

A THESIS

PRESENTED TO THE UNIVERSITY OF GLASGOW

SUBJECT:-

"THE INFLUENCE OF NEO-PLATONISM ON THE LIFE AND THOUGHT OF  
ST. AUGUSTINE".

by

JOHN ANDERSON.

In fulfilment of the requirements  
for the Degree of PH.D, in the  
Faculty of Theology.

JUNE, 1927..

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THE INFLUENCE OF NEO-PLATONISM ON THE LIFE AND THOUGHT  
OF ST. AUGUSTINE.

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## CHAPTER I. The Introduction.

As we recall St. Augustine's influence down the ages upon Philosophy and Christian Doctrine, the many volumes he himself wrote, and the literature which has gathered around his name; it becomes an impossible task to deal in an exhaustive way with so great a personality in a brief Introduction. His Polemical writings, his letters, and the record of his life as Bishop of Hippo, must, therefore, be passed by.

The difficulty of an accurate survey is enhanced by the fact that (1) there is no systematic exposition of his doctrines; (2) his views were considerably modified in the course of his mental and spiritual growth. Hence, many Schools of Thought claim Augustine as their authority.

St. Augustine the connecting link between the middle ages and modern times. What we owe to him.

The secret of his power; his passionate nature, his genius for friendship, his responsiveness to the movements of his day, his great analytical gifts. Two sides to his nature;—a mystic by reason of the influence of Plotinus, a dogmatist as he assumed the role of a Theological Statesman.

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## SYNOPSIS OF THE CHAPTERS.

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"The relationship between Christianity  
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## SYNOPSIS OF THE CHAPTERS.

## CHAPTER 4.

The Life of Saint Augustine.  
Part I. (From 354-386).

Aurelius Augustine, born at Thagaste, November 13th. 354, A.D., died at Hippo, on August 28th, 430. Family influences, his father Patricius, a pagan until a year before his death, worldly, quick-tempered, sensual. His mother Monnica, a type of Christian piety, uncommon amid such pagan surroundings, filled with deep concern for Augustine's spiritual state, frequent mention of her tears, her prayers, her pleadings on his behalf. From his birth Augustine a dedicated spirit. Impressions of Augustine's character, he confesses, his love of praise & play, his dislike for Greek, love for Latin, especially Latin poetry. He reveals his faults, but records the fact that he was considered 'a hopeful boy'. At 15, he is sent for a few months to Madaura, to learn grammar & rhetoric, as a preparation for the African bar. His sojourn there did him little good, he had too much time on his hands, and he becomes the victim of sensual desire. Leaving Madaura he spends a year in idleness at home. At 17, he is sent to Carthage where his life was of the wildest. He forms an alliance with a young woman, with whom he lives in strict fidelity for fifteen years. When Augustine was but 18, a son was born, to whom they give the name, Adeodatus, who becomes a gifted and devout youth, dying early. At 19, a decisive hour is reached in the life of Augustine, when he reads the Hortensius, which turns his thoughts to better things. He searches the Scriptures, but is offended by their 'unadorned & rugged style'. Moreover the fact that in the Hortensius 'the name of Christ' was not present, troubles him. He is attracted to Manichaeism, becomes a 'hearer', associates with the followers of this Faith for nine years. It seemed to appeal to him in many ways. At 20, Augustine becomes Professor of Rhetoric at Thagaste, but leaves it on the death of a friend, to whom he was greatly attached. He opens a School of Rhetoric at Carthage. Writes his book on 'The fair and the fit', when 26 or 27. Evidently a sign that his thoughts were turning towards Platonism. Augustine now is disappointed with Manichaeism, he feels that its pretensions are hollow, it gives him no release from his burden of sin, no peace of heart. He goes to Rome. Is inclined to the Scepticism of the New Academy. Still struggles towards the truth. Gives an account of his troubled thoughts concerning God and Evil. Disappointed with Rome, he goes to Milan. There Augustine meets with Bishop Ambrose, and is impressed by his preaching. Augustine becomes a catechumen of the Catholic Church. But still he is tortured, and his heart is torn between belief and doubt.

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## SYNOPSIS OF THE CHAPTERS.

## CHAPTER 5.

The Life of Saint Augustine.  
Part 2. (From 386-430.)

In the year 386, when Augustine was 32, help comes to him. He discovers the books of the 'Platonists', translated into Latin by Victorinus. None other than the Enneads of Plotinus. There is 'kindled' within him 'an incredible ardour'. Here he sees the name of Christ and recognises in the Nous of Plotinus the Logos of St. John's gospel. He perceives the Spirituality of God; light is shed on the origin of Evil, it is really not-Being, a deprivation of Good. Evil, he learns, springs from a Will & an Imagination, which has turned aside from God. Moreover, he is taught to enter into himself, that he may ascend to hold communion with the Absolute. These books gave him soul direction. Yet these books fail him, since he finds no Redeemer in them, no deliverance from his burden. He sees afar off the land of his desire but knows not the way there. Now he turns to the Epistles of St. Paul, & these complete the good work which Neo-Platonism had begun. He consults Simplicianus, hears of Victorinus & his conversion. Still he halts, debates hesitates. He is told of others who have surrendered all & found peace. Then follows the garden scene when he hears the voice crying, 'Take up & read'. He responds & passes into the light. He resigns his position as Professor of Rhetoric; enters upon a period of retirement at Cassiciacum in preparation for his baptism. Still, however deeply engrossed in Philosophy. On Easter eve (April 24th. 387.) Augustine is baptized, along with his son Adeodatus, and Alypius his friend. Augustine plans for a life of contemplation in Africa; his mother's death alters his intentions. A wonderful experience of Neo-Platonic Ecstasy is given to Augustine & Monica at Ostia, a few days before her death. In his description of what took place Augustine uses the very language of Plotinus. Augustine returns to Africa, sells his possessions, lives in retirement for three years, busy with literary work, prayer, meditation. In 391 he visits Hippo, and is summoned by preacher, the aged Bishop Valerius, and people to enter the Church. Is dismayed, but feeling the hand of God may be in this Call, he accepts the Call. Begins his duties in 392, a year later at 42, becomes sole-bishop, having been associate-bishop previously. His work is sketched, his character as Bishop outlined. The last 20 years of his lifewere years of sorrow. Rome sacked by Alaric in 410. Augustine begins his great work De Civitate Dei, which occupied thirteen years, before it was completed. The siege of Hippo takes place, in the third month Augustine is attacked by fever, he dies August 28th 430. A brief outline of the influences at work upon his life brings the chapter to a close.

A FOREWORD.

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For the sake of clearness, it might be well here to give a brief outline of the present work. This outline, it will be seen, is further developed in the synopses of the chapters.

The Thesis has been divided into three sections.

PART I deals with a background of the period in which Neo-Platonism came into prominence. Philo is considered as a forerunner of Plotinus as well as a bridge from philosophical Judaism to Christian Theology. A sketch of the life of Plotinus follows, and a survey of his system of Philosophy. A study of the inter-relationship which existed between Christianity and Neo-Platonism is then dealt with, and an attempt is made to explain something of the "borrowings" of ideas and rites which took place. Justin Martyr and the part he took in this matter are mentioned. The work of the Gnostics, and that of the Christian Platonists of Alexandria, Clement and Origen, come under consideration. All preparing the way for a somewhat detailed study of the life of St. Augustine.

PART II opens with a suggestion that the life and writings of Victorinus Afer may have been a determining force in the theology of St. Augustine. Then follows the account of St. Augustine's reading of the books of the Enneads. Direct quotations from the works of Plotinus and Porphyry are presented, showing that St. Augustine had intimate knowledge of the writings of Neo-Platonism. A study of the Christian philosopher at Cassiciacum is given together with the earlier writings of St. Augustine which are associated with this period. Chapters then follow dealing respectively with St. Augustine's psychology; his doctrine of God; of the Christian Trinity; of God's relation to the world; of Providence and evil; of the freedom of the will. And these are examined in order to discover what influence Neo-Platonism had upon the thought of St. Augustine. A final chapter, giving a general statement of the results of our examination, brings Part 2 to a close.

PART III is taken up with Appendices.

Appendix I. Bibliographical, being a table of books consulted in the study for the Thesis.

Appendix II. Chronological, giving the chief dates of the life of St. Augustine.

Appendix III. Comparative passages in the writings of St. Augustine, with those to be found in the Enneads.

References are marked at the foot of the pages. Fuller notes & longer quotations are placed at the end of each chapter. Parallel references to the Enneads are to be seen in Appendix III in the order of the books of the Enneads. For the translations from the Enneads (Books I-V) I am indebted to Mr. Stephen Mackenna,

(2).

"The Library of Philosophical Translations: Plotinus". Four volumes: ( 1917-1926 ); for Book VI. of the Enneads to the French translation of M.N.Bouillett, "Les Ennéades de Plotin".1861.

The English translation of the earlier writings of St. Augustine is in most cases my own from the

"Opera omnia Sancti Aurelii Augustini, Hipponensis  
Episcopi", Benedictine edition, e congregatione S.Mauri."  
Vol.I. 1836.

Due acknowledgment is given where I have adopted another translator's work.

[illegible]

...on us about heavily, we may lose a sense of the not peculiar  
but that the great African Father wrestled with something  
us". (2).

...there is world to be responsible to ...  
...the nature the nature of ...  
...description of so great a personality.

W. H. C. Galle to assist the party.

As a result of the above, the following theorem can be proved.

CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTION.

In this Introduction to the study of the influence of Neo-Platonism on the life and thought of St. Augustine, it is not our intention to deal in any exhaustive way with that greatest of the Christian Fathers, who not only towered like a giant above those of his day, but who also has never ceased to leave the impress of his personality upon the life and thought of each successive generation.

For "there has been no crisis of Religious history in later days when men have not turned to him for direction. ....There is hardly a topic in the whole range of Theology and Philosophy on which he has not something to say. However diverse our interests may be, whichever of the many problems of life weighs on us most heavily, we may learn that it is not peculiarly our own but that the great African Father wrestled with something similar in his time". (E).

Hence it would be an impossible task to attempt, within the compass of half-a-dozen pages, more than the briefest description of so great a personality.

When one calls to mind the many volumes which came from his pen; and the literature which has gathered around his name; and when one takes into account the minute study given to

Foot Notes- (I). "S.Austin and his place in the history of Christian thought", pp.4,&13. W.Cunningham, Hulsean Lecture, 1885. Cambridge University Press, 1886.

his writings, on the part of French and German Savants, to say nothing of those of our own land, one is inclined to agree with M. Louis Bertrand when he declares that "this great Saint is hidden behind a perfect rampart of print".

In touching upon our theme, we shall, therefore, have little to say concerning his polemical writings against the Manichaeans, the Donatists, the Pelagians, the Arians, important as they undoubtedly are. These, for the most part, must be passed over in silence as foreign to our subject. In like manner his letters, which cover a period of something like ~~40~~ 43 years, that is from 386-429, and of which we have 276 in our hands, can only be referred to casually by way of illustration, although these in themselves are not only of the deepest interest from the point of view of the history of religion, but of special value as giving us an insight into the real kindliness, warmth and sympathy of St. Augustine's heart. They indicate too how he grew in prestige and power during these years.

Furthermore, we shall have to disregard those last thirty-five years (395-430), during which St. Augustine was bishop of Hippo. But important years these were, years of ceaseless activity, and growing responsibility, during which he filled the part of a great Church Teacher, laying the foundations of those doctrines and shaping those dogmas which, in after years, became famous under the name of "Augustinianism", with the result that it could be said, concerning St. Augustine, that "he was incomparably the greatest man between St. Paul and Luther that

(5).

the Church has possessed". (1). To show how great a position St. Augustine held in the Church of Rome, we are told that the question was solemnly and seriously debated as to "whether plenary authority were really to be attributed to him, or whether he were only to rank as the first of the Church's authorised teachers". (2).

But, fortunately, we have our field circumscribed for us, and we must needs leave such notable parts of this great life in a large measure out of our consideration.

There is, however, another difficulty which faces us, as we attempt a rapid survey of St. Augustine's work. In the first place, he has left us no systematic exposition of his doctrine in any single treatise; we have to search through many of his volumes, which treat on a variety of subjects, to find out what was his considered thought upon any particular theme. Again, in the second place, in his eager search for Truth, St. Augustine was ever reaching out after clearer and more reasonable conceptions. Hence impression after impression flashes forth, & is seen reflected in his writings. How well this is illustrated for us on the pages of his Confessions! As a result of this, his views underwent considerable modifications. It was only in his last years that he set himself to revise, correct, and amend what

Foot Notes- (1). Harnack, "Monasticism & the Confessions of St. Augustine", Williams & Norgate, 2nd. impression, 1913. page, 123. see also page iv. preface, Nourrisson, "La Philosophie de Saint Augustin", Vol. I. & 2. Paris, 1865.  
(2). Warfield, article- 'Augustine', Vol. 2. Hastings' ~~Vol. 2.~~ Encyclopaedia of Religion & Ethics.



he had written. In this direction, however, he was but partially able to fulfil his intentions. These emendations or revisions we find in his *Retractationes*, (426-428).

Thus it follows that it is scarcely fair to formulate a doctrine upon any single statement, or depend upon it as being his considered judgment. Indeed, in many of his doctrines, St. Augustine is hardly consistent. It is not then to be wondered at that so many very different schools of thought should have found in his treatises aspects of truth which they recognise as their own. At the Reformation, for example, we find Romanists & Protestants alike accepting St. Augustine as their teacher.

Alfaric says, "there have been attributed to St. Augustine the dogmas of Luther or of Calvin, and, successively, those of the Council of Trent. Men have made him maintain the Theses of the Jansenists, or of the Thomist School of Dominicans and those of the Jesuit disciples of Molina". (I).

But then, we must remember, St. Augustine was standing, if we may put it in this fashion, between two worlds, on the one hand, the ancient world that was dying, and on the other, the new world that was just about to be born. The old Philosophy was passing: it had lost its vision. It could no longer speak with certainty, for it was floundering in the morass of scepticism. Christianity with its message of a Saviour was appealing to the ignorant and illiterate, by means of its new truth &

Foot Notes- (I). "L'Évolution Intellectuelle de Saint Augustin", par Prosper Alfaric, Paris, 1918. Preface page, 2.

fresh gospel; and St. Augustine sought to make clear that it had a message for the elite and cultured as well.

It was then that this great Church Father played the important part of gathering up much that was precious in the teaching of Philosophy, and handing on that rich treasure of thought which had been moulded by his massive intellect, he made use of it in the interests of the Christian Faith. It was then largely through him that the great Christian doctrines came to receive their present form.

How much we owe to St. Augustine, may be summed up in the words of Dr. Glover:—"He gave to Christian thought on God and man, on sin and grace, on the world and the Church, an impulse and a direction the force of which is still unspent. He shaped the Catholic theory of the Church, he gave to the great Popes the idea of the City of God, of God's empire; he was the Father of the Mystics, the founder of the Scholastic Philosophy of the Middle Ages, and, above all, the hero and master of the Renaissance and the Reformation. He gave the Catholic Church the baleful doctrine, 'Compel them to come in'. He gave Calvin the doctrine of Predestination, and he was the only Father from whom Luther really learnt." (I).

Now, is it possible for us to arrive at the secret of St. Augustine's power? Can we account for his greatness and the widespread influence which he exercised?

Foot Notes- (I). T.R.Glover, "Life and letters in the Fourth Century", St. Augustine's Confessions, page, 194. Cambridge, 1901.

There is no doubt that he was endowed with many precious gifts. He had the passionate nature of the African, a sense of feeling which was remarkable in its intensity, a quick and keen response to sight and sound and even smell. Eager and alert, his whole self seemed to respond to all the movements of his day, and he was able to sense the needs and desires of the human heart most accurately.

Is it to be wondered that he had a genius for making friends, that he called forth devotion, and hero worship, on every hand? He himself received just because he gave. Illustrations of this abound on the pages of his Confessions. <sup>Let MAY</sup> Call to mind his overwhelming grief upon the death of his friend Nebrid-  
-ius, (1) or the beautiful picture of friendship he gives us, (2). Witness how St. Augustine reveals his heart not only in the book of the Confessions, where he is unfolding the story of his very soul, but also in his letters. In his retreat at Cassiciacum, how he would break off in the midst of a learned and abstruse discourse to introduce little personal touches which are so revealing! That he was a live man no one can doubt; this living throbbing spirit of his is in evidence continually. Recall his description of the battle of the cocks, given to us in one of his earliest writings, (3) "the necks craned forward at full stretch- the erected combs- the vehement blows- the skilful evasions".

Foot Notes- (1). Confessions, IV.4.9. (2). *ibid*, IV.8.13. (3). De Ordine, I.8.25. Col.544, Vol.I. "Omnia Opera, St. Augustine.

Then we come upon the personal note- "The moving incidents of the fray induced in us a certain pleasure in the spectacle".

That is one side of the man. We have/ another glimpse when we recall his great intellectual gifts. He possessed a keen analytical mind; he probed and searched his inner life, and with remarkable power and deft touch he was able minutely to describe his inward spiritual states, never satisfied until mind confirmed what the heart had already proclaimed. The Truth! the Truth! How eager he was to obtain that!

He has been described as 'the real Father of Catholic Mysticism'(1). And, without a doubt, much of this he learned in the school of Plotinus. The Confessions reveal to us seasons when he was lifted out of himself and saw the vision ineffable, when he was 'alone with the Alone'. Many of his sentences and indeed moods are truly mystical in their temper. But it is impossible to speak of him as wholly a mystic. We do not suggest this because St. Augustine was also a man of practical affairs. Plotinus was a mystic, but he had many practical gifts; indeed Porphyry tells us in his life of Plotinus, (2) that the great Neo-Platonist had often the estates of minors entrusted to his care, and that in the management of these he acquitted himself in a very creditable way. No, it is when one considers other elements in his character, that seem incongruous with the spirit of Mysticism, that

Foot Notes- (1). Rufus Jones, "Studies in Mystical Religion", Macmillan, 1923. page 87. (2). Vit. Porphyry, (translated by Stephen Mackenna, Vol. I.) see section 9.

we are drawn to the conclusion that he cannot be regarded as purely a Mystic. There is, for example, his work as a theological statesman, "his power as an architectural genius, whose supreme task was the construction of an imperial system- a Catholic Church- as the mysterious instrument of grace in the midst of a ruined world". Moreover, we remember how "more than any other man he forged the iron system of dogma and authority".(1)

And yet, in spite of all this, the Mystic in him clung to the belief that the true fatherland was 'yonder', that his spiritual home was the Father, that there was a 'way' for a man to rise and enter into union with the 'One'.

It is not needful here to do more than briefly state the surprising fact, that although he had been "sealed with the mark of the Cross in infancy and salted with His salt", (2) it was through Philosophy that he was first drawn towards the Religious life. Amid the riot of pleasure with which he was surrounded at Carthage, in his 19th year, Cicero's book of the Hortensius, now lost, fell into his hands. (3) It was this that led him to prayer and to the study of the Scriptures. Again, it was after his wanderings in the maze of Manichaeism and his experience with the scepticism of the New Academy that Philosophy a second time saved him. "Plotinus, read in a Latin translation, was the schoolmaster who brought Augustine to Christ". (4)

Foot Notes- (1). See Jones for quotations here and above- (op.cit) page, 88. (2). Confessions, I.XI.I7. (3). ibid III.IV.(7.8.) (4). Inge, "The Philosophy of Plotinus", (2nd. Ed. Longmans Green & Co. 1923) Vol.I. page, 12.

It was Neo-Platonism that first opened his eyes to the true Spirituality of God. The basis of St. Augustine's Psychology is to be found in Neo-Platonism. From Plotinus Augustine learned to enter into himself, and through his own soul to mount up to a knowledge of God.(1). It was thus that St. Augustine became one of the "founders of modern thought". As he sought to find truth in what has been called "the immediate certainty of inner experience", (2) so he, influenced by Neo-Platonism, enriched Christian thought. When St. Augustine describes the upward climb that the soul takes as it seeks for union with the Infinite, he follows very much the same way as Plotinus. And "in giving expression to his deepest religious feelings we find that he repeats the thoughts and almost the very words of Plotinus". (3)

But more than that, we shall see <sup>that</sup> in St. Augustine's doctrine of Providence and the Order of the world, in his teaching on Evil, on Matter, on the Freedom of the will, he owes much to Neo-Platonism; whilst not only are his earlier writings strongly imbued with the thought and spirit of Plotinus, but also many of the illustrations he makes use of are drawn from the books of the Enneads. We shall, however, be able to mark how in several directions he very clearly differs from his great teacher, and in what respects Neo-Platonism was but the gateway to a fuller Christian truth as expounded, in many of his books, by the

Foot Notes- (1). De vera religione, 39,72. 'Noli foras ire, in te ipsum redi; in interiore homine habita veritas'. see also Confessions, VII.X.16. (2). Windelband, "A History of Philosophy", (Macmillan, 1910) page, 276. (3). Edward Caird, "The Evolution of Theology in the Greek Philosophers", (MacLehose & Sons, 1904) Vol.2. page 286.

Doctor of Grace.

St. Augustine by his intimate knowledge of human nature and his personal experiences of the inner states of the Spiritual life speaks to-day even as he did to his own age, and many have confessed that, notably of his book of the Confessions, his experiences described therein have seemed like the echo of their own. (1).

Foot Notes- (1). See Inge, "Christian Mysticism", (The Bampton Lectures for 1899, 5th. Ed. Methuen & Co. London. 1921.) page 219. Quoting from the Autobiography of St. Theresa, IX.9.

## CHAPTER 2.

### "THE RISE OF NEO-PLATONISM, TOGETHER WITH A BRIEF SURVEY OF ITS DOCTRINE".

It is well for us to consider, at the beginning of our Thesis, something of the background of the period in which Neo-Platonism took its rise.

The third century A.D. was a sad and gloomy time; pessimism seemed to be the prevailing note; men's hearts were failing them from fear; the golden age of literature had gone and an era of decadence had set in. The old world, sick and weary, seemed to many to be crumbling to decay. (1).

The Roman Empire, having practically reached a dominion of world-wide importance, held sway over many lands. The Imperial city itself was crowded with peoples that had come from far. Juvenal even in his day had bewailed the fact that the Orontes was emptying itself into the Tiber; (2). and since then the barbarian population had steadily increased. Those who were rapidly populating the empire were, for the most part, from Eastern lands; slaves who had been brought to the city to grace a Roman triumph; merchants who had travelled thither, bringing their wares with them, bent on doing business in the market of the world. One great feature, then, of Roman society was its cosmopolitan character.

From that inrush of foreign peoples there naturally

Foot Notes-(1)Inge, 'The Philosophy of Plotinus', op.cit.Vol.I. page 25.indeed the whole of the chapter. (2).Juvenal (c.A.D 60-140)Juvenal, 3.62. quoted by Elsee, 'Neo-Platonism in relation to Christianity' Chap.1.page 5.



followed an influence upon the form and spirit of Religion. Because of the instinct in the heart of man for worship and the haunting sense of the supernatural, wherever they went, their Gods must go with them, together with religious customs and ritual. As a consequence of this, strange sanctuaries and deities were in evidence everywhere. (I).

Moreover, outside the Imperial city itself, the Roman legions, on outpost duty in different parts of the empire, came into contact with new forms of Faith. Many, influenced by what they saw, took the Gods of these conquered peoples to be their own, or became missionaries of attractive cults to their fellow soldiers. Hence, at Antioch and at Alexandria, which had now become influential cities, as well as at Rome, there was Religious syncretism to be seen. Now the Roman people themselves were, for the most part, broadly tolerant of the introduction of these strange faiths; sick and weary of their own religion, which had seemed to fail them, many turned to find, if possible, something better elsewhere. Indeed, "the Roman Faith and worship were too dry and meagre to satisfy the cravings of the Romans themselves in the altered conditions created for them by the possession of a world-wide empire; still less could they furnish a

Foot Notes- (I). See J. Réville, "La Religion à Rome sous les Sévères", also A.W. Benn, "The Greek Philosophers", Chap. I3. for an illuminative study.

meeting ground for all the populations which that empire was rapidly fusing into a single mass". (1)

It is not possible, within the limits of this thesis, to do more than mention the names of the more important Eastern religions which did much to influence the Roman people, deeply interesting though a fuller study would be. There was Isis, the Egyptian goddess of fertility. She seems in a marked way to have attracted the Romans, possibly because she reminded them of certain features which they were accustomed to associate with their own Venus and Ceres. Temples were erected in her honour, and even Emperors took part in her imposing festivals. Other deities from Egypt were Osiris, Anubis, and Serapis; the latter becoming afterwards even more popular than Isis. We have also deities introduced from Phrygia, Syria, and Phoenicia, with an order of priests a ritual marked by its 'mysteries', and by elaborate ceremonial. These, however, mainly drew adherents from the lower classes.

Of considerable importance was the Persian divinity Mithras, or Mithra. He was the sun-god among the Persians chief of the kindly spirits created by Ormuzd. He was regarded as the god of faithfulness and purity, the special protector of man in this world and the next. Mithraism was very popular throughout the Roman Empire, especially in the army, in the Third Century, and was, at that time regarded as a formidable rival to Christianity. (2).

Foot Notes- (1). Benn, op.cit. page, 479. (2). C.p. Renan, "Marc-Aurèle, Histoire des origines du Christianisme", 5th. Ed. 1885, Vol. VII., page, 579. where he says, "on peut dire que si le christianisme eût été arrêté dans sa croissance par quelque maladie mortelle le monde eût été Mithriaste".

But now, amid this multiplicity of Gods, there began to spread an earnest feeling after communion with some unseen power. There was an evident hunger after spiritual certainty. Strange though it may seem, amid the polytheism which abounded, there came into being the consciousness of the one-ness of God. This arose in two ways. We have already referred to the widespread toleration in Religion which existed in the Roman Empire; but this toleration in Religion was conditioned on the varied peoples agreeing to the worship of the Emperor. Or rather, lest the character of the reigning Emperor should be unworthy of a nation's devotion, and so a baser thought of deity might arise, it was the 'Genius' of the Emperor which they worshipped. (1).

Such worship was enforced in order to give unity to the different parts of the Empire, and was at the same time a means of encouraging a loyalty and patriotism wherever Rome held sway. In the first place then, the worship of the Emperor, in this way, tended to a unification of the conception of deity in the minds of men.

But further, despite the presence of varied cults in their midst, it came to be seen that there was much that <sup>was</sup> basal and common to them all. Indeed philosophers declared that they were not worshipping many gods, but the One, who was behind them all. As Plutarch put it- "There is one sun, and one sky, over all nations, and one deity under many names". (2).

Foot Notes- (1). The idea of a 'Genius' was a common thought in the mind of the Roman people. See Inge, 'Plotinus', op.cit. Vol. I. page, 38. (2). Plutarch, De Isid. et Osir. 67. quoted by Elsee, op.cit. page, 14.

Now all this helped towards a clearer conception of the God, for whom men longed.

I cannot enter into the many ways in which this Spiritual revival manifested itself. For one thing, there arose a more definite belief in a future life, and a clearer idea of holiness, a sense of God's guidance of man's will, and a desire for purification that the worshippers might be made fit for a closer fellowship with deity. In the second place, a kinder gentler spirit seemed to be abroad; the poor were being considered as never before; slaves were recognised as being human, and as having rights. In a word, there was very evidently the breath of a new spirit abroad which was destined to bring with it a fuller life to the Graeco-Roman world. (I).

Now, it might have been thought that Judaism would have here become the Religion of the Empire. It is true that many of the Greeks were attracted to it, especially as some of the Jewish teachers, drawn to the Greek culture, were led to embrace many of the philosophical tenets of Platonism. Indeed, at one time, it seemed possible that Judaism hand in hand with Hellenism, might prove a formidable rival to Christianity itself for world-wide supremacy. But it was one thing to receive the Faith of Israel, and quite another to become a Jew. Moreover, the Jews made a fatal mistake when, under Barcocheba, (A.D.132-135) they endeavoured to throw off the Roman yoke. This ended in disaster and Judaism lost its chance of world dominion.

Foot Notes- (I).see W.R.Halliday, "The Pagan background of early Christianity", Liverpool Univ.Press, 1925. page, 139.

Steadily Christianity gained ground, and despite its terrible persecutions scores of adherents joined the number of those who believed.

But it was not merely a time of Religious quickening, it was also an age of Philosophical revival, a time when Philosophy had its Religious movement, as it sought to interpret for man his deepest needs. "A Religious development of Platonism is the fundamental character of this period", says Windelband. (1). The more enlightened spirits in the Empire, who had ever cherished in their hearts a love for culture, sought to make their appeal to the hunger of their age through a philosophy which was deeply impregnated with Religion.

Side by side with Christianity, and indeed a strong rival to it, was Neo-Platonism, which has been eloquently described by Hatch as- "that splendid vision of incomparable and irrecoverable cloudland in which the sun of Greek philosophy set". (2). We must not think of Neo-Platonism as being solely a Philosophy. It was really a great religious movement, which took place at a transition time, when Graeco-Roman paganism was engaged in its last great struggle with Christianity for supremacy. We shall see that Philosophy, in Plotinus, the last and greatest of all the Neo-Platonists, becomes a religion. If we may quote from one who has made the writings of Plotinus a life-long study, "There is no Greek philosopher who did not intend to be an ethical teacher; and in Plotinus the fusion of

Foot Notes- (1). Op.cit. page 212. (2). Hatch, "The Influence of Greek ideas and usages upon the Christian Church", 1898 Ed. page, 133.

religion, ethics, and metaphysics, is almost complete. He must be studied as a spiritual director, a prophet and not only a thinker. His is one of the most ambitious of all philosophical systems, for he not only attempts to unite and reconcile what was best in all Greek philosophy, but he claims to have found the way of deliverance and salvation for the soul of man, in whatever circumstances he may be placed". (1).

Now although Plotinus professed simply to expound the philosophy of Plato, nevertheless Neo-Platonism was more than a mere revival of the teaching of the great master. It was rather a fusion of the main doctrines of Hellenistic Philosophy; for Plotinus not only outdistanced Plato in his abhorrence of things material, but the teaching of Aristotle had a very real bearing upon his philosophy. We must not suppose, however, that Neo-Platonism as expounded by Plotinus was a pure syncretism. True, he was indebted to many sources for his essential doctrines, but he fused these elements of thought into a philosophy essentially his own, and made a very real personal contribution.

Before we deal with Plotinus, however, it might have been of interest to trace many of the Neo-Platonic doctrines back to their original source, and show how this and that philosopher had passed on his contribution. (2). But that would add <sup>E</sup>greatly to the length of our chapter, and it is an aside which we cannot undertake.

Something perhaps should be said about

Foot Notes- (1). Inge, 'Plotinus', op.cit. Vol. I. page, 7.

(2). ibid, in the chapter on "The Forerunners of Plotinus, Vol. 8 I. pages 71-121.

Philo the Alexandrian Jew, not that he had any direct influence upon the philosophy of Plotinus, but that he was of the lineage of those who prepared the way. (1).

The writings of Philo are of the greatest importance, since "they gather together, without fusing into a symmetrical system, the two dominant theories of the past, and they contain the seeds of nearly all that afterwards grew up on Christian soil...If we could find a key to the chronological arrangement"- of his writings- "we should find in them a perfect bridge from philosophical Judaism to Christian Theology". (2).

We may notice, in the first place, Philo's doctrine of God, the Logos and the Powers ( *δυνάμεις* ). He proclaims the existence, unity and spirituality of God. He is Absolute Being, above space and time; He is Himself space and time, since time can only be associated with finite beings, and when God made the world, He also brought time into being. He is the unchangeable One; nameless, for names are but symbols, and speech fails us when we attempt to describe Him. He is, therefore, best known by negation. Philo himself speaks of Him as 'The ONE'; He that IS; 'Himself'. God is without quality, ( *ἀποιος* ) (3). quantity and relation. That is, He is pure Spirit. (4).

Foot Notes- (1). "Philo inaugurated Neo-Platonism", J.B.Crozier, 'History of Intellectual development', 1897. Vol.I. pages, 70, & 450. (2). Hatch, op.cit. page, 182. We are, of course, anticipating what will be more fully dealt with in the next chapter, but this seems to be the proper place to speak of Philo. (3). Windelband, op.cit. page 237. foot-note, Phil. Leg. Alleg. 47.a. (4). Bigg, in the "Christian Platonists of Alexandria", Clarendon Press, 1886, page 9. says-"In the extravagance of his recoil from materialism, Philo transferred the good Father & Lord of the Bible into the eternal negation of dialectics."

In what relationship, then, does He stand to the world? The world was created out of pre-existing matter. And matter, though eternal, was evil, - 'lifeless, erroneous, divisible, unequal'. (I).

Such a conception of matter, however, must remove it far from God, since He was the pure and holy one. Hence Philo had to conceive of such matter as being outside God and uncreated by Him. God was but the moulder, the shaper of the world. In his desire to show how God is related to the world, Philo contrasts the 'Intelligible Cosmos' with the world of sense. The sensible world must be a copy of the divine image, and the archetypal seal which we call the intelligible world must be the pattern, the idea of ideas, the Supreme Reason ( $\lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$ ) of God. (E)

But how was God able to get into contact with the world and shape matter to His purposes? He could only do so by the intervention of those powers through the Logos who were ready to do His bidding. Many names are used to describe them; they are sometimes so closely associated with the Supreme Being as to appear as attributes; at another time it would seem as though Philo had appropriated Plato's conceptions of Ideas. At other times, using the language of the Old Testament, he thinks of them as Angels, or according to the popular mythology of his day, as Daemons. Or, yet again, he has made use of the Pythagorean speech and has called them Numbers. (2).

Foot Notes- (I). Bigg, op.cit. pages, 9, and II. (2). John Watson, "The Philosophical Basis of Religion", Maclehose & Sons, 1907. page, 471. I have been particularly helped in my study of Philo by Dr. Watson's extracts from Philo which he gives in his Appendix, pages, 468-479. of the above volume.



If, however, we remember that the Logos was the Mând or Thought of God, and that the Logoi are, under whatever name we think of them differing manifestations of the Logos, then it seems clear that these Logoi are closely associated with God. As Hatch tells us- "Philo never loses sight of the primary truth that the world was made, not by inferior or opposing beings, but by God. It is the expression of His Thought." (1)

There is one other point in the philosophy of Philo upon which we must touch. It is his doctrine on Ecstasy. How can a God so transcendent come into touch with human life, and how can man approach unto such a Deity? Philo points out that it is the Logos who stands as the connecting link between man and God. "For man, as regards his reason, is the image of the Logos, as the Logos is the image of God. Hence the Logos is the Mediator, the Heavenly man, who represents, in the eyes of God, the whole family upon earth...The Knowledge which He gives is a lower knowledge, the knowledge of God in nature, and our allegiance to Him is therefore but temporary and provisional. But He is necessary as the door through which we must pass to direct communion with the Father". (2)

The wise man, who desires to apprehend God, meets with the Divine Reasons, as he travels along the path of wisdom. Wisdom leads him first into the ante-chamber of the Divine

Foot Notes- (1) Hatch, op.cit.page, 187. (2).Bigg, op.cit.pages, 18, and following.

Reason. It is only as man begins to climb upward through fear and love that at last he attains to his Vision. Here we have the mystical experience of Ecstasy. Philo tells us that this experience has 'happened to himself a thousand times', and in a well known passage he describes this state.(1).

We can see how, again and again, Philo anticipates Plotinus. His Logos is really very much the same as the Nous of Plotinus; his thought of the Absolute also closely approximates to the conception which Plotinus had of the Supreme; the doctrine of the upward climb and his teaching on Ecstasy, at any rate, foreshadow, what the great Neo-Platonist taught his disciples in after days. Notwithstanding these close resemblances, we must not suppose that there was any direct influence on Plotinus from the writings of Philo. Philo but contributed to the common stock of ideas regarding God, matter, the world; how man could attain to fellowship with God. These ideas filtered through other minds and Plotinus found them ready to hand, and by his eclectic method he made use of them to serve his immediate purpose. (2).

But now let us pass to Plotinus. According to tradition, the founder of the school of Neo-Platonism at Alexandria, was Ammonius Saccas. We have little reliable information, however, as to his teaching. Porphyry (according to Eusebius, who at the same time throws doubt upon Porphyry's

Foot Notes- (1). Philo, Migrat, Abrah. 7. quoted by Inge, 'Plotinus' op.cit. Vol. 2. pp. 154, 5. see fuller notes at the end of this chapter for the quotation. (2). I have received help for the study of Philo from Inge, Bigg, Hatch, and Watson, op.cit.

story) (I) tells us that Ammonius was of Christian parentage, but that he afterwards became a pagan. The date of his birth is unknown, but he was probably lecturing at Alexandria about 231, A.D., and he must have died sometime between 240 and 245.

It is said that Plotinus disappointed by what he heard from many teachers at Alexandria, on the advice of a friend, visited the lecture room of Ammonius. So charmed was he by his teaching that he exclaimed to a companion, "This is the man of whom I was in search". He remained with Ammonius for upwards of ten years, becoming one of his most highly distinguished pupils.

Plotinus has always been considered the head of the school of Neo-Platonism, and his books of the Enneads have been regarded as its classical documents. Concerning Plotinus we have quite a wealth of information, for not only is there a short biography written by Porphyry, his beloved disciple, who also edited and arranged the six books of the Enneads, each containing nine parts; but we have also notices of his career in Eunapius' "Vitae philosophorum ac sophistarum". According to Eunapius, Plotinus was born at Lycopolis, in Egypt, possibly about 204, 5. A.D. Plotinus would never talk of his ancestry, parentage or birthplace, and would never sit for his portrait. Porphyry tells us- "he seemed ashamed of being in the body". (2). There is no need to go into details concerning what must have been a very saintly life; he won many friends, was greatly beloved and trusted.

Foot Notes- (I). Eus.Hist. Eccl. 6.19. (2). See Stephen Mackenna's translation of Plotinus, Vol.I. pages, 1-28, for a translation of the life of Plotinus by Porphyry.

Porphyry places it upon record that during the 26 years his master spent in Rome he never made an enemy, although he was chosen as arbitrator in many a dispute. (1) Whilst he was continually serving others, Porphyry adds, these labours "never interrupted during waking hours his intention towards the supreme".(2).

We must now proceed to give a brief outline of the philosophical system of Plotinus, ere this chapter is brought to a close. (3) It is difficult indeed almost impossible to treat this with the careful consideration it demands. As we proceed, however, in further chapters to deal with the points of resemblance which exist between Plotinus and St. Augustine, we shall be able more fully to appreciate the magnitude and the importance of his doctrines.

The system of Plotinus set forth in his *Enneads* is an attempt to discover what are the first principles of the universe, and an endeavour to explain the origin and nature of the world. Furthermore combatting a materialistic doctrine he proclaims the fact that the universe rests on a Spiritual basis, owes its very being and the continuance of its existence to the "One", who is high over all.

At the one end of the scale is the 'Absolute' at the other there is Matter. The One cannot descend and enter

Foot Notes- (1). Porphy. vit Plot.9. (2). *ibid.* 9. (3). For a full account of the system of Plotinus see "Neo-Platonism", by Dr. Bigg, S.P.C.K., 1895. pages, 191-279. "The Neo-Platonists", A Study in the history of Hellenism, by Thomas Whittaker, 2nd. Ed. Camb.Univ.Press, 1918. Chapter V.pp.40-91. "The Preller-Ritter extracts forming a conspectus of the Plotinian system". Mackenna, translation, Vol.I. Plotinus, 1917.pp.130-158. Also W.R.Inge's monumental work, "The Philosophy of Plotinus", to which reference is frequently made.

into touch with matter, nevertheless there is an indirect connection between the two by a series of emanations. Furthermore, if man would hold fellowship with the source of all beauty and return to 'the beloved Fatherland', he must take the upward path and ascend from stage to stage until, purified, the mystic vision is granted to him.

His system may be best understood by considering first his doctrine of the Divine Hierarchy. According to the philosophy of the day, and possibly influenced by the number-mysticism of the Pythagoreans, Plotinus conceives of it as a Triad. Of these three Principles or, as they are sometimes called, Hypostases, the First Principle is the Absolute, and is variously styled  $\tau\omicron\ \acute{\alpha}\gamma\alpha\theta\omicron\nu$ ,  $\tau\omicron\ \xi\nu$ ,  $\tau\omicron\ \pi\rho\omega\tau\omicron\nu$ , essential Existence, Goodness, Unity. The Second Principle is Spirit, ( $\text{Νοῦς}$ ) sometimes called the Intellectual Principle, or the creative power of the world of Ideas. The Third is  $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$ , or the Soul. The second Principle emanates from the first, and the third from the second. The Nous by contemplating the Absolute produces all that truly exists, that is, the world of Ideas. Similarly the Soul creates by contemplation, not directly of the Absolute but through the medium of the Nous. The Soul, like the Nous, is immaterial but as it lies between the Nous and the world of phenomena it has chosen to become disintegrated, and creates the Individual souls of men, plants, and animals. These separate souls can look up towards the source from which they have sprung and rise into union with the World Soul, or sink back into the material environment with which they are associated.

Corresponding to the three fold division of the Divine Nature we have a like interpretation of the nature of man as Spirit, Soul, and body. Dr. Inge tells us that "in their objective aspect, Body, Soul, and Spirit are, respectively, the world as perceived by the senses (*κόσμος αἰσθητός*); the world interpreted by the mind as a spatial and temporal order; and the spiritual world (*κόσμος νοητός*). The organs which perceive the world under these three aspects are the bodily senses, discursive thought (*διάνοια*), and spiritual perception or intuitive knowledge (*νόησις*). Of these, the last alone perceives the world as it really is, *sub specie aeternitatis*." (I).

Below the Divine Trinity, that is, directly after the World Soul is *φύσις* or Nature; this is on a lower level as being concerned with matter. Nature gives form to formless matter and thus the physical world is created.

But to return to the Three Principles or Hypostases. Above and beyond all else, according to Plotinus, there is the Absolute, the One, True Being. It is beyond existence, above goodness. It is an activity which transcends all else. It is beyond all powers of description. It is impossible to predicate anything of the Absolute for to do this would be to limit it and make it finite. And yet, "the one must be taken to be infinite, not in the sense of some mass or number never to be measured or traversed, but in the sense of inconceivable power". (2)

Foot Notes- (I). Inge, 'Plotinus', op.cit. Vol. I. page, 123.

(2). Mackenna, translation Plotinus, Vol. I. page, 141.  
Enneads, VI.9.6.

How Plotinus struggles to express himself as he seeks to describe the Absolute which is beyond description! "How can we make a statement about It seeing that all else we say of it is said by negation".(1). Our slender knowledge, our limited thought, our inadequacy of speech cause us to fail when we seek to describe the One who is above all being. Plotinus tells us that the One does not even possess will, if will implies the desire for something not present,—"The One, therefore, can experience no Good nor any will to Good; it is the Beyond-Good, or It is good, not in regard to Itself, but in regard to the lower that is capable of partaking in it." (2).

If we call It the Source and the Cause, this is not a definition of the One but merely a statement of the relation which the lower has to it. "All things, however exalted, august, are later than This; It is the source of all, though in some sense It is no source; we must keep all things apart from It...freedom of action...It can enter into no relation with the realm of Existence".(3).

How then can the Absolute act upon the world of existing things? It cannot part with Itself, it will not descend to nature or material things. It acts through the Nous. By contemplation the Nous receives its powers and energy from the Absolute. Not that the Absolute lessens Itself by imparting. Plotinus uses the images of the sun and of the light.

Foot Notes- (1)Mackenna, op.cit.Enneads, VI.8.II. (2).ibid. Enneads, VI.9.6. (3). ibid. VI.8.8.

As the sun radiates its light, without at the same time losing any of it or, to use another figure, as a cup which eternally overflows because its contents are infinite, so the Absolute imparts without <sup>E</sup>with~~er~~ change or lessening of its fulness.(1)

The second Principle, as we have seen is the Nous. Plotinus refrains from calling it the Logos. Here we find the Ideas. It is by contemplation of the Absolute that the Nous is able to pass on to the third Principle, that which shines forth or overflows from the Absolute. The Nous is called the One-many because each thought of the Divine Mind involves each and all the rest, so that each idea in a sense is the whole mind (Nous). Yet each is separate, having a separate life and energy all its own, and is an Intelligence (*νοῦς τις* ).(2).

But, like the Absolute, in imparting it does not lapse. "Nothing within the series of the three intelligible principles can be said to lapse in production; the term being applicable only to the descent of the individual soul. The order throughout, both for the intelligible causes and for the visible universe, is a logical order of causation, not an order in time"(3)

The third Hypostasis in the Divine Triad is the All-Soul, or the Universal Soul, the *ψυχὴ* . It is the emanation and image of the Nous. Just as the Nous had an upward

Foot Notes- (1). Enneads, V.I.6. (2). Bigg, 'Neo-Platonism' p.242.  
(3). Whittaker, 'The Neo-Platonists', page, 55.



contemplation of the One, so the All-Soul at once contemplates the Nous and generates the Individual Soul. It then becomes the creator of all that is lower than the Divine three. Plotinus lays great stress upon the importance of an exact knowledge of the soul. Whilst Eternity belongs to the Nous, Soul has to do with time. (1). Hence it is that which comes nearest to us all, entering into contact with the world of beauty, and with the life of man.

"Before all let every Soul remember that itself is the creator of every living thing, having breathed the life into them; into all that the earth nourishes and the sea; all that are in the air and all the stars in the heavens; itself has formed the sun and this vast firmament of sky; itself has given them their stately ordering and leads them around in their ranks; and it is a Nature apart from all to which it gives the order and the movement and the life, and must of necessity be more honourable than they; for they are things whose being has had a beginning, and they perish when the Soul that leads the chorus-dance of life departs, but the Soul itself has ever-being since it cannot suffer change." (2).

Thus we begin to see that the Universal soul from one standpoint separates itself into Individual Souls, and yet Plotinus assures us that it is not dismembered, but remains "present as a unit and as an universal". (3). Or again he says

Foot Notes- (1). Enneads, 3.7.II. cf. Enn. 4.4.15.  $\alpha\lambda\omega\nu\ \mu\epsilon\acute{\iota}\nu\ \pi\epsilon\pi\iota$   
 $\nu\omicron\upsilon\nu\ \chi\acute{\rho}\alpha\nu\alpha\varsigma\ \delta\epsilon\ \pi\epsilon\pi\iota\ \phi\upsilon\chi\acute{\eta}\nu$  - (2) Enneads, 5.1.2. 'On  
 the grandeur of the Soul' (Human and Divine). (3). *ibid.*

"The particular Souls merge into one Soul which has given itself to form the Multiplicity and yet has kept its character; it is of a quality to remain one though it bestow itself upon all; its potency runs to all at once; it is present in every particular Soul and is the same in them all: ~~no~~ one need baulk at this doctrine if he will but think how a science, with all its detail, constitutes one whole; the whole remains a unity and yet is divisible into its parts". (1).

"There is a soul above the soul of each,  
A mightier soul which yet to each belongs:  
There is a sound made of all human speech,  
And numerous as the concourse of all songs:  
And in that soul lives each, in each that soul,  
Tho' all the ages are its life-time vast:  
Each soul that dies in its most sacred whole  
Receiveth life that shall for ever last." (2).

I cannot enter fully, here, into the question of the descent of the soul into the body. It would seem according to Plotinus that the soul on the one hand runs the risk of degrading itself by coming into touch with nature, and yet on the other hand he clearly points out that it is the ordinance of God that man may by the help of the soul be lifted up to a higher estate. So that the things 'here' may be like unto those 'yonder'. Dean Inge suggests that "The Soul is a spiritual being, with its home in heaven- the heaven that is within us, even while it is in the body. But it has brought down this heaven with it into the time-process in which it energises. There is no contamination whatever

Foot Notes- (1). Enneads, 4.9.5. Mackenna's translation, Vol.I page, 133. (2). Stanza by Richard Watson Dixon, quoted by Mackenna, Vol.I. page, 120.

in these activities, so long as the Soul remembers that it has been sent into its present life as God's fellow-worker, 'to imitate the Divine providence,' as Proclus says. The more deeply it penetrates into the darkest recesses of the nature which has fallen furthest from God, the more faithfully it is fulfilling the Divine will, and vindicating its Divine origin. Its inmost life and being are safe, because the Soul is the child of God; but it is not allowed to remain always on the mount of vision; there are devils to be cast out in the plain below." (I).

This makes very clear to us the work of the Soul, the help that it may become to man even at the risk of polluting itself by the things of the body.

We now come to see what Plotinus has to say concerning the three-fold nature of man. Man is Spirit, Soul, & Body, or, as Mackenna puts it, he has an Intellective or Intuitive Soul, a Reasoning Soul, an unreasoning Soul. As Spirit he comes into touch with real existence, contemplates the divine, identifies his being with the highest and holiest, enters upon Sainthood. As Soul, he acts as a normal being. He is in the body, but he uses the body for higher ends. As Body, he lives the Animal life as distinct from the life which he has been called upon to share. Here he is at his lowest, having forgotten his high estate. Here we have, in this stage, Imagination, which concerns the senses, and appetites rooted in the flesh.

Foot Notes- (I). Inge, 'Plotinus', op.cit. Vol.I. page, 263.

A word must be said upon the view of Plotinus concerning Matter and Evil. In thinking of Matter, we must banish from the mind all thought of it as material. Matter (ὕλη) is rather a formless mass, if we can think of such a thing; rather, perhaps, we should say it is that upon which Soul works, the thing out of which forms are made, itself being formless. Mackenna says "it is almost non-being; it would be non-being except that Absolute non-being is non-existent, impossible in a world emanating from the bounty of Being". (1). Plotinus tells us- "Matter is not Soul; it is not Intellect, is not life, is not Ideal-Principle, not Reason-Principle; it is not limit or bound, for it is mere indeterminat-ion; it is not ~~a~~ power, for what does it produce? It lives on the farther side of all these categories and so has no title to the name of Being. It will be more plausibly called a non-being, and this in the sense not of movement (away from Being), or station (in Not-Being), but of veritable Not-Being, so that it is no more than the image and phantom of Mass, a bare aspiration towards substantial existence..." (2).

Passing to Evil, he tells us, that it is associated with matter. In so far as Evil exists, its root is in matter. But then Evil, according to Plotinus, does not exist, because it implies an absence of Good; it follows therefore, that about it there is an absence of Being. Rooted in Matter it partakes of its negative qualities. Yet Plotinus, in his optimism &

Foot Notes- (1). Mackenna, Translation Plotinus, Vol. I. page, 123.  
 (2). *ibid.* Enneads, 3.6.7. Vol. 2. page 77.

and earnest endeavour to insist upon a Spiritual Principle as Lord over the universe, tells us that the very Evil in the Universe may contribute to its good. (I).

A further word must be said concerning the Mysticism of Plotinus. He was indeed rightly called the Father of the Mystics. His experiences have been shared by many who have, like himself, been partakers of the Divine vision. It is here that we reach the heart of the Religion of Plotinus, for it is not as a Philosopher that the revelation of the Divine comes to him, but as one who hungers after God. In that revelation which springs from a deep experience, we have Neo-Platonism coming into the closest touch with the Christian Religion and becoming a formidable rival.

How is it possible to attain the Vision? We must prepare ourselves, cleanse mind and heart of all impurity, and take the upward path, up and up until the Soul has become pure intellect. For that which apprehends the One is Intellect, purged and purified. Then as we wait, eager to feel, to experience the holiest communion, the vision comes filling the heart with joy unspeakable. "One that seeks to penetrate the nature of the Divine Mind must see deeply into the nature of his own Soul, into the Divinest part of himself. He must first make abstraction of the body, then of the lower soul which built up that body, then of all the faculties of sense, of all desires & emotions and every such triviality, of all that leans towards

Foot Notes- (I). Enneads, 3.2.5. for a translation see Fuller Notes at the end of this chapter.

the mortal." (1). How well Plotinus has described for us this Mystic Vision! (2). And we shall also see that St. Augustine had a like experience, and tells us of it almost in the words of Plotinus himself. Porphyry informs us that Plotinus, during the six years that he was with him, enjoyed the ecstasy four times, whilst he adds concerning himself this note- "I, Porphyry, in my 68th year, I too was once admitted and entered into Union" (3)

In his 66th year the health of Plotinus, never robust, began to fail seriously. He apparently suffered from a serious internal malady. All his friends were away when the last moments drew near, with the exception of his friend and physician who had hurried from Puteoli to be by his side. As Eustechius entered the death chamber Plotinus said to him, "I have been a long time waiting for you; I am striving to give back the Divine in myself to the Divine in the All", (4) and passed away.

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Foot Notes- (1). Enneads, V.3.9. Mackenna's translation, Vol.I. page 155. (2). Enneads, I.6. (7,8,9.) for translation see the fuller notes at the end of this chapter. See also, Charles Bigg, 'Neo-Platonism', (1895. /S.P.C.K.)  
 X The whole of the 21st. chapter, for a good account of the vision. (3). Porphyry vit.Plot.23. (4).ibid.2.

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FULLER NOTES TO CHAPTER 2.

Page, 23. Foot Note- (I).

Migrat, Abrah, 7. (quoted by Inge, 'Plotinus' op.cit. Vol.2. Pages 154,5.)

"Sometimes, when I have come to my work empty, I have suddenly become full, ideas being in an invisible manner showered upon me, and implanted in me from on high; so that through the influence of divine inspiration I have become filled with enthusiasm, and have known neither the place in which I was nor those who were present, nor myself, nor what I was saying, nor what I was writing, for then I have been conscious of a richness of interpretation, an enjoyment of light, a most keen-sighted vision, a most distinct view of the objects treated, such as would be given through the eyes from the clearest exhibition."

Page, 34. Foot Note- (I).

Enneads, 3.2.5. Mackenna, Vol.I. page 150.

"Vice is not without its usefulness to the all; it exhibits the beauty and the rightness of virtue; it calls up the intelligence to oppose the evil course; it manifests the value and grace there is in goodness by displaying the cost of sin. No doubt evil has not essentially anything to do with these purposes, but once it is there it serves in working out great ends; and only a mighty power could thus turn the ignoble to noble uses and employ to purposes of form what has risen in formless lawlessness."

Page, 35. Foot Note- (2).

Enneads, I.6. (7,8,9.) Mackenna, translation, Vol.I. pages 87-89.

"Therefore we must ascend again towards the Good, the desired of every Soul. Anyone that has seen This knows what I intend when I say that it is beautiful. Even the desire of it is to be desired as a GOOD. To attain it is for those that will take the upward path, who will set all their forces towards it, who will divest themselves of all that we have put on in our descent;- so, those that approach the Holy Celebrations of the Mysteries, there are appointed purifications and the laying aside of the garments worn before, and the entry into nakedness- until passing, on the upward way, all that is other than the God, each in the solitude of himself shall behold that solitary-dwelling Existence, the Apart, the Unmingled, the Pure, that from Which all things depend, for Which all look and live and act and know, the Source of Life and of Intelligence and of Being.

And one that shall know this vision- with what passion of love shall he not be seized, with what pang of desire, what longing to be molten into one with This, what wondering delight! If he that has never seen this Being must hunger for It as for all his welfare, he that has known must love and reverence It as the very Beauty; he will be flooded with awe and gladness, stricken by a salutary terror; he loves with a veritable love, with sharp desire; all other loves than this he must despise, and disdain all that once seemed fair....And for this the sternest and

# FULLER NOTES TO CHAPTER 2. (Continued).

the uttermost combat is set before the Souls; all our labour is for This, lest we be left without part in this noblest vision, which to attain is to be blessed in the blissful sight, which to fail of is~~x~~ to fail utterly.

For not he that has failed of the joy that is in colour or in visible forms, not he that has failed of power or of honours or of kingdom has failed, but only he that has failed of only This, for Whose winning he should renounce kingdoms and command over earth and ocean and sky, if only, spurning the world of sense from beneath his feet, and straining to THIS, he may see.

But what must we do? How lies the path? How come to the vision of the inaccessible Beauty, dwelling as if in the consecrated precincts, apart from the common ways where all may see, even the profane? He that has the strength, let him arise and withdraw into himself, foregoing all that is known by the eyes, turning away for ever from the material beauty that once made his joy. When he perceives these shapes of grace that show in body, let him not pursue; he must know them for copies, vestiges, shadows, and hasten away towards That they tell of. For if anyone follow what is like a beautiful shape playing over water- is there not a myth telling in symbol of such a dupe, how he sank into the depths of the current and was swept away to nothingness? So, too, one that is held by material beauty and will not break shall be precipitated, not in body but in Soul, down to the dark depths loathed of the Intellectual-Being, where, blind even in the Lower-World, he shall have commerce only with shadows, there as here.

"Let us flee then to the beloved Fatherland": this is the soundest counsel...But what is this flight? How are we to gain the open sea?...The Fatherland to us is There whence we have come, and there is The Father. What then is our course, what the manner of our flight? This is not a journey for the feet; the feet bring us only from -and to land; nor need you think of coach or ship to carry you away; all this order of things you must set aside and refuse to see: you must close the eyes and call instead upon another vision which is to be waked within you, a vision, the birthright of all, which few turn to use.

This is the only eye that sees the mighty Beauty. If the eye that adventures the vision be dimmed by vice, impure, or weak, and unable in its cowardly blenching to see the uttermost brightness, then it sees nothing even though another point to what lies plain to sight before it. To any vision must be brought an eye adapted to what is to be seen, and having some likeness to it. Never did eye see the sun unless it had first become sunlike, and never can the soul have vision of the first Beauty unless itself be beautiful.

Therefore, first let each become Godlike, and each beautiful, who cares to see God and Beauty. So, mounting, the Soul will come first to the Intellectual-Principle and survey all the beautiful Ideas in the Supreme, and will avow that this is Beauty, that the Ideas are Beauty. For by their efficacy



## FULLER NOTES TO CHAPTER 2. (Continued)

comes all Beauty else, by the offspring and essence of the Intellectual-Being. What is beyond the Intellectual-Principle we must affirm to be the nature of Good radiating Beauty before it. So that, treating the Intellectual-Kosmos as one, the first is the Beautiful: if we make distinction there, the Realm of Ideas constitutes the Beauty of the Intellectual Sphere; and the Good which lies beyond is the Fountain at once and Principle of Beauty; the Primal Good and the Primal Beauty have the one dwelling-place and thus, always, Beauty's seat is There".

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## CHAPTER 3.

"THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CHRISTIANITY  
AND NEO-PLATONISM".

We shall now proceed to enquire how far Christianity had been influenced by Neo-Platonism previously to the time of St. Augustine that is, how far the doctrines of Philosophy had permeated the thought of the Christian Church.

It has already been suggested that Ammonius Saccas had been trained in the Christian Faith before he gave himself to the exposition of the doctrines of Neo-Platonism. One would, therefore, expect that, perhaps unconsciously, he had learned much as a Christian which would be of value to him in his study of Philosophy. At any rate, as Grandgeorge points out, it was hotly debated whether, on the one hand, Christianity was not deeply indebted to Neo-Platonism, or, on the other, whether it was not nearer the truth to declare that Neo-Platonism owed everything to Christianity. (1).

Some went so far as to say that the philosophers had "stolen" their main principles from the Scriptures. "They have borrowed from our books", says Clement of Alexandria, "the chief doctrines they hold, both on faith and knowledge and science, on hope and love, on repentance and temperance and the fear of God": and Clement goes on to show that "Philosophy was no less the schoolmaster of the Greeks than the Law was of the Jews to bring them to Christ". (2).

Foot Notes-(1). L. Grandgeorge, "Saint Augustin et Le Néo-Platonisme" Paris, Ernest Leroux, 1896. page, 4. (2) Strom. 2. I. Hatch, op. cit. page, 127.

In like manner Tertullian asks, "What poet or Sophist has not drunk at the fountain of the prophets? From thence it is, therefore, that philosophers have quenched the thirst of their minds, so that it is the very things which they have of ours which bring us into comparison with them". (1).

On the other hand there were not a few claiming Plato as their master, who adopted the Christian Faith, and who after their conversion sought to find a ground of agreement between Platonism and Christianity. Justin Martyr after he became a Christian continued to wear his philosopher's cloak, and travelled about proclaiming his doctrines, so that Eusebius described him as "an ambassador of the Divine Word in the guise of a philosopher". (2).

Without a doubt the Fathers of the Church owed a great deal to Platonism. It was their custom, whilst they combated the doctrines of Philosophy, to endeavour , by means of allegory, to reconcile them with Christianity. It is not therefore surprising to find, in the works of Tatian, Athenagoras, Theophilus, Irenaeus, Tertullian, Clement, Origen, and many others, abundant evidence of the influence of Neo-Platonism. The truth lies here- living side by side, meeting the same problems, and seeking to find a solution for them, endeavouring also to discover the way of deliverance from the misery of their age, each had turned to the same source and had found help from the words

Foot Notes- (1). Apol.47. quoted by Hatch, op.cit.page, 127.

(2). Eusebius, H.E. IV.II.8., Foakes-Jackson, "History of the Christian Church", 5th. Ed.1909, Cambridge. page, 159.

of the master, Plato, as well as guidance from the best that could be drawn from other pagan philosophies and from the Holy Scriptures. Indeed, as Hatch has pointed out, it was due to the fact of "kinship of ideas of current philosophy and the leading ideas of Christianity", that, "within a century and a half after Christianity and philosophy first came into close contact, the ideas and methods of philosophy had flowed in such mass into Christianity, and filled so large a place in it, as to have made it no less a philosophy than a religion." (1).

Justin Martyr, the ablest of the Apologists, sought to explain this by his firm belief in a scattered word. He says- "The teachings of Plato are not alien to those of Christ, though not in all respects similar...For all the writers (of antiquity) were able to have a dim vision of realities by means of the indwelling seed of the implanted Word". (2).

At first Christianity had little to do with Philosophy. Those who became Christians in the first instance, were for the most part humble men and women of little education. Moreover, the appeal which Christianity made rested upon a life, and that the life of the Lord Jesus Christ; it did not depend on the philosophy of the Schools, but upon purity of living, holiness of character, likeness to Christ. But as the new Faith gained ground, it received as converts those who had been trained in Philosophy.

Foot Notes- (1). ~~Apol. 2. 13.~~ Hatch, page 125. (2). Apol. 2. 13., Hatch, page 126.

Hence there arose a need for the Church to give reasons for the Faith delivered unto the Saints; in a word, it was compelled to set forth a Philosophy as well as to proclaim salvation through Faith in a Person.

Now the first attempts to give a philosophical colouring to Christian speculation are to be found in the heresy known as Gnosticism. (1). We cannot enter into details here as to the varied Gnostic sects or discuss their tenets. We must confine ourselves to a brief outline of the doctrine of Gnosticism generally as it influenced the Christianity of the first century.

Gnosticism has been defined as "an aristocracy of enlightenment, explaining a popular creed". (2) It was an attempt made to unite Christianity with philosophical speculations, in order to win the approval of the Intellectual world. As Harnack says,- "These Christian philosophers formulated the content of the gospel in a manner which appealed to the common sense of all the serious thinkers and intelligent men of the age. Moreover, they contrived to use the positive material of tradition, including the life and worship of Christ, in such a way as to furnish this reasonable religion with a confirmation and proof that had hitherto been eagerly sought, but sought in vain". (3).

Gnosticism, however, was really a serious attempt to probe the deep mystery which surrounded human life, caused by the presence of evil and suffering. "How could these things be reconciled with the belief that the world had been made

Foot Notes- (1). See Foakes-Jackson, op.cit. Chapter, VII., also Bigg, "The Christian Platonists of Alexandria", 1886, Ed. Clarendon Press, pages, 27-35. (2) Foakes-Jackson, page, 26. (3). Harnack, "History of Dogma", Eng. Trans. page, 270. Vol. 2.

by a beneficent Deity?" they asked. Now whilst the Orientals, notably the Persians, had dwelt much on this aspect of human life, the Greeks, in their philosophical reasonings, had never given an answer to these questionings; rather had they clung to the sunnier side of life. With the Gnostics as with the Manichaeans, the mystery of good and evil is explained by dualism, and the conclusions they came to were that all that could be perceived by the senses, that is, all that was material, partook of the nature of evil.

The principles of Gnosticism may be summed up briefly in the following way-

(1). The Gnostics, whilst professing to believe in the Christian Faith in its entirety, nevertheless interpreted it by means of a knowledge ( $\gamma\psi\omega\sigma\iota\varsigma$ ) which they had received and which enabled them to understand what was beyond the realm of sense, such knowledge giving them deliverance from the bondage of the evil which was associated with material existence.

(2). Since the world contained so much that was evil, they claimed that it could not have been made by a good God; it must, therefore, have been fashioned through the media of lesser powers; at any rate, it was obvious that the Creator must be of a nature lower than God Himself.

(3). Hence they sought to bridge the gulf between the world and God by aeons or angels. By means of such emanations only could man draw near to God.

(4). But if matter is essentially evil, then Christ could not have been polluted by any earthly form. So the story of the Incarnation must have been pure fiction.

(5). If the body is thus evil by reason of its associations with matter, then it follows that man must either conquer his desires by asceticism or give way to the lusts of the flesh, since the body, being already polluted, could suffer no degradation. The danger of Gnosticism thus lay in the fact that such a view of the body destroyed man's sense of responsibility, for how could he be held to be responsible for sin, when his very body was essentially evil, and he had been placed in an environment of evil.

From this résumé, it will readily be seen that here we have traces of Platonism among the Gnostics. "Like the Neo-Platonists they taught that the Soul, which has lost its way in the dark, must return to God. Like them they believed that there is a divine spark in the Soul which can light us through the gloom. Like them again, they held that this desire to return to God ~~is~~ is not an individual affair only, but a cosmic movement. They also spoke of the Godhead as beyond existence. (1).

Despite the danger of Gnosticism in the early Church, it was, indirectly, a very real help. It compelled men to examine their position as to what they really believed, and led them to formulate their doctrines. It also cleared the way for a stronger faith, and, ultimately it was conquered and made of service to the Church. (2).

Foot Notes- (1). Inge, 'Plotinus', page 106, Vol. I.

(2). See Bigg, op.cit. Page 35. foot-note, for what the Church owed to Gnosticism.

But now we will notice further influences which were at work upon the Christian Faith, notably from the School of Alexandria.

At Alexandria there was a large colony of Jews of considerable wealth and influence, who were desirous of converting the Greeks. The translation of the Hebrew Scriptures into Greek not only inaugurated a period of wide-spread literary activity; it made it possible for the Greeks to read the Scriptures in their own tongue. Along with this new interest in the Sacred writings there arose by means of the writings themselves an earnest endeavour to reconcile Greek thought with the Faith of Judaism. Indeed distinct evidences of the presence of Platonism in the Pentateuch, and of Stoicism in the Apocrypha, are manifest. (1). There is also an attempt made to modify the anthropomorphic conceptions of God by a change in the translation, whilst the Targums or Aramaic versions of the Scriptures go a step further by representing God as acting through His Memra, or Word, which becomes, in this way, personified. (2).

Moreover, in order that their strong belief might be justified, that the Scriptures were a sufficient guide for life, they proceeded to discover Greek Philosophy in the Law, by means of symbolic and allegorical interpretations, and to argue that Plato was but "an Attic Moses", declaring that all that was best in the Philosophy of the Schools had been taken from the Holy Scriptures.

Foot Notes- (1). See Bigg, op.cit. page, 4. for such evidences.  
(2). Foakes-Jackson, page, 155.



All this but serves to indicate the tendency towards reconciliation which was at work.

Let us, however, pass rapidly onward and notice how that, within the Christian Church itself, there arose a like endeavour to blend the doctrines of Christianity with the teaching of Plato, so that a Christian Philosophy might be their's which would enable them to refute the Gnostic heresies and at the same time justify Christianity to the cultured people of the day.

Justin Martyr (c.100-165) was the first of these philosophical Fathers. By birth a Greek, Justin had received his early training in the schools of the Stoics and Platonists; it was only late in life that he was converted to Christianity. In two passages, (1) Justin declared that the Logos was the means by which God had instructed the whole world, and that the entire human race was partaker of that Divine Logos. It is of importance to notice that Justin was the first Christian writer to make use of the word Logos in its two-fold sense, that of Reason, in its philosophical import, and that of the Word, as the Christian understands it. (2). Whilst Justin adopts the Christian view of our Lord, he is in danger at times of making Him but a manifestation of the power of God, thereby denuding Him of personality; and at other times he so emphasises His personality ( $\text{ὁ ὑποστάσις}$ ) as to be apparently guilty of the

Foot Notes- (1). Apol. I. 44, &59. (2). Hatch, op.cit. page,262.

heresy of Di-Theism. But the work of Justin is of value, in giving Plato a place in the Divine revelation, and by his use of Philo's conception of the Logos, which he imbues with a definitely Christian spirit.

It was at Alexandria, however, that there sprang into being that great school of Christian Platonists with which we are accustomed to associate the names of Clement and his still more famous successor Origen. Of that school at Alexandria, Harnack makes the remark that it was "of inestimable importance for the transformation of the heathen empire into a Christian one, and of Greek philosophy into ecclesiastical philosophy".(1).

Clement, who was born about the middle of the second century, A.D., and who probably lived until 220, was a Greek, probably an Athenian, and came of heathen parents. (2). Eager to discover the Truth, he sought for her in the varied schools of philosophical thought of his time. He rejected Epicureanism, and, whilst he was influenced by the Stoics, he yet quarrelled with them because they conceived of God as being in corporeal form. Plato and Pythagoras were the philosophers for whom he had the warmest regard. Concerning the former he says "Plato is the friend of truth, he is inspired by God Himself".(3). Concerning the latter, it was the Pythagoras of legend rather than the Pythagoras of history that quickened his fancy.

Still, Clement had the eclectic spirit characteristic of his age, and drew his doctrines from many sources. "I

Foot Notes- (1).Harnack, op.cit.Vol.2.Chap.VI. (2).see Foakes-Jackson, page 162 and Windelband, page, 217. for the names of his various books. (3). John Watson, "The Interpretation of Religious Experience", Gifford Lectures, (1910-12). Maclehose & Sons, 1912., page 39.

call philosophy", he says, "the sum of doctrines which teach justice and piety, of which each school furnishes a part". (I).

Making use of the allegorical method of interpretation common to his age, he was able to interpret the Christian writings in the language of Plato. "There is one river of Truth", he says, "but many streams fall into it on this side and on that". (2). It is not possible to dwell here, upon Clement's conception of the relation of Faith ( $\pi\acute{\iota}\sigma\tau\iota\varsigma$ ) to knowledge or wisdom ( $\gamma\upsilon\omega\varsigma\iota\varsigma$ ). Faith, with Clement, is the necessary basis of Knowledge; and, in his eyes, the true Gnostic is the Christian believer.

In Clement's doctrine of the Godhead, as we might expect, we find a strange mingling of Platonic and Christian ideas. He had learnt that God was a Spiritual Being, but when he tries to explain His nature he does so in the language of Platonism. It is impossible to define the nature of God, he tells us, for He is beyond our conception of either the phenomenal or the intelligible world. He adopts the principle of abstraction or elimination. (3). But in this way Clement comes perilously near the idea of God as one of negation, that has been emptied of all content. He has described for us by what stages we attain unto the most abstract of conceptions. (4). By the adopting <sup>ON</sup> of this method Clement seems to have entered upon an impassable road.

Foot Notes- (I). Strom. I.37. Watson, "The Interpretation of Religious Experience", page, 40. (2). Strom. I.5.29. Bigg, op.cit. page 42. (3)  $\alpha\rho\alpha\lambda\upsilon\sigma\iota\varsigma$  Strom. V.II.7I. (4). Strom. V.II. see Watson, ib. page, 47. and fuller notes at the end of this Chapter.

"The great First Cause is not space, but beyond space, beyond time, beyond language, and thought. We know not what God is, only what He is not" In another passage, he tells us, it is difficult to apprehend the principle of things, and much more difficult to apprehend the First Cause, the Cause which is the Principle of all other things. And he concludes that- "our idea of the unknown is solely the effect of Divine Grace. (1)

But Clement cannot stay here. He has his Christian conception of God, which he must endeavour to reconcile with those ideas which he has received from Philosophy. God is absolutely good; otherwise He would not be God, for goodness is the expression of His self-conscious Personality. So he adds to the philosophical thought of God that fuller conception which has become his from Christian experience. "Our Father", we find Clement saying, "full of tenderness, does not cease to exhort us, to warn us, to discipline us, for He does not cease to save us". (2). How different this is from the idea of the abstract Being which Clement has attempted to describe in terms of negation

When we turn to his thought concerning the Logos we find a further development of his Christian ideas on the Godhead. In the main, Clement adopts Philo's doctrine, but he amplifies it and makes it clear that the Logos is "the Word which has become flesh". How can a Being, absolutely self-complete and transcendent, manifest Himself to men? Clement agrees

Foot Notes- (1). Strom. V.81,2. Watson, op.cit.page,48. See fuller notes at the end of this chapter. (2). Watson ibid. page, 51.

with Philo that He does so by means of the Logos, who stands as the Mediator between God and man. According to Philo, the Logos was at work in Old Testament times, speaking to Moses, delivering Israel from Egypt, speaking through the prophets. He it was who supplied the Greeks with wisdom. But the Logos is more than that- He is, in the mind of Clement, the teacher and redeemer of men from their sins; He is also the conqueror over death, and has gained immortality for men. Clement proclaims in no uncertain language the unity, equality, and eternity of the First and Second Persons. In a certain passage he seems to think of the Holy Spirit as also co-equal with the Father and the Son, as when he says:- "O mystic wonder, One is the Father of All, One also the Word of All, and the Holy Ghost is One and the same everywhere". (I). Clement proposed to deal more fully with the doctrine of the Holy Spirit, but this intention was never carried out.

Whilst Clement rejects the thought of the pre-existence of the Soul, and denies the eternity of matter, he for the most part closely follows Philo in his view of Creation. We saw that with the Platonists matter was the cause of Evil and therefore could not have been created by God, whose purpose was frustrated by the nature of the substance from which he moulded the world. Clement, however, does not trouble to explain the evil properties of Matter. With him, God was the Creator of all

things, and, giving to man the freedom of the will, He endowed him with the power of choosing evil. It was through man therefore that Evil came into the world. But Clement declared that evil is only an action, not a substance (*ὁβσῖα*), and that it therefore could not be regarded as the work of God. (1).

We have, however, said enough concerning Clement and his association with Hellenism to understand how close a union there existed between this Christian Father and Neo-Platonism, and to perceive how into Christian Theology there entered many of the ideas of Platonism.

On the other hand, it may be that even the great Neo-Platonist himself was influenced by the writings of the Christians, (2) although this is nowhere acknowledged, and he never makes direct reference in his writings to the Christian Faith.

Let us now pass forward and briefly touch upon the work of Clement's successor and pupil in the School of Alexandria. Origen (185-254, A.D.) was born at Alexandria, of Christian parentage. His father died a martyr's death when Origen was 17, and, it is said, that he would gladly have followed in his father's steps had not his mother and a numerous family been dependent upon him for support. He received from his father a thorough knowledge of the Sacred Scriptures: in addition to this he became widely learned in Hellenistic culture. At 18 it is said that on account of his piety ~~and~~ learning he obtained an

Foot Notes- (1). Strom. IV.13.605., see Windelband, op.cit. page, 252. (2). It may be that Plotinus was influenced somewhat by Clement's description of the Beatific Vision, Strom.7. (12,13) and the Christian father's account of the Holy Trinity. Strom.4.158.

unsalaried position as Catechist in the Alexandrian Church.

On account of the fact that many of his pupils had been trained in Neo-platonic philosophy, Origen himself, in order that he might be more fully acquainted with its tenets, became a pupil in the school of Ammonius Saccas. It was there that he came into contact with Plotinus, who was a scholar at the same time. (1).

Origen was the most eminent of the early Christian writers, indeed the number of his works is stated by Epiphanius to have exceeded six thousand; he was also the father of Biblical criticism and exegesis. "Origen it was who actually founded Christian Theology as a philosophy, and who established his views so firmly that although the Church has rejected much in detail, its dogmas still bear the stamp of his system". (2).

It will readily be seen how impossible it is to give anything like a detailed account of the writings or doctrines of this great master. It will be well for us, however, to notice the personal contribution which he made to the influence of Neo-Platonism on Christian Dogma. For Origen has been considered to be the most important representative, in this period of Christianity, coloured by Hellenism. (3).

In dealing with the nature of God and His relation to the world, we find Origen placing emphasis upon the Spirituality of God. "God is a Spirit, God is Light. It must not

Foot Notes- (1). We have this on the authority of Porphyry. (2). C.H.Moore, "Religious Thought of the Greeks", Oxford University Press, 1916. page, 342. (3). For a detailed account of the doctrine of Origen, see Bigg, op.cit. pages, 115-234.

be supposed", he says, "that God is a body or is in a body, but a simple intellectual nature admitting of no addition at all. There is in Him no greater or less, no higher or lower, for He is the Monad, the Unit, Mind, the Fountain of all mind". (1).

Being Mind, God is incorporeal, and therefore, He is independent of the laws of Space and Time, omnipresent, omniscient, unchanging, incomprehensible. But here Origen parts company with both Clement and Philo, and whilst Clement had emphasized the negative aspect of God, Origen takes pains to show that our knowledge of Him is clearly positive. If we speak of God as being incomprehensible, it is because of our human frailty and the limitations of our speech and knowledge. But we can see God revealed in Creation and more truly in His word, and there is a possibility that, by the Divine Grace, when we are purged of evil, we may yet know him more perfectly.

Whilst, moreover, it is untrue to conceive of God as swayed by passions like men, yet He is by no means passionless. "The Father Himself and God of all", he says, "is long-suffering, merciful and pitiful. Has He not then in a sense passions? The Father Himself is not impassible. He has the passion of Love". (2).

Again, with Origen, God is not Absolute, but Perfect. He is perfectly wise, perfectly just, perfectly mighty, but the perfection of these attributes consists in the

Foot Notes- (1). De Principiis, I.1., see Bigg, op.cit. pp. 155, 6.  
 (2). In Ezech. Hom. VI. 6. ; also in Num. Hom. XXIII. 2. where he deals at length with the same subject. See Bigg, ibid, Page, 158.



fact that they are limited by one another. (1).

As we consider his idea of the God-head, we find that whilst he places emphasis on the Trinity, he makes clear also the Unity of the God-head. Bigg tells us that with Origen the word for Person is most commonly Hypostasis, whilst that for the Divine Nature is frequently Ousia. (2).

The Logos with Origen is verily and substantially God, and hence co-eternal and co-equal with the Father. "There never can have been a time when He was not", says Origen. "For when was that God, whom John calls the Light, destitute of the radiance of His proper glory, so that a man may dare to ascribe a beginning of existence to the Son?...Let a man, who ventures to say there was a time when the Son was not, consider that this is all one with saying there was a time when Wisdom was not, the Word was not, the Life was not." (3). Origen declares the doctrine of the eternal generation of the Son. "The Father," he says, "did not beget the Son and send Him free when He was begotten, but He ever begetteth Him ( $\alpha\epsilon\iota\gamma\epsilon\gamma\epsilon\tau\alpha\iota\ \alpha\upsilon\tau\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$ )". This generation he illustrates by the continual generation of Light from the Sun. (4).

With regard to the Third Person in the Christian Trinity, whilst Origen does not give to Him the title of God,

Foot Notes- (1). See de Princ. II.9.1. "Non enim, ut quidam volunt, finem putandum est non habere creaturas; quia ubi finis non est nec comprehensio ulla nec circumscriptio esse potest." quoted by Bigg, op.cit. page 159. foot note. (2). ibid. page, 163. (3). De Princ. IV.28. "Qui autem initium dat Verbo Dei, vel Sapientiae Dei, intueri ne magis in ipsum ingenitum Patrem impietatem suam jactet, cum eum neget semper Patrem fuisse, et genuisse Verbum, et habuisse Sapientiam in omnibus anterioribus vel temporibus vel saeculis vel si quid illud est quod nominari potest". Bigg, op.cit. page 167. (4) Foakes-Jackson, op.cit. pages, 162-3.

still he gives us to understand that he regards Him as being Divine. He maintains His eternity and suggests in several passages His equality. He is 'associated in honour and dignity with the Father and the Son'. He is one of the adorable Trinity wholly present in the work of the Godhead; and Origen himself invokes the Holy Spirit in prayer. (1).

In the beginning, He moved on the face of the waters; sharing in the work of Creation; (2). it is by the ceaseless ministrations of the Holy Ghost that the work of Sanctification is accomplished. "It is He that creates in a man the capacity to receive Christ, first as Justice, then as Wisdom, and so on in ever deepening affinity, till at last the gift of being becomes worthy of the Giver". (3). In a word, the Holy Ghost is "the substance of the graces of the Father". (4).

Now it will be naturally asked, since Origen's doctrine of the Godhead appears so completely in harmony with that of the Christian Church, in what sense then has Origen been influenced here by Neo-Platonism? We must point out that Origen's conception of the generation of the Logos by the Father, left in his mind the thought of the inferiority of the begotten. "When he turned to consider the origin of the Logos he did not hesitate to speak of Him as a  $\kappa\tau\acute{\iota}\sigma\mu\alpha$  and to include Him amongst the rest of God's spiritual creatures. A  $\kappa\tau\acute{\iota}\sigma\mu\alpha$  which is at the same

Foot Notes- (1). De Princ., Preface 4. and elsewhere, See Bigg, op. cit. page, I73. (2). De Princ. IV. 30. Bigg, page, I73. (3). Bigg, page, I74. (4) ὅλη τῶν χαρίσμων τῶν Bigg, page, I74, foot note.

time  $\epsilon\mu\phi\omicron\upsilon\sigma\iota\omicron\nu\ \tau\hat{\omega}\ \theta\epsilon\hat{\omega}$  was no contradiction to him, simply because he held the immutability, the pure knowledge and the blessedness which constituted the Divine Nature to be communicable attributes! (I) Indeed, Origen accepted the Platonic view that God was the  $\delta\upsilon$  and exalted in essence even above His Nous or Logos, and taught that there was a difference of essence ( $\epsilon\pi\epsilon\rho\acute{o}\tau\eta\varsigma\ \tau\hat{\eta}\varsigma\ \omicron\upsilon\sigma\acute{\iota}\alpha\varsigma$ ) between the Father and the Son. In his division of humanity into three classes Origen again lays emphasis upon the subordinate position occupied by the Son. The first class contained those who were capable of understanding the  $\alpha\upsilon\tau\acute{o}\theta\epsilon\omicron\varsigma$ , then came those who knew Him by the Logos, and lastly those who know God by recognising the divine essences which animate the planets.(2).

When we come to Origen's doctrine concerning the relationship which existed between God and the world, we find him asserting that the world took its beginning in time: but it is not the first, nor will it be the last of such worlds.(3) The matter as well as the form was created by God; made by Him, and to Him it will return. Origen clearly sees the disorders that are in the world, the inequality and apparent injustice which exist. Whence then hath this evil come? Not from God, nor from matter, since this came from God. It is the work of man.(4) As Windelband puts it, - "the sin of free spirits consists rather

Foot Notes- (I). See Article, 'Origen' by Harnack, Ency Brit. Vol.20. pp.270, et seq. (2). Foakes -Jackson, op.cit.page, 163. (3). De princip. 2.9.4. Hatch, op.cit.page, 205. (4). Contra Celsum, IV.66. 'Evil is not of God nor yet of matter',  $\tau\hat{o}\ \gamma\acute{\alpha}\rho\ \epsilon\kappa\delta\acute{o}\tau\omicron\upsilon\ \eta\gamma\epsilon\kappa\omicron\nu,\ \kappa\omicron\nu\ \alpha\iota\tau\iota\omicron\nu,\ \tau\hat{\eta}\varsigma\ \omicron\upsilon\sigma\tau\acute{\iota}\alpha\varsigma\ \epsilon\nu\ \alpha\upsilon\tau\hat{\omega}\ \kappa\alpha\kappa\iota\varsigma\ \epsilon\sigma\tau\iota\nu,\ \eta\tau\iota\varsigma\ \epsilon\sigma\tau\iota\ \tau\hat{o}\ \kappa\alpha\kappa\acute{o}\nu$

in their rebellion against the will of God, in their longing after an unlimited power of self-determination, and only secondarily in the fact that they have turned their love toward God's creations, toward the world instead of toward God Himself. Here too, then, there prevails in the conception of evil the negative element of departure and falling away from God; (1) but the whole earnestness of the religious consciousness asserts itself in this, that this falling away is conceived of, not merely as an absence of the good, but as a positive, perverted, act of will." (2)

Origen then maintains that the evil in the world is the result of man's evil choice. God has given freedom to man and man has chosen amiss.

We may note in passing, that Origen adopts the view which appears in Plotinus, of the triple division of man into body, soul, and spirit, and he develops it in a specially interesting way. In this passage, (De Princ. III. 3-5), the 'Soul' is treated partly as motive power, partly as faculty of ideation & desire, while the spirit, on the contrary, is presented as the principle of judging, on the one hand, between good and evil, on the other hand, between true and false; in this alone, teaches Origen, consists man's freedom. (3)

A word may be said concerning the optimism of Origen. Since the very world itself is built on spiritual lines and since all that is spiritual is incapable of being destroyed, at the long last God must triumph and every spirit must return to the Good. (4).

Foot Notes- (1). Windelband, op. cit. P. 253. F. N. 'In this sense even Origen would call the Evil, τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ὁ κατὰ φύσιν' (2) ibid. (3) ibid, p. 233. (4). See fuller notes.

In bringing our brief study of Origen to a close and completing our chapter, we may well quote the words of Harnack as he writes on Origen. "The Science of Faith as expounded by Origen, bears unmistakably the stamp both of Neo-Platonism and of Gnosticism. As a Theologian, in fact, Origen is not merely an orthodox traditionalist and believing exegete, but a speculative Philosopher of Neo-Platonic tendencies. As a Philosophical Idealist he transmutes the whole contents of the Faith of the Church into ideas which bear the mark of Neo-Platonism and were, accordingly, recognised by the later Neo-Platonists as Hellenic. Porphyry says of Origen- *κατὰ τὰς περὶ πραγμάτων καὶ τοῦ Θεοῦ δόξας ἑλληγνίσαν* Euseb. H.E.VI.19."(1).

Thus, along many avenues and by means of varied influences, we find that Neo-Platonism left its impress on the life and thought of the Christian Church. In this way St. Augustine would enter a Church which, already, was greatly indebted to the spirit of Hellenism. And, by means of his keen subtle intellect, he too was destined to enrich this heritage and, in his turn, do so much towards clarifying the thought of the Church; broadening its spirit; furnishing it with material which would enable that Church not only to meet and overcome its opponents, but to obtain a reasoned ground for the Faith which must be fearlessly proclaimed.

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Foot Notes- (1). Harnack, Article on Origen, Encyc. Brit.

## FULLER NOTES TO CHAPTER 3.

Page, 48, Foot Note- (4).

Clement himself has given an account of the process of abstraction or elimination.

"By analysis we reach the first conception, starting from things that are subordinate to it and stripping off from bodies their physical properties. In this way we abstract from the three dimensions of length, breadth and depth. The residuum is a point, or, as we may say, a unit occupying a certain position. Eliminate position, and what is left is simply the conception of unity. Now if, removing from bodies the properties that are inherent in them, and from incorporeal things the properties by which they are characterized, we throw ourselves into the greatness of Christ and by the energy of holiness advance to His immensity, we shall in a sense reach to the comprehension of the Almighty, understanding not so much what He is as what He is not. For we must not suppose that the terms used in Scripture, such as figure, motion, state, throne, place, right hand, left hand, are literally applicable to the Father of the universe. The First Cause is not in space, but beyond space, beyond time, beyond language and thought." Strom. V.II. See Watson, "The Interpretation of Religious Experience", page, 47.

Page, 49, Foot Note- (I).

"It is difficult," says Clement, "to apprehend the principles of things, and a fortiori much more difficult to apprehend the First Cause, the Cause which is the principle of all other things. For, how can we define that which is neither genus nor species, nor difference, nor individual, nor number, nor accident, nor that to which accident belongs? We cannot properly call Him the All, for the All implies magnitude. Nor can we speak of His parts, for the One is indivisible and infinite, not as incomprehensible, but as being without dimensions or limits. Nor can we say that God has shape or name. If we speak of the One, the Good, Reason, Being in itself, or even of Father, God, Creator, Saviour, we employ terms that are not strictly appropriate. Such high names we employ because of our impotence to find the veritable name, in order that the mind may have something to fasten upon and steady it. None of these names taken separately expresses God; combined, they but indicate His omnipotence. We designate things by their qualities, or by the relations they bear to one another; but we cannot do so in the case of God. Nor can He be apprehended by demonstrative knowledge; for such knowledge presupposes better known principles, and there is nothing prior to the Uncreated. It follows that our idea of the Unknown is solely the effect of Divine grace."

Strom. V.8I, 82. See Watson, *ibid*, page, 48.

## FULLER NOTES TO CHAPTER 3. (Continued).

Page, 57, Foot Note- (4).

We may note the Optimism of Origen. This is how he expresses himself- "It is an indication not only of His wisdom but of His goodness that, while no creature is coerced into acting rightly, yet when it lapses it meets with evils and punishments. All punishments are remedial. God calls what are termed evils into existence to convert and purify those whom reason and admonition fail to change. He is thus the great Physician of souls. (Contra Celsum, 6,56. also, De Princ. 2.10.) The process of cure, acting as it does simply through free-will, takes in some cases an almost illimitable time. For God is long-suffering, and to some souls, as to some bodies, a rapid cure is not beneficial. But in the end all souls will be thoroughly purged. (De Princ. 3,1,14,17) All that any reasonable soul, cleansed of the dregs of all vices, and with every cloud of wickedness completely wiped away, can either feel or understand or think, will be wholly God: God will be the mode and measure of its every movement; and so God will be 'All'. Nor will there be any longer any distinction between good and evil, because evil will nowhere exist; for God is all things, and in Him no evil inheres. So, then, when the end has been brought back to the beginning, that state of things will be restored which the rational creation had when it had no need to eat of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil; all sense of wickedness will have been taken away; He who alone is the one good God becomes to the soul 'ALL', and that not in some souls but in all. There will be no longer death, nor the sting of death, nor any evil anywhere, but God will be All in all." (ibid, 3.6.3.) See for a fuller statement of what Origen here says on this matter, Hatch, pp.234,5,6. "The Influence of Greek Ideas and Usages".

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## Foot Note-

I had meant to say something about that fascinating character Synesius (365-414), who became Bishop of Ptolemais in A.D.410, but the chapter is much longer than I had intended.

There is not the slightest evidence, moreover, that Synesius and St. Augustine ever met or that Synesius influenced him in the slightest degree. But as we read the hymns of Synesius, ten of which have come down to us, we can see how easily one steeped in Neo-Platonism could pass from it to the Christian Faith. An excellent account of the life and writings of Synesius is to be found in the Dictionary of Christian Biography, pages-757-780, in an article by the late J. T.R. Halcomb. See also A. Gardner, "Synesius of Cyrene", (The Fathers for English readers 1886) Also H.O. Taylor, "The Classical Heritage of the Middle Ages" 1901, pages, 78-82. And references in Foakes-Jackson, op.cit.

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## CHAPTER 4.

## THE LIFE OF SAINT AUGUSTINE.

## Part I. (From 354-386, A.D.)

Aurelius Augustine (1) was of North African descent, born at Thagaste (sometimes written as Tagaste), a small municipality in Numidia, on November 13th. 354 A.D. (2) He died, during the siege of Hippo by the Vandals, on August 28th, 430 A.D., in his 76th year. (3) His father, Patricius remained a pagan until a year before his death. Patricius appears to have been a man of considerable position in Thagaste, for he evidently lived in a house of no mean dimensions; St. Augustine himself refers to several servants. (4) He also belonged to the 'ordo decurionum', an honour which was only enjoyed by the most distinguished citizens, and which carried with it membership of the Municipal Senate. (5) Still Patricius was by no means rich, for Augustine tells us that his patrimony consisted of a "few small fields, (6) and "a vineyard bordering upon an orchard" (7); moreover, when Augustine had to journey to Carthage to complete his education, we learn that the expenses were met by a friend of the family, probably by a wealthy patron of the neighbourhood, called Romanianus a relative of the family. (8)

Foot Notes- (1). The name Aurelius is not to be found in any of his writings, but his contemporaries make use of it. (2) de beata vita, 8. "idibus novembris mihi natalis dies erat". (3). Possidius, Vit. Aug. 31. Possidius adds some further notes to Augustine's story and gives us an account of his Apostolate. (4). Conf. IX. 9. 20. "Library of the Fathers", edition by Pusey. (5). Conf. 2. 3. 5. (6). "paucis agellulis", Epist. CXXVI. 7. (7). Conf. 2. 4. 9. (8). He is often referred to with deep gratitude, by St. Augustine. *Contra Acad. 2 (2-3) ("ope adiuvisti")*  
*See also Cont. Acad. 1. 2.*



Patricius was a man of the world, bent upon enjoying the good things of life, kindly upon occasion, but of quick temper, and somewhat loose in his morals- St. Augustine hints at the fact that his mother must have suffered much by reason of his infidelity. (1) The father was quick to perceive that his boy had unusual gifts and was eager that he should make his mark in the world. Augustine owed a great deal to his father despite his pagan ways and sensual habits, and Patricius left on his son's early life the impress of his personality.

But it was his mother Monnica (2) who was destined to exercise the predominating influence upon his character. At the time of the birth of Augustine, although Monnica had been brought up in the Catholic Church, it would seem, she had not yet become a Christian. (3) Still she was soon concerned for her son's spiritual state, and whilst at his birth he had not received the sacrament of baptism, lest the sins of his early days might render that sacred rite of none effect, nevertheless he had been "sealed with the mark of His cross and salted with His salt". (4) Thus from his earliest days St. Augustine was a dedicated spirit. (5). Monnica therefore stands out early in the life of St. Augustine as a type of Christian piety by no means common in such pagan surroundings. Again and again we have glimpses given to us

Foot Notes- (1). Conf. IX.9.19. "toleravit cubilis iniurias.."

(2). All the Augustinian M.S.S. have the spelling thus.

(3). Conf. 2.3.6; 2.3.8. (4). Conf. I.XI. (17-18).

(5). Conf. 3.IV.8. see also Contra Academicos, 2.5. "in illam religionem, quae pueris nobis, insita est et medullitus implicata". All references to St. Augustine's early writings are taken from Opera omnia Sancti Aurelii Augustini, by the

Sancta Benedicta ed. 1836. Vol. I.

*Benedictine of Congregation of St. Maur -*

of her gentle forbearance, her tactfulness, her deep concern that her son should become an earnest Christian. It could not have been always easy to live with a husband of the spirit and temper of Patricius, yet we are told that they dwelt together in complete harmony; that she avoided provoking her husband; so that the neighbours could neither perceive nor hear by any token that Patricius had beaten his wife or that there had been any domestic difference between them, even for one day". (I)

Monnica's influence on the life and character of Augustine grew year by year. We are reminded frequently on the pages of the Confessions how deep her concern was that her son, amid all the insidious forms of temptation which surrounded his early days, and especially in the passionate time of adolescence, should keep himself from the sins of the flesh.

Very early Augustine must have received religious instruction from her lips, and in all probability he attended with her the services of the Church, so that he was continually in touch with Christian influences. Reflecting upon his mother's anxious solicitude for his wellbeing, Augustine acknowledges that it was this, by the help of the Holy Spirit of God, which kept him from making total shipwreck of his life. He tells us that when, in her anxiety, she had turned to a certain bishop and besought help that she might guide her son aright, he made answer—"let him alone awhile, only pray God for him, he will of himself

Foot Notes- (I)Conf. IX.9.19.

by reading find what that error is, and how great its impiety". When, however, she urged him the more, "with entreaties and many tears", he added, "Go thy way, and God bless thee, for it is not possible that the son of these tears should perish".(1).

We have dwelt thus at length with these early home influences because they would seem to explain much which took place in the impressionable period of his life. On the one hand we have the father, a man of the world, enjoying luxury, and sensual pleasure, delighting in the games at the Coliseum with their lascivious display, eager for his son's advancement and worldly success, but caring little for his spiritual life; on the other hand we have the mother, a Christian, devout, an adherent of a Church which had placed its ban on the luxury and pleasure seeking in which the father delighted, and mother-like, knowing full well the sins which surrounded her son, eagerly desirous that the growing youth should be kept in safety. These gave direction to his life. As Boissier puts it- "He received in his early years two contrary impulses, which seem to me to explain the indecisions and contradictions in which he passed his youth" (2).

We know now that Augustine, destined to become the great Father of the Church, responded at last to the spiritual influence of Monnica rather than the adverse and wholly worldly direction which proceeded from Patricius. But Augustine had yet to travel far before he was ready to confess himself a

Foot Notes- (1). Conf.3.12.21.St. Augustine in one of his early writings, ( de util credendi, I.2.) declared that he had been "a Catholic Christian from his early years". (2) Gaston Boissier, "La fin du Paganisme", (7th.Ed.2.Vols.Paris,1913.) Vol.I.page, 204.

Christian.

Following his own story in the Confessions, we have there vivid pictures given to us of his boyhood. We see him at school, with a boy's natural love for play, scamping his lessons dreading the consequences, praying that he may not receive punishment; and when his prayers were not answered, feeling that God had done him grievous ill. (1) He chronicles the fact that sometimes he did not speak the truth; that he pilfered from the pantry & the table so that he might enjoy the good things or share them with his companions; and sometimes, he confesses, he cheated at games. In those early days he is fired with ambition to stand well in the eyes of his masters and being fond of poetry, he learned it 'willingly with great delight, and for this was pronounced a hopeful boy! His recitals won for him great praise, even among those who were older. He tells us of his intense dislike for Greek, and his love for Latin, his mother tongue. A childish illness of the stomach had taken a somewhat serious turn, so that he was 'near to death', whereupon his mother would have had him baptized. However, he quickly recovered, and the Holy Rite was postponed lest 'the defilement of sin' might 'after that washing' bring greater and more perilous guilt.(2).

The school days at Thagaste come to an end and he must needs go to Madaura a neighbouring town, twenty miles away, to learn grammar and rhetoric with a view to the African bar.(3). He was then 15, a growing lad, awake to all the mysteries of self

and sense. His sojourn there evidently did him little good; he became the victim of fleshly desire; too much liberty was given him, and, evidently he had much time on his hands, with the natural result that his Faith became weaker and the world of sense took him captive. Madaura was the birthplace of the gifted rhetorician, Apuleius (born about 125). He had become revered there almost as a God, and many strange stories had gathered around his name as a worker of miracles. M. Bertrand suggests that the youthful ambition of St. Augustine may have been fired by the local reputation of Apuleius. (1) At any rate we know that St. Augustine in after years held him in high esteem, and often speaks of him in his rôle as a Neo-Platonist.

After leaving Madaura, having spent probably less than a year there, he remained for a time in idleness, at home; drifting from his early promise of godliness and mixing with lewd companions, he sought to outdistance them in sin that he might win their admiration. (2).

At 17, he is sent to Carthage, the great capital of the western Mediterranean. His parents could ill afford such expense, but they were willing to make every sacrifice, and as we have already stated, Romanianus, their wealthy relative, who had a villa at Carthage, generously came to their aid. Carthage was a gay, pleasure-loving city and there Augustine was drawn into scenes of a most degrading character. (3) He joins a band of

Foot Notes- (1) De Civ. Dei, IX.4. "Vir elegantissimi ingenii et multae ac facundae scientiae". (2) Conf. 2.3.8; 2.4.9. (3). Conf. 3.1.1; 2.3.7. "There sang all around me in my ears a cauldron of unholy loves". "Among my equals I was ashamed to be less shameless."

'subverters', 'eversores', wreckers; his life at this time was of the wildest, but no one save his mother seems to have been concerned as to his state. His father dies whilst Augustine is at Carthage, but his mother shouldering the burden of his support with the help of Romanianus keeps him at the Rhetorical school, where he shows great promise. It was here that Augustine formed an alliance with a young woman, whose name has never been recorded; and with her he lived in strict fidelity for fifteen years. Such unions in that day, seem to have been quite common, and excited little comment. To them, in 372, when Augustine was but 18 a little son was born, to whom they give the name of Adeodatus. He was a gifted and devout child and became a youth of much promise.

(I). It was when Augustine was 19, that a great event took place which left upon his mind and life an abiding impression. He came upon a book by Cicer~~o~~, the Hortensius, now lost; the reading of that book turned his mind to better things. It was a decisive hour in his spiritual pilgrimage and must be regarded as the first step on the way which was to lead him, in later days, to become the Father of the Church. He tells us- "This book altered my affections, and turned my prayers to Thyself, O Lord; and made me have other purposes and desires. Every vain hope at once became worthless to me; and I longed with an incredibly burning desire for an immortality of wisdom, and began now to

Foot Notes- (I). Adeodatus was with Augustine at Cassiciacum, later and was baptized, in his 15th. year along with his father. In the book entitled 'De Magistro', St. Augustine has preserved for us many of the thoughts of this gifted lad who unfortunately died early.

arise, that I might return to Thee". (1) Augustine now became determined to search for Truth, and at all costs find it. Strange to say, whilst the polished phrases of Cicero appealed to his literary taste, one thing was a source of trouble to him- 'the name of Christ was not in it'. (2) It was not indeed for Wisdom herself that Augustine sought, but for something that would bring peace to his soul and still the tossings of his restless spirit. There awakened within him the devout reflections of his early years, and, compared with Religion, the systems of the Philosophers seemed incomplete and empty. He turns to the Sacred Scriptures for guidance, but these with their 'unadorned and rugged style' repel him. Yet no Philosophy could satisfy him, he must find the truth- truth about God, and truth concerning his own tortured spirit. He had grown weary of his senseless round of pleasure and self-indulgence; but he could not see eye to eye yet, with his mother in matters of Faith, there was much in the stories of the patriarchs on the pages of the Old Testament that repelled him; he was not ready to become a Catholic Christian.

At that moment, the claims and promises of Manichaeism seemed to meet his needs. To the teaching of this powerful sect then, when a youth of nineteen, Augustine surrendered himself. And, whilst he never became one of the initiated, he was yet a 'hearer', and remained such until his twenty-eighth year. It is not needful for us to enter fully into the origin of this Religious Faith; nor, indeed, is it worth while to outline its chief tenets.

Foot Notes- (1). Conf. 3.4.7. (2). 3.4.8.

It is sufficient to say that Manichaeism contained elements drawn from Persian Zoroastrism, Syrian Gnosticism, Christianity, and perhaps from Buddhism. It found the origin of evil in the strange dualism which they taught existed between Light and Darkness, Good and Evil, and their continuous warfare. Mani rejected the old Testament as the work of the devil: Jesus he set among the prophets, although, he declared, His flesh was but a phantom, and his crucifixion merely a semblance. Jesus had foretold the coming of a Paraclete, and Mani claimed that he was himself the promised Holy Ghost.

A much more important consideration for ourselves is to see how it was that such a system could make its appeal to Augustine and how it seemed, at this stage of his life, to answer his heart's cry for Truth. Harnack tells us- "At that time anyone who had studied the Scriptures, but had no confidence in Ecclesiastical exegesis, especially in regard to the stumbling-blocks presented by the Old Testament, anyone who knew not the perils of free speculation, yet who enquired into the nature of the world and attempted to frame a conception of the spiritual world and the problem of evil, naturally became a Manichaean"(1).

It is of interest to recall the passage addressed by St. Augustine to his friend Honoratus, written about 391, in which he gives an account of what the Manichaean teachers professed to offer, and the specious appeal which their system made to restless and enquiring minds. (2).

Foot Notes- (1). Harnack, Augustine's Confessions, page, 20.  
 (2). de util cred. I.2. See fuller notes at the end of this chapter.



He was evidently drawn to Manichaeism by its offer of Truth, its specious promises of enlightenment, its parade of Divine Knowledge. It made use of Christian terms, he found too 'the name of Christ there': it spoke of God and the Holy Ghost, it recognised prayer, and it insisted on a certain asceticism. Augustine had shrunk from the enforced dogmas and doctrines of the Church, but Manichaeism did not thrust its faith upon its converts. He was able to become a 'hearer' without committing himself to all its tenets, reserving to himself the right of a certain freedom of thought. Still further, Manichaeism rejected the Old Testament, and refused to countenance the conduct of the patriarchs, and such had always seemed a perplexity to him.

Another thing which had given him no little concern; ~~and~~ this was the existence of evil in the world. Manichaeism, here, by reason of its dualism, seemed to satisfactorily explain this. Their doctrines freed God from the onus of such evil and in like manner acquitted man, in such a way that he was not altogether answerable for his sins. Augustine, seeking to be right intellectually, and wishful of deliverance from the bondage of his passions, saw in Manichaeism an explanation of not a little that troubled him; such an explanation as appeared to be acceptable alike to his vanity as to his reason. Moreover, he was not required to break with his mistress.

His mother Monnica, distressed by his errors, forbade him her house for a while. She was however, encouraged by a dream wherein she saw a shining youth coming towards her, and comforting her, bidding her rest content, for where she was, there

also her son would be. When Augustine heard this, he interpreted it in this wise- that Monnica herself would one day stand where he was, that is, that she too would become a Manichaeian.(1).

At twenty, Augustine was elected Professor of Rhetoric in his native town at Thagaste. But, becoming conscious of his growing powers, he desired to settle down in Carthage. His departure, perhaps, was hastened by the death of a friend to whom he was passionately attached, who had followed him into Manichaeism. Taken seriously ill, this friend lay unconscious, and indeed was thought to be dying. In that state he received the sacrament of Holy Baptism. When he rallied and it seemed as though he would recover, Augustine jested with him on what had been done in his unconscious state, when, greatly to Augustine's surprise, his friend shrank from him, and bade him, as he valued his friendship, nevermore to speak in that way again. A few days after, the fever returned and he passed away. This event so preyed upon Augustine that long years after he could record on the pages of the Confessions how sore was his heart. (2) If he tried to comfort himself by saying, 'Trust in God', what God had he to trust in? (3) Life was insupportable in the place where everything reminded him of the friend who was no longer with him. Hastening away to Carthage, probably about 376, his friend Romanianus again aiding him, he opened a School of Rhetoric, and ere long he was firmly established and acquiring an increasing reputation.

Foot Notes- (1).Conf. 3.XI.(19,20).(2). Conf. 4.4.9. See fuller notes at the end of this chapter. (3). ibid.

He was little more than 20 years of age when, there fell into his hands a book of Aristotle on the Ten Predicaments. He quoted it with pride and proclaimed the fact that he had read and understood it unaided.(1) Meanwhile he was deeply engaged with Manichaeism, and whilst in order to gain a victory in a theatrical contest, he would not accept the help of magic, he yet ventured to consult the astrologers, despite the fact that his friend, Nebridius, did his utmost to prove to Augustine their falsity.(2).

St. Augustine tells us that when he was 26 or 27, year of age he wrote two or three books on 'The Fair and the Fit', (de Apto et Pulchro) (3), dedicating this work to Hier<sup>2</sup>us who had become famous as a Professor of Rhetoric at Rome. Later he expressed himself as being glad that it had been lost, for he wished he had never written it. It is of interest to note that even in this youthful essay into the fields of literature there is an indication that St. Augustine's thoughts were already turning in the direction of Platonism. (4).

During his stay at Carthage, St. Augustine still sought to discover whether the Manichaeans were right in all their affirmations; for example they believed that the stars were connected with the lives of men and had a direct influence on human conduct. Now Augustine could not be sure as to the truth of that. It might serve as a sop, and dull the pangs of conscience to believe that man might blame his moral failure on the stars, or declare that sin was a matter of necessity; (5) but Augustine

Foot Notes- (1). Conf. 4.16.28. (2). *ibid*, 4.3.6. (3). *ibid*, 4.13.20 (4). see R.L.Ottley, "Studies in the Confessions of St. Augustine", Robert Scott, 1919. page, 16. (5). Conf.4.3.4. "De caelo tibi est inevitabilis causa peccandi."

could never be satisfied with half truths, he must press ever on. His friends, Nebridius and Vindicianus, often debated the matter with him, vehemently affirming that strange coincidences had but been the result of accident. (I) One day a conversation with Firminus, an educated man, well taught in Rhetoric, greatly impressed him. Augustine had raised the question of the connection of the stars in the heavens with the destiny of men on the earth; Firminus then told him of how he and the child of a slave woman had been born at precisely the same time, that the stars and their positions were carefully noted, and yet- Augustine says-"Firminus, born in a high estate in his parents' house, ran his course through the gilded paths of life, was increased in riches, raised to honours; whereas that slave continued to serve his masters, without any relaxation of his yoke..." ~~KWL~~ (2) This illustration seemed conclusive, and yet Augustine was loth to give way.

Furthermore, Nebridius used to propound a difficulty. Suppose, he would say, that when the darkness attacked the light, the God of Light refused to fight, was the Darkness able to injure the Light? If that were possible, then the God of Light was subject to violation and, therefore, corruptible. But if, on the other hand, the Darkness could inflict no harm on the Light, then the position of Manichaeism was ridiculous; for why should there have been a war at all? Or the defeat of the primal man? Or where was the need of the intervention of God's

own substance, Jesus Christ? Or His work of redemption? (I). Still Augustine was not even then, fully persuaded. He would wait, he said, until the coming of the great Manichaeian preacher, Faustus and put to him some of the questions which had troubled him. On the arrival of Faustus, however, Augustine, whilst pleased by his fluent discourse, was grievously disappointed with the result of his interview with him. Frankly, Faustus acknowledged that he could not solve many of the problems with which Augustine had confronted him. (2).

Augustine now had his faith shaken in Manichaeism; he had become suspicious of its empty and pretentious claims. He realized some of the absurdities that were present in its doctrines, and, above all, he was shocked by many of the inconsistencies that were present in the lives of some of that sect who made the greatest profession. More than this, Manichaeism had failed him; it had brought no peace to his troubled heart.

It was in this state of mind that Augustine left Carthage for Rome. His mother, however was very much against his going to the Imperial city, but he managed to escape from her by a base and unworthy subterfuge, pretending that he was about to bid farewell to a friend. He persuaded Monnica to remain in a little chapel near the sea; there she spent the night in prayer, and weeping. St. Augustine says- "And what, O Lord, was

she with so many tears asking of Thee, but that Thou wouldest not suffer me to sail? But Thou, in the depth of Thy counsels and hearing the main point of her desire, regard<sup>d</sup>est not what she then asked, that Thou mightest make me what she ever asked". (1)

During the whole of his sojourn in Rome, he seemed, however, to be destined to disappointment and failure. Almost immediately, upon his arrival, in August or September 383, he was taken ill with a grievous fever; at one time he appeared to be dying, but, thanks to his mother's prayers his life was spared. (2). Moreover, he had not the success that he had hoped for; there was much competition, he was an unknown man, and, to add to the trouble, his pupils often disappeared without paying their fees.

Still at Rome he had the opportunity of a clearer insight into the inconsistencies of Manichaeism, with the result that his allegiance to that Faith was strained almost to breaking-point. He became inclined towards the Scepticism of the Academicians, for he despaired of ever reaching the Truth which he so eagerly sought; until, thinking of the mind of man, "tam vivacem, tam sagacem, tam perspicacem", he realized that with such a gift from God truth must be discoverable, but that it must perchance come by means of a revelation. But whence? (3)

Foot Notes- (1). Conf. 5.8.15. (2). *ibid*, 5.9.16. (3) 5.10.19. see also- *de util. cred.* 8.20. "Saepe mihi videbatur non posse inveniri (verum) magnique fluctus cogitationum mearum in Academicorum suffragium ferebantur."

Fortunately for St. Augustine a way of deliverance came to him. The Magistrates of the city of Milan were in need of a Professor of Eloquence for their public schools. By the influence of Symmachus, the prefect of the city, to whom Augustine had been introduced by one of his friends, he was successful in obtaining the post. In the autumn then of 384, or the beginning of 385, Augustine removed to Milan. He was then 30 years of age, having passed through much of folly and dissipation, ill health, sorrow, and disappointment. He was now losing heart and hope in Manichaeism, but he was still in quest of Truth.

He gives us an account of his belief at the time. "When I wished to think on my God", he says- "I knew not what to think of, but a mass of bodies,...this was the greatest, and almost only cause of my inevitable error".(I) Of Evil too he tells us- "I believed Evil also to be some such kind of substance, and to have its own foul, and hideous bulk;"..."AND I seemed to myself more reverential, if I believed of Thee, my God, ...as unbounded, at least on other sides, although on that one where the mass of evil was opposed to Thee, I was constrained to confess Thee bounded; than if on all sides I should imagine Thee to be bounded by the form of a human body. And it seemed to me better to believe Thee to have created no evil,...than to believe the nature of evil, such as I conceived it, could come from Thee. Yea, and our Saviour Himself, Thy Only Begotten, I believed to have been reached forth, as it were for our salvation, out of the

Foot Notes- (I). Conf.V.X.I9.

mass of Thy most lucid substance, so as to believe nothing of Him, but what I could imagine in my vanity." (1)

Such was the state of Augustine's mind when he left Rome for Milan. Manichaeism had failed him, and he had come to the conclusion that Astrology was but a baseless superstition. When he reached Milan, he almost immediately came into touch with Ambrose, the Bishop who had then been for some ten years the head of the Church there. Boissier tells us- "He was then the greatest personage in the Western Church, and perhaps the one of the greatest importance in the Empire. He surpassed the other bishops by his talents, his virtues, the affection which he inspired in the hearts of his people, and the respect which the princes showed to him. His birth, relationship, habits, bound him to the ancient society; whilst he was linked to the new by his beliefs and his dignity, and was thus able to be a link between them". (2) Augustine informs us that Ambrose received him as though he were a father, and that he showed him an Episcopal kindness. There was much that Augustine wanted to talk to him about, but the great Bishop was so busy, and had such constant audiences that Augustine never seemed to get an opportunity of pouring out his heart and receiving from him the guidance which he needed. Later, in his Soliloquies, Augustine expresses himself thus- "It is my only grief in not being able to disclose to him as much as I should have liked of all my affection for him and for his wisdom" (3).



We must remember that Augustine was a heretic, that, moreover, he had been introduced to the post of public orator by the pagan Symmachus, with whom Ambrose would hardly be on speaking terms. Again, it is possible that Ambrose, taken up by his many duties, did not realize the great future that was in store for this young man who so persistently haunted his presence.(1)

However, when Augustine heard the Bishop preach, he was captivated by the grace of his diction, rather than by his matter. One thing impressed him, that was his treatment of the Old Testament Scriptures. His favourite text was- 'The Letter killeth, but the Spirit giveth Life'. His allegorical treatment of Holy Scripture led Augustine to see that there was far more to be said for the Old Testament than ever he had imagined. The result was that a new meaning was given to him of the sacred books. Further, his attendance at the services of the Church led him to take a new interest in Catholic Christianity. He was a man 'haunted by God', and he could not help but feel that despite his wanderings from the Faith of his childhood he still belonged to the Church. He therefore became a catechumen.(2)

Still he panted after honours, gains, marriage. He had separated from his mistress, the mother of Adeodatus, but after her departure he had succumbed to one more beautiful. Says Boissier- "It was not passion but custom, and habits are of all the cords most difficult to break. To change suddenly the life he

Foot Notes- (1). For the relations between Ambrose and Symmachus see Glover, 'Life and letters in the Fourth Cent.' pp.153;ff. also Ottley, op.cit. page 24. (2). de util cred. 8.20. "Decrevit-ram tamdiu esse catechumenus in ecclesia, donec aut invenirem quod vellem, aut mihi persuaderem non esse quaerendum; opportunissimum ergo me ac valde docilem tunc invenire posset, si fuisset qui posset docere"

had been living from his youth, to cease at a stroke from doing what he had ever done, to renounce occupations which had commenced sometimes by being constraints and which ended by being necessities was nothing less than dreadful. To fight against these little tyrannical things, against the last revolts of the flesh, was to endure more than he wished". (1) In striking language he has described his struggle. (2)

Meanwhile Augustine, busy with his professional duties, receives the honour of being selected to deliver a panegyric in praise of the Emperor, which filled with empty plaudits, would be largely false; his conscience is shocked by the thought of his having to do this thing. Again- passing along the streets, one day he sees a happy beggar, drunk and joyous. The sight of this man causes Augustine to reflect that here was one who, by means of a few 'begged pence', had obtained what he himself had long been struggling after; the beggar was without a care, whilst he was full of fears and yet in his heart there was a yearning for a deeper joy. Tortured and discontented, he tells us- "I was entangled in the life of this world, clinging to dull hopes, of a beautiful wife, the pomp of riches, the emptiness of honours, and the other hurtful and destructive pleasures". (3) His mother urges him to be married and he is promised that, once married, the health-giving baptism would cleanse him. (4)

Foot Notes-(1). Bossier, op.cit. pages 311, f. (2). Conf. 8. XI. 26. see fuller notes. (3). See de Util. Credendi, 3. also de Vita Beata, 4. (4). Conf. VI. 13. 23.

In all probability, it~~y~~was suggested to him that if he married a modest beautiful woman, who had culture, and was in easy circumstances, who could bring with her means, he might then have more leisure to devote himself more assiduously to his search for Truth. (1) A pleasing maiden was found for him and asked in marriage, but as she was 'two years under the fit age' Augustine must wait for her .(2) But Augustine could not wait, and , to his shame be it said, he took unto himself another mistress. (3)

Still he was unhappy, he tells us—"I was becoming more miserable, and Thou nearer; Thy right hand was continually ready to pluck me out of the mire, and to wash me thoroughly, and I knew it not". (4) Indeed he suggests that, if it had not been for his fear of death and the judgment to come, a worse state might have been his. He had now reached his 31st year. He had broken with Manichaeism; under the influence of Ambrose, the Scriptures had become of greater value to him. He was a Catechumen of the Catholic Church; but still he was not a Christian. He was troubled by his materialistic conception of God, and he could meet with no rational explanation concerning the existence of Evil. Although he felt that God must be incorruptible, unchangeable, yet he could not but conceive of Him as being in space. The old dilemma of Nebridius still worried him, If Evil came from matter, surely that seemed to limit the power

Foot Notes- (1). See Solil. I.17,18,end.(2). Conf.VI.13.26. (3) ibid,VI.XV.23. (4). ibid,VI.16.26.

of God. Freewill, he had heard, was the cause of man's illdoings, but he could not clearly discern that.

It may have been, as Alfarcic suggests, (1) that Augustine had learned this from the preaching of Ambrose.

Still the heart of Augustine was torn between belief and doubt. He could not remain in such a state, he must find the Truth which would satisfy his heart and his reason. Help as we know, was not far away. Possibly the preaching of Ambrose was unconsciously to Augustine, preparing the way for him to receive the new influence which was to play such a part on the life and thought of the future of St. Augustine. (2)

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Foot Notes- (1). Conf. 7<sup>1</sup>/<sub>2</sub>. 3.5. Compare Alfarcic, "L'Évolution Intellectuelle de Saint Augustin", (Paris, Emile Nourry, 1918.) page, 370. (2). Alfarcic suggests, page 372, *ibid.* that Ambrose was familiar with the writings of Philo and Origen and that he, whilst making use of their thoughts for practical ends, was yet influenced himself by their Neo-Platonism. Alfarcic quotes from 'De Isaac et anima', by Ambrose, page, 60. "Quid ergo est malit̃a, nisi boni indigentia?..Non enim mala sunt nisi quae privantur bonis...Ergo indigentia boni malit̃a est et definitione boni malit̃a deprehenditur." Such was the Neo-Platonic interpretation of evil. Though Alfarcic adds that such an idea is to be seldom found in the preaching of Ambrose. At any rate Augustine himself clearly shows that he had only known of it through the "Platonists", more especially from Plotinus. See Confessions, VII.XI.(17-22).

## FULLER NOTES TO CHAPTER 4.

Page, 69, Foot-Note (2).

De Util. Credendi, I.2. Writing to Honoratus, about 391, he says- "You know that we adhered to these men on no other ground than this- that they ~~promised~~ by pure and simple reason to bring their disciples to God, discarding all peremptory authority, and to liberate them from error. For what else made me reject, for almost nine years continuously, the religion my parents had instilled into me as a child? What else made me a follower and diligent 'hearer' of this sect than the assertion that we Catholics are terrorized by superstition, and that faith is thrust upon us before any reason is given; whereas they bind none to believe except upon the truth's being examined and made clear? By such promises who would not have been inveigled, especially the mind of a young man, desirous to know the Truth, and already, through disputation with clever persons in the Schools, grown proud and talkative; just such an one, indeed, as they found me; contemning religion as an old wives' fable and eager to apprehend and drink in the very Truth which they so confidently promised".

Page, 71, Foot-Note (2).

Confessions, IV.4.9. "At this my heart was utterly darkened; and whatever I beheld was death. My native country was a torment to me, and my father's house a strange unhappiness; and whatever I had shared with him, wanting him, became a distracting torture. Mine eyes sought him everywhere, but he was not granted them; and I hated all places, for that they had not him; nor could they now tell me, 'he is coming', as when he was alive and absent. I became a great riddle to myself, and I asked my soul, why she was so sad, and why she disquieted me sorely; but she knew not what to answer me. And if I said, Trust in God, she very rightly obeyed me not; because that most dear friend, whom she had lost, was, being man, both truer and better, than that phantasm she was bid to trust in. Only tears were sweet to me, for they succeeded my friend, in the dearest of my affections".

Page 79. Foot-Note, (2).

Confessions, 8.XI.26. "The very toys of toys, and vanities of vanities, my ancient mistresses, still held me; they plucked my fleshly garment, and whispered softly, "Dost thou cast us off? and from that moment shall we no more be with thee for ever? and from that moment shall not this or that be lawful for thee for ever?" And what was it which they suggested in that I said, "this or that", what did they suggest, O my God? Let Thy mercy turn it away from the soul of Thy servant. What defilements did they suggest! what shame! And now I much less than half heard them, and not openly shewing themselves and contradicting me, but muttering as it were behind my back, and privily plucking me, as I was

FULLER NOTES TO CHAPTER 4. (Continued).

departing, but to look back on them. Yet they did retard me, so that I hesitated to burst and shake myself free from them, and to spring over whither I was called; a violent habit saying to me, "Thinkest thou, thou canst live without them?"

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## CHAPTER 5.

## "THE LIFE OF SAINT AUGUSTINE".

## Part II. (From 386-430, A.D.)

St. Augustine had now reached his Thirty-second year. He was still a prey to doubt and fear, he was troubled and distressed because he had not yet arrived at the Truth. Deliverance was, however, close at hand. About the beginning of the year 386, there fall into his hands certain books of the Platonists, translated from the Greek into the Latin. It is sufficient to say here, that very probably these books were none other than certain of the Enneads of Plotinus, which had been translated into the Latin by Victorinus Afer. Augustine often speaks of the Neo-Platonists under the term 'Platonists'; in another of his writings, (I) he explains that the most celebrated of the 'Platonists' were Plotinus, Porphyry, and Jamblichus. Of Plotinus as we shall see, he ever speaks in the highest terms and in the Seventh Book of the Confessions, St. Augustine shows very clearly how much he owed to the perusal of these books. (2)

As in succeeding chapters we are to deal more fully with the influence of Neo-Platonism on the thought of St. Augustine, it will be sufficient, here, to state briefly, the impressions which these books made upon him at the time when he

Foot Notes- (1). De Civitate Dei, VIII.12. (2). Harnack in his article in the Encyc. Brit. on Neo-Platonism, says- "The best account ever written by any Church Father on Neo-Platonism, is to be found in the Confessions of St. Augustine, Book, VII.Chapters, IX-XXI."

first read them. He himself tells us that the reading of them "kindled in me an incredible ardour". (1). And again- "When I had read a very few books of Plotinus...I was so kindled that I wished to break away from all those anchors which held me, but for the influence of certain persons." (2) Here at any rate Augustine judged that he had found the name of Christ. For St. Augustine saw in the Second person of the Neo-Platonic Trinity, the

*Voûs* of Plotinus, the Logos of St. John, described in the prologue to his gospel, and he learned that the *Voûs* was of the same substance as the 'ONE'. More than that, in the "Absolute Being" of the Neo-Platonists, St. Augustine discovered a truer conception of God than the "diffused luminous body", which he had previously imagined God to be. In a word, he saw the Spirituality of God as he had never done before. But further, he had also a new light shed on the origin of Evil. He saw that the World-Soul, the third person in the Neo-Platonic Trinity, (3) was below "The One", or Absolute Being, and that, although it derived its existence from the 'One', yet the further removed it was from that 'One' the more defective it became in Being. (4) St. Augustine here perceives that Evil is really not-being, failure to be, a deprivation of Good. (5) Evil hence appears to him as no longer

Foot Notes- (1). Contra Academ. I, 2, 5. "Etiam mihi ipsi de me ipse incredibile incendium in me concitarunt". (2) de Beata Vita, 4. "Lectis autem Plotini paucissimis libris", True- only five of the M.S.S. read 'Plotini', all the rest have Platon- is, but the former according to Alfarić, Grandgeorge, &c is undoubtedly the accepted reading. (3). Whilst Augustine speaks of 'person', we must note that with Plotinus it is 'Hypostasis'. (4) Conf. VII. XI. 17. (5) See De vera relig. I. 4, 27. written seven years before the Confessions, Here he defines sin as "defectus voluntarius a summa essentia". ibid 40, 76. See also Bright, "Lessons from the lives of three great Fathers", Longmans Green & Co. 1891. Appendix XV. Page, 271.



the creation of God, but as springing from a Will and an Imagination which has turned aside from God. But he found something still more valuable, something which led him to enter into the realm of mysticism. He tells us- "And being thence admonished to return to myself, I entered even into my inward self, Thou being my guide;...and I entered and beheld with the eye of my soul, such as it was, above the same eye of my soul, above my mind, the Light Unchangeable". (1) Later, he tells us of how, withdrawing himself from the world of sense, there came to him the consciousness of Absolute Being and, at a bound, he found union with Him- "And thus with the flash of one trembling glance it arrived at THAT WHICH IS". (2) Here we see how truly St. Augustine had been impressed and had entered into the spirit of Neo-Platonism.

We shall, at a future stage, have something more to say concerning the mysticism of St. Augustine.

Now these books of the 'Platonists' had opened his eyes to a great deal. They had given direction to his soul. But St. Augustine whilst acknowledging what they had been to him in the hour of his travail of spirit, makes manifest also wherein they failed/him. He had been given an insight into the truth concerning the Spirituality of God, he had also light shed on the problem of Evil. But he did not find in the Enneads of Plotinus what he had learned in the gospels and what was taught by the

Foot Notes- (1). Conf.VII.X.I6. (2). *ibid*, VII.I7.23. c.p.(*Enn* V.1.2.)  
c.p.(*Enn*: IV.3.5- 1.6.9.)-

Christian Church, namely, "That the Word became flesh". In Neo-Platonism, he did not find a Saviour, one who would redeem him from his burden of guilt. Appealing to his reason it failed to appease the pangs of conscience, or heal his disordered will. He says- "Then I sought a way of obtaining strength sufficient to enjoy Thee, and found it not, until I embraced the Mediator betwixt God and man, the man Christ Jesus". (1)

Neo-Platonism had done much for him, but it had not given him deliverance from the carnal habit, the weight of which continually held him back. St. Augustine now saw the 'land of peace', but as he tells us, it was one thing to see it afar off, and quite another 'to keep on the way that leads thither'. (2)

He began now to diligently read the Epistles of the Apostle Paul. There he found a great deal which seemed to him to resemble what he had already seen in Neo-Platonism, but he also saw there what was further true to his own experience. As he read the words of Romans VII.24, "O wretched man that I am, who shall deliver me from the body of this death?" - he felt it to be the cry of his own heart. But, as he read on, he found St. Paul's answer to the cry making its earnest appeal to his heart. (3) His difficulties began to disappear; he was now sure of God's Eternal essence, of His incomparable beauty. What he wished was not to know more of Him, but to be more steadfast in Him. But

Foot Notes- (1). Conf. VII. 18. 24. (2). *ibid*, VII. 21. 27. (3). *ibid*. It is of interest to compare what St. Augustine writes here in the Confessions with what he wrote to Romanianus, nearer to the time of his experience. See *Contra Acad.* 2. 3. (beginning). The whole passage will be quoted in a subsequent chapter.

he was not willing to break with his old life of selfish indulgence; "his heart", he tells us, "had to be purged from the old leaven; the way well pleased me but as yet I shrank from going through its straightness".(1) Again he tells us- "I had now found the goodly pearl, which, selling all that I had, I ought to have bought, and I hesitated." (2) He sought out Simplicianus, the 'spiritual father' of Ambrose, a man of wide experience and saintly character, and to him he opened his heart. When he was told of the reading of the books of the "Platonists", translated by Victorinus, Simplicianus expressed his joy that Augustine had been so wisely guided as not to have been led astray by false philosophers, "whereas the Platonists' many ways led to belief in God and His Word" .(3) The aged saint deeply interested Augustine by his account of the conversion of Victorinus; who had also been led from the Neo-Platonic philosophy to an earnest study of the Scriptures, and whose conversion, late in life and at considerable sacrifice, had been the talk of Rome some 25 years previously. (4) When Augustine heard this, he tells us,—"I was on fire to imitate him".(5) But past habits still held him in their chains. He compares his state to that of a half-awakened sleeper, unable to shake off his lethargy, crying, "Anon, anon"; "Presently"; "Leave me but a little". But- he adds- "Presently, presently, had no present, and my little while went on for a long

Foot Notes- (1).Conf.8.I.I.(2).ibid,8.I.2. (3).ibid,8.2.3. cp. de Civ.Dei,X.29. (4).Conf.8.2.(3-5) (5).Conf.8.5.I0.  
"Exarsi ad imitandum".

while".(I) He attended the services of the Church, but he had not yet found the peace of heart he had been seeking. One day, however, Augustine and his friend, Alypius, received a visit from one of their countrymen, Pontitianus, who was in high office at the Emperor's court. He was a baptized Christian and seeing on the table a copy of St. Paul's Epistles, he expressed his wonder and his joy. St. Augustine then told him of his search for Truth; whereupon, for the encouragement of Alypius and himself, Pontitianus related the story of the conversion of St. Antony, an Egyptian monk, and proceeded to dilate on the joys of the monastic life. Pontitianus further told the story of how two friends of his own, courtiers and officers in attendance on the Emperor, had been so deeply impressed on reading the account of the life of St. Antony, that they resigned their commissions and entered the monastic life; and how that their brides, when they heard of it, also 'dedicated their virginity unto God'. (2)

This recital so moved Augustine that he was overwhelmed with a burning sense of shame; he realized that in order to have peace, he must make a decided choice. Vividly describing his feelings, Augustine tells us- "Thus soul-sick was I, and tormented, accusing myself much more severely than my wont, rolling and turning me in my chain, till that were wholly broken, whereby I now was but just, but still was, held". (3)

Foot Notes- (I). Conf. VIII. 5. 12. "Modo et modo non habebant modum".  
 (2). ibid, 8. 6. 15. (3). ibid, 8. XI. 25.

Then the storm broke. Rising, he left Alypius who was sitting by his side, and withdrew that he might weep alone. As Augustine cast himself beneath a fig tree, weeping in penitence of spirit, he heard from a house close by a voice, 'as of a boy or girl... chanting and oft repeating, 'Take up and read; 'Take up and read'. Instantly", he tells us- "my countenance altered, I began to think most intently, whether children were wont in any kind of play to sing such words; nor could I remember ever to have heard the like. So, checking the torrent of my tears, I arose, interpreting it to be no other than a command from God to open the book and read the first chapter I should find....Eagerly then I returned to the place where Alypius was sitting; for there had I laid the volume of the Apostle, when I arose thence. I seized, opened,& in silence read that section, on which my eyes first fell: 'Not in rioting and drunkenness, not in chambering and wantonness, not in strife and envying: but put ye on the Lord Jesus Christ, and make not provision for the flesh, in concupiscence.' No further would I read; nor needed I : for instantly at the end of this sentence, by a light as it were of serenity infused into my heart, all the darkness of doubt vanished away."(I)

So did Augustine pass into the light and find liberty and peace. He relates his wonderful experience to Alypius, who was now sitting by his side, and he, reading further, came upon the sentence, 'him that is weak in the faith receive'.

Foot Notes- (I).Confessions, 8.XII.(28-30).

This he applied to himself. Together they go and tell Monnica the glad tidings, to her unspeakable joy. (1)

The conversion of Augustine probably took place in the summer of 386; he was desirous at once of resigning his post as Professor of Rhetoric, but deferred doing so until the vacation. He alleged as the ground of his resignation, the chest weakness, possibly asthma, from which he frequently suffered; but his real reason was that he had made up his mind to dedicate himself henceforth to the pursuit of Truth, in preparation for his baptism and possible retirement from the world; for the monastic life forcibly appealed to him. (2).

Upon his retirement, a friend and professorial colleague, Verecundus by name, placed at his disposal his country house, 'Cassiciacum', on the outskirts of Milan, situated towards the top of the mountains, with a view of the beautiful lakes and plains of Lombardy. In his Confessions, Augustine makes no mention of those who accompanied him in his retreat, but suggests that he was alone with his family. (3) We shall deal at length with this Cassiciacum period in a subsequent chapter, and see how this further study will correct many of the impressions which are suggested to our minds as we read the account given us in the Confessions. It is sufficient to say here that whilst in the Confessions we are led to believe that St. Augustine devoted his nights and days to penitence and prayer, in preparation for his

Foot Notes-- (1) Conf. 8.12. (28-30) (2). see his Epistles for this reason. (3). Conf. IX.4.7. "Profectus in uillam cum meis omnibus".

baptism, in his books which are written at that time, we find that he is deeply engrossed in the study of Philosophy. Under the spell of Neo-Platonism, he speaks as an ardent follower of Plotinus.(1) However, in the Confessions this period is passed over very lightly, and it is a real help to our study of the development of St. Augustine's thought to have his early writings as a guide to his real state of mind.

In the following Spring St. Augustine returned to Milan, and was baptized on Easter Eve (April 24th) 387, along with his friend Alypius and his son Adeodatus, a lad not yet fifteen. To St. Augustine's great sorrow, Adeodatus died two years after his baptism. (2)

In the summer of that same year, Augustine planned that Monnica and himself, with the group of friends who had shared his doings at Cassiciacum, should retire to Africa and there carry on the life of contemplation which they had enjoyed together previously to his baptism. With this intention they had left Milan and had reached the port of Ostia when Monnica was taken ill and died. Five days previously she had an earnest conversation with her son on the subject of the future life, which made a deep impression upon Augustine; so that he narrates it and describes the experience that followed, with considerable detail.(3) This Ecstatic Vision which Augustine tells us of here

Foot Notes- (1).See Glover, op.cit.page,215."In these (dialogues) his language is not so avowedly Christian as in the Confessions, for he is still trying to couch the new thought in the old terms, but the new thought is there, and if not yet fully developed it is still Christian". (2).see de Vita Beata,6. "Erat etiam nobiscum aetate minimus omnium, sed cujus ingenium si amore non fallor, magnum quiddam pollicetur,Adeodatus filius meus". (3).Conf.9.X.(WE- 23-25.)

is an excellent description of the Ecstasy as depicted by Plotinus. It is <sup>a</sup>~~is~~ condition transcending thought, a stillness of the Soul in which all consciousness of external objects is suspended, and "the seer no longer distinguishes himself from what he sees". (I)

A few days afterwards, in her fifty-sixth year, Monnica passed to her rest. The death of Monnica apparently took place in 387, and changed Augustine's plans. He remained in Italy for something like ten months, spending most of his time at Rome, where he made a closer study of the Manichaeian system in order that he might be the better able to confute its heresies.

The ninth book of the Confessions, closes with an account of the death and burial of Monnica and tells us of the grief of Augustine. Here his autobiography ends; for the remaining books of the Confessions add nothing to the story of his life. For the closing years of the life of Augustine we are indebted, in the main to Possidius, the bishop of Calama, who enjoyed a close friendship with St. Augustine for more than 40 years.

In the August or September of 388, Augustine returned to Africa, and upon his arrival at his old town of Thagaste, he took up his abode in a house which he had inherited from his father. He sold his possessions, gave the proceeds to the poor, keeping back only the house in which he lived and what

Foot Notes- (I). See Ottley, op.cit. page 37. For the account of this Mystic experience at Ostia, see fuller notes at the close of the present chapter.



would suffice for his barest needs. Here he lived for three years, in retirement from the world with a company of kindred spirits who had all things in common, and who had pledged themselves to a life of prayer, meditation, and self-discipline.(I)

The next year, 389, once again Augustine is plunged into grief by reason of the death of his dearly loved son Adeodatus.

Whilst he had been in Rome, after the death of his mother, Augustine had written 'de Quantitate Animae', and two of the volumes of his 'de Libero Arbitrio'. He now at Thagaste completes his study and adds another volume to his 'de Libero Arbitrio'. During these years of retirement he also wrote 'de Genesi contra Manichaeos', 'de Musica' (books I-6) and 'de Magistro', and began his 'de Diversis Quaestionibus LXXXIII', and his 'de Vera Religione'.

In 391, however, his life of quiet was interrupted by a visit to Hippo Regius, which was destined to have an effect on his whole future. His fame had spread far and wide, and he was well known for his piety and learning. It was whilst he was listening to the sermon of the aged bishop Valerius, that the preacher declared that they were in great need of another priest. Thereupon, greatly to Augustine's surprise and dismay, the people demanded that he should accept the office. Augustine was far from willing to give up his life of meditation and literary activity and take up a position for which he felt he was not qualified;

and it was only after great pressure had been brought to bear upon him, and because he felt that perchance the hand of God might be leading him all unwillingly, that finally he yielded. He begged that a few months might be given him to prepare for his new office. This was granted, and he began his duties at Eastertide, 392.

Very soon did both Bishop and people feel that their choice had been a wise one. They perceived not only that Augustine was a man endowed with gifts of speech, learning, and piety, but also that he possessed a shrewd commonsense which was most valuable in the work to which he had been called. So impressed was Valerius with his powers that, contrary to all custom, he often asked him to preach in his stead. Lest he might be tempted to leave Hippo, Valerius, within two or three years, begged Augustine to allow himself to be consecrated as Associate Bishop along with himself. A year later, upon the death of Valerius, when St. Augustine was but 42, he became sole Bishop of Hippo, an office which he held until his death.

Although he had reached thus early so high a place in the Church, yet his manner of life was of the simplest. He dwelt with the clergy of his household after the manner of a monastic community. (I) He also established a sort of Theological seminary, where candidates were prepared for their future duties. Like Ambrose, we are told that he had the vessels of the Sanctuary

melted, and the silver and gold made use of to meet cases of extreme need, or to redeem prisoners. (1) He would take no money willed to the Church if poor relatives would suffer thereby. He was greatly in demand as a reconciler between those at enmity, and was often asked to settle disputes; whilst daily he busied himself rendering service to the poor. He rejoiced in his duties as a preacher, and it is on record that he often preached on five days in succession and even twice in one day.

There is no need to deal at length with his enormous literary activity, which occupied a great deal of his time, nor to expatiate on his work on behalf of the Church. It is sufficient to say that the presence of the Manichaeists in his diocese roused him to combat the heresy from which he had himself been delivered. By public debate and by a series of treatises which fell from his pen, he did his utmost to overcome the influence of their teaching.

But there were other enemies of the Christ-ian Church against whom he wrote. These were the Donatists and the Pelagians. (2). Whilst many of his works were of special value for his day and generation, they still contain much which is of real worth for all time.

The last twenty years of the life of St. Augustine were years of trouble and sorrow. Rome was sacked by

Foot Notes- (1). See Bright, 'Lessons from the lives of three great Fathers.' Longmans Green & Co. 1891. pages, 128, ff. for an excellent account. Note here- Possidius, Vit. Aug. c. 24.  
(2). See the work by Dr. Bardenhewer, 'Patrology' Trans from the 2nd. Edition by Dr. Shahan. (1908). Section 94, Pages, 473-508, for a full account.

Alaric in the year 410, and as a result of this, many of the educated and ruling families of the Empire fled in terror into Africa. In their misery the refugees strove to find some reason for so terrible a misfortune as had befallen their city and fortunes. It was alleged by some that this punishment had come because they had forsaken the ancient shrines;- "This horror would not have been", said some, "had we stood by the ancient ways. The mad policy of the Emperors in prohibiting sacrifices to the Gods has produced this inevitable nemesis. The sack of Rome is the judgment of Jove".(1) In a word, they laid the responsibility at the door of the Christians.

It was partly in answer to that charge that St. Augustine began to write one of his greatest works, if not the greatest, his 'De Civitate Dei'. He commenced this book in 413, publishing it in parts between 417 and 426. It therefore occupied thirteen years of his life. During that period, from time to time, Africa was overrun by barbaric hordes, reducing towns and villages to ashes and inflicting most terrible sorrow and misery upon the inhabitants. The feeling of St. Augustine was that Bishops and pastors should stay beside their flock and help them in their time of deepest need. In 429 Gaiseric, the Vandal king, crossed from Spain at the urgent request of Boniface, the Count of Africa. Boniface was friendly to St. Augustine, but he was beaten back, with the remnant of his army into the fortified city of Hippo,

**Foot Notes-** (1). See-J.N.Figgis, "The Political aspects of St. Augustine's City of God", Longmans, 1921. page, 6. Also Dr. J.E.C.Wellden, "St. Augustine, De Civitate Dei", S.P.C.K. 2 Vols. see especially Introduction, Vol.I. also Bright, op.cit Appendix, 13., page, 263.

where Possidius and several of the bishops had taken refuge. Augustine was greatly troubled by the dreadful calamities that had befallen his beloved land. Once he declared to his friends- "What I pray God for is that He will deliver this city from the enemy; or, if He has determined otherwise, that He may strengthen His servant for His sufferings; or, which I would rather, that He would call me from this world to Himself". (1)

In the third month of the siege he was attacked by fever; ten days before his death he had retired from active ministry, having up to that time proclaimed unceasingly the word of God to his people. The end came on August, 28th 430, and, in the 76th year of his age St. Augustine passed to his rest.

Possidius tells us that he left no will, for, having embraced poverty, he had nothing to leave save his books and his manuscripts, which fell to the Church.(2)

In closing, may we say that our chief purpose in these chapters which have outlined the life of St. Augustine, has been to place the man in his setting and endeavour to show the varied influences which had been at work upon his life and the part which each influence contributed towards the enrichment of his genius. We saw the growing youth in his home life at Thagaste, with a Christian mother and a pagan father, each impressing the life, at its most plastic period. And outside the

Foot Notes- (1).Possidius, Vit.Aug.C.29."ut aut hanc civitatem ab hostibus circumdatum liberare dignetur, aut, si aliud ~~ea~~ videtur suos servos ad perferendam suam voluntatem fortes faciat, aut certe ut ~~ne~~ de hoc saeculo ad se accipiat". (2).Possidius, Vit. Aug.c.31. <sup>SESE</sup>

same pull of contrary powers; on the one hand the world, the flesh, riches, success, ambition; and on the other the unseen things of the spirit, the memories of Christian teaching, the sensitive conscience, and the reasonings which no specious arguments could satisfy.

There is too the Manichaeian influence, followed by his brief essay towards the Scepticism of the New Academy; & yet no peace. His meeting with Ambrose, the new view which he receives of the Old Testament, & his becoming a Catechumen of the Church. Finally his discovery of the books of the 'Platonists', and a study of the Epistles of St. Paul.

We venture to think that it was Neo-Platonism which opened the doorway for him into a new life and that, from the day when he first read the Enneads in a Latin translation right on to the close of his life, it was that philosophy which exercised a very pronounced influence upon Augustine's life and thought.

It is of course true that this influence was more pronounced at first, as will be seen when we study his early writings; true also that Augustine believed later that he owed little to the teaching of Plotinus. But all unconsciously much that was essentially Neo-Platonic enriched his thought, so that through this philosophy the Christian Father was able to more perfectly clarify the doctrines of the Church.

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## FULLER NOTES TO CHAPTER 5.

Page 93, Foot Note- (1). The Mystic Experience at Ostia.

They were standing together leaning over the window ledge of the house where they were staying, looking into the garden. They were discoursing on the nature of the eternal life of the Saints, and when they had reached the point at which the greatest delight of the earthly senses became unworthy of being named in the same breath as those of the spiritual life, then occurred this mystic experience.

Confessions, IX.X.24. "We raising up ourselves with a more glowing affection towards the 'Self-Same', did by degrees pass through all things bodily, even the very heaven, whence sun and moon, and stars shine upon the earth; yea, we were soaring higher yet, by inward musing, and discourse, and admiring of Thy works; and we came to our own minds, and went beyond them, that we might arrive at that region of never-failing plenty, where Thou feedest Israel for ever with the food of truth, and where life is the Wisdom by whom all these things are made, and what have been, and what shall be, and she is not made, but is, as she hath been, and so shall she be ever; yea rather, to 'have been' and 'hereafter to be' are not in her, but only 'to be', seeing she is eternal..."

25. We were saying then; if to any the tumult of the flesh were hushed, hushed the images of earth, and waters, and air, hushed also the poles of heaven, yea the very soul be hushed to herself, and by not thinking on self surmount self, hushed all dreams and imaginary revelations, every tongue and every sign, and whatsoever exists only in transition, since if any could hear, all these say, We made not ourselves, but He made us that abide for ever- If then having uttered this, they too should be hushed, having roused only our ears to Him who made them, and He alone speak, not by them, but by Himself, that we may hear His Word, not through any tongue of flesh, nor Angel's voice, nor sound of thunder, nor in the dark riddle of a similitude, but, might hear Whom in these things we love, we might hear His Very Self without these, (as we two now strained ourselves, and in swift thought touched on that Eternal Wisdom, which abideth over all;) could this be continued on, and other visions of kind far unlike be withdrawn, and this one ravish, and absorb, and wrap up its beholder amid these inward joys, so that life might be for ever like that one moment of understanding which now we sighed after; were not this, 'Enter into thy Master's joy?'"

We may compare this Ecstasy as it is recounted here with the Enneads, V.I.2. see Appendix, III.

Plotinus taught that the way which man must take to enter into communion with God, was to climb, by degrees from nature, upwards by means of the highest forms, inward to the mind, then above the mind, thus would man enter into union with the One.

FULLER NOTES ON CHAPTER 5. (Continued)

See Harnack, "History of Dogma", Vol.I.E.T. page 352, on  
"Neo-Platonism".

"Man frees himself from every sin through asceticism. But he is to reach still higher; he is not only to be without sin, but he is to be "God"....The soul can only see and touch the Original Essence in a condition of complete passivity and rest. Hence, in order to attain to this highest, the soul must subject itself to a spiritual exercise. It must begin with the contemplation of material things, their diversity and harmony, then retire into itself and sink itself in its own essence, and thence mount up to the Nous, to the world of Ideas; but, as it still does not find the One and Highest Essence there, as the call always comes to it from there. "We have not made ourselves",...it must, as it were, lose sight of itself in a state of intense concentration, in mute contemplation and complete forgetfulness of all things. In that moment it enjoys the highest and indescribable blessedness; it is itself, as it were, swallowed up by Deity and bathed in the light of Eternity."

It will be evident that St. Augustine here in his description of his Ecstasy has most closely followed the very words of Plotinus.

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End of Part I.



SECRET (CONFIDENTIAL)

REF ID: A1

1. THE ANCHORING AND TWO-ARMED

2. THE CHRISTIAN PERCEPTION OF  
COSMOTOPIC.

3. THE IMPRESSION OF ANCHORING  
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE ANCHOR

4. THE HISTORY OF THE ANCHOR  
ANCHORING AND AS THE POWER OF  
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## CHAPTER I. St. Augustine and Neo-Platonism

Before the time of Augustine many of the ideas of Hellenism had entered into Christian thought. It may be that the preaching of Ambrose had prepared Augustine for the reception of the teaching of Plotinus. Victorinus suggested as a greater influence (1) By his translation of the books of the Enneads. (2) By the admiration Augustine himself had for him. Victorinus; a pioneer in the adaptation of Neo-Platonic doctrines to Christian Theology; an Augustine before Augustine. Outline of the doctrine of Victorinus; his indebtedness to Neo-Platonism. Influence of Victorinus on the thought of Augustine. Impression which the reading of the books of the 'Platonists' made upon him—where they failed him. By the 'Platonists' Augustine means the Neo-Platonists. Evidence of Augustine's knowledge of the Enneads. His high praise of Plotinus; and criticism of him. Augustine's knowledge of the writings of Porphyry. Augustine's indebtedness to Neo-Platonism in several directions, but whilst this Philosophy reveals to him the truth, he finds it powerless to deliver him from the sins of the flesh.

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## CHAPTER 2. The Christian Philosopher at Cassiciacum

An additional chapter to the Confessions, furnished by his account of his sojourn at Cassiciacum, a country house lent to Augustine by his friend Verecundus. The reason suggested, since Augustine had resigned his professorship, as to why he should undertake the teaching of youth. The picture which is given in the Dialogues of the life there; Augustine and his duties. The chief subject of his lectures that of Philosophy as the gateway to the blessed life. In the instruction of his pupils, Augustine was grounding himself in the knowledge of Philosophy. Frequent references to Philosophy. It is that of Neo-Platonism which he has in mind. Difference between the tone of the Confessions and that of the Dialogues explained. He unites a love for Philosophy with a like love for Religion. Abundant evidence that the devotional life is not neglected. Review of the writings of Augustine at Cassiciacum. *Contra Academicos*, dedicated to Romanianus., outlined. *De beata Vita*, the title and a great deal of the argument taken from the Enneads. *Precis* given of this tractate on Happiness. The *De Ordine*, which has for its theme the Divine Providence. These books of the *De Ordine* steeped in Neo-Platonism. The *Soliloquia*; a revelation of Augustine's devotional spirit.

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## SYNOPSIS OF THE CHAPTERS.

## CHAPTER 3.

THE INFLUENCE OF NEO-PLATONISM ON THE  
PSYCHOLOGY OF ST. AUGUSTINE.

The importance of the study of Augustine's Psychology; it lay at the core of all his thinking and his Psychology forms the basis of his Metaphysics. His study of Neo-Platonism presented Augustine with a dependable system. With Augustine there were two kinds of knowledge, the knowledge of God, & the knowledge of the Soul. Augustine's discovery of the immediate certainty of Inner Experience; how he illustrates this. By intuition the Soul arrives at the basis of knowledge. Augustine influenced by Plotinus in his doctrine of Ideas. Augustine's definition of the Soul; the Soul the centre of his Psychology. The Soul the link between the world of Spirit and that of Sense. Simple in essence the Soul is manifold in its operations. It can neither grow nor diminish with the body; although it feels in every part of the body it is not to be regarded as body. The sympathy which unites the organs indicates the presence of the Soul in the whole body. Augustine develops the ideas of Plotinus on the difference between the irrational Soul and the rational. Sensation, an active power of the Soul. The Interior Sense. Pleasure & pain are experienced by the Soul. Memory associated with the Imagination by Augustine & Plotinus alike. The two kinds of Memory, Sensible & Intellectual. Discursive and Intuitive Reasoning, their distinction. The Immortality of the Soul, here also Augustine closely follows Plotinus. The Soul's return; its Purification, Illumination, and Union. The Seven degrees of the Soul described.

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## CHAPTER 4.

THE DOCTRINE OF GOD AS SET FORTH BY ST. AUGUSTINE  
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## SYNOPSIS OF THE CHAPTERS.

## CHAPTER 5. THE DOCTRINE OF THE TRINITY IN THE WRITINGS OF ST. AUGUSTINE AND IN NEO-PLATONISM.

Enquiry as to how far the Triad of the Neo-Platonic hierarchy resembles the Christian doctrine of the Trinity. Some analogies between these. Divergence of opinion with certain Fathers of the Church as to substantial identity of thought in the conception of the Triad and that of the Christian Trinity. Comparisons between the three Hypostases and the three Persons, and the parts they severally play. Augustine's explanation of the difference. Love present in the Christian Trinity, and mutual fellowship. Influence of Neo-Platonism on the Christian view. Danger of Modalism in Augustine's theory of the Trinity. Augustine's difficulty in reconciling the thought of the Simplicity of the Divine Being with the three-fold personality. Here we see the influence of Neo-Platonism.

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## CHAPTER 6. GOD'S RELATION TO THE WORLD IN HIS WORK OF CREATION.

How Augustine differs from Plotinus in his doctrine of Creation. Outline of the theory of Plotinus. He safeguards himself with respect to his view of the Simplicity of the Divine nature by reducing activity within the circle of the three Supreme Beings to a minimum. He is careful not to introduce the thought of change into his conception of the Godhead. Plotinus affirms the eternity of Matter, he describes it as an image, a shadow of the divine. He conceives of the world as having been 'generated', begotten in eternity. The Neo-Platonic Principles are devoid of Will as well as Love; the world came into being as a result of necessity. His description of Matter. Augustine held that the world had been created not begotten, since the world could not be either co-equal or co-eternal with God. God, according to St. Augustine made the world out of nothing. God made the world because of His goodness, and His Will. Augustine cannot believe that matter is eternal, so he affirms whilst God did not make the world in time, he made it with Time. God has only to do with Eternity. Augustine declares there was no change in God's plan because of the creation, for all things are eternally present to God. In order to reconcile his view of the Divine Simplicity with his theory of the Creation, Augustine regards the Goodness, Knowledge, Will, and action of God as His attributes. Finite things, according to Augustine cannot add to the sum of Being since they are of the nature of negation. The world depends on God for the limited reality it has.

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## SYNOPSIS OF THE CHAPTERS.

## CHAPTER 7.

THE INFLUENCE OF PLOTINUS ON THE  
THEORIES OF ST. AUGUSTINE CONCERNING  
PROVIDENCE, EVIL, OPTIMISM, AND  
FREEDOM.

Augustine was drawn to Manichaeism because it professed to give a solution of the pressing problem of evil; an authoritative revelation of truth. But when he was delivered from its bondage he welcomes all the help he can obtain from Neo-Platonism that he may hotly contest that specious and dangerous doctrine of the Manichaeists. On all the subjects dealt with in this chapter Augustine closely associates himself with Plotinus. The world, according to both Augustine & Plotinus, is dependent upon God for its very life. The Providence of God is universal says Augustine. So too Plotinus tells us that a principle of order pervades the entire realm of existence. Both agree this cannot be the result of chance. From this prevailing harmony Augustine deduces the Unity of the creation, and, therefore, the Unity of the Creator. But how are we to account for the presence of Evil in the world? Augustine does not associate Evil with Matter; adopting the view of Plotinus that evil is a negation of Being, a negation of Good. Hence Evil is in the realm of Non-Being. But since Augustine knows something of the profound reality of sin and its misery, he puts forward a second theory which is also made use of by Plotinus, namely, that evil has been chosen to enhance the glory & beauty of the world. It is a necessity for greater Being. We are unable to pass adequate judgment on the disorders of the Universe since we only see a part of the whole, and we are members of the very Order we are censuring. But a third theory urged by Augustine is, that moral evil or sin is due to God's gift of Freedom to man. This theory is also advanced by Plotinus. Two kinds of Freedom examined. Is Freedom of choice to choose wrongly to be regarded as true Freedom? Both Augustine & Plotinus say that this is not freedom but bondage to the lower nature. 'Freedom is really shown in right action,' says Plotinus. 'Man using evilly his free-will hath lost both himself and it,' says Augustine. Illustration if this from what Plotinus has to say concerning the fall and return of the Soul. The Optimism of the Christian Father and the Philosopher indicated.

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## SYNOPSIS OF THE CHAPTERS.

## CHAPTER 8.

## A SUMMARY OF RESULTS.

Philo the fore-runner of Plotinus. Gnostics and the Christian Apologists. The School of Alexandria, Clement & Origen & their work. Thus the Christian Church in its doctrines became enriched by what it received from Neo-Platonism, long before Augustine entered it. Augustine, himself tells us of the help of the 'books of the Platonists', in delivering him from the bondage of Manichaeism. Plato and his influence; Augustine indebted to Aristotle. Predominating influence was that of Plotinus. Augustine fired by the example of Victorinus studies the Pauline Epistles & his conversion is complete. The Influence of Neo-Platonism on the LIFE of Augustine; (1) Through Philosophy he is led to Christ, finds his vocation, becomes the Bishop of Hippo, the Ecclesiastical statesman. (2) By means of the teaching of Plotinus Augustine enters the realm of Mystical Piety. Heiler's view. The Influence of Neo-Platonism on the THOUGHT of Augustine. (1) Psychological; (2). Porphyry's books known to him. (3) The influence of Plotinus on Augustine's doctrine of God. Evil. (4) Earlier writings exhibit profound influence. Later the hold of Neo-Platonism wanes, but never wholly disappears. Augustine makes use of Plotinus to help him as a defender of the Faith. And makes use of Philosophy to aid him in giving clearer shape to Christian doctrine.

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PART TWO.

CHAPTER I.

St AUGUSTINE AND NEO-PLATONISM.

"In the Ancient World there was only one Western Theologian who came directly under the influence of Neo-Platonism; but that one is Augustine, the most important of them all".

Harnack, Article, 'Neo-Platonism', Ency.Brit.

"If we wish to see the true difference between such a Mysticism (that of the Christian Mystics) and the ecstatic ascent to reality, 'solus cum solo', taught and practised by Plotinus, we have but to go to St Augustine; who stands at the end of the Fourth Century, the typical figure which links in experience these two tendencies of life, and transmits them- fused in the crucible of his ardent temperament- to the mediaeval world".

Miss Evelyn Underhill, "The Mystic Way", page, 299.

"Aussi est-il indispensable, pour bien comprendre Saint Augustin, de connaître la langue et la doctrine de Plotin".

Bouillet, "Les Ennéades de Plotin", Vol.2. Page, 590.

We have seen from the previous chapters that before the time of St Augustine there had taken place a leavening of the doctrines of the Christian Church by means of Neo-Platonism, and that many of the ideas of Hellenism had already entered into Christian Thought. "In effect"- writes Grandgeorge-..."it was almost the only ~~system~~ which was fully known, and which was in a condition to influence the newly born philosophy of Christianity". (I)

But now with greater precision, we must endeavour to make clear the way in which Augustine himself, becoming a disciple of Plotinus, thereby imparted a Neo-Platonic colouring to the Christian Faith of the Western Church. It may have been, as we have already suggested, that it was the preaching of Ambrose that already prepared him for the hour of his awakening, and

Foot Notes- (I) "Saint Augustin et le Néo-Platonisme", page, 21.



rendered him the more susceptible to the teaching of Plotinus which was destined to open for him the gateway into a new life. Still that may be but a conjecture. St Augustine, in the seventh book of his Confessions, has made it very clear to us that it was the translation of the books of the Platónists which gave him a new conception of God and His universe. We would, however, claim that it was Victorinus himself, the translator of these books into the language of Augustine, who played a prominent part in this influence and who completed the good work which these books had begun. For we would recall the fact that Augustine himself tells us that, when he poured out his heart to Simplicianus, and spoke of the 'mazes' of his wanderings; in order to guide him into fuller truth his friend told him of the conversion of Victorinus, who, in his old age, had turned from Neo-Platonism and had entered the Christian Church. We have already marked the fact that when he heard this he was deeply stirred and "burned to imitate him". Moreover, we know that Augustine had a very high opinion of the ability of Victorinus, and honoured him as one who was "most learned and skilled in the liberal sciences, and had read and weighed so many works of the philosophers". (1)

Furthermore Victorinus had been, like himself, a Rhetorician, and had stood high in the esteem of the members of his profession. Is it not, then, highly probable, that Augustine,

Foot Notes--(1) Conf.VIII.2.3. "Philosophorum multa legerat et dijudicaverat et dilucidaverat".

impressed by the story of the conversion of Victorinus, in his eagerness for the Truth which would lighten his darkness, "would make him his model in the crucial period of his life"? (1)

Is this not extremely likely? Does not the fact that, when the truths of Neo-Platonism set his heart on fire, ~~and~~ he turned to the Epistles of St. Paul, thus completing his conversion, does this not suggest to us that here, at the outset, Augustine was indeed following in the steps of Victorinus who was himself a student of that Apostle? Harnack favours this view when he says- "Unless all signs deceive, Augustine received from Victorinus the impulse which led him to assimilate Paul's characteristic ideas, and Augustine demonstrably devoted a patient study to the Pauline Epistles from the moment when he became more thoroughly acquainted with Neo-Platonism". (2)

The importance of Victorinus for ourselves lies here- that he was a pioneer in the 'borrowing' of Neo-Platonic doctrines and in their transmission to Christian Theology, and that he would seem to have played an important part in the formative period of Augustine's life, becoming in this way a link between Plotinus and Augustine himself. (3)

"In fact, when we study the works of Victorinus, we are astonished to find in him a perfect Christian Neo-Platonist, and an Augustine before Augustine. The writings 'Ad Justinum Manichaeum' and 'De generatione verbi divini', and the great

Foot Notes- (1)Harnack, 'History of Dogma', Eng. Trans. by Millar; Williams & Norgate, 1898. Vol.5, page 33. (2)ibid, page, 34. (3). See Bouillett, op.cit. Vol.2. page, 555. and elsewhere for his many illustrations.

work against the Arians, read like compositions by Augustine; only the Neo-Platonic element makes a much more natural appearance in him than in Augustine, who had to make an effort to grasp it." (1)

But now let us mark the presence of Neo-Platonism in the writings of Victorinus, and, what is much more important for ourselves, the influence of Neo-Platonism, through Victorinus, upon Augustine. Dr. Gore has told us that not only was "Victorinus the first Christian Neo-Platonist who wrote in Latin", but that he was "the first systematically to convert the results of the Neo-Platonic system to the uses of Christian Theology". (2)

In his doctrine of the Trinity we find that Victorinus has been greatly influenced by Plotinus. According to Victorinus, the Father has generated the Son, but this proceeding forth of God in the act of creation does not involve a change in the Divine Essence. The Son is the eternal utterance of the Divine Will; from all eternity He has issued forth this manifestation of Himself, but He has not lessened His content by doing so. "The Father is God and the Son is His Will, both are one, not by union but by simplicity of Essence, the Will proceeding forth into actualized capacity, but not withdrawing from the Father's own substance and identical motion". As God in His universal thought has but one Will, therefore One and Only-begotten is the

Foot Notes- (1) Harnack, op.cit. page, 35. Foot Note, quoting Gore's article on 'Victorinus', in the Dict. of Christian Biog. IV. pp. II29-II38. (2). Gore Article, op.cit. to which I am greatly indebted for my outline of the doctrine of Victorinus.

Son. God thought not one thing first and then another. The Eternal act of thought or Will has one eternal object.(1)

Victorinus further says that the generation of the Son is -"Non a necessitate naturae sed voluntate Patris. Ipse se ipsum circumterminavit". With him the Son is the object of the Divine Self-knowledge. Since the Father eternally wills so He also eternally knows Himself in the Son; the Son is the expression, the utterance of His own Being. Hence the Son becomes an object of knowledge, and Victorinus speaks of the Son as the 'forma' of God, and His limitation. We must not think, however, of any outside limitation being imposed upon God; God has limited Himself in the Logos. Knowledge is thus conceived as 'limitation' or 'form'; "it is an eternal abiding relation of subject and object". The Son is an object of knowledge distinct from the Father and yet one with Him.

Victorinus describes the relationship between the Son and the Father by means of many terms- the Father is the 'esse', the Son the 'Intelligentia'; the Father is the 'motio' and the Son the 'motus'. All things are potentially in the Father, actually in the Son. He makes use of a curious comparison when he speaks of the relationship of the Father to the Son as being

ὁ μὴ ὡν ἐστί - ὁ ὡν "So utterly essential is the Son to the Being of God that nothing can be so untrue as to describe Him as created. It were better to deny Him begotten than to assert Him created. He is the 'actio'; the Father is Being; and perfect being involves

Foot Notes- (1)Victorinus in Ep.ad Ephes. I.1.see Gore.Art.Vict. op.cit.

perfect action. "...The Father is greater than the Son, not in virtue of having or being anything which the Son is or has not, but as He<sup>1</sup> that gives is prior to Him that receives. The Son has life, not as a creature, but in Himself. He has it as the Father has it, but He has received from the Father what He has and is". Victorinus thus makes clear his thought of the co-essential equality of the Son with the Father.

He is not, however, quite so easily understood when he deals with the Holy Spirit. The Holy Ghost proceeds 'from the Father and the Son'. He is 'a Patre per Christum et in Christo'. That is to say, He is after the Son in order of place and time. Yet there is a sense in which He precedes the Son, as being the Spirit of God, by means of which the Father begat the Son. "He is the 'progressus' as well as the 'regressus' of God. In a certain way the Spirit and the Son appear to be more closely one than the Father and the Son. They are 'existentiae duae', but they proceed forth 'in uno motu' and that 'motus' is the Son; so that the Spirit is, as it were, contained in the Son. Indeed Victorinus sometimes speaks of the Spirit as the 'Logos in occulto' (I), and of Christ incarnate as the 'Logos in manifesto'. He thinks of the Spirit as the bond or 'copula' of the Eternal Trinity, completing the perfect circle of the Divine being. He follows the idea of the Neo-Platonic triad of 'status', 'progressio', 'regressus' ( *μονή, πρόοδος, ἐπιστροφή* ).

Foot Notes- (I). Compare, Enneads, V.I.6. where the Soul is spoken of as being 'an obscure Logos'.

This idea was implied by Plotinus, but was not definitely stated until Proclus. In his doctrine of the Trinity Victorinus places emphasis on the circuminsession of the three Persons.

We must notice particularly, in closing this brief outline of the doctrine of Victorinus, how greatly he was indebted to Neo-Platonism.

(1) He borrows from the doctrine of the Neo-Platonists in his description of the process of creation as a drawing out of the plenitude of God into a chain or gradation of existences; "Deus, Jesus, Spiritus, *voûs*, anima, angeli et deinde corporalia omnia subministrata"

(2).He also does so in his conception of the *voûs* and 'anima' as substantial substances, the source of all particular minds and souls, by means of which God has informed and animated the lower material world. He adopts the Neo-Platonic thought of anima as something capable of spiritualisation but not yet 'Spirit', intermediate between spirit and matter.

(3) He is also a Neo-Platonist in his conception of the return of all things 'into God'.

(4) He is Neo-Platonic, too, in his doctrine of Matter as having no existence apart from God, but as being an abstraction. Still he holds that as created and fashioned by God it is both appreciated and depreciated. It is appreciated as a true revelation of God, but depreciated with the old philosophical depreciation and horror of the material which still clings to Victorinus and militates alike against his grasp of the thought of the Incarnation and also against his clear assertion of

responsibility.

(5) The thought of Victorinus also, concerning the relationship of the Father to the Son is considerably influenced by what Plotinus said with respect to the relations which existed between the One and the *vous*. But with this difference— instead of an impersonal God, without will or consciousness or motion, abstract and lifeless, Victorinus is able by reason of his Christian Faith to fill the Neo-Platonic conceptions with love and life and personality suffused by the very spirit of a Father.

A word may be added from Gore as to the influence of Victorinus upon the thought of Augustine. "It is worth while," he says, "calling attention to the evidence suggested by a good deal of Victorinus' Theology, of a closer connexion than has been yet noticed between him and St Augustine. His strong insistence in his Trinitarian Theology on the double procession of the Holy Spirit, his conception of the Holy Spirit as the 'bond' of the blessed Trinity, his emphasis on the unity of Christ and His Church, his strong prædestinarianism, his vehement assertion of the doctrines of Grace, his assertion of the priority of Faith to intelligence; all these elements, important and unimportant in Victorinus, reappear in St. Augustine, and it seems not at all improbable that the influence of the old philosopher whose conversion stirred him so deeply was a determining force in the Theology of St Augustine." (1)

Foot Notes— (1) Gore, op.cit. page, 1138.

But let us now retrace our steps to what St Augustine has to say concerning these books of the 'Platonists'. There is no need for us again to relate the story of the kindling of his heart as he learned from them the deep truths concerning the Spirituality of God and the mediating Logos. Years afterwards he gives his account of that memorable occasion on the pages of his Confessions. (1) And writing in the light of a fuller Christian experience, he tells us, there, that even these books, precious as they were to him at the time he first read them, did not satisfy his heart's deepest needs, for he found in the Neo-Platonists no incarnation of the One who was the Saviour of the human heart. They fell short of the best, - "For", he says, "it is one thing, from the mountain's shaggy top to see the land of peace, and to find no way thither; and in vain to essay through ways unpassable, opposed and beset by fugitives and deserters, under their captain the lion and the dragon; and another to keep on the way that leads thither, guarded by the host of the heavenly General". (2)

In giving an account of this time to his friend and patron Romanianus, Augustine unites the story of the discovery of these books and of the value they were to him with an account of his conversion in the garden. (3)

There we have additional evidence of the part which these books played in his religious life. This passage is

Foot Notes- (1) The Confessions were written some 12 or 13 years afterwards. That is between the years 397 & 399. Inge, page 124, 'Classics of the Quiet life', says 12, years after his baptism. (2). Conf. VII. 21. 27. (3). Contra Academicos, II. 2. 5. Augustine dedicates this book to Romanianus. See fuller notes at the end of this chapter.



of value since it was written considerably before the Confessions and it, therefore, gives us the state of his mind nearer the time . It makes clear to us that philosophy had opened the door for him into a fuller life, and that he had adopted Neo-Platonism before his adhesion to Christianity. "Nothing but a philosophy which addressed the heart,- a philosophy which coincided with the inward witness of a nature in man akin to the divine,- a philosophy which, at the same time, in its later form, contained so much that really or seemingly harmonized with the Christian truths implanted in his soul at an early age;- nothing but such a philosophy could have possessed such attractions for him in the then tone of his mind". (I)

Now although Augustine refers to these philosophers as the Platonists, it is clear that he really means the Neo-Platonists, for in one of his books he writes- "The most illustrious recent philosophers, who have chosen to follow Plato, have been unwilling to be called Peripatetics, or Academics, but have preferred the name of Platonists. Among these were the renowned Plotinus, Jamblichus, and Porphyry, who were Greeks, and the African Apuleius who was learned both in the Greek and Latin tongues". (2) We shall see, moreover, that when Augustine quotes directly from Plotinus and Porphyry (Jamblichus he never cites), ~~that~~ in these quotations he attributes to them the same doctrines as those which he tells us are to be found in the works of the Platonists. We may remark here, in passing, that the

Foot Notes- (1). Neander, "Church History", Eng. Ed. trans. by Torrey George Bell & Sons, 1887. Vol. 3. page, 504. (2) De Civitate Dei, VIII. 12.

Seventh book of the Confessions, as indeed the whole work, is imbued with the spirit of Neo-Platonism. (I)

Again in his book on the "City of God", we find an indication that the relationship between the Soul and the Logos, which Augustine discovered in the books of the 'Platonists', corresponds to that harmony which he finds existing between the teaching of Plotinus and that of St. John in his gospel. (2)

From that quotation it is evident that he was not only familiar with the teaching of Plotinus, but that, from the comparisons he there makes in that passage, he was also acquainted with three of the books of the Enneads of Plotinus. (3)

Furthermore, we would mark the fact that the theory which he advances, that the Platonists considered the Logos to be consubstantial with the Father, is to be found in the first book of the Fifth Ennead, entitled 'On the Three Principle Hypostases'. (4).

Without a doubt Augustine had an intimate knowledge of the works of Plotinus. He quotes him by name at least six times, (5). and it is perfectly clear that he knew the six books of the Enneads, for references in his writings may be compared to passages which are to be found in the books of the Enneads. (6) Now, considering the great debt which Augustine owed to Neo-Platonism, it is not surprising that he frequently

Foot Notes- (1).For evidence of this see Appendix 3. (2) De Civ. Dei, X.2. see the fuller notes at the end of this chapter. (3).Enneads, 2.9.3.- V.VI.4.- IV.3.XI. (4).Enneads V.I.6. see Confessions, VII.IX.I3.also page 85, Thesis.For details of comparisons here see Appendix, 3. (5).See fuller notes De Civ.Dei,IX.I0.-IX.I7.- X.2.- X.I4.- X.23.- X.30. (6).See Appendix 3. for comparative passages in substantiation of this statement.

expresses his admiration for that saintly philosopher, the greatest of all the Neo-Platonists, Plotinus. In one of his earliest writings he could declare:- "The utterance of Plato, the most pure and bright in all philosophy, scattering the clouds of error, has shone forth most of all in Plotinus, the Platonic philosopher who has been deemed so like his master that one might think them contemporaries, if the length of time between them did not compel us to say that in Plotinus Plato lived again". (1)

In one of his letters, he writes "of the very acute and able men" in the school of Plotinus at Rome, and of how some of them had been degraded by curious arts. He adds in that same letter that if only Plotinus and his friends had lived a little later they would have "changed a few words and phrases and become Christians, as many of the Platonists in our generation have done". (2) If we may add another quotation, in the *De Civitate Dei*, Augustine remarks:- "we prefer these (the Platonists) to all other philosophers, and confess that they approach nearest to us. (3)

It is only fair to say that, notwithstanding this high praise, Augustine differs at times very markedly from Plotinus, criticises his positions, and, in his *Retractationes*, he regrets somewhat his seemingly extravagant praise. (4) Still it is very evident that at one period of his life he was deeply impressed by the truths which Plotinus set forth. They were kindred spirits, each a seeker for the fullest knowledge of the Truth, and fellowship with the highest. Indeed Augustine shared the

Foot Notes- (1). *Contra Academicos*, 3.18.41. (2) *Epist.* 118, and *De Vera Religione*, 17.7. also *Cont. Acad.* 3.20.43. (3) *De Civ. Dei*, VIII.9. (4). *De Civ. Dei*, criticising Plotinus, X.23, 4-X.29, 30. *Retractationes*, I.3. N.B. See fuller notes for Latin of above.

mystic experience of Plotinus when, in an ecstatic moment, he was, as it were, lifted out of the body and both heard and saw things which no speech could fully describe.

A word should be said concerning Porphyry, the pupil and biographer of Plotinus, the one who did so much to produce something like order in the Enneads of Plotinus and who thus brought the teaching of the great master into prominence.

Now whilst, at times, Augustine sharply criticises Porphyry, he yet speaks of him also in terms of the highest esteem. (1) Moreover, he makes references to Porphyry's writings- 'The Return of the Soul to God', 'The Philosophy of the Oracles', 'The Letter to Anebo', and 'The Principles of the Theory of Intelligibles'. (2)

In the De Civitate Dei Augustine makes frequent comments upon the Neo-Platonists, sometimes speaking of Plotinus, at other times of Porphyry, and distinguishes wherein his doctrine diverges from the teaching of these great Philosophers. ~~XX~~

But, apart from minor differences, it is not difficult to see in how many respects St. Augustine has been greatly indebted to Neo-Platonism, especially the teaching of

Foot Notes- (1). De Civ. Dei, XIX.22. "Philosophus nobilis, doctissimus philosophorum, quamvis Christianorum acerrimus inimicus" (2). Augustine presents the general doctrine of the 'Return of the Soul' in several passages, e.g. Cont. Acad. III.42. (end) De Ord. 2.47-51. Solil. I.5. &c. He also quotes & analyses this book De Civ. Dei, X.29. cp. ibid. 30, 32. 'The Philosophy of Oracles', De Civ. Dei, X.23, -X.9, & 10. -X.26, 27. and XIX.23. 'The Letter to Anebo', De Civ. Dei, X.II. Augustine reproduces a passage from 'The Principles of the Theory of Intelligibles' textually in De Musica, VI.40. Alfarić says that Augustine was able to know these several writings from the Latin version of Victorinus. see Alfarić, op.cit page, 375. also Bouillett, op.cit. Vol.2. page 561.

Plotinus in the Enneads. We shall see how clearly this is to be noticed as we examine Augustine's earlier works. Further we shall have an opportunity of <sup>discovering</sup> ~~noticing~~ that his doctrines and basal ideas unmistakably bear the marks of Neo-Platonic influence. But at the present juncture it will be sufficient to remark upon a few instances of very evident 'borrowings'.

For example, Augustine, in his Theory of the Purifying and Intellectual Virtues, has closely followed what Plotinus had already said in the book of the Enneads. (I) Here we may compare the definitions which he gives us on Prudence, Justice, Temperance, Courage, with those of Plotinus.

Again all the ideas which Augustine has developed in his De Quantitate Animae, 33. have been taken from the Enneads, Book, I. (2); and he closely follows the Arguments of Enneads, 4.7. 3. in De Immortalitate Animae, 8.14. (3). Moreover, in his treatise on 'Happiness' (De beata Vita), he has borrowed much from Enneads I.4. where Plotinus discourses on Happiness. Many of the arguments which he uses in his polemical writings against the Manichaeans. have also been drawn from what Plotinus has said when he writes against the Gnostics. On Time and on Eternity, as well as on 'Numbers', he owed much to Neo-Platonism. And, as we have already noticed, the well-known passage in the Confessions when he describes his ecstatic moment has been inspired

Foot Notes- (1). Enneads, I.2. see <sup>De</sup> Musica, VI.13-16. (2) See Bouill-et. op.cit. Vol. I. page, 590. (3). See Appendix, 3.

-red by Plotinus. (I) But there is no need to multiply comparisons at this point. We shall see that- "if Plotinus makes Plato live again, he himself lives again in Augustine". (2)

That is to say we shall find that, far more deeply than Augustine was conscious of, he had caught the spirit of Plotinus and formed the habit of interpreting the teaching of the great Philosophy in terms which he employs when dealing with Christian Truth.

Now we can well understand how this came to pass. At a transition period in his life St Augustine weary of Manichaeism, and inclined to doubt whether Truth could ever be discovered, finds in Neo-Platonism a new orientation by means of which his thoughts are spiritualised. It was like the opening of a window through which the freshness of the morning came with its breath of invigoration, quickening him into a newness of life.

It would seem as though at first he was converted to Neo-Platonism and was satisfied. Then the old memories of his early Religious training swept across his spirit and he turned to the New Testament and more especially the Pauline Epistles to find how far this New Philosophy confirmed the teaching he found there, for he argued that, since all Truth was one, this Religion could not be different from that highest wisdom. As he thought of God in terms of the Highest Being in the Triad of Neo-Platonism, so he saw that Jesus Christ was none other than the Nous of whom Plotinus had spoken. In like manner he sought to

Foot Notes- (I) Conf. IX.10. see Appendix 3. (2) Alfarié, op. cit. page, 518.

explain the Christian doctrines in terms of Neo-Platonic idealism. It is true that looking back upon his experience he feels ashamed of his delight in wisdom. (1) What brought him to his senses was the fact that, whilst he had seen the Truth, he seemed powerless to be delivered from the flesh. It was only when he read in the Epistles concerning the strivings of the flesh & the Spirit which so aptly seemed to describe his own condition, that what he had longed for became his and he found deliverance from the bondage of the flesh by the acceptance of the Lord Jesus Christ as his Saviour. Still he sought to find confirmation of the inner experience and an added certainty from the books of the Platonists. (2).

But sufficient has been said, at the present stage of our study, to indicate how pronounced was the influence of Neo-Platonism upon the life and thought of Augustine. We shall now proceed to deal with that period of his life when Neo-Platonism most clearly seemed to have captured his heart.

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Foot Notes- (1). Conf.VII.XX.26. "I prated as one well skilled;... For now I had begun to wish to seem wise, being filled with mine own punishment, yet I did not mourn, but rather scorn, puffed up with knowledge. For where was that charity building upon the foundation of humility, which is Christ Jesus? or when should these books teach me it?" cp.Ep.II8. 22. where Augustine describes the road to Truth as being 'first humility; second humility; third humility;' (2). Contra Acad.III.20.43. (Col.488.) "Mihi autem certum est nusquam prorsus a Christi auctoritate discedere: non enim reperio valentio rem. Quod autem subtilissima ratione persequendum est; ita enim jam sum affectus, ut quid sit verum, non credendo solum, sed etiam intelligendo apprehendere impatienter desiderem; apud Platonicos me interim quod sacris nostris non repugnet reperturum esse confido." See also Neander, op.cit.Vol.3.pp. 504-510.

## FULLER NOTES TO CHAPTER I. (Part 2.)

Page 110. Foot Note- (3). Contra Academicos, II.2.5.

"Since that vehement flame, which was about to seize me, as yet was not, I thought that by which I was slowly kindled, was the very greatest. When lo! certain books- when they had distilled a very few drops of most precious unguent on that tiny flame, it is past belief, and perhaps past what even you believe of me, (and what could I say more?) nay to myself also is it past belief, what a conflagration of myself they lighted. What ambition, what human show, what empty love of fame, or, lastly, what incitement or band of this mortal life could hold me then?

I turned speedily and wholly back into myself. I cast but a glance, I confess, as one passing on, upon that religion which was implanted into us, as boys, and interwoven with our very inmost selves; but she drew me unknowing to herself. So then stumbling, hurrying, hesitating, I seized the Apostle Paul; 'for never' said I, 'could they have wrought such things, or lived as it is plain they did live, if their writings and arguments were opposed to this so high good. I read the whole most intently and carefully. But then, never so little light having now been shed thereon, such a countenance of wisdom gleamed upon me, that if I could exhibit it,- I say not to you, who ever hungeredst after her though unknown- but to your very adversary, casting aside and abandoning whatever now stimulates him so keenly to whatsoever pleasures, he would, amazed, panting, enkindled, fly to her Beauty."

Page 112. Foot Note- (2). De Civitate Dei, X.2.

The opinion of Plotinus the Platonist regarding enlightenment- "But with these more estimable philosophers we have no dispute in this matter. For they perceived, and in various forms abundantly expressed in their writings, that these spirits have the same source of happiness as ourselves,- a certain intelligible light, which is their God, and is different from themselves, and illumined them that they may be penetrated with light, and enjoy perfect happiness in the participation of God. Plotinus, commenting on Plato, repeatedly and strongly asserts that not even the soul which they believe to be the soul of the world, derives its blessedness from any other source than we do, viz. from that Light which is distinct from it and created it, and by whose intelligible illumination it enjoys light in things intelligible. (cp. Enneads, II.IX.3.) He also compares those spiritual things to the vast and conspicuous heavenly bodies, as if God were the sun, and the soul the moon; (see Enneads, V.VI.4.) for they suppose that the moon derives its light from the sun. That great Platonist, therefore, says that the rational soul, or rather the intellectual soul,- in which class he comprehends the souls of the blessed immortals who inhabit heaven,- has no nature superior to it save God, the Creator of the world and the soul itself, and that these heavenly



## FULLER NOTES TO CHAPTER I. (Part 2.)

Page II2. Foot Note- De Civitate Dei, X.2. continued.

spirits derive their blessed life, and the light of truth, from the same source as ourselves, agreeing with the gospel where we read, - 'There was a man sent from God whose name was John; the same came for a witness to bear witness of that Light, that through Him all might believe. He was not that Light, but that he might bear witness of the Light. That was the true Light which lighteth every man that cometh into the world;'- a distinction which sufficiently proves that the rational or intellectual soul such as John had cannot be its own light, but needs to receive illumination from another, the true Light. This John himself avows when he delivers his witness: 'We have all received of His fulness'. (see Enneads, IV.3.XI.) (Dods trans. Vol. I. pages, 385, 6.)

For translations from the Enneads, see Appendix 3.

Page X II2. Foot Note- (5).

De Civitate Dei, IX.10. Translated Dods, pages, 364, 5. Vol. I.

"Plotinus, whose memory is quite recent, enjoys the reputation of having understood Plato better than any other of his disciples. (Plotinus died in 270 A.D. For his relation to Plato, see Contra Acad. III.41.) In speaking of human souls, he says, - 'The Father in compassion made their bonds mortal;' (Enneads, IV.3.12.) that is to say, he considered it due to the Father's mercy that men, having a mortal body, should not be for ever confined in the misery of this life".

De Civitate Dei, IX.17. See Dods, op.cit. Vol. I. page, 374.

"I am considerably surprised that such learned men, men who pronounce all material and sensible things to be altogether inferior to those that are spiritual and intelligible, should mention bodily contact in connection with the blessed life. Is that sentiment of Plotinus forgotten? - 'We must fly to our beloved fatherland. There is the Father, there our all. What fleet or flight shall convey us thither? Our way is, to become like God'. If, then, one is nearer to God the liker he is to Him, there is no other distance from God than unlikeness to Him. And the soul of man is unlike that incorporeal and unchangeable and eternal essence, in proportion as it craves things temporal and mutable." (see Enneads, I.VI.8. and I.2.3.)

Enneads, I.VI.8. *φύλασσε γὰρ ὁ θεὸς τὴν ψυχὴν εἰς πατρίδα· τίς οὖν ἡ φύξις; . . . πατὴρ δὲ ἡμῶν ὁ θεὸς παρήλαθε καὶ πατὴρ ἐκείνους· τίς οὖν ὁ δαίμων καὶ ἡ φύξις.*

Enneads, I.2.3. *τὴν ὁμοίωσιν τὴν πρὸς τὸν θεὸν φύξιν τὸν ζῆν τεύθουσιν εἶναι.*

## FULLER NOTES TO CHAPTER I. (Part 2.) continued-

De Civitate Dei, X.14. see Dods, op.cit. Vol.I. pages, 402, 3.

"The Platonist Plotinus discourses concerning providence, and from the beauty of flowers and foliage, proves that from the supreme God, whose beauty is unseen and ineffable, providence reaches down even to these earthly things here below; and he argues that all these frail and perishing things could not have so exquisite and elaborate a beauty, were they not fashioned by Him whose unseen and unchangeable beauty continually pervades all things".

Here the reference is to Enneads, 3.2.13. (see Appendix, 3)

De Civitate Dei, X.23. see Dods, op.cit. Vol.I. pages, 413, 4.

"And what he (Porphyry) as a Platonist means by 'Principles', we know. For he speaks of God the Father and God the Son, whom he calls (writing in Greek) the intellect or mind of the Father; but of the Holy Spirit he says either nothing, or nothing plainly, for I do not understand what other he speaks of as holding the middle place between these two. For if, like Plotinus in his discussion regarding the three Principal substances, he wished us to understand by this third the soul of nature, he would certainly not have given it the middle place between these two, that is, between the Father and the Son. For Plotinus places the soul of nature after the intellect of the Father, while Porphyry, making it the mean, does not place it after, but between the others. No doubt he spoke according to his light, or as he thought expedient; but we assert that the Holy Spirit is the Spirit not of the Father only, nor of the Son only, but of both."

Compare the whole book, Enneads, V.I. 'On the Three Principle Hypostases'—  $\pi\epsilon\rho\iota\ \tau\hat{\omega}\nu\ \tau\rho\iota\hat{\omega}\nu\ \acute{\alpha}\rho\chi\iota\kappa\hat{\omega}\nu$   
 $\delta\ \tau\hat{\omega}\sigma\tau\acute{\alpha}\sigma\epsilon\omega\upsilon$

De Civitate Dei, X.30. see Dods, op.cit. Vol.I. pages, 426, 7.

"If it is considered unseemly to emend anything which Plato has touched, why did Porphyry himself make emendations, and these not a few? for it is very certain that Plato wrote that the souls of men return after death to the bodies of beasts. Plotinus also, Porphyry's teacher, held this opinion; yet Porphyry justly rejected it."

The reference here is to Enneads, III.4.2.  
 (see Appendix 3.)

Page, II3. Foot Note- (I)

"Os illud Platonis quod in philosophia purgatissimum est et lucidissimum, dimotis nubibus erroris emicuit, maxime in Plotino, qui platonicus philosophus ita ejus similis judicatus est, ut simul eos vixisse, tamen autem interest temporis ut in hoc ille revixisse putandus sit". Contra Acad. III.18.41. (col. 486.)

FULLER NOTES TO CHAPTER I. (Part 2.) continued-

Page, II3. Foot Note- (2).

Epis. II3 and De Vera Relig.I2.

"Plotini schola Romae floruit habuitque condiscipulos multos acutissimos et solertissimos viros. Sed aliqui eorum magicarum artium curiositate depravati sunt; aliqui, Dominum Jesum Christum ipsius veritatis atque sapientiae incommutabilis (quam conabantur attingere) cognoscentes gestare personam, in ejus militiam transierunt".

"et, paucis mutatis verbis et sententiis, Christiani fierent, sicut plerique recentiorum nostrorumque temporum Platonici fuerunt."

Page II3. Foot Note- (4).

Retractationes I.3. "Verum et in his libris displicet mihi saepe interpositum fortunae vocabulum.....et quod philosophos non vera pietate praeditos dixi virtutis luce fulsisse. Et quod duos mundos, unum sensibilem, alterum intelligibilem, non ex Platonis vel ex Platoniorum persona, sed ex mea sic commendavi....."

In speaking of the Platonists, that is, Plotinus and Porphyry, Augustine makes use of the terms, 'Quidam docti' (De Musica, VI.13) 'Non mediocriter docti homines' (De Civ.Dei, V.I.) 'Doctissimi homines' (De quantitate Animae, 30.) and others of a like kind.

.....

## CHAPTER, 2.

## THE CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHER AT CASSICIACUM.

We have fortunately other sources , to which we can turn apart from the Confessions, for our study of the development of the thought of St Augustine, and in our attempt to mark the influence of Neo-Platonism upon his life.

A very valuable help for the purpose which we have in hand is the account which he has himself given us of his sojourn at Cassiciacum in the interval between his conversion and his baptism. Indeed the writings of this important period furnish an additional chapter to the Confessions, and at the same time correct, somewhat, many of the impressions which we may have perhaps gained as we have read the brief account given to us in St Augustine's story of his soul's awakening.

But this is hardly <sup>to</sup> be wondered at, since the Confessions were written some twelve or thirteen years after the events which he relates took place, and naturally he would see the facts in a somewhat changed perspective; whilst the story of the Cassiciacum days and his reflections at that time follow immediately after the scene in the garden.(1)

We shall, however, see as we proceed that this new view point does not materially contradict what we have already gleaned from our study, and that, despite certain criticisms which have been passed upon these seemingly different accounts,

Foot Notes- (1). The date of the Confessions has been estimated as somewhere between 397 and 400, whilst his conversion took place towards the end of July or the beginning of August, 386. A.D. He retired to Cassiciacum probably in the August, of that same year.

the situation in the Dialogues is not incompatible with the representations of the Confessions. (1)

After resigning his professorship of Rhetoric at Milan, Augustine tells us that he retired to Cassiciacum, a country house which was lent to him by his friend Verecundus. (2) Without a doubt his chief reason for his resignation was an earnest desire for a season of reflection and an opportunity of thinking out the new implications which presented themselves to him. His health, it is true, had given him an occasion for anxiety, but he knew above all else that amid the round of his professional duties he would have no opportunity of giving himself to a serious consideration of the new Truth which had been revealed to him at this important stage of his career. The monastic life appealed to him; moreover, he must needs make some preparation for his baptism. Many reasons then prompted him to accept gladly his friend's offer of his country home.

That there were more than his own people with him in his retreat we learn from this new account of his retirement there. In addition to his mother Monnica, his son Adeodatus, his brother Navigius; there also accompanied him two of his cousins, Lastidianus and Rusticus, his old friend Alypius, and two of his pupils, Trygetius and Licentius.

Foot Notes- (1). We may note L.Gourdon, 'Essai sur la conversion de Saint Augustin', (Cahors, 1900); and H.Becker, 'Augustin Studien zu seiner geistigen Entwicklung', (Leipzig, 1908). See Montgomery's criticism of these in his vol. 'St Augustine, aspects of his life and thought', (Hodder & Stoughton, MCMXIV) pages, 33, and following. (2). Confessions, IX.3.5.

It may come as a matter of surprise to us that St Augustine, so desirous of the quiet which was needful to him at this time, should have taken so many with him into the country, and that, after resigning his professorship, he should have taken up this further duty of teaching the youths who shared in his retreat. But Augustine had given up his livelihood and having inherited little from his father, he was compelled to find some means of support for his mother and son as well as for himself(1) He knew the necessity of having leisure, but he had no income to retire on; he therefore, perforce had to take pupils. When, moreover, we recollect that the fathers of Trygetius and Licentius were both wealthy men, and that Romanianus, who had always been most generous to Augustine, was the father of Licentius, it would seem that here Augustine had found a way of obtaining his opportunity for self-recollection, and that he <sup>was,</sup> at the same time, thus able to obtain the wherewithal to accomplish his desires.(2)

In the Dialogues written at Cassiciacum we have a vivid picture of the life they passed there and a glimpse given to us of the way in which Augustine spent his time. (3)

They were indeed a merry party, bright, jocular, and at times even boisterous. Augustine himself, upon occasion, shares in their jest and play. They lived a common life, Augustine admirably filling the rôle of guide, philosopher, and friend, - very evidently beloved by all around him.

Foot Notes- (1). Augustine speaks (Contra Academicos, 2.2.4. Col. 441 of the necessity of providing for his dependents as having hindered him from giving up his profession. (2). Montgomery, op.cit. pages, 36, 37. (3). For the best account of the period, see 'La fin du paganisme', Vol. I. pages, 313-325.

Their fellowship together has been compared to that which took place between Cicero and his friends beneath the shades of the tree at Tusculum, and this indeed must often have been in Augustine's mind; although, as Dr. Gibb rather suggests, "an apter comparison would be that of a reading party from an English University under the leadership of a sympathetic tutor. (1

Monnica naturally had charge of the domestic arrangements, but we find her occasionally joining in their discussions. When the weather was fine they wandered in the meadows, talking as they went, or, sitting beneath the shade of some great tree, they discoursed on the themes that were before them; if the day were wet, they would adjourn to a spacious bath-room for their talks. The conversations were taken down by a shorthand writer, not only to give continuity to their debate, but also that they might be preserved and serve as a literary legacy for the friends and pupils of Augustine at Milan and elsewhere.

Sometimes Augustine must needs absent himself in order to deal with his correspondence; at other times he is engaged with the payment of accounts, or attending to the work on the farm and to duties in connection with the management of the estate. (2). Very evidently Verecundus had entrusted him with the responsibilities of ownership, for the time being. But we see

Foot Notes- (1). Alfarc, op.cit. page, 398. - See the preface to 'The Confessions', Gibb & Montgomery, Patristic Texts.

(2). Contra Academ. I. 5. 15. (col. 432.) "diesque pene totus cum in rusticis ordinandis". Contra Academ. 2. 4. 10. (col. 445.) here we are told- that they 'rose earlier than usual to help the labourers with some work for which time pressed'.

Augustine finding opportunity also for private study and devotion.

Here and there throughout the narrative we have illuminating touches as with apt phrase Augustine gives us an insight into the personal characteristics of his companions; (1) moreover we have descriptive scenes of happenings by night & by day. (2) These, and other asides, lend colour and give vividness to the picture of the days at Cassiciacum.

But their tutor is not unmindful of the fact that a major portion of his time must be taken up with the education of the youths entrusted to his care. We find him covering a varied field; whilst he lectured on grammar, rhetoric, & history, he does not neglect the study of the Classics. One day he explains the first book of the Georgics, and, in the week that follows, three others; of these he makes them read a portion each evening. (3)

His chief subject, however, is the study of philosophy as the gateway to the blessed life. Licentius, who was in the habit of slipping away from breakfast in order to write poetry, is reminded that Philosophy is much more attractive than the Muses; (4) and at length Licentius confesses that indeed Philosophy has become fairer to him than all the love tales of the poets, 'and with a sigh he gives thanks to Christ'. (5)

Foot Notes- (1). De Ordine, I.2.5. (col.533.); Contra Acad. I.1.2. Contra Acad. I.2.5. De Ordine, I.7. De beata vita, 7.14.  
(2). See De Ordine, I.2.5. 3.6.; 8. (25,26.) (3). Contra Acad. 2.4.10. De Ordine, I.8.26. (4). De Ordine, I.3.8. & I.5.12.  
(5). De Ordine, I.8.21. (col.542.)



Still Augustine is anxious that there shall be a good ground-work of other knowledge before Philosophy is fully studied. We find, for example, Augustine writing to Romanianus concerning his son Licentius:- "Your boy is beginning to take an interest in philosophy, but I restrain him somewhat, that he may make firmer and better progress when he has been thoroughly trained in the necessary disciplines". (I)

In our brief outline of this period we have seen the kind of life which St Augustine lived at Cassiciacum, and that he endeavoured to instruct his pupils in philosophy. In doing this, however, we must remember that the master himself was feeling his way towards certainty in deeper matters, and that he sought to arrive at a solution of the problems which vexed him by the help of the New Philosophy which had appealed so strongly to him. Whilst instructing his pupils he was then endeavouring to ground himself in philosophical knowledge.

Before we pass in review the writings of this time which will clearly indicate how markedly St Augustine was under the influence of Philosophy, let us see how Philosophy had made its appeal to him before his acquaintance with Neo-Platonism. We have already noticed that as a youth of nineteen, the reading of the Hortensius kindled within him a remarkable ardour. Whilst later he had become attracted by Aristotle's Categories or Predicaments. But these experiences were but, as it were, preliminary essays into a new field of knowledge.

Foot Notes- (I). Montgomery, op.cit. page, 36.

As we read the Dialogues we are impressed by the fact that, at this stage of his development, Philosophy has won his whole-hearted allegiance, and taken him captive.

In order to illustrate this, let us here mark the frequent references which he makes to Philosophy. He expresses his delight that he has escaped from the world and has taken refuge- 'in the bosom of Philosophy'. (1) Writing to Romanianus he says- 'At the time when you were absent, I never ceased to aspire after Philosophy, and after that life which was more pleasing and agreeable to me than anything else'. (2) He declares that after reading the Epistles of St. Paul the face of Philosophy appeared to him in all its attractive beauty. (3).

But what did St Augustine precisely mean when he made use of the word 'Philosophy'? He has supplied us with numerous definitions in his early as well as in his later writings. He tells us that- 'Philosophy consists of a taste for & a love of Wisdom'; (4) that the very name 'Philosophers' signifies those who profess the love of Wisdom; and he adds- 'now if Wisdom is God, by whom all things are made, as authority and truth show, then the Philosopher is a lover of God'. (5) Again he says- 'To be a Philosopher is, according to Plato, to love God'. (6) Philosophy is the guide of men in order that they may learn the principle of all things. (7) It treats of God and

Foot Notes- (1). Contra Acad. I.I.3. (col.424) 'in philosophiae gremium confugere'. (2). Contra Acad. 2.2.5. (col.442.) (3). Contra Acad. 2.2. (6. & 7) cols. 442, 3. (4). De Moribus Ecclesiae, 21, 38. 'Et quia ipsum nomen si consideretur, rem magnam toto animo appetendam significat, siquidem philosophia est amor studiumque sapientiae'. (5). De Civ. Dei, 8.1. also Contra Acad. 2.3.7. (col.443). (6) De Civ. Dei, 1 8.8. (7). De Ordine, 2.5.16. (col.562).

and the Soul, and by its help we are able to know our nature and whence it came.(1) It gives satisfaction to all our aspirations and leads us to blessedness. (2)

All this assuredly indicates how warmly August-  
-ine had embraced Philosophy and what expectations he had from its guidance.

Now from our knowledge of the experiences of St. Augustine up to the present, there can be no doubt that he is here thinking of Neo-Platonism. Grandgeorge, who has made an exhaustive survey of the works of Augustine, assures us that very evidently the systems of philosophy which had attracted St Augustine most were those of Plato and the Neo-Platonists. Grandgeorge informs us that Augustine quotes Plato fifty-two times, and that the Neo-Platonists are mentioned forty times: & he adds- 'This is not surprising for the philosophy of Plato agreed fully on several points with Christianity; the fame of Plato was also very great in the time of St Augustine...and the philosophy of Plato was a system which, more than any other, would please a spirit such as that of St. Augustine, eager, as he was for Truth and Beauty'. (3)

But despite the fact that Augustine has written in the highest terms of appreciation concerning Plato, (4) it is probable that in reality Plato had not the influence upon him that we might have expected. For one thing, as we have seen,

Foot Notes- (1) De Ordine, 2.18.47.(col.581.) (2) De beata vita, I.I.(col.497) 'Si ad philosophiae portum, de quo jam in beat-  
-ae vitae, regionem solumque proceditur'. (3) 'Saint August-  
-in et Le Néo-Platonisme', L.Grandgeorge, Paris, 1896. page, 32.  
(4) See Contra Acad.3.17.37.(col.483.) also De Civ.Dei, 8.4;  
8.II;22.28. De Vera Relig.3.3.(col.1208)

Augustine often uses the term 'Platonists' when clearly he means the 'Neo-Platonists'. For another, he was not happy with the Greek language, and preferred rather to read Greek philosophy through the medium of a translation. (1). This leads us to conclude that it was Neo-Platonism which exercised a predominating influence upon his thought. Indeed, Augustine himself later, referring to the writings composed 'in his breathing time', suffused as they were by the spirit of Neo-Platonism, tells us that they were written in a style which, although enlisted in the service of God, yet breathed something of the pride of the Schools. (2) Here we have an indication of the fact that Augustine himself realized that he was under the spell of Neo-Platonism. Now there has been much criticism with respect to the difference in tone and atmosphere which exists between the writings of this Cassiciacum period and those of the Confessions. Critics have gone so far as to maintain that Augustine was not really converted to Christianity at all, but only to Neo-Platonism. But does that affirmation fully meet all the facts of the case? After all at Cassiciacum, Augustine was but a novitiate in the Christian Faith; feeling his way towards greater certainty, and a surer conception of the Truth. Neo-Platonism had attracted him, helped to make clear much that had been hard to understand, and, moreover, to him did not appear, at this period

Foot Notes- (1). Dr. Gibb tells us (Gibb & Montgomery, Confessions, op.cit. Preface, p. XXXIX) 'Possibly the reading of the Enneads led St Augustine to acquaint himself with the works of Plato. ... He seems to have known, though perhaps at second-hand, Phaedrus, Philebus, Theaetetus, Charmides, Laws. With Timaeus (which was translated into Latin by Cicero) he was familiar.'

(2). Confessions, IX.4.7.

to differ very greatly from Christianity. (1) Indeed we have already remarked that when Augustine read the Pauline Epistles he found there the same truths which had been revealed to him in Neo-Platonism. It would be very surprising if we found in the Dialogues what is to be seen, at a later period, in the Confessions. In the record of his life there is more maturity in his Christian thought; and whilst there is even in the Confessions abundant evidence of the influence of Neo-Platonism, (2) it is clear that he has become more truly grounded in the Christian Faith. It is perfectly true that the atmosphere of the Confessions is different from that of the Dialogues. But in the former book he is giving an account of his Soul's pilgrimage, whilst in the latter books he is engaged in Philosophical speculation which he seeks to reconcile with Christian Truth. At Cassiciacum he was in touch with young men who knew little about Christianity, but who were deeply interested in Philosophy. Neo-Platonism had led him into the light, was it too much that he should assume that through the same gate-way of Philosophy he might also be able to lead his young friends to Christ?

Further, in the mind of Augustine there seemed to be nothing incongruous in uniting a love for Philosophy with a like love for Religion. Perhaps, too, St Augustine is here assuring his old friends that, in spite of the fact that he has

Foot Notes- (1). Contra Acad. 3.20.43. (col. 488.) 'Apud Platonicos me interim quod sacris nostris non repugnet repertum esse confido'. (2). Notably in his view of Evil, in his thought concerning the 'Inner Sense', Time, Eternity, Memory, his conception of Ideas, the Order of the world, Providence, and his account of the Mystic Vision; as well as other clear indications of the spell of Neo-Platonism.

become a Christian, he has not given up his study of Philosophy.

There is abundant evidence in the Dialogues that the devotional life was not forgotten and that whilst he was busy teaching his pupils the knowledge of the Schools he was himself a seeker after the highest Truth to which Philosophy had opened his eyes.

For example we read that he had formed the habit of spending, - 'the beginning or ending, generally the half, of the night in watching and seeking out truth.....nor do I allow myself to be taken away from myself by the studies of the young men'. (1) Again we read- 'I prayed to God with almost daily weeping that my wounds might be healed, but often upbraided myself as unworthy to be healed as soon as I wished'. (2)

Several times we have mention made of his daily prayers. (3)

Thus we see that whilst he was busy with the problems of Philosophy he was also careful concerning the nurture of the inner life. Impressed by all that Neo-Platonism had been able to reveal to him, he regarded Philosophy as his guide into the highest realms of Truth.

But now, ere this chapter is brought to a close, we must pass rapidly in review the writings which he penned during his days of retirement; for here we shall be able to find abundant illustration of the influence of this newly found Philosophy.

Foot Notes- (1). De Ordine, I.3.6. (col.533). (2). De Ordine, I.10.29. (col.547.) (3). De Ordine, I.8.25.(col.544). Soliloquia, I.(2-6). (cols.598-602) Epist. 3.4. addressed to Nebridius, "Thus I talked with myself, then prayed according to my custom, and fell asleep".

In his first work, that of the *Contra Academicos*, (1) we are able to indicate few direct references to the books of the *Enneads*, perhaps this may have been due to the fact that at the first he had none of the writings of Plotinus with him; or it may be that he was only a beginner in the study of that Philosophy, which was so greatly to enrich his thought; indeed he gives us hints of this, as he frequently makes reference to his lack of knowledge, and declares that he can hardly yet speak of himself as a wise man, although he hopes some day to become one. (2)

On the other hand he continually speaks of the Philosophy to which he has become attached, as being the highest ideal that he has been able to find, as the 'harbour' by which he is to enter the life of happiness. (3) Wisdom, he says, claims for itself, sometimes authority, at other times Reason. The former enjoins faith; the latter, on the other hand, gains for us knowledge. (4) But whilst the one is the gateway for the multitude, the other is only accessible to the few. The one is useful, but the other makes greater demands upon us. Accordingly it is Wisdom which, above all else he will seek. (5) The new convert makes mention of the Christian 'Mysteries', and that very name he borrows from Neo-Platonism. (6) We gather then from these writings against the Sceptical Philosophers as well as from the other writings of the period that Augustine has taken Plotinus to be his guide in the firm belief that his teaching does

Foot Notes- (1). These books in three vols. were written in 386. (2) *Contra Acad.* I.I.3. (col. 424), also Book 2. (2, 6, 9,) Book, 3 (12, 17). &c. (3). *Cont. Acad.* I.I.3. (col. 424) *C. Acad.* 2.I.I. (cols. 439, 440) *C. Acad.* 2.3.8. (col. 444.) (4). See Martin, 'Saint Augustin' (*Les Grands Philosophes*, 2nd. Ed. Paris, 1923) pages, 1-5. for St. Augustine's distinction between knowledge and Wisdom. (6). *C. Acad.* 3.20.43. (cols. 487.8) *Enneads* VI. 9. 11. 5. 5.

not contradict what is set forth in the Sacred Scriptures.

Indeed, Alfarcic goes so far as to say,-

"Moralement comme intellectuellement c'est au Néoplatonisme qu'il s'est converti, plutôt qu'à l'Évangile". (1)

These first books of the Contra Academicos, St Augustine dedicates to his friend and patron, Romanianus.

His treatise opens with a debate on the question of Truth. It is agreed at the outset, that whilst happiness may not consist in the possession of Truth, yet Truth, at any rate, should be sought after. Finally after a discussion which occupies several days, they conclude that Truth is to be found in the Philosophy of Plato, revived by Plotinus. Augustine then proceeds to declare that the Wisdom taught by the Schools, that is by Neo-Platonism, is not alien with that which the Church proclaims concerning the Christian Faith. In spite of the fact that the Holy Scriptures warn us against the philosophy of this world, these do not condemn the highest truths which lead men beyond what has been revealed to sense, that is, to intelligible realities. In short whilst Augustine trusts that he will find nothing in the teaching of the Platonists which is opposed to the teaching of the Holy Religion, yet the latter is presented by the Church in a simpler way and one better fitted for the needs of the multitude. (2)

Dialectic with its subtle distinctions could never have the power of delivering the souls of men from error or cleansing them from earthly stains, if the Almighty God

Foot Notes- (1). Alfarcic, op.cit. page, 399. (2). Contra Acad. 3. 20.43. (col.488) "Apud Platonicos me interim quod sacris nostris non repugnet reperturum esse confido".



had not united His Intelligence with the human frame, that men might be taught by example as well as precept to enter again into themselves and return to their Fatherland. Then Augustine sounds the Christian note as he declares that the Wisdom which formerly was the possession of the élite has become in Jesus Christ at the disposal of the many. (1)

Very probably Augustine had here in his mind the third tractate of the first book of the Enneads, which deals with 'Dialectic' or 'The Upward way'. We see also a recollection of the 'Nous' of Plotinus,; indeed, it may be that we have a parallel between the words of Augustine here and those of Plotinus. (2)

We may note also a passage where, speaking of Plato, Augustine says- "He has given thus to Philosophy its last and definite form. According to the terms of his teaching there are two worlds, widely separated, the one Intelligible, where Truth dwells, the other Sensible, made in the image of the former, which is manifested to us who feel by sight and touch. The Soul which knows itself raises itself to the first; that which is ignorant of itself remains imprisoned in the second. The one contemplates pure ideas; the other sees them laboriously through opinions. This one restrains itself by practising the 'Civic' or inferior virtues; that other realises the true moral sense set apart for the few wise." (3)

Augustine here presents also a reference to the doctrine of Porphyry's 'Return of the Soul' from which he often

Foot Notes- (1). Contra Academicos, 3.XIX.42.XX.43. cp. De Ordine, 2.5.16. (2). Enneads, V.I.II. (3). Contra Acad. 3.I7.37. (col. 484 c.p. - Enneads, 1.2.7: 1.3.1: 1.2(2.3): 1.3.2. (Appendix. 3)

quotes in the tenth book of the De Civitate Dei. (1)

About this time Augustine sends a letter to Hermogenianus, in reply to one which he had received from his friend who has expressed his pleasure in reading the Contra Academicos. It is only needful to quote the final sentence- "But whatever be the value of those treatises, what I most rejoice in is, not that I have vanquished the Academicians, as you express it (using the language rather of friendly partiality than of truth), but that I have broken and cast away from me the odious bonds by which I was kept back from the nourishing breasts of philosophy, through despair of attaining that truth which is the food of the soul. " (2)

Immediately after the completion of the first book of the 'Contra Academicos', Augustine began his 'De beata Vita'. In this treatise on the subject of Happiness he not only borrows his title but a great deal of his argument from the Enneads. (3) Just as he had dedicated his previous book to Romanianus, so he addresses this in a preface to his friend Theodorus, and in this preface he explains the origin and aim of his new work. (4)

In the following brief outline of Augustine's tractate it will be readily seen how deeply indebted he was here to Plotinus.

Foot Notes- (1). See Bouillet, op.cit. Vol.I.page LXX. for a translation of Porphyry's, Fifth Ennead, Book 2.<sup>30</sup>. 'On the Return of beings to the First'. (2) Epistle, I.(A.D.386.) The works of Augustine, Vol.VI.page,3.translated Dods. (T. & T. Clark, Edinburgh, 1872.) (3).Enneads, I.4. on 'Happiness'. (4).De beata Vita,4.(col.500.)This preface points clearly to the fact that Augustine, fired by the reading of Plotinus, had resigned his professorship that he might devote himself to the study of Philosophy.He however mentions, also, here his 'pectoris dolor'. See Fuller Notes.

Let us grant, says St Augustine, that we all wish for happiness. Does not happiness, however, imply an absence of unhappiness? Still whilst we may say that the unfortunate man is unhappy because of his poverty, it does not follow that all who are poor are, on that account, unhappy. (1)

For example, the man who is in possession of Wisdom may stand in need of many things without necessarily being unhappy, since he has sufficient moral character not to be afraid of physical privation. He possesses also what he ever desires. (2) On the other hand have we never known men who live in the sunshine of material well-being who yet live a life of misery, since Wisdom is absent? In a word then, it is folly which constitutes the real poverty. (3)

Indeed Wisdom should be esteemed the best kind of wealth since it suggests the thought of fulness. (4)

To put it more correctly, Wisdom is to the Soul what nourishment is to the body, and in addition Wisdom declares itself to be greatly superior to all material food. Still, as with feastings it is needful to shun all excess, so too with the banquets of the Spirit. Wisdom presupposes frugality, propriety, the things which Cicero has rightly associated with moderation and temperance. In effect, Wisdom implies an agreeable manner, a just temperament; lacking nothing, it has yet nothing too much,

Foot Notes- (1). Plotinus begins his treatise on Happiness by asking the same question. Enneads, I.IV.1. see Appendix, 3. (2). De beata Vit. 25. cp. Enneads, I.IV.4. where Plotinus also agrees that it is the sage who possesses happiness. (See Appendix, 3.) (3). compare Enneads, I.IV.2. (4). De beata Vit. 31. 'Et si egestas est ipsa stultitia plenitudo erit sapientia'. see Enneads, I.IV.3.

for if this were the case it would be wanting in moderation. All things are held in fitting restraint, since Wisdom avoids all things that create vanity, such as luxury, pride, ambition; and also all that hampers us, as meanness, fear, melancholy, or indeed cupidity. Wisdom is the regulating principle of the Soul.

(1) Whosoever, therefore, is happy has accordingly his own power of moderation (modus), which is Wisdom. But when we speak of Wisdom, of what do we think? Surely of the Wisdom of God. But we have it on the Divine Authority that the Son of God is nothing else than the Wisdom of God, and that the Son of God is really God. Whoever then has God is happy. But what do you estimate wisdom to be, is it not really Truth? For even thus is it written: 'I am the Truth'. But it indeed becomes Truth by reason of such a high standard from which it proceeds, and through its own innate perfection, it transforms us. But the Standard which represents Wisdom cannot be measured by any other thing; measureless itself, it constitutes the First Principle, from which all comes. In other words, it is God Himself. Whoever then through the Truth has arrived at the highest standard (summum modum), is happy. For such has God in his soul, that is he enjoys God. (2) But, adds St Augustine, there is ~~is~~ a certain friendly Adviser who acts with us in order that the very thought of God

Foot Notes- (1). De beata Vit. 32. 'Sapientia igitur plenitudo. In plenitudine autem modus. Modus igitur animi in sapientia est .... Ut ne quid nimis'. Compare Enneads, I.8.2. (See Appendix 3.) (2). Plotinus establishes a close analogy between the Supreme Being or the Sovereign Rule and Wisdom. He also makes man's highest well being to consist in the observance of the Standard. See Enneads, I.8.2. (Appendix, 3.)

may be recalled to our minds, that we may seek Him, that, with every loathsome thing thrust far from us, we may thirst after Him. From that very Fount of Truth He Himself comes to us.

Now that mysterious Agent is only capable of producing such effects in us as He is the All Powerful One and the Sovereignly Good. Without losing any part of His own life, He participates in the perfection of the Divine Nature.

Happiness therefore, consists for us, in our union with Him, that through Him we may arrive at the Contemplation of Wisdom and by Wisdom at the possession of the Supreme from whom all things proceed.

So closely does the Neo-Platonic doctrine of the Trinity here given by St Augustine, resemble that of the Church, that Monnica joyously gives expression to her feelings by breaking forth into the Ambrosian hymn to the Trinity,

'Help us as we pray, O Trinity!' (I)

Here then we can well see how closely Augustine in these days at Cassiciacum, followed in the steps of Plotinus.

But passing onward to notice the other books of this same period, we find that the day after St Augustine had completed his book on the subject of Happiness, he begins his first treatise on 'De Ordine', a book which has for its theme the

Foot Notes- (I). This thought of an inward guide or friendly adviser is referred to again and again by Augustine. Solil. I. (# 2, & 3) It is He who makes us understand, (Solil. I. 15.) He is identified with Reason, (Solil. I. I.). Is named as being by the side of Sovereign Intelligence and of the First-Principle. (De Ordine, 2.26.) A like idea although somewhat different from that of the Universal Soul, known as superior Reason, which directs beings, is to be found in Enneads, 2.3.13. Iv.4.39. Cp. also De Diversis Quaest. 83.5. & Enns. I. IV. I.

Divine Providence. He himself gives us an explanation of the purpose of this book:- "I have written two books on 'Order', in which the great question is considered, as to whether the Order of the Divine Providence is concerned with everything, good and bad alike. But when I saw that it was a theme difficult to understand and that it lay somewhat beyond the grasp of those with whom I was dealing; I chose rather to speak concerning the order of applying oneself to learning by what means one can advance from things corporeal to things incorporeal". (1)

We shall find in these books also a strongly Neo-Platonic influence. Plotinus had dealt with the subject of Providence in the second tractate of the third book of his *Enneads*. From this and from other portions of the writings of Plotinus, Augustine has been able to make use of many suggestions.

This new work he dedicates to his friend Zenobius, to whom he addresses his second letter, probably about the same time. In the first and second chapters of his first book of the 'De Ordine' St Augustine has given to us a delightful description of the character of his friend.

Since we shall be dealing with this book in a later chapter when we discuss the influence of Neo-Platonism upon St Augustine's doctrine of Providence and Optimism, it is unnecessary to give an outline here of the author's argument. (2)

Foot Notes- (1). *Retractationes*, I.3.1. (cols. 27, 28.) (2) See Appendix, 3. for parallel passages. *Enneads*, I.2. (1-6); I.3. (1-6); I.6. (1-2); I.8.5; 2.3.7; 2.3.18; 3.2. (2, 8, 11, 14, 17); 3.3.5; IX.3. (1, 25, 28, 29).

Immediately St Augustine had finished his *De Ordine*, he began to commit to writing his meditations or 'talks with himself', to which he gives the name 'Soliloquia'. These are in two books, and they were written probably in the December of the year which preceded his baptism, or at any rate, early in 387.A.D.

In these books we have another side of Augustine's nature portrayed; here we have presented to us the outpourings of his soul as he cried out after God. As a Candidate preparing for Christian baptism he felt it to be needful to cherish and foster the life of the Spirit. Possibly he is here carrying out in a very practical way the advice so frequently given by Plotinus, that if a man would enter upon the Upward Way which would lead him to be 'alone with the alone' he must begin his quest by entering into himself. (1)

In his very prayers we are able to see here that he very evidently thinks of God in terms which Plotinus has set before him. In his doctrine of Grace also, he follows the conceptions of Neo-Platonism.

In his *Soliloquia* Augustine moreover has drawn from the writings of Porphyry; notably from his treatise 'On the Return of the Soul', (2) and also from his other work, 'The Philosophy of the Oracles'. (3) . In the first book there are

Foot Notes- (1). *Enneads*, V.8.2. and V.I.I2. &c. (2). *Solil.* I.6.I2. (col.606). *Solil.* I.X.I7. (cols.609,610) compare *Retract.* I.4.4. (3). In his invocation (*Solil.* I.I.(2-6) (Cols.598-602) Bouillet, (op.cit.Vol.3.page,626.) suggests that possibly Augustine had in his mind Porphyry's invocation to God, in book X. of his 'Philosophy of the Oracles' See also Alfarić, op.cit.432.page. where he draws attention to the analogy. See also, Bright, 'Lessons from the lives of three great Fathers' (2nd.Ed.Longmans Green.1891)Appendix,XI.pp.253-257.

two references to the 'Platonists'. (1)

Here we bring our study of the Dialogues to a close. They have been of special value since here we have abundant illustration of how closely Augustine had fellowship with Plotinus. (2)

.....

Foot Notes- (1). In Solil. I.IV.9.(Col.604.) Augustine says- "If the things which Plato and Plotinus have said concerning God are true, is it not enough for thee thus to know God, since they knew Him". Again towards the close of Solil. I.I3.23. (Col.614) he apparently refers to the Platonists when he says- "Tale aliquid sapientiae studiosissimis, nec acute, jam tamen videntibus, magistri optimi faciunt".

(2). For parallel passages see Appendix, 3. under, Enneads, I.2.(4,5.); I.3.6; I.6.7; V.I.II,12.; V.3.17.

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FULLER NOTES TO CHAPTER 2. (Part 2.)

Page, 136. FOOT NOTE- (4).

De beata Vita, 4. (Col.500).

"The false charm of women and the attractions of honours, I confess it, held me back from flying quickly to the bosom of Philosophy. I wished at first to attain that two-fold object, in order that, with full sails set and by the help of oars, I might make that harbour and settle down there, a thing which only a very few most fortunate ones have been able to achieve. But after having read some books of Plotinus, (I) to whom I know you were greatly attached, and after having compared them as well as I could with the authors who have dedicated themselves to the Holy mysteries, I was fired with such an ardour that I should have wished to break all my chains, if I had not been held back by the fear of wounding certain persons."

.....

Foot Note- (I). There is another reading, "Lectis autem Platonis paucissimis libris". Alfarcic however and others prefer "Lectis autem Plotini paucissimis libris". see Alfarcic, op. cit. page, 375.

CHAPTER, 3.

THE INFLUENCE OF NEO-PLATONISM ON  
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ST. AUGUSTINE.

"Saint Augustin a emprunté à Plotin le fond de sa psychologie; ces emprunts, dont ce Père indique lui-même quelques-uns dans divers traités, sont faciles à reconnaître, parce qu'ils portent sur des théories qui sont propres à notre auteur."

Bouillet, 'Les Ennéades de Plotin'. Vol.2. page, 588.

.....

It is of considerable importance for our study of St. Augustine that we examine in detail his Psychology, since it lay at the heart of all his thinking, and coloured his thought on man, the world, and God.

We do not find, however, any systematic outline of his Psychological considerations set forth in any one treatise; we have to piece together the thoughts which are scattered throughout his varied writings, before we can arrive at any true conception of his position.

Like Plotinus Augustine is an eclectic; gathering his material from Plato, and the Neo-Platonists, from the Stoics and the Peripatetics; the main source being undoubtedly Neo-Platonic. Indeed, it has been remarked that Augustine became a Psychologist because of the influence of Neo-Platonism. That, however, is scarcely true. Without a doubt it was the study of the writings of Plotinus which gave his thoughts a direction and helped materially in their development, furnishing him with a dialectic, so that he became a master in the art of self-observation and self-analysis.

But in our survey of the life of Augustine we have seen that he possessed the psychological temperament; that is, he had innate qualities which were of value for psychological study. Keen, ardent, responsive to all that went on around him, observant not only of the workings of his own mind but of the minds of others, he was deeply interested in all psychological phenomena. Long before he had knowledge of Neo-Platonism he had been drawn to Philosophy, and with considerable intensity of feeling had given himself to the pursuit of Truth, questioning, probing, and never contented until he had reached a solution to his problems which commended itself to his intelligence.

Would it not then be nearer the truth to say that, whilst Augustine had always been a psychologist, it was Neo-Platonism which shaped his Psychology to a definite mould and presented him with a system which appeared to him to be dependable? Whilst we would claim, then, no great originality for his system as such, we have no hesitation in declaring that it has been largely through Augustine that the science of modern Psychology has been enriched. And, were it not that such a question were alien to our present theme, it would be of considerable interest for us to notice in how many ways Augustine has contributed to modern Psychological knowledge.

But to return— there is an originality associated with Augustine's system of Psychology; it reveals itself in the way in which he applies Psychological data to Christian Truth; his Psychology, as we shall see, forms a basis for his Metaphysics.

Indeed we might confidently assert , his Philosophy was but the means to an end- that of the knowledge of God.

With Augustine there were two kinds of knowledge that were of the greatest importance, the knowledge of the Soul and the knowledge of God. And because of his hunger after God and his eager desire to obtain a fuller conception of the Divine Nature, he gave himself so earnestly to the pursuit of Philosophy.

In the Soliloquies he represents Reason as putting to him the question- 'What do you wish to know?', to which he makes answer- 'I desire to know God and the Soul; nothing more'. Again we find him saying, in terse utterance, 'Deus semper idem, noverim me noverim Te'. (I)

In our outline of Augustine's treatise on Happiness we saw that happiness consisted in a knowledge of the Truth, it could only be gained by the man who pursued Wisdom, a philosopher was a lover of Wisdom and, since Wisdom was God, therefore, a Philosopher was a lover of God. Very frequently throughout his many writings Augustine dwells upon the question of Truth. For him Truth was one, wherever it was to be found; it had sprung from the fount of all Truth that is God. So as he seeks Truth he is seeking the One who will satisfy his deepest needs and who will also reveal the Truth to his enquiring mind.

Now it was from the study of the Enneads that Augustine had learned that if a man desired to know God he must first of all seek to know himself; that it was not by going with-  
Foot Notes- (I). Solil. I.2.7.(Col.602.) Solil. 2.I.I.(Col.619).

-out that God would be found, **HE** was within. It was a familiar philosophical counsel, 'Know thyself'. In a familiar passage in his **Confessions**, Augustine tells us how being admonished to return to himself, he obeyed and- 'beheld with the eye of my soul ...the Light Unchangeable'. (1) In another chapter coloured by reminiscences of Plotinus, making clear to us the progress of his thought, Augustine tells us how the beauty of the world around him led him to judge clearly as to the unchangeable and true; so he is led from bodies to Soul, from the faculty of sensation to one that is within, that is, the 'Inner Sense', then upward to the reasoning faculty, and so to the Eternal and Unchangeable, thus- 'with a flash of one trembling glance it arrived at THAT WHICH IS'. (2)

When he confined himself to objects of Sense he lost his way- 'Too late loved I Thee; O Thou Beauty of ancient days, yet ever new; too late I loved Thee! And behold, Thou wert within, and I abroad, and there I searched for Thee, deformed I, plunging amid those fair forms which Thou hadst made. Thou wert with me, but I was not with Thee. Things held me far from Thee, which, unless they were in Thee were not at all'. (3)

So he finds that his own spiritual experience coincides with what he has found in Neo-Platonism, that in man's

Foot Notes- (1).Confessions, Vii.X.16. The whole passage is permeated with the thought of Plotinus who, in giving his directions for self-purification, by which alone can the Soul attain unto the vision of the Divine, bids us- 'Withdraw into yourself and look'. Enneads, I.6.9. IV.3.11. 'αὐτοῦς γινώσκοντες' (2).Conf.VII.17.23. cp.Enneads,V.1.2;V.3.2. V.3.3. (3).Confessions, X.27.38.

very being there shines the light which lighteneth the world, and that only as man searches into the recesses of his own Soul can he become assured of the Deity which is akin to himself, One who is the unchanging Light of Reason, (1) the fountain of Life, (2) the supreme Good towards which human nature aspires, and the inspiration and cause of its upward struggling. So we find Augustine exclaiming,--'By my very soul will I ascend to Him. I will pass<sup>s</sup><sub>1</sub> beyond the power whereby I am united to my body, and fill its whole frame with life'. (3) Thus in the totality of his own personality Augustine like Plotinus, sees 'a trace of that mysterious Unity', whence he was derived. (4)

He has now discovered that his reasoning faculty is a ray of the unchanging Light; (5) his will has brought him into contact with the Being whose Will and Powers are one. (6) He acknowledges that the One whom the Neo-Platonists have described is the "true God", the author of all things, the source of the light of truth, and the bountiful bestower of all blessedness". (7)

But it is of considerable importance that we should mark this fact- that Augustine, having followed the Neo-Platonic direction to enter into himself- made a discovery which became not only a starting point for his philosophical knowledge, but was also fundamental to all his thinking.

Foot Notes- (1). Conf.VII.X.I6. *ibid*, XIII.20.28. De Util.Credendi, XVI.4 34. De Vera Relig.2.21;39.72. and De Morib.Eccles.I.31. 66. compare- Enneads,I.6.9.IV.8.I. (2).Conf.3.8.I6;3.6.I0.cp. Enneads,I.6.6;VI.9.4. (3)Conf.X.7.II. (4).Conf.I.20.3I."cp. Enneads,3.8.I0;6.9.I. "Vestigium secretissimae unitatis".(5). Conf.I2.I5.20."Intellectualis natura, quae contemplatione luminis lumen est" cp.Enn.IV.3.I7. (6)Conf.7.4.6.(7)De Civ.Dei, VIII.5.

This was the immediate certainty of Inner Experience. (1)

Hence for St. Augustine "the Soul is the living whole of personality, whose life is a unity, and which, by its self-consciousness, is certain of its own reality as the surest truth". (2) St. Augustine was sure at any rate of one thing, ~~he~~ namely, that he existed; if he could not be sure of that he could not be certain of anything.

Now to arrive at that certainty he travels by many routes. In the Soliloquies, for example, he says- "You wish to know yourself, do you know that you exist? I know it...Do you know that you are thinking? I know it. Therefore it is true that you think. It is true." Hence follows the conclusion- "Consequently you know that you ARE, you know that you LIVE, you know that you THINK". (3)

Again in another of his earlier books, after mentioning several Neo-Platonic ideas, Augustine says- "Or if you do not understand these assertions, or are doubtful whether they are true, examine at least whether you doubt that you doubt them, and if it is certain that you doubt them ask whence it is certain ....and think it out in this way; everyone who knows that he doubts knows something true, namely, that he doubts, and concerning this thing that he knows he is certain that there is something true. Everyone, therefore, who doubts whether truth exists,

Foot Notes- (1).De vera Relig. 39.72.(Col.I246)."Noli foras ire, in teipsum redi; ~~in~~ in interiore homine habitat veritas".  
(2).Windelband, 'History of Philosophy'(2nd.Ed.I910) pages, 276, et.seq. (3). Solil. 2.I.I.(Col.619).

has in himself a truth which he cannot doubt". (1)

But Augustine proceeds to show that all kinds of consciousness may be included in that state of doubting. A man who doubts knows that he exists, that he remembers, for his ~~very~~ doubt is related to previous knowledge that he knows and wills. Hence, by this process of reasoning, he postulates for man, thought, knowledge, and judgment. But more; it is one and the same mind that doubts and knows and judges and wills; hence for St. Augustine life is a unity. Augustine then, in his search for certainty arrives at the conclusion that since we cannot depend on tradition, or on the ground of <sup>the</sup> general opinion of mankind, or again upon what we learn from the senses, certainty must be found by our entering into the deepest part of our nature. (2)

From this argument, he reasons, that Truth can be no stranger to us, and that all the uncertainties of the phenomenal world can never destroy our certainty of knowledge.

The human spirit has been made for Truth and it recognises Truth when it sees it. It is therefore by an intuition of the Soul that man arrives at the basis of knowledge; within ourselves, with a loftier and more dependable knowledge than the senses can ever impart, the most essential conceptions of the spirit are to be discerned with remarkable fulness. (3)

Foot Notes- (1). De Vera Relig. 39.73. (Col. I246). (2). De Civ. Dei. XI.26,27. (See fuller notes for quotation) This is a favourite argument with Augustine, see also De beata Vita, 7. and De Trinitate, X.I4.&c. (3). De Trinitate, 8.6.



(151).

Augustine speaking of our sense of Justice and Wisdom, declares also that these are made clear to us by a simple inspection of the spirit and by the help of Reason. (1)

After meeting the argument that these conceptions or ideas in general are bound up with the words which express them, <sup>(2)</sup> and showing clearly that words only imply ideas, he warns us against confusing simple conceptions with ideas. Ideas are unchangeable, eternal, universal. Whilst men may differ in their opinions, ideas unite them in one indissoluble bond. They constitute that common boon which we call knowledge. In the same way they existed before the world was and will remain although the earth shall be destroyed. Whence then have these eternal Truths come but from God Himself? Are they not the Ideas, heaven sent? (3) For with God is the highest Good, the most perfect beauty.

Here Augustine in his doctrine of Ideas is clearly under the influence of Plotinus. Yet- "their Christian character is preserved in Augustine's presentation, by the fact that the religious idea of the deity as absolute personality is fused with the philosophical conception of the Deity as the sum & essence of all Truth". (4)

Foot Notes- (1). Epistle CXX.2. (see fuller notes) (2). De Magistro; I. IX. 27. "Knowledge includes four elements; the word, the reality, the idea of the word, and the idea of the reality". See also- De Magistro, I. 2. 3. (Col. 890) I. XI. 38. (Col. 916) De Catechizandis rudibus, 2. 3. (3). "Principales formae vel rationes rerum stabiles atque incommutabiles, quae in divino intellectu continentur." De Diversis Quaest. 83. 46. see Conf. XI. 7. 9. and cp. Enneads, IV. 4. 16. Porphyry (Vit. Plot. 18.) tells us that Plotinus was the first to show the identity of Ideas with the Divine Intelligence. Bouillet, (Vol. I. p. 351.) asserts that Augustine has taken his doctrine of Ideas wholly from Plotinus (4). Windelband, op. cit. page, 279.

Now it is by the contemplation of these ideas that the human intelligence is illumined, (1) and this illumination can be shared by all men. (2). But in order to perceive that illumination and to be made partakers in the Divine Ideas, it is needful that the Soul should undergo an education, and train herself for that wisdom which will enable it to perceive the highest Truth. (3)

But now let us carefully examine what Augustine has to say on the subject of the Soul; he has dwelt at considerable length in many of his treatises with this question. (4)

St. Augustine defines the Soul in very much the same way as Plotinus, who borrows his definition from Plato. "It seems to me", says Augustine, "that the Soul is a certain substance, a sharer of reason, fitted to govern the body".(5)

For Augustine as for Plotinus the Soul was the centre of his Psychology. (6) The Soul is joined with the world above and at the same time is united with the phenomenal world below; so that it is in communication with the world of Spirit and in touch with the realm of sense. From its upward part, and by means of its higher nature it receives the Divine Ideas and, stooping, it imparts these ideas to men. It has to do with

Foot Notes- (1).De Magistro, 12.40.compare with Enneads, IV.4.5.  
 (2)De Lib.Arb.2.33.& Enneads,I.1.8.see Appendix,3. (3) Solil. I.13. (Cols.606,7.) Augustine continually refers to this doctrine of Ideas. Conf.XI.VII.9.De Diver.Quaest.83.46. De Civ. Dei, XI.X.cp.Enneads, 2.9.I.Epistle,XIV.De Vera Relig.XXX.56.(Col 1236, ibid.XXXI.57.(Col.1237). See also Enneads,IV.4.16.V.8.7. V.2.1.-3.2.4.- 3.2.13. (4).De Quantitate Animae,De Immortalitate Animae, De Anima et ejus ~~origins~~ in his Eps.and elsewhere. (5).De Quant.Animae, XIII.22.(Col.693)."Nam mihi videtur esse substantia quaedam rationis particeps, regendo corpori accommodata."compare with Enneads, VI.7.5. (6).Enneads, 4.4.23- 4.6.3.- 4.8.7.

Memory and Imagination, and unifies the differing parts of the body. We all know that there is within us life or Soul. Consciousness assures us that we live, remember, purpose wish. Such consciousness is corroborated by what we see in other beings and by what we perceive also in the animal world. These movements belong to Soul; for although it is Simple in its essence, the Soul is yet manifold in its operations. (1). Whilst the Soul is present with the body it is not within it; for it remains pure of all mixture and ever remains itself; (2) it is dynamically omnipresent throughout the body and capable of feeling and action, as a whole, at every point. It is present 'Vi et potentia' and 'tota singulis partibus'. (3) Thus the Soul is at one and the same time indivisible and yet divisible; here Augustine makes use of the illustration of an earthworm which, whilst it may be cut up into several sections, yet continues to live, thereby showing that it cannot be deprived of the principle of life that is of Soul. (4) In all this reasoning Augustine closely follows Plotinus.

But, although the Soul is associated with the body, one must not think of it as being in any sense corporeal. It differs entirely in its essence from the body. We cannot, for

Foot Notes- (1). De Trinitate, 3.2. also *ibid*, 10.XI. & XI.3  
 (2). De Immort. Animae, XV.24. compare Enneads, IV.7.9.  
 (3). De Quant. Animae, XXX.61. (Cols.720, I.) compare Enneads, IV.3.20. (4). De Quant. Animae, XXXII.67. (Col.724.) compare Enneads, IV.3.8. Also De Quant. Animae, XXXII.68. (Col.725) compare with Enneads, IV.2.(1.2.)

instance, speak of the magnitude of the Soul in the sense of its length or breadth or depth. It is not an extended thing. It is only by metaphor or simile that we can use the term 'great' in respect to the Soul. (1)

The Soul can neither grow nor diminish with the body; (2) changes in the Soul are certainly spoken of, but what Augustine implies is this- there is no spatial or material increase in the form of the Soul. (3) He makes use of the same argument as Plotinus in order that he may show that the Soul is not an extended thing, as he puts the question to Evodius- "How is it that the Soul which is in a so much lesser place than the body is yet able to contain within itself images of such large proportions as we find in Memory?" (4) And he answers that question by recalling the fact that great images may be reflected in a tiny mirror, such a mirror as we see, indeed, in the pupil of the human eye. Augustine also frequently makes use of the illustration which he borrows from Plotinus, in instituting a comparison between the Soul and a central dot within a circle- a point from which radii proceed in all directions to the circumference. (5)

The Soul, then, which feels in each part of the body as if it were entirely included in it, is present entirely there and yet cannot be regarded in any way as body. Augustine says- "The Soul does not in consequence occupy wholly the body as water which fills a leather bottle or a sponge. But it is in a

Foot Notes- (1).De Quant.Animae,XVII.30.(Col.698.) compare Enneads, 3.6.1. IV.2.1."Soul has not the unity of an extended thing". See Appendix,3. (2).De Quant.Animae, XIX.33.(Col.701)."Recte dicitur anima discendo quasi crescere,et contra minui dediscendo, sed translato verbo,..".compare Enneads, IV.7.5. (3).De Quant.Animae, V.9. (4) & (5) FOOT OF NEXT PAGE.

marvellous manner as an animation wholly incorporeal mingling with the body for the purpose of imbuing it with life and commanding the body by a dictatorship which it enforces on it, and not by the weight of a bulk beneath which it is compelled to yield". (1)

The Soul is entirely present in the whole body, as can be shown by the sympathy which unites the organs. For the whole feels the suffering of each part of the body, even though that suffering is not in the whole body. For where there is pain in the foot, the eye turns to it, the tongue speaks of it, the hand moves. Now this would not take place unless something of the Soul which feels in the feet were also in these parts, for if it were absent it could not feel what happened there. (2)

Augustine has much to say on the Impassibility of the Soul. No changes, he tells us, which may come to the Soul either through the passions of the body or through desire, joy, fear, sadness, or the like, can ever make the Soul not a Soul; none of these things bring death to the Soul. (3)

He proceeds to argue that when the Soul is united with Reason or Wisdom it must become Divine, and therefore immortal; otherwise the living Soul could not be a Soul, nor could

Foot Notes from PREVIOUS PAGE- (4). & (5). De Quant. Animae, V.9. De Quant Animae; X.10-21. compare Enneads IV.7.6; IV.2.1; V.8.9. see also Augustine's work- 'Concerning the Soul and its origin'. a treatise written by him to refute Vicentius Victor who maintained, as the Stoics did that the Soul is a body. De Anima et ejus origine, IV.27. (1). De Genesi ad Lit.8.21.cf. IO.26. also Cont.Ep.Manich.XVI.20. (2). De Immort.Animae, I6.25. (Col.666) cp.Enneads, IV.2.1; IV.2.2. De Orig animae, II.4. & Enneads, IV.7.7. (3). De Immort.Animae, V.(7,8,9.) also Porphyry's 'Principles of the Theory of Intelligibles', Enneads, 3.6.(6.7) also De Immor. Animae, V.8. compare Enneads, III.6.9.

reason possess life or immortality. (1)

Augustine identifies the Soul with life, and reasons that the Soul cannot die since it contains within itself the very principle of life. It would seem that he had either obtained that thought from Plato himself (Phaedrus, c.54,55.) or from Plotinus. (2) He also reproduces and develops the ideas of Plotinus on the difference which exists between the two Souls, and on the subordination of the irrational Soul to the rational. He seeks to make clear that the Soul of the wise man, purified by the virtues and clinging to God, is worthy of the name of Sage; & that for the most part the lower conditions and clothing of the body, with which that man once panted after the world, are now in subjection to the Soul. The Rational Soul is fixed on God; the lower Soul clings to the things that are below. The Sage who possesses this Rational Soul sees everything in God; spirits also share in the life of God in the measure in which they attain unto the knowledge of God. (3)

It is by means of its superior part, that is by Reason and Intelligence, that the Soul contemplates things intelligible and Augustine explains how the Divine Being communicates to each Soul according to its individual capacity. (4)

Foot Notes- (1) De Immort. Animae, V.9. (Col.655) cp. Enneads, IV.7.10. see also, De Trin. X.10. cp. Enneads IV.7.8. Further, De Immort. Animae, VIII.14. (Cols.658,9) cp. Enneads, IV.7.3. Also De Anima et ejus orig. IV.14. cp. Enneads, IV.7.8. (2) De Immort. Animae, IX.16. cp. Enneads, IV.7.11. De Quant Animae, XVII.29. cp. Enneads IV.7.8. (3) De Anima et ejus orig. IV.14. cp. Enneads, IV.7.8. See also De Ordine, 2. (4-7.) cp. Enneads, I.2. (1-6); I.8.4. & c. (4) De Magistro, XII.40. cp. Enneads, IV.4.5. De Trinit. XI. cp. Enneads, IV.6.2. Also Ep. 187.6. cp. Enneads, III.8.6.

Let us now see what Augustine has to say on the subject of Sensation.

Plotinus, before him, held that "we must not regard Sensation as a passive impression made by external objects on the perceiving faculty. It is an activity; (1) a kind of force. (2) Is not the eye which sees, but the active power of the Soul. (3) 'External sensation,' he says, impresses forms on the 'animal nature', and these forms which are spiritual things can be perceived by the Soul. Sensation is a reception of Form, for the nature of Form must be an activity, which creates by being present. (4) The difference between sensations and spiritual perceptions is one of degree; sensations are dim spiritual perceptions, spiritual perceptions are clear sensations". (5)

Here Dr. Inge has stated the case very clearly and now we shall be able to see how Augustine receives help, in this direction, from Plotinus.

In the Confessions, (6) Augustine describes the relationship which exists between Soul and body and the dominating power of the Soul. As he deals with the different degrees of the Soul life, he begins with 'that power of the soul whereby I vitalise my body'. This power he says, elsewhere, (7) "unifies the body, resists disintegration, regulates the distribution of nutriment within the body, and presides over growth and generation". Then he speaks of 'the power by which I endow the

Foot Notes- (1). See Inge, op.cit 'Plotinus' Vol.I. page 222. for the quotation. Reference here to Enneads, 3.6.1; (2) Enns. 4.6.3.

(3). I.I.7.(4). I.I.2. (5) 6.7.7. (6) Confessions, X.7.XI.

(7). De Quant Animae, XXXIII.70. (Col. 726).

body with sense-perception', for whilst the body receives the sense preception it is the Soul that interprets it. Again in the same treatise he defines sensation as a "passion of the body which does not escape the notice of the Soul" (1)

Augustine then agrees with Plotinus in speaking of Sensation as an active and not a passive thing. In several passages he brings this out very clearly and closely follows Plotinus as he speaks of the way in which the eye has power of vision. (2)

It is of interest further to see how Augustine has also taken from Plotinus the conception of what he calls 'the inner Sense'. This "Interior Sense" presides over the other senses; (3) it is to this sense that the others make their report. (4)

Augustine seems at times to regard this Inner Sense in the light of Conscience; or perhaps it might be truer to say—a sort of consciousness of feeling towards things below and at the same time a response towards things which are intimately connected with the Moral Life. (5) In reality, of course, the sense Idea or Sensation does not belong to the body but to the Soul, through the mediation of the body. For the Soul is superior

Foot Notes— (1). De Quant. Animae, XXX.58. (Col. 719). (2). See Montgomery, op.cit. page, 109, et seq. De Musica, VI.V.10. (Col. 853). De Trin. XI.2. XI.1. cp. Enneads, IV.6.1. Also De Quant. Animae, XXIII. (43,44). Cols 708, 9. cp. Enneads, IV.6.1; IV.5.4. see also De Gen ad Litt. I.31. (3). Conf. I.20.31. 'I guarded by the inward sense the entireness of my senses'. Siebeck (quoted by Gibb & Montgomery, op.cit. page 23.) maintains that Augustine goes beyond his predecessors in the clearness with which he attributes to this sense, not merely the correlation of diverse sensations, but the consciousness of the self as an object of sensation. (4). Conf. VII.17.23. see Enneads, V.3.2; V.3.3. Also De Lib Arb. 2.4.10. cp. Enneads, I.1.7; IV.3.23, 24. (5). De Civ. Dei. XI.27.



to the body and that which is superior cannot be modified by that which is inferior. Augustine marks the differing degrees of perception. He tells us that Perception may be distinguished as being Corporeal, Spiritual, Intellectual.; he speaks also of a twofold rapture of the Soul. I) Further, in several of his writings, he makes comparison between Sense Intuition and Intellectual Intuition, these, although they may be regarded as being similar, may still be distinguished. (2)

Before we leave this subject of Sensation, a word should be added concerning Pleasure and Pain. It is not the body but the Soul which experiences pleasure and pain, says Augustine; (3) pleasure and pain are born of the union of the soul and the body. The body is the occasion of these but not the cause. 'Feeling does not belong then to the body but to the Soul, through the medium of the body' (4)

Augustine explains the origin of pleasure and pain in the same way as does Plotinus. (5) The passions are connected with the imagination and are the result of concupiscence. (6) Dr Inge remarks- "Plotinus is right in saying... that pleasure and pain are not pure sensations, since they are states of consciousness; and, on the other hand, that they are not affections ( $\pi\alpha\theta\eta$ ) of the Soul. What is characteristic of

Foot Notes- (1). De Genes. ad Litt. XII.26. (see fuller notes) (2). De Trinitate, XI.1. "Potissimum testimonio utamur oculorum. Is enim sensus corporis maxime excellit, et est visioni mentis pro sui generis diversitate vicinior" cp. Enneads, IV.6.1 De Trinitate, XI.9.16. XII.15.24. and Enneads IV.6.3. (3) De Civ. Dei, XIV.15. (4). De Genes. ad Litt. XII.20. See also Inge 'Plotinus', Vol. I. page 225. (5). De Musica, VI.5-9. cp. Enneads IV.4. (18-21) also III.6.4; I.8.12. (6). De Musica, VI.11.32. cp. Enneads, III.6.5. also De Musica, VI.5, 13, 14, and Enneads III.6.5. last clause.

pleasure and pain is that they 'tell us nothing beyond themselves, have no meaning, and suggest no object or idea'. And when they are over, they are as if they had never been. ...This isolation and ephemeral character of pleasure and pain stamp them as being very slightly connected with the real or spiritual world....The Soul can therefore to a large extent conquer them by living upon its own highest level. It will then continue to be conscious of them, but not as states of itself." (1)

We come now to the discussion of Memory. Here St. Augustine has displayed in a remarkable manner, his gifts as a Psychologist. Nourrisson says- "Or, on peut affirmer qu'il ne se rencontre point dans toutes les oeuvres de saint Augustin, de théorie philosophique qu'il plus approfondie que la théorie de la mémoire." (2)

It will again be seen that here again Augustine follows Plotinus very closely as this philosopher deals with Memory, especially in the third book of the fourth Ennead.

Augustine has dealt very fully with this theme in his classical passage in the Confessions, (3) and has also referred to Memory in his Seventh letter to Nebridius, as well as made mention of it in many other treatises, hence, it is impossible for us in this chapter to give anything like an adequate survey of his Psychology of Memory.

Augustine and Plotinus both regard Memory as being closely connected with Imagination. Memory does not

Foot Notes- (1). Inge, 'Plotinus', op.cit.Vol.I.pp.225,6.

(2). Nourrisson, 'La Philosophie de Saint Augustin', op.cit. Vol.I.page 133. (3).Confessions, X.VIII.12-XXVI.37.

depend on the sense organs. (1)

In the Confessions, Augustine says- "I come to the fields and spacious palaces of my memory, where are the treasures of innumerable images, brought into it from things of all sorts perceived by the senses. There is stored up whatsoever besides we think..." (2) There are, he tells us two kinds of memory, the Sensible Memory and the Intellectual; the one is derived from sense impressions, the other from scientific knowledge of numbers, and of intellectual operations. More, the Intellectual Memory recalls to us our passions and the states of the spirit. Memory whilst closely associated with the imagination, may yet be exercised independently of such images. (3) Memory is an essentially active state. (4). We may notice that in the passage from the Confessions to which we have just referred, (2) Augustine speaks of Memory and the Will as being associated, as also does Plotinus. (5) Augustine says- "For even while I dwell in darkness and silence, in my memory I can produce colours if I will, and discern betwixt black and white and what others I will ....For these too I call for, and forthwith they appear".

Sometimes we find Augustine making use of the term memory to mean, not only the storehouse of ideas or images, but also potential thought. In a passage from the De Trinitate, (6) he first of all uses memory in the ordinary sense, saying, that when we have thought out a truth we hand it over to memory

Foot Notes- (1). ~~Confess.~~ De Musica, I.8. cp. Enneads, IV.3.26. (2) Confess. X.VIII.12. cp. Enneads, IV.3.29. (3). Nebridius Ep. 7. also De Ordine, 2.2. cp. Enneads IV.3.32. (4) Cp. De Trin. XI.8. 15. with Enneads, IV.6.3. (5) Enneads, IV.6.3. (6) De Trin. XV.40.

to keep, and then he adds- "But there is a deeper depth of our memory, (*abstrusior profunditas nostrae memoriae*), in which we found that truth, when we began to think about it". Montgomery likens this to the modern conception of the subconscious mind. (1)

We may note in closing this brief résumé of what Augustine has to say on Memory that like Plotinus, he makes use of the word *phantasia* to denote a simple memory image, and employs ~~makes use of~~ the term *phantasmata* for imaginary constructions. (2)

Again we find Augustine and Plotinus saying that Memory only concerns itself with things that pass away, that is, memory is concerned with something that the Soul has Experienced; it is therefore associated with time. From that it is argued that the Sage has no need of Memory, since, by contemplating always the Divine Intelligence, he has ever before him all the things which he contemplates. (3)

When we come to the consideration of 'Reason', we find that Augustine makes the same distinction as do the Neo-Platonists, between Discursive Reasoning and Intuitive Reasoning or Intelligence. The Discursive Reason he speaks of as the '*rationandi potestas*' or '*rationatio*'. He describes it thus:- "Reasoning is a searching for reason, that is, it is a faculty by means of which things are perceived by sensation. Wherefore that operation is for purposes of enquiry...by it the mind searches, but by the intuitive reason it sees". (4).

Foot Notes- (1). Montgomery, op.cit. page 123. (2) De Musica, VI. 32. (Col. 867). cp. Enneads, III. 6. (5.6.) (3). De diversis. Quaest. I7. cp. Enneads IV. 3. 25. (4) De Quant. Animae; XXVII. 53. (Cols. 715, 6) compare Enneads, IV. 3. 18; V. 2. 3. 2; V. 3. 3.

If we may quote Mr Montgomery here, we find him saying that "The discursive reason compares and judges, but the principles by which it judges are supplied by the intuitive reason. The laws of thought, the laws of mathematical truth, as well as the sense of justice, and the sense of harmony which makes us admire beauty in art and nature, are all thought of as ~~suppl~~ data supplied by the intuitive reason. Augustine tells us, for example, that when in the course of his search for God he was impressed by the order and beauty of nature, he found himself judging of these things by an immutable law. He felt that this could not have come from his own mutable discursive reason ('ratiocinans potestas'), and so was led up to the higher intelligence, which he found to be directly illuminated by the Divine light". (I)

Here we have a reference to the innate 'Idea' which had been implanted within him by God Himself.

But how does this knowledge arise? In his earlier writings we find Augustine adopting the old Platonic conception of Reminiscence, he explains that such truths must have been implanted in the mind in some earlier stage of existence, but later he replaces that thought by one which he had received from the Neo-Platonists. For example he says, "We ought rather to believe that the nature of the rational mind is so constituted that being, in the natural order of things, by the disposition of the Creator, in touch with the things of the intelligible world, it sees them by a certain incorporeal light of a unique character, as the eye of the flesh sees by the corporeal light the things by

Foot Notes- (I).Montgomery, 'St.Augustine aspects of his life & thought'. page,126 and following.

which it is surrounded." (1)

With regard to Augustine's line of argument concerning the question of the Immortality of the Soul, it is not necessary to enter into details; it will be sufficient to briefly state his line of thought .

No changes, he tells us, which take place either through the body, or by means of the Soul itself, can make a Soul not a Soul, (2) for none of these changes can bring death to the Soul. (3) Since the Soul is united with Wisdom it must partake of the Divine nature and therefore be Immortal. (4) Further, the Soul cannot die because it contains within itself the principle of life; it would seem that Augustine here had either obtained this thought directly from Plato himself, or through the medium of Plotinus. (5)

We may remark that in his treatment of this subject, Augustine does little more than reproduce the thesis which Plotinus had already outlined in his seventh book of the Fourth Ennead, which has for its title 'The Immortality of the Soul'. (6)

A word must be said, ere this chapter is brought to a close, on St. Augustines's doctrine on the Soul's Return, & concerning its purification. Here we may note the influence of

Foot Notes- (1) De Trinitate, XII.24. compare Enneads, IV.6.3.

(2) The Soul contemplates things intelligible by its superior part, De Magistro, XII.40. cp. Enneads, IV.4.5. De Trinitate, XI.1. & Epistle, 137 cp. Enneads, IV.6.2. (2). De Immort. Animae, V.7. (Col. 654) cp. Porphyry's 'Principles of the Theory of Intelligibles' Bk. 6. (6, 7.) & Enneads, I.8.10. (3) De Immort. V.8. cp. Enneads, III.6.9. (4). De Immort. Animae, I.1. - XI.18 Solil. 2. XVIII.32, 33. De Immort. Animae, V.9. cp. Enneads, IV.7.10. St Augustine in De Immort. Animae, VIII.14. (cols. 658, 9.) has reproduced the heart of the argument contained in Enneads, IV.7.3. (5) In Enneads, IV.7.11 Plotinus makes use of a passage from Plato's Phaedrus, (c. 54, 55) comp. De Imm. Animae, IX.16. & IV.7 II. For (6) See foot-notes following page.

Porphyry; Augustine frequently quotes from his book on-'The Return of the Soul'. Augustine has also developed, in a very full way the Neo-Platonic ideas of the purification of the Soul.

There are, according to St Augustine, for the Soul three lives which surpass its ordinary state of existence. These are the life of Purification, that of Illumination, and, lastly, the life of pure Love which follows from the Soul's union with the Divine being.

Above all else the Soul must purify itself.

"Every reasonable Soul is not able to enjoy the vision of God, but only that which shall have become pure and holy; that is to say, that which shall have obtained the vision by means of which the things of God can be perceived. Such a vision must be healthy, serene, sincere, and responsive to the things which it compels itself to contemplate". (1) What then will the Soul learn by such a vision? "As long as it clings to God by means of its love for Him it becomes illumined, and, as it were, inundated by that intelligible light which enables it to perceive, not by the eyes of the body but by the essential vision which becomes it, (that is to say by its intelligence), those principles which will make it happy." (2) Now what are the stains from which the Soul must needs be cleansed? "The filth of the Soul, in brief, is the

Foot Notes- (1) FROM PREVIOUS PAGE- Bouillet says- speaking of St Augustine- "The tractate which this Father has composed 'On the Immortality of the Soul', is almost entirely taken from Plotinus". Vol. 2. page, 607. op. cit.

Present Page-Foot Notes.- (1) De diversis Quaestionibus, 83, 46. See Nourrisson page, 242, Vol. I. (2). ibid.

the love of any things whatsoever, save God and the soul; from which filth the more any one is cleansed, the more easily he sees the truth". (1). Again Augustine tells us- "God can only be contemplated by the Spirit. How does such a contemplation take place? We can make it clear to ourselves by considering the ordinary laws of vision. In the first place, the eyes themselves must be healthy, then, we must look with attention, so that we may acquire the power of attention. Now the soul is of the nature of the healthy eye when it is purified from bodily defilement, that is, when it is separated and purged from the lust of perishable things". (2) And Augustine informs us that- 'The faculty of sight for the Soul is Reason'. (3)

It is not, however, by any sudden leap, but only by degrees, that the Soul, having cleansed itself, is raised to the life of Illumination, and, after that, to the life of Love. St. Augustine explains it thus- "It is gradually, not by any sudden leap of faith, but rather by a tested knowledge, (certa ratione) that the soul arrives at the realm of the most excellent life. As it diligently pays attention to the power and strength of harmony, it will appear to itself too unworthy, and consider itself too wretched as it tries by means of its own knowledge, to arrange harmoniously a verse and to produce melodies upon its lyre, whilst its very Life, which is the Soul, follows a devious way and dominated by passion, makes discord by reason of the most hideous noises caused by its own vices. But when it

Foot Notes- (1). De Utilitate Credendi, XVI.34. (2) Solil. I. VI. 12. (Col. 606) (3). Solil. I. VI. 13. "Aspectus animae ratio est". compare Enneads, I. 2. (4.5.)



shall have composed itself and set itself in order, and has made itself harmonious and beautiful, it will give its attention to and behold God who is the fountain from whom all truth flows and is Himself the Father of Truth". (I)

In his description of the way in which the Soul makes its return to God, Augustine tells us that there are seven ascents or degrees. Proceeding from the simple life of animation, the vegetative life (*animatio*), the life which man shares along with the animals, we come to the second stage, which is the Sensitive life (*sensus*), when the soul makes use of the senses; this also is held by man in common with the animals. The third degree marks that which specially belongs to mankind. It is the life of Reason, (*ars*) or knowledge; thought in all its varying manifestations. When, however, the soul reaches the fourth degree it has arrived at a true conception of its dignity and worthiness. Then, does the soul venture to prefer itself not only to all other bodies in the Universe, but also to its own body. Augustine calls this the life of Virtue (*virtus*).

When the soul has reached the fifth degree it is in possession of a purity for which the previous degree has been preparing it. Augustine speaks here of the soul enjoying a passivity (*tranquillitas*), which follows as the result of purification. On reaching the sixth degree the soul has gained the

Foot Note- (I).De Ordine, 2.XIX.50,51. (Cols.583,4)

desire to listen to what is supremely true; it here turns towards the Divine Intelligence. Such a stage is called Ingressio.

Lastly, on arriving at the seventh stage, the soul attains a vision of truth, or rather we perhaps should say, it has reached the moment of Contemplation (*contemplatio vel mansio*), by means of which the soul through the vision ineffable, raises itself even beyond the realm of thought itself and arrives at THAT WHICH IS. (I)

We now bring this chapter to a close and must have arrived at the very evident conclusion, after having been able to mark the many similarities which exist between the thought of St. Augustine and Plotinus, that there in respect to the Psychology, we have abundant testimony of the influence of Neo-Platonism upon the thought of St. Augustine.

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Foot Note- (I). We may compare what Augustine has said concerning the stages or degrees of the soul with what Plotinus has set forth in his tractate on Beauty. *Enneads*, I.VI.(I-9) It is readily to be seen that Augustine, as he describes the Soul's ascent has Plotinus in his mind. See *De Vera Religione*, III.3. (Col. I208) and *De Quant. Animae*, XXXV.79. (Col. 733) where he minutely describes the seven stages. In *De Quant Animae*, XXXIII.70. (Col. 726) where he speaks of the 1st degree of the soul, see also *Enneads*, IV.4.18. In *De Quant. Animae*, XXXIII.71 (Cols. ~~VXX~~, 726, 7). here he speaks of the 2nd. degree, cp. *Enneads*, IV.4.20. Augustine expresses himself on the subject of the Purifying virtues in *De Quant Animae*, XXXIII.73, 74, 75. All the ideas which Augustine develops in these sections are taken from *Enneads*, I.2.(4.5) We may remark further, that Augustine has in *De Musica*, VI.5.(13.14) (Cols. ~~IXA~~, 854, 5) reproduced the whole theory of the purifying and intellectual virtues, such as are to be found in the works of Plotinus and Porphyry. See Porphyry's 'Principles of the Theory of Intelligibles' Bouillet, Vol.2. Page 138.

FULLER NOTES TO CHAPTER 3. (Part 2.)

Page 150, Foot Note, 2.

De Civitate Dei, XI.26. "For we both are, and know that we are, and delight in our being, and our knowledge of it. Moreover, in these three things no true-seeming illusion disturbs us; for we do not come into contact with these by some bodily sense, ... nor as we perceive in the mind and hold in the memory, and which excite us to desire the objects. But, without any delusive representation of images or phantasms, I am most certain that I am, and that I know and delight in this.... For if I am deceived, I am. For he who is not, cannot be deceived; and if I am deceived, by this same token I am. And since I am if I am deceived, how am I deceived in believing that I am? for it is certain that I am if I am deceived."

Page, 151, Foot Note, 1.

Epistle, 120, 2. "Whence comes our sense of justice and wisdom and all that resembles such things? Not by imagination, nor by any other intuition. It is by a simple inspection of the spirit and by the steady regard of reason that we contemplate these invisible objects. For they have no form nor are they included in any corporeal mass, they present no lines nor figures, they are neither contained within the bounds of space nor in infinitely extended space".

Page, 151. Foot Note 3.

Augustine tells us that it is by the reasonable Soul that man has power to contemplate these ideas. (De Diversis quaestionibus, 83. 46.) as well as by a certain living intuition that the soul can raise itself to the Divine Truth.

See, Cornford, 'From Religion to Philosophy' (Arnold, 1912) pages 242-250. for a very illuminating section on the rise of Ideas.

CHAPTER 4.

THE DOCTRINE OF GOD ACCORDING TO ST AUGUSTINE  
AND AS SET FORTH IN THE ENNEADS.

Augustine never seems to have had any doubt in his mind concerning the existence of God. His early training, the piety of his mother, his attendances at religious services, all these led him to take the existence of God for granted.

Speaking of his life as a boy and his belief in prayer at that time, he says- "We found that men called upon Thee, and we learnt from them to think of Thee (according to our powers) as of some great One, who though hidden from our senses, couldst hear and help us." (1)

In some form or other the thought of God never left him, and, as we have seen, in his study of Philosophy he was dissatisfied when he found that 'the name of Christ was not in it! (2)

The promptings of passion, the subtleties of philosophical reasoning, his own doubts and fears, none of these things could shake his faith in the being of God.

He tells us, writing of a time immediately before his discovery of the books of the Neo-Platonists,- "But Thou sufferedst me not by any fluctuations of thought to be carried away from the Faith whereby I believed Thee both to be, and Thy substance to be unchangeable". (3)

Foot Notes- (1).Confessions, I.IX.I4. (2).ibid,3.4.8. (3) ib.7.7.XI  
see also Confessions, VI.5.(7.8.)

If, then, Augustine clung to a belief in the existence of God, what was his conception of Deity?

For a long time, he tells us, he thought of God as a Corporeal Substance, a being of length and breadth and bulk.(1) He imagined God to be he says- 'a vast and bright body, and I a fragment of that body'. His spirit was then, as we see, involved in the grossest form of pantheism. The pure conception of God had become obscured by sense emotion; he had been led away by the teaching of the Manichaeists, and his difficulty in solving the problem concerning the existence of evil. His pantheism resolves itself into a dualism, since God could not be considered as the creator of evil.

But we find Augustine unable to be contented with these monstrous suggestions, and his first step was to renounce his thoughts of God as a being in the likeness of a human body.(2) He now is constrained to conceive of God as being diffused throughout space- 'as vast, through infinite spaces, on every side penetrating the whole mass of the universe, and beyond it, every way, through unmeasurable, boundless spaces." (3)

Then he describes to us how that light came to him from Neo-Platonism. After reading the books of the 'Platonists' he saw God as infinite, saw all things owed their existence to God, and that, because of the over-ruling of the Divine, all things harmonised in time and space.(4) It was the hour of his awakening

Foot Notes-(1).Conf.3.7.12. also 4.16.31. (2)ibid,VII.I.I.(3) ibid VII.I.2. and VII.5.7. (4). ibid. VII.15.21.

for Augustine now realized the Spirituality of God.

It was, then, through Neo-Platonism that Augustine was first convinced of the Spirituality of the Divine Being. Now there is, of course, a great difference between the Absolute of Plotinus and the God of the Christian Faith. We shall see the manifest distinctions in our next chapter when we come to deal with the doctrine of the Trinity. But for all that there was much in common between the spirit of Plotinus and that of Augustine. Both were devout seekers after the Truth, both were eager to probe to the heart of the deepest mystery of the inner life. Just as the idea of God coloured the whole of Augustine's thought, so we find that with Plotinus the One, the Good, the First Principle was never absent from his mind; and both authors have given to us very clear conceptions concerning their belief in the One who was for both of them the exalted head of the Universe. For Plotinus as for Augustine there was no need to argue or to debate upon the question of the existence of God.

But it is one thing to be sure on this point and a very different thing to be able to clearly express the nature of God in well-defined terms.

How can it be possible for finite man to describe the Infinite God? He surpasses all thought and He transcends all speech. If a man were able to define God, then, He would cease to be God. (I)

Foot Note- (I). De Ordine, 2.18.47. Sermo, 117, 5. De Civ. Dei. IX. 16.

God is beyond all our knowledge; we cannot put into words what He is; it is better to confess our ignorance than rashly declare ourselves in possession of knowledge. He is best described by negatives; in a word, He is Ineffable. Augustine often expresses this thought. (1)

Now we have already seen that there was a considerable interchange of ideas on the part of the Philosophers and the Christian Fathers, and that in this way many philosophical truths have found a place in the Christian metaphysic. We have already marked the influence of Philo, Clement of Alexandria, Justin Martyr, and others in this direction. This truth concerning the incomprehensibility and the ineffability of God is frequently expressed in their writings. Justin, whom we have seen was a Neo-Platonist before his conversion to Christianity, says - "We have no name which can fitly describe the supreme Principle of the Universe. God, the Father, the Creator, the Lord, are not names which explain His essence, but simple descriptions drawn from His favours, and His works". (2). Whilst Tertullian declares - "that God in Himself is hidden and inaccessible but that He has revealed Himself by the Logos as the sun too brilliant for our eyes in its very brightness, permits itself to be seen by means of its rays". (3) Clement in the same way remarks - "The name which befits Him best, the One, does not define His essence but only expresses the absolute simplicity of His nature". (4)

Foot Notes- (1). De Ordine, XVI.44. Contra adv. leg. et proph. I.40-I.41. De Ordine, 2.18.47. Sermo, IV.4.&c. (2) Apol. I.46:II.8. IO, I3, I4. See Fouillée, 'La Philosophie de Platon' (Hachette, 1922) page, 287. (3). Tert. adv. Prax. p. I4. cited by Fouillée, page 288. (4). Clem. Alex. Strom. I. XVII.369, Fouillée, ibid.

Now whilst this was quite a common thought in regard to the Divine Being with the Philosophers of the School of Alexandria, it was probably through Plotinus that Augustine first became familiar with the idea of a negative conception of God. (I)

With Plotinus the Absolute not only transcends all speech but all thought- indeed the Absolute is not only 'without form,' 'it is no Being'. "Being", says Plotinus, "must have some definition and therefore be limited; but the First cannot be thought of as having definition and limit...Even the phrase, 'transcending Being', assigns no character, makes no assertion, allots no name, carries only the denial of particular being...Its definition, in fact, could be only 'the indefinable'; what is not a thing is not some definite thing". Plotinus struggles to make himself clear; he continues- "We are talking of the untellable; we name, only to indicate for our own use as best we may. And this name, The One, contains really no more than the negation of plurality...If we are led to think positively of The One, name and thing, there would be more truth in silence..." Enneads, V.5.6. (2)

God then, is Infinite and Ineffable with Plotinus as with St. Augustine. And yet it is still possible for reasonable beings to arrive at certain knowledge concerning God and at some conception of what we mean when we speak of God.(3) It is, however, better to seek what God is not than what He is. "If, before we can know what God is, we can already know what He

Foot Notes- (I).De Ordine, 2.XVI.44.(Col.579)"Scitur Deus melius nesciendo". ibid XVIII.47.(Col.581)"cujus nulla scientia est in anima, nisi scire quomodo eum nesciat". (2)See also Enneads V.I.13;V.3.(13,14) VI.9.5. (3).In Joann Ev.Tract.106.4.



not...For when we aspire from this depth to that height it is a step towards no small knowledge". (1)

By this process of reasoning Augustine arrives at the position of being able to say that God is absolutely indeterminate, that one should not ascribe to Him any qualities or attributes- in brief, God is a being who is absolutely simple.(2)

But, being Simple, God is therefore, according to St. Augustine, unchangeable, for simplicity excludes all change.

(3) Indeed, the Immutability of God can admit of no exceptions.

(4) We may notice too that with Plotinus also God is absolutely Simple. (5) So, in like manner, with Plotinus the Absolute is unchangeable; in fact, with Him no motion can be associated.(6)

From the Unchangeableness of God Augustine reasons that God must also be Eternal. For Him there can be no past or future, He is the Eternal Now. For time implies change & with God there is no change . "In His wholeness everywhere set without place, eternal without time, making things changeable & without change of Himself". (7) So also with Plotinus, God is Eternal. Eternity is part of the very nature of God. (8)

Foot Notes- (1).De Trinitate, Viii.2,3. (2)De Trin.XV.5.8;XV.22 'God is a pure Essence and his nature is Absolute' De Trin.VI.6.8. 'God is a substance both Simple and manifold'. (3).De Trin.VI.5.8. "Nihil enim simplex mutabile est". De Trin.V.2.3 'He who is God is the only unchangeable substance or essence'. (4). De Moribus Manich.I.I."For that exists in the highest sense of the word which continues always the same, which is throughout like itself, which cannot be corrupted or changed which is not subject to time..Such things can only be said of God". De Nat.boni Manich.I.2.Conf.XII.XV.18. &(5).Enneads,VI.9.5;V.3.XI;3.8.9. (6).Enneads, V.I.6. (7) De Trin.V.I.2.De Civ.Dei, XII.I4. Conf.XIII.37.52. Conf.XI.I3.I6; De Trin.I2.I4 (8).Enneads,3.7.2.'The Intellectual Substance & Eternity have the one scope & content'..'Eternity & the Divine Nature envelop the same entities'.Enneads,3.7.4; 3.7.5; 3.7.6.'There is no difference between Being and Everlasting Being'.

But God with Augustine and with Plotinus also was Omnipresent, filling all space and yet not bounded by space. Augustine expresses himself on the matter in this way- "But these things the one true God makes and does, but as the same God, that is, as He who is wholly everywhere, included in no space, bound by no chains, mutable in no part of His being, filling heaven and earth with omnipresent power, not with a needy nature" (1)

In like manner God is free from all temporal determination, since time is only a condition of creature life, an image of eternity. Created things cannot be eternal, for eternity can only be postulated of God. It follows, therefore, that He ought to be Infinite and Eternal. (2)

It may be remarked that Augustine holds the same opinion as does Plotinus on the question that time does not consist in a number of things which are in movement or repose.

God, then, according to Plotinus and Augustine, is above all being and all thought; He is also free from all determination. (3) His simplicity is absolute, for we cannot speak of either His quality or quantity. To predicate anything of God would be to say that He stands in need of something.

But although Augustine arrived at certain deductions concerning God, by means of this negative method, yet he in many of his writings has made very positive statements concern-

Foot Notes- (1). De Civ Dei, VII.30. Sermo, 277, 13 & 18. Conf. I.3.3. and often. Ep. 187.4. God is not confined in space. De Diver. Quaest. 83.20. cp. Enneads, 3.9.3. "How, then, does Unity give rise to Multiplicity? By its omnipresence: there is nowhere where it is not; it occupies, therefore, all that is." also VI.5.9. (2). Compare De Musica, VI.XI.29 & Enneads, 3.7.1. also Conf. XI. II.13 with Enneads, 3.7.6. (3). Enneads, V.5.6. VI.8.9. VI.9.6.

-ing God. (I)

Let us see how he had reached such positive knowledge, and how in this way his reason was satisfied and he found himself in possession of a truth which commended itself to his whole consciousness.

What attracted St Augustine to Neo-Platonism was its spiritual conception of God. But once he had seen that God must be spiritual, there came to him a new revelation of the Universe. No longer could it be solely material; in so far as it possessed true being it owed that being to God, and was, therefore, a Spiritual world. He expresses that thought frequently in the Confessions. For example, we find him saying- "Thou art, and art God and Lord of all which Thou hast created: in Thee abide, fixed for ever, the first causes of all things unabiding; and of all things changeable, the springs abide in Thee unchangeable: and in Thee live the eternal reasons of all things unreasoning and temporal". (2)

Again he says- "For Thou art God...whose Unity is the mould of all things; who out of Thy own fairness makest all things fair; and orderest all things by Thy law".(3)

Augustine now was able to see all things glorified with a beauty that had sprung from the source of all Beauty.

Dr. Inge puts it thus- "Augustine is fond of speaking of the Beauty of God, and as he identifies beauty with symmetry (4) it is clear that the formless 'Infinite' is for him, as for every true Platonist, the bottom and not the top of the scale of being.

Plotinus had perhaps been the first to speak of the Divine Nature

Foot Notes- (1). See Confessions, I.IV.4. and often. Also Solil. I. I.2. (2). Confess. I.6.9. (3) ibid. I.6.I2. compare I.I8.3I. compare Enneads, I.6.6. III.8.10. VI.9.1. (4) Epis. I20.29.

as the meeting place of the good, the true, and the beautiful; and this conception, which is of great value, appears also in Augustine. There are three grades of beauty, they both say; corporeal, spiritual and Divine. (1) The first being the image of the second, and the second of the third. (2) Augustine says more than once, 'All that is beautiful comes from the highest beauty, which is God'. " (3)

Without a doubt it was Neo-Platonism that opened his eyes to the perception of that truth. He now saw that all about him was, by its very forms, suggestive of the ideas of order beauty, rhythm, that had come from some loftier beauty. With St Augustine as with Plotinus the here was but a copy or a shadow of the yonder. All things reflected a supreme order, beauty and goodness; in a word, these things suggested God. (4) They all revealed an all-pervasive Unity which brought the thought of The One to Augustine's mind. This was a familiar thought with Plotinus, and he often spoke of the beauty and glory of the world of sense as reflecting the Beauty of the Divine mind. (5)

Hence in the world without he saw a revelation of God. And here we have the thought of the forms, ideas, reasons &c. which we considered in our previous chapter.

But there, we saw that St Augustine's Psychology forms the basis of his Metaphysic. Augustine, as we have learned,

Foot Notes- (1). De Ord. 2.16.42.59. Enneads, I.6.4. (2) De lib. arb. 2.16.41. Enneads, I.6.8.; 3.8.11. 'Righteousness is the truest beauty'. Enarr. in Psalmos, 44.3. Ep. 120.20. Enneads, I.6.4. (3) Inge, 'Christian Mysticism', page, 129. (4) Conf. VII. 17.23. (5). Enneads, V.1.4. comp. Conf. 3.6.10. 'Beauty of all things beautiful' also Conf. 4.16.29.; 10.27.38. and Enneads, VI.9.4. See also Sermo, 148.2. & Enneads, VI.5.1.

was haunted by the overwhelming sense of the mystery of his own personality. Following the advice of Plotinus , he entered into himself that he might not only know himself, but also know God.(1

In the Seventh book of his Confessions, Augustine has given us a clear account of the development of his thought. The beauty of the world, as we have seen, suggested to Augustine the beauty of the Creator. But Augustine with his fondness for analysis, proceeds to examine the very faculty which would perceive this beauty, and so, led from the world of sense to the soul which was aware of the beauty, he thence travelled upward to the reasoning faculty, and again onward to the eternal, unchangeable light which enables reason to form its judgments, and to that, indeed, which is the very life of the Soul's life.(2) So he could exclaim- "O Truth Who art Eternity, and Love Who art Truth, and Eternity Who art Love! Thou art my God". (3)

Thus in his own personality Augustine, like Plotinus, had discovered 'the impress of that most mysterious Unity' (4) which was the very fount of his life.

It was, then, from the principle of the absolute and immediate certainty of consciousness, as we have seen before, that Augustine arrived at truth; and he makes use of this method in his search after a knowledge of God. "It belongs", says Windelband, "to the essence of truth that it is or exists. But the Being or existence of those universal truths, since they are absolutely incorporeal in their nature, can be thought only as that

Foot Notes- (1).Confessions, X.7.II.'By my very soul will I ascend to Him' ibid,IO.XVII.26.'I will pass even beyond this power of mine which is called memory;..that I may approach unto Thee, O sweet Light'. and elsewhere.(2).Conf.IO.6.IO.see Ottley,op.cit page 91. (3)Conf.VII.X.I6.(4)Conf.I.29:31.

of the ideas in God, after the Neo-Platonic mode; they are the changeless forms and norms of all reality...and the determination of the content of the Divine mind. In Him are contained the highest union; He is the absolute unity, the all-embracing truth, He is the Being, the highest good, perfect beauty (unum, verum, bonum.) All rational knowledge is ultimately knowledge of God". (1)

In this way we see Augustine reasoning that, if the soul of man can in thought and imagination and by means of memory pervade the whole of space, much more can we attribute omnipresence to the Creator of the Soul.(2) If the Soul be non-material and thereby distinguished from the body, with much greater reason should God be distinguished from corporeality since He is the maker of the Soul. (3) Again, if reason be eternal and unchangeable, so must God be who is above all thought. God is the eternal truth and He is the incarnate Logos. (4) So he breaks forth in his Soliloquies- "Thee I invoke, O God, O Truth, in Whom and through Whom are all true things, which are all true. O God, O Wisdom; in Whom and through Whom are all things that are wise! O God, the true and highest life, in Whom and through Whom all things true and exalted live". (5)

So St Augustine proclaims God to be 'Causa subsistendi, ratio intelligendi, et ordo vivendi'. (6)

But we find that Augustine makes another discovery, which is of infinite importance to himself. There was a

Foot Notes- (1).Windelband, op.cit.page, 279. (2).Epistle,I37,2.  
(3).ibid.(4).De Lib.arb.2.I4.- 2.39. De Vera Relig.30;31.  
(5). Soliloq.I.(I.2) (6).De Civ.Dei,VIII.2. 4.

principle of Unity in the world, that is a harmony which sprang from the One, and which was only a complete harmony by its remain- in such union. As man wandered away and lost himself amid the multiplicity of things he lost that beauty, that oneness from his life. The goal of the happy life, true rest, true being consisted in fellowship with the Highest Being. All that is around man is but an image of the infinite fulness, but only an image. Man longs after reality and true reality can only be found along with perfect blessedness in union with that One. (1)

But how are we to be sure of God, how may God be known as the chief good? Augustine tells us- "Take away this and that and regard good itself if thou canst; so wilt thou see God, not good by a good that is other than Himself, but the good of all good. For in all these good things, whether those which I have mentioned, or any else that are to be discerned or thought, we could not say that one was better than another, when we judge truly, unless a conception of the good itself had been impressed upon us, such that according to it we might both approve some things as good, and prefer one good to another. So God is to be loved, not this and that good, but the good itself". (2)

Here we have the Christian Father proclaiming one of the deep truths of the Christian life. Augustine had learned from his own experience, that man is ever striving after true being because the soul, so far as it has true being, is from God and yearns after God. But in the world there is evil, which is really non-being since it has nothing of the true Being in it, and as men, despite their longing after God, seek for that which is

Foot Notes- (1). De Vera Relig. 35, 36. see also Fouillée, op. cit. p. 289  
(2). De Trinitate, VIII. 3, 4.

evil, that is the cause of unrest and sorrow. Evil, then, consists in the will being perverted, the choice of non-being instead of God. So Augustine declares- "Nothing is good but a good will", to which he added- "Nothing is good but God".

Augustine, in glowing terms, has expressed the Christian experience of redemption and the thought of God as omnipotent love coming to man's rescue and giving to him deliverance from the power of an evil will that he may be thus able to enjoy the fellowship for which he has longed.

God may be ineffable; it may be that we cannot with our slender intelligence define his wisdom or describe His glory; words may fail us, yet here is the wonder of the Father in heaven- that He gives Himself to man and makes men taste and see Himself. That is the goal of the true life and the highest knowledge of God. Augustine thus puts it- "For that vision of God is the beauty of a vision so great and so infinitely desirable, that Plotinus does not hesitate to say that he who enjoys all other blessings in abundance, and has not this, is supremely miserable". (I)

Augustine frequently utters the warning that the knowledge of God does not come easily, it must be sought after & earnestly desired. And as we have seen in our previous chapter, Augustine clearly marks the stages in the upward way, until at last there is union with God. Plotinus in beautiful phrase has described this for us, and for those who have never read Plotinus, it has been made familiar by Augustine's account of the mystic vision which Monica and he enjoyed at Ostia.

Foot Notes- (I) De Civ. Dei. X.16.



Now in this chapter we have endeavoured to mark in several ways the influence of Neo-Platonism upon St Augustine's idea of God. We have seen that it was from Plotinus that Augustine first learned of the Spirituality and Simplicity of the Divine nature. As we shall find later, it was this conception of the Divine Simplicity, which Augustine tenaciously adhered to, that created difficulty, as he sought to reconcile it with the fuller truth of the Divine nature which as a Christian Philosopher he endeavoured to proclaim. But further, influenced by Neo-Platonism we have marked how Augustine was led to affirm the immediate certainty of the inner consciousness, and was able from his memory, reason, and soul, to arrive at some notion of the Divine attributes. Undoubtedly Neo-Platonism did him great service in giving him a vision of the Mystic way; and by the help of Neo-Platonism Augustine was initiated into the realm of Mystical Piety which played such a part in his after life. It was through this Philosophy, and largely owing to Plotinus that the heart of Augustine was quickened with an intense desire to enjoy a mystical union with God. For by his own spiritual experiences in this direction Augustine learned that it was here by intuition that the human soul can obtain its fullest knowledge of the Divine Nature.

Whilst, however, Plotinus opened the gateway for Augustine which led him into the blessed life, very soon the two part company. In the Christian conception of the Divine nature, there was something more than a philosophy of cold dialectic. The God of the Christian religion was after all very different from the Absolute of Neo-Platonism. He was a God who loved men,

and it was a knowledge of that love that touched the warm heart of Augustine, and brought about his redemption. It was because He loved first that love was kindled in Augustine's heart, because He stooped to give his Son in order that the evil will of man might be transformed into the good, and the weak will might become strong; it was this which made its appeal to St. Augustine but he tells us, he found it not in Neo-Platonism.

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CHAPTER 5.

THE DOCTRINE OF THE TRINITY IN THE WRITINGS  
OF ST. AUGUSTINE AND IN NEO-PLATONISM.

From our study of Neo-Platonism we must have already gathered that, in certain of its aspects, that Philosophy closely resembles Christianity. It does so in its attempt to understand the nature of the Divine Being, and the character of the Universe in which man has his home. Dr. Glover referring to Neo-Platonism says- "It felt the unity of nature, the divinity of man as God's kinsman, the beauty of a morality modelled after God, the appetite of the human heart for God, and something of man's hunger after redemption." (I)

Neo-Platonism summoned men to a life of blessedness; it proclaimed, as we saw in the previous chapter, the spirituality of God and His Universe, and that He must by His very nature manifest Himself. At the same time it taught that man must prepare himself that he might attain unto union with the unseen, and that, in an ineffable 'ecstasy', his soul might be flooded with the Divine Light.

In many ways, then, we are made conscious of marked resemblances which exist between its fundamental ideas and those of the gospel as proclaimed by the Christian Church.

It is now our purpose to enquire how far the Trinity or Triad in the Divine hierarchy of Neo-Platonism, resembles the doctrine of the Tri-une Godhead set forth by the Christ-  
Foot Notes- (I). T.R.Glover, op.cit.Chap.IX.

-ian Faith. We have already noticed how closely Plotinus in his conception of the First of his Divine Principles , approximates to the Christian view of the first Person in the Holy Trinity. And, naturally, as we consider the Triad of Plotinus, the Absolute, Intelligence or Spirit, and Soul, as well as his tripartite division of man's nature into Spirit, Soul, and body, there does appear to be a considerable likeness between the two systems.

Both Augustine and Plotinus insist on the existence, the unity, the spirituality, the goodness of God; for both of them He is the transcendent and ineffable One from Whom all things have sprung, to Whom all things will return, and upon Whom all things depend for their very being.

Furthermore, both, in attempting to describe the nature of the Second and Third Principles of the Godhead, make use of terms which are analogous. We have, for example, in the Nous or the Logos, the mind and word of God and the expression of the thought of the Eternal. In like manner we may find a close kinship existing between Soul and Spirit. It is not then to be wondered at that we find a considerable divergence of opinion expressed by the Fathers of the Christian Church on the question of the substantial identity of thought in the conception of the philosophical Triad and the Christian Trinity. Indeed, several have believed that they could see in the Three Divine Hypostases of Plotinus the three Persons of the Holy Trinity. (I)

Foot Note- (I). Notably, Justin Martyr, Eusebius, Theodoret, Gregory, Clement, Cyril. (Bouillet, op.cit.Vol.I.page, 257.  
See also Inge, 'Plotinus', op.cit.Vol.2.pages, 209, 210.

For example, Cyril, referring to Enneads, V.I.6, says-

"We find in the Greek Philosophers themselves a knowledge of the Holy Trinity. They say in effect that the three natures are closely united, without anything separating them, and that the Soul, which occupies the third place, is in precisely the same intimate way related to Intelligence, which occupies the second place, as Intelligence is associated with the One. So we see that these philosophers maintain an existence of intimacy between that which engenders and that which is engendered; that this is their belief is shown by the words of Plotinus." (1)

Again, in writing upon the Neo-Platonic theory of the Three Hypostases, Cyril adds-

"When they admit the Three Principle Hypostases and declare that the substance of God extends to these Three Hypostases, when they make use sometimes of the same name of the Trinity they are in agreement with the belief of the Christians, and they lose nothing if they wish to apply the term consubstantiality to the Three Hypostases, in order to present their conception of the unity of God in which the three-fold form does not imply a difference of nature, and, in which the Hypostases are not inferior to each other." (2)

But many other references might be cited, suggesting that in their earnest desire to win converts to the Christian Faith they have emphasized a resemblance which was only apparent, and sought to reconcile the teaching of Neo-Platonism with that of the Christian Church.

Such an attempt, however, ended in failure for among the Christian apologists there were many who, whilst they admitted a likeness between the two doctrines, yet stoutly denied that there was any real agreement; in fact, some went so far as to say that the Neo-Platonists differed totally in their doctrine of the Trinity, from that which the Christian Church acknowledged.

Foot Notes- (1). Contra Jul.VIII. see Bouillet, Vol.3. pages, 15, 16. translated from the French of Bouillet. See Fuller notes at the end of this chapter for a translation of Enneads, V.I.6. (2). Cont. Jul.VIII.-Bouillet, Vol.3. page, 626, foot-note. translated from the French of Bouillet.

If we compare the Trinity of Plotinus with that of St Augustine, we notice that both use the term Hypostasis which with Plotinus means substantial existence. St. Augustine, however, has clearly pointed out, (1) that although the same term is used the meaning is not quite the same. Whilst the Neo-Platonists suggest a difference between Hypostasis and Being, Augustine speaks of one being (or essence), and three substances. Now if Plotinus adopts the Christian meaning of the term, that is, if he thinks of three substantial existences, then his Godhead is three-fold, and he thereby violates his principle of the Unity of the Godhead which he so frequently emphasizes. We must bear in mind, however, that Hypostasis is not the same as Person, and at the same time remember that Plotinus never calls his Divine Principles Persons. (2).

As we have already remarked, the First Hypostasis of Plotinus is The One, The Absolute, transcending all else; simple, infinite, eternal, unknowable, transcending even the quality of Being. It acts everywhere, in the sense that without it nothing can exist, and yet it is nowhere, in that it is above all else. It is the unchanging cause from which there emanates the Nous or Intellectual Principle, which is the image ( $\Sigma\iota\kappa\acute{\omicron}\nu$ ) of it. (3)

Foot Notes- (1). De Civ. Dei, X.23. De Trinitate V. <sup>VIII</sup>IX.10. for the translation see fuller notes at the end of the present chapter. (2). Inge, op. cit. 'Plotinus', Vol.2. page, 210. (3). Enneads, V.I.7. translated in the fuller notes at the end of the present chapter.

The Second Hypostasis, the Nous, the Divine thought, Intelligence, best called, perhaps, the Intellectual-Principle, is a real Being, the first 'thing' of which existence may be affirmed. It is an image of the First, emanating from the One, mediating the Unknowable One to the world. (1)

Here we find the beginning of Plurality or Multiplicity. For the Intellectual-Principle contains within itself the totality of the Divine Thoughts, commonly spoken of as the  $\overset{\text{ἰδῶν}}{\text{ἰδῶν}}$   $\overset{\text{ἀρχῆς}}{\text{ἀρχῆς}}$ . These are the Originals, Archetypes, Intellective forms of all that exists in the lower sphere of the world. But the Intellectual-Principle to be of real help to the world, whilst it looks upward to the Absolute, cannot bend to the lower world of sense. So we find it engendering a power 'apt to the realization of its thought', apt, that is, to Creation. (2)

There emanates, therefore, from the Second Hypostasis a third, the Universal Soul, the All-Soul commonly known as  $\psi\chi\alpha$ . This plays the part of a mediating agency between the world of the Intellective Order above it and that of Sense below, thereby bestowing life and beauty to the Universe. (3)

Briefly, then, we have here described the Three Principle Hypostases of Plotinus. And, at once we see how very greatly these differ in character from the <sup>2</sup>Three Persons of the Christian Trinity.

Foot Notes-(1) Enneads, V.8.9. translated at the end of this chapter. (2). Mackenna, op.cit. Vol. I. page, 120. (3). Enneads, IV 3.XI. "Such mediation and representation there must have been, since it was equally impossible for the created to be without share in the Supreme, and for the Supreme to descend into the created". Mackenna, Vol. 3. page 22.

In Neo-Platonism the Three Hypostases are inferior and subordinate, the Second to the First and the Third to the Second. They are in no sense co-eternal or co-equal; whilst, on the other hand, in the teaching of Augustine the three Persons in the Trinity are of the same rank and possess the same Essence. (1)

Moreover, the part which each plays is very different. The Absolute does not of himself create the world; He cannot stoop to the realm of thought or sense, but remains above and beyond everything else in lonely isolation, august and infinite. He cannot come to man; man must reach upward to Him.

As Ottley puts it- "To Plotinus it appeared inconceivable that the immutable 'One' should act upon the many except as a principle of attraction. It could not go after the lost sheep; at best it would draw all things towards itself; whereas the Gospel proclaimed an actual descent of Deity into the very heart of the world to redeem, to heal, and to aid the aspiring will of man: an Incarnation of the Divine, uniting matter and spirit. Such an idea was wholly uncongenial to Neo-Platonic thought...its whole tendency being to remove the divine nature as far as possible from any possible contact with the material universe". (2)

Again, the Second Hypostasis can only look upward to the heights of the Absolute. He too remains aloof from the life and thought of the world. Moreover, in the doctrine of Plotinus, it is the Soul that plays the part of the Creator.

But in the conception of the Christian Church of the Trinity, the Father draws near to His children, He has made them in His own image, He loves them and seeks to reveal His will

Foot Notes- (1).De Trin.VII.V.10.-V.8.9.see Fuller notes.  
 (2).Ottley, op.cit.page,59.cp.Baron von Hügel,'The Mystical Element of Religion.'Vol.I.I.25.



to them. Whereas in the Neo-Platonic triad, there is ~~a~~ complete absence of love, the three are Principles, not Persons. How can we possibly find any comparison between the Nous of Plotinus, or the Logos, if we may call Him so, and the Word that became flesh, the Saviour of men, who took upon Himself the form of humanity?

In the Christian Trinity the work of Creation is not confined to the third Person; it is the Father and the Son who create; it is the Holy Spirit who broods over the unformed Kosmos; each of the Three playing a part in the work of the Creation. Now much as Augustine acknowledged the help which he received from Neo-Platonism, in assisting him to perceive the Unity and spirituality of God, he yet very clearly saw wherein it failed to satisfy perfectly his yearnings. Neo-Platonism maintained, it is true, that God manifested Himself in the Nous or Logos, that is, in His Son; but in Neo-Platonism the Nous was but an emanation of the Absolute and not ~~a~~ complete manifestation of His inner being. Now <sup>^</sup>Augustine saw that in His Son, Jesus Christ, God's manifestation of Himself was full and complete, and that from the Father and the Son there proceeded the Holy Spirit which was identical in nature with both. (1)

Augustine tells us himself that he saw in Neo-Platonism no mediating Logos, saw not the Divine Saviour there. He saw in the Holy Scriptures that the Son was in the form of the Father and naturally the same in substance, but he read further 'that He emptied Himself...and became obedient unto

Foot Notes- (1). See Watson, "The Philosophical Basis of Religion" page, 332.

death, and that death the death of the cross...those books have not". (1) In a word, Neo-Platonism proclaimed no gospel of a Saviour.

We are able now to see the wide disparity which existed between these two doctrines of the Trinity.

With the Neo-Platonists, all Being is inferior to that from which it has sprung, and only gives an imperfect image of it. So we see that, of these three divine Hypostases, the last is subordinate to the second, as the second is to the first; they are, in no sense whatsoever, coeternal or coequal. (2)

Within the divine hierarchy itself there is also a complete absence of mutual and loving fellowship; the first does not love the second, nor the second the third, in the intimate way that we would have expected; moreover, there is no outflowing of a fulness of love from the Godhead towards men; a love which can stoop and save.

How different it is with the Holy Trinity! There, the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are each, in the same way, equal and eternal; they each act as one, and, in a mysterious but very real sense, they are one. One in being, power, and dignity. Their relationship with each other is that of cordial love, a love which reveals itself in each of their manifestations in its complete fulness.

The only real identity between the two doctrines seems to lie in this, that they are alike in proclaiming a three-fold Godhead, and that this unity admits at the same time of plurality.

Was the teaching of Plotinus here, on that account, of no value to Augustine or the Fathers of the Christian Church? By no means. Indeed the philosophical doctrines as enunciated by Plotinus and others helped to clarify the ideas of the Christian Apologists when they found it needful to define and defend the doctrine of the Church, and they were not slow to make use of their arguments.

But with regard to Augustine himself; although he differed greatly from Plotinus in his conception of the Godhead he was very evidently influenced here in his conception of that doctrine. In the previous chapter we saw that one thing of fundamental importance Augustine had received from Plotinus, and this was his conception of the Simplicity of the Divine Nature. But Augustine found considerable difficulty in reconciling that thought of the Unity and Simplicity of God with the doctrine of the Christian Church concerning the threefold personality of the Godhead.

Now in the Christian view of the Trinity there is much, we must confess, which has militated against the co-equality of the Godhead. For example, the Son is begotten, He does not exist of Himself; from that there springs the thought of the pre-eminence of the Father over the Son, since the begetter is considered to be greater than the begotten. Further, the Holy Spirit is not even created, but proceeds alike from the Father and the Son. It is clear, however that the dignity and co-equality of each was fully recognised by the Church Fathers from the time of Theophilus of Antioch, (171-183) when the name of the Trinity first came to be accepted, and when baptism was administered - 'in the name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit'.

In the time of Origen, however, the question was raised as to whether the Holy Spirit might or might not be a creature, and we find in his day a growing tendency to associate the idea of createdness with the Holy Spirit. In fact, as Neander says, "the Fathers alternated between the doctrine of the Holy Ghost as being part of the Trinity and a good gift through Christ" (1)

Now St Augustine, whilst seeking to maintain the orthodox position and at the same time attempting to give a rational explanation of the Trinity, comes perilously near to what is known as Modalism. And here he seems to have been influenced by Neo-Platonism.

We have seen that Augustine had accepted the view of Plotinus that we can best know God by knowing ourselves. This helps him towards an understanding of the nature of the Godhead. (2) He conceives of the mind as being an essential unity, and yet that unity may be perceived by means of differing manifestations. For example, he sometimes speaks of the mind which is one in its essence, whose unity is yet capable of being displayed by means of three different, though not separated functions, memory, intelligence, love. (3) Or again, he speaks of 'Memory, Intelligence, Will'. (4) Of- 'being, knowing, willing'; <sup>(5)</sup> of- 'being, life, & knowledge;' or further, of human consciousness as the consciousness of wisdom, love, and happiness. (6)

And St Augustine reasons that, since the mind of man is made in the image of God, we can think of the unity in

Foot Notes- (1). Neander, Church History, Vol. 2. pages, 337-9. (2) De Trinitate, IX.2.2. see fuller notes. (3) De Trinit. VIII.8. 12. (4). Sermo, 52, cap. VII. X. (19-23) De Trin. X. I. &c. (5) Conf. XIII. XI. 12. see fuller notes. (6). De Civ. Dei, XI. 26. see fuller notes.

distinction which is found in our own self-consciousness as analogous to the unity of the three Persons in God. (1)

What Augustine seeks to show is this, that, whilst there are here in these illustrations three modes of activity which may be separately distinguished, nevertheless in each of them the whole mind is active. So in the Divine Trinity each Person contributes something to the production of the Divine self-consciousness, whilst the essential unity of the Divine Being is unimpaired. If we may quote Windelband, "In accordance with these relations thus recognised in man's mental life, Augustine then not only seeks to gain an analogical idea of the mystery of the Trinity, but recognises, also, in the *esse, nosse, & velle*, the fundamental determination of all reality. Being, knowing, and willing, comprise all reality, and in omnipresence, omniscience, and perfect goodness, the deity encompasses the universe". (2)

But how can Augustine reconcile this thought of the simplicity of the divine being with the three-fold thought of the Divine nature? If we take his illustrations in their entirety, do they not seem to suggest that all thought of personality has been forgotten and that the Persons in the Trinity are but as attributes of the Supreme One? If that be so, then they would seem to be merely subjective. "Here", says Dr. Watson, "we have in Augustine's doctrine a clear instance of the power of Neo-Platonism over him. He is prevented, by his perception of the importance of holding fast by the idea of God as self-manifesting, from Foot Notes- (1). See Watson, *op.cit.* 'Philosophical basis of Religion', pages, 333.f. (2). Windelband, *op.cit.* Page, 280.

(196).

admitting that God is indefinable, he is unable to reconcile the doctrine of the three Persons with the conception, taken from Neo-Platonism, of the absolute simplicity of the divine nature". (I)

We see then that, despite the profound differences which exist between the doctrine of God according to Plotinus, and the conception of the Holy Trinity in the writings of St Augustine, ~~that~~ even here, Neo-Platonism had left a distinct influence upon his mind and helped him to give a clearer exposition of the doctrine of three Persons in One Being.

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Foot Notes- (I). Watson, op.cit. pages, 335,336.

[illegible]

FULLER NOTES TO CHAPTER 2. (Part 2.)

Page, 187. Foot Note-(1).

Enneads, V.I.6. "The offspring of the prior to Divine Mind can be no other than that Mind itself and thus is the loftiest being in the universe, all else following upon it- the soul, for example, being an utterance and act of the Intellectual-Principle as that is an utterance and act of The One. But in soul the utterance is obscured, for soul is an image and must look to its own original: that Principle, on the contrary, looks to the First without mediation- thus becoming what it is- and has that vision not as from a distance but as the immediate next with nothing intervening, close to the One as Soul to it."

Mackenna, Vol.4. page 9.

N.B. Had Cyril noted the whole passage he would have marked this essential difference, namely, that in Neo-Platonism the three divine Hypostases are never equal. In the same section as the above passage, Enneads, V.I.6.- we read "At the same time, the offspring is always minor". In the Christian Trinity, each of the Three Persons is of the same substance and they are co-equal. (u)

In order to mark the difference which exists between the theory of Plotinus and the doctrine of the Christian Church on the Trinity, we may note the following-  
De Civ.Dei, XI.I0. "There is, accordingly, a good which is alone simple, and therefore alone unchangeable and this is God. By this Good have all others been created, but not simple, and therefore not unchangeable. "Created", I say,- that is, made, not begotten. For that which is begotten of the simple Good is simple as itself, and the same as itself. These two we call the Father and the Son; and both together with the Holy Spirit are one God; and to this Spirit the epithet Holy is in Scripture, as it were, appropriated. And He is another than the Father and the Son, for He is neither the Father nor the Son. I say "another", not "another thing", because He is equally with them the simple Good, unchangeable and co-eternal. And this Trinity is one God; and none the less simple because a Trinity. For we do not say that the nature of the good is simple, because the Father alone possesses it, or the Son alone, or the Holy Ghost alone; nor do we say, with the Sabellian heretics, that it is only nominally a Trinity, and has no real distinction of persons; but we say it is simple, because it is what it has, with the exception of the relation of the persons to one another."

Dods, Vol.I. pages, 447,8.

De Civ.Dei,X.23."And what Porphyry as a Platonist means by "principles", we know. For he speaks of God the Father and God the Son, whom he calls (writing in Greek) the intellect or mind of the Father; but of the Holy Spirit he says either nothing, or nothing plainly, for I do not understand what other he speaks of as holding the middle place between these two. For if, like Plotinus in his discussion regarding the three principal substances, (E) he wished us to understand by this third the soul of nature, he would certainly not have given it the middle place between these two, that is, between the Father and the Son. For Plotinus places the soul of nature after the intellect of the Father, while Porphyry, making it the mean, does not place it after, but between the others. No doubt he spoke according to his light, or as he thought expedient; but we assert that the Holy Spirit is the Spirit not of the Father only, nor of the Son only, but of both."

24. "Accordingly, when we speak of God, we do not affirm two or three principles, no more than we are at liberty to affirm two or three gods; although, speaking of each, of the Father, or of the Son, or of the Holy Ghost, we confess that each is God: and yet we do not say, as the Sabellian heretics say, that the Father is the same as the Son, and the Holy Spirit the same as the Father and the Son; but we say that the Father is the Father of the Son, and the Son the Son of the Father, and that the Holy Spirit of the Father and the Son is neither the Father nor the Son. It was therefore truly said that man is cleansed only by a Principle, although the Platonists erred in speaking in the plural of principles. But Porphyry, being under the dominion of these envious powers, whose influence he was at once ashamed of and afraid to throw off, refused to recognise that Christ is the Principle by whose incarnation we are purified."

(I) Enneads, V.I. Dods, Vol.I. pages, 413,4.

see also De Civ.Dei, X.29.

8.

De Trinitate, V. IX. 10. "They indeed use the word hypostasis; but, they intend to put a difference, I know not what, between οὐσία and hypostasis: so that most of ourselves who treat these things in the Greek language, are accustomed to say, *μία οὐσία τρεῖς ὑποστάσεις*, or, in Latin, one essence, three substances". Dods, page, 155.

De Trinitate, V. IX. 10. "By essence we understand the same thing which is understood by substance; we do not dare to say one essence, three substances, but one essence, or substance and three persons."

Dods, page, 155.



Fuller notes to Chapter 5 (Part 2.)

Page, 188, Foot Note- (3)

Enneads, V.I.7."The Intellectual-Principle stands as the image of The One, firstly because there is a certain necessity that the first should have its offspring, carrying onward much of its quality, in other words that there be something in its likeness as the sun's rays tell of the sun".

Mackenna, Vol.IV.page, 9.

PAGE, 189, Foot Note- (1)

Enneads, V.8.9."The very figment of Being needs some imposed image of Beauty, to make it passable, and even to ensure its existence; it exists to the degree in which it has taken some share in the beauty of idea; and the more deeply it has drawn on this, the less imperfect it is, precisely because the nature which is essentially the beautiful has entered into it the more intimately".

Mackenna, Vol.IV. page, 84.

Page, 190, Foot Note- (1).

De Trinitate, VII.V.10." So the Trinity , if one essence, is also one substance".

De Trinitate, V.8.9."Whatever, therefore, is spoken of God in respect to Himself, is both spoken singly of each person, that is, of the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit; and together of the Trinity itself, not plurally but in the singular. For inasmuch as to God it is not one thing to be, and another thing to be great, but to Him it is the same thing to be, as it is to be great; therefore, as we do not say three essences, so we do not say three greatnesses, but one essence and one greatness. I say essence, which in Greek is called οὐσία , and which we call more usually substance."

Dods, Page,155.

Contra Maxim- "Unam esse virtutem, unam substantiam unam deitatem unam gloriam".

Epistle, 149, 2.5."Let it not be supposed that in this Trinity there is any separation in respect of time or place, but that these three are equal and co-eternal and absolutely of one nature: and that the creatures have been made not some by the Father, and some by the Son, and some by the Holy Spirit, but that each and all have been or are now being created subsist in the Trinity as their Creator; and that no one is saved by the Father without the Son and the Holy Spirit, or by the Holy Spirit without the Father and the Son, but by the Father, the Son , and the Holy Spirit, the only one,true,immortal, (that is absolutely unchangeable) God, these things presenting the three to our apprehension separately,indeed, but in no wise separated"

Dods,pages, 336.7

FULLER NOTES CHAPTER 5 (Continued)

Page, 80A I94. Foot Note- (2).

De Trinitate, IX.2.2."Where, then, is the Trinity? Let us attend as much as we can, and let us invoke the everlasting light, that He may illuminate our darkness, and that we may see in ourselves, as much as we are permitted, the image of God."

De Trinitate , IX.IV.4."The three are one, and are also equal,viz. the mind itself, and the love, and the knowledge of it. The same three exist substantially, and are predicated relatively. The same three are inseparable. The same three are not joined and commingled like parts, but that they are of one essence, and are relatives".

De Trinitate, XV.3.5."And in this we found( that is man in respect to his mind) a kind of trinity, that is, the mind, and the knowledge whereby the mind knows itself, and the love whereby it loves both itself and its knowledge of itself; and these three are shown to be mutually equal and of one essence".

Dods,pages, 381,2

Confessions, XIII.XI.I2."Which of us comprehendeth the Almighty Trinity? and yet which speaks not of It, if indeed it be It? Rare is the soul, which while it speaks of It, knows what it speaks of...I would that men would consider these three, that are in themselves. These three be indeed far other than the Trinity; I do but tell, where they may practise themselves, and there prove and feel how far they be. Now the three I spake of, are; To BE, to KNOW, and to WILL. For I AM, and KNOW, and WILL: I am KNOWING & WILLING: and I know myself to BE, and to WILL: and I will to BE and to KNOW".

De Civitate Dei, XI.26."And we indeed recognise in ourselves the image/ of God, that is, of the supreme Trinity, an image which, though it be not equal to God...being neither co-eternal, nor, to say all in a word, consubstantial with Him,- is yet nearer to Him than any other of His works...For we both are, and know that we are, and delight in our being, and in our knowledge of it."

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CHAPTER 6.

GOD'S RELATION TO THE WORLD IN HIS WORK  
OF CREATION.

We have now reached the point in our study of the doctrines of St. Augustine when we must consider what his views were concerning God's relation to the world, and whether, on this question, he owed anything to Plotinus.

We will confine ourselves in this present chapter to a contemplation of God's relation to the world in the work of Creation.

It has already been remarked that both Augustine and Plotinus emphasize the spirituality of the Universe, and that both strongly affirm that the world owes its existence to God; whilst, however, there is agreement in this direction, they differ very considerably in their opinions as to the manner in which God's action upon the world took place.

Both had to overcome certain difficulties if they were to safeguard themselves against apparent inconsistencies, consonant with their conception of the nature of the Divine Being. Now, whilst Augustine takes an independent line of thought in his doctrine of the Creation, and very clearly diverges from the doctrine of Plotinus, nevertheless he is still influenced somewhat, by what he has learned from Neo-Platonism.

According to the Christian view of the Godhead, the Three Persons are co-equal and co-eternal, their action, therefore, is a united action. Augustine tells us, "Every think-

-ing being and animal and corporeal creature, no matter how many exist, is perceived, without any doubt, to be from the Trinity as creator, so that it is not thought that any part of the whole creation has been made, at one time by the Father, at another by the Son, and at another by the Holy Spirit, but that at the same time each and every part of the nature of the God-head made it". (I)

But if we consider the doctrine of Plotinus, the Absolute can have no direct contact with the world, such an association with matter would soil its purity. So too in regard to the Intellectual-Principle what connection can there be on its part with the world of Sense? It can only look upward and, whilst receiving its power and light from above, reflect the mind and thought of the Absolute, and impart its power to the world of Soul below. It would seem then, at first sight, as if only the Soul had to do with the work of Creation.

Plotinus, however, takes pains to explain that whilst the Soul alone in its descent comes into contact with matter, yet, by emanation, each of the Divine Hypostases has a share in the relationship which exists between God and the world.

He tells us, for example, - "The Good is that on which all else depends, towards which all Existences aspire as to their source and their need, while Itself is without need, sufficient to Itself, aspiring to no other, the measure and Term of all, giving out from Itself the Intellectual-Principle and Existence and Soul and Life and all Intellective-Act... All.. is with

the King of All, unfailing Cause of Good and Beauty and controller

Foot Note (1) DE VERA RELIG. VII. 13 (COL. 1214) DE GEN ad LIII. 9. 26. 10.

of all; and what is Good in the second degree depends upon the Second-Principle and tertiary Good upon the Third."(1)

Within the Intellectual-Principle are the Ideas, forms, patterns upon which the world and every individual thing within it, is to be moulded and by which the world itself can be shaped. The 'here' is an image, a copy of the 'yonder'. (2)

Plotinus says- "The Intellectual-Principle, then, in its unperturbed serenity has brought the universe into being, by communicating from its store to Matter: and this gift is the Reason-form flowing from it. For the Emanation of the Intellectual Principle is Reason, an emanation unfailing as long as the Intellectual Principle continues to have place among beings".(3)

"So", Plotinus adds, "from this, the One Intellectual Principle, and the Reason-Form emanating from it, our Universe rises and develops part, and inevitably are formed groups concordant and helpful in contrast with groups discordant and combative;...Its two extremes are Matter and the Divine Reason; its governing principle is Soul, presiding over the conjunction of the two, and to be thought of not as labouring in the task but as administering serenely by little more than an act of presence".

(4) But here we are confronted with a difficulty. Plotinus has insisted, as we have seen, on the absolute simplicity of the One. How then can the Infinite, the Simplex, come into

Foot Notes- (1). Enneads, I.8.2. Mackenna, Vol.I. pages, 93,4.

(2). So too Augustine, De Genesi ad Litt.IV.24."In the Word (Logos) of God are found the eternal Reasons of all things, even of those which have been made in time".Cp.De Civ.Dei,XI.10,also XII.31. (3) Enneads, 3.2.2. Mackenna, Vol.2.page,13.

(4). ibid, pages, 13,14.

contact with the finite and complex? Plotinus himself sees that the association of action with his conception of the nature of the Divine Being will violate his view of the Simplicity.

He, therefore, seeks , as much as possible, to minimise that activity, and endeavours practically to annul any thought of movement.

The Absolute is motionless, aloof and apart from the realm of mundane things. The Intellectual-Principle, whilst it communicates from its store to Matter, yet dwells- "in its unperturbed serenity". The Soul, although it governs, is- "to be thought of, not as labouring in the task but as administering serenely by little more than an act of presence".

In describing the creation, Plotinus compares the creating principle to a spring, having an endless source within itself, and although it supplies all the rivers yet it is never exhausted by what these take; or again he likens it to the 'life which courses through some mighty tree while yet it is the stationary Principle of the whole'. (I)

Yet again, Plotinus in speaking of the First-Principle, says- "But such is the blessedness of this Being that in its very non-action it magnificently operates and in its self-dwelling it produces mightily". (2)

But in ascribing the creation of the world to the whole of the Divine Being, Plotinus is careful not to introduce any thought of change into his conception of the Godhead.

Foot Notes- (I). Enneads, 3.8.10. (2). *ibid*, 3.2.1.

God must not be thought of as having determined , as it were, by second thoughts to make a world. So in order to preserve the immutability of the Divine Being, Plotinus affirms the Eternity of the world of matter. He says-"Since we hold the eternal existence of the Universe, the utter absence of a beginning to it, we are forced, in sound and sequent reasoning, to explain the providence ruling in the Universe as a universal consonance with the divine Intelligence to which the Kosmos is subsequent not in time but in the fact of derivation, in the fact that the Divine Intelligence, preceding it in Kind, is its cause as being the Archtype and Model which it merely images, the primal by which, from all eternity, it has its existence and subsistence". (I)

The world, then, has only a causal commencement, not in time nor in space, since God is everywhere and eternal. In the mind of God there was ever the Thought of the world; the world of matter is but an image, a shadow, from the Divine.

Moreover, consonant with that thought of the eternity of the world, Plotinus does not use the term created. He tells us that the world has been 'generated'; it has been begotten, not made. Begotten in eternity, ever existing, it can never be destroyed. This is how Plotinus expresses himself-"In other words, things commonly described as generated have never known a beginning: all has been and will be. Nor can anything disappear unless where a later form is possible: without such a future there can be no dissolution. If we are told that there is always Matter as a possible term, we ask why then should not

Foot Notes- (I). Enneads, 3.2.I. Mackenna, Vol.2. page, 12.

Matter itself comes to nothingness. If we are told it may, then we ask why it should ever have been generated. If the answer comes that it had its necessary place as the ultimate of the series, we return that the necessity still holds. With Matter left aside as wholly isolated, the Divine Beings are not everywhere but in some bounded place, walled off, so to speak; if that is <sup>not</sup> possible, Matter itself must receive the Divine Light (and so cannot be annihilated)." (I)

We have seen already that the Neo-Platonic Principles are devoid of Love, they are no less devoid of Will. The world came into being not because of the Love of God, according to Plotinus, but as a result of necessity. (2) "This Kosmos of parts", Plotinus says- "has come into being not as the result of a judgment establishing its desirability, but by the sheer necessity of a secondary Kind".

But how are we to account for Unity giving birth to plurality; eternity giving place to time, and succession; & harmony yielding to division? We shall see that the reason is to be found in the existence of Matter. But what does Plotinus mean by Matter? With him the term  $\mu\alpha\tau\eta\rho\iota\alpha$ , which unfortunately has been translated Matter, does not bear the connotation which we usually associate with matter. Plotinus interprets it as the indefinite ( $\alpha\iota\sigma\iota\rho\omicron\nu$ ) the indeterminate ( $\alpha\delta\acute{\epsilon}\rho\iota\sigma\tau\omicron\nu$ ). It is "but the bare receptacle of

Foot Notes-(I) Enneads, 2.9.3. Mackenna, Vol. I. page, 219.

(2). Enneads, 3.2.2., Mackenna, Vol. 2. page, 13.



Forms; the subject of energy, as we should say, viewed by abstraction as separated from the energy which alone gives it being and reality." (1) Plotinus says concerning Matter, "Investigation will show us that Matter has no reality and is not capable of being affected. Matter must be bodiless- for body is a later production, a compound made by Matter in conjunction with some other entity. Thus it is included among incorporeal things in the sense that body is something that is neither Real-Being nor Matter. Matter is not Soul: it is not Intellect, is not Life, is no Ideal-Principle; no Reason-Principle; it is no limit or bound, for it is mere indetermination; it is not a power, for what does it produce? ....It has no title to the name of Being. It will be more plausibly called a non-being, and this in the sense not of movement (away from Being) or station (in Not-Being) but of veritable Not-Being, so that it is no more than the image and phantasm of Mass, a bare aspiration towards substantial existence; ...a phantasm unabiding and yet unable to withdraw....so absolute its lack of all Being". (2) We can now understand how it was that Plotinus conceived of the world as an image, a phantom, a shadow.

"For Plotinus", says Windelband, "the world of the senses is not in itself evil any more than it is in itself good; but because in it light passes over into darkness, because it thus presents a mixture of Being and Non-being, it is good so far as it has part in God or the Good; that is so far as it is; and on the other hand, it is evil in so far as it has part in matter or the Evil; i.e. in so far as it is not (has no real, posit-

Foot Notes- (1). See Inge, 'Philosophy of Plotinus', Vol. I. page 128, and following. (2). Enneads, 3.6.7. Mackenna, Vol. 2. pages, 77, 8.

-ive existence). Evil proper, the true evil ( *πρῶτον κακόν* ), is matter, negation; the corporeal world can be called evil only because it is formed out of matter: it is secondary evil ( *δευτερον κακόν* ); and the predicate "evil" belongs to souls only if they give themselves over to matter". (I)

It is in this way that Plotinus seeks to preserve his theory of the Simplicity of the Divine Nature and at the same time to account for the world of existence as owing its being to God. We have dwelt upon the question of Matter thus in detail for later we shall see how Augustine was led to make use of this theory in his attempt to explain God's association with the world.

But now let us turn to Augustine's account of the Creation. Asserting with Plotinus that the world had a causal commencement and that it had been brought into being by God, Augustine yet arrives at very different conclusions.

In the first place, Augustine held that the world had not been engendered, but created. He distinguishes very clearly between begetting and creating. God begat His Son, for He was co-eternal with Himself. (2). But Augustine would not accept the doctrine that the world was co-equal <sup>or co-eternal</sup> with God. The heavens and the earth, being subject to change, and unlike the immutable God, must have been created, for only that which is absolutely ~~self-existent~~ unchangeable is self-existent. (3)

When we think of the Creation, moreover, we must not

Foot Notes- (I). Windelband, op.cit. page, 247. (2). Contra Secund. Manich. 3.8. (3) See Watson, 'The Philosophical Basis of Religion', page 338.

imagine God as a workman who applies to matter his industry. He was no fashioner of pre-existent matter. God is not simply the Architect of the world, He is its Creator. Matter and form were created at the same time ; God made the world out of nothing.

Augustine explains this by saying- "When we say that He made it out of nothing, we mean that there was no pre-existent Matter, unmade by Himself, without which He could not have made the world". (I)

But , if God made the world, it was not because of necessity says St. Augustine; it was rather an act of goodness on His part; He found it good to create it, and if he found that it was good to create it , it was because of his will. The will of God is, therefore, says Augustine, the cause of the Creation.

"He who asks why God willed to make the world, seeks the cause of the will of God. Shall we not then, reply to them that cause is efficient? Now the producer is always greater than that which is produced; but there is nothing greater than the will of God; there is, therefore no point in asking what is the cause of it?"

(2) Augustine found a difficulty in reconciling the conception of the Eternity of God with a creation that was not eternal. He grants that many ages may have passed since the world was created, but he adds- "Yet I have no doubt that no created thing is co-eternal with the Creator." (3)

Now whilst Augustine could not think of a world co-eternal with God, neither could he conceive of God as

Foot Notes- (I). Augustine, Ad Orásium, I-2. De Fide et symbolo, I.2. De Vera Relig. XVIII.35. De Genesi contra Manich. I.6.

"Et ideo Deus rectissime creditur omnia de nihilo fecisse, quia etiamsi <sup>OPINIA</sup> formata de ista materia facta sunt, haec ipsa materia <sup>OPINIA</sup> tamen <sup>OPINIA</sup> nihilo facta est". (2). De Diversis Quaest. 83.28.

(3) De Civ. Dei, XII.16. see also ibid. XII.15.

as creating the world in time. He reasons that Time cannot be thought of in connection with God, for God has only to do with Eternity. Time has no meaning apart from change, the ground of change lies in things, but God being absolutely immutable can experience no change, and therefore for Him there is no time.

Plotinus had said- "Eternity is characteristic of the Intellectual-Principle, time of the Soul- for we hold that time has its substantial being in the activity of the soul, and springs from soul...We repeat, identity belongs to the eternal, time must be the medium of diversity". (1) And we find that Augustine closely follows him here.

Time began, says Augustine, with creatures, that is with creation; hence he declares the world was not made in time but with Time. (2) Whilst, Augustine finds himself unable to accept the truth which Plotinus holds concerning the eternity of the world, he yet comes here very closely to that thesis without making God and the world co-eternal. (3)

Augustine too is prepared ~~but~~ to admit that there may be new things created by God, but he argues, such new creation does not necessitate a change in God's will, since all things must be included in God's plan. God cannot think one thing at one time and another thing at another time. All things are eternally present to God. (4)

**FOOT Notes-** (1). Enneads, IV.4.15. (2). See Confessions, XI.13.16. also many other passages in the same book of the Confess. (3). De Genesi ad Litt. 9.26. "Hic ergo incommutabili aeternitate vivens creavit omnia simul ex quibus currerent tempora et implerentur loca, temporalibusque et localibus rerum motibus saecula volverentur". (4). De Civ. Dei, XII.20. "What can seem more in accordance with godly reason than to believe that it is possible for God both to create new things never before created, and in doing so, to preserve His will unaltered".

We are able now to see the difficulties with which Augustine was confronted in his attempt to maintain his view of the Simplicity of the Divine nature, and at the same time set forth such a view of God's work in the Creation of the World.

It is true that like perplexities had troubled Plotinus, but he has sought to overcome them by reducing the Divine activity to a minimum by representing the power as emanating from the three Hypostases from one to another, so that "in its very non-action it magnificently operates".

But Augustine, on the other hand, had already admitted creative action on the part of God, and further he had declared that God made the world because He wished to make it. In the work of Creation, Augustine has then set before us the Goodness, the Knowledge, and the Will of God. He endeavours, <sup>in order not to</sup> however, <sup>to</sup> violate his view as a Psychologist, <sup>by</sup> regarding these as but the attributes of God. These, he declares, are each and all parts of God's Unity. God is not God apart from His goodness; He is absolute Goodness; He is The Good; so with His Will and His Knowledge. All contribute to the glory and splendour of the Divine Nature. (I).

It is unthinkable for Augustine to identify the world with God, and yet how was it possible for him to explain the world apart from God? He solves his difficulty by adopting the Neo-Platonic view that finite things cannot add to the sum of being, since they partake of the nature of negation. Then it would seem to logically follow from that, that the world cannot partake of reality at all, but is only an illusion. But

Foot Note- (I) See Watson, 'The Philosophical basis of Religion' page, 337.

St. Augustine will not agree to that; hence he seeks to show that the world depends upon God for the limited reality which it possesses. As it partakes of the nature of God it has being; as it remains apart from God it can only be an illusion.

"Whilst this", says Dr. Watson, "is the logical consequence of Augustine's Neo-Platonic doctrine that finite being is purely negative, his more explicit doctrine is that the world is a relatively independent existence, which owes its origin to the creative power of God". (I)

We see then that whilst Augustine differs greatly in the view he takes of the creation, from that which Plotinus has set forth, nevertheless there are even here, very evident signs of the influence of Neo-platonism upon his thought.

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Foot Note- (I). Watson, op.cit. "The Philosophical Basis of Religion", page, 356.

CHAPTER 7.

THE INFLUENCE OF PLOTINUS ON THE THEORIES OF  
ST. AUGUSTINE CONCERNING PROVIDENCE, EVIL,  
OPTIMISM, AND FREEDOM.

"De graves raisons conduisirent saint Augustin à étudier et à adopter les idées fondamentales de la théorie professée par Plotin sur la Providence."

Bouillet, Vol. 2. Page, 523.

In our study of the life of St. Augustine we have seen that at an impressionable period he was attracted to Manichaeism by its specious promises of enlightenment upon life's most pressing and most perplexing problems. Here was a System which professed to give just that of which the world stood in need; an authoritative revelation of truth; (1) a solution of the pressing problem of evil; in a word, an explanation of the meaning of life. As we know Manichaeism exercised a marked influence upon Augustine's mental and spiritual development for the nine years during which he remained as 'a hearer'. It offered a dualistic explanation of the Universe. It proclaimed an eternal warfare between the rival powers of light and darkness, good and evil, and, by means of the dualism which existed in the world, it solved the harassing problem of evil which had long vexed the heart of St. Augustine. He tells us that here in this system he found an answer to the question, Whence is Evil?

When, however, Augustine was delivered from the bondage of Manichaeism by means of Neo-Platonism, and had grasped the principle of the spiritual Unity of the world, he was not

Foot Note- (1) De Utilitate Credendi, I.2.

slow to accept all the help he could receive from that Philosophy in order that he might warmly contest what he now saw to be a most specious and most dangerous doctrine.

In many of his treatises against the Manichaeans as well as when he is dealing with the order and harmony which exists in the universe, we find St. Augustine closely associates himself with Plotinus and makes free use of many of his arguments and illustrations.<sup>(1)</sup> Here then on the themes of Providence, Evil and Freedom we shall be able to find that St. Augustine has been profoundly influenced by Neo-Platonism.

In the previous chapter we saw that whilst for Plotinus the world owed its existence to an emanation, and that it was begotten by the Divine Hypostases, on the other hand St. Augustine affirmed a creation by the Will and owing to the goodness and Love of God.

Despite these differences, however, there is complete agreement upon the fact that the world owes its existence to God. Plotinus declares and Augustine follows him in a like assertion that the world and all things in it have received their ~~the~~ forms and patterns from the mind of the Supreme Being.

But now, God in His infinite goodness and Love, having brought the world into being, does not cease to act upon it or in it when the work of His creation has become perfected. Indeed the world, so Augustine and Plotinus tell us frequently, is dependent upon Him for its very life, indeed, &c

Foot Note- (1) Most especially do we see this with respect to the writings of Plotinus against the Gnostics. These held the same dualistic principle, as the Manichaeans, & Augustine found here powerful arguments whereby he too could combat Manichaeism.



the world would cease to be were it not for God's continuous action upon it. Augustine says- "There is about His work a continuity by means of which He directs and rules every creature. That continuity of operation which gives to all things a harmony that charms us, and which makes them incomparable and ineffable, and, if one could only take it in, their stable movement is evident to those who pay attention. Now <sup>h</sup>~~s~~<sub>u</sub>ppress that continuity and that movement ceases and when such movement is at an end, as a result things will perish...That is why we believe and affirm that God works ceaselessly in His creatures..Hence it follows that if He were to withdraw his cooperation, we should have neither life, nor movement, nor Being". (I)

And the Providence of God is universal, extending to all things, man, animal, plant, even to things that are most insignificant. Everywhere there is to be seen that harmony which is the result of an over-ruling Providence.

Augustine describes this many times . Here he says- "God supreme and true, with His Word and Holy Spirit (which three are one) one God omnipotent, creator and maker of every soul and of every body; ...who has given to the good and to the evil, being in common with stones, vegetable life in common with trees, sensuous life in common with brutes, intellectual life in common with angels alone; from whom is every mode, every species, every order; from whom are measure, weight, number; from whom is everything which has an existence in nature, of whatever kind it be, and of whatever value from whom are the seeds of forms and the forms of seeds, and the motion of seeds and of forms; who gave also to flesh its origin, beauty, health, reproductive fecundity, disposition of members, &

Foot Note- (I).De Genesi ad Litt. IV.I2. also ibid, V.20.

the salutary concord of its parts; ...who has not left, not to speak of heaven and earth, angels and men, but <sup>not</sup> even the entrails of the smallest and most contemptible animal, or the feather of a bird, or the little flower of a plant, or the leaf of a tree, without an harmony,- that God can never be believed to have left the kingdoms of men, their dominations and servitudes, outside of the laws of His providence". (1)

And Plotinus, in very much the same way tells us- "We cannot but recognise from what we observe in this universe that some such principle of order prevails throughout the entire of existence- the minutest things a tributary to the vast total; the marvellous art shown not merely in the mightiest works and sublimest members of the All, but even amid such littleness as one would think Providence must disdain: the varied workmanship of wonder in any and every animal form; the world of vegetation, too; the grace of fruits and even of leaves, the lavishness, the delicacy, the diversity of exquisite bloom: and all this not issuing once, and then to die out, but made ever and ever anew as the Transcendent Beings move variously over this earth." (2)

Now both Augustine and Plotinus declare with emphatic insistence that all this cannot be the result of Chance. (3) Everywhere there is evidence of prevailing law and Universal Order which even extends to particular things.

Augustine in his treatise on Order tells us- "All things act according to Order in our world of sense. In all

Foot Notes- (1). De Civ.Dei, V.II.- XXII.24.-Confess.VII.5.7.&c.

(2). Enneads, III.2.13.-cp.De Civ.Dei, X.I4.where Augustine quotes this passage, mentioning Plotinus by name.Enns.V.I.4 and often. (3).Enneads, 3.2.1.-3.2.13.-De Ord.I.I.

material being we are able to behold a wonderful harmony. Each is linked with each; cause and effect, everywhere. Even the apparently insignificant thing has a real purpose. God guides all events; order is everywhere. What is called chance is but Providence forgotten". (1)

So too Plotinus, in many places tells us- "All things must be enchained; and the sympathy and correspondence obtaining in any one closely knit organism must exist, first and most intensely, in the All". .."and there is nothing undesigned, nothing of chance, in all the process".(2) Again he says-  
~~"The~~ "The Universe is permeated by one Soul, Cause of all things and events; every separate phenomenon as a member of a whole moves in its place with the general movement; all the various causes spring into action from one source: therefore, it is argued, the entire descending chain of causes and all their interaction must follow inevitably and so constitute a universal determination".(3)

Now from this prevailing harmony Augustine deduces the Unity of the Creation and argues that the Godhead must be a Unity. He affirms that if only the Manichaeists had acknowledged the admirable unity which is everywhere present, they would have affirmed that there was but one God, and that He was the Father of Unity and is perfectly good, and is Providence. (4)

Moreover, Augustine reasons that in man's struggle after being lies his search for Unity. "Things which

Foot Notes- (1). De Ordine, I. c.I-VI. (2). Enneads, W.E. 2.3.7.  
 (3) Enneads, 3.1.4.-see also Enneads, 3.2.1.-3.3.6.-IV. 39.  
 and often. (4). De Genesi contra Manich. I.21. 4.

tend towards existence tend towards order; and in attaining order they attain existence, as far as that is possible with a creature. For order reduces to a certain uniformity that which it arranges; and existence is nothing else than being one. Thus, so far as anything acquires unity, so far it exists." (1)

Then Augustine goes on to say that the source of every kind of obscure trouble arises from an absence of unity.(2)

We see then both Plotinus and Augustine are agreed that there is law, harmony, order, and beauty in the Universe and that these things proclaim the mind and beauty of the Divine Being. Plotinus in an eloquent passage says, "Surely no one seeing the loveliness lavish in the world of sense- this vast orderliness, the Form which the stars even in their remoteness display- no one could be so dull-witted, so immoveable, as not to be carried by all this to recollection, and gripped by reverent awe in the thought of all this, so great, sprung from that greatness. Not to answer thus could only be to have neither fathomed this world nor had any vision of that other". (3).

But despite the fact that Providence watched over the world and that there were everywhere perfect Order, Law, and Beauty, nevertheless the world was not as perfect as one would expect. This had given Augustine much thought. The world was marred by the presence of Evil in it; whence came such Evil?

Foot Notes- (1). De moribus Manichaeorum, VI.8. (2).De lib arb. 3.23.70. (3).Enneads, 2.9.16. Mackenna, page,239. Vol.2. compare De Civ.Dei, VIII.6.

How are we to justify the misery of this life if the world is ruled by Providence? We see how Augustine in his many treatises debates this question. In the book of the Confessions he says- "God is good, yea most mightily and incomparably better than all these: but yet He, the Good created them good;...Where is evil then and whence, and how crept it in hither? What is its root, & what its seed? ..Whence is it then? seeing God the Good, hath created all these things good...Or was there some evil matter of which He made, and formed, and ordered it, yet left something in it, which He did not convert into good?...Had He no might to turn and change the whole, so that no evil should remain in it, seeing He is Almighty? ..Or if it were from eternity, why suffered He it so to be for infinite spaces of times past, and was pleased so long after to make something out of it? " (1)

One cannot associate evil with matter, reasons St. Augustine, since matter has been created by God, and to link evil with matter will be in an indirect way to make God responsible for Evil. "On that account," says Augustine, "Matter which the ancients call Hyle cannot be spoken of as Evil". (2)

Again we find Augustine saying- "One may perhaps ask, whence comes sin, and then add, whence comes Evil? If it comes from the angel, whence comes the angel? But without doubt both man and angel come from God. But that is no reason for referring to God evils and faults by a chain of sequences as some ignorant spirits do who are not able to penetrate into the heart

Foot Notes- (1). Confessions, VII.V.7. (2). De natura boni cont. Manich. 18.

of things..We know God and all the objections which trouble us may spring from ourselves". (I). Augustine is drawing near to a solution of his problem.

We may now notice several ways in which Augustine endeavours to vindicate the ways of Providence. In the first place he begins by an enquiry concerning the Nature of Evil, following the direction of Plotinus whose view of Evil Augustine adopts. (2).

We find Plotinus saying- "Those enquiring whence Evil enters into beings, or rather into a certain order of beings, would be making the best beginning if they established, first of all, what precisely Evil is, what constitutes its Nature. At once we should know whence it comes, where it has its native seat and where it is present merely as an accident;" (3)

We have seen that Augustine affirmed that all things lower than the Creator had only an apparent reality. In a sense they were 'real' as coming from God, but in a sense they are 'unreal' since they are not wholly what He is- the sole unchanging reality. In effect things only 'are', that is only exist, as they partake of the being of God. In his Confessions he says- "I looked back on other things; and I saw that they owed their being to Thee;...and all things are true so far as they be; (vera sunt quantum sunt) nor is there any falsehood, unless when that is thought to be, which is not." (4)

Foot Notes- (I). De duabus animabus con.Manich.8. (2).De morib. Manich. 2.X. (3). Enneads, I.8.I. (4). Confessions,VII.I5. 21.compare Confess.XI.4.6."Nec ita pulchra sunt nec ita bona sunt, nec ita sunt sicut tu, Conditor rerum;cui comparata nec pulchra sunt, nec bona sunt, nec sunt".

All things made by God are good, he says many times. If Evil existed in God, it would be good, but being external to God it is outside all being and substance. In one of his Manichaeian treatises he says- "Evil is not a substance but a hostile defect of substance". (1)

Augustine arrives therefore, at the conclusion that Evil is nothing real, it is negation of being, a deprivation of good. Since God is the true Being, and it is outside God it is a deprivation of being. Augustine repeats this with emphasis in many of his writings. In the Confessions he says- "As yet I knew not that evil was nothing but a privation of good, until at last a thing ceases altogether to be." (2) Again- "Therefore, if they shall be deprived of all good, they shall no longer be. So long therefore as they are, they are good: therefore whatsoever is, is good. That even then..is not any substance: for were it a substance, it should be good". (3)

This was then, Augustine's first attempt to throw light upon the problem of Evil. Let us compare this with what Plotinus has to say on the matter. "Evil", Plotinus tells us, "manifests itself as the very absence of Good." (4) "Evil cannot have place among Beings or in the Beyond-Being; these are good. There remains, only, if Evil exist at all, that it be situate in the realm of Non-Being, that it be some mode, as it were, of the Non-Being, that it have its seat in something in touch with Non-Being or to a certain degree communicate in Non-Being. By this

Foot Notes- (1). De Moribus Manich. 2.8.XI. 'inconvenientia inimica substantiae'. (2). III. 7. 12. (3). ibid, VII. 12. 18., De Civ. Dei, XI. 9.- XI. 22. and often. (4). Enneads, I. 8. I.

Non-Being, of course, we are not to understand something that simply does not exist, but only something of an utterly different order from Authentic-Being;...the Non-Being we are thinking of is, rather, an image of Being or perhaps something still further removed than even an image". (I)

Plotinus, then, like Augustine, holds that Evil is deprivation of Being.

But Augustine, who knew so well the misery of the human heart and the profound reality of sin, was aware that to simply affirm the negative character of Evil and nothing more would be of little profit. Hence he proceeds to argue further that Evil has been included in the Order of the Universe for a wise purpose, that is that it may enhance its glory and beauty. Whilst then, God did not choose Evil, nevertheless He permits it, since things both good and evil have been included by Him in His Order. "You ask", says Augustine, "how can evil itself be in the order when God has chosen the Order? For without a doubt there are evil things in the Order itself. Do you then consider that it is a poor order that God should choose good things and that God should not include bad? Nay the very fact that He elects to choose good and not to choose evil, proclaims it to be a great order and one of Divine arrangement. That very Order and arrangement has been made because in this way He could thus preserve harmony, along with variety in His Universe. For that reason Evil must be regarded as being unavoidable. Just as in oratory, the very beauty of speech becomes the more pleasing by reason of its antitheses, so

Foot Notes- (I). Enneads, I.8.3. Mackenna, page 94. see also Enneads III.2.5.



it is by its contraries that the beauty of all things is in like manner brought forth." (1)

Augustine frequently illustrates this; we find him saying, "What can be more offensive than an executioner?... yet even he holds a needful place in the law of the land, in the punishment of criminals who are hostile to the Order. What more sordid, more devoid of dignity, more shameful than prostitutes procurers, and other pests of like nature? But take these away from society and everything would be thrown into confusion by reason of rampant lust". (2)

Hence we see that Augustine has arrived at the conception of Evil as a necessity for greater Being. God has permitted it to be included in His order that through the Evil as well as despite the Evil greater glory and beauty and good may be the result. Such was the finding also of Plotinus; it forms the basis of the Optimism of both Augustine and Plotinus.

Plotinus asks- "Are the evils of the Universe necessary because it is of later origin than the Higher Sphere? Perhaps rather because without evil the All would be incomplete. For most or even all forms of evil serve the Universe- much as the poisonous snake has its use- though in most cases their function is unknown. Vice itself has many useful sides: it brings about much that is beautiful, in artistic creations for example, and it stirs us to thoughtful living, not allowing us to drowse in security". (3)

Foot Notes- (1). De Ordine, I.VII.18.(Col.540) cp.De Civ.Dei,XI.18.- XII.5. (2). De Ord.2.4.12. see also, ibid.2.4.13.(Cols. 560,I). (3).Enneads, 2.3.18. Mackenna, Vol.2.page, 177.

In like manner both Plotinus and St. Augustine agree that all other ills, such as poverty and sickness, grief, nay even injustice play their part in the world, contribute to the greater perfection of the Universe, and become conditions of greater moral well-being. (1).

It would be folly to expect that all things should be made equal; if this were so where would be the variety? The very charm, beauty, and splendour of the world in its perfection demand that there should be things and creatures of varying degrees and grades. The Statue which is but more or less perfect does not cease to be beautiful because all its parts are not comely. It is in this way that both our authors proclaim their optimism.

Is it possible for any one of us to pass wise judgment upon the order or seeming disorder of the Universe? Both Plotinus and Augustine ask, and we find them giving the same answer. We are not able to judge wisely because we ourselves form a part of the Universe, and because we see only the imperfection of a part, and the beauty of the whole escapes our notice. (2)

Moreover, in the moral and spiritual world, as we behold injustice, calamity, suffering, in the case of the righteous, we must remember that we only can view things from the standpoint of the present brief life, whilst God has all eternity to perfect his work. We ought to judge therefore not from the single point of space or time, but from the totality and univers-

Foot Notes- (1). Enneads, III.2.5. & De lib.arb.3. IX.26.(Col.I009. Enneads,3.2.11.& De.Ord.2.4.13.- Enneads,3.3.5. & De Ord.I.7. 18.- Enneads, IV.3.16. & De Div.Quaest.24,27. &c. (2). See De Civ.Dei, XII.4.De.Ord.I.I.De Genesi con.Manich.I.16. De Musica,VI.XI. De Vera Relig.40.Conf.VII.13.19.cp.Enneads, 3.2.3,7.

-ality of things. (I)

Furthermore, hidden causes; reasons that we are ignorant of because of our very limited humanity make our judgment impossible; the Universe is wholly regulated by a Providence whose designs cannot be determined .

So for both Plotinus and Augustine the activity of the Divine Being towards His Universe makes for ever increasing blessing; He is the centre to which all things turn.

One final quotation from Plotinus will express all that needs to be said further on this point.

"Nor would it be sound to condemn this Kosmos as less than beautiful, as less than the noblest possible in the corporeal; and neither can any charge be laid against its source.

The world, we must reflect, is a product of Necessity, not of deliberate purpose: it is due to a higher Kind engendering in its own likeness by a natural process. And none the less, a second consideration, if a considered plan brought it into being it would still be no disgrace to its maker- for it stands a stately whole, complete within itself, serving at once its own purpose and that of all its parts which, leading and lesser alike, are of such a nature as to further the interests of the total. It is therefore, impossible to condemn the whole on the merits of the parts which, besides, must be judged only as they enter harmoniously or not into the whole, the main consideration, quite overpassing the members which thus cease to have importance. To linger about the parts is to condemn not the Kosmos but some isolated appendage of it; in the entire living Being we fasten our eyes on

**Foot Note- (I).De Lib.arb.3.23.(66,7,8.) (Cols.I033f.**

on a hair or a toe neglecting the marvellous spectacle of the complete Man; we ignore all the tribes and kinds of animals except for the meanest; we pass over an entire race, humanity, and bring forward- Thersites. No: this thing that has come into Being is (not a mass of fragments, but) the Kosmos complete: do but survey it, and surely this is the pleading you will hear:-

I am made by God: from that God I came perfect above all forms of life, adequate to my function, self-sufficing, lacking nothing: for I am the container of all, that is of every plant and every animal, of all Kinds of created things, and many Gods and nations of Spirit-Beings and lofty souls and men happy in their goodness.

And do not think that, while earth is ornate with all its growths and with living things of every race, and while the very sea has answered to the power of Soul, do not think that the great air and the ether and the far-spread heavens remain void of it: there it is that all good Souls dwell, infusing life into the stars and into that orderly eternal circuit of the heavens which in its conscious movement ever about the one centre seeking nothing beyond, is a faithful copy of the divine Mind. And all that is within me strives towards the Good; and each, to the measure of its faculty, attains. For from that Good all the heavens depend, with all my own Soul and the Gods that dwell in my every part, and all that lives and grows, and even all in me that you may judge inanimate". (I)

Foot Note- (I). Enneads, 3.2.3. Mackenna, Vol.2. pages, 14,15.

Before we bring this chapter to a close we must briefly touch upon a third theory which St. Augustine adduces concerning the presence of Sin or Moral Evil in the Universe. Sin says Augustine is due to the Freedom which God has granted to man.

God in His infinite goodness, when he created man, endowed him with the power of Freedom of choice; as man abused that gift and chose wrongly sin entered into the world.

In his Confessions, Augustine says- "And I enquired what iniquity was, and I found it to be no substance, but the perversion of the will, turned aside from Thee, O God, the Supreme, towards these lower things". (I)

Again we find him saying- "I believe that you will remember that in our first discourse, it was sufficiently ascertained that in no way can the mind become enslaved by lust except by its own free-will: for neither can it be compelled to commit such an infamy by a superior, nor by an equal...nor by an inferior. ...The impulse is his own by which, for the sake of personal gratification, he turns away his will from the Creator to the creature: such an impulse if it be deemed a fault, is assuredly not natural but voluntary; it may be likened to that movement by which a stone is borne downward to the earth, for this is the peculiar quality of the stone and that the tendency of the soul; nevertheless indeed it is different with the former, because the stone has no power by which it can prevent the movement by which it is borne downward, whilst, on the other hand,

Foot Notes- (I). Confessions, VII.I6.22.see also De vera relig. I4.27. In De vera relig.40.76.sin is defined as- 'defectus voluntarius a summa essentia' See Enchiridion, XXIII. De Civ. Dei XIV.XI.&c.

though the soul does not desire it, is it not thus moved when in neglecting the higher things it chooses the lower". (I)

Again Augustine says- "For God, the author of natures, not of vices, created man upright; but man, being of his own will corrupted, and justly condemned, begot corrupted and condemned children...and thus, from the bad use of free-will, there originated the whole train of evil, which with its concatenation of miseries, convoys the human race from its depraved origin, as from a corrupt root, on to the destruction of the second death.... ..those only being excepted who are freed by the grace of God."(2)

In the same book, Augustine again says- "It is He who gave to the Intellectual nature free-will of such a kind, that if he wished to forsake God his blessedness, misery should forthwith result...And indeed evil had never been, had not the mutable nature- mutable, though good, and created by the most high God, who created all things good- brought evil upon itself by sin". (3)

We see from these quotations that nothing compels the Soul to obey the passions and impulses of its own will, it is therefore free; hence through that freedom and a wrong exercise of it Evil arises. Such was the finding of St. Augustine.

Now in like manner Plotinus ascribes Evil to a like freedom. He says- "Men are no doubt involuntary sinners in the sense that they do not not actually desire to sin; but this does not alter the fact that wrongdoers, of their own choice, are

Foot Notes- (I). De lib.arb.3.I.2. (Col.994) (2). De Civ.Dei, XIII I4. (3). ibid, XXII.I.

themselves, the agents; it is because they themselves act that the sin is in their own; if they were not agents they could not sin". (1)

Or again, this is how the matter is summed up concerning the fall of the Souls- "What can be the cause that has led the souls to forget God, their Father, and members of Him though they are, wholly His, to cease to know both themselves and Him? The evil that has befallen them is due to a Rebellious Audacity to their entry into birth (or their desire to 'become') to the Primal Differentiation and to the desire of the Souls to have similarly a life of their own. They began to revel in free-will: they indulged their own movement: they took the wrong path: they went far astray: thus it was that they lost the knowledge that they sprang of that Divine Order (were members of the Triune..They no longer had a true vision of The Supreme or of themselves". (2)

Free-will, Pride, Lust- these are the causes of Evil, it is by these things men arrive at the state of Non-Being; so says Plotinus. We have already seen how St. Augustine speaks of Freedom as the cause of sin, he is equally insistent that sin is caused by Pride and Lust and frequently in his many treatises sounds his warning concerning these vices. (3)

So ~~as~~ we find Messrs Gibb and Montgomery stating the case- "Evil has happened through the contact of the world-soul with matter. Certain souls from a desire to be independent separated themselves from the world-soul and descended into bodies..

Foot Notes- (1)Enneads, 3.2.10. (2)Mackenna, Vol.I.P.130. (The Preller-Ritter extracts forming a conspectus of the Plotinian system. (3).De lib.arb.3.24.Conf.7.7.II.& often, De Fide spe et caritate,XXX. frequently.

In thus placing the beginnings of sin in a wrongful choice, Plotinus approached the Christian position". (I).

We are now able to see that with both Augustine and Plotinus, the Evil in the world, (or rather we should call it sin,) and all its attendant miseries, has been due to mankind; it originates with ourselves. We cannot blame anyone or anything else, we are free agents in the matter, the cause of our Evil cannot be assigned to the stars, we cannot rail against the heavens. We alone are responsible in this matter; Plotinus and Augustine say this. But man having thus brought trouble and misery into the world through his sin by no means overturns the rule of Providence. Certain things happen, good or bad, helpful or injurious; but blessing or bane, beauty or ugliness, each and all is so made use of by Providence that Goodness, and Beauty, and Being is triumphant. (2) God is never defeated; such is the optimism of the Philosopher and the Christian Father.

But a final word must be said concerning Freedom. It must have become plain to us from our survey of what both Augustine and Plotinus have set forth in their writings that there are indeed two kinds of Freedom. In the first place we have given to us a Freedom to choose between good and evil; freedom of choice and with it the power to choose wrongly. But can that ever be really true Freedom? Are we ever then entirely free? True, we look upon ourselves and others as being free agents; we regard others

Foot Notes- (I). St. Augustine's Confessions, Patristic Texts, op. cit. p. xlv. (2). Enneads, III.3.5.



as being responsible beings and accord to them the same freedom which we claim for ourselves. But with respect to that freedom of choice, is it not true that as we choose unwisely, foolishly, wrongly, by reason of passion, feeling, or sensation, we really part with our liberty and become enslaved and under bondage to lesser powers? Exercising our freedom to choose evil we become hounded onward by our lower natures, in the grip of the very ill which we have foolishly chosen.

But there is another kind of Freedom; The Christian Father would speak of it as the Liberty of the Spirit. We possess that Higher Freedom when our better nature rules, when by union with the Infinite power that has brought all things into being we gain dominion over sense. Augustine has defined such Freedom for us when he speaks of it as- "The movement of the Soul, which, without any restraint, bears it towards something which it does not wish to lose, or which it desires to obtain".(I

Very clearly both Plotinus and Augustine have set forth a distinction between these two kinds of Freedom.

Plotinus says that Free-Will is shown in right action not in acts done under the driving of the senses;- "Whensoever the soul has been wrested from its own character by the force of the Outer and so acts- rushing in a blind excitement- the act or the state is not to be called an act or state of freedom; so, too, when in a self-induced corruption it answers to impulses within itself that are not entirely right, not of its highest nature: only when our soul acts by its native pure and independent

Foot Notes- (I). De duabus animabus con.Manich. X."Voluntas est animi motus, cogente nullo, ad aliquid vel non amittendum, vel adipiscendum".

Reason-Principle can the act be described as ours and as an exercise of Free-Will". (I)

Again, Plotinus often affirms that the Liberty or Free-Will by which we pursue or accomplish evil is rather the very negation of freedom - "All that descends to a lower state descends against its own Free-Will, but since it has followed an impulse of its own nature it is said to pay the penalty, which is no other than the very fall itself. But in the sense that such act and experience was necessary from eternity by a law of nature, then one may say,...that this thing, descending from what was above it to the service of something else, was sent down by God" (2)

In the same way Augustine expresses himself thus- "Man using evilly his free will hath lost both himself and it. For when through free-will sin was committed, sin being conqueror, free-will was lost. For he serves freely, who willingly does the will of his master. And thus he is free to commit sin who is the slave of sin...This is the true liberty by reason of the joy in doing right, and at the same time godly slavery by reason of the obedience to the command. But this liberty to do well, when shall it be to man, made over and sold, unless He redeem him Whose is that saying, 'If the Son hath set you free, then shall ye be truly free! ...Therefore then are we made truly free, when God fashions us, that is, forms and creates us." (3)

Thus have we set before us the clear distinction which exists between the two freedoms. A word might be added to show how Plotinus draws near to the Christian position as he tells

Foot Notes- (1). Enneads, III.8.9. Mackenna, page, 131, Vol. I.

(2). *ibid.* Enneads, IV.8.5. (3). Enchiridion, XXX. For an illuminating section on this, see Inge, 'Plotinus', Vol. 2. pp. 181-185.

us of the fall and return of the Soul.

The Soul in its original purity is free, but by its union with the body it becomes liable to the things of sense. If then it turns from the contemplation of that which is above it and allows its yearnings to be captured by the things that are carnal, it loses its pristine glory and freedom. If such a Soul has thus become defiled, it can only regain its lost liberty by setting its affections on that which is above, purifying itself and withdrawing itself from the attractions that are without and beginning to take that return which will lead it to union with the true Being.

But Plotinus makes it clear that the Soul need not of necessity suffer defilement even when it comes into contact with matter and enters into union with the body. It is able on the other hand to play the part of heavenly messenger & cause the body to be of use in the highest service of all.

"This is how we come to read", says Plotinus, "that our soul, entering into association with that complete soul and itself thus made perfect, walks the lofty ranges, administering the entire kosmos, and that as long as it does not secede and is neither inbound in body nor held in any sort of servitude, so long it tranquilly bears its part in the governance of the All, exactly like the world-soul itself; for in fact it suffers no hurt whatever by furnishing body with the power of existence, since not every form of care for the inferior need wrest the providing soul from its own sure standing in the highest". (I)

So do we see the Christian Father and the Neo-Platonist, Plotinus in close fellowship concerning the deepest things of the Spirit.

Over against the potency of sin Augustine would set the omnipotence of God, over against the power that would ruin and destroy he sets the grace that saved. Plotinus and Augustine proclaim their message ~~in~~ in different form of speech, but they often mean the same thing, and are prompted to proclaim it with the same earnest purpose.

Dean Inge has a beautiful reference to Plotinus in his volume from which we have often quoted, which fitly expresses the optimism of the philosopher and is pertinent to the theme of this chapter- with that we shall close.

"He (Plotinus) knows that the earth is full of darkness and cruel habitations; but he is convinced that evil is not the truth of things; he cannot regard it as having a substance of its own. "Evil", he says, "is not alone. By virtue of the nature of Good, the power of Good, it is not Evil only. It appears necessarily, bound around with bonds of Beauty, like some captive bound in fetters of gold; and beneath these it is hidden so that, while it must exist, it may not be seen by the gods, and that men need not always have evil before their eyes, but that when it comes before them they may still be not destitute of images of the Good and Beautiful for their remembrance.(I) In another place he says , in words as true as they are consoling, "Wickedness is always human, being mixed with something contrary to itself". It is human, and therefore not wholly evil and not wholly incurable;

Foot Notes- (I) Enneads, I.8.12. Mackenna, page, 108.

for the Soul of man comes from God, and cannot be utterly cut off from Him. And above the Soul of man is the great Soul, the Soul of the world." (I).

Foot Note- (I). Inge, 'The Philosophy of Plotinus'. Vol. I.  
page, 22.

Philo's doctrine of the Logos as mediator between God and man, resembles in some points the Nous of Plotinus. His doctrine of the Logos as mediator between God and man, resembles in some points the Nous of Plotinus. Philo too had a mystical experience of the Logos which Plotinus, as we have seen, so fully described.

Philo anticipates Plotinus, and, with regard to his doctrine of the Logos, he is more than a prophet.

## CHAPTER 8.

## A SUMMARY OF RESULTS.

We have now reached the stage in our study of the influence of Neo-Platonism upon St. Augustine, when we must gather together some of the fruits of our enquiry.

Nearly two centuries before the time of Plotinus, Philo had anticipated many of the doctrines commonly associated with Neo-Platonism. And whilst on several points there is a marked difference between Philo and Plotinus, yet we can see a general agreement between them. Hence, it has been declared that 'Philo inaugurated Neo-Platonism'. Philo frequently asserts the Existence and Unity of God; with him God is One, Simple, Unchangeable, Incomprehensible, and He is Eternal. He is, therefore, best known by negation. He is The One, with Philo as with Plotinus. His doctrine of the Logos as mediator between God and man, resembles in some points the Nous of Plotinus. Whilst in what Philo has to say concerning the Powers, he closely follows Plato in his conception of the Ideas, although he adopts the view of Aristotle and represents the Ideas as existing within the Logos. Philo too had a mystical experience of Ecstasy, which Plotinus, as we have seen, so fully describes. In these & on other points Philo anticipates Plotinus, and, without a doubt, Plotinus has made use of them.

We have seen also that within the Christian Church itself there were the Gnostic heresies which sought to make use of philosophical speculation in the interpretation of

the Christian Faith.

In order that these Gnostic heresies might be refuted, and that, at the same time, the Christian Faith might be received by the cultured people of the day, there was an earnest endeavour on the part of Christian apologists, Justin Martyr and others, to blend the doctrines of Christianity with the teaching of Plato.

But the most pronounced attempt to effect a rapprochement between Christianity and Philosophy took place in the great Catechetical School which existed at Alexandria. There we have found that Clement and Origen did their great work, and there, there arose a widespread interchange of ideas between Christianity and Neo-Platonism and Neo-Platonism and Christianity.

Many philosophers as they were converted to the Christian Faith, took with them the ideas and conceptions which they had received from Neo-Platonism, and adapted these towards the fuller understanding and exposition of the doctrines of the Christian Church; whilst, on the other hand, in the passing of others from Christianity to Neo-Platonism, that Philosophy was also leavened by much that had been received from Christianity.

If the story be true that Ammonius Saccas was a Christian before he became a Neo-Platonist, he surely must have been influenced by much of his early training.

Thus long before St. Augustine entered the Christian Church, its doctrines must have been enriched by much which its teachers had received from Neo-Platonism. It ~~may~~ have been that St. Augustine, as we have already suggested, had been prepared by the preaching of Ambrose, for many of the truths

which he met with in the books of the Enneads of Plotinus.

From Augustine's own account of his deliverance from the bondage of Manichaeism, and the enlightenment which he received from the study of the books of the Platonists we are left in no doubt as to the influence which Neo-Platonism exercised upon his life and thought.

We need not again, detail that story, or give the reasons for our assertion that in the mind of St. Augustine the Platonists were none other than the Neo-Platonists, chiefly Plotinus and Porphyry. It is true that Augustine often mentions Plato by name and that he had a very high regard for him; indeed sometimes he appears to have an exact knowledge of his position, whilst at other times, he quite erroneously attributes to him views which he did not hold. Because of this, and the fact that Augustine did not have a very extensive knowledge of the Greek language, we gather that, for the most part, his knowledge of Plato, with the exception perhaps of the *Timaeus*, had been received either from translations or through Plotinus himself.

Further, although we recognise that Augustine appears to have been greatly influenced by Aristotle in many ways, (I) yet we again would recall the fact that Plotinus himself was considerably indebted to that Philosopher, and we affirm that possibly here also, Augustine had obtained his information of the tenets of Aristotle, indirectly, by means of Plotinus.

We have no hesitation in saying then, that

Foot Note-(I). See Nourrisson, 'La philosophie de Saint Augustin', op.cit. Vol. 2. pages, 107-128. for an account of Augustine's indebtedness to Plato and Aristotle.



the Neo-Platonists, especially Plotinus, exercised the predominating influence upon his thought.

Augustine regards Plotinus, as the successor of Plato, indeed, that he is but another Plato, and that in Plotinus, Plato lived again. (I)

We gather from his account of his awakening, in the Confessions, that the intense spirituality of Plotinus left a very marked impression on the mind of Augustine, struggling as he was in the bondage of Manichaeism and longing for a way of escape. He saw in Plotinus, one whose deepest interest in life was a knowledge of God, one whose mind and will were united in the Divine quest, and who was able to describe with great clearness the steps which must be taken by any who sought, above all else, a mystical union with the Divine.

Augustine was eager to know the Truth about God and his own soul, and he finds in Plotinus a kindred spirit, who had evidently reached a knowledge of that Truth for which he himself panted, one, too, who claimed to have found the way of deliverance for man, a way which would lead him into the liberty of the spirit. What wonder, then, that Augustine must have said of Plotinus, what Plotinus had himself said of Ammonius Saccas, 'This is the man for whom I have been seeking'. (Τούτου ἐστὶν ὁ ἄνθρωπος)

St. Augustine's heart, therefore, was kindled

Foot Note- (I). De Civ. Dei, IX. 10. "Plotinus, whose memory is quite recent, enjoys the reputation of having understood Plato better than any other of his disciples". Contra Acad. 3. 18.

by the reading of these books which set before him the way of life and told him so much about God and his own soul.

But, herein lay the trouble, Augustine was still burdened with his sins, and troubled by his fleshly desires. He had had a vision of the Truth from Plotinus, but how was he to reach it? He vividly describes his old passions and habits as they hold him back and mock him as he longs to enter on the way which leads to Truth. How was he to see the Beauty of which Plotinus had written? Only the pure in heart could see God; but how was he to gain that purity? "As it is not for those to speak of the graceful forms of the material world who have never seen them or known their grace- men born blind, let us suppose- in the same way those must be silent upon the beauty of noble conduct and of learning and all that order who have never cared for such things, nor may those tell of the splendour of virtue who have never known the face of Justice and of Moral-Wisdom beautiful beyond the beauty of Evening and of Dawn." (I)

How was he to obtain the cleansed sight that he might behold that heavenly beauty? He seeks out Simplicianus a man of saintly character, and to him Augustine unburdens his heart. Simplicianus, when he learns of what Augustine had found from the books of the Platonists, tells him of Victorinus, the translator of these very books, who, late in life had been converted from Neo-Platonism to Christianity by the reading of the Pauline Epistles. The recital deeply moved Augustine, he 'burned to imitate him'. Here then was the way to life, and Augustine following in the steps of Victorinus began his study of the

Foot Note- (I). Enneads, I.6.4. Mackenna, page, 82.

New Testament which led him into the light and liberty of a child of God. It is not necessary to deal further with the fact that Victorinus at this stage was a real help to Augustine not only because of his translation of the Enneads, but by reason also of his exposition of Christian Truth by means of the principles of Neo-Platonism. It was probably here that Augustine now began to discover that all Truth was one, and that in the writings of the New Testament, notably in the prologue to St. John's gospel and in the Epistles of St. Paul, there was much which Plotinus had revealed to him. (I)

Hence Augustine found ready to hand, in Neo-Platonism, a help towards the elucidation of the Christian Mysteries. Neo-Platonism as we have frequently seen, taught him to test all things by the principle of the 'immediate certainty of inner experience', and that axiom he made use of as the starting-point of philosophy.

Neo-Platonism has been described as "the half-way house at which Augustine made a stay between Manichaeism & Christianity". (2) But in our judgment that is hardly a happy description of what actually took place, since St. Augustine did not cease to be a Neo-Platonist after he became a Christian. Indeed its influence upon him continued for several years, and even when his devotion towards that philosophy waned, he was quite ready to make use of the arguments of Plotinus to aid him in his writings against the adversaries of the Christian Faith.

Foot Notes-(I). "Which beginning of the holy Gospel of St. John, a certain Platonist, said, ought to be written in letters of gold". De Civ. Dei, X.29. (2). Elsee, op.cit. page, III.

Let us, however, examine more minutely the question concerning the influence of Neo-Platonism upon Augustine.

Without a doubt, it is possible for us to affirm that Neo-Platonism influenced his whole life. Before the reading of the books of the Enneads, we find Augustine as a man of the world engaged in his professional duties as a Rhetorician, troubled by his sins, haunted by thoughts of God and eager to know the Truth, but still more or less entangled by the affairs of a mundane character, pleasures, gaiety, passions of the flesh & the honours of his profession and the esteem of his fellows. We see him then at that time torn as it were between two worlds and hence distracted, and often depressed. He would fain enter the Christian Church and share the faith of his mother, but his intellect craved for certainty. He found himself unable to take the spiritual experiences of others on trust, above all else he must himself be sure.

We have marked the fact that he was quickened in his admiration for higher things when as a youth he read Cicero's Hortensius; he saw that in comparison with the noble thoughts of philosophy wealth and worldly success were poor indeed, but he did not, on that account there and then, give up his pursuit of them. And he is disappointed that he is unable to find the name of Christ in the Hortensius, somehow he feels that it falls short of the best.

Then we find Augustine drawn to Manichaeism because of its apparent devoutness of spirit, and the supposed ascetic sanctity of many of its followers, as well as by its promise of enlightenment. Writing to his friend Honoratus, he

says- "For you know, Honoratus, that for no other reason we fell in with such men, (the Manichees) than because they used to say that, apart from all terror of authority, by pure and simple reason, they would lead within to God, and set free from all error those who were willing to be their hearers." (I)

Here we have evidence that Augustine was impatient of Authority, and desir<sup>ous</sup> of something which would commend itself to his reason.

But we come to his most important essay into the realm of spiritual truth. The teaching of Neo-Platonism made it evident that Truth did exist and could be obtained by all who would give themselves to its search. As a result of his Neo-Platonic studies he is led to turn, ~~to~~ almost immediately, to the writings of St. Paul, and there he finds a confirmation of the truth which philosophy has revealed to him. (2)

In the De Ordine, St. Augustine clearly shows us what Neo-Platonism had done for him, he says-"There are two ways that we can follow when we are troubled with difficulties, that of Reason and that of Authority. Philosophy offers us reason, & scarcely succeeds in liberating a very few; and so far from teaching them to despise these mysteries" (that is the deeper doctrines of Christianity) "it only brings them to understand them as they ought to be understood. True and genuine philosophy has no other business than to teach us what is the un-caused Cause of all things ('principium sine principio'), how great is the

Foot Notes- (I). De Utilitate Credendi, 2. cp. De beata vita, 4.

(2). Contra Acad. 2. 5. (Col. 442) "Itaque titubans, properans, haesitans arripio apostolum Paulum: neque enim vere isti, inquam, tanta potuissent, vixissentque ita ut eos vixisse manifestum est, si eorum Litterae atque rationes huic tanto bono adversarentur".

Intelligence which abides in it, and what it was that for our salvation issued thence without any degeneration". (I)

Augustine very evidently believed that in his study of the tenets of Neo-Platonism he would not find in it anything which contradicted the beliefs of the Church. (2)

We see then that Neo-Platonism played a notable part in the conversion of Augustine. Whilst his entrance into the Christian Church opened up gradually for him, the rich treasures of Religion. The whole current of his after life was thereby changed; he finds his vocation in the ministry; presently he becomes the Bishop of Hippo. There he develops, in after years, into a great Ecclesiastical statesman. His knowledge of the principles of philosophy as expounded by the Neo-Platonists, become invaluable to him as he enters upon the work of shaping and helping to clarify the doctrines of the Church. Thus he becomes one of the founders of modern thought, with the result that in every age men of very differing faiths have turned to him for guidance.

It is in this way that we would suggest that Neo-Platonism had a very marked and beneficial influence upon the life of St. Augustine.

Moreover, it was the study of the Enneads of Plotinus that quickened his life of the Spirit and led him into the realm of Mystical Piety. In reality, the conversion of St. Augustine to Christ was a conversion to mystical piety. The act of conversion was nothing else than the deliberate decision to ascetic celibacy, which in those days, formed the indispensable

Foot Notes- (I).De Ordine, 2.V.I6. (col.560).see Montgomery,op. cit.page,48. (2).Contra Acad.3.20.43.(col.488).

precondition of personal mysticism. (1)

Whilst the thoughts which Augustine had received from Plotinus, and which are so clearly present in Augustine's early writings, recede into the background and their place is taken by Christian and preeminently ecclesiastical ideas, these Neo-Platonic conceptions do not really disappear entirely. For the Mystical vision remains throughout his whole life as the final goal of all effort after salvation. Indeed, Heiler goes so far as to say- "The last and most precious thing after which the passionate heart of Augustine longs, is not God's sovereign rule over the whole earth; not the blessedness of forgiveness which God so freely bestows, but the mystical enjoyment and vision of the immeasurable Divine Beauty". (2)

We find Augustine again and again referring to this mystical union with God, in his writings. He says- "The Soul that has died to the world is sunk in Holy contemplation and rests in the Eternal Divine calm". (3) It enjoys that Holy love; (4) it embraces God and clings to Him; (5) it becomes conformed into the image of God; (6) in a word it is deified. (7)

This most blessed vision is imparted here on earth to happy souls in special hours of grace, but it experiences its full completion only after <sup>the</sup> death of the body, then this vision continues through all eternity. (8)

Foot Notes- (1). See F. Heiler, "Der Katholizismus seine idee und sein erscheinung". 2nd. Ed. 1923. pages, 104-106. (2) ib. page, 104 (3) De Spiritu et Lit. V. (4) Conf. 8.1. (5) De Ordine, 2.7. (6) De Moribus Eccl. Cath. XIII. 22. (7) Epistle, X. 2. (8) See also De Ord. 2. 24, 47. Solil. I. 23. De Civ. Dei, IX. 22.

Thus, frequently in his later as well as in his earlier writings St. Augustine dwells upon the thought of this mystical union with the Supreme, and the Vision of the Divine, which he had first heard of from Plotinus.

Heiler, however, as he compares the account of the inspiring Ecstasy which Plotinus gives in his closing chapter of the Enneads, with the portrayal of the heavenly bliss that Augustine sets before us in the ninth book of the Confessions, clearly shows wherein the Mysticism of Augustine differed from that of Plotinus, he says- "Certainly in contradistinction to the Neo-Platonists who were his schoolmasters, Augustine never overstepped the bounds of Christian Personality. Like Plato, he too remains standing at the vision of the Highest Good and does not step forward to the Ecstasy which extinguishes individual personality". (1)

Now although we feel that Heiler has been guilty of extravagance in the stress he has placed on the Mysticism of St. Augustine, for as Inge puts it "there are important parts of his teaching which have no affinity to Mysticism", (2) yet, if we allow for that overemphasis and lack of balance in Heiler's judgment in this matter, in these directions we are still of opinion that Neo-Platonism left a very lasting influence upon the life of Augustine and that to the end of his days, "he remained half a Platonist". (3)

But as we have already in this thesis attempted to

Foot Notes- (1) Heiler, op.cit. page, 105. (2). 'Christian Mysticism' op.cit. page, 128. (3) ibid.



show, we have abundant evidence that Neo-Platonism also played an important part in stimulating the thought of St. Augustine.

There is no need here to enter into details. We will content ourselves with simply giving a brief résumé of our findings.

Sometimes we find that Augustine makes use of the thought which he has received from Plotinus and adapts it to the Christian Faith, whilst at other times, as in the case of his tractate on the Immortality of the Soul, he takes the whole of the arguments from the Enneads, and makes use of them as his own.

Indeed we might say that in his treatises on the Quantity of the Soul, the Origin of the Soul in man, as well as in the case of the work we have just named, there is overwhelming evidence of his indebtedness to Plotinus.

With regard to the Psychology of St. Augustine, whilst he rejects the Neo-Platonic idea of Metempsychosis, he practically makes use of all that he has learned from Plotinus on that subject, to form the basis of his own system. Thus all that Augustine has to say on the Soul, that it has no magnitude; that the sympathy which unites the organs is a proof of the presence of the Soul in its entirety in every part of the body; that whilst we speak of its presence in the body we should rather think of it as being with the body, that it is impassible, hence it is immortal- all this the Christian Father borrowed from Plotinus. Whilst Augustine had little to say on the idea of the World-Soul, yet he did not deny its existence, indeed he regarded the Universe as a living organism. (I) ~~Indeed~~ As Dean Inge says- "The Neo-Platonic teaching about the relation of individual souls Foot Note- (I). De Civ.Dei, IV.12; VII.5.

to the World Soul may have helped him to formulate his own teaching about the Mystical union of Christians with Christ".(I)

If we turn to what Augustine has to say on Sensation and the Inner Sense; on Pleasure and Pain; on the two kinds of Memory; on the distinction between Discursive and Intuitive Reasoning; on ideas; and on the seven degrees of the life of the Soul, although he differs here in his nomenclature; we find he has been wholly inspired by Plotinus.

When we recall these evidences, it is not surprising that Bouillett should say- "In order to thoroughly understand Augustine it is indispensable to know the speech and doctrine of Plotinus". (2)

But it is not only with regard to his Psychological knowledge that he shows his indebtedness to Neo-Platonism. He also received from Plotinus his theory of Numbers; his conception of Beauty; his doctrine of the Providential Order of the world, and the universal harmony which exists; his views of non-being; as well as considerable help from the writings of Plotinus against the Gnostics, which he was able to make use of in his treatises against the Manichaeans.

Moreover we find that Augustine was familiar with the writings of Porphyry, which had been translated into Latin by Victorinus. There is no need to refer to the many quotations which Augustine has made from these books, especially in his De Civitate Dei. (3) Briefly, these were his Letter to Anebo; his book on Abstinence; his tractate on the Return of the Soul to God;

Foot Notes- (I). Christian Mysticism, op.cit.page,130. (2) Bouillett, op.cit.Vol.2.page,590. (3). Book,X. and elsewhere.

the Philosophy of the Oracles; the Principles of the theory of the Intelligibles. Often do we find Augustine critising Porphyry's statements, sometimes, as in the case of his work the Return of the Soul to God, he makes use of his views. But for St. Augustine, Plotinus was the authority, and was ever held in the highest esteem.

In this connection, ere we bring this chapter to a close, we must again refer to the deep and lasting influence which Plotinus had upon our Christian Father in the realm of Metaphysics.

We have seen that in their doctrines of the Trinity and the Creation of the world, there were marked differences between them; and that yet even here Augustine received considerable help. With regard to the doctrine of the Trinity, we saw that with Plotinus the three Principles are subordinated one to another, and are in no sense co-equal and co-eternal. The Intellectual Principle is an emanation from the Absolute, the Soul is an emanation from the Nous. There is thus no thought of that perfect equality which subsists between the Three Persons which was in the mind of Augustine with respect to the Holy Trinity, moreover, there was a complete absence of love. The only real resemblance seemed to lie in the fact that whilst the hypotheses or Persons in the Godhead are three, yet both Christian & Neo-Platonist proclaim the essential unity of the Divine Being, & yet that this unity admits of plurality.

But still we find that in his earlier writings Augustine influenced by Plotinus, thought of the Second Person in the Trinity as the Logos, the speech or Wisdom of God, in whom were the ideas, forms, conceptions of all created things, and in this way the Christian Father thought that here there was a like-

-ness between the Nous of Plotinus and the Logos which he read of in the prologue of St. John's gospel. But here the resemblance ended, for in the Scriptures Augustine found that God had in his Son revealed Himself as Love , which took upon itself the nature of man, and dying for men, so brought about their deliverance from the bondage of Sin. These truths he found not in Neo-Platonism. As we have also pointed out Augustine also sometimes speaks of the Holy Spirit in terms of the Neo-Platonic Soul, these are but indications of the great influence which Neo-Platonism had upon him, at that time.

In the doctrine of Creation, we saw that whilst for Plotinus God had begotten the world, thus affirming the eternity of matter; for Augustine the world had been created out of nothing. Created by the Will and goodness of God according to the view of Augustine, begotten by necessity as Plotinus states the matter. But here also Augustine was powerfully influenced by Neo-Platonism in what he says as to Time and Space. Whilst the world was not eternal, according to Augustine, it could not be created in time, but with Time.

But with regard to the being of God and His nature, it was from Plotinus that Augustine learned the great truth concerning His Spirituality, His Simplicity, His Unity. And that thought of the Simplicity of God which was so persistently emphasized by Plotinus, receives a like emphasis on the part of Augustine. Here then we have a very manifest influence on the mind of Augustine. He follows Plotinus closely as he delineates His attributes; dwells upon his ineffability; proclaims

that God can be best known by nescience.

But, as we have seen, neither Plotinus nor Augustine could be contented with the attitude of negation with respect to the Divine Being. Hence we find them both positing certain affirmations concerning God. From the realm of the world about them they, beholding there the beauty and harmony and goodness of all things which owe their very existence to God, proclaim the fact that God must be The Beauty, The Supreme Goodness.

Entering into their own hearts they make discoveries there which help them in their knowledge of God. And thus Augustine follows in the steps of the Philosopher.

Lastly, Augustine learned from Neo-Platonism much that shed a new light upon his perplexity with regard to Evil. The World for any real being that it might possess owed that being to God, as it was closely associated with God it had greater being, as it lost touch with God it ceased to have being. God could not have created Evil, since ~~HE~~ HE was Good; therefore it belonged to the realm of non-being, it was but a privation of good.

We have now said sufficient to indicate the influence which Neo-Platonism had upon the thought of Augustine.

If we turn to his earlier writings we find them steeped in the spirit of Neo-Platonism; in his lectures at Cassiciacum he speaks as a Neo-Platonist. If Plato lived again in Plotinus, it seemed almost as though at that time, Plotinus lived again in Augustine. (I) Alfarc speaking of Augustine's first writings at Thagaste says- "He proclaims himself on the  
Foot Note- (I). Alfarc, op.cit. page, 518.

highest questions of Theology; on the nature of God, and the Ideas; on Good and Evil; on the Soul and Matter; on Being and non-being, in the same way but even perhaps a more pronounced fashion than does Plotinus. Any page devoted to these latter problems agrees so closely with the spirit and even the terminology of the Enneads, that it would seem, indeed, to be but a fragment of that work".(1) And Alfarić adds- "If Augustine had died after writing his Soliloquies, or his treatise on the Quantity of the Soul, one could only have thought of him as a convinced Neo-Platonist, more or less touched with Christianity." (2)

But in later years, as Augustine obtained a fuller knowledge of Christian Truth, more and more the influence of Neo-Platonism upon him wanes. He is then more pronouncedly Christian, and tends increasingly towards the orthodox position. In a word, his philosophy becomes subservient to his faith. It was only as he played the part of defender of the Faith that again he turned to Plotinus for help and made use of the weapons from his armoury. Neo-Platonism had been of real help to him in his early days, it had made many truths clear to him, it had led him to Christ.

But the influence of that teaching never wholly disappeared, by the help of Neo-Platonism Augustine was able to clarify Christian truth and play the part of fashioner of the dogmas and doctrines of the Christian Church. More than that the inspiration which it gave him for the inner life of the Spirit remained as a help in the culture of his own heart.

Through Augustine Neo-Platonism entered into the Christian religion, and since that day it has been at home in spirit

within the Christian Church, and it was largely through St. Augustine that Christian Theology became Neo-Platonic.

It would have been of deepest interest to have traced the influence of Neo-Platonism upon mediaeval and modern thought, but that would carry us far beyond the limits of our present theme.

It is sufficient to add that Plotinus and his influence is still at work in devout hearts to-day and this is due to the Christian Fathers who have reflected his teaching & not the least among them has been St. Augustine.

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### PART, III.

#### APPENDICES:-

(1). BIBLIOGRAPHICAL.

(2). CHRONOLOGICAL.

(3). COMPARATIVE PASSAGES in the writings of  
St. Augustine, with those to be found in  
the Enneads of Plotinus.

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APPENDIX, I.

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Augustine wrote the "Confessions" of himself  
to seek a higher life. He turns to the Lord  
in repented of his sins of the hardness of his  
(Confessions, 1911, 1912, 1913).

371. Became a Christian. (Confessions, 1911, 1912, 1913).

Professor of Philosophy at the University of  
(Confessions, 1911, 1912, 1913).

Returned to the world. (Confessions, 1911, 1912, 1913).

APPENDIX, 2.

CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE OF THE LIFE OF ST.AUGUSTINE.

A.D.

354. Augustine born at Thagaste, November, 13th.  
(De beata vita, 6. Possidius, Vit.Aug. 31.)
- 365? (Autumn) He departs for Madaura, for school.
- 369-370. He returns from Madaura to Thagaste, where he had been at school- how long is not stated- he spent a year in idleness while his father was endeavouring to raise funds to send him to Carthage for further study; fell into evil ways.  
(Confessions, 2.III. (5 and 6.))
370. He goes to Carthage, and there distinguishes himself in the school of Rhetoric.  
(Confessions, 3.I.1. - 3.III.6.)
- c371. Patricius dies. (Confessions, 3.IV.7.) Augustine is supported by his mother with the help of a wealthy friend, Romanianus.  
(Contra Academicos, 2. (2, & 3.))
372. Birth of Adeodatus.  
(Confessions, 9.VI.14.)
373. Augustine reads the 'Hortensius', of Cicero; is inspired to seek a higher life. He turns to the Scriptures, but he is repelled by reason of the harshness of their style.  
(Confessions, 3.IV.(7-9.))
- 373-374. Becomes a Manichaeian 'Auditor'.  
(Confessions, 5.VI.10.)
375. Professor of Rhetoric at Thagaste.  
(Confessions, 4.IV.7. )
376. Returned to Carthage and taught Rhetoric there.  
(Confessions, 4.VII.12. Contra Acad.2.II.3.)
- c380. Wrote a treatise, 'de Pulchro et Apto'. (lost).  
(Confessions, 4.XIII.20.)
383. Beginning to feel doubts as to the Manichaeian system and finding that Faustus the great Manichaeian preacher from whom he had expected to receive help, could not solve his problems, Augustine becomes inclined to accept the doctrines of the New Academy.  
(Confessions, 5.(10,12,19.) (De utilitate Cred.8.20.)

383. (Autumn) Went to Rome. (Confessions, 5.VIII.I4.)
384. Appointed public teacher of Rhetoric at Milan. Monnica joined him there.  
(Confessions, 5.XIII.23.) (Confessions, 6.I.1.)
385. Honoured in having to deliver a formal panegyric in the presence of the Emperor.  
(Contra Litt.Petil. 3.25.30.)
385. At Milan he meets with Ambrose, who helps him greatly, but he is still held back by the flesh; becomes a Catechumen.  
(Confessions, 5.XIV.25.)
- 385-6. A translation of the Enneads of Plotinus by Victorinus is put into his hands; this freed his mind from a materialistic conception of God and also gave him a new conception of the origin of Evil. He begins to study the Pauline Epistles.  
(Confessions, 7.IX.I3.-26.- 7.XXI.27.)
386. He is relieved of his intellectual difficulties but is still fettered by the sins of the flesh. At length the inner struggle issued in his conversion, towards the end of July or the beginning of August.  
(Confessions, 8.VI.I3.- 8.XII.29.- cp. 9.II.2.)
- 386-7. Augustine in retirement at Cassiciacum, a villa on the outskirts of Milan, which was lent to him by his friend Verecundus. Probably in August he enters upon his retreat. Augustine writes there, Contra Academicos, De beata vita, De Ordine, his Soliloquia, a tract De Immortalitate animae, and a few epistles.
387. Augustine returned to Milan. Wrote De Immortalitate Animae, and began De Musica, (Retract.I.5.6.) Baptized by Ambrose on Easter Eve, April, 24th. together with his son Adeodatus, a gifted lad of 15. (Possid.vit.Aug.I.)  
(Confessions, 9.VI.I4.)  
Sets out for Africa with Monnica, who died at Ostia in her 56th.year. After her death, Augustine returned to Rome.  
(Confessions, 9.(23-29.))
- 387-388. Wrote at Rome, De Moribus Ecclesiae et Manichaeorum, De quantitate animae, De libero arbitrio, (books, I, & 2. the remaining books later in Africa.)  
(Retract.I.7.8 I.- I.8- I.9.)
388. (Autumn) Augustine returns to Africa.  
(De Civitate Dei, XXII.8.)  
At the end of the year he returns to Thagaste. Having sold his property there he lives a monastic life in

388. company with a few friends.  
(Epistles, CXXVI.7.- CLVII.39.)
389. Death of Adeodatus. (Confessions, 9.VI.I4. )  
Augustine writes De Genesi contra Manichaeos, De Libero  
et Arbitrio, (book, 3.) De Musica, (books, I, & VI.)  
De Magistro, (Confessions, 9.VI.I4. and Retract.I.I2.)  
and began De diversis Quaestionibus, 83. (Retract.I,10-13,  
and 26.)
390. De vera Religione.
391. Augustine ordained Presbyter of Hippo by Valerius its  
bishop. Wrote De Utilitate credendi, and De duabus anima-  
bus contra Manichaeos. (Retract.I,(14-25) )  
Founded a monastery at Hippo. (Possid.V.)
392. Held a public debate with Fortunatus, a Manichaean.  
(Retract. I.I6.)  
Wrote Contra Fortunatum. (August, 28th. & 29th. 392.)
393. Council at Hippo. Augustine, on the invitation of the  
assembled bishops, delivered a dissertation, De Fide et  
Symbolo. (Retract. I.I7.)  
Wrote De Genesi ad litteram.
- 394-5. Wrote Expositio in Epistolam ad Galatas, Expositio quarum-  
dam Propositionum, ex Epist.ad Romanos. De Libero Arbit-  
rio, completed. (Retract.I.9.) De diversis Quaestionibus,  
83, de mendacio. (Retract.I.18-27.)
395. Ordained assistant Bishop to Valerius, towards the end of  
the year. (Epist. 322.) Wrote De continentia.
- c396. Bishop Valerius dies, Augustine becomes sole Bishop.  
Wrote De Agone Christiano.
397. De diversis Quaestionibus ad Simplicianum. De doctrina Chris-  
-tiana commenced. Contra Epistolam Manich., quae dicitur  
Fundamenti. (Retract.2.2.)
- 398-400. Began the Confessions. (Retract.2.I-6.) Contra Faustum  
Manichaeum. Began De Trinitate, (400-415) De Catechi-  
zandis Rudibus. (Retract.2.I4.)
401. De Genesi ad litteram, begun. (401-415.)  
De Bono Conjugali.
402. Contra Litteras Petiliani Donatistae.
404. Wrote De actis cum Felice, (Dec.7.& 12th).

405. Contra Secundinum. De Natura Boni.
410. Fall of Rome.
412. De Peccat. Meritis. De Spiritu et Lit.
413. Augustine begins the De Civitate Dei, in his 58th year and completes it at the age of 71.
418. De gratia Christi.
419. De Nuptiis. De Anima.
420. Contra Adv. Leg. et Proph.
421. Enchiridion. (Retract. 2.63.) De cura pro mortuis.  
(Retract. 2.64.)
426. St Augustine completes De doctrina Christiana and the De Civitate Dei.
427. Augustine writes the Retractationes, also De gratia et Lib. Arb.
430. St. Augustine dies on August 28th, in the third month of the siege of Hippo by the Vandals.

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### NOTE TO APPENDIX, III.

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After the frequent references that have already been made in the successive chapters of our Thesis, to similarities in the thought and expression of St. Augustine and Plotinus, it may seem that such an Appendix as this is quite needless.

But, having included a scheme of comparisons in our plan, we felt compelled to adhere to our original intention. We have, however, contented ourselves by giving a brief selection from each of the six Enneads. To set forth all the parallel passages that are suggested in the works of Alfarić, Bouillett, and Grandgeorge, would make this Appendix as large as the Thesis itself. Moreover, it is not really vital to our object to stress verbal likenesses, or to point to kinship of illustration. These, after all, are but of minor and secondary importance.

It is of far greater moment to mark the influence of Neo-Platonism on the basal and fundamental truths of Augustine, and to indicate the influence of that Philosophy upon his Philosophical and Theological ideas, and this we have endeavoured to do.

For the suggested comparisons which have been included in this Appendix we are indebted to Bouillett; as, however, he seems to make use of a different text of the Enneads from that which Mackenna has followed, in some cases the likeness between Augustine and Plotinus seems somewhat strained.

We are responsible for the translations from the French, and for the renderings of the Latin especially of early writings of St. Augustine.

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### APPENDIX 3.

COMPARATIVE PASSAGES in the writings of Augustine  
with those to be found in the ENNEADS of PLOTINUS.

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THE FIRST ENNEAD.

## First Tractate

## The Animate and the Man.

ENNEADS, I.I.7. compared with DE MUSICA, VI.4.5. (Col.848)  
DE LIB.ARB.I.8.I8. (Cols.940, B.  
DE LIB.ARB.2.4.I0. (Cols.960, I.

Enneads, I.I.7. "From the organised body and something else, let us say a light, which the Soul gives forth from itself, it forms a distinct Principle, the Animate; and in this Principle are vested Sense-Perception and all the other experiences found to belong to the Animate.

But the "We" ? How have We Sense-Perception?

By the fact that We are not separate from the Animate so constituted, even though certainly other and nobler elements go to make up the entire many-sided nature of Man.

The faculty of perception in the Soul cannot act by the immediate grasping of sensible objects, but only by the discerning of impressions printed upon the Animate by sensation: these impressions are already Intelligibles while the outer sensation is a mere phantom of the other (of that in the Soul) which is nearer to Authentic-Existence as being an impassive reading of Ideal-Forms. And by means of these Ideal-Forms, by which the Soul wields single lordship over the Animate, we have Discursive-Reasoning, Sense-Knowledge and Intellection. From this moment we have peculiarly the We: before this there was only the "Ours"; but at this stage stands the WE (the authentic Human-Principle) loftily presiding over the Animate.

There is no reason why the entire compound entity should not be described as the Animate or Living-Being- mingled in a lower phase, but above that point the beginning of the veritable man, distinct from all that is kin to the lion, all that is of the order of the multiple brute. And since The Man, so understood, is essentially the associate of the reasoning Soul, in our reasoning it is this "We" that reasons, in that the use and act of reason is a characteristic Act of the Soul."

Enneads, I.I.7, compared with DE MUSICA, VI.IV.5.

De Musica, VI.IV.5. "M. But I wish now to ask, which, pray, of these four kinds (of harmony) do you judge to be the most outstanding? I am inclined to think that, by reason of the very judgment which we are capable of passing upon them, there is a fifth class; that, by means of which, unison in harmony gives us pleasure and failure in harmony displeases us....Is there not such a class which, whilst it has to do with the other four, is yet separate and distinct from them all?" D."Yes, indeed, I think that there is such a class which may be distinguished from these others. If indeed, there is something pertaining to sound which may be associated with the body, something of the nature of hearing, which by sounds in the body, the soul becomes aware of; something which is at work in the production of a harmony of a longer or a shorter duration, something which has to do with memory; apart from all these there is surely, in the natural order of things, a sense which has the power of approving or of expressing disapproval on these things".

Enneads, I.I.7., compared with De Lib. Arb. I.8.I8.

De Lib.Arb. I.8.I8."Whatever is it that sets man over the beasts of the field as their chief? Is it the power of mind, or should we call it spirit? Would it not be a better name, if using the language of the divine books, we were to speak of that power as 'ordination'? If it is agreed that man holds dominion and lords it over all other things, then, indeed, is man most highly ordained. ....But when you find that Reason is dominated by the things which cause distress to the Soul can man be said to be ordained? For it is not a proper order, neither is it an order universally recognised when better things are in subjection to the worse".

Enneads, I.I.7., compared with De Lib.Arb.2.4.I0.

De Lib.Arb.2.4.I0."I think too that it is clear, that this Inner Sense does not so much feel the things which it has received from the five bodily senses, but that rather indeed they have a sense of feeling by reason of the possession of this Inner Sense..For bodies manifest signs of life when they feel by means of the bodily sense; but really that same sense is not capable of feeling by its own powers; but it is by the Inner Sense as well as by the bodily sense that there arises sensation. It is by the Reasoning Faculty that we become acquainted with each separate sense and all these things are retained by knowledge"

See also- Enneads, IV.3.23.-IV.4.(I8,I9)- III.I.9.-III.2.9.- 3.4.2.  
IV.3.26.

We may add another comparison to Enneads, I.I.7. De Civ. Dei, XI.27. After speaking of the irrational animals & their senses, St Augustine says—"For we have another and far superior sense, belonging to the inner man, by which we perceive what things are just, and what unjust,— just by means of an intelligible idea, unjust by the want of it. This sense is aided in its functions neither by the eyesight, nor by the orifice of the ear, nor by the air-holes of the nostrils, nor by the palate's taste, nor by any bodily touch. By it I am assured both that I am, and that I know this; and these two I love, and in the same manner I am assured that I love them".

St Augustine refers to the Inner Sense in Confessions, I.20.31, and in VII.XVII.23. This Inner Sense connects the sensations with each other, and with the self as the subject of sensation, it is equivalent to the Aristotelian 'Common Sense'. The Neo-Platonists held that such functions were to be directly attributed to the *δύναμις τοῦ αἰσθητικῶς* of the Soul. See Gibb & Montgomery on the Confessions, op.cit.page,32. According to Siebeck, (quoted by Gibb & Montgomery) Augustine goes beyond his predecessors in the clearness with which he attributes to this Inner Sense, not merely the correlation of diverse sensations, but the consciousness of the self as an object of sensation. See also Bouillet, op.cit.Vol.I.page, 325. Vol.2.page 571.

.....

It is like the living being not by merging into the earth, which may change its self, images of itself like the face caught by many mirrors.

(Enn. I.1.2.1)

compared with

Enn. I.1.2.2. "The Soul can be high, serene, and pure, or it can be low, dark, and impure. It can be like a mirror, reflecting the light of the divine, or it can be like a mirror, reflecting the darkness of the material world. The Soul is like a mirror, and it is the duty of the philosopher to polish it, so that it may reflect the light of the divine." (Enn. I.1.2.2)

The Soul is like a mirror, and it is the duty of the philosopher to polish it, so that it may reflect the light of the divine.

ENNEADS, I.I.8. compared with De Lib.Arb.2.XII.33.(Cols.976,977)  
De Quant.Animae,32.68.(Col.725)

Enneads, I.I.8. "And towards the Intellectual-Principle what is our relation? By this I mean, not that faculty in the soul which is one of the emanations from the Intellectual-Principle, but the Intellectual-Principle itself (Divine-Mind).

This also we possess as the summit of our being. And we have It either as common to all or as our own immediate possession: or again we may possess It in both degrees, that is in common, since It is indivisible - everywhere one, and always Its entire self - and severally in that each personality possesses It entire in the First-Soul (i.e. in the Intellectual as distinguished from the lower phase of the Soul)."

compared with-

De Lib.Arb.2.XII.33. "How as a consequence can we deny that there is a truth unchangeable which contains all the truths that are unchangeable? It is of that truth that you are unable to say; that it is thine or mine or that it belongs to any man, for it is the possession of all those who recognise unchangeable truths. It is in an amazing way a light, now secret now flashed abroad, which presents itself and communicates itself to all those who seek it. How can we regard it as the possession of any one when it is shared by all who use their Reason?"

It is by reason of the unchangeableness of truth that St Augustine proves the existence of God and the Immortality of the Soul.

Enneads, I.I.8. "For, note, we inevitably think of the Soul, though one and undivided in the All, as being present to bodies in division: in so far as any bodies are Animate, the Soul has given itself to each of the separate material masses; or rather it appears to be present in the bodies by the fact that it shines into them: it makes them living beings not by merging into body but by giving forth, without any change in itself, images or likenesses of itself like one face caught by many mirrors."

(also ENN. IV.2.1.) -

compared with-

De Quant Animae, 32.68. "The Soul must be highly esteemed on account of those things which it contemplates and reflects upon so that you are able to understand most clearly what is maintained by certain most learned men, namely that whilst the Soul keeps hold of itself and can in no way become divided, yet it is still possible for it to be shared throughout the body."

By the phrase, "certain very wise men" (quibusdam doctissimis viris) Augustine evidently means Plotinus and Porphyry.

## THE FIRST ENNEAD.

## Second Tractate

## On Virtue.

ENNEADS, I.2.I.      see translation page, 6.  
                              compared with De Ordine, 2.2.(4-7).

In the second section of his book of the De Ordine, Augustine takes up the question as to what is meant by being with God, and in what sense a wise man remains immovable with God.

De Ordine, 2.2. (4-7). Spirits share the life of God, according to the measure in which they attain knowledge of Him. By His help the Wise man gains a mastery over the world and avoids its alluring powers. The Soul of the Wise man charged as a leader or pilot with the conduct of the body remains, despite the inferior functions of the body attached to the Divine Wisdom, which is everywhere present throughout the vast universe. It is from this unique source of Truth that the Soul draws its spiritual knowledge. It is there as he comes to a knowledge of himself, that the superior part of his being dwells hence sense and memory abide ever in subjection in the person of the wise man.

We may compare the above also with

ENNEADS, I.2.3. "As the Soul is evil by being interfused with the body, and by coming to share the body's states and to think the body's thoughts, so it would be good, it would be possessed of virtue, if it threw off the body's moods and devoted itself to its own Act- the state of Intellection and Wisdom- never allowed the passions of the body to affect it- the virtue of Sophrosyne- knew no fear at the parting from the body- the virtue of Fortitude- and if reason and the Intellectual-Principle ruled- in which state is Righteousness. Such a disposition in the Soul, become thus intellectual and immune to passion, it would not be wrong to call Likeness to God; for the Divine, too, is pure and the Divine-Act is such that Likeness to it is Wisdom".

See also De Musica, VI.XVI.5I.

Enneads, I.2.3.    see page, 10.    translated.

Enneads, I.2.4.    see page, 11.    translated

Enneads, I.2.5.    see page, 12.    translated.

Enneads, I.2.6. "At this height, the man is the very being that came from the Supreme. The primal excellence restored, the essential man is there; entering this sphere, he has associated himself with the reasoning phase of his nature and this will lead up into likeness with his highest self, as far as earthly mind is capable..." Mackenna, Vol. I. page, 41-48.

## THE FIRST ENNEAD.

## Second Tractate

## On Virtue.

ENNEADS, I.2.I. compared with De Musica, VI.XIII.37. &c.

Enneads, I.2.I. "Since Evil is here, "haunting this world by necessary law", and it is the Soul's design to escape from Evil, we must escape hence.

But what is this escape?

"In attaining Likeness to God", we read. And this is explained as "becoming just and holy, living by wisdom", the entire nature grounded in Virtue.....But, at the beginning, we are met by the doubt whether even in this Divine-Being all the virtues find place- Moral-Balance (Sophrosynē), for example; or Fortitude where there can be no danger since nothing is alien; where there can be nothing alluring whose lack could induce the desire of possession.....But does this Power possess the Virtues? We cannot expect to find there what are called the Civic Virtues, the Prudence which belongs to the reasoning faculty; the Fortitude which conducts the emotional and passionate nature; the Sophrosynē which consists in a certain pact, in a concord between the passionate faculty and the reason; or Rectitude which is the due application of all the other virtues as each in turn should command or obey. Is Likeness, then, attained, perhaps, not by these virtues of the social order but by those greater qualities known by the same general name? And if so do the Civic Virtues give us no help at all? It is against reason, utterly to deny Likeness by these while admitting it by the greater: tradition at least recognises certain men of the civic excellence as divine, and we must believe that these too had in some sort attained Likeness: on both levels there is virtue for us, though not the same virtue. Now, if it be admitted that Likeness is possible, though by a varying use of different virtues and though the civic virtues do not suffice, there is no reason why we should not, by virtues peculiar to our state, attain Likeness to a model in which virtue has no place...It is from the Supreme that we derive order and distribution and harmony, which are virtues in this sphere: the Existences There, having no need of harmony, order or distribution, have nothing to do with virtue; and, none the less, it is by our possession of virtue that we become like to Them. Thus much to show that the principle that we attain Likeness by virtue in no way involves the existence of virtue in the Supreme."

St Augustine has reproduced under different forms the theory of Plotinus on the Purification of the Soul. We may see here from the following comparisons how Augustine has borrowed the doctrine of the purifying and intellectual virtues as set forth in Enneads, I.2.

Enneads, I.2.I. compared with De Musica, VI.XIII.37. &c.

De Musica, VI. XIII. 37. (Col.870.) "Wherefore prithee, now, I ask you, does this man of musical taste withdraw from the contemplation of things (divine), in order that such may be recalled to memory? Or indeed, in the case of another- an earnest soul- must we think that he stands in need of such a return? (to God)..... (Col.871.) This disposition, therefore, or movement of the soul, by which one comprehends eternal things, and learns that temporal things are inferior to these, even in themselves; and knows that these things which are superior rather than those which are inferior must be desired; does not the name of that disposition appear to you to be that of Prudence? D. Yes! it seems to be nothing else.

38. (Col.871). Is there anything else that you think should be considered, which is of lesser importance, although it may not appear to be intimately associated with eternal things, yet, for all that may be linked with them? D. Assuredly I beg that this may be taken into account, and I desire to know how it happens to come within our survey. ....

39. (Col.872). Love of action, therefore, in respect to the rising passions of one's body turns away the soul from the contemplation of eternal things, calling off its earnestness by reason of its care for pleasures of the senses.... Love of labour in respect to bodily activities, even turns away the soul's attention and makes it restless....

40. (Col.872). Indeed a general love of accomplishing something, which turns the soul away from that which is right is roused by Pride, for by this fault the soul chooses rather to imitate God than to serve Him. ... For when the soul of itself is as nothing, (for otherwise it will not be subject to change, and will render itself liable to a defect in its essence) when, therefore of itself it realises its nothingness and that whatever it has is from God, abiding in his order, it is quickened in mind and in conscience by the very presence of God Himself. Thus it has this inmost good. Why then become puffed up by Pride, for this is to set out to the remotest bounds, and, so to speak to become empty, that is to be less and less. But setting out towards external things, what is this indeed but to banish the inmost things, that is to put God far from itself, not with respect to spatial distance, but by the disposition of the mind?

Bouillet (Vol.2. page, 545 footnote) reminds us here that these lines are taken textually from Porphyry.

Porphyry, "Principles of the Theory of Intelligibles".

XLIV. "The human Soul is united by its essence with the Universal Being". "He who is able by his thought to enter into his inmost being, and thereby acquire knowledge, discovers himself in that act of knowledge and conscience, for there the subject which knows becomes identical with the object that is known. Now, in



Porphyry, "Principles of the Theory of Intelligibles"- (Continued)-

possessing himself, he possesses also Being. He who goes out of himself in order that he may attach himself to external objects, in the very act of going away from himself, he also removes himself from true Being. It is part of our very nature to establish ourselves within our own breast, where we may enjoy all the riches of our own hearts, and not to turn ourselves away towards that which is foreign to our own nature, where we only find the most abject poverty. Otherwise, we remove ourselves far from Being, although He may be near to us; for it is neither place, nor substance, nor obstruction, which separates us from Being, it is our turning away to non-Being. On the other hand, the love which the Soul has for herself, leads her to a knowledge of herself, and to union with God. Thus, one has truly said, that man here below, is in a prison house because he has run away from heaven, and he has blemished himself by breaking his bonds; for, in turning towards earthly things he has forsaken himself and has strayed from his Divine origin; it is as Empedocles has said-'he is a fugitive who has deserted his Divine country'. You see then, how it comes to pass that the life of a vicious man is a servile life, impious and unjust, his spirit is full of impiety and injustice. Justice, on the other hand, consists, as one has rightly said, in each of us fulfilling his own function, rendering to each what is his due. There then you have the picture of true Justice."

Translated from the French of Bouillet, op.cit.Vol.I.pages, LXXXV, LXXXVI.

DE MUSICA, VI.50. (Col.878.) "But this act by which the Soul, by the help of God and our Lord, withdraws itself from the love of inferior beauty, subduing and slaying as it wages war against its own habit, triumphing in that very victory over the power of the air, from which envyings and evil desires hamper, flies upward to its source of steadfastness and support, that is God; does not that seem to you to be the virtue which we call TEMPERANCE?... What then? When it sets out on its journey, now perceiving and almost grasping eternal joys, can you think it possible that the loss of temporal things, or any death, will hinder it from saying farewell to its weaker associates; 'Good were it for me to be set free, and to be with Christ: but to remain in the flesh, is needful on your account'?...But that frame of mind which fears neither foes nor death, what can it be called but by the name of FORTITUDE?...Now that very ordinance (ordinatio) which is at the service of none save the one God, which is equal in dignity to none but the purest souls, which seeks to laud it over none but the lordship over its own bestial nature, what name would you give to such a virtue? D.Why! everyone knows it is none other than JUSTICE.

DE MUSICA, VI. XVI. 51. (Col. 878). "But now I seek to learn this, (when such a virtue as this PRUDENCE is in the ascendancy it will stand firm within us, for it is by it that the Soul learns where it should take its stand, in the place to which it has raised itself by means of TEMPERANCE, that is a turning of its love towards God which is called Charity and a turning away from this world- in this it will have for its companions FORTITUDE & JUSTICE)- very well then- I seek to know whether you think when it shall have arrived at the fruit of its own choice by perfect sanctification, and when the hordes of phantasms have been wiped out from its remembrance,- it will then begin to live in the presence of God Himself with God alone then will be fulfilled that which is promised us from heaven "We are now the chosen sons of God, and it doth not yet appear what we shall be,; for we know that when He shall appear we shall be like Him, since we shall see Him as He is". I ask you whether you think that these virtues which we have been recounting here shall be ours then. D. I cannot see, when we have escaped from the disasters with which we are now struggling, in what way either PRUDENCE can be present, for it only makes its choice in the presence of disasters or TEMPERANCE, which only turns its love away from disasters, or FORTITUDE which only keeps us safe from disasters, or JUSTICE which only seeks to be kin to the happiest souls and to gain the mastery over its lower nature before disasters;- I do not see yet how such virtues shall be present at the time of which you have been speaking."

DE MUSICA, VI. XVI. 52. (Col. 879) "Your answer is not wholly absurd indeed, I quite agree that such has been the view of certain learned men. For when I consult books which no authority can ever set on one side, I come upon this sentence- 'Oh taste and see how gracious the Lord is'- to this the Apostle Peter has added- 'If you have tasted how gracious the Lord is'. And I cannot think but that such is brought about by means of these virtues which, in their conversion, purify the Soul. For the love of temporal things is not expelled save by the graciousness of eternal things. ....Other things are afterwards united, and we read- 'In Thy Light we shall see Light. Shew forth Thy compassion to those who know Thee'. 'In Light'- such as we have received in Christ, who is the Wisdom of God, and is spoken of many times as 'The Light'. When, therefore, it is said- 'In Thy Light...to those who know Thee'- one cannot declare that PRUDENCE will not be present. For how is it possible for us to know the true good of the Soul, where there is no PRUDENCE?" D. I do not now know.

DE MUSICA, VI. XVI. 53. (Col. 879) "Very well then- Can the upright in heart be such without JUSTICE? D. I realise, by the repetition of that word that JUSTICE is indicated. M. Why then does the same prophet consequently remind us of that as he sings- 'And JUSTICE to those who are upright in heart'? D. Clearly that is so. M. Well then, following upon this, recollect if it is pleasing to you, that we have not previously sufficiently investigated the truth that the Soul falls through pride to the doing of certain

things associated with its own power, slew itself by neglecting the universal law in attending to its own affairs, for that is how we speak of apostasy from God. D I indeed remember. M. When therefore, it follows no longer in the way of self pleasing, does it not further seem to you that its love is fixed on God, and that now it lives, most temperately and most chastely, and most securely free from contamination? D. Truly it seems so.

DE MUSICA, VI. XVI.54. (Col.880) "FORTITUDE therefore remains. But as TEMPERANCE is opposed to any lapse which may take place because of the freedom of the will; so FORTITUDE makes one strong in the presence of opposing strength, for it is through that virtue that we are able to gather strength, but if FORTITUDE is weaker than those things which it is subverting, it lies most wretchedly abject."

DE MUSICA, VI. XVI.55. (Col.880) "You will not then deny that the Soul being thus established in that perfection and blessedness both beholds the Truth, and remains pure, thus it can suffer no harm, but being subject to the one God, it is able to rise above all natural things. D. I cannot conceive of anything else than that such an one must be most perfect and most happy. M. These therefore, Contemplation, Sanctification, Impassibility, Orderly Regulation- these four virtues are either perfect and complete or if they are but names chosen to fit our argument, then we have laboured in vain. Indeed these are the virtues which the Soul placed amid its struggles makes use of, such are certain powers which give us hope of obtaining Eternal life".

.....

We have already noticed one passage from the Enneads which may be associated with the lengthy section which we have taken from the De Musica, we shall now quote others from the Enneads.

ENNEADS, I.2.3. "To Plato, unmistakably, there are two distinct orders of virtue, and the civic does not suffice for Likeness: 'Likeness to God', he says, 'is a flight from this world's ways and things': in dealing with the qualities of good citizenship he does not use the simple term Virtue but adds the distinguishing word civic: and elsewhere he declares all the virtues without exception to be purifications.

But in what sense can we call the virtues purifications, and how does purification issue in Likeness?

As the Soul is evil by being interfused with the body, and by coming to share the body's states and to think the body's thoughts, so it would be good, it would be possessed of virtue, if it threw off the body's moods and devoted itself to its own Act- the state of Intellection and Wisdom- never allowed the passions of the body to affect it- the virtue of Sophrosyne- knew no fear at the parting from the body- the virtue of Fortitude- and if reason and the Intellectual-Principle ruled- in which state is Righteousness. Such a disposition in the Soul, become thus intellective

(II).

ENNEADS, I.2.3. (Continued)

and immune to passion, it would not be wrong to call Likeness to God; for the Divine, too, is pure and the Divine-Act is such that Likeness to it is Wisdom".

ENNEADS, I.2.4. "We come, so, to the question whether Purification is the whole of this human quality, virtue, or merely the forerunner upon which virtue follows? Does virtue imply the achieved state of purification or does the mere process suffice to it, Virtue being something of less perfection than the accomplished pureness which is almost the Term?

To have been purified is to have cleansed away everything alien: but Goodness is something more.

If before the impurity entered there was Goodness, the Goodness suffices; but even so, not the act of cleansing but the cleansed thing that emerges will be The Good. And it remains to establish what (in the case of the cleansed Soul) this emergent is.

It can scarcely prove to be The Good: The Absolute Good cannot be thought to have taken up its abode with Evil. We can think of it only as something of the nature of good but paying a double allegiance and unable to rest in the Authentic Good.

The Soul's true Good is in devotion to the Intellectual-Principle; its kin; evil to the Soul lies in frequenting strangers. There is no other way for it than to purify itself and so enter into relation with its own; the new phase begins by a new orientation.

After the Purification, then, there is still this orientation to be made? No: by the purification the true alignment stands accomplished. The Soul's virtue, then, is this alignment? No: it is what the alignment brings about within.

And this is.....?

That it sees; that, like sight affected by the thing seen, the soul admits the imprint, graven upon it and working within it, of the vision it has come to.

But was not the Soul possessed of all this always, or had it forgotten? What is now sees, it certainly always possessed, but as lying away in the dark, not as acting within it: to dispel the darkness, and thus come to knowledge of its inner content, it must thrust towards the light".

We might also make comparison by means of Enneads, V.I.I.  
(see this under Enneads V.)

It may be that there is a reflection of the above Enneads, I.2.4.  
IN with the Confessions, XIII.II.3.

We may here also find comparisons between-  
 ENNEADS, I.2.4; I.2.5. and DE QUANTITATE ANIMAE, XXXIII.(73-75)  
 (Cols. 728,9.)

ENNEADS, I.2.5."So we come to the scope of the purification:.....  
 how far does purification dispel the two orders of passion-  
 anger, desire and the like, with grief and its kin- and in what  
 degree the disengagement from the body is possible. Disengagement  
 means simply that the soul withdraws to its own place.  
 It will hold itself above all passions and affections. Necessary  
 pleasures and all the activity of the senses it will employ only  
 for medicament and assuagement lest its work be impeded. Pain it  
 may combat, but, failing the cure, it will bear meekly and ease  
 it by refusing assent to it.....The Soul has nothing to dread,  
 though no doubt the involuntary has some power here too: fear  
 therefore must cease, except so far as it is purely monitory. What  
 desire there may be can never be for the vile;... The Soul itself  
 will be inviolately free and will be working to set the irration-  
 -al part of its nature above all attack...."

Compare then- ENNEADS, I.2.4.,5. and

DE QUANTITATE ANIMAE, XXXIII.(73-75). "Raise yourself, therefore  
 and leap up to the fourth stage, whence virtue and all true praise  
 begin. For after this the Soul herself dares to take command not  
 only of her own body, but, if she rules any part of the Universe  
 that universal body also; she does not think now of her own well-  
 -being as belonging solely to herself, but having reflected upon  
 her own power and excellence, dares to discriminate and to hold  
 certain things in contempt; hence the more she pleases herself  
 the more does she withdraw herself from the things that are mean,  
 both cleanses the whole and restores it most adorned and most  
 beautified;....

DE QUANTITATE ANIMAE, XXXIII.74.(Col.729.)"And when this shall  
 have been accomplished, that is, when the Soul shall be free from  
 all corruption and washed from all blemishes, then at last she  
 takes her way most joyously, nor does she fear anything at all  
 for herself, neither is she vexed on her own account. Accordingly  
 here we reach the fifth stage: for now it both completes and poss-  
 -esses purity; and right onwards any other act by means of which  
 she restores the impure soul does not suffer her again to be  
 defiled. In this stage she apprehends the ALL-SUSTAINING, how great  
 it is: and when she perceives it, then indeed by a certain mighty  
 and incredible courage she proceeds to God, that is, into the  
 contemplation itself of the Truth, and that, for which one must  
 toil so greatly which is the highest and most secret reward.

DE QUANTITATE ANIMAE, XXXIII.75."But this act, that is, an earnest  
 longing for those things which really and in the highest degree  
 exist, is the loftiest function of the Soul, apart from which it  
 possesses not that which is the more perfect, the better, the more  
 befitting. Consequently that will be the sixth stage of its action

DE QUANTITATE ANIMAE, 75. (continued)- for one thing the eye itself of the Soul becomes fine, so that it does not see in vain, nor at random, nor does it see amiss; for another, it preserves and strengthens its own purity, so that now it is able to direct a serene and noble gaze upon what can be seen".

.....

We may also compare ENNEADS, I.2.5. with De Ordine, II.2.7.  
(Cols.556,7).

DE ORDINE, II.2.7. "Nor is there anything at all which I think will be intrusted to the memory of such a Sage; if indeed he is ever steadfast in God, whether silent or whether he be speaking with men: but that one now a servant well equipped will pay heed as he ponders to what his Lord enjoins, and to that one as most just, he is grateful and makes it his business to live under the power which he finds over him. And this he does, not by reasoning but by the highest law and Order which is laid down for him".

.....

This may also be compared with ENNEADS, IV.3.25.  
(see under Enneads,IV.)

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THE FIRST ENNEAD.

THIRD TRACTATE

On Dialectic, (The Upward Way).

The Neo-Platonists placed a very high value on the Science of Dialectic. See Enneads, I.3.(1-6).

ENNEADS, I.3.1. for part translation, page 16.

ENNEADS, I.3.2. part translation, page, 16

ENNEADS, I.3.4. Here Plotinus defines Dialectic, as "The Method or Discipline, that brings with it the power of pronouncing with final truth upon the nature and relation of things- what each is, how it differs from others, what common quality all have, to what Kind each belongs and in what rank each stands in its Kind and whether its Being is Real-Being, and how many Beings there are, and how many non-Beings to be distinguished from Beings..... it makes itself the judge, here as in everything else: where it sees use, it uses; anything it finds superfluous, it leaves to whatever department of learning or practice may turn that matter to account."

Enneads, I.3.5. "It is the precious part of Philosophy".

Mackenna, Vol.I. pages, 53,4.

De Ordine, 2.38. Here we have a possible reference to the above. Augustine has just been dealing with Grammatical Science, he now turns to discuss Dialectic. Grammatical Science having been perfectly arranged says Augustine, Reason begins to consider how it has acquired a well ordered and dependable knowledge, by its definitions, its divisions and its deductions. In a word, it proceeds to analyse its own machinery, and to examine its working. So Dialectic comes into being. That Science, which learns by learning and then by teaching; (haec docet docere, haec docet discere). Which knows what it knows and not only desires to make real scholars but actually does so. (Scit scire, sola scientia facere non solum vult, sed etiam potest.) Col.576.

.....

De Ordine, 2.18.47. may be compared with Enneads, I.3.1.  
see page, 15.

De Ordine, 2.18.47. "Philosophy deals with a two-fold question; one concerning the Soul, the other about God. The former leads us to a knowledge of ourselves, the latter to a knowledge of our origin; the one is more agreeable to us, but the other is more precious; the one makes us fitted for the life of happiness, the other makes us happy. The former is the possession of the teachable, the latter for those who are already taught. Here is the

order of the study of Wisdom, by means of which, each becomes capable of understanding the Order of the Universe, it is for the discernment of the two worlds, and of the Author of the Universe Himself, unless one knows Him in this way there is no knowledge of the Soul." (Col.58I.)

The whole passage is imbued by the spirit of Neo-Platonism. Plotinus taught continually that the search for the One was the final aim for all philosophy.

.....

Enneads, I.3.6. "And is it possible to be a Sage, a master in Dialectic, without these lower virtues? It would not happen; the lower will spring either before or together with the higher. and is it likely that everyone normally possesses the natural virtues from which, when Wisdom steps in, the perfected virtue develops. After the natural virtues, then, Wisdom and, so the perfecting of the moral nature. Once the natural virtues exist, both orders, the natural and the higher, ripen side by side to their final excellence; or as one advances it carries forward the other towards perfection."

Mackenna, Vol.I. page, 55.

this may be compared with Soliloquia, I. 23, 24, 25.

it contains the same thought, but there is no need to quote it in detail.

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## THE FIRST ENNEAD.

## Third Tractate

## On Dialectic (The Upward Way).

In DE MUSICA, VI. XII.36. St. Augustine explains how the Soul can by the study of Music make its return to God. This is an idea borrowed from Plotinus. (ENNEADS, I.3.I,2.)

ENNEADS, I.3.I. "The musician we may think of as being exceedingly quick to beauty, drawn in a very rapture to it: somewhat slow to stir of his own impulse, he answers at once to the outer stimulus: as the timid are sensitive to noise so he to tones and the beauty they convey; all that offends against unison or harmony in melodies and rhythms repels him; he longs for measure and shapely pattern. This natural tendency must be made the starting-point to such a man; he must be drawn by the tone, rhythm and design in things of sense: he must learn to distinguish the material forms from the Authentic-Existent which is the source of all these correspondences and of the entire reasoned scheme in the work of art: he must be led to the Beauty that manifests itself through these forms; he must be shown that what ravished him was no other than the Harmony of the Intellectual world and the Beauty in that sphere, not some one shape of beauty but the All-Beauty, the Absolute Beauty; and the truths of philosophy must be implanted in him to lead him to faith in that which, unknowing it, he possesses within himself.

ENNEADS, I.3.2. "The born lover, to whose degree the musician also may attain- and then either come to a stand or pass beyond- has a certain memory of beauty but, severed from it now, he no longer comprehends it: spellbound by visible loveliness he clings amazed about that. His lesson must be to fall down no longer in bewildered delight before some, one embodied form; he must be led, under a system of mental discipline, to beauty everywhere and made to discern the One Principle underlying all, a Principle apart from the material forms, springing from another source, and elsewhere more truly present. The beauty, for example, in a noble course of life and in an admirably organised social system may be pointed out to him- a first training this in the loveliness of the immaterial- he must learn to recognise the beauty in the arts, sciences, virtues; then these severed and particular forms must be brought under the one principle by the explanation of their origin. From the virtues he is to be led to the Intellectual-Principle, to the Authentic-Existent; thence onward, he treads the upward way".

DE MUSICA, VI.XII.36. (Col.870). "Come now, tell me whether these harmonies which we have been discussing, appear to you to be subject to change. D.In no way. M.Then do you deny that they are not eternal. D.I fully confess that they are eternal.M.Have you no

DE MUSICA, VI.36 (Continued)-

fear that by reason of their very dissimilarity, it may be suggested to you that they may deceive? D.Nothing is more certain to me than the similarity of these harmonies.M. Whence then comes the belief which is attributed concerning the Soul, that it is eternal and unchangeable, unless from the one eternal and immutable God? D. I do not see that one can believe anything else. M.Well then, is this not clear, when anyone questioning within himself, in order that he may discover the unchangeable truth, does not such an one move towards God? Unless Memory controls his very movement it is not possible that any one can perceive that truth, for it cannot be recalled by any suggestion from without. D.That is clear."

We may mark a close parallel here between this thought of Augustine and ENNEADS, V.I.II.(see ENNEADS, V.)

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## THE FIRST ENNEAD.

### FOURTH TRACTATE

#### On True Happiness.

Augustine, as we have seen borrows his title De beata Vita from Plotinus and at the same time adopts a great deal of the arguments which this Tractate makes use of.

ENNEADS, I.IV.I."Are we to make True Happiness one and the same thing with Welfare or Prosperity and therefore within the reach of the other living beings as well as ourselves?....And if, even, we set Happiness in some ultimate Term pursued by inborn tendency, then on this head, too, we must allow it to animals from the moment of their attaining this Ultimate:"

De beata Vita, 10!Let us grant that we all aspire after happiness. What is it then to be happy unless it is to be not unhappy? De beata Vita, (23,24). "I say therefore that it does not follow that if anyone is in need he is unhappy, anyone who is not in need is happy."

In De diversis Quaestionibus, 83.5.-Augustine asks the question, "Utrum animal irrationale beatum esse possit?" There Augustine makes answer that the beasts do not know happiness because they do not possess knowledge. The same remark is made by Plotinus.

ENNEADS, I.IV.2."Perhaps, however, the theory is that the Good of any state consists not in the condition itself but in the knowledge and perception of it".

We may also add a further quotation-

ENNEADS, I.IV.2. "Perhaps, then, those are in the right who found happiness not on bare living or even on sensitive life but on the life of Reason".

Compare this with De beata Vita, 26-28. Here, Augustine argues that there are some men who lead a life of unhappiness even whilst they loll in the lap of luxury. He quotes Cicero who speaks of a certain man who, whilst possessing every kind of good thing, yet life a life of supreme wretchedness for he was in constant fear of losing all that he possessed. His fear- says Augustine- was due to a certain lack of judgment. Hence, 'it is folly which constitutes real poverty.

ENNEADS, I.IV.3. "If mere Being is insufficient, if happiness demands fulness of life and exists, therefore, where nothing is lacking of all that belongs to the idea of life, then happiness can exist only in a being that lives fully".

In like manner Augustine says- De beata Vita, 30, 31. (Col. 517) Wisdom should be esteemed the best kind of wealth since it suggests the thought of fulness. "Et si egestas est ipsa stultitia, plenitudo erit sapientia".

ENNEADS, I.IV.4. "Once the man is a Sage, the means of happiness, the way to good; are within, for nothing is good that lies outside him. Anything he desires further than this he seeks as a necessity, and not for himself but for a subordinate, for the body bound to him, to which since it has life he must minister the needs of life, not needs, however, to the true man of this degree. He knows himself to stand above all such things, and what he gives to the lower he so gives as to leave his true life undiminished.... Adverse fortune does not shake his felicity: the life so founded is stable ever. Suppose death strikes at his household or at his friends; he knows what death is, as the victims, if they are among the wise, know too. And if death taking from him his familiars and intimates does bring grief, it is not to him, not to the true man, but to that in him which stands apart from the Supreme, to that lower man in whose distress he takes no part".

We may compare this with- De beata vita, 25. where Augustine very closely follows Plotinus. He who has Wisdom can stand in need of many things and yet abide in the happy life. He has no fear either of the death of the body, or distresses, or want. He has the peace of happiness within.

In the same way we may compare ENNEADS, I.4.7. with this section also Enneads, I.4.8. which carries forward the same thought concerning the endurance of the Sage since his life is grounded on Wisdom. There is an echo of Enneads, I.4.15. in De beata Vita, 26-28-. quoted above.

Lastly we would note in connection with this Tractate on Happiness that Augustine and Plotinus arrive at the same conclusion. Both find true happiness in Wisdom and both agree that such Wisdom is only to be found in the life of the man who has found the Highest Wisdom, that is the one who has found God.

We may compare then- ENNEADS, I.IV.I6. with De Beata Vita, 33, 34.

Enneads, I.IV.I6. "Those that refuse to place the Sage aloft in the Intellectual Realm but drag him down to the accidental, dreading accident for him, have substituted for the Sage we have in mind another person altogether; they offer us a tolerable sort of man and they assign to him a life of mingled good and ill, a case, after all, not easy to conceive. But admitting the possibility of such a mixed state, it could not be deserved to be called a life of happiness; it misses the Great, both in the dignity of Wisdom and in the integrity of Good. The life of true happiness is not a thing of mixture. And Plato rightly taught that he who is to be wise and to possess happiness draws his good from the Supreme, fixing his gaze on That, becoming like to That, living by That".

De beata Vita, 33, 34. (Cols. 518, 9.) But if you ask what is Wisdom ..it is nothing else than a regulating principle in the Soul. Or we may speak of it as to the Soul what nourishment is to the body. But when we speak of Wisdom of what do we think? Surely of the Wisdom of God. Now the Son of God is none other than the Wisdom of God, and the Son of God is really God. Whoever then has God is happy. (See pages, 137, 8, 9, of this Thesis for a fuller account; the above is only a very condensed paraphrase, but it is sufficient to indicate that Augustine and Plotinus present the same argument).

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## THE FIRST ENNEAD.

### SIXTH TRACTATE.

#### Beauty.

ENNEADS I.VI.I. "Almost everyone declares that the symmetry of parts towards each other and towards a whole, with, besides, a certain charm of colour, constitutes the beauty recognised by the eye, that in visible things, as indeed in all else, universally, the beautiful thing is essentially symmetrical, patterned".

Augustine may have had this in his mind when he wrote in- DE ORDINE, 2.XI.30. (Col. 571). "Reason is the movement of the mind. This enables us to distinguish and arrange what we learn, by means of analysis and synthesis. It declares itself sometimes even in

objects perceived by the smell, the taste and the touch...On the other hand it proclaims itself in a very direct way by many things which please the sight or the hearing, for example, the very symmetry of a house, or a rhythmic chant will please us. In a word, Reason, which is only another term for Orderly arrangement, gives birth to Beauty as well as harmony".

So also we may find a parallel thought to this in Enneads, I.6.2.

Enneads, I.6.2."Let us, then, go back to the source, and indicate at once the Principle that bestows beauty on material things.... Our interpretation is that the soul- by the very truth of its nature, by its affiliation to the noblest Existents in the hierarchy of Being- when it sees anything of that kin or any trace of that kinship, thrills with an immediate delight, takes its own to itself, and thus stirs anew to the sense of its nature and of all its affinity."

Compare Confessions, III.VI.10."And I indeed ought to have passed by even philosophers who spake truth concerning them, for love of Thee, my Father, supremely good, Beauty of all things beautiful".

Enneads, I.6.2."But where the Ideal-Form has entered, it has grouped and coordinated what from a diversity of parts was to become a unity: it has rallied confusion into co-operation: it has made the sum one harmonious coherence: for the Idea is a unity and what it moulds must come to unity as far as multiplicity may..... This, then, is how the material thing becomes beautiful- by communicating in the thought that flows from the Divine".

also a like thought in Enneads I.6.3.

Compare with Confessions, IV.XIII.20."These things I then knew not and I loved these lower beauties, and I was sinking to the very depths, and to my friends I said, 'do we love any thing but the beautiful? What then is the beautiful? and what is beauty? What is it that attracts and wins us to the things we love? for unless there were in them a grace and beauty, they could by no means draw us unto them.' And I marked and perceived that in bodies themselves, there was a beauty, from their forming a sort of whole and again, another from apt and mutual correspondence, as of a part of the body with its whole, or a shoe with a foot, and the like".

Enneads, I.6.6."That divine order from which the wellspring of Beauty rises and all the race of Beauty....in the Soul's becoming a good and beautiful thing is its becoming like to God, for from the Divine comes all the Beauty and all the Good in beings..... The beauty in things of a lower order- actions and pursuits for instance- comes by operation of the shaping Soul which is also the author of the beauty found in the world of sense. For the Soul, a divine thing, a fragment as it were of the Primal Beauty,

makes beautiful to the fulness of their capacity all things whatsoever that it grasps and moulds".

Compare- CONFESSIONS, I.7.13. "For Thou art God...whose Unity is the mould of all things; who out of Thy own fairness makest all things fair; and orderest all things by Thy law".

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ENNEADS, I.6.7. "And one that shall know this vision- with what passion of love shall he not be seized, with what pang of desire, what longing to be molten into one with This, what wondering delight! If he that has never seen this Being must hunger for It as for all his welfare, he that has known must love and reverence It as the very Beauty; he will be flooded with awe and gladness, stricken by a salutary terror; he loves with a veritable love, with sharp desire; all other loves than this he must despise, and disdain all that once seemed fair..And for This, the sternest and the uttermost combat is set before the Souls; all our labour is for this, lest we be left without part in this noblest vision, which to attain is to be blessed in the blissful sight, which to fail of is to fail utterly. For not he that has failed of the joys that is in colour or in visible forms, not he that has failed of power or of honours or of kingdom has failed, but only he that has failed of only This, for Whose winning he should renounce kingdoms and command over earth and ocean and sky, if only, spurning the world of sense from beneath his feet, and straining to This, he may see".

We may compare this with-

SOLILOQUIA, I.XIII.22. (Col.613). "But do I love on account of Wisdom herself, or do I wish that other things are also mine, or am I afraid that on account of this, life, tranquillity, friends will be wanting? But can one have the love for the beautiful in such a fashion, in which I do not only refuse the rest, but even seek those who call to me, those who long for me, who hold me, who enjoy themselves with me. Inasmuch as these are merely friendly to me, so much the more will my love become more degraded".

We may compare this also with Enneads, I.3.2.

Compare too- De Civitate Dei, X.16. "For that vision of God is the beauty of a vision so great, and so infinitely desirable, that Plotinus does not hesitate to say that he who enjoys all other blessings in abundance, and has not this, is supremely miserable"

Enneads, I.6.8. "Let us flee then to the beloved Fatherland": this is the soundest counsel. But what is this flight? How are we to gain the open sea?...The Fatherland to us is There whence we have come, and There is The Father. What then is our course, what the manner of our flight? This is not a journey for the feet; the feet bring us only from land to land; nor need you think of coach

or ship to carry you away".

Compare this with, Confessions, I.XVIII.28. "For it is not by our feet, or change of place, that men leave Thee, or return unto Thee. Or did that Thy younger son look out for horses or chariots, or ships, fly with visible wings, or journey by the motion of his limbs, that he might in a far country waste in riotous living all Thou gavest at his departure? A loving Father, when Thou gavest, and more loving unto him, when he returned empty. So then in lustful, that is, in darkened affections, is the true distance from Thy face".

see also Confessions, VIII.8.19. for a similar thought. A like reference is to be found in De Civ.Dei, IX.17.

Enneads, I.6.8. "When he perceives those shapes of grace that show in body, let him not pursue: he must know them for copies, vestiges, shadows, and hasten away towards That they tell of".

Compare with Confessions, I.20.31. "For it was my sin, that not in Him, but in His creatures- myself and others- I sought for pleasures, sublimities, truths, and so fell headlong into sorrows, confusions, errors".

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ENNEADS, I.6.9. "Withdraw into yourself and look. And if you do not find yourself beautiful yet, act as does the creator of a statue that is to be made beautiful: he cuts away here, he smooths there, he makes this line lighter, this other purer, until a lovely face has grown upon his work. So do you also: cut away all that is excessive, straighten all that is crooked, bring light to all that is overcast, labour to make all one glow of beauty and never cease chiseling your statue, until there shall shine out on you from it the godlike splendour of virtue, until you shall see the perfect goodness surely established in the stainless shrine.....This is the only eye that sees the mighty Beauty. If the eye that adventures the vision be dimmed by vice, impure, or weak, and unable in its cowardly blenching to see the uttermost brightness, then it sees nothing even though another point to what lies plain to sight before it. To any vision must be brought an eye adapted to what is to be seen, and having some likeness to it. Never did eye see the sun unless it had first become sunlike, and never can the soul have vision of the First Beauty unless itself be beautiful. Therefore, first let each become godlike and each beautiful who cares to see God and Beauty".

We are able to compare this with the following passages from the Confessions.

CONFESSIONS, VII.X.I6. "And being thence admonished to return to myself, I entered even into my inward self, Thou being my Guide:

and able I was, for Thou wert become my Helper. And I entered & beheld with the eye of my soul, (such as it was) above the same eye of my soul, above my mind, the Light Unchangeable. ...He that knows the Truth, knows what that Light is; and he that knows It, knows eternity. Love knoweth it. O Truth Who art Eternity! and Love Who art Truth! and Eternity Who art Love! Thou art my God, to Thee do I sigh night and day. Thee when I first knew, Thou liftedst me up, that I might see there was what I might see, and that I was not yet such as to see. And Thou didst beat back the weakness of my sight, streaming forth Thy beams of light upon me most strongly, and I trembled with love and awe: and I perceived myself to be far off from Thee, in the region of unlikeness."

CONFESSIONS, VI.IV.6. "And by believing might I have been cured, that so the eyesight of my soul being cleared, might in some way be directed to Thy Truth, which abideth always, and in no part faileth".

CONFESSIONS, VII.XX.26. "But having thus read those books of the Platonists, and thence being taught to search for incorporeal truth, I saw Thy invisible things understood by those things which are made; and though cast back, I perceived what that was, which through the darkness of my mind I was hindered from contemplating".

The different degrees which Augustine marks in his *De Quantitate Animae*, on the theme of Beauty, are the same as those which Plotinus describes in his *Enneads*, I.6.

Bouillett, (Vol.I., page LX.) calls attention here to Porphyry's "Principles of the Theory of Intelligibles", IX. "The Soul is itself bound to the body when it turns itself to its passions, which it feels, (ἐπιστροφὴ πρὸς τὰ πάθη) it detaches itself from the body when it turns itself away from its passions (ἀπαθεία).

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## THE FIRST ENNEAD.

## SIXTH TRACTATE.

## Beauty.

ENNEADS, I.VI. 4. compared with De Ord.2.I6.(42,59.)

Both St. Augustine and Plotinus say that there are three grades of Beauty. The first being the image of the second, and the second of the third.

ENNEADS, I.VI.4."But there are earlier & loftier beauties than these. In the sense-bound life we are no longer granted to know them; but the soul, taking no help from the organs, sees and proclaims them. To the vision of these we must mount, leaving sense to its own low place. As it is not for those to speak of the graceful forms of the material world who have never seen them or known their grace- men born blind, let us suppose- in the same way those must be silent upon the beauty of noble conduct and of learning and all that order who have never cared for such things, nor may those tell of the splendour of virtue who have never known the face of Justice and of Moral-Wisdom beautiful beyond the beauty of Evening and of Dawn. Such a vision is for those only who see with the Soul's sight- and at the vision, they will rejoice, and awe will fall upon them and a trouble deeper than all the rest could ever stir, for now they are moving in the realm of Truth. This is the spirit that Beauty must ever induce, wonderment and a delicious trouble, longing and love and a trembling that is all delight. For the unseen all this may be felt as for the seen; and this the Souls feel for it, every soul in some degree, but those the more deeply that are the more truly apt to this higher love- just as all take delight in the beauty of the body but all are not stung as sharply, and those only that feel the keener wound are known as Lovers."

Mackenna, Vol.I. page, 82.

ENNEADS, I.6.6. may also be compared with Confessions, 3.6.10.  
for the translation of the Enneads, see  
page 20.

Confessions, 3.6.10."Beauty of all things beautiful". also

Confessions, I.7.12."For Thou art God, Almighty and Good,...whose Unity is the mould of all things; who out of Thy own fairness makest all things fair; and orderest all things by Thy law".

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THE FIRST ENNEAD.

EIGHTH TRACTATE

On Evil.

ENNEADS, I.8.2. "The Good is that on which all else depends, towards which all Existences aspire as to their source and their need, while Itself is without need, sufficient to Itself, aspiring to no other, the measure and Term of all, giving out from itself the Intellectual-Principle and Existence and Soul and Life and all Intellective-Act".

In the same way as we have seen (Thesis, page I38.) Augustine in his treatise on Happiness speaks of the Standard, which is the measure and term of all. Here we see how he reasons.

De beata Vita, 34. (col.518) "But what must we think of Wisdom, unless it is the Wisdom of God? But let us receive from divine authority the statement that the Son of God is none else than the Wisdom of God: and the Son of God is really God....But what do you think to be Wisdom, unless it be the Truth? For even it is said of this: I am the Truth. But in order that it may be the Truth, it becomes such by means of a certain high standard from which it proceeds; and into which being perfect itself it betakes itself."

ENNEADS, I.8.3. "Evil cannot have place among Beings or in the Beyond-Being; these are good. There remains, only, if Evil exist at all, that it be situate in the realm of Non-Being, that it be some mode, as it were, of the Non-Being, that it have its seat in something in touch with Non-Being or to a certain degree communicate in Non-Being."

see also Enneads, III.2.5.

We have already noticed (Chapter, VII. Thesis) that Augustine took the conception of evil as being negative from Neo-Platonism. Here we have some comparisons with Enneads, I.8.3.

Confessions, 3.VII.12. "Because as yet I knew not that evil was nothing but a privation of good, (privationem boni) until at last a thing ceases altogether to be." cp.also ibid, IV.XV.24.

Confessions, IV.XV.26. "I returned not to Thee, but I passed on and on to things which have no being, neither in Thee, nor in me, nor in the body. Neither were they created for me by Thy truth, but by my vanity devised out of things corporeal".

See also Confessions, VII.V.7. "Where is evil then, and whence, and how crept it in hither? What is its root, and what its seed? Or hath it no being? Why then fear we and avoid what is not?"

ENNEADS, I.8.4. "The Soul wrought to perfection, addressed towards the Intellectual-Principle is steadfastly pure; it has turned away from Matter; all that is undetermined, that is outside of measure, that is evil, it neither sees nor draws near; it endures in its purity, only, and wholly, determined by the Intellectual-Principle....The Soul that breaks away from this source of its reality to the non-perfect and non-primal is, as it were, a secondary, an image, to the loyal Soul. By its falling-away- and to the extent of the fall- it is stripped of Determination, becomes wholly indeterminate, sees darkness. Looking to what repels vision as we look when we are said to see darkness, it has taken Matter into itself".

Compare the above with- De Ordine, 2.III.8. St Augustine here defines the phrase 'being with God', to mean knowing God. And he adds that with God is to be found those treasures of Wisdom which the Wise man possesses. But in that case the element of foolishness will become associated with God. For if the Wise man finds whatever things that are in God, it will be tantamount to saying that sin and disease are likewise associated with God. Augustine, however, reasons that the books of the Wise declare that such things arise dimly from an absence of thought, as darkness arises from a failure of light. To say then that one cannot know foolishness is no more absurd than to declare that we cannot see the darkness. (De Ordine, 2.3.10. Col. 559.) Now the Wise man sees everything in God, as he sees God, directly and without effort. It is this fact which leads one, therefore, to say that the Wise man is in no sense submissive to the ~~claws~~ of Matter".

We may add what Plotinus has to say also in Enneads, I.8.5. concerning Evil.

Enneads, I.8.5. "Evil is not in any and every lack; it is in absolute lack. What falls in some degree short of the Good is not Evil; considered in its own kind it might even be perfect, but where there is utter dearth, there we have Essential Evil, void of all share in Good; this is the case with Matter."

ENNEADS, I.8.9. "We utterly eliminate every kind of Form; and the object in which there is none whatever we call Matter: if we are to see Matter we must so completely abolish Form that we take shapelessness into our very selves".

Compare this with-

Confessions, XII.VI.6. "So I conceived of that Matter as having innumerable forms and diverse, and therefore did not conceive it at all.....and I bent myself to the bodies themselves, and looked more deeply into their changeableness, by which they cease to be what they have been, and begin to be what they were not; and this same shifting from form to form, I suspected to be through a certain formless state, not through a mere nothing; ...for the changeableness of changeable things, is itself capable of all those forms, into which these changeable things are changed. And this

changeableness, what is it? Is it Soul? Is it body? Is it that which constituteth soul or body? Might one say, 'a nothing something', an 'is, is not', I would say, this were it: and yet in some way was it even then, as being capable of receiving these visible and compound figures".

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ENNEADS, I.8.12. "What Soul could contain Evil unless by contact with the lower Kind? There could be no desire, no sorrow, no rage, no fear: fear touches the compounded dreading its dissolution; pain and sorrow are the accompaniments of the dissolution; desires spring from something troubling the grouped being or are a provision against trouble threatened; all impressions is the stroke of something unreasonable outside the Soul, accepted only because the Soul is not devoid of parts or phases;"

Augustine follows Plotinus in associating Pleasure and Pain with the Soul, by reason of its union with the body. see- De Civitate Dei, XIV.15. "And the pains which are called bodily are pains of the Soul in and from the body. For what pain or desire can the flesh feel by itself and without the Soul? But when the flesh is said to desire or to suffer, it is meant..that the man does so, or some part of the soul which is affected by the sensation of the flesh, whether a harsh sensation causing pain, or gentle, causing pleasure. But pain in the flesh is only a discomfort of the soul arising from the flesh, and a kind of shrinking from its suffering, as the pain of the soul which is called sadness is a shrinking from those things which have happened to us in spite of ourselves".

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Enneads, I.8.10. and Porphyry's, "Principles of the Theory of Intelligibles", Ennead, 3.Book,6. (6,7.)  
 may be compared with De Immort.Animae, V.7.(Col.654)

Enneads, I.8.10."Now as, going upward from virtue, we come to the Beautiful and to the Good, so, going downward from Vice we reach the Essential Evil: from Vice as the starting point we come to the vision of Evil, as far as such vision is possible, and we become evil to the extent of our participation in it. We are become dwellers in the Place of Unlikeness, where, fallen from all our resemblance to the Divine, we lie in gloom and mud: for if the Soul abandons itself unreservedly to the extreme of viciousness, it is no longer a vicious Soul merely, for mere vice is still human, still carries some trace of good: it has taken to itself another nature, the Evil, and as far as the Soul can die it is dead. And the death of Soul is twofold: while still sunk in body to lie down in Matter and drench itself with it: when it has left the body, to lie in the other world until, somehow, it stirs again and lifts its sight from the mud: and this is our "going down to Hades and slumbering there".

Mackenna, Vol.I.page, 105.

Porphyry's "Theory of Intelligibles"- Ennead,3.Book.6.(6,7.)  
 "The Soul is an essence without extension, immaterial, incorruptible; its being consists in a life which is its very own. When the being of an essence is its very own life, and its passions spring from its course of life, its death consists in a life of a certain character, and not in the entire deprivation of life. For the passion which this essence experiences by its death does not lead to a complete loss of life".

Translated from Bouillet, Vol.I.LIX.

De Immortalitate Animae, V.7."But now let us see to what an extent it may be understood that the Soul suffers change...What on the contrary is wont to be regarded as of greater value than change? Who denies that the Soul exists, at one time foolish, at another time wise?...Let us see firstly in how many ways what is called change of Soul may be understood; indeed, several kinds of change may be discovered, but, as I think, there are two which are more manifest, or, at least more distinct. For the Soul is said to be changeable either according to the passions of the body, or on account of her own; according to the body, as by age grief, toil, annoyance, or through pleasure; in accordance with her own passions, as by desire, joy, fear, sadness, study, instruction. All these changes, it is needless to argue, will not bring about the death of the Soul, there is no fear of the Soul being torn asunder on her account..No changes which take place either through the body or through the Soul itself can ever make a soul not a soul; although whether some may spring through itself by means of which it is itself the cause, is a great question."

## THE SECOND ENNEAD.

## THIRD TRACTATE

## Are the Stars Causes?

ENNEADS, II.3.7."All things must be enchained; and the sympathy and correspondence obtaining in any one closely knit organism must exist, first, and most intensely, in the All. There must be one principle constituting this unit of many forms of life and enclosing the several members within the unity, while at the same time, precisely as in each thing of detail the parts too have each a definite function, so in the All (the higher All) each several member must have its own task- but more markedly so since in this case the parts are not merely members but themselves Alls, members of the loftier Kind....And there is nothing undesigned, nothing of chance, in all the process: all is one scheme of differentiation, starting from the Firsts and working itself out in a continuous progression of Kinds."

As we saw (in Chapter VII. of our Thesis), Augustine in his doctrine of Providence was greatly influenced by Plotinus. We may compare here what he has to say in his 'De Ordine'.

DE ORDINE, I. (Chaps. I-VI.) Here Augustine tells us, -All things act according to Order in our world of Sense. In all material being we are able to behold a wonderful harmony. Each is linked with each, cause and effect, effect and cause are everywhere evident, even the apparently insignificant thing has a real purpose. God guides all things and is present in all happenings. Order is all-pervasive.

See also Enneads, III.1.4; III.2.1; III.3.6, 7.

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ENNEADS, II.3.13."The gist of the whole matter lies in the consideration that Soul governs this All by the plan contained ~~by~~ in the Reason-Principle and plays in the All exactly the part of the particular principle which in every living-thing forms the members of the organism and adjusts them to the unity of which they are portions; the entire force of the Soul is represented in the All, but, in the parts, Soul is present only in proportion to the degree of essential reality held by each of such partial objects. ....The ensouled fall into two classes. The one kind has a motion of its own, but haphazard like that of horses between the shafts but before their driver sets the course; they are set right by the whip. In the Living-Being possessed of Reason, the nature-principle includes the driver; where the driver is intelligent, it takes in the main a straight path to a set end."

A comparison may be seen in the idea of Augustine concerning the function of the Holy Spirit. In De Ordine, 2.26., the Holy Spirit is spoken of as being by the side of Sovereign Intelligence. See also page, 139, Thesis, where in a reference to De beata Vita 35. it is found that in that passage Augustine represents the Holy Spirit as Guide and Director.

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ENNEADS, II.3.18. "Without evil the All would be incomplete. For most or even all forms of Evil serve the Universe- much as the poisonous snake has its use- though in most cases their function is unknown. Vice itself has many useful sides: it brings about much that is beautiful, in artistic creations, for example, and it stirs us to thoughtful living, not allowing us to drowse in security".

Augustine proclaims a like Optimism, and following Plotinus he makes use of like illustration as he seeks to show that the partial disorders of the world, under the hand of God contribute to its general harmony.

DE ORDINE, 2.IV.12.(Col.560). "What is more offensive than an executioner? What can be more cruel or more awful to the mind? Yet even he holds a needful place under the very law of the land and in a well governed state his name is associated with Order. Now he is harmful in his design but only in the punishment of criminals who are themselves harmful to the Order. What more sordid, ~~not~~ more void of dignity, more full of shamelessness can be conceived than prostitutes, procurers, and other pests of that class? But remove prostitutes from human society and you will throw everything into confusion by reason of lust."

DE ORDINE, 2.IV.13.(Col.561) "Poets love to introduce what they speak of as barbarisms or solecisms, or if we may use the terms rhetorical figures and Metaplasms, just as they with like reason seek to avoid evident faults. Yet take these away from their songs and we should spoil the sweetest music. So too an absolutely perfect discourse would bore us by reason of its very perfection, but let it be varied by touches of carelessness and we are all the more pleased. We all disapprove of sophistry, but a serious discourse is enhanced by its use. So evil is needful for the harmony of the Cosmos. Turn where you please and you will find that everything proclaims the fact that all things are ordered for the best in the world about us".

So also in De Libero Arbitrio, 3.IX.25. (Col.1008,9.) we find the same thought.

## THE SECOND ENNEAD.

## FOURTH TRACTATE

## Matter in its Two Kinds.

ENNEADS, 2.4.1. "What is known as Matter is understood to be a certain base, a recipient of Form-Ideas."

τὴν λεγομένην ὕλην ὑποκείμενον τι καὶ ὅθεν δοχὴν  
εἶδων ... εἶναι .

ENNEADS, 2.4.2. "Now (it will be reasoned) if Matter must characteristically be undetermined, void of shape, while in that sphere of the Highest there can be nothing that lacks determination, nothing shapeless, there can be no Matter there. Further, if all that order is simplex, there can be no need of Matter, whose function is to join with some other element to form a compound: it will be found of necessity in things of derived existence and shifting nature- the signs which lead us to the notion of Matter- but it is unnecessary to the primal".

γιννομένης κέν ὕλης διττὴ καὶ ἐξ εἰζέρων  
εἰς τὴν ποιομένης

See Confessions, XII.VI.6. (Reference to be found under Enn.I.8.9. for comparison with above.

also note Enneads, 2.4.6. for a like thought.

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According to Plotinus matter can only be conceived by a species of abstraction which he calls, 'spurious reasoning'.

ENNEADS, 2.4.10. "But how can I form the conception of the sizelessness of Matter? How do you form the concept of any absence of quality? What is the Act of the Intellect, what is the mental approach, in such a case? The secret is Indetermination. Likeness knows its like: the indeterminate knows the indeterminate. Around this indefinite a definite conception will be realised, but the way lies through indefiniteness. All knowledge comes by Reason and the Intellectual Act; in this case Reason conveys information in any account it gives, but the act which aims at being intellectual is, here, not intellection but rather its failure: therefore (in this crippled approach) the representation of Matter must be spurious, unreal, something sprung of the Alien, of the unreal, and bound up with the alien reason. This is Plato's meaning when he says that Matter is apprehended by a sort of spurious reasoning."

CONFESSIONS, XII.V.5. "So that when thought seeketh what the sense may conceive under this and saith to itself, -'It is no intellectual form; as life, or justice; because it is the matter of bodies nor object of sense, because being invisible, and without form,



there was in it no object of sight or sense;'- while man's thought thus saith to itself, it may endeavour either to know it, by being ignorant of it; or to be ignorant by knowing it".

.....

ENNEADS, 2.4.16."Then Matter is simply Alienism (the Principle of Difference)? No: it is merely that part of Alienism which stands in contradiction with the Authentic Existents which are Reason-Principles. So understood, this non-existent has a certain measure of existence; for it is identical with Privation, which also is a thing standing in opposition to the things that exist in Reason."

Sp Augustine- Confessions, 3.7.12."Because as yet I knew not that evil was nothing but a privation of good, at least until a thing ceases altogether to be".

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## SECOND ENNEAD.

### NINTH TRACTATE

Against Those that affirm the Creator of the Kosmos and the Kosmos itself to be Evil: (Generally quoted as 'Against the Gnostics').

ENNEADS, 2.9.1."We have seen elsewhere that the Good, the Principle, is simplex, and, correspondingly, primal- for the secondary can never be simplex- that it contains nothing: that it is an integral Unity. Now the same Nature belongs to the Principle we know as The One. Just as the goodness of The Good is essential and not the outgrowth of some prior substance so the Unity of The One is its essential. Therefore:- When we speak of The One and when we speak of The Good we must recognise an Identical Nature; we must affirm that they are the same- not, it is true, as venturing any predication with regard to that (unknowable) Hypostasis but simply as indicating it to ourselves in the best terms we find. Even in calling it The First we mean no more than to express that it is the most absolutely simplex: it is the Self-Sufficing only in the sense that it is not of that compound nature which would make it dependent upon any constituent; it is "the Self-Contained" because everything contained in something alien must also exist by that alien. Deriving then, from nothing alien, entering into nothing alien, in no way a made-up thing, there can be nothing above it." also Enneads, 2.9.3.

CONFESSIONS, VII.V.7."Where is evil then, and whence, and how crept it in hither? What is its root, and what its seed? Or hath it no being? Why then fear we and avoid what is not? Or, if we

fear it idly, then is that very fear evil, whereby the soul is thus idly goaded and racked. Yea, and so much a greater evil, as we have nothing to fear, and yet do fear. Therefore either is that evil which we fear, or else evil is, that we fear. Whence is it then? seeing God, the Good, hath created all these things good. He indeed, the greater and chiefest Good, hath created these lesser goods; still both Creator and created, all are good. Whence is evil? Or was there some evil matter of which He made, and formed, and ordered it, yet left something in it, which He did not convert into good? Why so then? Had He no might to turn and change the whole, so that no evil should remain in it, seeing He is All-mighty? Lastly, why would He make any thing at all of it, and not rather by the same All-mightiness cause it not to be at all? Or, could it then be, against His will? Or if it were from eternity, why suffered He it so to be for infinite spaces of times past, and was pleased so long after to make something out of it? Or if He were suddenly pleased now to effect somewhat, this rather should the Almighty have effected, so that this evil matter should not be, and He alone be, the whole, true, sovereign, and infinite Good. Or if it was not good that He who was good, should not also frame and create something that were good, then, that evil matter being taken away and brought to nothing, He might form good matter, whereof to create all things. For He should not be Almighty, if He might not create something good without the aid of that matter which Himself had not created. ".

Grandgeorge draws a comparison (pages, I43,4. op.cit) between Enneads, II.9.8. and De Civitate Dei, XII.4.  
 Enneads, II.9.13. and De Civitate Dei, XI.22.- see page, 140.G  
 Enneads, II.9.16. and De Civitate Dei, VIII.6.-see page 123.G.

We may draw a comparison between Enneads, II.9.13. and De Lib.Arb. 3.24.(cols.1007,8).

ENNEADS II.9.13."Those, then, that censure the constitution of the Kosmos do not understand what they are doing or where this audacity leads them. They do not understand that there is a successive order of Primals, Secondaries, Tertiaries and so on continuously to the Ultimates; that nothing is to be blamed for being inferior to the First; that we can but accept, meekly, the constitution of the total, and make our best way towards the Primals, withdrawing from the tragic spectacle, as they see it, of the Kosmic spheres- which in reality are all suave graciousness."

De Libero Arbitrio, 3.9.24."The order of creation from the highest to the lowest runs thus in just ranks, so that he is envious who says this is not, indeed he is envious who will say that might be of such a nature. For if he wishes such to be like its superior, it is already that, and is so much so that he ought not to cast it from him because it should be perfect. Again he who says, 'Even that might be like such a thing' either wishes to add to a super-

-ior perfection and will be immoderate and unjust, or he wishes to destroy that and will be vexed and evil".

It may be that Augustine here has also in his mind the closing lines of ENNEADS, II.9.I3. "Once more, we have no right to ask that all men shall be good, or to rush into censure because such universal virtue is not possible: this would be repeating the error of confusing our sphere with the Supreme and treating evil as a nearly negligible failure in wisdom- as good lessened and dwindling continuously, a continuous fading out: it would be like calling the Nature-Principle evil because it is not Sense-Perception and the thing of sense evil for not being a Reason-Principle. If evil is no more than that, we will be obliged to admit evil in the Supreme also, for there, too Soul is less exalted than the Intellectual-Principle, and That too has its Superior".

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THE THIRD ENNEAD.

FIRST TRACTATE

FATE.

We may compare Enneads, 3.I.4. with De Ordine, I.(I-VI).  
see page 29, of this Appendix for  
the translation.

Enneads, III.I.4." The Universe is permeated by one Soul, Cause of all things and events; every separate phenomenon as a member of a whole moves in its place with the general movement; all the various causes spring into action from one source: therefore, it is argued, the entire descending claim of causes and all their interaction must inevitably follow and so constitute a universal determination".

Mackenna, Vol.2. pages, 4,5.

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Enneads, 3.I.9. compared with De Lib.Arb. I.8.I8. (see page,2.  
of this Appendix.

Enneads, 3.I.9."When our Soul holds to its Reason-Principle, to the guide, pure and detached and native to itself, only then can we speak of personal operation, of voluntary act. Things so done may be truly described as our doing, for they have no other source; they are the issue of the unmingled Soul, a Principle that is a First, a leader, a sovereign not subject to the errors of ignorance, not to be overthrown by the tyranny of the desires which, they can break in, drive and drag, so as to allow of no act of ours, but mere answer to stimulus".

Mackenna, Vol.2.page, 10.

We may also compare this with Augustine's Enchiridion, XXX.  
see page, 232, of our Thesis.

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## THE THIRD ENNEAD.

## SECOND TRACTATE

## Providence: First Treatise

Enneads, III.2.I. may be compared to De Libero Arbitrio, 2.44,5

Enneads, III.2.I. "The authentic and primal Kosmos is the Being of the Intellectual Principle and of the Veritable Existent. This contains within itself no spatial distinction, and has none of the feebleness of division, and even its parts bring no incompleteness to it since here the individual is not severed from the entire. In this Nature inheres all life and all intellect, a life living and having intellection as one act within a unity: every part that it gives forth is a whole; all its content is its very own, for there is no separation of thing from thing, no part standing in isolated existence estranged from the rest, and therefore nowhere is there any wronging of any other, any opposition. Everywhere one and complete, it is at rest throughout and shows difference at no point; it does not make over any of its content into any new form; there can be no reason for changing what is everywhere perfect."

Mackenna, Vol.2. page, 12.

De Libero Arbitrio, 2.(44,45) " If then you will turn your eyes on anything changeable, whether it be towards bodily sense, or contemplation, you are not able to form a true conception of things unless you take into account some sort of harmony, which if that were withdrawn all would fall into chaos. Apart from all change which is associated with temporal things, and their separate variety, there remains a certain inherent form which is eternal and unchangeable....by means of this all the elements are moulded and according to its own kind, each exist as harmonies of space and time. For everything that is changeable some pattern is indispensable. ..But nothing is able to give form to itself, because it is not possible for it to supply what it does not itself possess, and assuredly in order that each thing may have a form it must be formed....Thus it follows that both body and soul are fashioned by a certain unchangeable and ever abiding Form. And of this Form it has been said, 'Thou wilt change these things and they shall be changed; but Thou art Thyself the same and Thy years fail not'.....Concerning this Form it has been said that, remaining in itself, it makes all things new. Hence it is understood that all things are governed by Providence. For if all existing things, when the form is taken away, become nothing the Form through which all things subsist, is itself unchangeable, in order that they may be imbued and live according to the harmony of their Forms, Providence is associated with these, for if He were not, these things could not be."

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Enneads, III.2.2. compared with Confessions, VII.XI.I7.  
 De Civ.Dei, XII.5.  
 De Ordine, 2.2.3.

Enneads, III.2.2."So from this, the One Intellectual Principle; and the Reason-Form emanating from it, our Universe rises and develops part, and inevitably are formed groups concordant and helpful in contrast with groups discordant and combative; sometimes of choice and sometimes incidentally, the parts maltreat each other; engendering proceeds by destruction. Yet: amid all that they effect and accept, the divine Realm imposes the one harmonious act; each utters its own voice, but all is brought into accord, into an ordered system, for the universal purpose, by the ruling Reason-Principle".

Mackenna, Vol.2. Page, 14.

Confessions, VII.XI.I7."And I beheld the other things below Thee, and I perceived, that they neither altogether are, nor altogether are not, for they are, since they are from Thee, but are not because they are not what Thou art. For that truly is, which remains unchangeably".

De Civ.Dei, XII.5."All natures, then, inasmuch as they are, and have therefore a rank and species of their own, and a kind of internal harmony, are certainly good. And when they are in the places assigned to them by the order of their nature, they preserve such being as they have received. And those things which have not received everlasting being, are altered for better or for worse, so as to suit the wants and motions of those things to which the Creator's law has made them subservient; and thus they tend in the divine providence to that end which is embraced in the general scheme of the government of the universe".

De Ordine, 2. (2,3.) It is agreed that God is not subject to any Order. He knows neither imperfection nor change; He is the Supreme and Unchangeable Being. He cannot then be subordinated to any end. He is self-sufficient, and dwells immovable, whilst everything gravitates around Him.

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Enneads, III.2.3. compared with Confessions, VII.XIII.I9.  
 De Lib.Arb. 2.XVII.46.

Enneads, III.2.3. (For translation, see pages, 225,6.Thesis.)

Confessions, VII.XIII.I9."And there is nothing whatsoever evil; yea not only to Thee, but also to Thy creation as a whole, because there is nothing without, which may break in, and corrupt that order which Thou hast appointed it. But in the parts thereof some things, because unharmonizing with other some, are accounted evil; whereas those very things harmonize with others and are good. And all these things which harmonize not together do yet with the inferior part, which we call Earth, having its own cloudy and

Enneads, III.2.3. with  
Confessions, VII.XIII.19.

windy sky harmonizing with it. Far be it then that I should say, "These things should not be;" for should I see nought but these, I should indeed long for the better; but still must even for these alone praise Thee; for that Thou art to be praised, do shew from the earth, dragons, and all deeps, fire, hail, snow, ice, and stormy wind, which fulfil Thy word....But when, from heaven, these praise Thee... I did now long for things better, because I conceived of all; and with a sounder judgment I apprehended that the things above were better than these below, but all together better than those above by themselves".

De Lib.Arb.2.XVII.46."But when you find some other kind of creatures, in addition to that which neither lives and that which lives, but has no intelligence, and that which both lives and thinks. Do you dare to say that there is something good which is not from God? ...All good things, whether they be great or small, can come from none other than God. For what is greater in the creature than intelligent life or what can be less than mere corporeality? Whatever things are in any way lacking or strive with Him, so that they are not, nevertheless some form remains to them, so that in a certain measure they are. But whatever deficient in any form remains, it is ignorant of that which it is deficient from that Form, and He does not permit its movements ... to depart from the laws of His own harmony. Whatever therefore is praiseworthy is directed by the nature of things, whether it be judged worthy of scant or abundant praise, and such must be attributed to the most excellent and ineffable praise of the Creator".

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Enneads, III.2.5. compared with De Lib.Arb.III.IX.26.  
Confessions, 3.7.12.

Enneads, III.2.5. "Now, once Happiness is possible at all to Souls in this Universe, if some fail of it, the blame must fall not upon the place but upon the feebleness insufficient to the staunch combat in the one arena where the rewards of excellence are offered. Men are not born divine; what wonder that they do not enjoy a divine life. And poverty and sickness mean nothing to the good- only to the evil are they disastrous- and where there is body there must be ill-health. Besides, these accidents are not without their service in the coordination and completion of the Universal system. One thing perishes, and the Kosmic Reason-whose control nothing anywhere eludes- employs that ending to the beginning of something new; and, so, when the body suffers and the Soul, under the affliction, loses power, all that has been bound under illness and evil is brought into a new set of relations, into another class or order. Some of these troubles are helpful to the very sufferers- poverty and sickness, for example- and as for vice, even this brings something to the general service: it acts as a lesson in right doing, and, in many ways even, produces good; thus, by setting men face to face with the ways and consequences of

Enneads, III.2.5.

iniquity, it calls them from lethargy, stirs the deeper mind and sets the understanding to work; by the contrast of the evil under which wrong-doers labour it displays the worth of the right. Not that evil exists for that purpose; but, as we have already indicated, once the wrong has come to be, the Reason of the Kosmos employs it to good ends; and precisely the proof of the mightiest power is to be able to use the ignoble nobly and, given formlessness, to make it the material of unknown forms.

The principle is that evil by definition is a falling short in good, and good cannot be at full strength in this Sphere where it is lodged in the alien: the good here is in something else, in something distinct from the Good, and this something else constitutes the falling short for it is not good. And this is why evil is ineradicable: there is, first, the fact that in relation to this principle of Good, thing will always stand less than thing, and, besides, all things come into being through it, and are what they are by standing away from it"

Mackenna, Vol.2.pages, 17,8.

De Lib.Arb.III.IX.26."If indeed our very misery is of value for

the completer perfection of the universe, something must be lacking in its perfection, if we are to be always happy. So too in that case, if the Soul has not arrived at wretchedness except by sinning, even our sins are needful for the perfection of the universe which God hath established. In what way then can God justly inflict punishment for sin, since if these sins were absent his creature would not be complete and perfect? Here is the answer. Sins themselves, or misery itself - these are not needful for the perfection of the universe, but Souls and a fulness of soul life. If men will these things, they sin, and if they have sinned, they are miserable. And if, despite the removal of these sins from them, wretchedness persists, or indeed has preceded their sins, then the order and administration of the universe may rightly be said to have been marred. But when happiness is present to those who sin not, the universe is perfect. But because of the presence of soul, misery follows those who sin and blessedness those who do rightly. For there are certain natures who pay the penalty of their sins, that they may be compelled to correspond to the glory of the universe, and that the dishonour which follows sin may be corrected by the punishment of the sinner".

Confessions, III.VII.12."Because as yet I knew not that evil was nothing but a privation of good until at last a thing ceases altogether to be".

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## Enneads III.

## THIRD TRACTATE.

## On Providence, Second Treatise.

Enneads, III.3.5. compared with De Ordine, I.VII.18. (Col. 540.)

Enneads, III.3.5. "All such right-doing, then, is linked to Providence; but it is not therefore performed by it: men or other agents, living or lifeless, are causes of certain things happening, and any good that may result is taken up again by Providence. In the total, then, the right rules and what has happened amiss is transformed and corrected. Thus to take an example from a single body, the Providence of a living organism implies its health; let it be gashed or otherwise wounded, and that Reason-Principle which governs it sets to work to draw it together, knit it anew, heal it, and put the affected part to rights. In sum, evil belongs to the sequence of things, but it comes (not from Providence but) from necessity. It originates in ourselves; it has its causes no doubt, but we are not, therefore, forced to it by Providence: some of these causes we adapt to the operation of Providence and of its subordinates, but with others we fail to make the connection... The act of the libertine is not done by Providence or in accordance with Providence; neither is the action of the good done by Providence— it is done by a man— but it is done in accordance with Providence, for it is an act consonant with the Reason-Principle".

Mackenna, Vol. 2. pages, 42, 3.

De Ordine, I.VII.18. "God does not choose evil, we must not for one moment suppose that God chooses evil, despite the fact that evil is present in the Order. And on the other hand he often chooses an Order just because through Himself Evil has been preferred. But, you ask, how can evil itself be in the Order when God has not chosen it? For, without a doubt, there are evils in that very order that have not been chosen by God. Do you imagine then that it is a poor order that God should choose good things and that He should not choose bad? For, contrary to the Order there are evils which God does not choose, and yet despite that fact he chose the Order. Just consider; the very fact that He elects to choose good and not evil is for the reason that the Order may be a great Order and a Divine arrangement. And that very order and arrangement has been made because God would preserve the harmony of His universe by reason of its very variety. For that reason evil has been made unavoidable. Just as in oratory, it is by way of antithesis that it becomes the more pleasing so it is by contraries that the beauty of all things, in like manner has been established."

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THE THIRD ENNEAD.

FOURTH TRACTATE

Our Tutelary Spirit.

Enneads, III.4.2. compared with De Lib.Arb. I.8.18.  
see page, 2.Appendix.3.

Enneads, III.4.2."Now, in humanity the lower is not supreme; it is an accompaniment; but neither does the better rule unfailingly; the lower element also has a footing, and Man, therefore, lives in part under sensation, for he has the organs of sensation, and in large part even by the merely vegetative principle, for the body grows and propagates; all the graded phases are in a collaboration, but the entire form, man takes rank by the dominant, & when the life-principle leaves the body it is what it is, what it most intensely lived. This is why we must break away towards the High: we dare not keep ourselves set towards the sensuous principle, following the images of sense, or towards the merely vegetative, intent upon the gratifications of eating and procreation; our life must be pointed towards the Intellective, towards the Intellectual-Principle, towards God".

Mackenna, Vol.2. page, 47.

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THE THIRD ENNEAD.

SIXTH TRACTATE

THE IMPASSIVITY OF THE UNEMBODIED.

Enneads, III.6.1. compared with De Quantitate Animae, XVII.30.

Enneads, III.6.1."If the Soul were material and had magnitude, it would be difficult, indeed quite impossible, to make it appear to be immune, unchangeable, when any of such emotions lodge in it. And even considering it as an Authentic Being, devoid of magnitude and necessarily indestructible, we must be very careful how we attribute any such experiences to it or we will find ourselves unconsciously making it subject to dissolution".

Mackenna, Vol.2. page, 68.

De Quantitate, Animae, XVII.30."What if that troubles you which the Greeks are wont to speak of as μακροθυμία but which we call longanimas (length of Soul) one may observe that many words are transferred from the body to the Soul, just as in like manner they are transferred from the soul to the body; for when Vergil spoke of a "worthless mountain", and of a "very just land", these words

you recognise have been transferred from the soul to the body, why be surprised if we, in like manner speak of longanimas, where length, save for bodily forms cannot be? That which is spoken of as greatness of soul, among the virtues, does not rightly refer to space at all but to a certain strength, that is to the power and potency of soul". *See also page 46. App.(3).*

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We may also compare Enneads, III.6.I. with De Immortalitate Animae, V.7. (see translation, page, 28, of this Appendix.)

Enneads, III.6.I. "Even in the superior phase of the Soul- that which preceded the impressionable faculty and any sensation- how can we reconcile immunity with the indwelling of vice, false notions, ignorance? Inviolability; and yet likings and dislikings the Soul enjoying, grieving, angry, grudging, envying, desiring, never at peace but stirring and shifting with everything that confronts it!"

Mackenna, Vol.2.page, 68.

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Enneads, III.6.4. may be compared to De Musica, VI.V.9.

Enneads, III.6.4. "We have, however, still to examine what is called the affective phase of the Soul. ..In general terms it means the centre about which we recognise the affections to be grouped; and by affections we mean those states upon which follow pleasure and pain...It should, however, be quite clear that the Soul or Mind is the seat of all imaginative representation- both the higher representation known as opinion or judgment and the lower representation which is not so much a judgment as a vague notion unattended by discrimination...It is equally certain that in all that follows upon the mental act or state, the disturbance, confined to the body, belongs to the sense-order; trembling, pallor inability to speak, have obviously nothing to do with the spiritual portion of the being. The Soul, in fact, would have to be described as corporeal if it were the seat of such symptoms; besides, in that case the trouble would not even reach the body since the only transmitting principle, oppressed by sensation, jarred out of itself, would be inhibited."....The affective phase of the Soul or Mind will be the operative cause of all affection; it originates the movement either under the stimulus of some sense-presentment or independently- and it is a question to be examined whether the judgment leading to the movement operates from above or not- but the affective phase itself remains unmoved like Melody dictating music".

Mackenna, Vol.2.pages 72,3.

De Musica, VI.V.9. "I do not believe that this body is animated by the Soul, except for the purpose of the Soul being of service to it. Nor do I think that the soul suffers anything from this, but that divinely, she is able to act by its help when in subjec-

-tion to its overlordship; I am convinced that just as, more or less she yields to its ministrations, so she labours now with ease, or again with difficulty...And therefore, when it eagerly strives in its attentiveness...there arise, what is spoken of as, grief and toil".

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Enneads, III.6.4. may be compared with De Musica, VI.V.(I3,I4.)

Enneads, III.6.5."Separation ...is the condition of the soul no longer entering into the body to lie at its mercy; it is to stand as a light, set in the midst of trouble but unperturbed through all. In the particular case of the affective phase of the Soul, purification is its awakening from the baseless visions which beset it, the refusal to see them; its separation consists in limiting its descent towards the lower and accepting no picture thence, and of course in the banning for its part too of all which the higher Soul ignores when it has arisen from the trouble storm and is no longer bound to the flesh by the chains of sensuality and of multiplicity but has subdued to itself the body and its entire surrounding so that it holds sovereignty, tranquilly, over all".

Mackenna, Vol.2. page, 74.

De Musica, VI.V.(I3,I4.) "When the Soul has turned aside from its Lord to become the slave of itself, it inevitably loses in its power; but when, on the other hand it leaves the service of itself and busies itself with that of its Lord, it gains immeasurably...For it is the function of the Soul both to be ruled by its Superior and to rule its inferior. God is the only Superior of the Soul and its body the only inferior, that is if you direct your attention to the thought of the Soul in its entirety. As therefore it cannot be its whole self without God, so it cannot excel without devoting its service to Him....Wherefore as it is fixed on God it chooses eternal things and becomes greater, and greater is also its service in its own way through that. But when God is neglected, the Soul being intent on service of a carnal nature, which leads to Concupiscence, it feels its own passions which it displays and becomes less...I4. But when the Soul has turned itself to its Lord a greater care springs into being ~~and is~~ ~~not~~ lest it may be turned away from Him. Then, unrestrained by daily habit and tumultuous recollections since in its conversion it has joined itself to its Lord, the power of carnal affairs dies down; thus its passions by which it was being carried away into outside things, being calmed it reaps the fruit of leisure within".

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Enneads, III.6.9. may be compared with De Immort. Animae, V.8.

Enneads, III.6.9. "It must, first, be noted that there are a variety of modes in which an object may be said to be present to another or to exist in another. There is a 'presence' which acts by changing the object- for good or for ill- as we see in the case of bodies, especially where there is life. But there is also a 'presence' which acts, towards good or ill, with no modification of the object, as we have indicated in the case of the Soul. Then there is the case represented by the stamping of a design upon wax, where the 'presence' of the added pattern causes no modification in the substance nor does its obliteration diminish it".

Mackenna, Vol.2.79,80.

De Immortalitate Animae, V.8. "None of these changes, it is hardly needful to say, bring about death to the Soul; there is no fear of its being torn asunder through these very things. For in accordance with our idea of change, as the name implies, a thing is said to be subject to change when it is changed in its entirety. For if a piece of white wax from some quarter or other assumes a black colour, it is no less wax; and if it assumes a round form in place of a square, or instead of being soft it becomes hard, or becomes cold from being hot, these things are in the subject and that subject is wax. Wax it remains, nothing more or less than wax. It is possible then for a certain change therefore to take place within the subject, and yet it is not changed as we have been thinking of change."

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Enneads III.

#### EIGHTH TRACTATE

Nature Contemplation and the One.

Enneads, III.8.10. may be compared with De Quant. Animae, 33.76.

Enneads, III.8.10. "But:- As one looks up to the heavens and sees the splendour of the stars thinks of the Maker and searches, so whoever has contemplated the Intellectual Universe and known it and wondered for it must search after its Maker too. What Being has raised so noble a fabric? Andwhere? And how? Who has begotten such a child, this Intellectual-Principle, this lovely abundance so abundantly endowed? The Source of all this cannot be an Intellect; nor can it be an abundant power: it must have been before Intellect and abundance were; these are later and things of lack; abundance had to be made abundant and Intellection needed to know. These are very near to the un-needing, to that which has no need of Knowing, they have abundance and intellection authentically, as being the first to possess. But, there is That before them which neither needs nor possesses anything, since, needing or possessing anything else, it would not be what it is- The Good."

Mackenna, Vol.2. pages, 135,6.

St Augustine teaches like Plotinus that the intuition of true being is the highest degree by means of which the Soul raises itself to God.

De Quantitate Animae, 33.76. "Now indeed in that contemplation and vision of the truth, which is the seventh and last step of the Soul...and what shall I say of the joys that there are, such as the enjoyment of the highest Good, with its serenity and inspiration of eternity? Certain great and incomparable Souls, have proclaimed these things which we believe they have seen and do see, and have determined how much must be said. This certainly I dare to say to you now, if God demands that course for us, and we assume that in that direction lies our path; we shall have to hold fast continually, that we may arrive by the strength and wisdom of God at that high condition, or high source or high principle of all things, or if by any other fashion so great a thing can more fitly address itself to us".

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## THE FOURTH ENNEAD

## SECOND TRACTATE

## On the Essence of the Soul.

Enneads, IV.2.I. compared with De Quant. Animae, 32.68.  
see page 4.

Enneads, IV.2.I. "The nature, at once divisible and indivisible, which we affirm to be soul has not the unity of an extended thing: it does not consist of separate sections; its divisibility lies in its presence at every point of the recipient, but it is indivisible as dwelling entire in the total and entire in any part. To have penetrated this idea is to know the greatness of the soul and its power, the divinity and wonder of its being, as a nature transcending the sphere of Things. Itself devoid of mass it is present to all mass: it exists here and yet is There, and this not in distinct phases but with unsundered identity: thus it is "parted and not parted" or, better, it has never known partition, never become a parted thing, but remains a self-gathered integral, and is "parted among bodies" merely in the sense that bodies, in virtue of their own sundered existence, cannot receive it unless in some partitive mode; the partition, in other words, is an occurrence in body not in soul".

Mackenna, Vol.3.page, 4.

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see also comparison with De Quant. Animae, XVII.30. page 41. of this Appendix.

Enneads, IV.2.I. "This unity of an Essence is not like that of body which is a unit by the mode of continuous extension, the mode of distinct parts each occupying its own space. Nor is it such a unity as we have dealt with in the case of quality".

Mackenna, Vol.3.page,4.

Enneads, IV.2.2. "If it had the nature of body it would consist of isolated members each unaware of the conditions of every other; there would be a particular soul- say of the finger- answering as a distinct and independent entity to every local experience; in general terms, there would be a multiplicity of souls administering each individual; and, moreover, the universe would be governed not by one soul but by an incalculable number each standing apart to itself. But without a dominant unity, continuity is meaningless."

Mackenna, Vol.3.page,5.

We may compare the above with De Immortalitate Animae, XVI.25.  
also with Epistle, CLXVI.2.4.

De Immortalitate, Animae, XVI.25. "Surely the whole mass which occupies a place is not in its own several parts but in all; wherefore one part of it is here and another there. The Soul, indeed, is not only present in the universal mass of its body, but it is also present wholly in each of the particular parts. For the whole feels the suffering of a part of the body, even though that suffering is not in the whole body. For when there is any pain in the foot, the eye turns to it, the tongue speaks, the hand moves. Now this would not take place, unless something of the soul which feels in the foot were also in these parts; for if it were absent it could not feel what happened there. For this information could not credibly exist if it were not announced by feeling the pain, for the suffering which is experienced does not pass through the whole of the mass, but for all that it does not allow the other parts of the soul which are elsewhere to escape, but the whole soul feels what takes place in a portion of the foot, and there it feels as much pain as is there. Therefore the whole is present at the same time as it is in the individual parts which whole feels alike as in these separate parts."

Epistle, CLXVI.2.4. "On the Origin of the Soul of Man".

"But if matter be used to designate nothing but that which, whether at rest or in motion, has some length, breadth, and height, so that with a greater part of itself it occupies a greater part of space and with a smaller part a smaller space, and is in every part of it less than the whole, then the soul is not material. For it pervades the whole body which it animates, not by a local distribution of parts but by a certain vital influence, being at the same moment present in its entirety in all parts of the body and not less in smaller parts and greater in larger parts, but here with more energy and there with less energy, it is in its entirety present both in the whole body and in every part of it. For even that which the mind perceives, in only a part of the body is nevertheless not otherwise perceived than by the whole mind; for when any part of the living flesh is touched by a finely pointed instrument, although the place affected is not only not the whole body but scarcely discernible in its surface, the contact does not escape the entire mind and yet the contact is felt not over the whole body but only at the one point where it takes place. How comes it then that what takes place in only a part of the body is immediately known to the whole mind or soul unless the whole soul is present at that part and at the same time not deserting all the other parts of the body".

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FOURTH ENNEAD.

THIRD TRACTATE.

Problems of the Soul.

Enneads, IV.3.1. "We will only be obeying the ordinance of the God who bade us know ourselves"

compare this with Confessions, VII.X.16.  
see Appendix, 3. page 22.

Enneads, IV.3.8. compared with De Quantitate Animae, XXXII.67.

Enneads, IV.3.8. "It is no external limit that defines the individual being or the extension of souls any more than of God; on the contrary each in right of its own power is all that it chooses to be; and we are not to think of it as going forth from itself (losing its unity by any partition): the fact is simply that the element within it, which is apt to entrance into body, has the power of immediate projection any whither: the soul is certainly not wrenched asunder by its presence at once in foot or finger. Its presence in the All is similarly unbroken; over its entire range it exists in every several part of everything having even vegetable life, even in a part cut off from the main; in any possible segment it is as it is at its source. For the body of the All is a unit, and soul is everywhere present to it as to one thing".

Mackenna, Vol.3. page, 18.

St. Augustine has just made use of the well known illustration of the earth worm which although it was cut up into many pieces, yet it was still alive in its several parts. Hence he deduces that you cannot deprive it of Soul, that is of the principle of vitality. He continues-

De Quant. Animae, XXXII.67. "If therefore you have looked closely into this similitude and marked in what manner it is possible whilst the body has been dissected for the Soul not to be cut up. Perceive now in what way the pieces themselves of the body when the soul has not been severed are able to live".

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Enneads, IV.3.17. may be compared to Confessions, XII.XV.20.

Enneads, IV.3.17. "All the souls, then, shine down upon the heavens and spend there the main of themselves and the best: only their lower phases illuminate the lower realms; and those souls which descend deepest show their light furthest down- not themselves the better for the depth to which they have penetrated. There is, we may put it, something that is centre; about it a circle of light shed from it; round centre and first circle alike, another circle, light from light; outside that again, not another circle of light but one which lacking light of its own, must borrow".

Confessions, XII.XV.20."But that wisdom which is created, that is the intellectual nature, which by contemplating the light is light. For this, though created, is also called wisdom. But what difference there is betwixt the Light which enlighteneth, and which is enlightened, so much is there betwixt the Wisdom that createth, and that created".

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Enneads, IV.3.18. ~~A~~ may be compared with De Quant. Animae, 27.53 where Augustine refers to the distinction which Plotinus makes between Reason and Reasoning.

Enneads, IV.3.18."There remains still something to be said on the question whether the soul uses deliberate reason before its descent and again when it has left the body. Reasoning is for this sphere; it is the act of the soul fallen into perplexity, distracted with cares, diminished in strength: the need of deliberation goes with the less self-sufficing intelligence; ...but if souls in the Supreme operate without reasoning, how can they be called reasoning souls? One answer might be that they have the power of deliberating to happy issue, should occasion arise: but all is met by repudiating the particular kind of reasoning intended (the earthly and discursive type); we may represent to ourselves a reasoning that flows uninterruptedly from the Intellectual-Principle in them, an inherent state, an enduring activity, an assertion that is real; in this way they would be users of reason even when in that over-world".

Mackenna, Vol.3.page, 29.

De Quant.Animae, 27.53."But rightly that perhaps is named Ratio-cination (an exercise of reasoning powers), since Reason may be a certain faculty of mind, but Ratiocination on the other hand, is a searching forreason, that is it is a faculty by means of which things are perceived by sensation. Wherefore the former is for purposes of enquiry, whilst the latter is for life itself. Hence, when that faculty of mind which is called Reasoning has been directed towards something which it sees or perceives, it is called Knowledge".

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Enneads, IV.3. ~~N~~ 25. may be compared with De ~~diversis~~ Quaest.17.

Enneads, IV.3.25."No memory, therefore, can be ascribed to any divine being, or to the Authentic-Existent or the Intellectual-Principle: these are intangibly immune; time does not approach them; they possess eternity centred round Being; they know nothing of past and sequent; all ~~A~~ is an unbroken state of identity, not receptive of change".

Mackenna, Vol.3.page, 38.

De diversis Quaest.17."Every past thing is not now present; every future thing is not yet present; consequently every past thing and every future event is absent. But with God there is nothing

absent. Neither past therefore, nor future, but all~~is~~ present with God".

.....

Enneads, IV.3.26. may be compared to De Musica, I.8.

Enneads, IV.3.26. "It may be suggested ~~that~~<sup>while</sup> while the soul is perhaps not in itself a remembering principle, yet that, having lost its purity and acquired some degree of modification by its presence in body, it becomes capable of reproducing the imprints of sensible objects and experiences, and that, seated, as roughly speaking it is, within the body- it may reasonably be thought capable of accepting such impressions, and in such a manner as to retain them (thus in some sense possessing memory)....Further there is one order of which the memory must obviously belong to the soul; it alone can remember its own movements, for example its desires and those frustrations of desire in which the coveted thing never came to the body: the body can have nothing to tell about things which never approached it, and the soul cannot use the body as a means to the remembrance of what the body by its nature cannot know".

Mackenna, Vol.3.page, 40.

De Musica, I.8. "What about Memory? I think that it should be ascribed to Soul. For if we do not perceive through the senses anything which we intrust to memory, therefore memory must be considered to be in the body".

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Enneads, IV.3.29." may be compared with Confessions, X.8.I2.

Enneads, IV.3.29. "We may well conceive that where there is to be memory of a sense-perception, this perception becomes a mere presentment, and that to this image-grasping power, a distinct thing, belongs the memory, the retention of the object: for in this imaging faculty the perception culminates; the impression passes away but the vision remains present to the imagination. By the fact of harbouring the presentment of an object that has disappeared, the imagination is, at once, a seat of memory; where the persistence of the image is brief, the memory is poor; people of powerful memory are those in whom the image-holding power is firmer, not easily allowing the record to be jostled out of its grip."

Mackenna, Vol.3.page, 44.

Confessions, X.8.I2. "I come to the fields and spacious palaces of my memory, where are the treasures of innumerable images, brought into it from things of all sorts perceived by the senses. There is stored up, whatever besides we think, either by enlarging or diminishing, or any other way varying those things which the sense hath come to, and whatever else hath been committed and laid up, which forgetfulness hath not yet swallowed up and buried"

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Enneads, IV.3.32. may be compared with De Ordine, 2.2.6.

Enneads, IV.3.32. "The lower soul must be always striving to attain to memory of the activities of the higher; this will be especially so when it is itself of a fine quality, for there will always be some that are better from the beginning and bettered here by the guidance of the higher. The loftier, on the contrary, must desire to come to a happy forgetfulness of all that has reached it through the lower: for one reason, there is always the possibility that the very excellence of the lower prove detrimental to the higher, tending to keep it down by sheer force of vitality. In any case the more urgent the intention towards the Supreme, the more extensive will be the soul's forgetfulness, unless indeed, when the entire living has, even here, been such that memory has nothing but the noblest to deal with: in this world itself, all is best when human interests have been held aloof; so, therefore, it must be with the memory of them. In this sense we may truly say that the good soul is the forgetful. It flees multiplicity; it seeks to escape the unbounded by drawing all to unity, for only thus is it free from entanglement light-footed, self-conducted."

Mackenna, Vol.3. page, 46.

De Ordine, 2.2.6. "Do you therefore deny that it is not merely from the body and from the rational part of the soul but from the whole Soul that the wise man remains steadfast; if indeed that part which is made use of by the senses can be denied to the foolish soul.... The Soul of the wise man purified by the virtues and now clinging to God is worthy indeed of being called wise, but yet, up to a certain point, if I might put it thus, the lower things, those that are the clothing of the body with which that very one who has now withdrawn to himself, once parted after the world, these things are now in subjection to the Soul. ... Now I believe that it is in that subjected part that memory dwells. Consequently the Wise man makes use of these by holding them in subjection, conquering them and forcing them to submit. ... he does not venture to vaunt himself nor glow with pride because of his lordship, nor does he dare to make use of these lower things although they belong to his life, in a random or careless way or extravagantly. For it is to that vilest part of his nature that these things cling which he wishes most of all to forget".

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## Enneads IV.

## FOURTH TRACTATE

## Questions referring to the Soul.

Enneads IV.4.5. compared with De Magistro, XII.40. (Col.9I7).

Enneads, IV.4.5. "At any time when we have not been in direct vision of that sphere, memory is the source of its activity within us; when we have possessed that vision, its presence is due to the principle by which we have enjoyed that vision: this principle awakens where it awakens; and it alone has vision in that order; for this is no matter to be brought to us by way of analogy, or by the syllogistic reasoning whose grounds lie elsewhere; the power which, even here, we possess of discoursing upon the Intellectual Beings is vested, as we show, in that principle which alone is capable of their contemplation."

Mackenna, Vol.3 pages, 51,52.

De Magistro, XII.40. "When with regard to those things which we perceive mentally, that is by means of the intelligence and the reason, one is guided, then those things indeed which we speak of as being present, we descry in that inner light of truth, by means of which that which is spoken of as the inner man is illumined and enjoys. But then also our hearer if he himself also sees those things by the secret and guileless eye, knows what I say, not merely by my words but by its contemplation. Wherefore I teach that one truth not by my utterance of truth but because he beholds the truth; for it is taught not by my words, but by the very things of God which has revealed them to him secretly. So when one is asked concerning these things one is able to reply!"

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Enneads, IV.4.I6. may be compared with Confessions XI.7.9.  
 ... XII.29.40.  
 De Div. Quest. 83.46.

Enneads, IV.4.I6. "The ordering principle is no conjoint of matter and idea but is soul, pure idea, the power and energy second only to the Intellectual-Principle: and because the succession is a fact of the things themselves, inhibited as they are from this comprehensive unity."

Confessions, XI.7.9. "And therefore unto the Word coeternal with Thee Thou dost at once and eternally say all that Thou dost say; and whatever Thou sayest shall be made is made".  
 see Confessions, XII.29.40. where the same Truth is stated.  
 The Reasons which are all present to the Soul are the Ideas which it has received from the Divine Intelligence. Thus does Augustine follow Plotinus.

Compare also Enneads, IV.4.16. with De Div. Quest. 83.46.

De Div. Quest. 83.46. "We are able in the Latin tongue to call them Ideas, forms or species, so that we seem to use figuratively the term Logos, from word. But if we call them Reasons, we depart indeed, from a suitable interpretation (for Reasons in the Greek language are called Logoi not Ideas), but yet anyone who desires to make use of this designation has not departed from the thing itself. For the Ideas are principles, forms or Reasons of things fixed and unchangeable, which have not themselves been fashioned and on that account remain throughout eternity in the same fashion since they abide in the Divine Intelligence. And since they themselves are not born, neither do they perish, yet it is said that according to these, that is after their pattern everything which can spring into being and perish, and everything which does spring into being and does perish is fashioned. The Soul indeed declares that it is not possible to behold them unless rationally, by that part of itself which excels, that is by the mind and reason, as if by a certain look or by the inner and intellective eye".

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#### ENNEADS IV. SIXTH TRACTATE.

##### Perception and Memory.

Enneads, IV.6.2. may be compared to De Trinitate, XI.2.

Enneads, IV.6.2. "But if perception does not go by impression, what is the process? The mind affirms something not contained within it: this is precisely the characteristic of a power- not to accept impression but, within its allotted sphere, to act. Besides, the very condition of the mind being able to exercise discrimination upon what it is to see and hear is not, of course, that these objects be equally impressions made upon it; on the contrary, there must be no impressions, nothing to which the mind is passive; there can be only acts of that which the objects become known....it belongs to the faculty, and the soul-essence, to read the imprints thus appearing before it, as they reach the point at which they become matter of its knowledge".

Mackenna, Vol.3. page, 118.

De Trinitate, XI.2. "When, then, we see any corporeal object, these three things; as is most easy to do, are to be considered and distinguished: First, the object itself which we see; whether a stone, or flame, or any other thing that can be seen by the eyes; and this certainly might exist also already before it was seen; next, vision or the act of seeing, which did not exist before we perceived the object itself which is presented to the sense; in the third place, that which keeps the sense of the eye in the object seen, so long as it is seen, viz. the attention of the mind. In these three, then, not only is there an evident distinction, but also a diverse nature".

Enneads, IV.6.2. may be compared with De Trinitate, XI.I.

Enneads, IV.6.2. "The knowing of the things belonging to the Intellectual is not in any such degree attended by impact or impression: they come forward, on the contrary, as from within, unlike the sense-objects known as from without: they have more emphatically the character of acts; they are acts in the stricter sense, for their origin is in the soul, and every concept of this Intellectual order is the soul about its Act. "

Mackenna, Vol.3. page, II9.

De Trinitate, XI.I. "No one doubts that, as the inner man is endued with understanding, so is the outer with bodily sense... And owing to that very order of our condition whereby we are made mortal and fleshly, we handle things visible more easily and more familiarly than things intelligible; since the former are outward, the latter inward; and the former are perceived by the bodily sense, the latter are understood by the mind; and we ourselves, that is our minds, are not sensible things, that is, bodies, but intelligible things, since we are life. And yet, as I said, we are so familiarly occupied with bodies, and our thought has projected itself outwardly with so wonderful a proclivity towards bodies, that, when it has been withdrawn from the uncertainty of things corporeal, that it may be fixed with a much more certain and stable knowledge in that which is spirit it flies back to those bodies".

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Enneads, IV.6.3. may be compared with, De Trinitate, XI.4.

... XI.8,  
... X.6.

Enneads, IV.6.3. "To the sense-order it (Memory) stands in a similar nearness and to such things it gives a radiance out of its own store and, as it were, elaborates them to visibility: the power is always ripe and, so to say, in travail towards them, so that, whenever it puts out its strength in the direction of what has once been present in it, it sees that object as present still; and the more intent its effort the more durable is the presence".

Mackenna, Vol.3. page, I20.

De Trinitate, XI.4. "Commonly, when we have looked for some little time at a light, and then shut our eyes, there seem to play before our eyes certain bright colours variously changing themselves, and shining less and less until they wholly cease; and these we must understand to be the remains of that form which was wrought in the sense, while the shining body was seen, and that these variations take place in them as they slowly and step by step fade away".

Enneads, IV.6.3. "Now, if memory were a matter of seal-impressions retained, the multiplicity of objects would have no weakening effect on the memory. Further, on the same hypothesis, we

## Enneads, IV.6.3. (continued).

would have no need of thinking back to revive remembrance; nor would we be subject to forgetting and recalling; all would lie engraved within."

Mackenna, Vol.3. page, 120.

De Trinitate, XI.3. "Vision is produced from a thing that is visible, together with one who sees; in such way that, on the part of him who sees, there is the sense of seeing and the intention of looking and gazing at the object; while yet that information of the sense, which is called vision is imprinted only by the body which is seen, that is, by some visible thing; which being taken away, that form remains no more which was in the sense so long as that which was seen was present; yet the sense itself remains, which existed also before anything was perceived; just as the trace of a thing in water remains so long as the body itself, which is impressed on it, is in the water; but if this has been taken away, there will no longer be any such trace, although the water remains, which existed also before ~~the~~ it took the form of that body".

Enneads, IV.6.3. "The very fact that we train ourselves to remember shows that what we get by the process is a strengthening of the mind; just so, exercises for feet and hands enable us to do easily acts which are in no sense contained or laid up in those members, but to which they may be fitted by persevering effort. How else can it be explained that we forget a thing heard once or twice but remember what is often repeated, and that we recall a long time afterwards what at first hearing we failed to hold?"

Mackenna, Vol.3. page, 120.

Compare this with-

De Trinitate, XI.8. "But the will averts the memory from the sense; when, through its being intent on something else, it does not suffer things present to cleave to it. As any one may see, when often we do not seem to ourselves to have heard some one who was speaking to us, because we were thinking of something else. But this is a mistake; for we did hear, but we do not remember, because the words of the speaker presently slipped out of the perception of our ears, through the bidding of the will being diverted elsewhere, by which they are usually fixed in the memory".

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## FOURTH ENNEAD.

## SEVENTH TRACTATE.

## The Immortality of the Soul.

Enneads, IV.7.3. may be compared with De Immort. Animae, VIII.14.

Enneads, IV.7.3. "Perhaps we will be asked to consider body as a simple entity (disregarding the question of any constituent elements): they will tell us, then, that no doubt, as purely material



## Enneads, IV.7.3. (continued).

it cannot have a self-springing life- since matter is without quality- but that life is introduced by the fact that the Matter is brought to order under Forming-Idea. But if by this Forming-Idea they mean an essential, a real being, then it is not the conjoint of body and idea that constitutes soul; it must be one of the two items and that one, being (by hypothesis) outside of the Matter, cannot be body; to make it body would simply force us to repeat our former analysis. If on the contrary they do not mean by this Forming-Idea a real being, but some condition or modification of the Matter, they must tell us how and whence this modification, with resultant life, can have found the way into the Matter; for very certainly Matter does not mould itself to pattern or bring itself to life. It becomes clear that since neither Matter nor body in any mode has this power, life must be brought upon the stage by some directing principle external and transcendent to all that is corporeal. In fact, body itself could not exist in any form if soul-power did not; body passes; dissolution is in its very nature; all would disappear in a twinkling if all were body....All bodies are in ceaseless process of dissolution; how can the kosmos be made over to any one of them without being turned into a senseless haphazard drift? ...But: given soul, all these material things become its collaborators towards the coherence of the kosmos and of every living being, all the qualities of all the separate objects converging to the purpose of the universe: failing soul in the things of the universe, they could not even exist, much less play their ordered parts".

Mackenna, Vol.3.page, 124,f.

De Immortalitate Animae, VIII.I4."But if what we have alleged is true, then the body has been made by someone, and that someone not inferior to itself. For it would have been impossible for it to have furnished what it has supplied by its own power. Now it could not have been made by an equal; for it is reasonable when one is doing any creative work to take counsel with someone better than oneself concerning what one is making. For with respect to a body that grows it is surely not absurd to say that it must be like unto the one from whom it has sprung. Therefore the whole universe has been created by some power and nature which is mightier and better certainly than corporeal beings; for if the body had been made by a mere body it could not become universal, for it is true what we assumed at the beginning of our argument, namely that nothing could be made of itself. But this nature and power which is the incorporeal maker of the universal body holds the universe in his present sway, for He did not make it and then depart from it, neither did He set asunder the thing that He had made. ...For all that it possesses it has received from Him and if  $\frac{1}{2}$  it were abandoned by the Being to whom it owes its life, it would cease to be."

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Enneads, IV.7.5. may be compared to De Quant. Animae, XIX.33.

Enneads, IV.7.5. "What answer can be made by those declaring soul to be corporeal? Is every part of the soul in any one body, soul entire, soul perfectly true to its essential being? and may the same be said of every part of the part? If so, the magnitude makes no contribution to the soul's essential nature, as it must if soul (as corporeal) were a definite magnitude: it is, as body cannot be, an "all-everywhere", a complete identity present at each and every point, the part all that the whole is. To deny that every part is soul is to make soul a compound from soulless elements. Further, if a definite magnitude, the double limit of larger or smaller, is to be imposed upon each separate soul, then anything outside those limits is no soul....surely no honest mind can fail to gather that such a thing in which part is identical with whole has a nature which transcends quantity, and must of necessity be without quantity: only so could it remain identical when quantity is filched from it, only by being indifferent to amount or extension, by being in essence something apart. Thus the Soul and the Reason-Principles are without quantity". Mackenna, Vol.3. pages, 127,8.

In De Quantitate Animae, 30 & 33. Augustine speaks of the way in which the word growth is used concerning the Soul and indicates that it is only to be understood in a metaphorical sense that one can use the term growth, in association with the Soul. The Soul has no magnitude.

We might point out frequent comparisons in connection with this tractate, which Augustine closely follows. For example,

Enneads, IV.7.6	may be cp. with	De Quant. Animae, V.9.
.. IV.7.7.	.....	De Orig. Animae, II.4.
.. IV.7.8.	.....	De Trinitate, X.10.
.. IV.7.9.	.....	De Immort. Animae, XV.24
.. IV.7.10.	.....	De Immort. Anim. V.9.
.. IV.7.11	.....	De Immort. Anim. IX.16.

but we have already given sufficient illustrations.

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Enneads, IV.8.I. may be compared with Confessions, VII.X.I6.  
see Appendix, 3. pages, 22, 3.

Enneads, IV.8.I. "Many times it has happened: Lifted out of the body into myself; becoming external to all other things and self-centered; beholding a marvellous beauty; then, more than ever, assured of community with the loftiest order; enacting the noblest life, acquiring identity with the divine; stationing within IT by having attained that activity; poised above whatsoever within the Intellectual is less than the Supreme: yet there comes the moment of descent from intellection to reasoning, and after that sojourn in the divine, I ask myself how it happens that I can now be descending, and how did the soul ever enter into my body, the soul which, even within the body, is the high thing it has shown itself to be".

Mackenna, Vol.3. page, 143.

This may also be compared with Confessions, X.XL.65. where St. Augustine is thinking of the mystical experiences such as came to him at Ostia.

Confessions, X.XL.65. "And sometimes Thou admittest me to an affection, very unusual, in my inmost soul; rising to a strange sweetness, which if it were perfected in me, I know not what in it would not belong to the life to come. But through my miserable encumbrances I sink down again into those lower things, and am swept back by former custom, and am held, and greatly weep, but am greatly held".

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## THE FIFTH ENNEAD.

## FIRST TRACTATE.

## The Three Initial Hypostases.

Enneads, V.I.I. (see page II of the Appendix).

Enneads, V.I.I. "What can it be that has brought the souls to forget the father, God, and, though members of the Divine and entirely of that world, to ignore at once themselves and It? The evil that has overtaken them has its source in self-will, in the entry into the sphere of process, and in the primal differentiation with the desire for self ownership. They conceived a pleasure in this freedom and largely indulged their own motion; thus they were hurried down the wrong path, and in the end, drifting further and further, they came to lose even the thought of their origin in the Divine. A child wrenched young from home and brought up during many years at a distance will fail in knowledge of its father and of itself: the souls, in this same way, no longer discern either the divinity or their own nature; ignorance of their rank brings self-depreciation; they misplace their respect, honouring everything more than themselves; all their awe and admiration is for the alien, and, clinging to this, they have broken apart, as far as a soul may, and they make light of what they have deserted; their regard for the mundane and their disregard of themselves bring about their utter ignoring of the divine."

Admiring pursuit of the external is a confession of inferiority; and nothing thus holding itself inferior to things that rise and perish, nothing counting itself less honourable and less enduring than all else it admires could ever form any notion of either the nature or the power of God."

Mackenna, Vol.IV.page I.

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Enneads, V.I.2. may be likened to Confessions, IX.X.25.

Enneads, V.I.2. "Let every soul recall, then, at the outset the truth that soul is the author of all living things, that it has breathed the life into them all, whatever is nourished by earth and sea, all the creatures of the air, the divine stars in the sky; it is the maker of the sun: itself formed and ordered this vast heaven and conducts all that rhythmic motion; and it is a principle distinct from all these to which it gives law and movement and life, and it must of necessity be more honourable than they, for they gather or dissolve as soul brings them life or abandons them, but soul, since it never can abandon itself, is of eternal being. How life was purveyed to the universe of things and to the separate beings in it may be thus conceived:- That great soul must stand pictured before another soul, one not mean, a soul that has become worthy to look, emancipate from the lure, from ~~the~~ all that binds its fellows in bewitchment, holding

## ENNEADS V.I.2. (continued)-

itself in quietude. Let not merely the enveloping body be at peace, body's turmoil stilled, but all that lies around, earth at peace, and sea at peace, and air and the very heavens. Into that heaven, all at rest, let the great soul be conceived to roll inward at every point, penetrating, permeating, from all sides pouring in its light. As the rays of the sun throwing their brilliance upon a lowering cloud makes it gleam all gold, so the soul entering the material expanse of the heavens has given life, has given immortality: what was abject it has lifted up; and the heavenly system, moved now in endless motion by the soul that leads it in wisdom, has become a living and a blessed thing; the soul domiciled within, it takes worth where, before the soul, it was stark body- clay and water- or rather the blankness of Matter, the absence of Being, and, as an author says, "the execration of the Gods".

Mackenna, Vol.4. pages, 2,3.

Confessions, IX.X.25."We were saying then: If to any the tumult of the flesh were hushed, hushed the images of earth<sup>9</sup> and waters, and air, hushed also the poles of Heaven, yea the very soul be hushed to herself, and by not thinking on self surmount self, hushed all dreams and imaginary revelations, every tongue and every sign, and whatsoever exists only in transition, since if any could hear, all these say, We made not ourselves, but He made us that abideth for ever - If then having uttered this, they too should be hushed, having roused only our ears to Him who made them, and He alone speak, not by them, but by Himself, that we may hear His Word, not through any tongue of flesh, nor angel's voice, nor sound of thunder, nor in the dark riddle of a similitude, but, might hear Whom in these things we love, might hear His Very Self without these, (as we two now strained ourselves, and in swift thought touched on that Eternal Wisdom, which abideth over all;)- could this be continued on, and other visions of kind far unlike be withdrawn, and this~~one~~ ravish, and absorb, and wrap up its beholder amid these inward joys, so that life might be for ever like that one moment of understanding which now we sighed after; were not this, Enter into Thy Master's joy?

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Enneads, V.I.4. compare this with Confessions, III.6.I0.  
... I0.27.38.

Enneads, V.I.4."Admiring the world of sense as we look out upon its vastness and beauty and the order of its eternal march, thinking of the gods within it, seen and hidden, and the celestial spirits and all the life of animal and plant, let us mount to its archetype, to the yet more authentic sphere: there we are to contemplate all things as members of the Intellectual- eternal in their own right, vested with a self-springing consciousness and life- and, presiding over all these, the unsoiled Intelligence and the unapproachable wisdom". Mackenna, Vol.4. page, 5.

Enneads, V.I.4. and

Confessions, 3.6.I0. "And I indeed ought to have passed by even philosophers who spake truth concerning them, for love of Thee, my Father, supremely good, Beauty of all things beautiful."

.....compare also-

Enneads, I.6.2."Let us then, go back to the source, and indicate at once the Principle that bestows beauty on material things".  
Mackenna, Vol.I. page, 79.

Enneads, VI.9.4."For Beauty is posterior to the One and comes from him, as the light of the day comes from the sun".  
Bouillet, Vol.3.page, 543.

.....

Enneads, V.I.6."Origin from the Supreme must not be taken to imply any movement in it:...Given this immobility in the Supreme it can neither have yielded assent nor uttered decree nor stirred in any way towards the existence of a secondary". (Thesis,P.I75.)  
Mackenna, Vol.4.page,8.

Enneads, V.I.XI."Further, since the soul's attention to these matters is intermittent, there must be within us an Intellectual-Principle acquainted with that Right not by momentary act but in permanent possession. Similarly there must be also the principle of this principle, its cause, God...Within our nature is such a centre by which we grasp and are linked and held; and those of us are firmly in the Supreme whose collective tendency is There".  
(Thesis, P.I35.) Mackenna, Vol.4.page,I5.

Enneads, V.I.I2." If there is to be perception of what is thus present, we must turn the perceptive faculty inward and hold it in attention there. Hoping to hear a desired voice we let all others pass and are alert for the coming at last of that most welcome of sounds: so here, we must let the hearings of sense go by, save for sheer necessity, and keep the soul's perception bright and quick to the sounds from above". (Thesis, P.I4I.)  
Mackenna, Vol.4.page, I5.

.....

Enneads, V.2.2."There is from the first principle to ultimate an outgoing in which unfailingly each principle retains its own seat while its offspring takes another rank, a lower, though on the other hand every being is in identity with its prior as long as it holds that contact". (Thesis, P.I92).  
Mackenna, Vol.4.page,I7.

## THE FIFTH ENNEAD.

## THIRD TRACTATE.

## The Knowing Hypostases and the Transcendent.

Enneads, V.3;I3. "Thus The One is in truth beyond all statement: any affirmation is of a thing; but the all-transcending, resting above even the most august divine Mind, possesses alone of all true being, and is not a thing among things; we can give it no name because that would imply predication: we can but try to indicate, in our own feeble way, something concerning it: when in our perplexity we object, "Then it is without self-perception, without self-consciousness, ignorant of itself"; we must remember that we have been considering it only in its opposites."

Mackenna, Vol.4.page, 36.

Enneads, V.3.I4. "How, then, do we ourselves come to be speaking of it? No doubt we deal with it, but we do not state it; we have neither knowledge nor intellection of it. But in what sense do we even deal with it when we have no hold upon it? We do not, it is true, grasp it by knowledge, but that does not mean that we are utterly void of it; we hold it not so as to state it, but so as to be able to speak about it. And we can and do state what it is not, while we are silent as to what it is: we are, in fact, speaking of it in the light of its sequels; unable to state it, we may still possess it. Those divinely possessed and inspired have at least the knowledge that they hold some greater thing within them though they cannot tell what it is; from the movements that stir them and the utterances that come from them they perceive the power, not themselves, that moves them: in the same way, it must be, we stand towards the Supreme when we hold the Intellectual-Principle pure; we know the divine Mind within, that which gives Being and all else of that order: but we know, too, that other, know that it is none of these, but a nobler principle than anything we know as Being; fuller and greater; above reason, mind and feeling; conferring these powers, not to be confounded with them."

Mackenna, Vol.4.Page, 38.

Enneads, V.3.I3-I4. see Thesis,P.I74.

Plotinus is speaking here of the Supreme Being

Enneads, V.5.6."Its definition, in fact, could be only 'the indefinable': what is not a thing is not some definite thing. We are in agony for a true expression; we are talking of the untellable; we name, only to indicate for our own use as best we may. And this name, The One, contains really no more than the negation of plurality: ...If we are led to think positively of The One, name and thing, there would be more truth in silence: the designation, a mere aid to enquiry, was never intended for more than a preliminary affirmation of absolute simplicity to

ENNEADS, V.5.6.(Continued).

to be followed by the rejection of even that statement: it was the best that offered, but remains inadequate to express the Nature indicated. For this is a principle not to be conveyed by any sound; it cannot be known on any hearing but, if at all, by vision; and to hope in that vision to see a form is to fail of even that". Mackenna, Vol.4. pages, 54,55.

See Thesis, P.I76.

we may compare the above with

De Ordine, 2.XVI.44."God is best known by nescience.

De Ordine, 2.XVIII.47."CUjus nulla scientia est in anima nisi scire quomodo eum nesciat".

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## SIXTH ENNEAD

## Tractate Four.

The One and identical Being is everywhere present  
in its entirety.

Enneads, VI.4.I. may be compared with De Trinitate, VI.6.8.

Enneads, VI.4.I. "On the other hand, the part of the soul which is present in the foot is identical with the part of the soul which is in the hand, as one may see from the perceptions."

Bouillet, Vol.3. page, 305.

De Trinitate, VI.6.8. "For it (the Soul) is on this account more simple than the body, because it is not diffused in bulk through extension of place, but in each body, it is both whole in the whole, and whole in each several part of it; and, therefore, when anything takes place in any small particle whatever of the body, such as the soul can feel, although it does not take place in the whole body, yet the whole soul feels it, since the whole soul is not <sup>un</sup>conscious of it".

.....

Plotinus in this part of his tractate refers also to the whiteness of the body. Enneads, VI.4I. "Besides the whiteness of one part of the body does not partake in the quality experienced by the whiteness of another part of the body, the whiteness of one part is identical to the whiteness of another part with respect to kind, but it is not identical with respect to harmony."

Bouillet, Vol.3. page, 305.

The basis of the ideas which Plotinus develops here is to be found in Augustine's Epistle, 187, 'On the Presence of God'. Section, 18. It is a long passage and there is no need to quote it.

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Enneads, VI.4.I<sup>5</sup>. may be compared with De Trinitate, XII.7.10.

Enneads, VI.4.I<sup>5</sup>. "We are thus become two men at once (the intellectual man and, in addition, the sensitive man) we are no longer only one or the other, as previously, or rather, we are still sometimes only one of two, the kind of man which has been added to the former man, it is that kind of man which remains when the first man sleeps, and then in a certain sense, because we do not then reflect on the conceptions of the Intellect, it is not present".

Bouillet, Vol.3. page, 334.

De Trinitate, XII.VII.10. "As we said of the nature of the human mind, that both in the case when as a whole it contemplates the truth it is the image of God; and in the case when anything is divided from it, and diverted in purpose to the dealing with temporal things; nevertheless on that side on which it beholds and consults truth, here also it is the image of God, but on that side whereby it is directed to the dealing with the lower things, it is not the image of God".

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Enneads SIX.

TRACTATE FIVE.

Enneads, VI.5.1. may be compared to Augustine's remark which he makes in his Tractate according to St. John.

Enneads, VI.5.1. "When a principle one in its harmony and identical is everywhere present in its entirety, it becomes a common conception of the human intelligence: now all declare instinctively that the deity who dwells in each of us is in all things one and identical."

Bouillet, Vol.3. page, 341.

Tractatus in Joannem. "Now this is the power of true deity, that He is not able to be wholly hidden from the rational creature creature when he makes use of his reason. For with the exception of a few in whom their nature is grossly depraved, God is confessed to be the author of His world".

see Thesis, page, 178.

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SIXTH ENNEAD

TRACTATE SEVEN.

HOW THE MULTITUDE OF IDEAS EXIST; & ON THE GOOD.

Enneads, VI.7.5. "The Superior man (the reasonable man) is better he possesses a diviner soul and clearer sensations. Plato, without a doubt, has this in mind when he says, 'Man is the Soul; (he adds in his definition) who makes use of the body', because the diviner Soul rules when it makes use of the body, and it only uses the body in the second degree".

Bouillet, Vol.3. page, 420.

De Quantitate Animae, XIII.22. "But if you wish me to define the Soul for you, and indeed you ask, what is the Soul? I can easily reply. For it seems to me, that the Soul is a certain substance participating in reason, which is fitted to govern the body".

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SIXTH ENNEAD.

TRACTATE EIGHT.

On Free Will and the Will of the One.

Enneads, VI.8.9. "It is impossible that the Principle of all things should be regarded as accidental, not merely that he should be conceived as being less perfect by accident, but yet he should be conceived of as being good by accident, or good in any other fashion, as a thing less complete. The Principle of all things ought to be better than these, therefore a determined being; I say determined in the sense that ~~He~~ is in an unique way, but not determine by necessity for necessity has no existence for Him".  
see Thesis, page, I76.

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TRACTATE NINE.

ON THE GOOD OR THE ONE.

Enneads, VI.9.I. Here we find a thought which is frequently expressed by St. Augustine.

Enneads, VI.9.I. "All beings are beings through their Unity, both such as are primarily beings, and such as in any respect whatever are said to be classed in the order of beings. For what would they be, if they were not One? For if deprived of unity they are no longer that which they were said to be".... "Health, likewise, then has a subsistence, when the body is coordinated in Unity; and beauty then flourishes when the nature of unity embraces its members".

Confessions, I.VII.12. "For Thou art God... Whose Unity is the mould of all things; who out of Thy own fairness makest all things fair; and orderest all things by Thy law".

Confessions, I.20.31. "For even then I was, I lived, and felt; and had an implanted providence over my own well-being,- a trace of that mysterious Unity, whence I was derived".

De Moribus Manich.6. "To be, is none other than to be one. In so far as anything, therefore, attains unity, in so far it IS. For unity worketh congruity and harmony, whereby things composite Are in so far as they ARE: for things uncompounded are in themselves, because they are one".  
See also Confessions, IV.XV.24.

.....

Enneads, VI.9.4. "For Beauty is posterior to the One and comes from Him as the light of the day comes from the Sun."

Bouillet, Vol.3.page, 543.

Enneads, I.6.2."Let us then, go back to the source, and indicate at once the Principle that bestows beauty on material things".

Mackenna, Vol.I.page, 79.

Confessions, 3.6.10."And I indeed ought to have passed by even philosophers who spake truth concerning them for love of Thee, my Father, supremely good, Beauty of all things beautiful."

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Enneads, VI.9.5."But the One and Principle of all things is Simple...But if it is necessary to give it a name, it may be appropriately called in common ONE, yet not as being first something else and afterwards one. It is indeed on this account difficult to be known; but is principally to be known from its offspring essence."

Taylor, pages, 308,9.

see Thesis, page, 174.

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Enneads, VI.9.XI."This, therefore, is manifested by the mandate of the mysteries, which orders that they shall not be divulged to those who are uninitiated. For as that which is divine cannot be unfolded to the multitude, this mandate forbids the attempt to elucidate it to any one but him who is fortunately able to perceive it. Since, therefore, (in this conjunction with deity) there were not two things, but the perceiver was one with the thing perceived, as not being (properly speaking) vision but union; whoever becomes one by mingling with deity, and afterwards recollects this union, will have with himself an image of it".

Taylor, pages, 320,I.

Plotinus refers to the mysteries again in Enneads, V.V.II. Mackenna translates the term there, "sanctities of the shrine".

Augustine speaks of the Mysteries in Contra Academicos, 2.I.I. and De Ordine, 2.5.I6.

De Ordine, 2.5.I6."There are two ways that we can follow when we are troubled with difficulties, that of reason and that of authority. Philosophy offers us reason, and scarcely succeeds in liberating a very few; and so far from teaching them to despise these Mysteries it only brings them to understand them as they ought to be understood. True and genuine philosophy has no other business than to teach us what is the uncaused Cause of all things, how great is the Intelligence which abides in it, and what it was that for our salvation issued thence without any

degeneration. Now it is this same omnipotent God, who is at the same time tripotent, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, who is taught in those sacred Mysteries which, by the way of a sincere and firm faith deliver the masses of mankind; and they teach this neither confusedly, as some assert, nor arrogantly, as many allege". (Col.562.) I have made use of the translation by Montgomery, page, 48. op.cit.

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We should bear in mind in making our comparisons, this fact which Alfarric and others suggest, namely that it is highly probable that often Victorinus in making his translation of the Enneads, contented himself with giving a paraphrase of the Greek of Plotinus . So that, it is just possible that Augustine had no literal or accurate rendering to guide him. If this be the case it is remarkable that Augustine should in certain passages have approximated so closely to the literal text.

But again, we would emphasize what we stated in the opening note of this Appendix. Our main purpose has not to concern ourselves with the discovery of verbal resemblances between St. Augustine and Plotinus, but rather to indicate a resemblance in the thought and spirit of our authors and to indicate that Augustine undoubtedly received guidance from the truths of Neo-Platonism as proclaimed by Plotinus.