Repetition and the Question of Temporality in Kierkegaard's Authorship

Dafni Giofkou

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School of Critical Studies
College of Arts
University of Glasgow

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"...κι ίσως, για να βγάλεις φτερά,
φτάνει ν' ακουμπήσεις σ' έναν τοίχο και να σκεφτείς πόσο λίγο θα ζήσεις
- έτσι άρχισαν τα πουλιά."

[...and perhaps to grow wings,
it is enough to lean against a wall and think how little time you shall live
- so began the birds.]

Tasos Livaditis, *The Devil with the Candlestick*

Abstract

This thesis undertakes the task of elucidating Kierkegaard's category of repetition as related to temporality and the way in which it unfolds from *Repetition* (1843) and *The Concept of Anxiety* (1844) to the "Upbuilding Discourses" and the three sets of discourses on the lilies and the birds published in 1847, 1848, and 1849. I draw on literary theory and rhetorics, ancient theories of time (from Parmenides to Plato and Aristotle), selected writings from monastic literature (from *Apophthegmata Patrum* to Ps-Macarius' *Homilies* and the *Philokalia* of the Neptic Fathers) and Pietism (mainly, Johann Arndt's *True Christianity*).

The thesis is divided in two parts, entitled "Movement" and "Rest," alluding thus to two overarching themes in Kierkegaard's writings. Part I takes the cue from Diogenes' anecdote that opens the novella *Repetition* and follows along the notion of movement/change/becoming and time as treated by Plato, Aristotle, and Hegel. I show (a) how the themes of recollection and immortality outlined in *On the Concept of Irony* (1841) are reworked by Kierkegaard in *Repetition* (b) that Hegel's *Lectures on the History of Philosophy* proves to be an important intertext in *Repetition*. By employing the narratological taxonomy of Gérard Genette and being attentive to the narrative temporality of the novella, I illustrate the way in which the text engages the reader with the question of the possibility of repetition.

I expound Aristotle's theory of time and movement (κινήσις) in *Physics* and Plato's and the instant of change (*ἐξαίφνης*) in the *Parmenides* so as to provide the necessary grounding in order to (a) read the long footnote on the *Parmenides* (CA, 82-84n/SKS 4, 385) as it is refracted in the text of *The Concept of Anxiety* (b) evaluate the critique of Platonic moment in *The Concept of Anxiety* (c) situate his critique within the context of Kierkegaard's contemporary readings of the *Parmenides*. Kierkegaard faces the challenges of treating the moment as an extra-temporal, aesthetic-metaphysical abstraction and, in doing so, alternative temporalities emerge, cast as existential affects: anxiety, concern, longing, joy.

The main argument of Part II is that via the inactivity of the lilies and improvidence of the birds, that is, through the 'antithetical' pair of work and rest, Kierkegaard introduces the theology of the Sabbath-rest. In particular, the

kingfisher (Alcedo ispida), which achieves peace [*Ro*] by building its nest upon the sea, illustrates Kierkegaard's notion of 'freedom from care'. Therefore, an important dimension of Kierkegaard's theory of time and eternity is fleshed out. Kierkegaard continually reworks the theme of "the day of rest [*Hviledag*]" incorporating in his text Hebrews 3, in which the Sabbath and the 'today' are most distinctly intertwined. I evaluate a variety of textual sources ranging from the spiritual writings of Ps-Macarius (a desert father of the 4th century) and the literature of desert monasticism to Pietist writers. My aim is: (a) to present the theology of the Sabbath rest in Eastern Orthodox tradition and in Pietism (b) to address the complicated issue of Ps-Macarius' influence on Pietism (c) to expound the presence of the themes of vigilance in prayer, soberness, and *ἀμεριμνία* (freedom from care) in desert monasticism and in Kierkegaard's discourses (d) to show how the notion of rebirth and the Pietistic "spiritual Sabbath of the heart" are rearticulated in Kierkegaard. The expectation of the Sabbath rest, apart from its eschatological overtones, is a reality that could be achieved here 'today'. The inbreaking of the Sabbath rest in time could transform time within time. The longest day, "the day of eternity," this very day (*Without Authority*, 44-45/SKS 11, 48) is the day of rest [*Hviledag*] and, as I have tried to show, bears affinities to the mystery of the eighth day and the doctrine of Transfiguration in Orthodox spirituality.

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Abbreviations

Citations are from the Danish *Søren Kierkegaards Skrifter* abbreviated as SKS followed by the volume and page number (source is the digital edition of *Søren Kierkegaards Skrifter*). All biblical quotations in English are from *New Revised Standard Version* (NRSV) and in Greek from SBL Greek New Testament (SBLGNT).

ACKL	*The Auction Catalogue of Kierkegaard's Library*, Jon Stewart, Gerhard Schreiber, Katalin Nun (eds.) (Oxford: Routledge, 2016).
AP	Apophthegmata Patrum
CA	*The Concept of Anxiety: A Simple Psychologically Orienting Deliberation on the Dogmatic Issue of Hereditary Sin*, Reidar Thomte (ed. and trans.) (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980).
CD	*Christian Discourses: The Crisis and a Crisis in the Life of an Actress*, Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (eds. and trans.) (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997).
CI	*The Concept of Irony, with Continual Reference to Socrates/Notes of Schelling's Berlin Lectures*, Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (eds. and trans.) (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989).
CUP	*Concluding Unscientific Postscript to the* Philosophical Crumbs (Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy), Alastair Hannay (trans.) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).
EO 1	*Either/Or, Part I*, Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (eds. and trans.) (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988).
EO 2	*Either/Or, Part II*, Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (eds. and trans.) (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988).
EUD	*Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses*, Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (eds. and trans.) (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991).

EPW	*Early Polemical Writings,* Julia Watkin (ed.), Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990.
FSE	*For Self-Examination/Judge For Yourself!*, Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (eds. and trans.) (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991).
FT	*Fear and Trembling/Repetition*, Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (eds. and trans.) (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983).
GNO	*Gregorii Nysseni Opera,* W. Jaeger et al. (eds.) (Leiden: Brill, 1952-).
JFY	*For Self-Examination/Judge For Yourself!,* Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (eds. and trans.) (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991).
JP	*Soren Kierkegaard's Journals and Papers,* Vols. 1-7, Howard V. and Edna H. Hong (eds. and trans.), assisted by Gregor Malantschuk (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1967-78).
KJN	Kierkegaard's Journals and Notebooks (Vol. 1-10), Niels Jørgen Cappelørn, Alastair Hannay, David Kangas, Bruce H. Kirmmse, George Pattison, Joel D. S. Rasmussen, David D. Possen, Vanessa Rumble, K. Brian Söderquist (eds.) (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007-2018).
LD	*Letters and Documents*, Henrik Rosenmeier (trans.) (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009).
P	*Prefaces: Writing Sampler*, Todd W. Nichol (ed. and trans.) (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998).
Pap.	*Søren Kierkegaards Papirer* [The Papers of Søren Kierkegaard], 16 Vols., P.A. Heiberg, V. Kuhr, and E. Torsting (eds.) (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 1909-1978).
PC	*Practice in Christianity*, Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (eds. and trans.) (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992).
PF	*Philosophical Fragments, or a Fragment of Philosophy/Johannes Climacus, or De omnibus dubitandum est*, Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (eds. and trans.) (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985).

PV	*The Point of View*, Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (eds. and trans.) (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009).
R	*Fear and Trembling/Repetition*, Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (eds. and trans.) (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983).
SLW	*Stages on Life's Way*, Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (eds. and trans.) (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989).
TA	*Two Ages: The Age of Revolution and the Present Age A Literary Review*, Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (eds. and trans.) (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009).
TM	*Attack Upon "Christendom",* Walter Lowrie (trans.) (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1944).
UDVS	*Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits*, Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (eds. and trans.) (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009).
WA	*Without Authority*, Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (eds. and trans.) (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009).
WL	*Works of Love,* Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (eds. and trans.) (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995).

Introduction

The work of the present thesis began as research into the relation between Søren Kierkegaard (1813-1855) and Gregory of Nyssa, a Cappadocian Father of the 4th century, attempting to read Gregory's notion of "double" creation of humanity[1] via the category of repetition. Even though the project didn't come to fruition, Gregory's insights into the atemporal and temporal perspectives on the biblical story of creation, his teaching on re-creation as "giving birth to ourselves,"[2] and the notion of *epektasis*, the spiritual ascent towards the infinite God, as continual stretching out and abiding steadily in the Good,[3] have been valuable signposts during the progress of the thesis.

In a journal entry (1850), Kierkegaard cites approvingly Gregory's view about pilgrimage:

> Gregory of Nyssa put it splendidly in connection with pilgrimages: "One does not come closer to God by changing one's place." Alas, no, it is only all too certain that it can only be done by changing oneself. (KJN 7, 157/NB16:89/SKS 23, 154 [1850])

Gregory continues that even if one were "at Golgotha or on the Mountain of Olives or by the memorial-rock of Resurrection," she would be no nearer to God if she has not made her soul a dwelling place for God.[4] Both writers share the faith that the created nature of human beings is mutable and thus can be transformed and recreated. Kierkegaard would frequently scribble down in his notebooks quotes from other writers that validate views and ideas that he had already explored in his own writings, as is the case with Gregory's quote, although his immediate source(s) might be elsewhere.

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[1] *Op hom* 16, PG 44, 181. 'Double creation' refers to Gregory's exegesis of *Genesis* 1:26 and 1:27.
[2] Gregory of Nyssa, *The Life of Moses*, Abraham J. Malherbe and Everett Ferguson (eds. and trans.) (New York: Paulist Press, 1978), p. 56.
[3] Gregory of Nyssa, *The Life of Moses*, pp. 116-118.
[4] Gregory of Nyssa, *The Letters*, Anna M. Silvas (ed. and trans.) (Leiden: Brill, 2007), p. 121.

This raises the problem not only of methodology of writing a thesis which adopts a comparative perspective but of readership of Kierkegaard's authorship. Kierkegaard says that he has written his literary review on H.C. Andersen's novel *Only a Fiddler* "with a sympathetic ink" that one must hold to "that light which alone makes the writing readable and the meaning clear" (EPW, 102/SKS 1, 57). A similar comparison of his writing with something clandestine and invisible emerges in the following note:

> There are remarks and feelings that are expressed in the sort of medium in which they only become visible when they are fired by the warmth of sympathy and the flames of enthusiasm—as with the sort of paper on which writing only becomes visible when it is held up to the light.— (KJN 2, 80/FF:57/SKS 18, 87 [1837])

In this regard, what kind of reader does this note call out? If Kierkegaard's authorship comprises pseudonymous and eponymous works, moods and biographical details, philosophical fragments and religious discourses, journal entries and drafts, puns and ironies, reading notes and translations, which "warmth of sympathy" would make the writing at least visible, let alone transparent and decipherable?

The title of the present thesis "Repetition and the Question of Temporality in Kierkegaard's Authorship" promises to elucidate Kierkegaard's category of repetition as related to temporality and the way in which it unfolds from *Repetition* (1843) and *The Concept of Anxiety* (1844) to the "Upbuilding Discourses" and the three sets of discourses on the lilies and the birds published in 1847, 1848, and 1849. Attempting to trace the various transformations of the category itself and without disregarding Kierkegaard's philosophical and theological sources, I draw on literary theory and rhetorics, ancient theories of time (from Parmenides to Plato), selected writings from monastic literature (from *Apophthegmata Patrum* to Ps-Macarius' *Homilies* and the *Philokalia*) and Pietism (mainly, Johann Arndt's *True Christianity*). The usage, for instance, of terms of literary criticism in this thesis

while discussing philosophical problems was not due to any interdisciplinary aspirations or commitments but was dictated first by the very nature of Kierkegaard's authorship,[5] wherein literature, philosophy and theology intersect, and second, by the topical hermeneutical issues that each text (even each passage) under discussion presents. My commitment though remains to find a path to engage Kierkegaard with themes and figures of Eastern Orthodox Christianity without being mired into a discourse of influence or confessional differences, which is often counter-productive if not adding to the pile of academic clichés and denominational entrenchments that impeding the reception of his authorship.

My thesis builds on the important research on repetition by N.N. Eriksen,[6] Clare Carlisle,[7] and David Kangas.[8] Eriksen undertakes the project of reconstructing the category of repetition exactly because of "an evident lack of conceptuality"[9] of this category focusing on the questions of historicality, relation to the Other, and the relation between Becoming and Being in the history of philosophy. Eriksen's study provides the paradigm of a reading that does not limit itself to the eponymous novella but seeks also to unearth repetition in Kierkegaard's upbuilding discourses. Clare Carlisle's book focuses on how movement is thematised in Kierkegaard's 1843 writings, helpfully situating the question of movement and becoming in the German and Danish philosophical landscape, particularly with regard to how F. A. Trendelenburg, Jakob Peter Mynster, F. C. Sibbern, among others, discussed the intricacies of Aristotelian and Hegelian logic. It is shown that Kierkegaard's concern with movement lies with his

[5] Kierkegaard describes himself as "the poet of the religious" (KJN 6, 300/NB13:37/SKS 22, 298 [1849]) and "a Christian poet and thinker" (KJN 5, 379/NB10:200/SKS 21, 368).

[6] Niels Nymann Eriksen, *Kierkegaard's Category of Repetition: A Reconstruction* (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2000).

[7] Clare Carlisle, *Kierkegaard's Philosophy of Becoming: Movements and Positions* (Albany: SUNY Press, 2005) and "Repetition and Recurrence: Putting Metaphysics in Motion," *The Edinburgh Critical History of Philosophy*, Alison Stone (ed.) (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2011), pp. 294–313.

[8] David J. Kangas, *Kierkegaard's Instant: On Beginnings* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2007).

[9] N.N. Eriksen, *Kierkegaard's Category of Repetition*, p. 2.

project of how one becomes a Christian.[10] David Kangas' illuminating interpretation of Kierkegaard's enduring problematic of the moment and coming-into-existence is helpful to understanding that the philosophical discussions around the problem of becoming is more than a metaphysical exercise but real stakes are involved regarding repetition as creation, the affirmation of finitude, and the instant that "falls prior" to consciousness.[11] From here, I was able to view with new eyes a text like Basil's *Hexaemeron*, where we read that "the beginning of time is not yet time [...] it is ridiculous to imagine a beginning of a beginning"[12] (see Chapter 5). George Pattison's reading of Kierkegaard's Upbuilding Discourses[13] and especially his work on the discourses about the lilies and the birds,[14] by laying emphasis on the liturgical context and the theology of creation, put me on track to think more closely the convergences between Kierkegaard and the Eastern Orthodox theology of recreation and thus forming decisively the second part of this thesis.

Lastly, I want to acknowledge the importance of the digital edition of *Søren Kierkegaards Skrifter*[15] undertaken by the Søren Kierkegaard Research Centre. With its detailed commentary, the index of biblical passages, and the hypertextual references, *Søren Kierkegaards Skrifter* was not only an invaluable source that assisted me throughout my research but has provided me, among others, the possibility to attempt a somewhat crude genetic approach, offering thus a chronological unfolding of some of Kierkegaard's ideas and motifs (i.e., the figure of the halcyon; see Chapter 6 and 7).

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[10] See also her "Climacus on the task of becoming a Christian," *Kierkegaard's 'Concluding Unscientific Postscript': A Critical Guide*, Rick Anthony Furtak (ed.) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 170-189.

[11] David Kangas, *Kierkegaard's Instant*, p. 4.

[12] Homily 1.6.

[13] George Pattison, *Kierkegaard's Upbuilding Discourses: Philosophy, Literature, and Theology* (London: Routledge, 2013).

[14] See Chapter 5 "Out there with the lilies and the birds," in *Kierkegaard and the Theology of the Nineteenth Century*: *The Paradox and the 'Point of Contact'* (Oxford: University of Oxford, 2012), pp. 102-123 and "Kierkegaard on the Lilies and the Birds: Matthew 6," *The Oxford Handbook of the Reception History of the Bible*, Michael Lieb, Emma Mason, Jonathan Roberts, and Christopher Rowland (eds.) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 529-541.

[15] http://www.sks.dk/red/forord-e.asp

As regards Kierkegaard's encounters with ancient philosophy, I largely refrain from evaluating whether Kierkegaard provided an 'accurate' reading of Plato or Aristotle. And while I am sceptical every time Kierkegaard reiterated "Aristotle rightly says…" or a similar claim, I recognize the merit of researching both the relation between Aristotle and Kierkegaard as stand-alone thinkers *and* as mediated through philosophical commentaries and readings of Kierkegaard's contemporaries. Further, the present thesis is more attentive to the poetic and rhetorical fabric of Kierkegaard's texts in order to redeem these areas in which microtemporalities operate beyond the schema of past-present-future. This reading would be more open to aberrant modes of temporality as, for example, illustrated by the alienative experience of passing over Langebro [long bridge] in *Stages on Life's Way* (1845): "Then when one is standing on the other side in Christianshavn, it in turn seems that the bridge must nevertheless be long, because one is far, very far away from Copenhagen" (SLW, 276/SKS 6, 257). Lastly, it tries to give an account of the relevance of liturgical "now" – an analogue of Kierkegaard's "today" – in the discourses on the lilies and the birds.

The thesis is divided in two parts, entitled "Movement" and "Rest." Part I adopts a more philosophically focused approach since it takes the cue from Diogenes' anecdote and follows along the notion of movement/becoming and time as treated by Plato, Aristotle, and Hegel. It covers a period of Kierkegaard's authorship during which he familiarized himself extensively, albeit unsystematically, with ancient philosophy. In Part II, I suggest that the notion of "being present to oneself today" is better understood in the context of the theology of the Sabbath rest, which hasn't received attention in Kierkegaard's scholarship. In the Christian context, Sabbath rest is viewed as the end of motion of the created being, the suspension of the movement of corruption, thereby the restoration to the original condition. The inbreaking of the Sabbath-rest into time could be considered as a possibility of reformation of time within time itself.

The first chapter touches upon questions of methodology and readership and serves as an introduction to the common problematic of the various chapters:

time, change, and faith. In particular, I aim to explore the way in which Deleuze and Guattari articulate their key philosophical notion of becoming-imperceptible via Kierkegaard's knight of faith in Novellas Plateau ("1874: Three Novellas, or 'What happened?'") from *A Thousand Plateaus* (1980). The novella as a literary genre by essentially relating to secrecy advances a distinctive way of relation between the three dimensions of time (the past, present, and future). I argue that the temporality of novella could be extended beyond the limits of the literary genre 'novella'. To this end, I engage with reading Kierkegaard's novella *Repetition* (1843) together with selected entries from his journals in order to identify his contribution as a religious writer to the discussion of philosophy as literature.

In Chapter 2, I aim at a close reading of *Repetition* that is attentive to the narrative temporality, the characters, and the ironic undertones of the text insofar as these elements undergird the author/authors' intent to delineate the performative and authentic repetition. In my reading, Hegel's *Lectures on the History of Philosophy* proves to be an important intertext in *Repetition*. I show how the themes of recollection and immortality outlined in *On the Concept of Irony* (1841) are reworked by Kierkegaard in *Repetition*. Further, far from being a whimsical play, Diogenes' anecdote and Zeno's paradoxes that open the novella introduce us to the classical philosophy of time to the degree that Plato and Aristotle set forth their theories of time and change seeking to refute Zeno's paradoxes of motion.[16]

[16] Jon Stewart writes that "[t]he point of Kierkegaard's use of this anecdote is not easy to discern." Stewart goes on to say that there is an analogy between Diogenes' way of refuting Zeno's denial of motion, i.e., without constructing an argument and by a kind of "a performative act," and Constantin's trip to Berlin (Jon Stewart, "The Eleatics: Kierkegaard's Metaphysical Considerations of Being and Motion," *Kierkegaard and the Greek World: Tome II: Aristotle and Other Greek Authors*, Jon Stewart and Katalin Nun [eds.] [Aldershot: Ashgate, 2010], p. 136). Arne Melberg argues that the anecdote mirrors both the narrative temporality of the novella, the continual back and forth between the past and the present time, and the philosophical discourse, the *past* of recollection and the *now* of 'repetition'" (Arne Melberg, "Repetition (In the Kierkegaardian Sense of the Term)," *Diacritics* 20:3 [Autumn, 1990], p. 72). Samuel Weber instead proposes that the stepping up of Diogenes to pace back and forth opens up a theatrical space (See his "Kierkegaard's Posse," *Theatricality as Medium* [Fordham: Fordham University Press, 2004], pp. 202-203).

Following Constantin Constantius' claim – the pseudonymous author of *Repetition* – that his newly coined philosophical term "repetition" corresponds to the modern category of "mediation" but is more affiliated with the Aristotelian *κίνησις*, I expound Aristotle's theory of time in *Physics* (Chapter 3). As will become evident by redefining the basic tenets of Aristotle's philosophy, such as possibility and actuality, Kierkegaard in fact shows the limits of Aristotelian *κίνησις* when applied to the sphere of existential becoming. In the same chapter, a detailed analysis of Plato's *Parmenides* and the instant of change (*ἐξαίφνης*) provides the grounding so as to evaluate the critique of Platonic moment in *The Concept of Anxiety*. To this end, I commence Chapter 4 by reviewing (a) the translation of *ἐξαίφνης* in various contexts (in philosophy, theology, and literature) and the concomitant problem of untranslatability (b) the reception of the *Parmenides* through translations of the dialogue, commentaries, and dissertations. I read the long footnote on the *Parmenides* (CA, 82-84n/SKS 4, 385) as it is refracted in the text of *The Concept of Anxiety*. I argue that the Platonic moment puts pressure on Kierkegaard's project regarding sin and rebirth. Therefore, he endeavours to avoid theorizing the sin as happening in an extratemporal moment, abstracted from time. In doing so, alternative temporalities emerge, cast as existential affects: anxiety, concern, longing, joy.

The main argument of Part II of this thesis is that via the inactivity of the lilies and improvidence of the birds Kierkegaard introduces the theology of the Sabbath-rest and therefore an important dimension of Kierkegaard's theory of time and eternity is fleshed out. In Chapter 5, I start off with Ps-Macarius' spiritual teachings, a desert father of the 4th century, and in particular with *Opuscula* and *Apophthegmata*, edited by Johann Georg Pritius (1662-1732).[17] This edition should be considered the most extensive work in Greek language from the Eastern Christian tradition in The Auction Catalogue of Kierkegaard's Library. Pritius' edition forms part of the reading material in Pietism and I outline the complex issue of the impact of Macarian spirituality on Pietist writers with regard to the

[17] *Sancti Patris Macarii Aegyptii opuscula nonnulla et apophthegmata*, ed. Io[annes] Georgius Pritius, Lipsiae: Bibliopolio Grossiano, 1714 (ACKL 144).

notion of rebirth and the "spiritual Sabbath of the heart." I situate Macarius' teachings within the context of the desert monasticism presenting the quintessential virtues of monastic life: freedom from care, rebirth and the renewal of the image, soberness and watchfulness, detachment. In the following chapters, I propose that in his discourses on the lilies and the birds, Kierkegaard offers a distinctive rearticulation of such spiritual doctrines and practices.

Chapter 6 attempts to trace the image of the halcyon bird, which the miraculous resting upon the sea prefigures the inactivity of the lilies and the improvidence of the birds, through Kierkegaard's works and notebooks. By means of this image, we revisit the relation between the aesthetic and the religious. Further, it draws attention to the rhetorical tropes that rely on repetition at the level of sounds, words, or phrases (polyptoton, anaphora, climax, etc.) that make up the poetic fabric of the discourses on the lilies and the birds. While there are readings that treat the image of the lilies and the birds as analogies that ultimately must be left behind, there are textual elements to suggest that the employment of this image tends to create zones of proximity between the lilies and the birds, God, and the reader, with the view to affectively transforming the reader and her comportment in the world.

In the seventh and final Chapter, I engage in reading together the third discourse "At the Communion on Fridays" (1848) and the discourses on the lilies and the birds so as to show that Kierkegaard continually reworks the theme of "the day of rest [*Hviledag*]" incorporating in his text Hebrews 3, in which the Sabbath and the today are most distinctly intertwined. In Part II, I try to do justice to Kierkegaard's own self-description as cartographer. In a journal entry (1948), he offers the production of a map as a fitting analogy for his writing:

> With my writings I hope to achieve this: to bequeath so accurate a depiction of Christianity and its relationship to the world that a noble-minded, inspired young person will be able to find in it a map of relationships [*Kaart over Forholdene*] that is as accurate as any topographical map produced by the most famous institutes.

I have not had the assistance of such an author. The teachers of the ancient Church were lacking in one aspect: they did not know the world. (KJN 5, 183-184/NB8:73/SKS 21, 176 [1848])

PART I: MOVEMENT

Chapter 1

The Writer as an Acrobat: Deleuze and Guattari on the Relation between Philosophy and Literature (and How Kierkegaard Moves in-between)

Introduction: On the Mobile Relations between Philosophy and Literature

> All philosophy is condemned, to the extent that it is dependent on figuration, to be literary and, as the depository of this very problem, all literature is to some extent philosophical.[18]

The above-cited passage from Paul de Man's essay "The Epistemology of Metaphor" describes a recurrent gesture in the history of philosophy: philosophical discourse, defending its epistemological rigour and its truth claims, seeks to suppress the literary, to mark the territory of the literary inside literature "by keeping it, so to speak, in its place."[19] As the figurality of language, according to de Man, permeates both literature and philosophy, there is no innocent reference either to "the nonverbal 'outside'"[20] or to an inner presence of consciousness. Is it possible, then, to think the relation between philosophy and literature beyond suppression or imposition of a hierarchy?

Deleuze's philosophy not only attests to such a possibility but, more importantly, his own writings as well as his collaborations with Guattari explore the relations between these two realms in their multiple becomings, "in a perpetual in-between movement, or *perpetuum mobile*," as André Pierre Colombat aptly puts

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An early version of this chapter was published in *Transnational Literature* (Special issue: Philosophy and literature; philosophy as literature), Vol. 7, Issue 2 [May 2015]).

[18] Paul de Man, *Aesthetic Ideology*, Andrzej Warminski (ed. and trans.) (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), p. 50.

[19] Paul de Man, *Aesthetic Ideology*, p. 34.

[20] Paul de Man, *Allegories of Reading: Figural Language in Rousseau, Nietzsche, Rilke, and Proust* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979), p. 3.

it, in which philosophy and literature "are interconnected."[21] For example, whereas de Man's reading of (philosophical and literary) texts appeals to a third factor, namely, the rhetorical substratum of all language, Deleuze prefers the smooth space[22] rather than the substratum, allows for philosophy-becoming-literature, talks about literature as "an assemblage," namely, Kafka's literary machine is "plugged into" the bureaucratic machine in order to work (ATP, 4). Art, science and philosophy are "caught up into *mobile* relations" – we could say cinematic/machinic relations – "in which each is obliged to respond to the other, but by its own means" rather than "statable" ones.[23] Deleuze's engagement with literature is an endeavour to chart this mobility, rather than to trace the common ground between philosophy and literature.

In *What is Philosophy?* (1991), Deleuze with Guattari offers the image of writers, such as Kierkegaard and Nietzsche but also Kleist, Mallarmé, Kafka, and D. H. Lawrence, who, like acrobats, dancers, and athletes, leap, dance, and stretch between the two planes of literature and philosophy. And yet:

> To be sure they do not produce a synthesis of art and philosophy. They branch out and they do not stop branching out [*bifurquer*]. They are hybrid geniuses who neither erase nor cover over differences in kind, but, on the contrary, use all the resources of their "athleticism" to install themselves within this very difference, like acrobats torn apart in a perpetual show of strength.[24]

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[21] André Pierre Colombat, "Deleuze and The Three Powers of Literature and Philosophy: To Demystify, to Experiment, to Create," *Deleuze and Guattari: Critical Assessments of Leading Philosophers*, Gary Genosko (ed.) (London-New York: Routledge, 2001), p. 208. For a helpful overview of Deleuze's diverse relations to literature, see also Claire Colebrook, *Gilles Deleuze* (London-New York: Routledge, 2002), pp. 103-123; Ronald Bogue, "Deleuze and Literature," *The Cambridge Companion to Deleuze,* Daniel W. Smith and Henry Somers-Hall (eds.) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), pp. 286-306.

[22] Smooth space as a Deleuzean concept denotes the unlimited, acentered, open space of the nomads, which privileges flows and movement in contradistinction to the striated space that is hierarchically constructed and evaluated. See Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, "Treatise on Nomadology-The War Machine," *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, Brian Massumi (trans.) (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), pp. 351-423. (Hereafter ATP)

[23] Deleuze, "Preface to the English edition," *Difference and Repetition*, Paul Patton (trans.) (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), p. xvi (my emphasis).

[24] Deleuze and Guattari, *What is Philosophy?*, Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchell (trans.) (London-New York: Verso, 1994), p. 67. (Hereafter WP)

"These thinkers," we would call them acrobat-writers, "are 'half' philosophers but also much more than philosophers" (WP, 67). What accounts for such an excess – the "much more" – is exactly the fact that they dwell as much as they bifurcate/"branch out" in this differential 'within' philosophy and literature.

The latter is best illustrated with the creation of, what Deleuze and Guattari call, "conceptual personae" or "intercessors" (WP, 64). Conceptual personae, such as Plato's Socrates or Diotima, Nietzsche's Zarathustra or Kierkegaard's knight of faith in *Fear and Trembling* (1843), could be considered as a literary technique introduced in philosophy with the scope to articulate (philosophical) perspectives or theses. However, this view is partially reductive; the conceptual personae are not abstractions, although "they play a part in the very creation of the author's concepts" (WP, 63). Inhabiting the in-between of philosophy and literature, a conceptual persona thinks, moves, and acts expressing new "possibilities of life or modes of existence" (WP, 73).[25] Thus, Zarathustra is the subject of Nihilism as the knight of faith is the subject of religious existence, the lilies and the birds fabulate the carefreeness of faith. In other words, the conceptual persona is both a philosopher's creation and the creation *of* a philosopher: "The conceptual persona is the becoming or the subject of a philosophy, on a par with the philosopher" insofar as Nietzsche in becoming Zarathustra/Dionysus says "'I dance as Dionysus'" (WP, 64) or Kierkegaard in becoming the knight of faith may as well say: "I leap."

Accordingly, the advantage of Deleuze and Guattari's approach to literature is that the impasse of representation (i.e., literature represents life, philosophy thinks about life, literature influences philosophy, and vice versa) is overcome. This becomes particularly evident in their analysis of the three novellas written by Henry James, F. Scott Fitzgerald, and Pierrette Fleutiaux respectively in plateau 8

[25] Kierkegaard's literary personae dramatize perspectives on the world. This point is clearly elucidated by Clare Carlisle, *Kierkegaard's Philosophy of Becoming: Movements and Positions*. For a more comprehensive analysis on Deleuze as a reader of Kierkegaard, see Arnaud Bouaniche, "'Faire le Mouvement': Deleuze lecteur de Kierkegaard," *Kierkegaard et la Philosophie Française: Figures et Réceptions*, Jean Leclercq et al. (eds.) (Louvain-la-Neuve: Presses Universitaires de Louvain, 2014), pp. 127-150 and José Miranda Justo, "Gilles Deleuze: Kierkegaard's Presence in his Writings," *Kierkegaard's Influence on Philosophy: Tome II: Francophone Philosophy,* Jon Stewart (ed.) (Farnham: Ashgate, 2012), pp. 83-110.

of *A Thousand Plateaus* (1980): "1874: Three Novellas, or 'What happened?'" The purpose of this introductory chapter is: initially, to trace the import of style in philosophy and literature as Deleuze and Guattari construe it in terms of the creation of the new; next, to explore how the relation between literature and philosophy is refracted in Novellas plateau, regarding the questions of secrecy and time; finally, to consider the way in which the recourse to Kierkegaard's writings, especially *Fear and Trembling*, elucidates key philosophical terms coined by Deleuze and Guattari. This line of exposition has a twofold aim: to identify the distinctiveness of Deleuze and Guattari's approach to literature and to expound what Kierkegaard as a religious writer has to offer in the discussion of philosophy *as* literature.

The Question of Style in Philosophy and Literature

Deleuze, as early as in *Difference and Repetition* (1968), stated in a quasi-normative way that "a book of philosophy should be in part a very particular species of detective novel, in part a kind of science fiction. By detective novel, we mean that concepts, with their zones of presence, should intervene to resolve local situations." As a consequence, concepts "themselves change along with the problems," they act like characters in a drama.[26] The same question about style and time returns and is posited with respect to the writing of a philosophical book but also to the reading of the history of philosophy. Deleuze maintains that "the time is coming when it will hardly be possible to write a book of philosophy as it has been done for so long: 'Ah! the old style …'"[27] In the history of philosophy the time of the new style has already begun with Nietzsche and yet the time of the new style should be reached in the future. It seems that Deleuze invites us to read and write about "a real book of past philosophy as if it were an imaginary and feigned book," asking the questions 'What happened? / What is going to happen?', until our present text comes to meet

[26] Deleuze, "Preface," *Difference and Repetition*, p. xx.
[27] Deleuze, "Preface," p. xxi. (ellipses in the original)

the text of the past as its double.[28] Philosophy is not a sterile exegetical exercise but a creative act.

When Deleuze was asked in an interview (1988) how he sees "the question of the philosophical style," he defined style in philosophy as "the movement of concepts [...] a modulation, and a straining of one's whole language towards something outside it." He goes on to compare philosophy with the novel:

> Philosophy's like a novel: we have to ask "What is going to happen?" "What's happened?" Except the characters are concepts, and the settings, the scenes are space-times. One's always writing to bring something to life, to free life from where it's trapped, to trace lines of flight.[29]

Modulation, a term borrowed from poetry, music, and painting (or even respiratory systems, life sciences), expresses temporal relations and variations in the same manner that the questions about the future ("What is going to happen?") and about the past ("What's happened?") seek to decipher the sequence of events not from a localised point in the present, as these questions are traditionally understood, but from a point that is continuously shifting. The question of style and the question of temporal sequence seem to interflow in an unexpected mode: the act of writing, for Deleuze, is to liberate life and "to make us see" things that we weren't previously aware that they existed. Between what has passed and what is going to pass, things "come to pass, a spark can flash and break out of language itself"[30] until everything becomes pure passage of life. Not because language strives towards the inexpressible or breaks in a moment of revelation but because writing creates lines of flight, new space-times, "mapping, even realms that are yet to come" (ATP, 5), as Deleuze and Guattari put it in *A Thousand Plateaus*. For Deleuze, what suggests the presence of style is "when the words produce sparks leaping between them, even over great distances,"[31] invoking thus the genesis of something beyond the semantic field of

[28] Deleuze, "Preface," pp. xxi-xxii.
[29] Deleuze, *Negotiations 1972-1990*, Martin Joughin (trans.) (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), pp. 140-141. For Deleuze's own philosophical style of writing, see Ronald Bogue, *Deleuze's Wake: Tributes and Tributaries* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1994), pp. 9-26.
[30] Deleuze, *Negotiations 1972-1990*, p. 141.
[31] Deleuze, *Negotiations 1972-1990*, p. 142.

the words themselves.

The question of style is not addressed in the field of rhetorics but the style of a writer, Deleuze and Guattari remark, with her specific materials (the syntax, the creation of new words that violate the maternal language), "summons forth a people to come" (WP, 176-177). Carsten Meiner rightly notes that the style thus understood "seems to have an existential function."[32] In an important essay entitled "Life and Literature" (1993), Deleuze underscores the existential aspect of writing as follows: "Writing is a question of becoming [*devenir*], always incomplete, always in the midst of being formed" and to become means to become other (a woman, an animal, a minority), something "unforeseen and nonpreexistent [*non-préexistants*]."[33] Hence, both philosophy and literature strive to bring forth the "nonpreexistent"; insofar as writing "consists in inventing a people who are missing [...] a people to come [*à venir*] [...] a possibility of life,"[34] correspondingly, Deleuze seems to suggest, the writer herself as much as the philosopher are in the process of becoming, they are 'a people to come.'

Thus far, the multifarious relation between movement, becoming, and transformation has surfaced many times while reading Deleuze and Guattari's texts. In this respect, we see the notion of temporality implicated in this construal of becoming, an issue to which we will turn in the next section.

The Novellas Plateau: Secrecy and Time

The Novellas plateau begins by distinguishing between the literary genres of novella, novel, and tale on the different questions that these genres pose to the readers. In novella, everything revolves "around the question, 'What happened? Whatever could have happened?'," whereas the tale breathes in and out with the

[32] Carsten Henrik Meiner, "Deleuze and the Question of Style," *symploke* 6.1 (1998), p. 160.
[33] Deleuze, *Essays Critical and Clinical*, Daniel W. Smith and Michael A. Greco (trans.) (London-New York: Verso, 1998), p. 1.
[34] Deleuze, *Essays*, p. 4.

question "what is going to happen?" The living present of the novel as duration is constituted by integrating "elements from the novella and the tale" in varied modes (ATP, 192). The distinctions drawn between these genres while corresponding to the three dimensions of time (past, present and future) should not be viewed, as Deleuze and Guattari warn, in a strict chronological sequence. The present is traversed by movements (of lines) that "are contemporaneous with it"; one line moves by casting everything "into the past *from the moment* it is present (novella) while another *simultaneously* draws it into the future (tale)" (ATP, 193, emphasis in original). The moment renders the present – '*from the moment* it is present' – quite precarious as the latter is *schizzed* into two different directions. As Deleuze writes in *The Logic of Sense* (1969), "each present is divided into past and future, ad infinitum" and therefore the present forms an unlimited line "the two extremities of which endlessly distance themselves from each other." The time of the pure event is not tensed in the present – it is happening – but is both the time of novella ("*it* just happened") and the time of the tale (it "is always about to happen").[35] Since the event eludes the present, it is designated as "*Untimely*" (WP, 111).

Bearing in mind these remarks, it follows that the presence of the present in novella is construed differently from that of both the tale and the novel. Though the question 'What happened?' directs one to the/a past, the novella itself does not aim at uncovering a memory or unearthing something past but rather "plays upon a fundamental forgetting" (ATP, 193). Deleuze and Guattari write that "the novella has a fundamental relation to *secrecy* (not with a secret matter or object to be discovered, but with the form of the secret, which remains impenetrable)" (ATP, 193, emphasis in the original). In other words, the novella does not contain a secret as an irretrievable content, something inexpressible in words, or an event unknowable because of its missing details, but what happened becomes purely

[35] Deleuze, *The Logic of Sense*, Mark Lester (trans.), Constantin V. Boundas (ed.) (London: The Athlone Press, 1990), pp. 62-63 (emphasis in the original). A full treatment of the event in Deleuze's sense would require more space than the present introductory chapter. In broad lines, the event is the unanticipated new that is not yielded to the senses, whilst it is actualised as transformation. For an illuminating account of the pure event and the notion of becoming with reference to the time of novella, see Paul Patton's chapter "History, Becoming, and Events," *Deleuze Concepts: Philosophy, Colonization, Politics* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010), pp. 81-99.

"imperceptible" (ATP, 193). The temporality of novella is defined by its relation "in the present itself, to the formal dimension of something that has happened, even if that something is nothing or remains unknowable" (ATP, 194).

Therefore, the secrecy and the temporal cannot be extricated from each other. From one part, the question 'What happened?' is hollowed out of its hermeneutical value, works against itself, becomes "the ungivable 'What happened?'" (ATP, 197) Deleuze and Guattari initiate a "perceptual semiotics" (ATP, 194) between the body postures assumed and the secret: I may hump guilt-ridden, become exhausted, and bend under the burden of the secret – "the better hidden the more ordinary it was" (ATP, 197). The novella thus "enacts" the secret by a means of enfolding, unlike the tale that unfolds events in the process of narration. The primary body posture of novella is "like inverse suspense" (ATP, 193-194). The text, and the time in the text, is curved and moulded into the form of secrecy, the enfolding, until all forms dissolve into "a pure abstract line" (ATP, 197). As Claire Colebrook suggests, Deleuze and Guattari transform "the ontology of the secret" by moving away from the secret as content to secrecy as structure that determines the interpretive horizon of the subject; additionally, by gesturing beyond the form-content opposition they affirm "a proliferating secrecy" or imperceptibility that is life itself in its multiplicity of relations.[36]

For Deleuze and Guattari, the novella names the specific way a text combines the several lines that traverse and compose us: "Lines of writing conjugate with other lines, life lines, lines of luck or misfortune, lines productive of the variation of the line of writing itself, lines that are *between the lines* of writing" (ATP, 194, emphasis in the original). There are three kinds of lines: A rigid line of segmentarity, a line largely defined by the certificate of birth and death. Everyday life is marked by finite pieces of information, finite actions and sets of time periods, segments of space (territories), in which we move and acquire our identity until the post-mortem rigidity: I have a date at 4 pm, I live on the West Side of the city, I have a class to attend between 7 pm and 9 pm, and so on. There is also a line of

[36] Claire Colebrook, "The Secret of Theory," *Deleuze Studies* 4:3 (2010), pp. 291-292.

molecular or supple segmentation made up of "*micromovements*," "tiny cracks," "secret lines of disorientation or deterritorialization" (ATP, 196-197, emphasis in the original), whence the possibilities of another life, a life no less real and present, struck as "a moonbeam" (ATP, 195). Finally, a point is reached when no segmentarity is tolerated, all previous positions are de-posed. This line of flight is like making the other two lines explode, as Deleuze and Guattari note; it is "absolute deterritorialization" (ATP, 197). The lines of flight cannot be represented or captured by any means because we are "in the process of drawing them" (ATP, 199).

It is appropriate here to recall that Deleuze and Guattari conjoin writing with creating new possibilities of life, liberating a new space-time. How do they read these life lines/lines of writing in Henry James's novella *In the Cage* (1898)? The heroine is a young girl who works at the Post Office; she dispatches telegrams for her upper-class clients, counting "numberless" words, receiving and sending intimate but segmentary contents of their private lives. "In a framed and wired confinement,"[37] in her cage, in her territory, she conjures up stories from these bits of information. She becomes particularly entangled into the secrecy of the telegrams exchanged by a rich couple as well as into the secrecy of their love affair. She soon leads a kind of a "double life": "As the weeks went on there she lived more and more into the world of whiffs and glimpses, she found her divinations work faster and stretch further."[38] Deleuze and Guattari remark that the girl sensed that the man is in danger because of a secret, though the secret itself is never defined and does not need to be defined by Henry James. Telegram texts, material and yet immaterial segments, seem to illustrate best the line of molecular segmentation, on which we are close to something that has already happened but "the ungraspable matter of that something is entirely molecularized, travelling at speeds beyond the *ordinary thresholds of perception*" (ATP, 196, my emphasis). In terms of (linguistic) communication, this line abounds with "silences" and "innuendos" in contrast to the clear-cut segments of "interminable explanations,"

[37] Henry James, *In the Cage* (London: Martin Secker, 1919), p. 5.
[38] James, *In the Cage*, p. 28.

of "questions and answers" we encounter on the first line of rigid segmentarity (ATP, 198). At the end, the interpretive skills of the girl are stretched to the point that she cannot withstand any form of "gaps and blanks and absent answers."[39] Deleuze and Guattari cite and underline the phrase "*There were no longer shadows to help her see more clearly, only glare*" (ATP, 197)[40] as a point of maximum intensity and maximum affectivity whereby everything has changed and everything becomes imperceptible; it accentuates a turning point in her life in which she has reached a new line, a line of flight.

In its most ordinary sense, Deleuze and Guattari aver, "the secret always has to do with love, and sexuality." But in becoming imperceptible, the secret and the form of secrecy has changed again. It means becoming "a clandestine passenger on a motionless voyage": clandestine because his secrecy is not covered (a clandestine passenger is "like everybody else"); motionless because his movement is like jumping "linearly" on a train in motion (ATP, 197-198), an allusion to the Kierkegaardian leap of faith. For Deleuze and Guattari, Kierkegaard's knight of faith serves as a figure, as a conceptual persona, of this clandestine motion, which occurs beyond the ordinary threshold of perception:

> As Kierkegaard says, nothing distinguishes the knight of the faith from a bourgeois German going home or to the post office: he sends off no special telegraphic sign; he constantly produces or reproduces finite segments, yet he is already moving on a line no one even suspects. (ATP, 197)

The reference here is to Kierkegaard's *Fear and Trembling*, which was published under the pseudonym Johannes de silentio. In Kierkegaard's recounting of the Genesis story (Gen 22, 1-14), Abraham's journey to Mount Moriah under God's command to sacrifice Isaac, his only begotten son, is made in faith that he will receive his son back and in keeping silence about the purpose of his journey. The

[39] James, *In the Cage*, p. 141.

[40] The translator of *A Thousand Plateaus* draws attention to the original English text, which conveys rather the opposite meaning from the French translation that Deleuze and Guattari had in mind (ATP, 535, note 6). Cf. James, *In the Cage*, p. 134: "She knew at last so much that she had quite lost her earlier sense of merely guessing. There were no different shades of distinctness – it all bounced out."

moment that Abraham raises the knife with his hand, an angel of God prevents Abraham from completing the sacrifice, giving back to him his beloved son. The knight of faith repeats Abraham's journey-movement at every moment of his life by infinitely resigning everything and by receiving everything back again "[in] temporality, [in] finitude"[41] (FT, 49/SKS 4, 143). By performing this "double-movement" (FT, 36/SKS 4, 131) – renouncing and receiving back – the knight of faith "belongs entirely to the world," writes Kierkegaard, without revealing "a bit of heterogeneous *optical telegraphy* from the infinite" (FT, 39/SKS 4, 133, my emphasis). There is nothing external that would "distinguish him from the rest of the crowd"; in fact, he does resemble a "bourgeois philistine," engaging himself in the most mundane tasks and activities (FT, 39/SKS 4, 134).

> And yet, yet the whole earthly figure he presents is a *new creation* [2 Cor 5:17] by virtue of the absurd. He resigned everything infinitely, and then he grasps everything again by virtue of the absurd. He is continually making the movement of infinity, but he does it with such precision and assurance that continually gets finitude out of it, and no one ever suspects anything else. (FT, 40-1/SKS 4, 135, my emphasis)

For Johannes de silentio what the knight of faith achieves continually and repeatedly, at every moment is "to change the leap into life into walking, absolutely to express the sublime in the pedestrian [...] and this is the one and only marvel" (FT, 41/SKS 4, 136). The marvel does not consist in the fact that the knight of faith performs the impressive movement of the leap, but in transforming his leap into a walk, he becomes imperceptible, like everybody else. He properly installs himself "in a zone of indetermination, of indiscernibility" (WP, 173), which only life and literature can create.

Even if there is no mention of "a bourgeois German" (ATP, 197) going to the post office in Kierkegaard's text, the line of association – the telegraph line – exists.

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[41] From the extensive secondary literature on *Fear and Trembling* see: Edward F. Mooney, *Knights of Faith and Resignation: Reading Kierkegaard's* Fear and Trembling (Albany: SUNY Press, 1991); John Lippitt, *Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Kierkegaard and* Fear and Trembling (London and New York: Routledge, 2003).

The introduction of the term "thresholds of perception" is crucial as it leads to plateau 10 of becomings, "1730: Becoming-Intense, Becoming-Animal, Becoming-Imperceptible…," where Deleuze and Guattari continue referring to Kierkegaard's text. The knight of faith, "the man of becoming" (ATP, 279), as they renamed him, moves in a straight, abstract line, unsuspected by the others; he does not follow pre-traced lines of faith (lines as guides), but he draws the lines on which he moves concurrently with his movement/becoming. "Becoming everybody/everything (*tout le monde*)" equates with an act of creation and recreation – means both "to make a world" and to make "the world a becoming" (ATP, 280). Most importantly, in becoming everybody/becoming the world/becoming imperceptible, one does not transcend the world, but "*the* world that becomes" overlays the first world until there are not two worlds but a kind of transparency. In this way, it is possible one "to be present at the dawn of the world" (ATP, 280).

Via Kierkegaard's knight of faith, Deleuze and Guattari elucidate the fact that the lines of flight, contrary to the ordinary significance of the words, are not an escape from the world, but reside in immanence (ATP, 204). Not without some awkwardness they remark that "it is odd that the word 'faith'" is used by Kierkegaard to describe the infinite movement and the returning to the world to receive back the finite – the lost girl[42] or the lost son – insofar as the knight of faith "regathers the finite" (ATP, 282). Movement always occurs "below and above the threshold of perception," in a kind of interval (ATP, 280-281). All we can perceive are segments, dislocations of bodies in space, finite parts of an infinite movement in time, a movement that we ignore its beginning and end. But to become everybody "requires much asceticism, much sobriety," dismantling of "everything that roots each of us (everybody) to ourselves" (ATP, 279), an excess of love that overflows into creation, into new thresholds of perception. Is this a new faith then?

At first sight, Deleuze and Guattari's reading of *Fear and Trembling* underscores the pedestrian of walking rather than the sublime of the leap.

[42] The reference here is to Regina Olsen, Kierkegaard's fiancée, with whom he broke his engagement.

According to their interpretation, "in jumping from one plane to the other," that is, the plane of transcendence and the plane of immanence, the knight of faith continually expresses the relation between the two planes reaching "the absolute threshold"; therefore, what cannot be perceptible (the plane of transcendence) becomes perceived (ATP, 281-282). The knight of faith changes perception (ATP, 282) by changing himself in his passion, whilst he himself becomes imperceptible. To add another layer, it is also Deleuze and Guattari who jump with maximum velocity from plateau 8 to plateau 10, from Henry James's novella to Kierkegaard's text among others, showing "an athleticism of becoming" (WP, 172) in their own writing of *A Thousand Plateaus*.

Novella's Time: Kierkegaard's Novellas and the Turning Point

The question raised here is for what reason Deleuze and Guattari turn from a modernist novella as it is Henry James's *In the Cage* to a text such as *Fear and Trembling*, which does not belong to the genre of novella. Johannes de silentio marvels at the movements that the knight of faith performs, but he comes as far as this limit; he cannot give an account how/when faith originates but awkwardly remarks: "only then does faith commence, *nec opinate* [unexpected], by virtue of the absurd" (FT, 69/SKS 4, 161). What Kierkegaard offers is the threshold of perception at the limit of the ordinary and the marvellous, but in doing so he invokes and rebuts the temporal structures of the novella, particularly of the German Romantic tradition. We will try to follow the trajectory of this refutation from his journal notes to the pseudonymous authorship.

The German Romantics not only wrote novellas but produced a theoretical discourse reflecting on the formal aspects of novella under the category of the new. One of the definitive characteristics of novella is the narration of "an unheard-of event that has occurred," according to Goethe's famous definition, while Tieck considered that the plot of the novella should be built around "a strange, striking

turning point (*Wendepunkt*)."[43] The novella often creates the effect of the marvellous or uncanny by interweaving in its plot-structure something "mysterious" and "unfathomable."[44] Kierkegaard's critical stance towards the romantic indifference to actuality is reflected in his comments regarding Tieck's plays in *The Concept of Irony* (1841). He writes that one who reads Tieck and the rest of the romantic poets "gain[s] a notion of the unheard-of and highly improbable things that take place in their poetic world. [...] Nothing becomes everything, and everything becomes nothing; everything is possible, even the impossible" (CI, 302-303/SKS 1, 335-336). Kierkegaard uses the word "turning point [*Vendepunkt*]" to designate the critical point of change in history where the new breaks forth and the old is annulled (CI, 260/SKS 1, 298) More often, he uses the expression "*discrimen rerum*" as the break of sin in the individual (CA, 50/SKS 4, 355) or he talks about the moment as "a *discrimen* [boundary]" that divides the past, the future, and the eternal (CA, 90-1/SKS 4, 394).

In Kierkegaard's Journals, there are a number of entries regarding his relationship with his father or his broken engagement with Regina that could be rearranged and read like a novella, or explicitly refer to this specific genre.

> I could perhaps reproduce the tragedy of my childhood: the terrifying, secret explanation of the religious that was granted me in a fearful presentiment which my imagination hammered into shape—my offense at the religious—in a novella entitled "The Mysterious Family." It would begin in a thoroughly patriarchal-idyllic fashion, so that no one would suspect anything before that word suddenly resounded, providing a terrifying explanation of everything. (KJN 2, 174/JJ:147/SKS 18, 188 [1843])

Equally ambiguous are the entries around the 'great earthquake':

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[43] Santiago Rodriguez Guerrero-Strachan, "Récit, story, tale, novella," *Romantic Prose Fiction*, Gerald Ernest Paul Gillespie et al. (eds.) (Amsterdam-Philadelphia: Benjamins, 2008), pp. 365-367.

[44] Peter Hutchinson, "Novella," *Encyclopedia of the Novel*, Paul Schellinger (ed.) (New York: Routledge, 2014), pp. 948-950.

> Then it was that the great earthquake occurred, the frightful upheaval which suddenly drove me to a new infallible principle for interpreting all the phenomena. Then I surmised that my father's old-age was not a divine blessing, but rather a curse. (*Pap*. 305:3/*JP* 5, 5430/SKS 27, 291-292 [1843-45]).

There are allusions to a sin of his father, but the text with much assuredness points towards the burden of guilt that the whole family must bear and the death of his siblings as punishment: "it [i.e., the family] was supposed to disappear, obliterated by the mighty hand of God, erased like a mistake" (*Pap.* 305:3/*JP* 5, 5430/SKS 27, 291-292 [1843-45]). What happened? Whatever could have happened? How could a single event – a word or an earthquake – become the rule of interpretation for everything? As George Pattison has argued:

> Seen in the enigmatic mirror of such texts, 'Søren Kierkegaard' becomes the title of a dramatic tale that might be construed as a modern Antigone and that might equally well have provided the plot for a novella or play by one of the writers of the modernist breakthrough of the later nineteenth century – an Ibsen, a Strindberg, a Dostoevsky, or such twentieth-century continuers of that tradition as Kafka or Bergman.[45]

Whereas "the actual content" of the sin committed by Kierkegaard's father may be "more or less accidental," most important, writes Pattison, is the theological thought that Kierkegaard developed about repentance and the forgiveness of sin.[46] For "the movement of sin, and the movement of faith in which sin is overcome" remains ultimately something "unrepresentable [...] a secret and a mystery."[47]

On 16 October 1843, nearly two years after breaking his engagement with Regina Olsen and a few months after being informed about her own engagement, Kierkegaard published *Repetition* under the pseudonym Constantin Constantius.[48] As the storyline goes, Constantin met a young man of a melancholy nature and

[45] George Pattison, *Kierkegaard and the Quest of Unambiguous Life* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 159-160.
[46] George Pattison, *Kierkegaard and the Quest of Unambiguous Life*, p. 167.
[47] George Pattison, *Kierkegaard and the Quest of Unambiguous Life,* p. 170.
[48] See the "Historical Introduction," in Kierkegaard, *Fear and Trembling/Repetition*, pp. ix-xxxix.

soon became his confidant. The young man was humbly in love with a girl, but, as Constantin recounts the story, the whole love affair became a burden to him. Unable either to move forward and complete the relationship with a marriage or to break off and give an explanation to the girl, the young man escapes to Stockholm from where he sends a number of letters addressed to Constantin. What had happened? There is no explanation of how life "has mocked him [the young man] by making him guilty where he was innocent" (R, 185-186/SKS 4, 56). The young man awaits a marvel that would make possible to get the girl back. Instead, he reads in a newspaper that the girl was married to someone else, deeming this as a divine sign – "like a thunderstorm" – that he is now been released from any commitment (R, 220/SKS 4, 87). This contingent event might be considered as a turning point from the perspective of narratology: a momentous, non-iterative event that provides structure in the lived experience of characters and affects their world-making and self-making process.[49] The young man asks: "Is there not, then, a repetition? Did I not get everything double? Did I not get myself again […]?" (R, 220/SKS 4, 87). But with respect to genuine repetition as transcendence, as separation from the former existence, the young man's rebirth – "I am born to myself " (R, 221/SKS 4, 88) – is actually, and it is intended to be, a mockery of the 'turning point'; nothing new occurs, no transformation affects the young man, no repetition is achieved.[50] What is lost, however, the lost girl, is not restored to him. Constantin concedes that:

> [The young man's] soul now gains a religious resonance. This is what actually sustains him, although it never attains a break-through. His dithyrambic joy in the last letter is an example of this, for beyond a doubt this joy is grounded in a religious mood, which remains something inward, however. He keeps a religious

[49] Ansgar Nünning, "'With the Benefit of Hindsight': Features and Functions of Turning Points as a Narratological Concept and as a Way of Self-Making," *Turning Points: Concepts and Narratives of Change in Literature and Other Media,* Ansgar Nünning, Kai Marcel Sicks (eds.) (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2012), pp. 31-58.

[50] David J. Kangas advances the idea that this "quasi-repetition" of the young man is essentially a mimicry of repetition. See David J. Kangas, *Kierkegaard's Instant: On Beginnings*, p. 119.

> mood as a secret he cannot explain, while at the same time this secret helps him poetically to explain actuality. (R, 228-229/SKS 4, 94)

At the end of the book, Constantin revokes any genre identification – "it is not a comedy, tragedy, novel, novella [*Novelle*], epic, or epigram" (R, 226/SKS 4, 92) – as if any aesthetic category would be a further mystification.

The lines of life and the lines of writing intermingle, as Deleuze and Guattari would have noted. The temporality of novella is extended beyond the limits of the genre. Journal notes, letters, suicidal notes, and in general every text with "blanks and gaps" bear resemblance to telegram texts. What is that which needs explanation and in what does this explanation consist of? What makes the secrecy of the secret is precisely the explanation, the enfolding of one into the other. Kierkegaard's insight here is – and at this point he moves away from the Romantic novella to an area closer to modernism – that not only there is a turning point that marks a radical change, but (a) the turning point of change is itself "invisible" (b) the repeatability of the turning point at every moment undoes the past and makes everything new (CA, 17-18n/SKS 4, 324). However, this movement of repetition requires faith and it is faith in repetition, in forgiveness.

From what precedes, it is evident that temporality and transformation within time constitutes a common problematic for philosophy and literature. By focusing on Kierkegaard's knight of faith, we are in position to better understand the figure of the acrobat-writer. What gives strength to the acrobat is not the confidence that he will not fall down while leaping or his forgetting that he fell in the past but the faith that he will repeat the movement of the leap anew, at the threshold of the ordinary and the marvellous. Therefore, Deleuze and Guattari's remarks about Kierkegaard as an acrobat-writer who leaps between literature and philosophy are justified in view of his authorship; except that Kierkegaard may be stretching from and towards another plane, that of theology.

Chapter 2

Repetition: From pun to possibility

> When the Eleatics denied motion, Diogenes, as everyone knows, came forward as an opponent. He literally did come forward, because he did not say a word but merely paced back and forth a few times, thereby assuming that he had sufficiently refuted them. (R, 131/SKS 4, 9)

With Diogenes' pacing "back and forth," the philosophical problem of movement is restated; along with it, Constantin Constantius' narrative *Repetition* (1843), subtitled "A Venture in Experimenting Psychology," begins. It is immediately worth noting the oddness of the fact that *Repetition* begins with a Cynic philosopher – a kind of "Socrates gone mad."[51] The when-clause ("When the Eleatics denied motion") introduces an ambiguous beginning, since from the point of historical accuracy there is no contact between the Eleatics and Diogenes of Sinope (ca. 412-323 BC). The anecdote about Diogenes, an incident from philosopher's life, might therefore not be a genuine beginning for the history of philosophy, but it does problematize the space and time between history and philosophy – "the essential issue" ["something between"], as Kierkegaard writes in *On the Concept of Irony: with Continual Reference to Socrates* (1841). For philosophy, although it comes later than history, surpasses the temporal and considers itself "the eternal *prious* [first]," i.e., what is already presupposed by historical understanding. By making "such a monumental step," Kierkegaard

[51] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of Eminent Philosophers*, 6.48. Kierkegaard refers to Diogenes of Sinope as exponent of Cynicism (CI, 182/SKS 1, 292). He compares the modern irony with the ancient one, which was not only a figure of speech but an act: "...but the irony of the Greeks is also *plastic*, e.g., Diogenes" (KJN 1, 226/DD:38/SKS 17, 235 [1837]). Diogenes' "performative rhetoric," according to R. Bracht Branham, includes aphorisms, puns, and paradoxes, comic self-dramatization, philosophical jesting, improvisation, parody of syllogistic process and social norms. His anti-theoretical attitude consisted in mocking philosophical systems and by "making himself the medium" of arguments Diogenes practiced a kind of philosophy that was open to the material conditions of life. See R. Bracht Branham, "Defacing the Currency: Diogenes' Rhetoric and the *Invention* of Cynicism," *Cynics: The Cynic Movement in Antiquity and Its Legacy*, R. Bracht Branham and Marie-Odile Goulet-Caźe (eds.) (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), pp. 81-104.

continues, philosophy "recollects the past as present" (CI, 10 and 466n12/SKS 1, 72). The particular, the historical existence, therefore, yields to the superiority and eternity of the philosophical look on the past when viewed as a fragment of the idea "that long[s] for the backward-looking repulse emanating, face to and against face, from the consciousness" (CI, 11/SKS 1, 73).

On the other hand, it is a proper novelistic opening for *Repetition*. It starts with two philosophical opponents. On the one side, there are the Eleatics, who like Zeno dismissed movement and change as illusions or, like Parmenides asserted the reality of *what-is* (τὸ ἐόν) "that Fate shackled to be whole and changeless" (Fr 8.37-38). On the other, stands Heraclitus, who spoke of the strife of opposites and the eternal flux of all things – "things taken together are whole and not whole, <something that is> being brought together and brought apart" (Fr 10).[52] From this initial confrontation, *Repetition* continues with couples (Constantin and the young man, the young man and his beloved girl) and pairs of oppositional terms (recollection and repetition, unhappiness and happiness, ideality and actuality, all and nothing, understanding and misunderstanding), contradictions and revocations.

Constantin is impressed by the compelling manifestness of Diogenes' action and the way he resolved Zeno's paradox of motion with the immediacy of motion. The "repetition" of his journey to Berlin, to where Constantin had traveled "once before," will "now" acquire the apodictic value of the possibility and importance of repetition – i.e., he will discover, as he claims, "whether something gains or loses in being repeated" (R, 131/SKS 4, 9). We infer that the "now" is relatively defined to "about a year ago," when Constantin first became acquainted with a young man and became his "confidant" during the young man's unhappy love affair (R, 133-134/SKS 4, 11). This episode seems to be the occasion of his thoughts contrasting repetition to recollection and the occasion of his "experimenting Psychology." Constantin thus distinguishes himself from Hegel, who, recounting the same

[52] All translations of the fragments come from *A Presocratics Reader: Selected Fragments and Testimonia*, Richard D. McKirahan (trans.) and Patricia Curd (ed. and intro.) (Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett, 1996).

anecdote about Diogenes in his *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, warns against such non-argumentative refutations based on "sensuous appearance" and not on reason: "but it is necessary to think of motion as Zeno thought of it, and yet to carry this theory of motion further still."[53] The manner of Diogenes' refutation, "which commonsense finds so illuminating," Hegel writes in *The Science of Logic*, is something must be left behind, as Aristotle did in the *Physics.*[54] Accordingly, Hegel counts as an opponent of Diogenes.

The scientific nature of Constantin's experiment is undermined from the start by its merely 'occasional nature'. Someone has occupied himself, "at least on occasion," with the problem of repetition – a category that "will play a very important role for modern philosophy," precisely for the reason that "*repetition* is a crucial expression for what 'recollection' was to the Greeks." This kind of mirroring continues in the next sentences. "Repetition and recollection are the same movement, except in opposite directions"; the one who recollects repeats backwards what it has been, "whereas genuine repetition is recollected forward"(R, 131/SKS 4, 9). In an almost similar case, namely, the treatment of immortality and recollection in Platonic *Phaedo*, Kierkegaard himself comments: "....because of the importance such a question as the immortality of the soul must always have, there is something dubious about its being treated incidentally in Platonism, that is, on the occasion of Socrates' death" (CI, 67/SKS 1, 126). The category of "occasion" presents a paradoxical aspect for thought, writes Kierkegaard in *Either/Or*; "it is a

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[53] Hegel, *Lectures on the History of Philosophy: Greek Philosophy to Plato,* E. S. Haldane and Frances H. Simson (trans.) (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1995), pp. 267-268. Kierkegaard owned a copy of Hegel's Lectures (*Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel's Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie*, vols. 1–3, Karl Ludwig Michelet [ed.] [Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, 1833–1836] [ACKL 557-559]). Hegel refers as his sources for the anecdote, Diogenes Laertius (*Lives of Eminent Philosophers,* 6.39) and Sextus Empiricus (*Pyrrhonian Hypotyposes*, III.8, 66) but in neither of them Diogenes of Sinope confronts Zeno. Pierre Bayle, a third source of Hegel, explained how the philosopher who denied motion in the anecdote was identified with the name of Zeno the Eleatic in later sources (lemma "Zeno" in *Dictionnaire historique et critique,* Vol. 10). Kierkegaard may have read about Zeno independently from Hegel's Lectures since he owned Bayle's *Dictionary* (*Herrn Peter Baylens...Historisches und Critisches Wörterbuch*, vols. 1–4, Johann Christoph Gottsched [ed. and trans.] [Leipzig: Bernhard Christoph Breitkopf, 1741–1744] [ACKL 1961-1964]). For Kierkegaard's sources about the Eleatic philosophy, see Jon Stewart, "The Eleatics: Kierkegaard's Metaphysical Considerations of Being and Motion," pp. 123-145.

[54] G.W.F. Hegel, *The Science of Logic*, George di Giovanni (ed. and trans.) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 164-165 and p. 742.

little accidental external circumstance that becomes the occasion," whereas before this becoming, an occasion does not have an intrinsic identity; it is "nothing in and by itself." Otherwise, it would be "either ground or cause" of what it produces, thus the occasion "in this accidentality" would be "the necessary" (EO1, 233-234/SKS 2, 227-228). Encountering the accidental and the necessary in life, the accidentality or necessity in the midst of change, becomes a matter for freedom. With the loss of freedom in this encounter, the characters resort to recollection or repetition.

When repetition is understood as forward movement, Constantin continues meditating, it is identified with life in its entirety; rather than being another attitude towards life, repetition "is actuality and the earnestness of existence" (R, 133/SKS 4, 11), whereas recollection is merely an evasion of life, like someone finds "an excuse to sneak out of life again, for example, that he has forgotten something" (R, 131/SKS 4, 9). If someone chooses repetition and has "the desire to rejoice in it" from life's beginning, "repetition makes a person happy" (R, 131-132/SKS 4, 9-10). Recollection's love, however (or so Constantin claims), means happiness only because it covers up a deeper unhappiness; it presupposes the loss – the end of a love affair, death or forgetfulness – consequently, "it has nothing to lose" (R, 136/SKS 4, 14). Repetition provides continuity in time from time's own creation, as opposed to a fleeting mood, the momentary diversion, or what Kierkegaard calls, "the interesting" (R, 147-148/SKS 4, 23-25). In the course of the book, meanings and non-meanings are built up and subtracted from the field of repetition the category, but we are always faced up with the aporia if the repetition is possible.

The outcome of his journey to Berlin finds Constantin persuaded that instead of repetition being able to serve as a principle of life, life is turning everything to its death. He describes his whole experience as awaking from a dream "to have life unremittingly and treacherously *retake* everything it had given without providing a *repetition*" (R, 172/SKS 4, 45, emphasis in the original). Even Constantin's efforts to attain and repeat a feeling of complete satisfaction were enough to throw him "in[to] the abyss of despair." No moment of pleasure could be an instance of another moment; neither could moments be added together to form a totality of

happiness (R, 173-174/SKS 4, 46-47). On the level of narrative, we are back at the beginning of the novel: "That was how far I had come before I learned to know that young man. […] It was then that time after time I turned to and became excited about the idea of repetition…" *(*R, 174/SKS 4, 47).[55] The narration of the second trip to Berlin is embedded in the interstices of the "now" at the beginning and the "then" at the end of the first part of *Repetition*.

Constantin's renunciation of "the idea of repetition" is a bitter acceptance of the common view that "life is a stream" (R, 174/SKS 4, 48). Recalling the opening of *Repetition* the defining image of Constantin's position is the river that is flowing into the sea, "which is never filled." This is not the Heraclitean flux but rather constitutes an allusion to *Ecclesiastes*: "All the rivers run into the sea; yet the sea is not full" (Eccl 1:7). In fact, in the last paragraph of the first part of *Repetition* - "all is vanity" (Eccl 1:2), Kierkegaard must be reworking the whole prologue of Ecclesiastes (R, 175-176/SKS 4, 49). In the midst of change, there is no change at all: "The thing that hath been, it is that which shall be; and that which is done is that which shall be done: and there is no new thing under the sun" (Eccl 1:9).[56] As he writes in his unpublished reply to J.L. Heiberg's review of *Repetition*[57]: "The consequence of the journey is that I [Constantin] despair of the possibility and step aside for the young man" (R, 304/SKS 15, 69). Thus the previous "relative statements" about repetition, though some may hold truth, "with respect to realization [*Realisationen*], have to be retracted, which is illustrated by my despair"

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[55] J. Ferreira draws attention to this point of narration and comments that the ambiguity with regard to the temporal sequence of events is due to "a confusing back and forth between the recent past and distant past" (M. Jamie Ferreira, *Kierkegaard* [Malden, MA.; Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009], p. 43).

[56] Kierkegaard compares the passage from *Ecclesiastes* 1:9 with St Paul, 2 Cor 5:17 "Everything is New in Christ" as different standpoints (KJN 2, 117-118/HH:1-3/SKS 18, 125-126 [1840-1841]). He explains that 'New in Christ' is "New not merely insofar as it is something other, but also in the sense of the renewed, the rejuvenated." The 'new' in Christianity differs from 'new' understood from "the aesthetic viewpoint" and it presupposes "the concept of revelation." The standpoint that "There is Nothing New under the Sun," Kierkegaard continues, "instills an abstract monotony which destroys life." In *The Concept of Anxiety*, Kierkegaard ties the concept of repetition with St Paul's dictum in the sense that when the whole of existence begins anew, there is a break in the "immanent continuity with the former existence" (CA, 17/SKS 4, 342).

[57] Kierkegaard using the pseudonym Constantin Constantius drafted but never published a response to Heiberg's critique of *Repetition* in his "Det astronomiske Aar [The Astronomical Year]" (*Urania Aarbog for 1844*, J.L. Heiberg [ed.] [Copenhagen, 1843], pp. 97-102).

(R, 306/SKS 15, 71).

By way of underling his conclusion Constantin alludes to Hegesias the Cyrenaic (ca. 290 BC), known with the epithet "πεισιθάνατος" (R, 176/SKS 4, 49) for employing the rhetorics of death. Hegesias taught that happiness is altogether impossible for humans and pleasure is nothing but a relative and transient sensation. It is therefore a mark of sagacity to show indifference to life to the point of death.[58] Hegesias is, according to Hegel, the paradigm of a philosopher who evokes individual sensation as a universal principle but is unable to provide an objective determination of it. The "incongruity between sensation and universality" is brought in his philosophy to the highest degree with the subsequent result that "the individuality of consciousness as such, disappears" together with every meaning and reality of life.[59]

With Hegesias the circle constituted by marginal figures of the Socratic schools, a circle opened with Diogenes, is now closing. It is as though Constantin wants to inscribe himself in Hegel's history of philosophy, something he ironically alludes to: "Perhaps something may come of it, a footnote in the system – great idea! Then I would not have lived in vain!" (R, 150/SKS 4, 26). Just before this remark, and before embarking on his trip, Constantin, who knows something "of modern philosophy and is not entirely ignorant of Greek philosophy," demonstrates his philosophical education. Three points stand out: (a) *Gjentagelse* [Repetition], his newly coined philosophical term "explains the relation between the Eleatics and Heraclitus"; (b) in the philosophical card-game, the Greek explanation of "the moment," the theory of being and nothing "trumps" (*siger Spar To til*) the Hegelian mediation; (c) "the Greek view of the concept of *κίνησις* [motion, change]" – probably because all previous theories hinge on this

[58] Giovanni Reale, *A History of Ancient Philosophy: The Systems of the Hellenistic Age*, Vol. 3 (Albany: SUNY Press, 1985), pp. 40-41. As Julia Annas suggests, the hedonism of Cyrenaic School paradoxically ends up in the pessimism of Hegesias. See Julia Annas, *The Morality of Happiness* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 232-233.

[59] Hegel, *Lectures on the History of Philosophy: Greek philosophy to Plato*, pp. 477-478.

(philosophical) problem – "should be given close attention."[60]

Constantin expounds the dialectic of repetition as follows:

> The dialectic of repetition is easy, for that which is repeated has been – otherwise it could not be repeated – but the very fact that it has been makes the repetition into something new. When the Greeks said that all knowing is recollecting, they said that all existence, which is, has been; when one says that life is a repetition, one says: actuality, which has been, now comes into existence. (R, 148- 149/SKS 4, 25)

On his trip Constantin has run through all the history of philosophy, from Parmenides via the Socratics to Hegel, and ironically played it out – the movement in the journey to Berlin "became a pun" (R, 309/SKS 15, 74). Again, it is worth noting Hegel's view: anecdotes, jokes and word-plays attributed to the exponents of Socratic schools are valued if they bring "all particular conceptions" into contradiction, so that "the form of universality" comes forth; otherwise, they are "insignificant."[61] Considering the affinity between Diogenes and Constantius' project, Hegel's comment can be read inversely: the jest is significant because Kierkegaard resists making repetition a universal principle and closing repetition up into the philosophical. The jest is made in earnest, because it paves the way for pondering repetition as a question for the individual: "Can repetition be realized?" Repetition "in this pregnant sense" is "a task for freedom" in the concrete conditions of life and not an exposition of an abstract thesis about freedom (R, 312/SKS 15, 77).

[60] The jesting tone of this passage at the expense of Constantin Constantius' endeavours in modern philosophy is obvious.

[61] Hegel, *Lectures on the History of Philosophy: Greek philosophy to Plato,* pp. 459-465.

Repetition: The constitution of narrative temporality

Among the interpretations suggested for Kierkegaardian repetition, H.V. Martin identifies repetition with prolepsis in an article entitled "Kierkegaard's Category of Repetition" and published in 1943. "[The Moment of Repetition]," Martin writes, "is the future restoring and repeating the past in the present under new possibility."[62] Furthermore, he argues that "the theme of Repetition lies at the heart of Christianity," since the restoration of creation and the redemption of man could be interpreted as "Repetition of man's original creation in the image of God."[63] Thus Martin considers the Kierkegaardian category of repetition inscribed within the semantic field of "restitution" (*ἀποκατάστασις*, Acts 3:19-21) and the Irenaean doctrine of recapitulation (*ἀνακεφαλαίωσις*).[64]

He further relates repetition with proleptic eschatology and the conception of messianic time in Christianity, stating that "the underlying thought is the same."[65] Prolepsis expresses the paradox that the future Kingdom of God and the Eschaton "has reached from the future backwards to us in the present, without at the same time ceasing to be future." He elucidates the category of *prolepsis* with extensive references to passages from the Old and New Testament; the use of the verb *φθάνω* ("arriving in anticipation") in St Paul's Epistle to the Philippians conveys the meaning of having already reached – "proleptically" – what is still ahead and at the same time walking towards it: "πλὴν εἰς ὃ ἐφθάσαμεν, τῷ αὐτῷ στοιχεῖν κανόνι" (Phil 3:16).[66] Martin also refers to the anointing of Jesus by the woman in Mark's Gospel as a proleptic act, an act in anticipation of His death and burial: "προέλαβε μυρίσαι μου τὸ σῶμα εἰς τὸν ἐνταφιασμόν" (Mk 14:8).[67]

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[62] H.V. Martin, "Kierkegaard's Category of Repetition," *The Expository Times* 54:10 (July 1943), pp. 266. For the various interpretations given to repetition, see David Cain, "Notes on a Coach Horn: 'Going Further', 'Revocation', and Repetition," *International Kierkegaard Commentary: Fear and Trembling, and Repetition,* Robert L. Perkins (ed.) (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1993), pp. 335-358.

[63] Martin, "Kierkegaard's Category of Repetition," p. 267.

[64] Martin, "Kierkegaard's Category of Repetition," pp. 267-268.

[65] Martin, "Kierkegaard's Category of Repetition," p. 267.

[66] Martin, "The Messianic Age,"*The Expository Times* 52:7 (April 1941), p. 272.

[67] Martin, "Proleptic Eschatology," *The Expository Times* 51:2 (November 1939), p. 89.

Prolepsis is a narratological term used by the French literary theorist Gérard Genette. Genette's theory of narrative provides helpful insights into how the narrative temporality of *Repetition* is constituted, involving the relationship between the narrating act assumed by Constantin (the character, narrator and pseudonymous author of *Repetition*), the narrative itself, and the chronological order of the story. According to Genette, every narrative is marked by *anachronies*, that is, temporal discordances between the linear sequence of events in the story and the narration of the same events in the text. Genette distinguishes between two types of anachronies, *analepsis* and *prolepsis*. *Analepsis* designates the evocation or the narration of any event "that took place earlier than the point in the story where we are at any given moment," whereas *prolepsis* signifies the anticipatory evocation of "an event that will take place later."[68] The linearity of the story-events is to certain extent elusive since the story is mediated through the narrative utterance/discourse and is reconstructed or inferred "from one or another indirect clues" by the reader.[69] Genette is reluctant here to reduce "the narrative categories of analepsis and prolepsis" to the psychological ones of 'retrospection' and 'anticipation', for the reason that, as he maintains, the latter "take for granted a perfectly clear temporal consciousness and unambiguous relationships among present, past, and future."[70]

Anachronies could reach further backward in the past or further forward into the future with regard to the 'present' moment from which the temporal continuity of the narrated story is transgressed "to make room for the anachrony."[71] The reach of every anachrony indicates the temporal distance between these two (always relative) points between the past-present or between the present-future. It is noteworthy that Genette puts "present" in quotation marks since such a moment

[68] Gérard Genette, *Narrative Discourse: An Essay in Method*, Jane E. Lewin (trans.) (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1980 [1st ed. 1972]), p. 40. Genette calls attention to the Greek roots of the terms coined, namely, the root *-λημψις* from the verb 'λαμβάνω' (take, assume responsibility for, receive): "prolepsis: to take on something in advance; analepsis: to take on something after the event".

[69] Genette, *Narrative Discourse,* pp. 25-32 and 35.

[70] Genette, *Narrative Discourse,* pp. 78-79.

[71] Genette, *Narrative Discourse,* p. 48. The present moment of the story could be articulated in the past (narrative) tense.

is continuously flowing as the narrative unfolds the events of the story. Genette introduced a further distinction between: (a) external analepsis or external prolepsis whereby the events narrated in the anachronic segment precede the opening of the text or are located posterior to the closing of the text respectively. In this manner, a retrospective look into the past elucidates certain aspects of the main narrative or antecedently fills in a gap whilst in proleptic account the narrative extends beyond its own ending foreshadowing its possible future(s). (b) Internal analepsis or prolepsis connotes that the narrative section "taken on" falls within "the temporal field of the first narrative."[72] It is possible that the narrative in recalling events "retraces its own path" – what Genette calls "repeating analepsis." Correspondingly, prolepses "still ahead of time – double, however slightly, a narrative section to come (repeating prolepses)." These cases border narrative redundancy, that is, "duplication."[73] The narrative structure of *Repetition* reinforces the performative rhetoric of the text and helps us understand the way Kierkegaard stages the failed repetition of Constantin.

Although every narrator controls the narrative time, Constantin treats time itself as a controllable element. Constantin also assumes the role of the observer of the young man's moods and "the observer's art is to expose what is hidden" (R, 135/SKS 4, 12) and to register "the momentum of his melancholy" (R, 137/SKS 4, 14). The narrative rhythm is marked by the repetitive "as time went on," "time passed" (R, 141/SKS 4, 18); as his confidant, Constantin helps the young man to "pass the time, which went far too slowly for his impatience" (R, 146/ SKS 4, 23). These indications of time in effect skip over time, making time insignificant. His plan that the young man should deceive the girl and replace her with another, means, first and foremost, to "burn all [his] bridges," to annihilate everything (R, 142/SKS 4, 19): the time past, the relationship, his poetic-existence. "[T]he moment of repetition," as Constantin understands repetition, will possibly come after a calculated year: "if

[72] Genette, *Narrative Discourse,* p. 61.
[73] Genette, *Narrative Discourse,* p. 71.

he [the young man] succeeded in that, a *redintegratio in statum pristinum* [reestablishment of the prior state] might be accomplished" (R, 144/SKS 4, 21).[74]

As the young man writes in his first letter, the plan was "[his] future" modelled according to "the heroic figure" that Constantin holds up before "[his] admiring gaze" (R, 189/SKS 4, 59). The manipulation of time verges on the transformation of the self, but it does so in the mode of deception and fabrication. Constantin's imperative is: "Transform yourself" into a deceiver (R, 142/SKS 4, 19). The young man used "his poetic originality in order to delight and amuse her" all the while being anxious about this "monstrous falsehood" that he himself had been fabricating (R, 138/SKS 4, 16).

As time passes, it brings changes that Constantin can observe in the young man (the poetic productivity, the deepening of his melancholy) and changes that he cannot. Only after young man's escape to Stockholm and the arrival of his first letter, Constantin remarks that time/life "has mocked him by making him guilty where he was innocent" (R, 185-186/SKS 4, 56).

With his trip from Copenhagen to Berlin, another circle is opened between two points in space. His insistence on visiting the same places (the apartment, the Theater, the café) in order to prove the possibility of repetition ends up in boring "same sameness" (R, 170/SKS 4, 44). All the while he is exposed to time and changes that he cannot control, not even give meaning to them outside fate, chance or bad habit.

[74] Kierkegaard uses the Latin "redintegratio" as restoration and renewal in *The Concept of Anxiety* (1844): "The good, of course, signifies the restoration [*redintegration*] of freedom, redemption, salvation, or whatever one would call it" (CA, 119/SKS 4, 421) and in *Prefaces* (1844): "redintegratio amoris [re-establishment of love]" (P, 11/SKS 4, 475).

> When I came home the first evening and had lit the candles, I thought: Alas! Alas! Alas! Is this the repetition? I became completely out of tune, or, if you please, precisely in tune with the day, for fate had strangely contrived it so that I arrived in Berlin on the *allgemeine Buszund Bettag* [Universal Day of Penance and Prayer]. (R, 152-153/SKS 4, 28-29)

The failure of his journey back to Berlin (an investigation into the Aristotelian concept of motion in space [*φορά*]) partly excludes the possibility of the young man's returning to the girl to be considered as genuine repetition.

Only in the second part of *Repetition*, entitled "Repetition," is time measured by the frequency of the young man's letters to Constantin; here, time fluctuates between intervals of five to three weeks, beginning with 15th August, the date of the first letter (R, 179/SKS 4, 51). It could be said that a full circle of a year is closed with Constantin's letter addressed "To Mr. X, Esp. the real reader of this book" that intentionally confuses the historical with the narrated time (Copenhagen, August 1843). Despite the historical anchoring, we are told that the reader would understand "the variety of moods," "the interior psychic states" in a book that "the lyrical is so important"; the temporal span of the novel is enfolded back into the lyrical, into poetic time (R, 230-232/SKS 4, 96).

The 'now' of the act of writing is constantly being reconstructed anew in *Repetition*. Constantin is explicitly jesting with the rhetorical aspect of writing and repetition: "But here I sit going on at great length about what was mentioned just to show that in fact recollection's love makes a man unhappy" (R, 145/SKS 4, 22)/ "I must constantly repeat that I say all this in connection with repetition. Repetition is the new category that will be discovered" (R, 148/SKS 4, 25). The epistolary form has a different temporality; "the narrator," Genette maintains, "is at one and the same time still the hero and already someone else," since the hero gives "an account after the event" had taken place.[75] Epistolary time is essentially

[75] Genette, *Narrative Discourse,* p. 218.

fragmentary, with traces of the past and ruptures towards the future. Janet Gurkin Altman maintains that the now of narration in a letter is effaced by the very act of writing: "Yet *now* is unseizable, and this unseizability haunts the epistolary language,"[76] which nevertheless creates a fictive but yet impossible present. Similarly, the validity of every feeling expressed is suspended until the arrival of the next letter. A letter may be orientated to a future that is by necessity unknown to the letter writer, a future that is delayed until the time of reaching its addressee. Paradoxically, Altman concludes, "enigmatic silence realizes the letter form's potential for open-endedness."[77] The young man is caught in this impossible present: "What am I doing at present? I begin from the beginning and then I begin backwards. [....] My own name is enough to remind me of everything, and all life seems to contain only allusions to this past" (R, 194/SKS 4, 63). He is constantly evoking the future while he returns to the past, unable either to recollect or to forget it: "Or is it perhaps best to forget the whole thing? Forget – indeed, I shall have ceased to be if I forget it" (R, 202/SKS 4, 70).

In broad lines, *Repetition* is communicated predominantly as a future-orientated narrative: "[...] modern philosophy will teach that all life is repetition" (R, 131/SKS 4, 9). The repetition of the second trip to Berlin is superimposed upon the first one – which means that essentially is bound by this past – to the extent that Constantin discovers "that there simply is no repetition and had verified it by having it repeated in every possible way" (R, 171/SKS 4, 45). Due to the structure of *Repetition* (Part One-"Repetition"-Concluding Letter to the reader), the future anticipated by the reader is every time different: repetition is foreclosed as possibility for Constantin by the end of the first part. This seems to comply with the authorial intention:

> *"Repetition"* is and remains a religious category. So Constantin Constantius can get no further. He is clever, an ironist, struggles against the interesting but doesn't

[76] Janet Gurkin Altman, *Epistolarity: Approaches to a Form* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1982), p. 129.
[77] Altman, *Epistolarity: Approaches to a Form,* p. 187.

> notice that he remains caught up in it himself. The first form of the interesting is to love variation; the second is to want repetition but still in Selbstgenugsamkeit [self-satisfaction], with no suffering—therefore Constantin runs aground on what he himself has discovered, and the Young Man advances further. (KJN 2, 180-181/JJ:172/SKS 18, 195 [1844])

In the second part, the future possibility of repetition lies ahead for the young man, lying back before him in the figure of Job. Constantin wonders whether or not the young man will succeed in making the movement of repetition. As the young man writes in his penultimate letter, "I am waiting for a thunderstorm – and for repetition." And "[i]f the thunderstorm does not come," he would pretend to be dead, so that buried in a coffin he "will in all secrecy hide" his expectancy (R, 214/SKS 4, 81).

From narratological point of view, the young man performed the single proleptic leap[78] into the future by eclipsing the time of actually living already from the beginning of the book: "His eyes filled with tears, he threw himself down on a chair, he repeated the verse again and again." Constantin cannot show how "he [i.e., the young man] took such a tremendous step that he leaped over life," but he can tell that he recollected his love as a memory of the past which he would repeatedly return into its recollection: "If the girl dies tomorrow, [...] he will throw himself down again, his eyes will fill with tears again, he will repeat the poet's words again" (R, 136/SKS 4, 13-14). The question is if repetition can be brought to the temporal field of the narrative *Repetition*, either as internal or external prolepsis of a future event; in other words, if repetition is to be thought as a modality of the temporal. The narrated time in *Repetition* borders two creation narratives (Genesis and the Whirlwind in the Book of Job) that it cannot appropriate their temporality – it is the world that comes-into-existence. As a narrative, it can repeat another narrative, but it cannot be placed before that time;

[78] For the term "proleptic leap," see Alfonso de Toro, "Time Structure in the Contemporary Novel," in *Time. From Concept to Narrative Construct: A Reader*, J. Ch. Meister and W. Schernus (eds.) (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2011), p. 134.

only in the *confinium*.

Repetition and the Platonic Recollection

The aim of this section is to show how the strands of Platonic thought and the Socratic gestures in the Platonic dialogues (mainly in the *Phaedo* and *Phaedrus*) are interwoven in the narrative text and content of *Repetition*. By focusing on the two characters, Constantin and the Young man, we would lay out the way in which they relate to time and eternity.

Kierkegaard wrote and publicly defended his dissertation, *On the Concept of Irony with Continual Reference to Socrates* in 1841. As we will see, his early readings of Platonic dialogues shaped Kierkegaard's distinctive understanding of the doctrine of recollection. While the *Phaedo* has been treated by Kierkegaard extensively, albeit in an idiosyncratic way in his dissertation and Meno's paradox (80d) has found its place in *Philosophical Fragments* (1844),[79] it seems that an isolated passage revealing the perplexity of Socrates as to his true nature from the *Phaedrus* (*Phdr.* 229e-230a) is often-quoted in his authorship: "Socrates [...] 'did not know for sure whether he was a human being or an even more changeable animal than Typhon'" (R, 162-163/SKS 4, 37).[80] Here Socrates invokes the Typhonic monstrous nature as emblematic of human ignorance regarding one's own soul.

Plato expounds his theory of recollection (*ἀνάμνησις*) of the Ideas mainly in three dialogues, in the *Meno*, *Phaedo* and *Phaedrus*, each from a different perspective dictated by the context of each dialogue.[81] Recollection as learning of "the absolute, pure essence of things [*αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ*]" (*Phd.* 66a3-4),[82] though

[79] PF, 9ff/SKS 4, 218.
[80] Cf. PF, 37/SKS 4, 242.
[81] Charles Kahn, "Plato on Recollection," *A Companion to Plato*, Hugh H. Benson (ed.) (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2006), pp. 119-132.
[82] Unless otherwise noted, all translations of Plato's dialogues come from Loeb Classical Library. See Plato, *Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, Phaedo, Phaedrus* (Loeb Classical Library), Harold N. Fowler (trans.) (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005).

epistemological in intent, is metaphysically grounded on the immortality of the soul and its kinship with the objects of knowledge, that is, the immutable and eternal Forms; thus, the soul belongs to the uncompounded, imperishable natures, being itself an unchangeable, invisible entity (*Phd.* 78c-79e). The theory is further supported by the mythical element in the *Phaedrus*: the soul unfettered by the body is dwelling in the "place beyond heavens," abides in eternal contemplation of the Ideas and is "nourished by" the eternal truth (*Phdr.* 247c-e). Recollection as activity is also likened to the awakening of *eros* in the soul; the resplendent beauty of earthly particulars prompts the upward movement of the soul to their intelligible prototypes, to the extent that she recognizes the resemblance between the two realms (*Phdr.* 249d-250d).

In the *Phaedo* (or *On the Soul*) the argument for the immortality of the soul evolves around the fact that knowledge as contemplation of beings becomes a possibility when the soul is released from the body, hence the soul of the philosopher greatly "strives to be alone by itself [*αὐτὴ καθ' αὑτὴν*]" (65d). This kind of state could be either before or after death, but equally, a deathlike detachment from contradictory sensory perceptions and, most of all, a purification from bodily passions, desires, and "fancies [*εἰδώλων*]" could be attained during this life. In fact, this is the definition of philosophy – or better, the philosophical life – as preparation for death (65a-67a). Through its attachment to the body the soul is in a state of wandering (*πλανᾶται*), confusion, and dizziness, immersed into the realm of dissimilar multiplicity of particulars (79c). Accordingly, the releasement from the body as "from fetters" is portrayed in the *Phaedo* as "gathering [*συναγείρεσθαι*] of the soul into itself" and collecting her parts from the body, and therefore, "dwelling in her own place alone" from the present time "as in another life" (67c4-e2, trans. B. Jowett). Longing to leave the body, the soul redeems the errancy of desire for the body by which she is "attracted and seduced" (81b).

In this context,[83] Socrates recalls an ancient tradition according to which the souls go to Hades "from here and come back here again (*πάλιν*) and are born from the dead" as proof of the pre-existence of the soul: "they could not be born again if they did not exist" (70d). If it wasn't for this circle of regeneration whereby each thing is incessantly turning to its opposite and back again, everything would be absorbed into death and dispersion (72d). Consistent with the previous argument from opposites, Socrates further contends that recollection is the process of regaining ("taking back" [*ἀναλαμβάνομεν*]) the knowledge we gained [*λαβόντες*] "before we were born and lost it at birth." Recollection is the recovery of this loss, i.e., the forgetting; we are taking back that "which was our own" (75e1-8). The 'now' time of recollection is grounded on the first time we saw the ideas which ultimately refers to a previous time – "before we come to existence [*πρὶν γεγονέναι ἡμᾶς*]" (75a-76e), with the subsequent tension between 'our soul' and the 'we', the eternal past of essences and the present fear for the soul's dispersion upon the dissolution of the body (77b-e). Immortality is nothing other than the self-sameness of essence that survives the eternality of the soul's migrations through different bodies. More positively defined though, immortality as imperishability is a metaphysical dimension grounded on the soul's affinity to the divine essences, and therefore she cannot undergo "alteration [*ἀλλοίωσιν*]" (80c) or admit death as its opposite (105e). It is evident, Socrates provocatively questions, that if the good, the beautiful, and "every essence of that kind" do not exist, "neither did our souls" (76e); as all the interlocutors in the dialogue affirm that the existence of Forms has sufficiently been proved, also did so the immortality of the soul.

The similarity of the phrasing between Socrates' delineation of recollection and Constantin's claim that "repetition and recollection is the same movement, except in opposite directions" (R, 131/SKS 4, 9) is helpful in elucidating the relation and counter-relation between the two concepts. What is being gained – "taking back" – or being lost in recollection? Kierkegaard follows closely the Platonic text

[83] The arguments provided to support the immortality of the soul in *Phaedo* are conventionally called: the argument from opposites, the argument from recollection, the argument from affinity. For an overview of these arguments, see Fred D. Miller, "The Platonic Soul," *A Companion to Plato*, pp. 278-283.

in *On the Concept of Irony* and what he infers from Plato's series of arguments is that either the pre-existence of the soul "excludes the idea of its coming into existence" or if the argument for the pre-existence is to be "in harmony with the view of becoming," then "Socrates has demonstrated the resurrection of bodies." The latter view, of course, stands in contradiction with the Socratic teaching about the separation of the soul from the body (CI, 69/SKS 1, 128-129). The immortality of the soul is supposed to be a principle of continuity between time and eternity, but instead, in the Platonic theory of the soul's immorality the dimension of becoming vanishes under the priority of "genuine being – can this ever undergo change whatsoever?" (CI, 72-73/SKS 1, 131-132)

For Kierkegaard, the separable nature of the soul and the separateness of Being means that eternity, as advanced in Platonism, splits the self in its inwardness. Everything withdraws from sight into eternity: "the existence resulting from the successive dying to [*Afdøen*] is understood altogether abstractly in *Phaedo*" (CI, 66/SKS 1, 125). The soul is caught between "two extremes of abstractions" – the pre- and post- of death/existence; this means that instead of gaining gravity, Plato evaluates temporal existence entirely negatively. In Plato's belief, "life on this earth," Kierkegaard writes, "shades off (to use a term both pictorial and musical) on both sides" (CI, 72/SKS 1, 131). On one side, the soul in its preexistence is "totally volatilized in the world of ideas" and on the other, its coming into the physical life is described by Plato as forgetting of what the soul saw before. Kierkegaard renders the circularity of the argument as follows: "Thus forgetting is the eternal limiting presupposition that is infinitely negated by the eternally combining presupposition of recollection" (CI, 71-72/SKS 1, 130-131). In this flowing back and forth, not only "individuality" (CI, 71/SKS 1, 130) is erased, but immortality "becomes just as *langweilig* [boring] as the eternal number one" (CI, 73/SKS 1, 132).

In fact, there is never a proper descent into actuality, and Kierkegaard, citing the Platonic text verbatim, writes that through fear of "the formless" – that is, according to Plato, "the invisible and the Unseen world (*Ἅιδου*)" (*Phd*. 81c-d) – the

souls "are dragged back to the visible world," haunting the graves and monuments like "shadowy apparitions [*skyggeartede Skikkelser*/σκιοειδῆ φαντάσματα]" [*Phd*. 81d3]). Neither being released into the eternal nor belonging to the temporal, souls appear as ghost-like "incomplete existences" (CI, 69/SKS 1, 128). Only a moral concern could save eternal life from becoming "a *Schattenspiel an der Wand* [shadow play on the wall]" and only an ethical view of life could hinder the "unrestrained leap of abstraction," but, as Kierkegaard argues, this ethical view is not fully elaborated even in the mythical part of the dialogue (CI, 74/SKS 1, 133).[84] At the end, everything is valued negatively and "life dies away in a distant, fading echo (*Nachhall* is to me a preferable word)" (CI, 75/SKS 1, 134). Step by step, Kierkegaard is reversing the Platonic vocabulary, dislocating the meaning of 'the departure of the soul from the body' to abstraction from life, the notion of immortality to living "in the stillness of death" (CI, 77/SKS 1, 135), and the ideal becomes the formless.

However, in his account of the *Phaedo* Kierkegaard does not primarily aim at demonstrating that the arguments put forth for the immortality are not persuasive but that Plato's metaphysics is in the area of the demonic; thus he uses the expression "phantom existence [*Skygge-Existents*]" (CI, 74/SKS 1, 133) and its cognates. If everything exists by participating in the world of Ideas, "this life is the incomplete" (CI, 72/SKS 1, 131); likewise, the soul as the life principle cannot "assimilate" the opposite of the idea, i.e., death, therefore the soul is immortal, inclosing "within itself the idea of immortality" (CI, 75/SKS 1, 134). Kierkegaard draws the far-reaching consequence of these, namely, that the relation between the soul and the body, between life and death rests unexplained in Platonism (CI, 73-74/SKS 1, 132-133). The Christian view, on the other hand, calls for a radical division between life and death and the positive understanding of both: dying to

[84] The basic tenets of Kierkegaard critique of Platonism are repeated in *Concluding Unscientific Postscript* (1846) regarding speculative thought: pure thinking, pure subjectivity, Climacus contends, is nothing other than escaping out of existence into "abstraction's *Schattenspiel*" (CUP, 297-298/SKS 7, 323).

sin is not an intellectual death and death is triumphantly considered as birth into a new life (CI, 76-77/SKS 1, 135-136).[85]

In *The Concept of Anxiety* (1844) Kierkegaard will discuss further how "eternity is conceived metaphysically" in the context of the phenomenon of the demonic. Here he defines demonic anxiety as the lack of will to conceive eternity with earnestness, to understand eternity "concretely." Kierkegaard seems to deem the realm of pure identity, "the eternal self-consciousness," and the Greek notion of immortality that is gained by oblivion (*Lethe*) of the temporal as "evasions" from properly conceiving eternity as relation *to* rather than separation *from* the temporal (CA, 153-154/SKS 4, 452-453). Kierkegaard draws the motif of Lethe from the myth of Er in *The Republic*. In contrast to the Platonic thesis, the Socratic ignorance regarding death and Socrates' trust in embracing the unknown that comes after life casts doubt upon the Platonic visibility of the beyond (place and time) as it is developed in eschatological myths of the dialogues. In these journeys to the underworld, Kierkegaard notes, "we see the soul vanish, accompanied by its daemon" (CI, 109/SKS 1, 162).[86] Although the *Republic* is not treated extensively (except Book I), Kierkegaard alludes to the allegory of the Cave and the river of Lethe, both in *On the Concept of Irony* and *The Concept of Anxiety* (CI, 10/SKS 1, 72 and CA, 154/SKS 4, 453). The eschatological myth of Er in Book X of the *Republic* contours the place of the demonic. Socrates recounts the story of Er, who was killed in a battle but having revived after twelve days described what he saw "on the other side." His soul left his body and "made its way with many others" to a certain demonic place (*τόπον τινά δαιμόνιον*) between heaven and earth where the souls were gathered and judged. As they prepared to be reborn, they chose their daemon and the (new) way of living; Er goes on to relate how the souls crossed "the plain of Lethe" and drank from "the river of Forgetfulness," as it was necessary to forget

[85] Laura Llevadot explains that Kierkegaard had already delineated the distinction between recollection and repetition in his dissertation. See Laura Llevadot, "Repetition and Recollection in *On the Concept of Irony*: Kierkegaard's Use of Socrates and Plato in his Analysis of Religious Existence," *Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook* (2009), pp. 285-304.

[86] Kierkegaard states that the mythical "*does not belong* to Socrates" (CI, 104/SKS 1, 158). For Kierkegaard's critique of Platonic mythos, see David J. Kangas, *Kierkegaard's Instant: On Beginnings*, pp. 32-37.

their past life, before leaping up to their birth "like shooting stars" (*Rep.* 614b-621b). Undertaking the interpretation of this myth in the *Republic* Claudia Baracchi describes excellently the daemonic in Platonic philosophy as the place of the in-between (*μεταξύ*). This middle place is illustrated in the *Symposium* by the daemonic power of Eros, who mediates between the divine and the mortals, with the pregnant lover, who "gives birth" in the beautiful (*Symp*. 206c-e).[87]

Kierkegaard considers "the longing that desires to possess" in the *Symposium* and "[the longing that] desires to lose" in the *Phaedo* as the same (metaphysical) longing that both constitutes and annuls the substance. The longing of the soul for the idealized abstract, "the formless," is portrayed as the desire of dying to [*Afdøen*] (CI, 72/SKS 1, 131);[88] similarly, in the *Symposium* "love is continually disengaged more and more from the accidental concrete" until it becomes desire without object – "the abstract itself" – bringing forth in desire what is lacked (CI, 45-46/SKS 1, 106-107). With regard to what is lost (either in life or in death), the imagination comes "to repair and make good the loss." The mythical works as one who cannot cast away something in oblivion or cannot relate to one's own past (experience): "the object is placed outside, is distanced in order to be drawn back again." In this way, one "tries to make the present tense of imagination all the more attractive by way of a time contrast." This is exactly the poetic-melancholic longing: it draws its object outside in order to draw nearer in imagination.[89] Kierkegaard aligns imagination with fabrication, though he draws attention to the distinction between the mythical and poetic. He cites here Ast's remark that "Diotima is a pure fabrication (*Opdigtelse*)" (CI, 107-108/SKS 1, 160-161), but Kierkegaard does not merely intend that Plato created a myth and placed it in the mouth of Diotima. In Diotima's speech, the name "fabrication" (*ποίησις*)[90] is attributed to "any (cause)

[87] Claudia Baracchi, *Of Myth, Life, and War in Plato's* Republic (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2002), pp. 181-188.

[88] As already been noted, when Kierkegaard talks about the 'formless' and the 'abstract', he plays with the literal translation of Hades as the Unseen world, while Plato uses *Forms* or *Shapes* as cognate terms for the Ideas.

[89] Cf. R, 137/SKS 4, 14.

[90] For the meaning of *ποίησις* as fabrication in Diotima's speech, see Luc Brisson, *Plato the Myth Maker,* Gerard Naddaf (trans.) (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), pp. 40-48 [esp. pp. 42-43].

that makes something pass from not being into being." Poetry – and those who practice it, the poets – is a small part of the whole art of "fabrication" (*Symp*. 205b-c).[91] As we shall see, this is crucial for understanding of the Young man as a lover who needs to lose the object of his love in order to place it at a distance and poetize it in his imagination.[92]

However distant, there is a correlation between fabrication and what Kierkegaard writes about the Romantic poet/the ironist who "creates/poetizes" both himself and himself with the nothing: "when he notices that he is becoming nothing, he includes that in his poetizing." And still, the poet's position is to retain "a negative freedom" to what he creates, to stand "above himself" (CI, 281/SKS 1, 317). Living poetically means living "in this totally hypothetical and subjunctive way" (CI, 284/SKS 1, 319).[93] As a counterargument to the immortality, which Kierkegaard grasps to its ironic consequences, one of Socrates' interlocutors remarks that the soul like a weaver may weave a new body around her in every new birth, but after weaving and wearing out many garments there is the danger that finally she herself perishes "altogether in one of its deaths" (*Phd*. 87a-88b) (CI, 73/SKS 1, 132). The desire for immortality "is based on a kind of weariness with life" and not on the desire for new life (CI, 77/SKS 1, 136). Just like in the *Phaedo* the soul "continually tries to sneak out of the body" (CI, 73/SKS 1, 132), the romantic longing is for a "sentimental sneaking out of the world" (CI, 329/SKS 1, 357). As Kierkegaard writes in *The Concept of Anxiety*, "some bend eternity into time for imagination," thereby in this "duplicity" – the bending of the 'I' and reality into its eternal double – the eternity both enchants and is "wistfully" dreamed of (CA, 152-153/SKS 4, 452).

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[91] For the weaving as an analogy for poetry, see John Scheid and Jesper Svenbro, *The Craft of Zeus: Myths of Weaving and Fabric*, Carol Volk (trans.) (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1996), pp. 111-130.

[92] Niels Nymann Eriksen compares Poul Møller's poem "The Old Lover" with Young man's poetic escapism from actuality. See Niels Nymann Eriksen *Kierkegaard's Category of Repetition*, pp. 29-34.

[93] For a discussion of Romantic Irony and the negative freedom, see K. Brian Söderquist, "Irony," in *Oxford Handbook of Kierkegaard*, John Lippitt and George Pattison (eds.) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 344-364.

Romantic poetry, much like Platonism, cannot cope with either life or death. This is particularly evident in passages in which the first part permeates the second part of *On the Concept of Irony*, where he treats Romantic irony. With the entering of sin in the world, the "discrepancy" in nature instead of "harmoniousness starts to appear. Echo, "a friendly nymph" in classical mythology, has become in Norse mythology *"Bergmaal* [a mountain language]*,"* an anxious repetition. What Kierkegaard illustrates with this analogy is that there is no place any more for "a quiet recollection [*stille Erindring*]" to alleviate "the sorrow [*Sorg*]" but "a deep sigh and everlasting oblivion [*evig Glemsel*]" (CI, 254-255 and 541n30/SKS 1, 293). It is noteworthy that sorrow as sorrow *for* remains without object.

Oblivion, reflected into its opposite, takes the appearance of memory. This comes forth with intensity in the aesthete's reflections in "Diapsalmata"; in his unhinged talking *ad se ipsum* the child remembers everything:

> Then I live as one already dead. Everything I have experienced I immerse in a baptism of oblivion unto an eternity of recollection. Everything temporal and fortuitous is forgotten and blotted out. Then I sit like an old gray-haired man, pensive, and explain the pictures in a soft voice, almost whispering, and besides me sits a child, listening, although he remembers everything before I tell it. (EO1, 42/SKS 2, 51)

Fabrication, whether with the meaning of poetic creation that compensates for loss or with the meaning of delusion that entraps its characters into a misrelation to reality or into voluntarily creating a false reality, underlies the text of *Repetition*. The narrative outer shell is a fictive fabrication – a piece of "ventriloquism," "a misunderstanding" prompted by its pseudonymous author, which can seduce the readers into its meandering of moods. Constantin "just like a midwife" brought the young man, a poet, into being (R, 228/SKS 4, 94). Ultimately, fabrication implicates the reader in unearthing the various layers of illusion that cover the distinction of recollection with repetition. In his unpublished response to Heiberg, Kierkegaard

alludes to the task to dispel the illusion. While the Greek mentality finds in recollection "freedom's consolation" by moving backward into the past, the modern view "must seek freedom forward, so that here eternity opens up for him [the young man] as the true repetition forward" (R, 317/SKS 4, 81). Seeking freedom forward could be triggered by a crisis of freedom as the one that the young man faces. If the problem of the loss of freedom, the passage of time, the relation to the eternal, commitment to others poses as a problem *for* freedom and if this problem is grasped, as Kierkegaard writes, "with the interest of actuality, then the distinction will readily appear between the Greek recollecting and repetition" (R, 318/SKS 15, 82).

Kierkegaard reworks here the thematic of the *Phaedo* as he has expounded it in *On the Concept of Irony* in delving into what the "shadow-existence [*Skygge-Existents*]" is and what is reversed into shadow-existence (R, 154/SKS 4, 30). Constantin writes before his recount of theatrical excursion: "There is probably no young person with any imagination who has not at some time been enthralled by the magic of the theatre."[94] The "artificial actuality" that the theatre provides corresponds to a stage in the spiritual life in which "only the imagination is awakened to his dream about personality" together with "the passion of possibility." In this setting he splits himself into "a variety of shadows" and every shadow "resemble[s] him, while only "a self-vision of the imagination" and not "the actual shape" of individuality is present. In this stage, "the individual's possibility wanders about in its own possibility" as a play and as freedom; "this shadow-existence" must be given time to "live out its life" but, on the other hand, it is a mistake for the individual "living out his life in it" (R, 154-155/SKS 4, 30-31). Indifference towards possibilities, all of them being equal to the extent that all are different at the same time, assumes only the semblance of freedom. The individual remains 'hidden' with the double meaning of the word: he wants to see and does not want to see "his actual self"/his actual self never comes forth. Constantin deduces that this stage of life soon approaches the realm of the demonic.

[94] For the central role of theater in *Repetition*, see George Pattison, *Kierkegaard: The Aesthetic and the Religious: From the Magic Theatre to the Crucifixion of the Image* (London: SCM Press, 1999), pp. 111-124; Samuel Weber, "Kierkegaard's *Posse*," pp. 200-228.

Therefore, the theater provides a superficial environment for "the *Schattenspiel* [shadow play] of the hidden individual" (R, 156/SKS 4, 31). For Constantin, the desire to return to the theatre equals an opportunity "to return to that first stage [*Tilstand*] [of life] and resume it in a mood" (R, 157/SKS 4, 33). The shadow-existence does not reserve only possibilities, but actuality is reduced to "a shadow" for the young man: "the actuality in which she is supposed to have her meaning remains but a shadow [*Skygge*] for me, a shadow that trots alongside my essential spiritual actuality [...]" (R, 201/SKS 4, 69).

The ambivalent relation to the in/visible characterizes the young man as a poet; for, in the end, what he gains back is not his self but a spectral consciousness: "When I come home, no one reads my face, no one questions my demeanor. No one coaxes out of my being an explanation that not even I myself can give to another, [...] whether I have won life or lost it" (R, 221/SKS 4, 88). Constantin explains that the young man's understanding of his actions remains external to him to the extent that "he both want to see it [what he has done] and does not want to see it in the external and the visible" (R, 230/SKS 4, 95). As soon as his actions become something external and visible, he can disengage himself from them bringing new possibilities, retaining thus the negative freedom of the romantic poet.

Constantin himself recedes further and further into his memories, staging the substitution of the one girl that the young man was unable to perform. The first "pleasant" recollection is about a young girl that he had driven from the countryside to Copenhagen with his coach "six years ago" (R, 147-148/SKS 4, 24-25). Then, there is the young girl at the Königstädter Theater, "half hidden" and suddenly revealed to him, so as to believe that it was "his good guardian spirit" – his demoniac luck – that confided the girl to him (R, 166-167/SKS 4, 41). The latter triggers the remembrance of another girl in the garden outside the city to where he escaped – when "my mind is sleepless" – to gaze at her appearance from a distance (R, 168/SKS 4, 42). All these memories seem to be wrapped up into a dreamlike, mythical image of his childhood, the fleeting nymph, goddess of brooks

and streams. To this archetypical image "he turned once again" in order to vanish from time, himself, and above all, from eternity: "…so weary that I needed an eternity to rest up, so melancholy that I needed an eternity to forget. You did not deny me what men want to deny me by making eternity just as busy and even more appalling than time" (R, 166/SKS 4, 40-41). Happiness and sadness, recollection and oblivion seem to flow together into a single desire for loss.

Interestingly, Constantin in his reverie at the theater, fantasizing the nymph of his youth, which he figures as living in a brook, exclaims: "Then I lay at your side and vanished from myself in the immensity of the sky above and forgot myself in your soothing murmur [*Rislen*]!" (R, 166/SKS 4, 40). Kierkegaard repeatedly alludes to this "murmuring" of the brook as an image of the meaningless passing of time that gives the impression of uniformity, particularly with regard to nature's repeated rhythms. This rhythmic repetition, in turn, may yield the impression of dream-like eternity. For example, in "The Immediate Erotic Stages" in *Either/Or* (1843), Kierkegaard writes that "[W]hen a brook ripples [*risler*] and keeps on rippling, there seems to be a qualification of time involved therein" (EO1, 68/SKS 2, 75). However, this figure is dismissed as a spatialized representation of time. In *The Concept of Anxiety* Vigilius underscores the complicity between the unmarked flowing of time, "without any punctuation marks," and the spiritlessness of Christian paganism. He contends that aesthetically "it is beautiful to listen to a brook [*Bæk*] running murmuring [*nynnende*] through life" but "from the standpoint of spirit" to exist in such unpunctuated time, that is, without distinction between the present, the past, and the future is sin (CA, 94/SKS 4, 397). We will return to this theme of punctuation in the last chapter.

Constantius can recognize "the demonic" that lies behind the abstract possibilities of youth, the flow of reflections but he cannot diagnose his own condition. The young man can feel Constantius' "demonic power" (R, 189/SKS 4, 59) over him as a temptation and captivity. Nevertheless, his self-entrapment is not healed at the end. He presumes that the girl's marriage is a divine intervention – "the thunderstorm" – that frees him:

> The split that was in my being is healed; I am unified again. [...] Is there not, then, a repetition? Did I not get everything double? Did I not get myself again and precisely in such a way that I might have a double sense of its meaning? (R, 220-221/SKS 4, 87).

Although the young man evokes his redemption from the chains that kept him still and in a state of despair, the meaning of the repetition gained is quite ambivalent and inexplicable to him – whether the girl's marriage was a fortuitous event or the much awaited help of "Governance" (R, 213/SKS 4, 80).

Chapter 3

Classical Conceptions of Time: Plato and Aristotle on Movement and Change

The problem that triggers the anecdote of Diogenes (Zeno's refutation of motion and the counter-refutation by Diogenes) is an important one for understanding Kierkegaard's category of repetition, namely, the continuity and discontinuity of space and time and the possibility of real change. Kierkegaard writes:

> Movement is dialectical, not only with respect to space (in which sense it occupied Heraclitus and the Eleatics and later was so much used and misused by the Skeptics), but also with respect to time. The dialectic in both respects is the same, for the point and the moment [*Punktet og Øieblikket*] correspond to each other. Since I could not name two schools in which the dialectic of motion with respect to time is expressed as explicitly as Heraclitus and the Eleatics express it with respect to space, I named them. (R, 309/SKS 15, 74)

A few lines later, he admits that *Repetition* the book shifts the attention of the reader to the movement in space, hence Constantin's trip to Berlin, but, in doing so, movement becomes "a pun [*Ordspil*]" (R, 309/SKS 15, 74). This raises the question of what are the implications for time if indeed we follow the premise that the point and the moment correspond to each other. Kierkegaard, under the pseudonym of Vigilius, pursues the implications of the spatialized conception of time and eternity (i.e., the correspondence between the point in space and the moment in time) in *The Concept of Anxiety* (Chap. III). From Kierkegaard's reading notes, it is clear that he meticulously studied Zeno's paradoxes of motion from Tennemann's *Geschichte der Philosophie* vis-à-vis Aristotle's theory of change as

expounded in *Physics*.[95] In fact, when he refers to "the point and the moment" he may have in mind Tennemann's account of Zeno's paradoxes.[96]

However, the way in which Kierkegaard frames the Aristotelian notion of *κίνησις* is quite baffling. He writes: "Therefore, when Aristotle long ago said that the transition from possibility to actuality is a κίνησις [motion, change], he was not speaking of logical possibility and actuality but of freedom's, and therefore he properly posits movement" (R [Supplement], 310/SKS 15, 74). The statement is further complicated by Kierkegaard's dismissal of Heiberg's critique that the writer of *Repetition*, i.e., Constantin Constantius, has applied the concept of repetition to "'a concept from natural philosophy, namely, *movement*'."[97] having thus confused the realm of nature (wherein the repetition of natural phenomena is subject to law) with the realm of spirit (R, 308/SKS 15, 73). Kierkegaard contends that on the contrary the pseudonymous author in his "experimenting psychology" is preoccupied with "the transcendent, religious" movement of repetition (R, 313/SKS 15, 78).

Constantius' investment in the Aristotelian theory of change seems misplaced and makes sense only in the fictional microcosm of *Repetition,* with friends, foes, and philosophical rivals. Albeit Kierkegaard's reception of Aristotle's philosophy relies heavily upon commentaries and historical introductions, this does not mean that he necessarily misunderstood Aristotle.[98] Aristotle's definition

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[95] See KJN 3, 424-425/Not 14:1/SKS 19, 426–7 (1843) and KJN 3, 393/Not 13:27/SKS 19, 394 (1842-43) and Wilhelm Gottlieb Tennemann, *Geschichte der Philosophie*, Vol. 1 (Leipzig: J. A. Barth, 1798), pp. 150–209 (ACKL 815).

[96] Tennemann, *Geschichte der Philosophie*, Vol. 1, pp. 197-202.

[97] This is a quotation from Johan Ludvig Heiberg, "Det astronomiske Aar" ["The Astronomical Year"], *Urania*, 1844, p. 98.

[98] For Kierkegaard's reading of Aristotle's work, see Håvard Løkke and Arild Waaler, "*Physics* and *Metaphysics*: Change, modal Categories, and Agency," in *Kierkegaard and the Greek World: Tome 2: Aristotle and other Greek Authors*, pp. 25-46. The authors bring attention to the fact that although Kierkegaard builds his notion of change and modality on Aristotelian conceptual framework, he nevertheless, working freely within this framework, diverges from the core of Aristotelian doctrine, especially when one reads closely the "Interlude" in *Philosophical Fragments*. Aristotle offers Kierkegaard a path to think movement and change as reality outside the Hegelian logic and towards the conception of existential movement. On this point, see also Clare Carlisle, *Kierkegaard's Philosophy of Becoming*, pp. 9-22. Also helpful is the recent paper by Ingrid Basso, "Notes on Aristotle's Metaphysics in Kierkegaard's Thought," *Acta Kierkegaardiana* (Supplement, VII: Kierkegaard and Classical Greek Thought) Andrew J. Burgess

of motion as transition from possibility to actuality holds particular appeal to Kierkegaard. He notes:

> The transition from possibility to actuality is a transformation [*Forandring*]; that is how T[ennemann] translates κινησις; If this is right, then this proposition is of the uttermost importance. (KJN 3, 393/Not 13:27/SKS 19, 395 [1842-43])

A side note, however, elucidates how Kierkegaard conceives possibility and freedom and, in part, explains the inconsistency of relating Aristotle's κίνησις with the realm of freedom: "Empty space is to the sphere of natural science, what possibility is to the sphere of freedom; I think a significant parallel could be drawn here, which, strangely enough, I don't find at all in Greeks, not even intimated" (KJN 3, 393/Not 13:27/SKS 19, 395 [1842-43]). The common ground for this parallelism between possibility and empty space is the "negative,"[99] that propels the transition from possibility to actuality, a parallelism that nevertheless is never found in Greek philosophy. Therefore, it is pertinent to take into consideration how the various pseudonymous writers appropriate and employ the pair possibility/actuality. For example, Vigilius offers one of the most forceful critique of Aristotle's construal of time as an abstract measure of change in the *Concept of Anxiety* (CA, 85ff).

In the remainder of this chapter, we shall further explore Kierkegaard's sources by first presenting Aristotle's theory of movement in *Physics*, before looking briefly at Hegel's account of Zeno's dialectics.

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and William McDonald (eds.) (Kierkegaard Circle, Nitra-Trinity College, University of Toronto, 2017), pp. 187-207.

[99] Kierkegaard associates Leucippus' definition of the void as "non-being" with the concept of possibility. The analogy must be: as the void (non-being) is the possibility of motion in natural philosophy, so the possibility as the negative is the necessary condition of movement and change in the sphere of freedom. Climacus articulates this idea in *Philosophical Fragments* as follows: "But such a being that nevertheless is a non-being is possibility, and a being that is being is indeed actual being or actuality, and the change of coming into existence is the transition from possibility to actuality" (PF, 74/SKS 4, 274)

a. Nature as the principle of change

At the beginning of Book III of the *Physics*, Aristotle emphasizes the importance of the study of change. For the reason that "nature is just a principle of movement and change [*ἀρχὴ κινήσεως καὶ μεταβολῆς*]," any failure to adequately define *κίνησις* would result in ignorance of what nature is (*Phys* III.1, 200b12-15).[100] Furthermore, Aristotle asserts that "there is no such thing as change in the abstract [*παρὰ τὰ πράγματα*]" (III.1, 200b32-33);[101] change always concerns things *qua* changeable in the actual world, things that have in their nature the ability to change or to be changed, namely, to produce change as agents or to undergo change. In this way, the subject-matter of *Physics* as natural philosophy is demarcated. On the other hand, as Sarah Waterlow remarks, "it is his metaphysic of substance" which upholds and determines the becoming since change is the expression of a particular substance in the natural world.[102]

Correspondingly to the categories of being, Aristotle distinguishes the following kinds of change: that "of substance or of quantity or of quality or of place" (*Phys* III.1, 200b33-34). Generation and destruction (*γένεσις καὶ φθορά*) describes any change (*μεταβολή*/*κίνησις*) in respect to substance, qualitative change is called alteration (*ἀλλοίωσις*),[103] growth and diminution (*αὔξησις καὶ φθίσις*) are changes in quantity, whereas locomotion refers to movement in place (*φορά, κατά τόπον*) (*Phys* III.1, 201a11-15). In the final Book of the *Physics*, the primacy of locomotion,

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[100] All the references to the Greek text are from Aristotle's *Physics*, W. D Ross (ed. with an intro. and commentary) (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1936).

[101] Aristotle classified the different species of change according to the categories of being, although he reduced change to the first four: substance, quantity, quality, place, relation, action, passion, time, position, and state. The additional point made here by Aristotle restates that change is not something apart from actual things. See the comments of Edward Hussey in Aristotle, *Physics: Books III and IV*, Edward Hussey (trans. with notes) (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), pp. 56-58.

[102] Sarah Waterlow, *Nature, Change, and Agency in Aristotle's* Physics*: A Philosophical Study* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), pp. 37-39.

[103] According to Robert Wardy, Aristotle seems to restrict alteration (qualitative change) to the perceptible/affective qualities, even though the category of quality (*ποιόν*) includes states/conditions, capacities or shape. See Robert Wardy, *The Chain of Change*. *A study of Aristotle's* Physics VII (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 142-143, 161ff.

and more specifically, the incessant revolution of heavenly bodies, is being sustained on the grounds that (a) it is the only perfect movement that imitates the unmoved mover; (b) all other movements depend on this first movement of the heavens. We will return to locomotion at the end of this section.

In *Phys* III.1, 201a10-11, Aristotle defines change as "the actuality of what [a being] is potentially, as such" (*ἡ τοῦ δυνάμει ὄντος ἐντελέχεια, ᾗ τοιοῦτον*),[104] only to acknowledge, after giving the above definition, that there remains "an indefiniteness" of the notion of change, inherent in the reality of change. Change is a kind of activity (*ἐνέργεια*) but "incomplete" (*ἀτελὴς*) insofar as it is a process of becoming of what a being potentially is to what it becomes in actuality; therefore, change, as it would also be evident from Aristotle's analysis of time, cannot be assigned either to the side of 'potentiality' or to the side of 'actuality' of the things that are (*Phys* III.2, 201b29-35). When the bronze has become a statue and that particular change has occurred, this actuality – the statue – of this particular potential of the material 'bronze' – to become a statue – is manifest (III.1, 201a29-34); afterwards, we are able to recognize this actuality as the end-state of the whole process of change and identify the type of change that has taken place (III.1, 201b5-7). What Aristotle brings out with his definition, as Ursula Coope puts it, is that "a change is the fulfillment of a potential something has to be different from how it currently is (or, equivalently, to be in a state in which it currently is not)."[105] As such, change "is difficult to grasp but of which the existence is possible" (III.2, 202a2-3).[106] As part of the inquiry into the nature of change, Aristotle offers a detailed analysis of notions related to his main topic, such as the infinite, void, place, and time.

[104] For a detailed analysis of the different translations and interpretations of Aristotle's definition of change, see Ursula Coope, "Change and Its Relation to Actuality and Potentiality," *A Companion to Aristotle,* Georgios Anagnostopoulos (ed.) (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), pp. 277-291.

[105] Ursula Coope, "Change and Its Relation to Actuality and Potentiality," p. 283.

[106] Sarah Waterlow highlights the advantage of Aristotle's formal definition of change which "does justice to the negativity" of change without undermining its reality against his predecessors, who either denied the reality of change or classified it among the 'indefinites' (*Nature, Change, and Agency in Aristotle's* Physics, pp. 120-121).

A broad definition of change (*μεταβολή*/*κίνησις*) includes any transition from a state A to a state B ("from something to something"), and the very term "transition" (*μεταβολή*), as Aristotle underlines, indicates the "before" and "after" in change as well as the otherness between the two (*Phys* V.1, 224b35-225a1-2). Secondly, any change presupposes a pair of contraries (i.e., white and non-white in qualitative change) and a substratum/a subsisting subject of change (*ὑποκείμενον*), where the alteration of contraries or intermediates (*ἐναντία ἢ μεταξύ*) can be observed (V.2, 225b3). The generation and the corruption[107] cannot properly be defined as movement (*κίνησις*), as no generation from the complete non-being nor the absolute annihilation of substance is admitted by Aristotle: "In respect to *substance* there is no movement, because substance has no contrary among the things that are" (*Phys* V.2, 225b10-11). Generation and corruption could more accurately be described as change in relation to contradictories (*κατ' αντίφασιν*), where the presence of the one negates the presence of the other. Coming-to-be (*γίγνεσθαι*) is transition from not-being to being, that is, a transition between the upmost extremes (V.1, 224a34-225b3). As he explains in *On the Generation and Corruption,* this kind of change is absolute, for "something changes from this to that as a whole" (*GC* I.2, 317a).

His treatment of generation does not posit or presuppose the pre-existence of nothing (*μηδέν*). The non-being as distinct from nothing is "spoken of in both ways"; in potentiality "is" but actually "is not" (*GC* I.3, 317b14-18). In order to understand this refinement on the definition of *κίνησις*, we must go back to the Book I of *Physics* where Aristotle attempts to refute the arguments of the Eleatics about the impossibility of change. The Parmenidean dictum that only Being exists and nothing comes-to-be out of non-being, entails the denial of motion and the plurality of beings. In this context, Aristotle dedicates a significant part of his treatise in order to prove that Zeno's paradoxes are based on false premises (VIII.8).

[107] Generation as *γένεσις ἁπλῶς* is conventionally translated as "generation *simpliciter*" or "unqualified coming to be." Becoming something (*τόδε*) describes a qualified alteration. See C.J.F. Williams, "Introduction" in *Aristotle's* De Generatione et Corruptione (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), pp. ix-xvi.

Initially, Aristotle presupposes that change can be observed in nature and there is no refutation of an observable fact: "it would be foolish to try to prove that nature exists" (*Phys* II.1, 193a3). Being, according to the Eleatics, always exists and there never was a time when it was not. Of the initial aporia "what comes-to-be must come into being [*γίγνεσθαι*] either from what is [*ἐξ ὄντος*] or from what is not [*ἐκ μὴ ὄντος*], both of which is impossible," Aristotle takes up the second side of the dilemma: "nothing could come into being from non-being, since there must be some underlying subject" (*Phys* I.8, 191a23-31). But, in this path-changing move away from his predecessors regarding the inquiry about "the first principle" (*ἀρχή*), Aristotle has to establish the metaphysical proposition that being – just as non-being –"is said in many ways" (*Phys* I.2, 185a21). Elsewhere in the *Physics* he asserts that non-being does not move neither is it in any place so as to be able to move from there (V.1, 225a25-32). In addition to form and privation (of form) as principles which constitute change, there will always be an underlying subject of change, whether the term s*ubstratum* refers to an individual substance (i.e., man), the elements or the prime matter. That something-which-persist change, "the presence of the ὑποκείμενον," as Wardy notes, "dissolves the paradox of Parmenides."[108]

In Book VIII, the above thesis is rephrased in the form of the reduction ad absurdum argument: "to suppose that such [i.e., movable] things always pre-existed without any motion taking place is absurd [...] So before the first change there will have been a previous change" (VIII.1, 251a20-28). This claim is reinforced by the previous discussion that (a) coming-to-be is a kind of motion and (b) there could be "no change of change and no becoming of becoming" – unless we are

[108] Robert Wardy, *The Chain of Change*, pp. 158-159. Accepting nature as an inner principle of change, Aristotle tries to solve the traditional paradox of becoming. Part of Aristotle's explanation is based on the metaphysical distinction between substance and properties. In the example provided by Aristotle ("an uncultured man becomes cultured") the substance 'man' remains, it is the 'underlying subject' of change. A new property appears ("cultured"), which did not exist before the change occurring. As Sarah Waterlow explains, in Aristotle's account of change "*something* new happens, only not the emergence of a new thing." See Sarah Waterlow, *Nature, Change, and Agency in Aristotle's* Physics, p. 21.

entangled in an infinite regress of changes (V.2, 225b33-35) and into a series of paradoxes.

b. Time, the Infinite, and limits

Whereas Aristotle expounds his theory of the nature of time in Book IV.10-14, the correlation between magnitudes, change, and time introduced in Book III.4 (202b30-31) serves as a principle that guides his line of reasoning. As change unfolds in time and only natural bodies are changeable, Aristotle goes on to argue that change, time, and spatially extended magnitudes are continua divisible *ad infinitum*. How are we to understand continuity and infinity? In what follows, we will focus on how Aristotle construed change in time and place through the infinite/finite relation. He sets out by presenting the difficulty about the nature and mode of existence of the infinite:

> Inquiry into the infinite presents difficulties: if one supposes it not to exist, many impossible things result, and equally if one supposes it to exist. (III.4, 203b30-32)

Remarkably, one of the consequences of denying that the infinite exists would be that "time would have a beginning and an end" (III.6, 206a9-11). If there were to be an infinite that transcended the physical world of change, it would be indivisible, simple (without parts) and omnipresent. However, a physical body is by definition "bounded by a surface" and has place as its limit; thus an infinite body would be extended into every direction ad infinitum (III.5, 204b5-6 and 20-22).

Therefore, since the infinite could not be ascribed with a separate existence "in itself" (*αὐτό τι*) (III.5, 204b8-9), it is reduced to a relational status – something is "infinite either by addition or by division" (III.4, 204a6-7). When saying that a magnitude or a distance is infinite by division, this means that it can be divided into further divisible parts *ad infinitum*, but this process never exceeds the limits of the magnitude/distance divided. After all alternatives being excluded, Aristotle

admits that the infinite is in no other way than this: "to be potentially [*δυνάμει*]" (III.6, 206a18) but of a kind of potentiality that would never be actualized (III.6, 206a9ff). For example, an infinite line or a numerical infinity (n+1)[109] is a mathematical hypothesis, not a physical actuality; an "actual" (*κατ' ἐνέργειαν*) infinite line or magnitude or multiplicity will never be an object of sense-perception or thought (III.7, 207b27-34), and furthermore, an infinite line, as Aristotle will argue, cannot be traversed in a finite time.[110] The mere thought of or imagining an infinite would not turn the infinite into actuality.

Aristotle certainly employs "a sort of geometrical abstraction"[111] in his treatment of the infinite, but his conclusions are referred back to the conditions of the material, sublunary world – where, in which, and how. Equally, against the common perception the infinite is not a totality that contains everything or an inexhaustible vastness (III.5, 204a14); rather the relation is reversed: "it is not that of which no part is outside, but that of which some part is always outside" (*μηδὲν ἔξω, ἀλλ' οὗ ἀεί τι ἔξω ἐστί,* III.6, 206b33-207a2). Infinity is an ever-wanting absence of limit, as limit and end is perfection: "nothing is complete (*τέλειον*) which has no end (*τέλος*); and the end is a limit (*πέρας*)" (*Phys* III.6, 207a10-15).[112] So the infinite is neither whole nor complete. We may want to relate "the something incomplete" of change with the incompleteness of the infinite; the infinite is pushed even further into the realm of potentiality, whereas change as actuality of the potential is tending towards an end-state.

Nevertheless, infinity and time seems to be co-articulated with the concept of 'becoming', since "the infinity does not stay still but comes to be [*γίγνεται*], in

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[109] Generally, Hussey considers the theoretical treatment of the infinite in *Physics* as an example of Aristotle's finitism. Aristotle is concerned only with positive integer numbers. See the comments of E. Hussey in Aristotle*, Physics: Books III and IV*, pp. xx-xxvi, 79-82, and 88-89.

[110] The same argument is repeated against Zeno's paradoxes of motion: "For it is not possible to traverse an actual infinity, but it is possible to traverse a potential infinity" (VIII.8, 263b).

[111] Michael J. White, "Aristotle on the Infinite, Space, and Time," *A Companion to Aristotle,* p. 272.

[112] This is a key passage in John Protevi's discussion of change and time in Aristotle. The ecstatic change – the transition from "something to something" (*ἔκ τινος εἴς τι*) – establishes an economy of exteriority of change whereby the changing thing, transgressing its limits, "plunges into exteriority." This transgressive moment is always recuperated in a new state and new form within the limits of the species (See John Protevi, *Time and Exteriority: Aristotle, Heidegger, Derrida* [London: Associated University Press, 1994], pp. 52-57).

the same way as time and the number of time" (III.7, 207b14-15). Infinity is not something static, but just as the days constantly come-to-be, time and the number of time is becoming as the days are added to one another.

Aristotle lays out the perplexities about the nature of time, which threatens the existence of time. If we think of time as consisting of parts (same part of it "has been", the other "will be"), it means that we subsume time under "non-being"; if neither of its parts is (present) when time as a whole supposed to be (present), how do we confer existence to time, meaning, how time should "participate in being" (IV.10, 217b29-218a6)? As far as the "now" (*τὸ νῦν*) is concerned, the now "appears [*φαίνεται*] to be the boundary between past and future" (IV.10, 218a8-9). If we postulate one and the same now, all past, future and present events would be in an undifferentiated *simul* – "then events of a thousand years ago will be simultaneous with events of today" (IV.10, 218a25–30). On the other hand, if the now is always "other and other" (IV.10, 218b11), is the past now dislocated by the subsequent now or does it perish (*ἐφθάρθαι*) in it as time passes? Again, limits and boundaries don't have an independent existence; they are always relational.

For time to be a reality it always involves change, and change occurs in the changing thing. Aristotle seeks to hold together the perception of this particular change which occurs with the objectivity of time which "is equally everywhere and with everything" (IV.10, 218b13).[113] Change "appears to the perception" of the soul only when the difference between two nows – or two different nows - is marked off by the soul; together we sense that time elapses. In cases in which such alteration escapes the notice of sense-perception (*λάθωμεν*), the soul seems (*φαίνηται*) to stand in the same and indivisible state as if in a time-lapse. The interval is the in-between where "time has come to be [*γεγονέναι*]," but it became imperceptible through falling of the soul to define and tell the passage of time. With the example of the soul missing and passing over time, a kind of gap in the continuum, Aristotle illustrates the primary togetherness of motion and time (*ἅμα γὰρ κινήσεως*

[113] On the uniformity of time or time as universal order, see Ursula Coope, *Time for Aristotle:* Physics IV.10-14 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005), pp. 9 and 35.

αἰσθανόμεθα καὶ χρόνου, IV.11, 219a3-4). Thus far, Aristotle has proposed first that the soul is affected by change, though more is needed to "converse" the inner affection into active perception;[114] secondly, that time is "something of change" (IV.11, 219a3).

Some fundamental aspects of change and time are emerging, the most important of which is that things that are in time are affected by time:

> All things that are in time are surrounded by time [...] just as we are in the habit of saying 'time wears things away' and 'everything grows old through time' and 'forgets because of time'-but not 'learns because of time' or 'becomes young' or 'becomes beautiful'. For time, in itself, is responsible for ceasing-to-be rather [than for coming-to-be]; for it is the number of change, and change removes what is present. (IV.12, 221a28-221b3)

Translated more literally the last line reads as follows: "movement displaces/changes what is already in existence/what has already begun to be" (*ἡ δὲ κίνησις ἐξίστησιν τὸ ὑπάρχον*, IV.12, 221b3). The movement and time is marked by a kind of directionality.[115] As always being removed by time, the existent as

[114] Hussey refers to parallel passages from treatises *On the Soul*, *On Memory and Recollection*, and *Sense and Sensibilia*, where Aristotle elaborates his theory of the perception of change and time (Aristotle*, Physics: Books III and IV*, p. 142). Tony Roark advances the thesis, grounding largely on Aristotle's hylomorphism, "that time ought to be understood as a compound of motion and perception." Motion provides the matter of time whereas perception enforms the matter by counting, which results in the determinability of actual change. This argument is grounded on the fact that in *De Anima* II.6, Aristotle identifies motion and number as "common perceptibles" by the soul (Tony Roark, *Aristotle on Time. A Study of the Physics* [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press], 2011, pp. 105-121). Therefore, time has no independent status apart from the soul's act of perception. Engaging in the reading of several passages from Aristotle's *De Anima* and the *Parva Naturalia*, Roark seeks to examine the role of memory and imagination (*φαντασία*) in the perception of time. Commenting on the passage cited above, Roark maintains that according to Aristotle, there is no imperceptible time and there is no perception of the instant either since the instant is not time. The supposed discontinuity of perception of time here is due to soul's absence of forming an accompanying image of perception - "the perception of perception" (*Ibid.*, pp. 126-127).

[115] Hussey remarks that "there is an essential asymmetry: a change 'points forward' to its completion in a way in which it does not 'point backward' to its inception" (Aristotle*, Physics: Books III and IV,* p. xiv). This is an important comment with regard to the definition of change but also elucidates further the relation between change, time, and the infinite.

something permanent(ly) present is unrepeatable. From another perspective, certain periods of times recur (i.e., a year, seasons) and that is because, Aristotle claims, the same movement recurs "again and again" (IV.12, 220b12-14).

In his definition of time *Phys* IV.11: "this, then, is [a] time: the number of motion with respect to the earlier [or 'prior' – *proteron*] and the later [or 'posterior' – *husteron*]" (219b1–2). Time is the number of change, but here Aristotle is not referring to any particular measuring system of time. We should understand the above definition at the backdrop of his analysis of the infinite. The enumeration does not annul the continuum of time. In fact, 'the before and after' evokes the time-continuum, which in turn makes the enumeration possible. 'The before and after' is primarily "in place" (*ἐν τόπῳ*); so we perceived 'the before and after' first in magnitude and, by analogy, in change and in time. 'The before and after' describes relations – it resides in place "in virtue of relative position (*τῇ θέσει*) [trans. Hardie and Gaye]." As change follows magnitude (the changing thing), time follows change, as an aspect of change (IV.11, 219a14-19).[116] Time being "something of change," far from a vague expression, intertwines with the aporia whether time can become an independent object of study.

If we inquire why Aristotle writes that 'the before and after' is in place, there are two options: (a) place (and the motion with respect to place) holds a certain primacy and hence the tendency is to reduce time to place; (b) the soul perceives magnitudes first in place either by habit or due to the limits of its perceptive faculty. There is an analogy between saying that bodies are in place and saying that they are in time: "bodies perceptible by the senses are in place" (IV.1, 208b28).

Notwithstanding the spatial connotation of the definition of time, time is not a composite of indivisible nows that are added to form a whole in the same

[116] Ursula Coope argues that the verb "following" does not suggest that Aristotle establishes an ontological or epistemological priority but rather underlines the correspondence between structural features of magnitude, change, and time (*Time for Aristotle*, pp. 47-59). Nevertheless, time is something dependant on change, whereas the continuity of magnitude guarantees the continuity of change and time. Hussey makes a similar remark about "the analogical dependence of time on change, and change on magnitude" (Aristotle, *Physics: Books III and IV*, p. 140).

way that a point is "adjoining a point" (IV.10, 218a18). As Aristotle seems to concede, the spatial connotation is, to a certain degree, misleading. A point dividing a line into two segments (AB and BC) corresponds to the 'now' which potentially divides the continuum of time into two segments of time, the past and the future. A point is static, gives the impression of rest, so it leads more easily to the observation that it unites two parts of a line. The 'now' which divides two different intervals of time is not the same now: it is the end of "that which is past" and the beginning of "that which is to come."

Aristotle presents the ambiguous character of the now, as follows:

> The now is a link of time, as has been said, for it links together past and future time, and is a limit [*πέρας*] of time, since it is a beginning of one and an end of another. But this is not manifest, as it is in the case of the point at rest. It divides potentially, and *qua* such, the now is always different, but *qua* binding together it is always the same, just as in the case of mathematical lines. (IV.13, 222a10-15)

Additionally, the now is moving together with the moveable magnitude wherein change is manifest; the figuratively moving now accounts for the otherness between nows (*τὸ δὲ νῦν διὰ τὸ κινεῖσθαι τὸ φερόμενον αἰεὶ ἕτερον*, IV.11, 220a14). There is no proper 'end' of time. Paradoxically, in the continuum of time, of which the now is one mode, "time will not give out, for it is always in the beginning [*αἰεὶ γὰρ ἐν ἀρχῇ*]" (IV.13, 222b7). Neither does time have a beginning and an end and nor is it infinite. In the Book VIII of *Physics*, Aristotle rebuts the Platonic 'myth' that time is generated together with the cosmos, being in effect "coeval with heavens." The notion 'generation of time' is nonsensical for Aristotle: "if there is always [*ἀεὶ*] time, there must always be everlasting [*ἀΐδιον*] motion" (VIII.1, 251b13).

To summarize some of Aristotle's remarks about time and the now: the now is not a part of time (IV.11, 220a19) but nevertheless is the boundary (*πέρας*) between past and present. The soul must discern and tell the difference between the two different 'nows' that delimit motion so as to make sense of the change that

is taking place. The nows function as "extremes [*τὰ ἄκρα*]" (IV.11, 219a26-29) of change, just as points are termini/extremities of a line (IV.11, 220a4-10). The time numbered – time as number of change according to Aristotelian definition – is a quantified magnitude, but it may be debated (and this is a doubt that Aristotle raises, albeit indirectly) whether the number reveals anything about the nature of time, since by the same numbers we count men or horses (IV.12, 229b10-12). A numbered magnitude of men does not reveal the nature of man either; time as numbered measures change and thereby "we become acquainted with change." But the only way to measure change is to count 'the before and after' of change in the moving thing which is "a 'this'" (*τόδε γάρ τι*). The moving now is always the same – what constitutes its being is 'the before and after' in change. But 'the before and after' in change, considered as countable, the being of the now is different. "It is this," writes Aristotle, "that is most familiar [*γνώριμον*]" (IV.12, 219b22-33). Aristotle suggests that counting presupposes the presence of the soul which, by perceiving and differentiating, makes the time familiar; otherwise, time would remain unknown and unintelligible.

Time as now is the nearest to us; we are surrounded by time. Aristotle offers the example of ordinary language usage of now "when the time of something is *near*" (IV.13, 222a21, trans. Hardie and Gaye);[117] for example, an event is closer or not by virtue of its relation to the moment in which we are speaking. In this sense, any past event is defined in relation to proximity with or distance from the now-speaking. This is best illustrated with the movement of walking; the "just now" (*ἤδη*) may refer to the near future ('I am going to walk') or the near past ('I have just walked') (IV.13, 222b7-11). Returning to 'the before and after', these were nows in time but are perceived "according to the distance from the now" that is nearest to us (IV.14 223a5-13). If the nows, as Aristotle construes the now, are limits and potentially divide time, it is not possible for someone to be coincidental with the now – we are closer or further from the now. The sense of being in the present is given when: (a) someone is concurrent with the moving-together-with-change-

[117] Cf. "when the time of a thing is close at hand" (trans. Hussey)

now; and (b) one is in the situation of several changes taking place in the same temporal interval (*διάστημα*).

Given the previous account of Aristotle, the sudden cannot be perceived: "The *suddenly* is that which removes [something] out of its previous state in a time which is so small as to be imperceptible" (*τὸ δ' ἐξαίφνης τὸ ἐν ἀναισθήτῳ χρόνῳ διὰ μικρότητα ἐκστάν,* IV.13, 222b15). Aristotle notes that the smallest number that numbers time must be "at least two" (IV.11, 220a27). Theoretically, the difference between the nows could be infinitesimal, so that the interval of time passed would also be small. Tony Roark juxtaposes the perceptibility of time with that of spatial magnitude,[118] referring to the following passage from *De Sensu*: "The distance (*τὸ ἀπόστημα*) whence an object could not be seen is indeterminable, but that whence it is visible is determinable [...] Now, there is, in the interval of distance, some extreme place, the last from which the object is invisible, and the first from which it is visible" (*Sense et Sensibilia*, 449a). With this analogy of the visual horizon of the eye, Aristotle illustrates that perception always needs a distance, a temporal and spatial displacement. The moment is in time but as limit and extremity is imperceptible.

At the end of Book IV of the *Physics*, Aristotle is again facing the issue of how the soul perceives change and time: "whether if there were no soul there would be time or not" (IV.14, 223a21-22). Granting the correlation between that which counts (the soul) and that which is counted (time), it is impossible to bring about a numbering of time without the soul. Aristotle explores the possibility of change and time without the soul (IV.14, 223a27-28). But Aristotle also draws a second correlation between time and time, change and change.

[118] Tony Roark, *Aristotle on Time*, pp. 129-132.

> If, then, that which is first is the measure of all things of the same sort, then the uniform circular motion is most of all a measure, because the number of this is most easily known. (There is no uniform qualitative change or uniform increase in size or uniform coming to be, but there *is* uniform locomotion.) This is why time is thought to be the motion of the [celestial] sphere, because the other changes are measured by this one, and time by this change. (IV.14, 223b18-23)

Time as measure of continuous motion was and will be independent of the soul's perceptive act. Any such act of perception does not affect time either. A non-counted time would lack actuality; it would be an infinity "that comes to be" (III.7, 207b14-15). My extinction would not make time extinct. The interval between my coming-to-be and my perishing is measured by the number of circular motion insofar I am surrounded by time and time is everywhere the same. The interval measured by the birth and death of men gives the impression of a circle and the common saying that Aristotle repeats here is that "human affairs are a cycle"; the latter suggests that everything is judged by time just as the coming to be and the ceasing to be is decided by time. Together with the cycle of time as measure that measures all changes a real dimension of time co-appears (*παρεμφαίνεται*): that the circular motion of the heavens is the measure of all changes (IV.14, 223b22-224a2). That is nearest to us and the most familiar.

In the following Books, Aristotle will expound the argument about the primacy of cosmic rotation, explaining why it is the first measure (*τὸ πρῶτον μέτρον*) of all finite and perishable motions in the world.

c. Time and infinity: Zeno's paradoxes

We would expect then that generation and corruption is an instantaneous change but Aristotle's theory of time precludes this; more specifically, as we shall see, there is no change taking place in an indivisible particle of time ("atomic time"). If there were an instantaneous change, it would (necessarily) disrupt the continuum of time. This is the crux of Aristotle's contestation of the Zenonian

paradoxes of movement. When Aristotle writes that there is no "coming-to-be of coming-to-be" (*γενέσεως γένεσις*), it is important to understand the distinction between incessant generation (within the limits of species) and infinite becoming: infinite becoming suggests that there is a coming-to-be always in the process of becoming, so that what is coming-to-be is "not yet" or is "already" at the process of becoming. Apart from the inconsistency, this hypothesis forecloses the possibility/reality of change (V.2, 226a1-6), which resides "in place or state," at some time, and regards "this something" (*τόδε τι*) of an individual whose nature is perishable (V.4, 227b20-34). Aristotle's thesis about time and coming-to-be is concisely stated in the following quotation: "for if whatever exist without having existed previously must come to be, and if when it is coming to be, it does not exists, time cannot be divided into indivisible times [*ἀτόμους χρόνους*]" (VIII.8, 263b26-28). The meaning of dividing time into indivisible times would be clear as Aristotle unearths the assumptions of Zeno's *logos*, which give rise to the paradoxes of movement. What is of interesting for the present study is the fact that, as Aristotle formulates his refutation, several paths are explored on how the infinite is related to the finite and what would be the concomitant implications for time and change.

Zeno's arguments against the existence of motion lie on the assumption that "it is not possible for a thing to pass over [infinite things] or to come in contact with [touch] infinite things each severally (*καθ' ἕκαστον*) in a finite time" (V.2, 233a22-23). Zeno envisaged this impossibility with such paradoxes like Achilles' race or the flying arrow. Achilles running toward the end has to cover half the distance and then successively the half of the remaining distance *ad infinitum*; in other words, he has to traverse infinite points without being able to reach the terminus. In this way, Achilles never moves from the spot. The flying arrow while moving is always at rest because at every instant it occupies a space equal to its body.[119] In order to move in an instant, it must change from its previous position to the new one, dividing the instant into a period of rest and into a period of

[119] David Bostock, "Aristotle, Zeno, and the Potential Infinite," in S*pace, Time, Matter, and Form. Essays on Aristotle's* Physics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006), pp. 116-127.

movement; but being both in motion and in rest at the same instant is, again, impossible. Besides proving the contradictory nature of motion (or reducing it to mere appearance), these paradoxes entail infinite approximation (Achilles' race) and/or immobility (the flying arrow).

For the sake of coherence in natural philosophy, Aristotle maintains that "the same reasoning applies equally to magnitude, to time, and to motion"; we therefore suppose (a) either that all of these are finite or infinite; or (b) "either all of these are composed of indivisibles and are divisible into indivisibles, or none" (VI.1, 231b18-20). And for the sake of the existence of a meaningful reality, the continuity of space, time, and magnitudes must be upheld.

Aristotle's answer is that infinity is to be considered either in respect to extremities (*τοῖς ἐσχάτοις*) or in respect to divisibility; evidently, the last is Aristotle's position.

> So while a thing in a finite time cannot come in contact with things quantitatively infinite, it can come in contact with things infinite in respect of divisibility; for in this sense the time itself is also infinite: and so we find that the time occupied by the passage over the infinite is not a finite but an infinite time, and the contact with the infinites is made by means of moments not finite but infinite in number. (VI.2, 233a24-34)

Aristotle's philosophy of nature advocates the contained infinity: time "contains an infinity within itself" (VIll.9, 263a) as well as containing "something indivisible" (*ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ ἀδιαίρετον*) – which is the 'now' in its primal sense (VI.3, 234a22-24). Zeno's logic transgresses – in appearance – the limits of contained infinity. Where does the fallacy lie? In bisecting a part of space or a part of time and counting these as separate infinite points, he annuls the continuum of space and time. For example, if we take the now and call it indivisible part of time (i.e., an atom of time), the past will have no contact with the future and the passage of time will be impossible. In the same lines, if we take a line AC and divided it infinitely into B1,

B2, B3 points…,[120] the result would be a motion with leaps from one point to the next in purportedly equal instants of time.[121] The paradox of the flying arrow presupposes that time "is composed" of indivisible nows (VI.9, 239b30-33). Aristotle repeats that the now is an "extremity" between the past and the future and straightforwardly avers: "nothing can be in motion in the now" (*οὐκ ἄρα ἔστιν κινεῖσθαι ἐν τῷ νῦν*, VI.3, 234a31, VI.10 241a15). Setting aside the time continuum, an indivisible now as an atom of time would be unrelated to the past or to the future, and thus the notion of memory would be impaired or inexistent. Conversely, an atom of time devoid of change would be reduced to extended space.

David Bostock has convincingly argued that when Aristotle contested Zeno's paradoxes he was refuting "the hypothesis about the 'atomicity' of time and space." Although there no historical evidence that Zeno (or any of the Eleatics) held such a theory, "it is plausible," according to Bostock, "to say that atomism, in one form or another, is Aristotle's main target in this book of the *Physics.*" Another line of inquiry proposed by Bostock is that Aristotle possibly tried to respond to Plato's *Parmenides* and the paradoxical "sudden" moment (*τὸ ἐξαίφνης*), in which change from motion to rest occurs outside time – the sudden is literally absurd and out-of-place (*ἄτοπον*) [*Parm*. 156d-e].[122] It is also certain that Aristotle denied the existence of void and dedicated a significant part of the *Physics* to attack the theses of Atomist philosophers.[123]

If something moving has to cover the distance AB, we must admit that it could not arrive at point B in an instant without an intermediate time, because the two points would be the same one point –"or it would be in A and B at the same

[120] See the comments of Daniel Graham in Aristotle, *Physics Book VIII*, Daniel Graham (trans. with notes) (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999), pp. 143-144.

[121] Theoretically a movement with leaps is a possibility but it cannot be instantaneous and continuous. See the comments of Hussey (Aristotle, *Physics: Books III and IV*, pp. 144-145) and David Bostock ("Aristotle on Continuity in *Physics VI,*" in S*pace, Time, Matter, and Form,* p. 166).

[122] David Bostock, "Aristotle on Continuity in *Physics VI*", pp. 158-188. Bostock's view is endorsed by Daniel Graham who provides additional historical information at this point: Diodorus Cronus of the Megarian school adopted the concept of indivisible (partless) place and time, largely exploiting the paradoxes of Zeno. Epicurus and his school developed similar theories of material atomism. See Aristotle, *Physics Book VIII*, pp. 145-148.

[123] Edward Hussey, "Aristotle on Earlier Natural Science," *The Oxford Handbook of Aristotle*, Christopher Shields (ed.) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), p. 30.

time." Also, granted that it is moving all the way long the whole stretch of the relevant distance ("in every now in the time"), when it leaves the point A, it has started moving toward the point B but it will have not yet arrived at B point until it has completed its motion and actually arrived at B as its terminus ad quem. We cannot localize a part of A or take a segment of time A that change has first started because both length and time is infinite divisible "and so on *ad infinitum*. Thus what has changed was previously changing" (VI.6, 237a7–28).[124] Consequently, no absolute first stage of change can be represented by any particular part of space or time which the changing thing may occupy. But this leads to the objection that since there is no primary time of change, we must infer that there must be not first time of rest either (VI.3, 234a33-34).[125]

> Now the primary time that has reference to the end of the change is something really existent: for a change may be completed, and there is such a thing as an end of change, which we have in fact shown to be indivisible [*ἀδιαίρετον*] because it is a limit [*πέρας*]. But that which has reference to the beginning is not existent at all; for there is no such thing as a beginning of change, nor any primary time at which it was changing [...] for the divisions are infinite. (VI.5, 236a10–15)

Change as "something incomplete" is determinable by its final stage. In this manner, Aristotle ensures the definability of change in a unified sense. Clearly, the change described is not infinite, since it is bounded between extremities (VI.10, 241a26-33, 241b11-12). If every motion were likewise in the world, time would be measured backwards. Aristotle appeal to common sense for the change in contradictories, namely, generation: something cannot come-to-existence and perish at the same now, as it cannot be both in motion and rest. There is no primary time of generation either.

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[124] According to the analysis of S. Waterlow, the argument in VI.6 rests on the Law of Non-Contradiction: excluding the possibility of instantaneous change, Aristotle avoids the object having contradictory states at once or none of them. See S. Waterlow, *Nature, Change, and Agency*, pp. 131-145, especially p. 141.

[125] Tony Roark, *Aristotle on Time*, pp. 97-98.

d. Locomotion: movement in a straight line and in a circle

The primacy of cosmic motion, having the characteristics of continuous and everlasting, is defended on the grounds of its cause: the unmoved mover "remains simple and self-identical and in the same," accordingly the movement he imparts is necessarily "a single and simple motion" (VIII.6, 260a17-19). Interestingly, the singularity of the motion of the universe is due to the fact that it remains "in-itself" with a kind of self-sufficiency that other motions, such as the ones that animate beings can instigate, lack. Though animals are self-movers, in that they have an inherent capability for motion, they do not always move themselves because primarily "the source of their motion is outside" (VIII.6, 259b12-31). Aristotle contends that locomotion holds priority over other motions both in time and in essence insofar as *prior* is defined as that "without which other things will not exist, while it can exist without them" (VIII.7, 261a13-14).

Secondly, the primacy of cyclical cosmic motion is discussed with respect to (a) other movements in sublunary world, and (b) linear locomotion. The multiplicity of motions attests to a succession of actualized and potential changes and furthermore to a fundamental ontological and temporal asymmetry between actuality and potentiality: "actuality is prior both to potentiality and to every origin of change" (*Metaph* Θ, 1051a). Generation, for example, presupposes the actuality of the progenitor, meaning that an individual of a species has reached maturity in order to procreate. Indeed, generation adheres to and hypostatizes the formal aspect of change: what is in motion is through potentiality, and as not yet actualized is incomplete. "But the mover is already actual" (VIII.5, 257b9).[126] Generation is discontinuous and perishable motion, so it cannot be primary.

[126] The passage is better understood in the light of *Metaph Θ,* 1050a4–10, where Aristotle writes that actuality is prior to potentiality in substance, in time, in definition: "But indeed actuality is prior in substance too, first because things posterior in coming to be are prior in form and in substance (for example, adult to boy and man to seed; for the one already has the form, the other does not), and because everything that comes to be proceeds to an origin and an end (for that for the sake of which is an origin, and the coming to be is for the sake of the end), and the actuality is an end, and the potentiality is acquired for the sake of this." For the distinction between mature and immature substances, see Charlotte Witt, "Priority of Actuality in Aristotle," *Unity, Identity, and Explanation in Aristotle's Metaphysics*, Theodore Scaltsas, David Charles, Mary Louise Gill (eds.) (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001), pp. 215-228.

Aristotle produces an additional argument for the primacy of locomotion: "this kind of motion would also be prior to the others in essence, both for the stated reasons and because what is moved in locomotion loses its essence less than in any other motion. It alone does not change its being at all" (VIII.7, 261a19-22). The motion in place is the simplest motion, which affects the subject of change in the least.

Subsequently, he goes on to compare the linear with the circular movement, intending to prove that circular cosmic motion is the one which could fulfil the conditions of being infinite and continuous. A rectilinear motion is always and by necessity "finite" (*πεπερασμένη*) – i.e., it cannot go on incessantly – or discontinuous. First, it is restricted between limits and therefore it is necessary that it comes to a standstill, as if to exhaust itself in the end. It is possible for something moving from A to B to come to rest at point B, and then continue its movement back to A. But this kind of motion could not be described as one and the same continuous movement, even if it gives the appearance of the circle; it consists of two different motions: "For it doubles back (*ἀνακάμπτει*), and what doubles back[127] on a straight path describes contrary motions" (VIII.8, 261b31-262a12).

For what moves in a circle, since its movement is not restricted between two contrary points, different conditions apply; here "the end is contiguous with the beginning and it [the movement] alone is complete (*τέλειος*)" and as such returning to the same point (*ἀφ' αὑτοῦ εἰς αὑτό*) (VIII.8, 264b19 and 28). What moves in a circle seems as if it "occupies the same place" (VIII.9, 265b2); its motion closest resembles rest. This does not mean that circular motion per se is everlasting. Only the circular motion of the heavens presents the uniformity of the moving thing, its mover, and the relation between the two: the heavenly spheres are moving eternally without changing, whereas the prime mover is unextended and "does not experience any change" either (VIII.10, 267b1-26). Hence, in the difference from all

[127] *ἀνακάμπτω* means "turn back, return to the same point, start anew" (See *Liddell-Scott-Jones Greek-English Lexicon*).

other motions,[128] cosmic rotation lasts for an infinite time. With these properties, cosmic motion presents the power of normativity sufficient to become the measure of all other motions in the world (VIII.9, 265b8-11).

The imitation of circular motion, which in turn imitates perfectly the stability of the unmoved mover, is expressive of the immanent teleology of natural changes and accounts for the preservation of life. Although commentators have denied that Aristotle holds this view,[129] there is an allusion to providence, or at least, divine purposiveness: "God has filled up the whole in the only way that remained", bringing into coherence being and incessant becoming. Nature always "reaches after the better and being is better than non-being" (*GC* II.10, 336b); Notably, Book VIII, in which Aristotle infers the unmoved mover, opens with the aporia concerning whether change "being deathless and unceasing, is [...] present in all things as if it were a kind of life belonging to everything composed by nature?" (VIII.1, 251b11).

In the realm of the generation of species, the natural causes coincide with the only unnatural cause, the unmoved mover (*GC*, II.7, 198a-198b). Coming-to-be is a continuous process safeguarded by its source, "that which is throughout time unmoved" (*GC* I.3, 318a).[130] From the standpoint of continuity, the generation of things that are subject to corruption is "the nearest thing to being (*τῆς οὐσίας*)" (*GC* II.10, 336b). Aristotle goes on to consider the conditions and limits of necessity in the realm of generation. Coming-to-be is inscribed "within the field of that which can both be and not be" (*περὶ τὸ δυνατὸν εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι*), as opposed to eternal beings that "are of necessity" (*GC* II.9, 334b-335a). Some things, like the elements

[128] Cf. Ursula Coope, *Time for Aristotle*, p. 76: "...infinite changes do not exhibit the kind of asymmetrical before and after order that is found in finite changes." Though I agree with the comment, generation and corruption is incessant as in a series and not infinite as the cosmic motion is.

[129] Stephen Menn observes that the search for an extra-temporal cause for all the temporal causes of change leads to the eternal unmoved mover. Thus, the theory of change elaborated in all the previous books of the *Physics* is "sufficient to infer a cause beyond the physical world, and so to give the physical foundations for *theologike*." See Stephen Menn, "Aristotle's Theology," *The Oxford Handbook of Aristotle*, pp. 422-464 and 435, n. 39.

[130] I follow the translation: *Aristotle's* De Generatione et Corruptione, C.J.F. Williams (trans. with notes) (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982).

(water, fire, air etc.), by their perpetual transmutation, give the impression that "their generation has come round in a circle because it has turned round and come back again" (*διὰ τὸ πάλιν ἀνακάμπτειν*, *GC* II.10 337b). Affected mostly by the rotation of the heavens and especially by the oblique movement of the sun, their generation is "everlasting"[131] and of necessity, taking place in a self-same manner. This does not apply to animals and men: "[they] do not return on themselves in such a way that the same one comes to be again (since there is no necessity)." Moreover, the relation between the parent and its offspring is not defined by converse necessity but by the possibility of not-coming-into-existence. Thus, their generation is not necessary, so it seems to move in a straight line (*GC* II.11, 337a-338b). Here, the succession in time does not entail a necessity. Aristotle offers the example of the house and its foundation; the complete house is posterior to its foundations, but its foundation is not the necessary cause of the house.

Indeed, as Aristotle repeats in *Movement of Animals*, the movement requires the existence of a mover and in regard to generation "nothing is prior to itself" (*MA,* 700b1-3). Equally, the notion that something pre-exists and then comes to be is contradictory. Therefore, 'eternity' is opened in the only way possible for individuals, only as members of a species. Aristotle in the *Generation of Animals* writes:

> For, since the nature of such a kind (*γένους*) cannot be eternal, that which comes into being is eternal (*ἀΐδιος*) in the way that is possible for it. Now it is not possible for it [to be eternal] in number - for the being of existing things is in the particular things (*καθ' ἕκαστον*), and if this were such it would be eternal— but it is possible in form (*εἴδει*). That is why there is always a kind of men and of animals and of plants. (*GA*, II, 731b-732a)

As J. Lennox comments on this passage, in the case of the solstices of the sun, we have a spatial recurrence: "Here, one and the same being exists throughout the

[131] We should distinguish the "everlasting" from "eternal".

change of place. The 'recurrence' is a recurrence of one and the same substance at the same location: literally a return."[132] In human reproduction, the progenitor does not generate himself nor is there a case of regeneration. Individuals by reproduction can repeat the eternality of form, but they are not "eternal numerically, that is, *as particulars.*"[133] The metaphysical presupposition is that the essence is in the particular being – the individual composite of form and matter (i.e., man is perishable, not eternal substance). Their generation depends on the ontological priority of the genus and temporal priority of the generator.[134]

Aristotle provides a systematic approach to a vast range of problems concerning time and change aiming at "a theoretical understanding of the nature of time" based on our experience of it.[135] But such an approach comes with its limitations: the nature of a thing and its innate potentiality conditions the changes that a particular subject undergoes. Under this principle, nothing entirely new could come into existence. The latter is connected with Aristotle's argument that there is no absolute beginning and that time as well as motion has always existed. With respect to the now and the question of sudden change, Aristotle acknowledges that the now is only a limit between the past and the future and therefore it is paradoxical to argue that change happens in an instant.

Hegel and Zeno's paradoxes of motion

The Zenonian account of motion is presented in Hegel's *Lectures on the History of Philosophy* through Aristotle's scrutiny of its premises in the *Physics*.

[132] James G. Lennox, "Are Aristotelian Species Eternal?," *Aristotle's Philosophy of Biology: Studies in the Origins of Life Science* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p. 139.
[133] James G. Lennox, "Are Aristotelian Species Eternal?," p. 135.
[134] Michail Peramatzis distinguishes between ontological priority (things are ontological prior when it is possible to be what they are without the others) to existential priority "which have temporal implications" (when something cannot exist unless something else existed prior to it). See Michail Peramatzis, *Priority in Aristotle's Metaphysics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 203-211 and 278-286.
[135] Jonathan Lear, *Aristotle: The Desire to Understand* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 74.

According to Hegel, Zeno was the originator of dialectical thought, "thinking movement." Zeno did not mean to deny the existence of movement since movement is "as sensuously certain as that there are elephants"[136] but to exploit our ordinary conceptions about space and time and bring them into contradiction in the concept of movement. What Zeno aimed at was denying the reality of motion by proving that "no true Being can be predicated of it [i.e., motion]."[137]

Zeno's paradoxes, Hegel says, "rest on the infinite divisibility of space and time," whereas Aristotle dissolved these paradoxes by proving that the continuity of space and time must be presupposed in them. In Aristotle's explanation (solution), the divisibility of space and time is only a potentiality – "the universal" – since neither space nor time is actually divided by a moving body. Equally, the measuring off of time or space does not annul their continuity because space and time in their essence "form a limited extension."[138] The way Hegel rephrased it, there is neither absolute continuity nor absolute discontinuity - "[*Punktualität*]"/"negativity" - in space and time, but theses opposites exists only as moments that are passed into each other: "the point is posited in it – but posited as moment, and not as existent in and for itself."[139] As Allegra de Laurentiis puts it, what Hegel appreciates in Zeno's paradoxes is the fact that when something is established, its opposite is posited in the same moment; for example, "when continuity is assumed, discreteness turns out to be its 'moment', and that when 'discreteness is presupposed, continuity is maintained' (Hegel, *Lectures,* 275)."[140] Therefore, the essence of movement is to be comprehended "in the form of Notion, *i.e.*, as unity of negativity and continuity."[141] This is for Hegel the merit and contribution of Zeno to dialectics, showing the contradictions in the thought of motion.

Hegel's siding with Zeno is better illustrated when he expounds the paradox

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[136] Hegel, *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, p. 266.
[137] Hegel, *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, p. 266.
[138] Hegel, *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, pp. 266-267.
[139] Hegel, *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, p. 270.
[140] Allegra de Laurentiis, "'And Yet It Moves': Hegel on Zeno's Arrow," *The Journal of Speculative Philosophy* (New Series) 9:4 (1995), p. 267.
[141] Hegel, *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, p. 270.

of the flowing arrow. The paradox is based on the perception of motion and the ordinary belief that since the body "equals itself" in any given now, it is at rest. In the ordinary way of representing motion, we think that a body in movement must be in one place and then in another while it cannot be both at once. "But movement means," Hegel continues, "to be in this place and not to be in it, and thus to be in both alike."[142] Here it is evident that the way Aristotle thought of movement and the law of excluded middle must be left behind.

As the arrow passes through each point in its path, according to the ordinary view, it must be "here and here and here." If we consider the 'here' and 'now' as points in space or atoms in time, there are posited as absolute limits.

> In the Here and Now, the becoming "other" is abrogated, limitation indeed being established, but only as moment; since in the Here and Now as such, there is no difference, continuity is here made to prevail against the mere belief in diversity. Each place is a different place, and thus the same; true, objective difference does not come forth in these sensuous relations, but in the spiritual.[143]

If every 'here' is different by being the same, then the continuity of space is re-established. The moving body cannot pass into its other – the 'not-here' – so it does not become; it remains immovable, as the 'now' becomes its limit. Hegel concludes that movement in actuality brings forth the continuity in space and time, whereas thought "keeps apart the moments of an object which in their separation are really united. It brought about the Fall, for man ate of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil; but it also remedies these evils."[144]

In his treatment of 'here' and 'now' Hegel rehearses what he argued in the chapter on "Sense-certainty" in *Phenomenology of Spirit* (1807).[145] When we

[142] Hegel, *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, pp. 273-274.
[143] Hegel, *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, pp. 274-275.
[144] Hegel, *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, p. 274.
[145] Allegra de Laurentiis, "'And Yet It Moves': Hegel on Zeno's Arrow," p. 277, n. 9.

encounter an object in its "simple immediacy," we merely apprehend the 'now' and 'here' of this object (§91).[146] If we further try to determine this particular 'now' by asking the question "What is Now?" any given answer, e.g., "Now is Night" or now is noon is contradicted in the next 'now,' which is a different 'now' and a 'now' all the same (§95). Immediacy is the movement of pointing out: this 'I' points out to this 'now' that is night and it is 'now' insofar as it is pointed to by this 'I'; sense-certainty resides in the relation between the 'I' and the 'now' (§101 and §§106-107). The act of pointing-out does not ascribe any specific content to this 'I' or this 'now.' For, as Hegel claims, even uttering the question and examining the truth of this utterance we "stand *at distance*" and "do away with the immediacy" (§105). Accordingly, in attempting to say this 'now' we "have to admit to speaking about something which *is not,*" about something that it has been (§110). The self-identity of the now – the fact that we even recognize this 'now' as a 'now' – is constituted by reference to its otherness, to what is not-now. Hegel observes that "The 'Now', and pointing out the 'Now', are thus so constituted that neither the one nor the other is something immediate or simple but a movement that contains many moments. [...] The Now is in truth, viz. a result, or the plurality of Nows all taken together" (§107). Thus, the particularity of the now that sense-certainty seeks could not be expressed in language, but what is gained for the loss of immediacy is the notion of the now. Zeno, as we have seen, pits dialectical reasoning against the sensuous assurance arriving, as Hegel tells us, "at the movement of the Notion in itself."[147]

Many philosophers have addressed Zeno's paradoxes from different perspectives (mathematical, metaphysical, logical, and even in quantum physics) and indeed they set forth their theory of motion and time in parallel

[146] All translations from G.W.F Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, A.V. Miller (trans.) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977).

[147] Hegel, *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, p. 261. On Kierkegaard's diverse appropriation of Hegel's "Sense-Certainty" see Jon Stewart, *Kierkegaard's Relations to Hegel Reconsidered* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 268-281 and David J. Kangas, *Kierkegaard's Instant: On Beginnings*, pp. 80-99.

with/contradistinction to Zeno's, as for example did Plato and Aristotle. In broad terms, we stumble upon Zeno's paradoxes every time one tries to think and determine the moment of change and the relation between the previous and the subsequent state of change.[148] In *The City of God,* to give another example, Augustine ponders on the moment of death as the moment of separation of the soul from the body. In doing so, he is entangled in paradoxes; for, if we are to say that one is dying but not yet dead, "the very same person then is at once both dying and living" (XIII, 9).[149] He admits the absurdity of such thought and the difficulty to define when man is in the state of death. Thereafter, he compares death to the elusive nature of the present: "So too, as time goes by, we seek the present moment without finding it because there is no duration of any length [*spatio*] in the passage from future to past."[150] Following this mode of reasoning, Augustine continues, in neither way could we say that there is no death (or there is no time). Death is a reality ("*verum*") that "can neither be defined by any mode of speech nor be avoided by any device" (XIII, 11). Sean Hannan, presenting a similar argument as mine, writes that the inability to pinpoint the instant of death, does not prove that the death is illusory any more that Zeno's paradoxes proved the illusory nature of movement.[151] In this way, Augustine emphasizes the fundamental "belatedness" of our temporal experience.[152]

The Paradoxes of Time in the Parmenides

The *Parmenides* attests to the confrontation between two different ontological systems: Plato's ontology allows for the unity and multiplicity, both in the intelligible realm and in the sensible world, against the Eleatic monism which

[148] A notable example is the doctrine of resurrection. See Kierkegaard's notes from Henrik Nikolai Clausen's "Dogmatic Lectures" (KJN 3/Not 1:6/SKS 19, 26 [1843-4]).

[149] Augustine, *City of God, Volume IV: Books 12-15* (Loeb Classical Library), Philip Levine (trans.) (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1966).

[150] Augustine here forms the same argument as in the *Confessions* (XII, 15, 20), where he writes that the present is an interval between past and future so infinitesimal that is "without duration" and therefore "the present occupies no space."

[151] Sean Hannan, "Augustine's Time of Death in *City of God* 13," *Augustinian Studies* 50:1 (2019), p. 59.

[152] Sean Hannan, "Augustine's Time of Death in *City of God* 13," p. 60.

upholds the separation of the One from the others, standing apart (*χωρίς*, fr. B 8.56). Plato, therefore, distinguishes two ontological realms, that of Forms and that of sensible particulars, with participation (*μέθεξις*) constituting the fundamental ontological relation between these two realms. The possibility of change in the sensible world is safeguarded insofar that each sensible thing partakes of the eternal Forms. As Socrates phrased it, contesting Zeno's denial of multiplicity and consequently of change, there is "nothing strange" if the same thing participates in one Form (i.e., likeness, largeness) and in its opposite (i.e., unlikeness, smallness), either at different times or at the same time. "But," Socrates continues, "if someone will prove that that which is one is itself many, and again that the many are indeed one, at this I shall then wonder" (*Parm*. 129b). The contradictions manifested in the sensible world can be explained by the theory of participation, whereas Forms are "apart in themselves" and cannot be "mixed with and separated from one another" (*Parm*. 129e). Parmenides aims to show that Socrates' theory of participation does not save from contradictions in the material world since the problem of contradiction is simply raised in the world of Ideas. For exactly what Parmenides is going to prove is that "the One is both one and many."[153]

The Platonic theory of participation undergoes the dialectical scrutiny of Parmenides in the second part of the dialogue, in which the problem is posited in a more abstract way, namely, as the relation between the one and the many.[154] Parmenides lays out and examines two hypotheses: "If [the] one is" (137c-160b) and "If [the] one is not" (159b-166c). Each hypothesis unfolds in a series of four arguments or deductions which explore the possible consequences of every premise for the one and the others (i.e., the many), both in relation to itself (or themselves) and in relation to the others. It will become evident that the discussion around the relational status of entities—"in relation to itself" (*πρὸς αὑτὸ*)/"in

[153] Mary Louise Gill, "Problems for Forms," *A Companion to Plato*, Hugh H. Benson (ed.) (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2006), p. 186.

[154] Mary Louise Gill contends that the overall aim of the dialogue is "to show the ways in which Forms are problematic" but "there must be Forms, or intelligible objects of some sort, if we are to explain the world at all" ("Problems for Forms," pp. 184 and 185).

relation to other" (*πρὸς ἄλλο*) (136c)—plays an important role in the course of the dialogue.

Thus, for Plato, sensible beings are not bereft of being but there are dependent on Forms; in the language of the *Parmenides*, they are what they are only "in relation to another [*πρὸς ἄλλο*]." Forms, on the other hand, are separate and separation entails ontological independence, being "in itself" (*αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτὸ*, 130b).[155] As Scolnicov explains, according to Parmenides "[i]n a totally heterogeneous ontology [as it is the Platonic one], there can be no middle ground," meaning that according to the Eleatic principle the introduction of a doctrine such as participation is unsound.[156] Along these lines, if the Forms reside in an eternal realm separate from sensible things, how can the sensibles participate in Forms without the transcendent status of Forms being compromised, in other words, without Forms collapsing into time?[157]

Temporal relations (*κατὰ χρόνον*) could be considered as a subcategory of the possible relations that Parmenides examines between the one and the many, again both in relation to itself and in relation to others.[158] In this context, Plato elaborates on the problem of participation in time as well as of transition within time mainly in three passages in the *Parmenides*. Granted that these passages belong to different deductions and each of these deductions leads to contradictory conclusions, it is arguable whether a consistent view about time could be inferred from the dialogue or even whether Plato's intention was to advance one. Yet, as it becomes evident, it is time and the moment that put pressure on the unity and relations, considered either in the sensible or the intelligible world. The issue of interest in the treatment of the one in its temporal relations either with itself,

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[155] For this point see the comments of Scolnicov in *Plato's Parmenides*, Samuel Scolnicov (intro. and trans.) (Los Angeles/Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), pp. 21-22. Plato uses the prepositional phrase "πρός τι" (in relation to something) as a cognate of participation since participation is a form of relation.

[156] *Plato's Parmenides*, p. 25.

[157] See also R. E. Allen's discussion of participation and relation in the *Parmenides*, which concludes as follows: "The core problem is not the relation of the sensibles and the Ideas as such, but that of reconciling participation with separate existence" (*Plato's Parmenide*s, R. E. Allen [ed. and trans.] [New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1997], p. 206).

[158] See *Plato's Parmenides*, Samuel Scolnicov (ed.), pp. 36 and 90-91.

unrelated to others or with others is how to preserve the unity and singularity of something implicated in time and/or undergoing change over time.

In the first deduction of the first hypothesis, the One is considered in an absolute sense: if the one is one, then it is absolutely "other than" and unrelated not only to others, namely, the many (137c4) but also to itself. Hence, if the one is truly one, it does not participate in time. For the reason that it is necessary that whatever is "in time [*ἐν χρόνῳ*] and participates in time," as Parmenides remarks, "it would ever be coming to be older than itself." The previous proposition denotes a relation to a previous state in respect of which the qualification "older" is valid (141a5–b3). If the one is determined by time, in coming to be older than itself, it "is simultaneously coming to be younger than itself." Time introduces "a distinction [*διαφορότης*]" into the one, splitting it into a whole and its parts, whereby a part becomes older and a part younger at the same time, if the proposition "becoming older than itself" is to be held true. Crucial here is the word "simultaneously" which gives rise to the contradiction; as a result, the premise that the one is in time must be abandoned. Parmenides had already precluded the possibility of the one being either in motion or at rest (138c) or being afflicted by any "alteration" (i.e., qualitative change); the one would not be one if it suffered such "affections [*παθημάτων*]" (141d). Parmenides' conclusion is that the one cannot have any participation in temporal relations[159] in any way: "it has never come to be nor was it ever coming to be nor was it once, nor has it come to be now nor is it coming to be nor is it, nor will it be afterwards." (141d6–e7).[160]

In the second deduction of the first hypothesis, Parmenides concedes that the one, "If the one is," participates in being, in the sense that the one and being are different and 'is' and 'one' are "said of the one that is" (142c7). Next he goes over the consequences of this premise, inquiring if participation in being would also mean participation in being in time: "And is 'being' [*εἶναι*] anything else than

[159] As Scolnicov notes, the one "cannot be a member in any relation without ceasing to be what it is" (*Plato's Parmenides*, p. 95).

[160] The conclusion of the first deduction is in alignment with the Parmenidean thesis in his poem: "Nor was it ever, nor will it be, since it is now, altogether one, holding together" (fr. B 8, 5-6).

participation in being [*οὐσίας*] together with time present [*τοῦ παρόντος*], just as 'was' is communion with being together with time past, and, again, 'will be' together with time future? (151e). The analogical comparison ("just as") results in the vagueness of the sentence; the phrasing here gives the impression either that (a) being remains the same, extended over the three dimensions of time (present, past and future) or (b) being is properly restricted to whatever has come to be at any present time, at any given now. Previously, Parmenides admitted that 'the one that is' can be whole and have parts, can be measured or numbered;[161] consequently, a part of the one can be in a part of time, whereby both can be measured. Parmenides further seeks to clarify if participation in time means "in time as it passes [*πορευομένου*]" (152a3). The passage reads as follows:

> —But is it not older when, in coming to be, it would be in respect of time now, which is between [*μεταξὺ*] the 'was' and the 'will be'? For, at any rate, in passing [*πορευόμενόν*] somehow from the 'before' to the 'after' it will not overstep [*ὑπερβήσεται*] the 'now' [*τὸ νῦν*]. —It will not. —Next, will it not thus stop then coming to be older, once it reaches [*ἐντύχῃ*] the 'now', and then it does not come to be [*οὐ γίγνεται*] but is already older? For, if it were advancing, it would never be caught [*ληφθείη*] by the 'now'; for what is advancing is such that it touches [*ἐφάπτεσθαι*] both, the 'now' and the 'after', the 'now' in leaving it and the 'after' in reaching for it, and it comes to be between these two, the 'after' and the 'now'. —True. —And if, at any rate, it is necessary that all that is coming to be should not side step the 'now', since it should be in respect of it, it will ever cease to be coming into being and will then *be* whatever it happens to be coming to be. —It appears so. —And so, the one too, whenever in coming to be older it coincides with the 'now', ceases to come to be and *is* then older. —Absolutely. (152b2–d4)

The coming-to-be older is represented as movement in a mode such that "we are first offered," as Bostock remarks, a "picturesque view."[162] Indeed, in the whole dialogue this passage stands out depicting 'becoming', somewhat dramatically, as

[161] Scolnicov, *Plato's Parmenides,* pp. 113 and 127
[162] David Bostock, "Plato on Change and Time in the *Parmenides,*" *Phronesis* 23: 3 (1978), p. 232.

a pacing movement. The succession between before-now-after is evoked, but instead of time passing, something—the one—is passing through different points in time. If the 'now' lies in-between the 'before' and the 'after', something on its way from the 'before' to the 'after' encounters the 'now'; it cannot side step the 'now' but neither can the 'now' catch the thing in its movement of becoming. In its advancing, on the one hand, it touches and binds together the 'now' with the 'after', with 'becoming' taking place in the interval, whereas this becoming and this interval are not yielded to the present. What is endangered here is either the premise that 'to be' entails "participation in being together with time present" or the process of becoming. If it is to remain true to the above definition of being, there is a ceasing of becoming in the 'now', as if being and becoming is mutually exclusive in the 'now': "whenever in coming to be older it coincides with the 'now', ceases to come to be and *is* then older." Parmenides' final word here is that the 'now' and the one being are coextensive: "But the 'now' is ever present to the one throughout all its being [*εἶναι*]; for, whenever it should be, it will ever be now" (*τό γε μὴν νῦν ἀεὶ πάρεστι τῷ ἑνὶ διὰ παντὸς τοῦ εἶναι: ἔστι γὰρ ἀεὶ νῦν ὅτανπερ ᾖ*, 152d4–e3).

The contradictions encountered lead Parmenides to revisit the relation of the one with time in the so-called Appendix on change (155e-157b), introduced with the exhortation: "Let us say, again, for the third time" (155e3). There is no consensus among the contemporary scholarship on what is being intimated in this enigmatic passage which has generated the most diverse readings, already in antiquity. It affords different aspects according to the vantage point of our approach.

Scolnicov takes the lead from two claims of Parmenides about the one: that (a) "at some time" the one participates in being, "at some time" it does not (155e) and (b) there is "a certain time when it comes to take part in being and when it lets go of it" (156a). Accordingly, Scolnicov accepts that the one which "comes to be" and "passes away" (156b) is a "temporal," "changeable" thing and the change that is described "in the instant" regards the physical process of generation and

destruction.[163] In this light, it is striking that the moment of transition with respect to these purely temporal changes is non-temporal.

The interpretation that Mary Louise Gill offers is based on the principles of formal classical logic. According to Gill, the Appendix is an attempt of Parmenides, albeit a failed one, to reconcile the two contradictory conclusions of the first two deductions ("the one is neither one nor many"/"the one is both one and many") in a third position: if the one participates in time, it cannot be *both* in motion and in rest "in one time" (156c), due to the Law of Non-Contradiction; necessarily, it should be in opposite states at different times. Nevertheless, there must be an *in-between* when something changes from motion to rest and from rest to motion, being neither in motion nor in rest. But since, according to the Law of Excluded Middle, "there is no time in which something could simultaneously neither move nor rest" (156c), the instant of transition (*τὸ ἐξαίφνης*) should reside outside time. The failure of the synthesis, as Gill explains, consists in that "now the contradiction reappears at the instant" of change and the impasse reached forces Parmenides to move ahead in the dialogue.[164] In a similar vein, Mary M. McCabe avers that the Appendix "generates a higher level of absurdity, the 'suddenly'"[165]—the sudden is exactly the *ἄτοπον* (the absurd) for logic. The instant of change violates all the logical laws to the extent that "this allows the possibility that what goes on in 'the suddenly' is nothing at all."[166]

> Now, is it this strange [*τὸ ἄτοπον*] thing in which it should be when it changes? — What sort of thing is this? The instant [*τὸ ἐξαίφνης*]. For 'instant' seems to signify something such that from it a thing changes into one or other of these two states. For, surely, it does not change from rest so long as it rests, nor does it change from movement so long as it moves; but the instant is that certain strange nature inserted in between [*μεταξὺ*] movement and rest, being in no time [*ἐν οὐδενὶ*

[163] Samuel Scolnicov, *Plato's Parmenides*, pp. 134-136.
[164] Mary Louise Gill, *Philosophos: Plato's Missing Dialogue* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 65-66.
[165] Mary Margaret McCabe, *Plato's Individuals* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), p. 122.
[166] Mary Margaret McCabe, *Plato's Individuals*, p. 123, n47.

> *χρόνῳ*], and it is into it and from it [*εἰς ταύτην δὴ καὶ ἐκ ταύτης*] that what moves changes into resting, and what rests into moving. —Very likely. —Also the one, therefore, if indeed it both rests and moves, would change into the one or the other—only thus would it do both—and in changing it changes instantaneously, and when it changed it would be in no time, and would then neither move nor rest. (*Parm*. 156d-e)

Logically, there is an infinite regress.[167] Metaphysically, we are found out of time. Plato, it seems, aims at offering a totalizing explanation of what enables and conditions all transitions, either occurring in time or outside time. For, as Parmenides continues, the same reasoning as with motion and rest applies to all other changes, such as: the change "from being into passing away or from not being into coming to be [*τὸ γίγνεσθαι*]", "from one to many and from many to one", "from the like to unlike", and so forth; whereas, in the instant of change, it is "neither being nor not [...] neither coming to be nor passing away" (156e7). Conversely, the moment cannot participate in being nor surface in the present (the 'now'); rather it is the *ἄτοπον* out of which the being of everything appears, of what is already present or yet absent, in their passing away and their coming-to-be, so much that the instant is likened to "*ex nihilo.*"[168]

If compared and co-read with the previous section (152b2–d4) about the 'now' (*τὸ νῦν*) as intermediate between the 'before' and 'after', the Appendix seems as a reiterated venture to pass through the 'now' without halting at it, which proves impossible, since the moment does not belong to the temporal continuum of "before and after." Instead of time's passing, the *ἐξαίφνης* stands out as the moment of "passing" (*ἰὸν*, 157a) or "overturning" (*μεταβάλλον*, 156d). Yet, the moment is out of place (156e–157b) and this place becomes infinite, indeterminable. The moment

[167] Bostock points out that there are hints for "a potential regress," since for every moment in which something changes from being A to being B, there must be an intermediate moment that A turns in the possess of becoming B and so on ("Plato on Change and Time in the *Parmenides,*" pp. 237-238). As an objection to this claim, the instant is not in time to be divided into time stretches. Furthermore, "the sudden" may be viewed as an attempt to redeem from this regress in time.

[168] Charles P. Bigger, *Between Chora and the Good: Metaphor's Metaphysical Neighborhood* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2004), p. 317.

seems to conjoin two opposites (e.g., motion and rest, any past state and any future one)—"into it and from it"—as well as to disjoin them—"neither…nor." Understood in this way, the moment both sustains and undermines the idea of continuity in time. It could be argued that Plato delves into the unfathomable structure of the "in between" (*μεταξὺ*), with the 'coming to be' always occurring "between certain movements and rests,"[169] against which the temporality of the sudden emerges.

The issue of continuity and discontinuity of time reflects on the unity of everything being in time. As Mitchell H. Miller put it, if a thing is "characterized at different times by mutually exclusive states and processes," how is it to preserve its unity and identity, indeed, how "is it that it is *one* thing"?[170] Miller urges to consider the presence of "countless 'instants' in the course of [a thing's] temporal existence,"[171] which means that only by virtue of the foundation of temporal being upon the non-temporal, the unity and self-sameness of the thing is saved from disintegration. The form, "situated in the 'instant' and unchanging"[172] though the various changes, "itself indifferent to the determinations of time,"[173] bestows the temporal continuity of the thing. Extending the comments of Miller, the Platonic theory of recollection responds to this call for gathering of the scattered temporal parts – the many, the manifold – into the one. Nevertheless, this reading is over-determined by the construal of continuity as the teleology of form. From a different perspective, the instant of change interrupts not only the continuity of existence but existence itself. To cite McCabe again:

[169] It is noteworthy the repetition of the verb *γίγνεσθαι* in the sentence: "Whenever it should change from […] from not being into coming to be [*τὸ γίγνεσθαι*], does it then come to be [*γίγνεται*] between certain movements and rests, and is it neither being nor not, and is it neither coming to be [*οὔτε γίγνεται*] nor passing away?" (157b)

[170] Mitchell H. Miller, *Plato's Parmenides: The Conversion of the Soul* (University Park, Pa.: Pennsylvania State, 1991), p. 117.

[171] Miller, *Plato's Parmenides*, p. 118

[172] Miller, *Plato's Parmenides*, p. 120.

[173] Miller, *Plato's Parmenides*, p. 121.

> The puzzle of the coda is this: even if we take steps (postulating the "suddenly") to allow individuals to change, the exigencies of process demand that the subject of change go out of existence altogether as the change occurs.[174]

We encounter again the problem of reconciling the moment of change with the notion of unity and individuality. Plato seeks to uphold the unity by recourse to the eternity of forms; In Aristotle, the possibility of change is framed by a teleological worldview. As perceived by Bergson, "metaphysics, as a matter of fact, was born of the arguments of Zeno of Elea on the subject of change and movement." Philosophers, like Plato, led "to seek a true and coherent reality in what does not change."[175]

[174] Mary Margaret McCabe, *Plato's Individuals*, p. 124.
[175] Henri Bergson, *The Creative Mind: An Introduction to Metaphysics*, M.L. Andison (trans.) (New York: Greenwood Press, 1968), p. 166.

Chapter 4

Translating the moment

Preliminary comments

The 'moment' (Greek: καιρός, ῥοπή/Latin: momentum/Danish: Øjeblick/German: Augenblick, das Moment) features in the *Dictionary of Untranslatables*, a philosophical lexicon that attempts to review the history of philosophy "through the lens of" philosophical concepts/terms that are "left untranslated as [they are] transferred from language to language [...] or [are] typically subject to mistranslation or retranslation."[176] The focus here is not only on the etymology of philosophical terms, the quest and reconstruction of a genealogy, but on treating these terms as a site of encounter, appropriation, and confrontation of different philosophical traditions. Along these lines, the *Dictionary* valorizes the labor of translation between languages as well as the remnant in-between that remains untranslatable; it pays particular attention to the "bilingualism" of philosophy in general mapping those interzones that don't belong to any national language.[177]

The authors underline "the problem of the metaphoricity proper to *Augenblick*"[178] or, as Kierkegaard tells us, "'[t]he Moment [*Øieblikket*]' is a figurative expression [...] a beautiful word to consider" (CA, 87/SKS 4, 390). The crux texts that seem to engender such metaphoricity is Plato's *Parmenides* (156d-e) and Paul's 1 Corinthians 15:52 ("ἐν ἀτόμῳ, ἐν ῥιπῇ ὀφθαλμοῦ") in the sense that we tend to replace one metaphorical expression for another ("in the twinkling of an eye") in order to designate a mode of temporality – "the moment" – that is difficult to articulate. Before proceeding to Kierkegaard, it is worth pausing here in order to

[176] Emily Apter, "Preface," to *Dictionary of Untranslatables: A Philosophical Lexicon*, Barbara Cassin (ed.), Steven Rendall et al. (trans.) (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014), p. vii.
[177] Emily Apter, "Preface," p. xv.
[178] "Moment, Momentum, Instant," *Dictionary of Untranslatables: A Philosophical Lexicon,* p. 689.

outline three instances that illustrate the intersection between metaphoricity and translation: Dionysius Areopagite, Thomas Aquinas, and Friedrich Schleiermacher.

A paradigmatic case of bilingualism is the use of *ἐξαίφνης* by Pseudo-Dionysius Areopagite. We read: "'Sudden' [*ἐξαίφνης*] is that which, contrary to expectation, and out of the, as yet, unmanifest, is brought into the manifest. But with regard to Christ's love of man, I think that the Word of God suggests even this, that the Superessential proceeded forth out of the hidden, into the manifestation amongst us, by having taken substance as man" (Epistle III, 1069B).[179] Alongside the Platonic and Neoplatonic lineage of the word *ἐξαίφνης* and its presence in Christian literature, Alexander Golitzin notes that Dionysius may have in mind the Syriac phrase (*men shelya*) for rendering the 'sudden', which literally means "from silence/from stillness." The sudden, as Golitzin remarks, is not only associated with divine manifestation and the sudden appearance of light in the mystical vision but with the incarnation of the Word who proceeds from the silence of the Father.[180] In this manner, Golitzin continues, Dionysius intimates in a condensed form an important association between silence and darkness – both as divine essence and as the condition of the soul ascending towards God – in ascetic-mystical tradition.

Thomas Aquinas in his commentary on 1 Corinthians 15:52 ("In momento, in ictu oculi" [Vulgate]) provides two interpretations regarding the temporal quality of "the twinkling of an eye." He writes: "It should be understood that a moment [*momentum*] can be taken either for the instant of time itself, which is called 'now [*nunc*],' or for a certain imperceptible time" (*Super 1 Corinthios* 15.8, [1007]).[181] Aquinas brings forth the ambivalence of the expression, as follows: if it means "the opening of the eyelids (which happens in a perceptible time)" then it

[179] *The Works of Dionysius the Areopagite*, John Parker (ed.) (London and Oxford, 1897).
[180] Alexander Golitzin, "Revisiting the 'Sudden': Epistle III in the Corpus Dionysiacum," *Studia Patristica* 37 (2001), pp. 489-490.
[181] Thomas Aquinas, *Commentary on the Letters of Saint Paul to the Corinthians* (Latin-English Opera Omnia), Fabian Larcher, OP (trans.), The Aquinas Institute https://aquinas.cc/201/205/~3565

must refer to something analogous to the perceptual present, having therefore some kind of temporal extent. If however, it is understood "as the instantaneous sight [*subitus contuitus*] of the eye itself, which happens in an instant" (*Super 1 ad Corinthios 15.8*, [1007]), then this moment is an imperceptible, indivisible instant. In *Summa Theologica*, Aquinas identifies more clearly the Pauline phrase with 'the sudden', since the resurrection as the work of an infinite power "will happen suddenly, namely, at the end of the time" (*Sum. Theol.*, III [Supplement], Q. 77).[182] In Aquinas, we also encounter two other connotations of *momentum* that are common in medieval philosophy: (a) the moment as the boundary of motion (b) "the moment of eternity," possibly of Neoplatonic provenance.[183]

Interestingly, the meaning of "the twinkling of an eye" as "an opening of the eyes [*apertio oculorum*]" is registered in Gesenius' *Dictionary of Hebrew and Chaldean to the Books of the Old Testament*,[184] which Kierkegaard consulted frequently. The proposed interpretation though, according to David Daube, is not accurate and Genesius probably was influenced by the German *Augenblick*,[185] a word already introduced into the German language by Luther's translation of 1 Corinthians in his well-known effort to "Germanize" the Bible.[186] Daube leans towards the view that Paul's phrase "ἐν ῥιπῇ ὀφθαλμοῦ" is an internal translation of "ἐν ἀτόμῳ" which belongs to the linguistic stock of eschatological discourse and in Paul conveys rather "the hope which will materialize in an instant when God so

[182] Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae Supplementum* (Latin-English Opera Omnia), Laurence Shapcote, OP (trans.), The Aquinas Institute https://aquinas.cc/91/92/~799

[183] On this point, see Rory Fox, *Time and Eternity in Mid-Thirteenth-Century Thought* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 31-35. Aquinas writes that a thing that is in the moment of eternity by substance and action is measured by eternity and a thing that is in the moment of time is measured by time (*Commentary on the Book of Causes*). Elsewhere, he writes that the moment of eternity is present to the whole of time, being concomitant with both the past and the future. See Harm Goris, "Interpreting Eternity in Aquinas," in *Time and Eternity: The Medieval Discourse,* Gerhard Jaritz and Gerson Moreno-Riano (eds.) (Turnhout: Brepols, 2003), pp. 193-203.

[184] Wilhelm Gesenius, *Lexicon manuale hebraicum et chaldaicum in Veteris Testamenti libros*, Leipzig 1833, p. 849 (ACKL 72).

[185] David Daube, *The sudden in the Scriptures* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1964), p. 78.

[186] "...und das plötzlich, in einem Augenblick." Luther uses the verbs "to translate" and "to make into German, to 'germanize'" as cognates in his "Open Letter on Translation" (1530). See André Lefevere, *Translating Literature: The German Tradition from Luther to Rosenzweig* (Assen/Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1977), pp. 7-9.

decrees."[187] In Karl Gottlieb Bretschneider's *Lexicon manuale graeco-latinum in libros novi testament*, a book also included in Kierkegaard's library, under the lemma "ῥιπῇ ὀφθαλμοῦ" several terms ("iactu oculorum," "temporis momentum," "subito") are lumped together with *Augenblick* appended as modern language parallel.[188] A common characteristic of these dictionary entries is the lack of critical distinction between Greek, Latin, and German terms that are distant in time, suppressing thus the historicity and contextuality of these terms.

Schleiermacher enables us to elucidate the intersection between translation and theology with regard to the moment. Between 1804 and 1828 Schleiermacher completed the translation of *Plato's Works,* a project that he has undertaken shortly after penning his *On Religion: Speeches to its Cultured Despisers* (1799).[189] In the introduction to the *Parmenides*, he writes that Plato pursues one of the most difficult problems raised in philosophy, namely, to discover "somewhere an original identity of thought and existence."[190] In the context of his attempt to confront the paradoxes of thinking about the unity of the ideas and reconciling the antitheses in dialectical fashion, Plato has come to develop "the idea of the infinitesimally small in time/the momentary [*der Begriff des Augenbliklichen*]."[191] In the main body of his translation, Schleiermacher interchanges between the terms "der Augenblikk" and "Das Augenblikliche" in order to render the Platonic *ἐξαίφνης*.[192] Another important dialogue that we should take into consideration is the *Symposium* and especially Diotima's speech. Here, Diotima teaches that the lover after he "has beheld" many beautiful forms, "all of a sudden he will catch sight [*ἐξαίφνης κατόψεταί*] of something wonderfully beautiful in nature" (*Symp.* 210e). Given the allusion to sight and contemplation in this passage, it would be plausible

[187] David Daube, *The sudden in the Scriptures*, p. 76.
[188] Karl Gottlieb Bretschneider, *Lexicon manuale graeco-latinum in libros novi testamenti*, Vol. 2, Leipzig 1829, p. 385 (ACKL 74).
[189] Julia A. Lamm, "Schleiermacher as Plato Scholar," *The Journal of Religion* 80:2 (Apr., 2000), pp. 206-239.
[190] "Introduction to the Parmenides," *Schleiermacher's Introductions to the Dialogues of Plato*, William Dobson (trans.) (Cambridge and London: Pitt Press, Deighton and Parker, 1836), p. 118.
[191] "Introduction to the *Parmenides,*" p. 123/*Platons Werke*, Vol. 2, part 1, F. Schleiermacher (trans.) (Berlin: In der Realschulbuchhandlung, 1818 [2nd revised edition]), p. 95.
[192] Plato, "Parmenides," *Platons Werke*, pp. 158-159.

to expect that Schleiermacher would have opted for "Augenblick" but instead he consistently preferred the word "Plözlich" throughout the dialogue.[193]

The problematic of untranslatability first emerges in Romanticism and Schleiermacher's lecture "On the Different Methods of Translating" (1813) contributed greatly to it.[194] Here Schleiermacher argues that there is no word for word correspondence between any two languages, especially when they are far distant from one another with respect to etymology and time, a feature that he calls the "irrationality" of languages.[195] The greatest barrier for the translator is that every utterance is an expression not only of "the genius of the language" but also of the spirit of an individual speaker/writer, thus it is the product of a particular individuality.[196] Although such a barrier is not possible to be overcome, both the translator and the reader have to rely on "the talent of intuitive perception" as a means of possible approximation to the original work.[197] The translator may master the original text in such a way that the author sounds as he would have spoken "as a German to Germans."[198] According to Schleiermacher though, the task of the translator is otherwise: to disseminate to the reader "a feeling of the foreign,"[199] meaning that the reader encounters the difference of the source language within the translation, getting therefore the sense that there is a difference in translating a work of a Greek or Latin author in terms of the historical horizon and the singularity of the author's voice.

In view of his theory of translation, the choice of "Augenblick" or "Plözlich" could be evaluated as a case of assimilation of Plato's *ἐξαίφνης* to already familiar German words, with the caveat that the translator, according to Schleiermacher,

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[193] *Platons Werke*, Vol. 2, part 2, F. Schleiermacher (trans.) (Berlin: In der Realschulbuchhandlung, 1807), pp. 431, 434, 435, 451.
[194] See Alexandra Lianeri, "Translation and the Ideology of Culture: Reappraising Schleiermacher's Theory of Translation," *Current Writing* 14:2 (2002), pp. 2-18.
[195] Friedrich Schleiermacher, "On the Different Methods of Translating," Susan Bernofsky (trans.) in *The Translation Studies Reader*, Lawrence Venuti (ed.) (Oxford and New York: Routledge, 2012), pp. 45-46.
[196] Schleiermacher, "On the Different Methods of Translating," pp. 46-47.
[197] Schleiermacher, "On the Different Methods of Translating," p. 55.
[198] Schleiermacher, "On the Different Methods of Translating," p. 49.
[199] Schleiermacher, "On the Different Methods of Translating," p. 53.

"seeks to impart to the reader the same image, the same impression which he himself received thanks to his knowledge of the original language of the work as it is written."[200] This means that the translator endeavours to communicate his experience of reading the original text (Plato's *Parmenides* in this case); "Augenblick" could thus mediate an analogous experience to the reader as "ἐξαίφνης." Therefore the translator assumes the role of mediator, negotiating the irrationality of languages and the different subjectivities involved.

Schleiermacher points towards the historicity of every translation as well as sets forth a rationale for the ethics of translation. Antoine Berman aptly remarks that Schleiermacher "aims to constitute a theory of translation based on a certain theory of subjectivity."[201] Others have underlined the fact that in Schleiermacher "feeling" and "immediate self-consciousness," the sphere of "individuality," is correlated to the notion of "untranslatability" or "non-transferability."[202] Though every utterance is an externalization and communication of a feeling, the uniqueness of this feeling does not belong to others and it could not be transferred completely in the medium of language. Schleiermacher's account of the "mysterious moment" in *On Religion* interests us from the point of view of whether anything could be translated – 'carried across' – in this moment or whether what one is experiencing in this moment could be translated to another.

In the second speech, Schleiermacher designates religion as grounded in the "immediate experiences of the existence and the action of the universe, with the individual intuitions and feelings."[203] He privileges a moment prior to reflection, as reflection inevitably introduces a dichotomy between the subject and object of experience. He preempts the assumption that he could convey "the spirit

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[200] Schleiermacher, "On the Different Methods of Translating," p. 49.

[201] Antoine Berman, *The Experience of the Foreign: Culture and Translation in Romantic Germany*, S. Heyvaert (trans.) (Albany, NY: SUNY, 1992), p. 144.

[202] Andrew Bowie, "Hermeneutics," *The Oxford Handbook of German Philosophy in the Nineteenth Century*, Michael N. Forster, Kristin Gjesdal (eds.) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), pp. 427-429; Theo Hermans, "Schleiermacher and Plato, Hermeneutics and Translation," in *Friedrich Schleiermacher and the Question of Translation,* Larisa Cercel and Adriana Serban (eds.) (Berlin/Boston: de Gruyter, 2015), pp. 77-106.

[203] Friedrich Schleiermacher, *On Religion: Speeches to its Cultured Despisers*, Richard Crouter (ed. and trans.) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 26.

of religion" in his speech: "I can disclose its innermost secret only unsteadily and uncertainly."[204] He continues:

> That first mysterious moment that occurs in every sensory perception, before intuition and feeling have separated, where sense and its objects have, as it were, flowed into one another and become one, before both turn back to their original position—I know how indescribable it is and how quickly it passes away.[205]

What follows is an array of imagery, often reminiscent of Plato's erotic-mystical language,[206] by means of which Schleiermacher tries to capture "the natal hour of everything living in religion" as if one would resurface from the immersion into this flowing feeling with only but images and representations. These very images (i.e., "Even as the beloved and the ever-sought-form fashions itself, my soul flees towards it"; "the image of the vanishing beloved in the awakened eye of a youth") bespeak that the mysterious moment is fleeting and marginal. It is indescribable because it is "a manifestation, an event" before forming into an image; even the produced images when adopted by someone from the outside are "only illegitimate children."[207] He writes with the awareness that he is a mediator and that he could only lead the reader as far as "the forecourt" of religion but not to "the innermost sanctuary."[208]

The 'moment' has acquired its own history of philosophical interpretations accruing layers of meanings as well as forming diverse associations within

[204] Schleiermacher, *On Religion*, p. 31. On the problematic of language in *On Religion* see Richard Crouter's chapter "Schleiermacher's theory of language: the ubiquity of a Romantic text," in *Friedrich Schleiermacher: Between Enlightenment and Romanticism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 195-206.
[205] Schleiermacher, *On Religion*, p. 31.
[206] The translator alludes to this linkage with Plato's *Phaedrus* (Schleiermacher, *On Religion*, p. 31, footnote).
[207] Schleiermacher, *On Religion*, p. 32.
[208] Schleiermacher, *On Religion*, p. 33.

theological texts (i.e., revelation, eschatology, mystical experience). On the other hand, Heidegger proposes that "[w]hat we here designate as 'moment of vision' is what was really comprehended for the first time in philosophy by Kierkegaard—a comprehending with which the *possibility* of a completely new epoch of philosophy has begun for the first time since antiquity."[209] Whether or not the possibility of the new epoch in philosophy was materialized by Kierkegaard, Heidegger's remark is part of the history of the moment. By this I want to point out that the interpretation of Kierkegaard's 'moment' in *The Concept of Anxiety* in particular is irreducible to any etymological explication or the sum total of interpretations of the 'moment' in various texts, although Kierkegaard himself offers to the reader a text that takes advantage of both. Instead, I have chosen to focus first on outlining the reception of the *Parmenides* in the first half of the nineteenth century through translations and studies in German in order to evaluate the intellectual environment in which Kierkegaard's work appears and responds.

Kierkegaard's primary and secondary sources regarding the Parmenides

It is widely agreed that F. Ast's Greek-Latin edition of Plato[210] and Schleiermacher's translation of the *Parmenides* served as reference books to Kierkegaard. Considering the extensive citations of the Greek text from the *Parmenides* in *The Concept of Anxiety* (CA, 83-84n/SKS 4, 385), Kierkegaard most certainly has consulted an edition of the Greek text. As it is evident from his notebooks, other books might be relevant during his formative years, namely Wilhelm Gottlieb Tennemann's (1761-1819) *History of Philosophy*[211] and Gotthard Oswald Marbach's (1810-1890) *Lehrbuch der Geschichte der Philosophie* (1838). In the section that Tennemann expounds the basic concepts of Platonic metaphysics,

[209] Martin Heidegger, *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude*, William McNeill (trans.) (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1995), p. 150.
[210] *Platonis quae exstant opera*, Vol. 3, Fridericus Astius [Friedrich Ast] (ed.) (Lipsiae: Weidmann, 1821), pp. 78-79. Ast translates *ἐξαίφνης* as "momentum."
[211] Wilhelm Gottlieb Tennemann, *Geschichte der Philosophie*, Vol. 2 (Leipzig: J.A. Barth, 1799).

regarding the problem of "transition (*γένεσις*)" and whether it happens gradually or suddenly ("in a moment [*in einem Augenblicke*]"), he remarks that Plato accommodates both views. Citing the relevant passage from the *Parmenides* (156e), he infers though that Plato considered the sudden change as absurd, as logically unsustainable.[212] Marbach expands on Plato's dialectics and translates a passage from the third deduction (*Parm*. 155e-157b),[213] interpolating in parenthesis a comment about "the sudden"/"Das Plötzlich": "*The sudden* (*τὸ ἐξαίφνης*: the now, the glance of the eye [*Augenblick*], the moment – the eternal present, in the reality of which past and future, all time sublates itself)."[214] Marbach's conjunction of words seems inventive or, at least, not faithful to the original text. Although nothing conclusive could be said, an influence of Goethe's "moment" is traceable here, especially if we consider Marbach's engagement with Goethe's *Faust*.[215]

Tennemann's book on the history of philosophy as well as Schleiermacher's "Introductions" to Plato's dialogues and Hegel's *Lectures on the History of Philosophy* form part of a trend in the historiographical tradition of the nineteenth century that seeks to reconstruct Plato's philosophy as a system.[216] Alongside these studies, a significant number of dissertations[217] and commentaries focusing on various hermeneutical problems of the *Parmenides*[218] which, together with the

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[212] Tennemann, *Geschichte der Philosophie*, pp. 355-356 (ACKL 816).

[213] G.O. Marbach, *Lehrbuch der Geschichte der Philosophie: Mit Angabe der Literatur nach den Quellen*, Vol. 1 (Leipzig: Otto Wigand, 1838), pp. 211-212 (ACKL 642).

[214] "*Das Plötzlich* (*τὸ ἐξαίφνης*: das Jetzt, der Augenblick, Moment,—ewige Gegenwart, in deren Wirklichkeit Vergangenheit und Zukunft, alle Zeit sich aufhebt)" (G.O. Marbach, *Lehrbuch der Geschichte der Philosophie,* p. 212).

[215] G.O. Marbach, *Ueber Moderne Literatur, in briefen an eine dame* (Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1836), pp. 120-132 and *Goethes Faust* (Stuttgart: Göschen, 1881). On Goethe's *Augenblick* as a pictorial and temporal metaphor, see Nicholas Rennie, "'Ut Pictura Historia': Goethe's Historical Imagination and the *Augenblick*," *Goethe Yearbook* 8 (1996), pp. 120-141. For a useful and illuminating study on the literary life of the moment, see M.H. Abrams, *Natural supernaturalism: tradition and revolution in romantic literature* (New York: Norton, 1971), pp. 385-390 and 418-427.

[216] See Leo Catana, *The Historiographical Concept 'System of Philosophy': Its Origin, Nature, Influence and Legitimacy* (Leiden: Brill, 2008), pp. 195-260.

[217] Gustav Friedrich Wilhelm Suckow, *De Platonis Parmenide* (Vratislaviae: Typis Universitatis, 1823); Karl Werder, *De Platonis Parmenide* (Berlin: August Petsch, 1833); Kuno Fischer, *De Parmenide Platonico* (Stuttgart: Flammeri et Hoffmanni, 1849).

[218] Theodor Carl Schmidt, *Platons Parmenides als dialektisches Kunstwerk* (Berlin: G. Reimer, 1821); Eduard Zeller, "Ueber die Composition des Parmenides, und seine Stellung in der Reihe der Platonischen Dialogen [About the Composition of Parmenides and its position in the series of the Platonic dialogues]," *Platonische Studien* (Tübingen: C. F. Osiander, 1839), pp. 157-196; Karl

editions and translations of the same dialogue,[219] attest to the growing interest in Plato's dialectics often in conjunction with references to the dialectics of modern philosophy, i.e., Hegel. Th. C. Schmidt, for instance, writes, probably referencing *The Phenomenology of Spirit,* that Hegel hailed the *Parmenides* as a great work of dialectical art.[220] Karl Werder (1806-1893) is fully aware that Plato's dialectics as a philosophical method is akin to but nevertheless different from "our modern philosophy."[221] Eduard Zeller (1814-1908) analyses the deductions of the *Parmenides* into a schema of thesis-antithesis. In general, the third deduction was quasi-fetishized by the writers and translators sympathetic to Hegel's philosophy insofar as there lies the dialectical core of the dialogue wherein all the antinomies are being sublated. That said, I leave unaddressed more substantial research questions such as, why the transition from Being to its Other is hidden in the suddenness of the moment[222] or why the Platonic moment is designated as "indifferent middle of all opposites."[223]

Karl Werder's commentary on Hegel's *Science of Logic*,[224] a copy of which Kierkegaard owned, is of particular interest for its possible influence on Kierkegaard and his conception of the Parmenidean moment. Kierkegaard attended Werder's lectures that were based largely on the aforementioned book at the University of Berlin during the Winter Semester 1841-1842. Werder himself has studied under Hegel and wrote his dissertation on the *Parmenides* (1833). His name may eventually, according to Jon Stewart, be reduced "to little more than a

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Fr.[iedrich] Hermann, *Geschichte und System der Platonischen Philosophie. Erster Theil, die historisch-kritische Grundlegung enthaltend* (Heidelberg: C.F. Winter 1839).

[219] Johann Kaspar Götz, *Platon's Parmenides, aus dem Griechischen übersetzt und mit philosophischen Anmerkungen ausgestattet* (Augsburg: Jenisch & Stageschen Buchhandlung, 1826); Johann Gottfried Stallbaum, *Platonis Parmenides: cum quatuor libris prolegomenorum et commentario perpetuo* (Lipsiae: Lehnhold, 1839 [2nd, 1848]).

[220] Schmidt, *Platons Parmenides,* p. iv. Cf. "the greatest artistic achievement of the ancient dialectics" (Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, p. 44).

[221] Werder, *De Platonis Parmenide,* p. 52.

[222] Schmidt, *Platons Parmenides*, p. 147. Cf. "...the *origination* of the new object, that presents itself to consciousness without its understanding how this happens, which proceeds for us, as it were, behind the back of consciousness" (Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, p. 56).

[223] Kuno Fischer, *De Parmenide Platonico,* p. 72.

[224] Karl Werder, *Logik. Als Commentar und Ergänzung zu Hegels Wissenschaft der Logik*, Erste Abtheilung (Berlin: Veit und Comp., 1841) (ACKL 867).

footnote [...] even in the history of Hegelianism,"[225] but his dissertation was often cited as an authoritative work in Platonic studies during the nineteenth century. As Lawrence S. Stepelevich tells us, Werder's approach to Hegel's *Logic* was tinted by his reading of the *Parmenides* with emphasis on the nothing.[226]

As Werder proceeds to the exposition of the dialogue, he contends that the first hypothesis "If the One is" means that the unity of One excludes every opposition as well as every attribution of predicates, thereby the One "passes over/vanishes [*abit*] into nothing [*Nihil*]."[227] In the same vein, the One transcending every temporal and spatial relation "resembles eternity."[228] The argument seems to be that insofar something is in relation to something other, it becomes finite, excluding from itself the inclusion of everything else; relation means finitude. Therefore, if the One were in relation to something other, it would "step out of its own nature"[229] losing its singularity. Under the second hypothesis, the One is subject to time and thus undertakes contradictory qualities, since "the notion of time signifies the transition of contraries and the flux of things."[230]

Following this, Werder dedicates a considerable part of his dissertation to "the category *τοῦ ἐξαίφνης*," citing extensively from the original text. It is evident that Werder considered "what Plato calls *τὸ τρίτον* [the third]"[231] – a reference here to the way Parmenides introduces the third deduction: "Let us say, again, for the third time..." (155e3) – as the apex of the dialogue and as an important step in Plato's dialectical *via*. The reason is that in this 'third' deduction the second series of deductions (the second hypothesis) "is raised above itself [*supra se ipsam extollitur*]"; with this movement, a higher reality is attained, none other than "the

[225] Jon Stewart, "Werder: The Influence of Werder's Lectures and *Logik* on Kierkegaard's thought," *Kierkegaard and His German Contemporaries: Philosophy* (Kierkegaard Research: Sources, Reception and Resources), Vol. 6, Tome I, Jon Stewart (ed.) (London and New York: Routledge, 2007), p. 339

[226] Lawrence S. Stepelevich, "Hegelian Nihilism: Karl Werder and the Class of 1841," *Philosophical Forum* 46 (3): 2015, p. 256.

[227] *De Platonis Parmenide*, p. 24.

[228] *De Platonis Parmenide*, p. 25.

[229] *De Platonis Parmenide*, p. 25.

[230] *De Platonis Parmenide*, p. 30.

[231] *De Platonis Parmenide*, p. 26.

beginning indeed and the origin of time itself, not falling into time, being itself of invisible nature, which is consequently the foundation and the highest point of the whole."[232] For Werder, what Plato intimates by *ἐξαίφνης* is a kind of germinal moment that "gives birth to all contraries."[233]

By interweaving the poetic rendering of the moment with solid argumentation while exploiting the polysemic ambiguity of the Greek and Latin language, he proceeds to elucidate two Platonic terms, *τὸ ἐξαίφνης* and *τὸ ἄτοπον*, without providing a translation of them. Since *τὸ ἐξαίφνης* in its essence is "outside time," no predicates can be attributed to it insofar as, "in a sublime mode," it comprehends them all.[234] Further, in this moment the One is neither One nor Many and yet "what is not One is One," which is a logical contradiction – the *ἄτοπον*. *Τὸ ἐξαίφνης*, in order to be "pure transition," must be absolved from all predicates. It could thus be designated as "void [*Vacuum*]," in which all kinds of transitions are taking place.[235] Hence, it is necessary *τὸ ἐξαίφνης* to have nothing positive, to be "highest of every negation," and to "subtract" itself from every position, which again is to be (in) the "*ἄτοπον*," a place of non-place. In this context, he characterized pure transition as "a quasi vital force [*vis vitalis*]." [236]

It is evident that Werder associates the moment with creation or origination of the whole. This idea finds resonance in his *Logik*, where he refers to becoming as "eternally creative." He continues: "Becoming itself is not a determinate presence, for it is all present, it is the absolute transition, the eternal moment [*der ewige Augenblick*]."[237] In this way, *Augenblick* is elevated into an eternal moment of creation.

Although it is not possible to reconstruct with detail the reception of the *Parmenides* in the first half of the nineteenth century, we could discern some

[232] *De Platonis Parmenide*, p. 30.
[233] *De Platonis Parmenide*, p. 31.
[234] *De Platonis Parmenide*, p. 31.
[235] *De Platonis Parmenide*, p. 32
[236] *De Platonis Parmenide*, p. 31.
[237] "Das Werden selbst ist keine bestimmte Gegenwart, denn es ist alle Gegenwart, es ist der absolute Übergang, der ewige Augenblick" (Werder, *Logik*, p. 121).

common hermeneutical gestures: the fusion of Hegelian terminology and Platonic dialectics, a focus on the third deduction, the common usage of "Augenblick" or "Plötzlich" for translating *ἐξαίφνης*. Plato's phrase that the moment is "in no time at all" (*Parm*. 156e) instigated readings that the moment of change is (a) extra-temporal (b) suspends or breaches the continuum of time and thus equals eternity. It is important not to overlook that the intellectual production around Plato's *Parmenides* takes place in an equally fertile substratum of romantic literature (Goethe) and art criticism (Lessing's doctrine of the pregnant moment).

The Critique of the Parmenides in The Concept of Anxiety

> Plato fully recognized the difficulty of placing transition in the realm of the purely metaphysical, and for that reason the category of *the moment* costs him so much effort. To ignore the difficulty certainly is not to "go further" than Plato (CA, 82/SKS 4, 385).

While the named target is Hegel and his use with "no embarrassment" of the terms "transition," "negation," "mediation" as principles of movement in logic (CA, 81/SKS 4, 384), the foregoing could serve as a marginal comment on the *Parmenides*. Vigilius seems to regard as a quasi-positive contribution of the dialogue that "in pointing out contradictions within the concepts themselves, [...] it may well put to shame a more recent boastful philosophy" (CA, 83n/SKS 4, 385). We will come back to this point after taking a closer look at the long footnote.

In this footnote, Vigilius makes several claims about Plato's moment, some of which are firmly grounded on extensive quotations from the *Parmenides*, while others are better understood by situating them in the context of contemporary to Kierkegaard readings of the dialogue. Moreover, what is here presented as a conclusion either echoes ideas in Kierkegaard's previous authorship or would more

fully take shape and recast in works such as *Concluding Unscientific Postscript* (1846).

According to Vigilius, Plato puts forward a conception of the moment as "purely abstract" and as "non-being under the category of time" (CA, 82n/SKS 4, 385); he goes on to present an overview of the history of philosophy with emphasis on the concept of non-being, ranging from the Pythagoreans to the Eleatics and Plato's *The Sophist*. In a manner reminiscent of Constantin Constantius' zestful historical-philosophical comparison between the ancient and modern philosophy regarding their respective construal of the category of transition (R, 148-149/SKS 4, 25), Vigilius' focus is on non-being in the sphere of metaphysics, ethics, and dogmatics. Whereas ancient and modern philosophy "alike" venture into "bringing non-being into being" by an all-too easy move of making non-being vanish,[238] for the Christian view "non-being is everywhere present as the nothing from which things were created, as semblance and vanity, as sin, as sensuousness removed from spirit, as the temporal forgotten by the eternal." By acknowledging that non-being exists, Christianity effectuates a movement opposite to that of Greek thought and it does so not in logic but in history, since Atonement reveals the previous being as non-being in order to "bring forth being" (CA, 83n/SKS 4, 385).

Next, Vigilius turns to the dialogue itself, which proceeds by means of "an imaginatively constructing dialectic," that is, by setting out the various hypotheses about the one and the many. In this dialectic exercise, "the moment becomes the category of transition (μεταβολή)," since the moment accounts for all the transitions taking place in it (e.g., the change from the one to many, from likeness to unlikeness, etc.), whereas in the moment itself "there is neither ἐν [one] nor πολλά [many], neither a being determined nor a being combined (οὔτε διακρίνεται οὔτε συγκρίνεται, §157A)" (CA, 83n/SKS 4, 385). For this reason, Vigilius notes, the moment is most appropriately designated with the word *ἄτοπον* – an allusion to its

[238] For all its puzzling brevity, the reference to the *Sophist* regarding non-being is accurate. In this dialogue, the Sophist contends that non-being exists redefined as other than being.

double meaning as 'out of place' and as 'strange, paradoxical'[239] – as its paradoxical nature comes to the fore:

> [T]he moment appears to be this strange [*underlige*] entity (ἄτοπον [that which has no place],[240] the Greek word is especially appropriate) that lies between [*mellem*] movement and rest without occupying any time [*uden at være i nogen Tid*],[241] and into this and out from this that which is in motion changes into rest, and that which is at rest changes into motion. (CA, 83n/SKS 4, 385n)

Thereby, in Plato the moment "remains a silent [*lydløs*] atomistic abstraction" (CA, 84n/SKS 4, 385), something that underscores its strangeness. Some light may be shed on this enigmatic phrase by a quotation from Kierkegaard's unpublished response to Heiberg's review of *Repetition* (1843-1844). Therein, Kierkegaard notes that "[i]n logic, transition is movement's silence [*Bevægelsens Lydløshed*], whereas in the sphere of freedom it becomes." When, "by means of the immanence of thought," possibility becomes actuality, this occurs in "the silent self-inclosure [*Indesluttethed*] of the logical process," a self-inclosure that mere talk about transition and movement "disturbs"; nothing actually is becoming (R [Supplement, 309/SKS 15, 74).

By way of multiple exposure, an additional layer is superimposed here; Kierkegaard writes that one "who lives only in the moment as abstracted from the eternal" sins (CA, 93/SKS 4, 396). To live only in the moment is quintessentially the aesthetic life-view. As the Seducer in *Either/Or* says, "the moment is everything" (EO 1, 433/SKS 2, 420). Johannes Climacus provides the arc that unites these scattered statements: "This, in its generality, is the essential aesthetic principle, namely that the moment is everything and to that extent essentially in

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[239] See the lemma "ἄτοπος" in Liddell-Scott Jones, *Greek-English Lexicon* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1940).

[240] The in-text translations of the Hongs' edition eliminate the ambiguities of the original Greek text between the literal and the figural meaning, ambiguities which Kierkegaard most likely intended to preserve in his own text.

[241] Cf. "ἐν χρόνῳ οὐδενὶ οὖσα" (*Parm*. 156d-e).

this way nothing, just as the sophistic proposition that everything is true means that nothing is true" (CUP, 250/SKS 7, 272).[242] If the aesthete lives as being enclosed in the moment abstracted from time and eternity, it is Christianity that unmasks this moment as nothing, as sin, in the same manner that Socrates brings forth to light the sophist who "is himself a non-being," "invisible" (CA, 82n/SKS 4, 385n).

If "being in no time" (*Parm*. 156e), i.e., extratemporality, constitutes Plato's idea of the moment and eternity, then it is legitimate to infer that the moment is non-being in time, an abstraction from time and eternity. In the same gesture though, the *Parmenides*, Vigilius states, "points out the consequence of treating the moment as such an abstraction." For, if we assume that the one has "the determinations of time," several contradictions appear. On the one hand, the one must become in time ("become older and younger than itself") and on the other, the one must be in time, since by definition "'to be'" means "[p]articipation in an essence or a nature in the present time (τὸ δὲ εἶναι ἄλλο τί ἐστιν ἢ μέθεξις οὐσίας μετὰ χρόνου τοῦ παρόντος, §151E)."[243] The contradiction arises when the one in becoming cannot bypass the now, which "lies between [*mellem*] 'was' and 'will be' [...]. It comes to a halt in the now, does not become older but is older" (CA, 84n/SKS 4, 385).[244] Kierkegaard not only accurately conveys the antinomies of the passage but draws the implications of being/becoming in the present time, concerning either the temporal or the eternal. If being in the present entails the suspension of becoming in the 'now', and therefore the suspension of time, Kierkegaard concludes that "the present (τὸ νῦν) vacillates between meaning the present, the eternal, and the moment" (CA, 84n/SKS 4, 385). This comment may also be intended as a critique of the contemporary interpretations of the dialogue, which saw the third deduction as a culmination of the dialectic process in the *Parmenides*

[242] By "the sophistic proposition" Kierkegaard has in mind *The Sophist*. See Kierkegaard's *Johannes Climacus, or De omnibus dubitandum est* (JC, 167/SKS 15, 54).

[243] In a journal entry Kierkegaard quotes the above definition that Plato gave to being in the *Parmenides* (KJN 3, 404/Not 13:41/SKS 19, 406 [1842-1843]).

[244] Cf. "In logic, no movement must *come about*, for logic is, and whatever is logical only *is*" (CA, 12-13/SKS 4, 320, emphasis in the original).

by positing the moment as "the eternal present."[245] Furthermore, abstraction means isolation, non-relation of the present from the past and the future.

This leads us to the notion of "disinterestedness" that Kierkegaard borrows from Kant[246] and rearticulates as an "aesthetic-metaphysical principle" (CUP, 249/SKS 7, 270), a principle that defines metaphysics, logic, and aesthetics alike insofar as these areas presuppose a disinterested and detached spectator (CA, 18n/SKS 4, 324n; CUP, 262n/SKS 7, 285). I argue that Plato's treatment of the moment manifests the prevalent "mood" of metaphysics, that "of dialectical uniformity and disinterestedness" (CA, 15/SKS 4, 322).[247] As we have seen, the passing of time is depicted in the *Parmenides* as a pacing movement from the 'before' to the 'after' (*Parm*. 152a-e) with indifference as to this or that particular past or future; the turning "from being into passing away or from non being into coming to be" in the moment (*Parm.* 156e) appears as indifferent and non-related to any actual death or any actual birth; furthermore, something remains undecidable and indeterminate in the moment, in which "neither is nor is not" (*Parm*. 157a). A different picture emerges if the interest in one's existence is posited or if one is concerned with the necessity of choice. Kierkegaard writes in *Either/Or* that the moment of deliberation lies "outside the person who is choosing; he stands in no relation to it, can maintain himself in a state of indifference towards it."[248] As such, the moment of deliberation, "like the Platonic [moment], it is actually not at all [*slet ikke*] […] and the longer one stares at it, the smaller it becomes" (EO2,

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[245] See the previous section of this chapter. The Hongs' edition points towards a possible sub-reference here to Hegel's view of eternity and the Now in his *Philosophy of Nature* (Hongs, pp. 244-245, notes 15 and 17). Indeed, Hegel writes that the Present is the negative unity of the Past which has been but is not now and the being of the non-being which is the Future. Rephrased in positive terms, only "the Present *is"* and "Before and After are not." Hegel preserves the continuity of time by saying that "the concrete Present is the result of the Past and pregnant with the Future. The true Present, therefore, is eternity" (Hegel, *Philosophy of Nature: the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences (1830): Part II*, A. V. Miller [trans.] [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004], p. 39).

[246] Ronald Green, *Kierkegaard and Kant: The Hidden Debt* (New York: SUNY Series in Philosophy, 1992), p. 105.

[247] On the relation between interest and metaphysics, see Niels Nymann Eriksen, *Kierkegaard's Category of Repetition*, pp. 115-116. See also Corey Benjamin Tutewiler, "Metaphysics," *Kierkegaard's Concepts: Individual to Novel*, Vol. 15, Tome IV, Steven M Emmanuel, William McDonald and Jon Stewart (eds.) (Farnham: Ashgate Publishing, 2014), pp. 151-157.

[248] Regarding the indifference of the aesthete in *Either/Or* as an existential attitude, see Clare Carlisle, *Kierkegaard's Philosophy of Becoming*, pp. 49-66.

163/SKS 3, 160). Not only does the moment become non-existent and insignificant, but the consequence of the infinite divisibility of the moment ("smaller") is the suspension of decision and stillness.[249]

The indifference of abstract thought to actuality and ethics is the basic argument in the *Postscript*: "Disinterestedness is therefore the expression of indifference to actuality" (CUP, 267/SKS 7, 290). Climacus expounds the predicament of thought and existence as follows: on the one hand, the one who exists cannot truly exist *sub specie aeterni*. By intertwining existence and motion, Climacus states that "existence without motion is unthinkable and motion is unthinkable *sub specie aeterni*" (CUP, 258/SKS 7, 281) because time and motion "cannot find a place within pure thought" (CUP, 263/SKS 7, 286) or the realm of logic, which Climacus associates with "abstract eternity" (CUP, 261/SKS 7, 284). On the other hand, it is no way forward to maintain that 'everything is in motion', as Heraclitus did, or 'everything is and nothing comes into being', as the Eleatics did. But to correlate existence with motion is not the ultimate rebuttal of abstraction:

> All logical thinking is in the language of abstraction and *sub specie aeterni*. To think existence in this way is to disregard the *difficulty*, namely that of thinking the eternal in becoming, as one is surely obliged to do, since the thinker himself is in the process of becoming." (CUP, 257-258/SKS 7, 280 [emphasis mine])

Against the abstract eternity (Plato) and movement tending towards an end (*τέλος*) (Aristotle), Climacus advances the notion of "concrete eternity" which gives continuity to existence and holds it together (CUP, 261/SKS 7, 284). Concrete eternity is precisely the eternal in becoming. Whereas the Aristotelian final cause provides the continuity of the whole process of change explaining the existence

[249] William Spanos offers an interesting discussion of the relation suggested by Kierkegaard between disinterestedness and recollection as indifference to the temporal. In this sense, the recollected image becomes the aesthetic-"spatial image" of "a totalized and de-differentiated present, the timeless moment, the *epiphany* of the full presence" (William V. Spanos, *Heidegger and Criticism: Retrieving the Cultural Politics of Destruction* [Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993], p. 66).

and production of a thing, Climacus does not appeal to such a metaphysical τέλος: "The goal of motion for someone existing is decision and repetition" (CUP 261/SKS 7, 284). Kierkegaard does not go so far as to suggest that eternity is produced, but the continuity of eternity is not something given.

In a way Kierkegaard is rehearsing through Climacus the same ideas that first presented in *Repetition*, which reveals Kierkegaard's abiding engagement with Plato's moment and Aristotle's *κίνησις*. Plato's contribution consists in the fact that by theorizing on the moment, he shows how a conceptual metaphysical system is thrown into contradictions and inconsistencies, from which Plato ultimately takes refuge in the recollection of eternal forms. Kierkegaard avers that Plato articulated "the difficulty of placing" the moment in a metaphysical system. Consequently, it is restrictive to argue that what Kierkegaard has learned from Plato is that the concept of the moment "is a self-contradictory concept" and therefore it does not belong to logic.[250] Kierkegaard does not abrogate contradiction; the contradiction is present in man as "a *synthesis of the eternal and the temporal*" (CA, 85/SKS 4, 388); thereby, Kierkegaard writes, "a contradiction is always the expression of a task, and a task is a movement" (CA, 28/SKS 4, 335; CA, 49/SKS 4, 354),[251] meaning that the individual has the task of expressing the contradiction in his own history as freedom. Kierkegaard added a different inflection to the *difficulty* in CUP; the difficulty does not refer to some metaphysically perplexed term that it is difficult to explain but to the difficulty of existence (CUP, 252/SKS 7, 274).

To recapitulate: The paradoxical moment of becoming in Plato challenges and puts pressure on Kierkegaard's own project relating to the moment and anxiety. The footnote foreshadows the discussion in the following paragraphs of the exigency of positing the right relation between the present, the past, and the

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[250] Janne Kylliäinen, "*Phaedo* and *Parmenides*: Eternity, Time, and the Moment, or From the Abstract Philosophical to the Concrete Christian," *Kierkegaard and the Greek World: Vol.2, Tome I: Socrates and Plato*, p. 62. Kylliäinen's article is a succinct introduction on Kierkegaard's reading of Plato's *Parmenides* and useful for pointing out the relation between the Platonic One and the eternal God who comes into time.

[251] For contradiction as a task in *The Concept of Anxiety*, see the analysis of Arne Grøn, *The Concept of Anxiety in Søren Kierkegaard,* Jeanette B. L. Knox (trans.) (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 2008), pp. 27-31 and 115-116.

future. Importantly, it indicates that Kierkegaard became attentive to the interval, what lies in-between [*mellem*], the significance of which he explored in his authorship.

The coming into existence of the moment in Philosophical Fragments

Vigilius concludes the long footnote by insisting that only in Christianity do temporality, eternity, and the moment acquire their proper significance, since "only with Christianity does eternity become essential" (CA, 84n/SKS 4, 385). As Climacus writes in *Philosophical Fragments*, published four days before *The Concept of Anxiety*, the moment is indeed passing, "as the moment is," but becomes a "decisive" moment, when "filled with the eternal": "A moment such as this must have a special name. Let us call it: *the fullness of time*" (PF, 18/SKS 4, 226). Beyond verbal similarities, the way in which Climacus formulates his argument around the historical and the coming to existence serves as a preamble on how the relation between the eternity and the moment is to be figured in *The Concept of Anxiety*.

In the section entitled "The Preceding State [*Tilstand*]," Climacus sets as his task to distinguish the Socratic learner, who is ignorant about the truth (such that all that is needed is to be reminded of it), from the learner who is essentially "outside the truth [...] or as untruth" (PF, 13/SKS 4, 222). Regarding the preceding state of this second learner, in effect, his present state, it could be described as a "state of loss," a loss eventuated "through his own fault" and "by his own act" (PF, 15/SKS 4, 224). Since he may be held accountable for his act, it follows that he has acted in freedom; yet, Climacus says, "he is bound by himself" even though he cannot free himself "at his will" and "by willing." The fact that in his present state he acts having the illusion of acting in freedom – "he might seem to be free" – can only be revealed "in the moment of liberation [*Frigjørelsens Øieblik*]" (PF, 15-16/SKS 4, 224). "In that very moment," Climacus writes, "he would sink down into himself again, just as the person did who once possessed the condition and then, by

forgetting that God is, sank into unfreedom" (PF, 17/SKS 4, 226). If we go back to define the state of loss and what exactly is lost, it can only be the loss of "the condition for the truth" (PF, 15/SKS 4, 224) and it is only in the moment that the teacher as redeemer "gives him the condition again and along with it the truth" (PF, 17/SKS 4, 226). As created by God, man has already been given the condition, so the condition cannot be lost – since it is "an essential condition" – but nevertheless must be given again by the one, the teacher and the God, who "transform[s]" the learner (PF, 14-15/SKS 4, 223-24).

This transformation is properly a "*rebirth* [*Gjenfødelsen*], by which the individual enters the world a second time" (PF, 19/SKS 4, 227). Whereas in birth "the transition from 'not to be' to 'to be'" (PF, 19/SKS 4, 227) falls within the paradigm of Greek philosophy, the notion of rebirth in which the learner becomes aware of his previous state as having been "one of 'not to be'" (PF, 21/SKS 4, 229) is not conceivable in philosophical categories, even if Climacus consciously continues employing exactly the same philosophical categories in his thought-project. Adding another layer to his argument, Climacus writes: "Or is the matter made more difficult by this—that the non-being preceding the rebirth has more being than the non-being that precedes birth?" (PF, 20/SKS 4, 228) The question cannot be thought or answered objectively but becomes a question for the one who is thinking his own rebirth from his previous state of "'not to be'," a state to which nevertheless "he is not to appeal [*til…ikke skal henholde sig*]" (PF, 21/SKS 4, 229). In an ordinary sense, it is always someone else who witnesses our own birth; here, instead, there is no standpoint from which to appeal to the state of non-being without adhering to the idea of recollection and pre-existence.[252] The awareness of rebirth cannot be articulated in purely cognitive terms insofar as the coming into existence occurs in time beyond any representation within time.

Similarly, to the extent that the moment is filled with eternity, it reveals the previous state in time as non-being; and yet the moment can only become/or be

[252] Kierkegaard identifies recollection with pre-existence and pre-existence with the demonstration of the immortality of the soul (PF, 10/SKS 4, 219; PF, 96/SKS 4, 294).

revealed as the fullness of time, unless in that very same moment one is in passion – and passion meaning, according to Climacus, "acting or suffering" (PF, 51/SKS 4, 255). Climacus explains about his own project as follows:

> Whereas the Greek pathos focuses on recollection, the pathos of our project focuses on the moment, and no wonder, for is it not an exceedingly pathos-filled matter to come into existence from the state of "not to be"? (PF, 21/SKS 4, 229)

Philosophical Fragments revolves around these two different 'moments'. On the one hand, in the moment (Socratically conceived) the recollection of truth could be described as birth, but "in this birth the moment is instantly swallowed by recollection" (PF, 31/SKS 4, 237), while "the everpresence"[253] of the moment makes recollection always possible. Along these lines, Climacus remarks that if the god could be "envisioned" by the learner, that moment of reminder "instantly vanishes as an atom [*Atom*][254] in the eternal possibility that was in his soul" (PF, 63-64/SKS 4, 265). Climacus ascribes to the moment the temporal modalities of the past, present, and future, as if it were the moment that comes into existence together with the believer, who comes into existence for the second time. Therefore, Climacus writes: "The dialectic of the moment is not difficult. From the Socratic point of view, the moment is not to be seen or to be distinguished; it does not exist, has not been, and will not come" (PF, 51-52/SKS 4, 255). In this context, is the moment supposed to be seen or to be awaited?

Climacus speaks of the other moment when the eternal comes into history and as such historical moment can only be believed – "belief believes what it does

[253] Mitchell H. Miller, *Plato's* Parmenides: *The Conversion of the Soul*, p. 119.

[254] Kierkegaard uses the word "atom" with the meaning of fragmentary and something so small that it vanishes. Kierkegaard writes in "'Guilty?'/'Not Guilty?'": "So is my life. At times it is an atom, which cannot be seen by the naked eye, a mere nothing, that sets the vortex seething" (SWL, 224/SKS 6, 209). And again: "The esthetic healing consists in this, that the individual, by staring himself into the esthetic dizziness, disappears from himself, like an atom [*atom*], like a speck of dust, something thrown into the bargain along with what is the common lot of all human beings, of all humanity, disappears like an infinitely brief fractional consonance in the harmony of the spheres of life" (SWL, 462-463/SKS 6, 426-427).

not see" (PF, 81/SKS 4, 281). More specifically, if we view any historical event in time, this event is surrounded by a halo of uncertainty – "the double uncertainty: the nothingness of non-being and the annihilated possibility"; as "the historical intrinsically has the *illusiveness [Svigagtighed]* of coming into existence, it cannot be sensed directly and immediately" (PF, 81/SKS 4, 280). Climacus correlates the immediacy of perception with presence, whereas the historical/coming into existence cannot become "an object of sense perception or immediate cognition," for the reason that there is no immediacy or temporal immediacy involved. The presence does not yield any certainty, since, once reflected upon, the event is temporally dislocated as past. Climacus brings the analogy of the star; perception does not doubt the existence of a star, but uncertainty ensues from the reflection that the star "has come into existence":

> The same is true of an event [*Begivenhed*]. The occurrence can be known immediately but not that it has occurred, not even that it is in the process of occurring, even though it is taking place, as they say, right in front of one's nose. The illusiveness of the occurrence is that it has occurred, and therein lies the transition from nothing, from non-being, and from the multiple possible 'how' (PF, 81-82/SKS 4, 281).

Ultimately, belief does not annul the uncertainty, but it relates in a different way than does apprehension to its object ("the historical") as well as to the nothingness and to the possibilities out of which the coming into existence of the historical has taken place.

The condition is the same for the contemporary of a historical event as for the non-contemporary one who "cannot immediately and directly know that it has come into existence, but neither can he know with necessity that it has come into existence, for the first mark of coming into existence is specifically a break in continuity [*Afbrydelsen af Continuiteten*]" (PF, 84/SKS 4, 282). The break relates primarily to temporal continuity and constitutes the first mark of coming into

existence, that is, of change and alteration in being, that cannot be given to the senses. Climacus deems more pertinent to speak of coming into existence in terms of affectivity, that is, as "a *suffering [Liden]*": "Coming into existence is a change, but since the necessary is always related to itself and is related to itself in the same way, it cannot be changed at all. All coming into existence is a *suffering [Liden]*" (PF, 74/SKS 4, 274). Notably, referring to God's who comes into time Climacus remarks that "his whole life is a story of suffering" (PF, 33/SKS 4, 239).

If coming into existence is to be reintegrated into the time-continuum, it would be viewed as something of the past ("it had come into existence") (PF, 86/SKS 4, 284) while within this past ("the actual thus and so") there also remains the possibility of "another thus and so," which makes belief "an act of freedom" (PF, 83/SKS4, 282). By believing a past event, the one "who comes later" as the one who is contemporary, "repeats its possibility" (PF, 86/SKS 4, 284) and not the absolute certainty. Next, Climacus brings his conclusions about the historical event to bear on the god who comes into existence in time. He denies the idea of immediate contemporaneity with such an event to the degree that "[e]very time the believer makes this fact an object of faith," he relates to the historical event anew. Hence, belief is a matter of freely "assenting to the god's having come into existence" (PF, 81/SKS 4, 280).

To some extent, it is counter-intuitive to argue that the moment comes into existence together with the individual who is being reborn or liberated. For, to speak about, for example, the moment of decision is to continue speaking about the moment abstractly. Addressing the question of 'when the passage from…to…occurs' (i.e., when one makes the movement of becoming from non-believer to believer, from innocence to sin, the experience of rebirth, the resurrection as a new creation), Kierkegaard imports different categories of transition, such as the leap as "a break with immanence" (CUP, 247/SKS 7, 269), a leap that could appear only anachronically: "the leap appears in the way that a leap can appear: that it might come or it has been" (CUP, 287/SKS 7, 313). Kierkegaard consistently employed paradoxical expressions that subvert the everyday

sequential order of time in order articulate a new relation with time and, within time, with eternity as, for example, being "*older* than the moment" (EUD, 86/SKS 5, 93) or "a possibility of a coming into existence within its own coming into existence" (PF, 76/SKS 4, 276). By means of this disjunction of temporal succession, alternative temporalities emerge which bear the name of existential affects: anxiety, concern, longing, joy.

Kierkegaard presses this point early in a journal note that is worth citing at length:

> Precisely because with Chrstnty [*sic*] an entirely new life arises in humankind, it will be impossible to decide anything about immediacy that precedes—and will, in all eternity, precede—the mediacy and dialectic that are given through reflection; this is similar to natural birth if the soul may be thought of in a spontaneous relation to the creating deity; in this way it is apparent that it becomes a purely metaphysical question about which [one] begins, and the individual reflecting upon it must always become conscious of a relation to the divine, but precisely because spiritual birth [*aandelige Fødsel*] itself lies beyond all consciousness, it has to be situated in the div., and the fact that the individual can reflect upon it shows the priority of the divine— (KJN 3, 173/Not 5:9/SKS 19, 177 [1840])

What Kierkegaard is saying is that reflecting upon the birth and the rebirth of an individual becomes a metaphysical questioning about the beginning and God's creation, which cannot be present to the immediacy of consciousness. There are affinities of this passage with the way dogmatic theologians such as H.N. Clausen and Hans Martensen talk about rebirth. For Clausen, there is a "turning point of rebirth [*Gjenfødelsens Vendepunkt*]" when man breaks the law of sin.[255] Martensen writes that rebirth is "the deciding turning point [*det afgjørende Vendepunkt*]" in the life of a Christian, which marks the separation of the old and new man, whereby after deliberate self-reflection in consciousness and comportment a change is also

[255] H.N. Clausen, *Christelig Troeslære*, (Copenhagen: C.A. Reitzels, 1853), p. 408.

witnessed.[256] For Kierkegaard, the second birth as a break with continuity and as the beginning of a new existence occurs out of the invisible, a turning point that cannot be brought to consciousness.[257]

The concept of temporality and the moment

After defining man as "a *synthesis of the temporal and the eternal*," Vigilius attempts to define one factor of this synthesis: "What, then, is the temporal?" (CA, 85/SKS 4, 388). The question opens a critical survey of representations of time in spatial terms. If time is defined as "an infinite succession," forming the idea of an infinite succession implies a distinction between past, present and future. However, such a distinction presupposes the conception of the moment as a "dividing point" which is not only arbitrary but brings the succession of time to a halt: "every moment, as well as the sum of the moments, is a process (a passing by), no moment is in the present, and accordingly there is in time neither present, nor past, nor future" (CA, 85/SKS 4, 388-89). The spatialized conception of time, according to Vigilius, yields "an illusionary view" of the present as "an infinite, contentless nothing," which, in turn, permeates the representation of eternity. For eternity as "an annulled succession of time" resembles an ever present now, "a going forth that nevertheless does not get off the spot" (CA, 86/SKS 4, 389). With these remarks, it becomes clearer what Vigilius means by saying in the long footnote that eternity, the present, and the moment are confused and become nothing.

Kierkegaard takes up the thread from the footnote about the *Parmenides* arguing that if we consider the moment as an intermediary, lying between the past

[256] Hans Martensen, *Christian Dogmatics: A Compendium of the Doctrines of Christianity,* William Urwick (trans.) (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1874), p. 390.

[257] David Kangas, reading Kierkegaard in the context of his critical relation to German Idealism, writes that the instant transcends self-conciousness in the sense that is prior to consciousness: "The instant is the name for a beginning that cannot be interiorized, appropriated, recollected, represented, or possessed" (*Kierkegaard's Instant: On Beginnings*, p. 4).

and the future, "then the moment is precisely not the present, because the intermediary [*Mellemliggende*] between the past and the future, purely abstractly conceived, is not at all" (CA, 87/SKS 4, 390). Thus understood, the moment endangers the present to be fully present. The reference to the moment as intermediary is quite interesting as it resonates with a passage that discusses the transition from possibility to actuality: "In a logical system, it is convenient to say that possibility passes over into actuality. However, in actuality it is not so convenient, and an intermediate term is required. The intermediate term [*Mellembestemmelse*] is anxiety, but it no more explains the qualitative leap than it can justify it ethically" (CA, 49/SKS 4, 354). As remarked in the previous section, the in-between of the 'before' and 'after' of change is filled by affective states like anxiety.

"The Platonic moment" helped Kierkegaard to formulate his own category of the leap[258] while he endeavours to avoid the pitfalls of Platonism. In Chapter I §2 "The Concept of the First Sin," Vigilius writes that Adam's sin "constitutes the nature of the quality: the first sin is sin" and "[t]he new quality," that is sinfulness, "appears with the first [sin], with the leap, with the suddenness of the enigmatic" (CA, 30/SKS 4, 337). A few pages later, he repeats: "Thus sin comes into the world as the sudden [*Pludselige*], i.e., by a leap" (CA, 32/SKS 4, 338). Vigilius is attentive not to reduce this sudden leap to something atemporal or the actualization of a substance, i.e., human nature as sinful. In the same paragraph, Vigilius dismisses the interpretations that consider Genesis as a myth or place Adam "fantastically" outside history (CA, 28/SKS 4, 334), whereby Adam becomes man "no. 0" (CA, 34/SKS 4, 340). He wants to maintain that the history of both the individual and the race begins with Adam's sin insofar Adam is an "*individuum*" and, as such, he also "participates [...] in the whole race" (CA, 28/SKS 4, 335). In this regard, Genesis "presents the only dialectically consistent view," which is summed up in the dictum that "*Sin came into the world by sin.*" To say that "sin presupposes itself" without being presupposed by anything else, including the continuity of the race, is a view that "accommodates both the leap and the immanence (i.e., the subsequent

[258] *Pap*. 283:1/*JP* 3, 17/SKS 27, 275 (1843-44).

immanence)" (CA, 32/SKS 4, 339). To accommodate both the leap and the immanence becomes a recurring gesture in *The Concept of Anxiety* which continues producing contradictions in the course of the book. With the same gesture, Vigilius refutes the myth of understanding "which denies the leap and explains the circle as a straight line" (CA, 32/SKS 4, 338).

Another pitfall that Vigilius has to overcome is that in his treatment of time he needs to preclude the continuity in time (and hence the progress of sin within it) from acting aetiologically. The continuity of sin draws its potency on the repetition of sin over time – sin is "again and again" (CA, 15/SKS 4, 323). Vigilius' concern as well as the challenge of his interpretation is that the "transition" from innocence to guilt does not become "a simple transition" (CA, 60/SKS 4, 365), as if one slides towards sin. A simple transition in this respect may be found in a logical system, wherein "it is convenient to say that possibility passes over into actuality" (CA, 49/SKS 4, 354), as if the mere use of phrases such as "thereupon," "when" (CA, 82/SKS 4, 385) by Hegel has any significance per se. As Vigilius previously stated, "every individual begins anew, and in the same moment he is at a place where he should begin in history" (CA, 35/SKS 4, 341). He wants to maintain that subjective anxiety concerns the continuity of sin as much as it is itself a state out of which there is a breaking forth of a new sin.

> Anxiety may be compared with dizziness. He whose eye happens to look down into the yawning abyss becomes dizzy. But what is the reason for this? It is just as much in his own eye as in the abyss, for suppose he had not looked down. Hence anxiety is the dizziness of freedom, which emerges when the spirit wants to posit the synthesis and freedom looks down into its own possibility, laying hold of finiteness to support itself. Freedom succumbs in this dizziness. Further than this, psychology cannot and will not go. In that very moment everything is changed, and freedom, when it again rises, sees that it is guilty. Between these two moments lies the leap [*Imellem disse tvende Øieblikke ligger Springet*], which no science has explained and which no science can explain. He who becomes [*bliver*] guilty in

> anxiety becomes as ambiguously guilty as it is possible to become. (CA, 61/SKS 4, 365)

The passage starting with the comparison of anxiety to dizziness and the personification of freedom intends to 'present' how one becomes guilty in anxiety when she was innocent. There seem to be distinguished two moments: the first moment is when "the freedom succumbs" and the second one when freedom "again rises, sees that it is guilty." To the question when one becomes guilty or when innocence is lost, we are lead to answer, *pace* Vigilius, that the transition from innocence to guilt happens "between these two moments" where the leap also lies.[259] Taking into account the tenses used here, the first moment (which is never explicitly named as such) when "everything is changed [*er Alt forandret*]" is actually the last moment of change; everything has already changed. The second moment, inferred from the first, is when freedom regains its consciousness or when freedom's consciousness of being guilty comes.

Nevertheless, it ought to be considered whether speaking of two moments is an appropriate way of speaking, that is, whether these two moments, posited in the temporal axis as 'before' and 'after', delineate a temporal span or a non-temporal interval. The language about the individual's becoming/being guilty invites comparison with a similar passage from the *Parmenides*, where Plato unearths the contradictions in charting the course of the One becoming older in time (*Parm.* 152b-d). As the One advances from the 'before' to the 'after', wherein becoming takes place "between these two" (*Parm*. 152c), it is necessary that becoming cannot overstep the now (cf. "bypass [*springe*] this 'now'" [CA, 84n/SKS 4, 385]) but comes to a halt at the now so that the one does not come to be older but is older. Does this mean that Kierkegaard advocates the leap as transcendent of the present? Grappling with these inconsistencies, Darío González writes that "the leap as *actus,* cannot be represented but as a sort of non-movement. [...] The leap is a contraction of movement, the radical actuality of a movement that cannot

[259] For a commentary on this passage see, Arne Grøn, "Time and History," *The Oxford Handbook of Kierkegaard*, pp. 278-279.

develop itself in time."[260] The non-representational quality of the leap leads us back at the introduction of this thesis and the Deleuzean question "What happened?"[261]

This accords with the subject and limits of psychology, as they were laid out by Vigilius in the "Introduction"; there he defines the concern of psychology as being "not that sin comes into existence [*bliver til*], but how it can come into existence. Psychology can bring its concern to the point where it seems as if sin were there, but the next thing, that sin is there, is qualitatively different from the first" (CA, 22/SKS 4, 329). In other words, the how consists of "the sin's real possibility." Therefore, Vigilius as "a psychological observer" endowed with "poetic originality in his soul" is able to give an account of sin as it was there, creating "the totality and the invariable from what in the individual is always partially and variably present" (CA, 55/SKS 4, 329). With metonymies and personifications[262] he supplements his observations, but he cannot identify the moment that sin "breaks forth" – and he is not supposed to – but only of the proximate psychological state "that precedes sin," that is, anxiety (CA, 92/SKS 4, 395). Parenthetically, with regard to personifications, Kierkegaard uses the Pauline expression "ἀποκαραδοκια τῆς κτίσεως [the eager longing of creation] (Rom. 8, 19)" to designate the objective anxiety (CA, 57-58/SKS 4, 362). The eager longing of creation proves a deeply temporal category, explicitly related to "expectation." Literally, the word "ἀποκαραδοκία" conveys that creation "watches with the head stretched out" or "keeps an eager look-out"[263] and, as St Paul's text continues, "the creation waits with eager longing for the revealing of the children of God."

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[260] Darío González, "'Act' and 'Occasion' On the Ontological Structure of *Coming into Existence*," *Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook* (1997), p. 190.

[261] Only sense-perception renders the leap into something static, a non-movement (see the Zeno's paradoxes). Deleuze and Guattari explain that "[a] point is always a point of origin. But a line of becoming has neither beginning nor end, departure nor arrival, origin nor destination; [...] A line of becoming has only a middle. [...] A becoming is neither one nor two, nor the relation of the two; it is the in-between" (*A Thousand Plateaus*, p. 323). For Deleuze and Guattari, becoming is multiple, proliferated, anarchic.

[262] Jason A. Mahn argues that the eye and freedom function as "metonyms for the falling individual" (Jason A. Mahn, *Fortunate Fallibility: Kierkegaard and the Power of Sin* [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011], p. 68). Jacob Bøggild enumerates various instances of personification of anxiety in Kierkegaard's authorship. See his "Irony haunts: On Irony, Anxiety and the Imaginary in Kierkegaard," *Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook* (2009), pp. 263-267.

[263] Samuel Bagster, *The Analytical Greek Lexicon* (London: Samuel Bagster and Son, 1852), p. 42.

To recapitulate some of the themes presented in this chapter: regarding the platonic *ἐξαίφνης*, the problem of metaphoricity and translation is particularly accentuated as the word transmigrates in different languages and contexts. According to Schleiermacher, untranslatability is integral to any singular experience. Kierkegaard brings into his text the persona of Ingeborg, the heroine of the romantic saga *Frithiof*, when the exploration of the notion of temporality reached an impasse, as it is constantly resulting in viewing time and eternity in spatialized terms: "…and now we have come to the moment."

> "The moment" is a figurative expression, and therefore it is not easy to deal with. However, it is a beautiful word to consider. Nothing is as swift as a blink of the eye, and yet it is commensurable with the content of the eternal. Thus when Ingeborg looks out over the sea after Frithiof, this is a picture of what is expressed in the figurative word. An outburst of her emotion, a sigh or a word, already has as a sound more of the determination of time and is more present as something vanishing and does not have in it so much of the presence of the eternal. For this reason a sigh, a word, etc. have the power to relieve the soul of the burdensome weight, precisely because the burden, when merely expressed, already begins to become something of the past. A blink is therefore a designation of time, but mark well, of time in the fateful conflict when it is touched by eternity. (CA, 87/SKS 4, 390)

Ingeborg looking out over the sea after Frithiof is a figure (an image [*Billede*]) of what is figuratively (with an image) expressed in the word "Øieblikket." There is a self-reflective structure in this sentence which, in turn, reflects the relation between the artistic illustration of Ingeborg with the text of *Frithiof's saga.*[264] However minimal, within "Ingeborg's Lament" (Canto IX) there is a poetic narration of the separation of the two lovers, which can be reconstructed as follows: Frithiof is sailing away in exile while Ingeborg, sitting on the seashore, is

[264] Kierkegaard may have in mind a pictorial illustration of this scene on the title page of Esaias Tegner's *Frithjofs Saga* (Stockholm, 1825) (See the Hong's edition of *The Concept of Anxiety*, p. 245, n. 22)

looking over the sea after Frithiof's boat vanishing into the horizon, with the bitter awareness that the separation will be forever:

Ah! Faint we, gazing and yearning,

Ere his returning.

[Ack! hur vi längte och blicke,

kommer han icke.][265]

For Kierkegaard, Ingeborg sitting at the water's edge and following with her eye the vanishing ship of Frithiof constitutes "a truly romantic situation" (KJN 11:Part 1, 132/*Pap*. 128:1/SKS 27/130 [1836]).[266]

Ingeborg's glance – the "Øieblikket" – holds certain analogies to Paul's "poetic paraphrase" of "the twinkling of the eye [*ἐν ἀτόμῳ, ἐν ῥιπῇ ὀφθαλμοῦ*]." The most obvious one is that both designate the moment as "commensurable with eternity" (CA, 88n/SKS 4, 391). An important distinction should be made; as N. N. Eriksen remarks, by employing this image Kierkegaard suggests that "temporality is seen as the distinguishing mark of modernity over against the Greeks."[267] It differs though from the moment as "the fullness of time" which, as Vigilius contends, constitutes "the pivotal concept in Christianity" (CA, 90/SKS 4, 394). While the pervading of time by the eternal is essential for the notion of temporality to emerge, the affect of being touched by eternity is experienced in the romantic figuration of the moment as "fateful [*skjebnesvangre*] conflict." Both these moments intimate loss and transformation – Ingeborg's lover, the passing away of the world in 1 Cor 15:52. For lack of a better term, I call the fact that Kierkegaard accommodates the different designations of the moment in the one single page

[265] *Frithjofs Saga,* p. 71/Esaias Tegner, *Frithiof's Saga: A Legend of Ancient Norway*, Clement B. Shaw (trans.) (Chicago, 1908), p. 152.

[266] Cf. the following passage from a journal entry referring to Don Juan: "…or else he would follow the vanishing object of desire with the yearning gaze of Ingeborg" (KJN 1, 108/BB:24/SKS 17, 114 [1837]).

[267] N.N. Eriksen, *Kierkegaard's Category of Repetition,* p. 72, n. 141.

presumably working back and forth between the main text and the footnotes (CA, 88/SKS 4, 391) 'multiple photographic exposure'. This last feature (the relation between the main text and the footnotes) can be seen in the following reproduction of the page from the first edition of *The Concept of Anxiety*. For example, the asterisk used to call out the footnote (CA 88n/SKS 4, 391) appears next to "vanishing" [268] and not to "the atom of eternity" that Paul's "ἐν ἀτόμῳ, ἐν ῥιπῇ ὀφθαλμοῦ" is supposed to clarify. By a kind of attraction then, Kierkegaard writes that "the world will pass away [*forgaae*] in a moment" (CA 88n/SKS 4, 391) instead of the correct citation from 1 Cor 51-52: "We will not all die, but we will all be changed, in a moment, in the twinkling of an eye, at the last trumpet."[269] Back in the main text, although it is not clear if the inference "Thus understood" refers to Ingeborg's *Øieblikket* or to the Platonic *ἐξαίφνης*, the meaning seems to be: the atom of time vanishes into time like a speck of dust; the atom of eternity vanishes into eternity, as the Greeks culture comprehends the atom of eternity by entering eternity backwards.[270] A draft passage is more illuminating, wherein Kierkegaard writes that "for the moment is really time's atom, but not until eternity is posited, and this is why one may properly say that eternity is always in ἐν ἀτόμῳ" (*Pap.* V B 55:6/*JP* 3:2740 [1844]).

Kierkegaard slides from the figurative to the pictorial, to poetic paraphrase and, towards the end of the footnote (CA, 88n/SKS 4, 391), to the accidental "eternalization" of the moment (the freezing of the movement of two actors during a theatrical performance), which equates to a sheer mimicry. It would be fruitful,

[268] Kierkegaard derives the etymology of the moment (*momentum*) from the verb 'to move': "The Latin term is *momentum* (from *movere* [to move]"), which by derivation expresses the merely vanishing" (CA, 88/SKS 4, 391).

[269] See the comments on this misquotation in SKSK 4, 391. Kierkegaard's phrasing is rather reminiscent of 1 Cor 7:31: "For the present form of this world is passing away [*thi denne Verdens Skikkelse forgaaer*]."

[270] Referring to recollection, Johannes Climacus writes: "…this reminder instantly vanishes as an atom in the eternal possibility that was in his soul" (PF 64/SKS 4, 265). In an early journal note, regarding Romanticism's conception of time and eternity, Kierkegaard writes: "The Middle Ages, being romantic, grasped only one side of eternity—the vanishing of time" (KJN 1, 215/DD:16/SKS 17, 224 [1837]).

„Dieblikket" er et billedligt Udtryk og forsaavidt ikke saa godt at have med at gjøre. Dog er det et skjønt Ord at agte paa. Intet er saa hurtigt som Diets Blik, og dog er det commensurabelt for det Eviges Gehalt. Naar saaledes Ingeborg skuer ud over Havet efter Frithiof, saa er dette et Billede paa, hvad det billedlige Ord betyder. Et Udbrud af hendes Følelse, et Suk, et Ord har allerede som lydende mere Tidens Bestemmelse i sig, og er mere nærværende i Retning af Forsvinden, og har ikke saa meget det Eviges Nærværelse i sig, som jo derfor ogsaa et Suk, et Ord o. s. v. har Magt til at hjælpe Sjelen af med det Betyngende, netop fordi det Betyngende blot udsagt allerede begynder at blive et Forbigangent. Et Blik er derfor en Betegnelse af Tiden, men vel at mærke af Tiden i den skjebnesvangre Conflikt, da den berøres af Evigheden *). Det, vi kalde Dieblikket, kalder Plato *το εξαιφνες*. Hvorledes det end etymologisk forklares, det staaer dog i Forhold til Bestemmelsen: det Usynlige, fordi Tid og Evighed opfattedes lige abstrakt, da man manglede Begrebet Timelighed, hvilket har sin Grund i, at man manglede Begrebet: Aand. Paa Latin hedder det momentum, hvis Derivation (af movere) kun udtrykker den blotte Forsvinden **).

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*) Det er mærkeligt, at den græske Kunst culminerer i Plastik, der netop mangler Blikket. Dette har imidlertid sin dybe Grund i, at Grækerne ikke fattede i dybeste Forstand Aandens Begreb, og derfor heller ei i dybeste Forstand fattede Sandseligheden og Timeligheden. Hvor stærk er dog ikke den Modsætning, at man i Christendommen netop billedlig fremstiller Gud som et Die.

**) I det N. T. findes en poetisk Omskrivelse af Dieblikket. Paulus siger, at Verden skal forgaae *εν ατομῳ και εν ριπῃ οφθαλμου*. Dermed udtrykker han ogsaa, at Dieblikket er commensurabelt for Evigheden, fordi nemlig Undergangs-Dieblikket i samme Dieblik udtrykker Evigheden. Man tillade mig

then, to trace the motif of Augenblick with all its permutations not only in philosophy and theology but also in the context of literature and aesthetics.[271] The fact that Kierkegaard brings together Ingeborg's sea-shore lament ("An outburst of her emotion, a sigh or a word") and Ingeborg's illustration ("Ingeborg looks out over the sea after Frithiof") evokes and problematizes Lessing's thesis about the temporality of pictorial representation. Lessing argues in his essay *Laocoön: An Essay on the Limits of Poetry and Painting* (1766) that poetry represents actions progressing in time while the visual artists, restricted by their medium, can depict actions in space in a stationary manner. Painting could transcend its limits acquiring a narrative quality only when the artist chooses "one single moment [*Augenblick*] of action [...] the most pregnant, from which what precedes and follows will be most easily apprehended."[272] The viewer's imagination comes to supplement the artistic choice by speculating the before and after of the moment. Regarding the statue of Laocoon, which Lessing uses as a case study, the challenge facing the plastic artist is to depict his subject's movement, emotional expression or action not at the moment of culmination but just before, for example, the scream or the sigh. Lessing has argued that the monumentalization of "transitory" phenomena, which "break out suddenly and as suddenly vanish," is not the ultimate goal of artistic endeavour.[273] The play of the spectator's imagination in a way reintroduces the temporal/narrative element into spatial simultaneity of the

[271] As a literary locus, "the moment" harbours contradictory connotations: the eternal moment and the sudden in Goethe (see Nicholas Rennie, *Speculating on the Moment: The Poetics of Time and Recurrence in Goethe, Leopardi, and Nietzsche* [Gottingen: Wallstein Verlag, 2005]), the contingent and violence in Kleist, the epiphanies in Joyce and Woolf, and the ecstatic interruption of time in modern literature (see Karl Heinz Bohrer, "Instants of Diminishing Representation: The Problem of Temporal Modalities," *The Moment: Time and Rupture in Modern Thought*, Heidrun Friese [ed.] [Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2001], pp. 113-133 and Mark Currie, *The Unexpected: Narrative Temporality and the Philosophy of Surprise* [Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2013]).

[272] Lessing, "Laocoön: An Essay on the Limits of Poetry and Painting," W. A. Steel (trans.) in *Classic and Romantic German Aesthetics*, J.M. Berstein (ed.) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 81. About Lessing's "pregnant moment" in poetry and the plastic arts with respect to Kierkegaard, see Lasse Horne Kjaeldgaard, "'The Peak on Which Abraham Stands': The Pregnant Moment of Søren Kierkegaard's *Fear and Trembling*," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 63:2 (Apr., 2002), pp. 303-321 and Ragni Linnet, "Kierkegaard's Approach to Pictorial Art, and to Specimens of Contemporary Visual Culture," *Kierkegaard, Literature, and the Arts*, Eric Ziolkowski (ed.) (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 2018), pp. 193-222. On the sudden leap of Mephistopheles, see Bo Kampmann Walther, "Questioning the Moment: Reflections on a Strange Figure (or a Moving Image)," *Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook* (2001), pp. 234–246.

[273] Lessing, "Laocoön: An Essay on the Limits of Poetry and Painting," p. 37.

statue. As David E. Wellbery puts it, "[a]chieving the pregnant moment (no simple thing) transforms the unity of the painted content from the oneness of an instant within time into the oneness of time comprehended."[274]

If "art depicts repose, poetry motion" (EO1, 169/SKS 2, 167), as Kierkegaard avers referring to Lessing, neither of them could portray the secret sorrow of the literary women that are shadowgraphed in "Silhouettes": Marie Beaumarchais, Elvira, and Margarete. The reflective sorrow that characterizes these female figures "does not have inner stillness but is constantly in motion" (EO1, 170/SKS 2, 168) and therefore cannot manifest itself at any exterior form. Kierkegaard, or rather his pseudonym A, the author of "Silhouettes," writes that "the exterior does indeed have significance for us, but not as the manifestation of the interior, but rather as a telegraphic report that there is something hidden deep within" (EO1, 174/SKS 2, 172). Along these lines, the inwardness and suffering of Ingeborg never yields to representation, all the more that she, aside from being a picture [*Billede*], is herself a seer. It could be argued though that what Kierkegaard puts forward here is an aesthetic suspension of time in order to grasp with a figure "the content of eternity" (CA, 87/SKS 4, 390), a reflection of eternity in time. Still, it remains an ambivalent image as Ingeborg's glance resists this aesthetic closure; Ingeborg suffers time rather than is abstracted from time. Vigilius writes that a sigh would make the burden something of the past. But isn't the sigh that makes Ingeborg's glance what it is in the sense of conveying the untranslatabilty of the moment?

Kierkegaard closes *The Concept of Anxiety* by asserting that "he who in relation to quilt is educated by anxiety will rest only in Atonement" (CA, 162/SKS 4, 461). A quote from J.G. Hamann attached a further signification to the long-discussed concept of anxiety: "our heterogeneity" to the world, "homesickness [*Heimweh*]," "disquiet [*Unruhe*]" (CA, 162/SKS 4, 460). The longing of returning

[274] David E. Wellbery, "Laocoon Today: On the Conceptual Infrastructure of Lessing's Treatise," *Rethinking Lessing's Laocoon: Antiquity, Enlightenment, and the 'Limits' of Painting and Poetry*, Avi Lifschitz and Michael Squire (eds.) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), p. 71.

home stirs the anxious restlessness and the movement back to one's origins. In a journal note, Kierkegaard writes: "Presentiment is the earthly life's nostalgia [*Hjemvee*] for something higher, for the lucidity which man must have had in his paradisial life" (KJN 1, 238/DD:80/SKS 17, 248 [6 Nov. 37]).

Homesickness already in Plato and Plotinus has become a common mystical motif. The pursuit of stillness and *hesychia*, as will be shown in the next chapters, prompted in the early Christian centuries the wandering monks to settle in the desert in order to live like the lilies and the birds. Living without care (*amerimnia*), *ascesis*, detachment from the world were essential for their spiritual advancement. From another vantage point, the migratory restlessness of the birds [*Zugunruhe*] will become an object of study for the nascent science of ornithology in the nineteenth century.[275] The phenology and patterns of avian migration particularly regarding the knowledge of time and distance to travel was invested with spiritual overtones.

We will take up these threads and follow them in the next chapters while reading the discourses about the lilies and the birds, the divinely appointed teachers of the worried one.

[275] Although the idea was coined much earlier in 18th century, Johann Andreas Naumann (1795-1817) systematically studied 'the migratory restlessness' of captive birds (Jürgen Haffer, Hans Hudde, and Brian Hillcoat, "The Development of Ornithology," *Bonn zoological Bulletin – Supplementum* 59 [November 2013], p. 57). The Danish ornithologist Frederik Faber, to whom Kierkegaard refers (see p. 182 of the present thesis), observes that homesickness and migratory instinct drove the migratory behavior of birds. See Friedrich Faber, *Ueber das leben der hochnordischen vögel*, Vol. 2 (Leipzig: E. Fleischer, 1825-1826), p. 60.

PART II: REST

Chapter 5

Sabbath Rest in Patristic Literature and Pietism

Movement and rest are often viewed as antithetical terms. Aristotle for example, argues that the state of rest (*stasis*) and the state of movement cannot be predicated of the same object in the same instant. Only the everlasting motion of the universe, as self-identical, resembles eternal rest (*Phys*. 265b). In pseudo-Dionysius Areopagite movement and rest is one of the divine names as God "is established above every rest, and every movement, […] is a rest and movement to all"[276] and God is "a loving Movement [*ἐρωτικὴ κίνησις*]."[277] Although it is not possible to give an adequate account for the mystical tropes of movement and rest in Patristic literature, Gregory of Nyssa described the ascent to God as perpetual movement from beginning to beginning[278] while Maximus the Confessor used such oxymorons as "ever-moving rest" and "stationary movement"[279] to designate the progress of the soul towards God's infinity.

Regarding the motif of 'rest in God', a number of scholars have underlined the affinities between Kierkegaard and Augustine.[280] Taking the cue from Kierkegaard's upbuilding discourse "The Expectancy of an Eternal Salvation" (1844), in the following chapters I draw attention to the way in which the traditional binary of 'movement/rest' is reconfigured as labor and prayer, the activity and inactivity with a view to showing how Kierkegaard rearticulates the

[276] *Divine Names*, IV.7. *The Works of Dionysius the Areopagite: Part 1: Divine Names, The Mystical Theology*, and Letters, John Parker (trans.) (London: James Parker, 1897).
[277] *Divine Names*, IV.14.
[278] *Vita Moysis*, II.225-227. Gregory of Nyssa, *The Life of Moses*, p. 113.
[279] Maximus the Confessor, *Questiones ad Thalassium*, 65.
[280] Harald Høffding, *The Philosophy of Religion*, B. E. Meyer (trans.) (London: Macmillan, 1906 [1st ed. in Danish, 1901), p. 121; Lee C. Barrett, *Eros and Self-Emptying: The Intersections of Augustine and Kierkegaard* (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing, 2013); Christopher Barnett, "'Rest' as Unio Mystica?: Kierkegaard, Augustine, and the Spiritual Life," *Spiritus: A Journal of Christian Spirituality* 16:1 (2016), pp. 58–77.

Sabbath theology. In doing so, I evaluate a variety of textual sources ranging from Ps-Macarius to Pietist writers.

According to the Auction Catalogue, Kierkegaard owned a copy of Macarius of Egypt's *Opuscula* and *Apophthegmata*, edited by Johann Georg Pritius (1662-1732).[281] The *Opuscula* comprehend seven treatises: I. "On the Guarding of the Heart"; II. "On Perfection in Spirit"; III. "On Prayer"; IV. "On Patience and Discretion"; V. "On the Raising of the Intellect"; VI. "On Love"; VII. "The Freedom of the Intellect." For editing the *Apophthegmata*, Pritius drew from two main collections: Johannes Baptista Cotelier, *Ecclesiœ Græcæ Monumenta* (Paris: Muguet, 1677-1686) and *Vitae Patrum* (Heribert Rosweyde [ed.], Antwerp, 1615). The paradox with this edition is that the *Opuscula* is written by Ps-Macarius whereas *Apophthegmata* are Sayings attributed to Macarius of Egypt. As with the *Spiritual Homilies,* the practice of attributing the writing of Ps-Macarius to a respectable figure of monasticism was part of an effort to 'save' these works from their condemnation as heretical.

In Kierkegaard's authorship there is no direct or oblique reference to Macarius nor to Pritius' edition. However, Kierkegaard was acquainted with Eastern monasticism, in particular with *Apophthegmata Patrum*, through his reading of *Grammatica Religiosa,* written by Abraham a Santa Clara (1644-1709). There are two references, one in his notebooks and a second one in *Christian Discourses*.

> Abraham a St. Clara tells the story of an old hermit who was named the sole heir of a wealthy man. When the hermit was informed of this he is said to have replied:

[281] *Sancti Patris Macarii Aegyptii opuscula nonnulla et apophthegmata*, ed. Io[annes] Georgius Pritius, Lipsiae: Bibliopolio Grossiano, 1714 (ACKL 144). Kierkegaard owned the second edition of *Opuscula*, comprised of the original Greek text and Pierre Possin's Latin version; the first edition was published in 1699. A year earlier, Pritius edited Macarius' *Fifty Spiritual Homilies* (ΤΟΥ ΑΓΙΟΥ ΠΑΤΡΟΣ ΜΑΚΑΡΙΟΥ ΤΟΥ ΑΙΓΥΠΤΙΟΥ ΟΜΙΛΙΑΙ. *Sancti Patris Macarii Aegyptii Homiliae*, Leipzig, 1698; 2nd ed., 1714).

there must be a misunderstanding; how could he name me as his heir when I died long before him[?] (KJN 4, 178/NB2:98/SKS 20, 180 [1847])[282]

Abraham a St Clara in his 14th sermon "On Poverty" cites this story of Abba Arsenius and presents Arsenius as "a beautiful exemplar to imitate" (see the notes in KJN 4, 521). The saying of Abba Arsenius now can be found in alphabetical edition of *Apophthegmata Patrum* (AP, 29).[283] Kierkegaard would take up this story again and elaborate on it, comparing the poverty of the bird with the poverty of the Christian in "The Care of Poverty" (CD, 17/SKS 10, 29). It is worth noting that Abraham a St Clara makes abundant use of *The Sayings of the Desert Fathers* in *Grammatica Religiosa* and this work must be considered one of the main sources of Kierkegaard's contact with this particular genre of monastic literature of Eastern Monasticism.[284]

First I shall briefly address the virtue of amerimnia (*ἀμεριμνία*/freedom from care) in desert monasticism. Then I will provide an outline of Macarius' teaching and then turn to Pritius' edition of Macarius' *Opuscula* in order to gain some perspective regarding the perplexed issue of the presence of Macarian writings in Pietistic tradition. This is necessary in order to explore more closely the themes of

[282] The reference is made to *Abraham's à St. Clara, Sämmtliche Werke*, Vol. 15-16 (Lindau: Johann Thomas Stettner and Augsburg: Rieger, 1845), p. 276 (ACKL 294-311). As the Commentary to KJN informs us, Kierkegaard bent down the corner of this page (see KJN 4, 521).

[283] *The Sayings of the Desert Fathers: The Alphabetical Collection*, preface by Metropolitan Anthony of Sourozh, ed. with an introduction by Benedicta Ward (Kalamazoo, Michigan: Cistercian Publications, 1984), p. 15: "Abba David related this about Abba Arsenius. One day a magistrate came, bringing him the will of a senator, a member of his family who had left him a very large inheritance. Arsenius took it and was about to destroy it. But the magistrate threw himself at his feet saying, 'I beg you, do not destroy it or they will cut off my head'. Abba Arsenius said to him, 'But I was dead long before this senator who has just died', and he returned the will to him without accepting anything."

[284] Abraham a Santa Clara's own quotations of *The Sayings* come from the following sources: *Vitae patrum sive Historiae eremiticae libri decem,* ed. Heribert Rosweyde, Antwerpen, 1615-1628. Also Palladius, *Historia Lausiaca* and Rufinus, *Historia Monachorum*. Peter Šajda confirms that the passages Kierkegaard highlights from his reading of *Grammatica Religiosa* have to do with monastic authorities and edifying stories (Peter Šajda, "Abraham à Sancta Clara: An Aphoristic Encyclopedia of Christian Wisdom," *Kierkegaard and Renaissance and Modern Traditions*, Vol. 5: Tome II: *Theology*, Jon Stewart (ed.) (Farnham: Ashgate, 2009), p. 10.

prayer, labor and rest (and the Sabbath-rest), rebirth and the renewal of the image, vigilance and freedom from care.

The spiritual virtue of amerimnia

"μὴ οὖν μεριμνήσητε εἰς τὴν αὔριον"

(Matthew 6, 34)

Athanasius' *Vita Antonii* constitutes a key text for understanding the beginning of desert monasticism. It recounts how Antony upon hearing these words of the Lord in the Gospel "could not remain any longer, but going out he gave" his possessions to the poor. He "devoted himself from then on to the discipline [*τῇ ἀσκήσει*] rather than the household, giving heed to himself and patiently training himself" (Athanasius, *VA*, 3).[285] Among the practices he adopted was that of praying unceasingly. He exhorted the other monks who came to visit and seek for counsel: "Conducting our lives in this manner, let us carefully keep watch [*νήφωμεν*], and as Scripture says, let us *keep* our *heart in all watchfulness* [Prov 6:23]" (*VA*, 21). At the end of his life, he "talked cheerfully" urging them "to live as though dying daily" (*VA*, 89). Athanasius, the compiler of St Antony's biography, relates that the saint withdrew further into the desert willingly seeking solitude among those to whom he was unknown, until he finally took his abode in a place called "the inner mountain" (*VA*, 49). Athanasius marvels as Antony, while alone in the desert, was unassailable by demons and beasts made peace with him: "But truly he was one who, as the Scripture says, having *trusted in the Lord* was *like Mount Sion* [Ps 125:1], keeping his mind unshaken and unruffled" (*VA*, 51).

Antony became the prototype of holiness and the *Life of Antony* reserves a number of salient features of monastic spirituality: renunciation, constant prayer and watchfulness, the spiritual combat for attaining virtue and repose, freedom

[285] All translations come from Athanasius, *The Life of Antony and the Letter to Marcellinus* (Classics of Western Spirituality), Robert C. Gregg (trans.) (New York and Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 1980). The number in parentheses refers to the paragraphs of Athanasius' *Vita Antonii*.

from care. As Douglas Burton-Christie has argued, the hearing of the biblical text marks a transforming "religious experience" that turned young Antony to the path of a*scesis*, an outward expression of it being the change of place[286] and the ever further "movement through space and time"[287] – the retreat into the desert. The narrative itself though is reticent about "what happened to Antony or what he experienced."[288] Undoubtedly, "key gospel texts," to which the desert monks responded, shaped the ideal of renunciation and freedom from care practised in the first monastic communities in the desert. Far from being a seclusion from the world, freedom from worldly cares should be deemed as openness to the world, as concern for the others and "intimacy with God." In particular, texts such as the *Apophthegmata Patrum* or *Vita Antonii* evince that the desert monks "sought to realize in their own lives that elusive 'freedom from care' that Jesus spoke of in the Sermon on the Mount."[289] Finding "the place of God" lies at the heart of the monastic form-of-life as well as their spirituality. However, as Burton-Christie observes, "what Antony and the other early Christian monks achieved" at the end of their journey remains hidden and not clearly articulated in these texts; Athanasius' *Vita* only hints that they may have reached "the depth of the inner freedom."[290]

Indicative of the appeal of Matthew's Gospel is the following story handed down in the *Apophthegmata Patrum*, where the boundaries between interpreting the Word and living by the Word are not clear-cut.

> Abba Poemen was asked for whom this saying is suitable, "Do not be anxious about tomorrow" (Matt 6:34). The old man said, "It is said for the man who is

[286] Douglas Burton-Christie, "Early Monasticism," *The Cambridge Companion to Christian Mysticism*, Amy Hollywood and Patricia Z. Beckman (eds.) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), p. 45.
[287] Burton-Christie, "Early Monasticism," p. 46.
[288] Burton-Christie, "Early Monasticism," p. 45.
[289] Douglas Burton-Christie, *The Word in the Desert: Scripture and the Quest for Holiness in Early Christian Monasticism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 213. See also Daniel Caner, *Wandering, Begging Monks: Spiritual Authority and the Promotion of Monasticism in Late Antiquity (*Berkeley, Calif.; London: University of California Press, 2002).
[290] Douglas Burton-Christie, "Early Monasticism," pp. 57-58.

> tempted and has not much strength, so that he should not be worried, saying to himself, 'How long must I suffer this temptation?' He should rather say every day to himself, 'Today'." (AP, 126)

Contextualized in the situation of the addressee, the saying is meant to heal and transform one by means of transforming her experience of enduring suffering in time.

In "Ascetic Discourse," a text included in *Philokalia of the Holy Neptic [Fathers]* (1782), St Neilos the Ascetic (d. ca. 430) invokes the Sermon on the Mount as a reminder and an admonition against those who falsify the "simplicity" and "stillness" of monastic life, distracted by worldly attachments, trusting their own resources rather than Lord's commandment.[291] Through a catena of biblical texts, St Neilos aims to circumscribe what constitutes the ideal – or rather the way of life – of detachment/freedom from care.

> Detachment [*τὸ ἀμέριμνον*] is the mark of a perfect soul, whereas it is characteristic of an imperfect soul to be worn down with anxiety about material things. The perfect soul is called a 'lily among thorns' (S. of S. 2:2), meaning that it lives with detachment in the midst of those who are troubled by such anxiety. For in the Gospel the lily signifies the soul that is detached from worldly care: 'They do not toil or spin … yet even Solomon in all his glory was not arrayed like one of them' (Matt 6:28-29). But of those who devote much anxious thought to bodily things, it is said: 'All the life of the ungodly is spent in anxiety' (Job 15:20. LXX).[292]

"Freedom from care" (*ἀμεριμνία* and its cognates) persists in the texts of Eastern Christian Spirituality, especially in monastic literature. Upon embarking on

[291] Neilos the Ascetic, "The Ascetic Discourse," in *Philokalia*, Vol. 1, compiled by St Nikodimus of the Holy Mount and St Makarius of Korinth, G.E.H. Palmer, Kallistos Timothy Ware, Philip Sherrard (trans. and eds.) (London: Faber & Faber, 2011), p. 286.
[292] Neilos the Ascetic, "The Ascetic Discourse," p. 349. (PG 79, 800D-801A).

monastic *bios*, freedom from care may be linked with the practice of *xeniteia*, that is, the departure from one's familiar surroundings and the adoption of living as a foreigner in a foreign land;[293] with the detachment of material needs and with voluntary poverty or with the liberation from the bodily passions (*ἀπάθεια*). In the case of the monk Bessarion, his whole life is consummated in *ἀμεριμνία*: His "disciples related that his life had been like that of a bird of the air, [...] passing all the time of his life without care [*ἀμερίμνως*] or disquiet (AP, 12). In the *Ladder of Divine Ascent*, John Climacus writes about Stillness, the 27th step that leads to theosis: "The first task of stillness [*ἡσυχίας*] is disengagement [*ἀμεριμνία*] from every affair good or bad since concern for the former leads on to the latter. Second is urgent prayer. Third is inviolable activity of the heart."[294]

Ps-Macarius' spiritual teachings

Regarding the authorship of Macarian corpus, although the majority of the manuscript tradition is ascribed to Macarius of Egypt (ca. 300-390 AC),[295] internal evidence (i.e., the language and imagery) demonstrates the Syrian background of

[293] Daniel Caner, *Wandering, Begging Monks*, pp. 24-47. About the relation between xeniteia and tranquillity and silence, see Brouria Bitton-Ashkelony, *Encountering the Sacred: The Debate on Christian Pilgrimage in Late Antiquity* (Berkeley and London: University of California Press, 2005), pp. 146-160. Xeniteia is an inner withdrawal rather than a physical act of journeying and wandering (See Antoine Guillaumont, "Le dépaysement comme forme d'ascèse, dans le monachisme ancient," *École pratique des hautes études, Section des sciences religieuses. Annuaire 1968-1969*, Vol. 76, p. 31).

[294] John Climacus, *The Ladder of Divine Ascent* (Classics of Western Spirituality), Colm Luibheid and Norman Russell (trans.) (New York and Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 1982), p. 268. (PG 88: 1109).

[295] On the problem of authorship, see George A. Maloney, "Introduction" to Pseudo-Macarius, *The Fifty Spiritual Homilies and Great Letter*, George A. Maloney S.J. (ed. and trans.) (New York: Paulist Press, 1992), pp. 6-9; Marcus Plested, *The Macarian Legacy: The Place of Macarius-Symeon in the Eastern Christian Tradition* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 12-16. The reason for the anonymity or better for the manuscripts' transmission under the protective name of St Macarius of Egypt seems to be that the Macarian corpus bears relations with Messalian ideas, which were condemned as heretical. The Messalians ("those who pray") or *Εὐχίται* or, as deprecatorily named, *Ἐνθουσιασταί* ("Enthusiasts") privileged the constant prayer and the direct of experience of spirit as means for salvation against sacraments and ecclesiastical hierarchy. However, Ps-Macarius' association with Messalianism is being re-evaluated. See John Meyendorff, "Messalianism or anti-messalianism? A Fresh Look at the 'Macarian' Problem," *Kyriakon: Festschrift Johannes Quasten,* Vol. II (Münster, Westfalen: Aschendorff, 1970), pp. 585-590.

the unknown author, a monk who lived in the late fourth century, now conventionally referred to as Pseudo-Macarius.[296] Through Ps-Macarius the Syrian expression of spirituality exerted enormous influence on the Eastern Christian mystical tradition. The intriguing relations to the Cappadocian Fathers, especially in relation to St Basil's attempt to monastic reform and the ascetic writings of Gregory of Nyssa, remain open to research. A paraphrase of Macarius' *Opuscula Ascetica* by Symeon Metaphrastes (10th century) has been incorporated in the *Philokalia*. Macarius' presence in German Pietism is associated with Johann Arndt's (1555–1621) *True Christianity* (1605; 1606 and 1610) and with a substantial number of editions, among which the first German translation of the Macarian *Homilies* by Gottfried Arnold (1696). As Marcus Plested notes, "the timeless and cross-confessional appeal" of his writings owns much to his message, namely, that the road to spiritual perfection is open to every Christian who strives to attain it.[297]

Macarius is often characterized as "existential" and "experiential" writer,[298] in part due to the fact that his writing is orientated towards providing guidance not only for his fellow ascetics but for all Christians, who ought to "run nobly the race of this world's course" (II 4.4).[299] Columba Stewart underlines this aspect of readership when he characterized the Macarian *Homilies* as "a staple of Byzantine devotional literature."[300] The term 'existential' harbors diverse features of the Macarian corpus: his emphasis on the life of the inner man, the struggle by incessant prayer and *ascesis* for the total "transformation of the heart [*μεταβολή καρδίας*]" (II 31.1), the living encounter with the workings of Spirit and the divine grace, which attends a feeling of joy and "complete assurance [*πληροφορία*]" (II 4.27). For Macarius, the mystery of Incarnation, Crucifixion, and Resurrection of Christ is an affective reality for the Christian. He seems to register his own

[296] Marcus Plested, *The Macarian Legacy*, pp. 30-31.
[297] Plested, *The Macarian Legacy*, p. 2.
[298] Kallistos Ware, "Preface" to Pseudo-Macarius, *The Fifty Spiritual Homilies and Great Letter*, p. xii; Maloney, "Introduction," p. 2.
[299] In parenthesis, I provide the number of the collection, the number of the homily and the relative subsection.
[300] Columba Stewart, "Rethinking the History of Monasticism East and West: A Modest *tour d' horizon," Prayer and Thought in Monastic Tradition: Essays in Honour of Benedicta Ward SLG,* Santha Bhattacharji et al. (eds.) (London and New York: Bloomsbury, 2014), p. 7.

experience when he writes: "After I received the experience of the sign of the cross, grace now acts in this manner. It quiets all my parts and my heart so that the soul with the greatest joy seems to be a guileless child" (II 8.6). Thus the language of 'experience' and 'plenitude' is founded upon his conviction that there is nothing spiritual which is not enhypostatized and nothing material that does not affect the spiritual life of man. God himself becomes bread and fountain of water, fire and light (II 4.12-13), as he becomes "an inexpressible and mysterious/ineffable [*ἄρρητος καί ἄφραστος*] rest so that the soul may find rest in God's rest" (II 4.11).

The conversion of the will towards God initiates a holistic transfiguration of human being (body, soul, and spirit), with deification being the apex of this process, insofar as one "become[s] attached completely and totally" - literarily translated, "whole through his whole" - "to the Lord" (II 21.4). In this regard, Alexander Golitzin rightly notes that the Gospel of Transfiguration of Christ on the Mt Tabor shapes Macarius' theological vision.[301]

> For our Lord Jesus Christ came for this reason, to change and transform and renew human nature and to recreate this soul that had been overturned by passions through the transgression. He came to mingle human nature with his own Spirit of the Godhead. A new mind and a new soul and new eyes, new ears, a new spiritual tongue, and, in a word, new humans—this was what he came to effect in those who believe in him. (II 44.1)

The birth from above, from Spirit, becomes one of the most recurrent themes in Macarian writings. Commenting on Jn 3:3 ("Unless one will be born from above, he cannot see the Kingdom of God"), Macarius maintains that the soul should seek to receive the life of Spirit "here on this earth" (II 30.6), as Jesus came on this earth to heal the wound of sin. He writes that God "would put on us, who have shed the old man, the heavenly Christ, *even from now*" (II 14.3, emphasis added). Even from now,

[301] Alexander Golitzin, "A Testimony to Christianity as Transfiguration: The Macarian Homilies and Orthodox Spirituality," *Orthodox and Wesleyan Spirituality,* S. T. Kimbrough (ed.) (Crestwood, NY: St Vladimir's Seminary Press, 2002), p. 131.

we have a foretaste of the Kingdom, as Macarius audaciously avers: "For the Lord, who wishes to fill [*πληρῶσαι*] us with a taste of the kingdom, says: 'Without me you can do nothing' (Jn 15:5)" (II 14.3). Extending the metaphor of the earth, Macarius confers upon it a protological aspect since heavenly earth stands for our origin and kinship with God: "We, however, should zealously ask ourselves whether we have been sown in that invisible earth and planted in the heavenly vineyard" (II 14.7). The earth of the heart is the site where everything happens – the here and from now as well as the above and then. This is best illustrated with the following analogy, which is often cited as an example of the doctrine of synergy in Macarius:

> In the material world of things around us, the farmer works the earth. So also in the spiritual world there are two elements to be considered. It is necessary for man to work the soil of his heart by a free deliberation and hard work. For God looks to man's hard work and toil and labor. But if the heavenly clouds from above do not appear and the showers of grace, the farmer for all his labor avails nothing. (II 26.10)

The time here is the time of work and of change that would fully be completed "on that day," the day of resurrection (II 15.38). The work concerns also Spirit's "co-activity [*συνέργεια*]" in the heart (II 24.5). Macarius makes fully clear that the completion of any work is possible only through divine grace (II 37.10); even if man often strives with his will and becomes shattered [*θλίβηται*] in his labouring, "still it is the Lord who works secretly in him. [...] and renews his heart" (II 37.11). As the heart is centered on God, the heart is being the center of man's rebirth (II 11.7).

This outline of Macarius' teaching is necessary in order to explore more closely the themes of prayer, labor and rest (and the Sabbath-rest), rebirth and the renewal of the image, vigilance and freedom from care. First, we turn to Pritius' edition of Macarius' *Opuscula* in order to address the issue of the influence of Macarius on Pietistic tradition.

Ps-Macarius and Pietism

Several features of Pritius' edition suggest that it forms part of the reading material in Pietism.[302] The editor, Johann Georg Pritius, though not a Pietist "in the strict sense,"[303] also edited a Latin translation of the fourth book of Arndt's *True Christianity*[304] and he took an interest in Philipp Jakob Spener's work (1635-1705). Pritius writes that Macarius "exhibits extreme care to everything that pertained to the true piety and solid devotion" (Praefatio, XV). As testimony of the importance and value of Macarian writings, Pritius alludes to the name of Johann Arndt and the latter's deep familiarity with Macarius' *Homilies*, to the degree that he could recite them verbatim (Praefatio, XVIII). To be more precise, Pritius cites here the relevant passage from Melchior Breier (1589-1627), who belonged to the circle of Arndt: "B. Macarius, scriptor religiosissimus, & de quo B. Arndus mihi confirmavit, fuisse cum illum verbotenus posset libro reposito recitare."[305]

Already in 1696, Gottfried Arnold (1666–1714) published the first German translation of Macarius' *Homilies*, an edition that contributed greatly to the dissemination of Macarian ideas.[306] In both these editions, Macarius is introduced to the reader as a disciple of St Antony and in the context of desert monasticism,[307] with the primary sources of which both Arnold and Pritius seems to be well versed.[308] Additionally to Melchior Breier's testimony, Arnold further informs us

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[302] Marie Mikulova Thulstrup has already underlined the fact that Pietists used to republish older and newer mystics. In this context, Pritius' edition of Macarius is labelled as "pietist." See her "Studies of Pietists, Mystics, and Church Fathers," *Kierkegaard's View of Christianity,* Niels Thulstrup and Marie Mikulova Thulstrup (eds.) (Copenhagen: C. A. Reitzels, 1978), pp. 65 and 71.

[303] Hermann Dechent, "Pritius, Johann Georg," *Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie* 26 (1888), pp. 602-604 Online < http://www.deutsche-biographie.de/sfz97439.html#adb>

[304] *Io. Arndtii De vero Christianismo libri quatuor*, ed. Io[annes] Georgius Pritius, Lipsiae: Gleditsch, 1704.

[305] M.B.F.B. [Melchior Breier], *Mysterium iniquitatis pseudoevangelicae: Hoc est: Dissertatio apologetica pro doctrina Beati Joannis Arnd* (Goslar: Typis Ioannis Vogtii, 1621), pp. 209-210.

[306] *Des Heiligen Macarii Homilien: Oder Geistliche Reden* (Leipzig: [Bibl. der Marktkirche Goslar], 1696). The second edition appeared under the title *Ein Denckmahl des Alten Christenthums. Bestehend in des Heiligen Macarii und anderer Hocherleuchteter Männer aus der Alten Kirche Höchst-erbaulichen und Außerlesenen Schrifften* (Goslar, 1699, 2nd 1702, 3rd 1716).

[307] Praefatio II-IV (the references are to paragraphs of the introduction).

[308] Their reference books on monastic literature were Pierre Possin's *Thesaurus Asceticus* and Palladius's *Historia Lausiaca* among others.

that Arndt's appreciation for Macarius' work was such that in a letter to his student and theologian Johann Gerhard (1582–1637) he recommended Macarius as a truly spiritual – "ex Spiritu" – author, along with Bernard of Clairvaux and Thomas á Kempis.[309]

However, a contemporary scholar, Hans Schneider, is cautious in his approach to this matter; notwithstanding these second-hand sources, there is not a single reference to Macarius by name or even an unattributed quote in Arndt's work that could attest a direct influence. By contrast, Arndt did mention in *True Christianity*, for example, Irenaeus, John Chrysostom, and St Basil. However, Schneider adds, various "themes and motifs" are uncovered that at least bespeak of "comparable structures of piety" - i.e., the emphasis on the inner man, the call to true Christianity as opposed to outward, falsified manifestations of Christian faith, the importance of rebirth, the work of Spirit in the heart towards the restoration of the fallen image of God in man, self-renunciation as the road to sanctification, prayer as a preeminent aspect of the Christian life.[310] Overwhelming as these parallels and commonalities may be, they are, according to Schneider, either to be inscribed within broader currents of the Christian spiritual tradition or, most likely, are to be encountered in medieval mystical authors, on which Arndt frequently draws.[311]

As an illustration of the above claim, Schneider draws attention to Arndt's numerous references to "the still and quiet Sabbath of the soul" (*True Christianity*, III 1.3), which invite comparison with Macarius' Homily "Concerning the old and the new Sabbath" (II 35). As such, Schneider contends that there is only one case in which Arndt might be expounding on the Macarian notion of spiritual Sabbath, meaning, when one celebrates the Sabbath in his heart, resting "from evil thoughts and wicked desires" (*TChr* II 4,4). Concerning the other references to 'the Sabbath of the heart', one is an acknowledged – yet untraceable – excerpt from Tauler's

[309] Hans Schneider, "Johann Arndt und die makarianischen Homilien," *Der fremde Arndt: Studien zu Leben, Werk und Wirkung Johann Arndts (1555-1621)* (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2006), pp. 17-18. The authenticity of this letter is contested.
[310] Schneider, "Johann Arndt und die makarianischen Homilien," pp. 28-29.
[311] Schneider, "Johann Arndt und die makarianischen Homilien," pp. 29-30.

Sermons while the other two have Weigel's prayer-book[312] as their source.[313] Arndt appears to employ the mystical notion of 'rest', which, amongst others, belongs to the parlance of the spiritualist writers of the 16th century (Karlstadt, Franck, Schwenckfeld, and Weigel).[314] We will come back to this issue later in this chapter as Schneider seems to overlook the importance and presence of rest (or Sabbath-rest) in Macarius' *oeuvre*, which certainly is not restricted to Homily 35.

Schneider's cautious methodology corresponds to the research question he ventures: the indisputable dependency of Arndt's theology on Macarius' corpus. His argument is that source-criticism leads to inconclusive results due to: first, the patchwork quality of *True Christianity*; and second, the fact that details on the history of Macarius' reception in the 16th and 17th century are missing.[315] It is arguable that, if Macarius' influence is proven and, given that *True Christianity* saw a large number of editions, the diffusion of Macarian ideas is more widespread than was previously thought.

Themes in Pseudo-Macarian Corpus

a. Sabbath-rest

Macarius' Homily 35 begins with a comparison between the old Sabbath of the law and the new (*καινοῦ*) Sabbath that was given by the Lord, the first being the typos of the new, true Sabbath. Thus the soul observes the true Sabbath when abstaining from evil thoughts and deeds becomes purified: the soul "rests in the eternal rest [*ἀνάπαυσιν*] and joy of the Lord" (II 35.1). The Sabbath-rest is presented as gift – "Lord came and gave the true and eternal Sabbath" (II 35.2) and as call – "the Lord calls man to his rest, 'Come, all you who labor and are heavily burdened and I will give you rest' (Mt 11:28)" (II 35.3). Finally, having established that those

[312] Valentin Weigel (1533-1588) was a Lutheran pastor and a Spiritual author.
[313] Schneider, "Johann Arndt und die makarianischen Homilien," pp. 32-33.
[314] Schneider, "Johann Arndt und die makarianischen Homilien," pp. 33-34.
[315] Schneider, "Johann Arndt und die makarianischen Homilien," p. 42.

who worship God with purity of the heart "celebrate a feast of the Spirit, of joy and ineffable exultation," Macarius exhorts: "Let us, therefore, entreat God that we may enter into this rest [*κατάπαυσιν*] (Heb 4:11)" (II 35.3). Hebrews 4:1-11 proves an important intertext here as it provides an explanation of why rest is already given and yet is not fully complete.

In his tract "On Prayer" (*Opusc* III),[316] Macarius relies extensively on Heb 3-4 expounding on how rest ensues the perseverance in prayer and the indwelling of Spirit in the heart, which alone brings about "the new creation of a pure heart" (*Opusc* III 13). Therefore, "the work of prayer" must be undertaken with "upmost care and vigilance [*νήψει/vigilantia*], patience and struggle/combat of the soul," resisting to "the distraction of idle thoughts" or to "sloth [*ἀκηδία*]" (III 4). Only through constancy in prayer could all the other virtues (love, humility, simplicity, goodness, and discernment) flourish (*Opusc* III 2). Insofar as perfection is not outside what Scripture promises, the denial of the possibility that perfection is attainable deprives the soul of "the blessed hope" (*Opusc* III 11-12). Referring to the Hebrews, he points to the example of those who, due to their unbelief, mistrust the promise of God and God denies their entering into his rest. The allusion to those whose "carcasses fell in the wilderness (Heb 3:17)," we must assume, is for Macarius and his fellow brethren, a reminder of the spiritual death in the desert.

Macarius recites the text of Hebrews and glosses it with emphasis on the promise of rest: "Therefore, while the promise of entering his rest [*κατάπαυσιν*] is still open, let us take care that none of you should seem to have failed to reach it (Heb 4:1)" and again "Let us therefore make every effort to enter that rest, so that no one may fall through such disobedience as theirs (Heb 4:11)." Rest means nothing other than "the redemption from the passions of sin" and "the full and operative inhabitation" of the Spirit in the heart (*Opusc* III 13). Despite the eschatological connotations, which are undeniably present in Macarius' injunctions as they are in Hebrews, prayer is not a labor that bears the promise of

[316] All translations of *Opuscula* come from Macarius the Egyptian, *Institutes of Christian perfection*, Granville Penn (trans.) (London: John Murray printing, 1816).

a future redemption; it is itself a labor full of rest. As Macarius writes in his *Homilies*, "[i]f, therefore, you are withdrawing from all the things connected with this life, and if you are persevering in prayer you will rather consider this labor full of rest [*ἀναπαύσεως*]" (II 49.4). In the opening of promise "today," the undertaking of labor is an act of confession, gratitude, and affirmation that God's promises are indeed true (*Opusc* III 13). This resonates with the present continuous tense of the verb "enter": "For we who have believed enter [*εἰσερχόμεθα*] that rest (Heb 4:3)." From the aspect of the temporal extension of human life, the struggle to enter God's rest endures and it is not yet accomplished. As Macarius avers, "[t]his is the sign of Christianity," that every work is undertaken "in the presence of hope and joy" and begins every day anew (II 26.11). For:

> However much man should do and how many justifying works he should perform, he should feel that he has accomplished nothing. And even if he is righteous before God, he must say: 'I am not righteous. I am not working, but I begin each day'. He ought every day to have the hope and joy and confidence in the future kingdom and in redemption and say: 'If today I have not been delivered, tomorrow I will be'. (II 26.11)

On the other hand, there is the eschatological expectation of an eternal Sabbath, whereby "[w]e rest in God, in his kingdom, and God rests in us for all ages unending" (II 19.9).

b. The renewal of the image

Macarius' distinctive vocabulary of mutual indwelling, of God in man and man in God (cf. Jn 15: 1-7),[317] resurfaces especially in passages where he talks about creation and the spiritual rebirth. Indeed, Macarius rearticulates the creation narrative in Genesis and the theology of *Imago Dei* in the language of rest.[318] God

[317] Marcus Plested, *The Macarian Legacy*, p. 31.

[318] I am indebted to the insights of Susan E. Ramsey concerning the interrelation of rebirth and the Sabbath rest. See her unpublished dissertation, *Exploring the Harbor of Rest: The significance of ἀνάπαυσις in the theology of Pseudo-Macarian Corpus*, PhD Diss. (Marquette University, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, 2012), pp. 64ff.

made all creatures, but only man was made in his image and likeness, only in man did He find rest.

> All creation is ruled by him, and still he did not establish his throne in them nor did he establish communion with them. But it was only with man that he was pleased, entering into communion and resting in him. Do you see the kinship of God to man and of man to God? Therefore, the wise and prudent soul, after passing through all creatures, found no rest for herself, but only in the Lord. And the Lord was well pleased in nothing except man alone. (II 45.5, cf. II 49.4)

A few lines later, the soul is transformed both to a bride and to a bridal chamber while the language of rest acquires mystical overtones. Perfect communion [*κοινωνία*] and rest between the Creator and the creature is nothing other than "love, which is unchangeable and unfailing" (II 45.7).

The restoration and renewal of the image, indeed the new birth of Spirit, is thus presented in terms of re-establishing the promised rest after the Fall. Christ is both the prototype and the painter who paints in our soul "according to his own image a heavenly man" with his own light. Christ is both the action and the means (the light) whereas our own action consists of turning of our gaze on his face, "believing and loving him, casting aside all else and attending to him" so that the heavenly image is imprinted in the soul.[319] "Carrying the Christ" and the newly-formed image of him, "we may receive eternal life and even here, filled with confidence, we may be at rest" (II 30.4). "Rest," Ramsey notes, "is not merely a reward anticipated [...] but rather a reality intended for humanity since the creation of Adam. [...] Macarius makes it clear that the Sabbath Rest is not ritual observance, but a greater reality ultimately fulfilled in heaven, but also available as a present experience in this age."[320] Therefore, rest is not only connected with the

[319] For the mysticism of light and transfiguration, see Alexander Golitzin and Andrei Orlov, "'Many Lamps are Lightened from the One': Paradigms of the Transformational Vision in Macarian Homilies," *Vigiliae Christianae* 55:3 (2001), pp. 281-298.

[320] Ramsey, *Exploring the Harbor of Rest*, p. 188.

pre-fall condition of humanity but primarily with the eschatological promise, God's call for the completion of rest and the enjoyment of eternal life.

c. prayer

Prayer is both incessant activity and rest (II 40.6). Macarius often repeats St Paul's recommendation to "pray incessantly in everything" (1 Thes 5:17, cf. II 33.4) and considers as the highest of all efforts "perseverance in prayer" (II 3.3 and 40.2). In prayer the soul "recollects herself" (II 33.4), prepares herself to become "the dwelling place" (II 19.1) and waits until Christ comes and "finds rest [*ἐπαναπαυόμενος*] in her" (II 33.2).

> We ought to pray not according to any bodily habit, nor with a habit of loud noise or out of a custom of silence or on bended knees. But we ought soberly (*νηφαλέως*) to have an attentive mind, waiting expectantly on God until he comes and visits the soul by means of all of its openings and its paths and senses. [...] the soul should be totally concentrated on asking and on a loving movement toward the Lord, not wandering and dispersed by its thoughts but with concentration waiting expectantly for Christ. (II 33.1)

Prayer emerges as expectancy and loving movement to God, qualified by vigilance and concentration. Most importantly, vigilance procures freedom from care. Freedom of care is twofold, as an outward withdrawal from the world, from "the anxieties [*μεριμνῶν*], busyness, and earthly worries" (II 4.3) and as an inward state, which must endure throughout one's whole life: "We only have to have a sincere heart and live in vigilance and be converted [*ἐπιστρέψωμεν*] immediately after seeking [the Lord's] help" (II 4.17). Elsewhere, he points out that "to become poor of all visible things [*φαινομένων*]"[321] and to stand vigilant day and night "at the door waiting for the time when the Lord will open the closed hearts" means preparedness of the soul to become recreated anew (II 11.6). Releasement and rest

[321] Translation slightly altered.

of mind, turning of the will and a desirous disposition is needed, yet Christ is the one who "works in us a true conversion [*κατόρθωσιν*]" (II 4. 17). Vigilance does not stand as opposite to amerimnia but exactly procures freedom from care.

The treatment of prayer as ascetic practice in Macarius could be viewed in the context of prayer in *Philokalia*. Kallistos Ware writes: "The hesychast ceases from his own activity, not in order to be idle, but in order to enter into the activity of God."[322] The pillars of Philokalic spirituality are incessant prayer, *nepsis* and *hesychia*. *Νῆψις* (nepsis) derives from the verb *νήφω*, which means 'being sober' as opposed to being in a state of intoxication and stupor. The seminal text for the development of this concept is the instruction in 1 Pet 5:8: "Be sober, be vigilant."[323] In the context of ascetic texts, it denotes a state of spiritual watchfulness and sobriety, when one constantly guards his heart and mind, "scrutinizing every mental image"[324] that might lead to temptation and stopping them from entering within. On one hand, this practice, accompanied by incessant prayer, aims at the purity of the heart and undistracted mind that draws us nearer to God. Most important is the inner *nepsis* which founds the "unfathomable stillness of soul."[325] Inner vigilance is attainable by means of repentance, "freeing the heart from all thoughts"[326] as well as freeing "ourselves from the burden of" our actions.[327]

d. freedom from care and rebirth

Homily 48 is an extensive meditation of Macarius on the Sermon of the Mount as a rule of life that compels us to undertake self-examination: "Therefore, examine yourself whether earthly cares have still a hold on you and much solicitude for feeding and clothing the body and other attentions and satisfaction, as though by your own power you received them, and you were to provide for yourself instead of having been commanded not to be at all anxious about these

[322] Kallistos Ware, *Inner Kingdom* (Crestwood, NY: St Vladimir's Seminary Press, 2000), p. 97.
[323] Burton-Christie, *The Word in the Desert*, pp. 203-208.
[324] St Hesychios the Priest, "On Watchfulness and Holiness," in *Philokalia*, Vol. 1, p. 227.
[325] "On Watchfulness and Holiness," p. 226.
[326] "On Watchfulness and Holiness," p. 227.
[327] "On Watchfulness and Holiness," p. 255.

things in regard to yourself" (II 48.3). Perfect faith consists of whether or not the monk trusts himself completely to the Lord's word "Seek first the Kingdom of God and his justice and all these things will be added unto you" (Mt 6:33). Faith is tested with regard to the carefreeness about the temporal and the trust towards the eternal. If one holds any concern [*μέριμνα*] for the temporal and "is found unbelieving to the temporal,"[328] so much more he has not yet believed in the eternal (II 48.3).

Believing in God's providence is one aspect of the freedom from care; accepting Christ as a healer not only of the soul but of the body, "of its temporary sufferings and sicknesses" (II 48.4), is where perfect faith is founded. The way Macarius ties the freedom from care with rebirth and rebirth with deification is not argumentative. The Homily that opens with Jesus' words "Whoever is unfaithful in little, he is unfaithful also in much" (Lk 16:10) closes as follows: for the monk who "wishes to be son of God and to be born on high from spirit," the promises he awaits supersede those of the first Adam. This expectation is what Macarius calls "new and strange [*καινοτέρα τινά και ξένην*]" faith, which in turn eventuates in a new understanding and manner of life (II 48.6), with *amerimnia* being an aspect of this life. The man who is recreated as a new being "receives again the first creation of the pure Adam." Beyond this, Macarius continues, man "not only comes to the measure of the first Adam, but he also reaches a greater state than he possessed. For man is divinized" (II 26.2).

There is no "external sign" of such a spiritual rebirth distinguishing the Christians from "the men of this world" but only an inner state of "equilibrium, tranquillity and peace [*κατάπαυσιν*]" (II 5.4). However, even the Apostles were not totally free from care, though they were perfect and received the gift of grace (*Opusc* V.16). "On this side of the *eschaton*,"[329] the spiritual warfare never ceases, but those who have been tried and are experienced in the battle, they "are at rest [*ἀναπαύονται*]" in God (II 15.18). Whereas it is evident that Macarius conceived of

[328] Translation slightly altered.
[329] Golintzin, "A Testimony to Christianity as Transfiguration," p. 129.

the change and transformation of the soul as a restoration to the heavenly Kingdom, his emphasis is rather on the continued and renewed struggle of the soul than on any sudden change. Only in two cases does he speak of change occurring "in a critical moment of time" [*ῥοπῇ ὥρας*]. The first instance concerns the conversion of Paul; God is the power of change which can transform the souls and "lead them back to his own goodness and peace" (II 44.8). The second case comes from Luke 23: 39-34.

> All things are possible with God (cf. Matt 19:26; Mk 10:27; Lk 18:26) as it happened in the case of the good thief. In a moment [*ῥοπῇ ὥρας*] through faith he was converted [*μετεβλήθη*] and was restored to Paradise. The Lord came for this in order to change us and recreate [*ἀνακτίσῃ*] us and make us, as it is written, "participators of the divine nature" (2 Pt 1:4), and to give to our soul a heavenly soul, that is, the Spirit of the Godhead leading us to every virtue so that we might be able to live eternal life. (II 44.9)

In what follows, I will delineate the notion of Sabbath rest in Greek Patristic literature and subsequently the presence of the same theme in Pietist writers.

The Sabbath rest in Greek Patristic Literature

The notion of the eighth day as repetition and fulfilment of the day of creation in a more exalted way, the beginning of the new creation, permeates the writings of the Cappadocians and beyond. In St Basil's *Hexaemeron* (Homily II, 8),[330] Genesis's verse "And there was evening and there was morning, one day" (Gen 1:5)[331] is interpreted as follows: the reason that Scripture designates the beginning of time as "one day" instead of the "first day" setting aside this one day from the succession of days, "it is because Scripture wishes to establish its relationship

[330] The number in parenthesis refers to paragraphs.
[331] "ἐγένετο οὖν ἑσπέρα φησί καί ἐγένετο πρωΐ, ἡμέρα μία" (SBLGNT).

(kinship) with eternity."[332] The first day of creation is indeed "the type of eternity, the first fruits [*ἀπαρχὴν*] of days, the contemporary of light, the holy Lord's day honoured by the Resurrection of our Lord" and, according to Basil's exegetical vision, 'the one day' looks forward to the 'eighth day', the "day without evening, without succession and without end." Both these days transcend the chronological series of days – the first as the beginning and the latter as the end of it. Both these days by their very name register the interface between time and eternity, the tension of which ripples through the language: "Thus whether you call it day, or whether you call it eternity, you express the same idea." Their connection, textually and historically, is typological and indeed mystical, established through God's creative act and providential purpose.

In order to appreciate Basil's approach is helpful to place it into a broader historical context provided by Jean Daniélou's study *The Bible and Liturgy*. Through a meticulous study of primary sources, Daniélou recovers the links between the Jewish Sabbath, the celebration of the Lord's Day, and the mystery of the Eighth day, particularly in the Eastern Orthodox Tradition. The main components of the Jewish Sabbath – the idea of rest, the day consecrated to God, and the eschatology of the seventh day – found at once their fulfilment and their abolition in Christ. St Paul's teaching that Sabbaths and festivals "are only a shadow of what is to come, but the substance belongs to Christ" (Col 2:17) seems to reinforce the tradition of patristic exegesis that identifies Christ as "the true rest, the *anapausis* of the true Sabbath."[333] Regarding the institution of the Lord's Day as a day of worship and rest, Daniélou maintains that the Christian writers wanted to disassociate the Lord's Day from the Jewish Sabbath: "The Lord's Day is a purely Christian institution; its origin is to be found solely in the fact of the Resurrection of Christ on the day after the Sabbath. The custom of gathering together on this

[332] Basil, "The Hexaemeron," *Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, second series*, Second Series: Vol. 8, Henry Wace (trans.) Philip Schaff (ed.) (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1895), pp. 64-65. All translations of Basil's Hexaemeron come from this edition. For a useful survey of the Hexaemeron, see Peter Bouteneff, *Beginnings: Ancient Christian Readings of the Biblical Creation Narratives* (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2008), pp. 133-136.

[333] Jean Daniélou, *The Bible and The Liturgy* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1956), p. 225.

day appears in the very week following the Resurrection, when we find the Apostles gathered in the Cenacle."[334] Progressively, they view God's rest on the seventh day of creation as prefiguring the eternal rest of the age to come. Along with these eschatological overtones, the Sabbath rest meant abstinence from bodily needs, purification, and turning from work to contemplation. Daniélou discerns in this transposition a "spiritualization of the Sabbath,"[335] which culminates with Augustine's work. Here, Sabbath acquires an internal axis, becomes the longing of the soul for the eternal Sabbath rest. Augustine is credited with the poetic expression of the Sabbath doctrine:

> For we shall ourselves be the seventh day, when we shall be filled and replenished with God's blessing and sanctification. [...] the seventh shall be our Sabbath, which shall be brought to a close, not by an evening, but by the Lord's day, as an eighth and eternal day, consecrated by the resurrection of Christ, and prefiguring the eternal repose not only of the spirit, but also of the body. There we shall rest and see, see and love, love and praise. (*The City of God,* XXII.30)[336]

Gregory Nazianzen, another Cappadocian father, in his oration "For 'New Sunday'" on the celebration of the Easter Octave, writes that the Easter Sunday "revealed the boundary between the grave and the resurrection, but today [i.e., the first Sunday after Easter] reveals, in all its clarity, our second beginning. [...] For it refers to the state of things that lies beyond us" (*Or*. 44.5).[337] As Brian Daley notes, the inscription of the Psalms "for the eighth," although probably a musical reference, was interpreted by most patristic commentators as alluding to the eighth day.[338]

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[334] Daniélou, *The Bible and the Liturgy*, pp. 242-243.

[335] Daniélou, *The Bible and the Liturgy*, p. 224. On the theme of the spiritualization of the Sabbath, see R. J. Bauckham, "Sabbath and Sunday in the Medieval Church in the West," *From Sabbath to Lord's Day: A Biblical, Historical and Theological Investigation*, D. A. Carson (ed.) (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 1999), pp. 299-309.

[336] *Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers: First Series, Volume II St. Augustine: City of God, Christian Doctrine*, Philip Schaff (ed.), Marcus Dods (trans.) (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1887).

[337] *Gregory of Nazianzus* (Early Christian Fathers), Brian E. Daley (ed.) (London and New York: Routledge, 2006), pp. 157-158.

[338] Brian Daley, "Training for 'the Good Ascent': Gregory of Nyssa's Homily on the Sixth Psalm," *In Dominico Eloquio/In Lordly Eloquence*, Paul M. Blowers et al. (eds.) (Grand Rapids, MI: W.B. Eerdmans, 2002), p. 197.

Gregory of Nyssa, who dedicated a short homily "On the Sixth Psalm, concerning the Eighth Day," says that the seventh day "set the boundary for time that is coextensive with all the furnishings of this world." The seven-day cycle measures things in change and alteration, whereas the eighth day "will remain one day continually, never to be divided by the darkness of night" (GNO 5, 188-189).[339] A similar wording returns in his treatise "On the Inscriptions of the Psalms": "The whole of the latter [the next age] becomes one day, as one of the prophets says when he calls the life which is anticipated *the great day*" (Inscr. Psalm. 2 [GNO 5:84]).[340] The eighth day is associated, as in many Christian writers, with the resurrection and eschatological judgement, but Gregory, in attunement with the penitential nature of the sixth psalm, is more concerned here with confession and repentance as stages in a way of life that "looks forward to the eighth day" (GNO 5:83). This progress is akin to a mystical ascent, the labour of which is the eighth day. As Daniélou remarks, the mystery of the eighth day represents for Gregory "the summit of the spiritual life, for here the eternal life has already begun."[341] As the creation of the world posited the problem of the beginning of time, in a like manner, the eighth day challenges the attempts to be couched in purely temporal terms without falling into paradoxes. The sequence between the seventh and eighth is not conditioned by any necessity, temporal or other, since the eighth day has already been made, as the verse recited in the Easter liturgy reveals: "This is the day that the Lord made" (Ps 117 [118]:24).

The hope of the eighth day, whether commemorated in a liturgical context (in the Eucharist, the Holy Week) or irrigating various currents of mysticism, always implicates a relation between the temporal and the eternal. Returning to Augustine but remaining in the motif of the Easter Octave, in a sermon delivered on the same liturgical occasion, he sets out to convey the blessedness of the eighth day by comparing it to the continuity of an everlasting 'today'. The seventh day

[339] As translated in Brian Daley, "Training for 'the Good Ascent': Gregory of Nyssa's Homily on the Sixth Psalm," p. 213.
[340] *Gregory of Nyssa's Treatise on the Inscription of the Psalms*, Ronald Heine (trans.) (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995).
[341] Daniélou, *The Bible and the Liturgy*, p. 274.

transpires "while the times pass" and it signifies "to rest in the Lord," the true "spiritual sabbath."[342] This day is without evening or closure followed by the eighth that transcends times:

> ...it is always 'today' there, since nothing there replaces anything that is being displaced. And that 'today' doesn't begin from the end of yesterday, or end with the beginning of tomorrow; but it is always today [*hodie*]. All the past has passed by without its setting, and all the future is to come without its dawning. ("On the Lord's Day, the Octave of Easter" [Sermon 260C])[343]

What Augustine illustrates here is that the past and the future are enfolded in this eternal 'today', which is not conditioned by any periodicity (daylight/night, activity/rest, happiness/sadness) that features human life. This passage parallels Augustine's account of God's eternity in his *Confessions*: "Your 'years' are 'one day' [Ps. 89: 4; 2 Pet. 3: 8], and your 'day' is not any and every day but Today, because your Today does not yield to a tomorrow, nor did it follow on a yesterday. Your Today is eternity" (Conf XI, 13.16).[344] Erich Przywara traces the usage of *hodie* from ancient liturgy to the texts of Augustine and Thomas Aquinas, noting that "there is no specific proper word"[345] for divine eternity and therefore only improperly the word 'today' may be attributed to God. And though Augustine distinguishes between the creaturely 'hodie' which passes away and the divine 'hodie' which alone exists,[346] Przywara holds that the mystery of time and eternity lies in the unique moment wherein the eternal 'today' cuts through/pervades the ordinary 'today', an incisive moment that is designated as *kairos*.[347] In this moment, still "intratemporal," it becomes apparent the fundamental otherness between time

[342] Augustine, *Sermons 230-272B on the Liturgical Seasons* (Vol. III/7), John E. Rotelle (ed.), Edmund Hill (trans.) (Brooklyn, NY: New City Press, 1994), pp. 196-197.
[343] Augustine, *Sermons 230-272B*, p. 198.
[344] Saint Augustine, *The Confessions*, Henry Chadwick (trans.) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 230.
[345] Erich Przywara, *Analogia Entis: Metaphysics: Original Structure and Universal Rhythm*, John R. Betz and David Bentley Hart (trans.) (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2014), p. 586.
[346] Przywara, *Analogia Entis*, pp. 586-587.
[347] Przywara, *Analogia Entis*, pp. 593-94.

and eternity as time stands "in relation of contrast to the divine."[348] From Przywara's account, we should note that (a) every ordinary 'hodie' is "an always opportune favorable moment" as *kairos*[349] and (b) the word 'today' registers the difference between the creaturely and divine time in "its highest intensity."[350]

With regard to the grammar of time, the two words that are semantically linked to human transience, 'today' and the 'moment', are used as descriptive terms for eternity, the former associated with presence and the latter, as Rory Fox has shown, with the instant-like, non-extensional construal of eternity.[351] However, if medieval writers would unambiguously talk about the moment of eternity in order to convey the limitless and simultaneity of God's eternity, Przywara emphasizes the aporetic character of this moment and, in this respect, his analysis is closer to Kierkegaard's moment as a designation "of time in the fateful conflict when it is touched by eternity" (CA, 87/SKS 4, 390-391). In this framework of the rhetorics of time, we should examine the Sabbath in its correlation with today and the eternal.

Alexander Schmemann's work is relevant here, as it articulates how Sabbath rest is accommodated in the liturgical practice and acquires significance by being actualized in the liturgical life of the Church, at the center of which is the Eucharist.[352] He emphasizes that the Lord's Day bears relation to the Jewish Sabbath as "participation" in and "affirmation" of the goodness of creation.[353] But he also points to the distinctive character of the Lord's Day as commemoration of the resurrection of Christ "on the *first day* after the Sabbath." The Lord's Day, being both the first day and the eighth day, is "the beginning of the new life and the new time," as it escapes the "limitations of 'seven'", that is, "of time that leads to

[348] Przywara, *Analogia Entis*, p. 589.
[349] Przywara, *Analogia Entis*, p. 593.
[350] Przywara, *Analogia Entis*, p. 586.
[351] For the use of momentum as a non-temporal durational element within eternity, see Rory Fox, *Time and Eternity in Mid-Thirteenth-Century Thought*, pp. 31-35 and 282-308.
[352] For a concise introduction to Schmemann's theology, see Sigurd Hareide, "Alexander Schmemann," *Key Theological Thinkers: From Modern to Postmodern,* Svein Rise and Staale Johannes Kristiansen (eds.) (London and New York: Routledge, 2013), pp. 403-414 and Aidan Nichols, "Alexander Schmemann and Liturgical Theology," *Light from the East: Authors and Themes in Orthodox Theology* (London: Sheed & Ward, 1999), pp. 146-169.
[353] Alexander Schmemann, *For the Life of the World: Sacraments and Orthodoxy* (Crestwood, NY.: St Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1998), p. 50.

death."[354] The institution of Sunday as the Lord's Day is not meant to separate time into holy and profane; Sunday remains an ordinary day, "*one of the days,*" and yet "*the beginning* of the world to come."[355] For the "liturgy of time," as Schmemann calls the daily, weekly or yearly cycles of worship and prayers, does not intend to the transformation of the calendar but to make the whole time "eschatologically transparent."[356] Each day is a step "in a movement from Mount Tabor into the world, from the world into the 'day without evening' of the world to come."[357] These remarks are cast as a polemic against Christianity, which, having "announced the fullness of time," then promises eternity as eternal rest. In this way, time is vacated of meaning, which, for Schmemann is indicative not only of a failure of Christianity but also of an increasing secularization and compartmentalization of religious life.[358]

Schmemann is cautious not to relegate the eighth day into a mystical or eschatological beyond since the eighth day is deeply rooted in this world and in this time and yet the Lord's day "does not belong to time [...] But at the same time, Lord's Day, the first and eighth day, does exist in time and is revealed in time, and this revelation is also the renewal of time."[359] The antinomy of the eighth day lies in binding together the revelation of the finitude of time with the restoration of time.

Although Schmemann relies on the work of Daniélou with respect to source material as well as the liturgical practice of the early Church, he best articulates the import of the Sabbath with reference to the hymnographic tradition, in particular, the Matins of Holy Sabbath. In the following verses, the notion that the Sabbath is fulfilled in Christ comes into sharp focus:

> What is this sight we behold?

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[354] Schmemann, *For the Life of the World*, p. 51.
[355] Schmemann, *For the Life of the World*, pp. 51-52. (emphasis in the original)
[356] Alexander Schmemann, *Introduction to Liturgical Theology* (Crestwood, NY: Faith Press, 1975), p. 56.
[357] Schmemann, *For the Life of the World*, p. 52.
[358] Schmemann, *For the Life of the World*, p. 49.
[359] Schmemann, *Introduction to Liturgical Theology*, p. 139.

What is this present rest?

The King of the ages keeps the Sabbath in the tomb [*ἐν τάφῳ σαββατίζει*];

Through His Passion He has fulfilled the plan of salvation,

granting us a new Sabbath rest.

[…]

The great Moses mystically foreshadowed this day,

when he said:

God blessed the seventh day.

This is the Blessed Sabbath;

this is the day of rest,

on which the Only-Begotten Son of God rested from all His works.

By suffering death to fulfill the plan of salvation,

He kept the Sabbath in the flesh [*τῇ σαρκὶ σαββατίσας*];

by returning again to what He was,

He has granted us eternal life through His resurrection,

for He alone is good, and the Lover of man.[360]

The antinomy of the Sabbath rest – Christ rests in the tomb/Christ rests from his works –, the recapitulation of Gen 2:2 in the Holy Sabbath, the new Sabbath rest that is procured to man by His death and resurrection culminates in the liturgical 'this': "This is the Blessed Sabbath; this is the day of rest." The same notes resound in one of Gregory of Nyssa's paschal homilies, entitled "On the Three-Day Period of the Resurrection of our Lord Jesus Christ (*De Tridui Spatio*)," preached on the Holy Sabbath:[361] "Behold the blessed Sabbath of the first creation of the world, recognize by means of that Sabbath that this Sabbath is the day of rest, which God blessed above all the other days" (GNO IX, 274). As the praises follow the

[360] *Matins of Holy Saturday, with the Praises and Psalm 119*, David Anderson and John Erickson (eds.) with an introduction by Alexander Schmemann (Crestwood, NY: St Vladimir's Seminary, 2011).

[361] As translated in *The Brill Dictionary of Gregory of Nyssa*, Lucas Francisco Mateo-Seco, Giulio Maspero (eds.) (Leiden: Brill, 2010), p. 739.

lamentations, the phrase "celebrating the Sabbath in the flesh" conjoins the stillness of the tomb and the anticipatory joy of the resurrection.

From here, Schmemann is able to recognize the essential characteristics of temporal human existence, identifying the fundamental human condition with the Great Sabbath: "Our reality in this world, in this 'aeon,' is the reality of the Great Saturday; this is the real image of our human condition"[362] in the sense that we live tensely "in this middle day" in expectation of the common resurrection.[363] Due to the event of the resurrection, this world "in its mystical base has become sabbath."[364] Taking the lead from Hebrews 3 and 4, a germinal text in which the Sabbath and the 'today' are most distinctly intertwined, Schmemann emphasizes that "[w]e are still in the 'today', but the end is approaching."[365] Taking up the question of the significance of the liturgical *today*, the "transposition" of past events into the present of the Church liturgy,[366] Schmemann retorts that the commemoration of a past event does not intend to stirring of a feeling or ingratiating individualist piety, but the past acquires eternal validity through its integration into "*the remembrance of Christ.*"[367] "Liturgical celebration," Schmemann continues, "is thus a re-entrance of the Church to the event, and this means not merely its 'idea', but its joy or sadness, its living and concrete reality."[368] The brokenness of time is redeemed as we partake into "the ultimate and all-embracing *today* of Christ."[369]

[362] Alexander Schmemann, "Introduction," *Matins of Holy Saturday*, p. 14.
[363] Alexander Schmemann, "Introduction," p. 15.
[364] Schmemann, *The Great Lent* (Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1974), p. 69.
[365] *The Great Lent*, p. 70.
[366] *The Great Lent*, p. 80
[367] *The Great Lent*, p. 81.
[368] *The Great Lent*, p. 82.
[369] *The Great Lent*, p. 84.

Pietism and the Sabbath Rest

What Macarius and the Desert Fathers shared with Pietism and, in part, may explain their appeal to Pietist writers, is the quest for holiness[370] along with the cultivation of certain practices and virtues that assist such a quest. Ernest Stoeffler writes that one of the defining features of Pietism is its "religious idealism," the trust that Christian life is a striving for attaining perfection through adherence to certain patterns of devotion.[371] Admittedly, the impetus behind the quest for sanctification (for Macarius, holiness means *theosis* as eschatological expectation) is the belief that human nature can be changed and recreated. The collation of the following passages from Macarius and Ardnt's *True Christianity* is indicative:

> For our Lord Jesus Christ came for this reason, to change and transform and renew human nature and to recreate this soul that had been overturned by passions through the transgression. [...] A new mind and a new soul and new eyes, new ears, a new spiritual tongue, and, in a word, new humans—this was what he came to effect in those who believe in him. (II 44.1)

> [H]uman nature might in him, and by him, be restored and renewed, and that we, in him, by him, and through him, might become new creatures. [...] so by the spirit of Christ, our nature ought to be renewed [...] And thus is it necessary that we should, from Christ, derive a new spirit, heart, and mind. (*TChr* I, 3, 6-7)[372]

Macarius unequivocally affirms the synergism between the divine and the human will towards salvation ("When the will of man is lacking, God himself does nothing" [II 37.10]"). While Arndt holds that rebirth is a gracious act of God ("Christ's passion worketh our renewal and sanctification" [*TChr* I, 3, 12]), one encounters passages

[370] Burton-Christie, *The Word in the Desert*, pp. 33-75 and 297-300.
[371] Ernest Stoeffler, *The Rise of Evangelical Pietism* (Leiden: Brill, 1965), p. 16.
[372] All English translations of this work come from Johann Arndt, *True Christianity: A Treatise on Sincere Repentance, True Faith, the Holy Walk of the True Christian*, Charles Frederick Schaeffer (ed.) Anton Wilhelm Böhm (trans.) (Philadelphia: The Lutheran Book Shop, 1868).

as the following: "Thus then every man has it in his power to be changed with freedom and ease into a being more noble than himself" (*TChr* IV [part II] 28, 1). Interestingly, Arndt incorporated mystical texts into *True Christianity* by reworking them "according to the standard of Lutheran confessional writings" in order to erase "every appearance of human synergism."[373]

The pietistic doctrine of 'New Birth' and the narratives of personal conversion are expressions that such transformation is possible. In secondary literature three models of conversion are discussed.[374] Philipp Jakob Spener (1635-1705) published a collection of sermons on the New Birth,[375] where he underlines the necessity of the new birth as prerequisite of salvation due to the sinful condition of humanity. Apart from faith and the forgiveness of sins therefore, a second creation needs to be effected through God's grace alone, whereby "an entirely other and new nature is created in the believer."[376] The New Birth, as an instantaneous event initiated by God, would restore the *Imago Dei* in the regenerated Christian. Further, Spener advances the notion of continual renewal of the image so that the individual strengthens his relationship with God. The New Birth must be repeated as a healing process throughout the Christian's life.[377] For Spener, as for later Pietists, Luther's *Preface to Romans* was of fundamental importance in terms of associating faith and salvation with rebirth. Additionally, it gave their doctrine of rebirth the seal of orthodoxy at the same time they were assimilating mystical sources in their writings:[378]

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[373] Johannes Wallmann, "Johannes Arndt (1555-1621)," *The Pietist Theologians: An Introduction to Theology in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries*, Carter Lindberg (ed.) (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2005), p. 31.

[374] I mainly follow the distinction made by Peter C. Erb in his "Introduction," to *Pietists: Selected Writings*, Peter C. Erb (ed. and trans.) (New York: Paulist Press, 1983), pp. 1-27.

[375] Philipp Jakob Spener, *Der Hochwichtige Articul von der Wiedergeburt* (Frankfurt a. M: Zunner, 1696).

[376] K. James Stein, "Philipp Jakob Spener (1635-1705)," *The Pietist Theologians*, p. 91.

[377] K. James Stein, "Philipp Jakob Spener (1635-1705)," pp. 91-92. One of Spener's sermons titled "The Repetition of Rebirth" (*Der Hochwichtige Articul von der Wiedergeburt*, pp. 956-974) is an exposition on Gal 4:19: "My little children, for whom I am again in the pain of childbirth until Christ is formed in you."

[378] Regarding Pietism's relation to Reformation see, Carter Lindberg *Third Reformation?: Charismatic Movements and the Lutheran Tradition* (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1983), p. 139-143. See also in the same study the relative sections on the motifs of rebirth, renewal and sanctification in Pietists writers (*ibid*, pp. 160-165).

> Faith, however, is a divine work in us that changes us and makes us to be born anew of God [John 1:12–13]. It kills the old Adam and makes us altogether different men, in heart and spirit and mind and powers.[379]

As Carter Lindberg remarks, Pietists "found Luther's statement of faith as 'a divine work in us' equally meaningful."[380]

August Hermann Francke (1663–1727) is accredited with providing a datable, specific in date and place, account of his personal conversion in the context of a biographical narration. Francke's conversion story fits into the Lutheran model of penitential struggle (*Busskampf*), which the penitent endures before is touched by God's grace.[381] By employing an array of metaphors of awaking and rebirth, Francke's sudden conversion borders on mystical union.[382] A confession of a personal experience, vulnerable as it is to doubt of its veracity, opens a gap of interpretation not only for the later reader but for the witness itself, that is, the subject of conversion: he doubts initially, but afterwards he was completely convinced that it was "a foretaste of grace and the goodness of God": "All sadness and unrest of my heart was taken away at once, and I was immediately overwhelmed as with a stream of joy [...] I arose a completely different person from the one who had knelt down." Inevitably, the written account subjects the immediacy of conversion to its narrative temporalization since the moment of conversion can only be narrated but as an 'in-between' or as a break of the sequence "When I knelt down"/"when I stood up."[383] After the conversion being taking place, he is capable of appropriating the inner truth of Luther's text: "Now I

[379] As cited by Carter Lindberg, *Third Reformation?*, p. 140.
[380] Carter Lindberg, *Third Reformation?,* p. 140.
[381] Peter C. Erb, "Introduction," in *Pietists: Selected Writings*, p. 9.
[382] Hans-Martin Kirn, "The Penitential Struggle ('Busskampf') of August Hermann Francke (1633–1727): A Model of Pietistic Conversion?," *Paradigms, Poetics and Politics of Conversion*, Jan N. Bremmer, Wout J. van Bekkum, Arie L. Molendijk (eds.) (Leuven: Peeters, 2006), p. 131.
[383] August Hermann Francke, "Autobiography [excerpt, 1692]," *Pietists: Selected Writings*, p. 105.

experience that it was true what Luther had said in his preface to the epistle to the Romans."[384]

Gottfried Arnold (1666–1714), renowned for his editions of patristic and medieval mystical writings, is seen to have moulded the Boehmist language of regeneration and the Arndtian tradition into a unique synthesis that places emphasis on rebirth, illumination, and mystical union.[385] Arnold writes about the "prepared heart"[386] and the obedience of the person who wishes to receive the divine wisdom and he describes the birth of the new creature as a "spiritual birth-work" of wisdom that never stops "until Christ is formed in the heart according to his pure humanity."[387]

The controversies arose over the pietistic teachings of conversion concern the suspicion on how the reborn Christian is "led to an assurance of salvation,"[388] whether the penitent comes out as a co-redemptor or whether a passive or active posture is required. The spiritual Sabbath of the soul is implicated in the same issues, as the believer is called to imitate God's rest after the creation *and* Christ's work as a way of life. Before we turn how the Sabbath and rebirth is related in Arndt's *True Christianity*, it is worth noting a passage from Francke's sermon "The Foretaste of Eternal Life." After he describes the rebirth as the awaking of the image of God in the heart, he asserts that a person may indeed have a foretaste of eternity: "You must be led away from the noise of the world and its distractions, so that you can achieve in your heart spiritual stillness, Sabbath, and day of peace." While he acknowledges that "concerning this spiritual Sabbath, all the fathers gave witness," he only references to Luther's treatise "On Good Works."[389] Here Luther's definition of spiritual rest could serve as an epitome of Pietists' spiritual Sabbath: "we not only cease from our labor and trade, but much more, that we let God alone

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[384] August Hermann Francke, "Autobiography [excerpt, 1692]," p. 106.
[385] Peter C. Erb, "Defining 'radical pietism': the case of Gottfried Arnold," *Consensus* 16: 2 (1990), pp. 29-45.
[386] Gottfried Arnold, "The Mystery of Divine Sophia," *Pietists: Selected Writings*, p. 211.
[387] Gottfried Arnold, "The Mystery of Divine Sophia," p. 225.
[388] Jonathan Strom, "Conversion and Regeneration," *Dictionary of Luther and the Lutheran Traditions*, Timothy J. Wengert et al. (eds.) (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2017), p. 168.
[389] August Hermann Francke, "The Foretaste of Eternal Life," *The Pietists: Selected Writings*, p. 152.

work in us and that we do nothing of our own with all our powers" ("On Good Works," XVII).[390] But whereas Luther emphasizes self-mortification, abandonment of temporal things and desires, Pietists, like Arndt and Francke, drawing on V. Weigel and Tauler, make the Sabbath a spiritual state of the soul in which the binary of activity and passivity is transcended and in which the Genesis' story of creation is happening now in the praying heart.

Although we cannot treat this matter extensively, the Sabbath of the heart meant detachment from all creatures, releasement of the self-will, and total abandonment of the powers of the soul (i.e., intellect, imagination), the apogee of which leads to the knowledge of God, the illumination of the spirit.[391] In Tauler's *Nachfolgung des armen Lebens Christi* [Imitation of the Poor Life of Christ], a book that Kierkegaard owned and read around 1848,[392] we read that if one has emptied himself of all images and natural knowledge, he reaches the highest Sabbath of the Lord, rests in the purest stillness of spirit, and he has again found its first origin from whence he once went out.[393]

Arndt's *True Christianity* remains a point of reference as an "exhibition for a true, living, and active faith" that the Pietists were striving for. In an era that Christian faith resembles like one dwells "in a land of heathens and not of Christians," Arndt programmatically asserts "that the heart, mind, and affections must be changed; that we must be conformed to Christ and his holy Gospel; and that we must be renewed by the word of God, and become new creatures" (*TChr*

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[390] Martin Luther, *Treatise on Good Works*, Johann Michael Reu (trans.) < http://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/418>

[391] Weigel relates the Sabbath to silence and obedience: "The eye or the human being who wants to see and know God must do nothing, but rather must be [as if] dead, must celebrate and keep the Sabbath, must give and abandon himself to God in the obedience of faith, [must] await God within himself, and [do so] not externally, in this place or that, with thoughts in an active mode, [by] running hither and yonder among the creatures, and so on" (*Valentin Weigel: Selected Spiritual Writings* [Classics of Western Spirituality], Andrew Weeks [ed. and trans.], [Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 2003], p. 182); "To the eternal inner treasure no one comes except by way of surrender, obedience of faith, or Sabbath of being silent" (*Ibid.*, pp. 210-211).

[392] KJN 4, 332/NB4:91/SKS 20, 331 (1848). For Kierkegaard's reading of Pietist Literature, see Christopher B. Barnett, *Kierkegaard, Pietism and Holiness* (Farnham: Ashgate Publishing, 2011), pp. 63-107.

[393] Johann Tauler, *Nachfolgung des armen Lebens Christi*, new edition by Nikolaus Casseder (Frankfurt a. Main: Verlag der Hermannschen Buchhandlung, 1821), part II, § 42, p. 34 (ACKL 282).

xxxix)." The language of renewal of the image characterizes his teaching on the new creation, recounted also in these terms the history of fall and salvation. The man is created as an image of God so that in his will, affections, and actions reflects the glory of God. The fall is described as the deprivation of the image, alienation from community with God, "a breach of this union, by which he ceases to be the image of God" (*TChr* I, 1, 8-10). Correspondingly, with the new birth "from above" and "by grace" the man "is restored to the possession of" the blessings that were conferred on him before the fall (*TChr* I, 3, 5).

Arndt conceives the transformation into the image of God as a process of spiritual growth which begins in this life and will be fulfilled in the life to come. In this vein, he writes:

> For the whole life of a Christian upon earth, is properly nothing else than a continual *renewing* of the image of God in his soul: so that he may constantly live in the new birth, and daily mortify that which is old and corrupt, till the body of sin be eventually destroyed (Rom 6:4). This life must be begun in this world, that so it may be perfected in that which is to come. (*TChr* I, 41, 2)

Regarding "the inward, calm Sabbath of the soul" (*TChr* I, 17, 16), as an exercise of self-denial and as preparation for illumination from God, Arndt explicitly refers to Tauler: one celebrates "the true spiritual Sabbath" if he rests "from his sins and his own works." Arndt remarks that this state of the soul is reached "after conversion" (*TChr* I, 19, 6). Peter C. Erb seems to associate, though not explicitly, the spiritual Sabbath of the heart with Arndt's recasting of Tauler's *Gelassenheit*.[394] Tauler is not the only source here; in Chapter 34 of his second Book, Arndt incorporated Weigel's "Gebetbüchlein" (Prayer Book)[395] with the intent, as Arndt heads his chapter, "that the reader is taught how the heart is to be moved into prayer and brought to a quiet Sabbath so that prayer may be wrought in us by the Lord" (*TChr* II, 34). Again the emphasis concerning prayer lies upon preparation and upon the passage from passive to active, continual inner prayer. Prayer as activity redeems

[394] Peter C. Erb, "Introduction," in Johann Arndt, *True Christianity*, Peter C. Erb (trans. and intro) (New York and Toronto: Paulist Press, 1979), p. 13.
[395] Johannes Wallmann, "Johann Arndt," *The Pietist Theologians*, p. 31.

from the sloth and offers the desired stillness, which in turn is the precondition for the spiritual conception of the Logos.[396]

The third Book is an instruction for the reader on how to seek the kingdom of heaven within one's soul through prayer since the kingdom is an internal reality, a hidden treasure (*TChr* III Preface, 3-4). For Arndt, the boundaries between preparation of the soul, nearness to God, and mystical union are indistinguishable.

> Faith, then, is the means of attaining to this inward treasure, whilst it keeps a sabbath of rest unto God in every soul that is collected into itself. For as the motion of the heavens is therefore the most perfect, because it terminates in itself, and returns to its beginning; so the life of man may then be accounted most excellent and perfect when it returns to its original, which is God. And this a man does, when he enters deeply into himself, having collected all the powers of his understanding, will, and memory, and emptied them of the world, and all the lusts of the flesh; offering up his soul, with all its affections, to God, by the Holy Ghost, and celebrating an eternal sabbath in his presence. Then God begins to operate in him. He waits for such a frame of spirit, and rejoices to finish his work within us. For so great is the love of God towards us, so ardent is his affection, that it is as if his divinity itself could not consist without us; as if he should himself cease to be, unless he could discover the abyss of his divinity in us, and transfuse the overflowing fulness of his essence into us. So that the most acceptable service a man can do unto God, is to keep his heart so quiet and still that God may rest and manifest himself in it. All that God requires, in order to accomplish this work in us, is an humble and quiet spirit. Whenever he finds such a habitation, he dwells there with a high manifestation of his wisdom and power. The eternal wisdom of God cannot units with the wisdom of man; but when the human soul is entirely submitted to God, then God entirely rests in her. (*TChr* III, 2, 3)

Arndt achieves a unique synthesis of mystical motifs: the platonic/neo-platonic return to the origin, the overflowing fullness of essence, the recollection of the soul

[396] Kierkegaard took notes from II Book of *True Christianity*. See KJN 5, 175/NB 8:51/SKS 21, 168 (1848); KJN 7, 112/NB 16:28/SKS 23, 112 (1850).

inwards, the mutual indwelling between God and the soul,[397] the emptiness of will. We have already encountered the motif of reciprocal resting (i.e., if the soul rests completely in God, God finds rest in her) in Macarius: God rests in man after the creation (*Hom*. II 45.5), Christ finds rest in the soul (*Hom.* II 33.2). For Arndt, God's indwelling in the heart is a manifestation of God's love towards his creation (*TChr* II, 16). The restoration of the image – God works in the soul in order to reform her into his image – is therefore akin to the work of upbuilding of the soul/God's building a place of rest, a sanctuary for himself insofar as the soul's inactivity imitates God's inactivity.[398] Arndt compares the inactivity of the soul with the inactivity of Mary in the episode from Luke 10:38-42, where Mary "sat at the Lord's feet and listened to what he was saying" while Martha was preoccupied with many tasks. The "good part" that Mary has chosen is, for Arndt, "eternal life and blessedness" (*TChr* III, 1, 1).

Kierkegaard does not refer to this passage from *True Christianity*, but his interest in Luk 10:38-42 is attested by two journal notes. In the first one, he comments that the better part that Mary has chosen is "God—that is, everything" and it is by choosing "the better part" that one receives everything (KJN4, 135 and 138/NB2:5/SKS 20, 137 [1847]). In 1849, he refers again to Mary's choice when discussing the relevant interpretation in one of Tersteegen's Sermons (KJN6, 110-111/NB11:188/SKS 22, 113). Parenthetically, Tersteegen does allude to Arndt "eternal Sabbath" regarding "the holy silence" in which Mary sits at the Lord's feet.[399]

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[397] Bernard McGinn observes that passages from John's Gospel (14:23, 17:21) where Jesus uses the phraseology of "in me" or "remaining/abiding" in Father were sources for later Christian mystics for formulating the language of mystical union. See Bernard McGinn, *The Foundations of Mysticism: Origins to the Fifth Century* (New York: Crossroad, 1997), pp. 77-79.

[398] There is an interesting echo here from the Genesis' story and the Hebrews regarding the set of terms 'creation' and 'rest'. John Walton makes the lexicological observation that the verb 'rest' implies that someone creates a place or a building and settles in it as in a sanctuary. See John H. Walton, *Genesis: The NIV Application Commentary* (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2001), pp. 146ff.

[399] *Auswahl aus Gerhard Tersteegen's Schriften, nebst dem Leben desselben* [Selections from the Writings of Gerhard Tersteegen, Including His Biography], G. Rapp (ed.) (Essen, 1841), pp. 137-138 (ACKL 729). Tersteegen (1697–1769) is an interesting case, since not only he was influenced by Macarius' ascetic ideal through the writings of Gottfried Arnold and Pierre Poiret (1646-1719) (see W.R. Ward, "Mysticism and Revival: The Case of Gerhard Tersteegen," *Revival and Religion Since 1700: Essays For John Walsh*, Jane Garnett and Colin Matthew [eds.] [London: Hambledon Press, 1993], pp. 41-58) but he also wrote hymns on the theme of the Sabbath rest, which Kierkegaard must have read in Tersteegen's compiled works that he owned. See *Des gottseligen*

Further, Kierkegaard writes down a parallel passage from Christian Scriver (1629-1693), a devotional Lutheran writer:

> …Scriver says that the soul, the human soul, is God's repose [*Guds Hvile*], or that God reposes in it – that what here is granted to a hum. being is as extraordinarily splendid as it would be for a subject if a mighty prince were to rest his head on the subject's lap (KJN 8, 297/NB23:192/SKS 24, 297 [1851]).

The Pietists are not Kierkegaard's only source here. Adolf Helfferich's *The Christliche Mystik* (1842)[400] provided Kierkegaard with extensive texts of Catholic mystics. In his notebook Kierkegaard paraphrases a passage from Richard de St Victor's "Von der Gnade der Betrachtung" [On Grace and Contemplation]:

> It is very well put by Richard of St. Victor. He remarks that one should not be busy like Martha, but "idle" like Mary. Then he adds that there are nevertheless many whom this does not help either, for they certainly are free from the business of work, are not employed, "but all the same do not understand how to make a Sabbath of the Sabbath." (KJN 7, 28/NB15:44/SKS 23, 31 [1850])

'A Sabbath of the Sabbath' refers here not to the abstinence from bodily works but to the stillness of the heart in order to reach the higher contemplation of mystical vision. In the context of discourses, Mary's inactivity is compared with "the superfluity of beauty and joy of" the lilies and the birds, a beauty that "God has squandered on the creation" (CD, 81/SKS 10, 89). In conclusion, Kierkegaard had multiple sources and took up the motif of spiritual Sabbath[401] along with a set of

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Arbeiters ein Weinberge des Herrn: Gerhard Tersteegen's gesammelte Schriften, Vol. 1-8 (in 4 Vols.) (Stuttgart 1844-45) (ACKL 827-830); Vol. 1, pp. 38, 118, 182-183.

[400] Adolf Helfferich, *Die christliche Mystik in ihrer Entwickelung und in ihren Denkmalen* [Christian Mysticism: Its Development and Its Monuments], Vol. 2, (Gotha: Perthes, 1842), pp. 427-428 (ACKL 572).

[401] For example, Christopher B. Barnett explores the motif of rest in Kierkegaard in the context of the Augustinian tradition in his "'Rest' as *Unio Mystica*?: Kierkegaard, Augustine, and the Spiritual Life," pp. 58–77.

notions that shape the theological conversation around conversion, such as: activity and inactivity, praxis and contemplation.

Sabbath and the Epistle to the Hebrews

Kierkegaard translated the Letter to the Hebrews from Greek to Latin[402] in the years 1833-36, when he was a student at the Theological Faculty, and as part of his preparation for the examinations, which required interpretative and translational skills in both Greek and Latin.[403] There are a few notable points in his translation of Heb 3:7-4:11, the passage that interests us most here: Kierkegaard used the Latin "requies" and "quies" to render the word "κατάπαυσις" whereas he reserves *sabbatismus* for "σαββατισμός," a word that occurs only once in the New Testament. He translated the verse "εἰσερχόμεθα γὰρ εἰς κατάπαυσιν" (Heb 4:3) as "Introimus enim in requiem fidem habentes." The choice of present tense instead of the future tense "ingrediemur" (as Vulgata and Sebastian Castellio[404] has it) may suggest an interpretative move, particularly if we take into account the definitions of *κατάπαυσις* and *σαββατισμός* given in Bretschneider's *Lexicon Manuale Graeco-Latinum in libros Novi Testamenti*,[405] which Kierkegaard consistently consulted. Or, most probably, he worked in accordance with the Danish Bible: "Thi vi indgaae til Hvilen, vi, som troe" (1819).

In order to better understand the notion of "Sabbath rest [*σαββατισμός*]" we need to briefly outline the rhetorical structure of Hebrews 3:1-4:11. The author of the Epistle calls his addressees "holy partners in a heavenly calling" (Heb 3:1), an

[402] KJN 1, 173-185/CC:10/SKS 17, 181- 194 (1835-1836).

[403] Niels W. Bruun and Finn Gredal Jensen, "Kierkegaard's Latin Translations of the New Testament in the Journal CC," *Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook* (2001), pp. 443-452.

[404] *Biblia sacra ex Sebastiani Castellionis interpretatione eiusque postrema recognitione praecipue in usum studiosae iuventutis denuo evulgata* (Lipsiae [Leipzig]: Johann Gottlob Immanuel Breitkopf, 1778) (ACKL 2).

[405] Karl Gottlieb Bretschneider, *Lexicon Manuale Graeco-Latinum in libros Novi Testamenti*, Vols. 1-2 (Lipsiae [Leipzig]: Sumptibus Jo. Ambros. Barthii, 2nd 1829) (ACKL 73-74). According Bretschneider, Sabbatismus denotes the celebration of Sabbath in future time (p. 388) and rest means to obtain the future happiness after the cessation of work of this life (p. 364).

appellation which implies that they have received the call to enter the heavenly sanctuary, the promise to enter God's rest. What follows is a set of exhortations to strive to enter God's rest as well as warnings that past generations failed to enter due to faithlessness: "Let us therefore make every effort to enter that rest [*τὴν κατάπαυσιν*], so that no one may fall through such disobedience as theirs" (Heb 4:11). The passage under discussion is based on what David A. deSilva calls "repetitive recontextualization"[406] of Ps 95:7-11:

> Today, if you hear his voice,
> do not harden your hearts as in the rebellion, [...]
> "As in my anger I swore,
> 'They shall not enter my rest'."

That means that the verse is repeated three times (God speaks today), addressed each time to different historical generations and thus acquires transhistorical value by its very repetition. Unlike human promises, which uttered at a point of the temporal axis, may or may not be fulfilled, the divine promise remains the same and renewed in every utterance. The repetition of 'today', which is not identical with the 'now', intensifies the urgency of "responding to God's promise, to God's voice, with trust and obedience."[407] The author writes: "But exhort one another every day, as long as it is called 'today', so that none of you may be hardened by the deceitfulness of sin" (Heb 3:13). Every day is called today because God's promise abides: "Therefore, while the promise of entering his rest is still open, let us take care that none of you should seem to have failed to reach it" (Heb 4:1). Further, by means of verbal analogy, the author argues that the promised rest was established "at the foundation of the world. For in one place it speaks about the seventh day as follows, 'And God rested [*κατέπαυσεν*] on the seventh day from all his works' [Gen 2:2]" (Heb 4:3-4). As Jared Calaway remarks, by connecting "today"/"my rest" from the Psalms and the seventh day rest from the creation

[406] David A. deSilva, "Entering God's Rest: Eschatology and the Socio-Rhetorical Strategy of Hebrews," *Trinity Journal* 21 (2000), p. 40.
[407] David A. deSilva, "Entering God's Rest," p. 30.

narrative, "rest gains a further protological aspect."[408] Extending this remark, we could suggest that what makes the 'today' possible and within it the renewal of the promise is the fact that the rest was established by God on the seventh day of creation.

Much scholarly discussion revolves around the eschatology of the Hebrews as well as the connotations of *σαββατισμός*. In particular, the claim that "we who have believed enter that rest" (Heb 4:3) seems contradictory to (a) the continuous encouragement offered by the author towards his audience to enter God's rest (b) to the fact that the believers have not yet entered and "So then, a sabbath rest [*σαββατισμός*] still remains for the people of God" (Heb 4:9). Barrett has argued that it is far from inconsistent since "[t]he 'rest', precisely because it is God's, is both present and future; they are entering, and they must strive to enter it. This is paradoxical, but it is a paradox that Hebrews shares with all primitive Christian eschatology."[409] To the question whether the promised rest is present or future, Attridge has proposed that rest is "primarily a future reality pertaining primarily to human beings, but a feature of God's own existence which precedes and stands outside of human history."[410] Building on Attridge, Calaway concludes that the author of the Hebrews transformed the traditional Jewish association of rest with the Promised Land whilst retaining its eschatological aspect and "envisage[ing] rest as an imitative state of being" that one reaches by imitating God's rest from his works. Thus, Sabbath rest assimilates certain eschatological motifs like "the age to come," the "Lord's Day."[411] In this context, *σαββατισμός* constitutes "an enduring heavenly reality to enter into permanently at the end of time, the author's 'today'."[412]

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[408] Jared C. Calaway, *The Sabbath and the Sanctuary: Access to God in the Letter to the Hebrews and its Priestly Context* (Tubingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2013), p. 78.

[409] C. K Barrett, "The Eschatology of the Epistle to the Hebrews," *The Background of the New Testament and Its Eschatology*, W. D. Davies and D. Daube (eds.) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1956), p. 372.

[410] Harold W. Attridge, "'Let us strive to enter that rest': The Logic of Hebrews 4:1-11," *The Harvard Theological Review* 73 (January–April 1980), p. 282, note 8.

[411] Jared C. Calaway, *The Sabbath and the Sanctuary*, p. 78.

[412] Jared C. Calaway, *The Sabbath and the Sanctuary*, p. 79.

The discussion about whether the Sabbath rest is a present or future reality or a present or future possibility – and one may remark that the terms "reality" and "possibility" have been loosely used so far – stems from the tenses used in Heb 3:7-4:11 and the ubiquitous 'Today'. The verbal aspect of *εἰσερχόμεθα* ("For we who have believed enter that rest" [Heb 4:3]) became the focus of research. Verbal aspect regards the way in which the speaker chooses to view and report an event and in general verbal aspect manifests the position of the subject as well as "the internal temporal constituency"[413] of an event. For example, the speaker chooses to portray an event "from inside" and "as unfolding (imperfective aspect)" or "from outside" as a completed action, "as a whole (perfective aspect)."[414] The futuristic aspect of the present tense is favoured if rest is interpreted as a purely eschatological-future event.[415] DeSilva proposes that *εἰσερχόμεθα* is better understood as a "progressive or continual" action, as crossing of a "threshold," since one strives to enter and is entering God's rest from the present time forward.[416] Lincoln takes *εἰσερχόμεθα* as "a true present" in the sense that for those who truly believe rest is a reality in the present as God's promise is already being fulfilled through Christ.[417] He also underlines the tension that the final consummation of rest, the true sabbatism, is anticipated and is yet to come.[418]

From a strictly grammatical point of view, the verb *εἰσερχόμεθα* could accommodate all these suggestions. Additionally, as a verb that denotes motion, "enter" could be used to convey an action that has already begun and continues through today. Returning to the verbal aspect, it is possible to consider that the same event – 'entering God's rest' – is presented by two different aspects in Hebrews. Gustave Guillaume's theory on verbal aspect is helpful to articulate this idea. He distinguishes verbal aspect into *immanent* and *transcendent*: the

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[413] Bernard Comrie, *Aspect: An Introduction to the Study of Verbal Aspect and Related Problems* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), p. 5.

[414] Constantine R. Campbell, *Verbal Aspect and Non-indicative Verbs: Further Soundings in the Greek of the New Testament* (New York: Peter Lang, 2008), p. 6. See also Buist M. Fanning, *Verbal Aspect in New Testament Greek* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), pp. 1-85.

[415] Jon C. Laansma, *I Will Give You Rest* (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 2015), pp. 305-310.

[416] DeSilva, "Entering God's Rest," p. 32.

[417] Andrew T. Lincoln, "Sabbath, Rest, and Eschatology in the New Testament," *From Sabbath to Lord's Day*, p. 212.

[418] Andrew T. Lincoln, "Sabbath, Rest, and Eschatology in the New Testament," p. 213.

immanent aspect corresponds to one's inner viewing of an event, whereas the *transcendent aspect* consists of viewing a process from outside after its completion.[419] The transcendent aspect on the Sabbath rest, that is, rest as a complete whole, its beginning and its end, is not afforded to finite beings. Conversely, in its immanent aspect entering God's rest is an infinite, imperfect action, the future epoch of which is the time to come.

[419] Gustave Guillaume, "Immanence et transcendance dans la catégorie du verbe: Esquisse d'une théorie psychologique de l'aspect," *Journal de Psychologie* 30 (1933), pp. 355-372.

Chapter 6

Rest in Kierkegaard (1)

The image of the halcyon bird and the Sabbath rest

βάλε δὴ βάλε κηρύλος εἴην,

ὅς τ᾽ ἐπὶ κύματος ἄνθος ἅμ᾽ ἀλκυόνεσσι ποτήται

νηδεὲς ἦτορ ἔχων, ἁλιπόρφυρος ἱαρὸς ὄρνις.

[Oh, how I wish I were a kingfisher,

who flies with the halcyons over the see bloom,

with heart free from care, sea-purple sacred bird]

(Alcman, fr 26, Page)[420]

If ever I spread silent skies above me and flew into my own sky with my own wings: If I playfully swam in deep expanses of light, and my freedom's bird-wisdom came –– but bird-wisdom speaks like this: "See, there is no up, no down! Throw yourself around, out, back you light one! Sing! Speak no more! – are not all words made for the heavy? Do not all words lie to the light? Sing! Speak no more!" –Oh how then could I not lust for eternity and for the nuptial ring of rings – the ring of recurrence!

Nietzsche, "The Seven Seals (Or: the Yes and Amen Song)," *Thus Spoken Zarathustra*[421]

In an early journal entry (1837), Kierkegaard writes: "So one has achieved peace [*Ro*], when, like the Alcedo ispida (the kingfisher), one can build one's nest upon the sea" (KJN 2, 78/FF:49/SKS 18, 85). The same image of the halcyon resting

[420] D.L Page, *Poetae melici Graeci* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967). As translated by Chris Carey in his "Alcman: from Laconia to Alexandria," *Archaic and Classical Choral Song: Performance, Politics and Dissemination,* Lucia Athanassaki and E.L. Bowie (eds.) (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2011), pp. 437-460.

[421] Friedrich Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for All and None,* Adrian Del Caro (trans.) Robert Pippin (ed.) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 187.

on the sea transmigrates into "The Seducer's Diary" (1843), illustrating this time the contradiction in Seducer's erotic passion; a passion which may, like a storm in the ocean, stir his soul and cloud his mind while he never loses hold of himself. Rather, in the turbulence of passion he comes on the verge of plunging into but he never actually "steer[s] down into the depths of the abyss"; he is, like a sailor, "on the lookout."

> I am almost unable to find a foothold [*Fodfæste*]; like a water bird, I am seeking in vain to alight on the turbulent sea of my mind. And yet such turbulence is my element. I build upon it as the *Alcedo ispida* builds its nest upon the sea. (EO1, 325/SKS 2, 315)

In the next insert, another extended metaphor from nature manifests what the Seducer calls the enjoyment in "limit[ing] oneself" or in being "in motion within oneself": lying adrift in a boat while everything around him is moving (the moon, the clouds, the waves) he "find[s] rest [*Ro*] in this restlessness [*Uro*]," changelessness in constant alteration. This image becomes indicative at once of the Seducer's self-contained emotion and his ironic stance towards life (EO1, 335-326/SKS 2, 315). Such a life-view, detached from reality, is castigated by Judge William in his letters to A as in effect "rest[ing] in despair." According to his verdict, the aesthete is "a hater of activity [*Virksomhed*] in life" since he remains "unoccupied; like the laborers in the Gospel standing idle in the marketplace."[422] His actions have a semblance of real-life action, with him occasionally and merely "'involved' [*med*]" in situation and yet "not 'involved'," which accounts for the lack of continuity in his life (EO2, 195-196/SKS 3, 189).

In the 1849 discourses on the lilies and the birds, the lightness of bird which, "when it seeks a foothold, builds its nest even upon the surface of the sea" (WA,

[422] The reference here is to the Parable of the Workers in the Vineyard (Mt 20, 1-16). For a discussion of Kierkegaard's use of this parable, see the last section of Chapter 7 of this thesis.

7/SKS 11, 13), becomes the object of the poet's wish.[423] As opposed to the bird's carefreeness, the burden of considerations weighs upon the poet. The carefreeness [*Sorgløshed*] of the bird thus is poeticized, becomes the object of wish, extolled as "the highest bliss" (KJN 4, 357/NB4:154/SKS 20, 358 [1848]). As Kierkegaard further notes: "Poetically, immediacy is precisely the state one wishes to return to (one wants the childhood again, etc.); but for the Christian, immediacy is lost and one must not *wish* to return to it; it must be recovered instead." And because the poet looks backwards at this moment of immediacy, he cannot become the teacher for "those who must press forward" (KJN 4, 358/NB4:154/SKS 20, 358). What Kierkegaard is saying here is that if immediacy should be attained again, this can only be done by moving forward. In this notion of attaining again and of moving forward, there is a restatement of the concept of repetition, corresponding to a learning that is a kind of un-learning[424] or of "learn[ing] all over again" (UDVS, 173/SKS 8, 272)/"learning again from the lily and the bird" (WA, 5/SKS 11, 10) and of "*learning anew* through suffering" ("The Gospel of Sufferings," UDVS, 252/SKS 8, 351).

In the *Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits* (1847), Kierkegaard offers yet another image of the bird that finds rest.

> See how it is now standing still—in that infinite space. Thus it is resting there where no rest [*Hvile*] seems possible! See how it finds its path, and what a path through all the hardships and adversities of human life as difficult, as unfathomable as 'the bird's mysterious path [*Vei*] through the air!' Thus there is a path and a path to be found where a path seems an impossibility. (UDVS, 187/SKS 8, 284)

[423] The Commentary SKSK11, 13 draws attention to the similarities between the three passages from *Either/Or* (EO1, 325/SKS 2, 315), *The Works of Love* (WA, 7/SKS 11, 13), and KJN 2, 78/FF:49/SKS 18, 85 (1837).

[424] I am in agreement with the analysis of David Kangas of learning joy as a task and as un-learning living in the illusion of the future or the past. See David Kangas, "Being Today: Religion and Emotion in Kierkegaard," *The Oxford Handbook of Religion and Emotion*, John Corrigan (ed.) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 397.

The image stands in the midst of two apparently contradictory claims in the discourse; first, at the end of part I, "To be Contented with Being a Human Being," the learner comes to understand that as created being "is indeed living" with God, "since heaven and earth is God's house and property" (UDVS, 177/SKS 8, 276). The second claim appears in part II "How Glorious it is to be a Human Being" where the gloriousness of being human ensues from the imitation of his divine prototype, "the Son of man has no place to lay his head and this is about a state that is more helpless than the bird's and is also conscious of this." The consciousness of being without a nest and still "to be free from care [*Sorg*]" distinguishes the divine prototype from the bird as prototype from human being (UDVS, 197/SKS 8, 293). Nevertheless, the Gospel exhorts the worried one to "go out to the field and then stand still in order to look at [*at betragte*] the lily and the bird" (UDVS, 186/SKS 8, 284); in doing so, "indeed, he is built up" (UDVS, 197/SKS 8, 294). The exigency of this double imitation, of the birds and the lilies and the Son of man, runs through the discourses, since the human being should learn again what the birds immediately possess.

Though it could be safely argued that the image of the resting bird is not found in the Gospel, there is a Christological antecedent in the invitation: "Come here to me, all you who labor and are burdened, and I will give you rest [Mt 11:28]."[425] Further, the halcyon bird evokes similar images throughout Kierkegaard's writing as, for example, that of Peter who stands "securely on the billowing sea" (EUD, 272/SKS 5, 268) or "the 70,000 fathoms upon whose depth the religious person constantly remains," which essentially renders the triad of the suffering, joy, and the "deadly peril" that contours the religious existence (CUP, 241/SKS 7, 263 cf. CUP, 117/SKS 7, 131; CUP, 195/SKS 7, 212). Psalm 55: 5-7,[426] though it combines poetically the themes of anxiety, rest, and the flight of a bird, didn't seem to have attracted Kierkegaard's attention. The myth of Ceyx and Alcyone, which narrates the transformation of Alcyone into a bird after plunging into the

[425] See the second discourse "At the Communion on Fridays" (1848), which is an exposition on Mt 11:28, and *Practice in Christianity* (1850).

[426] "Fear and trembling come upon me,/and horror overwhelms me./And I say, "O that I had wings like a dove!/I would fly away and be at rest;/truly, I would flee far away'" (NRSV).

sea, was probably known to Kierkegaard through Ovid's *Metamorphoses*.[427] Early on the halcyon bird was related with mystical or miraculous traits such as, the construction of its nest that floats upon the sea or the brooding period around the winter solstices about which the poet Simonides (c. 556–468 BC) writes: "God lulls for fourteen days the winds to sleep/In winter; and this temperate interlude/Men call the Holy Season, when the deep/Cradles the mother Halcyon and her brood" (Aristotle, *Historia Animalium*, V, 8).[428] In a journal note, Kierkegaard expresses the desire to undertake writing "*On the Migration of Birds*, with tables and sketches" as a remedy for the depression of the present age, stating: "For what is as recreating as watching migratory birds: this apparent lack of any laws and yet a perfect law" (*Pap.* VI B 222/*JP* 5, 5761 [1844-45]). The tone is tinted with irony, reminiscent of the unpublished response to Heiberg's critique of *Repetition*,[429] but indicative of Kierkegaard's interest in books such as Friedrich Faber's *Ueber das Leben der hochnordischen Vögel*,[430] to which he refers. Around the migratory patterns, the seasonal phenology, and habitats of birds revolves a letter that Henrik Lund, Kierkegaard's nephew, sent on his uncle's request (LD, 262/SKS 28, 322-324 [April 12, 1850]).[431]

Providing a chronological overview of the trajectory of this image through Kierkegaard's works and notebooks, we risk reproducing the illusion, to which Kierkegaard is never tired of drawing attention, as, for example, in "The Accounting," namely: "the illusion that the religious is something one turns to as one has become older" (PV, 8/SKS 13, 14). Kierkegaard dismisses as incidental any

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[427] *P. Ovidii Nasonis quae supersunt*, vols. 1–3, Antonius [Anton] Richter (ed.) (Lipsiae [Leipzig]: Carl Tauchnitz, 1828). (ACKL 1265)

[428] *Complete Works of Aristotle, Volume 1: The Revised Oxford Translation*, Jonathan Barnes (ed.) (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014).

[429] For Heiberg's review of *Repetition*, see p. 37 of the present thesis. The editors point out that the reference to tables is probably an allusion to Heiberg's *Urania* (See Kierkegaard, *Journals and Papers*, Vol. 5, Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (trans. and eds.) (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1978), p. 528, n. 1156.

[430] Friedrich Faber, *Ueber das Leben der hochnordischen Vögel* (Leipzig: E. Fleischer, 1825-1826). Also, Kierkegaard had in his library N. Kjærbølling, *Danmarks Fugle* (Kjøbenhavn: Forfatterens Forlag, 1851-1852) (ACKL 947) and a poetry collection by Steen Steensen Blicher, *Trækfuglene. Naturconcert* [Birds of Passage. Nature concert] (Randers: Boghandler Smiths Forlag, 1838). (ACKL 1525)

[431] In SKS edition the letter is catalogued as Letter number 202.

explanation of his authorship reduced to the assumption that he was an esthetic author who has become religious, that is, "it was I who essentially had changed over the years" (*Pap*. IX A 227/*JP* 6, 6238 [1848]).[432] Instead, if we are to adhere to his words in the same note, "it was the upbuilding—the religious—that should advance, and that now the esthetic has been traversed," alluding thus to a necessity either internal to the authorship or external to it ("the Governance"). Nevertheless, "the traversed path [*Vei*]" of the literary production (PV, 7/SKS 13, 13) could come forth as a path only "retrospectively," that is, "understood only when it has been traversed" (*Pap*. X 5 B 148 *n.d.* 1849). As Kierkegaard explicitly says, "[f]rom the beginning I could not quite see what has indeed also been my own development" (PV, 12/SKS 13, 18).

Alternatively, the path is not linear but, like a spider-web, is created by "crisscrossing treads" weaved together while only afterwards one concludes about "the ingenious little creature [*Dyr*]" (PV, 6/SKS 13, 13). This latter figure of the act of writing reserves the paradox of drawing a line, like a spider, concurrently as one moves. Secondly, the authorship not only has a specific *telos* – "to become a Christian" – but performs a movement that is qualified as "the **Christian** *movement*" par excellence: moving "out of reflection" and reaching a point where one "becomes more and more simple, a Christian." And at the same time, Kierkegaard admits that at every moment of his writing: "I call my whole work as an author my own upbringing and development" (PV, 12/SKS 13, 18).

The contradictory statements throughout *The Point of View* as well as in the accompanying notes and drafts are due in part to Kierkegaard's endeavour to uphold the "concurrency" of the esthetic production with the religious one (PV, 8/SKS 13, 14) in tandem with the claim that "he was a religious author from the beginning *and* is esthetically productive at the last moment" (PV 31/SKS 16, 17

[432] I don't address the issues concerning the authorship (and authority) but the scope of my inquiry is rather limited and intends to shed light to the presence of the image of the halcyon bird. On how Kierkegaard sets forth the question of his development to a religious author over the years, see Joakim Garff, "The Eyes of Argus: The point of view and the points of view with respect to Kierkegaard's Activity as an Author," *Kierkegaardiana* 15 (1991), pp. 29-54 and Joseph Westfall, "Who is the author of The Point of View? Issues of authorship in the posthumous Kierkegaard," *Philosophy and Social Criticism* 38:6 (2012), pp. 569–589.

emphasis added). And if the concurrency refers to the parallel and almost simultaneous publication of an esthetic work with a religious one, and if Kierkegaard was a religious author from the beginning, how could there be any development or, for that matter, any traversal of a path? The only consistent view, Kierkegaard argues, is that "the change [i.e., from an esthetic author to a religious author] is concurrent with the beginning" (PV 30/SKS 16, 16) of his authorship insofar as "one [i.e., the author] certainly cannot concurrently [*samtidigt*] be older than oneself" (PV, 8/SKS 13, 14) – an extraordinary allusion to the *Parmenides*' paradoxes involved when we consider the One being/becoming in time (*Parm*. 141a5-d6 and 152a3-152e3).[433] Accordingly, one begins with a "duplexity" in the totality of the authorship rather than with a unity. The dialectical unity of the whole is induced when *Either/Or,* "the first book in the authorship now comes out a second time" (PV, 12/SKS 13, 18) or when the traversed path is taken up again. In this context, we should understand the reference to "a repetition" regarding the entire productivity: "all must be taken up again" (*Pap*. X 6 B 236, *n.d.*, 1853).[434]

As noted above, Kierkegaard is up against 'the ageing of author',[435] the objective passing of time, on which the ordering of the authorship is nevertheless dependent (i.e., the publication dates). And, it is this same objective time that he tries to undo by weaving "threads" between the aesthetic and the religious works. On those (two different) tracks of time, two different trails of change can be discerned: the one regards the reader, who is living in esthetic categories and

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[433] On the other hand, the hint to the *Parmenides* is plausible in a text like "The Accounting" in which the discussion of movement has a prominent role. The same paradoxes resurface in the following passage regarding the poetic and the religious: "I began concurrently, at the same time, in two places" (PV 85/SKS 16, 63), meaning this time, the poetic and the religious awakening following the "fact"/"the event" (PV, 84/SKS 16, 63), the break-up with Regine. Interestingly, in a footnote Kierkegaard alludes to the "enormous speed" with which his writing was executed and "the crucial development" (from the aesthetic to the religious) it has covered to such a degree that the entire work "does not fit in any moment of actuality" (PV, 85/SKS 16, 64). Hence, it becomes impossible for any the author (Kierkegaard) to give a proper account of the totality, as it were, to be pointing out to a moment objectively determinable.

[434] George Pattison observes that the 1849 discourses on the lilies and the birds should be read alongside *Either/Or* since the second edition of his first aesthetic writing was published on the same day, May 14 1849. See George Pattison, *Kierkegaard and the Theology of the Nineteenth Century: The Paradox and the 'Point of Contact'*, pp. 105 and 108ff.

[435] Cf. PV, 47-50/SKS 16, 29-31, where Kierkegaard contradistinguishes between "becoming older in the sense of time" and "becoming older in the sense of eternity." True religiousness has to do with the latter change.

whom the work encounters with the purpose of moving her "**maieutically**" to "become *aware*" of the religious (PV, 7/SKS 13, 19; cf. PV, 44/SKS 16, 26). The other regards the author and his own upbuilding. In this context, the migratory path of the birds becomes important insofar as repetition, change, and the writing are densely interrelated in it. And yet the migratory path (and in order to become a path, it has to be repeated) remains mysterious. If to become a Christian is the task of the authorship, the lowly Christian says "'What I shall become has not yet been disclosed' [1 Jn 3:2]" ("The Care of Lowliness," CD 46/SKS 10, 57).

Bearing in mind that "The Accounting" was planned to follow the publication of the Discourses, *The Lily in the Field and the Bird in the Air* (*Pap.* X 1 A 226/*JP* 6, 6388 [April 1849]), how do the previous remarks bear on the image of the halcyon bird? Put otherwise, why do a seducer, a poet, and an upbuilding-religious author (who wants to seduce his readers to the truth) have recourse to the 'same' image, if it indeed is 'the same'?[436] We can assume that Kierkegaard in his "own development" took notice of the potential residing in this particular image for the purpose of religious upbuilding. We opt for approaching thus the different appearances of the figure of the bird as snapshots/moments of the author's development from an aesthetic to a religious author. Or, granted that Kierkegaard was a religious author from the start, the image of *Alcedo ispida* retains an essential ambiguity or "poetic equivocalness"[437] to the degree that a poet's wish expresses something fundamental about the human desire for rest. In both cases though, the seducer and the poet does not consider the bird "according to the directions of the Gospel!" (UDVS, 162/SKS 8, 262).

The question whether the image produces the viewer or the viewer produces the image, while legitimate, cannot bypass the question of authorship (or how we view Kierkegaard as an author), since both the image and the viewer are 'the production of the author'. The poetical reception of the Scripture (the Gospel

[436] Cf. For a reading of the presence of the ocean as spiritual icon in Kierkegaard's journals, "The Seducer's Diary" and in the *Upbuilding Discourses*, see Christopher B. Barnett, *From Despair to Faith: The Spirituality of Søren Kierkegaard*, pp. 116-128.

[437] Paul Ricoeur, *The Rule of Metaphor: The Creation of Meaning in Language* (London and New York: Routledge, 2004), p. 308.

about the lilies and the birds) seems like a temptation. On the other hand, Kierkegaard suggests that the poetical or earnest reading of the Gospel comes down to the situation of the reader: "Poetically (i.e., when one's own livelihood is secure), what the gospel says is indescribably uplifting. But when it truly becomes a serious matter, that is, when somebody is in want and need is then supposed to be uplifted by the carefree ways of the lilies and the birds, or by the divine exaltation of Xt—that's too exalted, and hmnly speaking, too severe" (KJN 6, 33-34/NB11:55/SKS 22, 37 [1849]).

Drawing the various threads in Kierkegaard's writings together, we will see how he interweaves the inactivity of the lilies and the improvidence of the birds with the theology of the Sabbath-rest, work and rest, prayer, and rebirth.

Elements of Literary Rhetoric in the Discourses on the Lilies and the Birds

Kierkegaard resorts to a wide range of repetitive devices, that is, rhetorical tropes that rely on repetition at the level of sounds, words, or phrases. These particular figures, encountered already in the Bible text, in poetry, and oratory speech, serve diverse purposes of emphasis, creation of rhythm, or merely of capturing the reader's attention with the wordplay. As will be evident below, they become in Kierkegaard's hands more than stylistic choices.[438]

Notice that the third discourse from "What We Learn from the Lilies in the Field and from the Birds on the Air" (1847) closes with the figure of *anaphora* (*repetitio*),[439] whereby the verb "let" is repeated at the beginning of successive clauses:

[438] Henrike Fürstenberg pays attention to the stylistic devices (alliteration, repetitions, climax, polyptoton) in her reading of Kierkegaard's religious discourses. See Henrike Fürstenberg, "Re-reading the Religious – Aesthetically: A Literary Analysis of 'The Woman Who Was a Sinner' and *The Lily in the Field and the Bird of the Air*," *Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook* (2017), pp. 145-173.

[439] For the terms and definition of the literary figures in this section I draw from: Heinrich Lausberg, *Handbook of Literary Rhetoric: A Foundation for Literary Study*, Matthew T. Bliss, Annemiek

> Then *let* the lily wither and *let* its loveliness become indiscernible; *let* the leaf fall to the ground and *let* the bird fly away; *let* it become dark on the fields—God's kingdom does not change with the seasons! So *let* the rest be needed for a long time or a short time, *let* it come abundantly or sparingly; *let* all these things have their moment when they are lacking or possessed, their moment as subject of discussion until in death they are eternally forgotten—God's kingdom is still that which is to be sought first but which ultimately will also last through all eternities, and "if that which will be abolished was glorious, that which remains will be much more glorious," [2 Cor 3:11] and if it was hard to live in want, then it must indeed be only an easier separation to die to want! (UDVS, 212/SKS 8, 307. Emphasis mine)

As well as conveying the fervency of exhortation, this passage recapitulates the progression of all the three discourses and, by placing in juxtaposition "all these things" and "their moment" to "God's kingdom" and "all eternities," issues to the final plea for resolution. With every anaphoric series, the demand of resignation – "die to want" – is heightened. As we shall shortly see, Kierkegaard employs various "structures of intensification"[440] that are founded on repetition.

The final instance of anaphora, encountered in this last paragraph, the repeated "if [*dersom*]," is paired with the countermovement of *epistrophe*, a figure which consists of reiteration of the same word at the end of successive clauses, as in: "'...glorious/...glorious' and... in want/...in want." The effect is better illustrated if we break the sentences into verse lines:

> ...and "if that which [*dersom det*] will be abolished was glorious,

Jansen, and David E. Orton (trans.), Orton and R. Dean Anderson (eds.) (Leiden NL: Brill, 1998), §§ 608-664; *The New Princeton Encyclopedia of Poetry and Poetics*, Alex Preminger and T.V.F. Brogan (eds.) (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993).

[440] I borrow the term from Robert Alter's study *The Art of Biblical Poetry* (New York: Basic Books, 2011), pp. 75-103. Alter explores the poetic devices based both on formal structures of intensification (i.e., anaphora, climax, antithesis) and on their concomitant semantic, thematic or narrative parallels.

that which remains will be much more glorious," [441]

and if it [*dersom det*] was hard to live in want,

then it must indeed be only an easier separation to die to want!

Both sentences thus follow the pattern a…b/…b, with the second sentence receiving, as it were, and responding to the Pauline passage. The deployment of anaphora brings home Kierkegaard's efforts to create a juncture or concatenation between the apostolic word and his own discourse. I will argue that Kierkegaard experimented with different means to achieve this concatenation and his endeavour is a recurrent gesture throughout the discourses on the lilies and the birds. Consider, for example, the introduction to "The Care of the Pagans" from the later collection *Christian Discourses* (1848). He writes: not only did the Gospel come down "at the foot of the mountain" but also "the bird and the lily have also come […] they are not merely there, they are there as instructors" (CD, 9/SKS 10, 20). They are 'there', close to the Teacher, the Word, and 'there' in the Gospel. The ambiguous 'there [*med*]' is found in the adage at the end of each of the seven discourses: "Consider now, in conclusion, the bird, which is, after all, there [*med*] in the Gospel and must be here [*med*] in the discourse" (CD, 22/SKS 10, 33; cf. CD, 35/SKS 10, 46; CD, 46/SKS 10, 57; CD 58/SKS 10, 68; CD, 69/SKS 10, 77; CD, 79/SKS 10, 88; CD 90/SKS 10, 98), suggesting that the discourse, as the very the position of the birds and the lilies, is always relational to the Gospel.

The most prominent example of the structures of intensification is the use of climax (*gradatio*), whereby a phrase at the end of each sentence serves as a grade

[441] In the original Greek text the word "δόξα" returns at the end of each sentence in different cases, forming the figure of *polyptoton* (i.e., the repetition of a word in different noun or verbal inflections): "εἰ γὰρ τὸ καταργούμενον διὰ *δόξης*, πολλῷ μᾶλλον τὸ μένον ἐν *δόξῃ*." In the Danish translation, although the polyptoton is not retained, it is replaced by a similar figure constitutive of repetition, that is, *epistrophe:* "…i Herlighed /…i Herlighed." The word "Herlighed" returns at the end of each sentence. This is common in translations between languages that have different declension systems.

for the construction of the next in such manner that the climax conjures up the impression of ascent by steps:

> And if a human being, like the lily, is contented with being a human being, he does not become sick about temporal worries; and if he does not become worried with temporal things, he remains in the place assigned to him; and if he remains there, then it is true that he, by being a human being, is more glorious than Solomon's glory. (UDVS, 170/SKS 8, 269)

In this schema the most important idea is presented at the end, as is also the case in the following passage: "It is glorious to be clothed as the lily, even more glorious to be the erect and upright ruler, but most glorious to be nothing by worshiping!" (UDVS, 193/SKS 8, 290). Paradoxically, what is excelled in this ordering is to become "nothing by worshiping," which undergirds Kierkegaard's theological point that man resembles God and his invisible glory "not directly but inversely" (UDVS, 193/SKS 8, 290). Similarly, from the micro-level of sentences we move to the climactic arrangement of the three discourses, explicitly manifested in the in-text rubrics: "To Be Contented with Being a Human Being", "How Glorious it is to Be a Human Being", and "What Blessed Happiness is Promised in Being a Human Being", with *epistrophe* of the infinitive phrase: "Being/To Be a Human Being [*at være Menneske*]."

This array of ascending significance accords with interpretations which largely place emphasis on the imperfection of the lilies and the birds as the true prototype for human being and, of course, on explicit references by Kierkegaard himself to the "heterogeneity" inherent in the relation between the teacher (the lilies and the birds) and the learner (the human being) (KJN 4, 91/NB:129/SKS 20, 91 [1847]). David Possen, for example, talks about "a crescendo of individual discourses,"[442] each of which advances a "weaning-process" from the earthly cares

[442]David Possen, "Faith's Freedom from Care," *Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits* (*International Kierkegaard Commentary,* Vol. 15), Robert Perkins (ed.) (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 2005), pp. 157-158.

pointing toward the rigorous message of the Gospel to "Seek first God's Kingdom." For one thing, the parables of the worried lily or the wood-dove serve as didactic analogies and even the bird's flight is "a feeble and metaphorical suggestion" compared with faith's perfect "wind-stroke" (UDVS, 194/SKS 8, 291). Hence, the language of the prototype regarding the relation of the human being to the lilies and the birds is limited and, ultimately, exhausted insofar that the God-Man "in earnestness and in truth is the actual prototype" for human beings as creatures; this divine prototype does not exist for the bird (UDVS, 197/SKS 8, 293). Steven Shakespeare remarks that once the lilies and the birds have fulfilled their pedagogic role "these fictions have done their job. […] They become static images, signposts or markers along the way the self has travelled, but now entirely subsidiary to the narrative of actual life."[443] However, there are textual elements that undermine the secondariness or instrumentality of the metaphorical image of the lilies and the bird. Consequently, we either accept the birds and the lilies as an analogical schema that should be left behind or by being attentive to the paradoxical "like" – live like the birds and the lilies – rethink their position in Kierkegaard's discourses.

To this end, we notice that these repetitive tropes tend to abound densely in passages where a paradoxical idea is to be intensified. For example, after the *epanalipsis* of the words "away, far away" and "distant, distant" referring to the bird's flight and the polyptoton playing around the words "resting [*hviler*]" and "rest [*Hvile*]," the subsequent combination of *anadiplosis* (*reduplicatio*) – a figure by which the concluding word of a clause is repeated at the beginning of the next – with polyptoton reproduces the pattern ….a/a…./a1 in the following sentence: "Thus there is a *path* [*Vei*] and a *path* [*Vei*] to be found where a *path* [*Veien*] seems an impossibility" (UDVS, 187/SKS 8, 284). By folding back upon itself, the possibility to find a path unfolds within and out of its own impossibility; these units – the flight, the rest, the path, possibility/impossibility together with repetition – intend precisely to draw the territory of "the mysterious path of the bird." The use

[443] Steven Shakespeare, *Kierkegaard, Language and the Reality of God* (New York: Routledge, 2017), p. 125.

of rhetorical figures does not intend to logical persuasion but to induce an affective change in the reader.

So far, the text resembles the form of a music transcript with the various repetitions creating an undulating effect throughout the discourse or, to use a Kierkegaardian image: "And the ocean, like a wise-man is self-sufficient, whether it lies like a child and amuses itself by itself with gentle ripples, like a child playing on its lips…" (UDVS, 20-21/SKS 8, 135). How, thus, is possible for the text to escape from its narcissistic self-closure into its own captivating rhythm?[444]

We must read more closely the concluding paragraph of third discourse, focusing this time on punctuation; the first set of clauses beginning with the anaphoric "let" is followed by "God's kingdom does not change with the seasons!" after the placement of a colon. Likewise, the second set of the 'let-clauses' is divided by the subsequent sentence "God's kingdom […] through all eternities" with a colon mark.[445] Its use does not seem accidental for two reasons: first, a 'because' or a 'but' would confuse the meaning as it entails a logical conjunction between the preceding and the subsequent cause, the finitude of the temporal and the unchangeability of the eternal, where precisely such logical passage Kierkegaard wants to be avoided; second, the 1849 discourses on the lilies and the birds also conclude in the same way: "And you, to whom the longest day is granted—to live today, and this very day to be in paradise—should you not be unconditionally joyful…" (WA, 45/SKS 11, 48).[446] Again, at the end of this third discourse from *The Lily of the Field and the Bird of the Air: Three Godly Discourses*,

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[444] This is a restatement of the problem about the boundaries between language and music addressed in "The Immediate Erotic Stages": in oration and poetry "the musical element has developed so strongly that the language leaves off and everything becomes music" (EO1, 69/SKS 2, 75).

[445] In both cases, the Hongs' translation has an em dash where Kierkegaard used the colon: "Lad saa Lilien visne, og dens Deilighed blive ukjendelig, lad Bladet falde til Jorden og Fuglen flyve bort, lad det mørknes over Markerne: Guds Rige vexler ikke med Aarets Skiften! Lad saa det Øvrige behøves længe eller kort, komme rigeligen eller knapt; lad alle disse Ting have deres Øieblik, naar de undværes eller besiddes, deres Øieblik som Gjenstand for Omtalen, indtil de i Døden evigt ere glemte: Guds Rige er dog Det, som skal søges først, men som ogsaa skal vare gjennem alle Evigheder til det Sidste;" (UDVS, 212/SKS 8, 307).

[446] See the Danish original: "Og Du, hvem den længste Dag er forundt: at leve idag – og endnu idag at være i Paradiis, skulde Du ikke være ubetinget glad…"

emphasis is placed on the 'how' of "transition from temporality to eternity" (WA, 44/SKS 11, 48). Taken together, as we will see in the following sections, these concluding passages could be read as Kierkegaard's reworking of the mystical Sabbath-day rest.

Punctuation[447] forms part of the silent rhetoric of a text, which could only be articulated via reading aloud.[448] Significantly, Kierkegaard was alert to the potential of punctuation to uphold "the architectonic-dialectical aspect" of the sentences and consequently of the whole text. Further, he states that "I always have in mind readers who read aloud," readers who are thus able to follow "every little cadence of thought" as well as to "reproduce this with the voice"; such a reader is like "an actor or an orator," who reciting a piece from "my discourses" would be attentive to the punctuation marks by means of "modulating his voice." In this respect, the author proffers "instructive hints [*Vink*]" (KJN 4, 99/NB:146/SKS 20, 99 [1846]), a kind of intra-text, implicit stage directions. However authorial and artful these comments may sound, in the context of "The Occasion of a Confession" the

[447] The following is inspired by the brilliant reading of Hegel's texts by Rebecca Comay, who combines philosophical analysis with special attention to the punctuation of the text. See Rebecca Comay, "Hegel's Last Words: Mourning and Melancholia at the end of the *Phenomenology*," in *The End(s) of History: Questioning the Stakes of Historical Reason*, Amy Swiffen and Joshua Nichols (eds.) (New York: Routledge, 2012), pp. 141-160 and more recently, Rebecca Comay "The Dash, or How to Do Things with Signs," in Rebecca Comay and Frank Ruda, *The Dash—: The Other Side of Absolute Knowing* (Cambridge, MA: MIT, 2018), pp. 53-62.

[448] George Pattison proposes that we should understand Kierkegaard's exhortation to read aloud not literally but rather metaphorically, thus "*spiritually*, as the matter of inward understanding, acceptance, and commitment." Furthermore, the wager of upbuilding discourses is the transformation of the reader into an active disciple in the world. See George Pattison, *Kierkegaard and the Theology of the Nineteenth Century: The Paradox and the 'Point of Contact'*, pp. 189-191 [190]. Steven M. Emmanuel remarks that, although punctuation belongs to the area of aesthetics, Kierkegaard's usage intended to support the purposes of the ethical and religious communication: "It is in this concrete temporal and historical situation of reading aloud that the reader, the 'single individual', to whom Kierkegaard's discourses are always addressed, can existentially appropriate the meaning of his words." See Steven M. Emmanuel, "Punctuation," *Kierkegaard's Concepts: Vol. 15: Tome V: Objectivity to Sacrifice*, Jon Stewart, William McDonald, Steven M. Emmanuel (eds.) (Farnham: Ashgate Publishing, 2015), p. 178. I have much reserve about the remark that punctuation is "self-effacing" and that indeed negates "the sensuousness of the text" (*Ibid*., p. 178). Punctuation itself is historically conditioned and its presence rather affirms the materiality of writing at the same time that 'marks' an oral aspect (stress, pause, intonation) that is lost or missed by the reader. On this issue, see Theodor W. Adorno, "Punctuation Marks," Shierry Weber Nicholsen (trans.), *The Antioch Review* 48:3 (Summer, 1990), pp. 300-305. See also the interesting remarks of Agamben regarding the title of Deleuze's essay "Immanence: A Life…" in his "Absolute Immanence," *Potentialities: Collected Essays in Philosophy*, Daniel Heller-Roazen (trans. and ed.) (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), pp. 220-239. Here, Agamben advocates for a philosophy of punctuation.

point of gravity shifts to the reader: "So now, my listener, think about the occasion" (UDVS, 122/SKS 8, 222); and again, "Now forget the jest of art" (UDVS, 124/SKS 8, 224). For the confession is the occasion for the "action [*Gjerning*] of self-activity" and the key tone in the religious discourse is earnestness, openness before God: in an extensive theatrical analogy[449] that renders the stage as eternity, the God as spectator, and the listener as the actor, the speaker in and of the discourse is the prompter who "whispers to the actor what he has to say, but the actor's rendition [*Gjengivelse*] is the main thing, is the earnest jest of the art" (UDVS, 124/SKS 8, 225). The reader of the discourse is often entangled in this double-bind: look at the art/forget the art.

On this matter, a journal note entitled "My Punctuation from Now On" (1846) is somewhat enlightening. Kierkegaard writes: "The colon establishes reflexivity, perspective, and transparency [*Gjennemskueligheden*] in the sentence, such that, for example, by using the colon, the concluding main clause is posited in the introductory subordinate clause, and the reverse." Thereby, the two clauses "are not situated serially but, in their fundamental relation to one another they are on equal footing" (KJN 4, 100-101/NB:150/SKS 20, 100), with the effect being that the colon makes "visible to the eye" – graphically on the page – the intended transparency of the whole that the two clauses form. Regarding the second instance of the colon use, if the two clauses are related in such a way that the first is a "remark [*Replik*]" and the second "the reply [*Contra-Replik*]," the interposition of the colon aids that "the two ideas" – given that these ideas stand in antithesis – "are not to be expressed serially, but their zugleich [simultaneity] in the relation of remark and reply." It is not clear how the simultaneity is achieved except if we assume a voicing together of the two clauses and the aural effect that is produced, maybe like two voices in a chorus. The inference is that a syntactic structure is inescapably subject to seriality (understood either as subordination, temporalization, or linearity), while the rhetorical punctuation, which Kierkegaard

[449] For a more detail treatment of this analogy, see George Pattison, *Kierkegaard's Upbuilding Discourses*, pp. 93ff.

favors to "abstract grammatical punctuation," might be regarded as an attempt to transcend the boundaries of seriality.

The above journal note postdates the first drafts of the discourses about the 'Lilies and the Birds' (1847); nevertheless, we could extract a way of approaching this last paragraph in the context of *Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits*. At this point of the text, Kierkegaard has argued that (a) "Temporality, as it is knowable, cannot be the transparency of the eternal; in its given actuality, it is the *refraction* of the eternal" (UDVS, 90/SKS 8, 195) (b) the consciousness is "the place where "the eternal and the temporal continually touch each other, where the eternal is refracted in the temporal" (UDVS, 195/SKS 8, 292). The colon represents a pause that changes the tempo of the sentence, a change expecting and entrusting the reader for its enunciation. For it is the reader who by the end of the discourse is enticed to see through and in the transparency of the eternal seeing (a seeing that is different from knowledge or consciousness) the promise that is promised from the now: "But seek first God's kingdom and his righteousness; then all those things will be added to you" (Mt 6:33); the eternal is posited in the letting go of the temporal whilst, conversely, the same movement of resignation opens up to the eternal. With these remarks in mind, lets read the phrase again: "let all these things have their moment […]—God's kingdom is still that which is to be sought first [*lad alle disse Ting have deres Øieblik* […]: *Guds Rige er dog Det, som skal søges først*]" (UDVS, 212/SKS 8, 307).

Punctuation and the repetitive tropes thus contour what Kierkegaard named as "the cadence of thought," if cadence refers to the "accentual pattern" of a line, to "the timing of its delivery."[450] Granted that the colon has a "forward-referring" function in a sentence, that is, as an "opening" mark[451] announces what is to follow, I propose there is a close link here to the category of repetition "by which," as Kierkegaard writes, "eternity is entered forward" (CA, 90/SKS 4, 393). In the discourses on the lilies and the birds in particular, repetition as eternity acts

[450] See the lemma "Cadence," in *The New Princeton Encyclopedia of Poetry and Poetics*.
[451] M. A. K. Halliday, *Spoken and Written Language* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), pp. 33 and 35.

backwards to the whole measuring of time, transforming the past and the future at every moment of their articulation (accentual rendition) in the present; and repetition, as every rendition, is a singular event. Accordingly, considering punctuation as a part of Kierkegaard's method of indirect communication, the matter is not to speculate which is the right or wrong enunciation of the text but to fully trust the discourse to the reader. This is hardly an isolated example in Kierkegaard's authorship. In the first upbuilding discourse he published, "The Expectancy of Faith," the phrase "'and then at last obtain salvation'" is repeated by different persons, in different ages and circumstances; "yet no person learns this from another, but each one individually learns it only from and through God" (EUD, 28/SKS 5, 36). The matter is not that the meaning of this phrase "at last" is subjective or contextualized, but "we shall comprehend its full meaning" when there shall be salvation at last and God "opens his arms to receive in them the yearning soul" (EUD, 29/SKS 5, 37).

As mentioned earlier, there is an 'anxiety' in the discourse to relate to the Gospel as well as to its reader(s). The admittance that accompanies many of the prefaces to the discourses that the author/speaker is without authority to write or preach names this anxiety. A comparison with the *Apophthegmata Patrum* will put into relief the anxiety of the Kierkegaardian 'without authority'. A frequent opening in the *Sayings* is the plea of a young monk to an elder: "Abba, give me a word [*ῥῆμα*], that I may be saved." The request is usually followed by a short answer, like: "'Flee from men, stay in your cell…," (AP, 41) "'Keep silence and do not compare yourself with others'" (AP, 10) or "If you observe the following, you can be saved, 'Be joyful at all times, pray without ceasing and give thanks for all things'" (AP, 4). The request and the gift of the saving word is informed by and mutually informs a spiritual father–disciple relationship. Taking into consideration that the Greek *ῥῆμα* comprises the same semantic field of the Hebrew *dabar* (i.e., a word *and* a deed announced by a word), Burton-Christie writes that "It expresses both the close relation between life and action which characterized these words as well as the weight and authority they possessed."[452] Consequently, the saying is offered

[452] Douglas Burton-Christie, *The Word in the Desert*, p. 77.

to be taken up and put into action by the listener, who in effect, out of the exigencies of spiritual life, seeks "rather a new way to live."[453] In addition, though the *Sayings* have arisen from the concrete, singular conditions of communication between the elder and his disciples, they are collected and transmitted, orally and in writing, as the spiritual teaching for monastic and non-monastic communities.[454]

In relation to such practices, however, Kierkegaard's anxiety stems from the awareness that he is writing in an age in which not only the historical or existential terms of this kind of spiritual communication are absent, but every attempt to reproduce the same conditions of eremitical setting/form of life is a feign and even comical reenactment. Instead, he aims at creating in and through the discourse new terms of communication with the reader; at the same time, the discourses, on the lilies and the birds in particular, appeal to ascetical virtues and practices (amerimnia, vigilance, xeniteia, stillness, prayer) as they invite the reader to follow this path while the 'how' of their repetition in the life of 'the single individual' is open. Though Kierkegaard does not assume the role nor the authority of the teacher, we come across an 1849 journal entry where he sees himself as if he is writing contra tempo: "I am like a chaplain in a monastery, charged with the cure of souls for hermits and the like – but I cannot have anything to do with the nonsense that nowadays is called piety and religiosity" (KJN 6, 165/NB12:45/SKS 22, 166 [1849]). The second aspect of the discourse literature, emerging out of anxiety, is 'trust'. For, if "the listener, with the help of the discourse and before God, in silence speaks in himself, with himself, to himself" (UDVS, 124/SKS 8, 225), equally he comes "on [his] own behalf [to] assist the discourse" (UDVS, 123/SKS 8, 223-224).

For these reasons, I find the opening paragraphs of the first discourse (1847) especially important; after the long quotation of the Gospel of Mt 6:24-34,

[453] Burton-Christie, *The Word in the Desert*, p. 150.
[454] Burton-Christie, *The Word in the Desert*, pp. 76-78.

Kierkegaard writes that the joyful message "addresses itself to those who are worried." He continues:

> It is clear that the message is itself doing [*gjør*] what it says the God does [*at gjøre*]: it takes upon itself the worried and has solicitude [*Omsorg*] for them—in the right way. Ah, how necessary this is [*gjøres*], because anyone who has cares [...] is perhaps also tempted to be impatiently unwilling to hear any human words about comfort and hope. (UDVS, 160/SKS 8, 260)

The literary figure of polyptoton, which takes place around the stem *gjør*, accounts for the self-reflective structure between the two clauses, the saying and doing. And, what the Gospel is doing is what Gospel says the God does, that is, by taking upon itself the worried one is effectuating a profound change: the abandoned one "by properly considering the lily, understands that he is not abandoned" (UDVS, 162/SKS 8, 282). Notably, the polyptoton is the figure essentially associated with difference-in-repetition. It is pertinent to draw attention to the fact that this passage follows after and echoes the polyptoton around the word 'tomorrow' at the end of the Matthean excerpt (6:34): "Therefore do not worry about tomorrow [*Morgen*]: tomorrow [*den Dag imorgen*] will worry about itself. Each day [*Dag*] has enough trouble of its own" (UDVS, 160/SKS 8, 260), as if every day is repeated, but it is different; what abides today is God's providing for man's needs. As said, this is an endeavour on Kierkegaard's part to concatenate the discourse with the Gospel.

However, if indeed the message is doing what it says the God does, why is the discourse needed? If there is a break in what the message proclaims to the worried one, how could the discourse redeem it? In this context of polyptotic repetition, the discourse does not aim to verify what God does but rearticulates the Gospel as "invitation and request" (UDVS, 162/SKS 8, 262).[455] Therefore, it is not a question of firstness or secondariness of the discourse in respect to the Gospel to the degree that the Kierkegaardian repetition of what it has been "makes the

[455] About the subjective, see G. Pattison, *Kierkegaard's Upbuilding Discourses*, pp. 155ff.

repetition into something new" (R, 149/SKS 4, 25). We will address this issue in the following sections.

A re-evaluation of the literal/metaphorical in the Discourses on the Lilies and the Birds.

In discussing the difference between the literal/nonliteral reading of the Bible, an issue upon which Kierkegaard ponders, Jolita Pons elucidates various aspects of "his sophisticated and complex view of the 'literal'."[456] For Kierkegaard, the Bible text is read literally when it becomes "concrete for an individual reader"[457] and it becomes concrete when it leads not to hermeneutical deliberation but when it translates into action. In this sense, Pons remarks, the meaning of the Gospel is reduplicated in the life of the individual when it acquires continuity and is expressed diachronically as suffering insofar as, for Kierkegaard, "becoming spirit" is itself suffering, "the most agonizing" of all (KJN 9, 29/NB26:25/SKS 25, 32 [1852]).[458] Second, a constant preoccupation throughout Kierkegaard's writings, notably in *Philosophical Fragments* and *Practice in Christianity*, regards the possibility of the reader taking offence at contradictions, paradoxes, harsh commandments or "obscure passages" (FSE, 29/SKS 13, 57) encountered in the Bible – let alone the paradox of the God-man. Pons argues that, according to Kierkegaard, resisting taking the Bible in earnestness the reader either evades into a figurative interpretation of the Bible or fails to attend to the text as it is "transformed or clarified [*forklaret*] by the spiritual dimension of the literal."[459]

[456] Jolita Pons, *Stealing a Gift: Kierkegaard's Pseudonyms and the Bible* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2004), p. 68.
[457] Pons, *Stealing a Gift,* p. 60.
[458] Pons, *Stealing a Gift,* pp. 61-62.
[459] Pons, *Stealing a Gift,* p. 64.

Stressing the interrelation of reading and action, Pons concludes:

> Kierkegaard's dialectical imagination keeps the meaning of the Bible in tension between its literary sense and its spiritual sense (forming a kind of oxymoron: spiritual literalness), and this tension assures a transition to action.[460]

The hybrid expression 'spiritual literalness' stands not for the undecidability of meaning but rather indicates that the reader appropriates the text with the maximum intensity and interiority which is never insulated from action; indeed, Kierkegaard defines interiority in terms of action. For example, Climacus elaborates in the *Postscript* that action does not reside in the external – no actual change can be effectuated in "the individual's inner existence" – since only the deepening of the existential passion could transform "existence in action." The claim that the individual cannot change herself undergirds the paradoxical equation that "the action of inwardness is suffering [...] suffering is the highest action in the inner life" (CUP, 362-363/SKS 7, 363-364). In other words, spiritual literalness names the unconditional obedience to God's Word.

By way of emphasis on the moment of decision, Pons argues, Kierkegaard is able to breach the hermeneutical circle, contra the hermeneutical tradition (i.e., Gadamer and Ricoeur), since there is not only meaning-conducive action but in fact, for Kierkegaard, "action also defines meaning."[461] However, it is not clear if action and meaning are the inner circles of the same problem, namely, the problem of how one begins to exist in the middle of existence. The word *Alvor* (Earnestness/Seriousness) that Kierkegaard uses frequently, whether in respect to the Gospel or to how one is related to its message, cuts across the fields of language and ethical praxis,[462] which ultimately corresponds to his conception of

[460] Pons, *Stealing a Gift,* p. 146.
[461] Pons, *Stealing a Gift,* p. 30.
[462] John J. Davenport underlines the ethical side of earnestness, a virtue that links sincerity with "a kind of volitional commitment" as opposed to double-mindedness. See John J. Davenport, "Earnestness," *Kierkegaard's Concepts: Classicism to Enthusiasm: Volume 15: Tome II*, Steven M. Emmanuel, William McDonald, Jon Stewart (eds.) (Farnham: Ashgate, 2014), p. 222.

Christianity not as a doctrine but as "existence-communication" and as "existence-contradiction" (CUP, 318/SKS 7, 345-346):

> In respect of doctrine, understanding is the maximum and becoming an adherent merely an artful way of pretending to understand practised by people who do not understand. Regarding an existence-communication, the maximum is existing in it and understanding merely to shirk the task. (CUP, 312, note b/SKS 7, 338)

Kierkegaard seems to advocate a straightforward response to the requirements of the Gospel. He writes: "It is all too easy to understand the requirement contained in God's Word ('Give all your goods to the poor'. 'If anyone strikes you on the right cheek, turn the left')" (FSE, 34/SKS 13, 61).[463] In a journal note dated from 1851 Kierkegaard, referring to the reading of the Bible, writes: "We leave out everything existential, acting literally as if it simply was not there; we do this literally; the ancients" – meaning the fathers of the early Church – "took absolutely literally [*bogstaveligt*] what was written there." Interestingly, he adds that "I am closer enough to the ancients than is the average person of today" to the degree that admitting that something is written in the Gospel is an act of confession and not an assertion of authority or the hermeneutical value of a particular reading (KJN 8, 263/NB23:118/SKS 24, 263-264 [1851]). Commenting on this passage Timothy Polk, basically in agreement with Pons, suggests that 'literal' and 'existential' are conflated here, as the emphasis lies upon "the text's performative power, its capacity to occasion a transformation within the reader."[464]

The problematic of literality versus figuration touches not only the reading of the Gospel in the Discourses on the lilies and the birds but the Discourses

[463] For comments on this passage, see Joel D.S. Rasmussen, "Kierkegaard's Biblical Hermeneutics: Imitation, Imaginative Freedom, and Paradoxical Fixation," *Kierkegaard and the Bible: Volume 1: Tome II: The New Testament*, Lee C. Barrett, Jon Stewart (eds.) (Farnham: Ashgate, 2010), pp. 273ff.

[464] Timothy Polk, "Kierkegaard's Use of the New Testament: Intertextuality, Indirect Communication, Appropriation," *Kierkegaard and the Bible: Volume 1: Tome II: The New Testament*, p. 242.

themselves; programmatically, the discourses open with the assertion that the Gospel, the joyful message, "is itself doing what it says the God does" (UDVS, 160/SKS 8, 259). They also unfold the question as to how to do what the Gospel says when it issues the commandment 'you shall become/you shall live like the lilies and bird' to the degree that those being addressed don't actually know how to live like the birds. While Kierkegaard explicitly writes that the birds and the lilies are insufficient metaphors and only signs, there is a notable shift in emphasis in the third set of discourses (1849). The commandment "you shall imitate them [*Du skal tage efter dem*], learn from them in all earnestness, that you shall become silent as the lily and the bird" (WA, 17/SKS 11, 22) becomes a stumbling block not when it is taken metaphorically but when it is taken literally. It is necessary thus to reconsider the place and type of metaphor that Kierkegaard employs or, put otherwise, what is at issue in this strange "like" of comparison. Secondly, Kierkegaard constructs a mobile text that changes as the reader changes and becomes more perfect: "…and if you have learned you have become the more perfect one, so that the lily and the bird change from being the teacher to being the metaphor [*bliver Billedet*]" (WA, 32/SKS 11, 36). Birds are first teachers because they unconditionally, literally, do what the Gospel says: "The lily and the bird have taken to heart the apostle Peter's words and, simple as they are, have taken to heart [*lagt sig paa Hjerte*] altogether literally – ah, and precisely this, that they take them altogether literally, it is precisely this that helps them" (WA, 41/SKS 11, 45). Between understanding and action, the Gospel's "upbringing" reverses the process in a way that "by unconditionally obeying he first comes to understand that it is as the Gospel says" (WA 35/SKS 11, 38). The urgency and unconditionality of obedience reminds us and reduplicates the withdrawal of the first monks to the desert upon hearing the Gospel, the beginning of the path of *ascesis,* as we have seen in the *Life of Antony*.

Extending these remarks, we observe that a twofold change is effected: not only is the reader being changed – "becoming spirit" – but the text is also "transfigured." The same twofold mobility resonates distinctively in a passage from *Works of Love* about the spiritual and the metaphorical, which attracted much

scholarly discussion. The passage begins by suggesting that metaphoricity is a default condition of all language about the spiritual, advocating a kind of Derridean "generalization of metaphoricity":[465] "All human speech, even the divine speech of Holy Scripture, about the spiritual is essentially metaphorical [*overført*, carried over] speech." This is in accordance with "the order of things and of existence" since the human being may be spirit "from the moment of birth" but the consciousness of being spirit arises later in the life of the individual. Regarding language, as with every sensuous-physical medium, when it "is taken over [*overtage*] by the spirit", Kierkegaard writes, "*it becomes the metaphorical*" of the spirit (WL, 209/SKS 9, 212). That is, with "the awaking of the spirit" language becomes metaphorical a second time. Next follows the third turn of Kierkegaard's argument: there is no "noticeable difference" between metaphorical language and the ordinary – or better the "pedestrian" (FT, 41/SKS 4, 136) – language if you are looking for a "merely sensate" one. The difference – "an infinite difference" – lies in the person who is to 'perceive' the metaphor insofar as only the spiritual person, "[t]he one [who] has made the transition [*Overgang*] or let himself be *carried over* [*føre over*] to the other side," having become herself the metaphorical, uses the words as 'transferred' while the sensate-physical person does not. Finally, having stated that "spirit is invisible," Kierkegaard concludes with a quasi-definition of spirit, which is already a well-constructed metaphor: "the spirit's manner [*Væsen*] is the metaphor's quiet, whispering secret - for the person who has the ears to hear" (WL, 210/SKS 9, 213).[466]

There are a number of notable points here. Most telling is the absence of the 'literal' from the definitional horizon of 'the metaphorical', although the paragraph prefaces the subsequent comparison between the literal and the spiritual sense of the phrase 'to build up' (WL, 210/SKS 9, 213). In this matter, despite Kierkegaard relying heavily on the etymological connotation of the verb

[465] Jacques Derrida, "White Metaphor: Metaphor in the Text of Philosophy," *Margins of Philosophy*, Alan Bass (trans.) (Brighton: Harvester Press, 1982), p. 262.

[466] The secret can be kept by both metaphoric and literal language. Derrida speaks of "a secret narrative which nothing assures us will lead us back to the proper name" (Derrida, "White Mythology," p. 243).

"overføre [carry over]," it is tempting to consider whether, if he was writing "all human speech, even the divine speech of Holy Scripture, about the spiritual is literal," the core of his argument would be disturbed. Relatedly, the spiritual/Spirit from being the referent of language at the opening of paragraph comes at the end to condition all language. The spiritual thus is not subsumed under the binary literal/nonliteral because this very difference is rendered indifferent. Paradoxically, indifference stems from love's interest, for "spiritually, love is the ground of everything" (WL, 224/SKS 9, 226). When it comes to language or deed, there is no opposite: "There is nothing, nothing at all, that cannot be done or said in such a way that it becomes upbuilding, but whatever it is, if it is upbuilding, then love is present" (WL, 212/SKS 9, 215).[467] The 'real' difference resides in "the singular context in which the word is spoken, and in the singular heart, the singular intention with which it is spoken."[468] But the singular puts forth a challenge for theories of metaphor which, either advocate a passage to meaning, concept, or reconfiguration of world-meaning (Ricoeur), or, in contrast, affirm the impossibility of such completion (Derrida).

A comparison with the Aristotelian elaboration of *metapherein* reveals further undertones of Kierkegaard's account of metaphor. Aristotle writes in his *Poetics* that making a metaphor is a gift not "learnt from others; and it is also a sign of a genius, since a good metaphor implies an intuitive perception of the similarity in dissimilars [*τὸ γὰρ εὖ μεταφέρειν τὸ τὸ ὅμοιον θεωρεῖν ἐστιν*]" (*Poetics* 1459a 7-8). Drawing attention to the fact that Aristotle uses a verb ("to metaphorize well/*εὖ μεταφέρειν*") instead of a noun, Ricoeur remarks that in metaphorizing the "process prevails over result."[469] We will come back to this point later, but it is evident that Kierkegaard here is not concerned with how to construct a good metaphor, although, arguably, his authorship is rife with metaphors, parables, and various analogical tropes. The eclipse of *theoria*/contemplation, the presence of *Overgang*

[467] With regard to the language of upbuilding, see George Pattison, *Kierkegaard's Upbuilding Discourses*, pp. 134-138.
[468] George Pattison, *Kierkegaard's Upbuilding Discourses*, p. 135.
[469] Paul Ricoeur, *The Rule of Metaphor: The Creation of Meaning in Language*, Robert Czerny (trans.) (London and New York: Routledge, 1978), p. 25.

[transition] in this paragraph, a concept that recurs in various contexts in his writings, the alternating between passive and active forms of transition, suggests that there is a non-representational moment in metaphor or in metaphorical movement as such.

Hegel passingly refers to metaphor as transference in a few paragraphs in *Aesthetics*, which gained focus after Derrida's engagement with them. Initially, Hegel avers that metaphors "arise from the fact that a word which originally signifies only something sensuous is carried over into the spiritual sphere." Subsequently, he describes the process of literalization of metaphor as a loss and substitution of the sensuous "for the spiritual meaning." By usage and "by custom" in the life of language, Hegel continues, the original, sensuous meaning is forgotten, a loss counterpoised by the transparency of the image: "image and meaning are no longer distinguished, the image directly affords only the abstract meaning itself instead of a concrete picture."[470] However, "the invention of new metaphors," a kind of enlivening of metaphor, is the work of poetic imagination whereby, "in transferring, in an illustrative way," the sensuous, if indeed properly "imaged" in a higher, spiritual forms, "is elevated and ennobled." Through metaphor, "conversely, something spiritual is also brought nearer to our vision through the picture of natural object."[471] The thrust behind the creation of metaphors is that spirit revels "into the contemplation of cognate objects" by a kind of plunging movement while it exerts its freedom from every external representation it forms.[472] The inherent negativity of the metaphorical image procures the possibility of its transcendence. For Derrida, "the movement of metaphorization," as evinced in Hegel's *Aesthetics*, "(origin and then erasure of the metaphor, transition from the sensory meaning to the proper spiritual meaning by means of the figures) is nothing other than a movement of idealization."[473] More importantly, Hegel's text, in Derrida's reading, adumbrates metaphor as belonging

[470] Hegel, *Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art*, Vol. 1, T. M. Knox (trans.) (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), p. 404. See also Samuel IJsseling's Chapter "Philosophy and Metaphor," in *Rhetoric and Philosophy in Conflict: An Historical Survey* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 2008), pp. 115-126.
[471] Hegel, *Aesthetics*, p. 405.
[472] Hegel, *Aesthetics*, p. 407.
[473] Derrida, "White Mythology," p. 226.

to the linguistic mechanics of metaphysics, in the sense that it separates and mediates between metaphysical opposites (sensible/intelligible, sensuous/spiritual, interior/exterior etc.).

Along these lines, David Kangas, writing about the 1843 Upbuilding Discourses on James 1:17-22, argues that, when Kierkegaard claims that the gift and the father in the Epistle of James are not to be read as metaphors but as "expressions of actuality," this does not entail "a forgetfulness of its status as an image,"[474] something, as we have seen, Hegel upholds in his *Aesthetics*. Kierkegaard's critique of metaphor goes hand in hand with the displacement of Hegel's mediation. Kangas in order to make sense of the distinctive way that Kierkegaard 'hears' the Gospel text proposes calling 'the gift' and 'the father' "absolute figures," "an impure concept" as he concedes.[475] He concludes that the literality of these expressions "is no longer the opposite of a figurality" since there is nothing more original or proper that precedes them.[476] This is an important remark; it proves that Kierkegaard's texts put pressure and deviate from the traditional theories of metaphor as analogy.

Jamie Lorentzen's study *Kierkegaard's Metaphors* considers metaphor as an important aspect of Kierkegaard's indirect communication and underlines the transformative power of metaphor. Concerning the theoretical framework, Lorentzen employs – without proper acknowledgement – the terminological distinction I.A. Richards introduced between "vehicle and tenor" as constitutive parts of a metaphor, with the first being "the image," "the figure" while the latter defines "the underlying idea" to which the qualities of the figure are transferred and attributed.[477] Further, Richards fosters "the interaction" of the vehicle and the tenor to the degree that neither of them remains unaltered inside a metaphor and

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[474] David Kangas, "The Logic of Gift in Kierkegaard's Four Upbuilding Discourses (1843)," *Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook* (2000), p. 111.

[475] David Kangas, "The Logic of Gift in Kierkegaard's Four Upbuilding Discourses (1843)," p. 101.

[476] David Kangas, "The Logic of Gift in Kierkegaard's Four Upbuilding Discourses (1843)," p. 111.

[477] I.A. Richards, "The Philosophy of Rhetoric," *Philosophical Perspectives on Metaphor*, Mark Johnson (ed.) (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1981), pp. 52-53 (Originally published in 1936). It should be noted that Richards deems the dismembering of metaphor into "image" and "what it resembles" as inadequate, hence his introduction of the new terms.

by this tension, a new meaning is created.[478] According to Lorentzen's reading, leaving behind the aesthetic stage where metaphors are nothing more than peregrinations of imagination in the field of infinite possibilities, the reader is called to the task of appropriating the existential meaning communicated in the metaphor, "meaning bound up in ethical-religious practice, action, and actuality."[479] Lorentzen argues that Kierkegaard advances "a religious literalization of metaphor," that is, he "collapses tenor into vehicle and, in radical collision, renders the metaphorical literal," as, for instance, when one literally sees the "finger of God" in his life (EUD, 276/SKS 5, 270).[480] The annulment of metaphor is an absolute necessity in the religious sphere so as the reader "stand[s] unmediated in existence before eternity."[481] With the metaphor serving as a mediating factor between "the existing individual and the absolute faith in the paradox of Jesus Christ, which Kierkegaard calls 'the absurd',"[482] the task of Christianity as well as the paradox of God-Man become blunt. Hence, the neutralization of metaphor will retrieve the lost immediacy "in order to witness or existentially experience *its full referentiality*."[483] This is the most disconcerting part of Lorentzen's argument since it assumes that out of the ruins of metaphor a clear-cut referent unproblematically arises and is there to be appropriated existentially by the reader. As George Pattison notes, "the spiritual aspect of language is not available as something present here and now, 'behind' the surface of sensuous manifestation, as it were. The fullness of meaning belongs to a time that is not our time, to the absolute future, the eschaton."[484] Second, Kierkegaard rather problematizes both the notion of appropriation and the process of literalization of metaphor; the boundaries between the literal and figurative become porous and unstable and the call to read

[478] I.A. Richards, "The Philosophy of Rhetoric," p. 55.
[479] Jamie Lorentzen, *Kierkegaard's Metaphors* (Macon GA: Mercer University Press, 2001), p. 129.
[480] Lorentzen, p. 131.
[481] Lorentzen, p. 134.
[482] Lorentzen, p. 142.
[483] Lorentzen, p. 147 (emphasis added). Ronald L. Hall rightly criticizes Lorentzen that he offers a "'Platonic' reading" of Kierkegaard's metaphors and analogies. See Ronald L. Hall, Book Review of Jamie Lorentzen, *Kierkegaard's Metaphors*, in *International Journal for Philosophy of Religion* 53:2 (2003), pp. 119-122.
[484] George Pattison, *Kierkegaard's Upbuilding Discourses,* pp. 133-134.

the literal in the figurative while fully recognizing the metaphorical core of language instead intensifies the paradox, making strange its constitutive elements.

Lorentzen's study reiterates the terms under which the discussion about the metaphoric and the spiritual is taking place as well as the dominant hermeneutical gesture which treat the birds and the lilies as a metaphorical shifter, as middle terms that should be cast away. Second, it helps to situate the discussion of metaphor in Kierkegaard in the larger context of the dialogue between Ricoeur and Derrida on the metaphor and to rethink its relation to the issue of immediacy/mediation in Kierkegaard.

Concluding this section, it is worth presenting Mieke Bal's theoretical take on metaphor which comes from the area of contemporary art. Appositely, Bal articulates the concerns regarding the status of metaphor in political art by considering Doris Salcedo's sculptural installation.[485] Coining the neologism "to metaphor," which carries strong verbal connotations, she theorizes metaphor as action and performance by which both the artist and the reader or viewer intervene in the world. In particular, "the productivity of the metaphoric comes from a focus on *singularity* as something transferable: from singular to singular,"[486] meaning the singular conditions out of which the work emerges to the singularity of its reception. Instead of mediating between the singular and the general as the traditional construal of metaphor seeks, something that, according to Bal, leads to exemplarity and generalization, *metaphoring* transfers "a preoccupation that requires re-enactment in each event of occurrence" rather than a referential meaning.[487] What undergirds the possibility of re-enactment is (a) "non-representationalistic, 'performatist' the view of language" and (b) the emphasis on affectivity, that is, the possibility of one "to undergo the affect of this work to relate

[485] Salcedo's work *Atrabiliarios* (1991) places in small niches in the wall personal items, organic materials that function as traces of missing people, victims of political violence.

[486] Mieke Bal, *Of What One Cannot Speak: Doris Salcedo's Political Art* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010), p. 32.

[487] Mieke Bal, "Metaphoring: Making a Niche of Negative Space," *Metaphoricity and the Politics of Mobility*, Special issue of *Thamyris/Intersecting* 12, Maria Margaroni and Effie Yiannopoulou (eds.) (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2006), p. 165.

to it, if one takes it, in a strong sense, literally,"[488] entailing the "impossibility of separating metaphor from literality."[489] The *metaphoring* from singularity to singularity requires the activity of the reader or the viewer, whereby she/he assumes agency as a political subject. The Kierkegaardian concept of repetition is not unknown to Bal; in fact, repetition is closely related to performance to the degree that performance "*is* not; it occurs."[490]

Bal's *metaphoring* opens the possibility of reading Kierkegaard's metaphors not as static images but as singular events of re-enactment (as, for example, the obedience of lily, the joy of the bird) that intend not to convey meanings or abstractions (i.e., the bird means or represents X) but to initiate the affective transformation of the reader.

[488] Mieke Bal, "Metaphoring: Making a Niche of Negative Space," pp. 164-165.
[489] Mieke Bal, "Metaphoring: Making a Niche of Negative Space," p. 169.
[490] Mieke Bal, *Endless Andness: The Politics of Abstraction According to Ann Veronica Janssens* (London and New York: Bloomsbury, 2013), pp. 18-19.

Chapter 7

Rest in Kierkegaard (2)

A map of relations against the model of analogy

One of Kierkegaard's earliest references to Heb 4:9-11 is found in his notes of H.N. Clausen's Lectures on Christian Dogmatics that Kierkegaard attended as a student at Copenhagen University. Two things are of interest here: first, Kierkegaard cites the original Greek "κατάπαυσις" untranslated, with the note that "καταπαυςις [sic] is not to be understood in terms of the soul sleeping [*Sjelesøvn*] but in terms of happiness [*Lyksalighed*]" (KJN 3, 23/Not 1:6/SKS 19, 28 [1833-34]). Further, he disassociates the notion of κατάπαυσις from *psychopannychia* (ψυχοπαννυχια), according to which the soul falls into an unconscious sleep after death (KJN 3, 25/NB 1:6/SKS 19, 30), and thus rest is regarded as an intermediate state between death and resurrection. The context of this note is the doctrine of immortality and the resurrection. In this regard, Kierkegaard writes: "The Christian doctrine does not allow any disruption of hum. life and activity [*Virksomhed*] by death" (KJN 3, 23/Not 1:6/SKS 19, 28). With the absence of an intermediate state, the continuity of human personality before and after resurrection is safeguarded but there is the difficulty of how this continuity coheres with the doctrine of the judgement and the second coming. Relatedly, there is the paradox of reconciling the conception of temporal sequence of one's life with the suddenness of the event of the resurrection. Clausen does not cite or elaborate on the aforementioned passage from the Hebrews in his *Christian Dogmatics*, but he refers to the doctrine of the soul-sleeping as a long period of rest [*Hviletid*],[491] a teaching that stems from the eschatological interpretation of passages found in Revelation ("they will rest from their labors" [Rev 14:13]) or in John 9:4 ("We must work the works of him who sent me while it is day; night is coming when no one

[491] H.N. Clausen, *Christelig Troeslære*, pp. 472-478.

can work").[492] The latter verse comes from the parable of the healing of the man born blind on a Sabbath day, a text that lies at the core of Sabbath theology.

Anticipating the discussion of this passage in the following section, it is noteworthy how Kierkegaard appropriates John's verse (Jn 9:4) in the discourse entitled "Love is the Fulfilling of the Law" in *Works of Love* (1847) – a deliberation on Romans 13.10:

> Christ's life was sheer love, and yet his whole life was only one single working day; he did not rest before *that* night came when he *could* no longer work [Jn 9:4]. Prior to that time his work did not change with the alteration of day and night, for if he was not working he watched in prayer. (WL, 100/SKS 9, 105, emphasis in the original)

The work of salvation, as a work of love, 'extends' to one working day since it cannot be measured according to the division and succession of day/night. More importantly, Kierkegaard writes, Christ's love "was equally present in every moment, not greater when he expired upon the cross than when he was let himself born" (WL, 100/SKS 9, 104). Christ's life, insofar as "[i]n him love was sheer action" (WL, 99/SKS 9, 104), acts upon the ordinary dispensation of time. His whole life paradoxically is rendered as a workday by virtue of love's presence in every moment. This claim is better understood in light of Kierkegaard's remark that love is "eternity's bond" as it truly "connects the temporal and the eternal" (WL, 6/SKS 9, 14).

Secondly, Kierkegaard's variation on John's verse seems to neatly flow into Rom. 13. 11-12 ("For salvation is nearer to us now than when we became believers; the night is far gone, the day is near"), suggesting that now a new economy – between time and eternity, work and rest, life and death – has been inaugurated and that the believer lives in this "one working day" of Christ. How is one posited

[492] *Christelig Troeslære*, pp. 472-473.

in relation to Christ's workday and to God's eternity? Due to human frailty, Kierkegaard writes, "in relation to God, every person begins with an infinite debt" of love so much so that even in beginning to seek God's Kingdom one is "infinitely far removed from *first* seeking God's kingdom" since "God is an eternity ahead" (WL, 102/SKS 9, 106). In the same vein, we are to imitate the sheer action of love, which was Christ's life, by constantly being in the debt of love. Christ's workday is expressed in our life as "the continuance of love throughout the duration of time" (WL, 132/SKS 9, 134), when our life appears as "simultaneously and at every moment lying at death's door and, upright, having to walk forward" and then to "to have a future," to persevere (WL, 133/SKS 9, 135).[493] Two interrelated temporal modalities, providing that the temporal life is viewed in relation to the eternal, emerge here: "infinite distance" (WL, 102/SKS 9, 107) from fulfilling the infinite debt of love and continuance/duration through time.[494]

Kierkegaard obsessively returns, in the discourses on the lilies and the birds in particular, to the refrain phrase "this very day" (Lk 23:43),[495] which could either convey the notion of "being present to oneself," attention to and recollection of the self through practice, or urgency, continuity in perseverance, unchangeability of God and possibility of grace. Via the trope of "become-like-the lilies and the birds" Kierkegaard explores both the exigency of discipleship and the relation of time to eternity. Because of this double scope, Kierkegaard takes up the strands of insights from texts such as *Philosophical Fragments* and *The Concept of Anxiety* offering a

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[493] It is not surprising that Kierkegaard resuscitates the paradoxicality of the flying arrow together with these images of fall or lying dead and walking upright, especially since the discourse is about the Law as the downfall of man and the Christ as the downfall of the Law (WL, 99/SKS 9, 104). We may trace the origins of this contradiction to the wondrous walking of the knight of faith. However, there is a shift here that is critical; the knight of faith is the one that is "a dying man." Kierkegaard writes in his journal in 1855: "But to be a Christian means to be a dying man in the state of dying (you must die to yourself, hate yourself) – and then to live, perhaps 40 years in this state." He goes on to compare this state to the suffering of an animal during vivisection: "We shrink from reading about what an animal used for vivisection has to suffer; yet this is only a short-lived picture of the suffering of being a Christian: to be kept alive in the state of death" (*Pap*. 574/XI2 A 422/SKS 27, 672). This vision is already present in the discourse about the lilies and the birds, namely, in the question of perishability in nature: "Is this life or is it death?" (UDVS, 202/SKS 8, 298).

[494] For an extensive discussion of the relation between love, time, and the ethical implications, see Arne Grøn, "A Time and History," *The Oxford Handbook of Kierkegaard*, pp. 286-290.

[495] Lk 23:43: "He replied, 'Truly I tell you, today [*σήμερον*] you will be with me in Paradise'" (NRSV). It is variously translated as "today" or "this very day."

discourse that verges upon a virtual textbook of ascetic virtues and practices to be written, linking the ideality of Christian requirements proclaimed from the pulpit on Sundays with the madness of practical life (KJN 5, 171/NB8:43/SKS 21,164 [1848]). The most accurate description of this writing is found in Kierkegaard's notebooks where he sets forth the production of cartography as a fitting analogue for his writing work:

> With my writings I hope to achieve this: to bequeath so accurate a depiction of Christianity and its relationship to the world that a noble-minded, inspired young person will be able to find in it a map of relationships [*Kaart over Forholdene*] that is as accurate as any topographical map produced by the most famous institutes. I have not had the assistance of such an author. The teachers of the ancient Church were lacking in one aspect: they did not know the world. (KJN 5, 183-184/NB8:73/SKS 21, 176 [1848])

Kierkegaard previously used the analogy of the map as a means of deprecating abstract thought for disregarding the concrete, temporal existence. In *Concluding Unscientific Postscript*, he writes: "Having to exist under the guidance of pure thought is like travelling in Denmark with a small map of Europe" (CUP, 260/SKS 7, 283).[496] Elsewhere, he calls "the moment of contemplation" as "counterfeited eternity" (UDVS, 72/SKS 8, 179-180); like the abstractness of a map, the closing off of the self into a completed eternity equates to walking away from the actuality of life. Whether 'not knowing the world' means monastic withdrawal from the world or self-renunciation, Kierkegaard's underlying conviction is that there can be no indication or definition of the road "in the spiritual sense." The road "does exist" and yet "it comes into existence with each individual who walks on it; the road is: *how* it is walked" (UDVS, 289/SKS 8, 384). And when "the Gospel says to the learner, 'Go and do likewise'" (UDVS, 290/SKS 8, 385) contained in this exhortation

[496] Cf. an early note on the uses of maps by philosophers to depict Christianity: "It is unfortunate for the philosophers that re Xnty they use continental maps when they should use a local map; *for every dogma is nothing but a more concrete epitome* of the common hum. consciousness" (KJN 2, 27/EE:80/SKS 18, 31-32 [22 May 39]).

is that not only the Gospel should be read as a map but the learner should draw his own roads and maps. As Kierkegaard writes in the Preface at "Two Discourses at the Communion on Fridays" (1851), he perceived himself as "a singular kind of poet and thinker who, *without authority*, has had nothing new to bring but 'has wanted once again to read through, if possible in a more inward way, the original text [*Urskrift*] of individual human existence-relationships, the old familiar text handed down from the fathers'" (WA, 165/SKS 12, 281).

As I understand it, a map of human existence-relationships does not involve an ordering of the spatio-temporal or representing the world. It is rather an immersion and charting of this area of "Go and do likewise" or the "bird's carefree flight." The production of map is without authority since it does not preclude the possibility of new maps or existence-relations and every new mapping produces new forms of life which come into existence "with each individual who walks on it." I follow here Deleuze's introduction of maps and cartographies into philosophical vocabulary. Deleuze writes that "what distinguishes the map from the tracing is that it is entirely orientated towards an experimentation in contact with the real." Secondly, "the map is open and connectable in all of its dimensions; it is detachable, reversible, susceptible to constant modification." A map could be "reversed" or "reworked" by any individual or group of people; further, it can be "constructed as a political action or a meditation." The map resists being reduced to a representation of what is already there or to other mimetic structures (identity, analogy, resemblance) since it "has to do with performance."[497] Aside from a likely comparison of mapping with Kierkegaard's experimental novel like *Repetition*, the Deleuzean concept of map or cartography is useful because it is invested with a function that is not that of representation: a map "does not function to represent, even something real, but rather constructs a real that is yet to come, a new type of reality."[498] A map as an agent of constructing what is yet to come is inextricably

[497] Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, p. 12. For more on maps, diagrams, and becoming in Deleuze, see Simon O' Sullivan, "Memories of a Deleuzian: To Think is Always to Follow the Witches' Flight," *A Thousand Plateaus and Philosophy,* Henry Somers-Hall, Jeffrey A. Bell, James Williams (eds.) (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2018), pp. 172-189.

[498] Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus,* p. 142.

linked with the notion of 'becoming' and creation. The advantage of employing the concept of the map in reading Kierkegaard's discourses affords the ability of exploration of how the different planes, the plane of the discourse and its listener and the plane of the Gospel and its reader, relate and respond to its other focusing on the configuration of God-man-the birds and the lilies in a non-hierarchical manner. This cartographic approach leads away from viewing the 'becoming like the lilies and the birds' as a linguistic construction instead of appreciating it as a mode of action and comportment.

Reading "The Care of the Pagans," the first part of *Christian Discourses* (1848), the reader is immediately presented with a topography of high and low, where the Christian is positioned higher than the birds and the lilies whereas the pagans are lower than the birds and the lilies with respect to their comportment in life. The resemblance to the prototype that is Christ becomes the measure of distance and proximity, with the birds and the lilies as surrogate teachers being at once the perfect and imperfect analogue to the true teacher. This topography accords with readings in secondary literature that are based on the hermeneutical model of analogy. As I have already indicated, Kierkegaard intends to wrench out the reader into this area where "the worried person is free of any and all co-knowledge [*Medviden*], except God's, his own – and the lilies" (UDVS, 162/SKS 8, 261) and to map out "a zone of proximity"[499] whereby the becoming like a bird is possible.

I would not go into details on Kierkegaard's concept of co-knowledge/co-consciousness[500] but this is a rare instance in his authorship that he adds a third

[499] Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, p. 273.

[500] Kierkegaard uses the word *Samvittighed* for "conscience" and more rarely the cognates *Samviden* and *Medviden,* translated as "co-knowledge/knowledge with" or "co-consciousness/complicity" (See Niels Thulstrup, *Commentary on Kierkegaard's Concluding Unscientific Postscript: With a new introduction*, Robert J. Widenmann [trans.] [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984], pp. 240-241). The term was used by H.L. Martensen with reference to the possibility of participating in God's knowledge insofar as God knows man since God knows the world and man in his own consciousness. Conversely, the human being in its self-consciousness knows God and itself as God's creature when enlightened by the divine consciousness as its immediate source. Co-knowledge then expresses this fundamental relation between the human and the divine: "God, who is thought by us, consequently thinks the Godself in us" (See H. L. Martensen, "The Autonomy of Human Self-Consciousness in Modern Dogmatic Theology," in *Between*

factor – the lilies – in this equation between God and human. Considering the context of this passage, the withdrawal of the worried person from crumbling comparisons intensifies her relatedness to God and to herself by turning her attention to the lilies and the birds. Vigilance and attentiveness [*Agt*] are preparatory steps towards upbuilding in a way analogous to the steps before confession. Hence, Kierkegaard writes in "An Occasional Discourse" (Part I of *Upbuilding Discourse in Various Spirits*) that the one who is confessing collects her mind from multiplicity seeking "to interrupt the pace of busy activity in order to put on the repose of contemplation in unity with oneself" (UDVS 19/SKS 8, 134). The quietness [*Stilhed*] in which the person is hidden, "to become disclosed" (UDVS, 20/SKS 8, 134-135) differs from the poetic notion of "quiet places" that captivate the mind.[501] The half-sleeping state corresponds to the image of the ocean that "runs deep, it indeed knows what it knows; the one who runs deep always knows that, but it has no co-knowledge" (UDVS, 21/SKS 8, 135). What kind of co-knowledge could the birds offer to the worried one?

What Kierkegaard aims at here is more clearly articulated in the first discourse of *Judge for Yourself!* (written in 1851-52, published posthumously in 1876), "Becoming Sober." The title is a reference is to 1 Peter 4:7 ("But the end of all things is at hand: be ye therefore sober, and watch unto prayer").[502] What constitutes sobriety for Kierkegaard comes down to two propositions: a) "*to come to oneself in self-knowledge and before God as nothing before him, yet infinitely, unconditionally engaged*" (JFY, 104/SKS 16, 160) b) "*to come close to oneself in one's understanding, in one's knowing that all one's understanding becomes action*" (JFY,

Hegel and Kierkegaard: Hans L. Martensen's Philosophy of Religion, C. J. Thompson and D. J. Kangas [trans. and eds.] [Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press, 1997], p. 83. See also George Pattison, *Kierkegaard and the Theology of the Nineteenth Century*, pp. 47-56).

[501] On this point, see Christopher B. Barnett, *From Despair to Faith: The Spirituality of Soren Kierkegaard* (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2014), pp. 123-124.

[502] 1 Pet 4:7–11 is read on the sixth Sunday after Easter. The verse is cited multiple times throughout his authorship and, as the SKS Commentary informs us, Kierkegaard has underlined in his own copy of *Forordnet Alter-Bog for Danmark* [Prescribed Service Book for Denmark] the words "therefore sober" and "unto prayer" (see KJN 7, 518/NB15:19/SKSK 23, 19 [1850]). "In the spiritual sense, in order to be sober what is required, first and foremost, is the most thoroughly reflective isolation of oneself as an individual before God, alone before God; also the pure impression of the ethical and of what is ethically important, a clear and thoroughly examined consciousness of one's own actual condition" (KJN 8, 173/NB22:140/SKS 24, 175 [1851]).

115/ SKS 16, 170). Understanding and self-knowledge are not framed in terms of consciousness but in terms of "sheer transparency" (JFY, 105/SKS 16, 160) and action. When in the second part of *Judge for Yourself*! ("Christ as a Prototype, or No One Can Serve Two Masters") Kierkegaard takes up the exploration of the theme of attentiveness to the lilies and the birds and the imitation of Christ as the prototype (JFY, 179ff/SKS 16, 227), he concludes that the Gospel incites "to venture a decisive act" (JFY, 191/SKS 16, 238). Relation to the unconditioned and decisive action are the 'conditions' of one's striving to become "heterogeneous with the life of this world" (JFY, 191/SKS 16, 238), i.e., to become true imitator of Christ. His Kingdom is not of this world but "he remained in the world" (JFS, 168/SKS 16, 217).

Thus far, Kierkegaard has accommodated distinctive virtues and practices that belong to the repertoire of ascetical/mystical tradition: withdrawal (*ἀναχώρησις*), attentiveness (*προσοχή*), stillness (*ἡσυχία*) sobriety/watchfulness (*νῆψις*), the practice/memory of death. These practices contribute to the formation of the ascetics whether in monastic communities or in solitary retreat. This study has taken the writings of Ps-Macarius as paradigmatic case. From the viewpoint of neptic tradition, in which the prayer of the heart flourished, Kallistos Ware writes that *hesychia* not only as an external situation of space but as an inner state is associated with *neptis*, spiritual sobriety. "The hesychast," he continues, "cease from his own activity, not in order to be idle, but in order to enter into the activity of God. His silence is not vacant and negative – blank pause between words, a short rest before resuming speech – but intensely positive: an attitude of alert attentiveness, of vigilance, and above all of *listening*."[503] Repentance is the starting point of a spiritual effort that leads to wakefulness and self-knowledge, as the prodigal son repenting says that "he came to himself" (Lk 15:17).[504] Inner vigilance and recollection of mind from scattered thoughts means "to be *present where we are* – at this specific point in space, at this particular moment in time,"[505] which actually grows our openness to the needs of the others. It should be noted that the ascetic literature and its emphasis on 'today' adds to the liturgical vision of "all-

[503] Kallistos Ware, *Inner Kingdom*, p. 97.
[504] Kallistos Ware, *The Orthodox Way* (Crestwood, NY: St Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1986), p. 152.
[505] Ware, *The Orthodox Way*, p. 153.

embracing *today* of Christ" that Schmemann offers and from whose liturgical theology ascetic monasticism was ostracized.[506]

This inventory of practices is common in several ascetic traditions, particularly in those in which the guarding of the heart and inward prayer are perceived as stages on the way to transformation of the self and contemplation of God. There is a general consensus that Kierkegaard draws a number of recurrent themes, metaphors, and concepts (imitation of Christ, renunciation, 'dying to', transparency, the mirror of the soul) on a vast corpus of mystical and devotional literature and most probably he encountered these practices we discussed there.[507] His appraisal of monasticism is ambivalent. For example, he concurs that Medieval monasticism "conceived of Christianity along the lines of action, life, existence-transformation" but he mocks the antics of 'action', i.e., "crawling on one's knees" (JFY, 192/SKS 16, 238-239). In a journal entry from 1854, he comments:

> …asceticism and everything pertaining to it is merely a preliminary step, a precondition, for being able to be a witness to the truth. […] Thus the error of the Middle Ages was not the monastery and asceticism, but the error, fundamentally, was that worldliness had triumphed by regarding the monk as an extraordinary Xn. No, first, asceticism—which is gymnastics—then the witness to the truth, which quite simple is being a Christian […]. (KJN 9, 348-349/NB29:85/SKS 25, 345 [1854])

Evidently, the distinction between the extraordinary Christian (the monk) and the ordinary Christian introduces a kind of elitism in the spiritual life and devalues Christianity by shackling it to the complacency of the present age. True

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[506] Regarding Schmemann's liturgical theology and his distaste for monasticism, Andrew Louth observes that the emphasis on the liturgical piety comes along with an unjustified depreciation of "individual piety, understood as *individualistic piety*" underlining the importance of "hold[ing] together the ascetic piety of the *Philokalia* and the liturgical piety focused on eucharistic participation" (Andrew Louth, *Modern Orthodox Thinkers: From the* Philokalia *to the Present* [Downer Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2015], p. 208).

[507] See Peter Šajda, "Kierkegaard's Mystical and Spiritual Sources: Meister Eckhart to Tersteegen," *A Companion to Kierkegaard* (Blackwell Companions to Philosophy), Jon Stewart (ed.) (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2015), pp. 167-179. See also the first chapter "Kierkegaard as Spiritual Writer" in Christopher B. Barnett, *From Despair to Faith*, pp. 1-24.

Christianity instead relates inversely to the values and sagacity of the world. The call for retreat back to the monastery[508] does not intend to reinstitute an age that is long "vanished" (JFY, 168/SKS 16, 217), but it could function as an embankment for resistance against the secularization, the Christendom, the established order, as Kierkegaard insists.

There are different models of piety or forms of life that are compared in JFS: the monastic piety "that seeks a solitary hiding place far from the world's noise and its distractions and their dangers, in order, if possible, to serve God alone in deep stillness" (JFY, 168/SKS 16, 217); the piety of the present age that lives "in complete conformity with a secular mentality"; and the highest exemplar of life set by the prototype, that is, to be "unconditionally heterogeneous with the world" while remaining in the world (JFY, 169/SKS 16, 218). To elucidate my argument, I want to focus on two sermons on the sixth Sunday after Easter, one by Tauler on 1 Pet 7-11 and the other by Mynster on Jn 15:26–16:4. After the initial exhortation to examine her whole life and to consider her soul with care whether God dwells in it, Tauler refers to the quintessential dispositions of the soul: "detachment, self-renunciation, the interior spirit, union with God."[509] He advises: "And again the Apostle bids us to be 'prudent and watch in prayers' [1 Pet 7], that is, not to be so dull as to rest in anything that is not God; to keep the light of piety brightly burning; to keep a vigilant outlook over ourselves; always to long for God."[510] In his 1849 sermon, Mynster incites the congregation to "seek refuge from them [the hard times]" and claims that God procures "the internal peace, the peace of the heart" when the outer peace is ruptured.[511] He further avers: "out there in the streets and

[508] See KJN 9, 408-9/NB30:26/SKS 25, 403-404.

[509] Tauler, "Sermon on the Sunday after the Ascension," in *The Sermons and Conferences of John Tauler: being his spiritual doctrine*, Walter Elliott (trans. and intro) (Washington DC: Apostolic Mission House, 2010), p. 317. See the German edition in Kierkegaard's library: *Johann Tauler's Predigten auf alle Sonn- und Festtage im Jahr: zur Beförderung eines christlichen Sinnes und gottseligen Wandels*, Vol 3, Ed. Kuntze und J.H.R. Biesenthal (eds.) (Berlin: August Hirschwald, 1841–2) (ACKL 245–246; cf. ACKL 247), p. 149.

[510] J. Tauler, "Sermon on the Sunday after the Ascension," p. 320/*Johann Tauler's Predigten auf alle Sonn- und Festtage im Jahr: zur Beförderung eines christlichen Sinnes und gottseligen Wandels*, p. 153.

[511] Mynster, "Fred og Glæde hos vor Herre og Frelser. Paa siette Søndag efter Paaske" [Peace and Joy with Our Lord and Savior: For the Sixth Sunday after Easter], in *Prædikener holdte I Aarene 1849*

alleys, in the society of this world, it does not do any good to say it, but here in this holy place, in an assembly of those who confess him, here we dare say it, and want to say it: here with our Lord and Savior."[512] In a contemporaneous journal note, Kierkegaard was astounded by this denigration of Christian proclamation. He calls Mynster's sermons "a deception [...] and fraud (like his sermon in the quiet place, where everything is theatrical)" for presenting a comforting picture of Christianity (KJN 6, 35/NB11:61/SKS 22, 39 [1849]). One may ask if preaching about the inner peace of the heart is relevant after 1848.[513] By contrast, when Kierkegaard talks about spiritual sobriety and self-examination opens the inquiry into "How does actuality looks? Where are we? Where are we? What is the situation in Christendom?" (JFS, 123/SKS 16, 178). The undercurrent of polemic against Mynster present in *Judge for Yourself!* bursts out in his later writing in the *Fatherland* in which Kierkegaard reiterates that Christianity is heterogeneous to the world and from this standpoint should be preached.[514]

The Deleuzean concept of the map is helpful to understand what it means to "make a map of relationships" without forgetting actuality, to read through the old familiar text of the fathers, and more importantly, what it means the redeployment of such practices as attentiveness, vigilance, stillness, rest, in the public sphere. The polemical strand is certainly present in the 1847 discourses on the lilies and the birds, but due to either difference of genre or the exigencies of the epoch, is tempered. What could learn from the lilies and the birds is the heterogeneity to the world while remaining in the world and the change of comportment towards time and eternity.

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og 1850 [Sermons Given in the Years 1849 and 1850] (Copenhagen, 1851; ACKL 233), pp. 41–53 [p. 45].

[512] Mynster, "Fred og Glæde hos vor Herre og Frelser. Paa siette Søndag efter Paaske," p. 44. As translated in KJN 6, 465/SKSK 22, 39.

[513] Kierkegaard remarks that Mynster's sermons, especially after 1848, propagate a toned-down version of Christianity (*The Moment*, pp. 3-4). In particular, he calls out Mynster for being "self-indulgently" a preacher of peace (*The Moment*, p. 18). Regarding Kierkegaard's critique of Mynster in *Judge for Yourself!,* see Bruce H. Kirmmse, *Kierkegaard in Golden Age Denmark* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1990), pp. 430-448.

[514] See in particular the first three instalments in *The Fatherland* (February 1854 and 28 December 1854, and 11 January 1855), *The Moment and Late Writings*, pp. 3-18.

Entering God's rest: the blessedness of today

The discourse "The Care of Self-Torment" succinctly substantiates this analogy of writing to map-making. The anxiety about the next day does not arise for the bird because the bird "travels many, many days and arrives in the same time" (CD, 70/SKS 10, 79). As with the bird, the next day does not exist for the Christian on the condition that she is "properly positioned" towards eternity in the same manner that a rower turns her back toward her goal she is working to. Kierkegaard writes, "The more he is eternally absorbed in today, the more decisively turns his back to the next day" (CD, 73/SKS 10, 82), adding that "when the Christian works and when he prays, he speaks only of today" (CD, 75/SKS 10, 84). Kierkegaard takes up here the discussion of the present and the eternal in *The Concept of Anxiety* but significantly deviates here from the abstract terms in which the relation between the eternal and the present is articulated. He writes, for example, that "for thought" the eternal is the present and the present "is posited as the annulled succession" of time that passes by (CA, 86/SKS 4, 389). In the discourse though, what is important is comportment and position in time that passes by with the believer turning her back to the eternal. Christ offers himself as the true prototype for the way of "living without care about the next day" with the emphasis lying on "how did he conduct himself" (CD, 75-76/SKS 10, 84). Kierkegaard re-inscribes the paradox of the learner in the Christian context: learning from the prototype means learning how to become a learner and, for Kierkegaard, "the Christian is always a learner." However, the question "how did he conduct himself?" is suspended in order not to become a subject "for erudite research" (CD, 76-77/SKS 10, 85). Kierkegaard writes that "he [Christ] had the eternal with him in his today in a sense totally different from the way the human being has, for that very reason he turned his back on the next day" (CD, 76/SKS 10, 85). The similarity of phraseology draws attention to the different valence of the utterance "today": the today of the bird, of the Christian, and of Christ. As he concludes the discourse, Kierkegaard writes:

> Let us then in conclusion consider the bird, which was there in the Gospel and must be here in the discourse. The bird arrives at its far-off destination the same day; the Christian is in heaven, where his life is, the same day, "this very day" [Lk 23:43]; the pagan never moves from the spot. (CD, 79/SKS 10, 88)

In Luke's text that Kierkegaard cites here as well as in Hebrews (4:1-11), on which he draws frequently, 'today' is uttered by Christ as a promise ("today you will be with me in Paradise") and as an invitation ("Today, if you hear his voice, do not harden your hearts" [Heb 4:7]) to which both the bird and the Christian respond. Today is his today, his working day, and is being given. Kierkegaard clearly says that "[t]his contemporaneity today" – to be contemporary with oneself today – is given as a task to be worked out and "when it is worked out, it is faith" (CD, 75/SKS 10, 83). To get rid of the next day and to be present today is to work out the distance to eternity, to come near to Christ's today. When Kierkegaard writes that Christ "came into the world to set the task" and lets "the answer appear in the question" (CD, 77/SKS 10, 85), the question of "how did he conduct himself" in living without care about the next day opens for the Christian the possibility to draw the Gospel as a map for his own life, to re-enter it, to make it a map of existence-relations.

As mentioned above, Kierkegaard renounces the distinction between the extraordinary Christianity of monasticism and the ordinary Christians of nineteenth-century Denmark. Underlying the above separation and in fact proliferating the logic of separation per se is a certain economy of space and time, which Kierkegaard expresses by reciting one of Mynster's familiar cliché: "'these quiet hours [*stille Timer*] in the holy places'" (KJN 4, 385/NB5:37/SKS 20, 385 [1848]). Kierkegaard derides the preacher who "will explain emphatically that Xnty does not establish a separation, as if we were only to be holy on Sundays—no, Xnty must penetrate our entire lives, also the weekdays" only to go on to forget on Mondays what he was preaching on Sundays (KJN 5, 152-153/NB8:6/SKS 21, 146 [1848]). This very separation, however, constitutes the category of the ordinary

Christian while in fact it keeps true Christianity at an aesthetic-artistic distance. In a later entry, Kierkegaard explicitly points to Mynster as an apologist of such separation: "Mynster [...] wants a conscious separation between the quiet hours and daily life, whereas I want the religious to be heard in the midst of daily life, heard in its ideality" (KJN 8, 298-299/NB23:197/SKS 24, 299 [1851]).[515] Relatedly, he compares the worship of God only in quiet hours with the observance of the Jewish Sabbath, saying that "what God wants is precisely for religion to be positioned in the midst of everyday actuality, the weekdays (the most strenuous ones) and is not satisfied with the Jewish custom of the Sabbath or with an hour or half an hour every day" (KJN 9, 164/NB27:51/SKS 25, 164 [1852]). True worship then requires the breaking of the law together with the domesticated view of Christianity:

> Christ does not want what is objective
>
> Hence his constant attack on the Sabbath; for on the Jewish view it was something objective; and so Christ wished to worship God – by breaking [*bryde*] the Sabbath. (*Pap*. 499/XI2 A366/*JP* 4574/SKS 27, 624 [1854])

'Objective' here stands for the doctrine and the sacraments which, according to Kierkegaard, not only eradicate the subjective/existential concern but "provide rapid and objective reassurance with respect to the question of eternity" (KJN 10, 154-155/NB32:52/SKS 26, 155 [1854] cf. KJN 8, 400-401/NB24:118/SKS 24, 395 [1851]). The Sabbath-breaking refers to the Sabbath controversies in New Testament, which are often tied with healing miracle stories.[516] The correlation between the breaking of the Sabbath and the profanation of an already profane Christianity seems at work here.[517] Direct and oblique citations from these Sabbath narratives,

[515] George Pattison, "Kierkegaard and Copenhagen," *The Oxford Handbook of Kierkegaard*, pp. 44-61.

[516] Mt 12:1-14; Mk 2:23-28; Lk 13:10-17 and 14: 1-6; Jn 5:10-18, 7:23, and 9:13-17. Most of these pericopes narrate miracles and healings that Jesus performed on Sabbath day.

[517] See also Giorgio Agamben, "In Praise of Profanation," in *Profanations*, Jeff Ford (trans.) (New York: Zone Book, 2007), pp. 73-92.

which are inserted in the discourses about the lilies and the birds, bring into relief the interplay between work and rest.

In a draft of a sermon, Kierkegaard hints at this notion of profanation when, by way of rhetorical hyperbole, he remarks that he may seem to "desecrate this holy place" when saying that one should make her own house the house of God. With regard to the spiritual relation to the divine, it is not necessary to go out to find it (KJN 5, 334-335/NB10:131/SKS 21, 323 [1849]). Elsewhere, Kierkegaard holds that, in order to remove the element of aesthetic illusion that reduces the sermon to a performance, "either only a few people should be preached to at a time, more or less as in a confessional, or there must be preaching to the 'multitude' in the street, and not by civil servants with ecclesiastical livings" (KJN 6, 226/NB13:82/SKS 22, 323 [1849]). Even though the confessional and the street are construed here in such a way that the one is the obverse side of the other, both these places are material aspects of different allocations of time. Their distinction relies on the same logic of separation that Kierkegaard seeks to refute and it is therefore difficult to reconcile the contradictions unless we take into account, and adopt as our perspective, his task of introducing Christianity into Christendom. That said, for Kierkegaard, the nearness or distance from God is a matter of *changing oneself* and not of changing places.[518] For instance, he writes that one could be "as close to God as the lily and the bird are by continually willing and doing only as God wills" (CD, 63/SKS 10, 72).

There is a common thread here in the way in which Kierkegaard expounds his thoughts on the confessional, the holy day, and the ascetic: the separate space, the consecrated day, the recluse moves to become the ordinary in order to shake the very distinction between the ordinary and the extraordinary. I suggest that the Friday morning Eucharist service is equivalent to the original impulse of the

[518] See the following entry in his notebooks: "Gregory of Nyssa put it splendidly in connection with pilgrimages: 'One does not come closer to God by changing one's place.' Alas, no, it is only all too certain that it can only be done by changing oneself" (KJN 7, 157/NB16:89/SKS 23, 154 [1850]). Cf. the lengthy note on God being inversely related to location and places (KJN 10, 223-227/NB32:132/SKS 26, 221-226 [1854]).

Sabbath (the suspension of the ordinary time/the breaking of the Sabbath law as the new Sabbath observance), as conceived by Kierkegaard.

> Every holy day is an interruption of what is customary (and this is beneficial), but the holy day itself is the customary interruption and thus can in turn easily become a habit. But Friday is the original interruption [*Afbrydelse*].[519] (KJN 4, 207/NB2:168/SKS 20, 208 [1847])

If the attendance of liturgical days becomes habitual, participation in the Friday service preserves the element of freedom in repetition insofar as it demands from the individual true inwardness in its relation to the eternal. Kierkegaard articulated his thoughts on originality and repetition in *The Concept of Anxiety*. The pseudonymous author writes:

> When the originality in earnestness is acquired and preserved, then there is succession and repetition, but as soon as originality is lacking in repetition, there is habit. The earnest person is earnest precisely through the originality with which he returns in repetition. (CA, 149/SKS 4, 448)

If the participant in a liturgical repetition that takes the form of recitation of texts, of prayers or sacrament lacks the (self-)relation to eternal, then the liturgy becomes a formalistic act. As an illustration of the genuine repetition, Kierkegaard points to the priest who returns "regularly every Sunday with the same originality to the same thing" (CA, 149/SKS 4, 449). The suggestion that the Friday service is a variation of the Sabbath-breaking is not without problems since the Friday service itself is highly regulated, as it is provided for by the *Danish Law* (1838).[520]

[519] "Originality's break" (*JP* 4, 3921) [Hongs' translation]

[520] Niels Jørgen Cappelørn cites the relevant passage that institutes a service on "ordinary Prayer Days / which in market towns must be held every Friday by each priest in the parish / throughout the year" (Niels Jørgen Cappelørn, "Søren Kierkegaard at Friday Communion in the Church of Our Lady," K. Brian Söderquist (trans.), in *International Kierkegaard Commentary*: Without Authority," Robert L. Perkins (ed.) (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 2006), p. 276.

We now turn to consider how the discussion above brings to bear on the third of the "Discourses at the Communion on Fridays" (1848) and, tangentially, whether Mynster's 'quiet hours and holy places' put pressure on Kierkegaard's project.

Kierkegaard delivered this discourse in Frue Church on 17 August 1847 (*Pap*. VIII 2 B 108 [1847-48]), a few months after the publication of the first set of discourses on the lilies and the birds (13th March 1847). Apart from the chronological proximity, both these discourses draw on the same New Testament passages that prove to be pivotal points for our interpretation. Kierkegaard borrows a verse from "The Parable of the Wedding Banquet"[521] in which the kingdom is compared to a wedding feast. The invitation of the bridegroom – "everything is ready; come…" (Mt 22:4) – is rejected by the invitees making excuses: "But they made light of it [*οἱ δὲ ἀμελήσαντες*] and went away, one to his farm, another to his business" (Mt 22:5). The Greek text makes clear that the refusal of the invited ones is due to negligence and indolence.

When Kierkegaard repeats that "Today is not a holy day; today everyone goes routinely to his fields, to his business, to his work; only these few individuals came to the Lord's house today" (CD, 269/SKS 10, 288; cf. CD, 270/SKS 10, 289), this may read as a subtext to the present age. For the present age is characterized by "its flashes of enthusiasm alternating with apathetic indolence" (TA, 74/SKS 8, 71). The discourse, therefore, is lodged in these surroundings of indolence, busyness, indifference, and even active refusal.

He goes on to compare the Sunday as a holy day to the Friday service:

[521] Mt 22:1-14 and Lk 14:15-24. Kierkegaard was not unfamiliar with the eschatological outlook of the parable as he ends the fourth of "The Discourses at the Communion on Fridays" (1848) with the verse "Behold, everything is ready" (CD, 281/SKS 10, 300). Also, he drafted a discourse that he intended to deliver on the Gospel of the Great Supper (KJN 7, 295-299/NB18:60/SKS 23, 292-293 [1850]).

> On a holy day [i.e. the Sunday service] everything is quiet outside also; the customary work is suspended [*hviler*]; [...] Today, however, is not a holy day. The noise of the daily activity of life out there sounds almost audibly within this vaulted space, where this sacred stillness is therefore even all the greater. The stillness that public authority can command civilly [*verdsligt*] is nevertheless not godly stillness, but this stillness, while the world makes noise, is the godly stillness. (CD, 270/SKS 10, 289)

The difference comes down to stillness as civil piety, as an ossified custom and inertia, and to godly stillness as produced not by the environment or by the solemnity of the place but by the inward decision and choice with which the individual responds to the invitation. Carl Hughes cautions that Kierkegaard criticizes the notion of "finding rest in Vor Frue Kirke" as escapism from the actuality of life, hence finding rest is rather to pray for rest insofar as "only the penitent properly understands what it is to pray for rest for the soul (CD, 265/SKS 10, 281-82)."[522] I would add that Kierkegaard describes the act of confession and repentance as the day of rest [*Hviledag*]: "Admittedly it is an interruption of the usual task; admittedly it is a halting of work as if it were a day of rest when the penitent (and only in repentance is the burdened laborer quiet) in the confession of sin is alone before you in self-accusation" (UDVS, 7/SKS 8, 123). It is a day of rest because the repentant ceases from his own work and rests from his burden insofar as repentance is "repentance from dead works" (Heb 6:1). Kierkegaard conjoins rest and repentance, as the Pietists did by seeking "the spiritual Sabbath of the heart."

The final address to the audience in the last paragraph is based on distinctive modulations of the meaning of key words that are repeated in the discourse: "the day," "today," and "work." He writes: "Today is not a holy day; today there is divine service on a weekday—oh, but a Christian's life is a divine service every day!" (CD 274/SKS 10, 292) The Christian life acquires this continuity granted

[522] Carl S. Hughes, *Kierkegaard and the Staging of Desire: Rhetoric and Performance in a Theology of Eros* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2014), pp. 92 and 106.

that the blessing of this day, today, is recollected forward; and even if today "will soon be over" is not finished. This day acquires continuity to the degree that is founded on and flows from "the good work." As Phil 1:6 tells us and Kierkegaard evokes here, "the good work in you that God began it will complete on the day of our Lord Jesus Christ" (CD 274/SKS 10, 292), a verse that comprises the beginning of creation and its fulfilment through Christ. In an early journal note, Kierkegaard noted the consonance between Phil 1:2, Gen 1:31, and Jas 1:17. The "*good deed* [*gode Gjerning*]" that God is perfecting in us is the same work that God started in the beginning of creation (KJN 1, 214/DD:11/SKS 17, 222 [1837]) or better God is the one who begins [*ὁ ἐναρξάμενος*] the good work. The human works and deeds, finally, are suspended in order that God's work begins in the heart.

In the second discourse of "What We Learn from the Lilies in the Fields and from the Birds of the Air" (1847), the handling of Mt 22:5 is slightly different but it resonates perfectly with the third discourse "At the Communion on Fridays" (1847/48). There are two groups of people: the discourse says that "if you are hurrying 'to your field, to your business, to your wife'," there is no need to stand still and look at a bird that flies by, "if it is work time." The invitation is extended to the worried one, urging her "to go out to the field and then to stand still in order to look at the lily and the bird" (UDVS, 186/SKS 8, 184). This godly diversion – the breaking of work time, standing still in order to contemplate at the flight of the bird which does not work but finds rest where "no rest is possible" (UDVS, 187/SKS 8, 184) – is needed for everyone who forgets "in the midst of work [*under Arbeidet*]" how glorious it is to be a human being (UDVS, 200/SKS 8, 296). What amounts to human gloriousness is the possibility to be "God's co-workers [1 Cor 3:9]" whereas the bird cannot. Human perfection relies on her capacity to imitate God "that he works, that he has worked until now [*arbeider indtil nu*] [Jn 5:17]!" (UDVS, 198/SKS 8, 295). The verse comes from an episode in which Jesus confronts the Pharisees after healing of a disabled man on the Sabbath day: "But Jesus answered them, 'My Father is still [*ἕως ἄρτι*] working, and I also am working'." The temporal adverb

"until now" indicates constancy or duration of God's work[523] with which Jesus' work stands in continuity. As Lincoln remarks, "Jesus' work involves carrying out God's salvation, and John takes very seriously the course of this work in time."[524] On the other hand, the eschatological significance of the pronouncement is also emphasized in view of Gen 2:2-3 and Heb 4. Jesus' Sabbath activities (healing, life-giving) reinforce the belief that the Sabbath rest is being fulfilled now. In this respect, as Alf Corell writes, since the risen Christ continues to work in the Church, the life of the Christian is "one continuous Sabbath."[525]

Kierkegaard may or may not adhere to the interpretations of Jn 5:17 presented here, but, as we have already seen, he uses the references to Sabbath-breaking stories throughout the discourses rather consistently. The appeal to the bird's inactivity is necessary as a means of suspending the common meaning of work and rest, which, in turn, would transform the reader into a listener of the Gospel and let the Gospel do what it says God does.[526] Thus, it opens the potential for re-orientation in the world, for figuring a new relationship with the world. Instead of over-emphasizing human exceptionalism by relating human perfection with work, Kierkegaard seems to suggest that you could be God's co-worker only insofar you have consciousness of being, as the verse 1 Cor 3:9 continues, "God's field, God's building."

Following Kierkegaard's writing process, he first registers the nascent idea of the "New Discourses on the Lilies and the Bird" (KJN 4, 357-58/NB4:154/SKS 20, 358 [1848]) in a journal entry dated between 22 and 24 April 1848. This period coincides with the days between the Holy Saturday and Easter Monday as well as

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[523] On the different interpretations of Jn 5:17, see Herold Weiss "The Sabbath in the Fourth Gospel," *Journal of Biblical Literature* 110:2 (Summer, 1991), pp. 311-321.

[524] A.T. Lincoln, "Sabbath, Rest, and Eschatology in New Testament," p. 204.

[525] Alf Corell, *Consummatum Est: Eschatology and Church in the Gospel of St. John*, (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock Publishers, 2016), p. 63.

[526] David Kangas remarks that "What is important about the lily and the bird in the second discourse is that, in spite of their differences from the human, they are nevertheless, through a contrast, able to bring human beings to the contemplation of their own 'glory' [...] The lily and the bird can provoke what Husserl later called an 'epoché of the natural attitude'" (David J. Kangas, *Errant Affirmations: On the Philosophical Meaning of Kierkegaard's Religious* [London and New York: Bloomsbury, 2017], pp. 122-123).

the publication of *Christian Discourses* (April 26). Kierkegaard didn't start writing the 1849 discourses on the lilies and the birds until approximately one year later; the editors assume that they were written during a solid period of time, from around the beginning of March until mid of April, and they were sent for publication on 17 April 1849.[527] Again, the writing period covers the Holy Week. The aforementioned dates may be coincidental but are helpful to understand the common material on which these discourses draw as well as the change in social and psychic climate that dictated the reprisal of the theme in a new musical key. Kierkegaard comments:

> Not only is it the case that abuse at the hands of the vulgarity of the mob has developed me profoundly, profoundly, but it is quite certainly responsible for having provided a musical key that I would never otherwise have had within my range: the sort of lyric called ["]The Lily and the Bird.["] (KJN 6, 222/NB12:131/SKS 22, 221 [1849])

The first discourse opens with the ambivalent figure of the poet, who is unable to understand the Gospel's command 'you shall be like the lily and the bird' without poetising his despair over his own impossibility to become like the bird. The poet avers: "I cannot understand the Gospel; there is a language difference [*Sprogforskjel*] between us that, if I were to understand it, would kill me" (WA, 8/SKS 11, 14). Interestingly though, the language difference between God and the Christian is affirmatively acknowledged at the beginning of the third discourse "At the Communion on Fridays." Here the Christian says in his prayer: "There is a language difference [*Sprogforskjel*] between us and yet we strive to understand you and to make ourselves intelligible to you" (CD, 268/SKS 10, 287). Whereas the discourse is presented as an elaboration on Jn 10:27 ("My sheep hear my voice, and

[527] See the Critical Account of the Text "Tekstredegørelse til *Lilien paa Marken og Fuglen under Himlen*" http://sks.dk/lf/txr.xml

I know them, and they follow me"), the introduction takes its point of departure from Heb 4:7:

> Your grace remains unchanged, just as you are unchanged, the same, eternally young, new every new day—because you say 'this very day' [Lk 23:43; Heb 4:7; 3:7; 3:13; 3:15] every day. Oh, but if a person pays attention to this phrase, is gripped by it, and in holy resolution earnestly says to himself 'this very day'—then for him this means that he desires to be changed on this very day [...] (CD, 268/SKS 10, 287)

The human utterance of 'today' conveys the urgency of change and resolution, whereas the birds respond with silence and obedience to God's eternal today: "Therefore God is blessed, he who eternally says: Today, he who eternally and infinitely is present to himself in being today" (WA, 39/SKS 11, 43). Indeed, as we may recall from the Hebrews, God eternally says "Today." If tomorrow is "that unblessed day" (WA, 38/SKS 11, 42), as Kierkegaard writes, it is because God blessed today/the Sabbath. Birds take the words of Peter "Cast all your sorrow upon God" altogether literary while the discourse can intimate the unconditionality of their obedience and joy by making the language stutter: "In the same moment—and this same instant [*Nu*] is from the very first moment [*Øieblik*], is today [*idag*], is contemporaneous with the first moment one exist—in the same instant..." (WA, 41/SKS 11, 45).

The 1844 discourse "The Expectancy of an Eternal Salvation" prefigures many of the themes that Kierkegaard would develop in the discourses about the lilies and the birds. Through the birds and the lilies Kierkegaard evokes this Sabbatism, which is not passivity:

> …like the inactivity of the lily, which does not spin, and the improvidence of the bird, which does not gather into barns, the prayer will not be without blessing; the work will not be without gain even though he does not deserve heaven's salvation but becomes qualified to inherit it only by vigilance in expectancy. And this employment will also become a blessing for him in time, because the expectancy of an eternal salvation is able (which otherwise seems impossible) to be in two places at the same time; it works in heaven and it works on earth." (EUD, 258-259/SKS 5, 255)

Vigilance in prayer and the expectancy of salvation is an action that, taking its force from eternity, works in two places, in heaven and in earth. In this way, like the lilies and the birds, rest "in the trustworthiness of the eternal" procures "the authentic presence [*Nærværelse i det Timelige*]" in the temporal (EUD, 259/SKS 5, 255). The last three paragraphs of the discourse on "The Lily in the Field and the Bird in the Air" (1849) are the last petition in the prayer. The longest day, "the day of eternity," this very day (WA, 44-45/SKS 11, 48) is the day of rest [*Hviledag*] and, as I have tried to show in this chapter, bears affinities to the mystery of the eighth day and the doctrine of Transfiguration in Orthodox spirituality. Kierkegaard writes that Paul, after working his exposition in Rom 11, 1-33 "is taking a rest with" the words "Oh, depths of riches…" "I know nothing," Kierkegaard continues, "for which to compare his contemplative activity except God's creative action" and God's rest from his labors. The outburst of this praise is like an interruption in the text that marks "a point at which the world lies behind us, transparent and transfigured like a quiet evening, a contemplative ascent into Heaven" (KJN 2, 17/EE:43/SKS 18, 20 [3 May 1839]). The one who prays today contemplates the world transfigured, not as lying behind us but as still lying ahead.

Conclusion

In the preceding chapters, I set out to clarify repetition, a mystified concept in Kierkegaard's authorship. Several difficulties come with the task. 'Repetition' the category is mediated to the reader through a literary form, the novella *Repetition*, by a pseudonymous author that at times acts as an unreliable narrator. Constantin Constantius self-referentially comments:

> *Repetition* was insignificant, without any philosophical pretension, a droll little book, dashed off as an oddity, and, curiously enough, written in such a way that, if possible, the heretics would not be able to understand it. (R, 324/SKS 15, 85)

Constantin strides through the history of philosophy, from the Eleatics to Hegel, implicating repetition with every major philosophical problem: freedom, ethical choice and authenticity, the relation between possibility and actuality, time and eternity. After many wanderings, palinodes, and misunderstandings, Constantin writes that "the true repetition is eternity," is a "transcendent" "religious movement by virtue of the absurd" that "will come to mean atonement" (R, 324/SKS 15, 87). Plus, repetition is invested with the task of "the foundering of metaphysics."[528] Undoubtedly, with the anecdote of Diogenes and Zeno's paradoxes of motion, we are wrenched into "the battlefield of these endless controversies that is called metaphysics"[529] but it is arguable whether this is the terrain on which Kierkegaard chose to fight.

My approach was to go along with the claims of the pseudonymous author regarding Plato's recollection and Aristotle's *κίνησις* and seek to contextualize them and demonstrate their limitations. Kierkegaard's abiding engagement with ancient philosophy was shown with the caveat that we should be attentive to how

[528] See John D. Caputo's chapter "Repetition and Kinesis: Kierkegaard on the Foundering of Metaphysics" in *Radical Hermeneutics: Repetition, Deconstruction, and the Hermeneutic Project* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987).

[529] Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, Paul Guyer, Allen W. Wood (eds. and trans.) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 99.

every pseudonym appropriates and moulds certain philosophical concepts. In particular, the treatment of Plato's theory of recollection in *On the Concept of Irony* casts its shadow on the plot and the characters of *Repetition*. Kierkegaard's critical contribution is that he places (Platonic) metaphysics in the area of the demonic in the sense that metaphysics does not conceive eternity concretely and with earnestness.

Through a close textual reading, it emerges that the temporal structure of the narrative serves to orientate the reader towards conceiving repetition as an existential possibility that cannot be totalized in representational forms or presented as a completed action. This approach bears resonance with the second part of the thesis where I examined the rhetorical and lyrical substrate of the discourses on the lilies and the birds, the redeployment of repetition at the level of sounds, words, or phrases.

By introducing the notion of "untranslatability" in discussing the Kierkegaardian moment (*Øieblikket*) (Chapter 5), I was able to pursue two lines of inquiry: the first regards the translation and appropriation of Plato's *ἐξαίφνης* in diverse texts (philosophical, theological and literary), associated with the paradoxical moment of change (conversion, restoration, deification, mystical vision, revelation). The second line concerns the reception of the *Parmenides* in the first half of the nineteenth century through translations, dissertations, and commentaries by authors that were underlining the affinities between the Hegelian dialectics and the Platonic dialogue. Kierkegaard stands firmly in a tradition of texts wherein the words like *momentum*, *nunc*, or *hodie* (Augustine), semantically linked to human transience and finitude, were used to denote eternity. Further, it is shown that the references to the *Parmenides* in *The Concept of Anxiety* are not merely ornamental, but Kierkegaard faces head-on the challenges of treating the moment as an extra-temporal, aesthetic-metaphysical abstraction. By emphasizing the relational dimension in Ingeborg's glance, that is, the intricacies between the image and text of *Frithiofs Saga*, I have tried to uncover an important aspect of the moment, that of untranslatability.

The second part of the thesis focused on the theology of the Sabbath-rest in Eastern Orthodox theology, Pietism, and Kierkegaard, which is proven to be a fertile line of inquiry since Sabbath rest conjoins several themes that are often addressed separately such as, rebirth/conversion, stillness of the heart, 'being present to oneself', becoming (a Christian). The mystery of the eighth day (ogdoad/octave), with the risk of reading backwards, emerges out of a thought of repetition, which is a repetition in a new musical key "but within that key the same thing repeats itself" (KJN 2, 211/JJ:286/SKS 18, 230 [1844]). Notwithstanding his Lutheran background and his pietistic readings, there is a path of research opened up regarding Kierkegaard and Eastern Orthodox theology,[530] and in particular the desert and philokalic spirituality.[531] But beyond any comparative theological work, equally important would be to explore the possible political ramifications of introducing the Sabbath temporality as an interruption of the linear time, of the ordinary work, braided with the promotion of spiritual virtues (vigilance, soberness) into the public space or to consider whether these enclaves (the altar, the confessional) or spaces 'out there with the lilies and the birds' could catalyse any transformation of the world.

Fredric Jameson's critique of modernity, as aesthetics and as ideology, in *A Singular Modernity: Essay on the Ontology of the Present* ventures against the autonomization of the pure form of the moment. "The conception of 'suddenness', the radical temporal break" around which the aesthetic categories of modernism (irony, the paradox, cipher, sublime, etc.) are organized is a deeply anti-political move.[532] Disengaged from any historical process this sudden moment "tears the present time out of its continuum and allows it to subsist in a kind of strange autonomy."[533] According to Jameson, the experience of the sudden is both bound

[530] See, for instance, Niels Jørgen Cappelørn, "Gudbilledlighed og syndefald: Aspekter afGrundtvigs og Kierkegaards menneskesyn påbaggrund af Irenæus," *Grundtvig-Studier* 55:1 (2004), pp. 134-178; Agust Magnusson, *Kierkegaard in Light of the East: A Critical Comparison of the Philosophy of Søren Kierkegaard with Orthodox Christian Philosophy and Thought,* PhD thesis (Milwaukee: Marquette University, 2016).

[531] Christopher D. L. Johnson, "'The Silent Tone of the Eternal': Søren Kierkegaard and John Climacus on Silence," *Spiritus: A Journal of Christian Spirituality* 19:2 (2019), pp. 199-216.

[532] Fredric Jameson, *A Singular Modernity: Essay on the Ontology of the Present* (London and New York: Verso, 2002), pp. 189-190.

[533] Jameson, *A Singular Modernity*, p. 190.

to violence and upheld as a rupture, as "a single apocalyptical moment."[534] In fact, Jameson in "The End of Temporality" identifies the aesthetic closure of the moment in modern literature with violence.[535] Kierkegaard has much to offer towards a critique of the aesthetic closure of the moment as well as against the 'perpetual present' that, according to Jameson, characterizes postmodernity.

> This situation has been characterized as a dramatic and alarming shrinkage of existential time and the reduction to a present that hardly qualifies as such any longer, given the virtual effacement of that past and future that can alone define a present in the first place.[536]

On the other hand, Jameson's observations concerning the moment pose certain challenges to Kierkegaard in the sense that the move out of time is inevitably supplemented by the metaphysical belief in "the idea of eternity itself"[537] or what Jameson calls "the older atemporal temptation."[538] Kierkegaard, in fact, in many aspects is aligned with Jameson regarding the 'atemporal temptation' in the sense that he accurately describes the various falsifications of eternity: when eternity is denied, feared, "annihilated by mere moments," dreamed of, recollected, conceived abstractly, "apocalyptically" or "purely metaphysically" (CA, 151-154/SKS 4, 451-453). In order to account for Kierkegaard's notion of concrete eternity, we need to recharge these elements that produce and affirm it: the gait of the knight of faith, repetition as possibility, the inbreaking of the Sabbath-rest into time, the mysterious path of the bird when no path is possible.

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[534] Jameson, *A Singular Modernity*, p. 193.
[535] Fredric Jameson, "The End of Temporality," *Critical Inquiry* 29:4 (Summer 2003), p. 714.
[536] Jameson, "The End of Temporality," p. 708.
[537] Jameson, "The End of Temporality," p. 712.
[538] Jameson, *A Singular Modernity*, p. 194.

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