A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF SOME CURRENT TENDENCIES IN THE THEORY OF HUMAN CONDUCT.

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C O N T E N T S.

"Human nature does not lose by becoming intelligible, but comes into its own."

S. Alexander.

"Space, Time and Deity."

1.

INTRODUCTION.

The Problem and the Time.

The striking achievements of natural science during the last century and the increasing control over the physical world which its applications make possible has put twentieth-century humanity in a position which is entirely without precedent in human history. Its advent has revolutionized the conditions of human life and altered the whole outlook of humanity. In a recent Symposium in which various authors discuss the relations of science and civilization from different points of view, the conclusion is drawn that "science, or the spirit of seeking order in events, invading human life from many angles, has already profoundly altered both the general mind and the institution of civilized man"(1). In recent years, and especially since the war, it has often been pointed out that the application of all the new knowledge which physical science brings, while it makes possible a great amelioration in the conditions of life, also brings with it enormous dangers and difficulties. It is seen that man may utilize it in a way that will bring about his own destruction, and this, it is said, is because man's knowledge of himself, of the springs of his conduct and of the nature of his relations to his fellows has not kept pace with his knowledge of the external world. Knowledge leading to the control of things has far outstripped knowledge leading to the control of life. Increased scientific knowledge of human nature and of human

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society is needed if there is to be that progress through science which was so confidently believed in.

While it is true that the physical sciences are, in accuracy and completeness, far ahead of the sciences that deal with life - and particularly with human life - it is also true that these latter have in the last few decades made very marked advances. There has been brought to light from various sources an enormous body of new knowledge concerning man and his nature, and it is constantly being added to. The sciences of anthropology, of biology and of psychology are all in an exceedingly active condition, and each is making valuable contributions to the knowledge of man; writing of the development of science and the power which it brings, William McDougall says: "Most important of all, we are beginning to understand something of the nature of man, something of the history of development of the species, something of our bodily frame and mental powers, and of the long process by which our intellectual and moral culture has been achieved".(1) A biologist, Julian Huxley, has recently claimed that the progress in biology is now such that the centre of gravity of science as a whole is shifting. "The rise of evolutionary biology and of modern psychology," he says, "have not only changed our outlook on specially human problems, but have altered the whole balance, if I may so put it, of science. There was a time when the basic studies of physics and chemistry seemed not only basic but somehow more essentially scientific than the sciences dealing with life. Distinctions were drawn between the experimental and the observational sciences - often half-consciously implying a distinction between accurate, scientific, self-respecting

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(1) "National Welfare and National Decay", p. 28.

sciences and blundering, hit-or-miss, tolerated bodies of knowledge. Biological phenomena are now, however, seen to be every whit as susceptible of accurate and experimental analysis; and indeed to present so many problems to the physicist and chemist that in fifty years or so, I venture to prophesy, the wise virgins in those basic sciences will be those who have laid in a store of biological oil".(1)

In every sphere accurate scientific knowledge means the possibility of control, and biologists are now talking of the biological control of life - the conscious control, by man, of the process of evolution.(2) Something has already been done in controlling the lower forms of life, and new possibilities are opening up - even so far as man himself is concerned. To take only one example of the light which biology is now throwing on the nature of man - there is the recent discovery of the profound importance of the internal secretions of the ductless glands in determining bodily and mental growth.(3) Exaggerated claims may be made by enthusiasts,(4) but it cannot now be denied that the interdependent system of endocrine glands play a very significant part in determining not only bodily growth, but temperament and feeling, and so conduct and character. Unless there is full and orderly development of this system mental powers fail to develop in normal fashion. Psychopathologists are now finding that endocrine and mental

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(1) "Essays of a Biologist", "Biology and Sociology", p. 70.

(2) Cf. J. Arthur Thomson: "The Control of Life".

(3) For a brief account of the significance of this discovery, cf. F. W. Mott: "The Biological Foundations of Human Character", Edinburgh Review, July, 1923.

(4) Cf. for example Berman's highly-coloured book, "The Glands Regulating Personality".

factors are interdependent throughout in the production of certain types of mental disorders.(1) And now this is known it is possible to intervene, to adjust the defective endocrine balance and to put right the bodily and mental abnormality.(2)

In the essay already quoted, Julian Huxley points out that the biologist's attitude towards mind has now changed. He no longer seeks to explain it away as a epiphenomenon, but studies it as a phenomenon. His science in fact is the connecting link between physico-chemical science on the one hand and psychology on the other; between physics and chemistry and definitely human affairs. Psychology deals with definitely human affairs. One of its leading exponents at the present day has recently declared its aim to be "to render our knowledge of human nature more exact and more systematic, in order that we may control ourselves more wisely and influence our fellow men more effectively".(3) Psychology, it has been well

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(1) It is interesting to note that this fact seems likely to modify some of the conclusions of psycho-analysis, cf. "The Psychical and Endocrine Factors in Functional Disorders", H. Crichton Miller. Brit. Medical Journal, 1922.

(2) The possibilities which progress in the biological sciences open up are enthusiastically set out by Julian Huxley (op. cit. Pref. viii). "The biologist cannot fail to be impressed by the fact that his science to-day is, roughly and broadly speaking, in the position which chemistry and physics occupied a century ago. It is beginning to reach down from observation to experimental analysis, and from experimental analysis to grasp of principle. Furthermore, as the grasp of principles in physico-chemical science led speedily to an immense new extension both of knowledge and control, so it is not to be doubted that like effects will spring from like causes in biology. But whereas the extension of control in physics and chemistry led to a multiplication of the number of things which man could do and experience, the extension of control in biology will 'inter alia' mean an alteration of the modes of man's experience itself. The one, that is to say, remained in essence a quantitative change so far as concerns the real life of man; the other can be a qualitative change. Applied physics and chemistry bring more grist to the mill; applied biology will also be capable of changing the mill itself. The possibilities of physiological improvement, of the better combination of existing psychical faculties, of the education of old faculties to new heights, and of the discovery of new faculties altogether - all this is no utopian silliness, but is bound to come about if science continues her current progress."

(3) W. McDougall: "An Outline of Psychology", p. 1, cf. also the same author "The Present Position in Clinical Psychology", Proc. Royal Society of Medicine, 1918. "We are now in the age of biological discovery and since Darwin initiated this new age,

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said, is a very old study but a very young science. It is, in fact, the latest of the sciences, the last to 'arrive'; and it is now arriving with something of a rush. The reason for its lateness seems to be not merely the inherent difficulty of its subject matter, but also the fact that this latter is so near to us, and our interest in it is so intense, that dispassionate, scientific treatment of it is almost impossible. It is difficult to be as indifferent to the results of investigation as science requires. The same difficulty was formerly felt in biology in connection with the doctrine of the evolution of species. Remarkable advances have, however, already been made in psychology, particularly in the last few decades. Some of these and their significance it will be our business later to consider. The progress in psychology has been such that the President of the Psychology Section of the British Association was recently optimistic enough to claim, ~~but~~ "the main outlines of our human nature are now approximately known and the whole territory of individual psychology has, by one worker or another, been completely covered in the large".(1) At the present time interest and activity in psychology is particularly widespread. "An age of psychology," says one writer, "comes to crown an age of biology."(2) Interest in the various applications of psychology is also widespread.

"Psychology," says McDougall, "is coming into its own, and the psychologist, instead of ploughing his lonely furrow in the

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there has been growing up a biological and inductive psychology, a science not springing full-blown, like the psychology of James Mill or of Herbert Spencer, from the reasonings of one powerful mind, but a science, based like other sciences, on a vast mass of minute and careful observations, a slowly growing product of the co-operation of a multitude of workers."

(1) C. Burt: "Mental Differences between Individuals".

(2) F. S. Marvin, op. cit.

vague hope of contributing to a science that may some day be recognized as of value to mankind, finds himself embarrassed by the fact that men of the most varied occupations are calling on him for help, expecting from him definite pronouncements and safe guidance in a multitude of practical problems".(1) So enthusiastically is the subject being pursued and so keen is the sense of its importance, that there is a tendency to overlook the extreme youth of the science, and the tentativeness and incompleteness of its conclusions. There is much point in the warning uttered by the late Dr. Rivers, and at a time when psychology is being made into something of a popular 'stunt', it should be kept carefully in mind. "There is now a serious danger that psychology will fall into discredit, partly owing to the zeal of its votaries for the unconscious and infantile aspects of the mind, but still more owing to premature attempts to utilise its supposed discoveries practically while the basis upon which they rest is uncertain and insecure. It seems to me almost certain that there will be a reaction against the almost universal interest which the study of psychology excites to-day, and that we are approaching a period when it may even become a matter of ridicule to make those references to psychological explanation and interpretation which now arouse such hopes and interests."(2) Though he

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(1) "An Outline of Psychology", Introd.

(2) "Psychology and Politics", p. 6. The danger of the process of 'popularization' and inflation which psychology has undergone is also pointed out by Wm. Brown: "Responsibility and Modern Psychology", "Psyche", Oct. 1922. "One of the most characteristic features of modern intellectual life is the extraordinary degree of popular interest in problems of a psychological nature. The general educated and semi-educated public would seem to have realized, by a kind of intuition or instinctive insight, the tremendous possibilities of development of mental science in the near future, and the great importance for practical life of a profounder knowledge of psychological laws. Unfortunately, popular interest in the subject appears all too frequently as a fashion or fad of the moment instead of a serious study; and catchwords like 'hypnotism', 'psychoanalysis' and 'auto-suggestion', with a special jargon to match, monopolise attention and encourage an extremism which is foreign to the spirit of all true science."

was doubtful about the immediate practical value of psychology Rivers was not at all in doubt concerning its ultimate value. But apart from its practical applications psychology has undoubtedly succeeded in throwing much new light on the nature of the human mind, on the modes of its operation, and on the nature of the forces that move man to action. Though we must regard its conclusions as tentative, yet, taken with the results of anthropology and biology, they present a wealth of new knowledge for the understanding of human nature and conduct such as has never been available before.

The question inevitably arises - what is the relation of all this new knowledge concerning the nature of man, and the new outlook which it brings to the study which has traditionally concerned itself with the conduct of human life, namely ethics or moral philosophy. Has it made any difference? What answer we give to this question depends on the view we take as to the nature of ethics. When we go into this further question we find that the present status of ethics is ambiguous and uncertain in the extreme. It seems in fact to be in a transitional condition. From its beginnings among the Greeks ethical theory has been one of the great philosophical disciplines. With the extension of scientific inquiry, the rise of the sciences of man, and particularly the emergence of psychology from philosophy a new situation seems to have been created demanding some readjustment in our conception of the nature of ethics. What this situation is has been admirably stated in the writings of John Dewey.[1] He points out that ethical

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(1) Cf. "Reconstruction in Philosophy", Ch. VII: "Human Nature and Conduct", Introd. and Pt. IV: also in "The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy", "Intelligence and Morals".

theory, ever since its inception, has conceived its business to be the discovery of "some final end or goal, or some ultimate and supreme law". This, he says, is the common element in all the diverse classical theories; and it is the existence of this common premise which has made their age-long disputes possible.(1) This common element Dewey calls in question. He believes that the day of such theories is over, and as a result of the extension of the scientific spirit, it is no longer possible to assume in this way a single end or good, a single supreme law, or a single moral motive. According to Dewey (and his view seems to the present writer undeniably sound) what is now needed is not a further propagation of varieties among ethical theories, but a transformation of attitude. From this changed point of view there is "no separate body of moral rules; no separate system of motive powers; no separate subject matter of moral knowledge, and hence no such thing as an isolated ethical science". So that "if the business of morals is not to speculate upon man's final end and upon an ultimate standard of right, it is to utilize physiology, anthropology and psychology to discover all that can be discovered of man, his organs, powers and propensities. If its business is not to search for the one separate moral motive, it is to converge all the instrumentalities of the social arts, of law, education, economics and political science upon the construction of intelligent methods of improving the common lot".

Almost without exception the classical moral theories have declined to take account of the empirical facts of human nature.

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(1) This point of view is still current. The author of the article "Ethics" in the Encyclopaedia Britannica says that ethics is concerned with: "The Supreme Good or the Final End from which all particular duties and virtues may be deduced".

As a result they seem abstracted and apart from the practical conduct of life. In the face of this Dewey's watchword is: "Morals are human", and the study of morals is of all subjects the closest to human nature and "ineradicably empirical". It is not something with a separate province. "Since it directly concerns human nature everything that can be known of the human mind and body, in physiology, medicine, anthropology and psychology is pertinent to moral enquiry". The divorce of ethics from human nature has resulted in the divorce of human nature, in its moral aspects, from the rest of nature and from the actual social environment. "A morals based on study of human nature instead of upon disregard for it would find the facts of man continuous with those of the rest of nature and would thereby ally ethics with physics and biology. It would find the nature and activities of one person continuous with those of other human beings, and therefore link ethics with the study of history, sociology, law and economics. What is needed is the abandonment of 'sterile metaphysics' in dealing with human conduct and the recognition of the integrity of ethics with the facts of human nature and of both with the environment. The human sciences do not supplant ethics, nor do they exhaust it. They supply it with its subject and this it treats from its own particular point of view. Isolated from the facts which they supply it is entirely in the air. But on the basis of them it concerns itself with the valuation of a "plurality of changing, moving, individualized goods and ends", and with the use of "principles, criteria, laws" as "intellectual instruments for analyzing individual and unique situations".(1)

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(1) With Dewey's point of view may be compared that of Holt in "The Freudian Wish and its Place in Ethics". While it is not possible to agree with either the extreme Freudianism or the extreme 'behaviourism' which this book brings together we may agree with the view of the nature of ethics which Holt puts forward. He quotes Epictetus to the effect that morals is a question of "dealing wisely with the phenomena of existence".

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Some such view of the relation of ethics to the natural sciences seems now inevitable. In this essay we will be concerned with one aspect of this relation - with some of the facts of psychology as they bear on the problem of conduct. We must now go on to consider more in detail the relation of ethics to psychology.

2.

Psychology and Ethics.

James Drever has recently formulated what he terms the psychologist's creed. It runs as follows: "For all those arts and sciences which are concerned with the human factor in the world process in any of its phases, the science of psychology is as fundamental as is the science of physics for all those arts and sciences which are concerned with physical processes".(1) In another work he has shown how this claim can be made good so far as the science of education is concerned. It is difficult to see how it can be refuted: yet it is only very gradually being generally acknowledged. One of the reasons why the close bearing of psychology on the sciences that deal in any way with human affairs was so long unacknowledged is to be found in the fact that until very recently the aspect of psychology which is particularly concerned - the dynamic aspect - was in a very undeveloped condition. McDougall pointed out some fifteen years ago that "the department of psychology that is of primary

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Traditional and 'academic' ethics has been largely an ethics 'from above'; an attempt to impose moral ideals on human nature. Such theories hang in the air. We must be content with an ethics 'from below' - the 'unassuming ethics of the dust' - based on the realities of human nature as science discloses them and on the realities of social situations.

(1) "Psychology of Everyday Life", Pref. The same writer has also given an excellent definition of psychology. It is "the science which takes as its field of study the behaviour of living organisms so far as it is mentally or psychically conditioned, and can be interpreted in mental and psychical terms". ("Introduction to the Psychology of Education.")

importance for the social sciences is that which deals with the springs of human action, the impulses and motives that sustain mental and bodily activity and regulate conduct". This, he says, of all the departments of psychology, "is the one that has remained in the most backward state, in which the greatest obscurity, vagueness, and confusion still reign".(1)

Since this was written it is on this aspect of psychology that interest has been almost wholly centred, and as it has developed there has been a growing recognition of the place of psychology as a foundation for the social sciences. McDougall has himself endeavoured to work out the psychological basis of political theory,(2) and numerous writers have tackled the psychology of education. Though Drever has recently said that "the newer ethics is largely a psychology of ethics",(3) there has really been little attempt so far to work out the psychological basis of ethical theory. If evidence were needed as to the necessity for a sound psychological basis for the social sciences, it could easily be found in the fallacies which have resulted from the lack of it. A body of established psychological doctrine not being available assumptions concerning the mind and its mode of operation were consciously or unconsciously adopted, often with the most fallacious results. Psychological assumptions have also been made by those who had some normative doctrine to establish or a preconceived view to support. Ethics provides numerous instances. The doctrine of psychological hedonism is an outstanding one. As McDougall has remarked treatises on ethics have often consisted of amateur psychologising; and now that a body of psychological doctrine is

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(1) "Introduction to Social Psychology", Introd.

(2) Cf. "The Group Mind".

(3) Op. cit., p. 5.

becoming available, assumptions which have been made still hold the field and are very difficult to dislodge.

The relation of psychology to ethics may perhaps be made clear by reference to Drever's recent discussion of its relation to education. He points out that the theory of education presents two aspects: there is a philosophy of education, and a science of education. "The main task of the philosophy of education," he says, "is to examine and evaluate the ends with reference to which educational influences are brought to bear on the child. The task of the science of education is to describe and explain ..... the process by which the behaviour of the child is controlled and modified and his character moulded."(1) It is fairly clear that psychology underlies the science of education. But the scheme of values which the philosophy of education adopts must also be psychologically possible and it is only through psychological knowledge that "the results achieved by the philosophy of education can come to have anything more than a merely academic significance". Yet these values, while not independent of psychological investigation, also depend on a general philosophy of human life. Drever goes on to point out that not only education, but all the other sciences which deal with man have an aspect which is primarily philosophy rather than psychology: but this aspect is of varying degrees of importance. So far as the importance of this philosophical aspect is concerned education occupies a middle position. Where it is relatively insignificant, as in medicine or industry "the realization of the significance of psychology has come suddenly in our own time". Where the philosophical aspect is more fundamental, as in ethics or

(1) "Introduction to the Psychology of Education", p. 4.

political theory, recognition of the need for a psychological basis is more difficult to obtain. It is in ethics, probably, that this philosophy aspect is most fundamental; and there has never been any lack of recognition of the fact. As Dewey has shown, there has been little recognition of any other aspect. And this point of view is still exclusively maintained by some. Ethics is declared by one writer to be "a philosophy and not a science", and "one of the chief tasks of ethics is to prevent the intrusion into its own sphere of inquiry of ideas borrowed from other and alien sources"(1). But it is possible to distinguish also ethics as a science of conduct, drawing its material from all the sciences that deal with man - and particularly from psychology. The one aspect of ethics is concerned with ends and values, the other with the facts of human nature, and throughout the two must be kept in the closest relation. It should be possible to recognize and to do justice to both of them. They are clearly distinguished in a recent article by Laird(2). "It is a commonplace, surely, that the ordering of our lives is always the ordering of our impulses, instincts, and desires. Consequently, if these can be ordered, the essential problem is plainly which of them are best worth fostering, and how far our control of them extends. The first part of this question is a problem of values, and men will continue to argue about it so long as their sense of

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(1) Art. "Ethics", Enc. Brit.

(2) "Moral Responsibility and the New Psychology", Hibbert Journal, July, 1922. Cf. also the view of the relation of psychology and ethics advanced by J.K. Tufts in an essay "The Moral Life" (in "Creative Intelligence" by various authors). He says that writing about ethics has tended to take one of two forms: 1. Description of conduct in terms of anthropology and psychology; 2. Examination of concepts such as good and bad, right and wrong, duty and freedom. In ethics as in knowledge thoughts without contents are empty, percepts without concepts are blind. The 'thoughts' of ethics are the terms 'right', 'good', 'ought', 'worth'. The percepts are the instincts and emotions, desires and aspirations, conditions of time, place and institutions.

values continues to differ. The second part of the question is a problem of psychological fact, and it would be settled if we could determine the relative powers and potencies of the different impulses in men (including, of course, the reflective impulses)." Psychology, then, while it is basic for ethics is distinguished from it and does not exhaust it. It would be quite mistaken to attempt to reduce ethics to psychology. It should be possible to see and to keep in mind both the validity of psychological explanation and also its limits.

There will be no attempt here to cover the whole field of the psychology of ethics: but only some parts of it which are at present in dispute. However important the philosophical aspect of ethics may be, no one who has any knowledge of modern psychology would deny the fact that, at the moment, in view of the new and far-reaching developments which have been rapidly taking place in psychology, its scientific aspect is not also vitally important. What these developments are we will endeavour to make clear. It is not suggested that ethics should accept uncritically current psychological theories as they relate to conduct. Such acceptance must always be carefully guarded against, and especially at a time when theories are so rife. But they cannot simply be ignored. What is needed is an endeavour to examine them critically and an effort to determine how far they are well-grounded and what they really imply.

3.

Recent Developments in Psychology.

William McDougall has made the prophecy that "a century hence the present time will be held to be remarkable for the great advances made in our understanding of the mind"[1], and many

(1) "The Present Position in Clinical Psychology", loc. cit.

think that this is true. As has already been remarked the present is a time of extraordinary activity in psychology, and, as a necessary result, the subject is in a very fluid condition. Developments in the science have taken place so rapidly that there has been something of a break in its continuity. And since many of these new developments have come from outside the main body of psychological doctrine there is at present a tendency in many quarters to make a sharp distinction between the older 'academic' psychology and the 'new' psychology. While the reasons for this contrast are quite intelligible it cannot be regarded as other than unfortunate and efforts should be made to incorporate the new discoveries in the general body of the science.(1) The term 'New Psychology' now so very much in the air and very freely and loosely employed covers a number of different tendencies, though all with much the same outcome, which result from the adoption of the biological, the clinical and the social modes of approach to the problem of man's mind.

What is needed in a science at a time when new theories fill the air is, above all things, a right perspective and the ability to see things in their due proportion. It should help

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(1) Cf. Some remarks by Wm. Brown on the 'new' psychology and its wide applications (Art. Psychology and Psychotherapy, Journal of Mental Science, January, 1922). "There is just now a strong tendency towards a turning away from earlier modes of thought with regard to psychology, almost a looking down upon its past history and attempting to form a new science ready-made upon the basis of certain modern theories and observations. And you have a group of people who talk proudly of the 'new psychology' although when you get into their antecedents you find that, in their intellectual ambition, although they may start out from facts of pathological psychology, they are even more anxious to extend their generalisations, mainly based upon those facts, to wider and wider problems of human nature, of sociology and of civilisation. So that at the present day there is a danger of a new philosophy - I might call it following William James's nomenclature a chromo-philosophy - being built upon the basis of certain observations, and worked out in undue dissociation from earlier modes of thought."

us to do this if we remember that this is not the first time there has been a 'new' psychology. Nearly thirty years ago there was a similar enthusiasm. Writing then, William James said, "The 'new' psychology has become a term to conjure up pretentious ideas withal" - and it has become so again. The 'boom' in psychology to which James referred resulted from the application of experimental methods which, while it has led to important results, has certainly not fulfilled the exaggerated hopes of some of its advocates. The tendencies which make up what is now termed the 'new' psychology have already been flourishing for some time, and it is beginning to be possible to see what has been established.

Throughout, this movement has been characterized, negatively, by a strong reaction against the 'intellectualism' of the older psychology. It is claimed, and very justly, that there clung about it an air of unreality; it seemed divorced from the facts of mind and conduct as men actually knew them.(1) This was well put, some years ago, by one who is not a psychologist at all, by H.G. Wells, in one of his novels. "It seems to me one of the most extraordinary aspects of all that literature of speculative attack which is called psychology, that there is no name and no description at all of most of the mental states that make up life. Psychology, like sociology, is still largely in the scholastic stage; it is ignorant and intellectual, a happy refuge for the lazy industry of pedants; instead of experience and accurate description and analysis it begins with the rash assumption of elements and starts out upon

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(1) James printed out that the official outlines of the subject were "far too neat to stand in the light of analogy with the rest of nature ..... Nature is everywhere gothic, not classic. She forms a real jungle, where all things are provisional, half-fitted to each other, and untidy".

ridiculous synthesis. Who with a sick soul would dream of going to a psychologist?" However true this was when it was written, it is certainly less true now.

The reason for the almost exclusively intellectual preoccupation of psychology and its resulting barrenness so far as understanding conduct and character is concerned is clear if we consider the history of the science. To quote Rivers:(1) "Fifty years ago psychological teaching and research were entirely in the hands of men whose interests lay in the direction of philosophy. Psychology was regarded as a branch of philosophy and was treated by methods differing little, if at all, from those which were utilised in the study of logic, ethics and metaphysics. To men whose lives were devoted to such pursuits, intellect and reason were the salt of knowledge and their interest was turned predominantly, often exclusively, to the intellectual aspect of the mind. Even much later the text-books and manuals of psychology which formed the basis of academical instruction were almost exclusively concerned with purely intellectual processes. Feeling, emotion, and desire took a secondary place, while instinct was often omitted altogether". Rivers goes on to point out that two developments which took place in psychology did not rid it of its intellectual bias but, if anything, strengthened it. These were the introduction of the experimental method and the application of psychology to education. Intellectual aspects of the mind lend themselves far more readily to experimental investigation, and they were almost exclusively treated. Also the psychology of education, in its earlier phases, was concerned chiefly with the processes of memory and association, and others which are involved in the acquisition of knowledge. Little attention

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(1) "Instinct and the Unconscious", App. VII, "Psychology and the War".

was paid to the affective aspects of the mind. This neglect was also due to the fact that, until very recently, introspection was the chief method of psychology and the psychologist himself was his main subject. While introspection is a valuable and adequate method for investigating cognitive processes and must always remain one of the chief methods of psychology, it is difficult and almost impossible to apply it to the affective and active aspects of the mind. Instincts, emotions and sentiments, being so difficult to investigate by introspection, tended to be overlooked. As Rivers says, before the war psychology had reached a phase in which it was becoming more and more obvious that the intellectual factors with which it was chiefly concerned were wholly inadequate to account for human behaviour.

Now the reaction has come with a vengeance and there has been a complete shift of emphasis. On their positive side the newer tendencies in psychology stress the fundamental importance of all the non-rational aspects of the mind - of instincts, emotions and of unconscious mental processes, and they have been concerned wholly with their elucidation. As contrasted with the static elements in mental life with which traditional psychology had been concerned, all the tendencies which make up the new psychology agree in emphasizing the dynamic aspects of the mind. So much is this so that a recent writer speaks of dynamic psychology as a new science concerned with the study of "instincts, motives, emotions, and imaginative (or autistic) thinking as opposed to the static functions of attention, perception, memory and similar conscious logical processes"; this new science growing up "from the observations and speculations of sociologists, anthropologists, criminologists, neurologists and psychiatrists, and to a less extent from the work of the psychologist with the normal man"[1]. What are

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(1) J. T. MacCurdy: "Problems in Dynamic Psychology", Pref.

characterized as the 'arm-chair' and the 'laboratory' schools of psychology are both scorned by the newer writers. So also is introspection as a method. "The days of the 'a priori' psychologist are over," says one writer, "a man can no longer sit in his study and spin out of himself the laws of psychology by a process of self-examination."(1)

As was said the new influences now operative in psychology came more or less from without the subject. They did not arise within academic psychology itself. They came from investigation in various spheres in which observers found that they received little help from established psychological principles. These investigations have forced the academic psychologist to recognize the importance of the factors which he had neglected. It seems possible to distinguish three lines of influence which have brought the new psychology into being, and with it the shift of emphasis in psychology from the intellectual to the instinctive, affective and unconscious aspects of the mind. These are:

1. The biological mode of regarding the human mind: the application to mind of the doctrine of human development from sub-human ancestors;

2. The study of abnormal and pathological states of mind;

3. The study of the mental processes underlying man's social activities. Let uslook at each of these in turn.

1. In his "History of Psychology Brett says that "the most decisive factor in the progress of modern psychology is undoubtedly the theory of evolution".(2) It is only of comparatively recent work in psychology that this is really true. Psychology has, in fact, been late in being seriously influenced by the

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(1) H. Head: Article in "Brain", 1918.

(2) Vol. III, p. 285.

doctrine of evolution. In one of the chapters of the "Descent of Man" Darwin declared that his purpose was to show that "there is no fundamental difference between man and the higher animals in their mental faculties". He undoubtedly established his case for the continuity of development of the animal, and the human mind. But it was long before this point of view was generally adopted and the mind of man regarded as a product of evolution no less than his body. Now it is being very energetically proclaimed and constitutes one of the keynotes of the new psychology. There is no serious gap, it is said, and no difference in kind, but only those of degree between the reflex activities of the protozoa and the highest mental processes of man - a continuously graded series between the "pursuit of its prey by the amoeba and the moral struggles of man". "We have to regard the human mind," says McDougall, "not as different in kind from the animal mind, but rather as built up on a foundation which is essentially similar to the animal mind, especially to that of the animals nearest to us in the tree of life. We must look for evidence of the persistence of the types of structure and function of the animal mind, remembering that these fundamental structures are overlaid by later evolved structures, and that their functioning is complicated and disguised by the activities of the more recently evolved structures." (1) The adoption of this point of view has meant that those mental characteristics which man shares with the lower animals have been increasingly emphasized and claimed as of fundamental importance; (2) and it is claimed that any real understanding of man's behaviour must depend on a knowledge of

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(1) Outline of Psychology, p. 57.

(2) At the moment the resemblances of the human and the animal mind seem to concern many writers more than the differences. For an admirably balanced account of man's relation to the rest of the organic world, cf. Julian Huxley: "Essays of a Biologist", p. 76 ff. From a less general point of view cf. C. Read: "The Differentiation of the Human from the Anthropoid Mind", Brit. Journal of Psychology, VIII.

the relation his mind bears to that of the animals. Hence the emphasis on instinct. Primitive man, it is said, inherited his instincts from the animals, modern man from privitive man. To quote Trotter: "The instincts are tendencies deeply ingrained in the very structure of his being. They are as necessarily inherited, as much a part of himself, and as essential a condition for the survival of himself and his race, as are the vital organs of his body. Their persistence in him is established and enforced by the effects of millions of years of selection, so that it can scarcely be supposed that a few thousand years of civilized life which have been accompanied by no steady selection against any single instinct can have had any effect whatever in weakening them. The common impression that such an effect has been produced is doubtless due to the great development in civilized man of the mental accompaniments of instinctive processes".(1) What are ~~formed~~ termed the 'higher' - the characteristically human - mental functions are not completely ignored by these writers, but they are regarded as later and "relatively superficial" developments "built on a groundwork of largely unconscious and non-rational instincts, desires and emotions which are inherited from primitive man, and from man's non-human forerunners".(2) These latter influence human activities profoundly, often in quite unsuspected ways. The ideas which man often believes influence his conduct are regarded as but "eddies and ripples on the surface of the stream", deep within which are "the currents and forces of the mind". To quote from McDougall again: "The instinctive strivings of the animals generally bring them surely to their biological ends, without clear

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(1) "Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War", pp. 95-6.

(2) A.G. Tansley: "The New Psychology and its Relation to Life", p. 23.

consciousness either of those ends, or of the means by which they are achieved, or of the objects which, by impressing their senses, guide their successive steps. And it is not otherwise with man; he also is borne on to his biological ends, for the most part but dimly conscious of those ends or of the mental forces and processes by which he achieves them."(1) This, then, is the outcome of the biological way of looking at the human mind.

2. Just as the advent of the biological viewpoint has led to emphasis on the factor of instinct in man's mental make-up, so the viewpoint of psycho-pathology has resulted in a greatly increased emphasis being laid on the closely allied affective and unconscious factors. Very important developments have taken place in recent years in psycho-pathology, and they are the most important and best-known source of the new psychology. Here is another prophecy which indicates how important some writers believe these developments to be for the general understanding of the mind. "When the twenty years just past come to be looked back upon from the distant future, it is probable that their chief claim to interest will be that they saw the birth of abnormal psychology."(2) Probably the most far-reaching general conclusion of psycho-pathology is that disordered conditions of mind are simply extreme and heightened developments of functions and processes which characterize mind in general. They differ from normal states in degree and not in kind, and the two shade into each other imperceptibly. Mental disorders give variations in conditions such as are supplied in other sciences by experiment and by means of the

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(1) Art. "The Present Position in Clinical Psychology", loc. cit.

(2) W. Trotter, op. cit.

study of them it is claimed that light is thrown on much that has hitherto been inexplicable in mind and behaviour. In mental disorders such as hysteria and insanity it is found that emotional conflicts and processes which lie beneath the level of personal consciousness are all-important. It is concluded that they play a far greater part than has hitherto been realized in the normal mind.

These new developments have been associated chiefly with the names of Janet, Freud and Jung. When they commenced their investigations these workers found that the principles of psychology as generally accepted were of little or no help to them: so they cast these aside. Their work has developed on such independent lines and has resulted in so many new conceptions being introduced that it has been difficult to bring it into line with general psychology. Especially is this so in the case of the theories of Freud, and the early boycott of his views in scientific circles drove him and his followers into a dogmatism and an exaggeration such as often results from intellectual isolation. This has heightened the opposition of the psycho-analysts to academic psychology and has even led to the claim that psycho-analysis is a separate science - a claim which no psychologist would admit. Freud's work, it is asserted, signifies "a great deal more than the formulation of a series of new conclusions or the announcement of new discoveries, important as they may be: it involves a radical change in our attitude towards the structure and functioning of the mind".(1) Freud's theories have, of course, long passed beyond the sphere

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(1) Ernest Jones: Psychological Bulletin, 1910. For a recent exposition of the Freudian psychology cf. J. Levine: "The Unconscious"; cf. also Rivers: "Instinct and the Unconscious" App. I. For a brief account of the Freudian and various 'post-analytic' schools, cf. J. Ernest Nicole: "Psycho-analytic Schools: Old and New", Lancet, 1922.

of psycho-pathology. They have been very widely applied, very extensively discussed and very variously appraised. His followers do not seem likely to underestimate the importance of Freud's work. They have found in him "the Darwin of the mind". Ernest Jones, for example, writes: "Half a century had to elapse before the advent of a Darwin of the mind. Now, thanks to Freud, we have for the first time a purely naturalistic theory of mental evolution, one free from any admixture of metaphysical, ethical or supernatural mysticism".(1) Whatever may be the final judgment on Freud's theories and his therapeutic methods,(2) practically all psychologists would now agree that he has been responsible for many valuable contributions to their science: contributions which modify and enrich very considerably its modes of interpretation, and which have given much new impetus to the whole subject. A well-known American psychologist, G. Stanley Hall, has recently gone so far as to say that "the advent of Freudianism marked the greatest epoch in the history of our science. Not only did it bring the element of feeling, which had received comparatively little attention from scientific psychologists, into the very foreground of attention, but it made it the prime determinant of human development".(3)

The Freudian theory not only stresses the importance of affective factors in mind and conduct. It stresses also the

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(1) "Papers on Psycho-analysis", p. 6. The exclusively positive nature of Freudianism is often emphasized. It is illustrated by a remark of Freud's when questioned whether his doctrine of psychical determinism did not rule out all moral estimates. He replied "that it was not moral estimates that were needed for the solving of the problem of human life and motives, but more knowledge". (J.J. Putnam, "Addresses on Psycho-analysis".)

(2) And it must always be kept in mind that successful clinical results are not necessarily evidence of the truth of the psychological doctrines on which they claim to be based.

(3) "Life and Confessions of a Psychologist", Ch. VIII, "Progress in Psychology".

importance of processes which lie outside the field of conscious awareness. It claims that the mind has deep unconscious foundations and that consciousness often gives no indications of the real causes determining thought and action, and is not to be taken at its face value. One of the leading exponents of this theory, Ernest Jones, in a paper read before the International Congress of Psychology, sums up its contributions to psychology as follows: "Psychoanalytic investigation of the unconscious mind, the region from which proceeds the greater part of our mental activities, leads one to attach vastly more importance than is generally done to (a) the instinctual and emotional elements as compared with the intellectual: in fact one can see no dynamic significance whatever in ideas except in so far as they function as the representative of some impulse or other; to (b) inborn tendencies rather than acquired habits; and to (c) appetitive impulses as compared with reactive ones. The weight of these conclusions is hard to appreciate without some knowledge of the importance of unconscious activity in our mental life". McDougall, in a critical estimate of this theory,[1] says that Freud has brought to light two great allied facts. These are: 1. The impulsive, demoniac, illogical nature of much of human thought and conduct; 2. The very partial and inadequate way in which consciousness reflects and represents the workings of this impulsive force. Other conceptions which are due to Freud are those of mental conflict, of repression and of sublimation, and these are now widely accepted and seem to be of considerable value.

In general the outcome of this approach to the problem of mind and conduct, like the outcome of the biological approach, has been to give prominence to all the non-rational aspects of mental life.

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(1) Op. cit.

3. Very similar conclusions to those of psycho-pathology have been reached independently through the study of social psychology. In this sphere also there has been a turning away from the 'intellectualism' of academic psychology. When attempts were made to understand the mental processes which underlie associated life it was found that what Dewey terms "the rubrics of introspective psychology"(1) were of little assistance. Not intellectual and reasonable considerations, but emotions and sentiments resting back upon instinctive trends, and prejudices whose foundations were often quite unconscious, were found to be primary in determining the behaviour of man in his social relations. These conclusions are well illustrated in the earlier work of Graham Wallas.(2) In his "Human Nature in Politics" he endeavours to get at the real working forces of political life and he discovers the falsity of the intellectualistic assumption that the human adult is a reasoning being who acts according to certain rationally approved ends. The 'intellectuality' of mankind has been vastly exaggerated, and Wallas discovers the enormous strength of mental processes other than rational - of the instinctive and affective processes. Another writer who has been led to somewhat similar conclusions is Le Bon.(3) Rivers sums up the outcome of this line of study: "We have learnt that the behaviour of man is far less subject to reason and intelligence than was once supposed, and that his reactions

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(1) See "The Need for Social Psychology", Psychological Review, Vol. 24.

(2) Graham Wallas's change in point of view should be noted. In the preface to his "The Great Society" he says that while his "Human Nature in Politics" was an argument against 19th century intellectualism, his later book is, at times, "an argument against certain forms of 20th century anti-intellectualism". As McDougall says somewhere Wallas seems to have become alarmed by the success of his early attack on 'intellectualism' and to have set himself to undo the work he had achieved.

(3) Cf. "The Crowd"; on this topic cf. also W. Trotter: "Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War".

to circumstances are often with difficulty to be distinguished from the behaviour of the unreasoning brutes. This absence or deficiency of reason is especially pronounced in those social reactions in which individual differences dictated by reason sink into insignificance before the mass reactions of the crowd".(1)

These three points of view, the biological, the clinical and the social, and the conclusions to which they lead were all in evidence in psychology before the war, and were beginning to influence it. The war served to emphasize, to exemplify and to confirm the conclusions of all three. Since the war, as a result, the 'new' psychology has boomed. The spectacle of the civilized world at war, and the impulses which war called forth in combatants and non-combatants alike gave a new and heightened significance to the study of the biological foundations of human nature. "War," it is said, "strips off the later deposits of civilization and allows the primitive man in us to reappear."(2) It certainly gave added emphasis to the doctrine of the community of human and animal nature, and added colour to the doctrine of the persistence and strength of primitive instincts in the human mind.(3)

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(1) "Instinct and the Unconscious", p. 40. Cf. also by the same author "Psychology and Politics"; Chs. I and II of this book indicate very well the great change which has come over this aspect of psychology.

(2) S. Freud: "Reflections".

(3) Since the war there has been, very naturally, a marked tendency to take a much less optimistic and more disillusioned view of human nature. Cf. e.g. a recent article by Dean Inge: "Man to-day is what half a million years of evolution have made him. He has many noble qualities, but he is also the most cruel, treacherous and destructive of wild beasts. He submits to the law of the pack as wolves do. The higher qualities of mankind seem to be very closely intertwined with the lower". Kipling, in a recent speech, defined man as "an imperfectly denatured animal subject to the unpredictable reactions of an unlocated spiritual area". There is at present no end of popular psychologising of "the Cave-man Within Us" and "Our Savage Mind" type. As for reason in man the authors of this sort of book seem to take absolutely literally the couplet that

"Er nennt's Vernunft und braucht es nur allein
Ja thierischer als jedes Thier zu sein".

Further, the conditions of modern warfare produced mental disorders on an entirely unprecedented scale. While the experience in treating these did not confirm Freud's doctrine of the sexual origin of all psycho-neuroses, it did to a considerable extent confirm his theory of the mode of causation of these disorders. Not the sex instinct, but the powerful instinct of self-preservation and its associated emotions were found to be the causal factors, psycho-pathologists were strengthened in their belief in the significance of instinctive-emotional factors in mental life.(1)

Finally, the experiences of war-time were far from reassuring students of social behaviour as to the rationality of human nature. They found everywhere evidence of the operation of 'herd' instinct.(2)

The significance of war-time experiences is thus summed up by a recent writer on the psychology of the war. "The war," he concludes, "has shown very little of reason as the fundamental

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(1) For an account of the effects of practical war-time experience on psychology, cf. F.C.S. Schiller: Art. "Psychical Research", Enc. Brit., New Volumes. "Psychology during the war made considerable progress because numbers of academic psychologists were compelled to practise and to apply their theoretical conceptions to clinical problems, while numbers of medical men, finding themselves unable to cope with the profound disturbances of mental equilibrium inaccurately, but conveniently designated as 'shell shock', were compelled to reckon with the psychical side of medicine. Thus were large bodies of intelligent men forced not only to apply their theories to concrete cases and to correct them by their working but also to recognise the power of the disordered mind to simulate the most various lesions and diseases of the body. As might have been expected the older systems of academic psychology, being compiled out of aesthetic preferences, metaphysical prejudices, methodological assumptions, introspective observations of conscious states, and highly artificial and limited laboratory experiments, did not stand the test of the application to the battlefield at all well."

(2) Cf. e.g. Gilbert Murray, "Herd Instinct and the War", in "The International Crisis".

basis of human activity. It has shown that when reasoning powers were brought into operation it was solely in the interests of some affective-conative disposition, and for the purpose of adapting means to ends which had already been presented to the minds by non-rational causes."(1)

4.

The New Psychology and the Problem of Conduct.

William James says somewhere, that the philosophers who defined man as the 'rational animal' always had much more to say about the 'rational' than the 'animal' part of the definition - which is quite true. Now as we have seen the psychologists have turned the tables completely. Reason has become very much out of fashion. Its influence is belittled on every hand. As so often happens in reactions of this sort the pendulum has swung too far in the opposite direction. It is undoubtedly true as Rivers has pointed out that "there is now a tendency to underestimate the importance of the intellectual factors in the determination of human conduct. It is only gradually that we shall come to see just how intelligence and the intellectual factor take their part in controlling and directing the more affective elements, and how the ultimate factors upon which sane conduct, whether of individual or group, depends are those in which the basic instinctive elements have been modified by reason".(2) On the basis of what has been discovered about the human mind, sweeping generalizations about conduct and its motivation have been hastily made. These are often, as we shall see, of an exceedingly loose and exaggerated

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(1) W. N. Maxwell: "A Psychological Retrospect of the Great War".

(2) "Psychology and Politics", p. 5.

kind showing a complete lack of careful analysis and a failure to take into account all the factors actually involved in behaviour. Numerous examples could be given from current psychological literature. Two or three will suffice. "The first point to appreciate about human character," says one writer, "is that motives spring from instinct not from reason; that the human mind consists of feelings to which intellect is merely a superficial veneer."(1) Another writer refers to man's "simple childish belief that his mind is simple, rational, and straightforward", which ignores "the fundamental fact that the human mind is built up of a bundle of instincts, which, it is true, are kept in check, and therefore often masked, by their interactions, but which are just as much alive and just as vigorous as they were in the days of Neolithic man, which indeed furnish the sole driving power that enables man to do whatever he does do, good or bad".(2) One more quotation: "As a result of the far-reaching investigations of Freud and his followers it would seem that we shall probably have to look to the unconscious for an understanding of the ultimate nature of all the deepest and most powerful motive forces of the mind".(3)

Statements such as these, and they could be multiplied almost indefinitely, seem to show the need for some attempt to determine what has really been established by recent psychological investigation, and how it actually bears upon the problem of conduct. Some attempt to sift out what is true from what is simply picturesque exaggeration. Some that now passes for 'new' psychology can be written down as "pseudo-scientific

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(1) H. Taylor: Human Character, p. 3.

(2) A.G. Tansley: "The New Psychology and its Relation to Life", p. 181. This book is quite the most able of all those dealing with the new tendencies in psychology and stands in a class by itself.

(3) J. C. Flügel: "The Psycho-analytic Study of the Family", p. 7.

verbalism"; but it cannot all be so dismissed. Much that is valuable has been brought to light. What is wanted is neither a new psychology nor an old psychology, but, so far as it can be discovered, a true psychology of human conduct - one that will do justice not merely to some, but to all the known facts. It is certain that old theories have been rudely shaken, and in particular the problem of the intelligent guidance and control of conduct has been acutely raised. It has become necessary to ask the question: can man be rational, and if so, in what sense?

What is attempted here is a critical survey of the current theories of instinct and emotion, and an endeavour to see what part they play in motivating conduct; also some account of the elaboration of the life of feeling and the various factors which sre involved in this process. An attempt will also be made to examine the nature of the guidance and control which is effected and to indicate some conception which will show the different factors involved in conduct in their right relation and under which the self may be looked at as a unity.

The problem of understanding the nature of the forces that move man to action is certainly not getting any simpler. We are beginning to see how amazingly complex the mind is, and how subtle and unexpected are the interactions of all its functions. This is no time for simple and clear-cut theories. In the face of the complex tangle of facts all that can be hoped is to state the problem as clearly as possible, for we believe with Rivers that "if it is possible to state a problem clearly and unequivocally, one has already gone a long way towards its solution".

[illegible] that instincts play any great [illegible] in the production of human conduct.

[illegible] recently been asserted that "the recognition of instinct in the functioning of the [illegible] may be said to be the keynote of modern psychology". [illegible] subject is being very freely discussed. [illegible] amount of literature on this topic to [illegible]. [illegible] (2) but when we come to look into the matter we still closely find that, so far, there is little [illegible]. That is, in fact, a very great deal of confusion and misunderstanding so that one may well hesitate [illegible]

THE NATURE OF INSTINCT IN MAN.

[illegible] the term instinct [illegible] the notion of the [illegible] and the many attempts to apply notions of instinct [illegible] human behaviour, have produced a vast [illegible] of literature tending to make [illegible] instinct also [illegible]. Much of the confusion, as we shall see, arises over the [illegible]. The great diversity of opinion still exists as to [illegible] meaning should be attached to the terms 'instinct' and 'instinctive'. It is unfortunately quite misleading to [illegible] that two different psychologists use these terms [illegible] they mean the same thing by them. The terms are old [illegible] and they have been used in different departments of study [illegible] quite different ways. They are also widely current in popular

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(1) Bertrand Russell: "Primitive Instincts in the Human World" in "The World and what we ought to know about it", p. 6.

(2) See E. C. Tolman: "The Nature of Instinct", [illegible] Bulletin, April 1922.

(3) See [illegible] "[illegible] Instinct and Intelligence".

Our first business will be to examine the conception of instinct as applied to man and to seek to discover, by an examination of some representative theories, what grounds there are for believing that instincts play any considerable part in the motivation of human conduct.

It has recently been asserted that "the recognition of the importance of instinct in the functioning of the human mind may be said to be the keynote of modern psychology".(1) Certainly the subject is being very freely discussed. In a recent survey of current literature on this topic no less than sixty titles are quoted.(2) But when we come to look into this literature at all closely we find that, so far, there is little agreement. There is, in fact, a very great deal of confusion and uncertainty prevailing; so that one may well hesitate before accepting the sweeping statements made by some writers. The excessive use which has been made of the notion of instinct in man, and the many attempts to apply schemes of instincts in various of the social sciences, have provoked a reaction, so that now some are tending to repudiate instinct altogether.(3) Much of the confusion, as we shall see, arises over the use of terms. Great diversity of opinion still exists as to the meaning which should be attached to the terms 'instinct' and 'instinctive'. It is unfortunately quite misleading to imagine that when different psychologists use these terms they mean the same thing by them. The terms are old ones and they have been used in different departments of study, in quite different ways. They are also widely current in popular

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(1) Bernard Hart: "Primitive Instincts in the Human Mind" in "The Mind and what we ought to know about it". p. 9.

(2) See E. C. Tolman: "The Nature of Instinct". Psychological Bulletin, April 1923.

(3) See W. E. Hocking: "The Dilemma in the Conception of Instinct as Applied to Human Psychology", Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology: Vol. XV.

speech and literature where, it is said, they are used with "a minimum of meaning and a maximum of vagueness". All this makes it exceedingly difficult to come by a clear view of the nature of instincts as constituting part of the innate basis of the human mind.

I.

It is a mistake to imagine that the view, now so widely current, that innate tendencies are important in determining conduct is a new one. To go no further back, such writers as Dugald Stewart and others of the Scottish school of philosophers treated the active side of human nature fully and distinguished what they termed 'implanted' or 'instinctive propensities'.(1) Dugald Stewart, in fact, enumerated a list of these which contains almost all the instincts generally recognised to-day. But it was the doctrine of organic evolution, which, throwing light on the nature of instinct in animals and revealing man's relation to them, raised in a new form the question of the place of instinct in human nature. Among psychologists one of the first to take up this question was William James. He defined an instinct in terms of behaviour as "the faculty of acting in such a way as to produce certain ends, without foresight of the ends, and without previous education in the performance".(2) In some respects his treatment of human instincts seems much more adequate and nearer to the facts than many more recent ones. He believed "no other mammal, not even the monkey, shows so large an array". But he points out that the number of human instinctive tendencies, and their susceptibility to modification, have important

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(1) cf. James Drever: "Instinct in Man", Ch. II.

(2) "Principles of Psychology", Vol. II, Ch. XXIV.

consequences. "They contradict each other ..... The animal that exhibits them loses the 'instinctive' demeanour and appears to lead a life of hesitation and choice, an intellectual life; not however because he has no instincts - rather because he has so many that they block each other's path."

The writer who, more than any other, has been influential in advocating the view that instincts play an important part in human conduct is William McDougall. His "Introduction to Social Psychology", first published some fifteen years ago, has had a very remarkable influence on thought on this subject. His book is, in fact, now regarded as something of a classic in psychology. It is the source of almost all the attempts to apply schemes of instinct to practical human problems, and it has been the inspiration of much other writing on the subject. One reason for the wide acceptance of the theory of the instinctive motivation of conduct which it sets forth is to be found in the fact that, at the time of its publication, a satisfactory theory of action was lacking. Psychological hedonism - the pleasure-pain theory which had held the field for so long - had been successfully refuted. What was termed the 'ideo-motor' theory, that every 'idea' is not only a state of knowing but also a tendency to movement, had never been satisfactory. It was no longer possible to explain conduct by referring it to such unanalysed faculties as 'Reason' and 'Will'. McDougall then advanced his clear and simple scheme of the instincts and their accompanying emotions as the moving forces in all human activity. It filled a void and even where not accepted in its entirety it has exerted a striking influence. It has not, of course, escaped criticism. In its original form it was much too definite and clear-cut. McDougall has since introduced various modifications into it and has very

recently completely restated it in a form, however, which has lost much of the original definiteness.(1) It is important to consider it in relation to his views as a whole. It rests back on the system of animism which he expounds in his "Body and Mind", and on his whole doctrine of the 'purposiveness' of all human and animal behaviour of however lowly a kind. In his most recent statement of the theory he connects it with what has come to be termed the 'hormic' view of human activity.(2) The term 'hormic' was suggestive by T. P. Nunn who thus states the theory. "We need," he says, "a name for the fundamental property expressed in the incessant adjustment and adventures that make up the tissue of life. We are directly aware of that property in our conscious activities as an element of 'drive', 'urge' or felt tendency toward an end. Psychologists call it conation, and give the name 'conative process' to any train of conscious activity which is dominated by such a drive ..... To this element of drive or urge, whether it occurs in the conscious life of men and the higher animals or in the unconscious activities of their bodies and the (presumably) unconscious behaviour of lower animals, we propose to give a single name - 'horme'. In accordance with this proposal all the purposive processes of the organism are hormic processes, conative processes being the sub-class whose members have the special mark of being conscious." Schopenhauer's 'will-to-live', Bergson's 'élan vital' and Jung's 'libido' are conceptions closely analogous to this of 'horme'.

According to McDougall each of the instincts expresses

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(1) See "Outline of Psychology" 1923. cf also a long and important article in which McDougall answers criticisms: "The use and abuse of Instinct in Social Psychology", Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, Dec. 1921. Also "Instinct and Emotion", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1914-5, "Motives in the Light of Recent Discussion", Mind, 1920.

(2) "Education: Its Data and First Principles", Ch. II.

"an urge, an impulse, a striving towards some goal by the attainment of which it may be allayed or satisfied". But they are to be regarded, not as a collection of separate faculties, but rather as specific differentiations of a primordial capacity to strive, originally undifferentiated. The instincts are so many channels through which the vital or hormic energy flows. In essence instinctive activity is the liberation and direction of energy and McDougall has attempted to give a basis for this belief in the physiology of the brain and nervous system.(1) He maintains that "each instinct seems to be in some sense a great spring of psychophysical energy, a source from which, when it is tapped, when it is excited by the appropriate conjunction of circumstances, psychophysical energy wells up in a great gush to reinforce and sustain mental and bodily activity". In his latest statement McDougall defines an instinct as "an innate disposition which determines the organism to perceive (to pay attention to) any object of a certain class, and to experience in its presence a certain emotional excitement and an impulse to action which finds expression in a specific mode of behaviour in relation to that object". The word 'disposition' is important in the definition. McDougall stresses the Aristotelian distinction of structure and function. For him the instincts are facts of structure, part of the innate structure of the mind, though, of course, known only through their functioning. It is also important to note that this definition of instinct is based on the familiar threefold division of mental activities into cognitive, affective and conative aspects. This is a break with the traditional view of instinct as merely inborn tendencies to

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(1) See "The Source and Direction of Psychophysical Energy", American Journal of Insanity, 1913.

certain types of activity. As the result of experience the the cognitive and the conative aspects undergo considerable modification and complication. New objects excite the instinct and evoke the impulse to action, which action may take very varying forms. But the central aspect, the emotional excitement, remains unchanged throughout. However much modification the instincts may undergo and however they may be elaborated in the course of the development of character, they remain throughout, it is claimed, the sole motives of all thought and conduct. Habits are secondary and derived from them. Pleasure and pain serve merely to guide their direction. "We may say then," writes McDougall, in a much-quoted passage, "that directly or indirectly the instincts are the prime movers of all human activity; by the conative or impulsive force of some instinct (or of some habit derived from an instinct), every train of thought, however cold and passionless it may seem, is borne along towards its end, and every bodily activity is initiated and sustained. The instinctive impulses determine the ends of all activities and supply the driving power by which all mental activities are sustained, and all the complex intellectual apparatus of the most highly developed mind is but a means towards these ends, is but the instrument by which these impulses seek their satisfactions, while pleasure and pain do but serve to guide them in their choice of means. Take away these instinctive dispositions with their powerful impulses, and the organism would become incapable of activity of any kind; it would lie inert and motionless like a wonderful clockwork whose mainspring had been removed or a steam engine whose fires had been drawn. These impulses are the mental forces that maintain and shape all the life of individuals and societies, and in them we are confronted with the central mystery of life andmind and will."(1)

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(1) Introduction to Social Psychology, p. 44. Cf. also "The great instincts common to most of the higher animals were evolved long before mountain ranges such as the Alps assumed their present form; and they may well survive when all the mountains that we know shall have been worn away". "National Welfare and National Decay", p. 147.

When it comes to classifying instinctive activities and distinguishing the separate instincts McDougall's basis is the quality of the emotional excitement which accompanies the various types of behaviour. It is a fundamental aspect of his theory that "each of the principal instincts conditions some one kind of emotional excitement whose quality is specific or peculiar to it, and the emotional excitement of a specific quality that is the affective aspect of the operation of any one of the principal instincts may be called a primary emotion"[1]. This one-to-one relation of the instincts and primary emotions is the aspect of the theory which has come in for the most damaging criticism. McDougall retains it in the latest form of the theory, though he does not make it quite obvious whether he still uses the quality of the emotional accompaniment as the sole criterion for distinguishing the separate instincts. He now distinguishes in man the following instincts and emotions, recognising, however, that the specificity of these instincts is of very varying degrees.

Instincts.	Emotional Qualities.
1. Instinct of escape.	Fear.
2. Instinct of combat.	Anger.
3. Repulsion.	Disgust.
4. Parental.	Tender emotion.
5. Appeal.	Distress.
6. Pairing.	Lust.
7. Curiosity.	Curiosity.
8. Submission.	Negative self-feeling.
9. Assertion.	Positive self-feeling.
10. Social.	Feeling of loneliness.

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(1) William James ("Principles", Vol. II, p. 442) had called attention to the close relation existing between instinct and emotion: "Instinctive reactions and emotional expressions shade imperceptibly into each other. Every object that excites an instinct excites an emotion as well". McDougall has tried to give a definite explanation of this reaction.

Instincts.	Emotional Qualities.
11. Food-seeking.	Appetite (in narrower sense).
12. Acquisition.	Feeling of ownership.
13. Construction.	Feeling of creativeness.
14. Laughter.	Amusement.

Criticism of this theory of the instincts has, in the main, followed two lines, Lloyd Morgan, Thorndike and more recently Dunlap have tackled it from the side of instinctive behaviour. Shand and Drever have found it defective from the point of view of the relation between instinct and emotion. Let us consider the first of these lines of criticism. Lloyd Morgan (1) contends that what McDougall has termed instincts are simply class names under which are summed up varied modes of response which appear to serve the same general end. None of them is in any way elementary.

"So far from regarding any one of them as a primary element," says Lloyd Morgan, "I regard each item on the list as denoting a class to which a group name is attached - a class comprising varied modes of behaviour and modes of behaviour and modes of experience: a class within which these varied modes are grouped because they have certain features in common, and tend towards what we may term, in a very general way, the same end." McDougall's terms thus become not explanatory, but simply descriptive. Lloyd Morgan further criticises the view that the instincts, thus regarded, are moving forces or determinant of activity. "If we say that pugnacity makes the robin pugnacious, or self-assertion makes the child self-assertive ..... are we not in some danger of regarding each instinct as a faculty in terms of which the instinctive process may be explained? We have such a way of making our general

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(1) Instinct and Experience, Ch. IV.

and abstract terms pose as so-called forces..... Instinct (or a committee of instincts) is not something that through impulsive force and motive power drives bodily or mental processes towards their ends; it is a concept in terms of which we can in some measure interpret these processes as facts presented in nature."[1]

A somewhat similar criticism of McDougall is advanced by Thorndike[2], whose point of view is very similar to that of William James. He characterises instinct in McDougall's sense as "mythical potencies" to postulate which is altogether unnecessary. "It is no more necessary, and it is much less accurate, to describe man loosely as possessed of 'an instinct of self-preservation' than it is to describe oxygen as possessed of an instinct of rust production. The real facts meant, in this and in all cases, are a multitude of more or less specialized responses to certain actual situations." He finds it necessary to part company with "stock descriptions of instincts" and endeavours to replace them by a statement of the specific responses to specific situations which human nature displays. More recently Knight Dunlap has raised the question "whether there are instincts in the teleological sense - the sense in which the term is used in McDougall's Social Psychology"[3]. His answer is that there are not. What are termed such are groups of activities and such grouping of activities "may be admitted to be a useful procedure, if it be clearly understood to be a device of convenience only similar to the arrangement of documents in a well-ordered filing system". It is pointed out

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(1) The danger of regarding instincts in much the same way as the old 'faculties' were regarded is pointed out by G.C. Field: "Instinct Psychology and Faculty Psychology", Mind, 1921.

(2) "The Original Nature of Man."

(3) "Are there any Instincts?" Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, Dec., 1919.

that the same activities are, at different times, regarded as the expression of different instincts. "There are very few actual responses of the animal which do not form part of a number of 'instincts' whatever the system of classification. The same physiological processes, and in fact the same conscious processes are involved, in primitive man, in pursuing a deer for food, and in pursuing a female for amatory purposes. In other cases the same reactions may now be classed as mere 'flight', now as manifestations of 'gregariousness', now as manifestations of 'self-abasement' ..... I am sure that all the activities physiological and psychological, of which the animal is capable, participate at some time or other in the expression of the 'reproductive' instinct." This is an important point. Criticism of this nature, and much more from a purely 'behaviouristic' point of view, has compelled McDougall to modify his theory in a rather important way. He now admits that there was a confusion involved in the original form of his theory. When he set it out he was still influenced by the view that an instinct is simply an unlearnt motor mechanism. This view he tried to combine with the hormic view of instinct as expressing an inner urge or striving. The two views, he says, are radically incompatible and cannot be combined. This fact he has only just realised. He therefore rejects the view that an instinct is an innately organised mechanism of a reflex nature. Such a view was formulated under the influence of accounts of animal behaviour which exaggerated unduly its fixity and regularity. Later observations have shown that quite low down in the animal scale responses are not fatally determined, but that there is a surprising amount of adaptability. In the case of man especially we must abandon the notion that there are specific motor mechanisms corresponding to each instinct. Such motor mechanisms as exist are not

instincts but merely "the instruments of instincts". One instinctive impulse may make use, according to circumstances, of a variety of motor mechanisms and the same response may be the result of the functioning now of one and now of another instinct.(1)

With this modification of the theory on its motor side, it is clear that the central or emotional aspect of the instinct, which it is claimed is its permanent feature, becomes of even greater importance. But in this aspect the theory has not fared at all well.(2) Shand makes three strong points against McDougall's view that each instinct can be characterised by some one kind of emotional excitement, and he backs them up with numerous illustrations. 1. It is possible for an instinct to be excited and characteristic behaviour to follow without any specific emotion being experienced. Rivers has recently confirmed Shand's contention that in the case of the "danger instinct" fear or emotional excitement of any kind may be lacking. 2. The same primary emotion may be connected with several instincts. McDougall himself points out that the emotion of anger may be aroused in connection with the obstruction of any instinctive impulse. 3. The same instinct may at different times be connected with different primary emotions. The instinct of flight for example may be connected with the emotions of fear, anger or disgust. Drever, who in many other respects agrees with McDougall, also finds himself unable to accept this aspect of his theory.(3) His view is that the affective aspect of instinctive activity is best described as 'interest' and that the more complex affective experiences which

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(1) See: "Outlines of Psychology", p. 117.

(2) "The Foundations of Character." "Instinct and Emotion." Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1914-5.

(3) "Instinct in Man", Ch. VII.

we term emotions only arise as parts of instinctive responses under certain special conditions, namely the checking or arresting of the instinctive impulse. When impulse is thus checked, 'tension' results and emotion appears. Drever agrees that some of the generally recognised instincts are closely related to some of the familiar emotions but adds: "Personally I am not prepared to regard an emotion as a definite psychological entity in the way McDougall apparently does. Nor am I disposed to limit the instinctive tendencies to such tendencies as show in their activity a characteristically emotional component".(1)

McDougall has thus abandoned the view that an instinct can be characterised by a specific form of behaviour. Criticism seems to have established the fact that it cannot be characterised by any one type of emotional accompaniment. The facts of emotion are too complex for the simple generalisation that they bear a one-to-one relation to the instincts. The question then arises how, on this theory, are the different instincts distinguished at all. McDougall seems left without a criterion. He makes one suggestion on this point in his latest statement. He says that we can define and recognize an instinct "by the nature of the goal, the type of situation that it seeks or tends to bring about, as well as by the type of situation or object that brings it into activity".(2) But this is not a psychological criterion at all. It is the abandonment of the psychological point of view in classification. McDougall's scheme of the instincts thus appears, when closely examined, to

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(1) "The Classification of the Instincts." Paper read before the International Congress of Psychology, 1923.

(2) "Outline." p. 119.

be in a far from satisfactory condition. It is attractive in its simplicity; but it is simple where, as we shall see further, the facts are exceedingly complex. He does not claim, however, ~~but~~ that it is more than an hypothesis "justified, if at all, by it co-ordinating in an effective manner an immense range of facts of immediate observation, facts of human and animal behaviour and of human experience".

II.

Dr. James Drever in his "Instinct in Man" has given a full historical survey of thought upon this subject, and in this and subsequent publications has propounded a theory of his own. He takes as a truism the statement "the basis of the developed mind and character of man must be sought in the original and inborn tendencies of his nature". Original nature, he says, consists first of all of 'capacities' such as those to have sensations, to learn, to reason and the like, and of certain active tendencies experienced as conscious impulses. Of these he writes: "The human being comes into the world with certain active tendencies, derived primarily, we may say, from the life force itself, shaped and moulded through long evolutionary epochs into the several forms we find to-day. These active tendencies, so far as they are tendencies involving the co-operation of experience in their working out, though independent of individual experience in their origin, may be designated instincts, the name by which they have been designated since the science of psychology came into being. These instincts are experienced as impulses, each accompanied by a feeling or interest, evoked by certain particular objects, situations, or other experiences, and manifesting themselves in more or less definite kinds of behaviour".(1) The main problem

(1) "Psychology of Everyday Life", p. 20.

for psychology in connection with instincts is the understanding of 'instinct-motivation', so that the psychologist is concerned with the inner or psychical aspect of the instincts, with the "drive, urge or impulsion" by which they are characterised. He believes that viewed from this point of view they fall into two great groups which differ fundamentally. These he terms the 'appetitive' and the 'reactive' respectively.(1) The distinction is this. The appetitive tendencies, including also 'aversions' as well as 'appetitions', are internally evoked by affective experience of an agreeable or disagreeable nature, and the end they seek has reference only to this agreeableness or disagreeableness. Hunger, thirst, sex and sleep are the characteristic appetitive tendencies. The reactive tendencies take the form of reactions to objective situations and the aim is adjustment to them. It is pursued often regardless of agreeableness or disagreeableness. Fear, anger, and curiosity are typical reactive tendencies. The appetitive tendencies are very closely connected with internal bodily changes, especially with the internal secretions. The distinction is not a new one. It has often been made in other terms. The distinction of appetites from instincts is an old one. But there are difficulties involved in it in face of the complexities of human behaviour. Many instinctive manifestations often appear to be both appetitive and reactive, for example, sex. The distinction does not appear to be fundamental and other writers prefer to regard appetite as a factor of greater or less importance in all instinctive activity. Drever further distinguishes between tendencies which are relatively specific and those which are more general. There is also a third distinction. The reactive tendencies are either 'simple' or

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(1) "Introduction to the Psychology of Education", Ch. IV.

'emotional'. This distinction has reference to the facility with which emotional excitement supervenes on any impeding of the reaction, or the degree to which it is normally involved in it. Using these three principles of classification Drever gives what is probably the most comprehensive classification of instinctive tendencies that has yet been offered.

Instinctive Tendencies.

Appetitive.		Reactive.		
General.	Specific.	General.	Specific.	
			Simple.	Emotional.
Unpleasure - avoidance	Hunger	Play		
	Thirst	Experimentation	Prehension	Flight
	Rest		Organ adjustment	Pugnacity
Pleasure - seeking	Exercise	Imitation	Locomotion	Curiosity
	Sex	Sympathy	Vocalization	Self-display
	Nausea	Suggestibility		Self-abasement
				Parental
				Gregarious
				Hunting
				Acquisition
				Courtship
				Repulsion

III.

In the extensive literature dealing with the theory of instincts which has recently grown up some modes of approach to the problem are from an almost exclusively biological point of view. This results in a classification of instincts into three groups: 1. those of self-preservation, 2. those which subserve the continuance of the race. 3. those which maintain the cohesion of the group. These are usually briefly designated as, ego, sex and herd instincts. Such a classification, it is important to observe, is made on the basis of the biological ends which the tendencies serve. It is adopted by Rivers,[1] MacCurdy[2] and

(1) "Instinct and the Unconscious."

(2) "Problems in Dynamic Psychology."

many other writers. As someone has pointed out it is so simple and obvious that it is not surprising to find writer after writer adopting it. It plays a great part in the more popular varieties of psychological literature. A. G. Tansley, for example,(1) speaks of the "three great dominant instincts of ego, herd and sex", which give rise to the "three universal complexes" whose conflicts and interactions are, in his view, "the most important factors in moulding character and personality". He attempts to reduce McDougall's list of instincts to this threefold scheme, not seeing that McDougall's classification is made on quite another basis. This classification has recently been defended by MacCurdy on the basis of its 'pragmatic' value. It is useful as a working scheme for clinical practice. He finds the long list of instincts given by some writers too diffuse. "From a dynamic standpoint their analysis becomes rather tautological, new instincts being easily hypothesized to account for new reactions. The cataloguing of long lists of instincts and disputes as to the existence or non-existence of separate minor instincts degenerate into sterile academic discussions and squabbles about nomenclature." What is wanted is the conception of a group of dominant instincts which interact to produce normality and which sometimes conflict, abnormality being the result. The grouping of instinctive tendencies into ego, herd and sex serves this purpose. But however valuable from this point of view, it is highly artificial in its simplicity. As has been remarked it is "altogether too alluring. It appears to reduce so beautifully the complexities presented by human conduct, normal no less than abnormal". It throws very little light on some aspect of conduct in the concrete to say that it is all the result of

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(1) "The New Psychology and its Relation to Life", Ch. XVIII.

the 'ego instinct'. It is in fact thoroughly misleading to assume, as in so often done, that there is in man an ego instinct, an instinct of sex or a herd instinct. These three are often used as principles of explanation without further analysis. This is 'faculty' psychology with a vengeance. Taken over from biology, this classification of instincts is of little value in attempting to understand the motivation of conduct.

IV.

The problem of instinct is also approached from the point of view of psychopathology. Psycho-analysis, for example, claims to recognise the fundamental importance of instinct in human nature. In psycho-analysis two interwoven strands can be distinguished - that of practice and that of theory. In its theoretical aspects psycho-analysis is open to criticism by psychologists just as is any other body of psychological doctrine. One of the chief exponents of this school has recently declared that its chief positive contribution to our knowledge of human nature is "the demonstration that the normal sexual instinct is vastly more complicated in its structure and extensive in its ramifications than had previously been recognised".(1) It certainly has demonstrated this and has performed a valuable service to psychology in doing so. The heated controversy which has raged over its treatment of sex and the opposition with which it has been met are well known. It now seems clear that the charge of 'pan-sexualism' was not without foundation. However widely 'sex' may be interpreted it has been considerably overemphasised

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(1) Ernest Jones: "The Classification of the Instincts". Paper read before the International Congress of Psychology.

as a principle of explanation.[1]

It is not at all easy to discover just how writers of this school regard instinct. It is certainly regarded very widely and loosely. As McDougall has somewhere pointed out the Freudian method is not one of preliminary analysis and clear definition. Freud does not delay to define the notion of instinct, or to discover what part it is or is not capable of playing in mental life. His method is rather to postulate the instinct and then to attribute to it a whole range of phenomena which may or may not really be connected with it.[2] Freudians "hasten to attribute to the sexual instinct a large number of mental and bodily activities which are rooted in other instincts than the sexual, or are highly intellectualized processes determined by more than one instinct or rather by highly complex sentiments in which perhaps the sex instinct has no part". The more recent developments of psycho-analytical theory have stressed not only sex instincts, but also what are termed the 'ego' instincts. All instincts are apparently reduced to these two groups.[3] The distinction is adopted as

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(1) For an admirable treatment of sex in man cf. Julian Huxley: "Sex Biology and Sex Psychology" in his recent "Essays of a Biologist".

(2) What Freud has done is well summed up by McDougall ("The Present Position in Clinical Psychology", Proceedings Royal Socy. of Medicine, 1918): "Without any preliminary attempt to consider first principles of mental life, to analyse consciousness, or even to define the terms which he uses, this daring and original inquirer has wrestled at first hand with the problems of conduct and especially with the problems of disordered conduct as presented to him by his patients in all their concreteness and complexity. Thus approaching, he has been deeply impressed by the great fact that much of human conduct, both normal and abnormal, proceeds not from consciously reasoned motives, nor from any chain of association of clear ideas, but from a great impelling force that works within us, expressing itself very obscurely in consciousness as vague feeling and uneasiness. This he has recognised as the sexual impulse; and, having been deeply impressed by the far-reaching effects of this on conduct, and by the obscure and devious modes of its operation, he has gone on to bring under the same heading whatever other forces of a similar nature he has seemed to detect as co-operating with and subserving it, or which the vagueness of common speech seems in any way to connect with it".

(3) cf. Freud: "Triebe und Triebschicksale" in "Sammlung Kleiner Schriften zur Neurosenlehre".

the result of inquiry into the origin of certain types of psycho-neurotic disorders - what are termed the "transference neuroses". These are held to result from a conflict between these two groups of instincts. Freud regards the sex instinct as made up of a number of partial instincts, which can be regarded as pairs of opposites. They are originally separate tendencies, and only gradually become integrated. Abnormalities in conduct are the result of the failure of this integration to take place. Of the ego instincts Freud says little. "Speaking very broadly, we may say that they are the non-sexual instincts."(1) This is speaking very broadly indeed. The term seems to cover everything in the personality which opposes or represses the 'libido' or sexual energy in its strivings for satisfaction. Freud has treated further of this topic in a recent work of a speculative or "metapsychological" nature.(2) He still stresses the antithesis between the sex and the ego instincts, but on an altogether new basis. He admits that in the course of the development of psycho-analytical theory the qualitative difference between the two groups was found not to exist: "A part of the ego-instincts was recognised as libidinous; in the ego, sexual instincts were found to be active". Then it seemed that Freud must "admit the critics to be in the right who from the first had suspected that psycho-analysis makes sexuality an explanation of everything". But he now transforms the original contrast into a purely hypothetical contrast of the sex instinct as 'life instincts' and the ego instincts as 'death' instincts. This is admitted to be pure speculation. It looks exceedingly like an attempt to find, at all costs, a way out of an 'impasse'. Freud's last word is that "it remains an awkward fact

(1) Introductory Lectures on Psycho-analysis.

(2) "Beyond the Pleasure Principle."

that analysis up to now has only put us in the position of demonstrating libidinous impulses". This seems to indicate that the charge of 'pan-sexualism' against this school is still well-founded. Freudian writers are all guilty of using the terms 'instinct' and 'instinctive' in an altogether illegitimate way. Confusion on a large scale is the result. No attempt is made carefully to define the meaning of the terms or to reach clear concepts. This may not matter very much in clinical practice, but when, as the result of such practice, far-reaching statements are made concerning conduct in general it does become important.

V.

In view of its amazing vogue as a popular conception it seems worth while to devote some special attention to what is termed the 'herd' instinct. The way in which, in the hands of some writers, this instinct becomes an almost universal principle of explanation, typifies very well the way in which instinct in general is regarded.

The recognition of a 'herd' or gregarious tendency in man is by no means recent. It is W. Trotter's "Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War" which is largely responsible for the present popularity of the conception, and for its use in a way which is positively riotous.(1) Trotter writes: "It is probably not necessary now to labour the proof of the fact that man is a gregarious animal in literal fact, that he is as essentially gregarious as the bee, the ant, the sheep, the ox, and the horse. The tissue of characteristically gregarious reactions which his conduct presents, furnishes incontestable proof of this thesis, which is thus an indispensable clue to an

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(1) Cf. also: "Herd Instinct and the War" by Gilbert Murray in "The International Crisis". Walter Lippmann ("Yale Review", July 1922) writing of the irrationality of much social behaviour says: "The fashionable thing to do in this connection is to pronounce the phrase 'herd instinct' with a sense of finality. At the moment these are magic words yielding glamour and ironical relief".

inquiry into the intricate problems of human society".(1) Trotter treats the herd instinct in the Freudian manner: that is he postulates it and does not inquire what is its exact nature in man, or the limits and scope of its application. He rather sweeps into its province whatever human activities are in any way social, which is, of course, most of them. It is thus made to 'explain' almost all that human beings do in relation to one another.(2) No attempt is made at further analysis. The tendency to form groups, to imitate the actions of others, suggestibility, in general, the dislike of innovation, religion, altruism and many other highly developed forms of conduct are all covered by it. Using precisely the same method it would be possible to make out an equally good ~~case~~ case for an 'instinct of isolation' or a 'solitary' instinct. There are numerous phenomena of animal and human life which could be cited to support the assumption of such an instinct. There is, in human nature, clearly a need not only for association with others but also for privacy. Both seem equally primitive. It might be said that it is the enormous increase in the intimacy and complexity of present social relations which has led to the emphasising of human gregariousness. But such a procedure of explaining by 'instincts' is wholly fallacious. Trotter has undoubtedly observed very acutely many of the outstanding phenomena of modern social life and he has been struck by their irrational character. But to ascribe them simply to 'herd instinct' is an easy and dogmatic way of explaining facts whose

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(1) p. 112.

(2) Cf. also Tansley, "The New Psychology": "Herd instinct in its raw form is an animal character, and the more clearly we recognise the fact the better position we shall be in to master it and direct it to worthier ends. It is well for us to realize that we constantly act like sheep, like monkeys, or like wolves; as well as that in virtue of the same instinct many of us are ready to die for our country, and a few to live for it, or even for the human race". (Preface)

causes and effects are far more complicated than is admitted. It is not of course denied that a gregarious tendency is involved in original human nature. But man's gregarious behaviour is of a very complex sort compared, for example, with that of the bee. Viewed historically human gregariousness is somewhat complicated. It seems that man became gregarious quite late in his evolutionary history. The instinct so far as it exists is thus much younger and cannot take place beside such tendencies as those of sex, or of self-preservation. The need for further analysis before we can talk with any confidence of a gregarious instinct in man has been well expressed by Rivers. "In recent psychological literature," he says, "we read far more about the activity and effects of the herd-instinct than about what this instinct is. Singularly few attempts have been made to justify the instinctive character of the processes by which the social group influences the individual, to distinguish between those elements which are instinctive and those which form part of the social heritage. The whole matter requires a prolonged and detailed study based upon evidence from amany different fields: from the comparative study of different societies; from the observation of the behaviour of the child; from the study of disorders of the mental life due in the main to conflicts between individual tendencies and social or gregarious factors; from that wider study in which human behaviour is regarded biologically in its relation to that of other animals."(1)

Cf. also F.C. Bartlett, "Psychology and Primitive Culture" Ch II

(1) "Psychology and Politics", p. 39. McDougall has given a very good account of the operation of the gregarious tendency in man: "I recognise that the gregarious instinct does play a part in giving society its great hold upon us, namely, as follows: Its impulse becomes on the human plane the desire, not only for the physical proximity of other human beings and for intercourse with them, but also for the sharing of our emotions with other men; for it is only then that the gregarious impulse attains its fullest satisfaction. On the primitive human plane, this satisfaction is attained by physical immersion in the crowd; for then the primitive sympathetic tendencies secure uniformity of emotion in all members. On a higher and imaginative plane this desire for community of emotion becomes what I have called 'the principle of active sympathy'; that is to say it prompts us to desire to be in emotional harmony with those about us, and it renders us uneasy and dissatisfied, so long as we feel that in any matter our emotional attitude is widely different from that of our group or social circle." (Outline of Psychology, pp. 430-1.)

VI.

A very valuable contribution to the discussion of the nature and place of instinct in man is contained in John Dewey's latest book: "Human Nature and Conduct". Dewey brings some very searching criticism to bear on some of the exaggerations of the upholders of instinct. Dewey discusses the original human tendencies in the second part of his book and justifies this order of treatment by pointing out that "impulses though first in time are never primary in fact; they are secondary and dependent. The meaning of native activities is not native; it is acquired. It depends upon interaction with a matured social medium".(1) This is a fact always to be kept in mind. He notes that psychology, after ignoring impulses for years, now usually commences with some inventory of instinctive activities. This is all to the good. But fallacies arise when attempts are made to explain the complicated events of individual and social life by direct reference to these native powers. To understand adequately the psychological basis of conduct it is necessary to treat also of environmental conditions which have "educated original activities into definite and significant dispositions". The need for this is illustrated by reference to the extraordinary diversity of habits, moral codes and institutions of the different races of mankind which, even allowing for some racial difference, take their rise from practically the same stock of native instincts. "The same original fears, angers, loves and hates are hopelessly entangled in the most opposite institutions. The thing we need to know is how a native stock has been modified by interaction with different environments."(2) He recognises, of course, the importance of a more complete knowledge of the native tendencies

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(1) pp. 89-90.

(2) p. 92.

themselves. He is concerned throughout to stress the plasticity of original human nature. This is in fact his main point. He uses the terms 'instinct' and 'impulse' as practical equivalents: and this for a reason. "The word instinct taken alone," he says, "is still too laden with the older notion that an instinct is always definitely organized and adapted - which for the most part is just what it is not in human beings. The word 'impulse' suggests something primitive, yet loose, undirected, initial. Man can progress as beasts cannot, precisely because he has so many 'instincts' that they cut across one another, so that most serviceable actions must be learned."(1) Viewing impulse in this way he lays it down that any impulse may become organized into almost any disposition according to the way it interacts with the surroundings. He criticises at length the widely held doctrine of a few distinct instinctive tendencies which lead to definite and specific forms of behaviour; and also the tendency to use these same as principles of explanation in conduct. It is useful to classify but "it is unscientific to try to restrict original activities to a definite number of sharply demarcated classes of instincts".(2) The object of classification - the assisting of the mind to deal with large ranges of facts - is forgotten, and they are taken as marking things in themselves. This tendency is at present very noticeable in theorizing about human nature. "Man has been resolved into a definite collection of primary instincts which may be numbered, catalogued and exhaustively described one by one. Theorists differ only or chiefly as to their number and ranking."(3) Of this artificial simplifying and of its influence in social science he gives

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(1) p. 131.

(2) Ibid.

(3) p. 132.

numerous illustrations. Just now, he says, "another simplification is current. All instincts go back to the sexual, so that 'cherchez la femme' (under a multitude of symbolic disguises) is the last word of science with respect to the analysis of conduct".(1) His own view is a radical one: there are no separate instincts. He writes: "In spite of what has been said, it will be asserted that there are definite, independent, original instincts which manifest themselves in specific acts in a one-to-one correspondence. Fear, it will be said, is a reality, and so is anger, and rivalry, and love of mastery over others, and self-abasement, maternal love, sexual desire, gregariousness and envy, and each has its own appropriate deed as a result. Of course they are realities. So are suction, rusting of metals, thunder and lightning and lighter-than-air flying-machines. But science and invention did not get on as long as men indulged in the notion of special forces to account for such phenomena. Men tried that road and it only led them into learned ignorance ..... It turned out that these 'forces' were only the phenomena over again, translated from a specific and concrete form (in which they were at least actual) ~~with~~ into a generalized form in which they were verbal".(2) This method of thinking has disappeared from the physical sciences, but it still persists in psychology. There sex, hunger, fear and even much more complex active interests are regarded as if they were 'lump forces'. The fact that specific bodily organs are involved is responsible in the case of hunger and sex for assuming that there is a corresponding separate psychic force or impulse. But this assumption involves two fallacies according to Dewey. First, the activity

(1) p. 133.

(2) p. 143.

is never confined to the particular organs but involves the whole organism. "The whole organism is concerned in every act to some extent and in some fashion, internal organs as well as muscular, those of circulation, secretion, etc." And since the total state of the organism is never twice the same, neither are these phenomena. Secondly, the environment in which the act takes place is never twice alike: and this social context is an important part of the meaning of the act. Dewey criticises the psycho-analysts for failing to see that what they treat as psychological originals are often the results of social causes. "Theytreat phenomena which are peculiarly symptoms of the civilization of the West at the present time, as if they were the result of fixed native impulses of human nature."(1) Dewey protests too against the view that there is a single instinct of fear. "It is only mythology which sets up a single identical psychic force which 'causes' all the reactions of fear, a force beginning and ending in itself."(2) But all psychologists are not as bad as Dewey makes out. Both Shand and Rivers have made efforts to escape from this way of regarding fear - and other instincts too.(3) In Dewey's view it comes to this: "There are an indefinite number of original or instinctive activities, which are organized into interests and dispositions according to the situations to which they respond". Much of current psychologising has derived its notion of instinct from an exaggeration of its fixity and certainty among the lower animals. Those who still cling to this idea are victims of "a popular zoology of the bird, bee and beaver which was largely framed to the greater glory of

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(1) p. 153.

(2) p. 154.

(3) Cf. Rivers: "Instinct and the Unconscious", Ch. VII.

God". Not only are instincts in general more fallible than was supposed, but, and this is Dewey's main point, "the human being differs from the lower animals in precisely the fact that his native activities lack the complex ready-made organization of the animal's original abilities".(1)

There is much valuable criticism in Dewey's book. The two fallacies which he points out, namely the artificial simplifying of the facts of conduct by ascribing them to a series of instincts, and the transformation of social results into psychological originals - both these fallacies are widely current. But on other points, by reaction, Dewey seems to go too far. There is, after all, a limit to the plasticity of human nature. It is not indefinitely variable. Further it has itself created the social context in which it operates. While it may be misleading to think of separate instincts functioning in isolation, distinguishable tendencies clearly do exist. Nor is it sufficient simply to say that in man none of them are specific. They vary and the great question is, how specific are they.

VII.

Several distinct lines of criticism of the whole idea of instinct in man can be distinguished in current literature. One comes from the 'behaviouristic' tendency in psychology. For the extreme behaviourist the human being is "a mechanism which makes responses to external stimuli". Instincts become, on this theory, strings of simple reflexes unfolding serially. What appear to be inherited instincts are explained by others as habits acquired within the lifetime of the individual.(2) These latter writers seem to overlook some rather obvious facts

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(1) p. 107.

(2) Cf. Z. Y. Kuo: "Giving up Instincts in Psychology". Journal of Philosophy, Nov., 1921. "How are our Instincts Acquired?" Psychological Review, 1922.

of phylogenetic evolution. Still other 'deniers', as McDougall terms them, follow up a line of thought similar to one suggested by Dewey. But they carry it much further, much too far, in fact. For the explanation of conduct they concentrate wholly on environmental conditions rather than on inherited nature. A recent work by C. C. Josey: "The Social Philosophy of Instinct" well illustrates this line of argument. This book constitutes a spirited attack on the whole notion of the potency of inherited instincts in determining behaviour. The give-and-take relations existing between individual and environment, natural and social, are held to supply sufficient explanation. From this writer the conception of the instincts as moving 'forces' comes in for special criticism. "There are no forces which manifest themselves in various ways. The forces that are experienced are the forces that are born in the relation of the agent to his environment. The experience of the social forces of the group are of this sort. The force which the individual here feels is born of his contacts with his group, which, like all contacts, profoundly influence him, and bring into existence a world of new emotions and ideals."(1) The impulses to activity which are called into being by our relation with the changing environment must not be hypostatized into a set of forces manifesting themselves in the activities so aroused. The view that such a set of forces exists is held

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(1) p. 70. The argument that psychology must give up the notion of 'force' and of determination from within is often met with. On this point cf. the remarks of Drever: "The concepts of activity and force are at the present 'taboo' in physical science. Physical science knows only happenings and laws according to which the happenings take place. Activities and forces it has discarded as remnants of the primitive anthropomorphic view of nature. Some psychologists have argued that psychology also as a science must follow suit. But that is quite impossible. Psychology, and with it all the biological sciences, cannot help knowing real forces and activities. To ignore their existence is entirely unjustifiable and would involve a 'hylomorphic' view of the living organism as unscientific as the anthropomorphic view of physical nature. For the biological sciences the organism is primarily a system of forces or activities, not a complex structure". ("Introduction to the Psychology of Education" p. 8.) It should be possible to distinguish between the concept of force or activity which is necessary in psychology and the view that instincts are so many separate 'forces'.

to be analogous to the conception of innate ideas which, it is said, it has largely replaced. On this ground the widely-held view that social institutions have their roots in the instincts is assailed. "Institutions are neither expressions nor repressions of original nature. They are the responses original nature has made when confronted with certain conditions. Given one set of conditions, we have one set of institutions and customs; given another set of conditions, we have different institutions."(1) Just what original nature consist of, if it does not contain instinctive tendencies, this writer nowhere says.

A somewhat similar line is taken by another recent writer, B. M. Laing, in his "Study in Moral Problems". He too maintains that for an explanation of action we must look not to internal conditions such as instincts, but to external factors, to the situation and its conditions. "It is purely illusory," he says, "to assign the cause of an action to an instinct ..... The so-called instincts ~~are~~ and impulses are really descriptions of different types of actions. It is not denied that there is such a thing as 'instinct' or 'impulse'; but it is denied that they are forces which prompt the individual to activity and urge him along a certain course ..... The stimulus or cause of an action is not to be sought in an instinct or impulse, but in a situation which calls forth or provokes a reaction. In so far as we refer actions to instincts or impulses, we are only describing them or distinguishing the various actions; we are not giving a causal explanation of them".(2) Following up this line of thought, he comes to the rather surprising conclusion that "there is no ground for

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(1) p. 251.

(2) p. 86.

assuming that the sex tendency is due to any innate nature of the organism; but it is probably due to external forces and conditions operating upon and through the organism". The uniformity which is displayed in mental life and in conduct is to be explained, not in terms of uniform innate tendencies, but in terms of uniformity of conditions. "Psychology has tended to ignore the part played by conditions, and in consequence has transformed the uniform mode of activity into a uniform or invariable tendency or character of the mind in its own nature."(1)

It is surely clear that these writers are seeing only one side of the problem, probably because others have seen only the other side. In the 'situation', rightly understood, there are two factors involved: an organism of a certain nature on the one hand and certain external conditions on the other. Conduct is the result of interaction between them. The same external conditions at different times and in different individuals call forth very different reactions, simply because the particular nature of the individual is also a factor. It is no doubt very difficult to determine exactly what part each factor plays. As McDougall has well pointed out, "Development is, at every stage, from the moment of the fertilization of the ovum, a matter of the interplay of innate constitution and environment, and we can never hope to ascertain just what is wholly innate and what is wholly due to environmental influences". At birth the mind is certainly not a 'tabula rasa'. Its innate structure appears to be very complicated. Organism and environment are, from the first, the two elemants in a dynamic relation. For a causal explanation of conduct both must be taken into account. It should be possible to keep both in mind.

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(1) p. 90.

VIII.

What general conclusion can be drawn from the foregoing discussion? Is it possible to reach any degree of clearness as to the nature and place of instinct in man? In the first place it is obvious that in a great deal of current writing on the topic the term is used far too broadly. Instinct is often spoken of as though it were equivalent with emotion and the term 'instinctive' is applied to behaviour when the term 'emotional' is really meant. The two are closely related, as we shall see further, but it is misleading to identify them. Further the term 'instinctive' is often used more widely still, as practically equivalent to 'unreflective' or 'non-rational' in general. If there is an absence of fully rational guidance in behaviour, as there so very often is, it is simply labelled 'instinctive'. The treatment of sex by the Freudians and of the herd instinct by Trotter have been largely responsible for rendering this loose usage current, even in writing professedly scientific. It is easy; but makes clearness almost impossible. It indicates a failure to make a careful analysis of all the facts involved.

Putting aside this loose usage of the term instinct, it is possible to distinguish two broad ways of regarding instinct and their place in man. Because these two views are not distinguished a great deal of misunderstanding results and much discussion is rendered futile. How they came into being is clear if we consider the history of the concept, and the changes which have come over it. Traditional definitions of instinct always ran something like this: "By instinct is meant[1] an inherited structure of the organism by which an animal manifests a specific kind of behaviour, common to the species

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(1) Cf. C. Lloyd Morgan: "Some Definitions of Instinct". "Natural Science", May 1895.

to which it belongs, and not acquired through experience". This concept was first developed in animal psychology, Emphasis fell on the specific and invariable nature of the behaviour and on its unlearnt character. Human conduct was regarded as guided not by instinct but by reason. When however it became clear that inherited factors were also involved in human activity and that the human mind and organism were continuous with the animal, the same concept was applied to man. But a lack of fitness was soon clear. It was obvious that there was in man little of this unlearnt behaviour of a fixed and invariable character. Incidentally it also became clear that the regularity and invariability of instinct in animals had been exaggerated. Some writers, when instinct in man was discussed, retained the original meaning of the term and still applied it to unlearnt responses of a specific nature. Hence they concluded that man possesses only the rudiments of true instincts. L. T. Hobhouse, for example, takes this view. He writes: "What is hereditary in man is capacity, propensity, disposition, but the capacities are filled in, the propensities encouraged or checked, the dispositions inhibited or developed by mutual interactions and the pervading influences of the circumambient atmosphere. Elements of true instinct remain, but in a state of delapidation".(1) A. F. Shand takes a similar view.(2) He considers human instincts to be few and fragmentary. "The child," he says, "inherits only the capacity to perform a few very simple types of instinctive behaviour connected with his appetites and primary emotions ..... Most of these instincts are useless fragments until combined with other means which the mother sometimes supplies and the child gradually acquires." Lloyd Morgan, who has largely been concerned with

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(1) "Mind in Evolution", p. 105.

(2) "Foundations of Character", Appendix.

instinctive manifestations in animals, has also retained this traditional conception of instinct. Behaviour, he says, implies the total response of an organism to a situation. So far as this response is not determined by what has happened to the organism in its individual past history, it is termed instinctive. "We must realise that the human subject is the very last which the investigator of instinctive behaviour should select as a basis for interpretation, or for purposes of illustration."(1) It is exceedingly difficult to determine how much purely instinctive behaviour there is in man. "No doubt in one large field of behaviour - that connected with reproduction and the relation of the sexes which is subsequent to the period of infancy - there is in man a recognisable legacy of instinctive form, as Freud and his disciples hold. But marking, as it does, the period of adolescence, and coming as it does after so much has been told and read about it, and after manifold warnings of the danger to the moral life which besets its advent - how difficult is the task of distinguishing what are here regarded as the purely instinctive."(2) This view of instinct, then, regards it as inherited disposition to specific kinds of activity. Since there is in human nature little which corresponds to such activity in animals, to the nest-building activity of birds for example, it follows that instincts in man, from the point of view of developed conduct, are unimportant. From this point of view Rivers has suggested that the concept of instinct may have to be rejected altogether so far as man is concerned.(3)

The other current line of thought in regard to instincts is represented by McDougall and Drever. The term instinct is not confined to innately organized behaviour. This

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(1) "Instinctive Behaviour and Enjoyment." British Journal of Psychology, July, 1921.

(2) Ibid.

(3) p. 31. *Psychology and Politics*

view McDougall characterizes as 'mechanistic'. He admits that he at first confused it with his own theory and tried to combine the two. He now rejects it completely. He sees clearly that its acceptance means practically abandoning instincts in human psychology, and since he is impressed with the importance of hereditary factors in determining behaviour throughout life, he does not wish to do this. So he gives the term a new meaning. Summarizing his theory he says: "If ..... the facts of human experience and of human and animal behaviour be impartially surveyed, we are fully justified in accepting the conception of instincts in the human species as innate tendencies to pursue by purposive actions certain biological ends, roughly definable as mating, the cherishing of offspring, the escape from situations of certain types, the breaking down of opposition to impulsive or purposive striving, the better acquaintance with strange objects, the dominance over one's fellows, the presence or companionship of one's fellow creatures".(1) This is a very different way of regarding instincts. They are innate tendencies to pursue certain large biological ends , characterised on their psychological side by strong impulses and by characteristic excitement. All behaviour which falls under them can be termed instinctive. So regarded the place of instincts in mental life and their significance for conduct becomes of the first importance.

We should keep these two widely different conceptions of instinct clearly in mind. At the present time they are hopelessly confused. Those writers who reject the conception of instincts in McDougall's sense are usually found to replace it by some other analogous conception. Shand, for example, speaks of inherited 'emotional systems' in much the same sense as McDougall speaks of instincts.(2) J.B. Watson, who writes

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(1) "The Use and Abuse of Instinct in Social Psychology." Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, Dec. 1921.

(2) "Psychology from the Standpoint of a Behaviourist."

from a purely behaviouristic point of view is forced to see the need for some such conception. He writes: "Individuality seems in some way to depend on man's original tendencies, not upon the presence of the completed pattern type of instincts, since these do not exist in any large number, but apparently upon factors which, when taken singly, are difficult to detect, but which when taken together are more important. There is not much experimental evidence for this conclusion, but there is a great deal of common-sense data". At the present moment various terms are being suggested to cover such tendencies of inherited make-up.[1] "Necessary interests" are spoken of by one writer: "fundamental desires" by another:[2] "primary urges" and "central" or "root interests" are also spoken of. The difficulty reduces itself largely to one of terms. Writers fight shy of the terms "instincts" and "instinctive" because of their traditional significance. The position is thus stated by J. A. Thomson in a recent book: "One plea is that the term 'instinctive behaviour' has a definite meaning in regard to animals, and that we should keep to that meaning when we are discussing man. We should think that it made for clearness to say that man had certain primary 'urges' or appetites - hunger and love; that he had a number of definite reflexes, such as those illustrated in jerking away from the painful, or in coughing, or in sucking, that he has a number of enregistered capacities, such as those of speech and locomotion; that he had many inborn general tendencies towards certain types of reaction, such as running away from danger, actively resenting interference; but that he had very little capacity for instinctive behaviour in the strict sense of the term".[3] It is impossible to get away from the fact that there are in inherited human make-up certain great tendencies which underlie specific impulses and form, as it were, the

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(1) W.E. Hocking: Human Nature and its Remaking.

(2) K. Dunlap: Elements of Scientific Psychology.

(3) "What is Man?" p. 110.

general ground plan of life.[1] But the complexities of innate constitution in man make it difficult, in any scheme of classification, to do justice to all the facts. A way out of the difficulty has been suggested by Lloyd Morgan. He attempts a classification on the basis of comprehensiveness and specificity.[2] He attempts to distinguish different levels of instinctive behaviour. The term 'instinctive' covers 1. that form of behaviour which comes by nature and has not to be learnt, and 2. the consciousness or 'enjoyment' which accompanies the behaviour. The levels of such behaviour are: 1. reflexes and simple motor tendencies. This class would, in man, apparently cover what is understood as instinctive behaviour in the narrowest sense. 2. mid-level instincts which make use of the motor tendencies comprised under 1. He means "those with which many writers on instinct, McDougall for example, almost exclusively deal". 3. the most comprehensive group with two classes comprising: (a) all the behaviour which falls under self-preservation and (b) all the behaviour which falls under race-maintenance. In this scheme, he says, two points should be borne in mind - "the intimate and multifarious interrelations at all levels" and "the presence at all levels of factors of acquisition derived from prior experience".

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(1) And it is, of course, the height of folly to try to get away from them. Here is a vigorous protest against the failure to take into account primary factors of this kind: "After perusing during the past twenty years a small library of rose-water psychologies of the academic type and noticing how their authors ignore or merely hint at the existence of such stupendous and fundamental biological phenomena as those of hunger, sex and fear, I should not disagree with, let me say, an imaginary critic recently arrived from Mars, who should express the opinion that many of these works read as if they had been composed by beings that had been born and bred in a belfry, castrated in early infancy and fed continually for fifty years through a tube with a stream of liquid nutriment of constant chemical composition". W. M. Wheeler. "On Instincts." Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology XV

(2) "Instinctive Dispositions." Scientia, Oct., 1920.

But it is well to keep in mind the relative value of any classification of instinctive tendencies. Lists of instincts are often discussed as though there were something absolute about them and some one must be true. Attempts are made to reduce the constituents of different lists to each other. But they are made on very different bases and all may be regarded as valid for the purpose in hand. The criterion is one of serviceability for certain purposes.

The great point to be kept in mind when discussing the instinctive tendencies of man is that, apart from a few simple motor mechanisms, they are of a very generalised character.(1) This is what is meant when their 'modifiability' is insisted upon. It is impossible for man, in any sense, to 'trust to instinct'. All his tendencies need interpretation and development. It is this which makes him man. He can learn. However important biological heredity may be for him, and however its importance may have been overlooked, it cannot be denied that in him, of all the animals, it counts for least; and in him social heredity counts for most. Compared with all the other animals, man is least dependent on facts of 'nature' and most dependent on facts of 'nurture'. The human infant is not born fully equipped, both as to means and ends, for the business of life. Compared with the young of other animals, the human infant is born far younger. Its nature is far more incomplete. This is all well and briefly put by Julian Huxley in discussing man's relation to other organisms.(2) "Great educability instead of differentiated instinct, infinite possibility, at the expense of the pains of learning, instead of an effortless but limited stock of inborn modes of behaviour": these, he says, are the things which characterise man.

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(1) Cf. on this point: K. Koffka: "Die Grundlagen der Psychischen Entwicklung".

(2) "Essays of a Biologist", p. 82.

If we accept as a working hypothesis some such scheme of human instincts as McDougall suggest we must keep clearly in mind exactly what we are doing. We must guard carefully against regarding the various members of the list as if each were an individual thing in itself and capable of separate functioning. To do this is very easy. But it illustrates a tendency which exists in all science and which we come across again and again in psychology, namely "the substitution of artificial conceptual simplifications for the tangle of empirical facts". Instincts do not survive in isolation, and the self is not an aggregate or a balance of instincts. As we shall see, with them as a basis, and with the help of those factors in human nature which make for guidance and control, the self becomes, in the course of development, a more or less well integrated whole. The impulses to which the instincts give rise, powerful as they are, are indefinitely interrelated and inextricably interwoven with all the other factors in human nature. It is quite fallacious to imagine that any one instinct can be used as a principle of explanation for conduct of a developed sort. In fact it is hardly too much to say that, in conduct which is instinctive at all, every instinct plays a part in every act. Human motives are exceedingly complete and while we may regard the instincts as the original 'prime movers' of human activity, of actual motives, as they exist much more must be said.

Current theorizing about human conduct [illegible] too much attention to the factor of [illegible] little to the factor of emotion. It [illegible] are for some time now been considering [illegible] which has led to the better understanding [illegible] which has generally fallen on deaf ears, or [illegible] simply as an aspect of it. It is [illegible] specifically dealt with or its importance [illegible] already been pointed out, much that is [illegible] which should more rightly be spoken of [illegible] seem to refer indirectly to either [illegible] but equally vaguely. Emotional states [illegible] difficult to investigate and their nature is [illegible] being fully understood. [illegible] by two years ago [illegible] in "Foundations of Character" called attention [illegible] of the study of the emotions and to the importance [illegible] study for the understanding of the basis of character. [illegible] as much evidence from many sources was [illegible] increasingly clear that to understand human [illegible] conduct it is to the study of emotional qualities [illegible] must more largely look. It is declared that [illegible] in moulding and determining character, and in [illegible] world and "human as well, are now sought in the field of the [illegible] in emotional tendencies inherited at birth, and in [illegible] experiences undergone during the formative [illegible] hands. "A very little consideration of the

III.

EMOTION.

(1) A recent example of the altogether [illegible] tion given to the emotions in the study of [illegible] book on "Human Nature and Conduct", [illegible] reside in the remark: "Emotion is a perturbation [illegible] nature of habit".

I.

Current theorizing about human conduct seems to devote far too much attention to the factor of instinct and far too little to the factor of emotion. It is true that the two have for some time now been considered in close relation, a fact which has led to the better understanding of both, but emphasis has generally fallen on instinct, emotion being regarded simply as an aspect of it. It is seldom that it is specifically dealt with or its importance adequately recognised. As has already been pointed out, much that is termed instinctive in conduct should more rightly be spoken of as emotional. Some writers seem to refer indifferently to either term and to use them both equally vaguely. Emotional states are exceedingly difficult to investigate and their nature is still far from being fully understood. Nearly ten years ago A. F. Shand in his "Foundations of Character" called attention to the neglect of the study of the emotions and to the importance of such study for the understanding of the basis of character.(1) Even since he wrote evidence from many sources has been making it increasingly clear that to understand human conduct in the concrete it is to the study of emotional qualities that we must very largely look. It is declared that: "the chief agents in developing and deranging character, and indeed intellect and reason as well, are now sought in the field of the emotions: in emotional tendencies inherited at birth, and in emotional experiences undergone during the formative period of early life".(2) Or again, "A very little consideration of the problem of conduct

(1) A recent example of the altogether inadequate consideration given to the emotions in the study of conduct is found in Dewey's "Human Nature and Conduct". His sole reference to the topic is the remark: "Emotion is a perturbation from a clash or failure of habit".

(2) C. Burt: "Psychology and the Emotions", "School Hygiene", 1916.

makes it plain that it is in the region of feeling, using the term in its broadest sense, that the key is to be sought".[1]

A recent writer[2] has called attention to the great change which has been coming over our attitude towards emotion and its place in life. For some time it has been gaining a new significance. It is not so long since it was altogether suspect. Emotion was regarded simply as a disturbing factor in mental life, or at any rate as an unimportant and unnecessary accompaniment of the thinking processes. Lange, for example, whose name, with that of James, is associated with a well-known theory of the emotions, looked forward to the time when "through the results of education and the intellectual life" man may end by realising the ideal of Kant as a being of pure intelligence for whom all the emotions, if he is still subject to them, will be looked upon as "mental troubles little worthy of him".[3] How far we have come from this point of view may be seen by comparing with this quotation one from a present-day psychologist. William Brown writes: "It is in feeling that all values reside and the life of feeling has a logic of its own distinct from the logic of pure reason, and not necessarily inferior to it. Without going so far as to say, with certain modern psychologists, that feeling is invariably the controlling factor in its relation to thought, we must urge that much of the best and most effective thought is stimulated and sustained by underlying emotional tendencies, and that in many cases, if not in all, the action of feeling upon thought is much more intense and decisive than that of thought upon feeling".[4]

(1) W. Trotter, op. cit.

(2) G.M. Stratton: "Anger: Its Religious and Moral Significance". Introduction. "The New Significance of Emotion."

(3) Quoted from "Les Emotions", by A.F. Shand, p. 4.

(4) "Psychology and Psycho-therapy", p. 89, cf. also J.B. Watson in "Suggestions of Modern Science Concerning Education". "We are being led more and more to the view that emotions are not useless things put there by an unkind fate merely to disturb the even tenour of our ways, but that, properly controlled, they can be made to serve practical uses ..... They can be made to serve as incentives or drives to many types of action."

What are now termed 'emotions' had long been discussed and classified under the name of the 'passions'. But bare analysis and classification of these had proved somewhat barren. It was Darwin, in his "The Expression of the Emotions in Man and the Animals", who gave a new stimulus to this study and set it as a scientific basis. He called attention to the biological significance of the emotions and showed that emotion expresses itself in ways which enable the creature to meet some crisis in its life. Darwin pointed out that in man many of the forms of expression had ceased to be serviceable. Though it stimulated new study, in itself this exclusively biological conception of the emotions did not carry very far the understanding of their place in the human mind. James and Lange were really carrying on Darwin's work. They called attention to the effects of the expression of the emotions on the individual himself and threw new light on their causation. They emphasised the 'organic reverberation' of the emotion. It became clear that an emotion was not merely a state of mind but very fully a state of the individual as a whole. The understanding of this organic aspect of emotion has since been carried much further by the work of a number of physiologists, ~~Parcor~~ Parlor, Cannon, Crile and others. More recently the psychopathologists have discovered that disturbances of an emotional nature are at the root of many mental disorders. "It is," says Rivers, "a principle now widely accepted by workers who otherwise differ greatly from one another, that mental disease is predominantly due to disturbances of the emotional and instinctive aspects of the mind".(1) These discoveries have shown the importance of the emotions in the normal as well as

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(1) Article "Psychotherapeutics", Hastings Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics. Cf. also J.A. Hadfield, "Psychology and Morals" (p. 122). "Every neurotic symptom emerges during life as the result of an emotional conflict", and D. Forsyth, "Psychoanalytic Review", VIII, "There can be no reasonable doubt that neuroses are essentially disorders of the emotions".

the abnormal mind. They appear as the centre of the mind's health and balance. They bear on life and conduct at every point and the question of the organisation of the emotional life appears as the central problem of conduct. As a recent psychologist has expressed it: "To say that the control of the emotions is the most important thing in life is trite, but the saying can hardly be overemphasized".(1)

II.

While all psychologists are now agreed that there is a very close relation between instinct and emotion they are not agreed as to its exact nature. As has already been mentioned James was the first to call attention to this relation and McDougall advanced an hypothesis to try and explain it. This hypothesis, that the primary emotions are the affective aspects of the instincts, has already been referred to. It must now be discussed somewhat further. In his latest book McDougall puts it forward in a somewhat more tentative manner and tends to give a more independent treatment to the problem of emotion. But he still maintains that his theory is on essentially right lines. He says that, faced with the question of motives to action, common-sense and literary tradition, which are not sophisticated by psychological theories, assume that instincts and emotions are the motive powers. Are they then two distinct principles of action, impulsive powers of two different orders? He answers: "Common-sense hardly seems to think so: for in some instances it seems to identify an instinct with an emotion, by giving them the same name: notably in the cases of fear, curiosity and disgust.

"Suppose that psychology, instead of turning away with scorn to devise fantastic theories which cannot be brought into

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(1) K. Dunlap: "Elements of Scientific Psychology", p. 322.

any intelligible relation with the common-sense type of explanation, should accept this clue offered by common-sense and work it for all it may be worth. Might we not hope to find that common-sense, the wisdom of the ages, is fundamentally right, and that its practice is capable of being developed into a consistent and useful theory.

"This was the line taken in my 'Social Psychology'. For the first time the cue offered by common-sense was frankly accepted as a working hypothesis. Emotion was regarded as a mode of experience which accompanies the working within us of instinctive impulses. It was assumed that human nature (our inherited, inborn constitution) comprises instincts; that the operation of each instinct, no matter how brought into play, is accompanied by its own peculiar quality of experience which may be called a primary emotion, and that, when two or more instincts are simultaneously at work in us, we experience a confused emotional excitement, in which we can detect something of the qualities of the corresponding primary emotions. The human emotions were then regarded as clues to the instinctive impulses or indicators of the motive at work in us. Guided by this hypothesis, I attempted to sketch the instinctive basis of our active nature, and its development, under experience and education, into character".(1)

As has often been said this hypothesis makes the whole subject extraordinarily clear and it has led to a very profitable discussion both of instincts and of emotional states. But it does seem to have been shown to be too simple for all the facts of emotional life. It has been argued that the characteristic affective experience involved in instinctive activity is not always or necessarily of the nature of emotion. It may be

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(1) "Outline of Psychology", p. 128.

something much simpler, though capable of becoming emotion under certain circumstances. "The alternative hypothesis to McDougall's," says Drever, "is that the affective element in instinct-experience becomes emotion only when action in satisfaction of the interest is suspended or checked, when interest passes into tension. If impulse immediately realizes itself in the appropriate action towards the situation, then there is no emotion in any strict sense of emotion."(1) There is a very great deal to be said for this alternative hypothesis. Drever backs it up with a careful analysis of the affective accompaniment of instinctive activity, showing that it is something which is best termed 'interest'. He also analyses emotional experience and shows it to be something much more complex than this instinctive interest. He is supported in his view by A. F. Shand who points out that "when the activity of the instinct is most sudden and unopposed, the emotion, if it is brought into activity at all, will be of less intensity and definiteness"; and, conversely, "the arrest of an instinct is that which most frequently excites the emotion connected with it - there is no anger so intense as when the blood boils and all the sudden energy that comes to us cannot vent itself on our antagonist". This view of the nature and arousal of emotional excitement is also adopted by Carver in an article on "The Generation and Control of emotion".(2) He writes: "I wish to define the interest of an instinct as the affective tone which accompanies the whole instinctive process when it is carried through in a normally satisfying manner; and to define emotion as the subjective experience which develops when gratification

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(1) "Instinct in Man", p. 157, cf. also "Introduction to the Psychology of Education", p. 51 ff.

(2) "British Journal of Psychology", Vol. X. This view is not altogether a new one. James discusses and rejects it (see "Principles", Vol. II, p. 476).

of the instinctive impulse is held in check by higher level control".[1]

Considerable support for this view of the nature of emotion is obtained from a comparative study of instinctive and emotional manifestations. It seems to be a fact that increase in the emotional element in behaviour proceeds 'pari passu' with the decrease in the fixity and invariability of instinctive response.[2] G. J. Romanes investigated the emotional manifestations of animals at different levels of development. His conclusion was that there appears to be less and less emotion as we go down the scale, correlated with increasing definiteness in instinctive behaviour. Increase in the intensity and extent of the emotional life and increase in the plasticity of instinctive response and in the possibility of its control, seem to go hand in hand. As the purely instinctive lessens, the emotional life becomes more and more important. In man this development reaches its maximum. So that we seem led to the very important conclusion that it is because man in his behaviour is of all animals the least purely instinctive that he is, of all animals, the most emotional. To quote again from Carver: "With the gradual increase in plasticity of response which develops 'pari passu' with intelligence, there is delay in reaction and with this is associated an increase of the emotional excitement. The longer the issue of the impulse in satisfying reaction is checked by higher level control, the greater becomes the generation of emotion, until in man with his practically unlimited choice of response we reach a stage where delay becomes almost inevitable. Hence

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(1) Cf. the very brief definition of emotion given by Burt (op. cit.). It is "the conscious aspect of a curtailed instinct".

(2) "Animal Intelligence."

it is rare, in man, for response to be unaccompanied by some generation of emotion" (1) ....

It seems then that McDougall is right in saying that in man, activity associated with the instincts is generally accompanied by some degree of emotional excitement, but that this is so because of the complexities which the facts of guidance and control introduce into such behaviour. The emotional life becomes in this way far wider than the instinctive life. It is not that each instinct has associated with it some one primary emotion of a particular quality. McDougall is, in fact, very hard put to it to fill out his scheme of the instincts and the primary emotions, as an examination of it will show. 'Feeling of creativeness' and 'feeling of ownership' for example do not seem to be easily distinguishable as primary emotions. Throughout he seems to regard the emotions far too much as individual psychical entities. (2)

III.

It is evident that emotion is a very complex state, and we may now endeavour to distinguish the various factors which seem to be involved in it. We will begin by considering the 'organic resonance' by which it is characterised. This brings us directly to the James-Lange theory. Ever since it was put forward it has been vigorously discussed and round it quite a voluminous literature has grown up. Opinion is still

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(1) Op. cit. another writer has contrasted man's early with his present environment in this respect. "In man's early environment there was no break between the preparation for muscular action and its consummation. As a consequence, there was much action and little restraint of action-emotion - just as to-day, when action ensues precipitately upon a stimulus there is no manifestation of fear, anger or sympathy. In the modern environment, where there is a minimum of action and a maximum of restraint of action, man is in auto-captivity to phylogenetic tendencies." G.W. Crile: "Man: An Adaptive Mechanism".

(2) J.Y.T. Greig has recently set out four laws of emotion. "Psychology of Laughter and Comedy", p. 21). "1. Emotion arises when behaviour is appreciably hindered. 2. Such hindrance may have its source either internally or externally. 3. The intensity of our emotion depends on the relative strength of the opposing forces, the greatest intensity being reached when they are almost equal. 4. Success in overcoming the hindrance is felt as pleasant, failure as unpleasant."

divided as to the degree in which it is true. James Ward[1] for example writes it down as "psychologically and biologically absurd". Quite recently it has been wholeheartedly accepted by an experimental investigator of emotional states.[2] Its essence is the contention that an emotional state is the experienced result of all the somatic and visceral changes caused by the exciting stimulus and nothing more. James writes:[3] "Bodily changes follow directly the perception of the exciting fact, and our feeling of the same changes as they occur <u>is</u> the emotion ..... Without the bodily states following on the perception, the latter would be purely cognitive in form, pale, colourless, destitute of emotional warmth". On this theory, taken literally, the difference between the various qualities of emotion becomes simply a matter of the different intensities and relations of the organic sensations involved. Both James and Lange rejected the current view that the various emotions which it was customary to list possessed definite and persistent characters. "They present," says Lange, "an infinity of imperceptible transitions." James said that "they are regarded too much as absolutely individual things".

In order to determine whether this theory covers all the facts of emotional experience it will be necessary to refer to the investigations into the physiology of the emotions which have been made since James wrote. Changes in respiration and circulation were long recognised as physiological accompaniments of emotion. More recently very subtle and complex glandular changes have been found to be involved. The best known work in this connection is that of Cannon.[4] The most striking of

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(1) "Psychological Principles."

(2) W. Whately Smith, "The Measurement of Emotion".

(3) "Principles", Vol. II, p. 449.

(4) "Bodily Changes in Pain, Hunger, Fear and Rage."

the glandular activities which he has discovered is that of the supra-renal glands which, during emotional excitement, secrete into the blood a substance termed adrenin which results in increased effectiveness in the whole of the muscular system. Cannon believes that all the changes which he has found to occur are of the nature of preparations for heightened activity. Here is his own summary of his results. "Every one of the visceral changes that have been noted - the cessation of processes in the alimentary canal (thus freeing the energy supply for other parts), the shifting of blood from the abdominal organs, whose activities are deferable, to the organs immediately essential to muscular exertion (the lungs, the heart, the central nervous system), the increased vigour of contraction of the heart; the quick abolition of the effects of muscular fatigue; the mobilizing of energy-giving sugar in the circulation - every one of these visceral changes is directly serviceable in making the organism more effective in the violent display of energy which fesr, or rage, or pain may involve."(1) It has been further discovered that it is the autonomic nervous system, which is to a certain degree independent of the cerebrospinal system, that is involved in these changes. The importance of this system in the causation of emotions has been emphasized by E. J. Kempf in his "Autonomic Functions and the Personality". Kempf is a supporter of James's theory of the emotions. Cannon on the other hand does not conclude in favour of it. Cannon's chief difficulty is with the differentiation of the emotions. He can find nothing specific in the physiological accompaniment of the different emotions and so concludes that other factors are involved in their constitution. He says: "I am inclined to urge that the visceral changes merely contribute to an emotional complex more or less indefinite, but still

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(1) p. 215.

pertinent, feelings of disturbance in organs of which we are not usually conscious".[1] He believes that the differentiating features of the emotions are of a psychological nature. C.S. Sherrington comes to much the same conclusion.[2] He maintains that the visceral functions do not produce the emotional state, but simply reinforce it. "We are forced back toward the likelihood that the visceral expression of the emotion is secondary to the cerebral action occurring with the psychical state ..... We may with James accept visceral and organic sensations and the memories and associations of them as contributory to primitive emotion, but we must regard them as reinforcing rather than as initiating the psychosis." Sherrington's experiments demonstrate the important fact that once these visceral accompaniments have been experienced their reoccurrence is not necessary for the full emotional experience to occur.[3] E. Prideaux, another investigator, also argues that the organic sensations, though giving intensity and duration to emotion are not responsible for the whole of its content. His experiments show a latent period between the subjective experience of the emotion and the occurrence of the bodily changes. He offers as a definition of emotion the following: "a subjective feeling consisting of central excitement and consciousness of peripheral sensations, occasioned by situations which powerfully oppose or facilitate the aim of any instinctive impulse".[4]

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(1) p. 280. For a discussion of the bearing of recent physiological investigations on this theory of J.R. Angell, "A Reconsideration of James's Theory of Emotions in the Light of Recent Criticism". Psychological Review, 1916. McDougall (Outline, pp. 323 & 350) claims that the primary emotions owe their specific qualities to the specific nature of the organic changes in each case. This does not appear to be borne out by the physiological work done so far: though of course differences may yet be discovered.

(2) See Proceedings R. Socy. 1910.

(3) "Expression of Emotion in Cases of Mental Disorder", British Journal of Psychology, Medical Section, October 1921.

(4) Cf. also Carver (op.cit.): "The visceral and somatic concomitants of emotion are not responsible for originating the affective state, but are anticipating physical adjustments which enable the organism to put forth all its energy effectively to satisfy the instinctive process stimulated".

It seems that James's theory is, at any rate, partly confirmed. No one has denied that the organic disturbance does play an important part in "making the emotion emotional", but undoubtedly there are other factors in the whole experience.

IV.

Viewed psychologically the complex state which is the emotion seems to involve 1. sensations from organic disturbances, 2. a conscious impulse to action, 3. an element of an affective nature. Drever believes that it is to this last factor that we must look for the source of the qualitative differences between emotions. The main psychological function of feeling appears to be regulative and viewed qualitatively, from the point of view of the type of affective experience by which they are characterised, the emotion seems to have a regulative or directive function. As McDougall points out, "the emotional quality serves to indicate, to the subject himself, the nature of his excitement and the kind of action to which he is impelled. This last we may fairly suppose to be the essential function of the emotional qualities in our emotional life. They enable us to regulate, direct and in some degree control the impulses by which we are moved".(2)

The impulsive aspect of emotion is of considerable importance and it is one of the chief defects of the theory of James that it tends to overlook it. James's paradoxical statement: "We are angry because we strike", includes the experience of striking in the preparatory bodily changes, the whole as experienced being the emotion. This seems certainly untrue.

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(1) "Instinct in Man", Ch. VI: "The qualitative differences between the different emotions cannot be explained in terms of the organic resonance, though this will undoubtedly accentuate the differences, nor can they ... be explained in terms of the experienced impulse, the conation, but only in terms of the qualitative difference in affection".

(2) Outline, p. 328.

Being angry means experiencing an impulsive tendency to strike. It is of the essence of emotion that there is experienced an impulse towards a consummatory reaction. Every emotion is a "wanting to do something". McDougall lays emphasis on this impulsive aspect of emotion and says that, "if the conative factor could be subtracted from an emotional experience, without other change, that experience would seem to be radically altered. We might still think of the object, and our thinking would still be coloured by the emotional quality: but the whole experience would be profoundly different; it would seem to lack its very essence, to be empty and unreal. It would be like the simulation of emotion".(1)

An emotional experience then is impulsive, and the impulsion is towards a reaction for which the body is prepared. Viewed physiologically the emotional state is, as Cannon has shown, a state of internal preparedness for some type of overt action. The whole organism is keyed up ready for discharging itself in some way.(2) Viewed psychologically it is in essence a conscious impulse towards activity.

In view of various phenomena which make their appearance in the course of the organisation of the emotional life (to be discussed later) it is important here to point out that there is much evidence to show that the effect of emotion which does not pass into action of some sort is injurious. If strong emotion is often aroused and action is persistently thwarted, so that no outlet is obtained, then conditions of mental disorder of a more or less serious nature are likely to

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(1) Op.cit. p. 322.

(2) Cf. O. Frink, "Morbid Fears and Compulsions": "An emotion, one might say, is an undischarged action, a deed yet retained within the organism. Perhaps it would be more accurate to say that an emotion is a state of preparedness for action, which, however, in many ways is almost the action itself. The involuntary nervous system is exerted in the same way as an action ..... A state of tonus is produced in the same voluntary muscles that would be innervated to produce the action itself".

arise. There is a well-known passage in James's 'Principles' where he points out the importance of emotional excitement receiving some discharge in action.(1)

There is another characteristic of emotion which should also be mentioned here; one which is exhibited most clearly when the emotion is strong. This is the narrowing or specializing of consciousness, tending to actual dissociation, which always characterizes violent emotion. It is well described by Drever:- "when under the influence of a strong emotion we may become blind and deaf to everything which is not relevant to the end determined by the emotion; we may forget principles and resolutions; we may even temporarily break away from what might be described as characteristically the whole trend of our life activity ..... In extreme cases an individual may lose control of fundamental muscular and sensory mechanisms. Speech may be lost, and the control of still earlier and more primitive functions and co-ordinations may disappear. Usually this dissociation is merely temporary, and normal conditions are restored as the emotion passes away".(2) The pathology of this type of experience has been investigated by Morton Prince.(3) It may become so heightened that the dissociation becomes a more or less permanent condition.

V.

As was pointed out, James, in his theory, endeavoured to break away from the barren classifications and descriptions of the emotions and to open up a new method of investigating them. "So long," he said, "as they are set down as so many

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(1) Vol. II, p. 123.

(2) "Psychology of Everyday Life", p. 35.

(3) "The Unconscious."

eternal and sacred psychic entities, like the old immutable species in natural history, so long all that can be done with them is reverently to catalogue their separate characters, points and effects".(1) Undoubtedly the emotions have been thought of too much as individual entities, and they still are. From the time of Descartes down to the present there is a succession of classifications and of theories as to how a few primary emotions become combined into complex emotions and so give rise to all the phenomena of the emotional life. Much the same has happened as in the case of instinct. The names of the distinguishable emotions have been hypostasized into so many unique qualities of mind. Terms are taken as standing for self-existent entities.(2) In recent times McDougall's scheme of the primary emotions and their elaboration has certainly tended to encourage this way of regarding the emotional life. In his most recent book, however, he deprecates this usage. He writes: "The poets legitimately personify these emotional experiences and speak of them as personal powers or agents ..... It results from this usage that psychologists commonly speak of 'the emotions' or of an 'emotion' just as they speak of 'sensations' or 'an idea'. And, as in these cases, the usage is misleading and confusing, though perhaps not so seriously misleading. Some psychologists, indulging our natural tendency to reify whatever we name, seem to assume that we recognize 'an emotion' of distinctive quality corresponding to every name used in popular and literary description of emotional experience".(3) The truth is that in fact there are no such things as 'emotions'. We should speak rather of different qualities of emotional experience. But the substantive

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(1) Op.cit., II, 449.

(2) On this point cf. two articles by J.R. Kantor: "An Attempt Towards a Naturalistic Description of Emotion", Psychological Review, 1921.

(3) Outline, p. 314.

mode of speech is very difficult to avoid. What experience shows is not occasional pure 'emotions' to be distinguished as cut and dried states. It shows variations in the quality and intensity of emotional experience which latter is always present in some degree. Mental states or behaviour which contain no emotional content are entirely mythical. This is well pointed out by Kempf. "There has been a strange tendency among many psychologists to consider that an emotional state exists only when the individual shows some perturbation of his habitual composure. It is fundamentally essential to recognise that during consciousness an emotional or affective state continuously exists..... We are always, when conscious, aware of a state of feeling, of an emotional status, even during states of rest, reverie, and general indifference."(1) He goes on to point out that it is fallacious to imagine that any single emotional quality ever possesses an individual completely. This is far too simple an account of actual mental life and behaviour. "There is no evidence that we are ever possessed by one pure emotion, such as love, anger, fear, sorrow, shame, disgust, etc. We may feel that an affective status such as love, anger, fear, etc. completely dominates us, but if one will trouble to analyze himself while he is dominated by a strong affective disturbance he can usually recognize the symptoms of other affective tendencies at work in the background of consciousness. Frequently they are quite opposite in nature, and one's behaviour is the resultant or compromise of the various affective tendencies inhibiting or reinforcing one another."(2)

An interesting suggestion has recently been put forward by Burt.(3) It is that we should distinguish in inherited make-up

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(1) Op.cit., p. 68.

(2) Ibid.

(3) "The Mental Differences between Individuals". Presidential Address, Psychology Section, British Association.

a factor which he terms 'general emotionality': a central factor underlying all distinguishable emotional qualities. The conception is analogous to that of 'general intelligence' as used by those psychologists who have investigated the problem of the measurement of intelligence. Burt has noted that all emotional tendencies, say in a child, appear to be correlated: "the child most prone to sorrow, is often exceptionally prone to joy. The coward who bullies the weak is often the first to quake and quail before the strong". Considerable differences exist between individuals in respect of this 'general emotionality'. There have been other attempts to distinguish various types of emotional dispositions. The best known classification is that of Jung.(1) He distinguishes an 'introverted' and an 'extroverted' type. In the former emotional stirrings and their impulses do not easily find expression in action. In the latter type the emotion and its impulse are freely expressed.

The important point for a theory of conduct is to understand how this original emotional endowment becomes complicated into the multiplicity of emotional qualities which adult life shows: and how the emotional tendencies become organised; and what is the nature of the control which is exercised over them.

VI.

Important work on this latter aspect of the emotional life has been done by J. B. Watson.(2) He has studied carefully the early manifestations of emotion in many hundreds of children. His work confirms the conclusion of the psychopathologists that

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(1) "Psychological Types."

(2) See "Studies in Infant Psychology", Scientific Monthly, Dec., 1921. Also: "Psychology from the Standpoint of a Behaviourist" and contribution to "Suggestions of Modern Science concerning Education".

the early emotional life is of fundamental importance for the whole of later development. "The question," he says, "as to whether the child will possess a stable or unstable personality, whether it is going to be timid and beset with many fears and subject to rages and tantrums, whether it will exhibit tendencies of general over- or under-emotionalism and the like, has been answered already by the end of the two year period." His observations have led him to the belief that, contrary to general opinion, the number of inherited emotional responses is small, and that the stimuli which bring them about are also few in number. He believes that the 'emotional patterns', as he terms them, are really quite simple and that the later complexity seen in the adult is brought about by training and environmental influence. "Our latest observations showed that from birth three fundamental inherited emotional patterns could be observed. Without assuming that our observations are complete, we feel reasonably sure that fear, rage and love are original and fundamental."(1) He gives an account of these responses and of the objects and situations which excite them. If this original simplicity is a fact the question arises, how is the later complexity brought about. "How can objects which at first do not call out emotions come later to call them out and thus enormously increase the richness as well as the dangers of our emotional life." By means of a series of experiments Watson shows how this comes about. He shows new emotional

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(1) Watson has small opinion of lists of emotions or instincts which are not based upon experimental investigations: "Modern psychology catalogues most elaborate lists of instincts and emotions in human beings. These catalogues are not based upon experimental work but upon the preconceived opinions of the men making up the lists. At present we simply have not the data for the enumeration of man's original tendencies and it will be impossible to obtain such data until we have followed through the development of the activity of many infants from birth to advanced childhood ..... a workable psychology of human instincts can never be attained by merely observing the behaviour of the adult".

attachments in the making. He uses a method similar to the well-known one of building up 'conditioned reflexes'. He actually creates 'conditioned fears' in the subject, that is fears evoked by objects which originally caused no emotional response but which can be made, by association, to do so. And he shows that these conditioned emotional responses are being constantly set up in the growing child, not only in the case of fear, but also in the case of other emotional qualities. "Many thousands of objects and situations which originally had no intrinsic value for the arousing of our major emotions come finally to possess that power." Through faulty nurture many wrong emotional attachments may be formed and the whole emotional life may be warped and twisted. Watson's conclusions seem to be of great educational significance. He says: "If we do possess, as is usually supposed, many hundreds of emotions, all of which are instinctively grounded, we might very well despair of attempting to regulate or control them and to eradicate the wrong ones. But according to the view I have advanced it is due to environmental causes, that is to habit formation, that so many objects come to call out emotional reactions. If habit thus plays the most important rôle in the attachment of the emotion, it lies easily within our control to perfect and to regulate and reshape and use practically the emotional life of the individual."

It is interesting to compare Watson's opinions with those of Shand.(1) For Shand the inherited make-up is very complex from the emotional point of view. Certain primary emotions are inherited which are complex systems and may have several instincts organized within them. Originally there

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(1) "Foundations of Character." It should be remembered that while Watson's views are based on the experimental investigations of infants, Shand's are based on the introspective records of the adult consciousness.

exists a balance of sensational stimuli and of emotional response. They are innately connected. But very soon this balance is lost. The life of memory and ideas upsets it and there result acquired connections of ideas and emotions, And while, from a biological point of view, the original connections possessed utility, the acquired connections may, from the point of view of conduct, possess actual disutility. While one may doubt the accuracy of Shand's account of the inherited emotional make-up his observations on the results which the life of ideas brings about in man's emotionality are very valuable. "The result of the modification which the systems of the emotions undergo in man, and especially the multiplication of the causes which excite and sustain them is (1) to make man the most emotional of animals, and (2) to render possible the debasement of his character. For that which is a condition of his progress is also a condition of his decline, - the acquired power of ideas over emotions, and the subsequent power of each indefinitely to sustain the other. Hence the existence of the emotions constitutes a serious danger for him, though not for the animals, and the balance which is lost when the emotions are no longer exclusively under the control of those causes which originally excite them can only be replaced by the higher control of the sentiments." The exact nature of this 'higher control' of which Shand speaks, and the means by which it is brought about constitute very important problems, which it will be our business to endeavour to investigate.

IV.

SENTIMENTS AND COMPLEXES.

I.

The process of biological evolution, it has often been pointed out, is characterised throughout by the creation of ever more complex units. Organisms become more and more complicated in their structure and in their modes of reaction. There is increased efficiency in the separate parts or organs which constitute them; there is also increase in the co-ordination of parts and in general harmony. The direction observable in evolution seems to be towards increased independence and also towards increased control. This is true of the evolution of the bodily organism, of the evolution of mind in the race and it seems to be true also of the development of mind in the individual. In every case there is increase in the complexity of organs and activities and increase also in the organisation which obtains between them. The analogy between the development of mind in the individual, on its active side, and the development of the bodily organism is well pointed out by Julian Huxley:(1) "We come into the world," he says, "with a set of instinctive and emotional reactions only waiting their proper stimuli to be fired off, and a capacity for learning, for amassing experience, and a capacity for modifying our instincts and our behaviour according to our experience. We incorporate experience in ourselves, and in doing so we alter the original basis of our reactions; a strongly emotional experience colours all that is closely associated with it; and so after birth we are continually making our mental microcosm not only larger but qualitatively more complex, in exactly the same way as before birth our body grew not only in size, but also in complexity of organization".

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(1) "Essays of a Biologist", p. 289.

At the present time there is a widespread tendency to explain the more complex forms of organization and activity which arise in the course of development simply by reference to the original elements. But it is a mistake to think that such an explanation is adequate. While analysis and the attempt to understand origins are important they are not all. If we are really to understand them we must study the later and more complex phenomena in and for themselves.

II.

In traditional psychology the principle of "association of ideas" was held to account for all the complexities of mental life. More recently new and more adequate conceptions have been developed. Very important among these, so far as the active side of mind is concerned, is the conception of the sentiment as a complex mental system determining thought and conduct. This conception is one of the most valuable of the recent acquisitions of psychology and we will give some account of its development in modern psychological theory. The term 'sentiment' was rescued from its vague and popular significance and made into a scientific concept by A. F. Shand. Its advent has made possible in modern psychology the profitable discussion of the organisation of the affective and active aspects of the mind. As McDougall says, "the concept of the sentiment as defined by Mr. Shand, enables us at once to reduce to order many of the facts of the life of impulse and emotion, a province of psychology which hitherto has been chaotic and obscure".(1)

It was first set out by Shand in an article on "Character and the Emotions".(2) He pointed out that "the

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(1) "Introduction to Social Psychology," p. 122.

(2) "Mind", N.S. V.

attempt to put order into the chaos of our feelings, to group or classify them under any intelligible principle not barren or useless, has not so far been attended with much success". To remedy this he endeavoured to demonstrate the organisation of the emotions in the system of the sentiments. Since it was first put forward the concept has been considerably developed; but in some form it is now accepted by most psychologists. Neither in his original article nor in his subsequent "Foundations of Character" was Shand primarily interested in the psychical origin or development of the sentiments. He was concerned with distinguishing them from the emotions. He says that his theory "is not chiefly concerned with the meaning to be given to the term sentiment, but essentially concerns the nature of love and hate (the main sentiments) and their distinction from the class of emotions to which they had hitherto been supposed to belong". In his latest contribution to the discussion of this subject he offers this definition of a sentiment. It is "a system of several emotional dispositions, having different conative tendencies, connected with a common object and subordinated to a common end".(1)

It is McDougall, Drever and Myers who have worked out the problem of the origin and development of the sentiments. McDougall's account of the instincts and emotions in his 'Introduction to Social Psychology' is simply the propaedeutic to an account of the development of character through the organisation of these instinctive bases into a hierarchy of sentiments. This is usually overlooked. McDougall defines a sentiment as "an organised system of emotional dispositions centred about the idea of some object". He differs from Shand

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(1) "The Relations of Complex and Sentiment", British Journal of Psychology, Oct., 1922. Cf. also: "The sentiment is a mental system which is capable of adapting itself emotionally to the changing situations of its object, and of persisting indefinitely in correspondence with the duration of its object without becoming morbid: the emotion is a mental system which is capable of adapting itself to only one kind of situation, and when it persists beyond this system tends to become morbid".

in regarding the sentiments as organised in the developing mind in the course of experience. Shand believes some of them to be innately organised but there seems to be no good ground for this belief. Their development can be traced in the course of experience. McDougall shows that "each has a life-history, like any other vital organisation. It is gradually built up, increasing in complexity and thought, and may continue to grow indefinitely, or may enter upon a period of decline, and may decay slowly or rapidly, partially or completely". He distinguishes four main types of sentiments, love and hate, respect and contempt. But besides these he says, "we must recognise the existence of sentiments of all degrees of development, from the most rudimentary upwards; these may be regarded as stages in the formation of fully grown sentiments although many of them never attain any great degree of complexity or strength. These we have to name according to the principal emotional disposition entering into their composition..... The number of sentiments a man may acquire, reckoned according to the number of objects in which they are centred, may of course be very large; but almost every man has a small number of sentiments - perhaps one only - that greatly surpass the rest in strength and as regards the proportion of his conduct that springs from them".

In his treatment of the sentiments McDougall stresses the distinction which he insisted upon in his treatment of instinct, viz. that between facts of mental structure and facts of mental functioning. For him sentiments are facts of structure. "The emotion," he says, "is a mode of experience, a way of functioning and a fact of activity; the sentiment is a fact of structure, an organized system of dispositions which endures, in a more or less quiescent condition, between the

occasions upon which it is brought into activity."[1] McDougall is followed here by Drever who says: "The sentiment is not an experience or conscious process, but a determinant of conscious processes and of the external behaviour which results. When a sentiment is part of the mental structure functioning by way of conscious process, what is experienced is a feeling or emotion relative to a certain object, and an impulse to act in a certain way. The feeling and impulse may vary according to the circumstances while the sentiment, as such, remains relatively unchanged. We may be clearly conscious that we possess a certain sentiment, as we are conscious that we possess a pancreas or adrenal glands, but the sentiment itself is never in consciousness".[2] This view, that the sentiment does not involve any specific conscious experience but is merely the liability to experience a gamut of emotional feelings according to circumstances, has been vigorously criticised by C. S. Myers. In an article on "The Nature and Development of the Sentiments",[3] he works out a view of the sentiments which differs a good deal from that of McDougall. He aims at showing that the sentiment is not simply a fact of disposition but that it involves when aroused specific feelings of its own, i.e. 'sentiment feelings'.

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(1) See 'Outlines', Ch. XVII, "Growth of Mental Structure". It is interesting to observe that a somewhat similar conception is to be found in Lotze's "Outlines of Psychology" (1881). Lotze writes: "In like manner must we distinguish the sentiments (Gesinnungen) - that is to say permanent species of mental constitution, which proceed from this, that a definite value is once for all placed upon certain contents of ideas; they are therefore - for example piety or patriotism - not themselves simple definite feelings, but causes from which the different species of feelings can originate according to the nature of the circumstances". Cf. also G.F. Stout ("Groundwork of Psychology"): "A sentiment as we have defined it cannot be actually felt at any one moment as emotions can be felt ..... They are complex mental dispositions, and may, as divers occasions arise, give birth to the whole gamut of the emotions".

(2) "Introduction to the Psychology of Education", p. 23.

(3) "Psyche", January, 1922.

The sentiment is more than its organised emotions. Those who hold that the sentiment is dependent entirely on its organised emotions, and that they alone are experienced, Myers likens to those who maintain that the emotion is entirely dependent upon its expression. Just as there is also an affective element in the emotional consciousness so, in the case of the sentiment, there is a distinct sentiment feeling. Further Myers does not believe that the sentiments take their rise only at the ideational level of the mind. He looks for their beginnings much earlier. "The rudimentary sentiments of love and hate are not mere dispositions to the feelings of joy, distress, anger, fear, etc. centred about an idea; they involve specific sentiment feelings which are based on certain feelings of interest which are related to the appetition or aversion of the individual in regard to objects. These sentiment feelings and feelings of interest may unquestionably be innate." So far as their relation to the emotions is concerned in Myers' view the sentiment feelings are affective experiences distinct from those associated with the emotions but (that) they may evoke "the various emotional and other feelings", which are organised within the sentiment as a whole. "All grades of sentiment feeling are recognisable, and it seems impossible to draw any clear line of separation between man's love of God or of truth, the love of a cow whose calf has just been removed and the (scarcely more than) interest of the bird that has just hatched out its young. For the essential nucleus of the sentiment is an interest in the object 'qua' object; and its consequence, its very 'raison d'être', is to invoke a variety of simpler emotional and other feelings according to the various situations in which the subject finds itself in relation to that object."

The sentiment feeling begins as a vague interest in the object but "with the clearer conception of subject and object and of concrete and abstract ideas, this feeling,

qualified by later affective expression, is largely responsible for the experience of values. At the same time, by its increasing and systematic control of various emotional and other feelings, it develops an ever-growing strength, stability and complexity of form and organisation, and it gains fuller expression by the aid of such feelings".

Myers seems to make good his point that sentiment covers more than mere disposition. When a well-developed sentiment exists something 'sui generis' seems to be experienced; though we may not agree with Myers's account of the origin of the affective experiences which characterise the sentiments. Still something more than one or another of simple emotional quality seems to be felt. Just as instinctive activities have their own feeling accompaniments, and emotional qualities have theirs, so too there are specific feelings accompanying the sentiments.(1)

III.

We may now endeavour to see more closely how sentiments are formed and what their place and function in mental life is. We have already seen that as the result of experience emotions tend to become associated with an increasing range of objects and later of ideas. Once an emotion has been strongly or repeatedly aroused in connection with any object or idea so that whenever the idea is in consciousness it is coloured by the emotional excitement, there exists the nucleus of a sentiment. If it is not to be called a sentiment - and Shand protests that it is to obliterate the point of principal importance to

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(1) Cf. a later article by Myers: "The Evolution of Feeling" (Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy, Mch., 1923). He summarises his views in this connection as follows: "Instincts are integrated from different higher and lower reflexes, emotions from different instincts, sentiments from different emotions organised within progressively higher systems and subjected to control and inhibition, which are important determinants of the accompanying feelings ..... Instincts, emotions, and sentiments are accompanied by their special feelings depending on the integration of dispositions to lower feelings".

call the fusion of ideas with a single emotional disposition a sentiment - it is at least a sentiment in the making.(1) Once such a rudimentary sentiment is formed, if it is frequently active, it tends to gain in strength and complexity. It may become more complex in either or both of two ways. In the first place the emotionally tinged idea may have associations with other ideas, and it tends to carry over its affect with it, so that it becomes attached to the whole system of ideas. There is complexity, in this case on the idea side. On the other hand frequent arousal of a single emotional tendency creates a condition in which other emotions are easily aroused. Thus a situation which gave rise at first only to the emotional quality of fear, may come to evoke also the emotion of anger. Thus a system of emotional tendencies is formed.(2) As Myers says, "there seems to be no reason to make any distinction between the organisation of ideas about an emotion, and the organisation of emotions about an idea".

As the sentiment is elaborated it prevents the disorderly arousal of emotional tendencies. The sentiment is not merely organised but itself organises the various emotions which make it up. When it exists it provides a setting which limits the activity of emotional impulses. It has an inhibiting and a controlling effect on the impulsive promptings which crude emotion arouses. Where no sentiment exists the emotional tendencies are independent and uncontrolled in their activity. The sentiment introduces stability. The emotions are no longer liable to constant excitation by primitive stimuli. But it is important to note that the control which the sentiments introduce is not a control 'ab extra' but results from a higher organisation of the life of feeling itself and from

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(1) Morton Prince ("The Unconscious") defines a sentiment (much too simply) as "an idea linked with an instinct".

(2) McDougall, "Outline", Ch. XVII, gives some good examples of sentiment-formation.

its co-ordination with the life of ideas. The sentiments control the flow of ideas and influence the formation of opinion and beliefs.(1) They determine what we shall attend to, what we shall think, and what we shall do. They are of all degrees of strength and complexity. They do not exist in isolation. They are related to each other in various ways. Some are caught up in the systems of others. In this way, as has been suggested, they may form a sort of hierarchy under the dominance of some one master-sentiment. It has been said that the strength and complexity of a sentiment, and the intensity of the emotions which it organises may be gauged by the extent to which it 'polarizes' words. The strength and pervasiveness of the religious sentiment or the sentiment of patriotism could be shown by the number of words, expressive of ideas in their system, which carry an emotional significance. Some sentiments pass with the growth of the mind and with a change of outlook. Others may deepen and strengthen throughout life.

It is important to note that ideas which are not organised within any sentiment are impotent and without any influence upon conduct. It is only as they are associated in the system of the sentiments with emotional tendencies that they possess conative force. Thus Morton Prince says: "The impulsive force of the emotional dispositions or linked instincts becomes the conative force of the idea and it is this factor which carries the idea to its fruition .....

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(1) Cf. Rivers, "Instinct and the Unconscious", p. 88, on "the 'something' in our mental constitution which determines that when we read in the paper of a certain event, we experience the special kind of affect and special tendency to behaviour, which determine the relation of that event to our political conduct, which help, for instance, to determine how we shall vote at the next election. This 'something' which thus determines our feelings and conduct is what the orthodox psychologist knows as a sentiment".

Without the impulse of a linked emotion ideas would be lifeless, dead, inert, incapable of determining conduct".(1) The importance of the sentiments in organising the emotional life may be very well seen when, through disillusionment, death, or any other cause, some important and dominant sentiment is broken up. Emotional disintegration, often with disastrous effects on character and conduct may follow. In such a case a man may "go to pieces". The sum of it is that the organisation of the emotional tendencies with ideas to form sentiments is essential for the regulation of conduct and the formation of what is termed character. This is well put by McDougall. "The growth of the sentiments is of the utmost importance for the character and conduct of individuals and of societies; it is the organisation of the affective and conative life. In the absence of sentiments our emotional life would be a mere chaos, without order, consistency, or continuity of any kind; and all our social relations and conduct, being based on the emotions and their impulses, would be correspondingly chaotic, unpredictable, and unstable. It is only through the systematic organisation of the emotional dispositions in sentiments that the volitional control of the immediate promptings of the emotions is rendered possible. Again, our judgments of value and of merit are rooted in our sentiments; and our moral principles have the same sources, for they are formed by our judgments of moral value."(2)

As McDougall says it is the existence of sentiments which gives 'value' to ideas and to objects and what are termed 'ideals' may be regarded as sentiments consciously adopted, or raised to the self-conscious level.

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(1) Op. cit., pp. 449-50.

(2) Introduction to Social Psychology, pp. 159-60.

IV.

We must now endeavour to relate the concept of the sentiment to another conception which has been elaborated in recent years. This is the 'complex'. This latter term has caught the popular fancy and its meaning has 'worked loose' somewhat. It figures very largely in the literature of the 'new' psychology. The two notions of sentiment and complex have grown up contemporaneously; that of the sentiment, as it has been put, in the calm fields of normal psychology; that of the complex in the jungle of psychopathology. Different lines of investigation have led to the two conceptions which now overlap so that it is difficult to find a satisfactory line of demarcation between them.

The relation between the two conceptions was recently the subject of a Symposium (1) in which six psychologists took part. Unfortunately the symposiasts did not succeed in reaching agreement though they did make clearer the ways in which their views differed.

The term 'complex' was originally introduced into psychopathology by Neisser and Jung and used by the latter to indicate any group of ideas carrying a specific affect (gefühlsbetonte Komplex), and not necessarily of a pathological nature. He found that factors of this sort were at the roots of certain types of mental disorders, but he also illustrated their operation in the normal mind. Later, psycho-analytical writers restricted the term to groups of emotionally toned ideas, which, through repression, had become dissociated from the rest of the mind. Bernard Hart, in his well-known "Psychology of Insanity", popularised the term in the wide

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(1) "The Relations of Sentiment and Complex" by W. H. Rivers, A. G. Tansley, A. F. Shand, T. H. Pear, B. Hart and C.P. Myers, British Journal of Psychology, Oct., 1922.

sense in which Jung used it. By it he denoted "a system of connected ideas, with a strong emotional tone and a tendency to produce actions of a certain definite character". He held that "complexes may be of all sorts and kinds, the component ideas may be of every variety and the accompanying emotional tone pleasant or painful, very intense or comparatively weak". As illustrations of complexes in this sense he gave the hobby and political bias. In the case of the man with the hobby he would be aware of the existence and operation of the complex. In the case of political bias the politician is not aware of the existence of the complex and we have an instance of what is termed the unconscious origin of beliefs and opinions. In his contribution to the Symposium Hart writes: "If we seek to discover the causes determining the direction of flow of our thought and conduct, we find amongst the causes systems of mental elements to which, following Jung, I gave the name complexes. The essential feature of each of these systems is that the constituent mental elements are linked together to form a 'higher psychic unit', which has a more or less definite conative trend, and which therefore tends to influence the flow of thought and conduct in a definite direction". In Hart's opinion the distinction of complexes and sentiments should be made on the basis of degree of organisation. The term complex should be the wider one covering all the less well-organised systems of ideas and tendencies. The term sentiment would be limited "to a comparatively small class of functional units distinguished by a high degree of integration and organisation with the whole structure of the mind".

A. G. Tansley insists on retaining the wide usage of the term complex and uses it as equivalent to sentiment as understood by McDougall. "The whole mental life and consequently behaviour," he writes, "depends primarily on the character and power of the complexes in which the structure of

the mind is organized".[1] His 'ego-complex' is equivalent to McDougall's 'self-regarding sentiment'. Tansley declines to use the term sentiment to denote mental constellations of this kind, holding that it has an exclusively affective significance and should not be used to refer to any mental system which includes cognitive elements. "A particular sentiment is the specific affect belonging to a specific complex; it is not the complex itself,"

The way out of this confusion seems to be indicated by Rivers. He proposed to make the term complex refer to those mental systems which are in some degree morbid and which, by reason of their lack of harmony with the rest of the mind, are characterised by what he terms suppression.[2] Suppression is the keynote of the complex; fusion, on the other hand, is the essence of the process upon which depends the formation of a sentiment.[3] Having come into being in these different ways the two types of mental system are marked by other characteristic features. They differ greatly, for example, in the degree in which they can be modified. "The complex, once having come into being through the process of suppression, is

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(1) "The New Psychology and Its Relation to Life", p. 69.

(2) Cf. "Instinct and the Unconscious", Ch. XI. "According to this usage the concept of 'complex' is closely linked with that of the unconscious. The term is appropriate to those cases in which experience shut off from direct access to consciousness is nevertheless capable of influencing conduct or of producing changes in consciousness, the underlying conditions of which cannot be reached by the ordinary process of introspection. Characteristic examples of a complex would be found in the suppressed experience upon the activity of which depends a phobia or the compulsive act or thought of a compulsion neurosis. The complex is usually of a relatively simple kind and may consist only of some body of experience which has been suppressed, though more usually the suppressed experience takes with it into the unconscious experience of other kinds with which it has been associated."

(3) Cf. also McDougall, 'Outline', p. 418. Also W.Whately Smith: "The Measurement of Emotion": "A complex is essentially a system of ideas or constellation, of a nature incompatible with other systems and whose presence in consciousness is productive of conflict, which leads to its repression".

highly constant. It may persist for years, or even for life, unchanged and unchanging." If it is brought into full consciousness it may disappear. But it is not capable of variation as the result of further experience. The sentiment, on the other hand, the product of fusion, is always changing under the influence of new experiences. It is more of a fluid product subject to modification throughout life. Another distinction, and perhaps the most important is that the sentiment is a necessary and constant feature of the normal mental life. "Most of our sentiments," says Rivers, "come into action daily and influence the behaviour of every moment of the life of every day." On the other hand the complex "may be dormant for long periods of time and is in no way necessary to the harmony and fitness of the mental life. Indeed it is a question whether its activity does not always involve a lack of harmony and a failure of adaptation to the circumstances with which the organism is called upon to deal".

It seems desirable, then, to use the term complex to denote those mental systems which are to a greater or less degree morbid, while the sentiment covers those which are recognised as normal and necessary. It is of course true that no sharp line can be drawn between them. It is one of the most important conclusions of modern psychopathology that no sharp line exists between the normal and the abnormal and pathological. The one shades off insensibly into the other. But even if we cannot draw lines, it is important that we should make distinctions. Nothing but confusion can result from the use of the same term for definitely pathological and definitely normal states.

Complexes, like sentiments, may be of all degrees of complexity. Their chief mark, as we have seen, is that they are not organically related to the main personality, but are at war with it. Some primitive tendency may never be

co-ordinated with the rest of mental life but may gather to itself compatible ideas and impulses and so form a system, which because it is out of harmony with the rest of mental life is more or less completely repressed. It could hardly be denied that no mind is free from the operation of such complexes.(1) And they influence thought and conduct in indirect ways. Several of the more characteristic ways have been distinguished. "Repressed complexes," says Drever,(2) "inevitably give rise to 'reaction formations' or 'compromise formations' or both."

Of the first of these Bernard Hart gives the illustration of a man who had been addicted in boyhood to the thieving of small sums of money. In later life the memory of this became painful and he strove to repress it. It became a complex and resulted in an exaggerated honesty so that the man "would devote endless time and trouble to the payment of some trifling excess fare, and an undischarged debt was a source of unceasing worry and self-reproach". In the case of what is termed 'compromise formation', the repressed complex finds expression in some disguised type of activity which does not involve conflict with conscious life. There exists also what is termed 'projection'. This is the ascribing to others of the tendencies and ideas which have been repressed in the person himself. The mind refuses to acknowledge ownership of part of its own content and attaches it to some external individual or object. Those who possess

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(1) Havelock Ellis says somewhere that "we do not know how great a part is played in the lives of men and women by some little concealed form of abnormality". For examples of complexes of more or less developed nature cf. J.A. Hadfield: "Psychology and Morals", Ch. IV and V.

(2) "Introduction to the Psychology of Education", p. 116.

some fault or deficiency of which they are ashamed are notoriously intolèrant of it in others.

V.

V.

MENTAL CONFLICT, REPRESSION AND DISSOCIATION.

I.

The foregoing account of the organisation of the emotional and active life might give the impression that it is a smoothly working process, inevitable and uninterrupted in its development. Most of the accounts of the development of the self do give this impression. But it is now seen to be, in fact, very far from true. The organisation and control of the emotional and impulsive life is something which is only very gradually achieved and its course is in almost every case a chequered one, characterised by more or less acute stresses and strains. Many of the processes and facts which mark its course are being demonstrated in present-day psychology, and some of them we are now to discuss. In recent psychology there have been developed three conceptions, all closely related, which seem to have an important bearing on the problem of conduct. These are the conceptions of mental conflict, of repression and of dissociation. They appear to throw new light on much that has hitherto been inexplicable in the development of conduct and of character. Like all new theories, in the hands of some they have been extravagantly exploited. But this should not prevent us from recognising their real importance. Each of them covers a wide range of psychological facts which it will be possible to survey only very briefly.

These conceptions have been developed largely as the result of investigations into disordered states of mind. The large body of pathological facts which they embrace has called attention to their significance for mental life generally. The extreme danger of inferring from the abnormal to the normal is well-known and evidence of its dangers are not wanting. But it cannot be denied that the study of abnormal processes has known considerable light on the normal. It is a fundamental tenet of modern psycho-pathology that the same processes are at

work in the abnormal as in the normal. There is no qualitative difference between them.[1] "In all cases," says Morton Prince, "these various pathological conditions are functional derangement of the fundamental factors of a given human personality - expressions of the same mechanisms which the organism normally makes use of to adapt itself harmoniously to its own past and present experiences and to its environment." In abnormal states mental processes show themselves in a heightened, exaggerated and often isolated form. In this way disordered conditions supply in psychology what is provided in other sciences by experiment. If this is kept clearly in mind and also the fact already mentioned that the normal and the abnormal shade imperceptibly into each other, there is little danger in looking to the facts of psycho-pathology for light upon mind and conduct in general.

II.

The notion of mental conflict is, of course, no new one. It cannot be said to have originated with modern dynamic psychology. Plato's psychology of the moral life is based wholly on the idea of conflict. It also plays a part in the system of Aristotle - and to a greater or less extent in the whole range of moral theories right down to the present day. But if the conception itself is not new, what is new is the laying bare of some of the factors which are involved in mental conflict, of the manner in which it occurs and the recognition of the hitherto unsuspected ways in which it influences mental

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(1) "The Unconscious", p. 642.

development.[1] It cannot be claimed that its nature is as yet at all fully understood. "The determination of its precise significance," says Bernard Hart, "is a problem of prime importance for psychology and for science. There can be no doubt that this problem will provide one of the most fruitful fields for the scientific work of the near future. At present, however, the significance of conflict is very imperfectly understood and but little definite knowledge concerning it has so far been established."[2] Acute mental conflict of an emotional nature is now believed to be an important causal factor in many forms of mental disorder. It is also believed to be responsible for many otherwise inexplicable phenomena of conduct. Criminal psychologists, for example, have discovered that delinquency and crime are often the results, perhaps indirectly, of mental conflict, though this may be far from obvious on the surface. "Mental conflict," says Hamblin Smith, "and the resulting repression are among the main causative factors which produce delinquent conduct."[3] The hypothesis has recently been put forward that the puzzling phenomena of dreams are explicable as attempts to solve conflict which are occupying the mind. Rivers, in his posthumously published

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(1) Cf. Rivers ("Instinct and the Unconscious", App. I). "A favourite statement concerning Freud's theory is that its fundamental idea is mental conflict. Standing out prominently in the system of Freud is the idea of conflict between the mental tendencies of the individual and the traditional code of conduct presented by the society to which the individual belongs. This conflict, however, was fully recognised by psychologists long before Freud. If the idea were the chief characteristics of his theory, no great claim for novelty or originality could be advanced..... The feature which makes Freud's theory noteworthy is his scheme of the nature of the opponents in the conflict, and of the mechanism by which the conflict is conducted".

(2) "The Psychology of Insanity", p. 164.

(3) "The Psychology of the Criminal." Cf. also W. Healy, "Mental Conflicts and Misconduct", where this subject is very fully treated: also C. Burt, "The Causal Factors of Juvenile Crime", British Journal of Medical Psychology, Jan., 1923.

"Conflict and Dream" challenges the well-known Freudian hypothesis that dreams are simply wish fulfilments. "I regard the dream," he says, "as the expression of a conflict and as an attempt to solve the conflict by such means as are available during sleep."

It has often been pointed out that, viewed broadly, conflict is a characteristic of all life. It does not occur only at the psychological level, but is a universal aspect of all nature.(1) "Conflict is at the very root and source of life, it is the very stuff out of which life is made." But it is at the psychological level of life that it becomes most obvious and important. Man comes to his problems of organic adjustment with the effective solutions reached during long ages of evolution laid down in his bodily and nervous structure. There is comparatively little chance of defects of adjustment developing and little occasion for conflict. But mentally it is all very different. Here certain factors are laid down in structure, but as we have seen in discussing the nature of instinct in man, not in the form of effective solutions to the problems which have to be faced; but as very general ends to be sought, and to be adjusted to one another and to the environment. Further, the problems which have to be met are infinitely more subtle and complex. Adjustment has to be made to a social environment which makes very definite demands in the way of standards of conduct. Thus the chances of maladjustment and the occasions of conflict are very greatly multiplied. Viewed very widely mental conflict is the outcome of the necessity of adapting original human nature to the requirements of the social environment - in the case of ourselves to the highly-developed civilised social environment.

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(1) Cf. W. A. White: "The Mechanisms of Character Formation", Ch. IV, also "Foundations of Psychiatry", p. 39 ff.

Conflict arises, as it has been well put, "between what is racially established for the furtherance of life, as such, and what is socially established, far later in the evolutionary order, at the reflective level of that which we call our morality". It is in the process of the socialization and the moralization of original impulses and emotions that conflict occurs. The notion that the conditions of modern civilized life impose on the natural man a strain which is often intolerable is now widely expressed.(1) It is pointed out that while biological heritage has not changed, social heritage has changed very greatly. The modern man, it is claimed, inherits precisely the same mental characteristics as his savage ancestors,(2) but that he must adapt himself to a vastly different social order which makes high demands upon him for the ordering and control of his innate tendencies. Compared with their almost limitless past, this need for the control of the great instincts is very recent indeed. Hence it is little wonder if there is in many cases partial and in some cases total failure of adaptation. "We should try and realise," says one writer, "how complicated a system our conventional civilization is. We require every person born into that society to adapt himself to it ..... We cannot be surprised that there are some cases of failure to attain this."(3) But this point of view, while

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(1) Cf. Bertrand Russell, "The Prospects of Industrial Civilization", p. 170. "With the advance of what is called civilization our social and material environment has changed faster than our instincts, so that there has been an increasing discrepancy between the acts to which we are impelled by instinct, and those to which we are constrained by prudence."

(2) Cf. Franz Boas, "The Mind of Primitive Man".

(3) Hamblin Smith op. cit. For an account of the process of social adaptation from the psycho-analytic point of view, cf. S. Freud, "Reflections" (New York, 1922), cf. also Ernest Jones (Papers on Psycho-analysis). "Behind the veneer of civilization there remains throughout life a buried mass of crude, primitive tendencies always struggling for expression and toward which the person tends to relapse whenever suitable opportunity is offered, an illuminating example of which is a state of war, when men will permit themselves to commit the most unthinkable acts." After all this is scarcely new doctrine, cf. Plato, "The Republic", Book IX. "What we want to be sure of is this, that a terrible, fierce and lawless class of desires exists in every man, even in those of us who have every appearance of being decent people. Its existence is revealed in dreams."

it must be recognised, must not be pushed too far. It is possible to overdo the idea that civilized man is so far removed from natural man that "his hold on normality of development is in the last degree precarious". After all, it is human nature which has brought civilization about.

What we must recognize is that in the process of social adjustment many stresses and strains do occur, and that many of the difficulties of mental life arise in this way. Some of the factors involved in the process of adaptation have now been said bare.② At the very beginning of life conflict is set up between the two forces of original impulse and social pressure. "The life of a child," says Rivers, "is a long conflict between instinctive tendencies and forces brought to bear upon these tendencies by its elders, and many are coming to believe that character is largely determined by the strategy and tactics of this conflict."(1) This conflict between original nature and the ideals which are derived from the social tradition is prolonged throughout life, and takes all manner of forms and is of all degrees of acuteness. It is now widely acknowledged that many types of mental disorder represent the more or less complete failure of mental life to meet social demands. Sanity and mental health appears as a successful insanity or an unsuccessful attempt to adjust life to social reality. Disorders of mind are the outcome of ineffective attempts to solve the conflicts which arise for everyone between native tendencies and controlling forces. "It has become

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(1) "Instinct and the Unconscious", p. 258. The recognition of this fact is very encouraging for the educator as Rivers points out elsewhere. "We are no longer content to adopt the psssimistic attitude of those who were fed on the old views of heredity, but we are coming to see to how great an extent the disorders and faulty trends of mental life are the result of wrong methods of treatment in the years when the individual is painfully learning to control the instinctive impulses which he has brought into the world with him so as to make them compatible with the tradition of the society of which he is a member." (Psychology and Politics, p. 100.)

② cf. F. L. Wells: "Mental adjustments"

evident that the psycho-neuroses are essentially attempts to solve in various ways the conflict between instinctive tendencies and controlling forces, the special form of the psycho-neurosis depending on the nature of the solution attempted, on the relative strength of the warring forces, on the nature of the instinctive tendencies involved, and on the outcome of a struggle between different forms of activity by which the cruder instinctive tendencies are controlled."(1) The symptoms which appear in mental disorder represent the re-entrance into activity of tendencies which in the normal healthy person have been brought under control and integrated into the personality. Rivers points out that in savage communities the psycho-neuroses are almost entirely absent, though the cruder forms of mental disorder are present. In such communities there has been reached a stable adjustment between original nature and social tradition, leaving no room for conflict. "The perfect social organization is one in which instinctive tendencies out of harmony with social ideals have so come under control that they no longer form the ground of conflict, or give occasion for it only in the presence of exceptional stress and strain." As is well-known, the psycho-analytic school have claimed that it is conflict connected with the sexual instincts which alone give rise to the psycho-neuroses. But this seems to have been definitely disproved. In the case of the very large number of war-neuroses the mental conflicts and disharmonies which gave rise to them were connected with

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(1) Op. cit. Cf. also W. A. White ("Foundations of Psychiatry"). "Mental disease is disease at the level of integration to the individual and society. It is not a disease of society, as such, nor yet of man as an individual solely; it is a disease of man as a social animal; it touches him in his social integrations". In other words mental disorders are social maladjustments.

the instinct of self-preservation and the emotion of fear. This was abundantly demonstrated by the work of Rivers, Brown, Myers and others. To quote Rivers once again: "The first result of the dispassionate study of the psycho-neuroses of warfare .... was to show that in the vast majority of cases there is no reason to suppose that factors derived from the sexual life played any essential part in causation, but that these disorders became explicable as the result of disturbance of another instinct, even more fundamental than that of sex - the instinct of self-preservation, especially those forms of it which are adapted to protect the animal from danger".(1) There is of course little in normal civilized life to set up conflicts of this sort. Psycho-pathologists all recognise that in the disorders which arise in civil life sex factors do play a great part. " ..... In those greater failures of adaptation of conduct to the circumstances it has to meet which we call disease, it is the sexual instinct which, in times of peace, provides the most potent agent in the mental conflicts upon which disorders of the mind depend."(2) This is because of the original strength and complexity of the instinct and the strong repression to which it is necessarily subjected. Here is a quotation from Dewey pointing this out: "Current clinical psychology has undoubtedly overworked the influence of sexual impulse in this connection, refusing, at the hands of some writers, to recognize the operation of any other modes of disturbance. There are explanations of this one-sidedness. The intensity of the sexual instinct and its organic ramifications produce many of the cases that are so noticeable as to demand the attention of physicians. And social taboos and the tradition of secrecy

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(1) Op. cit., p. 5.

(2) Ibid., App. VII.

have put this impulse under greater strain than has been imposed upon others. If a society existed in which the existence of impulses towards food were socially disavowed until it was compelled to live an illicit, covert life, alienists would have plenty of cases of mental and moral disturbance to relate in connection with hunger"[1]. It seems probable that conflict can arise in connection with any of the elemental instinctive forces of sufficient emotional intensity to result in serious mental disturbance. What modern psycho-pathology has shown is that mental health depends upon an equilibrium between the controlled and controlling forces of the mind.

Coming now closer to the question of the exact nature of mental conflict. Hart says that in such conflict "we find a struggle taking place in which one of the primary instincts is pitted against another"[2]; and Trotter says that "the essence of mental conflict is the antagonism of two impulses which both have instinct behind them"[3]. But this hardly seems to describe the real nature of mental conflict. It is rather too simple a statement of it. Nor can it now, of course, be described in the old terms as between "appetites" and "interests" or "desire" and "reason". Conflict occurs between different levels of mental life. This seems to be its real nature. Impulses arising from a higher and more recently developed level of the mind conflict with those which are more primitive. Thus the typical form of conflict is that between motives prompted by a permanent and developed mental system such as a sentiment and those which arise from the excitement of a simple instinctive tendency. As we have already seen the existence of

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(1) "Human Nature and Conduct", p. 165.

(2) Op. cit., p. 165.

(3) "Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War", p. 82.

a sentiment means a setting in which instinctive tendencies, if they are evoked, are limited and inhibited. And from time to time, they are bound to be evoked. The type of conflict which produced the psycho-neuroses of war provides a good instance. In the case of the soldier under fire the powerful emotion of fear, with its prompting to flight, conflicted with the developed sentiment of duty according to which fear and its expression are regarded as reprehensible. It is this conflict in the mind which, under the conditions of prolonged strain and fatigue occasioned by warfare, resulted in break-down and neurosis. In the case of conflict between sexual impulses and developed moral sentiments the mechanism is the same. But conflicts may also occur between the great systems of the sentiments themselves, for they, as has been pointed out, form some sort of a hierarchy in which there are different levels. Such a major conflict would be one between the sentiments of religion and patriotism. Conflicts between the great sentiments have been the themes of the dramatists and writers of all ages. There can be no denying the influence of unresolved conflict of long duration in influencing thought and behaviour. Some of its consequences will be pointed out. Often conflicts occur and persist of which the individual is not fully conscious. They exert their influence indirectly from below the conscious level and give rise to a vague sense of inner disharmony.

But while acute and chronic mental conflict may have harmful and in some cases disastrous results, and at any rate be wasteful of mental energy, there is also another side to the picture and it should be put. It opens very wide issues. The normal mind, while it is really living, can never be free from conflict and never raised above it. It rather proceeds from one conflict to another. If it be true that not complete adaptation but rather growth itself is the moral end, then it

is important to recognize that conflict, in the broad sense, appears as the condition of growth and development.(1) In this sense, conflict is ultimate. And it has a further significance. In the concluding passages of his "Instinct and the Unconscious", Rivers discusses the source of the energy which finds expression in creative work. There are, he says, two chief possibilities. One is that it is derived from instincts which fail, owing to control, to find their normal outlet and are, in current terminology, sublimated. The other possibility is that this instinctive energy "is increased in amount through the conflict between controlled and controlling forces. Many facts .... point to the truth of the second alternative". And of the energy derived in this way from conflict, Rivers says that "it is not easy to place any limit to its activity. We do not know how high the goal that it may reach".

III.

Returning again to the question of mental conflict in the narrow sense - conflict between an impulse to action arising from one level of mental life and one belonging to another and more developed level. All such conflicts have one very important aspect in common. They are all characterized by emotional tension, by indecision and paralysis of action. These are highly unpleasant and the mind seeks a way of escape from this tension - some resolution of the conflict. And we have come upon the important process of repression. One of the most frequent, and as we shall see, the most faulty methods of dealing with mental conflict is by repression, that is the excluding from consciousness of one of the emotionally changed impulses concerned. To quote Bernard Hart: "The solution of a mental conflict by the mechanism of repression is one of the

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(1) Cf. M. Harrison, "Mental Instability as a Factor in Progress", "Monist", Apl., 1922.

commonest refuges of the human mind ..... it not only explains the occurrence of phenomena frequently seen in every-day life, but it also enables us to understand the genesis of many abnormal mental symptoms".(1)

Psychology owes the conception of repression and the elucidation of its significance for conduct largely to the psycho-analytic school: though few psychologists now accept the Freudian view of repression without considerable modification. The conception is control in the psycho-analytical scheme. "The theory of repression," says Freud, "is the main pillar on which rests the edifice of psycho-analysis."(2) It was first regarded purely as a pathological conception, but now that its nature is more fully understood, it is seen to be a process which in some degree necessarily characterises all mental life. "Repression," says Hart, "is neither normal nor pathological, and it may lead to results which are either desirable or noxious according to the total setting of the picture of which it forms a part."(3) It is, in fact, now being very widely conceived and its naturalness and necessity is seen, as well as the unfortunate results which may follow from its faulty exercise.

Freud's doctrine of repression is very closely bound up with this whole rather picturesque scheme of the unconscious, of censorship and of the pleasure and reality principles of the mind. It is not at all easy to get a clear idea of what he actually means by it.(4) But he believes that there is a universal tendency in the mind to avoid or forget whatever is

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(1) Op. cit., p. 102.

(2) "History of the Psycho-analytic Movement."

(3) "The Relations of Complex and Sentiment."

(4) Cf. J. T. MacCurdy: "Problems in Dynamic Psychology", Ch. V, "Repression and Ego-Libido".

unpleasant, and that from the first there are tendencies at work which shield the mind, as far as possible, from disagreeable experiences. This process whereby painful or disharmonious ideas or impulses are expelled from consciousness or prevented from entering it, Freud terms repression. He appears also to identify repression with another process termed 'censorship', and the 'censor' would be the personification of the sum total of the repressing forces of the mind. When an idea or an impulse is repressed, it becomes, on this view, unconscious. Everything that is really repressed is unconscious and the censorship prevents the rising into consciousness of these unpleasant and disharmonious elements. The action of repression may extend over from the original elements to other mental processes which may be associated with it. There may be what is termed 'displacement of affect'. During sleep the activity of the censorship is somewhat relaxed, though even then repressed tendencies express themselves in dreams only in an indirect and symbolic form. An important point about repression as understood by Freud is that it cannot bring about the destruction of the emotionally toned impulses and their connected ideas which are repressed. They remain as complexes in the unconscious, which latter is essentially made up of such repressed material. There they continue to exert a powerful, though unrecognized influence upon mental life and behaviour. Often they succeed in obtaining expression in some indirect way. If they do not, their original energy remains, and they "exercise a continuous pressure in the direction of consciousness" so that their existence involves "a continuous expenditure of force". Freud does not regard repression resulting from conscious mental conflict as the most important type. He believes that there are certain repressions which occur in the first few years of childhood of tendencies which never become conscious at all, and that these early repressions are of very

great importance, remaining the condition of all later repressions. This appears to be a particularly doubtful part of the scheme. Freud backs up his theory of repression with his doctrine of the active nature of forgetting. It was very long held that forgetting was simply a passive process which presented no special problem to the psychologist, and needed no special explanation. It now seems however that it may be to some extent an active and purposive process. Freud regards the whole problem of memory as primarily an affective one. While formerly it was held that what is forgotten is forgotten because it lacked interest it is now claimed that it is not what lacks interest that is forgotten, but that which carries a powerful interest of an unpleasant nature. In other words repression is at work. Past experiences and present duties which are unpleasant and give rise to conflict are repressed and apparently forgotten. Some of the instances given to support this doctrine seem very far-fetched, and Ernest Jones seems certainly to go too far when he claims that all forgetting is due to repression; but there appear to be some grounds for the notion, and so far as memory is concerned the centre of interest for psychologists has shifted from the problem of remembering to that of forgetting.(1)

The conception of repression has been considerably clarified and developed by Rivers. He makes a valuable distinction between repression and what he terms suppression. Freud's term covered both processes. For Rivers repression is the 'witting' endeavour to banish some conflicting tendency. By suppression he means a much wider process, namely the 'unwitting' process by which experience becomes inaccessible to consciousness. "Experience which is thus suppressed is

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(1) Cf. T. H. Pear, "Remembering and Forgetting".

closely associated with instinctive tendencies, the suppression becoming necessary through the incompatibility of these tendencies with acquired standards of thought and conduct." Suppression is a spontaneous process and occurs without the intervention of volition. Rivers relates it to the process of forgetting and accepts the view that the latter is an active process. He shows that the hypothesis of suppression will account for the amnesias or pathological forgettings which characterize some of the neuroses - what is forgotten in these cases being distressing memories which would arouse the most painful feelings. And there is no difference, Rivers says, between these examples of complete and perhaps life-long suppression and the forgetting of the unpleasant and disharmonious experiences of everyday life. The most interesting and important part of Rivers's theory of suppression is his relating it to the process of inhibition in neurology, and his demonstration that it is only a special variety of a process common to every phase of animal activity and possessing considerable biological utility. Rivers effects this relation by means of the famous experiments which he made with Head demonstrating the protopathic and epicritic sensibility of the skin. These experiments showed that an earlier and cruder mode of reaction is inhibited and overlaid by a later, more discriminative and refined one, whose operation is incompatible with it. Rivers aims at showing that there is the same process of inhibition and control of earlier by later forms of activity at work at all levels of organic life, reflex, sensori-motor and conscious. "In all cases," he says, "we have to do with the means by which behaviour, whether of human being or animal, is adjusted to the needs with which man or animal is confronted. The suppression of conscious experience is only one example of a process which applies throughout the whole of the animal kingdom, and is essential to the proper

regulation of every form of animal and human activity."[1] From this point of view Rivers offers a valuable criticism of Freud's conception of the endopsychic 'censorship', and puts forward another hypothesis to account for the facts which this conception covers.[2] He is dissatisfied with a picturesque analogy drawn from a highly specialized social institution. But some hypothesis is necessary to account for the controlling and selective activities of the mind which go on outside the realm of conscious awareness. He draws an analogy from current theory concerning the nature of the nervous system. In its functional aspects it is regarded as consisting of a number of levels forming a hierarchy in which the lower at any stage is controlled by the higher. Rivers assumes a similar series of levels of acquired experience each tending to preserve a mode of action characteristic of its origin, yet each controlled by those above it and of later development. Rivers discusses the whole range of phenomena for the explanation of which Freud has recourse to the conception of the censorship, and believes that they can be accounted for in this way, namely, "as the result of an arrangement of mental levels

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(1) "Instinct and the Unconscious", p. 31. Here is another passage which gives the key to Rivers's thought not only on this subject, but on the whole problem of mental development and behaviour. "The great problem which had to be solved in the process of mental development was how mental processes and activities should be treated when, being adapted to one kind of existence or one phase of evolution, they had to be modified to meet circumstances of a different kind. Two main alternatives were open. The earlier activity, with its products, could be suppressed and treated so as to make them inaccessible to consciousness when incompatible with later developments; or they could be utilised by fusing them, or parts of them, with the products of later development. In the first case the suppressed activity will maintain its individuality in so far as it continues to exist; in the second case it loses its individuality and becomes merged in the product of the process of fusion, so that its nature can only be revealed by a special process of analysis." ("The Relation of Complex and Sentiment.")

(2) Ibid. App. V.

exactly comparable with that now generally recognized to exist in the nervous system, an arrangement by which more recently acquired systems control the more ancient".(1) This certainly fits in very well with all that we have seen of the nature of mental development.

While Rivers has demonstrated the naturalness and necessity of the unwitting process of suppression at all levels of mental life he also points out that it is especially characteristic of early years and less effective in more developed mental life. These open conflicts occur and he shows that in solving them witting repression is a failure. To quote him once again: "One of the most striking lessons of the new psychiatry teaches us the evil effect of repression, meaning by this term the process of putting unpleasant experience aside so that it may be forgotten, instead of facing the situation and tracing it to its sources so that it may be understood and suitable measures taken to put the situation right. There is an overwhelming mass of evidence to the effect that repression does not remove the evil, but that at the best the repressed experience remains in existence, always liable to flare up into activity later in life, while in the less favourable cases it leads directly to a whole series of morbid symptoms which greatly lower vitality and efficiency".(2) Repression is not the way in which emotional impulses out of harmony with the rest of the personality and causing conflict can best be met. Driven from consciousness they do not simply die out. They had to form complexes and to lead a surreptitious life resulting

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(1) For a somewhat similar explanation of the facts of censorship, cf. J. B. Watson, "The Psychology of Wish-Fulfilment", Scientific Monthly, 1916.

(2) "Psychology and Politics", p. 66.

in all kinds and degrees of intellectual and moral pathology. They are kept in restraint only by an exhausting expenditure of energy. This is a faulty and uneconomical way of organizing the mind. It is in fact a misuse of the mind, and its further consequences will now be pointed out.

IV.

Dissociation is the third of the conceptions which form the subject of this chapter. It is often quite wrongly assumed to be identical with repression. It is rather a possible consequence of it. Just as conflict may lead to repression so repression in its turn tends to bring about the condition known as dissociation. This condition involves essentially some degree of splitting of the mind and the acquiring of a more or less completely independent existence by the split off portion. The homogeneity and integrity which should characterize the mind is to a certain extent lost. Repressed emotional tendencies and associated experiences do not as we have seen, die out. It is these which tend to become dissociated and independently active. William Brown says of dissociation that "it is the result of mental conflict and involves the repression of emotional states. The repression of any emotion involves the danger of dissociation, the ideas accompanying the emotion being the more ready to split off from the rest of the mind and pursue a subconscious life of their own".(1) The study of dissociation in all its forms reveals the existence of deep-seated emotional conflict.

The conception is one which has long occupied an important place in psycho-pathology. It did so in pre-Freudian days, though Freud and his followers have thrown much new light on its causation. It covers a wide range of pathological and

(1) "Psychology and Psychotherapy", p. 125.

semi-pathological facts, e.g. somnambulism, hallucinations, etc. One of the most typical of the pathological phenomena which illustrate it is that termed the fugue. The patient passes from time to time into states of which at normal times he is quite unaware, and while in the fugue state he may perform complicated behaviour of which there is afterwards no conscious memory. "The fugue," says Rivers, "usually comes into being owing to the fact that some unpleasant experience has become unconscious by the unwitting process of suppression, or is tending to pass into the unconscious through the agency of the witting process of repression."(1) Morton Prince has conducted a famous series of investigations into the more complete forms of dissociation and has coined the term 'co-consciousness' for the independent consciousness which exists in those cases of complete dissociation which amount to multiple personality.(2) In such cases dissociation seems to be an escape from the stress of conflict which cannot be solved by any other means.

Dissociation has been shown to exist in all degrees and to play a part in every mind. "Even the normal mind," says Hart, "does not present that undivided field of consciousness which we might be tempted at first sight to ascribe to it."(3) There is a tendency to dissociation in everyone, because of the universal existence of emotional conflicts. No one is a complete mental unity. A very familiar phenomenon of the normal mind which constitutes a degree of dissociation is the functioning of our various interests and systems of sentiments in 'logic-tight' or more strictly 'emotion-tight', compartments.

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(1) Op. cit., p. 73.

(2) See "The Unconscious", cf. also "Awareness, Consciousness, Co-Consciousness and Animal Intelligence". Paper read at the International Congress of Psychology, 1923.

(3) Op. cit., p. 42.

Systems of sentiments which are really incompatible are preserved in the mind but are never allowed to meet face to face. There is thus lack of complete emotional integrity. To bring competing tendencies into a unity is not easy. It requires thought and effort. So the mind builds up barriers between them. The emotional stress which their conflict would occasion is avoided by keeping them apart. It is only in the mind however that they can be kept apart. In action the lack of integrity is clear enough. In the well-integrated mind there are no barriers of this sort.

Throughout this chapter we have been concerned with mental processes which may lead to faulty forms of organization of the mind with unfortunate reactions on conduct. We will endeavour later to indicate what, in the light of all that is now known concerning mental make-up, appears to be the right way of organizing the mind.

I.

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VI.

THE NATURE OF THE UNCONSCIOUS.

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I.

In a paper recently read before the Aristotelian Society,[1] C. D. Broad called attention to the looseness with which the term 'unconscious' is at present being used, and characterized it as 'a psychological scandal of the first magnitude'. He went on to distinguish some six senses in which the term was currently employed, holding that while there was "no theoretical impossibility in the existence of the unconscious or of unconscious states in any of the senses defined" it was desirable, for the sake of clearness, to make distinctions and to employ different terminology for the different senses. And he suggested a new set of terms.

Some such attempt is certainly highly desirable. No one can read current psychological literature without feeling that on this subject confusion on the grandest scale reigns supreme. On every hand one reads of 'unconscious wishes', 'unconscious motives', 'unconscious memories', 'unconscious ideas', and so on; while far-reaching claims of a large and general sort are made concerning the influence of these unconscious factors in determining conduct. Much of conduct, it is said, is motivated by processes which remain hidden from personal consciousness. What is the meaning of all this? Is it possible to give it any meaning? Whatever view we may take of this subject we cannot simply neglect it in any account of the psychological factors involved in conduct. We must endeavour to determine in what sense, if any, it appears to be admissable to speak of unconscious mental processes, and whether, if such exist, they are of the same or of a different order from conscious processes. We must try to decide if there are, as

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(1) "Various Meanings of the Term 'Unconscious'."

is claimed, unconscious determinants of conduct.

Though the current popularity of the conception of the unconscious is due largely to recent developments in clinical psychology it did not originate there, or with psychology at all. The conception is an old one. Before the days of modern psychology it was put forward in various forms as a speculative hypothesis by philosophers. It played an important part in the philosophies of Leibnitz, Schopenhauer, Von Hartmann, Fechner and others.(1) It is now claimed that as a result of the wide range of empirical facts which modern investigation have brought to light the 'a priori' speculations of these philosophers have received 'a posteriori' justification. There can be no denying the facts. The question is whether, in many cases, they are not falsely conceptualized in the light of a theory which is open to question, or given a metaphorical and misleading interpretation. The writings of F.W.H. Myers(2) did much to popularize the conception of the unconscious. He termed it the 'subliminal'. He compared the human mind to a spectrum, consciousness being the visible part of the spectrum and unconscious processes being like the invisible infra-red part of it. William James, in his "Varieties of Religious Experience", also adopted the hypothesis of the unconscious. There is a passage which indicates the wide view which he took of it. "It is an inexhaustible fountain-head, ever pouring out fresh conceptions as from some unseen laboratory, the abode of everything that is latent, the reservoir of everything that passes unrecorded and unobserved. It contains, for example, such things as all ~~over~~ our momentarily inactive memories, and it harbours the springs of all our obscurely motived passions, impulses, likes, dislikes and prejudices;

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(1) For a brief account of the unconscious as conceived by these and other philosophers, cf. I. Levine: "The Unconscious" (Part I).

(2) "Human Personality."

our intentions, hypotheses, fancies, superstitions, persuasions, convictions, and in general all our non-rational operations come from it. It is the source of our dreams, and apparently they may return to it. In it arise whatever mystical experiences we may have, and our automatism, sensory and motor; our life in hypnotic or hypnoid conditions, if we are subject to such conditions; our delusions, fancies, ideas and hysterical accidents, if we are hysteric subjects."(1)

It is the clinical psychology which has developed out of the work of Freud and Jung which has made this conception so very prominent. As the result of his investigations Freud has formulated an elaborate scheme of the organization of the unconscious and of its relation to the conscious mind. It is claimed to be strictly scientific and in sharp contrast to the vague and speculative doctrines of the philosophers. Unfortunately when Freudian writings are closely examined it is found that investigations have been carried on and conclusions established with very little regard for scientific caution and precision. This school have repudiated the traditional terminology of psychology but have neglected to define their own terms by careful analysis so that the large unanalysed conceptions with which they operate tend to become anthropomorphic agencies and their whole psychology takes a mythological turn. The unconscious, spelt with a capital letter, tends to be regarded as standing for some mystical, all-powerful entity. As McDougall very well puts it, Freudians "have tended to confuse together in one unanalysed mass whatever contents and operations of the mind are not clearly conscious at each moment, and to make of this an anthropomorphic entity, a demon, a god in the machine, whose nature and power remain entirely unlimited and incomprehensible".(2) Freudian writers,

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(1) p. 483.

(2) "The Present Position in Clinical Psychology", Proc. Roy. Soc. Med. 1918, cf. also Bertrand Russell: "The Analysis of Mind" (pp. 37-8). "Freud and his followers, though they

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though they repudiate the notion of the unconscious as a second consciousness, do in fact often write as if it were a second self of exactly the same kind as the conscious personality which we know. Theoretical difficulties are got over by the copious use of metaphor, and it often seems to be forgotten that it is metaphor. Spatial metaphors of the unconscious 'region' of the mind 'lying below' the conscious level and of the unconscious or a 'receptacle' in which experience is 'stored up', are very inadequate to describe the real nature of the mental. Such pictorial views of the mind are very simple and attractive. But whatever deficiencies may be discovered in the Freudian view of the unconscious, and it will be examined in more detail presently, some hypothesis of mental processes outside the field of conscious awareness now seems to be necessary for psychology.

The question is whether we are to take the terms 'mind' and 'consciousness' as being coextensive. Most psychologists now answer that we must not. As Drever says, "Modern psychology has realised that the conception of the psychical must be widened so as to include processes and phenomena other than conscious processes".(1) There are of course difficulties involved in such a conception; but there are far more difficulties to be met without it. It does not seem possible to make sense of all the known facts of mind without some such

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(Note Contd.)
have demonstrated beyond dispute the immense importance of 'unconscious' desires in determining our actions and beliefs have not attempted the task of telling us what an 'unconscious' desire actually is, and have thus invested their doctrine with an air of mystery and mythology which forms a large part of its popular attractiveness ..... The 'unconscious' becomes a sort of underground prisoner, living in a dungeon, breaking in at long intervals upon our daylight respectability with dark groans and maledictions and strange atavistic lusts. The ordinary reader almost inevitably thinks of the underground person as another consciousness, prevented by what Freud calls the 'censor' from making his voice heard in company, except on rare and dreadful occasions when he shouts so loud that everyone hears him and there is a scandal."

(1) "Introduction to the Psychology of Education", p. 28.

hypothesis. Philosophers may find it difficult to make it fit in with preconceived views of the nature of mind and may reject it, but psychologists, though they may differ as to its exact nature, are agreed that, to give a complete account of mental life, it is necessary in some sense.(1) Munsterberg's statement(2) made some years ago that "the story of the subconscious mind may be told in three words: there is none" will certainly not now do. Conscious processes now appear as part of a larger whole and consciousness does not seem to be the only mode in which the psychical is manifested. The data of consciousness appear in themselves as very incomplete, and unconscious processes are assumed as an hypothesis in order to complete the chain of mental causation. To quote Freud, "Conscious activities remain disconnected and unintelligible if we persist in the claim that everything psychical in us must be consciously experienced; whereas they fit into a demonstrated coherent system if we introduce the unconscious activities that are revealed behind".(3)

The only other hypothesis is to regard this whole as part psychical and part physiological and to look to physiological processes for an explanation of anything in consciousness which cannot be accounted for by previous events in consciousness. This involves heterogeneous interpretation. It is the giving up of the attempt at continuity of psychological explanation and psychologists decline to do this. They prefer, as Lloyd Morgan puts it, to adopt the hypothesis that "consciousness is based on and in touch with the unconscious which is psychical in its nature, and not with physiological processes as such".

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(1) For an account of the various psychological theories of the unconscious, cf. J. S. Moore: "The Foundations of Psychology", Chs. VII and VIII.

(2) See "Subconscious Phenomena" by Munsterberg, Ribot, Janet, Jastrow, Hart and Morton Prince.

(3) Sammlung Kleiner Schriften, Vierte Folge, p. 295.

Before we go on to discuss various theories of the unconscious we will quote a few passages in order to indicate the way in which this subject is now being regarded by representative psychologists. Here are two passages from McDougall:- "The reality, the richness and the importance of the subconscious operations of the mind have been brought home to many of us with a new force by our experience of the functional disorders of warfare; for no one working amongst these cases can have failed to come across many instances in which the symptoms, both bodily and mental ..... have been undeniably traceable to emotional conflicts and repressed tendencies and ideas which have operated wholly or partly beneath, or without the clear consciousness of the patient".(1)

"The difficulty that most men find in accepting the notion of unconscious mental processes may be softened for the reader if he will reflect that much of his normal mental life is only very partially expressed in consciousness; that he often is unaware of the motives of his own deliberate actions, and can recollect nothing of many past experiences which have contributed to shape his tastes, his moral and intellectual principles, his ideals, his character and his motives. And he must recognize that when we use for the description of unconscious mental processes, the terms in which we are accustomed to describe our conscious mental life, we take a certain liberty justified by the lack of any other terminology."(2)

From C. S. Myers we may quote the following: "At first sight the critical psychologist may hesitate to regard the 'unconscious' as 'mental', preferring to consider it in terms of physiological traces or dispositions, left behind in central

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(1) Op. cit.

(2) "Functional Nerve Disease", by various authors, p. 185.

nervous tissue, which can only be termed 'mental' in the presence of consciousness. But the result of investigations by psycho-analysis and under hypnosis, of studies of disordered, alternating and multiple personality, automatic writing, etc. must finally force the impartial psychologist to endow the unconscious, like the conscious, with a mental aspect. They convince him of the necessity of displacing consciousness from the pinnacle it has hitherto occupied in psychology. Unconsciousness is no longer a mere 'fringe' around the field of consciousness. It becomes the basis, the foundation on which consciousness depends, the nourishment from which it draws its very existence. We begin to see the 'superficiality' of consciousness, and to recognize that almost any mental event may happen with or without the accompaniment of personal consciousness. Such consciousness has been evolved to facilitate choice between alternative reactions - to bring the entire unity or personality of the organism into more complete relation to its environment".(1)

A final quotation is from T. P. Nunn.(2) Recent investigations, he says, "..... have shown on the one hand how large a part is played in our conscious behaviour by hormic factors of which we may be, at the time, utterly unconscious - that is, that our conative processes are rarely purely conative, but almost always embrace important components belonging to the lower strata of our bafflingly complex organism. On the other hand, they have illuminated in a striking way the continuity of our conative development, showing that the adult mind is, so to speak, but the visible surface of a living structure whose deeper layers are hormic elements dating from infancy or even beyond, and liable, in certain circumstances, still to break free from the systems into which they have become merged and to claim unfettered expression".

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(1) "The Independence of Psychology", "Discovery", Nov. 1920.

(2) "Education; Its Data and First Principles", p. 31.

II.

Freud claims that his doctrine of the unconscious has been arrived at by purely inductive means, from the amassing of facts in various spheres of psychological inquiry.(1) The chief of these sources are: 1, Dreams. "The interpretation of dreams," says Freud, "is the 'via regia' to a knowledge of the unconscious." 2. Errors. "The psycho-pathology of everyday life. 3. Wit. 4. The Neuroses. As a result of the evidence from these sources he has been led to a scheme of the unconscious and of mind generally somewhat as follows.

He divides those mental processes which are not accompanied by consciousness into two groups: those constituting the pre- or fore-consciousness (as Vor-bewusste), and those constituting the unconscious 'proper' (das Unbewusste). The pre-conscious corresponds somewhat to the subliminal of the older psychologists. These two systems differ considerably in origin and in characteristics. Of the two it is the unconscious proper, which, resulting from repression, is of fundamental importance in the Freudian scheme. The contents of the pre-conscious are simply latent and are capable of entering consciousness if their psychic energy is sufficient. But the contents of the unconscious, though strong and active cannot, because of the censorship, normally enter consciousness, and can only be discovered by the use of some special method. This difference is explained by a consideration of the origin of the two systems. This is a somewhat obscure part of the Freudian psychology and it is difficult to give a brief account of it. Apparently the two systems have their origin in two types of psychical processes - what Freud terms the 'primary'

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(1) Cf. "The Interpretation of Dreams", last chapter: "Introductory Lectures on Psycho-analysis"; also for an exposition of Freud's views which has his approval, I. Levine: "The Unconscious", cf. also William Brown: "Freud's Theory of the Unconscious". British Journal of Psychology, Vol. VI.

process and the 'secondary' process. These two types of processes are the precursors of the unconscious and the preconscious systems respectively. The primary process, actuated by what is termed the 'pleasure principles' is primitive and infantile; it aims at the procuring of immediately pleasurable satisfaction and at the avoidance of pain. In early years it automatically regulates mental life and strives to satisfy desires as they arise by regressing to previous satisfactions. But this gives no permanent satisfaction and very soon the fundamental tendency towards pleasure-seeking receives a check from the facts of the real world. It is found to be inadequate. Thus arises the secondary process, actuated by the 'reality principle', whose purpose it is to adapt the individual to the demands of the real world. It is regarded hardly as a separate process, but rather as genetically related to the primary process and as a complication of it. The secondary process also aims at satisfaction, but at securing a more permanent satisfaction. "The ego learns," says Freud, "that it must go without immediate satisfaction, learn to endure a degree of pain, and altogether forego certain sources of pleasure. It becomes reasonable, is no longer controlled by the pleasure principle but follows the reality principle." The secondary process "without intending to renounce the ultimate attainment of pleasure, demands and carries through the postponement of satisfaction as a long detour towards pleasure". The secondary process thus exercises an inhibitory function, controlling and guiding the primitive and infantile tendencies and endeavouring to adapt them to social and moral standards. And as development proceeds it inevitably conflicts with the tendencies of the primary process. The 'wishes' of the two types of process do not coincide; what is pleasurable to the one gradually becomes painful to the other. As a result of this affective conflict there arises the mechanism of repression and so the formation of the unconscious and the preconscious systems of the

mind. The unconscious system retains all the characteristics of the primary process, is guided solely by the pleasure principle and can do nothing but 'wish'. The preconscious system, in touch with reality, retains the characteristics of the secondary process. It is the source of the repressing forces. The unconscious comprises essentially infantile tendencies, and wishes which comprise its nucleus throughout life. They are later reinforced by memories and desires which are out of harmony with conscious life. All are regarded as retaining their activity. The unconscious is closely related to the instincts. "If," says Freud, "there are inherited psychical formations in human beings anything analogous to the instincts of animals, this constitutes the nucleus of the unconscious. Later there is added to this that which has been put aside as useless during the development of childhood." The content of consciousness at any time is, for Freud, really part of the preconscious system. Between the preconscious and the unconscious there is continual conflict. The conflict between them is paraphrased as a conflict between the animal and the human in man, between the primitive and the civilized, the infantile and the adult. The term unconscious as used by Freud stands not only for the sum of repressed experience but also for "a regular, inevitable phase in the processes constituting psychic activity". And so we reach the conclusion that, "mental processes are essentially unconscious, and those which are conscious are merely isolated acts and parts of the whole psychic entity". Consciousness thus becomes a sort of sense organ perceiving certain processes set up outside it.

"The unconscious is the larger circle which includes within itself the smaller circle of the conscious; everything conscious has its preliminary step in the unconscious, whereas the unconscious may stop with this step and still claim full reality as a psychic activity. Properly speaking the unconscious

is the real psychic; its inner nature is just as unknown to us as the reality of the external world, and it is first as imperfectly reported to us through the data of consciousness as is the external world through the indications of our sensory organs".

Before we go on to make any comments on Freud's theory we may look at the theories of the unconscious developed by Jung and by Rivers.(1) Jung defines the unconscious, not very helpfully, as "the totality of all psychic phenomena that lack the quality of consciousness". For him there is an important distinction between the 'personal' and the 'collective' unconscious. The personal unconscious is the result of the life experience of the individual and is unique in each person. The collective unconscious is the result of the experience of the race, is inherited by the individual and is common to all. The personal unconscious is "the receptacle of all lost memories and of all contents as yet too feeble to become conscious". There is also, following Freud, repression of painful thoughts and feelings. New products can originate from the association and combination of these unconscious contents - dreams are examples. The personal unconscious is thus made up of "the forgotten, the repressed, the subliminally perceived, thought and felt". But more important in Jung's scheme is the collective unconscious - the racial background of the mind. It consists of the instincts and the "archetypes of apprehension", i.e. the primordial forms of thought and feeling common to all. These latter are the source of all the myths, legends and religions of humanity. In normal life they are more or less disguised but appear in dreams and more manifestly in disordered states. Jung also appears to regard the

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(1) "Instinct and the Unconscious." Contribution to Symposium, British Journal of Psychology, Vol. X.

collective unconscious as an inexhaustible reservoir from which material can be drawn for mental development throughout life. Here his views shade off into a vague mysticism.

Rivers has taken much from Freud, but has also rejected much. And he has endeavoured to give to the doctrine of the unconscious a basis in biology as well as in psychology.(1) Rivers begins his account by indicating the senses in which he does not use the term unconscious. He does not use it to refer to marginal awareness or to the large body of experience which is not in consciousness at the moment but is capable of becoming conscious under appropriate circumstances. "In so far as the term unconscious applies to experience, it will be limited to such as is not capable of being brought into the field of consciousness by any of the ordinary processes of memory or association, but can only be revealed under certain special conditions such as sleep, hypnosis, the method of free association and certain further states." As an example of such experience Rivers gives the case of a claustrophobic patient, an example which has become very well-known. It illustrates the existence of experience shut off from consciousness yet retaining its activity and being capable of affecting consciousness profoundly. The question is how and why does experience become unconscious in this way. The answer is, by suppression and because it is painful and would interfere with the comfort and happiness of conscious life. Often experience originally neutral may, because of its association with this painfully toned experience, be also suppressed and become inaccessible to consciousness. The content of the unconscious then, according to Rivers, is "made up of affective elements and conative tendencies and intellectual experiences associated therewith". And since there is so close a relation between

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(1) "Instinct and the Unconscious."

affect and instinct Rivers says further that "the special function of the unconscious is to act as a storehouse of instinctive reactions and tendencies together with the experiences associated with them, when they are out of harmony with the prevailing content of consciousness, so that, when present, they produce pain and discomfort". As was indicated in discussing Rivers's views on suppression, he generalises widely as to the cause of it. In all forms of life experience associated with earlier modes of functioning becomes unconscious when later modes develop. "In many forms of animal life the persistence in conscious form of experience gained in one phase when the animal has passed into another would be so disturbing as to render existence impossible." The same principle applies to the infantile and adult experiences of man. "There is definite reason why the conscious states connected with infantile reactions should become unconscious." They do this when they are incompatible with conscious life in its later phases.

III.

There seem to be some grounds for the distinction which Freud makes between the 'pleasure principle' and the 'reality principle', which are held to be so important in bringing the unconscious and preconscious systems of the mind into being. A somewhat similar distinction is made in different terms by other psychologists. But in the Freudian scheme they remain abstract 'principles' and explain little. As in the case of so many Freudian conceptions no attempt is made to analyse them further. The division of mind into consciousness, the preconscious and the unconscious is certainly open to criticism. In particular it does not seem possible to maintain the sharp distinction between the unconscious and the preconscious. Under further investigation it tends to break down.

Varendonck,[1] for example, in concluding his study of day-dreams, says: "This investigation tends to establish that the unconscious, fore-conscious and conscious thought processes are three manifestations, varying only in degree, of the same function". Others have pointed out that the 'mechanisms' which are supposed to characterize the unconscious only and to be observable, for example, in the dream, are not confined to the unconscious, but that in some degree they are characteristic of all mental processes.

But the fundamental error of the Freudian psychology, and the cause of all the confusion is the interpretation of the unconscious in terms of consciousness and its processes, thinking of it, in fact, as a second consciousness with processes of the same order as conscious ones. We read of unconscious ideas, memories, thoughts, emotions. These are, in fact, two mental systems each with its own thoughts and wishes. No distinction is made as to essential nature between conscious states and unconscious states. May it not be, as a matter of fact, that what are termed unconscious processes are necessarily radically different from conscious ones? Freud speaks of unconscious 'ideas' and unconscious thinking, and appears to regard them as of the same sort as corresponding conscious processes. He writes: "An unconscious idea is one which we do not perceive, the existence of which we are nevertheless ready to concede on the ground of indications and proofs from other sources". And again he says that the unconscious denotes "not merely latent thoughts in general, but is confined to ideas of a definite dynamic character, which do not reach consciousness in spite of their effectiveness and intensity". Ernest Jones in an

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(1) "The Psychology of Day Dreams."

article[1] writes of the difficult question of determining the differences between unconscious ideas and conscious ideas and of what happens to the former when it is converted into the latter. It is clearly assumed throughout that ideas which have been in consciousness may be banished to the unconscious and there continue to exist as ideas, or that ideas which have never been in consciousness can take their rise and exist in the unconscious.[2] This notion that ideas can thus exist in two conditions, now conscious and now unconscious, seems to be fundamentally erroneous. It is a relic of the psychology of Herbart. Ideas are not entities capable of being stored away in the mind in this way and brought out again some time later. As William James pointed out: "a permanently existing idea or 'Vorstellung' which makes its appearance before the footlights of consciousness at periodical intervals is as mythological an entity as the Jack of Spades".[3] Mental processes, conscious and unconscious, are processes and not enduring structures; they take their rise and disappear and are succeeded by others. The question whether the unconscious contains ideas and images and whether unconscious ideation exists has been well discussed by Lloyd Morgan. He asks: "Does that which we call the unconscious depend on the presence

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(1) British Journal of Psychology, Medical Sect., Vol. I.

(2) Many psychologists are guilty of writing as if this were so: cf. C. S. Myers (op. cit.): "Into the unconscious we are perpetually, more or less unconsciously, banishing percepts and ideas which are incompatible and discordant with our general mental life. From the unconscious emerge not only complexes or parts of complexes which have been there repressed, but also new formations". Cf. also William Brown (Psychology and Psychotherapy, p. 26): "Memories, impulses and motives when not actually before the mind, i.e. conscious may still retain all their other mental characteristics, and from their place outside consciousness may continue to exert influences upon consciousness. They form part of the unconscious but are still psychical in nature".

(3) "Principles", Vol. I, p. 236. Cf. also J. Dunlap, "Mysticism, Freudianism and Scientific Psychology": "The Freudian doctrine of consciousness as a stuff which after it has functioned is stored away somewhere like the printer's type which is returned to its case after it has been used, has no more empirical basis than has an exactly corresponding conception of finger movements which after having occurred are somewhere stored up as motionless movements".

of images and ideas; or are images and ideas the cognitive raiment which the unconscious puts on at the emergent levels of perceptive and reflective consciousness. The question in brief really comes to this: are there what we may comprehensively speak of as memories in the unconscious? In much present-day resuscitation of Herbartian notions (which some of us thought were little better than picturesque mythology long ago discarded as obsolete) the unconscious is peopled with such memories, with images, ideas, wishes and thoughts, living together, as Professor James Ward puts it, "like shades on the banks of the Styx". Is this so? It is against this sort of thing that the behaviourist rises in vigorous protest; and swinging his pendulum too far (in some cases drops psychology overboard and proceeds on his course on the biological ship. For those who cannot go to this extreme, the alternative view is that memories have being only in supraliminal consciousness and that the unconscious is in no wise imaginal. It is not yet cognitive. Only through cognition at the higher level of reflective or perceptive consciousness does it begin to put on the raiment of images, ideas and the rest, and thus find expression in the supraliminal field".(1) He says elsewhere: "There are ..... unconscious psychical processes which in large measure (and perhaps especially in dreams) serve to determine the nature and course of conscious ideas, but there are in the unconscious no ideas, no representations, no memory images such as are developed in consciousness and there only ..... ideas and memory-images are no more preserved, as such, in the mind, than sounds, as such, are preserved in the gramophone record.(2)

This same line of criticism may be brought against Rivers for he speaks of the unconscious as a 'storehouse' of experience.

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(1) "Consciousness and the Unconscious", Presidential Address to Section of Psychology, British Assn., 1921.

(2) Art. "Psychology and the Medical Curriculum", Journal of Neurology and Psychopathology, Nov., 1920.

Now it is perfectly true, as he says, that every one of us has been the subject of a vast body of experience of which we have no manifest memory and which does not enter manifest consciousness. It is also obvious that this influences our thoughts and actions, feelings and sentiments. But it seems to be simply confusing to speak of this as 'unconscious experience'. In the case of the claustrophobic patient which Rivers quotes is it necessary to believe that the thought of the enclosed space persisted in order to explain the existence of the fear.(1) It is not necessarily true that because an effect persists and develops its cause also persists. Something certainly persists: the question is what? This is a very difficult question and opens up the whole problem of retention. In this particular case it may be said that not the experience, but some trace which it leaves persists. Of the intrinsic nature of such traces nothing is known, but they are probably quite unlike the experience itself. They are not what are meant by unconscious mental processes. Broad(2) has suggested that such traces be termed 'mnemic continuants', such continuants being facts of mental structure, not of experience. Of the total 'mnemic mass' he recognises that some parts are more accessible than others: some are inaccessible for the reason which Freud and Rivers give, namely that if they were revived and present in consciousness, they would give rise to painful feelings. The important point about such factors is not that they were unpleasant once but that now, if aroused, they would be experienced as unpleasant.

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(1) A recent reviewer points out how easily psycho-pathologists, in observing their cases, slip from the statement, "It was as if he thought", to "he must have thought unconsciously".

(2) Op. cit.

IV.

It is much easier to find difficulties in current conceptions of the unconscious than to discover a satisfactory way of regarding it and its processes. As we have seen Lloyd Morgan criticises the view that the unconscious consists of ideas and images which have been conscious and are now 'stored away'. He also suggests a positive way of regarding it. He distinguishes, as we shall see later, different levels of psychical integration. One of these levels of integration, lying below the perceptual level, is ours by inheritance, and it is characterized by what is termed 'unconscious enjoyment'.(1) It contains the instincts. "Its integrated form is inherited and not acquired, though it may be swiftly re-integrated at the perceptive or (later) at the reflective level. As such aid in its primary form as initially given, it is an ancestral bequest transmitted as psychical legacy through the parents. Of it the individual is the unconscious heir." A generation ago this would have been regarded as physiological in nature. Now it is regarded as the psychical basis for conscious mental life. Of the unconscious 'enjoyment' by which it is characterized "much is and may remain the subliminal basis for a supra-liminal superstructure at the levels of conscious integration". But it does not necessarily remain subliminal. It may surge up into consciousness with a strongly affective tone and may there conflict with what is perceptually or reflectively integrated or it may be woven into its structure. And there is in the mind not only ascending integration of this sort, but descending integration as well. "Well-established

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(1) The term 'enjoyment' in this connection is borrowed from Alexander. It is used to designate that which characterizes all psychical events and which is qualified by the adjectives 'conscious' or 'unconscious'.

reflective integration may assume the status of unreflective integration, and well-established unreflective integration that of the unconscious." Lloyd Morgan illustrates the influence of this unconscious integration in conscious life by means of the creative artist. His real work is done, not at the conscious level, but "unconscious integration of the emotional order precedes the imagery in which it is expressed ..... the clothing in imagery depends on the prior affective integration, as yet unconscious". Ideas and images are the cognitive raiment which unconscious products of an affective sort put on. On this view then there are no unconscious thoughts, but unconscious factors affect thoughts; no unconscious wishes, but unconscious tendencies for the conscious formulation of them.(1)

One feels that on this subject the difficulty is very largely one of the lack of suitable terms in which to describe unconscious processes. The use of the terms used to describe conscious life simply results, as we have seen, in confusion. As Laird puts it in the course of a recent article,(2) "we may speak thoroughly intelligibly (although barbarously) of unconscious 'trends' and 'impulsions' and 'urges' as well as of unconscious complexes of these ..... it may very well happen however that there is no intelligible meaning in speaking of unconscious wishes, or desires, or memories, or expectations, or emotions or resolves or ideas".

Perhaps the clearest conception of the nature of the unconscious and its processes, including as well a suggestion

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(1) A recent writer, H. T. Lovell ("Dreams") protests against the conscious flavour of the Freudian term 'wish' and suggests replacing it by 'a play of values'. By 'play of values' he means "those uncontrolled changes in feeling which are never matters of express volition, but rather hints at the varying courses taken by our preferences and avoidances".

(2) "Is the Conception of the Unconscious of any Value in Psychology"? Contribution to a Symposium, "Mind", July 1922.

towards the use of a new term, is that put forward by Drever.(1) He thinks that the most promising way of regarding the unconscious is to use the term to cover those psychical determinants of experience or conscious process, which from their nature can never become conscious. He proposes, then, to distinguish two types of mental fact, viz. conscious process, and unconscious determinants of conscious process. So regarded the unconscious itself includes two types of fact. The first type are facts of mental structure, which though determinants of conscious process and conduct are not themselves conscious. The most important of these structural facts are the inherited instincts. They form the basis for the development of other structural dispositions such as the sentiments. "From a certain point of view," says Drever, "we might even identify the instincts with this structural unconscious and regard all the other mental structures - sentiments, habits, prejudices, customs - as modifications of these primary mental structures with which the human being starts in life, that is, of the original unconscious." But there is another set of facts which goes to make up the unconscious. These mental structures, as parts of a living organism, can never be entirely inactive or inert. So far as they are active in relation to environmental conditions they are direct determinants of conscious process. But they may also be active in relation to one another and in this way give rise to processes which Drever proposes to term 'endopsychic'. Such endopsychic processes may never become conscious, yet may indirectly exercise a profound influence on mental life. "It is sufficient to bear in mind," Drever says, "that the mere existence of a strong sentiment can determine the inhibition or the greatly modified activity, even of natural tendencies, by exercising a force or

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(1) "Introduction to the Psychology of Education", Ch. II.

'tension' - if we may so designate it - which cannot for a moment be confused with the psychical integration that is consciousness. Such activity of the various mental elements in the unconscious relatively to one another we shall speak of throughout as 'endopsychic processes'." As examples of such endopsychic processes there might be cited the phenomena of 'reaction formation', 'compromise formation', and 'projection' mentioned at the end of the last chapter. Drever believes that the phenomena of 'censorship' can also find explanation in terms of endopsychic process.

Thus where psychologists used to recognise only one type of mental fact, namely conscious process, we now have to recognise three. There are: 1. conscious processes, 2. structural mental elements, 3. the processes involved in their interaction - endopsychic processes. Just as it is the merit of Shand and McDougall and others that they have called attention to the second type of mental fact, so, it is said, it is the merit of Freud and Jung and their followers that they have called attention to the third type - endopsychic processes.



VII.

IMPULSE AND INTELLIGENCE IN CONDUCT.

I.

There is at the present moment no lack of insistence on the fact that the place of intelligence in conduct is small, a good deal smaller, we are told, than used to be imagined; but there are few attempts to determine what precisely its place and function is. It may quite well turn out that it is no less important than used to be maintained, but simply of a somewhat different nature and more complexly related to other mental functions than was supposed.

When we come to consider what intelligence is and what its effect in mind and conduct we find ourselves faced with the long controversy concerning its relation to instinct. While this controversy can hardly be said to be settled, it does show signs of clearing up. It has passed through several phases. As was pointed out in discussing the nature of instinct, it is not so long since instinct was regarded as characteristic of animal life and behaviour and peculiar to it, while intelligence was regarded as being equally characteristic of man. The two stood in sharp contrast. Later, with the coming of the doctrine of the continuity of animal and human development, it was admitted that there were certain instinctive factors in human activity and that there was a degree of intelligence in some of the activities of animals. The problem was thus raised of the relation between the two and attempts were made at their definition and demarcation. This problem was fully discussed some years ago in a well-known symposium on "Instinct and Intelligence"[1]. Of this Symposium E. L. Thorndike has written,[2] "The eminent psychologists .....

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(1) By C.S. Myers, G.F. Stout, W. McDougall, C. Lloyd Morgan and Wildon Carr. British Journal of Psychology, Vol. III.

(2) "The Original Nature of Man", p. 12.

again and again speak of instinct as if it were something like a heart or a thyroid gland or a 'memory' or an 'imagination' which did this and that for a man". They regarded it, he says, as some sort of a mystical faculty. This has been the trouble right through the whole discussion, not only with regard to instinct, but also with regard to intelligence. They have been abstractly conceived as two separate faculties, different in nature, and this way of looking at them has obscured the whole problem. Fortunately this method of regarding them is now disappearing and the problem is assuming a new and more promising form.(1) The "false disjunction and opposition", as McDougall calls it, of instinct and intelligence, is now breaking down. In the Symposium just referred to Myers had advanced the view that instinct and intelligence are inseparable, that there is but one psychological function, namely 'instinct-intelligence'. Since he wrote, this point of view has been increasingly widely accepted. Drever, for example, in his "Instinct in Man", comes to a conclusion similar to that of Myers, though his argument is different. He concludes: 1. that there is no instinctive behaviour without an intelligent factor, and 2. that there is no intelligent behaviour without an instinctive factor. He further agrees with Myers that there is only one psychological function which

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(1) According to a recent writer this 'faculty' way of looking at the mind still persists as widely as ever. Spearman says in his "The Nature of Intelligence and the Principles of Cognition" (p. 25): "Just the same actual doctrine is still freely accepted under very numerous synonyms as 'powers', 'capacities', 'abilities', 'properties', and so forth. Despite all protests to the contrary this ancient doctrine has in good truth not even yet been abandoned. Modern authors seem rather to have been incapable of abandoning it - for they have discovered nothing acceptable to take its place ..... There has been preserved in unabated, nay enhanced degree, the most harmful fallacy it ever engendered, namely that formal powers function unitarily. The intelligence itself is an arch-faculty".

he prefers to call 'experience'. The only outstanding exception to this point of view in regard to instinct and intelligence is the view of Bergson. He has maintained that they represent two divergent paths in the evolution of mind. Instinct reaches its highest point of development in the insect world, intelligence in man. They are radically different in nature and there is no continuity between them. It now seems clear that Bergson was misled by faulty observation of insect behaviour which has since been corrected.(1) The contrast which he asserted can now no longer be maintained, at least not on the basis of the same set of facts. In any case Bergson's treatment of this problem is not really a psychological one at all. It is a philosophical argument which compels him to oppose instinct and intelligence. As Drever points out Bergson "is really opposing instinct and intelligence on an apperceptive background of philosophy, not of psychology, and of a peculiar philosophy, which requires him to use terms, which are used in psychology, but with a different and specialized or 'polarized' meaning".(2)

Graham Wallas in his "The Great Society" presents a view of the relation of instinct to intelligence which does not appear to be satisfactory. He is concerned to rescue the intellectual apparatus of man from the sway of his instinctive impulses and to show that instincts are not, as McDougall claims, the moving forces in all our activities, intellectual and otherwise. He maintains that there are springs of thought and action which are independent of the instincts and of another order. "We are born," he says, "with a tendency,

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(1) Cf. especially E. L. Bouvier: "The Psychic Life of Insects", also McDougall: "Outline of Psychology", Ch. III.

(2) "Instinct in Man", p. 109.

under appropriate conditions, to think, which is as original and independent as our tendency, under appropriate conditions, to run away."[1] Alongside the instinctive dispositions which McDougall postulates he sets up four intelligent dispositions which are independent causes of human action. These are: thought, language, trial-and-error and curiosity. He speaks also of dispositions of habit, memory and perception. As McDougall says,[2] he "seems to be on the high-road to a new faculty psychology of the very loosest kind; a psychology which will take every named function or peculiarity of our mental life and 'explain' it by attributing it to a special disposition or faculty". This is certainly not the way to clearness on the problem of the relation of instinct to intelligence.

Rivers, in an article on "Why is the Unconscious Unconscious?"[3] tended to revive the distinction between instinct and intelligence by connecting them definitely withthe two rather sharply distinguished systems of nervous mechanism which he believed to underlie protopathic and epicritic sensibility. Later,[4] however, he modified this view and admitted the extreme difficulty of distinguishing instinctive from intelligent behaviour. He discussed the various attempts at such a distinction and concluded that from the purely psychological point of view it is impossible to make one.[5] Still later, he wrote that it seemed likely that we should "be driven to give up the whole attempt to distinguish between instinct and intelligence and shall adopt a new classification with a new nomenclature". And

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(1) p. 47.

(2) "Motives in the Light of Recent Discussion", "Mind", July 1920.

(3) "British Journal of Psychology", Vol. IX.

(4) "Instinct and the Unconscious", Ch. VI.

(5) "Psychology and Politics", pp. 30-1.

he himself made an attempt at such a new classification of action with his distinction of ungraded activity of the protopathic "all or none" type, action showing no proportion between the response and the conditions which called it forth, and epicritic activity characterized by gradation and discrimination.

The best recent discussion of the instinct-intelligence question is undoubtedly that of McDougall in his "Outline". He first surveys the behaviour of insects and finds instinct and intelligence co-operating throughout. There is variation of modes of action in the face of difficulties, adaptation to unusual circumstances, and persistence of effort in the case of failure to achieve immediate success. The notion of the fixity and inevitability of response in the case of instinct in insects seems to be definitely exploded. McDougall concludes that "instinct and intelligence are not two diverse principles of action or of guidance of action ..... Instinct requires and implies the co-operation of intelligence, and without its aid can achieve nothing of value to the creature or the species. And intelligence operates only and always in the service of the instinctive impulses to action. This, then, is the relation of instinct and intelligence among the insects, which by common consent display instinct in its purest and most typical forms".(1) He then discusses the same problem in relation to the behaviour of the vertebrates, including man. He finds that there also this relation holds, though the interdependence is even more marked. Innate organisation is not so precise, it is general and non-specific and in proportion as it takes on these characteristics the importance of

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(1) pp. 92-3.

intelligent guidance and control increases. There is an increasingly long period of youth in which experience is accumulated. "We find that the longer the period of youth the higher is the development of intelligence, and the more obscured by intelligence is the operation of instinct. And in man, in whom youth is prolonged for so many years, the generality of instincts and their dependence upon and overlaying by intelligence reach such a point as to obscure the existence of the instincts from the eyes of man himself, especially those of sophisticated man." But, according to McDougall, though concealed they are still there, and intelligence operates only in the pursuit of goals which they prescribe. McDougall's last word on the relation of instinct and intelligence is that they "represent neither two divergent lines of evolution, nor two stages of evolution, but rather always only two aspects of all mental life which we distinguish by an effort of abstraction".(1)

It is thus clear that the discussion of the relation of instinct to intelligence in its old form is no longer profitable. With the passing of the notion that they stand for two separate faculties and the recognition of the fact that they are distinguishable, but interdependent aspects of all mental life, the problem passes into a new phase. From the point of view of conduct what we have now to discuss is not the relation of two hypothetical faculties but rather the relation of intelligence to impulses which may be instinctively grounded, and the nature of the intelligent guidance and control of impulse.

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(1) p. 202. cf. also T. P. Nunn (Education: Its Data and First Principles", p. 135): "Intelligent behaviour is not a specific variety to be distinguished from instinctive, but is instinctive behaviour itself in its higher forms; no longer mechanical or fixed in form, but indefinitely plastic and illuminated with purpose".

II.

Before, however, we can go on to this discussion there is a preliminary question: that of the nature of intelligence itself. Like 'instinct' the term 'intelligence' is at present freely and loosely used without any clear or generally accepted definition. Those who have been concerned in the widespread 'intelligence test' movement have not troubled to investigate the prior question of the nature of intelligence itself. They have been testing something, and have been content to regard intelligence simply as that 'something' which their tests measure. It is a very difficult question. Someone has doubted if we will ever produce "an intelligent definition of intelligence". But if it is impossible to define intelligence we should at least endeavour to have definite ideas about it. After surveying the current usage of the term both as contrasted with instinct and in connection with mental tests, Spearman comes to the conclusion that "the reason is now evident why all search for the meaning of 'intelligence' has, even with the greatest of modern psychologists, always ended in failure. It is simply that, in point of fact, the word, in its present-day usage does not possess any definite meaning".(1) As a term it has so degenerated as to be scientifically unusable and if its use is to be continued the question is not what it does mean, but rather what it is to be made to mean. It is doubtful however if the case is quite so desperate as Spearman makes out. An examination of current literature seems to show that a new concept of intelligence is in process of forming and there are numerous signs of agreement as to what constitutes intelligence in action. In contrast to the older concept which involved the idea of mental comprehension,

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(1) See "The Nature of Intelligence", Ch. I, "Intelligence in Modern Psychology".

the new concept of intelligence carries with it, as its essential feature, the implication of activity. To adopt the current jargon it is 'behaviouristic' rather than 'mentalistic'.(1) Briefly, intelligence is now being generally conceived of as consisting in the power of adaptation to new situations or new demands, or as the ability to solve a new problem. According to MsDougall, for example, intelligence "is essentially the capacity for making new adaptations", or again "the capacity to improve on native tendency in the light of past experience". An intelligent action is "generally defined as one which seems to show that the creature has profited by prior experience of similar situations and that it somehow brings to bear its previous experience in the guidance of its present action".(2) Intelligence is a matter of effecting correlation between past experience and future activities, and the whole evolution of mind may be regarded as nothing more than an increase in the possibility of effecting this correlation.

This 'behaviouristic' way of regarding intelligence is of all degrees of extremeness.(3) It is all of a piece with the widespread current tendency to regard all thinking as a form of behaviour - as 'trial and error by proxy', as someone has

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(1) Cf. A. A. Roback, "Intelligence and Behaviour", "Psychological Review", 1922, also L. Witmer, "What is Intelligence?", "Scientific Monthly", 1922.

(2) Cf. also H. R. Marshall, "Mind and Conduct", Ch. II, where intelligence is equated with adaptive behaviour. cf. also J. Dewey, "Intelligence and Morals" in "The Influence of Darwinism on Philosophy": "The progress of biology has accustomed our minds to the notion that intelligence is not an outside power presiding supremely but statically over the desires and efforts of man, but that it is a method of adjustment of capacities and conditions within specific situations". It is "properly an organ of adjustment".

(3) For a somewhat extreme form of it, cf. W.A. White, "Foundations of Psychiatry", Ch. VII.

termed it. Intelligent action is regarded as continuous with, and a developed form of, the trial and error process, which characterises so much animal behaviour. An excellent illustration of this usage of the concept of intelligence is provided in a recent paper by L. L. Thurstone.(1) This writer endeavours to show that the degree of intelligence in action is "the degree of incompleteness of the alternatives in the trial and error life of the actor and that the higher cognitive categories constitute incomplete conduct in the process of being formed". He takes overt trial and error in which there is no foresight as being the most unintelligent form of action. In this type all impulses pass directly into action and a successful reaction is achieved only by chance. Higher than this is what is termed perceptual intelligence. As a result of perceiving the situation and its possibilties the trial and error process is moved back in time and takes place at the stage where impulses are only partly formulated. "By perceptual intelligence we move the trial and error process from among overt alternatives to the realm of the incomplete and approximate alternatives which constitute perception." But it can be moved still further back and may deal with alternatives which are still more incomplete. It may take place at the stage where alternatives are ideational. From this point of view ideas are "loosely formulated, approximate conduct". There is a final stage. The highest type of intelligence, conceptual intelligence, consists in the capacity to carry on the trial and error process among concepts which are furthest removed from overt action. The progress from unintelligent to intelligent action thus means the transfer of the trial and error process "from overt alternatives to percepts, from percepts to still

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(1) "The Nature of General Intelligence and Ability." Paper read before the International Congress of Psychology, 1923.

more tentative ideas, and from ideas to the still more approximate actions that are known as concepts. Thurstone even takes in the unconscious. It is "the realm of impulses that are not yet sufficiently defined to be cognitive and focal". The degree of intelligence is thus the degree of abstraction from overt conduct at which the trial and error process between alternative impulses or conative tendencies is carried on. A somewhat similar argument, though not worked out in such detail, is advanced by J. T. MacCurdy,(1) who regards intelligent conduct as being distinguished from reflex or instinctive behaviour by its utilization of images. "Intelligent conduct," he says, "is the comparison of images with perceptions which makes planning possible."

III.

Turning now to the question of impulse and intelligence in conduct, it is in keeping with this current usage of the concept of intelligence that so far as conduct is concerned it is now being regarded as in some sense 'instrumental', that is as something which is not itself a cause of action but which operates in the service of impulses to action. In popular discussion, at the present time these impulses are indiscriminately described as 'instinctive'. Intelligence, it is said, discovers means for attaining the ends prescribed by instinctive impulses. This explanation is no doubt tending in the right direction but it is often stated far too simply. Thus Trotter writes: "Intelligence .... leaves its possessor no less impelled by instinct than his simpler ancestor, but endows him with the capacity to respond in a larger variety of ways".(2)

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(1) "Instincts and Images", paper read before the International Congress of Psychology", 1923.

(2) "Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War", p. 97.

Drever says of intelligence and instinct in conduct that "the relation of the two to one another may be best expressed even in the case of the human being by saying that instinct prescribes the end to be attained, whereas intelligence finds the means for attaining that end".(1) Statements of this kind are true only in the most general way. These statements, and much current writing on this topic, are reminiscent of the well-known views of Hume represented in his familiar statement that "Reason is and ought to be the slave of the passions and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey". Current views do in fact seem to represent in some respects a revival of those held on this topic by writers of the Scottish school of philosophers. Hutcheson, for example, held that "though we have instincts determining us to desire ends without supposing any previous reasoning, yet 'tis by the use of our reason that we find out the means of attaining our ends".(2) Hume in another place says that the function of reason is simply to direct "the impulses received from appetites and inclination".

Let us endeavour to see what the facts really are. There can be no denying the truth of the statement that intellectual processes are never themselves the motives to action. Aristotle has said, once and for all, that pure thought moves nothing. And since he said it others have said it after him again and again: it is not 'pure thought' but thought based upon emotional impulse which moves to action. The latest to say this and to put it very well is McDougall. On this point and on the general question of motives, he writes: "Reasoning, like all other forms of intellectual process, is but the servant of the instinctive impulses; it does

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(1) "Psychology of Everyday Life", p. 21.

(2) Quoted by Drever, "Instinct in Man", p. 40.

not prompt or impel us to action. By reasoning we discover new means for the attainment of our goals; and by its aid we envisage more clearly the nature and the further consequences of the goals we seek. But, unless we seek or desire some goal because it is our nature to do so, no reasoning can make us seek or desire it; it can at most reveal to us some probable consequence of action as of the kind which is a natural goal for us, that is to say, of a kind in the attainment of which some instinctive impulse of our nature will find satisfaction".(1)

And again "It is the paradox of intelligence that it directs, forces our energies without being itself a force or energy".(2) There can be no denying the fact that intelligence operates in the service of impulse but - and this is the fundamentally important point - impulses differ so. It is all very simple, but at the same time very misleading to dub all impulses 'instinctive' or to describe them all by the somewhat meaningless adjective 'primitive'. In actual conduct they may be nothing of the kind. It may be perfectly true that, in the case of any impulse to action, if we analyse it fully we will come upon some factor of the innate order, but the enormous complications which are effected in instinctive emotional dispositions can scarcely be forgotten. It hardly needs pointing out that there is all the difference in the world between an instinctive impulse, say to flight, prompted by the crude emotion of fear, and an impulse to action arising out of a well-ordered sentiment like love of country. In both these cases, as in every case, the impulses to action are backed by feeling, but in the one case it is feeling of a crude and in the other case of a highly-developed order. In each case

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(1) "Outline", p. 215.

(2) Ibid., p. 440 n.

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(1) "Outline", p. 215.

(2) Ibid., p. 440 n.

intelligence may direct the course of action but the impulses and the ends are vastly different. In the psychological sense man always acts on impulse but this may mean very different things in different cases. So that when we meet with statements like this; that man's mind is "actuated by instincts, but instrumental with reason" we must try to realise all the complications that are involved.

In endeavouring to understand how exactly intelligence operates in relation to impulses we cannot do better than follow and endeavour to elaborate the admirable discussion of this discussion given by Davey in his "Human Nature and Conduct".(1) Here is a quotation which gives the essence of his argument. "Impulse is primary and intelligence is secondary and in some sense derivative. There should be no blinking of this fact. But the recognition of it as a fact exalts intelligence. For thought is not the slave of impulse to do its bidding. Impulse does not know what it is after; it cannot give orders, not even if it wants to. It rushes blindly into any opening it chances to find. Anything that expends it, satisfies it. One outlet is like another to it. It is indiscriminate. Its vagaries and excesses are the stock theme of classical moralists; and while they point the wrong moral in urging the abdication of impulse in favour of reason, their characterization of impulse is not wholly wrong. What intelligence has to do in the service of impulse is to act, not as its obedient servamt, but as its clarifier and liberator."(2) In this last sentence we have what seems to be the key to the solution of the whole problem. Secondary as intelligence may be in one sense, its importance, as Dewey shows, is primary. He calls attention to the important fact that impulses to action

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(1) Part III.

(2) p. 255.

conflict and so give rise to a blocking of overt action. It is at this point that thought and deliberation has its place. Deliberation is a dramatic rehearsal, in imagination, of the various competing impulses to action. "Thought runs ahead and foresees outcomes, and thereby avoids having to wait the instruction of actual failure and disaster ..... Each conflicting habit and impulse takes its turn in projecting itself upon the screen of imagination ..... Activity does not cease in order to give way to reflection; activity is turned from execution into intra-organic channels, resulting in dramatic rehearsal." Choice between conflicting impulses is "simply hitting in imagination upon an object which furnishes an adequate stimulus to the recovery of overt action ..... Then energy is released. The mind is made up, composed, unified."(1) In this process of deliberation "to every shade of imagined circumstance there is a vibrating response". We find ourselves in imagination, in the completed situation, and choice is intelligently guided when that course is taken whose emotional response is most completely unifying and harmonizing. There is not a calculation of future pleasures and pains. Deliberation is not calculation. The basis of choice is the present satisfyingness of the emotional response which the thought of the completed situation arouses. The indirect nature of the control which intelligence exercises is thus clear. "We do not act <u>from</u> reasoning, but reasoning puts before us objects which are not directly or sensibly present so

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(1) pp. 190-2, cf. a recent work by E. Rignano: "The Psychology of Reasoning", where all reasoning is asserted to be of the type of imaginative experimentation. "Reasoning," he says, "is nothing else in substance than a succession or a combination of merely imagined operations or experiments which put the individual in the very same state of mental awareness in which he would ultimately have found himself if these operations or experiments had been performed not merely in imagination but actually." (p. 97)

that we may react directly to these objects with aversion, attraction, indifference or attachment precisely as we would to the same objects if they were physically present."(1) The function of intelligence is thus "to discover the object that will best operate as a releasing and unifying stimulus in the existing situation". In this way conflicting impulses are harmonized and action is set free. The value and necessity of conflict in this sense becomes clear. "Conflict is the gadfly of thought", it is "a 'sine qua non' of reflection and ingenuity". In Dewey's view there is no necessary antagonism between intelligence and the life of impulse. He says, "the man who would intelligently cultivate intelligence will widen, not narrow, his life of strong impulse, while aiming at their happy coincidence in operation".

This view of the relation of impulse and intelligence has a sound basis in comparative psychology. Current psychology tends to regard thought as having come into being in the service of action and clear conscious awareness of activity to have developed in the individual only where there were alternatives or when adjustment to new conditions was required. This is well pointed out by C. S. Myers.

"Consciousness has been evolved to facilitate choice between alternative reactions, to bring the entire unity or personality of the organism into more complete relation with its environment. Where only one reaction is possible, the action remains a reflex, and no sensation or impulse need be felt.

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(1) This point is well put by William James (Principles, Vol. II, 393). "Reason, 'per se', can inhibit no impulses; the only thing that can neutralize an impulse is an impulse the other way. Reason may however make an inference which will excite the imagination so as to set loose the impulse the other way; and thus though the animal richest in reason might be also the animal richest in instinctive impulses too, he would never seem the fatal automaton which a merely instinctive animal would be."

Where the reaction is to some extent modifiable, the action becomes instinctive - emotional activity, impulsive tendencies, and crude, blurred sensations being experienced. Where alternative responses are desirable discrimination becomes acute and a larger and more dominating self develops: a dominating apical system which endeavours to permit of action only after it has given its consent or sanction."(1) This is the manner in which intelligence has evolved in the race, and in the individual intellectual processes make their appearance only at moments of conflict and obstruction or checking of action. Choice has to be made. Different lines of behaviour open up and competing impulses are felt. At other times action is automatic, the result of habit. New and unusual conditions and alternative reactions result in fuller consciousness.

So far as the working of intelligence is concerned the important point is the delay which occurs between stimulus and response. As W. A. White points out, "where action follows stimulus instantly and without hesitation, there is the type of action known as reflex, with which there is associated little or no consciousness. When, however, for any reason, there is a delay between the stimulus and the appropriate action then there appears the phenomenon of consciousness".(2) If we include under the word 'stimulus' impulses to action arising from within we may say that it is the function of intelligence in general to cause delay between stimulus and the resulting action. When this is done response is postponed, impulse is held up and reflection and imagination take place

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(1) "The Independence of Psychology", "Discovery", 1920. Cf. also W.A. White, "Mechanism of Character Formation", p. 31. "We must think of full, clear consciousness as only accompanying those mental states of adjustment to new and unusual conditions; conditions permitting of various reactions and involving therefore selective judgment, critique, choice, in short, reason."

(2) "Foundations of Psychiatry", p. 112.

with the result that impulse may be transformed and re-directed.[1] Finally, there is a direct stimulus and response reaction, but of a very different sort from the one which would have occurred had it been immediate. It is informed and directed. When impulses compete reflection is stimulated and they are held against each other in the light of a knowledge of their results. That one is completed whose anticipated results arouse the most satisfying present response. In this way an impulse based on a passing feeling may be overruled by one whose outcome will be more in harmony with the organized life of feeling as a whole. Intelligent action is thus characterized by a certain degree of hesitancy. It is non-immediate, but because of this it is discriminative and graded. Intelligence does not merely find means for the ends sought by any or all of the impulses. It also brings them into relation so that some are subordinated to others. It is also interpretative. As has been said it makes impulse understand itself.

It should be clear from the foregoing that intelligence is not, as much current writing would lead one to suppose, an artificial interference with the natural life of impulse. Impulse and intelligence have been evolved together and the one is no less natural than the other. When Head[2] says that "the aim of human evolution is the domination of feeling and instinct by discriminative mental control", it should be remembered that increase in the richness of the life of feeling and impulse,

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(1) It is possible to give a wide significance to this period of delay between stimulus and response. It may be regarded as making possible the richness of mental life as a whole. Jane Harrison ("Ancient Art and Ritual") says: "It is just in this interval, this space between perception and reaction, this momentary halt, that our mental life, our images, our ideas, our consciousness, and assuredly our religion and all our art is built up".

(2) "Brain", XXXIV.

and increase in the possibility of discriminative mental control have proceeded together.

Naturalistic theories which idealize raw impulse and its spontaneities and contrast it with factors of guidance and control are simply failing to take all the psychological facts into account. Often they are not really concerned with impulse in the psychological sense at all. Bertrand Russell for example, in his "Principles of Social Reconstruction"[1], in glorifying impulse and demanding its liberation, is not really dealing with what the psychologist means by impulse. He is concerned with the fact that men's lives are unduly thwarted and frustrated by the conditions of the social environment. There is, of course, something to be said for a cult of impulse understanding by increased opportunity for the all-round expression of human nature.

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(1) And following him C.E.M. Joad in his "Common Sense Ethics".

VIII.

REASON AND "RATIONALIZATION".

I.

Perhaps the most difficult problem in the whole of psychology and ethics at the present time is that of determining what is meant by reason in mind and conduct. As was pointed out in the Introduction there set in some time ago a strong and widespread reaction against all forms of rationalism and intellectualism in psychological theory. The older science, it is said, vastly exaggerated man's rationality both in regard to his beliefs and in regard to his behaviour, and the main purpose of the 'new psychology' is to set right the balance.(1) It is concerned to stress "the primacy of feeling, the sway of instinct, the prevalence of the irrational". The 'rationalistic fallacy', that man is primarily a reasonable being who arrives at his beliefs by a process of reasoning and pursues in his conduct certain rationally approved ends, is regarded as completely exploded.

Like most reactions it has swung too far and resulted in a good deal of exaggeration and, in some quarters, in a view of mind which is as one-sided as that which is rejected. L. T. Hobhouse has very well pointed this out. He says: "Going behind the ordinary consciousness psychology is very largely concerned in distinguishing the forces operating in the twilight of semi-consciousness, if not in the dark of the unconscious, upon which our purposes depend, and, since new discoveries are very like new toys, it is not surprising if some psychologists, in their delight with the forces that they have laid bare, make of these the whole of mind, and, while elevating impulse and emotion to the highest place, regard reason and will as superficial conceptions".(2)

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(1) Walter Lippmann says somewhere that it is now as thoroughly out of fashion to mention reason in connection with conduct as for a scientist to declare that the earth is flat.

(2) "The Rational Good", p. 20.

What is clearly needed is a revised conception of reason, one which will take into account all the facts of mental life as psychology now discloses them and which will show the relation of reason to the other aspects of mental life. There is needed too a new statement of what is to be understood by rationality in conduct. At the present time the treatment of reason by those who uphold it in its traditional significance and by its popular opponents is equally unsatisfactory.

II.

We will first see what are the charges which are made against reason. In the literature of the 'new psychology' the operation of reason is explained as being apparent only and the term 'rationalization' has been introduced, and become widely current, to indicate the process whereby man persuades himself that he is believing or acting on rational grounds when, in reality, he is not. Tansley[1] defines this process as "the production of a 'reason' for, as distinct from the true cause or motive of an act or conation"; and he maintains that it is "so exceedingly common as to be practically universal". It is certainly a popular principle of explanation at the moment and it is important to examine it and to endeavour to see just what the facts are.

As in the case of other current conceptions, though the term is a new one the idea is not. It figures in the philosophies of Schopenhauer and of Nietzsche who distinguished the motives which are actually operative in conduct from those which are consciously formulated; and Huxley long ago said that "what

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(1) "The New Psychology and Its Relation to Life", p. 182.

we call rational grounds for our beliefs are often extremely irrational attempts to justify our instincts". The term appears to have been introduced into psychology by Trotter,(1) who applied it to the process whereby pseudo-rational grounds are given for the holding of opinions which are really the result of herd-suggestion. "It is of cardinal importance," he says, "to recognize that in the process of the rationalization of instinctive belief, it is the belief which is the primary thing, while the explanation, although masquerading as the cause of the belief, as the chain of rational evidence on which the belief is founded, is entirely secondary, and but for the belief would never have been thought of. Such rationalizations are often, in the case of intelligent people, of extreme ingenuity, and may be very misleading unless the true instinctive basis of the given opinion or action is thoroughly understood." The conception figures largely in psycho-analytic literature. It is an important part of psycho-analytic doctrine that consciousness is largely concerned with masking or justifying activities which are really the outcome of hidden and unacknowledged motives. To quote Ernest Jones, "Everyone feels that, as a rational creature, he must be able to give a connected, logical and continuous account of himself, his conduct and opinions, and all his mental processes are unconsciously manipulated and revised to that end. No one will admit that he ever deliberately performed an irrational act, and any act that might appear so is immediately justified by distorting the mental processes concerned and providing a false explanation that has a plausible ring of rationality".(2) Bernard Hart has done much to popularize this conception and to maintain that man is not a

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(1) "Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War."

(2) "Papers on Psycho-Analysis", p. 12.

rational animal, but a would-be rational animal. He writes: "That a man generally knows why he thinks in a certain way and why he does certain things, is a widespread and cherished belief of the human race. It is, unfortunately, for the most part an erroneous one. We have an overwhelming need to believe that we are acting rationally and are loth to admit that we think and do things without being ourselves aware of the motive producing those thoughts and actions".(1) He believes that this process of 'rationalization' is particularly obvious in the moral sphere where we endeavour to prove to ourselves, and to others if challenged, that our actions are the outcome of high ethical principles.(2)

According, then, to this mode of explanation reasons are produced 'ex post facto' to justify conduct the real motivation of which is unacknowledged. The reasons, that is, are based upon the impulses, of whatever kind, and not the impulses on the reasons.(3) This mode of explanation may be very widely applied.

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(1) "The Psychology of Insanity", p. 66, cp. also F. L. Wells: "Mental adjustments", p. 13 ff.

(2) Here is one of Hart's illustrations which shows very clearly the working of the process (p. 71). "One of my patients, a former Sunday School teacher, had become a convinced atheist. He insisted that he had reached this standpoint after a long and careful study of the literature of the subject, and, as a matter of fact, he really had acquired a remarkably wide knowledge of religious apologetics. He discoursed at length upon the evidence of Genesis, marshalling his arguments with considerable skill, and producing a coherent and well-reasoned case. Subsequent psychological analysis, however, revealed the real complex responsible for his atheism; the girl to whom he had been engaged had eloped with the most enthusiastic of his fellow Sunday School teachers. We see that in this patient the causal complex, resentment against his successful rival, had expressed itself by a repudiation of the beliefs which had formerly constituted the principal bond between them. The arguments, the study and the quotations were merely an elaborate rationalization."

(3) It has even been applied to philosophy. F.H. Bradley's well-known remark that metaphysics is "nothing but the finding of bad reasons for what we believe upon instinct" has recently been confirmed by Bertrand Russell, who maintains that philosophy has been largely concerned with rationalizing the world and giving it an appearance conformable with human wishes.

It can be applied, not merely to individual behaviour, but also to social customs and institutions. These latter are often found, not to be actually based upon the reasons which are advanced to account for their existence, but rather on underlying motives of a less rational order. The explanations given are secondary. To take an illustration given by Hobhouse, it may be argued on these lines that the institution of punishment is based not on an abstract theory of justice, but on fear. Criminals are punished because they are hated and feared. Legal theories are elaborate 'rationalizations' of these emotions. Franz Boas in his "The Mind of Primitive Man" gives numerous illustrations of this secondary explanation of customs, and says that its existence constitutes one of the most important of anthropological phenomena. He adds, further, that "it is hardly less common in our own society than in more primitive societies".(1) The whole outcome of this mode of explanation of behaviour is well summed up by Hobhouse.(2) "At bottom man is moved, not by ideas or principles, but by impulses and emotions, or to put them into a compound term - since they are so closely allied - by impulse-feeling. But he is influenced, not only directly, but in many subtle ways by the impulse-feeling of others, and he has to give and receive an account of what he does and what they do. Hence he formulates his impulses into ends, and explains them by reasons which are mutually intelligible. This explanation has a use of its own. It serves intercommunication and mutual understanding.

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(1) p. 226. Of this same process in individual behaviour Boas writes: "It is a common observation that we desire or act first and then try to justify our desires and our actions ... a candid examination of our own minds convinces us that the average man, in by far the majority of cases, does not determine his actions by reasoning, but that he first acts, and then justifies and explains his acts by such secondary considerations as are current amongst us".

(2) Op. cit., p. 22.

But in the order of causation it arises 'ex post facto'. The real cause, whether of the personal act, or the social custom, or the ethical principle, lies in impulse-feeling. To treat the alleged reason as the true ground is the fallacy of intellectualism."

Now it can scarcely be denied that 'rationalization' is a process which does occur on a large scale in normal life.(1) No one who is frank about his own conduct can fail to observe it in operation. We do, largely unwittingly, trump up reasons which put a better face on our conduct than is actually justified. To ourselves and to others we put order and purpose into our activities greater than actually exists. Further, so far as belief is concerned, few can claim that their views on religion, politics, or the relation of the sexes have an exclusively rational basis. The demonstration of the widespread existence of this process is a useful contribution to the theory of conduct. But the question is not whether these facts of 'rationalization' exist or not, for manifestly they do exist. The question is whether the right conclusions are being drawn from them. Those who have drawn attention to them have, for the most part, assumed that they altogether invalidate reason and make of it an epiphenomenon to be dismissed as of little significance. Like some other current generalisations this is

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(1) The familiar facts of post-hypnotic suggestion illustrate very clearly the working of this process. McDougall gives an instance ("Outline", p. 368). "A subject who passes into hypnosis and afterwards remembers nothing of the events of the hypnotic period, may be given some simple post-hypnotic suggestion, for example, may be told that, at a certain signal after waking, he will perform some simple train of action, such as rising from his chair, opening the window, and looking up and down the street. At the prescribed signal, the subject gets up in the most natural way, performs the actions, and returns to his seat. You then ask him - Why did you look out of the window? In all probability he will give a perfectly 'rational' explanation of his action. For example he may say: "It occurred to me that so-and-so was likely to be calling for me here, and he might be unable to find the house". That is to say, not knowing the nature and source of the impulse by which he was moved ..... he invents an explanation and puts forward a plausible motive in place of the true one, in perfectly good faith".

all too simple and shows lack of careful analysis. What these facts show is the extreme complexity of motives and that we are far from being fully conscious of their actual nature. As McDougall points out, "Such instances illustrate vividly the fact that the motives of our actions and of our beliefs are apt to be very obscure to us, so that we easily fall into error when we seek, however honestly, to state our motives or the grounds of our belief. In doing so, we naturally seek a 'rational' explanation of our action or belief, i.e. one which may seem reasonable or rationally defensible; we often act or believe from motives of which we have no understanding; but we always seek to explain our action or belief according to the principle of 'sufficient reason'. The fact that our motives are commonly so obscure to us gives plausibility to that kind of psychology which explains everything by invoking 'the Unconscious'".(1)

It may quite well turn out that, when facts such as these of 'rationalization' are fully analysed they show reason at work, but in a very faulty and imperfect fashion; and that there is no need to despair of rationality in conduct. The fact is that those who are denying the validity of reason are misconceiving its nature and thinking of it in some traditional sense which has now become impossible. What we have to try to determine, therefore, is the actual nature of reason and rationality.

III.

Even before the claims of reason were so vigorously attacked by the psychologists it had been found increasingly difficult to state its exact nature. "We talk of man being the rational animal," says William James, "and the traditional

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(1) "Outline", p. 369.

intellectualist philosophy has always made a great point of treating the brutes as wholly irrational creatures. Nevertheless it is by no means easy to decide just what is meant by reason."[1] Of its use by moralists Bosanquet writes: "It is most difficult to understand in many cases what is the meaning of the term reason, or practical reason, as appealed to in ethical treatises. It seems to be something which gives necessary judgments on self-evident principles affecting practice".[2] It is now becoming clear that the great stumbling-block throughout has been the separation of reason from experience so far as knowledge is concerned and the attempt to separate it from all the other factors of mental make-up so far as action is concerned. "In every age," says McDougall, "philosophers have been inclined to set 'Reason' apart from all other mental functions on a throne by itself."[3] In the sphere of knowledge this separation of the rational from the empirical has how become impossible. A new conception of the relation of reason to experience has come into being. Logicians now speak, not so much of the relation of reason <u>to</u> experience, but rather of the place of reason <u>in</u> experience. Dewey has very well pointed out that "'Reason' as a faculty separate from experience introducing us to a superior region of universal truths begins now to strike in as remote, uninteresting and unimportant. Reason as a Kantian faculty that introduces generality and regularity into experience, strikes us more and more as superfluous - the unnecessary creation of men addicted to traditional formalism and to elaborate terminology. Concrete suggestions arising from past experiences, developed and

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(1) "Principles of Psychology", Vol. II, p. 325.

(2) "Some Suggestions in Ethics", p. 157.

(3) <u>Op. cit.</u>, p. 401.

matured in the light of the needs and deficiencies of the present, employed as aims and methods of specific reconstruction, and tested by success or failure in accomplishing this task of readjustment, suffice".[1] This same transformation in the conception of reason must be effected in the sphere of practice. No reason outside experience and above it is needed either in knowledge or in conduct. The theory still exists that all human conduct is the expression of 'Reason', and like the theory which ascribes all conduct to the 'Will', it is a remnant of an outworn faculty psychology. It is against this type of theory that McDougall has so actively protested. He says, "There is a theory of human action beloved of some moralists. They tell us that our higher forms of conduct are due to Reason, while they ascribe our simpler and more impulsive actions to what they call our passions, propensities or instincts, usually prefixing the adjective 'baser' or 'lower' to these words. They are not much interested in these simpler modes of action and do not much care how they are described or explained, so long as Reason is admitted to be a supreme principle of action".[2]

The persistence of this theory is well illustrated in Rashdall's "Is Conscience an Emotion?" which is an attack on McDougall's theory of the development of moral judgment and character.[3] In this book Rashdall is concerned to show that "the moral faculty is essentially Reason". He makes no attempt to analyse reason but writes as if it were something apart, something standing right above the rest of mental life - undefiled by emotion and impulse. Psychology has now

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(1) "Reconstruction in Philosophy", pp. 95-6.

(2) Op. cit., p. 214.

(3) See also McDougall's reply, "Hibbert Journal", 1920.

demonstrated clearly enough the fallacy of making separations of this kind. They are wholly artificial. A moral or practical 'Reason' operating on a higher plane and independent of the rest of mental life save that it contrasts it from above, simply does not exist. It is in fact now quite impossible to conceive of the intellectual processes as in any sense functioning independently of the emotional-impulsive life. Emotion and thought cannot be separated from each other save by an effort of abstraction. In reality they appear as inextricably interwoven. This is a truth expounded very fully and convincingly by Rignano in his recent "The Psychology of Reasoning". In concluding a very complete survey and analysis of reasoning in all its forms, he writes: "The analysis of reasoning, the highest of our mental faculties, has led us to the view that it is constituted entirely by the reciprocal play of the two fundamental and primordial activities of our psyche, the intellectual and the affective ..... Affective activity seems to impregnate every manifestation of our thoughts". By 'affective tendencies' which play a very important part in his theory of mind Rignano means impulses backed by feeling. A psychology which does not set out with a neat scheme of mental make-up but which analyses mental states as they actually exist shows how closely bound up all mental functions are. Though psychologists have always maintained that the familiar threefold division of mental life into the cognitive, the affective and the conative was only a distinction of aspects which all mental processes showed, in actual practice these three have been regarded as distinct, and more or less independent types of processes. Distinctions of this kind made for purposes of analysis are again and again taken as marking things in themselves. In the concrete, as Graham Wallas very well says, "the mind of man is like a harp all of whose strings throb together, so that emotion, impulse, inference and the special kind of inference called reasoning, are often simultaneous and

intermingled aspects of a single mental experience".[1] This truth is being emphasized by the recent investigations into the psychology of day-dreaming.[2] No view of reason and its place in conduct can now be regarded as satisfactory which does not take these facts into account.

IV.

L. T. Hobhouse, in his "The Rational Good", has put forward a view of the nature and function of reason which takes account of all the facts which psychology has brought to light, and yet shows it to be an effective factor in the control of conduct. "Much of the prejudice against reason," he says, "is due to a misconception for which its friends are as much responsible as its enemies. By both alike reason is often taken as a thing apart. On the side of knowledge it is divorced from experience, on the side of conduct, from feeling. In both cases the divorce is fatal to a true understanding. In regard to conduct the 'practical reason' is not a faculty which sits aloft issuing impotent orders to a refractory multitude of impulses and emotions. It is not a faculty concerned with a system of abstract truths deducible, like so many mathematical formulae, from first principles that have nothing to do with human feeling. It is rather a general expression for something which careful analysis reveals in permanent operation within the emotional field."[3]

This last sentence gives the essence of Hobhouse's view. He develops the parallel between the logical and the moral and finds the work of reason, both theoretically and practically, to be the bringing of order and harmony into experience. Theoretically the irrational is equivalent to the inconsistent.

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(1) "Human Nature in Politics" p. 99.
(2) Cf. J. Varendonck, "The Psychology of Day Dreams".
(3) p. 29.

and the arbitrary while the rational shows "the principle of interconnexion systematically applied". From a survey of the reason of theory he concludes: "The conception of reason which emerges is not one of a faculty possessed, prior to and apart from experience, of certain clear and indubitable universal axioms with which it confronts a tangled experience proving and explaining so much as can be brought under these axioms and leaving the rest unrationalized. It is the conception rather of a principle operative within experience, the work of which is always partial and incomplete, always extending itself while at the same time pruning and sharpening its own methods".(1) The reason of practice resembles the reason of theory. It is a principle of harmony and integration. It is "the endeavour to establish harmony throughout its own world .... Its world is the world of impulses, emotions, fixed purposes, passions, all the vital activities of men, and it is within this turbulent mass that it has to establish harmony. For this purpose it must itself be charged with all the energy of profound feeling, and its development is as much a development of feeling as of thought".(2) Reason then is not something which is separate from and opposed to the body of impulse-feeling. "It is useless to look for anything, call it practical reason, will or what we may, that stands outside the body of impulse-feeling and controls it." Reason is something which is continually operative within that body. From the first there is, among the impulses, "a certain correlation which, in its simplest forms, makes for unitary control and, in its more rational form, for harmony. This tendency we can speak of as a specific impulse towards harmony, but we must note that it is an impulse among impulses, qualifying and reshaping them. In virtue of this movement

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(1) p. 63.

(2) p. 93.

our impulses become an organized body overcoming recalcitrant movements, however intensely felt, by the power of an organized mass. This organization, consistently and intelligently carried through, is the practical reason which is the mass of impulse-feeling harmonized, or in process of finding harmony".(1)

From this point of view reason is not something of another order distinguished from feeling and impulses, rather "it is clear that not only the intelligent, but the feelings, impulses and emotions of human beings that make for harmony in life as a whole may all be regarded as rational in character".(2) It is not that they are acquired or developed by ratiocination; they come into being as a result of the interaction of innate equipment with the conditions of life. "Reasoning cannot put into men feelings that they do not possess. but by directing and co-ordinating and giving unity and stability of aim it may most materially enhance the working energy of the feelings out of which it is itself engendered." Hobhouse is careful to point out that what he understands by harmony is something very different from order resting on repression. The impulse which is merely held down persists as a source of inner conflict. But "there is a deep distinction between the expression of a fundamental impulse and the governance of the temporary desire in which such an impulse manifests itself". The all-embracing harmony which Hobhouse believes to be the ideal of the practical reason can never be completely realised. "Experience is unlimited, and the mind with its capacities for feeling is always in process of 'becoming' if not of growth ..... the practical reason is the organizing principle in the actions of men. It is the impulse to develop harmony, on the one hand by

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(1) p. 89.

(2) p. 93.

extending the control of mind over the conditions of its life, on the other hand by establishing unity of aim within the world of consciousness itself. The measure of harmony so achieved at any given stage is not complete, and its rules are not necessarily final. But they are to be modified only in the interests of some fuller harmony to which such a change will demonstrably lead."(1)

Reason then is the tendency of the mind towards harmony and integration, and the practical reason is the synthesis or harmonized body of impulse-feelings made aware of its goal. This view of the nature of reason and of its function in mind and conduct may seem to differ somewhat radically from traditional conceptions, but it is the only type of view which now seems possible.(2) It is only to be regretted that Hobhouse does not show in more detail just how the life of feeling becomes harmonized and relate his theory to the important conception of the sentiment.

A view of reason very similar in outcome to that of Hobhouse is presented by Dewey. As we have already seen he declines to regard reason as in any sense outside experience so far as knowing is concerned, and he applies the same principle in the practical realm. "Reasonableness," he says, "is a quality of an effective relationship among desires rather than a thing opposed to desire."(3) When conflicts occur between

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(1) p. 95.

(2) It cannot of course be claimed as wholly new. Aristotle appears to have regarded reason in practical life not as a separate principle in the soul standing above the other elements and imposing on them a law of its own - but rather as the organizing principle in life adapting the parts to the purpose of the whole.

(3) "Human Nature in Conduct", p. 194.

emotional impulses "the conclusion is not that the emotional, passionate phase of action can be, or should be eliminated in behalf of a bloodless reason. More 'passions' not fewer is the answer ..... Rationality is not a force to invoke against impulse and habit. It is the attainment of a working harmony among diverse desires".(1)

The rejection of the view that reason in practice is something controlling 'ab extra' the life of feeling and impulse, and the regarding it as the inner organization of that life is really a return to what has always been the common sense meaning of reasonableness. It is to reason in the bloodless, abstract sense of a faculty apart that Chesterton is referring when he says that "from reason itself nothing rational has ever proceeded". Santayana in his "The Life of Reason" gives the essence of this way of regarding it when he says that "Reason, as such, represents, or rather constitutes a single formal interest, the interest in harmony",(2) and in entering on an account of the life of reason he takes it as his main guiding principle that "the progressive organization of irrational impulses makes up the rational life".

IV.

The essence of this view of reason is that it is the tendency of the mind towards harmony and integration. What we may term the 'rational impulse' is operative in mental life from the first, and its presence has been recognized by psychologists.(3) A. F. Shand has recognized its importance and has expressed it in what he terms the "Law of Organization", which

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(1) "Human Nature in Conduct", pp. 195-6; cf. also Bertrand Russell, "Can Men be Rational?" (R.P.A. Annual 1923). "Rationality in practice may be defined as the habit of remembering all our relevant desires, and not only the one which happens at the moment to be strongest. Like rationality in opinion it is a matter of degree. Complete rationality is no doubt an unattainable ideal."

(2) Vol. I, p. 267.

(3) "Foundations of Character."

in his view plays a fundamental part in mental development. He expresses it thus: "Mental activity tends, at first unconsciously, afterwards consciously, to produce and sustain system and organization". Drewer expresses the same idea more fully.

"It is obvious," he says, "that there is in psychical life a co-ordinating factor, which becomes clearly manifest at the higher levels where it has been identified with reason. But this co-ordinating factor is found at all levels. Reason is not a new force entering mental life from without at the higher levels. At the lowest levels the life and behaviour of the organism is co-ordinated, but the co-ordinating factor is not conscious of itself. When the ideational level emerges, however, the possibility of a conscious, co-ordinating factor is present."(1)

Viewing reason in this way, as the effort towards mental harmony, let us return to the consideration of the facts of 'rationalization'. This process appears clearly enough as an attempt at mental wholeness and harmony, but a false and illegitimate attempt. The 'reasons' which we produced 'ex post facto', and used to explain the behaviour, are attempts to introduce into the mind a degree of wholeness and consistency greater than has actually been achieved. Some unknown, or unacknowledged, motive has operated which is really not in harmony with the dominating tendencies of the mind, and the resulting action is falsely brought into relation with these conscious motives. As Julian Huxley says,(2) "Man displays disharmonies of mental constitution, together with an innate hankering after harmony". And this 'hankering' after harmony

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(1) "Introduction to the Psychology of Education", p. 78.

(2) "Essays of a Biologist", p. 273.

(which is really reason at work), is so strong, and inner disharmony is so unpleasant and disturbing, that by means of the process of 'rationalization' we achieve a peace with ourselves which is really quite artificial. The process simply shows to what an extremely limited degree rational harmony has actually been achieved. It does not show that rationality is impossible; it shows only that it is exceedingly difficult. It does also show one other fact which will be discussed more fully later, namely the very great importance for the rational ordering of conduct of increased self-knowledge, knowledge of all the underlying motives of the mind and the frank facing of them in consciousness.

From the point of view which has now been achieved in regard to the relation of reason to the life of feeling, and the nature of rationality, it should be possible to get beyond the traditional opposition between 'Reason' and the 'passions', or, as it is still expressed in the text-books on ethics, between such abstractions as "Reason" and "desire", and to express the moral problem in some form more adequate to the actual facts of mind and conduct as they are now being disclosed. "Shall we," asks McDougall, "be content to say with Plato and some modern moralists, that Divine reason sits in the head, controlling fierce passions that reside in the belly, as a charioteer controls with whip and rein a team of savage steeds?"(1) And he very rightly answers, hardly! Traditionally, and still in some quarters, emotion has been regarded as the enemy and the disturber of reason, just as instinct and impulse have been regarded as its rivals. It now seems possible to come to terms with both and to express their relation more adequately. If this is done rationality may still be taken as an ideal. Reason has undoubtedly been one of the most fruitful conceptions

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(1) "An Outline of Psychology"

under which the moral life has been regarded. It has always stood for an intelligent organization of life as opposed to its control of pure impulse on the one hand or by dogma on the other. But there can be no denying its frequent one-sidedness in the treatment of human nature. As Dewey points out, "Moralists have spent time and energy in showing what happens when appetite, impulse is indulged without reference to consequences and reason. But they have mostly ignored the counterpart evils of an intelligence that conceives ideals and goods which do not enter into present impulse and habit. The life of reason has been specialized, romanticized, or made a heavy burden. This situation embodies the import of the problem of actualizing the place of intelligence in conduct".(1) There have been abstractions on both sides, but it does now seem possible to get beyond them. It might of course be argued that the traditional opposition between 'reason' and 'passion' corresponds to a radical disharmony or dualism in human nature which is ultimate and which must simply be accepted. It certainly corresponds to something deep and universal; but it does not seem likely that it is a dualism which cannot be overcome. This seems to be a wrong way of looking at the facts. It seems rather that with effort the disharmonies of human nature can be overcome and not a final but a progressive synthesis be reached.

Before we go on to consider what the nature of this synthesis appears to be it may be pointed out that this problem of reason and feeling is far from being a mere problem of theory. It is, in fact, the first problem of practice and very near to everyone. In its practical aspects this problem and the direction in which a solution is to be looked for has recently

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(1) Op. cit., p. 275.

been clearly stated by Havelock Ellis in a chapter on "The Art of Morals"(1). He says, what modern psychology has been making very obvious, that there is something of a dualism in civilised man. "Objectively he has become like the gods and able to distinguish the ends of life; he has eaten of the fruit of the tree and has knowledge of good and evil. Subjectively he is still not far removed from the savage, oftenest stirred to action by a confused web of emotional motives, among which the interwoven strands of civilized reason are as likely to produce discord or paralysis as to furnish efficient guides, a state of mind first, and perhaps best, set forth in its extreme form by Shakespeare in Hamlet. On the one hand he cannot return to the primitive state in which all the motives for living flowed harmoniously in the same channel; he cannot divest himself of his illuminating reason; he cannot recede from his hardly acquired personal individuality. On the other hand he can never expect, he can never even reasonably hope, that reason will ever hold in leash the emotions. It is clear that along neither path separately can the civilized man pursue his way in harmonious balance with himself. We begin to realize that what we need is not a code of beautifully cut-and-dried maxims - whether emanating from sacred mountains or from philosophers' studies - but a happy combination of two different ways of living. We need, that is, a traditional and instinctive way of living, based on real motor instincts, which will blend with reason and the manifold needs of personality, instead of being destroyed by their solvent action, as rigid rules inevitably are. Our only valid rule is a creative impulse that is one with the illuminative power of intelligence."

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(1) In his recent book "The Dance of Life".

I.

(1)

A recent writer, in criticising certain aspects of the current psychology of boredom, has pointed out that much of it tends to the assumption that "behind the self, more real than the self, are a number of impersonal mechanical forces called impulses into which the self can be analysed away". These are undoubtedly good words to [illegible] psychological Atomism which has [illegible] think of the self as a [illegible] instincts or appetites, a [illegible] bundle of [illegible] necessary [illegible] to be [illegible]

IX.

THE INTEGRATION OF MIND AND CONDUCT.

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[illegible] considers elements in abstraction and that they are only rightly understood when considered in relation to [illegible] which they form a part. The need for recognising what is termed the 'unity of the organism' is at present [illegible] the sciences of biology. (3) It is thus stated by [illegible] ton. "The living creature is fundamentally a [illegible] to make the 'how' of an animal existence intelli[illegible]

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(1) A. Clutton Brock: "Evil and the New Psychology", "Atlantic Monthly", 1922.

(2) Julian Huxley: "Essays of a Biologist", [illegible]

(3) Cf. W.F. [illegible] formula for [illegible] an explanation [illegible] conscious [illegible]

I.

A recent writer,[1] in criticizing certain aspects of the current psychology of conduct, has pointed out that, underlying much of it there is the assumption that "behind the self and more real than the self, are a number of impersonal and indeed mechanical forces called instincts into which the self can be analyzed away". There are undoubtedly good grounds for this criticism. The success which has attended the efforts at psychological analysis has resulted in a strong tendency to think of the self as split up into elements, whether styled instincts or anything else, which function independently or interact mechanically. Psychological analysis is, of course, necessary and extremely valuable, but it should never lead us to forget the essential unity of the self as a concrete fact, and the need for studying it as such. "We are all of us," says a biologist,[2] "too prone to think that a phenomenon is somehow 'explained' or interpreted better by analyzing it into its component parts or discovering its origin, than by studying it in and for itself." We must not forget that analysis considers elements in abstraction and that they are only to be rightly understood when considered in relation to the whole of which they form a part. The need for recognizing what is termed the 'unity of the organism' is at present being felt in the science of biology.[3] It is thus stated by C. S. Sherrington. "The living creature is fundamentally a unity. In trying to make the 'how' of an animal existence intelligible to our

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(1) A. Clutton Brock: "Evil and the New Psychology", "Atlantic Monthly", 1922.

(2) Julian Huxley: "Essays of a Biologist", p. 171.

(3) Cf. W.E. Ritter: "The Unity of the Organism". His main formula is: "The organism in its totality is as essential to an explanation of its elements as its elements are to an explanation of the organism".

imperfect knowledge we have for purposes of study to separate its whole into part-aspects and part-mechanisms, but that separation is artificial. It is as a whole, a single entity, that the animal, or for that matter the plant, has finally and essentially to be envisaged. We cannot really understand its one part without its other."(1)

This point of view is just as essential in psychology: in fact in dealing with a mind and particularly with the human mind it is even more essential.(2) And it is particularly necessary when, as at present, evidence is being drawn so freely from the sphere of the abnormal and the disordered and applied to the understanding of the nature of mind and behaviour in general.(3) it must never be forgotten, as MacCurdy has pointed out that "the clinician works with disintegrated functions and is always in danger of assuming that disintegrated elements have, in combination, the functions exhibited when they are isolated by disease, or that in the evolutionary past they have had such functions. But this is a mistake. Any element, when it combines with others to form a more complicated functional structure is 'ipso facto' altered".(4)

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(1) "Some Aspects of Animal Mechanism", Presidential Address, British Association, 1922.

(2) L.T. Hobhouse ("Mind in Evolution", p. 105 n.) discusses the question "whether the fundamental elements of human nature are of the nature of separate units which interact like independent powers, or whether what is inherited is an abstraction and what is acquired another abstraction, the two together forming the concrete whole of actual behaviour". He goes on, "In the main I believe the latter account to be true of human nature, the former to be true of the lowest and partly true of the higher animals, and it is this increasing unity of the organism as a whole which I take to be one of the distinguishing marks of the human as compared with the animal mind".

(3) "Problems in Dynamic Psychology", p. 269.

(4) Failure to recognize his fundamental principle results in conclusions like the following: "Unlike the embryonic organs which disappear after fulfilling whatever rôle they may play during the embryonic phase of our physical existence, unlike the rudimentary structures which are carried forward but lie formant and useless in the adult, the mental vestiges of our earlier existence, our primordial cravings, our racial instincts, persist in their raw and naked forms alongside the more complex, subtle emotions - ideals and aspirations which we acquire in later life as the heritage of historic civilization". J.S.Van Teslaar: "The Significance of Psycho-Analysis in the History of Science", Internat. Journ. Psycho-Analysis, 1921.

We must, then, think of the self as functioning as a unity, and as characterized by some type of organization. But this does not take us very far. It is very obvious, and does not need pointing out that some sort of unity and organization is effected in mental life between factors inherited and acquired by interaction with the environment, natural and social. The question is, what is the nature of this unity and how may the organization of it be most adequately conceived. This is the difficult question. If we must think of the self as a whole, we want some adequate conception of mental wholeness. The simple idea of harmony, taken alone, does not seem sufficient. What is needed is some embracing conception which will enable us to take into account, and to show in their right relation all the phenomena of mental life which analysis has laid bare: a conception which will show how, from original tendencies, more complex mental structures are built up and interrelated; which will take into account the stresses which are incidental to the effecting of mental organization - facts of conflict, of repression and of dissociation, and facts of unconscious mental functioning: a conception which will show how guidance and also control are brought about and how the higher are related to the lower functions. This sounds a large order: but we must have some such embracing conception in terms of which to think of the self as a whole if we are to endeavour to do justice, not to some facts of mind and conduct, as so many current one-sided views do, but to all the facts as they now stand.

The present writer believes that the conception of <u>integration</u> is the one required. All that is meant by this conception will take some explaining.

The term 'integration' is now being used more and more frequently in connection with mental organization, but so far

with no very definite meaning.(1) As a conception it has scarcely yet been explicitly stated in connection with the theory of conduct, though in a vague way it seems to be implicit in a good deal of recent writing and to be the conception towards which thought is moving.(2) Lloyd Morgan appears to be the only writer who has so far worked it out at all fully in the psychological sphere. He wants to regard differentiation and integration, so far as the mind is concerned, "not as mere words" but as "vitalizing concepts". He understands by integration "that kind of systematic relatedness which obtains in an organism and in a mind, where the functioning of sub-systems, as parts of the whole, depends on that of the system as a whole". The unity of the whole, in the case of such an organism and mind, is thus not that of simplicity, but of 'integrated complexity'.

This conception is, of course, borrowed from the sphere of biology where, in recent years, it has proved exceedingly fruitful. It is the progress of the biological sciences which has led to the recognition of the importance of the conception and suggested its application to mind. Integration has been worked out on the organic side of the body-mind system. The analogous conception of psychical integration does seem to offer a promising way of tackling the problem of mental organization.

II.

Let us first endeavour to get clear what is understood by integration in the realm of the organic, particularly in relation to the physiology of the nervous system. Physiologists are

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(1) Cf. Tansley: "The New Psychology", p. 163: "Progressive integration is the key process in the evolution of animal and human behaviour": also E.A. Holt, "The Freudian Wish", p. 145: "Wisdom and virtue are in principle one, and that principle the progressive, life-long integration of experience".

(2) Several of the more philosophically inclined of the psychopathologists are now making use of it, cf. W.A. White: "The Foundations of Psychiatry".

now agreed in regarding integration as the main function of the central nervous system. This idea was first developed by Sherrington in his "Integrative Action of the Nervous System". In this important work he showed how, in the multicellular animal, the nervous system, through its integrative activity constitutes an individual out of a mere collection of organs. In a recent address Sherrington returns to this topic: "The nervous system," he says, "is that bodily system whose special office from its earliest appearance onward throughout evolutionary history has been more and more to weld together the body's component parts into one consolidated mechanism reacting as a unity to the changeful world about it. It more than any other system has constructed out of a collection of organs and individual of unified act and experience. It represents the acme of accomplishment of the integration of the animal organism .... In the brain, the integrating nervous centres are themselves further compounded, interconnected, and recombined for unitary functions .... the cortex with its twin halves corresponding to the two side-halves of the body is really a single organ knitting those halves together by a still further knitting together of the nervous system itself. The animal's great integrating system is there still further integrated ..... From small beginnings it has become steadily a larger and larger feature of the nervous system, until in adult man the whole rest of the system is relatively dwarfed by it."[1] It is important for our purpose to note the manner in which this integration is effected. Physiologists now look upon the nervous system as consisting of a functional hierarchy in which one form of activity is controlled by another standing higher than it in the evolutionary

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(1) Op. cit.

scale. This idea of functional levels of control was first advanced by Hughlings Jackson. It has been considerably developed by Head and others.(1) Head shows in detail that the integration in the organism effected by the nervous system, means the dominance, within the system, of higher over lower forms of neural activity. This integration of functions in a hierarchy is, he maintains, based on a struggle for expression between many potentially different physiological activities. "The aim of the evolutionary development of the central nervous system is to integrate its diverse and contradictory reactions so as to produce a coherent result adapted to the welfare of the organism as a whole." In pathological states, where there is some degree of loss of control, the most recently acquired and most complex functions disappear first, and the other levels of control in the reverse order to that of their acquisition. But it is important to note that when the control of the higher centres is thus destroyed it does not reveal the lower and earlier centres unchanged by the advent of those above them. Their activities have been profoundly modified. "It would be wrong to suppose that the removal of a dominant mechanism reveals the reactions of a phylogenetically older organ in all their primitive simplicity. The integrative activity of the higher centres has profoundly modified the functions of those below them in neural hierarchy; some have been caught up to take part in the new complex, whilst others are held in check or inhibited." In the gradual evolution of functions the reactions of the lower centres have been changed to meet fresh conditions, and it is pointed out that "the more complex an organism and the more efficiently it responds with discrimination

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(1) Cf. H. Head: "Studies in Neurology" (esp. Vol. II); also Croonian Lecture, Proceedings Royal Socy., 1916; and "The Conception of Nervous and Mental Energy", Paper read at International Congress of Psychology, 1923.

to external forces, the greater will be the need for such readjustment". The relation of the higher to the lower function is expressed again as follows. "The functions of the central nervous system are not a palimpsest, where a new text is written over an earlier manuscript, partly erased. The more primitive activities have been profoundly modified by the advent of the new centres, which utilize some of the faculties originally possessed by the older mechanism. In many cases the higher function could not be exercised, without the existence of these lower powers which it dominates and controls. When, however, the higher mechanism is thrown out of action the functions of the lower centres are free to exhibit their activity unchecked."

The organism, then, is now conceived of as a system of systems, in Rivers's words, as consisting of "unity within unity, group within group, the integration of which into a harmonious system is the function of its highest regions".(1) The physiologists, quite rightly from their point of view, would regard psychical integration as something more than an analogy from organic integration. It is simply a further stage in the process of organic integration. "The aim of consciousness," says Head, "is to produce a unity of action directed to the welfare of the organism as a whole." It is an undoubted fact, as Sherrington points out, that it is in the nervous system "that mind as we know it has had its beginnings and with the progressive development of the system has step for step developed"(2); and further within this system "the portion to which mind transcendantly attaches is exactly that where are carried to their highest pitch the nerve actions which manage

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(1) "Psychology and Politics", p. 60. cf. also W.A. White: "Foundations of Psychiatry" (p. 37). "The organism appears as a hierarchy of functions, each functional level controlling or inhibiting those that lie beneath it and in turn being controlled or inhibited by those above. There are no well-defined boundaries....each higher level represents the working out more accurately of the problems of the lower, a virtual unfolding and development of the lower levels."

(2) Op. cit.

the individual as a whole, especially in his reactions to the external world"; and this, he says, is surely significant. Undoubtedly it is and it may quite well be, as C.S. Myers has recently declared, that "the outstanding problems of mind and life must ultimately be solved in similar terms". But there is here not the least intention to attempt to explain problems of mind in terms of problems of life. We are concerned simply with an analogy: with integration within the psychical system itself. It seems possible to regard the mental organization as of the same general type as the organization which obtains within the organism. Julian Huxley has recently pointed out that this general type "has been developed over and over again in the course of evolution, for different functions: it is the hierarchical one, in which some parts are dominant, others subordinate, the dominant parts helpless without the subordinate, the subordinate different, through the fact of their subordination, from what they would otherwise have been, doing most of the hard work, but under the guidance of the dominant. Only in this way is a unitary organization arrived at in which there is the minimum of waste, of antagonism between the parts".(1)

III.

The conception of psychical integration has been very suggestively worked out in a series of articles by Lloyd Morgan.(2) We will outline his scheme fairly fully. He treats this conception in a very wide setting, no less wide than the whole process of 'emergent evolution' which works upwards "from

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(1) Op.cit. p. 155. Cf. also: "One of the most important biological generalizations is that progressive evolution is accompanied by the rise of one part to dominance, and, wherever there are many parts to be considered, by the arrangement of the rest in some form of hierarchy, each part being subordinate to one above, dominant to one below".

(2) "Consciousness and the Unconscious", Presidential Address, Psychology Section, British Assn., 1922; "Instinctive Behaviour and Enjoyment", "British Journal of Psychology", 1921; "Psychology and the Medical Curriculum", "Journal of Neurology and Psycho-pathology", 1920.

materiality through life to consciousness which attains in man its highest reflective level". He makes a striking attempt to link up the psychological with the biological in "one consistent scheme of natural development". Of organic integration he writes: "We find a number of sub-systems - respiratory, circulatory, reproductive and so on - within the comprehensive life-system of the organism. We find these functional activities inter-related in many very subtle and delicate ways in the life that is common to them all. We consider, for example, the integrative action of the nervous system, and of that which may now be called the 'hormonic' system of internal secretions distributed by the blood stream. The working of any one sub-system may facilitate or enhance the working of another, or it may partially arrest or even inhibit it". In such a comprehensive system it is important to remember that neither the whole nor the parts are historically prior; they have been evolved together with reciprocal interplay throughout. Lloyd Morgan goes on to suggest that what holds good for the life system, holds good also 'mutatis mutandis' for the psychical system. "As in the discussion of life problems, so too in that of mind problems, the stress in ultimate interpretations is on integration. It is now realised, that within the psychical system, only a small part of the integration which obtains, though no doubt a very important part, is established in the light of our personal consciousness, thereafter to descend towards the unconscious in habit. Far more integration (however it was originally established) is ours through inheritance. This affords the unconscious foundations of our mental life. But it need not remain subliminal; it may surge up above the threshold with enjoyment which is in itself new in the supraliminal region of that person, though it is swiftly integrated with much that is old. It brings with it no ideas or memory images, though it

colours affectively our mental outlook towards presentations, old and new". He assumes that throughout the whole range of the life process there is correlated 'enjoyment' psychical in its nature. And in the inner or psychical aspect of life there is progressive emergence just as there is in the outer aspect. At its lower levels it is unconscious. Later consciousness, with its external reference, emerges. With the emergence of consciousness, "We say that dispositions or interests, or innate tendencies, or emotional systems, or instincts, or impulses, are awakened to activity from a state of more or less unconscious slumber. (We are sure to use some rather metaphorical expressions.) These are then regarded as the sub-systems of the mind. Each has some measure of autonomous integration; all are in some measure inter-related; and in a well-balanced mind, the net results of a bewildering number of psychical processes, many of them previously subliminal and unconscious, are caught up in subservience to conscious integration. But taken in detail there is much interplay between the psychical sub-systems as such, with facilitation, partial arrest, more or less inhibition, and perhaps derangement of function. There may be failure of normal integration within one systematic whole, or even such dislocation as we speak of as complete dissociation. And any of the psychical sub-systems - the so-called sexual complex for example, - may be active in the subliminal region of the unconscious, or may rise into the supraliminal field and may modify the course of conscious events. There is thus integration within the sub-systems severally, and integration of these sub-systems collectively so as to constitute a whole with (let us hope) due balance and poise. The unity of the whole is not that of simplicity but that of integrated complexity".

Within the mind thus conceived there are distinguished levels of psychical integration. Of these there are three,

or at least three main ones. They are: 1. Reflective integration in the sphere of the throught processes; 2 Unreflective integration in the sphere of perceptual intelligence. These two are consciously established in the life-time of the individual. But there is also: 3. Integration of the unlearnt order in the sphere of the unconscious. This latter is ours by inheritance.(1)

Perceptive integration is consciously, but not reflectively established. It means the unreflective but intelligent profiting by experience and the adaptation to new conditions of life. It is "the salient feature in the mental life of many animals". But in man "it passes from its proper level to that of reflective consciousness and is there re-integrated in the new significant field of value". But this is not the only process". "As reflective habitudes of valuing get firmly rooted, such re-integration spreads downwards to give value to more and more of that which has been established under the lower and earlier integration of the perceptive order. Behaviour is reorganized as conduct in terms of value." The process is thus a double one: there is ascending and descending integration. This is important "when the emergent level of reflective consciousness is reached, the outcome of prior unreflective integration passes up from its lower level. But as re-integration at the upper level proceeds ~~processes~~, more and more of the unreflective substratum undergoes reflective regrouping around the values which are the new centres of that higher re-integration. Unreflective integration ascends from below; reflective re-integration descends from above. But they are different; the new 'form' of integration is other than the old. There is always some 'conflict' which has been a fruitful theme in

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(1) For an account of the physiological correlates of these three levels cf. the British Journal of Psychology article.

drama from the time of the Greeks onwards. And in our so-called normal life (to say nothing of that which is abnormal) this conflict of systems with different centres of groupings and fields of influence, is daily and hourly in evidence". Below the perceptual level there is a deeper psychical strata founded on life inheritance - the unconscious level. We have already discussed Lloyd Morgan's treatment of this level of integration in considering the nature of the unconscious. Its 'form' is inherited. But this given 'form' may be reintegrated at the perceptive or at the reflective level. It does not necessarily remain unconscious. It may surge up into consciousness. "This insurgent factor, welling up from the unconscious, may and often does, come into conflict with the outcome of perceptive or unreflective, and still more markedly with the outcome of our reflective integration." But once this unconscious or instinctive factor has appeared in the conscious field and has there been integrated into the structure of conscious life, its existence can be distinguished only by an effort of analysis. "It cannot ever be separated from the conscious factors which emergently combine with it in perceptive or in reflective re-integration."

Though the unlearnt, the perceptive and the reflective levels of integration can be thus distinguished there is, of course, no breach of continuity between them. And, in connection with the notion of ascending and descending integration, it is important to note that what is reflectively established may, through habit, assume the status of unreflective integration, and the unreflectively established, that of the unconscious. One final quotation from Lloyd Morgan will give a general picture of the mind viewed in this way. "In the organism there is differentiation of function; but the life of the organism is the integration of all functions. In the higher animals there is differentiation of instinct; but the psychical life of the

animal is the integration of instincts, supplemented by intelligent guidance. At certain times, however, one of these instincts may so dominate the psychical life that others are temporarily repressed. The whole poise of the psychical system is then altered. In man there are also in due course developed in the supraliminal consciousness distinctively human 'interests'. Now one and now another of these 'interests' may be dominant; with relative suppression of others, which may become subliminal, and with subtle alterations of mental poise. Furthermore, the whole system of such human 'interests' may be more or less markedly differentiated from that more directly founded on the instincts of animal life. Not only this; the human 'interests' may be further differentiated into those which are socially approved and those which are not. But save ~~some~~ in abnormal cases of dissociation differentiation is balanced by concomitant integration. There is: 1. That which subserves organic life; 2. That which furthers animal behaviour including reproduction; 3. That which leads to the development of human interests; and 4. That which accords with the social conscience ..... all these are unconsciously or consciously interrelated in such wise that some measure of total integration is partly retained and partly established in each one of us, with subtle and sometimes swift variations in dominance, with facilitation or arrest of this or that, and sometimes with temporary or permanent throwing of this or that out of gear. In which of us is integration, conscious and unconscious, all that the heart could desire?"

This extraordinarily comprehensive view of the mind and its organization seems capable of co-ordinating in a very valuable way the large body of facts which the study of mind and conduct now discloses. As it stands it is, of course, a somewhat formal scheme which requires much filling in; but it seems to provide what is now the fundamentally right way of regarding the problem of mind and conduct.

IV.

It must not be imagined that any attempt is here to be made to fill in the details of Lloyd Morgan's scheme of mental integration - or to work out any other scheme. Nothing of the kind can be attempted. We must be content with indicating what seems to be the right way of looking at the problem.

Something, however, may be said of the various processes which are involved in the effecting of integration and of its faulty forms. It must be realized that while, as is pointed out, a certain degree of integration is ours by inheritance, the complex integration which obtains within the whole psychical system is only very gradually achieved, and in different individuals it is achieved in all degrees of completeness. It has recently been pointed out[1] that one of the main features distinguishing the adult from the child mind is a greater co-ordination, in the case of the former, among the various component parts of the mind, a higher degree, that is, of psychical integration. It is also clear that adult minds differ very widely in this respect. There are some with "souls well knit"; others whose minds are only very loosely organized. In the former there has been extensive differentiation and a corresponding degree of integration. The originally given basis of the mind has given rise to and been organized into the sub-systems of the sentiments (Lloyd Morgan's 'interests'), and these have themselves been ordered into a hierarchy, so that they control one another within the one all-comprehensive system which is the character of the individual. Mental disorders appear as failures, for various reasons, to achieve a normal degree of integration. Integration appears as the factor of central importance in mental hygiene.[2]

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(1) Ernest Jones: "Some Problems of Adolescence", British Journal of Psychology, 1922.

(2) Cf. J. C. Flugel ("The Psycho-analytic Study of the Family, p. 3), "A person whose instincts and impulses are co-ordinated sufficiently to maintain, as regards all the leading aspects of life, a relatively harmonious functioning of the whole

(Contd.)

The process of effecting integration may be approached from many different points of view. In this process mental conflict, and the manner of dealing with it appear as factors of the first importance. Different methods of dealing with the conflicts which arise between the various sub-systems of the mind can be distinguished. One method, and the least effective from the point of view of integration is that of repression. The nature of repression has already been discussed. It is the endeavour to force one of the competing impulses, and the sub-system which it represents, from the mind. As a method of dealing with conflict it is a failure. Impulses cannot be destroyed in this way nor parts of the mind simply dismissed. As Dewey points out, "Every impulse is, as far as it goes, force, urgency. It must either be used in some function, direct or sublimated, or be driven into a concealed, hidden activity ..... The evil of checking impulses is not that they are checked. Without inhibition there is no instigation of imagination, no redirection into more discriminated and comprehensive activities. The evil resides in a refusal of direct attention which forces the impulses into disguise and concealment, until it exacts its own unavowed uneasy private life subject to no inspection and no control".(1) As we have already seen, repression tends to result in the building up and the maintaining of barriers between different parts of the mind or in some degree of dissociation. The method of repression

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(Note Contd.)

personality, can preserve mental health in circumstances under which a less integrated mind would fail, owing to the waste of energy occasioned by the internal struggles of the conflicting tendencies and emotions aroused in situations of difficulty or danger".

(1) "Human Nature and Conduct", p. 165, cf. also J.A. Hadfield: "Psychology and Morals": "We cannot control our instincts as long as we repress them; only by bringing them into consciousness and accepting them as part of ourselves can we control them".

cannot result in the achievement of any high degree of integration.

There is another method of dealing with mental conflict somewhat more effective than the method of repression. This is the method of displacement or sublimation. By displacement is meant the transference of one of the competing impulses from its original object to a new object so that it gains an indirect and modified expression. When this modified expression possesses a higher moral or social value, than the original impulse the process is usually described as one of sublimation. At the present time 'sublimation' is a highly popular concept and is often referred to as though it solved all problems of conduct, which it certainly does not. As a method of dealing with conflict it represents a compromise. It means some re-arrangement in the way impulses are linked up in the various sub-systems of the mental organization. It may prove effective, but it is blind and groping and not of itself likely to lead to any very complete form of integration.

It is what has been termed the method of 'conscious control' which makes possible the organization of the mind in a really effective hierarchy of systems. The highest type of integration is that which is effected in the whole mind by activity at the self-conscious, reflective level. "Individual minds," says McDougall, "become more completely integrated in proportion as they achieve a full self-consciousness."(1) From many different points of view psychology is now stressing the importance of increased self-consciousness, meaning by it, in this sense, increased awareness of the contents of all the levels of the mind, and so complete knowledge of its motive forces.

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(1) For an account of the development of self-consciousness and the self-regarding sentiment cf. McDougall: "Introduction to Social Psychology", Ch. VII.

Increased self-consciousness of this type means an increased field of conscious control, and it is now the aim of most methods of psycho-therapy to bring about such an increased self-knowledge.(1) This method of resolving mental conflict is the exact opposite of the method of repression. Instead of being thrust out of sight, competing impulses are brought into the focus of consciousness and their claims consciously adjusted. To quote one writer: "In so far as we can succeed in bringing to the focus of consciousness all the thoughts, feelings, emotions and tendencies aroused in us by a particular situation, just so far shall we be able to bring about a satisfactory solution of the conflict between opposing tendencies - a solution which is at once the wisest and the best of which our personality is capable".(2) The ends of the conflicting impulses are subsumed under each other, the lower under the higher and the narrower under the wider. We here see reason, which is the tendency towards harmony and integration being consciously employed.

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(1) Cf. W. Brown: "Psychology and Psycho-therapy" on "Autognosis".

(2) J. C. Flügel: "Freudian Mechanisms as Factors in Moral Development", British Journal of Psychology, Vol. VIII. Cf. also C. S. Sherrington (op. cit.): "Circumstances can stress in the individual some perhaps lower instinctive tendency that conflicts with what may be termed his normal personality. This latter, to master the conflicting trend, can judge it in relation to his main self's general ethical ideals and duty to self and the community. Thus intellectualising it, he can destroy it or consciously subordinate it to some aim in harmony with the rest of his personality. By so doing there is gain in power of will and in personal coherence of the individual. But if the morbid situation be too strong or the mental self too weak, instead of thus assimilating the contentious element, the mind may shun, and so to say, endeavour to ignore it. That way lies danger. This discordant factor escaped from the sway of the conscious mind produces stress and strain of the conscious self; hence to use customary terminology, dissociation of the self sets in bringing in its train those disabilities, mental or nervous or both, which characterise the sufferer from hysteria".

move man to action is not becoming any simpler. The whole tendency of recent investigation has been to emphasize the extraordinary richness and complexity of mental life and the multiplicity of the motive forces of human [illegible]. There is thereby about [illegible] a [illegible]. How [illegible] has come into a place that has thrown over all the [illegible] mind and the means by which the theories of action [illegible] by. One thing is [illegible], [illegible] and [illegible], [illegible] and complexity, [illegible] to [illegible] and [illegible]. [illegible] to be [illegible] by our [illegible].

X.

CONCLUSION.

[illegible] a terror of [illegible] single and supposedly dominant motive [illegible]? How often discussion and debate have been at bottom only a question as to which of two simple explanations we shall [illegible] alternative. Instincts or habit, or instinct or reason, [illegible] or suggestion, sex, love of [illegible], of money, all have their [illegible] in, and explanations [illegible] to [illegible] one another exclusively. [illegible] it is, I [illegible], [illegible] folly if anyone pretending to a scientific [illegible] from any other than a pluralistic basis: the complexity, the specific variety of the factors of human nature, [illegible] into the foundations of human life, the [illegible] of the community of human and animal nature and [illegible] recognition of the importance of [illegible] in mental life, has led to hasty and over-[illegible] to be a crop of popular generalisations about [illegible]. It is, of course, exceedingly difficult to be [illegible]

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(1) "The Need for Social Psychology", [illegible] Vol. 24.

As was pointed out in the Introduction, the problem of understanding the nature and relation of the forces that move man to action is not becoming any simpler. The whole tendency of recent investigation has been to emphasize the extraordinary richness and manysidedness of mental life and the complexity of the motive forces of the mind. As a result, theorizing about conduct is in a flux. New knowledge has come like a flood and has broken down all the neat schemes of mind and its make-up and the theories of action based on them. One thing is now certain, no theory will suffice which, by an artificial simplicity, fails to do justice to this richness and complexity. "How often," says Dewey, "have we been invited to build up our social, political and ethical explanations in terms of some single and supposedly dominant mental constituent! How often discussion and dispute have been at bottom only a question as to which of rival single claimants we shall yield allegiance. Instincts to power, to control of others, fear of authority, sex, love of pleasure, of ease, all have been appealed to, and explanations constructed in terms of one or another exclusively. Henceforth it is, I submit, pure wilfulness if anyone pretending to a scientific treatment starts from any other than a pluralistic basis: the complexity and specific variety of the factors of human nature."(1) The delving into the foundations of human life, the franker acknowledgment of the community of human and animal nature and the consequent recognition of the importance of instinctive-emotional factors in mental life, has led to hasty and one-sided theories, and to a crop of popular generalizations about human conduct. It is, of course, exceedingly difficult to do justice to all the

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(1) "The Need for Social Psychology", Psychological Review, Vol. 24.

facts, and these theories, by their very one-sidedness and exaggeration have brought about the recognition of factors which had been more or less ignored. We have now to think of human nature and all its activities not merely in terms of intelligence and reason, but also in terms of emotions, sentiments and impulses resting back upon inherited instincts. If we think of the self as a whole, and to do this is necessary if we take the moral point of view, we must think of it as a whole of a very complicated sort. "I ask myself," says Lloyd Morgan, "what a man walks about with under his hat. What is he? Well, he is (1) a marvellously complex physico-chemical system; he is (2) an organism; he is also (3) an animal, with certain fundamental instincts; and he is (4) a man, with sundry human interests. But as organism he is something more than a physico-chemical system; as animal he is something more than an organism; as man he is something more than an animal. Still he is all of these; all at once; and all in delicate interrelations."(1) And all these aspects of the self must be taken into account. It is quite true that it is the human interests which make man characteristically man, and which are primary from the moral point of view. In him what may be termed spiritual values have become the true ends of life and have been superimposed upon the biological ends given in the instincts. But it must never be forgotten that such values are, from the psychological point of view, secondary creations which have their roots deep in original nature though they may seem, in their developed forms, far removed from it. Nor is there any loss involved in the frank recognition of this fact.

In the face of modern psychology no one can possibly deny the irrationality of much of human conduct. It is to a

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(1) Journal of Neurology and Psycho-patholoy, Nov. 1920.

very limited degree that reason governs the lives of average men and women; and the disillusionment which has resulted from the recognition of this fact is not at all to be regretted. But while it is a fact, there is no need to make it a norm. The moral to be drawn is, surely, that men should be as reasonable as they can, by effort, make themselves. Of all the psychologists who have been engaged in demonstrating the irrationality of human nature, those who have preserved a sense of proportion have ended by looking to reason as the characteristic feature of man, and to rationality as the ideal of individual and social life. As an ideal it has certainly not been shaken, though the extreme difficulty of achieving it has been demonstrated and its meaning considerably enlarged and enriched. It is now possible to see more clearly all that is really involved in reasoned living - to see that it involves the progressive organization, and not the denial of the life of feeling and impulse. Rivers has said that modern investigations seem to show that two things are needed if reason and sanity are to be achieved in human life: these are self-knowledge and courage: knowledge of the nature of the mind and all its conflicting elements and courage to face these and consciously to reduce them to order rather than to attempt to escape from them by repression. It is the growing richness and accuracy of self-knowledge which makes their rational ordering possible. Viewed very broadly the whole evolution of man may be regarded as a progressive growth in the degree and range of self-consciousness and so of the possibility of self-direction. It is increased self-consciousness which has brought to man all his moral problems, and it seems that it is only a still further increase of it that can solve them. Morals thus appears to return to the Socratic principle of self-knowledge, and of the close connection of knowledge and virtue. But it returns to it equipped with an

organized mass of new material drawn from different sources and gained by many new methods of investigation.

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

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