"PROBLEMS RAISED BY KANT'S TREATMENT OF THE SELF"

by

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C O N T E N T S.

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R E F E R E N C E S -

A - First Edition of the Critique of Pure Reason.

(Max Muller's Translation).

B - Second Edition.

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T H E S U B J E C T

..or..

S E L F IMPLIED IN KNOWLEDGE.

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The destructive criticism of David Hume which culminated in the denial of all real connecting principles in our experience, and in the reduction of the Self into the sum of its states, finds a striking contrast in the Kantial Theory of Knowledge, with its insistence upon the existence of a self as the foundation on which to construct the world presented to us in knowledge. Modern Idealists, with their emphasis on the importance of a due recognition of the self in any constructive theory of reality, draw their inspiration from the pre-eminent position assigned by Kant to the transcendental unity of apperception in his Theory of Knowledge. A due realisation of the duality of subject and object in each and every form of experience, a conception so fully emphasised by many a present-day philosopher, as, e.g. Dr. James Ward, was what really led to the Kantian transcendental method of proof of the validity of the presuppositions of knowledge. A subject-in-itself and an object-in-itself are meaningless terms. In and by themselves subject and object are of the nature of the abstract universal and the abstract particular respectively. What really exists is the individual experience, where subject and object, universal and particular, are indissolubly linked together. Experience in all its various forms always gives us a "subject in relation to an object." Outside of this fundamental

subject-object relation there is no self and no object of knowledge. Both mutually condition each other. Only in so far as the self goes out, as it were, to comprehend objects does there exist a self for us, whilst, on the other hand, only in so far as objects become objects-for-a-self do they acquire a meaning for us. Such in effect is the teaching of the Transcendental Deduction in the Critique, though, as we shall see later, Kant did not keep consistently to the implications of such a doctrine.

Hume had contended that in all his speculative endeavours his way was always barred by an insuperable difficulty - the existence of two fundamental principles which could not be renounced - viz, "that all our distinct perceptions are distinct existencies, and that the mind never perceives any real connection among distinct existencies." Knowledge, he maintained, is resolvable into events which are entirely loose and separate. As against such a view Kant contends that from mere units of sense as such knowledge can never arise. The sensational atomism of Hume, so far from explaining knowledge, renders it impossible. Embedded in experience in all its forms are certain fundamental connecting principles. Every object as known involves multitudinous references to other objects and to an identical subject or self. In fact, it is not too much to say that the whole aim of the Kantian Theory of Knowledge is to demonstrate the necessity of "synthesis" for all knowledge, and that such synthesis in turn presupposes the existence of an abiding self which forms the principle of connection of our various experiences. To vindicate the presence of such a self we must resort to a criticism of the nature of knowledge itself. Such an immanent criticism, which will lead to the discovery of the various elements

that constitute experience, requires its starting-point to be beyond dispute. Such a factual experience, as Prof. N.K. Smith points out,[1] is to be found in consciousness of Time alone, for Hume had already argued that the other two forms of consciousness, viz. consciousness of self and consciousness of objects, may be illusory, whereas consciousness of time in the form of change is beyond dispute.

Starting, therefore, with consciousness of time as an actual fact, Kant shows that this inevitably presupposes the presence of a self that retains its identity throughout the succession of its various experiences.

Now, it is clear, as Caird notes in his Commentary to the Critique, that there are two different aspects to Kant's account of knowledge, viz. the psychological, and the metaphysical or transcendental aspect. Starting with experience as actually existing, Kant analysis it with a view to discovering its various elements. Such a procedure is thoroughly justifiable, for all advance in knowledge depends on analysis and synthesis, but, unfortunately, such an analysis of the context of experience caused Kant to conceive the various elements as capable of existing, though doubtless in a modified form, apart from the unity wherein they are found in actual experience. He separates the contributions of sense and the contributions of the understanding, intuition and conception, and consequently he has to invent many artificial media to try and cement the contributions of these different faculties. Throughout the Critique this dualism of sense and thought is to be found side by side with a saner view of the mutual dependence of the various elements revealed in the critical analysis of

[1] Commentary to Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason,' p. 241.

knowledge. When Kant is developing the transcendental method to its logical outcome, as in the sections on the Paralogisms of Rational Psychology, the self is regarded simply as the principle of unity of the manifold; when, however, he is trying to trace the genesis of experience out of what is not experience, he conceives the mind or knowing self as existing in and by itself prior to all experince, and contributing its own share to experience when it is brought into relation with the object-in-itself. In the words of Caird, "Often he (i.e. Kant) makes as if he were constructing experience out of elements prior to experience, while he is really showing the elements of it to be so correlated, that the abstraction by which we isolate them necessarily destroys itself. And there is an unsolved contradiction between his result and his starting-point, because he never revised his first conception of the different faculties or elements of knowledge in the light of that unity which it was the final result of his work to demonstrate."[1] In this exposition that immediately follows, to avoid confusion, I shall confine attention to Kant's insistence on the necessity of the subject-object relation for experience; that is, I shall merely note Kant's teaching when he is consistently developing his transcendental method, deferring for subsequent discussion his treatment of the genesis of experience, where the self-conscious subject is conceived as playing an exaggerated rôle in the generation of objective experience.

SUBJECTIVE DEDUCTION.

In the Subjective Deduction of the categories as given in the first edition of the Critique, where he seeks to discover the subjective conditions necessary to the

[1] Caird, 'The Philosophy of Kant,' 1st. ed. p. 373.

possibility of knowledge, Kant uses an argument to establish the presence of the self which caused Mill to waver in his support of Associationism, and of which Green made such an effective use in his onslaught on the Empiricists. The argument in effect is that a series of feelings cannot possibly be aware of itself as a series. Experience or consciousness of change, argued Green,[1] involves consciousness of a related series, consciousness which must be equally present to each member of the series, and so such a consciousness cannot be a member of the series; neither is it a product of a previous series of events, of which, of course, there is no consciousness. Similarly, Kant argues, in the Subjective Deduction of the categories, that since our experiences occur in successive moments, to know that the elements have occurred in immediate succession, and as together making up a certain total, as, e.g. when we count the units that go to make up a certain group, the series of contents must be run through and held together before the mind. Such a synthesis, however, would be impossible without the reproduction in image of earlier contents, and the combination of these with the present datum. But reproduction in turn has its presupposition, viz. an abiding self, which is capable of recognising the reproduced contents as its own past experiences. "Without the consciousness that what we are thinking now is the same as what we thought a moment before, all reproduction in the series of representations would be in vain."[2] Kant's argument is very concisely expressed by Prichard as follows:- "If I am to count a group of five units, I must not only add them, but also be conscious of my continuously identical act of addition, this consciousness consisting in the consciousness that I am successively taking units up to, and

1. 'Prolegomena to Ethics' §§ 16 and 17.
2. A. § 103.

only up to, five, and being at the same time a consciousness that the units are acquiring the unity of being a group of five."[1] Thus consciousness ultimately presupposes an identical self, which is conscious of the identity of its action throughout the various synthetic processes upon whose presence the very possibility of consciousness depends. "The word concept could have suggested this remark, for it is the one consciousness which unites the manifold that has been perceived successively, and afterwards reproduced into one representation."[2] All knowledge, therefore, presupposes a self as a principle of unity of the manifold. The particulars of sense, on which Hume laid such emphasis, can no longer be viewed as in and by themselves constituting the world of knowledge. If they are to obtain any significance for us, they must be viewed as in essential relation to the unity of the self. Experience is made up of a multiplicity in unity, and apart from the unity the multiplicity cannot exist for knowledge.

OBJECTIVE Deduction.

This unity of the self, which is so essential to experience in all its forms, is further characterised by Kant in the Objective Deductions of both editions of the Critique, where he deals with the objective validity of knowledge. The Objective Deduction of the second edition in particular is very illuminating as regards the mutual dependence of subject and object. The reason for this is that here Kant is more concerned with the logical presuppositions of knowledge, and so the logical character of the self in knowledge receives more attention than in the Objective Deduction of the first edition. In the objective deductions we find the self characterised under various unwieldy names, but they supply a true indication of its real

1.'Kant's Theory of Knowledge.' pp. 174-5.
2. A. § 103.

nature and function. It is "the transcendental self","the transcendental apperception", "the pure ego", "the transcendental unity of apperception", "the synthetic unity of apperception" and "thetranscendental unity of self-consciousness." Kant sharply distinguishes it from what he calls the empirical unity of apperception, which is the object of knowledge when our thought is, as it were, turned inwards. Empirical self-consciousness itself ultimately depends upon the presence of the transcendental ego. The empirical states of the self are always transient. Consequently we cannot become conscious of a fixed or permanent self by any act of introspection. The empirical self is constantly undergoing change, and so reflection upon its successive states cannot give us consciousness of a self which is necessarily identical with itself throughout its representations. Even if its states did not change, its identity, as Prichard notes, would be only contingent; "it need not continue unchanged,"[1] and this falls short of what Kant claims for his transcendental self. The thinking subject cannot be known as an object of knowledge, and, therefore, proof of its existence can only take the form of a transcendental proof, viz. by showing that it is presupposed in all consciousness of objects. Analysis of our knowledge of objects does show the indispensableness of such a transcendental unity. No representation can acquire a meaning for us unless it be accompanied by the "I think" of self-consciousness, "for otherwise something would be represented within me that could not be thought, in other words, the representation would either be impossible or nothing, at least so far as I am concerned."[2] So indispensable is the self for knowledge that Kant calls the transcendental unity of apperception an <u>objective</u> unity, for it is the condition of

1. 'Kant's Theory of Knowledge.' p.139.
2. B. § 131.

our representations acquiring relation to objects. Consciousness in all its various forms can exist only as unitary consciousness. In its ultimate form it cannot be regarded as a mass of isolated particulars. The manifold must be reduced to systematic order in accordance with the conditions demanded by the unity of consciousness. Hume's associationist theory in explanation of the connection in experience is no longer tenable. Before ideas can be associated, we must become conscious of such ideas, and so association presupposes the existence of that consciousness which it attempts to explain. Before there can be an association of ideas, there must be a consciousness of those ideas, and so these ideas have already conformed to the conditions required for a unitary consciousmess. Mere co-existence of ideas is not enough for their association. They must occur together in consciousness, and so, before their association, they have been brought under the unity of the self. Association, therefore, cannot account for the unity of consciousness; rather does its very possibility presuppose such a unity. As Caird puts it, ".....when the psychologist applies the law of association to the genesis of mind, he is obliged to presuppose a fixed and definite world of objects acting under conditions of space and time upon the sensitive subject, in order by this means to explain how the ideas of the world and of himself may be awakened in that subject. And this is to suppose that the world exists, as it can exist only to mind, before the process whereby associations are produced."[1] This is what Kant means by his doctrine of the "objective affinity" of ideas. In becoming conscious of ideas they are regarded as in necessary connection

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1. Caird, 'The Philosophy of Kant', 1st ed. pp. 398-9.

with one another; they are apprehended as objective, and an object is a "necessitated combination of interconnected qualities or effects."[1] These ideas, therefore, have an objective connection or objective affinity, and it is this objective connection that renders possible the empirical association of ideas.

Therefore, the conditions of unitary consciousness are the conditions of all consciousness, and consequently knowledge can never arise unless there be an identical self which is related to each event as it appears in consciousness, and combines the series into a unity, which expresses itself through a concept on the side of the object, and subjectively in self-consciousness.

So far we have only shown that the object cannot exist except in ultimate connection with the subject. Kant, however, is fully alive to the mutual dependence of subject and object. If the object can exist only in relation to the subject, so the subject can exist only in so far as it is aware of objects. If the manifold of sense can exist for us only as unified, so the unity of the self exists only as the unity of the manifold. The self can become conscious of itself only in so far as it is active in the determination of objects. "Particulars exist only as a manifold referred through the categorised forms of time and space to the unity of the subject; and the subject exists only as the unity of the manifold whose central principle of connection it is."[2] This is the element of truth in the Human doctrine of the self. The reason for Hume's denial of the existence of a self was that he could not find an impression of the self apart from the sensations and images that constitute our empirical self. He thus taught that the self cannot exist outside its own states, that conscious states are needed to the life of the self. This mutual dependence of the self

1. Prof.F.K.Smith's "Commentary to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason."
2. Prof. Seth Pringle -Pattison in 'Hegelianism & Personality,' pp. 17-18.

and its states is all that the argument of the transcendental deduction of the categories justifies us in postulating. The self becomes conscious of itself only in so far as it unifies a mass of particulars. It exists as the unity of this manifold, and apart from the diversity in which it exists there is no unity. In Kantian language, the synthetical unity of the manifold is the ground of the analytic unity of apperception, that is, the pure ego considered in and by itself. In itself the unity of apperception is merely analytic or self-identical. It is an analytic preposition= I am I. The ego in itself contains no content. Nothing manifold is given through it. Consequently it cannot come to knowledge of itself in and by itself. It is only through combining the manifold of representations in one consciousness that the self becomes aware of its own identity, that is, that the self becomes a self at all. "Only because I am able to connect the manifold of given representations in one consciousness, is it possible for me to represent to myself the identity of the consciousness in these representations, that is, only under the supposition of some synthetical unity of apperception does the analytical unity of apperception become possible."[1]

I have purposely omitted many important points in Kant's doctrine of the self as given in the Deductions of the Categories. So far as he is true to the transcendental method of proof, his argument can justify no more than the mutual dependence of subject and object. He cannot, e.g.,

1. B. § 133.

speak of the subject as contributing the connecting principles of experience, and things in themselves as contributing the sensuous manifold. The deductions make this clear. Self-consciousness is regarded as conditioning consciousness of objects, and it is this consciousness of objects that generates self-consciousness. Consciousnes of self and consciousness of objects grow up, together and mutually condition each other. Only in so far as the unity of the self is present in them can the particulars of sense exist for consciousness, and only in so far as it combines these particulars can the unity of the self exist as such. In the language of Prof. Seth Pringle-Pattison, experience is an individual whole, and such an individual contains within itself the universal and the particular in indissoluble union. In and by themselves subject and object are empty abstractions. They are merely different aspects of the concrete whole in which they are united. "..... so far is it from being a figure of speech that the self exists only through the world and the world through the self, that we might say with equal truth the self is the world and the world is the self. The self and the world are only two sides of the same reality; they are the same intelligible world looked at from two opposite points of view."[1] Such in effect is all that the argument of the transcendental deduction of the categories justifies us in holding, though Kant did not hold consistently to the implications of such a doctrine.

In the light of what has been said above it is readily seen that, on the Kantian view, the very possibility of knowledge demands a self which preserves its identity

1. Prof. Seth Pringle-Pattison, 'Essays in Philosophical Criticism' p. 38.

throughout the succession of its various experiences. This conception of a subject or self as necessary for knowledge has been disputed by many prominent philosophers, as, e.g., Hume, Hartley, James Mill, William James, etc.. On the one hand, therefore, in view of the extreme emphasis laid by Kant on the importance of the self: and, on the other hand, in view of the position taken up by the Associationists and other philosophers, who deny the existence of such a self: it behoves us, before proceeding to deal with the consequences of Kant's separation of the self and its objects, to try and decide as to whether experience by its very nature implies a subject or self.

X

GENERAL CRITICISM OF KANT'S CONCEPTION OF THE NECESSITY OF A SUBJECT OR SELF FOR KNOWLEDGE.

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It has been well said that Thomas Hill Green showed a correct instinct in examining the nature of man before entering upon his properly ethical inquiry, as illustrated in his Prolegomena to Ethics. His metaphysical results were no doubt inadequate, yet the empasis he laid on the importance of a prior examination of human nature, with a view to showing the necessity of a Spiritual Principle for knowledge and morality, was justified, for, as Prof. Sorley says, "One must know what man is before one can say what his 'good' or his duty is." The ever-increasing success attending the application of mechanical principles had developed the tendency to explain the conscious subject and all that his consciousness implies in such a way as would harmonise with the conceptions of physical science. The idea of a continuous evolution possesses a strong fascination for the scientific mind, and not without reason. Human history and every-day observation appear to present us with a gradual evolution of the more simple into the more complex, and so the inference is readily drawn that fuller insight will reveal human consciousness itself as a physical fact, admitting of the same kind of explanation as other natural phenomena which admittedly fall within the province of physical science. Such a view strikes at the very heart of morality, and Green fully realised that, if the standpoint of worth or value was to retain its supremacy in human thought,

the inadequacy of the method of Scientific Naturalism to account for the facts of mind must first of all be exposed. The substance of his criticism is that knowledge by its very existence implies a subject or self, a subject that can never be regarded as a mere object, and which, therefore, constitutes a problem that can never be solved from the standpoint of physical science. Naturalists cannot admit the existence of a subject as distinguished from the mental phenomena to which they are presented. To them the individual mind is a mere series of mental phenomena which can be adequately determined by means of mechanical principles, and thus they imperil the very existence of morality. As against the naturalists, therefore, modern ethical writers strongly insist upon the reality of the self as the foundation of knowledge and morality alike. As Rashdall rrmarks in his 'Theory of Good and Evil,' if the self is regarded merely as a mass of isolated feelings or psychical atoms, or as a mere attribute or accident of the material organism, then morality is impossible.

I have prefaced the argument of this section with the above remarks because the advocates of a purely 'objective' treatment of human experience have almost invariably adopted a psychology of the Associationist or Sensational, or, as Ward names it, Presentational, type, consideration of which will form the point of departure of our investigation of the nature of human experience. Locke's researches had pavd the way for such atomistic theories of mind. Mediaeval Scholasticism had given wide currency to the conception of a soul-substance as alone capable of accounting for the intelligent agent and all that his intelligence implies.

Locke's examination of the human mind, however, had clearly shown that such a 'substance' was beyond the pale of science, whilst his newly-coined phrase "association of ideas" formed the genesis of subsequent 'Associationism'. Berkeley utilised this principle of association to account for the formation of percepts and higher states, and so enabled Hartley to present an elaborate theory of 'Associationism', which earned for him the title of 'founder of Modern Associationism.' According to this view association is the sole explanatory principle in psychology. This obviously presupposes that cognition is the one fundamental process of mind. Moreover, it presupposes the atomic view of consciousness- that cognition is in the last resort deducible into a certain number of simple mental units or sensations along with their reproductions. All other mental products are due to different combinations of these. The complex products are regarded as consisting of the sum of simple units, the combination itself not contributing any additional feature. Sensations or ideas which have existed together or in immediate sequence become permanently connected so that the recurrence of the one is followed by the revival of the other.

Some such atomic view of mind has been invariably presented by those expounders of evolutionary philosophy who regard biology merely as a branch of physics, and contend that no sharp line of distinction can be drawn between organic and inorganic beings. The mode of procedure adopted by these evolutionists to account for the existance of consciousness consists in a process of 'levelling downwards', so that states of consciousness

are resolved in the last resort into mere reduplications of material states. As psychologists, therefore, they embrace some form of 'psychological atomism' as lending itself more readily to treatment on purely mechanical lines. History, however, is a sufficient proof of the impossibility of a successful development of the naturalist theory. Had Mill and Huxley, for example, been consistent in their reasoning, they could never had recognised the cleft between nature and mankind which morality implies. Scientific Naturalism, consistently developed, reduces everything in the world into quantitative differences, and so must disappear that conception of worth or value on which present-day philosophers lay so much stress as the key to the final interpretation of the universe. Moreover, Helmholtz has pointed out that the conception of mechanical causation, upon whose universal validity Scientific Naturalism rests, has so far failed to account even for the qualitative differences in nature. It can only account for the quantitative changes. Much less can it, therefore, account for those differences in consciousness which are essentially qualitative in character.

Conscious, therefore, of these difficulties, many evolutionary writers have contended for the presence of consciousness even at the very dawn of the evolutionary process. We are not here directly interested in the various attempts that have been made to bridge the chasm that is conceived as existing between body and mind. Sufficient it is for our purpose that these writers embrace the atomic view of mind. However much their theories may vary in detail, whether they embrace the 'Mind-stuff' theory, the 'Mind-dust' theory, or Associationism strictly so called, yet they are at one in maintaining that our mental states

are compounds formed by the combination in various ways of more simple and ultimate constituents of consciousness. Herbert Spencer believed in the existence of a "single primordial element of consciousness", which he called a 'nervous shock' (i.e. a mental shock), and the unlikenesses among our existing sensations he attributes to 'unlikenesses among the modes of aggregation' of this unit of consciousness. "There may be a single primordial element of consciousness, and the countless kinds of consciousness may be produced by the compounding of this element with itself and the recompounding of its compounds with one another in higher and higher degrees: so producing increased multiplicity, variety and complexity."[1]

Those writers, therefore, who embrace an atomic view of mind are at one in contending "that our mental states are composite in structure, made up of smaller states conjoined."[2] Ignoring or denying the subject - object relation required for all experience, they attempt to explain mental development as due to the interaction of mental units or atoms. These alone are regarded as primordial. The radical weakness of these and kindred theories is that they ignore the essential characteristic of mental facts as necessarily implying a subject. Every mental process or fact from its very nature implies a subject for which it exists. As Ward puts it, ".....whether seeking to analyse one's own consciousness or to infer that of a lobster, whether discussing the association of ideas or the expression of emotions, there is always an individual self or 'subject' in question."[3] But, continues Ward, in spite of its obviousness, this conception of the mind "has been

1. Spencer's 'Principles of Psychology.' § 60.
2. James, 'Principles of Psychology.' p. 145.
3. 'Psychological Principles.' p. 35.

forgotten among details or through the assumption of a medley of faculties, each of them treated as an individual in turn, so that among them the real individual was lost. Or it has been gainsaid, because to assert that all psychologocal facts pertain to an experiencing subject or experiment was supposed to imply that they pertained to a particular spiritual substance, which was simple, indestructible, and so forth;" and psychology as a science must exclude such an assumption which is not experientally verifiable. Indeed the history of philosophy shows that most of the arguments brought forward against the notion of a subject or self are really directed against the notion of a spiritual substance in which mental facts inhere as attributes. It was his failure to come across such an entity as distinct from our particular experiences that really led Hume to his destructive analysis of the human mind. He misinterpreted the proper character of the subject or self as the correlate and unifying principle of all our various experiences. Instead he looked for a particular perception of the self, for some object in addition to and of the same nature as the other mental phenomena, and of course his search was in vain. It was his failure to produce the impression corresponding to such an idea of self, which according to him is the sole criterion of reality, that made him maintain that the idea of a self is absolutely illusory. As a result of this he reduced the self into a complex of ideas, or into the sum of its states. The notion of personal identity, therefore, he regarded as a mere illusion, and could be explained as due to the same propensity of the imagination as produced the notion of material substance. Mankind, he affirms in the Appendix to

Book 1 of his 'Treatise of Human Nature', "are nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions." "All our distinct perceptions are distinct existencies, and the mind never perceives any real connection among distinct existencies. Did our perceptions either inhere in something simple or individual, or did the mind perceive some real connection among them, there would be no difficulty in the case." In his chapter on 'Personal Identity' he writes, "If any impression gives rise to the idea of Self, that impression must continue invariably the same through the whole course of our lives, since self is supposed to exist after that manner." But, he continues, such an impression is nowhere to be found. "For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble or some particular perception or other of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I can never catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the perception." The idea of personal identity, therefore, according to Hume, arises "entirely from the smooth and uninterrupted progress of the thought along a train of connected ideas." The imagination is conveyed from one link to another, and from this the transition is easy to "some fiction or imaginary principle of union." The semblance of connection in our inner life, therefore, is traced by Hume to the principle of association, and thus gave rise to the "Associationism" of Hartley and James Mill. We shall now proceed to a criticism of these associationists and similar theories that seek to ignore or dispense with the necessity of a 'Subject' or 'Self' to account for our experience.

The fundamental assumption of these theories, therefore, is that the nature of a mature consciousness can be

explained as made up of separate units of feeling. Mental development is conceived as consisting in the combination of certain simple and ultimate constituents of consciousness. Complex mental products, on this view, are mere compounds, consisting of the sum of simple units. Against this 'compounding' or 'association' of distinct 'ideas' or feelings as an explanation of the higher form of consciousness we can at the outset urge with James[1] that we cannot mix two distinct feelings so as to obtain from the mixture a third feeling distinct from them. We can simply mix the objects we feel, "and from their mixture get new feelings." So far is it, says James, from being true that we can mix feelings, that a close inspection of the facts of mind will reveal the impossibility even of having two feelings in our mind at once. Continuing with his criticism of the 'Mind-stuff' theory, James notes that the theory of mental units 'compounding with themselves' or being 'associated' into a unity is logically unintelligible, for "all the 'combinations' which we actually know are effects, wrought by the units said to be 'combined' upon some entity other then themselves."[2] To say that an idea of A plus an idea of B is an idea of A + B is, he remarks, "like saying that the mathematical square of A plus that of B is equal to the square of A + B, a palpable untruth. Idea of A + idea of B is not identical with idea of (A + B). It is one, they are two; in it, what knows A also knows B; in them, what knows A is expressly posited as not knowing B; &c. In short, the two separate ideas can never by any logic be made to figure as one and the same thing as the 'associated' idea."[3] There is no doubt that James has here laid his finger on a weak spot in the associationist Philosophy. So long as consciousness is regarded as a mere series of feelings, consciousness of a

1. 'Principles of Philosophy.' p. 157.
2. Ibid. p. 158.
3. Ibid. p. 161.

'compounded' idea is impossible. "Take a sentence of a dozen words, and take twelve men and tell to each one word. Then stand the men in a row or jam them in a bunch, and let each think of his word as intently as he will; nowhere will there be a consciousness of the whole sentence."[1] This is the point on which Kant lays so much stress in the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories. To be aware of a series as a series presupposes an identical self to which each member of the series is presented. The mere occurrence of feelings is not, as Spencer assumed, the same as the consciousness of their occurrence. To have the consciousness of a series we must be able to distinguish them at least in respect of time, and this implies that we have a consciousness of a universal and necessary relation. viz. that of time. Every object as known is known only in distinction from and in relation to other objects. Knowledge of an object, therefore, would be impossible if consciousness were confined entirely to each distinct and separate feeling as it comes and goes. If the existence of consciousness is to be admitted, therefore, the series of feelings must be regarded merely as moments in the life of an identical self, whose universalising activity enables it to grasp together a whole world of objects. The world, says Dr. Bosanquet, is my idea. It is a mental construction out of what comes to the self piece by piece, and Kant showed quite conclusively that a single world is impossible for us unless our successive experiences are regarded as but moments in the life of a continuously existing self. Experience, he is never weary of emphasising, is essentially a systematic whole or unity. It is permeated through and through with connecting principles The object is a "necessitated combination of interconnected qualities or effects." Hence he felt compelled to

1. James, 'Principles of Psychology' p. 160.

postulate an identical self to account for the unity of experience. Though we cannot follow Kant in assigning all relations to the self, yet his emphasis on the transcendental unity of apperception is to be welcomed as showing the inadequacy of any 'associationist' theory to account for the complexity of our mental life. The mere 'adding together' of atomic particulars can never explain what actually takes place in human experience. Apart from the universal, which the associationists cannot recognise, the higher forms of consciousness are inexplicable. Indeed, without the universal the laws of association themselves cannot operate. If A and B are merely isolated atoms there is no reason why they should become associated merely because they happen together. Association by contiguity becomes intelligible only in so far as two events that happen together constitute some kind of a whole. The experience of the moment leaves behind a total disposition, and when part of this disposition recurs it tends to revive the whole. This explanation is not possible for the associationists, for they do not recognise that A and B form a whole at all. They are merely separate atoms. Moreover, even if an association between mere particulars were possible, it would be of no use, for neither of the particulars can ever recur again. The doctrine of relative suggestion clearly proves this. A thin column of smoke calls up a small fire, whereas a thick column of smoke will call up a big fire; hence Bradley's statement - "Association marries only Universals." Association exists between the universal contents of our ideas, and not between one particular mental occurrence and another. If in the past we have experienced various green apples as sour, the association is between the colour in general and the taste in

general, so that the present green apple will call up a correspondingly sour taste. This implies that there is a constructive element as well as a reproductive element in all the so-called revival.

In his 'Analytic Psychology' Dr. Stout criticises the associationist theory on the ground that it fails to recognise the apprehension of a form of combination as distinct from the apprehension of mere particulars, and also in that it makes no allowance for the transformation that mental elements necessarily undergo in entering into new combinations. Moreover, he points out that themere combination of pre-existing elements cannot account for the novelty of a mental construction. Such states as reverie may perhaps be satisfactorily explained from the standpoint of association, but processes of systematic thought involve an 'implicit apprehension' of the form of a whole which exercises control over the ideas which emerge. This implicit apprehension tends to pass over to explicit apprehension. This is what is implied in the term schematic apprehension i.e., the process by which the implicit cognition of a whole determines the successive emergence of the parts into consciousness. On this view, therefore, every new synthesis that arises in consciousness will be the result, not of combining together distinct elements, as the associationists maintain, but rather of distinguishing and defining the parts and relations within a prior whole. This implicit apprehension of a whole is clearly seen in the case of simple perception. As Stout says, to recognise anything as such or such implies a reference to something beyond the given object. We

recognise the object as an instance of something which may have other instances, and "the word 'other' implies a reference beyond this particular object, a reference to a whole of which the presented particular is a constituent part."

The same inadequacy of association may be shown from a slightly different view. All cognition involves reference to an object. Stout uses the term 'noetic synthesis' to denote the synthesis which is involved in the reference of a number of presentations to the same object. We have noetic synthesis in so far as the emergence of ideas is controlled by the apprehension of the subject or topic or object. It involves the presence of implicit apprehension and the working of schematic apprehension, and the elements are always brought together as members of a whole and not as determined by chance experience.

In his 'Psychological Principles' Dr. James Ward shows that the associationists really invert the true order of mental development. We do not start with separate and distinct sensations and then combine them into a whole or unity. What is presented to us at the beginning is a total presentation-continuum in which all differences are latent. Mental life develops by the gradual differentiation of what is originally a continuous whole, and when differences emerge in this whole as when different sensations appear they do not lose their connection with the whole.

A consistent associationist theory, therefore, proving inadequate to account for our mental life, psychologists have felt compelled to introduce a 'self' as that which alone can render explicable the uniqueness that characterises the facts of mind. Indeed, many writers

who adopt the fundamental principles of modern associationism have been forced to acknowledge openly the necessity of something like a self possessing a certain persistence. The associationist D.G.Thompson[1] candidly admitted that conscious states imply and postulate a subject Ego, whilst J.S. Mill was driven under the stress of his logic to adopt a position which is scarcely distinguishable from the spiritualism of Mediaeval Scholasticism. According to Mill there is something real in the 'inexplicable tie' which memory implies, something which is not the arbitrary creation of the laws of thought. This something to which Mill is ready to ascribe a reality he names the Ego, or Self. "We are forced to apprehend every part of the series as linked with the other parts by something in common which is not the feelings themselves, any more than the succession of the feelings is the feelings themselves.....".[2] The Self, therefore, is a permanent element. "But beyond this we can affirm nothing of it except the states of consciousness themselves. The feelings or consciousness which belong or have belonged to it, and its possibilities of having more, are the only facts there are to be asserted of Self - the only possible attributes, except permanence, which we can ascribe to it."[3] In the chapter[4] on the 'Psychological Theory of Mind' in his 'Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy' he affirms that if we are to account for our existing consciousness we are compelled to accept either of two alternatives -" .....that the mind, or Ego, is something different from any series of feelings, or possibilities of them, or of accepting the paradox that something which ex hypothesi is but a series of feelings, can be aware of itself as a series."

1. Cited by James, 'Principles of Psychology.'
2. Mill's 'Examination of Sir. W.Hamilton's Philosophy.' 4th ed. p. 263.
3. Ibid. p. 263.
4. Ch. XII.

Commenting on this latter alternative Ward remarks that "paradox is too mild a word for it; even contradiction will hardly suffice."[1] 'Being aware of' cannot be expressed by one term. The knower can never be identified with the known. "If a series of 'feelings' is what is known or presented, then what knows, what the series is presented to, cannot be itself that series of feelings....."[2] There is no thought without a thinker, no knowledge without a knower. "A mere sensation without a subject is nowhere to be met with as a fact."[3] Agent and object can never be the same in the same act. In his 'Prolegomena to Ethics' Green writes,[4] "No one and no number of a series of related events can be the consciousness of the series as related. Nor can any product of the series be so either.....(Consciousness of a series of events) must be equally present to all the events of which it is the consciousness." Nor can this consciousness be a product of previous events, for this only involves an Infinite Regress or else the inconceivable idea that consciousness in the first instance resulted from a series of events of which there is no consciousness.

Similarly Seth. Pringle-Pattison on page 11 of 'Hegelianism and Personality' writes, "A knowledge of sequent states is only possible when each is accompanied by the 'I think' of an identical apperception. Or as it has been otherwise expressed, there is all the difference in the world between succession and consciousness of succession, between change and consciousness of change. Mere change, or mere succession, if such a thing were possible, would be, as Kant points out, first A, then B, then C, each filling out existence for the time being, and constituting its sum, then vanishing tracelessly

1. 'Psychological Principles.' p. 37.
2. Ibid. p. 37.
3. Lotze, 'Metaphysic' Bk. 3. par.241.
4. pars. 16 and 17.

to give place to its successor - to a successor which yet would not be a successor, seeing that no record of its predecessor would remain. The change, the succession, the series can only be known to a consciousness or subject which is not identical with any one member of the series, but is present equally to every member, and identical with itself throughout. Connexion or relatedness of any sort - even Hume's association - is possible only through the presence of such a unity to each term of the relation." The comparison of two ideas, says Lotze in his Metaphysic (Bk. 3.par.241), "presupposes the absolutely indivisible unity of that which compares them," and he concludes that "the inner world of thoughts is not a mere collection of manifold ideas, existing with or after one another, but a world in which these individual members are held together and arranged by the relating activity of a single pervading principle. "

Neither can we dispense with the subject by holding that each member of the series is subject and object in turn. William James's famous theory of the 'Passing Thought' comes under this head. "Each pulse of cognitive consciousness, each thought, dies away and is replaced by another. The other, among the things it knows, knows its own predecessor, and finding it 'warm' ..... greets it, saying; 'Thou art mine and part of the same self with me.' Each later Thought, knowing and including thus the Thoughts which went before, is the final receptacle - and appropriating them is the final owner - of all that they contain and own. Each Thought is thus born an owner and dies owned, transmitting whatever it realised in its self to its own later proprietor... It is this trick which the nascent thought has of immediately taking up the expiring thought and 'adopting' it, which is the foundation

of the appropriation of most of the remoter constitutents of the self. Who owns the last self owns the self before the last, for what possesses the possessor possesses the possessed."[1] James, therefore, attempts to resolve the knower into the known. That 'the thoughts themselves are the thinkers' he regards as the 'final word' of psychology concerning the self. In criticising this theory of James, Ward writes, "If I were to say to a child: It is the spoon that eats the porridge, and the fork that eats the meat, he would be puzzled; and still more puzzled if I were to add: But, of course, it's you that eat the breakfast. If anyone were to say : The poems themselves are the poet, or the laws themselves are the legislators, we should confidently declare such statements nonsensical. In what respect is this 'final word: the thought themselves are the thinkers' formally different?"[2] Ultimately James's theory is open to the same objections as that of Hume. In the 'Principles of Psychology' James notes that the associationists have a tendency of smuggling in surreptitiously the self which they profess to discard. It is hard to see how James himself does not fall under this condemnation, especially in the account he gives of the 'judgment' of Personal Identity. Actual human consciousness is too great a problem for the 'Passing Thought' to solve.

Prof. Titchener also argues against the existence of an identical self, and writes, "Mind splits up into consciousnesses. A consciousness is a mental present.....a bit of mind that is occupied with a single, however complicated, topic. Thus to put the matter crudely we begin the day with a getting-up consciousness : that is followed by a breakfast consciousness....etc."[3] In reply to this

1. James, 'Principles of Psychology,' pp. 339-40.
2. 'Mind (1892).' p. 537.
3. Quoted by Laird, 'Problems of the Self.' p.40

contention of Titchener, Prof. Laird asks, "But who are the 'we' who began the day, and does not the phrase 'a bit of mind' itself imply that very soul which Prof. Titchener is so anxious to ignore?"[1] In truth, consideration of the associationist and kindred theories will reveal the immpossibility of denying the existance of a self without at the same time assuming it. If these writers so not openly acknowledge the self, they at least assume its existence. As Ward puts it, "...however much assailed or disowned, the concept of a 'self' or conscious subject is to be found implicitly in all psychological writers whatever - not more in Berkeley, who accepts it as a fact, than in Hume, who treats it as a fiction."[2] Hume assumes the existance of the self in the very process by which he seeks to explain it away. Who is the "I" that looks into Hume's own mind and perceives a sensation or an image? It surely cannot itself be a sensation or an image. Thus he postulates a permanent self which reviews the perceptions of the mind, and for which they exist and are associated. It is significant also, as Prof. Seth.Pringle-Pattison notes, that Hume's destructive analysis of the self is to be found only at the end of his Treatise. It was easier for him to analyse the material world into ideas from the standpoint of self, for when the self was abolished nothing remained but mere ideas.

Rejecting the associationist and kindred theories, therefore, we shall willingly follow Descartes' lead, and say that the reality of the self is our foundation of Truth. Our first contact with reality is within, and this

1. ~~Quoted by~~ Laird, 'Problems of the Self.' p. 40.
2. 'Psychological Principles.' p. 35.

reality of ourselves makes it possible for us to predicate reality of the external world. All knowledge depends upon the reality of the self. If the self that knows is not real, then we cannot establish existence in any form. The reality and trustworthiness of our experience depend upon the reality of the self. This reality of ourselves is manifested not only in Thought, but also in Feeling and Will. Indeed, many present-day philosophers would give the primacy to the Will as the revealer of the self's reality. Prof. Seth Pringle-Pattison, e.g., would emend Descartes' formula into 'Ago, ergo sum.' The self, according to him, manifests its reality in its activity. But, in whatever way it is revealed to us, the tendency of present-day philosophy is to emphasise the necessity of a self or conscious subject to account for our experience. ".....without the assumption of a soul as a unifying and integrating subject of experience its parts fall into fragments and its world of content becomes chaotic." The problem of knowledge becomes "impossible and absurd" unless we assume a soul. "For the only point of view from which a cognitive experience can be conceived as possible is that of the subject of experience itself.....knowledge cannot arise in experience except as a function of a personal and persistent self."[1]

Since the time of Kant the concept of experience has formed the starting-point of most philosophical systems, and experience, says Ward, implies the duality of subject and object. The subject-object relation is fundamental for all experience. Experience is not simply a series of mental phenomena. It is essentially a unity, and something is required to account for this unity, viz. the synthetic activity of the self or conscious subject. In every mode of consciousness this reference of an object to a subject is

1. Ormond, 'Foundations of Knowledge' p. 266.

implied. Unlike Bradley, he insists that no experience, however high or however low, is possible apart from this distinction of subject and object. Even the experience of God involves this duality in unity. Ormond, in his 'Foundations of Knowledge' emphasises the same view. "Without the presupposition of some kind of duality, the very notion of consciousness loses its intelligibility." In the most rudimentary states of consciousness "some duality is involved out of which the full-fledged distinction of subject and object gradually emerges."[1] Ward, of course, would not say that this relation is a conscious relation at all levels of consciousness, but Hamilton in his 'Lectures on Metaphysics' would even accept that. "We may lay down as an undisputed truth, that consciousness gives, as an ultimate fact, a primitive duality: a knowledge of the ego in relation and contrast to the non-ego; and the knowledge of the non-ego in relation and contrast to the ego. The ego and non-ego are thus given in an original synthesis."[2] Now it is clear that consciousness of the subject-object relation is by no means primordial in character. It evidently presupposes a long process of mental evolution. This, however, cannot, as Bradley appears to think, be urged against Ward, who maintains that the absence of self-consciousness is no proof of the absence of a self.

Bradley denies the underivative character of the subject-object relation, and conceives of a pre-relational stage of experience which he designates as 'feeling'. This state he describes as "the immediate unity of a finite psychical centre." It is "the general condition before distinctions and relations have been developed, and where as yet neither any subject nor object exists. And it means in the second place, anything which is present at any stage of mental life, in so far as that is only present and simply is."[3]

1. p. 33.
2. Vol. 1. p. 292.
3. 'Appearance and Reality' p. 459.

As a "very obvious instance" of this primitive experience, he mentions "a simple pain or pleasure, or again those elements of our Coenesthesia to which we do not attend." Commenting on this passage, Dr. G. Dawes Hicks says, "An original sensuous ἄπειρον, psychical in character, which in some mysterious way is felt, and out of which, through articulation, knowledge of intelligible fact emerges, is a notion, I confess, which I have vainly struggled to grasp; it strikes me rather as a conundrum than as the solution of a problem."[1] Bradley's position is based on the assumption that if we are not conscious of a thing, then it does not exist. Thus, since a rudimentary consciousness is not aware of activity, he thinks that primitive consciousness is not an apprehending activity, but a 'mass of feeling.' "The perception of activity," he says, "comes from the expansion of the self against the not-self." Consciousness of activity as implying the idea of change is possible only after a long process of mental development. The same is true of the subject-object relation. It is not primary, but derivative. All this, however, says Ward, is based on a mistaken assumption. Before we can apprehend anything it must exist. Though a relation may not for a time be actual for us, yet it must exist before it can ever be apprehended. "Two and two simply are not four, but they are the ground of putting two and two together. So mental activity that is 'only present and simply is' is not the apprehension of an agent acting, but it is the ground that makes such apprehension possible and is besides its necessary presupposition."[2] Again, Ward asks, "....what gives a mass of feeling' unity and a centre in the absence of a subject,

1. 'Proceedings of the Aristotleian Society (1907-08).' p. 186.
2. Ibid. p. 233.

and what exactly does 'mental life' imply? Relations and distinctions do not constitute their terms or fundaments, how, then, could they be developed in the absence of these?"[1] Dealing with the conception of a purely Anoetic Consciousness in his 'Analytic Psychology' Stout says that a process of differentiation and complication cannot give rise to thought out of mere sentience. A "more complex and differentiated sentience" would be the only result of this. "Objective reference supervening on purely anoetic experience would be a completely new psychical fact." It is erroneous, he remarks, to think that ~~that~~ the distinction between subject and object can emerge out of "mere feeling" through special constituents of the total sentience acquiring salience and prominence. "This can only mean that special sensations are intensified out of proportion to therest. But an intensified sensation is merely a sensation intensified, and not, eo ipso, the perception of an object."

It is undoubtedly true, as Dr. G. Dawes Hicks notes, that as we descend from the higher to the lower forms of conscious life there is a corresponding loss of "qualitative definiteness and distinctness in sense-contents of any kind." Moreover, it is true that "confusedness" and "absence of individuality" are "characteristics especially of pleasure and pain." This, however, cannot justify us in holding that the three modes of mature consciousness are ultimately merged in one mode, viz. feeling. Feeling, as a mode of mature consciousness, has its own special characteristics due to a long process of mental evolution. We must rather believe that the three modes never lose their identity completely.

1. 'Proceedings of the Aristotleian Society (1907-08).' p. 233.
2. Ibid. p. 186.

"What we are entitled to assume in the case of the rudimentary consciousness is that, whilst its modes of being would be wrongly designated by any one of these general titles (i.e. cognition, feeling and striving), they contain in themselves the roots from which the three diverging stems take their rise. In the primitive consciousness there must be the germs of those lines of activity through which later distinct sense-contents are apprehended, feelings experienced, and definite movements executed."[1] Dr. Hicks, however, would demur to characterising the relation between a primitive consciousness and a real object as the subject-object relation of mature consciousness, because, believing that "relations are grounded in the nature of their terms," he concludes that the relation between a self-conscious mind and its object is characteristically different from the relation subsisting between a mind that is not self-conscious and its object, and he would reserve the title "subject-object relation" for the former.

The result of our discussion, therefore, is to uphold the Kantian analysis of experience into a subject in relation to an object. Examination of the theories that seek to dispense with the subject has only shown the more clearly the need of such a subject to account for experience in each and every form. Consciousness is impossible apart from the synthetic activity of the self. "That which I see, that which I hear, that which I think, that which I feel, changes and passes away with each moment of my varied existence. I, who see and hear and think and feel, am the one continuous self, whose existence gives unity and connexion to the whole."[2] So unassailable is the conscious subject that we cannot deny, without at the same time asserting, its

1. Dr. G.Dawes Hicks in 'Proceedings of the Aristotleian Society (1907-08).' p. 188.
2. Mansel, 'Bampton Lectures.' Lecture 3.

existence. This is the inexpugnable fact which formed the point of departure of modern philosophy in Descartes. The celebrated Cartesian Doubt found an insurmountable barrier in the certitude of the individual's own existence. Tradition and belief fell away before the sceptic's might; the self alone withstood the shock of doubt. In short, deny the reality of the self, and human life will be no more substantial than a dream.

This insistence on the reality of the self does not, however, mean that every conscious being is self-conscious, or that in our thinking we are always conscious of self. Some philosophers have contended that all consciousness is self-consciousness, for otherwise we should be involved in an indefinite regress. This, however, is not a fatal objection to our holding that, e.g. to feel and to know that we feel are two different states. As Ward says, "If it were impossible to feel without also knowing that you feel or to know without also knowing that you know, and if further this so-called regress really meant not progress in experience but antecedent conditions of its existence, the objection would be serious."[1] So far is this, however, from being the case that we can truly say that we are conscious before we become self-conscious. As Laird puts it,[2] "To know is the prius of knowing that you know. Cognition does not logically depend upon self-cognition, nor one act of self-cognition upon the next." "Self-ness", says McTaggart,[3] does not involve self-consciousness," for otherwise each of must be said to gain and lose the right to the name of self many times a day, since we are often not self-conscious. It appears obvious that we can be conscious of external

1. 'Psychological Principles.' p. 372 N3.
2. 'Problems of the Self.'
3. Article,"Personality" in 'Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics.' Vol.9.

objects without being conscious of ourselves. It is no answer to this contention to maintain that self-consciousness and consciousness are always to be found together, but that the self-consciousness is so faint as to escape observation when we describe our experience, for, as McTaggart very truly remarks, if there is no direct evidence of this self-consciousness why believe that it exists. Indeed, the more we are absorbed in external objects the less is the reference to the self. As Lotze says, "..... everyone is familiar with that absorption in the content of a sensuous perception which often makes us entirely forget our personality in view of it."[1] The consciousness of self is in fact a hindrance to the most profound and successful thinking, whilst beings who have not reached the level of self-consciousness cannot become conscious of their selves at all. The result yielded by our whole discussion, therefore, is not that every conscious being is always and necessarily self-conscious, but rather that every mental fact implies, by its very nature, reference to a subject for which it exists. As Ward puts it, "..... whether seeking to analyse one's own consciousness or to infer that of a lobster, whether discussing the association of ideas or the expression of emotions, there is always an individual self or subject in question."[2] We do not as yet make any assertions concerning the nature of this self or subject. That question will meet us later. Here we merely emphasise the necessity of a self for experience. This is the great truth to be found in the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories in the Critique of Pure Reason, but Kant went further and assigned an exaggerated rôle to the self in the construction of the world as revealed to us in

1. 'Metaphysic' Bk. 3. par. 241.
2. 'Psychological Principles.' p. 35.

knowledge. The self is conceived as building up a unified experience out of a disconnected manifold given through sense. This view of the self will form the next subject for discussion.

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THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE SELF IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE WORLD OF KNOWLEDGE.

As we have already noted in dealing with the subject-object relation in knowledge, so long as Kant is consistent with the immanent criticism of the transcendental method, the question of the special contributions of the Self in and by itself can never arise. Once we start speaking about a subject-in-itself and an object-in-itself we have transcended the bounds of knowledge, and consequently no assertions whatsoever can be predicated of such abstractions. It is only as conscious subjects that the world has any significance for us, and for such subjects experience is a finished product in the sense that it is already a unified experience. Consequently the activities generative of such an experience cannot be assigned to one of its elements which can only be conceived in abstraction apart from the unified whole wherein it derives its meaning and sustenance. To separate the terms of the subject-object relation and talk of them as if they could exist in and by themselves cannot be justified on transcendental principles. This, however, in effect is what Kant does when he insists that the matter of all experience is given us from without by the action of things in themselves upon the Subject's sensibility, whereas the form is derived from the self's own apprehending nature. Kant's real problem in the Critique is to discover the logical presuppositions of knowledge and thereby show their mutual dependence, but Kant never fully realised the implications of the argument he is developing, and so he is at times deserting the immanent point of view and giving an account of the genesis of experience out of what is not experience.

As Caird puts it, when Kant is asking how far experience can be produced out of sense and understanding, he seemed to take the position of a spectator with an already developed mind watching the growth of another mind out of its elements. "He seemed to forget for the moment that it was his own mind he was examining; and, therefore, he gave to a process which is really the exhibition of the necessary relations of all the elements of developed knowledge, the false appearance of an observation of the genesis of knowledge."[1] But, Caird continues, "observation of the genesis of knowledge or, what is the same thing, observation by the mind of its own genesis, is the crowning absurdity of speculation...."[2] ("We) cannot possibly trace back knowledge to faculties or elements, which have a character independent of their relation <u>in</u> knowledge. We have no standing ground outside of the universe of thought from which we can determine the factors that produce it."[3] Though Kant, therefore, realised that experience is a duality in unity, yet he did not clearly see the nature of the relation that subsists between the various elements within this unity. He did not realise that these elements are mere abstractions outside of that relation wherein they are found in experience. Sense and understanding are regarded as faculties capable of pre-existing in and by themselves before they are <u>brought</u> into relation in knowledge. If, therefore, we are to find our way through the labyrinth of the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories as given in the Analytic we must bear in mind these two different aspects of Kant's arguments, viz. the psychological, and the metaphysical or transcendental aspect respectively, and that Kant treats of both alternatively without giving us any warning of a change of standpoint. This supplies the key to Kant's vacillating attitude towards the self in the Transcendental Deduction. When he is criticising

1. Caird, 'The Philosophy of Kant'. 1st ed. pp 273-4.
2. Ibid. p. 374.
3. Ibid. p. 274.

knowledge from the inside the mutual dependence of subject and object is fully acknowledged, but when he criticises it from the outside, the subject is now conceived as capable of existing in and by itself, and as contributing its own share for the generation of experience after being brought into relation with things in themselves. As Prof. Seth Pringle-Pattison puts it, "It is obvious that while Kant investigates the logical presuppositions of knowledge or experience (finding them in the transcendental unity of apperception, the categories and the forms of space and time as applied to a sensuous matter), this knowledge is always for him the knowledge by a real being of a world of real beings; and therefore it has its real presuppositions in the existence of the noumenal self and of what he calls things in themselves."[1] If we concentrate attention on the transcendental aspect of Kant's argument, we have no right to postulate the existence of a noumenal self and to attribute to it the connecting principles required for knowledge. This is clearly shown by Kant himself in the sections on the Paralogisms of Rational Psychology as given in the Dialetic. The teaching of various passages in the Transcendental Deduction, however, is not so fully developed as that of the Dialetic, and besides, even when Kant had come to realise the negative conclusions to be drawn from his critical standpoint, his personal convictions still clung to many tenets utterly at variance with his genuinely critical teaching. Prof. N.K. Smith notes the ambiguity of Kant's statements in the Transcendental Deduction as regards the "syntheses" required for knowledge, but he contends that Kant was feeling his way towards an account of these "syntheses" as would be consistent

1.'Hegelianism and Personality,' p. 21.n.

with his transcendentalism, Dr. Smith maintains that there are two tendencies running through the entire body of the Critique, viz. the "subjectivist" and the " phenomenalist" tendency respectively. When the former tendency is in the ascendant the world is constructed out of a manifold consisting of the sensations of the special senses, whilst it is the knowing self through its own conscious activities that combines the manifold. Dr. Smith fully admits that on this view "the world in space is merely my representation," but he contends that there are passages in the Critique which are absolutely opposed to this doctrine, and he thinks that these passages are sufficiently illuminating to enable the commentator to build up an elaborate system of "phenomenalism" such as we find in his own Commentary, If it is true, Prof. Smith argues, that there is no consciousness apart from self-consciousness and such self-consciousness is possible only after the synthetic processes generative of experience have already completed themselves, then we cannot claim that we have a consciousness of these processes. The processes themselves must be non-conscious, and so we cannot say that they are the activities of a noumenal <u>self</u>. We cannot even say that they are mental. The noumenal conditions of the self of which we are conscious are, therefore, completely unknown. The same holds true of the noumenal conditions of bodies in space. They are entirely beyond the reach of knowledge. Now, the noumenal conditions of bodies in space affect those noumenal conditions of the self which constitute our "sensibility", and generate"a given manifold." The other aspect of experience, viz. its <u>form</u> is contributed by the noumenal conditions of the self.

It will be readily seen, therefore, that the process of constructing experience takes place entirely without our knowledge and apart from any conscious assistance on our part. So the world obtains a relative independence. The individual self is no longer viewed as constructing the world in space and time by combining subjective sensations in accordance with certain fundamental principles. The empirical world has been constructed by the unknown noumenal conditions of the self and the world, so that, when we become conscious of it, it is presented to us as an already finished product, and the problem for us now is not how subjective representations are referred to objects through the conscious activities of the individual self, but how, if a common world is alone immediately apprehended, the inner private life of the self-conscious being can be possible, and how such inner experience is to be interpreted."[1] Now I am far from minimising the significance of various "phneomenalist" passages in the Critique, but still Prof. Smith appears to emphasise Kant's "phenomenalism" too much at the expense of his "subjectivism". It is undoubtedly true that Kant at times is nobly inconsistent, and leaves behind his subjective standpoint, but on our view such cases are more of the nature of lapses on Kant's part when compelled by circumstances to face some special problems, and so I cannot follow Dr. Smith when he implies that the "phenomenalist" traces are so frequent and precise as to enable the commentator to construct a system of "phenomenalism" such as we find in Prof. Smith's Commentary.[2] Granting fully that at times, such as in the treatment of the Analogies of Experience and in the section on the Refutation of Idealism as given in the 2nd Edition of the Critique, the world in space obtains a relative independence, yet the Critique as a whole does not appear to

2. pp. 270-8 4

1. Smith's 'Commentary to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason.' p. 280.

supply us with sufficient evidence in support of a manifold and form as distinct from the manifold of the special senses and the form which the individual self contributes to this manifold. Moreover, if the empirical world is presented to us simply as a finished product, as this "phenomenalism" implies, what justification have we, on Critical principles, for saying that its form is due to one set of unknown noumenal conditons, and its matter to another set of similar conditions? Indeed, Prof. Smith realises that we are not justified in holding to this doctrine of manifold and form, but he claims that Kant is here simply arguing by anology from what happens in conscious experience, and that he fully realises that we cannot profess to comprehend the bare possibility of such non-conscious synthetic processes acting upon a given manifold. In fact, it is quite possible that it is the same transcendental object that underlies outer appearances and at the same time serves as the subject of our thoughts. Prof. Smith makes extensive use of the negative conclusions drawn in the Dialetic in the sections on the Paralogisms of Rational Psychology, but it must be remembered that the various suggestions thrown out in the sections are simply mentioned as possible suggestions in order to expose the weakness of the proof adopted by Rational Psychology. Kant's own private views as regards the noumenal conditions of consciousness coincided with those of the rational psychologists, and he clung fast to the idea of an immortal soul. How, therefore, can it be maintained that Kant, even at that period of his life when he was chiefly interested in moral questions which revealed the importance of the moumenal self, was gradually feeling his way towards a view which would involve the denial

of such a self? In fact, in the 2nd edition, when Kant makes some additions to the Critique in the light of a maturer standpoint, instead of pressing his criticism of Rational Psychology, he is more lenient towards these psychologists. There does not appear, therefore, to be sufficient evidence that Kant was ready to deny the part played by the self in knowledge as the contributor of the form, whilst things in themselves supply the manifold by acting upon the subject's sensibility. On the other hand, we can understand Kant holding the view of a disconnected mass of atomic sensations as being the matter of the special senses, for it is his direct inheritance from Hume. In fact, Kant was too much under the influence of Hume to abandon his "subjectivism" so much as Prof. Smith would have us believe.

Kant's main position as I understand him may, therefore, be summed up as follows:- All that is given us from without is a mass of isolated data of sense which embody no principle of combination whatsoever. David Hume had proved so much to Kant's satisfaction. But the world of our every-day experience is not a world of mere particulars of sense. Rather is it a world permeated through and through with connecting principles. Such connecting principles, therefore, can only be accounted for as due to the subject's own apprehending nature. As these principles ~~form~~ supply the forms under which every intelligence, endowed with the same faculties as ourselves, must think objects before it can possess knowledge of any kind, the world as presented to us in knowledge will have a relative objectivity as being the same necessarily and universally for all human beings. I am very far from denying that there are passages in the Critique which cannot be reconciled with the above view. My contention is that even in the passages when he appears to hold that the manifold in itself contains principles of connection which require only to be discovered,

upon which the advocates of "phenomenalism" fasten, as, e.g., when he asserts that the special laws of nature can only be ascertained a posteriori, or when he insists that the principle of causality must be already embedded in experience before we can distinguish a causal succession from a mere quantitative succession, Kant would stremuously maintain that all principles of connection are due to the nature of the subject. It was simply when special problems required solution that Kant modified his "subjectivism", and the success of his efforts in these special cases depended upon his treatment assuming throughout a realist position, that in the perception we perceive physical objects and not "ideas" in a subjective sense. Consideration of Kant's Refutation of Idealism as given in the 2nd edition of the Critique will make this clear. Kant is there maintaining that knowledge of our inner states involves a prior knowledge of something permanent, and this permanent is to be found only as a thing in space. This implies a difference between bodies in space and subjective representations. How, therefore, are we to account for our knowledge of such a thing in space as distinct from mere representations? The answer appears to be that the Critical Philosophy can give no explanation at all of the existence of such a thing. Kant himself found it very difficult to avoid the pitfall of subjective idealism. He does succeed in passing an unanswerable criticism on various types of"idealism," but if we only examine his proofs we see clearly that he employs different means for refuting different types of idealism. For example, we find him at one place refuting Descartes' position by adopting the more extreme subjective standpoint of Berkeley. At other times his belief

in the existence of things in themselves serves his purpose, though he admits that such things in themselves are quite unknown and unknowable. How, therefore, are we justified in positing their existence? In truth, we have to admit that Kant under the stress of polemical discussion was forced into inconsistencies, though he nowhere attempts to reconcile these inconsistencies with his main position. His honesty of purpose and penetrating insight led him in this section on the Refutation of Idealism into an admission of a difference between bodies in space and inner appearances, though it did not lead him to give up his main position. When he is able to make use of his "subjectivism" he employs it without any hesitation. Indeed, we find him even after being forced into admissions inconsistent with his original subjective standpoint still adhering to it. The recognition of inconsistencies is not always a proof that an author is ready to abandon his main position, especially when we see him persisting in occupying it after having apparently realised its inadequacy. These admissions of themselves cannot justify us in holding that Kant was seriously contemplating laying aside his original position because of these inconsistencies and developing an entirely different theory. The fact of the matter appears to be that Kant, like every other philosopher, was forced at times into inconsistencies, but he did not utilise these inconsistencies to think out a theory of "phenomenalism" as is given by Prof. N.K.Smith in his Commentary to the Critique. Kant cannot account for our knowledge of the permanent thing in space. He denies that such a "permanent" can be found among our subjective representations, and so in showing the weakness of idealism he assumes in his proof that we have a knowledge of a thing external to us as distinguished from a representation of a thing external to us, i.e., he agrees with the realist that we have a direct perception of a "physical object" in space. Fearing, however, that he had gone too far,

in the conclusion Kant hastily retracts his footsteps. He cannot admit that we have a knowledge of things in themselves, for the thing in itself is always for Kant the thing as it exists outside the subject-object relation. In coming into relation with the subject Kant thought that the thing must always undergo a change, so that we cannot know it in itself, and like many another idealist before and since his time he thought, therefore, that what we can know of independent things are the subjective representations which they generate in us. This is what we find in the Refutation of Idealism in the 2nd edition. To discover the "permanent" required for his proof he is forced to admit that we have a knowledge of things which do not depend upon the mind for their existence. These, however, cannot be admitted to be things in themselves for these have over and over again been pronounced unknown and unknowable. What, therefore, is this body in space which is independent of us? When Kant has to face this question, however ambiguous his language may be, he has to admit that ultimately such objects reduce into mere appearances, which as such have only an existence in us.

Caird, in his volumes on the Critique, tries to minimise Kant's"subjectivism" as much as possible, and instead of admitting that bodies in space are mere appearances, as Kant himself expressly declares, he uses the purely indefinite term "objects-for-a-self." If this term does not mean that objects in knowledge are mere mental representations, it can only mean that Kant maintained that the world must ultimately be interpreted in spiritual terms, a contention that fails to do justice to the full implications of Kant's Theory of Knowledge.

Taking up our argument again at the point where the digression on Kant's Refutation of Idealism starts, so long as Kant keeps consistently to his transcendentalism he is not justified in regarding the unity of apperception as causally determining experience. As Prof. Smith says, all that Kant has proved is that "self-consciousness is a mere <u>form</u> through which contents that never themselves constitute the self are yet apprehended as being objects to the self."[1] Yet, when Kant is attending to the psychological aspect of his argument he is under the impression that in postulating the necessity of a self for knowledge he has postulated the existence of a noumenal self. When he is concentrating attention on the transcendental aspect of his problem the self is conceived as a mere logical principle, but when he is dealing with the psychological aspect the self is now taken as equivalent to a <u>real</u> or noumenal self, manifesting itself through its fundamental faculty, viz. the understanding. This alone will account for Kant's varying utterances in the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories. Kant himself was of opinion that the unity of consciousness represented a <u>real</u> self though that cannot be demonstrated on theoretical grounds. In the Dissertation the self had been viewed as ultimate in an ontological sense. It preceded experience and to its synthetic activities the generation of experience was traced. Section A. 104-110 in the Critique, which, as embodying the doctrine of the transcendental object, is regarded by Dr. Smith as pre-critical or semi-critical, also represents the synthesis of the manifold as due to the activities of an individual self, which comes to consciousness of itself by being conscious of the identity of its activity in unifying its

1. 'Commentary to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason'. p. 251.

various representations. "For this unity of consciousness would be impossible, if the mind in the knowledge of the manifold could not become conscious of the identity of the function whereby it unites the manifold synthetically in one knowledge."[1] "The mind could never think the identity of itself in the manifold of its representations, and this a priori, if it did not clearly perceive the identity of its action which subjects all synthesis of apprehension (which is empirical) to a transcendental unity, and first makes possible its connection according to rules."[2] The self is regarded here as the source of all unity in our experience. It renders possible the formation of empirical concepts which mediate our consciousness of the transcendental object as constraining us to think the object in a certain manner. This entire section, however, was omitted in the 2nd edition of the Critique, and so Kant must have come to perceive its unsatisfactory character, but still the emphasis which he continued to lay on the transcendental unity of apperception is hardly consistent with its character as that of a mere logical principle. If the transcendental self is a mere abstraction when conceived apart from the menifold wherein it finds existence, we should naturally expect Kant to hesitate to deal so boldly with it in its isolation as he does in the transcendental deduction. He too often speaks of it as "preceding all data of intuition," as the original apperception, etc., assesrtions which tend to make us believe that the transcendental apperception is a noumenal self. Moreover, we even find him characterising transcendental apperception as a faculty. "....we shall no longer be surprised that we only see her (i.e.nature) through the fundamental faculty

1. A. 108.
2. A. 108.

of all our knowledge, namely, the transcendental apperception....."[1] "....; but the possibility of the logical form of all knowledge rests necessarily on the relation to this apperception as a faculty."[2] In A. 94 also he regards it as a faculty or power of the soul along with sense and the imagination, and so here it performs the same operations as he elsewhere attributes to the understanding (this paragraph was omitted in the 2nd edition). A. 115 again supplies us with the following statement:- "We saw that there are three subjective sources of knowledge on which the possibility of all experience and of the knowledge of all objects depends, namely, sense, imagination, and apperception." Its identification with the understanding is clearly stated in A 119 - "This unity of apperception with reference to the synthesis of imagination is the understanding, and the same unity with reference to the transcendental synthesis of the imagination, the pure understanding." Since Kant is continually reiterating the assertion that all combination is an act of the understanding, he therefore gives us sufficient cause for holding that it is the unity of apperception which supplies all principles of connexion to our experience. In B. 135 he names it "the supreme principle of all our knowledge." In this connection Prof. N.K.Smith maintains that the terms Kant employs here are misleading and do not adequately represent his real teaching. The "unfortunate phraseology" he traces "to the spiritualistic or Leibnizian character of Kant's earlier standpoint,"[3] and also to Kant's personal convictions as revealed in his

1. A. 114.
2. A. 117 n.
3. Commentary to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. p. 260.

ethical writings. However, in the next section, in dealing with "The Nature of the Self", we shall discuss several passages where Kant contends that the "I think" implies the "I am." Even in the "Paralogisms" he does not deny the existence of an individual self. He merely says that the "I think" of self-consciousness cannot in itself guarantee the existence of a substantial soul.. We cannot on theoretical grounds prove the existence of a noumenal self from the mere representation "I think."

Consideration, therefore, of all these tendencies on Kant's part appears to justify us in concluding that the connection involved in experience is due to the activities of the individual self. Though the transcendental self as revealed by the theory of knowledge is a mere principle of unity, yet Kant did undoubtedly believe that the unity required for all knowledge is due to the individual concrete subject which, by its faculty of spontaneity, viz. the understanding, combines the manifold of sense representations in accordance with the categories. Kant does indeed occasionally say that the synthesis of the manifold is due to the activity of the <u>productive imagination</u>, but closer reading leads us to identify this imagination with the understanding itself. It is the understanding working unreflectively. In B.162 n. he says that "it is one and the same spontaneity which at one time under the name of imagination, at another time under that of understanding, introduces connexion into the manifold of perception."

Therefore, our view of the self will vary according to that aspect of Kant's argument that we wish to emphasise.

If we confine attention to the transcendental aspect of his argument, we are not justified in saying that the self is more than a mere principle of unity. In the Transcendental Deduction of the 2nd edition, where he adheres more strictly to his transcendental method of proof than in the 1st edition, Kant does not now regard self-consciousness as consisting in the consciousness by the self of the identity of its activity in combining the manifold, as he had maintained in certain passages in the Transcendental Deduction of the 1st edition. Consciousness of the analytical unity of apperception is now made to rest upon a prior synthesis of the manifold; it is only after the manifold has been thus synthesised that we recognise the identity of its unity as the unity of the manifold. As Prichard outs it, "Instead of being regarded as the consciousness of this activity (i.e. the activity of the self in the combination of the manifold), it is regarded as presupposing the consciousness of the product of this activity,....."[1] Since, therefore, self-consciousness presupposes the product of the synthetic processes, we cannot say that these processes are the activities of the individual self. Yet, though, from this point of view, Kant is not justified in attributing the syntheses to the self, when he comes to conceive of the genesis of experience out of pre-existing faculties the self is taken as equivalent to a real being, which, through its faculty of spontaneity, whether under the name of imagination or understanding, combines the manifold of sense so that there results a unified experience for a unitary consciousness.

1. 'Kant's Thoery of Knowledge' p. 199.

I shall, therefore, at this point criticise Kant's view of relations as not inhering in the object but as imposed by the subject upon an alien matter. This directly leads to Kant's further contention that we are confined to a knowledge of mere phenomena, and can never know things in themselves, and so I shall take both positions together in the following criticism.

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CRITICISM OF KANT'S CONCEPTION OF THE SELF AS THE SOURCE OF THE RELATIONS TO BE FOUND IN EXPERIENCE.

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In criticising the associationist philosophy we saw that its fundamental weakness lay in its tendency towards psychological atomism, and its consequent failure to account for the unique unity that characterises our mental life. Resolving the mind into a mass of disconnected particulars the unity of experience proved an insurmountable difficulty to the associationists, and consequently we see Mill proving unfaithful to his fundamental principles, and looking round for something scarcely distinguishable from the substantial soul of mediaeval scholasticism. If the sensory elements "given" from without cannot provide for the relatedness and connectedness which actual experience appears to demand, it was but natural to turn for an explanation of them to the only other source from which it could possibly come, namely, the nature of the conscious subject. Hence we find James[1] saying that the real reason why the transcendental philosophers posited an Ego was that they believed in Hume's "bundle", and therefore they required something <u>from within to tie up</u> this buncle. The Ego is "invented for that use alone." It is this line of reasoning that really led Kant to his Transcendental Unity of Apperception. He unfortunately inherited from Hume the conception of a primordial "manifold of sense," and consequently he proceeded on the assumption that "synthesis" is the one thing that cannot be "given" from without. Hume, however, no less clearly than Kant,

1. 'Principles of Psychology'. Vol. 1. p. 370

recognised that a jumble of disconnected particulars does not constitute the world of our everyday experience. The world as we know it exhibits principles of necessary connection, and sense, argued Hume, cannot account for necessity. The principle of causality, e.g. cannot be inferred inductively from experience, and being also synthetic in character it cannot be regarded as self-evident, as the rationalists appear to hold. How, therefore is this principle to be justified? Hume cannot answer. According to him a sceptical attitude alone becomes a philosopher in the face of such a problem. Kant, however, could not rest content with Hume's scepticism. He realised that Hume's arguments were applicable to all our scientific principles, and consequently it was of the utmost importance to offer some kind of justification for our scientific beliefs. Hume had stated a possible way of escape from scepticism. In the Appendix to Vol. 1. of his "Treatise of Human Nature" he writes, "Did our perceptions either inhere in something simple and individual, or did the mind perceive some real connection among them, there would be no difficulty in the case." Kant pondered over these alternatives, and ultimately decided upon the first as alone adequate to account for the universality and necessity of the propositions of mathematics and of natural science. The full implications of the pernicious two-substance doctrine, which Descartes had openly espoused, were worked out to their logical conclusion in the philosophy of Hume, and this exercised a perverting influence upon Kant's subsequent reasoning. Without hesitation he adopted the prevalent view of the immediate data given through sense as being purely subjective in character. These sensations he regarded as possessing only intensive, not extensive, magnitude. All relations, therefore, including those of space and time, he attributed to the subject's own apprehending nature. All connection in our

experience is due to the synthetic activity of the self, which reduces "the manifold of sense" to systematic order, and thus makes possible our experience of a cosmos or world.

Kant, therefore, set out from the assumption that the rudimentary consciousness is to be regarded as containing a mass of distinct and separate data of sense, and that mental development consists in the putting together of these mental units by the activity of the self. All relations are thus conceived as superinduced by thought upon an alien disconnected manifold. Now, as against this view of Kant, we can at once urge that the account it offers of the development of mind is contrary to the results of modern psychological investigation. The supposition, says Ward, that psychical life begins with a confused disconnected manifold of sensations, finds no warrant either in direct observation, or in inference from biology, or in a priori considerations. "The process (of mental development, instead of consisting fundamentally in the combination and recombination of various elementary units,) seems much more like a segmentation of what is originally continuous than an aggregation of elements at first independent and distinct."[1] Ward, therefore, conceives of an original total "presentation-continuum" in which differences are latent. Experience advances by the "differentiation" of this "presentation-continuum". This is readily seen if we only compare higher minds with lower. ".....we find in the higher conspicuous differences between presentations which in the lower are indistinguishable or absent altogether. The worm seems to be aware only of

1.'Psychological Principles', p. 76.

the difference between light and dark. The steel-worker seems half a dozen tints where others see only a uniform glow."[1] Thus Ward maintains that the rudest beginnings of experience must not be conceived as containing"a succession of absolutely new sensations, which, coming out of nothingness, admit of being strung upon the 'thread of consciousness' like beads picked up at random, or of being cemented into a mass like the bits of stick and sand with which the young caddis covers its nakedness,"[2] but rather as containing a continuum to whose gradual differentation presentations and objects owe the distinctness which they now possess for consciousness.

A careful consideration of Kant's reasoning will reveal that Kant himself offered no proof that relations cannot be given to us by way of sensation. Like many a later writer he assumed that sensations in themselves have only intensive magnitude. As Prof. Smith notes,[3] Kant does not appear to suggest indirectly an argument in support of this contention when he says that space cannot by itself act upon the senses, but such an argument rests upon the presupposition that space can be conceived apart from objects. "It is no proof that an expended object may not yield extended sensations." Kant completely ignores the possibility that formal relations may be given in and with the sensations. If our sensibility, in consequence of the action of objects upon it, is able to generate qualitative sensations, why, as Vaihinger very pertinently enquires, should it be denied the power of also producing, in consequence of these same causes, impressions of quantitative formal nature? Sensations, on Kant's view, are the product of mind much more than of objects. Why, then, may not

1. 'Psychological Principles.' p. 76.
2. Ibid. p. 77.
3. 'Commentary to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason.' p. 3[illegible]

space itself be sensational? From the point of view of empirical science there is no such radical difference between cause and effect in the latter case as exists in the former."[1] In this connection Dr. Smith refers to Stout's Manual of Psychology,[2] where the author emphasises the importance of extensity as an attribute of presentations in our apprehension of space relations, and also to Riehl's Kriticismus,[3] where the writer says, "The relations of sensations, their determined co-existence and sequence, impress consciousness, just as do the sensations. We feel this impression in the compulsion which the determinateness of the empirical manifolds lays upon the perceiving consciousness. The mere affection of consciousness by these relations does not, indeed, by itself suffice for their apprehension; but neither does it suffice for apprehension of the sensation itself. Thus there is in these respects no difference between the matter and the form of appearance."

The sharp distinction between sense and thought implied in Kant's doctrine of matter and form cannot be entertained by modern psychologists who seek to evolve the higher process of mind from the lower. In the Aesthetic the sensibility and the understanding are regarded as two distinct and separate faculties, capable of yielding different kinds of knowledge. This teaching of the Aesthetic, however, is probably merely provisional, for in the Analytic the constructive activity of the understanding is spoken of as indispensable for knowledge of any kind, and the sharp distinction between sense and understanding is somewhat softened when Kant speaks of them as two stems of human knowledge "which perhaps spring from a common but to us unknown root,"

1. Prof. N.K.Smith in 'Commentary to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason' pp. 86-7.
2. 3rd ed. pp 465-6.
3. p. 104.

yet to the very last he continued to lay too much emphasis on the antithesis between sense and thought. It is from this dualistic point of view that Kant develops his doctrine of a "manifold of sense given to the mind," and thought afterwards supplying it with form. The genuinely Critical teaching shows quite clearly that such a "manifold" is a pure abstraction, incapable even of being recognised as a manifold apart from the form-giving activity of the mind. It is Kant's clear recognition of the impossibility of knowing a mere "manifold" that led to the introduction of the constructive imagination to unite the given material before it is brought to clear vision through the exercise of the understanding. Therefore, from his Critical point of view, Kant does recognise that no apprehension on our part can be an apprehension of a detached manifold. His vacillating attitude in characterising the imagination shows this only the more clearly. The imagination is spoken of as a blind faculty, a faculty of which we are hardly ever conscious. This shows that it is an already connected manifold that thought has to deal with. If, therefore, we are never aware of a disconnected manifold, but always are presented in conscious experience with a formed material, what justification have we for holding that the connection originates from within, and forms no part of the sense-given material itself? The truth of the matter appears to be that Kant has simply blundered here because he was under the influence of an older psychology with its doctrine of a medley of different faculties. Modern psychology, with its idea of a continuous evolution, recognises an identity of process between sense apprehension and thought. Instead of holding that we first of all possess a mass of distinct and separate presentations upon which thought then exercises its activity, we have to "assume that what appears to us, from the later position we occupy, as an isolated fact

upon which thinking may be exercised, has only gradually come to be thus recognised, through a long series of discriminative acts," whilst "the apprehension of even the crudest, most indefinite, sense-content to which the name presentation can be assigned, really involves an act of discrimination similar in kind, however differing in degree, from the discrimination involved in the apprehension of a content relatively clear and distinct....."[1] In no stage of knowledge are we merely passive recipients of what is given from without. From the very dawn of experience apprehension in all its forms has always involved activity on the part of the subject. The first material given to consciousness was already a formed material. Thought set out on its first journey, with a view, not to creating a form for the manifold, but rather to discovering the form already embedded in the material supplied. A "manifold of sense" is nowhere to be met with as a fact. As Prof. Mackenzie remarks in his 'Elements of Constructive Philosophy', the data of sense supply us with universals and also fall into definite orders, and so they cannot be said to constitute a disconnected manifold. Similarly, Hobhouse, in 'The Theory of knowledge', denies the existence of a "manifold of sense", and that the world as experienced is a thought construction. Primitive apprehension, he says, is an apprehension of formed objects in space and time, and not of undifferentiated sensations. "As long as we regard two sensations, one, say, of sight and one of touch, as 'given' spaceless and positionless, and 'referred' by some act of intellectual synthesis, or what not, to their positions in space, a difficulty would certainly arise when we come to the question how two sensations of different kinds apprehended by means of different organs

1. Prof. G.Dawes Hicks in 'Proceedings of the Aristotleian Society (1907-08).' pp. 207-08.

come to be referred to the same point in the same space (at one and the same time). There seems, indeed, no manner of reason why a positionless unextended content should be referred to any position at all, much less to the same position as some other. If, however, a sensation as given is extended and has position, if the position is a part of what is given, then there is no question about the psychological nature or logical value of the assertion of that position. It is simply a part of the act of apprehension."[1] Mental advance, therefore, consists, not in conferring a form upon a formless manifold, but rather in the development of this simple apprehension. James also argues against the existence of primitive disconnected sensations, and contends for a moving continuum in which qualities and relations are merged.

When we trace backwards the process of mental evolution we find that there is no justification whatsoever for sharply distinguishing the matter and the form of an object, the universal and the particular. The object is known as a combination of the universal and the particular, which, in and by themselves, are mere abstractions. What is known is not the bare universal or the bare particular but the individual, which is a unity of the universal and the particular. In every real act of knowledge these two elements are always found united together, and so we are not entitled to attribute them to two different sources. As Watson notes, though we may be called receptive in so far as our knowledge comes to us piece by piece, yet we are never receptive of mere feelings. "The knowledge which comes to us in fragments is not the less concrete: it is, in Kant's language, not a mere 'manifold' but a manifold reflected on a unity; it is not pure sensation but sensation

1. pp. 542-3.

informed by thought."[1] Psychology no longer recognises the existence of the mere sensation. There is no absolute distinction between the sensory and the intellectual factor in cognition, as is clearly shown by the doctrine of Primary and Secondary or Acquired meanings of sensation. In Green's 'Prologomena to Ethics' we meet with an emphatic denial of the existence of the mere sensation, and yet the author utilises the conception of such a pure sensation to construct an elaborate metaphysical theory. Green argues that all relations are the work of the mind, whilst admitting at the same time that we never come across a mere manifold prior to its unification by spirit. The unrelated sensation, he says, "cannot amount to fact." It is a"phrase that represents no reality." To the very last Green refused to attribute any kind of reality to the unrelated particular sensation. Yet careful consideration of his line of reasoning will reveal the startling fact that his whole argument in favour of a spiritual principle that originates all relations turns upon the existence of a disconnected manifold requiring unification. "First to pulverise the universe into a manifold of independent elements in order to demonstrate the need of a principle of synthesis, and then, having secured the principle of synthesis, to turn round upon the independent elements and discard them as sheer impossibilities, is certainly a precarious way of establishing the truth of a philosophical theory."[2]

In truth, the Kantian conception of relations as originating within the mind cannot be established on psychological or metaphysical grounds. Such a view, says Prof. Taylor in his 'Elements of Metaphysics,' violates the fundamental presuppositions of metaphysics, namely, that reality is a coherent whole. According to the Kantian view the systematic character of reality is a mere illusion, being an unwarranted addition of our own. Moreover, we cannot account even for the illusion of a system, if

1. 'Kant and his English Critics,' p.358. 2. Prof. G. Dawes Hicks in 'Proceedings of Aristotleian Society (1907-08).' p. 210.

disconnected simple qualities alone constitute the real world. Similarly, Prof. Seth Pringle-Pattison writes, "Even the illusion of connection is demonstrably impossible unless through the suppressed presence of certain principles of real synthesis." Again, in his 'Scottish Philosophy,' he remarks, "Indeed, if we but reflect, it must strike us as an incongruous idea that this human mind of ours should, as it were, supply the defects of the world, and breathe into it principles of which it contains itself no hint." [1]

In his 'Kant's Theory of Knowledge' [2] Prichard points out that, even if we do admit the main principles, there are still insurmountable difficulties involved in Kant's theory concerning the mental origin of all relations. From Kant's point of view it is not at all clear how the mind can perform different kinds of synthesis on manifolds of different kinds. If the manifolds as given are absolutely unrelated, how, e.g. can we distinguish between a causal order and a merely quantitative order? This weakness in the Kantian Theory is very effectively exposed by Dr. Stirling in his writings on the philosophy of Kant. He shows quite conclusively that on Kantian principles it is impossible to distinguish between an objective succession and a merely subjective succession. Of course, it is not contended here that a failure to distinguish between these different kinds of succession detracts from the effectiveness of Kant's vindication of the category of causality. In truth, it is extremely unfortunate that Kant has referred to these kinds of succession in the opening paragraphs of the section dealing with the category of causality, for it only tends to mislead us as to the real force of his proof of the validity of that principle. His

1. p. 145.
2. pp. 214 ff.

real vindication of the category of causality has nothing to do with the distinction between an objective and a subjective succession, but rather consists in showing that casual connection is all-pervading in character, that even to apprehend anything involves a necessary connection between it and everything else. All that we insist upon here is that we do in actual experience distinguish between different kinds of succession, and that this would be impossible if the manifold supplied contains in itself no hint as to what particular kind of synthesis it requires. Prior to all experience the categories lie dormant in the mind, waiting for the material of sense to call them forth. If the manifold itself, however, can furnish no 'cue', why does the category of causality answer the summons in the one case, and that of quantity in the other? Indeed, we are forced to admit that the reason why we call one succession causal and the other quantitative is because of differences in the facts presented to us. We perceive that the facts in the one case are causally related, and not so in the other. The relation between the facts is already involved in the facts themselves, for otherwise all <u>particular syntheses</u> would be unintelligible. "..... to combine the manifold into a particular shape, there is needed not merely the thought of a figure in general, but the thought of a definite figure."[1]

Prichard notes further that the "fundamental mistake" of Kant's theory is that, "misled by his theory of perception, he regards 'terms' as given by things in themselves acting on the sensibility, and 'relations' as introduced by the understanding, whereas the fact is that in the sense in which terms can be said to be given, relations can and must also be said to be given."[2] The distinction between terms and

1. Prichard, 'Kant's Theory of Knowledge' p. 216.
2. Ibid. p. 226.

relations cannot be regarded as that between universal and individual, in the sense that the individual is given or presented to us, whilst thought subsumes this individual under its corresponding universal. A relation is as much an individual as a term, and both imply corresponding universals. Therefore, if thinking is the activity by which we subsume the individual under the universal so as to recognise it as an instance of a certain kind, then the apprehension of a term requires thinking quite as much as the apprehension of a relation.

In an article[1] on the "Proceedings of the Aristotleian Society" Mr. A. Boutwood also argues in favour of the view that the unity of the world is not produced, but merely discovered, by us, In a sense, he remarks, the unity of the world may be spoken of as "the work of the mind" in that it "is not an empirically given fact, but, in our minds as a predicate of the world, it is always due to the characterisation of thought," but for all that the unity is already embedded in the world. "If the facts were truly unordered- if they were, indeed, 'formless' - the thinking mind would be powerless to organise them. It is only because the world is actually an ordered world that our thought is able to construe it as much. "

Prof. N.K.Smith has recently[2] emphasised the two conflicting tendencies that are to be found throughout the Critique of Pure Reason, namely, the "subjectivist" and the "phenomenalist". The former tendency, which predominates, assigns a mental origin to all relations; when the latter tendency is in the ascendant the connection of the world is conceived of as independent of the mind that perceives it. The exigencies of his position often force Kant to

1. (1901-02) p. 103.
2. 'Commentary to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason.'

recognise some kind of connection in the object. Hence we find him admitting that "empirical laws" cannot be derived from the understanding. It is the nature of the matter alone that will determine these laws, so that after all the manifold is not purely unrelated.

In an article in the 'Proceedings of the Aristotleian Society'[1] Prof. G. Dawes Hicks remarks that "the notion of sense-presentations as 'impressions' or affections of the mind'" inevitably leads to psychological atomism, and the consequent view of relations as external to the material of sense. From their own point of view, continues Prof. Hicks, Hume and Kant were perfectly justified in regarding "impressions" as being in themselves isolated and disconnected. To infer from this, however, that the relations of our world as experienced originate in the mind is due to a false theory of sense-perception. We do not first perceive impressions as mental states, which afterwards, through our constructive activity, acquire reference to objects. As a matter of fact, such inference would be impossible. If we start with mental states as the sole objects of knowledge we shall never be able to go beyond the limit of self at all. The psychologist, it is true, regards ideas as mere subjective states, but for the individual percepient his own ideas are from the beginning knowledge of reality. We do not start with the internal, and then infer the external. Rather do we know objects in space before we begin to reflect on our own subjective states. This is the nerve of Kant's argument in the section on the Refutation of Idealism added in the second edition of the Critique. Self and not-self mutually condition each other. They develop pari passu.

1. (1907-08).

Commenting on the theory of Representative Peception Ward writes in 'Naturalism and Agnosticism,'[1] "Shut in within a circle of ideas, how could the mind know the things beyond which this very circle shuts out? How could it trust the copies if the original were for ever beyond reach, nay, how know that there were any originals at all?" It is reality itself that is given to us in knowledge, and not a mere copy of the real. As Prof. Mackenzie says in his 'Elements of Constructive Philosophy', when I am conscious of myself, or a pain, or heat, etc., I am conscious of myself, of pain, of heat, and not of pictures of them.

The theory that we know only our own mental states directly has arisen owing to a confusion between two distinct meanings of the word "idea", a distinction, as Prof. Lloyd Morgan puts it, between the apprehending and the apprehended. The Realists have rendered valuable service in keeping distinct these two meanings of the word idea. It is undoubtedly true that the process in and through which we apprehend an object exists within the mind, but the object apprehended is by no means mental. Idealists in the past have been wont to regard ideas as existing as a kind of tertium quid between the mind and reality. This, however, is misleading, for when we talk of "ideas of things" we do not mean that idea and thing are two things. "To have an idea of a thing merely means that we know it, or think it. An idea is not given: it is a thing which is given in the idea. An idea is not an additional and intervening object of our knowledge or supposed knowledge. That a thing is our object of thought is another word for its being our idea, and that means we know it."[2] From the very start our mental states are states of objects. There is no meaning in talking of knowing mental states, which afterwards acquire reference to an object. Take away the object and the mental state vanishes.

1. Vol. 11. p. 109.
2. Wallace in 'Hegel's Philosophy of Mind'. p. cv.

Unlike Descartes and Locke the Realists do not assume the existence of a mental tertium quid, called a presentation, and infer physical existence from it. They hold that external objects are known directly. Knowledge, according to them, always presupposes the existence of that which is known, and the work of thought consists in discovery and not in construction. When we perceive an object, says Prof. G. Dawes Hicks,[1] what really takes place is that a certain object makes a physical impression upon the organ of sense, e.g., "a certain definite stimulation of the sensory organ" occurs. This impression gives rise to "a certain physical change or disturbance in the optic nerve, which change or disturbance is conveyed to the cerebal centre, with which the optic nerve is connected." There then results somehow "a specific mode or state of consciousness," in and through which we apprehend an external object, say, a house. Neither the "physical impression" nor the "nervous change" forms any part of the content apprehended, nor does it produce any of the qualities of the object apprehended. According to this theory, therefore, what we perceive are not mental objects, but rather physcial reality. We have still to recognise a difference between actual reality and the real as known to us, between the noumenon and the phenomenon, but this difference is simply "the difference between a fragmentary and partial aspect of the real and the real in its concrete richness and fullness, - a difference, in other words, between reality as it is but incompletely and as it might be completely known."[2] In 'The idea of God' Prof. Seth Pringle-Pattison writes as

1. 'Proceedings of the Aristotleian Society (1907-08).' p. 206.
2. Prof. G. Dawes Hicks in 'Proceedings of the Aristotleian Society (1907-08).' p. 201.

follows:- "The phenomenon is the noumenon so far as it has manifested itself, so far as we have grasped it in knowledge, In a strict sense, it is not really correct to say that we know phenomena: it is like saying twice over that we know. It is the noumena or real things that we know, and the phenomena are what we know about them."[1] The conception of an unknown and unknowable Absolute must, therefore, be rejected, as resulting from a false limitation of knowledge to mere mental phenomena. It was the subjectivity of their theory of knowledge that led Kant, Lotze, Spencer, Comte, Ritschl, etc. to advocate the conception of some Unknowable as lurking behind the known qualities of objects. From the time of Descartes up to the time of Spencer man and nature were regarded as two "res completae." The knowing subject stood on one side of the chasm, and a totally independent world on the other. In knowledge these two are brought together, with the production of certain effects in us, and as the effects will depend to a certain extent upon our constitution, they cannot give a true picture of the outside world. Even if the picture did correspond with reality, we could never become aware of the truth of the correspondence, for, according to the "copy-theory", the independent world is beyond our reach, and so we cannot compare the picture with its original.

We conclude, therefore, that we have a real knowledge of things so far as it goes. Knowledge is not creation, but the discovery of the real qualities of a real world. Neither the primary nor the secondary qualities of objects can be justly regarded as being merely subjective in character. Many philosophers regard the primary qualities

1. p. 163.

as objective but withhold this character from the secondary qualities. According to the view we are maintaining here the secondary qualities also must be regarded as objective, not merely in the sense that they have physical counterparts, but in that they are predicates of the real.

What has been said above would appear obvious were it not that we are all influenced to some extent by the common-sense distinction of body and mind as that of two separate and distinct substances. We are then faced with the problem of the interaction of these two different substances. This, however, as Ward argues so forcefully in 'Naturalism and Agnosticism' and in 'The Realm of Ends,' is a problem of our own making. We never in experience come across a dualism; experience from the very beginning presents us with a duality of subject and object, and this relation is inexplicable because it is ultimate. It is the basal fact of every finite experience. It is due to our abstraction - making intellect that this one world of experience is sundered into two halves. Presented with a synthesis of subject and object, thought necessarily proceeds analytically, and endeavours to discover the diversity inherent in the unity. Having discovered the various constituents of this unity, thought tends to regard these as capable of existing in and by themselves, confusing analysis for the time being with division which necessarily destroys a unity. Having once destroyed the unity we are confronted with the task of bridging the chasm which we have ourselves made between the various elements of experience. We have an instance of this in Kant's efforts to bridge the gulf between sense and thought by means of the constructive imagination.

The community of nature that exists between man and the world has been well emphasised by Prof. Seth Pringle-Pattison, in "The Idea of God." Man he regards as "organic to the world," "as the last term in the series of development," as being necessary for the completion of the world. "The intelligent being is, as it were, the organ through which the universe beholds and enjoys itself." The world is the embodiment of a purpose which is continuously working its way out. This is the meaning of development. The world as it appears to the knowing subject is truer than it would be apart from him. We know the real world so far as it has been revealed to us. Fuller revelation will depend upon our developing both mentally and morally. God will reveal himself according to our progress.

Prof. Laurie has worked out the same conception in his "Synthetica", where he says - "The real is truly to be found in the final presentation to subject."[1] "The world without conscious subject is a world waiting for its meaning - an uncompleted circle waiting to be closed."[2] This teleological interpretation of the universe is more than suggested by Kant himself. In the Critique of Judgment he attempts to overcome the dualism of his theory of knowledge. In the unknown ground underlying mind and nature there may be a single principle comprehending both purposiveness and mechanism. This, according to Höffding, "is the profoundest thought in Kant."

In the light of this rationally constituted character of the universe the Kantian conception of the categories as so many innate faculties must be revised. We must now regard them as so many attempts on the part of the conscious

1. Quoted by Prof. Seth-Pringle Pattison in 'The Idea of God'.
2. Ibid.

self to interpret its world. Instead of being separated, as Kant thought, the categories are all connected together, one conception naturally leading to another as knowledge advances. As Watson puts it in "Kant and his English Critics," space and time are not relations superinduced by thought upon an unconnected material, but "are just the simplest point of view from which the real world can be contemplated." These relations are simply inadequate expressions of the true nature of Reality. We are quite justified in employing such concepts to characterise the world so long as we are conscious of their limitation. It is undoubtedly true, as Kant insisted, that the categories, as, e.g., cause and effect, substance and attribute, etc., originate from within in the first instance, but for all that they are found to be true expressions of various aspects of reality. The idea of force or power, which we associate with causality, cannot be given from without. It is derived from our own volitional nature; but it is not merely subjective, corresponding to nothing in nature without. It merely gives an expression to a certain connection exhibited by nature itself. As Ward puts it, "The main structure of our concept of Nature is entirely anthropomorphic..... . The category of causality we owe to the interaction of active subjects with their environment and especially with each other, and we attribute it analogically to what we then call the interaction of natural agents." The same is true of the regularity of Nature. "It is a postulate that has its root in our primitive credulity. Were this anticipatio mentis never confirmed, knowledge would be impossible; but confirmed as it is continually in our earliest experience we thus advance to an interpretatio naturae as an orderly and intelligible

system, a cosmos that evinces directly or indirectly the all-pervading presence of mind."[1] The world is a connected order, and, as knowledge advances, the discovery of fresh implications in our world forces us to abandon lower for higher categories. One category leads naturally to another, until we reach a category that will adequately express the nature of the whole world, viz., the category of self-consciousness. It is significant that Kant himself, though he did not recognise development, yet started with the concepts of space and time, and <u>then</u> proceeded to a discussion of the categories. The concepts employed by the various sciences, therefore, can be placed in an ascending series - the concepts of mathematics leading to those of physics, then those of chemistry, then those of biology, and finally those of psychology.

If the world, therefore, is one connected order, and the categories are merely the ways in which we characterise this world, can thinking be regarded still as a process of synthesis? Our answer must be in the affirmative. Though we set out from a continuum, yet this continuum must be reconstructed by thought before there can exist <u>for us</u> a cosmos or world. Prof. Mackenzie thinks that this is the point that Kant really wishes to emphasise in the Critique of Pure Reason. As he puts it in Mind,[2] "It is not the manifoldness but the blindness of sensation on which Kant insists. The essential point of the Critique is not that Thought combines unrelated sense-data, but rather that, but for the reconstructive vision of the Understanding, there could never be for us the experience of a systematic world." All knowledge demands both analysis and synthesis. "The crude indeterminate mass of primitive perception is

1. 'The Realm of Ends.'
2. (1896) p. 400.
3. ~~Prof. G. Dawes Hicks in 'Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society' (1897-98) pp. 1-11.~~

gradually broken up; what is originally confusedly apprehended as in conjunction becomes sundered into distinct and separate objects. Then, no doubt, it is possible for our abstracting intelligence to regard such objects more or less apart from their relations, and, at the same time, to represent to ourselves the process of thinking as the activity by means of which these apparently isolated objects are 'brought into' connection with one another, through such ideas of relation as those of causality and the like. That is how relations come to be recognised as relations."[1] This, however, does not prove that all connection in the world is due to the activity of the knowing subject, and that, in itself, the real world is simply a mass of disconnected qualities.

We have, therefore, arrived at a "realist" view of the function and nature of knowledge, whilst at the same time maintaining that the world is penetrable by thought, that reality must ultimately be interpreted in spiritual terms. Nature, we insist, admits of a teleological interpretation. As Lotze says in the 'Mikrokosmos,' our principle of explanation is to be found within the world of values. Hence, Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle showed a correct instinct when they sought for a principle which would explain why, and not simple how, the universe conformed to one specific plan more than to others. Plato's conception of the "Idea of the Good," and Aristotle's conception of Matter and Form, indicate the important positions assigned to teleology in their philosophical investigations. It is true that many writers have objected to this conception of teleology as the final interpretation of the universe on the grounds of its finiteness. Purpose

1. Prof. G. Dawes Hicks in 'Proceedings of the Aristotleian Society (1907-08),' pp. 210-11.

in our limited experience implies an End that is in some sense external to the Means, but this is merely because, as finite individuals, our lives are not self-sufficing and self-explanatory. As Prof. Mackenzie puts it, "Human life, taken by itself, does not contain the explanation of the circumstances in which it grows up and the conditions with which it has to deal. Hence the end to which it strives may be treated as external to these circumstances."[1] Therefore, Prof. Bosanquet refuses to apply to the Absolute the conception of will or purpose as "a psychological, temporal, and ethical idea." Form and matter, however, cannot be sharply distinguished. To do so would lead to a hopeless dualism. But the human mind can never be satisfied with a dualism. Intelligence is one, and owing to its very nature, it demands that existence should be one intelligible whole. In an ultimate sense, philosophy must rest on a faith, a hope, a trust; but this faith is reasonable faith. It is not the faith that rests on ignorance, but rather, as Lotze puts it, "the confidence of reason in itself." We are compelled to regard existence as one interconnected system "because of the nature of human reason, which obeys an irresistible natural impulse in its strivings after unity." In the Hegelian modification of the ontological argument for the existence of God internal coherency is taken as an evidence of truth, "necessary implication in thought" is regarded as expressing "a similar implication in reality." Thus the universe must be regarded ultimately as the embodiment of a Purpose. We feel that all our efforts are directed towards an ideal, which, though in its completeness beyond human knowledge,

1. 'Elements of Constructive Philosophy,' p. 432.

yet is being continually realised in the processes of the universe and in our own lives. This conception of an immanent teleology does not separate the end from the means. In the words of Latta, "In so far as the means are utilised the end is realised..... . The specific nature of the means is an element in the end; the end, apart from the means, is not the end that we really seek."[1] Prof. Mackenzie takes a work of art as an illustration of this conception. As he puts it, the "finality" must be "immanent" in the system. The end of the universe is its own perfection, which, consequently, must be achieved entirely within itself. This conception of Worth or Value forms the central feature of most modern systems of philosophy. It is emphasised by Bosanquet and Bradley, Höffding and Eucken, no less than by Spinoza, Leibniz, and Kant. To Kant the world is a moral order, where the most prominent position is given to the good-will, as something intrinsically good apart from its material consequences. In truth, it is Kant's firm conviction in the ultimate value or worth of the universe as a "realm of ends" that supplies the key to his whole philosophy. As it has been put, Ethical Teleology is the middle term in the Critical Philosophy. The problem of the three Critiques is one problem, and apart from the positive contributions of the Critique of Judgment, the problem of the Critique of Pure Reason cannot be understood. The outcome of the Kantian Philosophy is the conception of Nature as a moral order. In the Dialectic Mechanicism is shown to be incapable of completely explaining Nature without introducing Teleology as a heuristic principle. The feeling of unity underlies all our speculative endeavours. Reason, from its very nature, strives after the unconditioned.

1. 'Proceedings of the Aristotleian Society (1907-08).'

Though this unconditioned is beyond experience, though the conception of the systematic unity of nature as complete teleological unity is an ideal, yet in the fact of freedom we have an instance of a Pure Teleology, and this conception of Freedom supplies the keynote to a teleological interpretation of Nature. The validity of Ethics presupposes the subordination of nature to a moral purpose. There is a close kinship between nature and the moral personality. It is only in a morally ordered world that the moral man can attain to moral culture.[1] Though Kant strenuously protests against the introduction of a Supreme Being to explain particular phenomena, and demands an explanation of the course of things on mechanical lines, yet this mechanism is not really contradictory to Teleology in the true sense. The Mechanism he favours in the Critique of Judgment is one that transcends the distinction of Mechanism and Teleology. It is nature regarded as purposive without a purpose, a theory that has been compared to Bergson's "creative evolution."[2]

1. Cf. Prof. Pringle-Pattison in 'The Idea of God.'
2. Macmillan, 'The Crowning Phase of the Critical Philosophy.'

X

THE NATURE OF THE SELF.

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Modern philosophy opens in Descartes with a fundamental opposition between the thinking subject on the one hand, and the world of extended matter on the other. The pernicious two - substance doctrine is openly espoused, and many of its fatal consequences are explicitly drawn. As a result Descertes shuts himself up within the circle of his own ideas, and can never reach a world of external objects.

Spinoza, with his omnis determinatio est negatio, denies the substantiality of the finite self. Substance is defined as that which is in itself and is conceived through itself, and such a character can be ascribed only to God, the Absolute Substance.

Leibniz, however, conceived the universe as made up of a multiplicity of spiritual substances, and saves his system from the charge of Atomism simply by holding that, though not a real, yet an ideal, continuity obtains between the monads.

The Empiricists, Locke and Berkeley, uphold the view of the self as a substantial entity, though Hume, coming immediately after, strenuously denied the existence of such a hybrid, and resolved the self into the sum of its own states.

Kant, coming after Hume, was at first steeped in the philosophy of Wolff, and so it is not surprising that his pre-Critical writings abound in passages which uphold the substantiality of the self. Wolff extended the Leibnizian philosophy in the direction of Atomism. He even wavers in his adoption of the idea of a pre-established harmony between soul and body as being hardly reconcilable with

the extreme heterogeneity which, on his view, obtains between these two substances. The pure self-determination of substances, upon which Leibniz had laid so much stress, is even exaggerated by Wolff. No wonder, therefore, that Kant's earlier writings show traces of such a view. The Leibnizian conception of a multiplicity of spiritual atoms, but modified in accordance with the Newtonian discoveries, influenced his thought for a considerable period. The conception of the self as a spiritual substance persists even throughout the Dissertation of 1770 and the earlier portions of the Critique of Pure Reason. In the Dissertation the self as an identical entity is conceived as existing prior to all experience, and to its synthetic activities is assigned a creative power in the generation of a unitary experience, for a unitary consciousness. A similar view is presented in those passages of the Critique of Pure Reason where Kant is not true to his own transcendental method. He never appears to have fully realised the implications of the standpoint he is aiming at, and so we find him actually trying to give an account of the genesis of experience out of what is not experience. But as Ward insists in his 'Naturalism and Agnosticism', if experience is essentially a duality in unity it is gratuitous to transcend the bounds of such an experience and speak of a subject-in-itself and an object-in-itself. We cannot, says Ward, explain experience; we cannot show how it arises from what is not experience. Kant, however, though he contends that experience is a duality in unity, yet tries to account for the origin of such an experience out of a subject-in-itself and an object-in-itself. It is here that we see the influence of the dualism of his predecessors, from which Kant never appears to have successfully freed himself.

When, therefore, he is developing this dualism, he conceives of the self as capable of existing in and by itself prior to all experience. The genuinely Critical teaching, however, casts no light on the existence of such a self as preceding all knowledge of objects. On Critical principles, the self can exist only in so far as it goes out of itself, as it were, to determine objects. It exists simply as the unity of the manifold. It is from this standpoint that Kant overthrows the doctrine of Rational Psychology.

To understand Kant's teaching in the section on the Paralogisms of Rational Psychology it is necessary to bear in mind the implications of his doctrine of Inner Sense. What really led him to adopt such a doctrine were the presuppositions laid bare in the analysis of knowledge. The results of the Critical analysis have definitely shown that there can be no knowledge apart from a sensuous material given in the mind. In and by themselves the categories of the understanding are mere logical functions, empty forms, which derive meaning and significance only in so far as they are realised in the alien matter whose principles of connection they are found to be. Knowledge is given only through perception, and perception involves passivity. The mind is affected by the activity of things in themselves, with the result that appearances are produced in us, and our knowledge of external things simply amounts to a knowledge of these external appearances; we can never know things in themselves, which are absolutely independent of the mind. Similarly, if the mind is to know itself it must perceive itself, and, just as external perception is possible only in so far as the mind is affected by the activity of independent things in themselves, so internal perception requires for its possibility that the mind be affected by its own activity. Moreover, just as

external perception is conceived as being due to a passive faculty, called external or outer sense, so the mind is conceived as affecting itself in virtue of a similar faculty, called internal or inner sense. Consequently, we never do know ourselves. Our knowledge of ourselves is limited to a knowledge of the affections produced in us by the mind's own activity. Hence, when we look inwards and contemplate our inner life, what are revealed to us are mere appearances due to ourselves, and not ourselves. The states and processes of the empirical self are mere appearances, and knowledge of appearance, Kant contends, is radically different from knowledge of that which produces the appearance. Hence, the limited character of our knowledge debars us from making any definite assertions concerning the nature of our real being. The transcendental subject, to whose activities empirical consciousness is ultimately due, is unknown and unknowable. This view of inner sense is not recognised by Caird, and he interprets inner sense to mean inner reflection. Kant himself does often take it in this latter sense, but so long as he consistently develops his Critical principles he has to deny knowledge of a real self by mere self-conscious reflection. Mental states and processes as known are mere appearances, mechanically determined in exactly the same way as the objects of outer sense, and together making up an empirically objective world. But Kant notices another aspect of the nature of the self-conscious subject. A man's phenomenal self is, as it were, limited to his own body, and is regarded merely as one object among others. On the other hand, however, there is that in him in virtue of which he is enabled to transcend his finiteness, his particularity, and contemplate the universe from a universal point of view. Instead of being a mere particular among others, the universal aspect of

consciousness, that is, the transcendental unity of apperception, enables the conscious subject to comprehend innumerable objects and reduce them into a systematic whole or world. Kant sharply distinguished these two aspects of consciousness, and consequently he regarded knowledge of the one as not equivalent to knowledge of the other. The universal aspect of the self calls for an explanation which inner appearances, owing to their contingent character, can never supply. Knowledge of the one aspect of consciousness must be sharply distinguished from knowledge of the other aspect. In truth, the universality of the self must always remain a mystery to us, for our sole object of knowledge, when the mind is turned inwards, is the particular phenomenal self which appears to be necessarily bound up with the presence of a finite body, and, therefore, it seems as if it were a totally different self from that which enables a man to transcend his finitude and contemplate the universe from a universal point of view. It is this difference between the two aspects of our consciousness, which tends to make us regard them as two separate selves, that underlies Kant's treatment of the Paralogisms and is responsible for his unfortunate doctrine of Inner Sense as we have outlined it above. Caird's version of "Inner Sense" fails to give expression to these distinct aspects of consciousness as conceived by Kant, whilst the view we have adopted of Inner Sense does full justice to Kant's conception of the empirical ego and the pure ego as being two distinct and separate selves. Since our knowledge, therefore, is limited to that of the empirical self, it must be maintained that the subject in itself is essentially unknowable. It must be admitted, however, that Kant at times seems to waver in his assertions concerning the

unknowableness of the real self, but this can be set down to his private convictions. The Leibnizian spiritualism had sunk too deep to be easily eradicated, and so he found it very difficult to deny absolutely any knowledge of a noumenal self.

Turning, therefore, to the sections on the Paralogisms as given in the 1st and 2nd editions of the Critique, we must bear in mind Kant's doctrine of Inner Sense and also the theory that he is combating. It has been well said that the destructive part of a theory generally casts more light on the author's meaning than the constructive part. The same holds true of Kant in this connection. His sole aim is to expose the weakness of the position adopted by Rational Psychology. It is not so much the conclusions drawn by these philosophers that call forth his strictures on Rational Psychology. In fact, Kant himself upheld the view of the existence of a soul that survives the body, but he did so entirely on ethical grounds. Here is simply averse to the process of reasoning by which the rational psychologists establish their conclusions. He seeks to save the soul from the pretentions of the speculative reason so that we shall have no justification for denying the existence of such a soul owing to theoretical inconsistencies. Therefore, he shows that the starting-point adopted by these philosophers cannot of itself supply sufficient evidence to warrant the remarkable conclusions drawn by Rational Psychology. Kant's criticism, in effect, is that the "I think" of self-consciousness is a mere representation, and as such its unity cannot of itself establish the unity of its substratum and foundation. He does not deny the existence of such a substantial unity;

he merely contends that the speculative reason, which is limited to a knowledge of the mere logical principle as revealed in the Theory of Knowledge, can neither prove nor disprove the existence of such a soul. Consequently we find him mentioning arguments which are quite legitimate so far as Rational Psychology is concerned, the substance of which, however, he himself would never dream of accepting. For example, in order to show that the unity of apperception as revealed in knowledge cannot of itself justify us in concluding that the self is a unitary substance, simple and self-identical, he suggests that the underlying substrata might change whilst still giving the appearance of an identical unity. We are not entitled to conclude from this that Kant was ready to deny the existence of a unitary soul as underlying the unity of apperception. Consequently, these arguments cannot be adduced as evidence of any change of view contemplated by Kant, as Prof. N.K.Smith appears to think in working out the elaborate system of what he calls Kant's "phenomenalism."

In the light of what has been stated above, we can now proceed to deal with the Paralogisms. In agreement with the Wolffian school Kant holds that if there is to be a knowledge of a thing in itself we can attain to it by means of the a priori alone. The a posteriori cannot carry us further than appearances. In the sections on the Paralogisms he asks if the a priori can give us a knowledge of the self as substance as the rationalists claim. It is this rationalist claim that he is out to overthrow. In accordance with its claims, therefore, Rational Psychology must base its conclusions on the pure "I think" of self-consciousness, for, if any empirical element is admitted, such a psychology would cease to be a pure science. The judgment "I think" is always empirical, but in and by itself the "I think" is a purely

intellectual idea. At the outset Kant notes that the difficulty pertaining to the self is that the thinking subject cannot be known as object. The self as known is the phenomenal or empirical self, but such an empirical self-consciousness presupposes the pure ego as the condition of its possibility. To have a knowledge of anything we must determine it as an object through the categories, but the self, as the source of the categories, cannot be itself determined through them. We are entangled in a "vicious circle" whenever we attempt to determine the subject-in-itself, for every application of the categories has already made use of the representation of the self. Since, therefore, we cannot know the self as existing in and by itself, we are able to comprehend it simply in its effects in the determination of the manifold of sense. "By this I, or he, or it, that is the thing which thinks, nothing is represented beyond a transcendental subject of thoughts = X, which is known only through the thoughts that are its predicates, and of which, apart from them, we can never have the slightest concept, so that we are really turning round it in a perpetual circle, having already to use its representation, before we can form any judgment about it."[1] Since, therefore, the self is known only in its relation to objects, we cannot make any assertions concerning it outside this relation, and so we cannot determine it, as Rational Psychology does, as a substance existing in and by itself apart from all objects whatsoever. To determine the self as an object and so as a substance would require a manifold, and there is no trace of such a manifold in the bare "I think." It is "the poorest of all our ideas," in itself perfectly empty, of which we cannot even say that it is a concept. It is not a representation serving to distinguish a particular object, but merely a form of representation in general. The fact of the matter is, that the

1. A. p.346.

Rational Psychologists have confused the self that can be known as an object with the thinking subject that cannot be thus characterised. The self as known is merely the phenomenal self, and in attaining to a knowledge of this self Rational Psychology thought that it was determining the pure ego which is quite distinct from the empirical ego. This is quite consistent with Kant's view of Inner Sense. His contention appears to be that the conscious subject in determining objects affects itself, so that within the subject-object relation it appears different from what it is outside that relation, i.e., as it is in itself. Our knowledge of the self, however, is limited to its appearance within the subject-object relation, and consequently we can never determine the subject in itself.

Before we begin discussing each of the Paralogisms in turn it is necessary to notice the full implications of Kant's doctrine of Inner Sense. Had he kept consistently to the implications of this doctine it would have been impossible for him to establish reality in any form. Our inner states and processes being mere appearances, it is obvious that whatever is apprehended by their means must be illusory. To know anything for what it is, to know appearance as appearance, evidently presupposes the reality of the mental process whereby it is apprehended. In the Postulates of Empirical Thought, however, and also in his criticism of the ontological argument for the existence of God, Kant had expressly declared that a mere concept, in and by itself, cannot establish existence. Experience alone can supply the necessary data for inferring existence. The "sole criterion of actuality" is perception, but a perceptual experience is necessarily appearance. Consequently, there are no real processes of a real self whereby appearance can be apprehended,

and so we have nothing but illusion. As Pistorius puts it, "(If our inner representations are not things in themselves but only appearances) there will be nothing bul illusion, for nothing remains to which anything can appear."[1] Kant, therefore, is faced with a serious problem. His doctrine of inner sense consistently developed implies that the only self revealed to consciousness is appearance. Yet, in some way or other, he has to maintain that the self-conscious subject possesses a real existence, even though the truly critical teaching makes it impossible for us to determine in anyway the nature of a noumenal being. In the 1st edition, however, he appears to have assumed the existence of a noumenal being, though he argues that we cannot have a knowledge of it. We know that something does think in us, he seems to assert, though we cannot say what it is. We know not whether it is "I" or "he" or "it." In the 2nd edition, however, the problem raised by the doctrine of inner sense is candidly faced, and several passages added in this edition show that Kant found it very difficult to carve out a satisfactory position for himself. The difficulty is eventually surmounted by holding that the proposition "I think" contains within itself the proposition "I am." The "I think", it is contended, is identical with the "I am." "The 'I think' expresses the act of determining my own existence,"[2] and the self thus revealed is neither appearance nor illusion, for the "I think" is not a sensuous, but an intellectual, representation, and, therefore, it can determine real existence. This intellectual representation, however, does not give us a knowledge of the self as existing. Intuition is required for knowledge. Prior to experience, therefore, the "I think" merely gives us the thought of something existing. Later on in the Critique Kant will not concede even this power to the "I think."

1. Quoted by Prof. N.K.Smith in 'Commentary to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason' p. 323, from Erdmann's 'Kriticismus'
2. B. 157 n.

In B. 422 n. he emphatically declares that the proposition "I think", or "I exist thinking," is an empirical proposition, and cannot take place without sensuous material being supplied to thought. The "I think" is still intellectual, but it now turns out that this "pure intellectual faculty" cannot be employed prior to all experience to determine the subject's existence. The empirical is indispensable for its application. "Without some empirical representations, however, which supplies the matter for thought, the act, I think, would not take place, and the empirical is only the condition of the application or of the use of the pure intellectual faculty."[1]

The "I think", therefore, involves the existence of the subject, but it cannot supply us with any further information regarding the nature of this noumenal being. It merely asserts <u>that</u> it is, not <u>what</u> it is. ".....I am conscious of myself, neither as I appear to myself, nor as I am by myself, but only that I am."[2] This notion of the self's existence involved in the "I think" is discussed by Kant in an interesting passage[3] added in the 2nd edition where he seeks further to reconcile a transcendental consciousness of the self's existence with the doctrine of the Postulates of Empirical Thought. Though in his earlier writings the pure forms of the understanding were regarded as capable of yielding the conception of objects in general, the genuinely critical teaching is absolutely opposed to such a view of the function of the categories. From Kant's mature standpoint the categories as pure forms of the understanding are merely logical forms, in and by themselves, perfectly empty, and thus they cannot yield us any object whatsoever. Sense alone can supply us with objects. In B. 429, however, Kant admits that in the proposition "I think," when it means "I

1. B. 422n. ~~he emphatically declares that the proposition "I~~
2. B. 157.
3. B. 422n.

exist thinking," we are determining the subject as an object with reference to its existence. The Categories cannot give us consciousness of such an object. Therefore, Kant concludes that the notion of existence involved in the "I think" is not the category of existence. His general theory of knowledge supplies no justification for the strange teaching of B. 422 n. It can only be interpreted as an effort after consistency. According to the Critical teaching to know a thing as actual demands perception. A pure category cannot yield an object. Therefore, in this passage, Kant says that the "I think" "expresses an indefinite empirical intuition, that is, a perception," and so is based on sensation, so that it can assert existence. The notion of existence here, therefore, is not a category. "An indefinite perception," he continues, "signifies here something real only that has been given merely for thinking in general, not therefore a phenomenon, nor as a thing by itself (noumenon), but as <u>something</u> that really exists and is designated as such in the proposition, I think." Such teaching cannot be fitted into his general Theory of Knowledge.

The net result of what has been said above, therefore, is that Kant holds that the self does rest upon noumenal conditions though we cannot determine these conditions any further. A transcendental subject does exist, but we cannot say precisely what is its nature. We can now deal with each of the Paralogisms in turn.

The four fundamental propositions of Rational Psychology all turn on a confusion between the subject in representation, and the subject <u>in itself</u>.[1] The characteristics

1. cf. Prof. N.K.Smith's 'Commentary to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason.'

of the self as revealed in knowledge are merely logical, and as such they cannot be identified with the real predicates of a real or noumenal self. We undoubtedly do think of the self as the subject of all our thoughts, but this constant logical subject of thought cannot be identified with the subject in itself, "which forms the substratum and foundation of it and of all our thoughts." It is simply the invariable centre wherein all our thoughts are focussed. The category of substance and attribute as applied to it can only denote the logical relation of a subject to its predicates. As Kant states it in the 2nd edition, that the I that think must always in thought be regarded as subject and cannot possibly be regarded as a predicate is an identical proposition, but this does not mean that I can determine myself as a self-subsistent being or substance, for such a proposition is an a priori synthetic judgment, and would require for its possibility data that cannot be found in the "I" as simply thinking. To apply the category of substance, we must lay hold of the permanency of an object given in experience, but the "I think" cannot of itself yield such a permanent intuition as is required for its determination as a permanent substance. The "I think" "signifies a substance in idea only, and not in reality."[1] When Kant states our inability to comprehend the thinking self as a substance, he explains that we always apply the category of substance only to objects of intuition. The category has meaning only in so far as it is realised in a manifold of intuition. The "I think," however, yields no such manifold, and so the category of substance cannot be applied to it.

In accordance with the plan of procedure adopted by Rational Psychology Kant next discusses the concept of simplicity as applied to the pure Ego of transcendental

1. A. 351.

apperception. It is undoubtedly true, he argues, that in thinking I am conscious of myself as one or a unity to which the manifold of experience is referred. If the "I" in each act of thought could be resolved into a plurality of subjects, knowledge would be impossible. All knowledge demands a unitary consciousness. That the "I" in thought is a logically simple subject is indeed a mere analytic proposition. To characterise the "thinking I" as simple substance, however, is a synthetic proposition, requiring for its possibility data beyond what the bare "I" can give us. The argument of paragraphs 5 - 9, as given in the account of this paralogism in the 1st edition, states definitely that the subject as revealed in knowledge is a mere subject in representation, and "the simplicity of the representation of a subject is not therefore a knowledge of the simplicity of the subject....."[1] The logical unity of the subject in representation can never justify us in inferring the real simplicity of the subject in itself. The opening paragraphs of the section dealing with this 2nd paralogism as given in the 1st edition of the Critique embodies a different type of argument in favour of the actual simplicity of the soul. The argument is stated as follows:- The unity of consciousness cannot be conceived as an effect due to the concurrent action of many independent substances in the same way as a mere external effect, e.g., the motion of a body, is the combined motion of all its parts. If that which thinks were composite, "then every part of it would contain a part of the thought, and all together only the whole of it."[2] This, however, would render thought impossible, for if the different representations, like the single words of a verse, be conceived as distributed among the different parts

1. A. 355.
2. A. 352.

of that which thinks, there would result a multiplicity of consciousnesses, and consciousness of the verse as a whole would be impossible. Therefore, Rational Psychology concludes, thought can inhere only in a substance which is absolutely simple.

This argument is eulogised by Kant, and William James makes use of it in his Principles of Psychology. It does not succeed, however, in establishing what it professes to prove. "(That) the many representations must be comprehended under the absolute unity of the thinking subject," cannot be proved analytically from concepts, nor can it be derived from experience. For all that we can prove to the contrary consciousness itself may be a mere effect, which, though one in itself, yet may be due to the collective unity of many co-operating substances. The simplicity of the subject can only be proved transcendentally, but such a transcendental proof can only demonstrate the simplicity of the subject <u>in thought</u>; it cannot establish the synthetic a pricri judgment that the soul is a simple substance.

In the concluding paragraphs of this section on the 2nd paralogism as given in the 1st edition, Kant remarks that the reason why we are so anxious to demonstrate the simple nature of the soul is in order to distinguish it from the corporeal, and thus preserve its incorruptibility. If the soul is incorruptible its separability from body must be demonstrated, but the argument advanced cannot prove anything concerning the separability of body and mind <u>in their noumenal conditions</u>. The spiritualists held that because the qualities of external objects cannot be applied to the objects of the internal sense, and neither can inner phenomena such as thoughts, feelings, desires, etc. be objects of external

1. A. 352.

intuition, we are justified in concluding that the thinking subject is not an appearance in space, and cannot therefore be regarded as corporeal. In his reply Kant reminds us that external objects have been proved to be mere appearances and not things in themselves, and so, if it is desired to demonstrate the distinct character of the thinking being as constrasted with material bodies, we must show that it is quite distinct from that something which underlies appearances in space. This, however, is impossible, for, owing to our limited knowledge, we are confined to appearances, and for all that we can see that something which underlies outer appearances, "if conceived as a noumenon (or better as a transcendental object) might be, at the same time, the subject of thinking....." [1] Therefore, the argument advanced cannot prove anything concerning the real nature of the thinking being and of its relation to matter in its noumenal conditions. It is quite possible that Leibniz was right when he conceived the world of material things to be really a multiplicity of spiritual monads. At any rate, the speculative reason cannot pass a verdict on such hypotheses.

It is from this same subjective standpoint that Kant in the 1st edition discusses the various questions connected with the relation of mind and body. The problem of the connection between mind and body is not to be conceived as that of the interaction of the soul with so-called matter, which is ordinarily regarded as the soul's opposite. Material bodies are simply subjective representations, so that the real question is how external intuition is possible in any thinking subject, and the only answer that can be offered is to refer outer appearances to an unknown transcendental object as their cause.

1. A, 358.

In the 2nd edition, in refuting Mendelssohn's proof of the permanence of the soul, Kant argues that even if we do admit the simplicity of the soul, the argument advanced in favour of the soul's incorruptibility is not valid. Mendelssohn argued by analogy from the causes of the annihilation of matter. The soul, he maintained, cannot pass out of existence suddenly, neither can it do so by the gradual disintegration of its component parts, for the soul is not made up of parts. Kant's reply is that the soul has no extensive, only intensive, quantity, and so it may disappear entirely by the gradual diminution of its intensity.

The 3rd Paralogism is that of Personality. It deals with the identity of the self. The first argument he employs is based on the subjectivity of time as existing in the subject. Consequently he holds that there is a special time belonging to each particular self. In my individual consciousness I necessarily conceive the self as self-identical in its own time, but an external observer places me in his own time, so that even if he does recognise the self-identity of my consciousness that will not prove the objective permanence of myself.

Kant proceeds with his criticism on the same lines as in the preceding paralogisms. The fallacy of Rational Psychology is traced to a confusion between the numerical identity of the "subject in representation" and the numerical identity of the "subject in itself." We must think of the self as preserving its identity throughout the succession of its various states, but such an identity of consciousness is "a formal condition only of my thoughts and their coherence, and proves in noway the numerical identity of my subject..."[1] As Kant puts it in the 2nd edition, the identity of consciousness in its various determinations is an analytic proposition. In and by itself the judgment "I think" cannot

1. A. 363.

express more than "I am I". But the self-identity of consciousness cannot prove that its underlying conditions do not vary. As motion can pass from one elastic ball to another and yet be the same motion, so consciousness may pass from one substance to another and yet preserve the appearance of an identical self. That the self is a self-identical substance is a synthetic judgment, and the "I think" cannot of itself supply sufficient material to frame such a judgment.

The fourth Paralogism deals with the relation of the self to possible objects in space. The connection between this paralogism as given in the 1st edition and the rest of the paralogisms is somewhat strained. The reason why Kant treats of this paralogism under Rational Psychology is that empirical idealism is the inevitable outcome of the position adopted by the rational psychologists. Viewing the soul as a distinct substance, capable of existing in and by itself apart from body, it is natural to conclude that the states of such a self are more directly known than outer bodies in space. The two-substance doctrine inevitably lands us in this "impasse." External objects being viewed, therefore, as things in themselves, we can only infer their existence, and consequently our knowledge of them is not beyond the reach of doubt. As against this empirical idealism Kant argues that external objects are as directly known as our own inner states. Unfortunately, however, he proves this by reducing material objects in space into mere subjective representations. Being, therefore, in consciousness, outer objects are as directly known as any other representations. Moreover, as Prof. N.K. Smith points out, Kant, owing to his " idealist" view of inner experience, instead of establishing really destroys the reality of external objects by equating inner and outer experience. So

that he does not prove more than Descartes himself assumes, viz. that some of the ideas in consciousness are ideas of a material world. By refuting empirical idealism, therefore, Kant thought that he was overthrowing one of the tenets of Rational Psychology.

The fourth paralogism is stated differently in the 2nd edition and the treatment of it is on the same lines as that of the preceding paralogisms. It is undoubtedly true that I distinguish my own existence as a thinking being from things outside me, one of which is my own body. This is a mere analytic judgment. But this will not enable me to assert whether I could be conscious of myself apart from such things outside me, "and whether I could exist merely as a thinking being without being also a sensuous being."[1]

In considering pure Psychology as a whole in the section that immediately follows the discussion of the paralogisms in the 1st edition Kant notes further that the separate existence of the self before the birth and after the death of the body constitutes a problem that can never be solved from a theoretical point of view. To establish the validity of the former conception, i.e. that of the pre-existence of the soul, we must prove that, before the beginning of our sensibility, those transcendental objects, "which in our present state appear as bodies, could have been seen in a totally different way;"[2] to establish the latter conception i.e. that of immortality, we must show that if our peculiar species of sensibility should cease, the thinking subject would continue to know the same unknown transcendental objects, though no longer in the quality of bodies. Speculative principles cannot afford the slightest evidence in support of these assertions, but, on the other hand, no

1. B. 409.
2. A. 394.

valid objection can be raised against them. Such questions must be decided on other than speculative grounds.

The conclusion, therefore, to be drawn from the argument of the Paralogisms is that the real nature of the subject in itself is beyond the reach of speculative reason. The self as revealed in the Theory of Knowledge is merely the subject in representation, and from the logical characteristics predicated of this representation we cannot infer the real attributes to be predicated of the subject in itself. Indeed, for all that we can prove to the contrary, there may be no real or noumenal self underlying the unity of consciousness. The subject in representation must be distinguished from the subject in itself as knowledge from its object, or, in other words, as the representation of an object from the object itself. Unity of representation does not guarantee the unity of that substratum that produces the representation.

Though, however, there can be no knowledge of such a substantial self as Rational Psychology maintains, still the notion of such a self is a necessary Idea of the Reason. The empirical employment of the understanding cannot satisfy the fundamental demands of human Reason. Reason, from its very nature strives after the unconditioned; it seeks complete systematic unity which as such can never be found in experience. There are three Ideas of Reason corresponding to the three complete totalities towards which Reason strives, viz. the soul, the world, and God. These Ideas have no constitutive, but only a regulative use. They cannot determine any real objects; rather are they of the nature of ideals, which animate and direct our striving after unity. Now, as regards the facts of the inner life, Kant claims that the ideal set before us by Reason is the notion of the self as "a simple substance,

existing permanently, and with personal identity (in this life at least)....." Kant, however, is not justified in attributing this special character to the unity and unconditionedness demanded in empirical psychology. The Ideas of Reason simply denote the demands of Reason for unity, system, and unconditionedness in general to stimulate and direct us in the organisation of experience. They cannot set up an ideal of a specific type as is involved in the notion of the self as an immortal being. As Prof. N.K.Smith justly remarks, Kant, by setting up a simple substance as the type of the unity and unconditionedness demanded for the development of the special empirical science of psychology, is "injecting into the Ideals that specific guidance which only the detail of experience is really capable of supplying. He is proving false to his own Critical empiricism, in which no function is ascribed to Reason that need in any way conflict with the autonomy of specialist research; and he is also violating his fundamental principle that the a priori can never be other than purely formal." Kant, however, is himself to a certain extent aware of this inconsistency, for he is not at all definite in his assertions concerning the content of this Idea. In A 649 he speaks of the Idea as that of a "fundamental power," and not as s simple, self-identical substance, whilst in A. 682-4, though he speaks of it as a substance and as a fundamental power, yet he qualifies his assertions to such an extent that it is clear he is simply maintaining the demand for a principle for the organisation of the facts of the inner life. It is his own spiritualist leanings that lead him to characterise the Idea as that of a simple self-subsisting intelligence. Prof. Smith Notes that Kant on page 683 (A) seems to insist on a special and

spiritualist Idea, as regulative of empirical psychology, in order to show the distinctive character of its subject-matter, so as to avoid applying mechanical principles to the determination of its phenomena. This, however, as Dr. Smith remarks, is quite untenable, for in the very next sentences Kant maintains that experience is one and single, and the principle of causality is conceived as determining both the mental and the corporeal.

The Idea of a pure intelligence, therefore, has simply a regulative value. It stimulates and directs us in our efforts to determine the phenomenal self. "That simplicity of substance, etc., was only meant to be the schema of this regulative principle; it is not assumed to be the real ground of all the properties of the soul. These properties may rest on quite different grounds, of which we know nothing; nor could we know the soul even by these assumed predicates by itself, even if we regarded them as absolutely valid with regard to it, for they really constitute a mere idea which cannot be represented in concrete. Nothing but good can spring from such a psychological idea, if only we take care not to take it for more than an idea, that is, if we apply it only in relation to the systematical use of reason, with reference to the phenomena of our soul."

If, now, we compare the two accounts of the Paralogisms as given in the 1st and 2nd editions respectively, the disastrous consequences of the teaching of the Paralogisms are not as rigidly drawn in the 2nd as in the 1st edition. The reason for this is doubtless that, by laying so much emphasis on the impossibility of demonstrating the existence of a substantial soul on theoretical grounds, Kant had appeared as if he wanted to deny altogether the existence of

a real self. As we have already noticed, however, that was not the end he had in view. It was the weakness of the proof, and not the weakness of the conclusion, of Rational Psychology that he wanted to expose. Kant did believe in the existence of an immortal soul, and it is to this personal conviction that Rational Psychology owes much of the more lenient treatment allotted to it in the 2nd edition. When the 2nd edition of the Critique was called for Kant pre-occupied with ethical problems, and in the light of the testimony of the practical reason he found it difficult to deny us all knowledge of the existence of a soul.

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GENERAL CRITICISM OF KANT'S DOCTRINE OF THE NATURE OF THE SELF.

In expounding the Kantian Theory of Knowledge in our previous sections we saw that the fundamental assumptions on which the theory is based made it impossible for us to know the real nature of a thing as distinguished from the subjective effects it was supposed to produce in the mind of the knowing subject. It is in the light of this doctrine that Kant discusses the question of the nature of the self. Things in themselves, whether inner or outer, are equally unknown and unknowable. Just as external things act on an outer sense, generating representations in us, so our noumenal being affects a corresponding inner sense, yielding representations, so that in introspection we are confined to a knowledge of appearance, and can never determine the subject in itself. The states and processes that constitute our empirical self are mere appearances, and, consequently, knowledge of them will not reveal the nature of that something which underlies and produces them. The real nature of the self, is, therefore, unknown, and this should prevent us from making dogmatic assertions regarding it. Once realise that there are inevitably some things beyond the pale of science, and the reputation of metaphysics as a science will be retrieved. The mystery surrounding the self had naturally led men to dogmatise concerning its nature, until in the end scepticism held the field. This, however, was due to a failure to recognise the limits of human knowledge. The problems pertaining to the real nature of the self, as, e.g. those of

freedom and immortality, are beyond the reach of the understanding. The speculative reason, therefore, can neither affirm nor deny the freedom and immortality of the self. If a solution of these ultimate problems is demanded, the practical reason alone can supply us with the necessary data.

Kant's doctrine of inner sense, therefore, shows the impossibility of acquiring any knowledge of the subject in itself. The self as known is mere appearance. It is the phenomenal self that is the object of knowledge when our thought is, as it were, turned inwards. The pure ego which is active in knowledge and morality does not belong to phenomena, though all its acts as revealed in empirical self- consciousness must be regarded as merely phenomenal. It is here that we see the difficulties attending Kant's unfortunate doctrine of inner sense. As a result of this doctrine he conceives of our mental states and processes as mere appearances of states and processes as things in themselves. This, however, is unintelligible. As Paulsen notes, a facial expression can be said to be an appearance of an inner process, but, as regards a thought and a feeling, to be thought and felt are sbsolutely identical with their existence. In the case of mental facts appearance is reality and reality is appearance. They <u>are</u> what they <u>appear</u> to us. The conception of an unknown ego in itself underlying the constituents of the empirical ego, remarks Paulsen, flavours too much of the soul-substance doctrine, which Kant clung to in his private convictions.

Paulsen further points out that if we take away all the particular acts of the self which are branded as phenomenal, what is left is merely the form of the ego in general, so that the ego as <u>individual</u> is phenomenal. This, however, would conflict with Kant's firm conviction that the pure ego is an individual. It is perfectly true that so long as we adhere

strictly to the implications of the doctrine of inner sense we are not entitled on speculative grounds to postulate the existence of a noumenal self. Indeed, in the section dealing with the Paralogisms of Rational Psychology, Kant himself says that it is quite possible that the substance that underlies our thoughts is the same as that which underlies the material world in space. This, however, is merely stated to show the many possibilities left open by the limitation of our knowledge. It must be borne in mind that Kant is criticising Rational Psychology, which maintained that the existence of a soul-substance is logically demonstable. What Kant urges in reply is that there may be a noumenal soul, but that the arguments advanced in its favour by Rational Psychology are inadequate. On Critical principles we can neither affirm nor deny the existence of such a soul on speculative grounds. That Kant, however, did believe in the existence of a pure ego as an individual is clearly seen in his ethical writings, where he contends for the immortality of the individual soul, and never once throughout the Critique of Pure Reason, which merely paves the way for the positive contributions of the Critique of Practical Reason, does he deny the existence of a noumenal self in us.

The term "inner sense" Kant took over from the philosophy of Locke, and, arguing by analogy from the five senses, he unfortunately interpreted self-consciousness as a kind of a sixth sense in order to fit in with the requirements of his general theory of knowledge, viz. that knowledge is limited to appearances. The conception of an inner sense, however, says Ward,[1] is untenable. Every sense has a sense-organ, but there is no evidence of any organ or physical basis of inner sense. Moreover, the different senses are distinct and

1. Article in 'Encyclopaedia Brittanica' Vol. 9.

independent; we cannot hear that we taste, but we may be conscious that we taste, Again, it may be urged that each sense is sui generis as regards quality, but the facts of the so-called inner sense are merely those of the external senses conceived in a new relation. Finally, it may be stated that sense impressions are passively received irrespective of the will of the recipient and without relation to the contents of consciousness at the time, but the facts of the inner sense are due to our mental activity and are never independent of feeling and volition and the contents of consciousness.

On the other hand, if we ignore the above interpretation of inner sense, and take inner sense, as Caird does in his massive volumes on the 'Critical Philosophy of Kant' and as Kant himself often does, to mean inner reflection, we are still confronted with formidable difficulties from Kant's point of view. If there is no internal sense similar to the ordinary five senses, how does the phenomenal differ from the noumenal self? We can understand Kant holding to the contrast between phenomenon and noumenon as regards external things, for things in themselves are supposed to affect a sense thereby producing representations, and knowledge of these representations will be merely knowledge of appearance as distinguished from knowledge of the external thing in itself, which on Kantian principles is impossible. If, however, there is no inner sense that the ego in itself can affect in order to produce representations, then clearly the knowledge we have of the self is not a knowledge of representations, as in the case of external objects. Why, therefore, is the ego as known branded as mere appearance? We may, of course, say that the real self is the self as it

is at rest outside the subject-object relation, and that the empirical self is the self in action within the subject-object relation, but, if there is no inner sense, then the contents of the empirical ego cannot be representations produced by the action of underlying processes as things in themselves. Hence our mental processes as known, not being representations produced by real processes, must be real processes themselves. As actual occurrences, therefore, our mental states are known as they are and not simply as they appear. Consequently, in direct contradiction to the fundamental assumption on which his general theory of knowledge is based, Kant would now have to admit that some facts, viz. mental facts, are truly known. Why, therefore, does he not admit that other facts likewise, viz. physical facts, are as directly known? In neither case can the act of apprehending be identified with the content apprehended. Knowledge of a psychical fact as it is involves the same kind of problem as knowledge of a physical fact.

Moreover, if we admit that mental states as known are realities and not simply appearances, it is impossible to maintain that the real nature of the self is unknowable, for the self reveals itself in its activities.

The difficulties that encounter Kant in formulating his doctrine of the self show that he is still baffled by the old problem of substance and attribute. He was convinced of the existence within us of a noumenal being, the thing that thinks, though we cannot say whether it is "I" or "he" or "it." This noumenal being in itself is beyond knowledge, but it has the power of going out of itself to determine objects, and it is only as revealed within the subject-object relation that the self can be known by us. Such knowledge,

however, does not give us an insight into the real character of our noumenal being, for the particular experiences of the self as known are mere appearances, and knowledge of appearance, argues Kant, is radically different from that which produces the appearance. The object-self presented to us in knowledge is merely phenomenal, and as such must be sharply distinguished from the thinking subject which can never be known as an object. Instead of regarding the particular experiences of the self as being a true, however inadequate, expression of the real nature of our noumenal being, Kant maintains that the subject in itself is unknown and unknowable. As in the case of the objects of outer sense, so in the case of the objects of inner sense we must abide by the old contrast of the noumenon and the phenomenon. What is known is the phenomenon; the noumenon lurks behind this phenomenon, and never reveals itself to human observation. This conception of a subject in itself underlying the empirical ego flavours too much of Locke's doctrine of substance as the "unknown substratum" wherein qualities inhere. It is perfectly true that Kant argues against the possibility of inferring the existence of a soul-substance from the data supplied by a careful consideration of the facts of the inner life, but his language betrays too clearly his spiritualist leanings. As a refutation of the claims put forward by rational psychology, however, which is Kant's main concern, his teaching must be regarded as conclusive. The rational psychologists had contended for the existence of a simple spiritual substance within us, capable of existing in and by itself apart from body, and preserving its identity amidst the flux of psychic phenomena. From the earliest times this substantialist view of the soul gained wide currency because it appeared

to satisfy the claims put forward respecting a life beyond the grave. In a crude, unelaborated form it appears in the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle. It was further developed in the scholastic philosophy of the Middle Ages, until in the philosophy of Descartes we see its full implications openly stated and defended. By the application of his celebrated method of doubt Descartes shows that what alone is beyond the reach of scepticism is the existence of a certain thought at a certain moment in a doubter's experience. This alone is clearly and distinctly perceived. Descartes' dictum, however, implies more than the momentary existence of a believing attitude in the sceptic's experience. By his formula-Cogito, ergo sum- he appears to mean that it is equally indubitably certain that there exists something that is referred to as "I". If Descartes means that we are intuitively aware of the existence of the "I" prior to all experience we have to reply that such is not the case. We do not originally apprehend our conscious states as activities of the "I." It is only after a long process of mental development that we are enabled to form a notion of the self. Consciousness of self is possible only in relation to and in contrast with what is not-self. Hence we find Huxley objecting to Descartes's starting-point, and maintaining that in the light of his own criterion Descartes had only proved that "there is a thought," for the mere fact of doubting simply shows that a certain state of consciousness does actually exist at the time. It is not intuitively and indubitably certain at the first glance that this state is an activity of the "I". In fact, such an assertion can be and has been doubted by many eminent

philosophers. Hume, e.g., contended that the notion of the self is a mere illusion. Those who believe in the existence of the "I" look upon it as having a certain persistence. It is the same self that covers the past, present, and future, and how can a present state of consciousness give of itself an immediate assurance of the existence of such an abiding self? Descartes, however, goes even further than this. He says that we apprehend more clearly and distinctly than we do anything else that this "I" exists as a thinking thing, a res cogitans. He seems to think that we are immediately aware of the self as a simple indivisible substance. This, however, is not true. As Prof. Mackenzie puts it, "When I apprehend that this flower is blue, I cannot really doubt either the 'I' or the 'apprehension' of the 'this' or the 'flower' or the 'blueness' but <u>what</u> exactly any of these is and how far any of them persists as a separate substance, is not yet determined."[1] Instead of proving, therefore, Descartes merely assumed the existence of a substantial soul in which consciousness was supposed to inhere. The result of this doctrine of the self as a thinking thing was to conceive of mind and body as two separate and distinct substances. Matter was regarded as forming no part of the <u>essence</u> of the self, which consists entirely in thought, so that the elimination of body would not affect the existence of the self. This conclusion was possible for Descartes, says Laird, because "of the barrenness of the content of the self" in his theory, and also because he confused ground and cause. "Unless cause and ground are identical the self may require physical conditions although these are no part of its essence, and this is the usual view. And when Descartes maintained that the presence or absence of the body does not affect the content of the self, it is doubtful whether

1. 'Elements of Constructive Philosophy.' p. 31.

he understood by this content or essence anything more than the permanent substance which he believed to continue unchanged so long as thinking persists."[1]

With the exception of Malebranche, who maintained that we have no clear idea of the self, and Spinoza, whose metaphysical system prevented him from assigning an independent existence to determinate things as mere modes of the one infinite substance, the soul-substance doctrine exercised a profound influence upon Descartes' immediate successors, viz. Leibniz, Locke, Berkeley, and even Kant. Berkeley's natural line of thought would have led him as it naturally led Hume afterwards to dissolve the self into a complex of ideas. Indeed, his earlier writings show that at one time he would not hesitate to develop his principles to their logical conclusions. Thus, e.g. in his "Commonplace Book' there are passages which show that he was ready to regard the mind as consisting in a collection of presentations "The very existence of ideas constitutes the soul. Mind is a congeries of perceptions. Take away perception, and you take away mind. Put the perceptions, and you put the mind." In the 'Treatise concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge', however, he lays stress on activity as the characteristic of the self. Confining the term "idea" to phenomena of sense Berkeley realised that the self-conscious agent cannot be an "idea." "But besides all that endless variety of ideas or objects of knowledge, there is likewise <u>something which knows or perceives them, and exercises divers operations</u>, - as willing, imagining, remembering, - about them. This perceiving active being is what I call Mind, Spirit, Soul, or Myself. By which words I do not denote any one of my ideas, but a thing entirely distinct from them, wherein they exist,

1. 'Problems of the Self,' p. 310.

or, which is the same thing, whereby they are perceived-for the existence of an idea consists in being perceived."[1] An idea, "being passive and inert, cannot represent unto us, by way of image or likeness, that which acts."[2] Spirit cannot be itself perceived, but only by its effedts. Still, Berkeley contends, we can attach a meaning to our personal identity and agency, and so he concludes that we have a "notion" of self. In our consciousness of self we have sufficient grounds for holding that we have a "notion" of a spiritual substance. "..... a spirit has been shown to be the only substance or support wherein unthinking beings or ideas can exist; but that this substance which supports or perceives ideas...."[3] "What I am myself - that which I denote by the term I- is the same with what is meant by soul or spiritual substance."[4]

Locke, whilst still advocating the soul-substance doctrine, denied the knowableness of such a substance, and thus paved the way for the subsequent destructive criticism of Hume. The complex idea of any substance, says Locke, contains a number of simple ideas corresponding to the qualities of the thing, and also a general idea of substance or of a substratum or underlying something in which the qualities of the thing are considered to be inherent. He fully admits that we have no experience of such a transcendent substance which we regard as the underlying support of qualities or attributes or accidents. The reason assigned for our having such an idea of substance in general is our inability to conceive how the qualities should subsist alone or in one another. ".....not imagining how these simple ideas can subsist by themselves, we accustom ourselves to suppose some substratum wherein they do subsist and from which they do result."[5] An analogous

1. 'Principles of Human Knowledge' par. 2.
2. Ibid. par. 27.
3. Ibid. par. 135.
4. Ibid. par. 139.
5. 'Essay concerning Human Understanding' Bk. XII. par.6.

substratum or substance is claimed for the operations of the mind, a spiritual substance which stands in the same relation to such mental operations as thinking, reasoning, etc. as corporeal substance does to corporeal qualities. In each case our idea of substance is equally obscure. Locke, therefore, holds that we have no clear or distinct idea of substance, and yet he cannot dispense with it. He realised that an unsubtantiated group of phenomena was unintelligible, just as language would be which had adjectives only and no substantives. The qualities of a particular substance must be considered as united in one thing. To regard them as so united is a necessity of thought, yet such an idea of substance in general is useless for all practical purposes. It is always the same and cannot, therefore, explain why certain particular substances have certain particular qualities. Neither can it explain how these particular qualities are unified. By the general idea of substance, therefore, Locke merely meant that the qualities of a particular substance must be regarded as unified in a certain way, and incidentally, whilst still advocating the soul-substance doctrine, he showed the futility and uselessness of this conception of substance to account for the facts of our inner life. In one passage[1] he even goes so far as to say that it is quite possible that there exists no distinct immaterial substance in us after all; the facts of consciousness are equally well explained if we conceive of God superadding to matter a faculty of thinking instead of superadding to it another substance with a faculty of thinking.

Again, the notion of personal identity is explained by him apart from the notion of substance. Personal identity, he insists, consists entirely in the identity of <u>consciousness</u> and not in the identity of a transcendent substance over

1. 'Essay concerning Human Understanding' Bk. IV.Ch.III.par.16.

and above our psychical states. Like Kant after him, he hints that consciousness might retain its identity throughout a succession of underlying substances, if there be any. Locke, therefore, minimised the value of a transcendent substance to such an extent as to make us feel that he could have easily denied its existence altogether.

Hume, as is well known, reduced the self entirely into the sum of its own states. The value of Hume's teaching, which we have already expounded in a previous section, consists in showing that the self cannot exist apart from its states. It was his failure to come across such a "spiritual substance" which is separate from, and irreducible to, particular experiences that led him to reduce the self into the sum of its states.

Kant, like Locke, whilst holding to a belief in the existence of a soul, shows quite conclusively in his treatment of Rational Psychology that the existence of such a "spiritual substance" is not logically demonstrable. Experience cannot vouch for the existence of a transcendent substance over and above the particular experiences that constitute the stream of consciousness. It is undoubtedly true that the self as known exhibits unity and continuity, but this does not prove the existence of a unitary substance capable of existing in and by itself apart from the series of processes that constitutes our present empirical self. Within the self there are to be found a multiplicity and a unity, but the unity cannot be separated from the multiplicity. Conceived apart from the manifold, whose principles of connection it is, the unity is a mere formal unity; it is a mere abstraction, a "focus imaginarius into which the multiple relations which constitute the intelligible world return."[1] That this logical characteristic of thought

1. Prof. Seth Pringle-Pattison in 'Hegelianism and Personality.' p. 28.

does not necessarily imply the existence of a unitary substance is clearly recognised by Kant. Like Locke before him he regards it as possible for the self to be represented to us as an identical unity even though its underlying conditions change. Indeed, he even hints that, for all we know to the contrary, what underlies consciousness might be the same substance as underlies matter.

Our discussion up to this point has shown the futility of endeavouring to explain the substantiality of the self by introducing a transcendent substance in which our particular experiences are supposed to inhere. Examination of the philosophical writings of the supporters of the soul-substance doctrine cannot supply a shred of theoretical proof for establishing the existence of such a "substance." Indeed, we are forced to conclude from a perusal of these writings that the real reason for these philosophers' advocacy of a substantialist view of the soul is, not the theoretical evidence in its favour, but the long-standing conviction that it alone was capable of safeguarding their cherished beliefs concerning the life after death. So firmly rooted was this conviction that many philosophers as, e.g. Reid, adopted the notion of a simple immaterial substance even in direct contradiction to the fundamental principles of their philosophical theories. According to Reid we have no consciousness of self, we have merely a "conviction" of its existence. Though he protests against the contrast of noumenon and phenomenon, he yet adheres to the notion of a transcendant immaterial substance in that he conceives of the self as lurking behind our mental operations which alone fall within the field of consciousness. He fails to see that the self reveals itself in its activities, and so he substitutes personal conviction for self-consciousness.

It is not at all certain whether Russell also is not

under the influence of the soul-substance doctrine when he holds in the 'Problems of Philosophy'[1] that we have a direct awareness, a knowledge by "acquaintance," of the self, but that we cannot determine its nature. He argues as follows:- All acquaintance is a relation between two terms, viz. "the person acquainted and the object with which the person is acquainted." In self-consciousness, where I am acquainted with my acquaintance with the object, the person acquainted is myself, so that "when I am acquainted with my seeing the sun, the whole fact with which I am acquainted is 'Self-acquainted-with-sense-datum.'" From the fact of introspection therefore, says Russell, it appears certain that we do have a knowledge of self, for in introspection our object is "Self-acquainted-with-sense-datum." So far we have no reason to quarrel with Russell's contention. Immediately, however, he makes the startling confession that he cannot say what the self is. Along with Hume he complains that in introspection we always stumble upon some particular thought or feeling, and never upon a separate and distinct "I" which has the thought or feeling. He unfortunately appears to conceive of the self as standing on one side of the chasm and the sense-datum on the other, with the act of acquaintance forming a kind of connecting link between them, and so, though he admits that in introspection we do become aware of cognitive acts, he thinks that a knowledge of such psychical processes does not give us knowledge of the self: otherwise why does he, after admitting that cognitive acts can be known, say that we cannot determine the nature of the self. It appears, therefore, that Russell is looking for the self in something quite apart from our mental processes. Evidently he is not ready to say that the nature of the self is revealed in our particular experiences, that the self is a unity of experiences, or he would not maintain, even after admitting that a knowledge of

1. p. 97.

our psychical processes is possible, that the nature of the self is unknown to us. The self, on Russell's view, sounds suspiciously like the noumenon lurking behind the phenomenon.

The conception of a transcendent substance in which qualities or "accidents" are supposed to inhere is evidently due to a failure to comprehend the true relation subsisting between substance and quality. Instead of recognising the mutual dependence of substance and quality, we are prone to conceive of the qualities in distinction from their substance. We tend to bestow upon the qualities a kind of substantial existence of their own, and then the "substance" is introduced as a kind of transcendent cement to unite together a number of particular things. The different things are regarded as somehow inhering in "one indivisible thing," and this, therefore, will explain how they are unified into one distinct whole. They form one whole because they are united together by one indivisible thing. The problem of the One and the Many is, therefore, regarded as solved by conceiving of the Many as being contained in a distinct indivisible entity. This, however, cannot solve the metaphysical problem of substance, for to conceive of substance as one thing among other things obviously leads to an infinite regress. When Locke occasionally regards substance as one idea amongst others he does not solve the problem of substance, for to conceive of substance as a simple idea like colours or sounds "would only add another unit to the collection, instead of explaining the union of this set of ideas in a distinct particular thing."[1]

The substantiality of a particular thing is not, therefore, explained by postulating a transcendent entity as the unknown support of its attributes. The substance cannot exist apart from its qualities, and qualities cannot exist except as qualities of substance. What really exists is the

1. Laird, 'Problems of theSelf." p. 315.

individual, and every individual thing, as Aristotle pointed out long ago, is a combination of Matter and Form. Aristotle himself clearly realised that it is impossible to come across "~~prior~~ pure matter", i.e. matter which is devoid of all form. The term"matter" he used in a relative sense. What is "form" with reference to inferior things in the scale of being becomes "matter" with reference to a higher form. The matter and the form, the particular and the universal, the substance and the quality, or, in Bradley's language, the "That" and the "What", cannot be separated. They form an indissoluble unity to constitute one particular thing. As Prof. Seth Pringle-Pattison puts it in the 'Idea of God', "Qualities do not fly loose as abstract entities, and substance does not exist as an undetermined somewhat - a mere "that" - to which they are afterwards attached. The idea of the substance is the idea of the qualities as unified and systematized, and indicating through this unity or system, the presence of a concrete individual. The two ideas, therefore, are in the strictest sense inseparable - the two aspects of every reality - its existence and its nature. Nothing exists except as qualitatively determined; and its existence as such and such an individual is, in fact, determined or constituted by the systematic unity of the qualities." Wherever we meet with such a unity of qualities, there we can say a particular thing exists. The identity of the thing does not depend upon its attributes remaining changeless. It depends rather upon the kind and degree of unity immanent in the attributes. "A thing is or is not the same, according to the unity and continuity of properties which it has at any one time and at any other."[1] It is from this point of view that we must interpret the nature of the self. When we examine our own minds we find that the content of our inner life at a certain time consists of psychical processes

1. Laird, 'Problems of the Self" p. 351.

which are in a perpetual state of flux. These particular experiences are not mere qualities of anything else. Qualities as such are universals, but our experiences are particular. They are, as Laird say, the subjects of qualities. "In short, they are substantial, and if they are not sufficiently self-subsistent to be themselves substances or things, they are at least elements in a substance, parts of it and not merely qualities of it."[1] These particular experiences, remarks Laird, constitute the matter or stuff of the soul. If, however, the self is to claim an existence of its own like any other particular substance or thing, it must have its form as well as matter. The form of the self is to be found in the unique unity and continuity which consciousness exhibits. Our experiences are essentially parts of a unity, and apart from this unity these experiences would become unintelligible. This unity of experiences is what we mean by the self. So long as there is unity of experiences we have a self, and so long as this unity persists there is personal identity. Our personal identity will depend upon the persistence of a specific mode of unity and organisation exhibited by our particular experiences. The minimum of unity and continuity sufficient to constitute a self will naturally be less than its unity at some particular time. "If we demand of a self the close-knit unity of the life of a Caesar during the Gallic wars, then, unity of the life of the self throughout its existence is, naturally, less than its unity at some particular time. There is enough unity for personal identity, and that is a very real unity, although it is all too easily exaggerated. And there may be enough unity for personal identity, even after the death of the body."[2]

The self, therefore, we regard as the unified totality

1. Laird, 'Problem of the Self' p. 195
2. Ibid. p. 361.

of experiences that constitute the content of the stream of consciousness. It is this unified whole we designate self-consciousness as distinguished from consciousness of self. Self-consciousness refers to the relation that obtains between our particular experiences. Unless our particular experiences be regarded as parts of a unity, there is no self-consciousness, i.e. there is no self. As Kant long ago pointed out, unless there be self-consciousness in this sense knowledge would be impossible,,for without the unity of the self we should be confined entirely to particular feelings as they come and go, and consequently experience of a world or cosmos as a unified whole could never arise. Self-consciousness must not be identified with consciousness of self. Indeed, consciousness of self is simply,a hindrance to complete self-consciousness. Consciousness of self is the knowledge of self that arises in opposition to the not-self, which is regarded as falling outside the totality of experiences that constitutes the self of the moment. This conception of self-consciousness as distinguished from consciousness of self is well worked out by Mr. G.W. Cunningham in Mind (1911). He illustrates the difference between self-consciousness and consciousness of self by reference to the difference between an inexperienced, nervous orator and a mature orator. The mature orator, he remarks, focusses the totality of his mental processes about one purpose. In so far as he succeeds in doing this there is genuine self-consciousness. The inexperienced orator,however, contrasts himself with his companions: he fails to lose self in its object: his self and other do not blend, and so he lacks that unity of purpose which is the manifestation of his real self of the moment. Consciousness of the self depends

on an opposition between self and not-self, i.e. between self and a foreign Other, but the Other in self-consciousness is not regarded as external to the self; indeed, in this latter case, the Other is the entire content of consciousness. It is this content regarded as unified that constitutes self-consciousness. In the case of consciousness of self, however, what really happens is that the self is identified with a very large part of the content, but a small part of the content refuses to blend with the rest of the content, and so is regarded by the self as an obstacle, as its Other. In the words of Mr. Cunningham, "The Other in self-consciousness is, in a very important sense, identical with the self; but the very essence of consciousness of self consists in the opposition between the self and its foreign Other." Mr. Cunningham proceeds to point out that it is due to a confusion between self-consciousness and consciousness of self that some Idealists refuse to apply the category of self-consciousness to the Absolute. As an example of this he quotes from Prof. Taylor's 'Elements of Metaphysics' - "An experience that contains no discordant elements, in their character as unresolved discords, is not characterised by the contrast-effect which is the foundation of self-hood. An experience which contains the whole of Reality as a perfectly harmonious whole can apprehend nothing as outside or opposed to itself, and for that very reason cannot be qualified by what we know as the sense of self." Taylor here confuses two entirely dirrerent things. The "sense of self" is not identical with self-hood, as Taylor implies. "Self-consciousness is the logical problem of the nature of the self, and not the psychological one of the origin and development of the

awareness of self in contrast with something else....."[1]

In the light of what has been said above it will be readily seen that it is only the experience of the Absolute that attains to complete self-consciousness. This is the element of truth in Kant's contention that the Idea of the self as a complete unity is merely regulative. Our life is continually developing, and so we have not complete self-consciousness. The self and its Other are not wholly unified in our lives. There may be an Absolute, however, whose experience is a perfect harmony, and we can conceive of the category of self-consciousness as being fully applicable to it. Such a complete unity is not absolutely different from the imperfect unity of our own lives. The unity of our actual selves will not be destroyed by the extension of our knowledge. To become conscious of self, i.e. to have a self at all, we shall still require consciousness of objects. "The Idea of completed knowledge is properly that of a self-consciousness in which the object has been completely carried over into the subject, and has, therefore, become in all its determinations combined with the unity of the self."[2] This ideal of a perfect subject-object is not merely regulative, as Kant thought, "since apart from it we should not be conscious of the incompleteness of our knowledge."[3]

In working out the above conception of the self as a unity of experiences we have taken our stand upon what actual experience testifies as to the nature of the self. Such an experience affords no justification for retaining the ontological notion of self as a transcendent spiritual substance over and above our particular experiences. We cannot separate the noumenon from its phenomenon. Hence Dr. Mellone in Mind[4] says that the term "empirical self" should

1. Cunningham in 'Mind' (1911).
2. Watson, 'An Outline of Philosophy,' p. 428.
3. Ibid. p. 429.
4. (1896).

not be applied to the real concrete self, for the notion of an empirical ego is only conceived in antithesis to that of a "transcendental ego" or "pure ego", regarded as possessing an existence distinct from that of the mental processes that constitute the empirical self. The so-called "pure ego",- the form of consciousness in general, however, has no separate existence. Apart from the manifold of the empirical ego it is a mere abstraction. It is merely the form of the manifold, which cannot exist apart from the manifold itself. Kant himself fully recognised this, though, in conformity with his general theory of knowledge, he regarded it as merely the appearance of some underlying unknowable reality. The real self, however, is not an unknown subject in itself, as Kant supposed. As Mellone puts it, "The real self is that which is known and realised or lived in and through the actual process of conscious life; it is essentaially manifested in this its content,- its existence consists in gradually organising itself in certain explicit, definite forms." From the standpoint of a Theory of Knowledge, however, the notion of a transcendental ego is necessary, "for this deals with knowledge as such in abstracto, without reference to any individual thinker, and so the real unity of an actual self-conscious mind becomes, for the Pure Theory of Knowledge, the formal unity of an abstract self."[1]

The conception of an ego, therefore, capable of existing in and by itself prior to all experience must be rejected. As Bradley urges so forcefully in his 'Appearance and Reality', the only self that we have experience of is the self in relation to the object, whilst Kant, in the Refutation of Idealism as given in the 2nd edition, shows that there is no consciousness of self apart from consciousness

1. Mellone in 'Mind (1896).'

of the world. All our particular experiences are experiences of objects. Take away the object and the mental process disappears, and with the disappearance of these mental processes will disappear the entire content of the self, and consequently there will be nothing left to constitute an ego in itself. Kant speaks as if the self as the supreme condition of all unity could exist apart from all relation to the system of nature. He admits that as such it is a mere analytic proposition - I = I. Having relegated all the"manifold", comprising all our particular experiences, to the empirical self, it is no wonder that he says that we can only speak of it as "the subject which thinks." But Kant is not justified in making even this assertion concerning the subject in isolation. As Watson says, "He does it too much honour. Separated from what he calls the object of inner sense, but which is really on his own showing the determinate modes of its activity in the comprehension of the world, it is not a thinking subject, but the mere abstraction of a possibility, which is the possibility of nothing in particular. .....It is not surprising that this fiction of a pure self should be declared unknowable: it is unknowable for the simple reason that it is nothing at all."[1] It is only in relation to knowable objects that the "I" acquires a meaning for us. Indeed, when Kant holds consistently to his view of the mutual dependence of subject and object in knowledge, he admits that the "I", conceived apart from the manifold of inner sense, is but a logical element in real knowledge. The self cannot exist independently of its functions. The self lives in its experiences, and just as mental processes and facts are inconceiveable apart from a self for which they exist, so there is no self which can exist independently of its states. ~~rightly emphasised the need of conscious~~ Hume,

1. 'An Outline of Philosophy' p. 424

in reducing the self into the sum of its states, rightly emphasised the need of conscious states to the life of the self. The self cannot be separated from its object. Its objects are really parts of itself. Its experiences which constitute its life depend on the presence of such and such objects. The Kantian conception of the Ego cannot account for the real concrete self. Kant excludes sentiency from the life of the real self. The desiring self, he says, falls within the realm of phenomena and is determined in exactly the same way as other natural pheomena. But Kant saw that man as a moral agent cannot be thus regarded. The facts of the moral life necessitate the conception of a transcendental freedom. We have a consciousness of a moral law which we are obliged to obey, and this we can do only on the supposition that the real self is free.

FREEDOM. In the latter part of the 'Critique of Pure Reason' he discusses the possibility of transcendental freedom. From the point of view of the theoretical reason an act can only be regarded as any other fact in the empirical world, and as such admits of no explanation other than that offered by the natural sciences. On the empirical level freedom is impossible. Ward in his 'Realm of Ends', eulogises Kant's argument in this connection. He maintains that there is a "profound truth" in Kant's contention that the problem of freedom cannot be solved in terms of cause and effect. All interpretation of human action in terms of cause and effect and of character and environment apparently involved determinism, physical or spiritual.[1] And refusal to recognise determinism by antecedents violated a fundamental law of science, and led apparently to the contingency of chance. Kant therefore offers us an indirect proof of the reality

1 cf. Sidgwick's criticism of Plato and Aristotle in 'The History of Ethics', and of Green in the 'Ethics of Green, Spencer and Martineau'.

of individual moral freedom by holding that the facts of the moral life imply that we are free agents, and that this transcendental freedom is not inconsistent with the admission of strict necessity on the empirical level. In working out this conception of freedom however he appears to be unaware of the full implications of his doctrine of "Inner Sense." His main concern is to establish the Biblical conception of rational freedom. The corporeal side of our nature, the sensibility, he holds to be a strictly natural object, and as such in necessary connection with all other natural objects, What it gives rise to is therefore strictly determined. This is not in accordance with the Critical principles. What he should have maintained is that the sensibility as known belongs to the empirical realm. The sensibility, together with the desires, inclinations, etc. to which it gives rise, is as unknown in its real nature as is the intelligible character of the self. Kant however speaks of the desires and inclinations in this connection as if they were truly known to us and not merely in appearance. These desires he regards as of the nature of impulses deciding human action apart from any interference by the self. He fails to see that a bare impulse in and by itself is not sufficient to account for human action. The impulse must be presented to the self and adopted by it before it can issue in an act. Desires are merely the ways in which the self acts. Our desires, motives, impulses, etc. cannot be separated from the self. They cannot be regarded as standing over against the subject as mere objective phenomena.

~~1. cf. Sidgwick's Criticism of Plato and Aristotle in 'The History of Ethics', and of Green in the 'Ethics of Green, Spencer and Martineau.'~~

They can only be understood as phases in the life of a conscious subject, the modes of the activity of the subject, the ways in which its self-consciousness develops, and the self can never be severed from its modes of expression. To eliminate the desires is to empty the self of its content and so it is no wonder, therefore, that Kant says that the "determining" self as isolated from the "determinable self" is unknowable, though he thinks that it is still real.

Now, Kant, truly realised that the thinking subject cannot be known as one object among others, but he was not justified in concluding from this that the thinking subject cannot be determined at all. Rational Psychology, in holding to the metaphysical conception of a substantial soul, simple, and eternal, he rightly criticises on the ground of confusing the unity of thought as implied in all experience with the conception of a unitary substance existing independently of all experience. The subject cannot exist independently of the system of nature, but, as Watson notes, it does not follow from this that the intelligent subject cannot be known. Kant confuses the inadequacy of the categories by which we characterise the world with their inapplicability to the nature of the self. Though the mechanical categories by which we determine the world are inadequate to determine the subject, yet it is not impossible to determine the subject at all. "It can be determined as what it is, viz. as a self-conscious and self-determining activity."[1] Kant could not admit any knowledge of the determining self, for, according to him, to know anything we must know it as an object determinable through the categories, and the subject-self cannot be thus known through the categories

1. Watson 'An Outline of Philosophy' p, 424.

for this would make it the product of the categories whereas in fact it is the source of them. The unity of thought is presupposed in the application of any category whatsoever, Being, therefore, the presupposition of all thinking it cannot be the product of thinking. The answer to all this, however, says Watson,[1] is that the self is its own product. The categories are merely the ways in which the self exercises its activity in the determination of objects, and it is only as thus active that the subject can become self-conscious. ".....the self-conscious subject exists only in the process by which its self-consciousness is realised. Thus there is no mind which is self-produced."[2] Apart from the mental processes which manifest the activity of the self there is no self, for the real concrete self is simply the unity of these processes.

Prof. N.K.Smith notes in his 'Commentary to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason,'[3] that Kant's argument concerning the unknowability of the self as stated in A. 402 and B. 422 is ambiguous, and in any case cannot be accepted without qualification. The argument as stated in 422 is as follows:- "The subject of the categories cannot by thinking the categories acquire a conception of itself as an object of the categories. For, in order to think them, its pure self-consciousness, which is what was to be accounted for, must itself be presupposed." This does not make it clear whether it is self-consciousness as such or the noumenal self-conscious subject that Kant means in this connection. If the former, then, says Dr. Smith, it is true that the unity of self-consciousness cannot be adequately expressed through any of the categories. Also the categories in the sense of schemata cannot be applied at all to it, for these can be applied only to natural existence in space and

1. 'An Outline of Philosophy.' p. 425.
2. Ibid. p. 426.
3. pp. 327-8.

time. If the latter, then the categories as pure forms of the understanding can be applied to it, e.g. we can say that it is always a subject and never a predicate, and is the ground or condition of experience. These assertions are purely indefinite. They do not say whether the self is "I" or "he" or "it." They merely assert that the self rests upon noumenal conditions. Further than this we cannot prove the applicability of the categories, but neither can we disprove it. Dr. Smith remarks that the real reason for Kant's statement here concerning the applicability of the categories is that he had been preoccupied with moral problems and thought that he had proved that the self, as a self-conscious being, is a genuinely noumenal existence. "That being so, he was bound to hold that the categories, even as pure logical forms, are inadequate to express its real determinate nature."[1] But Kant confuses this with the assertion that they are not only inadequate, but even inaplicable. This, however, is erroneous, "for even if the self is more than mere subject or mere ground, it will at least be so much." Leaving out ethical considerations we can only say that the applicability of the categories is capable neither of proof nor of disproof.

Knowledge of the Self. It is necessary to pause at this point and refer to the positions taken up by some prominent philosophers relating to the knowableness or unknowableness of the self. The position adopted by us in the above exposition rests on the assumption that introspection is a sure guide in determining the nature of the self. What introspection reveals concerning the nature of the self, that, we maintained, it really is. Kant, however, could not accept this, for, as an advocate of the doctrine of inner sense, he is confronted with the difficulty of how a subject can internally intuit itself. The same difficulty confronts Bradley from another point of view. Bradley admits the subject in relation to the object, but, like James, he tends

1. 'Commentary to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason' p. 323.

to disparage the self. He is compelled to attach reality in some sense to the self, but he minimises it as much as possible. The self, according to him, is an actual psychical group. In this he is right, for the self is not, as Lotze appeared to think, a single principle devoid of multiplicity. He then argues that most, if not all, of the content of the self can become an object, and, therefore, part of the not-self, and the not-self cannot form any part of the self. The self as an essential element in our experience is, therefore, disparaged. If the self's content can become not-self Bradley fails to see what can belong to it essentially. On this view, therefore, it is impossible to have any knowledge of the self's existence, for such knowledge would require the self to be its own object, and if when it becomes object it ceases to be a self, then knowledge of the self as object is not a knowledge of self at all. Therefore, knowledge of the self is impossible.

Bradley's difficulty faces every philosopher who contends for the existence of an identical self throughout the course of our lives. In reflecting on its own experiences the subject-self apparently transfers them to the object-self. This tends to make us believe that the self which had the experiences is not the same as the one that contemplates them in self-consciousness. Are there, therefore, several Egos, so that we can say that what we get through introspection is knowledge, not of the present Ego, but rather of the Ego that is past. William James, as is well known, believed in the existence of these several Egos. Though this theory of James is not open to the objection advanced against these theories that contend for the existence of one identical self, yet, as Prof. David Phillips points out,[1] it is confronted with other difficulties which are quite insurmountable. James thinks that the present pulse of the stream of consciousness

1. Article on "The Ego", in 'Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics'.
2. Ibid.

will accomplish all that is demanded of the Ego at any moment, but how, asks Prof. Phillips, "are we to account for its special characteristics, and for the selection made out of the total complex presented at any moment, and thus account for the concrete unity or unities then manifested."[1] Each Ego, according to James, is an isolated individual; it appears for a moment and then vanishes, never to return. The present Ego is not evolved out of the Ego that is past. Whatever of the past is to be found in our present experience is due to an act of appropriation on the part of the present Ego. Without explaining how and why it does so, each Ego in vanishing, says James, leaves behind its complex object and conative and reactive accompaniments to be appropriated by its successor. According to him there is no substantial identity between the present Ego and its predecessor. Each Ego as it comes, and goes, is a different being from its predecessor, and yet James believes that the past conditions the present. "Yet how can this be if there is no identity between past and present states? And how can a past state which is irrevocably dead and gone be known and welcomed by the subject as its own?"[2]

In short, it must be admitted that the conception of several Egos as worked out by James cannot account for the permanence and unity of experience. It is undoubtedly true that our mental states are in a state of perpetual flux, but at the same time experience exhibits a relative permanence. This permanence is accounted for on our view of the soul as a unity of experiences. The particular expeiences change, but the unity remains, and it is this abiding character of the specific mode of organisation of our particular experiences that constitutes personal identity.

We have discussed James's theory at some length because many thinkers believe that it is only by postulating several Egos

1. Article on "The Ego", in 'Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics'.
2. Ibid.
3. Article on "Personality" in 'Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics'.

that we can solve the problem of self-cognition. It appears, however, that we can surmount Kant's difficulty of how a subject can internally intuit itself without resorting to the conception of several Egos. As against Bradley's and kindred theories, which contend that the thinking subject of the moment cannot be known, McTaggart urges[1] that the self can be its own object whilst still preserving its character of subject in relation to the object, for otherwise knowledge of self would be impossible, and, therefore, all propositions which contain an "I" would be unintelligible to us. "Now, there are propositions in which "I" occurs which I do assert, and which are prima facie true. There are certain relations in which a substance can stand to itself, and what is there in the case of the relation of knowledge which should make us reject the prima facie view that this is one of them.. The more we contemplate experience, the more reason we find for holding that it is impossible to reject knowledge of the self."[2]

In an article in Mind (1896) Dr. Mellone remarks that a knowledge of self is possible in that the subject is "an individual centre of intellectual functions and also of affective and active functions which are more and other than the intellectual, though bound with these. And because they are more, the knowledge of them is possible, as involving the necessary transcendent reference of thought." When knowledge is subjectively directed, we become aware of various modes of knowledge, feeling and will, which cannot be identified with the process by which they are known. These modes, however, are modes <u>of the self</u> and so knowledge of them will give us a knowledge of the self. Laird, in his 'Problems of the Self' refers to a seeming contradiction in

1. Article on "Personality" in 'Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics.' Vol 9.
2. Ibid. vol. 9.

this connection. "In self-cognition the object is a series of experiences, and this series must form a unity if it is a self. Now, since it is my self which I cognise in self-cognition there appears to be the contradiction and the act of self-cognition and its objects must be part of the same unity which is cognised." This, however, does not prove the existence of an arch-ego. As Laird notes, it is not necessary for the whole self to be present to us before we can say that we have a knowledge of self. In truth, the whole self is never directly revealed to us in self-cognition, for the present self has existed in the past and will exist in the future. "The question is not whether we can envisage the whole series of our lives, but whether what we do envisage is part of the individual unity which we call ourselves, and how we can extend this by inference." This will surmount the difficulty pertaining to the act of introspection itself. The act of introspection cannot be known through itself, but the present act of introspection makes us aware of previous acts of introspection as parts of the unity of experiences that constitutes our past self, and so we can infer that a future act of self-cognition will make us aware of our present act of introspection as part of the unity of experiences that constitutes our present self.

Ward, also, in his 'Psychological Principles', maintains that a knowledge of self is possible. He admits that the subject of experience cannot be immediately known as an object, but he holds that the "Me" which is presented to us as an object is a "reflexion" of the "I". To the question how do we know that the "Me" faithfully portrays the "I" if the "I" cannot be known so as to be compared with the "Me", he answers that the problem here is not the same as Locke's, viz. how an idea can be regarded as a copy, if the original is forever beyond our reach. In Locke's case what is

presented is something that is "given" to us apart from our activity, but what is presented here is what the I has itself constructed by seeing itself mirrored in the social medium. Moreover, the "original" here is not another being and as such capable of being denied, but is within, and one whose existence is indubitable, for otherwise the existential proposition "I am" could not be asserted. "The I is known reflectively in the Me because the Me has been synthetically constructed by it, much as an artist paints his own portrait by means of a mirror. The mirror for self-consciousness is the social medium, and this is perfected the portraiture improves." [1]

Ward's contention is that the subject cannot be known immediately. The operations of the mind are not "presented" to us; "we know of them mediately through their effects." [2] Whatever knowledge we have of the "subjective side of experience" is the result of intellectual inference from "presentations". "Feeling" and "attention" are not directly known; our knowledge of them is an inference from their antecedents or from their consequents in presentation. It is hard to believe that such a theory will account for our knowledge of mental facts. "Now I ask whether it is credible that I apprehend the difference between (let us say) striving, loving, and judging, merely by inference from my presentations? I should have a lot to infer, should I not? - the whole of my mind, 'tout court.' By what species of reasoning and by what flights of intellect should I be entitled to infer with certainty that so many undeniable differences exist on the subjective side of my experience?

1. p. 381.
~~1. 'An Outline of Philosophy'. p. 427.~~
2. 'Psychological Principles.' p. 58.

According to Dr. Ward's theory all these palpable living differences would be so many hypothetical correlates of presentational differences, and, for my own peculiar, I doubt very much whether his general theory would permit me even to infer with him that there is a difference between feeling and attention. I should be very hard pressed if I tried to distinguish with certainty the precise presentational differences which presumably flow from each of these, and I am quite certain that the inferences which I actually draw in this matter are due to the fact that I know in advance with greater certainty than I know anything else that, e.g. believing or willing is not the same thing as pleasure or pain."[1]

Prof. Alexander also maintains that[2] mental processes cannot be "contemplated". According to him our mental states are "enjoyed". Ward substitutes the term "realization" for "enjoyment". Both Ward and Alexander therefore contend that the attention directed to our minds is different from the attention to other things. "Realization" or "enjoyment" cannot be classed under the ordinary types of knowledge. It is not an act of contemplation. "Realization" is a richer experience than ordinary cognition. It is, says Ward, that type of experience sought after by the ancients in which subject and object become one. On this view the mere existence of a mental process necessarily gives us a true insight into its nature and content. "Realization" is simply living. The attention is withdrawn from all irrelevant objects, we become immersed in ourselves, and this process is a complete revelation of our minds. Laird criticises this view as follows:- ".....if the mere existence of a conscious process is therefore and necessarily

1. Laird in 'Mind (1919).' N.S. 112..pp. 396-7 n.
2. 'Space, Time and Deity.'

a complete revelation of its character and content, where is the need for introspection at all, and how is there room or any possible mistake or dubiety? Why must the psychologist, with great pains and labour, become immersed in himself in this fashion if haply he may achieve some insight into what he really is? He is bound to be what he is without any effort whatever, and if his psychical existence reveals the whole of its character by the mere fact of existing, it would seem to follow that if the introspective attitude differs from the non-introspective, the difference must consist in the fact that the man has beccome different. In that case introspection would necessarily defeat its own aim, whereas, on the usual theory, there is merely a risk of failure from this cause. Attention to our own minds may alter their current. It is hard to suppose that it must. And if it must, how is it possible to allow for the error?"[1] We must attend to our minds to arrive at the truth concerning them, and such attention is not necessarily different from the attention to other things. "In both cases the attention is directed towards something, in both cases it fixes its object and dwells upon it, in both cases it is the only means of obtaining a direct inspection which has come claim to be trusted."[2] Introspection is mere observation, and observation merely discovers and does not create. As a method it does not necessarily lead to falsification.. Intellectual analysis of what we observe may mislead, but this does not affect the method of introspection itself. We conclude therefore that self-cognition is possible in that the self at any moment is a complex group of various functions. In introspection the

1. 'Mind (1919)' N.S. 112. p. 393.

2 *Ibid. p. 393.*

self does not attend to itself as a whole. The act of introspection is merely a part of the whole mind at any moment, and this part can attend to the rest of the self.

Our contention, therefore, is that the real nature of the self is not beyond the reach of knowledge. We have rejected the notion of an unknown and unknowable permanent indentical entity over and above our particular experiences. Experience cannot vouch for the existence of such a "substance". The denial of such a substance, however, has not made us deny the existence of a self. We have followed Prof. Muirhead's advice[1] and looked for the self in another way, viz. "in the extent and organisation of the contents of the mind, not in some needle's point of abstract conscicusness." To know ourselves, remarks Prof. Muirhead, simply means to understand[2] the mode of unification of the contents of our inner life. Such a unity, he notes, is not directly revealed to us. We have no immediate consciousness of it, but we know that our life is a unity because organised knowledge actually exists. This element of developed knowledge is not unknowable. To say with Kant that it is so is to "mistake mere existence for reality."

~~1. p. 381.~~
1. Article in 'Mind (1897)'.

X

THE TIMELESS SELF.

The view we have adopted of the self as a unity of experiences carries with it the implication that the self-conscious life is meaningless apart from time. The self admits of growth and development, and this necessarily implies time. Time is essentially involved in the conception of self-consciousness as a process. Kant, as is well known, conceived of the self as the source of time, and consequently denied that it can itself be in time. In the 'Dialectic' he shows the contradictions that inevitably arise when we attempt to apply the temporal form to the noumenal realm. "Kant's real objection," remarks Watson, "to the determination of the thinking subject by the idea of time is his assumption that what is in time cannot be a unity." Now, though it is true that the process of self-consciousness implies time or succession, we cannot regard it as a mere succession. It is "the development of a self-activity, which realises itself in time, and grows in complexity without ever losing its unity.....The element of truth, therefore, in Kant's contention, that the subject as the source of time cannot itself be in time, is this: that the subject cannot be determined as merely successive, but only as releasing itself in a temporal process by which it makes itself its own object."[2] In truth, Kant's conception of the passive character of the subject in knowledge is but a way of expressing the fact that consciousness develops under temporal conditions. The world is not given to us as a finished product. Our conception of Reality undergoes transformation according to our development. We cannot at will grasp the secret of the universe all at once. God

1. 'An Outline of Philosophy.' p. 427.
2. Ibid. p. 427.

reveals himself according to the gradual evolution of the human mind. As we advance in knowledge there occurs a gradual increase in the richness and fullness of Reality.

McTaggart, in an article[1] in the Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics (vol.9), says that one of the essential characteristics of a self is persistence through time, and he maintains that we are directly aware of the self as so persisting. "Awareness," he argues, "lasts through the specious present," and so I may perceive myself at different points of time within the limits of a specious present. Now, if at different points of time within the limits of the specious present, I perceive different objects, and attend to the relation between the various perceptions, "I shall be aware of my self as persisting while other things change, and so as persisting in time." This identity of the self, however, is not a bare identity exclusive of all difference. I may possess different mental states simultaneously and at different times, and so the same self can contain parts which exist simultaneously and at different times. McTaggart notes further that we have an absolute certainty of the existence of the self within the limits of certain memory. Outseide these limits we cannot be sure of the identity of the self, though it is "extremely probable" that the self is the same self throughout the course of our lives.

This persistence of the self through time, however, must not be confused with the totally different contention that the self is out of time altogether. Rashdall[2] mentions this as one of the misconceptions and confusions to which the doctrine of a "Timeless Self" is due. The conception of a "timeless self," says Rashdall, appears to result from

1. Article on 'Personality.'
2. Note on "The Timeless Self" in 'The Theory of Good and Evil.'

the fact that when in knowledge we compare a present and a past event, they are both "present" to the self that compares them. This presence however is a presence in idea only. As an "idea in my head" the past event is in the present time, but as a real event it occupies a different time, viz. the past. As Rashdall pertinently remarks, the fact that I know events that occurred in the 18th century does not prove that I existed at that period, nor does the fact that some of my personal experience occurred in the 19th century prove that I am now in that century.

Moreover, the timelessness of relations is mentioned by Rashdall as lending support to the doctrine of a "timeless self." Relations, however, conceived apart from their terms, are mere abstractions, and as such they are, of course, timeless, but as thus isolated they are not the actual events related, which are in time. A similar contention is seen in Green's confusion of the Kantian system of categories with the ego that is the source of them. The categories, apart from all relation to the subject and object, are doubtless out of time, but as such they are barren abstractions and cannot be identified with Reality. According to Green the self that is active in knowledge and morality is a "spiritual principle" which is not in time at all. This spiritual principle he identifies with the Eternal Consciousness. Our consciousness is spoken of as a reproduction of the eternal consciousness, and again he speaks of the eternal consciousness communicating itself to a finite individual. The activity of the self in knowledge is said to be not in time, and he makes the very doubtful assertion that there is no incompatibility between this and the admission

that our self-conscious life including its mental history which is organic to the Eternal Principle is in time, and has a strictly natural history. Green's theory of the spiritual principle in man implies that I am two things so disparate as an eternal consciousness out of time and a function of an animal organism changing in time, and also that at the same time I am one indivisible reality contemplated from two points of view. It must be admitted that, though Green does not say that man is a mode of the eternal, yet he can hardly safeguard man's individuality. On Green's premises the soul of man is merged into the eternal consciousness. Consequently, his metaphysical theory of the human self does away with the validity of Ethics. Though he talks of human responsibility and of the human self committing mistakes, these are inexplicable from the point of view of a timeless self which is identical with the Universal Self-consciousness. As Rashdall puts it in 'The Theory of Good and Evil', "But how a timeless self can find a satisfaction, not previously experienced, in human actions which have a beginning in time; how a self which is not differentiated (except perhaps on the side of the animal organism) from the Universal Self-consciousness can impute to itself its good or bad acts without imputing them in exactly the same sense and degree to the Universal Self-consciousness; how any event at all can be "imputed" to a self which thinks all things but originates nothing - Green cannot answer these." Knowledge and morality depend upon the existence of a real individual self, whose growth and development involve time. All that we deem of value in the universe will be

rendered illusory if time be regarded as merely "subjective". Actual human experience cannot be regarded as being out of time. As Rashdall says, our real concrete self is born at a certain time, and, for all we know to the contrary, may be annihilated at some time in the future, "while every moment of its thought or volition is in some time or other."

What we have contended for above implies that the self as known is the real self. Kant himself readily admits the empirical reality of time. He agrees that the states and processes that constitute the empirical self fall within the time-order. Experience cannot transcend the limits of time and space. Human apprehension is necessarily limited to apprehension of the temporal and spatial. Knowledge cannot comprehend a timeless reality. The only self of which we have any knowledge is admitted therefore to fall under the form of time. Kant contends, however, that the temporal order is inapplicable to the self in its real nature. Whilst admitting that the time-form is not a mere illusion, that it is real for human experience, he yet maintained that such a form has no place in ultimate reality. He appears to suggest that the real can only be truly described somewhat after the static whole of Parmenides. The notion of a timeless reality, however, is inconceivable. "I am quite certain, for my own part, that the utmost we can attain is the idea of something permanent in time; ....." "All our notions of reality being drawn necessarily from our own experience, and all

1. Prof. Pringle-Pattison, 'Man's Place in the Cosmos.' p.214.

our experience being in time, a timeless reality remains for our minds as inconceivable as wooden iron."[1] What meaning can be attached to the real as it is in itself apart from our apprehension of it? How can we speak of a "timeless self" if the only self that appears to us falls within the time-order? Experience appears to testify to the reality of the time-consciousness. Kant himself admits that in experience we cannot get rid of the notion of time. The form of time directly conditions our apprehension of inner phenomena, and also indirectly of outer phenomena. Individual experience appears to be necessarily bound up with the existence of the time-consciousness. Facts, whether inner or outer, are experienced as happening or changing, and time is the "form of the changing." "Change is the concrete fact of which time is the formal order."[2] The self is apprehended as undergoing constant change, and as such falling within thetime-order. The notion of a "timeless-self" therefore must be rejected.

Kant and his followers would advance an objection at this stage. "Granted", they would say, "that the self as apprehended is in time, yet this does not exclude the possibility of its being timeless in its real nature." As we have already noted, however, it is doubtful whether we can speak of a thing as it is in itself, apart from our apprehension of it. Moreover, even if we concede the legitimacy of the distinction between the real as apprehended and the real as it is in itself apart from our apprehension of it, it is still hard to see how we can arrive at the notion of a "timeless-self" unless we deny true reality to the time-consciousness. Suppose that the self is beyond time and change, that it is static in its real nature. Why

1. Prof. Pringle-Pattison, 'Man's Place in the Cosmos' p. 215.
2. Prof. J.S.Mackenzie in an Article on "Notes on the Problem of Time" in 'Mind' N.S. 21. 1912' p. 333.

then does it appear to us as changing? Besides, if the temporal representation has some reality, as Kant and his followers are wont to admit, its original can hardly be static. The temporal representation is a moving or changing representation, and a moving representation is not the representation of a purely statical object. Either therefore the real in its ultimate nature is not static, or the time-consciousness is a sheer illusion. We cannot preserve the phenomenal reality of time, whilst at the same time holding that ultimate reality is static or unchangeable.

Though we have contended above for the true reality of the time-consciousness, we can still admit that our apprehension of the real may be very inadequate. "There may be some inadequacy in its (i.e. time) representation of eternal reality; but the inadequacy can hardly be supposed to lie in the fact that it contains some sort of movement or change. A similar objection applies to most of the ways in which the phenomenal is contrastd with the noumenal. There may be some inadequacy in our apprehension of the reality of which order in number, time, space, etc., yield us the images; but at least that reality must, it would seem, contain some counterpart of these orders." [1]

Some thinkers, as e.g. Ward, would maintain that the self or subject is neither temporal nor spatial, in that time and space apply only to the object of experience. This contention rests on the assumption that we can never attain to a knowledge of the subject-self. The self as known is the object-self. We can only "realise" the subject-self, and such "realization" is devoid of spatial and temporal implications. Such an experience of "realization" or "enjoyment" is what the

1. Prof. J.S. Mackenzie's Article in 'Mind. N.S. 21-1912' p.334.

mystic contends for when he maintains that the truly religious are unhampered by the imperfections of time. In a state of bliss or ecstasy we are oblivious of the passing of time. We may contend therefore that the human self may at a future date attain to such a state of perfection that time will not exist for it. It is perhaps in some such sense that God may be said to be timeless. When the ideal of human perfection is reached, the richness and intensity of the individual's experience may be such that a thousand years will be as the passing of a day.

Ward contends therefore that such "realization" is the only experience we have of the subject-self. He admits that we may have a sense of enduring, but duration alone cannot give us time. Our concept of time is based on the perception of succession among the elements into which the object is distinguished, but the self is a unity devoid of parts. It will be seen that Ward's contention is that time as ordinarily conceived by science is inapplicable to the subject. Like Bergson, he admits duration or real time. We may admit with Ward that scientific description fails to do justice to the life of the self. The equipment of the natural sciences is too scanty for clothing the living richness of the self. This objection, however, merely applies to the interpretation of experience. Ward maintains that the self we observe in introspection is not the subject-self, whereas our contention is that introspection may give us true knowledge of the subject. As against Ward therefore we have urged that in self-consciousness the subject may become object without losing its essential characteristics as subject. Our view ~~therefore~~ is that introspection gives us knowledge of the self as being in time, though our

interpretation of the deliverances of introspection may be inadequate. Intellectual analysis, with its clear-cut distinctions, may fail to do justice to the unity of the self, but this difficulty applies to the description of anything that is essentially continuous. The self is dynamic and unique, whereas the materials for interpretation at the disposal of the natural sciences, as e.g. concepts, are static and general. We experience the difficulty of an adequate interpretation whenever we attempt to describe the dynamic and continuous, movement and change. We recognise the inadequacy of the interpretation of time itself in terms of discrete moments, as failing to do justice to its essential continuity. This difficulty, however, merely applies to the interpretation, and in no way militates against our contention that the self is experienced as changing and growing, and as such falling within the time-order.

X

I M M O R T A L I T Y.

To the question as to whether the human ~~being~~ soul is immortal and can exist after the annihilation of the body we can only answer that experience cannot decide one way or the other. The self-conscious life appears to be connected with a corporeal structure, and it is hard to see how an experience can exist apart from its bodily frame. Individual personality is an embodied personality, and it is very doubtful as to whether our individuality can be sustained after the annihilation of the self's embodiment. In his 'Elements of Constructive Philosophy'[1], Prof. Mackenzie remarks on the intimate connection that apparently exists between body and mind. He there notes that it is very difficult to <u>conceive</u> how our self-conscious life can be separated from our particular bodily organism "without the loss of a large part of what constitutes the essence of individual personality."[2] We have learned to work with a particular bodily organism and our habits and valuations are to a very considerable extent conditioned by it. So if the soul were to be transferred from one body to another, "it would not carry with it the instruments in connection with which its personality has been developed, and through which it has been expressed. .....However much the soul might select its own abode, it would have so much to learn and so much to unlearn that it could hardly be regarded as being, in any effective sense, the same person."[3] Moreover, real life presents us with cases of injury to the bodily organism resulting in such a radical change of what before constituted the essence of the man's individuality (as, e.g. when he becomes insane) that we can hardly call the man the same person before and after the

1. p. 319 f.
2. Ibid p.319.
3. Ibid pp.31-20.

injury. All this, however, does not conclusively prove that the soul cannot be transferred from one bodily organism to another, or even that it cannot exist as a pure spirit without embodiment.

To obviate the difficulty presented by the intimate connection of soul and body people have been wont to believe in a bodily, as well as a spiritual resurrection. Such a view, however, must by now be regarded as exploded, owing to what we know of the character of the animal organism, but it is by no means so obvious that the same soul cannot exist in successive organisms. Hence it is not surprising to find to-day many exponents of the view of successive incarnations. The tendency of present-day thought is against any materialistic conception of human consciousness, and consequently it lends itself the more readily to a belief in personal immortality. If consciousness is not essentially connected with the brain or any other part of the bodily organism, it is but natural to connect it with an immaterial something whose existence does not depend upon its being connected with some one particular organism. Many philosophers and theologians have adopted Descartes' view of the dualism of ~~the~~ body and mind as that of two distinct and separate substances. The soul is conceived as an indivisible entity not necessarily dependent for its existence upon the presence of a bodily organism, and thus its immortality appears to be assured. This was Berkeley's and Butler's line of reasoning. Dr. McTaggart also, among recent writers, has argued in favour of immortality by advocating a substantialist view of the soul. According to him what constitutes personal identity is "identity of substance," resulting in an identity of attributes. He realises, however,

that "all substances are absolutely indistinguishable", and so he says that if we are to distinguish one person from another they must differ in respect of their attributes, so that after all personal identity will depend chiefly on the attributes as distinguished from the "substance." The fundamental mistake here, as we have already noticed, is to separate two inseparable aspects of one and the same thing, viz. the substance and its quality. As Dr. G.E.Moore points out,[1] when we take a unique interest in ourselves we take an interest, not in our attributes as distinguished from our substances, but in the fact that they are <u>ours</u>. It is because <u>our own</u> substance is immanent in our attributes that we prefer our own experiences to those of others. According to the view of the self we have adopted in this section, personal identity will consist, not in the identity of some transcendent substance whose existence is incapable of logical demonstration, but in the identity of the form of organisation of our particular experiences. When we say that the child and the man are the same person we mean that the experiences of both are parts of the same unity, that they are the experiences of one and the same self, and, similarly, if personal immortality is a fact, then our experiences after the death of this particular bodily organism must be parts of the same all-comprehensive unity as the experiences of our corporate life. The persistence of some transcendent entity like the soul-substance of the spiritualists does not suffice to constitute personal immortality. As William James puts it,[2] "The enjoyment of the atom-like simplicity of their substance in saecula saeculorum would not to most people seem a consummation devoutly to be wished." "What seems to constitute our specific individuality as persons is the compact system of our conscious possessions, and especially our

1. 'Proceddings of the Aristotleian Society (1911-12).'
2. 'Principles of Psychology' p. 348.

valuations,"[1] and if these are irrevocably lost at death nothing of value will remain to constitute personal identity. Hence, ir order to preserve the real essence of personality, many tend to think of death as a transition from one state to another, somewhat after the manner of what we experience in actual life when we pass from one set of interests to another. As Prof. Mackenzie notes, when we are absorbed in one set of interests we may not give a thought to our previous interest for a considerable time," yet we may return again to the previous interest, and bring it into connection with that by which it was interrupted; and, in the end, we may realise that there has been no essential change in our personal attitude, but only that our consciousness has been enlarged and enriched by the double set of experiences."[2] Similarly, at death, we may enter upon a new set of interests, but the interests of our actual life are only in abeyance and can be recovered by us when in a future state of existence, and perhaps in the end we shall see that the experience of one incarnation leads naturally to that of another incarnation until at last, after passing through a series of successive incarnations, we shall reach the highest stage of human development. "It is felt," remarks Prof. Mackenzie, "that a view of this kind serves to remove the sense of incompleteness and frustration that we so constantly experience in the contemplation of the lives of those in whom we are interested."[3] It was a consideration of this sort that led Kant to his view of immortality as a continuous personal development towards perfection. Kant maintained that the idea of immortality is beyond the reach of the speculative reason, but that it is a necessary inference from the demands of the moral life. To realise the summum bonum man must be capable of perfect virtue. This he cannot be,

1. Mackenzie, 'Elements of Constructive Philosophy.' p.322.
2. Ibid.p. 323.
3. Ibid.p. 323.

for he is under the influence of desire, so that the only thing he can do is to continually subject the desires to the moral law, and thereby progress continuously in morality. This continuous progress requires continued existence, and so we must postulate immortality or endless time as the condition of the realisation of the summum bonum. This argument, however, carries no weight, for, as Watson notes,[1] Kant believes in an absolute opposition between reason and desire, and, therefore, no extension of time can remove it. So long as man is man he will be a subject of desire and so cannot realise perfect virtue. Kant cannot say that man in a future life will be free from the influence of desire and thus be enabled to realise perfect virtue, for his argument for immortality rests upon the opposition between desire and reason. We postulate endless time because reason can never complete its work of subjecting desire to itself, and "infinite time is not enough for an impossible task."[2]

Moreover, Watson remarks, "not only can virtue not be completely realised, but it cannot be realised at all,"[3] for, if reason and desire are absolute opposites, we cannot bring them any nearer to each other. Watson, therefore, would modify Kant's argument, and instead of basing immortality on the impossibility of morality in a finite time would do so on its possibility. There is, he says, a living principle of morality in man, and there is no limit to the development of such a principle. If man "is capable of morality he is capable of a progress in morality to which no limits can be set..... . In other words, the argument for immortality must be based, not upon what man cannot know or do, but upon what he can know and do."[4]

If, however, it be conceded that a continuous personal development will result in the realisation of that perfection

1. 'An Outline of Philosophy' p. 252 f.
2. Quoted by Watson in Ibid. p. 253.
3. Ibid. p. 253.
4. Ibid. p. 254.

which man's Rational nature demands, it will also result in the annihilation of personal identity, for, as Prof. Mackenzie urges,[1] "to think of such a perfect realisation of the demands of our nature is to think ultimately of the removal of those limitations that serve to distinguish one personality from another....., a perfectly good Falstaff or a perfectly wise Don Quixote would hardly be Falstaff or Don Quixote any longer."[2]

Dr. Mackenzie points out that in discussing the problem of immortality it is necessary to distinguish two questions, viz. "that of the persistence of an individual personality after bodily death, and that of the eternity of conscious life." The former problem can only be decided on empirical evidence. No "general philosophical principles" can decide the question one way or the other. It is quite conceivable that the soul can exist as a pure spirit or pass from one bodily organism to another, but if we are to accept it as a fact empirical evidence must be adduced in its favour. Hence the fact of ~~the~~ individual memory has been put forward in support of a theory of successive incarnations. An interesting instance of this was related in my hearing by a friend who had travelled in the East. According to the account given, a little girl was taken by her mother to a remote village on which the child had never set eyes before. Passing through the village they came upon a little cottage. As soon as the child saw it she stopped suddenly in the middle of the road, threw up her hands in an ecstasy of delight, and welcomed the cottage as her home for many years before she met her present parents.. The child proceeded to give a detailed description of the interior of the cottage, and according to the mother's evidence, the description was marvellously correct. The mother was ready to swear that the child had never been near the cottage before:

1. 'Elements of Constructive Philosophy.' p. 323.
2. Ibid. p. 392.n.

neither had she entered a similar cottage in the city where she lives. The conclusion my friend desired to draw was that the soul of the child, before it entered her particular body, had been incorporated in another bodily organism that had inhabited for years this particular cottage. Such inferences, however, are always very precarious. It is well-nigh impossible to take account of all the causes that could contribute to such a result. In the above instance, the child might have dreamt of such a cottage, or heard of a similar one described by her playmates.

"Spiritualism", also, has to-day many advocates. We hear of the "medium" claiming the power of entering into direct communication with "departed spirits". When men like Sir Oliver Lodge can openly expouse it, to ridicule such a doctrine is presumptuous, but it must be admitted that the evidence so far advanced in its favour is grossly insufficient. The descriptions given of "The Life after Death" savour too much of our earthly life to be above suspicion. We can hardly resist the suspicion that the "medium" sees in the future life merely what he wants to see there. The clergyman's description of "The Life beyond the Veil" coincides to a remarkable extent with his own narrowly orthodox interpretation of the Scriptures, whilst the sorrowful without exception see their beloved departed ones in a state of bliss! Whether the "medium's" deliverances be the result of hallucinations and guess-work or not, most people will agree that "Spiritualism" can as yet hold out but slender hopes for personal immortality.

Immortality, in the sense of the eternity of conscious life, is different from the immortality we have just been discussing, for it is quite conceivable, as some thinkers have held, that the human soul should undergo a number of successive

incarnations for a specific purpose, as, e.g., for the sake of purification, and then at last lose its personal identity by being merged in the Universal Self-consciousness. Our belief concerning the eternity of conscious life will have to depend ultimately upon the view we adopt concerning the universe in general. Those philosophers who, like Spinoza and Bradley, assign reality only to the Absolute, and regard finite persons and things as mere "modes" or "appearances" of the Absolute, are obviously not prepared to regard the human soul as worthy of personal immortality. These thinkers, also, who tend to over-emphasise the Universal Self-consciousness in their philosophical systems, are rather loth to admit personal immortality. Bosanquet would almost certainly deny personal immortality, whilst Edward Caird, for all his Hegelian sympathies, though he makes no definite pronouncement on the subject, would tend to preserve personal identity throughout eternity. However, it is clearly noticeable that, under the influence of the Hegelian philosophy, the natural bent of "Absolute Idealism" to-day is towards the denial of personal immortality. A striking instance of this is to be found in Prof. Seth Pringle-Pattison's 'Idea of God.' Prof. Seth Pringle-Pattison is a true personalist, and is to be placed in the first ranks of those who have emphasised the reality and importance of the individual self, but even he cannot tolerate Tennyson's contention that human life is a mere farce apart from personal immortality. Indeed, we get the impression from the 'Idea of God' that the author would not be absolutely averse to a negative conclusion as regards the eternity of individual conscious life.

Green, however, though his conception of the animal organism as being merely the vehicle of the Absolute Self-

consciousness ought to lead to the denial of personal immortality, yet writes in the 'Prolegomena to Ethics' as follows:- "On the whole, our conclusion must be that, great as are the difficulties which beset the idea of human development when applied to the facts of life, we do not escape from them, but empty the idea of all real meaning, if we suppose the development to be one in the attainment of which persons - agents who are ends to themselves- are extinguished, or one which is other than a state of self-conscious being, or one in which that reconcilation of the claims of persons, as each at once a means to the good of the other and an end to himself, already partially achieved in the higher forms of human society, is otherwise than completed."[1]

As against the "Absolutists", however, with their consequent tendency to disparage the individual self, "Pluralism" and kindred theories lay a marked emphasis on the importance of individual personality, and thus they lend themselves the more readily to a belief in personal immortality. Indeed, some philosophers, like Schiller and Howison, assume the existence of a multiplicity of eternal egos, and regard God simply as "primus inter pares." According to Schiller, " the one indisputable fact and basis of philosophy," is the impossibility of doubting the reality of the self. He, however, distinguishes between our every-day self and our real self. The ordinary self is the phenomenal self, but the real self is the transcendental self, which is placed in thefuture as an ideal. He seeks to avoid the Kantian dualism by saying that the two selves are somehow one. The transcendental ego is the "I" together with its infinite possibilities, its powers and latent

1. par. 189.

capacities of development. As we develop the phenomenal self approximates more and more to the transcendental self, until at last perfection is reached, and the phenomenal coincides with the transcendental ego, which is our ultimate reality.

McTaggart, also, in 'Studies in Hegelian Cosmology', appears to regard the existence of the finite self as underived. Being "fundamental differentiations of the Absolute", he argues, we must be "eternal." McTaggart, however, appears to confuse a timeless existence with an existence that is prolonged indefinitely in time. Time being regarded as ~~being~~ unreal, we, as differentiations of the Absolute, must be "eternal," in the sense of being out of time, but this does not prove that our existence will be prolonged indefintely in time.

The conception of underived, eternal egos is very difficult of acceptance in that the self of which we are conscious appears to be a self that came into being but a few years ago. When I am conscious of myself, I am apparently conscious, not of a self that existed from eternity, but rather of a self that was born along with my present bodily frame. If my present self has several past lives to its credit, it can, at any rate, be asserted that it appears to have forgotten all about its previous existence.

Rashdall, also, is a true champion of individual personality. He believes in the creation of finite selves, but he regards God also as being merely finite, and so he characterises the Absolute as a "community of persons." Rashdall, however, does not present us with a final and unmediated pluralism, for he regards his Absolute as being ultimately a unity. Even McTaggart, with his pluralistic conception of the Absolute as a "society", does not regard his selves as being absolutely independent of one another, whilst Howison sees the same central mind reflected in the ideals of each individual self, and thus, somewhat after the manner of Leibniz, he obtains

some kind of ideal connection between his eternal egos.

All these pluralistic theories, therefore, have rendered valuable service in that they have emphasised the reality and importance of the individual self, though some pluralists have perhaps over-emphasised the self's independence. Whatever view we adopt concerning the destiny of the human soul after the death of the body, its present reality must be acknowledged, and because of this reality we cannot easily lay aside the conception of personal immortality. We are more than mere "attributes" of some one infinite "Substance." As Prof. Seth Pringle-Pattison very finely puts it, "That sublime acquiesence, that ardour of self-identification with the spirit of the universe, is possible only to beings who are more than mere modes of a divine Substance - whose prerogative it rather is to become Sons of God."[1] When we reflect on the infinite possibilities of human nature, we are loth to say that the grave is the goal of human endeavour. The sterling qualities exhibited by some characters in real life call for a more worthy recognition than a mere earthly tomb. That perfect embodiment of all the virtues. that sublime mother, who counts it but a privilege to forget self in others, is surely something more than highly organised matter! Moral qualities cannot be accounted as nought in the evolutionary process of the universe. Each human being has his or her own spedial contribution to make to the cosmic endeavour. Perhaps we shall not preserve our personality to the end; perhaps the death of the bodily organism will prove an insurmountable barrier to the human spirit, but our contributions will abide somewhere in the universe, The onward flow of the universe will bear the marks of our puny strivings. And this should make us content. The

1. 'Idea of God' p. 291.

highest types of humanity throughout the ages have taken more pleasure in furthering the interests of a national or international cause than in satisfying individual desires.

Indeed, the higher we ascend in the scale of development, the less individual and the more universal we become. It is probable, therefore, that we are so constituted that only the immortality of the cosmic purpose can ultimately satisfy the fundamental demands of our nature. Throughout the ages the religious having willingly offered themselves to their God. We have prayed God to take everything that we possess, even to our individuality, and utilise it for His own special purposes, and perhaps, remarks Prof. Seth Pringle-Pattison in 'The Idea of God', our contribution to the Absolute lies in being ourselves, for many can bring other treasures to their Father, but the child alone can give himself as an offering. "Purely philosophical considerations," however, as Prof. Mackenzie remarks,[1] cannot defintely solve the problem of immortality, and so we shall have to be content with other and more precarious considerations. We may, as William James[2] notes, believe in immortality because we feel that we are fit for immortality, or we may endorse Prof. Fraser's words, "Does not a theistically constituted universe, with its moral implications, suggest that physical death is not the extinction of the moral agent after a short life in this mixed world, with its irregular distribution of happiness and opportunity? Moral experience of the organised unity I call myself seems to justify the previsive inference that the physical change called death is not the end of me. In one view the rising of the sun to-morrow, and the conscious life after death of any person who has not yet died, as future, are both 'beyond experience'. In another definition of experience, neither is 'beyond' it: the one may be involved in the rational constitution of natural, and the other in the constitution of moral experience."[3] Whether considerations such as these will

1. 'Elements of Constructive Philosophy' p. 397.
2. 'Principles of Psychology' p. 343.
3. 'Selections from Berkeley' 6th ed. p. 107.n.

satisfy every kind of temperament may be left an open question. The man of keenly religious susceptibilities may be satisfied with very little in the nature of actual proof: the rest of us dan only await a further revelation of the hidden mysteries of the universe, and carry on our duties in the firm conviction that no "righteous act" will ever be in vain.

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