

"THE SOCIAL ADAPTATION AND PSYCHOPATHOLOGY"

A Thesis submitted for the degree of
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INTRODUCTORY

Since 1914 I had been puzzled as to the reason for the very general neglect of psychology by the leaders of the psychiatric speciality. It seemed to me self-evident that, even for the purpose of describing, defining and diagnosing the morbid entities which it was the task of pathology to explain, psychological conceptions were essential. Mental symptoms are the chief data of psychiatry. At first I attributed this disrepute of psychology to its abstract nature and its preoccupation with cognitive processes. It seemed from an epistemological point of view, as if psychology were in much the same descriptive, phase of development as chemistry was when it left the hands of the alchemists. The introspecting mind distinguished aspects and qualities of experience, just as primitive chemistry distinguished primary and secondary properties and attributes of matter. In both cases the student aimed to analyse the impressions made by the object of his study upon his sensorium, instead of observing the natural history, behaviour and interaction of this object with other objects. Just as weight, wetness, plasticity, translucency, taste, etc., are aspects or qualities, not elements or components, of water which can be/

be abstracted from it conceptually, but which cannot be presented to our senses in separation from each other or from the unimaginable "essence" in which they 'inhere', so qualities of sensation and feeling and even the three aspects of mental process, cognitive, conative and affective, are not real elements of mind; they do not interact with each other and may indeed owe their apparent independence to the mind which discriminates them. That conation and affection are descriptions of mind rather than real factors in mental process, is apparent when we remember that psychology did not find it necessary to recognise the latter until the end of the eighteenth century, and that even yet the validity and nature of the distinction is not agreed upon (Brentano).

It appeared to me then that just as chemistry had stultified itself for a time with purely descriptive method and the purely illusory problems it raised of essences, properties and attributes, so psychology might even now be doing the same thing and elaborating sterile hair-splitting distinctions. This supposition accounted also fairly well for the relatively high prestige of the Freudian psychology. Although the latter had involved itself in all the difficulties of associationism, it had at the same time founded itself upon an analysis rather than/

then upon a description of mind. That is to say, that instead of distinguishing aspects and classifying forms of mental process, it had catalogued and studied the relations and natural history of concrete ideas, images, wishes, etc. Although perhaps it credited these with too great a measure of functional independence, there is no doubt that in accepting these cognitive, conative, - affective, units as the elements and factors of mind, psycho-analysis opened up for itself an avenue of real development.

In 1918 in Mesopotamia, I had an opportunity of studying insanity among orientals. In six hundred admissions in that year I came across twenty-seven different races representing most cultures on the south Pacific littoral. For various reasons the praecox paranoid group aggregated about forty per cent of this material, and I was impressed with the following facts.

I. The extreme frequency of a history of a change of religion in these cases, though changes of religion in these cultures are in general rare, involving as they do entire change of custom, tradition, associates, and even of economic conditions.

II. The remarkable uniformity in certain respects of the praecox/

praecox and paranoid syndrome among members of so many and such widely differing cultures.

These observations emphasised the essential autistic aspect of the disease, or, as I now see it, the peculiar indifference of these cases to the beliefs of their fellows.

In studying the varieties of religious belief moreover, their essential similarity to delusional formation forced itself upon my attention. In the lower religions wish-fulfilments and phantasy-replacements of reality are apt to be naive. Viewed collectively by a non-believer they could not be regarded as other than collective or social delusions. The significance of changes of belief, of individual delusion, was therefore emphasised, and the social point of view appeared as necessary for the understanding of belief and delusion as the data of individual psychology.

While it is abundantly evident that psycho-pathology deals with ~~a~~ every heterogeneous collection of cases, it seems more than probable that over and above brain disease and defect and various endo-psychic mechanisms, that there are a group of causes affecting unfavourably the/

the social rapport ^{of certain} individuals, i.e., their affective relations with their fellows and with their culture. It may have psychological as well as practical social significance that certain groups of cases are characterised by indifference to the feelings and beliefs of their fellows, to convention, custom, tradition and law. It appeared as if the psychology of the individual tended to disregard the mechanism of social integration, or at least paid too little attention to it. Here I perceived another possible reason for the relative success of the Freudian psychology. Besides being objective it is from the first concerned with the affective relationships of individuals to each other, it is predominantly a social psychology, in topic if not in method. All the same the Freudian psychology centres its interpretation upon the individual mind, taking the common view that culture, myth, etc., are its productions. Ernest Jones even ["WAR and Individual Psychology" (1915)] explicitly argues against the possibility of any social as distinct from an individual psychology. Psycho-analysis moreover was supplementing its doctrines with a number of biological theories, thereby implying that it had exhausted the potentialities of the psychological/

psychological method. In particular it interpreted certain facts and sequences of early mental development as being the expression of an innate tendency to recapitulate ~~the~~ phases of ancestral evolution. In attributing so much to germinal causes psycho-analysts are for once in agreement with many psychiatrists who abjure psychological explanations in toto. Such an alliance is naturally very strong, for who would dispute with the physiologists what the psychoanalysts yielded to them? It seemed therefore as if psycho-analysis had already forestalled social psychology, and by linking up with physical science, had rendered all other explanations superfluous.

Any psychopathic process not due to recognised individual traumata, would then be due to germinal inheritance.

We know however that besides germinal inheritance there is a social inheritance, a transmission of culture, tradition and even of tastes and points of view, family peculiarities are transmitted by imitation. Social and germinal ~~explanations,~~ *inheritance are then to some extent complementary explanations* and it is not obvious what relative parts they play in the transmission of psychopathy. While the germinal inheritance of imbecility, and of other gross organic defects and disorders, is manifest, the failure to demonstrate this transmission in the case of/

of the neuroses and the psychoses is all the more glaring. Though facts and even the logic of the statistical method are strained to the uttermost, though the conjecture of dissimilar heredity is made to help out the evidence of the inheritance of insanity, instead of being based thereon, in spite of all this special pleading, the hereditary transmission of the neuroses and psychoses remains doubtful. It is even possible that the facts admit of a different, cultural, interpretation.

The part attributed to the germinal mechanism by the psycho-analytic school in their recapitulation hypothesis, is even more questionable than the crude attribution of all psychopathies to germinal variation. I have therefore critically examined:-

- (1) the evidence for, and theory of, the germinal transmission of mental characters in general and of psychopathy in particular.
- (2) The extent and validity of the liason between psycho-analysis and biology.
- (3) The validity and necessity of the theory of mental recapitulation and the question of alternative interpretation of the facts.

The first paper (written 1920 published 1922, Journal of Neurology and Psychopathology) is selected from the group/

group dealing with heredity and insanity, and ^{is} included in this thesis because it indicates the relations of this topic to psychopathology, and in particular to social inheritance - the mechanism of the transmission of culture and tradition. The second paper is a general criticism of Freud's attempt to secure psycho-analysis upon a biological foundation, an attempt which if successful would secure for his psychology incontestable supremacy, *It shows that "social" interpretations are superfluous.* The third and fourth criticise, in more detail, his attempt to place a biological interpretation upon certain facts of mental development. My position is that not only is this recapitulation hypothesis false and untenable in itself, but that it hinders our understanding of the true psycho-sociological significance of the facts. (Paper number three, written 1922 published 1924, Journal of Neurology and Psychopathology)

Pari passu with these biological considerations I studied the psychological basis of the social adaptation. I noted that this was not homologous throughout the animal kingdom (Lancet Nov. 19th, 1921, "Significance of the Sexual Instinct for Psychology and Anthropology), and criticised the attempt to explain society as due to the operation of a specific instinct ("Critique of the Theory of Herd Instinct," written 1921, published Journal of Mental/

Mental Science, 1922, paper number five of thesis.)
 In a series of articles in the same Journal I then indicated the sphere and principles of social psychology, examining its relation to the psychology of the individual, with a view to understanding its applicability to psychiatry (Journal of Mental Science, 1923, paper number six of this thesis.)

The clinical opportunities afforded by my position as Medical Superintendent of the Criminal Lunatic Department, induced me to begin my review of social phenomena with a study of the actual disorders of the social disposition. Paper number ⁸ seven is a discussion of the conception and gnology of moral imbecility and moral insanity. Paper number ⁹ eight consists of two illustrative case histories (Journal of Mental Science, 1924.) [No ¹⁰ 9. is a preliminary discussion of Pathogenesis.]

Conclusions as to the essential nature of the social rapport, (or, regarded from the standpoint of the psychology of the individual, 'the social disposition') can only be drawn from an analysis of much case material considered in conjunction with the facts of suggestion, of mob behaviour, of early affective development, of comparative sociology, of the natural history of culture, (ethnology)/

(ethnology), and generally of psychopathic phenomena - an immense variety of complex data. A synthesis of all these facts and theories is not possible at any given time, and has not been attempted by me at this stage, even a summary must have arbitrary and fallacious definiteness. These and ^{other} papers represent merely the tentative exploration of a wide field from a new point of view.- that of social psychology. The most I can claim for them is a preparatory utility, that in clearing the ground by the demolition of certain obsolescent theories, way is made for the trying-out but the no-man's land between biology & psychology of social psychology, is not occupied by any one coherent theory, but by a number of partial explanations, which often contradict each other. A critical review of these topics must therefore itself be somewhat disconnected; to be useful it must deal with the criticised theories seriatim, and it can never aim at system and coherence for itself, except in so far as it proceeds always from the same data and standpoint. Moreover the utility of a criticism depends upon its prompt publication, and for this reason a systematic criticism of the whole field, even if possible, would be useless. It therefore seemed best to present the series of papers in their original form.

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"SERIES A. BIOLOGICAL."

PSYCHOPATHOLOGY AND THE THEORY OF PSYCHOPATHIC

(GERMINAL) INHERITANCE

In the psychological interpretation of a mental disease such as paranoia we are under the necessity of explaining the statistical fact of its high familial incidence. For the physico-chemical interpretation, however, the heritability of 'delusional insanity' presents no difficulty; indeed, in the absence of any specific histopathological findings, any characteristic lesion or abnormality whatever, the evidence of its inheritance is the only empirical ground for assuming in this mental disease, a structural basis determined otherwise than by function. Since there is physical but not ~~physical~~ continuity between successive generations, it might be argued that structure alone is transmitted; so far as morbid inheritance is proved a significant factor in the etiology of the neuroses, to the same extent the psychological etiology will be invalidated.

In this way the question of inheritance becomes crucial for psychiatry. Those ~~diseases~~ diseases which are fatally determined ab ovo must have a purely 'organic' development (pathogenesis), must be studied and formulated 'physically'; effective treatment (if any such be imaginable) must follow/

follow the same lines, and it would appear that prophylaxis is limited to eugenic measures. If the germinal cause be necessary, but not in itself sufficient then prophylaxis or treatment that preserves the individual without diminishing his fertility (or at least limiting it in certain directions) will defeat its own ends by disseminating the predisposition through the population. In so far as we attribute pathogenic efficiency to a germinal abnormality (always hypothetical) we limit the significance of 'trauma.' By solving the etiological problem in this manner we decrease the value and interest of the study of disease; by emphasizing the importance of germinal determination (morbid), and hence of inherited structure, we assign a superficial rôle to psychological interpretations. This would not further our understanding of the phenomena of paranoia and the neuroses.

It should be noticed that those diseases with mental symptoms in which an hereditary transmission has been most clearly made out, are precisely those in which the organic basis is most obvious.

The ideal of psychopathological interpretation is the formulation (from the standpoint of both experience and behaviour) of the nature and development of the morbid condition under its consideration, and the reference/

reference of abnormalities to traumata (in the widest sense) acting through the sense organs (i.e., by normal afferent channels) and not by physical or chemical means, directly upon nerve tissue. Fundamental, endogenous abnormalities of disposition are subjectively ~~in~~intelligible; they could not be appreciated by the patient or communicated to the doctor, since each interprets mind in terms of his own, and words exist only for trans-subjective meanings. The subjective evaluation of innate disposition is then impossible (except by exclusion); behaviour gives at best a rough quantitative indication of this; and it is obvious that psychopathology cannot assimilate the 'individual' and the 'innate' into its causal sequence. It is concerned with abnormal modifications of thought and conduct due to abnormal experience, and its objective is to complete as far as possible this causal explanation, deducing therefrom rational prophylaxis and treatment.

So far as values and qualitative experience generally are concerned, we have no resources but the current psychological conceptions interpreted in terms of our own experience. By what other vehicle than terms of accepted meaning can the patient communicate to/

to us his thought processes? He has no standard of comparison to enable him to appreciate his abnormality; even if he had a supernaturally acquired insight, he has no means of imparting to us an appreciation of any qualitative differences between his mind and ours. Only in so far as minds are similar can they develop (since development is a social process); only in so far as they are similar can they be scientifically studied and understood. Even could psychological analysis delve down (subjectively) to the bedrock of inherited tendencies, etc., it could never satisfactorily generalize these, could never make of them a scientific pathology.

For the psychopathologist, then, a patient is a potentially normal mind whose feelings, beliefs, attitudes, interests, and other reactions have been warped by abnormal experience. To an understanding of trauma and pathogenesis he looks for prophylaxis and therapy. The innate and the individual are an irresolvable residual which represent the limitations of his method. He is concerned to criticize the genetic interpretation put upon the familial incidence of mental diseases. For those diseases whose transmission is proved to be physiological he must abandon etiological research; /

research; where proof is wanting he must insist on the question remaining open.

I think it is sufficiently obvious that where transmission of any disease with mental symptoms is proved to take place through the mechanism of physical heredity, the physiological interpretation of that disease starts with a fundamental advantage - the certainty that its method is valid. On the other hand, in studying these diseases psychopathology must take account of a fact that is outside its 'universe of discourse.'

Here, then, in the mode of inheritance of any particular mental disease, is a criterion which will enable us to choose our line of research, which might save the psychopathologist a fruitless task. If the disease is inherited by physical channels, its fundamental cause and nature are physical. Psychological formulation is secondary and superficial; psychotherapy at best is palliative; mental hygiene, as I say, a means of propagating unsound stock. Both theoretically and practically, then, it is a matter of fundamental importance to attain definite knowledge of the validity of the interpretation of the facts in terms of physical heredity, and whether there is any possible alternative interpretation.

Failing/

Failing organic defects or stigmata whose correlation with innate defect of mind is completely established, the only positive proof of an organic transmission of mental characters would be a 'Mendelian' distribution among offspring. The noteworthy attempt of Davenport and Weeks to demonstrate this has been criticized by Mott himself, and we will here only remark that it is fully made out only in those diseases whose 'organic' basis is otherwise fully manifest. Unless such a 'specific pattern' is demonstrated, statistics can show only a connection between cases, and it seems worthy while to consider what alternative causal connection (to the germinal one) can exist. For the purpose of this inquiry we can accept the statistics of familial incidence without criticism, being merely concerned to show all possible causal connections between cases of mental disease, other than hereditary transmission and physical infection.

It is obvious that if trauma is here of any etiological importance, exposure to identical traumata must be a factor in certain 'bad family histories'. Unless the ontogenesis of mental disease be denied, it must be admitted that environmental causes themselves tend to produce a grouping of cases within certain families, in excess/

excess of theoretical expectation. That is to say, the incidence will not be 'random'; in the absence of all causal connection between cases, physical or psychical, statistics would still show a tendency to family grouping; by bearing on each generation in turn, such traumata as those arising from poverty and bodily weakness or deformity will tend to produce a succession of mental troubles within the family simulating inheritance.

For psychic characters other channels of transmission exist than the mechanism of physical inheritance. A child's imitation of mannerisms, standards and judgments is notorious. Its suggestibility is not merely positive; even the simple organic appetites are profoundly modified by upbringing. Interests, ambitions, sense of value and 'proportion', common-sense', 'moral' sense, sociability (or at least attitude to, and interest in, one's fellows), habits of industry, occupational 'bent', skill and capacity, tastes, enjoyments, hobbies, amusements, to say nothing of the capacity for clear and independent thinking and for controlling conduct in accordance with decisions so arrived at - all these are mainly acquired. Yet these practically form character and disposition; a healthy balance in these is mental health. Of course it will be argued that the 'predisposition' interferes with/

with the establishment of these mental qualities, etc. This must, however, be proved in general, and not merely assumed in regard to these cases which eventuate in psychoses, etc. It may be accepted, however, as certain that upbringing, as distinct from trauma, has much to do with mental stability or psychopathic predisposition, quite independently of our opinion with regard to the Freudian etiology, the psychic traumata of infancy, etc., and the pathogenic potentialities of certain family relationships.

All these considerations indicate the importance of such ontogenetic factors as, e.g., parental disagreement, irritability, or over-indulgence; the presence of a neurotic, psychotic, or defective member in the child's immediate environment. The family 'tradition' or 'atmosphere', its interests and amusements; its resources for occupying and developing rather than repressing the growing mind; play, games, books, companionships, social ideals and customs - all have a hygienic or pathogenic effect which is limited to the family and therefore expresses itself in statistics in a way indistinguishable from (non-Mendelian) inheritance. That is to say, that, whatever their influence for good or evil, these factors affect families as wholes (to a large/

to a large extent) thus making character, tastes, disposition, ability, temperament, and mental stability, to some extent acquired family characters. Only the specific pattern of a Mendelian distribution (by indicating a chromosomic determinant), will demonstrate unequivocally a physical rather than this psychic transmission. Hence the significance of the work of Davenport and Weeks. Failing the proof of this, the alternative is a suspension of judgement pending an evaluation of the psychic factors.

I have attempted to show that the neuropathological theory of mental disease is associated with the hypothesis of its hereditary transmission. I think even that the two lend each other 'moral' as well as logical support. I have also indicated that the crucial test of the ultimate validity of psychopathological interpretation is its ability to account for high familial incidence of the disease-form to which it is applied. If one might hazard a tentative judgement on these lines while presuming an agreement upon the evidence, one might say that as certain mental syndromes have no typical or integrated psychic aspect, but have, on the other hand, a demonstrably organic basis, we must infer that/

that any hereditary relation is physical, and mutatis mutandis where no neural lesion or abnormality is discoverable. Thus mental defect, as we know, is heritable; the psychoses are questionably so, with the exception of paranoia, which with the minor and anomalous neuroses are probably acquired.

META-PSYCHOLOGY AND BIOLOGY

The Freudian psychology offers plausible interpretations of such a varied and wide assortment of phenomena, it has been so suggestive in research and so potent in therapy, that its relations to all the sciences it touches upon are of the greatest interest. In particular it assigns such importance in mental development and functioning to the fundamental biological urges, that it forms the point of closest contact between the mental and the biological sciences. It is true that "instinct psychologies" of the faculty type are essentially biological; but they are a priori, they make no more than a formal pretence of being psychological, and beyond a sterile, because artificial, classification of mental activities, do not advance our understanding of mind. Psycho-analysis, on the other hand, is a genuine empirical psychology, and its inductions in its own field seem promising for a correlation with biological views of the activities of the organism and with physiological accounts of their mechanism. These facts are recognised and highly valued by Freudians; their attempts to link their theory of mind explicitly with a physico-biological foundation deserve therefore close attention.

Freud's /

Freud's "Beyond the Pleasure Principle" seems to aim at a more general view of mental process, in its relation to life as a whole, than that given by purely empirical psychology. Freud acknowledges the extent to which this departure involves frankly speculative reasoning. He exhibits a growing conviction that the hedonistic interpretation of human behaviour is not comprehensive and sufficient. Psychological analysis cannot get behind the fact that certain stimuli are pleasurable, others painful, that certain activities and tendencies are inherent in the organism and that the latter craves certain specific satisfactions for which no psychological reason can be assigned. That is to say, the canon of psychic determinism cannot get behind the data of values, it cannot carry us beyond the pleasure principle. Whether or not the pleasure principle is really the only or the best instrument for interpreting mental process, there is no doubt, as Freud says, that psycho-analysis has been built upon it. Wherever a mental phenomenon is traced to a previous mental fact (psychic determinism), this process is interpreted by the dynamic formulae of the pleasure principle. When therefore we have searched back to fundamental states of mind, i.e., those which do not appear to be derived from/

from antecedent ones, we leave the region of psychology proper. Here we must find substitutes for the descriptions of experience that apply in the subjective sphere, and naturally we will employ physical conceptions. Objectively considered the pleasure - displeasure mechanism is economic, since its effect is always to reduce psychic tension in the most direct available way, or at the least to keep it constant. Having indicated this translation of the subjective pleasure principle into an objective economic principle (essentially identical), Freud sets out to supplement the latter with a "dynamic and topographical" presentation, this he calls meta-psychology, it certainly is a topic on the borderline between psychology and biology. The latter science therefore has claims to consideration within this sphere. The purpose of this paper is to discuss how far Freud has done justice to these claims.

In the first chapter of "Beyond the Pleasure Principle" Freud briefly indicates the change of topic, of method, and of point of view, just mentioned. He formulates a tentative objective conception of pleasure-displeasure as a rate of alteration in amount of excitation present in the mind - "probably the amount of diminution of increase in a given time is the decisive factor for feeling." He quotes with approval Fechner's hypothesis/

hypothesis "that every psycho-physical movement rising above the threshold of consciousness is charged with pleasure in proportion as it approximates - beyond a certain limit - to complete equilibrium; and with displeasure in proportion as it departs from it beyond a certain limit." To me it appears however as if Fechner's view would allow us to conceive of an augmentation of excitation that is yet pleasurable, i.e., so long as discharge is not too much hindered any heightening of tension will be actually pleasant. Pleasure is however undoubtedly a function of detension, and the general purpose of the psychic apparatus is to bring this about. On the other hand tension is raised by the operation of the instincts, appetites and other tendencies, i.e., by factors meta-psychological in all but their final presentation to the mind. These urges are in fact felt to be painful even where there is no thwarted conation, even where satisfaction is being freely attained, we speak of a 'keen' pleasure in which introspection can detect an element of pain. Such a view in some form commands a very wide acceptance.

Freud goes on to speak of the limitation imposed upon the pleasure principle by that of reality, motivated by the instinct of self-preservation, so that we/

we find one instinct thwarting the immediate gratification of others. The task of the psychic apparatus is thus no longer direct detention but compromise (Page 5.). In the next paragraph reference is made to other unavoidable conflicts within the developing mind. The psychic apparatus must achieve the co-adaptation of somewhat incompatible desires and from these conflicting tendencies organise a harmonious personality. Obviously the psychologist must reckon with many factors beyond the pleasure principle.

The next two chapters develop, from an empirical standpoint, the view that there is a repetition-compulsion which is in no way dependent upon the pleasure principle and which in fact can and does re-instate memories which have not, and never have had, any pleasure value for the subject. Later (Pages 44-45) he finds that the compulsion to repetition is a general "characteristic of instinct, perhaps of all organic life." He says, "According to this an instinct would be a tendency innate in living organic matter impelling it towards the re-instatement of an earlier condition, one which it had to abandon under the influence of external disturbing forces - a kind of organic elasticity, or, to put it another way, the manifestation of inertia in organic life." (Italics in original) Having adduced some facts of migration and spawning/

spawning, in support of this view, he proceeds, "but the search for further examples becomes superfluous when we remember that in the phenomena of heredity and in the facts of embryology we have the most imposing proofs of the organic compulsion to repetition." He then refers to recapitulation in unequivocal terms as supporting his position, and states, that a mechanical explanation of these facts is impossible.

I have criticised the recapitulation hypothesis elsewhere (Journal of Neurology and Psycho-pathology, Feb. 1924.). Here we need merely note how meta-psychology tends to become biology, in which science Freud makes a rather impressive debut. A formal declaration of a vitalistic metaphysic, a new definition and usage of the term instinct, (which is identified with the formative forces of organic development) an assumption of the truth of the Biogenetic Law in its most extreme form, and as we shall see, a total disregard for the principle of evolution by the selection of the fit or of the fittest, (though the analogous principle of economy is made fundamental for psychology), all these "far-fetched conjectures" form perhaps an adequate reason for calling the discussion meta-psychological rather than biological.

"If then all organic instincts" (does this imply a division of instincts into organic and psychic?) "are conservative, historically acquired, and are directed towards/

17.

towards regression, towards reinstatement of something earlier, we are obliged to place all the results of organic development to the credit of external, disturbing and distracting interests. The rudimentary creature would from its very beginning not have wanted to change would, if circumstances had remained the same, have always merely repeated the same course of existence. But in the last resort it must have been the evolution of our earth, and its relation to the sun, that has left its imprint on the development of organisms. The conservative organic instincts have absorbed everyone of these enforced alterations in the course of life and have stored them for repetition; they thus present the delusive appearance of forces striving after change and progress, while they are merely endeavouring to reach an old goal by ways both old and new. This final goal of all organic striving can be stated too. It would be counter to the conservative nature of instinct if the goal of life were a state never hitherto reached. It must rather be an ancient starting point, which the living being left long ago, and to which it harks back again by all the circuitous paths of development. If we may assume as an experience admitting of no exception that everything living dies from causes within itself, and returns to the inorganic, we can only say 'The goal/

goal of all life is death', and, casting back, 'The inanimate was there before the animate,'

Freud himself has commented severely but justly upon metaphysical system-mongering as phantasy projections, but what shall we say of this? We have no evidence of an evolution of physical conditions on the earth's surface, and of a change in the earth's relation to the sun, which parallels the evolution of life. Freud himself admits that it is inconceivable how physical changes could have brought evolution about. Everywhere life is adapting, specialising, indeed its chief failures are due to over-specialised adaptation. Even the regressions of parasitism, when viewed in correct perspective, are seen to be concentrations of effort upon the vital ends of existence, and accordingly to be counter-balanced by tremendous expenditure of energy upon re-~~p~~roduction and by elaborate specialisation where this is of advantage i.e., in other life cycles and phases which enable the species to disseminate itself and perhaps maintain itself independently of its host. No biologist would interpret such an involution as evidence of a tendency to return to a previous evolutionary phase, to a more elementary organisation. A species that can exist in two or more alternative forms and that can/

can maintain itself in as many distinct environments, cannot be regarded as under the influence of a definite regressive tendency. Death itself has been interpreted as an adaptation to promote the increase and evolution of the species. It is more than doubtful whether, as Freud says, "everything living dies from causes within itself." It may be an imperfection or inadequacy of the life principle incidental to the attaining of other evolutionary, ends. It may even be normally due to the effects of parasitism and hence to the vital strivings of other organisms. Disorganisation, return to the inorganic, is certainly due to such activities. No where in the world of life do we find Freud's regressive tendency unequivocally displayed, everywhere we find 'upward' strivings, adaptations, elaborate specialisations, regenerations, evolution, as characteristic of life. Involution, disintegration, return to the inorganic, is to all appearance due to the accident of environment. Surely it is absurd to attribute all the indefinitely varied and elaborate vital activities in the world to the crude and uniform physical agencies of environment, and at the same time to regard death and dissolution as the sole aim, end and activity of the vital principle. Freud is clear-sighted enough to draw, and bold enough to state, the absurd conclusion that the ego instincts 'the/

'the principle of self-preservation', are really death seeking tendencies, i.e., a desire for the manner of death peculiar to the organism concerned.

We here see meta-psychology becoming metaphysics, and that without the resulting gain in simplicity and systematisation of knowledge, which alone justifies philosophical reflection as an aid to science. We can follow with approval speculative attempts to reduce the organic to terms ~~of~~ the inorganic, such fulfil the above condition. Even a pan-psychism might be defended. But Freud is a convinced dualist, i.e., he considers that animistic explanations must be used to supplement mechanistic formulae. He differs however from most animists in this, that he uses the vital principle to explain death and disintegration - a physical process - and assigns the explanation of life processes to the formulae of physical science. Thus he accepts the onus of introducing non-scientific, because teleological, explanations without using them to explain anything which cannot be explained on mechanistic lines.

Besides this complete reversal of the biological conception of life, Freud throughout assumes without comment or apology, that acquired characters are inherited. Underlying his idea that life harks back to the inorganic, there is a conception of the directive force/

force of life as a memory, such a conception is not unknown, but adds, I submit, another load to his already top-heavy speculations. He talks of a purposive striving after death, (return to the inorganic), meaning I take it, that this goal, consciously or unconsciously, must be in some sense represented in the organisms. Since it cannot be an idea based upon sense presentations (in the case of the lower organisms) it must be of the general nature of a memory of the organism's own primordial state. But how, it may be asked, can living matter remember its own condition before it became living matter? And of which of its many inorganic states (prior to vitalisation) does it retain the memory trace? The history of each constituent atom of the organism is different, yet we are asked to picture the totality as striving for a joint reversion. Memory in any conceivable form is organic, and cannot ante-date or refer back to preorganic phases. The atoms of my body need not have been part of any ancestral body, and consequently can have no yearnings to reconstitute such a primitive form, or indeed any memory of such, they have not necessarily taken part in evolution, they have been organised by assimilation during my own life-time, and, in the ordinary course of nature, by katabolism would be returned/

returned to the inorganic state without necessitating the dissolution of my body as a whole. We find therefore that the matter of organisms cannot retain the memory and cannot possess the desires with which Freud appears to credit it. Even pan-zoicism therefore, the postulate of memory and desire residing in matter itself, would not help Freud here, since the matter itself has taken no part in evolution and so cannot possess any tendency to retrace and undo that process. We could go so far with Freud as to compare the activity of the pleasure principle to the running-down tendency of a clock, instinct and appetite representing the winding up, when therefore instinct and appetite fail the clock will run down finally, but the clock did not design and evolve itself with a view to reattaining the condition of inactivity.

To my view this whole theory of Freud's is a phantasy, his vital aims are achieved, his ambitions fulfilled, his interests satisfied, perhaps even he feels that his work is done, in these circumstances unsatisfied,

repressed, infantile longings for return to the mother will attain relative preponderance. Combining forces with a desire to mitigate the unpleasantness of the idea of death, these have expressed themselves in a phantasy which has taken scientific form. Freud's intolerance of superstitious/

superstitious, plainly anthropomorphic immortality phantasies, would not allow him to indulge in the usual idea of heaven, but in this theory he achieves a return to the mother, he reconciles himself to the idea of death and produces a most startling and suggestive scientific theory all at once.

Another difficulty Freud attempts to meet is; how if the life urge is directed towards death has life not achieved its goal - extinction; why do we find life wherever it can be supported; why is extinction apparently due to failure of adaptation? Freud suggests that primitive strains of life may in fact frequently have achieved their own extinction, and here he is in agreement with some of the theories of the origin of life, which represent this as having arisen at more than one point, perhaps in more than one form. Now we can hardly imagine how life could arise, indeed under present conditions biogenesis is incredible, if we seek the reason for this we will at the same time discover why life could not have originated at any very widely separated points of time. It is not really necessary to postulate any vastly different conditions of heat, moisture, etc., from those prevailing at present. The impossibility of biogenesis hinges upon the fact of the presence of parasitic and saprophytic organisms. Prior to/

to their evolution the whole world was a sterile crucible in which synthetic processes were not perpetually terminated by digestion, in which nitrites and carbohydrates etc., could accumulate and interact unchecked for centuries. After life was once disseminated over the globe, a new genesis from inorganic matter would no longer be possible. Quite probably therefore life originated from several stems, but these stems were coeval unless stellar dissemination was also a factor.

Freud's conception of repeated origins and extinctions of life can therefore be true only up to a point, and of course the "decisive external influences" which compelled the living substance "to ever more complicated and circuitous routes to the attainment of the goal of death" are inconceivable, nor does he attempt to suggest their nature. He is then forced to interpret the self-preservative instinct as "part instincts designed to secure the path to death peculiar to the organism" - "the organism is resolved to die only in its own way."

In opposition to the death instincts (which we have been in the fallacious habit of regarding as egoistic and self-preservative) are the sex instincts "although perhaps it only means a lengthening of the path/

path to death." Nevertheless he regards the contradiction as full of significance for psycho-pathology, though he does not indicate the relative importance of the coincident conflict between the individual and his culture. Freud seems indeed to contradict himself (Page 49) where he says "the reproductive cells probably retain the original structure of the living substance and---detach themselves---charged---with---the newly acquired instinctive dispositions." In what form are we to conceive these dispositions if not as structural modifications, and how can the original structure be a modified structure? Is this where mechanistic explanations fail us?

These animadversions are not intended as deprecating the use of speculation, still less as condemning this particularly stimulating and original train of thought. It must be acknowledged also that Freud again and again characterises this speculation as "far-fetched", as "the exploitation of an idea out of curiosity to see whither it will lead" (Page 26) He refers to "this extreme view" and later criticises it; never does he leave us in any doubt as to what he regards as hypothesis and what as fact. But surely even free speculation should take some account of the canon of parsimony. We should not string together a chain of hypotheses of the/
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the greatest gravity and highly controversial, each false if another holds, in order to support some trivial or doubtful conjecture, the chain will break with its own weight. Surely also we should not use hypotheses in place of ascertained and accepted fact and of established principles. Yet Freud does both these things, airily he sweeps away the whole fabric of biology, taking the greatest liberties with the very principles of science, to make room for a meta-psychology constructed of the phantasies of neurotic patients and the dejecta membra of exploded and outgrown biological theories selected because they seem to suit his purpose.

I accept most of the Freudian doctrines with conviction, Freud himself I regard as one of the three great men in the history of mental science. Both as therapy and as mode of investigation of mind psychoanalysis stands supreme. But it is the curse of the movement that enough imbeciles have been attracted to it, and enough nonsense published in its name to do credit to a school of theology. There is no doubt I am afraid that Freud's cautions will be over-looked, ^{these biological} ~~his~~ findings accepted and developed, that he will in fact be teaching the wicked ones their ways. It is a deplorable thing that all but some few of the school adopt his teachings with such enthusiasm that they are thereby impelled to reject/

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reject his method, which is essentially critical and empirical. His whole success was conditioned by his refusal to accept the ponderous but empty psychiatry of his day. 'Take away your a priori theory' seems to have been his working principle, 'and let us develop a theory from nothing but the facts and the most intensive possible study of the facts.' Yet here we find him applying a priori inferences from psychology to biology, though the latter science is on far the sounder and more objective footing. Freud's objection was to the vicious method of interpreting one natural group of phenomena by formulae which were really derived from the study of another group, and to the supporting of this a priori theorising by adducing selected facts. This objection is perfectly valid, but the pity is that Freud seems to think the canon of method should be applied only in favour of psychology. He does not seem to realise how easily meta-psychology becomes a priori biology and physiology. It is perfectly true that if science is ever to offer a coherent explanation of nature, the partial theories developed in each department of experience must constantly endeavour to extend their application to facts not taken account of in their own first formulation. In a sense all inference/

inference is a priori, but in extending a theory from one department of knowledge to another, regard should be paid to theory already existing in that other, since it probably represents the facts on which it is based more impartially and systematically than any outside theory would do. This justice Freud denies to biology, and in fact leads an incursion into the latter science as a naive Lamarckian and holding some very unbiological views on the relation of survival value to evolution.

On page 27 (et seq) we find this argument.

Perceptual consciousness embraces exteroceptive stimuli on the one hand and feeling reactions on the other. It is in this sense the mediator between organism and environment. Originally this mediating function was performed by the whole surface of the simple organism; later part of the surface was withdrawn, centralised, and specialised to deal with the samples of stimuli still transmitted from the other parts of the ectoderm (remaining on the surface) (Page 29) "The grey cortex of the brain remains a derivative of the primitive superficial layer, and it may have inherited essential properties from this." Freud suggests that the mediating function of consciousness, the fact that it "must face towards the outer world and must envelop the other psychic systems" points to the localisation of this function ab origine
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in the outer layers of the organism, or, in the case of higher organisms, their morphological equivalent. So far he is reasonable and ingenious, though the assumption is perhaps greater than its heuristic value justifies. He says (Page 27) "We---are in agreement with the localising tendencies of cerebral anatomy, which places the "seat" of consciousness in the cortical layer, the outermost enveloping layer of the central organ. Cerebral anatomy does not need to wonder why - anatomically speaking - consciousness should be accommodated on the surface of the brain instead of being safely lodged ~~somewhere~~ in the deepest recesses of it." (Italics mine), Freud plainly founds upon the assumption that the cortex of the brain (outer surface) is the homologue or direct descendant and representative of the outermost layers of the ectoderm, whereas of course, the contrary is the case. In its withdrawal from the surface the ectoderm is turned outside in, and the "heirs" of the function of the original body surface should therefore be ependymal cells, or at least cells "in the deepest recesses" of the brain. Both functionally and developmentally therefore (regarded as the apex of the arc) the cortex is the part of the brain furthest removed from the periphery of the body. If Freud's argument is valid therefore cerebral/

cerebral anatomy will have to reconsider the very theory to which Freud's argument looks for support.

Freud proceeds to the startling suggestion that conscious processes are not remembered and that this is because the continued registration of new experience would exhaust the capacity of the physical basis of conscious thinking - "consciousness arises in the place of the memory trace" is a statement for which he claims at least the merit of definiteness. To academic psychology it appears to be definitely false, and that the whole of the inferences based upon it are therefore invalid. Freud himself (Page 32) seems to contradict it without however appreciating the fact. He points out that appreciation of time depends entirely upon the Conscious system of mind. But the function involves the ideal arrangement of a series of events, all but one of which are past, i.e., remembered. We see then that judgements of time, of before and after, are more dependent than any others upon the registration of experiences, and that in the order of their occurrence. Nevertheless I discern an element of empirical truth in Freud's suggestion. Conscious experiences are certainly registered but generally in a systematic way without a 'charge' of emotion being fastened to any one experience. Recall depends therefore on intellectual associative/

associative processes and not upon the autonomous activities of the stored experience. Conscious experiences tend to be stored as passive 'traces' not as dynamic 'complexes'.

It is noteworthy that Freud assigns no function to consciousness. Though he appears to appreciate that consciousness is an invariable concomitant of adaptive processes, and although it is a commonplace that perfected behaviour-adaptations (habits) become non-conscious, he still regards this unique phenomenon as being without biological significance. As a thorough-going and convinced Lamarckian how can Freud understand the acquisition and wide distribution of this function? It may be admitted that having allotted such complete functional capacity to unconscious mental processes, psycho-analysis leaves itself at a disadvantage in regard to finding a specific function for consciousness. Nevertheless as a pure speculation I would suggest that the coincidence of consciousness with the process of adaptation of wish to opportunity, is sufficiently close to merit attention.

Freud ignores the fact that the central nervous system exists only in higher animals and is not an evolution from, but superposed upon and additional to, the primitive nervous system that characterises the lower. His suggestion as to the evolution from a superficial/

superficial to a central sensorium, ignores this primitive nervous system or confuses it with the central system. It ignores the process of evolution from coelenterate to protochordate levels, and asks us to imagine the evolution of a central nervous system in a type of organism that one is forced to classify as protozoal. His whole conception of a "vesicle" first evolving a hyper-sensitive cortex, then acquiring a protective "in a measure inorganic" cuticle, and withdrawing and centralising its sensorium, seems to take little account either of the known facts of evolution or of the necessary conditions of survival. It confuses sensibility to stimulus with sensibility to injury. The first as the basis of all adaptation is wholly valuable and excessive development is inconceivable. The specialisation of sense organs represents an increase not a decrease of sensibility. As a matter of fact the elaboration of insensitive integuments is most unusual where there is a central nervous system, but quite common where there is not. The idea that a race could first evolve a sensitivity incompatible with existence and then compensate for this by an overcoat of insensitivity, does not appear valid from the stand point of survival value.

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We may fairly charge Freud with an entire lack of interest in evolutionary problems. At least he never takes the biological point of view. This also would explain his utterly uncritical acceptance of the Lamarckian principle and of the recapitulation theory, neither of which does he ever appear to think needs a word of defence or the acknowledgement of a possible alternative view. Though "Beyond the Pleasure Principle" is really a biological essay, Freud shows throughout a conspicuous disregard for biological fact, biological theory and biological problems.

CRITIQUE OF THE THEORY OF MENTAL

RECAPITULATION.

Does mental development recapitulate mental evolution?

General considerations.

The validity of a theory is judged not merely by its descriptive utility, but also by its functional (heuristic) value to science. If it enables us to generalise beyond the sphere of actual observation, if it suggests new starting points and methods of research, if it coordinates and 'explains' many and otherwise unconnected phenomena, or links together previously unrelated theory, above all if it enables us to predict and control events, it has then an interest for us beyond its mere capacity to represent or 'symbolise' facts. This is not to say that a theory can have permanent value for science independent of its correspondence with fact; it must ultimately be judged by its truth. But some of the discredited conceptions of the past have played a most valuable part in the process of science, and indeed all theories in their turn must be supplanted by more adequate instruments of thought. In the absence of verification or disproof an assessment of the heuristic value of a theory can profitably and legitimately be made.

The protagonists of the theory of mental recapitulation/

recapitulation cannot fairly object to criticism on these grounds, for the theory they defend owes much of its vogue and prestige to its supposed heuristic value. I think that it can be shown that the theory has outlived its usefulness, that much that has been promised on its behalf can never be fulfilled, and that its application to psychology can be of no conceivable value to that science.

There is another reason for keeping before our minds the value of the theory. It is not systematically worked out (for psychology) or even definitely stated, and therefore, under criticism, is liable to shift its ground. Now if all resemblance between ontogeny and phylogeny, no matter how general, no matter how caused, is accepted as evidence of recapitulation, then the theory cannot be verified or disproved. Under these circumstances, however, it will have no scientific value; no inference can be drawn from a vague and untested description, it cannot even in that form be the starting point of induction. For example, in development as in evolution the simple (egg) must precede the complex. We do not need the recapitulation theory to tell us this, and in any case the fact is so empty of content as to be quite useless to us. Again, for example/

example, it is accepted that the early phases of Jewish life-history and race-history are alike 'uncircumcised'. Is this recapitulation? Or must we recognise that a false or artificial recapitulation is possible? These examples are extreme to the point of absurdity, but they do show that even in regard to organic characters (and how much more in regard to mental - so moulded by tradition), an artificial or 'pseudo-recapitulation' is possible. How are we to distinguish this from the 'real' phenomenon unless we define the theory?

If we insist that recapitulation is a definite phenomenon, due to definite mechanism (discoverable), and if we insist on a corresponding definiteness of evidence and interpretation, we will find the theory undemonstrable; if we leave it a vague and mystical principle, we will find it worthless.

There may occur a difference of opinion as to the amount and character of the evidence necessary to establish the dictum that mental development recapitulates mental evolution, with its implication that there is a causal connection between the series.

The demonstration of mental recapitulation presents much the same logical problem as the demonstration of 'telepathy'. In both cases the data consist in certain resemblances between the mental products of different individuals/

individuals. In both cases the thesis is that the resemblance is brought about by a special (and otherwise unknown) mechanism. Both theories must therefore show that 'chance', that all known agencies which might bring about mental resemblances, are insufficient to account for the resemblances actually found.

Now thought products - like human beings - are often similar but rarely absolutely alike, and identification is more certain the more detailed and specific the resemblance. To prove that two thoughts have had a common origin or are otherwise interdependent one must demonstrate that they have a highly complex, point-to-point resemblance. Then only can a causal connection be postulated. As with particular thought products, so with the process of mental development, a close, detailed, intimate correspondence is of infinitely more weight than any empty, general and abstract resemblance. Abstract resemblances can always be found, patience, ingenuity and a poetic imagination will achieve anything. We want, however, concrete, literal identities which unequivocally show the two series as 'functions' of each other, and that the likeness is not merely accidental, simulated (artificial) or imaginary. Since 'mental' recapitulation is a hypothesis of even greater gravity than that of 'telepathy' we have a right to demand/

demand an equally critical scrutiny of the evidence; that the resemblances upon which it is based shall be shown to be reasonably frequent, precise and not due to known 'external' environmental factors (artificial).

Biological Considerations,

The origin of the Recapitulation Theory, appears in the observation of Agassiz that there is a general parallelism between the development of embryos and the palaeontological series. For pre-evolution thought this conception was not fruitful; but Von Baer generalised and formulated the facts. It was claimed for his 'Law' that it permitted us to reconstruct phylogeny from a study of ontogeny. "We may draw our conclusions with the utmost certainty as to the nature of the ancestral form, from the features of the form which the embryo momentarily assumes." (Haeckel, 'Evolution of Man') The 'Law' therefore became not merely a suggestive observation, but was now supposed to enable us to fill up the gaps in our knowledge of evolution from our observations of individual development.

Resemblances between ontogeny and phylogeny were eagerly sought for, and played a great part in the 'evolution' controversies, and the 'Recapitulation Hypothesis' undoubtedly won much prestige from its mere association with the triumphant 'Evolution Theory/

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Theory'. In Haeckel's presentation, however, the 'Biogenetic Law' attained the zenith of its fame and exercised its maximum influence upon our 'tradition'. He claimed that "Phylogeny is the mechanical cause of Ontogeny", and consequently that an understanding of the interdependence of development and evolution would give us our most intimate possible insight into the factors and mechanisms of both processes. The precise nature of the causal connection between ontogeny and phylogeny would be the 'key' problem of biology, and the observed onto-phylogenetic parallelism would be the most promising starting point of research. Haeckel regarded the 'Biogenetic Law' not merely as a general description of facts - extending and consolidating our knowledge certainly, but still only a description - for him it was a correlation from which the most profound and far-reaching inductions were possible as to the process of evolution, the nature of germinal inheritance and the mechanisms of development. All the problems then engaging the attention of biologists appeared to have the most significant relation to recapitulation.

Systematic examination of the facts, however, has shown that altogether too much was expected of the theory; and a comparison of the 'classics' of biology and/

and contemporary writings shows how far the theory has lost credit and how risky it is to use these classics as text books. Exceptions to the 'Law' predominate, so that the claim that it enabled us to infer from the onto-genetic to the phylo-genetic series and vice-versa had speedily to be abandoned. Obviously the probability of such inferences is inversely proportional to the ratio of exceptions, and Haeckel himself admits "in-most cases the correspondence is very imperfect." (Evolution of Man), Sir Archdall Reid - a convinced recapitulationist - says of the resemblance between ontogeny and phylogeny, "it may, and usually does, become unrecognisable, - - - as a result we cannot with any degree of accuracy trace the early ancestry of our race by watching the development of the individual." "No one, having an elementary acquaintance with the facts, has ever alleged that récapitulation is ever other than incomplete and inaccurate." ('Laws of Heredity') He refers also to complete obliterations and falsifications of the record. Comparing this with Haeckel's statement, above, ("we may infer with the utmost certainty, etc."), we may see how completely biological opinion has changed in regard to recapitulation as a valid generalisation.

This is not the only respect in which the recapitulation theory has lost prestige. From the prepondance of/
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of exceptions to the 'Law' it is obvious that the causal connection between, and the factors common to, development and evolution cannot be so all-important as they were once thought to be, while their investigation must be much more complicated and unpromising. We can no longer regard "phylogeny as the mechanical cause of ontogeny" (Haeckel) and from this (Lamarckian) standpoint investigate the nature of this mechanism. Indeed, the interdependence of ontogeny and phylogeny does not appear sufficient to warrant the postulation of any special mechanism constraining the individual to "climb his own family tree."

The descriptive value of Agassiz' observation, the validity (as extending our knowledge) of Von Baer's generalisation, and the inductive value of Haeckel's causal interpretation, are gravely impaired.

But this still does not represent the whole change that has taken place in biological opinion with regard to the recapitulation theory. The evidence upon which it was based is universally admitted to have been selected and is even regarded as equivocal. That is to say, the interpretation of the facts which this theory offers is seriously questioned, the suggestion being made that the resemblance is not so much between embryonic phase and adult ancestral form, as between the embryogenies/

embryogenies of allied species, all of which, together or separately, may diverge from the course of their common ancestral evolution.

We shall see that the all-important point is the question of the necessary causal connection between the ontogenetic and the phylogenetic series. It is therefore of the greatest interest to see how 'biological' recapitulationists deal with exceptions to the 'Law.' Haeckel admitted a whole class of these, which he called "ceno-genetic" characters, and which had this in common, that they were precise, specific, adaptations to either ancestral or embryonic special conditions. The difference between the two environments (e.g. in regard to nutrition, respiration, locomotion, reproduction, etc.) demands specialised adaptations to each which are incompatible with life in the other. Recapitulation in these important respects is impossible, but we will not follow Haeckel in assuming that otherwise it would have taken place, and that these exceptions represent a modification of the otherwise universal 'Biogenetic Law', due to the paramount 'Law of Natural Selection.' Natural selection, strictly speaking, has nothing to do with vital adaptations, and in any case could not have brought about this divergence unless there had been a/
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a fortuitous variability to select from, i.e., unless recapitulation does not hold. To begin with, the admitted fact here is that recapitulation is not true and this 'explanation', as also the 'Law of Anticipation', are retractions or modifications of the 'Biogenetic Law.' Exceptions remain exceptions however formulated and explained, and these supplementary formulae actually presuppose a variability in regard to recapitulation, since they do not postulate an influence causing ontogeny to diverge from Phylogeny but only a directive selection of preexisting divergencies. It is interesting to note, however, that if Haeckel's generalisation is correct, that characters specially adapted to adult ancestral or foetal conditions do not recapitulate, then we would not expect a recapitulation in the mental sphere. This is the special 'adaptive' character, and as regards both stimulus and reaction possibilities the foetal and ancestral environments are widely different. A priori, therefore, we would expect that the development of the mental function, like that of the respiratory, nutritional and locomotor functions to which it is closely related, would not recapitulate its evolution.

It is not possible to criticise the 'biological' aspects/

aspects of the recapitulation theory here. Enough has perhaps been said to show that the evidence in its favour is by no means conclusive or even unequivocal, and that far from being an accepted truth it is an exceedingly controversial proposition. In applying it to psychology we must then remember that we have not a consensus of biological opinion behind us, but that, on the contrary, even in its own home, the recapitulation theory is losing credit.

It is true that many biologists still strive to establish correlations between the ontogenetic and the phylogenetic series, to demonstrate that this or that phase or feature of embryogeny has a true ancestral homology. But even where they achieve their aim, and demonstrate the real parallel, it is obvious that the task of biology has only reached its first stage. These correlations are not explanatory but, on the contrary, demand explanation. They merely introduce us to the problems of the causes of evolution, the mechanism of development and the nature of the interdependence of the two series. These problems are taken up by experimental embryology, which by physiological method aims to furnish us with physico-chemical explanations. It is perhaps significant that the exponents of the purely "evolutionary" methods do not always realise the limited value of their interpretations (onto-phylogenetic correlation)/

onto-phylogenetic correlation), and are sometimes out of sympathy with physiology, which is destined to take over and complete their task.

I have insisted upon the importance of a clear and agreed understanding of the implications of the recapitulation theory. We are told that the psycho-analytic contention that mental development recapitulates mental evolution, is merely an 'extension' of the 'Biogenetic Law', i.e., that the same cause brings about recapitulation in the mental and organic spheres. Now biologists can hardly conjecture how recapitulation can be brought about, but if the theory has any value it implies that there is a specific causal connection between ontogeny and phylogeny - that the organism has an intrinsic, inherent biological tendency to 'climb its own family tree', and is not merely passively moulded by environmental influences into a succession of simulacra of evolutionary phases. I will show later that such pseudo-recapitulation actually occurs. From the 'biological' point of view it is artificial or 'accidental'.

What, then do we know or must we suppose to be the cause of recapitulation? Whether we hold with Lamarck that ancestral adaption can directly produce coincident/

coincident germinal variation, or with Weismann that evolution proceeds solely by the elimination of non-adaptive variations, we must equally in either case regard the constitution of the zygote as the factor that relates development (individual) to evolution (racial), and therefore as the factor upon which the correspondence between the two (i.e. recapitulation) depends. If phylogeny is the mechanical cause of ontogeny, this can only be because of its effect upon the germ-plasm. If germinal variations (whatever their origin) are the common cause of phylogenetic forms and ontogenetic phases, we must surely regard them as responsible for the sequence in which these two series occur. Since it is the parallel between the two series (especially in regard to their order) that constitutes recapitulation, we may fairly say that the biological theory of recapitulation depends upon the view that the germ-plasm, the 'bearer of heredity', the 'physical mechanism of inheritance' is the channel through which ancestral influences affect development (if only by natural selection of a particular germ-plasm, etc.) and is, or contains, the mechanism through which recapitulation is brought about. In biology the germ-plasm is the only connection between, the only factor common to, the organism and its ancestry. Any tendency to recapitulation must operate through this mechanism. Therefore only so far as development/

development is a function of innate endowment (the germ-plasm), is it possible for an organism to recapitulate. So far as the complementary factor - environment - moulds development (by selecting certain potentialities for realisation, etc.) a true recapitulation cannot occur. Innate characters may recapitulate, acquired characters do not.

Implications for psychology

Now for psychology this is tantamount to ^{saying} ~~say~~ that so far as mental development recapitulates mental evolution in the biological sense, it shows itself dependent upon the physico-chemical endowment and independent of the special characters of environment, upbringing, etc. ~~and~~ The corollary of this position is, that we must turn to cytological and biochemical methods for an understanding of the antecedents of infantile behaviour. Since the proximal link in the chain of causation stretching back from the child to his ancestry, is the fertilised ovum, and since ancestral recapitulatory tendencies all act through this, we must seek in this developmental mechanism the explanation of all behaviour that is recapitulatory.

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This may be so, and psycho-analysis may thus be on the point of defining, earlier than we dared hope, the respective roles of heredity and environment in mental development. At the same time, and in so far as psycho-analysts succeed in demonstrating recapitulation, they are limiting the aetiological significance to be attached to the function of 'nature'. Now the most important achievement of the psycho-analytic movement has been the demonstration of the pathogenic effect of certain emotional relationships, etc. in childhood. The working rule which has enabled it to make its unique contribution ~~to~~ psych-pathology is the canon, (not principle), of psychic determinism which asserts that the causes of acts and thoughts should be sought in the antecedent 'experience' of the individual, i.e. in 'nurture'. It is to be hoped that the exponents of psycho-analysis will have further success in relating mental characteristics and abnormalities to factors and abnormalities of upbringing, thus adding to our prophylactic, therapeutic and educative resources. It seems, however, that in claiming that biological recapitulation holds in the sphere of mental development they are admitting a restriction in the applicability of their method.

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This is surely not a triumph.

It is true there is no logical contradiction involved in asserting recapitulation and psychic determinism; they are merely mutually exclusive, mutually limiting. Each may hold ⁱⁿ its own sphere, but not both together. In the absence of conclusive proof, however, I suggest that it would be sound method for psychology to scrutinise very critically any hypothesis assigning to nature as against nurture a preponderant role in mental development.

Sir Archall Reid deduces the recapitulation theory as a necessary consequence of the modern evolution theory, (op. cit. p. 24) "we perceive that the theory that every individual in his own development climbs his own genealogical tree must necessarily be true. Given the unquestionable fact that the child recapitulates the development of the parent, any method other than by a recapitulation of the life-history of the race is not only impossible, but actually unthinkable. One truth necessarily involves the other " On p. 28 of the same work we find :- "As a fact we should know the doctrine of recapitulation as true even if an embryo resembling a lower type had never been seen, and it had been ascertained merely that the embryos of different generations resembled one another as much as the adult/

adult individuals."

In 'Development and Evolution' J.M. Baldwin says:- "If we hold that mind and brain processes are parallel as well in the species as in the individual, and also hold that the brain series in the individual's development recapitulates in the main the series gone through by his species in race descent or evolution, then it follows that the law of recapitulation must hold also for the mental."

If we accept these findings we must admit that mental recapitulation is a necessary inference from ~~the~~ fundamental and ~~un~~iversally accepted biological truths. Reid says it is unthinkable - logically impossible - that organic development should not recapitulate organic evolution. Baldwin says that given organic recapitulation, mental recapitulation must follow unless we are to believe that mind can exist and function independently of matter.

This chain of reasoning formidable as it appears, will not stand examination at any point. Organic recapitulation is not a corollary of the evolution theory and does not in fact obtain. The argument for mental recapitulation from the principle of psycho-physical parallelism, has therefore the ground cut from under it. But it is itself intrinsically erroneous, for it does not follow that **functional** development proceeds pari-passu with organic development/

development.

Dealing with Baldwin's argument first, we must note that, as worked out by himself ('Mental Development in the Child and the Race, 3rd edition pp. 15-16), the theory of mental recapitulation equates the infant's first reactions with the racial phase of "simple contractility with the organic analogue of pleasure and pain." That is to say, he regards human mental development as beginning at the very beginning - on a psychological level with the protista. The "child begins in its pre-natal and early post-natal experience with blank sensation and pleasure and pain with the motor adaption to which they lead." On the most favourable construction, he is arguing that the evolutionary parallel to the stage of mental development of the human being at birth is to be found among the invertebrata, and so on for later phases.

Leaving out of account the difficulties raised by the consideration that more primitive animals (than man) are born with more highly developed minds, we wish to know how Baldwin's own statements are consistent with the principle of psyche-physical parallelism from which they are mainly supposed to be/

be deduced. Baldwin tells us (in the two books cited) again and again with an explicitness peculiarly his own that gaps in either the physical or psychical series can be filled up from our knowledge of the other; "either series is sufficient to carry us over the critical point" (the gap).

If, however, we endeavour to fill in the gaps in our knowledge of mental development in the infant by a study of the physical correlate of mind, we must credit him with a mentality not substantially inferior to that of an adult man. In complexity the brain already exceeds that of the adult of any non-human species. If, on the other hand, we were to make inferences about his brain from an observation of his behaviour, we might well conclude that it is simpler, more primitive than the central nervous system of many invertebrates. Yet, if the principle of psycho-physical parallelism were a trustworthy guide - as Baldwin expounds it - we should reach identical results in inferring from either side.

The real source of Baldwin's error lies in the meaning he attributes to the principle of psycho-physical parallelism. It is a safe and necessary postulate/

postulate that mental process does not take place apart from brain function, and that conversely, the latter corresponds invariably and specifically to mental process. But after (unnecessarily) demonstrating the above principle as universal, etc., Baldwin tacitly alters its meaning and now uses it to imply that mental process corresponds always and absolutely with brain structure - an entirely different proposition. For although it is true that brain structure determines the potentialities of brain function (and hence, by our agreed principle, of mind) nevertheless it cannot be absolutely paralleled therewith. For example, the same brain under different conditions of stimulation may function in different ways, and by habit and accommodation pursue widely different alternatives of mental development. Again, resting and embryonic phases of brain life may be non-functional, and in fact it is roughly true that mental development begins where cerebral development leaves off. At any rate there can be little definite mental process before birth and there can be no organic recapitulation after about the age of three. Baldwin overlooks the fact that structures do not necessarily function at the time and in the order in which they appear, and, therefore, that cerebral recapitulation need not imply mental. It is also quite/

quite inconceivable that cultural evolution, with its periodic involutions, fusions and renaissances, has been paralleled by changes in cerebral endowment; it is quite reasonable to suppose that it may reach undreamt-of heights with the same cerebral potentialities as at present.

Recapitulation in the affective sphere is not possible, inasmuch as no demonstrable evolution has occurred. What development does take place here consists in cultural refinements and sublimations which are obviously in opposition to biological tendencies. Any parallel between cultural history and individual assimilation to that culture (which is really what mental development means) is not a biological phenomenon and requires a psycho-social interpretation. I have called it pseudo-recapitulation and will deal with it more fully in another article. In the unique case of sex the reverse of recapitulation takes place. For, while we must suppose the primitive form of the instinct to have had that fixity and definiteness necessary for the achievement of its biological purpose, and while human inheritance (sex-instinct) consists, as psycho-analysis has shown, of a heterogeneous collection of vague feelings and impulses, the course of development is partly towards the/

the primitive integrated and definitely directed disposition, partly a dispersal into cultural channels. The course of evolution has been from the definite and integrated instincts to the diffuse impulse bundle, the course of development the opposite way; how the psychoanalysts reconcile this with the 'Biogenic Law', I cannot see.

It remains to deal briefly with the assertion that recapitulation (organic) is a logical corollary of the evolution theory. What Sir Archall Reid asserts is true, but amounts only to this; that the ontogeny of the offspring recapitulates the ontogeny of the parent where variation has not occurred. The recapitulation theory asserts a very different proposition, viz. that ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny, i.e. reproduces as successive phases that series of variations which is the race history. Now where this difference between the parent and his variant offspring consists in the addition of a phase or stage to the parental development, the carrying of some process a step further, - then the parental ontogeny is repeated and the variations added. So far as evolution proceeds in this mode - where each variation is a further step at the end of a developmental process - ontogeny must reproduce each phase in ancestral history, must record faithfully, and in their correct order, each successive/

successive variation that goes to make up phylogeny. If we represent an ontogeny by the phases A, B, and C and one of these additive variations by D, so that the development ABC is changed into ABCD, and so on by the addition of other characters, then obviously we are symbolising a recapitulatory evolution. Even if we add a character which carries the ⁱⁿ evolution of a previous character, i.e., ABC, ABCD, ABCD-D, ABC, we still preserve in ontogeny a record of the gain and the loss of a character.

But this is not the only conceivable type of variation. Variation may consist in the simple deletion of an early phase or the substitution of another; it might take the form of a reversal of the process of development, and so on. Thus ABC might become AC or AXC or ACB. It must be admitted that the probability of variation giving rise to a variable, biologically efficient, variant is smaller in proportion as it affects the earlier stages of development. Just as the radical alteration of the foundations of a building must alter the whole plan, so a divergence from the specific pattern in the early phases of ontogeny is apt to disorganise all balances and to produce a monstrosity. Very probably the elimination of such variations will bring it about that evolution is mainly dependent upon variations taking effect near the/

the end of development - i.e., upon variation compatible with recapitulation. But this is quite a different thing from saying that ^{re}capitulation is inconceivable (is not logically possible) and in the long run these rare but radical variations probably account for the admitted fact that recapitulation is never exact and indeed is the exception rather than the rule.

Neither the evolution theory nor any other biological principle is logically compelled to assume recapitulation; neither are there any facts which compel us to assume that it must occur. On the contrary, the preponderance of "obliterations and falsifications of the record" shows plainly that recapitulation need not occur and that even in regard to organic characters onto-phylogenetic parallelism cannot be relied upon. If, then, the theory does not hold for structure, either as a generalisation or as indicating some mechanical cause for the parallelism, surely we cannot rely upon it in regard to function which is so much more dependent upon the accident of special stimulation. Surely we cannot postulate mental recapitulation upon biological grounds.

CONCLUSIONS

I have indicated that biological opinion is not united/

united as to the adequacy of the evidence for recapitulation, or even as to the necessity of this interpretation of the onto-phylogenetic parallelism. I have also shown that pari passu with this loss of credit the theory has suffered a progressive diminution of value as a description, a generalisation, and as an induction (~~causal~~). I have argued that in-as-much as ancestral and infantile environments differ and consequently lead to a divergence between ontogeny and phylogeny in regard to special adaptive phases and characters, therefore this most plastic and adaptive of all characters, mind, should be the least likely to recapitulate, i.e., there is no biological ground for anticipating that recapitulation will hold in the mental sphere. Since the phylogenetic and the ontogenetic series are related through the germ-plasm, the latter must be the mechanism which maintains the parallelism between development and evolution. The biological process (and mechanisms) of recapitulation therefore affects characters only in so far as they are germinally determined. That is to say, specific forms and functions tend to recapitulate only in so far as they depend on germinal variations. In other words, the biological theory implies that the recapitulatory tendencies come within the spheres of that developmental factor/

factor we call heredity. So far as development is moulded by the (complementary) environmental or 'Nurtural' factor, biological recapitulation cannot occur. To say that a reaction or phase of infantile development is 'recapitulation' (in the biological sense) is to imply that its immediate cause lies in the germ-plasm and its remote causes in the evolutionary (ancestral) series. If this is true, psychological investigation of these antecedent causes is irrelevant and we must turn to organic lines of research. The consequences of this position for psycho-pathology, psycho-therapeutics and mental hygiene have been briefly indicated.

I have then examined the more purely logical and metaphysical arguments for mental recapitulation and shown that they break down in many places. Recapitulation is not a necessary consequence of any established biological theory, nor are the germinal mechanisms of non-recapitulatory evolution 'inconceivable'. Even were recapitulation the rule in regard to structural characters and to brain in particular, it would not follow from the principle of psycho-physical parallelism that mental development also recapitulates mental evolution.

There is, then, no a priori probability that mental/

mental development recapitulates mental evolution.

The 'Biogenetic Law' in its psychological applications must stand or fall by psychological evidence. There must be no bias in its favour from the glamour of its history or its (imagined) biological prestige.

Alternative interpretations must be sought for on heuristic grounds, and indeed we may conclude, so far as biological considerations carry us, that mental development is more closely related to culture evolution than to brain evolution, and that any parallel between the first two has no biological significance — has nothing in common with recapitulation as biologists understand the phenomenon.

THE DEVELOPMENT AND EVOLUTION OF MIND;
 BIOLOGICAL V. PSYCHO-SOCIAL INTERPRETATIONS OF THE
 ONTO-PHYLOGENETIC PARALLELISM.

The psychoanalysts have pushed psychological interpretations farther perhaps than any other school, yet they have resigned to biology the interpretation of the resemblance between mental development and mental evolution. We shall see that in doing so they are not clear, either as to the data which necessitate the Recapitulation Hypothesis, nor as to the meaning and consequences of this. They seem to feel in a vague way that in establishing (?) this biological interpretation of a mental process, they have accomplished something of value:-

" 'Why, that I cannot tell,' said he,

" 'But t'was a famous victory.' "

We find Freud's views on mental recapitulation expressed in his "Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis" (1915 to 1917 Transl. 1922)

(P. 168) "in so far as each individual repeats in some abbreviated fashion during childhood the whole course of the development of the human race, the reference (of dreams) "is Phylogenetic. I believe it is not impossible that we may be able to discriminate between that/

that part of the latent mental processes which belongs to the early days of the individual and that which has its roots in the infancy of the race. It seems to me, for instance, that symbolism, a mode of expression that has never been individually acquired, may claim to be regarded as a racial heritage." (P. 197) "In considering the two developments undergone by the Ego and by the Libido we must emphasize an aspect which hitherto has received little attention" (Italics mine) "Both of them are at bottom inheritances, abbreviated repetitions of the evolution undergone by the whole human race through" etc. "In the development of the Libido this phylogenetic origin is readily apparent, I should suppose. Think how in one class of animals the genital apparatus is in the closest contact with the mouth, in another it is indistinguishable from the excretory mechanism, in another it is part of the organs of motility;" - - - "One sees in animals all the various perversions, ingrained so to speak, in the form taken by their sexual organisation^s. Now the phylogenetic aspect is to some extent obscured in man by the circumstance that what is fundamentally inherited is nevertheless individually acquired anew" etc. (P. 307) "In the place of effecting a change in the outer world they set up a change in the body itself: that is, an internal action instead of an external one, an adaption/

adaption instead of an activity - from a phylogenetic point of view again a very significant regression."

(E.310) "All this seems to lead to but one impression, that childhood experiences of this kind" (Phantasies of seduction, castration, etc.) "are in some way necessarily required by the neurosis, that they belong to its unvarying inventory." "If they can be found in real events, well and good; but if reality has not supplied them they will be evolved out of hints," (etc. ----) "even to-day we have not succeeded in tracing any variation in the results according as phantasy or reality plays the greater part in these experiences."

- - - "how is it to be explained that the same phantasies are always formed with the same content? I have an answer to this which I know to you will seem very daring. I believe that these Primal Phantasies" (- - -) "are a phylogenetic possession. In them the individual, stretches out beyond it" (his own) "to the experience of past ages" - - - "that the child in its phantasy simply fills out the gaps in its true individual experiences with true prehistoric experiences."

As these lectures are didactic these statements are presumably intended to be accepted literally. In "Beyond the Pleasure Principle" (P 45) Freud refers in unmistakable terms/

terms to recapitulation, not as a ~~theory~~, but as an unquestionable and accepted fact. "We see that the germ cell of a living animal is obliged to repeat in its development - although in a fleeting and curtailed~~ed~~ fashion - the structures of all the forms from which the animal is descended, instead of hastening along the shortest path to its own final shape."

It appears significant to me, moreover, that in his psycho-sociological writings, Freud makes no use of the Hypothesis of recapitulation. In "Totem and Taboo" for instance, where he has to account for a parallelism between infantile and primitive modes of thinking - a reproduction in early development of certain adult ancestral mental processes, - he does not mention recapitulation. Indeed he develops a most ingenious and plausible theory of "Unconscious tradition", a mechanism whereby the antagonism of each generation to its precursor and successor is maintained in a sort of chain reaction of jealousy and suspicion. This mechanism of unconscious tradition, if it exists, would account for the repetition by successive generations of a series of affective attitudes which are ^{here} supposed to be historically determined, i.e., to have an evolutionary parallel. It is then an alternative interpretation which/

which Freud apparently has dropped in favour of the recapitulation hypothesis.

In "Leonardo da Vinci" also we find a reference to recapitulation;- (P. 60) "Important biological analogies" (my italics) "have taught us that the psychic development of the individual **is** a short repetition of the course of development of the race," Note here he refers to Analogies and that in the "Totem and Taboo" (P. 265) he warns us, "We must not let our judgment about primitive men be influenced too far by the analogy with neurotics." (italics mine) From the form of these earlier pronouncements, from the absence of reference to phylogeny in "Three Contributions to the Sexual Theory" (which is concerned with the causes of development) and in "The History of Psychoanalysis," and particularly from his hypothesis of "Unconscious tradition" (which renders the recapitulat**ory** hypothesis superfluous) I am inclined to suppose that Freud did not originally found upon the "Biogenetic Law", but accepted it from others.

Jung, ("Psychology of the Unconscious" P. 27/38) after referring to organic recapitulation, says;
 "Therefore the supposition is justified that ontogenesis corresponds in psychology to phylogenesis. Consequently it would be true, as well, that the state of infantile thinking/

thinking in the child's psychic life, as well as in dreams, is nothing but an echo of the prehistoric and the ancient." (P. 30) "One might raise the objection that the mythological inclinations of children are implanted by education. The objection is futile." (P. 35) "Just as our bodies still keep the reminders of old functions and conditions in many old-fashioned organs, so, our minds too, which apparently have outgrown those archaic tendencies, nevertheless bear the marks of the evolution passed through, and the very ancient re-echoes, at least dreamily, in phantasies." (P.36) "man in his phantastic thinking has kept a condensation of the psychic history of his development. From all these signs it may be concluded that the soul possesses in some degree historical strata, the oldest stratum of which would correspond to the unconscious."

Jones (Papers on Psychoanalysis 2nd Ed. P6) says "The relations it" (psychoanalysis) "bears to the theory of organic evolution becomes very striking. Freud's recent" (italics mine) "demonstration of the truth - long suspected, but now proved in a far deeper sense than had been anticipated - that ontogeny epitomises phylogeny/"

phylogeny in the mental sphere just as definitely as in the physical", - - - "The conflict between the two systems recapitulates on a modified scale in the individual the history of its course in the race, producing strikingly similar manifestations in the two cases." Farther down he says, "hardly any serious endeavour had hitherto been made to fertilise psychology with the ideas of organic evolution."

References might be made to Hfister, Ferenczi, Helliffe, White, Brink, Janet, Payne, Lombroso, etc. but none of them use or define the theory in such a way that it is possible to verify their assumptions. The following are ~~more~~ explicit.

J.E. Lind. (Psychoanalytic Review IV. P.324)

"Of course, strictly speaking, we are not able to say definitely that any delusion, hallucination or mannerism, goes any farther back than the life-history of the individual. We can only surmise from the nature of some of them that they belong to the race consciousness." In regard to a demented negro, who says he ate his wife because he loved her, Lind remarks, "We feel that such an expression is something more than ontogenetical." The hallucinations of the deteriorated Precox who saw cows heads on the wall of his room, might not ordinarily attract much attention/

attention, but when we remember that throughout nearly all Africa the natives are an agricultural people and cattle are their chief possession" (?)

"it takes on a different aspect." (Italics mine)

One can only remark that if our memories cannot be trusted ~~on~~ in regard to elementary facts learned in the schoolroom, we will have to be chary of trusting it in regard to ancestral experiences of events and conditions thousands of generations ago. Among this author's examples of supposed phylogenetic thinking we find this, "Patient dreamed of 'chockchuckoo' - - - and that one day he made 4000 children" - the good old days, we presume. Lind farther remarks "I have often thought that a careful study of neologisms among negro psychotics might result in the discovery of many African roots." He thus regards language as germinally transmitted.

A.B. Evarts. (Same Journal Vol.I.P.388) "It is a fact recognised by all that the individual in his development relieves" (? recapitulates) "the **history** of his race." She then asserts that ontogeny shews like phylogeny, the following series of phases, - animality, acquisition of language, hunting, firemaking, playing with mud, basket-making, domesticating animals, agriculture, building, tool|using and finally abstract/

abstract thinking, - (at the opposite end of the series from the acquisition of language !!!!!), This author appears to have reconstructed both the ontogenetic and the phylogenetic series out of her own inner consciousness, presumably by the method of "free association" unless indeed we are to regard this contribution as an example of reasoning from the unknown to the known.

J.S. van Tes/laar in the "International Journal of Psychoanalysis" Vol. II. P. 339, et. seq., in an article on the "Significance of Psychoanalysis in the History of Science" makes the most definite and comprehensive statement of the doctrine of mental recapitulation I have yet come across. "Since Darwin the comparison between childhood and primitive mankind, as representative of the same developmental stages, has achieved new significance, Darwinism has led to the theoretic assumption that in our physical as well as mental development we recapitulate the biologic history of the race." Then after referring inaccurately and superficially to the history of the theory, he asserts, "The facts are sufficient in their essentials to prove the recapitulation theory is sound." "That our mind does that very thing" (recapitulate) "has long been a theoretic conclusion of biological investigators. Freud found that ordinarily we are often/

often prompted by bits of our racial past" - - -, "incidentally Freud's discovery shows that in the course of its development the individual mind repeats our racial history. The details of Freud's work amount to a restatement of the recapitulation theory applied to the biologic history of the mind. For the first time there has been disclosed to us the manner" (italics mind) "in which psychic recapitulation operates and its consequences." In reality the elucidation of the mechanism "the manner in which" recapitulation "operates" "and its consequences" are things which apparently no psychoanalyst has attempted. "Primordial cravings" - - - "are racial vestiges of the mind. They are racial endowments belonging to early psychic stages of our individual development, just as certain structures and organs of the embryo represent passing phases in the course of our physical development." This author talks of "reconstructing" ^{the} primitive world and thought from our knowledge of the unconscious. "For the first time since Darwin announced his discoveries" (?) "an important corollary of the theory of evolution - recapitulation - is thus proven to hold good of the psyche."

We may take these as official expressions of psychoanalytic/

psychoanalytic opinion, because, though Young America may appear to have gone one better than Freud, still, he himself is explicit enough, and, so far as I know, there has not been one published word of criticism of the mental recapitulation theory on the psychoanalytic side. Indeed the extravagances of the last three authors quoted, are really the logical consequences of Freud's own premises. The manifest absurdity of these conclusions is due to the naive acceptance and literal application of the theory, in fact to the attempt (that Freud was too cautious to make) to make use of it.

None of the writers earlier quoted uses this theory to make any close interpretation of definite facts, for them it is a 'stage property' which belongs to the background of Metapsychology. Lind is rash enough to bring it into the limelight, and credulous enough to accept his results as valid because they are consonant with the theory, instead of rejecting the theory because its consequences are inconsistent with fact. Besides this, it is worthy of note that none of these writers either bases any inferences upon this theory or makes it the object of farther study, with a view to discovering the causes and mechanism of mental recapitulation.

In this inquiry we have two definite questions to consider, (1) the evidences for the recapitulation theory of mind, and (2) the inferences it enables us to draw. Why must we assume that mental recapitulation has occurred, and what does this assumption enable us to explain?

Freud's first (quoted) reference adduces a dream material as evidence, both of the infantile and of the archaic modes of thinking. He does not adduce here concrete material, and the only inference he draws is that Symbolism has not been individually acquired and therefore is recapitulated. In the second reference, he is suggesting that oral, anal and muscle erotism are psychological vestigial phases, representing and homologous with certain organic adult ancestral forms. He implies that, though evolution has changed the form so that the sexual organs are no longer closely associated with mouth, anus or limbs, yet the reactive disposition of sex, in the course of its development passes inevitably through phases in which it is closely associated with and influenced by, alimentary, excretory and motor functions. That is to say, the instincts are supposed to recapitulate as a rudimentary functional association, an ancestral spatial association of their respective/

respective organs, which organic recapitulation fails to record. Mental recapitulation in this way will be able to tell us, not only about the behaviour of ancestral forms, but even about their structure.

Disregarding innumerable difficulties this raises, consider that Freud is here implying, (A) that all the types of organisation he mentions, appear in the Human ancestral series, and (b) that they appeared in evolution in the order in which he here mentions them. Unless these things are so his recapitulatory interpretations of libidinal development breaks down. He does not even seem to be aware that his argument turns on these two points, and makes no attempt to demonstrate them or to cite biological opinion in favour of his assumption. He apparently regards all non-human animals as ancestral forms, and imagines himself at liberty to arrange them in any genealogical sequence he pleases. The results of such a method are "readily apparent, I should suppose", and the most exasperating feature is, that having permitted himself such liberties with biology and with scientific method in general, he makes no use of the conception, does not develop or apply it in any way.

The third statement of his quoted, introduces a new and quite unjustified definition of adaption^{ta} which

which he contrasts with activity, and regards as equivalent to passive tolerance. In the fourth quotation he explains the consistency and identity of "primary sexual phantasies" as a phylogenetic possession. Here at ~~least~~ we find the hypothesis used to explain something whereby in turn it can be tested and verified. From a biological point of view there is something to be said for the idea that mental imagery might form part of an instinct; at least we do know that certain instinctive actions, performed prior to experience, are initiated only by highly complex and specific stimuli. It is not perhaps a very great step for the biologist to argue, that because there is an innate appreciation of the meaning of a situation, there may also be a preformed image, (innate), and that truly instinctive behaviour (first instance, or prior to experience of results) is perceptual.

are / Still this would not support Freud's position, which postulates that certain experience and behaviour is produced from within (i.e. from the developmental impetus) and in a certain definite order in time. Here he states explicitly that the childish and neurotic phantasies of seduction, castration and observation of parental coitus, are too frequent and realistic /

reality^s to be due to the child's own experiences. He admits that these experiences are far more numerous than an ordinary observer would credit, he also admits that retrospective memory falsifications are responsible for some of the data. ("we have not succeeded in tracing any variation in the results according as phantasy or reality plays the greater part in these experiences.") There is therefore no positive way of recognising ancestral "memories" To distinguish these from ontogenetic structures, we have to rely upon excluding individual experiences and "information" from which these phantasies could be constructed. Surely this process of exclusion is delicate and difficult, and only the most definite and unequivocal findings based upon exhaustive investigation with this problem in view will be conclusive in this case, particularly when we consider the gravity of the hypothesis our finding is destined to support. Freud is plainly unaware of the implications of the recapitulation theory (mental), and, contrary to his usual practice, he does not adduce actual evidence. Intuitively he appears to be aware that it is of no importance or value to psychology.

The reference in "Leonardo da Vinci" is not followed up, indeed the onus of the theory is here laid on the biologists and its psychological application is regarded/

Freud
 Introd. Lect.
 P. 310.

regarded as analogical. It is neither supported by facts here adduced, nor does it help us to understand any of them. In "Beyond the Pleasure Principle" recapitulation is treated as an unquestionable and self-evident truth, even in the mental sphere. Again it has no value either as an explanatory principle or as a basis for farther inference and investigation. Freud simply adduces it as an instance supporting his conjecture of a general "repetition compulsion" as characteristic of life in general.

Jung, though he recognises that it is an "organic" rather than a psychological theory, does not follow up this train of thought. Jones also is not concerned to verify the theory and bases no inference upon it. I understand he doubts its validity, and uses the term to indicate also the repetition of a previous ontogenetic phase. The minor prophets, however, are clear as to its being an extension of the "Biogenetic Law". Everts even seems to go so far as to reconstruct ontogeny from Phylogeny. Lind is the only one of those I have had access to, who has seriously attempted to interpret actual observations by this theory and hence to verify the latter. But even with the wild licence of conjecture he allows himself, he is not able/

able to infer anything that we did not know before. The Theory then adds nothing to our knowledge, nor does anything to compensate for the violence it requires us to do to the facts.

None of the psychoanalysts are interested in the mechanism of recapitulation, no inductive studies are made of this chef d'oeuvre of Psychoanalysis. We have seen that it was a late idea on Freud's part, a second thought. The tail in fact has wagged the dog. Even now the role of recapitulation in psychoanalysis is that of a mystical subject for "meditation" rather than an integral part of their working hypotheses. At least it seems by these references to be in itself a source of satisfaction, for they are content to adduce it without applying, criticising, verifying, or studying it inductively.

If we take the evidence for mental recapitulation at its strongest, as shewing the outcrop of highly specific, (see "Critique of the Theory of Mental Recapitulation) identifiable fragments of genuine ancestral myths in the individual's phantasy life, we must ask ourselves, is a simpler, less onerous interpretation of the facts not possible? Is it not possible to believe these "race memories" are transmitted via/

via the "social inheritance" (tradition) rather than through the mechanism of the germ plasm. How can Freud exclude or evaluate the factor of experience, on what grounds does Jung wave away as "futile" the objection that myths may be implanted by education? Nursery Rhymes and Fairy Stories are simply decorous and decorated editions of myth themes. They might easily give to the phantasies of childhood the specific archaic forms which lead us to observe a similarity between mental evolution and mental development. To give an instance of such a "social vestige" from my own observation, "the Jack and Jill" rhyme, so frequently exploited by Fantomines, can be traced back, etymologically and formally, to the ancient Scandinavian mythic fragment in which Hjuke and Bil (Idun) with the pail "Seething Over" and the pole "Brewing" are sent by their father to fetch the skaldic mead at night from the secret fountain Byrgir (hence possibly, by corruption, the somewhat inappropriate "hill") They are carried off (or run away) with the valuables and are adopted by the Moon-god, and in subsequent conflict with his own father Hjuke (Hoc in Beowulf) received a wound "clean to the thigh bone" for which reason he bore the epithet of "Gelding". Either he or his brother Volund (Wayland Smith)/

Smith) married Bil (Idun) so that all the elements for a psychoanalytic interpretation are here available. The story too has assumed a dozen forms, has spread throughout the whole Aryan (not merely Teutonic) world, and maintains itself in our present culture as the Rhyme, as a tale of a bad man with two children who wickedly gathered faggots (the mythological crime was arson), as the (Norse) names of the moon-spots, etc., and finally has attained the dignity of history in the tale of Hengist (The Gelding), the Saxon Leader. In all this the vitality of the Myth is abundantly evident and it is conceivable that it should be made the topic of phantasy and revived and elaborated into a form resembling one of the innumerable antique variants. If a Praecox patient, regressing to such an infantile phantasy, re-endowed it with adult sexual meaning of the symbolic kind characteristic of the myths, and generally restored it to functional perfection, then the parallelism between the archaic and the infantile - psychopathic products might be striking. If then we overlook the possibilities of traditional transmission, the cultural link between the myth-periods and modern times, then we are apt to imagine that the similarity between the ancestral and the infantile thought/

thought processes must be biologically (germinally) determined. The traditional link is so fragmentary, trivial and obscure that it is easily overlooked.

Quite possibly this once famous belief is now too dead to inspire anything, but other myths may not be; the example was chosen at random. It illustrates at anyrate the possibility of a surreptitious social transmission of the forms, affective values, and even names of myths, for phantasy to restore to their original form. The important point is the insignificance to the adult of nursery tradition, and his consequent difficulty in appreciating what access the child really has in his life history to archaic material. This very possibility has been overlooked by psychoanalysts because they are still too much under the spell of the "individual" point of view. Lind, for example, never mentions negro folk lore as an ontogenetic source of archaic material, e.g. the "Uncle Remus" collections, where we can actually find "plantation stories" collated with their African (and ancestral) parallels.

Before considering ~~far~~ further this culture-transmission, we must notice Freud's reference to symbolism as "never individually acquired". It is presumable that he refers particularly to sexual symbolism./

symbolism. Now we are told that all suitable objects are made to serve as sexual symbols, both by the neurotic and by primitive man. There is therefore no particular choice of symbols characteristic of this type or phase of mind, which would enable us to postulate a connection (casual) between ancestral form and infantile phase. In this random, indiscriminating acceptance of everything as a symbol, there is nothing specific to identify the two, and to prove more than a chance resemblance. As for the allegation that the symbolism cannot have been inspired by anything in "tradition", i.e. cannot be due to his own experience or have been imparted by others, I adduce the following three samples of nursery rhyme:-

I had a little husband, no bigger than my thumb;

I put him in a pint pot and there I bid him drum. ec.

Cock-a-doodle-doo

My dame has lost her shoe,
My master's lost his fiddling stick
And don't know what to do.

What is my dame to do?

Till master finds his fiddling stick
She'll dance without her shoe.

My dame will dance with you
Till master's found his fiddling stick
For dame and doodle-doo.

I had a little nut tree,
Nothing it would bear,
But a silver nutmeg, and a golden pear.
The King of Spain's daughter came to visit me,
And all for the sake of my little nut tree.

Poetic use of Nut Tree in this sense is not uncommon.

Now this argument does not require me to decide the validity of the Freudian interpretations of these and other suggestive nursery rhymes, but it must be this sort of symbolism that Freud refers to as, "probably a racial heritage," and all I require to do is to shew that it is in fact taught to the child from his earliest lullabys. It is verbally, not germinally transmitted, so why should we strain biology and psychology to put the matter beyond a simple explanation? The real Freudian interpretation of these facts is that the nurse or mother, to amuse the child, produce what they regard as rhyming nonsense. Under this process of "free association" however, their unconscious impulses find symbolic expression. The conditions are specially favourable for the relaxation of the sensorship, more favourable in many ways than a psychoanalytic "sitting". Here again I am not concerned to demonstrate the validity of the psychoanalytic interpretation, if it is invalid, then their finding (by exclusion) that these symbols are germinally transmitted is also ⁱⁿ valid. If it is valid, then it is simpler to suppose that this ~~symbolism~~ is transmitted/

transmitted is also invalid. If it is valid, then it is simpler to suppose that this symbol is transmitted to the child by the expressions of his parents and nurses, than through the medium of unimaginable determinants in his germ plasm, derived, we cannot conjecture how or when, from a hypothetical ancestor. The whole force of the argument for recapitulation rests on the denial of the possibility of a traditional or verbal transmission, and the consequent postulation of an organic transmission. Yet here we see how such a denial might be perfectly honest, but perfectly incorrect - because the transmission is unconscious. It might at least be better worth while to investigate the content, etc. of Nursery Tradition, than to close down psychological research by postulating mental recapitulation.

The upbringing of children moreover, in the class from which so much analytic material is derived, is left, to a large extent, in the hands of relatively uncultured and conservative people. Moreover adults do almost deliberately 'regress' to meet the simple child halfway. In the consequence the child first adapts to an intimate and tolerant circle, then to a succession of wider, more exacting, more cultured ones. It may even be true that those phases in the adaption/

adaptation of the individual to society may correspond in some measure with stages in the history of society and of culture, but this is not recapitulation. The recapitulation theory postulates a developmental tendency to repeat evolution, but here adaptions are exacted from the child in a sequence simulating the history of culture. There is no evidence that the child has an innate tendency to strive for these adaptions, and in this particular order. Psychoanalysis indeed has adduced much evidence to the contrary. This socialisation is not strictly speaking a development at all, but a process of modification imposed upon the child by custom and other non-biological circumstances. The life history is determined by a particular sequence of stimuli, which, from the biological point of view, is accidental. The demands of social life are the same for this generation as in the past, and in both series the most urgent obligations will tend to be enforced first, simulating recapitulation.

Culture itself, as we have seen is not homogeneous but has its more or less dissociated undercurrents, - a sort of social unconscious. With the evolution of a culture, and particularly at the critical moment when two culture streams blend and "fertilise", elements of both are dissociated as they cease to be compatible with/

with the resultant trend of culture. But, as in the case of memories in the individual mind, it is long before any social production is wholly lost; such rather tends to be degraded and concealed, or retained, by the less cultured classes. By such means much archaic material is preserved and rendered accessible to the neurotic. (vide "Tom Sawyer" and "Huckleberry Fin") Indeed, for several reasons, the child has this primitive material early forced upon him, and through such "strata" he must pursue his development. Naturally at nursery age, he will possess nursery culture with all the archaic vestiges of tradition, custom and ritual (note games). This and the phantasies dependent on, and constructed of, this, he has to put behind him as he grows up, and we know the strength of the "Peter Pan" motive. There are many circumstances then that tend to mould the individual along the general lines of the ancestral history, and their affect is a Pseudo-recapitulation, that must be discounted before we are justified in postulating a biological recapitulation in the sphere of mind.

We see also in intellectual development a rough onto-phylogenetic parallelism, which suggests recapitulation/

recapitulation. Simple and fundamental ideas must be mastered before the more complex and abstruse ones which imply them, whether in the history of knowledge (racial^{ly} phylogenetic) or in learning (individual assimilation of knowledge). Certain discoveries and propositions must precede others, whether they are made for the first time or learnt from other people. This is a logical not^a biological recapitulation, and the two causes or "mechanism" are quite distinct.

In conclusion, we must restate the biological view of recapitulation as implying an innate tendency to pursue a particular course of development which imitates the course of evolution sufficiently closely to compel us to suppose that the two series are causally related. (either as cause and effect - Lamarckism; or as joint effects of germinal variation - Weismannism) Where there has been no evolution, no change in germinal potentialities, there can be no ancestral series to recapitulate. On the other hand, modifications of the individual (though they may be acquired by the whole species and hence are not mere "differences", as Archdall Reid would have it), are not part of development, and cannot therefore, no matter how they suggest ancestral forms, be regarded as evidence of recapitulation.

Now/

Now there is no evidence of biological evolution having taken place during the history of our culture. It is indeed inconceivable that the fusions, differentiations, waxings and wanings of culture should have been paralleled, much less caused by, changes in the innate endowment for cerebral development. At least when a fusion of culture has taken place in the race history the child cannot recapitulate both of its race histories. Actually, when we speak of the evolution of the human mind (as distinct from the evolution of mind in general, - the topic of Comparative Psychology) we really mean the history of culture which is not an evolution but a continuous development, which is not broken at each generation as organic evolution is. The Freudians, and I think even Baldwin, have been misled by the popular or even metaphorical application of the term "evolution" to the history of culture. It would be more accurate to call it a development, for it is essentially the same thing that is handed on and built up from generation to generation, not a succession of organisms. The two processes are of an entirely different nature, and we must look for their causes in entirely different directions.

I should think it is glaringly obvious that the elaboration and accumulation of tradition, and the devising of new ways of training and applying thought, are quite independent of cerebral evolution, (1) Indeed I intend to put forward the thesis (which Freud's work goes far to prove), that most of the conditions with which psychopathology has to deal, are the results of stresses brought about by this independent 'development' of culture.

If then the evolution of mind is not an evolution in the biological sense, and if, as we have seen, the development of mind is not mainly a biological development, if we are in fact dealing with the social processes of the history and of the assimilation of culture, why should we evoke biological mechanisms to explain (! ! !) these? How can we speak of mental development recapitulating mental evolution in the biological sense, when, in the biological sense, mind (of man and in culture period) neither develops nor evolves? The history of culture and the assimilation

of culture are social processes to be explained by social psychology.

(1) This does not, of course, imply that the historical growth and individual assimilation of culture are not limited and conditioned by the evolution and development of brain, though the potentialities of the latter may at no time be fully utilised. I mean merely that nearly all our KNOWLEDGE of mind refers to the products of social thinking and to the acquisition of these by the individual, and to the results of training and education in the widest sense. Of the native tendencies of mind and of the consequences of a development independent of social environment we have no knowledge, Certainly not enough knowledge to enable us to demonstrate a recapitulatory tendency in this 'untutored brain function'. All the characters by which (objectively) we know mind are moulded by custom and tradition, and these factors consequently are far more important for our understanding of mental process than are the biological factors. (see, "The Conception of A Culture", Jl. of Ment. Sc. 1923) The Onto-Phylogenetic Parallelism of Mind is a social Fact.

Note (2)

In "Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego" P. 99 Freud explains the hypnotic RAPPORT as a re-evocation of the archaic attitude to the "primal father" or horde leader. Of course this is not, even if the interpretation is correct, Recapitulation, for it does not form a phase of development, has no tendency to appear at a certain definite point in the life history, to take a definite place in the sequence of events. Even so, Freud's phylogenetic interpretation is not here supported by any striking evidence, rather it is required to support a particular view of Hypnosis. His interpretation would lose nothing in force or value if we substituted "infantile" for "archaic" wherever the latter occurs, and dropped all reference to the phylogenetic series.

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SERIES B

SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY AND PSYCHIATRY

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CRITIQUE OF THE THEORY OF "HERD INSTINCT"

When we speak of a "herd instinct" we mean an innate motive (conscious) or impulse (unconscious) determining social conduct, or at any rate regulating individualistic tendencies in such a way as to make social life possible or necessary. Such a conception is of considerable significance for medicine in its psycho-social applications, and has already attained considerable currency with sponsors of such authority as Sir Clifford Albutt and Sir Frederick Mott, to say nothing of Macdougall and other psychologists who accept this theory. Its relation to the Freudian doctrine of the "censorship" has been pointed out by Trotter himself, and, if established, it would prove no less significant for the theory of hypnotism and suggestion. Indeed, for the future development of any criminology or psycho-pathology that takes account of conative affective endowment and of the influence of social environment, the acceptance of this theory must be crucial.

The criticism and verification of so important a conception is then a matter of the greatest interest. Unfortunately it has proved to be of no less difficulty, on account of the indefiniteness of the theory and of its lack of all positive content. If we attempt to pin it/
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it down to any position, to discover its implications, we shall be accused of misrepresentation. In fact, the assumption of a gregarious (herd) instinct is not formulated in any way, so that its logical coherence or consistency with established fact and accepted theory cannot be tested. In these circumstances the liability of the notion to abuse is obvious. The very descriptive aptitude of the term enables it to serve as a cloak for ignorance and slovenly thinking, so that it may actually obstruct research and obscure the issues by giving a false impression that the analysis of motive is complete.

To avoid this the concept must be given a clear and definite meaning, and, since the term "instinct" has been applied to it, we are justified in assuming that all the recognised characteristics of instinct are attributed to it by those responsible for its currency. It is not of course denied that in some form the conception of "associative tendency" may be valid. All that this paper aims to show is that its conception as an instinct is unphilosophical, unscientific and unnecessary. To show, then, that the concept of "herd instinct" is invalid, it is merely necessary to demonstrate a difference in kind between the associative tendency and the instincts generally recognised as such. I hope further, by tracing the genesis of this fallacy, to/

to satisfy you that there is no justification for the retention of the notion.

Before proceeding to criticise "herd instinct" it would be as well to emphasise two essential characters of instinct in general, upon which there is general agreement and without which the conception would be empty and worthless:

(1) Instinct is germinally determined and transmitted, is exercised prior to experience, and generally early in life (Shand). Though modifiable, it cannot be acquired, and it differs from "learned" reactions in many important particulars.

(2) When we distinguish specific instincts, we imply that each particular one so named has a relative independence. If regarded as a psycho-physical disposition, it has its special, if subordinate, integration; if regarded as a class of reaction (behaviour), it must be supposed to have some degree of homogeneity, at least of common function. Instincts generally accepted as such mostly have a definite organic basis. Subjectively they are associated with specific interests or motives. As behaviour, they have an equally specific adaptive function (indeed, I maintain that instincts, appetites, etc., often represent no more than the descriptive concepts resulting from an abstract analysis of functional/

functional adaptation). Whether we look at instinct from the point of view of biology (as a type of active functional adaptation to environment), or from that of physiology (as a class of reaction, a reflex integration or an organic system), or from that of psychology (as a group of motives or feelings), we find always the implication of ultimacy, of unity. Even where not explicitly stated, the conception plays the part of a prime factor, ~~an~~ entity, causal or functional, a conative element (in the sense in which chemistry still utilises the conception of its elements as relatively ultimate.)

Now there is no a priori reason why a descriptive abstraction arrived at in one field should be the exact correlative of another attained (perhaps by different methods, etc.,) in some other field. We see now that there was no justification for Gall's expectation of finding a cerebral centre for "hope", "destructiveness," etc. (application of psychological abstractions in the physiological sphere), yet errors of this sort are rife. Macdougall contemplates leaving the classification of instincts and emotions to the biologists; but if they choose to abstract adaptive behaviour into two (self-preservation and reproduction) or two hundred instincts, will he be equally ready to discriminate discrete psycho-physical dispositions correlative thereto?

The physiologists will certainly not allow that the biological unity of the function of selfpreservation finds a counterpart in a special organic integration. Appetite has indeed more in common with the sex instinct than with pain, with which it is actually incompatible. The smuggling of conceptions between these three sciences is a dangerous and unscientific game. Though we must assume a correlation possible, and work towards it, we must not assume one ready made for our convenience. Instinct is a term in use in all three with implications in all three, and in my opinion should be used as a sort of vital "x" This would, of course, restrict its use to the correlation of these three sciences, since, deprived of any definite fixed connotation in any one of these spheres, the sciences must be independent of this conception and must exclude it from their terminology. A classification of instincts would be a sort of intermediary subject to continual tentative redefinition, and would not admit of the inclusion of an instinct not represented in all three fields of the thought.

I have already mentioned a possible abuse of the conception of a specific instinct, as permitting the "rounding off" of inquiry at any convenient point and conveying an illusory impression of complete/

complete knowledge. Obviously the only heuristic justification for conceiving instinct as ultimate is its use to correlate function, motive and reactive mechanism, and its progressive definition and relation to the more precise conceptions proper to each field of investigation. Unless we limit its (the term "instinct") usage to this fluid tentative meaning we shall wall up the path to knowledge with our own ideas.

As currently employed, "herd" or "gregarious" instinct is little more than a verbal proposition. Social conduct is due to "gregarious instinct." Does this tell us anything about social conduct or help us to discover the motives and mechanisms that determine it? Surely the value of the conception we are criticising is purely descriptive, not suggestive or explanatory. We shall now see that it cannot be imagined, defined, or verified in any of the phenomenal fields to which it is ostensibly applicable.

Physiology, regarding instinct as a chain reflex of an arbitrarily distinguished degree of complexity, has no definite place for this conception in its (physiological) formulae. Organ-systems, mechanisms more or less integrated, centres for the co-ordination of reflexes, it recognises as forming the structural correlative for many of the propensities, but not for every aspect of behaviour that an analysis of/

of adaptation and conditions of life can discriminate. This structural basis is demonstrable in the case of instincts of sex, parentage, nutrition and locomotion; a bio-chemical integration is made out for fear, rage, etc. Though it will be claimed that the physical basis of herd instinct consists in a complex connection of cerebral paths, it is not unfair to point out that this is conjectural, difficult to imagine, and that even if we accept its possibility, this circumstance constitutes an important difference between the gregarious impulse and the instincts. We are asked to imagine an instinct without any special organ to originate and transmit stimuli or to discharge its function, or to be the intermediary between the germinal "Anlage" and a psychic function.

In the field of psychology we are invited to recognise the subjective aspect of herd instinct in the form of a craving for companionship. The social sentiments, we are told, develop from this impulse. Variation in sociability without corresponding variation in ethical character presents a difficulty by no means satisfactorily explained. We can hardly imagine the innate basic impulse to vary without causing its derivatives to vary. The theory here presents other difficulties also in the nature, mode and/

and time of acquisition of the social sentiments. They do not appear in children, who are not even sociable. Their development coincides in a noteworthy way with the establishment of the sexual function, and their nature, like that of the conduct they motivate, is complex and highly evolved - the very antithesis of the type of reaction, etc., we are accustomed to call instinctive. They are acquired, and with difficulty, are variable and easily lost in disease, and they are open to a number of interpretations. Introspective analysis is notoriously inadequate to analyse emotion, and the gregarious instinct has admittedly a peculiarly weak, elusive and indefinite emotional accompaniment. On a psychological basis alone no one could justify this conception.

If "herd instinct" has no definite and accepted meaning in physiology or psychology, it can have no use beyond that of describing behaviour and assisting the interpretation of evolution in terms of survival value. I think it can be shown that it lacks even descriptive validity, inasmuch as it is based on an arbitrary classification, imperfect observation, and several traditional assumptions that are quite fallacious.

I have pointed out elsewhere (Lancet, November, 19th, 1921, "Significance of Sex for Anthropology" etc.)/

etc.) the majority of animal societies - ant, bee, ruminant, etc., upon whose social behaviour the conception is based - are in reality families - sexual units - and that the fact of their cohesion does not imply any bond of union other than that of sex. In the same way symbioses and certain other associations indicate that alimentary instincts and fortuitous environmental circumstances may determine the gregarious habit. What, then, constitutes a society? How can we recognise the presence and operation of the gregarious instinct? Upon the possibility of such a definition and criterion depends the justification of the hypothesis of a special gregarious instinct.

Besides this artificial distinction between social and asocial animals, other fallacies are implicit in our traditional point of view, which lead us to regard minds as individual and autonomous, and as composing society and culture by their association and interaction. It is more in conformity with the facts to treat mind as a social product, as the embodiment of cultural contacts, and from this point of view the postulate of an instinctive harmonising control is superfluous.

The introspective method in psychology, theological speculation (e.g. free will) and philosophical idealism culminating in solipsism indicate how, and to what extent/

extent, mind has been regarded as individual and autonomous. The first attempt at a comparative psychology (evolutionary) was not the interpretation of higher in terms of simpler behaviour, but the attribution to lower forms of life of qualities of reason, morality, etc., which are merely human ideals. This anthropomorphism may have been due in some measure to the current conception of instinct as the antithesis of reason, and as a mechanism implanted for the fulfilment of Divine purpose. Such an anti-scientific conception, far from aiding in the interpretation of behaviour, had itself to be combated or given another meaning. As we know, many biologists and psychologists including Darwin and Romanes, actually came to explain instinct in terms of reason as "lapsed intelligence" though the former, of course, sought here, as always, to reduce teleological to mechanistic explanations by the principle of chance variations (in impulsive endowment). The earlier evolutionary psychologists, however, did not dare, or were unable to initiate the attempt to explain human in terms of animal behaviour. Interpreting the latter in terms of a psychology false even in regard to civilised man, it is no wonder that these earlier thinkers found that the social integration of minds, and especially of insect minds, was a phenomenon so remarkable as to justify any hypothesis.

The tendency in favour of simpler, more positive and mechanistic explanation (e.g., Lloyd Morgan's special rendering of the "canon of parsimony" and the contentions of the Behaviourist School) no longer permit us to regard such theories as explanations at all. Innate impulse as a function of structure, and hence germinally determined, is now the ultimate principle - the vera causa - in terms of which it is our business to formulate behaviour.

We have now, however, fallen into the error of accepting a superficial classification as a true induction. Any activities sufficiently homogeneous and striking are constituted a group and referred to the operation of a unitary motive (as above). Social behaviour is supposed to be determined by "herd instinct" Notwithstanding this radical change in method and terms of interpretation, the underlying fallacy remains the same. We still regard insect co-operation and communal organisation with astonished admiration because we still unconsciously attribute to them our own lazy, selfish, playful, variable, experimentally destructive, etc., etc., etc., nature. It is this attitude to the problem (a relic of our prescientific phase of education and thought), and this preconception of the independence of mind, that causes us to feel that some special explanation is required, that some "agency" must be discovered/

discovered to account for the fact that ant, bee, and other insect communities do not fall into disorder and dissolve in anarchy.

Imperfect observation and dramatic exaggeration of the harmony of insect societies, the attribution to these creatures of human complexity and variability, and of a degree of mental independence and individuality wholly untrue of man himself, invest the phenomena of animal communal life with an atmosphere of wonder and romance. We do not inherit the problem, of course, but we are certainly brought up to it.

The fact is that mind is social in origin and content, and individuality is largely an illusion due to the complex interplay of cultural influences. It is selected, moulded and developed to cultural or traditional pattern, not constrained or subordinated thereto by a regulating motive. Every step in every possible line of development is a step in social development, and we must not separate in our minds the process of development from the process of socialisation. They are identical, and if we make this arbitrary and abstract distinction, we will have to reunite them, to bridge our artificial chasm by some hypothesis such as that under discussion. Minds do not co-operate to form culture; they are not the units whose combination forms society, but are formed by society/

society.

Impulse, however, is not acquired, though affective-conative disposition may to some extent be socially harmonised by habit and organic sympathy. On the other hand, this endowment is relatively simple even in men, and in insects is highly stereotyped. To this extent the possibilities of disharmony are minimised, and when we take into consideration the practical absence of sex-rivalry among insects (where it can appear, it is expressed as frankly and aggressively among social as among asocial animals), we still further reduce the justification for the postulate of an instinctive regulating "agency" with the function of stabilising society.

In man, on the contrary, there is abundant need for an active gregarious instinct. Unlike insect communities his societies do not form mere reproductive units, while the plasticity of his instincts, the complexity of his culture and innate organisation, give rise to a variability and individuality of disposition which subjects his social organisation to considerable strain. Here, surely, we should be able to find evidence of a gregarious instinct in the form of a "categorical imperative." Subjectively this is nebulous, and we have no certainty of its congenital nature/

nature. Objectively we find everywhere formidable organisations based on force: authority and obedience, whose functions are to do what the "gregarious instinct" and its derivatives fail to do, namely, to maintain order, uniformity and social cohesion. Though the interpretation of the customs of government, etc., is debatable, its general bearing is against the hypothesis of a special social instinct. Unless we reduce our conception of herd instinct to so general and a-specific a form that there will be no justification or use in regarding it as an instinct, we cannot explain why training and compulsion should be so conspicuous a feature of human social life.

We have already mentioned the absence of a specific somatic mechanism proper to the gregarious instinct. Structural characters and their functions are, we know, inherited; the generally recognised instincts (nutrition, reproduction, defence, locomotion, etc.) have their own demonstrable organic integration and usually special receptor-effector mechanisms. It is certainly difficult to imagine the germinal determination of a psychic disposition without any organic correlative. Other difficulties also present themselves when we attempt to think out the implications of the hereditary transmission of "herd instinct." Its manifestation is adult, while the rule (Shand
would/

would make it a criterion of instinct) is for instinct to appear early in life - at least in rudimentary and playful forms. Again, we must note that both subjectively and objectively gregariousness appears to be a sentiment. As such, we must hold it to be acquired and even highly evolved within the limits of ontogeny. Finally, if we do not classify animals as social and asocial, we have seen that we cannot radically differentiate social from sexual associations. If, on the other hand, we do make this arbitrary distinction, we must imagine the germinal variations which determine the social habit as occurring convergently in different phyla yet limited to certain species of a genus.

Convergent adaptation has certainly occurred, but the identity is limited to the end result - the fact of communal life, not its mode or causes. The social habits of ants and men are merely analogous and only in respect to adaptation and survival value. There does not appear to be any real homology, sociological, psychological or physiological. Yet we are asked to believe that this type of behaviour is determined by a specific instinct - a psycho-physical disposition identifiable in different phyla (as subsumed under one conception having a psycho-physical implication) It is difficult enough to conceive a specific (integrated) disposition/

disposition capable of determining the complex and subtle modifications of behaviour we call social. It is harder still to imagine its germinal determination. I find it incredible that convergent variation should have produced a specific disposition psycho-physiologically identifiable in organisations so diverse as those of man and insect. But if we adopt the current view of the distribution of the gregarious instinct, we must suppose that these variations have occurred frequently, and so late in ontogeny that certain species only out of a genus - (are any genera or larger groups wholly social?) - have been affected, and, of course, independently.

Conclusions - One of three alternative views of gregarious instinct may be adopted:

(i) That it is really universal, but may lie latent.

This brings it into line with other instincts, gets rid of the difficulty of distinguishing social from asocial animals and of the impossible problem of its origin and distribution. On the other hand, it leaves the theory more speculative than ever, still without any definite psycho-physiological meaning, and aggravates the difficulty of distinguishing the effects of the social from those of the sexual instinct.

(ii) That it denotes merely a type of behaviour without/

without implying any identity in the psycho-physical mechanisms determining this.

Such a definition is logically unobjectionable, but is not in accordance with current usage of the term "instinct" It further definitely denies the conception of herd instinct any validity for psychology or physiology, sociology or psycho-pathology. Since the causal mechanisms and motives which determine the behaviour may vary indefinitely, all that is common to the instinct as manifested by different species is its adaptive significance (survival value as affecting evolution)

(iii) The conception of "herd instinct" as analogous biologically, ^{and psychologically} physiologically to sex, nutrition etc., with the exception that it is a specific character of limited distribution, is the view here criticised and rejected on the following grounds (it is the current conception, and indeed the only one that could have any real heuristic value, and has been exclusively considered on that account):

(a) The theory of "gregarious instinct" is formulated to solve a problem that is factitious and illusory. It rests upon a false conception of mind as individual and autonomous and the anthropomorphic interpretation of animal behaviour in terms of that misconception. It has other disreputable metaphysical antecedents/

antecedents and relationships. It necessitates an arbitrary classification of animals as social and asocial without regard to the fact that most infra-human associations are reproductive units, and hence not essentially different from the families classed as asocial. It ignores the facts of the conative simplicity and stereotypy of insects, that their solidarity and specialisation is organic, therefore mechanically determined by the nature of the other instincts, not by a special regulative instinct; that their harmony, so far as it extends, is really a unison. Human beings betray their lack of innate adaptation to social life by the universal and conspicuous phenomena of coercion and authority - a social and not an internal, individual control.

(b) There is no structural integration of the "gregarious instinct" unlike instincts proper. (The increase of the social sentiments at puberty suggests an association with sex.) On this account both its germinal determination and subjective representation are much more difficult to understand.

(c) Subjectively the mere impulse to associate is not constant or definite enough to be indisputably distinguished from a possible sexual derivative or component. The social sentiments, which are all that can be verified on introspection, are, like all their class, the very antithesis of instincts, the most/

most elaborate acquired reactions (orientations of emotional reaction) we know of. This is supported by the facts of child psychology.

(d) We cannot account biologically for the distribution of the instinct (sic!) determining the social habit.

Philosophically, the presuppositions and methods upon which this postulate was erected will not bear examination. Psychologically, biologically and physiologically, it has the slightest foundations, and raises difficulties vastly more formidable than those it solves. In every respect it is so indefinite, so lacking in positive content, that it serves more readily the purpose of disguising ignorance and evading difficulties than of increasing our grasp of the complexities of reality. I suggest that its use has that tendency and no substantial justification.

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SOME ASPECTS OF SOCIOLOGY AND THEIR
PSYCHIATRICAL APPLICATION

1.

CULTURE and ENDOWMENT

We attribute great psychopathic significance to the stresses incident to the adjustment of the individual to his culture. Everyone is supposed to bear the marks of this conflict. In fact, this disharmony is blamed for all human unhappiness and inefficiency not due to famine and disease. If this opinion is justified, how is it that culture, the product of the mind, is not better adapted to the needs and natural capacities of its creator?

The reason is partly that culture, as an ^{to}adaption to reality and the exigencies of social existence, must in some sense be a discipline and a constraint. But even allowing for this, and admitting the mechanisms described in "Totem and Tabu," it remains that culture is not the natural and direct expression of the impulses of the people.

Cultural evolution is largely independent of germinal evolution. This is obvious in the case of language, and can be demonstrated of many other contents of tradition. We find cultures rise, stagnate and fall, diverge, fuse, graft and overlap in a way that cannot/

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cannot be attributed to germinal variation. For one thing cultural acquisitions are transmitted to and built upon by the succeeding generations in a way that does not hold for organic characters. Of course the physical basis, the inherited potentiality must pre-exist, but it is not specific. Though it sets a "quantitative" limit to the progress of culture, this may never be reached. In such a case inheritance has not played even a negative part in shaping the evolution of the culture concerned.

The relation of endowment to culture is, then, not a simple and casual one. Undoubtedly cultural tend to coincide with racial boundaries, but this is true even of languages which are not germinally transmitted, and the same causes (e.g. early upbringing) may account for the racial limitation of many other racial boundaries, and though necessarily, as affecting adult cultural characters. Cultures do overflow at first, superimposed upon the pre-existing cultures, they may in time permeate and fuse with or oust the latter (e.g. Negro adoption of American culture). Cultures can therefore be transmitted regardless of cortical endowment, and it is important to notice that it is precisely the highest and latest acquisitions that are most readily transmitted. If germinal and cultural differentiation of races had proceeded pari passu if/

(if the former were the causal series) then surely cultures should more readily assimilate in their generic than in their specific features.

THE CONCEPTION OF A CULTURE

Tradition consists of a great deal more than language. Conceptual thought and knowledge, logic, arts and crafts, law, economic life and social organisation, family usages and sex customs, religious belief, myth and ritual, all these and more form the social heritage. Even personal ideas and ambitions, attitudes, habits, tastes and interests are all powerfully or decisively influenced by social contacts.

Culture is not merely a sum, a collection of practices and lore. Under the dominance of a religious belief or some other sentiment it becomes relatively organised. Pride of race may not only keep the race pure, but may even confine a culture to a race, as to some extent is the case with the Jews. But the sentiment may refer to class, sect, caste, or even to the culture itself, which thereby acquires great stability. On the other hand, the contact of two cultures leads to criticism, speculation and tolerance and tends to produce a diversity of minds. In this way both may be fertilised and stimulated to rapid development/

development and complication.

Certain homogeneous cultures are so "organised" integrated, preserve so truly a definite and characteristic form that some writers have conceived them as GROUP MINDS, attributing to them individuality and all the characters of mind as it is commonly understood. Others have been unjustly accused of this metaphysical speculation. With these controversies we have nothing to do, but they demonstrate the necessity for a clear conception of culture and of its relation to individual mind.

Culture is entirely composed of "mental contents." Apart from the minds in which it is embodied it has no existence. (This is clearly stated by many who use the term group mind) Yet, as the tissues of an organism may be renewed throughout by waste and repair without affecting its "form" and individuality, so may a culture propagate itself indefinitely as a whole with some degree of integration. Its constituent minds are its vehicle or "body"; in itself it is no more than a "pattern" to which they conform. It has the same kind of existence as a vortex or eddy, assimilating the infant minds of the rising to make good the loss of the passing generation. These minds are formed, moulded to type, sometimes with a very narrow range of deviation.

Homogeneous /

Homogeneous cultures are powerful social forces making for mental stereotypy and hence for their own unaltered persistence.

One factor of stability is obvious. Those (individual) endowments which are most apt to respond to the prevailing culture will be encouraged, stimulated, educated and improved in every way to the neglect of the less apt. Wide deviations from this arbitrary "optimum" will be to some extent isolated, atrophied from lack of harmonious intercourse, and thus denied their full potential development. Extreme deviations are coerced, repressed, or even actively eliminated, not because they are manifestly inferior but simply as deviations from the norm. There is thus a sort of CULTURAL SELECTION of individuals which will tend to mould the innate (mental) dispositions of a race to their culture. Even to the small extent to which individual and independent thought, art, etc., is possible, it does not follow that it will be able in turn to influence culture. Mental development therefore, not only tends to be moulded exclusively within the lines of the extant culture, but chance "improvements" on that culture as "strange" or "unintelligible" tend to be ignored and thus to leave no record of their existence. It is for these reasons that/

that cultural development owes more to the influence of "other cultures" than to "supermen" of its own population; the latter factor is not sufficiently organised, wide-spread and persistent to affect its inertia, and is thus unable to survive.

II.

"SOCIAL" AND "INDIVIDUAL" PSYCHOLOGY.

minds. It may therefore be argued that "individual"

It has been admitted that there is nothing of culture outside the contents and processes of "individual" psychology, or at any rate a special application or department thereof, can give an adequate account of culture. In the first place the development of culture is a matter of centuries; its progressions are infinitesimal and cannot be traced in the life-history of the individual. A history of culture has, therefore, facts of its own to deal with - if only as a descriptive science folk-psychology (or ethnology) is amply justified.

But even the causes of the evolution cannot be elucidated from a study of the norms of mental reaction (in the individual). It is true that every step in the process took place in mind. These minds are now inaccessible to study; our only data are the ethnological records. It is suggested that these might be formulated on their own merits, and that it might be more profitable/

profitable to interpret certain mental phenomena in terms thereof than has proved the attempt to formulate tradition in terms of "individual" psychology. Moreover, the evolution of culture is not due to any change in the endowment of its constituent minds, but rather to the interplay of diverse cultural influences to which they were subjected. The minds themselves, as it were, are the crucibles in which the chemistry takes place. It is of great and independent value to us to discover the "laws" of the combination, divergence, orthogenesis and degeneration of culture. From the biological standpoint we can regard culture as having a pathology of its own. Such a conception may prove of further interest to us inasmuch as culture may show trends ill-adapted to external reality or to instructive endowment.

The principal reason, however, why we are no longer satisfied with an "individual" psychology is that it has become a matter of uncertainty to distinguish individual from social. Of these two factors in mental phenomena, the former has been over-emphasised, and also the distinction between the two. While every endeavour is made to interpret the latter in terms of the former, at the same time the logical antithesis is so strictly read into the facts that a unification is made more difficult than need be (see below)

Baldwin/

Baldwin defines social psychology as "That department of psychology which treats of the individual mind with reference to the implication of other minds in its functions and development." It is obvious where the centre of interest is for him, yet this writer was particularly early and thorough-going in the study of the social factors of mind. Social psychology is actually made a department or special application of INDIVIDUAL psychology, for the profit of the latter. This, I suggest, is to look^{at} the facts from the wrong side, for, though mind undoubtedly makes society, yet it is equally true that society makes mind.

Psychology is largely based on the data of introspection, and is dominated by the conception of mind derived from the study of SELF. But the autonomy of the introspecting self is momentary and illusory; the act consists in an artificial isolation of the mind from its environment, and especially from its social environment. Though the method is indispensable, it gives us a STATIC description of MATURE experience under an ARTIFICIAL separation from the objective world and with an INTELLECTUAL interest. The reflecting mind has a fictitious independence; it is temporarily DESCORIALIZED, and erects a correspondingly imperfect psychology. Naturally, social phenomena are not readily explained by its formulae.

It tends further to be assumed that the contents, functions and processes of mind are "individual" whereas this can hardly be said of anything but the qualities of experience; all its forms are profoundly modified by social contacts. Thus one error is covered though not corrected by another. The over-emphasis upon the individual is disguised by including under this conception much that is ^{more} properly social. Manifestly social phenomena are neglected or relegated to the descriptive ethnologist, and where it is no longer possible to evade the problem of the social integration of minds; psychologists have to bridge the gap between social and individual (a gap exaggerated and misplaced by themselves) by transcendent and obscurantist hypotheses like that of "herd instinct"

III.

"SOCIAL" AND "INDIVIDUAL" PSYCHOLOGY

We cannot avoid this difficult and theoretical discussion of first principles. The distinction between social and individual phenomena must be defined and shown as real, relative, abstract, etc., as the case may be. We cannot, for example, understand the inter-relations of the group and the unit unless we can form a clear idea of their respective natures. Even the literature of social psychology is not helpful or intelligible to us/

us until the meaning and validity of such conceptions as group minds are definitely established. Hugo Munsterburg, for example, writes: "We compare the social mind with the individual mind. Such a comparison is not meant as a metaphor. It is a true, far-reaching analogy, an account of really corresponding processes." He then works out the most elaborate parallel, even in regard to "physiological basis." But parallels never meet, and though this one may be suggestive, it is not helpful to the understanding of the INTERACTION of the social and individual minds - i.e., the psychogenesis of the group and the socialisation of the individual, or even in forming clear ideas of these two and their relations. Other writers use group mind as a mere figure of speech, for others again it is a transcendent reality.

But, as indicated above, there seems to be a still more compelling necessity for methodological discussion. If psychological theory has been erected upon a basis of INDIVIDUAL behaviour to the relative neglect of SOCIAL DATA, then the enlargement of its field of enquiry so as to take full account of the latter is not a simple matter. We cannot assume that our psychological conceptions will merely be confirmed and perhaps amplified by these new data. They might prove inadequate and have to be radically modified. We must not therefore force/

force social fact into psychological formulae, nor on the other hand can we willingly allow it (social fact) to form an entirely independent theory of its own. To obtain a unified explanation that will do justice to both groups of phenomena we must either jettison all theory and generalise afresh on the new basis, or attempt to relate the two theories as they exist. Thus a purely theoretical discussion is justified.

We require to know how social and individual behaviour are related, and in particular whether the former is due to any special stimulus, motive or "faculty" (instinct.). If so, what postulates - if any - must we add to our psychological theory to enable it to take account of social fact, or how must we modify it in regard to method, point of view, and fundamental conceptions? Our method and probably our findings will be profoundly influenced by the mode in which we conceive the distinction between social and individual. At the one extreme there are students who ignore it ~~together~~, at the other those for whom it is absolute. Some of the former attempt to describe all social behaviour in terms of the instincts and purposes of the individuals involved. Others regard the individual mind as the product of its cultural contacts and the causes and mechanisms of mental evolution as themselves extramental. The problem of the social integration of/

of minds for example, practically disappears, or at least is profoundly modified, when approached from the latter point of view, yet it is crucial to the former school (which might be termed individualistic psychology.)

It is thus possible ^{either} to regard society as a special product of mind or mind as a product of social life (or both as distinct) and in this way to make either "social" or psychological "laws" fundamental. Both points of view are equally defensible, but if our method of interpretation must (unfortunately) follow one line exclusively, it cannot be a matter of indifference which we choose. We may on the one hand make the "culture" or the "group" the centre of interest and interpret the mind in terms of its history and purposes and of mass BEHAVIOUR. ~~On~~ On the other hand, since all the data consist of the behaviour of individuals, we may equally reasonably make our knowledge of the individual the basis of our study of the group.

What is an individual mind and what is its relation to social fact; are we to regard SOCIAL behaviour as distinguished by (a) a special form of stimulus evoking it; (b) a special motive, disposition, faculty or acquired ideational system producing it, or (c) merely by a special purpose utility or survival value which is its CONSEQUENCE (psychologically irrelevant except as/

as regards conscious purpose.) These questions indicate the perplexities that beset us in extending investigations from the individual to the social. They are not decided and perhaps cannot at all be decided on theoretical grounds. Even the most practical interest in the matter and the necessity for mutual comprehension in co-operative thinking requires a definition of the conceptions "social" and "individual"; their meaning, reference (extension) and relation to each other.

I will endeavour to show that we conceive of the individual as autonomous - self-contained, and self-determining - to a degree that makes social psychology impossible. Our formal admission that the CONTENTS of mind are social in origin and can only be understood from the standpoint of a ^{of culture} history, does not correct the error. How much of the actual structure of the mind is also part of the "social heritage" cannot be determined a priori, but I hope to demonstrate the existence of certain tendencies ^{that} ~~to~~ concentrate attention unduly upon the individual at the expense of the social, ^{and that} ~~to~~ over-emphasise the distinction and ~~to~~ misplace it.

(If ~~we~~ attempt to imagine the "group" and the "individual" mind as having spatial relations, we will obviously concede an unfair advantage to individualistic interpretation. But although the "social" is contained in/

in the individual mind, the degree to which it can be said to form part of (to be functionally integrated with) the latter varies greatly with corresponding variations in character and conduct)

HOW FAR DO THE FACTS IN THEMSELVES WARRANT US IN DRAWING
A DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE SOCIAL AND THE INDIVIDUAL?

The social habit has been regarded as a specific character (and hence innate), and that, not only in popular speech, but also in scientific literature. We are quite accustomed to talk of social and solitary species, but I have shown (Lancet, November 19, 1921), that this classification rests merely upon the selection of extreme examples of each mode of life. It is sufficiently evident that there is no natural division between the two classes of species, but that on the contrary intermediate forms (of sociality) are as common as in organic evolution. I have shown moreover that if social and solitary species are compared in regard to the adaptation of general instinctive activities necessitated by the social habit (i.e., in regard to its real psychological meaning), then it will be seen that the so-called animal societies are in fact families - centreing round ONE functionally active individual of either sex, and therefore presumably held together by reproductive impulses as they are certainly split by reproductive/

reproductive rivalry. If following this suggestion we define society as a permanent co-operative group transcending the bounds of the family (reproductive or sex units), we shall have to exclude from the class of social animals all the communal insects and will in fact be left with man and baboons as almost the only animals of which the "family" is not the natural division, or rather the natural group.

A still more startling consequence of the attempt to discover a definition or criterion of sociality which will enable us to classify species as social and solitary, is the light it throws upon the relationship of the family and the social group. The transition (evolution of social group from family) is regarded as natural and even easy, phylogenetically and ontogenetically (cp., however, Freud); the two organisations are regarded as analogous and closely related and the family is pointed out as supporting and aiding the state in every way and as promoting socialisation generally. Such a definition of social as that given above would lead us to the opposite conclusion; namely that the transition is critical and opposed by masculine jealousy, and (even yet) by many other motives, and that the two groups are in constant competition for the loyalty and interest of the individuals (constituent of both groups) with a constant tendency/

tendency towards the reversion from the social to the family interests and life. We may take it therefore that there is no obvious and natural division of species into social and solitary which would guide us in defining the social and individual modes of life, disposition, etc., and so, in forming a clear conception of the difference between these types of mind, i.e., in discovering a criterion of sociality.

Since we cannot classify species themselves, are we able to classify behaviour on these lines? Can we distinguish certain functions, acts and responses that are as definitely social as others again are alimentary ~~and therefore non-social or reproductive~~ ^{or reproductive}, and hence non-social. No; behaviour is classified according (1) to the structures involved, or (2) to the biological purposes subserved - preservation, propagation, alimentation and subordinate utilities. On neither basis can social conduct find a definite place; it involves no special reflexes, and social life is not a biological end in itself, but merely an adaptation for the easier attainment of the vital and truly instinctive needs. Social behaviour then is an abstraction and consists really in subtle modifications and adjustments of individualistic impulse. Regarded as /

as a special activity it does not warrant us in postulating a relatively integrated psycho-physical disposition (instinctive or acquired) as its proper source, and thus enabling ourselves to verify and re-define our conception of what is social - to discover to what the term properly applies, and to ascertain the validity and precise significance of the distinction social-individual.

Finally do subjective phenomena, the data of introspection assist us in drawing this distinction? Can we by looking into our own minds delimit the social and the individual? In the first place, such an enquiry assumes that all the data of social psychology are to be found in any given mind - an assumption that is by no means universally admitted. In the second, it is by no means clear what subjective criterion of sociality is possible, i.e., on what grounds we could make the distinction social non-social within the sphere of one mind. For example, are we to call all those mental contents "social" which are derived from or under the influence of our fellowmen (i.e. practically the whole of the mind) or only those which refer to them (fellows) directly or to their well-being as distinct from our own? In regard to instincts and emotions, McDougal admits that introspective analysis/

analysis is impossible and he turns to biology for guidance. But, as we have just seen, biology has nothing to say in definition and support of this distinction. Neither in structure, behaviour or purpose is any clear and natural difference discernible between the social and the individual. That is to say, the logical contrast has no phenomenal basis; it cannot be discovered in the facts and is highly abstract and even at that indefinite.

IV.

REASONS FOR THE EXISTING OVER-EMPHASIS UPON AND ARTIFICIAL DEFINITION OF THE DISTINCTION OF THE FROM THE SOCIAL INDIVIDUAL.

It is so widely and confidently drawn, however, that it is worth while to enquire how it is arrived at. Besides, since some animals can fairly be said to be more social than others, a genetic account required the definition of stages or degrees of sociality.

Perhaps the starting-point of all reflective thought is in the experience of conflict between social and selfish motives. At any rate we find ethical problems playing a great part in early discussions on the nature of man and the forms and causes /

causes of his behaviour. The distinction social anti-social is thus made, and later is never really disentangled from the psycho-sociological (and more purely scientific) distinction, social-individual. The vague conception of the former antagonism (social-anti-social) is a bias which tends to accentuate in our minds the opposition and contrast between the latter pair of ideas, and to preoccupy our attention with problems of policy and government which are not fundamental to sociology.

Psychology also has mainly been pursued by the method of introspection, which, as already stated, tends to exaggerate the independence of the individual i.e., to an artificial definition of individuality. This desocialised psychology naturally requires supplementing when confronted with social phenomena, and thus the sciences of the social and of the individual tend to develop in isolation, and their unrelated theories in turn confirm our tacit assumption that they deal with different groups of facts. Further, psychology like ethics, tends to identify the ego with the individual, just as "ethical" sociology confuses selfishness and individuality. It tends also to overlook the significance of complex cultural influences for the development of "personality". That the very person~~al~~/

personal differentiae are social^{ly} in origin is a true paradox that almost completely escapes our individualistic psychology. Another paradox is found in the fact that the "selfish" instincts whose unrestrained expression (and the consequent rivalry) is the main disruptive force of society, are in fact (by the mechanism of "organic sympathy") the foundation of that community of feeling that alone makes co-operative activity possible. WHAT DISTINGUISHES THE INDIVIDUAL FROM OTHERS, IS THAT WHICH HE HAS RECEIVED FROM OTHERS; WHAT ANTAGONISES HIM TOWARDS OTHERS, IS THAT WHICH HE HAS IN COMMON WITH OTHERS AND WHICH FORMS THE VERY BASIS OF THE SOCIAL RAPPORT. Psychology, dealing with cultural individuals and at a moment of self-consciousness (and therefore of the consciousness of the opposition self-other), attributes moreover to the individual much that is social in origin and reference. It thus obscures, misplaces and exaggerates the division between social and individual, and makes the problem of the evolution and development of the latter, and of his social integration much more difficult.

Speculative sociology on the other hand commits corresponding errors by regarding all the features of the evolved state as primitive and fundamental to social life, and their origin as coeval with that of the group itself./

itself. No wonder it had to postulate rational contracts, etc., when it set itself the fictitious problem of accounting for the synthesis, BY CRISIS, of scattered families into an organised and political state. Reason itself is a product of social life, and such speculations are absurd when applied to explain the origin of the group itself (or for that matter anything else) We must to a certain ^{extent} distinguish between the problems of the origin of culture and the origin of the group. The former is mainly secondary though having its roots back in family life, Without going further into detail, it is obvious that such speculations were based on a misapprehension of the relations between individual and society, and tended still further to obscure that relation, and in the long run to exaggerate the difference and the opposition between the two. Thus the problem of the social integration of individuals could only be solved by transcendent hypotheses, because both the individual and society were conceived in an absolute and unrelated way, and because much was attributed to the former that really was social in origin, and much was regarded as essential to, and therefore primary in social life, that really was a late product thereof.

Biology/

Biology did not serve to bring the social and the individual into relation. On the contrary, by selecting extreme examples of each mode of life (social and solitary), regarding them as typical and ignoring intermediate forms and the fact that hymenopterans communities are really families; by tacitly assuming that the SOCIAL HABIT IS HOMOLOGOUS THROUGHOUT THE ANIMAL KINGDOM, biology permitted the LOGICAL contrast, social non-social, to be forced upon the facts of life. The notion of a special social instinct too, has been, until recently, allowed to pass unchallenged, notwithstanding (among other objections) the fact that the social habit cannot be regarded as a biological end in itself, but is merely a special adaptation whose utility lies in the facilitation of reproduction, nutrition, defence, etc.

Philosophic discussion also has failed to solve the problems of the nature and inter-relations of the individual and the group. Far from it, besides reading the abstract distinction into the real, it has tended rather to carry the contrasting ideas to a limit, defining and emphasising their logical opposition. The evolution of the social thus becomes unintelligible, a genetic account impossible. Hence, for those who will abandon neither their problems nor their pre-conceptions, the necessity for juggling with metaphysical/

metaphysical (transcendent and essential) postulates, Approaching this impassable gap from the standpoint of sociology we tend to find the social bond in "rational contracts" dominance of leaders, group minds, or special dispensations of providence. The psychologist on the other hand, will fancy "moral senses," categorical imperatives (unless this was really a compulsion neurosis) herd instincts, rational hedonism, suggestion, sympathy, consciousness of kind, and combinations and permutations of these. Some of them obviously explain nothing, none are universally accepted, so it seems worth while to enquire into the necessity for postulating ANY social "centripetal" force whatsoever.

CONCLUSIONS

(1) The phenomena we group under the term "social" have apparently little in common. At most this common aspect or character is very obscure and indefinite, and consequently the conception "the social" is highly abstract and even empty, or else must be applied to things that are really different, in a confusing way. The denotation is so wide that the term ceases to have any strict and substantial meaning.

(2) Between (typically) "social" and "solitary" species, social and individual behaviour, social and individualistic/

individualistic impulse, motive and feeling, there is no sharp and natural line of demarcation. On the contrary, on searching closely for such a division, we find a continuous series of intermediate forms, while the very contrast between the extreme forms becomes obscured and confused by the question of the relation of "family" to "social" life.

An INDUCTIVE study of social phenomena soon raises the question of the validity of the distinction of this (the social) as a natural class. It throws doubt upon the tacit assumption that the social habit is homologous and serves always the same biological purposes, and upon the related theory that social behaviour has a single, relatively integrated instinctive root (i.e. that its psycho-physical disposition is primarily organised, that its impulse bundle is really a "bundle" and has any psychological unity). Thus the conception of the "social" becomes disintegrated, the purely logical distinction social-non-social loses even its descriptive validity, and every fresh attempt to discover it definitely in the facts leads us into further confusion. Consequently we can only attach a vague, relative, tentative meaning to the contrast, social-individual; we cannot rely on these concepts in classifying facts or in formulating problems. We must regard it rather as a dangerous preconception deeply/

deeply engrained in our tradition.

(3) Introspective psychology studies minds which apprehend the relation self-other, and tends to accept the "ego" as the "individual." It is largely responsible for the prevailing over-emphasis upon the distinction social-individual, and disguises this error by including under the conception of "individual" much that is social in origin and reference. The introspective method, point of view, and data are largely responsible for the cleavage between psychology and sociology, an isolation that is by no means remedied by poaching from either side. This psychology has divorced and robbed sociology. It has selected for attention SOME only of the facts of behaviour, and - because of its ego-centric point of view - inadequately interpreted others. Others again, until recently, it has wholly neglected. Sociology can bring against psychology two charges:

(A) That having formulated its theory upon a narrower basis, it attempts to extend it a PRIORI to a new range of facts (social) which ought to be generalised on their own account. Psychological theory applied to social fact is a preconception, and its findings should be received with caution.

(B) That its "ego-centric" method - the de-socialised and isolated state of the introspecting mind its "subjectivity" permanently disables it from inter/

interpreting SOCIAL behaviour (to some extent). The sociological inadequacy of such a psychology cannot be made good by ADDING certain (essential and transcendent mostly) postulates to its theory, or by specialising a department thereof to deal with social fact. These expedients serve merely to disguise the essential disharmony between the introspective and the sociological (objective and behaviourist) conceptions of the individual mind.

(4) We must regard all behaviour and experience as ONE group of phenomena. The distinction social-individual is in many ways uncertain and is probably not fundamental. We cannot rest content without a unified harmonious and systematic account of the WHOLE of mental activity. We cannot therefore permanently be content to supplement a theory of individual mind (conceived in abstract and absolute fashion) by an equally abstract theory of the Group, and to bridge the artificial gap between the two by unnecessary, unprofitable and non-explanatory explanations.

MORAL IMBECILITY (GNOSOLOGICAL)

There is a type of Social Psychology which finds the explanation of man's social behaviour in a hypothetical "disposition" of his mind. This motive-complex is conceived as specialised for the function of adapting conduct to social life, and as being in itself relatively closely integrated, developing and functioning as a whole. Of this hypothetical "Gregarious Instinct", McDougall goes so far as to say:—"For it is highly probable that instinctive dispositions are Mendelian Units" (JL. of Abn. Psych. & Soc. Psych. Vol XVI. P. 316)

This plainly suggests that the unity of ^{the} social disposition (its existence as a discrete factor in development) is to be regarded as antedating experience, that it is an ultimate datum for psychology not susceptible to analysis and is not a derivative of any other known motive such as "love", "Fear", or "Hope of reward". This "Instinct" interpretation of social behaviour has been criticised on many grounds (as unfruitful for Psychology, and incompatible with biological fact), but of course the demonstration of a Mendelian Transmission of the social disposition would compel us to regard it as an element of character. Our conception of mental development and of the "socialisation"/

"socialisation" of the individual, of the relative significance of upbringing as compared with organic endowment, and our whole psychopathology, depend upon our acceptance or rejection of Mr Dougall's view. If he is right in regard to the germinal "unit" determination of the social disposition, criminological studies should offer verification. I propose therefore to consider how far we are justified in regarding Moral Insanity and Moral Imbecility as true "morbid entities"

Our problem may be roughly stated; - how far is the social disposition of a man a "unitary character" relatively integrated within the larger whole of the organism, and relatively independent of similarly integrated "impulse-bundles"; how far does it function as a discrete factor in development and in behaviour? If we are able to demonstrate pathological disintegrations selectively affecting social behaviour, if we find gross congenital defect of this function uncorrelated with defect in any other, above all if such defect should be transmissible in Mendelian "patterns", then the question would be settled in McDougall's favour. If not, our research might still bring to light other correlations interesting and important in themselves and perhaps throwing light upon the nature of the social bond. We wish therefore to know/

know whether social reactions are ever selectively disordered or defective and if so, the etiology and pathogenesis of such conditions.

Clinical data however do not seem at first sight to decide unequivocally whether such specialised or limited abnormality does or does not occur. At least we find absolute differences of opinion among observers as to whether moral abnormality exists per se. Tredgold for example is confident not only that this is a clinical entity, but that the mind is made up of "four chief senses or sentiments", moral, religious, artistic and rational. He considers these components are independent variables. At the opposite extreme we find Healy declaring "that probably all moral imbeciles are primarily mentally abnormal" The most he allows is "that if the moral imbecile exists who is free from all other forms of intellectual defect he must indeed be a rara avis" Though constantly on the look out Healy has never found one.

The conflict of opinion as to the existence of abnormality limited to social behaviour turns mainly on the question of the relation of such a moral defect to intellectual defect, some considering that there are instances of a congenital incapacity to appreciate moral relations without any impairment of /

of the other functions of mind. Others again hold that moral defect or disorder is always secondary to intellectual inferiority. We can discern however a number of reasons why moral ^{and} intellectual defect should appear to be associated even though possibly independent. In the first place a wide range of intellectual inferiority is found in the general population - extreme dulness being quite compatible with a moral life. Though the proportion of intellectually defectives may be abnormally high among offenders, many causes may operate to bring this about.

(1) See however, Cyril Burt "Delinquency & mental Defect" British Journal of Medical Psychology 1923. P.169.

For instance the unintelligent are exposed to greater temptation, are less able to resist these on prudential grounds and are more liable to detection. Though they bulk largely in the group of convicted delinquents we cannot generalise and say, probably all offenders are defective more or less. It appears to me that some writers have a tendency to do this, they overlook the great variety that is within the limits of the normal. It would be easy to devise a group of intelligence tests that would find weak spots in any average intelligence. If therefore, we look/

look for the mental defect until we find it, as one writer recommends, we will certainly find it wherever our preconceptions require it to be found. We must in fact consider whether all incorrigible delinquents show a cognitive inferiority WHICH ACCOUNTS FULLY FOR THEIR BAD CONDUCT.

There is another circumstance tending to over-emphasize the association of mental and moral defect. In our psychiatric examination of delinquents we must to some extent depend upon discussion of ethical situations. Now a stupid patient is at a disadvantage here and his incompetence to utilise abstract conceptions might lead us to underestimate his moral sense. He might of course be unable to explain and to criticise his conduct and yet have a sound intuitive perception of moral obligations in a concrete situation. On the other hand, a highly intelligent man will appreciate the purpose of the interview, he knows the right attitudes to adopt and the normal answers to give. He knows in fact all about morality and social life, his ethical understanding is perfect. Here we may miss a true case of moral imbecility by diagnosing it a normal criminal. Yet again a man may be so anti-social, so suspicious, so out of sympathy with his fellows in general and his examiner in particular/

particular that he neither follows ~~the~~ questions with his interest or exerts himself to respond. Here there will be a tendency for the examiner to attribute erroneously, a deficiency of intelligence to a case of moral disorder. Not only then does the mode of selection of our material tend to present us mainly with cases in which mental defect complicates moral disorder, but in our examination of these cases there are many circumstances that would lead us to confuse the two. It is extremely difficult to estimate the two factors separately. Our evaluation of the moral condition of the patient is largely dependent upon his intelligence; our estimate of his intelligence depends somewhat upon the emotional rapproch (i.e. social) between examiner and examinee. For test purposes intelligence is really social intelligence, and moral disposition is intelligent appreciation of social standards.

On examining the genetic relationship of moral and intellectual defect we find another reason for their close association. It is obvious that gross congenital defect of cognitive capacity will disable the affected individual from mastering the principles which govern social relationship, or even from learning and remembering the customs of his community.

It/

It seems probable moreover that a radical defect in the social rapport must have equally disastrous effects upon intellectual development. This latter process consists largely in the assimilation of tradition and in the acquisition of skills in the use of complex abstract^s thought symbols. Both these acquisitions depend not only upon intimate and constant contact with minds of similar interests, but also upon the existence of a DIRECT AFFECTIVE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE LEARNER AND HIS TEACHERS. The precise nature of this bond^{it} is the ultimate object of social psychology to discover; meantime it seems certain that in its absence learning from others would be impossible. Some personal attachment seems then a precondition of intellectual development, as being necessary to establish or maintain the sympathetic understanding, the identity of interest and point of view that is required if the child is to acquire and correctly apply his community's conceptual formulation of environment. We know how cross-purposes, difference in point of view, etc., stultify science and philosophy, and how the resulting misunderstandings may confound human intelligence for generations. Any such misunderstandings and disharmonies between the child mind and its teacher would/

would render development impossible. The affective attuning of minds is then necessary for their interaction, and development requires also that interest in other's which motivates the playful interactions of conversation. This co-operative play-thinking is a sine qua non of mental development. It is a commonplace how even at school age the affective relations of teacher and taught affect the latter's intellectual interest and progress. Refusal to learn at this age may merely deprive the individual of school knowledge, but non-incenative to learn at an earlier age may lead to ignorance and stupidity indistinguishable from congenital defect. We see then that even in the event of a constant concomitance of moral and intellectual abnormality being demonstrated, we must not on that account jump to the conclusion that intellectual defect is necessarily primary and fundamental. We must in fact trace out the precise mechanism of the correlation and not merely state the association of the two conditions as a statistical fact.

In this connection we may anticipate a later observation. The more intelligent of the morally defective sometimes exhibit a curious and highly specific stupidity in their social relations. This is/

is not because of the complexity of the latter which are well enough 'understood'. These cases fail in the INTUITIVE APPRECIATION OF OTHER PEOPLE'S ATTITUDES AND FEELINGS. They are clumsy in their social relations because of their lack of sympathy. The stupidities into which this may lead them vary from the slightest and the most laughable maladroitness to the grossest blunders. It is sometimes possible to describe the same offence in two alternative ways, both true ~~to~~ fact. One of these ways may picture the action of the culprit as childlike, or stupid to the point of imbecility. The other may as plausibly regard it as the oversight of a crafty villain. Medical testimony tends to emphasize the stupidity of the offence as evidence of intellectual defect or of psychopathy. The Court however is often able to satisfy itself that the general intelligence of the offender is up to average. The intellectualist preoccupation of both parties causes them both to overlook the fact that this stupidity indicates neither chance oversight nor radical mental inferiority but rather a defect in social flair. Here is another reason for the prevalent opinion that offenders are most^{ly} intellectually defective or mentally normal, the possibility of moral defect is overlooked.

We will ~~now~~ consider an a priori argument often advanced, (oftener still tacit), that the fact of misconduct in itself implies intellectual defect in as much as wrong-doing is contrary to the evil-doers' own best interests. The position that crime is insanity, is made the basis of a ridiculous attack upon the principle of punishment. Partly as a reaction to this subversive movement, partly from the same rationalistic preconceptions, the Law adheres steadfastly to the view that only intellectual abnormality limits criminal responsibility. Both of these attitudes to crime show an over-valuation of prudential motives and intelligence as factors in social conduct. This is in fact the fallacy of hedonistic utilitarianism which finds in the reasonable calculated pursuit of pleasure, in enlightened and rational self-interest, the whole cause of social conduct. As an ethical dogma this has fallen into disrepute, as a preconception influencing practical judgments it seems as strong as ever. The argument is this, "If the patient could understand the disadvantages and appreciate the consequences of such conduct, he would abstain." Certainly for these who consider that conformity to social exigences is solely and sufficiently motivated/

motivated by prudence and the policy of honesty,
 it is difficult to conceive of moral imbecility
 without concomitant intellectual inferiority. We
 now know that "economic man", if not a fabulous
 monster, corresponds pretty closely to our conception
 of a ~~amoral~~ imbecile. Rationalistic ethics regard
 this character as typical of the good citizen.
 This may of course be true, in which case the
 search for an affective socialising factor,
 instinctive or derivative, (under the influence of
 culture), is illusory. The conception of human
 nature as rational or "economic" is however
 thoroughly discredited, and was indeed based on a
~~one-~~~~considered~~ view of social obligations as comprising
 only those incidental demands upon self-denial
 in connection with which WE ARE IN THE HABIT OF
 EXPERIENCING CONFLICT. As is now well-known the
 vast majority of social reactions are, by normal
 adults, performed as automatically - with as little
 conscious deliberation, 'shall I or shall I not' -
 as reflexes. Many of these customary reactions more-
 over are highly A-RATIONAL and even disadvantageous
 to the individual performing them and to the
 community at whose unspoken demands they are performed.
 A more comprehensive view of social motive is therefore
 necessary/

necessary than that offered by Utilitarian Ethics, and this involves a corresponding modification in our theory of antisocial conduct. If we do not wish to saddle ourselves with the task of defending an abandoned and untenable psychosociological theory, we must cease to look upon intellect as the foundation of social conduct, and upon abnormalities of intellect as the source of all social maladaptation.⁽²⁾

(2) ⁽²⁾ It will of course be asserted as usual that no one supports the Utilitarian Ethical Theory, etc. Both in writings and in testimony however, there is abundant evidence of the belief that the folly of wrongdoing connotes defect of intelligence.

It may be true that the normal man in resisting a temptation applies some such formula as "honesty is the best policy". But is this judgment the real cause of his continued probity, and is the process truly intellectual? I should imagine that a purely intelligent decision would depend upon weighing the probability and value of the forbidden gain against the probability of detection and the severity of consequent punishment. This punishment moreover is itself largely moral rather than material and so is not/

not really grievous to the man who is insensitive to his fellow's feelings. Does even the business man (and we know that a modified code of morals is supposed to be sanctioned in business) weigh and consider dispassionately every possibility of gainful wrong-doing? Even if he did, this would not establish a norm and we might have to consider this class (in the pursuit of their occupation) as enjoying (!) a special custom-sanctioned licence. Our problem is really this - is intelligence the prime and general cause of moral (or social) conduct? Even the most unscrupulous business man would protest that he does not order his whole life by his business standards, unless he pretended to probity, in business, or on the other hand, with Bottomley, claimed that all morality was cant. This double moral standard is quite a well recognised phenomenon and we must ask ourselves, are both of these moralities based on intelligence and if so why do they differ?

But if we do not confine our attention to commercial dealings (where varying views of rights are possible and not settled by custom and where the only personal motive is the desire for gain) and if we consider the general conduct of life, we find that normal men do not meet temptation intellectually at all/

all. On the contrary where they do not yield to temptation they turn from it in horror and fear, thus resolving the conflict on purely emotional, i.e. non-rational lines. Self-interest and the real possibilities of the situation are not considered, nor is a balance of pros and cons calculated. The forbidden desire is met by an equally emotional resistance, and even when the conflict is not at once decided it continues ^{to} be fought out on emotional lines. At most there are intervals of rationalisation, but reason is rather a spectator whose approval is sought than an effective director of action. It merely serves to bring other motives into relation with the point at issue, and of these motives, long-sighted self-interest is lamentably weak even in intelligent and well-behaved people. The social sanction takes form within the mind as a compulsion or an arrational dread. The rational examination of this sanction would generally weaken it and thus pave the way for a-moral conduct.

In this connection the voice of the people is the voice of God, and whether it is obeyed from love or from fear it is obeyed on emotional grounds. To anticipate a future article, we see here the cause of the criminality of mobs, they are their own social sanction, their own public opinion, they ~~cause~~ ^{cause} to be/

and no longer owe deference to the laws and customs of the latter.
 be a psychic part of the larger community, [✓] We may go
 further than this and say that not only does the fear,
 respect or love, of one's fellows and of the mystic
 public opinion, prevent the normal man from examining
 intellectually a chance of wrong-doing, but that
 probably in the vast majority of cases opportunities
 of pleasurable and gainful wrong-doing PASS UNNOTICED.
 People are blind to the chances of doing "the things
 that are not done" by members of their community.
 Habit will not explain this altogether, for habit
 can not only be formed by the operation of a motive.
 We see moreover, that in regard to social conduct
 powerful motives are always operative. The motive
 behind the habit cannot have been rational self-
 interest, for the habit of self-denial is formed at an
 age and in regard to activities which forbid such an
 explanation. It is, of course true in a sense that all
 motives whatever are related to or derived from self-
 interest, for attachment to others is pleasurable and
 dependent to begin with in the pleasure others give
 us. But the selfishness of such motives early
 disappears from consciousness and the gain from the
 conduct it motivates is often non-existent. The
 distinctions between pleasure and duty is real if not
 fundamental/

fundamental and the reduction of all modes of conduct to the expression of the pleasure-pain principle obliterates real and useful distinctions. It is a fact that people do things for which they have no instinctive desire and which bring them no pleasure, they may even incur loss and injury without limit; though this unselfish conduct may be derived from originally selfish motives, the change is real and important, and we wish to know how it came about. To insist on hedonistic and utilitarian interpretations of all behaviour results in straining the facts of social conduct through the formulae of individual psychology, giving us a very incomplete view.

Consider now the case of a hypothetical moral imbecile. (He will not overlook opportunities of wrong-doing). He is in the unhappy position of the "economic man", of having to decide whether each particular temptation is worth the risks that yielding to ~~them~~^{it} involves. To the desire of the moment he has nothing better to oppose than prudential considerations, he is not startled and horrified by the idea of wrong-doing and an opportunity for him is a chance to be seized rather than an evil omen. Even imprisonment means merely a period of privation, and for that matter as/

as a good egotist, he generally has supreme confidence in his luck. For the normal man, and for all crimes but murder, it is the trial, the disgrace, as much as the actual punishment that is the deterrent where the deterrent is actually considered. The moral imbecile shows up well at his trial, perhaps conducting his own case. Any sort of acquittal (in Scotland "not proven" verdict) is a triumph for him. He takes a highly legalistic view of the proceedings and cannot really appreciate why the Jury and the public should be prejudiced against him by his employing quibbles and technical evasions. We find prisoners who have made no secret of their guilt and ^{are} yet bitterly aggrieved over their conviction, they feel that they have put up a good defence and deserve to get off. For them a commonsense verdict is not 'playing the game'. Where they have fallen into social disrepute these people are genuinely indignant, make no effort to rehabilitate themselves and justify themselves into an increasingly anti-social attitude.

Unless social sanctions are immediate and well-enforced, the moral imbecile can see no reason for self-denial. In like circumstances the normal individual conforms without seeking any reason, without indeed/

indeed reflecting whether social exactions are justified by social necessities. The gravity of crime is intuitively, not intellectually, assessed as is apparent from a consideration of recent conditions in Ireland. It has been accepted in our culture that crimes aiming at a change of government are less heinous than similar crimes gratifying the selfish desires of individuals. But in Ireland there was endless confusion and disagreement as to whether secret murder was or was not merely such a "political" crime. No clear distinction seems to have been drawn by either of the contestants between acts subversive of a particular and alien political authority, and acts subversive of all social life. Even the lawyers and the journalists felt rather than thought about it, that is to say their appreciation of the social significance of the act was purely intuitive. If then deliberate, professional judgments of social conduct are not intellectual, what is the sense of pretending that individuals shape and control their own conduct by an understanding of consequences.

3)

It is interesting to note that the early Norse settlers of Iceland recognised the special gravity of an unavowed manslaughter (saga of Burnt Njal) If the killer avowed the deed he had to reckon merely with the blood feud and was not despised. If he did not declare himself he was a murderer - an offender against public/

public security

We see then that reason - the appreciation of ~~particular~~ ^{practical} consequences - does not play a great part either in prescribing or enforcing social conduct. If then the OTHER FACTOR - whatever it may be - is deficient or disturbed, then intelligence will have a task imposed upon it to which it is not normally adapted. We ~~must~~ reject then the argument that a wrong-doer must either be intellectually deficient or else a normal man whose plans have miscarried. Theoretically then it is possible that a defect in the social disposition will lead an individual into wrong-doing, even though there is no defect in his intelligence.

Bearing this conclusion in mind we may proceed to examine whether there is a definite group of cases characterised by primary moral defect, and if so whether such defect is congenital. We will not expect to find such a group clearly and sharply defined. The conflict of opinion regarding its existence would have warned us against such an anticipation, apart altogether from the considerations previously adduced showing how moral and intellectual defect tend to implicate each other and to be confused by/

by examination methods. We must nevertheless see how far it is possible to discover a clinical entity corresponding to the conception of moral imbecility.

We must begin by ruling out the following groups of cases which bear a superficial resemblance to moral imbecility.

I. Those who are primarily and substantially defective or disordered in intellect, so that their understanding of their actions or of the complex social situation and exigences to which they must adapt, is seriously impaired. Any mental defect implies inefficiency and some consequent privation in life, hence special temptations to illicit gratification where normal satisfaction and even necessities are hardly attainable. We must therefore distinguish from moral imbeciles the large heterogeneous group of defective delinquents, the shiftless, the vagabonds, the catspaws, the economically inefficient.

II. Post-psychotic deteriorations, abortive dementia praecox form an important group which may have important etiological relations with moral imbecility. They should, however, be tentatively excluded until we determine whether moral abnormality exists in more specific form,

l.e./

i.e. without general affective deterioration.

III. It is conceivable that a morally normal person might become a habitual criminal through lack of ^{opportunity, lack of} strength and stability of general character ~~to~~ to rehabilitate himself socially. I would regard such cases as moral deteriorations consequent upon a disruption of social relations.

IV. We must also exclude "gangsters" and bred criminals who do possess social sentiments of a sort. These differ from moral imbeciles in being loyal members, good citizens (!) of their own little predatory communities. They are not a-social and defend the anti-social activities of their group. The frankly criminal gang spirit does not in Great Britain reach quite the same corporate and explicit development as in Italy, Ireland, America or China, though class anti-social activities are common enough. For really good examples of a criminal tradition we must go to the criminal tribes of India, though as minor factors in crime the criminal family and group do play a part in this country also. The criminal then may only be relatively a-social.

V. Again/

V. Again we find in anarchical revolutionaries, *behaviour is indubitably & consciently anti-social, whose anti-sociality* individuals whose ~~sociality~~ (generally disguised as antipathy to certain specific institutions), is an end in itself, conscious and deliberate, and not merely evinced as self-indulgence and ~~grudges~~ grudges against those who punish it. Such individuals indeed may be ascetic. Though some cases classed as moral imbeciles may be genetically related ~~to~~ this group, I think the latter are purely psycho-pathic. A radical antagonism fastening upon certain forms or institutions of society does not imply the absence of any social rapport; on the contrary it implies its presence in a negative or distorted form. It might be regarded as a moral insanity but not as imbecility.

Having defined this group by exclusion, following as far as possible current opinion, we must consider its contents. We find a variety of cases described as moral imbeciles. ~~In~~ In order to classify these we must distinguish four groups. (Nearly identical with Tredgold's)

- I. Mischievous, antagonistic, actively, intentionally anti-social individuals.
- II. Insensitive, selfish, a-social cases.
- III. Facile/

III. Facile cases who respond to the suggestion of the moment, who know right from wrong and who are even capable of kindly and generous feeling. Their sentiments either are not aroused in the moment of temptation or if they are, are unable to control conduct.

IV. "Exclusives" whose intelligence and social nature are even better developed than in the above, but who, under the influence of passion, lose all control of themselves. They are more dynamic than class III. but are like these in their instability.

In regard to the first group, any cases of repeated "malicious mischief" I have seen, have either been grossly defective in other ways, or have developed a very definite anti-social grudge in response to punishment and hardship. Fire-raising and other spectacular forms of destruction, are of course very attractive to the defective mind. Here however, the motive is not to do harm to others but simply the desire for a certain sensuous enjoyment. It does not indicate any special affective attitude to fellow-beings.

Such a case I would describe as having perverse or perhaps obsessive desires which he does not control, since his general defect has prevented him acquiring the necessary moral knowledge and sentiments. He is merely/

merely a delinquent defective, not a moral imbecile. His intellectual defect is primary, his destructiveness has no anti-social motive. On the other hand cruelty and malice indicate plainly an abnormality centering in affective relationships to fellows. Whether this cruelty has the object of enhancing the feeling of power, or whether it is of directly sadistic motivation, in either case it depends upon an affective bond and implies the existence of some appreciation, however abnormal, of the feelings of others. These cases should be included in our group though it is difficult to draw the line between them and other cases where intellectual defect is primary. Their relation to the neurotic anti-social group will be noticed.

II. The insensitive group includes a number of highly intelligent but utterly unscrupulous individuals, the moral defectives proper. These people know well the difference between right and wrong and the proper application of these terms; they are keenly aware of the consequences of detection in wrong-doing and may show great ability in avoiding it. They are not cruel or hostile, nor proud and revengeful, they are not to begin with, anxious to do harm, they are selfish not self-centred. (The self-centred may be constantly pre-occupied with social judgments and standards as applied/

applied to himself - troubled about what other people are thinking or might think about him), Self-consciousness is the reaction of a highly socialised disposition. The selfishness of these cases is naive, unreflective like that of a child, they regard others either as competitors or as tools.

By the time they are adult these insensitives have mostly learnt the importance of keeping within the law. They may even be alive to the value of a good reputation, their indifference to the rights and feelings of others need not therefore be so flagrantly shown as to interfere with their economic efficiency. Up to a point they may be good business men and take kindly to the rules of commercial morality, but they carry their sharp practice too far, they have not the intuitive caution of their fellows, they never know where to stop and sooner or later they take risks with the law, with public opinion, or with their customers or friends, which are out of all proportion to possible gains. Their defect also shows itself in tactlessness, they make enemies needlessly and do not get the best work out of subordinates and those with whom they have dealings. This nullifies the advantage of an often striking manner and personality, which is due to a lack of deference for others and of self-consciousness. The over/

over-valuation of self characteristics of these cases is impressive, they are brazen and convincing liars, act a part very well, and can study an intended victim very shrewdly, being well aware of the effect of appeals to the lower nature and unashamed to make them. All these and other characteristics make up a personality that is often very striking in its way and which is the true reason for the frequently amazing success of their frauds.

No clear line can be drawn between this class and the normal, their imperfect appreciation of social conditions and their recklessness - as it appears to ordinary men - may be foolish, yet no tests or interrogations can establish a definite intelligence defect. They are accordingly subjected to penal discipline until the obvious failure of this method, and perhaps secondary deterioration due to imprisonment, finally convinces the authorities that they are dealing with abnormal individuals.

III. The characteristic defect of this group or facile cases is instability and lack of continuity. Their ideals and sentiments expend themselves in feeling, in relation that is to say to the mental life rather than to behaviour. They alternately reform and relapse, they go on turning over new leaves with enthusiasm and the best intentions to the end of the/

the book. By calling them weak characters we indicate our intuitive perception of a moral defect - a defect of integration of the sentiments into personality, without which synthesis life is lived as a succession of impulsive reactions rather than as a coherent whole.

IV. The explosives have the characteristic peculiarity that as soon as any passion reaches a certain intensity, it appears to increase automatically discharging itself in a paroxysm during which the rest of the personality seems in abeyance. The whole organism, body and mind, is dominated by the emotion of the moment. No other stimulus is felt, no inhibiting or indifferent thought can reach consciousness. At ordinary times such cases appear not only to have normal sentiments but even to have good self-control. As soon as the limit of the latter is passed however, it vanishes utterly and does not re-appear at all until the storm has spent itself. The impression conveyed by such cases is that of an excessive emotivity. The normal tendency for any active emotion to become dominant is here quite unchecked, and the emotion seems to increase in a sort of vicious circle, the active emotion appears to inhibit all the others. I see no reason to suppose that/

that the emotions are stronger than normal as some writers insist. It is the integration that is defective allowing each emotion unchecked and maximal expression.

These four groups together present a very heterogeneous assortment of cases. It is not easy to find in them any common concrete psychological character, while the differences they cover are profound. Of supreme importance, at any rate for our present enquiry, is the question of the nature and strength of the affective attitude to fellow-men. In the first group this rapport is variable and disordered, in the second it is weak, in the other two it is not markedly abnormal, but defective integration of personality or an unregulated emotional mechanism prevents it controlling conduct. The most striking difference is that between the group of cases (II) in which the social disposition is weak, or insufficiently developed, and the other three groups in which it is perverted or thwarted in some way. This difference strongly suggests a radical difference in etiology or pathogenesis. These four groups however are only descriptive, they are not even empirically well defined and have no claim to be regarded as psycho-pathological entities. Since our purpose is to discover/

discover to what extent defect or disease can selectively affect the social disposition (i.e. without a general mental abnormality) we must push our analysis and definition further, even at the expense of further limiting the application of the conception of moral psycho-pathology.

We have already noticed that cruelty and malice actually vouch for the presence of a special social rapport, though perverse. The bully craves a sort of admiration, the sadist appreciates the feelings of his victim, they have a form at any rate of organic sympathy. It is probably permissible to regard the former as a secondary perversion, or even as in some cases, a reaction to a sense of inferiority or a resentment of punishment and privation not comprehended and acquiesced in. The class of moral psycho-path characterised by these cruel and malicious reactions is therefore probably not pathologically distinct though socially conspicuous. We will accordingly devote no further attention to it as a class, and in the same way we will assume that the explosive type has no fundamental defect or disorder of his moral sentiments and feelings, but that his abnormal tendency to an all or nothing, one way, discharge of emotion (and consequently to its crude physical expression) is the consequence of a faulty ^{physical} or psychical make up.

It is a commonplace that there is a normal tendency for every instinct to inhibit all activities irrelevant to/

irrelevant to its purpose, and to make use of all the resources of the organism until its ends have been achieved. The emotion of an instinct, by flooding the mind holds up mental activities which might compete or criticise. Homologous with this "all or nothing" reaction for the organism as a whole, we find in the intellectual sphere the dominance of one interest in attention. Mental concentration however, is wholly good, for thought processes are merely experimental, i.e., they do not commit the organism to irrevocable action and to the expenditure of much energy, but work out ideal plans of action of which one alternative is chosen for realisation. In the course of development we find mental processes 'taking over' to a certain extent from the primitive organic reaction, and in this way bringing the interest-emotion of the moment into relation with other interests. The feelings and desires evoked by the state of the organism and its environmental opportunities are then less dominant, they are integrated into life-purposes and regulate behaviour on a longer view. This integration, though achieved under social direction, does not appear to me to be simply a function of the social disposition. Failure of affective integration is not therefore synonymous with/

with failure of the social rapport or moral imbecility. Tentatively therefore I exclude this group from that of moral imbeciles, though the pathogenesis of the condition must be related and though the explosives and the faciles are both essentially unstable.

Our search for an abnormality limited to the social sentiments is now narrowed down to groups II and III, the a-social and the facile. If a specific moral defect or disorder exists, we should find it here. Theoretically and in well-marked instances, the distinction between these groups is fairly definite. In the first the social sentiments are imperfectly developed, in the second they appear ineffectively articulated with every-day life; actually however we cannot regard the latter as having normal social sentiments, and cases exist ⁽¹⁾ R. for example, which really belong to the first group and which seem nevertheless to have genuine religious feeling. The analysis of clinical data should however be postponed until after a consideration of the social rapport as manifested in mob behaviour.

(1) See following paper.

TWO CASES ILLUSTRATING THE CONCEPTION

of

MORAL IMBECILITY

Case I. R. is of working-class parentage. His father is said to have taken alcohol but there is no evidence of excess. He is one of the younger ones in a family of 14 of whom 3 died young and 3 in adult life. The remaining members of the family are all married or working and have no psycho-pathic history. R. himself was not very robust but was intelligent and ambitious, he had a good school record but had to leave at 14 to earn his living. After a short service as a shop-boy he became a col-porteur and later - probably by the assistance of friends, he managed to put in a certain amount of training at a University studying for the ministry. He was appointed a collector and organiser for Church charities (?) this brought him into touch with the "good and the great" and in a short time he obtained an appointment as a sort of lay assistant missionary.

Prior to this time we have no record of wrongdoing. He now however attempted to combine the pursuit of material interest with the Church work he professed and was paid for. He retailed tea as a sort of side-line, though, having no shop he seems to have relied at first upon personal interviews with the members of the congregation to do business. He soon became more enterprising/

enterprising and carried on trade by post. He recognised the necessity for advertisement and also showed his intelligence by circulating a leaflet and by issuing numbered coupons with his wares. In connection with these there was a regular "drawing" - money prizes - and the names of ^{the} winners were advertised. There is no evidence that he did not run this lottery fairly (even though it was illegal), but one might conjecture that the distribution of prizes was such as to increase business. Then came rumours about the condition of a lady in the neighbourhood, and the Church, fearing worse scandal, decided to dispense with his services. He was told that he was a whole-time employee and was expected to be this or resign. R. was loath to lose the prestige of his semi-ecclesiastical status and determined not to give up the prospects held out by his growing tea business. He met the difficulty in a bold and adroit manner which showed at once his originality and ability to influence others. He seceded from the Church and set up a congregation of his own. I am convinced that the pleasure of preaching and the dignity of "being a minister" were quite as dear to him as the "credit" it gave him in his business transactions.

These seem to have been going to his satisfaction when/

when his wife, (the lady referred to above) had a baby untimely. R. bolted and disappeared. Whether this panic was due to a correct estimate of public opinion in a Scottish Parish, or to a wholly unfounded and unreasonable dread of material punishment, I cannot say. I should not feel inclined to credit the man with the grace to be ashamed of anything, while I know that he ~~was~~ now a very shrewd understanding of the limitations of the law. Whatever the cause of his flight, he recovered his confidence almost immediately and reappeared with a plan of campaign. He issued the circular appended at the end of this article to all his congregation.

Note first the supposed "medical certificate" If I dared to publish it in extense its spuriousness would be obvious to every medical man. It purported to be signed by a highly respected local physician who would have had a fit if he could have seen the "qualifications" appended to his name. Note also the clause about bringing the circular to serve as a ticket of admission. By this ruse he recovered all but three of these compr^{om}ising documents. Indeed the wonder is that any remain^{ed} extant if it involved their possessor's absence from the meeting. Here again if he does not show a real appreciation for the feelings and ideals/

and ideals of others, at least he has a practical acquaintance with some aspects of human nature and the ability to turn this to account. At any rate he actually managed to preserve a following.

He next appears as the champion of the oppressed in the law courts, and by his acuteness and energy wins a large inheritance for two of his "adherents". These old ladies, from gratitude (though other reasons are also hinted at), take R. and his wife to live with them. R. is now a capitalist and does business as a money-lender; He also begins to drink and is known to be sexually immoral. His wife divorces him. He marries again and has children but treats his second wife very badly. Friends rally, however, round and a very eminent person is interested, R. once more gets into the thick of religious and humanitarian movements and even seems to have been worthy of his hire.

Whatever the reason, R. was now promoted so rapidly from one job to another that he had no time to show his incompetence or to make any place too hot to hold him - until he got to the very top of this particular tree. There his way of enjoying the fruits and of carrying out the duties of his office led to his summary dismissal in nine months. The job was one requiring not only intelligence and organising power, ability to influence others and some knowledge of the

world, -R. had these. - it required also diligence and a sincere interest in the work, a personality which would stand the scrutiny of really intelligent men, and above all an understanding of the real functions and mechanisms of social life. In these he was grossly defective.

Eight months after dismissal he is known to have obtained drink and money on false pretences and to have evaded payment of an hotel debt. Almost immediately after this he got in touch with ^a well-to-do man to whom he represented himself as a high official in the Ministry of Munitions. He professed a great interest in the career of this gentleman's son and posed as able and willing to procure him good employment (this was a "lay" he had worked before). Later, being as he said, short of ready cash, he borrowed twenty-five pounds without giving a receipt.

Three days afterwards he called again on this gentleman and borrowed another fifty pounds on the strength of the same "patter." This time however, R. appears to have felt that some formalities were necessary, so he wrote out a cheque on a piece of paper. This cheque was drawn on Cox's bank, London and/

and R. drew the recipient's attention to the magic letters M/M (Ministry of Munitions), after his signature. In recognition of this obligation in the matter of the loan, and in token of his interest in the lender's son, R. drew the cheque for a hundred pounds, the extra twenty five pounds being a "present" for the young man. Whether R. felt that he had been too generous in this or whether he blamed himself for neglecting golden opportunities, he was back again at his victim the next day. This time he swapped cheques for twenty five pounds, R. cashed what he held at once before his own "London" cheques could be collected, and when in due course the latter were dishonoured, ("drawer not ~~iden~~ identified") and the man to whom he owed a hundred pounds came round to see him about it, R. met him in the friendliest manner. He certainly managed to reassure his victim as to his bona-fides, and to turn the conversation to the young man's prospects. R. made definite offers but required in turn certain signed particulars. In this way he got his man to sign across two stamps on a blank sheet of paper, the details as R. said could be filled in when he had more time.

So far as this story has gone, the intellectual defect, if any, seems to have been on the side of the honest population. R. now however, seems to have over-looked the possibility that his victim's trustfulness/

trustfulness and tolerance might not last after his own soothing glamour had been withdrawn. Perhaps he relied on the stamped receipt; in any case he took no precautions to cover his tracks and merely moved into the next parish before settling down to drink his plunder. There he was arrested almost immediately in an extremely alcoholic condition with fifty pounds still on him.

A few days after arrest he smashed up his cell and was then lodged in a lunatic asylum because of his acute excitement, not because any suspicion of a permanent abnormality had been aroused. Even two months later on appearing before Court he is recorded to have behaved in an insane fashion. His condition was said to have been one of mania or delirium tremens or general paralysis, and Dr. Watson, now of the Board of Control, who saw him shortly afterwards, reports that ^{he said} he would be alive at the end of a thousand years. He was terrified of the hangman, of a wild beast at his heart about to suck his blood, and was restless and emotional. This quickly cleared up, however, and he became his normal self. There can be no doubt that alcohol played an important part in this psychotic episode, though it lasted far too long to be diagnosed Delirium/

Delirium Tremens. Quite possibly arrest and imprisonment may have had something to do with this acute confusional condition.

As an inmate of the C.L.D. (Criminal Lunatic Department) detained during H.M.P. he quickly and accurately grasped the situation and, while making the best of it for the sake of the present comfort, at once began to shape the most comprehensive plans to get out, and once again to get into "a position of trust and responsibility not overworked but with adequate remuneration." He "had buried the past" and it "shamed and grieved" him so much that he "could never again refer to it". Having "repented on his knees and made his peace with Christ", he did not see why his fellow mortals should be less forgiving. In order that he ~~do~~ should understand the public point of view and not acquire an anti-social grudge, I pointed out that his detention here was not retributive for the past but precautionary for the future - in fact that the public had a practical interest in the matter and could not afford to forgive too lightly.

His religiosity disgusted most people, who thought him a canting hypocrite. Though it was impossible for his intimates to doubt the spurious nature of his piety, yet for my own part I am convinced that he did experience/

experience, and intensely enjoy, the religious emotions. The sentimental good-nature, the expansive feelings, of benevolence, the generous and lofty intentions that most people experience only ~~in~~ⁱⁿ special circumstances or under the influence of alcohol, this man could evoke, one might almost say at will. Not merely a deliberate, fraudulent mimicry of the expression of emotion, but the thing itself was at his call. He really took pleasure in sentimentalising and in pious talk, it cost him no effort to keep it up, and it was not a pose of which he tired or out of which he could **be surprised**. He was a real actor, not a simulator, and it was this that caused a difference of opinion about his character. He was, however, a phenomenal liar, knew very well the advantage of religious and moral pretensions, and had no scruple about deliberately turning them to account. The sincerity I attribute to him amounts merely to this, - a sincere hope for a happy life after death, a genuine pleasure in emotional religious exercises, and perhaps a real interest in the speculative metaphysics called Theology. He also (and this is important) appeared to value his status as a professed christian because of the company with which it identified him; it was a sort of class pride, much as "being a sportsman" or "being a gentleman" is - it gave him a sense of dignity. (he did not however act as if it laid him under any obligation/

obligation.

Not but that he was prepared to lay his piety aside temporarily now and then, in order to be "all things to all men". My own receptive attitude towards him, neither critical nor commendatory, puzzled him. He could not quite place my detached interest. At times I could see he suspected me of being a worldling, perhaps even a scoffer, although in point of fact no other competent observer really credited him with so much sincerity as I did. He showed a broadminded desire to adapt himself to whatever might be my attitude in these matters, and from time to time, he experimented in the role of "man of the world". Finding that even this could not draw me - did not produce any favourable or unfavourable response from which he could learn my "personal" attitude, he gave it up. These manoeuvres however compelled him ever afterwards to discuss his ambitions etc. more frankly with me. Whether he felt that not having been "choked off" to begin with, he might safely show an interest in his own material prospects, or whether he felt the necessity of maintaining for the sake of consistency, the broad-minded and practical attitude he had once adopted, at anyrate he never again camouflaged himself quite ^{so} completely behind moralisations. Not that he gave up the endeavour to size me up, but he never again risked allowing me to think/

think him inconsistent or hypocritical.

The intelligence here displayed might be stigmatised as cunning so as to imply that the case shows a defect in the cognitive function and is not a true example of "moral imbecility". To my mind this would be to use a word of uncertain meaning - cunning - to convey a false impression. Cunning is no other than intelligence used in the pursuit of narrow, shortsighted or unworthy purposes, or directed against fellow citizens; just as wisdom means intelligence with good sense, breadth of outlook and socially commendable. A man with sufficient cunning cannot be claimed as intellectually defective. In my opinion this man showed no intellectual defect which could account for his moral lapses. On the contrary there is evidence that his ability to think and to express his thought has steadily improved during his adult life, in spite of alcoholism. He now writes an excellent letter, not merely well expressed but well arranged, so that his topics are dealt with systematically. He neglects no conceivable source of help in his present predicament. He humbles and reconciles himself to his relations, makes interest with half a dozen philanthropic and evangelical agencies, moulds his conduct so as to secure the favour of the prison authorities, and at the same time corresponding with his lawyer with a view to compounding with/

with the complainant so as to have the charge withdrawn. To a lawyer this last scheme might seem stupid, but it must be remembered that R. has had no experience of criminal law. Also as he is untried (insane in bar of trial) it is quite natural for him to imagine that restitution and the appeasing of the plaintiff will at least weaken the prosecution, - in point of fact it would tend to have this effect in a jury trial. Again when I pointed out to him the futility of this course as a legal procedure, he at once grasped the situation and concentrated all his efforts on other plans. Churches, Freemasons, Salvation Army, Prisoners Aid Societies and other social and charitable agencies, and various influential people with whom he had come into contact, were all canvassed and considered with a view to their possible usefulness in securing liberation and employment for himself.

When finally he knew that he was to be liberated his active mind at once attacked the new situation. None of his material interests were overlooked, from a spare collar-stud upwards. Teeth were put in order, eyeglasses were obtained, D.P.A.S. was laid under contribution for collars, handkerchiefs, etc. and his friends and relations were touched for small presents in kind or specie. New toothbrush and powder, spare elastic bandage - his outfit though meagre was considered/

considered as carefully and systematically as if he were going to the South Pole. He could say with perfect justice that he had no prospect of being able to replace it, that he could not afford to neglect any chances. At the same time I think a normal man who was being liberated ostensibly and professedly that he might morally rehabilitate himself, would have been a little shy of showing quite such enthusiasm and loving care over his kit.

This typical indifference to the impression his conduct might make upon others will be referred to again. Before liberation he freely questioned the motives of the Society that was going to take over the responsibility of looking after him. He suspected them of the intention of exploiting him, and he tried very hard to arrange fixed terms with a definite period of probation. As the Society agreed to accept the responsibility as guardians and employers only at his earnest and importunate entreaties, he not only shows himself unreasonable but again betrays his disregard for, or incapacity to appreciate, the niceties of social feeling - what is sometimes called "common decency". No sooner were the arrangements made for conditional liberation than he was enquiring and scheming about the removal of all conditions. The influential friends he could get at, the Societies whose good offices he could enlist for employment, etc. the old/

old game of intrigue was on foot again. Even after he was out he was "touching" his friends for money, etc. writing the Prison Commissioners and the Medical Superintendent complaining of the condition of his kit, etc. and trying to fasten upon them the responsibility for the loss of his baggage which had gone amissing during his drunken spree prior to arrest. Every effort had been made to recover this and he had professed himself satisfied that no more could be done. Apparently he actually reckoned that his letter to the Commissioners would procure him sympathy and perhaps a little cash or a lightening of conditions. Yet it contained several demonstrable mis-statements in to which he must have supposed no enquiry would be made. Another typical act was to "raise the wind" by "writing up" his prison experiences. This has not been admitted by him nor by the editor of the 'weekly Sewer', but it is morally certain that R. was the correspondent.

And all this time his real, rational objective is unconditional liberation. He knows it and knows too that it depends upon the judgment of men who are observing these actions. He neglects no pains to secure their favourable opinion of him - his overt actions, and particularly his professions, are laboriously saintly. Yet he spoils the whole effect through failure to appreciate the importance of so-called "intuitive" or/

or "sympathetic" judgments of character. He takes the same trouble to present a uniform attitude towards things before me, though there is some difficulty in synthetising a broad-minded and practical "man of the world" point of view with extreme and even extravagant piety. Still such characters do exist, blameless themselves yet tolerant and even humourous. His conscious pose is consistent, not merely as a habit but by deliberate intention. Yet he cannot see the inconsistency of his solicitude for all the trifles of his personal comfort. Perhaps no one but a psychologist could perceive it, but any normal man would feel it. Though there is no logical inconsistency, and though there is nothing wrong in his attention to personal interests, yet it is out of the part that he has set himself to play. Everywhere R. shows himself utterly lacking in tact, he has a certain knowledge of human nature which he can turn to account in dealing with his fellows, but the natural, unstudied facility for getting on, or remaining in harmony, with them he has not. He is like a man laboriously speaking a foreign tongue, all the ideas, the nuances of meaning escape him and he is in consequence quite unconvincing. His adaptation to social life is an intellectual

intellectual one, for him his fellow beings are objects whose reactions have to be laboriously calculated and who require to be controlled by constant watchfulness and dexterity. Where he is inattentive, excited or out of his depths psychologically, his defect - his inability to deal naturally with his fellows - becomes obvious.

It is no wonder that at times he shows the most startling clumsiness in his social relations, a disregard for, or ignorance of, the consequences of behaviour which is not legally forbidden but prevented by custom.

Unconscious tradition intuitively recognises many details of conduct and expression too subtle for the ordinary *mind* to distinguish cognitively. Besides unwritten laws there are unspoken conventions and manners which are learned without ever being put into words. These R. had not learned and his emotional relation to his fellows is now such that he cannot learn them. This is his defect, and certainly it is not dependent upon any inability to think logically or to understand and use highly abstract conceptions. He cannot "put himself in another's place" and this is an operation which requires not so much high intelligence as sympathetic imagination, in which R. is totally lacking. In consequence he cannot "see himself as others see him" and has no feeling for the delicacies and niceties of social/

social intercourse. I do not refer to class mannerisms. Actually his manners are superior, while the lower classes whose experience of the raw facts of life induces in them a corresponding bluntness of speech, are in no way characterised by the insensitiveness I have tried to describe. R. has the intelligence not to be obtrusive in his piety to the extent of annoying others, but he has not the flair to avoid disgusting some by his ostentation. He has no sense of shame and once, when detected by my predecessor in a petty breach of trust, he lied magnificently; finding this useless he waited some days and then apologised - for the breach of trust.

With this goes naturally an utter lack of self-consciousness, and it is largely to this I fancy that he owes his power of convincing others. Those who would not be deceived by his plausible stories or dazzled by his affected learning and semi-genuine piety, might well be taken in by his assurance. It is noteworthy that R.'s mental condition came in question only because of an alcoholic psychosis, defect was never suspected.

If we take it that his abnormality consists primarily and essentially in a defective social rapport, the question of origin arises; whether it is germinal or acquired, whether it is due to psychical agents.

This/

This question can only be answered after full consideration of the nature of this rapport from all possible points of view.

All that can be inferred from this case is that a man of average, or more than average, intelligence and power of attention who earnestly and consistently applies his abilities to the task ^{of} making an impression on his fellows, may fail in his purpose because he is affectively out of harmony with them. While he has a measure of success with strangers and inferiors, he is utterly unconvincing to intimates and equals who have no hesitation in calling him an arrant humbug. I submit that the curious obtuseness displayed by this man cannot be accounted as the ignorance and stupidity of the congenital defective. It is not facts, relations or logical consequences that he over-looked, but merely the feelings and point of view of others, their insight (even where intellectually subnormal) into human motive and their intuitive appreciation of sincerity and consistency. The suggestion is that R. is defective in organic sympathy or the power of identifying himself with others and seeing himself and seeing things with their eyes. Again I do not think that we explain the case by calling him a hypocrite - apart altogether from the fact that hypocrisy on this scale itself

bespeaks an abnormality of the social rapport. R.'s pose is certainly largely assumed and he spares no care nor effort to make it convincing; but he spoils his effects repeatedly, blindly, gratuitously, in a way that a person of ordinary social sensibility would not do. An accomplished hypocrite, like Mr Pecksniff, habitually exploits subtleties of expression to which R. - ^{equally} intelligent - is totally blind. R's defect, though certainly not defined by the data here given, does show with significant conspicuousness in his social reactions.

Case II. N. was the youngest son, he was brought up by his grand-parents and, by his own admission, was thoroughly spoiled though religious observances were scrupulously insisted on. He was neither "wild" nor specially studious, but appears to have been a normal youngster very keen on boating and fishing. He had an average education but left school (against his parent's wishes) at the age of fourteen, "to see the world and earn some money". There is no evidence of early delinquency, his companions were respectable, his grand-parents were affectionate and supplied his wants generously. He learned to express himself well, to "know right from wrong" and could have had a trade or a training if he had had the patience to wait for it.

He seems to have avoided sex difficulties, to have got through adolescence contentedly enough with a minimum of information. Even now he is "refined", in no way hyper-erotic, and though not prudish he never formed the habit of obscene speech. There is quite probably an element of self-righteousness in his contempt for his former Borstal companions, but his remarks about their inability either to think or talk about other than sex matters and without garnishing their language, are quite just and far too moderate to be mere cant. His attitude is not so much one of

disgust/

disgust and horror as of amused contempt. He regards obscenity as a stupidity.

This healthy, energetic, well-brought up youngster gets home-sick within the year at his first job on leaving school. When his employer refuses him leave and arrears of wages, M. deserts, stealing his employer's bicycle "to get home on" and caps the matter by selling the bicycle. Although he is only fifteen he gets ten days imprisonment. Thereafter he worked for six months then idled at home for five months and then went to work again. Almost immediately he injured his hand and consequently was out of work for a week. He did not get the compensation he wanted and could not meet his lodgings bill. As he puts it now "so as ^{not} to defraud her (his landlady) and get jailed anyhow" he stole five pounds from a work-mate. He actually used one pound to pay his debt and banked the rest which was recovered and returned to its owner.

His action in this situation is really very extraordinary. He could have got the money by writing home for it, there is no evidence that his landlady suspected his bona-fides or dunned or threatened him in any way; his inability to pay was clearly accidental and temporary, while the probabilities of detection of the theft appear to have been very high indeed. Altogether/

Altogether this was a very abnormal reaction and was met by sixty days imprisonment.

After three months work and three months at home, he took a situation at which he was hard-worked but which allowed him a certain amount of rabbit shooting which he keenly enjoyed. He was now nearly seventeen ~~when~~ a middle-aged woman seduced him. This liason was in no way of his seeking and he broke it off immediately in disgust and disillusionment. (the facts of the affair are fairly well ascertained and the details of his story are of a character and consistence that make falsehood very improbable.)

M. now gets "fed up" with the situation, breaks his engagement, though by so doing he forfeits his wages, and joins the army. He appears to have been in a very bad temper and to have had a strong grudge at something for he threw his civilian kit into the sea. This kit consisted of two good suits and was for him quite valuable property; his present-day explanations of this act (which were only obtained under cross-examination) are obviously rationalisations; he "had no use for them"

- "no place to keep them", "never thought of sending them home" and "did not like to sell them."

It must be noticed that in view of the charge subsequently /

subsequently brought against him this action will bear a more sinister interpretation. He may have been getting rid of clothing that might help to identify him. But the police never knew or inquired about this jettison and there was no reason for him to tell me about it if it was meant to conceal guilt. It was told ~~in~~ context and with the expression of grievance - bitterness against his employer because M. had lost his wages and was dissatisfied anyway. Judging from his manner and expressions, etc. I formed a fairly confident opinion that this was a primitive reaction to a sense of injury. This self-hurting reaction is common in people of low culture, Celts p. particularly and children, and of course it greatly reinforces the pleasing sense of injury.

M. now joined the army and seems to have got along very well for a few months. A scandal however, came to light in regard to a weak-minded girl and M. was arrested on suspicion. He did not communicate with his people, had no agent, did not apply for bail, but the prosecuting authorities satisfied themselves that he was innocent of the charge. I was not allowed to see the precognitions but I am satisfied from his account and from other circumstances that this is true.
He/

He had, however, been in prison nearly three months and was discharged without a trial, and these circumstances and the nature of the charge "turned all his folk against him". With his accumulated pay, however, he easily found less particular companions in town, got drunk and had a serious accident. After recovery he still found his situation intolerable and after trying for a transfer he left the army,

In his next place M. met a girl whose people were respectable and fairly well-to-do. He became very intimate with her and it was practically arranged that they were to get married, when his story came out. (He says the local police told the father and there is no reason to doubt this). The girl did not change her mind and he is still quite confident that she was willing to elope with him as he intended, before her parents could make any effective opposition. He had at that time twenty pounds but reckoned that all that would be needed for honey-moon expenses. At anyrate though he needed a rig-out he resolved not to trench upon capital and got what he wanted "on tick". To procure this he found it necessary to give his employer's name and did so, though he had no authority for this. He now appears to have had an excellent opportunity to achieve his purpose and celebrated his success by/

by a drink, and another one, etc. In a week's time, he found himself without money, without a job, and consequently without means to get married, or to repay his debt, and conceal his illegal use of his employer's name or even ^{to} escape. Three month's imprisonment followed. The abnormality of this reaction consists in, that the clothes were not really necessary, that he could have got them by writing home, that there was no such desperate hurry, that he did not carry out his own plan.

On release he fell in with a widow (middle-aged with a family) whom he had known formerly. He lived with her for a week and entertained her copiously with liquor obtained by forging orders in the name of a former employer against whom he had a grudge. He then cleared out and went to meet his sweetheart whose attachment seems to have been undiminished. She gave him two pounds and asked him if he were going to go straight. She found a photograph of the lady he had just left holding one of her children. Her jealousy was quited^e by M. explaining that this was a picture of his mother and himself when a child. To lull her suspicions he resumed relations with her and managed to persuade her he had come straight from prison. It was no time, however, till the liquor/

liquor fraud was discovered and traced to him and he got five months imprisonment. His first letter from prison was to his sweetheart asking her to wait for him and when she did not (or was not allowed to) reply, he was bitterly agrieved. He could understand that she must have discovered his untruthfulness and infidelity, but this did not diminish his resentment. His mind turned at once to the other lady, the widow whose good-nature he praised, she certainly did not neglect him in his adversity. He remarked of her "I could love that woman as my mother."

Almost immediately after his release M. got into trouble again and he is now - at the age of twenty - in prison for the sixth time ("fraud and false pretences" six months.) He is ^{of} medium ~~in~~ height, stoutly built, healthy and good-looking without any physical abnormality whatever. Unaffected and refined in speech, he expresses himself well, his manners are good, he has a quiet dignified bearing with no trace of self-consciousness or self-assertiveness. Pleasant to talk to, sometimes witty and even humorous, he never becomes "loud" or tries to make an impression. He neither truckles to authority nor becomes familiar nor fastens his anti-social/

social grudge upon his custodians. He has all the Celtic gentleness and charm of manner, and generally speaking he has the "presence" of a man of culture.

M.'s intelligence is not defective and this is confirmed by two other observers to whom I specially referred the matter, his information is just what could have been expected from his history and circumstances. he perfectly appreciates his position and prospects. His ethical knowledge and judgment are fully up to the average. There is no emotional dulling, his interests are fairly wide and lively. As regards his feeling for others he is in no way callous, though not excessively sociable. He keenly regrets the loss of his "pals" in his regiment, and apparently got on very well in this society. He has a strong attachment to his grand-father who is now a cripple and to whom he used to read. In general he shows a strong craving for affection and would, to judge from letters and remarks, be demonstrative. His affection, however, like an infant's, takes all and gives nothing. Apart altogether from his reckless, impulsive lawlessness, his utter disregard for public opinion and the will and well-being of the community, he shows himself extraordinarily unjust and ungenerous to his intimates. He is apt to find a grievance and prone to cling to it/

it - I mean beyond even what is commonly found in Celts and children. He speaks warmly and gratefully of any kindness shown to him, yet paradoxically has no sense of obligation. That is to say he has social emotions but no organised sentiments which can influence conduct and persist through change of mood. Yet his plan to elope with his girl (when his story had "got out") was not really a triumph of self-interest ^o ever regard-for-others. When was he ever regardful of his own interests and why if this was the dominant motive did it not achieve its object? Certainly M. himself now puts the worst construction on his intentions. "If I had once got married to her they could have done nothing" - "They" being the parents-in-law, meddling policemen and a hostile environment generally, who would, had things gone according to plan have been satisfactorily bested. To my mind he does not well fill the part of ruthless fortune-hunter.

Undoubtedly however he did treat his girl very badly, but the point is that it was for no corresponding gain to himself. Angry at not getting any reply to his letter he now grumbles that she did not give him much chance to pull himself together "after only two simple charges." - "she was my ruination." I suggest that she has learned all about his faithlessness and how ruthlessly he has treated her. He says: "I am not one of/

of those sorrowful, pity^{ing} kind. I am sorry for no one and no one is sorry for me." Again I say he has nothing to reproach her with, all the wrong-doing is on his side; he has been a thoroughly "bad hat" to her. He answers; "She has been to me - wasting a stamp and a letter." again I suggest that after his last arrest she had found him out. He says: "When I have forgiven her (for having a child), could she not have forgiven me?" and apparently fails to appreciate the significance of the fact that her liason came before her acquaintance with M. while his philandering had been continuous up till now. He admits also casting up her previous lapse to her whenever he was drunk or angry.

If these responses and his explanations of his acts of dishonesty truly represent his mentality; if his motives are not more social than this would indicate, more consistent with each other and with his own interests; even if we consider that he is unable to give truly or falsely a more plausible consistent account of his desires and intentions, we must consider him an imbecile. Taken seriously, his autobiography would indicate in his character a naive ruthless selfishness which unfits him for social life and which is yet so unintelligent that he does not form/

form purposes, foresee difficulties or shape his conduct with any consistence towards an end. It would be easy to diagnose in him gross intellectual and moral defect on the strength of his own admissions and to infer that social censure is not apprehended by him and merely provokes in him sulkiness, defiance and malice and that consequently segregation is the only way of dealing with this case.

M's ridiculously unjust reproaches against his fiancée are not however stated by him as fixed opinions. In making them he does not express the assurance that comes from a sincere sense of injury (real or delusional). There is no vehemence of anger but rather a sulky, bitter grumble which, though directed against her, is apparently inspired by a resentment at things in general. It is very difficult and tedious to record observations of the shades of emotional expression. The impression conveyed by tone, manner, etc., suggested a very complex feeling reaction. A masochistic, self-pitying satisfaction in the irretrievable breach with his girl and the ruin of his own prospects; an attitude of sour grapes; an assertion of his independence and self-sufficiency as if to say "I don't care what she does/

does and I let her see it ^U, all these and other compatible interpretations of his story are suggested by his demeanour in recounting it.

Though he is never coarse nor loud nor really boastful, I am satisfied that he has not presented his conduct in an unduly favourable light but rather the reverse. Milton is not unique in idealising Lucifer, and the situation where the hero misunderstands and violently upbraids the heroine has a very strong and widespread fantasy appeal. This sado-masochistic attitude and the splendid isolation ideal are consistent with each other and with his childish nature and Celtic temperament. They probably played a considerable part in his bad conduct and certainly contribute to his present attitude, for it is certain that he is dwelling on his wrong-doing in the spirit of an Ishmael, and that to some extent his account of his motives and intentions and the blame he throws upon the girl is rather a reflex of his present mood than a true index to his character, intelligence, and understanding of right and wrong. At most times he recognises enthusiastically her kindness and generosity, her loyalty and unsuspectingness, and admits the recklessness and stupidity of his own actions. Though quite/

quite frank and of rather an introspective habit of mind, this boy has really very little insight into his own motives. He is quite unable to supply any explanation for his erratic conduct. I will not presume to decide how far this may indicate a definitely pathological (unconscious) motive as responsible for his offences, or how far the unformed, volatile nature of his mind makes it impossible for him to remember and describe his experiences. Certainly this character - the absence of fixed interests, purposes, sentiments etc, - must also have the effect of rendering him particularly subject to the influence of any sudden impulse.

I am adducing this case merely to show how gross disorder in social reactions can occur in the absence of rational motive, intellectual defect or other definite psycho-pathology, and even in a person affectionate and otherwise well-disposed; even where none of the reputed causes of crime are present, psycho-pathic inheritance, delinquent companionship, poverty and slum life, parental neglect and alcoholism, vice, ill-health idleness or gambling - even in the absence of all these traumata, development need not run on social lines. This at least is certain that in this case affection for others and pleasure in their society has never developed into a sense of reciprocal obligation, nor has intelligence and/

and self-interest been able to supply its place. I suggest the conclusion that it is possible for the development of the social rapport to be arrested at certain levels.

Appendix to case I. R's manifesto to his congregation

"My dear Brethren,

Doubtless you will be aware of the present very serious illness of Mrs R. It is only my duty to my Church and work which compels me to write this letter.

Mrs R. gave birth to a premature child last Thursday. The child is dead and was buried a few days later, in the presence of Mr - -

On account of the illness of my wife I was forced to deny myself the pleasure of attending our Saturday night and Sabbath services, and this is the first opportunity I have had of referring to above matter. I am eager to meet you all and state what I cannot here write. In a word I desire to thank all who have extended to us on this trying occasion their sympathy and assistance.

I am led to understand that others have misunderstood, misjudged and said hard, cruel and unchristlike things about the illness of Mrs R, with whom I have the utmost sympathy for, for had they the true facts of the case before them, their opinion, I venture to say, would change.

I/

I make no comment, but invite the earnest, wise and prayerful consideration of the following certificate from Mrs R's Medical Adviser.

'I certify that Mrs R. was delivered of a premature child on the 27th inst., the child is small and feeble and doubtful whether it will live. Mrs R., while standing upon a chair cleaning or reaching for something, fell to the floor, which I believe was the cause of bringing on premature labour.

Later

From the appearance of the child when born, although it lived three days, nothing can be brought against Mr R's moral or Christian character in connection with the affair.

(Signed) X.Z.
Physician and Surgeon'

This matter will be dealt with fully on Thursday night first at 8 p.m. in above Church and you are specially invited to be present. On entering, kindly hand this letter over to the person in charge at the door, it acts as your ticket of admission to meeting.

I purpose at this meeting, giving once and for all an authoritative statement regarding this matter. It is expected that addresses will also be given by the Rev./

Rev. Y.Y., Mr X.X., Mr Q.Q., Register of Births and Deaths, etc.

Mr X.X. will preach on Sabbath forenoon and I propose delivering a special sermon on Sabbath evening first, when I do trust all shall be in their usual places at both diets of worship. It is easier to face the cannon's mouth than to expose oneself to the slings and arrows of a scandal-loving and uncomprehending public, therefore I ask all the Lord's People and friends on this occasion, to assist me with their prayers.

Yours sincerely ⁱⁿ Christ's service,

(Signed) R.

Minister "

PRELIMINARY NOTE ON THE PATHOGENESIS OF MORAL IMBECILITY

Only the most tentative conclusions as to the etiology and pathology of moral imbecility can be offered at this stage. The indefiniteness of the condition, if indeed it exists as a clinical entity, and the variety of forms it may assume, suggests that several processes are at work, while we have already noticed how delicate and even artificial our distinctions of sub^{ve}groups has been. Unsatisfactory as they are however, these data offer one avenue to the understanding of the social disposition of man, and the conclusions reached along this line can be checked by those arrived at on other grounds. Our conception of the conditions moreover will probably be clarified by a preliminary review of several possible pathogenic mechanisms.

The two most striking syndromes so far noticed are

(1) the **INSENSITIVENESS** of a number of cases to the feelings opinions etc. of their fellows, and to the taboos and other sanctions of the community. Case R. is an example.

(2) the **INSTABILITY OF TEMPERAMENT** which does not seem to be associated with (1), and which we have tentatively interpreted as a defective integration of the conative-affective dispositions. This may either take the form of a weakness of moral character ("facility"), of an occasional 'impulsiveness', or of a liability to morbid "storms" of passion, uncontrollable and out of proportion to the ostensible cause.

This syndrome is not so definite as the first, and consequently cannot be so well illustrated. In its various forms and grades however it is much commoner (Case 3, 4) ^{Page 126 copy.} In all probability we are dealing with a group of related conditions.

Nothing is known of the pathogenesis of moral imbecility. It is (as usual) conjectured that it, or they, may be due to a germinal deficiency, but as the question of the germinal and unitary (instinctive) character of the social disposition is one of our main concerns, we will not take it for granted. There is no evidence whatever of the heritability of the various conditions described as moral imbecility, and on theoretical grounds the variability ^{ibility} of these conditions and the highly indefinite and abstract nature of the psychological abnormality involved, makes it improbable that they are due to the absence of a definite germinal determinant.

We do know however that they are, like criminality in general, commoner in the male sex, that they appear early in life - the impulsiveness and egotism of childhood never being outgrown-, that they are not progressive conditions, and that there exists a popular impression that "regardless" selfish, uncontrolled conduct like this, (with or without "grudges" and feelings of injury and injustice) is characteristic of children who are 'spoilt' or badly brought up. From psychoanalytic investigations moreover we find reason to believe that the child's future affective relation to

his fellows depends mainly upon the character and history of his affective relationship to his parents and other members of the family circle. We find indeed ("Beyond the Pleasure Principle" / Ø. P.21.) the statement, "Some few regularly recurring types are to be found, according to the way in which the typical love of this period was brought to an end." and we must at least see what Freud has to tell us of character formation at early ages. IN reference to what has been said elsewhere of Freud's biological interpretations, it should be noted that he does not regard these arrests of development as weaknesses or failures of the developmental impetus (i.e. as due to germinal defect), but as due in the main to unwise treatment of the child by his parents, who perhaps suffered in the same way at the hands of the previous generation. Though Freud recognises that some children seem to have a special tendency to the FIXATIONS he describes, he rightly confines, in practice, biological interpretations (germinal and unverifiable) to the explanation of phenomena for which neither cause nor mechanism is discernable in the individual's life history.

As I understand it, the Freudian conception of the genesis of the social rapport may be conveniently formalized as a series of adjustments, overlapping certainly, but roughly in this order.

(1) The child's libidinal interests are at first attached to, and gratified by, his own bodily functions. The EGO-

INSTINCTS are stated to be opposed to these but are not defined or assigned any real psychological RÔLE, and are functionally indistinguishable ^{from} ~~for~~ sublimated libidinal interests.

(2) The first personal attachment, to the mother, is of the nature of an identification. The mother becomes an extended self.

(3) The primitive, omnipotent, hedonistic ego - in conflict with reality - suffers limitations and is compelled to recognise other selves.

(4) The love for parents becomes objectified and idealised.

(5) An "ideal" (aesthetically satisfying) "self" is constructed after the image of the parents as the child sees them.

(6) Parents' love is shared (at first under compulsion) with brothers and sisters, and, though reinforced by other components this common attachment (to the same loved object) remains an important bond of union and the archetype of all social ties.

(7) Leaders, rulers and other "parent" surrogates (or their ideal equivalents) mediate the farther spread of social recognition to all members of the community as such, so that society is the affective homologue - indeed develops out of the family.

In regard to the first two of these phases in the social adaptation it seems to me that the psychoanalysts

conceive the infant as, to begin with, engrossed with his own bodily functions and satisfactions and as, later, including his mother in the circle of his interests. The phrase 'Identification with the mother' seems to imply that at an earlier stage in development there was present in the infant mind some idea of 'self' and of 'mother', and that these two ideas become somehow united or synthesised. As an intellectual process this is very difficult to understand, and it is still more difficult to see what motive the child could have for carrying out this mysterious process of mental chemistry. Later indeed, when he begins to feel the stress of competition for her attention he may appropriate her in a manner so complete as to merit the term 'identification'. But his attachment to her is or should be, fully formed by then, so that THIS (later) identification cannot be the origin and prototype of all TRANSFERENCE. I confess I cannot see under what psychological conditions and influences a narcissistic love could develop into an object love. The tendency is all the other way, and it is notorious how bad the prognosis is in states of isolation and self-absorption. It is easy to displace a value from an object to the gratification it can give, but very difficult to reverse the process. The reversal involves sacrificing immediate pleasure for ultimate and contingent gain, and if the child can command his own pleasures and shortcircuit his own interests, what motive can there be for the child foregoing this

easy and pleasant self-sufficiency to seek satisfaction dependent upon an unsympathetic environment. Either the state of narcissism is not primary, or the satisfactions connected therewith are not so complete as the Freudians seem to imply, otherwise emergence from it is psychologically inexplicable. It seems to me therefore necessary to reverse the order of the two stages, and to say rather that the child has never distinguished himself from his mother. In the gradual discrimination of the NOT-SELF from the SELF, the distinction between the mother and the real self is the last to be drawn, the final stage in the formation of the idea of self. The point appears to me to be of the very greatest importance.

Ideas are parts of experience integrated and distinguished by some special character or meaning, relatively independent and holding attention by contrast with the undifferentiated "matrix" of experience. The formation of IDEAS and the appreciation of DISTINCTIONS are complementary aspects of the same process. The child is not generally regarded as being born with a stock of formed ideas and the distinctions they imply. At least there is not any evidence of their existence ^{at birth}, we cannot conceive how they could exist, and if we assume their existence it is certain that we will be unable to discover how they are formed. The conditions of the formation of the distinction between self and mother -of the definition of ^{- the child's -} these two ideas- must therefore be sought in his life,

The child's earliest experience presumably ("a blooming buzzing confusion" James) is not definitely organised. How does analysis of the universe begin? In the first place certain sensation patterns will present themselves repeatedly en bloc, in identical form, and thus images (or objects) will take regular, definite form. Distinctions, can therefore be arrived at on a purely OBJECTIVE ~~as~~ basis (i.e. not determined by interest), but it is very doubtful whether this mode of cognitive development has much importance.

A far more significant factor in the organisation of experience is found in the instinctive reaction^s, their kinaesthetic associations and in the satisfactions that follow from and reinforce certain modes of activity. The "matrix" of experience 'crystallises' round certain interest-stimulating sense pictures, which also become signs foretelling gratification or the reverse. Certain presentations have INSTINCTIVE MEANING and acquire also HEDONIC MEANING, and it is this process that determines the first integrations of sense data into defined ideas. It is not possible to overestimate the importance of this fact, that the 'oneness' of the first objects distinguished depends, not so much upon the homogeneous character of their sense impressions, as upon the unity and constancy of their meaning. (affective significance).

The analysis of experience then proceeds by the attaching of interest or value or meaning to certain presentat-

ions which thereby engage attention and are clearly distinguished by consciousness. By degrees more refined discrimination becomes possible, analysis is elaborated and extended, until each 'centre of interest' becomes a group of related ideas. More of the environment is analysed into objects, these are increasingly accurately defined and begin to be related to each other causally, "process" begins to be grasped and "control" striven for. Until the child has become aware, however dimly, of the difference between the percipient self and the perceived thing value or interest must remain vested in the desired object rather than in the mechanism of enjoyment (bodily), it is for the child, not so much a means to satisfaction as an absolute good. He does not locate his appetites and satisfactions in his own body and regard this as the source of pleasure, his yearning is no more concerned with the apparatus of enjoyment than ocular perceptions are concerned with the retina. We still say 'sugar is sweet' and the form of the expression illustrates the tendency for interest to remain attached to the object rather than to the organ that is gratified by the object, or the bodily processes the object may set up.

I repeat that the child groups his experiences (images, presentations etc) not so much on the basis of their SENSORY FORMS AND CHARACTERS as upon their emotional meaning for himself. If there is a difference in hedonic value or a qualitative difference in the gratification they

afford, then he will pick up and attend to the most minute and subtle presentational differences. If on the other hand, the affective significance of two presentations be identical, then the most striking differences in appearance will be overlooked. The child may accept many 'dadas', but quickly knows its own mother. Now most of his early waking life is spent in her presence, at least his most vivid and significant experiences are indissolubly associated with her ministrations. All his wants are satisfied by her, she is the necessary source of all his gratifications. All his privations are due to her absence, in fact she is the hedonic centre of his universe and therefore ^{of} meaning and of consciousness itself. What part does his own body play in comparison? It cannot at anyrate bulk largely in sensepresentation (sight and touch) as his mother does, and its very constancy, as against her significant appearances and disappearances, militates against its acute realisation. He is hungry in her absence and fed on her return, both experiences direct attention to her rather than to himself. Why should he attend to the passive and inconspicuous condition, rather than to the obvious and sufficient cause of these important things? There is no logical or psychological reason for his doing so, and as a matter of fact we find, even at a much later age, that he is still uncertain as to the actual extent of his self, whether, for example 'toes' come under this category.

If we are right in saying that the infant- even more than the adult- attaches his values naively to the thing desired rather than to the mechanisms and processes of enjoyment, and if we are right in regard to the hedonic significance of the mother-object in the infant's mental life, then it follows that nearly all his sense of value attaches to her rather than to his own bodily apparatus. At this stage the centering of interest on, and the attribution of value to, the self, cannot serve any hedonic or "economic" purpose, that is to say the child has no motive or reason to doubt his valuation of the mother or to reflect upon the part played by his own body in these pleasures, he has not, indeed, either the motive or the sense data to analyse the mother-self situation. Only as he spatialises his universe and as he becomes able to satisfy his own wants in her absence does it become psychologically possible for him to realise that the only constant and hence necessary factor in these pleasures is his own body. Only then does narcissism become possible.

The difficulty in the way of our imagining such a state of mind on the part of the infant is extreme. We have so thoroughly and absolutely arranged our conceptual univers^o on a spatial plan that anything that seems to impugn the validity of this strikes us as bizarre. Consider, for example, the intellectual "shock" that the theory of temperospatial relativity (as distinct from the philosophical theory) caused, and the difficulty some ps

people yet have in accomodating their minds to it. Yet it is highly probable that 'psychological' space is a product of experience, we can watch any infant gradually learning to refer his perceptions to a scheme of distance and direction. We know that stereoscopic vision is not innate and that in fact the infant does not possess any ideas that COULD BE MADE MORE INTELLIGIBLE OR PLIABLE TO HIS WILL BY BEING SPATIALLY RELATED. Knowledge of space is only acquired as a result of his own motor activities and is only of use in connection with the adjustment of these. While therefore it is self-evident to US that the mother and infant are separate bodies and that the infants' enjoyments must take place in and depend on his own body, a realisation of this is utterly impossible for the infant himself. For him, his mother does not "go away" and "come back", she disappears and reappears, the infant lives in the world of magic (to which the child later loves to return via the "fairy story") where there are no dull and fixed causal relations. Why should, and how could, he analyse the pleasant mother-self situations into active mother and passive self?

From this ^{premises} aspect identification with the mother assumes a different aspect; it is THE PRIMITIVE CONDITION to which the distinction between the mother and the self succeeds. The intense pleasure-value of the various mother-child situations moreover will probably act as a hindrance to this analysis of these situations. The interest, meaning or value that originally integrated an idea may be regarded

as tending to maintain the unity of the idea.

Once the child has appreciated the distinction between himself and his mother, it is difficult to see how he can lose it again. He cannot spin fine theories to overcome it, (phantasy regressions too must be very vague in content unless they can take the form of a "return to the womb"), he cannot resubmerge his own identity in hers any more than we as adults could do so, or can imagine how it could be done. The "Reality-Principle" then is against the process of identification, but there is a still stronger reason for doubting whether such a process takes place. The Pleasure-Principle (or, objectively considered, the Principle of Psychic Economy) expresses the constant tendency of the mind to seek the greatest pleasure by the most direct paths and with the least expenditure of effort. New subjective gratifications are easier and more certain of attainment than those arising out of objective attachments which make far heavier demands upon patience, selfdenial, adaptation, etc. It is therefore difficult to see how the latter come to be substituted for the former (how interest and love can become 'exproverted' after having been ^{directed} upon the self and the processes of enjoyment unless; - (1) 'narcissism', interest in self, etc. are inherently unsatisfactory- are not EQUIVALENT from this point of view to the objective absorption of love and interest; or (2) the PRIMARY FIXATIONS OF LOVE AND INTEREST ARE THEMSELVES OBJECTIVE in the sense that they are attached to persons and things rather than to processes of enjoyment.

I think both these propositions are true, but that the second is the most important as it implies that 'narcissism' is secondary- a perversion of development- and suggest the possibility that ALL external interests and attachments are derivatives (reinforced doubtless but dependent on) of the primary fixations of interest and love. Those interests which are withdrawn from the external world cease to play any useful part in development, to urge the child to extend, elaborate and refine the distinctions whereby he analyses his environment into a system of related objects and thereby understands and controls it. Moral development also will be impaired by the selfabsorption of interest, and thereby the assimilation of the "social heritage" will be hindered.

It is then I think, as the child comes to realise his own power to command pleasure by calls, manipulations etc. that he draws the mother-self distinction, and according to the manner and completeness with which this is done, depends to some extent his future trend of character development. If much 'love' is withdrawn, an overvaluation of the self-egoism- must result, if very little then the opposite tendency is favoured- towards dependency and self-depreciation. The child's idea of his place in the world, of what he is and what he ought to be, must naturally depend on the value he places upon himself, and as he cannot have any objective, social standard of value, naturally he estimates his importance according to his power of commanding attention and of supplying his own pleasure.

As shewing how easily the balance in character-formation may be turned to one side or another at this critical time, consider the extremes of helplessness and dominance, impotence and omnipotence, that are united in the same infant. He may insist upon remaining a helpless baby for years as a certain way of securing all he wants and without exertion. Some individuals carry this dependent attitude throughout life and it is a most important social fact. He may, on the other hand, become an aggressive tyrant and regard his mother and ultimately all his fellows as ministers to his pleasure. On the other hand, even if his "transference" to his mother is not weakened by a concentration of interest upon himself, his socialisation may still be interrupted at the stage of fixation upon the mother; the results of this, though equally undesirable, are clinically different. Yet again this transference may be broken so violently (or at any rate "denied" satisfaction so suddenly and completely) that either a rebellious, discontented attitude is assumed (permanently affecting development) or abject self-depreciation ("inferiority complexes") as suggested above, may be farther encouraged in the child.

Full and reliable data of the childhood of moral imbeciles is not easy to obtain. The condition (as at present defined) cannot be diagnosed early, the patients are exceptionally and intentionally untruthful and the relatives and friends often wish nothing more to do with them. I have not therefore at present the material for more than the most speculative attempt to trace the

pathogenesis of these conditions. I consider that this is justified from the intrinsic interest and importance of the problem, the light it throws upon the nature and origin of the social disposition in man, the fact that there are no alternative hypotheses with ANY evidential basis, and from the possibility of checking results in other ways. As a result of the foregoing discussions moreover it is clear;-

(1) That there are powerful character-forming influences at work VERY EARLY in life.

(2) That character is then very plastic.

(3) That there are several critical points in development at which characteristic types of character, or at least different lines of character development, are determined.

(4) That what we call 'Mental Development' is largely AFFECTIVE ADAPTATION TO KIND^Y whether 'social' or 'sexual' (See "Development and Evolution of Mind") and that, as Freud has shown, the mother is the first "personal" object for the child's consciousness. That she is the essential "bridge" or "conductor" whereby his affections are extended to his fellows, and that his affective relationship to her is even more important for his social than for his sexual disposition later on.

(5) That this attachment to the mother is subjected to strain as the infant discovers his own resources and independence.

(6) That it is again made use of as a lever to compel the child to forego his uncultural interests and pleasures

and consequently is subjected to farther strain - this time by the mother. The infant is thus compelled to choose between his forbidden desires and his affections, and the solutions to this conflict may be classed in three groups.

(1) where the forbidden pleasures are renounced - the normal solution.

(2) where there is some degree of splitting of interest, or rather where both interests are preserved, but dissociated. This "lower" and "higher" nature is the prototype of the unconscious, and in its more extreme forms this represents the NEUROTIC solution.

(3) where there is some degree of withdrawal of interest and affection from the mother to the self- the external attachment is given up. This mechanism is of significance for Moral imbecility (and perhaps also for the psychoses).

Case 3. Male aet. 40 Early life not known. Went about in bad company from adolescence and had several convictions for theft. When arrested, and at other ^moments of provocation, was guilty of most violent and desperate assaults ('by stabbing' etc.). His record therefore was not allowed to grow to the usual length before his mental abnormality was recognised and he was ordered to be detained D.H.M.P. He was transferred to an ordinary asylum where he was allowed whole day 'parole'. This he broke and took alcohol, got himself arrested and committed another dangerous assault. During stay in C.L.D. he must have smashed thousands of panes of glass besides doors, furniture, clothing, etc. and generally proved himself a very costly and troublesome patient.

He is not of criminal or malicious disposition, on the contrary is genial and goodnatured, intensely loyal to at least one friend (of somewhat similar nature to himself) and shows himself grateful for favours and attention. Intelligence is quite up to average. Against this it must be noted that he can be very untruthful, unscrupulous in pursuing petty vendettas by slander, that he is quite undependable, subject to fits of sulking or of passion in which no consideration of right, decency or self-interest avail to restrain him from the most violent and outrageous conduct. With the best intentions in the world he cannot live up to his promises, or face the difficulties of life 'outside', as he is

utterly unable to accept the smallest slight, disappointment or annoyance of any kind. Anything of the sort upsets him, leading to brooding, sulking and finally to overwhelming outbursts of rage. There is no evidence of periodicity or 'spontaneity' in this to suggest an epileptic or manic condition, but I consider that he does- perhaps unconsciously- 'lay himself open to' these petty grievances and cherishes them.

The similarity to an almost normal phase of infantile character is suggestive, and a wholly spontaneous remark of his points in the same direction. Something had annoyed him and he announced that he was 'fed up' and would never work again. I was warned that this meant a relapse into the former state of open war, and a regime of sulphonal, hyoscine, padded rooms, etc. Sure enough next day he would not go to work, 'mooched' about apparently very sorry for himself and luxuriating in a sense of hardship and ill-usage. At dinner the luxuries he was accustomed to purchase by industry (cocoa etc.) were there before him as usual, apparently thinking there had been an oversight and that it was a good chance to "spoil the Egyptians" he finished it hurriedly. The same thing happened at tea however, and he then learned that officially he was not on strike but on holiday, and drawing full marks (an unheard of thing). Consequently all his indignation and self-pity were wasted. Next day he went back to work and was abjectly apologetic,

almost maudlin, to me. "Nobody ever understood me, doctor, you know, and when I was a boy, you know, my sister did not care what happened, you know, so I just felt I would show them I didn't care and carry on so they would have to care what became of me." All this was spontaneous- in response to nothing but inarticulate grunts of comprehension and encouragement on my part- so it could fairly be said to be unprompted. (Nothing in the way of psychoanalysis had been attempted in the case and no questions had been put). His emotional reaction was genuine and he was rather shamefaced, both about his conduct and about the confidence. This was entirely unnecessary, he gained nothing by it and could not have suspected that I expected anything of the sort. It was in fact this speech that aroused my suspicions that temperamental instability might not after all be due to germinal defect. I have therefore no doubt that it was a genuine moment of insight and self-revelation. It certainly has had a lasting effect upon our relations, No. 3 has not again been in conflict with "authority" and now holds the responsible position of boilerman.

In spite of all his good and likeable qualities the prognosis in this case is bad; he is essentially unstable, and until we have more knowledge of the psychopathology of this condition, radical treatment is impossible.

You could no more make a good citizen out of this man than you could make a good tool out of lead. It is impossible to influence him permanently or to predict his behaviour. He is a good example of the "Explosive" type, and what meagre indications exist point to a childhood etiology.

Case 4. Female aet 30- fourth youngest of family of 12 (B.S.B.B.B.S.B. Patient S.B.S^B -twin-) People well to do, Father a strong, masterful person. Mother managed the house until she died when Patient was aged 12 (cancer) Father remarried when she was about 16 and died after she was 25. Brothers and sisters all strong, healthy and well-doing.

Patient attended school 5-15 and was two years in the "Supplementary" class- quite a fair record. Her chief difficulty was a speech impediment, which consisted, so far as I can ascertain- in using wrong consonants (e.g. "tat" for cat.)

Unlike the rest of her family she was small, weak and "ugly" and always felt, and still feels this very acutely. On this account she claimed and received exceptional treatment and attention from both her parents,- "Father made a tiny bit of a favourite of me, but I think it was because I was so small." The father was very strict, thrashed them occasionally and would not allow frivolous amusements. Patient's attachment to him was, and still

is, of immense strength, - "No girl ever loved her father as I loved my father" (not in response to question, and with intense feeling) "If our Heavenly Father had not forbidden it, I would have gone to join~~z~~ him long ago; but I know that he never forgives that sin" (i.e. suicide; "heavenly" and "dead" father are not really confused- distinguished by context- but they have very similar emotional meaning)

She says she felt the death of her mother very acutely; but whether there was an element of morbid self-reproach about this it is impossible to say. In regard to the still-birth of her father and stepmother's child however, she shows definitely exaggerated emotion; - "the poor wee baby, and me so fond of children." At age 15-16 she ran away to an aunt, but her father brought her back. When she was 16 her father married again, and from the first there was open war between her and her step-mother, whom she could not tolerate. Patient soon ran away again, and for the next three years wandered about the country, in hostels, homes, refuges, Salvation Army shelters, with relatives or in "situations"; but the usual duration of her stay in any one place was about three weeks. At the age of twenty she was arrested for theft and made a doubtful attempt to commit suicide in her cell. At that time her case was thoroughly examined by Dr. Devon, and it was clear that, though not intellectually defective or disordered, she was

unsuited to penal discipline. Accordingly she was sent to Gartloch Asylum, thence to Rosslynlee and she is recorded as being, "irritable- impulsive, incorrigible, and irresponsible,- destructive, violent and aggressive - INTENSELY JEALOUS OF ANY ATTENTION PAID TO OTHER PATIENTS" (my italics) She repeatedly made attempts to strangle herself and gradually became more troublesome and dangerous, until finally she was charged with assault (6charges) and attempt to murder etc. and sent to Edinburgh Prison, thence to Morningside, thence to C.L.D. Perth. Two months later she was transferred to Bangour, where however,- "The authorities were unable to control her." She was therefore formally charged, found insane in bar of trial, and ordered to be detained D.H.M.P.

In Perth also she was a very troublesome patient, but finally she was tried back again in Rosslynlee, where for a time she did very well, got full parole, and was trusted in every possible way. Finally she was tried under an older sister's guardianship, but h they did not get on at all well together; Patient behaved badly and now makes all sorts of countercharges against her sister. Anyhow she had to come back to the Asylum. Recently- whatever the provocation,- she had a tremendous outburst of temper, during which she was so violent and dangerous that she had to be returned

to Perth. She has suffered an intense disappointment for her step-mother had died, and she had planned that her father would take her out, he however also died. She has thus been "too much" for three Asylums, although her physical strength is very small.

Though she blames everyone but herself for her troubles, this is as much a defensive reaction as due to lack of insight; her intellect is neither weak nor disordered. She is industrious, cheerful and pleasant to talk to, very honest and above-board, and in a good mood nothing would induce her to break her trust. She is as one would expect very prudish. She is childishly eager for attention and jealous of other patients.

On the other hand her emotional instability is extreme, it is impossible to forecast what imagined or trivial grievance will not provoke sulks, which are hardly removed from maniacal violence and destructiveness. I have not seen her in these tantrums but I have the best of evidence that she combines an utter reckless ferocity with a cool ingenious destructiveness rendered possible by her unimpaired intelligence. On readmission here I expect she narrowly escaped one, though she was allowed no ground for feelings of grievance HERE. She was "risked" in an ordinary room, and her demand to be allowed up was yielded to. For a day or so, however she was in a very querulous emotional, unstable, condition before she settled down.

This case might be called "hysterical" and though of course there is no resemblance to any of the recognised 'forms' of true hysteria, it is possible that there are common elements in the etiology. Her symptoms are simply excessive emotional reactions, an egoistic over-sensitiveness, and totally uncontrolled resentment of any restraint. This constitutes her to my mind a typical example of the "explosive" or "temperamentally unstable" type of moral imbecile. It might be objected that she is neither vicious, immoral, criminal or ill-disposed; but her good conduct is essentially a response to good personal relationships, i.e. she is nice to and with those with whom she is on good terms, as it were 'to please someone'. Of deference to social opinion, to the rights of others in general, she has NONE, and therefore it is not wrong to say that her morality has not developed beyond the family level- industry, cleanliness, chastity, etc. in obedience to the parents' will. The acceptance of FELLOWS, with equal rights and of abstract standards that are not personal commands is beyond her.

Here the "infantilism" is unmistakable, the lalling, the petty jealousy, the craving for attention, the submissiveness at times and to some people, with rebelliousness in other circumstances, the tremendous father-fixation and hostility to stepmother, the dependence (she has no real ambition to leave the asylum) etc. all bespeak the abnormal persistence of infantile characters.

Case 5. M.35. Early history obscure, but apparently well brought up and of good heredity, for his only brother and his six sisters are doing well. F. and M. still alive. Patient left school at 14 -standard VI. No intellectual defect. Convicted of dishonesty as a message boy, but not dismissed- repeated changes of employment- militia service- then enlisted in regulars but dismissed after 10 months as incorrigible, since then has gradually become an habitual criminal. He has stolen from his own family, even objects of mainly sentimental value, and it is typical of him that he writes to apologise offering to make it up and let bygones be bygones. His attitude in fact is something between a whine and "divine right"- begging for cigarettes, newspapers etc. He is perpetually aggrieved, asking for "another chance" seeing in the suspicion with which he is now regarded, and the precautions taken in his case, injustice to and dislike of himself. When the situation is explained he appreciates it well enough, but this has no permanent effect upon his affective attitude., which remains "injured". He is perfectly unscrupulous, a fluent, ingenious and brazen liar, wholly selfish and very careful of himself. (he made a doubtful attempt at suicide in Peterhead by cutting a vein with broken glass. He says he wanted to be sent here and that he overdid the wound and though this statement is made with the object of securing his return with a view to remission and

ultimate liberation, I am inclined to believe him.)

His record includes "assault by stabbing" (twice) "assault" (four times) "theft etc." (eight times) "false representations" (once) "burglary" (twice) ^{fourteen years} in a period of ~~twenty years~~ OF WHICH ONLY ABOUT FOUR YEARS HAVE BEEN OUT OF PRISON. He has been in Broadmoor as well as here.

He is capable, industrious, intelligent and pleasant to talk to, not wantonly malicious or illdisposed. He is however totally unreliable, regardless of the rights and feelings of others- an individualist without the rudiment of a social disposition. He is a moral imbecile proper, who does not see why he should take the trouble to rehabilitate himself socially when he can obtain ALL HE WANTS by predatory methods. He is a true "insensitive" without a mask of habitual hypocrisy.

The etiology of this case is quite conjectural, but here also there is no evidence of congenital defect, and a strong suggestion of the persistence and aggravation of certain infantile traits of character, notably the naive egoism, failure to appreciate the feelings and point of view of others, etc. Certainly there are law-abiding citizens who are egoistic and narcissistic, but in the normal egoist there is a desire for "SOCIAL RECOGNITION" for the esteem of his fellows. In any case an unadapted egoism must be a strong predisposing

factor in criminality, in this case, I think, sufficient in itself to determine such a relation to society that habitual criminality is inevitable.

Case 6. M. 22. Elder of two brothers, Mother died when he was six, Father remarried a year later and Patient did not get on well with stepmother who had a family of her own. He was always in trouble, a truant from school and at eleven was sent to an Industrial School, from which however he escaped so frequently that he had to be sent to a Reformatory in England. From there he went into the Army (age 16) but was "drummed out" $3\frac{1}{2}$ years later for striking an N.S.O. Returned home and has never done or attempted to do any honest work since. In prison could work hard, but was utterly undependable, would sometimes cut the leather (he was a shoemaker) up to make belts etc. though detection and punishment was almost certain. He could not tolerate regular work, confinement and discipline, and after being punished for something he flung his Bible at the Chaplain in Church. Then sent to C.L.D. where his character and conduct showed no real improvement. e.g. he attempted escape a few weeks before liberation, taking a risk and showing himself willing to be a "wanted" man outside rather than wait that time. After discharge on expiry of sentence ^{it} was not long before he was rearrested ("reset" - his previous record being "housebreaking") and at first the prison M.O. would not credit that there was

anything abnormal about him. However after a month he broke down as before and became refractory, reckless and violent, and he is now here for the second time. The words of his "reformatory" school master still apply "A good enough scholar and a capable bandboy, but could never be depended on."

His characteristic is a total lack of continuity or of regard for his own or others interests; he is more irresponsible than a child and obeys nothing but the impulse of the moment. The only time in which he is "serious" is when he is angry. In fact he has not got any character, good or bad, and in consequence the prognosis is bad. He therefore belongs to the group of "faciles" though over and above the "instability" his interests and dispositions are decidedly childish.

These six cases, while they serve as clinical illustrations of "moral imbecility", give only the vaguest and scantiest indications of the etiology of the conditions. They do however, in my opinion, strongly suggest ^{that} to "lump all these cases together" as congenitally defective, is a mistake, and that the most promising line of research is not a cytological study of the germ plasm or a superficial ~~etc~~ comparison of the social and economic success of the relatives of moral imbeciles. They suggest rather the value of a farther attempt (on a basis ~~of~~ of more and 'earlier' material,) to define

such syndromes as 'instability' or 'social insensitive-ness' so that departures from the normal may be recognised early. They suggest that, as Psychoanalysis finds, the early familial affective adjustments are vital for character formation, and that more primitive attitudes to life etc., may persist as underlying bias, tendencies, temperament, etc. Thus the over-centralisation of interest on the ego, with the consequent diminution of the affective significance of the mother and perhaps the farther weakening of the "transference" when it is used to compel the child to forego some of its valued, but socially disallowed, pleasures, must permanently affect the self-other relation. It may permanently diminish the amount of interest and affection available for socialisation and mental development generally, it may even be true that the various degrees of "moral insensitiveness" depend on the length to which this process of autoabsorption of interest has been carried.

The group of "unstable" ; 'explosives', 'faciles') may originate in various later, (but still very early) maladjustments of infancy. The problem of the integration of impulses and dispositions into a coherent personality, though related to that of the development of the social disposition, cannot be considered here. I suggest however that for the etiology of these conditions also, infantile development offers the most prom-

ising sphere of research. It is at any rate at this period that the infant learns not to live merely by a succession of impulsive reactions to the stimulus and desire of the moment, but either to accept limitations to his will or to accept postponement and to take the trouble to adapt means, more or less indirect, to his ends. The third biological alternative (to these passive or active adaptations) is to put forth greater effort to attain the desire, but without modifying or deviating from the direct and customary means of accomplishing this. This effort is supported by a corresponding emotional reaction- passion. The child whose wishes are not complied with redoubles his cries and under certain circumstances it is conceivable that a habit of passion might be formed if the child were not taught or could not learn to adopt one of the other modes of adapting to denial. This habit might become a permanent tendency to an outburst of anger where thwarted, or where egoism is hurt in any way, - such a disposition in fact as we find in "the explosive type"

Yet another series of character aberrations is found connected with FIXATION on the mother, where this transference is so strong and satisfactory that it fails to act as a "bridge" or a conductor to direct interest and affection outwards upon other persons and things.

CONCLUSIONS TO PAPERS ON "MORAL IMBECILITY"

(1) For many reasons it is particularly difficult to decide whether or not there are cases in which the social rapport is primarily or exclusively disorganized or defective.

(2) Chief among these is the fact that any radical defect in the affective relationship to his social environment impairs the child's power of mastering tradition, custom, etc. Still more, in later life, does defective sympathy throw an individual "out of touch" with his fellows, and this leads to TACTLESS conduct which often wears the aspect of extreme stupidity. Judgement also must be defective where it involves the appreciation of SOCIAL values and their balancing against direct instinctive satisfactions. In this way gross MORAL defect of necessity involves a SECONDARY INTELLECTUAL INFERIORITY, and the absence of a definite boundary between the group of moral, and the far larger group of intellectually defectives, is of less significance than it might appear.

(3) With some difficulty it is possible to distinguish a group of cases in which moral defect is the characteristic and dominant symptom.

(4) This group however is too protean and illdefined to justify us in regarding the condition as due to the presence or absence of a specific germinal factor.

There is moreover no evidence- from family histories - of the heritability of the condition; its rarity also is against this interpretation.

(5) Psychopathology then lends no support to the view advocated by McHougall that the social disposition is a true instinct, dependent upon a definite germinal factor and thus integrated prior to experience.

(6) On the contrary it presents us with a heterogeneous group of conditions, which certainly seem to take their origin early in life, but which seem to depend each upon some particular maladaptation of the infant to persons in his environment. Vicious cycles are thus set up which may produce highly specific and "localised" aberrations of function, very definite and intractable trends of development, without these being due to the absence of a specific germinal factor.

(7) In the nature and history of these first attachments of interest and love we find character-forming influences and "critical points" which are probably sufficient to account for the phenomena under discussion, without the hypothesis of innate constitutional aberrations.

(8) A more promising working hypothesis of the pathogenesis of "moral insensitiveness" is that it proceeds from a primitive faulty definition of the self-mother relationship, and the ^{consequent} absorption of interest by the self.

(9) "Instability" of temperament ^{is} has a persistent infantile character, the conditions of which are obscure.

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