

THE FRENCH CONQUEST
and
ADMINISTRATION OF MILAN
1499-1512.

by

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(A) Unpublished material.

The authorities I have consulted in the various Archives are fully described both with regard to contents and condition of preservation in the first chapter of the thesis.

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P R E F A C E.

On the principle that good wine needs no bush a good book should need no preface. But occasionally the writer has something to add or to explain - something which, because it is extraneous to the subject matter, can find no place in the text of the work. This is the position in which I find myself.

I should like to express my indebtedness to all with whom I have come into contact while gathering material for the essay. To the officials of the archives I have visited I am deeply grateful, particularly to the Superintendent of the Archivio di Stato, Turin, and to Cav. Achille Giussani, Economist in the Archivio di Stato, Milan.

I am indebted also to the kindness of His Eminence, Cardinal Gasquet, who saved me a fruitless visit to the Vatican Archives, and to Señor Alcocer, Jefe del Archivo General, Simancas, who drew my attention to some papers in the Paris Archives.

Some of the books I had the greatest difficulty in procuring. Pélissier's Les Sources Milanaises de l'histoire de Louis XII./

XII., and Note e Documenti sur Louis XII. et Ludovic Sforza. as well as Segre's Ludovico Sforza and the Cronaca of Ambrogio da Paullo, I have been unable to obtain though search was made for them in Glasgow, Edinburgh, Paris, Milan and Turin. They are not in the Library of the British Museum, and none of the London dealers could supply them, as they are out of print. On the other hand I found some material in the British Museum which proved of considerable value.

M. Pélissier has given such a full account of the conquest of Milan in his Louis XII. and Ludovic Sforza that it would have been useless for me to give a more detailed story than I have done. The same applies to the excellent article of Miss A.M.F. Robinson in the English Historical Review for 1888, treating of the Orleanist claim upon Milan.

The very great importance of the Treaty which in June, 1499, closed the negotiations between France and Savoy, led me to place in a separate roll a photograph of that record, and to insert in an Appendix two photographs, obverse and reverse, of the Seal attached to it, all three being the exact size of the objects.

In another Appendix will be found a copy of the document. It should be noted, however, that this is not the Definitive Treaty printed by M. Pélissier in his Traité d'Alliance de Louis XII./

XII. et de Philbert de Savoie en 1499, but that contained in the Archives of Turin.*

It only remains to say that if I have added to the knowledge of Milanese affairs at the beginning of the sixteenth century I shall feel that my efforts have not been misdirected.

William MacDougall.

* The actual Definitive Treaty is contained in the photograph of the document sent along with the Thesis. The wording as given in the Appendix is taken from the Inventario of Trattati Diversi in the Archives in Turin.

CHAPTER 1.

Records and Chronicles Consulted.

The science of history suffers from the fact that it is not, and can never be, experimental. The chemist, the physicist, the physiologist, in their endeavour to construct a theory which will include any given set of facts, have at their command a laboratory in which they are able to reproduce at will the phenomena with which they are concerned. Further, they can vary to any extent the conditions governing their experiments, and thus test their results as they proceed. The historian has no such help. He cannot establish an historical laboratory in which he may repeat at will the conditions under which he conceives certain phenomena to have had their origin. His material belongs to the past and cannot be reproduced, and he is thus compelled to work his way back from the known to the unknown, calculating and deducting as he proceeds. Moreover, as history is an inverse science, every problem is capable of many possible solutions, not all of which can be correct. And in seeking for the best solution the historian is peculiarly liable to reason post hoc ergo propter hoc, to mistake sequence/

sequence for consequence, to deduce, for example, one series of phenomena as the development of another and earlier series showing similar features, when there exists no real evidence to prove such a connection.

Again, besides being able to repeat his experiments as often as he chooses, the chemist has the additional advantage that his material remains constant. He may depend absolutely on it to obtain certain unvarying reactions provided that, under exactly similar conditions, he employs reagents which are constant in quality and quantity. The material with which the historian deals is altogether different. He is concerned with documents of various kinds, subject to many possible errors. They may tell the truth, but by accident or design they may give an account partially, or it may be completely, falsifying the event described. Thus, before constructing an hypothesis based upon the information contained in any document, he must make as certain as possible that the document in question is genuine, and that it gives a truthful account of what it purports to describe; and if he suspects its character he must collate and compare with other documents bearing upon the point at issue, accepting those parts in which they agree and rejecting or, at least, casting doubt upon those parts in which they differ. The criticism of documents, then, resolves itself into two parts - external and internal.

The first step is to decide whether or not the document is/

is genuine. It is unnecessary here to detail the number of literary and historical forgeries which render this step essential. The Donation of Constantine, the Ricardi Monachi Westmonasteriensis Commentariolum Geographicum de Situ Britanniae et Stationum quas in ea Insula Romani aedificaverunt, purporting to have been written by Richard of Cirencester, the Journal of a Spy in Paris during the Reign of Terror,^(I) the Poems of Ossian, and the Shakespearean forgeries of Jordan and the Irelands will occur to every one.

The outward form of a document offers, as a rule, definite evidence as to its genuineness. Signatures and seals may be compared with those known to be genuine, the quality of the ink sometimes gives a clue,⁽²⁾ while a close examination of the parchment or paper will often yield valuable results. The character of the hand-writing, especially the cursive hand, serves to fix the date of the document within certain limits, as will the presence or absence of distinctive words, together with the general style of composition.⁽³⁾

Having completed his criticism of the outward form, the investigator/-----

- 1.- Published by John Murray, London, 1895.
- 2.- One must be cautious, however. The ink of many of the documents contained in the Registri Panigarola - Archivio di Stato, Milan - is very brown through age and exposure; but, on the other hand, the writing in some of the documents in the Hunterian Museum, Glasgow University, dating from the time of Queen Elizabeth, is as strong and black as though it had been done only yesterday.
- 3.- Here, again, caution is required. Legal formulae tends to persist, phrases current at the end of the fifteenth century

investigator turns to the actual contents of the document. These should agree with what is known from other genuine sources of the same time and place. But omissions need not invalidate the document. Thus, though the author should be expected to possess a good knowledge of contemporary events, the document must not be rejected because the writer has failed to mention some fact of which he might reasonably have been expected to take notice, and which has been described by other historians of the period; for he may have observed the fact and deliberately refrained from mentioning it.

On the other hand - and this is where most forgeries come to grief - anachronisms may appear in the text. The writer may make some unguarded statement which shows him to have been acquainted with events of a later date, or with things which were not known or used at the time the document purports to have been written./ .

3.- (Cont.) being in use at the present day. Further, identical phrases are employed in different countries. These two extracts will illustrate the point.

"Se fa publica crida e comandamento ad qualuncha persona de qual conditione voglia se sia non ardisca ne presuma directo ne per indirecto dare ne fare dare dinari ni niuna altra cosa ad dicti offitiali." - Milan, Archivio di Stato, Reg. Panig. N., fol. 25 tergo.

"Apartir del día primero del próximo mes de Agosto, toda persona, de cualquier clase y condición que sea, que tenga que salir y retornar a la plaza deberá ir provista de su tarjeta de identidad, quedando exceptuados de esta obligación los militares y empleados del Estad, que la acreditarán unos y otros por el uniforme o cartera militar de identidad y, respectivamente, por el titulo o nombramiento, que exhibirán siempre que sea preciso." - La Identificacion de Personas en Melilla, Edict issued by El Comandante de la zona de Melilla, and published by El ABC, Madrid, July 19, 1923.

written. If so, the document must be rejected in that respect. But, as the forger, in his attempt to secure acceptance for his wrong statement, may be scrupulously accurate in other details, his work, as a whole, may possibly serve as a piece of corroborative evidence.

Without a knowledge of its authorship, date, and place of writing, the evidence of a document leaves something to be desired. The next step, therefore, is to learn its provenance. For this purpose the name of the author is, as a rule, of minor importance. What is required is information regarding his personal character and his position in society, so that the value of his evidence may be sifted by reference to the opportunities he possessed of knowing the pros and cons of the matters he writes about. Sanuto, for example had access to documents denied to others, and had opportunities which he seems to have used to advantage of seeing and talking with all sorts of men who came to Venice on state business. Moreover, he was an observant, intelligent man. His Diarii, therefore, form a trustworthy source of information and anecdote regarding his time. Again, as Corio was commissioned to write a history of Milan and, like Sanuto, had access to documents of all kinds in the Archives, it is logical to deduce that, unless he had some reason for falsifying what he found in these records, his Storia di Milano is worthy of credence.

Methods of dating documents have already been mentioned.

There/

There remains, however, the special case of fixing the actual or the approximate date of one record among three or four, all of which refer to a single event in a known period. Obviously the contents of the undated document should be compared with those of the dated records. If the documents form a series, the undated one may be placed in its proper order, though it may only be possible to assert that it must have been written within the period limited by a definite forward and backward date.

The third requirement - place of origin - is most readily determined from the contents of the document. If the information is definitely given, then the investigator has only to guard against the possibility of fraud. If, on the other hand, the information is not given, it may sometimes be obtained by examining the author's treatment of his subject. Should he enter into greater wealth of detail regarding one town than he does about others, showing such familiarity with local laws, customs, feasts and celebrities that he almost appears to take his reader's knowledge of them for granted, it is safe to assume that he has a special interest in that town, either from birth or from residence. The deduction would be that here, probably, was the place of origin.⁽⁴⁾ But this, after all, is only guessing which requires to be supplemented by more definite information before/

4.- See, for example, the anonymous Cronica Gestorum in Partibus Lombardie et Reliquis Italie, which, because its author was so interested in Parma, Muratori published under the title Diarium Parmense.

before it is possible to say with certainty that the search has been successful.

In a narrative document of any length it is hardly probable that the writer can have had personal experience of all the events he describes. To some extent, therefore, he must be dependent upon tradition or upon the written observations of others. But these observations must be traced to contemporary writers or the historian cannot use them with any confidence that they deal accurately with the events of which they treat. In the case of Grumello, for instance, we know that he could not have been an eye-witness of all the political and military occurrences he has recorded; for he sets out not merely to describe the state of affairs in Lombardy, but rather to give a history of Italy during his life-time. He does not even exclude events memorable in other parts of Europe - the understanding between François I. and Henry VIII. of England, (5) the visit of Charles V. to Henry VIII., (6) the capture of Rodi by the Turks, (7) and the Turkish campaigns in Hungary, (8) are examples - which had a bearing upon Italian affairs.

But Grumello had brothers who played their part in the events of the time in Italy, and he was doubtless indebted to/-----

- 5.- Grumello, lib. VI., cp. xvii., pp. 239, 240.
- 6.- Ibid. lib. VI. cp. xix., p. 241.
- 7.- Ibid. lib. VI., cp. ix., pp. 230-233.
- 8.- Ibid. lib. VII., cp. v., pp. 457-459. Practically all Book VI. of Grumello's Cronaca treats of "foreign history."

to them for some of the information preserved in his chronicle. This, of course, was second-hand authority, and possibly his account of such events is not exact, merely because the mental impression of them passed through two minds before being committed to writing. Nevertheless, if his brothers were eye-witnesses, and were capable of expressing with accuracy what they saw, their testimony should be accepted as a genuine contribution to our knowledge of the affairs in which they took part.

In analysing a source the statement of any one writer is not sufficient to guarantee its accuracy. In that case the statement must be given as on the authority of the writer making it. Nor is a multiplicity of records of the slightest historical value as a determination of the truth unless the writers produced them independently. If a hundred newspapers give an account of, say, a political meeting, its value as a truthful record is not in the least strengthened if the information has been supplied by one and the same news agency. Thus, with the chronicles of Cagnola, Grumello, Giovio, and the rest, even where their account of some occurrence seems to guarantee its truth, it is necessary if possible to trace the origin of the account. If Cagnola and Corio, for example, describe some occurrence, localization of the source will indicate whether they were eye-witnesses, or whether Corio, having had free access to documents, produced from them a record from which Cagnola copied.

It may happen, however, that the provenance of a document/

document cannot be settled. Another method must then be adopted. No two persons witness an event in precisely the same manner. A policeman, a newspaper reporter, an artist, a clergyman, and a casual labourer will describe a street incident from very different points of view. Training, environment, natural endowment, physical defects all play their part in presenting to their minds what is taking place before their eyes. Yet, underlying the circumstantial variety of their account is general truth, and a comparison of their testimonies will, at any rate, aid in settling what really did happen. The same process may be applied to documents when it is impossible to localize them. The complexity of historical events, combined with the psychological and physical differences between any two observers, forbids us to expect that independent eye-witnesses will describe an occurrence with the same details and in approximately the same verbal forms. Hence, if the accounts, while substantially the same, differ in minute details and in the form of words employed, they may be accepted, pending further investigation, as the work of independent writers. Two cautions, however, are necessary. In every language there are fixed forms of speech. But a baron on the verge of rebellion is not the king's "well-beloved" though he is so termed. Nor is every cleric "most learned". The Englishman may sign himself "your obedient servant", the Spaniard may remain "your faithful servant who kisses your hands", and the Italian may address you as "most estimable sir". But these and their/

their like, being stereotyped forms of speech, should be disregarded in criticism.

If both writers were eye-witnesses of the occurrence described copying is not likely to take place. The critic has then to guard against distortion of the facts due to defective powers of observation mental and physical, and against the possibility of deliberate falsification for some ulterior motive. But where only one of the writers was present and both give an account of the occurrence, one of the records is bound to be a copy. Criticism will decide the identity of the eye-witness, whose account will be accepted and the other rejected. But to settle which of two documents is the authentic record is not always an easy matter. Where a word or a phrase in one document is misunderstood in the other it is evident that the second document is a copy. On the other hand, where both are intelligible and agree with each other except that the first has modifications of the facts contained in the second, the interpolations and suppressions should be carefully criticised to see if they have been made with the view of supporting some opinion, prejudice or political bias of the writer. The gravest difficulty appears where a copyist deliberately alters details and verbal forms in order to conceal that copying has taken place. Not much can be done in such a case if localization is impossible, but if the slightest impression of copying remains/

remains in the investigator's mind both documents should be
(9)
regarded as under suspicion.

In the case where neither of the writers is able, from personal knowledge, to vouch for the truth of his record, both papers are almost valueless, for obviously both have been derived from some source, known or unknown. That source the investigator must endeavour to discover and, if successful, base his argument upon it and not upon either of the copies.

One of the most delicate operations which the historian must on occasion attempt to perform is the emendation of the text he is studying. With modern work this is not difficult since, as a rule, it is sufficient to see that the printed copy corresponds in spelling, punctuation and capitalisation with the manuscript from which it is derived. With ancient writings the case is altered. Before the invention of printing, copies of manuscripts, both literary and historical, had to be written by trained men who made it their business. Skilled though the copyists were, it was natural that some errors should creep into their work. These were increased when the copyist's production was re-copied. Hence, as the process went on, the manuscript became increasingly corrupt.

Some of the errors in manuscripts are due to deliberate falsification, but most of them depend upon the mental and physical/

9.- This applies to external criticism. Internal examination of the documents will frequently decide which of the two is authentic.

physical condition of the scribe at the time of writing. A little carelessness, too great eagerness, over-confidence in the ability to retain in the memory the wording of a phrase without constant reference to the text, account for most of the mistakes. Further, the prevalence of contractions and contractional signs, often carelessly made, was a fruitful source of error even to those accustomed to the work.
(10)

It would thus appear safe to say that the older the manuscript is the fewer will be the textual errors. As a general rule, perhaps, this is true; but, where two or more manuscripts contain variant readings in the text, the only way to make certain of the original is to obtain the localization of each. If complete provenance is impossible, an examination of the oldest copies may result in the production of a fresh text nearer the original than any of the copies. The relative values of the manuscripts undergoing criticism may then be decided by comparing them with the amended text produced by the collation of the oldest copies.

A further point should be mentioned. Most documents must be criticised with relation to the conditions under which they/

- 10.- See, for example, Doc. 32, p. 113, of Documents pour l'Histoire de la Domination Française dans le Milanais, 1499-1512. A comparison with J. 505, No. 9, Paris Archives, shows some capitals to be misplaced in the printed copy, while the original fratris appears as fratus.

they were produced, and the men who wrote them. Thus the history of a document is important. If it has been preserved in a place recognised as trustworthy, such as the archives of a state, there is at once a disposition to regard it as genuine, while, on the other hand, if it has been in unofficial custody, its genuineness is more or less open to doubt and must be thoroughly tested. In the absence of contrary information an official document preserved in the archives may be presumed to have been written by a state official and to contain a reliable statement of the facts with which it deals. Further investigation should be directed to the character of the official and to discover whether his statement fits in with what is already known of the matter in question. In brief, the investigator should regard himself, as far as possible, as a contemporary of the writer, see things with his eyes, be alive to his prejudices, and calculate his limitations so far as concerns his natural ability and his opportunities for observation.

But there are difficulties, not the least of which lie in the investigator himself. Documents are written to induce belief, and though they may not give a detailed account of the matter in hand, the critic must not, therefore, decline to give them credence. Internal criticism, that is, should not be over-done. The trustworthiness of a writer is not to be impugned because he shows honest partiality, for complete impartiality is not to be obtained. So long as no attempt is made/

made to conceal the partiality, or to suppress points unfavourable to the opinions of the writer, so long, that is, as there is no suppression for the purpose of imputing motives, partiality is not to be condemned.

But this is applicable to the critic as well as to the writer of the document; hence, while entitled to his opinion, the investigator must guard against reading his own thoughts, ideas or prejudices into the record he is criticising, and thus impugning testimony which runs counter to any opinion he may have formed.

It is seldom that all these methods of criticism can be applied to one and the same document. The treatment varies according to the character of the record and its provenance. While the general intention of the criticism remains unaltered the number and the quality of the tests differ according as the document is narrative or what is specifically known as a record. A municipal or a royal edict, for example, requires somewhat different treatment from that of the Cronaca of Grumello or the Mémoires of Commynes. So far as this thesis is concerned, the genuineness of documents housed in the archives of Milan, Turin, Florence, Venice and Paris has been taken for granted; while the narratives of the various chroniclers has been subjected to analysis in accordance with the principles discussed above. To a certain extent this has been a work of supererogation, inasmuch as the editors have attended to textual accuracy. But there, for the/

the greater part, their labours have ended. This is not surprising. Their business was to produce a text of the narrative with which they were concerned, not to go into questions of the dependence or independence of the writers. Consequently a criticism of the relative values of the narratives as authentic records of their time, of their originality, their impartiality, their general trustworthiness, is not lost labour.

For the period of the French occupation of Milan record evidence has been chiefly employed. Through the researches of M. Maulde la Clavière and M. Leon G. Pélissier some of these records have been published. Where such printed copies were available I have not hesitated to use them. Many of them I have collated with the originals to satisfy myself of their correctness; but, as search for further documentary evidence was a better employment and likely to corroborate results already established as well as to make public new facts, I took the majority of the printed copies as accurate, and investigated at first hand such things as the Treaty of 1499 between France and Savoy, and those Registers of Panigarola from which Pélissier (II) gives no extracts in his collection.

The history of Milan under the French domination, particularly on its administrative side, has not yet been treated with any approach to thoroughness. One reason for the neglect is/

II.- Documents pour l'Histoire de la Domination Française dans le Milanais, (1499-1513).

is the lack of documentary evidence upon which to work. Very few records exist in the Archivio di Stato at Milan dealing with the French occupation of Lombardy from 1499 to 1512, and, on the whole, these few are of secondary importance. They consist of some confirmations of privileges granted by former dukes, some proclamations, and some acts of administration. The archives, properly speaking, of the period, have disappeared. They may have been lost in the troubles that overtook the city from time to time; the Milanese themselves may have destroyed them as hateful memories of their subjugation to a foreign power; or the French may have carried them off on the failure of their first occupation of the duchy. (12) The point is immaterial so far as it concerns the French administration of Milan, but it may be noted that the condition of such records as remain is sufficient to indicate that carelessness may account to a large extent for the paucity of documents relating to this period.

The papers located in the Archivio di Stato and referred to in the text may be arranged according to their provenance. Two series, the Registri Panigarola and the Gridario Generale, have their source in municipal action, while the Carteggio Generale, Registri Ducali, Lettere Missive and the Decreti Senato are of ducal or royal origin, according to the period to which they refer.

The Registri Panigarola form what is probably the finest/-----

12.- The archivists at Milan agree that the papers were taken away by the French.

finest collection of documents in the archives at Milan. The origin of the series is interesting. From a very early period all police edicts and proclamations issued by the municipal body or by the Ducal Council were published by criers at certain fixed places in the city, and then put into the care of the Gubernatore degli Statuti. About the middle of the fourteenth century Paganolo Panigarola began to enter all such documents in a register. Each member of the family as he succeeded to the office (it was practically hereditary) kept up the practice, and the registers thus formed received from the name of their founder the title Registri Panigarola. Obviously these registers are not originals. These were written on single sheets but, being unbound, have nearly all been lost. Those which have been recovered have been placed together and form the Gridario Generale.

A collation of the recovered sheets with the copies existing in the Registri Panigarola proves the accuracy of the transcript to be so great as to give them the value of originals. Now the sheets were recovered by mere chance, so that it is justifiable to conclude that the other documents, also, in the series are quite as accurately copied. Hence the Registri Panigarola may be taken as equivalent to originals. The importance of this can hardly be over-estimated, for the series, being very complete, affords information otherwise unattainable with regard to the internal history of Milan.

At first all edicts and decrees of the administration, whether/

whether ducal or municipal, were entered indiscriminately in one volume; but during the French occupation an alteration appears to have taken place. Two registers were employed. Of these, the first, reserved for edicts of the municipality and the Departments through which it worked, is in poorer condition than the second, which contains the decrees of the Lieutenant General.

The registers are denoted by the letters of the alphabet either single or doubled, the most useful for the period of the French administration being K,L,N,EE,FF,GG. Those marked I,O,P,Q,S, are subsidiary, and interesting mainly because of the light they throw on the acts contained in the first set. From Sept. 1, 1499 to Dec. 27, 1513 the registers contain one thousand three hundred and sixteen acts of the French administration; but these are by no means of equal value, as many of them deal with matters of purely private interest.

The volumes are well indexed by means of a schedario - a series of boxes containing slips of paper on which are indicated the nature of each document and its number in the series, together with its date, register, and folio in the register. The note regarding the nature of the document varies in character. Generally speaking, it consists of a few words indicating the contents, but occasionally it is so full as to become almost a synopsis. As the slips are arranged in chronological sequence each schedario contains documents from more than one register; that for the period Feb. 1, 1494 - March 23, 1501, for example, includes/

includes specimens from Registers I, E, EE, FF, K, L, N, and S.

Of the actual appearance, condition and contents of the registers something must now be said. In the first place they are all bound. The sheets are of paper, brownish-yellow in colour and as nearly as possible twelve inches by nine inches in size, though these dimensions are not invariable. Most of the documents are written in book hand, in ink which has lost much of its colour. Sometimes, indeed, it is so faint as to be almost illegible. No general description will define sufficiently the state of preservation of the various registers, as some are in good condition while others show unmistakable signs of careless handling and poor storage. The only way is to take them seriatim.

Register K, twelve inches by nine inches in size, has been fortunate. Its condition is very good, indeed. It has (I3) 298 folios containing acts of Ludovico Sforza, Massimiliano Sforza, and François I. There is a four folio index.

Register L, also in good condition, has 320 folios of the same size as Register K, and contains acts of the same rulers as are mentioned in that register.

Register N, of the same size and condition as K and L, is entirely taken up with acts of Louis XII. The dates indicated by the register (I507-I512), are not quite correct, as it/

I3.- Pélissier, Documents pour l'Histoire de la Domination Française dans le Milanais, Avertissement, p. xi., Note 1. says there are 308.

it contains one document dated July 10, 1504, while another, the second in the register, belongs to the year 1505. The folios (14)
run from I to 295.

Register EE is in extremely poor condition. The size of the folios is rather smaller than those of K, L, N, and the tops have either rotted or been completely rubbed away as far as folio 60, though the edges are not quite so bad. Many of the folios have had paper pasted on them to keep them together. Their colour is dark yellow and the ink, brownish-yellow in tint, shows to a certain degree through the paper. The register contains 731 folios, but there are gaps in the foliation, and the acts of the French administration occupy fewer than 70 folios at the end.

Register FF, though badly preserved, is in better condition than EE. Folios 1-41 are extremely bad, as are folios 171-175. The remainder are not so poor, but are not to be compared with K or L. The foliation runs from I to 386, and covers the period 1505-1508.

Register GG deals with the period 1508-1513. The foliation begins with 387 and runs to 993, that is, the register is a continuation of FF. The first 17 folios are in poor condition, the tops having entirely disappeared, while the corners and/

14.- Pélissier, Op. et loc. cit. in Note 13, says there are 304 folios.

15.- Here, again, there is a difference between what Pelissier states and what I found. See Pélissier, Op. et loc. cit. above, where he gives the number of folios as 1003.

and edges of nearly all the folios are badly broken from neglect. The whole register, though bearing manifest signs of ill-usage, is much better preserved than EE which, in that respect, is the worst I have examined.

Register O, on the other hand, is in very good condition. It covers the period 1516-1519, has 327 folios, and is beautifully written.

Details need not be given of Registers I, P, Q, S. They contain a few scattered acts which have been consulted merely because they throw light occasionally on the papers mentioned in the registers described above. All are written on paper discoloured by age and neglect, and contain acts similar in character to those in the other registers of the series.

The contents of the registers are of the most varied nature - notices of condemnations of goods, proclamations by the Health Department and by the officials charged with the upkeep and repair of streets; decrees concerning the interruption of the business of the Law Courts; the stabilization of the price of butcher meat, fish and straw; compulsory carrying of/-----

16.- Reg. EE, fol. 665.

17.- Reg. EE, fol. 675, 679, 686, 687, 688 tergo, 692 tergo, 717 - all issued within the period May 19 - Oct. 6, 1501.

18.- Reg. EE, fol 670, and Reg. FF, fol.9. The latter folio is in very bad condition.

19.- Reg. N, fol. 28 tergo.

20.- Reg. EE, fol. 725; Reg. FF, fol. 270 tergo; Reg. GG, fol. 583 tergo.

(21) (22)
of lights after dark; the carrying of arms; the wearing of beards
(23) (24) (25)
longer than was customary; traffic in foreign money; duelling
(26) (27) (28)
and prostitution; references to concessions, grants of citizen-
(29) (30) (31)
ship, taxes, trade regulations, and the Ospedale Maggiore.

Like the Registri Panigarola the Gridario Generale is of municipal origin. The collection, indeed, consists of the originals from which the Registri Panigarola were compiled. The gride, as soon as they had been proclaimed by sound of trumpet at the appointed places in Milan, were put into the custody of the Gubernatore degli Statuti, and a copy made of each by Panigarola or his successors. Practically all of these originals have disappeared, though some have been recovered and placed in mazzi (bundles) under the title Gridario Generale.⁽³²⁾

The/

- 21.- Reg. N, fol. 19 tergo.
- 22.- Reg. N, fol. 26 tergo, 27 tergo, 33 tergo; Reg. I, fol. 234, 244.
- 23.- Reg. N, fol. 31 tergo.
- 24.- Reg. N, fol. 33 bis.
- 25.- Reg. N, fol. 37 tergo; Reg. O, fol. 184; Reg. P, fol. 143.
- 26.- Reg. GG, fol. 599 tergo; Reg. EE, fol. 655, 660.
- 27.- Reg. N, fol. 140; Reg. S, fol. 175.
- 28.- Reg. O, fol. 188 tergo.
- 29.- Reg. FF, fol. 370.
- 30.- Reg. GG, fol. 396 tergo.
- 31.- Reg. L, fol. 7.
- 32.- The origin of the title Gridario is obvious.

The gride were written on single sheets of paper - in manuscript till the Spanish occupation of the province, and printed from that time onward.

The recovered portions of the Gridario belonging to the first French period have been placed in four mazzi. The earliest (I392-I499) contains a document dated September 3, I499 - an edict issued by the Gubernatores Status Mediolani to ensure public order - but this is the only one relating to the French occupation. The second contains sixty-five documents dating from January II to November 3, I500. The third mazzo has a longer range, covering the period December II, I500 to the end of September I5I0, and containing a hundred and fifty papers. The last of the four deals with the period I5I0-I5I6. It contains sixty documents.

The four mazzi thus deal with the period beginning September 3, I499 and ending with the year I5I6. For less than the same period, viz., from September I, I499 to the end of I5I3, the total number of folios in the Registri Panigarola K, L, N, EE, FF, GG, is 2642. These preserve no fewer than thirteen hundred and sixteen acts of the French Administration. That the four mazzi of the Gridario should contain only two hundred and seventy-six is sufficient indication of the number that has been lost.

As the documents of the Gridario are the originals of those contained in the Registri Panigarola, nothing need be said of/

of their contents. Their condition, as might be expected, is not too good. The paper is discoloured, the folios have broken edges, and much of the writing is faint. Most of the documents referred to in the text have been taken from Mazzo III.⁽³³⁾

The Registri Ducali, two hundred and nine in number, are drawn from royal or ducal Administrative Departments, and contain entries regarding privileges, treaties, concessions, military operations, investitures and letters patent dependent upon royal or ducal authority. The acts preserved in the registers are copies of original papers, many of which have been lost. Some of them have been recovered in Milan, while others are in the collection JJ in the national archives in Paris. As in the case of the Registri Panigarola, the correspondence of the copies with the originals, where these have been discovered, allows the acceptance of the registers as equivalent in value to originals. The concessions and privileges are, for the greater part, granted to individuals, and offer the best means of judging the relations between Louis XII. and the notables of Milan. Many of the acts, again as in the Registri Panigarola, are concerned with favours bestowed upon Gian Giacomo Trivulzio⁽³⁴⁾ and his family. Yet there is a fair number of documents

particularly/

- 33.- The reference to a document merely by indicating the mazzo in which it is found cannot be called satisfactory; yet the vagueness is unavoidable since the entries are on single sheets and are not numbered.
- 34.- See, e.g., Registri Ducali RR. fol. 15I. This document is one among others which I have not seen in print.

particularly those relating to finance and law, which are of greater historical importance than the concessions and grants of privileges to individuals. Some of these are discussed in the body of the essay.

The registers are numbered in three ways. Those of the first set, fifty-six in number, are distinguished by the letters of the alphabet, either single or doubled as in the Registri Panigarola. They are then continued by arabic numerals from I to I33, 27 being followed by 27 bis, and I29 by I29 bis. The remaining eighteen are denoted by Roman numbers. Each series has a manuscript inventory, and there is, in addition, a general inventory from II53 to I535. The records having a bearing upon the subject of this essay are contained in Registers IV., VI., and RR, of the contents of which the following notes will give some idea.

REGISTER IV., Lettere e Concessioni di Ludovico re di Francia, (I479-I5I2), has a hundred and fifty folios, twelve inches by nine inches in size, and preserves a hundred and sixty-five entries of gifts, concessions, and confirmations of privileges.

REGISTER VI., Lettere e Concessioni Ducali (I487-I499),
(35)
contains a hundred and ninety-six folios the same size as those of Register IV. The entries, some of which appear also in Register IV./

35.- The entries are not placed in chronological order. For example, a document on folio I5I is dated May I6, I5IO, while another on folio I52 bears the date July II, I509.

Register IV., are fifty-six in number, and of the same character as those of the two other registers.

REGISTER RR., Donazioni, Essenzioni e Concessioni, (I486-I506), has two hundred and fifty-three folios the same size as those of Register IV., and contains a hundred and fifty-six records of the same nature as those of that register.

None of the registers in the series is in good condition. This, indeed, is the normal state of the records for the epoch of the French domination of Milan, there being left only the debris of what has apparently been a fine collection. A description of Register RR will indicate both its bad state and the difficulties which beset the investigator of the period.

There are some slips in M. Pélissier's description of this register. (36) In the first place he gives the limiting dates (which I have accepted) as I486-I506. It is true that this appears on the cover of the register, but the first entry is dated September 26, I484. The second entry belongs to the same year, and the third to I485. The limiting year I506, also, is contradicted by an entry on folio I5I, dated I5I0. This is not a slip on the registrar's part, for the document is marked as having been issued millesimo quingentesimo decimo et regni nostri mo. (37) xiii. Again, Pélissier gives the number of documents as II9 while/

36.- Pelissier, Documents pour l'Histoire de la Domination Française dans le Milanais, Avertissement p.viii., Note 2, (Continued from the previous page) No.I., says there are II9. But see further criticism of the register for this and other slips.

37.- Op. et loc. cit. in Note 36.

while there are really I56, of which I22 are letters and the remainder, 34 in number, donazioni etc. Further, he gives the number of folios as 309, while my record carries the foliation only as far as 253 tergo. Besides, there are some blanks in the foliation of the register, e.g. I55 tergo to I57 inclusive, and I64 to I66 inclusive. The widest gap, however, is from folio I69 to folio 224 tergo.

The folios of the register are of paper, the edges of which are worn and stained by damp, particularly at the top, where in some instances it is practically impossible to tell what has been written, as all signs of ink have vanished. ⁽³⁸⁾ This is specially noticeable at the top of folios 224-227, both sides. Folios III tergo and II2 have been accidentally stained a brown colour, ⁽³⁹⁾ on which a black ink stands out strongly, forming a great contrast with folio II3, the ink of which is yellow in colour and difficult to read, not only from its faintness but from the style of the writing. On folios 5I tergo and 52 the ink is yellowish-brown in colour; on folio 53 it is black but slightly faded, as are folios 46 tergo, top half, and 47, bottom half. Folio III is very dirty, apparently through exposure. At the top of folio I2I eleven lines have been cancelled and re-written/

38.- See, for example, folios 33, 34, 34 tergo, 35, 45, 46. The last of these folios is in a very bad state of preservation.

39.- The appearance of the folios seems to point to the upsetting of a dish of colour, as the tint covers the whole surface, and is heavy in tone.

re-written. One double and one single sheet have been inserted loosely in the register, but I have not determined whether they actually belong to RR.⁽⁴⁰⁾

The other registers in the Milanese Archives may be dismissed with shorter notice. The series entitled Lettere Missive is in quite as bad condition as are the Registri Ducali. Of the five registers which remain for the period 1499-1512 only one, No. 213, is concerned with the acts of Louis XII. Of the others, No. 210 (May 14, 1498-August 22, 1499) deals with Ludovico's foreign correspondence; No. 211 (January 19, 1498 - August 2, 1499) contains his correspondence with the communal representatives of Milan, Lodi and Novara; while No. 212 (May to August, 1499) preserves his correspondence with various towns in the duchy, especially Pavia and Parma. No. 214 (1506 - 1510) should not be included in the series, as it is a register of the French Treasury. The only one of value for the treatment of Franco-Milanese relations from the time when the two countries came into conflict is thus Register 213. For matters dealing with the foundation of French rule, that is, for affairs preliminary to the real domination - appointments, permits, interdicts and so forth - interesting information may be obtained; but for illustrating actual and permanent administrative operations the register/

40.- The double sheet - folio 2 tergo is blank - is inserted between folios 110 tergo and 111. The single sheet is placed between folios 116 tergo and 117. Both are written in cursive hand and are undated. The paper is badly rotted at the foot of the folios.

register is of little value, as the letters cease before Louis XII finally entered upon the government of the Milanese. Three extracts from the register have been used in the text of the essay.

The registers just described, especially the Registri Panigarola and the Gridario Generale, form the fullest source of information relative to the internal history of Milan; hence I spent most time upon them. In addition to them, however, are the Carteggio Generale and the three series known as Potenze E Estere, Potenze Sovrane, and Vicende de Comuni. These registers contain a vast number of letters of all kinds received or sent by the Chancery of the Sforza, but, for the period of the French domination, they are of hardly any importance. ⁽⁴¹⁾ Finally, there are five Senatorial Registers, one of which is a collection of ordinances, while the four others contain reports of Senatorial meetings.

Though the Archivio di Stato in Milan preserves the fullest collection of documents necessary for a history of the province, it does not house all the records of the French Administration. Some of these are in the Archives Nationales in Paris, while others - letters, treaties, diplomatic correspondence, for example - are kept in the Archives of Venice, Florence/

41.- These registers I did not examine. The extracts used in the text have been taken from L. G. Pélissier's collection Documents pour l'Histoire de la Domination Française dans le Milanais. Nor did I consult the five registers of the Senate, though I have used four extracts - Nos. 66, 74, 86, and 88 of Pélissier, Op.cit.

Florence and Turin. Others, again, are found in such libraries as the Bibliotheque Nationale in Paris, the Ambrosiana and the Brera in Milan, and the Marciana in Venice. (42) Unfortunately, the Brera was closed each of the times I was in Milan, so that where quotations are given from manuscripts preserved there they have been taken from M. Péliissier's collection. (43) Most of them come from the compilation entitled AG,X,- Nos. 36 and 37 being those employed. These registers are not originals but copies.

Like the Brera, the Biblioteca Ambrosiana houses a large number of manuscripts, but very few belong to the period I499-I5I2. Of these I consulted two, viz., Decreta Ducum Mediolani ab anno I386 ad I523, and Dazii Provisioni Ordinii Sopra il Pane Venale di Milano dall Anno I33I al I5I6. (44) (45)

The first is a collection of ducal decrees drawn from various sources. Some of them are certain to have been published, but the manuscript has not yet been printed as it stands.

The /

42.- As the Archives of the Vatican are closed during July and August, I was unable to examine any documents there. In the re-arrangement of the records now going on (which will make consultation an easier matter than it is at present) Cardinal Gasquet has taken part but, so far, has not come upon any papers regarding Milan that would serve to illustrate the period of the French domination. Further, he wrote me, "I fear that the documents in the Vatican Archives regarding the period I499-I5I2 - other than purely English papers, which are in order and now bound - are not yet arranged for consultation. The work of sorting etc. is a very long job and our officials are at present too few."

43.- Documents pour l'Histoire de la Domination Francaise dans le Milanais, I499-I5I3.

44.- The location is H.S. IV., 43.

45.- The location is F.S. IV., I9.

The folios are of paper about twelve inches by nine inches in size. The second manuscript deals with bread. It treats of control, bakers, method of baking, the places from which the wheat must come, price, sale, the non-interference of officials without good cause, and the trial of accused persons. After a preamble of two folios the edicts begin on folio 3. The manuscript is written on paper of the same size as the Decreta Ducum, the writing being large and very clear, though some of the letters are peculiarly shaped. Fewer than the usual number of contractions are employed. There are 47 folios, all but one of which are written on both sides, with an average of 26 lines to the folio. The writing shows slightly through the paper. The same remarks apply to this manuscript as to the Decreta Ducum. As it is a collection, some of the decrees are bound to have been printed from other sources, but the manuscript as a whole has not been published. The two extracts given in the body of the essay are made public for the first time.

Since the political relations between Milan and Turin at the beginning of the fifteenth century were both interesting and important, the archives of the latter city can hardly be omitted from consideration in any study of that period. Many references to Milan are to be found, though naturally such material is less abundant than in Milan itself. Much of the interest centres round the league between Louis XII. and Philiberto (I499), by which the French were guaranteed a safe passage through/

through Savoy on their way to invade Milan. A complete copy of the treaty is found in the Inventario of the Mazzo in which the original is preserved. But there are other documents, also, which both indicate the somewhat close political connections between France and Savoy, and throw light upon such Milanese affairs as were affected by the relations of the two other countries and Germany. As these relations frequently find expression in treaties, I consulted the series Trattati Diversi.

This register is on paper, large folio in size, well bound, and in good condition. It contains an index. Its 193 folios preserve, in all, 532 documents - Deputazioni, Ordinati, Tregue, Trattati, Ratificanzi, Dichiarazioni, Donazioni, Obbligazioni, Capitoli (of treaties), Convenzioni, Atti, Promesse, Procure, Lettere, Arbitramenti - executed between the dates 1183 and 1799. The first record is a treaty (1183) with the Emperor Barbarossa, and the last a Protestation de S.M. Charles Emanuel II. de Sardaigne contre l'acte par le quel S.M. a renoncé l'exercice de tout pouvoir en Piedmont.

The originals of the register are contained in a series of thirty-seven mazzi, but I did not consult those beyond No. VI. (May 1507 - December 1561), though I examined isolated documents throughout the series. With the exception of the first and second mazzi the originals correspond in number with the copies preserved in the register. In the first mazzo two papers, Nos. I and 27/ -

46.- See, for example, Trattati Diversi, Mazzo III., No. 16.

I and 27 are missing, while Nos. 2 and 25 are in the Museum in Turin. Of Mazzo II. all the papers are preserved, though No. 5 is in the Museum. The following table shows the position with regard to Mazzi I. - VI.

Mazzo.	No. of Documents.	Missing.	In Museum.
I.	36.	I, 27.	2, 25.
II.	14.	None.	No. 5.
III.	29.	None.	None.
IV.	24.	None.	None.
V.	28.	None.	None.
VI.	24.	None.	None.

The register contains very few records relating to Milanese affairs during the period 1499-1512, though there is preserved in Mazzo V. a Trattato (dated December 5, 1494) tra la Duchessa Bianca ed il Duca Ludovico Maria Sforza di Milano di rinnovazione e confermazione delle Leghe altre volte seguite e specialmente quelle del 1471, 1484, 1485, et 1490, e queste per (47) la conservazione e reciproca difesa di rispettivi loro stati. Although this record is beyond the range of the period 1499-1512, it is useful as indicating the friendly relations which normally existed between Milan and Savoy during the thirty years immediately preceding the French invasion of the province. (48) The same mazzo/

47.- Trattati Diversi, Mazzo V., No. 25. This record may have been published but, if so, I have not come upon it in print.

48.- There were other treaties of peace and friendship between the two provinces. For example, one was signed with Francesco Sforza on Dec. 27, 1450 (Trattati Diversi, Mazzo IV., No. 24) and ratified on Jan. 10, 1451. See Coda to/

mazzo contains the treaty of June 12, 1499 with France, arranging terms for the free passage of the French troops through Savoy on their way to Milan. (49) It contains also two references to this treaty. The first consists of Lettere di dicto Re di Francia di riduzione dell' annua e perpetua pensione di Ducati ^M20 d'oro promessa al Duca Filiberto di Savoia nel trattato tra essi conchiuso in occasione del passaggio da questo accordato alle truppe di dicto Re per la conquista del Ducato di Milano a quella di Ducati ^MX da prendersi sopra li reddite del medesimo Ducato senza innovazione alcuna del sudetto trattato. (50) The second, dated October 3 1500, is a confirmation of the above mentioned pensions. These two/

- 48.- (cont.) to Mazzo IV., No. 24. Another, confirmatory of that of Dec. 27, 1450, was concluded in 1554. It was signed by the respective provinces on July 24 and 28, and entered in the records of the Archivio di Stato, Turin, on August 30 of the same year. See Trattati Diversi, Mazzo V., No. 9.
- 49.- This important treaty is on parchment 26 $\frac{1}{4}$ inches wide by 21 inches deep. The writing, of which there are 53 lines, is in French, and runs parallel to the long side of the document. The terms are comprised in ten articles. In the twelfth line there is an erasure with two "dashes" inserted in order to mark the blank. Lines 14 and 23 also contain slight erasures, and in line 31 an alteration is made in one word, the same ink being used in the alteration as in the word itself. Attached to the document is the king's seal in red wax. It is 3 $\frac{7}{8}$ inches in diameter. The seal is impressed on the obverse side with a figure of Louis XII, enthroned, and holding a sceptre in his left hand. On the reverse is a shield with three fleurs de lis. Between the uprights of the shield and the inner ring of the seal are grouped on each side seventeen fleurs de lis. See Trattati Diversi, Mazzo V., No. 26.
- 50.- Trattati Diversi, Mazzo V., No. 28, Inventario, fol. 45.
- 51.- This is a Coda attached to the document mentioned in Note 50.

two documents bear out what I have said later about the attitude of Filiberto, viz., that he was animated, not by friendship for either of the combatants, but by the consideration of what profit he could make out of their quarrel.

Besides the Trattati Diversi other registers of a similar nature are preserved. A register of Addizione dei Trattati Diversi, for example, contains an inventory of 176 documents preserved in 20 mazzi. As the covering dates are Dec. 26, 1362 - Feb. 6, 1836, it will be seen that the papers, for the greater part, are outside the period of the French occupation of Milan. Even the few that belong to the epoch are unimportant, and have not been employed in this essay.

Another series, Traité Anciens, written in French, proved more valuable. The contents are similar to those of the Trattati Diversi, viz., Lettres Patentes, Traités, Promesses, Ordres and Requisitions. The papers, 249 in number, are contained in ten Paquets, and deal with the period June 18, 1297 - November 1489. To these must be added six documents, viz., Lettre de Donation de la Dauphine Beatrice, fille de Pierre, Comte de Savoye, of all her rights in the lands and the Lake of Geneva (1294), and a Ratification et Approbation by Beatrice of the cession of all her rights as above (1294); another Lettre de Donation de Beatrice, fille de Pierre, Comte de Savoye (1295); a Ratification of an arrangement between the Dauphin and the Count of Savoy (1309), a Donation of ¹⁰M livres by the Dauphin to/

to Maria, daughter of the Count of Savoy, in conformity with the agreement of 1309, and an entry of Homage paid by the Dauphin and Beatrice (1309) for certain fiefs in Savoy in accordance with the same agreement. Obviously these transactions are domestic in character; but they show, also, the existence of friendly relations between France and Savoy at the beginning of the fourteenth century.

To these six documents falls to be added a Paquet d'Addition (I269-I483), containing 27 papers, of which none have a direct bearing upon Franco-Milanese relations. The whole collection thus contains 273 documents. The register has been carefully compiled. In the Inventario, Document No. 9, Primo, ⁽⁵²⁾ is placed at the end, after No. 34, its chronological position, Nov. 15, 1308, being immediately prior to No. 9, Secondo, of the ⁽⁵³⁾ same date. Possibly this results from the discovery of No. 9, ⁽⁵⁴⁾ Primo, after the insertion of No. 9, Secondo, in the register.

Two of the papers in the register are interesting. In 1489 a donation of 1,200,000 gold crowns was made by Charles I of Savoy, surnamed The Warrior, in favour of Charles VIII. of France, the Principality of Piedmont, the Marquisates of Suza and Canavais and the County of Nice being tendered as hypothec.

The/-----

52.- See Register of Traités Anciens, fol. 37.

53.- Ibid. fol. 28.

54.- Traités Anciens, Paquet III., Nos. 9, Primo and 9, Secondo.

The payment was not completed, though, twenty-one years later, rumours were abroad that Louis XII. intended to force a settlement. Louis, however, asserted that he had not then, and never (55) had previously, any intention of compelling Charles of Savoy to pay the sum mentioned, especially as the agreement was suspected of being a piece of trickery. The paper containing the denial is placed along with that which contains the agreement between Charles I. of Savoy and Charles VIII. of France, though the date (56) (April 19, 1510) is beyond the date-limit of the register.

The second paper is a letter of Charles VIII. dated August 26, 1489, in which he engages to defend and give succour to Charles I. of Savoy against all enemies except Berne, Freiburg and the Duke of Milan. While this document indicates no hostility to the duchy, it may also be read as expressing, not so much friendship for Milan as a desire to eliminate from the agreement the nearest probable enemies of Savoy, and thus limit the/

55.- This, of course, was Charles III.

56.- Traités Anciens, Paquet 10, No. 18.

The fact that Louis took such pains to placate the government of Savoy is indicative of the importance he attached to the friendship of the Italian state. His attitude was wise, for Julius II., having admitted Venice to his peace in February, 1510, had determined to clear Italy of both French and Germans. The significance of the papal peace with Venice could not be under-rated by Louis, even if he did not fully comprehend the aim the Pontiff had in view. In any case, trouble in the peninsula, with the possible necessity for a French retreat, compelled him to maintain a safe passage to France by land. The repudiation of a debt which he could hardly hope to collect was a cheap way of securing his object.

the danger of embroiling France in quarrels which would not be
(57)
to her advantage.

Of still greater value for information regarding Milan
(58)
is the Inventario Milanese. This register contains an inventory
of records - Economico, Poste, Lettere Diversi, Militare, Con-
sulte della Giunta, Giuridico, e Politico, Incidente col Governo,
Editte, Ordini e Gride - the originals of which are preserved
in mazzi.

For the period 1499-1512 the most valuable is Mazzo III
but Mazzo J, Primo, also, is important from the constitutional
side. Three documents deal with this aspect of Milanese
history. The first (1541), is Constituzioni de Stato di Milano,
del Emperatore Carlo V., and the second, Decreti Antichi del
Stato di Milano. These have little concern with the French
administration of the duchy; but the third, Ordini, Decreti e
Dichiarazioni della Costituzione de Senato di Milano, 1490, (sic)
deals with matters which are fundamental in the study of that
administration. Unfortunately, the paper is not an original
record but a copy. It bears the date 1641 and the note Rac-
colti dal Garroni. Hence the document is valueless until its
original has been traced. For the purpose of this study, then,

Mazzo/

57.- This is the more likely reading as, though the letter was
issued in Charles VIII's name, the regency was in the
hands of his sister, Anne de Beaujeu, till 1491. Anne's
policy, like that of Louis XI., was cautious.

58.- This collection will be referred to under its title
Milanese: Città e Ducato.

Mazzo J, Primo, important though it is constitutionally, has but little assistance to offer. With Mazzo III, the case is altered.

In this mazzo I found that the first seven papers dealt with the period 1496-1513. These I shall take in chronological order. The first, dated Dec. 27, 1496, is a letter to Battista Spondrati, the Milanese Ambassador, advising him of the league made between the Emperor and the King of Spain, and their break with France. (59)
(60) The second, dated three years later, (Nov. 15, 1499), is a letter from Louis XII. telling of the erection of a single Senate instead of the two former Milanese bodies, the Secret Council and the Council of Justice. (61) The third document belongs to the same year and contains Notizie Istoriche del (62)
Invasione ed Assedj fatti da' Francesi nello Stato di Milano.

The next paper, dated May 31, 1506, is the will of Louis XII. (63) This must be a copy as it is not likely that the original should find a home in the Archives of Turin. In the will Louis declares that, in the event of his death without his having other legitimate children, his daughter Claude is to be his/

59.- Philip, Maximilian's son, had just married Juana, daughter of Ferdinando and Isabella of Spain.

60.- Milanese: Città e Ducato, Mazzo III., No. I.

61.- Ibid. Mazzo III., No. 2.

62.- Ibid. Mazzo III., No. 3.

63.- Ibid. Mazzo III., No. 4. The king had been seriously ill in April of 1506. See d'Auton, Vol. IV., pp. I-9.

his heiress and, as such, is to inherit the duchy of Milan, Genoa, the Counties of Pavia and Asti, together with other lands and lordships held by him di qua de Monti nella Lombardia, and other lordships in France which are not appanages of the French crown. His queen, Anne de Bretagne, is left as the guardian of Claude. A further provision declares that Claude shall marry the Comte d'Angoulême, although she is already betrothed to the Duca di Luxembourg, Figlio del Ré de Castiglia, qual (sposalizio) dovesse esser d'alcun effetto. (64)

The next document raises the question of Louis XII's investiture in Milan by the Emperor. The subject is mentioned in three documents. The first stipulates for Louis' investiture (65) but says nothing with regard to his descendants; the second is the League of Cambray, of which the investiture forms part; the (66) third is preserved in the series now being discussed. There are differences in the contents of these three papers. The League of Cambray stipulates that the investiture is for Louis and his heirs; the French document confines it to Louis; while the record in Turin, like the League of Cambray, includes his descendants/-----

- 64.- Milanese: Città e Ducato, Inventario, fol. 28. The Duke of Luxembourg was the future Charles V. As husband of Juana, heiress to Castile through her mother Isabella, the Arch-Duke Philip (Charles' father) is termed Ré di Castiglia.
- 65.- Archives Nationales, Paris, Tresor des Chartes, Carton J. 505, No. 9.
- 66.- Milanese: Città e Ducato, Mazzo III., No. 5.

descendants. Now the document in the Paris Archives is dated April 4, 1506, and is really a receipt for money paid to Maximilian by Louis XII., though the investiture is an integral part of the transaction, as the money was handed over in return for its bestowal. The League of Cambray (Dec. 10, 1508) and the Turinese document (June 14, 1509) indicate an advance in Louis' claims and a disposition on Maximilian's part to admit them. But the Emperor's grant of the investiture was compulsory, as he had just been defeated both in war and in diplomacy by Louis. His participation in the League of Cambray was an attempt to regain prestige by occupying a portion of Venetian territory.

The Turinese paper is a Diploma dell' Imperatore di concessione ed Investitura a favore di Ludovico XII., Re di Francia del Ducato di Milano ed e' Contadi di Pavia, Angleria, Bressa, Cremona, Verona, Crema, e Gera d'Ada per lui, e suoi Eredi Maschj, e in mancanza di quelli per Claudia sua figlia, e del suo futuro Sposo, e de' suoi discendenti Maschj, e in mancanza di quest' ultimi per l'altra Figlia del Re, chesera (sic) la Primogenita, e che eleggera, e de' suoi (sic) Discendenti Maschj ed in mancanza di questi per gl. Eredi Maschj, e particolarmente per il Duca di Vallois. This is not the original diploma but, as its terms (so far as they concern the question of Investiture) agree with those of the League of Cambray, concluded/-----

67.- Milanese: Città e Ducato, Inventario, fol. 28.
The paper is in Mazzo III. (No. 5) of the series.

concluded only six months previously, it may be taken as being authentic.

The sixth document of the series is dated Dec. 2, 1512. It thus belongs to the period immediately following that in which the French were driven from Milan. But the terms of the paper indicate that Louis did not intend to accept the loss of the duchy as final, for in it he grants to his daughter Renee a number of Italian towns over which, at the time of the gift, he had no control. The record consists of Donazione fatta da Ludovico XII., Re di Francia à Madama Renata di Francia sua, e della Regina Anna Duchessa di Bretagna figlia Primogenita de' Castelli, Terre, e Luoghi di Cremona e Cremonense, Gera d'Ada, Bergamo e Bergamasco, Crema e Cremasco, Bressa e Bressiano, e Pescara, e di tutti e ciaschaduni diritti, che le possano spettare senza Verona, Vallegiatto, Vignago, Salò e sua Riviera per lei, (68) suoi Eredi e aventi ragione dalla detta Renata.

This record cannot be the original Donazione, for it contains an error which could not exist in such a paper. Claude, not Renée, was the eldest daughter of Louis XII. and Anne de Bretagne; so that either there has been a slip in writing the name, or the addition figlia primogenita is wrong. But neither of these errors would have occurred in a document drawn up by a French lawyer and examined before it was filed. The next record carries/

68.- Milanese: Città e Ducato, Mazzo III., No. 6.
The quotation is from the Inventario to the series, fol. 29.

(69)

carries the matter a step farther. It is summed up in the Inventario as Altra fatta da' Ludovico XII. Ré di Francia à Madama Renata di Francia sua figlia del Ducato, e Paese di Milano, co' Castelli, Terre, Città, e sue pertinenze, prerogative, e preminenze, dependenti da' godersi pienamente da Lei, e suoi Discendenti in perpetuo succesivamente dall' uno all' altro, preferendo Li Maschj alle Femine con ordine di Primogenitura tanto di Maschj, che femine, e mancando questi Discendenti, a Posterì della detta Renata, à Madama Claudia altra sua Figlia, e Discendenti suoi in perpetuo succesivamente nella sudetta forma, e venendo à mancare li Discendenti di dette sue Figlie e Francesco Duca di Vallois Conte d'Engouleme, e suoi Discendenti in perpetuo, e mancando questi a chi spetterà de' Discendenti della Linea, sangue, e Parentella di Madama Valentina di Milano da dove sono pervenuti al detto Ludovico XII. il detto Ducato, Terre, Signorie (70)
Nov. (No day mentioned) 1513.

Three points emerge from the information given by this paper. First, the arrangement with regard to Renee's succession to the duchy stands good; second, there is a reversion of the Milanese possessions (or, in reality, of the French claims upon them) to Claude in the event of Renee's line, both male and female becoming extinct. This, and the previous paper seem to indicate/

69.- Milanese: Città e Ducato, Mazzo III., No. 7.
The record is dated Nov. 1513, nearly a year after the Donation mentioned in Note 68.

70.- Milanese: Città e Ducato, Inventario, fol. 29.

indicate a change of policy on Louis' part. Hitherto, Claude had been regarded as the heiress to the Milanese. The first Treaty of Blois (Sept., 1504), the king's will (May, 1505), and the Diploma of Investiture (June, 1509), had all stipulated for her succession. As the settlement arranged by the first Treaty of Blois had been due in large measure to the influence of Anne de Bretagne, the change may point to a lessening of her power. Alternatively, it may indicate Louis' desire to provide for his second daughter, as Claude and the Comte d'Angoulême were already betrothed. Certainly it could not have resulted from Louis' marriage with Mary, sister of Henry VIII. of England, nor from the Comte d'Angoulême's marriage with Claude, as both of these events took place in 1514; while the last arrangement concerning Renée's succession to the duchy belongs to November of the previous year.

From the series Traités avec les Suisses et Vallesans I obtained no information pertinent to the French domination or to events connected therewith. The Swiss papers I did not examine as there is another register dealing with the treaties between Savoy and the Swiss Cantons. This is discussed in the next paragraph. That portion of the register containing the traités avec les Vallesans consists of seven mazzi comprising in all 138 papers, the first dated 1179 and the last 1816. There is an Inventario to the mazzi

The last register I consulted in the Turinese Archives was/

was Trattati co' Svizzeri e Grigioni, in which there is only one document having even a remote bearing upon Milanese politics during the period 1499-1512. This record, dated Jan. 7, 1511, contains Rinovazione di Lega tra' l'Imperatore Massimiliano a suo nome, e di Carlo Arciduca d'Austria, e li Cantoni di Zurich, Berna, Lucerna, Urania, Suitz, Unterwalden, Rozenwalden, Zug, Glaris, Basilea, Friborgo, Soleure, Schiaffosa, St. Gallo, et Apens, et per la reciproca difesa de' loro rispettivi stati. (71) (72)

The Archives of Milan and Turin preserve papers of greater importance than do any of the other collections I have consulted. M. Péliissier found the Archivio di Stato in Florence a fruitful source of information for the years 1498-1500. He was fortunate. The period of the French administration in Milan is almost unrepresented in the various registers I consulted. Those of the Consiglio del Cento, for example, contain four volumes treating of the years 1458-1524. Of these, Registers 1-3 deal with the events of the years 1458-1491, while No. 4 begins with 1514. The hiatus of twenty-three years is to be regretted, as it covers the period of the French domination. Again, the registers of the Protocolli o Minutari is quite as bad/-----

71.- Trattati co' Svizzeri e Grigioni, Mazzo I., No. I.
This is the only document within the period of the French domination of Milan. Document 2 of Mazzo I. belongs to the year 1516.

72.- Trattati co' Svizzeri e Grigioni, Inventario, fol. I.

73.- See Louis XII. et Ludovico Sforza, Vol. I., Avant-propos, p.v.

bad. Of the four registers covering the years 1460-1527, No.1 deals with the period 1460-1476, and No. 2 with the years 1481-1494. Then comes a blank of twenty years, Register 3 starting with the year 1514 and No. 4 ending with 1527.

Under the general heading Signoria are four sets of registers. The Registro di Lettere Interne et Esterne contains a large number of volumes of which I consulted Nos. 51-57. The registers are folio in size, clearly written in Latin and Italian on paper, and are well preserved. In these seven volumes, covering the period July 12, 1497- March 13, 1515, I found no reference to the French administration of Milan. This is somewhat singular as the registers deal with current events of all kinds. Volume 52, (1500-1501) for example, contains no fewer than eleven letters to Louis XII., a passing reference to the Pisan War, and a plea for an Italian captain taken prisoner by de Ligny while on a visit to France.

The second series of registers is entitled Lettere Responsive cioè recevute della Signoria. Thirty volumes, viz., Nos. 10-48, deal with the years 1498-1531. These I examined as far as the years 1513 without finding a single helpful document. A third series, Lettere Esterne alla Signoria del 1497, was quite as unfruitful. The same remark applies to the registers of Minutari, of which I consulted Volumes 7-20 (1466-1512).

The Registro di Elezione e Lettere ad Ambasciatori was the last I consulted. It is folio in size, written on paper with an/

an average of twenty-eight lines to the folio, and has no index. There is no reference to Milan even during the period May 1499-August 1512, though Register 105 has several entries to Pisa and Genoa.

One other document may be mentioned which, though it does not deal with the French administration of the duchy of Milan, is interesting in the light it throws upon the instinct for internal development that swayed the provinces of Italy at this time. (74) The importance of the Milanese Canals, especially the Martesana which brought the waters of the Adda to the City, is discussed in the body of the essay. But the Florentines, also, were anxious from political motives as well as from a desire for commercial development, to connect their city with the coast. A proposal to this effect is found in No. 32 (1458-1477) of the series of Balie. The plan projected was a water-way from Leghorn to Pisa, and the (75) canalisation of the Arno to Florence, so that the distance between the city and the coast would be shorter and safer than by way of the river. The document further mentions the appointment of a Balia or committee of five citizens to consider ways and means of carrying out the scheme.

The register is folio in size with an average of thirty-nine/

74.- See d'Auton, Vol. 111., p.24. The Martesana was begun by Francesco Sforza. But for this and similar points see C. M.Ady's History of Milan under the Sforza, pp. 81, 106, 166.

75.- The title of the document - Provvisione relative alla costruzione di una Canale per Arno da Livorno e Pisa a Firenze alla quale fu deputata una balia di cinque cittadini sufficiently indicates the scope of the proposal.

nine lines to the folio. It is written in Italian by at least six different copyists, one of whom has an irritating trick of ending many letters in succession by a horizontal line, so that he appears to be cancelling what he has written. (76)

As my visit to Venice was very hurried I had no opportunity of consulting the registers of the Frari, and, as the Biblioteca Marciana was closed at the time, I was debarred from consultation there also. Of the two documents from which I have quoted in the text, the first, Geronimo Borgia's De Bellis Italicis is of no great importance. The second, however, a despatch from the Venetian Ambassador, Blanco, to the Council of Ten, is of much interest owing to the information it gives regarding the state of political parties in Milan in 1504. This document has been included in L.G. Péliissier's collection. (77) The original Diarii of Marino Sanuto, of course, I have not seen. For the quotations used in the text I have been obliged to rely on the printed copies. Quotations from other documents preserved in the Frari have been used in the text, particularly in the portion treating of the preparations for the invasion of Milan. These, for the greater part have been taken from Rawdon Brown's Documents Preserved in the Archives at Venice.

I had thought that probably there would be preserved in/-----

- 76.- All the registers I consulted in the Archivio di Stato in Florence are well bound and in excellent condition. Some of them, however, lack an index. If this flaw were remedied it would be a distinct advantage to the investigator.
- 77.- Documents pour l'Histoire de la Domination Française dans le Milanais. The extract from the De Bellis Italicis is the first in this collection, and Blanco's despatch is No. 29.

in the Archivo General de Simancas some registers which might help to illustrate the period 1499-1512, especially as regards Spanish relations with Louis XII. But Senor Alcocer, the chief archivist, says that (as in the case of some of the Milanese records) the papers have been removed to Paris. (78) I pass on, then, to consider one or two of the records preserved in the Archives Nationales.

In the Archives in Paris those documents referring to Milan are preserved in cartons in the series entitled Tresor des Chartes. The cartons are distinguished by the letters of the alphabet each series being further numbered under its own alphabetical designation. They contain documents of all kinds, written on parchment and on paper. Two of the cartons - J. 505 and J. 507 - preserve papers which are valuable as illustrations of the period 1499-1512. (79)

The receipt given to Louis XII. by Maximilian for money received/

78.- To Senor Alcocer I am indebted for the following information:- "Tengo el gusto," he wrote me, "de manifestarle que los legajos de la negociacion de Milan de esta epoca se encuentran en Paris.

"Vistos los de Venecia No. 500, Genova 522 y sitados varios de Italia 559, no hay nada de lo que busca. En cambio en el legajo 847 antiguo de la negociacion de Roma se encuentran bastantes documentos de esta epoca (algunos cogidos para Mr. Firan y para Mr. Gustavo Begenrroth). La mayor parte son Minutos de cartas del Rey Catolico a su embajador en Roma, Jeronimo de Viele de los anos 1507-1515.

79.- No. 8 of this carton, of date September 15, 1576, is a communication from Galeazzo Maria Sforza to Louis XI. renewing and recognising certain feuds. For other documents nearer the period 1499-1512 see Nos. 5 and 10 of the same carton.

received as the price of investiture and other matters (April 5, 1505) is contained in Carton J. 505. The deed (No. 9 in the carton) is $12\frac{7}{8}$ inches broad and 16 inches long. There are thirteen lines beautifully written in ink which is fairly black. Attached to the documents by parchment tapes is Maximilian's seal of red wax. It is saucer shaped, concave on the obverse side and convex on the reverse. The reverse contains no marks. The seal is in very bad condition, quite a third of it having been broken off.

In comparing the original with the copy published by M. Pélissier, I found several points of difference, most of them referring to capital letters. To show these differences the paper as I copied it is given here and explanatory notes added.

Maximilianus divina favente clementia Romanorum Rex
semper augustus ac Hungarie Dalmatie Croacia &c Rex: Archidux
 (81)
Burgundie Brabantie &c.

Recognoscimus tenore presentium nos recepisse a sere-
 (82) (83) (84)
nissimi principis domini Ludovici Regis Francorum Fratris nostri
 (85)
clarissimi/

80.- Documents pour l'Histoire de la Domination Française dans le Milanais, No. 32 p. 113.

81.- This portion of the deed M. Pélissier omits. See Op. et doc. cit. p. 113.

82.- Pélissier, Op. et doc. cit. has Domini.

83.- Pélissier, ibid. has regis.

84.- Pélissier, ibid. has fratus.

85.- Pélissier has carissimi.

(86)

clarissimi consiliario & receptore generali finantiarum
(87)

Magistro Henrico Bohier summam centum Milium Librarum Turo-
(88)

nensium in Pecunia numerata, videlicet in scutis auri cugni
(89)

Regni Frantie tam ad solem quam ad coronam nobis manualiter
(90)

realiter & de facto traditam. Et hoc pro parte ducentarum
(91)

milium librarium Turonensium quas nobis tenebatur soluere
(92) (93)

prefatus serenissimus Francorum Rex tam ratione Investiture
(94)

per nos eidem serenissimo Francorum Regi de Ducatu Mediolani,
(95)

comitatu Papie, ceterisque terris in Investitura comprehensis
(96)

facte quam pro quibuscumque alijs rebus & causis contentis in
(97)

Tractatibus et articulis initis factis & conclusis inter nos &
(98)

clarissimum/

86.- Pélissier omits generali.

87.- Pélissier has librarum.

88.- Pélissier has turonensium.

89.- Pélissier has regni Francie.

90.- The sign & is generally used in the deed. Pélissier uses
et.

91.- Pélissier has turonensium.

92.- Pélissier has rex.

93.- Pélissier has investiture.

94.- Pélissier has regi.

95.- Pélissier has investitura.

96.- Pélissier has aliis.

97.- Pélissier has tractatibus.

98.- Pélissier has charissimum.

clarissimum filium nostrum Philippum Archiducem Austrie et
 (99) (100)
Regem Castelle nostrosque oratores ex unaparte (sic) et pre-
 (101) (102)
faturn serenissimum Regem Francorum et eiusdem Oratores ex alia
tam Tridenti quam Blesis prout indictis tractatibus et articulis
latius continetur de qua quidem summam centum milium librarum
 (103)
Turonensium nos pro benesatisfacto tenemus quittamus & liberamus
 (104)
prefatum serenissimum Regem Francorum fratrem nostrum dictum
bohier & alios quoscunque ad quos spectare poterit. In quorum
fidem presentes signo manu propria confecto & sigillo nostro
 (105)
muniri fecimus. Dat. in Civitate nostra Hagnaw Die quinta
Aphrilis (sic) Anno Domini Milesimo quingentesimo quinto Regnorum
 (106)
nostrorum Romani Vicesimo Hungarie vero decimoquinto.

Two other documents should be mentioned here. The first, that interesting paper known as the Political Testament of Ludovico Sforza, has been published by M.R.de Maulde la Claviere/

99.- Pélissier has regem.

100.- Pélissier has una parte.

101.- Pélissier has regem.

102.- Pélissier has oratores.

103.- Pélissier has turonensium.

104.- Pélissier has Francorum regem

105.- Pélissier writes the word Datum in full.

106.- Pélissier has anno Dni. 1505 RR. NN. Romani 20^{mo},
Hungarie vero xv^{mo}.

Clavière in his Chroniques de Louis XII., par Jean d'Auton.

In Volume 11. (published in 1891, page 297) he says with regard to the preservation of this document: -"Il appartient a la Bibliotheque Nationale de Paris, ou il est catalogue sous la rubrique Italien, 821. La presence de ce manuscrit a la Bibliotheque Nationale de Paris n'a rien que de naturel, puisqu'il avait ete depose au Tresor du chateau de Milan. Il n'a ete publie qu'avec des inexactitudes a la fin du tome I. du Recueil de documents diplomatiques sur Francois I. donne par Gius. Molini a Florence, en 1836, sous le titre: Documenti di Storia Italiana."

An error of some kind has crept into this reference as, when I tried to obtain the original for consultation in the Bibliotheque Nationale, the officials, after having searched, declared that the paper was not in their possession. The Documenti di Storia Italiana mentioned in his reference I have not seen.

The second document, Privileges granted to Milan by Louis XII. at the request of the citizens, has been published by M. Péliissier. (108) It had been published previously by "M. Biondelli sous le titre peu precis de Condizioni politico-economiche della citta di Milano, dans l'Archivio Storico Lombardo, V., p. 181, mais avec quelques erreurs de lecture." One copy/

107.- See d'Auton, Vol.II., Pièces Annexes pp. 296-328.

108.- Documents pour l'Histoire de la Domination Français dans le Milanais, No. 22.

109.- Péliissier, Op. cit., p. xv., Note, continued from the previous page.

copy of the document is preserved in the Archives Nationales (110) in Paris. Another has been transcribed into the collection AG, X, 7 in the Brera in Milan, and a third, which is the one (111) I consulted is in the Registri Panigarola. Though the Privileges had been granted on August 7, 1502, their formal issue was delayed till December 23. The date given in the Schedario, December 22, may be the date of confirmation; but in any case the publication took place on the following day, that being the date on the document.

M. Pelissier points out some errors in Biondelli's (112) (113) copy. In Demand No. VI., he has transferenturque ad PORTAS, (114) instead of transferenturque ad PARTAS; in Demand XX., for petit civitas ut officia publica et ecclesiastica beneficia domini hujus gratis Mediolanensibus qui R. Majestati V. probi et digni VISI fuerint conferentur, he has petit civitas ut officia publica et ecclesiastica beneficia domini hujus gratis Mediolanensibus qui R. Majestati V. probi et digni VIRI fuerint conferantur; and (115) in Demand XXXI., he reads et maximum OFFERT damnum civitati et dominio/

110.- J. 507. This is Pélissier's reference.

111.- Registri Panigarola, K., fol. 88. Pélissier refers the document to fol. 88, tergo

112.- Documents pour l'Histoire de la Domination Française dans le Milanais, p. xv., Note continued from the previous page.

113.- Pélissier, Op. cit., Doc. No. 22, p. 70, line 8.

114.- Ibid. p. 77, line 4 of the Demand.

115.- Ibid. p. 82, line 10 of page.

dominio instead of et maximum AFFERT damnum civitati et dominio. As these words are all clearly written in the register there is (116) little excuse for the errors. In Demand XXVIII., he omits the word aguae. But, as that word appears at the beginning of a line, the slip is more easily understood.

One other document deserves mention - the Marriage Contract between Valentina Visconti and Louis of Orleans, a copy (117) of which is preserved in the British Museum. The folios of the register are of paper 14 inches by nine inches in size, and are bound in brown leather, each cover having in gilt the Visconti Viper on a shield placed in an oval and surmounted by a floral design. The condition of the register (No. 6 of the series) is excellent, the writing large and clear although the ink has worked through the folios from both sides. The title of the collection is Traictez des Rois de France avec les Papes, avec les Ducs de Ferrare, avec les republiques de Florence, Sienne, Luques et avec les Ducs de Milan ensemble les investitures dudit duche.

The document (fol. 215 of the Register) which, besides being a marriage contract, is a papal dispensation for the marriage and a transference of Valentina's dowry of Asti, is of extreme importance, as it declares that in the event of Gian Galeazzo's death without heirs male his successor shall be his daughter/

116.- Ibid. p. 80, line 5 of page.

117.- Additional Mss. No. 30669. I consulted this copy and not the original which is in the Paris Archives.

daughter Valentina. Upon this declaration was founded the Orleanist claim to the duchy of Milan - a claim which is discussed in the body of the essay.

This closes the account of the documents upon which is based the information contained in the thesis. But such information is confirmed, and in some respects supplemented by the narratives of eye-witnesses. In dealing with official records the historian, provided he uses ordinary precautions, is on comparatively safe ground. When the testimony of unofficial writers is taken into account, however, the case is altered. All narratives must be scrutinised carefully to see if their statements are accurate, to see, that is, if they agree with the facts as given in documents where these are in existence. In such an examination the first pitfall awaiting the historian is the lack of precision characteristic of the statements of mediaeval writers. The account of some event may be built upon a solid basis of truth, may, in fact, be almost completely true, but be more or less embellished by the author with matter which is either the product of his imagination or extraneous to the subject. Further, no historian is so detached that he is able to treat of every event with scrupulous fairness. In some instances bias may be detected at once. However regrettable this may be, it does not render the record untrustworthy. If the bias is openly shown (provided that it is not outrageous, when, of course, the narrative ceases to be of /

of value) and a comparison with other similar records proves that no suppression or addition has taken place for the purpose of making a point or bolstering up a case, it is possible to reach the truth. In other words, honest bias, without conscious fraud, must not invalidate a narrative.

It is curious that the Italian chroniclers of the period discussed in the essay are sympathetic towards Ludovico Sforza; but I have found no instance in which essential historic truth has been sacrificed in order to make out a case in his favour. The standard of comparison I have adopted is Bernardino Corio's Storia di Milano, as that chronicler was specially commissioned by Ludovico Sforza to write a history of Milan, for which purpose he had access to documents both archival and municipal that other writers could not obtain.

Corio was well qualified for the task he undertook. He (118) was born in 1459, the son of patrician parents, his mother being of the same family as Buonacossa, wife of the great Visconti, Matteo I. The presence of Galeazzo Maria, Roberto Sanseverino, and Cecco Simonetta the ducal secretary, at Bernardino's baptism is sufficient proof of the status of his parents. In his youth Corio held the post of Chamberlain to Galeazzo Maria, and later, to his son Gian Galeazzo, while, still later, he was one of Ludovico's secretaries. The date of his death is uncertain, but/

118.- Bernardini Corii Marci F. patricii qui primus origines et inclyta Mediolanensium gesta monumentis literarum mandavit patriae historiae pars prima. - Storia di Milano, Vol. 1. p. 1, Preface to cp. 1.

but he is known to have been alive in January, 1513, as, in that month he was elected one of sixty centurions of Milan. (119)

(120) By his contemporaries he was regarded as a learned man. He had all the confidence that comes from good birth and good fortune. He possessed, too, a sound knowledge of men and competent judgment in affairs of state, combined with a critical attitude of mind which enabled him to discriminate between the trivial and important. With him originated in Milan the attempt to write history proper as contrasted with that mere setting down of a sequence of events which characterises the chronicler and marks him off from the historian. It is too much to expect that in all respects Corio should be in advance of his age. He was not exempt, for instance, from a belief in portents. Nor did he despise tradition, though he did not accept it blindly: he is not sceptical - his age would not have tolerated this - but, more than once he is politely dubious and tentatively critical.

It has been objected that the fact of his having been commissioned by Ludovico Sforza to write the Storia di Milano must have deprived Corio of independence in preparing the work. Such/

119.- I give this on the authority of Egidio De Magri. See Corio, Storia di Milano, Vol. 1., p. xlvii. Of Cagnola, Prato, Burigozzo and Grumello not one has anything to say on the matter.

120.- It is necessary to discriminate between the mediaeval and the modern connotations of the word learned. The mediaeval conception of the term was that of wide, though shallow, and quite possibly, from the modern view-point, inaccurate knowledge.

Such critics assume that the ingenuousness apparent in the Storia di Milano is simply a pose. They are quite wrong in thus charging Corio with insincerity. He was independent, revealing the truth as he knew it, telling the good and the evil alike of men and their affairs with a frankness which is almost child-like. His critical bent of mind deterred him from making monster, whether of goodness or wickedness, of the historical characters with whose deeds he had to deal. Even in the account he has left of the inordinate viciousness of Galeazzo Maria, Ludovico's own brother, he admits that some of his acts were beneficial to the community.

"Questo principe fu molto dedito a Venere, ed a sozza libidine, pel qual motivo molestava grandemente i suoi sudditi: teneva a proprie spese molte donne: e peggio si e che quando avea soddisfatto i carnali appetiti, le faceva poscia stuprare da gran numero de' suoi cortigiani. Faceva uso dei bagni, e con artificio si faceva cavare i peli dalla persona, e cio anche a colero con cui usava: si faceva tagliare i capelli ad onde:" (121)

Then follows a list of cruelties so bestial in their nature that they could have been perpetrated only by a moral degenerate of the most depraved type. Yet Corio affirms of him that il suo concilio era composto dei piu ragguardevoli uomini de' suoi stati, e ad onta che avesse alcuni vizj, nondimeno amava/

121.- Corio, Storia di Milano, Vol. III., Part VI., cp. III., p. 313.
See also Cagnola, lib. VIII., p. 179.

122.- Corio, Storia di Milano, Vol. III., Part VI., cp. III., p. 315.

amava molto i virtuosi, e con doni li accarezzava, abborriva al contrario i presuntuosi, e li uomini bugiardi e cattivi..... Fece costruire molti edificj nel castello di Milano, e fece pur fabbricare il castello di Novara e quello di Caliate.

This account disproves, also, the charge of subservience to Ludovico. If Corio's object were to write merely a glorification of the house of Sforza why should he have given such a summary of Galeazzo's character? And if his revelation of historic truth were conditioned by his dependence upon Ludovico why should he have risked the almost certain loss of that prince's patronage by such an uncompromising description of his brother's evil nature? No assertion of insincerity-and that is the charge against Corio - can stand the test of this and other passages in his work.

It may be objected that the Italians of the time would not condemn Galeazzo for his vices alone, and that therefore, Corio's estimate was not so dangerous to himself as it appears. Even if this were so - I do not think that, in spite of the licentiousness of the age, his contemporaries would have condoned the vices mentioned by Corio - had his independence of treatment been destroyed, he would never have written Galeazzo seguiva in tutto il rigore la giustizia, ma molti liberava per denari, as (123) the last clause is a condemnation which Ludovico would find difficult to pass without hostile comment.

So eminent an historian as Cesare Cantù says of Corio

E/

123.- Storia di Milano, Vol. lll., Part VI., cp. lll., p. 314.

E fra questi (cronisti) tiene senza forse il primato Bernardino Corio, il quale, a sentir mio, starebbe fra i buoni storici d'Italia, se la forma non fosse troppo necessaria per dar vita ai libri. (124) Yet Cantù accuses Corio of misrepresentation in connection with the establishment of the Ambrosian Republic in Milan after the death of Filippo Maria Visconti. (125) The slander of which Cantù writes must remain a matter of opinion. Certainly Corio's opening paragraph does not support it.

Da principio fu ammirabile la concordia di tutto il popolo nel ricusare la signoria di un solo principe come una pessima pestilenza, ed ordinarono oratori per impetrare dai Veneziana amicizia e lega, e poscia tentarono di rendere soggette ai Milanesi tutte le terre che obbedivano al duca. (126)

Most of the chapter, too, is occupied by a description of Francesco Sforza's operations on behalf of the new republic - his reduction of provincial cities such as Bologna and Pavia, his opposition to the Genoese at Tortona, to the French at Alessandria and to the Venetians at Cremona, and his constant resistance to the military designs of his famous rival Piccinino. Corio mentions that the Milanese sought to make a league with the Venetians against Francesco; but that is a matter of historical fact, and though it exhibits the Milanese officials in a /

124.- Cagnola, Prefazione, p. xv.

125.- Di questa (repubblica) parlò il Cario per adulazione ai padroni. - Cagnola, Prefazione, p. xviii.

126.- Storia di Milano, Vol. lll. Part VI., ep. l., p.4.

127.- Corio, Storia di Milano, Vol. lll., Part V., ep.l., p.

a bad light the action was, from their point of view, justifiable on account of their suspicions of the ultimate designs of Sforza. It is hardly fair, however, to employ the word sparlò in this connection; for if faults as well as virtues are not to be dealt with history would cease to be written. The house of Sforza was a bugbear to Cantù, but he should not have allowed his prejudice to warp his historical judgment.

A more serious complaint is that in the portion of the *Storia* which treats specially of Ludovico his argument alters. It becomes more artificial, more cautious, as if he were on the defensive. He implies that for the actions of Ludovico - his seizure of the government and later, his installation as duke, for example - the ambition of Beatrice d'Este, his wife, were to blame. But Corio really did not need to take up this attitude as, had Ludovico not taken control, Naples would have done so. Again, though Ludovico took possession of the duchy while his nephew's son was still alive, Francesco was a mere child, and there was the danger, almost the certainty, that in this case also, Naples would have assumed control of Milan. Further, to be fair to Corio it should be mentioned that he does not attempt to conceal the facts that Ludovico invited the French to make an attack upon
(128)
Naples, that he sought and obtained from Massimiliano the suc-
(129)
cession to the duchy in 1494, and that he must have been aware of the/

128.- Corio, Storia di Milano, Vol. III., Part VII., cp. II., p.

129.- Corio, ibid. Vol. III., Part VII., cp. II., p. 560. On pp. 560-572 the terms of the grant are given. The date is September 5, 1494.

(130).

the danger to himself involved in his invitation to the French.

Of many facts mentioned in his Storia Corio was an eye-witness. Evidently, too, he was an observer of more than ordinary keenness. The wealth of detail he has left, for example, regarding the murder of Galeazzo Maria is wonderful for a boy of seventeen, and could only have been possible because of his interest in Galeazzo, his shrewd observation, and his favourable position at the moment of the crime. Above all, it must never be forgotten in estimating his reliability that he based his work upon documentary evidence obtained from the state and municipal records of Milan, and that his desire for accuracy was great enough to cause him to consult papers in other parts of Italy.

Another of the chroniclers upon whom the historian of the/

130.- Alfonso was under no delusion as to the ultimate effect of the projected French invasion of Naples, but he foresaw also the ruin of Milan from the same cause. Corio makes him say: "Io concedo che la prima rovina sarebbe la mia, e poscia con maggior fierezza essi mi inseguirebbero. Di tanto male e stato la causa Ludovico Sforza, contro il quale io non ho mai congiurata cosa alcuna, anzi durante il suo governo, ho data in moglie mia figlia Isabella a Giovan Galeazzo suo nipote. E se pur esso crede d'essere da me offeso, non mi rifiuto di accomodarmi ai giudizio di questo venerando e sacro concistoro di cardinali, Fiorentini e Veneziani, e quando poi Ludovico non mosso da alcun motivo, istiga contro di me codesti barbari, vi prego a voler abbracciare questa mia giustissima causa, e non lasciarmi opprimere dalle arme straniere, le quali poi si rivolgeranno anche contro di voi." Storia di Milano, Vol. III., Part VII., cp. 11., p. 553.

131.- As the account of the assassination indicates, he was present, though somewhat to his disappointment he was not in the duke's retinue.

the period must rely for his knowledge of events is Antonio Grumello. Like Corio, he was well-disposed to the house of Sforza, as, indeed, was all his family. Of one incident in the attempt of Ludovico Sforza to recover the duchy after the first conquest by the French Grumello writes as follows:- Fra li altri seruitori fu caza Grumella, habitante in Pizleone castello, qual castello hera sotto lo imperio del senato Veneto et forono quatro fratelli: Ioanne Stephano, Marcho Antonio, Alexandro et Galeazzo, quali intexo che hebeno la nous, aschanio Sforza essere in la citta Mediolanense, ussiti fora de Pizleone, abandonando moglieri, figlioli, robe et possessione intrarno in la rochetta posta in Giarra al rimpeto di la roccha di Pizleone, doue li hera uno bellissimo ponte de legnami, fornita a nome dil Gallicho re. Intrati in epsa roccha predicti fratelli, pigliato il castellano lo gittarno fora depsa rocchetta, lassato per castellano Marcho Antonio Grumello, et fornita a nome dil Sforza, Johanne Stephano poi Alexandro et Galeazzo, uniti insemi circha mille fanti, passarno il Pado fiume nel locho del Corno per resistere alo exercito Gallicho, qual hera in lo imperio Placentino per andare al camino di Alexandria. Passato il Pado fiume li predicti fratelli di Grumello incontrandosi in uno richo merchadante Gallicho con una bolgia piena di auro et gioie al numero de duchati mille, lo feceno pregione, facendolo condurre in la preditta rochetta et quella quantitate di auro et gioie fu com-
partita ad ognuno de li fanti la parte sua.

The fidelity and affection of his family towards
 Ludovico/
 132.- Grumello, lib. III., cp. XII., pp. 41, 42.

Ludovico and others of the Sforza is apparent throughout his work, especially in such passages as the description of Ludovico's betrayal by Bernardino da Curte and the words he puts into the duke's mouth when he heard the news. (133)

Grumello mentions other instances of the part his family took in the affairs of Italy at this time. One of his brothers was taken prisoner at Mortara, but was redeemed by Ludovico - a testimony to the esteem in which the family was held by that prince. Antonio himself was in Novara at the time when Ludovico was captured. His account, as that of an eye-witness of that event, is interesting. (134) The end of the narrative indicates with perfect clearness the sympathy of the chronicler for the fallen prince.

Videndo Ludovico Sforza essere scoperto disse ad alta uoce:
Io me rendo a mio consanguineo, monsignore de Lignino;" e cossi
el pouero Ludovico Sforza fu conducto in pregione nel castello
di Nouara. (135)

In the following chapter, where he describes the capture of Galeazzo Sanseverino he puts it on record that he was an eye-witness/

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- (133) Grumello lib. I., cp. VIII., p. 36.
(134) Grumello, lib. I., cp. XV., pp. 46, 47.
(135) Grumello, lib. I., cp. XVII., p. 55.
(136) Grumello, lib. I., cp. XVII., p. 55.

witness of the events he writes about.

In la prexa di Ludouico Sforza fu pregione Galeazo Sanseverino et Frachasso suo fratello et epso Galeazio fu pregione de Eluecij et hera condotto da epsi Eluecij sopra una cavalla (137) negra senza sella con solamente uno sacho, ET IO IL UIDI.
Grumello mentions another of his brothers, Galeazzo, who took part in the battle of Cirignola in 1503.

Ma ritrouandosi Galeazo Grimello a pede con una gianetta dette in la panza al cauallo di Cazauillano facendo caschare in terra epso cauallo, et Cazauillano fu poi ucixo. (138)

Now, the chronicler would be able to obtain first hand information from Galeazzo regarding the Neapolitan campaign. Therefore, though the account is Grumello's, it may be accepted as substantially accurate as he received it from a trustworthy source.

Though unceasing in his hatred of the French domination Grumello did not cut himself off from public affairs. He continued not only to write but to fight; he was present, for example, at the battle of Agnadello regarding which he wrote:-

Profughato lo exercito Veneto et Gallicho re fece fare bando non se faceno pregioni, et fu facto una mortalita de homini, che non fu longo in Ittallia. IO UIDI al artellaria del senato Veneto

(137) Grumello, lib. I., cp. XVIII., p. 56. The capitals are mine.
(138) Grumello, lib. IV., cp. XI., cp. XI., p. 82. Cazavellano del Corno was a man-at-arms in the pay of Gian Giacomo Trivulzio.

Veneto una montagna de homini morti che foreno estimati quatro millia, cossa terribile da uidere; et assai anchora, quali non herano fornito de morire, li Guaschoni li segauano la gola. (139)

If his affection for the house of Sforza rendered him ill-disposed to the French Government from the very beginning, the conduct of the French soldiery, and particularly the Gascons, only served to increase his hatred. This is evident in the word canaglia which he applies to them, and also in his description of the horrible cruelty committed by the Gascons at Barbarana and by the French generally at Pischera. (140) (141)

From 1512 to 1521 no mention occurs of the Grumello family. But in June of the last named year one of the towers of the Castle of Milan was struck by lightning. Antonio was in the city at the time, for he mentions the occurrence calling it cossa stupendissima et da non credere chi non la uide con li occhij. (142)

The Cronaca of Grumello differs from those of Prato and Burogozzo in that it takes cognizance of affairs all over Italy and/

(139) Grumello, lib. IV., cp. XXXV., p. 112. The capitals are mine.

(140) Grumello, lib. IV., cp. XLVI., pp. 126, 127.

(141) Pigliati tutti epsi milliti Veneti foreno da Galli occixi, et la maggiore parte aperti da essi Galli disfacendoli le budelle per uedere, se dentro haueano danari, et a molti dessi milliti foreno ritrouati duchati doro, et poi aperti che li haueano li gittaueno intra le fosse depsa roccha, cossa crudelissima da uedere. - Grumello, lib. IV., cp. XXXV. p. 115.

(142) Grumello, lib. VII., cp. II., p. 262. Grumello is known to have been alive in 1525, but the year of his death is uncertain.

and, indeed, in Europe generally, so long as they have a bearing upon Italian politics; while the others describe what took place within the walls of Milan and under their eyes. Frequently he shows a fine sense for a telling phrase, yet, though his words are sometimes so touched by fire that they rise almost to the level of poetry, his style, on the whole, is harsh and unpolished, monotonous in expression, and often even halting in construction. These may be blemishes on his book as a work of art, but they do not affect its value as a record of his time.

As an historian, he was a careful, conscientious investigator who refused to affirm as fact that which he knew only by hearsay. More than once in the course of his narrative there appears the naïve statement Questo non la scrivo, perche non la scio precixa. He hated the French domination in Milan, not from ignorance or prejudice, but simply because, as an Italian, he refused to acknowledge any foreign claims upon his country. In point of fact, he admired France and, seeing the hand of Providence in all things, regarded her defeat as a judgment of God upon Francois I. for his injustice in withholding the duchy from the Sforza family. His apostrophe to France on her defeat at Aversa (August 18, 1528) besides being an indication of his regard for that country, is one of the noblest passages in the Cronaca. In dignity and in poetic fervour - though, unfortunately, this high level is not maintained throughout - it approaches the utterances/

utterances of the Hebrew prophets.

O uictoria mirachulosa de uno tanto exercito posto in ruina
da cossi pocho exercito! O Franza, paexe nobile, uestite di
bruna, piangi et chiama uendetta del tuo re nel conspecto de Idio
che per non attendere la promessa fede a Cexare Imperatore ha
mandata toi principi, baroni, signori, gentilhomini, plebei al
macello credendosi epso tuo re non li fusse al mondo maggiore
signore di lui. O re Gallicho, considera la ruina de uno tuo
tanto felice exercito, qual hera per combattere con tutto il
mondo per una giornata et he stato posta in ruina. Non credere
che sia stata la forza del magno Idio! Tu hai mandato uno tuo
capittaneo superbissimo, quale ha lacerata la infortunata citta
di Pauia, lacerata li lochi sacri, lacerato il corpo di Christo,
lacerata le croce, li callici, lacerate le pouere uergini, le
pouere moniche, le uidue, li pupilli et orphani; insanguinato in
el sangue de poueri tutti han cridato ad alta uoce uendetta,
uendetta in el conspecto del magno Idio, et epso Idio ha uoluto
exaudire le prece et uoce de le uergine, monache et boni religiosi
che ha facto lacerare tutto tuo exercito et maximamente ha uoluto
exaudire le prece del Affrichano Augustino, patrono de la infor-
tunata citta de Pauia, perche in el suo sanctissimo giorno fu
lacerato tutto tuo exercito che fu adi 28 Agosto 1528. O re
Gallicho, considera bene la ruina dil tuo exercito che io li
conforto a fare bona pace con Cexare Imperatore et fare il
passo dil mare et andare contra Turchi et accrescere la religione
Christiana et che sotto al tuo uexillo se adimpischa el dicto de
Christo/

Christo in el suo Euangelio: multos oues habeo, que non sunt de hoc ouili, et illas oportet me adducere, et tunc fiet unum ouile et unus pastor, et cossi facendo Idio mantegnera te et toi exerciti felicissimi. Utinam.
(143)

The same feeling governed his estimate of Louis XII. It was perfectly obvious to him that, for the troubles of Milan during the French occupations (dependent as they were upon the initial crime of usurpation) the usurping rulers personally, no matter how well they tried to govern, must be held responsible. Hence, while he hated the French soldiery and condemned their excesses, Grumello's resentment was specially directed against Louis XII., and Francois I., since, without their usurpation, the excesses could not have occurred.

Finally, Grumello exhibits a tendency, belonging more to the Middle Ages than to the modern spirit that was abroad in Italy of his time, to be somewhat credulous, to believe in omens, and to establish a connection between natural phenomena or out-
(144)
standing occurrences and political events which followed them.

The/

(143) Grumello, lib. X., cp. XVIII., pp. 488, 489.

(144) Poi adi 28 Iunio 1521 da hore 23 dette la saietta in la torre de le hore dil castello di porta Giobia de Milano Millano, cossa stupendissima et da non credere chi non la uide con li occhij.....Le ruine de le stantie et tecti et muraglie non ne dicho niente. Più ruina fece Idio in uno momento in epso castello che non haueria facto lartellaria dil re Gallicho in uno anno. De le ruine facte di fora dil castello non ne scriuo, como ruinamenti de tecti de ecclexie, caxe, rompimenti di chatenazi de botteche inuedriate, COSSE ADMIRANDE ET TUTTO AD FUTURA RUINA DIL RE GALLICHO. - Grumello, lib. VII., cp. II., p. 262. The capitals are mine.

The historian, while making allowance for this idiosyncrasy, will not refuse to accept at a high value the painstaking and, on the whole, accurate work of this chronicler.

The Storia di Milano by Giovan Pietro Cagnola, the next cronaca to be discussed, differs in many respects from the work of Antonio Grumello. Little is known of the life of Cagnola except that he was the castellan of Sartirana, and that he was a sedulous reader and copier of old chronicles. In truth, his Storia di Milano is a compilation rather than an original work. He follows Corio, for example, in his treatment of the Ambrosian Republic. In this connection, one comparison of the two writers will be sufficient. The extracts are rather long, but they are important as showing not only that Cagnola consulted Corio, but that he lifted some of his matter almost verbatim from that writer.

Immediately prior to the entry of Francesco Sforza into the city as duke, stormy meetings of the citizens had been held. The people were in grave danger of starvation. No solution of their difficulty seemed to present itself except ignominious surrender to the Venetians or the acceptance of Francesco Sforza as duke. The first was not to be thought of and the second meant the immediate fall of the republic. Part of the tumult is described in each of the following extracts.

Ma certo Francesco da Triulzio comincio a gridare: perchè
fuggiamo noi, non essendo inseguiti da alcuno, e Cristoforo
Pagano

Pagano ripetendo le di lui parole fu cagione che tutti ritor-
nassero a Gasparo, il quale li richiamaa nell' ultima squadra.
Pietro Cotta che avea prima messo in fuga i fautori della liberta,
essendosi essi rimessi non pote piu sostenere il furore tirannico,
e fuggendo tento d'uscire da porta Comasina per la sua salute, o
per andare al conte per aver soccorso; ma preso dalle guardie fu
incarcerato: Gasparo avendo gia radunati tutti, con acconce parole
li esorto a seguire l'impresa, dimostrando che se credevano al
magistrato che li esortava a deporre le armi, e tornare a casa, che
il giorno successivo si provvederebbe in maniera da accontentar
tutti, e a poco a poco sarebbero impiccati; per la qual cosa tutti
s'accesero contro il magistrato con maggio animo e maggiori forze,
e Melchiore da Marliano era venuto con molta gente in loro aiuto
dubitando di Ambrogio perche era d'animo audace, nimico del conte,
e fautore del partito contrario.

Si disputava da qual parte si dovessero assaltare i nemici,
ed affermando molti che v'era un'ottima strada dall'ultima parte
del palazzo, dove stava la moglie di Filippo, dopo la di lui
morte, Giovanni Andrea Toscano promise di metterli dentro per la
porta di dietro perche era meno guardata. Venne pertanto alla
porta e fatto il cenno consueto, gli fu tosto aperto: dopo lui
entro Gasparo e Giovanni Stampa e molti altri cittadini armati,
e dietro a questi entro il resto della moltitudine con impeto.
Udito lo strepito e le grida quelli che erano nella parte anteriore
del palazzo fuggirono tutti. Nel medesimo tempo entrarono per la
parte/

parte interiore gran numero di cittadini, ed empivano cielo e
terra di grida. Gasparo e Giovanni furono i primi che salirono
le scale, e gli altri li seguivano. E giunti all'uscio che mette
nella sala a lato della torre interna dove sedeano i principi della
liberta, venne loro incontro Leonardo Veniero, legato veneziano,
il quale parlando a' cittadini che affollati e tumultuosi venivano
con soverchia insolenza, e troppo aspramente riprendendoli, fu
tosto con molte ferite ucciso dallo Stampa, e spogliato di molte
ricchezze che avea seco; il magistrato vedendo tal cosa fuggi, ed
i cittadini preso il palazzo e liberata la patria corsero a tutte
le porte. Acconsentiva di gia tutta la citta, e lodava grandemente
il fatto, per cui nel giorno successivo tutti i piu ragguardevoli
cittadini si radunareno nel medesimo tempio dove ebbe origine
quella rivoluzione. Fu lungo il consultare perche molti desider-
avano la liberta e non voleano alcun principe, altri voleano chia-
mare il re di Francia, altri il duca di Savoia, altri il re Al-
fonso ed altri il pontifice. Tutti odiavano i Veneziani, e
nessuno ardiva nominare il conte, o per la recente guerra che
avea ridotta la citta all' estrema fame, o per la lega che aveano
fatta prima coi Veneziani. In tanta discordia Gasparo o perche
giudicasse il meglio, o per rendere al conte tanto beneficio,
disse che nessun maggior bene si poteva fare alla citta che
chiamar dentro il conte Francesco Sforza, e fu il primo che
mostro non potersi fare alcun calcolo della liberta tanto per le
molte discordie civili, come anche per essere il popolo tanto
privo/

privo di denari e tanto oppresso dalla fame che non si poteva piu difendere. Il pontefice, Carlo re di Francia ed Alfonso re di Puglia per la grande distanza non potevano porgere ajuto, ed il duca di Savoia non aveva tante forze; per cui era necessario sottomettersi ai Veneziani, il che era peggio che soffrire la morte piu crudele per cui era meglio ricevere il conte genero di Filippo e suo figlio adottivo, il quale era tanto umano e clemente che non si comporterebbe come signore ma come padre del popolo milanese. Oltre cio ad eccezione di lui nessun altro poteva in un sol giorno levar la guerra e la fame alla tanto afflitta citta. Non e da credersi in qual breve tempo gli animi di tutti si volsero al conte, e fu tosto commesso a Gasparo che andasse a lui e dimostrasse qual fosse il volere del popolo e lo esortasse che entrasse tosto. Corio, Storia di Milano, Vol. III., Part V., cp. IV., pp. 176, 177.

(2) Essendo la cittate in questa perturbacione, ogni di crescevano le discordie e sedicione; et quelli del governo erano in poca reverencia. Et essendo ragunati alcuni a consiglio nel templo di Sancta Maria de la Scala per fingiere alcuna cosa per tenere il populo in isperancia, erano di fora molti, fra' quali Petro Cotta e Cristofano Pagano, inimici a la factione tirampnica de la libertate, dolendose de la presente calamitate. Ragionavano in che modo si potesse provvedere a tanto male; et a poca a poca molti cittadini si ragunoreno; et spargiendose per la cittate/

cittate che Porta Nova era in arme, e che nel templo di Sancta Maria si tractava de la repubblica, molti li vennero de quelli de le altre porte. Il che intendendo i principi de la tirampnide, li mandoreno a dire che deponessero le arme e andassino a casa, che in breve loro provvederebbero; ma il messo fu cacciato, e con fatica ritorno. De poi mandeno Dominico da Pesaro, capitaneo, con molti cavalli e capestri per impaurirli; ma fu cacciato, et commencioreno a sonare le campane a l'arme. Et radunato molto populo, feceno dui capitanei, Gasparo da Vimercato, et Petro Cotta: et di poi li venne Zohane Stampa, con quatro fratelli, homo molto ardito e pronto, et de comune consenso corseno a la Corte dove erano i principi; ma loro preparati e defendendose, molti ne foreno feriti, e abandonareno l'impresa. Petro Cotta fugi per andare dal Conte per soccorso, ma fu preso da le guarde de porta Cumana. Francesco Triulcio, gioveneto, disse:- Dove fugiamo noi che nessuno ci caccia - ? Cristofano Pagano si fermo, e Gaspero (si che era de dreto e seguitava, li reteneva e confortava a seguitare l'impresa; et li dice che deponendo le arme, saranno morti ad uno ad uno. Et Melchiore de Marliano venne con molta gente in lora aiuto: et consultando de quale canto dovesseno assaltare, ecco Zohane Andrea Toscano promise metterli per la porta di dreto del palacio dove stava la moglie de Felipo Duca; et, facto aprire, li intro, et dopo lui Gasparo Vimercato e Zohane Stampa e molti altri cittadini armati, e dreto la moltitudine con grande strepito; et udito e strepito, quelli che erano a la guardia denanti, fugireno
Si/

Si che molti cittadini intronno, con grandi gridi che empiveno el
cielo e la terra. Gaspare e Zohane foreno i primi che salireno
le scale; et venendo loro incontra Lonardo Venero legato Veniciano,
subito con molte ferite fu morto. El magistrato, vedendo questo,
fugitte. E quelli preseno il palacio, e corseno a le porte; et,
cacciate le guardie, le preseno. El di siguento i primi cittadini
se ragunoreno nel medesimo templo de Sancta Maria, e longo fu la
consultacione. Molti desideraveno la libertate, per non essere
sotoposti ad alcuno principe; altri, il re de Francia; altri, el
duca de Savoglia; altri, il re Alfonso; altri, il papa. Tutti
aveveno in odio i Veniciani, e nessuno ardiva nominare el Conte.
In tanta defesione, Gasparo, che gia era stato soldato del Conte
disse, che nessuna maggiore comoditate se poteva fare a la cittate
che recevere dentro el Conte; alegando, che de la libertate
non se poteva fare stima per le grande discordie che erano tra'
cittadini, e per essere vacui de pecunia e il popolo opresso da la
fame; e che il papa e questi altri re erano tanto da la longa che
troppo tardo saria il loro aiuto, et il duca de Savoglia non aveva
tante forcie: il perche era necessario, o sotometersi a Veniciani
(che era peggio che sostenere ogni crudele morte), o veramente
recevere el Conte, gienero de Felipo e figlio adoptivo, il quale
e di tanta umanitate e clemencia, che non si portera come signore
ma come patre del populo Melanese; et nessuno, ecepto lui, puo in
uno (?di) levare la guerra e la fame a la tanto afflicta cittate
Incredibile e in quanto breve momento gli animi de tutti si
volseno/

volseno al Conte. Et di subito fu comiso a Gasparo che andasse
a lui, e dimostrasse la voluntate del populo, e lo confortasse
che subito intrasse. - Cagnola, Storia di Milano, lib. VI., pp.
124-126. (145)

There is a close similarity between these two passages, a similarity not merely general, but extending into minute details. This alone would raise suspicion of copying, and when Cagnola admits that he consulted other chronicles, while Corio tried to obtain his information from authoritative sources, it is practically certain that Corio's is the original statement. How much Cagnola was indebted to Corio not only for his matter but for the very phrases he employs in his account will be seen in the following comparisons the insertion of which is justified by the length of the quotations.

CORIO:- Ma certo Francesco da Triulzio comincio a gridare:
perche fuggiamo noi, non essendo inseguiti da alcuno.

CAGNOLA: Francesco Triulcio, gioveneto, disse:- Dove fuggiamo
noi, che nessuno ci caccia? (145)

CORIO: Et a poco a poco sarebbero impiccati.

CAGNOLA: Seranno morti ad uno ad uno.

CORIO:- E Melchiore da Marliano era venuto con molta gente in
loro aiuto.

CAGNOLA:- Et Melchiore de Marliano venne con molta gente in
loro aiuto.

CORIO:-dall' ultima parte del palazzo, dove stava la moglie
de/

(145) The depreciation of Francesco Trivulzio by Cagnola's use
of dove instead of perchè is noteworthy.

de Filippo dopo la di lui morte.

CAGNOLA:-del palacio dove stava la moglie de Filip duca.

CORIO:- Il magistrato vedendo tal cosa fuggi.

CAGNOLA:- El magistrato vedendo questo, fuggitte.

CORIO:- Fu lungo il consultare perche molti desideravano la liberta e non voleano alcun principe, altri voleano chiamare il re di Francia, altri il duca di Savoia, altri il re Alfonso, ed altri il pontefice. Tutti odiavano i Venezioni, e nessun ardiva nominare il conte.

CAGNOLA:- E longa fu la consultacione. Molti desideraveno la libertate, per non essere sottoposti ad alcuno principe; altri, il re de Francia; altri el duca de Savoglia; altri, il re Alfonso; altri, il papa. Tutti aveveno in odio i Veniciani, e nessuno ardiva nominare el Conte.

Gasparo da Vimercato's arguments in favour of Francesco Sforza are the same in both accounts. Here, again, Corio's words remain almost unchanged, as the following example will show.

CORIO:- Per cui era necessario sottomettersi ai Veneziani, il che era peggio che soffrire la morte piu crudele, per cui era miglio ricevere il conte genero di Filippo e suo figlio adottivo, il quale era tanto umano e clemente che non si comporterebbe come signore ma come padre del popolo milanese....Nessun altro poteva in un sol giorno levar la guerra e la fame alla tanto afflitta citta.

CAGNOLA:- Il perche era necessario, o sotometersi a Veniciani (che era peggio che sostenere ogni crudele morte), o veramente ricevere el Conte gienero de Felipo e figlio adoptivo, il quale e di tanta umanitate e clemencia, che non si potera come signore ma come padre del populo Melanese. E nessuno, ecepto lui, puo in uno (?di) levare la guerra e la fame a la tanto afflitta cittate.

But Cagnola does not follow Corio throughout his Storia.

Had he done so, the terms of peace concluded among the warring Italian/

Italian states in 1454 could have been supplied. He gives the terms as they are enumerated by Corio, but that historian's statement is merely a summary. Unfortunately the loss of a folio of the manuscript causes Cagnola's account to break off abruptly just as he is about to discuss the position of the Duke of Savoy and thus supplement the information given by Corio who does not mention the duke or his lands. (146)

In the account of the trial and execution of Cicco Simonetta differences are apparent between the statements of Corio and Cagnola, that of Corio being more to the point and more probable in its details. Both agree as to the method of trial, but while Cagnola asserts that, before his death, Simonetta confessed to molti mancamenti et machinacione per lui perpetrate against Ludovico, Corio, like Grumello, is silent on the matter.

(Simonetta) che fu aspramente tormentato e fattogli un certo processo al penultimo di ottobre nel rivellino del castello dalla parte del parco sopra uno strato nero fu decapitato nel settantesimo anno di sua eta: ed infermo per dolori ne piedi. (147)

Cagnola's account may or may not be true. Simonetta certainly had tried to keep Ludovico out of Milan, but whether he confessed to any mancamenti e machinacione which were not already known is doubtful. His relation of the event:-

"Lui(Ludovico) fece prendere Cicco suo inimico, e fu mandato nel/

(146) Cagnola, lib. VI., p. 142.

Corio, Storia di Milano, Vol. III., Part VI., cp. I., p. 210.

(147) Corio, Storia di Milano, Vol. III., Part VI., cp. IV., p. 354.

nel castello de Pavia; e poi, a certo tempo, avendo lui confessato molti mancamenti e machinacione per lui perpetrate, li
(148)
fu tagliata la testa,"

it will be noticed, says nothing of the torture under which Simonetta's confession was obtained, though it is implied; nor does he add the human touch about the old man being infermo per dolori ne piedi. In this case, Cagnola's work is independent of Corio's. The latter's account also offers a contradiction to those who will have it that his relation of events was conditioned by Ludovico, for it would have been easy for him to suppress the sympathy he shows towards Simonetta in his trouble. Nor is it likely that, if Ludovico's chief object were the glorification of his house and particularly of his own acts, he would have allowed the account to pass as it stands.

Again, his work is independent in its relation of the seizure of the duchy by Ludovico in 1494. On the death of Gian Galeazzo, says Cagnola, "tolto prima licencia da Carlo, subito parti et ando a Milano; et gionto e ragunati li nobeli, insieme tutti de uno animo elesse elesseno esso Ludovico per suo Duca, perche de ragione li perveniva, essendo lui primogenito a Francesco Sforza poi che fu Duca de Milano, si anchora per la prudencia e valore suo: e questa electione fu a li vintidue del gia dicto mese in
(149)
mercoledì, corrente lo anno detto 1494."

Corio's/

(148) Cagnola, lib. VIII., p. 182.

(149) Cagnola, lib. IX., p. 192.

Corio's account is more circumstantial, but it does not in any way invalidate that of Cagnola. He agrees that Ludovico, who heard of Gian Galeazzo's death while he was at Piacenza, hurried at once to Milan. From this point his relation treats in more detail than does that of Cagnola of the proceedings accompanying Ludovico's succession.

Ludovico pure accorse guivi colla massima prestezza, e radunati entro il castello i primati della città, prudentemente propose la creazione d'un nuovo duca, e disse che gli sembrava cosa conveniente che Francesco Sforza primogenito del defunto principe dovesse succedere al padre. Ma in fine levandosi Antonio Landriano suo generale prefetto dell' erario, Galeazzo Visconti, Baldassare Pusterla, Giovan Andrea Cagnola esimio giureconsulto, ed alcuni altri dissero che per le occorrenze de' tempi sembrava a loro, non dovessero succedere fanciulli a tanta dignità, parer anzi a tutti conveniente cosa ch'egli prendesse lo scettro ducale, e non osando alcuno contraddire a tale proposta, si acconsenti che Ludovico dovesse succedere nel ducato di Milano: e così gridandosi duca e fattosi portare una veste di drappo d'oro, montato a cavallo scorse la città; mentre i suoi fautori lo proclamavano duca, visitò il tempio di sant' Ambrogio, e fece suonare le campane in segno d'esultanza. (150)

In his account of Isabella, Corio shows a compassion which is all to his credit. The contrast between her position as Duchess/

(150) Corio, Storia di Milano, Vol. III, Part VII., cp.II., p. 574.

Duchess of Milan and the miserable condition in which she found herself after Ludovico's succession appealed to his sympathy, and the result is a passage which, more than four hundred years after the event, tells the world that the unfortunate lady was pitied by at least one of those who were favourable to the new regime.

Sua moglie Isabella coi poveri figliuololetti vestiti a lutto si rinchiuse a Pavia come prigioniera entro una camera, e stette gran tempo giacendo sopra la nuda terra senza vedere la luce. Dovrebbe ogni lettore pensare l'acerba sorte della sconsolata duchessa, e se avesse il cuore più impietrito d'un diamante, pur piangerebbe nel considerare qual dolore dovea esser quello della sciagurata ed infelice moglie, vedere in un punto la morte del giovinetto e bellissimo consorte, la perdita di tutto il suo impero, i figli a lato privi d'ogni bene, il padre ed il fratello colla sua famiglia espulsi dal regno di Napoli, e Ludovico Sforza con sua moglie Beatrice, avergli nel suesposto modo occupata la signoria.

Cagnola's account of the battle of Fornovo differs from that of Corio, though it is inevitable that their statements should coincide to a certain extent. That of Corio is much the longer, but/

(151) Corio, Storia di Milano, Vol. III., Part VII., cp. II., p. 575.

It is not to be inferred that Cagnola was devoid of sympathy. More than once he writes the word povero, as does Grumello, but he has no passage such as that in Corio.

but part of it is occupied by a description of the Valley of the Taro which Cagnola omits. Generally speaking the two accounts are corroborative, though they differ in details and in style, Cagnola's story being much more vivid and full of fire than that of Corio.

Cagnola, of course, obtained much of the material for his Storia di Milano from other chroniclers. For the early part of the book this was unavoidable. But, to some extent, he was dependent, as has been seen, upon the work of others for the more recent portions of his history. Nevertheless, most of the history relating to his own times is either his own, or only very slightly indebted to contemporaries. While this indebtedness lowers the value of the book as an original contribution to the history of Milan, it does not render it untrustworthy. His sympathies are openly on the side of the Sforza, but he is not guilty of perversion of facts in order to make out a good case for them. It is true that, in spite of the bad character he gives to Galeazzo Maria, he is, perhaps, too favourable to Francesco Sforza; and he certainly makes extravagant claims on behalf/

(152) Corio's account occupies roughly 3,000 words, while Cagnola's is under 1400.

(153) See Cagnola, lib. IX., pp. 198-201, and Corio, Storia di Milano, Vol. III., Part VII., cp. II., pp. 588-596.

(154) He is, I think indebted to Corio for this character.

(155) See his address to mio signore e divo principe (Ludovico Sforza) following the close of Book IX., p. 214.

behalf of Ludovico. Cagnola's treatment of the Sforza, indeed, may be taken as the truth but not the whole truth, and requires correction by references to documents and to other chronicles. Bearing this in mind, his Storia di Milano may be accepted as a reliable piece of work.

Finally - and this lifts the value of his work to a higher plane - though Cagnola obtained much of his material from other chronicles, he makes a clear statement that, for the greater part of the Storia treating of his own time, he writes of what he has actually seen.

E delle cose moderne, dalla impresa di Milano fino al tempo che qua mi rinchiusi, per la più parte li sono stato presente, (156) e con ogni veritate le ho annotate in questa mi opera.

The next chronicler of whom notice must be taken is a patrician, Giovanni Andrea Prato, brother of Monsignore Giovan Antonio da Prato. (157) Prato makes no claim to consideration as an historian, though his De Rebus Mediolanensibus Sui Temporis contains more of the essentials of history than other Storie which/

(156) Cagnola, Preface p. II.

(157) There were two men of this name, one of whom was President of the Milanese Senate in 1516.

Unde, il dì vigesimo terzo di Novembre, il Signor Ioan Iacobo Trivulzio, et lo illustrissimo Monsignor Ioan Antonio da Prato (non già il fratello mia, ma dico il Presidente del Senato de Milano), feceno comandare a tutte le parochie, che insieme se unissero per fare nova elezione de ufficiali. - Prato, p. 393.

which are more pretentious. He writes as a citizen giving an account of events which happened in Milan during his life-time.

Mi ho pensato, non come docto istoriografo (titolo certamente da me in tutto alieno), anzi come cittadino più curioso che litterato, scrivere quanto dagli anni de la mia puerizia in qua e a Milano accaduto. (158)

(159)

His book, which is full of life, treats of the joys and sorrows of the populace, their festivities, their subjection to cruel taxation, the wretched state of Massimiliano Sforza and the greed of the foreigners who had placed him in Milan as a puppet duke. He has the gift of political vision. To him it is obvious that the prime cause of Italy's woes was her lack of unity. The division into Guelf and Ghibelline persisted long after the original reason for separation had been forgotten. In Prato's day the Guelfs were on the side of France and thus supported Trivulzio who, in turn, was bitterly hated by the national party, the Ghibellines. If the parties would only sink their differences and join forces to obtain freedom from outside interference, or, if that were not possible, unite in support either of France or of the Empire, Prato foresaw that no city would be in a better position than Milan. Anything of that nature, he thought, would be preferable to a continuation of the suicidal strife which had ruined/

(158) Prato, p. 221.

(159) His over-employment of parentheses, particularly at the beginning of the book vitiates his style and is a source of irritation to his readers.

ruined Italy, and made her a scorn among the nations. Thus Trivulzio, magnificent in war but typifying the forces hostile to Italian freedom, dominates the situation as Prato sees it.

This it is, too, which prevents him showing more sympathy with Ludovico Sforza in his fall. He does not write as an enemy of the Sforza, but he has some touches which prove that he laid on Ludovico a large part of the blame for the troubles which afflicted Milan. According to his own statement he was not alone in this attitude.

Il Duca Ludovico Sforza (como si dice) fece avelenare il Duca Gioan Galeaz suo nipote, per se indebitamente la signoria de Milano usurpandosi; poi tiro re Carlo in Italia alla desfacione de Ferdinando re de Napoli suo nepote: le quali cose comisse lo hanno facto degno, per divina justizia, di perpetuo carcere: che io (avenga che fanciullo fussi) mi ricordo, che essendo alla predica de un cieco, frate dell'Incoronata, che a esso duca predicava su la piazza del Castello, nel tempo che il re Carlo doveva passare in Italia, dirli in pulpito: SIGNORE NON LI MOSTRARE LA VIA, PERCHE TU TE NE PENTIRAI: et cosi invano (160) poi se ne penti, con danno di tutta Italia.

This is first hand testimony: Prato writes of what he himself has seen and heard, and his work is, therefore, independent of other cronache. He describes the surrender of the castle/

(160) Prato, p. 251.

castle of Milan by Bernardino Corte in less detail than Grumello. The passage is full of contempt for the traitor who thus did so ill a service to his country; but it is the treachery and cowardice alone which rouse him. His feeling towards Ludovico and the effect of the surrender upon his fortunes is quite impersonal. He has not a single word of sympathy for the man who had been so vilely betrayed.

Unde, non andando la cosa in lungo, a di 17 Settembre,
nel giorno dicato a Sancto Satiro, il prefato Bernardino Curcio
senza alcun pongiemento d'onore ne recordazione de receputi
beneficj, bette la rocca del castello de Porta Zobia a Francesi;
et Filippino dal Fiesco, et Cristoforo da Calabria li detteno il
castello senza la sarsi trarre un sol colpo d'artellaria; et
Messer Bregoncio Botta, qual era in esso castello, ai fece
portare a casa de Messer Baldissar Pusterla; et cio che ne la
rocca vi ci trovo, de le robbe et paramenti lasciati a dietro da
Ludovico Sforza, fu tutto partito tra il Trivulzio, il Curcio,
il Pallavicino et il Vesconte..
(161)

In his account of the capture of Ludovico, again, he lacks some of the detail given by Grumello but on the other hand, he adds an interview with Trivulzio in which without exhibiting sympathy with the fallen duke he contrives to leave a picture of the renegade Italian which does much to destroy his unmerited reputation for chivalry.

Et il Trivulzio, essendoli menato avanti il captivato
Principe/

(161) Prato, p. 225.

Principe, disse;"Or sei tu qui, Ludovico Sforza, el quale per
amor d'un forestiero, Galeazo Sanseverino, hai scacciato me tuo
cittadino; ne d'una sol volta d'avermi cacciato bastandoti hai
novamente sollicitato li animi de'Milanesi a rebellarsi alla
regia maesta?" A che bassamente rispondendo il Principe, dissa:-
(162)
Se inclini ad amare uno ed odiare un altra, e difficil cosa.

As Prato's work agrees in the main with that of other writers, and as he expresses his opinion of men and events without fear or favour, it is worthy of regard as a source of information. It is true that the figure of Trivulzio bulks largely in the events narrated by the chronicler, but he makes no attempt to conceal his faults; he sees, as all Italians of the time must have seen, the extraordinary importance of the man, his unscrupulous policy, his favour with Louis XII. He recognises him as a great soldier and a strict administrator, but does not forget that all his talents were employed to the advantage of the foreigner and to the ruin of his native land.

On a lower plane as far as literary excellence is concerned, is the Cronaca of Gio. Marco Burigozzo. It is the production of a merchant turned historian. His work has been much used by writers on Italian history and not without reason. He noted from time to time events that occurred during his life and then at his leisure wrote them up as a cronaca. The book covers the period 1500-1544.

One supreme qualification he possessed for writing the story
of/-----
(162) Prato, pp. 247, 248.

of Italy at this epoch - he was intensely patriotic. The pages of Guicciardini may in some ways be more rhetorical, but they are not more eloquent than his when treating of the sorrows of Italy. In general it may be said that his narrative of events agrees with what is known from other writers, and may therefore be accepted as authoritative.

One of the most important sources of information for the period is the Diarii of Marino Sanuto. As the writer had access to documents and had every opportunity of free speech with those who came to Venice on political missions, he collected a store of news and anecdote which he carefully transcribed into his diary.

The original volumes, fifty-eight in number, are now in the Marciana Library in Venice, but there are two other manuscript copies, one of which is in Austria and the other in the Marciana. The whole collection has now been printed.

The trustworthy nature of the work has been long recognised. Often an entry throws light on some transaction which would otherwise be obscure; while the writer's comments on men and their actions always deserve careful consideration. The volumes form a mine of information, much of which is unobtainable elsewhere. I have consulted the volumes dealing with the period of the French domination but few references appear in the text as the Milanese records are of more importance in dealing with matters of administration. On the other hand, some of the documents quoted as from Rawdon Brown's Calendar of Venetian State Papers are drawn from Sanuto.

Some entries which do not find a place in the text may be mentioned/

mentioned here. On April 29, 1496, he mentions the fortifying of Alessandria, Novara and the borders of Piedmont (Vol. 1., col. 120). An entry in May, 1498 (Vol. 1. Part 11., Col. 954) contains the famous account of Ludovico's outburst when he heard that Trivulzio was at Asti, and that the Duke of Bourbon had made his peace with the French king. In the same month another entry informs us that Trivulzio was already practising against Ludovico (Vol. 1. Part 11. Col. 961). In July, 1498 (Vol. 1. Part 11., Col. 120) he informs us Ludovico was in disgrace with the Venetian government.

Again, he tells us (Vol. 111. Col. 844, 845) the terms upon which Cesare Borgia's marriage was concluded, and how Louis XII. obtained his divorce so that he might marry Anne of Bretagne. In Vol. 111. Col. 49, and Vol. 1V. Col. 72 are found very respectful references to d'Alviano, and in Vol. 1V. Col. 70 under June 14, 1501, is an entry telling that Trivulzio has been created a Marquis and Marshal of France, and that he is in high favour with Louis XII.

These references will serve to indicate the amount of interesting matter found in the Diarii of Sanuto.

Two other Italian chroniclers remain of those I have consulted - Guicciardini and Giovio. The work of Guicciardini has been criticised so often that I do not propose to deal with it in detail, but simply to say that his record of events is, as a rule, trustworthy, and that while he has prejudices, he always endeavours to be fair. Giovio's Istorie, while interesting, is somewhat difficult to follow. His record of events during the period covered/

covered by this essay being in accordance with those of other chroniclers, may be accepted as worthy of credence. In the main he treats of the same incidents as the other croniche. He mentions for example, the capture of Ludovico (Vol. 1., lib. 1X., p. 202.) and in doing so supports the accusation of treachery made against the Swiss. Again, he points out that Alfonso of Naples was left as Filippo Maria's heir (Vol. 1., lib. 1., p. 14.) a fact which is omitted by others of his contemporaries. He mentions also the battle of Agnadello (Vol. 1., lib. 1X., p. 207.) but without going into any great detail. In a way the work is authoritative, as the author was alive while some of the events were being enacted. Since Giovio does not confine himself to Italian history a considerable portion of his narrative is outside his personal knowledge. But as these portions do not concern this study nothing more need be said on the matter.

Burckardi and the anonymous writer of the Diarium Parmense are both valuable authorities as each of the authors records events of which he was an eye-witness. Burckardi was born at Haslach near Strassbourg about the middle of the fifteenth century. Having completed his legal studies he went to Rome in November 1481, where he became an apostolic protonotary. Seeking to obtain a more secure and profitable position, he asked and received an appointment as Master of Ceremonies. His practical mind led him to make notes of all ceremonies as they occurred, so that they might serve as a guide for future occasions. These notes form the Liber Notarum/

Notarum. But the book, though written as a work of reference to ensure the prevention of mistakes in the ceremonies appropriate to the various fasts, feasts and other observances of the Church throughout the year, is more than a mere formulary; for Burckardi relates many historical events and anecdotes gathered day by day. These he narrates with wonderful simplicity. There is no malignity in his character. If he cannot say any good he is very unwilling to say what is ill. Above all he is a treasure to an historian, for if he makes a statement or describes an event of which he has no direct personal knowledge, he owns at once that the information is given on the authority of others. He died in May 1506.

The Cronica Gestorum in partibus Lombardie et Reliquis Italie or Diarium Parmense as it was called by Muratori, has been little used in the essay, but it is a trustworthy work though the greater portion of its contents refer to Parma rather than to Milan. He has an interesting note (p. 97.) which appears to prove that torture was not uncommon in order to force a confession of guilt from an accused person. Die decimo nono februarij quoniam captus et curtatus fuerat quidam Dominicus ex tribus squadris, imputatus de furto paullo ante commisso.

He is independent in his narrative of events. His account of the death of Simonetta, for example, differs from that of Corio.

Penultimo octobris 1480 in mane cum dominus Cichus de Callabria/

Callabria primus secretarius quondam illustrissimorum domi-
norum ducum Francisci et Galeaz Marie, detemptus retineretur in
castro Papie, ut alias anno proxime curso narratum est, in
adventu Mediolani illustrissimi domini Ludovici Sforcie, ac
domini Roberti de Sancto Severino post tantos eius labores, ac
persecutiones et deposita domina ducissa a regimine status,
decapitatus fuit in ipso castro Papie. Post quam decapitationem
illico caballarius applicuit com gratia, et frustra. Nec pub-
licata fuit causa tallis decapitationis.
 (163)

The French chroniclers do not require so detailed attention as do those of Italy. Those I have found of most use are Jean d'Auton's Chroniques de France and Commynes' Mémoires. But I consulted also Le Journal of Louise of Savoy, Le Loyal Serviteur and the Chronique of Fleuranges.

The works of d'Auton and Commynes are very important, but so much has been written about the second of these historians that it would savour of impertinence to add to what has been said. If the view were taken that his Mémoires were untrustworthy, a detailed criticism would be necessary as justification; but, as will be seen from the quotations scattered throughout the essay, I agree in regarding the work as honest, fair and conscientious. These qualities are enhanced by the fact that Commynes took part in many of the events he describes. Not only so; he was a diplomat as well as an historian, and in addition had ample opportunity of knowing what was passing in court circles.

Jean d'Auton is worthy of the same praise. So far as his knowledge/-----
 (163) Cronica Gestorum, p. 81.

knowledge goes he is accurate in detail. Unfortunately that knowledge was sometimes scanty. He had no help in writing his Chroniques de France either from men or from documents. The lack of documentary evidence is, of course, a blemish on the work; but the care of the writer, his transparent honesty, and the accuracy with which he describes events of which he was an eye-witness do much to neutralise this imperfection.

He was a religious peace-loving man yet, that his descriptions might be accurate, he did not hesitate to be present at battles in order to test the effect of artillery fire, observe the actions of leaders, and see for himself the behaviour of the troops.

His style, after his appointment as official chronicler becomes more diffuse, more attentive to minutiae, and shows him even more conscientious than before. Writing without fear or favour he yet feels bound to protest vehemently that he is both careful and impartial (Vol. III., p.158). A fine trait in the man's character is the quiet sympathy he manifests for a beaten enemy even while he recognises the necessity of the conquest. His work is to be regarded as authoritative and well worthy of credence.

Robert de la Marck's Chronique also is trustworthy. He took part in much of the fighting in Italy at the beginning of the sixteenth century, and his comments on methods of warfare as, for example, when he treats of artillery, (cp. V., p.221) are always/

always worth reading. As was natural in a soldier he notes the quick surrender of towns after the battle of Agnadello (cp. IX., p. 226) and admires the bold bearing of Alviano before Louis (cp. 9., p. 225).

On a different plane is Le Loyal Serviteur. The enthusiasm and ability of Bayard's faithful servant have resulted in the production of a clear and very well-written record of events which show that the days of chivalry were not quite over. The record is so well known that I do not propose to offer any criticism save that it is trustworthy, first-hand work, and that the comments of Bayard on men and battles are at all times deserving of consideration.

Another French work I consulted was the Journal of Louise of Savoy. It is not particularly valuable, as some of the events recorded took place before the writer was born. The Duchess never thought that the Journal would be read by anyone who cared to do so; otherwise, she would have avoided the trivialities with which its pages are crowded. Nor would she have made such an entry as je feus griefvement malade de colique a Cognac, et par ce fut rompu mon voyage (296).

But all the entries are not of this character. The life of the Duchess was bound up in her son - mon roi, mon seigneur, mon Cesar et mon fils, as she terms him. It was natural, therefore, that she should be interested in the succession to the French throne. Thus she could not conceal a note of exaltation when/

when she learned that Anne of Bretagne had given birth to a still-born son on January 1, 1502. The child ne pouvoit retarder l'exaltation de mon Cesar car il avoit faute de vie (p. 296). Again, (May 23, 1507) she notes the confirmation of le mariage par parole de presente entre mon fils et Madame Claude, a present reine de France (p. 317). But though the Journal is interesting it contains nothing directly bearing upon the French occupation of Milan, and is therefore of much less value than the works of Commynes and d'Auton.

The Mémoires de Messire Martin de Bellay and La Vie du Connétable Charles de Bourbon de 1490-1521, while interesting for political references contain little that is of use for the subject of this essay. De Bellay, however, mentions Louis XII's determination to regain Milan after the French had been expelled in 1512 (p. 316). La Vie du Connétable Charles de Bourbon also mentions Louis's attempt, giving the story of Valentina's marriage with Louis of Orleans. But as it contains (164) no new matter I refrain from making any quotation here.

(164) But see La Vie du Connetable Charles de Bourbon, p. 144.

Chapter II.

Some Preliminary Considerations.

The chief difference between the constitution of society in the Middle Ages and in Modern Times is the difference between rigidity and flexibility. According to the theory of the earlier system each man had a fixed place in society under a master, either individual or corporate; he was bound to certain definite work the nature of which was determined with regard not only to the community in general but also to that class of the community of which he was a member. The character of that work depended upon the condition on which the man held his fee or feu. It might range from military service to the feeding of swine, and vary from the highest customary exaction to the gift of an ounce of pepper per annum to the Superior.⁽¹⁾

That some such method of organising society during the/

1. - A survival of this is found in the Feudal Dues still levied on land holdings in Scotland. The Superior may require the Tenant to pay in kind or in money, but the commutation of payment in kind for a money payment is the common practice. A holding in Fife, for example, commutes its duty of two bolls, three firlots, two pecks bere and two pence of money for a payment in money of £4.8.5d., though that amount will vary according to Fiars' Prices.

the Middle Ages was necessary is beyond dispute. It was probably the highest conception of social rights and duties possible to a world which, having lost the tradition of Roman rule, was in grave peril of reverting to anarchy. But, while saving the community from a lapse into barbarism, the system sacrificed the individual in the process. Fixed in his own particular position in the scheme of government, he dared not dream of other than existing conditions; for heterodox ideas at once brought him into conflict with society and hence with his political masters. It is true that by somewhat tortuous means a strong-willed man might rise above his environment, might even receive education and an official appointment in church or state; but the advantage he had obtained was vitiated by his obligation to confine his thoughts within prescribed and conventional channels. With hardly any reservation it may be said that under the mediaeval system of government no political, social, intellectual, or religious liberty was allowed. If a man refused to subscribe to the conventions of the age he simply became a rebel and suffered accordingly. Under pressure these circumstances altered; but the change to modernism was not complete till ordinary men were regarded not as unthinking automata but as individuals having thoughts, feelings, and aspirations of their own.

The decay of the social structure through external influences was quite visible during the fourteenth and fifteenth/

fifteenth centuries; but in reality the system had organic defects - its rigidity and the concomitant inability to meet the requirements of changing social circumstances - which must eventually have proved its ruin. When arts and crafts, agriculture and commerce were in their childhood; when the rule of law had not yet begun; when justice, or what stood for justice, could be obtained only by those strong enough to enforce their claim; when the necessities of the time demanded that each man should be a soldier as well as a worker - then feudalism formed a passable form of government. Even at its best it was not an admirable system; for it encouraged oppression, restrained trade, hindered industry, and impeded the general development of the country. But when the craftsmen became strong and commercial men began to wield influence, when trade routes opened east and west, and when the discovery of new lands widened the mental horizon even of the unimaginative, feudalism proved quite unadaptable. Within it there was no reserve of power to meet such altered circumstances, and it was compelled to give way. The spirit of enquiry and the revulsion of feeling against social and political conditions which failed to cope with the necessities of a new age were responsible for the final blow.

By the end of the fifteenth century feudalism had lost most of its power. Its collapse was inevitable, but the process of disintegration was accelerated by the operation of/
of/

of external circumstances. As these forces involve a complete revolution of political theory in Europe they are of fundamental importance in any study relating to the end of the fifteenth century.

The old conception of the countries of Europe as forming a great church-state over which the Pope was the spiritual and the Emperor the secular head had fallen into disfavour. Actual facts were in direct opposition to the theory. Far from possessing this extensive authority, the Emperor found himself at this time fully occupied in maintaining his power within his own special domains; while he was practically unable to enforce his rule upon external countries. France would not acknowledge his authority; English and Scottish kings, backed by their people, would have tolerated no imperial claim on their land; Spain would suffer no interference in her concerns.⁽²⁾ Of Italy, though there the imperial power first became inoperative, no such simple statement is possible. As the decline of the Empire's influence in the peninsula had allowed the establishment of petty dynasties which naturally were hostile to the idea of imperial suzerainty, the country on the whole was anti-imperialist. Even where the Emperor's claim was acknowledged/

2. - It may be noted, however, that Ferdinand I. of Castile who had styled himself Hispaniae Imperator was compelled by the Emperor Henry III. to cease using the title.

acknowledged its admission was of the most shadowy nature. Milan, it is true was more or less vaguely imperialist towards the end of the fifteenth century - a position forced upon her rulers by dynastic considerations; but Naples had successfully maintained her independence of the Empire from the death of Conrad in 1254, and Venice had never acknowledged within her border any secular power but her own. Republican Florence, zealous for the extension of her trade and her territory, had no wish for imperial domination; while the last of the greater states, the Papacy, was traditionally hostile to the Emperor⁽³⁾ as personifying civil power in action against the Church.

The internal condition of the Empire itself strengthened the forces which were undermining its influence. During the earlier Middle Ages the Emperor wielded powers which commanded respect; but the rise of many petty principalities within its borders caused such a welter of conflicting interests that the Emperor could not take independent action with any assured prospect of success. Weakened on one side by internal divisions, and on the other by the constantly increasing aggression of neighbouring princes/

3. - The struggle between them began with the refusal of Halinard Archbishop of Lyons, to render homage to the Emperor Henry III. as his overlord.

princes, the imperial power retained only the shadow of its former greatness.

The long-continued hostility between Rome and the Emperor damaged the cause of both; but the extensive claims made by the Popes were, in themselves, largely responsible for the decrease in papal influence. These reached their zenith under Boniface VIII. who insisted on the right of the Pontiff to control both civil and religious government. Learned and unlearned alike refused to accept his dictation. At the beginning of the fourteenth century the jurists of Philip the Fair held that the spiritual and temporal functions were separate and independent one of the other. In Italy, Dante rejected the claim of the Papacy to control the civil government; while William Occam, going further, declared not only that the spheres of influence of each were distinct, but that cases might be conceived in which an attack on the spiritual power by temporal forces would be wholly justifiable. After Boniface, however, no Pope was in a position to attempt to realise the aspirations of the Roman Curia; for the Babylonish Captivity began with the election of Clement V. in 1305, less than two years after the death of Boniface, and continued till March 1378. In that year the Great Schism took place, Urban VI. being elected in April and Clement VII. in September, the former residing in Rome and the latter in Avignon. The struggle between Pope/

Pope and Anti-Pope lasted till 1449. Anti-Pope Felix V. (Amadeo VIII. of Savoy), who had been elected by the Council of Basle in November 1439, resigned in April 1449. Pope Eugenius IV. dying in 1447 was succeeded by Nicholas V. who was accepted by both parties on the resignation of Felix V. Thus for nearly a century and a half the Popes were impotent so far as a realisation of the curialistic theory was concerned. It could hardly be otherwise when it was plain to the world that, for more than seventy years the advocates-in-chief of the theory had, themselves, falsified it.

Apart from the Captivity and the suicidal struggle between Pope and Anti-Pope, the deficiencies of the Papacy itself were largely responsible for its failure to control the moral conscience of Europe. Nor did the Pontiffs who reigned during the latter half of the fifteenth century do anything to redeem that failure: rather they emphasised it. The domineering ambition and gross nepotism of Sixtus IV., the immorality and corruption of Innocent VIII., and the appalling profligacy, avarice and unscrupulousness of Alexander VI. procured hatred for themselves and contempt for the office they so unworthily held. Since neither Pope nor Emperor was able to agree upon the functions to be exercised by each in the church-state, neither was capable of combining with the other to uphold that state in its integrity. Thus the ultimate rejection of the under-lying theory/

theory was assured, and with its rejection came a certain diminution of the respect attaching to both Emperor and Pope.

Concurrently with the decay of the church-state theory, but more slowly, there evolved the idea of nationality - an idea much more complex than at first sight it appears to be. The feudal monarchs regarded their kingdoms as private estates, and added one to the other without considering that natural reasons might exist for keeping them apart. But as feudal power declined the class distinctions on which it was based became confused. More and more men were being regarded as individuals, and it was fortunate that, as the older theories were being discarded, their appreciation of such common interests as origin, language, literature, religion, laws, customs, traditions, prejudices and natural boundaries led them to perceive that through these, and not by the exaggeration of class differences, lay the way to safety. Individualism, carried to excess, would soon have exhausted its energy; but, united with community of interests, it aided materially in developing the idea of nationality, which, if not so attractive as the theory of the church-state, was, at least, more likely to succeed as a practical policy. Common danger during the Hundred Years' War had induced consolidation both in France and in England; while English triumphs under Edward III. and Henry V. on the one side, and on/

on the other the brilliant and unexpected recovery by France of her conquered territories, roused local enthusiasm to a high pitch. Hence there was development of national sentiment in both countries. Common religious feeling, narrow and rigid in character, and produced by the struggle for centuries against the Moors (aliens in race and in faith) was, perhaps, the dominant factor in the formation of the Spanish nation, though marriage and conquest also played their part.

To the development of nationality among European peoples Germany and Italy are exceptions. Nominally united, Germany was in reality a loose federation of princes, unwilling to remain at peace with one another and equally disinclined to unite against a common enemy; while in Italy, mainly because of the insane jealousy of its component states, not only did national feeling fail to secure any foothold,⁽⁴⁾ but the country was on the verge of becoming the battle-ground of foreign powers, covetous of its fruitful plains and rich cities.

From the triumph of the principle of nationality two results/

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4. - The first appearance of the idea of nationality in Italy (and it was of a nebulous character) was the attempt of Florence to combine the Guelph cities into an Italian federation headed by herself to preserve liberty and withstand foreign tyranny, the special and immediate object being to thwart the designs of the Emperor Henry VII., who had invaded the peninsula.

results followed which are important as throwing light upon the complex conditions characteristic of the beginning of the sixteenth century. As feudalism decayed and the power of the nobility lessened, the influence of the king increased until, strengthened by the support of the non-noble portion of the country, he was more than able to withstand any attempt of the aristocracy to dispute his position. The establishment of a strong monarchy, then, was one of the first results of national feeling. This produced the second result. As soon as any society realises the strength it possesses through its community of interests it desires to test that strength, and so becomes aggressive. Nations are no exceptions to the rule. Hence France and Spain, greedy for extension of territory, are found waging wars for which little excuse can be offered. For such adventures Italy, disunited, and containing mutually hostile states, presented a fair opportunity of which advantage was readily taken. As yet, England had practically no share in these struggles, principally because Henry VII., besides having domestic troubles of his own to hold his attention, was an extremely cautious monarch.

"I consider it certain," wrote Raimondo de Soncino⁽⁵⁾ to Ludovico Sforza on November 17, 1498, "that the king (Henry VII) will never stir against France till he sees it in confusion; neither will he ever cause her any suspicion unless for his own security and advantage.

There will be no change in England whilst the present king lives."

The/

5. - Ambassador of Ludovic Sforza to Henry VII. The quotation is/

The change to modernism brought about by the decay of feudalism had been hastened by the growth of national feeling, but by far the most powerful influence operating against the old system was the Renaissance. The New Learning was the most important factor that had yet entered into the civilisation of Europe, comparable indeed with the discovery of America, but transcending in significance even that extraordinary event in the changes it involved. The Renaissance was not merely literary or aesthetic in character: it was in essence a revolt against the authority exercised by old ideas, against the domination of outworn political, social, religious and philosophic creeds: it was an attempt to gain for the individual the full, free opportunity of self-expression. Men's minds were fired by the splendours of ancient Greece and Rome. They caught the spirit of antiquity, and their devotion to its service became almost a religion. Vernacular literature, sculpture, painting, music, were enthusiastically cultivated. Everywhere men were attracted by the love of beauty for its own sake.

Such a movement must inevitably have modified and almost transfigured the mental outlook of the nations, as of the individuals, subjected to its influence. Italy, nearest to the fountain-head, understanding the sincerity and/

5. - (Contd.) is taken from Calendar of Venetian State Papers, Vol. 1. Doc.776.

and appreciating the beauty of the works of antiquity, was most profoundly affected. Her response was frankly pagan in character. Searching for truth and a life in accordance with the dictates of nature and reason, her people found christianity seemingly opposed to nature, and the Church forbidding the exercise of reason except under her direction, while communion with the master-minds of antiquity was bringing them back to nature and placing reason upon its proper plane.

Again, as a purely aesthetic movement, the Renaissance in Italy was carried further than in other lands. The Italians seemed to lose themselves in the contemplation of the beautiful not only as expressed in painting and sculpture, but as exhibited in the human body. Unfortunately this sensuous delight often developed, or rather degenerated, into sensuality, and immorality became extremely common. Apparently, too, in many instances, the broadening of the mind resulted in no real advancement in moral worth; for jealousy, treachery and cowardice,⁽⁶⁾ prevalent not only among the general populace but among the most cultured Italians of/

6. - It is not implied that these faults were due to the Renaissance - some of them were the result of the political and social conditions of the time in Italy - but that they were present despite the good effect of that movement, either because the true spirit of antiquity had not been fully comprehended or because men acted in defiance of it.

of the time, are not characteristic of the best spirit of antiquity. To the Italians the aesthetic element in the Renaissance made the strongest appeal. Religion as it was presented to them they despised though they accorded it a formal adherence: morality, in great part they disregarded. But aesthetics without religion and morality simply drives its devotees into the wilderness. Yet little was done to reconcile the existing practices of the Church with the principles of the Renaissance.

As a means of escape, some of the Italian humanists professed their adherence to a morality the essential principle of which was the absolute freedom of the human will. They believed that virtue, that is, the coincidence that ought to exist between man's will and the life and power of nature, was the sole good. Men should therefore be free from passion, remain unaffected by joy or grief, and bow without complaint to the unavoidable necessity by which all things are governed. But the austerity of such a conception of morality fitted it only for the few; and thus while some found salvation in this stoical doctrine, others fell far short and gave themselves up to licentiousness. The Italians, in truth, were temperamentally unfitted to undertake the labour necessary to harmonise the practices of the Church with Renaissance ideals. They preferred to live their lives in their own way, to make the peccant clergy pose as subjects for lampoons, to profess/

profess themselves christians and refrain from attacking the dogmas of the Church, while their speculations as philosophers, scientists, or even as literary men, all tended to destroy their belief in the christian faith.

The Renaissance and the growth of national consciousness were the two chief positive factors in the change from mediaevalism to modernism. On the negative side were the decline of the old theoretical unity represented by the church-state, and the passing of the feudal conception of society with all the class interests it involved. But these were not the sole factors. Other forces were present, which, if not so influential, had, nevertheless, no small part in the coalescent movements that brought modern Europe into being. Of these the invention of gunpowder was one. Till now the mail-clad man-at-arms had been more than a match for the foot-soldier; but a cannon-ball respected the armoured knight as little as it did his meanest follower. Hence military practice began to substitute infantry for cavalry, a process much accelerated by the more extensive employment of artillery. The introduction of printing also exercised a powerful influence upon the general movement, for, by enormously increasing the number of books, it forwarded the acquisition of knowledge of both ancient and modern ideas.

Two potent factors still remain to be mentioned - the Reformation/

Reformation and Geographical Discovery. But the Reformation is outside the limits of this study, for it did not begin in Germany till some years after the expulsion of the French from Milan, and thus exercised no influence on conditions requiring treatment in the period under discussion. The second influence is on a somewhat different footing. At the beginning of the fifteenth century the southernmost extent of African exploration was Cape Nun. To Portugal, under the direction of Prince Henry, fell the honour of initiating systematic voyages planned to lay bare the mystery attaching to the Dark Continent. The character of Prince Henry the Navigator was a combination of theorist and practical business man. He knew that India lay to the east, and his voyages were intended to reveal if Africa were an island, or, at any rate, to settle whether it were possible to reach Asia by journeying along its coasts. He died in 1460, before his object was achieved, but the work he accomplished was of considerable importance to Europe. Under him Portugal became a centre from which exploring parties set out, and, venturing over the Green Sea of Darkness, added discovery to discovery - the Canaries, Madeira, the Azores, the Cape Verde Islands, the coast of Africa.⁽⁷⁾

After/

7. - The Canaries and much of the African coast were discovered by Cadamosto, a Venetian in the service of Prince Henry.

After his death Portuguese zeal for navigation declined, but the work was subsequently carried on by Spain under Ferdinando and Isabella, in whose reign came the discovery of America by Columbus (1492), followed by da Gama's voyage to India via the Cape of Good Hope.⁽⁸⁾ England was represented in the movement by the discovery of Newfoundland (1497) on a voyage undertaken by Cabot at the request of Henry VII.⁽⁹⁾

While all these explorations were of special importance to the countries concerned, none was more anxiously interested than Venice, for the discovery of rich lands in America meant a depreciation of her wealth as compared with that of Spain; while the sea-route to India threatened a diminution, if not the disappearance, of her overland trade with the Far East.

But despite the epoch-making importance of these voyages, the general public in Italy seems to have known little, if anything, about them. In such seaport towns as Genoa - the birth place of Columbus and John Cabot - and in a trading republic like Venice most people would know something of what had taken place; but if the people as a whole were aware of the wonderful events that were laying open other worlds for trade, for conquest, for future homes, the chroniclers/

8. - Under King Manoel of Portugal (1495 - 1521).

9. - The entry in the Privy Purse Accounts - "To Hym that found the New Isle, ten pounds" - is one example of the meanness of Henry VII in money matters.

chroniclers were strangely silent about it.⁽¹⁰⁾ Thus, though the knowledge of these discoveries eventually produced its effect upon the Italian public, its influence, so far as it concerns the particular period under survey, may be much discounted.

The state of Italy during the latter half of the fifteenth century, and especially in the last decade, is peculiarly interesting. Europe, generally, was standing on/

10. - Of Cagnola, Prato, Burigozzo, Grumello, Corio and Giovio, not one has anything to say of these discoveries. The silence of the last of these historians, at least, is somewhat strange, since it must have been fairly well known that Spain was pushing forward her conquests in the New World. In 1510, for example, Alonso de Ojeda had founded the town of San Sebastian on the Gulf of Darien; while, in 1513, Balboa had discovered the Pacific Ocean, thus proving that, unless a way could be found to the north or to the south, a continent barred the western route to India. Vida de Vasco Nuñez de Balboa. cp.I., p. 8. and cp.6, pp. 35-42.

Carlo Passi - Della Selva di Varia Istoria - mentions Canada and Labrador; il famoso Colombo and Fernando Cortes; tutte le Isole scoperte da Colombo, Mexico, Peru, Brazil, Quito, Sumatra and the Moluccas. - Cp. cit. lib. I., fol. I., 2 tergo, 3. He writes, also, of the South Sea and India, thereby showing his knowledge of the sea-route to the East via the Cape of Good Hope. - Op. cit., lib. I., fol. 56.

It is true that the Selva was not published till 1572, but its composition must have been begun much earlier. On the other hand Giovio's Istorie carries the narrative beyond the death of Henry VIII. of England in 1549, by which time the greater discoveries were common knowledge in Europe. It will not do, then, to apply the "argument from silence" - at any rate in Giovio's case. I prefer to think that, not recognising the importance of the discoveries, he (and possibly some of the others) deliberately confined himself to Old World history.

on the threshold of modern life. The rise of individualism and national feeling, discontent with out-worn political creeds and philosophical aphorisms, even the tentative questioning of religious doctrine, were significant of the passing of mediaevalism. But Italy had already entered into the possession of the newer life. In the extent of her commerce, in the width of her culture, in the independence and comfort of her people, she was two centuries ahead of her contemporaries. In Naples feudalism still persisted, but in the north it was a spent force. Individualism, though its progress was modified by the adherence of the mass of the people to one or other of the great houses, was much further developed than in the rest of Europe.

Yet in some respects she was behind the nations of the time. The Renaissance had its genesis in Italy, but, though her people were extraordinarily affected by the movement, they appear, to some extent, to have missed the real spirit. Otherwise how is one to account for such phenomena as the absence of patriotism and the undoubted decline of both moral and physical courage among Italians ?

The states of the Peninsula comprised dukedoms, kingdoms, commercial oligarchies and republics each pursuing a selfish policy, lacking in political vision, caring nothing for the interests of Italy as a whole, but, for the greater part, satisfied if its own immediate ambitions were attained.

And/

And to realise these ambitions no state hesitated to employ both secret diplomacy and open warfare. Thus Italian politics of the time acquired a character for faithlessness and cunning that has become proverbial.

Italy then, at the time of Charles VIII of France, was quite unable to resist invasion. The selfish, predatory policy of Venice, partly imposed on her by circumstances, made her hated and feared by the other Italian states. Her own interests were paramount. Patriotism, other than purely local, she had none, and for Italy as a whole she was not at all concerned. The Popes were too desirous of satisfying their personal ambitions and aggrandising their own families to make a patriotic effort to unite the country in its own defence. The result of their policy was, indeed, to disintegrate rather than to bind the states. Naples was jealous of Milan, and Milan was jealous and suspicious of Naples and of Venice. Florence was the pivot upon which might have turned much that would have been lastingly beneficial to Italy. Lorenzo de' Medici, taking advantage of this position, formed a league with Florence, Naples and Milan, which, so long as it lasted, not only offered no excuse for foreign interference in Italian affairs, but promised a good chance of successful resistance if such interference should be attempted. But the treacherous folly of Alfonso of Naples and Piero de' Medici broke the league/

league. At once prospects of peace disappeared, and the country was plunged into the vortex of wars which brought it under foreign domination lasting almost to our own day.

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Chapter III.

The Contending States.

The feeling of nationality which had made such progress in the west of Europe during the latter part of the Middle Ages found no expression in Italy and Germany. The two countries existed under different social and political conditions; and the characters of their people had little in common. The excitable, nimble-witted, versatile Italian stood in almost complete contrast to the slower, more stolid, plodding German, with his comparatively undeveloped artistic sense and his graver outlook on life. One of the tasks set the Emperors was the government of these two peoples. At the best it was difficult, but owing to the conditions under which the Emperors held office, it became impossible. As the Empire adhered to the principle of election, candidates for the imperial throne had to purchase in one way or another the votes of the electors, whose power thus gradually increased. And, just as the electors grew powerful, so the central government declined in strength. A remedy, indeed, might possibly have been found, had the Emperors not persisted in their attempt to govern Italy as well as their German possessions, for then the/

the energy thus dissipated might have been concentrated upon the establishment of a strong central administration, with the consequent weakening of the independence of the electors. Their refusal to follow this policy was detrimental to the interests of both countries.

By the middle of the thirteenth century all real attempt by the Empire to govern Italy had come to an end. Henry VII. and Louis of Bavaria, reviving the policy of the Hohenstaufen, tried to reduce the country, but, though Henry overcame the resistance offered by Milan, Cremona, Brescia, Florence and other cities, and was crowned at Rome, he died (1313) at Buonconvento et non sencia suspecta de veneno.⁽¹⁾

This was the last exhibition of real imperial feeling in Italy, for, though Louis of Bavaria invaded the country in 1327, his hold on it never became secure. A popular insurrection drove him from Rome, and though he harassed the Florentines on the way north, he received so little support that he had to leave the peninsula. These events were all symptomatic not merely of the general decline of the imperial spirit in Italy, but of its death. Even had resuscitation been possible, the Emperor was incapable of reviving a dying tradition, or of inspiring respect for the Empire and all it had/

1. - Cagnola, lib. II., p.14. In spite of this suggestion it is more than probable that Henry died of fever. Corio states this distinctly :- "Per febre ventitre del mese abbandonò la vita." Storia di Milano, Vol. I., Part II. cp.IX ., p. 757.

had represented. Dante could uphold the right of Henry VII. to imperial rule in Italy. It was difficult for him to conceive the possibility of the Italians offering resistance to the "supreme lord of earth and sea," and, when the resistance did take place, he assailed the anti-imperialists with bitter indignation.⁽²⁾ Half a century after his time it was plain to Italian politicians that any attempt of the Emperors to enforce their authority upon the southern country would be futile.

But the long connection between Italy and the Empire could not fail to leave traces of its influence upon the politics of the southern people, which persisted even when fear of imperial domination had passed away. For long there lingered a traditional admission of vague, ill-defined feudal rights possessed by the Empire. Even Florence, republican to the heart, and unwilling to submit to the exercise of the most attenuated feudal claims of the Empire, was unable totally to reject them. It is this indefinite shadow of imperial superiority, not yet dead, but dying, and kept alive only by the force of tradition, that must be remembered in discussing the relations of Italy with the Empire at the end of the fifteenth and beginning of the sixteenth centuries.

Just as the attempts of the Emperors to govern both Italy and their German possessions resulted in the establishment of/

2. - See Epistles V., VI., VII.

of more or less independent princes in Germany, so in Italy it produced a number of rulers who governed tyrannically the states they had seized. The whole peninsula was divided into districts at once independent and mutually repellant. Some of these were large and others small, and the smaller they were the more watchful they had to be lest their independence should be snatched away, and they themselves be incorporated in one of the larger bodies. Of the states thus existing in Italy five are of sufficient importance, both generally and for the purpose of this study, to receive some attention.

MILAN. In the midst of the large and fertile plain of Lombardy stood the city of Milan. Little is known of it till its sack by the Huns in the middle of the fifth century. A hundred years later it was destroyed by the Goths. Again it was destroyed by the Emperor Barbarossa in 1162, and, though it recovered, its progress was hindered by fierce civil war which brought the democratic element under the Torriani into power. But they were badly defeated at Desio in 1277 by the Archbishop Otto Visconti, who had assumed the leadership of the aristocratic section. For a brief period the Torriani returned, and then, for two and a half centuries the Visconti ruled both city and state.

Of this family's political sagacity no doubt exists; but they were as cruel and unscrupulous as they were capable. During/

During their tenure of power they extended the boundaries of Milan and increased its prestige, but they subverted the liberties of the citizens. The real founder of the influence of the Visconti was Matteo I., a nephew of Archbishop Otto. His son Galeazzo, who did nothing worthy of note, was succeeded in turn by his son Azzo, who attempted to carry on the work of his grandfather. Upon his death in 1339 the lordship (it was not yet a duchy) was divided among three grandsons of Matteo I. Gian Galeazzo, the first Duke of Milan, was the son of one of these, Galeazzo II. He proved the most powerful of the Visconti, and not only held Milan in safety, but even aspired to make himself king of Italy.⁽³⁾

The extent of his political authority, indeed, was realised only after his death, which was followed by a terrific outburst of civil strife.⁽⁴⁾ He was succeeded by his son, Giovanni Maria, an/

3. - The marriage of Valentina, daughter of Gian Galeazzo, to Louis of Orleans, and the political claims arising from it are discussed later. See Chapter IV.

4. - La morte de questo illustrissimo principe fu ruina de tutta Lombardia et revelacione de la parte Gelfe e Giebelina con morte de molti, et altre assai dirupacione de terre e castele, et molti mali sucesseno, come se dira de sotto ... Gelfi e Giebelini se excitonno a le arme et non solum per le cittate et castele, ma per le ville se ucidevano, et da ogni parte se sentiveno incendi, sangue, guerre, rapine, et subversione de terre e cittate. - Cagnola, lib. II. pp. 23,24. See Corio Storia di Milano, Vol. II., Part IV., cp. II., p. 462 et seq.

an Italian tyrant of the worst type, whose misgovernment caused his murder in 1412.⁽⁵⁾ Cagnola does not deal hardly with Filippo Maria (the brother and successor of Giovanni Maria) for he terms him segnoe splendido, magnanimo e prudentissimo, though, in reality, this last of the Visconti was mean-minded, cunning and utterly untrustworthy.

On the death of Filippo Maria an attempt was made to establish a republic, and in the end the duchy fell into the hands of the condottiere, Francesco Sforza, a son-in-law of the late duke. At that moment Milan was in dire need of a strong ruler, unscrupulous, if need were, who had inside knowledge of the intricacies of current politics, together with the military ability to defend his possessions should they be attacked. Such a man was Sforza. For years his reputation as a military commander had been beyond dispute, and/

5. - Questo fu inumane e crudele, et molti fece morire, et fu il primo che denigrò la fama de così gloriosa et illustre casa Finalmente del mese de Novembre de lo anno 1404, fece incarcerare essa madre sua nel castelo de Moncia, dove in pochi dì la prudentissima donna morì de dolore; el quale peccato pose che Idio non lasciasse impunito, che da suoi domestici in camera fu morto lo anno 1412. - Cagnola, lib.II., p.24.

Corio, whose sympathies are with Giovanni Maria, points out that the assassination was not popular with the Milanese. One of the murderers who was found by the mob "fu ucciso e trascinato per la città, e finalmente fu appeso sopra la porta della sua casa e poscia il vilipeso cadavere fu lasciato insepolto in un sozzo luogo. - Storia di Milano, Vol. II., Part IV., cp.II., p.511.

and, as his only important rival, the Condottiere Piccinino, had died before Filippo Maria, his credit among the mercenaries of Italy was supreme. As a condottiere he had fought for whatever party paid him best, and had no hesitation in changing sides. He understood thoroughly and turned to his own advantage all the wiles and trickery that passed for political sagacity. Diplomatic in his dealings with men and subtle where his interests were concerned, he let nothing stand in the way of his advancement. Finally, he possessed characteristics almost inseparable from his occupation - he was greedy, and a spendthrift. Consequently he tired out with his exactions those who might have been friendly to him - Florence, for example - though he continued to hold the friendship of Cosimo de'Medici.

His first task after his election as duke was to defend himself against Venice, the bitter rival of Milan for the supremacy of the north. But the capture of Constantinople by the Turks terrified Venice, and the war was ended by the Treaty of Lodi. This really finished Francesco Sforza's military career; for though he took possession of Genoa two years before his death, his chief concern was the good government of the duchy, and in this he was successful to a degree.

"Questo principe era stato molto caro et acepto a magnati et a la plebe Melanese," says Cagnola, who also affirms/

affirms that by his death the people lost "non solum uno
(6)
optimo principe, ma uno clementissimo patre."

Francesco was succeeded in 1466 by his eldest son, Galeazzo Maria, who married Bona, daughter of the Duke of Savoy. His reign of ten years was of little benefit to Milan, and when he was murdered at the end of 1476, probably no great regret was felt.

It is somewhat difficult to estimate the character of this prince. Cagnola has nothing to say of the years from 1468 till Galeazzo's assassination, so that his eulogy "fu amatore/

6. - Cagnola, lib. VII., p. 174.

Despite his faults, Francesco Sforza ruled Milan with such ability that he gained and held the respect of his subjects. Grumello's Cronaca, of course, begins too late for him to offer any opinion, and Giovio, in his Istorie, (Vol. II., lib. XXXIV., p. 384) merely says that his death caused a grievous war. Corio, however, speaks highly of him. But, as the chronicler was only six years old at the time of Francesco's death, his statements, if accepted, can be taken as nothing more than a summary of the general opinion held by those whom he had consulted.

Questo principe fu liberalissimo, pieno d'umanità, e nessuno mai parti da lui malcontento: onorava in particolar modo gli uomini virtuosi e dotti: non era crudele contro gli ignoranti, ma odiava sommamente i bugiardi e maliziosi; nessuno più di lui fu più osservatore della fede; amo sempre la giustizia, e fu amatore della religione; ebbe eloquenza naturale, e non faceva conto degli astrologhi. Storia di Milano, Vol. III., Part VI., cp. II., p. 254.

amatore de la justicia, fu glorioso e liberale nel dare, e con grande prudencia governo li suci popoli, e li tenne in pace ⁽⁷⁾ "is nothing more than an ex parte statement; while his admission "fu aliquanto macchiato de la libidine" is most damaging to the duke's moral character. The moral code in fifteenth century Italy was lax, so that a comment of this kind inevitably leads (1) to the presumption that Galeazzo's infractions of morality were more than ordinarily heinous, and (2) to the belief that, if the events of the suppressed years in Cagnola's account had been inserted, his glorification of the second Sforza would be found unjustified.⁽⁸⁾

The phrase accumulo molto tesoro, used by the chronicler is worthy of note as indicating that Galeazzo was of a greedy disposition;⁽⁹⁾ while, fu glorioso e liberale nel dare/

7. - Cagnola, lib. VIII. p. 179.

8. - Corio is more severe upon Galeazzo Maria than is Cagnola. "Questo principe," he says, "fu molto dedito a Venere, ed a sozza libidine, per qual motivo molestava grandemente i suoi sudditi." - Storia de Milano, Vol. III., Part VI. cp. III., p. 313.

His character sketch of Galeazzo is that of a moral pervert who had power to gratify the passions of his debased nature, and whose Nero-like cruelties brought on him a fate he could not hope to escape. - Op. et loc. cit. pp. 313. 314.

Corio agrees with Cagnola that Galeazzo was a lover of justice; but, with almost the sole exception of his attempt to pave Milan at the expense of the citizens, his reign is a record of lust, war, and splendid spectacles - for which the Milanese had to pay. - See Storia di Milano, Vol. III., Part VI., cp. II., pp. 254-315.

9. - Tesoro, of course, might mean, not riches, but an accumulation/

dare points to a spendthrift nature. As the accumulation of riches and his glorious liberality in giving involved the unjust taxation of his subjects they help to explain the discontent which ended in his assassination. Grumello gives no help either in estimating his capabilities or in explaining the events of his reign, for his account of Galeazzo's administration is brevity itself, and he ventures no criticism of the duke's character.⁽¹⁰⁾

Dissatisfaction with the government, excitement consequent upon the death of the duke, together with the infancy of his successor, combined to make the citizens ready for a change. A strong administration was required, and that the city did not appear likely to obtain. By Galeazzo's will, his son, not yet nine years old, was left to the care of his mother, Bona of Savoy. The government of the state was/

9. - (Contd.) accumulation of art treasures. In that case, however, one would expect the plural to be used. But Cario has employed the plural in a similar statement, where the context can hardly indicate art treasures. "Era avido d'accumulare tesori," he writes, "per cui privava molti sudditi delle loro sonstanze, ed imponeva gravose tasse. - Vol. III., Part VI., cp. III., p.314. To suppose tesoro, then, to mean riches, is quite a fair assumption.

10. - Grumello, lib.1. cp. 1. p.1.

was placed in commission, the members being Bona of Savoy, the young duke's uncles (the Sforza) and Francesco Simonetta.

Simonetta had been chancellor and secretary to Francesco Sforza, and held the same offices under Galeazzo. He was a man of boundless energy, never afraid of facing and overcoming difficulties, and possessed of an ambition which made a subordinate position hateful to him. Before long he had secured the chief share in the government, but his masterful spirit was not content: he purposed that complete control should be vested in himself and a few of his adherents. There is no reason to doubt that he intrigued against the Sforza, but there is just as good reason for believing that the Sforza, in their turn, were conspiring to drive him from office. Francesco struck first. His capture of Donato del Conte at Whitsuntide, 1478, sent the citizens seething through the town, clamouring for the prisoner's release, and his own resignation. The Sforza, however, distrusting the Milanese mob, and afraid that Simonetta's power was even greater than it appeared, preferred to calm the passions of the citizens and to wait for a more favourable opportunity. ⁽¹¹⁾

But/

11. - Ma parendò a questi signori la cosa non essere sencia qualche periculo a mettere le arme in mane a tale populo come e quello de Milano, aquietorno il tumulto - Cagnola, lib. VIII. p.180.

But their plans came to nothing. The youngest brother, Ottaviano suspecting that the daring spirit of the regent - for such, in fact, he was - might devise schemes for his destruction, fled from the city, and was drowned in crossing the Adda. He was followed by his brothers, who left Milan as soon as they heard of his death.

All power was now in Simonetta's hands. But the duchess, becoming alarmed at the subordination of her son's interests to those of Simonetta, recalled Ludovico, who re-entered the city on September 7, 1479.⁽¹²⁾ Naturally Simonetta was opposed to the policy of the duchess;⁽¹³⁾ and with good reason, for he was beheaded by Ludovico's orders before the end of the year.⁽¹⁴⁾ The young Galeazzo was committed to his uncle's/

12. - Ma la Duchessa, mossa da paura del stato del figliolo ... rechiamo a se Ludovico, che entrò in Milano a dì 7 del mese de Settembre. Cagnola, lib. VIII., p.182.

13. - He told Bona plainly, "Se ad questo Vostra Excellencia he contenta che Ludovico et fratelli venghano in lo imperio Mediolanense, achaschera a Vostra Excellencia lo etato et a me la vita." Grumello, lib.I., cp.I.p.2.

Corio's report of the matter is substantially the same :- "Duchessa illustrissima, io perdero la testa, e voi in processo di tempo perderete lo stato." Storia di Milano, Vol. III., Part VI., cp. IV., p.348.

14. - It is only fair to Ludovico to say that Simonetta, according to Cagnola, had been guilty of malpractices which he confessed before his death - See Cagnola, lib. VIII., p.182. This may, or may not be true; but as the confession was obtained under torture, it should be ruled out as evidence.. According to Corio's account the story is probably untrue, for Simonetta nella morte
e/

uncle's care, and henceforward Ludovico ruled the city as if he were its lord. It is unnecessary to enter upon a detailed account of his administration. On the whole he governed wisely and the state prospered accordingly. He encouraged the Renaissance spirit in Milan by his patronage of writers, painters, sculptors and architects, and was himself an enthusiastic art collector. But his zeal for these forms of culture resulted in heavier taxation than was either requisite or politic.⁽¹⁵⁾ The marriage of his nephew to Isabella - daughter of Alfonso II. of Naples - was, in the light of later events, a grave error of judgment. If, as seems probable, he had determined to retain the administration of Milan in his own hands, he should have kept clear of entanglements with the southern kingdom. Alfonso's character must have shown itself before his accession to the throne, and Ludovico should have foreseen political complications most disadvantageous to himself which must result from the antagonism of interests set up between him and the Neapolitan king. Alfonso was/

14. - (Contd.) e nei tormenti mantenne un' incredibile costanza e gravità d'animo. - Storia di Milano, Vol. III., Part VI., cp. IV., p.354.

15. - When Louis XII captured Milan he sent to France not only pictures but artists - such, for example, as Gerolamo Pallavicino, the poet bishop of Novara and Fra Giacondo de Verona who designed the Pont-Neuf of Paris. Perhaps his most extraordinary piece of plunder was the removal en bloc of the famous library of Pavia. See d'Auton Vol. I., Pièces Annexes, p.320.

was notoriously greedy for power, and it was natural that he should object - as did Isabella - to the young duke being kept in leading-strings while his uncle governed in his name.⁽¹⁶⁾ The strained relations which followed gave an opportunity for foreign intervention, and began the series of wars which crippled Italy's resources and deprived her of liberty for centuries to come. The marriage had taken place in 1489, and two years later a son was born to the duke and duchess. Ludovico's hopes of receiving the duchy fell to a certain extent, but they revived again when Charles VIII. of France began his expedition against Naples. While the campaign was in progress Gian Galeazzo died. At once Ludovico, who was with Charles, took his leave and hurried to Milan where, says Cagnola, "gionto e ragunati li nobeli, insieme (sic)⁽¹⁷⁾ tutti di uno animo elesse esso Ludovico per suo duca."

NAPLES. At the southern end of the peninsula and separated from Milan as much by the character of its people as by the geographical distance from the northern state, lay the/

16. - Videndo il sacro re Alphonso Ioanne Galeaz, ducha de lo imperio Mediolanense, suo genero, essere in seruitute di esso imperio et sotto ala potestà de Ludouico Sfortia patruo gubernante, deliberatò de redurlo a libertà ... Grumello, lib. I., cp.III., p.3.

17. - Cagnola, lib. IX., p.192.

the Kingdom of Naples. Stretching across Italy from coast to coast it ran north till it marched with the Papal States. Its history is long and complicated, but its interest in connection with the Italian wars of the fifteenth and the beginning of the sixteenth centuries commences only with the reign of Joanna I, (1345-1382), for with her originates the extraordinarily tangled series of events upon which was based the French claim to Naples. Joanna had no family, and lawfully the throne should have gone to Charles of Durazzo, a younger brother of Charles II, the Lamé. But in 1345 Joanna's first husband,⁽¹⁸⁾ Andrew of Hungary, was murdered, the queen being suspected of complicity in the crime. Soon she married Louis of Taranto, but both were driven from Naples by an attack led by Louis of Hungary, brother of the murdered king-consort. Charles of Durazzo also was assassinated, and Louis, who had been aided by Joanna's barons, claimed the throne. Pope Clement VI., however, refused to acknowledge Louis' right to Naples, and seeing little prospect of enforcing his wishes he returned to Hungary in 1348. The fickle Neapolitan barons now changed sides and invited Joanna to return. At this point began the curious series of adoptions and repudiations which proved so important for the future not only of Naples but of Italy as a whole.

Being/

18. - She was four times married.

Being on bad terms with her nephew, Charles,⁽¹⁹⁾ (afterwards Charles III,) she disinherited him and in his place adopted her distant relative, Louis of Anjou - her own husband, Louis of Taranto, being passed over. But Charles did not acquiesce in his exclusion from the throne, and so well did he and his family maintain their position that, from the death of Joanna I, till the end of the reign of Joanna II, in 1435, their house possessed the kingdom. Possibly under French influence, Anti-pope Clement VII, recognised Louis of Anjou as the heir, while Urban VI, declared in favour of Charles. The duke took up arms, conquered the country, and captured Joanna I, 1381. In the struggle which continued after her death in 1382, Louis, aided by Amadeo of Savoy, attempted to displace Charles III, but failed. In 1385 he died, and next year his rival followed him.

Charles' son, Ladislas, was only seven years old. French power was by no means at an end, for many of the Neapolitan barons sided with Louis II, of Anjou against the child-king. A period of anarchy and civil war resulted, and not till 1400 was Ladislas safe on his throne. He ruled till 1414 and was succeeded by his sister Joanna II, the story of whose reign, in so far as it concerns French claims upon Naples is best read along with the account of Louis XII's claims upon Milan.

VENICE/

19. - He was the son of Louis, younger brother of the murdered Charles of Durazzo, whose daughter, Margaret, by Mary, the sister of Joanna I, he married.

VENICE. East of Milan lay the state of Venice. Originally a small town confined to the islands of the Lagoon, she had gradually extended her territory till in the latter half of the fifteenth century she had become the most powerful state in Italy. Her borders ran from the coast near Monfalcone up the Isonzo River, along the line of the Dinaric and Rhaetian Alps to the Adda, down that river to the Po, and hence to the sea. By the end of the century this territory had been contracted towards the coast.

While the Venetian constitution was democratic in character, the "ordinary people" had but little share in the government, which more and more fell into the hands of a privileged class, so that, latterly, even the Doge came to be a mere puppet who moved only as he was directed. Yet the government was stable. The constitution had none of the rigidity of the feudal system: it could, and did, adapt itself to circumstances as need arose. The Senate, for example, gradually took over the rights and privileges of the Maggior Consiglio, and the famous Consiglio de'Dieci in turn displaced the Senate. But provision for the strict administration of justice invited peaceful submission to the government. Magistrates for the people, for foreigners, for the poor, looked after the interests of their special clientele. Again, the energy of the various classes was provided with appropriate outlets - the workers as agents in trade and as sailors in the fleet, the middle classes as merchants and as government employees, and/

and the nobility in the administration of dependencies.

For the most part the political history of Venice prior to the middle of the fifteenth century is of less importance so far as Franco-Italian relations are concerned than is that of Naples. Nominally a republic, she was, at that time, really a commercial oligarchy. By the end of 1381 she had asserted, in a long protracted struggle with Genoa, her claim to be mistress of the Mediterranean Sea. But fate proved too strong for her. Although a sea power, she was driven to seek territorial expansion, success in which proved her ruin.

Venice has been severely censured for her attempt to become predominant on land as at sea. It is true that, in many ways, she was a selfish state; but selfishness is not always a fair charge to lay against her so far as territorial expansion was concerned. What was the position? After the middle of the fifteenth century she was cramped by the Turkish possession of Constantinople. Her commerce had no free passage-way from the East, and at any moment her Mediterranean trade might be interfered with by the Mohammedan power. Again, at the end of the century, the new sea-route to India via the Cape of Good Hope had been discovered. This meant that goods could be carried all the way without breaking bulk; it meant, also, a saving of the duties levied on merchandise by those through whose territory it passed. Naturally she anticipated a continuous and serious decline in the value of her commerce with/

with the East, and would be the more disposed to seek compensation in another direction.

But the advent of the Turk and the discovery of the Cape route to India were not the original causes of her aggressive policy on land, for she had begun this as early as 1338. In that year, by her defeat of the Scaligeri, of Verona, she gained the district of Trevigiano. Not, however, till the beginning of the fifteenth century did her policy of territorial aggrandisement, possibly only tentative under Duke Francesco Dandolo (1329-1339), become a guiding principle. In 1405 Vicenza and Feltre were gifted to her by the duke and duchess, who were unable to defend it against Francesco de Carrara. In the same campaign Venice, now actively participating in the war, captured Verona and Padua, seized Francesco, who had surrendered in very humble fashion, and imprisoned him till his death.⁽²⁰⁾ Twenty-two years later, by the battle of Maclodio (1427), the district of Bresciano, Bergamesco, and part of Cremona came under her sway. Ravenna was added in 1441 and Crema in 1454.

These annexations and the wars connected with them were not undertaken by Venice from sheer lust of power. Behind the action was the instinct of self-preservation.⁽²¹⁾ It was becoming increasingly/

20. - Cagnola, lib. II., pp.24,25.

21. - The action of Venice may have been morally wrong, but she had either to expand or pass out of existence as a great power. She is not the only country which has succumbed when faced by the same problem.

increasingly apparent to her that, as she was a state with no home supplies of corn or cattle, a defeat at sea, such as had been inflicted on her by the Genoese in 1379 at the battle of Pola, or a league against her of land forces in her rear, or it might be a combination of both, would simply starve her into abject surrender. In addition to this the merchandise sent overland was so heavily taxed that the price was, in some cases, almost doubled before it reached its destination. If, then, she could hold the greater part of northern Italy, the taxation on her overland goods would be less, and her trade would increase. Further, if the roads and rivers were held by hostile forces, the transit of goods would become absolutely impossible, so that it was imperative for her to master the country at least to the mountains, if she were to survive at all.

There remained, of course, the alternative method of despatching a fleet across the Mediterranean to the western ports of Europe. This route was not neglected; but there was always the danger that Spain would close the Straits of Gibraltar against the fleet, and hence it must not remain the sole avenue of trade. Yet, although Venice was compelled to have more than a foothold on the mainland, her doom was sealed from the moment she took the first step. She could not expect to extend her territories at the expense of the Milanese without their protesting: her rapid growth alarmed the other Italian powers, and was a source of irritation to the Popes, whose policy was to strengthen their own temporal power at the expense of the other states/

states. Hence Venice became isolated and gained a character partly but not wholly merited for selfishness.

The radical defect of Venetian policy was not her territorial expansion but her failure to recognise that, even in her own interests, the foreigner must be absolutely excluded from Italy. Her policy was always cautious and, as far as possible, secret; and perhaps it was in accordance with this traditional caution that she sent envoys to meet Charles VIII. at Asti.⁽²²⁾ Certainly she later atoned in some measure for her shifty policy at this time by forming the League of Venice to drive the French out of Italy.⁽²³⁾ But the mischief had already been done. The foreigner knew that the petty selfishness of the Italian states would prevent their union against a common enemy.

The lesson taught by the invasion of Charles VIII. was not taken to heart by Venice. She saw that the presence of foreigners in Italy was dangerous not only to the peninsula in general but to herself in particular. Yet, in order to obtain a territorial advantage and ruin Ludovico Sforza, she sided with the French in Louis' projected invasion of Milan. In 1498 Raymondo di Soncino, writing to Ludovico Sforza from London (Nov.17) informs him that Henry VII. is not so much disturbed by/

22. - Cagnola. lib. IX., p.190.

23. - The coalition was merely a selfish compact, the oppugnant interests of which caused its dissolution immediately the danger had passed.

by trouble between Florence and Venice as by the tacit yet manifest confederation between the Pope and Louis XII., which he expects Venice will join to the duke's detriment.⁽²⁴⁾ Henry was right. Three months after Soncino's report the league between France and Venice was in being. Inasmuch as she was establishing an extremely powerful neighbour, France, on her frontier, this alliance with Louis XII, was foolish, though to a certain degree it had been provoked by the help given by Ludovico to the Florentines against Pisa. By her action, too, she gained the enmity of the Emperor, as she was placing the French between him and Lombardy, alienated still further from herself the smaller states of Italy, and drew the attention of the greater European powers to her visibly increasing importance.

FLORENCE/

24. - Calendar of Venetian State Papers. Vol.1. Dec. 776.

See also the following statement by Grumello :-

El senato Veneto trouandosi grauamente essere stato iniuriato da Ludouicho Sforcia per lo adiuto prestato ala republica Fiorentina et che per epso Ludouicho hauere perso la città di Pisa et il porto di Ligurno, importante al suo imperio. Unito esso senato tutto insieme secondo suo ordine, fu fra detto senato ballotato, se Ludouicho Sforcia si hauesse expellere da lo imperio Mediolanense, et fu ottenuto che si, et ad questo consulto foreno concordanti tutti li gioueni di epso senato, et il consulto de li antiqui fu gittato a terra, e con pacto fu ottenuto esso consulto de non manchare al re Gallichio de le forze sue per lo aquisto de lo imperio Mediolanense, et con pacto che Cremona et Giera de Abdua, paese nobile, fusse sotto suo imperio. Grumello, lib. III. cp.II.p.29.

FLORENCE. Bordered on the north and east by the Papal States, on the south by the republic of Siena, on the extreme north-west by the republic of Lucca and on the west by the sea, lay the state of Florence, - its capital in a grand though somewhat sombre fashion one of the most beautiful cities in Europe. Of the bordering states not one might be called friendly. Lucca, Siena, the Papal States were all hostile; further afield, Milan under the Visconti and Naples under Alfonso the Magnanimous required careful attention; while Venice, because of the clash of its interests with those of the Florentines, was a natural enemy.

Just as Venice was nominally a republic but actually a commercial oligarchy, so Florence, theoretically a republic, was in reality a commercial state built upon a system of trade-gilds. But although her government still retained its democratic form, the whole ruling power had passed, during the course of a century and a half, into the hands of the Medici. From the beginning of the thirteenth century that family had taken part in the government, but the first really influential participation had been that of Giovanni de'Medici (born 1361), who, having accumulated a vast fortune by trade, spent it freely in his native city. His good-natured generosity made the citizens friendly to his famous son, Cosimo (1389-1464).

In Florence two parties strove for the mastery - the Popolani and the Ottimati - and the Medici allied themselves with and gradually obtained the leadership of the people's party. The/

The Ottimati - the aristocracy - headed by the Albizzi, did not resign their power without a struggle, and succeeded in having Cosimo banished for a time. He returned to Florence in 1435. Except for this short exile Cosimo was successful in his political alliances and schemes, and his astute statemanship won for Florence security from foreign enemies and peace within the city itself.

The foreign policy of Florence for some years after Cosimo's return was dictated not by choice but by necessity. Filippo Maria, Duke of Milan, by his treachery and ambition was keeping the north of Italy in a ferment, and in order to secure their safety an alliance was imperative among the threatened states. Thus Florence, Venice and the Pope joined to defeat the schemes of the Visconti. But the commercial interests of Venice and Florence were too antagonistic to permit of a long-continued alliance between them. Several breaches occurred, and then, with Filippo Maria's failing health the situation altered. Cosimo and Francesco Sforza had become close friends, and the Florentine conceived the idea of playing off Milan against Venice. To that end he aided Sforza to obtain the duchy (1450), knowing that Milan, for her own sake, dared not allow Venice to attack Florence. He had really adumbrated a scheme to establish a balance of power. In this scheme Venice took its natural position as the commercial rival of Florence, and all pretence at an alliance was at an end.

In/

In 1450, however, Venice and Naples allied against Milan and Florence, and thus Cosimo's attempt to preserve a balance of power was not realised. Against their better judgment he and Francesco Sforza sent an invitation to Charles VII. of France to invade Naples on behalf of Rene of Anjou. Venice knew of this embassy but laid little stress upon it. To her surprise Rene accepted the invitation on his own behalf, and, joining Sforza, fought to such purpose that before the end of the year almost all the Brescian territory was in his hands, while in Tuscany the Neapolitans were badly beaten.⁽²⁵⁾

The capture of Constantinople, however, caused all the combatants to pause, and, after a deal of haggling over terms, the war ended by the Treaty of Lodi. Before peace was signed there had come the delicate matter of the disposal of Rene, who must be induced to return to France, and that, if possible, without offending the French king or Rene himself. This was necessary for the future safety of Milan. No open breach occurred between the Frenchman and his faithless Italian allies, but Rene left Italy. In truth he had discovered that he was being employed in the interests of Florence and Milan, and, not relishing the position, left his allies to do the best they could for themselves, promising only to send his son, Jean, to take military service with the Florentines.⁽²⁶⁾

To/

25. - Cagnola, lib. VI., p.138.

26. - Ibid. lib. VI., p.140.

To all appearance, Florence prospered under the rule of Cosimo de' Medici. Trade was good, money was plentiful, there was peace within the city. But it soon became evident that, for the time at least, Cosimo was Florence. It was recognised that he was all-powerful and that to gain his favour was to be successful. That in his long experience of statesmanship he frequently dissembled, keeping his real sentiments hidden, is the merest truism. He had to do so, for example, in prosecuting his designs for Francesco Sforza upon Milan. But he possessed real political genius; otherwise he would have been unable to mould to his will the most nimble-witted, brilliant people of the age. His generally friendly relations with Milan and Naples enabled Florence to act as the pivot upon which Italian politics swung.

Mild as was the rule of the Medici when compared with the governments of Milan and Naples, it had not failed to raise enemies; every policy does which is worthy of the name. His son, Piero, who succeeded his father in middle life had to meet a conspiracy of citizens jealous of his family's influence. Although the plot was supported by Venice it failed, and at his death Piero left the Medicean power stronger than ever.

His two sons, Giulano and Lorenzo, succeeded him, and were recognised by the Florentines as principi dello stato. Once more hostility showed itself. The Pazzi, leagued with Pope/

Pope Sixtus IV, (Francesco della Rovere), attempted to overthrow the Medici. Giuliano was murdered, but Lorenzo escaped and retained his position with greatly increased popularity. His policy, in a large measure, was directed against the endeavours of Sixtus IV, to increase the temporal possessions of the Papacy. Perhaps the most interesting direction it took was the attempt, quite consciously made, to establish a balance of power in Italy. Florence, of course, he intended to be the pivotal factor. The traditional enmity of Venice and the aggressive action of the Papacy put the inclusion of either or both of these states out of the question. But he was on good terms with Milan and Naples, and these two powers, through inter-marriage between their ruling houses, were friendly one to the other. Here, then, was an ideal combination of three states against two, able, if need were, to enforce peace in Italy, and, above all, offering no opportunity for foreign interference in Italian affairs. Had the alliance held it would have been well for Italy. Her whole future, indeed, hung upon the ability of the three states to preserve the balance of power which their combination had brought into being. Whether it was possible to maintain the triple alliance is questionable, but if any one man could have done it, that man was Lorenzo. Unfortunately he died, when he was badly needed, in 1492.

Lorenzo the Magnificent was as just in government as
he/

he was magnanimous by nature. But though he ruled well, his policy of advancing the Medici to still greater power undermined the foundations of government, leaving merely the hollow shell of constitutional forms; and his death, removing the master-hand, left Florence a prey to her enemies during the series of wars which began with the sixteenth century.

Piero II, stood in curious contrast to his father. Incapable, lacking even in common prudence, he had neither the ability to rule nor the sense to make way for a better man. His treachery was notorious, even in a treacherous age: to friend and foe alike he was faithless, and in allying himself with Alfonso of Naples, he joined with a kindred spirit. The strained relations between Alfonso and Ludovico Sforza were made worse by Piero's friendship with the Neapolitan king, and particularly by the secrecy attaching to the negotiations between them; for Ludovico not unjustly believed that, in the event of a breach with Naples, Piero would place at Alfonso's disposal all the resources of Florence. This correspondence⁽²⁷⁾ Guicciardini regarded as the source of all the evils that were to follow. How Piero fared during the invasion he did so much to bring about will be seen later.

THE PAPAL STATES. The last of the five great Italian powers occupied a peculiar position in politics, due partly to the/

27. - The word is used in its old sense of political relations existing between two or more countries.

the nature of the Pontiff's office and his tenure of it, and partly to the character of the states over which he ruled. As the Head of the Church the Pope should have been concerned solely with matters pertaining to religion.⁽²⁸⁾ But from very early times the holders of the office had attempted to add the secular rule of Rome and its vicinity to the spiritual power they possessed. The Renaissance movement in Italy had largely averted men's minds from the spiritual aspect of things, and while Italians had become indifferent to religion and were temperamentally incapable of initiating reform, they had also begun/

28. - Yet the Papacy at the zenith of its power, under Boniface VIII, claimed absolute supremacy in civil as in religious government. The bull Clerici Laicos, for example, forbade the clergy to pay taxes to the Civil power, and the civil power to demand them.. Six years later in the bull Unam Sanctam, the same Pope formulated claims more extensive, more crushing, than any made before or since that time on behalf of the Papacy. Civil government must be utterly subordinate to the will of the Church. It must, indeed, merge itself in the government of the Roman See and have no opinion or existence apart from what the Pope might allow.

"Surely", he wrote, "he who denies that the temporal sword is in the power of Peter wrongly interprets the words of the Lord when he says: 'Put up thy sword in its scabbard'. Both swords, the spiritual and the material, therefore, are in the power of the Church; the one indeed to be wielded for the Church, the other by the Church; the one by the hand of the priest, the other by the hand of kings and knights, but at the will and sufferance of the priest." "The Bull UNAM SANCTAM" Historical Documents of the Middle Ages, p.436.

And again :- "Indeed we declare announce and define that it is altogether necessary to salvation for every creature to be subject to the Roman Pontiff." Ibid., p.437.

In view of the feeling of nationality which was beginning/

begun to regard the Papacy much in the light of one among a number of rival secular states. If, then, the office were to survive and remain independent, it could only be by increasing its temporal power so that it might compete successfully with the opposing states in the peninsula. Unfortunately this necessity inevitably plunged the Papacy into the welter of Italian politics, and the resultant subordination of the spiritual element to temporal requirements alienated men's minds abroad and helped to prepare the way for the Reformation.

Again, the possession of the tiara was not, and could not be hereditary. It was elective, and, as a rule, the Pontiff was an old man before he was called upon to guide the policy of the Church. This, also, had its effect. The age of the Pope prevented any expectation of a lengthy tenure of office: ⁽²⁹⁾ theoretical celibacy forbade hopes of founding a dynasty; nothing remained but the aggrandisement of his family, and, as a result, the Popes of the latter part of the fifteenth century/

28. - (Contd.) beginning to assert itself in Europe, it is not surprising that these bulls caused much questioning with reference to the limits of papal power, and that in England and France, the two most progressive countries of the time, there was steady opposition to them. But nearly two centuries had passed since then, and with them the mediaeval conception of Europe as a church-state ruled over by Pope and Emperor. Few men of the late fifteenth century, particularly in Italy, would admit the validity of a claim such as that made by Boniface.

29. - Machiavelli says the average duration of the Pope's tenure of office was ten years. But on these and similar points, see The Prince, cp. XI., p.93.

century were guilty of the grossest nepotism.

The peculiar character, too, of the states over which they ruled was a direct source of trouble to the Pontiffs for, while recognising the papal suzerainty, they were in reality independent. Thus the Popes, far from being able to unite all Italy, were hardly capable of enforcing their rule upon the states supposedly under their control. Unfortunately, they adopted the wrong line of policy. Failing to unite the peninsula under their sway, instead of seeking its unification in another way by Italian alliances they showed their chagrin by doing all in their power to prevent union. If they were not the first to bring the foreigner into the country it was simply because circumstances had interposed, for more than once they had invited outside interference; and, when intervention finally did come, their policy did much to keep Italy under foreign domination.

If the later fifteenth century had produced Popes remarkable for high intellect, or estimable for their moral qualities, the story of Italy might have been different. But the occupants of the chair of St. Peter during that period were mentally undistinguished⁽³⁰⁾ and of poor moral fibre. True, Pius II/

30. - In fairness it must be conceded that both Nicholas V., and Pius II, did their best to invest the papacy with the intellectual leadership of Europe, but their attempt met with little success.

Pius II (Enea Piccolomini) devoted himself to organising a crusade against the Turks. But he was centuries too late. Greed of material gain, whether in money or lands, the mutual jealousy of the Italian states and the selfish indifference of the European powers, rendered impossible such a combination as was necessary for the purpose. Paul II., a Venetian by birth, was too absorbed in secular pursuits to devote himself to his spiritual duties. Sixtus IV., whom Machiavelli characterises as courageous, was one of the worst Popes even of that time. His nepotism accentuated the divisions already existing in Italy and brought the prospect of foreign invasion appreciably nearer. His successor, Innocent VIII., more indolent by nature, was no better morally; while Alexander VI. who succeeded him, was the worst Pope ever called on to lead the councils and direct the policy of the Church. Roderigo Borgia was one of the most influential cardinals at Rome; yet he owed his election as Pope not to his ability but to disputes between the leaders of factions. Simony, too, was a material asset to him, for he openly bribed the cardinals, some with money and others with promises of profitable benefices. He was astute, shameless, and impure of life but of persuasive eloquence. Chroniclers and historians can find nothing too hard to say of him. He was, in Guicciardini's opinion, irreligious, barbarously cruel, and immoderately fond of dominion/

dominion; while Machiavelli writes, "Alexander the Sixth did nothing but deceive men, nor ever thought of doing otherwise, and he always found victims; for there never was a man who had greater power in asserting, or who with greater oaths would affirm a thing, yet would observe it less." (32)

Of his acts as they concern Franco-Italian relations more will be said further on.

FRANCE. - A knowledge of the internal history of France is only to a small extent necessary for the understanding of the events which were on the eve of happening in Italy. But the strength of France, the hostility to her of the Emperor Maximilian, and the apparent propitiousness of Charles VIII's reign for the invasion of the peninsula require explanation. Under Louis XI, the power of the princely barons had been broken; feudalism in the wider sense had received its death-blow, and the country was almost consolidated. France passed from the Middle Ages into modern times with a modern system of government. She was thus better prepared than ever before to undertake the conquest of Italy. But Louis refused to be dazzled by the prospect of adding such a rich territory to his already extensive domains. Charles VIII., with none of his father's caution and foresight was fascinated by the idea of conquering a land which seemed to cry out for subjugation, and afterwards/

32. - The Prince, cp. XVIII., p.143.

afterwards leading a crusade against the Turks. Whether he was wise to attempt the conquest is another matter. The man whose education had been based on the maxim "Qui nescit dissimulare nescit regnare" was unfitted for the task. Not dissimulation only, but a knowledge of men and of military leadership was requisite; and Charles had not that knowledge. His mental endowment was not commensurate with his ambition and thus in the end the expedition, so rashly undertaken at the request and on the advice of those whom he ought to have suspected of ulterior motives, failed, leaving him poorer in purse and reputation than he had been before becoming the tool of abler men than himself.

When Charles the Bold of Burgundy was killed in an attempt to re-capture Nancy (1477) he left an only child, Mary. Had Louis XI., been sufficiently cautious and farseeing at the time he might have married Mary to the Dauphin and thus have brought about union, or, at least a reconciliation which might have led to union, between France and Burgundy. But he preferred to beat the Burgundians into the dust, seizing for the crown all the French territories and dividing the German lands among German princes favourable to himself. Mary, resenting his action and determined to make a fight for her inheritance, married Maximilian, who at once offered resistance to Louis in defence of his wife's domains. The war ended by the Treaty of Arras in 1482. But by this time Mary had died leaving a daughter, Margaret, who with Maximilian's consent was betrothed to the Dauphin/

Dauphin Charles. In the following year Louis XI., died, leaving his son, Charles, a boy of twelve or thirteen in the care of his sister, Anne of Beaujeu.

Anne carried on the policy of her father and pushed forward her design of adding Bretagne to the crown of France. The Duke, Francis II., died in 1488 leaving the duchy to his daughter Anne. Maximilian saw an opportunity here and married Anne of Bretagne by proxy. But Anne of Beaujeu was awake to the danger with which such an alliance threatened France, and, invading Bretagne, compelled Anne to marry Charles VIII. This injured the Emperor in two ways. It took from him the wife he had just married by proxy and it grievously insulted his daughter, Margaret, who was engaged to Charles. Maximilian prepared for war.

But Charles had now taken the government into his own hands and was dreaming of the Italian invasion. It was impossible, of course, to attempt the conquest of Naples unless he could leave his kingdom in safety; and even in that event, foolish and stubborn though he was, Charles might well have hesitated had not an extremely favourable opportunity seemed to present itself in the quarrel between Milan and Naples. He had to consider, also, the question of Italian allies. Ludovico he must regard as being on his side, and Florence, always favourable to the French, would, he hoped, join him when he came to her borders. On the other hand he had to reckon on the/
the/

the hostility of Alexander VI., and the neutrality - probably maleficent - of Venice.

To begin with he must preserve the interests of France during his absence on the expedition. Had he possessed a share of his father's astuteness he would have hesitated before paying the price demanded. The first to be pacified was Maximilian. With him he concluded the Treaty of Senlis (1493) by which he restored Margaret's dowry, Artois and Franche Comte. But he should have known that, even then, Maximilian would consider himself ill-treated, and would wait a favourable moment for seeking revenge.

The treaty by which he bought off England was still more costly and degrading to France. The annexation of Bretagne, the last of the great French fiefs to be incorporated, was unpopular in England, since the placing of the Breton ports in the power of the French crown was an undoubted menace to the northern kingdom. Henry, personally, was interested in protecting the Duchess Anne, whose father had been of much service to him. But Maximilian was too poor to give any real help, and Ferdinando of Aragon, bent upon the conquest of the Moors, had no time to spare. Henry's expedition, therefore, failed and Bretagne became part of France. The English king, however, did not forget the matter, and, in 1491, along with Maximilian, laid siege to Boulogne. Charles had no wish to prolong a war with the English, and signed almost at once the Treaty of Etaples (1492) by which he agreed to pay the English the/

the expenses incurred by the expedition to Bretagne, as well as two years' arrears of the annual sum arranged for at Pecquigny. (33) The English were dissatisfied with the treaty, but Charles was on safe ground in relying upon the non-interference of Henry VII. in French affairs. His character as a hoarder was well known in Europe, and, so long as the payments to him continued, he would be unlikely to spend money in an attempt to break the peace. Yet it would have been better for France had Charles bent his energies to the task of driving the English entirely out of the country.

Ferdinando of Aragon he tried to bribe by the cession of Roussillon. This province, acquired by Louis XI., from John of Aragon, provided France with a strong frontier on the French side of the Pyrenees, and Charles should have risked Ferdinando's enmity rather than part with it. The treaty of Barcelona, which foolishly gave away the province, was signed in 1493.

None of the powers seems to have suspected the underlying motive which induced Charles to sign these treaties. It may have come to their knowledge that he was projecting a crusade against the Turks; but certainly the news of his Italian venture produced a great shock, especially to Maximilian, who had feudal claims on Italy, and to Ferdinando and Isabella of Spain whose conquest of Granada in 1492 had prepared them to take a more important part in European politics.

33. - By the Treaty of Pecquigny Edward IV. was to receive 75,000 crowns down, and an annual pension of 50,000 crowns.

CHAPTER IV.

French Claims in Milan and Naples.

The succession of Louis XII to the French throne was an event of grave importance to Italy, for to the personal claims of the Orleanists upon Milan it joined the pretensions of France to the kingdom of Naples. The reigning Sforza were descended from Filippo Maria Visconti through his natural daughter Bianca, the mother of Ludovico "Il Moro"; while Louis XII was the grandson of Valentina, an older sister of Filippo Maria, who had married Louis, Duke of Orleans. Apart from the election of Francesco Sforza to the duchy at the close of the short-lived Ambrosian Republic established on the death of Filippo Maria, the reigning family based their title to power upon their descent from Bianca. The Orleanists justly claimed to represent the legitimate line of the Visconti. On that ground and on the terms of Madonna Valentina's marriage contract they asserted their right to Milan. But the legitimacy of their descent does not necessarily imply the legitimacy of their claim to the duchy. Other factors are present, and a consideration of them is all the more necessary because, in general, the Orleanist claim has been tacitly admitted without any examination/

examination of the opposite view - without indeed any indication that there was an opposite view. The Orleanist pretention to Milan through descent from Valentina may be admitted as sound if, inter alia, direct descent from an illegitimate branch of the family be regarded as an absolute bar to succession.

The relations between illegitimacy and inheritance vary according to the country concerned. In France and Germany an illegitimate child laboured under many disadvantages; while in England his sole disability was that he could inherit⁽¹⁾ neither from parents nor from any one else. But in Southern Europe greater laxity prevailed, and in a fair number of instances the successor to the throne was base-born. Henry II. of Trastamare, a natural son of Alfonso XI. succeeded his brother Pedro the Cruel, to the throne of Castile in 1638. Similarly, John I. of Portugal, an illegitimate son of Pedro (who died in 1637) obtained the throne in succession to his brother Ferdinando in 1383, though that brother left a daughter Beatrix, Queen of John I. of Castile. A most illuminating instance is that of Ferrante I. of Naples, the natural son of Alfonso I. who became king in succession to his father in 1458, despite the claim made by the legitimate branch of the family, represented by Ferdinando the Catholic. Further, Alessandro, first Duke of/

1.- History of English Law, Vol. II., pp. 396, 397.

of Florence, a natural son of Lorenzo, Duke of Urbino, succeeded his father in 1531.

Commines, who had no admiration for Ludovico Sforza, offers no objection to him as the son of an illegitimate mother. He declares, indeed, with emphasis, that the Italians looked indifferently upon such matters - ils ne font point grande difference⁽²⁾
au pays d'Italie d'un enfant bastard à un legitime⁽³⁾. Nor is the fact commented upon in the Italian chronicles. Therefore, in evaluating the claims of Louis XII. and Ludovico Sforza to the duchy of Milan, it must not be assumed that illegitimate descent formed in itself an absolute barrier to succession.

Arguments, of course, might readily be adduced to prove that various combinations of circumstances rendered it politic that these successions should fall as they did. But precisely the same arguments will apply to the Milanese question. For the safety of the duchy her ruler must be an able politician of Ludovico's stamp. Further, it was of the utmost political importance that all the Italian states should be ruled by Italians, not by foreigners. Hence, while custom sanctioned the succession of Ludovico,⁽⁴⁾ accompanying circumstances, if they be regarded, really increased/

2.- Commines, liv. VII., cp. 11., p. 585.

3.- Hier. Borgia, however, De Bellis Italicis lib. III., fol. 43. says Louis was from a legitimate and Ludovico from an illegitimate mother - quippe ille legitima ortus matre, hic vero spuria fuerat - and hints that Louis' claim therefore was the stronger.

4.- Apart, that is from the fact that his grand-nephew Francesco was alive.

increased the value of that sanction and correspondingly weakened the Orleanist claim.

But to decide the question of succession other factors than that of legitimacy must be considered. The matter is all the more complicated because of the difficulty of fixing upon the real crucial point. Was it the marriage contract of Madonna Valentina with its reversion to her of the duchy in default of heirs male to Gian Galeazzo; was it her father's will; or was it the grant of investiture to Gian Galeazzo by the Emperor? Could the duchy be bequeathed by will and, if so, which will was valid - that of Gian Galeazzo or that of Filippo Maria?

In 1389 the Duke of Orleans and Valentina were married. Upon the terms of the marriage contract the Orleanists based their claim to the possession of Milan. One stipulation in the agreement was that, in the event of Gian Galeazzo dying without heirs, his daughter Valentina should succeed to her father's dominions as they stood at his death.

Item est actum et pactum solemnī stipulatione Vallatum
expresse deductum quo in casu quo prefatus Dominus Ioannes
Galeaz vicecomes Virtutum comes dominus Mediolani decedat sine
filijs masculis de suo proprio corpore procreatis dicta Domina
Valentina nata sua succedat et succedere debeat in solido toto
dominio suo presenti et futuro
(5)

Now at the time this instrument was drawn up Gian Galeazzo was/

5.- British Museum, Additional MSS. 30669, fol. 230 tergo.

was not Duke of Milan: he was simply its lord. Had he then any right to entail a fief of the Empire without obtaining the consent of the superior? Strict feudal law forbade the succession of a female unless under special arrangement.

L'exclusion des femmes du droit de parvenir au trone, et non seulement des femmes, mais encore des males qui n'etaient parents que par les femmes du roi decédé, est sans doute un point incontestable du droit public français. Pensa-t-on que le royaume étant un propre du roi defunt, qui l'avait reçu de ses ancêtres, les fils de ce roi devaient exclure leurs soeurs? Si l'on n'avait usé que du droit commun, à défaut de males, les filles auraient dû heriter de la couronne, comme le decide la loi des Visigoths. Le roi aurait pu appeler ses filles concurremment avec ses fils; or l'histoire n'en present pas un seul
(6)
example.

The rule was specially binding upon the lord of Milan who held his fief under the tenure of Fahnlehen, that is, the gift of a banner in token of homage. Under this tenure female succession was barred. Apparently, then, Gian Galeazzo's position as lord of Milan and his inability under feudal law to entail the lordship especially if it were entailed upon a female, rendered the terms of the marriage contract null and void. But as has been already pointed out the suzerainty of the Empire over its/

6.- Loi Salique, Dissertation Quatorzième, p. 718.

its Italian fiefs was of the vaguest description. Again, feudalism in Northern Italy had practically ceased to exist, and with its passing there disappeared much of the respect for feudal law. The Popes also claimed a right in the disposal of imperial fiefs. Hence the papal consent conveyed in the instrument signed between the contracting parties apparently satisfied the French side. Indeed, it does not seem to have occurred to any one to question the papal powers in the matter. On the other hand, as the lordship of Milan was held under Fahnlehen tenure, it was impossible for the Empire to acquiesce in such an entail as Gian Galeazzo had proposed and the Orleanists accepted. The position so far then, was dubious. Yet the determination to leave Milan to Valentina and her descendants is insisted on later in the marriage contract.

Quo in casu predicto videlicet quo Altissimus de Ipsa nullis superstitibus filijs masculis legitime procreatis de suo corpore faceret voluntatem Ipsam Dominam Valentinam et ejus liberos de dicto matrimonio reputabunt Ipsisque et eorum posteritati tanquam suis dominis naturalibus obedient cum effetu. Poterit tamen idem Dominus Ioannes Galeaz in casu quo filias habebit ipsis providere in denariis et bonis mobilibus prout placebit sibi et honori suo
(7)
videbitur convenire.

When in 1395 the lord of Milan received imperial investiture as its duke the situation was not made any clearer. Gian

Galeazzo/

7.- British Museum, Additional MSS. 30669, fol. 231 and 231
tergo.

Galeazzo had paid the Emperor a hundred thousand crowns to obtain confirmation of his position in Milan; but there is nothing to indicate that the fief now became a feudum emptum . Had it taken that status it was quite in order for a female to succeed if no male heir survived, but in the absence of evidence to that effect it cannot be taken for granted that Valentina was the legal successor to her father's domains.

Nevertheless Gian Galeazzo's will distinctly appoints Valentina as his heiress.

Item instituit sibi heredem ill. d. Valentinam filiam suam et consortem ill. d. Ludovici ducis Aurelianensis et filii quandam Francorum regis in omnibus rebus mobilibus et immobilibus, pecuniarum quantitativibus et aliis sibi datis quam in dotem, quam alia occasione, de quibus iussit eam fore sarcitam et contentam. Ita quod nihil aliud petere possit in bonis ipsius testatoris, salvo quod si veniret eidem casus viduitatis vel paupertatis, quod absit, possit eo caso venire ad patriam predicti testatoris et eo casu legavit sibi alimenta necessaria et decentia sibi prestanda
(8)
per primogenitum suum.

But another point arises. As nothing was said regarding female succession the Emperor's understanding was that in default of heirs male the fief would lapse to the Empire. But in Italy it/

8.- See Testamento del duca Giovanni Galeazzo Visconti in Doc. ccxxiii., p. 332 of Documenti Diplomatici tratti dagli Archivi Milanesi, Vol. lll.

The date of the document is 1397. No day or month is mentioned.

it would be understood that as females had not been definitely excluded, they had the right of succession if male heirs failed. The situation was thus ambiguous. The following year (1396) a second investiture was granted by which only heirs male were to succeed, and yet again a third investiture restored the successional arrangements to the position they held under the first grant.

Orleanist claims could not be made till the death of Filippo Maria, by which time they had been half forgotten. But as Filippo's life drew to a close the question of the succession was bound to arise. The Emperor relying on the grant of investiture in 1396 expected the reversion of the duchy; the Orleanists, looking to Valentina's marriage contract thought it should fall to them; while Francesco Sforza, son-in-law and adopted son of Filippo Maria, saw no reason why he should not succeed. The cynical old man added another complication by appointing Alfonso of Aragon as his successor.

Cagnola suggests double-dealing on the part of the duke for he declares that Francesco Sforza was adopted by him as his son and heir. In his Storia di Milano he writes under the date 1430:-

Felipo Duca vedendo Veniziani intenti a la nova guerra, se
aparecchia e provvede a le cose necessarie; et a Francesco Sforza,
che era a Mirandola, per mezo de Martino summo pontefice, el duca
li da la Bianca Maria, sua unica figliola, in moglie, et lo fa
suo figlio adoptivo et de la casa de Vesconti, e lui e tutti li
suoi/

suoi discendenti; et donolli el Castelacio, el Bosco, el Fregarolo, castele de Alexandrina, et uno stendardo con la pantera depinta, el quale ancora portano."
(9)

The story of Francesco's adoption by Filippo may or may not be true; there certainly was nothing in it inherently impossible or even improbable. Contemporary events, indeed, would appear to suggest its truth. Filippo was without heirs; he had been hard pressed by enemies; and though he and Francesco had been estranged they were now reconciled. Besides, Sforza had married Bianca Visconti and was suspected by the Italians as a possible claimant to the duchy. If Milan fell to him, Filippo would have the satisfaction of knowing that it was remaining in his own family, even though he had willed the duchy to Alfonso of Aragon.

That the Milanese on the death of Filippo did not recognise Francesco as duke seems to tell against Cagnola's story, and doubt is increased because Francesco himself apparently made no claim to the duchy. He seemed, indeed, condottiere though he was, to be more concerned for the well-being of the state than for his own advancement. Cagnola remarks:-

Grand dolore prese Francesco de la morte del socero, e tutta nocte stette a pensare in che modo se dovesse governare, perchè vedeva i nemici potentissimi su le porte de Milano.
(10)

When an attempt was made to form a republic immediately upon Filippo/

9.- Cagnola, lib. 11., p. 40.

10.- Ibid. lib. IV., p. 73.

Filippo Maria's death - Milanesi preseno el governo de la
cittate, e se redusseno a libertate, con proposito de non darse
a principe veruno - Francesco accepted the decision. He became
(11) the general of the new republic which he defended against the
attacks of Venice. But his acquiescence was temporary and com-
pulsory. The time had not yet arrived for him to take possession
of the state. In September 1445 he defeated the Venetians,
entered into alliance with them and, turning against Milan, laid
siege to it. In six months he had broken with his new ally but,
aided by Cosimo d'Medici, continued to press his claims to the
duchy. By 1450 the Milanese, weakened by internal struggles,
famine, and the jealous greed of the neighbouring powers, were com-
pelled to choose between submission to Venice, which was unthink-
able, and the acceptance of Francesco as duke. The arguments
used in the discussion preceding the invitation to the Count to
accept the rule of Milan confirm Cagnola's story, though it must
be remembered that it is still that historian who writes:-

Il perche era necessario, o sotometersi a Veniciani (che era
peggio che sostenere ogni crudele morte) o veramente ricevere el
Conte, gienero de Filipo e figliolo adoptivo il quale è di tanta
umanitate e clemencia, che non si porterà come signore ma come
patre del populo Milanese; et nessuno, ecepto lui può in uno
levare la guerra a la fame a la tanto afflicta cittate.
(12)

If the chronicler's account be true, Francesco's election was
popular/

11.- Cagnola, lib. V., p. 74.

12.- Cagnola, lib. V., p. 125. See also Corio, Vol. 111., Part V.,
cp. 1v., pp. 181, 182.

popular, for se la moltitudine de fora era stata grande, quella de dentro fu molto maggiore, e ressonabe l'aiera de alegre salutacione, e ogni homo cridava - "Sforzia è Duca "- E tutti si sforciaveno toccargli la mano; e tanta e si stretta era la moltitudine, che'l suo cavallo fu con le spalle portato per non
(13)
poco spacio.

Though d'Auton's account flatly contradicts that of Cagnola the credibility of these chroniclers is not impaired thereby; for it is possible that both stories are true. Filippo Maria, like all the Visconti, was able and unscrupulous. His shifty, double-dealing nature found ample opportunity of expressing itself in the welter of fifteenth century politics in Italy. His treatment of Sforzia was mean and underhand, and it is quite probable that he professed friendship and esteem for his son-in-law, adopted him, and promised him the succession to the duchy, while aware of a previous arrangement made between his father Gian Galeazzo, and Louis of Orleans - while, indeed, he was contemplating Alfonso of Aragon as his heir.

Sforza himself might also be cognisant of Valentina's marriage settlement, but would scarcely lay aside his ambitious plans on that account. He knew his power and could await a favourable opportunity of securing success. Between himself and/

13.- Cagnola, lib. V., p. 126.
But Salomoni, Memorie Storico-Diplomatiche, Intro. p. xv., says Francesco toccò la sovranà di quel Ducato, avendoselo egli conquistato più colle armi, che per le ragioni della propria moglie Bianca Maria.

and Filippo, whatever chroniclers might write or the people believe, no trust existed. Filippo had kept Italy embroiled for over twenty years and had found Sforza a useful tool; but the duke was too crafty to allow the Condottiere power enough to overthrow him. He did not underestimate the military genius of Sforza, and probably understood, at least in part, his friendship and working arrangement with Cosimo de'Medici. If so, he was aware of Francesco's ambition to rule in Milan when the ducal throne should be vacant, and lest he should try to seize power before that time, attempted to lessen the Count's influence by pitting against him his rival Piccinino. The natural inference is that, if Cagnola's account be true, the adoption was a matter of political expedience - as the Count's marriage with Bianca certainly was - designed to quieten Sforza for the time, to hold him in check and render him less suspicious of his father-in-law's intrigues.

But the adoption only gave Sforza a somewhat questionable right of succession to the duchy; even if he were regarded as next in succession, the ultimate appeal must be to force. For there were other claimants. As there were no heirs male, the emperor Frederick III., looking on Milan as a feudal possession, expected it to fall into his hands upon the death of Filippo Maria. If Frederick knew of Gian Galeazzo's arrangement with Louis of Orleans he simply set it aside. In any case he knew of the marriage, and his expectation of the reversion of Milan is/

is one proof that he did not regard that marriage as invalidating his feudal right. Thus from the beginning, there was no imperial sanction to the Orleanist claim to the duchy. But the Emperor's attitude told against Sforza also; for, while he ruled the state he was not granted the imperial investiture.

Another question now arises. What was the position of the Emperor Maximilian with regard to the succession? Did he favour Ludovico, or was he inclined to the Orleanist claim? The answer is important for, by refusing investiture to Ludovico, Maximilian could have declined to recognise him as Duke de jure. The Emperor's rights were acknowledged by Louis who, in his anxiety to play the part of Duke of Milan, had never failed to show respect to Maximilian as his feudal superior. Commynes was quite as clear on the point. "Toutesfois ie croy", he wrote, "que s'il eust esté coupable d'un tel cas comme d'avoir voulu bailler le chasteau de Milan a l'Empereur (auquel il pourroit pretendre droit, comme Empereur, et aussi comme Duc d'Austriche: car ceste maison y querelle quelque chose) il ne luy eust pardonné." ⁽¹⁴⁾

Now, since Louis and Commynes were prepared to acknowledge the feudal superiority of the Emperor over Milan, they should have been prepared to acquiesce in his decision with regard to the succession. It is easy to see the direction of Maximilian's sympathies. On the assumption of the dukedom by Ludovico he not only/-----
14.- Commines, liv. VII., cp. 11., p. 587.

only made no protest, but even wrote to the Duchess of Savoy on September 5, 1495, asking her not to favour the interests of the French king, though the Duchess had really been doing quite the reverse. (15) His favour to Ludovico was further shown by his marriage to Bianca, the duke's niece. Hard upon the marriage followed Ludovico's investiture, which gave to him the same rights as those held by Gian Galeazzo, and incidentally denied the claims of that duke to dispose of his fief as he thought fit. This event, so important to the duke, may have been merely a continuation of the Emperor's favour towards him, or may have been inspired by the alliance he had just contracted. It is probable, too, that Ludovico foresaw this result, and deliberately laboured to attain it. Such at any rate, was the opinion of Grumello, a partisan of the Sforza. (16)

The investiture made Ludovico duke de jure as well as de facto; yet Louis, despite his open acknowledgment of the Emperor's feudal rights in Milan proceeded as if nothing had happened./

15.- Calendar of Venetian State Papers, Vol. 1., Doc. 655.

16.- Pensato esso Ludovico de essere confirmato et investito da Cexare Maximiliano di epso imperio Mediolanense. Mandato legati in Alemania, paexe grandissimo, da epso Cexare Maximiliano de darli sua nepote, sorella de Ioanne Galeaz Sforza, in sua consorte.....Mandato Cexare uno suo barone in persona di sua Maestà a disponsare la prelibata nepote sua, chiamata Blanca.....Per epso matrimonio Ludovico Sforzia fu investito de tutto quello hera il dexiderio suo, videlicet del imperio Mediolanense per epso et soi successori per el prelibato Cexare Maximiliano. - Grumello, lib. 1., cp. xxi., pp. 18,19.

happened, for he claimed the duchy not merely in virtue of his representing the legitimate line of the Visconti, but because of the marriage settlement arranged between his grandfather and Gian Galeazzo Maria.⁽¹⁷⁾

Two other claimants remain to be considered - Naples and Venice. It has been said that, in spite of Filippo Maria's open protestations of affection for Francesco Sforza and the extreme probability of his having adopted the Count and promised him the succession he had left the duchy by will to Alfonso of Naples.⁽¹⁸⁾ But Alfonso, conscious that the French pretensions to Naples rendered his possession of the kingdom somewhat precarious did not care to claim his legacy. He had already warned Filippo Maria that the French conquest of Naples would be followed by their subjugation of Milan, and he repeated his warning when Francesco Sforza gained the dukedom. In order to protect both countries a close alliance was formed by the marriage of Sforza's daughter Ippolita, to Alfonso, Prince of Calabria.⁽¹⁹⁾ Venice, the last claimant was anxious principally through sheer greed, to annex Milan and the whole of Western Lombardy. Such an enormous accession to her domains would inevitably have roused other states and general warfare would probably have resulted.

The pretensions of Alfonso upon Milan at the time of

Ludovico's/

17.- The story is told by Jean d'Auton in his Chroniques de Louis XII., Vol. 1. pp. 4,5.

18.- Alfonso V. of Aragon and 1. of Naples (1435-1458).

19.- Alfonso II. of Naples (1494-1495).

Ludovico's second coup d'etat (1494) rest upon a different foundation. (20) Four bases of claim lay open to him, though two of them even superficially considered were invalid. If he claimed (21) through his late wife Ippolita, the daughter of Francesco Sforza, he was acting in direct opposition to the Salic Law which the chroniclers assert - and Sismondi supports them - was operative in Milan. In that case Ludovico certainly had a better claim. If he relied upon his position as Isabella's father he was still wrong. When Ludovico made his successful attempt to drive Bona of Savoy from power, he was encouraged to undertake the revolutionary adventure by Ferrante of Naples, the father of Alfonso II. (22) But the death of Gian Galeazzo in 1494 left his widow, Isabella of Naples, in practically the same position as Bona of Savoy had been on the death of Galeazzo Maria in 1476. Thus Ferrante's action in the case of Bona of Savoy almost debarred his son Alfonso II. from pushing his claim on behalf of Isabella. Besides, she had no more right to the duchy as the guardian of her son Francesco than had Bona, who had been acting for her son Gian Galeazzo. Something might, indeed, be said in favour of his interference on behalf of his grandson Francesco whose hereditary succession had been brushed aside by Ludovico. But it formed no/

20.- See Genealogical Table IV.

21.- She had died in 1480.

22.- Nephew of Ludovico and grandson of Francesco Sforza.
See Genealogical Table III.

no reason for a personal claim. His strongest justification for interference was, perhaps, the fact that his grandfather had been left the duchy of Milan by Filippo Maria's will. But as the Duke of Milan exceeded his powers in this appointment and as Alfonso I. refused to accept the duchy, his grandson's claim was invalid.

It appears, however, to have been understood that the struggle was really one between Ludovico and Alfonso. The Neapolitan king's greed of power was notorious and the record of his reign was not such as to induce any country to desire his rule. Ludovico held the dukedom with the consent of the Milanese as much because of their desire to keep out Alfonso as because his regency had been acceptable to them. The unfortunate Francesco was merely a pawn whose interests neither Ludovico nor Alfonso regarded as of any account.

Coming back to the original point, - the comparative values of the claims of Louis XII. and Ludovico Sforza to the duchy -
(23)
it is now possible to form a judgment. Owing to the operation of the Salic Law in Milan, Louis' descent from Valentina gave him absolutely no claim to the inheritance he sought. According to feudal law the duchy was not in the power of Gian Galeazzo to/

23.- Of course, if the question of illegitimacy be disregarded the real heir was not Ludovico but his grand-nephew Francesco, son of Gian Galeazzo and Isabella of Naples. But Francesco was only an infant of four years when his father died in 1494, and it is doubtful whether he would have succeeded without opposition. If Ludovico's coup d'état had not taken place, Alfonso, in all probability, would have forced a quarrel to secure the regency during his grandson's minority.

(24)
to bestow. Hence the terms of the marriage treaty had no real sanction. But similarly Ludovico - though, if Cagnola's story be accepted, he had a somewhat questionable right as the son of Filippo Maria's adopted son - had no claim through his mother Bianca. The whole question thus really reduces to one, not of the relative value of descent from a legitimate or illegitimate branch of the Visconti but of the wisdom or otherwise of the Emperor's decision, as feudal superior to support Ludovico.

Maximilian, while not desirous of interfering in the affairs of the Milanese, was naturally anxious to retain for the Empire whatever authority it still possessed in Italy. His policy, therefore, was to discover which of the claimants to the duchy would best serve his interests. He must guard against danger from France, where he had to contend with Louis XII. The deferential attitude to the Emperor of the French king as soi disant Duke of Milan, did not deceive Maximilian. But even had he not suspected Louis, the Emperor, for his own sake, could hardly have supported the Frenchman's claim to the duchy. His policy must be to lessen as far as possible the political ascendancy of France. But France was already well consolidated, her power was increasing and her influence would be all the more strengthened by the possession of Milan. Further Maximilian did not know whether Louis holding the Milanese, might not make an attack/

24.- It should be noted, however, that feudal domains in Italy were frequently left by will. But that fact does not legalise the action.

attack upon Naples which, if successful, would place France in a position of such political superiority that she would become a menace to the other nations of Europe. Maximilian, therefore was unable to support Louis' claim.

So far as Naples was concerned he did not wish to see Alfonso in Milan. The Neapolitan king's avaricious, treacherous nature was enough in itself to induce Maximilian to keep him out of the province; for a political union between the two states would do the Empire no good, and possibly much harm. Besides, in that event he would be faced by the same problem that he had with regard to France. Louis XII. had designs upon Milan and had also dynastic claims on Naples. If, then, the Neapolitan king held both countries, there was more than the probability that Louis, irritated by his enemy's success, might attempt to achieve the conquest of Naples and Milan at one and the same time by an attack on Alfonso.

In considering Ludovico's claim the conditions were different. The duke certainly was strong, subtle and unscrupulous, but he had proved himself an able governor. He was much less to be feared than Alfonso, and there was the possibility of so binding him to the Emperor that their interests would very largely coincide. Perhaps what influenced Maximilian most was the enmity existing between Ludovico and Louis of France. Ludovico might be trusted to resist Louis and, by adopting a friendly policy towards him, Maximilian might rely on him for aid if occasion required/

required - in the event, for instance, of a quarrel between him and France. The Emperor, therefore, determined to support Ludovico when by his coup d'état he gained possession of the Milanese. Later, he tried to strengthen Ludovico's position by representations at the court of Savoy and as evidence of the complete amity existing between them married Ludovico's niece Madonna Bianca, made a league with him and granted him investiture, thus making him duke de jure as well as de facto.

Some consideration is due also to the French claim upon Naples. The story of the southern kingdom has been traced as far as the death of Ladislas in 1414. He was succeeded by his sister Joanna II., under whom the condition of Naples steadily deteriorated. The story of the reign is that of plots and intrigues, the intricacy of which makes them extremely difficult to follow. Joanna and her lover Giovanni Caracciolo, Alfonso of Aragon and Louis of Anjou engaged in plot and counter-plot in almost every possible combination. At times the queen favoured one at times another of the aspirants to power. To defend herself against Louis III. she adopted Alfonso as her heir. Then, when Alfonso schemed to obtain the throne before her death, she repudiated his adoption and turned to Louis, whom she had so recently as an enemy. Him she adopted and, on his death in 1434, took his brother René as her heir.

(25)

Thus there were two disputants for the crown - René of Anjou and/

25.- Et non avendo altri eredi li (Ladislas) successe Zohana sua sorela, la quale avendo chiamato a se per marito Jacobo de/

and Alfonso of Naples, the one heir by adoption into the house of Durazzo by Joanna 11, the other a former heir by adoption but repudiated by the same queen. The dispute lasted till Pope Eugenius IV. recognised the title of the Aragonese, who received the kingdom, had a brilliant reign and, dying in 1458, left the throne to his illegitimate son Ferrante. (26) The new king soon discovered that his power was unstable and his successful attempt at consolidation involved what was really a reconquest of the country.

Meanwhile the Angevins had consistently refused to recognise the justice of their exclusion; for, if Joanna's adoption were of any value, her repudiation of Alfonso and installation in his place of Louis 111. and, on his death, of René, made Alfonso an usurper/

25.- (contd.) de Narbona conte de la Marcia, homo excelente e bello di corpo tra gli altri principi francesi, et parendoli che non la extimasse come ella voleva, lo refuto, e chiamo a se Alfonso re de Aragona, e se lo fece figliolo adoptivo et da poi venuta tra loro grande defesione, impero che Alfonso voleva el governo tutto in lui, et avendo preso Zohane Caraciolo, homo molto amico e benevolo et in strectissima amicitia a la regina, poi assediata essa regina ne la rocca Capuana, lei domando aiuto a Sforzia....Et per li iniqui et ingrati deportamenti de Alfonso fu da la regina privato de la adoptione, et da Martino summo pontefice fu afirmato questo edicto. Et de sua voluntate la regina chiamo a se Ludovico terciio de Angio et lo instituitte successore del regno. - Cagnola, lib. 111., pp. 32,33.

26.- Commynes' comment on the character of Alfonso 11. and his father Ferrante is interesting:- Nul homme n'a esté plus cruel que luy, ne plus mauvais, ne plus vicieux et plus infect, ne plus gourmand, que luy. Le père estoit plus dangereux, car nul ne se cognoissoit en luy, n'en son courroux; car, en faisant bon chere, il prenoit et trahissoit les gens: comme le Comte Jaques qu'il prit et fit mourir vilainement et horriblement, estant Ambassadeur devers luy, de par le Duc Francisque de Milan. - Commynes, liv. VIII., cp. vi., pp. 636,637.

usurper. More than once René tried to enforce his claim as the rightful heir; but his last hope vanished when, in 1464 his son Jean was driven out of Naples. In 1480 he died leaving his inheritance to his nephew, Count Charles of Maine⁽²⁷⁾, who, on his death in the following year bequeathed it to Louis XI. The king of France accepted Anjou and Provence but, while not openly abandoning his claim upon Naples, made no effort to assert it. Louis' death in 1483 left his son Charles free to enforce French pretensions in South Italy or to continue his father's policy. But unlike his prudent father, he was fascinated by the idea of conquest in Italy. Wisely Louis XI. had contented himself with Anjou and Provence. His foolish son, instead of consolidating his own kingdom still further, suffered himself to be led into an enterprise, success in which few of his wisest counsellors regarded as possible.⁽²⁸⁾

The value of the French claim on Naples is more easily adjudged than was their pretention to the duchy of Milan. The death/

27.- Both his son Jean and his grandson Nicholas were dead, the former in 1470, the latter in 1473.

28.- Avant l'entreprise duquel voyage il eut mainte disputation scauoir s'il iroit ou non. Car l'entreprise sembloit à toutes gens sages, et experimentez, très dangereuse, et n'y eut que luy seul, qui la trouua bonne; et un appellé Estienne de Vers, natif de Languedoc, homme de petite ligneeUn autre s'en estoit meslé jusques là (à qui le coeur faillit) homme de finances, appellé le General Briçonet..... et eux deux furent cause de ladite entreprise dont peu de gens les loioyent, et plusieurs les blasmoient. Car toutes choses necessaires à une si grande entreprise leur defailloient; car le Roy estoit trèsieune, et foible personne, plein de son vouloir, peu accompagné de sages gens, ne de bons Chefs, et n'auoit nul argent contant; Ils n'auoient ne/

death of Charles III's children, Ladislas and Joanna II, both without heirs, meant the extinction of the direct line of the house of Durazzo. Thus consideration must be directed to the relative value of the adoptional claims of Alfonso V. and Louis III. Alfonso was the first to be adopted, but he was repudiated because of his too eager desire for the throne. Now, if Joanna had the right of adoption she had also the right of repudiation. The moral question does not enter into the case; for both adoption and repudiation were employed for political purposes and were so understood by all who had anything to do with them. The repudiation of Alfonso V, then, was legitimate, as was Joanna's immediate adoption of Louis III. of Anjou. Had the queen shown signs of indecision in Louis' case, Alfonso's cause might have had some support; but no indecision was apparent, for on the death of Louis she adopted his brother, the inevitable implication being that she wished the Neapolitan throne to go to Anjou rather than to Spain.

The decision of the Pope (Eugenius IV.) in favour of Alfonso V. is open to three objections. It is somewhat difficult to obtain a just decision even when the whole position has been carefully discussed by a number of men; it is much harder to judge with equity when the case is left in the hands of only one man. The decision of Eugenius, therefore, is open to objection on that account. It may be said that the Pope's judgment was given only after/

28.- (contd.) ne tentes, ne paillions, et si commencèrent en
hiuer à entrer en Lombardie. - Commines, Prelude
to cp. 1., liv. VII., p.575.

after consultation. But naturally he would consult those who were churchmen by profession and whose judgment, therefore, was likely to be biassed. And this leads to the second objection.

The Pope was the head of the Church; but it must never be forgotten that he was a temporal prince also, intent on increasing the political jurisdiction of the Church, and hence, even if he did not consult with some of the chiefs of the Curia, it would be an extremely difficult matter for the judgment to be equitable if such a decision were to run counter to the political interests of the Church. In the third place, the position of the papacy was unfavourable to the Pontiff's acting as arbitrator. The Great Schism had not yet run its course. It is true that, for the moment, no Anti-Pope was reigning at Avignon, but no one knew how long this would continue. Obviously it would be a serious matter for the Pope should the man he favoured for the throne of Naples be on good terms with the Anti-Pope, if one should be elected; or worse still, if he should be one of the agents controlling the actions of the Anti-Pope. The Pontiff had to consider the result of his judgment on the Church as a religious institution and its effect upon her political fortunes. To this must be added the strong presumption of Alfonso's fidelity to the Roman See rather than to any Anti-Pope holding his court in France. On the whole, then, the correctness of the papal decision may be questioned.

What does seem strange is that no one apparently realised the/

29.- Clement VII. had resigned in 1429 and Felix V. was not elected till ten years later.

the danger of giving a foothold in Italy to any foreigner, whether French or Spanish. Papal policy was opposed to the union of Italian states under any leadership but its own. It may be that had the Neapolitan baronage come to some working agreement among themselves, even if it had involved the election of one of their number to the throne, neither Louis III. nor Alfonso of Aragon could have driven the country to accept him. But the apathy, jealousy and treachery of the times in the peninsula prevented the success of any such plan. The result was that whether the family of Aragon retained Naples or lost it to Charles VIII., the country would be ruled by foreigners.

CHAPTER V.

Preparations for the French Conquest.

Though the French conquest of Milan took place during the reign of Louis XII., the series of events leading up to it originated long before his time. The marriage of Valentina daughter of Filippo Maria Visconti to Louis of Orleans gave a degree of plausibility to the Orleanist claim upon the duchy of Milan; but that claim never could have been enforced - its enforcement, indeed, might never have been attempted - had not the state of Italy laid her open to attack. Italian rulers in the main, had forsaken the real principles of government, caring for little but their own personal pleasures and aggrandisement, craft, trickery and treacherous cunning passed current with them for statesmanship. One has only to read the pages of Macchiavelli to see how these were eulogised as virtues. The ancient Roman patriotism, bravery and military genius alike had passed away, to be succeeded by an indifference that was paralysing the manlier virtues and bringing upon Italian speaking peoples the contempt of their neighbours. The liberty of Milan had been partially, and that of Naples wholly destroyed; Florence was torn by internal strife; even/

even Venice and the Papal States, where the government was more stable, were not free from conspiracy. The introduction of condottieri aggravated the evils of this political and military nugacity; for while not abandoning their quarrels with one another, instead of carrying out their own campaigns the Italian States employed mercenaries whose only interest in the strife was the amount of profit they could obtain. As their employment spread so their influence increased, till, at length, they exercised an altogether disproportionate power in the peninsula.

It is more than astonishing that such an intellectual, quick-witted people as the Italians, should not have perceived where their danger lay, and have taken steps to ward it off. The disunion among the five great powers, their unwillingness to compromise, to sink their differences and join forces to secure the safety and independence of Italian speaking peoples, formed the radical cause of their long subjugation to foreign powers. Their weakness invited attack. Conscious as they must have been of the fact, they did little to bring about union. Suspicion, treachery and jealousy set up almost insuperable barriers to united action. Lorenzo de' Medici was right when he joined Naples and Milan with Florence in a Triple Alliance which would maintain/

maintain peace in Italy and present a united front to any invading force; but the malevolent action of Alfonso of Naples and the treachery of Piero de' Medici sealed the fate of the balance of power, and with it, the fate of Italy for nearly five centuries to come.

The story of the preparations which resulted in the French domination of Milan must be begun within reasonable distance of the event, and the reign of Charles VIII. is for this purpose as good as any. All the threads of Italian politics seemed to lead to France. Neapolitan exiles, eager for revenge upon a perjured prince, emissaries from Milan urging upon Charles the same action, though from a different motive, the general weakness of the country - all excited the ambitious king. From his own side he was provoked into attempting the Italian venture because of his weak, restless nature and the traditional claims of his house upon Naples.

The warlike schemes of Charles were encouraged by
(1)
Estienne de Vere and General Brissonnet, but a strong appeal came from another quarter. In 1485 Ferrante's misgovernment led to a rebellion of his barons under Roberto San Severino and Francesco Coppola. When the revolt had been crushed, the implicated barons, relying on the king's amnesty, returned. But Ferrante treated them with treacherous cruelty. Many were/

1. - Commynes' term. See Mémoires, liv.VII., Intro. to
Chapter 1. page 575.

were imprisoned and put to death. Among those who escaped was the Prince of Salerno, who fled to Venice. There it was arranged that Salerno should ask help from France, with the intention of dethroning Ferrante, which he did.

But the arguments which Salerno advanced in favour of an invasion by Charles might have been futile had not San Severino and others been at the French court as ambassadors from Ludovico Sforza to urge the same measure (2) upon the king. The presence of these ambassadors must be explained.

By the marriage of Ippolita, daughter of Francesco Sforza to Alfonso, son of Ferrante, a bond of union had been formed between Naples and Milan. Lorenzo de' Medici of Florence joined them in the hope of forming an alliance of the three states which would be sufficiently strong to enforce peace in Italy and prevent any foreign intervention in her affairs. The death of Ippolita in 1480 did much to sever the connection between Milan and Naples, and the marriage of Isabella to the young duke Gian Galeazzo in 1489, in what was probably a desperate attempt to revert to the status quo ante 1480 only produced a crisis. By 1492 Alfonso was intensely jealous of the power wielded by Ludovico and wished the government to be in the hands of his son-in-law. But Gian/

Gian Galeazzo was a weak-minded man, and Alfonso was scheming to seize the power himself. To attain his end he was prepared to make almost any bargain. The death of Lorenzo de'Medici in 1492 fitted in with his plan. Lorenzo was succeeded by Piere, who joined Alfonso in a secret compact against Ludovico. Into the league Ferrante of Naples reluctantly entered.

The triple alliance upon which so much depended was thus broken, not by the action of Ludovico but of the two other partners. Not only had the hope vanished of an alliance strong enough to keep the peace in Italy and exclude the foreigner - and this, it must be remembered, was Ludovico's policy - but Sforza found himself faced by a combination against which he was almost powerless. He had to reckon, too, on Venice. Always hostile to Naples and losing no opportunity for her own aggrandisement, she might for the moment dissimulate her hostility, aid Florence and Naples to crush Milan, and then, turning on her allies, gain the whole of northern Italy. Well served as he was by his agents at foreign courts, Ludovico must have known that Venetian diplomacy was working against him. Even if in so doing her diplomats were concerned solely with Venetian interests he could ill afford to trust the rival of Milan.

Under/

Under these circumstances the instinct for self-preservation made him search for fresh allies and, in order to scare Naples, he tried to induce Charles VIII., to consider the possibility of an invasion in assertion of his right to the southern kingdom. To this end San Severino was sent as ambassador to the French court.

It is undeniable that Ludovico invited him to make the attack, and it has been customary, on that account, to blame him as the instigator of foreign intervention in Italy. But the bald statement contains less than half the truth. The call for interference from outside had so long been a feature of Italian politics that those who advised it gave little consideration to the results that must follow; they had, indeed, no intention that such intervention should take place if matters could be arranged without it. Practically all the Italian states had used the threat when it suited their purpose. Prior to the death of Francesco Sforza's rival, Piccinini, Filippo Maria had negotiated with René of Anjou for the expulsion of Alfonso I. from Naples. Cosimo de' Medici, just after Filippo's death, suggested to Venice that René should be invited to attack Naples; and more than once Venice herself had threatened to recognise Louis of Orleans⁽³⁾ as Duke of Milan in opposition to Francesco Sforza.

Thus/

3. - Valentina's husband.

Thus in calling upon Charles VIII., to invade Naples, Ludovico Sforza was neither more nor less culpable than others of his fellow-countrymen who had acted in a similar manner. But, though the governor of Milan intended his action mainly as a deterrent against Alfonso, it must be remembered that the critical situation in which he found himself was the result of the broken Triple Alliance. Had it remained intact no foreigner would have dared to attack any state in the peninsula. Obviously, then, the real blame for foreign intervention at this particular moment does not rest altogether, or even chiefly, upon Ludovico Sforza, but upon those who by destroying the balance of power rendered his position desperate, and laid Italy open to the designs of the French king. Ludovico had no desire to see Naples conquered by France, for, with his knowledge of the French claim in the north, he well understood how precarious the situation of Milan would then be. Unfortunately for him and for Italy the king of France was obsessed by the idea of enforcing his dynastic claims in Naples, and Ludovico's invitation came at precisely the opportune moment. Charles gave way to the solicitations of the various ambassadors chiefly because, as Milan and Naples were mutually hostile and the Triple Alliance dissolved, he believed the way clear for/

for an easy conquest. Ludovico's threat was transformed by Charles into action. The French invasion took place, and in the end Ludovico lost his duchy and his liberty; while Italy entered upon half a millennium of subjugation to foreign powers.

The invasion of Italy by Charles VIII., had no permanent success. Unable to hold the land he had over-run he was compelled to return home. Nevertheless he had paved the way for the later invasion by Louis XII., who, as Duke of Orleans, showed the direction of his ambition by his attempt upon Milan before the end of the campaign. From its results, then, the invasion by Charles VIII., must be taken as part of the preparation for the French domination of the Milanese. Of the reasons which induced Charles to make his attempt enough has been said. The invasion, itself, must now be treated in barest outline, but something must first be said of the central figure in both invasions - Ludovico, Il Moro, Governor and, later, Duke of Milan.

Ludovico Sforza was one of the most important men of his time. Attention had originally been directed to him as the son of the soldier of fortune who had taken such a prominent part in Italian affairs, and had finally secured for himself the duchy of Milan. But interest soon centred/

centred in him for his own sake and, as his character developed, he impressed all his contemporaries by his wisdom.
(5)

By more than usual political sagacity he overcame the influence of Simonetta and seized the virtual government of Milan into his own hands. Yet he ruled wisely, exercising a far-seeing clemency and a political tolerance which were beyond most princes of the age. After his second coup d'état in 1494 he adopted the policy of pacifying possible enemies by granting them influential positions in the state. Especially he favoured the Visconti, making them senators and appointing them to other offices of importance. Although unscrupulous and fond of intrigue he was not more so than other Italian princes of his time. But these were not traits which troubled the statesmen of that age. The pages of Machiavelli are a glorification of these very characteristics; he points out indeed, that the wisest prince and the one who has the best chance of success is he who keeps faith only when he sees it is to his advantage, who is utterly unscrupulous in the means he adopts to secure his ends, and whose only standard of/

5.- Ludovico Duca de'Melanesi, signore prudentissimo e de perspicace e divo ingiegno in entevedere et conoscere le future cose.....Cagnola, lib. 1X., p. 204.

of conduct is the action he considers necessary for his own personal advancement.

But if Ludovico were not more unscrupulous than his contemporaries he lacked one quality most necessary for the age in which he lived. The want of physical bravery in Italy has already been commented upon, but if Commynes is to be believed, Ludovico must have been more than ordinarily deficient in that virtue ⁽⁶⁾. He was seldom at a loss for an expedient to meet a difficulty and, consummate master as he was of political intrigue, he might have aspired to rule the greater part of Italy. But such an ambition would have demanded long-sustained effort, and of this he was apparently incapable. His nerve failed him and under the stress of danger he became timorous.

He possessed the power of attending to detail without losing sight of the main object, and he seldom missed the opportunity of gaining friends. A trivial transaction will illustrate this. A certain Anthony Spinola had been detained in Milan solely by inability to recover money due to him. Henry VII., of England who was interested/

6 - Ledit Seigneur Ludovic estoit homme très-sage, mais fort craintif et bien souple, quand il avoit peur (i'en parle comme de celui que i'ay cognu, et beaucoup de choses traité avecques luy) et homme sans foy, s'il voyoit son profit pour la rompre. Commynes. liv. VII.. cp. 11.. p.590.

In considering this assertion, however, one must not forget that Commynes is a witness hostile to Ludovico.

interested, asked Ludovico to go into the matter, with the result that about seven months afterwards the English king wrote to him, thanking him for the favour he had afforded to Spinola in his suit, and promising that if opportunity offered for reciprocating similar favours he would always respond willingly.⁽⁷⁾

Occasionally his statesmanship was at fault, as in the marriage of his nephew Gian Galeazzo to Isabella of Naples. For the time it seemed to promise a continuance, or rather, a renewal of friendly feelings between Naples and Milan. But had Ludovico looked further ahead, he would have seen that in the character of Isabella's father, Alfonso, there existed an obstacle to the satisfaction of his ambition in Milan.⁽⁸⁾ Alfonso, greedy of power, and treacherous by nature, was not likely to allow Ludovico to govern while Gian Galeazzo and Isabella were kept in the background. The marriage, indeed, added its quota to the series of disturbances which produced the invasion of Charles VIII.

Ludovico was a strong supporter of peace, partly from policy, partly from inclination. He knew that it was the only means of keeping the foreigner out of Italy, and, as/

7 - Calendar of Venetian State Papers, Vol. 1., Doc. Nos. 738, 777.

8 - He may of course, have been perfectly conscious of this danger and have committed the grave folly of under-estimating the power of his political enemy.

as his policy was to give no opportunity for foreign intervention, war must be avoided at almost any sacrifice. He was a lover of art and helped to beautify the city of Milan, but the taxation to which this gave rise, made him less popular than he might have been.

Milan, like Naples, was a despotic state, yet it cannot be said that Ludovico abused his power to any great extent. He was by no means the worst of the Italian rulers, and it would be interesting to know how he would have governed his duchy had he retained possession of it. ⁽⁹⁾ Unfortunately for Italy the treachery of Alfonso and Piero de' Medici wrecked the Triple Alliance, the sole hope of peace and independence, and thereby was the means of calling in the French. But it was surely the irony of fate that made Ludovico, of all contemporary Italian rulers the most opposed to foreign intervention, the instrument to put into practice the policy he detested.

It is commonly accepted that the idea of French intervention originated with Sforza. It may have been so; but Grumello has a curious story to the effect that the Governor/

9 - His Political Testament, not meant to be read till after his death, makes comprehensive provisions for the government of the duchy. A copy will be found in d'Auton Vol. 11. Pièces Annexes pp. 298-328.

Governor of Milan - he was not yet Duke - knowing of Alfonso's intention to dispossess him of the governorship, sent to Hercules of Ferrara his father-in-law, asking him to devise some plan by which the attack might be countered; upon which Hercules promptly entered into an agreement with Charles VIII. "Ritornato" he concludes, "con li capituli signati dal prelibato Carlo re Gallico, che Ludovico Sfortia non manchase de le forze sue, per aiutare epso Carlo per lo aquisto del regno Neapolitano".⁽¹⁰⁾

Apparently Ludovico hesitated. As yet Alfonso was ignorant of the negotiations between Charles and Hercules and, with a large army, began his effort for the downfall of the governor. Ludovico, seeing war to be inevitable, closed with the terms arranged by his father-in-law, and sent a messenger post haste to Charles agreeing to the conditions that had been drawn up. An army under San Severino and d'Aubigny appeared before Mordano and summoned the garrison to surrender, promising them safety and liberty to carry off their personal property. Should the terms be rejected the city would be put to fire and sword. On receiving the refusal to capitulate d'Aubigny and San Severino were as good as their word. The city was stormed and the inhabitants/

(11)
inhabitants treated with the utmost severity. Thus Italy had its first experience of the methods to be used by the French in the coming war. The story of Mordano was noised abroad, and such was its effect that Cagnola could write of a later phase of the war (1494):-

Li signori de la Romagna, destituiti de aiuto, fono constrecti prendere acordo: et maxime che tutti li populi temeveno la gallica crudelitate, la quale prima usareno contra li homeni da Mordano, terra de lo Imolese, menando per li ferri la piu parte di quello populo, non perdonando ne a sesso ne ad esate; che a tutto il resto
(12)
de quello paese dette grande terrore.

Ferrante, confident in the superior numbers of his forces, planned the annihilation of d'Aubigny and San Severino and marched against them with the intention of forcing a battle. But San Severino's spies had served his well; Ferrante's design was known, and during the night the two leaders marched off in silence, leaving the Neapolitan monarch in a very ugly mood.

But these actions were merely preliminary. Charles was scarcely ready to move. His preparations for two years past had been injurious to France in more than one/

11.- Grumello, lib. 1., cp. 1V., pp. 4, 5.

12.- Cagnola, lib. 1X., p. 191.

one way. The revenue was mortgaged, heavy taxes were levied, forced loans exacted and royal estates sold in order to provide money for the expedition. In 1493 he showed his hand openly by assuming the title King of Sicily and of Jerusalem, and at the beginning of 1494 the Neapolitan ambassadors were dismissed. But the mobilisation of a sufficiently large expeditionary force was a slow process, and to hurry on the preparations, Charles went to Lyons on March 6. In the same month the size of the army was fixed - roughly fifty thousand men.⁽¹³⁾

Charles' life at Lyons did not auger well for the success of the expedition, for in spite of the lack of money he employed part of it to pay for the intrigues in which he was engaged. At length a small body of troops crossed the Alps and the Duke of Orleans took his station at Asti. The Neapolitan fleet made an abortive attempt to rouse the Genoese, but it was not till September 8 that the first important collision took place. Not satisfied with the previous defeat the Neapolitan navy made a further attack - this time at Rapallo on the Genoese Republic. Having occupied the town they landed four thousand men but, becoming panic-stricken at the advance of the French fleet, they/

13 - Cagnola. lib. IX., p.190 says about thirty thousand men passed with Charles into Italy.

they sailed off leaving the men on shore to their fate. In the battle that followed the French and Genoese were victorious and, as at Mordano, Italy was shocked by the bloodshed and the deliberate cruelty of which the Swiss, in particular, were guilty.

(14)

And now Charles moved. The heavy artillery was sent to Genoa by sea, and the king crossed the Alps by Mont Genevre. Since the time of Louis XI. Savoy had been well disposed to France, and the king found every facility offered him, and all kindness shown him during his passage through the country. At Asti he held a great reception,

at which the warmest greetings were conveyed to him from Ferrara, Venice, Florence, Milan and other states. The news of the victory at Rapallo appeared to give a good

(15)

start to the expedition. Unfortunately for the French an attack of small-pox laid Charles aside for some time, and the consequent disorganisation was much increased by the illness from fever of the Duke of Orleans. On the king's

recovery/-----

- 14 - The cannon were heavy pieces for their time and some of them were so arranged as to project a number of bullets at once. One or two curious illustrations of this species may be seen in Hardy de Perino's work, Les Francais en Italicie.

The carriage by sea of the heavy artillery was a wise arrangement. To haul the guns over the passes of the Western Alps would have caused considerable delay, which would probably have been increased by the character of the ground on the Italian side. The plain from the Western Alps to Turin is flat, but is intersected by several broad though shallow streams which might have proved obstacles in the way of rapid progress

- 15 - Cagnola liv. IX., p. 190.

- 16 - Commines liv. VII., cp. VI., p. 611.

recovery it was decided that he should go on while Orleans remained at Asti.

(17)

On October 14 Charles was at Pavia and at
(18) Piacenza he heard of Gian Galeazzo's death from fever. (19) Here Ludovico, who had accompanied him, took his leave and hastened to Milan, et gionto e ragunati li nobeli, insieme tutti de uno animo elesse e sovrano esso Ludovico per suo Duca, perchè de ragione li perveniva, essendo lui primogenito a Francesco Sforzia poi che fu Duca de Milano, si ancora per la prudencia e valore suo; e questa electione fu a li vintidue del/

17.- Cagnola, lib. IX., p. 191.

18.- Grumello, lib. I., cp. V., p. 6.

19.- Both Cagnola and Grumello agree in saying that Gian Galeazzo had been ill at Pavia. The commonly accepted story that he died by poison is probably untrue. Cagnola writes:- "(Carlo) Visitò Zohane Galleazo Sforzia Vesconte Duca de Milano, suo consubirino amalato de grave febre." Further, "Zohane Galeazzo Duca de Milano che era amalato nel castelo de Pavia, come è dicta, passò de questa a l'altra vita."- Cagnola, lib. IX., p. 191.

Similarly Grumello says:- "(Carlo) intexò Joane Galeaz Sfortia duchi di Milano essere gravement infermo de una febre tossichata."- Grumello, lib. I., cp. V., p. 6.

Both writers agree that he was ill of fever: both assert that he was visited by Charles at Pavia. If he were poisoned (and the implication is that Ludovico was concerned in it) then the Governor of Milan must have been reckless indeed to act as he did during such a critical period, with no care lest his guilt should be discovered. There was motive on his part, it must be admitted, for the removal of Gian Galeazzo, but I have found no positive evidence whatever that Ludovico was in any way instrumental in bringing about his death.

del gia dicto mese in mercolidi, corrente lo anno detto 1494.

At Piacenza the route of the expedition was settled. To the north-east lay Venice, neutral, it is true, but a possible enemy. After some hesitation the Pope had decided to resist the French, while Ferrante was prepared to meet them in the Romagna. Charles chose the more difficult route by the west because the fight at Rapallo had given the French the command of the sea. It was possible, too, that Florence, friendly as a rule to France, though now in alliance with Naples, might change sides and join forces with Charles. In the third place, the choice of the western route would compel the Neapolitans to alter their plan of campaign./

Operations in the Romagna were abandoned owing to the king's decision to attack Naples via Tuscany. The impression had been that he would invade the southern kingdom from the north-east; hence Ferrante's movement in that direction. The Neapolitan's intention was not to attack Milan via the Romagna, but to hold back the French from/

20.- Cagnola, lib. IX., p. 192.

21.- Son of Alfonso. Alfonso's father, Ferrante, had died earlier in the year.

(22)
from an invasion of his father's territory by this route. If, however, Charles were going to attack from another point, further fighting in the Romagna was useless.

Leaving Piacenza the French entered Tuscany by the pass of Pontremoli, the route was so difficult that, had the Florentines defended it vigorously, the war might have come to a close. The death of Gian Galeazzo had shaken to a certain degree the Neapolitan claim upon Naples, (23) and Ludovico himself was half repentant of having invited the French into Italy. An arrangement among the warring Italian states was quite possible. Unfortunately, Florence was in a most difficult position. Traditionally she was on good terms with France, and was participating in the war on the Neapolitan side solely because Piero de' Medici had leagued her with the southern kingdom.

The divided counsels which resulted rendered her/-----

22 - Cagnola lib. IX., p. 191.

23 - If Alfonso's belief in his claim were genuine the death of Gian Galeazzo made little difference, since he left a son, Francesco, who would naturally succeed his father. But he was only an infant four years old to whose claim neither Alfonso nor Ludovico paid any attention. Each of them was fighting for his own advantage. Alfonso's objection to the regency of the Moor was only an excuse to enable him to seize power in Milan. The importance of Gian Galeazzo's death lay in the fact that it enabled Ludovico to anticipate the Neapolitan and secure his own election to the duchy.

her helpless. No opposition was offered. Charles passed into Tuscany and, having sacked Pivizzano, laid siege to Sarzana. Thither Piero de' Medici went, intending to out-face Charles, but his heart failed him and he ended by surrendering not only Sarzana but Pietra-Santa, Pisa and (24) Leghorn. At once the patriotism of the Florentines blazed into wrath, French friendship was forgotten. What was remembered was the granting of freedom to Pisa, and the surrender of Florentine territory. Their anger concentrated upon Piero de' Medici, who was exiled. Quite unmoved, Charles entered the city as if he had conquered it, and his extravagant demands almost brought about an outbreak. In the end the city agreed to pay a hundred and twenty thousand florins within six months, and to allow within her walls two lieutenants of the French King. On the other hand, the Medici were to remain in banishment, and the towns surrendered by Piero were to be handed back at the close of the war.

The next part of the campaign was to compel the Pope to acknowledge the French power, and thus detach him from/

24 - This is the generally accepted account, but Cagnola tells a different tale.

Ma, passati lo Apenino con lo exercito, tale terrore miseno ad esse Fiorentini, maxime intendendo loro il novo Duca essere in compagnia del re che per componersi con lui le detteno ne le mani Sarazana, Sarazanelo, Pietrasanta, le fortecie de Piza e Portopixano: benché alcuni hanno voluto dire, che Pietro de' Medici le dette contra a la voluntate de quelli del governo, e per questo poi fu cacciato de Fiorenza. cagnola lib. IX. p. 192.

from his alliance with Florence and Naples. The Neapolitan army under Ferrante had taken up a strong position at Viterbo, and the general belief was that the decisive action of the campaign would be fought there. But the extraordinary good fortune of the French continued. As they approached his lines, Ferrante retreated the forty miles that separated him from Rome, with Charles not far behind.

Even the wily Alexander found his role difficult to play. He felt unable to offer a successful resistance to the French, and had, in addition, to cope with the open hostility of the Colonna. Having secured a further retreat for his Neapolitan allies he opened his gates to the French and sought safety in the castle of St. Angelo, overlooking the Tiber and within a stone's throw of the Vatican. Cardinal della Rovere and Ludovico's brother, Cardinal Ascanio Sforza, urged Charles to depose Alexander and call a Council for the reformation of the Church. But French councils were divided. Charles himself was no reformer - nor in point of fact was either of the cardinals - while Briçonnet, who had much influence over the king, was afraid that so complete a breach would endanger his prospects of securing a cardinalate. The astuteness and bribery of the Pope settled the matter. Certain fortresses, among them/

them Viterbo and Spoleto together with Civita Vecchia and Terracina on the coast, the possession of which the French regarded as necessary for their safety, were
(25)
surrendered, Bricconnet received his cardinalate, and the pontiff's son, Cardinal Cesare Borgia, went with Charles as a hostage.

The success of the French from the beginning of the campaign, and particularly their capture of Rome, rendered Alfonso desperate. The war was on the point of being carried into his own country where, owing to the bitter hatred against him, he had no hope of prolonging the struggle. He adopted the cowardly device of having his son Ferrante crowned and then fled to Sicily, leaving
(26)
the new king to oppose the French as best he might. It was a hard task. The Neapolitans had not a single victory to their credit, the unimpeded progress of the French dispirited them and, when the report spread among them of the cruelty of the advancing forces at Monte San Giovanni/

25 - Cagnola, lib. IX., pp. 192, 193 and Commynes liv. VI.
cp. XII. pp. 645, 646.

26 - See Grumells, lib. I. cp. VI., p. 7. and Cagnola,
lib. IX., p. 193.

(27)

Giovanni, what courage they had rapidly melted away.

Under these conditions Ferrante took command at San Germano. His terror-stricken troops could not be induced to make a stand, and he had to fall back on Capua, though he left men enough to defend the port. They surrendered to the French. The unhappy king had to leave Capua and hasten to Naples to quell a revolt of his barons and, while he was away, the town turned against him. On his return after suppressing the rebellion the Capuans refused to admit him within the walls. Nothing remained but to return to Naples. There he found that the populace, whether in revenge for his father's cruelty, or because they/

27 - Cagnola, lib. IX., p. 193.

28 - It has been charged against Gian Giacomo Trivulzio that he surrendered to the French at Capua where he had been left along with Cirgilio Orsino and Nicolo, Count of Petiano, in control of the army. Cagnola certainly does not support the charge though a hint of it is given by Commynes. It must be noted, however, that in Commynes' account Trivulzio is not mentioned, though the names of the two other leaders are given. See Cagnola, lib. IX., pp. 193, 194 and Commynes, liv. VII., cp. XLIII., p. 648.

they were well disposed to France, would have no dealings with him. Abandoned by his subjects; betrayed by all whom he had trusted, he fled to Ischa and thence to Sicily.

On the day following Ferrante's flight Charles entered Naples. The Neapolitans welcomed him as a change from the oppressions they had suffered under Alfonso, a continuation of which they feared if Ferrante retained the throne. The prospect of lighter taxation and freedom from tyranny, rather than love of the Frenchman, made them submit to his entry. But the very ease with which he had overcome Italy from north to south proved the undoing of Charles. He had formed the opinion that the Italians were a paltry, unwarlike race, scarcely worthy to be called men, and acting on this belief he let ambition take too great a hold of him. At first he had sought the sovereignty of Naples; now nothing less than dominion over the whole peninsula would satisfy him. But he forgot that he was dealing with people who kept faith only when it suited them, who saw by this time that a grave mistake had been committed in allowing the French any entry into Italy, and who might be expected to combine, even though temporarily and to protect their own selfish interests, against a danger that threatened each of them.

Such/

Such a movement had already begun. The Venetians, who at first had looked on the expedition as a somewhat humorous interlude, realised the gravity of the situation and the peril which threatened them. The Pope feared lest, after all, a General Council might be held which would result in his deposition. Above all Ludovico perceived the weakness of his position. Outside of Italy, Ferdinando of Spain feared that, not satisfied with Naples, Charles would attack Sicily, while the Emperor Maximilian was enraged by the large increase of power which the conquest was placing in the hands of the French royal family. Under these circumstances it was not difficult to form an alliance to drive the French out of Italy, and soon the League of Venice (March 1495) was in being. Ostensibly the league was devised to protect the territories of the contracting parties and prepare for a crusade against the Turks, but in reality the intention was to oust the French from the peninsula. The moving spirit was probably Ludovico, whose half-repentance had developed into hostility.

Whether or not this was the case, Ludovico was the first object of Charles' new ambition. He sent word to/

to the Duke of Orleans, who was in the north, to attack him as speedily as possible, and himself prepared to march into Lombardy.
(29)

On May 20 Charles began what was eventually to be his retreat from Naples. Behind him he left the Count of Montpensier as viceroy, Estienne de Vere (Duke of Nola) as governor of Gaeta and Stuart d'Aubigny as governor of Calabria. Directly Charles left Naples trouble began. The French were haughty and domineering in their manner, they took pains to show their contempt for the Neapolitans, and they remitted no taxes. None of these things was to the liking of the southern Italians. Depending on Ferrante's willingness to fight for them they sent for him, and a war of expulsion began against the French. But although the re-called king was supported by Spanish soldiery under Gonsalvo de Cordova he was defeated by d'Aubigny at Seminara and forced to cross the strait of Messina. However, he/

29 - Carlo rè Christianissimo ritrovandosi nel regno Neapolitano in pacifica posesione, pensando di volere ascendere più alto et destendere le ale sue, et de aquistare il nome del rè Italicho, et quello subiugare presto al suo inperio mandato littere per advixo al ducha de Orliens et delphino che unire volesse più erercito potesse, et quello condurlo in li campi de Ludovico Sforzia.
Grumello lib. 1., cp. Vlll., p. 8.
Et cosi, ritracto molta pecunia da privati homeni napolitani attendeva a prepararsi per venire in Lombardia. Cagnola lib. IX., p. 195.

he made a second attack on Naples. The citizens rose, Ferrante was admitted, Montpensier took refuge in the castle which he was compelled to surrender, and before the end of (30) 1496, Naples was lost to France.

The northward march of Charles was no more fortunate. On his arrival at Rome he found that the Pope had fled to (31) Orvieto and thence to Perugia. When he entered Tuscany matters were going badly. Florence, the only state which refused to join the League of Venice, was in grave danger from a combination formed by Pisa, Siena and Lucca. Denied any help by Charles, she demanded the return of the cities surrendered to him on his march south. But the king had as little regard for a promise as had his Italian allies, and, instead of keeping faith with the only state which had remained true to him, he marched off, leaving French garrisons in the towns demanded (32) by the Florentines.

So/-----

30 - Cagnola. lib. IX., p. 202.

31 - Commines, liv. VIII., cp. 11. p. 683.

The story of Ferrante's campaign against the French in Naples and the help afforded him by Venice is told in Grumello lib. I., cpa., VIII. - XVIII.

32 - By Charles' grant to the Pisans of freedom from Florence - a freedom which was not his to bestow - the seeds of a future war were sown. To this war may be attributed, in Grumello's opinion, the ruin of the Italian people. In his heading to op.cit.cp.1. lib.11. he writes, "De una nova guerra impensata sortita in Itallia, qual si po attribuire la ruina de la Italliche nazione, principiata per la repubblica Florentina ala repubblica Pixana."

So far the king had escaped without fighting. French ships protected him on the west coast from an attack by the Spanish or Venetian fleets, but at Fornovo he had to make a stand against the army of the League. The action was indecisive, but as Charles was able to continue his march, it really ended in favour of the French. Yet they must have been hard pressed, for, though Charles was able to move northwards, it was with the loss of his baggage, and with part of the League army hanging in pursuit upon his rear. In the account given by Cagnola the words of the Marquis of Mantua ring out with a sound rarely heard at that time in Italy, "Italians, we are fighting against the French for the honour and well-being of all Italy. Now will be known the strength and valour of Italy's soldiers" (33)

At Asti Charles was compelled to face the result of the instructions he had sent from Naples to the Duke of Orleans. Novara, having been besieged, fell by treachery to Orleans on June 10, but was immediately invested by Ludovico. On/

33 - Italiani miei, noi combatiamo contra a ' Francesi per l'onore e bene de tutta Italia; e al presente si conoscerà il valore e forcia de la milicia Italians.
Cagnola lib. IX., p. 199.

34 - Cagnola, lib. IX., p. 197.

On the invitation of Charles an agreement was reached by which Orleans surrendered the town and was permitted to
(35)
leave Italy.

Charles/

35 - It might have been better for Ludovico had he refused an accommodation with Charles, carried on the siege till the garrison surrendered unconditionally, and then put Louis to death as a reminder that drastic action need not be confined to one side in the strife. He would thus have taught Charles a lesson, also; for he had been a contributory cause of Louis' bad faith. That Ludovico came to an agreement with the king and allowed Louis to go home was due to his strong desire to see Italy free from the French at the earliest possible moment. But the fall of Novara was certain, for the French garrison had been reduced to such straits that a vigorous siege for a day or two longer must have driven them to capitulate on almost any terms.

"Novara fu restituita al Duca de Milano e fornita de' suoi; e Francesi che erano drento, fono acompagnati salvi loro e sue robe, a Vercelli, mezi amalati e quasi morti. E cosi da poi molti ne perireno per lo Piamonte in diversi lochi, per li grandi stenti e fame che aveveno suportati in dicto assedio." - Cagnola, lib. IX., p. 204.

Louis' death must have caused trouble in France with regard to the position of Bretagne, if not with regard to the succession itself. The heir to the throne after the Duke of Orleans, was his cousin, Charles, Comte d' Angoulême, a grandson of Louis of Orleans and Valentina Visconti through their younger son, Jean, Comte d' Angoulême. But he was old and married. Now, by the marriage contract between Anne of Bretagne and Charles VIII., the autonomy of Bretagne was left intact, though it was arranged that the duchy should fall to the survivor. But there was the further proviso that, if Charles died, leaving no children, Anne should marry the heir to the French throne. In the case of Charles d' Angoulême (he died in 1496) this was obviously impossible and his son, François, afterwards François I., being only about a year old at the time of Charles' invasion, could not be considered as a husband for Anne. Clearly in the event of the king's early death without heirs male of his body, and with the Duke of Orleans dead, France would have had sufficient internal trouble to prevent her from interfering with Italy for a considerable time.

Charles had gone from Asti to Turin but the negotiations were carried on at Vercelli. Cagnola remarks:- "I soldati de' Veniziana e tutti li altri retornonno a casa loro, e Ludovico Duca de Milano con il duca de Ferrara andonno a Milano; e stato quivi alcuni di el duca de Ferrara in piacere ritorno poi a casa sua. El Duca Ludovico da poi, con grande (36) triumpho e piacere, fece il cristiano Natale a Milano.

No help is given here or elsewhere in Cagnola to determine whether Ludovico broke with the League of Venice, (37) for as the war ended in October by the Treaty of Vercelli there was no necessity for the venetian troops to remain in Milan. Their presence, indeed, would have roused suspicions as to their intentions, and might have led to an outbreak of hostilities between the powers. The last sentence of the quotation does not indicate that Ludovico was at fault. Certainly he had achieved his purpose of driving the French from Italy, and might thus enter Milan in triumph. Nevertheless there is some doubt whether the Duke kept faith with the League, even if the breach were of short duration. This is probably Guicciardini's chief reason for his belief that Sforza/

36 - Cagnola, lib. IX., p. 204.

The history of the negotiations is given by the same historian op. cit. pp. 203. 204.

37 - See Lettres de Charles VIII., Roi de France Vol. IV., p. 301.

Sforza had done less than he ought against the French at
(38)
Fornovo.

In any case, though they had left Italian soil,

Ludovico/

38 - Per contra, when Lord Egremont went to Maximilian as ambassador from Henry VII., Maximilian asserted positively that though Milan had made peace with France (at Vercelli) an express clause stated that Ludovico had remained and persevered in the League. But Venice had made no peace with France. The date of the despatch is January 6, 1496.

See Calendar of Venetian State Papers, Vol. 1., Doc. 666.

The whole matter is somewhat confused. Venice, at any rate, hinted that Ludovico had acted wrongly. Two days before the date of the above mentioned despatch, the Venetian ambassador, Zacharia Contarini, writing to the Doge and Senate of Venice, expressed his conviction that Maximilian would inform Lord Egremont that Venice was no party to the peace, but intended adhering to the League. Now, from Egremont's report to Henry, we know that Contarini's expectation was justified; but the Venetian's hint of Ludovico's faithlessness is negated by Maximilian's assertion with regard to Sforza's special clause. See Calendar of Venetian State Papers, Vol. 1., Doc. 664.

There were two treaties. A provisional peace was signed on September 17 (See Cagnola lib. IX., p. 204.) and a final ratification on October 10. (Cagnola says it was Friday, October 9. See op. et lib. cit. p. 204.) At the discussion of the preliminary peace terms, in addition to Ludovico, there were present a representative of the Empire, no fewer than three representatives of Venice (one of them an ambassador), together with the Marquis of Mantua and the ambassadors of Spain and Ferrara. (Commines, liv. VIII., cp. IX., p. 758)

The Frenchman records no protest by the Venetians against the terms proposed, but when he visited Venice as a member of the Peace Commission, he failed to secure the republic's adherence to the final treaty. Their refusal, however, was not due to their loyalty towards the League, but to the fact that the proposed peace was not sufficiently favourable to themselves. They offered to conclude a private treaty with Charles, by which Ferrante would declare himself a vassal of France and pay a yearly tribute together with an immediate sum on account, while Venice would obtain

Ludovico remained suspicious of the French. At once he occupied himself in fortifying Novara, Tortona and Alexandria, and openly professed his allegiance to the League with Maximilian, Venice, Alexander VI., and Ferdinando of Spain - Ferrante II., of Naples and Henry VII., of England being admitted as additional members (July 31, 1496.⁽³⁹⁾ The new League was to last twenty-five years or more, and was intended to maintain the authority of the Pope and to preserve inviolate the territories of the contracting states with a view to keeping the peace in Italy.

For the time Italy was free from the French. The attempted conquest by Charles had failed because of personal defects/

38 - (contd.) possession of certain Neapolitan towns.

(Commines, liv. VIII., cp. XII., p. 769.)

Again he states quite definitely that one of the peace terms stipulated that le duc de Milan serviroit le Roy de Genes, contre tout le monde. Commines, liv. VII., cp. XI., p. 765.

This clause certainly provided a valid reason for the refusal of Venice to ratify the final treaty. On the other hand, as Maximilian was quite cognisant of the terms, his statement to Egremont appears to indicate an understanding between him and Ludovico that the Duke of Milan would not implement this portion of the treaty, but would continue, or rather, renew, his policy of preventing foreign intervention in Italian affairs. Alternatively, but less probably, it may indicate that Commynes' statement is incorrect.

39 - Cagnola, lib. IX., pp. 204, 205.

Calendar of Venetian State Papers, Vol. 1., Doc. 714.

This document which refers to the proclamation of the new League, omits to mention Ferrante II. as one of the contracting parties.

defects in the king's character and the inability of the French leaders to understand the people they sought to govern. The expedition had passed by a sort of military miracle from north to south of the peninsula carrying everything before it with hardly any opposition. When Charles reached Naples he had an excellent opportunity of binding the Neapolitans to him. But his foolish, inconsequent nature and the arrogant behaviour of his troops cost him the popularity he might otherwise have retained. His treatment of Florence, the only state which had any real regard for the French, was foolish in the extreme; and, even on his retreat, instead of trying to allay the bitter feelings of the Florentines over the surrendered towns, especially Pisa, he merely intensified the bitterness by his shifty policy.

The easy nature of the conquest had bred in the minds of the French a supreme contempt for Italian statecraft and military ability; they committed the fatal mistake of underestimating their opponents. But in political intrigue and craft they were very children as compared with the Italians, and their inability to recognise and make allowance for this defect formed a strong contributory factor in defeating the object of the expedition. Particularly ineffective was the instruction sent by Charles to the Duke of Orleans, as it made perfectly clear what/

what most Italians had already suspected, that the conquest of Naples would be followed by an attempt to bring the north under the power of the French crown. Besides, had Charles been possessed of ordinary commonsense, or had he been willing to listen to those of his counsellors who had his interests at heart he would have hesitated before urging on the Duke of Orleans, a course which, from personal ambition and family claims, he was already too disposed to follow.

The close of the French campaign appeared to have left Ludovico in a secure position. The death of his nephew during the early part of the expedition allowed him to succeed to the duchy without opposition despite the fact that a strong party favoured the claims of the child Francesco. He was regarded as the saviour of Italy although the pro-French faction looked on his possession of the duchy as an act of usurpation which kept from his rightful inheritance Louis of Orleans the lineal descendant of Madonna Valentina. Coupled with this there was an under current of suspicion as to his ultimate aims and distrust regarding the policy he was pursuing.

But the effect of the campaign upon Ludovico is less important than its significance for Italy as a whole. The ease with which the French had passed from north to south bred contempt in their minds for the Italians. They saw that factional strife divided provinces from within, while inter-jealousies forbade any long-continued combination of states against a common enemy. Military power for the greater part was in the hands of Condottieri there/

there existed no Italian leader capable of uniting the states and defying the foreigner. Her lack, not only of general but of local patriotism, disarmed Italy and left her at the mercy of any resolute invader. Still further, as Naples had shown, her people were capable of turning against their rulers and driving them out even while the enemy was battering at their gate.

The French could not fail to be impressed by this state of affairs despite the fact that the ultimate fate of the expedition was failure. Moreover, they were convinced that although the Empire claimed feudal superiority in many parts of Italy, it was powerless to intervene with any effect should another attack be made on the peninsula. They were bitter, too, regarding the defection of Ludovico Sforza, the prince on whose solicitation the expedition had been undertaken.

To the Italians the result of the expedition should have conveyed a warning. The designs of Orleans had been exposed; but the hatred of Venice against Milan from tradition, from Ludovico's conduct at the peace, from his supposed desertion of the League, rendered her reckless of the consequences which might attend a second attempt by the French. Thus Louis of Orleans had the way partly paved for his schemes against Milan, especially as a considerable party in the duchy regarded him as the real heir.

Finally the barbarous cruelty of the French had its effect upon Italy. The fighting of the Italians had mostly been done by proxy and they themselves regarded the wars which they did/

did wage as a kind of game. The French looked on it as a serious business, to be carried out effectively no matter what cruelty was involved. Their Swiss allies and the Gascons were particularly savage in their treatment of their enemies and the fear with which they inspired the Italians deprived the southern people of their courage and left them half beaten, even before Louis' expedition took place. This was largely why, when the time of stress came, Ludovico had to stand alone.

After his return to France, Charles, while dreaming in a desultory fashion of a second attack upon Italy, was too engrossed in a life of pleasure to allow his dreams to become reality. (40) His death, (April 7, 1498) less than three years after the close of his Italian expedition, brought about the greatest crisis the peninsula had yet been called upon to face. It gave the French throne to Louis of Orleans, whose succession made almost certain a renewal of the Italian war. Hostile as Louis was to Ludovico, it was impossible for the Italian states to avoid/

40.- At the beginning of 1497 Trivulzio was concerned in an attempt of which Charles was cognisant, to gain Milan for France. For particulars see Cagnola lib. IX., p. 210. et seq. But Charles on the whole, was on friendly terms with Ludovico. See, for example, his plea on behalf of a French merchant in Milan in connection with the Octroi.- Lettres de Charles VIII., Roi de France, Vol. 4. p. 327.

avoid the suspicion that the new king would endeavour to enforce his claim upon Milan; they knew that any invasion of the peninsula would put all Italy in danger of conquest; and they were bitterly afraid of French cruelty in war. The experience of Naples under the rule of France had been too unhappy for other states to desire a repetition of it; yet Italy failed to combine against the foreigner. Venice, indeed, became aggressively active on his behalf.

This time, the aim of the French was not Naples but Milan, although Louis' ambition was not confined to the possession of that province. He had visions of sovereignty over the whole peninsula, and for the realisation of this ambition the conquest of Milan was a prime necessity. The late invasion had plainly shown that he was ambitious to conquer and hold the northern duchy, and now that the means for that conquest were placed in his hands, he employed them at once and without scruple.

Though Louis XII. had a traditional claim upon Milan he never would have ventured to enforce it had not the disunion and mutual suspicion of the Italian states placed success almost beyond doubt. His defeat by Ludovico during the late war rankled in his mind. A successful attack on Milan would satisfy family ambition and personal vengeance. That/

That he could carry through the invasion to a victorious termination he had no doubt; for he knew himself to be more capable than Charles, yet that king, almost without breaking a lance, had passed in triumph right through the peninsula. In the end, it is true, he was compelled to relinquish his conquest; but that was due to personal follies which Louis would be sufficiently wise not to commit. He was, too, more warlike by nature than his predecessor had been, and his experience in the late expedition had taught him much that would smooth his way to conquest. The solidity of France, her great reserves of fighting men, the ferocity of French warfare as compared with that of Italy, all combined to increase his natural confidence, and, as soon as he came to the throne, he began his preparations against Ludovico.

Ludovico Sforza was too wary a politician and too conscious of Louis' intention to enforce his claim upon Milan to be deceived regarding the king's designs. But while taking steps to meet French hostility he did not neglect any attempt to arrive at a friendly understanding with Louis. He sent an embassy charged with the task of negotiating a treaty of friendship, but, from the first Louis showed himself implacable, though he tried at the same/

(41)

same time to deceive the embassy as to his real intentions.

In Grumello's fine phrase, monstro per li ochij quello non hauea nel core. Louis professed willingness to come to an agreement with Ludovico, but the condition he attached implied the Duke's acknowledgment of the justice of the French claim upon his duchy. He was very content, he declared, to be in accord with Ludovico, and, for the present, would be satisfied with the payment of two hundred crowns, which he would regard as a quit rent. The Milanese treated the proposal with the utmost contempt, and their insulting reply made the king more than ever determined upon the subjugation of the duchy. (42)

Then began a struggle between the rulers to secure allies. Louis was compelled to arrange for the safety of his kingdom while he was absent on his projected expedition. His energies were directed, therefore, to making friends, if not allies, /

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41. - Ludovico could hardly be deceived with regard to Louis' ambitions. The French king's previous actions showed plainly enough what his intentions were; and, in addition there was the very significant fact that at his coronation he took the titles - King of France, King of Sicily and Duke of Milan .
42. - Visto il Gallico r  li legati de Ludouica Sforza, monstr  per li ochij quello non hauea nel core. Hauendo epso Ludouico datto in comissione e soi legati che temptaseno acordo con el r  Gallico de lo imperio Mediolanese, el qual il r  Gallico pretendeua de iure essere suo. Temptato per il legati lo acordio, epso re Christianissimo disse essere contentissimo di fare acordio con Ludouicho Sforza, ma che al prexente uoleua scudi ducento millia et che epso Ludouicho Sforza fusse censuario di epso re Gallico.

allies, of England, Spain and the Emperor. He had to secure, also, not merely the benevolent neutrality of the Italian states, but, as far as possible, to make them actively hostile to Milan. Ludovico's diplomats were, like those of Louis, engaged in the attempt to find allies, and had, in addition, to counteract the French attempts to leave the Duke friendless when war eventually broke out. The rival embassies met at every court, and in each case the French proved the stronger.

Both parties were solicitous of obtaining the alliance, or, at least, the benevolent neutrality of England. Louis desired it because the traditional hostility between French and English might lead to an invasion of France while the Italian expedition was in progress. For precisely the same reason Ludovico wished England to be on his side. On September 12th. 1498, Raimondo de Soncino arrived in England as
(43)
ambassador from Ludovico. A week later he reported to the Duke that he had had an adventurous time. The French were evidently/

(42) (Contd.) Intexo li consiglierij de Ludouico Sforzia lo acordio, dette risposta galliarda el thexaurero Landriano che non hera da fare detto acordio: che con ducento millia scudi se farebe guerra ducento anni con il Gallico rè et che se farebe fare ritorno ad epso rè Gallia Transalpina con suo damo et scorno.

(43). Calendar of Venetian State Papers, Vol. I. Doc. 770.

evidently aware of his journey, and the king had given orders that he was to be racked if caught, compelled to disclose the mission on which he was engaged, and then he hanged as a spy. Although he had landed in safety he had not yet obtained an audience of the king. ⁽⁴⁴⁾ By the middle of November Ludovico was becoming anxious about the success of his mission. In a despatch to Soncino he told how he had learned that Henry VII. and Louis XII. had come to terms. If that were true then Soncino's mission had failed, and nothing remained but to take leave of the king as gracefully as possible. On the other hand, there was a possibility that the agreement reached by the two kings might not be very unfavourable to Milan. In any case it would ⁽⁴⁵⁾ be of advantage to know the terms of the treaty.

Three days after the despatch of Ludovico's letter, and probably before the ambassador had received it, Soncino wrote to the Duke (Nov. 17) that he had had four interviews with Henry VII, forty days after the king had been informed of his arrival. ⁽⁴⁶⁾ Evidently Henry was most particular that his message to Ludovico should be delivered exactly as it was given for, having allowed Soncino to make a copy, he received and retained the original document. The ambassador was greatly concerned/

44. - Calendar of Venetian State Papers, Vol. 1. Docs. 770, 772.

45. - Calendar of Venetian State Papers, Vol. I. Doc. 775.

46. - Calendar of Venetian State Papers, Vol. 1. Doc. 776.

concerned at the replies he had from Henry, who had visibly cooled towards Ludovico. The previous year he was ready to intervene if the French should attack Italy, but now he put off Soncino without committing himself to anything. Soncino himself shrewdly conjectured that the change was in part due to the fact that Henry, whose love of money was notorious, was receiving a larger sum from Louis than from the late king. Thus he was unwilling to offend Louis. Soncino believed, also that Henry was perturbed because of the understanding which existed between the French king and the Pope.

The quarrel between Venice and Florence over Pisa did not cause Henry much concern, although he probably foresaw complications, if, while matters were in this state, Louis should seize the opportunity to invade Italy. He had no wish to support the losing side, and, unless affairs in the peninsula changed, Milan appeared likely to take that position. Further, Soncino was convinced from his knowledge of Henry's character, that no alteration in the English attitude was to be expected during his lifetime. If France were in confusion Henry might move, and then only if it were to his personal advantage. Soncino's conclusions were correct, even if he had not complete data upon which to found them. Really his mission had no chance of success from the beginning; for, two months before his arrival in England, Henry had accepted from Louis a renewal/

renewal of the Treaty of Etaples.

That the Milanese ambassador was in poor favour at the English court was apparently common knowledge. Towards the end of February, 1499, Giacomo Capello, captain of the Flanders galleys, reported to Venice that the king did everything possible in favour of Venetian subjects and showed them great good will. He mentioned, also, that an ambassador from the Duke of Milan was in small repute at the court, as the king had kept him waiting fifty days before granting him his first audience and hearing his statement. (47)

Ludovico would have been lacking in common prudence had he not considered what the situation would be if England failed him. In that case a possible ally was at hand. Scots and English were proverbially hostile and, if James IV. were on friendly terms with Ludovico, England would be unable to put forth her full strength. The Duke, therefore, did not neglect friendly intercourse with the Scottish king who, for his part, appeared willing that the friendship should continue. (48) There was, it is true, the long-established alliance between Scotland and France; but in the event of a league between England and France, the Scots would hardly be bound by it if an opportunity occurred of levying successful war upon their southern/

47. - Calendar of Venetian State Papers, Vol.1. Doc. 782.

48. - Calendar of Venetian State Papers, Vol.1. Doc. 774.

southern neighbours.

But in reality the situation was more complicated than it appeared to be. Negotiations for an Anglo-Scottish royal marriage had been taking place long prior to the reign of James IV.. That monarch, being a minor at the time of his accession, was in the hands of nobles who for their own purposes were distinctly hostile to the policy of peaceful intercourse with England, and for some years no attempt was made to draw the countries closer. But as James grew older he began to assert his own authority. Henry VII. was eager for an alliance with him, and in May, 1493, suggested a marriage between the king and Catherine, daughter of James, Earl of Wiltshire by Eleanor, daughter of Edmund, Duke of Somerset, Henry's grand uncle.⁽⁴⁹⁾ This was not a very close relationship to the Royal Family, and probably for this reason, and still more probably because of James' strong disinclination to marry at the time, negotiations ceased; but a truce was concluded extending to the end of April, 1501.

Scotland's position had now become rather interesting. For the first time she was being recognized as a real though not very potent factor in European politics. James had diplomatic relations with France, Spain, Burgundy and the Empire. He was likely to be in treaty with the Duchess of Burgundy in 1495, and his/

49. - Bain's Documents. Vol. IV. No. 1588.

See also Rotuli Scotiae Vol. II., pp. 508 and 511.

(50)
his ambassadors seem to have been successful at Worms.
Benedetto Trevisano and Zacharia Contarini, the Venetian
Ambassadors to Germany and the King of the Romans, reported
in June 1495 that they had good authority for stating that
the Scottish Ambassadors were treating for a marriage between
James IV. and the Emperor's daughter, Margaret of Savoy. (51)
On August 22 they further reported that, at an interview with
Maximilian they were informed that Margaret was betrothed to
the eldest son of the King of Spain and that he intended to
marry a relative of his to James IV. but who the lady was he
did not mention. (52) This was known to Henry and, coupled
with his suspicions of James' intentions in Burgundy was
sufficient to cause him to make a counter-move. He there-
fore made overtures to James respecting a marriage between
that Monarch and his daughter, Margaret. (53) This was on May 5,
1496,/

50. - Calendar of Venetian State Papers, Vol. 1 Docs. 643, 644, 645.

51. - Ibid., Vol. I. Doc. 647.

52. - Ibid., Vol. I. Doc. 633.

53. - Leslie says James was the first to make advances to Henry for his marriage with Margaret. See Leslie's History of Scotland, Bk. VIII., p. 117.

Drummond of Hawthornden corroborates this, saying that James' reply to the Bishop of Durham's peace mission was, "these temporary truces and peace were soon broken. He desired a traiter amity with the King of England, discovering his mind that if the king would give him in marriage his eldest daughter, that, indeed, might be a knot indissolvable. Drummond's History of Scotland, p. 200.

1496, and on June 23 following, he appointed a second commission
(54)
for the same purpose. For some reason a third commission was

appointed on the same day as the second, also to treat of the
(55)
marriage. Apparently James took but little notice of

(56)
these. He was in truth bent upon aiding Perkin Warbeck,

and in a short time, invaded England on his behalf. After
(57)

some correspondence about this pretender during July,
negotiations, conducted by the Spanish Ambassador, Don Pedro
de Ayala, resulted in the restoration of peace, the treaty being
signed on December 12, and ratified on February 10, 1498. One
of the stipulations was a Spanish marriage for James, so that
(58)
he would become the brother-in-law of Arthur, Prince of Wales.

This offer was not very honestly made for Henry,
though agreeing to it, had by no means abandoned his plans for
the marriage of James and Margaret, which Ferdinand and
(59)
Isabella of Spain were also anxious to see completed.

Probably/

54. - Rotuli Scotiae, Vol. 11., p. 521.

55. - Ibid., Vol. 11., p. 521.

56. - This does not correspond with the remarks of Leslie and
Drummond quoted in note 53 above.

57. - Bain's Documents, Vol. IV., Nos. 1635 and 1636.

58. - Calendar of Venetian State Papers, Vol. 1. Docs. 754 & 759.

59. - See letter from Puebla to Ferdinand and Isabella quoted in
Gairdner's Letters and Papers Illustrative of the Reigns of
Richard III, and Henry VII., Vol. 1., p. 114.

Probably James was not deceived by the Proposal for a Spanish marriage. At any rate, negotiations for his betrothal to Margaret must have been going on regularly for, as early as December 17, 1498, Raimondo de Soncino wrote to Ludovico that a project was on foot for marrying her to the King of Scots, (60.) with whom Henry was on very good terms.

Soncino's information was correct. On June 10, 1499, Henry commissioned Robert Rydon to negotiate for the marriage and on September 11 a warrant to the same effect was issued to Richard, Bishop of Durham. (61).

The knowledge of the negotiations between James IV. and Henry VII. was a powerful incentive to Ludovico to win England to his side, as he might then gain Scotland also, thus inflicting a double blow upon France. But if he relied upon Scotland joining England against France he had misread the situation; for the hostility between the two nations was too deep-rooted to render probable Scotland's desertion of France, especially if that desertion involved against her ancient ally in co-operation with her and France's traditional enemy. In spite of the reports of his agents he laid too little stress upon the personal character of Henry. That king's notorious greed/

60. - Calendar² Venetian State Papers, Vol. 1. Doc. 776.

61. - Rotuli Scotiae ll., p. 537.
Bain's Documents, Vol. IV., No. 1658.
See also Buchanan's Rer. Scot. Hist. lib. Xlll., cp. XX.

greed of money, as Soncino had already pointed out, had induced him to become friendly with France, and the Duke of Milan must have known that if Henry's support had to be bought he was utterly unable to compete for it with Louis, and therefore must lose the help of England in the coming struggle to retain his duchy.

His agents served him well. Remaining in England Soncino fought a gallant but losing battle for Ludovico, and refused to give up before Agostino Spinola advised the Duke that his ambassador's longer stay was useless. (62). This advice was given on April 9, but on the first of the month a crisis had come and gone which Ludovico, when he heard of it, must have regarded as the end of his hopes of English help. An envoy from the Duke appeared before King Henry. He made no secret of his knowledge that Louis was on the point of invading Milan, and asked for the king's help in defending their territory. As a symbol of the unity between Milan and England the ambassador was charged to propose a marriage between the king's daughter and the eldest son of the Duke. As a further token of good friendship Ludovico asked for admission to the Order of the Garter. Henry's reply was brutally frank. He declared he was at peace with France and therefore Ludovico should have no assistance from him. The proposed marriage, he said, was impossible, for his daughter was/

was only three years old, and besides, the Duke was looking too high when he made the proposal. To the request for the Garter he replied that Knights of the Garter were sworn to be friends of friends and foes of foes, and, as the King of France was a member, obviously Ludovico could not enter the order. Without further ado the envoy was dismissed. (63).

Ludovico must have suffered bitterly at this time. He was physically ill and in low spirits. The death of his daughter in December 1496 and that of his wife Beatrice less than a month later, were blows from which he never really recovered. (64.) Then came the fear of invasion, the feeling that no neighbouring state might be trusted, together with the troubled despatches of Soncino and others of his/

63. - Calendar of Venetian State Papers, Vol. 1. Doc. 790.

64. - Ne lo prencipio del presente anno (1497) la fortuna se mostrò alquanto calva a questo mio illustrissimo Principe e signore; che essendoli già del mese di Dicembre de lo preterito anno andata ad altra vita Bianca sua dilecta figliola ex pellice nata ch'era sposata a Galeazzo Severinato gienerale capitaneo de le copie sue; in lunedì poi de lo seguente anno, che fu a dui di de Zenaro ad ore 7 de la seguente nocte, Beatrice Duchessa, sua dilectissima moglie passo de questra a meliora vita, de parto de uno figliolo maschio, che ancora lui moritte, auto prima el batesimo sacro: di che tanto dolore ne prese esso Duca, quanto dire ne scrivere per me si potesse. Cagnola. lib. lX. p. 210.

(65).

his ambassadors. Master of intrigue as he was, he was beaten at all points by the combinations formed against him by the wily Louis.

On the continent he was as unsuccessful as in England. The Emperor, indeed, was kindly disposed towards him; but he was impecunious and at war with the Swiss. He might have joined Ludovico if he had been certain that Henry VII, would aid in an attack upon France. But he rightly believed that the English king, though apparently willing to help, was merely playing with the idea to suit his own purposes, and that no help was to be expected from him. Nevertheless, Ludovico's money was welcome to Maximilian and he took it without scruple although he had no prospect of rendering material assistance in return. (66). With Spain Louis had concluded the Treaty of Marcoussis (August 1498).

Through/

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65. - Apparently nothing was too insignificant for Soncino's attention if he thought that by any means it would advance Ludovico's interests. On March 18, 1499, he advised the duke that the Spinolas were well-disposed towards him and that Antonio was high in the king's favour. In the same despatch he mentioned the arrival of a Genoese physician Zoanne Batista de Tabia, whose ability had gained him a good position in the court and who, being of the Spinola faction, would help the duke's cause whenever he could. Cipriano de' Fornari, he added, though opposed to the Spinolas, was devoted to Ludovico's interests. He had been in London for thirty years, and, as he would soon be in Milan, the duke might do something for him.
Calendar of Venetian State Papers, Vol. 1. Doc. 784.
66. - So late as April 4, Soncino wrote to Ludovico that Maximilian was willing to take the field against France if England would join him. But he suspected that Henry's purpose/

Through his envoys at the court Ludovico must have learned of the fact, and was probably somewhat grimly amused when Don Pedro de Ayala wrote congratulating him on his friendship with their Spanish majesties. (67). Ludovico was in no immediate danger from Spain, which was already meditating an attack not upon Milan but upon Naples; yet the peace compact left France free to move greater forces against Milan and might thus prove the determining factor in the coming war.

The Italian situation was quite as bad. Naples, feeling that if Milan fell she would be the next object of French ambition, was in an extremely difficult position. Federigo's power was so precarious that he did not know at what moment he might lose his throne. The country was reduced by famine and by the ravages of the late war.

Naples,/

66. - (Contd.)
purpose was to collect money from his kingdom for the war, keep France in fear - and do nothing. - See Calendar of Venetian State Papers, Vol. 1. Doc., 789.

On August 20, 1499, when Ludovico's cause was almost hopeless, Maximilian wrote to Philibert of Savoy, upbraiding him for his disloyalty to the Empire, threatening to put him to the ban and insisting on his granting the Milanese troops a passage through Savoy in order to defend their territory. In conclusion he again threatened punishment if Philibert disobeyed.

67. - See Calendar of Venetian State Papers, Vol. 1. Doc. 783.

Naples, therefore, though friendly to Ludovico, was helpless and could only offer him good wishes. The smaller states - (68). Mantua, Bologna and Ferrara - hated Venice. But their expression of hate was tempered by the fear of the vengeance the aggressive republic might take if they opposed her and sided with Milan. Florence, too, could afford him no aid. Enraged though she was with Venice about Pisa, and bitter though she felt against France over the towns surrendered during Charles' expedition, she was compelled to take part with both against Milan in order to safeguard her very (69) existence.

Upon Venice must be laid the blame of having not merely rendered possible the invasion of Italy by Louis XII, but of having actively assisted the invaders. Nor may it be denied that greed of territory was the fundamental cause of her action. She had long coveted Milan, and when offered the opportunity/

68. - For the treacherous behaviour of the Marquis of Mantua towards Ludovico see La Politique du Marquis de Mantoue pendant la lutte de Louis XII. et de Ludovico Sforza (1498-1500), especially pp. 51, 61, 76.
69. - She was much occupied, too, in her attempt to subjugate Pisa. In the Archivio di Stato at Florence the Registri di Elezioni e Lettere ad Ambasciatori contains nothing relating to Milan even in the period May 1499 - August 1512. There are, however, a fair number of references to Pisa and the attempts of Florence to control that city. See e.g. Reg. 105.

opportunity of satisfying this ambition, at least in part, she had no hesitation in accepting it. In February 1499, she came to terms with Louis, agreeing to help him if, in return he would possess her of Cremona and the Ghiara d'Adda. (70) One Italian power - the Papacy - remained, but here, again, Ludovico was beaten. The Pope was ambitious for his son Cesare, and on the French side Georges d'Amboise hoped to occupy the Pontiff's chair. Louis and Alexander each had something with which to bargain; Ludovico had nothing.

The death of Charles VIII. lost Bretagne to the French crown, as it reverted to his widow Anne. This was a serious/

70. - Grumello's account almost suggests that Venice made the proposal.

El Senato Veneto trouandosi grauemente assere stato iniuriato da Ludouicho Sforcia per lo adiuto prestato ala republica Florentina et che per epso.

Ludouicho havere perso la città di Pisa et il porto di Ligurno, importante al suo imperio. Unito esso senato tutto insieme secondo suo ordine, fu fra detto senato ballotato se Ludouicho Sforcia si hauesse expellere da lo imperio Mediolanense, et fu ottenute che si, et ad questo consulto foreno concordanti tutti li gioueni di epso senato et il consulto de li antiquo fu gittato a terra, e con pacto fu ottenuto esso consulto de non manchare al rè Gallichio de le forze sue per lo acquisto de lo imperio Mediolanense, et con pacto che Cremona et Giera de Abdua, paese nobile, fusse sotto suo imperio.....Gionti che fereno li legati del Veneto senato da epso rè, et narrato quanto hera la mente dil senato Veneto per lo acquisto de lo imperio Mediolanense, uidelicet da essere esso senato in bona legha con il re Gallichio. - Grumello lib. lll. cp.11. pp. 29, 30;

Though the League (the Treaty of Blois) was formed in February the Venetians did not formally break with Ludovico till July 27.

serious matter, but Louis persuaded Alexander to grant him a divorce from his wife Jeanne, daughter of Louis XI. and immediately afterwards he married Anne, thus uniting Bretagne to the rest of France. The Pope would not have been so complaisant had not Louis been willing to give him something in return. His ambitions were partly satisfied when, as a result of the king's divorce Cesare Borgia received the hand of Charlotte d'Albret.⁽⁷¹⁾ The way was now open for an understanding with the Pontiff, who declared for Louis on condition that French troops would be sent to aid in the conquest of Romagna. Georges d'Amboise was not neglected. The Pope knew of his aspirations and encouraged them by giving him a cardinalate. Thus he secured a powerful friend in France, the country by whose help he intended to advance Cesare. In the meantime, as a step towards satisfying his designs on the Papacy, d'Amboise exerted all his influence to forward Louis' projected invasion.

The vacillation of Maximilian had its effect on Louis. He dared not leave his kingdom open to attack from that quarter and/

71 - Cesare Borgia's first choice was Charlotte d'Aragon, daughter of Federigo of Naples. Charlotte was a maid of honour in Anne of Bretagne's court, and was well-liked both by her and by Louis. She curtly refused Cesare's proposal, and Louis did not attempt to compel her to consent. Instead, he offered him Charlotte d'Albret, daughter of Alain d'Albret, who was heartily disliked by Anne and himself. It was a brilliant marriage for Cesare, and served to gratify Alexander VI. and thus to secure him as an ally in the forthcoming invasion of Italy. It served also the un-chivalrous purpose of humiliating Alain d'Albret.

and, being unable to depend upon Maximilian, opened negotiations with his son Philip, whom he won to his side by concessions in Artois. Two powers remained to be conciliated - Switzerland and Savoy. With the Swiss he made a league in March 1499, by which he agreed to pay the cantons an annual sum of twenty-thousand florins and to afford them monetary assistance if, and when, they became involved in war on their own account. On their part the Swiss promised to supply him with men and munitions during the coming campaign. Desperate at the thought of having no allies Ludovico made a strong effort to induce Savoy to help him.

The diplomatic struggle that ensued between him and Louis in Savoy has not received the consideration due to its importance. Had Savoy chosen to join Ludovico the French would have found considerable difficulty in forcing their way overland into Milanese territory. Even when they had carried the/-----

- 72 - Ludovico knew of the League before the end of April. See letter from Bianca Maria to Ludovico dated April 22, 1499. This is quoted in P. lissier's Documents Relatifs au Règne de Louis XII. et sa Politique en Italie, p. 138.No.7.
- 73 - This was not the beginning but a continuation of the rivalry between Milan and France at the court of Savoy. Agents on both sides had been at work ever since the accession of Philibert II.

the high passes in the mountainous region lying between France and Savoy and had entered the plain, their difficulties would not have ended. The country is intersected by many streams, shallow, it is true, for the greater part, but of fair width, and in face of a strong defencing force the heavy French artillery would have been greatly hindered in its passage. General transport difficulties, too, would have arisen, and, though the invaders might eventually have overcome them, much valuable time would have been lost; while the troops would have been discouraged at the beginning of the campaign and the defending forces correspondingly elated. A delay in crossing the mountains would have forced the prosecution of the campaign at a bad time of the year, and the natural difficulties would, therefore, have been accentuated.

Both Ludovico and Louis realised the importance of a friendly Savoy, and neither spared any effort to secure that friendliness for himself. But the able diplomats of Savoy kept them for long uncertain upon which side the country would ultimately take its stand. The situation was interesting, for both powers had friends at Turin, where their political agents employed every diplomatic device to secure the alliance for their own side. The reigning duke, Philibert had held power for about/

about six months prior to the death of Charles VIII., but, so far, had puzzled the diplomats by giving no sign of his political policy. In addition to the efforts of his agents at Turin, Louis relied on the connection between the Royal House of France and the Ducal Family of Savoy. The Luxemburgs, too, were connected with both houses; Louis de Ligny, the representative of the family, being the only son of Marie of Savoy, who was the second wife of Louis of Luxemburg, Constable of Saint Pol. Again, as the result of intermarriage, the Duke and Duchess of Bourbon had a friendly interest in the young Duke of Savoy. Finally there was the fact that, in the previous expedition Savoy had granted the French a free passage through the country. Louis' business was to maintain and strengthen the friendly feeling between the two states so that in the new expedition the same, if not greater, facilities would be granted, though the attack was being made not on Naples but on Milan.

But despite the French connection with Savoy the Milanese interests were not negligible. The Dowager Duchess Bianca, aided by Sebastian Ferrier the Treasurer of the state, and/

74. - There was a double connection, for Amadeo IX. son of Louis of Savoy, had married Yolande, daughter of Charles VII. of France, while Louis XI. the son of Charles VII. had married (his second wife) Charlotte, daughter of Louis of Savoy. (see Genealogical Table (1)).

Another connection was that by the marriage of Louis XII's cousin Charles, Comte d'Angouleme to Louisa, daughter of Philip II. of Savoy.

75. - See Genealogical Table (5).

76. - See Genealogical Table (6).

and the Milanese Secretary Pirovano, who was charged to interest the young duke in the maintenance of the status quo in Italy, was working steadily against French influence at the ducal court. Pirovano, of course, was specially concerned about Milan, and (77) did his utmost to show Philibert that friendship, family alliances and personal interest involved a good understanding with Ludovico. Politically, he pointed out, it would be dangerous to allow France to attack Milan, as, in the event of Louis' success, Savoy would be threatened by France from two sides. Philibert gave no sign of preference for one or other of the contending parties, though his court was at first strongly in favour of the Milanese.

Ludovico possessed several advantages over Louis. In the first place the Dowager Duchess Bianca passed on to Pirovano any information she received from France or from her son's court. Further she insisted upon being possessed of all information sent from France to Trivulzio of Cardinal de la Rovere, and aided Ludovico to bribe the courtiers of the duke. She understood thoroughly that the satisfaction of their selfish interests was the only way to induce courtiers and influential men to work on behalf of the Duke of Milan. (78) The Bastard of Savoy who was already in Ludovico's pay, had his pension increased to/

77.- Ludovico's grandfather had married Maria, daughter of Amadeos VIII. of Savoy, and his brother Galeazzo Maria had married Bona, daughter of Louis of Savoy.

78.- René, natural brother of Philibert II.

to six hundred scudi per annum: while M. de Chateaufvieux, useful through his dealings with the Duke of Bourbon, had his salary increased to five hundred scudi. The exciting passage of Raimonde de Soncino through France was proof that Louis was suspicious of spies in the service of Milan and would spare no pains to hunt them down. When, therefore, it was proposed that M. de la Motte should undertake secret service on behalf of the duchy, Pirovano advised Ludovico to accept. As he had been educated in France and was personally acquainted with Louis XII. de la Motte was a good man to send to France on such a mission. He accepted the commission upon the condition that he should be paid thirty crowns a month. For this he undertook to be active in Ludovico's interests, to be cautious in his enquiries, and to send immediately all important information through the Duchess of Savoy.

Ludovico had no reason to complain that his ally the Duchess, did not advance his interests to the best of her ability. Trivulzio had denounced the truce between France and Milan and it was she who drew from René the admission that the denunciation (79) had been his own idea and was unauthorised by the king. This relieved Ludovico's mind for he had regarded the denunciation as tantamount to a declaration of war.

In/

79.- See Pelissier's La Politique de Trivulce au debut du regne de Louis XII. in Revue des Questions Historiques for 1894. p. 11. et seq. especially p.14.

In August, 1498, a new movement began. Information of some kind, the important of which one can only guess, must have reached Savoy. The Duchess may have begun to believe herself incapable of resisting Louis' diplomacy, or she may have thought her information justified her in advising Ludovico to effect a reconciliation with Louis. The task would be difficult, yet she was willing to make the attempt. Ludovico desired nothing better than a friendly understanding with France, for his chances of success against Louis, in the event of an attack upon Milan, were small and rapidly decreasing. He therefore left the Duchess to deal with the matter on his behalf.

At the beginning of October a safe-conduct was refused to one of Ludovico's chamberlains whom the duke wished to send on a mission to France, the excuse being that the secretary who was expected to grant it, was not at the court. Now, had the king wished for a reconciliation with Ludovico, the safe-conduct would have been granted, so that either Louis was not cognizant of the attempt of the Duchess, or he was guilty of double dealing. But he was so well prepared that it was unnecessary for him to resort to such trickery. On the other hand he may have wished to know at first hand what Ludovico was likely to do, but in that case/

80. - It was probably a hint that Ludovico's position was so critical that, instead of meeting Louis' projected attack, he should rather seek some accommodation with him.

case the safe-conduct would not have been refused to the chamberlain as that would simply have been an intimation that no reconciliation was desired. Probably, almost certainly, the Duchess made her plan without reference to Louis, though naturally he knew of it when negotiations were begun.

Philibert returned to Turin in November, a fact of which Ludovico was immediately informed. But prior to Philibert's return Louis had shown his determination to destroy Ludovico by attempting to buy over the Duchess Bona. Had he been successful he would have caused the Duke of Milan serious embarrassment; but Bona did not consider the offer, as she saw clearly that by accepting it she resigned to Louis all her claims upon Milan. She therefore asked to be put into communication with Ludovico through Philibert, who promised to help her as far as he could. Ludovico refused at first and the matter was then left in the hands of Pirovano, but nothing came of it.⁽⁸¹⁾

In the meantime Philibert sent to Louis congratulating him on his accession. But this was merely the nominal object of the mission. In reality Philibert felt drawn towards France, and the embassy was a proof that, though the Milanese influence was strong in Turin, the new duke meant to hold an independent course./

81. - It is known that the duchess declared herself satisfied with the offer made to her by Ludovico (prior to Dec. 23) of an annual pension of twelve thousand ducats, a house, and an immediate payment of six thousand ducats to take her to Ferrara. See Sanuto, Diaries ii. 283.

course. A further demonstration of the critical state of Ludovico's fortunes was the fact that Chateaufieux, who had gone to France in Milanese interests, was disgraced. His fall was accomplished through the Bastard of Savoy, although he was even then in Ludovico's pay.

So far, if the Duke of Savoy had not committed himself to France, he had shown himself more complaisant to Louis than to Ludovico. But the first fortnight of November brought a change. Louis definitely offered both Philibert and the Bastard of Savoy two companies of one hundred lances. His offer was refused though negotiations were re-opened. Philibert's pursuance of a practically negative policy was now ending, his natural inclination towards a French alliance, hitherto considerably repressed, becoming apparent. The duke, however, was wary and desirous of selling his services to the highest bidder, and, before accepting the renewed French offers, tried to ascertain Ludovico's exact intentions. He may have preferred the Milanese alliance, or his prolonged negotiations may have been meant to deceive Ludovico as to his real designs. (82). Most of the communications between Milan and/

82. - It is probable that at first Philibert was indifferent as to which alliance might emerge. His main concern appears to have been the amount of money he and his natural brother René could make out of the transaction.

and Savoy were concerned with the amount of money to be paid as pensions to Philibert and René as the price of an alliance with Ludovico.

René, already in receipt of a pension from Milan, and understanding fully his advantage in being able to treat with Louis, if necessary, for better terms, became offensively proud and overbearing. His behaviour had a prejudicial effect upon the court of Savoy, which, laying the blame upon Ludovico, became thoroughly hostile to Milan. The duke, too, was leaning towards a French alliance. At this moment the sinister appearance at Turin of Ludovico's enemy, Trivulzio, indicated that Sforza's case had failed. On January 25 Pirovano returned to Milan. From then matters moved rapidly in favour of France, and on February 22, 1499, a treaty of alliance was signed between Louis and Philibert. On March 18 a revised and definitive treaty was sworn to by both powers.

The dissimulation of Philibert kept the alliance secret from Ludovico till the middle of April. The small pro-Milanese group in Turin was also ignorant of the treaty and when, at length, it became known, was powerless to aid the threatened dukes. Even when the alliance was disclosed to Ludovico, the duke of Savoy continued his attempts to deceive, and the Duchess Bianca by her well-meant efforts on behalf of Milan merely helped to confirm Philibert's efforts. But Ludovico/

Ludovico did not give up without further struggles.

Now, however, he relied not on his own diplomacy but upon the influence of Maximilian. The Emperor claimed feudal superiority over Savoy and sent Pier de Trieste to point out to the duke how he was failing in his duty to the Empire. But the political cunning of Philibert turned the rebuke to his own advantage, making it appear as if Pier's embassy were a mark of favour from the Emperor and a witness of the good understanding between him and Savoy. The embassy was too late. The treaty sworn to on March 18, had been sent to Paris, where it was revised, and signed on May 13, the final ratification also taking place at Paris on June 11.

For good or for ill Philibert had now joined Louis XII against Ludovico. He understood perfectly the ultimate design of the alliance, and that by joining France he was threatening Italy. The underhand means employed to keep from Ludovico the fact of the treaty, and even, when it became known, to induce him to believe that it was not a matter about which Milan might be in the slightest degree apprehensive, may have been good policy, but it was poor morality; while, to lament, as he did, that Ludovico's ill-advised ambition was bringing fire and sword into Italy was mere hypocrisy. For a considerable time the real cause/

cause of the alliance as an expression of hostility towards Milan seems to have been misunderstood by the Court of Savoy. The common belief was that Louis had been urged in that direction by the spiteful advice of Trivulzio, whose enmity towards Ludovico was well-known. The renegade Italian has faults enough to answer, but this is not one of them. The whole blame rests upon Philibert, Louis XII., and their willing accomplice, the Bastard of Savoy.

The treaty concerned itself mainly with two items - the military aid to be rendered by Philibert, and the monetary considerations upon which the agreement depended. The Duke of Savoy agreed to allow the passage of the French army and its allies through his territory without let or hindrance, stipulating at the same time that, on their March, the troops must/

83. - Et premierement, mondit seigneur le duc de Savoye, adverti du vouloir et intention que ledit Roy très chrestien a daller conquerer et recouvrer son vray et ancien héritage de la duché de Millan, comté de Pavye et aultres terres et seigneuries que lui detient et occupe indeument le seigneur Ludovic, promet et accorde mondit seigneur le duc de donner passaige par ses terres païs et seigneuries au Roy et à son armée tant de pied que de cheval, toutesfois et quantes il voudra passer en personne ou faire passer sadicte armée pour en aller faire ladicte conquete.
Definitive Treaty, Art. 1.

The text of this Treaty is contained in Pélissier's Le Traité d'Alliance de Louis XII., et de Philibert de Savoie en 1499, pp. 57-70.

must behave peaceably towards his subjects. He agreed also to allow his subjects to join Louis' army, and to refuse aid of any description to the king's enemies. (85) The French king, for his part, undertook to pay the Duke of Savoy an annual pension of twenty-two thousand livres tournois, and to René an annuity of ten thousand livres. (86) Philibert and his brother must have attached considerable importance to these payments, for they are mentioned again in the Treaty, this time with the addition that the money would be paid to them as long as Louis lived. (87)

The/

84.- Def. Treaty, Art. 1.

85.- Et permettra aussi Mgr. de Savoye se serve à ladite conquête de sesdits subjects qui faire le voudront.

Et au surplus en tant que touche ce que le roi demande que Mgr. de Savoye ne donnera vivres, retraicte ne faveur, ne permectra donner par ses subjects aux ennemys du roy, Mgr. le duc est content, en reservant toujours son honneur et devoir de fidélité.- Def. Treaty, Art. 2.

Ludovico had asked Philibert to allow him the same rights and privileges as had been granted to Louis with regard to passage through Savoy. This was impossible, as it might have happened that, for a time at least, Savoy would become the battle ground of the two forces.

86.- Le Roy considérant la proximité de lignaige qui est entre luy et mondit seigneur de Savoye; aussi pour le bon et grant vouloir qu'il a cogneu par cy-devant et cognoist par effect Mgr. le duc avoir à lui et pour la grant amour et affection que ledit seigneur a envers Mgr. de Savoye, le voyant si bien disposé à lui faire service; dès maintenant donnera à mondit seigneur de Savoye vingt deux mille livres tournois de pension par chacun an et à Mgr. le bastart de Savoie son frère dix mille.- Def. Treaty, Art. 3.

87.- Item et oultre ce que dit est avoir conquesté la meilleure partie de ladite duché de Millan, ledit seigneur tant qu'il vivra donnera à mondit seigneur sa vie durant ladite pension de vingt deux mille livres par chacun an et à Mgr. le bastart son frère dix mille livres sans aucun retranchement. - Def. Treaty, Art. 6.

The political situation on the eve of hostilities may readily be summed up. In every court where France and Milan had been pitted against each other the Italian state had been worsted. Louis was in alliance with Spain by the Treaty of Marcoussis, with England by a renewal of the Treaty of Étaples, and with Venice through the league by which the republic was to aid France in return for a share of Milanese territory. The smaller Italian states, though opposed to the French, were coerced by circumstances into accepting the position, while the Pope had been gained over by the marriage of his son, Cesare Borgia to Charlotte d'Albret. Florence, incensed at her treatment by France, was compelled to side with Louis as her only hope of regaining her lost cities. Naples, racked by the aftermath of war and stricken by famine, was unable, willing though she was, to render any aid to Ludovico. With the Swiss, too, Maximilian was at war, and was thus powerless to help Milan; while Louis' caution in allying himself with the cantons had supplied him with experienced troops who otherwise might have been in arms against him.

Ludovico's position was therefore precarious in the extreme. He had no allies, he distrusted the Italian states, he hardly dared depend upon his own people. Thus he stood alone in doubtful command of a small province, threatened not only/

only by one of the most powerful and warlike nations of Europe but by Italian-speaking states whose prime concern should have been to keep the foreigner from entering the peninsula. Still depressed by the loss of his wife and daughter, and desperate at the odds he was facing, Ludovico really was beaten before the campaign had opened. Yet despite the fact that the conquest of Milan occupied so short a time, it says something for his courage that he dared to make any stand against the host of enemies who were seeking to compass his destruction.

CHAPTER VI.

The Conquest of Milan

Ludovico's defeat in diplomacy had left him in a bad position. Surrounded by states which were either aggressively hostile or powerless to aid him, and having no hope of friendly intervention even by countries traditionally antagonistic to France, Milan was lost before Louis' army had begun to advance against it. One enemy to Venice he contrived to move - the Turks. But their attack upon Venetian territory, while it rendered him no real service, made his foes more bitter than ever.

Having secured the right of passage through Savoy, Louis pushed forward his preparations for the forthcoming campaign with the utmost speed. On July 10, 1499, he held a review of his troops and, towards the end of the month the French army with Trivulzio in command, crossed the mountains and entering Savoy concentrated/

(1) Le roy, voullant veoir passer ses gens d'armes et mettre l'armée aux champs, sur la fin du mois de june, entra dedans sa ville de Lyon sur Le Rosne, ou illecques vist l'ordre et police de son ost, la monstre de ses souldars et nombre d'iceulx; et, premier qu'il despartist de la ville, tout son arroy fut à chemin, et puis, sur la fin du mois de juillet, s'en retourna en poste a Romorantin pour veoir la royne qui là estoit. d'Auton, Vol. 1, p. 15.

(2) About the 27th.

(3) Under him were de Ligny and d'Aubigny.

(4) Ores, s'en va la bruyant gendarmée de France, les dangereux destroitcz des haultz mons de Savoye traversant, fasant des lieux inaccessibles chemins errans, les fins et mectes de la duché de Millan tousjours approchant, en tel arroy que desordre n'y avoit lieu.....Que diray je de plus? si n'est que le voyage/

(5)
concentrated at Asti. Ludovico in the meantime had not been idle. He may have felt he was waging a hopeless fight against overwhelming odds, but he determined that, so far as he could, he would delay the French advance. To that end he had fortified strongly such places as the Rocca d'Arazzo, Annona, Valenza,

(6)
Tortona and Alexandria. The key to the conquest of Milan lay in the possession of Alexandria which naturally became the first objective of the invaders. The city would be most likely to fall if, before it was attacked, some of the smaller though well-fortified towns in the neighbourhood came into the possession of the French. For the safety of the troops, too, it was necessary that these towns should cease to menace the army. Hence before attacking Alexandria the Rocca d'Arazzo was besieged and taken in four days (August 5 - 9). At once a warning was given to Italy of what she might expect from the French troops. The Rocca was taken by a treacherous trick and, Ludovico's forces having been massacred in cold blood, the place was set on fire and the/

(4) (Contd.) voyage fut si brief qu'en moins de quinze jours de Lyon en Ast fut l'armée, avecques tout son arroy. d'Auton
Vol. 1., pp. 15, 16.

(5) See Grumello, lib. III., cp. IV., p. 31.

(6) Long temps d'avant que les François fussent aux champs bien estoit le seigneur Ludovic adverty de la venue d'iceulx, et bonne paine avoit mise a bien fortifier, remparer et avitailler ses villes et places et mesmement La Roque, Non, Valance, Fourtonne, Alexandria et aultres de frontiere, ou grosses garnisons de souldartz avoit mys, avecques force traict et bonne artillerie, et tant de boulouars, tours, foussees, paliz et aultres deffences necessaires pour actandre et/

(7)
French returned to camp laden with booty. Annona, captured on
(8)
the seventeenth of the month, suffered the same fate. Eight
(9)
days later Valenza fell. Then in quick succession, other im-
portant towns surrendered - Tortona, which commanded the road
(10)
from Alexandria to Piacenza; Piovera near Tortona; Novi lying
about half way between Alexandria and Genoa; Monte Castello and
(11)
Voghera near Alexandria. While part of the French forces dealt
with/

(6) (Contd.) et soustenir sieges et assaux, que bien pençoit Ludovic
les places et fors a tous humains estre inexpugnables; et,
avecques ce, telle puissance de Lombars, Albanoy, Bourguignons
Allemands et autres naciones estranges avoit a sa poye, que bien
se vançoit toute l'armée de France aux champs attendre, a la
force d'icelle resister. d'Auton, Vol. I., pp. 16, 17.

(7) Et, ainsi qu'on traictoit de l'entrée, souldaynement les gens
de pyé se gecterent a la breche et tous a la foule entrèrent
dedans; et, eulx ainsi entrés, prindrent le chasteau d'assault
et tuherent tous les souldartz de Ludovic et grant partie de
ceulx de la ville; et, après ce, pillèrent tout, puis firent
courir le feu par les maisons, et s'en retournerent au camp
avecques leur butin. d'Auton, Vol. I. p. 21.

(8) Après la prise de la ville et chasteau et occision faicte,
fut dit, par commune extimation, que de huyt a neuf cens
hommes lombars avoyent ce jour esté mis a l'espée. Ainsi
fut la ville de Non prise d'assault, pillée, destruite et
mise en cendre. d'Auton, Vol. I., p. 26.

(9) Au matin, se rendirent les souldartz a la volonté des
lieutenans du roy, lesquelz, ung baston blanc au poing, les
envoyerent, et ceulx de la ville baillerent les clefz et,
leurs bagues sauves, se soubmirent sans nulle autre deffense
faire. Ibid. Vol. I., p. 30.

(10) It lies half way between the two towns.

(11) Voghera is half way between Alexandria and Genoa.

with these towns the rest closed in on Alexandria, which was invested on August 25. Four days later it fell. Galeazzo San Severino, who was in command, was faithful to Ludovico but fearful of treason within the city and unable to depend on the fidelity of his brother. (12) He might even then have attempted to hold out, but the receipt of a letter from Ludovico, ordering him to leave the city to its fate induced him to desert his post. (13)

The fall of Alexandria was really the end of the first phase of the war. Ludovico had not merely to meet the French advance; he had to contend against disaffection in the city of Milan. On August 30 riots broke out, in which the treasurer Landriano was killed. (14) The duke was more than suspicious that traitorous influences were at work, but he certainly did not know how far they had gone. His rule, on the whole, had been just; he had not been vindictive to his enemies and he was generous to those whom he regarded as his friends. But his clemency did not reconcile his foes, and his benefits to so-called friends raised no feeling of gratitude in their minds; while the populace, divided by political parties and resentful of taxation, could not be trusted. The family of Borromeo was openly of the French faction, and even Ludovico's/

(12) Facto il passo il conte di Gaiazo del Pado al locho dil porto di la Stella, et firmato suo exercito hauendo epso conte intendimento con il re Gallichio non uolse passare più auante. Grumello, lib. III., cp. V., p. 32.

(13) See Appendix V.

(14) Intexo Simon Rigono, gentilhomio Mediolanense, la [redacted] perdita di Alexandria et del profugato exercito di Ludouico Sforzia con animo deliberato hebe occixo el Landriano thexaurere. Grumello, lib. III., c.V., p. 33.

Ludovico's intimate friend Francesco Bernardino Visconti who had conducted negotiations for the treaty of Vercelli and held rank as captain in his service, was leagued in secret with Gian Giacomo Trivulzio.

The fall of Alexandria, one of the most anti-French cities in Lombardy, convinced Ludovico that, for the time at least, his cause was hopeless, and he fled on December 2 via Como and the Valtellina to Innsbruck in the Tyrol, leaving the castle of Milan in charge of Bernardino Corte, his most trusted friend, with strict orders to hold out for six months, before which time he might expect to be relieved.

On September 4 a deputation sent from Milan to treat of surrender had an interview with the French generals. They pointed out to Trivulzio and de Ligny that the merchants and bankers of Milan feared lest the entry of the French should be followed by a general sack in which not only goods but lives would be lost.

They,/

(15) Lassato Ludouicho Sforzia Bernardino Curcio nel castello suo di porta Giobia, partito esso Ludouicho da la città sua Mediolanense, et da soi gentilhomini pigliato licencia, montato li caualli piglio il camino de Como, et in epsa città facto soi alogiamenti, laltro giorno montato li nauiglij per il lagho, pigliando il camino di Morbegno et iui facto soi alogiamenti.....Laltro giorno Ludouico Sforza montato li cauilli piglio il camino di Alemania in la città de Isprucho, locho di Cexare Maximiliano, Gionto Ludouico Sforza in epsa città sano et saluo con soi figlioli et robe. Abochato esso Sforza con Cexare Maximiliano, dolendosi esso Cexare di tal caxo, et confortato Ludouicho Sforza, non dubitasse che non hera per mancharli de le forze sue per requistare el perduto suo stato Mediolanense et cossi Ludouicho Sforza hebe pigliato animo et certificato de reassumere lo imperio suo Mediolanense sotto al suo imperio contra le forze del Gallichio re, suo mortal nimicho. Grumello lib. III., cp. VII., pp. 34, 35.

They, therefore, asked that, for the time being, the general body of troops should remain outside the city, and promised that the Milanese would send plenty of provisions. Trivulzio agreed to their request and, on September 6, entered the city accompanied by a few of his own people.

He was well received by his friends and the general body of the citizens, who had temporarily turned against Ludovico, and who, though they feared the French, yet hoped that their advent signified a remission of the heavy taxes to which they had been subject. Possibly as a matter of policy the French command did their best to keep the soldiers in hand, and certainly they dealt most severely with infractions of their orders. A Frenchman was/

(16) The deputation met Trivulzio and de Ligny on September 4. But on September 5, Sanuto tells us, (Diaries II. 947) a list of privileges demanded by the Milanese from Louis was drawn up and presented. Sanuto has preserved a copy of this document in his Diaries. Both Prato and Jean d'Auton relate the incident of the deputation (d'Auton's account has been followed here) but neither of them has anything to say of the demands mentioned by Sanuto. But see Chapter VI.

(17) Le seigneur Jehan Jacques, accompagné de plusieurs des gentilzhomes de cheulz le Roy et d'autres gens d'armes, entra ce jour en la ville et la fut de ses parens et autres ses cog-neuz honnourablement receu. d'Auton, Vol. I., p. 86.

La ville et chasteau et tout le pays ainsi renduz et submys en l'obeissance du Roy, par toutes les rues et places chascun cryoit: France, France, et de l'enseigne de la croys blanche grans et petiz estoient parés, et des armes du Roy la pluspart des maisons ornées et décorées; et n'y avoit ne Guelphe ne Vibelin qui, pour l'heure, ne fussent bons François: mais si, par crainte qu'ilz avoyent de perdre leur robe, ou par amour que de nouveau vouloyent avoir aux François, ou bien pour hayne qu'il avoyent a Ludovic, le fasoyent, j'en lesse le determiner a ceulx qui la fin en verront. d'Auton, Vol. I. pp. 88-90.

was hung for insulting the Milanese by crowing like a cock, and a Gascon for stealing bread; another suffered the same fate for stealing a cloak, and a fourth was put to death for an attempt to ravish. Yet Trivulzio's orders were broken. In particular the citizens were disgusted and angered by the bestial behaviour of a company of Gascons who had been lodged in the Abbey of St. Ambrose in Milan. Some disorder was, of course, natural when the/

(18) Et il die seguente lo intromisse in Milano, et l'artellaria fece condurre nella contrata da Cusano, et esso allogio nella casa de Monsignor Joanne Angelo Simonetta, facendo gran principio di justicia, maxime contra i soi. Imperocchè per un pane violentemente tolto, fece suspendere lui Guasconi ad una quercia fora di Porta Ticinese; et per una galina furata, fece appicare un Gallo: appresso fece strangulare un Francese sopra il Ponte Vetro, per aver ad un Milanese un manto rapinato. Similmente, a di 9 Settembre, fece suspendere sopra esso ponte un Monsignor de Valgi, cavagliere Francese; perchè, andando costui per la piazza del Viridario di Milano, li venne veduta una figliola de Messer Carlo Trivulzio sopra la porta de Monsignor Bartolomè Pagnano, la quale temerariamente volse in publico basiare et quelle parti toccare che li drappi nascondono. Prato pp. 223, 224.

(19) See Prato p. 224.

(20) Finalmente, a di 10 di Settembre introrno in Milano circa a tremille Guasconi, et alloggiorno in Porta Comasina, et circa a quattrocento nel monasterio di S. Ambrogio al Nemo, et nel monasterio de la Incoronata sei cento, et nell'abbazia de Santo Simpliciano circa a mille, et altri tanti ne l'abbazia di Santo Ambrosio in Milano, et più che tanti nel convento de Santo Francisco; tutti o per maggior parte pero gente gregaria, et pedestra: et quali fussero i loro deportamenti, sallo Iddio et li loro pazienti ospiti. Ma tanto so ben dire, che non avendo egli riguardo ne a santità di luoco ne a qualità di persona, quelle malvagita commettevano di giocare, rubare, biastemare et puttaneggiare, che possibile fussero; et nel mezzo dello pubbliche piazze si facea taberna, essendo ad ogn'uno concesso di poterle fare senza soluzione di gabella.

the French first took possession of the city, especially as the siege of the castle was still being carried on, but the French command did its best to reduce this inconvenience to a minimum.

The business of the siege, however, did not trouble Milan for long. Bernardino was more than willing to meet the advances made to him by Trivulzio, and, for the sum of a hundred and fifty thousand ducats, the possession of certain important offices and the presentation of large domains, surrendered the castle. (21)

The loss of the castle of Milan fifteen days after his flight/

(21) Trouandosi epso re Gallicho in pacifica possessione de lo imperio Mediolanense, et cossi el senato Veneto in pacifica possessione de lo imperio Cremonense con la Giara di Abdua non manchando ad epso re Gallicho altro che il castello di porta Giobia, mandato per Iohanne Iacobo Triuulcio uno suo fidato a Bernardino Curcio, preghandolo uolese alquanto prestarli audientia, dil che il Curcio fu contentissimo et tolse epso noncio in el castello, et facto capituli di darli il castello di porta Giobia con pacto che li danari et robe, se ritrouaseno in epso castello fusseno sue; et cossi il Triuulcio fu contentissimo, et a nome dil re Gallicho hebe signato li capituli secondo la dimanda del traditore dil Curtio; et esso datta expeditione ad robe et danari, qual herano in epso castello, hebe assignato el castello al Triuulcio al nome del re Gallicho. Fu datto auixo a Ludouico Sforza con littere dil perso castello suo di porta Giobia; et ritrouandosi epso Ludouicho in la città di Isprucho in sua camera asentato sopra il suo lecto parlando con soi gentilhomini di raquistare el stato suo di Milano, hebe noua dil perduto castello suo di porta Giobia. Legendo le littere recepute, intendendo noua pessima, stando sopra di se non parlando, como fusse mutto, alciando li ochij al cielo disse queste poche parole: Da Iuda in qua non fu mai il maggiore traditore de Bernardino Curtio, et per quello giorno mai mosse altre parole. Grumello, lib. III., c. VIII., pp. 35, 36.

Essendo adonca le cose del ducato di Milano in si facta maniera riducte, che solo il castello d'essa città restava sotto il titulo di Ludouico Sforza, cominciò l'astuto Trivulzio/

flight was a severe blow to Ludovico. The French subjugated all the duchy lying to the west of the Adda while the Venetians operated to the east of the river. Pavia, which had refused to allow Galeazzo San Severino within its walls (August 23), Piacenza, Parma and Genoa, with some smaller cities, surrendered without offering resistance. One little town, Tirano, on the borders of Milan and the Tyrol, almost at the source of the Adda, held out for some time, but had at last (October 4) to give way, and the conquest/

(21) (Contd.) Trivulzio a pensare in che modo senza esperimento de fortuna, potesse esso castello (occupazione de intiera victoria) avere. Et cosi praticata la cosa con alcuni cittadini de Milano, et conosciuto la viltà et perfidia de Bernardino Curcio castellano non essere meno che quella del Conte Gaijazo Sanseverino, extimò facilmente potere il suo desiderio mandare ad affecto. Unde, senza alcuno perdimento di tempo, con il mezzo di Messer Francesco Bernardino Vesconte et Messer Antonio Maria Pallavicino, mandò secreti messi ad esso castellano, promettendoli per parte dil re di Franza se il castello a lui voleva rendere, de darli a sè et a suoi figlioli premj onorevoli, si come in sì facte subversioni far si suole, et como quello che molto ben lo sapea fare, Unde, non andando la cosa in lungo, a dì 17 Settembre nel giorno dicato a Sancto Satiro, il prefato Bernardino Curcio, senza alcun pongimento d'onore ne recordazione de recepti beneficj, dette la rocca del castello de Porta Zobia a Francesi. Prato, pp. 224, 225.

See also Jean d'Auton, Vol. I., pp. 87, 88. Note that d'Auton makes no mention of the betrayal of the castle.

(22) Et expedita che fu questa impresa del castello, subito il Sig. Trivulzio regio governatore da qua de'monti, mandò a dì 22 Settembre Guasconi cinque mille, et ducento huomini d'arme, con due bombarde grosse et altri tormenti, nella Val Telina, et a Tirano et a Lugano, et in que'confini, per sottometterli a la signoria de'Francesi; de'quali, a dì 28 Ottobre, non senza occisione ne fu vincitore: et de questi ne fu il capitano Monsignor Obignino Francese, compagno de esso Trivulzio; el quale, dal nome suo non devariando, era veramente benigno. Prato, p. 225.

conquest of the Valtelline was complete. The Venetians were quite as successful on their side of the river. Before long they possessed all the province of Cremona with the exception of the castle in the town of that name. But it, too, fell to them by treachery, (September 22) just as the castle of Milan had fallen to the French. Against the will of his father, an old adherent of the Sforza, Battaglione, who was in command, surrendered the fortress to the Senate of Venice for twelve thousand crowns. (23)

Louis XII. highly delighted at the rapid progress of the conquest, arranged to pay a visit to his new territories. Trivulzio was in close attendance upon him as he passed from place to place. Crossing the Alps he arrived at Vercelli on September 21. Two days later he left for Novara and on the 26th was at Vigevano. On October 2 he made a triumphal entry into/

(22) (Contd.) Apres que la cyté d'Alexandrie fut, comme j'ay descript, au ceptre de France subjuguée, les cytoyens de Pavye, de Palme, de Plaisance, de Gennes et de toutes les autres places et villes de la duché, hors la ville et chasteau de Milan et une autre seule place sur les fins d'Allemagne, nommée Tyzan, apportèrent les clefs aux lieutenans du roy et firent l'obbeissance. d'Auton, Vol. I., p. 76.

(23) Essendo el senato Veneto in pacificha possessione de lo imperio Cremonense, restando solamente il castello di Cremona, signati li capitulli con el Battaglione contra la uoluntate dil Battallia, suo patre, qual hera anticho Sforcescho, tollendo in premio esso Battallione scudi dodece millia dal senato Veneto, et facto collaterale generale depso senato, dato il possesso depso castello, epso Battaglione fu posto in el libro chiamato Te, cioè, Traditore, con Bernardino Curcio. Grumello, lib. III., C. VIII., p. 36.

(24)
into Pavia which was decorated in his honour. Whether from policy or because they possessed no sense of nationality, the powers of Italy sent ambassadors to Milan to await the arrival of the king, who entered the city attended by a magnificent retinue. There he remained a month making arrangements for the government of the duchy. (25)
On November 7 he left for France, leaving Trivulzio as governor with a Senate composed of the Chancellor and a council of seventeen - both French and Italian - (26)
the functions of which were both administrative and judicial. Four days earlier he redeemed his promise to Pope Alexander VI. by sending five thousand Gascon infantry and five hundred men-at-arms to aid Cesare to conquer Imola in the Romagna. (27)

His stay had not been altogether quiet. Already the Milanese were becoming impatient for the reduction of taxes. Riots broke out which Trivulzio had to quell. A few citizens were killed/

(24) For a full account of Louis' journey, and especially of his entry into Milan, see Prato pp. 225-229.

(25) See Prato p. 235.

(26) The Senate was instituted by an ordinance of November 11, 1499.

(27) Poi, a dì 3 Novembre, se parti da Milano Monsignor de Obignino, capitaneo Francese, con il Sig. Valentino, Conte di Valenza in Spagna et figliuolo de Papa Alexandro, homo facinorosissimo, per andare a Imola città di Romagna per farsene signore; et il rè di Franza li dette cinque milla fanti Guasconi, et cinque cento armati da cavallo, si come era ne capituli tra Papa Alexandro et esso Rè. Prato, p. 235.

killed and others injured, but the good offices of Bernardino Visconti modified the severity of the French and, on October 30, the king settled the tumult by proclaiming that Milan was exempt both from the usual wine tax and from the special duty
(28)
levied on every pipe of wine.

The king's choice of Trivulzio was weak. He was a Milanese and a strong party man who might be relied upon to advance his own side to the detriment of the opposing faction. Had he been merely a Milanese citizen this would have been of but little account, but he was there as representing the new duke, Louis of France, and in such a position in a newly conquered territory he ought to have kept himself free from party broils. He has been praised as a good example of a chivalrous man, but a strict examination of his actions will not bear out this opinion. Exiled
by/

(28) Or nel primo proposito ritornando, dirò del popolo Milanese, el quale, o per vaghezza de vivere alla imperiale o alla francese (sotto al qual titolo eravamo novamente venuti), o veramente per la baldanzosa libertà della recente mutazione presa. egli, maxime borghesi, cominciarono a gittare a terra quelli lochi nelli quali li daci se exercivano. La qual cosa intendendola il Sig. Jo. Jacobo Trivulzio, governatore, se ne andò a Porta Ticinese, dove era il romore maggiore; et quivi, non potendo con parole obviare, comincio con l'evaginato stocco, et con l'aiuto de suoi staffèri et seguaci, a percuotere chiunque li veniva tra mano; de sorte che dieci uomini de populo rimasero feriti et duoi morti; cosa certo da seguire gran disordine, se Monsignor Francesco Bernardino Vesconte non se gli fusse con bone parole interposto. Le quali cose intese dal Rè, per mitigare il tumulto, il giorno seguente, che fu il penultimo de Octobre, fece per pubbliche cride exempto Milano del dazio del vino et dell'imbota. Prato pp. 234, 235.

by Ludovico, he hated the late duke most vehemently, and his deeds in Milan were coloured by that hatred. His services in Naples had not been above suspicion of double-dealing, and his willingness to conclude treacherous agreements, while it may have been good policy, was certainly not chivalrous.

He must have caused Louis XII. some anxious moments at the beginning of his reign. Quite evidently his attachment to the king was dictated purely by self-interest. Thinking he saw better opportunities in Venetian service he negotiated with the republic. He even made overtures to Ludovico, which, whether or not they were meant in good faith, rendered him guilty of treachery either to that duke or to Louis. His denunciation of the Treaty of Vercelli⁽²⁹⁾ which he did on his own initiative might conceivably have hindered the success of Louis' designs upon the duchy by revealing to Ludovico what he might expect, and thus placing him upon his guard. For some reason, however, Louis chose either to forget or to ignore these dealings and risked the loss of his new territory by appointing a man of indifferent character though of undoubted military ability to the highest position he had to bestow in Milan.

Apart from this, he was of a haughty, tactless, domineering disposition, and the play of these qualities at once brought him into conflict with the people he had to govern. Quite as much as/

(29) See Pelissier La Politique de Trivulce au debut du Regne de Louis XII. p. 12.

as Francesco Sforza he was a soldier of fortune, selling his service at the highest price. With other faults of the condottiere he possessed their greed, and as an administrator he proved himself hopelessly incompetent. Of his military capacity no doubt exists and it stands to his credit that on one occasion, at least, he protected women and young girls from the violence of the soldiers.
(30)

The situation Trivulzio had to meet would have taxed the administrative ability of much better men. The Milanese had accepted the French occupation in the main because they expected a reduction of taxation, which was precisely what the new governor was unable to accomplish. The war had to be paid for, and Louis had no intention of letting France shoulder the burden. He had already remitted the wine taxes, but he had gone back to France leaving to Trivulzio the task of obtaining a revenue. Immediately upon the king's departure the governor sent troops to reduce Imola, the fortress of Catterina Sforza. On November 26 he proclaimed his scheme of taxation in Milan and left for Parma, Piacenza, Pavia, Lodi, and other towns to inform them of the share they must take in providing revenue.
(31)

This gave an opportunity to Ludovico's friends in the city. Discontent was rife, Trivulzio/

(30) At the siege of Siena.

(31) Indi, a di 26 ditto, nel Broletto de Milano se incanto li daciai al loco consueto: poi se partitte il Trivulzio, et ando a Parma, Piasenza, Pavia, Lode, et ad altri luoghi per mettere essi daciai. Prato, p.236.

Trivulzio was disliked both for his lack of capacity and for the taxes he had been compelled to levy: the French strength in the city was lessened by the departure of the troops to the siege of Imola. (32) A conspiracy to bring back Ludovico was begun and by the end of January it was plain that Trivulzio's position was untenable.

For a time the governor attempted to quell the rising rebellion. Troops poured into the city but they were opposed by the conspirators, amongst whom were Friar Geronimo Landriano, (brother of the late Treasurer of Milan and General of the White Friars of the Brera) and several of the Visconti. (33) Trivulzio tried to calm the passions of the Milanese mob but was howled down. (34) Realising that/

(32) Partita la Regia Maestà, il Sig. lo, Iacobo Trivulzio fece venire a Milano trecento Todeschi, et li alloggiò in corte, dove esso era alloggiato, per securità di lui; perchè gran parte de li Francesi erano andati a campo a Imola. Prato, p. 236.

Discontent over the question of taxation is quite understandable, as the various levies - the customs, general imposts, and the taxes on merchandise and salt - amounted to no less than 78,000 ducats per annum. See Prato, p. 235.

(33) See Prato, pp. 237, 238.

(34) See Prato p. 238.

that nothing was to be gained by remaining in the city he re-retired, leaving the garrison of the castle under the command of a Franco-Scot named Codebar Carr, Seigneur de Saint-Quentin-le-verger. (35) The retreating French passed through Sedriano and Cuggiono, crossed the Ticino and came to Novara via Mortara, (36) burning and slaying as they went.

In the meantime Galeazzo San Severino entered Milan with a force of four thousand Swiss infantry. (37) Wild scenes followed. Frenchmen were either killed in the streets or consigned to prison. The houses of Trivulzio, Bernardino Corte, Simon Rigoni (the murderer of the late Treasurer) and the brothers Certosini were sacked, while the office of the salt gabelle was burnt to the ground. So great was the terror inspired by the riots that a new prayer was added to the Litany - "From the fury of the (38) populace, Good Lord deliver us".

While/

(35) Code Becarre, according to Jean d'Auton. He was brother-in-law of Stuart d'Aubigny, who shared the command of the French forces with de Ligny and Trivulzio. The table here given shows the connection between Carr and the Stuarts.

Jean Stuart

Berault Stuart (Seign.d'Aubigny)	Guillaume Stuart (Seign.d'Auzon)	Martine Stuart (Dame de Saint Quentin) married Codebar Carr.
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The Stuart family was connected with the Royal Stuarts of Scotland, but had been long resident in France.

(36) See Prato, p. 239.

(37) February 3, 1500. See Prato, p. 239.

(38) See Prato, p. 240.

While Milan was seething with tumult Ludovico had not been idle. Having managed to patch up a truce between Maximilian and the Swiss he secured a force of fifteen hundred men-at-arms from Burgundy, and even persuaded the Swiss to take his pay. By one means and another he gathered an army of some twenty thousand men, but its ill-assorted elements rendered it unfit to cope with the more homogeneous French forces. Galeazzo San Severino now played his part. Leaving Milan he marched through Savoy to Aosta with his contingent of Swiss mercenaries. At Como, de Ligny made an unsuccessful attempt to resist him, and Trivulzio ordered him to retreat on Milan. By this time the French had returned to Novara, where they were joined by the forces lent by Louis to Cesare for the conquest of Imola and Forli. (39)

On February 4, Ludovico entered Milan and received a warm welcome. (40) But his troubles were not over. To pay his army large sums of money were required, and to raise them the most desperate measures had to be taken. Friends lent because of their interest in the duke's cause; enemies were compelled to contribute: even the churches were robbed of their treasures, (41) though to them a promise of restitution was given. The castle of/

(39) See p. 257 note 27.

(40) See Prato, p. 240, and d'Auton Vol. I., p. 163.

(41) Poi, a di 5 Febraro, lassando Monsignore Ascanio per governatore de Milano, se parti per andare in campo contra Francesi. Et prima ando a Pavia, dove fu benignamente receuto, con causa ancora del castello mal fornito sotto la guardia d'un Francese; et a di otto fece appiccar Scariotto:/

of Milan was strongly held. Ludovico wisely wasted no time upon it but left on February 5 for Pavia where he was well received. Thence he passed to Vigevano which, surrendered to him on February 23. Fresh troops having arrived - fifteen hundred Swiss and a hundred cavalry - he moved against Novara where he received a welcome present of artillery from Maximilian. (42) The city, which was friendly to the French, was forced to surrender (March 21) and Trivulzio retreated to Robbio, a town commanding the road between Mortara and Vercelli and lying almost midway between them./

(41) (Contd.) Scariotto: de poi pagò la sua gente, a lui pochi danari restando; in modo che per Milano si cominciò a fare quotidiani consigli, con exortacione de aiutare il Duca de danari: ma poco effecto segui. Il che questo vedendo Monsignor Ascanio, ne ardindo de asperare la città, fece domandare molti in particolare; et da alcuni amici per amore, et da molti nemici per tema, ebbe danari. Et tuttavia venne gran numero de Elvecii a Milano, domandati et non domandati; et a tutti li conveniva dare danari. Prato, pp. 240, 241.

Or queste cose (per causa di regnare) non estimando Monsignore Ascanio, in executione de le ducali lettere, mandò a Chieravalle, in Domo, a S. Lustorgio, a San Francisco, a S. Marco, et in molti altri templi; et con grandissime promesse de restitucione, li spoglio de' tesori ecclesiastici, et ne fece bona somma de danari, li quali mandati in campo, prima fu pagato li Todeschi, che erano più di ventimilia; poi li nostrali, che erano poco più che la meta. Ibid. p. 243.

(42) Et a Milano ancora da indi arrivava Sviceri; et il giorno primo de Marzo gionsero mille cinquecento Sviceri del Vesco di Valeso; poi a dì dui arrivò mille cavalli Brogognoni e tutti andornò a Novara; et a dì 16 arrivò in campo alcuni pezzi d'artiglieria de Maximiliano re de' Romani. Prato p. 243.

(43) them. Against Ludovico's will, his Swiss mercenaries, greedy for plunder, began to sack the city. As soon as the duke heard of the matter he ordered the Swiss to cease at once. It was a merciful action, but Ludovico paid dearly for it. Trivulzio had already been at work endeavouring to cause dissatisfaction among the Milanese troops, especially the Swiss, and Ludovico's veto upon the sack of the town made them more than willing to accept Trivulzio's offers. On March 25 the duke left for a short visit to Milan, to take council with his brother Ascanio, placing the troops under the command of Galeazzo San Severino and his brother Francesco. Trivulzio did not miss the opportunity. Immediately he heard of Ludovico's departure he renewed his efforts to induce the Swiss to betray the duke, and the mercenaries, discontented by irregular payments of their wages and irritated by Ludovico's refusal to allow the sack of Novara, closed with
(44)
Trivulzio's terms.

Two/

(43) Vedendo li capittanei Gallici, quali herano ala custodia di Nouara, non essere possibile a resistere a Ludouicho Sforza, mandorno legati a lui per rendersi saluo robe et persone Intendendo Iohanne Iacobo Triuulcio la batteria grande facta ala muraglia de dicta città Nouariense et che stabilita hera la battaglia dubittando non si hauesse a perdere per forza abandonando Mortara, doue si ritrouaua con una parte di lexercito Gallichio fu retirato a Robio quella medema matina che dare si douea la battaglia per lo exercito dil Sforza ala città di Nouara. Grumello lib. III., c. XV., pp. 47, 48.

(44) Cominciò il Trivulzio a pensare con quale arte o astuzia potesse vincere l'impresa, la quale per via de arme era pericolosa; et fra le altre cose una li venne pensata: cioè de fare che Novaresi con accordo al principe Ludovico se/

Two days before Ludovico's departure La Tremouille entered Lombardy with four hundred men-at-arms and some artillery. On April 4th the French were further strengthened by the addition of a large contingent of Swiss; while in one day in Milan (April 8) six thousand horse and foot rallied to Ludovico. By this time La Tremouille had joined Trivulzio at Mortara and the united forces marched on Novara. The Milanese troops, though superior in numbers to the French, were much inferior to them in quality. Practically all the advantages lay on the French side. Trivulzio was, indeed, disliked and distrusted, but the gallant Tremouille to a certain extent counterbalanced this disadvantage. Again, the wily Trivulzio had sown discord in the ranks of his enemies and was depending upon the Swiss in Ludovico's service to desert at a favourable opportunity. In addition, the strength of the Milanese/

(44) (Contd.) se rendessino, acciò non avessero a patire il saccomano el quale non seguindo, era opportuna causa de sdegnare i Todeschi; il che poi con facilità se sariano possuti subvertire Poi, il giorno vigesimo quinto di Marzo, venne esso principe Ludovico a Milano, lasciando Monsignor Galeazo et Francesco fratelli Sanseverini per governo del campo, con comission de non combattere: fra il qual tempo il Signor Jo Iocobo Trivulzio cominciò secretamente a sollicitare li capitanei Sviceri con assai promesse, acciò volessero tradire il Signor Ludovico. - Prato, p. 244.

(45) See Grumello, lib. III., c. XVI., p. 51.

(46) See Prato, p. 246.

(47) See Grumella, lib. III., c. XVII., p. 51.

(48) See Prato, p. 245.

(49) One must remember, also, the rivalry which existed between Trivulzio and de Ligny.

Milanese troops was greatly discounted by unrest, particularly among the mercenaries; many of the soldiers, indeed, had deserted, and Ludovico was gravely suspicious that some who remained were disaffected.

(50)

(51)

Ludovico was justified in his suspicions. The bribes of Trivulzio had done their work, and the Swiss mercenaries in Milanese pay were prepared to betray not merely their leader but their companions in arms. A series of skirmishes took place

(52)

during the Week of Olives, on Wednesday of which the decisive battle was fought at Novara. It went against Ludovico who was compelled to retire to the town, where he was besieged by the French. On Thursday the Swiss leaders arranged with Trivulzio to desert the defeated Duke, making provision for their own lives but leaving their Italian comrades to their fate. Most of these mercenaries, as a matter of fact, had already left him,/

(50) See Prato, p. 246.

(51) These suspicions are justified by the French official account of the negotiations with the Swiss.

Et, a l'heure que nosditz lieuxutenans et armée sont approchez dudit Novarre, est sorty d'icelle ville ung capitaine des Bourguignons, appelé le capitaine Pietres, lequel s'est venu rendre et a faict l'appoinctement de luy et de tous les autres Bourguignons, pour estre a nous et a nostre service. Pareillement dient que le baillif de Dijon estoit allé audit Novarre pour traicter et practiquer les Suysses dudit seigneur Ludovic qui estoient dedans en nombre de quatre mille, qui ne demandoient que payement. Et, au regart des lansquenetz, ilz ne scavent encores qu'il en adviendra, car les Suysses de nostredite armée ne les vouloient prendre a mercy. Toutesfoys, nosditz lieuxutenans mettront peine que le tout se rendra a la moindre effusion de sang que faire se pourra. d'Auton, Vol. I., p. 357, note.

(52) So called by Grumello; (ib. III., p. 53) the week preceding Passion Week.

(53) him, and those who remained did so, for the greater part, to make sure that he did not evade capture. A few, according to Prato, were faithful, but the majority were traitors. Both Grumello and Prato point out specially that one of the Swiss captains (Grumello/

(53) El giouedi de la quia mandato legati per Eluecij alo exercito Gallichio per arendersi et essere contra a Ludouicho Sforzia, intendendo li lanzinechi la rexa de Eluecij et soilltradimenti per non perdere la lor uitta mandorno legati ad epso exercito; et foreno facti capitulli di rendersi saluo robe et persone, et cossi fu facto per li Bergognoni, tollendoli il Tremollia ed il Triuultio, capitanei Gallici, tutti apacto saluo robe et persone, excetuando li poueri Ittalliani, quali uolseno in preda. Intendendo Ludouicho Sforzia tutto il suo exercito essere arexo alo inimicho exercito, saluo li Ittalliani, domando li capittanei Eluecij et maxime Soprasasso, capo de Eluecij preghando essi capittanei non lo uoleseno dare ne le mane de lo inimicho exercito et saluandolo da epso li faceua promissione, saluato che fosse, di darli il possesso di la cittate de Como, et cossi fu promisso per Soprasasso, capittaneo Elueticho. La mattina dil Venere de Loliua ussiti li Eluecij, lanzichenechi, Borgognoni, essendo Ludouicho Sforza in la ordinanza de li Eluecij, el Tremollia, non uedendo Ludouicho Sforza, si delibero hauerlo pregione et foreno forzati li Eluecij passare tutti sotto una picha, et gionto il Sforza per passare sotto essa picha, el tradittore de Soprasasso d'atto il baxo, como fece Iuda, disse: he le quello. Vedendo Ludouicho Sforza essere scoperto disse ad alta uoce: Io mi rendo a mio consanguineo, monsignore de Lignino; et cossi el pouero Ludouicho Sforza fu conducto in pregione nel castello di Nouara. Grumello p. 54.

La qual cosa vedendo el Principe, si trovò, ultra modo dolente, et, certo de niuna salute, non sapea che se fare. Unde Mercurio, ardito capitaneo de Albanesi, li disse che de Sua Signoria volea montare sopra uno suo cavallo barbaro, che lo averia portato fora de'nemici: ma lui o per la infirmità de moroedi, o che la paura vincessi il consiglio, o che se ne fusse cagione, non volse acettar la partita: ma subito facto per interpetri dimandare li capitanei Sviceri, pregò elli che, se la intenzione loro era de non *aiutarlo,* ~~aiutarlo~~, almeno volessero rimenarlo a salvamento in Allamagna, da unde esso sopra la fiducia loro se era partito. A che li fu per alquanti de loro data la fede (se fede dir si può) de salvarlo: et con verità, io credo che tutti non fussino partecipevoli della fraude. Prato p. 247.

(Grumello calls him Soprasasso) definitely promised to defend Ludovico, and the last named historian adds that he was the
(54)
actual betrayer of the duke. Jean d'Auton, while agreeing that Ludovico was betrayed as he was attempting to escape in the disguise of a poor Swiss, does not mention the actual traitor
(55)
but blames the Swiss in general. Whether or not Soprasasso was the traitor it is certain that some of the Swiss deserted in the battle and most of the others during the siege of Novara, that Ludovico disguised himself as one of them, and that his betrayal was due to them.

As the greed of the Swiss was notorious Trivulzio must have paid them well in money for their defection. But d'Auton relates that they went away discontented, and, when on the borders
(56)
of Milan seized the town of Bellinzona. Was the possession of this/

(54) See note 53 on previous page.

(55) Pour au propos revenir, après la somacion du sire de la Trimoille, les Allemans du seigneur Ludovic promirent de rendre ledit Ludovic; et, pour ce, vers iceulx Allemans furent transmys le seigneur de Mauleon et le baillif de Disjon, qui bonne dilligence misrent pour le trouver; et telle poursuyte en fist le baillif de Disjon que, par aucuns des Allemans, a qui ilz donna deux cens escus, sceut ou il estoit; et, la, prist son adresse, ou prist le seigneur Galleaz. Il voulut prendre le seigneur Ludovic, lequel ne luy vouloit bailler la foy; et ainsi qu'ilz estrivoient, arriva le conte de Ligny parmy la presse et la le vint trouver, a tout, ses cheveux troussés soubz une coiffe, une gorgerete autour du cou, ung pourpoint de satin cramoisi et unes chausses d'escarlata, la hallebarde au poing; et en ce point, le prist le conte de Ligny et le fist monter sur ung courtault, que luy bailla le seigneur de la Palixe. d'Auton Vol. I. p. 260.

(56) Après toutes ses choses, heurent iceulx Suyces leur argent. et, pour les contenter, furent presque tous payez en escuz au/

this town part of the price paid to the Swiss for the desertion of Ludovico's cause? M. de Maulde La Clavière, agreeing with d'Auton denies that it was.

Depuis lors. Bellinzona et le canton du Tessin n'ont cessé d'appartenir à la Suisse, quoique de race italienne. Telle est l'origine de la conquête. Bellinzona était une place forte, assez importante en ce qu'elle commandait les défilés. Mais c'était un territoire pauvre, constamment ravagé par la peste, et fort séparé du reste du Milanais. Tristan de Salazar, Ambassadeur en Suisse, protesta vainement. On prétend, bien à tort, que Trivulzio l'avait promise aux Suisses en paiement. d'Auton, Vol. I., p. 266, note 1.

But an examination of the facts will show that Trivulzio's consent to the occupation of Bellinzona requires explanation. He was not the kind of man to suffer such a deliberate flouting of his authority as is implied by the seizure of a Milanese town without his permission, and the discontent of the Swiss at their pay supplied an additional incentive to punish them for the capture. Besides, though it was poor territory, it was still part of the province of Milan which he had just conquered, and if supineness on his part allowed it to fall into the hands of/

(56) (Contd.) au souleil. Partie de leurs capitaines heurent de somniers pour emporter leurs bagues jucques en leur pays. Ainsi s'en allerent, bien payez et mal contens: et en eulx retirant, prindrent une ville de la duché de Millan sur leurs Marches, nomme Bellisonne. d'Auton, Vol. I., p. 265.

of another power he would have to account to Louis XII. for his inactivity. Again, it was a powerful fortress commanding the mountain passes, and from it an attack might be organised upon Como or even upon Milan itself. Political expedience and military necessity, then, would dictate its retention by the French. Sooner or later Trivulzio must have made an attempt to recover the district unless something restrained him. It may be true that the French ambassador protested to the Swiss, but the fact that nothing came of his protest seems to indicate that it was a mere matter of form. Had France been in earnest she had troops enough to compel the return of the town. Now Louis was not likely to acquiesce willingly in the loss of an important fortress belonging to the province he had so long coveted, and if he stayed his hand there must have been some reason for his abstention. But Trivulzio had Swiss in his own service, and admittedly he had bought over to his side those who served Ludovico. If these mercenaries demanded the cession of Bellinzona as part of the price of their treachery, he was powerless to resist, since without their aid he might have been unable to overcome Ludovico: he might, indeed, have found himself obliged to face a confederation of the Swiss with the duke. M. de Maulde la Claviere points out that the defection of Ludovico's allies at Novara was due to the fact
(57)
that the pennons of the Swiss on both sides were identical,
and/

(57) See d'Auton, Vol. I., p. 114.

and that the confusion thus engendered explains the desertion. Perhaps so; but it does not explain away the fact, stated by d'Auton and admitted by himself, that Trivulzio had been in communication with Ludovico's Swiss from the time when the duke
(58)
had refused to allow the sack of Novara. Nor does it sweep away the confirmatory statements of Grumello and Prato. Prato, indeed, makes the definite assertion that Bellinzona was ceded to the Swiss by agreement.

"Queste cose facendosi, i Sviceri, detti Grisoni, abbero Belinzona, a loro per convencione promessa." Prato, p. 252.
As against this, however, there is Trivulzio's statement in a letter to La Tremouille dated April 17, 1500.

"Les Almans, qui ont prins Bilansone nous ont envoye dire qu'ilz ne l'ont point fait contre le Roy, ains l'ont faict pour le service dudit seigneur et nous ont faict quelques requestes, mais ce n'est que argent qu'ilz demandent."

The insatiable Swiss had to be bought in one way or another, and the cession to them of Bellinzona and the surrounding district
(59)
was part of the price demanded. In view of the French inaction, Trivulzio's connivance at the seizure appears more than possible. But in reality he was not to blame.

It/

(58) See d'Auton, Vol. I., p. 217, note 1.

(59) Prato says they received thirty thousand gold crowns as the price of their treachery.

Et parte de li Sviceri, avuti trenta millia scuti d'oro per precio del nefando tradimento, se trasferirno a Lumelina.
Prato, p. 247.

(60)
It has been remarked that the Swiss were discontented with Louis, that the French ambassador protested in vain against the seizure of the town, that Trivulzio made no attempt to recover it and that Prato insists on a bargain between Swiss and French. Why? The answer to these questions solves the problem.

In his agreement with the Swiss Customs through his agent Gian Giacomo Ferrari, a judge in Asti, Louis XII. had promised the cession of the town. But immediately after the conquest of Milan he refused to implement his bargain on the ground that he (61) had promised the Milanese not to alienate any of their territory. This was a clumsy subterfuge as he had already handed over almost half the duchy to the Venetians.

In the second place, the Swiss had not seized the town; it (62) had been occupied on the invitation of the inhabitants. But d'Amboise refused to sanction the occupation and threatened to withdraw the commercial privileges granted to the Swiss. The natural/

(60) Li Suiceri stano molto mal contenti del Rè, et di venti quatro pezi di artiglieria li forono promessi, non li sono stati consignati se non otto o dieci pezi, et quelli anchora non havevano havuto. Pélissier, Trois Relations sur la situation de la France en 1498 et 1499, envoyés par Ludovic Sforza au duc de Ferrare, p. 22, No. 33.

(61) Kohler, La Conquête du Tessin par les Suisses, Revue Historique, Vol. XLV., p. 376.

(62) Ibid, p. 313.

natural indignation of the Cantons found expression upon Ludovico's return. Some Swiss had taken service under the returned duke and the Cantons forbade their subjects to the number of (63) 10,000 to aid Louis. The king was on the point of re-opening negotiations regarding Bellinzona when the Swiss mercenaries saved him the trouble by disobeying the orders of their governments and enlisting under his banner. On their return they simply retained possession of the town, which was finally ceded to them in 1503. The loss of Bellinzona was thus due to Louis' (64) faithless dealings with the Swiss, his own cession to them of (65) the town, and indirectly to French policy in Italy.

Immediately upon Ludovico's surrender to de Ligny he was brought before Trivulzio whose conduct towards him was the reverse of chivalrous. (66) In contrast stands the quiet sympathy of the Frenchman Jean d'Auton for a beaten enemy. "Somme", he says, "si le pauvre seigneur captif de duel inconsolable avoit (67) le cuer serre, a nul devoit marveilles.

Ludovico/

(63) Kohler Les Suisses dans les Guerres d'Italie, Intro. p. 9.

(64) He owed them 300,000 crowns which he had refused to pay.

(65) Kohler bases the whole argument on references to the Swiss Reces Fédéraux.

(66) See Prato pp. 247, 248.

(67) See d'Auton, Vol. I., p. 261.

Ludovico was carried prisoner, but apparently well treated, under the care of de Ligny as far as Susa in Savoy. There he was handed over to the Seigneur de Cressol in whose charge he went back to Pavia, and thence to Lyons where he met Louis XII. From Lyons he passed to the Castle of Pierre Encize in the town (68) of that name, and then to the castle of Lys Saint-Georges, in Berry. There he remained five years. Finally he was imprisoned at Loches, where he died on May 17, 1509. Francesco de Pontremoli shared his imprisonment. (69) Ludovico had made at least one attempt to escape, being carried out of the town hidden in a hay cart. But he did not know the country; spies were all round him and, blood hounds being put on his track, he was discovered and brought back. (70) Ludovico's brother, Cardinal Ascanio Sforza, captured by the Venetians, was handed over to France and (71) brought by the Seigneur de Xandricourt to Lyons. Thence he was taken to the state prison at Bourges from which he was set free in 1503.

The/

(68) It was destroyed during the French Revolution.

(69) See Grumello, lib. III., c. XIX, p. 57.

(70) See Prato, pp. 266, 267.

Ludovico appears to have been well treated on the whole, but, after his attempted escape, his imprisonment was more rigorous. Possibly it was this portion of Ludovico's incarceration to which Francesco di Pontremoli referred on his return to Italy. If so, it may have been the cause of the Italian story that Louis treated the late duke badly.

(71) The usual treachery, according to Prato, was at work. See Prato, p. 248.

The/

The capture of Ludovico made a virtual end of the rising against French domination. The Milanese were no more reconciled to the government of Louis than they had been at the end of 1499, but their position had altered for the worse. When the rising began in January they had hopes that Ludovico would return in triumph, but, the duke being a prisoner, they had now no dynasty to defend. A republic at that moment was out of the question. Internal division, if nothing else, made it impossible. But there were other reasons. Louis was not likely to relinquish the advantage he held, and even if he did the Venetians would see to it that the troubles of Milan would be a source of gain to them. In truth no citizen expected anything else than severe penalties upon the city; the ferocious conduct of the French at the beginning of the campaign and the terror of fire and sword they had created on their retreat from Milan during Ludovico's rising, together with the advantageous position they held at the moment awed the Milanese into sullen subjection. That they dared not show their bitter feelings was an aggravation of their misery./

(71) (Contd.) The account given by Jean d'Auton is slightly different.

Le cardinal Ascaigne, qui lors estoit a Millan, sachant la prise du Seigneur Ludovic, son frere, avecques quatre cens chevaux se mist au champs et prist le chemin de Bouloigne la Grasse; le quel, en passant près Plaisance, par une bende de François et quelque nombre de Venissians, qui la estoient, fut assailly et tant rudement mené que ses gens furent deffaictz, et luy chacé jucques dedans ung chasteau nomme Rivolle pres de la, ou fut assiége et priz. d'Auton, Vol. I., p. 262.

Grumello's account agrees more with the narrative of d'Auton than with that of Prato. See Grumello, lib. III. c. XIX., p. 56.

misery. Nothing could be done but submit as gracefully as possible in the hope that by so doing the wrath of the invaders would be assuaged.

They therefore sent an embassy to Cardinal d'Amboise as the king's Lieutenant-General praying him to come to Milan and take up his quarters there, and begging him to have mercy upon the town and its citizens. To this the cardinal made an evasive reply. He refused to enter a city so stained with the vice of rebellion, but promised to take up his abode in the castle which had always held out for the king. This was on the fourteenth of April and on the seventeenth (Good Friday), apparently yielding to the entreaties of the Milanese, he entered the city. His appearance produced the effect that might be expected. A procession, including four thousand children, bare-headed and humbly clad, met him and besought his clemency. Never again, they said, would they rebel against his sacred Majesty of France nor do anything disparaging to his honour. As evidence of their repentance they humbly begged pardon for their disloyalty and rebellion and offered three hundred thousand crowns to help pay the French army of occupation.

The cardinal delayed his answer for a little and in sending it by a young doctor of laws, rated the Milanese soundly for their disloyalty and treason, promised them their lives and their goods, and warned them, once for all, never again to foment rebellion/

rebellion in the king's realm. Overjoyed at so favourable a response, the procession was re-formed, the children shouting as they passed the cardinal, "France, France, Mercy, Mercy".⁽⁷²⁾

Though d'Amboise was thus lenient to the citizens the same consideration was not shown to those who had been leaders in the late revolt. Day by day, they were captured and brought to Milan and confined till they could be sent to France. Their fate varied. Some were imprisoned and some put to death; a few were tortured to make them give up their secrets, while others were kept in exile long enough to make them realise what their share in the rebellion had cost them.⁽⁷³⁾

In the meantime Venice had contributed her share in the war. The province everywhere was out of Milanese control, and the French had now to concentrate their efforts on the administration of their new territory.

(72) See d'Auton, Vol. I., pp. 270-274.

(73) See Prato, p. 251, 252.

CHAPTER VII.

The New Constitution

The military conquest of Milan, to be effective, required to be followed by the stabilisation of the French government. Milanese institutions had to be reorganised, fresh officials appointed, and the limits of their power defined. To carry out this task, not only effectually, but to the best advantage of both French and Milanese, was a work of considerable delicacy; for extravagant expectations - Milanese hopes for remission of taxation, and increased powers of self-government, and French hopes for booty in money, real estate or official position - must inevitably be disappointed in the process. Yet the arrangement must be such that both parties would see the justice of the settlement and be contented with what was allotted to them.

So far as re-organisation was concerned, Louis had to decide whether he would maintain Milanese institutions as they stood; he had to settle whether he would modify them or abolish them and substitute governmental forms of French origin. But before he could make any attempt at re-organisation, it was necessary to appoint officials to keep matters going till the larger question could be discussed. Ludovico Sforza had left the affairs of/

of the Duchy in grave disorder. It could hardly have been otherwise. The finances of the state had been strained to support him against Louis; he had alienated ducal properties in favour of his adherents; the courts of justice had been closed since his flight on September 2.

Under these circumstances Louis might have made a clean sweep of all the Milanese institutions and imposed upon the duchy a constitution similar to that of France. But a combination of events militated against this procedure. In the first place, though the armed conquest was fairly complete, the Milanese might at any moment call for Ludovico's return if they were seriously offended with the new methods of government. Now, as the nature of the established law courts was known to the general body of the citizens, any change in the judicial system would be regarded with suspicion. Besides, Louis' aim was to retain full power in the province while making the French occupation as invisible as possible - an aim which could not be attained if the French legal system were substituted for that of the Milanese. The financial question, also, claimed attention. Taxes must be collected, and at the same time the minds of the Milanese must be reconciled to a smaller remission (if indeed, any were made) than had been expected.

The obvious thing in the midst of such disorder was to put the administrative machine into action at once even if it were not/

not functioning at its best and for that purpose it was better to make no immediate change, But certain alterations were bound to be made. Louis had taken the place of the defeated Duke. As he could not always be in Milan he had to appoint a substitute with practically royal powers. The man chosen was Gian Giacomo Trivulzio who became both Governor General and Lieutenant of the King in Milan. The second office ceased of course at the time of Louis' visit. But the definite appointment of a Viceroy then became necessary. Trivulzio's rival for the office was de Ligny, who, on Trivulzio's retention of the title, became sulky, refused to govern Pavia to which he had been appointed, and sought service as a condottiere in Italy. His hopes came to nothing, and still refusing to live at Pavia, he returned to Milan. Trivulzio held the position after Louis left Milan, but it was merely the possession of a name; for the military direction was in the hands of La Tremoille, and the civil administration under the control of Cardinal d'Amboise.

Early in 1500 de Ligny went to Louis to complain of the conduct of his Lieutenants in Milan. Louis appointed La Tremoille who refused office as he did not wish to live in Milan. Between his departure and the arrival of Chaumont d'Amboise his successor, with Stuart d'Aubigny as Commander-in-Chief of the Army and M. de Talleyrand as Captain of Justice (they arrived in Milan on July 22nd 1500), the city was governed by the Senate the/

the Captain of Justice and Yves d'Alegre who commanded the troops. The new officials were installed the day following their arrival. From that date the military government of Milan - really part of the conquest - came to an end, and civil administration took its rightful place. (1)

In the midst of these intrigues for the viceroyalty of Milan matters quite as important to the general body of the citizens had not been neglected. The certainty that justice will be dispensed with fairness by a duly constituted body is a most important asset to the people of any state, but a suspensio causarum had been decreed in Milan on September 2nd 1499. The consequent inability to obtain legal redress for wrongs inflicted or to have civil cases tried involving disputes about lands, water rights, debts and so forth, would have caused resentment in normal times. At a moment when the political atmosphere was charged with excitement and suspicion, resentment was liable to become specially acute. Trivulzio was wise therefore when on September 17 he annulled the decree and re-opened the law courts.

Really the only department that took long to recover was that of finance for the instability of which Ludovico's flight with most of the treasure, and his delivery of certain ducal properties into the hands of his partisans were partly responsible. For/

(1) For a full account of what has been described above see Pélissier
"Louis XII et Ludovico Sforza, Vol. II, pp. 322-329."

For the rest, the citizens lived under the old Milanese institutions till the eve of Louis' departure from the city. The new duke was in no hurry to set up a fresh constitution; for on his decision depended not only the well-being of his lately acquired duchy but its smooth administration and even its retention by the French. Already the improbability of his importing a ready-made French constitution has been noted. There remained two other methods. He might determine to utilise the old Milanese constitution or he might make a compromise between it and the adoption of a completely French system. Ultimately he compromised by abolishing the Ducal Counsels and adopting, almost in toto, the central administrative departments as they stood, although the actual basis of the new constitution, as expressed in the establishment of the Senate, was French.

In general it may be said that in accordance with the ideas of the age, the French government of the province was despotic in character, protectionist, and intervenient in the most minute affairs of the administration. Such close attention to details must have reduced the efficiency of all governmental departments. But, as against these defects, must be placed the facts that the administration was wiser and more just than in any other Italian state, and that, under the French domination, Milan was more flourishing, if not happier than any of her contemporaries in Italy.

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In attempting to detail the history, scope and character of the French administration considerable difficulty has to be overcome. (2) The chroniclers give practically no help, and, while many documents remain in the State Archives, it is unfortunately true that those referring to the period of the French occupation are in worse condition than most of the others. Yet it is from these that the character of the administration must be determined. There are, however, sufficient to give a fair conception of how French rule affected the Milanese, and these may be supplemented by documents drawn from the archives of other states.

The full constitution did not spring into being at once. Even had it been wise to attempt the imposition of fresh laws and regulations upon a newly conquered territory, the circumstances under which the conquest took place rendered it impossible. The first year was occupied by temporary measures necessary, perhaps, during the settlement period, but not meant to remain in force when a normal government could perform its functions. Nevertheless some general administrative statutes were passed.

During the period 1500-1506 action was taken against rebels.

These/

(2) Cagnola's narrative ceases at 1497, while Prato's does not begin till 1499. The gap of two years is filled by Grumello. Burigozzo's Cronica Milanese begins with 1500, though he leaps at once to 1507. But not one of them deals with the administration of Milan. Corio's Storia of course, is not carried far enough; but Giovio, whose work goes beyond Louis' time, says nothing of administrative affairs.

These laws, of course, were transitory; but the six years witnessed also, the completion of the constitution, especially by the establishment of financial and judicial departments through which the administration was enabled to work smoothly. The protectionist character of the government was shown in the laws for the safe-guarding and development of industry. But by 1507 such statutes became less common. The administration was in working order, and what may be called local government (though it was under the control of the central authority) became more important, municipal decrees and warrants claiming a larger share of notice than did the general statutes. With 1512 a change came. Once more the Province was in revolution; and repressive measures and laws of exception prove that the restoration of the Sforza was as brutal in its immediate effects as was the conquest by the French. With the three years of anarchy which followed the succession of Maximiliano Sforza to the duchy this study has nothing to do; but it may, at least, be remarked that it was a pity that the good government and progress of the last twelve years in Milan should have been swept away almost as though they had never existed.

It is impossible to understand the difficulties of the French or to estimate their success in administering the duchy without some information regarding the component parts of the Milanese constitution and the manner in which they functioned. Such knowledge is specially important because, as will be seen, many/

many of these institutions were retained by Louis unaltered, while others were grafted upon French methods of government. Theoretically, Milan was a democracy the ruling body of which was the Council of Nine Hundred. The members of the Council were elected by the citizens - a hundred and fifty from each of the six gates - and could be chosen only from lawyers and from soldiers above a certain rank. Practically the influence of the Nine Hundred was small. Very seldom had the Visconti summoned it and then it had no opportunity either of initiating or even discussing measures. Its sole duty was to accept or reject the proposals placed before it by the duke.

This was perhaps, natural. With an assembly of such proportions discussion of legislative proposals would have been almost interminable and reasonable progress impossible. This was recognised by the citizens when, during the establishment of the Ambrosian Republic, a committee of twenty four was appointed to govern the city and arrange for its defence. It is true that the Council of Nine Hundred was called to confirm the election of the Committee. But that did not legalise the position of the Twenty Four for according to the constitution the committee had no standing, the government being vested in the Council of Nine Hundred.

Some shadow of its original powers clung to the Council during the régime of the Sforza Dukes. At a new accession, for example, the/

the members met to swear allegiance on behalf of the citizens of Milan. Occasionally, too, as when in 1474, Galeazzo Maria called the Council together to obtain its consent to the abolition of the inquinto, the reigning duke made a pretence of recognising its authority. Ludovico Sforza's system of secretariats besides reducing the power of the Ducal Councils, left the Council of Nine Hundred practically nothing to do. The explanation is necessary, as it might otherwise be deduced that the Council disappeared under the French administration simply because it did not fit in with the new duke's scheme of government, whereas it had really fallen into disuse prior to Louis' conquest of the duchy.

But if the municipal Council of Nine Hundred sank into insignificance during the times of the visconte and Sforza another body had come into being, much smaller in number and definitely attached to the reigning duke. This was the Ducal Council. Originally it was one body, but before it had been long established an off-shoot appeared which took cognisance of more secret matters connected with the Duke's government, while the other and larger portion became a ducal law court having certain jurisdiction beyond which it must not travel. The two divisions became known as the Council of Justice and the Privy Council.

With the establishment of the Ambrosian Republic both Councils disappeared, the government as explained in the description of the Nine Hundred being taken over by the Ventiquattro, the Captain and Defenders of the Liberty of Milan. On Francesco Sforza's/

Sforza's election to the dukedom the revival of the Ducal Councils was taken for granted. The new duke actually appointed ten members of the Privy Council and four of the Council of Justice (3) before his coronation.

When the Ducal Council was originally established it was meant to serve as a tool in the hands of the lord of Milan, and to some extent it continued till its dissolution to fulfil that purpose. It levied taxes and supplied the dukes with money for war, for entertainment, for the court and, during Galeazzo Maria's reign, incurred public odium by the frequent demands it was compelled to make upon the purses of the citizens.

It placed a levy of twenty-five per cent on the incomes of ecclesiastical benefices and added a fifth to the already sufficiently high food taxes - the hated inquinto. Yet it would be wrong to regard these Councils as wholly bad. The Council of Justice, for example, concerned itself with the trade of Milan - both home and foreign. Thus it is found issuing edicts against defective weights and measures as well as against the adulteration of goods - duties which, after the disappearance of the Council were performed by the Vicar of Provisions and another official specially appointed to look after weights and measures.

Nor was such a duty light. The baking trade in Milan, to take one instance, was peculiar, in that the price of the loaf was fixed while the weight varied with the price of flour, which again/

(3) See C.M. Ady, Milan Under the Sforza, p. 66.

again depended upon that of grain. Ample opportunity was thus given to dishonest traders to increase their profits by decreasing to a slight extent the legal weight of the loaf. Against this the Council of Justice took action.

Under the Sforza, as under the French administration, there was an almost never-ending struggle to compel civil service departments to confine themselves to their own work and prevent their absorbing the duties and privileges of other departments. The Council of Justice was not exempt from the general failing. Hence the College of Jurisprudence was obliged to complain of encroachments upon their judicial rights by both the Council of Justice and the Privy Council. The Milanese themselves were partly to blame for this as many of them preferred to have their cause heard before one of the Ducal Councils rather than bring it to the local court within the jurisdiction of which it lay. To Galeazzo's credit he took the constitutional side, forbidding his Councils to touch cases pertaining to other courts unless he himself decided otherwise. This reservation was important as it points to the duke's intention of disregarding constitutional practice if he saw fit; in other words, although in theory his power was limited, he did not accept the limitation but held himself, as James II. of England afterwards did, by his use of the Dispensing Power, as above the law.

The functions of the Privy Council were, if anything, more important/

important than those of the Council of Justice. It discussed with the duke the nature and amount of taxation required for the upkeep of the duchy and the ducal court. If fresh taxation were necessary it suggested ways and means of raising it. Further, it either brought into operation such new laws as might be proposed by the reigning duke or initiated legislative measures. It is thus apparent that under certain circumstances the Privy Council might act not merely as an instrument for carrying out the ducal policy but as a check on the action of the duke. On the whole, however, it is true to say that it was really an agent to express and carry into effect the duke's financial and legislative proposals. Its deliberations were conducted in secret and from this it is often termed the Secret Council.

Next in importance to the Ducal Council were the two chambers of the Entrate - the Magistrato Ordinario and the Magistrato Straordinario. Between them these two magistracies collected the whole revenues - Entrate - of the duchy. In addition they acted as Courts of Law, hearing and deciding cases pertaining to taxation throughout the province; while every day they sat as an executive committee entrusted with the ducal finances. The importance of the two chambers warrants a somewhat full description of their constitution, powers and methods of procedure.

Possibly the two bodies were at first united but perche le memorie antichissime sono sepolte nelle tenebre della dimenticanza, e pochi/

e pochi sono stati diligenti nello scrivere le Geste di questi
Magistrati, e gli atti delle cose publiche posso sol dire che
anticamente vi erano li Maestri delle Entrate Ordinarie e
(4)
Straordinarie separati in due tribunali.

The reason for their separation is sufficiently obvious. The whole taxation from which were derived the revenues of the state was of two kinds - ordinary and extraordinary - each of them being controlled by a body appointed ad hoc. The Magistrato Ordinario controlled taxation on lands, farms (luoghi) and bird preserves, together with the taxes levied in the ordinary course of administration. (5) But these ordinary taxes were many. In the first place, practically all goods entering the province from abroad had to pay customs duties and, whether or not they had already paid these duties, they were subject to the octroi upon their introduction into any of the cities of the duchy. Within the bounds of the province salt, wood, cloth, bread and wine - all necessities of life - paid a regularly assessed tax. Further, there was a grist tax, and occasionally as under Galeazza Maria a fifth was added to the value of all assessments in order to meet some pressing difficulty. All revenues derived from these regular sources were the care of the Entrate Ordinario. The remainder was the charge of the Entrate Straordinario.

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(4) Benaglio, Relazione Historica del Magistrato Straordinario delle Entrate di Milano, cp. I. p. 1.

(5) See Benaglio Relazione, p. 12.

In addition the Magistrato Straordinario had the duty of seeing that fines and other pecuniary penalties were passed on to the Ducal Camera, i.e. to the Treasury. It enforced the surrender of the proceeds of all goods to which by confiscation, condemnation or devolution the Treasury was entitled, and it approved the appointment of notaries and actuaries (as well as their coadjutors) in the Criminal Departments of the State. The Chamber received also the security paid biennially by officials, and took charge of the expenses in connection with the grant of citizenship to foreigners.

Under the care of the Magistrato Straordinario were the Beni Patrimoniali of the duke, ducal waters and rivers, Beni Vacanti (vacant heirships) together with the fiefs, movable goods and other possessions of condemned persons. The Chamber administered these lands, goods and waters, hiring them out and causing the rents, fruits and other returns to be collected. It had also the task of making improvements, seeing to necessary repairs and renewing or terminating the lets of the goods, fiefs, lands, waters and devolutions above mentioned.

The Entrate Straordinario comprised a President who must hold the degree of Doctor of Laws and be a member of the Ducal Council; ⁽⁶⁾ Maestri or Questori, three of whom must be doctors and the three others holders of an inferior degree (Cappa Curta); and a varying number of notaries. The establishment of the notaries was as/

(6) In Louis XII's time he was a member of the Senate.

as ancient as that of the Maestri. They were an essential part of the magistracy and took part in judicial affairs, though they had nothing to do with legal decisions. Through them justice was administered, as they took charge of the legal documents of the magistracy and drew up reports of the causes heard before that body when it functioned as a law court.

The President and Maestri had a fixed salary together with a share of the salt Gabelle. A stated sum was allowed for the upkeep of the various canals and waterways of the state, which sum, along with a percentage of the proceeds from the fines and sales of the goods of condemned persons ~~was~~ shared monthly between the President and the six Maestri, the whole being divided into eight equal parts, of which the President took two, and the Maestri, whether Dottori or of Cappa Curta, one part each.

The functions of the President were to attend to all business carried on by the Magistrato Straordinario, take the votes, and sign all ordinances, letters, commissions or patents, and all sentences whether provisional or definitive. He must preside at all meetings of the Magistracy and present a list of cases to be heard before that body.

Like the Senate and the other Magistracies, the Magistrato Straordinario met every day in the week except Sundays and feast days, the business of hearing cases being taken over by the Maestri Dottori in turn. The morning session lasted for three hours, the first/

first two being controlled by one of the Maestri Dottori and the third by one of the Maestri "Cappa Curta". Then followed an adjournment to hear Mass, after which the session was resumed for the purpose of promulgating the decisions made at the first meeting. This routine work having been completed, attention was directed to other matters within the jurisdiction of the magistracy, such as the proclamation of sales or administration of the goods of condemned persons, and the repair of the Martesana or the Muzza. As soon as the meeting began a sand glass - orologio da polvere.- was set, by which the time was measured.

The results of their deliberations were expressed by vote in connection with which minute directions were laid down. The first to vote was the Maestro Dottori who had been longest in office, the others following in order of seniority. Next came the Maestri "Cappa Curto" who voted in the same manner, and last the president, who had a casting vote. The Maestro Dottori in charge for that morning then noted on the agenda list the result of the voting for each matter under discussion and passed the papers on to the notaries or the chancellor to be put into legal form.

The Maestri Dottori had the oversight of all matters within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal except those which were definitely assigned to the Maestri "Cappa Curta". One of the Dottori took charge of all cases dealing with fiefs, with devolutions and confiscations/

confiscations or notifications in connection therewith, and of all pecuniary condemnations within the city and duchy. These cases, as well as disputes concerning the Martesana and the waters between the Adda and the Muzza, he had to initiate and press to a conclusion, and in addition had the care of the Fossa of Milan.

The second Maestro Dottore took charge of similar cases in connection with the cities of Cremona, Pavia, Lodi and their vicinity, together with matters arising out of the care of the Grand Canal and the Bereguardo. The third was responsible for the same work in the cities of Alexandria Vigevano, Tortona, Novara, Como and their neighbourhood. He was entrusted also with the care of the Muzza. In the absence of one of the Maestri Dottori his duties were undertaken by his two colleagues.

The senior Maestro "Cappa Curta" saw to the carrying out of confiscations throughout the whole state, had charge of the books of the magistracy and made sure that the income due to the Treasury from confiscation or devolution came into the proper hands. Under the third Maestro Dottore he supervised the Muzza, visiting the waterway when necessary, to decide what repairs were required. The second in seniority was responsible for all pecuniary fines and saw that they came to the Treasury. He reported to a full meeting of the Magistracy the inability to pay their fines of all who were in poverty; he received accounts from the Executors fortnightly, from the referendaries annually and from/

from the other commissioners every six months. These he balanced at least once in two years (biennio). Under the direction of the second Maestro Dottora he took charge of matters pertaining to the Grand Canal and the Bereguardo. The third was responsible for the taxes on corn (biade), the Canal of the Martesana and the moat round the city of Milan. As in the case of the Maestri Dottori, the duties of an absent Maestro "Cappa Curta" were undertaken by the two who remained.

The number of Maestri employed in the Magistracy was not invariable. Nor did the same chamber always control the same taxation. In 1471, for example, Galeazzo Maria in an attempt to centralise the collection of taxes transferred part of the jurisdiction of the Magistrato Straordinario to the Magistrato Ordinario; while sixteen years later Gian Galeazzo ordered the Entrate Straordinario to consist of five degree men and four military officials - an arrangement which lasted less than a year.

In addition to the Maestri Dottori there were in the time of the Sforza two ragionati or accountants plus a coadjutor. Their duties were to keep the books of the Magistracy to receive the accounts of the Referendaries and other officials dependent upon the chamber, and to register sentences and descriptions of goods of condemned persons. They also kept the Libro di Civiltà, a register of privileges, dispensations and patents granted to foreigners to acquire goods in the State of Milan.

In addition to the ordinary ragionati there was in the time of/

of Francesco Sforza an official of the same standing whose duties though similar were concerned solely with matters pertaining to cultivated lands. Over these the ragionato ad laboreria had control in the interest of the Magistrato Straordinario.

The duties of the Recettore or Treasurer require but little explanation. Into his hands were paid all sums derived from confiscations, pecuniary condemnations and vacant heirships, together with the revenues of the Martesana, Bereguardo and Grand Canal, of the Muzza and other waters over which the Magistrato Straordinario exercised control. He had to give security of eight thousand crowns (scudi) and as no salary was attached to the office he was allowed a commission of one half percent of all monies paid into the General Treasury.

The remaining officials consisted of (1) two Cancellieri delle Condanne who were bound to employ two coadjutors appointed by the reigning duke; (2) a number of other coadjutors and inferior clerks working under the direction of the superior officials of the Magistracy; and (3) an Executor. The Cancellarie had the care of pecuniary condemnations in connection with the various canals and waterways of the state, and of the arrangement for their repair. They received the security of the officials who were in charge of these waterways, saw to the issue of patents to Campari and of edicts against those who unlawfully drew water from the canals. They took charge also of cases involving such infringements of the law, but could not prosecute without the sanction/

sanction of the notaries and coadjutors of the Criminal Office.

The Executor was entrusted with the duty of enforcing payment of fines levied by the court, seizing money, goods, effects, real and personal, as well as the fruits of confiscations, devolutions and vacant heirships.

Louis XII. made nineteen appointments to posts in the Magistracy, none of which was given to a Frenchman.⁽⁷⁾ This information which was given by Benaglio is not quite correct. For the year 1510 the Budget (d'Auton Vol. II. p. 358) mentions sixteen officials not counting the President and the Ushers. Of these members of the Magistracy no fewer than seven - one Maestro, one Ragionato, two Cancellieri, one Conductor and two Notaries - were French.

Under the Magistrato Straordinario was the Cancelleria delle Biade which kept an account of grain both growing and harvested, saw to the importation of supplies if a shortage of corn seemed likely and forbade exportation unless under stringent conditions. (d'Auton II. 361, VIII. xx).

The same Magistracy controlled the corps of Ducal Engineers. Their duties were of two kinds. In the first place, they were overseers of the rivers, canals and lakes of the province as well as of the smaller irrigation ditches which drew their water therefrom. Where repairs were required they saw them carried into effect and where the law regarding the running of waters from main/

(7) This information is gathered from Benaglio's Relazione, various pages.

main streams' was infringed, they reported the matter. Their other duties were miscellaneous. They saw that goods devolving to the Treasury were kept in order, and made sure that the regulations regarding the distance of rice fields from towns, villages and ducal roads were observed. Benaglio mentions three appointments during Louis XII's administration - all Italians. But here, again, he is not accurate, as at least one Frenchman received a post by direct order of the king.⁽⁸⁾

On the whole it is true to say that Louis interfered very little with the Magistrato Straordinario, leaving it to do its work in its own way. The appointments made were almost bound to include some Frenchman, yet the majority of the members were Italian. The king was wise to pursue a policy of non-interference with a body of men whose duties brought them into close contact with every class of the community, who were accustomed to deal with all sorts of taxes - except the ordinary ones - the salt gabelle, the grist tax, the duties on cattle and horses, customs duties, imposts on bread, wine, wool, wood, cloth, - which were under the control of the Magistrato Ordinario. This body had an organisation similar to that of the Magistracy just described in detail. The two chambers were equal in power and honour, although in Louis' time the total expenses of the Ordinary Chamber exceeded those of the Extraordinary Magistracy.

In Milanese edicts the office entitled Vicar of Provisions frequently/

(8)Milan, Reg. Duc. IV. fol. 54, tergo.

frequently occurs. With the holder of this position were associated a committee of twelve whose duties were similar to those of the modern Town Council. This Committee was invested with the right to issue such edicts as might be required for the general well-being of the city and had power to compel obedience to them.

The Police Department, like the Vicar and the Twelve, possessed the privilege of issuing and enforcing obedience to its edicts, it controlled the streets and waterways of the city, preserving the amenity of the roads and seeing that waterways were maintained in an efficient state. In addition, the Department made arrangements for the safety of the public at ordinary times and issued special regulations when circumstances appeared to demand it.

One of the most notable Departments was the Sanita. Even judging by the standard of modern times the arrangements for preserving health and preventing the spread of disease were admirable in Milan. The plague, the most dreaded disease of the age, was the object of much attention. A century and a half later, people in London could do more than paint a cross on the door of a house where the pest had fallen, and write the prayer "Lord have mercy upon us!" but in Milan under the Sforza isolation hospitals had been established, compulsory notification of the plague was enforced and a heavy hand laid on mountebank practitioners whose interference did infinitely more harm than good.

No state can be administered without taxation. So far it has/

has simply been said that taxes in the land were of two kinds, ordinary and extraordinary, each kind being in the charge of an ad hoc body. How then was the revenue of the state raised? Owing to the decay of feudalism in the North of Italy little revenue was obtained from feudal incidents; but the reigning duke retained the profits of justice, and such rights as the fruits of vacant heirships and the goods of foreigners dying without heirs.

Of direct taxation there was practically none if such imposts as dues levied for the use of canals and for the privilege of building wharves on their banks be excepted. The bulk of the revenue was derived from duties placed on the sale of wine, bread, butcher meat, wool, cloth, wood, horses, cattle, that is, on food stuffs and other necessities of life. The gabelle, or salt tax, also brought in a considerable sum of money. Goods entering the province from abroad were subject to customs duties, and each city through which they passed exacted its octroi - though this last was not national but municipal. All these taxes were retained by Louis. One or two documents referred to in the body of the essay make mention of tax farmers, which point to the sale of offices from which a further revenue was raised.

The two chambers of the Entrate already described were part of the central administration and dealt both with taxation and legal cases arising from it. But the real head of the administration in the Sforza's time was the Ducal Council in its two divisions/

divisions, the Council of Justice and the Secret Council. Under French rule its place was taken by the Senate which formed the Supreme Court of Justice. Subordinate to it were other legal tribunals analogous to the parlements of France.

Except where mention has been made of changes introduced by the French, the administrative system so far as it has been described was retained by Louis. But everything could not be so easily settled. For instance, the duke's almost permanent absence from Milan necessitated the appointment of a Lieutenant General and a Chancellor, the one controlling the military arrangements, while the other headed the civil administration. Both of these posts were new to Milan.

The advent of the French found both financial and judicial administration in the utmost disorder. As Louis XII's desire for the possession of the duchy had been guided by the hope of inheriting the ducal treasures and revenue he must have been disappointed at the position in which he found them. The common belief among the invaders was that the fugitive duke's treasure (9) would be sufficient to maintain them for at least three years. But Ludovico had carried off what treasure he could and distributed the remainder among his friends; while the financial resources of the duchy had been strained to the utmost to subsidise Maximilian and pay the expenses of the troops in the field. The people, crushed/

(9) Sanuto Diaries II. 1209.

crushed beneath the burden of taxation, looked to the French to lighten it. This was impossible; yet by preserving the Milanese financial system and enforcing stability in the incidence of taxation much was done to improve the situation. But the Milanese desired more than the French could or would give, and from their disappointment arose the movement to recall Ludovico.

The judicial side of the administration was quite as bad. Not for some months after the second conquest did the courts begin to carry out their duties with any approach to efficiency. (10) M. Péliissier points out that it was difficult, even in cases of extreme gravity, to lay hands on highly placed criminals. However, by reducing the number of prorogations, and defining the powers of the Executor Camere an improvement was made, so that before long, the ordinary business of the courts proceeded without difficulty.

The fundamental act in the establishment of the new régime was the erection of a Senate which took the place of the former Ducal Councils. The relative numbers of French and Italian members was a difficult problem and d'Amboise deserves credit for his courage in putting the Italians in the majority. The document containing the terms of its constitution may be divided into/

(10) Louis XII. et Ludovic Sforza, Vol. II. p. 336.

(11) A copy of the decree, now lost, was formerly in the Archivio di Stato, Milan (Reg. Panig. M.). But another exists in the Biblioteca Brera in the same town.

into five sections dealing respectively with the appointment of the governing officials, the constitution of the Senate, its powers, the machinery through which it acted, and its functions as a judicial body.

Louis begins by reciting the reasons which have induced him to establish this method of government. Unless men were restrained by law, envious ambition would prevail; therefore kings were necessary to enforce law. But he was unable to remain in Milan: other affairs had a claim upon his attention, and thus he was compelled to make provision for the good government of the Milanese while he was absent. (12) In the first place he must appoint a deputy who would have almost plenary power, and this office he gifted to Gian Giacomo Trivulzio, whose fidelity, wisdom and steadfastness he had frequently noticed. To him, as Governor-General, he deputed full power to act as he thought best in all matters concerning war and the defence of the state. He might enter a meeting of the Senate if he chose, or he might call a meeting at his own house of any members of that body whom he might wish to consult. He could issue letters patent, and disputes of which an ordinary judge could not take cognizance he might settle by his own authority. Finally, each and all of the king's new subjects, as well as the Frenchmen in the duchy, were (13) commanded to obey him as they would the king.

A second appointment was made by Louis - that of Pierre de Sacierges,/

(12) See Appendix III. Art. 1.

(13) Ibid. Art. 2.

(14)
Sacierges, Bishop of Lucon, to the Chancellorship of the duchy. He was to act as President of the Senate which was being established, and also as President of Justice. By Letters Patent dated from Vigevano on the day of his appointment (Nov. 11) Louis declared that, in addition to his salary as Chancellor he should retain the emoluments of his office as temporary President of the Grand Conseil, a post which he held during the absence from France of the Chancellor. As the new appointment involved residence in Milan and consequently inability to perform the functions of his French office, the continuation of his salary as deputy President of the Grand Conseil might indicate that Louis had no strong belief in the ultimate success or even in the permanence of the system he was establishing. But quite as probable an explanation is that he wished to avail himself of the new Milanese Chancellor's long administrative experience, and yet retain him in the French appointment till he found a suitable successor for one or other of the offices.

These two administrative posts having been filled, the next step was the creation of a Senate. In Milan there had been two councils, one a Privy Council and the other a body charged with the conduct of judicial affairs. As the authority of these two assemblies was fairly equal, and as their continued existence involved/

(14) Appendix III. Art. '3.

For notes regarding the attainments and experience of the Senators appointed, see Appendix IV.

involved the payment of a large number of officials who were not required for the efficient government of the state, the duke determined to merge the functions of both in a new body. (15) By so doing he believed that the government would be improved, and that a saving would be effected by a reduction in the number of civil servants.

The Senate, which took over the duties of the two councils just mentioned, was under the presidency of the Chancellor of Milan. Besides the President it comprised seventeen members, two of whom were prelates, and four were knights, while the remainder, viri electi docti et graduati, were chosen both from French and from Italian subjects of the king. The appointment as Senator carried with it a salary together with all the rights and privileges attaching to membership of the Grand Conseil and the Parlements of France.

The two prelates chosen were Antonio Trivulzio, Bishop of Como, and Girolamo Pallavicino, Bishop of Novara. The knights appointed were Pietro Gallerate, Francesco Bernardino Visconti, Gilberto Borromeo and Erasmo Trivulzio. Of the eleven remaining members of the Senate only ten are mentioned in the document now being discussed, viz. Claude de Seyssel, Scipione Barbavara, Accurse Maynier, Giovanni Francesco Marliano Michele Rizzo, Giovanni Francesco da Curte, Geoffredo Caroli, Giovanni Stephano da Castiglione, Girolamo de Cusano and Antonio Caccia.

Having stated the constitution of the Senate and the choice of/

of members made by the king, the document proceeds to specify how its membership might be varied, and to detail the arrangements for filling places vacated by death or by default. Louis evidently had in mind the gradual reduction of the ecclesiastical and knightly representatives, for the regulation is laid down that if one of these offices is vacated by the death of its holder, the place is not to be filled. "Nec alii," the article declares, "possint in eorum locum subrogari, sed tantum unus prelatus et tres viri militares remaneant." What was to happen if more than one of these officials died is not definitely stated; but, when the instruction regarding the first vacancy is so emphatic, a continuation of the same policy might be expected. Yet, from a further provision it is clear that Louis meant to retain at least three knights in his Senate. He ordains that if a Senator dies or loses his place by default the vacancy is at once to be filled; and if the person appointed fails to perform his duties satisfactorily another must be appointed, and so on, ending with the phrase "et idem in militaribus viris volumus observari."

The number of Senators was fixed, and any vacancy must be filled by election. Three suitable candidates were elected by the Senate and their names submitted to Louis who made the final choice. Those whose birth-place was "ultra montane" did not undergo/

(16) Appendix III., Art. 5.

(17) Ibid. Art. 7.

undergo this double test, as the king retained their election
(18)
in his own hands. The Senator-elect was compelled to take oath
that neither he nor any one on his behalf had disbursed money or
its equivalent to secure his election. The further good stipula-
tion was made that, if a Senator-elect were proved to have of-
fended in this way, he could not take his seat and the Senate was
(19)
left with the duty of punishing him.

The choice of candidates was not altogether free. It has
already been said that there were under Ludovico's regime two
administrative bodies in Milan - the Privy Council and a judicial
body termed the Ordinary Council. As members of these Councils
had a fair amount of administrative experience, Louis wisely de-
creed that, when an election was required for a Senator from the
"citramontane" district, the candidates submitted must be ex-
(20)
members of one or other of the former Milanese Councils. These
ex-members, he points out had lost their appointments not be-
cause of any fault but simply because he had destroyed the of-
fices they held when he was reconstructing the administrative
fabric. Besides occupying this preferential position they were,
in the meantime, to hold all privileges, honours and prerogatives
which/

(18) Appendix III., Art. 6.

(19) Appendix III., Art. 6.

(20) Incidentally this leads to an understanding of the meaning
Louis attached to ultramontane. He was thinking from the
view-point of Milan; hence those who were ultramontane
lived in France.

which they had formerly enjoyed. If need were, the Chancellor might invite their presence at a session of the Senate, their votes being counted for that occasion. To a certain extent, this was a dangerous permission, as by this means it might be possible for the Chancellor to force through measures which were repugnant to the Senate as a whole. Further, they were allowed to take part in judicial and extra-judicial meetings of the Senate in the absence of members sufficient to carry on the business. (21)

Another wise precaution was the regulation that all members of the Senate should live in Milan. By their doing so Louis believed that the people would have more faith in their actions, and that they themselves would be able to exercise the functions of their office with greater effect, especially those connected with the administration of justice. (22) Finally, before passing to the powers of the Senate, Louis laid down the condition that, as the Lieutenant Governor represented him in every way, Trivulzio (23) had the right of entry into the Senate whenever he chose.

The decree then passes to offices of the judicature, important enough in themselves, but to be held subordinate to the Senate - Captains of Justice, Judges, Vicars, Commissioners of Towns, Consuls, Podesterie (Mayoralties), et alii similes.

Such/

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- (21) Appendix III.; Art. 7
(22) Ibid. Art. 8.
(23) Ibid. Art. 9.

Such offices had been held during the regime of the late duke, and from the wording of the article it is justifiable to conclude that there had been no wholesale dismissals when the French took over the administration. In the event of any of these posts falling vacant by death or lapse of time, somewhat the same procedure was to be followed as in the election of Senators. Three suitable men were chosen by the Senate and notice of the election sent to the Lieutenant General who then chose the one he thought best fitted for the office in question. The appointment was issued in the king's name under the Chancellor's seal but, before he was permitted to exercise the functions of his office, the person appointed had to swear, as in the case of Senators-elect, that no bribery or payment of any kind had been employed to secure the appointment. He took an oath, also, to perform well, legally, and in the accustomed manner, the duties of the office according to its nature.⁽²⁴⁾

Not only had the Senate full control of the judicial arrangements of the duchy: in virtue of its functions as a parlement it was itself a court of law. Acting like the Grand Chambre of the parlement, it tried important cases involving disputes between the nobility of the duchy and between the king and the great houses, as well as those in which the king and his chancery/

(24) Appendix III. Art. 10.

(25) Ibid. Art. 11.

chancery were at variance. Its activities in this capacity, however, were not confined to such cases, for it took cognizance, also, of financial disputes in which the sum involved was at least of the value of a thousand ducats per annum. Again, it performed the functions of the Chambre des Enquetes in hearing cases of appeal. These, however, the Senate might refuse to take up if, after consideration, the members were of the opinion that the hearing of any such appeal would be displeasing to the king. (26)

It was further ordained that the decrees of the Senate should have the effect of laws. Any person condemned by that body had the right of appeal before punishment was inflicted. This right he exercised by obtaining an order for revision of the sentence from the Chancery, which was then bound to bring the case before the Senate. Next, the appellant deposited sixty ducats with one of the senatorial secretaries, upon which an enquiry into the case took place within one year. No one interested in the issue of the re-trial might act as judge, other members being substituted for them. (27)

The Senate exercised, also, the important function of verifying and interpreting the duke's letters of gifts, remissions, indulgences, privileges, ordinances and edicts, both political and judicial. Further, and very important, until such documents had been examined, interpreted and verified by the/

(26) Appendix III., Art. 13.

(27) Ibid. Art. 16.

the Senate their terms could not be put into operation.

Had these various provisions been left without further comment, the ruder spirits of the time might have been tempted to defy the Senate's decrees and thus render the whole scheme of government unworkable. Louis' lawyers, however, saw to it that the Senate was supplied with the authority necessary to enforce its edicts. It had, for example, power to punish judicial officers who failed to perform their duties satisfactorily. They might be reprimanded, suspended, or even deprived of their office. Yet this governing body was not left to do exactly as it pleased. Minute rules were laid down for its guidance. The Chancellor, or other officer presiding in his stead, was empowered, or, rather, enjoined to close discussion by a vote of the members present. Even in so slight a matter as hours of meeting it was bound. On holy days no meeting was held, while on lawful days two hours in the morning and the same in the afternoon were to remain free from the trial of appeal cases, the hearing of petitions and other such business, so that the ordinary work of legislation might be overtaken.

All decisions of the Senate in reply to petitions by the duke's subjects were signed by a Senator and passed to one of the secretaries with instructions to deliver it to the Chancery either/

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- (28) Appendix III., Art. 15.
(29) Ibid. Art. 17.
(30) Ibid. Art. 18.

either for registration or for confirmation - probably the
(31)
former.

As a further aid to the machinery of government Louis decreed
the appointment of a Procurator-fiscal to undertake ducal prosecu-
tions in the courts, and an Advocate-fiscal whose duties would
(32)
be those of defence in matters concerning the ducal revenue.
(33)
The first of these appointments was given to Giovanni Birago and
(34)
the second to Girolamo Morone. As often as a vacancy occurred in
either of the offices three candidates were to be chosen by the
Senate and presented to the duke, who would appoint one of them.
The holders of the two offices had no right of entry into the Sen-
ate unless their presence were requested by the members. In ad-
dition, four salaried clerks were appointed to aid the Senate,
the choice ad praesens ac cum tempus vacationis evenierit being
(35)
left to the Senators.

The document then proceeds to a consideration of the
Chancery, without, however, defining its duties, its relation
to the Senate, or its actual composition. Fortunately some
information/

(31) Appendix III., Art. 19.

(32) Ibid. Art. 20.

(33) His name appears in the Milanese Budget of 1510 as Procureur
du Roy against a payment of £400.

(34) Morone's name also appears in the Budget of 1510 as a Senator,
but no indication is given of the date when he was appointed.

(35) Appendix III., Art. 21.

information may be gathered respecting its position. First of all may be noted the appointment of ten secretaries to the Chancery, nine of whom are mentioned by name. As their duties consisted in the preparation and signing of all acts, ordinances and appointments dealing with civil and criminal trials, it is apparent that the Chancery was a law court. This is confirmed in the same article by the mention of the oath the secretaries took to do their duty and be obedient tanquam eorum judici et immediate superiori.

Article 26 puts the matter beyond doubt. There it is decreed that letters of justice passed by the Senate must be delivered to the Chancery. The court took charge, in its own right, of such matters as pardons, remissions, privileges, bans, reception of homage and investitures. Should any case prove too difficult for the Chancery and any council assisting it, then it was remitted to the Senate which, after consideration, issued the/

(36) Appendix III., Art. 22.

In Art. 24 the tenth secretary, Pierre de Mansebrey, is mentioned.

Of the ten secretaries appointed very little is known. Bartolomeo Calco - he signed B. Chalcus - certainly took the oath of allegiance to Louis and performed his secretarial duties. Several documents exist bearing his signature - including the one now under discussion. He joined Ludovico in his attempt to regain the duchy, was captured on its failure, and imprisoned in Milan. See Prato p. 252. What became of him is doubtful. His name does not appear in the list of condemnations, nor is he mentioned as having been put to death or pardoned.

Of Pierre Garbot I have found no trace, unless he be the recorder whose visa is attached to a document dealing with a political journey of Louis XII. into Burgundy at the beginning of 1501. See d'Auton, Vol. II., Pièces Annexes, p. 392.

the judgment. Two points thus emerge; first, that the Chancery as a court, had extensive powers of its own, independent of the Senate; and, second, that in certain circumstances it was subordinate and had to commit its cases to the larger body.

Further, the composition of the Chancery was, to some degree, dependent upon that of the Senate; for, whenever it held a meeting, four Italian and an equal number of French members of the Senate must be present, and take part in the deliberations. (37) The members, however, were elected by the permanent body of the Chancery, which thus exercised a certain amount of control over its own composition.

Two minor points may be mentioned here. In the Chancery were two keepers of the seal who, as salary, received not more than twenty-five gold ducats per annum. (38) The second point is that the Chancery was left with plenary powers to punish by confiscation of salary and otherwise those who had falsified the royal letters committed to their charge. (39) The two remaining articles need but little comment. The seal with the royal arms was/

(37) Appendix III., Art. 28.

(38) Ibid. Art. 25.

(39) Ibid. Art. 27.

The provisions of Art. 27 and 28 were based on the French model. The senatorial members of the Chancery were, indeed, a kind of *Maîtres des Requêtes*, entitled, as these officers were, to payment for their services.

was ordered to be used only by the Chancellor - a natural provision, as he was the highest civil official in the duchy. It prevented, too, any attempt of the Senate to control the royal seal or to put it into commission. The last article merely contains the usual exhortation to keep the statute inviolate in all its provisions upon pain of the royal displeasure. (41)

From the references made to institutions upon which the constitution of the Senate was based, it is plain that its foundation was not Italian but French. It performed the functions of the Grand Chambre and the Chambre des Enquetes of the Parlements. In its possession of supreme executive and legislative power and in its function as a Law Court it had all the attributes of the Conseil du Roi while the offices of Advocate-fiscal and Procurator-fiscal were innovations from the French administrative system. The chancellorship was partly of Italian and partly of French origin, while the Controllershship of Military and Judicial Officials was of French extraction. On the other hand the system of checks by which the powers of Chancellor and Senate were so balanced that neither could over-ride the other was neither French nor Italian but a new device necessitated by the exigency of circumstances. (42)

Few of the old institutions disappeared. The two Ducal Councils/

(40) Appendix III., Art. 29.

(41) Ibid. Art. 30.

(42) Reg. Panig. N. fol. 20, tergo.

Councils, of course, were replaced by the Senate, and the Cancellaria delle Condanne gave way to a Receiver General of Con-
(43)
demnations, an office specially created for Milan. But the two most important administrative departments, the Magistrati Ordinario and Straordinario, with the Syndics and Referendaries, as well as the Cancellaria delle Biade and the Sanita remained unchanged in function as formerly, though some of the members were now French.

With the erection of the Senate began the real administrative life of Milan under French rule. Though it did not set so high a standard in politics as did the Sanita in the preservation of health it was nevertheless a great advance on the régime of the ducal Councils. It is true that these had exercised a restraining influence on the reigning duke, but it was not self-elective, nor were its resolutions regarded as laws. The old Milanese Councils took their orders in the main, from the duke; they had little opportunity for initiating legislation and even then it was subject to the duke's veto. The Senate, on the contrary, made laws with which the Chancellor was powerless to interfere. Thus a long step had been taken in the direction of popular government, despite the fact that the body was quite undemocratic in character. The twelve years of its rule gave to Milan peace and prosperity which were sadly lacking for three and a half centuries after the French evacuation of the duchy.

(43) Reg. Duc. IV., fol. 46.

CHAPTER VIII.

The French Administration During the Settlement. -----

The re-conquest of Milan left the French with a problem to solve materially different from that which they had acquired by the first flight of Ludovico. Then they had found Milan in a state of disruption. Of the great families some remained loyal to the fugitive prince; others were, even as they had been under Ludovico's rule, favourable to the foreigner; while a third section, indifferent to everything save their personal advantage, pursued an opportunist policy. Hence the natural leaders of the populace were powerless to make a stand against the invaders.

The people, too, though probably mindful of Louis' attitude towards them at the end of Charles VIII's invasion, were not unwilling to accept him, as the taxation to which they had been subjected had alienated them to a considerable extent from Ludovico, and they did not dream of heavier burdens being laid upon them by their new masters. The strength of France as compared with that of Milan awed the citizens, and the mere fact of the conquest exercised a powerful restraining influence over them; while the ferocious methods of French warfare rendered them still more chary of provoking the wrath of Louis. The administration of the state, /

state, then, ought to have been comparatively easy had not grievous blunders been made.

For some of the events leading to Ludovico's attempt to recover Milan the French authorities were not altogether responsible. The interval between the first conquest and the revolt was of necessity an unsettled time. The citizens had to suffer hardships upon which they had not reckoned. The expenses of the war must be paid, and naturally Louis endeavoured to obtain as much as possible from his new province. This, of course, was in addition to the ordinary taxation required for the conduct of government. Thus there arose discontent, which was further increased by the overbearing conduct of the French soldiery - a discontent which expressed itself in rioting that was quelled only on the king's personal orders to drop certain of the taxes. By that time, however, the evil had been done. It may be true that the military might have been under better control; but from the examples quoted by Prato it is evident that the authorities were aware of the existing turbulence and adopted severe measures to repress it, both as a means of restoring discipline and as a guarantee of the good intentions of the French towards the Milanese.

Again, Louis was placed in an awkward position. Those of the Milanese who had helped him he was compelled to reward for their services. But he was unable to give them all they desired, and thus they, too, grew discontented and were, perhaps, more/

more bitter against Louis than were those who had opposed him at first. The king's most grievous error, however, was his appointment of Trivulzio as governor of the conquered province. He was a Milanese, a party man, greedy in disposition and bent on advancing the interests of his own family, the members of which received favours far beyond their merits, their devotion to the cause of Louis being for the greater part simply a means of expressing their hatred towards Ludovico. The administrative incapacity of Gian Giacomo, with the civil confusion it engendered, must bear the heaviest responsibility for the failure to retain Milan after the first conquest.

The situation was distinctly altered by the second conquest. The French had now to deal with a sullen population exasperated by the presence of the invaders, bitterly disappointed at the heavy taxation, and yet afraid to show its resentment. Charles d'Amboise certainly proved a better administrator than Trivulzio, and/

(1)(a) Erasmo Trivulzio became Governor of Valenza upon its capture in August, 1499.

(b) In a list of those condemned for having taken part with Ludovico against the French are the following notes:-

(1) Messire Galeaz Sforce, Conte de Melce, bastard, est en Alemaigne. Il avoit la contée de Melce, qu'a esté transferée en Messire Georges et les frères de Trivolce.

(2) Le conte Ludovic Bergamin est à Mantue. Il avoit ccc ducas de revenu, chascun an, donnés à Messire Catellan Trivolce. Paris, Archives Nationales, J. 507, No. 22.

(2) Seigneur de Chaumont, nephew of Georges d'Amboise, Cardinal of Rouen.

and once the government had really become settled the French dealt justly by the Province. Nevertheless there always remained in the minds of the people the feeling that they were conquered, that they were ruled by a foreign nation, and, even when the authority of that nation was benevolently wielded, the subjugation itself was a sore provocation to them.

The loss of Milan to the French in 1512 was due, not so much to lack of administrative ability, as to Louis' unfortunate entanglement in foreign affairs. The Venetians, who were really responsible for bringing him into Italy, had contracted with him to receive almost the half of Lombardy. Possibly Louis was not satisfied with such an agreement, but the conduct of Charles VIII, during his Italian campaign had left him no option. The Venetians, however, when they saw the king master of Lombardy, realised the folly of which they had been guilty. The smaller Italian states Louis might easily have bound to himself, as each of them had some special enemy of which it was afraid. Had the king offered protection to them they would have rallied to him in their own interest, and in the aggregate they would have been sufficient to aid him against the greater powers. Instead of this, however, he helped Alexander VI. to conquer the Romagna. Thus, while by this action he alienated the small states which feared the aggrandising spirit of the Pope, he was at the same time/

(3) It is only fair to bear in mind that his league with Alexander provided for this conquest.

time increasing the temporal power of the Church. In the end, Papal ambition rose to such a pitch that Louis had to interfere (4) in order to defend Tuscany.

In his relations with Naples he was equally unfortunate. Common prudence should have warned him against allowing Spain any foothold in Italy. Had he been able to attack and hold Naples without foreign help, only moral scruples need have prevented his doing so; but to allow Spain an entrance into the southern portion of the Peninsula was, in reality, inviting his own expulsion. Again, his adherence to the League of Cambray (1505) that he might recover from Venice the Ghiara d'Adda and Cremona, the price he had paid for Venetian help in 1499, lost him the friendship of the republic; and when, in 1510, Julius II. joined with Venice (5) and the Swiss to drive him from Italy, Louis had no friends on whom he might depend. He had extended the temporal power of the Papacy and now suffered from his indiscretion. His attempt to depose Julius II. roused the princes of Europe against him. Julius formed the Holy League (October 1511) and the war of expulsion began and ended in 1512, Louis being driven out and Maximiliano Sforza, eldest son of Ludovico, restored to the duchy.

But the administration of Milan is concerned more with internal/

(4) Alexander's schemes were carried through by his son Cesare Borgia, of whose exploits something will be said further on in the essay.

(5) The investiture of Naples and Sicily in July, 1510, secured the neutrality of Spain.

internal affairs than with foreign politics. The precarious nature of the first conquest is well illustrated in the demands made to Louis XII. by the Milanese on September 5, 1499, three days after Ludovico's flight. (6) The importance of the document containing the demands is seemingly emphasised by the fact that it was not a party but the electors, both nobles and commons, who thus laid down the conditions on which they were prepared to accept the French king as their new duke. (7) In the first place the Milanese swore to be true and loyal subjects of Louis, an exception being made in the case of Genoa which, apparently, was left to settle its own terms. But the oath of fealty was not unconditional. The citizens demanded a certain amount of self-government, which, when granted, was to be actual and not merely formal. They agreed to pay an annual tribute to Louis, but beyond that he must ask nothing. (8) They claimed, also, that they should elect their own parliament to treat of Milanese affairs, and/

(6) The claims are preserved in Sanuto's Diaries, Vol. II. 947.

(7) It will be seen presently that this representation of all classes of the community was less real than it appeared to be.

(8) Che la città de Milano e tuto il stato che tenea lo illustrissimo signor duca Zuanne Galeazo sesto et signor Ludovico Sforza, excepto el stato di Zenoa, jurava fideltà et omaggio a la Regia Majestà de esser veri e liali e fideli servitori. Che ditta cità e stato daranno quello censo annuale a la Serenissima Majestà et ultro quo lei non se impazerà de altro. - Sanuto Diaries II., 947.

and that the king should not interfere with it nor seek to
(9)

bring about innovations. This parliament should levy on the state all taxes, gabelles and imposts, both ordinary and extraordinary, which it thought necessary, and Louis must be bound by the decisions and not attempt to raise further taxes. The Milanese themselves, the document continues, would make appointments to the various offices and magistracies. From the decisions of the officials thus appointed an appeal might be made by those who considered themselves aggrieved; but, if the appeal were carried to the parliament, its decision was irrevocable. To this, also, they expected the king to agree.
(11)

The next section, dealing with prisoners, as well as with civil and criminal trials, was quite as definite. None of these cases should be brought before the courts, and prisoners from whatever/
(12)

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- (9) Che Milanesi elegirano da loro il suo conseio et parlamento nel quale tractarà tutte le cosse del stado, e che quella Regia Majestà no se impazi ne innovi altro. - Sanuto Diaries 11., 1947.
- (10) Che el parlamento predito imponerano per la cità e stato quelle gravezze, daci, e gabelle et impositione ordinarie et extraordinarie secundo parerà senza che la Regia Majestà habia a circhar altro. - Ibid.
- (11) Che li Milanesi distribuirano li officii et magistrati de Milano et stato, et se alcuni de la cità o subditi se vol- esseno gravare o appellare di le sententie altramente, non passino andare altrove che al dito parlamento de Milano di la sententia del quale non si possino appellare; e che la Regia Majestà non habbi a cercar altro. - Ibid.
- (12) Che tutti li processi criminali et pendenti et civili siano revocati e cassi, sine prejuditio tertii. - Ibid.

(13)
 whatever cause should be released. A pardon, with return of
 goods when these had been confiscated, was demanded for those who
 had opposed the king, especially at Alexandria, and the same favour
 (14)
 was asked for prisoners of war. Further, they demanded that
 the common soldiers should have liberty to stay in their homes,
 or leave them, as they thought fit, and that all sentences,
 whether of fines or confiscations, should be according to the
 (15)
 will of the parliament alone.

Not less clear were the demands made in the following section. All exemptions, privileges and concessions granted by
 (16)
 previous promises must stand untouched. A further insistence
 on the importance and rights of the parliament is contained in
 the stipulation that church livings should be granted by that
 body alone to persons of its own choice, provided that they had
 the/

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- (13) Che tutti li carcerati ex quacumque causa siano relaxati
sine prejudicio tertii. - Sanuto Diaries 11.. 947.
- (14) Che la Serenissima Majestà perdona a tutti quelli de li
 quali se intendesse lesa, maxime Alexandria e cadauno altro
 et (a) li signori (siano) restituiti tutti li suoi beni
 senza molestia alcuna.
 Tutti li presoni fatti o in guerra o altramente siano con
 tutti li loro beni relaxati senza taia, etiam se già
 lhavessero facta. - Ibid.
- (15) Che tutti i fanti a piedi e gente a cavallo, soldati o
 altramente possino liberamente stare a casa sua et andar
 dove li parerà senza offesa alcuna.
 Che tute le condanatione reale o personale, etiam multe,
 etiam confiscate, se ne habi a dispensar come vora dito par-
 lamento, senza che la Regia Majestà se ne habi ad impazare. -
Ibid.
- (16) Che tutte le exemptione, privilegi e concessione, immuni-
 tate et cetera, concesse per li illustrissimi signori
 passati et dominio stiano valide e ferme. - Ibid.

the necessary qualifications. In any case the king must not
(17)
interfere.

The confidence of the Milanese in the strength of their position is shown in their demand that all promises of lands or goods in the state of Milan which Louis might have made to others than the owners should be regarded as null and void. (18) They claimed, too, that Milanese merchants in France should be well treated, and that special favour should be shown to those who were openly on His Majesty's side. (19) In no particular was their confidence more evident than in their attempt to settle the succession to the duchy in the event of the king's death. They were prepared to recognise legitimate heirs male of the king; but, should he die childless or leaving only natural children, then the duchy should not pass to them or to other heirs, either as a matter of course or by the king's will, but should be left free to choose its own ruler. (20)

On the military side their conditions were definite and emphatic/

(17) Che tutti li beneficii ecclesiastici sedagano per lo dicto parlamento a chi li parerà, havendo perho le bolle apostoliche, senza che la Regia Majestà se ne impazi. - Sanuto
Diaries 11.. 947.

(18) Che le promesse e doni facte per la Regia Majestà de beni e terre ed altramente de questo stato ad altri siano nulle. -
Ibid.

(19) Che tutti li Milanesi dil stado siano ben tratadi in Franza et habino quello bono trattamento che hano li mercadanti da Lione e quelli che sono de la Majestà sua meglio tratadi. -
Ibid.

(20) Se laccadesse che la Regia Majestà morisse (quod Deus avertat) senza fioli legittimi maschi, che la non possa lassar Milano e lo stato ad altri, ma lassarlo in libertà. - Ibid.

emphatic. As the city was being handed over to Louis, it was his duty to provide at his own expense for its defence. A double significance lies in this article. There is a plain indication that, subject to the conditions laid down in the document, the Milanese regarded Louis as taking possession of the city, not through its compulsory surrender to him as its conqueror, but in right of his personal ownership; that is, they tacitly admitted the validity of the Orleanist claim upon the duchy. Since Maximilian had granted investiture to Ludovico, as Duke of Milan, this amounted to a denial of the Emperor's feudal authority over the Province. Louis, however, had for long acknowledged in the most ostentatious fashion his vassalship to the Emperor as the overlord of Milan, and thought it politic to maintain the same attitude after the conquest. In the end, Maximilian not only made no trouble over the flouting of his feudal superiority, but actually invested Louis as Duke of Milan.

In/

(21) Se la città de Milano o stato occorresse bisogno e li fosse mosso guerra o altramente, la Sua Majestà a sue proprie spese sia obligata defensarlo e mandarli quelle gente d'arme bisognerà. - Sanuto Diaries 11., 947.

(22) One may make too much of the Milanese admission of the Orleanist claim. The majority of the citizens were indifferent. Their immediate concerns were a reduction of taxation and liberty to carry on their ordinary business. Louis was accepted as likely to effect this. Still, unless the document were a huge pretence meant to deceive the king into a belief in the solidarity of Milanese opinion - and this is hardly probable, since Louis was known to have in the city friends from whom he could obtain accurate information - it implies that the Milanese accepted the new duke of their own free will.

In the second place the article gives a broad hint that parliament, the ultimate controller of taxation, would not consent to a levy on the citizens for the defence of the city. Possibly it expresses also a fear lest, under the plea of defence, the state might be committed to wars in which it had no interest and, in addition to supporting them by money and provisions, might have to suffer the presence and probably the ill behaviour of the French troops and their allies.

Their fear of the French soldiery was very real. It led, indeed, to the insertion of a special clause in the articles of capitulation. Trivulzio they knew as a party man and distrusted both his will and his ability to have the citizens treated with the consideration they expected. Hence they stipulated that, should he and the other French captains enter the city they must do so peaceably and live in the Corte Vecchia and, if further accommodation were required, the rest of the staff should lodge at the Porta Vercellina. (23) They attempted, also, to prevent the entry of French soldiers into the city: they even tried to keep them/

(23) Se messer Zuan Jacomo Triulzi o altri regii capetani intrarono in Milano, vengano civilmente e siano alozati in Corte Vecchia de la Ragion, e quanto quello alozamento non fusse capace, alozarano il resto in borgo de Porta Vercellina. - Sanuto Diaries 11., 947.

(24)
them at a distance of ten miles from the town. Their last military demand was that the Castle of Porta Zobia should be razed to the ground and never again rebuilt.
(25)

One demand seems to point to the farming out of governmental appointments. No person, it stipulates, who has disbursed money for an official position shall be deprived of his office before his time of tenure shall be completed, unless he be compensated for the loss he has sustained.
(26)
Obviously, the existence of these Milanese publicani partly explains the heavy burden of taxation under which the city suffered.

The assertion of the rights of parliament in the particular instance of church benefices has already been noted. Evidently those who framed these demands were determined that it should be the highest power in the land. Parliament might be under the control of the king or of the duke for the time being, and might thus serve merely to register his decrees. Nevertheless, if its supremacy were admitted, and even granting that, for the time, /

(24) Che niuna gentedarme francese non possi per hora ne in lo advenire per tempo alguno alozar in Milano ne in lo destreto apresso la cità dece miglia. - Sanuto Diaries 11., 947.

(25) Che de presente el castello de Porta Zobia se habia a spianare, e tuto butar in terra et quod nullo unquam tempore se possi redifichar. - Ibid.

(26) Che quelli che hanno sborsati danari per havere officii non possino esser mossi da li officii, fin che non habiano adimpito el tempo suo, se non li è restituito li soi danari.
Ibid.

time, its members would in all probability be aristocratic, a step would be taken which must ultimately result in the establishment of a democratic government. It is scarcely probable that those who drew up this document intended that such a form of government should be the result of their action; yet their claim that parliament was the proper and only body to pass the statutes and decrees which Milan required at the moment, and that these statutes and decrees should stand as law, ⁽²⁷⁾ was actually a step in that direction.

Possibly the Milanese did not expect to have all these requests granted. But they did not confine themselves to demands; they went directly into action. There exists a letter addressed to Alberto Marliano ⁽²⁸⁾ by the Governors of Milan, which leads one to believe that some part, at least, of the demands mentioned in the previous document must have been conceded. The order to Marliano is peculiar in that the Governors speak of themselves in the first person, and mention the fact that they have made an arrangement/

(27) Per che la città de Milano ha bisogno de reformar statuti e decreti, che dicto parlamento possi elezer che li parerà ad questo, e dicti ordini siano validi. - Sanuto Diaries 11.947.

(28) Archivio di Stato, Milan, Carteggio Generale, Busta 886, (Sept. 1499). It was sent, also, to Cesare Visconti.

Alberto Marliano appears again as one of the Ventiquattro elected to take charge of the six gates of Milan in 1515, that is, after the restoration of Ludovico's son Maximiliano. On the discharge of this body through suspicion of their pro-French activities, Marliano was again nominated as one of the new Ventiquattro. See Prato, pp. 332 and 338.

It is somewhat puzzling to note that two men of this name were elected to the second Ventiquattro. See Prato, as above.

arrangement with M. de Ligny by which certain evils will be remedied. Now, the order is dated September 25, and at that time Trivulzio was Governor by appointment of Louis XII. It seems as if part of his duties had been delegated to Milanese.

The document begins with a complaint against "these French people" living round about Milan. (29) They wished to live where they chose, would not pay for goods supplied to them, or, if they offered payment, the amount tendered was less than it should have been. They were accused, also, of threatening the country folk with evil, and of carrying out their threats. (30) In consequence the Governors of Milan had an interview with M. de Ligny, at which it was arranged that he should send one or more of his people throughout the country to make enquiries and to suppress the unlawful doings of the soldiers where such action was required. That the work might be carried out the more effectively a Milanese citizen was elected to serve on the commission of enquiry/

(29) The phrase allogiate intorno a Milano e per il paese is indicative of the fact that the main body of the French was not within but near the city; that is to say, one of the requests made to Louis by the Milanese had been granted.

(30) Ogni hora ne sono sparse nove querelle de queste gente francese allogiate intorno a Milano e per il paese, che voliano alloggiare a discretione e non voleno pagare le robe che togliono, e se pur ne paghino, non voleno dare li pretii limitati secondo li ordini facti, ma che pegio menazano e fano del malo alle persone. - Milan, Carteggio Generale, Busta 886.

(31)

enquiry and travel with the French representatives. The Governors had chosen Marliano: hence the order he received. His instructions were to go with the French officials, examine into all reports of threats, damage, or robbery by the soldiers in the army of occupation, and adjudicate upon them to the best of his ability. Finally the governors intimated that they declined all responsibility for claims that might be made on account of damage suffered.

(32)

Whatever the doings of the French soldiery, this document indicates a desire on the part of the conquerors to deal justly with the duchy - an extremely difficult task, considering the curious temper of the Milanese at this moment. It may be suggested that the action of the Governors was intended as a rebuke to the French command for their slack control of the army. That is scarcely probable; for it is not credible that de Ligny would accept such a rebuke and at the same time agree to the proposals. On the contrary, indeed, it seems rather to show that the Milanese regarded/

(31) Havemo operato com lo illustrissimo M. de Ligni, lassato qui in castello per la Maestà christianissima, chel mandi uno o più di soi per il paese dove sono allogiate queste gente, per fare che ogniuno se contenga nelli debiti termini e paghi le robbe seconde li pretii taxati, e questo effecto lo facia in compagnia duno di nostri da far electo da noi; alquale effecto havendo noi designato la persona vostra...

The fact that de Ligny was lassato qui in castello per la Maestà christianissima is another indication that some sort of liaison existed between the Milanese Governors and the French command. - Milan, Carteggio Generale, Busta 886.

(32) Provederete che esse gente se abstengano dare damni dale persone, e, tollendo del suo, lo paghino secondo li ordini facti/

regarded themselves as subjects of Louis XII. entitled to all the privileges and protection offered to French citizens, This is the more likely as they were expecting a considerable reduction of taxation as a result of the French conquest.

An extract from the Lettere Missive preserved in the Archives of Milan throws light upon another side of the early French administration. (33) It has already been shown that Louis XII pleased at the uninterrupted progress of the conquest, had set out from France to visit the duchy which he expected would be in his possession almost immediately. He was in Vigevano from September 26 and left the town in time to enter Pavia on October 2. The document in question, issued from Vigevano on September 30 and probably meant to prepare for his approaching visit to Milan, is an appointment to two brothers, Geronimo and Andrea de Cermenate to provide fish for the king and his court, wherever it might be within the bounds of the duchy. It is noteworthy in more than one respect.

In the first place it gives permission to the two men concerned, together with certain of their friends, to move freely about the duchy. The country was unsettled, and the permission may/

(32) (contd.) facti et essendo alcuno che se lamenta, provedere ad questa cosa con quella melior via ve parerà, in modo che li nostri habiano esser preservati più si possa, e noi habiamo restare liberi de tali rechiami. - Milan, Carteggio Generale, Busta 886.

(33) Lettere Missive, Reg. 213, fol. 27.

may thus have been an attempt on the part of the new duke to discover to what extent his authority was acknowledged by the duchy as a whole; or it may have been instigated by a desire to open up trading relations as early as possible. The main object, doubtless, was to secure a supply of fresh fish for the king and his retinue, but that object may quite well have been combined with the endeavour to settle the extent of his authority. That it was in any sense an attempt to encourage trade is more than doubtful, as will be seen when the conditions attaching to the appointment are considered.

In the second place it is to be noted that the appointment was conferred not upon Frenchmen but upon Italians. This may indicate a conciliatory policy on Louis' part. Certainly the appointment of a Frenchman to the post would have been an excuse for hostility. Louis' choice, then, may have been dictated by prudence. There is the probability, also, that the two Italians were chosen because of their topographical knowledge and their acquaintance with the language and local customs. In any case, the appointment was one in which Milanese susceptibilities were not offended. Another explanation - perhaps as likely as any - is that the appointment was conferred as a reward for services performed on Louis' behalf.

The fish were to be procured from Lake Maggiore, and every help was to be given so that they might be brought to the court/

court in good condition. No taxes of any kind were to be imposed upon the load which the brothers were bringing, either in carts or on pack animals, though the usual dues must be paid on entering Milan. (34) But such privileges per se would be of little value to the holders of the appointment, and, as nothing is said about payment, a further examination is necessary. Now, the brothers were given the sole right of taking fish from the lake, (35) together with power to prosecute those who infringed that right. The appointment was thus a monopoly conferred upon them on condition of their supplying the court with fish. This view is corroborated by the information at the end of the letter of appointment, which states that the arrangement was to hold good for one year, during which the brothers undertook the supply of fish to the/

(34) They were allowed to come and go "cum armis suis et rebus ac bestiis a basto portaturis pisces praedictos in quavis quantitate, nec minus cum predictis piscibus et sine, quacumque transire permittant ac per stratellas vetitas libere et expedite omniaque impedimento prorsus cessante et sine alicujus datii, pedagii, gabelle, fundinavis, traversus, passus quotienscumque expedierit pagamento, solutis tamen datii introitus portarum Mediolani juxta solitum, et dummodo non veniant per partes morbo infectas; attribuentes eisdem supranominatis Lacus nostri Majoris conductoribus facultatem et arbitrium capiendi et arrestandi quamcumque piscium quantitatem ipsius lacus quae quovismodo quocumque conduci contigerit, contra dispositionem et formam ordinum et proclamationum superinde factarum; et denique adversus quoscumque in fraude repertos procedant, juxta predictam formam et dispositionem ipsorum ordinum in materia piscium ipsius lacus confectorum." - Lettere Missive, Reg. 213, fol. 27.

(35) See above note.

(36)
the court.

One other point may be noted. The condition dummodo non veniant per partes morbo infectas, indicates either the presence of plague in the north of Italy, or a wise provision should the epidemic break out.

Another appointment made by Louis before he left Vigevano, was, perhaps, of more importance to the Milanese. The disturbed conditions during the war and the settlement might cause a decreased sowing of cereals which, if unchecked, would lead, as in the case of Naples after the invasion by Charles VIII., to a famine. In the interest both of himself and of the Milanese Louis felt obliged to avert any danger of such a calamity so far as it was in his power. Happily all the machinery lay ready to his hand, for an office having this very object in view had been established in Milan prior to the French invasion. Distinct reference is made to it in that interesting document known as the Political Testament of Ludovico Sforza. Louis proposed a similar/

(36) Mandantes propterea quibuscumque officialibus et subditis nostris ut praenominatis conductoribus et eorum nunciis ut supra circa praemissorum executionem quibuscumque auxiliis juvaminibus et favoribus opportunis hinc ad annum unum proxime futurum faveant, quo tempore praenominati conductores onus susceperunt muniendi et fulciendi curiam nostram piscibus recentibus opportunis. - See Note 34.

(37) Ordinamo ancora se tengi spetiale cura che loffitio de le biade sij administrato cum omne diligentia secundo che in li ordini se contene: perche in la vigilantia, et bono governo di epso consiste el modo de tenere el Dominio copioso de victualie, ne si po molto temere de cosa scandalosa quando e proveduto alla carestia. d'Auton, Vol. II., Pièces Annexes, p. 323.

The text of the Political Testament of Ludovico Sforza will be found in d'Auton, Vol. II., Pièces Annexes, pp. 296-328.

similar office because he considered it his duty in primis Deo maximo gratias reddere, et deinde populorum suorum studere commoditati et beneficio. In appointing Conradino Marliano to the post of Praefectus Annonae he declares he chose the man generally regarded as most suitable. (38) With Marliano were associated other praefects with whom he was to consult. Their duties were to improve and conserve the corn supply and to see that no part of it was allowed to be taken from the duchy. For this they were paid a monthly salary the amount of which is not known, despite the fact that the last paragraph mentions "the aforesaid salary". (39)

Three days after Conradino Marliano's appointment Louis sent from/

(38) The letter of nomination from which this and the extract in the following note are taken, is preserved in the Archivio di Stato, Milan, Lettere Missive, Reg. 213, fol. 25, tergo. Quamobrem cum Dei clementia hic status noster Mediolani populorum frequens sit, ita imprimis curandum censemus ut bene eis sit circa provisionem annonae ne blada extra hunc statum deducantur, cum ea res omnes tangat et nisi a prestantissimis et integerrimis viris gubernetur incommodum et damnum omnes sentire possint. Facto itaque a nobis diligenti scrutinio eorum quos praeficere muneri annonae possemus, ut res ipsa voto succedat, multorum sententiis comprobatus nobis fuit egregius vir Conradinus Marlianus civis Mediolanensis noster dilectus, quando quidem testati sint ipsum unum esse qui generi nobili suo integritatem, modestiam, ac rerum usum ac virtutem singularem conjunctam habeat.

(39) Mandantes ipsis deputatis nostris ut dictum Conradinum in eorum ordinem admittant; thesaurarioque nostro generali injungimus ut ipsi Conradino de predictis sallario et preheminentiis debitis temporibus respondeat et integre respondere faciat.

from Pavia a letter to his representative at Lodi, dealing with
(40)
another aspect of the same question. The Commissioner had written several times to Gian Giacomo Trivulzio informing him of certain proclamations he had made in Pizzighetton with reference to a trade that had either sprung up or was being continued between that City and Cremona and the Ghiara d'Adda. The traders of Pizzighetton were in the habit of going to Cremona to buy corn and other victuals, while the Cremonese came to Pizzighetton to purchase calves, fat cattle and wine. As Cremona was in the hands of Venice the Commissioner evidently thought that the trading relations of which he wrote to Trivulzio were disadvantageous to the king's interests at Pizzighetton. He pointed out, also
(41)
that he had warned the Cremonese against the practice. Louis, having seen the letters, commended the Commissioner for the diligence he had shown in the performance of his duties, and agreed that the proper attitude had been adopted. His reasons however, are not what might have been expected. Had he objected to the trade being carried on because it might benefit possible enemies
at/

(40) Lettera Missive, Reg. 213, fol. 32, tergo.

(41) Havendo veduto quanto hai scripto al signore Gio. Jacomo Trivultio, nostro locotenente generale, circha la publicatione per te facta in la Giara de Pizighitone perchè venesse ad notitia che si po andare in Cremonese et Giara d'Alda per condure di qua victualie e biade, e l'aviso che dai de quelli Cremonesi che venghino di qua a comprare vitelli, bestiami grassi e vini; circha le qual cosse meriti comedatione de la diligentia usata. - Milan,
Lettere Missive, Reg. 213, fol. 32, tergo.

at his expense, one might have argued that it was part of the policy he had adopted towards the Venetians and the lands under their control. But his objection was that, if at any time he came to Milan with a large retinue, there might be a scarcity of provisions for him and his court. That he had no political end in view is evident from his instruction to the Commissioner to stop the trade in whatever way appeared best, at least, when Louis and his court were staying in or near Milan. From this single instance, then, it is impossible to deduce that the new duke was deliberately, and as a matter of policy, acting in restraint of trade, though he showed indifference regarding its continuance or cessation so long as he suffered no discomfort.

The arrangement of September 25 with de Ligny covered only the cases of Italians who, living outside Milan, felt aggrieved by the actions of the French soldiery scattered throughout the district. On October 12 a new order came into force, which to a certain extent supplanted the earlier agreement. By this time

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(42) E per riposta de l'ultima parte, a noi pare cossa fora d'omne honesta che quelli che sono fora de questo stato venghino di qua a comprare tale cosse, perchè andando noi ad Milano, et essendo di qua quello numero di gente con noy che si sa, più presto se ne haverebe condure di qua che lassarli andare di fora; e pero provederai, con quello più degno e migliore modo te parirà, che non sia alcuno fora del stato nostro, saltem per questo tempo che staremo qui, venghi di qua ad comprare vitelli, bestiame grassi, vini ed altre victualie. - Milan, Lettere Missive, Reg. 213, fol. 32, tergo.

(43) A copy of the order is in the Brera Library in Milan, AG.X 37, fol. 2, tergo.

a fair number of Frenchmen were within the city and its suburbs, and others were living in those parts of Milan outside the city but within the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of the Bishop. Under the first agreement Alberto Marliano should have looked after the interests of ^{the} Milanese in the corpi santi, but the new decree handed them over to the care of the President of Justice. This was a better arrangement, as the aggrieved parties could bring their case (they were, indeed, invited to do so as their duty) before the President, with the expectation of having it promptly and fairly tried.
(44)

But while Louis was willing to do justice between his own people and the Milanese, he was not unmindful that in his newly acquired state there still remained a strong party hostile to his rule. The city, through an embassy, had already expressed its willingness to accept him as duke upon certain conditions, but the oath of fealty had not yet been taken. Pending the issue of the terms of that oath Louis had been considering the imposition of a time limit within which those who had fought on Ludovico's side and left the city with him might return and make their submission/

(44) Si da notitia ad caduna persona quale se possa debitamente lamentare seu dolore de alcuni Francesi per alcuno maltractamento quale havesse havuto in la città, borghi e corpi sancti di Milano da dicti Francesi per qualunque causa, modo et forma, debia comparere nante al monsignore preposito de la casa seu corte del christianissimo e sacratissimo nostro Rè e Duca, che li farà presta et celere et bona expeditione con satisfactione di quanto il dovere ricercherà. - Brera, AG.X 37, fol. 2, tergo.

(45)
submission to French rule. If they failed to promise allegiance by that time they would be regarded as rebels. This was put into force on November 10 by a decree issued from Vigevano, intimating the confiscation of the goods of rebels, among whom, in addition to Ludovico himself, are mentioned Cardinal Ascanio Sforza, Galeazzo San Severino et alios qui cum ipso Ludovico, ut praemittitur, perfugerunt. Now, the oath of fealty was issued at Milan on October 29, so that, if any confiscations took place prior to that date, Louis laid himself open to a charge of unfairness. The time within which Ludovico's partisans must submit should thus begin with some date prior to October 29 and end not later than November 9 - a view which is confirmed by an order for the arrest of those of Ludovico's followers who without safe-conducts had returned to the city. This decree was issued at Milan/

(45) What this time limit was I have been unable to determine directly from documents but I have shown from them indirectly the extreme limits within which the period must lie.

(46) Certum tempus preditum illis prefigi nostro nomine jussimus, intra quod eis libere et impune ad nos, si vellent, redire possent et deberent; communicatione adjecta quod eos, qui intra tempus presignatum non rediissent, rebellium, perfugarum et deficientium loco essemus habituri, et bona eorum ac jura universa velut lese majestatis reos persecuturi. Quod edictum locis et temporibus opportunis publicari et proclamari fecimus, adeo ut in omnium noticiam absque ulla dubitatione pervenerit. Reg. Ducali VI., fol. 160.

(47) Milan, Archivio de Stato, Carteggio Generale, Busta 887, (October, 1499)

(48) Per parte de la Maestà del christianissimo Rè di Francia e duca di Milano, se fà publica crida che se persona alcuna, maxime stapheri, famigli od altra gente de quelli se partirono et andorno al signor Ludovico Sforza, che sia tornato senza salvocondotto possa essere da ciascuno preso/

Milan on October 15, exactly a fortnight before the publication
(49)
of the terms of the oath of fealty. In the decree of confiscation
(Nov. 10) safe-conducts are not mentioned. It is justifiable,
then, to regard the period prior to October 15 as a time when
safe-conducts were not only required but issued. Now, any per-
son openly entering the city to tender his allegiance to Louis
would not require such a protection; so that the time limit could
not have been fixed prior to October 15. It is almost certainly
wrong, however, to assume that October 29 was the commencement
of the period of limitation, because the time from that date to
the publication of the edict of confiscation was too short to
make known the decree and allow those at a distance to come to
the city and offer their allegiance. Allowance must be made,
also, for collecting the names of those who refused to surrender.
These could not be known till the expiry of the time limit;
hence it is very improbable, indeed, that October 29 was the
first day of the period permitted for return and submission to
the new order of things. One is probably right in regarding the
period/

(48) (Contd.) preso et presone e consignato al magnifico Monsignore
lo capitano de giustizia di questa città; ed a ciascuno per
la presente crida se concede licentia de posserli prendere
per presone et consignarli al prefato domino capitano. -
Milan, Brera Library MS. AG, X 37, fol. 3, tergo.

(49) It is worthy of note that the decree of October 15 is
aimed against the less influential adherents of the late
duke, grooms and servants - maxime stapheri famigli od
altra gente - being specially mentioned.

period as beginning shortly after October 15 and ending two or three days before November 10.

The oath of fealty was taken pro se (Louis XII), filiis, heredibus et successoribus suis in dicto ducato. No arrangement is mentioned regarding the succession should the king die without heirs male. The omission may indicate Louis' acquiescence in the request of the Milanese that in such an event they should be free to choose their own ruler. But there remains the possibility that Louis may simply have passed over the matter. If so, it was an oversight on his part, for the oath as it stood covered only allegiance to him, his heirs and successors in the duchy. Yet if he regarded his successors to the throne of France as the heirs to the duchy of Milan, it was sufficiently
(50)
comprehensive.

Having/

(50) Et Juratis manibus propriis tacta ymagine crucifixi Domini nostri Jhesu-Christi et sacris scripturis super missalle ad sancta Dei evangelia, et in (unreadable) vestras proprias et constituentium predictorum, filiorumque et descendendum suorum, et juratis per expressum quod ab hodie in antea usque ad perpetuum eritis fideles, sinceri, recti et obediētes homines, cives et subdicti prelibato Christianissimo regi duci Mediolani quoad vixerit et ipso Christianissimo domino Rege Duce antedicto decedente (quod Deus avertat !) eritis fideles, sinceri, recti et obediētes homines, cives et subdicti ejus liberis, heredibus et successoribus in dicto ducatu.....

Quinymo ad omnem ejus requisitionem et suorum omne mandatum ut fideles, recti, veri et sinceri cives et subdicti, agetis et facietis omnia omni tempore necessaria et utilia servicia et obsequia in omnem fortune et temporis eventum; nec ob aliquam causam praesentem, novam vel futuram aut status varietatem seudiminucionem ab obediencia et fidelitate prefati Christianissimi regis et ducis ac suorum liberorum et heredum vos retrahetis seu abstinēbitis; et si quid vobis vel alteri vestrum in secreto dictum fuerit vel commissum per dictum christianissimum/

Having received the allegiance of his new subjects, Louis was in a position to make definite arrangements for their government. As he was unable to reside permanently in Milan he was obliged to appoint deputies and, that his representatives might not exceed their powers, he formed a Senate the composition and powers of which have already been discussed.

Louis' arrangements for the government of his newly acquired duchy had, at the beginning, small chance of success. The fault was partly his own. His choice of Trivulzio as Governor was unwise, and his inability to grant an appreciable remission of taxes roused the deepest resentment among the Milanese. Though some of the wine duties were taken off the discontent remained. Then came Ludovico's attempt to recover the duchy, during which the new constitution was in abeyance. The military and political aspects of the revolt have already been considered. It now remains to enquire as to the administration of the Province during the period of unsettlement.

Ludovico could hardly be expected to spend much time on the administrative affairs of Milan while he was engaged in the struggle against the French. Yet he did not leave the duchy to look after itself. On February 5, he issued a proclamation in which,/

(50) (Contd.) christianissimum regem ducem antedictum aut aliquem suorum, id nemini, sine licentia ipsorum, manifestabitis aut propalabitis, nec aliquid facietis propter quod pandatur. - Milan, Archivio de Stato, Carteggio Generale, Busta 887.

(51) Reg. Panig. L., fol. 57.

which, after thanking the Milanese for their extremely friendly reception, he pointed out that, being unable to undertake administrative affairs himself owing to the necessity of meeting the French in the field, he had appointed his brother Ascanio as Vice-chancellor. (52) Then followed the order that all officials who had been acting at the time of his flight should return to their posts and carry out their administrative duties. (53) Proceeding, the proclamation declared that Ludovico had intended to give up all his possessions to the state, but, being of the opinion that the French might despoil the possessors, he had refrained from handing them over at that particular moment. Yet he meant to pay all the debts contracted by the state, for which purpose he was still willing to sacrifice all his wealth. (54) Finally, he had appointed/

(52) Havendo domani S.S. a transferirse in campo per proseguire la victoria contra li inimici soi, ha pensato de deputare persone degne et idonee a le infrascripte cose a beneficio de la città et del stato, benche La lassi qui lo illustrissimo et reverendissimo signore Vice-canzelaro, suo fratello, cum arbitrio di fare tanto quanto la Signoria soa. - Reg. Panig. L., fol. 57.

(53) Et, ante omnia, se notifica che la vole che ogniuno quale fusse consilliero et in magistrato inanze la partita sua, ex nunc sia remisso al loco suo e vada a l'officio secundo el solito, quale se studiano de administrare cum fede e justicia. - Ibid.

(54) Da poi, per procedere a la satisfactione de li debiti contracti per li bisogni del stato, li quali el desiderio suo fu sempre de soddisfare, et a la partita sua fu in animo de darli tute le possessione sue, ma giudicando chel sia stata opinione de qualchuni chel havesse dato quello chel non poteva tenere, pensò de expectare meliore tempo el quale sperava chel sia questo quale è al presente, e pero certifica che La vole dare tute le possessione sue in pagamento a dicti creditorì e darà ordine expediente a questo. - Ibid.

appointed a governing body which, under the Vice-chancellor, would
(55)
administer the duchy in his inevitable absence.
(56)

Another decree, issued on February 26, contains an order
for the notification of all goods belonging to the French party
(57)
in Milan. Further, as the times demanded the utmost prudence,
the citizens were warned to have no dealings under colour of
trade or otherwise, which might be prejudicial to the interests
of/

(55) The following are the names of those composing this temporary
council:-

El R. Vescovo de Lactura	M. Fran. Bernardo Vesconte
El generale de li Humiliati	M. Baptista Vesconte
Lo R. arcivescovo di Bari	M. Galeaz Vesconte
El R. prothonotario de S. Celso	M. Ambrosio del Mayno
El R. prothonotario Crivello	M. Jo-Francesco da Marliano
El R. prothonotario da la Torre	M. Gaspar Vesconte
El R. proposito da Vidolbono	El Conte Bartolomeo Crivello
D. Petro da Gallara	D. Baptista da Landriano

(Reg. Panig. L., fol. 57)

The proclamation/is signed by Bartolomeo Calco -
B. Chalcus. It will be noted that the list contains the
names of Pietro Gallerate, Francesco Bernardino Visconti
and Giovanni Francesco Marliano, three members of Louis'
recently created Senate.

(56) Reg. Panig. L., fol. 64.

(57) Per parte de S.E. si fa crida e publico commandamento ad
ogni persona di qualunca stato sia, che ciascano che
sapesse dove fossino, o havesse alcuni beni mobili o immo-
bili di tuti quelli sono con essi Franzesi, overo nel
castello de Milano, cosi persone ecclesiastiche como secu-
lare che siano, li habino notificato sotto pena de rebel-
lione e confiscatione de suoi beni, in termine de tri di
proximi doppo la publicatione di questa crida, a M. Bernar-
dino de Aretio, vicario de la provixione di Milano, et
M. Hilario Gentile, deli maestri ducali de le intrate
extraordinarie. - Reg. Panig. L., fol. 64.

(58)

of the state. Nor must any one carry letters or bear verbal messages treating of the duke's affairs. An evil point in the proclamation was the attempt to set up what was virtually a system of espionage in which the citizens were invited to watch each other. (59) It must be admitted that Ludovico was justified in trying to prevent information with regard to his movements or intentions from falling into the hands of the enemy. But to ask the citizens to spy upon one another, and to promise secrecy with regard to the names of informers together with rewards for their information, even if they themselves were implicated, must inevitably have resulted in the creation of many agents provocateurs acting independently of the police. The consequent atmosphere of suspicion could not fail to endanger Ludovico's prospects of success.

The issue of this decree was followed two days later by another giving protection to the textile trade in Milan. It was a renewal/

(60)

(58) Acioche ogniuno sapi como deportarsi, andando intorno a questi tempi, neli quali convene havere grande advertentia che sotto spetie di mercantia o altri diversi colori, non si tractassino cose contral stato di S.E. - Reg. Panig. L., fol. 64.

(59)facendo intendere ad ogniuno che notificando alcuno tuti li malefactori predicti ogni accusatore, etiam chel fusse conscio e colpevole di tal cosa, sera liberato e tenuto secreto, e li sera dato la tertia parte de la pena serano incorsi quelli chel acusasse, e non havendo li accusati roba sera in altro modo dignamente remunerato.
Ibid.

(60) Reg. Panig. L., fol. 65, tergo.

renewal of an older edict to the same effect, or, perhaps, a reminder that the former decree was still in force, rather than absolutely fresh legislation on the subject. In 1474 Galeazzo Maria had issued an order forbidding the importation of foreign cloth at a greater price than forty pounds imperial per piece, and in 1481 Gian Galeazzo, through his uncle Ludovico Sforza, confirmed this with the exception that the price limit was abolished. The intention was to increase the sale of home manufactured textiles by making the upward limit of price for imported cloth too small to admit of foreign competition. (61) This concession to the merchants and manufacturers of Milan was strengthened by the edict of February 28, which forbade the importation of textiles and prepared wool even under the conditions of the previous two decrees. All such goods brought into the city contrary to (62) the regulation would be confiscated.

Along with the prohibition of foreign woollens, silk, and prepared yarn, which naturally acted in favour of the home manufacturer, there was published a necessary condition meant to prevent/

(61) It must be remembered that weaving was a staple industry of Milan.

(62) Se fa publica crida e bando che non sia persona alcuna di qual condicione, stato, grado, dignita e preheminentia voglia se sia, che olsa ne presuma portare ne condurre ne fare portare ne fare condurre in questa città de Milano e suoi burgi alcuna quantità de drapi de lana alti ne bassi, sayete, caresce ne lana laborate, salvo ut supra, ne tenere ne acceptare de dicti drapi de lana, sayete, caresce, che non siano facti in la dicta città o burgi de Milano, sotto pena de perdere tali drapi, sayete, caresce e lana forestere a spese et damni de che serano. - Reg. Panig. L., fol. 65 tergo.

prevent an excessive rise in price to the consumer. Textile goods made within Milan could be sold freely, but the price must not exceed fifty pounds imperial per piece, and the cloth must be standardised as regarded quality, length and weight. (63)

During the period that elapsed between the first and the second conquest of Milan no administrative measures either by the French or by the Milanese had any real chance of success. If Trivulzio's position in the city had become untenable by the end of January, that of Ludovico was not much better by the middle of March. Lack of money to pay his troops had reduced him to such straits that his efforts were concentrated upon supplying that want rather than in making arrangements for the government of the duchy. While, therefore, the attempts at administration made by one or other of the parties during this interval may not be neglected, the actual administrative ability of the French can be fairly gauged by what they did after the rebellion was crushed, rather than by what was attempted during their first occupation of Milan. The establishment of a Senate and the arrangements made regarding judicial affairs showed the direction Louis' home policy/

(63) Che, non obstante la dicte inhibitione, che sia licito ad caduna persona securamente e senza pena alcuna portare, tenere, et acceptare, comprare e vendere in questa cita de Milano drapi facti nel predicto dominio del illustrissimo signore nostro, damente che non excedano el pretio de libre 50 imperiali per ceschaduna peza de dicti drapi. - Reg. Panig. L. fol. 65 tergo.

policy was likely to follow. In the succeeding chapters it will be seen whether he retained his first ideas of administration in the duchy, and how far his schemes of government achieved their object.

CHAPTER IX.

Administration of Milan from the Second Conquest to 1506.

The defeat of Ludovico and the humble acceptance of French domination by the Milanese did not end Louis' troubles in the city. Within the walls the late duke had still adherents who sullenly acquiesced in their evil fortune while remaining bitterly hostile to the conquering French. Others had fled from the town and might be relied upon to make Louis' administration as difficult as possible. What was happening in Milan was taking place, also, in other towns of the duchy. Before any real progress could be made in general government these people must be rendered powerless to interfere. Hence at the beginning of the period there was issued a series of measures confiscating the goods and incomes of those who had sided with Ludovico in the late revolt. Besides serving to reduce to impotence these enemies of Louis, the confiscations provided a means of rewarding his friends. The penalties were severe, and the thoroughness with which they were carried out was brutally vindictive. In one case, for example, a man's house valued at ten ducats per annum was seized; worse still two people - Giuliano Brocardo and Gian da Costa - lost by confiscation/

confiscation their total income of a quarter ducat each per annum.

In addition to the desire for vengeance on those who had sided with Ludovico in his recent rising, which was the origin of the action taken against even extremely unimportant people, Louis' measures were intended to cow the citizens and convey a warning to all who might contemplate any further revolt against his authority. It was also an intimation that by the second occupation of the city he had not merely taken possession of his own property but that he entered it as a conqueror. Apart altogether from its ruthlessness such rancorous retaliation by the orders of Louis or his subordinates was politically inexpedient. The pitiless exactions levied upon even the humblest individuals who had taken part in the recent attempt to restore Ludovico roused deep resentment among the Milanese which was all the more bitter since the victims were unable to give expression to their feelings, and contributed to the growth of an anti-French sentiment among the populace which milder action on Louis' part would have done much to destroy. Ludovico, it is true, was in his hands, and the Milanese were powerless to recall him. But not so many years before, the citizens had set up a republic,⁽¹⁾ and dissatisfaction with Louis and his methods - for the king must be held responsible for the deeds of his subordinates - might/

(1) Upon the death of Filippo Maria Visconti.

might induce them to attempt its re-establishment when an opportunity presented itself. The king had simply failed to recognise that his first care ought to have been so to bind the Milanese to his cause as to make them not merely submissive to the new régime, but to lead them to see that he and they were working together for the good of the state, and that the French administration would be much more beneficial to them than the rule of the Sforza.

Confiscation and repression were probably to be expected after the final defeat of Ludovico; but the severity of the measures adopted by Louis induced an under-current of antagonism to his rule that decreased the success which undoubtedly attended the French administration of the duchy, and made the Milanese willing to risk the loss of good social and economic conditions by deserting Louis and recalling Massimiliano Sforza of whose capabilities as a ruler they knew nothing. Some of the documents dealing with Louis' policy at this period are important. A series of three is specially interesting not only because they treat of the confiscations but because the order of their issue has to be settled. The three documents I shall call A, B and C.

Document A gives no trouble as far as date is concerned; but the two others B and C are in a peculiar position. A is dated/

dated July 10th, 1500, but was issued by Louis from Lyons on the second day of that month. B bears the date August 25th, 1500, and C is undated. The problem is to settle whether B was issued before C or vice versa.⁽²⁾

First, then, what are the titles of the two documents? B is an instruction for an INQUEST to be held regarding the actions of certain persons named in the document. It bears the title:-

Inquisitio contra eos qui post Ludovicum Sfortiam captivatum denuoque debellatum latitabant seu fugam arripuerant Millesimo quingentesimo die 25 Augusti.

C has for title:-

S'ensuyvent les noms des condamnés pour rébellion qui avoient suyvi le seigneur Ludovic en Alemaigne.

These titles would seem to indicate that B was the earlier, a view that is confirmed by internal evidence. With the exception of four - Alexandro Borromeo, Count Guido Taurello, Alexandro de Cremona and Dominico Petrobono - every name contained in B is contained also in C where the owners are marked as condemned or pardoned. But as against 42 names in B, mention is made of no fewer than 372 condemnations in C. This document thus appears to show that a more complete list of rebels had been drawn up, the names contained in B being the chief offenders. In any event, the fact that names appearing in B as subjects of an/

(2) Doc. A is preserved at Milan, Archivio di Stato, Regist. Ducali VI, fol. 165; B at Milan, Archivio di Stato, Potenze Sovrane, Ludovico Sforza, Vicende Personali; and C at Paris, Archives Nationales, J 507, No. 22.

an inquest, appear also in the list of condemnations and pardons is proof that B was published before C. The best proof of B's Priority, however, is the fact that, of Baldasar Magiolin, it is reported in C - Il est mort en Alemaigne et n'a laissé nulz biens ou bien peu; while his name, Balthasarem Magiolanum, appears last on the list of those rebels in B whose conduct was to be reviewed by the Inquest.

Two quotations from B will give sufficient information with regard to the charges against those whose names appear in the list of rebels.

Non contenti de predictis, sed mala malis addendo, existente ipsa civitate Mediolani in dicto tumulto et congregatione armorum et in dicto tempore de quo supra, ausi fuerunt clamare et seu clamari facere, tempore de quo supra, palam et publice et per stratas patentes, nomina hostilia et inimica predictae Majestati, videlicet: "Moro, Moro, Duca, Duca," expresse demonstrantes et palam fatientes se facere ea quae faciebant ad finem retrudendi et introducendi predictum Ludovicum Sforzam, hostem et inimicum predictae Majestatis, in dictum dominium et statum Mediolani; et dum predicta fierent, auditi fuerunt etiam dicti superius inquisiti et rebelles, animo et intentione quibus supra, dicto tempore de quo supra, mittere nuncios et ambassiatas et litteras ad instigandum et solicitandum predictum Ludovicum Sfortiam hostem et inimicum ut supra, in partibus Alamaniae existentem, ut veniret sine delacione ad invadendum predictum dominium et statum Mediolani; sibi pollicendo et pollicebantur dare auxilium, consilium, opem et favorem ad occupandum dominium ipsum et expellendum locumtenentes et alios qui pro predicta Regia Majestate in dominio ipso erant; et eodem etiam tempore, occasione predictorum quae animo et intentione quibus sic faciebant et committebant, coegerunt et intulerunt predictum locumtenentem regium et alias gentes regias de quibus supra, metu et timore ipsorum superius inquisitorum derelinquere ipsam civitatem Mediolani et ab ea recedere; providendo etiam et providerunt quod strate publice claudarentur (sic) et obturarentur, et seu impedirentur, ne gentes regiae possent per civitatem ipsam ire et redire; et aliquas etiam personas ex gentibus regiis, tam armigeris quam aliter, hostiliter capiendo et capi faciendo et acceperunt/

acceperunt ac capi fecerunt; itaque demonstrarunt expressam et manifestam rebellionem et defectionem a predicta Regia Majestate, et sese inimicos et hostes ac rebelles et auctores rebellionis exhibuerunt in omnibus et per omnia predictae Majestati Regie; et haec omnia ante diem secundam februarii proxime preteriti.

(These rebels) non contenti de predictis, sed mala malis addendo, animo et intentione quibus supra circa principium mensis februarii proxime preteriti, iverunt obvii predicto cardinali Ascanio venienti nomine et ad utilitatem predicti Ludovici Sfortie, hostis et inimici ut supra, et eum gentibus armatis ipsorum suprascriptorum inquisitorum stipparunt et associarunt; et in ipsam civitatem Mediolani, cum magno applauso et letitia introduxerunt et associaverunt; induxerunt quoque et instigarunt alios cives et habitantes Mediolani ad sociandum et introducendum ut supra predictum cardinalem Ascanium; clamando et clamarunt, et clamari faciendo et fecerunt nomina infesta et inimica Regie Majestati ut supra in maximum damnum et vilipendium predictae Regie Majestatis; tantas gentes congregarunt et in armis posuerunt quod audebant et ausi fuerunt insequi, capere et occidere non solum particulares personas ex gente regia, sed etiam exercitum Regie Majestatis; itaque coegerunt metu et per vim ipsum exercitum a dicta civitate Mediolani recedere, et recessit propter vim et metum dictarum gentium armatarum, per suprascriptos superius inquisitos ut supra rebelles unitarum et congregatarum; et infra paucos dies in dicto mense februarii, veniente etiam predicto Ludovico Sfortia, hoste et inimico ut supra, ab eis inquisitis ut supra sollicitato et instigato, ad dictam civitatem Mediolani, ei obviam accesserunt, et eum ultro et sponte in dominium et ducem suum receperunt; ac ei auxilium, opem, consilium et favorem prestiterunt et prestari fecerunt, et curaverunt in multis et diversis modis ut possent se tueri et perseverare in occupatione predicti status et domini Mediolani et in privatione de eodem statu et dominio predictae Regie Majestatis, et ita perseverarunt usque quo divino favente auxilio et viribus exercitus regii predicti Ludovici Sfortiae exercitus debellatus exstitit et ipse Ludovicus Sfortia in captivitatem regiam devenit, videlicet de mense aprilis proxime preterito.

Reading between the lines one seems to gather that Louis felt he had narrowly escaped the loss of the duchy. But to lay the charge (as the document does) exercitia et mercimonia cessaverunt/

cessaverunt is unjust, since, even while the revolt was in progress, Ludovico's government spared time to foster industry in Milan.

From A and C some interesting information may be drawn. The confiscations in money, in goods, and in lands were not confined to Milan. The other cities of the duchy suffered also. In all there were three hundred and seventy-two condemnations which brought to Louis more than 30,000 ducats per annum. This sum he divided between his adherents and his government offices. In addition, certain of his officers compounded for a single payment, which led to the expenditure of another 2050 ducats. Sixteen estates are specially mentioned as having been taken from their owners and handed over to Frenchmen; while others are dismissed under a somewhat vague "plusieurs".

Further from C comes the information that certain rebels had not been condemned as they were ecclesiastics. They included the General of the White Brothers of the Brera, two archbishops, three bishops, four protonotaries, five provosts and a Messire Charles de Baldo. Of these the two archbishops, one protonotary, all the provosts and Charles de Baldo received pardon; two of the protonotaries and a bishop effected a settlement with the duke; the remainder were, so far, left undcondemned; but the bishop of la Tuada who had fled to Provence, was forbidden to/

(3)
to re-enter Italy.

Though this document is intended as a list of rebels condemned and the forfeitures exacted, it conveys much information of a different kind. In the first place an examination of the names brings to light the fact that many noble Milanese families had cast in their lot with Ludovico's party. Confining the inspection of the names to the city of Milan there appear, in addition to six of Ludovico's own relatives, no fewer than six Visconti - an eloquent testimony to the fair treatment

their family had received from the late duke. The family of Landriano, Ludovico's Treasurer, is represented by five names, that of Marliano by three, and that of Crivello by nine. Of these, some were pardoned, but most of them suffered confiscation of goods and remained in exile. In the city of Milan, of all Ludovico's party who were condemned, eight (that is, without counting the ecclesiastics mentioned above) were pardoned and, if the document may be regarded as giving a complete list, only three were put to death. Either this is wrong, or it serves to indicate a clemency on Louis' part which is not consistent with the extraordinarily severe confiscations in other cases.

From/

(3) Some of the entries in these documents are interesting as denoting the part taken by Scottish mercenaries fighting on the French side. The following names and amounts received from the confiscations are mentioned:- Robert Stuart received 300 ducats as a gift. Codebert (?Cuthbert) Carr received 500 ducats per annum. Georges Carr (his brother), Guillaume Collichon (?Collison) and David Folerton (?Fullerton) each received 100 ducats per annum.

From the city of Milan, alone, twelve rebels are reported to have fled to Venice. It is, of course, possible to make too much of this flight to the rival state; yet some thing apparently underlies it. Venice was in league with Louis and was receiving her share of the spoil. But she knew that the surrender to her of the stipulated places was much against Louis' real wishes, and it is possible that she had already begun to suspect his intentions. She may even (like Ludovico, himself, during the invasion by Charles VIII.) have begun to regret her part in bringing the French into Italy. Certain it is that, while Germany was open to them as a refuge - many of their fellow-rebels, indeed, had fled there - Venice, despite her alliance with France, must have seemed a secure dwelling-place to the Milanese exiles or they would have avoided it. Perhaps, too, they counted on taking service with the Venetian forces, but even if that were so, they must surely have had some ground for their faith.

In connection with the confiscations it may be noted that the relatives of Trivulzio obtained rewards more than proportionate to the services they had rendered. Gian Giacomo, himself, is not mentioned, but one relative received the County of Melce, and two others an annuity of three hundred ducats each, while his wife was granted the town of Bourgfranc and certain allodial/

allodial rights formerly belonging to Ambrogio del Mayno.

Ambrois del Mayno, des premiers auteurs de ladite rebellion, est en Alemaigne et à Padua. Il avoit la ville de Bourgfranc et aucuns biens alodiaulx illecques donnés à la femme de M. le marescal de Trivulce.

It may further be noted that the names of those mentioned in the list as pardoned, though probably correct at the time, do not include all who obtained remission from Louis. At least one interesting example remains.

Among the entries in the list is the name of Francisque du Conte, a Milanese, to whom no pardon has been granted.

Francisque du Conte se tient à Mantue. Il a chascun an 300 ducas assignés au frère de M. de Sepy et à deux ses compagnons.

But under the great seal of the king, there was issued to Francesco in the month of November 1505, a formal pardon. He had remained under ban and in exile from his flight after the rebellion until his name had been submitted to Louis as a suppliant for the king's grace. In formal fashion Louis declares that, wishing to be merciful towards his subjects, and especially to those who confess and repent of their faults, he grants a pardon to Francesco and restores to him all his goods and rights as they were prior to his revolt under Ludovico. But he must first take oath that he will be a good and faithful subject and act as such a subject ought towards his lord. Further, Louis directs that, in addition, the sum of two thousand ducats must be/

be lodged with the Chancellor of Milan as security for the newly-pardoned subject's good faith and conduct.⁽⁴⁾

Humour is not expected in a list of this kind, yet some of the entries are amusing. Galeazzo Visconti and Giacomo Crivello are both subjects of sardonic description, the first being said to be incapable de l'eritage pour ce qu'il est bampny, while of Crivello it is related that he was vieil et presque hors de sens. Three others are humorous enough to be quoted. Blasin Crivello is très malvais homme; another Crivello, Antonio-Maria, is pire que tous les autres; while, concerning two of the Landriano family, the entry remarks that they are frères du general des Humiliatz (the White Brothers of the Brera) ainsi malvais que luy est. Possibly the naïve bitterness of the description is due to the vigorous patriotism of the rebels mentioned.

The large number of confiscations and the wide area covered by them involved the employment of a considerable staff commissioned to take possession of goods movable and immovable. The question of storing and sale, together with the rendering of accounts in connection with the transactions, took time, as did the transfer of annual incomes from the original owners to the persons to whom they had been gifted. Louis, apparently, was/

(4) Reg. Panig. N. fol. 73.

was dissatisfied with the progress made, and perhaps a little suspicious that the returns were not accurate. The longer the commissioners were in completing their returns and vacating their office the greater would be the amount payable to them for salary and expenses and the smaller the amount placed to the credit of the revenue.

On November 18th, 1500, therefore, he forwarded to the officials of the Extraordinary Revenue a decree in which he enjoined them to call before them the various administrators of the estates of rebels.⁽⁵⁾ Together they would go over the accounts, deduct salaries and what expenses they considered reasonable, see that the remainder corresponded with the returns made by the administrators, and place it in the hands of the Treasurer. Should the accounts of any administrator not be completed, rather than incur delay they were to help him to finish his work as quickly as possible, as Louis had no desire to continue these appointments indefinitely.

The officials of the Extraordinary Revenue were informed, also, that henceforth, until the confiscations were absolutely completed, the administration of such money, estates, and movable goods would be part of their duties. For this purpose they would keep a record of all confiscated goods sold, with/

(5) Regist. Ducali VI, fol. 169.

with the place of sale and price obtained, and hand over the money to the Treasurer. Finally Louis intimated that he had appointed Jo. Andreas de Parisius, Auditor-General of the French Revenues and one of the officials of the Ordinary Revenue at Milan, as auditor and co-accountant with the officials of the Extraordinary Revenue. He must be present at the examination of the administrators of confiscations, and without his advice and sanction the officials of the Extraordinary Revenue must do nothing.

In these regulations appears a hint of the line of policy Louis meant to adopt with regard to financial administration, even when it was of a temporary nature. First of all, he endeavoured to secure a prompt and accurate return of all monies, goods and lands due to him through the sequestration of the estates of those who had taken part in Ludovico's revolt. The sooner he knew what the confiscations would bring to the Treasury the more quickly would he be able to decide upon the amount of taxation he must levy upon his new subjects in order not only to recoup him for the expenses of the original expedition and the suppression of the attempt to restore Ludovico, but to leave him with a profit after deducting the expenses of general administration.

The implied rebuke to the administrators of the estates/

estates of the rebels tended towards their prompt recording of accounts with the Treasurer lest they should receive an unfavourable report and be at a disadvantage in the future in their search for further government employment. As the returns were recorded the offices, having fulfilled their purpose, ceased to exist, and with them the expenses they had incurred.

Louis' instructions thus furthered the time when a normal government would come into being, and tended to hasten the production of a more contented state of mind among those who had just come under his rule. So long as the Milanese were in doubt regarding the taxation to be levied on them they would not settle steadily to their usual occupations. But here the king was placed in an awkward predicament. His victory over Ludovico was due, in part, to the fact that the taxation of the province by the late duke had lessened his popularity. The revolt for his restoration partly originated in the dissatisfaction caused by Louis' inability to raise this burden from them more than he had done. If, after obtaining possession of the Milanese for the second time, he continued to tax more heavily than his new subjects thought necessary he must be prepared for sporadic risings in the province which would militate against the establishment of a normal government. While having regard, therefore, to efficiency, it was to his interest to employ the smallest/

smallest possible administrative staff, especially where the appointments were temporary. The sooner such a staff was in existence the sooner he could establish a normal administration and afford his Milanese subjects the opportunity of adjusting themselves to the new conditions.

In the documents designated A and C many references are made to men who had fled from Milan to avoid the consequences of their rebellion. Of these, some had goods and others had none. Their goods, if they had them, were confiscated, but, whether or not, all who had fled remained in banishment. To Louis' government these men were a menace, and quite soon after the conquest he put measures into operation having in view their extirpation. Citizens were encouraged by rewards to capture or kill banished men. They were allowed, also, the privilege of freeing one banished man by striking down another. A curious echo of this appears in an edict of May 16th, 1506, in which the conditions were explained under which exiles might be permitted to return. (6) Former edicts on the subject had resulted in a scandalous state of affairs in which even those officers whose business it was to clear the Province of banned men, were receiving rewards as ordinary citizens for performing their official duties. The edict of May 16th excludes those whose business it/

(6) Regist. Panig..N. fol. 66.

it was to kill or capture those under the ban, and in addition, such officials as justices, government officers, as well as their servants and dependents, were forbidden to receive rewards for this class of work. Restrictions were also laid down limiting the operation of the former edict. If by the capture or killing of a banned man another exile received freedom, the crime of the recipient must not be greater than that of the man killed or captured. In the second place, although he might have fulfilled the condition of slaying or capturing a banned man, no exile should be allowed to return under any pretence whatever, before he had made his peace and received pardon. (7)

The edict was designed to attain two objects. Louis hoped that the knowledge of a possible, nay, a probable pardon would lead to an appreciable diminution in the numbers of unruly Milanese/

(7) Quare, pro recte memorati edicti intellectu, declaramus in eo nullatenus comprehendi iudicantes, nec officiales, nec servitores aut famulos suos, et quoscumque alios qui pro officio suo ad id teneantur.

Dehinc etiam ordinamus ut auctoritas illa eximendi bannitum, ubi bannitus occidatur vel capiatur, proportionabiliter intelligatur, ut, scilicet possit unus bannitus eximi qui pro pari vel minori causa damnatus sit cause illi pro qua talis occisus aut captus bannitus erat; secus autem, si pro graviori causa talis qui eximi petatur bannitus esset.

Rursus, nullo casu, quempiam bannitum eximi nec etiam redire posse, si ipsemet bannitum occiderit aut ceperit volumus et declaramus, nisi prius habita ab eis ad quos attinet pace et remissione; hancque mentem nostram vim decreti obtenturam decernimus. - Reg. Panig. N., fol. 66.

Milanese both within and without the Province, which would automatically ease the difficulties of government. When an exile returned he would be careful, for his own sake, to refrain from provoking the authorities. Even if he were rash enough to do so, he would be under the surveillance of officials who, upon evidence of hostile activity, could order his immediate arrest.

Such legislation, however necessary, was only temporary. The permanent acts of the French administration are more important as indicating the policy pursued with regard to the conquered state. These acts group themselves, broadly speaking, into four divisions. The first treats of the administration of justice, the second of finance, and the third of measures designed to promote the material interests of the province. The fourth division contains statutes and edicts of a general nature, dealing with subjects so widely different as health, copyright, beggars and sumptuary laws.⁽⁸⁾

The first judicial edict to be treated was issued on Saturday, September 17th, 1500, and dealt with prorogations and suspensions in civil cases.⁽⁹⁾ The necessity for such an edict indicates/

(8) It may be that, in some cases, a cross classification exists between the fourth division and the three others; but the gain in clearness by retaining in a separate class such measures as are only remotely connected with those of the other divisions is sufficient justification. Otherwise the classification would become too intricate to be of much value.

(9) Regist. Panig. K. fol. 76.

indicates an objectionable laxity on the part of the authorities in granting these concessions, while the edict itself is a proof of Louis' determination that, in the interests both of good government and of the suitors concerned, the number of prorogations must be considerably diminished. After the formal expression of his desire that his subjects should live in amity with one another, the duke points out that, where civil cases have been tried, the cunning of certain litigants has frequently led to unwarrantable delays. In order that this practice may cease, rules are laid down, according to which a case may be prorogued or temporarily suspended. If these regulations are neglected then no delay whatever may be permitted in hearing the case.

No prorogation was to be possible unless both parties to the dispute were agreeable, and before effect could be given to the proposal both parties and the magistrate hearing the case must take oath that the prorogation was necessary and not dictated by cunning. A copy of this oath must be in the hands of the *Maîtres des Requêtes* (or a secretary of the Senate appointed for the purpose), within two days of the presentation of the petition for prorogation. Further, in order that disputes might not be unduly prolonged, only two prorogations would be granted in any one case, neither of which must exceed a month. This regulation provided a measure of protection for a litigant whose cause might be delayed to his disadvantage either by collusion between his opponent/

opponent and the judicial authority or by the disinclination of the judge to proceed at once with the case. A further most important condition was attached, viz., that no prorogation or suspension, no matter at what stage of the proceedings, could be granted sine die unless - the rule is repeated, thus emphasising its importance - with the consent of both principals.

Amodo tales prorogationes vel suspensiones sine temporis predefinitione non concedantur, nisi procedant ex libera et spontanea partium ipsarum voluntate petite ab principalibus ut supra.

Evidently the measure was not intended to be oppressive, but rather to assist the courts to overtake their work, as allowance was made for unexpected contingencies both in the city and out of it. In such an event four additional prorogations of a single day were allowed to litigants living within Milan, and from four to twelve continuous days for those outside, the length of time being proportional to the distance from the city.

As regarded suspensions or prorogations already granted under the old system, power was reserved in the Senate to deal with each case on its merits; while in instances where a prorogation had been requested but not yet granted, the regulations laid down by the edict were to be observed. ⁽¹⁰⁾

Although/

(10) Et predicta omnia locum habeat etiam in causis pendentibus respectu prorogationum et suspensionum in futurum concedendis. circa autem prorogationes et suspensiones hactenus factus, senatus reservat facultatem providendi in casibus particularibus prout sibi videbitur. - Reg. Panig. K., fol. 76.

Although the decline of feudalism was more marked in Italy than in other countries, certain features of the system still remained. Some of the great families yet retained the right (or, at least, exercised it) of private jurisdiction, which not infrequently brought them into conflict with the duke's law courts. In the list of condemnations for rebellion (document designated C) two feudal lords are mentioned as having allodial goods.⁽¹¹⁾ Another is said to have an annual revenue of two thousand ducats comptant les biens feudaux, which biens feudaux probably included the profits of justice derived from his private courts.⁽¹²⁾ Now allodial tenure was possibly the fullest form of ownership known to the law. It included the right of private jurisdiction, and in most cases the charter included clauses placing the land outwith the functions of the national system of police.⁽¹³⁾ But, unless the king or duke was prepared/

(11) Messire Galeaz de Saint-Séverin est en Alemaigne. Cestuy avoit plusieurs biens de ceulx de Vermes tant par donation que soubz quelque charge, lesquelz à present tient M. de Ligny. Il avoit aussi ung lieu en la jurisdiction de Pavye, nommé Silvan, qui a été donné a M. de Sampre; item Chasteauneuf en Tortonois, qu'a esté donné au conte de Minsoch. Et avoit aussi certains biens alodiaulx qu'on a réservé pour les creditours.

Ambrois del Mayno, des premiers auteurs de ladite rébellion, est en Alemaigne et à Padue. Il avoit la ville de Bourgfranc et aucuns biens alodiaulx illecques donnés à la femme de la marescal de Trivulce. - Paris, Archives Nationales, J.507, No. 22.

(12) Le conte Jehan Antoyne de la Somallie, qui fut des premiers auteurs de la rébellion; pour ce qu'il a eu la remission il demeure à Milan. Il avoit chacun an le revenu de deux mil ducas, comptant les biens feudaux. - Ibid.

13 See Domesday Book and Beyond, p. 257; also History of English Law, Vol 1, pp. 60, 68-72.

prepared to allow his nobles to become as powerful as himself, he could not possibly consent to private courts taking the place of his own. This was one of the problems Louis had to face in his administration of Milan. That he was alert to the danger of these irregular forms of dispensing justice is evident from the preamble to an order issued on December 23rd, 1501,⁽¹⁴⁾ in which he points out that, unless the officers of justice keep to their own particular jurisdiction, confusion is bound to result. Specially he condemns the actions of those lords, who having private courts, have infringed the statutes and ordinances of the Province by passing cases through these courts, with which according to law, they were incompetent to deal.⁽¹⁵⁾

Here, /

(14) Regist. Panig. K., fol. 86.

(15) Perchè non senza grande confusione se poteria governare il stato del chiarissimo Rè Duca de Milano se li offitiali non osservasseno li termini de le sue jurisdictione, et non se ingerischoeno ne le aliene, le quale pretergradendo veneno a violare il decoro dil stato, et anche a fare non mediocre detrimento a la regia camera.

Intendendo aduncha la Maestà dil prefato Serenissimo Rè et Duca de Milano, che molti feudatarii o vassalli suoi et altri officiali cosi de Milano quanto del ducato suo quali hani (sic) jurisdictione, abutendo de la benignitate e clementia de S.M. hanno ardire procedere contra li cittadini et altri quali per la dispositione de li decreti statuti et ordini non sono sottoposti a la loro jurisdictione, exercendo contra loro cause civile et criminale e vexandoli mulctandoli et condemnandoli, dopoy applicando le condemnatione et multe ad chi non spectano secundi (sic)li decreti, statuti et ordini, et per altri varii modi contraveniendo a tali decreti statuti et ordini Reg. Panig. K., fol. 86.

Here, quite obviously was an attempt to assert the supremacy of the duke's courts over all private jurisdiction whatever in the province. But it was vitiated by the general weakness of the arrangements for the conduct of judicial affairs by the duke's officials. This flaw, specially notable in the lack of accurate definition of the duties attaching to each office, led to such confusion and overlapping of functions that Louis declared that unless it ended, there would be more disputes among his judges than among litigants,⁽¹⁶⁾ and the whole fabric of judicial administration would fall to pieces. The confusion was particularly marked in connection with the duties of the Executor Camere. Long protracted cases, quarrels about jurisdiction, constant appeals to legal subtleties and investigation of precedents took up time that would have been better employed in a direct consideration of the suitors' claims. These disputes and formalities carried the additional disadvantages that litigants, being unable to understand the methods employed, were, in Louis' opinion, distrustful of the awards and apt to suffer wrong/

(16)

Non possunt recto tramite et sine confusione civiles cause que inter subditos nostros agitantur ad expeditionem perducī, nisi singule causarum species singules habeat (sic) magistratus, et eorum quilibet jurisdictionis sue limites observet, finibusque suis coerceatur. Et enim si eveniat unumquemque magistratum qui specificam quarundam causarum habeat notionem posse de quibuscumque causis directe aut per indirectum se intromittere, jamjam dilacerata corrueat tota ordinaria jurisdictio, ac maiores animi passiones inter iudicantes exorientur quam inter litigantes controversie tractabantur. - Order settling the powers of the Executor Camere; Regist. Panig. K. fol. 78, tergo.

wrong through the delay in settling their case.⁽¹⁷⁾

Much of this confusion could be obviated by a clear definition of the functions of the Executor Camere, and this Louis laid down in the document under discussion. That no excuse might exist for further confusion the court is informed both as to what it may do, and, quite as important, what is outside its jurisdiction. In addition to proceedings against debtors, which rightly belong to it the Camere is empowered to consider and judge cases arising out of its own administration. Within its jurisdiction were disputes regarding taxation, so long as these were confined to private parties, that is, in so far as they did not involve the duke; but such cases could be taken only if they emerged incidentally. Unfortunately this decision gave an opening to what might eventually become a long dispute as to the exact interpretation in any particular instance of what might or might not be regarded as incidental. Finally, administrative cases against debtors might be brought before the court at the request of the duke's officials, as long as the action of the officials had the sanction of the duke or of the Senate.⁽¹⁸⁾

----- On -----

(17) Regist. Fanig. K. fol. 78, tergo.
This ordinance was issued in October 21st, 1500.

(18) Decernimus, edicimus, et declaramus:- Quod prefatus camere nostre executor qui de presenti est et ii etiam qui in futurum erunt, ultra executiones, quas contra debitores camere nostre ex proprio eorum officio facere possunt, etiam valeant de causis illis/

On the negative side the camere was forbidden to interfere in any way with cases or business outside its jurisdiction. The prohibition held good even if intervention were desired by the most highly placed justices or other officials. Nevertheless, if permission were given under the duke's seal, the court was entitled to act even in cases otherwise excluded from its jurisdiction. (19)

As the profits of justice in the camere might become a subject of dispute, certain fixed charges were decreed. If the case were heard and judged by the Executor Camere without assistance he was entitled to a profit of one per cent a qualibet partium. If he had the help of counsel in making his decision he/

(18) (contd.) illis cognoscere et eas terminare que circa executiones ipsas pro camera faciendas, et etiam circa executiones que pro materiis dationum inter privatos fiant, oriantur, et incidenter emergerint; nec non etiam in causis executivis, quas ad instantiam officialium nostrorum contra aliquos eorum debitores moveri continget; dummodo tamen quo ad ipsos officiales etiam speciale mandatum aut commissionem a nobis et cancellaria nostra habeant. - Reg. Panig. K., fol. 78 tergo.

(19) Inhibentes, quod ultra causas et negotia de quibus supra, non possit prefatus executor nunc vel in futurum de aliquibus aliis cuiuscunque qualitatis existant se intrromittere, etiam si fuerit sibi per aliquem iudicentem aut officialem nostrum demandatum, quacumque dignitate aut preheminentia talis iudicens aut officialis prefulgeat, nisi demum in dictis aliis casibus litteras sub sigillo nostro in cancellaria senatus Mediolanensis expeditas habeat;

Mandantes ex nunc prefato executori presenti, et eis etiam qui per tempora erunt, quatenus non audeant de aliis causis aut negociis quam de supra permissis se aliqualiter intrromittere. - Ibid.

he received not more than twenty shillings apart from counsel's fee and if, on the advice of counsel, he issued an interlocutor he received only ten shillings.

By a clause in the decree the Executor Camere was bound in difficult cases, to call in the help of counsel, the lawyer chosen being of necessity a member of the College of Jurisprudence of Milan - quo in casu teneatur assumere consilium unius de collegio jurisperitorum urbis nostre Medoiloni. As the Executor Camere was left free to decide when his skill or his legal knowledge was insufficient to deal with a case, there was always the chance that an unjust or an unduly self-confident judge would regard himself as competent to settle a cause the merits of which either were beyond his understanding or called for consultation with a specialist. But, as he was ultimately responsible to the king for his judgment, he was unlikely to offend flagrantly in this respect.

Without punishment for the infraction of these regulations they would have been ineffective. Hence there appears at the end a note that penalties will follow if the edict is not obeyed. The punishment fell on the Executor's servants as well as on himself, as they were mulcted in ten ducats for each infraction, or, if they had no money, then such punishment as the duke (probably through the Senate) chose to inflict.

Confusion/

Confusion of function and interference of one official in the business of others was not ended by the decree addressed to the Executor Camere. It may not have been worse than before the issue of the edict; yet there is evidence that not only was the administration of justice impeded but that in some cases money was being exacted in fines and confiscations which, instead of going into the duke's revenue, passed into the possession of the administrators. Hence on December 23rd, 1501, another decree appeared, which acts as a kind of pendant to the one just treated. (20) It prohibits any official, vassal or feudatory either in Milan or in the Province, to exercise jurisdiction or cause it to be exercised, to proceed or cause proceedings to be taken against any person, community, college or university, to condemn or cause to be condemned, transmit or cause to be transmitted to themselves the proceeds of any condemnation, fine, or confiscation except in so far as permitted by the decrees and ordinances of the duke. Nor shall he attempt or cause to be attempted anything contrary to the constitution of the decree De Majore Magistratu. Similarly no notary shall affix his signature to any order, request or other act, contrary to the contents of the present/

(20)

Regist. Panig. K., fol. 86

present edict.⁽²¹⁾ Then follows the usual article detailing the penalties for infraction of the ordinance.

It may be taken for granted that an edict is not issued without cause. Hence the existence of the one under discussion indicates a state of matters not at all creditable to the judicial authorities. But there must be discrimination. It may be that, while the French legal system, so far as it had been established in Milan, was not faultless, the edict was aimed against practices that had been prevalent in the city and the Province before Louis' agents took charge. On the other hand, if such infringements of the ducal control of justice had originated under the former dukes of Milan and the French officials were guiltless, it is certain that Louis would have made this plain in the preamble. But there he distinctly imputes fault to his own officials who, by not observing li termini de le sue jurisdictione, cause no small amount of trouble and loss to the Regia Camera./

(21) Deliberando S.M. dignamente provederli et redimere suoy subditi da indebite vexatione, e deffensare le ordinarie jurisdictione et succorrere a le indempnitate del suo fisco, et de chi spectata: per le presente, fa fare publica crida che alcuno officiale cosi de dicta città quanto del ducato suo et anchora vassalo o feudatario dil dicto ducato de Milano, o vero alcune terre de quello, et anche suoy officiali o vero dellegati o altro a loro nome non ardisca exercere jurisdictione ne fare exercere ne procedere ne fare procedere contra qualunque persona, comune, collegio o universitate ne condannare ne fare condannare ne trasmettere ne fare trasmettere condempnatione, multe o confiscatione alcuna a se medesmi ne ad altri cha (sic) quelli ad chi deno essere transmesse secundo/

Camera. Further, blame is laid to the charge of molti feudatori o vassalli et altri officiali. Though the tone of the preamble indicates that these were Frenchmen, some of them may have been unpatriotic Milanese who had supported Louis both in his first expedition, and later, in his movement to crush Ludovico's revolt.

It might be added that the fact of the edict being published in Italian was a proof that the chief offenders were Milanese. But this would be a wrong deduction. The edict was meant to be known and understood by the Milanese. Louis meant them to have the impression that he was seeing to their interests, that they must look to his courts for justice and not be intimidated by any individual, however powerful he might be, who proceeded against them in matters outside his jurisdiction. It is true that the information - Publicatum ad scallas pallatii Mediolani et super platea arenghi per Andream Pisonum tubetam communis Mediolani, die jovis XXIII Decembris 1501, sono tubarum premisso - is to a certain degree a matter of legal formality and was attached also to documents published in Latin. Nevertheless, it was a public proclamation, meant to be understood by/

(21)

(contd.) secundo la forma di decreti et ordini ut supra, ne atemptare ne fare temptare alcuna altra cosa contra la dispositione del decreto de majore magistratu, et altri decreti et ordini o vero statuti disponenti e militanti circa cio, et similiter che alcuno notaro cosi de civile quanto de criminale olza ne presuma sottoscrivere ne rogare comandamenti, inquisitione ne altri acti quali se facessero contra la forma de la presente crida. Regist. Panig. K., fol. 86.

by the citizens. Hence even a document written in Latin would probably be proclaimed in Italian, or, it may be, both in Italian and in Latin. There is no ground for believing that because this particular proclamation was written in Italian, Milanese lords were specially singled out as offenders.

Almost a year after the decree confirming the Greater Magistracy Louis put into operation a most praiseworthy piece of legislation.⁽²²⁾ Recognising that in the duchy there must be many people suffering wrongs without hope of redress, owing to their inability to pay legal expenses, he decreed that poor or infirm persons, women, minors and similar people should have their cause tried free of any expense. They were to undergo no delays; the cases must be tried summarily, simpliciter et de plano, sine strepitu et figura judiciaria. The decree strikes a note of humanity in a hard time, and its operation, if carried out as Louis desired, must have proved beneficial to many an unfortunate person in the duchy. Infractions of the law by the exaction of fees from the classes of people mentioned were/

(22) Regist. Panig. K., fol. 87, tergo. The edict was issued from Milan on December 2, 1502, but was not published in the city till the following January.

Nearly eighty years previously the Scottish Parliament had passed a statute having precisely the same intention as the edict issued by the French king. The kindly spirit in the words warrants their quotation.

"Gif there bee onie pure creature, for faulte of cunning, or dispenses that cannot nor may not follow his cause, the king, for/

were punished by a fine equivalent to four times the fee extorted.

In spite of the duke's efforts to make justice available to all his subjects and to see that his officers carried out their duties without fear or favour according to the jurisdiction placed in their power, complaints reached him that his good intentions were constantly frustrated by corrupt officials who levied fines, decreed unjust awards, and, in general, made their administration profitable to themselves instead of advantageous to the suitors appearing before them.⁽²³⁾

More/

(22) (contd.) for the love of GOD sall ordaine the judge before quhom the cause suld be determined to purwey and get a leill and wise advocate to follow sik pure creature's causes . . . and gif the judge refusis to do the law eavenlie as is before said the partie complainand sall have recourse to the King quho sall see vigorouslie punished sik judges that it sall be exemple till all uthers. Acts of the Parliament of Scotland, II James I, c.45

(23) Per havere il serenissimo rè di Franza e duca nostro de Milano compreso di quanta importantia e bisogno he il magistrato de li colaterali generali de la banca di stipendiati, per tuti li respecti concerneno esso officio et maxime per le injuste executione, inique extorsione et eccessive mercede quale fano e togliono li cavaleri, onestabili, barueri, fanti, et servitori et altri executori de li officiali de questa sua inclita città de Milano e suo ducato, contra la dispositione de li ordini, decreti e statuti facti sopra le executioni reale e personale quali esso magistro era solito di fare osservare . . . Preamble to a document in the Regist. Panig. N., fol. 20, tergo.

More than once, as has been said, Louis had endeavoured to check this injustice and end the scramble for unlawful gains; but apparently the justices concerned found some means of circumventing the duke's clearly expressed intentions. Even so late as 1505, when the legal administration should have been fairly settled and functioning without much trouble, he was compelled to intervene. On this occasion he appointed a Controller-General who exercised full authority over both military and judicial officers.⁽²⁴⁾ He was expressly commissioned not only to root out all extortion and robbery, but to compel observance ad unguem of all the decrees, statutes and ordinances of the Province. Concurrently with his position as Controller-General of Military and Judicial Officers he held an appointment as one of the collateral judges de la banca di stipendiati.

Messer Laurentio de Mozanicha, who received his commission on January 7th, lost no time in beginning his duties; for in the same document which contains the information of his appointment two months previously, he caused a public proclamation to be made of certain acts which were forbidden. This was done so that every one might be warned, and therefore unable to plead ignorance of his duty.

The/

(24) Milan, Regist. Panig. N. fol. 20, tergo. The appointment was made on March 3rd, 1505.

The forbidden acts were of the most varied character, First comes the familiar injunction to each potestate, judice, rectore, e altro ufficiale to refrain from meddling in judicial cases, whether civil or criminal, which were outside their jurisdiction, more especially if such cases fell to be tried by the bench of collateral judges.

A curious veto upon the sale of horses or mules unless the bench of collateral judges had previously been informed of the proposed transaction, was the second article. From the comparatively heavy penalty of ten ducats for each offence such sales were evidently regarded as prejudicial to the state. An ad valorem tax was due to the revenues of the city for each horse or mule sold, ⁽²⁵⁾ though there is no indication in the article of such a duty. But the animals were necessary for transport of stores and for gun haulage if war should break out, and it was part of the scheme of defence that sufficient of them should be left in the province to serve this purpose. Probably, then, the application to the bench of collateral judges was deemed necessary not only in order that the tax might be levied but that the administration might be kept informed regarding the number of horses and mules exported, and those merely changing ownership/

(25) See Reg. Panig. N. 86, where Baptista Cribello is mentioned as Commissaris Generale de le taxe di cavalli.

ownership within the city or the Province. Should the numbers appear to be too low, a proposed sale for export would be forbidden. In any case, from what is known of Louis' policy, it is certain that the regulation was not made merely in restraint of trade.

The third article forbade constables of the gates of the city to take away fruit, wine, wood, hay, straw or other goods coming into Milan. The object was probably to prevent these officials seizing goods, paying their own price for them, and then re-selling at a heavy profit. That this offence, also, was regarded seriously is evident from the penalties attached to it. For the first offence a fine of a florin was levied; for the second offence the constable's salary was stopped for a month, and another repetition of the crime was punished by ⁽²⁶⁾
duy tracti de corda.

The Controller-General meant to carry out his duties effectively if one may judge by the articles contained in this document. At any rate he was not afraid to undertake the responsibility of seeing that the terms of his commission were thoroughly observed. If all executions real and personal were made to depend upon a mandate from the bench of collateral judges/

(26) The Strappado. The offender was drawn to the top of a beam and let fall, by which means a limb was sometimes dislocated.

judges he was bound to know what permissions were granted; and, if any execution were carried through without the express permission of the collateral judges, he could at once arrest the offenders. That his intention was to act in this manner is clear from an article which forbids any police official, constable, retainer, soldier, or any other person to carry through an execution in the city by command of the Captain of Justice, the podesta, or their vicars and justices, the vicar of provisions, the controllers of taxes, streets, and food supplies and customs duties, the commissioner and collector of the royal camere, consuls of justice, abbots and consuls of Merchant Gilds, the Captains of the Martesana or any other officials or their assistants who have jurisdiction and authority to order such executions, unless the bench of collateral judges are first acquainted with the fact that such an execution is intended. Small opportunity existed of infringing the statutes of the duchy, so far as this particular phase of the administration was concerned, unless the collateral judges themselves should connive at the infringement. In that event the Controller-General was in a position to quash the action and order the arrest of those who were conspiring to break the law. Nor could any one plead ignorance, as the contents of the article had been publicly proclaimed. (27)
claimed. With/

(27) The word execution is used here in the sense of proceeding against a person by seizing his goods.

With regard to the seizure of goods by warrant, several details are given which indicate that Louis was making a real endeavour to rule Milan with equity. Such goods when held in pledge for debt or other default must not be sold to an innkeeper, nor must the host supply the soldiers with food or drink on the strength of the goods. Again, when an execution was effected outside the city of Milan, the Consul of Justice belonging to the district must be present on behalf of the person whose goods were being sequestered. If the proceedings took place in a small village then the anziano de la (28) parochia must be present to watch on behalf of the culprit. Further, before an execution could be effected the man in charge must have an order, giving details regarding the number of men to be employed, and signed by the justice under whose jurisdiction the action was taken. The executors retained a copy, the original being deposited in the court of the justice concerned.

Two other provisions are remarkable. The first declared that if goods thus sequestered were sold on behalf of creditors, whoever they might be, the balance, if any remained, was returned to the late owner. The second refused to allow the/

(28) The anziano may have been one of the old men of the village (quite obviously the word is the same as the Spanish anciano, an old man.), but much more probably he was a village magistrate. This suggestion is supported by the fact that each of the parishes in Milan possessed its own anciano.

the poinding of agricultural implements or other tools used by a workman in his trade. The fact that such an article was necessary in a decree indicates that the evil practice existed of seizing a man's goods in totis leaving him without even the means of earning a living. Alternatively, but less likely, the rule may have been introduced to meet the needs of one special case in which an attempt had been made to seize a man's working tools. The article contains the further excellent provision that a woman's clothes, including her wedding robes, might not be seized for debt or other default, nor might her dowry be touched.

The supply of food for the city was a most important matter of which the Controller-General took cognizance. Towards the end of this, his first decree, he forbids any interference with people who are bringing food to Milan. Nor must they be molested on their return. Obviously he issued that instruction in order to end such depredations; so that, despite all the regulations already made, people were not yet secure in carrying on their ordinary business if any interference with it was likely to benefit the interferer.

There is possibly some connection between this regulation and that already mentioned, by which constables of the city gates were forbidden to seize food stuffs from those who were bringing them within the walls. If a constable were compelled to/

to cease this practice it may be presumed that he would attempt the same robbery by other means. Colour is lent to this suggestion by the fact that the decree directs attention not only to viotualie but to altre cose, and some of these altre cose, viz., wood, hay and straw are specifically mentioned in the section dealing with the intrusions of the constables. There is at least a suspicion that the two cases are connected, though still worse for the unfortunate vendor of provisions - others beside the constables were certainly concerned in the robberies. The clause forbidding interference with the provision vendors on their return seems to point to the Controller-General's knowledge that they were not only occasionally robbed of their goods on the way to Milan but sometimes, also, of the money they received (when they got their goods through in safety) on their way home.

The same article establishes sanctuary for hunted men. They must not be captured within the city, in a church, or even in their own homes from the ringing of the Angelus till dawn of the next day. Nor might they be taken at all on a feast day. On the other hand, another section points out that, the man having been captured, no attempt at rescue must be made, nor any endeavour to prevent the carrying out of a sequestration of goods, and that no pledge shall be taken, against their will, from the officials in charge. Thus, while there was humane consideration for the alleged culprit, if he were found guilty the law must take/

take its course.

The regulation regarding sanctuary for a hunted man is open to another interpretation - and possibly there is something in it - namely that, to have armed men marching about the streets at night in search of a prisoner was a practice that might be easily abused. Reckless or revengeful men might readily seek to redress their grievances under colour of such a search, while anti-French citizens might just as readily employ it to further their designs against the government. Even if this abuse could be restrained a night capture would have afforded too great scope for attempts at rescue.

Finally comes the warning that, as laxity in carrying out the instructions contained in the decree might bring evil consequences upon the king, the officials concerned would be held responsible for each and all of their failures.

Perhaps Louis was right regarding the integrity of the officials he had appointed at Milan. At all events he left nothing to chance. Where money was concerned, and especially where only a small check could be placed on its disposal, corruption was at least a possibility. Despite the commissions he had given to various officials to oversee the accounts of the province he remained dissatisfied. Thus he added one more to the number in February, 1504, when he appointed Paulus Ghisulfus, secretary/

secretary to Charles d'Amboise, as Commissioner-General to receive the various fines and fees of justice awarded by the camere.

In issuing the commission he points out that in order that the court shall not be defrauded he has deemed it necessary to appoint an export who shall take charge of and be responsible for all condemnations, seizure of goods, confiscations, compositions and remissions. To that end Paul's appointment is cum auctoritate, arbitrio, baylia, cura, salario, honoribus, oneribus, preeminentiis, prerogativis, emolumentis, utilitatibus et juribus quibuscumque dicto officio spectantibus et pertinentibus.
(30) Further he decrees ut nichil in premissis sine participatione dicti Pauli exigant et nisi prius de eo sibi notitiam dederint.

To him must be referred for settlement all disputes, inquisitions, trials, condemnations and confiscations over which the camere has jurisdiction.

The administration of a conquered province in which many/

(29) Charles d'Amboise was the nephew of Cardinal d'Amboise. The Cardinal held full power over Milan as Louis' Lieutenant General; but, curiously enough, his nephew Charles, Seigneur de Chaumont, Grand Master and Marshal of France, also held the Lieutenancy and retained it even after the arrival of his uncle in Milan in 1501.

(30) Reg. Ducati lV., fol. 46.

many of the inhabitants remained hostile to the ruling power was a matter of considerable difficulty, but five years of comparatively just government should have produced more than the semblance of order. Yet, even so late as the middle of 1505, the French administration had apparently failed to provide for the safety of Milanese subjects. In reality the failure was by no means so great as the decree about to be considered seems to indicate. For the general body of citizens there was protection and justice, or the records would bear witness to the contrary. The class of murder mentioned was certainly far too common, but it was confined to a small portion of the community, and the citizens in general were not greatly perturbed by it. Perhaps, therefore, it would be fairer to say that the attempts to secure the safety of the general community were partially frustrated by the French themselves, and by those Milanese who were opposed to their rule.

Private vengeance had become common. Broils, tumults and assassinations were of so frequent occurrence, even if confined to a small class, that special legislation had to be introduced to terminate the scandal. The French soldiery, if they be judged by some of the documents already quoted, cannot be held guiltless. Their bearing, haughty and domineering in the extreme towards the Milanese, must have provoked many a quarrel in which the citizen suffered at the hands of the military man. There/

There were, too, feuds among the Milanese themselves. But the worst phase of these crimes was the action of those who, wishing vengeance or seeking the removal of an enemy, and being too cowardly to make the attempt themselves, employed professional murderers for the purpose. If the actual murderer were caught he suffered for the crime, while the instigator of it was treated most leniently or escaped punishment altogether.

Manifestly this was an incentive to influential men to gain their ends at whatever cost to their adversaries, and yet remain secure from punishment. It was also an indication that equity was not sufficiently considered in judging these crimes; and thus, besides failing to repress them, such injustice caused a certain measure of discontent among the law-abiding portion of the community.

To meet the situation a decree, issued on August 25th, 1505, had long been necessary.⁽³¹⁾ In it Louis recites that more than twenty decrees, ordinances and statutes against murder had been published. Each of these probably dealt with some particular phase of the matter, for the complaint is made that human foresight cannot possibly make provision for the innumerable ways in which the law may be broken or its effect avoided by criminals. Consequently fresh legislation is being constantly required. Proceeding, the decree points out the grievous state of affairs due to/

(31) Reg. Panig. K., fol. 122

to the non-infliction of punishment upon those who instigate to crime, and directs that the law shall be applied tam contra predictos mandantes quam contra quoscumque alios, contra quos homicidii penam imposita est prout contra veros homicidas procedi debet.

Possibly this decree did not cure the evil at once, but it was at least a praiseworthy attempt to make both instigator and perpetrator suffer the same penalty.

One other decree is worthy of attention. In judicial condemnations the culprit might be punished by sequestration of goods, imprisonment or death. But there remained for consideration the case of the man who, charged with an offence against the law, defied the courts, refused to stand his trial, and took to flight. Put to the ban he became an outlaw who, if he did not make his way to another state and settle there, had no alternative but to prey on his fellows, and thus found "every man's hand against his hand".

To rid the land of such a menace to peace and good government ancient custom sanctioned his capture or death by any means. Naturally the officials concerned with the administration of justice were expected to capture or kill such outlaws, but frequently the task was beyond their power. An edict had been published pointing out that it was the right, nay, the duty of all citizens to aid in the chase after the criminal, and that if success/

success attended their efforts they might claim the pardon and release from the ban of some other exiled criminal whose offence was not more serious than that of the slain or captured man.

This method of procedure may have served to attain the object towards which it was directed. But, on the other hand, it must have led to an amount of spying that was demoralising to the state, and opened the way to fraud and trickery. The legal authorities, for instance, having captured or slain an exiled criminal (and this was only part of their duty) had no hesitation in demanding that they should be allowed to nominate another banned man for pardon just as was the case with private citizens. It is easy to see how such a claim conflicted with the interests of justice, and how corrupt officials might turn it to their own advantage. The claim, of course, was not formally allowed; nevertheless the practice had become common enough for Louis to take notice of it and forbid it definitely by edict.

A further abuse had grown up by which the intention of the law was circumverted and the state of matters made appreciably worse than it should have been. Not only did officials claim the right of the private citizen in obtaining pardon for the banned man in return for the death or capture of another criminal of the same type, but they obtained release from the ban for criminals whose culpability was considerably greater than/

than that of the man who had been captured or slain.

Louis could not afford to have his laws flouted in so flagrant a fashion, and on May 16th, 1506, he issued an edict on the subject explaining and restricting the conditions under which the capture or death of the banned man might procure the pardon of another exiled outlaw and his release from the ban.⁽³²⁾ Officials whose duty it was to effect such captures, and who were paid for it, were, in that respect, absolutely excluded from participation in the rights of private citizens. Further, even when the privilege was won by a private citizen, the exile whose pardon was sought must not have been guilty of more heinous crimes than the man who had been captured or slain. Nor must it be taken for granted that his pardon was certain. The man's case must be considered on its merits, and it was regarded as essential that he should make his peace before he was allowed to return to the city or province as a free citizen.

With this edict may be closed the consideration of judicial administration up to the year 1506. The choice of examples apparently indicates that the French government of the Milanese was not particularly successful; but it is only apparently. In reality the documents indicate a desire to rule the Province with equity and to reduce it to a state of peace and satisfaction. But it is to be remembered that, though the majority/

(32)

Reg. Panig. N., fol. 66. See also Note 7 in this chapter.

majority of the citizens acquiesced in the French occupation, careless whether they were ruled by their own people or by foreigners, they were ready to turn against the French if such action would improve their position, either by giving them greater liberty or by reducing the burden of taxation. There remained, too, a minority which never reconciled itself to the domination of the Province by foreigners, and accepted its lot from sheer inability to do anything else. Some of the governmental difficulties had their source in this minority which, by passive opposition, refused to co-operate in work that was for the good of the state merely because it was initiated by the French administration.

Two other facts should be borne in mind. For some years after the occupation there existed the necessity for constant legislation. Louis' new subjects were being governed in accordance with the French conception of administration and, while most of the old laws remained in force, it was essential that the Milanese should thoroughly comprehend whatever in the new system was different from that to which they had been accustomed. The second fact is a positive proof that the French administration was not so barren of results as it appears to be. As the year 1506 drew nearer the mass of legislative and judicial edicts, decrees, statutes and ordinances decreased, while the orders of the municipal bodies became increasingly frequent and increasingly/

increasingly important. The declaration of means and methods, of the appointment of fresh officials, of the limitation and definition of official functions gradually assumed a less important position because they were no longer required to the same extent as formerly. The legislative and judicial decrees had accomplished their purpose. The new government had established itself and was working satisfactorily, while communal life, so long disturbed by the atmosphere of war and the excitement of change, had now become more settled and was beginning to run its normal course. Political events in Italy, of which something will be said later on, - the capture and death, for example, of Cesare Borgia, that arch-disturber of Italian peace - had not a little to do with the development of municipal life in the city.

It may be noted here that Louis had promised in 1502 to treat the Milanese exactly as if they were French, inasmuch as he granted them the same privileges and allowed them the same franchises as were enjoyed by his original subjects. The demand for certain privileges made by the Milanese in September 1499 has already been dealt with. Louis' formal answer to the series of requests was returned on December 23rd, 1502. The document containing the demands was written in Italian and having been submitted to the secretary concerned, was re-written in Latin and the king's reply placed against each article. One request and its/

its reply is worth attention, viz.,

Quod Mediolanenses uti valeant omnibus privilegiis, immunitatibus et franchisiis quibus utuntur Gallici in omnibus partibus R. Majestatis V., et per quoscumque Regios Magistratus habeantur pro habilibus ad quaecumque beneficia et officia in toto regio dominio, aliquibus in contrarium facientibus non attentis. - Reg. Panig. K., fol. 88, tergo.

To this the king replied "Libentissime conceditur".

The answer is a proof that Louis meant to deal justly with the Milanese. It might be argued that the response was meant merely to quieten the apprehensions of the citizens; but Louis by that time had control of the city and hardly required to attempt to deceive the people. The king was astute enough, too, to know that the deception, if it were so, would be discovered almost at once, and as a matter of policy had better not be practised. It may, therefore, be taken that the reply was honestly given.

During the earlier part of the French administration of Milan it was a matter of considerable difficulty to keep officials to their own work. Constant interference of one department in the affairs of other departments was a continual source of annoyance and inconvenience. Edict after edict was issued stating plainly that officials were appointed for the purpose of carrying out definite duties, and forbidding them to exceed those duties or exercise powers which were not within their commission. After each issue some improvement took place, but the temptation to risk/

risk the inclusion of rights and privileges belonging to other departments was always present and frequently over-mastered the officials.

The defect was specially troublesome when, as was often the case, money was in question. The resultant confusion not only caused a loss of revenue to the state but provided many opportunities for open fraud and corruption. Private citizens, too, suffered under the exactions, open or secret, of officials who had no right to levy them. The exactions might, indeed, be quite illegal. The official took the risk of discovery, which was not too great, as the injured citizen would hesitate to complain if he had handed over any money, lest he, in turn, should be accused of conniving at the fraud for the sake of his own interests; while, if he had paid no money, he was left without proof that fraud had been attempted.

The difficulty was further increased if a department had at one time possessed powers which were afterwards recalled. Custom, both on the part of the officials and of private individuals made it hard to adopt the new conditions, especially if the officials resented the change and imagined themselves wronged by it. The officers of the Mint, for example, either found it difficult to break away from old official habits, or they acted in defiance of the regulations which stripped them of part of their former powers. Such, at any rate, is the implication contained/

contained in an edict published in March 20th, 1505. (33)

In this edict the Maestro of the Ordinary Revenue declared he had information that certain officials of the Mint were still exercising powers of which they had been deprived by a recent decree. As he was the official responsible for the due observance of all edicts and decrees relative to state money received or spent in the ordinary course, these people were usurping the functions of his office by collecting money without his express sanction. He laid no charge of fraud against the officials: he was satisfied merely to point out the inconvenience caused by the practice and to insist that it must cease. He forbade private individuals to hand over money or goods to those officials, and likewise refused to allow the said officials to accept such money or goods even at the request of the person offering them. The private individual who disobeyed the edict was liable to a fine of twenty-five gold ducats, to be divided in equal portions among the Regia Camera, the informer, and the Master of the Mint, while, if an official refused to submit to the rule he might suffer three inflictions of the strappado. (34)

(33) Reg. Panig. N., fol. 25, tergo.

(34) Per parte de la pr. R. Mta. se fa publica crida e comanda-
mente ad qualuncha persona de qual conditione voglia se sia non
ardisca ne presuma directo ne per indirecto in don ne per altro
modo che sapiano usare dare ne fare dare dinari ne niuna altra
cosa ad dicti offitiali, sotto la pena de xxv ducati d'oro da
essere applicati per la terza parte a la regia camera, per la
terza/

No delay was permitted in the punishment of an official. He was brought before Messer Bernardino Moresino, a Commissioner of the Mint, to whom was given power to try and to condemn without any further commission.⁽³⁵⁾

Another edict concerning officials is interesting in many ways.⁽³⁶⁾ In the first place it deals with the salaries paid to officers in the service of the Magistrato Straordinario. The amounts show that, if the administration of the Milanese was expensive, the expenditure was not due to subordinate officials. The information regarding the standing of the officials and the sums of money they received is scattered throughout the edict,/

(34) (contd.) terza parte ali magistri de la zeca e per l'altra terza all'accusatore . . .

Item se comanda ad dicti officiali che non ardischano ne presumano andare cerchando ne togliere da alcuna persona dinari ne altra cosa; etiam gli volesse essere dato in dono ut supra e se fin a qua hanno ricevuto cosa alcuna debano anche loro havere consignato ut supra et non presumano fare offitio et inventione de monete, se primo non hanno dato securità nel modo e forma e stato ordinato, debano dare quelli vorano fare tale officio e facto tuto quello se contene ne li ordini circa cio, e se non haverano lettere de novo concesse di potere fare officio como in diote oride ultimo loco facte se contene; e questo sotto la pena de tre tracti de corda achi presumera fare tal offitio, senza havere dato tale securità, e facto quello se contene in dicti ordini e tolto le sue lettere ut supra. - Reg. Panig. N, fol. 25, tergo.

(35) E per observatione de la presente orida, è data special cura e commissione al spectabile doctore M. Bernardino Morexino etiam commissario sopra le monete de punire tali officiali che serano trovate contrafare ipso facto et incontinenti senza altro processo ne altra commissione. - Ibid.

(36) Regist. Ducali IV, fol. 23, tergo. It was issued in June 23rd 1502.

edict, but for convenience it is given here in tabular form.

Statement of sums paid to Officials of the Extraordinary Revenue from July 1st, 1500, to December 31st, 1501.

Zo. Angelo da Castiglione, Secretary	£48	0	0
Sigismondo da Osio, Assistant Secretary	23	5	0
Bernardino Mombreto, Assistant Secretary	23	5	0
Felix Vistonte, Notary	63	0	0
Jacobo Pelegrino, Cashier	22	10	0
Zo. Pedro Bossio, Notary	70	0	0
Bernardino dalla Gazada, Notary	70	0	0
Baptista da Oppreno, Auditor of Accounts	120	0	0
Four Ushers, viz.,			
Bartolomeo dal Pozo,			
Michele da Basalica,			
Christofero da Carimate,			
Antonello de Pozobonello,	135	0	0
	<u>£575</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>

In addition to this a sum of £60, voted in 1500 was divided among seven officials whose names are not given, and a further sum of £120, voted in 1501 was distributed among the staff, commencing with a M. Alan Portinaeger, one of the secretaries.

Three facts emerge from this statement. The names of the officials indicate Italian origin and afford evidence that Louis did not confine his civil service appointments to Frenchmen. He was really carrying out the policy of making as little difference as he could between his Italian and his French subjects. Thus, when he promised in December 1502 to treat both alike, he was merely confirming a policy which he had already put into operation.

In/

In the second place it is noteworthy that the salaries were small. This was unfortunate, as a poverty-stricken civil servant was more likely to seek for illicit means of augmenting his income than one whose salary was rather more than sufficient to cover his necessities. Further, it is to be noted that the year and a half for which the salaries were due had expired six months previously. Nothing could have been worse for the morale of the administrative staff than to be uncertain as to the time when they would be paid. The sums were not large, and, if the staff had no other means of livelihood, Louis gave them a direct incentive to leave his service or defraud the revenue in one way or another in order that they might not starve. There is, however, the probability that the notaries, at least, would find other employment in addition to their duties in the Extraordinary Revenue. The secretaries and the auditor of accounts would suffer most, as their employment was constant, while the ushers were receiving almost, if not quite, as much as they would at any other work of which they were capable. Despite the probability of many members of the staff obtaining extra employment it would have been to Louis' advantage to have paid better his civil servants, whose work was specialised and whose places could not readily be filled by untrained men.

The following quotation reveals another fact.

Aliquali noi l'havimo ordinato, et ordinamo per questa presente, per loro salarii de sei mesi integri, de Zulio, Auosto, Settembre, /

Septembre, Octobre, Novembre et Decembre di lanno finito lultimo di del dicto mese di Decembre lanno 1500, et del anno integro appresso, cominzando al primo di Zenaro 1501 et finito lultimo di de Decembre appresso et ultimamente passato. Aquelle somme se ha havere et prehendere sopra una partita de LX libre Tornese stabilite nel stato generale de dicte nostre finanze del dicto anno 1500, comenzando al luocho de cancelleri che erano tri, et tri coadjutori se prehendera uno di secretarii che serà griffero criminale; e sopra una altra partita de CXX libre Tornese, stabilite nel stato generale de dicte nostre finanze del dicto anno sequente 1501, comenzando a M. Alan Portineger secretario che servirà de grifferi in la dicta camera al luocho de cancelleri, per questo che a noi è debitamente apparso per la certificatione de dicti Maestri de nostre intrate extraordinarie, che tuti li sopranominati et caduno de loro respectivamente ne hanno continuamente servito de poi el dicto tempo, et servano continuamente in li dicti officii in epsa nostra camera, et che alchuni de nostri secretarii ne el dicto M. Alan non ne hanno in alchuno modo servito de grifferi in luocho de cancelleri. - Reg. Ducali IV, fol. 23, tergo.

The settlement of ways and means for the administration of the province was decided at the introduction of the general financial statement for the year, the budget (if stabilire be taken in the sense of resolving with common consent) being passed after discussion and vote. But this check on finance was really less powerful than it appears. In the tabular statement just given of payments made on behalf of the Extraordinary Revenue the names from Zo. Pedro Bossio to the end do not appear in the Budget. They had been employed, however, in the Extraordinary Revenue and the king himself orders that payment be made for their services. The Treasurer, he directs, will accept the payments as correct and deduct them when he is striking his balance. There should be no difficulty in the matter as it is the king's will - Ai quali noi mandiano cosi farlo senza alcuna difficultate perche
cosi/

così è il nostro piacere etc. Nothing must be allowed to interfere: ordinances, strictness in accounting, restrictions - all must give way because the king decreed it.

E non obstante qualuncha altra ordinanza, o stillo, rigore de conti et de finanze, restrictione, mandamenti, o defense e qualuncha altra cosa a questo in contrario. - Reg. Ducali IV, fol. 23, tergo.

In the practical working out of this instance of Louis' disregard of the Budget decisions there was probably nothing to grumble at. The men had performed the duties of their office though their appointment had been irregular. But the fact that the king could thus over-ride the law was significant, and pointed to the possibility of future trouble if a constitutional issue should emerge. Even if Louis were right and his instruction were in the nature of a supplementary estimate, that estimate should have been framed by those who were responsible for the general financial statement to which the instruction was an appendix.

Cardinal d'Amboise, who succeeded Trivulzio as the king's Lieutenant-General in Milan after the suppression of Ludovico's revolt, had not the amplitude of power that might have been expected. Louis seems to have kept a grip upon the more important appointments to the administrative staff. This is illustrated by an edict issued from Lomello by the Cardinal on September 24th, 1502, confirming the appointment of Jean Antoine de Caymis as Master of the Extraordinary Revenue. ⁽³⁷⁾ The

(37) Regist. Ducali IV, fol. 33, tergo. Benaglio, Relazione Istoria del Magistrato delle Entrate di Milano, op. I, p. 16, gives this appointment as belonging to the year 1503.

office had actually been granted by Louis. True, the appointment had been left to the Cardinal if he judged it wise for the good of the state. But this was purely a matter of form: the king had already decided that de Caymis should have the post. The Cardinal knew this and naturally confirmed the appointment.

In addition to this indication of the limits placed upon the Cardinal's power as Lieutenant-General, the edict is interesting in another particular. In the last document treated, irregularity of payment was mentioned. In the present instance, unless the conditions of the appointment were infringed no such complaint could be made, as the confirmation states distinctly that payment was to be made for each year's tenure of office
(38)
at the accustomed times.

In the detailed examination of administrative documents the political state of Italy outside of Milan is apt to be forgotten. Yet the events that occurred from the time of the first French occupation of the Province have a certain effect upon its internal affairs. They have, for example, a bearing upon the next document to be treated, which deals with the granting of investiture to Louis as Duke of Milan. They serve to/

(38)

Mandantesque ulterius generali financiarum tam ordinariorum quam extraordinariarum magistrisque intratarum ordinariorum ducatus domini Mediolani et eorum ouilibet prout ad eum pertinuerit, quod per thesaurarium et receptorem generalem dictarum financiarum sive per alium ad quem spectaverit, persolvi faciant salaria dicto officio pertinentia singulo anno et temporibus solitis.

to show also, that, though the government of Milan was not all it might have been, its citizens were better provided for and more happily situated under the French régime than were the inhabitants of almost any other part of Italy. A bare sketch of these events will, therefore, be of value in this place.

The record is one of warfare and suffering, for a great part of which Louis was responsible. A shady action in politics is frequently forgiven - a blunder, never. Louis' most grievous fault after establishing himself in Italy was his allowing the presence of a rival foreign power. Dynastically he had claims upon the kingdom of Naples, and if he were unable to enforce these, he ought, at least, to make certain that Spain, which also had pretensions to the southern kingdom, had no opportunity of obtaining a foothold there. His wisest course would have been to placate Federigo, to bind him to the French interests by treating him as a friend. By offering protection to the Neapolitans and disclaiming all intention of intervening in their affairs, except at their request, he would probably have prevented the Spaniards from gaining a footing in the peninsula.

Instead of this he rushed on preparations for an attack upon Naples. The only opponent of whom he had any fear was Ferdinando of Spain, with whom, in 1500, he came to a disgraceful accommodation by the Treaty of Granada. Federigo, in despair at the precarious state in which he found himself, had allied himself/

himself with the Turks. For Louis and Ferdinando this offered the very excuse they required. Declaring that the divisions of Christian princes offered opportunities for Turkish aggression, and deploring the fact that Federigo had not only increased these divisions but had actually joined himself as an ally to the infidels, the treaty went on to say that the right to Naples was vested not in Federigo but in Louis and Ferdinando, and that, to maintain peace, they had agreed to divide the kingdom between them. In the ensuing struggle Federigo was defeated and driven from his kingdom.

The inevitable happened. Frenchman and Spaniard quarrelled over the division of the plunder they had taken, and by 1502 the former allies were at war. The two most prominent figures were on the French side, Bayard, and on the Spanish, Gonzalo de Cordova, El Gran Capitan. In the course of the war, Louis had to pay for another bad mistake in policy. When he compelled the marriage of Charlotte d'Albret to Cesare Borgia he accomplished two aims - he gained the friendship of the Pope and insulted the Sieur Alain d'Albret, father of the unfortunate Charlotte. The insult was neither forgiven nor forgotten by Alain who took his revenge by delaying, either through apathy or treachery, an invasion of Spain projected by Louis. By 1504 the French were compelled to quit Naples, leaving the victorious Ferdinando in possession.

Concurrently/

Concurrently with these events in south Italy, there were disturbances in the centre of the country. The name of Cesare Borgia is pre-eminent in the wars waged there. Immediately after the first French occupation of Milan, Louis, carrying out his agreement with the Papacy, aided Cesare to obtain Forlì and Imola. The revolt of Ludovico Sforza caused the withdrawal of French troops for a time, but they returned after the second occupation. By their help Cesare was enabled to seize Pesaro, Rimini and Faenza. He even meditated an advance on Florence, but desisted upon an order from Louis.

The trouble in Naples afforded him an admirable opportunity of furthering his designs and, by August 1503, he had captured Fermo, Urbino and Camerino, and was lord of Pisa; while he had Louis' sanction to move against Bologna.

The death of Alexander VI, and his own illness ended Cesare's conquests. The Pope's death caused the usual intrigues for the election of a successor. Cesare, of course, was not a possible candidate, but he plotted to secure the election of a Spanish Cardinal. Giuliano della Rovere opposed this and pressed his own claims, but Cesare's policy being likely to succeed, he retired from the contest and helped to elect Pius III, a nephew of Aenea Piccolomini, who had worn the tiara as Pius II. The new Pope died in October and, settling his differences with Cesare, della Rovere was elected. This was a grave error on Cesare's part/

part, for Giuliano della Rovere was an inveterate enemy of his house. For the time being, the Pontiff was compelled to dissemble, but he was none the less determined that if the Romagna were conquered it would be for the Papacy and not for the Borgias.

Cesare acted in defiance of the Pope, and, being ordered to come to Rome, was taken prisoner. As the price of his freedom he was forced to surrender the towns of the Romagna in his possession. But he was not satisfied. Setting out for Naples he sought aid from Ferdinando. The king at first appeared friendly, but suddenly changing, had Cesare sent to Spain as prisoner. In 1506 he escaped and less than a year afterwards (March 1507) was killed in battle.

Franco-Spanish relations now claim attention. By the Treaty of Lyons in April, 1503, an attempt had been made by Louis XII and the Archduke Philip, son of Maximilian, to settle the Neapolitan quarrel. By this treaty the French claims on Naples were to fall to Claude, daughter of Louis XII, while those of Spain were vested in the Archduke Philip, son-in-law of Ferdinando and Isabella. (39)

Neither/

(39) Et, avecques ce, estoyent constantz lesdits Roy et Royne d'Espaigne, et promectoyent par iceelles lectres lesser et transporter le droict qu'ilz se disoyent avoir sur ledit Royaume de Naples a l'archiduc, qui leur fille aînée avoit esposée, si le Roy ausi, de sa part, vouloit laisser le droict par loy pretendu audit Royaume de Naples à madame Claude, sa fille, laquelle le filz de celuy archiduc avoit pareillement par procureur fiancée. Les lectres de procuracion furent par ledit archiduc baillées au Roy pour iceelles veoir et visiter, lesquelles après les avoir veues et lues, mist en conseil et fist debatre la chose à l'equité et/

Neither Louis XII, nor Ferdinando was sincere in his professions. Louis made the secret stipulation that, if the fulfilment of the terms involved the dismemberment of France, he would denounce the treaty and refuse to be bound by it; while Ferdinando, unfriendly to Philip, did not forget that the Archduke's son Charles was betrothed to Claude and thus, besides obtaining Naples, might one day rule also over Castile. This idea was so repugnant to him that he determined to respect the treaty only in so far as it suited his own purpose.

Estranged as he was from his father-in-law, Philip attached the utmost importance to the marriage of his son with Louis' daughter; and Maximilian, who was dreaming of a vast addition to the Hapsburg dominions, supported him to the best of his ability. Queen Anne who also was in favour of the marriage, persuaded Louis to settle as Claude's dowry (by the Treaty of Blois) not only Naples but Milan, Genoa, Asti, Bretagne, Blois, and, in the event of his death without male heirs, Burgundy. Maximilian made the mistake of showing his hand too openly by a proposal that the Salic Law should be suspended so that, if Louis had no son, Claude might succeed him as Queen of France.

Ferdinando was already jealous of Philip, but the prospect of the Archduke's son succeeding to such vast territories brought/

(39) (contd.) et deuement consulter. Si fut conclud que, pour le bien de la paix, unyon des princes et salut de la chose publique, le trecté estoit bon, juste et raisonnable. d'Auton, Vol. III, pp. 154, 155

brought to his aid all the cold craftiness he possessed, and he began at once to seek an accommodation with Louis. The result was seen in the second Treaty of Blois (October 12th, 1505) by which Ferdinando agreed to marry Louis' niece Gervaise de Foix to whom, instead of to Claude, the French claims on Naples were given up. At this juncture Philip died. Though the right to Castile was Juana's, Ferdinando still retained the regency and by a despicable piece of trickery had Juana declared mad and thus incapable of undertaking the rule of her dominion. Maximilian's hopes sank and, before, long, events in France completely shattered his schemes. The French would not tolerate the idea of a foreigner one day becoming their king. The marriage of Claude and Charles was, therefore, definitely broken off, a new groom being found in François d'Angoulême - which was the best settlement possible for France.

Maximilian took his diplomatic defeat badly. He levied war on Louis, but as his abilities were by no means commensurate with his ambitions Louis had little difficulty in dealing with him. Driven to desperation by a threatened attack in the Netherlands he sought peace with Louis and made with him (December 10th, 1508) one of the many disgraceful agreements of the time - the Treaty of Cambray - by which Venice, which had successfully resisted him, was to be partitioned between him and the French king, despite the fact that she was an ally of/

of the French and had made it possible for Louis to obtain the Duchy of Milan.

One article of the treaty is interesting, as it stipulated for the investiture of Louis as Duke of Milan in return for a sum of money, his heirs being included in the succession. It is a confusing clause, for almost the same agreement had been concluded between them in April 5th, 1505.⁽⁴⁰⁾ In this document, really a receipt by Maximilian for money received from Louis, investiture is granted to the Frenchman(not, be it noted, to his descendants) in return for a hundred thousand livres/

(40)

Recognoscimus tenore presentium nos recepisse a serenissimi principis Domini Ludovici, regis Francorum fratris nostri carissimi, consiliario et receptore finantiarum magistro Henrico Bohier (Louis' Controller General of Finance) summam centum milium librarum turonensium in pecunia numerata, videlicet in scutis auri cigni regni Francie tam ad solem quam ad coronam, nobis manualiter, realiter et de facto traditam, et hoc pro parte ducen-
tarum milium librarum turonensium quas nobis tenebatur solvere prefatus serenissimus Francorum rex tam ratione investiture per nos eidem serenissimo Francorum regi de ducatu Mediolani, comitatu Papie, ceterisque terris in investitura comprehensis facte, quam pro quibuscumque aliis rebus et causis contentis in tractatibus et articulis initis, factis et conclusis inter nos et charissimum filium nostrum Philippum archiducem Austrie et regem Castelle nostrosque oratores ex una parte, et prefatum serenissimum regem Francorum et eiusdem oratores ex alia, tam Tridente quam Biesis, prout in citatis tractatibus et articulis latius continetur: de qua quidem summa centum milium librarum turonensium nos pro bene satisfacto tenemus, quittamus et liberamus prefatum serenissimum Francorum regem fratrem nostrum, dictum Bohier et alios quoscumque ad quos spectare poterit. Paris, Archives Nationales, J 505, No. 9

livres Tournois. It is not credible that this arrangement came to nothing, for the money was actually paid and the investiture granted. Nor, if Maximilian had attempted to recall the investiture, is it possible to explain the friendliness between him and Louis which has just been commented upon. It is, perhaps, explicable by the assumption that, when the breach occurred between the two sovereigns, the investiture was recalled by Maximilian. But there is no evidence on the point, though the re-appearance of the matter in the Treaty of Cambray seems to show that something of the kind had happened, and that Louis insisted on his position in Milan being made feudally legal before entering upon his engagement with Maximilian to destroy the Venetian republic.

Again, the sum of two hundred thousand livres Tournois had been fixed as the price of the investiture. The reason for its reduction by a half is to be found in the fact that both Maximilian and Louis were hard pressed for money. With Maximilian, of course, this was a normal state of affairs, and he would be prepared to accept half rather than have none. The military operations in which Louis had been engaged furnished the reason for his lack of money; but he knew that Maximilian would accept less, so that with him the offer of the smaller sum was partly due to the fact that he was in a position to compel acceptance. But, even so, the confusion between the agreement of April 5th, 1505, and the further settlement in the Treaty/

Treaty of Cambray is not quite dispelled. In the second arrangement Louis bargained that the investiture should apply not only to himself but to his successors, and this addition may account for the payment of a further sum. The receipt of 1505 covers more than the investiture: that of Cambray includes that process and nothing more. Probably the whole matter points to Maximilian's dissatisfaction with the earlier agreement, and Louis' willingness to compound for the further extension of the investiture by the payment of an additional sum. Together with this may be placed his anxiety to partition Venice by Maximilian's help, then later to seize all the Province and recoup himself for his outlay.

Returning now to matters more immediately affecting the administration of Milan, it will be well to deal first with a few documents illustrative of the French attitude towards health, education and other matters connected with the mental and physical well-being of the city, and then proceed to discuss the economic position.

Moderns are apt to take pride in the way the state exerts its power by laying down regulations through which disease may be prevented, or, if it obtains a hold, may be kept under control. But to most it comes as a surprise to learn that over four hundred years ago regulations of a somewhat similar nature - the existence of isolation hospitals, ^(40a) for example, as well as compulsory/

(40a)

See Reg. Panig. EE. fol. 730.

compulsory notification of infectious disease - ^(40b) existed in a small Italian province. One of the terrors of the time was the Plague. English literature of the fourteenth century gives frequent expression to this fear; while the habit of dating events as "from the pestilence time" is sufficient evidence of the terror inspired in those who lived during or immediately after a visitation. Italy suffered heavily from the first visit, and her literature, like that of England, bears witness to the virulence of the disease and the despair of those who suffered under it. One passage of Boccaccio illustrates admirably the wondering horror and fear with which it was regarded. ⁽⁴¹⁾

To the cure of this malady, neither medical knowledge nor the power of drugs was of any effect; whether the disease was in its own nature mortal, or that the physicians (the number of whom, taking quacks and women pretenders into account, was grown very great) could form no just idea of the cause, nor consequently ground a true method of cure; whichever was the reason, few or none escaped, but they generally died the third day from the first appearance of the symptoms, without a fever or other bad circumstance attending. And the disease, from being communicated from the sick to the well, seemed daily to get ahead, and to rage the more, as fire will do by laying on fresh combustibles. Nor was it given by conversing with only, or coming near the sick, but even by touching their clothes or anything that they had before touched. It is wonderful what I am going to mention; which, had I not seen it with my own eyes, and were there not many witnesses to attest it besides myself, I should never venture to relate, however credibly I might have been informed about it: such, I say, was the quality of the pestilential matter, as to pass not only from man to man, but, what is more strange and has been often known that anything belonging to the infected, if touched by any other creature, would certainly infect/

(40b) See Reg. Panig. EE. fol. 717.

(41) Boccaccio Decamerone, Intro. p. XX

infect, and even kill that creature in a short space of time: and one instance of this kind I took particular notice of, namely, that the rags of a poor man just dead, being thrown into the street, and two hogs coming by at the same time and rooting amongst them, and shaking them about in their mouths, in less than an hour turned round and died on the spot.

And this is even more poignant. ⁽⁴²⁾

We stay here for no other purpose, that I can see, but to observe what numbers come to be buried, or to listen if the monks, who are now reduced to a very few, sing their services at the proper times, or else to show by our habits the greatness of our distress. And if we go from hence, we are saluted with numbers of the dead and sick carried along the streets; or with persons who had been outlawed for their villainies now facing it out publicly, in defiance of the laws. Or we see the scum of the city enriched with the public calamity, and insulting us with reproachful ballads. Nor is anything talked of but that such an one is dead or dying; and, were any left to mourn, we should hear nothing but lamentations. Or if we go home (I know not whether it fares with you as with myself), when I find out of a numerous family not one left, besides a maid-servant, I am frightened out of my senses; and go where I will, the ghosts of the departed seem always before; not like the persons whilst they were living, but assuming a ghastly and dreadful aspect.

These statements were written of the first visitation; but other, though lesser, outbreaks occurred at intervals. Prato ⁽⁴³⁾ writes under the year 1502.

In questo anno 1502 la pestilenza, portata da Roma, cominciò in Milano nella casa de' Simonetti, et durò più di due anni, con mortalità grandissima di gente, maxime fuori de Porta Ticinese.

Another visitation took place in 1506 and this time, at least, the authorities were not merely cognizant of the danger but alive to the necessity of controlling it. From the Department/

(42) Boccaccio Decamerone Intro. pp. XXV, XXVI

(43) Prato, p. 255

Department of Public Health⁽⁴⁴⁾ - Officio Sanitatis - were issued two edicts, on April 23rd and April 29th, making an attempt not so much to cope with the disease itself as to prevent its entrance into the city.⁽⁴⁵⁾

The existence of an Office of Public Health is an indication that an attempt was being made to improve the sanitary conditions not only of the city but of the Province in general. It affords proof, also, that the enlightened sanitary policy of Ludovico Sforza was being pursued by the French administrators - a policy that was far in advance of that of other countries. The edicts issued by the Department were all for the good of the Milanese, and the heavy penalties attached to infringements of their regulations showed the importance attached by the authorities to healthy sanitary conditions in the Province.⁽⁴⁶⁾ The present document indicates the manner in which it sought to carry out the duties entrusted to it.

The edict begins by pointing out that day and daily instances of plague are being notified to the officials of the Department/

(44) A Public Health Department had existed in Milan under Ludovico Sforza. Under the title De l'offitio de Sanità there appears in his Political Testament the following note:-

Similmente si haverà advertire cum omne diligentia al offitio de la sanità, senza la quale le cose del stato: et maxime le intrate andariano in confusione: è in questo se remettemo alli ordini facti.

(45) Gridaria Generale III

(46) Further examples of the Department's work will be noted in another part of the essay.

Department. As yet, happily, the pestilence has not reached Milan and, to provide as far as possible against its entry, no person, whether or not he is protected by a passport or any other form of guarantee, shall be admitted within the city. Infringement of the order will entail loss of goods and personal punishment at the discretion of the Department. No appeal may be made against the judgment as, for the sake of preserving private and public interests, no remission of the sentence can be allowed. Possibly the reward of one fourth of the fruits of the condemnation to the informer was necessary to induce notification of infringements of the edict, but it had the evil effect, mentioned in connection with other decrees, of bringing about an amount of espionage which was bad for the state and demoralizing to the citizen.⁽⁴⁷⁾ The first edict referred only to persons coming from Mantua and the surrounding district. The second included Pizzighetton, Fontanella in the Ghiara d'Adda and particularly Ferrara.

Fear of infection brought into prominence a number of quack doctors both male and female. The College of Medicine intervened/

(47) Per la presente orida, si fa commandamento che alcuno veniente da epsa città e terre, con bulleta ne senza ne de ogni altra sorte di fede, sia admisso, sotto pena de la privatione de suoi beni et ultra in pena corporale ad larbitrio nostro, havuto respecto a la qualità de la persona et excessso; et a questa non se gli haverà remissione alcuna, per concernere il bene publico et privato; et agli accusatori si gli darà uno quarto de la condemnatione, e sarà tenuto secreto. Gridario Generale, III

intervened and the practice was ordered to cease.⁽⁴⁸⁾ The veto was wise, for much of this business was carried on by gipsies who, together with the charlatans whose trade was based in the ignorance and credulity of the citizens, were forbidden to enter the city.⁽⁴⁹⁾

These injunctions referred to persons seeking admission to Milan. Even if, by chance, they managed to enter, innkeepers were forbidden to harbour them. Nor might any citizen of Milan entertain a relative or friend coming from an infected district.

Cases of hardship would occasionally arise, but there was always a remedy. Anyone trying to enter the city or present his passport was detained in the suburbs if he arrived after the Department's officials had left for the night. In producing his/

(48) E cosi si fa publico comandamento ad qualuncha persona, maschio o femina come si voglia, che non presuma ne ardischa medicare quovismodo, sel non è di collegio di medici, overo comprobato et collaudato da loro o da nui, per la admissione de li giudicii; sotto pena de ducati cinquanta dapplicare como sopra per uno e per ogni volta se trovarano contrafare. - Gridario Generale, III

(49) Ancora, volendo provvedere, che da altro canto non ce sia portato male, trovando il commercio de chadegipti e caritoni posservi portare malo, per le presente facemo publico commandamento che zinghari e charitoni non possino venire ne stare in dominio, sotto pena de tracti tri di corda, per uno et ogni volta se trovarano contrafare, et a quelli quali li lassarano passare et li alogiarano in questo regale dominio, fiorini ventioinque dapplicare como sopra per ogni volta; e per uno non havendo il modo, in quella pena che a nui parerà, havuto consideratione a la persona e natura de l'excesso, e sarano irremissibilmente puniti. - Ibid.

his passport and taking an oath that he had not come from an infected district he was lodged for the night, and in the morning was taken to the office of the Department where his case was considered. Legitimate travellers had nothing to fear, but if they were found to be breaking the terms of the edict they were punished.

The informer against an offender received, as has been said, the fourth of the fruits of the condemnation, his name being kept secret. The citizen who contravened the terms of the decree was fined ten ducats which were applied to the service of the Department of Public Health. If he were unable to pay he suffered the strappado three times. The punishment meted out to gipsies and charlatans was three inflictions of the strappado for each offence, without any option of a fine; while the man who allowed them to enter was fined twenty-five florins applied as above. If he had no money he was punished at the discretion of the Department.

On December 13th of the same year (1506) the Department
(50)
issued another edict dealing specially with gipsies, charlatans, thieves and "other beggarly fellows". By their restless movements from place to place this class formed a potent source of infection, and for this reason the edict orders their expulsion. A further reason why their presence in the city was undesirable lay/

lay in the viciousness of their lives, whereby, although perhaps free from the plague, they originated new maladies among the citizens. They were given four days to leave Milan and were warned that punishment awaited them if they remained in the city beyond that time. The Milanese, themselves, were expected to take their share in clearing out these people under a penalty of twenty-five ducats for each offence, inn-keepers being specially mentioned as in the previous edicts.⁽⁵¹⁾

The three decrees show from their wording that the Department of Public Health possessed judicial functions in addition to its special duty of coping with and preventing outbreaks of disease. Though this power conflicts with the modern conception of such a Department, it was advantageous to the general public, as the same body which tried the case had not only issued the regulations but, if any difficulty arose, interpreted their meaning and intention. Now unless infringements of the health regulations could be dealt with summarily these regulations/

(51) Si fa publica crida et commandamento ad ogniuno hostero, tavernaro, o altra persona, sia come voglia, in la cità e ducato non presuma alloggiare ne tenere in casa, directe nec per indirectum, tali charitoni, zingoli, furfanti, et altri simili mendici; sotto la pena de ducati vinotioinque per uno, da applicare ad la regia camera per uso de la sanità, et ultra ad l'arbitrio nostro; anzi li cazzino fora de dominio, ne li lassino habitare in questo regale ducato, in modo che, nel termino de quatro giorni, habino spazato, soto la pena de essere fusticati, e come meglio a nuy parirà. Gridario Generale, III

regulations became largely ineffective. The judicial powers of the Department of Public Health made for a more rapid settlement of cases involving only infractions of the edicts legally issued by that body, and thus contributed to the efficiency of the regulations.

Quite as remarkable as the establishment of the Department of Public Health were the powers conferred upon the Chief Commissioner of Streets, Bridges and Water-ways of the city and Duchy of Milan. His duties and those of the Department were complementary. While the Department of Public Health was mainly concerned with endeavours to prevent an outbreak of infection from outside the city and province the Chief Commissioner looked after the cleanliness of the city, and if both did their duty the probability of an epidemic was considerably reduced. Even if an outbreak should occur, the measures adopted would make the death-roll appreciably lighter than it was in places where similar precautions had not been taken. The apathetic tolerance by English municipal bodies of disgraceful sanitary conditions in their streets compares very unfavourably with the strenuous efforts made by the French administration to improve the sanitation of Milan. The unwholesome state of the streets of London even a hundred and fifty years later had much to do with the devastation wrought by the Great Plague. Had the Pestilence gripped Milan the French administration could at least have claimed/

claimed that they had made conscientious efforts to prevent the outbreak - efforts which were almost entirely lacking on the part of the English authorities both then and for another century and a half.

An order issued by the Chief Commissioner of Streets, Bridges and Water-ways on February 13th, 1506, is significant of the co-ordination of effort between him and the Department of Public Health. ⁽⁵²⁾ No person must throw rubbish, excrement, or other filth on the streets so that they form an obstacle to passers-by. The heap must be cleared away at once under pain of punishment either in person or by deprivation of goods. Cumulations of sand must not be thrown into the streets or gutters within the city, nor into the main streets of the suburbs. ⁽⁵³⁾ No earth, mud, excrement or other filth must be kept in the vicinity of a dwelling house, and if it is there it must be removed in three days after notice has been given, under penalty of a fine. If the pavement in front of a dwelling house or a shop is broken the owner of the property must at once call in the plasterers and have it mended.

The/

(52) Gridario Generale III

(53) Che non sia persona ut supra che ardischa far ne fare far tope de sabiono ne le strate ne pasquari de la città e borghi de Milano, ne ancora ne le strate mastre de fora de li borghi, sotto la pena ut supra da essere schossa ut supra. - Gridario Generale III

The regulations with regard to water are extremely interesting, especially those which refer to domestic supplies. It is forbidden to throw rubbish into a stream lest the flow of the water be obstructed. Further, those who dwell in the neighbourhood of certain specified rivers are ordered to clear away all decaying matter, mud and filth thrown up by an overflow of the stream. (54) These instructions argue an appreciation of the sanitary value of cleanliness.

The Chief Commissioner directs particular attention, also, to the importance of a pure supply of domestic water. To aid in securing this, he orders that every house must be provided with a cistern. If there be none, then one must be installed within thirty days from the date of issue of the edict, under a penalty of twenty-five pounds. These cisterns must be kept clean. No sweepings shall be brushed behind them without the special permission of the Commissioner, under a penalty of ten pounds. (55)

Returning/

(54) Item, che, nel termino de mexi dui proximi ad venire, ciaschune persone che harano le caxe per mezo li dicti fiumi de Nironò, Cantarane, Senexo, Vetra et Canossa, lo debiano havere facto spazare, cossi ne la città de Milano como de fora, et, infra octo giorni, habiano facto condurre via lo fango e terreno et immonditie extracti da essi fiumi, sotto la pena se contene ut supra laquale sarà scossa ut supra; et in el termino soprascripto, habiano fato fare li mureti per mezo le loro caxe in li dicti fiumi, sotto la soprascripta pena. - Gridario Generale III

(55) E che qualuncha persona che non habia cisterna in le loro caxe aut in piazza, le habiano facto fare infra giorni trenta, sotto/

Returning to his regulations for securing the amenity of the streets and the health of the city, the Commissioner orders that all owners of houses shall brush and gather together all decaying matter and other dirt and have it taken away within a week at the latest. Finally he decrees that all persons having ditches on their property shall see that they are kept clear of any matter which would obstruct the flow of the water. Especially must they be careful to ensure a free passage under bridges. Little delay was allowed, as the terms of the edict were ordered to be carried out within fifteen days. (56)

Louis' educational and sanitary policies appear to stand in rather curious contrast. The decrees of the Department of Public Health were much in advance of the sanitary measures of other countries. The educational policy might naturally be expected to show a similar progress. On September 7th, 1506, a decree was issued which lends colour to the suggestion that this/

(55) (contd.) sotto la pena de libre venticinque se non li harano facto far, laquale sarà scossa ut supra.

Item, che non sia persona alcuna che ardischa spazare ne far spazare dextro ne cisterna alcune, senza speciale licentia del predicto maestro de le intrate, sotto la pena de libre dieci imperiali da essers applicata per la mita a li acusatori, e per l'altra mita al comune de Milano, laqual pena sarà scossa ut supra.
Gridario Generale III

(56) Item, che oaduna persona sia obligata, per mezo le loro caxe ne la città e borghi de Milano, schovare e spazare ogni fango et altre immonditie, e da poy farle condurre via ad minus dentro la settimana, sotto la pena se contene neli ordini e statuti ut supra, la quale sarà scossa ut supra.

E che ogni persona che harà fossati per mezo li loro beni suso le strate mastre, che sia pleni per modo che laqua non possa havere/

(57)
this policy was reactionary. But in reality it was not so
reactionary as it seemed. For one thing it took official
notice of Education, and though the edict was restrictive in
character and wrong in principle it made no conscious attempt
to restrict the spread of knowledge.

The decree orders all Milanese students to study at
the University of Pavia. Such an order at a time when students
passed from one university to another much more readily than
they do now appears to lack breadth of view. Yet, while it
is not to be denied that the policy was to a certain extent
narrow, it was by no means so intolerant as at first sight it
appears to be.

Pavia was a famous university. As Louis declared
in his edict, ample opportunities existed there for the ac-
quisition of knowledge. (58) Its schools were equipped with the
most/

(56) (contd.) *havere el suo corso, et anche habiano ponti
obturati o vero pleni per modo ut supra, li habiano facto spazare
e remondare nel termino de giorni quindecì, per modo che habiano
il corso suo juxta solitum, sotto la pena se contene ut supra
la quale sarà scossa ut supra. - Gridario Generale III.*

(57) Regist. Panig. N., fol. 72.

(58) *Dedans la oitè de Payye est encloze la florissant univer-
sité de toutes les Italles, en laquelle est l'exercice studieux
de toutes sciences à portes ouvertes cellebré. - d'Auton, Vol.III
p. 32.*

*Nec ullo impendio peperimus, ut nichil desit quod studentes
in ipso gymnasio ad perfectam scientiam possit erigere; ex quo
non immerito damnandi viderentur quicumque ex subditis nostris
ad aliene dicionis gymnasia se conferrent; proinde, publice
proclamari/*

most modern apparatus, and its professorial staff were men of high repute in the world of learning. Nevertheless a student might be attracted by lecturers in his particular subject who resided at other universities, and to regard him as worthy of condemnation because he chose to hear them in preference to the lecturers at Pavia was to confess ignorance of the benefits to be derived from the reception of fresh ideas, and to curtail not merely the student's opportunity of obtaining the most varied knowledge relative to his future profession but seriously to limit the cultural side of his education.

On the other hand, Louis may have wished to make the University of Pavia even more famous than it was. At any rate, he seems always to have had a kindly feeling towards it. During Ludovico's revolt Pavia, to Louis' disappointment, had turned against the French; yet, in August, 1502, when he visited the town, he promised three doctors of the University not only to continue the benefactions of Ludovico and his predecessors but to increase them. (59) His decree of September 1506 may have

formed/

(58) (contd.) proclamari faciatis volumus in locis consuetis ne quis, sub pena in decretis et ordinibus alias ea in re editis contenta, ad alia se gymnasia studendi gratia conferre audeat, et, si quis jam se contulerit, eadem sub pena intra mensem redeat. Edict ordering Milanese students to study at the University of Pavia. See regist. Panig. N., fol. 72.

(59) Le XVII jour dudit mois d'aoust, troys docteurs de l'université de Pavie furent au soupper du Roy, et la luy firent chascun sa harange en latin, demandant que son bon vouloir et plaisir fust/

formed part of a policy of conciliation. If so that policy was generous in conception and generously carried out, for the Milanese Budget of 1510 contains an entry of twelve thousand pounds devoted to the purposes of the University. (60)

This attitude was not shown with regard to religion. Had Louis lived twenty years later he might have been called upon to take sides with or against the reforming party. But as yet no hint of the Reformation had arisen. There was, perhaps, a vague desire that the Church might be reformed, but there was no intention to attack it on the doctrinal side, Louis himself was a good Catholic, and his Milanese subjects gave at least a formal adherence to the dogmas of the Church, whether they actually believed them or not. The only way in which

Louis/

(59) (contd.) fust, que les collieges et escolles de celle université fussent par luy entretenus et augmentez, comme du temps des autres ducz de Milan avoyent estez, à celle fin que la mellifflue fontaine de science, qui de la par tout le monde ses ypocrenes ruisseaulx rependoit, ne fust par deffault d'entretènement mise à sec et estanchée. Esquelz docteurs fist le Roy faire responce, par ung françoys nommé maistre Jehan Poncher, seigneur en parlement à Paris, et chancelier de Milan, lequel leur respondit pour le Roy, en très bon et rhetoric latin, jouxte le vouloir du Roy, et l'intencion de leur demande; dont après ce, s'en allerent iceulx docteurs, bien acquietez de leur office et très contans de leur octroy. d'Auton, Vol. III, p. 33

(60) L'entretènement de l'université de Pavie, en ce compris ceulx qui liront à Millan, et aussi les gaiges de ceulx qui nestoyent les escolles, et les reparations qu'il convient faire en icelles par le roolle de Mons. le Chancelier ou vichancelier de Millan, la somme de xijm livres. Extract from the Milanese Budget of 1510.

Louis' position may be judged is by the special opportunities he gave his people for joining in certain religious festivals and by his attitude towards the temporalities of the Church.

Among the requests put forward by the Milanese at the time of the first occupation of the city was one referring to some of these temporalities. They asked that alms and oblations should remain as had been the custom. To this the king replied in 1502. His response indicates a cautious attitude. The matter had been considered and discussed for two years, yet at the end of the time Louis refused to give a definite answer. Perhaps he wished to have a clearer understanding with regard to the amount of money that might be included under elemosinae et oblationes before committing himself to any action. In any case he replied rather bluntly that he would be guided in the matter by his honour and his conscience. (61)

It has already been seen how severe were the penalties against those who incited to crime, particularly to the crime of murder. Duelling was really only one form of this offence. Mediaeval law regarded the duel as an appeal to the judgment of God./

(61)

Petitio

Ut Deus contra R.M.V. hostes victoriam facilius prestare possit, et fines imperii vestri latius amplientur, rogat civitas ut R.M.V. dignetur fieri facere omnes elemosinas et oblationes per priores dominantes fieri solitas monasteriis, piis locis capellanis publicis, puellis maritandis et ad quoscunque alios pios usus.

Responsum. Regia Majestas consulit suis honori et conscientias. Reg. Panig. K. fol. 88, Art. XXIV.

Pelissier, Documents Pour l'Histoire de la Domination Française dans le Milanais. Index to Documents, gives the folio as 88 tergo. This is a skip as the folios run from 88 to 100.

God. The King's Courts in England even allowed it on occasion
(62)
as an appeal against judgments delivered by themselves. Modern
law looks on it as an attempt at murder - an attempt, it may be
by mutual consent of the parties concerned - and pronounces
judgment accordingly. In France, under Louis XII, the modern
conception was gaining ground, and though many duels took place,
it was for the good of the country that the king frowned upon
the custom. (63)

In their administration of Milan the French must have
encountered/

(62) The unsuccessful suitor in an action, if he wished to appeal,
began by obtaining a writ of false judgment - breve de falso
iudicio. The court which had delivered the judgment was bound
to defend it, and if the appellant offered "battle" the court was
bound to accept the challenge. As a rule, however, the judges
contrived to settle the case without recourse being had to a duel.
But see History of English Law, Vol. II, p. 667.

The edict of d'Amboise by legalising the duel, provided
the disputants complied with certain formalities, really trans-
formed the private duel into a lawful wager of battle. This,
of course, was different from the judicial wager of battle men-
tioned above, inasmuch as the quarrel which provoked the duel
was not an appeal from the judgment of the duke's courts. The
dispute, indeed, need not have been before the courts at all.
Officially, nothing was known of it prior to the application for
a license to fight.

(63) *Touteffoys, selon toutes les loix, sont iceulx combats
reprovez, qui par nul prince catholiques se doyvent recevoir
ne permeatre, car en telles choses est veu Dieu contre son divin
commandement estre tempté, pour ce qu'il est vraisemblable que
le plus fort submarche le plus debille . . . Ce qui fut re-
monstré au Roy, et plusieurs autres raisons contre ledit combat;
par quoy il deffendit le champ ausdits querelleurs et volut que,
à son grant conseil, en fust de tous pointz décidé; dont les-
dites armes furent arrestées. - d'Auton, Vol. IV., pp. 38 and 39.*

encountered frequent instances of private grudge, disagreement or hate over matters which possibly might not come within the jurisdiction of the Duke's Courts. While it was better to settle such cases by duel than by secret assassination, the courts did all in their power to induce the parties to come to an agreement, or, at any rate, to consider the affair in cold blood, before meeting each other in the field. This wise regulation would frequently postpone a duel indefinitely, and if, at the end of the time allotted, the opponents were still determined to fight, it was better that the combat should take place under regulations laid down by the state. Thus in less than four months after the edict against incitement to crime, Cardinal d'Amboise issued regulations by which the contending parties must be bound if they wished to settle their dispute by single combat.
(64)

No one, whatever his condition might be, must dare to challenge an adversary to fight on foot or on horseback in any part of the Province without the express sanction of the King or his Lieutenant-General, under pain of forfeiting half his goods. If he has no goods, he shall lose his right hand. The same penalty shall apply to the adversary if he shall accept the challenge.

Certain forms are prescribed. The man who believes himself aggrieved shall apply to the Lieutenant-General for a licence/

(64)- Regist. Panig. N., fol. 57, tergo.

licence to fight. If this be granted the duel may proceed: if it be refused, the appellant has the right to appear before the Lieutenant-General once every three months for a year and repeat his request for a licence. That condition being fulfilled, the duel may take place after the expiry of a year and a day from the time of the first application, even if the licence has been refused. But the combat must be fought outside the Duke's dominions.

Finally, if the opponents meet each other, all the formalities and ceremonies customary in France shall be observed by the combatants, under the penalties mentioned above.

As a link connecting legal processes with the economic side of the French administration an inquest, the result of which was published on December 24, 1502, is peculiarly interesting. (65) The story is that of an application made by Fra Ghiringelo and Caldino Carpane to M. de Chaumont (66) for permission to draw water from the River Lambro, irrigate their meadows with it and return the waste to the river again. The application was referred to Louis who, on June 8, instructed de Chaumont/

65.- Reg. Ducali. IV., fol. 39, tergo.

66.- Ejusmodi supplicationem carissimus et fidelissimus consanguineus noster dominus Caldumontis, magnus magister Francie et locumtenens noster citra montes generalis, cui ipsa supplicatio data fuerat, prout conveniebat transmisit magistris intratarum nostrarum extraordinariarum, etc.
The wording affords another proof of the position held by M. de Chaumont, nephew of Cardinal d'Amboise.

Chaumont to appoint a commission to study on the spot the possibilities of the case. On September 23 de Chaumont wrote to Louis that he had appointed Messer Gian Moresino and Messer Luigi d'Alla (the latter of whom, as will be seen later, was admitted as a citizen of Milan with privileges on February 4, 1503) and enclosed their report.

The application had not been allowed to proceed without opposition. The two Commissioners heard arguments by the applicants and their engineer on the one side, and by Gresoble de Ladisino and Benedicto de Cassano (Canons of the Church) and others with their advocates and engineers on the other. The opposition to the scheme of Ghiringelo and Carpano was heard on the question of its interference with water rights alleged to be held by their opponents. Neither side would yield, and the Commissioners, after many interviews and discussions, partly favoured the claim that had been made in the first instance, and recommended that a licence should be given to proceed with the
(67)
work.

An appeal by the opposition led to a new petition by

Ghiringelo/

67.- Audivimusque oppositiones factes per dictos canonicos et Jo.- Augustinum et eorum advocatum et ingeniarium, et petita ac opposita hinc inde in scriptis redigi fecimus, et omnibus mature consideratis, M.V. referimus judicii nostri esse ut ipsi D. Fra. et caldinus in dictis tribus petiis terrarum propriis dicti D. Caldini possint fodi facere et construi ea fontanilium capita et aqueductus que et qui eis videbuntur pro aquis hauriendis, modo non impediunt alios aqueductus nec alias aquas in presentiam per ipsos aqueductus defluentes in dictum flumen Lambri quarum aliarum aquarum cognitionem et decissionem nobis reservamus; de/

Ghiringelo and Carpano in which they alleged that Ludovico Sforza, while he was Duke of Milan, had ordered an enquiry, that the enquiry had been held, and that the Commissioners had reported favourably to the magistrates concerned, who, however, had taken no action. They then recapitulated the proceedings and the report ordered by Louis, noting that he had already written to the Senate on the matter, ⁽⁶⁸⁾ as the case had been appealed there by the opposition, and ended by asking the king to grant their petition on the grounds they had mentioned.

The case being referred to the Senate, its consideration was entrusted to Geoffrey Carles, President of Dauphiné and Vice-Chancellor of Milan, who issued his judgment on December 14. He decreed in favour of the petitioners, pronouncing the opposition to be trivial and unreasonable, and not to be regarded. The report being submitted to the Senate, was passed and a licence ordered to be granted as soon as possible.

Ten/

67,- (contd.) aquis

de quibus aliis, et locis per nos visis in presentiarum nichil refferimus nec judicamus, quia de eis inter partes disceptatur et nondum clari sumus de juribus partium;

This recommendation only held good on condition "ut plus aquarum ab eo flumine derivari non possit quam in illud deflui per tempora continget ex dictis fontanilibus et aqueductibus fabricandis, et hoc arbitramur fieri et concedi posse absque aliquo publico vel private prejudicio. Agant modo M.V. hac in re quicquid eisdem agendum videbitur; quibus ex corde nos commendamus." - Reg. Ducali. IV. fol. 39. tergo.

68,- This was on October 27.

Ten days later Louis issued a decree conferring on Fra Chirigelo and Carpano the powers they requested.

The case is extremely interesting as exemplifying an attempt to raise the economic value of land by irrigation, and the struggle of the petitioners against vested interests. But it has value, also, in that it shows the stages of a civil process in which a judgment is appealed till it reaches the Supreme Court - the Senate. If the reports of the Commissioners and of Carles are trustworthy, it indicates further, that the procedure in the case was careful and carried out with due regard for equity.

The protectionist character of the French Administration and its attention to detail is well illustrated by some of the documents dealing with the economic side of its work. Frequent instances occur in which this attention is levelled against those who sought to charge extortionate prices for their goods, especially for food-stuffs. Long before the French had come to Milan the civic authorities had devoted much time and energy to securing a supply of sound well-made bread, the weight and quality of which was tested by officials appointed for the purpose. Many instances of such legislation prior to the end of the fourteenth century are preserved in the Ambrosians Library at Milan. They refer to the control of the bread supply/

69.- Milan, Biblio. Ambros., MS. F.S., IV., 19.

The two extracts given will illustrate the character of the documents contained in this manuscript.

supply, the method of baking, the bakers, the place from which the wheat must come, the price, the non-interference of officials without cause shown, and direct how the bread is to be sold and how a person accused of breaking these decrees is to be tried. When the French administration, therefore, issued regulations controlling the quality and sale of bread they were introducing no new system.

On May 4, 1506, the vicar of provisions, Jacobo Crotto, published an edict⁽⁷⁰⁾ in which after referring to complaints which/

69.- (contd.)

- (a) De pane bene cocto et saxonato et de meta.
Primo quidem quod dicti emptores et socii et illi quibus dederint vel concesserint in dictis civitate et suburbiis et partibus infra dictum terminum facere teneantur et debeant panem furmenti venalem album pulchrum et bini (sic) coctum et conditum sive asaxonatum per infradictum modum et formam, videlicet de onciis decem pro qualibet pane a duobus denariis imperialium si furmentum valuerit soldos decem octo imperiales pro modio et abinde supra usque a soldis viginti uno pro modio; et si furmentum valuerit a soldis viginti uno pro modio usque in soldis viginti quatuor imperialibus pro modio teneantur dictum panem facere ita pulchrum et benecoctum ut supra pro quolibet pane de onziis novem cum dimidia, et si furmentum valuerit etc, for another page and a half. The item ends:- Quod possit fieri panis albus infra miliaria quatuor prope civitatem.
- (b) Item, quod nullus hospes nec tabernarius, dans (sic) cibum et potum in civitate et suburbiis Mediolani habeat nec teneat in domo ejus panem furmenti nisi ille panis fuerit de pane dictorum emptorum. . . et qui contrafecerint condemnentur qualibet vice ut supra cujus pene medieta perveniat in Communa Milani, et alia medieta in Accusatorum (sic). Quod liceat ipsiis emptoribus intrare domos.

70.- Gridario Generale III.

which had reached him about the price of bread as compared with the price of grain and flour, he settled the amount to be (71) charged. Should any person buy bread which is not of the standard weight or is adulterated with inferior flour, upon the matter being brought to the notice of the Vicar of Provisions, he, or one of his officers, will take action against the seller. Similarly, if an inferior quality of flour be supplied for the best, the buyer shall take a sample to the Office of Provisions, the officials of which will see that he (72) is recompensed, and the vendor punished.

The reason for the publication of the edict is that the Milanese subjects of the king shall be well treated.

This/

71.- Two examples will suffice.

- (a) E per tenore de la presente, se fa publica noticia chel pane de furmento, bono e bello, ben condito e asasonita, de essere de onze quatro e meza per dui danari.
- (b) La farina de furmento, bona et bella, se debe dare per soldi xiii denari vi per staro, che pensa libre xvi.

72.- Sel sarà adunque persona alchuna che compri pano che non sia ben condito et asasonato e del debito pense, portando il pane, quale non sia manco duno penso, videlicet dinari 20 de pane, per servare li ordini, sel sarà pane de furmento, e de mistura quale se vora, al offitio predicto, se farà intendere chel non manca ne mancharà per il predicto M. Vicario ac domini presidenti ad dicto officio ad fare che ogniuno habia suo debito, e che li malfactori siano puniti.

E chi comprerà farina al qual sia tolto più del dovere, havendo ricorso al dicto offitio de provisione et exhibendo la farina, subito sarà restaurato e ben satisfacto e li malfactori puniti. Gridario Generale III.

This is the king's desire, and the Vicar of Provisions will do his best to give effect to that desire. ⁽⁷³⁾ Infractions of the decree on the part of the vendors will be treated as a fraud, since it is their business to know whether the bread is of good quality and of standard weight. If it is not, then they must report to the Office of Provisions. They will be held responsible, and every offence against the decree will be punished by a fine of twenty-five ducats. The same penalty attaches to those who break the law with regard to the sale of flour.

The business-like way in which Crotto preformed the duties of his office is seen in another edict issued on Friday, ⁽⁷⁴⁾ February 20, 1506. The Lenten season afforded an opportunity to dealers in fish, both wholesale and retail, to raise prices to an extortionate level, of which they had taken full advantage in the past despite the warnings given them by the Office of Provisions.

Instead of the usual formula indicating that the issue was in the name and by the authority of the king the preamble begins simply In nomine Domini. Proceeding, Crotto points out that fish vendors had been advised in the past with reference both to the price of their goods and to their methods

of/
73.- E li predicti domini vicario e presidenti niunaltra cosa più desiderare che li populi e subditi regii e ducali siano ben tractati, como c'è mente del christianissimo et serenissimo signore Rè e duca nostro, quale Idio in felicità e prosperità conservi.

74.- Gridario Generale, III.

of sale. The present edict, he says, is not to ensure the sale of fish at an unremunerative rate but merely to make certain that the city may have an abundant supply of that food, both fresh and salted, at a reasonable price, which will benefit the citizens without leaving the dealers any ground for complaint.
(75)

He then goes on to instruct fish-vendors that they must neither demand nor take more than the prices quoted at the end of the decree, either in Milan or its suburbs. The penalties fixed are rather curious. If the fish be small, i.e. under one pound in weight, an infraction of the law entails a fine librarum trium tertiorum; if they be over a pound the penalty is a fine librarum trium imperialium for each offence, the informer to receive half of the fine imposed. If the condemned dealer cannot pay in money he forfeits goods which in the opinion of the Vicar of Provisions are equivalent in value, or, in default, suffers in his own person. The punishment is to take place immediately judgment has been pronounced.

Again, the fish must be exposed for sale in the customary manner, and must not be taken away nor hidden from intending purchasers, under a penalty of ten pounds.

A third item forbids any person to meet importers of

fish/

75.- In nomine Domini. Millesimo quingentesimo sexto, indictione nona, die veneris vigesimo mensis februarii. Cum magnificus et praestantissimus, juris utriusque doctor, Jacobus Crottus, vicarius offitii provisionum communis Mediolani, spectabilesque et praeclari cives domini duodeci (sic) memorato provisionum offitio praesidentes, preteritis/

fish while they are on their way to the city and offer to buy their wares with the intention of re-selling them. Nor must any restraint be placed in the way of free purchase and sale of the fish, under an indefinite penalty to be inflicted at the discretion of the Vicar of Provisions. Not only must the fish be sold in the customary places and at the prices fixed by the edict, but they must be sold nowhere else. The Vicar of Provisions further gives notice that, in awarding penalties for/

75.- (contd) preteritis diebus pluries convocati sermonem fecerint inter eos circa pisces vendendos in civitate Mediolani, et de modis adhibendis quibus civitas piscibus abundaret pretio honesto et convenienti, venditoresque ipsorum nulla molestia afficerentur indebita nec queri valeant, voluerintque informari tam a mercatoribus pisces in grossum ad hanc civitatem conduci facientibus quam ab aliis, participarint quoque cum multis aliis civibus cum quibus expediens visum fuit; tandem, precedentibus omnibus considerationibus et examinationibus opportunis, hanc in sententiam devenerunt et deveniunt, sicque servandum statuunt et ordinant, ut infra et prout infra; auditis etiam et intellectis venditoribus piscium ipsorum tam salsorum quam recentium, et omnibus quae dicere et alegare voluerunt.Gridario Generale lll.

The Indiction mentioned in this note, was a cycle of fifteen years beginning with September 1, 312 A.D. Any year in the cycle, when expressed in terms of the Christian Era is denoted by the year in that era in which the greater part of it falls. The year 1506 is thus indictione nona. Besides this Greek Indiction, as it was called, there were two others - the Imperial Indiction (generally called the Bedan Indiction from the Venerable Bede who adopted it) beginning on September 24, and the Roman or Pontifical Indiction, beginning on Christmas Day.

The Indiction was used by the Imperial and the Papal Chanceries, but, apart from them was not generally employed except as an ecclesiastical system. Notaries Public who received their authority from the Pope or the Emperor invariably inserted the Indiction in their official edicts and decrees. This order of February 20, for example, is signed "Franciscus de Romate provisionatus, et comunis Mediolani notarius."

for the infractions of the regulations, not merely the principals but their servants and agents will be held liable.

The actual prices fixed by the decree are of minor importance, and therefore it is unnecessary to go into them in detail. The really notable point is that the edict was not issued in restraint of trade but with the intention of securing a supply of fish for the city at a time when such food was urgently needed, and that at prices which were not extortionate.

It is, of course, impossible to credit the French Administration with all the arrangements that were in force for the supply of food to the city. Some of these were in existence before they had undertaken the rule of Milan. The many roads with which the Province was provided served admirably for the transport of goods even in fairly large quantities, though when merchandise had to be brought to the city in bulk, carriage by road was both expensive and inconvenient. But the Province was well watered, and the rivers could carry goods in quantities with which the roads were unable to cope. As an aid to this means of transport canals had been constructed through districts (76) which were away from the course of the rivers. Such were the Muzza, the Martesana and the Abbiate from Abbiategrasso to Milan.

The Martesana, almost forty miles long, was the most important/

76.- The importance of canals was generally recognised. Among the Balie for the period 1453-1477 preserved in the Archivio di Stato at Florence is one (No.32) dealing with the proposal to canalise the Arno, from Livorno and Pisa to Florence. For the purpose of discussing the provisions relative/

important. Leaving the city, it crossed the river Lambro and passed eastward to the river Adda. Then, keeping a little to the west of that river, it turned north till it reached the town of Trezzo. Its junction with the Lambro opened up the district lying almost due north of Milan and the country to the south as far as the Po. In its eastward course it served that part of the Province which lay between the Lambro and the Adda where there was no navigable stream; while its union with the Adda gave a free passage from Lake Coma in the north, down the river to the Po. This single canal, then, connected practically every part of the Province lying to the east of a line running north and south through the city.

The control of the Martesana was vested in the Extraordinary Magistracy, though the care of the revenue derived from it was the duty of the Ordinary Magistracy. This had been the case prior to the advent of the French, and Louis did not think fit to alter the regulation. In the petition made to/

76.- (contd.)

relative to the construction of the canal a balia of five citizens was appointed.

77.- Da li Governatori et Consiglieri del stato questi doverano essere solicitati che non manchino del debito attendendo alla exactione de le condemnatione, et li liquidatione de le confiscatione; a le cose de li navilij de Abiate, Bereguardo, Martesana, et alla Muza: lassando pero che le intrate de questi navilij et aque siano curate per la Camera Ordinaria. - Political Testament of Ludo. Sforza, Art. De li Magistri Extraordinarij.

to him by the citizens on the first entry of the French, one of the articles dealt with the carelessness and open disregard of the importance of canals and waterways through the city. It was pointed out that the canals were constructed at great expense, and that, without them, navigation to the town would be almost impossible. Some of these waterways, too, cleansed the city, and if they had not a free passage there was grave danger of pestilence. The request was therefore made that it should be forbidden to deposit rubbish of any kind whereby the flow of the water might be impeded. Louis granted the request, promising that the ancient customs would be preserved and that the Magistrato Straordinario would deal with fresh difficulties as they arose.

(78)

(79)

On September 19, 1502, a notice was issued in which

regulations laid down in 1468 regarding the navigation of the canal are recapitulated and confirmed. In the first place the use/

78.- Petitio.

Quia maiores nostri cum magna impensa fabricari fecerunt navigia defluentia ad hanc civitatem, pro molendinis et pratis ac rebus ad civitatem vehendis, sine quibus navigiis vix civitas permanere possit, et quia etiam nonnullae aquae per civitatem defluebant ex quibus civitas purgabatur, et aliae commoditates percipiebantur quae nunc diversimode divertuntur, petitur ut provideatur quod navigia ad civitatem taliter defluant quod continuo sint navigabilia, et aquae ad et per civitatem labantur et decurrant. aliae

Responsum.

Ad vigesimum octavum servetur solitum et mandetur Magistris Intratarum Extraordinariarum quod super novis casibus occursis et aliis qui occurrent provideant opportune.

Reg. Panig. K. fol. 88

79.- Reg. Panig. N. fol. 33. tergo.

use of the Martesana is forbidden to all who have not previously satisfied the Lieutenant of the Signoria that they will obey the rules and regulations governing the navigation of the canal. That there may be no doubt on the matter the regulations are appended. No one must unload building timber, fire-wood, lime, bricks, stones, cereals, flour, wine or other goods and merchandise on the banks of the water-way without having paid the canal dues. Nor must any goods be brought to Milan without payment of these dues. Each vessel must have a minimum crew of three men; oar-blades must be bound with iron; and all damage to vessels or to the apparatus of the canal, by which navigation may be impeded, must be repaired within one day. Finally it is forbidden to draw water from the canal for the purpose of irrigating lands unless by permission of the Commissioner of the canal or of those deputed by him to allow such water to be drawn.

If the state were to be responsible for the maintenance of roads, bridges and artificial waterways, it was essential that it should have in its service men whose profession rendered them capable not only of undertaking their supervision but of initiating and carrying through projects of a similar nature. Hence there are found, both in the Ordinary and the Extraordinary

Magistracies/

80.- Che non sia persona alcuna, de qualunque conditione voglia se sia, la quale habia facto prati o voglia adaquare terreni che ardisca ne presuma de tore aqua fora del dicto navillio per adaquare loro prati o terreno, nisi per la via del commissario deputato sopra el dicto navillio o de li campari deputati a dare dicta aqua.

Magistracies, professional engineers and architects charged with these duties. The appointment of one is mentioned in a document (81) dated May 30, 1506.

From the wording of the document it would appear that such posts were granted on the nomination of some one of high authority on the administrative staff at Milan - in this instance by Jerome de Malabaila, a member of a family which held several offices in the duchy. Jerome himself was Maître d'Hôtel to Louis, Secretary of War, and Controller-General. The nomination having been made, was approved by Charles d'Amboise and forwarded to the king, who, taking it for granted from this approval that the credentials of the nominee, Bertholinus de Cotiis, were satisfactory, issued a letter of appointment.

By the appointment, de Cotiis was added to the already existing body of engineers and architects in both Magistracies; but either his merits were outstanding or he was highly favoured by d'Amboise, as he was appointed primum architectorem et ingeni-
arum, and thus took precedence (82) of those who had held office before he had even been nominated.

The document just considered links administration with economics. It is a governmental appointment; the official has to perform duties which bring him into contact with the economic side of things and give him ample opportunity of adding to the development/

81.- Regist. Ducali. IV.. fol. 54

82.- Besides exemplifying the method of appointment the document is interesting for its proclamation by Louis of the position held by Charles d'Amboise, to which attention has already been/

development of the state's resources to the benefit of both duke and people. The one now to be considered is of somewhat different nature. (83) This edict makes an attempt to regulate the quality of the goods produced by the weavers of silk, cloth-of-gold and cloth-of-silver. The interesting point is that the attempt was made from within by the abbots, consuls and syndics of the trade, and was not imposed upon the weavers by any outside authority, royal or otherwise. It is true that Louis had previously issued decrees to the weavers of the city with regard to the quality of their goods; but the tradesmen seem to have practically ignored them. To obviate fraud, therefore, and for the honour of their city, the trade guild officials now took up the matter and published stringent regulations which they were determined to see carried out to the letter.

Any person having in his house or his shop, or even in a web, cloth-of-gold or cloth -of-silver which does not conform to the standard of quality must repair to the abbot of the guild within a fortnight and declare before him the quality of the/

82.- (contd.)

been drawn. De Cotiis, the king says, was appointed per carissimum consanguineum nostrum Carolum de Ambrosia, magnum magistrum et marescalum Francie ac locumtenentem nostrum citra montes generalem.

This appointment is not mentioned by Benaglio in his Relazione.

83.- Reg. Panig. N., fol. 59.

The first part of the edict was issued by the abbots, consuls and syndics of the trade guild on December 20, and the second part by the officials of the testers on December 24, 1505.

the stuff. The declaration will be sealed and the whole process will be free of charge to the weaver or merchant concerned. If any one is afterwards found to have in his possession cloth of this character which is below standard quality and regarding which he cannot produce the sealed statement, it is taken from him as a fine. (84)

This portion of the regulation, issued on December 20, was followed by a second part four days later. In this, the abbots and consuls of the testers define the quality, width and thickness of pile to which the cloth must conform. They point out that fraud has been going on for some time. Testers excuse themselves on the ground that lower quality or lesser width is inevitable because they are at the mercy of those who bring the cloth to be tested. Other excuses, also, are offered by them, by shop-keepers and similar persons whose cloth is found deficient in quantity or quality. The practice must cease. Minute technical directions are then given with regard to/

84.- Se fa publica crida per parte dessi Domini abbati (that is, the abbots of the guild, viz., Leonardo de Osii and Bernardino de Valle) chi se ritrovava dal giorno presente inanze havere drapi doro o d'argento o di setta in casa vel altrove a suo nome e telle etiam in tellaro, fra giorni quindecim proximi a venire, che siano mancho dell' altezza infrascripta, sia tenuto et obligato ad comparere nante aloro abbate e dare in scripto tali drapi et telle e quelle farle bollare dal bolle consueto quale sta apresso ad uno di lore Domini abbati et li saranno bollati senza spesa alcuna et questo sotto pena de perdere tali drapi e telle, che non seranno bollate depso bolle; la terza parte de la quale pena sia applicata a la regia e ducale camera, l'altra terza parte a la camera depsi mercadanti, e l'altra terza parte ale accusatore sive inventore.

to width, thickness weight and general quality, and the testers are charged to see that no cloth shall be woven which falls in any respect below the standard set up by the present proclamation. (85)

Regulations insisting on fair prices for food argue a certain degree of stability in the administration of Milan: that stability is further proved by the fact that a trade corporation assists the government by laying down rules concerning the quality of the work done by its members. But perhaps as good proof as any is found in the publication of an edict dealing with no less modern a subject that copyright. One is entitled to conclude that an administration must have been well established which could legislate about private ownership of the profits derived from artistic works, forbidding them to be reproduced without the consent of the author or maker. (86)

This curiously modern law was contained in an edict issued by Louis on April 7, 1506, in favour of Jean Pierre de Birago, a painter of miniatures. (87) Reproduction, whether by engraving/

85.-- Milan was not the only place where such regulations were in force. For example, Deacons of Crafts in Scotland under James I. occupied a position analogous to that of the testers. They were ordered to have na correction of the craft nor of na man thereof, but annerlie to see that the warkemen be cunning and the warke sufficient. See Acts of Parliament of Scotland - V. James I., c. 77.

86.-- Reg. Parig. N., fol. 68.

87.-- Probably he belonged to the same family as Jean de Birago another miniaturist, and a second Jean de Birago, one of the king's Public Prosecutors in the Milanese Senate. The last named is mentioned in the Milanese Budget of 1510 as receiving a payment of four hundred pounds.

engraving on copper or by means of wood-cuts, of any miniature painted by de Birago is forbidden under a penalty of fifty gold ducats for each offence, together with the forfeiture of all designs so reproduced.⁽⁸⁸⁾

Though its modern aspect seems strengthened by the limitation of the copyright to a term of ten years, it is possible to overestimate its approach to present day practice. The undercurrents of politics and administration were then, as they are now, extremely complex; and it is quite possible that the ten years' copyright was simply a reward for administrative service, or a favour conferred upon de Birago through his connection with the Senator and Public Prosecutor of the same name. In that case while the copyright was actually granted, the principle underlying modern practice was absent. It was granted as a privilege, and did not altogether depend upon the artist's right to the profits derived from the work he had produced.⁽⁸⁹⁾

As/

- 88.- Per tenore de queste nostre, inhibissemo a ciaschuna persona, de quale stato e condictione voglia se sia, non ardisca ne presuma per anni dece proximi a venire, in questo nostro Dominio contrafare ne fare contrafare alcuno designe stampato de mane del suprascripto prete Joanne Petro, tagliato in arame de bolino sive intagliato in legno con el signe della gloriosissima Vergine Maria o vero senza signe, ne vendere ne fare vendere de dicti designi; sotto pena de ducati cinquanta d'oro per ciaschuno designo seu stampa o forma de dicti designi et de perdere dicti designi a qualuncha contrafacente. Reg. Parig. N., fol. 68.
- 89.- It is only fair, however, to note that Louis declares the copyright to have been granted because of the value of de Birago's work, and so that he might not be deprived of the due/

As a pendant to the economic documents of the period may be added three references to privileges - one to a town, another to a profession and a third to a private individual.

Prior to the French occupation of the Province certain towns had been granted privileges by the Dukes of Milan. Among them was Pisa. Afraid that these privileges, franchises, immunities and indulgences would be revoked under the new régime, the authorities of the city applied to Louis, praying him to continue them. The document issued on October 25, 1502, in reply to their request gives no information as to what these privileges were. But, from what has been shown in connection with other documents discussed, it will be evident that the immunities and indulgences mentioned in this confirmation would not seriously affect the revenue of the state. Louis' action was well-advised since, as it indicated his desire to interfere as little as possible with the state of affairs existing prior to the occupation, it induced the city to look on the new administration with favourable eyes.

For some reason, despite all efforts to define the functions of the various officials acting under the direction of/

(contd.)89.- due reward of his labour.

Volendo noi provvedere che il dilecto nostro prete Joanne Petro da Birago, miniatore, quale, secondo n'è stato significato, con grande vigilie, studio e fatica ha facto certi designi di qualche momento e quelli facti imprimere, non resto defraudato e privato del suo debito premio, e altri habino el commodo e fructo del sudore suo. Ibid.

90.- Reg. Ducali IV., fol. 32.

of the Administration, there was much overlapping. Part of it, doubtless, was caused by the greed of those who, because of what they conceived to be their stronger position, lost no opportunity of magnifying their office and interfering with the functions of such officials as they imagined powerless to resist their illegal actions. These interventions were specially irksome where money entered into the question. It was, of course, always open to the aggrieved person to complain to the king, though this was not very frequently done, since failure in the appeal would certainly, and success probably, bring upon the complainer the enmity of those who had injured him.

Where the question of taxation arose, and proof could be adduced that the revenues of the state were suffering from the intervention of unauthorised individuals, the king would naturally take immediate action and, for his own sake, if for no other reason, provide a remedy for the wrong. The privileges granted, or, it would be more correct to say, confirmed, to the recorders and notaries of Milan form an example of such action. Some of these lawyers had to deal with revenue derived from taxation, and were, of course, paid for their services. But their functions were being usurped by Captains of Justice and by many notaries not legally entitled to interfere in such matters. As a result, the revenue was decreasing, since the money/

money obtained was largely swallowed up in fees; members of the ancient College of Justice were wronged, and the general public was defrauded in having to provide taxes merely for the upkeep of a number of officials who had no right to handle a penny of the sums collected.

A crisis came when the notaries and recorders concerned lodged a pretest with Louis, offering, as a test case, the unfortunate position of one of their number who was reduced to poverty by the unwarranted interference of the officials named. In reply the king issued an edict on April 30, 1505, addressed Capitaneis et pretori Mediolani ac aliis iudicentibus et officialibus Mediolani ad quos spectat, ordering them to see that all statutes, decrees, ordinances and proclamations pertaining to the point at issue be observed in every particular. As for the case of Johannes Maribilia, the notary whose name had been presented to the king, Louis orders that restitution be made to him. (92)

This/

91.- Reg. Panig. N., fol. 30.

The decree was published by the podestà of Milan a week later, that is, on May 7.

92.- Ideo volumus et vobis et cuilibet vestrum mandamus ut visis supplicatis, statutis, decreta, ordines et proclamationes ac capitula banci notarie, de qua in supplicatione, observetis et observare faciatis ac exequamini et executioni mandari faciatis, etiam puniendo quoscumque contrafacientes et transgressores juxta decretorum, statutorum et proclamationum predictarum dispositionem; et etiam restitutionem pecuniarum actuum, sententiarum et relationum civilium spectantes dicte notarie per quoscumque notarios et alias personas receptas et habitas; prout juridicum fuerit procedendo tam per executiones et crias quam aliter per/

This chapter may conclude with a document which, partially, at least, refers to privilege. On February 4, 1503, Louis issued letters patent (93) granting citizenship in Milan to Maître Louis Alla (alias Luigi d'Alla) a Genoese, and his sons. He was a doctor of both Civil and Canon Law and was in the king's service as a master in the Extraordinary Revenue. The grant was probably made as a reward for d'Alla's good service, as he and his family were allowed a remission of taxes for ten (94) years.

The mere grant of citizenship, which was, after all, only a transference of his permanent abode from Genoa to Milan where/

92,- (contd.)

per omnia juris remedia, realiter, personaliter prout conveniens fuerit; ita et taliter quod ipse notarius habeat satisfactionem juxta decretorum et proclamationum ac datorum predicti banci causarum civilium dispositionum.

93,- Regist. Ducali IV., fol. 36.

94,- Declaramusque et intendimus quod ipse Aluysius et ipsius descendentes ut supra hujus nostri diplomatis pretextu sint exempti et immunes a solutione datii rippe et datii veteris mercantie predictae urbis nostre Mediolani, eo quod ex certa informatione nobis constitit dictum Aluysium habitasse in dicta civitate nostra Mediolani per decennium, et jam habitatum esse cum tota familia tanquam in loco originis suae, et etiam quia nobis obtulit habere et possidere in eadem urbe nostra et ducatu Mediolani bona immobilia maioris valoris quam summam florenorum ducentum et sustinere onera prout sustinent et sustinere tenentur alii cives Mediolanenses, prout ordines nostri disponunt.

Benaglio in his Relazione omits mention of Luigi d'Alla as one of the Maestri of the Magistrato Straordinario.

where he was already dwelling, is not so interesting as the freedom from taxation enjoyed by the new burgess. Such a privilege, though it may have been the readiest method of rewarding d'Alla's services, was bad in principle. If it were the first instance of the kind it might easily come to be regarded as a precedent; if it were not, then it indicated that the precedent had already been established. Freedom from, and privileges with regard to, the citizen's liability to taxation for the maintenance of the administrative services was a dangerous form of reward. It was likely to spread further than had been the intention of the originator, and would certainly become a fruitful source of discontent. The point need not be laboured. It is sufficiently exemplified by the French Revolution which to a considerable extent was occasioned by unequal incidence of taxation, and especially by the freedom from taxation possessed by the privileged classes in France. Louis' reward would have been more happily conceived had he increased d'Alla's salary, or even if he had granted him a pension in addition to his salary.

The series of privileges asked by the Milanese at the time of the first occupation need not be considered in detail. Reference has already been made to some of them in connection with other documents discussed in this chapter.

The position is now clear to sum up the work of the period lying between Ludovico's definite expulsion and the year 1506. The constitution had to be created and the Administration given/

given time to establish the new régime. Hence there are found edicts and decrees dealing with those who were hostile to the French domination. The powers of the Law Courts and their officials on the judicial side, and of the Revenue and its officials on the financial side had to be made plain and enforced - a matter of no little difficulty, as has been seen from the various documents discussed. In addition, instructions had to be issued to the subordinate departments and their powers defined.

But while all this was necessary if the machinery of government was to run smoothly, there was another side - the economic - of which the Administration did not fail to take account. Hence there appear documents dealing with the development of the Province by means of its canals and roads, with the increase of trade, with careful and honest manufacture of goods, with the security and reasonable price of food supplies. About 1506 these regulations had achieved their purpose, and henceforward municipal decrees became more numerous and more important than those issued from the central departments of the Administration.

The long peace had stabilised the Administration, and with it, the many subordinate bodies responsible for carrying out the details of government. Speaking broadly, the success of the central Administration, the dearth of serious complaints/

complaints on the part of the Milanese, and the efforts to put economic life on a more secure foundation, are proofs of the beneficial government of the Province by the French. The next chapter will show how that government was continued.

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CHAPTER X.

The Administration of Milan from 1507 to the Expulsion of the French.

The period 1507-1512 witnessed the French administration functioning at its highest pitch of efficiency. It saw Milan far in advance of the neighbouring states, prosperous if not contented, her people working in peace and quietness, her trade increasing. It witnessed, on the other hand, the expulsion of the French from the Province, the loss of Milanese prosperity and the introduction of a period of anarchy which destroyed, almost in a moment, the labours of the last twelve years. Of the events leading to the French expulsion something will be said in the proper place; meanwhile the study of a bright portion of Milanese history claims attention.

A very cursory examination of the documents already considered will show that, though they were all intended to better the condition of the Milanese, the principle of despotism underlies practically each one of them. True, it was a benevolent despotism, which in some instances foreshadowed the advent of a more democratic form of government; nevertheless the principle was vicious./

vicious. But while this vice and another quite as essential, viz., its exercise by a foreign power, must be borne in mind, one cannot be blind to the fact that the French despotic government of Milan was vastly better than the native despotisms of the other Italian states.

Most of the documents of this period treat of the economic side of government. Finance and police regulations have their share, while edicts relating to current politics claim more attention than in the period 1500-1506. Apart from these no one class of document is specially common. Military affairs, grants of copyright, questions affecting the Church, taxation, privileges and the judicial system all have a place, though not a prominent one. Edicts and decrees relating to social conditions are by far the most important. The prevalent peace and the ease with which the governmental machine was running are reflected in the documents preserved in the archives, though now and again one hears the echo of warlike doings which interest not Milan in particular but the Province in general, as part of the French king's possessions.

In some respects the administration moved slowly. An order⁽¹⁾ issued on January 2, for example, enjoined all debtors and creditors of the Ordinary Revenue whose accounts lay between the/

(1) Reg. Panig. N., fol. 86.

the death of Gian Galeazzo in 1494 and April 10, 1500, to effect a settlement within a month from the publication of the edict.

Another edict of the same nature was published by d'Amboise on March 24 of the same year.⁽²⁾ Prior to his flight Ludovico had granted certain privileges to various persons with regard to real estate, remission of taxation and the administration of the revenue. The order of March 24 insists that people who claim such rights shall place their proofs in the hands of the advocates of the revenue within twenty days, failing which they shall be deprived of further opportunity of proof. Again, certain accounts beneficial to themselves and prejudicial to the revenue are in the hands of people who are in debt to the revenue. These must be delivered up at once. Any one who knows of such accounts is enjoined to declare his knowledge upon pain of being proceeded against as a rebel.

These enquiries into the last financial acts of Ludovico were dictated by two considerations. The administration of Milan had proved so successful that d'Amboise could afford to examine pre-conquest financial conditions in order to increase the revenue if that were at all possible. In acting thus, he was probably obeying a hint from Louis who foresaw that money would presently be required in greater abundance than hitherto.

In May, 1506, the Estates-General at Tours had expressed disapprobation of the proposed marriage between the king's daughter,/

(2) Reg. Panig., N. fol. 92. tergo.

daughter, Claude, and Charles, the grandson of Maximilian, begging the king not to risk the transference of the French throne into the hands of a foreigner. The heir-presumptive, François d'Angoulême, would make an excellent husband for Claude, as the marriage would ensure the possession of the throne by a Frenchman. Louis knew that in agreeing to the proposal he must eventually break with Maximilian, and thus he wished to have as much money as possible in his possession for the payment of troops. Again, internal strife in Genoa had resulted in the expulsion of some of the great families and the election of a new duke by the people towards the beginning of 1507. Desiring to return to the city, the exiles sent to Louis asking him to help them. As a refusal would have meant the loss of Genoa, Louis consented and, moving against the city, began the siege on April 25. In the meantime the citizens forwarded to Maximilian, as their feudal superior, a request that he would do something for them. Maximilian's response was a letter to Louis forbidding him to continue the siege. To this, Louis paid no attention, but proceeding with his investment of Genoa, captured it, beheaded the duke, Paolo da Nova, and built a high fort to command the city. On May 24 he returned to Milan. (3)

(3) See Prato pp. 259-260.

For a full account of the rising and the siege see d'Auton, Vol. IV., cp. xxiii., pp. 214-229.

Prato's account leads one to believe that Paolo da Nova was beheaded immediately the city was captured. But d'Auton points out that he fled to Corsica, whither Louis sent a captain with two hundred men-at-arms to make him prisoner. When captured, he was taken to Genoa, tried for treason and beheaded. See d'Auton, Vol. IV., cp. xxx, pp. 300-303.

For this campaign, also, Louis required money. But he went further. On April 12, that is, about a fortnight before he began the siege of Genoa, he challenged both the loyalty and the business instincts of the Province by an edict demanding provisions for the army. Had this been purely a command success might have been doubtful; but he ensured a prompt delivery of bread, wine, fresh meat, butter, cheese, salt meat, live cattle and hay, by allowing these goods to pass from the place of origin to the camp at Genoa free of the taxes, duties and gabelles ordinarily payable.⁽⁴⁾ The opportunity of obtaining an extra profit/

(4) Gridario Generale III.

Adcio chel felice exercito quale al presente si è preparato contral populo genuese, per reprimere le insolentie e temeritate sue, sia più copioso et habundante de victualie, per tenore de la presente crida, se fa noticia, per parte del serenissimo et christianissimo Rè e duca de Milano, signor nostro observandissimo, e cussi per tenore de epso crida, se concede libera licentia, facultate et arbitrio, inherendo alli ordini, ad qualunque persona, di quale stato e condictione voglia se sia, che liberamente, senza alcuna exceptione, possino condurre e fare condurre, da caduno loco, cità, terra et altri loci de questo regio dominio e stato de Milano, etiam infeudati, victualie de ogni manera, cioè pane, vino, carne, formagio, bestie vive, carne salata, butyro, biada de cavalli, et ogni altra victualia, excepto frumento, rixo, sigale e millo. Quale victualie sopradicte se possano extrahere da le cità e loci, e condurle al dicto exercito senza alcuno pagamento de dacio, pedagio, ne gabella, perchè cusi è anche disposito per li ordini, cum questa condictione pero, che li conductori depse victualie siano obligati ad portare li retorni, dali commissarii e sescalchi del campo, de la consigna depse victualie ad li datiarrii o altri offitiali de la cità e loci dove epsi conductori farano transito, aciochè li datiarrii non siano fraudati sotto pretexto de condurse in campo, e dicte victualie serano pagate secundo l'honestate.

profit through fraud, by representing such goods as meant for the army while they were really intended for private sale, was overcome by the condition that the seller must produce to the Revenue officials a receipt from the commissioners or stewards of the camp showing that the goods had been delivered to them. (5)

In their financial administration of Milan the French had to contend with many difficulties. The system bequeathed to them was complicated, and they had to adjust, or adjust themselves to, more than one peculiarity. A curious instance of these obstacles to good government is noted in a decree published on February 10, 1508. (6) Certain creditors of Ludovico's last government, acting on an ordinance promulgated by that prince, were refusing to pay debts which they themselves had contracted. This was absurd, especially in view of the fact that Louis, of his own free will, had taken upon himself the burden of the yearly payments required to clear off these governmental liabilities. In any case, as he pointed out, it was unjust that a creditor should suffer because of a previous arrangement which had been made by his debtor and with which he had nothing to do.

Anxious to have the matter settled, Louis referred it to/

(5) See quotation on page 461.

(6) Reg. Panig. K., fol. 123, tergo.

to the Senate which, after long and careful deliberation, pronounced that, despite any decree which might exist to the contrary, no debtor could escape payment of his debt by a plea that he was a creditor of Ludovico or of Ludovico's administrative departments. The finding of the Senate was accepted by the king and published in the decree of February 10.

From the tone of the documents already considered it is plain that Louis was dissatisfied with the state of finance at Milan. He may have expected too great a sum from the duchy, or he may have suspected the integrity of the officials⁽⁷⁾ concerned in the actual administration. His own definite statements are indicative of his belief that, while the Milanese were paying a sufficiently heavy contribution, the revenue did not benefit to the extent it should have done. Hence document after document treats of the manner in which financial affairs are to be administered. Apparently, too, he wished to obtain independent testimony with regard to the general government of the duchy. To that end he sent commissioners with ample powers to hold inquests throughout the Province, taking special cognisance of financial affairs, while not neglecting problems of general administration.⁽⁸⁾

The important document dealing with the results of this commission was published at Chinon on August 14, 1508. It is addressed/

(7) Farmers of taxes are specially mentioned in the document about to be considered.

(8) Reg. Ducali IV., fol. 66
Comme/

addressed to the Masters of the Extraordinary Revenue and, in the preamble, makes reference to the creditors of Ludovico Sforza, directing that they shall be paid.

The first article deals with a subject that had already caused much trouble and inconvenience. Frequent mention has been made of the difficulty experienced by the Administration in keeping officials to their own particular duty, and in preventing them from interfering with the affairs of other departments. The trouble, indeed, seems to have been never-ending. Referring to it, the first article lays down the regulation that castlewards and governors of cities in the duchy shall not meddle at all in civil or criminal causes, the jurisdiction of which must remain with the judges and officers appointed for the purpose.

Possibly there is here a hint of private jurisdictions or of jurisdictions regarded as being attached to the governorship of a city or of a castle. But if these powers were invested in such offices then the king's court must frequently take a subordinate position. Their right of jurisdiction would be denied and if,/

(8) -----
(Contd.) Comme pour un certain temps en ça, nous avons commis et députés aucuns de nos principaulx officiers et serviteurs, au fait de nos finances, pour eulx transporter en notre duché de Milan et autres nos seigneuries oultramontaines, auxquels entre autres choses avons donné charge d'eulx informer et enquerir de l'estat et disposition de nos affaires et finances d'icelluy duché, tant pour l'ordinaire que pour l'extraordinaire, et aussi du fait et gouvernement des cités, villes et chastellanies dudit pays et comme la justice y a esté administrée depuis la reprise et réduction de notredit duché en nos mains et obéissance, lesquels nos deputés ayent trouvé..... Reg. Ducali IV., fol. 66.

if, in spite of this, a judgment were delivered, then the governor or castle-ward might render it ineffective by a refusal to allow the sentence to be carried out. Louis, both to preserve the dignity of his judges and to avoid the confusion that must inevitably result from interference by unofficial "judges", was compelled to forbid utterly the assumption of jurisdictions by those to whom they had not been definitely granted.

Yet the king did not intend that any of his officials should become too powerful. Hence offices were to be held for two years only, except where they had been specially granted ad vitam or where they were held durant notre bon plaisir, as in the case of the Captaincy of the Martesana and the Mayoralty of Varese. In some respects this regulation was wise. It tended to keep the younger men active and keen, since promotion was no longer dependent upon the death of an office-holder; but it was disadvantageous in that men of experience were at regular intervals displaced in favour of those whose administrative skill was as yet untested. As experience is a most valuable asset to a judge the principle was, perhaps, questionable in the case of legal appointments. But Louis was acting on the advice of his commissioners, who must have given reasons for their recommendation that the old system - it was not an innovation - should be retained, or, it may be, renewed. Corruption, as one may learn from the documents in the archives, was not uncommon, and the commissioners' advice regarding the two years' appointment may have/

have been an endeavour to check that evil.

The next article continues the complaint about the disappearance of fines and confiscations which ought to have come into the Entrate, both Ordinario and Straordinario. Under the penalty of loss of their official position Captains of Justice, Mayors of cities and others possessing jurisdiction in criminal causes are ordered to send the proceeds of all condemnations, fines and confiscations to the Ducal Chamber at Milan. Up to the present, the article goes on, the negligence and culpability of the officials concerned has made these fines and confiscations comme de nulle valeur. Further, as the next article insists, all cases must be reported to headquarters at Milan. Hitherto officials had made a practice of reporting only the cases of poor persons, the fines upon whom were of little value to the State. The larger confiscations, says the article, quite bluntly, had been appropriated by the officials or their deputies, instead of being passed on to the Revenue Office. The decree rendered such fraud more difficult, as any breach of the regulations laid down therein would be treated as evidence of an attempt to over-reach the law, and the offender punished accordingly.

A further protection was provided by the election of an advocate and a procurator-fiscal, whose services were to be paid from the fines and confiscations levied in the cities where they held office. The check was increased by limiting the fees of these officials to not more than one fourth of the proceeds of the/

the fines or confiscations. In places having gladii potestas a syndic-fiscal was ordered to be appointed to oversee all criminal and fiscal processes, and to interfere where necessary in any matter pertaining to the offices of the advocate and procurator-fiscal.

The decree is very definite in its statement with regard to the procedure to be adopted in all trials. Under penalty any officer having gladii potestas must forward each month to the syndic-fiscal a list of the causes marked for trial during the ensuing month. Next month the syndic-fiscal enquires as to the progress made and, if the causes have not been completed, urges the officials to greater diligence than had hitherto been shown. All complaints and trials must be registered and preserved for reference in a special book, sur grosses peines. The names of witnesses in the case are also entered, so that legal delays shall be as short as possible and lawyers prevented by this record from deferring judgment to the prejudice of the Ducal Chamber.

Within the area over which they have jurisdiction, procurators-fiscal must be cognizant of all trials relating to the revenue, and are bound to be present to watch over the interests of the duke. This instruction holds good no matter before whom the case is tried - vicar general, senator, or any other judge. Again, processes which have not been placed in the hands of judges chosen by the Senate shall be brought up by the vicar-general, who shall then be commanded to have them before the court/

court within a certain time. Here, also, the procurator-fiscal must give permission and be present at the trial. Whatever term is appointed, no interference will be tolerated on the part of a captain of justice, mayor, commissioner or other judge, unless with the consent of the procurator-fiscal.

The decree takes cognizance, also, of the appointment of the officials deputed to carry out its provisions. The importance of the procurator-fiscal is evident from his powers and his duties. Officials who have been syndics are appointed in turn for a period of two years at a time according to an ancient custom. They and the vicars-general shall be aided by the procurators-fiscal of the city in which they hold office.

Two important provisions remain. The first declares that no confiscation of the goods of an accused person, for and in the name of the Ducal Chamber, shall take place before his condemnation, without the consent of the notary of the Extraordinary Revenue in Milan, or by permission of the notary of the referendaries of other cities or the syndics-fiscal in the districts under their jurisdiction. Evidently such confiscations had taken place or the edict would not have mentioned them. The declaration, therefore, is a proof that Louis did not desire this method of confiscation to be regarded as normal. But the good intention is almost completely vitiated by the condition that on the consent of certain officials - it does not matter how fair-minded they might be - an untried, or, at any rate, an uncondemned man might suffer/

suffer an unjust penalty. Such power was too great to lie within the discretion of any official, however important he might be: it offered too wide scope for injustice. In point of fact, it might conceivably overcome the power of the court trying the supposed delinquent. The article also maintains the principle that a man may be judge in his own cause - a principle the demerits of which are so obvious as not to require mention.

The second provision which affected the revenue is not open to the same objection. It had become the custom to employ too many officials when an inventory had to be made of the goods of a condemned person. By this extravagance the proceeds of the inventory were diminished to the prejudice of the revenue: there-⁽⁹⁾fore the edict orders a reduction in the number of such officials.

Some light on the difficulties of the French administration is to be found in documents of a political nature. A breach with Venice caused the recall of French subjects serving the republic, and expelled Venetian subjects from the duchy. An attempt to foment rebellion in the province itself brought about a trial for treason, while a politic exercise of clemency permitted the return/

(9) Et pour ce que avec lesdits notaires vont souvent plus de sergents que le cas et la description des biens des delinquants ne requiert es cites et autres lieux, et mesmement en notre cité de Millan, et veuillent être payés sur lesdits biens, qui est su très grand prejudice et dommaige de notre dite chambre et de ceux à qui appartiennent lesdits biens, voullons et déclarons que le nombre desdits sergents soit restreint et réduit au nombre compétant, et selon la qualité de la description qui se devra faire et du lieu où elle se fera/

return of banned and other condemned men. As will be seen immediately, some of these events are intimately connected with one another. The storm centre was Venice.

"L'anno MDVII," says Burigozzo,⁽¹⁰⁾ "fu rotto guerra fra Veneziani et la Maestà del Rè." Now, on February 18 of that year, Simone Arrigoni⁽¹¹⁾ had been put to the ban for treason. On his flight, a reward of five hundred ducats was offered for his body, and a thousand ducats if he were delivered alive into the hands of the king's officers. Further, if the person effecting the capture or death were himself in exile, he would not only receive the reward but would be released from the ban and permitted to return to the city. In addition, if any follower of the rebel were killed, the slayer would receive fifty ducats or, if the man were taken alive, a hundred ducats.⁽¹²⁾

The magnitude of the reward for the capture or death of the rebel and his followers indicates the apprehension of the

Administration/

(9) (Contd.) fera, et sera ordonné le nombre desdits sergents, qui devront aller avec ledit notaire ou greffier de la chambre et les notaires du cappitaine, podestat ou aultres justiciers et seront payés selon les statuts et ordres dudit décret. - Reg. Ducati IV. fol. 66.

(10) Burigozzo, lib. 1., p. 421.

(11) He admitted to the Venetian Ambassador Leonardo Blanco that he had killed Ludovico's treasurer, Landriano.

(12) Gridario Generale III.

An account of Simone Arrigoni's rebellion is given by Prato p. 259.

Cosi/

Administration regarding the result of the rising upon the Milanese. Had it been an ordinary revolt it might have been suppressed without the exhibition of so much anxiety. But Simone's action had more behind it than his personal quarrel with the Administration. So far back as September 1504, the Venetian Ambassador, Leonardo Blanco, writing to the Council of Ten, informed them that Simone had several times tried to obtain an interview with him and, finally finding him alone, had given him much information regarding Trivulzio and the state of parties at Milan, which he was communicating to the Council. Among other things, Simone mentioned the fact that he had spent over seven thousand ducats in fortifying the Rock of Baye in Valsasina, which he/

(12)

(contd.) Così dico in proposito de Simono Rigono; el quale avendo il tesorero del duca Ludovico Sforza (qual che si fussi) ucciso, poi accostatosi al re di Franza, et tolto all'incanto li daci de Milano, et factone non poca perdita, fu constretto a partirsi a guisa di fugitivo da Milano, et andarsene ad uno suo castello, detto Valsasina. Ivi facendo recetto de ogni sorte de homini pravi, tutto il vicino paese non altramente che assassino danneggiava; de modo che, venuto li lamenti a Milano, fu mandato a richiedere per li agenti del re di Franza, Duca nostro; et non volendo venire, li fu mandato molta gente d'arme per prenderlo: ma essendo il castello per l'altezza fortissimo, li tenne alcuni di a bada. Ma a la fine (per inganno del capitano Ieronimo Paggio, el quale era seco nel castello) fatto captivo, et menato a Milano, il giorno vigesimo septimo di Febraro fu tormentato; et quel proprio di del mese di Marzo, su la piazza del Castello, vestito de velluto bruno con una colanetta d'oro, fu decollato, poi squartato, et posti i soi membri alle porte di Milano.

(13)

Venice, Archivio di Stato Dispacci ai Capi del Consiglio de'X (1501-1525) busta 15 dispaccio 2.

(14)

he had rendered almost impregnable.

Simone did not give all his information without a purpose in view. He admitted that he was ambitious, and sought for the support of Venice as a power naturally hostile to Louis. But, while offering to serve the republic in return, he stated clearly that he did so not from any hope of reward but that he might have

(15)

patrons who would appreciate his action.

It seems probable, then, that one of two things had happened - either Venice had accepted his services more than two years later, or Simone, letting ambition over-rule his prudence, had rebelled on his own account. But Simone was a cautious man. He had made preparations and built a fortress upon which, as he admitted, all his hopes rested. He was well aware that the French were too strong/

(14) Questa forteza disse esse nominata la rocha de Bayé forteza de monte inexpugnabile in Valsasena, sopra la riva del lago de Como, i porti del quale dice essere in poter suo. For reference, see previous Note.

(15) Dicto che me hebe M. Simon predicta tute queste cose cum longo discorso me disse: "Non pensate che la indulgentia e servitù che desidero cum la illustrissima Signoria sia per speranza de premio, che mi non ho heriedi e non ho bisogno, ma solum haver padroni che sia certo habino grato el mio servizio, Scrivete questo mio desiderio in loco secretissimo, accio in non patisca, che non potria, essere senza incommodo de la illustrissima Signoria e raccomandatemi a quella." Ibid. But see Pélissier, Documents pour l'Histoire de la Domination Française dans le Milanais, p. 105.

strong for him to overcome single-handed, and was unlikely, therefore, to make the attempt. On the other hand, hostilities were on the point of breaking out between Venice and Milan, while the relations between Louis and Maximilian were very strained. Even with this knowledge he would have hesitated had not support been promised or, at least, hinted at. That support could only come from Venice. Simone's revolt, whether or not he had been promised aid, was unsuccessful. Having been captured - the usual treachery had been at work - he was tortured, beheaded, his body quartered, and his limbs fixed on the gates of Milan.

Venetian diplomacy proved unequal to the task of preventing an outbreak of hostilities between France and the republic. Maximilian had already, in 1507, attempted to repay Louis for the failure of the scheme for the marriage between his grandson, Charles, and Louis' daughter, Claude. But though his restless, ambitious mind was capable of conceiving great projects, his ability to carry them out was on a much lower level. By lavish promises to the Diet he gained a body of troops which he supplemented by Swiss mercenaries. Crossing the Brenner Pass, he reached Trent. But the Venetians, fearing his designs, opposed his further progress, while Louis, as his share, at once strengthened the fortifications of Milan, and induced the Duke of Gueldres to attack/

(16) See Burigozzo, p. 421.

(17) Poi venuta la nova ad esso Rè et Duca dell' apparato del rè de Romani per venirli contra, subito fece, a dì cinque di Luglio, dar principio a fare evacuare, allargare et imbastire/

attack the Netherlands. Completely foiled, Maximilian was compelled to sue for peace with Louis, and joined with him in the infamous League of Cambray. The Frenchman was anxious to seize Cremona and the Ghiara d'Adda, the price paid to Venice for her alliance against Ludovico. Bergamo and Brescia, formerly possessions of Milan, were other objects of his ambition. Ferdinando of Spain, also, had a grievance against Venice as she had been ceded five Apulian ports in return for her aid in recovering Naples from the French. Maximilian himself was sore at the recent discomfiture he had suffered through Venice, and Julius II. was ambitious to extend the temporal power of the Papacy.

In this bald statement Venice appears to play a poor part. But her selfishness and greed were equalled by the treachery of the very powers which had sought her aid and then grudged paying the price upon which they had agreed. The League of Cambray, comprising the princes mentioned, was easily formed, though Julius II. had some hesitation in joining it. Some other Italian rulers - the Duke of Ferrara and Gonzago of Mantua - threw in (18) their lot with the League, and Venice, depending solely on her own resources and the loyalty of her people, was left to meet the attack of the alliance formed against her.

But/

(17) (Contd.) imbastire li refossi de Milano, et fabricare li novi rivellini, col principio de la sua torre, che di presente si vedono; et a Milano cominciò a far venire fantaria; et del resto tutte quelle provisioni, che a prudente Rè in sì facto caso si richiedeano, non mancò in exeguirlo. Prato p. 264.

(18) Il/

But not all of her foes could take the field. Maximilian, poor at the best of times, was exhausted by his recent campaign, while Ferdinando had sufficient occupation in a war against the Moors in Africa. The attack was thus left to the French and Papal troops. The Romagna was the scene of action of the Papal forces; but the Venetians, preferring to prevent a French invasion, avoided the Romagna and defended their territory on the west. The component parts of the League were so ill-assorted that Venice would have been wise to adopt Fabian tactics. By avoiding a pitched battle she could have worn down the spirits of her enemies and, by prolonging the war, would almost certainly have provoked a quarrel among the allies. But other counsels prevailed. In their manoeuvres the two armies met at Agnadello and the Venetians were utterly defeated. Their rear guard sustained the brunt of the attack under Bartolomeo d'Alviano a condottier of undoubted bravery. But he was abandoned by the
(19)
Conte de Pitigliano who was in command of the van, either because
the/

(18) (Contd.) Il che, unito il re de Romani con Iulio Papa, et con il nostro Re di Franza, et con quel di Spagna posseditore del reame de Napoli, et con Ferrara, et con Mantua, se pattuirno insieme di exeguire proprio quella fabula de li pavoni et del graculo. Prato p. 267.

(19) It was perhaps natural that wild accusations of treachery should be made, but d'Alviano should not be blamed as, despite his abandonment by Pitigliano it was only after a hard struggle that he was taken prisoner by the French.

Emmi referto poi, che il Conte Bartolome del Viano non volesse soccorrere colla cavalleria per esserli emulo et malvogliente; et altri dicono, che fu per paura de non esser vincto; et altri per intendimento che avea il Conte Aluisio Avogadro et Sacino Benzono con il Trivulzio. Prato, p. 275.

From/

the distance was too great or because Pitigliano was jealous of d'Alviano.

As a result of Agnadello the allies obtained all they wished. Maximilian, it is true, would have carried matters further, but the others were satisfied. Without trouble to himself Ferdinando had gained the Apulian ports; Louis had achieved his object of humiliating Venice and seizing the districts he had coveted; the Pope had acquired Ravenna, Faenza and Rimini in the Romagna. They therefore left Maximilian to fight on his own behalf if he so desired. As the campaign that ensued has no bearing upon the French administration of Milan it may be dismissed by saying that the Venetians made a wonderful recovery. Maximilian, unable/

(19) (Contd.) From the account given by Prato the blame for the loss of the battle lies, not upon d'Alviano but with the cowardice of Pitigliano, who, although in command, fled from the enemy and left his army to its fate.

Anzi (il Conte da Pitigliano) voltato le spalle all' occidente con le gente d'arme, se ne fuggi verso Bressa, et la compagnia della molta artiglieria, insieme con il Conte Bartolomè del Viano, d'ogni aiuto abbandonati doppo grande combattere, fu alla fine, poco men che tutti, occisa, et esso, vulnerato ne la faccia, cadette nel conflitto; continuamente piovenda si dirottamente, che proprio pareva li cieli lacrimando di tanta occisione condolarsi. Prato p. 275.

Le Loyal Serviteur, cp. xxix., p. 41, blames d'Alviano for his rashness, though he praises the quality of the Venetian troops. See also Robert de la Marck, Sire de Floranges, Chronique, cp. vii., p. 225.

unable to defeat them in the open field, began a cruel and useless series of massacres which only acted as a foil to the better government under Venice. But the events following these campaigns were of extreme moment to the French, and will be treated later. Meanwhile the effect in Milan of the League against Venice must be noted.

The League of Cambray was formed on December 10, 1508, and as its object was the spoilation of Venice, it was natural that precautions should be taken in Milan to prevent leakage of information regarding any preparations for the pending attack. It was considered necessary, also, to withdraw all Louis' subjects from Venetian service. The wording of the decree issued by d'Amboise
(20)
on March, 12, 1509, establishes the fact that the main reason for their recall was that they might be drafted into the allied army. This, of course, would inflict a double loss upon the Venetian forces. The list of military qualifications mentioned is sufficiently suggestive, and the penalty incurred for disobedience - la pena de la forza, ita che sia impicato per la gola et che mora senza processo alcuno - indicates the importance attached to the
(21)
order.

Another/

(20) Reg. Panig. N., fol. 142, tergo.

(21) Se fa publica crida..... che nesuno de loro ardisca andare a la servitii, ne in operare, ne in fabricare in alcuno modo, ne in arte militare ne altramente, da la Signoria de Venetia, ne da soi officiali, capitanei, feu datarii, e qualunque agente per dicta Signoria mediate aut immediate; e si qualuncho li è, de qualunque grado, stato, condictione se sia, non banito ut supra, sia a sapere capitaneo, conductore,/

(22)

Another edict was published by d'Amboise on April 1, annulling safe-conducts to Venetian subjects - tanto Venetiani che del territorio jurisdictione e Signoria de Venetia - and ordering them to leave Milan within three days, the day of issue of the edict being reckoned as one.

It is further declared that, if any Venetian subjects enter the city, with goods or without, their merchandise, if they have any, shall be confiscated, and if they have none, they shall be imprisoned. For the present the edict is not to be enforced against citizens from Crema, the Ghiara d'Adda, Cremona, Brescia and Bergamo. If they care to remain in the Province, they and their goods will be safe.

In what may be called a postscript, d'Amboise explains that, for fifteen days, including the date of issue of the decree, Milanese merchants and other subjects of Louis are at complete liberty to move with their merchandise through the Province, provided/

(21) (Contd.) ductore, capo de squadra, homodarme, balestrere, arcere, fante da pede et omne altro de lo exercito de la guerra, magistro d'arme, laborante et cosi d'artelaria, magistro da cazola, magistro da legnamo e de qualunche altre arte e magisterio se sia, cosi da nave como da altro, e cosi de omne altra qualitate e facultate, debba, nel termine de tre septimane, partirse e levarse con ogni sua familia, se ne haverà, da omne loco et imprexa che sarà al servizio d'essa Signoria et in dicto dominio, e repatriare al loco del sua origine sive habitatione, o altrove dove li parirà nel regio dominio de Milano. - Reg. Panig. N., fol. 142, tergo.

(22) Reg. Panig. N., fol. 148. tergo.

provided that the goods are Milanese and not Venetian. If the goods belong to Venetian subjects, then, even though they be in Milanese hands, they will be confiscated.

The political documents from this date onwards deal chiefly with the influence of the Holy League upon Milan. Julius II. had been favourable to the entry of the French into Italy, but once Venice had been humbled, he perceived an opportunity of freeing the peninsula from the foreigner. The diplomatic correspondence immediately before and after the formation of the Holy League is specially interesting to English speaking people, as many of the documents preserved in the Frari at Venice passed between England and the republic during the reigns of Henry VII. and his successor Henry VIII. They make plain the fact that England was taking part in foreign politics and that her influence on one side or the other of the contending parties in Italy was not to be despised.

During the critical period from the League of Cambray to the battle of Agnadello there was an almost unbroken stream of correspondence between England and Venice. Two months after the pact had been made the Consiglio de' Dieci sent to Lorenzo Giustiniano, the Venetian Consul in London, a communication containing an Ambassador's commission and credentials for Andrea Badoer. As the Ambassador was travelling as an Englishman it would have been unsafe for him to carry these documents on his person. To Giustiniano they gave instructions to rouse Henry VII. against/

against France, so as to prevent any further violation of Italian soil. This, of course, meant that Venice wished to protect her own territory from invasion; though her anxiety to keep the French from Italy at that time contrasts very strongly with her previous actions. Even the reasons she advanced form her condemnation.

Giustiniano is instructed to "discover to the king the deeply rooted and detestable greediness of the King of France and of the Cardinal of Rouen (Georges d'Amboise); how they shamefully broke faith, oaths, and their alliance with the State, unmindful of the Signoria's great services in securing to them the Milanese in observance of her promise, and thus perilously drawing the war into Venetian territory; and finally, how, consigning to oblivion endless promises made to the State by letter and their own word of mouth, they are preparing to invade the Signoria's possessions without any legitimate cause."⁽²³⁾

Giustiniano's business was so to lay his case before Henry that he would feel disposed to oppose the French king's projected invasion of Venetian territory.

Four days later (Feb. 16) a despatch having the same object in view was sent to the Imperial Ambassador, Dom. Luca di Renaldi.⁽²⁴⁾ He was informed that France was on the point of invading Venice, and/

(23) Calendar of Venetian State Papers, Vol. I., Doc. 922.

(24) Calendar of Venetian State Papers, Vol. I., Doc. 923.

and was instructed to attempt to secure Maximilian's intervention. From this despatch it appears plain that Venice was as yet unaware of the coalition formed against her, of which the Emperor was a member. Renaldi was to show Maximilian how damaging such an invasion would be to the prestige of the Emperor, as, in the event of the French being successful, the Apostolic See would pass under her control so that she would thus obtain both the temporal and the spiritual command of Italy. Here, again, Venice appeared ignorant of the fact that the Pope himself had joined the League.

Further, Renaldi was to make clear that Venice was most anxious to have a perpetual alliance with the Emperor. Knowing the Emperor's poverty and his grudge against the French for their occupation of the Milanese, the Consiglio de' Dieci instructed the Ambassador to offer and promise him all the resources at the command of the republic, including the sum of two hundred thousand Rhenish guilders, for the recovery of the Milanese territory, and to express the willingness of the Consiglio to cede that territory either to him or to his assigns. The bribe was well conceived. It offered Maximilian an excellent opportunity of revenging all the insults placed on him by his ancient and natural enemy - an opportunity the acceptance of which they were justified in expecting from their knowledge of Maximilian's character. Finally they declared - they may or may not have believed it - that all Italy, detesting the French, would rally to the Emperor in the hope of expelling them.

The/

The importance of Maximilian's decision was so great that the Consiglio de' Dieci passed a motion granting Renaldi benefices to the value of two thousand ducats per annum if he brought the negotiations to a successful conclusion, and guaranteeing him a thousand ducats per annum from the funds of the Consiglio till he was put in possession. As an earnest of their good faith they sent him at once the sum of five hundred ducats.

Under date March 19, 1509, another letter was addressed to Andrea Badoer, Ambassador to England. In it the Doge and Senate of Venice inform him of the attempt to come to an arrangement with Maximilian, and desire him to convey the intelligence to the king. In the event of Henry asking how much money Venice was prepared to pay to the Emperor, Badoer was instructed to say two hundred thousand Rhenish florins. (25) Five days after the last despatch had been sent the Consiglio de' Dieci received from Consul Lorenzo Giustiniano a letter dated March 7, in which he declares (26) that Henry is well disposed to Venice.

On the death of Henry VII., the Venetian Ambassador tried to interest Henry VIII. in his country's affairs, and succeeded so well that, on May 8, the Consiglio wrote expressing its satisfaction that the new king was so utterly hostile to France. (27) In less than/

(25) Calendar of State Papers, Vol. I., Doc. 929.

(26) Ibid. Doc. 931.

(27) Ibid. Doc. 942.

than a week later the rout of Agnadello had occurred. Yet although Henry had so far done nothing to help the Venetians, the friendship continued. In December the king even received a note thanking him for having interested himself in Venice against
(28)
France.

By this time the republic had recovered her self-respect and was anxious to win the favour of Julius II. That Pontiff had already in his mind a plan which, though for a space it might deluge Italy with blood, would, if successful, result in the expulsion of foreign powers from the whole country. His first action was against the French, but, before he would proceed against them, he required the help of Venice and Spain. It fitted in opportunely with his project, then, that the republic was keen to be re-instated in his good graces; but it would have been premature to lift his displeasure from Venice and attempt the expulsion of the French before being certain that the republic was willing and strong enough to help him. Meantime Henry VIII. used what influence he possessed at the Roman Curia in favour of the Venetians, for which help the republic did not fail to thank
(29)
him.

In the latter half of 1511 the Pope felt he might risk the formation of a new League. Therefore he came to a friendly understanding/

(28) Calendar of Venetian State Papers, Vol. 11., Docs. 22, 25.
See also Docs. 45, 130, 179.

(29) Calendar of Venetian State Papers, Vol. 11., Doc. 33.

understanding with Venice, which was easily done, and reached an agreement with Ferdinando. The Spanish king, having gained the Apulian ports, had ceased to take any real interest in the still existing League of Cambray. Hence, when Julius II. proposed to him the formation of a League, nominally to protect the Church and restore her lost lands to Venice, he was not unwilling to join, especially as, in view of the French power in the north of Italy, he had no desire to see Venice so weak as she was. The real aim of the Holy League, as it was termed, was to drive the French out of Italy and, when the Pope arranged with Ferdinando to confirm any Spanish conquests outside Italy, he joined at once. This particular condition applied to Navarre, possession of which had for a long time been an object of Ferdinando's ambition. But the astute Spanish king had another design in mind, which was nothing less than to extend his own dominions in Italy at the expense of the French. A fourth member of the League was admitted in the person of Henry VIII. of England, who from the first had been friendly with Venice and desired, also, to stand well with his father-in-law, Ferdinando; while Maximilian, who seems at the beginning to have hesitated, joined immediately after the battle of Ravenna on Easter Day, 1512.

Naturally these warlike preparations had not passed without notice in Milan. The formation of the Holy League on October 5, 1511, became known to Louis XII., who, possibly with the intention of/

of lessening the number of his internal enemies, proclaimed an
(30)
amnesty (November 5, 1511) for Milanese under the ban. Point-
ing out in the decree that he is aware of the unhappy life led by
many of these people, some of whom have been unjustly condemned -
alii etiam insontes dampnati sunt - and others exiled for slight
offences, he cancels all condemnations of this kind, whether on
account of one crime or of many, and allows the exiles to return
home and dwell in Milan just as though no sentence had ever been
passed upon them. Certain offences, however, he regards as un-
pardonable - treason, manufacture of false money, heresy, sacri-
lege, and intentional murder, whether committed personally or by
the hands of an agent. (31)

If/

(30)

Reg. Panig. N., fol. 278. tergo.

(31)

Quare, per presentes quas vim decreti et legis generalis habere decrevit, remisit, abolevit, et cancelavit omnes condemnationes et banna contra quoscumque subditos suos Galie Cisalpine quacumque occasione hinc retro facta et publicata, sive unicum delictum alicui objiceretur, sive ex pluribus multiplicatis fazinoribus aliquis impetitus esset, decrevitque ac concessit quod omnes ipsi banniti et dampnati, sive delinquentes essent sive non, possint libere tute et impune in patria et qualibet Domini prelibati parte degere, morari indeque discedere, ac in omnibus habeantur perinde ac si nunquam delinquissent et condempnatio ac bannum non successissent; modo tamen non possint frui presenti gratia nostra nec in dominium venire, nisi prius habita pace cum offensis aut eorum heredibus, et eadem gratia nostra non trahatur ad bona^{am} camere nostre confischata; reservantes tamen eos qui pro crimine lexe Majestatis, aut sacrilegii, aut herexis, aut fabricat-ionis falsarum monetarum post recuperatum dominium ipsum secute, aut homocidii actualis appensati et deliberati, manibus propriis aut eorum mandato perpetrati, dampnati sunt, quoniam eos hac nostra generali abolitione indignos censemus. Reg. Panig. N., fol. 278, tergo.

If Louis expected by this exercise of clemency to rally to his support the returned exiles and their friends he was disappointed. What weighed with them was not gratitude for the pardon which had been granted, but bitterness at the sufferings so long endured. There was, too, the general and never-failing feeling of resentment at the rule of a foreign power. The Holy League, when its existence became known, provided an additional incentive to regard Louis' offer with coldness, as it made his proclamation appear more a matter of policy than of sympathy for the exiles. The French victory at Ravenna certainly had the effect of holding in check those Milanese who wished to expel their rulers, but later events completely altered the position.

Maximilian had contributed most efficiently to the defeat
(32)
of the allies at Ravenna; but his participation was partly the result of an accident, as he had come to terms with the Holy League before the battle was fought. But immediately after the battle he recalled his troops, and, weakened by his defection,
(33)
the French were unable to withstand the League army.

By the irony of fate, the Swiss, who had aided Louis so materially/

(32) An account of the battle is given in Grumello, lib. V.cp.xv. See also Journal de Louise de Savoye, p. 297. and Chronique de Robert de la Marck, Sire de Floranges, cp. xxix., pp. 237-240.

(33) Prato. p. 298.

materially in his suppression of Ludovico's revolt, were the means of forcing the French out of Italy. No moral credit attaches to these mercenaries on account of their action. It was not intended as a tardy attempt at reparation for the evils they had brought on the Sforza family, but as an expression of their resentment against Louis, who had both refused to increase their subsidy and forbidden them to draw supplies of corn and wine from the Province. Under Matteo Scheiner, Bishop of Sion, they swept down upon Milan in May, 1512.

As might be expected the city was in a ferment. An echo of this is preserved in an edict, issued on June 11, for the election of two captains of justice and the disarming of Milan. ⁽³⁴⁾ By this time Trivulzio and the higher French command had left Milan ⁽³⁵⁾ and gone to Pavia to join La Palice who had taken command after the death of Gaston de Foix at the Battle of Ravenna, the city being left in the hands of a Commission, by which the edict was published. The decree ordered the election of two Captains of Justice having under them a body of three hundred paid officials to prevent all attempts at rioting or other tumult in the city. The Milanese were forbidden to carry arms of any kind, under penalty of three inflictions of the strappado or death by hanging, according/

(34) Reg. Panig. L. fol. 121, tergo.

(35) See Prato, p. 299.

(36)

according to the rank of the offenders.

On the day before the issue of this decree a police edict was published having in view the safety of the general public during the troubled times that seemed to be coming. (37) While the edict is wholly preventive, its provisions fall into two parts, the first negative and the second positive. It was impossible that life should run its normal course when the city was in the throes of war, but the more nearly the ordinary routine could be approached the greater was the chance of a happy issue from the conflict. Discontent among the citizens must be avoided; hence two negative measures are put into operation by the decree. The first forbids all distraint of goods whether or not such distraint be./

(36) Essendo aduncha assai provisto al publico bisogno con li dicti capitanei e deputati, ed essendo renunciato a li signori deputati de la inclita città di Milano che molti porteno e fano portare arme inastate, balestre, e sciopeti e simile arme, il che non è bisogni anze poteria generare pernizioso tumulto, fano publico commandamento che non sia persona alcuna di qualuncha stato, grado, conditione, preeminentie si voglia, che ardisca portare ne fare portare arme alcune inastate, balestre overo schiopetti de qualunque sorte, sotto pena de quatro tratti di corda, et anche de la forcha secondo la conditione de la persona, a lo arbitrio de li capitani e deputati de le porte irremisibilmente. - Reg. Panig. L., fol. 121, tergo.

It is of interest to note that, during this trying time the Commissioners had a special care for the health of the city. The second part of the edict forbids all persons stricken, or suspected of being stricken by the plague, to move from their usual place of abode. Nor must they move clothes or other goods from a stricken area without the licence of the Commissioners, upon pain of death.

(37) Reg. Panig. L., fol. 122, tergo.

be lawful, the importance attached to the provision being indicated by the penalty - death to the offender together with the confiscation of all his goods. The second forbids rioting within the city or its environs. No person, whether Frenchman or foreigner, must offer violence either directly or indirectly; no one must sack or take part in sacking under pain of death. Further, should a man suffer violence of any description he must not retaliate but have recourse to the four deputies appointed for each gate of the city, or to the Captains of Justice, who have the will and the ability to punish all delinquents.

On the positive side arrangements are made for a supply at reasonable prices of bread, meat and wine and, that these foods may be sold more cheaply, they are to be free of tax. The last provision is specially wise. All merchants and workers of every sort are to continue their ordinary business and keep their shops open without any fear of violence, the penalty for disobedience being fifty ducats for each offence. ⁽³⁸⁾ The provision was a direct challenge to the disorderly elements of the city and, at the same time, an appeal to law-abiding citizens to support the authorities in their efforts to maintain unimpaired the ordinary activities of life. Whether they were sure of their ground is another matter./

(38)

Si commanda ad tutti li mercadanti et artificii dogni sorte che perseverano in li soi (sic) lavorerii et arte solite et senza dubitatione de violentia tengano aperte de loro apoteche, sotto pena de ducati cinquanta ad chi contra' fara. - Reg. Panig. L., fol. 122 tergo.

matter. Circumstances eventually proved too strong for them, but it stands to the credit of the Administration that, in face of grave difficulties, they remained at their post and attempted to carry out efficiently the duties attaching to their office.

In dealing with edicts issued by the police authorities one passes from the enunciation of general principles to their application in those more minute details upon scrupulous attention to which successful administration depends. The decree just treated was intended for abnormal circumstances, yet it does not differ materially from the majority of police regulations, as a consideration of some of them will show. One such decree was published on January 13, 1507, that is, at a time when the general administration was working smoothly. ⁽³⁹⁾ As no country is ever entirely free from crime it is no indictment of the French administration to admit that there existed a certain amount of lawlessness. The documents bearing witness to law-breaking are really evidence that the authorities knew what was going on and were determined to stamp it out. The disorder under French rule was probably less than had previously been the case; for the severity of the penalties as well as the unhesitating manner in which they were enforced must have rendered intending law-breakers apprehensive/

(39) Reg. Panig. N., fol. 90.

(40) French justice was even-handed. The stern fashion in which military offenders were treated during the first occupation of the city has already been commented upon. A further example is contained in the decree of January 13 where datieri, officials/

apprehensive lest they put themselves within the power of the courts.

The lawless instinct of the age found expression in Milan as in other places. Singly, or in gangs, disorderly men lurked in the streets at night, insulting and robbing by violence whenever opportunity offered. Against such malefactors the decree of January 13 is directed, by forbidding the carrying of arms at night.

This regulation is admirably supplemented by another section which commands all who have occasion to go out at night to carry a lantern, under penalty of twenty-five ducats. ⁽⁴¹⁾ Such an order shows that the streets were either not lit at all or so poorly that the municipal efforts had to be aided by the private citizen.

Another/

-----p-----
(40) (Contd.) officials of the Administration, are specially mentioned.

Monsignore capitaneo de justicia....per la presente crida commanda ad ogni persona, sia de che conditione si voglia, etiam datieri, che al tempo di nocte non ardiscono portare arme vetate di veruna sorte, sotto pena de quatro tracti de corda e di ducati cento per ciascuno.

(41) Che niuno, sia che si voglia, non ardisca di nocte, dopoy la prima hora di nocte, andare per la presente città de Milano senza lume, sotto pena de ducati vincticinque per ciascuno. - Reg. Panig. N., fol. 90.

Although the placing of clocks with bells in churches established a system of uniform hours, local custom in Italy was so far regarded that the beginning of the day (24 o'clock) varied with the season, being fixed at or soon after sunset. The injunction to carry lights dopoy la prima hora di nocte is thus quite definite as to time. The fact that night could be defined so exactly had the advantage that it prevented any dispute as to the legal interpretation of the period during which men might go about without lanterns.

Another police edict of a similar nature was published on
(42)
December 30, 1508. This decree, however, deals not with night
proawlers but with those taking part in masques, or having them-
selves disguised in any way. They must carry neither sword,
gun, nor any other weapon, under penalty of a fine of a thousand
ducats. If they are convicted of the offence and have no money
to pay the fine, they must submit to six applications of the
strappado. It is hardly possible to say that these extremely
heavy penalties are indicative of an increase of crime. It is,
of course, true that the detection of a murder committed at a
masque was a difficult matter, and that the comparatively secure
position of the criminal might lead to an increase in the number
of offences committed during a merry-making. But quite as pos-
sible is the suggestion that the edict was simply an effort by La
Palice (who was Deputy Lieutenant-General, and issued the decree
in the absence of d'Amboise) to prevent the commission of murder
by forbidding the carrying of weapons at such times. In view
of the regulation the possession of arms at a masque would be
regarded as evidence of unlawful purpose on the part of the bearer,
against whom the crushing penalty would be enforced.

On September 27, 1509, Louis interfered with the duty of
the officials whose care was the public safety by issuing a decree
referring/

(42)

Reg. Panig. N., fol. 138, tergo.

referring to the unsettled condition of various parts of the
(43) Province. Some degree of restlessness was, perhaps, natural.
The war with Venice had just concluded so far as Louis was concerned. Maximilian, bent on continuing it, was meeting with strong opposition from the Venetians who, loyal to the republic even after the terrible defeat at Agnadello, had rallied and defied all his efforts to crush them.

Louis knew the value of taking prompt action against those who, by force of arms or otherwise, were defying the authority of his Administration. He understood quite well how likely it was that the war spirit would invade the Province, or, at any rate, he did not care to risk it. Hence the tone he adopted in his amnesty decree of November 5⁽⁴⁴⁾ contrasts strongly with that of the present edict. Yet an examination of both documents will show that he was quite consistent. When granting the amnesty he expressly excluded those who had been guilty of murder, treason, heresy, blasphemy and the manufacture of false coinage. In the decree of September 27 he is dealing with precisely that class of delinquent. The man who tried to cause trouble at that time in the Province he regarded as guilty of treason: hence the grim, uncompromising tone of the edict.

The/

(43) Reg. Panig. N., fol. 169.

(44) See page 485.

The decree begins with the statement that Louis has received complaints from various parts of the Province regarding the depredations of exiles who, by their unlawful deeds, are terrifying whole districts. This could not happen unless among the inhabitants there were some who assisted the evildoers by counsel and protection. Every effort must be made to discover those who favour the exiles. Yet no action is to be taken against them before their case has been reported to the Senate. This was a wise provision, for, if local action were to be allowed, without reference to the central authority, wide opportunities would be offered for the indulgence of private revenge - which was one of the evils Louis was trying to destroy.

Apparently the king's suspicions were not confined to private persons. Privileged corporations were more powerful than private individuals, and might be tempted to use their position for their own profit regardless of the effect their action might have on the general administration of the Province. Such, at least, is the deduction to be drawn from the opening provisions of the decree. If any such body is known to have harboured exiles or banned men, or given them aid or other favour, its members shall be held liable to punishment in goods and person at the discretion of the justice trying the case. Again, if any banned man is dwelling within the lands, castles or districts in the control of privileged corporations he must be compelled to depart within/

within fifteen days from the publication of the edict; and if he refuses to go, the corporation must endeavour to capture him and hand him over to the podestà or rector concerned with such cases. In the event of no capture being made the members of the corporation will be held liable to the same punishment as the banished man.

The foregoing portion of the decree is written in Latin. The second part, applying not to privileged bodies but to individuals, is written in Italian. Possibly the change of language depends upon the fact that privileged corporations were either learned bodies or, if not, had in their pay clerks and secretaries whose knowledge of Latin might be presumed; while the second part, being intended for citizens in general, was written in a tongue they could understand. The precaution was necessary because of the responsibility laid upon citizens both as individuals and as members of a community.

The decree deals with all cases likely to arise. First of all, if a rising or tumult is apprehended in any parish, town, or district in the duchy, the inhabitants are bound to try to prevent it under a penalty of fifty ducats or three inflictions of the strappado. If, however, they are unable for any reason to prevent the trouble - if, for example, it has already begun - they must endeavour to arrest those who have caused it, place them in safe custody, and have them conveyed before the Senate which, in/

in the meantime, shall be informed of what has happened. But it may be impossible to make these arrests. In that case the names of the leaders must be handed to the local judge at his office. To a certain extent the matter was now out of the control of the private citizen. It was the business of the local justice to proceed with his staff to the place mentioned as the abode of the malefactors and try to arrest them. In so doing he might call upon the inhabitants for help which, under penalty, they must not refuse. If the accused surrendered, they were held in custody till they could be brought before the Senate which, as before, was informed of what had been done. But if the rioters refused to surrender and offered resistance to arrest they might be killed without anyone being held responsible.

But not all delinquents would wait to be arrested. Some would flee. In that case the justices must institute a close pursuit from town to town throughout the Province till the man was either captured or killed. That the pursuit might be over as soon as possible no one, under penalty of life and goods must dare to aid or comfort the fugitive. But Louis recognised that the mere edict was not sufficient to prevent a hunted man's friends from helping him to the best of their ability. Therefore he added that, should a person be known to have aided a fugitive in any way whatever he should be denounced at once to the judge by those having knowledge of the act. Here, again, self-interest was brought to bear upon the matter, a penalty of fifty/

fifty ducats being decreed for non-compliance with the order.

The third part of the decree deals with the case of exiles who, despite the sentence laid on them, have ventured to return to the duchy and, cumulando delicto a delicto, have gravely disturbed the peace of the country. No mercy is to be shown to these bandits. They are to be captured or slain if at all possible. Both citizens and exiles are encouraged to aid in their extermination, an offer of free pardon being proclaimed to any exile who slays one of them, provided that the slayer has not been guilty of the crime of treason, murder or coining; while a private citizen who performs the same service to the state may claim the freedom from exile of any man at his choice whose crime was not greater than that of the slain bandit.

Not all police regulations were of so political a nature as the one just considered. A decree, for example, published on March 20, ⁽⁴⁵⁾ 1510, dealt with matters more nearly conforming to the modern conception of the province of the police. Milan during the French occupation was a busy city. So prosperous was its foreign trade that its goods were sent all over the north of Italy; while the various regulations issued from time to time testify to the importance of its internal commerce. But the keen business instincts of the Milanese merchants led them to encroach upon the rights of the general body of citizens in their endeavour/

(45) Gridario Generale III.

endeavour to display their wares and tempt the public to buy. If one may judge from the wording of the new decree the streets had become a disorderly market, through which traffic could force its way only with the utmost difficulty and with much danger to beasts of burden.

A statute was already in existence dealing with the obstacles to traffic caused by the erection of drapers' stalls. This old statute forbade drapers to place any shade over the benches on which they measured their cloth. Nor must their stances occupy space intended for the convenience of the public. If such erections existed, the statute directed their removal within three days under a penalty of fifty pounds. The decree of March 20 declares that for these restrictions to be confined to drapers alone is unfair. Other traders must come under the same regulations. But apparently the provisions of the old decree had gradually been neglected, as, when a draper was charged with an infraction of the law, he made the excuse that he was unaware of any regulation forbidding what he was doing.

To render this plea of no avail the Vicar of Provisions insists that the decree shall be made as public as possible, and directs that it shall be obeyed in tutto et per tutto ac de parola, under the penalty mentioned in the old statute, together with an additional fine of ten florins for each contravention. The new order applies to all who have shops, but especially to vendors of silk and fustian. No goods whatever which may impede the free passage/

passage of the public must be placed outside shops.

But while directing these improvements, the Vicar of Provisions did not forget that consideration was due also to the merchants. It was quite possible that strong sunlight might destroy their goods. It was possible, again, that their merchandise might be damaged by storms of wind or rain. If the merchant could protect himself against such loss without materially inconveniencing the public, it was only fair that he should be allowed to do so. Crotto wisely permitted the erection of shades if weather conditions called for them, but only on the strict understanding that as soon as the temporary difficulty had passed the shades should be removed.

The next provision treats of an inconvenience of a different nature. Many of the merchants apparently stored their goods in sunk flats lighted by windows from the street. These windows were protected by grills. But the grills proved dangerous to traffic, as the meshes were wide enough to trap the hoof of a horse or a mule. The decree therefore declares that the meshes shall be small enough to prevent such accidents. When necessary, alterations/

(46)

E perchè il statuto predicto non fa mentione nisi de draperi e pare cosa inconveniente che loro soli debiano essere astrecti, e li altri fanno mercantie e trafici de le altre cosse, etiam de più importantia siano in libertà,

Pero, volendosi servare egualità, etiam se commanda ad tuti li altri qualli hanno seu teneno robe da vendere, maxime pani de setta, fustagni et altre cosse, similmente non tenghano nec permetano tenere avante le apotece loro alchuna cosa che impedisca la clarità sotto la pena predicta. -
Gridario Generale III.

alterations must be made within three days from the issue of the order under a penalty of ten gold ducats for each case and for each time the owner is convicted - per caduno contrafaciente et caduno volta - a third going to the Ducal Chamber, a third to municipal funds, and a third to the informer.

The last article in the decree forbids the display of goods in the streets to the hindrance of traffic. No benches, large or small, boxes, baskets, tables, trivets, sawing-trestles or other goods may be placed in the public thoroughfares without permission granted by the authorities. The fine for disobedience in this instance is twenty-five pounds, half of which goes into the city treasury and half to the informer.

Of a different nature is an interesting case of police action in Milan given by an edict published on April 12, 1510. A black horse, of which a full description is circulated, had disappeared from Trivulzio's stables about four hours before sunset, the presumption being that it had been stolen. At once a search began. Any information was ordered to be reported to the Captain of Justice under penalty of death, the same fate being threatened to all those concerned if they failed to make diligent search for the animal.

The penalty was severe, but the fact that the horse had been taken from the stables of Trivulzio in broad daylight was proof that/

(47) Reg. Panig. GG., fol. 612, tergo.

that some daring spirit was in the city. The police authorities took the action not merely as a simple theft but as a personal affront to Gian Giacomo, and were therefore prepared to act without mercy. Perhaps the recent admission of Venice to the Pope's peace had something to do with the severity, as no one could tell when Milan might be forced into a struggle against a combination of these two powers. Hence Trivulzio's préstitute (48) must not be allowed to suffer.

Another curious police decree bearing the rubric Contra (49) Ludentes ad pugilos was issued on June 30, 1510. Apart from the danger to the boxers themselves, an opportunity of riot existed each time a crowd gathered to witness a contest. Now the negotiations between Julius II. and Ferdinando of Spain which had been proceeding for some time were on the point of a successful issue. Venice, as has been seen, was already in league with the Pope. Such an alliance could have only one object - an attack on the French in Italy. The neutrality of Ferdinando was not secured till July by the investiture of Naples and Sicily, which the Papacy had hitherto refused; but the/

(48) This, of course, is conjecture, of which too much need not be made.

(49) Reg. Panig. GG., fol. 626, tergo.

Se fa publica crida, bando e comandamento che non sia persona alcuna qual olsa ne presuma zugare a le pugne in alcuno loco de questa cità, sotto la pena di tracti quattro de corda, da esserli dati sopra la piazza publica del Broleto de Milano, ad ogniuno che contrafara et oltra dessere bannito dal regio e ducal dominio per uno anno.

the progress of negotiations must have been known, in part, at least to the French authorities. Hence there must have been anxiety in Milan to prevent any tumult which might easily enough spread till it became a general rising. This suggestion is borne out by the facts that the zogo de le pugne had been allowed to proceed for so many years before being forbidden, that the penalty - four inflictions of the strappado and a year's banishment - was so heavy, and that the veto was applied just as the political situation had become extremely critical. If these considerations influenced the French, the issue of the decree indicated both a wise precaution and a fear lest their hold upon Milan was less secure than they had supposed.

As a link connecting the judicial with the military organisation of the Province an edict of the Captain of Justice, dated June 30, 1507, is worthy of note. In all ages and in all countries sexual crimes and the meretrix have provided a difficult problem. James I. of Scotland relegated les filles de joie to those parts of a town where fire was least likely to occur, while English Statute Law makes frequent mention of crimes against women, rape being punishable by death. In countries containing a large number of foreign soldiers these offences were common. Milan with its host of foreign mercenaries was/

(50) Gridario Generale III.

(51) Acts of the Parliament of Scotland, XIII. James I, c. 144.

(52) See History of English Law, Vol. II., p. 491.

was no exception to the rule. The evil, indeed, had increased to such an extent, that the authorities could no longer afford to look on it with the slightest toleration. In the order which he issued the Captain of Justice declares that no Gascon, mercenary, or any other soldier of the king shall dare to force any woman of ill-fame to come with him to the town, even if she lives in a brothel. Nor shall he compel any woman to his will within the town upon pain of death by hanging. (53)

The decree is important constitutionally as well as socially. One incentive may have been the preservation of the health of the soldiers, but the main reason was that such actions on the part of the military, if permitted by the authorities, would exasperate the Milanese and possibly lead to tumults. They further recognised that the attention of the soldiery would not be confined to the professional meretrix but would extend to women of honest life - which, of course, would render the Milanese still more resentful.

On the constitutional side the decree is equally important, as the interference with the military by the Captain of Justice is/

(53) Se fa publica crida, bando, e commandamento, che non sia Guascone, venturere ne soldato alcuno de la Maestà del Rè che olsa ne presuma per forza torre alcuna femina de dishonesta vita, ne meretrice, etiam che fosse in bordello, e menarla in le ville, ne anche fare forza a quelle che sono in villa, sotto pena de essere impicati per la gola.
Gridario Generale III.

is an indication that, while soldiers were under military discipline, the ordinary civil power held them responsible for acts committed contrary not to military but to civil law. In short, the decree points to the supremacy of the civil administration of the Province.

Of defensive operations in Milan one instance may be given, as exemplifying the methods employed by the Administration. It is contained in a report issued by a Commission appointed in 1507 to devise means of improving the fortifications of the city. The Commission really issued three reports, on July 30, August 11, and August 18, ⁽⁵⁴⁾ proposing in the first that an addition should be made to the moat, and in the two others that bastions provided with appropriate munitions should be built to defend the new addition. They advised that this new portion should be broad and deep, and that the banking on the city side should be so built that it would be difficult to destroy. The bastions should be built of stone and lime, should have the moat led round them, and be furnished with three bombards apiece.

All labour and material had to be found either by the district protected by the new fortifications, or by the city as a whole. The report is quite indefinite upon the point. A certain sum (the exact amount is not stated) was apparently set aside for ⁽⁵⁵⁾ the work, and, from the wording of the report, it is clear that, if/

(54) All are contained in Gridario Generale III.

(55) Che siano obligati ad compensare et detrahere del soprascripto pretio (the document does not mention the amount) le opere se ritroverano essere facte da qui indreto.
Gridario Generale III.

if that sum were exceeded, the district (or city) would be held responsible for the difference.

Apart from its value as military information the report is interesting as an indication that Louis was providing for the defence of the city. It is by no means clear how the money for the operations was to be obtained. If Louis paid for it out of the ordinary revenue then he was agreeing to the wishes of the Milanese as expressed in their statement of conditions upon the first occupation by the French. From the fact that the city was held responsible for all expenditure beyond a definite amount it would appear that this was the case. But, on the other hand, as Louis had not agreed to be personally responsible for the defence of Milan, it is possible that a special tax was levied on the citizens, out of which came the money earmarked for the construction of the moat and bastions.

The arrangements for the administration of justice during the period 1507-1512 require no elaboration. The main principles had been established during the previous period; the working of the courts had become almost completely a matter of routine: usurpation of functions had been reduced to a minimum. Occasionally, however, an official assumed authority which was not his to exercise. One such instance is mentioned in an edict dated May 20, 1511. The praetorship was a more ancient office than the captaincy/

(56) Reg. Panig. N., fol. 243, tergo.

captaincy of justice, yet the Captain of Justice had assumed power to limit the number of armed retainers in the service of the Praetor to assist in the capture of criminals. (57) As a result the Praetor appealed to Louis who, after referring the case to the Senate, and receiving its judgment, published the edict of May 20, sustaining the Praetor's appeal and forbidding any interference by the Captain of Justice. (58)

A fairly equitable incidence of taxation seems to have been established during the first period of the French administration, as few complaints are registered during the second half of the occupation. Merchandise, both when entering the Province and when sold, was subject to duties. The salt gabelle provided a large revenue; bread and butcher meat contributed their share; and/

(57) Notumque pariter Majestati Vestrae est ipsum pretorem causarum criminalium habere cognitionem, antequam ullus unquam capitaneus designatus fuerit....Novissime autem magnificus dominus capitaneus justitiae videtur ei offitio preture velle imponere normam, et tringinta (sic) famulos tantum, familiaribus computatis, taxaverit, qui aliter arma defferre non possunt, nisi ab ipso capitaneo habita licentia in scriptis et ejus sigillo sigilata; quae omnia in signum imperii in offitium preture tendunt, et si sine ejus licentia famuli pretoris inveniuntur, cum maxima magistratus injuria die noctuque ad carceres trudi mandat. Ibid

(58) Censuit senatus ipse, cum par in parem non habeat imperium, aliisque dignis ex causis et rationibus, et ita nos decernimus, quod pretor ipse presens et futuri possint tenere eum numerum familie qui sibi expediens videbitur pro rerum exigentia, absque eo quod presens capitaneus et futuri possint illis ullum numerum prescribere, nec de eorum notariis, familia et curialibus quovismodo se impedire, mandantes omnibus et singulis ad quos spectare quomodolibet possit ut has nostras in locis consuetis registrari faciant, observentque ac observari inconcusse faciant nec contra earum tenorem attemptare nunc et imposterum quicumque presumant, memoratis in supplicatione ac aliis in contrarium facientibus non attentis. - Ibid.

and an impost was placed upon the grinding of cereals. In addition, certain boon labours (corvées) were enforced which, if they did not entail a direct tax to the government, involved expenses which, in reality, formed an impost. The conscription of labour lent itself to abuse, but even if a just apportionment were attempted, one part of the community was almost certain to suffer more than another. Occasionally this inequality of incidence led to complaints. Under the rubric Pro onere plaustorum, for example, a complaint of injustice together with its remedy is registered in a decree promulgated by the Lieutenant-General on
(59)
September 11, 1511.

By the application of the waggon corvée to the carting of
(60)
dust in the suburbs certain expenses had been incurred for which the Province as a whole had to pay. A complaint was lodged that this incidence of the corvée was against the wishes of the king, and that, in addition, the whole Province should not be expected
(61)
to pay for what concerned only a part of it. The Lieutenant-General/

(59) Reg. Panig. K. fol. 163.

(60) The term used is corpi santi which is defined by Petrucchi as Zona intorno alla città a cui s'estendeva la giurisdizione del vescovo.

(61) Alcuni zentilhomini del payese sono venuti a dolersi da noi, dicendo che non deno havere questa graveza, per essere insolita e contra li suoi privilegi concessi a Milano per la Maesta Christianissima e quando ben la prefata Maesta volesse alcuna cosa da loro, non e conveniente che le plebe del ducato debiano contribuire a carichi di corpi santi.

General admitted the justice of the complaint, and pointing out that it was unreasonable that only those should be at a loss whose carts had been conscripted, ordered that the expense should be shared by all the corpi santi.

Before June 1512 the French position in Milan had become very precarious. Food was not too plentiful and corn was high in price. The citizens, excited till they were almost beyond the control of the authorities, were eagerly discussing the chances of the expulsion of their masters. It wanted little more to rouse them to revolt. At this critical moment a series of edicts was issued which, by the contradictory nature of their contents, indicate that the authorities felt, at least, a touch of panic. On June 7 three of these decrees were published, the second of which destroyed the good effect of the first and was itself annulled by the third.

(62)

The first, issued by Thomas Bohier, Louis' Lieutenant-General in Milan, declared that, owing to the high price of corn, the grist dues would not be exacted. Following this came an explanatory proclamation by Crotto, the Vicar of Provisions, pointing out that the remission of dues referred to the grinding only,/

(62) Reg. Panig. N., fol. 285, tergo. The three decrees are under one heading in the Register.

(63)

d'Amboise had died in March 1511.

only, and that the ordinary tax on the sale of bread, wine and butcher meat must still be paid. In its turn, Crotto's edict was succeeded by one declaring that the taxes on the sale of bread, wine and flesh were abolished. ⁽⁶⁴⁾ Spanjota, the notary who signed the last decree, added wisely that the mills were to be kept going as long as corn was brought to be ground, upon penalty of four inflictions of the strappado for each refusal. Further, he forbade the export of wheat or flour under the penalty of loss of goods and death on the gallows.

These were critical times, but the Province had not always been so disturbed. An instance of the comparative tranquillity that prevailed during the major part of the administration is found in a document containing a grant of copyright. ⁽⁶⁵⁾ The defeat of Venice at Agnadello had inspired many poets to sing the praises of the French army. When verses became popular they were at once copied and sold without any recognition of the author's claims. One Milanese poet, Simone Litta, fearing this might happen in his own case, petitioned the king to grant him copyright of his verses for the space of two years. Neither poet nor king wasted any time as, twelve days after the battle, Louis, acceding to his request, issued letters patent forbidding the reproduction by/

(64) Se adjunge che sia licito ad cadauna persona vendere pane, vino et carne ad minuto et fare et far fare pane cosi de formento como di mestura, senza pagamento de alcuno datio.

(65) Gridario Generale III.

by any process of the poet's works. The grant was proclaimed in Milan four days later.

Two decrees published in May, 1507, are worthy of mention as an indication that life in Milan under the French administration had its lighter side. The king visited the city in that month and, in honour of his presence, the operations of the law courts were suspended during his residence there. (66) On his entry he was to be met with all the signs of joy. The streets were specially cleaned, the thoroughfares through which he passed were covered with cloth and strewn with greenery; the walls were hung with tapestry, while triumphal arches, glittering with silver and gay with flowers, lined the route. (67) Under the deep blue Italian sky, and steeped in sunshine, the scene must have been brilliant; but, though the Milanese enjoyed the holiday spectacle, into their minds must have come the thought that it cost money which would be drawn from them in taxes.

Two classes of documents still require consideration - those referring to religion and to economics. Of the former, one had more a political than a religious signification. When, as a result of the League of Cambray, the Venetians were defeated at Agnadello, and Louis recovered the territory which had been held by/

(66) Reg. Panig. N., fol. 95.

(67) Gridario Generale III.

by the republic, he was not satisfied merely to take possession of the lands he had won. Dishonourable as had been his action against Venice, his behaviour after the war was quite as unchivalrous, for, so far as he could, he took vengeance on all who had opposed him on behalf of the republic. Among them was the bishop of Cremona. Louis seized his territories and revenues, placing them in the hands of a deputy, who collected the revenues and ruled the see till May, 24, 1511, the date of issue of the decree confirming the sequestration.⁽⁶⁸⁾

In the interval between Agnadello and the publication of this edict, Pope Julius II. had admitted the Venetians to his peace and attempted the expulsion of the French. Successful at first, he had latterly to give way, the French having rendered him helpless for a time by the capture of Bologna on May 13, 1511. Eleven days later Louis turned upon the Bishop of Cremona. It appears probable that, while Julius adhered to the League of Cambray, the king had some hesitation about carrying to an extreme his resentment against the bishop. Now that Julius had not only broken with the League but had actually attempted to expel the French, Louis was indifferent whether or not he offended the Holy See. His action, about four months later, when he tried to procure the deposition of Julius is proof of his altered attitude.

By/

(68) Regist. Senato Decreti, fol. 465.

By the decree of May 24 he confirmed the sequestration of all houses, lands, temporalities and revenues whatsoever belonging to the bishopric. As his commissioners to act either jointly or one in the absence of the other, he appointed Jacques de Velleneuve and the apostolic protonotary Anthoine Magistrellles. The sequestration was a purely political matter, the Pope's interest in it being considered as that of a temporal prince. Of hostility to the Church there was none. The man and not the spiritual prince, whether Bishop or Pope, was the object of Louis' resentment.

Little definite information regarding Louis' attitude to religion is to be obtained from documents belonging to the first period of the French occupation. This cannot be said of the second period. Besides his references to heresy as one of the unpardonable crimes, instances occur in edicts dealing with special phases of the religious question which indicate that he was not only a faithful son of the Church but that he was almost aggressively determined that others should follow his practice.

Of his general attitude an example is contained in a decree dated March 15, 1510. The Augustinian monastery of Santa Maria Incoronata stood outside the walls of Milan. As the prior and monks were excluded from the operation of certain statutes which would have affected them favourably they petitioned Louis that they might be admitted to the privileges of citizens, offering/

offering, at the same time, to be subject to the ordinary laws. Louis, believing that the civil power should be supreme in all that concerned the law of the land, granted their request on condition that they obeyed not only the statutes which favoured them but also those which affected them adversely. The petition and the concession are important as indicating that the monks acknowledged the supremacy of the civil power in interpreting and administering laws. But the general position requires both amplification and restriction.

The conciliation shown in arranging matters as between religious institutions and the state was not continued when Louis came to deal with offences against the principles and the formal expression of religion. Heretical tendencies he abhorred; the offence of blasphemy was equally detestable to him; while irreverence, which struck at cherished ideas, he loathed. His attitude in these respects is clearly shown in an edict published six days after his settlement with the Augustinian monks. (70)

In an early part of this essay reference was made to some of the effects produced on the Italians by the Renaissance. A formal adherence to Christianity coupled with a disbelief in its principles was one. Such disbelief was bound to find expression even on the part of those who still professed the doctrines/

(69) Reg. Panig. K., fol. 297, tergo.

(70) Reg. Panig. N., fol. 193.

doctrines of the Catholic Church. There is, at least, a strong presumption that the prevalence of blasphemy was a result of the irreverence which accompanied the decay of belief in the tenets of christianity. Louis speaks of it as detestable, abhorrent and offensive to Almighty God and provocative of Divine wrath. Many decrees, Louis continues, had been put into operation against this sin, but most of them seemed to be forgotten. To stamp out the practice this decree renews and confirms all the previous edicts upon the subject.

No one, whether in anger or in cold blood, shall dare to take in vain the name of God, the Blessed Virgin or the saints, nor by any deed or gesture detract from the honour of the Divine Majesty. Louis leaves to God the future punishment of such people; but, in the meantime, to teach them that this sin may not be committed with impunity, he orders a fine of ten florins together with a month's banishment for each offence. (71)

From/

(71) Per la presente publica crida, excitando et renovando Sua Excellentia dicti decreti, edice, dichiara e comanda che non sia persona alcuna, de qual stato, grado, conditione et preheminentia se sia, de alcuna citate, terre e ville del regio ducato e stato del Milano, tanto mediate quanto immediate, la quale ardisca ne presuma in alcuno loco publico ne privato, con ira ne senza ira, biastimare, maledire ne vituperosamente nominare el Nostro Signore Dio ne la sua gloriosissima matre Vergine Maria ne sancti o sancte, ne con parole, acti o gesti, et modo alcuno detrahere a la divina Maestà, sotto pena per caduno contrafaciente per caduna volta de essere subito posto in presone, et non essere relaxato finchè non habia pagato fiorini dece, da essere pagati in termine de tre giorni, e poi sia bandito dal stato de Milano per uno mese. Ibid.

From those who sacriligiously strike, defile or in any way damage an image of the Saviour, the Blessed Virgin or the Saints, the same penalty will be exacted, but, in addition, such offenders shall lose the right or the left hand, whichever is the stronger; while further offences may lead to the infliction of the death
(72)
penalty.

The decree defines Louis' position with regard to the formal side of religion. His attitude towards heresy indicates his doctrinal orthodoxy. But while he accepted the Catholic faith, that acceptance did not include his submission to the Papal See in matters affecting civil government. The Pontiff he regarded as a temporal prince as well as the spiritual head of the Church; that is, he made a clear distinction between the man and the official. He adhered to Dante's rejection of the Papal claim to control civil government, and to Occam's declaration that the "spheres of influence" of the spiritual and the temporal functions were distinct, and that in certain circumstances an attack on the spiritual power by temporal forces might be justifiable.

The difficulty in applying Occam's theory lay in the definition of the circumstances under which such action might take place./

(72) E se alcuno, instigato dal diavolo, presumera, con ira o senza ira, percutere, battere o deturpare injuriosamente la imagine o figura de Dio o de la Nostra Donna o sancti o sancte, oltre le prediete pene vole gli sia tagliata la mano dextra o la sinistra, se in quella fusse più potente, et più oltre al arbitrio del prefato Signore fin a la morte inclusive. - Ibid.

place. Obviously, the most careful scrutiny was required. A general statement was of little use, as its terms might be wrested to support almost any projected attack while, on the other hand, it was quite impossible to provide for every case that might arise. Rightly or wrongly Louis was in Italy with the consent of the Papacy, the political support of which had helped to place him there. If another Pontiff, after acting in alliance with him, changed his mind and tried to expel him from the peninsula, the action was still political though performed by the spiritual power. Thus Louis felt justified in meeting the attack of Julius II. by an attempt to depose him - an attempt which did not succeed because Europe was adverse to a repetition of the Great Schism.

Among the economic problems the French Administration had to face was that of the stabilisation of money. The Milanese coinage was standardised; it was of definite size, weight and value. But a steady influx of inferior coins, deficient in various respects, had nullified the effect of the standardised coins. The circulation at one and the same time in any country of good money and that of lower standard results in the disappearance of the better coins. The higher grade metal money, having a better commercial value, is chosen for export or is melted down for use in the arts. Thus, as time passes, the standard of coinage sinks. This is precisely what was happening in Milan.

The amount of depreciated money entering the Province was not/

not always caused by the acceptance of foreign issues as currency. That could be, and was, dealt with by refusing to allow foreign coinage as currency unless it had received special licence. Some of the trouble arose from the immoral action of certain foreign mints which deliberately stamped inferior coins as if they had been issued from Milan. The only remedy was to call in such coins, pay the owners the face value, and refuse to recognise the inferior money as currency after a definite date.

A further source of annoyance was the want of uniformity caused by the issue of money from private mints. Such money was a source of profit to the patentees; but it was at the same time a loss of revenue to the state and, through its lowered value as a medium of exchange, an inconvenience as well as a loss to the public.

When money was issued illegitimately the inconvenience and loss were still greater, as no check could be placed on its quality. The mere fact that it was so issued is presumptive evidence that it was so debased as to be useless - that it was, indeed, a fraud both on the public and on the state. The issue of false coins had been regarded in England as one form of treason, punishable by heavy penalties - the loss of a hand or other mutilation. Under the French régime the penalty was perpetual banishment, the crime being regarded by Louis as unpardonable.

Judging from the frequent issue of decrees touching upon this side of the economic life of Milan, it is clear that the Administration/

Administration found serious difficulty in coping with the irregularities that had arisen. Even when the problem had been faced and an apparent solution obtained there remained the further task of enforcing obedience to the regulations laid down. Thus one decree is found insisting upon measures which another has already stated to be the law. This does not indicate weakness on the part of the Administration but rather the intricate nature of the problem. Had the central authority been feeble it would have let matters take their own course: that repeatedly the attack was renewed, sometimes covering fresh ground and at others explaining and amplifying the rules already in force, is proof that it was determined to stamp out the irregularities while trying to protect unwitting offenders.

A series of three edicts, issued on November 8, and November 13, 1507, and February 26, 1508, affords useful information regarding the currency troubles of the Administration. In the preamble, complaint is made of the confusion into which the currency has fallen through the circulation of foreign money, especially coins of small value called imperiali - dinari minuti appelati "imperiali". These are minted in foreign states and, being bought by speculators, are carried into Milan where they are circulated at more than their real value, thus bringing an illegitimate profit to those who introduce them. The constant increase/

(73) Reg. Panig. N., fol. 100, 101, 107.

increase in the number of these coins is prejudicial both to the general public and to the revenues of the state. The Lieutenant-General, having no wish to deny his responsibility, issues the decree in order that the confusion in the currency may be abated and the monetary system atabilised. His first direction is (74) that the use of imperiali shall cease, eight days being allowed to possessors of the coins to dispose of them either by melting them or by sending them outside the boundaries of Milan. The penalties fixed for infractions of the order are severe. All imperiali possessed by the offenders shall be confiscated and, in addition, a fine shall be inflicted equivalent in value to a fourth of the imperiali possessed. Further, the offender shall lose all waggons, boats, horses, mules and other beasts of burden, employed in the importation of the coins.

The/

(74) E pero, per tenore de la presente crida, per parte de soa illustrissima Signoria, se fa publico bando e comandamento che non sia persona alcuna, de qual stato, grado, e conditione se voglia, che da hora inanze ardisca ne presuma portare, aut condure, ne far portare o condure, spendere, ricevere ne tenere, ne far spendere ricevere aut tenere, in questa città aut altri loci del prefato dominio de Milano, alcuni de dicti dinari minuti forasteri, sotto pena de perdere tuta quella quantità d'essi dinari che se trovara havere portato aut conducto, sive facto portare o condure, spendere, ricevere, o tenere, aut facto spendere, ricevere, e tenere, aut haverne facto mercantia in la predicta città e dominio, dopo la presente crida, e ulterius de pagare per uno quatro, et anchora de perdere li cavali, muli e altre bestie e instrumenti, con li quali se conducesseno dicti dinari. Reg. Panig. N., fol. 100.

The authorities recognised, however, that it might be difficult for possessors of low-grade foreign money to dispose of it within the stipulated time. To punish the holder for what was not his fault would have been unfair, while to allow the circulation of the surplus coins would have defeated the object of the measure. Notice was therefore given that all such money would be accepted at the mint and its value assessed and paid. As no excuse could then exist for the possession of debased coinage the authorities were justified in attributing fraudulent intention to any person holding such money after the prescribed date.

In the second place, it is decreed that no gold or silver, whether in grain, bars, or other form of bullion, shall be carried out of the state. Here, evidently, is an attempt to prevent the melting down of the better class Milanese money in order to procure the higher price it would bring - a trick which both constituted a fraud on the revenue and tended to reduce the standard of money-value adopted in the Province.

The third decree deals with the currency of gold crowns minted in foreign states. As the standard was below that of Milan the gradual disappearance of Milanese-minted coins together with a corresponding increase in the number of foreign crowns in circulation would automatically follow. To prevent the material loss in gold, as well as the deterioration of the coinage, /

coinage, the edict forbids foreign-minted crowns to be accepted
(75)
as current money in Milan. Fifteen days are allowed for their
disposal, by export, melting, or sale to the mint, after which
date penalties will be exacted from those who possess them.

In spite of these prohibitions and warnings the traffic in
foreign money went on to the detriment of both citizens and rev-
(76)
enue. As a result, another decree was published on June 14;
1508. The confusion that still existed through evasions of
the previous edicts is the reason given for the issue of the
new order which is both explanatory and restrictive in character.
It begins, as the previous edicts had done, by insisting that
the traffic in foreign money must cease. It concedes, however,
that certain coins of foreign origin - of which a list is given -
may pass as currency in the Province, provided that they are of
good quality and just weight. Their use is restricted by a
statement of the value in imperial pounds, shillings and pence
for which they may be accepted as an equivalent. No attempt
must be made to defeat the object of the edict. If foreign
money/

(75) Per tenore de la presente crida, se fa banno et commanda-
mento ad qualuncha persona, de qual stato, conditione,
grado e dignitate voglia se sia, e maxime a thesaureri,
dätieri, gabellieri, bancheri, e mercadanti, che non
presumano per alcuno modo spendere ne fare spendere,
recevere ne fare recevere scuti d'oro di maniera alcuna,
salvo e reservato quelli sono fabricati, in le zeche de
la Maestà sua, sotto pena de perdere tali scuti, e de
pagare per uno quatro d'epso oro prohibito. - Reg. Panig.
N., fol. 107.

(76) Reg. Panig. N., fol. 115-121.

money be offered, it must be of the denominations and origins specified in the order. The seller must not depreciate nor the buyer appreciate the value of the foreign coins passing in any business transaction, under penalties which will be inflicted on both parties.

Special warning is given to all officials - the Master of the Mint and the officials under his charge, the President and Masters of the Ordinary Revenue, the General of Finance, and even the Lieutenant General - that they shall observe to the letter the regulations contained in the decree. In addition to these highly placed administrators, the warning is extended to humbler civil servants.
(77)

An unhappy phase of the regulations is Louis' apparent reluctance to trust the staff concerned in their administration. If this had been the first time such warnings had been issued it might be possible to say that the king meant to prove his good/

(77)

Et ad majore declaratione de la mente nostra, e più firma osservanza de quanto è dicto de sopra, comandamo in specie a tuti nostri officiali, Thexorero generale de Milano, Thexorero de la guerra de Franza e de Milano, et ad caduno loro clerici et comissi, a fare pagamenti ancora a capitanei e gente de guerra dimorante in lo dicto nostro dominio de Milano, a tuti pensionarii et altri officiali de dicto nostro ducato, ac etiam a datieri, gabellieri, canepari e receptori de nostre intrate ordinarie et extra-ordinarie, che non ardiscano ne presumano transgredire ne contrafare a le presente nostre ordinatione et ut supra, sotto pena de privatione de loro offitii, stipendii sive gaggi, e pensione, e de essere cassati dale loro ordinanze. Reg. Panig. N., fol. 115-121.

good faith towards the Milanese. But as semi-imputative mention of officials occurs in many documents no option remains but to believe that Louis was suspicious of his civil service - a belief which is strengthened by his repetition of the warning in another document on the subject of foreign money, together with a statement that faithful officials will be paid every month. (78)

The issue of these edicts caused a temporary increase of the already existing confusion. Merchants wished to know exactly what the situation was before committing themselves to the purchase or sale of goods. Their hesitation resulted in a scarcity of certain commodities, some of which the public could do without for a time, while others, such as bread and flour, were vitally necessary to the city. (79) In an edict published on June 20, 1508, by Crotto, the Vicar of Provisions, vendors of wheat, flour and bread are assured that they have a month to trade under the old conditions, during which, subject to a penalty of a hundred gold ducats for each offence, they are obliged to sell their wares to any person who desires to purchase them. The order is further extended to the sale of other victuals, as also to clothes and general merchandise.

A curious exception occurs at the end of the edict. Payment of bills maturing during the month of grace may be offered and, if so, must be accepted in the foreign coinage. The Revenue/

(78) Reg. Panig. N., fol. 274. The italics are mine.

(79) Reg. Panig. N., fol. 121.

Revenue Offices guard themselves from loss, however, by refusing to accept the conditions laid down for others. Foreign coins will not be regarded as legal tender in their case. Probably this simply means that the lower standard crowns would not be accepted at their face value but on their assessed intrinsic worth. If so, it was a shrewd though somewhat unscrupulous action, since, by indicating that the Administration would not accept foreign mintage at its face value, it induced a more rapid movement of such money out of the Province.

The temporary confusion occasioned by the attempt to stabilise the Milanese currency by driving out of circulation foreign-minted money of inferior standard did not last long. About a year after Crotto's explanatory edict it was possible for the Administration to say that the good effects of the measures were already quite apparent. But the new decree was not issued
(80)
merely to give this information.

Venice, beginning to recover from the disaster of Agnadello, had renewed the war and, making rapid progress against Maximilian, had captured Padua nine days before the publication of the present decree. Maximilian, aided by a French contingent, was unable to retake the city. Although the possibility was remote that the republic, flushed by success, might seek revenge on Louis by an attack on Milan, the king bore it in mind and did not neglect/

(80) Reg. Panig. N., fol. 155. The decree was issued on July 26, 1509.

neglect the opportunity of adding to the number of his friends. Now the cantons of Uri and Unterwalden were on good terms with him. But the Swiss were notoriously greedy and fickle, and might join Venice against the French. Consequently, when the two cantons requested that their money, struck at Bellinzona, might pass current in Milan, he was disposed to give a favourable reply. That some such reason underlay Louis' action seems evident from the fact that though he declares himself to be influenced by the faithful devotion of the cantons towards France, neither Uri nor Unterwalden had been mentioned in the list of states published in the previous year, the coinage of which would be accepted as currency at Milan.

The concession, however, was granted only under stringent conditions. No crowns whatever were to be minted. Only large ducats were to be struck, and these must be equal in quality, value, size and weight, to those minted in Milan. To lay down this rule was easy: to see it carried out was another matter. Arrangements were made to have Milanese assessors constantly in the/

(81) Louis complied with the request of the two cantons

"dummodo siano dicte monete in ogni qualitate, precio, pexo, liga, e bontade, et in simile specie quale sono quelle se fabricharano in questa cecha de Milano, e se intenda non se fabricha in dicta cecha de Bilanzona scuti d'oro d'alcuna sorte, sed solum ducati largi e monete a la qualitate e bontade de Milano, come consta per li capituli de gratia concessi a dì 19 de Maggio 1509, esistenti a la camera de li Magistri de le intrate ordinarie." - Reg. Panig. N., fol. 155.

the mint at Bellinzona, charged with the duty of seeing that no inferior ducats were struck. Under these conditions the currency of the two cantons would be accepted at Milan, proclamation to that effect being made alike to officials and to the general public.

Although the measures regarding the circulation of low-grade money had proved effective, constant attention was necessary in order that they might be thoroughly carried out. But the zeal of the officials concerned required to be supplemented by the co-operation of the general public. Otherwise much of their energy would be wasted. Now, assessors had been appointed to whom suspected money ought to be brought for testing, which was done free of charge. But few persons had paid attention to this regulation - perhaps because they hoped to pass the bad money along with the good. Nevertheless, complaints had reached the government officials that certain base coins were in circulation, stamped with tri zillii (the fleur de lis) in imitation of those issued from the Milanese Mint. As the Milanese were compelled by law to accept all coins produced by the Ducal Mint they lost the face value of the base coins when their falsity was discovered. The plan adopted by the Government was perhaps conducive to an increase in the amount of false money in circulation; but it was, at least, an attempt to see that the public suffered as little as possible from the fraud practised upon it. An edict published/

(82)

published on March 3, 1511, orders coins stamped with the tri zillii to be taken to the assessors within eight days. The good will be separated from the bad, and restitution made for those which are withdrawn from circulation.

(83)

The second part of the edict treats of the coining of money within the Province by private persons who hold no licence permitting them to own mints. There is no hint that the money so coined falls below the standard of the mint at Milan: the grounds of complaint are that the persons are unlicensed and that their coins are imitations of those issued by the mint. It is evident from this that the Ducal Mint was not the sole producer of authorised coinage.

Despite the fact that the decree makes no charge against them of issuing low-grade money, these private legalised mints formed a source of danger to the finances of the state. They were carried on, not to aid the Government but to obtain profit for their owners. The state may have received the price of a licence, but the owner was at no loss, as he passed the cost on to/

(82) Reg. Panig. N., fol. 258, tergo.

(83) Se fa publica crida e comandamento ad qualuncha persona, la quale se trovasse havere de presente de le terline stampate con lo stampo de tri zillii, sia tanta quantita quanto se voglia, in termino de giorni octo proximi debia consignarle a la cecha o vero a le piazze del Domo e Broleto, dove sarà deputato persone experte quale li cernirano le bone da le cative, senza pagamento alcuno, e poy le cative li serano solamente tagliate et restituite insema con le bone. - Ibid.

to the public in the form of money which was under the standard of the Ducal Mint. Thus the existence of private mints partly explains the circulation of light and even spurious coins in the (84) duchy. If, in addition, the privately produced coins counterfeited the stamp of the Ducal Mint, it is clear that the evil was greater. Where the stamp indicated the origin of the money, official vigilance might defeat an attempt of the private mint owner to issue debased coinage; but it was more difficult to detect the imposture where the coins bore the same stamp as that of the Ducal Mint and were only slightly below the standard adopted. The decree, therefore, forbids any imitation of the stamp employed by the state mint, under a penalty of a hundred ducats for each offence. But this proceeding merely touched the problem. The root of the evil lay in the existence of private mints. Had the authorities declared that no further licences would be granted and no renewals allowed upon the expiry of those then in force they would have helped to stabilise the currency. Their refusal to accept as currency any coins other than those issued by the Ducal Mint (an exception being made in favour of foreign money which was already allowed under stringent conditions) would have had/

(84) The issue of token money by tradesmen all over England in the reign of George III. in order to supplement the inadequate supply of copper coins had a similar effect. Not only did they produce tokens easily recognisable as such; some of them issued, to their profit, imitations of the royal coinage.

had the further effect of driving out of circulation the lower standard coinage which was causing them so much trouble and expense.

In its third part the edict forbids all Milanese subjects to work in foreign mints under penalty of being refused employment at any future time in the Ducal Mint. If such persons are already employed by foreign governments they must cease minting at once and return to Milan within eight days under the penalty just mentioned, unless they have received official licence to continue their occupation. The reasons for this regulation were probably that these men were few in number, highly skilled, and acquainted with the stamps used in the Milanese mint.

Considerable difficulty was experienced in carrying out the regulations. In spite of the decree the amount of foreign money in circulation was increasing, not only from states with which an arrangement had been made, but from countries the coinage of which had been definitely excluded as currency from Milan. A gold coin was regarded as the equivalent of a certain number of silver coins of definite size, quality and weight. Hence, if the silver coinage was depreciated in any of these respects the value of the standard gold coin was correspondingly appreciated. Further, the/

(85) Milan was not the only state which suffered in this way. The English silver coinage, in 1694, for example, had become so debased by wear and by clipping that the guinea, nominally worth twenty shillings, was accepted as value for thirty shillings.

the presence of lower standard foreign silver money tended to drive out of circulation the better quality of coinage minted at Milan. Thus, a general deterioration was setting in which, as
(86)
an edict of August 18, 1511 points out, was gradually becoming worse, so that the coinage appeared likely to sink to the level it had reached prior to the issue of the decrees intended to
(87)
stabilise it.

The frequent publication of edicts insisting on the non-currency of foreign money which had not been specifically licenced as current coin of the duchy raises the question of the allocation of blame for the comparative failure of the measures adopted. It is difficult to understand how a general infraction of the regulations contained in the various edicts could take place without official laxity. If the laws had been enforced strictly against offenders - the foreign money confiscated and fines imposed in addition - as the decrees had directed, the risk would have been too great to permit general disregard of the regulations.

But/

(86) Reg. Panig. N., fol. 274.

(87) Non solamente essi ordini non sono intertenuti et observati, ma che pegio, quando non se li oponessi debita et celere provixione, se ritornerebe a li termini quali erano inanti essi ordini fusseno facti et publicati; il che comprehendesi evidentemente che la moneta de oro ha facto et di giorno in giorno fa augumento di pretio contra la forma d'essi ordini; et questo procedere per le monete forestere prohibite, quale pareno habiano tolto corso, et molto più per respecto de certa sorte de monete nove fabricate ne le ceche forestere, le quale sono de molta inferior bontà et valore de quello se spendano, che sono potissima causa di esso desordine.

But if the officials did not adhere steadily to the terms of the edicts there would not be wanting men who, for the sake of the profit to be gained, would willingly risk discovery in the hope that the penalties might not be enforced against them in full. There was also the possibility, as the present edict suggests, of bribing the officials.

Within the duchy two classes remained upon whom official laxity exercised a pernicious influence. If men in general found that inferior coins were accepted at their face value they would become careless, and certainly would not report to the assessors any cases of the kind that came under their notice. The second class was composed of those who, hostile to the French occupation of the duchy, would hesitate at nothing which might embarrass the Administration.

Outside the Province foreign mints were issuing money which, the decree of August 18 says, was much inferior to that of the Ducal Mint. Its presence in Milan, whether by accident or by design, was a potent source of the prevalent disorder in the currency. But when, as is suggested in this and former edicts, the foreign coins were counterfeits of the genuine Milanese money, the evil was still more difficult to eradicate.

The present decree deals with almost all these means of creating disorder in the monetary system, stating the law and fixing penalties for its infraction. After reciting the reasons for/

for its publication the edict proceeds to sum up the position. First of all it declares that no one shall receive or spend or cause others to receive or spend any money in the Province which has not been specifically permitted as currency. Neither shall any one place upon current money, nor accept for it, value exceeding that fixed for it by previous decrees. The penalty incurred for disobedience is the loss of the money together with a fine equivalent to a fourth of its value. The same penalty is incurred by any one who possesses money which is not allowed as currency, even if he is not caught in the act of spending it.

The second item forbids traffic in non-current foreign money. Those engaged in the business are guilty of a very grave offence, since, looking only to their own gain and thinking nothing of the injury they do to the public, they corrupt the whole dominion and are the cause of serious disorder in monetary matters. If they are caught importing prohibited money they will lose the total amount and, in addition, suffer a fine equal to one tenth of its value.

A previous edict had forbidden Milanese to work in foreign mints. Apparently the workers had paid scant attention to the order, for the third item of the present edict deals with the subject again. If the man has a written permit from the king or the senate he is at liberty to continue his occupation; otherwise he must cease to have anything whatever to do with the minting/

minting of foreign money. The previous penalty had been refusal of future employment in the Ducal Mint: this time the law confiscates all the goods, movable and immovable, of the offender.

Shorter but still important items declare that no gold or silver may be exported from Milan in the form of bullion, and that all non-current foreign money must at once be broken or cut in such fashion that it is useless as a means of exchange.

Another article is of interest as an indication that one part, at least, of the civil service was regarded with suspicion. No official whose duties are connected with the subjects mentioned in the decree must, at any time, seek or accept a gift of money or goods, nor by any other means exact tribute from merchants, shop-keepers or workmen, the penalty for disobedience to the order being deprivation of office and banishment for a year. The closing statement that all faithful servants will be paid monthly seems to indicate a certain degree of irregularity in the payment of salaries.

One source of confusion lay in the meaning attached to the directions for payment in bills of exchange. The usual formula was li pagamenti se habiano ad fare in bona moneta de Milano corrente. Some people, the article declares, have persuaded themselves that, because by one means or other forbidden money still continues to circulate in Milan, that money should be regarded as currency. But the words must not be so understood.

By/

By bona moneta de Milano is meant authorised money, not the inferior coinage of other states, which by fraud or accident has been illegally put into circulation.

A further article deals with the fraudulent action of foreign mints, which are issuing coins with a stamp so like that of Milan that the king's subjects are easily deceived by them. This is to their loss, as the foreign money is by no means so good as that of the Ducal Mint. A change of stamp is therefore intimated, the new one being of such a nature that foreign mints will find it difficult or even impossible to counterfeit it.

The last article continues the subject. Coins stamped with the tri zillii are being made in the mints of foreign states. Some of them are not of very poor quality, but none is of so high a standard as that of Milan. As the similarity between the Milanese coins and those produced in other mints is so close as to cause confusion, the Ducal Mint will issue no more of them but replace them with other coins.

The economic side of the French Administration dealt with other subjects besides currency. The decrees and edicts indicate good intention in government, while the minute details into which they descend argue a thoroughness which was altogether praiseworthy. An important point to be noted is that where legislation already existed on any matter the new decrees did not sweep it away, but built on its foundations, adding new regulations/

regulations as circumstances required and destroying what lapse of time had shown to be inefficient. Thus constant references occur to regulations which are already in force and which the new decrees are intended to supplement and improve.

Not all of the Milanese were rich and powerful. Among them, as is the case in every state, was a number of citizens who were either on or below the poverty line. When such people are mentioned in the various issues of decrees it is invariably with the utmost sympathy. It was, indeed, a remarkable feature in the French administration of the Province that the laws passed were, in large measure, intended to protect those who, being unable to help themselves, would otherwise have been in the power of profiteering merchants and probably victimised by the minor officials with whom they came into contact.

Regulations with regard to the necessities of life - food and clothes - were fairly common. The French certainly did not originate such legislation, but they initiated reforms which considerably enhanced the value of laws passed prior to their occupation of the Province. At a time when coal was not used as fuel in Italy an adequate supply of firewood at a reasonable rate was important. For the poorer section of the population it was necessary not only that the supply should be moderate in price but that some guarantee should exist that they would receive the real value of their purchase. But, unless regulations were adopted establishing/

establishing a definite ratio between the money paid and the fire-wood received, each merchant would charge as much as he could obtain and pay as little regard as he dared to the quality of his wares.

Recognising the position, the Administration through Jacobo Crotto, the Vicar of Provisions, issued an edict on February 25, (88) 1508, which, if its terms were carried out, would diminish, if it did not abolish, fraud in connection with such sales. Various kinds of wood are mentioned and definite prices fixed for stated amounts. Wood merchants must keep their yards open so that any one wishing to purchase may enter. To weigh the wood, accurately adjusted scales must be provided in the yard, and purchasers may buy at their pleasure according to the rate fixed by the decree. Another provision forbids dry and green wood to be bound together into faggots so that the customer may not really be paying more (89) than the legal price for his purchase. Finally, the officials appointed to attend to the proper measurement and weight of the wood are warned to perform their duties faithfully and take no reward beyond their stipulated salary, upon pain of deprivation of office or other punishment at the will of the Vicar of Provisions.

The/

(88) Gridario Generale, III.

(89) Che non se possa religare verde e sicche, nixi in caso de penuria seu de necessita, et che togliono licentia dal dicto officio, sotto la pena predicta. Gridario Generale, III.

The appointment of these officials increased the revenue expenditure; but as the citizens received their wood at a definite price they were more than compensated for the slight increase of taxation involved.

In dealing with edicts referring to commerce discrimination is required, as what is apparently intended for the benefit of a particular trade is sometimes an excuse for procuring an increase in the revenue. When, for example, Louis issued from Chinon on August 14, 1508, an edict permitting the export of surplus grain from the Province, he was not so much concerned with the profits to the dealers as with the revenue he would obtain from the taxes on the increased sales. True, he declares in the preamble that, since an excellent harvest has left more grain in hand than is sufficient to supply the requirements of the Province, the remainder may be exported to the benefit of the vendors. But he follows up the permission by an intimation that the usual tax of sixteen sols imperiaux pour chaque charge will be exacted. This, he points out, will be paid by the foreigner - which, if true, laid Milan open to retaliation by the grain-importing states.

Whether the export tax was of much benefit to the revenue may be questioned. In order to ensure its collection officials had to be appointed and paid. These, Louis declares, must be syndics. They shall hold office for two years only, shall have no/

(90) Reg. Ducali IV., fol. 69.

no personal interest in the sale of cereals, and shall perform their duties personally and not by deputy. By placing upon them the responsibility for the honest computation of dues, the king was endeavouring to prevent fraud and the consequent loss to the revenue of the state.

He further guards his interests by directing that all duties, fines and confiscations shall be sent to the Chamber of Deputies which shall then pass them on intact to the Extraordinary Revenue - the Extraordinary Ducal Chamber, as he calls it in this place. The deputies are salaried officials, so that they have no excuse for interfering with the money forwarded to them, from which the officials had hitherto been accustomed to draw their allowance.

That no doubt may exist as to his intentions, the king charges all officials to see that the decree is observed in every particular; and, lest any one should plead ignorance of its terms, a copy of the edict is ordered to be written out and exhibited in the offices of all who are concerned with the matter. (91)

Another/

(91) Ordonnons en mandement par ces présentes à notre très cher et aimé cousin le sieur de Chaumont, notre lieutenant général de la les monts et gouverneur en notre dit duché de Millan, grand maistre et mareschal de France, et à nos amis et féaux les gens de notre Conseil et Sénat dudit Millan, maîtres de nos intrades ordinaires et extraordinaires, général ayant la charge de toutes nos finances, tant ordinaires que extraordinaires, et à tous nos justiciers et officiers d'icelle duché, ou à leurs lieutenants ou commis, et à chacun d'eulx, si come à lui appartiendra, que nos présens décret, statut, articles, ordonnances et tout le contenu en lesdites présentes, les observent, gardent et entretiennent, et fassent garder, observer et entretenir/

(92)

Another short edict published at Milan on December 20, of the same year is illustrative of the protectionist policy of the Administration, as well as of the struggle to maintain an orderly city. The decree, issued by Jacobo Crotto, deals with the iron trade. The first section forbids the hawking of keys in Milan and its suburbs by iron-smelters. ⁽⁹³⁾ The penalty for infraction of the regulation is two gold ducats and the confiscation of the keys.

There appears to be a double signification in this part of the order. The prevention of such sales by unauthorised persons, that is, by people who were not locksmiths, indicates a desire to protect those who exercised that craft. But it contains also an attempt to avoid the danger that might arise through irresponsible and possibly criminal persons acquiring knowledge which they might use for illegal purposes.

The second part aims at the prevention of the display of goods to the inconvenience of the public. The authorities had more than once taken action against merchants who blocked the paths and impeded traffic by erecting stances on public thoroughfares./

(91) (Contd.) entretenir inviolablement et sans aucune contrainte, et les faictes lire, publier et enregistrer, et envoyer par toutes les juridictions et auditoires de notre dit duche et afin de perpétuelle mémoire les fêtes inscrire en tableaux, atacher et infixer en leur dit auditoire, à ce que aucun n'en puisse prétendre cause d'ignorance. - Reg. Ducali IV., fol. 69.

(92) Reg. Panig. N., fol. 138

(93) Coldirari (sic), a variant of calderari.

(94) thoroughfares. In this decree they declare that no ironmonger nor cutler shall expose his wares for sale on stalls erected anywhere in the city except in his shop, under penalty of confiscation of the goods so exposed, together with a fine of two gold ducats for each offence. He may, however, offer his merchandise for sale where he chooses provided that he does not erect a stance for the purpose. Another exception is allowed when a fair is in progress, during which time booths may be erected and goods displayed as had hitherto been the custom.

As the weaving of cloth of gold and cloth of silver was a staple industry of Milan, it is natural that some of the economic documents of the period should deal with it. Whenever a district becomes noted for excellent production of material of any kind, unscrupulous manufacturers are found ready to take advantage of its good reputation by making material similar in appearance but of lower quality, which they place on the market as genuine products. The Milanese manufacture of cloth of gold was no exception. Genuine gold and silver thread was being displaced to a large extent by poorer materials which imitated the genuine article. Probably some of the native population shared in the fraud, but foreigners, attracted by the profits they might obtain and careless of the high repute of the city, seem to have been/

(94) One has already been mentioned in connection with cloth sellers - the edict of March 20, 1510. See Gridario Generale III.

been the chief offenders.

At the beginning of 1509 matters had evidently reached a crisis, for the abbots, syndics and consuls of the trade guild lodged a formal protest with Louis, asking him to issue an edict on the subject. They pointed out that fraud had been carried on for a considerable time. Especially they complained of Francisco, a Spaniard, who had settled in Milan and who, with his friends, was damaging the reputation of the craft by the manufacture of inferior cloth so skilfully produced that it was difficult to distinguish the real from the adulterated material. Besides being contrary to the ordinances of the trade, their action was injurious to the whole state, as merchants, not knowing whether the cloth of gold was genuine or adulterated, were refusing to purchase. The French people also were deceived by the fraud, though the Germans, who did not understand very well about the quality of that cloth, suffered more than any others. (95) So far as the craft was concerned, poor workmen who paid the regular guild tax were severely injured, since employment was beginning to fail through the sale of adulterated cloth of gold as genuine.

They pointed out, further, that the king ought not to allow the fraudulent manufacture of this cloth to continue, and begged him to give orders to the Captain of Justice and others of his officials/

(95) This was a good point to make, as Louis had only lately allied himself with Maximilian by the League of Cambray.

officials to intervene and put an end to the trickery of Francisco and his friends. Persistence in the fraud, the craft officials suggested, should be punished by the deportation of the offenders from the Province together with a money fine to be applied to the revenue.

As Louis wished the Province to prosper he made no difficulty about granting the petition. His reply, published on March 15, (96) informed the trade officials that in virtue of the craft statutes and ordinances it was within their power to proceed against the people of whom they complained, and that, if they took action, the Captain of Justice would give them all the help they required. Immediately on receipt of the permission, the abbots, syndics and consuls issued orders that no gold or silver thread below the trade standard must be used in the manufacture of the cloth. Nor must adulterated cloth be sold as genuine. They further declared that, if inferior cloth were put on the market as genuine, diligent search would be made to discover the delinquents. Those who knew the source of the fraud were encouraged to give information by the offer of a reward of twelve pounds imperial and the promise that their names would be kept secret.

(97)
An edict of January 30, 1510, brings forward the policy of protection again in another form, in connection with the cloth trade./

(96) Reg. Panig. N., fol. 143, tergo.
(97) Reg. Panig. N., fol. 186

trade. Other cities besides Milan, both within and without the Province were engaged in the manufacture of cloth. In some instances the product was equal to that of the Milanese: in others it was inferior. But, as the quantity of goods demanded is a function of their price, it follows that inferior foreign cloth, being sold at a lower rate, would command, at least temporarily, a larger market than that of the higher class Milanese article. Again, if the quality were almost if not quite as good as that of the Milanese manufacturers and the cost smaller even to a slight extent, the consumer would naturally choose the lower priced goods. In this case also the home manufacture would suffer. This was the argument of the Clothworkers' Guild and, so far as they alone were concerned, it was not without cogency. If the supply of the home market were retained for home manufactures then employment of the craftsmen would, in all probability, be full and constant, and their profits would rise; hence the issue of the edict of January 30. Its provisions may be treated briefly.

By authority of their craft statutes and ordinances the consuls of the wool merchants declared first of all that no one should have in his possession, openly or secretly, any cloth which had not been manufactured in Milan. The prohibition was not applied only to foreign cloth: it was sufficient that the place of origin was outwith the bounds of the city. Further, the/

the word possessor included not only merchants but private owners. The penalty exacted for any infraction of this provision was confiscation of the cloth and a fine of twenty-five ducats. (98)

The general prohibition was subject to exceptions. Cloth manufactured within the Province, provided it were of the value of fifty pounds or more per piece, might be imported, stamped with the seal of the Wool Merchants' Guild, and sold retail. (99) Under the same condition, cloth of less value than fifty pounds per piece must not be imported for sale but solely for dyeing, and then only under the authority of a written and sealed licence. This cloth must be exported. On no account must it be sold within the city. Further, all imported cloth must be of the same length and width as that of Milan. White cloth for lining imported under licence must not be sold in the city under twenty-eight pounds per piece, including taxes and incidental expenses.

Other concessions were granted with regard to cloth made at Como, Inzino and Brianza. That from Como was admitted without restriction as to price so long as the quality satisfied the consuls of the Guild. But it must be sealed with the seal of Como, and have in addition the "trade mark" of the manufacturer and/

(98) The value of the ducat in this case was taken as thirty-two soldi.

(99) Li drapi forexi fabricati in lo dominio de Milano, che siano de pretio de libre cinquanta in zoxo, se posseno condure a Milano et retaliari. - Reg. Panig. N., fol. 186.

The amount of cloth to be valued at fifty pounds is not stated. Probably it was understood to be per piece of a certain length and width and, perhaps, weight.

and, as a guarantee that it was licenced, the seal of the Wool Merchants' Guild of Milan. (100) From the two other districts the import was permitted if the cloth were of good wool and not shoddy (garzatura), and at least of fifty pounds per piece in value.

Having completed its list of prohibitions and concessions the edict laid down regulations for the protection of buyers and for the disposal of foreign cloth at present in the city. Such cloth must receive the Guild's seal within six days and be sold within the next three months, failing which the owners would be treated as offenders against the edict.

The last part deals with officials appointed to carry out the terms of the decree. They were warned to permit no irregularities in its administration, and to allow no sale of foreign cloth. They must give surety to the consuls of the Guild that they would perform their duties faithfully. If found to be committing or conniving at fraud or deceit in connection with their work they were liable to a fine of twenty-five ducats for each offence. Finally the edict declared that no one, under a penalty of fifty gold ducats, should dare to hinder officials of the/

(100) Li drapi baretini'da Como, de qualuncha mesgia, bontà e pretio voglia se sia, essendo stameti e ben lavorati a laude de li consuli presenti e futuri como li drapi da Milano, posseno venire, essendo bollati del bollo de la terra e marchati de la marcha del merchadanto che li havera facti, et similmente del bollo de li mercadanti de Milano. - Reg. Panig. N., fol. 186.

the Guild in their search for offences against the regulations. Rather they must give all the help in their power.

As might be expected, the regulations were drawn up mainly from the point of view of the Wool Merchants' Guild. But there is another aspect - that of the consumer. The craftsmen were enjoying what was virtually a monopoly. The whole measure was, of course, protective and, as the object of all protection is to raise the price of the protected goods or, at any rate, to prevent its fall, it is intelligible that the regulations should contain no clause restricting the amount that might be charged to the buyer. Nevertheless the omission was a radical defect. Even from the cloth-workers' standpoint it was a mistake, as an unrestricted monopolist price would react unfavourably upon the demand for their wares.

(101)

In at least one respect the edict was a failure. The number of men appointed to carry out its provisions was out of all proportion to the amount of work, many of them being unknown to the Guild officials. Every day some new instance of their corruption was brought to the notice of the authorities and, at length, the scandal became so notorious that no alternative remained/

(101) There was the probability, too, that the stringent exclusion of their goods would rouse resentment in the states concerned, which would find expression in measures of retaliation. Thus the whole Province might be involved in a "tariff war" for the benefit of a small section of the population.

remained but to recall their commissions and dismiss them all. This was done by a resolution publicly proclaimed on March 3, (102) 1512, less than two years from the issue of the edict. Not only were the officials dismissed but it was ordered that, if any of them, depending on the commissions they had held, should attempt to perform the functions of their former office, they were to be resisted by all means at the disposal of the victim. (103) The ex-officials were further warned that under a penalty of fifty ducats, their commissions must be returned within eight days to the notary acting for the consuls of the Guilds.

The tone of the document induces the feeling that Milan was in considerable disorder. If it were, it is not surprising. The Holy League, which had been formed the previous October, was taxing to the full the energies of the French Administration. In the war, Louis, for the time, was holding his own. The brilliant generalship of his nephew, Gaston de Foix, secured the capture of Bologna and drove back the League Army. Hurrying to Brescia as soon as he heard of its revolt, he took the town on February 18. Then, by forced marches he came back to Bologna, again forced the League Army to retire, and, moving against Ravenna,

(102) Reg. Panig. N., fol. 283, tergo.

(103) Et che a tali volese fare offitio alcuno, per vigore de epse lettere da qui in dretto facte, se li posse resistere et obviare como melio a loro parirà, senza altra pena.
Ibid.

Ravenna, tried to take it by storm. This was on April 19. On Easter Day he won the battle of Ravenna and lost his life.

For the next document it is necessary to go back a year. Among the decrees contained in the Registri Senato is one dealing with wool-workers outside Milan, and interesting because of the light it throws upon the internal administration and general policy of the Craft Guild. On April 29, 1511, the craftsmen of Soncino petitioned Louis that the rules drawn up by them for the government of the trade might have his approbation, and thus acquire legal standing as statutes. The various branches of the craft - examiners, beaters, dyers and general workers in woollen material - appointed a committee of ten by whom the regulations were proposed. To these regulations Louis gave sanction on May 27.

Each of the articles is intended to stabilise the position of the woollen industry. The first - that wages must be on a level with the payments made for the same class of work in Milan, Lodi, Cremona, Brescia, Bergamo and Crema - has a curiously modern sound. But it was not merely a question of high rate of pay. The purpose was to secure the retention of good workmen in Soncino by depriving the other towns of the advantage they would possess if the wage rate were higher than in the home town. Indirectly it tended to build up the reputation of the craft in Soncino and thus increase the amount of woollen goods manufactured.

The/

The trade had somewhat of the nature of a close corporation as, unless he were registered in the Guild's books, no worker might practise the craft. Before registration could be obtained the intending craftsman had to be taught the trade, and for this the Guild exacted a premium of three pounds imperial. Obviously the workers could limit the numbers on the Guild register by refusing to undertake the teaching of apprentices; so that the craft really exercised complete control over its membership. This was further shown by a retaliatory clause decreeing that foreign craftsmen coming to work in Soncino should pay to the Guild the same sum as was paid to the corresponding Guild of their town by workers going there from Soncino.

Before considering three measures dealing with the development and utilisation of the resources of the Province a small but highly important order may be mentioned. The documents already dealt with have shown that the French Administration had in view the prosperity of the duchy. Law, finance, and economics all received careful consideration. In some instances the methods employed may not have been well adapted to secure the intended result: they were naturally limited by the political and economic ideas of the age. But at least they were honestly conceived and, on the whole, well executed. In some respects, too, they had a modern quality which placed them far in advance of similar legislation in contemporary Europe.

Where/

Where so meticulous attention was paid to securing fairness in commercial transactions it is not surprising that part of that attention was directed to the adoption of a legal system of weights and measures. In an edict of February 1, 1508, that is, almost as soon as the new regime had established itself, all weights and measures in use were ordered to be examined and tested by the standards kept in the office in the Porta Cumana, so that their accuracy might be ensured. If they were passed as accurate they were sealed and their use permitted, but without the seal no scales, weights, lineal measures or measures of capacity, both for dry and for wet goods, might be used.

The first document dealing with development was issued primarily as a health measure. Outside the cities many people made their living by cultivating kitchen gardens. These small holdings formed an admirable addition to the cereal crops of the Province, and were, therefore, to be encouraged. Whether from a desire to reduce expenses to a minimum, or because the price of farm-yard manure had so risen as to be beyond their power to purchase with any hope for a reasonable return for their outlay and labour, many owners of kitchen gardens had fallen into the habit of using human excrement as a fertiliser. This practice, being regarded as a potent means of infection, was forbidden by an order issued from the Office of Provisions by/

(105)

by Jacobo Crotto on March 8, 1511. Neither in small nor in large quantities must this fertiliser be dug into the ground nor used among the crops when they are making growth.

The order provides an example of the way in which the Administration endeavoured to aid and supplement the efforts of one Department by those of another. The practice of the kitchen gardeners, being regarded as offensive and dangerous to the health of the citizens, might have been dealt with by the Department of Public Health; but action on its part could have been construed as an interference with the functions of the Office of Provisions, and would probably have resulted in friction. On the other hand, as the gardens were under the legal control of the Vicar of Provisions, it was easy for him to veto the practice, without intruding upon the efforts of the Department of Public Health. Apart from such considerations, the important point is that the health of the Province was an object of concern to any Department which found itself able to aid the Office specially charged with the duty. Here, again, the administration of Milan was in advance of contemporary European practice.

It has already been pointed out that the maintenance of the Martesana Canal was a matter of supreme importance not only to the city but to the whole Province of Milan. Upon it depended the water communication between north and south in the eastern half/

(105) Reg. Panig GG., fol. 713, tergo.

half of the duchy. There were roads, it is true, but goods could be carried on the canal in greater bulk and at much less expense than on the roads. The Martesana had the further advantage that its water could be used to a certain extent for irrigation - upon payment of a tax, of course, which helped to swell the revenue.

Without wharves, basins and warehouses the utility of the canal would have been much impaired. That the authorities were alive to this is proved by an order, issued to take effect on January 1, 1510, ⁽¹⁰⁶⁾ providing for the erection of stores and sheds in addition to those already built. The order permits, also, the dredging of basins. It lays no stress on the trade value of the Martesana, but deals in detail with regulations affecting its navigability, the cleanliness of its water and the repair of damage sustained by its banks.

The first duty of the officials was to ensure a plentiful supply of water so that vessels might pass at any time. But the abuse of the permits granted to draw water for irrigation from the canal occasionally endangered its navigability. The order therefore insists that no more water shall be taken away than is allowed by the terms of the permit. Where an excavation has been made in the bank for the purpose of forming an irrigation ditch, the outlet must be walled to prevent damage, but no fresh outlets/

(106) Reg. Ducati IV., fol. 96.

outlets are to be made and no further permits issued to draw water from the canal. Again, as the Adda is a source of water supply for the Martesana, water-mills are forbidden to draw upon the river if there is the slightest chance that the navigability of the canal will thereby be endangered. Within the city, the Castle and Garden of Milan may use canal water for irrigation, but for no other purpose.

The object of the water-way was the development of the district it served. This purpose would be frustrated if roads on opposite sides of the canal could not be connected. Hence the order gives permission for bridges to be built. The concession, however, is granted only if the bridges are so constructed as to form no impediment to free navigation, and if the banks near and under them are kept in a good state of repair.

Details are given also with regard to repairs. Any subsidence of the banks, or other damage, must be repaired by the lessees at their own expense up to a sum of four hundred pounds. For repairs costing more than that amount the Ducal Chamber will be responsible. All damage to the canal must be reported within eight days; otherwise, the lessees shall be responsible for the repairs, no matter what the cost may be.

With regard, to the payment of dues, the order deals justly with the lessees. So long as the canal is navigable the dues must be paid, but if, because of war or plague, traffic is forbidden, the lessees shall pay no dues for the period during which navigation/

navigation has ceased. Accounts are ordered to be kept of all money paid to the Maestri of the canal for use of the water-way. The Maestri (i.e., of the Magistrato Straordinario) shall receive the payments in the name of the Ducal Chamber and pass them on to the Treasurer as an addition to the taxes of Milan.

The last regulation of which notice need be taken is one authorising officials of the canal to go armed by day and by night. For this provision three reasons may be given. Despite the efforts of the French Administration a certain amount of unrest was abroad in the Province. Again and again, as has been seen, edicts were published dealing with felons who had been banned. But exiled men did not always remain outside Milanese territory, and there was, at least, the possibility that in revenge for their banishment they might damage the canal. Now, the officials were responsible for the safety of the water-way. But if they were unarmed they would be incapable of defending either the canal or themselves against attack; hence the permission granted them.

Another reason lay in the political situation. During the winter of 1509-10, Maximilian was carrying on a war of rapine and massacre in Venetian territory. So far from helping him, his cruelty served to show how much better had been Venetian rule. It was, too, a fight of Italians against foreigners, and likely, therefore, to cause special interest in the duchy. Thus though/

though these events were happening outside the Province, the war contributed a share to the unrest among the Milanese subjects of the French king. Further the French authorities must have known of the negotiations proceeding between Venice and Julius II. If these proved successful, and Venice were admitted to the Pope's peace, it would be because Julius, for his own ends, desired the alliance of the republic. But such an alliance could have only one meaning - an attempt to expel the French from Milan. The situation was thus critical. The destruction of part of the canal or, perhaps, an attempt to render it even temporarily un-navigable must be considered as a possible act of war. Such an attack must be carried out only by small numbers, as a large body of men, by drawing attention to themselves, would invite defeat. It was presumed, then, that the guards, if armed, would be able to deal effectively with any such intending mischief-makers.

The third reason has force, also, though it does not involve questions of high politics. The crews of vessels using the Martesana Canal were somewhat unruly. If trouble arose which necessitated the interference of the guards, arms were required: hence they were supplied.

A few documents still remain to be mentioned, but, as they deal with the situation immediately following the expulsion of the French from Milan, they will be treated cursorily. Before considering them the events leading to the loss of the duchy must be summarised. In a previous part of this essay the progress of/
of/

of the army of the Holy League has been traced as far as the battle of Ravenna and on to the investment of Milan by the Swiss under Matteo Scheiner, Bishop of the Valais. La Palice, who had succeeded Gaston de Foix, withdrew from the city, and was soon followed by Trivulzio. At once the crumbling conquests of the French began to fall from their grasp. The castle of Milan held out for some time, but had to surrender; while Genoa, plucking up courage, drove the French out of the city and elected Giano Fregoso as their duke. Trivulzio and La Palice retreating to the south on Pavia, with the Venetians and Swiss in close pursuit, passed through Savoy and over Mont Cenis into France.

In August the confederates of the Holy League met at Mantua. Their first consideration was the position of Florence. That city had clung to the French alliance, but she had given no help to Louis in his time of trouble, when her intervention might have turned the scale in his favour. For her policy of neutrality she was now to pay dearly. She was compelled to recall the Medici, but declined to depose Piero Soderini who had been elected Gonfalonier for life in 1502. As a result she suffered a sack of/

(107) Alias Bishop of Sion. But see Burigozzo, p. 422, Note 1.

(108) Unable to make a stand, he sent to Milan describing his position. The despatch was captured by the Swiss. See Prato, p. 298.

(109) For a full account of the events from the funeral of Gaston de Foix to the fall of Milan, see Prato, pp. 295. et seq.

of such brutal vindictiveness as few cities have had to undergo. The Medici, who had returned as private citizens, soon seized the control of the town. Under them Florence dropped the French alliance and joined the Holy League.

The case of Florence being settled, the allies turned their attention to the duchy of Milan. Maximilian wished the Province for his grandson Charles, whose extensive possessions, together with the probability that they would be increased in the future, rendered him unacceptable to the other members of the Holy League. But immediately on the expulsion of the French the Milanese despatched an embassy to Maximilian, who was then in Flanders, to ask that Massimiliano Sforza might be sent as their duke. The desire of the Milanese and his inability to withstand the opposition of the members of the Holy League to his own proposal forced a reluctant consent from the Emperor, and Sforza entered the city on/

(110) El pontifice Iulio et li Eluetij con lo imperio Mediolanense essendo concorrenti ad uno medemo animo di hauere Maximiliano Sforza, primogenito di Ludouicho Sforza, mandarno leg^oati ad Cexare Maximiliano che uolesse essere contento di quello hera contentissimo la maggiore parte de Ittallia de mandare Maximiliano Sforza, primogenito di Ludouicho Sforza, in lo imperio Mediolanense, perchè de iure esso imperio hera suo. Grumello, lib. V., cp. xx. p.166.

Trapassando queste cose, da Milano se partirno ambasciatori per andare in Fiandra, dove era Maximiliano rè de Romani a dimandarli Maximiliano Sforza per Duca nostro; el quale dalla prima partita del Sig. Ludovico Sforza, patre suo, sino a quelli dì, era sempre stato sotto li governo suo. Prato, p. 301.

on December 9. But Massimiliano had no real power. Louis XII. was not resigned to the loss of the duchy, and the Emperor Maximilian was still hopeful that, in time, he might gain it for his grandson. To these must be added hostility in the duchy itself, for not all of the Milanese desired Massimiliano's succession.

While it was well that Milan should regain her independence, it cannot be said that her improved political status implied a higher conception of the functions of government. In that respect, indeed, the duchy had been better under French control. With the events which happened under the rule of Massimiliano Sforza this study has nothing to do: all that remains is to note what took place on the eve of his accession and during the period immediately following.

Upon the evacuation of Milan the Holy League took temporary charge, Ottaviano Sforza being appointed as Commissioner-General. (111) Four edicts issued by him must be mentioned. The first, published on June 21, 1512, orders a return to be made to him of all goods, money, houses, horses, arms or other possessions of Frenchmen, failure to do so being punished al arbitrio nostro. The indefinite nature of the punishment will be noted. The second, issued/

(111) Reg. Panig. L., fol. 123.

(112)

issued on the following day, ordains that all officials who held office at the time of Ludovico's deposition shall take up their duties again. It also forbids forcible entry into any house to search for goods belonging to Frenchmen, unless a permit has been given for that purpose. This provision was necessary as, owing to the edict of the previous day, a general search would be made for such goods, and the way would thus be open for criminals to enrich themselves at the expense of the state. The third edict, (113) which appeared on August 10, requires the restoration within three days, of all goods belonging to Ludovico which were confiscated by the French on their occupation of the duchy. If it is impossible to return the goods their value in money must be tendered, upon pain of the defaulters being held as rebels.

(114)

The fourth edict, issued on September 18, was necessary as an assertion of the authority of the new régime as well as an intimation that it would brook no attempt to dispute its powers. Certain of the Milanese, still adhering to the French party, were holding out in the Castle of Milan. The edict warns them to surrender within three days on pain of being considered in open rebellion. The order was issued almost two months after the/

(112) Ibid, fol. 126

(113) Ibid, fol. 134, tergo.

(114) Reg. Panig, L., fol. 139, tergo.

the main body of the French had left. During the interval the
(115)
Bishop of Lodi, having studied the situation closely, felt that
the time was ripe for such an intimation. Even if it be granted
that he had been waiting for a suitable opportunity, it must be
admitted that his offer to receive the surrender of the recal-
citrants before declaring them rebels was generous.

On October 8, the Emperor Maximilian issued a decree from
(116)
Cologne which was not published in Milan till June 17 of the
following year. From two points of view this edict is inter-
esting. Ostensibly it was intended to further the cause of
Massimiliano Sforza by ordering the return of their property and
civil rights to all Milanese who had been deprived of them by
the French Administration. But it is much more interesting as
an indication of the position Maximilian was maintaining with
regard to the duchy.

Louis XII. had acknowledged the Emperor's feudal superiority
over Milan both before and after the conquest. Massimiliano
Sforza also allowed the Imperial claim upon the duchy. Thus
the decree of October 8 was, in essence, the support of a vassal
by his feudal lord. But that support was not disinterested.
Massimiliano Sforza was not the real head of his government, nor
was that government itself independent. Had the duke and his
advisers pursued the proper policy they would have issued a
similar/

(115) Ottaviano Sforza.

(116) Reg. Panig. L., fol. 180, tergo.

similar decree on their own account. By leaving it to the Emperor and accepting his intervention they ceded to him their power of independent action.

The very form of the decree ought to have caused resentment, as in it the Emperor assumes the right not merely to advise but to dictate the course of action the Province must pursue. It is addressed to the duke, his captains, judges and magistrates, just as if Massimiliano Sforza himself were an official answer-
(117)
able to Maximilian for the government of the Province. Further it is issued without a single reference to the wishes of Massimiliano or his government; while the passage declaring that banned men were restored to the position they had held in the time of Ludovico is insulting in its disregard for the functions belonging of right to the governing body at Milan.
(118)

The last document to be mentioned is a list of Milanese condemned/

(117) Maximilianus, divina favente clementia, electus Romanorum imperator, etc. Illustrissino Maximiliano Sfortie Vicecomiti, Mediolani Duci et consanguineo nostro carissimo, et honorabilibus nostris et sacri Romani Imperii fidelibus dilectissimis capitaneis, praefectis, magistratibus et officialibus quibuscumque ducatus et status Mediolani, et eorum successoribus, gratiam nostram Caesaream et omne bonum. - Reg. Panig. L., fol. 180 tergo.

(118) Ideo volumus et tenore presentium mandamus, ipsos omnes ad bona et jura eorum omnia quae tenebant et possidebant legitime ante expulsionem dicti quondam ducis Ludovici integre restitui. - Ibid.

condemned as rebels. Many of the French party had fled after the evacuation of the city. By a decree dated March 18, 1513, (119) they are ordered to return and surrender personally within three months from the publication of the edict, upon pain of being condemned as rebels. A list of fugitives is appended containing seventy-eight names - forty-five from Milan and the remainder from provincial cities - among which the family of Trivulzio has fifteen representatives in addition to Gian Giacomo.


With this document ends the enquiry into the administration of the Milanese under the French. In accordance with the ideas of the age it was protectionist in policy, despotic in character, and instead of laying down broad principles and seeing them carried out, spent too much time on minutiae which might well have been left to local bodies. Yet there was always present the endeavour to act justly and to improve the condition of the Province. The essential vice of the domination was that the government was exercised by a foreign power; to which must be added that the haughty, domineering manner of the soldiery was a constant affront to the Milanese and an ever present danger to the Administration.

In finance, law, and economics the efforts of the Administration were commendable; while in their care for the general mass of the citizens - in their efforts, for example, to regulate prices of commodities and to preserve the health of the community - they/

they were in advance of the majority of contemporary European nations. Nor can it be denied that they did their best to develop the resources of the Province to the benefit both of themselves and of the Milanese. Such efforts, supported by the ability which the French undoubtedly displayed, could not fail to raise the standard of life in the Province. As a result, Milan has seldom been so prosperous and happy as under the domination of a power which her citizens never really loved.

A P P E N D I X ' 1.

Map of the Martesana Canal.



The Martesana Canal and Water-ways to the east of Milan.

Appendix 11.

Ludovico Sforza and the Invasion of Italy.

LUDOVICO SFORZA AND THE INVASION OF ITALY

The legend that Ludovico Sforza alone was responsible for the French invasions of Italy will die a hard death. R. de Maulde la Clavière, commenting upon Ludovico's assertion in his Political Testament that his people had not to complain of war, since he had never waged it unless in their defence, remarks:- "Nous nous bornons à enregistrer ce plaidoyer, en laissant à l'histoire le soin de le discuter. Bornons-nous à constater, relativement à la dernière assertion, que Ludovic portera éternellement la responsabilité d'avoir attiré, en 1494, les Français en Italie, et d'avoir ouvert pour sa patrie cette période d'occupation étrangère qui ne s'est terminée qu'en 1866.- Chroniques de Louis XII, Vol. II, Pièces Annexes, p. 298.

But the writer has taken no account of extenuating circumstances. Ludovico was just as much or as little to blame as the other Italian rulers who had employed the same political ruse. Unfortunately for his reputation he was more successful than, perhaps, he desired.

Again, in the Introduction to the edition of Commynes' Memoires published in 1610 - a corrected edition of that published in 1559 by Denis Sauvage - the same feeling is expressed. The editor regarded the invasion of 1494 as an extremely foolish step for which Ludovico was primarily responsible.

Mais sur tout est à remarquer Ludovic Sforce, le motif du voyage du Roy en Italie, pour s'impatroniser de l'estat de son neveu et pupille, par la mort d'iceluy, qui peut sembler avoir esté avancée en quelque façon à ceste occasion. Dont iceluy Ludovic se voyant au dessus de son intention, à commencé le premier à payer le Roy de France, du bon tour qu'il luy avoit fait: ayant couvert de son voyage ou passage en Italie l'usurpation tyrannique d'iceluy Ludovic: jusques à ce que le temps a porté puis après, que Louis XII, successeur de Charles, ait esté Commissaire de la justice de Dieu contre ledit Ludovic, ainsi que la vérité en est assez connue: et mesmes a fallu que le fils dudit Ludovic, et par consequent la race en ait porté les marques après iceluy père, sous le Roy FRANÇOIS I, de ce nom.- Introduction to Commynes' Memoires, p. 12.

Prato also expresses his belief in the legend; but his opinion/

opinion should be largely discounted since, as he was only a boy of six years when the invasion of 1494 occurred, his information must have been received at second hand. He writes:-

"Il Duca Ludovico Sforza (como si dice) fece avelenare il Duca Gioan Galeaz suo nipote, per sè indebitamente la signoria de Milano usurpandosi; poi tirò re Carlo in Italia alla desfacione de Ferdinando re de Napoli, suo nepote: le quali cose comisse lo hanno facto degno, per divina justizia, di perpetuo carcere; che io (avenga che fanciullo fussi) mi ricordo, che essendo alla predica de un cieco, frate dell' Incofonata, ch'è a esso duca predicava su la piazza del Castello, nel tempo che il re Carlo doveva passare in Italia, dirli in pulpito: SIGNORE NON LI MOSTRARE LA VIA, PERCHÈ TU NE PENTIRAI; et così invano poi se ne pentì, con danno di tutta Italia." - Prato, p. 251.

The evil tradition has been kept alive in Italy by the smaller histories, especially those prepared for school use. In La Storia d'Italia Raccontata alla Gioventù, Ludovico's story is presented in a garbled form, as is that of Savonarola (See pp. 90, 91); while in Cesare Balbo's Della Storia d'Italia dalla Origine, Fino ai Nostri Tempi Sommario (Ed. 10, Firenze, 1856) the same spirit is manifest.

"La causa de' nuovi guai d'Italia fu senza dubbio l'incapacità politica e militare de lei; l'occasione poi, fu l'ambizione straniera di Carlo VIII, aiutata dall'ambizione traditrice de Ludovico, il Moro . . . a quindi il Moro è il traditor più esecrato nelle memorie Italiane." Balbo, op. cit. opp. 273, 274.

And again, "Il Moro il gran chiamator di stranieri . . ." which he certainly was not.

One is almost compelled to regard these as ex parte statements, and to ask why equal emphasis is not laid on statements which implicate others than the Moor. Guicciardini, a very fair-minded historian with no partiality towards Ludovico, mentions the fact that he was not the only offender in calling foreigners to Italian soil. "From this adoption," he writes, "arose the claims of the Dukes of Anjou to the kingdom of Naples. And the Popes, whenever they had any quarrel with the Neapolitan kings, invited the Angevins to invade their dominions."

In the body of this essay will be found further examples of Italian rulers who were guilty of the same evil practice.

Appendix 111.

Constitution of the Senate.

This document was contained in Reg. Panig. M.
in the Milanese Archives, but the volume is now lost.

The copy here given is taken from the Brera Library
in Milan, MS. AG X, 36, fol. 5.

ORDINANCE CONCERNING THE GENERAL ADMINISTRATION

OF THE DUCHY AND THE CREATION OF THE SENATE

Ludovicus, D.G., etc. Ad aeternam rei memoriam

1 - Humanum foedus, quodque fraterna primum violavit invidia, excrescente in dies mortalium ambitione et avaritia, nisi leges quibus malorum hominum audacia refrænaretur latae fuissent et principes et magistratus qui illas exequerentur creati, conservari diutius nequivisset. Inde Regum officium originem habuisse manifestissimum est: ut in pace et custodia populos urbesque, justitia mediante, continerent et eo pacto imperia sua stabilirent. Unde divino spiraculo Reges ipsi et qui terram judicant justitiam admonentur diligere; quam qui deserit Deo fit dissimilis et regio nomine indignus, sineque illa urbes et regna latrocinia nuncupantur.

Nos igitur, attendentes divos praedecessores nostros Francorum reges prae caeteris principibus illam summopere coluisse et illius cultu atque observantia suum et solidasse imperium et auxisse, indeque maximam apud omnes exterarum nationes gloriam reportasse, volentesque illorum vestigia quantum possumus imitari, cum nuper Ducatum et Statum Mediolani cum suis omnibus pertinentiis ad nos hereditario jure spectantem divina potius dispositione quam humanis juribus fuerimus assecuti, illum justitiae tramitem magis quam militum nostrorum robore regere conservare et augere divinis auspiciis constituimus. Verum animadvertentes nos continue in dicta Mediolanensi provincia non posse residere, sed pro regni nostri et aliarum provinciarum imperio nostro parentum necessitatibus ad alias nostrae ditionis provincias nos esse quoque transituros; impositum nobis onus exequi toto conatu gestientes;

Ad Dei immortalis, cujus beneficio tot populis et nationibus praefecti sumus, gloriam; Ducatusque et status nostri Mediolanensis ac subditorum nostrorum extramontanorum pacem quietem et tranquillitatem, perpetuo edicto et inviolabili decreto, omnia et singula in his nostris litteris inferius contenta, stabilimus et ordinamus et hac lege perpetuo valitura stabilimus.

2 - Imprimis in dicto ducatu nostro et dominio Mediolanensi locumtenentem unum habebimus virum nobilem, aequum, strenuum et militari disciplina peditum. Et ex nunc creamus deputamus et ordinamus dilectum fidelem consanguineum consiliarium ac ciambellanum nostrum Joannem Jacobum de Trivultio, militem, comitem Pedenatiol,/

Pedenatici, marescalcum Franciae, cujus fidem, prudentiam, strenuitatem ex plurimis rerum argumentis perspectam habemus. Cui in concernentibus guerram, armorum expeditionem, civitatum, oppidorum et aliorum locorum conservationem et defensionem, plenariam potestatem vice nostro relinquimus. Poteritque idem locumtenens super praedictis, quotiens sibi videbitur expedire cum senatu nostro Mediolani inferius nominando communicare. Vel quos voluerit ex senatoribus nostris dictisenatus et de capitaneis nostris ad se vocare. Et super concernentibus praemissis dum et quando erit extra civitatem Mediolani mandata, et literas patentes sub proprio nomine tamquam locumtenens noster generalis decernere et conficere, ac de negotiis et controversiis supra designatis super quibus non erit aliis iudex ordinarius deputatus cognoscere, val causas cognoscendas aliis committere, prout bonum sibi videbitur. Ordinamus itaque ac praecipimus omnibus nostris capitaneis militibus stipendiariis armigeris tam equitibus quam peditibus, officariis civitatum et aliis inferioribus quibuscumque, quatenus prefato nostro locumtenenti, super praemissis et ex eis descendens, indubie et sine difficultate pareant, obediuntque veluti nobis.

3 - Ordinamus insuper quod in dicto ducatu nostro et dominio Mediolanensi sit unus cancellarius ultramontanus qui caput et praesidens senatus nostri et iustitiae nostrae habebitur et cui custodia Sigillorum nostrorum committetur, aliisque honoribus et praerogativis, quibus cancellarii nostri Franciae utantur, in dicto dominio potietur. Ad quod quidem officium praesentium tenore creamus, deputamus et stabilimus dilectum fidelem consiliarium nostrum Petrum de Sacierges, episcopum Lucionensem, qui erga nos et christianissimos praedecessores nostros Francorum reges plurima et maxima suae probitatis, fidel, prudentiae, virtutis et integritatis praebuit experimenta.

4 - Et quia temporibus retroactis duo fuerunt in civitate nostra Mediolanensi, unum secretum et aliud iustitiae consilium ordinarium, quae fere eandem habebant auctoritatem; existimantes multipliciter magistratum non necessarium reipublicae fore minus utilem, inicumque consilium ad omnia quae utrique praedictorum consiliorum incumberebant onera sufficere; reipublicae nostrae consulere, officiariumque multitudinem ressecare in nostrum subditorumque nostrorum sublevamen cupientes;

Statuimus et ordinamus quod de caetero erit in dicto dominio nostro Mediolani unicum supremum consilium qui Senatus noster juxta veterum morem appellabitur, in quo dictus cancellarius providebit. Erunt praeterea 17 consilarii seu senatores: quorum duo erunt praelati, quatuor erunt militares, ceteri vero undecim erunt viri electi docti et graduati, quinque scilicet ultramontani et sex citramontani. Quos ex nunc harum tenore creamus/

creamus et constituimus secundum ordinem infrascriptum videlicet dilectos filios nostros Magnificos Antonium de Trivultio Episcopum Comensem, et Hieronimum Pallavicinum Episcopum Novariensem; Petrum de Gallerate, Franciscum Bernardinum Vicecomitem, Gibertum de Borromeis comitem, Erasmus de Trivultio milites; Claudium de Seyssello, in magno consilio nostro et parlamento Tholosano consiliarium nostrum, Scipionem Barbavariam: Accursium Maynerii, in dicto magno consilio nostro etiam Consiliarium et Provinciae Majorem Judicem; Joannem Franciscum de Marliano; Michaellem Ritium, etiam in consilio nostro magno et in parlamento Burgundiae Consiliarium nostrum; Jo.-Franc. da Curte; Japhredum Caroli, consiliarium nostrum in parlamento Delphinali; Joannem Stephanum de Castillione; Hieronimum de Cusano et Antonium Cacciam, juris utriusque doctores. Et hoc cum et sub stipendiis per nos particulariter illis in rotulo super hoc conficiendo taxandis et ordinandis, et cum aliis privilegiis, preheminentiis, prerogativis, immunitatibus, libertatibus, franchisiis et commodis, quibus consilarii nostri magni consilii et parlametorum nostrorum Franciae et dicti ducatus nostri gaudent et fruuntur et antehac frui et gaudere consueverunt.

5 - Ita tamen quod, cum primum unus tam ex dictis duobus praelatis quam ex dictis quatuor militaribus viris decesserit aut aliter eorum officia vacaverint, sint illa duo extincta officia et suppressa, nec alii possint in eorum locum subrogari, sed tantum unus praelatus et tres viri militares remaneant. Erunt etiam ipsi omnes senatores officarii perpetui nec poterunt quovis pacto ab eorum officiis per dictum nostrum locumtenentem vel senatum aut alium removeri sine causa legitima, cujus cognitio et declaratio ad ipsum senatum nostrum pertinebit.

6 - Item, quod quotiescumque aliquod dictorum officiorum praefatorum consiliariorum seu senatorum nostrorum citramontanorum per mortem, delictum aut aliter vacare contigerit; juramento prius per ceteros senatores de eligendo tres quos cognoverint magis idoneos ad tale officium obtinendum in manibus cancellarii vel praesidentis et per ipsum cancellarium vel praesidentem in manibus immediate sequentis solenniter praestito, eligent dicti senatores nostri tres quos ad tale officium sufficientiores et idoneos esse cognoverint, et electionem seu nominationem factam sic per eos nobis transmittere tenebuntur.

Nosque unum ex sic nominatis et electis ad dictum senatorium officium confirmabimus et deputabimus, qui dicto senatui nostro litteras nostras sue confirmationis et collationis dicti officii tenebitur praesentare; et deinde priusquam ad dicti officii exercitium admittatur, in praesentia totius senatus praedicti et in manibus in eo praesidentis juramentum praestare quod pro/

pro dicto officio per se vel interpositam personam nemini dedit vel promisit seu promitti fecit pecuniam vel aliam rem aequivalentem. Et si aliquam pecuniam vel rem aequivalentem per se vel interpositam personam reperietur donasse aut promisisse directe vel indirecte, volumus et ordinamus ipsum a dicto officio repellendum et arbitrio nostri senatus puniendum.

In ista tamen nominatione et electione officium cancellarii praefati intelligimus minime comprehensum, idemque et de officiis senatorum ultramontanorum juxta praetextatum numerum, quae, cum tempus vacationis occurrerit, plenariae dispositioni nostrae reservamus absque aliqua nominatione.

- 7 - Volumus etiam quod, aliquo ex dictis senatoribus nostris togatis absente vel in totum deficiente, alius immediatus subsequens, et eo absente vel etiam deficiente, alius subsequens, et sic deinceps eiusdem nationis locum aliorum ut praemittitur ascendendum obtineat, itaque ille qui de novo in locum deficientis creabitur novissimum locum inter ceteros de sua natione consequetur, et idem in militaribus viris volumus observari. Et quoniam eos qui retroactis temporibus in dictis consiliis secreto et iustitiae locum obtinebant, non ob antiquam eorum culpam vel defectum, sed ad numerum refraenandum, quem determinatum esse volumus, exclusos esse oportuit:

Volumus et declaramus quod, quamdiu aliqui ex eis supererint, et locus vacationis in persona alicujus ex senatoribus nostris citramontanis evenerit, non possint alii praeter dictos antiquos consiliarios ad dicta officia vacantia nominari vel eligi, et nihilominus ipsos omnes antiquos consiliarios interim omnibus privilegiis, honoribus, praerogativis, preheminentiis et commoditatibus quibus antea gaudebant uti, gaudere et frui volumus quoad vivent. Poterunt insuper dictum senatum nostrum, quoties per dictum cancellarium vel alium praesidentem vacabuntur, intrare, et in omnibus actibus, cessionibus publicis post dictos senatores numerarios ceteris anteferri, et ulterius quoties aliquis actus iudiciarius aut extrajudicialis per aliquem Senatorem nostrum fieri debet, in defectum dictorum numerariorum per dictos antiquos consiliarios seu Senatores talis actus poterit explicari, nullique alii debet committi.

- 8 - Volumus praeterea et ordinamus praefatos Senatores nostros sic in Senatu nostro ordinatos in dicta civitate Mediolani residentiam facere, ut sua valeant officia exercere et subditis nostris prout de eis confidimus, iustitiam ministrare.

- 9 - Quem quidem senatum poterit dictus noster locumtenens quotiens voluerit intrare.

- 10 - Quantum/

- 10 - Quantum autem ad alia officia Judicaturae quae sunt dicto senatui nostro inferiora et subalterna, prout sunt Capitanei Justitiae, Potestates, Vicarii, Commissarii civitatum et oppidorum, Judices, Consules et alii similes, temporalia seu perpetua, quae temporibus retroactis per duces Mediolani solebant conferri seu donari; quotiescumque aliquod praedictorum officiorum vacare contigerit morte, lapsu temporis vel aliter; volumus dictos senatores nostros, juramento juxta formam supra dictam in manibus cancellarii vel alterius in dicto Senatu nostro praesidentis per eos praestito, procedure ad electionem trium virorum, quos in eorum conscientia cognoverint sufficientes ad tale officium obtinendum pro bono nostro et subditorum. Quam nominationem sic factam et in scriptis redactam habebunt dicto locumtenenti nostro generali praesentare, qui unum de tribus sic nominatis sine mora tenebitur acceptare. Et illi sic acceptato dabuntur et expedientur litterae nomine nostro et sigillo nostro per dictum cancellarium sigillatae; tenebiturque dictus officarius juramentum in manibus dicti cancellarii vel alterius praesidentis ut supra praestare: qui per se nec per alium pro dicto officio obtinendo aliquam pecuniam vel aliquam rem aequivalentem donavit seu promisit. Et juramento sic per eum prius praestito tenebitur postmodum iterum jurare quod bene et legaliter dictum officium exercebit juxta naturam officii et secundum formam consuetam.
- 11 - Item eidem Senatui nostro damus et concedimus per praesentes potestatem seu auctoritatem decreta nostra ducalia confirmandi et infirmandi, dandi omnes et quascumque dispensationes, statutorum et ordinationum confirmationes, rehabilitationes, temporum prorogationes, in integrum restitutiones et omnes alias provisiones justitiae in dicto ducatu nostro Mediolanensi et aliis terris ab eo dependentibus ac in toto Dominio nostro Astensi.
- 12 - Poterit etiam dictus Senatus noster contra statuta ducalia curiarum stylos dispensare, lecturis universitatis nostrae Papiensis prout expedierit providere, rotulosque legentium et stipendiorum suorum confirmare vel reformare et coetera alia omnia facere quae praedicta Consilia secretum et justitiae Mediolani ordinata antehac facere consueverunt.
- 13 - Et cognoscet dictus Senatus de causis arduis inter subditos nostros praefati domini: utputa comitatum, marchionatum et quorumcumque feudorum nobilium, quando erit quaestio inter nos et nostros vassallos, seu inter ipsos vassallos, nec non de omnibus aliis causis magnis, quoties res de qua agetur erit et ascendet usque ad summam mille ducatorum in annuo reddito et supra, et etiam de causis per nos et cancellariam nostram illis specialiter commissis, et aliis de quibus per appellationem vel aliter dicta consilia secretum et justitiae retroactis temporibus cognoscere consueverunt, /

consueverunt, nec non de causis appellationum a sententiis definitivis vel interlocutoriis vim definitivarum obtinentibus quae per Magistros intratarumstrarum proferentur; (exceptis iis, quae super calculo ferentur a quibus nolumus appellari), item et de causis appellationum dicti domini Astensis quae ad nos devolvuntur et devolvi consueverunt sine praejudicio separationis olim factae.

- 14 - Et cognoscet ulterius dictus Senatus de verificatione et interinatione litterarumstrarum donorum, remissionum, indulgentiarum, privilegiorum, ordinationum, et edictorum tam justitiam quam policiam concernentium. Quae quidem litterae omnes supradictae, nisi per prius fuerint in dicto Senatu nostro praesentatae, interinatae, et verificatae, nullius firmitatis, effectus vel momenti esse poterunt, easque tam concessas quam concedendas decernimus per praesentes irritas et inanes.
- 15 - Habebit praeterea dictus Senatus curam et superintenduntiam super omnes officarios justitiae tam temporales quam perpetuos. Et poterit illos punire, suspendere, privare et corrigere secundum casus exigentiam et prout dicto consilio videbitur, et providebit de syndicatoribus juxta solitum.
- 16 - Praeterea ordinamus et perpetuo edicto declaramus quod sententiae, decreta et ordinationes proferendae per dictum consilium nostrum suum sortiantur effectum. Et tamquam sententiae seu arresta curiae supremae, a quibus appellari seu provocari non potest nec de eorum nullitate, dictae executioni mandabuntur. Et tenebitur dictus locumtenens ceterique officarii nostri Ducatus et Domini illa facere exequi et similiter alias provisiones dandas per dictum consilium et super his manum fortem concedere si opus sit; et similiter officarii domini nostri Astensis in his quae eos modo praemisso concernant. Poterit tamen condemnatus per dictum Senatum infra terminum juris supplicare, recurrere et remissionem processus petere contra dictas sententias seu arresta, et punito prius judicato, super dicta supplicatione vel recursu a cancellaria nostra litteras revisionis impetrare, quas dicto senatui tenebitur praesentare, et deinde, priusquam ad dictam revisionem procedatur, deponere et consignare summan 60 ducatorum auri in manibus unius ex secretariis dicti senatus vel alterius per dictum consilium deputandi camerae nostrae ducali, casu quo dictus supplicans succumbat, irremissibiliter applicanda. Quo deposito facto, tenebitur dictus Senatus noster infra unius anni spatium dictum processum revidere et denuo prout justum fuerit judicare; rejectis iis quos ex causa legitima altera partium instante suspectos esse cognoverit et allis in eorum locum, si opus fuerit, subrogandis.

- 17 - Volumus etiam et ordinamus quod in docto senatui nostro teneatur cancellarius seu alius praesidens in eius absentia concludere materia sufficienter discussa a pluralitate vocum et opinionum.
- 18 - Volumus ulterius quod dictus senatus habeat litigationibus causarum, expeditionibus supplicationum et aliis negotiis occurrentibus vacare duabus horis de mane et duabus post prandium diebus non feriatis in honorem Dei, horis congruentioribus et prout per eos pro meliori fuerit deliberatum; quodque ipse senatus sententias ordinarias decreta ceteraque sua ordinamenta sub nomine nostro faciat et expediat.
- 19 - Statuimus praeterea quod provisiones ordinandae super supplicationibus quae in dicto Senatu nostro per subditos nostros porrigentur, referantur, expédiantur et subsignentur per unum ex dictis nostris senatoribus, secundum quam expeditionem secretarii habebunt litteras expedire et ad cancellariam nostram deferre.
- 20-- Item et ad tuendum et jura nostra defendendum, volumus et ordinamus quod in corpore dicti nostri consilii habebimus unum procuratorem et unum advocatum fiscales, viros in jure doctos et literatos a nobis debite stipendiatos. Quos ex nunc deputamus, videlicet ad officium advocationis dilectum nobis magistrum Hyeronimum Moronum, ad officium vero procurationis magistrum Joannem de Birago, juris utriusque doctores; ad quorum officia, cum locus vacationis contigerit, nominabuntur per dictos Senatores nostros tres nobis praesentandi et confirmandi, juxta superius declarata qui tamen non intrabunt dictum senatum nisi vocati aut pro negotiis nostris proponendis, horis congruis et per ipsum Senatum eis ordinandis.
- 21 - Erunt et in corpore dicti Senatus nostri quatuor hostiarii salariati expensis nostris, quorum officia ad praesens et cum tempus vacationis evenerit ad collationem praefati cancellarii nostri et suorum in dicto officio successorum relinquimus. Et idem de hostiarios magistrorum intratarum nostrarum concedimus.
- 22 - Item quoad cancellariam, statuimus et ordinamus quod in dicta cancellaria nostra erunt decem secretarii per nos ordinandi, qui in causis tam civilibus quam criminalibus processus, acta, ordinationes et appontuamenta dicti concilii conficient et subscribent. Et ulterius signare habebunt omnes litteras deliberatas et ordinatas per dictum cancellarium qui tenebit dictum sigillum et per consiliarios cum eo deputatos, postquam dictae litterae fuerint in caude per alterum consiliariorum subsignatae. Dubque ex ipsis acta, processus, litteras et alia quae/

quae in auditorio magistrorum intratarum nostrarum fient, ordinabuntur et erunt necessaria, conficient et subscribent. Et tenebuntur dicti secretarii ante dictorum suorum officiorum exercitium in manibus praefati cancellarii iuramentum solempniter praestare, secundum qualitatem et materiam suorum officiorum et quod sibi parebunt et obedient tanquam eorum iudici et immediate superiori.

Et ex nunc ad dicta officia ordinamus dilectos nostros magistros Bartholomaeum Calchum, Petrum Magurey, Constantium Ferrerii, Petrum Garboti, Angelum Dominicum de Grandis, Philippum de Comite, Joannem Magnum, Julium Cattaneum, notarium intratarum ordinariarum, et Jo. Mollam de Bellisona, notarium intratarum extraordinariorum.

- 23 - Ordinamus praeterea quod dicti secretarii tenebuntur et jurabunt signare dictas litteras quas non composuerint et tam expeditas per Senatum quam cancellarium, absque eo quod aliquid a partibus occasione dictae signaturae recipiant.

Statuimus praeterea et ordinamus quod dicti secretarii qui eorum officia in dicta cancellaria exercebunt quolibet mense habebunt bursas super emolumento dicti sigilli per manus audientiarum distribuendas prout in cancellaria Franciae hactenus fuit observatum.

- 24 - Et hac de causa in dicta cancellaria ordinabimus unum audientiarium et unum contrarelatorem seu scriptorem ex numero dictorum secretariorum. Et ex nunc ordinamus dictum Petrum de Mansebrey audientiarium et contrarotulatorem seu scriptorem dictum Petrum Garboti, qui recipient et contrarolabunt seu conscribent emolumentum et pecunias procedentes ex dicto sigillo, et de illis tenebuntur computum et rationem reddere coram dictis magistris intratarum, prout in cancellaria Franciae fuit hactenus observatum.

- 25 - Erunt etiam in dicta cancellaria duo sigillatores qui habebunt salaria et stipendia prout per dictum cancellarium et consiliarios in dicta cancellaria modo quo infra deputatos fuerit ordinatum. Et collatio dictorum officiorum, ad praesens et cum locus vacationis contigerit, dicto cancellario et suis successoribus pleno jure pertinebit, similiter et collatio quorumcumque officiorum quorum stipendia summam vigintiquinque ducatorum auri annuatim non excedent.

- 26 - Item volumus et declaramus quod in dicta cancellaria expediantur omnes litterae justitiae per dictum consilium ut supra

supra decretae. Concedet insuper dictus cancellarius omnes alias litteras justitiae ac gratiae et remissiones seu indulgentias casuum remissibilium, bannorum, carcerum infractions, receptiones homagiorum quae recipiuntur per dictorum nostrorum cancellarium forma et modo consuetis, confirmationes privilegiorum; investiturarum et similium gratiae concessionum litteras spectabit, et similiter omnes et quascumque alias provisiones merae gratiae. Et ubi super dictis justitiae provisionibus aliqua difficultas oriretur, quae fuerit facta per dictum cancellarium vel alterum ex consiliariis sibi assistentibus, cancellarius praedictus tenebitur consilio remittere, ut super illis maturius per dictum senatum judicari et ordinari possit prout fuerit rationis.

- 27 - Et si aliquam falsitatem in litteris nostris in dicta cancellaria expeditis committi contigerit, cognitio plenaria et emolumentum confiscationis (si locus sit) ad dictum cancellarium nostrum pleno jure pertinebit qui super dicti crimine ordinare et falsarium punire poterit aut illi indulgere, quemadmodum cancellarius Franciae circa falsificantes litteras nostras facere consuevit.
- 28 - Ordinamus ulterius quod dictus cancellarius dictam cancellariam tenebit, convocatis secum quatuor ex dictis senatoribus nostris tam ultramontanis quam citramontanis per dictum cancellarium nostrum eligendis, qui tamquam magistri requestarum habebunt quolibet mense unam bursam in dicta cancellaria quemadmodum magistri nostri requestarum in cancellaria Franciae habere consueverunt.
- 29 - Prohibemus igitur et destrictius inhibemus ne aliquae personae cujusvis status, gradus aut conditionis existant praeter dictum cancellarium nostrum aliquod sigillum in quo arma seu insignia nostra sint insculpta conficiant aut confici faciant vel penes se habeant, neve litteras aliquas sub nomine nostro sigillent aut sigillare faciant alio sigillo quam apud dictum cancellarium nostrum existente et de eius mandato, neque deinceps aliquo modo in quovis loco sub nomine consilii nostri convenient aut provisiones aliquas vel litteras decernant, exceptis dictis senatoribus nostris et aliis qui pro tempore in eorum locum successerint per modum superius expressum sub poena falsi. Quae omnia et singula per nos ut superius decreta, statuta et ordinata in vim edicti perpetui et constitutionis volumus observari.
- 30 - Mandantes propterea omnibus et singulis officiariis et subditis nostris dicti ducatus et status Mediolanensis et comitatus Papiae et domini Astensis, mediatis et immediatis, praesentibus et futuris, sub poena indignationis nostrae, quatenus praedicta/

praedicta omnia et singula in litteris nostris promulgata, statuta et ordinata inviolabiliter observent ac per quos expedit fieri faciant observari; mandantes insuper thesaurariis nostris, magistris intratarum ac ceteris ad quos spectabit quatenus dictis consiliariis et ceteris officialibus nostris superius nominatis stipendia et salaria per nos eisdem et cuilibet ipsorum statuta et ordinata, sine quavis difficultate, persolvant, eosque libertatibus, franchisiis, commodis, immunitatibus, preheminentiis et privilegiis quibuscumque eis aut alteri eorum quoquomodo concessis et debitis ac pertinentibus frui et gaudere faciant et permittant inconcusse has in testimonium concedentes; quas ad perpetui roboris firmitatem manu nostra signavimus et sigillo nostro jussimus sigillari.

Datas Viglevani die undecimo mensis novembris anno
Nativitatis Domini 1499 et regni nostri secundo: LOYS

Per regem ducem Mediolani in suo consilio: ROBERTET

Visa, lecta, publicata et registrata in senatu Mediolani die decimo quinto novembris 1499. B. CALCHUS.

Appendix 1V.

Biographical Notes.

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES

BARBAVARA, SCIPIONE, was one of those mentioned as being present during the speech made by Michele Tonso, a Milanese doctor, after the children's procession of April 17th, 1500.

BORRROMEO, GILBERTO. The Borromeo family was strongly pro-French. There was, indeed, a rumour that a marriage had been arranged between Gian Giacomo Trivulzio's son Misoccho and a daughter of Giovanni Borromeo, the head of the family. The rumour may not have been true, but it plainly shows the intimacy of the Borromei with the French.

CACCIA, ANTONIO. was a native of Novara and is mentioned in connection with Tonso's "oration". See d'Auton, Vol. I, Pièces Annexes, p. 362.

CAROLI, GEOFFREDO, was a member of the parliament of Dauphine when he was appointed to the Senate of Milan. Special mention is made of his having been present at Tonso's "oration". From an entry in the Milanese Budget of 1510 he is known to have held office still under Louis XII. See d'Auton, Vol. II, Pièces Annexes, p. 362.

CASTIGLIONE, GIOVANNI STEPHANO. His name appears in the Budget of 1510, where it is noted that he received £600 for his services as Senator. - d'Auton, Vol. II, Pièces Annexes, p. 357. After the restoration of the Sforza he still was prominent in Milanese affairs. Vide, e.g. Prato, pp. 336, 347, 356. He, also, is one of those mentioned as being present at Tonso's "oration".

CUSANO, GIROLAMO DA, was one of the eight men left as "governors" of Milan by Ludovico. He was still a Senator in 1510 and, besides his salary of £600, received a pension of £200. Vide d'Auton, Vol. II, Pièces Annexes, pp. 357, 386.

GALLERATE, PIETRO, was sent by Ludovico along with Antonio Trivulzio, Bishop of Como, Francesco Bernardino Visconti and Brando Castiglione to conduct negotiations for the Peace of Vercelli. Vide Cagnola, lib. IX, p. 204. Gallerate was one of eight citizens to whom Ludovico on his flight in September, 1499 had committed the government of Milan. These may have been the "governors" mentioned in the decree of September 25th. But see under Cusano.

MARLIANO, GIOVANNI FRANCESCO, was one of the eight "governors" left by Ludovico in charge of Milan. He was also one of the "orators" who formed the deputation to Trivulzio to arrange concerning the surrender of the town. Though he became a member of the Senate, he joined Ludovico in his attempted re-conquest of Milan and, on the failure of the rising, fled from the city, but was captured by the Venetians and sent back. He must have made his peace with Louis for, as will be seen from the undernoted extracts, though members of his family suffered confiscation, his own name does not appear.

- (a) A Fontrailles, son (i.e. M. d'Alegre's) lieutenant, sur les biens et confiscation de Bernabò et Dominique de Marillan et de Loys (Luigi) potero de Fignolle, jusques à 200 ducats per an.
- (b) A Messire Robert d'Etain, les cassines de Premulgy et d'Aiguebelle, qui firent à Francoisque de Marillan.
(Note that this is Francesco not Giovanni Francesco.)
- (c) Maistre Aloys Marlian, autrefois medicin dudit Sr. Ludovic, fut desdits premiers aucteurs; est en Alemaigne. Il a le revenu de cent soixant-quinze ducas tous les ans assignés à Loys d'Ars.
- (d) Alexandre Marlian, dit Stradiot, suyvant le conte Jehan Antoyne de la Somaille; pour ce qu'il a eu sa grâce, il se tient à Milan. Deduyt ce qu'il doyt, il n'a riens ou bien peu.
- (e) Messire Michiel de Marlian, docteur, est in Alemaigne. Il avoit chacun an 204 ducas, assignés à M. de Gruyer.

(a) and (b) are contained in the Reg. Ducali at Milan. The remainder are from a document in the Archives Nationales Paris, which has been published by M. de Maulde la Clavière in his edition of d'Auton's Chroniques de Louis XII, Vol. II Pièces Annexes No. 11, pp. 328 to 347.

In the statement of an Inquest held on August 25th, 1500, (Archivio di Stato, Milan, Potenze Sovrane, Ludovico Sforza, Vicende Personali) dealing with those who had aided Ludovico in his attempted re-conquest of the Province, the names of Luigi, Alessandro and D. Michele Marliano are mentioned. These complete the references to the Marliani in this connection.

Giovanni/

Giovanni Francesco had not died in the interval between the definitive defeat of Ludovico and the condemnation of those who had sided with him, for he is found again taking part in Milanese affairs in 1513. Vide Prato, p. 316.

MAYNIER, ACCURSE afterwards held, among other appointments, that of Ambassador at Venice.

PALLAVICINO, GIROLAMO. the poet-bishop. The Pallavicini were strong supporters of the French party in Milan, especially after the accession of Louis XII, and were suitably rewarded by him when the conquest was completed.

RIZZO, MICHELE in Latin, Michaelus Ritijs. He was already in the service of France, having been made a royal pensioner upon the capture of Naples by Charles VIII. Apparently he was not well known in Milan, for, in summarising the speech he made following that delivered by Michele Tonso, Prato mentions him as un Messer Michele Rizzo. See Prato, p. 250.

SACIERGES, PIERRE DE, had administrative experience in France covering a period of almost thirty years, his first appointment (as secretary to the Duke of Guyenne) having been received in 1470. In 1498 he was appointed President of the Grand Conseil during the absence of the French Chancellor. This position he held till 1501, when he was superseded by Gervais de Beaumont. His administration of Milan was severe especially in the matter of forfeitures.

SEYSSSEL, CLAUDE DE, was a native of Savoy who passed into the service of Louis XII. Seyssel played an important part in French affairs. In 1498 he acted in the divorce of Louis, from Jeanne, daughter of Louis XI, became a member of the Grand Conseil and, in 1499, was appointed as lay counsellor to the parliament of Toulouse. (Vide Appendix III, Art.4) In 1502 he was still a member of the Milanese Senate, but left to re-enter the Grand Conseil in 1506. When he took orders is not certain, but he ended his life as Bishop of Turin after having held the same status in Marseilles.

TRIVULZIO, ANTONIO, is not to be confused with a captain of the same name who served in the French army. He was Bishop of Como, and a cousin of Gian Giacomo Trivulzio.

TRIVULZIO, /

TRIVULZIO, ERASMO, was appointed Governor of Valenza immediately after its capture by the French in August, 1499. Upon Ludovico's return he expressed contrition for his treason and received pardon.

VISCONTI, FRANCESCO BERNARDINO. The visconti and the Borromei were the two most important feudal families in Milan. Francesco Bernardino, though secretly of the French party, had acted as Ludovico's plenipotentiary during the negotiations leading to the Peace of Vercelli. In August 1499 he was one of the committee which approached the duke and advised him to leave the city; and when the Milanese, exasperated by the conduct of the French, began rioting, his moderating influence did much to render the situation less desperate and save the citizens from the vengeance of Trivulzio.

A p p e n d i x V.

The Abandonment of Alexandria

THE ABANDONMENT OF ALEXANDRIA

The evacuation of Alexandria raised the question of the fidelity of Galeazzo San Severino towards Ludovico. Jean d'Auton, while he makes no statement on the matter, contrives to leave the impression that Galeazzo was responsible for the sudden fall of the city.

"Oyant le peuple de la ville et les souldars de Ludovic l'asseurée maniere des François qui de volonté deliberée mettoient main a l'oeuvre, et que l'heure de leur destruction tant prochaine leur estoit que de moment en autre n'atendoyent que le cry de l'assault et fureur de la guerre sur eulx par glayve a la rigueur executer, par toute la ville commencerent a bransler cloches et baffroiz, faire criz et huées, trasser et courir de ruhe en ruhe, remuer et oster le plus portatif de leurs bagues, et tout bellement dedans ung des fors de la ville, nommé La Roque, de bonne heure se retirer; et les souldars, tout autour des murailles abbatues, grant force enseignes despleyer et monstrier tenir bon semblant et maniere assurée, comme pour vouloir attendre et bien deffendre l'assault. Mais bien autre pencee avoit missire Galyas, qui n'actendoit que l'obscur tenebre pour, plus au couvert, vuyder la place et prendre chemin, ce qu'il fist; car, pour executer l'intencion de son propos, sur l'heure de la mynuyt ou peu plus tost, avecques une guyde et quelques autres ses privez, par voyes obliques et chemins escartés, vers Millan print son adroisse. - d'Auton, Vol.1, p. 64-67.

Guicciardini doubts the fidelity of Galeazzo on the ground that he had twelve hundred men-at-arms, the same number of light cavalry, three thousand infantry, and the protection of a powerful fortress. Had he chosen, he might have forced a passage through the French, who were disadvantageously placed. But if he had received orders from Ludovico to leave the city, (and Guicciardini admits that Galeazzo showed a letter to that effect) he had no choice but to obey. Thus Guicciardini's suggestion loses much of its weight. Again, if he had fled from the city without Ludovico's instructions, why should he have gone direct to Milan? Surely, if he had betrayed the duke, Galeazzo was not reckless enough to place himself in his power. Besides, /

Besides, his future actions - in particular, his flight with Ludovico and his valiant conduct at Novara - do not accord with the accusation of treachery brought against him.

Da Paulla asserts that the letter received by Galleazzo was a forgery. This is more than doubtful; for, in that case, one or other of the chroniclers would have recorded Ludovico's denial of its authenticity. Grumello, for example, with his fine feeling for a dramatic situation, as well as his sympathy towards Ludovico, would almost certainly have had something to say on the matter. Yet he accepts the letter as genuine, and offers as a reason for Ludovico's action the fact that he knew of the disaffection of Giovanni Francesco, Count of Gaiazzo, brother of Galleazzo San Severino.

"Intendendo Ludouico Sforzia la peruersa opinione di epso conte di intendersi con el re Gallichio, subito data expedicione ad Ioanne Iacobo dal Castellacio, homo darne di Galeazo Sanseuerino, con sue littere dandoli per auxio de lo peruerso animo dil conte di Gaiazo, suo fratello, di non uolere passare al soccorso suo, anzi intendersi con il Gallichio re, che uiste sue littere douesse abandonare suo exercito et sua citta di Alexandria et saluare sua persona pigliando il camino di la citta Mediolanense. Intexo Galeazo Sanseuerino capittaneo le littere di Ludovico Sforza, circha la media nocte epso Sanseuerino abandonato suo exercito et la citta di Alexandria, non sonando trombe ne tamburri, pigliando il camino dil Pado, et passato epso fiume saluo da menici. - Grumello, lib. III, cp.V. pp.32,33

On the whole, then, one is justified in believing that Galleazzo was faithful, and that the city was abandoned on Ludovico's orders. The moral aspect of the abandonment both of the city and of the army, is, of course, quite another matter.

A p p e n d i x V l .

Genealogical Tables.

I - Double connection between France and Savoy

Louis of Savoy (1434-1465)


Charles VII of France (1422-1461)

Charlotte (2) = Louis XI = (1) Margaret of Scotland Iolande = Amadeo IX

2 - French Claims upon Naples

Louis I of Anjou Mary d. of Charles, Duke of Bretagne

Louis II = Iolande, d. of John I of Aragon



Adoptions

Joanna I. (ob. s.p. 1382) adopted as her heir Louis I of Anjou (ob. 1385) who obtained Provence. Charles of Durazzo obtained Naples.

Joanna II, adopted at different times Réné of Anjou and Alfonso V of Aragon, the latter of whom was her successor.

Claims

Réné II, as the direct descendant of Réné of Anjou.
Charles VIII, by the wills of Réné I, and Charles, Duke of Maine.

Fernando the Catholic as representing the legitimate Aragon line.

- 3 - (a) Relations between the reigning
houses of Naples and Milan
(b) French Claims on Milan

Catharine Visconti = Gian Galeazzo Visconti

Giovanni Maria
ob. s.p. 1412

Filippo Maria = Maria
ob. 1447
d. of
Amadeo
VIII of
Savoy

Valentina = Louis D.
of
Orleans

Charles
D. of
Orleans

Louis XII
1498-1515

Bianca Maria = Francesco Sforza

Galeazzo Maria = Bona of Savoy
ob. 1476

Ippolita = Alfonso II
ob. 1480
of Naples.
ob. 1495

Ludovico
1494-1500
ob. 1510

Gian Galeazzo = Isabella of Naples
ob. 1494

Francesco
ob. s.p. 1521

- Notes
- 1 The reigning Sforza were descended from Filippo Maria (ob. 1447) through his illegitimate daughter, Bianca, who was the mother of Ludovico.
 - 2 Louis XII, was descended through a younger but legitimate branch, viz. through Valentina.

4 - Neapolitan Claims upon Milan

Francesco Sforza = Bianca Maria Visconti

Galeazzo Maria = Bona of Savoy

Ippolita = Alfonso II of Naples

Gian Galeazzo
1476-1494
1476-

=

Isabella


Francesco
ob. s.p.
1521

Possible Claims

- 1 Any claim made on account of Ippolita was invalid.
- 2 Any claim made by Alfonso as the father of Isabella was also invalid
- 3 Alfonso's claim as the protector of his grandson's interests might be defended, but only if it were honestly advanced and not intended as a cloak for personal aggrandisement.
4. His claim through the will of Filippo Maria was also invalid.

5 - Louis de Ligny and his Relatives

Jeanne de Bar (1) = Louis de Luxembourg = (2) Marie de Savoy.
Countess of Marle



Louis de Ligny was thus:-

- 1 Uncle (a) of the duke of Vendôme
(b) of Philip of Cleves
- 2 Related to Louis XII
- 3 Related to the reigning house of Savoy, and
through them was
- 4 Related to the family of Sforza of Milan.


6 - Connection between Philibert II, and the Bourbons

Louis of Savoy = Anne of Lusignan
1434-1465

Margaret = (1) Philip II (2) = Claudine of Bresse
d. of 1496-1497
Charles I
of Bourbon

Philibert II = Margaret, dau. of
1497-1504 the Emperor Maximilian
ob. s.p.

7 - Connection between Spain and the Empire



The Rejection of Charles' Claim upon Milan

By the Treaty of Blois (Sept. 1504) the dowry of Louis XII's daughter Claude, who was betrothed to Charles, was fixed as Milan, Genoa, Asti, Blois and Bretagne, together with Burgundy if Louis died without heirs male. In 1505 Maximilian, with the consent of Anne of Bretagne, proposed that the Salic Law should be repealed so that Claude might succeed her father to the French throne. Thus Charles appeared likely to unite Castile and Aragon (through his mother Joanna (Juana), France, the Milanese and Naples with his own hereditary dominions.

When the Allies considered the case of Milan after the expulsion of the French, Charles' claim to the Milanese was rejected as, in addition to the dominions of the House of Hapsburg, there was the prospect of his obtaining Spain and Naples - possessions which would make him much too powerful in Europe.

A P P E N D I X V I I .

The Treaty of 1499 between France and Savoy.

Trattato di Lega convenuto trá il Cardinale d'Amboise à nome di Ludovico 12° Ré di Francia et il Conte de sa Chambre à nome del Duca Filiberto di Savoja per sua Conquista che dicto Ré intendeva far del Milanese in cui si è convenuto.

Primo. Che dovesse dicto Duca dare il passaggio e somministrare li viveri, pagando all'armata francese in corresponsività pagarebbe al dicto Duca una pensione annual di $\pounds 22^m$ et altra di $\pounds 10^m$ al Bastardo di Savoja.

2.º Che nel caso si resolvesse dicto Ré di passare in persona in Italia per la sudicta conquista, dovesse dicto Duca darle il passaggio con dicto sua armata, la quale fosse anche venuto di ritirare nelle sue Piazze, e fortezze.

3.º Che ove dicto Duca desiderasse d'impiegarsi personalmente, dicto Ré le darebbe il comando di 200 uomini d'armi coll'elezione degl'ufficiali.

4.º Che pendente tal guerra, e dal principio sino al fine farebbe dicto Ré pagare al sudicto Duca 2^m del sole cadun mese, mediante il che fosse tenuto somministrare 600 combattenti à cavallo, ed in caso di bisogno 2^m fanti pendente il tempo di sei settimane solamente.

5.º Che compita (sic) la sudicta conquista fosse dicto Ré tenuto de rimettere al dicto Duca tante terre del Milanese prossime, ed attigue ai di sui stati per il valore de ducati 20^m d'oro, ed al sudicto bastardo suo fratri per il valore d'altri Ducati/

Ducati $\frac{m}{4}$ coll' obbligo della difesa, e manutenzione.

6.^o Che terminata dicta guerra fosse dicto Rè tenuto di mantenere, e pagare pendente la vita dei dicti duca e Bastardo la sudicta pensione di $\frac{m}{£32}$, e mantenere à sue proprie spese 100 uomini d'armi tanto in tempo di pace che di guerra.

7.^o Che nel caso che avanti, e dopo la predicta guerra il Duca Ludovico Sforza di Milano venisse ad invadere li stati di dicto Duca di Savoja fosse dicto Rè tenuto di difenderlo, ed assisterlo con tutte le sue forze.

8.^o Che dicto Rè fosse venuto d'includere, e riservare in tutte la Leghe che fosse per fare, il dicto Duca di Savoja.

9.^o Che fatta sudicta Conquista fosse il Medesimo Rè tenuto d'assistere, e dar ajuto al dicto Duca per la ricuperazione de' Castelli, e Luoghi occupatighi dal Vescovo e Rep^{ca}. di Valley.

10.^o Che finalmente per la presente Lega non fosse in alcun modo derogato alle antiche alleanze contratte trà li loro rispettivi antecessori.

Colla ratificanza, ed approvazione di dicto Re Ludivico 12.^o

Appendix Vlll.

Trivulzio does Homage for Lands.

Ludovico per la gratia de Dio Rè di Franza de Sicilia et Jerusalem Duca de Millano. Ali nostri amati et fideli consiglieri li presidenti et consiglieri del Senato et gente de li nostre computi et Intrade et Maestri rasonatori in el nostro Ducatum de Milano salutem.

Sapere vi facemo chel nostro caro et fidele cosino Joanne Jacomo di Triultio cavhalero del nostro ordine et Marescalo di Franza ne ha hogi facto la fidelitade et homagio in le mane del nostro amato et fidele cancellario: quale ne he obligato de fare per rasone dela terra et signoria del Castello arguato à luy appertinente per trasporto à luy facto pocho he cose che se dice per lo nostro caro et fidele cosino lo signore le gia. (sic) Marescalo de Franza epse terra, et signoria del Castello arguato tenuta da noi à causa de la nostra signoria, et ducato de Milano: ali quali fidelità et homagio noi lo habiamo recepinco Salva la nostra rasone et la aliena: si ve Mandemo et à ciascaduno de voi si como à luy appertenero chi per causa dela dicta fidelità et homagio à noi fati non faciati ne donati ne soffriti essere facto miso o donato al nostro dicto Cosino Joanne Jacomo de Triultzo Altemo distorbio o impedimento: ma se soa dicta terra et signoria del Castello arguato et soa appertinentie o altri deli soi beni sono o erano per questo preisi et misi in la nostra mane: metiteli o fati nettere incontinenti et senza dimora a plena deliveranza: proveduto che lo nostro dicte/

dicte Cosino Joanne Jacomo darà per scripto infra el tempo debito suo denombremento et advenuto etchel farà et pagarà le altre rasone et debiti se alcuni sono per quisto debuiti: si fati et pagati non le ha.

Dato a Milani adi xiii de Settembre lanno di gratia mille cinquecento et de nostro regno lo terzio Per lo Re ala vostra Rellatione petita duplicata.

A P P E N D I X I X .

Seal Attached to the Treaty of 1499.



Obverse of Seal.



Reverse of Seal.

Par le Roy mon frere le cardinal d'ambroise
ce eueques d'ally et de luon les p^{res} de pe
marcell et de geaulle n^{om}me de pe
Et autres p^{res}.