanction from the will of the people who elected them. Those immediate successors of Muḥammad very nearly fulfilled the demands of a just State.

(c) With the Umayyad dynasty a hereditary conception of government began. The supremacy of the Arabs over the

rest of the Muslims was asserted and exercised by the Umayyads who conducted the state on political and not on religious lines.

(d) The 'Abbāsids went to the other extreme and ruled as absolute theocrats. They declared that their sanction of government was derived from Allah and not from the people. Though generally lax in morals, the 'Abbāsids claimed for themselves a kind of personal divinity totally alien to the original precepts of Islām.

We have reason to assume that the conduct of State can have a place of independence in the life of Islām. Successful political life is principally the duty and responsibility of the community as a whole. This view may be confirmed from the impartial and non-committal attitude of the Prophet on the subject of succession and leadership. For Muḥammad must have deliberately left this matter to the decision of the people concerned. Had he intervened, he might have invested his successors with semi-prophetic authority, and the government of Islām would have been a theocracy for all time.

The contrast between political theory and practice in Islām has been striking, and it thus tends to confirm the negative conclusion stated above. From the general rules and injunctions of the Qur'ān the opposing parties tried to deduce definite conclusions. Confusion and contradictions

were the outcome. So curious and inconsistent were some of these deductions that the murder of children, women, and the aged, were allegedly justified on Qur'ānic premisses. (10) So hostile were some of those parties to one another that persecutions and merciless murders often took place. The caliphs themselves were not immune against that weakness of character; in fact they were the instigators of some of the most heinous wickedness. The despotism of the rulers was aided by the readiness of the subjects to surrender with little or no resistance, their inherent rights and privileges. It is futile, therefore, to assert even indirectly that religion has been the mainspring of such crimes. The truth seems to be that the motive for worldly power has on the whole been stronger than piety and genuine religious beliefs. If, however, the time comes for men to control their passions and conduct their life according to the conceptions of the Muhammadan religion, the Muslim State may yet be realised.

NOTES

Since the views expressed in this introduction are expounded in the following pages, only reference to quotations will be included in these notes.

- (1) F.F.Arbutnot: Arabic Authors, London, 1890, p.149.
- (2) LHP 1: 186.
- (3) Majid Khadduri: The Law of War and Peace in Islām, London, 1940, p.13.
- (4) Cf. H.A.R.Gibb: The Islamic Background of Ibn Khaldūn's Political theory, art. BLSOS, VII,i:23ff.
- (5) Khald. P. xxviii:219.
- (6) Ibid. 210-219.
- (7) Hajjī Khalīfah: Kashf al-zunūn, Ed. Flügel, Leipzig, 1835-1858, i:77.
- (8) Ibn Abū 'l-Rabī' :Sulūk al-mālik fī tadbīr al-mamālik, Cairo, 1286/1869. Section iv, p.98 ff. is particularly worthy of note; it is devoted to the divisions and principles of politics.
- (9) Cf. Carl Brockelmann: Geschichte der Arabischen Litteratur, i:209, and Supplement, i:372. Prof. Sherwani supports the view that the book had been written by command of al-Mu'tasim. Cf. Studies in Muslim Political thought and Administration, Lahore, 1945, p. 43 ff.
- (10) 'Iqd, i: 346.

PART ONE

THE INFLUENCE AND CONTRIBUTION OF MUHAMMAD.

CHAPTER. I.

THE EARLY ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE PROPHET.

In the first half of the seventh century A.D. the Prophet Muhammad was struggling hard in an attempt at the conversion of his compatriots to his way of thought. In his preaching of Islam the Prophet maintained that he was fulfilling the command revealed to him by God. "We revealed to you an inspired book by Our command. You did not know what the Book was, nor what the faith was...." (1) "Surely We have revealed to you as We revealed to Noah and the Prophets after him...." (2)

The object of Muhammad's mission was the same as other Prophets before him. They were all sent "as givers of good news and as warners, so that the people should not have a plea against Allah after the coming of the apostles...." (3)

Before the revelation of the Qur'ân the Prophet was supposed to have been in a state of religious ignorance and uncertainty. "We explain to you with the best explanation by Our revealing to you this Qur'an, though before this you were certainly of the unaware ones." (4) In another verse of the Qur'ân Allah reminded Muhammad that by an act of divine favour he was shown the right way. "Did He not find you an orphan and gave you shelter? And recognised your inability to see and led you aright?" (5)

The principal dogma of Muslim teaching is the unity of God. "Allah is one, eternal, omnipotent, and there is none like Him." (6) Some Traditions suggest that the Prophet said

"He who admits that there is no God but Allah, and dies thus believing will enter paradise." (7) In their confession of faith all Muslims declare that "there is no God but Allah; Muhammad is his servant and apostle." (8)

Against this back-ground the whole of the Prophet's life history must be reviewed. All his thoughts and actions emanated from this religious conception. During his long career he was called upon to play the parts of legist, moralist, diplomatist, and head of State. Important as these roles were, they were only secondary to his main work as preacher of a message of God.

At the beginning of his mission Muhammad concentrated on the area of Mecca for the propagation of his beliefs. For three years he worked in secret within a very narrow circle of relatives and friends. At one time his party consisted of five slaves, two women, and Abū Bakr. (9) Then followed a period of ten years in which he publicly taught and practised his religion in his native town. (10) That city of Mecca is considered holy by Muslims, and in prayers their faces are turned towards it. In fact it is to the Ka'bah, thought to be the sacred house of God, that they address themselves. (11)

Little notice was taken of the Prophet when he started. The Meccans treated him with kind forbearance as a fine orator whose utterances did them no apparent harm. The rich aristocrats who governed the city "regarded him with good humoured toleration as a harmless oracle monger," says Nicholson. (12)

Another reason for the non-interference with him at the beginning was that he belonged to the noble tribe of Quraish, which was the most powerful in the locality.

By his orations, however, the Prophet was neither seeking admiration as such; nor was he aiming at the simple amusement of his kinsmen. An unshakable belief was motivating him to convey his message with zealous passion. But the majority of his fellow citizens turned against him when his designs came to light. In their opinion, his religious teaching was revolutionary in character, and did not suit their customary pattern of life.

They argued with him, but he frustrated their arguments with his superior mastery of logical disputation and rhetoric. (13) They told him if it were money or social prominence that he was seeking, they would gladly satisfy all his wishes and ambitious desires; but he answered them firmly: "I do not come to you looking for money or worldly honour, and I have no personal desire to reign over you; but Allah has sent me as His apostle, and revealed a Book to me, and ordered me to be a giver of good news and warning. I have delivered the message of my God. If you accept what I have told you, it will be to your own good in this world and the next. If you reject my mission I shall be patient, and shall wait for the judgement of Allah between you and me." (14) When he persisted in his prophetic claims the Meccans appealed threateningly to his uncle and patron Abū Tālib to exercise control over him.

They said to the embarrassed uncle: "by Allah, we shall not overlook the insolence of him who insulted our ancestors, ridiculed our conceptions, and belittled our gods. Either you will ask him to leave us alone, or we shall fight you and him till death." (15)

The uncle was in a dilemma, because he did not believe in the teaching of his nephew and died as a non-Muslim. (16) Yet he was bound by familial ties to protect muḥammad. Abū Tālib, therefore, approached the Prophet and advised him to give up his new ideas. But Muḥammad was adamant, and gave his uncle a prompt answer, "Oh Uncle! by Allah I will not forsake this cause until God shall make it prevail or until I shall perish therein - not though they should set the sun on my right hand and the moon on my left!" (17) And so the struggle went on until he decided finally to go to Medina.

To appreciate fully the extent of the success achieved through his emigration to Medina, it would be necessary to assess the concrete results of the first phase of the prophetic career in Mecca. There is reason to believe that the result of thirteen years of preaching in Mecca - three of which were done secretly - was disappointing to Muḥammad. Although the thought of transferring the centre of his activities to a new territory had occurred to him some time before the actual departure from his native city, the open and persistent hostility of his fellow citizens, and the persecution inflicted upon him and the small number of believers must have hastened the process. It was apparent to him ~~that~~ there could be no

compromise. The conflict of ideas and interests had assumed a very serious nature, and one of the parties was bound to be annihilated. Leaving miracles aside, it would have been a certainty that Muhammad and his followers were going to be wiped out had they remained in Mecca any longer, or had they chosen to enter into open armed struggle with the greatly superior number of their uncompromising antagonists. In dealing with the situation, rash courage resulting in certain defeat had to be ruled out of the Prophet's calculations. It was not really death itself that frightened him; for in war he proved that he could face perils courageously and unflinchingly. What worried him most was the loss of the cause, for the establishment of which he devoted life and energy. (18) Had Muhammad been captured and killed by his enemies at that very critical stage, Islam might in all probability have died with him.

Professor Toynbee, however, considers the Hijrah as a definite exhibition of moral and spiritual weakness on the part of the Prophet. He says: "the truth seems to be that in the invitation to Medina, Muhammad was confronted with a challenge to which his spirit failed to rise." (19) This verdict is based on the Professor's "conjecture on the historic analogy of Jesus and the Christian Church", and goes to suggest that "if Muhammad had lived in those circumstances and had died as Jesus did without offering resistance, then Islam might have become something different from, and spiritually higher than, what it has become in fact....Instead of sealing his prophetic

message with his blood by becoming Caesar's victim it was Muhammad's ironic destiny to compromise and debase his prophetic message by becoming an Arabian Caesar himself. (20)

Both on logical and historical grounds we find that we are diametrically opposed to the views of Professor Toynbee. In the first place the difference in the careers of Jesus and Muhammad is so striking that it renders the application of a common conclusion an expectation out of place. We agree that the ideal expression of resistance to evil and sin demanded that Jesus should seal his message with his blood. Such an action fitted in beautifully with the doctrines he preached. Had he chosen any other course, it would have been to the decided detriment of his lofty principles. On the other hand, had Muhammad been killed by his enemies, it would have been in their opinion, and perhaps even in that of his own followers, a final proof of falsehood. In fact when the Meccans realised their inability to defeat him by peaceful means, that is to say, prove him wrong by reasonable argument, they seriously considered murdering him. (21) Had they succeeded in their ignominious scheme, they might have retained their paganism. In any case the application of analogies of this kind is not the best way of deciding the truth. For although the apostles and messengers of God had one noble aim in common, their circumstances were not usually identical.

In the second place the assumption that an invitation was issued to Muḥammad to go to Medina, is basically wrong. The truth seems to be that the Prophet had been trying very hard to persuade the Medinese to accept him in their midst and give him refuge. After a reasonably long time, the plans he was perfecting to settle with his followers in that new locality reached maturity. This should be considered as a diplomatic victory for the Prophet; in other words, the agreement of the people of Medina to give him shelter and protection was the successful realisation of one of his most ambitious plans. He went there with renewed hopes and brighter prospects. He was convinced that the change was really imperative for the service of Allah, and the maintenance and expansion of Islām.

The hostility of the Meccans was not due to religious motives only, though the religious factor should not be minimised. Subtle and deep rooted political issues were also involved in that conflict of ideas. It is apparent that the stress during the Meccan period was laid mainly on religion, but the political consequences inherent in the acceptance of Islām could not be hidden from the penetrating eyes of his antagonists. Obviously, there is no strong evidence to show that Muḥammad "entertained ulterior political designs during the Meccan period of his Prophetic mission."(22) But that did not matter much; because the acceptance of Islām ipso facto implied the surrender to the absolute

rule and authority of the Prophet in all matters divine and secular. As was proved later, that happened to be the case. Not only were the people asked to confess the omnipotence of Allah - a thing probably not unknown to them even before the birth of Muhammad - but they were expected to agree also that Muhammad was the sole interpreter of the message of God. The Prophet, therefore, had to be given unquestioned obedience; in other words, the Muhammadan movement was nothing less than a religio-political revolution. The Prophet's authority among his people was unique in the sense that he was the only person who could explain the commands of God; and by that fact his position had to be second to none. No distinction was made between divine and secular affairs. To the believers he was the final reference in all matters. It is true of course that during the Meccan period his sermons were mainly devotional; he was initiating his adherents into the new faith. Once that was over, he introduced a strong measure of discipline in their life. The Medina verses with their stress on obedience to Allah and the Prophet are a proof of that development in the religion of Islām.

Both the rulers and ruled in Mecca had reason to oppose the initial efforts of Muhammad. The ruling class considered that his success would constitute a potent threat to their established position. Every success he achieved meant a defeat to them coupled with an equal measure of material loss.

The ruled on the other hand, were apathetic and unimaginative. The ideas preached by Muhammad demanded higher imagination, and strength of character, than they were hitherto prepared to expend. If by nature people have a disinclination to change consolidated beliefs, they would certainly offer at least equal resistance to drastic alterations in the institutions based on those beliefs, for the latter are symbols and expressions of the former. That explains the very slow progress achieved by the Prophet in his native town.

Mecca was governed by a plutocratic minority. We avoid on purpose the use of the word "aristocracy" in this connection because there is no proof to show that the rulers were the best or most excellent element in the community. The chiefs of the various clans usually assumed government, and used to decide in assembly the important affairs and common problems of the whole community. (23) Each clan, seemingly, held an office in connection with the Ka'bah. The most influential office was probably that of the holder of the keys or that sacred temple or house. This is borne out by the tradition that when Muhammad had finally conquered Mecca, and was thus the undisputed lord of the vanquished city, he took possession of the keys. After performing devout prostrations he called 'Uthmān b. Talḥah who was the guardian of the temple up to the fall of the city and confirmed him in office. (24)

Then he (Muhammad) appointed his uncle al-ʿAbbās in charge of the well Zamzam and said to him: "it is no mean office this, that I give now unto thee." That tacitly implied that the post of guardian of the Kaʿbah was the most coveted one. (25)

It is difficult to decide how just and stable the government of Mecca was. From the available sources of information, however, it seems that at times, its board of elders or governors enacted some fine principles of justice. These became binding when the contracting parties had taken solemn oath or pledge to respect and fulfil them. (26) Ibn-Hishām gives an interesting illustration of the working of that system. (27) Some heads of clans entered into a compact whereby the contracting parties took it upon themselves to see to it that justice was done, and violated rights restored to any bona-fide citizen or temporary resident in Mecca. This they called Hilf al-Fudūl. (28)

Nevertheless, in spite of these creditable instances, Mecca seems to have been a poorly governed city. There are ample data in the Qur'an and Tradition to confirm this view. But we think it an unfair method - dialectically - to quote arguments from these sources to discredit a system, the destruction of which was their ultimate aim. This is a common fallacy of thought, yet by no means an infrequent one. It has been agreed at the outset that Muslim law was binding

only on Muslims, or on others who resorted voluntarily to its jurisdiction. We cannot, therefore, condemn a people of a different standpoint just because our teachings are at variance with theirs; unless of course, we possess a proof that our moral ideas represent the summum bonum in ethics. If one wishes to try a case with strict impartiality, the instrument of trial should be the particular legal or moral code binding on the person or institution concerned.

However, we can reasonably infer that, at the dawn of Islām, Mecca, as well as many other parts of the Arabian Peninsula, was in a degenerate political condition. From Pre-Islamic poetry, with its appraisal of raids, plundering, internecine tribal feuds, and the description of the very narrow clan loyalties, we are given an uncomplimentary picture. But even this evidence is not conclusive. Some scholars hold that pre-Islamic poetry is not really pre-Islamic; and that it has been composed after, and not before, the advent of Islām. (29) The truth is, therefore, that unless we possess some genuinely authoritative pre-Islamic documents, most of our description of life and conditions must remain on the whole speculative.

It is obvious, in fact it is certain that Muhammad wanted to win to his religion the maximum possible number of adherents. Therefore, knowing the psychology of his people, he would present to them terms that were most likely to win their favour. From the terms he presented, and the practices he allowed to survive temporarily in Islam, and which he

later attacked and prohibited, we can safely deduce that the social, economic, moral, and spiritual conditions of the Jahilite Arabs were not good or high. Take for instance the picture of a paradise where wine is served in silver goblets, carried by smart pages, to patrons dressed in expensive silk garments. (30) Would such ideas appeal to any people other than those inclined to crave for these things? And has there been in history a society given to excessive carnal pleasures without being a decadent and unjust society? And since these expensive luxuries could be had only at the toil of some other section of the community, that section must of necessity have been greatly oppressed and exploited. Frequent Qur'anic references give support to this view. And was it not due to the polygamous practice of the Arabs that the Qur'ān allowed each man a maximum of four wives; And to the virtuous and chaste in this world a happy life was promised in the next? (31) Obviously all these inducements were intended as a compensation for giving up the excessive indulgence the people were accustomed to. But with the consolidation of faith, the evil things which were deeply rooted in the structure of society, and which the Prophet tolerated for a time malgré lui, had to be abrogated. To begin with "he sought to bring his teaching into harmony with their prejudices, and lead

them gradually to a better knowledge." (32)

From the masterly rhetoric the Prophet used in order to persuade the rich believers to pay $2\frac{1}{2}\%$ of their annual wealth to ameliorate the condition of their poor brethren, we conclude that the rich Arabs were neither generous nor unduly charitable. (33) The Qur'an, therefore, fixed the compulsory alms at the lowest possible acceptable rate. (34) Benevolence, nevertheless, ranked very high among the desired virtues of a Muslim. The praise of charity as the foundation of moral justice has been a feature both of the Qur'an and the Tradition. Yet knowing his people, the Prophet did not leave it to individual judgement to fix the amount of Zakāh. It is to his credit that "Muhammad perhaps, is the only lawgiver who has defined the precise measure of charity." (35) As a measure of equality the Prophet discouraged the use of silk garments for dress. That, incidentally, gives the impression that silk clothing was customary to a certain class of that society.

The prohibition of usury also conveys the impression that the poor were being exploited badly. This suggests that the masses were in a constant state of financial embarrassment. At that time, the volume of money lending was a sign of a slump and not as nowadays of a boom. Men resorted to loans to tide them over severe hardships. Money was essentially used for personal purposes, and not for the finance of industrial or trade enterprises, as is the case now.

Apart from the Qur'ān the Tradition mentions that Mecca was a big, busy, and flourishing city-state. That information is not expressed directly, but is inferred easily from fragmentary items. Putting these together one can visualise a concrete whole. The book of trade (Kitāb al-Buyūʿ) (36) points out that many kinds of consumers' goods, not necessarily home produced, could be had at Mecca. Besides the lively condition of commerce, there were many ordinary and skilled trades in existence. For example: blacksmiths 17:38, perfumers 17:38, tailors 14:30, weavers 14:31, butchers 12:21, fruiterers 12:20, provision stores 11:18, traders who crossed the seas in the course of business 8:10, auctioneers 25:59, middlemen 28:68, wine merchants 42:105, potters and sculptors 41:104, 43:113. (37)

In the markets of Mecca one could buy the following among other things: silk garments which were a luxury 17:40, carpets of fine design and quality 17:40. Gold was legal tender but was not the only currency available 5:1; paper money was known and used 31:78, and gold and silver were exchangeable but the rate was not stated 31:77. (38)

It is not difficult to understand, therefore, that the work of the Prophet in converting Mecca must have been very arduous indeed. The task of persuading a city of that size to give up its accustomed way of life and accept a new set of ideas, could not have been easy under any circumstances.

It is quite probable that, at one stage of the initial struggle the Prophet had concluded that his progress was discouragingly slow, and a change of ground was thus indicated. This process was hastened by the vehement and persistent molestation to which he and his followers were subjected. The ordeal was made worse by the fact that at that juncture he was ordered (by Allah) not to retaliate.

Taking the small number of converts into account, one would certainly justify the Prophet in his decision to try his fortunes in a new locality. It seems that at the time of the Hijrah the number of the Muslims was not over three hundred men and women; and possibly even less.

Actual figures are not given in early Arabic sources.

Ibn-Hishām, (39) however, mentioned by name the people who emigrated to Medina following the Prophet's instructions.

These numbered seventy four. It must be borne in mind that this was a source of very great honour and pride once Islām had the upper hand. To the Arabs who were very fond of their glorious deeds a man's name could not have been missed out by a chronicler if that man had really been an emigrant or muhajir. The number of three hundred should, therefore, include all Muslims in areas other than Mecca -including early emigrants to Abyssinia- as well as all the believers detained in the city itself.

It would be interesting to establish what percentage of the whole Meccan population that figure represented;

because it would reveal in a concrete form the extent of the Prophet's achievement in thirteen years. To do so, some estimate of the population at that time must be attempted. It should be mentioned here that Muḥammad did not restrict the invitation to the Meccans alone.

During the annual season of heathen pilgrimage he had opportunities to propagate his faith among members of other tribes. Besides, he is reputed to have sought refuge in al-Ta'if, and to have urged its inhabitants to confess Islām, but was not successful. He did likewise with the tribes of Kindah, Kalb, Banū Ḥanīfah, and Banū 'Āmir with the same disappointing result. (40)

Jurjī Zaidān suggested that the number of Quraish during the reign of the Caliph 'Uthmān was two hundred thousand. (41) He quoted Ibn-Khaldūn for that information. (42) Carlyle said in his essay on "Mahomet" that Mecca "had at one time a population of 100,000" (43) He did not say where he found, or how he computed that figure. One feels disinclined to entertain it as authentic.

Since no reliable census, or any other trustworthy record is to hand, perhaps the safest method would be the examination of army figures during the Prophet's campaigns. According to Tradition there were nineteen battles in which he took part; but we think that the most important, and historically significant ones, did not exceed eight in number. The strength of the opposing

forces was as follows:-

BATTLE	MUSLIM TROOPS	MECCAN TROOPS
Badr	3 ⁰ 5	900 - 1000
Uhud	700 - 1000	3000
Al- <u>Khandaq</u>	3000	4000 (44)
<u>Khaibar</u>	1600	
Mu'tah	3000	
Al-Fath	10,000	
Hunain	12,000	
Tabūk	100,000 (45)	

Without unwarrantable stretch of imagination the following conclusions may be reached from the above figures:-

1- The maximum estimate of Meccan Muslims prior to the Hijrah could not have exceeded the 300 mark, possibly not even 200. Most authorities agree that the Muhajir warriors at Badr numbered 80-85 men. That constituted the majority of them. So important was this battle in the history of Islām, and so great was the honour of those who fought in it, that some historians mentioned by name those who failed to take part in it. (46) That battle gave the Muhājirs an opportunity to show their devotion to their religion and their support to the new policy of expansion by force of arms. It should be remembered in this connection that the Anṣār were not bound by the terms of their compact with the Prophet to wage aggressive war with him. The striking feature of this famous battle is that it was fought

within less than two years from the arrival of Muhammad in Medina. Since only Muslims were allowed to join the ranks of the Prophet's army, we can see at once the wisdom of his decision to transfer his activities to a new locality. (47) There seems reason to suppose that in one year or so, the city of helpers produced more followers of the new religion than Mecca did in thirteen years; a clear justification of the Prophet's action. (48)

2- In the battle of Badr, the Meccans had a thousand troops in the field. (49) By that number they thought they could deal a crushing blow to the Muslims. Since in all their combats against the rising power of the Muslims, they relied mainly on sheer weight of superior numbers, we may gather that the Meccan chiefs could not have estimated the number of their adversaries at more than half their own; and even allowing that Muhammad's army was then composed of equal fighting units of Muhajirs and Ansār, this establishes yet another indication that the emigrants could not have counted more than two hundred and fifty persons.

3- At Uhud, the Meccans were estimated at three thousand men; and at al-Khandaq the figure was about four thousand. According to Arab historians, these warriors represented Mecca, and not its adjoining or allied tribes. Chroniclers tell us that the total number

of fighters against Muhammad at al-Khandaq was ten thousand. Be that as it may; our main concern at the moment is with Mecca.

If a city in the seventh century A.D. could put into the field of battle four thousand able bodied men, what would its total population be? We may venture to state that it would be at least eight or nine times that amount. This estimate is not based on the modern conception that, to put a warrior in the field, a statesman must reserve eight or ten others for his supply, equipment, and maintenance. Such ideas are out of place in the case of Arab armies of that age. They used simple weapons like swords, spears, arrows, shields, and stone throwers. They were hardy by nature, and their food rations were carried with them to last the whole campaign. Our estimate is based on a conception of the social life of Mecca as pictured by many historical sources.

Polygamy was rampant. The Qur'anic legislation of four wives was at the time considered a harsh rule. Taking rich and poor together, it would be very reasonable to assume that the adult female population would be double that of the male. The Arabs were known to be a prolific race, but owing to severe climatic conditions and rigorous circumstances of life, infant mortality must have been high. That situation was also aggravated by infanticide or wa'd. Therefore, an estimate of four non-combatant

children to each warrior may be justified. Aged men and women, slaves and foreign settlers may count at least another four thousand. On that estimate, the approximate total of the Meccan inhabitants about the year 622 A.D. (the year of the Hijrah) may have been in the region of thirty two thousand.

fighting men	4000
women	8000
children	16000
aged etc.	<u>4000</u>
total	32000

Since it was considered a miracle that the Muslims with their inferior numbers defeated their superior enemies, (50) some historians might have been inclined to accentuate the phenomenon by putting the figures of Muslim troops at the lowest possible level, and that of their enemies at the highest possible standard. In calculations, this possibility was not overlooked, and hence the very conservative figures we have quoted above. Compared with the computations of others, this estimate may be considered as an under-statement. (51) For example, Maulvi Muhammad 'Alī, in his commentary on the Qur'an says in reference to the Prophet's last visit to Mecca for pilgrimage that the sacred city contained over one hundred thousand followers (52).

At once we conclude that on account of numbers alone,

the Muslims prior to the hijrah constituted a negligible section of the population, and even if the ratio of converts had increased many times, it would still have taken Muhammad more than the normal span of human life to form a strong minority in his native city. This gives yet another^r reason for the wisdom of his emigration to Medina.

Perhaps it may be wise not to lay the stress on the religious element as the main cause of the Meccan opposition to the Muhammadan movement; because, it would indeed, be credulous to attribute great and profound religious belief to that loose society. The advantages - purely^l worldly and material - were the main reason for the resentment of the Meccans. It had not occurred to them that the importance and sanctity of their city would be retained in Islām. Any impartial observer may look upon this as an act of political compromise of the first order; for the retention of some of the ritual connected with the pilgrimage to Mecca seems very bewildering to many Muslims because it is very reminiscent of heathen customs. Notice, for instance, how 'Umar b. al-Khattab is reputed to have said on kissing the black stone of the Ka'bah; "Oh stone! I kiss you, knowing you to be only a stone. Had I not seen the Prophet doing so, I would not have done it myself."

(53)

To the Meccans the adoption of one God, and the abandonment of the many idols their city possessed would have meant

a crushing blow to their livelihood, and prosperity. These idols had a national as well as a local significance. The various Arab tribes which had their own idols in their particular localities, used to flock to Mecca at certain seasons to make sacrifices to the Meccan ones. We are not told that the reverse took place. Also, offices of importance in Mecca were mostly connected with some kind of service to the chief temple, or to the pilgrims themselves. It becomes obvious, therefore, that the stern opposition on the part of the rulers was mainly due to political and economic reasons, rather than to pure religious convictions or piety. As Margoliouth points out, "it is, however, certain that the gods suffer by the neglect of their dues, and as they have representatives on earth, some men suffer thereby also; and since the favour of gods is thought to be necessary for the well-being of the state, many persons who have no other commercial interest in the matter are anxious to suppress heresy for fear of offending their masters." (54)

This view may be strengthened further by two considerations: the presence in Mecca of Jews and Christians who were not idol worshippers, and by the comparative ease with which Islām spread in Medina. If the Meccans were really firm believers in idols and idolatry, they would have been intolerant of other faiths, because religious tolerance was as yet unknown. There is no evidence to suggest that

the Jews and Christians who had settled in Mecca were ill treated on account of their faith. Nor is there any indication that attempts had been made to dissuade them from their religions. On the contrary, Muslim chroniclers even state that some Qurashites had adopted Christianity.

(55) Essad Bey explains ~~aby~~ the main reason for the religious tolerance of the Meccans. "Every idol", he says, "meant more visitors, assured greater incomes to the inhabitants....The Meccans themselves were fairly indifferent to all the gods. They were only too happy to offer everything that might make the market more successful." (56) It is needless to say, that the rulers of that city, in no small measure owed power, and high prestige among other tribal chiefs, to the presence of the idols in Mecca. Any threat to those false gods meant a threat to their livelihood; and hence, the reason for their vehement opposition to Islam.

Once we understand the purely selfish and ulterior motives behind the Meccan untiring resistance to the Message of Muḥammad, we can with perfect ease find the adequate grounds for the rapid expansion of Islām from the Hijrah onwards. In Medina no vested interests were endangered. On the contrary, Islām might have strengthened the position of that town against its rival Mecca. For if this new faith proclaiming the unity of God would prevail, fewer people would have reason to go to a

particular locality to make sacrifices to its pseudo-gods. And perhaps, some of the habitual pilgrims of heathen days might even change their course and set their caravans in the direction of Medina to see and hear the Prophet of the new and revolutionary movement. Let it be borne in mind that Islām was revolutionary only in the sense that it was an endeavour by an Arab against the established religious order of his society. Muḥammad was not content to hold the unaccustomed belief within his own heart. Like all apostles before him, he was proclaiming fearlessly the message entrusted to him, and was actively trying to convert to his ordered way as many members of his society as he could. That inevitably led to strong resentment from the leaders whose interests were threatened.

There is reason to believe that Islām as a monotheistic religion was not totally new. Christianity and Judaism, the two other monotheistic religions, were already known and practised in Arabia. We must, therefore, concede that besides the idols, the Arabs must have had some idea of a supreme and all powerful God. Allah was seemingly the word symbolic of that idea. Muḥammad did not coin the word himself, because it was in circulation before his birth. Had it been associated in any way with idol worship, he would in all probability have chosen another word for the One and Eternal God of Islām.(57)

Whereas Judaism and Christianity came from outside, that is to say, did not originate in Arabia, Islām was revealed

in the pulsing heart of that country, and from there, spread all over. This is the source of the personal element of pride the Arabs had in that religion once it was established. Unfortunately, this feeling of exultation turned later into an unjustifiable monopoly of power.

The result of the initial stage of the struggle for Islām should not be judged in terms of numbers only, because that would give a misleading view of the case. The few men and women who had the strength of character to declare their convictions and support Muhammad publicly were only the pioneers of the new movement. There must have been others besides them who found it more convenient not to commit themselves at that early stage. The truth seems to be that the Prophet Muhammad had initiated a mental and spiritual activity of such proportions as astounded his rivals and set the whole people thinking. Once they saw the light of Islām, a distinctive factor entered into their lives. Some were dazzled, and shut their eyes against it preferring the darkness of their spiritual night; others realised that in the progress towards that light, the way lay open for the emancipation of their souls. And although the Prophet had thought it prudent to concede ground for a short time, he was certain that he would come back to bring to a successful conclusion the work he had originally started. His emigration to Medina should not, therefore, be considered a flight from danger or an admission of defeat. In the circumstances, it was the best tactical

move that a resourceful leader could devise.

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CH. I.

N O T E S .

1. Qur. xlii:52.
2. " iv:163.
3. " iv:165 .
4. " xii:3.
5. " xciii: 6 f.
6. " cxii: 1 ff.
7. Bukh. 77:24 (iv:82), 79:30 (iv:178), 97:33 (iv:477)
8. Bukh. 79:3 (iv:167), 79:28 (iv:176), 80:32 (iv:197);
the word ^{عبد}'Abduh or His servant, is a formal denial
of any divine attribute to Muḥammad whose relation to
God is no more than that of a serving creature to
the Almighty.
9. Bukh. 63:30 (iii:23).
10. Ibid. 63:28 (iii:21), 63:45 (iii:36).
11. Al-Makḥzūmī: Fi faḍl Makkah (The Excellence of Mecca),
Cairo, 1922, p.102.
12. LHA : 145.
13. Taha Husain: Fi 'l-adab al-Jāhiliī (The Pre-Islamic
or Jāhilitic Literature), Cairo, 1927, p. 123.
14. Hish :188.

15. Hish: 168.
16. Ibid. 160 "My son, I cannot part with the religion of my fathers." Cf. Bukh. 63:40 (iii:29), 78:115 (iv:161), where it is stated that Abū Tālib died without confessing Islām, and would thus remain in Hell in spite of the help and protection he gave to the Prophet.
17. Hish:168, cf. LHA: 154. This tradition is translated in a slightly different form by Carlyle. Cf. Thomas Carlyle: On Heroes and Hero-Worship, London, 1926, and T.W.Arnold: The Preaching of Islām, London, 1913, p.13 f.
18. When seriously wounded at 'Uḥud Muḥammad advised his people not to relapse into unbelief. Cf. Hish: 597.
19. A.J. Toynbee: A Study of History, 15 vols. in progress, Oxford, 1934, iii:471.
20. Ibid. 470. Wellhausen says that "Muḥammad did not deteriorate by his change from preacher to ruler." Cf. Wellhausen: Arab Kingdom and its Fall, translated into English by ^{M.}G.Weir, Calcutta, 1927, p.4.
21. Tab. I,i:1230 f.
22. Toynbee, op.cit. 469.
23. Cf. Hish:187, 324 , and H.K.Sherwani: Distribution of Governmental functions about the time of Muhammad, art. IC. Oct. 1936, p. 533 ff.
24. Muir. LM. p. 409
25. Ibid. 409 .

26. It is interesting to observe, that the institution of al-Bai'ah or Pledge, has not been introduced in Arabia by the Prophet. It was an ancient practice resting on the word of honour of the contracting parties, and was usually symbolised by a handshake, and was valid between man and woman alike. Qur. lx:12, gives the impression that the Prophet was reluctant to accept the pledge of women.
27. Hish: 84 f.
28. For similar compacts see A.P.Caussin De Perceval: Essai sur L'Histoire des Arabes, Paris 1847, i:330 ff., and EI, ii:307 art. Hilf.
29. This is the gist of Dr. Taha Husain's argument in al-adab al-Jähilī.
30. Qur. xviii:30, xxii:23, xliii:71, xliv:54, xl:11ff., lvi:18. For further Qur'ānic description of life in paradise see: Jules Le Beaume: Le Koran Analyse, Paris, 1878, p. 504 ff.
31. Qur. iv:3. Although the marriage of four was allowed, it was subject to restrictions, principal among these was doing justice to all four. This condition was declared as extremely difficult of attainment. Qur.iv: 129 says: "you have not in your power to do justice between wives." It is, therefore, difficult to accept Dr. Roberts view that Muḥammad did not recognise the evils of polygamy. Is it not contradictory that Dr.

Roberts should say that "it is very questionable whether the prophet could have abolished polygamy entirely had he wished to do so, " and goes on to state that "What he could do, he did. If he could not abolish, he could and did restrict," ? Cf. R.Roberts: The Social Laws of the Qoran. London, 1925, p.9. For the praise and encouragement of chastity see Qur. xxiv:30 ff.

32. Theodore Nöldeke : HH :viii:115.
33. This view contradicts the favourable impression of generosity conveyed by ancient Arabian poets.
34. I used the ambiguous word "wealth" in preference to income or revenue because the zakāh is paid on accumulated savings, as well as on annual earnings or income. Cf. T.P.Hughes, Dictionary of Islām, London, 1896, p.700, and C.Hamilton:The Hedaya or Guide, ed . Grandy, London, 1860, p.1.
35. HH. viii:140.
36. Kitāb al-buyu' is book 34 of Bukhārī.
37. Margoliouth also mentions : leather merchants, oil merchants, arrow and sword makers, and money lenders. Cf. Marg.M.p.13., and Darimi's Musnad p. 245.
38. Dr. Haikal -though without indicating the source of his information- gives an interesting account of the busy and prosperous life of Mecca. Cf. Haikal.HM, 96 ff.
39. Hish: 314 ff., and 339 ff.
40. Haikal HM: 182 ff., Hish:281, Athir, ii:34 f., Khald. H. ii,2:10.

41. Jurjī Zaidān: Tārikh al-tamaddun al-Islāmi (History of Islamic Civilisation), Cairo, 1902-5, iv:40.
42. Zaidān's reference is not in Ibn Khaldun's History (1:36) as suggested, nor is it in the Muqaddimah.
43. Carlyle, op.cit. p.61.
44. These figures represent the Meccan forces only, but the total was bigger than that. Cf. Khald.H. ii,2:29, and Haikal HM:320.
45. Most Arab historians and chroniclers mention these figures with little or no variations.
46. Ibn Qutaibah: Handbüch der Geschichte. ed. Wüstenfeld, Gottingen, 1850, p.76.
47. The Anṣār were under no obligation to take part in offensive war. When, however, the Prophet consulted them, they agreed to share in the struggle against the Meccans. Cf. Haikal, HM : 253.
48. This success was not in any way due to the use of force, because up till then serious armed conflict had not taken place and most of the Muslims were keen and zealous believers. Cf. D.S.Margoliouth: Early Development of Mohammedanism, London, 1914, p.4.
49. Khald. H. ii,2:19.
50. The Prophet ascribed his success "to the miraculous assistance of God" who commanded invisible angels to fight on the Muslims' side. Qur. viii:9 ff., and Muir, LM :235.

51. For example, al-Ta'if, which was definitely smaller than Mecca is said by IbnKhalidūn (H. ii,1:338) to have had a population of 70,000 inhabitants at one time.
52. Maulvi Muḥammad 'Alī: The Holy Qur'ān, Woking, 1917, p.1231.
53. Bukh. 25:50 &60 (i:404 &406). Even in his farewell pilgrimage the Prophet is reputed to have kissed the Black-stone. This practice, though reminiscent of heathen customs was accepted unquestionably after the Prophet's example.
54. Marg. M. 152.
55. For example Waraqah b. Nawfal, Khadijah's cousin, was a Qurashite Christian. Cf. High: 143. Père H. Lammens gives a detailed account of Christians and Jews in Mecca; see: L'Arabie Occidentale avant L'Hégire, Beyrouth, 1925.
56. Essad Bey, Mohammed , translated into English by H.L. Ripperger, London, 1938, p. 47.
57. Additional note on the knowledge of the name "Allah" before Islām.
- Muḥammad's father was called 'Abd Allah. The word "Allah" as Hitti suggests, was held in very high esteem by the pre-Islamic Meccans, who looked upon Allah as "the Creator and supreme provider." Cf. Hitti. HA:101.
- The phonetic resemblance between الله and אלהים is too obvious to comment upon. D.B.Macdonald (EI, i:302) points out that الله corresponds to אלה among the Hebrews

It is interesting to note that in the seven mu'allaqāt, or poems hung on the walls of the Ka'bah, and generally attributed to pre-Islamic times, the word "Allah", occurs twice: Zuhayr, v:27, and Ibn Hillizah, v:75. Allah is also mentioned in the qaṣīdah of al-A'shā, v:52, and Ibn al-Abras, vv.18,19,20. The word "al-Ilāh" occurs in v.85 of Labīd's mu'allaqah. Cf. Tibrīzī: Commentary on the mu'allaqāt, ed. C.J.Lyall, Calcutta, 1894. Cf. ERE, i:326, and Arther Jeffery, The Foreign vocabulary of the Qur'an, Baroda, 1938, p.66.

CHAPTER II.

THE CONSOLIDATION OF THE STATE.

The success of the Prophet in Medina did not come by accident. It was the natural result of sound bases. Some of these, are well worthy of analysis.

Buhl suggests that the desire of the Aus and Khazraj to end their tribal feuds and unite under the political leadership of a neutral ruler - a foreigner, in other words - caused them to issue an invitation to the Prophet to come and settle in their midst. "The Medinese," he says, "did not so much want to attract an inspired preacher to themselves as to get a political leader, who would readjust their political relations, which had been shattered in the tribal conflicts culminating in the battle of Bu'ath." (1) This theory is open to criticism on the following grounds:-

(1) It is alien to Arab traditions which placed clan or tribal loyalty above all other considerations; thus the invitation to a total stranger to solve other people's affairs would appear very awkward. At that time, of course, the clan represented and constituted their widest or ultimate social and political unity. It was, in fact, a great credit to Muhammad that he skilfully convinced the Arabs of the necessity of substituting a national unity for the narrow tribal loyalty. This creditable achievement, however, materialised if at all, after, and not before, his Hijrah. It

should be remembered that the Meccans considered his departure from their city as a betrayal, and a violation of the established ethics. The poet al-Hārith b. Hishām said that the Muhajirs had sold themselves to another society (ʿAshīrah) far away, and of a different origin! And he stated that such behaviour was an expression of "ingratitude, definite sin, and severing (of relations), condemned by people of wisdom and right opinions". (2) The point we seek to establish is this: the Medinese would have been condemned in the same way had they chosen freely to entrust their affairs to someone from a society far away and different in origin; because, of course, the Meccans were just as alien to the Medinese as the latter were to the Meccans.

(2) There was no parallel or precedent proving that at any time in their history the Arabs had willingly invited a member of a different tribe to assume the reins of government; because that would be a tacit admission that the inviting party had no talented men of its own. Even if that were the case, it would be a shameful weakness the truth of which most people would be reluctant to exhibit.

(3) The pacts of al-ʿAqabah, clearly stated that Muḥammad and his party were to be given refuge and protection. In the negotiations leading to the second or great compact of al-ʿAqabah the Prophet's Uncle, .

al-ʿAbbās, made quite certain of this condition when he explained to the Medinese that Muḥammad had chosen to adhere to them. When they agreed, the Prophet asked them to accord him the protection they gave to their women and children. (3) This confirms the belief that Muḥammad was more interested in the Medinese than they were in him. Those negotiators were not plenipotentiaries, they were only the representatives of that section in Medina which had declared itself in favour of Muḥammad and Islām. On the strength of the above consideration we feel disinclined to accept the validity of Buhl's conclusion that, by inviting Muḥammad to settle in their midst the Medinese were "seeking in him a saviour from their social and political difficulties." (4)

Margoliouth denies that there is sufficient evidence to support the view that the Prophet was glad "to accept an invitation from the inhabitants of Yethrib to come thither as dictator, to heal their feud and restore order." (5)

Yet, the emphasis on the politico-religious motives still seems to us the right interpretation for the initiation of the nijrah. Only there is reason to believe that it was the community of interests that united both parties. As Buhl argues with good reason, Muḥammad was aware that he lived in a higher intellectual world which was closed to the Meccans. The

conviction of his righteousness became a fixed idea, and the "consciousness of being a chosen instrument of Allah had gradually become so powerful within him that he was no longer able to sink back into an inglorious existence with his object unachieved." (6) Therefore, he sought new ground for a fresh start, and temporarily gave up the struggle with the Meccans, consoling himself that "whomsoever Allah guides, will be rightly guided, and whomsoever He causes to err, you shall not find for him any friend to lead him aright." (7) The Arab inhabitants of Medina, on the other hand, found that they were systematically subjected to the subtle intrigue of the Jews. (8) Following the principle divide et impera the Yathribite Jews were playing the rival clans of Aus and Khazraj against each other to the enhancement and maintenance of Jewish ascendancy. We do not know how much truth there is in the report that the combined forces of the Jews and the Aus had defeated the Khazraj at Bu'ath; nor can we be certain that the first Muslim converts from Medina were Khazrajites, "fresh from a severe defeat which they had sustained from the Aus and Jews; and the native tradition represents them as having taken up with Muhammad in order to outwit the latter." (9) From the collection of poems supposed to have been delivered at the battle of Badr, we find that both the Meccans and the Medinese

mention the Aus first as the staunchest supporters of Muḥammad and Islām. (10) Margoliouth himself argues that "the persons whose conversion decided the fortunes of Islam at Yethrib were two chieftains of the Aus, Usaid, son of Muraith, and Sa'ad, son of Mu'adh." (11) We are, therefore, led to conclude that the initiative must have come from both the Aus and Khazraj. It is not unlikely that these clans had realised that the Jews were the main instigators of the fratricidal conflict, and thus agreed to invite Muḥammad and his followers to join them and so increase their power and tip the balance of power in favour of the Arabs against the Jews in that locality. This view may be corroborated by the report that during the negotiations leading to the al-'Aqabah convention the Medinese secured the assurance of help from the Prophet in case of local conflict with the Jews. Abu 'l-Haitham b. Al-Tayyihān said to the Prophet: "Oh Prophet of Allah! There are covenants between us and the Jews that we intend to revoke. If we do so, and if Allah causes you to prevail, would you leave us alone and go back to your people?" (12) Whereupon the Prophet smilingly answered: "I will live and die with you. Your blood is my blood; your ruin shall be mine. I am from this moment your friend and

the enemy of your foes." (13) Thus, "the men of Yethreb offered him their support and an asylum in their city, but they added a condition that disclosed their motives" (14) It is probable, therefore, that "the adhesion of Yethreb to the new faith was inspired by policy rather than religion." (15) If at that moment one of the Medina parties were really interested in the safety, or welfare of the Jews, then they would have objected to the Prophet's acceptance of that condition. Instead, when they secured his promise of support, they all got up and shook hands with him thus signifying the verbal ratification of the contract.

The presence in Medina of the Banū 'l-Najjār who were near relatives of Muḥammad was an additional factor in aiding his cause; but this reason should not be unduly exaggerated; because the Meccans were nearer to him than the Najjars or any other people; and yet, when their interests collided blood relationship proved to be of very little account.

We can see, therefore, that the people of Medina by their acceptance of the Prophet were adding to their power. This decision was, nevertheless, fraught with danger; for it was obvious that, giving shelter and protection to a dissident faction of a neighbouring city was definitely an unfriendly act towards that city. They thus left themselves open to future unfriendliness

and possible hostilities from Mecca.

However, Muḥammad settled comfortably in Medina, and was accorded honour and hospitality by the Anṣār; and it did not take him long to assume supreme power in the new locality. He set to work, and all his potentialities as a Prophet-statesman were fully exhibited. Yet it is not safe to assert that the two periods formed distinct stages in his career. It is true that circumstances were different; but the person himself did not change accordingly, because the dominant motive of his life remained the same to the end.

Many writers, however, have laid undue stress on his political and administrative work in Medina to the neglect of the religious. Referring to his life in Yethrib Essad Bey says, "Here ends the life history of the Prophet Mohammed, and his career as a statesman begins." (16) Another writer says, "the Hijra marks in Muhammad's career a no less interesting change; it started the political evolution of Islam, the Prophet became the ruler of the State." (17) Bosworth Smith says: "with the flight to Medina the scene changes. The Prophet and his creed now take their place for good or for evil on the theatre of the world." (18) "The Prophet in spite of himself became by force of circumstances, more than a prophet...he became a temporal ruler." (19) Zwemer maintains that "The flight to Medina changed not

only the scene, but the actor and drama, He who at Mecca was the preacher and warner, now becomes the legislator and warrior." (20) Another writer goes to the extent of considering that, "It is with this flight to Medina that Islam commences. If the men of Medina had refused to receive him it would have been all up with the new religion; it would have remained the project of an idle dream." (21) We may also recall here Toynbee's description of the second stage of Muhammad's career as the turn of a prophet into a Caesar. (22) Buhl's account of the Hijrah is equally interesting. "The inspired religious enthusiast whose ideas mainly centred around the coming last judgment....with the migration to Medina enters upon a secular stage and at one stroke shows himself a brilliant political genius." (23) "We can confidently record here," says Taha Husain, "that this Hijrah has set the conflict between the Prophet and Quraish in a new light, and turned it into a political struggle dependent for its solution upon the power of the sword; while before it was religious based on argument only." (24)

The Hijrah was, undoubtedly, an event of the greatest importance in the history of the Arabs and Islām. This can be grasped from the fact that it started the Muslim era. (25) Besides, there is reason for supposing that in Medina, Islām began to have an independent identity

or personality which it did not possess in Mecca. But, to look upon the Hijrah as signifying mainly a political change is not wholly true. It is clear from the history of the Meccan period that the rulers of that city were persisting in their antagonism because of their fears of the political supremacy of the Prophet. He had by his careful manoeuvring of the situation established himself as a political power in Mecca, and its rulers resorted to force only when his "successful diplomacy threatened to wreck the independence of their city." (26)

We find no reason, therefore, for the assumption that the life history of Muhammad can be divided into two water-tight compartments; the one religious, and the other political. We are more inclined to believe that such division leads only to confusion. The Prophet was guided all his life by one single purpose, and he does not seem to have deviated from it to any marked extent.

Nevertheless, the striking change of circumstances is worth while considering. Whereas we see him in Mecca as a peaceful preacher, patiently arguing with the people in an attempt to convert them to his religion, he is in Medina a leader definitely using a great measure of force in spreading his thoughts. To think otherwise is to deceive oneself. He is reputed to have said, "I have been ordered to fight the people till they admit that there is no God but Allah." (27) The Qur'an is equally demonstrative of the

altered policy. Within the pages of the same book one finds verses like the following:-

"There is no compulsion in religion." ii.256.

"Surely you cannot guide whom you love, but Allah guides whom He pleases....." xxviii : 56.

"Whomsoever Allah guides, he is the rightly guided one, and whomsoever He causes to err, you shall not find for him any friend to lead aright." xxviii : 17.

"Say: O unbelievers! I do not worship that which you worship. Nor do you worship him whom I worship....You have your own religion and I have mine." cix :1 ff.

At the same time a different attitude is expressed in the following verses:-

"....kill them wherever you find them and take not from among them a friend or a helper." iv : 89.

"Fight those who do not believe in Allah, or in the last day, and do not prohibit what Allah and His apostle have prohibited....." ix : 29.

"Verily the religion with Allah is Islām." iii : 18.

"Fighting is enjoined on you, and it is an object of dislike to you,...." ii:216.

"....and fight the polytheists all together as they fight you all together,....." ix: 35.

It is revealing to observe that the parts of the Qur'ān advising tolerance are mostly Meccan, while forceful measures are encouraged in the Medina sūras. On the

whole the resort to force constitutes the main feature of policy adopted after the Hijrah. However, this can be explained on reasonable grounds.

We shall leave aside the theological argument, indicating that the Prophet was strictly following the orders of God when he adopted a pacifist policy in Mecca, and an assertive one in Medina. Such methods of approach are dogmatic, and may be accepted only on belief or trust. On that assumption, no one should question the messenger's actions because, he was "obeying implicitly the orders issued to him by God." (28) Obviously, this is not the line of reasoning adhered to in this work. Our efforts are mainly directed to the discovery of the motives behind the Prophet's dealing with the various problems of his life's work. We are guided by the view that he is a morally responsible agent, quite capable of accounting for his actions on rational bases.

What, we may ask, were the pointers of his policy in Medina? A study of his background there, together with an examination of the events which took place after the Hijrah may provide an answer.

1. The number of adherents of Islam in Medina greatly increased. Muhammad felt his position getting stronger every day. The rest of the citizens of that town who had not yet adopted the new religion, were not

openly actively hostile to him. That made his task easier and prompted him to greater efforts, because it was easier for him to win to his side a neutral rather than an aggressive population.

2. Muḥammad had to convince the Medinese that the emigrants or Muhājirs were not a party of parasitic refugees coming to compete with the native population in securing a livelihood. On arriving at Medina some Muhājirs proudly declined the genuine offer of hospitality, and asked to be shown the way to the market-place. They were certain that their business ability would secure them a comfortable living without resort to the generosity of their hosts. (29)

3. At the same time Muḥammad must have found it necessary to demonstrate in a concrete form his adherence to the new city. His raids on the Meccan caravans exhibited his change of clan loyalty in an unmistakable manner.

4. It was obvious to the Prophet that, if he really wanted his cause to prevail, Mecca must be subdued. It was undoubtedly the most important centre in the whole of the Arabian Peninsula. Its strategic geographical position, and its bearing on the religious and cultural life of the country made that decision a foregone conclusion. He had only to prepare himself and wait for the chance, or create it when the opportune moment

arrived. Before everything else, he wanted to show the Meccans that the very things that caused their persistent hostility to him were now in a greater peril. They opposed him mainly out of selfish motives. Therefore, it was incumbent upon him to frustrate the aims they wanted to achieve through opposition.

These points may justify his change of tactics; for his tactics rather than his strategy altered to meet the demands of the new situation. His original plan of proclaiming Islām was uniform all his apostolic life.

To achieve his purpose Muḥammad had to insure peace and unity not only among the Muhājirs and Anṣar, but between all the Muslims and non-Muslims in Medina; in other words, he had to create a new unity among a community of people of different religious views. What unity was practicable in that case but the political one? Therefore, Muḥammad had to organise the already existent body-politic into a State. We do not agree with others (30) that the Prophet created a State; for no single man can create a State. This is not intended to belittle Muḥammad's valuable contribution to the establishment of Arab unity. The part he played was indeed very impressive.

From the standpoint of political theory, however, the creation of a State implies the transformation of a collective body of men from a condition of nature, to

one of maturity. Such a process of development takes longer than the span of life of any man. Besides, it is an organic growth which cannot be hastened materially by the active help of one man or a small group of men.
(31)

To glorify the work of the Prophet, some Muslims maintain that he found Arabia in a condition of nature, and changed it during his life-time into a fully consolidated, and united nation. The same misapprehension is also apparent in statements asserting that, "the histories of Italy and Germany begin respectively with Cavour or Bismarck or thereabouts." (32) The suggestions that Hitler created the third Reich, and Mussolini Fascist Italy are equally wrong. To re-organise or reform a state does not mean its creation. Assumptions of this sort, are condemned by Collingwood as nonsense, "and nonsense many centuries out of date."
(33)

Referring to "the state of nature in Medina", Ilyas Ahmad says: "socially and morally, this part of Arabia was as low in the scale of civilisation as any other part of that country." (34) Yet he admits in the following page that "at the time of the First Pledge of Aqaba.....it seemed that there was peace, goodwill, mutual assistance and preservation because it was a

state of equality.....and liberty of each individual."

(35) And, it is obvious of course, that the influence of Muhammad on the community of Medina was exercised after and not before the pledges of al-'Aqabah. In point of fact, however, a people who, in the words of Buhl, were seeking in the Prophet "a saviour from their social and political difficulties," (30) could not have been very backward or low. Even the assumption that they were conscious of their social problems and anxious to solve them, is in itself an indication of a fairly healthy stage of development before the arrival of the Prophet.

Even assuming that Medina was in dire need of a capable and resourceful leader to settle its affairs that does not mean that it was in a primitive political state. Be that as it may, the Prophet supplied the demand, and very ably discharged the duties of a prophet-statesman.

It is necessary to estimate the extent of Muhammad's original thought in the field of politics. Whether or not he embarked on that course to serve his religious aims, is irrelevant to the present argument. There is reason to hold that his political and military successes, perhaps more than any other factors, have helped in the establishment and consolidation of Islam. He seems to have worked according to a well conceived, and clearly defined plan. His policy aimed at steady progress. Towards his goal he advanced with measured but sure steps. His success did not

cause him to hasten. His experience must have convinced him that it was better to have a few sincere and faithful adherents, than to have many reluctant or hypocritical ones. He always guarded his back against sudden attack, and made certain that in case of a reverse, his followers would not forsake him or revolt against him. Little by little he widened his circle, and after every triumph devoted himself to the consolidation of his gains, before unfolding plans for further action. In his own mind, he must have had supreme confidence and faith in the righteousness of his cause, an asset indispensable to any leader. Let us see how he worked and fulfilled his plans.

1. UNITY AT HOME.

In spite of his awareness of the mutual distrust and suspicion between the Jewish and non-Jewish Arabs in Medina, the Prophet tried to unite in peace all the members of his new community. (37) As far as was practicable he dispensed with the principal loyalty based on the tribal or clan unity, and persuaded his followers to adopt an abstract political bond instead. Seemingly that was an idea of his own. It followed naturally from the unification of the Muhajirs and Anṣar under the banner of Islām. The compact with the Jews which he had contracted for that purpose was a necessary expedient, that had to be undertaken in the

interests of the City-State of Medina. (38) It ensured peace which was the prerequisite of the development of his plans.

Although that compact confirmed the principle of religious tolerance in Islām, and gave equal status in civic rights to all citizens, it was not a compromise between Islām and Judaism or any other religion. For while the Qur'ān holds that, "God will explain - in the next world - the differences between religions," it tells the Muslims at the same time that, in the eyes of God Islām is the religion par excellence. (39) To tolerate a thing does not imply its acceptance. Particularly in matters of religious belief, what one considers to be true implies that all other propositions are false. (40)

The agreement with the Jews should therefore be viewed as an inevitable step in the unification of Yathrib. Muhammad was quite aware that he and his followers were still but an insignificant minority that could be crushed under a determined attack. He could not risk having disunited and hostile factions in his own city. The wisdom of that policy was clearly demonstrated after his defeat at 'Uhud. Had the Meccans then pressed their success home to Medina, or had the Jews been obviously dissatisfied and broken out in revolution at his back, thus blocking

his line of retreat, the course of world history might indeed have been different.(41) On the other hand that political compromise with members of a different religion entailed no material sacrifice to the Muslims, because at that time Muḥammad was the head of the State, and could hardly be expected to sanction anything that would jeopardise the interests of his religion and its followers. On the contrary, all his efforts were devoted to furthering and propagating the cause for which he lived and worked. It remains to his credit that he was the initiator of that great unity among the Arabs. The idea itself, was simple, yet unique; simple because it was the most natural and immediate plan to take; unique because it introduced an abstract thought in place of the hitherto obvious and concrete one of blood ties. Further, it had not been successfully attempted before in Arabia. No longer were the people united through the accident of descent from a common father. Their unity was now resting on ideals of thought and ties of creed. So strong and so real was the new bond of Islām that men of the same tribe fought against their kinsmen in defence of their concepts, a thing unheard of before in that land.(42) The originality of muḥammad's idea was the more remarkable because of its unnatural character to the Arab environment. Small and scattered communities separated from each other by seas of sand, tend to be self-centred, independent, and resentful of any external encroachment on their liberty. Yet

the prophet brought home to them the idea that there was a greater link, in many ways more real and more advantageous, that could hold the loyalties of groups and individuals. While any man could still retain his freedom in all ways, and develop to the full his character and personality under the new pattern of thought, the basic unit in the^e state was expressed in terms of groups as well as of individuals. That was an appreciable advance politically and morally; politically, because it introduced the principle of allegiance to the city and its citizens; and morally because, as Dr. Temple ably expresses it, "Moral progress has largely consisted in the expansion of the area within which obligation and loyalty are recognised to exist. At first the^{re} is loyalty only to the clan, and obligation is scarcely recognised in relation to members of other clans.(43)

Before the introduction of this idea as a general principle, the Prophet formed personal brotherhoods valid for legal purposes between men unrelated by family ties.(44) The various marriages which he contracted after the Hijrah, may also be looked upon as positive measures in the realisation of that policy. All along he seems to have aimed at binding his followers to himself and then to each other by every possible tie.(45) But it was hardly to be expected that this abstract idea would meet with instant and unqualified success. New thoughts need to be digested mentally and appreciated

fully before they begin to modify one's behaviour. The clan loyalty had previously served the people well, and had for generations been the pivot of group attachment; therefore, it was not easy at a moment's notice to uproot it and dispense with it. In fact it was an innate weakness in the moral temper of the Arabs that they could not be brought to realise the equality of all men. a fact so often stressed in the Qur'ān and Muḥammad's injunctions. This defect proved later to be a major cause in the downfall of the Arab Empire. It is apparent, therefore, that in his attempt to establish unity at home Muḥammad had to contend with the difficulties arising out of the background of Arabia and the temperament of the inhabitants.

2. THE EXPANSION.

As soon as the Prophet thought he had founded a solid and united home front, he turned his attention to subduing his persecutors and antagonists. This action was not undertaken for the mere sake of vengeance or retaliation.(46) It was embarked upon simply because he felt he was in a position to assert himself, and his cause, with the weapon that had often been used against him without any justification. He felt he was on strong ground, and his resolution was sharpened because he possessed a body of resolute and dependable men who admitted his spiritual leadership and were ready to obey

his every word. Behind him Medina was a hospitable place of refuge. That city with its inhabitants was a source of great encouragement to him. No longer was he looked upon as the despised head of an illegal band. Even then, his pledged supporters were not numerous; but, their devotion and moral discipline compensated for the meagreness of their number. The rest of the non-Muslim inhabitants were bound by convention to be either sympathetic or benevolently neutral. The worst of them were not actively hostile to him. He was ready to fight; in other words, he was now prepared for his armed Jihād. (47)

We accept as a fact that armed force was at one time in the history of Islām resorted to as a means of spreading religion. Many Muslim writers have devoted time and energy to the interpretation of that phenomenon. The crux of their argument was that the Jihad was a defensive and not an offensive measure. (48) Be that as it may, there is no escaping the Qur'ānic text that the sword, in certain circumstances is a legal means of upholding the Islamic faith. (49) Remember however, that the same sacred book is quite clear and definite on the principle of freedom of religion and tolerance of other beliefs.

The simplest and perhaps the most logical way out of this dilemma would be to seek the interpretation of these verses with an eye on the political background at that par-

/ticular

time. Although from the Muslim point of view the Qur'anic injunctions are permanent and universal, that is, generally valid for all time and in all circumstances, we notice that the verses allowing armed violence invariably have a characteristic Arabian setting. For example, Qur.ii:190 f, are retaliatory in nature; "fight (Ar. qātilū) in the way of Allah those who fight you, and do not start aggression; surely Allah does not love the aggressors." 191: "and kill them wherever you find them, and drive them out from whence they drove you, and sedition is severer than killing; and do not fight them at the sacred mosque until they fight you in it..." Qur.ii:217, gives the law concerning battles or fighting during the sacred months. It is obvious that the sacred months were a purely Arabian institution. The justification of this policy of positive or retaliatory aggression is not difficult to defend. The Prophet found that as long as the Arabs, and in particular the Meccans, retained their religious institutions, their pride and independent character remained intact. As long as Mecca continued to have independence, it constituted a potent threat to Islām, and encircled it in a spiritual siege. Therefore, in order that these fetters might be broken, and in order to insure the future of his religion, Muḥammad had to subdue that proud city, and humble to the ground its arrogant chiefs. Once that task was accomplished, and once the Meccans confessed their Islām,

even by lip service, the whole desert would follow suit. To some people physical violence is the most convincing argument. Whether the defeated foe was sincere in his confession of faith or not, did not matter very much; only God knows the secrets of hearts. But the possibility always remained that new generations would be born in Islam, and take its teachings for granted.

3. THE CONQUEST OF MECCA.

Mecca was conquered peacefully at Hudaibiyah. (50) The Muslim victory without a shot (of an arrow) was final and decisive. The humiliation of the mother of cities or umm al-qura, was so overwhelming and complete, that in the opinion of the prophet the physical surrender of the city and its annexation to the Muslim State were only a matter of time to be decided by himself. The prestige he acquired through his diplomatic success on that occasion was great. But the material advantage to the Muslim cause was even greater. "Cette remarquable victoire diplomatique du Prophète mit les Quraishites dans un état d'isolement total." (51) In conformity with his policy of steady progress, he realised that the time was ripe for extending the message of Islam by the argument of force. The actual entry into Mecca at the head of his victorious troops took place some two years later, but that was in the nature of an impressive ceremony

of a pre-arranged military parade rather than the culmination of a battle.

The importance attached to Hudaibiyah is based on the following considerations:-

(a) The mere agreement of the chiefs of Mecca to send delegates to negotiate with Muhammad implied his legal recognition as the political head of another city-state. It must have been a bitter memory for the Meccans to recall that only six years earlier when the Prophet was in their midst they looked upon him as a rebel against society. Not only that, but they discovered to their cost in the course of negotiations, that during his stay in Medina he had developed into a statesman of the first order. Their best negotiators were no match for him. With the exception of the last one, Suhail b. Amr, the rest returned to their chiefs to report their failure. Undoubtedly Muhammad made the most of his intellectual brilliance on that occasion.

(b) For the first time in the history of Mecca, the supremacy of its religious position was put at a serious disadvantage. Through lack of vision, the Meccan delegates agreed that the tribes were now free to join the party of Muhammad, that is to say the Muslim community, if they wished.

(c) Although Muhammad and his adherents were not allowed to perform the ceremony and ritual of the pilgrimage in that year, their right to do so was legally established

by the Convention of Hudaibiyah. The institution of the pilgrimage to Mecca as a feature of Islām, and the retention of Jahilite ritual connected with it were among the main factors in reconciling the Meccans to Islām, and inducing other tribes to join in the new and youthful community of believers. (52) "Mecca," says Essad Bey, "was suddenly to become the centre of the Islamic world. Mohammed made Mecca and the Kaaba, which drew the hearts of the Bedouins like a magnet, the spiritual centre of his anti-Meccan faith. The victory of Islam over Arabia could only be certain when Mecca and Islam should have been fused together, when they should have become one in the minds of the Bedouins. The method which Mohammed chose gave evidence of a statesman-like vision, of a diplomatic capability possessed by no one else in the desert." (53)

(d) The extent of that victory was not hidden from Muhammad, nor was its importance minimised because he entered into negotiations with the Meccan unbelievers and reached a compromised agreement with them. He knew what he was doing, and if actions are to be judged by their results, the outcome of that treaty proved in a short time that his estimate of the situation was perfectly sound. Some of his uncompromising lieutenants openly expressed their dissatisfaction with his conciliatory attitude on that occasion. Others did not quite grasp the significance of that bloodless triumph. Umar in

his characteristic impulsiveness exclaimed to the Prophet.(54)

"Are you not the messenger of Allah?"

"Yes, I am," answered the Prophet.

"And are we not the Muslims?"

"Certainly ; "

"And are they not the unbelievers?"

"Yes, they are."

"Why then should we bargain with them about our religion?"

"I am the servant and messenger of Allah, and will never disobey His commands; and I am certain He will not forsake me." concluded the Prophet.

On the way back to Medina, the Muslim caravan was moving steadily and peacefully across the desert. The Prophet in great contentment was reciting a new chapter from the Qur'ān. "Verily, we have given you a resounding victory." (55) Even then some people were still unconvinced. "Is it really a victory? " said one man to the Prophet.

"By whom in whose hand my soul is , it is a victory." said the Prophet.(56)

Commenting on the Hudaibiyyah truce, al-Zuhri says, "no greater victory than that was ever attained in Islam. In the two years that followed the truce, the number of adherents equalled the combined total of earlier ones." Ibn Hisham confirms this statement by asserting that, "the Prophet went to Hudaibiyyah at the head of fourteen hundred men,

and only two years later on entering Mecca, he was followed by ten thousand Muslims," (57)

Maulvi Muhammad 'Alī says, "The truce at Hudaibiyah was surely a real victory for the Muslims, because it opened the way for the propagation of Islam among the unbelievers and by putting a stop to hostilities gave the opponents an occasion to ponder over the merits of the religion against which they had hitherto struggled in vain in the field of battle." (58)

Dr. Haikal says, "There is no doubt that the Convention of Hudaibiyah was a brilliant conquest. The days proved that the political wisdom and foresight inherent in it had the greatest influence on the future of Islam and the Arabs; subsequent events confirmed the immense profit gained at Hudaibiyah; for only two months later, the way was paved for the invitation issued by Muhammad to the Kings, and heads of foreign States to join Islām." (59)

4. THE INVITATION TO NON-ARABS.

Muslim historians agree that Muhammad sent envoys to deliver invitations to the reigning emperors and monarchs of his time asking them to follow Islām, and thus to surrender their sovereignty to him. The mission of these envoys is supposed to have taken place in the year six of the Hijrah, after the truce of Hudaibiyah. The texts differed

in content and tone. Some were very mild and indicative of diplomatic skill and tact in approach. Others were terse, peremptory, and intimidatory in expression, as though they were ultimata of war rather than peaceful communications.(60)

The authenticity of these documents has been questioned. Dr. Bell suggests that they "are of very doubtful genuineness and stories regarding their reception by those to whom they were addressed are manifest fables." (61) Commenting on the letter sent to Heraclius Muir says: "The terms of this and other despatches are altogether uncertain. The drafts given by tradition, with the replies, are apocryphal, and tinged with the idea of universal conquest, as yet existing (if at all) only in embryo. The ordinary copy of the letter to Heraclius contains a passage from the Kor'an which, as shown by Weil, was not revealed till the ninth year of the Hijra."(62) A Muslim writer -Dr. Hamidullah- maintains that "Le problème de l'authenticité est plus délicat...En l'absence des originaux, l'historien est obligé de s'en tenir aux ouvrages classiques qui en donnent copie.(63) On the whole he takes a middle course in assessing the genuineness of the documents. In his opinion, some "soivent généralement être considérés comme authentique," others are "sans aucun doute, d'invention postérieure."(64)

There is reason to hold that these criticisms are not without justification. Muslim chroniclers and historians,

in repeating the same story or event, often stretch their imagination, and give scope to their literary faculties. The inevitable result is that accounts of the same incident are often differently stated. Yet the variations are on a certain theme. Obviously, it would be credulous to suppose that, because there are many reports of a certain event, it follows that it must have had some origin in reality. In this particular case, however, the evidence in support of missions to the then world rulers is rather convincing. The authenticity of the documents delivered on those occasions -assuming there were any- may be open to doubt; but, the actual contact of muḥammad, through his envoys, with those dignitaries is probable. It is one thing to suggest that the letters in the form handed down to us are fictitious, and another to conclude that the invitations did not take place.

The general agreement on the date -6 A.H.- strongly supports the argument. It is safe to assume that by the truce of Ḥudaibiyyah, the Prophet became convinced that the fate of Mecca was sealed. He therefore decided to push forward his plans of political expansion in the name of religion yet another step. Arab writers give the impression that in revealing his thoughts of a universal mission, the prophet was very guarded and apologetic to his companions. "One day after Ḥudaibiyyah, " says Ibn Hisham, "the Messenger of Allah said

to his companions, Allah has sent me as a universal mercy to all people; so do not disagree with me." After explaining to them what he meant, he selected envoys from them, and entrusted them to deliver the invitation to Islām."(65) The names of the envoys were known and handed down to posterity. Further, it is suggested that one of the rulers -the Roman Governor of Egypt- though tactfully refusing the surrender of his sovereignty to Muḥammad, had nevertheless presented him with two slave women -in some reports four- one of whom became his wife and mother of his only son.(66)

We conclude, therefore, that contact between Muḥammad and other rulers was highly probable.

5. THE LIQUIDATION OF THE JEWS.

The Prophet is reputed to have said in his last illness that "two religions cannot exist in the land of the Arabs."(67) If that is so, then it provides a proof of the clear distinction between religion and politics, and their possible independence of each other in Islām. For it must have been obvious to Muḥammad that Judaism was incompatible with Islām. Yet in spite of the difference he entered into compact with the Jews soon after reaching Medina, and assured them of their civic liberties and religious freedom. Can we assume, therefore, that that contract with the Jews was no more than a temporary expedient?

Some historians, like Ibn Khaldūn and Ya'qūbī, (68) take the battle against the Jews for granted, and do not consider it necessary to detail the reasons for such a deterioration in^r relations between two groups bound together by a solemn pledge. Others (69) maintain that the persistent hypocrisy and insincerity of the Jews were constant sources of anxiety to the prophet and the Muslims. It is not difficult to see that their hostility was tolerated until the opportune moment had arisen for securing a decision by force of arms. Accounts of the battle of Khaibar suggest that the Jews were taken completely by surprise.

6. THE FORMAL SURRENDER OF MECCA.

The signatories at Hudaibiyyah pledged their parties to keep the truce for ten years. In reality not more than two years had elapsed before the truce was broken and rendered invalid. The Meccans were accused of violating its terms first. (70) From general historical observation, it is usually the stronger who breaks agreements, if he is ruthless enough, and provided the move is to his advantage. The weaker party as a rule is also commonly indicted for initiating the breach of contract. Be that as it may, had the Muslim party not been in a superior position, they would not have attempted their march against Mecca. The Prophet had made up his mind that the time had come to subdue the rebellious city of Mecca and end its

independence. The pleading of Abū Sufyān for the continuation of the truce was ignored. The man himself was humiliated and refused audience of the Prophet. The fate of that city was already sealed and mediation was indeed of no avail.

On his victorious entry into the capital, Muḥammad undoubtedly exhibited remarkable self-restraint and magnanimity; for it certainly needs great moral courage to have one's own foe laid low and yet forgive him. To the citizens of Mecca, who only a few years earlier had been irreconcilable in their hostility to Islam and its preacher, a general amnesty was given. It was the greatest expression of thanks to God who granted final victory to Muḥammad and his arms. Only a few men and women were put to death. So bitter was the Prophet against those revilers, that he ordered their execution, "even though they sought sanctuary under the curtains of the Ka'bah itself".(71)

Viewed from the moral and political angles, however, no other course of action could possibly have been of greater value to the cause of Islām. Muḥammad's splendid behaviour on that occasion was certainly a vivid demonstration of his moral greatness, and a proof of the loftiness of his purpose; for at the moment of his triumph, painful memories of the past subsided and the enemies were forgiven. The Meccans as a result were reconciled to accepting the inevitable. No drastic change took place among the administrators of the

city. He thought it wise to confirm them in their offices under the banner of his religion. Their loyal services and co-operation were thus secured. The whole conduct of that bloodless campaign reflected great credit on the human understanding and diplomatic acumen of the Prophet.

7. THE TRIBAL DELEGATIONS TO THE PROPHET.

The year 10 of the Hijrah witnessed the conversion en masse of many Arab tribes. This movement actually started in the year 9 A.H. or slightly earlier.(72) Delegates empowered to represent their people travelled to Medina and confessed Islām on behalf of their tribes. The Prophet welcomed them and accepted their profession of faith. Each deputation was sent back with a political agent, sometimes accompanied by a learned Muslim to teach the principles of religion.

That movement was a voluntary one, and consequently no bloodshed was entailed. It included representative bodies from nearly the whole Peninsula. The political agents of Muhammad attached to the newly converted localities were not appointed to supersed^e the original tribal chiefs. They were mainly concerned with the collection of the tithe. Apparently, they were also keen observers and kept the Prophet well informed of all that was taking place in their spheres of duty. Some of these agents actually judged and adminis-

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the laws of Islām.(73)

The movement of mass conversion had a political as well as a religious significance. That it followed so quickly after the conquest of Mecca was itself a proof that religion might not have been the primary factor in the matter. We tend to believe that after the surrender of Mecca, the chiefs of the other tribes became so convinced of the power of Muḥammad, that they thought it would be wiser to join him freely rather than be forced to do so in a short while. Further, it seemed to them that it was now a case of the Arabs fighting as a unified whole against the non-Arabs. There could be no great loss of face if all the tribes joined forces with Muḥammad. The battle of Tabūk demonstrated to them that the Muslim army was sufficiently strong to challenge and possibly defeat the Byzantine forces. The fact that Mecca surrendered last, yet was sharing equally in the booty, must have hastened their decision in favour of Islām. In any case those tribes knew well that they could not stand by themselves for any length of time, and had they not entered the Muḥammadan ranks peaceably, they would have done so forcibly.

Nevertheless, Dr. Haikal's view that "these tribes favoured unity under the banner of Muḥammad, the banner of Islām, to the Persian tyranny", can hardly be sustained; for it was not Islām that they were seeking at that stage. It was the fear of what would befall them if they delayed sur-

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to it that decided their action.(74) It is obvious, of course, that neither the Muslim unity, nor the idea of Arab superiority or hegemony had taken firm root at that stage. Therefore, it seems that those tribal chiefs were simply making a virtue of necessity, and were thus keeping their authority intact by initiating the move themselves. However, the conversion implied no drastic change in the normal life of the converts; for as Nitti says, "for a tribe to become Moslem in those days simply meant that its chiefs so became." (75) It is certain that a great number of those men did not see the Prophet personally -there are no records of any visits made by him to those areas- but they accepted his suzerainty nevertheless.

The Prophet was quite aware that some of his adherents had been swept into the tide of Islām without really understanding its meaning or aims. The essence of religion is not in the automatic performance of certain rites, nor is it in the public confession of any specific principles. Religion is a positive act of genuine belief. It is a mode of life based on the solid conviction in the existence of a divine power ruling over, and controlling the whole universe. What it amounts to in reality is a spiritual relationship between man's conscience and the Creator. Outward manifestations count for very little if one is lacking in the inner light of faith. Muhammad made this point quite clear. The Qur'ān

says: "The dwellers of the desert say: we believe. Say: you have not attained belief; therefore say we have submitted; for faith has not yet entered your hearts..." (76)

8. ISLĀM: THE RELIGION OF ARABIA.

The closing years of the prophet's life witnessed the fulfilment to an appreciable extent of his main ambition; that is, the establishment of Islām as a religion. Some of his close companions grasped firmly his teaching, and modelled their life on his lofty principles. They thus became worthy disciples of his. The rest attained varied degrees of faith. On the other hand, many people though admittedly Muslims, were only so in name and no more. The success of the Medina adventure and the setting up of Islām as the main religion of that city-state, must have encouraged the prophet to extend the experiment to cover the widest possible field. That seems to have been the pointer of his policy. In fact he demonstrated to all the Arabs that it was profitable for them morally and materially to hold Islām.

His next step was to show them in the same unmistakable manner that it was unprofitable for them to hold any other faith. There is strong reason to suppose that the Qur'anic verses urging the Muslims to purge all non-Muslims refer only to residents in Arabia.(77) Idol worshippers are to be killed, and non-Muslim believers in God are to be fought till they pay

the Jizyah, which is the "tax taken from the free non-muslim subjects of the muslim government whereby they ratify the compact that ensures them protection."(78) To the self-asserting Arab this is both humiliating and unpalatable. Besides, in the narratives containing these verses there are other definite indications restricting the application of certain sanctions to the muslim holy-land. For example:-

- (a) The prevention of heathens from performing the pilgrimage to Mecca.(79)
- (b) The reminder that it was they who first started aggression and molested the Prophet.(80)
- (c) The promise of compensation to the Meccans in the case of material loss resulting from the decrease in the number of tourists during the season of pilgrimage.(81)

It is needless to say that it was only the heathen Arabs who made pilgrimage to Mecca, and it was they or at least a party of them who opposed and persecuted Muhammad, and it was the Meccans who were liable to lose in case of deterioration of tourist trade. Thus we see that the whole setting was an Arabian one. If this interpretation is found plausible, then the suggestions of Islamic intolerance are rendered invalid. The truth seems to be that this alleged intolerance was only a protective measure, and not an aggressive move against other religions.

Muhammad must have been in earnest about the unification

and Islamisation of the whole of Arabia. On the authority of 'Umar, the Prophet is supposed to have advised shortly before his death the expulsion of the Jews from the Arabian Peninsula.(82)

9. THE SERMON ON MOUNT 'ARAFĀT.

The last memorable public function held by Muḥammad was the Farewell Pilgrimage. Many times before he had visited the Ka'bah; but on that last occasion (10 A.H.) the setting was different. It was the greatest Muslim rally ever witnessed by the man who preached submission to Allah, the Lord of heaven and earth. The holy sanctuary, for many years the centre of heathen pilgrimage, was on that day reserved for Muslims only.(83) The Prophet had strong reason to give praise to the Almighty. At that moment of justifiable pride and exhilaration, the principal Muslim realised that his mission had been fulfilled and his duty finally discharged. He preached a sermon to many of the listeners from distant tribes, his last sermon. His words as usual, were uttered with the great passion derived from absolute conviction. The voice of Muḥammad was deep and moving. Silence reigned all over, and the echo of his words was clearly audible in the neighbouring houses.(84) But the strain of the heavy burden that he had unflinchingly shouldered for long years was already telling on him. Yet he was glad to watch the multitudes

performing the full rites of that ceremony according to the Islamic rules. From that day, no other god was worshipped in that vicinity. The walls of the Ka'bah resounded with words of praise in thanks to Allah. At 'Arafāt, so great was the number of people that the voice of the Prophet could not reach them all and Rabī'ah b. Umayyah had to relay it. (85)

"Oh People!" said the Prophet, "listen carefully to what I say, perhaps I may never meet you again in this place." He then proceeded with his sermon. He advised the believers to take care of themselves, and their property; to be considerate towards their neighbours, and kind to women. He reminded them strongly of the prohibition of usury, and re-emphasised its untold harm to society. He stressed the importance of unity, discipline, and obedience to the leader whoever he may be. "Oh people! listen and obey even though an Abyssinian slave were in command over you, as long as he rules according to the Book of Allah." (86) "Oh People! I am leaving with you that which will never cause you to be led astray as long as you adhere to its prescriptions." (87)

"Oh People! listen to, and understand my words. Know that the Muslims are brothers, and no one has any right to his brother's possessions, except that which has been given willingly; therefore, do not bring injustice upon yourselves."

In the afternoon of that memorable day, a famous Qur'ānic verse (v:3) was revealed. "This day have I perfected for you

your religion and completed My favour on you, and chosen Islām for you as a religion;..." On hearing this verse, the gathering understood perfectly that the work of that great man had reached completion. They then silently dismantled their tents and dispersed each to his own locality.

Muhammad and his party returned to Medina. Not long afterwards, illness overwhelmed his already exhausted resistance. He died on the 12th Rabi' al-awwal, 11 A.H. / June, 632 A.D. And thus ended a most memorable chapter in human history. To all Muslims, Muhammad was the greatest of all mortals.

CH. II.

NOTES.

1. EI, iii:648.
2. Hish :519. تُعْقُونَ وَأَنَا بَيْنَا وَقَطِيعَةٌ ... بَرِي خُورَكُم فَمَا نَدَّرَ الرَّأْيَ وَالْعَقْلَ
3. Al-'Abbās is reputed to have said to the Medinese:
"Muhammad has chosen to adhere to and follow you."
cf. Tab. I,iii:1220, Hish :319, Fida:58.
4. EI, iii:648.
5. Margoliouth, EB, xv:647, art. Moḥammad.
6. EI , iii:648.
7. Qur. xviii:17, vii:178, xvii:97.
8. The word "Arab" in contradistinction to "Jew" is rather misleading. The Jewish tribes of Medina had Arabic names and manners, and it is improbable that they were racially strikingly different from other sections of the community. Their unity was religious, whereas the unity of the rest was clannish based on blood ties; and hence the difference. Cf. Marg. M:186 ff.
9. Marg. M:196.
10. For example Hish:519, mentions that Darr b. al-Khaṭṭāb (a Meccan) said at Badr:-

عَجِبْتُ لِقَعْرِ الْأَوْسِ وَالْحِمْيَرِ كَأَبْرٍ :: عَلِيمٌ نَعْلًا وَالذَّهْرُ فِيهِ بَصَائِرُ

and Ka'b b. Mālik (a Muhājir) said:-

وَفِينَا رَسُولُ اللَّهِ وَالْأَوْسُ حَوْلَهُ :: لَهُ مَعْقِلٌ مِنْهُمْ عَزِيزٌ وَنَاصِرٌ

11. Marg. M: 199.
12. Haikal. HM :201.
13. André Servier: Islam and the Psychology of the Musulman,
London , 1924, p. 53, Tab. I,iii:1221.
14. Servier, op.cit. p.53.
15. Idem p.54.
16. Essad Bey, op.cit. p.145.
17. H. Lammens: L'Islam, croyances et institutions,
Beyrout, 1926, translated into English by, E.D.Ross,
London, 1929, p.27.
18. R. Bosworth-Smith, Mohammed and Mohammedanism, London,
1876, p. 124.
19. Ibid. 138.
20. S.M. Zwemer: Islām, New-York, 1907, p.36.
21. Servier, op.cit:54.
22. Cf. p. 55 above.
23. EI, iii:648.
24. Taha Husain, op.cit. 123.
25. This decision was reached during the reign of 'Umar.
"The traditions which try to trace it to the Prophet
are devoid of all probability," says Carra De Vaux,
EI, ii:302, Fida: 62, Tab. I,iii:1250, Van Dyck:
History of the Arabs, Laibach, 1894, p. 48.
26. Marg. M: 183.
27. Bukh, 2:17 (i:14), 8:28 (i:111), cf. Ibn Mājah: Kitāb
al-Sunan (Book of Traditions), Cairo, 1896, ii:238.

28. Qur. xv:94, v:70.
29. Haikal, HM: 219.
30. Essad Bey, op.cit 152.
31. The organic theory of State "is merely an analogy which cannot be driven very far." Cf. R. Nicols, art. Political science, in : History of our Time, ed. R.J. Woodward, Edinburgh, n.d. p. 206.
32. R.G.Collingwood: The New Leviathan, Oxford, 1942, p.186.
33. Ibid. 186 (25:37)
34. Ilyas Ahmad: The Social Contract and the Islamic State, Allahabad, 1944, p. 79.
35. It should be remembered that the assumption of a contract as the basis of a State is but a political theory, and the suggestion that: "in Islām the contract is real and is also a permanent affair," takes the validity of this theory for granted, and that is not the case. Cf. Ilyas Ahmad op:cit:81.
36. EI. iii:648.
37. The various affinities between those two groups of citizens make hair-splitting distinctions between Jews and Arabs quite unnecessary. Cf. Ya'qūbī, i:298.
38. "The Prophet said that the Muhājirs and the Anṣār, and all who join them in the struggle form one nation." Hish:341
39. Qur. xxii:17, iii:19, iii:85
40. C.S.Lewis: Beyond Personality, London, 1944, p.6.
41. Muir , LM :265, Marg. M. 301.

42. In Rasā'il Ikhwān 'l-Safā' (Die Abhandlungen Der Ichwan Es-Safa in Auswahl) ed. F. Dieterici, Leipzig, 1886, p. 598, it is stated that the Muhājirs in the battle of Badr fought relentlessly against their very near relatives from Mecca.
43. From the sermon delivered by Dr. W. Temple, at the opening of the Disarmament Conference, January, 31, 1932. Cf. Woodward, op. cit 250.
44. Bukh. 63:3 (iii:5), 63:50 (iii:50), Khald. H. II, 2:16, Hish:344.
45. Margoliouth, cf. EB, xv:647.
46. Bukh. 78:80 (iv:141) 'Āishah said that Muhammad never exacted vengeance for personal injury inflicted upon himself."
47. Armed Jihād is only one form of Jihad. The word, however has other applications. Cf. Lisān iv:107 ff., Tāj. ii:329 ff. In his Concordance et Indices de la Tradition Musulmane, Leyden, 1936, p.387 ff., A.J. Wensinck gives a comprehensive collection of these traditions.
48. This is the gist of Chiragh 'Alī's argument in his book: A Critical Exposition of Jihad, Calcutta, 1885. Muhammad 'Alī and Haikal follow the same line of reasoning. Cf. Haikal, HM :243 ff, and M. 'Alī :The Religion of Islam, Lahore, 1936, p. 545 ff.
49. Many Qur'anic verses are quite clear on the necessity

of physical violence, i.e. war. The word "qitāl" principally means fighting with weapons. Qur.ii:190 ff., ii:216, ii:84. Cf. H.U.W. Stanton: The Teaching of the Qur'ān, London, 1919, p. 65.

50. For an account of the proceedings at Ḥudaibiyah, see Khald. II,2:34 f. Hish: 740, Tab. I,iii:1542, Sa'd II,i:69., Muḥammad Hamidullah: Documents sur la Diplomatie Musulmane, Paris, 1935, corpus, 4, p.14
51. Hamidullah, op.cit. p. 35.
52. Ya'qūbi, i:296 f.
53. Essad, op. cit. 238.
54. Hish:747
55. Qur. xlviii: 1 f.
56. Sa'd II,i:69.
57. For al-Zuhri's comment Cf. Hish:751
58. M. 'Alī: Qur'ān, comment 2306, p. 982.
59. Haikal,HM :364.
60. Bukh. 65:4 (iii:214 f.), Athir ii:80, Khald. H. II,2:36. Hish: 971 f., Hamidullah: Documents, p. 37, and Corpus 3 f.
61. R. Bell: The origin of Islam, London, 1926, p. 162.
62. Muir, LM :369.
63. Hamidullah: Corpus p. 4 f.
64. Ibid. 4.
65. Tab. I,iii:1650, Hish: 971
66. Muir, LM :371, Khald. H. II,2:36. Ibn Khaldūn says the number of slave women was four. See Additional note 88 below.

67. Khald. H. II,2:39, Dārimī:235, cf. Muslim v: 404.
68. Ya'qūbī, ii:56
69. For Jewish-Muslim conflict see Haikal HM :318. Haikal presents the Muslim point of view. Cf. JA, Jan. 1937, p. 57 ff. where the Jewish point of view is ably put forward by Georges Vajda.
70. Hish: 802 f., Khald. H. II,2:41.
71. Hish:818. Ibn Taimiyyah gives a detailed account of the reasons for the few executions ordered by the Prophet. Cf. Kitāb al-Ṣārim ...Hyderabad, 1322/1904,p.132.
72. Athīr ii:109, Khald. H. II,2:51, Muir, LM, 449.
73. That does not imply that the Prophet had a fixed system of administration. Those appointments were temporary, and were effected as the occasion demanded. Cf. 'Alī 'Abd al-Rāziq: al-Islām wa 'uṣūl al-ḥukm (Islām and the Principles of Government.) Cairo, 1925, p. 40 ff.
74. Haikal, HM: 450.
75. Hitti, HA :141.
76. Qur. xlix:14.
77. This view has partly been expressed in this chapter in dealing with the expansion.
78. Qur. ix:6 , cf . Lane: 1,2:422.
79. Qur. ix:3.
80. Qur. ix:14.
81. Qur. ix:29.

82. Sa'd, II,ii:44. "Near the end of his life the Prophet advised that two religions should not remain simultaneously in Arabia." 'Umar based his policy on that theory. Cf. Haikal, 'U, ii:204.
83. The previous year Muḥammad had prohibited all non-Muslims from the vicinity of the Ka'bah. Knowing the attachment of the Arabs to the Holy Sanctuary, this policy may be regarded as a subtle measure for Islamising the remainder of the Arabs. Cf. Khald, H. II,2;53, Athir , ii:111, Hish: 919 f.
84. Sa'd, II,i:132.
85. Tab. I,iv:1755, Hish: 969, Athir, ii:116.
86. Sa'd, II,i:132. This is a strange statement because, it tacitly implies racial discrimination. It is interesting to observe that on Judgment Day, the faces of the happy ones will be white , and the rest black. Cf. Qur. iii: 106 f.
87. The allusion is to the Qur'ān, cf. Tab. I,iv: 1754.
88. Additional note: The Muhammadan Embassy to Egypt. Ibn Iyas, mentions in Tārīkh Miṣr (History of Egypt). 1893-96, i:20, that: "in the year 6 A.H. the Prophet sent Ḥātīb b. Balt'ah with a letter to al-Muqawqas, the governor of Egypt...al-Muqawqas gave Ḥātīb a magnificent gift for the Prophet consisting of the following: a thousand weights of gold, twenty pieces of fine Egyptian cloth, a slave woman called Māriah, and another

called Shirīn, a eunach called Mābūr, a mule called Daldal, a donkey called 'Āfir or Ya'fūr, and some honey from the province of Benha." Al-Muqawqas, nevertheless, retained his Christianity.

PART TWO.

AN ESTIMATE OF THE POLITICAL IDEAS
IN THE QUR'AN AND TRADITION.

CH. III

EVIDENCE FROM THE QUR'AN.

Islām in its final form was declared a universal religion. Qur.vii:157, "Say: O People ! surely I am the apostle of Allah to you all..."

Qur.xxxiv:28, "We have not sent you but to all the men as a bearer of good news and a warner,..."

Qur. xxi:107, "We have not sent you but as a mercy to all the nations." In his comment on this verse, Maulvi M. 'Alī says, "whereas every prophet before him (i.e. Muḥammad) was sent as a mercy to a particular people he is sent as a mercy to the whole world." (1)

For the proper life of Islām the Qur'ān does not suggest the creation of a particular State or any State. The dominion of religion is one's own conscience. It appears to us, that there is no ordinance or definite divine command for the creation of a muslim State or empire. The Book, nevertheless, lays down some general moral rules for the well-being of all men in any form of society. These, if applied, would ensure the peace and prosperity of any community, political or otherwise. This Qur'anic viewpoint may be summarised as follows:-

1. THE VARIETY OF NATIONS.

God created different tribes and nations and intended them to retain their identity. He ordered that they should establish good relations with one another, and show earnest-

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in His worship. In the eyes of God the chosen or most honoured people are the most pious. Qur.xlix:12, "O you men! surely We have created you of a male and female, and made you nations and tribes that you may know each other; surely the most honourable of you with Allah is the most pious; surely Allah is knowing, aware." Commenting on this verse M. 'Alī says, "The principle of the brotherhood of man laid down here is on the broadest basis... divisions into nations...should not lead to estrangement from, but to a better knowledge of each other. Superiority of one over another in this vast brotherhood does not depend on nationality, wealth or rank, but on the careful observance of duty -moral greatness." (2)

Nations were intended to be different, and should remain so. Each should lead its own life, follow its own laws and morae. If God had wanted, He would have integrated all peoples into one. Qur.v:51, "...for every one of you did We appoint a law and a way, and if Allah had pleased, He would have made you all a single nation..." Qur.xi:119, "if your Lord had pleased He would certainly ^ahave made people a single nation,..." These differences, however, are manifestations of Divine Power, and are declared as signs or 'āyāt of His omnipotence. Qur.xxx:22, "One of His signs is the creation of the heavens and earth, and the diversity of your tongues and colours; verily these are signs (i.e. convincing evidence)

to the learned." (3)

2. THE PRINCIPLE OF JUSTICE.

Justice is the main pillar of the State, injustice is the doom of nations. Qur.iv:58, "...and if you judge between people you must judge with justice..." This verse does not refer to legal arbitration only, but also to the method of State management by men of high competence and moral integrity. The whole verse simply states the "reciprocal duties of the governed to the governors and of the governors to the governed." (4)

Qur.xlii:15, "I am commanded to ^{do} justice between you."

Qur.v:9, "O you who believe! be upright for Allah, bearers of witness with justice, and let not hatred of a people incite you not to act equitably; act equitably, that is nearer to piety, and be careful of Allah; surely Allah is aware of what you do."

Justice in the Qur'ân is conceived as a universal law; hence the strict and impartial application of its principles irrespective of who is dealt with. Some Muslims interpret this verse and similar ones, in the light of modern politics, and suggest that the Qur'an laid down the foundation of a law of nation.(5) M. 'Ali says: "Islâm alone can serve as an international law, requiring equal treatment for all nations." (6) Be that as it may, it is true that the above

quotations supplemented by others, give an encouraging picture of the Qur'anic point of view on national and international justice. On the whole, however, charity, and tolerance are prominent features of Islamic teachings. In fact, it seems highly doubtful whether any religion does actually incite active hostility to others. We think that no system of beliefs can aspire to call itself a religion if it does not sustain equity, tolerance, and freedom of conscience.

There is reason for supposing that the Muslim views on justice between the various peoples of the world represent a definite improvement on the classical notion of Plato and Aristotle asserting that, "where the existence of other states is specifically referred to, it is assumed that the only relation which they can have to the State is one of hostility. Thus the natural or juristic relation of one Greek State to another was one of latent enmity, and was recognized as such." (7) But it should be mentioned that the breadth of the Muslim notion of justice is due mainly to the principle of universality in that religion.

Whereas the appeal of religion is directed to the human soul or heart, (8) and to men as individuals, the concern of politics is the State, society, or community. Its basic unit is the group and not the individual. Even in the most advanced democracies power is exercised on behalf of the majority, or the largest single group of citizens, without total

disregard towards the wishes of the other parties.

Having affirmed that justice was indispensable to the happiness of the individual and society, the Qur'ān asserted with equal emphasis and clarity that its opposite, namely injustice, was injurious to the soul of man, and destructive to the State.

Qur.xxviii:58, "...verily We do not destroy the villages except when their people are unjust."(9) Idem.xxix:31, "surely We are going to destroy the people of this town, for its people are unjust." Idem. xi:102, "and such is the punishment of your Lord when He punishes the towns while they are unjust; surely His punishment is painful, severe."(10)

3. CONSTRUCTION IS THE AIM OF LIFE.

God has created the earth and all that is in it. It is, therefore, the duty of man not to destroy maliciously the work of the Creator. Those who do, will be punished. Construction and not destruction should be the object of all. Qur.xxvi:183 f., "...and do not act corruptly in the earth as destroyers. And guard against (the punishment of) Him who created you and earlier nations." Idem. ii:205, "and when he turns back he sets about deliberately to cause mischief in the land and destroy the tilth and the stock and Allah does not like mischief-making." Idem. xxi:105, "My righteous servants shall inherit the land." Idem lxxxix:11 f.,

"Those who acted tyrannically in the cities. And increased mischief in them. Therefore your Lord let down upon them a portion of the chastisement."(11)

4. RELIGIONS MAY VARY.

Not only does the Qur'ān assert that nations were intended to be different from one another, but that their religions and beliefs may also vary. The toleration of other beliefs is a duty incumbent on every true Muslim. Qur.xxii:67 f. "To every nation We appointed a manner of devotion which they observe,...Allah will judge between you on the day of resurrection respecting that in which you differ." "This verse gives us another proof of the principle of tolerance and equal religious freedom to all inculcated by Islam." (12) Commenting on this view, Prof. Sherwani says, "It was therefore something novel and startling in the history of political principles that the Qur'ān should take variety of religious beliefs in a State almost for granted, and building from these premises, lays down for all time the magnificent ideal that there is to be no compulsion in religion." (13)

5. THE RULE OF LAW.

Law is the instrument for protecting society. When the authority or governing body in the State is Muslim, then Muslim laws must operate. The Muslim law is a divine law.

since it is assumed to have been revealed in the Qur'ān, it is looked upon as the intervention of God through direct revelation in the government of society. The parts of the Book dealing with law have been developed by muslim savants and jurisconsults or the 'ulamā' and fuqahā', into a wide and independent science called Sharī'ah, that is technically, "the canon law of Islām," or the "totality of Allah's commandments." (14) In other words, the sharī'ah which must be followed by every believer, is the "system of rules comprising every part of a Muslim's life from the humblest details up to the principles of his moral and social existence."

A Muslim may also look for guidance to the science of Fiqh, which is the name given to jurisprudence in Islām, and which in "its wider sense covers all aspects of religious, political, and civil life." (15)

It is not our immediate concern here to follow the development of these twin subjects. we need only consider their bearing on the political life in the state. It should be held in mind that they both owe their origin to the Qur'ān. Their growth and development, however, were aided by the Tradition, and intelligent interpretation of jurisconsults in the course of time. If indeed there is an institution in the Muslim State which is truly organic, then law is that institution par excellence; for it grew and advanced with the very life of the community. we cannot say that it was

formed by custom or popular feeling, or that it was the reflection of a human will acting in the field of legislation; but we can assert, nevertheless, that the breadth of conception and infinite wisdom of the Divine Legislator in laying down the general rules as a guide and leaving the working of the details to the people themselves, has allowed a wide scope for the ingenuity of the lawyers. They were thus able to deal with the varied problems of life with confidence and equanimity.

The Muslim law is binding on all those who profess Islām. At the same time followers of other religions are not required to adhere to it, because they have the right to practise their own laws. Surah v. portrays this principle in an unmistakable fashion. The three major religions in their juridical aspects contain guidance from God. All revealed books should be respected. To the Muslims of course, the Qur'ān is the last word in perfection and wisdom. If non-Muslims appeal to it for judgement they must be treated with all impartiality and equity.(16) During the reign of 'Umar, a Jew brought a case against 'Alī b. Abū Tālib, and when 'Umar came to judge between them he said to 'Alī, "Oh Abū 'l-Ḥasan go and stand beside your opponent." 'Alī did not mind that impartial attitude from the judge, but protested that the use of the honorific title Abū 'l-Ḥasan on that occasion did not show the strict neutrality expected from a

Muslim Arbiter.(17)

Yet the Qur'ān has shown surprise at the non-Muslims who went to the Prophet for arbitration. "And how do they make you a judge and they have the Torah wherein is Allah's judgment?" (18) Similarly, the right of the Christians to follow the lead of the Lord Jesus Christ is equally affirmed. "...We gave him the Gospel, in which there was guidance and light... and the followers of the Gospel should judge by what Allah has revealed in it; and those who do not judge by what has been revealed by Allah, are indeed transgressors." (19)

The bases of Muslim law are righteousness or truth, i.e. ḥaqq, equity or qist, and justice or ʿadl. Equality of all before the law is the indispensable condition. The subjects of the State may differ in religion, but justice is a universal concept that must apply to all without favour or discrimination. "Judge between them with equity; surely Allah likes the equitable." (20)

Obedience to those in authority is incumbent upon the Muslim even though he happens to live under the jurisdiction of non-Muslims. This is both interesting and revealing of the tenacity of the Sharīʿah. "Obey Allah and the Prophet and those in authority over you." (21) It is quite possible that those in authority over a Muslim may be adherents of a different religion. In that case, however, compliance with the law should be restricted to secular matters only. (22)

6. THE SANCTIONS OF LAW.

These are treated in the Qur'ān under two headings:

(a) punitive or retaliatory measures, and (b) divine sanctions. The first are concrete and direct, consisting of punishment administered by the authority exercising power on behalf of society. The domain of this branch of law is limited to external acts only, that is, to proven cases of violation manifested in physical deeds. The object of the earthly punishment is obviously the protection of the community against individual aggression, and the insurance of disciplined promotion and steady welfare. "There is life for you in (the law of) retaliation, O men of intelligence, that you may guard yourselves." (23) In the normal course, therefore, an action directly or indirectly harmful to the community is punishable by law. It does not matter whether the aggrieved is an individual, a private person or body, or even if no apparent harm has been inflicted upon anyone. For example: theft, non-payment of tithes or poor tax, and the neglect of prayers are all malpractices. The justification of punishment for the neglect of prayers which is a personal duty to God, is that the accepted rules have been infringed.

The second, by far the more important, is the divine sanction. This category itself is composed of two subdivisions: positive and negative. On the understanding of this part of belief rests the whole moral basis of obedience

to the law. One obeys the law not only because its violation would -if detected and proven- be punishable by society, but because of the conviction that, in breaking the commandments of God one is disobeying his Creator. This religious notion can be a deterrent to sinners. Even if one succeeded in escaping the punishment of society, he could not avoid the chastisement of God. On the positive side, the hope of divine blessing in the next world encourages man to do what is right and just. Besides the hope in the expectation of reward, fear plays an important role. Allah knows the heart of man and all the secrets of the mind. Nothing can be hidden from Him. Therefore, praise or condemnation will be accorded not only for the acts but for the motives as well. This realisation of the power of God should help man to be sincere in his intentions.

It is evident that, although the sanctions of the Qur'án are both secular and divine, there is a greater stress on the latter. "Juridical order and religion, law and morals, are the two aspects of that same will, from which the muslim community derives its existence and direction; every legal question is in itself a case of conscience, and jurisprudence points to theology as its ultimate base." (24) Even if a Muslim sometimes fails to understand why certain things have to be observed and others avoided, he is enjoined to follow the rules of law. In doing so he is content that in the obedience

to God he is promoting his own interests in both worlds. For man acts in the belief that he has been created in this world for a constructive purpose, and his duty is to realise this object as best he can by following the right path. Whosoever violates the law "not only infringes the legal order, but commits a sin, because there is no right in which God has not a share." (25)

Religion in Islam has a point of view on everything that affects the life of a Muslim as an individual, or as a social being, or in any other capacity he happens to assume. These opinions are expressed in the Sharī'ah. Political and legal considerations are of lesser importance compared with the religious evaluation. This difference should be grasped firmly because it constitutes the guide to the real understanding of a Muslim's mind. Whether the subject discussed comes under ṭibādāt, that is "the regulations relating to worship and ritual duties" or mu'tāmalat, meaning "the regulations of a juridical and political nature," (26) the sharī'ah has the final word; hence the stumbling block in the way of independent thought on matters demanding rational and impartial judgment. and although the Fiqh -broadly speaking a synonym for Sharī'ah- is applied to the independent exercise of intelligence, the decision of legal points by one's own judgment in the absence or ignorance of tradition bearing on the case in question, (27) Muslim thinkers all through the

ages could not free themselves from their conscious or unconscious mental fetters for which religion has wrongly been blamed. The fault was entirely their own and not religion's; for instead of utilising their faith in a positive manner they applied it negatively. They looked backwards to find reasons for halting the advance of society. They were so absorbed in glorifying their history and all who contributed to its making, that they overlooked the truth that in tackling new situations something more than simple imitation of ancient practices was needed. Pondering past traditions is not a bad thing in itself; actually it can often be to the benefit of one to study the ways of previous generations, not with a view to copying their models blindly, but to learn their lessons and thus become better equipped for facing the future. The weakness of some Muslims, however, was the habitual escape from handling pressing issues with the necessary vigour. Whenever a problem confronted them they sought its solution at the hands of men who long ceased to exist. They thus labelled themselves thinkers and wanted others to do the thinking for them. It is here, and not in religion that responsibility for Muslim immobility must be pinned.

The assumption that religion has a point of view on every subject should be regarded as an incentive to thought and initiative rather than the reverse. Islamic influence

on science and the arts, is in our view likened to the power of the wise guardian who always directs his ward to what is good, and who interferes only to safeguard the interests of the minor under his care. What this authority amounts to is that it acts as a constant reminder to men, so that their aim may always be high. What is a blessing; for if people in their dealings with one another were motivated by the love of God, or even by his fear -though that is a lower form of relationship- many of the petty rivalries and jealousies that disturb and disrupt the structure of society would indeed be averted. Islām is not more secular than any other religion. It may even be more spiritual in conception because it exercises a definite supervision over all human interests, and does not allow the establishment of strict lines of demarcation between the divine and the secular spheres. An intelligent Muslim readily understands that his religion supplies all that is needed for a full and successful life. He knows too, that in secular matters his faith provides general guidance but not specific rules, thus making certain that an element of moral nobility and spiritual grace always tempers his deliberations and actions.

At once, it becomes clear that the position of politics in the Qur'ān is not different from that of any other social subject. Politics, like economics, ethics, or law, is dealt with only in general terms. As long as man bears in mind

the rights of God, he is free to plan his social life in any way conducive to the well-being of all. This we believe, is freedom within wise and temperate limits; freedom guaranteed not only by the rule of law, but by the will of God.

7. INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF THE QUR'ĀN.

In peace as in war the Qur'ān set for the believers some general rules of conduct for dealing with non-Muslims whether or not they came under the jurisdiction of a Muslim government. These rules of conduct have been magnified by some modern writers, especially by Indian scholars, into a code of international law. This is open to criticism because the technical bases upon which international law is founded, are absent from the Qur'ān. It does not follow, however, that Muslim history is devoid of splendid examples of just and efficient inter-state dealings. Nevertheless, it is not Muslim history in general that we are examining at the moment; we are here strictly concerned with studying a special aspect of the Qur'ān, namely the international. But in its development, however, the Muslim State was subject to other influences besides the Book.

The important international features of the Qur'ān deal with the waging of war, defensively and offensively, the treatment of prisoners of war and other captives, and their ransom, the tax or Jizyah upon nationals who surrender to

Islām, but who nevertheless prefer to hold another faith, and the conditions of peace on the cessation of hostilities.(28) It is a credit to the Qur'ān that it exercised moral pressure with religious sanctions on all its adherents to wage war and settle peace in as humane a manner as possible. It is interesting to observe that modern European international law was at the beginning an attempt to tackle the problem of war between nations, and up till now all international organisations devote the maximum of their efforts to the maintenance of peace and prevention of war. The Italian Jurist Gentilis (1551-1608 A.D.), and the Dutch lawyer Grotius (1582-1645 A.D.) attained fame through their theses on aspects of war. "The most important work of Gentilis," says Prof. Brierly, "was the 'De Jure Belli' published in 1597." Grotius, "on the whole rightly regarded as the founder of international law," wrote 'De Jure belli ac pacis' which was his best work. (29)

In applying the term international law to the Qur'ānic features mentioned above certain technical difficulties arise. These may be summarised as follows:-

(a) International law is so considered, because it aims at separating its rules from religion and ethics and making them a branch of jurisprudence without however violating the accepted precepts of religion and morals. This obviously cannot take place in Islām because as long as it

remains an effective factor in the life of its people all branches of knowledge must take cognizance of its authority.

(b) Laws and conventions of an international character are usually concluded between sovereign powers on a basis of equality. A law is called international when bilateral or multilateral agreement has been reached voluntarily between equal States; this means in other words that "the rights of one state, whatever they may be, are as much entitled to the protection of law as the rights of any other." (30) The wisdom of this assumption as a starting point in international law becomes fully appreciated when one realises that in fact States are unequal in most respects; for example, in territory, population, military and economic powers etc. Applying this test to the laws of the Qur'ān it becomes evident that the use of the word international is out of place. The Divine Law of the Qur'ān, and in fact all divine laws, are unilateral. These laws emanate from one omnipotent God who has no equal. The injunctions of the Book are only a pattern to be followed by Muslims; but they have no binding force on others who refute their authority.

(c) International law is binding on all signatories, and sanctions are taken against any transgressor. Such a situation is inadmissible in Islām. Any move against a Muslim State by a foreign power is looked upon as aggression

or ittidā', and has to be met with equal violence; "...whoever acts aggressively against you, act aggressively against him according to the injury he has inflicted on you." (31) "Muslim International Law," says Dr. Hamidullah "depends wholly and solely upon the will of the Muslim Law of the land. Even the obligations imposed by bilateral or multilateral (international) treaties have the same basis, and unless they are ratified and executed by the contracting Muslim party, they are not binding, and their non-observance does not create any liability against the Muslim State." (32) A critic may justly interpret this attitude as meaning that, a Muslim State may observe international agreements only in so far as they serve its purposes.

(d) International law is actually a limitation on the sovereignty of the individual States participating in it. Since, however, Allah is the Sovereign of the Muslim State, it follows that there can be no conceivable authority to over-ride or even limit His Law.

These considerations lead us to the conclusion that the verses of the Qur'ān dealing with non-Muslims are no more than the express enactments of rules of conduct under certain conditions. There is no justification, therefore, for suggesting that "it is when we turn to international affairs, the laws of war, diplomacy and alliances that the thoroughness of the Qur'ān comes home to us." (33) The truth seems

to be that the Qur'ān is not a manual of international affairs, but a sacred book of religion. It is quite true that the message embodied therein is morally high and very inspiring, and that barriers of nationality, birth, caste, and colour etc. have been discarded in favour of unity of faith. At the same time, while allowing a place on earth for believers in other religions, the Qur'ān allotted the highest position to the Muslims; in other words, the faithful legally formed the élite of of humanity leaving the rest of the world in an inferior position. "You are the best of the nations raised for (the benefit of) mankind: you enjoin what is right and forbid the wrong and believe in Allah..."(34) In his commentary M. 'Alī says, "Not only are the Muslims the chosen people of God, who are now called upon to be the standard bearers of truth in the world, but they are at the same time declared to be the best of the people that had ever been chosen for the purpose."(35)

From the religious point of view the superiority of the believers in Allah is understandable, otherwise there would have been no driving motive for upholding a certain faith. The practical result, however, is that legally and political-ly a superior-inferior relationship exists between the Muslims and the rest of mankind, and the world is thus split into two groups. whenever a relationship of this nature exists between different people, the chances of equal rights toge-

with lasting peace diminish greatly. As Prof. Carr says: "no political community can be established among individuals divided by conspicuous, significant and irremediable inequalities." (36) Hence the insistence of international lawyers on an a priori equality between all states and communities, so that the weakness or inferiority of one nation or other may not be an excuse for disregarding its rights; hence also, the emphasis that international relationships should be the primary concern of jurisprudence.

The Qur'ān with its stress on the brotherhood of the Faithful has created a universal institution unrestricted in scope. And although the only relation that exists between the Muslim community and the rest of mankind is one of hostility, active or suspended, the fact that any person can by the simple process of confession of faith alter his status from enmity to brotherhood, acts as a check against excessive hostility. The difference is one of principle only. Nevertheless, disagreements on religious questions can assume very serious proportions, and it may be safe to suggest that they often lead to the worst kinds of persecution. Admittedly, the Qur'anic assumption of the common descent of all men from Adam and Eve, is another indication that humanity is after all but one family. Therefore, antagonisms between its various branches should not be driven too far.

On the other hand the Book does not suggest the formation

of a Family of Nations agreeing on the principal differences and striving to co-operate in other fields. Even within a single family religion should be the main guide. "O you who believe! do not take your fathers and your brothers for guardians if they prefer unbelief to belief; and whoever, of you be friendly with them, these it is that are the unjust." (37) If this is the case with relatives and kinsmen it follows, a fortiori that it is also so with all non-Muslims. (38) It is thus seen that external relations based solely on political considerations are not touched upon, though it cannot be denied that the Qur'ān occasionally makes a reference to people as political units. (39) But as a rule it is addressed to, and binding upon the Muslims each in his own individual capacity, and whenever social groups are dealt with, the reference is always made in religious and not political terms; a thing hardly accepted or practised in the international field.

"The conclusion cannot be escaped that, "the more specific definitions of modern International Law show the immense differences between the nature of modern International Law and Muslim International Law." (40) Strictly speaking, "there is no Muslim International Law in the sense of the distinction between modern municipal (national) law and International Law based on sources and maintained by different sanctions." (41) It would be more consistent with the

precepts of the Qur'ān if we referred to the body of rules popularly described as "Muslim International Law" in a prosaic though perhaps more accurate manner by calling it Muslim Inter-religious Code.

8. THE QUR'ANIC THEOCRACY.

"Judge between them by what Allah has revealed,... and you must judge by what Allah has revealed." (42) This is the principle of legal arbitration as well as government according to the divine law. Those who do not judge or rule accordingly are described as transgressors (Qur.v:47,50), unbelievers (Qur.v:45), and unjust (idem v:48).

Revealed religions aim at the establishment of the rule of God, through divine laws and agents. "The system of state organization and government in which God is recognized as the ruler in whose name authority is exercised by His chosen agents, the Priests or the Prophets" is called theocracy. (43) The word in this technical capacity seems to have been used for the first time by the Jewish historian Josephus (37-100 A.D.) to describe the Jewish government as devised under divine direction by Moses. (44) Hirsch maintains with reason that "the dominance of the Law is as clearly recognized in Islam as it ever was in post-exilic Judaism." He asserts, however, without strong evidence that "in fact Islam is even today a theocracy." (45)

Theoretically, the muslim theocracy is not unlike its mosaic counterpart, because all its social political and legal aspects of life derive their binding force from religious injunctions and commandments. But whereas many Old Testament prophets fearlessly declared their views and affirmed their arguments by appealing to the authority of God: "thus saith the Lord", in Islām only one person namely Muhammad, could command unequivocal personal influence through the power delegated to him by Allah. He was the only man mentioned by name and office who had the right to legislate. He had been elected for his post by Allah, and was therefore responsible only to Him. The Book was revealed to him, and helped him to settle his major problems whenever he was in doubt or difficulty. The familiar Qur'anic phrase: "they ask you...say:" (46) was primarily intended for Muhammad.

With the death of the Prophet the revelations ceased, and although the Book remained as a source and guide, no person whatsoever had any right or authority to speak ex cathedra. The Qur'ān was there for all to read and interpret.(47) No successor of the Apostle, no Caliph or Muslim ruler could, resting on his personal authority, effect any drastic change in the established rules of religion. Those who attempted to do so were not entitled to legal obedience. As Dr. Sanhoury mentions, "le Calife n'a aucun pouvoir législatif dans le domaine politique, ni aucun pouvoir spirituel dans le

domaine religieux. Tout empiètement sur ces deux pouvoirs serait un acte excessif et, par conséquent, nul." (48) It may be said therefore, that theocracy as a form of government in Islām began with the announcement of the Muḥammadan Prophethood and ended with his death.

Since there is no divinity in Islām, and since the rulers, even those in the highest positions, namely the Caliphs, hold office and power by the will of the citizens who elect them, and since their tenure of appointment is conditioned by their adherence to the Muslim precepts, and since the words of God can be expounded by any Muslim according to his understanding, (49) and since the faithful are enjoined to decide their own affairs by debate and discussion, (Qur.xlii:38) it reasonably follows that the nature of government after Muḥammad should be different in character and administrative procedure from that during his lifetime. That fact was properly grasped by the immediate followers of the Prophet. Abū Bakr, who was elected in the traditional Arabian fashion, al-bai'ah, said immediately on his appointment, "obey me as long as I obey Allah and His Apostle, and if I disobey Allah and His Prophet, you shall not be bound to comply with my commands." (50) Such limitation on the power of the ruler could never have been made by the prophet, because he himself was a legislator, both in his own right as the absolute ruler of his State,

and by virtue of his position as the agent of divine revelation.

But this, unfortunately, is the theoretical interpretation of the Qur'anic message. In actual practice many caliphs claimed power by simple inheritance and divine right, and acted as though they had been invested with supernatural authority. The bai'ah was accordingly reduced to a formal ceremony of allegiance and submission to the one appointed by God to rule over all men. In support of those autocrats, some jurists had to propagate views contrary to the spirit and letter of the religion. But seemingly, those propagandists were motivated by fear more than by real conviction. It is strange to detect this servile tendency even among ascetics and mystics of renown. Ibn al-ʿArabī, (1165 - 1240 A.D.) maintained that "the qualities of the imāms were the qualities of God. Their obedience was a categorical imperative. Their power was the legal power of Allah; therefore, those who obeyed them would be saved and those who disobeyed them would be condemned to damnation." (51)

In course of time together with the degeneration of orthodoxy in Islām, and the assimilation of foreign ideas, the veneration of the rulers nearly culminated in their deification. Some Ottoman Sultans were addressed as though they were miniature gods. "King of Kings...Shadow of the Provider, writer of justice on the pages of time,...opener

of the gates of benevolence unto mankind, giver of all kinds of bounty in the west and the east... Majesty high as heaven, having its dwelling in the sky, moon of the heaven of mightiness,... engineer of the ways of equity,..." (52)

How far the religion was to blame for this unfortunate regression we cannot say, but it can be asserted with conviction that the Qur'ān was not the source from which those blasphemous ideas were derived. If it were a theocracy they were trying to establish, then surely it was not one after the Islamic fashion. The real theocracy of Islām is in our opinion the realisation in the tawhīd, or unity of Allāh, of a definite Muslim society. Since the principle of tawhīd constitutes the main dogma of Islām, it would not be unnatural for the community of believers to establish its social organisation on that pattern of thought. For if one believes implicitly that there is but one God, then the conclusion cannot be escaped that all men are inherently equal, and their differences only transitory entailing no permanent rights or privileges. That, if any, is the main Islamic guide to human relationships and social organisations. The essence of tawhīd is as Iqbāl puts it, "equality, solidarity, and freedom," and it is in this sense alone that the State in Islām is a theocracy, not in the sense that it is headed by a representative of God on earth who can always screen his despotic will behind his supposed infallibility. (53)

9. NEGATIVE CONCLUSION.

From the above survey we conclude that the Qur'ān has touched upon politics only in the most general terms. There is no valid reason, therefore, to see in the Book much more than that. Some scholars even assert that the Qur'ān "contains no theory of government nor any definition of the relation between civil and religious law and administration." (54) This is a negative conclusion, and should be recognised as such. But it does not necessarily follow that the Qur'ān is against, or even unsympathetic to social and political progress. Since the declared object of this religion is the promotion of a happy and constructive life in this world, leading to bliss in the next, and since the object of political thinkers and reformers is in the main similar to that of the theologians, at least as far as temporal affairs are concerned, and since man is essentially looked upon as an agent possessed of a free will and imbued with sufficient intelligence to be held responsible for his deeds, it reasonably follows that in Islām there should not be room for conflict or antipathy between religion and politics or Church and State. Quite the contrary, co-operation should exist between them, because both State and Church are expressions of the will of God.

The truth seems to be that the absence of any specific method of political thought in the Qur'ān should be regarded

with relief and satisfaction, as it leaves the field open for the ability of the people themselves to plan their social life and political institutions as they consider most suitable to the prevailing circumstances. Since, however, conditions are liable to change from one age to another, for that is the law of nature, the Qur'anic standpoint may be considered as a spur and not an inhibitor to initiative. "Human intelligence has now had sufficient experience of the dynamic character of the world to acknowledge the utter impossibility of a wooden constitutional frame, and divine intelligence, of course, could not but take account of the fact." (55) The limits of God mentioned in the Book, are only an insurance against excessive worldliness in man's deliberations. (56) Had the Qur'ān recommended a particular theory of State, it would have sentenced the Muslim community to a permanent and perhaps immobile system. But that was neither the object nor the intention of the Qur'ān, which was first and foremost religious in content.

If this is the case, are we at liberty to make precise theories as to the nature of its political norms? Can we in other words, borrow an alien system, or evolve one of our ^{own} and declare emphatically that it represents the true spirit of the Book? The logical answer should be a negative one. Yet, many attempts had been made to see in the Qur'ān something which was not in it, and read into its purely

moral precepts most of the political developments of later times.

Some Muslims firmly believe that their revealed book has dealt fully with every conceivable subject. This conviction is derived from the famous verse: "... We have not neglected anything in the Book..."(57) It is needless to say that the interpretation in this case is too literal: besides, when the sentence is referred to its proper context a more restricted sense is unavoidable.(58) Be that as it may, it is quite possible that sufficient fragmentary information may be gathered from the moral approbations and prohibitions of the Book to act as a guide to the examination of any form of political theory. On this assumption it may be affirmed that some doctrines are inadmissible in Islām because they are diametrically opposed to its accepted standards, and their adoption by the State would be a violation of the divine commands. Communism for example, is an apt illustration of what is meant here. However agreeable Communism may appear to be to some societies, the fact that it runs counter to the maxims of private enterprise, profit making, possible individual ownership of means of production, and of wealth and its sources, all of which are allowed in the Qur'ān, excludes it from consideration as a possible form of Islamic government; leaving aside the inferior position communism gives to religion as a factor of decisive import-

in the structure of society.(59) It is on this score alone, that the communist theory of State may be unequivocally rejected by all Muslims. Similarly, any form of arbitrary or dictatorial rule, or any government claiming absolute power regardless of the established limitations on man's authority must be equally condemned. Having indicted authoritarianism in its various guises, it does not follow that the only remaining regular alternative, namely democracy, must therefore, be the system most suitable to the life of Islām. There is no reason for such an assumption. As we shall attempt to show later, Islām in practice has not been a working democracy at any stage in its history. This assertion is based on the technical usage of the word democracy; in other words a State in which (a) "the general will is inclusive of the community as a whole or of at least the greater portion of the community."(60) (b) A State in which the legislative sovereignty is formally determined by the exercise of the general will, and (c) a State in which the free will of the majority is prevalent and exercised, and in which the minorities give their consent to be so governed. But in theory, however, the institutions of Shūrā, and Ijmāʿ, or consultation and unanimity, both developed quite early in Islām, may be considered as definite democratic bases upon which a sound government may be safely established. That such a method has not prevailed in the past does not exclude the possibility

of its adoption in the future. As Prof. Gibb says with reason, "... the traditions of government in the Islamic world are not of a kind which tends to develop the qualities required for the successful working of democratic institutions, but to deny the possibility of their development under new conditions is to make an irrational leap from history to prophesy." (61)

It is evident that the art of government has not been recognised as an independent branch of Islamic study. Further, it is interesting to note that the word siyāsaḥ which is the technical term for politics does not occur in the Qur'ān, despite the tradition that it was supposedly known to and used by the Prophet in that particular sense. Muḥammad is reputed to have said that the "Jewish Prophets conducted the political affairs of their people." (62) Be that as it may, had the study of politics in its own right been as important a subject as some modern Muslim thinkers would wish us to believe, it would in all probability have been developed into a position of its own in the course of Muslim history. Even if we consider favourably Ibn Khaldūn's argument that the Arabs were inherently incapable of excellence in the art of politics, they way would still have been open for its fuller growth and objective treatment at the hands of the conquered races who contributed greatly to the enrichment of Islamic thought and learning. (63) But it seems

that the Muslims as a whole allotted to this department of knowledge only a humble place. On the other hand, it is quite possible that they were alive to its impact on society, and yet did not consider it necessary to separate it from the collective domain of sharī'ah. For if, as Sabine says, "Political theory .. is a reflection upon morals, economics, government, religion, and law -whatever there may be in the historical and institutional situation that sets a problem to be solved," (64) then sharī'ah in Islām may be the nearest equivalent to the Western notion of politics, provided allowance is made for the inherent differences in scope between both.(65) . "The structure and working of the Islamic State rested on an analysis and systematization of those fundamentals into a body of rules called the Shari'at."(66) But care must be taken not to fall into the error of regarding the sharī'ah as an inflexible body of rules. Because, by its nature and function, this subject must be capable of expansion and modification.

This idea may be unpalatable to those who teach that the "conduct of the Muslim is alone right which is according law, and law here means shari'at, and shari'at will tell him what is right and what is wrong." and conclude from these premisses that "the constitution of the Islamic State is written and rigid. It cannot be amended or modified."(67) It is needless to say that the sharī'ah is the result of the

combined efforts of many minds, and provides a record of the considered views and decisions of the learned on cases not specifically mentioned in the two original sources. It is highly probable that^this form of applied reasoning is coloured to some extent by the personal ideas of the legists themselves. To accept what they say as irrevocable or final would be a tacit admission of their infallibility; but the truth seems to be that those ideas are no more than the expressed opinions of highly knowledgeable and revered jurists; but opinions, nevertheless. They serve mainly as pointers to the development and evolution of thought and organisation in certain directions. Those who consider that the doors of independent research in jurisprudence were closed after the four principal imāms are indeed taking a poor view of the progressive possibilities and vitality of their religion. Surely the imāms, or leading jurists themselves do not seem to have claimed such exclusive rights. Abū Ḥanīfaḥ (c.767 A.D.) is reputed to have said in all modesty, "we have learned this, it is our opinion; if any one comes to us with a better we will receive him." (68) Admittedly the work of those doctors is a contribution of the first order to the science of law in Islām, and even possibly to the study of jurisprudence as a whole, but it should not be treated as unalterable or binding for all time.

the significance of this negative conclusion is twofold:

(a) The Qur'ān is revealed to herald a universal religion; one which is not bound by territorial or ethnic limitations. It is addressed to all men, and recommends a philosophy of life based on the idea that man is an indivisible whole.

The main interest of the Book is the salvation of the human soul, and its guidance into the ways of righteousness.

(b) The Qur'anic political notions are moral in nature, therefore, provided account is taken of these, Muslim thinkers are quite free to plan and construct the life most suitable to their needs and circumstances.

CH. III.

NOTES .

1. M. 'Alī: Qur'ān, comment 1667, p. 658.
2. Ibid. comment 2331, p. 993.
3. The interpretation "convincing evidence or proof" for the word 'āyah' is clear from Qur. xx:133.
4. M.'Alī: Qur'an, comment 592, p. 218.
5. Cf. Hamidullah: Muslim Conduct of State, IC,1941, p.28 ff.
6. M. 'Alī: Qur'an, comment 660, p. 251.
7. C.E.M. Joad: Guide to the Philosophy of Morals and Politics, London, 1940, p. 584. To the ancient Romans, the word "hostis" meant stranger and enemy.
8. Christianity as a positive religion, "demanded a concret visible and permanent social form, universal and hence independent of family or State as of the exigencies of races or nations," says Luigi Sturzo in his:Church and State, London, 1939, p. 22.
9. The word "qura" has been translated here as villages, yet in the Qur. the word often conveys the idea of a bigger entity, such as a State. Qur. xxviii:58 "And your Lord would never destroy the qura until He raises an apostle in their metropolis."
10. Cf. Qur. vii:5, 55.
11. Qur. xvii:16.

12. M. 'Alī: Qur'ān, comment 1709, p. 677.
13. H.K. Sherwani: The Origin of Islamic Polity, IC. 1936, p. 550.
14. J. Schacht, EI, art. sharī'ah iv:321.
15. I. Coldziher, EI , ii:101 ff., art. fiqh.
16. Qur. v:42.
17. Haikal, 'U, ii:294.
18. Qur. v:43.
19. Since the Christian scholars refer to the Messenger of Islām as the Prophet Muḥammad, it is only just that the Muslims should in their turn refer to Christ, in the same way as the Christians do. Qur. v:46, is not translated accurately by M. 'Alī. The word "liyāḥkum"^{يأمر} literally means, should or must judge, but not "should have judged," as M. 'Alī suggests.
20. Qur. v:42.
21. Ibid. iv:58, cf. M. 'Alī's comment 593, p. 218.
22. Cf. Taf. taf. v:187, on the extent of obedience to those in authority.
23. Qur. ii:179.
24. David De Santillana, art. Law and Society, The Legacy of Islam, London, 1943, p. 288.
25. Ibid. 288.
26. EI , iv:321, 'uqūbāt, or punitive sanctions form the third branch of Muslim Law.
27. EI. ii:101.

28. The Qur'ān contains many reference to religions other than Islām.
29. J.L. Brierly: The Law of Nations, London, 1928 , p. 19.
30. Ibid, p. 66.
31. Qur. ii: 194.
32. IC, 1941, p. 3.
33. IC. 1936, p. 548.
34. Qur. iii: 110.
35. M. 'Alī, comment 475, p. 174.
36. E.H. Carr: Nationalism and After, London, 1945, p. 21.
37. Qur. ix:23.
38. Qur. v:54 f.
39. For instance sura xxx is called al-Rūm , or Romans.
40. Khadduri, op. cit. p. 117.
41. Ibid, p. 120.
42. Qur. v:48.
43. E.G. Hirsch, JE, xii:124 f.
44. Schaff-Herzog Encyclopaedia, London, 1910, vi:234.
45. JE, xii:125.
46. Cf. Flūgel's Concordantiae Corani Arabicae, Leipzig, 1842, pp. 89, and 157.
47. Collected versions of the Qur'ān were increasingly available from the time of 'Uthmān onwards.
48. A. Sanhoury: Le Califat, Paris, 1926, p. 173 f.
49. The Qur'ān was revealed in a language familiar to the

Arabs, and they understood it without any difficulty.

"There are no reports that the companions referred to Muḥammad for Qur'anic interpretations," says Prof. M.

ʿAbd al-Rāziq : al-falsafah al-Islāmiyyah, Cairo, 1944, p. 152.

50. Haikal, AB:67.

51. Ibn al-ʿArabī: al-futuḥat al-Makkiyyah, Cairo, 1329/1911. 1:445 f.

52. T.W. Aronold: The Caliphate, London, 1924, p. 203 f.

53. Sir M. Iqbal: The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, London, 1934, p. 146 f.

54. Stanton, op. cit. p. 64.

55. IC, 1943, p. 378.

56. For a fuller explanation of ḥudūd Allah, or the rights of God, see Ṭab. taf. iv:181.

57. Qur. vi: 38.

58. It is interesting to observe that some Muslims have tried to prove that everything has been mentioned in the Qur'an. Cf. al-Suyūṭī: al-itqān fī ʿulum al-Qur'ān, Cairo, 1306 /1888, ii:130 ff.

59. S & B. Webb: Soviet Communism, London, 1937, pp.948 f., 1134 f., and M. Cole: Our Soviet Ally, London, 1943, p. 187 f. and S.N. Harper: Civic Training in Soviet Russia, Chigago, 1929, p. 4.

60. R.M. MacIver: The Modern State, Oxford, 1926, p. 342 f

61. H.A.R. Gibb, Whither Islam, London, 1932, p. 328.

62. Ibn al-Athīr, Mubārak b. M. : Gharīb al-ḥadīth,

Cairo, 1318 /1900, ii:208 كانت بنو اسرائيل تسوسهم انبياءهم اى تتولى امورهم
 Cf. Lisan, vii:413, and Taj. iv:169.

63. Khald. H. i:169.

64. G.H. Sabine: History of Political Thought, London, 1939, viii.

65. Abū Tālib al-Makki, expounds the main branches of the shari'ah; cf. qūt al-culūb, Cairo, 1932. iv:5.

66. M.A. Ahmad: IC, 1943, p. 40ff. art. The Nature of Islamic Political Theory.

67. Ibid. p. 47.

68. 'Abd al-Ḥalīm al-Gindī: Abū Hanīfah, Cairo, 1945, p.68.
 Cf. MW, July, 1946, p. 227 art. Abū Hanīfah, Champion of Liberalism and Tolerance in Islām , by C.C. Adams.

CH. IV.

THE CHARACTER AND ADMINISTRATION
OF THE MUHAMMADAN STATE .

When the Prophet died, he left a religion to be propagated and spread as far as it could reach. But he also left a State. The question may be asked whether the same principle of preservation and expansion applied to it; in other words was the Muḥammadan State an integral and indispensable part of Islām? If so, it had also to be developed and extended to keep pace with the religion. If on the other hand, the State was not a necessary compliment to religion, Islām could still be preached to other nations peaceably through the medium of zealous men. Events following the death of Muḥammad have shown that to the Muslims Church and State were an indivisible whole. To some observers it seems that territorial expansion ranked first, because the Arabs in their conquest did not compel the conquered to accept and uphold Islām, and if the propagation of faith were their primary object stricter measures would have been enforced.

The view has been expressed above that for the proper life of Islām the State was not a necessary factor. That, of course implied that the Muḥammadan State was an expedient resorted to after the Hijrah, therefore we referred to it as the Muḥammadan and not the Muslim State. In his own judgment the Prophet concluded that the unification of temporal and divine authorities was imperative for the life and safety of the religion he was entrusted to proclaim. He was thus

"an apostle of Allah as well as a political monarch."(1) Nevertheless, the character he wanted to be remembered most in association with his name was undoubtedly that of the prophet. He attended to the affairs of government only in so far as the smooth running of its machinery made it necessary for him to do so. The bulk of his energy was devoted to the spiritual side of life. Compared with his voluminous religious heritage, the genuine traditions on politics seem to be small despite the large number of obvious fabrications in the latter group, the reason being that politics was not the most essential aspect of his prophethood.

The faithful, however, believe implicitly that Muham-
mad was religiously inspired. But surely, this view cannot be applied generally to all aspects of the Prophet's conduct; for if we are to credit him with a free will, and consider his actions rationally, his infallible inspiration must either be set aside or restricted to religion. However, there is reason for supposing that in dealing with temporal affairs, he relied on his innate intelligence at least as much as he did on intuition, if not more. He realised the responsibility of his position, and reduced his legislation on social and political matters to the necessary minimum; in other words he gave more attention to spiritual affairs on which he was empowered to legislate for all time. But

the political ideas which were more liable to evolutionary change, progressively or regressively, were touched upon only in a general manner. It looks as though the traditions of Muḥammad were a repetition and a reaffirmation of the Qur'anic phenomenon of neutrality on this subject.

We cannot tell what shape of State the Prophet had in mind, nor how far it should extend. From the policy he followed, we can surmise that he wanted to establish a strong Arab centre to act as the hub of Islām, over which he would reign supreme. The object of that unity was the consolidation of Islām. The fact cannot be escaped that physical coercion was one of the means used for the achievement of this plan. It is our considered opinion that at one stage during the lifetime of Muḥammad, the opponents of Islām in Arabia were forced to choose between the sword or physical submission. That seems to us to have been a personal decision of the Prophet; furthermore, its main motive was political; for it would be credulous to assume that a man with the intelligence and determination of Muḥammad would believe that any faith could be propagated by force.

Since we have already dealt with the expansion under the Prophet, we shall now discuss some of its relevant aspects.

(a) The Muḥammadan State was a political state. Even judged by modern standards and definitions this conclusion

still holds good. It was in the first place "a grouping or organization of persons acting together for common ends." (2) Secondly, it was a unity of legal and political authority whose competent and obeyed ruler was the Prophet himself. (3) And thirdly, it was established on a certain and fixed territory where one language was understood and probably spoken by all citizens. To use Prof. Le Fur's modern definition, it was a State "constitué par la réunion sur un territoire déterminé d'un groupe d'hommes obéissant à une autorité indépendante chargée de réaliser le bien commun du groupe." (4)

(b) The institution to which we refer as the Muhammadan State was Arab in nature and composition, and Islamic only in belief, and it was formed after Muhammad's own conception. He did not restrict the Islamic message to the Arabs only, but declared it to all men. But the State which he helped to organise was Arab in character and formation. It was the Arabs who were advised, and later ordered, to unite under the leadership of "the Apostle, the Prophet, the plebeian (ummi)." (5) Although the spread of Islām was his final aim, it seems surprising at first sight to find that the exclusive Arab State was not exclusively Muslim in faith. With the exception of idolatry, which was finally prohibited in the Peninsula, the other two monotheistic religions could still be held by any person or tribe provided that the Jizyah was paid. The Prophet is reputed to have fixed the religious tax at one

dinar per adult person, "free or slave, man or woman." (6) Muhammad was always hopeful that the remaining tribes would declare their confession and complete the unity for which he had striven so hard.

The difference between the Arabs and non-Arabs was clearly stressed in the invitations to Islām thought to have been issued by the Prophet to contemporary rulers. To the chieftains considered Arab or within the Arabian sphere of influence Islām or the Jizyah were offered as alternatives. For example in his letter to the Bishops of Najrān he said: "I invite you to the worship of Allah; if you refuse then you must pay the Jizyah, or else I will inflict punishment upon you through war." (7) To the non-Arabs, like Abyssinians, Persians, Egyptians, or Greeks, Islām or moral condemnation (lawn) were the alternatives. No tribute was demanded at that stage. (8)

In the last year of his life, the Prophet's plans developed a step further as a result of his attempts to achieve the maximum integration of Arabism and Islām. That decision seems also to have been conceived and executed on political ground. Experience must have convinced him that the more loyalties the citizens had in common, the better it was for the national interest. Since, in his opinion, religious sentiment formed the loyalty par excellence, the existence in Arabia of religions other than Islām became an anachronism

embarrassing to both parties. To the Muslims, it was a direct challenge resembling a pocket of resistance in the middle of a conquered land; and to the non-Muslims, the fact of holding different beliefs excluded them from taking part in the great activities of the nation. That painful isolation must have made their position very awkward. Be that as it may, Muhammad acted in the belief that nationals who did not share the faith of the majority tended to weaken from the unity of the State; hence the probability of the traditions advising the eviction of the Jews and Christians from the Peninsula. As Mez suggests, the professors of the protected religions have from the beginning hindered and thwarted the political unity of the Islamic Empire. (9) Although the freedom of conscience remained inviolable, or partly so, Muhammad made the exercise of that right in Arabia so difficult that it was almost negated. It is easy to imagine that after the unbroken series of victories he met with, he looked on the whole Arabic Peninsula, and not only a small part of it as before, in a new light. The Peninsula was now the nucleus or heart, the rest of the known world the potential body. If that heart were to pump faith into the veins of other lands, it should of necessity maintain the regular rhythm of one religion. It stands to reason that the Arabs could not start Islamising the world before they themselves were fully Islamised. Admittedly, rigorous measures

were taken to reach that end; but it must not be taken for granted that the procedure followed by the Prophet in that case was set as a definite precedent for posterity, otherwise the Muslims would be condemned to a life of perpetual hostility towards the rest of the world. However, that expediency was not without its repercussions on later generations, for indeed, it was aggressive in conception and execution, and trustworthy Muslims could not but admit that truth in their reports. We quote here two examples from the histories of Ibn Sa'd and Ṭabari, both of whom are reputed for partiality to Islām.

In his account of 'Alī's expedition to al-Yaman, Ibn Sa'd says: "In the year 10 A.H. the Prophet sent 'Alī (b. Abū Ṭālib) to al-Yaman and ordered him saying: 'go directly to your destination and when you reach it do not fight till you are fought first.' 'Alī set forth at the head of three hundred horsemen... and when he penetrated into the heart of the Yamanite land he invited the people to Islām, but they refused and attacked him and his company with arrows and stones. Whereupon, 'Alī arranged his contingent in battle formation and charged at the enemy, killing twenty men in the assault. The rest dispersed and took to their heels. He then repeated the invitation and it was unanimously and immediately accepted."(10) It should be remembered that the Yamanites were not idolaters, but mostly Jew-

They were not the aggressors but the defenders. The attacking party was that of ʿAlī. Therefore it cannot be denied that at one stage of his life, the Prophet offered the sword as an alternative to faith. ʿAlī, who was among Muḥammad's closest companions, was seemingly aware of that policy and in agreement with it. He (ʿAlī) is reputed to have said: "from Arab polytheists only Islām is recognised, or else the sword! The Jizyah may be taken from foreign polytheists or Mushrikū 'l-ʿAjam. If the people of the book, Arab or foreign, refuse Islām and ask to be treated as Dhimmis, then we should treat them as such, and accept their Jizyah." (11) The legist yaḥyā b. Ādam 230/818, specifically mentions, "the Arabs from whom the Jizyah is unacceptable, and for whom Islām or death are the only alternatives." (11a)

Ṭabarī's report of the expedition to Najrān is equally revealing. "In the year 10 A.H." says Ṭabarī, "the Prophet sent Khālid b. al-walīd to Bilhārith b. Ka'ab with an invitation to Islām. Khālid was ordered to keep the invitation open for three days before commencing hostilities. 'if they answer you favourably, accept their confession of faith, stay with them and teach them the Book of Allah, the ways of His Prophet, and the manners of Islām. Should they, on the other hand, refuse you or resent your mission, then they should be engaged in battle.' When Khālid descended upon that locality of Najrān, he dispatched his men all over

to warn the inhabitants: Oh people! submit that you may be saved (aslimū taslamū), and without a murmur they submitted. when Khālīd communicated the news to the Prophet, he was ordered to return to Medina with a delegation representing Najrān. On meeting them the Prophet said: 'had Khālīd not told me that you confessed Islām without giving battle, I would certainly have thrown your heads under your heels.' "(12)

If those isolated instances were intended to serve certain limited purposes, then they could not be termed binding, and imitable. That is probably the truth, because freedom of conscience, and religious tolerance have not been abrogated in the Qur'ān or the Tradition. These principles could still be treated as cardinal Islamic rules.

(c) The Muhammadan State was totalitarian in character, and the Prophet as its legal head was despotic in his method of government. This conclusion refers to the final development before his death. At that stage there were one ruler, one people, and one religion; in other words, Muhammad, the Arabs, and Islām. We cannot say what would have happened had he lived longer; but it may be conjectured on the strength of the preparations undertaken prior to his death for campaigns in Syria, that the Muhammadan State was in process of development into a universal Muslim State giving equal rights to all members admitting their faith.

By totalitarian, we mean that which permits no rival loyalties or parties.(13) There were one supreme loyalty and one dominant party: Islām and the Muslims. The minority by that time small in size, had no weight and no share in deciding the affairs of the nation. And until their final eviction during the reign of 'Umar, the non-Muslims were forced to remain inert, and accept the position assigned to them by the Muslims. As a political system, however, totalitarianism has some aspects which in fairness cannot be attributed to the Muḥammadan State. For example, the view that "the State is regarded as a whole which is more than the sum of its members, and has a being in its own right," could not have been entertained by the Prophet because he was mainly concerned with living human beings and groups of people and not with mythical ideas.(14) His teachings make it clear that he treated State or nation and people as synonyms. It is interesting to notice that the word dawlah, which is the accepted technical term for State, is not used in the Qur'ān in any political sense.(15) Islām does not encourage its believers to conceive themselves as individuals or groups whose life is decided only in relation to a State. In fact it would be the negation of its main doctrines if one held that "the State is prior to the individual, that its good is the object or end of society, and that it is in opposition to the Church because the latter substitutes God for

the State." (16) Yet, the essential character of totality is so strong and clear in the expressed thoughts and actions of the Prophet that it would be intellectually dishonest not to mention it, let alone repudiate it. The basic feature of totalitarianism in the Muhammadan State, is the absolutism of the Prophet deriving its sanction from the will of God. It is a totality represented in the person of Muhammad, rather than an idea attached to the State as a "living" personality. In practice however, both are similar in the demands they make on their subjects, such as supreme sacrifice, fanaticism, and unquestioning obedience; only one works for "the glory of Allah" and the other for "the glory of the State."

Despotism, as a description of the Muhammadan government calls also for some elucidation because that word is often used to convey the idea of tyranny and oppression. No such thoughts occur to us when we think of the Prophet as a despot. But, in a work of this sort, it is necessary to be as exact as possible; and it is unfortunate that some of the technical terms used in this connection have a sombre emotional colour in the public mind. To suggest that as a ruler, the Prophet was a despot, simply means that he was an absolute monarch, in other words, an autocrat or master with unrestricted power invested in his own person and not in an outside body; a person, that is to say, who was not bound by law to give account of his actions or decisions to the

people he governed; an individual, who could repeal resolutions adopted singly or collectively by any body under his jurisdiction, without at the same time being himself subject to similar treatment. He was a master who was fully obeyed, yet he was constitutionally irresponsible. It is interesting to observe that Prof. Barker translates the Greek word "despotes" as "master". (17)

Justice, the will of the ruler, and the law of the state, are one and the same thing in any totalitarianism. (18) The identification of all three with the ruler, is or must be taken for granted under that system. Muhammad, according to Islamic beliefs, dispensed justice and nothing but justice as commanded by Allah. (19) What he willed, was considered right and was consequently enforced. The contrary, that is, the acceptance of the people's will, was a danger from which he was warned. (20) The law of the land was the law of the Qur'ān as revealed and interpreted by the Prophet. He was bound by no other code or system. In fact his declared object was the abrogation of previous laws and practices. From these premisses the conclusion of despotism must follow naturally.

It has been established historically that absolute power often corrupts its possessor; but there is no reason why this rule should apply to prophets who were divinely guided. By virtue of their prophethood they were incorruptible. At any rate, in Muslim opinion, the theory of infallibility of

muhammad has popular support. (21) It should be held in mind, however, that because of his unique position, the system adopted by the Prophet must also remain unique.' For that is the real meaning of absolutism or autocracy as a suitable description of the Muhammadan government. His authority was derived from God and not from the people; and by virtue of his position he was a law giver in his own right. Whether the people accepted and admitted his prophethood or denied it mattered little to him; for he acted in the belief that he was the Messenger of Allah and was responsible only to Him. That is the reason for calling his office unique, and hence the assumption of similar prerogatives by any successor of his can never be theoretically conceded. Muhammad was undoubtedly aware of his extensive power, and the dangers inherent in its imitation by any other man liable to corruption -and no man is by nature immune from corruption. Therefore the Prophet observed strict silence on the subject of succession. Like his apostolic office, his method of government should have come to an end at his death.

II. THE PROPHET'S SECRETARIATE.

The machinery of government or administrative staff under Muhammad was very simple. He seems to have meant it to be so; besides, he was careful not to confer permanence in office upon any of his companions lest that action might be

interpreted as an authoritative delegation of power. He appointed some of his trusted lieutenants as judges, tax collectors, and military commanders. He charged others with duties in foreign countries. Clerical functions at home were also performed by his command. But all these tasks were delegated for limited periods; further, there is no indication that a regular administrative staff of a stable kind was at any time established during the Prophet's life. There is no evidence either to show that appointments followed a set plan, or that promotions following successful discharge of duties were awarded. Of course Muḥammad had a shrewd knowledge of men, and inspired his companions to do their best in his service. When the occasion demanded, he appointed one of his lieutenants to attend to the specific business in hand, and when that was over the appointment came to a natural end. This statement represents the views of the majority of authorities quoted in this work. Al-Jahshiyārī (942 A.D.), and Ibn Miskawayh (1030 A.D.) are conspicuous exceptions; for they give a detailed and comprehensive account of the various clerks forming the Muḥammadan administration.

Whether Jahshiyārī's report was founded on authentic information available to him at the time, or was only due to his imagination and "skilled craftsmanship" is difficult to establish. (22) Nevertheless, his account is of particular interest as it shows that the Prophet was conscious of the

value and importance of administration as an organ of the State; further that Muḥammad was more interested in the conduct of political affairs than is generally realised. Especially worthy of notice is the suggestion that the Prophet left no business unattended for more than three days. Such promptness was very creditable, particularly to a man who had so much work to deal with.

Jahshiyārī says that the Prophet had a staff of principal secretaries, and in their absence under secretaries deputised. The clerks were assigned to the different departments as follows:

(1) The scribes of revelations: ʿAlī and ʿUthmān. In their absence Ubai b. Kaʿb, and Zaid b. Thābit deputised.

(2) Private secretaries: Khālid b. Saʿīd b. al-ʿĀṣ, and Muʿāwiyah b. Abū Sufyān.

(3) Writers between the people and the Prophet: al-Mughīrah b. Shuʿbah, and al-Ḥasan b. Nimr. (Their work was similar to that of public relations officers nowadays.)

(4) Writers between the people in tribal and water disputes; and with the Anṣar acted as writers between men and women, (Registrars General ?) Ibn Arqam, and Ibn ʿUqbah.

(5) Scribe between the Prophet and (foreign) kings in addition to duties as ordinary secretary; and scribe of revelations: Zaid b. Thābit.

(6) Registrar of booty: Ruʿay b. Abū Fātimah.

(7) Deputy or representative (khalīfah) of every scribe absent from work, Ḥanẓalah b. al-Rabīʿ, who was thus nicknamed the Scribe (al-kātib). The Prophet used to keep his seal with Ḥanẓalah, and said to him: "follow me always and remind me of everything to a third (night)." (23)

Ibn Miskawayh (24) repeats most of the names in Jahshiyārī's list with slight variations. To the scribes of revelations he adds fourteen more names. He says that Zaid b. Thābit was an accomplished linguist who excelled in Persian, Greek, and Ethiopic. (25)

There is no need to translate Ibn Miskawayh's version as it is quite similar to that of Jahshiyārī. It may be observed, however, that neither writer goes beyond the compilation of names. For instance there is no mention of regular meetings, or explanation of procedure in council. There does not seem to have been a special place apart from the mosque where they conducted their regular business. No statement is made about the special advantages resulting from that division of labour, nor is there any reference to rights or privileges conferred upon the holders of these appointments. It may be assumed, therefore, that none of those officials had any authority to act on his own, and we are thus unable to conclude that they formed an executive body. We are still of the opinion that the whole administrative power was in the hands of the prophet. Those secretaries

helped to save his time, and possibly also acted as witnesses of revelations and administrative procedure. Their contribution on the whole was not insignificant, especially from the point of view of preserving the Qur'ān. On the other hand, some of the duties performed by those secretaries strike one as ambiguous. For example, the question of writing between the people and the Prophet. Does it mean that men needed to have access to their leader through writing instead of personal interview at the mosque or some other public place? The writer or registrar of booty is another interesting case; for had that office been in existence at the time of Muḥammad, there would have been no need for the introduction of the Persian system by al-Hurmuzān during the reign of 'Umar. The fact that the Muslims were quite puzzled and unable to deal effectively with the spoils of war until 'Umar adopted the Persian method, indicates that they had no method of their own.

What has been contended here is not that Muḥammad acted arbitrarily, or that he forced his wishes against those of his followers and companions for mere assertion of authority, but rather that he was extremely careful not to bestow his permanent recognition on any person lest after his (Muḥammad's) death claims might be put forward in favour of that person or party. This reason seems strong enough to account for the lack of authentic traditions on the subject of succession.

There are of course some Hadīths the purport of which is that before his death, the Prophet had expressed definite opinions in favour of one person or another, or even in support of the right to leadership of one tribe or section to the exclusion of the rest. A comment will be made presently on these traditions to find out if they can stand the test of scrutiny. Meanwhile it is necessary to proceed directly to the important topic of Shūrā or consultation which was recommended in the Qur'ān, both as a virtue and a social necessity. The object is to set the principle of Muḥammadan absolutism in its proper perspective, not as a ruthless dictatorship, but as a wise and tempered leadership; and also to strengthen the opinion expressed in these pages that in theory and practice, the government of the Prophet was in a special category by itself.

III. THE SHŪRĀ AS A MUSLIM INSTITUTION.

The word shūrā or similar derivatives from the triliteral root shāra or shawara, occurs four times in the Qur'ān; (26) and in two of these instances it is used in the sense of consultation or discussion with a view to reaching decisions based on agreement and general support. This seems to us an imperative in verse xlii:38 which refers to the practice among all Muslims, and conditional only in verse iii:159 addressed personally to Muḥammad. The import-

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attached to consultation may be grasped from the fact that the sūrah or Qur'ānic chapter advising and actually instituting taking counsel is called al-Shūra, (Qur. xlii). Besides, the idea itself, as an attempt at adopting the wisest possible course of action, is likened to the pleasant task of extracting the honey from its source; for that is the literal meaning of the verb shāra or shawara. (27) Taking counsel with one another is enjoined in all matters personal, social, and religious.

Bukhārī says that before taking some of his decisions, the Prophet used to discuss matters with his companions. As an example, Bukhārī mentions that the manner of summoning the believers to prayers was decided after consultation. Someone suggested the adoption of the Christian method of ringing a bell, another advised imitating the Jews by blowing a horn, and a third (ʿUmar) proposed that a public crier (mu'adhhdhin) should be appointed. The prophet favoured ʿUmar's plan and it was thus adopted. (28) "Consultation must precede resolutions." (29) "From the pulpit, Muḥammad sought public opinion on a personal matter," says Bukhārī. (30) "Oh community of believers, what do you suggest for me to do with the slanderers of my family?" (31)

Al-Zarnūjī (1223 A.D.) says that "the Apostle used to consult his companions in all matters including personal ones relating to his family." (32) And Ibn Qutaibah states that

"the Prophet used to seek advice even from women. He used to consult them and accept their suggestions." (33)

Chroniclers and classical Qur'ānic commentators are unanimous in the opinion that consultation is very commendable in the case of the Prophet, that is, a meritorious action or mustahabb. On the other hand, its observance by the people amounts nearly to an absolute duty or a farḍ. Ibn Hishām says that the shūrā tends to promote social unity between leader and led. Referring to Qur.iii:159 "...take counsel with them in the affair, and when you decide put your trust in Allah..." he comments: "take counsel with them in order to show them that you are prepared to listen to their views even though in reality you are in no need to do so. This would unite their hearts around their religion. When however you reach a decision, proceed with it irrespective of the approval or disapproval of any one else." (34) It is interesting to note that in the verse, consultation is in the plural (^{شاورهم} shawirhum), while decision is in the singular (^{عزمت} ʿazamta). Since the address is to Muḥammad it can be deduced unmistakably that his is the final decision. No such distinction is made in verse xlii:38 which refers to the Muslims generally. Both the action and the resolution are in the plural, and that establishes conclusively that no Muslim other than the Prophet could legally claim for himself autocratic powers and force his will upon the believers.

Al-Baydāwī (685 / 1286) suggests that the Prophet is under no compulsion to follow the advice of his people; but he may do so because of the beneficial moral value that may result from placing trust in their wise counsel. "This," says Baydāwī, "tends to increase the devotion of the followers to their leader and helps to consolidate their religious loyalty." (35)

Al-Nīṣābūrī (791 / 1388) follows the same line in his argument and adds that "the neglect of the shūrā constitutes an insult to them (the believers) and shows hard-heartedness. Besides, it has some definite advantages as it is quite possible that a good idea may occur to someone other than the Prophet especially in secular affairs. Apart from the sense of dignity and responsibility it adds to the people, the shūrā is a reliable test for judging the mental calibre of men, so that he (Muḥammad) could place his men according to their ability." (36) Nīṣābūrī attributes the saying to Muḥammad that: "as long as a people take counsel with one another they shall always be guided to the soundest conclusions." (37)

In his lengthy exegesis Ṭabarī expounds the above views and adds that: "Allah would never have ordered the shūrā had He not known of its inherent value...It is a precedent of abundant good and should be observed in solving divine and secular problems." (38) Ṭabarī agrees with the rest

that Muhammad is not bound to adhere to counsel, and that final decision in all matters should rest in the hands of the Prophet whether or not that happens to be in conformity with the opinions and general inclination of the companions." (39) In general council, however, Ṭabarī maintains that the majority view must be adopted."

Two conclusions may be established from the above commentaries: (a) that the shūrā is enjoined as a very desirable practice in Islām, but it does not amount to a farḍ, and (b) that the Prophet being in a category by himself, is not bound to follow the advice of his councillors.

Modern Muslim scholars lay great stress on the political significance of the shūrā; a thing which had not been dwelt upon to any extent by earlier commentators. There is nothing wrong in discovering new meanings in earlier texts, but the tendency to narrow the sense of the text and restrict it to the latest interpretation only is to be deprecated. M. Ṭalī says: "The injunction is clearly meant to prepare them (the Muslims) for transacting the momentous affairs of State and all matters connected with national weal and woe...the Muslims shall be governed by counsel...In this Islām has laid the basis of government by parliaments, and the idea found a clear practical expression in the early days of the Caliphate, when the Khalifa had to refer every important affair to a Majlis-i-Shura (council), and it is strange indeed that

government by parliament is now looked upon by Europeans as an institution which is quite foreign to Islām and unsuited for the Muslim people." (40)

"There is a place, and a very important one, for counsel in the Qur'anic State." says Prof. Sherwani. "The Prophet is advised to consult even those who are his enemies at heart. It is this democratic spirit, taking count of numbers as well as efficiency, which made the religion of the Qur'ān capable of converting the world, if not in so many words, at least so far as its main doctrines were concerned." (41)

It is of course undeniable that from one shūrā verse, at least, a good case may be argued for a kind of democratic muslim State. But to claim that that portion of the Qur'ān is revealed to prepare the Muslims for a certain kind of political government, is definitely going beyond the interpretation of the text into reading something that is not originally intended. Besides, M. 'Alī's statement that "the Khalīfa had to refer every important affair to a Majlis-i-Shura (council)," may lead to thinking that the Caliph was constitutionally bound to do so. Such assumption cannot be substantiated historically. Mr. Sherwani's application of the expression "democratic spirit", followed by reference to numbers and efficiency (both words italicised in the text), is also liable to interpretation in a technical sense, and so a theory of a democratic form of government under the

Prophet may be entertained. Such a conclusion cannot be drawn either. For if by democracy is meant a State in which the general will is inclusive of the whole or the greater part of the community, it follows that the Prophetic government wherein the general will acts only as the receptor and not the originator of law, is the very antithesis of democracy. The result is the same whether the constitutionally irresponsible agent acts for the welfare of the community or not. Even without resort to technical details, Mr. Sherwani's reference to the democratic spirit, that takes cognizance of numbers and efficiency, can be invalidated on his own admission by asserting that, "if there be any division among them (the Muslims) over anything, they have only to turn to this Law as expounded by God through His Messenger, and they would find all they want." (42)

IV. THE WEAKNESS OF TRADITIONS ON SUCCESSION.

The Muslims unanimously believed that Muḥammad fulfilled completely the message entrusted to him, and therefore, they had no need for a successor to develop further or introduce fresh improvements in the religious heritage of the Prophet. The demand for a new leader was mostly secular. Since every group of men must of necessity have a guide or chief, the Medinese naturally proceeded to choose a new head for their community. The heated debate at the shed of the Banū Sā'idah

illustrated that social urge very clearly. It also showed that no one could prove conclusively by way of recommendation from the Prophet an indisputable right to leadership. The problem was settled in the Jahilite fashion of the baitah. The election of Abū Bakr, however, was not carried through as the natural result of the debate, but was effected through a coup de main by 'Umar.

There is strong reason to believe that most traditions asserting the sole right of certain persons or groups were deliberately fabricated long after the death of Muḥammad in order to give credence to propaganda in favour of the particular claimants of power. The opinion has been expressed that, "it became the practice of members of various parties to invent traditions in order to uphold the views they wished to propagate." (43)

Since Medina was thinking primarily of its own needs, the proceedings seem to have been undertaken in all good faith. It is unlikely that the thought of offending the rest of the Muslims by excluding them from consultaion on such an important issue had really occurred to the Medinese. They were thinking of their city not as the metropolis of the Muslim State, but as an independent centre fully entitled to the selection of its new head. Their insistence on the appointment of one of their own citizens was an indication of their thoughts. This right would have been conceded by others had

it not been for the unfavourable repercussions resulting from the final choice of a Meccan to the post. When the Meccans won the day at Medina, it became clear that the hegemony of one section over all others was being contemplated; and hence the offence to Muslims outside. (44) For it seems highly probable that many Arab tribes declaring Islām had been under the impression that their loyalty was to the person of Muḥammad, especially when the formula of tawḥīd or declaration of faith laid it down that admission of the unity of Allah, and the apostleship of Muḥammad were the only postulates.

It is true that the problem of succession with all the dissensions it created and the bloodshed it entailed has proved to be the most troublesome of Islamic problems. Yet had the Prophet himself chosen to appoint someone as his successor, Islām might have assumed a theocratic character quite incompatible with its original precepts, which included among other things the right of the believers to trust their leadership to whoever they thought fit to rule justly. And it might indeed be a credit to Muḥammad that not even the inventors of ḥadīths could pervert his utterances to serve as conclusive evidence in support of any particular claimant.

Traditions were circulated in favour of Abū Bakr. Similar ones supported the case of ʿAlī. Some maintained that monopoly of leadership had been invested in the family of the

Prophet. Others affirmed identical views in favour of Quraish in particular, and the Arabs in general. These claims could be easily offset by the definite principle of equality of all Muslims enunciated in the Qur'ān.

Another kind of fabricated traditions was said to have been expressed in private by the Prophet. And even the assumption that such opinions were aired in confidence, supports, rather than detracts, from the force of argument that the believers have the sole right to select or elect their head of State.

There was also the kind of Hadīths prophesying certain eventualities, and aiming at the right guidance of the people by directing them to put their confidence in the party for whose benefit the traditions were obviously fabricated. By its length and minute detail this category of tradition may be dismissed. It is not impossible for one to express contradictory or even diametrically opposed views on the one subject on different occasions. In the case of a preacher who may be under the sway of emotion to impress his argument on the listeners the likelihood of contradiction is not at all remote. But cardinal principles are observed constantly. As previously expressed, although Muḥammad was a Prophet he did not prophesy, and he repeatedly expressed that such power lay in the hands of God only. This point of view is stated very firmly and clearly in the Qur'ān. The expression ʿĀlim

al-gnaib or "Knower of the unseen" is an attribute of God. (45) and is repeated no less than eleven times in the Book, and in various other forms over ten times. The possibility of human prophecy or knowledge of the unseen is categorically denied. (46) Muhammad's inability to know the unknown or foretell it is unambiguously stated. (47) Now when a tradition purports to make a forecast of events its genuineness must inevitably be denied.

The following are brief examples of pronouncements on the subject reputed to have been made by the Prophet.

"Allah and the believers forbid anyone to covet or contest the right of Abū Bakr to command...Verily he is my intimate friend. (48)

"The Prophet embraced ʿAlī and said: 'verily this is my brother, heir, and successor among you; therefore, listen to him and obey.'" (49)

"This command shall remain in Quraish as long as any two of them survive." (50)

"People are as equal as the teeth of a comb...all are alike in Islām, no preference is granted to an Arab over a foreigner (ʿAjāmī). (51)

"Twelve princes (amīrs) shall reign over you, and all belonging to Quraish." (52)

"The Caliphate is for thirty years; afterwards kingly rule will commence." The recorder of this tradition counted

the years of the reigns of the first four Caliphs and found by coincidence that they amounted to thirty. He ended his tradition with the comment: "the Umayyads alledged that they were entitled to the Caliphate. Verily they were liers; for they were indeed among the most evil of kings." (53)

"Members of my family will suffer great hardships, banishment, and destitution after me until a party from the East, carrying black banners, comes forward,...restores order, and instals a member of my family in power...whoever of you lives in that time must hasten to their aid..." (54)

"The Prophet told Ḥafṣah (his wife) that Abū Bakr, then ~~then~~ 'Umar, should be in charge of the affairs after him. Ḥafṣah passed on this information to 'Ā'ishah." (55)

Leaving aside all these contradictory statements, the events following directly upon the Prophet's death may help to clarify the point at issue. The Muslims at Medina either knew or did not know the will and testament of their leader. Proceeding with the appointment of a new head of State in spite of their knowledge of the Prophet's expressed wish in favour of a certain person would be too ugly a proposition to entertain. For acting as they did immediately on his death would simply mean that they deliberately ignored his advice. Assuming on the other hand, that they did not know of the recommendation by Muḥammad of any particular successor, and this is the more likely interpretation, it follows that their move

was a spontaneous one in response to the natural urge of finding a new leader to replace the old or deceased. The proceedings in the shed of the Banū Sā'idah indicate strongly that the Muslims were acting freely; in other words, they were not burdened with specific claims from any source.

Seeing, however, that they were the Prophet's companions and close followers, and considering that they were probably aware of his inclinations and trends of thought on various matters, it would be reasonable to expect from them a fairly accurate account of his ideas. Consequently their views cannot be easily rejected in favour of others circulating at a much later date.

V. A NEGATIVE CONCLUSION.

It follows from the above argument that the traditions on succession are not definite or conclusive; and a negative result must therefore be admitted. The position of politics is, however, less ambiguous. In his conduct of State, the Prophet acted openly and his methods were watched carefully by his companions. They in turn tried to emulate his example. Nevertheless, oral traditions of a political significance are indeed scanty.

Holding in mind that there was ample legislation on many subjects less important than politics, and seeing that the impact of State affairs was so great that it could not be

ignored, we deduce the the Prophet's avoidance of establishing the law on this subject must of necessity have had a reason. Indications point out that his methods of government were his own, and should strictly remain so; but it would have been much better had he said so. The object of his life's work was based on the Qur'ān, but not so his political actions. He left a religion to be followed by all, and a political method to be adopted by none. Had that position been properly understood, much trouble and bloodshed would have been averted; and the baffling silence which has bewildered many people might not have arisen. "Mohamed, who issued laws and directions regardig quite unimportant questions and ceremonies, maintained as regards the constitution of the state the profoundest silence... Not only as an inspired propnet did Mohamed fail to give direction as to the most important branch of the law of the constitution, but even as a temporal ruler he made no arrangement as to how and by whom the Arabs whom he had reduced to subjection were to be governed." (56)

The question may be asked, whether in spite of this negative conclusion, a positive verdict could be traced to the Qur'ān and Tradition. An affirmative answer may certainly be given, provided that the inherent character of the Muslim system both as a religion and a way of life remain unchanged and unchallenged. Strictly speaking, however, politics qua politics has no place in orthodox Islām.

CH. IV .

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7. Ya'qūbī, ii: 89.
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9. A. Mez: The Renaissance of Islām, translated into
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10. Sa'd, II,ii:44; Dārimī:235, Mālik's Muwatta:363 f.
11. Sa'd, II,ii:122; Zaid b. 'Alī: Majmū' al-fih (Corpus
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12. Tab. I,iv: 1724 .
13. Oxford English Dictionary (Murray's) x:176.

14. Joad, op; cit. p. 645.
15. The words " nudawiluha" ^{نذاولها} and "dawlah" ^{دولة} are used to convey the idea of turn of time, and change of fortune. Cf. Qur. iii:141, lix:7.
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19. Qur. xlii:15.
20. Ibid. vi:116.
21. Tab. taf. vi:176; cf. EI.ii:543, art. ʿIsma ; Ibn Taymiyyah, op.cit. 418.
22. LHA :145.
23. Al-Jahshiyārī: Kitāb al-wuzarāʾ, ed. Mzik, Leipzig, 1926 p. 12 f.
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26. Qur. iii:159, xlii:38, ii:233, xix:30.
27. Lisān vi:103 f., Tāj. iii:318 f.
28. Bukh. 10:1 f. (i:160)
29. Ibid. 96: 28 (iv:443)
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is 620/1223. Hitti. HA:409, suggests 1203 as the
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38. Tab. taf. iv:94.
39. Ibid, iv:95.
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41. Sherwani, op.cit. 30 f.
42. Ibid. 27.
43. Dr. J. Robson, TGUOS, ix:3, 1938-39.
44. Cf. Wellhausen , op.cit. p. 40. Although Wellhausen
is dealing here with elections after 'Umar, he still
considers Medina as the Polis .
45. Qur. vi: 73.
46. Qur. lxxii:26.
47. Qur. vi:50, vii:187.

48. Sa'd, II,ii:24; cf. Bukh. 62:5 (iii:419).
49. Fidā, 34. Cf. Bukh. 62:9 (iii:436), Ya'qūbī, ii:125.
50. Bukh 61:2 (iii:382), 93:2 (iv:384 f.), Ya'qūbī, ii:115, Muslim, iv:264. (According to Muslim, allegiance must be given to the Qurashites as long as any two believers remain alive.)
51. Ya'qūbī, ii:112, 123.
52. Bukh. 93:51 (iv:407)
53. Al-Tirmidhī : Traditions, Cairo, 1292/1875, ii:35; Muslim, iv:265.
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Mohammad Tewfik Ramzi, M.A.

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VOLUME TWO

PART THREE

THE ARISTOCRACY OF ISLĀM

OR

THE ORTHODOX CALIPHATE .

CH. V.

THE BASES OF POWER, AND EXTENT OF
AUTHORITY OF THE FIRST FOUR CALIPHS.

The institution of the Caliphate established after the death of the Prophet was a good example of the integration of the secular and divine influences. Both factors combined to produce something representative of each, and yet at the same time possessing an identity of its own. Religion alone could not guide the Muslims in the choice of their first caliph. There was no compelling reason why Abū Bakr should have prior claims to supreme leadership just because he happened to have been an imām or leader of prayers during the last illness of Muḥammad. Irrespective of what later legists attributed to the religious side of that office, the essential function of the first successor was a secular one. He was primarily the elected head of the State. Later caliphs, however, assumed the title of defender of the faith.

There is reason to believe that the manoeuvres of the Muḥājirs to install one of them at the helm was a conscious attempt to re-establish the hegemony of Mecca over Medina and the rest of Arabia. It is true that Mecca was for a short time second in importance to Medina, and it is true that it adhered to Islām by force of conquest. Medina, on the other hand opened her gates and heart to Muḥammad and gave him refuge, and by that help it became worthy of the new name: city of the Prophet. It was natural, therefore, that it should gain the ascendancy over Mecca. We cannot say that a city or a State has a living personality or memory, but we are certain

that its inhabitants reflect such attributes in their behaviour, and are thus unable wholly to sever their past from their present. This is perhaps how the national ego survives.

Medina subjected Mecca for about three years (8-11 / 630-632). But with the establishment of the caliphate with a Meccan at the head, Medina's identity and independence were confiscated for good. Had the Muhājirs succeeded in carrying out their plan of burying Muḥammad in Mecca, the City of the Prophet might have been forgotten altogether. Since that decisive electoral victory of Mecca, no Medinite ever reached supreme executive authority in Islām. Not only that, but we doubt if any man from Medina had a chance to occupy a high office in the State. While under Muḥammad no distinction was made in appointments between Muhajirs and Anṣar, it was noticed that with the inauguration of the caliphate, all important posts were given to Meccans including the governorship of Medina itself. The governorship of Mecca was invariably assigned to one of its own citizens. (1) This Meccan success in self-reassertion should not be hailed as a wonderful achievement; for it was indeed the first cleavage in the edifice of Islām and a definite sign of regression into jāhilite morality of self centredness, and limited loyalty.

The reason for this strange departure from Islamic unity was political, and had the profoundest repercussions later on. The frustration of the Medinese owing to their failure to prove

themselves masters in their own house, and the aggression of the Meccans were proofs that the quest was mainly for political power. Not only were the Meccans determined to choose a muhājir who possessed the qualities of a good Muslim and an excellent leader, but they were hoping to effect the election of a man of noble Qurashite descent. When finally Abū Bakr secured the position, Abū Sufyān, who was neither a Muhājir nor a very sincere Muslim, expressed indignation at the choice of a man "who belonged to the most humble branch of Quraish." (2) This evidently shows that the contest was not only between Muhājirs and Anṣār, but also between the superior ideas vigorously preached by Muḥammad for twenty three years, and the jahilite practices. And although the affair ended peacefully, and the appointment was the best possible, the seeds of suspicion and resentment sown there had their bitter fruit later on. Indeed, it must have been a painful memory for the Medinese to recall that the people whom they had welcomed as refugees, now became lords in the house of their hosts.

The method of settling that problem was not conducive to the maintenance of friendly sentiments between the contestants. The Anṣār witnessed with much resentment the indignities laid upon their candidate Sa'd b. Ubādaḥ, who was the chief of the Khazraj. He was a man of great dignity and sincerity of faith, and did not seek the appointment, but was called out of his sick-bed by his fellow citizens and

asked to stand forward as their representative. His speech to his supporters was very logical, moderate and sensible. "Oh community of Anṣār, there is a precedent in your favour and an honour that no Arab can surpass. Verily Muḥammad had spent some ten years in his own locality preaching, and none but a few listened to him. They could not protect him or defend his religion, nor could they prevent his persecution. But when Allah intended you for the high rank, He favoured you with belief in Him and His messenger. You sheltered him (Muḥammad) and his companions, vindicated his religion, and struggled against his enemies. You were the hardest people on his foes until the Arabs submitted to God voluntarily or forcibly. It was with your swords that the Arabs succumbed to the Messenger, and he died contented and well pleased with you. Insist, therefore, on retaining this command among you to the exclusion of all others; for that is your rightful due." (3) The words of Sa'ūd aroused the admiration of the Anṣār, and the vehement disapprobation of the muhājirs. A heated argument then followed. Had it not been for the sudden and forceful intervention of the chief Muhājirs, the Medinite candidate might have succeeded, or at least a compromised agreement on a system of dual executive might have been adopted. Umar in particular was most persistent in the demand that the muhājirs should have first place. He could not be reconciled, and was very hostile towards Sa'ūd and even incited his murder,

which luckily enough was not carried out. In spite of the tolerant attitude of Abū Bakr and his very tactful handling of the situation, Sa'ūd was kicked and trampled upon. (4)

The gravity of this first crisis in Muslim political history has not been fully realised. (5) It is interesting to observe, therefore, how modern Muslim scholars are tackling the question afresh. Dr. Haikal says: "Those who can assess the significance of events, would soon attach to this historical meeting (in the shed of the Banū Sa'ūdah) with its far-reaching results on the life of the religion of Islām, as much importance as they would to the great compact of al-ʿAqabah, or the Hijrah of the Apostle from Mecca to Medina. They would also find in the achievement of Abū Bakr, and his capable handling of the situation the work of the politician, nay, the performance of the far seeing statesman." (6)

To show that the institution of the caliphate was mainly temporal in conception, it should be stated that neither of the contesting parties dwelt at any length on the question of religion during the whole course of the debate. Abū Bakr himself was willing to approve the appointment of ʿUmar or Abū ʿUbaidah. Even the recommendation of Abū Bakr that "if he is good enough for our religious leadership, he should be good enough for our secular management," tacitly implied that the main concern of the meeting was social or political but not principally religious. (7) ʿAli was mentioned in that

debate, but the voices raised in his support did not receive an encouraging response. Nevertheless, we think it was here that the Alids may be said to have started their movement.

Those responsible for the cleavage in Muslim unity admitted later that the election of Abū Bakr was a slip that must not be repeated. (8) Yet, in spite of that admission and instead of trying to close the gap and secure the co-operation of the Medinese by giving them a reasonable share in the management of the expanding State, the Meccans persevered in their greed for power. That seems to have been their set plan, otherwise they would have implemented the promises made by Abū Bakr that the Amīrs would be Meccans and the Wazīrs or counsellors Medinites, especially when the person who suggested that solution was finally appointed to the office of caliph. (9) Had the motive been the integration of Muslim power by keeping a united front and selecting to each post the person most capable of managing it irrespective of his tribe or party, the attempt might well have succeeded. But the records bear no witness to such a policy. Meccan superiority was established over Medina and ultimately over the rest of the Muslim world.

In their disappointment the Anṣār were patient but outspoken in criticism of the preferential treatment of the Meccans to one another. When Abū Bakr assigned the command of the army to Khālīd b. al-Walīd, a man from Medina called

Thābit b. Qais protested: "Oh, community of Quraish! is there no man among us suitable enough for what you are always fit for? Oh verily we are neither blind to what we see, nor deaf to what we hear, but the messenger of Allah has commanded us to be patient, and we shall therefore endure." (10)

Some observations may be made on the significance of the incidents leading to the establishment of the caliphate.

First: the heated debate resulting in the revival of dormant antagonisms revealed at once how little the Arabs had advanced during the life of Muḥammad. It was clear that ^{the} new morality prescribed by Islām had not a sufficient time to influence favourably the behaviour of the believers. Their method of argument was still very rough and had not in it the mellow-ness of conciliation prescribed by the Qur'ān. The injunction to the Muslims was to argue or debate by peaceful means and in the best of manners. (11) The first independent trial was a proof to the contrary; for it seemed that up till then Islām had affected the surface only. A longer time was definitely needed for Muslim ethics to catch root. The rattling of swords was very reminiscent of jahilite violence. In that case political considerations outweighed the religious; hence the assertion that political development did not keep abreast with religious development should in fairness be reversed. For as Taha Husain says with reason, "the Arabs could not free themselves from political considerations for a single

moment during the first two centuries of their history;" that is, the history beginning with the Hijrah. (12) Religion in the form introduced by Muhammad was a new experience in their life, and actually it was failure to aspire to its teachings and raise themselves to its high ethical code that was responsible for their ill success.

Secondly, the temporary return to pre-Islamic ideas shows that the caliphate^e was a conscious imitation of an earlier practice. When the Arabs were confronted with the crisis and did not know how to solve it on lines of the new religion, they resorted to the ways they and their ancestors had for generations been accustomed to; that is to say, they re-adopted clan loyalty, which in any case was not so deeply buried. This view is in opposition to Sir Thomas Arnold's theory that, "unlike the Holy Roman Empire, the Caliphate was no deliberate imitation of a pre-existent form of civilization or political organization. It was the outgrowth of conditions that were entirely unfamiliar to the Arabs, and took upon itself a character that was exactly moulded by these conditions. The Caliphate as a political institution was thus the child of its age, and did not look upon itself as the revival of any political institution of an earlier date." (13) The manner in which the issue was decided, and the division after tribal traditions leave no doubt in our mind that the caliphate was a definite revival of the earlier clan government.

Even on Arnold's own admission, if the assumption by 'Umar of the functions of head of the State was "quite in accordance with primitive Arab custom," does it not follow that the custom must of necessity have survived during the reign of Abū Bakr before it could reach 'Umar? In other words, it could not have been the outgrowth of conditions entirely unfamiliar to the Arabs.

Thirdly, from the above considerations the idea that the caliphate was a form of theocratic government cannot be entertained. Wellhausen's assertion that it was a theocratic government cannot be sustained. Besides, his view that the end of the world did not come with the death of Muhammad seems to have been coloured to some extent by his (Wellhausen's) traditional Christian outlook. (14) For in Islām there was no suggestion of a Parousia. (15) As is well known, the debate on leadership after Muhammad began very soon after the news of his death was known, and the people did not wait to see whether or not the end of the world would come. Had 'Alī been elected, there might indeed have been great weight behind Wellhausen's suggestion of theocracy. How could the survival of a theocracy be maintained when the essential organs of such a system were absent from the body of Islām? Admittedly, the divine law was there; but the order of men who could claim priesthood or divinity for themselves and thus command the

necessary authority was never a feature of orthodox Islām.(16) It is generally agreed, at least in so far as the first four caliphs were concerned, that they possessed no spiritual powers setting them apart from the rest of the faithful.(17) Later caliphs did not possess such powers either, but some of them pretended they did.

It is necessary to distinguish between the original prerogatives of the caliphate as an office, and the rights attached to it later on. It may be conceded that theocratic authority was attached to some caliphs, but that does not prove that earlier ones were invested with such personal influence. Similarly, the fact that later successors turned that elective office into "a despotism placing unrestricted power in the hands of the rulers and demanded unhesitating obedience" from their subjects, does not mean that earlier caliphs behaved politically in like manner. (18) Nevertheless, the reason for that change was not far to seek; for in their autocratic attitude those successors were trying to emulate the Prophet, and wanted to show that they were not only his heirs in temporal affairs, but on the spiritual level as well. And as previously stated, some caliphs claimed super natural powers for themselves and alleged that they were the successors on earth of God Himself. Such deterioration, however, was the outcome of many factors. It does not invalidate our assumption that on its adoption the caliphate was an

Arab institution in conception and prerogatives, and that it owed more to Jahilite than to Muslim ideas.

There is reason to believe that nearly all the movements taking place in Islām from that time onwards owed their origin directly or indirectly to that momentous event. Wellhausen does not credit this event with the importance it deserves, and thinks that it was the murder of ʿUthmān which was more epoch-making than almost any other event of Islamic history, and suggests that since then the question of who would assume leadership was fought out with the sword. (19) Wellhausen does not even see any great significance in the part played by Abū Bakr, and maintains that "ʿUmar b. Khattab may be regarded as the founder of the second theocracy, the theocracy without a prophet." (20) But if careful attention were given to the study of the first two years after the death of Muḥammad, the whole of Muslim history might be viewed from a different angle, which we believe would provide the most proper perspective.

From the election of Abū Bakr the following different currents of opinion began: the supremacy of the Meccans; the rekindling of dormant Jahilite enmities; the ʿAlid party of theocratic legitimists; and the Khārijites or moral anarchists of Islām. All those movements were in fact interdependent, but they only represented different shades of opinion. For example, the assertion of Mecca over Medina

resulted in the alienation of one major section from the other. Among each of the two groups unity was not very strong and relations were not particularly happy. The latent enmity between the Aus and Khazraj was revived even though without much active manifestation. Had the Aus supported the claims of the chief of the Khazraj, his election might have succeeded. On the other hand, Mecca the winning city, was subject to three channels of thought: (a) adherence to the true and excellent party of Muhājirs among whom were the caliph himself, ʿUmar, ʿUthman, Abū ʿUbaydah, ʿAlī, and al-Zubair to name only a few. (b) The supporters of ʿAlī, who on seeing that the question was decided on merits alone, clamoured for leadership to be installed in the house of the Prophet. (c) The ancient nobility of Mecca; who maintained that since power was restored to the old city, it should rightly go to the noblest and most distinguished branch of Quraish, which they alleged was not that of Muḥammad. The leader of that movement was Abū Sufyān.

Succeeding events confirmed that the aspirants for supreme command were not inert, but were vigorously pursuing their schemes and aiming at seizing the opportunity to establish their authority. So deep rooted were those latent antagonisms and jealousies, that no drastic political change in Islām was carried through peacefully, and no major dynasty launched its ship of state but on a tide of blood. As an

outlet for repressed hatred, persecutions, and indignities were always visited upon the remnants of the dislodged rulers. Could that not be a proof that the religion itself was innocent of such atrocities and that sheer lust for mastery was to blame?

Outside the two cities -Mecca and Medina- a movement, owing its birth to the teachings of Islām, began to take shape in the form of serious challenge to the continued hegemony of one group of Muslims over the rest. The inherent equality of all believers, derived from the notion of divine unity, must have permeated the thoughts of men. Perhaps more than any other Muslim dogma equality of all faithful men appealed to the inner nature of the Arabs. The result was a positive denial of the alleged superiority of one party over the rest on the refutable basis of kinship or association with the Prophet. Thus when the tribes outside the two cities heard that a caliph had been elected as supreme head of the whole community, resentment over the decision arose immediately; not only because the outside clans were ignored in consultations, but because the office itself was not an imperative requirement to the life of Islām. They understood that the object of the Muḥammadan message was not the creation of a certain State in Arabia or on earth, but rather the setting up of divine government over man's soul or conscience. They believed that Muḥammad aimed at elevating the faithful to a

moral standard whereby spiritual control should prevail, and conscience should reign supreme. But that of course was an ideal, and like all ideals difficult of attainment; yet it had to be sought after. This, then, was the argument of the challengers to the central authority. They thought they had attained moral anarchy, and were thus in no need of guidance from their equals in Medina. By moral anarchy we mean the ethical level at which man recognises no power other than that of his own rightly guided conscience.

Looking at the caliphate from that angle, resentment and active opposition to the rulers of Medina could be appreciated. The dissentients demanded that claims of superiority must be discounted and annulled. The assertion of the argument of the caliphs and their supporters was far from convincing. It is here that we should look for the seeds of the Khārijite movement denying the validity of the first three elections, and suggesting that external government was not an imperative rukn or cardinal principle in the foundation of Islām. And if at all an Imām were needed, no considerations of family or tribe should affect the issue. (21)

A distinction should be made between the moral anarchy of this party and the political^{al} anarchy which is always associated with the word. (22) It is suggested the the Khārijite movement sprang into being during the conflict between ʿAlī and Muṭāwiyah. We think, however, that at the time referred

to the Kharijite party had reached its manhood, but it was born during the battles of al-Riddah or sedition in the time of Abū Bakr. The best definition of that movement is perhaps offered by Shahrastānī, who describes as Khārijite any one who goes forth from, or actively opposes the Imām. Without specifying the exact period, Shahrastānī maintains that the Khārijites began their opposition during the Orthodox Caliphate. (23)

It should be borne in mind, that once there was a caliphate account had to be taken of it. Irrespective of legality, though that was not greatly contested, the caliphate was the de facto authority in the State. This is a point that should be firmly grasped in reading Muslim writers. Their views seem to us as rationalisations of an existing organisation rather than a critical examination of the organisation itself. The truth seems to be that those writers knew that their criticism, if any, had to be as mild and as unobtrusive as possible, lest the displeasure of the supreme ruler might be incurred. Fear of the despot was then an important factor to be reckoned with, and the people therefore took particular care of that fact, and endeavoured not to arouse his anger by trespassing unduly upon his sphere of authority.

Nevertheless, thorough investigation would disclose some revealing statements by Muslim thinkers. Ibn Khaldūn for

example, treats the subject from two different angles, theoretically and empirically. Discussing the different aspects of succession (Khilāfah), and spiritual leadership (Imāmah), he points out that, "since sovereignty or mulk is a social necessity based on conquest and force, the government of the sovereign is often unjust and oppressive to those under its sway; and therefore obedience to it becomes difficult...but since government is essential, resort is often made to political principles the validity of which is admitted by all. If the State is lacking in such politics its authority cannot prevail, and its power cannot be complete...when these principles are introduced by the wise, distinguished, and far-sighted statesmen, they are called rational politics or siyāsaḥ ʿaqliyyah...But when these are laid down by Allah they become known as siyāsaḥ dīniyyah or religious politics, and serve the interests of both this, and the next world...Politics of sheer force is condemned as despicable violation and aggression...Tempered or wise politics is also doomed to failure because it is vision without the light of God, and its aim is the service of temporal interests only, but the ultimate object of the Legislator (Allah) is the wellbeing of man in the next world." (24)

In another part of the same chapter Ibn Khaldūn says: "had the Imamate been a basic principle of Islam, as is alleged, it would have been established as such. But that

has not been the case, because the Imamate was a public interest founded by the agreement of men... Succession was not enacted by the Prophet, because its importance was not as great then as it is to-day." (25)

Now the study of Ibn Khaldūn's theories does not lie within the immediate scope of this thesis, but we have selected those short extracts to show that interest in political thought has been kept alive through the ages. It is needless to suggest that Ibn Khaldūn and those before him were writing under the watchful eyes of the caliphs. Any detract-
ion from the importance of that institution would have been considered an offence against the caliph and the existing order of State, and treated as an incitement to sedition.

Whether or not the caliphate was an indispensable religious or political establishment, its legality was derived from the support given it by the people. And irrespective of all opposition or doubt concerning its validity, once it became an accomplished fact it had to be accepted as such. Abū Bakr was chosen, and the rest of the Muslims were informed of that decision, and allegiance to the new head was expected as a matter of course. Those who withheld their support were labelled as apostates and fought into submission to the central government.

Apostasy was not the correct description of that movement. It is true that some tribes had rejected Islām, and

others followed prophets of their own. (26) The main rising however, was in protest against the right of Abū Bakr to the Zakāh or alms which was paid to Muhammad during his lifetime as an expression of allegiance to his person. It may be remembered that in introducing the Zakāh as a Muslim farḍ, the Prophet ordered that it should be taken from the people and given to their poor. (27) The continuation of the Zakāh payment to the government of Abū Bakr appeared to the independent tribes as an expression of submission to Medina. Their refusal was, therefore, an attempt at regaining their full independence. As Becker says with reason, "the fight against the ridda was not a fight against apostates; the objection was not to Islām per se but to the tribute which had to be paid to Medina, the fight was for the political supremacy over Arabia, and its natural result was the extension of the dominions of the prophet, not their restoration." (28)

Whatever objections there may have been to the election of Abū Bakr, his spectacular success in keeping the unity of Islām, and extending its boundaries, had given the stamp of permanence to the caliphate. There is reason to believe that Abū Bakr had a greater claim to the title of the true founder of the Muslim State than had Umar. The honour in this case should not have been decided on length of service, but on the value of the services rendered. His imperturbability before crises, his far sightedness, self control, and unbending

determination, together with a diplomatic skill rarely matched among the companions of Muḥammad put him on a higher level than Umar. Had Abū Bakr failed in his onerous task, it is very likely that an armed revolution might have taken place, and it is doubtful if at that time the tender structure of that youthful community could have survived the shock without permanent injury. The antagonists of the first successor might have envied his position, but they certainly could not fail to respect him and admire his ability. His piety and age, besides the other moral qualities he possessed made him both a very suitable successor of the Prophet, and a chief after the original Arab traditions. In his political practice, he did not lose sight of both requirements. His first official public utterance was a reaffirmation of Islamic principles, and an appeal to the inmost soul of ancient Arab traditions. To those who think that government after Muḥammad was a theocracy, a re-examination of that speech of Abū Bakr may cause them to reconsider their views. Far from being the declaration of a theocrat, it was a well balanced statement of an aristocrat.

Can it be, therefore, that at its inauguration the caliphate was an aristocracy? We think a positive answer would be the right one. The Orthodox Caliphate^r represented the most excellent elements in the Arab State. Its authority and sanctions were derived directly from the

people, and ultimately from God. The bases of that government were portrayed unmistakably in the announcement of Abū Bakr.

The speech referred to became a classic in Muslim history, and practically any book dealing with that period gives a version of it. "(Oh people ! " said Abū Bakr, "now I am chief over you, albeit not the best amongst you. If I do well, support me; if ill, then set me right...obey me wherein I obey the Lord and His Prophet; when I disobey, then obey me not...) Truth is a trust and dishonesty a betrayal. Before me the meek among you shall be the strongest until I vindicate his right; and the most powerful among you shall I render impotent until I secure the right from him." (29)

At once the constitution of the new State is presented in clear terms. AS a statement of policy, those words of the caliph may be likened to a speech from the throne, or a presidential address in modern times. From its contents the following guiding principles may be discerned.

1. The caliphate is an elective and contractual office.
2. Its legal head is directly responsible to his electors.
3. He is neither a despot nor a theocrat.
4. Obedience to him is not unconditional.
5. Autonomy and isonomy are the legal foundations of the State.

These conclusions are in direct opposition to the popular belief that the caliphate is mainly a religious institution. De Santillana says: "God has perfected the

edifice of law by establishing a ruler (imam, or khalifah), and prescribing obedience to his behests. Supreme power can be conferred by God alone, because no man, as such, is entitled to rule over his fellow beings...The establishment of the chief and obedience to his directions are both a religious duty and a necessity of existence for the Muslim community,.."(30)

The same opinion is held by Muslims. Dr. Ahmad says: "No individual, no amīr, and not the whole millat can lay claim to the sovereignty of the state; their status is that of subjects under the sovereignty of God." (31) "The Muslim millat," says Dr. Yusuf, "is a politico-religious unity,..hence authority in Islam is unassailed. It is not only feared but respected and loved by all alike, because it proceeds not from the so called 'national will' ..but from Allah." (32)

While we do not disagree that all power and authority are ultimately derived from God, we contend that the will of the people is an expression of the will of God. According to Islamic belief, of course, no man can act but by the will of God. In actual practice, however, he who is appointed by the people derives his direct authority from the people, and he who claims power from God, holds no responsibility before man. Abū Bakr, as his speech showed, entertained no notions about divine ordinance in nomination. He was installed in his office by his electors as the leader of equal men, and in all modesty he mentioned that he was not the best

of them. Notwithstanding the religious duties he performed as the spiritual leader of the community, he was pre-eminently a political functionary. (33) We think, therefore, that De Santillana's opinion is based on later developments of the office, and does not go back to the origin of the institution itself. The will of the people seems to have been the deciding factor in the creation of the caliphate. The Prophet is reputed to have said: "my nation shall not unanimously agree on an error." (34) Whether or not the Prophet really made such a statement, Muslims always acted on that principle. The difference has arisen not on the contents of the tradition, but on who actually constituted the community or jamā'ah of the believers. Size and numbers were not the most important factors in assessing the strength of a party's claims.

The community of Medina formed the élite or aristocracy of Islām. Both the Muhājirs and Anṣār had a special place among the believers. They deserved their honour for the un-failing support they had given to Muḥammad. The title of companion or associate became in time a very honourable designation, and in time the traditions attributed to Muḥammad through them commended favourable reception. Of all companions, the first four caliphs were the most distinguished. We believe, therefore, that aristocracy is an apt description of that government. The excellence of those men was not due

to birth or any other accident, but was the result of rigid self-discipline and training in the ideas of Islām. Like the guardians of Plato's Republic, they began from a state of ignorance, and with wise direction and rigorous education they reached the light of knowledge. They were privately elected from a limited group of good and highly capable men, and responsibility of government was pinned on their shoulders. They took counsel with their associates, but on the whole the private inclinations and ideas of the caliphs directed the general current of opinion in the State. It is doubtful whether any plan was carried through without their personal approval and desire. Another great source of power besides the confidence of the people, was the adherence of the caliphs to the precepts of Islām. This is perhaps the most probable reason for referring to their government as a theocracy. Al-Fakhri says: "the first dynasty, or the dynasty of the four... was not after the fashion of worldly States. It was more akin to the order of the prophets..." (35) And Zaidān says: "we do not consider the Orthodox State as a political government, but as a religious succession." (36) But the difficulties in calling that system a theocracy are sufficiently intricate to make us avoid its application to the Orthodox Caliphate.

On the other hand, aristocracy conveys the idea of excellence in all respects, and is therefore more fitting in this

case. Literally, the word aristocracy is a very suitable description of the moral qualities of the Muslim leader as conceived in the Qur'ān. For if, as the Book suggests, the cities or States are destroyed because of the prevalence of evil-doers and their perpetual mischief, does it not follow that the contrary assumption would lead to the prosperity of the State and those who live in it? And has it not been established (from Qur'ānic premisses) that good and constructive life is the aim of our existence in this world? And has it not been advised (by Allah) that good must be encouraged and evil suppressed? And in order to carry out these commands of God, must we not possess the means to do good and repel evil? And are not piety, moral goodness, justice of the soul, or in short, excellence, the best guarantees for such an end? And is aristocracy other than the Kratia of the aristos? We think there is reason for supposing that the expression of these requirements in one political formula, leads to the conclusion that the excellent should have the right and opportunity to rule the community of believers; and that is precisely what we intend to convey by Muslim Aristocracy.

A system conceived and established on these lines, must of necessity be permeable. The reason is to leave the way open before all to live up to that high standard, and compete in virtue: "and help one another in goodness and piety, and do not help one another in sin and aggression." (37)

virtue and courage, rather than noble descent or sheer unscrupulous cunning should be the test of the ruler. As already explained, politics has been touched upon in the Qur'ān only in general terms. Moral excellence, however, has been praised highly, and Muslims have been exhorted to pursue it as a desired end. Obviously, it does not need a great stretch of imagination to deduce that the rulers of the State must have that quality in abundance. The proviso of permeability is a safeguard against monopoly of power on reasons other than moral. It is also a refutation of doctrinaire aristocracy in Islām; that is to say, a rejection of the idea that one single group of Muslims, namely the Arabs, is inherently endowed with the right to govern, while at the same time the rest of the believers have to be governed with no hope of ever becoming rulers. Thus it may be suggested that the special characteristic of Muslim aristocracy is the denial of the principle of permanent separation of the body politic into two distinct classes, rulers and ruled, in which the segregation is unsusceptible to interchange or permeability. (38)

The Muslims under the first caliphate acted in the belief that rulers and ruled were equal, and their subdivisions were only functional and elastic enough to admit the most humble if he proved his worth. That system could be described as a semi-aristocracy, but with the above expla-

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the additional word could be dispensed with. However, the bases of that government were strong enough, and a promising start had been made despite the stormy beginnings. But unfortunately that order did not continue for long. With the expansion of Islām and the inclusion in its dominion of other races and nations, the Arabs insisted on being the sole managers of all affairs on the unacceptable argument of kinship with the Prophet. The contents of that page of history are too well known to be repeated here. It may just be mentioned that the Muslims did not accede voluntarily to the unfounded claims of the Arabs, but were actually coerced into their acceptance. A critic may say with justice that the inclusion of non-Arabs in Islām was the subjection of men, and the annexation of territory by the right of conquest. That failure accounted for the conflict arising from the earliest stages of the caliphate. Further, it provided the historians with a vivid illustration of how fine theoretical doctrines could be rendered obsolete in practical application.

For twenty three years the Prophet preached and laboured in order to raise the standard of his people to a higher level of civilisation, and yet the recoil following his death proved that the Arabs were on the whole unable to advance as quickly as their leader had intended. It is here, and not in politics or social development, that we must look for the downfall of the Arab Empire. The weakness and dissolution

were essentially moral, and we suggest that failure to absorb fully and act upon the religious or ethical teachings of Muhammad was the main defect in the moral temper of the Arabs.

After the initial struggle resulting in the formation of a small group of men quite conscious of the meaning and value of the new ideas, it was an easy matter for anyone to confess Islām; in other words, later converts had not the same opportunity to study and appreciate the Muhammadan message, as had their earlier brethren. To many Arabs Islām meant no more than a simple declaration of faith, which allowed them to take part in wars and share in the spoils of battles. They took it as a way of life, and pursued it actively, and their energies were directed in the channels made for them by the thinking few. The masses were so efficiently led, and their warlike instincts were so directed towards their enemies, that they had no opportunity to stop and think for themselves. Action rather than thought was the rule of their life.

As a limited policy that plan proved very successful, but in the long run it was harmful to the interests of the State. The soldier class of the Arabs, that is to say, every able-bodied man, was busy conquering new territory, and increasing its material wealth and sphere of influence. The conquered, on the other hand, were silently trying to

find out the underlying causes for the sudden change that transferred the Arabs from a conditions of bedouin primitiveness, and confinement within a closed desert, into one of semi-civilisation and active expansion. It was this thorough investigation carried out by the subject people that resulted in the understanding and consolidation of Islamic philosophy of religion and life: hence the fact that the greatest Muslim thinkers were not Arab in origin. We hold that the Arabs had embarked upon a policy of conquest to spread their religion before they themselves had a full opportunity to study and digest its real meaning. It is quite possible for a man to carry a message from one place to another without knowing its contents. The fighters among the Arabs were many, but those well-versed in Islām were only a few. In the appreciation of this fact, perhaps, lies the key to the understanding and proper interpretation of the expansion. At the outset, the Muslims were all Arabs. They behaved and thought on Arab lines, and their government was conceived after an Arab pattern. "This impression of the Government of Abū Bakr," says Dr. Haikal, "established that it was near to the primitiveness of the Bedouins, and that it was purely Arab." (39) Instead of advancing towards the brotherhood of all men, or even all believers, the Arabs persisted in an attitude of superiority. whether or not they were aware of the departure from basic Islamic ideas inherent

in that policy, is not for us to decide; but events have proved the existence of that outlook.

The favourable impression created by Abū Bakr when he proclaimed that excellence on merits was the sole criterion of government, was surprisingly enough dimmed by ʿUmar who declared that the Arabs were the aristocrats of Islām; he added that they should prove their worth by their good deeds, and should they fail to do so, the foreigners would be more entitled to the distinction. "By God," exclaimed ʿUmar, "we have not won superiority in this world, nor do we hope for recompense for our works from God hereafter, save through Muḥammad...He is our title to nobility, his tribe are the noblest of the Arabs, and after them those are the nobler that are nearer to him in blood. Truly, the Arabs are ennobled by God's apostle. Peradventure some of them have many ancestors in common with him, and we ourselves are only removed by a few forbears from his line of descent, in which we accompany him back to Adam. Notwithstanding this, if the foreigners bring good works and we bring none, by God, they are nearer to Muḥammad on the day of R^esurrection than we. Therefore let no man regard affinity, but let him work for that which is in God's hands to bestow. He that is retarded by his works will not be sped by his lineage." (40) Contrasting this statement with that of Abū Bakr, the change in attitude can be sensed immediately. Here we have the second caliph

reviving the ideas of nobility of birth, and superiority of Arab ancestry, instead of attempting to put out of circulation all that tends to create barriers between the members of the same faith. Although ʿUmar was careful enough to stress the value of good deeds, his remarks meant that whenever two men were equal in point of merit, the Arab would have preference just because he happened to be an Arab, and that of course was an unwarrantable assumption.

ʿUmar was regarded the most excellent Muslim after Abū Bakr, and it was for this reason alone that he was recommended and adopted as the successor of the first successor. Before appointing him as caliph, Abū Bakr conducted a series of consultations with the wisest among his counsellors. Having made up his mind, he proclaimed ʿUmar and secured for him public support. "If I am required to account for my decision before God, I would say 'I have chosen over your people, the most excellent among them,'" declared Abū Bakr to Ṭalḥah b. ʿUбайдallah when the latter objected to the nomination of ʿUmar. (41) Other companions also complained to Abū Bakr of ʿUmar's undue severity, and hard-heartedness, but he waved their objections aside by declaring them only superficial.

ʿUmar was undoubtedly a very just and strict Muslim, yet on the whole he was impulsive and dictatorial. He was seemingly aware of the resentment created among the Muslims by his appointment, but he justified his position to himself

on the ground that the State needed such a strong hand.

"I heard the people were afraid of my severity," said Umar, "... now that I am in charge of your affairs, you should know that my strictness has been restrained, and will be let loose only on the oppressors of the Muslims. The peace-loving, religious, and well-meaning citizens may rest assured that I shall be more gentle towards them even than they are to one another." (42) He won the people to his side by strict impartiality and able statesmanship.

Consultation was a characteristic of his rule. He always availed himself of the wise counsel of the elders of the State, but invariably had the final word on any subject; for he believed that the ultimate decision must be taken by the caliph. In his short address from the pulpit on his assumption of office, he confidently undertook full responsibility. The Arabs, he said, "are like a camel¹ tied by the nose, and compelled to follow the driver. The driver should, therefore, look where he is taking his camel. By the Lord of the Ka'bah, I shall force you into the (right) way." (43) It is interesting to observe that most of the metaphors of Umar were Bedouin in origin. The man himself was more of a bedouin and austere tribal chief than any other caliph. He forced the people to do what he thought right, but he did not persuade them to realise and appreciate their responsibilities. He despised worldly pleasures, and lived like an ascetic. In

fairness, however, it must be mentioned that he did not expect his people to do likewise, although he would very much have liked them to follow his example voluntarily. In his management of the State he was serious, and was concerned only with what was relevant to the business in hand. Freedom from ostentation was second only to justice in his moral fibre. The combination of all such fine qualities reflected very favourably on his work, and established his success. Al-Fakhrī tells how anxious ʿUmar was to receive news from the Persian battle-front, and how he went out to the outskirts of Medina to wait for a messenger from the army, and returned to the city walking beside the mounted courier and conversing amiably with him without the latter realising who the poorly clad Arab was, until he heard the people addressing him as commander of the faithful. (44) In the same humble attire he visited foreign lands where a respectable appearance was very desirable. On his entry into Syria riding a donkey, Muʿāwiyah, then governor of that province, met him in a great procession. ʿUmar was very displeased at seeing the Muslims dressed in expensive clothes, but when he was told that in order to impress their opponents the Arabs had to look presentable, he did not raise much objection. (45) The interesting thing was that he himself made no attempt to dispense with his own old robes. Bishop Sophronius of Jerusalem must have wondered at ʿUmar's

shabbiness. After the surrender of Jerusalem, "the Bishop pressed Omar to accept new clothes for his dirty ones, but Omar declined." Bar Hebraeus who mentions this story adds: "This man Omar was wholly upright (or, just) and he was remote from avarice, and although they (the Arabs) were masters of all treasures of the Persians and the Rhomaye, he never changed his original manner of attire." (46)

The object of these illustrations is to show that Umar's actions were primarily religiously guided. Had he really been following a policy of conquest for its own sake, he would at least have availed himself of some of the material benefits resulting from expansion. But he was following a plan that was in his opinion an important part of his religious duties. He was trying to bring the message of Islām to every land he could reach.

It may be asked how far Umar conformed to the ideas of Muslim aristocracy, and how much he contributed to establishing its power. There is reason to think that during his comparatively long term of office, (13-23 / 634-644), he exerted a great influence, cemented the unity of the Arabs, and Muslims in spite of his private views, and helped to consolidate the caliphate. His justice and religious zeal became legendary in Islām. Above all the motivating force of his life's energies was the true understanding of religion; for he practised what he preached, and he preached after the fashion of his

master. On his death-bed after a mortal blow, "he kept repeating the name of the Lord and the Muslim creed, until his spirit passed away." (47) It is this devoted adherence to the precepts of Islām before anything else, that has suggested to us the choice of the word aristocracy as an apt description of the government of the big four in Islām. The character of ʿUmar stands out as a type uncommon among great men. "Simplicity and duty were his guiding principles, impartiality and devotion the leading features of his administration," says Muir, who places ʿUmar next to the Prophet in greatness among Muslims. (48)

The opinion of Sir William Muir about ʿUmar is echoed in the writings of many modern students of Islām. Levi Della Vida says: "the caliphate of 'Omar which is marked by the complete transformation of the Muslim state, is regarded by tradition as the period in which all the political institutions by which it was later ruled had their origin... We cannot however refuse the title of political genius to the ruler who was able to impress a stamp of unity and permanence upon the variegated and confused elements which went to make up the new Muslim state... He was really the second founder of Islām, he who gave the edifice erected by the religious inspiration of Muhammad, its social and political framework." (49) Goldziher is also of the same opinion, and refers to ʿUmar as the "véritable fondateur de l'État Islamique." (50)

ʿAbbās al-ʿAqqād, a prominent Egyptian literateur, gives his biography of the second caliph under the title of ʿAbqariyyah ʿUmar or the Genius of ʿUmar. (51)

From the point of view of concrete achievement ʿUmar deserves great credit. But we do not think it would be unjust to assert that some of the apparently strong pillars of State erected by him, were in fact hewn from clay. It was his own strength that kept those threatening tendencies under control. As is known, he was more feared than loved, and he ruled with an iron hand. When, however, he thought fit to put on a glove, he invariably preferred a steel to a velvet one. His legacy was a mixed one.

It fell to the unfortunate ʿUthmān to suffer the wrong policy of preferential treatment inaugurated, at least in theory, during the lifetime of ʿUmar, in favour of the Arabs to the exclusion of other Muslims. ʿUthmān was a morally good man, but an incompetent and weak-willed ruler. He was primarily chosen for his excellence as a Muslim and a devoted companion of the Prophet. It is very doubtful whether his inability had been detected before his appointment. During the life of Muḥammad and the two successors after him, he was consulted on all important matters and his views were often very sound; for he was an intelligent man. We believe, therefore, that the six electors, who were good Muslims before anything else, had attempted earnestly to choose from among

them the most promising and able candidate. It often happens that when a small group of men is entrusted with such an important task, the choice is subject to personal influences, and the selected one is often the least capable and most yielding. Such considerations were not in evidence in the election of Uthmān, but circumstances proved him so otherworldly and so trusting, that his virtues were revealed as liabilities rather than assets. He had not the strength of character to restrain his relatives from treating the State as the belonging of their family. The tendency was apparent under Umar, but was kept under severe check. But now, that there was a member of their own house in supreme authority, they discarded all pretence and exploited the position to the full under the unsuspecting eyes of the caliph. After all, that had always been their aim since Abū Sufyān voiced their opinion after the death of Muḥammad. And as Wellhausen says with reason, "with Uthman the Umayyids actually attained to the Khalifate, for his government was the government of his house." (b2)

Whatever else may have happened during the caliphate of Uthmān, one prominent feature singled it out as a period of underlying struggle of ideas. The Muslim State was still faithful to the teachings that brought it into being. The cleavage which appeared earlier now became a threatening split. Two currents of opinion were in conflict. On the one

hand there was a group that definitely wanted to turn the system of government into one of clan or Jāhilite aristocracy; and on the other, stood the majority of Muslims bent on retaining the moral excellence and the personal qualities of the individual as the sole criteria of command. The battle ended in the victory of the latter group defending the original precepts of equality of all in opportunities. When Uthmān promised to end favouritism, the protestants should have retired and given him a chance to fulfill his promises. But fate decreed otherwise, for the winners who stood for the prevalence of orthodox Muslim rather than Arab ideas lost their case when a party of them mobbed and killed Uthmān. They thus gave members of his house a golden opportunity for survival and revenge.

The situation even then could have been saved had a tenacious and capable man been in charge. But in the hands of Alī, the position worsened beyond repair; for he was neither brilliant enough to counteract successfully the Umayyad propaganda, nor was he strong enough to crush their disorders. He could not even fully establish his authority over his own followers, and so face his opponents with a united front. More than any other factor, the indecision of Alī caused his downfall. (53)

In a way it could be said that the Orthodox Caliphate or Aristocracy of Islām came to an end after Uthmān. But

in keeping with the definition that the excellence of the caliph himself was the deciding factor in calling him a head of State, the name of ʿAlī may unhesitatingly be included among the best of all Muslims. Unlike his three predecessors, he could not secure the formal allegiance of all the believers, nor could he establish his authority over the whole domain of Islam. Masʿūdī maintains that ʿAlī was actually given general and formal allegiance four days after the murder of ʿUthmān, and was therefore the supreme ruler of Islām. (54)

If there is any doubt that statesmanship needs something else besides sincerity of heart and religious devotion, the career of ʿAlī would soon dispel any uncertainty. It was the misfortune of that ruler that he witnessed the Muslims divided into hostile groups resorting to arms to settle their differences. To a great extent his hesitance and lack of compromise were to blame. In the battle of the Camel (36 / 656) the number of fallen was estimated between seven thousand and thirteen thousand. (55) Here we see for the first time Muslims bearing arms against one another on a huge scale. There is no need to stress that civil war was in defiance of the teachings of Islām. The failure of ʿAlī meant the vigorous restoration of the ground temporarily lost by the Umayyad party. Had he possessed the experience and skill to keep them under constant check, it is highly probable that hereditary monarchy might not have been established in Islām.

Like all men the Four Caliphs had their own good and other qualities. Their attributes of strength and weakness alike left an indelible mark on the history of their people and perhaps the world. Besides using their own judgement, they attempted to follow the path of their master and emulate his ways. They were arbiters in the affairs of State primarily on the strength of their profound knowledge of Islām. Their excellence was the foundation of their respect and authority among their subjects; and their sincerity of heart and purpose was not doubted. Even 'Uthmān who unjustly favoured his relatives at the cost of others is reputed to have died with the Qur'ān in his hands and its words on his lips, and was not greatly perturbed at seeing the angry and uncontrollable mob breaking through his house. (56)

"Rarely has religion united with politics" says Zaidan, "and their unity under the Orthodox Caliphs was but an accident of history." (57) In any case an experiment carried out successfully for over thirty years cannot be too much of an accident, and had the balance been retained, the Aristocracy of Islām might have lived longer. Instead, the pendulum of power swung to an extreme in the form of Arab Nationalism under the Umayyads, and recoiled to the other extreme in the shape of priestly monarchy under the 'Abbāsids.

CH. V.

NOTES .

- 1.. Cf. al-Makhzūmī, op. cit. p. 283 f., and E. de Zambaur: Manuel de Généalogie et de Chronologie, Hanover, 1927, p.19. Whereas during the life-time of the Prophet there was no discrimination between Meccans and Medinese, as the appointment of Ma^lād^h b. Jabal al-Anṣārī to the imamate of Mecca testified, with the inauguration of the Caliphate, the Meccans and the Muhājirs in particular were favoured with the most important offices in the State.
2. Athir, 2:124.
3. Ibid, 125.
4. Tab. I,iv: 1832.
5. Al-Shahrastānī fully understood the seriousness of that situation; cf. milal p. 12.
6. Haikal; AB :60.
7. KHald. H. 1:177.
8. Tab. I,iv:1822; milal, 12; Bukh. 86:31 (iv:305)
9. The word wazīr is not easy to translate accurately; it describes different functions at different times. In the Qur'ān it describes a helper or supporter. During the early Caliphate, the functions of a wazīr, were those of an adviser, and in its later development the office denoted a minister of State. See additional note ch. viii below.

10. Ya'qubi, ii:145.
11. Qur. xvi: 125.
12. Taha Husain, op.cit. 122.
13. Arnold's Caliphate, p. 11.
14. Cf. Wellhausen , op.cit. 33.
15. Cf. ERE, ix:636, art Parousia.
16. ERE, xii:287 f.
17. Arnold's Caliphate, p.17.
18. Ibid. 46.
19. Wellhausen, op.cit. 50.
20. Ibid. 34.
21. Milal:87; Van Vloten, thinks that "la secte des Kharijites avait declare indidelès les trois Khalifes Ali, Othman et Moawia avec tous leur adherents." Cf. La Domination Arabe, Amsterdam, 1894, p.31
22. LHA :209 f.
23. Milal: 85.
24. Khald. H. 1:158.
25. Ibid, i:177.
26. Fakhri. 105; Fida:210.
27. Bukh, 24:41 (1:369)
28. Cambridge Medieval History, ii:335.
29. Tab. I,iv:1822; Athir, 2:126; Haikal AB. 67 &327.
The Quotation in brackets is from Muir. C:47.
30. De Santillana, op.cit p. 295
31. IC. 1943, p . 44.

32. IC. 1943, p. 385.
33. Cf. Arnold's Caliphate :17.
34. Tirmidhī , ii:125; Abū Dāūd al-Tayālīsī: Traditions, Hyderabad, 1321 /1903, ii:202 &282; Ibn Mājah, ii:241.
35. Fakhri: 101.
36. Zaidān, op.cit. iv:53.
37. Qur. v:3.
38. Cf. Collingwood, op.cit. 192.
39. Haikal, AB :342.
40. LHA: 188.
41. Athīr, 2:163.
42. ʿAbbās al-ʿAqqād: ʿAbqariyyah ʿUmar (The Genius of 'Umar), Cairo, 1943, p. 17 f.
43. Athīr , 2:164.
44. Fakhri: 114
45. ʿAqqād, op.cit. 162.
46. Bar Hebraeus: The Chronography , translated into English by E.A.W Budge, London, 1932, p. 96.
47. MUIR, C. 190.
48. Ibid. "
49. EI, iii:983.
50. I. Goldziher: Le Dogme et la Loi de l'Islame, Translated into French by F. Arin, Paris, 1920, p. 28.
51. Cf. note 42 above.
52. Wellhausen, op.cit. 41.
53. Cf. Henri Massé: Islam, translated into English by

Halide Edib, New York, 1938, p. 49.

54. Mas. M. ii:2.

55. Ibid. p.3; Fakhrī:123: Muir. C. 250 .

56. Mas. M. i:307, Fakhrī: 137.

57. Zaidān, op.cit iv:53.

CH. VI.

THE POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND THEIR
FUNCTIONS UNDER THE ARISTOCRACY.

The Khilāfah, the Baitah, and the Shūrā were words mentioned in the Qur'ān in different contexts. When, later, political institutions bearing these names were established, it could at least be argued that they owed their origin to the Book. Although such words occurred in the Qur'ān they were not intended as an enunciation of a method of government, nor as an exposition of State administration. For example, the verb khalafa, and other variations from the same root, meaning "to follow", or "to succeed", are mentioned in the Qur'ān no less than thirty six times. The word khalīfah, is used twice, but in neither case does it convey any direct or indirect suggestion that a political organ for the object of succession and government of the State should be created under that label. In fact the august title Khalīfah or caliph which was later mentioned with reverent awe was at the beginning a very simple and most unassuming one; for it simply meant "the one who followed" (the Prophet). We can, therefore, look upon this and similar establishments as improvisations by the Muslims themselves owing their origin to ancient customary practices, and their development to time and circumstances. Although the caliphs admitted that they were following strictly in the Prophet's track, their own thoughts and interpretations contributed greatly to the consolidation of that track and giving it a definite shape. In spite of their simplicity of manner and life, their in-

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was always felt, and their wishes were invariably carried out by order, because they were ultimately responsible for directing the destiny of their people. There is reason for supposing that Islām "in its physical as well as its spiritual aspects,... is essentially the religion of democracy." (1) That assumption is truer in the spiritual than in the political sphere. Both from a practical and a technical point of view it is difficult to find traces of a political democracy in Islām. The austerity and strict discipline of the first four caliphs created the impression that they were democrats. Modern Muslim writers often think of modesty in manners and humility in appearance and behaviour as the most fitting attributes of a true democrat; and whoever portrays these qualities in sufficient measure is by that fact looked upon as a democrat.

The truth, however, seems to be different. The test of democracy is in the effective control of the people over their personal and public affairs. Irrespective of whether that is a good or a bad thing in itself, such a system of government was not applied in the Muslim State. Contrary to popular belief, the majority of the believers under the Orthodox Caliphs had little contact with, and no constitutional control over, their rulers. They could, and occasionally did criticise their leaders, but they could not intervene individually or collectively in the management

of the State. Nevertheless, whenever major enterprises were contemplated, the caliphs availed themselves of the advice of their close associates and made certain of public support for the proposed schemes. But such consultations were purely voluntary. No constitutional machinery representing the people was in operation. There is an idea that there was an official organ called Majlis-i-Shura to which the caliph "had to refer every important affair." (2) Apart from the council appointed to elect a caliph after Umar, I have been unable to find reference to the constitutional functions of a permanent body under that name, or to any other for similar purposes.

The advisers to the caliph had no power of direction over him, and when they differed in opinion his views always prevailed. And although the successors of the Prophet were not given to display or splendour, their dignity was unimpaired. Wāqidī suggests that access between the caliphs and their subordinates followed a certain order. He cites a very interesting illustration of this procedure under Umar. No junior officer could overstep his immediate superior and report directly to the caliph. In correspondence from foreign countries the field commanders reported to their chief army commander who in turn conveyed what news he had to Umar. (3) Similarly when the caliph wanted to contact a subordinate officer, he did so through his commander,

and that was surprisingly good discipline.

Some form of election was observed in the choice of the caliph. It would be interesting to assess the extent and relevance of that practice which together with the shūrā constituted the main legacy of the Muslim Aristocracy.

The only case in which the people had a chance to express their opinion freely was that of Abū Bakr. It is immaterial how they were influenced in their judgment. What mattered was that the caliph was finally elected on the strength of an overwhelming majority. Dr. Haikal says: "Abū Bakr did not derive the authority of government from God, but from those who elected him," (4) "and the source of his adherence to the straight path was his conviction that he was to give account before God, as well as before His servants." (5)

To avoid a repetition of the electoral battle, Abū Bakr took matters into his own hands, and nominated ʿUmar as successor, and secured the agreement of the people in Medina for that appointment. Abū Bakr could not have undertaken such a step had he not had some doubts about the certainty of ʿUmar's uncontested nomination. Possibly Abū Bakr was afraid that the continued supremacy of Mecca would be rechallenged.

After ʿUmar, there was a further development. It is generally agreed that before his death ʿUmar had appointed a

board of elders to choose the new caliph. Arnold points out that, "Prince Caetani, has suggested that this story of 'Umar having nominated a body of electors was an invention of later times." (6) However this may have been, this was a different method from that of Abū Bakr, and it implied not only that the electorate had been extended to include Muslims from outside Arabia, but that right previously enjoyed by the electors had been denied. Now the six wisest had to decide between them who was to assume supreme leadership. It is worthy of note that all six were distinguished and excellent Muslims. This is yet another indication of the plausibility of the view expressed above that government and supreme leadership were invested in the aristocrats of Islām. Mainly because of their superiority and fine personal virtues those men assumed the guardianship on behalf of their less able brethren in the faith.

Although 'Alī ruled for about five years, it could not be maintained that he was generally elected or given allegiance by all Muslims. Nevertheless, it was this refusal to grant their support that drew attention to the newly conquered provinces; for according to principles of belief, there must be equality between all believers. Syria as a political unit could not be said to be less important than Medina or Mecca. Therefore the baitah must come from every department in the State; hence the view that the caliphate

was always an elective office. (7) Even when Muṭāwiyah turned the caliphate into a hereditary monarchy, he made certain of securing formal allegiance from all Muslims for his heir apparent. Thereafter the bai'ah became only a symbolic traditional ceremony, but was adhered to just the same. From this short survey it is difficult to reach a conclusion that elections were a reality in the life of the Muslim community.

The Shūrā played a more important part in public life under the Orthodox Caliphs. The number and influence of the companions of Muḥammad was not negligible, and therefore the caliph had to take into consideration all their views. But consultation with that distinguished group usually took place after independent deliberation and serious study of the projected plans by the caliph himself. When his thoughts on a subject reached a definite stage, he summoned his advisers and declared to them his intentions, listened to their arguments, and explained the intricate points in the proposed scheme. When agreement had thus been reached, the caliph officially ordered the enforcement of the decisions. All this was done with the minimum of formality, and in good faith. The caliph invariably took notice of what was said, and attempted to overcome all objections. It is worthy of note that the consultants were neither delegates nor representatives of the people; in other words, they had no official, legal,

or constitutional standing. The eminence and respect of those men were the sole qualifications in the circle of the ruler who, by taking them into his confidence, made certain of avoiding any possible split on important issues.

Sometimes consultations were conducted by a person other than the caliph, and in that case these were carried out by arbiters of great dignity and wisdom. The arbiter took account of all shades of opinion, and pronounced judgment on that basis. We quote here an example of each method.

1. Abū Bakr decided upon the invasion of Syria. For a time he did not reveal his intentions to anyone. (8) He then called a meeting to which the close companions of the Prophet, as well as some distinguished Muhājirs and Ansār were invited. He opened the proceedings with a short prayer, and then said: "I intend to spur the Muslims to strive against the Byzantines (al-Rūm) in Syria, so that Allah may consolidate Islām and make His word supreme. The Muslims will reap the greatest benefit, because whoever of them perishes will be a martyr, and whoever lives will be a defender of the faith... These are my views and I should like to hear yours." ʿUmar said, "I wanted to forestall you in this suggestion, and I think you are right." ʿAbd al-Rahmān b. ʿAuf drew attention to the strength of the enemy and suggested flying raids only for the purpose of booty. But ʿUthmān supported the original plan and commented that Abū

Bakr knew best what was good for promoting Muslim interests. The rest agreed and informed the caliph that they would follow him and never suspect his motives. Abū Bakr then got up and said: "Oh people I order you to prepare for the invasion of Syria," and the meeting was thus closed.(9)

2. Bukhārī states that when the six electors appointed by ʿUmar met for consultations ʿAbd al-Rahmān b. ʿAuf told them that he had no desire to compete with them, and if they liked he would choose one of them for the caliphate. They agreed and he set to work, and all the people turned their attention to him and told him their views as to who should be caliph. On the eve of announcing his judgment, he still continued to weigh opposing currents of opinion. He sent for al-Zubair and Saʿd, and when they went away he summoned ʿAlī with whom he deliberated most of the night, and ʿAli went away full of hopes. Then finally ʿUthmān was called and remained with ʿAbd al-Rahmān till the morning prayers separated them. When the prayers were over the people congregated round the pulpit. They included the Muhājirs, the Anṣār, and the military leaders. The arbiter addressed the meeting, and informed ʿAlī that the Muslims would not prefer anyone to ʿUthmān. ʿAlī then accepted the decision and declared his allegiance to the new caliph in the traditional manner. The Muhājirs, the Anṣār, the army commanders, and finally the mass of the people in that particular order of

precedence acknowledged the new caliph. (10)

It may be gathered from this illustration that although the people expressed their opinions freely the decision finally devolved on one man only: the appointed arbiter. The main guide of ʿAbd al-Raḥmān was of course the personal fitness of the candidate, and it is curious how little family relationship with the Prophet counted in deciding the issue. Further it is interesting to observe that while Medina formed a society of equals, those equals were stratified in groups; the College of Electors, the Muhājirs, the Anṣār, the army commanders, and the mass of the people, and precedence over one another was decided accordingly.

When the State expanded through conquest the importance of the shūra increased, and governors as well as army commanders had their counsellors, by appointment of the caliph. Wāqidī quotes a letter from ʿUmar to Abū ʿUbaidah, the commander-in-Chief in Syria, in which the caliph says: "...and when you read this letter of mine, give orders to ʿAmr b. al-ʿĀṣ to proceed with his troops to Egypt, and sent with him ʿĀmir b. Rabīʿah al-ʿAmrī, and other elders from the companions of the Prophet to support him with their advice." (11)

The most remarkable physical achievement of the early caliphate, and perhaps of all Islām, was the rapidity and extent of its territorial conquests. It is necessary to establish the underlying causes for that movement which went

on unchecked for nearly a century, and resulted in the conquest of lands larger in size than Arabia, and the adherence to the muslim faith of men more numerous than the original conquerors. "The traditional view that the Arabs...were fired by religious zeal to march forth on a mission of proselytizing the world is no longer acceptable." says Dr. Bert-ram Thomas. (12) Other views have been advanced, and these may be summarised under the four following headings:-

- 1- The continuation of the Muhammadan policy.
- 2- The missionary urge.
- 3- The economic necessity stimulated by the weakness of others.
- 4- The political expedient dictated by force of circumstances.

Maulvi M. ʿAlī offers another theory in which he refers to expansion not as fath or ḥarb, that is, conquest or war, but simply as jihād in the strict sense of being a struggle against unprovoked aggression. Since this modern view on jihād is held by more than one Muslim authority, and since it has a bearing on the political development of Islām, an attempt will be made at the end of this chapter to examine that view critically. In the meantime we shall expound the four traditional views stated above.

1. Abū Bakr decided to fulfil the uncompleted plans of the Prophet. He therefore despatched an expedition under the leadership of Usāmah b. Zaid, ^{to} the borders of Syria. The Prophet had intended to send such an expedition before his

death. Abū Bakr dismissed all objections against sending the army away at that critical moment and leaving Medina vulnerable to the threatened attack of the seditionists of the neighbouring tribes. His motive was simply that "not a word of the master's lips should fall to the ground." (13) This, then, is the gist of this view. Having asserted on his inauguration that he was a mere follower of Muḥammad's policy, and not an innovator himself, Abū Bakr was now implementing his promise by continuing his master's work. As Buhl suggests, "In no way did Abu Bekr represent new ideas or principles, but clung to Muḥammad's way of thinking and held fast to everything his friend had ordered or hinted at." (14) Expansion in this case was simply perseverance in the policy originally conceived by Muḥammad. Whether the Prophet had intended to conquer foreign lands by force of arms was not certain, but as we have already shown, ample evidence could be found in the Qur'ān that fighting in the way of Islām was not only permissible but highly commendable. Besides, there are suggestions of prophecies reputed to have been made by the Prophet that Syria would be conquered by the Muslims. (15) Nevertheless, Abū Bakr had his own contribution in the matter; for while the prophet had intended the attack on Syria's borders as an intimidatory and disciplinary raid, Abū Bakr entered the country itself, and in doing so he declared that he would prepare the Muslim warriors to fight in east and

west, until the people would either say that God was one, or pay the jizyah in submission. (16)

2. The missionary urge was conquest for Islamising the world. That policy was primarily arrived at by way of deduction from the Qur'ān, and secondly... from the views thought to have been expressed by the Prophet to his companions or declared publicly to all Muslims. The believers also found through their reasoning that it was their duty to wage war for the propagation of Islām. It was the independent judgment of the caliphs themselves that guided them to that conclusion. They had reason to think that the Prophet had ordered the conquest of the Byzantine and Persian Empires, and the subjection of their people^t to the Arabs.

From the manner of life of the Orthodox Caliphs, it appears that they were motivated by an idea higher than sheer annexation of other lands. They were convinced that it was their duty to carry the message of Islām to other people, and thus lead them to a better way of life. As Khadduri says: "after the death of the Prophet, the caliphs, without consulting the Muslim community, took the responsibility of declaring the Jihad. The duty was a divine one, imposed by Allah through His Apostle, and was delegated after his death to his successors." (17) Their war was, therefore, an ideological one. It should be borne in mind that we are dealing here with the men who were in charge of planning, and dis-
/charging

the higher policy of the State. Those leaders had intended well, and desired to share the blessings of their religion with others, and make it possible for anyone to accept it without fear. They thus forced their way into other countries and proclaimed themselves masters, and invited the citizens to confess Islām. Paradoxical as this may seem, there was no compulsion in religion even then. Force was applied only to break resistance, but holding Islām was left optional. In removing the territorial barriers, the Muslims were aiming at making the universality of their religion a reality. That method strikes us nowadays as curious and contradictory, but it was not so to its upholders. They argued that if Islām were a universal religion, then with the delivery of its message everyone on earth became bound by its rules and laws, and ignorance of these could no longer be accepted as a valid excuse. After all, the principle "nul n'essensé ignore la loi," is legally a universal maxim and hold^s good in all civilised countries up till now. (18) It is needless to suggest that the notion of universality also implied that every country in the world, and every individual were supposed to have received a call to Islām. Acceptance or rejection were different matters. Even those who never heard of Muḥammad, his creed, or his language, were from the point of view of the shari'ah, still under the same legal obligation. That position was taken

for granted by Muslim legist-theologians. The only difference was whether or not another invitation should be sent to the leaders of foreign countries before the beginning of hostilities. In his ikhtilāf al-fuqahā' or "Differences of the Learned", Ṭabarī maintains that war should be prosecuted on the assumption that the universal message had been delivered by Muḥammad. At the same time Ṭabarī points out that it would be an act of charity or grace if an invitation to accept Islām or pay the jizyah were re-issued. (19) Al-Māwardī (450/1058) says that residents in dar-al-ḥarb, or world of hostility (to Islām), may be divided into two sections: those who had been told of Islām and rejected it by refuting its thesis and continuing to hold their own religious beliefs; and those who had no knowledge of Islām. It is prohibited for Muslims to attack members of the latter group. Polytheists who have no idea of Islām must be approached peacefully to find out whether they would respond favourably or not. (20) Dr. Khaduri says that, "the custom was developed that fighting should be preceded by an 'invitation to Islam,' and only failure to accept the new faith, or pay the tribute, would precipitate fighting with the enemy. Muslim publicists were unanimous on this rule, but there was difference of opinion as to the necessity of 're-inviting' the same people in a second fighting." (21)

The bursts of anger of 'Umar at seeing his subjects, whom

he considered as soldier priests, indulging in luxuries as a result of war, revealed his motives. On being informed by a courier from Syria that the Arabs were enjoying the fruits of victory, he immediately sent a letter to their commander reminding him of the necessity of austerity and hardihood, and ordered him to follow the Qur'ānic injunction: "those who, should We establish them in the land, will keep up prayer and pay the poor-rate and enjoin good and forbid evil." (22)

3. The barrenness and poverty of Arabia were among the causes driving the Arabs from their land to seek a better life in other places where nature was more bounteous. It has been observed that such mass migrations or Völkerwanderung had previously taken place in history, and that Semitic migrations were phenomena of that human tendency. The theory of economic necessity as the basis of Arab expansion is held by many European scholars. "Not fanaticism but economic necessity drove the Bedouin hordes... beyond the confines of their arid abode to the fair lands of the North," says Prof. Hitti. He also suggests that passion to go to heaven in the next life may have been operative, "but the desire for the comforts and luxuries of the civilized regions of the Fertile Crescent was just as strong in the case of many." (23) Dr. Thomas maintains that: "whatever the higher motives of the Caliphs of Medina and the enlightened Moslems

of the settlements, there can be little doubt that the desert man himself was principally inspired by the hope of plunder. (24) And Arnold points out that, "this expansion of the Arab race is more rightly envisaged as the migration of vigorous and energetic people driven by hunger and want to leave their inhospitable deserts and overrun the richer lands of their more fortunate neighbours." (25) Besides the driving forces of hunger and poverty, Arnold holds that the movement was accelerated by the weakness of the invaded countries, and therefore, "it was not in the annals of the attacking armies that one should look for the reasons which led to the rapid spread of Islām, but rather to the conditions prevailing among the conquered people." (26)

4. Haikal Pasha suggests that the original intention of the Medina Caliphs was the unification of the Arabian Peninsula under one political leadership by the formation of a federation of the free independent tribes. The result Dr. Haikal maintains "could have been a United States of Arabia, not unlike present day America, or the Federation of the Swiss Provinces." (27) But extensive conquest abroad was neither contemplated nor intended. The unity of the Arab race was the main motive of action, and when that was accomplished it was hoped that hostilities would cease. "But circumstances often prove stronger than the will of man, and it was the momentum of events that was responsible

for forcing the Muslims to proceed with conquests." (28)

This theory indicates with reason, that once the aggressive spirit of the Arabs was aroused, it could not be checked until its force had fully spent itself. Conquest whetted the appetite of the Arabs, and so they attempted to acquire more territory. The flood of active expansion inundated more lands than was originally anticipated. And even when the caliph was hesitant, the commanders in the field occasionally took matters into their own hands and advanced on their own responsibility. The conquest of Egypt was a case in point. ṬAmr b. al-ṬAs actually invaded the country before official orders to do so had been issued by ṬUmar. This form of expansion may be considered Arabian rather than Muslim, in other words, it was more political than religious.

Each of the theories of expansion explained above presents part of the truth, and a combination of all would give the truest picture of the whole position. The Arabs themselves admitted that they were poor and looking for more comfortable conditions. They tried to exploit every weakness in the enemy's front. For example, when the young and inexperienced Yezdejird ascended the Persian throne at the age of twenty one, the Arabs could not hide their delight because they knew that his defeat would be easily accomplished. Al-Fakhrī commenting on that situation says: "then the greed

of the Arabs was intensified." (29) Yet it was those same covetous and poor men who said to Yezdejird, "embrace the Faith and thou shalt be even as we; or, if thou wilt, pay tribute and come under our protection." When in anger he told them they were hungry adventurers from a naked land, they did not deny his assertions. (30)

The view may be tentatively added that after the shock to the Muslim solidarity at the meeting of Banū Sa'idah, the caliph Abū Bakr thought it would be good policy to regain the lost unity and cement its basis by directing the energies of the believers into an outward channel. And what better outlet is there than war for projecting frustrations and repressed emotions? For war can often be the best temporary antidote to local or national troubles, because it shifts the centre of conflict from home and places it at the door-step of an external real or imaginary enemy. And thus, as Hitti suggests, the expansion provided "an outlet for the warring spirit of tribes now forbidden to engage in fratricidal combats..." (31) Becker supports the view by maintaining that, "it would have been an enormous task for the government in Medina to compel all these restless elements accustomed to marauding excursions, to live side by side in neighbourly peace under the sanctuary of Islam in unfertile Arabia." (32) In order to keep their troops actively employed the caliphs were compelled to embark on a scheme of

territorial aggrandisement. Two purposes were thus served: the propagation of Islām with the extension of its dominion, and the creation of an outlet for the flood of energy of the zealous Arabs. Finally, it must be emphasised that, had it not been for Muḥammad, and Islām, the Arabs might well have been confined to their desert for generations to come, and their potentialities might have remained dormant even up till now. They were just as poor materially before the advent of Islām as they were after it; and yet, when Muḥammad awakened them spiritually, they responded, shook off their inertia, became full of life. The change must, therefore, be primarily attributed to the influence of Muḥammad on his men; all other factors were ancillary and should be treated only as such.

Some form of jihad could always be offered as a reason for Muslim expansion. It is generally agreed that the word jihad was not restricted to war, but had different uses. The moral and spiritual jihads were not less important than the physical. The simplest examination of the Qur'ān and Tradition could confirm that conclusion. In the books of sharīṭah, however, jihad was mainly applied to armed struggle; it was very nearly a synonym for qitāl or fighting. All Muslim legists accepted a priori the idea that war was a valid instrument in the hands of the head of the State, and we are not aware of any striking exceptions to this rule. The

arguments and technical differences of the lawyers were concerned with the manner of beginning and ending the jihad, but not with questioning its validity. On the strength of that view, the state founded its international relations, and shaped its home policy. The faqīhs interpreted the Qur'ān and Tradition, and thus helped in the formation of an enlightened public opinion. Previous to that, the state, represented in the person of the caliphs, reached a similar conclusion. The Orthodox Caliphs had a great reputation for being authorities on law.

In recent years, however, some Muslim thinkers have declared that the classical legists were misguided in their interpretation. The modern school of thought advances the theory that Islām did not expand by force, and jihad was not at any time the proclamation of aggressive war for the propagation of religion. Maulvi Muḥammad Ṭalī, was perhaps the greatest exponent of that idea. Since, however, some of his arguments were similar to those mentioned above, we shall summarise his theory briefly. In chapter five of his Religion of Islam, M. Ṭalī deals exclusively with jihad.

1. He points out that jihad and war are not synonyms, (p.545) and that "war undertaken for the propagation of Islam... is unknown to the Arabic language and the teachings of the Holy Qur'ān." (p.546)
2. Jihad is enjoined (a) to attain nearness to God, and

(b) to win over the unbelievers not with the sword but with the Qur'ān. (p.548)

3. The injunctions of Qur'ān ix:73: lxvi:9 urging perseverance in the jihād against the unbelievers and hypocrites do not mean war against them, for that was "unthinkable and none was ever undertaken." (p.548)

4. "The sword was taken up to annihilate the Muslim community or to compel it to return to unbelief. That was the challenge thrown at them, and the Prophet had to meet it." p.553

5. The Qur'ānic verses ix:5, ii:191, allowing the slaying or killing of the idolaters wherever they may be found, refer only to the idolaters of Arabia who had made agreements with Muslims, but did not respect their undertakings. (p.556) In spite of the idolaters' unprovoked attack on Muslims, peace was concluded as soon as the idolaters asked for it, even though their good intentions were doubted.

6. "Nay! in the life of the Holy Prophet there is not a single instance in which he led an aggressive attack." (p.560)

7. "According to Muir, even the conquest of the whole of Persia was a measure of self-defence on the part of the Muslims, not of aggression." (p.562) The reference is to Muir's Caliphate p. 120 ff.

8. The jizyah was a form of tax that had nothing to do with religion, but was levied for the maintenance of the central government of Medina. "It was an act of great magnanimity

on the part of the Holy Prophet to confer complete autonomy on a people after conquering them, and a paltry sum of tribute (jizya) in such conditions was not a hardship but a boon." (p.577) The discrimination made by the introduction of the jizyah was not in favour of the Muslims but in that of the non-Muslims, for the Muslims had to pay a tax heavier than that which the non-Muslims were required to pay. (p.578)

9. Seeing that the Roman Empire and Persia were bent upon the subjection of Arabia, and the extirpation of Islām, the Arabs were forced to fight in self-defence. (p.590)

10. Even the war of apostasy during the reign of Abū Bakr was waged not for religious, but for political reasons; its object being the consolidation of the Islamic government. The murtaddūn or apostates would receive their grievous chastisement in the next life. "The general impression that Islam condemns an apostate to death does not find the least support from the Holy Qur'ān,... and so far as the Holy Qur'ān is concerned, there is not only no mention of a death sentence for apostates but such a sentence is negated by the verses speaking of apostasy, as well as by that magna charta or religious freedom." (p.592 f.) The allusion is to Qur.ii:250

11. "Turning to Fiqh, we find that the jurists first lay down a principle quite opposed to the Holy Qur'ān, namely that the life of a man may be taken on account of his apostasy." (p.598)

Muhammad ʿAlī's theory of jihād implies a condemnation of all wars undertaken by Muslims after the death of Muhammad, and occasionally during his life-time. His endeavour is sincere, and his argument is ingenious, but seemingly quite contrary to the unanimous judgement of the classical jurists, whose ideas on that subject he ridicules as misconceptions. We think, therefore, that his theory is extreme and untenable. It is open to doubt that all jurists were misguided in their views on such a vital issue, were unable to see the verses in their true perspective, and quoted them out of their proper context. Even leaving aside the verdict of the legislators, the historians and chroniclers convey a different impression from that of Muhammad ʿAlī. Let it be borne in mind that we are not in the least suggesting the infallibility of any human authority however great it may be, but we are just pointing out that since the principal imāms lived in an expanding Muslim State, and derived their theories from the two main sources of law in the light of their interpretations and teachings, it follows that such concurrence of opinion could not altogether have been baseless.

M. ʿAlī was quite aware of the volume of Qur'anic and traditional evidence of a convincing nature on the coercion of armed jihād, and he made a serious attempt to give an exposition to suit his theory. Even the reference he made to Muir confirms this conclusion. Reading Muir (Caliphate

p.120 f.) we cannot find justification for assuming that the Arabs had conquered Persia simply for self-defence; at least Muir does not hold that opinion. Perhaps M. ʿAlī was thinking of the modern principle of first aggression. Nevertheless, it was the Arabs who entered by force into foreign territory, and should thus be established as the attacking and not the defending side. Even assuming that war had been initiated by the Persians, it could have stopped at the national boundaries of Arabia. But to defend one's own country by subduing another and confiscating its independence has been a favourite excuse for aggressive war all through history.

That the jihad besides its other meanings, had a special warlike significance is a conclusion that most people with knowledge of Muslim law are compelled to reach. Every collection of hadīths devotes at least one chapter to military jihad; and all books on fiqh, sharīʿah, and general Muslim history hardly ever fail to emphasise^s the necessity and place of jihad in the life of Islām.

Abū Bakr declared that the apostates were to be fought not only for their abandonment of the faith after holding it, but also for the least deviation from the conditions they had accepted when the Prophet was alive. (32) That, of course, might have been the private opinion of the first Caliph; but the rest of the Muslims including ʿUmar and other eminent companions agreed with him and helped him.

To fight is to imperil the lives of members of both parties; if, therefore, a caliph finds it reasonable and necessary to engage in war with those who neglect the payment of taxes, which is not a very serious offence after all, does it not reasonably follow that the total rejection of the faith would provide a stronger reason for hostilities? Not only should that be the case from the logical point of view, but historians also mention incidents confirming this inference. Abū 'l-Fidā' states that Khālīd b al-walīd, who subdued the secessionists, killed Mālīk b. Nuwairah, the Chief of the Banū Yarbū' for his apostasy. (33)

If we accept the theory of M. 'Alī, then the practical implication would be that, from its very early stages the Muslim State had given preponderance to political over religious issues. For if Allah had decreed that no man should be killed or molested for his religious beliefs, and history testified that thousands had been killed in the course of wars sanctioned by the Orthodox Caliphs, then the dead must have been the victims of non-religious wars. This is a position from which we dissent. Although the Big Four had political views of their own, these were directly motivated by, and invariably subjected to considerations of a religious character.

Muḥammad 'Alī could have maintained with reason that religious freedom was not annulled or abrogated at any time,

but war for political reasons was resorted to in order that the power of the state might be kept intact, and through the liberty of the State men could practise unfettered the religion of their choice.

We have previously quoted instances from the Qur'ān, the hadīth, and Muslim history to show that on certain occasions Islām and the sword were offered as alternatives. We have no reason to change our opinion as a result of the argument advanced by Mawlānā Muḥammad 'Alī.

CH . VI .

N O T E S .

1. M. 'Alī: Religion of Islām, p. 737.
2. " " : The Qur'ān, comment 2230, p. 938.
3. al-Wāqidi, op.cit. . 3.
4. Haikal, AB:333. *تم يكن أبو بكر يستمد سلطه الحكم من القرآن من الذين يابره*
5. Ibid. 342.
6. Arnold's Caliphate, p.31.
7. Ibid. p.22.
8. In a story which was probably apochryphal Abū Bakr admitted that for some time he had been keeping his attention to that subject . Cf. 'Asākir, i:125.
9. Ibid. i:126.
10. Bukh. 93:43 (iv:403)
11. Wāqidi, op.cit. p.6 .
12. B. Thomas: The Arabs, London, 1937, p. 77.
13. Fida:208, 'Asākir, i:117; Muir. C:9; Arnold's Caliphate, p. 45.
14. EI, i:80 f.
15. Cf. 'Asākir, i:40 f., i:85 f. Those prophecies could be considered as fabrications of later times to justify the Muslim policy in Syria.
16. 'Asākir, i:126.
17. Khaddūrī, op.cit. 46.
18. Code Civil Francaise, art 3.
19. Tabarī: Ikhtilāf al-fuqahā' . ed. J. Schacht,

Leyden, 1933, p. 1-3.

20. Al-Mawardi: al-ahkām al-sultāniyyah (Constitutiones Politicae) Ed. M. Enger, Bonn, 1853, p.57 f.
21. Khadduri, op.cit. 47.
22. Qur. xxii:41; cf. Wāqidī, op.cit. 6.
23. Hitti, HA: 144.
24. Thomas, op.cit. 82.
25. Arnold's Preaching...p. 46.
26. Ibid. 47.
27. Haikal, 'U. ii:207.
28. Ibid. 200 .
29. Fakhri:108
30. Cf. Muir. C:101.
31. Hitti: HA: 145.
32. Cambridge Medieval History, ii:337.
33. Milal: 13, Haikal, AB :104; cf. Muir's C. 15.f.
34. Fida:216.

وَقَوَى حَيْثُ نَزَّ طَمَعُ الْعَرَبِ

PART FOUR

HEREDITARY RULE IN ISLAM .

CH. VII

THE UMAYYAD MONARCHY .

The Umayyads, so called after their progenitor Umayyah b. 'Abd Shams, were Arabs from the tribe of Quraish. Their rule of caliphs of Islām was established when Mu'tāwiyah b. Abū Sufyān was proclaimed in the year 40 / 661 as a legal successor of the Prophet. Damascus was the seat of government, and during their reign lasting for eighty nine years, fourteen caliphs assumed office.

The brilliant and energetic Mu'tāwiyah ruled for nearly twenty years. During that period (661-680 A.D.) he succeeded in introducing a measure of stability and peace hitherto unknown, and perhaps unsurpassed in the annals of the Arabs. Judged by any standard, he was a ruler and a statesman of the first order. The shrewd management of men and affairs was an art in which he excelled. His religious beliefs or sentiments did not interfere with his discharge of duties as a ruler who judged men solely on their merits.

Before his death Mu'tāwiyah secured an oath of fidelity to his son and successor Yazīd, and it was thus considered that by his action Mu'tāwiyah turned the caliphate, which was essentially an elective office, into a mulk or hereditary monarchy.

The Umayyads as a whole maintained the sound principles of government conceived and applied successfully by Mu'tāwiyah. Politics qua politics was the maxim they endeavoured to realise. Under their management the territorial expansion of

Islām reached its greatest limits within the effective control of a single central authority. In the days of Hishām b. ‘Abd al-Malik (724-743 A.D.) who was the tenth Umayyad Caliph, the Muslim Empire extended from the Oxus to the Pyrenees, and from the Caspian to the Nile. The Caliph exercised real power over the whole dominion, and fairly trustworthy governors ruled in his name.

Although the services of able non-Arab Muslims as well as Christians and Jews were carefully mobilised, the main control was jealousy and inexorably retained in the hands of the Arabs. It may even be stated that Arabism rather than Islām was the dominant feature of the Umayyad rule.

In the course of conquests people were free to choose between Islām and the payment of the jizyah, and it is not unlikely that some caliphs had secretly hoped that the latter course would be preferred so that the State Treasury would benefit. ‘Umar b. ‘Abd al-‘Azīz, the eighth caliph of that house was perhaps the only exception to this rule. His caliphate (717-720 A.D.) was looked upon by pious Muslims as a revival of the early traditions of the Orthodox Caliphs. He was a morally good man, and was reverently called the second ‘Umar, after the famous caliph ‘Umar b. al-Khattāb.

The Umayyads were generally fortunate in the choice of their provincial governors and lieutenants. Their caliphate

was distinguished by the number of remarkable and efficient administrators who were devoted servants of that dynasty. But it is thought that some of those governors were at times unnecessarily cruel in the execution of their duties; besides, their collection of taxes was not free from oppression and corruption. However, their main loyalty was to their masters, and when the interests of the State collided with those of religion or even the Arabs, strict adherence to the orders of the ruling caliph was observed. Some serious political murders were thus committed, and Mecca and Medina were not spared bombardment in the course of disciplinary expeditions.

The ruthlessness shown in suppressing opposition to the government frightened into apparent submission all the unruly elements in the State. But political and religious dissensions were going on surreptitiously, and it was only a matter of time and opportunity that delayed open revolts against the Umayyads. Time was needed for the malcontents to gain support and find suitable ground for rising. The weakness and negligence shown by some Umayyad caliphs, especially the four last ones, presented their enemies with the opportunity long hoped for. Marwān II, (744-750) who witnessed the final collapse of the dynasty was called al-Himār, or the ass. He was so called because of his stubbornness and perseverance in the face of difficulties.

Despite his patience in war, his cunning and ability, Marwān could not stem the tide of disaster for which he was not directly responsible. His three predecessors whose combined terms in office did not exceed two years - February, 743-December, 744 - were incapable of efficient management of the State. They were jealous of one another, and actually fought between themselves to the extreme delight of their enemies. The Shī'is and the 'Abbāsīd agents and sympathisers were the principal antagonists of the Umayyads. Against these and other enemies nearer home tenacious Marwān al-Ḥimār fought gallantly to the end, but was defeated and escaped to Egypt where he was pursued and murdered.

Hair-raising persecutions swiftly followed the overthrow of the Umayyads. Wherever they were found they were hunted down and mercilessly killed and mutilated by the 'Abbāsīds who declared themselves caliphs of Islām and legal heirs of the Prophet Muḥammad. Thereafter members of the dislodged dynasty became destitute refugees.

'Abd al-Raḥmān b. Mu'āwiyah, a grandson of the famous caliph Hishām, was among the very few who managed to escape with their life from the general massacre. He found his way to North Africa, and with the characteristic Umayyad cunning and resource he took advantage of the favourable circumstances prevalent in Spain and entered it and became its independent ruler in 138/755. After a short struggle

lasting about a year 'Abd al-Rahmān consolidated his home front and repelled all 'Abbasid attempts to defeat him and recapture Spain.


In Cordova, the capital of al-Andalus, the Umayyads established themselves as rulers but not as caliphs. It was not till the year 300/912 that 'Abd al-Rahmān III, known as al-Nāṣir, proclaimed himself caliph. The Umayyad Caliphate in Spain lasted till the year 422/1031.

From their history and fine record of public service and stable government, the Umayyad Caliphs in the east and west, proved that given the opportunity the Arabs could develop into an imperial race that stands comparison with any the world has seen. In theory the Umayyads were aristocrats. They claimed that their house was the noblest and most excellent among the Arabs. In practice, however, they were simply autocrats of the benevolent type. They took the interests of their subjects to heart so long as the latter strictly refrained from interference in politics.

The following is a list of the Umayyad Caliphs of Damascus.(1)

- | | |
|-----------------------------|--------|
| 1. Mu'āwiyah b. Abū Sufyan. | 41/661 |
| 2. Yazīd b. Mu'āwiyah. | 60/680 |
| 3. Mu'āwiyah II b. Yazīd. | 64/683 |
| 4. Marwān b. al-Ḥakam. | 64/684 |
| 5. 'Abd al-Malik b. Marwān. | 65/685 |

6.	Al-Walīd b. 'Abd al-Malik.	86/705
7.	Sulaimān b. 'Abd al-Malik.	96/715
8.	'Umar II b. 'Abd al-'Azīz.	99/717
9.	Yazīd II b. 'Abd al-Malik.	101/720
10.	Hishām b. 'Abd al-Malik.	105/724
11.	Al-Walīd II b. Yazīd II.	125/743
12.	Yazīd III b. al-Walīd I.	126/744
13.	Ibrāhīm b. al-Walīd I.	126/744
14.	Marwān II b. M. b. Marwān.	127/744
	Fall of the Umayyads.....	132/750.



The Umayyads are reputed to have created in Islām a hereditary system of government. By their establishment of a mulk or kingship they are thought to have introduced a bid'ah or an innovation. On examination, however, it seems that the change was a constitutional one based on the support and consent of the Muslim community. The legality of the situation was quite in accordance with the only known elective procedure namely, al-bai'ah.

In theory Muslim law was followed, and Islām as a religion increased rather than diminished in power. Conquests went on at an even greater pace than before; but no longer could it be asserted that war was a defensive measure against

attack. It was rather a definite means of territorial expansion and aggrandisement of a youthful and vigorous State. Since the freedom of religion was observed it was necessary to find some method whereby the numerous non-Muslim citizens could play an active part in the life of the State. It was, therefore, good policy on the part of Mu'āwiyah to have looked upon the whole of his dominion as one political entity where religion was left aside as a personal matter. to say this does not in the least imply that Mu'āwiyah treated religion lightly, or that he himself was negligent of his duties as a sincere believer; for we shall learn differently when we study the man's life in some detail. But it may be remembered in this connection that the Prophet himself at the outset of his career in Medina, found it expedient in the interests of his mission to form a political unity between the Jews and the Muslims. Under Mu'āwiyah the amṣār or provinces were dealt with on similar lines. It seemed to him that only on non-religious bases could he effectively control the various departments of the State. In the long run, however, the result was just as beneficial to the cause of Islām, as was the original Muḥammadan plan in Medina. To govern one needs a governor, and to preach one needs a preacher, and neither is expected to perform properly the functions of the other. Herein lies the success of Mu'āwiyah; and because his policy was tenaciously

followed during the greater part of the Umayyad rule the success achieved by that dynasty was a result of consistency of method. When that course was abandoned, and when the strict and capable administrators were no longer in power, decadence crept in and the house of Umayyah finally collapsed. It is these causes and their effect that should guide one in the study of the rise and fall of dynasties and States. On these lines it is hoped to give an account of the political thought and practice of the Umayyads.

Two aspects are worthy of consideration in the life of Mu'āwiyah the founder of the Umayyad dynasty: (a) the bases of his claim to the caliphate, and (b) his method of government.

(a) At no time before his conflict with 'Alī, was the name of Mu'āwiyah mentioned as a suitable candidate for the caliphate. The rise of the son of Abū Sufyān to the summit of power may be attributed to his own endeavours, and to a lesser extent to propitious circumstances. The man himself, though brilliant and well suited both by temperament and training to play the part of a supreme ruler, was quite content with his rank as a provincial governor, and his ambitions did not go much further than that. Bal'amī thinks it was Ka'b 'l-Aḥbār (2) who had encouraged Mu'āwiyah to aspire to the caliphate. Ubiquitous Ka'b was a converted Jew with great learning and cunning. He is thought to have been a

counsellor to Mu'āwiyah when the latter was still governor of Syria. When the news of 'Uthmān's murder reached Damascus, Mu'āwiyah said to Ka'b: "how I would like to know who will rule after 'Uthmān so that I may begin to woo him!" And Ka'b answered: "it is you who shall reign after him." (3)

It was 'Alī with his characteristic stubbornness who challenged Mu'āwiyah by asking him to relinquish his post as Governor. The order was refused and a civil war ensued which ended in the defeat of 'Alī whose real weaknesses were exposed; for it was shown that not only was he incapable of controlling effectively the wide dominions of Islām, but that he was in fact unable to control his own men. Besides, the arbitration of Dūmah al-Jandal (37/657) between Abū Mūsā al-Ash'arī and 'Amr b. al-'Āṣ, following the indecisive battle of Ṣiffīn (36/656), proved to the Muslims that successful statesmanship needed special aptitudes. (4)

These, then, were the main qualifications of Mu'āwiyah: he was an able man well prepared to handle the State in the ways most conducive to its continued strength and prosperity. On the other hand, besides the ability he had the experience, he could weigh men accurately and direct them in the ways he wanted. His previous record in Syria won him his point.

Mu'āwiyah thought that the Arabs owned the conquered territories, and it was proper in his opinion that the best

element in Arabia should rule the newly formed empire.

The Umayyad appeal was directed to the clan loyalty of the Arabs, in other words it was a regressive rather than a progressive move, and Prof. Browne's estimate of the Umayyad caliphate as "the period of Arabian Imperialism and Pagan Reaction," is fully justified.(5) Indeed the record of the Sufyānid family in championing the cause of Muḥammad and Islām was a poor one. Mu'āwiyah with his father Abū Sufyān and mother Hind resisted Muḥammad bitterly and proclaimed their faith only when Mecca fell into the hands of the Prophet. (6) And as Wellhausen says, "It was a lasting reproach to the Umayyids that they had been root and branch the most dangerous foes of the Prophet." (7) In spite of all this the factors in favour of the Umayyads finally prevailed.

Great credit is due to Mu'āwiyah for the masterly fashion in which he made use of the opposing points of view, and harnessed them all to serve his own ends. In previous elections Medina decided the issue and the provinces had to succumb before the inevitable. That caused bitterness to the Muslims in the conquered lands because they expected the principle of equality of the believers to be observed in all matters. Now from Syria Mu'āwiyah dictated his will to the Peninsular Arabs.

Mu'āwiyah was fortunate to have had Syria as his working base. Apart from its strategic position as the gateway

to the West, some inhabitants of that province considered themselves as pure Arabs. The rest accepted the Arab conquest with relief because it brought an end to the Byzantine mismanagement. But whatever the attitude of the population may have been, it was quite evident that under the governorship of Mu'āwiyah Syria enjoyed a spell of tranquility and prosperity unsurpassed for generations. (8) It is reasonably certain that the tribes bordering on the fertile Syrian crescent were Arabs in origin and language, though mostly Christian in faith; yet despite the religious differences they helped the Muslims in raids against the Byzantines. (9) To the Syrians, the Arab invasion was considered a liberation and not a conquest, and Mu'āwiyah did his utmost to encourage that belief. He was in Syria more or less constantly from the year 13/634, first as a junior commander, then as a local governor, and a governor general, and finally as caliph. (10) That experience itself was invaluable, because it meant that he had the advantages of leadership and government for at least a quarter of a century before his encounter with 'Alī.

During the short period that preceded the serious encounter with Mu'āwiyah, 'Alī found out that he could not assert himself in Medina, and admitted that fact by transferring the seat of government to al-Kūfah; then he had to put down the rising in the south culminating in the battle

of the Camel and return to establish himself in a locality whose people were notoriously unruly and fickle, and finally to prepare himself for a mighty struggle against a well organised force. The defeat of 'Alī in the battle of Ṣiffīn was therefore not surprising.(11)

After the decision of the umpires was announced 'Alī became only a shadow of a caliph. His plenipotentiary Abū Mūsā al-Ash'arī, who was justly described in al-Fakhrī as "a stupid old fool" had unwittingly denounced the rights of his master to Muslim leadership.(12) But it was the dagger of the Kharijite Ibn Muljam that brought to an end the unavailing struggle of 'Alī, and thus relieved him of his repeated disappointments and establish^{ed} him as a martyr especially to the Shi'ah.

The road was now comparatively clear. Mu'āwiyah endeavoured to strengthen his position by every possible means. To begin with he attempted to legalise his caliphate by turning what was in reality a seizure of power by force of arms, into an institution resting on the vote of the whole electorate. He confirmed his election in three ways each of which might in itself have sufficed in the normal course. For as a result of the arbitration he had a right to the title of caliph, and was actually addressed as such even in the lifetime of 'Alī. (13) Near the end of the year 40/660 an oath of allegiance was given to Mu'āwiyah

in Jersulem. (14) And when 'Alī was murdered Mu'āwiyah bought from the former's son al-Ḥasan all rights to the caliphate, (Rabi' I, 41/July-August, 661). (15) Thus it can be established that Mu'āwiyah had left no possible sources of criticism against his constitutional status. The trouble taken in securing the bai'ah revealed the importance attached to the will of the people. In Mu'āwiyah's opinion it was the paramount source of power; for he did not entertain any illusions about divine rights or spiritual heredity, and his life was a clear proof of this realistic viewpoint. "Oh people! I am not the best among you; verily there are others who surpass me in goodness, but perhaps I am your most efficient statesman, the hardest on your enemies, and the most productive in work." (16) His emphasis on practical and social virtues was also recorded, and his views revealed insight and human understanding. "Wisdom and clemency are the finest possessions of man," said Mu'āwiyah. "One must remember when reminded, be thankful when given, patient under tribulations, self-controlled in anger, forgiving in power, asking forgiveness in error, and fulfilling promises once the word is pledged." (17)

The purport of this argument is that in his government the founder of the Umayyad caliphate laid the proper emphasis on the qualities needed for the service of the State. He seemingly followed the view that the caliphate,

which was the focal point of the Arab Empire, was a political institution deriving its sanctions from the general will of the Muslims. Even when he was persuading the electorate to adopt his son Yazīd as a prospective caliph Mu'āwiyah observed that rule.

Paradoxically, the belief in the sovereignty of the people did not induce the caliph to restrict his own power, or even to control it by admitting to his council a representative body of the electors. Quite the contrary, he exploited to the full the general mandate he managed to extricate from the people, and it did not matter greatly to him how the allegiance of his subjects was secured. There is reason to believe that the punctilious care he attached to fulfilling the requirements of the bai'ah, was a measure of his anxiety over his usurpation of the caliphate. For had Mu'āwiyah really believed in the sovereignty of the people he would have treated them with greater consideration, and would at least have given them a greater scope of political expression. But that was not the case. In spite of his hilm, or forbearance, he was uncompromising and intolerant of any interference in State affairs. Ibn Duraid says that once a man provoked Mu'āwiyah intensely but was forgiven, and when the caliph was asked why he did so, he answered: "I do not care very much what the people say so long as they do not interfere between us and our kingdom." (18) It should be

remembered that Ibn Duraid, (d.321/933), was a pro-Umayyad and a champion of the Arab cause against the shu'ubiyah, and could not, therefore, have been maliciously prejudiced against Mu'awiyah. (19)

Occasionally, however, Mu'awiyah behaved as a first among equals, especially with noble dignitaries from the two cities; but of course that clever show of modesty accompanied with lavish hospitality, was a measure of good diplomacy and nothing else. In reality, Mu'awiyah kept himself above the rest and repeatedly demonstrated his authority lest those around him should forget who he was.

Two ideas seem to have permeated the thoughts of Mu'awiyah and the rest of the Umayyads: the Muslim State was a political institution and a social community; and the leadership of the State was the right and duty of the able nobility of the Arabs. That policy and the way to its fulfilment were clearly defined in the advice reputed to have been given by Mu'awiyah, in his last illness, to his son Yazid. The salient points of the caliph's counsel are the following:-

1. By suppressing the enemy and subduing the Arabs I (Mu'awiyah) saved you a great deal of fighting.
2. Know (Oh Yazid) that the people of the Hijaz are your relatives, so treat them generously.
3. If the 'Irāqīs ask you to change their governor daily, then do so in order to avoid insurrections.

4. Rely on the Syrians for support.

5. You have only four possible Qurashite competitors: al-Ḥasan b. 'Alī, 'Abd Allah b. 'Umar, 'Abd al-Raḥmān b. Abū Bakr, and 'Abd Allah b. al-Zubair.

6. The most potent threat may come from Ibn al-Zubair. If he attacks you, and you prevail over him, then tear him into pieces.

7. Avoid bloodshed as much as you can." (20)

These words seem to reveal the dying caliph as a totally secular ruler, and it is quite possible that they had been attributed to him by later writers. Obviously a dying man does not make such clear and comprehensive pronouncements, and indeed those directions are too long and too elaborate to be the last words of a man whose powers of life were crumbling under the hammer of death.

(b) The government of Mu'tāwiyah achieved its purpose because he followed a correct method. He put the interests of the State as a whole before the interests of any individual, and preferred the service of society to that of the private person. That this sound maxim guided his actions can be verified from his public appointments which led to a stable administration in the Empire. And although to Mu'tāwiyah the leadership of the State was generally an Arab, and specifically an Umayyad concern, he did not fall in the error of 'Uthmān and 'Alī who appointed their near relatives to

important positions regardless of ability or worth. (21) Mu'āwiyah was careful, and favoured his relatives only when they were sufficiently capable of discharging the duties assigned to them. With his keen sense of knowing the value and potentialities of those who came in contact with him, this caliph soon gathered around him a group of excellent and reliable lieutenants. (22) As a result of this wise policy all undeserving aspirants to high office quickly realised that the Empire was not after all a family estate intended solely for their enrichment and exploitation.

Old prejudices did not unduly disturb Mu'āwiyah's sense of proportion. Once he had a need for the services of a particular person, it was almost certain that the caliph would manage somehow to gain those services for himself and the State. The famous Ziyād b. Abīh, was once a trusted supporter of 'Alī, and even up till the year 38/658 he was the governor of Persia on behalf of 'Alī. (23) Yet Mu'āwiyah attracted Ziyād to his side; and how right 'Alī was when he warned Ziyād that, "Mu'āwiyah's intrigue envelops men from left and right, front and back !" (24) Similarly, al-Mughīrah b. Shu'bah (25) was a counsellor to 'Alī before joining Mu'āwiyah's ranks, and so was 'Amr b. al-'Āṣ. To Ziyād, al-Mughīrah, and 'Amr, the term dāhiyah was applied - a word signifying a person of extreme cunning and intelligence without an equal measure of virtue.

Among the Muslims four men were thus described: the three mentioned above and Mu'āwiyah. This gives an idea of the immense advantage secured for the Umayyads at the outset of their régime

The employment of capable non-Muslims by Mu'āwiyah proved of great benefit to the State. This caliph was the first to appoint Greek or Byzantine secretaries in his administration. This precedent was observed by all the Sufyānids, and was later changed by 'Abd al-Malik b. Marwān. (26) Al-Mawardī mentions that the change over from Greek to Arabic took place in Syria by order of 'Abd al-Malik, and from Persian into Arabic in the Eastern provinces by order of al-Ḥajjāj. (27)

The army under the first Umayyad caliph and others after him included non-Muslims. On one occasion during the reign of Yazīd b. Mu'āwiyah, "a disciplinary force which included many Christian Syrians," was dispatched against Medina. (28) This fact indicates a drastic change of thought; the army became an instrument of the State, and was used against all insurgents irrespective of their religion or standing. Orthodox Muslims were embittered and alienated by that regrettable move.

It was a measure of extreme prudence on the part of Mu'āwiyah that he did not install in positions of real authority men who had even the remotest possibility or right to

the caliphate. For example, Sa'īd b. 'Uthmān, the son of the third Orthodox Caliph, was living comfortably in Damascus under the watchful eye of Mu'āwiyah. When asked, Sa'īd showed some reluctance in giving his vote to Yazīd and demanded a provincial governorship as a price for his vote. The shrewd caliph was very obliging, and appointed Sa'īd to the principality of Khurāsān, and sent with him as lieutenant-governor Aslam b. Zur'ah, who was in reality an agent of Mu'āwiyah. (29) When, however, Mu'āwiyah secured the fealty for Yazīd, he lost no time in dismissing Sa'īd and reappointing 'Ubaidallah b. Ziyād. A worse incident is reported by al-Jahshiyārī. "'Abd al-Rahmān b. Khālid b. al-Walīd was the 'āmil, or agent in Ḥimṣ, and did so well that Mu'āwiyah feared that the Syrians might transfer their allegiance to the son of Khālid. A man Awthal, who was a Greek secretary of Mu'āwiyah, was sent to Ḥimṣ where he poisoned 'Abd al-Rahmān and thus murdered him." (30) It was also for a similar reason that the caliph dispensed with the services of 'Abd Allah b. 'Amr b. al-'Āṣ who was the governor of al-Kūfah in 41/661, while his father 'Amr was at the same time the governor of Egypt. (31) Al-Mughīrah who was once the 'āmil of al-Kūfah and made a fortune for himself by exploiting his position, pointed out to Mu'āwiyah that 'Amr and his son could easily form a pincer movement round Damascus; and where would the caliph be? The caliph's suspicions

were aroused and 'Abd Allah was deposed. (32)

Another great weakness in the character of Mu'āwiyah was his lack of compromise. In spite of his hilm he could not really be genuinely reconciled to his enemies, and some form of coercion was his principal instrument in dealing with actual or potential foes. His appointments in al-Kūfah and al-Basrah showed that tendency unmistakably; for his chosen agents there were on the whole tyrannical and oppressive. As a short term policy the method proved successful, but in the long run it was disastrous because suppression never wins the hearts of men. In fact this weakness was characteristic of the Umayyads and proved to be a major cause in their downfall.

Nevertheless, the reign of Mu'āwiyah was remarkable. He found the State in a chaotic condition, and moulded it into a strong and unified whole. Henri Lammens, who is perhaps the best biographer of Mu'āwiyah, goes so far as to assert that: "No one possessed to such a degree as Mu'awiyah the gifts of the founder of an empire: vision, energy, and promptitude in action, breadth of view, logical thinking... and ability to use men to deal tactfully with their prejudices so as not to offend them. This rare combination of qualities enabled him to extract order out of the apparent chaos of Beduin anarchy. He created the Arab State: a creation seen darkly by 'Omar without having been brought to realisation."(33)

The historian al-Mas'ūdī (345/956), known as the Herodotus of the Arabs, speaks highly of Mu'āwiyah's piety, strict personal observance of religious duty, and profundity. In a chapter devoted to "the character and politics of Mu'āwiyah," Mas'ūdī mentions that:

1. Mu'āwiyah's daily routine - invariably beginning before dawn - started with a short reading from the history of previous kings, their wars, politics, and administration.
2. Besides reciting a section of the Qur'ān, and performing voluntary devout prostrations, the caliph fulfilled with regularity the five compulsory daily prayers.
3. Most of his time was fully occupied in the management of the State.
4. He spent the evenings with his ministers and close associates, reading and discussing the history, literature, and politics of earlier nations. (34) It is little wonder, therefore, that Mu'āwiyah attained such great eminence. He left his impression on his followers, and their fine achievements were in no small measure due to his planning. But that, of course, does not detract from the creditable records and contributions of the other famous Umayyads such as 'Abd al-Malik b. Marwān, and his son Hishām both of whom were nearly equally as eminent as Mu'āwiyah.

THE UMAYYADS AND HEREDITARY KINGSHIP IN ISLĀM.

We mentioned above without comment the prevalent view

of the Umayyad mulk. Dr. G. Stewart says that this principle "appeared first when Mu'āwiyah, the founder of the Umayyad dynasty in 676, four years previous to his death nominated his son as the future Caliph." (34) Mu'āwiyah is reputed to have initiated this movement deliberately and in full possession of his faculties. Lammens exclaims, "non seulement ce souverain se permit de transmettre le pouvoir à son fils, mais il prit cette mesure non à ses derniers moments, mais en pleine santé." (35)

Like many other unfounded allegations against the Umayyads this tradition seems to have been transmitted through the ages without much scrutiny until it has assumed the semblance of a fact. There is reason to believe that Mu'āwiyah was not the first caliph to secure an oath of allegiance to his son. It was 'Alī who conceived the idea in the year 40/660 by ordering the citizens of Medina to swear allegiance to his son al-Ḥasan; the order was given at the point of the sword. (36) But whereas 'Alī failed Mu'āwiyah succeeded.

Even assuming that the Umayyads had really established, the system of mulk in Islām, that does not indict them as misguided innovators. The word bid'ah is an emotionally coloured one and implies the initiation of a legally unfounded practice. But as it has been shown above, the Qur-'ān, and the Hadīth are non-committal on the question of

succession. Therefore, the Umayyad action cannot with justice be termed an innovation. It is true that the idea of kingship with its attendant pomp and circumstance is incompatible with the primitive nature of the Bedouin Arabs, but that is no reason why Muslim institutions should strictly follow those of the primitive Bedouins. Besides, kingship as an institution cannot be definitely invalidated on Qur'anic premises. The Book contains at least twenty two references to mulk, or earthly kingship -universal mulk is, of course, an attribute of Allah. Only two verses (Qur. xviii:80, xxvii:34) denounce the system. The other verses commend it as a blessing of Allah on His good servants. The best king is he who possesses both power and wisdom, or al-mulk wa 'l-hikmah like David; (37) and how reminiscent this is of Plato's conception of the king-philosopher! (38)

In the course of time kingship became quite acceptable to the Muslims, and now the title of king is the usual one for the figure-head in most Muslim States. There are kings in Egypt, al-'Irāq, Transjordan, and Sa'ūdī Arabia. The Imām of al-Yaman is a hereditary ruler and has the status and title of a monarch, so has the sultan of Morocco. The Shah of Persia, as his title suggests, is also a king. (39)

If the critics of the Umayyads were really serious in their allegations, they could very easily have adopted a different system in place of hereditary succession. But history

proves that the notion of mulk under different guises was adhered to with great tenacity after the Umayyads. It seems to us that the action of Mu'āwiyah was no more than a retrogressive step towards clan loyalty. This caliph's plan was designed to retain power in the house of Umayyah, and strict hereditary succession from father to son was not perhaps contemplated. The analysis of the Umayyad record of succession helps in clarifying this point. Among the fourteen caliphs of that dynasty only four directly succeeded their fathers. These were the 2nd, 3rd, 5th, and 6th rulers; namely Yazīd and his son Mu'āwiyah II, 'Abd al-Malik b. Marwān and his son al-Walīd. (40) On the other hand, eighteen out of the thirty seven 'Abbāsīd caliphs directly succeeded their fathers; and this obviously shows that the 'Abbāsīds were insincere in their criticism of the Umayyads. (41) Besides, it should be borne in mind that it was the Kūfans who initiated the method of direct filial succession in Islām as conceived by 'Alī. On his death they announced the caliphate of his son al-Ḥasan, and this action was taken without consultation with other provinces.

THE BAI'AH UNDER THE Umayyads.

The Umayyads ruled as autocrats or benevolent despots, but not as monarchs by divine right. From the constitutional point of view this method of government was self-contradictory.

On the one hand the caliphs were disinclined to share responsibility of government and control of public affairs with their subjects, and were actually very jealous of any interference in politics from the people whose primary duty was obedience to orders from the rulers. On the other hand, the Umayyads relied on the strength of public allegiance expressed in the bai'ah, for continued legal authority in the State. To them the will of the Muslims was the only source of constitutional government. And yet, the oath of fidelity was often secured under extreme duress. When generous presents or threats failed to achieve the desired purpose ruthless violence was employed. The validity of an allegiance wrested by such coercive methods may, therefore, be questioned.

But it is to the credit of the Umayyads that they attached equal importance and significance to the votes of every province in the empire. No longer was Medina the polis and the rest of the Muslim world mere followers. In fact the important election campaign in which Yazīd was nominated had been decided first in Syria, then in Medina and Mecca. Actually the two cities were confronted with a fait accompli in which they had to acquiesce after some reluctance. (42)

Although delegations from every corner of the empire

went to the court of Damascus to confirm their loyalty to Muṭāwiyah and his son, there was a sense of make-believe about the whole demonstration because everyone realised fully that Yazīd had to be elected. In their speeches the delegates tried to confer upon the occasion an air of seriousness and dignity. But a man, Yazīd b. al-Muqaffa', was particularly realistic and forthright in his short but remarkable address. He got up, pointed at Muṭāwiyah and said laconically: "the Commander of the Faithful is this;" he then faced Yazīd, pointed at him and said: "and after him that," then finally the speaker drew his sword, looked at it and announced tersely: "and he who dissents will surely suffer this." The caliph smiled meaningly and said to him: "you are the master of all orators." (43)

The use of force by the umayyads had its serious drawbacks; for those rulers répressed and did not conciliate, and they failed to diagnose properly the underlying general dissatisfaction of which the repeated risings were only a symptom. The Muslims were as yet quite unprepared to support voluntarily the Umayyad policy of secularisation. The ruthless measures against insurrections, and the political murders of relatives of the prophet including women and children, and the violation of the sanctity of the holy cities combined to intensify the resentment of all other parties and led inevitably to the risings which brought to

a violent end the power of that dynasty.

It was under those conditions that the ʿAlids and ʿAbbāsids gathered followers and moral support; not so much because the Muslims had any particular appreciation for the esoteric doctrines of the Shiʿīs and anti-Umayyads but because the new parties had declared their opposition to secularisation and announced that they would re-install Islām in its proper place. Even when it was beyond doubt that the opposition was steadily gathering momentum the Umayyads did not compromise. ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd al-Kātib, the famous secretary and one of the most celebrated Arabic prose writers, suggested to Marwān the last Umayyad caliph a marriage alliance with the leading house of the ʿAbbāsids, but the advice was ignored. (44) Marwān thought that taking such a course would in effect be an admission of weakness, and argued that the rebels must be punished for violating their oath of allegiance. It was indeed curious how one-sided the Umayyads were in their interpretation of the binding force of the baiʿah. They thought that once a people admitted their allegiance to the caliph they were bound to obey him. On the other hand, when a few persons or a group of men withheld the baiʿah from the caliph they were considered rebels against the existing order and were found relentlessly. There is reason to conclude, therefore, that although the baiʿah was observed all through the Umayyad

rule its existence was of value to the rulers only.

THE VALUE OF A CONSISTENT POLICY

A major source of power and stability in the Umayyad State was the adherence to one general strategy. Religious considerations were left aside and the affairs of the community were dealt with on political lines. Some members of this dynasty did not initially subscribe to this policy, but they soon changed their minds when they became caliphs. Al-Fakhri mentions that 'Abd al-Malik b. Marwān had expressed his horror at the sacking of Medina and Mecca during the reign of Yazid b. Mu'āwiyah, and yet, when he ('Abd al-Malik) became caliph he surpassed his predecessors in ruthlessness. It is further reported that 'Abd al-Malik was a devoted student of Muslim law, and used often to recite the Qur'ān in the mosque of Medina, and when he was summoned to the caliphate he closed the Book saying: "this is a parting between you and me." (45)

It does not matter whether or not the Umayyad policy was a correct one. The important point is that the method was consistently observed; but a minority of caliphs failed to do so, and their weakness was immediately exploited by their enemies and thus grievous injury was done to the cause of that dynasty. 'Umar b. 'Abd al-'Azīz who revived the pietist tradition was politically a conspicuous failure.

As Von Kremer points out, his management of affairs ruined the machinery of government painfully and laboriously built by his predecessors, and his kindness was misinterpreted. During his caliphate the decline of the Umayyads began. (46)

There is reason to suppose that the Umayyad plan of government was a right one, and if at all politics qua politics was exercised in Islām, it was under the Umayyads and nowhere else that it took place. But unfortunately neither the time nor the temperament of the Muslims in general and the Arabs in particular was sufficiently propitious to insure the success of the experiment. It seems as though Mu'āwiyah, the initiator of that policy was a long distance ahead of his time and people. As is known, he was a keen student of past history and it may be plausible to suggest that he had borrowed some of his ideas from non-Arab sources. However, the Umayyads were fortunate in their choice of Syria as their base because, although that province had previously suffered from Byzantine mismanagement, the Syrians themselves were for many generations accustomed to submit to authority. They were on that account in advance of the unruly Arabs of the interior in their readiness to respond favourably to discipline under an ordered government. But this initial asset turned later into a liability. As the centre of gravity moved eastwards

Damascus became too far to the west to exercise effective control over the rebellious provinces.

Good fortune also played its part in allowing the three ablest rulers to govern longest. Mu'āwiyah, 'Abd al-Malik b. Marwān, and Hishām, each ruled nearly twenty years. This is an indication that consistency and stability are prerequisites of construction and development.

Another remarkable feature of the Umayyad government was the continuity of a fixed administration, and the fulfilment by the new caliphs of the general plans conceived or partly finished by their immediate predecessors. This resulted in an efficient and undisturbed State machinery. These essentials of a successful government reflect credit on the Umayyads because even in the present time such principles are observed only in well organised and politically mature States. It is interesting to notice, for example, that Sarjūn b. Manṣūr al-Rūmī, the head of dīwān al-kharāj, or Board of Land revenue, held office continuously under five caliphs - Mu'āwiyah to 'Abd al-Malik. (47) This Greek Christian was a devoted servant of the Umayyads and held their complete trust. Besides being in charge of the most important department in the whole administration, he was a secretary to the caliphs and his advice was often sound and sincere. Once Yazīd I was reluctant to appoint 'Ubaidallah b. Ziyād - whom he hated - to the governorship of al-

Kūfah, but when told by Sarjūn that Mutāwiyah had personally intended Ubaidallah for that post Yazīd immediately gave his consent. (48) It was not unusual for able government to continue service without interruption under more than one caliph irrespective of personal differences. But on the whole confidence was mutual between rulers and lieutenants. Once a general or governor proved himself worthy of trust he was given full scope and constant encouragement. Nevertheless the selection of the right persons was not an easy or a haphazard affair; for it could hardly have been chance or random choice that resulted in the mobilisation of such an impressive number of talented men.

ADVERSE CONDITIONS: THE ECLIPSE AND FALL OF THE Umayyads.

Although the success of the Umayyads was predominantly of their own making, their failure was only partly due to political miscalculations and partly to circumstances beyond their control. Paradoxical as it may seem, the main pillar of strength upon which that dynasty had established its power proved later to be its heel of Achilles. The untimely secularisation of the state was perhaps the principal adverse factor leading to disintegration. The attendant evils of this policy were pervasive throughout but remained latent because the scheme was administered ably and ruthlessly. The strict monopoly of power by one single family had the

beneficial effect of strengthening the solidarity of that group. But the exclusion of others was a violation of the principle of equality inherent in Islām. Arab families other than the umayyads took a more serious view as they considered the arrest of power by one house a definite act of unjustifiable monopoly. Deep resentment was aroused and might have led immediately to the formation of a united opposition had it not been for the existing antipathy of the Arabs towards other races. The assertion of the superiority of the Arabs was of course an endemic weakness which was condemned by the prophet but was persisted in, nevertheless. The result was that the alienated Arabs could not easily join hands with other enemies of the Umayyads. It was to the delight of the conquered nations to hear of dissensions between their conquerors. In speech and letter derogatory accusations were exchanged between the umayyads and their Arab opponents represented by the 'Alids and the orthodox inhabitants of Medina and Mecca. (49) The echo of these words did not escape the ears of the subject peoples, especially the Persians who were always looking for an opportunity to rid themselves of Arab rule and regain their lost freedom. By every possible method the Persians tried to exploit these differences to their own advantage. If the Arabs could lay claim to superior lineage, why not the 'Ajam? After all, they were

heirs to a civilisation greater than that of the Arabs.

This reciprocal antagonism led to the movement known as Shu'ūbiyyah. The name was derived from Qur'ān xlix:13, "O men! verily We have created you from a male and a female, and have made you nations (shu'ūb) and tribes (qabā'il) that you may know each other; verily the noblest of you in God's sight is he amongst you who most fears God..." By knowing each other was intended the promotion of friendly relations, and it was evident that the undisguised contempt of the Arabs for foreigners had no religious basis. It should be held in mind that it was not restricted to the Persians. On the other hand, of all the foreigners the Persians were the most violent in their reaction. At the beginning the Shu'ūbis claimed with justice equal status with the Arabs, but their movement in its later developments definitely asserted the superiority of the 'Ajam over the Arabs who, it was stated, were barbarians of no civilisation worthy of the name. This latter contention was motivated by the sense of injury of the Shu'ūbis and their strong desire for self-vindication.

The Shu'ūbiyyah reached its full force in the early period of the 'Abbāsids, but its origin was much earlier than that. In the days of Hishām, a Persian, Ismā'il b. Yasār was thrown into a stream of water and nearly lost his life because

he boasted his descent from a race which excelled all others.(50) But repression only retarded for a short time the active rising against the oppressors. When the alienated groups began to work together the Umayyads were doomed. It is doubtful whether the Persians had any special liking for the 'Alids or the 'Abbāsids, but there seems reason to believe that it was the community of interests that caused these groups to unite. The Persians thought with good judgment that any action undertaken to weaken the Arabs was a step forward on the road to emancipation; hence the repeated support offered by the Kūfans to the 'Alids and their faction or shī'ah. Another indication of this tendency was the bewildering exhibition of Kūfan cowardice at crucial moments. They lured the descendants of 'Alī to their camp and promised to champion their cause, and when the Umayyad expeditions arrived on the scene of action the inhabitants of that area of al-'Irāq hurried their retreat and left one Arab party to exterminate the other. The truth is that that locality was predominantly Persian in race and sympathies and from a national point of view their treachery was highly commendable. When they assured themselves that the Umayyads were sufficiently exhausted, they openly revolted against them and supported the 'Abbāsids and made certain that the new dynasty would establish itself on Persian swords. By so doing they

knew that they would be putting an end to the Arabs and Arabism. And how prophetic Ka'b b. Sayyār the governor of Khurāsān was in his distressing and moving appeal to his master Marwān the last Umayyad caliph! "If you do not waken and stand up to the impending menace, then better bid your last farewell to Islām and the Arabs." (51) . How else can one account for the wave of vaunted claims of Persian superiority that accompanied the rising of 'Abbāsīd power? It appears that the final triumph of the sons of 'Abbās and the establishment of their caliphate in Persian surroundings was a definite success to that nation's cause. In fact it looked as though it were a Sassanid renaissance. Thus as Taha Husain remarked, "the Umayyads deviated from the policy of the Prophet. He wanted to dispense with clan loyalty and they relied on the help of one single party of the Arabs to the exclusion of all others. To do so they strengthened al-ṭaṣabīyyah (esprit de corps) but failed to control it, and that consequently led to their downfall; nay, to the whole overthrow of the Arabs and the revival of the Persians." (52) The Umayyad monarchy with its enlightened autocrats now gave way to a more intensive despotism under the 'Abbāsīd theocracy in which the Arab racial element fell behind and the Persian gained the ascendancy. Islām, however, did not suffer adversely under the new dynasty but only underwent new developments.

CH. VII

NOTES

1. The above introduction is primarily intended to avoid argument from assumed knowledge of Arab history. The material included in this compilation is mostly non-controversial. Cf. Fakhri, 143 ff., Mas.M. ii:39 ff., LHA. xxviii, Muir C. 269 ff., Hitti HA. 189 ff., EI. iv:998 ff., Zambaur op.cit. 3f., LHP. i:209 ff., S.Lane-Poole: The Mohammadan Dynasties, pp. 3-8. For a comprehensive history of the Umayyads in Spain see: al-Maqqarī: Nafh 'l-Tīb, translated into English by P. De Gayangos, London, 1840-43, and L'Histoire et la Litterature des Arabes D'Espagne, ed. Dozy, Leyden, 1855-60.
2. An additional note on Ka'b al-Ahbār is given at the end of these foot-notes.
3. Bal'amī, ii:380.
4. Cf. Fakhri, 130, Mas. M. ii:23 says that 38/658 was the year of arbitration.
5. LHP. i:210.
6. EI, iii:617, Fakhri 144. Hind was the famous noble-woman who antagonised the Prophet greatly. She was derisively called the eater of (human) liver, because of her savagery in the battle of Uhud, Cf. EI, ii:312.

7. Wellhausen, op.cit. 61.
8. The Arab province of Syria was much greater in size than the Syrian State of the present time. Cf. Prof I. Bowman: The Political Geography of the Mohammadan World, art. MW. 1930, 1 ff.
9. J.H.Mordtmann (EI. iv:155 f.) says that the word Saracens refers to the inhabitants of a district in Arabia bordering on Judaea. About the third century A.D. they began to disturb the Roman frontiers, and after the foundation of the Arabian Empire the Byzantines called Saracens all the Muslim people subject to the caliph. On the other hand, Toynbee (op. cit. i:73) suggests that the name Saracens or *Σαρακηνος*, is a derivative from *سمرقند*, and is coined by the Western Arabs under the rule of the Banū Ghassān. The Arabs, however, hardly ever use the word.
10. Bal'ami, iii:409.
11. Muir. C. 259, Wellhausen, op.cit 75.
12. Fakhri. 127
13. Ibid. 130.
14. Tab. II,i:4, but Mas. M. ii:39, suggests that the date was Shawwāl 41 /February, 662.
15. Mas. M. ii:36.
16. Ibn Duraid, p.36.
17. Ibid. p. 40.
18. Ibdi. p. 40.

19. Cf. LHP. i:269.
20. Bal'ami, iv:23, Fakhri 155 f., 'Iqd, ii:363.
21. 'Alī was just as prejudices as 'Uthmān in favour of his relatives. The major principalities of Mecca, Medina, al-Yaman, and al-Basrah, were all governed by 'Alī's cousins the sons of al-'Abbās. Cf. Muir C. 284.
22. Cf. Zambaur op.cit. pp. 19, 24, 39.
23. Ibid. p. 46.
24. Fakhri, 153.
25. EI, iii:639.
26. Jahshiyārī, pp 20, 35; Fakhri, 167.
27. Māwardī, op.cit 349.
28. Hitti HA. 191 .
29. Zambaur p. 47, mentions this appointment of Sa'id and comments: "tres peu de temps."
30. Jahshiyārī p.23.
31. Zambaur, 25, 42.
32. Bal'ami, iv:6.
33. EI. iv:620 f.
34. Dr. G. Stewart, Is the Caliph a Pope? art. MW, 1931 p.189, cf. Hitti HA 196.
35. H. Lammens: Le Berceau de L'Islam, Rome,1914, p.331.
36. Mas. M. ii:138, Muir. C. 283.
37. Qur. ii:251, For the Qur'ānic references to mulk, see: 'Ilmī Zādeh: Qur'ānic Concordance, Beyrout, 1323/1905, p. 414 f.

38. Plato's Republic, translated into English by A.D. Lindsay, London, 1937, bk. v:473.
39. It is interesting to notice that the ruler of the Yaman who is a shī'i, refers to himself in State documents as "We the King of al-Yaman al-Imām Yahyā etc." Cf. 'Abd al-Razzāq al-Hasanī: Tārīkh al-wizārāt al-'Irāqīyah, (a History of the 'Irāqī Cabinets), 4 vols., Syria 1933-40, iv:237.
40. It should be noted that Sulayman, Yazīd II, and Hishām, the 7th, 9th, and 10th caliphs were sons of 'Abd al-Malik. Yazīd III, and his brother Ibrāhīm, the 12th, and 13th caliphs were the sons of al-Walīd, the 6th caliph.
41. The rest of the 'Abbāsīd rulers were either brothers, sons, or grandsons of previous caliphs.
42. Bal'ami, iv:20 f.
43. 'A. 'Abd al-Rāziq, .28.
44. Jahshiyārī 68.
45. Fakhri , 167.
46. Von Kremer: Culturgeschichte des Orient, translated into English by S. Khuda-Bukhsh , Culcutta, 1920,-.212.
47. Jahshiyārī 20 ff., cf. Von Kremer, op.cit. 205.
48. Ibid. (Jahshiyārī) 26.
49. Mas. M. ii:38, 43, Ibn Duraid 39.
50. LHP. i:266.

51. Mas. M. ii:144.
 52. Taha Husain, op.cit. 137.

Additional note.

Ka'b al-Abbār d.c. 32 /652.

Ka'b is referred to (JE. vii:400) as one of the most prominent fathers of Muslim tradition. He was a native of al-Yaman and on account of his learning he was styled al-ḥibr or al-aḥbar -possibly from Heb. כִּבְר. He settled in Medina and declared his acceptance of Islām. His knowledge and integrity won him the respect of the Muslims and their leaders. Ka'b was a great favourite of 'Umar.

'Abbās al-'Aqqād (op.cit.348) describes Ka'b as :
 "a defeated and converted Jew who pretended sincerity to Islām." 'Aqqad suggests further that Ka'b had taken part in the planning of the assassination of 'Umar. "Three days before the murder took place Ka'b prophesied it to 'Umar, and claimed that it was mentioned in the Torah... But the truth is that 'Abd al-Raḥmān b. Abū Bakr saw Ka'b, Abū Lu'lu'ah (the murderer of 'Umar) and two other Persians whispering." ! Al-'Aqqād does not mention the source of his information.

According to Ṭabarī and Bal'ami, Ka'b must have died after 35/655, because his advice to Mu'āwiyah to arrest power was tendered after the murder of 'Uthmān. But Ibn Qutaibah (Handbüch der Geschichte p.219) maintains that

Ka'b was living in retirement at Ḥims, and died there in 32/652, while 'Uthmān was still alive. On that account it would appear that Bal'amī's report concerning the counsel of Ka'b to Mu'āwiyah is apocryphal. We are inclined to accept Ibn Qutaibah's view. This is borne by the historical study of the character of Mu'āwiyah who was not inclined to act on sudden impulses.

The first of these is the fact that the
 Abbasids were not a new dynasty, but
 a branch of the Umayyad family, who
 had ruled the empire for nearly a
 century. This continuity of power
 helped to stabilize the new regime
 and to ensure a smooth transition
 from the old to the new dynasty.

CH. VIII

THE 'ABBASID THEOCRACY.

The Abbasid Caliphate was a theocracy
 in which the Caliph was considered
 to be the representative of God on
 earth. This belief was based on the
 idea that the Caliph was the
 successor of the Prophet Muhammad
 and that he was therefore
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The ʿAbbāsids began their rule when ʿAbd Allah Abū ʿl-ʿAbbās known as al-Saffāh, or shedder of blood, was proclaimed caliph at al-Kūfah in 132 /749. This event took place when Marwān II, the last Umayyad ruler was still the recognised head of State; in other words, the ʿAbbāsids usurped power by armed revolution.

From al-Kūfah the new caliph sent his uncle ʿAbd Allah to engage in battle with the remaining Umayyads. In the battle of the Zāb near al-Mausil, the Umayyads were defeated beyond recovery.

Close blood relationship with the Prophet was the claim of the new dynasty to the headship of Islām. But this argument depended on the unwarrantable acceptance of spiritual heredity as a basis of government; and even assuming there were reasons to hold this view of succession, the descendants of ʿAlī b. Abū Ṭālib would have been more entitled to the caliphate. The truth is that the ʿAbbāsids seized power first and justified or rationalised their position afterwards.

By skilful use of propaganda in Khurāsān and al-ʿIrāq -two provinces quite suitable for intrigue and clandestine movements- the ʿAbbāsīd agents manoeuvred and prepared the way for their masters by leading the people to believe that the Hāshimids would supersede the Umayyads and observe the principle of equality between all Muslims.

The reign of the first ʿAbbāsids, especially al-Saffāh,

will long be remembered for its violent storm of terror against their foes and competitors.

Al-Manṣūr, the brother and successor of al-Saffāh built and made Baghdād his seat of government. It remained capital during the greater part of the rule of the dynasty.

It is said with reason that the first century of the ʿAbbāsīd reign was the golden period of Islām. In material wealth and intellectual life, in brilliant prosperity and internal peace, Islām reached its summit. The rulers gave the lead to their subjects in the field of peaceful occupations. Culture and urbanity were the professed aims of life. Al-Manṣūr, al-Rashīd, and al-Ma'mūn, the three most prominent caliphs were especially remembered for their construction, fine administration, and patronage of science and the arts. It is interesting to observe that each of them had a comparatively long term of office -about twenty years.

The Arabs lost their ascendancy under that dynasty and had to accept at the best only an equal status with the ʿAjam. But the Arabs benefited indirectly from this policy. Instead of seeking their advantage at the cost and labour of others, they began to engage in useful and constructive work. This rehabilitation was aided by the few generations of settled urban life and intermarriages that preceded the advent of the ʿAbbāsīds.

In theory the method of the new dynasty was theocratic,

but its practice was most despotic. The familiar picture from alf laylah (Arabian Nights) of the caliph; the wazīr or vizier, and the executioner was on the whole accurate.

Because of stability in the Empire, and owing to the increased number of cities comparatively densely populated, a greater number of government officials was employed to run the different departments of State. It should be noted that this staff had no legal influence or independent command; its jurisdiction was derived from the caliph who retained and exercised absolute autocratic sovereignty and constitutional irresponsibility. That state of affairs was intensified by the fallacious claims to divine prerogatives. The ʿAbbāsids asserted in speech and action that ^aunique mandate from Allah had been invested in them; and that is the main reason for declaring the rule of that dynasty as theocratic.

The hold of the central government over the dominion of Islām was not firmly maintained. Even at the height of power the ʿAbbāsids could not subdue their Umayyad rivals in Spain. As time passed the rulers of Baghdād progressively weakened and their grip on the outlying provinces relaxed to an increasing extent, until finally the stage was reached when the caliphs themselves were over-shadowed by their mercenaries. Independent and hereditary principalities sprang up within the Empire and only formally acknowledged the religious or spiritual position of the

impotent and often virtually imprisoned caliphs. Before final collapse the 'Abbāsids reached such a low ebb that their command could hardly extend beyond the walls of their capital and its immediate environs.

This dynasty came to an end when in 656/1258, the Mongols under Hūlāgū, the grandson of Jenkiz Khān, conquered and sacked the metropolis once called the City of Peace. Al-Musta'ṣim the last of the 'Abbāsīd rulers, his family, and staff were murdered by the invading hordes. Half a millennium previously a similar fate had been mercilessly inflicted upon the umayyads by their compatriots and co-religionists, the sons of al-'Abbās. How the fortunes of men and dynasties change !

The following is a list of the 'Abbāsīd caliphs. (1)

1.	Al-Saffāh	132 /750
2.	Al-Manṣūr	136 /754
3.	Al-Mahdī	158 /755
4.	Al-Hādī	169 /785
5.	Al-Rashīd	170 /786
6.	Al-Amīn	193 /809
7.	Al-Ma'mūn	198 /813
8.	Al-Mu'taṣim	218 /833
9.	Al-Wāthiq	227 /842
=====		
10.	Al-Mutawakkil	232 /847
11.	Al-Muntaṣir	247 /861
12.	Al-Musta'in	248 /862
13.	Al-Mu'tazz	251 /866
14.	Al-Muhtadī	255 /869
15.	Al-Mu'tamid	256 /870
16.	Al-Mu'taqīd	279 /892
17.	Al-Muktafī	289 /902
18.	Al-Muqtadir	295 /908
19.	Al-Qāhir	320 /932
20.	Al-Rāqī	322 / 934
21.	Al-Muttaqī	329 /940
22.	Al-Mustakfī	333 /944

23.	Al-Mutī'	334	/946
24.	Al-Ta'ī'	363	/974
25.	Al-Qādir	381	/991
26.	Al-Qā'im	422	/1031
27.	Al-Muqtadī	467	/1075
28.	Al-Mustazhir	487	/1094
29.	Al-Mustarshid	512	/1118
30.	Al-Rāshid	529	/1135
31.	Al-Muqtafī	530	/1136
32.	Al-Mustanjid	555	/1160
33.	Al-Mustaḍī'	566	/1170
34.	Al-Nāṣir	575	/1180
35.	Al-Zāhir	622	/1225
36.	Al-Mustanṣir	623	/1226
37.	Al-Musta'ṣim	640	/1242
	Fall of the 'Abbāsids	656	/1258 (2)

AN ESTIMATE OF THE LEGAL BASES OF THE 'ABBĀSIDS.

Ṭabarī says that the Prophet had informed his uncle al-'Abbās b. 'Abd al-Muṭṭalib that the leadership of the Muslims would reside in the latter's descendants. (3) The source of the tradition was Muḥammad b. 'Alī b. 'Abd Allāh b. 'Abbās who was in fact the arch designer of the 'Abbāsīd movement. The fictitious nature of the statement can be detected in the prophetic forecast; for as previously mentioned, most serious Muslim thinkers reject hadīths based on prophecy. Besides, if al-'Abbās, the uncle of the Prophet, had any such information he would have presented it at the meeting of the Banū Sā'idah in which Abū Bakr was chosen as caliph. Al-'Abbās, who was two or three years older than Muḥammad, took an active part in that assembly, but no one at the time seriously considered him as a suitable candidate despite his age and relation to the Prophet. Unlike his brother, the faithful martyr Ḥamzah, al-'Abbās did

not help appreciably in the spreading of Islām, and declared his faith only when Mecca surrendered. He was rather unctuous and was thought to have acted as a spy. (4) Yaqūbī mentions that al-ʿAbbās was dissatisfied with the election of Abū Bakr, and went on to further the cause of ʿAlī in spite of the unanimity of the electors to the contrary. (5) That implies that al-ʿAbbās acted as a disruptive element and tried to split the ranks of the Muslims. It is not unreasonable, therefore, to question the genuineness of a tradition coming from that source.

It would be more correct to trace the origin of ʿAbbāsīd ambitions to ʿAbd Allah b. al-ʿAbbas. (6) To transfer the investigation from father to son is not as trivial as it appears at first sight; in fact it helps in directing the course of research from the less, to the more important person. A study of the career of Ibn ʿAbbas would clearly reveal the motives behind his actions. Buhl is of the opinion that the ʿAbbāsīds have descended from ʿAbd Allah b. ʿAbbas. (7)

ʿAbd Allah served ʿAlī as an ambassador and later as governor of al-Baṣrah. From his record of administration in that city, the conclusion cannot be escaped that he was astute, untrustworthy and perfidious. He left his cousin ʿAlī at a most critical moment and returned to Medina with his stolen treasures. Buhl believes that ʿAbd Allah had sold himself to Muʿāwiyah at a high price, and afterwards

acted treacherously towards al-Ḥasan. (8)

The object of showing ʿAbd Allah in this discreditable but most probably true character is not to belittle a cause by throwing odium on its upholder, for that would indeed be fallacious. The idea is to point out that a man cannot be generally trusted when his actions have repeatedly proved him unreliable. ʿAbd Allah owes his fame not to his politics, "but to his greatly admired knowledge of profane and sacred tradition." (9) He is a prolific traditionist, but scholarly criticism has exposed him as a conscienceless liar whose forgeries quite correspond to his cunning political tricks. It is perhaps relevant to mention that Ṭabarī and Balʿamī consider ʿAbd Allah as a dāhiyah. There is reason to assume, therefore, that having witnessed the loss of the ʿAlid cause and the success of the Umayyad's, ʿAbd Allah nursed his ambitions and began to prepare the way for his own family by coining forged traditions in order to strengthen the position of his descendants to the caliphate. As is generally admitted, political motives have been among the strongest reasons for the fabrication of traditions. Thus the inference may be drawn that the ʿAbbasids had no valid legal or religious rights to supremacy among the Muslims. Only by very subtle propaganda and unchecked use of force did they reach, and then consolidate their hold on the caliphate. In this aspect they were not different from any other dynasty usurping power.

THE ʿABBĀSID PROPAGANDA.

During the Umayyad rule some nashimids lived in the village of al-Humaymah in the province of Syria. Muḥammad b. Zayn al-ʿĀbidīn, who was a direct descendant of the Prophet's daughter Fāṭimah and her husband ʿAlī, died there in 116/734. (11) The family of Muḥammad b. ʿAlī b. ʿAbd Allah b. ʿAbbās also resided in that hamlet. It is thought that Muḥammad b. ʿAlī was the first to spread active propaganda in the name of the Hāshimids -an ambiguous term generally used in reference to the family of the Prophet. The famous Abū Muslim al-Khurāsānī was a slave of this man Muḥammad, and was entrusted by him to disseminate secretly in Khurāsān publicity in favour of his master's family. (12) It should be borne in mind that Abū Muslim was not the first agent of the ʿAbbasids. Their subversive activities had started sometime before the engagement of Abū Muslim, but as Barthold points out, "the movement prepared since long, was accelerated through his (Abū Muslim's) arrival and the success of his religious propaganda." (13) When Muḥammad b. ʿAlī died, his place was taken by his son Ibrāhīm. The revolution broke out in 129/747 and a serious struggle went on between the Umayyad governor of Khurāsān and the ʿAbbāsīd insurgents. Marwān II, managed to capture Ibrāhīm in 130/748 and is thought to have put him to death. But Ibrāhīm's brothers Abū 'l-ʿAbbās and Abū Jaʿfar, later known as al-Saffāh and al-Manṣūr, took charge of the revolution

and even added to its fury, until in 132/750 al-Saffāḥ became caliph. It is interesting to notice that neither al-Saffāḥ nor al-Manṣūr had actually taken part in the fighting. They stayed in al-Ḥumaymah, then moved directly to al-Kūfah, where they remained in hiding for some time until it was considered safe to proclaim themselves and declare openly their intention of assuming the caliphate as the rightful heirs of the Prophet. (14)

The subtlety of the 'Abbāsīd propaganda was revealed in its ambiguity. The main cry against the Umayyads was that the descendants of the Prophet must be his legitimate successors. This argument had previously been unequivocally rejected by the majority of the Arabs who realised the serious implications of admitting such a principle. The 'Abbāsīds, therefore, left aside the predominantly Arab areas and fixed their attention on the provinces of al-'Irāq and Khurāsān, which were considered most suitable for an anti-Umayyad rising. Both localities were sufficiently removed from Damascus to render difficult the rapid movement of government troops to put down the insurrection. At the same time al-'Irāq and Khurāsān presented the 'Abbāsīds with a fertile breeding ground for their activities. It was also fortunate for the 'Abbāsīds to have chosen al-Ḥumaymah for residence. That village being within easy reach of the rulers of Damascus made it difficult for them to suspect the existence of an underground movement designed to uproot their dynasty, and by the time the Umayyads

discovered the plot, it was too late for them to take effective measures to save the situation. Abū Muslim asserted with satisfaction that he worked under the very nose of his enemies until he took them completely unawares. A saying of his to that effect became proverbial: "he who tends his sheep in a lion's den and relaxes his vigilance, will certainly have lions to look after his flock." (15)

The dā'īs, or publicity agents, endeavoured to persuade the people to transfer their loyalty from the sons of Umayyah to the sons of Hāshim. The sons of Hāshim formed three branches: The descendants of Muḥammad, ʿAbbās, and ʿAlī. The Prophet had no direct male heirs to survive him. Since Arab lineage principally followed the male side, it can be asserted that Muḥammad had no descendants in the proper sense of the word. Incidentally, this view implies that any Muslim who poses as a descendant of the Prophet is either an ignorant impostor or a barefaced liar attempting to exploit the credulity of the people. (16)

The children of al-ʿAbbās were in no way distinguished before or after Islām, and their eligibility as leaders of the Muslim community was not seriously entertained in the early days of the caliphate. They had to content themselves with second-class appointments, and fully realised the weakness of their own position. Had they at the early stages of rising declared their real intentions of becoming cal^liphs,

the story might indeed have been different even in Khurāsān. But only the agents were acquainted with the plot and kept it as a guarded secret.

The 'Alids had their own supporters from the very beginning. Their party was not very strong, but in time it became an effective force in the arena of Islām. Many people leaned towards the shī'ah out of sympathy and sorrow for the fate of its leaders. It may be reasonable to suggest that every political failure suffered by the descendants of 'Alī resulted in the consolidation of their standing later on. The martyrdom of some chiefs of the house of 'Alī was in fact the corner-stone of the shī'ah. The more tragic the affliction the greater was the sympathy. Thus it appears that by their misfortunes the 'Alids rendered a great service to the shī'ah movement. The curious and unorthodox views held by this party are to some extent also due to the fact of martyrdom. For example the belief that "the death of an Imām is rendered void by the idea of radj'a (the return of the soul), concealment and parousia" does not find any support in the sunni school of thought. (17) These opinions of the shī'ah reveal the extent of their frustration and the measure of their hopes. It is a curious fact that their ambition to secure power in the name of the ahl 'l-bayt, or family of the Prophet, had not been satisfied. Apart from the Fātimid rule in Egypt, and the small independent principality founded in 172/788 in Morocco by Idrīs b. 'Abd

Allah, a great grandson of 'Alī, the shī'īs never at any time exercised supreme power in Islām, and until they get their chance they have to console themselves with the hope that one day the absent Imām will reveal himself and spread justice in the world according to shī'ī prescriptions. It can be seen, therefore, that shī'ism always had a special appeal to a certain type of mentality, and its attraction was particularly strong to the oppressed, frustrated and persecuted. Such people presented the 'Abbāsīd agents with an ideal medium for revolutionary activities.

The belief was spread in the lands of insurrection that the principal aim of rising against the Umayyads was to vindicate the wrongs inflicted upon the 'Alīds; and hence the use of the obscure term Hāshimīds. The campaign was conducted by twelve chief propagandists supported by seventy other assistants and they were all sworn to secrecy. They were well trained in the art of persuasion and instructed in the different methods of approach and appeal to men's weaknesses and prejudices. (18) Even when success was assured the 'Abbāsīd general 'Abd Allah al-Qusarī took al-Kūfah on behalf of the Banū Hāshim. Abū Salamah the new governor of the city also maintained his silence. When after two months he heard that allegiance was publicly given to al-Saffāh, he hurried to the new caliph and said: "you have hastened in announcing yourself but I hope the outcome will be safe." (19)

It should not be assumed that the underground movement worked peacefully all the time. When the ground was prepared by the original agents, and Abū Muslim took over, these men discarded their guise of simple and harmless commercial travellers and joined his forces. In a directive from Ibrāhīm b. Muḥammad, Abū Muslim was ordered to be extremely ruthless in waging war. "Kill whoever you suspect, and if you can annihilate every Arab from Khurāsān, then do so." (20) Abū Muslim fulfilled his instructions mercilessly and it is estimated -probably exaggeratedly- that his victims numbered six hundred thousand. How anyone can think those massacres were carried out in the name of Islām it is very difficult to imagine! The motive for those hideous crimes was simply blind lust for worldly power and nothing else. The 'Abbāsids hoaxed the people and led them blindfold and finally confronted them with an accomplished fact for which there was no alternative but death. Al-Saffāḥ, the first caliph of the new dynasty, did not acquire his infamous label in vain; for it was the blood of the Muslims shed so freely by him that earned that tyrant his description. (21) Far from being a movement intended to do away with Umayyad injustice, the 'Abbāsīd rising heralded a despotism more unscrupulous than anything seen before.

THE PERSIAN CHARACTER OF THE 'ABBĀSID CALIPHATE.

The advent of the 'Abbāsids marked a revival of the

national life of Persia. Arab writers often minimised this definite change and took comfort in the Qurashite lineage of the caliphs. Although rulers and ruled are normally interdependent and closely linked by the common bond of nationality, greater importance is usually attached to the people regardless of the sovereign. Whatever his origin or ancestry, the supreme head of a State should be identified with the people he rules and not vice versa. For example, Otto the first ruler of the resurrected and independent Kingdom of Greece in 1830 was himself a Bavarian Prince; Muhammad 'Alī "the founder of Egyptian independence and of the royal house which still reigns in Cairo, was an Albanian Moslem from Kavalla;" and the present monarch of the United Kingdom is partly of German ancestry. (22) Therefore, it is not an extraordinary historical event to find an Arab caliph on the Persian throne. It is interesting to notice that a secretary of Charlamagne refers to Hārūn al-Rashīd as "the King of Persia, Aaron." (23)

There is reason to believe that although the Persians were decisively defeated in battle by the Arabs, they never gave up the struggle for national survival and independence. Islām was accepted by them as a religion and a civilisation, but at the same time they continued to oppose the Arabs, and whenever possible plotted seriously for their downfall. Proofs are not lacking of Persian endeavours to disorganise and split Arab unity. "National

enmity was the principal cause of the murder of 'Umar b. al-Khattāb," says al-'Aqqād.(24) The murderer was a Persian who was motivated by hatred to the Arabs. "The Persian converts and slaves were not really sincere to the Arabs," says Ṭaha Hussain.(25) By way of vengeance and as an outlet for the intense dislike they had for their conquerors, the Persians exploited the political differences between the Arab parties and tried to intensify discord between them in order to disorganise their ranks and weaken their solidarity. Further, the treachery of the 'Irāqīs and in particular the residents in the area near al-Kūfah which was the seat of the Persian kings before Islām, was one effective method of shattering Arab unity and strength. The Persians in that locality were very conscious of their defeat, and their repeated betrayal of Arab claimants to the caliphate should be regarded as an expression of a determined will to emancipation. It is unlikely that any people can be perfidious or volatile by nature; circumstances, however, sometimes force men to resort to practices of this kind for higher ends. It should be remembered that even when the wave of Arab conquest was at its height, the Persians revolted against the attacking armies and rejoined the resisting remnants of the forces under Rustum. (26) We seem entitled to conclude, therefore, that the 'Abbāsids by establishing their rule in Persian surroundings and with Persian swords, had unwittingly caused the rebirth

of that nation. This fact was clearly realised at the time of the revolution immediately preceding the collapse of the Umayyads. The leaders on the spot knew then that the struggle was a national and not a religious one, and they appealed in vain for a concerted Arab counter attack.(27) Fortunately for Islām, however, the Persians themselves had been absorbed in that religion. Their renaissance was to a great extent modelled on the Muslim pattern, but traces of the Sassanid régime could be detected in the various political institutions introduced by the 'Abbāsids. The social life of the new dynasty was also influenced by the pre-Islamic Persian standards and manners.

Some students erroneously use Arabism and Islām as synonyms. This may perhaps account for the mistaken application of the term Arab to the 'Abbasid caliphate. Dr. Sanhoury refers to that dynasty as "la deuxième dynastie arabe." But he does, however, qualify his statement by mentioning that "c'est l'élément persan qui est devenu préponderant...L'influence de cette nation s'est fait sentir dès le debut du règne Abbaside." (28)

On the whole, the Persian stamp on the 'Abbasid period has been marked clearly. "A Persian and Khurasanian dynasty," is the description of Prof. Browne.(29) Prof. Nicholson in his moderate statement asserts that "we pass from the period of Arabian nationalism to one of Persian ascendancy and cosmopolitan culture,...the new dynasty, owing

its rise to the people of Persia and especially of Khurasan, could exist only by establishing a balance of power between Persians and Arabs." (30) Dr. Thomas suggests that since the 'Abbāsīd caliphs owed their throne to Persian Khurāsān-ian levies they had to shape their rule accordingly. (31)

It is doubtful whether the new rulers had intended the Persians to rise again as a nation opposed to the Arabs. There is reason to believe that the 'Abbāsīds were forced to choose Persia as a final resort. This is inferred from the letter of the chief 'Abbāsīd in al-Ḥumaymah to his agents. The Arabs having previously rejected the thesis of hereditary succession in the Prophet's family could not be induced to change their minds in favour of remoter relatives of his. The people of Syria were definitely pro-Umayyad. "But the people of Khurāsān were great in ⁿumber...empty in hearts having no fixed loyalties...possessed of large bodies and low intelligence, yet impressive and persevering soldiers." (32) When finally the revolution succeeded, the ruling house had to be set up amid its supporters and nowhere else, and it had also to accept the character of the environment that brought it victory. The effects of the change were far reaching. Persia did not only become a free State once more, but actually fell heir to the Arab and Muslim Empire. From al-Anbār, the capital of al-Saffāh, and later from Baghdād, the famous capital of al-Manṣūr and his followers appointments all over the whole dominion were

made, and the City of Peace became the political Ka'bah of the Muslim world. Thus the new society was not a closed one but a unit in a cosmopolitan State, and the new civilisation was neither wholly Persian nor purely Muslim; it was a combination of both with an essence of its own. The remarkable feature about the Persian^s was their keen interest in Islāmic studies. Their antipathies towards the Arabs were not combined with similar feelings towards the language or the culture derived from Islām. On the contrary, a great interest was taken in the study of Arab literature and thought. The first century of the 'Abbāsīd caliphate was rightly called the golden period of Islām, not only because of the great material prosperity and splendour of rulers and ruled that followed the change of dynasties, but because of the impressive strides in scholarly achievements. As soon as the wave of persecution was over, both Arabs and non-Arabs set to work together under the auspices of the caliphs. The benefits of that policy were immense. As already mentioned, it was during that century that the sciences of tradition, law, philology and philosophy seriously engaged the minds of Muslim thinkers of all nationalities. Parochial considerations were dwarfed by the unifying power of Islām. In administration and court life, the Persian pattern was in vogue, but in the more fundamental matters Islām kept its original identity. But it was singularly unfortunate that politics followed the baser values of the period. The Arabs

were not fully reconciled to the prevailing conditions and attempted to stage a come-back. They exerted themselves to tip the balance in their favour but their efforts were defeated, and civil war proved harmful to both sides. The most painful symptom of that phenomenon was the struggle between al-Amīn and al-Ma'mūn.

GOVERNMENT BY DIVINE RIGHT.

The 'Abbāsids introduced into Muslim politics a wholly unorthodox theory of State, namely, government by divine right. Not only did the caliphs rule as special agents of God, but claimed a kind of divinity for themselves -an assertion which no Muslim ruler before, including the Prophet himself, dared to put forward. Leaving aside the revolutionary movement which culminated in their seizure of power, the 'Abbasids attributed their legal sanction not to the will of the people as was the case previously, but to the principle of sacred heredity. The ruling imām, who by that very fact allegedly possessed a divine and unique authority, had the right to appoint his successor and impart to him his mysterious spiritual power. The waṣiyyah, or bequest, was the term used for this peculiar transaction. Like the word shī'ah, the waṣiyyah became a technical expression. We learn that Ibrāhīm b. Muḥammad appointed his brother al-Saffāh as a waṣī, or executor, and bequeathed to him his hereditary rights. Prof. Browne suggests that this idea and the special relationship of the imām and

his executor are of Jewish origin. Moses and his brother Aaron were the classical examples of this concept, and the Prophet Muḥammad and his cousin ʿAlī were supposedly its Muslim prototypes. (33) We have reason to think that a combination of shīʿī and Persian ideas can be put forward as an explanation of this development in Islām. The origin of this belief can be traced to a much earlier period than ʿAbbāsīd times. Al-Shahrastānī in his account of al-Ghulāh, or shīʿī extremists, says that ʿAbd Allah b. Saba once addressed ʿAli b. Abū Tālib as anta anta, literally meaning "you are you," or in other words, "you are God." ʿAlī immediately refuted the assertion and ordered the banishment of Ibn Saba from Medina. (34) But the profound enthusiast did not desist and went on with his activities setting up a conspiracy in favour of ʿAlī. With the passing of time the shīʿah movement widened rather than diminished in scope. It was observed further that heretic teachings had a greater chance of acceptance in the areas which were far distant from the orthodox Muslim centres. But nowhere in Islām was there a more intensive concentration of shīʿīs than in al-ʿIrāq and the provinces surrounding it. This, incidentally is the case up to the present time. (35) Therefore, there must have been another factor peculiar to that province to account for the phenomenon. We are inclined to believe that the explanation may be found in the pre-Islamic Persian traditions. It is probable that the reverence of kings was

so great that it amounted to deification. When the 'Abbāsids established a government and a court after the Sassānid fashion, the people must have revived the custom of earlier times. When the imām became caliph his alleged divine illumination did not weaken or suffer, but rather increased. The Rawandiyyah, a faction of the Ghulāh, flocked to the residence of the caliph to pay him homage. These extremists declared their caliphs to be gods. (36) But their exaggerated sentiments could not be accepted with safety by any responsible ruler. Al-Mansūr, whose palace was once visited by these men, was shrewd enough to realise the danger of allowing such views to pass unchallenged. He rejected their beliefs and punished them for their profanity. (3)

Although the 'Abbāsids were not foolish enough to declare that they were gods, they nevertheless went far beyond their station when they attributed a measure of divinity to their own persons, thus setting themselves on a plane higher than the rest of the Muslims. This unparalleled attitude of superiority was expressed in three ways: (a) constitutional irresponsibility, (b) assertions in public implying unique spiritual powers, and (c) disregard for the will of the people. Upon these three contentions the 'Abbāsīd theocracy was established.

(a) In their autocracy and consequent legal irresponsibility before their subjects, the rulers of Baghdād

were not different from their Damascan predecessors. Although the machinery of State was bigger and more intricate than before, no legal competence was invested in the officials. Even the prerogatives of the wazīr were exercised as a personal concession from the caliph; in other words, the principal secretaries of State had no constitutional standing; what power they possessed was conferred upon them by their masters as a personal favour. But "if at any moment the Caliph lost patience with the Wazir, he would relieve^e him of his office if not his head." (38) The might of the magnificent Barmakīs vanished overnight by one wrathful blow from Hārūn and nobody dared to interfere or raise a voice in protest. As Prof. Browne says, "the office of the Wazir for all the power and dignity which it carried with it, was a perilous one." Abū Salamah, the first minister in Islām, was put to death by order of al-Saffāh, and Abū 'l-Jahm, the successor of Abū Salamah was poisoned by the same caliph. Feeling the venom of his sovereign, the first minister dragged himself out of the caliph's presence. "Where are you going?" asked al-Saffāh, "to where you are sending me!" replied the broken man. Abū Muslim, the architect of 'Abbāsīd victory was also murdered by al-Manṣūr .(39) It would be wise, therefore, not to dwell too much on the similarities between a wazīr of that period, and a prime minister in modern times. There seems reason to accept the view

that the wizārah of the 'Abbāsids was a revival of a Persian institution.(40) On the other hand, the present ministerial system in independent Muslim States is largely based on the western notion of legal and constitutional responsibility before the nation and its representatives.

(b) In their public speeches and statements the 'Abbāsīd caliphs left sufficient evidence to indict them not only as theocrats, but as heretics in the eyes of the pious Muslims. The speeches referred to have often been quoted as examples of the fine oratory and literary ability of the rulers concerned, and this lends greater force to the charge. Had the writers been seeking to incriminate the caliphs by quoting their words, the possibility of forgery in the records would have arisen.

In a sermon delivered at Mecca during the season of pilgrimage al-Manṣūr said: "Oh People! verily I am the power of God on earth. I lead you with His approval, guidance, and support. I am the custodian of His property, and I do with it what I like, certain that I act according to His will and desire; for Allah made me a lock. If He wished, he would cause me to open (my hands) and be generous to you and decide your fortunes; and if He pleased, He would close my hands on His wealth. Intercede, therefore, with Allah and His Prophet that I may be directed to the right path and act mercifully and charitably towards you."(41)

Evidence of caliphal divine mandate can also be

deduced from some State documents of al-Rashīd. This caliph who lived luxuriously and indulged in wine and other carnal pleasures in a lax manner, thought and acted as if he were himself a god. The concluding part of his document of succession in which al-Amin was appointed heir to the throne, contained besides an irrevocable command binding on all Muslims, a potent threat of excommunication to all dissentients. "Oh community of Muslims! You have to fulfil the articles contained in this letter by the Commander of the Faithful...and if you change any part of this will, or in any manner revoke its terms...you will lose the protection of Allah, His Prophet, and all the Faithful and Muslims, and everything you may possess now or for fifty years to come, will be given away to the poor...and every rebel must walk in penitence to the House of God in Mecca fifty times in pilgrimage, and Allah shall insist on the fulfilment of this condition and no alternative can be accepted... and every slave you own or may acquire in the course of fifty years from now will be free.. and every wife you have will be irrevocably divorced." (42) The astounding assertions contained in this document by Hārūn, were reaffirmed in similar orders to his sons, and the possibility that his action had been taken in haste or without serious meditation must, therefore, be excluded. But the people do not seem to have conceded such right to the caliph; for in spite of all his threats, the will of Hārūn

was totally revoked a short time after his death. But the point we seek to establish is that any ruler who claims for himself such authority over men's lives and fortunes is exceeding all conceivable limits. He is in fact setting himself on a plane higher than that ordinarily accorded to mortals; or else he could not venture to exercise such an unwarrantable mandate on behalf of God.

By order of Hārūn the document was hung on the walls of the Ka'bah for all to read, and copies of it were circulated through the whole dominion with specific instructions to provincial governors to spread its contents as far afield as possible. The circular stated: "By order of the Commander of the Faithful, a copy of the agreement reached between his two sons Muḥammad and 'Abd Allah is attached herewith...Read it to all the Muslims in your area and explain its contents to them,... and register it in your diwān, and write to the Commander of the Faithful of the reaction it causes. (Written by Ismā'īl b. Ṣabīḥ on Saturday 23rd. Muḥarram 186 A.H.)" (43)

The same theocratic despotism was exercised by al-Ma'mūn who followed closely the method of his predecessors. He went a step further by asserting that the caliphate was not only an office, but a unique quality that certain people only do possess. (44) The implication was that the will of his subjects had no validity or

meaning because^s he was installed in his office by God whether they liked it or not.

Another indication of 'Abbāsid theocracy may be inferred from the manner of address to the caliphs. These included some complimentary expressions which were so highly exaggerated that they amounted to blasphemy. Since these undeserved compliments had often been made during the first century of that caliphate, and since we have no records of official disapproval of these profane assertions, we may be justified in concluding that the caliphs encouraged and fostered such ideas among their subjects. The following are a few revealing examples of the exaggerated eulogies.

"Thanks be to Allah who made the caliph an heir to His inspiration, and a trustee of His Book among His servants,... for verily Allah has chosen the Commander of the Faithful for his caliphate, and created him to rule the peoples and nations by His command and His justice."

"Thanks be to Allah who supported the Commander of the Faithful since his appointment as His successor in earth, and trustee over His creatures."

"Thanks be to Allah who conferred upon the Commander of the Faithful the inheritance of His apostleship, and transferred to him the reins of His succession."

"Thanks be to Allah who singled out the Commander of the Faithful with His inheritance and directed him to His caliphate." (45)

(c) The will of the people expressed in the bai'ah reached a very low ebb under the 'Abbāsids. It was, of course, meaningless to make such grandiose claims about the divinity of the caliphs and at the same time appeal to the people for confirmation. Nevertheless, a shadow of the bai'ah was maintained. Men acted only as negative agents because the caliph used to nominate his successor and confirm his appointment by spiritual^a bequest and the only part played by the Muslims in the transaction was to acknowledge the accomplished fact. Occasionally a caliph would appoint two successors, but the practice proved very disappointing as it created severe conflict between the interested parties. Be that as it may, the traditions of theocracy were quite strict under this régime. The ruler received -or thought he did- his prerogatives from God. He acted in His name and was consequently responsible to Him. The will of God was expressed in the actions of the caliph who thus concluded that his will must be treated as an expression of divine will. This, incidentally, was more than the Prophet's claims for himself and his office.

The 'Abbāsīd caliphs took the obedience of the people for granted, because in their opinion men had no rights or privileges but those bestowed upon them by their rulers. This, then, accounts for the theoretical origin of the divine prerogatives of the caliphs; it also explains the bases of the uncommon disciplinary sanctions declared

against any possible withholders^h of allegiance; in fact both notions were closely inter-related. In the circular of Hārūn to his governors the threatened damnation of dissentients was the natural result of the alleged unidirectional^u relationship between God and caliph. The preamble to the document under consideration lends force to this view. "Allah is the Patron of the Commander of the Faithful and his heirs. He is the protector of His caliph, and his guide in what he does or leaves undone. He is the bestower on the caliph of victory in east and west..." (46)

ELEMENTS OF POLITICAL THOUGHT.

Settled conditions of life and comparative prosperity together with caliphal patronage of scholars justified the assumption that the first century of the 'Abbasids was a memorable one. Independent studies were encouraged, and the learned and talented men of the age were welcomed in court circles. Munificent rewards were given in appreciation of valuable contributions in the realm of knowledge. Accounts of the generosity of caliphs are given in most literary works. These, however, are not our immediate concern, and we shall, therefore, dwell only on the aspects most relevant to our subject. Jurisprudence and translations of foreign works into Arabic were among the prominent features of mental life under the 'Abbāsids.

The influence of the faqīhs was most marked not only on their students and immediate associates, but on

the Muslim world as a whole. Eminent teachers like Abū Hanīfah and Ibn Hanbāl in Baghdād, and Mālik b. Anas in Medina attracted to their circles students from near and distant parts of the Empire. The respect and sympathy shown to these doctors were clear indications of high understanding and admiration. That these jurists were principally guided by their impeccable conscience and unbiased love of truth can be confirmed from the moral courage exhibited in their teachings which at times were in diametrical opposition to the views of the caliphs. Imprisonment and flogging were inflicted upon Mālik, Abū Hanīfah, and Ibn Hanbāl -three out of the four founders of Sunni schools of thought. Ibn Khallikān says that Abū Hanīfah died in prison.(47) But like all men of mental integrity and resolution the faqīhs held tenaciously to what they considered to be right. The points of difference between jurists and caliphs were not extraneous or irrelevantly pedantic, but really fundamental. Mālik, for instance, received his chastisement for asserting that the oath of allegiance to the 'Abbāsids was not legally binding. That amounted to sedition which at the time was a very serious charge against anyone; but Mālik took his stand deliberately and with his eyes open. Ibn Hanbāl denounced the Mu'tazilite doctrines, and dissented from al-Ma'mūn's theory of the creation of the Qur'ān, and was on that account scourged and flogged by order of the caliph.

According to Ibn Khallikān, 800,000 men and 60,000 women attended Ibn Hanbal's funeral.(48) If that is so, then it was an eloquent expression of sympathy and support to the reverend doctor, and a silent demonstration against his persecutor. It is quite possible that the moral excellence and unwavering conviction shown under trial by the celebrated imams made a^s deep an impression^{on} the public mind as did their profundity.

The active movement of translation into Arabic from Greek, Persian, Sanskrit, Syriac, Hebrew, Latin and Coptic sources, resulted in the enrichment of the language and paved the way for Muslim scholars to proceed on their own initiative in the new tracks. Muslim and non-Muslim intellectuals engaged in translation, but the latter were more numerous and in this respect it seems that no discrimination was made between men because of religious differences. In philosophy, the Greek masters of political thought exerted a decided weight on later Muslim philosophers; it was only natural that a certain time should be spent in the understanding and adequate recognition of a branch of knowledge for which the Muslims, and the Arabs in particular, had no special aptitude.

In his thesis on "Islam and the Principles of Government," the modern Egyptian jurist 'Alī 'Abd al-Rāziq, asserts categorically that: "we do not know of a single author or translator of politics in Islām, neither are we

aware of any researches in systems of government or fundamentals of State." He maintains further that, "the Muslims have neglected the study of Plato's Republic and Aristotle's Politics."(49) We venture to suggest that this part of the celebrated treatise needs to be reconsidered; for the truth is that, not only were the Republic and the Politics translated into Arabic during the first century of the 'Abbāsids, and made a profound impression of some men of distinction, but that all the major political works of Plato and Aristotle available at the time had been rendered into Arabic. At a later date these books and others of similar interest were expounded by no less an authority than al-Fārābī. Ibn Rushd and al-Kindi, besides their commentaries on these political classics, added original contributions of their own.

Ibn al-Nadīm (325-400 /936-1009), the author of al-Fihrist, or Index, says that Hunain b. Ishāq (194-260 /809-873) translated kitāb al-siyāsa (politics) and kitāb al-nawāmīs (laws) by Plato.(50) We are also told that the Philosopher of the Arabs al-Kindī -born about the middle of the ninth century A.D.- worked under al-Ma'mūn and al-Mu'tasim as a translator and editor of Greek philosophical manuscripts. "His major thesis was on politics," says the author of al-Fihrist. (51)

Ibn 'l-Qiftī (568-646 /1172-1248), gives a similar account and adds some details on the political translations

and compositions by Arabic authors. (52)

Ibn Abū 'Usaibi'ah (600-663/1203-1270), says: "some philosophical compositions^a are concerned with morals, others with politics; those on politics deal with the State, or siyāsaḥ al-mudun, and with economics, or siyāsaḥ al-manzil. In his reference to Plato, Ibn Abū Usaibi'ah says: "among his twelve philosophical books, one is on political philosophy and another on law." (53)

"Al-Fārābī," says Usaibi'ah, "has two excellent books, one on politics and the other on morals,.. and he also edited the Compendium of Politics by Aristotle and the Laws by Plato." (54) Another source gives the information that al-Fārābī included politics among the five principal sciences. (55)

"The philosophy of Ibn Rushd (Averroes) is based on that of Plato as is shown by the former's commentary on the Republic," says Faraḥ Antūn, a modern biographer of Ibn Rushd . Antūn also says that the Politics of Aristotle was rendered into Arabic by Ibn Rushd . (56)

The conclusion cannot be escaped, therefore, that the study of political philosophy was open before Muslim thinkers. They availed themselves of the opportunity, but it seems that their efforts in that direction were not fully appreciated, and the interest aroused in the subject was not large enough to create a general impression in the public mind. It is highly doubtful whether the caliphs

deliberately discouraged their subjects from the study of politics. It is evident that the faqīhs who preferred to suffer persecution rather than give up or change their views on jurisprudence could easily have done the same in the sphere of political thought had they accurately assessed its far reaching impact on the life of the individual and the State. There seems reason to hold that the Muslims voluntarily concentrated on jurisprudence and derived from it their notions on social and political life. Good life in the State was based on the rules of the sharī'ah, and good morals were those prescribed in the Qur'ān and Tradition. Reason played its part in shaping the thoughts of Muslims, but when a choice had to be made between wisdom and religious dogma, the latter was invariably followed.

This, then, is our view of the development of political thought and practice in Islām. From the Hijrah to the end of the first century of the 'Abbāsīd caliphate, no Muslim thinker deservedly reached fame through eminence in political philosophy. In the practice of government and administration there certainly were many renowned and able men. But these were individual cases, and had their number been greater, or had their methods been steadily and consistently observed and improved, a fine tradition of good government might have been established, and the Muslim Empire might not have dwindled so quickly. The believers were too quick and ready to surrender their inherent rights

of self-government. The caliphs who benefited from that weakness exploited their advantage to the full. On the whole, insatiable lust for power, individually or dynastically, was the motivating force behind the rule of the Umayyad and Abbasid caliphs. Had the promising start shown after the death of the Prophet been faithfully kept up, the political heritage of Islām might have been something higher than it actually was. But that unfortunately was not the case; for every addition to the power of the ruler meant an equal subtraction from the collective authority and will of the nation; in other words, a weakening of the essential antidote to unchecked autocracy.

If asked to summarise in one sentence the gist of the views expressed in this thesis, we would say that we have discussed various aspects of despotism.

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CH. VIII

NOTES

1. In this short historical introduction only factual data have been included, and controversial arguments purposely avoided. Cf. Khald. H.iii:128 ff., Athir v:152 ff, Ṭab.III,i:23ff., Mas.M ii:143 ff., Fakhri 201 ff., Ya'qūbī ii:404 ff., Muir C. 432 ff., LHA 254 ff., LHP I:251 ff., Lane-Poole 12, Zambaur 4, EI i:14 f., Hitti HA 288.
2. Our survey ends with the reign of al-Wāthiq. For exact dates and fuller information concerning lineage see Zambaur op.cit. p.4.
3. Tab. III,i:23. I failed to find this tradition in Bukhārī .
4. Ya'qūbī ii:47, EI i:10.
5. Ya'qūbī ii:138.
6. EI i:10.
7. Ibid "
8. Ibid i:20.
9. Ibid. "
10. Bal. iv:5.
11. Fida 450, Yāqūt, Geography ii:342, and cf. iii:271.
12. Fida 474.
13. EIi:101
14. Fida 480.
15. Bayhaqi: al-mahāsin wa 'l-masāwi', ed. Schwally, Glessen 1902, p.403.

16. See additional note 1, below.
17. EI, iii:1170, cf. iv:351.
18. The names of the chief 'Abbāsīd propagandists and the directive issued to them are mentioned in 'Asr al-Ma'mūn i:83.
19. Ya'qūbī ii:412 f., Ibn Qutaibah op.cit. 187.
20. 'Asr i:84.
21. Cf. 'Alī 'Abd al-Rāziq op.cit.29.
22. H.A.L.Fisher: A History of Europe, London, 1942, p. 880.
23. Hitti, HA. 298.
24. Al-'Aqqād op.cit. 346.
25. Taha Husain op.cit. 137.
26. Bal'amī iii:399.
27. Ṭab. II,iii:1865.
28. Sanhoury op.cit 300.
29. LHP . i:265.
30. LHA. xxviii
31. Thomas op.cit. 204.
32. 'Asr. i:83.
33. LHP. i:215.
34. Milal. p.132.
35. For an estimate of the shi'ah position in the present time, see additional note 2 below.
36. Milal 132, LHP. i:315 f.
37. Van Vloten, op.cit. 48: "the Rāwāndīs worshipped as God al-Manṣūr."

38. Thomas, op.cit. 137.
39. LHP .i:257.
40. The Persian origin of the word wazīr is stated in additional note 3 below.
41. 'Iqā. ii:370, Cf. 'Alī 'Abd al-Rāziq p.4.
42. 'Aṣr ii:244.
43. Ibid ii:249.
44. Ibid iii:29.
45. Ibid ii:174 ff.
46. Ibid. ii:249.
47. Wafayāt, ii:241, cf. i:625.
48. Ibid i:23.
49. 'Alī 'Abd al-Rāziq, 22-24.
50. Ibn al-Nadīm: Kitāb al-Fihrist, ed. Flügel, Leipzig, 1871, i:246.
51. Ibid i:260, cf. EI ii:1019.
52. Ibn al-Qifti: tārīkh 'l-hukamā', ed. J.Lippert, Leipzig, 1903, pp. 17, 27, 197, 277.
53. Ibn Abū Usaibi'ah, ed. Müller, 2 vols. Cairo, and Königsberg, 1883-4, i:58.
54. Ibid. ii:136.
55. Muḥammad Riḍā al-Shabībī: ihṣā' 'l-'ulūm by al-Fārābī, published in the 'Irfān, Syria, 1921, p.252.
56. Farah Antūn: Ibn Rushd wa falsafatih, (Averroes and his Philosophy." Alexandria, 1903, pp.26,59.

Additional note 1; .

FALLACIES IN LINEAGE.

According to Ya'qūbī the Prophet is reputed to have said: "do not boast of your lineage, but of your (good) work." (Ya'qūbī ii:123). Ibn Sa'd, II, i:131, gives evidence of the Prophet's disapproval of appeal to glorious ancestors as a means of attaining distinction undeservedly. In the event of such appeal, however, Muḥammad favoured adherence to the paternal line. Since the Prophet left no male heirs, the children of his daughters should have followed the family tree of their fathers. Qur.xxxiii:40 "Muḥammad is not the father of any of your men... "وَمَا مُحَمَّدٌ أَبَا أَحَدٍ مِّن رِّجَالِكُمْ" may have been intended for that purpose.

It seems however, that the architects or makers of lineage, were quite inconsistent in their method; for they selected the route that yielded the greatest honour and ignored the humble side of descent. The paternal and maternal sides were thus confused. For instance, al-Amin, and al-Ma'mun were half brothers. The mother of the first was said to have been Arab, and the latter's was Persian. Al-Amin was on that account considered Arab. But Hārūn, the father of both men, was himself a son of a Persian woman called Khayzurān. (Hitti HA.304) How then could al-Amin justify his Arab descent? Now Zudaydah, who conferred the honour of Arab origin on her son al-Amin was not fully entitled to do so: for she was a descendant of al-Mansūr, himself a son of a Berber slave woman. No lineage, should be admitted without careful scrutiny.

Additional note 2.

THE PRESENT STRENGTH OF THE SHI'AH.

Of the twenty two million shī'īs forming 9% of the Muslim population of the world, the greatest concentration is still in the traditional shī'ī localities, that is Persia and al-'Irāq. The rest are scattered in small pockets in Asia and Africa. The official religion of Persia, whose population is about sixteen million, is the Ithnā 'Ashariyyah or believers in twelve hereditary imāms. The proportion of sunnīs to shī'īs in al-'Irāq, whose population exceeds three million, is 5:8. The southern provinces of al-'Irāq are predominantly shī'ī. There seems reason to think that the bond between the shī'īs in al-'Irāq and their neighbouring co-religionists is very strong. In Karbala and al-Najaf which are considered sacred in shī'ī opinion, Persian is nearly a second language besides being the tongue of culture. It is interesting to observe that the chief priest of Persia usually resides in al-Najaf and sometimes in Karbala, even though both localities are outside the political frontiers of Persia.

A visit to al-Najaf and Karbala is called a pilgrimage, and is considered to be as meritorious as that to Mecca. The shī'īs hardly ever follow or share the traditional religious festivities of the sunnīs. Religious intolerance between both sects is unhappily apparent up to the present time. Cf. The Statesman's Year Book, ed.M.Epstein, London, 1946, pp.1014, 1154, 1302.

Additional note 3.

A COMMENT ON THE WORD WAZĪR.

Although the Qur'ān contains two references (xx:29, xxv:35) to wazir, neither the word nor its 'Abbāsīd application conform to the special notion depicted in the Book. In both Qur'ānic references, Aaron was the person intended. But he was not totally subservient to his brother, because both Moses and Aaron were appointed by Allah and each had a specific duty to perform. They were complementary to one another. This is shown from the verses (Qur.xx:43 ff.) "Go both to Pharaoh, ..and speak to him..and say: surely we are two apostles of your Lord.." the dual form of address is used, and had one of them been solely responsible the singular would have been applied. The Jewish interpretation of this fraternal relationship is not dissimilar to the Qur'ānic one. (Cf. JE. i:2) Prof. Browne (LHP. i:255) maintains that the word wazir is identical with Pahlawī vi-chir meaning counsellor. It is interesting to notice that Dr. Jeffery (op. cit.287) includes the word among the foreign ones in the Qur'ān. His conclusion seemingly reached independently of Browne's. (LHP. is not mentioned in Jeffery's work.)

The fact that al-Saffāh was the first to appoint a wazir in Islām can be taken as an indication of the Persian origin of the institution. Ibn Khaldūn P. xvii:5, confirms the Persian origin of the office of wazir, and Jurjī Zaidān agrees. (Cf. Zaidān, op.cit. i:112).

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