CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE PSYCHOPATHOLOGY OF EVERYDAY LIFE:

THEIR RELATION TO ABNORMAL MENTAL PHENOMENA.

being a thesis presented by

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CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE PSYCHOPATHOLOGY OF EVERYDAY LIFE: THEIR RELATION TO ABNORMAL MENTAL PHENOMENA.

'Sooner murder an infant in its cradle than nurse unacted desires!..... Blake.

THE FOREWORD.

" Mankind has a bad ear for new music ".
Nietzsche.

The fundamental difference between the old and the new psychology lies in the fact that, in the former, the part played by feeling in relation to mental processes is a subordinate one, whereas, in the latter, it occupies in this connection a very prominent place. The play, so to speak, of our feelings determines, to a great extent, our mental processes: and if, through the interference of the censor of consciousness, no direct play be allowed, then the manifestation of such feelings may be traced indirectly. But if we maintain that feeling plays such a large part in the determination of mental processes, then we are only paving a way for the doctrine of rigid determinism in thought and action, and here we are face to face with a great stumbling - block, at least, as far as the ordinary individual is concerned. Even if one only endeavours to demonstrate to him the fact that

much can be said for the deterministic theory, his pride is hurt. He likes to think, and with good reason, that his thoughts and acts are volitional. So far, our remarks on the attitude of the ordinary individual apply only to processes which are conscious. What about those that are unconscious ?. Let us first deal with the average man. For him, unconscious processes might be non-existent. He never seeks to explain them, nay, thinks it folly on the part of anyone to attempt to explain them, for he regards them as meaningless and therefore, in his eyes, any attempted explanation can only be attended with fruitless results. For the determinist, however, they are subject to as rigorous a determinism as are processes in consciousness. On the one hand, then, we have those to whom conscious processes are volitional, but to whom all, or nearly all, unconscious processes are meaningless; and, on the other hand, those to whom conscious and unconscious processes are alike subject to a rigorous determinism. Incompatible as these theories seem, it may be that a solution of the problem is to be found in accepting the determ-

inistic theory as far as unconscious processes are concerned, the truth of which it is partly the purpose of this thesis to demonstrate, in conjunction with the volitional theory where conscious processes hold sway. The difficulty lies in the illusion that because in conscious processes we exercise free-will, that, therefore, free-will plays a large part in our conscious processes. Here we must leave the matter for the present, as it is not the object of this thesis to answer the vexed question of determinism and free-will. It is sufficient that we are now able to recognise clearly two distinct classes; first, those who attach little or no significance to unconscious processes, these forming by far the great majority; and second, those who not only attach great significance to such processes in themselves, but who regard them as being very pertinent to processes taking place in consciousness.

It is to this latter class that Professor Freud, of Vienna, belongs, and as a member of which he has done such

Herculean work as far as psychology is concerned. Briefly stated, the points in Freud's psychology which concern us here are four in number.* First, he assigns a rigorous determinism to all psychical events; second, he states as a tentative hypothesis, that there is to be assigned to each psychical event what he calls an "affect", varying in quantity and possessing a certain degree of independence in its attachments; third, every psychical event is accompanied by a certain amount of energy, the over-accumulation of which leads towards abnormal mental functioning and the discharge of which is accompanied by the sensation of relief; finally, inasmuch as feeling plays such a large part in the psychology of the individual, he regards unconscious processes as the expression of our feelings or desires, which, of course, need not necessarily be gratified in consciousness. This last hypothesis he further elaborates in order to show the

* His views are expounded in his numerous writings, the most important of which, in the present connection, are 'Die Traumdeutung', 'Drei Abhandlungen zur Sexualtheorie', and with (Breuer) 'Studien uber Hysterie'.

the mechanisms which are at work in the construction of mental processes. One of these mechanisms commands our attention at present, a knowledge of it being necessary to a proper understanding of this thesis. If gratification is denied to a feeling, or, in other words, to an unconscious wish, through the censorial influence of consciousness, more conveniently termed the psychical censor, then what is known as 'repression' of that wish occurs, the amount of repression depending partly on the strength of the wish, partly on the strength of the censor.

A wish, then, may be successfully repressed, but it is not to be inferred that it is therefore rendered inactive. It still plays an active part in mental life, even though it remains for all time insufficiently active to overcome the psychical censor. If, then, it be not subjected to repression, it appears direct in consciousness; whereas, if, owing to the strength of the psychical censor, an unconscious wish prove

scarcely strong enough to find direct expression in consciousness, it will manifest itself therein indirectly.

That this mechanism holds good in certain normal and abnormal mental processes and that it explains many hitherto seemingly absurd phenomena occurring in insane states, it is our endeavour to prove. A word may be conveniently said here, however, as to the justification of the adoption of these hypotheses, for though we shall, by personal experience and personal observation, prove their correctness, it is as well to offer some show of reason for the use of such terms as psychical censor, intrapsychical conflict, and the like.

In the elucidation of any problem, Science demands a very definite method of arriving at the truth. If we turn our minds, for example, to the subject of acquired immunity, we find, as the method adopted in the solution of this problem, first, a collection of facts; second, a classification of these facts; third, the construction of a theory designed to explain these facts. The theory propounded need not necessarily explain

all the known facts; it is sufficient if it lead to the establishment of fundamental laws relating to them. Ehrlich's side-chain theory is of this nature, inasmuch as it does not explain active immunity apart from the presence of anti-substances in the serum. Nevertheless, Ehrlich is entitled to speak of a molecule of protoplasm as being composed of a central atom group with a large number of side-chains. His 'atom- group' and 'side-chains' have no real existence: they are but figments born of his scientific imagination, and, as such, are comparable to the atoms of the chemist and the ether waves of the physicist. That they enable him to give a reasonable explanation of certain phenomena is sufficient justification for postulating their existence. For exactly the same reason, such terms as were mentioned above are used in this script.

I. Contributions to the psychopathology of everyday life.

" He who has eyes to see, and ears to hear, becomes convinced that mortals can hide no secret. Whoever is silent with the lips, tattles with the finger-tips; betrayal oozes out of every pore" --- Freud.

THE FORGETTING OF GIVEN MEMORIES.

We are here only concerned with typical cases. If I fail to recollect that I was accosted on the street yesterday by a boy who asked to be directed to the British Museum, there is nothing strange in my inability to remember the incident. I had no cause to remember it, and there is nothing psychopathological about my forgetting it. But if I forget my own name, or my brother's name, or if I set out from my house one morning to make a call in a certain part of the city and find myself, after travelling some distance, not at, nor approaching my *intended destination, but in some other quarter to which I had no conscious intention to go, then some explanation of such an unusual occurrence is necessary. It is not merely an unusual occurrence, it is a very definite psychopathological act.

We have one other consideration to take into

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* I had almost said 'desired' destination, but strictly speaking, this would have been incorrect, otherwise there had been no mistake. Our unconscious desires are, as will subsequently be shown, much stronger than our conscious ones.

account besides the fact that we are dealing with a given memory, and that is, that the person with whom we are dealing must not be subject to memory disturbances either quantitative or qualitative. The forgotten memories of an alcoholic dement, for example, are not, for the present, to be compared with those of the normal individual.

Proper names furnish, perhaps, more striking instances of what we refer to, than anything else. Everyone has, at some time or other, had the experience of being suddenly unable to recall a hitherto well-known name. We think of the person, of his appearance, of where we last saw him, perhaps we even remember the name of a companion who accompanied him on that occasion, whom we had not previously met and whom we have not since encountered, yet still we are baffled in our quest for the name. We may get the length of saying that we think the name begins, for example, with a B, that we are sure it does, but still the name escapes us. Next day, perhaps, the name suddenly flashes

through our mind, and we pause for an instant to think how curious it is that we forgot it. The incident then passes into oblivion: we never seek to explain such occurrence to ourselves, unless, perhaps, to add by way of explanation that memory plays us funny tricks sometimes.

Some time ago, I took up a card to send to a friend of mine, with whom I had been long and intimately acquainted. I was taken by surprise, however, when I found that I could not recall his name. It was his Christian name I especially tried to remember, for I had always known him by such, and seldom was obliged to use his surname. I thought of him as I could see him in my mind's eye, of when and where I had last seen him, and so on, but no clue came to hand. Suddenly I recalled the surname, but the Christian name was as far off as ever. That I should be able to recall that portion of his name by which I seldom had cause to refer to him, seemed to me, at the time, a most unusual circumstance. I may say here that I was then unacquainted with

the mechanism involved in the forgetting of such memories. It was only after some twelve to fifteen hours had elapsed that I succeeded in recalling the Christian name. Why was this ? I can demonstrate the matter clearly enough. The full name of the individual in question was John Calderwood, the latter part of which, as we noted above, I remembered before the former. Previous to knowing him, there had entered into, and had disappeared out of, my life, a person, by name John Burton Brown. Ever since this latter person passed out of my life, I have been unconsciously repressing all memories of him. To those who are unacquainted with psychical laws, this statement may appear paradoxical enough, as it seems to infer a contradiction in terms and that if a mental process of any kind takes place, it must, ipso facto, take place in consciousness. That this assumption is wrong, it will be my endeavour to demonstrate in these pages. Both persons had been known to me by their Christian names; but their Christian names were the same, and owing

to the fact that that particular name, through its association with the surname Brown, had been repressed into my* unconscious. I was unable to recall it in connection with the surname Calderwood. Let me now explain how I came to this conclusion. As has been mentioned above, the incident occurred before I was familiar with the Freudian mechanisms, and it was only after becoming acquainted with these that I reached a satisfactory explanation of my memory lapse. I took the Christian name John which I had forgotten, and which, as I thought, I had little reason to forget, and proceeded to associate to it. This entails the putting down, in sequence, of the various thoughts that rise in one's mind when reacting to the word in question, care being taken to exercise as little censorial influence over one's thoughts as is possible. The first association I gave was the French word Jean, then the corresponding feminine Jeannette. This made me think of a character I had lately seen

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* The adjective used substantively, as in the writings of Brill, Jung and Freud.

in a dramatic sketch, and this in turn brought another character to mind, of the same name, whom I saw many years ago in an opera performed in the Athenaeum at Glasgow. My next thought was that my knowledge of the operas was by no means what I should like it to be and that I had often had had cause to regret this fact. My next association was the opera Faust, which was the one I had last witnessed, and following upon that, the person who had accompanied me on that occasion, viz, John Burton Brown. My associations carried me no further, and curiously enough, I failed to recognise that I had already reached a satisfactory explanation of the difficulty*. So I again began to associate to the Christian name John, and again arrived at a point at which the person John Burton Brown completely filled my thoughts. This time I did notice that his Christian name was the same as the one I had forgotten, and it was only on re-reading my first associations that I found I had previously missed the same

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* Association tests, as a rule, take a long time to complete and cover many pages. This one is cited in detail, because of its brevity.

result. Thus reaching of the same goal by two distinct routes rules out of account a mere coincidence. Furthermore, the overlooking of John Burton Brown's identity in the first instance is not to be ascribed to chance. Such a mechanism is only too frequently adopted by the psychical censor in order to avoid disagreeable thoughts rising into consciousness.

It is here convenient to bring forward another point for our consideration, viz, the way in which an * affect cleaves to a name. We are all aware that there are certain names we would not like to bear because of the affects accompanying them, and others again to which, for the like reason, we are partial. A good example of what I mean is to be found in 'Julius Caesar' (Act. 3, Scene. 3) : -

Third Citizen.	Your name, sir, truly.
Cinna.	Truly, my name is Cinna.
Second Citizen.	Tear him to pieces; he's a conspirator.
Cinna.	I am Cinna the poet, I am not Cinna the conspirator.
Second Citizen.	It is no matter; his name's Cinna; pluck but his name out of his heart, and turn him going

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* An 'affect' may be defined as that which gives an idea its emotional tone. Cf. page 6.

Again, every schoolboy knows, as Macaulay would have said, that there are anarchists and anarchists. Those who do not believe in the 'propogation by deed' methods are closely allied to such individualists as Herbert Spencer and Harold Cox. Yet one has always the greatest difficulty in getting people to understand (as a rule, discussion yields more heat than light upon the subject) that an anarchist may be a highly respectable member of a community. The difficulty lies, I think, not so much in ignorance, but in the affect accompanying the term.

Not long ago, I was discussing boys' Christian names with a friend, and I ventured to remark that 'Archie' was a very suitable and pleasant- sounding name. He replied that he could not tolerate it, and I might have pursued the matter no further, had he not again introduced the name in question only to re-express strongly his disapproval of it. This aroused my curiosity sufficiently to test the Freudian machanisms, for wherever one encounters a strong prejudice, one may suspect

some very touching reason for the same. I asked what objection he took to the name, but his only reply was that he did not like it. When I told him that he probably had had some unfortunate connection with some-one of that name, he did not deny it, but asked if one might not simply take a fancy or a dislike to a name. Two or three days later, however, he admitted that my surmise was correct, and gave me sufficient details in explanation.

It is worthy of notice that sellers of goods are well aware of the value of the affect attaching to a name. The 'Phiteest' Boot Company is an example of this kind, and many more might be added. Cryptograms, too, are made use of because they serve to hide painful affects.

At the present time, I have a patient in one of my wards, whose name I ought not to have forgotten because of his striking facial characteristics if for nothing else. The fact that he occupies a bed in one of my infirmary wards and that I

have been attending him every day for a prolonged period makes my memory lapse all the more surprising. His name is 'Burton', and I need only point out that it is the same as the second Christian name of my one-time friend, John Burton Brown, referred to above. It is to be observed that, as a general rule, anything once forgotten tends to be forgotten again.

To a colleague of mine I once had occasion to refer to a third party who had made a strong impression on me, but whose name I could not recall for a matter of twenty-four hours or so. The name in question was 'Gresham', and it was only after associating to the word, that I realised that I then had an outstanding account with the Gresham Publishing Company.

It is convenient to remark here upon another definitely psychopathological act. During my student life, it was my misfortune to find myself in an unenviable position financially. Much time and much self-denial* were necessary ere

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*The reader will excuse the frankness of this statement, in the cause of science.

I could say farewell to my creditors. So much indeed, was this the case, that for the past two years I would not allow an account of any kind to be run up against me. I even sacrificed my early morning newspaper in order to pay for it before I read it. I am only now beginning to adopt a more reasonable attitide in these matters. The over- scrupulous attitude here shown was but the result of over-determination and is undoubtedly a defense mechanism, primarily conscious, secondarily unconscious, in order to avert a like calamity.* Bernard Hart defines an obsession as the "over-weighting" of a particular element in consciousness, and it is such instances as the above that lead us to the genesis of true obsessions. The 'washing mania' of which I will have to speak later, is due to the same mechanism symbolically expressed.

One of our greatest living writers, Anatole France,** tells a story concerning Pontius Pilate. The incident

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* Psychology of Insanity p. 33.

** Mother of Pearl.

with which the story deals is supposed to have occurred when he was a man well-advanced in years. While travelling through the desert on one occasion he lights upon an old acquaintance, and, as two men should who hail from the same land, they spend an hour or two together in pleasant reminiscences. The acquaintance has occasion to recall to Pilate's mind the trial of Jesus, and the story winds up dramatically enough with Pilate saying "Jesus - Jesus - of Nazareth ? I cannot call him to mind". The associations centring around the trial in question must have been a source of great pain to Pilate. How well repression had forced them deep into his unconscious is here well illustrated.

Before we pass from the subject of proper names, one other point is worthy of our attention. I refer to the common enough habit of casting a slur upon a person by pretending to forget his name. I have heard a politician raise a titter amongst his audience by referring to his opponent in the election field as 'Mr. - Mr. - what's his name '. In such a

case the speaker acts as though the name had suffered through repression. On the other hand, we feel rather pleased that our names are remembered, when we have little reason to expect that such will be the case.

The forgetting of words other than proper names may be just as important. While examining a row of books in a second-hand bookshop in Charing Cross Road one day, I picked up a volume on 'Sleeplessness' and read therein the following lines -

'Blest be the man who first invented sleep,
But curst be he with curses loud and deep
Who then invented, and went round advising,
An artificial, cut-off, early rising'.

They amused me much at the time and I committed them to memory by repeating them to myself at odd intervals. The day following I repeated them to a colleague with the exception of the word 'artificial', which I failed to remember. Associations to the word brought to consciousness the fact that I had that day paid a visit to my dentist, whose rooms, by the way, are also in Charing Cross Road, and that I had come away from him, thinking

what a pity it is to have a single artificial tooth in one's head. Artificial ---- I can remember how the very word pained me at the time.

The forgetting of articles, the carrying out of an intended purpose wrongly, and the forgetting to carry out an intended purpose are due to the same causes. When travelling from Manchester to London one day last year, I made up my mind, as the day was fine, to seek out a friend as soon as I arrived at my destination and spend the evening with him. I considered that I could leave my bag in the left-luggage office, but looked upon my umbrella as a decided nuisance. On arriving at Euston, I would have left the latter behind, had not a fellow-passenger directed my attention to it.

Last Christmas, I offered, by way of a present, to pay a dentist's bill. A day or two later, I found that my offer had been somewhat rash, and that I could barely undertake the expense. I promptly forgot all about it, and several weeks

had elapsed ere my brother introduced the matter in conversation and I was reminded of my unfulfilled promise. Similarly, bills are frequently mislaid, cheques but seldom.

Those who have witnessed Bernard Shaw's 'Caesar and Cleopatra' cannot fail to remember how upset Caesar becomes, as the hour of his departure arrives. He has forgotten something, and feels very annoyed with himself on this account. Finally he remembers what it is - to say goodbye to Cleopatra. This showing to the world at large that she had suffered repression into his unconscious, and thus expressing his opinion of her, is a very delicate method of disparagement, and is similar to the pretended forgetting of names.

Having occasion to appear at Bow Street one day, in connection with a deportation order, I enquired of my colleagues the most convenient way to travel. I was advised to alight at Holborn tube station, have my lunch in one of the neighbouring restaurants, and procced to the Court. I duly set forth, but when I first realised what I was doing, I found myself, after having

alighted at Piccadilly, which is three stations beyond Holborn, walking towards the restaurant I usually frequent when off duty. The erroneously carried out act indicates where I would rather have been at the time.

By hee loquus linguae, in which also t

MISTAKES IN SPEAKING.

Mistakes in speaking are pregnant with meaning. An excellent example is afforded us in 'The Merchant of Venice', (Act.3, Scene 2), in which Portia says : -

'There is something tells me, but it is not love,
I would not lose you; and you know yourself
Hate counsels not in such a quality:
But lest you should not understand me well,
(And yet a maiden hath no tongue but thought)
I would detain you here some month or two,
Before you venture for me. I could teach you
How to choose right, but then I am forsworn;
So will I never be; so may you miss me ;
But if you do, you'll make me wish a sin,
That I had been forsworn. Beshrew your eyes,
They have o'erlooked me, and divided me:
One half of me is yours, the other half yours, -
Mine own, I would say; but if mine, then yours, -
And so all yours'.

By her lapsus linguae, in which she tells Bassanio that she is already his, Portia allays her suitor's anxiety.

What is known at Oxford as a Spoonerism, so called on account of a distinguished professor who frequently committed the

error, is the common mistake of replacing the initial letter or letters of a word by those of a succeeding word, usually taken from the same sentence.

While making a mental examination of a patient under my care, I obtained an anamnesis in order to test his memory. He had occasion to point out to me that he had made a mistake in saying that he had been at home prior to his admission to the asylum. I knew, of course, that this was so. In making his statement, however, he said 'miscape' for 'mistake' and I at once concluded that he was either meditating an escape from the asylum, or that he had escaped from the poorhouse infirmary, which had been his place of residence prior to admission. The latter was the more probable supposition for the simple reason that he had omitted all mention of that institution when giving me his history. I at once taxed him with having taken French leave of that place. He hesitated, became agitated, and finally, with some sense of shame, admitted the truth of my statement.

When returning from Glasgow to London recently, the day being particularly fine, I was loth to spend time in travelling. However, I had no option in the matter, and approaching the book-stall in the Central Station, I asked, amongst other things, for the 'Telegraph' instead of the 'Herald'. Thus, in my lapsus linguae, I expressed very pointedly my feelings in connection with the long journey that was before me.

While speaking to a colleague of mine who was a candidate for an asylum post in Wales, for which a knowledge of Welsh was a necessity, I said to him, "So if you feel that your knowledge of French is good" etc., substituting the word 'French for the word 'Welsh. The error that I had fallen into would have escaped me, had not my attention been called to it. I made a mental note of the mistake, and later, found on associating to the word 'French' that only that morning I had expressed the regret that my knowledge of French was not sufficient to allow me to

speak it fluently,

and that I had pondered over various methods of remedying this deficiency.

One day, when taking a very full anamnesis from a patient as a preliminary to submitting her to a psycho-analytical investigation, I had occasion to ask her at what ages her parents had respectively married. She told me that her father was then twenty-two years of age, but that she could not say how old her mother had been. She gave me the year of their marriage, however, and her mother's age at death. Thinking to get what I wanted, viz- her mother's marrying age, by means of a little arithmetic, I asked her in what year her mother had died. To this she did not at first reply, but later said questioningly, more to herself than to me "1822"?, and then, "No, No; how stupid of me: she was married in 1861". But when I thought of it thus 18 - 22, I felt certain I had got the information I desired. I assumed her mother to have been eighteen years of age when she married. My assumption proved correct, for the patient brought

me a record of her mother's death a few days later, from which it was easy enough, knowing the year of her marriage, to calculate her age at that time. My questions, as I subsequently found out, touched upon a * complex, and her mistake serves to show how well her mother's marrying age was known to her, though it had not succeeded into rising into consciousness. If anyone thinks that I am here reading a meaning into what has no meaning at all, I can only say that such an attitude is neither justifiable nor scientific, that the mistakes of everyday life must, a priori, have some explanation, and that until someone can furnish us with psychical laws which can be adopted over as wide an area and hold as true as those so ably set forth by ** Freud, then, and then only, can his theory and its practical application be questioned. The incident recorded above is also an excellent example of that feature in word-reaction tests known as 'perseveration', a thing the patient

* A 'complex' may be defined as a repressed group of emotionally toned ideas.

** As Jones, in his 'Papers on Psycho-Analysis' epigrammatically says, "In the future, reason will be used to explain things; at present, it has to be used to explain them away".

referred to was particularly guilty of in her subsequent associations.

One other matter we may well consider under this heading, and for an illustration, I turn to Hamlet(Act 3 Scene 2.). Thus the Player-Queen: -

"Nor earth to me give food, nor heaven light.
Sport and repose lock from me day and night,
To desperation turn my trust and hope,
An anchor's cheer in prison be my scope,
Each opposite that blanks the face of joy
Meet what I would have well, and it destroy,
Both here and hence pursue me lasting strife,
If, once a widow, ever I be wife".

The Queen (of Denmark) here interpolates : -

"The lady doth protest too much, methinks".

Precisely : by a process analogous to the phenomenon of over- determination which I have already commented upon, the Player-Queen betrays her own mind. In her determination that no one shall know her true feelings in the matter of second marriages, she oversteps herself; and her vehement denunciation

only serves to show in what direction her thoughts lie. Many people are guilty of this protesting-too-much, and in so doing only succeed in laying bare their minds.

MISTAKES IN WRITING - MISPRINTS.

Mistakes in writing are not made without cause, and furnish us with good examples of repressed desires. When next January comes round, we will all probably make the mistake of heading our letters January, 1913, thereby signifying our regret that another year has slipped past. Similarly, when we are eagerly anticipating some event, we frequently mistake Monday for Tuesday, Tuesday for Wednesday, and so on. A student may, as the end of a term approaches, date back his letters, thereby expressing his wish for more time to prepare himself for examination. The commonest mistake made in writing is, perhaps, that of writing the first letter or syllable of one word, usually taken from the same sentence, instead of that of another. Such mistakes are not to be ascribed to chance, haste, inattention or the like. These are only predisposing factors, not the cause. Besides, in the committance of these errors, haste only succeeds in defeating its own object.

One day, when deep in a book on mythology, I suddenly remembered that I had omitted to write a somewhat urgent letter. As I was very interested in the matter I was then reading, I turned over in my mind the possibilities of postponing my letter-writing. Realising this to be impossible, I very reluctantly laid down my book and began to write. Let me now quote the lines which I had just read, and which I was so loth to leave aside. The tale is that of Isis and Osiris from a chapter on Egyptian mythology : -

'She, (Isis) was represented as a woman with the horns of a cow. Osiris, her husband or son, for he is regarded as both, is killed by his brother Set or Sethi, a being whose character answers to that of the Hindu Vritra, etc. Where two names are offered for the same individual, I instinctively choose the more euphonious, and in this instance I selected the form Sethi for future reference. Turning now to the letter I wrote, I had therein occasion to remark that my brother was 'analysing' busy

and 'synthetising' certain substances, but when I reached the latter word it recalled to mind the fact that I had seen * Jones use a different form of the same word, viz, 'synthesising'; and that when I had come across it, the subject-matter having proved so interesting, I had omitted to consult a dictionary as to which was the more correct form. I there and then looked the matter up, and found that the latter was given the preference. I therefore proposed to use it, but found on re-reading my letter, that I had spelt it thus 'synsethising'. For a time I was quite unable to account for this mistake, but if the word I wrote be divided up into three syllables, thus, 'Syn-sethi-sing,' in the centre is found the name of Osiris's brother, a name which I had made a mental note of prior to throwing my book aside. My unconscious thoughts were with Sethi, and my mistake indicates the spirit in which I took up my pen to write.

When furnishing a medical report on some boys, I recently wrote, 'many of the boys were found to be underglad'.

* 'Papers on Psycho-Analysis.

putting 'g' for 'c', at the same time showing in what direction my sympathy lay. On another occasion, when acting as an assist_ ant in general practice, I had good reason to complain of the poverty of the heating arrangements. I wrote to my principal about the matter, and amongst other things said "Surely a man is worthy of his fire", substituting 'f' for 'h'.

It may here be observed that once a mistake is made, re-reading of the script only too frequently fails to reveal the error. The unconscious impulse which was the cause of the mistake is still potent enough to prevent the attention of the writer from being cast in that direction. Hence the value of having one's proofs read by a second party.

Misprints are due to the same causes, though they are not so easy of explanation owing to the fact that the errors may be made by one of several people, the proof-reader, the printer, or the writer.

Punch takes the following from the Scotsman, 'He had neither the wealth of the Plantagenets, nor did he derive any income from the American trusts (loud daughter)' ; and thus comments upon it - 'We knew what was meant without the explanatory parenthesis'.

MISTAKES IN HEARING AND READING - ASSIMILATION.

One of the commonest examples of assimilation is the hearing of one's name in mistake for another's. The likelihood of this is increased by similarity of the names and an anticipatory mood. The student, expectant of passing in an examination, may fancy he hears his name two or three times when the pass-list is being read out.

When submitting a patient to the word-reaction test, he mistook the word 'cream' for 'dream', and reacted with 'something going on in the mind'. I mistook this for 'something going wrong in the mind', a most appropriate assimilation on my part considering the fact that he had assimilated the test word.

Mistakes in reading, provided the type is clear and distinct, furnish us with truer examples of assimilation than mistakes in hearing; for in the latter, one must always discount the factor of indistinct pronunciation on the part of the speaker. An assimilation, in its psychological sense, is a difficult thing to define. All mistakes in hearing and reading are not true

assimilations , a fact which I have seen no psycho-analyst comment upon. It is true, nevertheless, that one can almost always instinctively distinguish between a word assimilated and a word taken up wrongly through bad pronunciation. If a speaker have a number of people for his audience, all of whom simultaneously mistake one of his words, especially if they do so in the same sense, there is no assimilation; but if only one or two out of the number present make the mistake, we are justified in assuming an assimilation. The sense of hearing of everyone concerned must, of course, be normal.

One evening recently, when my mind was full of the new psychology, I thought I saw, on opening a newspaper, in fairly large type the heading 'Freud in Germany'. On looking again, however, I saw 'Fraud in Germany'. In this instance no blemish could be found in the printing.

The following, from Punch, is also an excellent example of pure assimilation. An extract from the Dublin Saturday Herald reads:'The suffragette leader, looking very pale and

emancipated, was driven out of prison in a closed carriage'. Punch comments on this 'The wish is father to the look'. So much for the misprint; now for the assimilation. On reading the above extract and the accompanying comment, I failed to see the point of Punch's remark, so I read the matter once more but with the same result. Thinking that I must be unusually dull in the head, I set myself to carefully read the matter a third time. Then, and then only, did I notice that the word linked to 'pale' was 'emancipated', and not 'emaciated', as I had taken it to be. I need only add that I am an ardent supporter of the anti-suffragist movement.

On opening my programme at Covent Garden last winter, whither I had gone in company with a friend to see the Russian Ballet, judge of my astonishment in seeing the title 'Les Syphilides' given to one of three dances. The title was, of course, 'Les Sylphides'. My friend made the same mistake and correctly interpreted it as the result of a heated discussion we had had, previous to leaving for the theatre, on the value of

salvarsan in the treatment of syphilis. Curiously enough, a colleague of mine, who had been present during the discussion, and to whom I handed my programme when I returned, remarked to me, "Do you know, when I saw that (pointing to the title) at first, I thought it was 'Les Syphilides'.

SYMBOLIC ACTS.

Symbolism plays a large part in our everyday life. That symbolic acts enable us to get a glimpse of a person's unconscious is well known, though the importance of it generally passes unperceived. Music is often used to give expression to our complexes. For instance, when a person sits down of his own accord at a piano, we may justly interpret his unconscious feelings by what he plays.

A good illustration of symbolism is here related. One very hot day, having walked far into the country and having had nothing to eat or drink since early morning, I halted at a farm house not far from the road,* and asked for food. The good lady of the establishment very civilly entered into conversation with me, and learning that I had travelled far, she bade me come in and be seated. Being pleased with my reception, I entered; and while I partook of the food and drink set before me, our conversation continued. In the room in which we were seated was a curtained recess

* Beyond Baker's Loch, near Drymen.

leading to an outhouse of the kind so frequently seen in farm houses, from which resounded the voice of someone singing 'Coming through the Rye'. During a pause in our conversation, the strains grew louder and louder, and finally, a young girl entered the room, abruptly ceasing her song as she stepped forward and caught sight of a stranger. I asked her to continue, but this she would not, only busying herself with her work. When I had finished my repast, and was about to take my leave, I asked permission to put a question to her. To this she readily enough assented, so I asked her if she would tell me why she had been singing. She replied "What a question ! I sing because I am happy". "Yet many people", I said "are happy, and have good voices, but only few sing" Here she vouchsafed no remark, so I continued; "But I am not so concerned about your singing; besides, you have already given me an answer";"but why do you sing that particular song; perhaps you have good reasons for doing so?."To this she naively replied, as she beat a hasty retreat through the door by which she had entered, "And I have".

A friend of mine, who was about to get married, came downstairs to breakfast one morning, whistling the Wedding March from Lohengrin. "Surely" I said, "you think it long waiting for the 21st. (naming the wedding day.) "As a matter of fact, I do;" he said, "but I don't quite follow your remark". I asked him if he knew what he was whistling, but it was evident from the pause which followed that he did not. He finally succeeded in bringing the matter into consciousness, when he realised the justification of my remark.

Those who have been fortunate enough to see 'Instinct' a play, by the way, which might have been written by Freud himself, so accurately does it portray his theories, must remember the incident when the husband, a surgeon, advances towards his wife, thinking to embrace her, but only to find that she recoils affrightedly, throwing both hands over her eyes. To her husband's "Why, what's the matter?", she replies, "Nothing - nothing: I - I saw a spot of blood on your cuff". No blood was there, and after demonstrating this fact to her, her husband says "Come, come, your

nerves are out of order"! But her false perception is only a preliminary to her denunciation of him as one whose hands are continually steeped in blood, and proves to be symbolic of the mental picture she had of her husband.

While speaking of this play, it is worthy of notice that a lapsus linguae occurs in it which is pregnant with meaning. The surgeon, in his consulting room, is notified of the arrival of the Iago of the piece, by name 'Walker', and when he approaches, the surgeon says, "Sit down, Doctor - eh - Walker, I mean" substituting 'Doctor' for 'Walker', and thus unconsciously expressing his disapproval of the latter's visit. Her affection, too, for the consumptive poet, who is the source of all the discord, is but her unsatisfied maternal instinct coming into play.

PROJECTION AND ALLIED MECHANISMS.

The phenomenon of projection, which, as we shall see later, is a noticeable feature in many abnormal mental states, is also commonly resorted to in everyday life in order to avoid touching upon a painful complex. One illustration will suffice. A friend of mine one day asked me if I could do anything for a fellow-worker of his who suffered much from spermatorrhoea. During the latter part of his recital of the case, he said, "Six months ago he sought medical advice on the matter, but the doctor has failed to treat me with any degree of success". Here I interpolated "You mean 'him' of course". He at once recognised his mistake and added by way of explanation "No, 'me' is correct. I regret I misled you, but I felt so ashamed of my condition that I did not wish you to know I was referring to myself". Here we have an individual who, in order to hide feelings which were a source of much mental pain to him, projects them, during conversation, on to some non-existent party.

A few other mechanisms, by which a painful complex is repressed, may be briefly touched upon. The following lines taken from* Burns show us how two lovers throw dust in the eyes of the world, in order to hide their true feelings for each other : -

'Aye vow and protest that ye care na for me,
And whiles ye may lightly my beauty a wee;
But court na anither tho' jokin' ye be,
For fear that she wyle your fancy frae me '.

In a similar way, by the assumption in consciousness of the opposite quality, does an individual counteract feelings which are incompatible with his ego, and throw dust, so to speak, in the eyes of the psychical censor. The over - scrupulous attitude, already cited, which I adopted with regard to the payment of accounts is an excellent example of this.

The exhibition of bien-être which we are so pleased to note in our friends is, alas, only too often superficial, and serves but as a cloak to conceal a life of sorrow.

* 'Whistle, and I'll come to you, my lad'.

It is for this reason that the Jester in the 'Yeoman of the Guard' commands so much sympathy.

In order to reach the same goal, viz, a refuge from intra-psychical conflict, too many people indulge in alcohol.

'Care, mad to see a man sae happy
E'en drown'd himsel amang the nappy'. *

In his lectures on Materia Medica, Professor Stockman says that no one indulges freely in alcohol without having some psychological necessity for doing so: and ** Trotter speaking of alcoholism, says "almost universally regarded as either, on the one hand, a sin or a vice, or, on the other hand, as a disease, there can be little doubt that it is essentially a response to a psychological necessity. In the tragic conflict between what he has been taught to desire and what he is allowed to get, man has found in alcohol, as he has found in certain other drugs, a sinister but effective peacemaker, a means of securing, for however short a time, some way out of the prison-house of reality back to the Golden Age".

* Tam o'Shanter. ** 'Herd Instinct', Sociological Review, 1909.

II. Their relation to abnormal mental phenomena.

'He concluded by paraphrasing Hamlet, "There are more things in heaven and earth, doctor, than are dreamt of in your psychiatry".'

Brill's 'Psychanalysis', page 123.

The lot of the alienist is, in one respect at least, not a happy one; he has to be content with few, if gratifying recoveries. Nor has it ever been otherwise throughout the history of insanity. Is it, then, that the maladies which are his special care are not, for the most part, amenable to treatment, or is it that the poverty of his recovery list is due to the lack of a proper understanding of such abnormal phenomena as present themselves for treatment ? Recent advances in psychology point to the latter as being the more correct inference. If this be so, then there is yet no need for us to join the ranks of the materialists, there is yet no need for us to say with * Stoddart : -

"The pith of the whole matter is this: that among savage peoples the interests of the individual are subordinated to those of the race and natural selection is at work; while among civilized nations the interests of the race are subordinated to those of the individual, natural selection is allowed no play, and the result

* Mind and its Disorders.

is the survival of the unfittest. This is the true cause of the increase of insanity; it lies under our very hands. The medical man is himself responsible for the increase of disease and the degeneration of the race. The physician who specializes in mental diseases is, or should be, a comfort and a blessing to his present patients, but he is a curse to posterity'.

With the exception of that brief period when Hippocrates endeavoured to give to insanity a definite scientific footing, the first or demonological conception held sway until the middle of the eighteenth century. At the end of that century, the physiological conception had taken firm root and may be said to continue to hold the field at the present day. Much was, and is, expected, though but comparatively little has been gained, at least, as far as increasing the percentage of recoveries is concerned, from this conception of insanity. Its main contention is that mental changes are dependent on, and proceed pari passu with, physical changes. This conception may eventually prove to be the correct one, but that it certainly is not, from the point of view

of the psychiatrist, a very encouraging one, must be admitted by even its most ardent supporters. The 'mens sana in corpore sano' dictum has its origin in a physiological conception of insanity; and yet, it has always seemed strange to us that so many people are admitted to asylum wards who bear little or no clinical evidence of an unsound body. If an unsound mind is the reflex of an unsound body, one would expect to find a large proportion of asylum patients confined to bed for one reason or another. That this is not the case here * is evidenced by the following, taken from the latest Commissioners' Report : - 'The number of patients confined to bed at the time of our visit amounted to 187, or about 7.4 per cent of the total in residence. They included several cases so confined for mental reasons, amongst which were the most recently admitted patients. **' It is not sufficient to account for the discrepancy existing between theory and fact by saying, as some have the habit of saying, that the clinical evidence of a physical lesion is not forthcoming because the means at our

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* Colney Hatch Asylum.

** Recent admissions are, of course, confined to bed, irrespective of their physical condition.

disposal for eliciting certain lesions are yet too meagre for that purpose. This is only begging the question. Leaving on one side cases of congenital mental defect, of epilepsy, of general paralysis of the insane, and of insanity with grosser brain lesions, there exists a large number of cases in which we have, as yet, no legitimate reason to infer a brain lesion; nor is the evidence on the post-mortem table sufficiently weighty to account for the abnormal phenomena observed.

Towards the end of the nineteenth century, however, a new school of psychologists arose in France. These, with Janet at their head, developed the psychological conception of insanity, and since then great strides have been made in this direction by Kraepelin, Jung and Freud. This more recent conception, which, si non è vero, è ben trovato, has cast abroad a more hopeful spirit in psychiatric circles. Much good work has already been done abroad in attacking insanity from this standpoint; but in this conservative country of ours, the views of the new psycho-

logists seem to gain favour but slowly. It is with the view of demonstrating, in normal and abnormal states, the wide applicability of some of the Freudian mechanisms, that this thesis has been undertaken.

As we had occasion to mention already, if the ordinary individual is asked for an explanation of the mistakes which he makes in everyday life, he at once retorts either, that they are due to chance, haste, or inattention, or, that they are causeless: and, in any case, he regards the person who seeks to interpret them as one to be laughed to scorn. The adoption of this attitude is simply due to the fact that he can find no better reason for his error. Why ?. Because the cause is hidden from him: it lies there in his unconscious, and, being there, does not for him exist. His nearest approach to a correct answer is to ascribe such mistakes to what are, after all, only predisposing factors.

Now this attitude of the ordinary individual

with regard to the mistakes of everyday life is a very apposite illustration of the attitude adopted by the average sane man towards the delusions of his insane brother. In one breath, a lunatic describes himself as a multi-millionaire, and, in the next, begs for a sixpence to buy tobacco. The sane brother, who is listening attentively the while, goes home and writes a chapter on the irrationality of the lunatic. As a matter of fact, the insane person will give us a better show of reason for his delusion than will the ordinary individual for his mistake. This is but natural, for in both cases, the rationalisation is produced subsequently, and we have yet to meet the sane man who can rationalise as well as the deluded lunatic. The truth of the whole matter lies, of course, in the fact that reason does not play such a large part in relation to mental processes as it is thought to do.* Both the mistake and the delusion have their origin and their rationality somewhere out of the reach of

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* Cf. p. 3.

consciousness, viz, in unconscious feelings. The truth of this statement need not be pressed home by the quandary, familiar enough, in which a politician finds himself, in seeking to make his party opponent 'see reason'.

Let us now direct our attention to the subject of repression and repressed desires. While endeavouring to obtain a psychical cause - trauma - for hysterical manifestations,* Freud formulated the following theory : - " Through my psychic work I had to overcome a psychic force in the patient which opposed the pathogenic idea from becoming conscious". The reason for this resistance on the part of the patient is owing to the fact that the pathogenic idea is always accompanied by an affect of shame, reproach, mental pain, or a feeling of injury. We have seen how well this theory of repression holds good in the trivial mistakes of everyday life; and if we now pause to consider exactly what happens when a pathogenic idea strives to enter consciousness, we

* 'Selected Papers on Hysteria and other Psychoneuroses', p. 87.

can then see how far the theory applies to abnormal mental phenomena.

When an idea is found to be incompatible with our ego, i.e., when it is a pathogenic idea, the ego may treat it in one of several ways. If the affect accompanying the idea is not a strong one, the ego does not stoop, as it were, to repress such an idea, but merely treats it, as far as possible, as non-arrivé. The two ideas are maintained, but separately so, in consciousness. This is the explanation of 'Dissociation of Consciousness', a conception which is by no means confined to abnormal mental states. When a person plays a skilful hand at Bridge, and attempts, at the same time, to solve some abstruse problem, for example, in metaphysics, he exhibits dissociation of consciousness, inasmuch as two ideas occupy his field of consciousness at one and the same time. Here, however, the dissociation is temporary, partial, and subject to the will of the individual; whereas, in abnormal mental states the dissociation is no longer under control, is complete if temporary, and only too frequently is found to be

permanent. Closely associated with this conception, but quite distinct from it, is the dissociation of the stream of consciousness. In normal mental life, the idea, which, at any given moment, holds sway in consciousness, is intimately connected with that which preceded it and with that which follows it. If this be not so, then there is interruption or dissociation of the stream of consciousness.

Let us now return to our deluded friend who describes himself as a millionaire and yet asks for a sixpence. The ideas which centre around his delusion, being incompatible with those which centre around his ego, are shut off from the latter by the process of dissociation: at the same time, the dissociation of consciousness prevents the patient from becoming aware of their incompatibility. If, however, his attention is called to the absurdity of his position, or if he has a keen insight into his own mental condition, he obviates the difficulty in which he is placed by means of rationalisa-

tions. In so doing he is only acting like the normal person who, when accused of inconsistency in his actions, pours forth a volley of reasons in order to explain away his conduct. It is in rationalisations that secondary delusions have their origin.

It may now be worth our while to enquire why a patient should have a delusion, and having one, why it is sometimes a delusion of grandeur, sometimes a delusion of unworthiness. We have seen that in the psychopathological acts of everyday life our mistakes are determined by our unconscious feelings or desires, which, having taken advantage of such predisposing factors as haste, inattention and the like to elude the psychical censor, have, in order to find expression, risen into consciousness. We have also noted that a painful complex may be repressed by the assumption in consciousness of the opposite quality, that a life of sorrow is often concealed beneath a smiling face; and that one of the main reasons, at anyrate, for indulgence in alcohol is the avoidance of intrapsychical conflict. Let us now consider another phenomenon which presents

itself in the daily life of the individual, viz., day-dreaming. Day-dreaming is a mechanism to which we resort in order to give expression to our unconscious desires. When we are unsatisfied with reality, when our present position in life is incompatible with our insatiable ego, we seek relief from the intrapsychical conflict by building castles in the air; we are no longer bound down by facts, but in imagination satisfy all our wants. As * Brill, when speaking of repressed desires, says "To-day there are no more worlds to conquer, but we are all Alexanders, none the less. Each of us who is not afflicted with the emotional deterioration of the Schizophrenic is dominated by ambitions and is never perfectly contented..... We want much, and we get comparatively little, but we never stop wanting."

The delusions of the insane are of the same nature as the phantasies of the normal individual. Delusions of grandeur are , in this light, self-explanatory : delusions of unworthiness, however, do not at first sight seem to tally with

* 'Psychanalysis, its theory and practical application '. p. 40.

this explanation; but a moment's consideration shows us that such delusions always touch upon a strong religious complex, and are to be regarded as a negative expression of the desire for future happiness; they are but the exaggerated developement in consciousness of opposite repressed feelings. As we have noted above, delusions of persecution have their origin in rationalisations: and, as we would expect, are exhibited by such patients as have some insight into their own mental condition.

How far this conception of delusions has taken us is manifest by reading the following lines taken from *Stoddart: 'We have just seen that all who suffer from delusions lack insight; and from the investigation of patients we find that the converse usually (sic) holds good, that those patients who lack insight almost invariably suffer from an insane delusion, and that those who have insight do not '. We cannot agree: we maintain that secondary delusions can only arise where the patient has sufficient insight into his own condition to

* 'Mind and its Disorders' p. 149

recognise that his primary delusion is incompatible with his ego. Our millionaire friend who finds himself unable to purchase tobacco solves the absurdity of his position by assuming that someone has robbed him of his money. Thus, the insight which the patient has into his own condition is the basis of the delusion of persecution.

Hallucinations are to be regarded in the light of a dissociation of consciousness, the 'voice' being the dissociated or split-off portion addressing the main body of the personality. How much sounder this conception of an hallucination is than that adopted in current text-books is best evidenced by a reading of the following passage, in which the writer in endeavouring to bolster up the physiological conception of insanity, has only succeeded in getting himself inextricably mixed up. Again we quote from * Stoddart : 'The deaf, but not the congenitally deaf, are especially liable to hallucinations of hearing..... Auditory hallucinations are, as a rule,

* Op. cit., p. 110.

of evil prognostic significance; the exceptions to this rule may sometimes be recognised by getting the patient to ascertain whether he can still hear the sounds when his ears are stopped. In the majority of cases they are no longer heard; but if they still persist, the prognosis is more favourable since the patient either believes or may be reasoned into the belief that the sounds are hallucinatory..... Hallucinations of both vision and hearing are most frequent at night when all is dark and quiet'. Here we have the statement that, when their ears are stopped, the majority of hallucinated patients no longer hear hallucinatory sounds. Apart from the fact that our limited experience flatly contradicts this assertion, it is tantamount to saying that, if we felt so inclined, we could relieve patients of their hallucinations, by depriving them of their sense of hearing. But how does this coincide with his first statement that the deaf(not the congenitally deaf, mark you) are especially liable to hallucinations ?. Again, his statement, which we believe, that

auditory hallucinations are most frequent at night when all is dark and quiet, i.e. when the conditions are such as most resemble a stopping-up of ears, does not, to put it mildly, in any way strengthen the view that a patient's hallucinations disappear when his ears are stopped. Furthermore, to attempt to reason a patient into the belief that the sounds which he hears are of an hallucinatory nature is as great folly as to try to reason a patient into the belief that he is suffering from an insane delusion, and is attended with as beneficial a result.

Dissociation of consciousness, while it does not account for an obsession, explains the relation it bears in consciousness to the ego. As we shall see later, the ego regards the obsession as absurd, but at the same time does not subject it to repression for a very definite reason.

It now remains for us to see in what way the ego treats pathogenic ideas which are accompanied by strong affects. In such cases, the idea, having been refused direct admission into

consciousness by the psychical censor, declares war on the main body of the personality, and an intraphysical conflict ensues. This may result either favourably or unfavourably to the individual. In the normal course of events, the ego thoroughly appreciates the incompatibility existing between the pathogenic idea and itself and consciously selects one or other of the alternatives. This is a right and proper solution of the difficulty . In other cases again, the pathogenic idea is modified sufficiently to render it no longer incompatible with the ego: this also is a natural reaction to conflict. One of two other results, however, both of which are abnormal and terminate unfavourably to the individual, may take place. The first of these is best explained by considering how an obsession is formed, and the 'washing mania' to which we previously referred serves as a good illustration for this purpose. A young woman, admitted to this asylum last year, was found to be suffering from an obsession of this kind. Six months previous to her admission she had given birth to an illegitimate child, and

(and) the circumstances arising in connection with this event had been a source of great mental pain to her. The set of ideas centring round her moral lapse constituted a psychical trauma; and her ego, finding such ideas incompatible, repressed them. The repression was for the most part successful, but the affect of uncleanliness being a strong one, it detached* itself from an idea which was being subjected to repression, and, in order to find expression in consciousness, attached itself to another indifferent idea, in this case no longer in the psychic, but in the physical sphere. In washing away a stain from her hands, she, like Lady Macbeth, is symbolically washing away a stain from her conscience. It may here be mentioned that when the patient had the obsession explained to her in this light, the constant washing of the hands ceased and has not since been resumed. More often the affect is simply transferred from one idea to another in the psychic sphere; but it is here worthy of note that** Freud

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* Cf. p. 6.
**. Op. cit., p. 3.

regards the somatic innervation of hysteria as the result of a previously received psychic trauma, and he speaks of the transference of an affect from the psychic to the physical sphere as the process of 'conversion'. The advantage thus gained by the ego in the case of an obsession is less than in the case of hysteria, inasmuch as in the former, though the pathogenic idea is repressed, the affect still remains potent after transference; whereas in the latter, psychic excitement becomes mere bodily innervation.

The various phobias have their origin in the same mechanisms as obsessions, so that we may speak of hysteria on the one hand, and, obsessions and phobias on the other, as having a psychogenetic origin.

The second and more drastic method which is employed by the ego towards a pathogenic idea accompanied by a strong affect is best illustrated by a consideration of what happens in acute mental conditions such as the acute confusional

states, cases of complete autopsychic amnesia, and the acute maniacal states of folie circulaire. In such acute states the ego, wearied by the constant strain of suppressing the painful complex, is finally, though temporarily, overcome by it. Even so, however, the mechanism of repression still holds good, for when the complex erupts into consciousness, the ego retires from the conflict, and leaves it in entire possession of the field. It is in these cases that dissociation of the stream of consciousness occurs. When an individual merges into an acute hallucinatory psychosis the complex dominates the field of consciousness, and he remembers little or nothing of his former existence. Similarly, when the complex retires, the ego resumes its wonted position and takes up the thread of life where it left off.

The phenomenon of 'projection', which, as we have seen, is a common feature of everyday life, furnishes us with another reaction of the mind towards a repressed complex. The painful pathogenic ideas, being incompatible with the ego, are

projected on to some other person where they can be more conveniently rebuked. As * Hart says, "Throughout all ages 'the woman tempted me' has been the stock excuse of erring man": and this mechanism of avoiding intrapsychical conflict is a characteristic feature not only of chronic alcoholism and dementia praecox, but is perhaps the main feature of paranoia. The persecutory delusions of the paranoiac are projected repressed complexes, the pathogenic wish being thrown on to some other, mayhap, non-existent individual who is then regarded as a tormentor.

The phenomenon of 'introjection' which is also a common feature of everyday life and which is exhibited in excessive sympathy displayed without due cause, is the exact opposite to that of projection and is a characteristic feature of the psychoneurotic.

We hope we have succeeded in demonstrating the bearing which the psychopathology of everyday life has upon mor-

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* Psychology of Insanity. p. 122.

bid mental phenomena. It has enabled us to find a reasonable explanation* for many things which have been too long been regarded as meaningless or absurd. Yet one more illustration. When making a mental examination of a female patient, the last note on whose case sheet, typical of the others which preceded it, ran as follows, 'In statu quo, dull and demented. Bodily health fair', we found very little evidence to show that the dementia was emotional and not genuine in character, until on asking the patient to waken up and take a little more interest in her surroundings, we received the startling answer, which taught us a severe lesson, "But, doctor, how can I find time to take interest in my surroundings ? I am busy enough as it is ". That many so-called cases of dementia are not genuine cases of dementia, but are what Hart** refers to as cases of emotional dementia, is well known. We are all aware that a 'demented' patient periodically acts in an extremely rational manner, and it is this

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* Cf. p.9.

** Ibid, p. 27.

which has led * Brill to say that dementia praecox is often neither a dementia nor yet a praecox.

To sum up, we are too ready to regard the isolated phenomena which are presented to us in the insane states in the same light as the ordinary individual regards the erroneous mental functioning of everyday life. We forget that the sane and the insane are subject to the same psychical laws, and that the difference in their mental states is one of degree only. As ** Kohnstamm, speaking of the relation existing between conscious and unconscious mental processes, says : " The biological way of thinking sees in the facts of consciousness only mountain-peaks, which soar into sight over a sea of mist, while the mountain as a whole - the totality of vital phenomena - remains hidden from the immediate consciousness. If one confines oneself to the view from above, there appears to be no natural connection, no regularity. If, however, one disregards the mist that

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* Op. cit., p. 125. ** Quoted by Jones, op. cit., p. 95, from the Journ. f. Psychol. u. Neurol, Bd. 18.S. 101.

conceals the base, one recognises how the mountains rise from the plain and have a common basis. One attains the scientific insight of the unity of what, under chance conditions was partly visible, partly invisible".

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