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The Visible and Invisible Discourses: The Securitization of Pakistan and Its Impact on the Social Construction of Girls'/Women Education

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Abstract

This study examines the securitization of Pakistan and its impact on the social construction of girls'/women education. The research has applied the school of Copenhagen's securitization model to offer a constructivist analysis of Pakistan's security struggles. Using the ideas of Michel Foucault and Judith Butler, the study explores the power of both discourse and performativity to examine issues of gender and education in a religiously driven post-colonial-security state.

The study adopted a qualitative methodological approach, and twenty-eight elite interviews were conducted with officials from five cohorts: the army, religious scholars, bureaucrats, educationists, and third-sector officials. The rationale in the selection of participants was done keeping in mind the significance of their influence on the issues of security, gender, and education in Pakistan. The findings of the study suggest that the notion of discourse, which is profoundly prevalent and holds credible relevance in educational studies but needs to be extended and adapted to engage with a postcolonial context. Therefore, the thesis argues that it is not only through visible discourses that the discourse of securitization impacts girls'/women education in Pakistan. However, there exist invisible discourses, such as, the discourse of gendered 'hypocrisy' and 'hidden curriculum', which come together with the visible discourses to constitute exclusionary gendered educational practices in Pakistan. The study also illustrates that power structures contest and negotiate power within the discourse of securitization. This negotiation and contestation generate discourses that influence the inequitable constitution of the 'girl/woman' as subject in Pakistan. However, the thesis discerns that in a postcolonial society, such as Pakistan, the creation of subject within discourses is diverse from the creation of Foucauldian subject in European society.

Acknowledging, the diversity of discourses and the varied working ways of power among distinct societies and cultures, the research study suggests that within the realm of education, the application of theories of discourse and power have definite strengths but once applied out of their contexts can exhibit limitations as well. Hence, it argues, discourses and power should be studied and explored keeping in mind their social and cultural relevance and differences.

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And lastly, *the One*, who is perfectly complete and beautiful, a true friend and a companion.

Author's Declaration

I declare that, except where explicit reference is made to the contribution of others, this dissertation is the result of my own work and has not been submitted for any other degree at the University of Glasgow or any other institution.

Printed Name: _____Ali Sameer_____

Signature: _____

1 Chapter: Introduction

1.1 Background

14th August 1947 marked the end of the British Raj on the Indian Subcontinent and the birth of Pakistan (White-Spunner, 2018, Talbot, 2013). Pakistan was created, as an Islamic state, where the freedom movement for Pakistan was led by Mohammad Ali Jinnah, a Lincoln's Inn graduate (Wolpert, 2005), who advocated that women should be equipped with modern education, as their role is as vital as of men in the progress of a country (Butt, 2011 , p. 71). While addressing a freedom rally at the Muslim University of Aligarh on 10 March 1944 he said:

> No nation can rise to the height of glory unless your women are side by side with you; we are victims of evil customs. It is a crime against humanity that our women are shut up within the four walls of the houses as prisoners. There is no sanction anywhere for the deplorable condition in which our women have to live.
>
> (Reynolds, 2009 , p. 3)

However, seventy-two years after its creation, in a country of 217 million (worldometers, 2019), the education standards for women are at alarming low rates (Central Asia Institute, 2018), and is ranked the second worst country in the whole world on gender equality scale (World Economic Forum, 2017). Although, on the national website of Pakistan (Government of Pakistan, 2019), under the article 25(2) **Equality of Citizens** of the constitution, it is stated, 'there shall be no discrimination on the basis of sex', and under the article 25A **Right To Education**, it is said, 'The State shall provide free and compulsory education to all children of the age of five to sixteen years in such manner as may be determined by law'. Contrarily, according to the latest report by Human Rights Watch (2018) there are nearly 22.5 million children out of schools, where thirty-two percent of primary school girls are missing as compared to twenty-one percentage of boys, and by ninth grade only thirteen percent of girls stay in schools (p. 6).

In the National Education Policy Framework report, the Ministry of Federal Education of Pakistan (2018) states that it is the 'low financing coupled with inefficiency in budget spending and weak management have crippled the system'

which has resulted in poor education outcomes (p. 2). Human Rights Watch (2018) list two kind of barriers to girls'/women education in Pakistan: within the school and outside the school. In the first category, the main barriers are: lack of investment, high cost of education, poor quality of education, no enforcement of compulsory education, and corruption. Under the second category, it points out, poverty, social norms, insecurity, such as sexual violence and gender crimes, along with armed conflict and targeted attacks on schools, as the major outside education barriers. A white paper on the Education in Pakistan (Aly, 2007), prepared by the National Education Policy team in 2007 evidenced the commitment of the government to invest 4% of the GDP in the education sector. Further, it argued, that the current capacity does not allow the 4 % expenditure to be spent immediately. Hence, it predicted that the given target of 4% of the GDP will be achieved in the next two years. In addition to this, the government set a target of taking this investment to the level of 6% of the GDP in next 8 to 10 years (2007, p. 9).

On the other side, the Economic Survey of Pakistan (Finance Division Government of Pakistan, 2019) for the year 2018-19 reveals that the total spending on education is 2.4 percent of the GDP, which remains to be on the low end in the South Asia. In such situations, where Pakistani government itself neglects the education sector and restricts itself to verbal claims, the empirical results do not present encouraging signs for girls'/women education in Pakistan. In addition to financial issues, there are socio-cultural issues – as we shall see in this thesis - such as cultural feudalism and parental attitude (Latif, 2009), coupled with a patriarchal hierarchy (Rabia et al., 2016) and in some cases an extremist mind-set (Ford, 2017) that have further impacted girls'/women education narrative in Pakistan in a negative way.

Consequently, the factors that I take into consideration, in order to build an understanding of Pakistan's gradual decline in both domains of gender and education, are coupled with its troubled inception (Talbot, 2015, Lieven, 2011) that played a significant role in establishing its national security state approach (Ali and Patman, 2019). Its postcolonial roots and the conflicted Subcontinent history of Hindu-Muslim feuds, left their imprints on shaping the power structures

of Pakistan (Cohen, 2013, Svensson, 2016, Alavi, 1973, Jalal, 1995b). Therefore, in a country where the official policy narrative promotes girls'/women education but in practice the situation is marred by distinct factors, thus, the attempt is to critically interrogate the security struggles of Pakistan, which becomes the basis of power contestation in the country and explore its impact on the social construction of girls'/women education.

1.2 Motivation for this research

During my college and university days in Pakistan, my friends and I, being idealists, developed an infatuation with the idea of *changing* society. Growing up in a developing country like Pakistan, it is easy to start romanticising change, and want to reconstruct the society from your own particular perspective. Being part of the urban-middleclass with private school education backdrop, you tend to start believing that the onus of society's progression relies on your newly acquired intelligence, and it should be shared with others, with or without their consent. After my Master's in Anthropology, I came to the UK for my postgraduate and enrolled in the Development Studies discipline. During my time at the University of Leeds, it dawned upon me that education could be that vehicle, which can help me to bring that long-awaited change in society. Coming from a society where reality is often perceived as objective truth and the one-truth-fits-all-mentality, I found both an academic and personal challenge in the form of the subjective leaning of the Western society. Being a construct of the imperial residual, I felt a strong urge to embrace the newly learned consciousness. With this thinking, I idealised that the next step would be to build a career in the third sector, and work towards my goal to be the agent of *change* in the Pakistani society.

However, when I worked for two years in the third sector in the UK, for organisations such as Save the Children and Oxfam, it made me realised the gravity of the politics of development. I felt that the notion of *change*, itself is a social construct, and the politics of global and national interventions to eliminate the social disparities cannot be replicated from one case to another, and one country to another. My educational and professional training made me realised that there exists a major gap between theory and practice. Although, there are copious interventions to improve girl's/women education in Pakistan, both in the form of

global and national efforts, it felt to me that they are actually trying to fix the exterior surface of the issue rather than aiming to understand the problem itself. Therefore, moving away from objectivity to subjectivity, from intervention to understanding, and from change to exploration, the main motivation evolved into a query to *understand the social construction of girls'/women education in a postcolonial-security-state*. The other impetus is to understand the strengths and limitations of applying the Western theoretical frameworks to study social issues in postcolonial societies within the field of education and gender studies. The motivation is not to *change* society using the education vehicle but to develop an understanding regarding why it exists in the way it exists, which might then feed into a discussion around more contextually-informed change that is not surface.

1.3 Aims and research questions

The aim to conduct this study is multi-pronged. The primary objective is to study the dynamics of power relations emitting from the security state status of Pakistan and its impact on girls'/women education. Its purpose is to offer a distinct perspective for both educational practitioners and policy makers to comprehend the issue of girls'/women education in Pakistan. This contrasting approach, which becomes the bedrock of the study is that every society has its own concept/idea of education, which is under the influence of various social and state power structures. Therefore, in order to comprehend the fault lines in an educational system, it is crucial to understand and explore the working of dominant power structures, and their influence on social and cultural policies, attitudes, and practices. Hence, such analytical understanding can assist educational researchers, policy makers, civil servants, and development experts to build a framework that is not only about offering short-term solutions but building a deeper understanding of the problem first, particularly, in the case of developing countries, such as Pakistan.

Framed by the poststructuralist perspectives of Michel Foucault and Judith Butler, I examine the securitization of Pakistan and its impact on the social construction of girls'/women education. In order to explore the situation of girls'/women education in Pakistan, firstly, I suggest that it is crucial to highlight the key institutional/ sectoral 'power players', and secondly, the impact they hold on the

societal issues. Therefore, this brings us to a question that what are the factors and players that constitute the policy? And, what discourses are they drawing on regarding gender, nation and security? Moreover, it aims to take the debate, in the domain of educational studies undertaken in a postcolonial society to comprehend the nuances of girls'/women education, one step forward.

In order to meet the above-mentioned objectives, I have framed the following research question and sub-questions:

1. How does the securitization of Pakistan impact the social construction of girls'/women education?

This research question will be explored by using the following sub-questions:

a. What form of power/knowledge structure is produced and sustained by the discourse of securitization in the context of Pakistan?
b. To what extent does the discourse of securitization in Pakistan give birth to regime of practices and production of truth in the society, generating a particular form of social discourse?
c. Is the gender construction of women in Pakistan and educational discourse influenced by the discourse of securitization? If so, how far and in what ways?
d. How far does the securitization discourse in the Pakistani context influence educational policy and impacts girls'/women education?

1.4 Significance and Contributions

1.4.1 Conceptual Contribution

The study is conducted in the global context where Foucault and Butler's approaches to study gender and education has grabbed the attention of scholars from all over the world. Whether it is the application of Foucault to study history in South Asian context (Daechsel, 2015), or the quest of academics to examine the South Asian governmentalities (Legg and Heath, 2018), there is a gradual rise in the application of Foucauldian approaches to investigate social issues in the South Asian context. Likewise, the growing influence of Butler's work is penetrating the South Asian feminist literature (Loomba and Lukose, 2012), and, also, assisting

local (Fatima, 2019) and foreign scholars to unravel the women issues in the South Asian context (Walter, 2016).

While contemporary scholarship on education and gender is profoundly influenced by Foucauldian ideas (Ball, 2010, Ball, 2013, Leathwood and Read, 2013, Jardine, 2005, Walshaw, 2007, Gillies, 2013, Ball, 2017, Olssen, 2016, Tamboukou, 2003), in the case of Pakistan, there are relatively few works that stand out in this context. M. Ayaz Naseem's (2010) *Education and Gendered Citizenship in Pakistan,* incorporates the Foucauldian poststructuralist feminist analysis to overview the textbooks used in public schools and the gendered subjectivities produced in a postcolonial state due to social, economic, political and legal issues. It makes a claim that the educational discourse in Pakistan disempowers women, and ensures the longevity of the gendered status quo, which in itself challenges the development narrative that education promotes progression.

Additionally, in the recently published, *Forging the Ideal Educated girl,* Shenila Khoja-Moolji (2018), offers a Foucault-inspired genealogy of the 'educated girl' in the colonial and postcolonial India and Pakistan, by examining the educational reform discourses. She argues that the advocacy on women's and girl's education, is not about accessibility and empowerment, but forging the ideal educated Muslim girl subject. Moreover, Kieran Ford (2017), utilises the Foucauldian notion of *savage vs barbarian* to examine the securitization of education in North-West Pakistan. In her article, she argues that due to the securitization of education, it has 'weaponised' education, and given way to a 'mind-set' which aims to transform 'the extremist mind-set into an educated mind-set' (2017 , p. 117). According to her such global interventions have further inculcated insecurity in the educational discourse. Furthermore, the application of Foucauldian thought to understand the matters of power, governmentality, education, and gender are appearing (Khoja-Moolji, 2014, Zia, 2017, Daechsel, 2011, Ayaz Naseem, 2006), but still there are few applications of Foucauldian ideas in the context of Pakistan, particularly, on gender and education.

Similarly, the concept of performativity developed by Butler (Butler, 2010) has penetrated the academic life of Pakistan. However, contrary to the reception of Foucauldian analysis, Butler is still an alien voice for Pakistani academics. A closer

investigation of the academic archives, such as journal articles, and academic books, depicts that Butler mostly acts as a passing reference (Osella and Osella, 2006, Durrani, 2008, Ahmad, 2009, Ullah and Skelton, 2013, Zaman, 2019), specifically, the notion of performativity (Pirzada, 2017), as the researchers and academics wrestle the binary world of gender, and, as well, education, in the context of postcolonial South Asia. For example, even if there are attempts to challenge the muted voices of transgender people, in a heteronormatively constructed society, Butler exists in theoretical analysis as a mandatory gender ideologue citation (Majeedullah, 2016), but the textual analysis fails to incorporate her ideas to unearth the issue of the binary gendered formation. A text, which to some extent, attempts to merge the intricate gaps between theoretical statements and practical principles, as it tries to unravel the socially constructed binary practices of gender that instigate the exclusion of transgender people from the Pakistani gender discourse, is a standalone application of Butler's notion of performativity to address the appalling situation of transgender people in Pakistan. But just like the binary gender world of Pakistan, where transgender people are an invisible and muted gender, Sidra Zubairi's (2018) work in the shape of *Gender Beyond Binary*, loses its voice in comparison to women and girls education research, that is prompted by the international development wave of the 1970s (Khoja-Moolji, 2018), which focuses on practical interventions to improve the dismal condition of women issues (Bhatti and Jeffery, 2012, Chaudhry and Rahman, 2009, King, 1990). This resulted in a significant gap that further creates a void between theory and practice.

Consequently, this gap between theory and practice indicates a pressing need for a reconstructed theoretical framework, based on Foucauldian discourse and Butler's performativity, and apply it to a postcolonial state to explore the nuances of gender and education. In this regard, Pakistan, as a case study, offers a physical space to explore Foucauldian discourse approach and Butler's performativity theory, in an *enigmatic* country (Inkster, 2012), that till today is struggling to come to terms with its postcolonial past (Talbot, 2015). The two-pronged investigation provides a timely opportunity to interrogate educational research by applying an intersected notion of Butler and Foucault to a non-Anglo-European world, but, contrarily, it also opens up a debate on the application of Anglo-

European theoretical underpinnings to investigate educational and gender nuances in a postcolonial state.

Now, coming to Pakistan, the country not only offers a unique case to further explore the domain of educational studies, in a state where both education and gender are contested subjects, but presents a compelling case study via which to interrogate the application of Western theoretical frameworks in a security-centric and religiously idelogical nation-state, which has a conflicted relationship with its colonial past. Deviating from the plethora of standard educational studies on girl's/women education in Pakistan, which either reflects the international development agenda on girls'/women education[1], that in itself is triggered by the Western social movements that highlights the case of women rights and civil rights (Khoja-Moolji, 2018, p. 9), or assesses education as a medium of women empowerment in Pakistan[2]. I intend to adopt a shift in tone from the *change through education* approach and explore the social construction of girls'/women education in a security-centric nation-state, where the religious ideology becomes the bedrock of a postcolonial country. The intersectionality between Foucault, Butler, and Pakistan, facilitates an exploration of girl's/women education, not restricting itself to descriptive explanations of socio-economic and cultural barriers as highlighted by numerous studies (Siddiqui, 2006, Latif, 2009, Tanwir and Khemka, 2018, Jamal, 2016), but to analyse the social production of gender and education inside the contested security discourse of a postcolonial state.

1.4.2 Significance of the Study

The major significance of the research study, through its findings, highlight a different way of thinking about power/knowledge and discourse in a postcolonial and gendered context. Moreover, as argued in this thesis that the working of power mechanisms is highly relative to the socio-cultural context of discourses. Hence, the way the concepts of self and body are not fixed. Likewise, the

[1] Studies reflecting the international development agenda of girls'/woman education – Qureshi, 2012, Aslam, 2007, Aslam and Kingdon, 2012, Saleem and Bobak, 2005, Kabeer et al., 2010, Benz, 2013, Sales, 1999, King and Hill, 1993, Chaudhry, 2007, Sheikh et al., 2017, Asghar et al, 2009, Herz et al., 2004, Sperling et al., 2015, Heward and Bunwaree, 1999)

[2] Studies on education as a medium of women empowerment in Pakistan – Malik and Courtney, 2011, Mumtaz, 2007, Shaheed and Mumtaz, 1993, Mahmood, 2012, Halai, 2011, Khattak, 2018, Khurshi, 2015, Noureen, 2015, Shah and Khurshid, 2019, Khurshid, 2018, Seeberg et al., 2017)

emergence and maintenance of discourses cannot be fixed either. Therefore, keeping in mind, historical and cultural, convergence and progression of discourses can play a significant role for policy makers, educational researchers, and academics to investigate social issues in a constantly evolving world. Additionally, the other significance of the research is its interdisciplinary approach. The intersectionality between Foucauldian and Butler thought to examine a social issue in a religiously-ideological-postcolonial-security state, is a novelty on its own. The theoretical hybridization (Murphy, 2017) between International Relations concept of securitization, and its reading from a Foucauldian discourse perspective to illuminate the security discourse of Pakistan, is a new attempt, both in the field of Foucauldian and Pakistan studies. Thus, I do not only intend to offer a diverse approach to study the issue of girls'/women education from a distinct perspective, but the originality of the work aims to address the gap in both the educational and gender literature.

The practical implications of the study are that it does not investigate the securitization discourse as a 'repressing' agent for the power structures in Pakistan. Contrarily, the study presents the role of securitization as a major power relation framework within which the practices of both gender and educational inclusion/exclusion are constituted. The application of Foucauldian thought of productive power offers a new understanding of the power/knowledge contestation on Pakistan, which can build a better understanding of girls'/women education. The questions, which were not asked before, are being probed with the aim to facilitate future studies on the issue of education and gender in the context of Pakistan. The questions such as *who holds the authority to speak? Who gets the attention of people once they speak? Whose knowledge gets legitimised, and why? How a girl is required to perform? What performances legitimise a girl?* And the most crucial one (from a theoretical perspective), *what are the advantages and disadvantages of applying the Western theoretical frameworks to probe social issues in a postcolonial society?*

There is a scarcity of academic studies on girls'/women education in Pakistan that has studied the social construction aspect of education. The overarching contribution of the research study, as argued above, is the aim to deviate from

interventional educational studies promoting girls'/women education, but to illuminate the discourses and performances that construct girls'/women education in Pakistan. Hence, this deviation suggests that it is important to acknowledge the fluid characteristics of power/knowledge and discourse keeping in mind their historical and cultural context.

1.5 Explanation of key terms

1.5.1 Securitization

In order to probe the security angle of Pakistan, the research study is straying from the objective reading of security and aiming to examine it as a social construct. The objective approach of security from the perspective of *realism* equates 'security' to the security of a state. Under this approach, the primary objective of a state is to protect its territorial borders and provide physical safety to its population (Walt, 2017). The reason states are insecure because in a global context there exists struggle between states, and this struggle is marked by the use of power, military force, and realpolitik (Lynn-Jones, 1999). Hence, in such power tussle, it is the survival of the fittest among states without keeping in account the socio-cultural differences of states (Mearsheimer, 2007).

The poststructuralist approach of the study can offer a different perspective to policy makers, practitioners and researchers to interrogate the security of Pakistan, which is previously limited to its objective rationale, and view it from the *realist* lens (Lavoy, 2006, Rizvi, 2002). The concept of securitization presented by School of Copenhagen (Buzan et al., 1998), is a procedural way of grasping the social construction of threat and security policies (Charrett, 2009 , p. 3). The contours of securitization theory constitute of three integral notions: the concept of security, the nature of referent objects, and the role of security actors (Skidmore, 1999, Buzan et al., 1998). Copenhagen School defines *referent objects* as things under threat and have the legit claim for their survival such as nations, states, and tribes. Whereas *securitizing actors* who securitize issues by declaring a referent object under threat could be ranging from individuals to sub state groups (Williams, 2003) such as state, military, political leaders, media, international organisations and non-governmental groups (McDonald, 2008, Buzan et al., 1998, Hirschauer, 2014). The research is using the securitization notion to

probe the relationship between the security actors, such as military-mullah, and their influence on the production of knowledge in the context of Pakistan.

1.5.2 Discourse

The Foucauldian notion of *discourse* is used in the thesis to analyse the securitization of Pakistan. According to Foucault, it is within discourse power is negotiated, and production of knowledge occurs, which influences the constitution of a subject (Foucault, 1981, Foucault and Rainbow, 1984, Mills, 2003b, O'Farrell, 2005, Oliver, 2010). In order to understand the system of knowledge, Foucault emphasised that understanding system of knowledge requires identification of the authority and institutions that has the ability to speak knowledgeably. Further, he argued that how knowledge and power operate simultaneously, developing a mechanism that not only classifies and monitor the members of modern society but also plays a significant role in controlling, rewarding and punishing them (Foucault, 1989, Foucault, 1995, Foucault and Rainbow, 1984). Consequently, I intend to understand the nuances of the relationship between discourse and the construction of a subject that is to examine the ways in which the securitization discourse impacts the social construction of gender and education.

1.5.3 Performativity

Building on Foucault's work, and highlighting the relationship between gender and discourse, Butler (2010) through the theory of *performativity* argued that the construction of gender occurs by impersonating and repeating the acts that are laid down by the dominant gender discourse. A person, being classified by others as a 'girl', is then highly influenced to 'perform' according to socially valorised gender discourses in order to be or 'do' their gender, and thus be recognised as an intelligible 'subject' in the social world. Bringing together the Foucauldian notion of discourse to analyse the securitization of Pakistan, and Butler's performativity theory, I aim to explore the construction of the subject as a 'Pakistani girl/woman' within the discourse of securitization (Butler, 2010). The rationale behind this intersectionality is to illuminate the complexities of performance that a Pakistani girl/woman is required to perform so they can participate in socially recognised way in educational discourse.

1.5.4 The Postcolonial

The other key term that holds an immense importance in the context of the study is *postcolonialism*. The postcolonial framework as an analytical tool offers an approach to comprehend and explore issues in former colonies such as Pakistan (Yousaf, 2019). Additionally, it's not just about exploring issues in former colonies, but it specifically focuses on the continuing social, cultural, political effects of the legacy of colonialism on these societies. Hence, in order to explore the power dynamics of Pakistan, its postcolonial past cannot be overlooked, particularly the impact of educational reforms that were performed by Lord Macaulay, and contributed in the creation of conflicted and distorted social and educational classes (Saleem and Rizvi, 2011). Pakistan's colonial past, not only aided in the emergence of new power structures, such as, bureaucracy (Nazar, 2014) and army,(Alavi, 1973) but created conflicted zones, in the form of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) that later on paved the way for the militant extremism (Yousaf, 2019). Moreover, coming from a poststructuralist perspective, I aim to employ postcolonial lens to evaluate the application of western theoretical frameworks in a non-European context to study.

1.6 Structure of the thesis

The thesis consists of ten chapters. Below is the detail of each chapter:

Chapter 2: The Discourse of Securitization

In this chapter, I critically analyse the concept of securitization as a social construct. The chapter presents the current literature on securitization and moves on to build a comprehensive understanding of securitization as a theoretical framework developed by the Copenhagen School. In the latter half, I offer an overview of the socio-political evolution of Pakistan as a security centric state and the impact of military-mullah nexus on Pakistani state and society in general. In the last section, I apply the Foucauldian concept of discourse to explore the notion of securitization. In the end, the chapter closes by highlighting the need for evaluating girl's/women education in Pakistan through the theoretical prism of securitization.

Chapter 3: The Foucauldian Discourse and the Securitization of Pakistan

Chapter three starts by building an understanding of the concept of power through various philosophical positions. Chapter three provides a review of academic literature that deals with Foucauldian notions of discourse and power/knowledge. Further, through the work of Foucault it investigates that how power relations become productive impacting social discourses. Moreover, it interprets the role of power relations in the realm of Foucauldian discourse, creating a *regime of practices*, and how does these practices forge the self. In the last section, the Foucauldian idea of discourse is applied on to the case study of securitization of Pakistan.

Chapter 4: Construction of Woman – Theorizing Gender through Poststructuralist Analysis

Chapter four theorize gender construction primarily from a poststructuralist feminist perspective. It starts by exploring the debate around poststructuralism and gender construction in academic literature. It analyses Butler's notion of performativity to conceptually comprehend the social construction of gender. Also, Foucault's notion of Panopticon, power and discourse creating the *subject*/self – in terms of women – is interrogated in order to understand the construction of woman/girl.

Chapter 5: Educational Discourse and the creation of Subject

Chapter five in the first section discusses education as in relation to the concept of power, whereas the second section explores the notion of education and subjectivation. Lastly, the chapter discusses the critique of Foucault's work particularly focusing on his work on power, self and subjectivation and critically exploring the commentary on Foucault's work by other scholars. Moreover, it offers a commentary on the application of Foucauldian ideas in a postcolonial society.

Chapter 6: Research Methodology

Chapter six presents the methodological approach of the study. It begins by describing the ontological, epistemological and theoretical viewpoint of the study. From there on the chapter explains the application of the qualitative methodology

to answer the research question. It discusses in detail the research method used to collect the data, and also elaborate on the sampling approaches. Lastly, the chapter ends with presenting the ethical considerations in regard to the research study.

Chapter 7: The Discourse of securitization, power contestation and knowledge production

Chapter seven presents the research findings regarding the first two sub-research questions. Based on the views presented by the participants, the chapter explores the relationship between the securitization discourse and power/knowledge nexus in Pakistan. It unravels nuances that are constituted due to power contestation between various power players. Also, it presents the opinions of participants, and examine the discourses that are generated within Pakistani society as an outcome of the securitization discourse.

Chapter 8: The visible and invisible Discourses: The social construction of women and girls' education in Pakistan

Chapter eight, second findings chapter, examines the impact of the securitization discourse on the social construction of girls'/women in Pakistan. The chapter particularly engages with the point of views of the participants regarding the role of girls'/women in Pakistan and highlights the prevalent ideas in regard to girls'/women education. In the second part, chapter eight illustrates the impact of the securitization discourse on the girls'/women education, and the factors that play a significant role on the social construction of girl's/women education in Pakistan.

Chapter 9 - Discussion: The securitization discourse, the subject creation, and girls'/women education

Chapter nine brings together the findings from chapter seven and eight to construct a discussion in the light of relevant literature. The findings of the research study attempt to expand the debate on girls'/women education in a postcolonial society using a hybridised theoretical analysis approach. Additionally, this chapter presents me with an opportunity to voice my ideas by utilising Foucauldian and Butler notions to unravel gender and education issues in Pakistan.

Chapter 10: Conclusion

The last chapter of the thesis offers answers to the research questions, and summarise the vital issues debated in the research study. It concludes by listing the limitations of the study and highlighting further gaps that can be explored by future studies.

1.7 Conclusion

In this chapter I have provided the contextual background of the research study, along with sharing my aims and motivations to conduct this research. Additionally, I have briefly described the significance of this research, and the way it contributes to an overall debate dealing with education and gender. In the penultimate section of the chapter, I offered a brief explanation of the key terms used in the thesis, and in the last section I have outlined the structure of the thesis.

2 Chapter: The Discourse of Securitization

2.1 Introduction:

In this chapter, I critically analyse the concept of securitization as a social construct. The section presents the current literature on securitization and moves on to build a comprehensive understanding of securitization as a theoretical framework developed by the Copenhagen School. In the latter half, this section gives an overview of the socio-political evolution of Pakistan as a security centric state and the impact of military-mullah nexus on Pakistani state and society in general. In the last section I have applied the Foucauldian concept of discourse to explore the notion of securitization. In the end, the section closes by highlighting the need for evaluating girl's/women education in Pakistan through the theoretical prism of securitization.

2.2 The theoretical framework of Securitization:

Security is a contested concept, having no consensual meaning or singular definition (Williams, 2012) and could be assigned diverse meanings and connotations (Baldwin, 1997, Collins, 2013, Shepherd, 2013). Security as a divergent concept encompasses such diverse aims that extremely differing policies can be categorised as policies of security (Wolfers, 1952). It is defined in relation to vulnerabilities both internal and external that threaten states, institutions and governments (Ayoob, 1995 , p. 9). In the words of Buzan (2008) until the 1980s the phenomenon of national security was explained through the approaches of power and peace, where the former sees security as a derivative of power and the later as a consequence of peace. He further argues that security as a concept in itself is versatile and the holistically developed analytical framework of security lies between the extremes of power and peace, where it incorporates the majority of their insights, and adding more of its own (2008). Moreover, security as a concept is elaborated as a rationale of predictability present at various tiers of social order, encapsulating from local communities to the global level or the world order but the notion of 'whose security' it is that to be secured still remains a debatable issue (Hettne, 2010). Contemporarily, the understanding of security problems has

evolved much more than military threats (Dannreuther, 2014). Mitzen (2006) proposes that states not merely seek physical security but they also strive for ontological security, or security of the self.

The phenomenon of security, considered both highly dynamic and contested, emerged as one of the integral issues of world politics during the 1980s (Buzan, 2008, Williams, 2003, Buzan et al., 1998). Since then, a plethora of literature has emerged, both in the theoretical sphere and in empirical case studies. The theoretical shift in the domain of security was widened by Buzan, Wæver and De Wilde (1998) where, the traditionalist approach of restricting security to the single domain of military-political was rejected. A new comprehensive framework was developed by adopting constructivist disposition to conceptualise the distinctive characters of security in five domains: military, political, economic, environmental and societal.

Within the theoretical discourse as expressed by Williams (2003), the contribution of Buzan, Wæver and their collaborators emerged into a school of academic thought referred as 'Copenhagen School', who coined the term *securitization*. Wæver the pioneer of securitization theory (Balzacq, 2010), defines the theory of securitization as a speech-act, in which security is not treated as an objective condition but a consequence of a certain social process (Wæver, 1995). As aptly explained by Wæver (1995):

> What then is security? With the help of language theory, we can regard ''security'' as a speech act. In this usage, security is not of interest as a sign that refers to something more real; the utterance itself is the act. By saying it, something is done (as in betting, giving a promise, naming a ship). By uttering ''security'' a state-representative moves a particular development into a specific area, and thereby claims a special right to use whatever means are necessary to block it. (Wæver, 1995 , p. 55)

2.2.1 Security as a social construct

The concept of securitization presented by School of Copenhagen is a procedural way of grasping the social construction of threat and security policies (Charrett, 2009 , p. 3). The contours of securitization theory constitute of three integral notions: the concept of security, the nature of referent objects, and the role of security actors (Skidmore, 1999, Buzan et al., 1998). Copenhagen School defines

referent objects as things under threat and has the legit claim for their survival such as nations, states and tribes. Whereas *securitizing actors* who securitize issues by declaring a referent object under threat could be ranging from individuals to sub state groups (Williams, 2003) such as state, military, political leaders, media, international organisations and non-governmental groups (McDonald, 2008, Buzan et al., 1998, Hirschauer, 2014).

Balzacq (2010) labels Wæver's approach of securitization as a philosophical approach, where securitization is a conventional procedure. Contrary, to this he adds the sociological approach to define securitization, where pragmatic situations and factors construct the threat image. Contrary to this, Balzacq critically analysed the limitations of speech-act notion in the Copenhagen School's securitization theory. According to Balzacq (2005), the over reliance on securitization theory on speech-act falls flat while addressing the security practices in actual scenarios. Further contributing to the Copenhagen School's theory of securitization, he deliberates securitization as a strategic practice. He incorporates three more notions, where securitization is: (i) audience-centred, (ii) context-dependent, and (iii) power-laden (Balzacq, 2005).

In addition to this, Shepherd (2013 , p. 53) stresses on the role of the audience, where a securitizing move made by a security actor will be not considered valid until and unless audience accepts and considers it as a valid move (through this thesis I have tried to illustrate that in the case of Pakistan this is done through the discourse of legitimacy – see chapter seven and nine) . Hence, the conceptualization of securitization theory is laden with understanding the intersectionality between referent object, security actor, threats and audience. Whereas Duffield (2007) debates that security viewed from the perspective of securitization theory is often less an objective condition but more of a vehicle used by policy makers, politicians and security scholars to compete for prominence and resources.

Thus leading on to this, according to Williams (2003), if security is treated from the perspective of securitization, where speech-act and threat construction is the main architects of the notion of securitization, it indefinitely expands the security agenda. In such a scenario, not only the possible threats are magnified but the

actors or objects that are perceived being threatened tend to include actors and objects well outside the realm of military security of a territorial state. In its applied discourse, the course of securitization is structured in a way, where the "securitizing actors" in their varying ability presents threats in a socially impactful manner. The threats are presented in such a convincingly manner, by using the empirical factors or situations to which these actors make reference, they are recognised and accepted by the relevant audience (2003 , p. 513-514).

The theory of securitization lays out a distinctive and first-hand framework of analysis for security studies and issues stemming out of it. Buzan, Wæver and Wilde's (1998) scholarly approach lays out a unique and overarching approach, which incorporates cultural, economic and environmental aspects to already existing traditionalist point of view of military-political notion to study security issues, by adopting a constructivist disposition. In this regard, Pakistan as a state provides a strong case study and offers an empirical scenario to examine the theoretical postulates of securitization, the role of securitizing actors and its impact on the working of the state. The following section will critically explore the emergence of Pakistan as a security centric state and building a rationale to why apply theory of securitization on Pakistan and how it can contribute to building a better encapsulating understanding of Pakistani social discourse as a society marred by the intersectionality the country's referent object, security actors, threats and audience.

2.3 The Securitization of Pakistan:

Understanding Pakistan requires generic dissection of its chronological history right from its inception until today. The narrative of Pakistan has to be understood in its holistic disposition, digging its factual history all the way to the country's emergence as a security centric state, as aptly rationalised by Khattak (1996) as an artefact of fear and existence. She argues that 'A large majority of Pakistanis live with the fear that Pakistan will disintegrate in the near future. This fear is the subject of many discussions cantered around the question of the country's existence. It has been possible to produce such a mind-set because deterrence - the underlying philosophy of security in Pakistan- is based on the fear that India will attack (p. 344).' Tracing the roots of this troubled birth of two nations Lieven

(2011) tries to shed some light on the reasons behind this securitization of Pakistan:

> Pakistan was born in horrendous bloodshed between Hindus, Sikhs and Msulims; and within two months of its birth, fighting had broken out with India over the fate of Muslim majority state of Kashmir. This fighting has continued on and off ever since. Two out of Pakistan's three wars with India have been fought over Kashmir, as have several campaigns. These include the bitter, 25 year long struggle for Siachen Glacier (possibly the most strategically pointless fight I the entire history of human conflict) initiated by India in 1984 (Lieven, 2011).

Regards to Pakistan, the emergence of the security-centric mechanism of the state is synonymous to its troubled inception, where India perceived as a constant threat. In the words of (Buzan, 2003), securitization is not only a persistent issue between Indian and Pakistan, but within Pakistan as well. The application of the theory of securitization on Pakistan can be of immense significance, while comprehending the security issue in Pakistan mainly of two reasons. Firstly, it dissects the social constructive procedures in creating, maintaining and perpetuating a threat image. Thus, the application of theory of securitization can lead to a better understanding of Pakistan and its issues, like the country's struggle with threat concerns both internal (Hoodbhoy, 2007, Cohen, 2003) and external (Amin, 2000, Kukreja and Singh, 2009), along with role of security actors such as military (Zaidi, 2005) and Islam (Haqqani, 2004) on socio-political procedures. In the case of Pakistan, the *referent object* is the state, the *threat* is India and the main *security actors are* military and Islam. This whole theoretical discourse leads to the debate on understanding the securitization of Pakistan, the role of the securitizing actors, the use of empirical factors and situations in legitimising the security threat claims, and its impact on the social order.

This brings us to the juncture of the securitization of Pakistan and its impact on the power structures, thus, in order to critically evaluate this impact, it is crucial to analyse the securitization of Pakistan first. In the words of Cohen (2002), the inception of Pakistan was not merely restricted to provide welfare, order and justice to its citizens - drawing strong parallels between Pakistan and Israel in their creation process – but securing a homeland for the minority Muslims of Sub-Continent to protect them from the bigotry and intolerance of Hindu majority, along with an ideological anchor and political guardian of the Islamic world (p.

109). Cohen (2004) argues that the idea of Pakistan originated in the early eleventh century with the invasion of India's northwest by the Muslim invaders. According to him, the question of how Islam spread within South Asia holds great importance to today's political world, although, it is hard to encapsulate the impact of Islam on India due to wide regional variations (p. 15-18). Hence, stating this Cohen highlights that even before Pakistan's creation; Islam was the fundamental and integral securitizing actor, which later caused the split of India. The arrival of Muslim invaders, the invasion and conversion of Hindus, Sikhs, Buddhists (Ibid) explains, the initiation of the securitization of Pakistan before its inception, where Islam was the main securitizing actor.

In addition to this, not only the Islamic ideology of Pakistan securitized the country as a state but also the Western and Indian strategists perceived Pakistan as a security line of South Asia from Central Asian and Soviet threat. Moreover, due to its geostrategic security position and strong military tradition, the British envisioned Pakistan as the *guardian* of South Asia, balancing both the Soviet and pro-Soviet government of India in the region (Ibid). Secondly, the issue of Kashmir dispute with India right from the day of partition of Sub-Continent emerged as the strongest and vital empirical situation in the securitization of Pakistani state, cementing Pakistan military's role as the strongest securitizing actor (Cohen, 2004, Haqqani, 2004, Inkster, 2012, Fair et al., 2010, Synnott, 2009, Christine Fair and Jones, 2009, Schmidt, 2009). Thus, before Pakistan's creation Islam played a major role in the securitization of Pakistan and after its inception, it was Pakistan's military. The nexus of Islam and military defined Pakistan's national objectives of securitization. Therefore, the main thesis of this research is to comprehend how this nexus shaped up Pakistan's power structure over the years? Along with exploring empirical situations and factors contributing in the securitization of Pakistan and its impact on the girls'/women education?

2.4 Military and Islam: the two security actors of Pakistan:

Buzan (2008) argues that both strength and power have different connotations when applied to a state. In his argument Pakistan is a substantial power to reckon with but weak as a state (2008, p. 93-96). As regards to this, understanding why Pakistan evolved as a substantial power but failed to establish itself as a strong

state and what factors played a part in it and what impact they had on the Pakistani institutions and social system holds serious importance. Lately, the term *most dangerous place on the earth* has been in use to define Pakistan (Schmidt, 2009 , p. 29). Understanding the enigma of Pakistan (Inkster, 2012) both historically and socio-politically, it has to be treated as a sui generis country rather than being explored through improbable contrasts to the developed countries (Lieven, 2011). Tenets of Islam hold a firm influence on the ideology of Pakistan, shaping up the country's constitution, economic and educational systems and their significant role in state legitimacy (Weinbaum, 2013). Haqqani (2004) argues that from the time of its creation to the foreseeable future of Pakistan, Islam holds a defining impact on Pakistani politics. The rationale behind Pakistan's outlook as an Islamic state is deeply rooted in history and is neatly tied both with the praetorian motivations of the Pakistani military and Pakistan's elite worldwide (2004, p. 85). Understanding of Pakistan as a state requires an insightful investigation of both its religious ideological foundations and Pakistani military and their relationship.

2.4.1 Security Actor: The Army

Right from the time of its creation, Pakistan came into being as an insecure state because of its dispute with India over Kashmir and its contested border with Afghanistan, and these historical whys and wherefores gave rise to the dominance of Pakistan military (Fair et al., 2010, Aguilar et al., 2011). The idea of Pakistan army as the guardian of the ideological frontiers of Pakistan was first floated by General Yahya Khan, which was later vigorously expanded by the President of Pakistan General Zia ul Haq during his process of Islamization of the country in the 1980s (Haqqani, 2010, Aguilar et al., 2011). This notion of guardianship, well-rehearsed in public, allows the Pakistani army to intervene in the matters of governance, foreign and domestic interests (Fair, 2011 , p. 573). The civilian institutions of Pakistan failed to curtail this notion of guardianship because of their own failures and their implicit acceptance of this narrative (Fair et al., 2010). In addition to this, Fair (2011) further debates that even the civilian governments have supported the Afghan and Kashmir Jihad because popular sentiment in Pakistan supports this notion. Moreover, the civil-bureaucracy, judiciary and public do believe that the army as a dominating, disciplined and only

capable institution to defend Pakistan from any internal and external threats (Fair, 2011). Thus, this status of the army makes it a major power player in the realm of securitization of Pakistan, which is deemed to play a vital role in upholding the guardianship of Pakistan.

2.4.2 Security Actor: Religious Ideology

This, consequentially, leads us to critically debate the role of religions as a securitizing actor and its impact on Pakistani state. Ideologically being an Islamic state, the religious groups in Pakistan holds well-armed and well forced influence on the Pakistan government. In contrast, Pakistan army uses these religious parties and outfits as pressure groups, using them as a tool to perpetuate the military's control over foreign and domestic policies (Haqqani, 2004). Hence, the combination of the Pakistan army's praetorian status (Siddiqa, 2007) and the rise of Islamic groups lead to the *Islamic democratization* of Pakistan (Pupcenoks, 2012). The inception of Islamization in Pakistan was to preach national coherence and stanchion Pakistani army, however, it led to the juggling of the social order, where it gave rise to the sectarian violence and gender parity (Samad, 2011). Pupcenoks (2012) labels Pakistan's case of democratic Islamization of the state as "Conflicted Repressive Islamization", where the three fold approach of Islamization of educational systems, economies and social policies is required to understand the concept of democratic Islamization. Consequentially, the important thing to be understood over here is to critically analyse the relationship between the securitization and the Islamization of Pakistan, and critically investigate its impact on the educational system particularly focusing on the girl's/women education.

2.5 The Securitization of Pakistan as a Foucauldian Discourse

Through the application of securitization model on Pakistan, I seek to explore the practices triggered by the securitization of the state: practices defining the social discourse and aiding in the process of social construction. Securitization and *its latent impact* on the social discourse of Pakistan and how does it impact the social construction of girls'/women education in Pakistan in particular. The conceptual understanding of the problem heavily relies on understanding the correlations existing between the securitization of Pakistan and the social discourses. Like the

critical and analytical study done by Foucault on prisons, where he rationalises that the aim of research on prisons was not to critically analyse the institutions, theories or ideology but practices. He argued (Foucault et al., 1991):

> In this piece of research on the prisons, as in my other earlier work, the target of analysis wasn't 'institutions', 'theories' or 'ideology', but practices - with the aim of grasping the conditions which make these acceptable at a given moment; the hypothesis being that these types of practice are not just governed by institutions, prescribed by ideologies, guided by pragmatic circumstances - whatever role these elements may actually play - but possess up to a point their own specific regularities, logic, strategy, self-evidence and 'reason'. It is a question of analyzing a 'regime of practices' - practices being understood here as places where what is said and what is done, rules imposed and reasons given, the planned and the taken for granted meet and interconnect. (1991, p. 75)

As discussed earlier in this chapter, the ideological stance of Pakistan is hinged onto its security dilemma. The state went through an overhauling process of securitization right from its inception but unfortunately, the empirical application of the theory of securitization has not been used to investigate the case study of securitization of Pakistan in scholarly terms. Foucault through his work argued that it is within discourses people become subjects because of the interplay of power relations. In the case of Pakistan, securitization just like the notion of power presented by Foucault (1978) is ever evolving without being governed by an individual mind, institution or any governing body. Although, as argued above, there are major security players that can have substantial advantage over other players because of the country's socio-political past. However, interrogating the security struggles of Pakistan from a Foucauldian lens can facilitate in comprehending the securitization discourse, and the ways in which power is contested and creates tactics/ practices/ discourses that influence on the society at large. As according to Foucault (1978):

> ... there is no power that is exercised without a series of aims and objectives. But this does not mean that it results from the choice or decision of an individual subject; let us not look for the headquarters that presides over its rationality; neither the caste which governs, nor the groups which control the state apparatus, nor those who make the most important economic decisions direct the entire network of power that functions in a society (and makes it function); the rationality of power is characterized by tactics that are often quite explicit at the restricted level where they are inscribed (the local cynicism of power), tactics which, becoming connected to one another, attracting and propagating

> one another, but finding their base of support and their condition elsewhere, end by forming comprehensive systems: the logic is perfectly clear, the aims decipherable, and yet it is often the case that no one is there to have invented them, and few who can be said to have formulated them: an implicit characteristic of the great anonymous, almost unspoken strategies which coordinate the loquacious tactics whose "inventors" or decision-makers are often without hypocrisy (1978, p. 95).

Thus relating to Foucault's notion of power and building onto the idea of Balzacq (2005), which in a signifies that dynamics of securitization are power-laden. He states that (Balzacq, 2005):

> In this regard, the revision I propose here is to recast the speech act model of security. By integrating strategic purposes into the equation, my approach elevates securitization above its normative setting and, in so doing, ensconces it in the social context, a field of power struggles in which securitizing actors align on a security issue to swing the audience's support toward a policy or course of action (p. 173).

Therefore, through this research, I do not merely focus on the securitization of Pakistan as a Foucauldian discourse, but I intend to trace various *discourses st*emming out of this securitization on Pakistani society. Just like Foucault's work on prison aimed at exploring the practices and discourses generated by the mechanisms of prisons, not institutions, theories or ideologies, similarly, studying Pakistan's securitization as a discourse, the intention is to locate the struggles of power within this discourse. It does not restrict itself to critically analyse the role of institutions, but to understand the mechanism of power struggle within the discourse of securitization and its impact on the knowledge production of gender and education.

2.6 Conclusion

In this chapter, I have discussed the constructivist take of the school of Copenhagen on security. In the first half of the chapter, I have presented relevant literature that critically analyses the securitization theory, which was theorised by the Copenhagen school. In the middle section of the chapter, I discussed the issues of Pakistan stemming out of its security struggles and rationalised the application of the theory of securitization to study the case study of Pakistan. Last part of the chapter, in a brief manner attempts to justify the application of Foucauldian approach to study the role of securitization discourse with the aim to

comprehend the issues of power struggle in the context of Pakistan. The next chapter, in detail, evaluates the securitization of Pakistan from the Foucauldian discourse perspective.

3 Chapter: The Foucauldian Discourse and the Securitization of Pakistan

3.1 Introduction:

This chapter investigates the work of Michel Foucault on power and the way it functions in a society. It begins by building an understanding on the concept of power through the diverse Western notions of power. Further, it employs Foucault's notion of productive power in contrast to other theoretical concepts on power to understand the nuances of power relations within a societal discourse. Moreover, it interprets the role of power relations in the realm of Foucauldian discourse, creating a *regime of practices*, and how does these practices forge the self. In the last section, the Foucauldian idea of discourse is applied on to the case study of the securitization of Pakistan.

3.2 Power: A contested notion

The academic debate on power does not only transcend the realms of radical politics but comprehending how does power work is a central concept to theoretical discourse on political institutions and social relations (Newman, 2005 , p. 10). In his work 'The Purpose of Political Science' Morgenthau raises the question that *'why is that all men lust for power?'* (Morgenthau, 1966, p. 75). This lust for power is labelled as an instinctive desire in a man where he wants to empower himself over the others and is a product of ultimate dynamic of social interaction (Petersen, 1999, Mollov, 2002, Pichler, 1998). However, drifting away from the positivist approach to interpret power, I plan to approach the concept of power from a Foucauldian poststructuralist notion, where power serves through discourses instead of structures (Foucault, 1971, Miller, 1990, Karlberg, 2005, McNay, 2007b, Hall, 2004, Mills, 2003b).

Even before the advent of Foucauldian interpretation of power, the concept of power holds a central figure among Western social and political thinkers (Karlberg, 2005). In regards to this, the concept of power (macht) defined by Max Weber in his *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft* holds a great significance in the field of social sciences and many scholars have attempted to translate the German text in to

English and in their conceptual approach differ to each other (Parsons and Henderson, 1965, Freund, 1969, Bendix, 1962). However, in *Misreading Weber: The concept of 'Macht'* Wallimann, Rosenbaum et al. (1980) argues most of these translated works have failed to convey the actual meaning of Weber's core concept of power and are abstract. The literal definition provided by Wallimann, Rosenbaum et al. (Ibid) is:

> within a social relationship, power means every chance (no matter whereon this chance is based) to carry through the own will, (even against resistance) (p. 264).

Critically speaking the word-to-word translation of Weber's power concept remains divided of opinions and does not provide clarity on the subject of power. Therefore, understanding Weber's concept of power requires a conceptual framework. The words of Habermas and McCarthy (1977) sheds light on the contextual explanation to Weber's concept of power. Weber defined power (macht) as an act of forcing one's own will on the behaviour of others. The conviction behind the act of forcing one's will is driven by a subject whose aim is accomplishing a desired goal. An individual actor/subject - or a group that can be regarded as an individual – applies all means so that the behaviour of another subject is in align to his desired goal as the desired goal cannot be accomplished without the support of another subject. Having the means, access and disposition to instigate the other and influencing the behaviours of another subject to the desired behaviour is termed by Weber as *power* (Habermas and McCarthy, 1977, p. 3-4). However, Weber's definition of power hinges onto the relational view of domination, contrasting to the organization-building qualities of power (Warren, 1992 , p. 20). Contrary to this, Hannah Arendt (1970) portrays power as a communicative act, she argues:

> Power corresponds to the human ability not just to act but to act in concert. Power is never the property of an individual; it belongs to a group and remains in existence only so long as the group keeps together. When we say of somebody that he is "in power" we actually refer to his being empowered by a certain number of people to act in their name (p. 44).

In addition to this, Parsons associate power to a general capacity of a social system, where the aim is to mobilize resources so that a mutual and collective aim could be successfully achieved (Parsons, 1960, p. 181). The above-mentioned

definitions shed light on two different dimensions explaining the concept of power: relational approach and organizational approach. According to Warren (1992) the organizational approach excludes the issue of conflict of interest and doing so discounts the relational dimension (power over) while comprehending the theme of power. Contrary to this, the relational approach (power over) look at power through the lens of conflict of interest. In the relational approach, it does signify the presence of conflict of interests, but these conflicts are solved by coordinated actions resulting in consensual engagements. The persuasive motivations are applied by an agent in command to influence the subordinates to do their duties, which are tailored to their interests. If the same task is governed by the element of threat, it will generate actions falling short of meeting the required actions (1992, p. 20-21).

Weber labels this form of power as *domination,* where the ruler influences the actions of the ruled and the commands of the ruler are obeyed by the ruled as a voluntary action and not stemming out of conflict of interests (Weber, 1978). On the other side, Foucauldian notion of power differ from the above mentioned power concepts and states that 'in the modern era power is increasingly 'productive': power relations develop and discipline the capacities of individuals and align them with organisations' (Warren, 1992, p. 21). Consequentially, considering the case of Pakistan and analysing the whole securitization process, it is vital to comprehend the role of Pakistani state and its security actors especially army that how does it establishes power over the masses, where the Pakistani people in majority align themselves to the state narrative of security and act in accordance to this narrative voluntarily and consensually. Therefore, out of numerous philosophical concepts of power, I have opted to apply Foucault's productive power idea to explore the power mechanism of the discourse of securitization.

3.3 Foucault's Analysis of Power:

Foucault (1982a) argues on the reasons that establish specific nature of power, which shapes the conduct and actions of individuals and groups. For instance, he argues that:

> The exercise of power is not simply a relationship between partners, individual or collective; it is a way in which certain actions modify others. Which is to say, of course, that something called Power, with or without a capital letter, which is assumed to exist universally in a concentrated or diffused form, does not exist. Power exists only when it is put into action, even if, of course, it is integrated into a disparate field of possibilities brought to bear upon permanent structures. This also means that power is not a function of consent. In itself it is not a renunciation of freedom, a transference of rights, the power of each and all delegated to a few (which does not prevent the possibility that consent may be a condition for the existence or the maintenance of power); the relationship of power can be the result of a prior or permanent consent, but it is not by nature the manifestation of a consensus (p. 788).

This leads to a further inquiry that what are the underlining reasons that make people to be driven by an authority in command so heartily that rather than interpreting the commands of domination as a forced will of few, it becomes a consensual social discourse. Nietzsche and Weber shared the belief that the relations of dominations create the identities of the individuals involved, thus, according to Nietzsche, Weber and Foucault *self* is forged by power relations (Warren, 1992). In the words of Digeser (1992) the main claim of power is that it forge subjects enabling us to comprehend who we are, what we believe and how should we behave, the complete social discourse that stems out of political, economic, legal and religious norms is forged by power relations (1992, p. 982). Further explained by Foucault (1980):

> Between every point of a social body, between a man and a woman, between the members of a family, between a master and his pupil, between everyone who knows and everyone who does not, there exist relations of power which are not purely and simply a projection of the sovereign's great power over the individual, they are rather the concrete, changing soil in which the sovereign's power is grounded, the conditions which make it possible for it to function (1980, p. 187).

The scholarship of Foucault holds immense importance in understanding of self because his genealogical methods are not solely based on tracking historical occurrences but understanding the philosophical foundations beneath those occurrences (Shiner, 1982, p. 382). According to Foucault (1982a), in a societal paradigm human beings are made into subjects and by the word subject he means when an individual is dependent and controlled by someone else, moreover, when he is tied to his identity by conscience and self-knowledge. The whole process of converting human beings into subject is done by the modes of objectification. The

three modes of objectification that converts humans into subjects are: modes of inquiry, modes of dividing practices and mode of human being turning himself into a subject. He believes that understanding the objectification of subject requires critical analysis of historical patterns such as cultural modes that construct human beings into subjects. According to him, this objectification of subject happens when human beings are place inside the realms of power relations. Furthermore, he points out the need of enhancing the parameters of studying power, if objectification of subject has to be understood completely.

In regard to this, he states that a critical conceptualization is mandatory and this conceptualization can only be performed through the critical analysis of our past conditions which in return carve our present circumstances (Foucault, 1982a). Likewise, Nietzsche attributes the forging of self to the occurrence of practices and conditions which catalyses the whole societal construction process. He states that *practices produce the self*. Thus, it is the existence of practices in our societies which carves a certain form of self and made human beings into subjects. Such as, 'the kind of self that results from historically contingent practices – a Christian soul, an ascetic, a rational calculator, a romantic – will have much to do with conditions under which the practices are generated' (Warren, 1992, p. 23-24).

Following Nietzschean philosophy *practices produce self,* Foucault divulges into the notion of *regime of practices*, although 'the Nietzschean roots of Foucault's thought' (Thiele, 1990) has always been the part of critical debate around Foucault's work (Mahon, 1992, Sluga, 2005, Hoy, 1992). For Foucault power is embedded in the *micropractices* of a social discourse, where the social practices of daily life constitute power (Fraser, 1981). Through his work of *genealogy* he contradicts the prior structuralist understanding of culture as systems of signs, in fact, he perceives cultures as a set of practices, where these cultural practices are established historically and are therefore in a sense 'arbitrary or contingent' (Ibid, p. 274). Therefore, comprehending Foucault's analysis of power requires understanding of his concept of regime of practices. For instance, he elaborates his concept of regime of practices by his analysis of prisons. He (Foucault et al., 1991) writes:

> In this piece of research on the prisons, as in my other earlier work, the target of analysis wasn't 'institutions', 'theories' or 'ideology', but practices - with the aim of grasping the conditions which make these acceptable at a given moment; the hypothesis being that these types of practice are not just governed by institutions, prescribed by ideologies, guided by pragmatic circumstances - whatever role these elements may actually play - but possess up to a point their own specific regularities, logic, strategy, self-evidence and 'reason'. It is a question of analyzing a 'regime of practices' - practices being understood here as places where what is said and what is done, rules imposed and reasons given, the planned and the taken for granted meet and interconnect. To analyze 'regimes of practices' means to analyze programmes of conduct which have both prescriptive effects regarding what is to be done (effects of 'jurisdiction'), and codifying effects regarding what is to be known (effects of 'veridiction'). So I was aiming to write a history not of the prison as an institution, but of the 'practice of imprisonment (1991 , p. 75).

Hence, human practices within a particular social realm, for instance prisons, can explain the working of power and the constitution of knowledge in that specific realm (Schneck, 1987). According to Hall (Hall, 2018), knowledge is not only produced through language but through practices, practices that have meanings. For example, diverse individuals coming together and creating a discourse within particular institutions, such as prisons. According to this, it can be argued that regimes of practices acquire certain form of power relations, which in return forges the self, converting human beings into subjects. However, the critical point is how these regimes of practices are integrated into a societal discourse, what enables them to carve out particular form of identities in a society.

3.4 Foucauldian Power: Regime of Practices and Discourses

In the words of Martino (1999) 'different forms of the subjects cannot be separated from a regime of practices through which power is channelled and particular truths established'(1999 , p. 240). This gap is filled by Foucault's work on *Power/ Knowledge,* where he brings together power, right and truth and brackets them in a troika. Leading this debate further Foucault's analysis of production of truth establishes the relationship between discourses of truth and mechanism of power. Foucault (1980) in his lecture on January 14, 1976, explains the holistic rationale of how working of society depends upon the production of truth of power for its operation. As Foucault explains power through the paradigm of power relations, he believes that this power relation mechanism constitutes

our social body and gives it certain characteristics. However, these power relations rely on a production and functioning of particular *discourses* to establish, constitute and characterise a society. Furthermore, he argues that working of power in a society is handicapped without the discourses of truth as power 'operates through and on the basis of this association' (1980 , p. 93).

This raises further questions about what does Foucault mean by truth and how it is produced in a society, moreover, how does the construction of truth assists in establishing the right. Foucault answers this inquiry and critically outlines the nature of intersection existing between troika of power, right and truth. Foucault (Ibid) states that functioning of our societies seeks forced production of truth of power for its functioning, moreover, exercise of power and production of truth are intervened ideas, which rely emphatically on each other for the workability of both concepts. He further argues that power is in a constant struggle to institutionalise and professionalise the production of truth. Thus, why we are subjected to the production of truth because it is the truth that make laws, carves true discourses and our whole existence from the right start to the end is the reflection of those true discourses, which in return are marked by specific effects of power. Consequentially, the specific relationship between power, right and truth are organised in particular ways in our societies thus leading to a roleplay between exercise of power and production of truth (Ibid, p. 93-94). Further building onto his argument Foucault (2002b), highlights the ways in which power relations and knowledge production takes places within discourses. He reasons that:

> The important thing here, I believe, is that truth isn't outside power, or lacking in power: contrary to a myth whose history and function would repay further study, truth isn't the reward of free spirits, the child of protracted solitude, nor the privilege of those who have succeeded in liberating themselves. Truth is a thing of this world: it is produced only by virtue of multiple forms of constraint. And it induces regular effects of power. Each society has its regime of truth, its 'general politics' of truth: that is, the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the means by which each is sanctioned; the techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth; the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true (2002b , p. 131).

Hence, summarizing Foucault's main postulates of power, right and truth, it is evident that power relations through the production of truth constitute knowledge within the realm of discourses. Therefore, it is the performance of power within discourses that determines what we are and how we are to live and behave (Foucault, 1980). But the most important factor, which he highlights in the above quote is the idea of 'every society having its own system of truth production'. This notion becomes a vital point for the research study to investigate the role of power structures and their impact on generating and maintaining discourses that establish truth production in a society. Therefore, this aspect of power relations and truth production within discourses become a starting point for me to apply it on to the case study of Pakistan.

3.5 Case Study of Pakistan:

Reverting back to the concept of the self is forged by the power relations and drawing parallels between Nietzsche's concept of domination of church (Warren, 1992) and Foucault's Pastoral Theory (Foucault, 1982a) with the case study of Pakistan, there could be striking similarities. In his analysis of Christianity, Nietzsche argued that individuals can only maintain their identities by accepting the domination of the Church. The relationship between the Church and its followers is not of forced will, in fact, it is of obedience. Where the Church through priests provides an empirical reasoning to the sufferings of its followers and commands an authority over their salvation. In return of their obedient submission to the will of the Church, priest promises them redemption. The control over the sufferings of the followers provides the Church and priests an authority on defining the subjectivity of its followers (Warren, 1992).

Accordingly, Foucault (1982a) said Pastoral power which stems out of Christian traditions, aims at the individual channelising his thoughts, soul and actions. Pastoral power seeks domination by venturing into the minds of the people, by controlling their fate and directing their salvation courses. Hence, Pastoral power does not deal at collective levels but it works through its 'individualising' tactic, where the religious power spreads out of religious institutions through the means of individuals and triggers into the whole social body (1982a). The discourse on the power of the Church presented by both Nietzsche and Foucault has one

commonality that obedience from the followers is obtained voluntarily not by force or oppression.

Drawing back to the concept of practice in the philosophical approaches of *practices produce self* and within *discourses,* it is vital to understand how the practices of securitization came into existence in the context of Pakistan. As argued by Stephen Cohen (2004) the securitization of Pakistan happened with the first Islamic invasion of Sub-Continent, so these practices of securitization had a religious backdrop from historic times. In addition to this, the already existing security dilemma of Pakistan at the time of its creation enabled Pakistani army because of its colonial history to establish itself as the guardian of Pakistani state (Fair, 2011). In the case of Pakistan, it will be significant to comprehend the domination of the army and religion in forging the 'girl/woman' *as subject*. In the words of Daechsel (1997), the role of religion in gaining the obedience of individuals in Sub-Continent is an imperialist idea. He states:

> Pakistani nationalism and the ethos of the Pakistan Army were the most important formative elements of the state's military consciousness. In both elements, colonial patterns of thought are prevalent. The largely unchanged social practices of the Pakistan armed forces today are responsible for the preservation of a colonial logic of political manipulation: the vast majority of the indigenous population is perceived as a stagnant, backward and politically immature mass governed by religious sentiments, while legitimate politics remain the privilege of Westernised elite. Like the administrations of the British, Yahya Khan and Ayub Khan, that of Zia ul-Haq believed that the 'common Pakistani' was inherently religious and used religious symbolism to help legitimise its rule (1997 , p. 141).

The above argument shows that Pakistani army carried forward the colonial method of using religion to assert their will on the individuals, hence alleviating the position of army and religion in the case of Pakistan as the primary security actors. Building on the argument that self is forged by power relations within discourses, thus in Pakistan's example the army and religion can be identified as two main hubs of power that hold a significant impact on forging the selves in Pakistan. Consequentially, the emergence of Pakistani army as the guardians of the state occurred, where 'the army's ability to intervene in Pakistan's governance without immediate public outrage stems from its assumption, well-rehearsed in public, that it is the pre-eminent guardian not only of Pakistan's

foreign and domestic interests, but also of the nation's 'ideology', variously construed' (Fair, 2011, p. 573-74). This guardianship role of army legitimised through the non-Muslim threat in the form of India and strengthened by the Islamic ideology, I will argue produces the discourse of securitization. Furthermore, I will contend that this discourse of securitization influences in the generation of further discourses that through the contestation and negotiation of power forges the 'girl/woman' as subject (see chapter seven, eight and nine). Moreover, through the discourse of securitization, in the words of Fair (Ibid), 'the Pakistan establishment has nurtured this perception by influencing curricula in Pakistani schools and managing the public discourse about its neighbour'(p. 573) .Hence, Pakistan being a patriarchal society, the discourse of securitization can be a significant point of inquiry to evaluate its impact on the construction of the 'girl/woman' subject.

3.6 Conclusion

In this chapter, I highlighted that the exploration of the discourse of securitization from a Foucauldian perspective can offer diverse dimensions to comprehend the notion of power in the context of Pakistan. As a result, in this chapter I explored the work of Michel Foucault on power and the way it functions in a society. It began by building an understanding on the concept of power through the Western notion of power. Further, through the work of Foucault it investigated that how power relations become productive, which in result has an impact on social discourses. Moreover, it interpreted the role of power relations in the realm of Foucauldian discourse, creating a *regime of practices* that has the ability to forge the self. In the last section, the Foucauldian idea of discourse was applied to the case study of Pakistan to explore its securitization discourse.

4 Chapter: The Construction of 'Girl/Woman' – Theorizing Gender through Poststructuralist Analysis

4.1 Introduction

The previous chapters critically evaluated the notion of power through the work of Michel Foucault and analysed the discourse of securitization from the Foucauldian discourse perspective. The evaluation of securitization of Pakistan by the application of Foucault's notion of power/knowledge and discourse explained how historically driven securitization of Pakistan creates a certain regime of practices, which perpetually produces the self in the Pakistani context. In regard to this, the process of securitization gives birth to a regime of practices and production of truth in society, generating a particular form of social discourse. Therefore, the purpose of this study is to understand the discourse of securitization and what impact it has on girls'/women education.

Accordingly, analysis of girls'/women education in Pakistan firstly requires an understanding of gender in Pakistan. Therefore, the chapter's starting point is to theorize gender construction primarily in the poststructuralist context. Also, this chapter interrogates domination and power from a poststructuralist perspective to further build an understanding of gender construction processes. For this purpose, Foucault's notion of panopticon, power and discourse creating the *subject*/self – in terms of women – is studied in order to understand the construction of woman/girl. The chapter offers a poststructuralist feminist critique of Foucault's work and rationalise why it is important to the scholarship of the study to include Butler's notion of performativity to grasp the social construction of the 'girl/woman' subject in Pakistan.

4.2 Theorizing Gender and the Poststructuralist Perspective

Poststructuralist thought tends to centre around the work of Derrida, Lacan and Foucault, who drifted away from the Western liberal idea of a unified self, which saw the notion of self as fixed (Miller, 1998, Palmer, 2007, Peters and Burbules, 2004). Contrary to the ideas of liberal humanists, they advocated that *self* is

forged by the contradictory discourses around it and is fluid (Pilcher and Whelehan, 2004 , p. 112). Consequentially, Derrida through *deconstruction* was able to dislodge the binary conception of the Western philosophy, which observed the world through the bifurcated lens of good/bad, nature/culture, man/woman, dominant/other, master/slave, white/black etc. (see see Derrida et al., 2016, Colebrook, 2014, Culler, 1983, Royle, 2003, Derrida and Bass, 1978). Particularly, in relation to the binary of man/woman, Culler (1983), described how this bifurcation constituted the idea of woman as *other*. He argued:

> Men can proceed without the mention of woman because she is deemed to be automatically included as a special case; male pronouns exclude her without calling attention to her exclusion; and if she is considered separately, she will still be defined in terms of man, as his other
>
> (1983 , p. 166).

Additionally, the forte of Poststructuralist discourse is to focus on the construction of social practices and cultural patterns and how they mark their imprints on the processes of subjectivation (Søndergaard, 2002). Subjectivation as in the process of producing subjects and as described by Søndergaard 'subjects emerge through and within discursive power' (Ibid , p. 189). According to Foucault (1982b), in a societal paradigm human beings are made into subjects when they are placed in the realms of power relations. Whereas, in the words of Butler, power not only constructs subjects but also 'providing the very condition of its existence and the trajectory for its desire' (Butler, 1997 , p. 2). Poststructuralist discourse studies the construction of social identities and it gauges how the processes of exclusion and power relations determine the creation of subject (Søndergaard, 2002). Therefore, this chapter aims to study the construction of gender and to draw upon the facts of how the discourse of securitization forges the notion of 'girl/woman'.

Poststructuralists elaborate on the production of individuals in a society (Belsey, 2002, Williams, 2014). Their critical analysis of the production of individual is not entirely fixed to the idea that the production of individual occurs because of the process of social construction. In fact, as an individual take part in various discursive practices, the self of individual is constituted and reconstituted (Davies, 1989, Weedon, 1987). Similarly, in the poststructuralist perspective understanding the meaning of girl/woman is problematic as it cannot be fixated to a particular

notion as there is a constant shift in its meaning (Jones, 1993). Bronwyn Davies, Valerie Walkerdine and Alison Jones through their work critically analyse the poststructuralist feminist position to explain the construction of becoming a girl (Walkerdine, 1989, Davies, 1989, Jones, 1993).

Davies and Banks (1992) focus on subjectivity and expounds that how a person in a social setting attach meaning to his/her existence also to the people around them and in the world they reside. Thus, it opens up a debate on the construction of meaning, interpretation of acts and how the concept of body is established in social discourse. The construction of the meaning of gender acts as a point of departure to comprehend the meaning of girl/woman. As in the words of Davies (1989) individuals create gender by participating in discursive practices, she says, 'gender is created by individuals and within individuals as they learn the discursive practices through which to locate themselves as individuals and as members of the social world' (1989, p. 229). Accordingly, Walkerdine (1989) rejects the patriarchal set up as monolithic force which enforces the core concepts of socialization on girls, however she argues that patriarchy merely produces positions for subjects to enter (1989, p. 205). Moreover, Davies (1989) stresses on the fact that becoming of a girl by a girl occurs when she participates in that occurring set of social discourses and practices. She argues:

> What I have argued here is that masculinity and femininity are not inherent properties of individuals; they are inherent or structural properties of our society: that is, they both condition and arise from social processes. Each of us, as a member of society, takes on board as our own the 'knowledge' of sex and of gender as they are discursively constituted. As children learn the discursive practices of their society, they learn to position themselves correctly as male or female, since that is what is required of them to have a recognisable identity within the existing social order (1989 , p. 238).

Thus, girls can no longer be seen as simply socialized into their appropriate gender roles. They *'position themselves'* (Jones, 1993 , p. 159).

4.3 Gender Performativity

Taking the debate forward regarding the participation of an individual in those discursive practices that play a crucial role in the social construction of gender is elaborated by Thompson (1975), where he says that it is the centrality of gender

to one's own identity, thus gender gives individuals identity. Consequentially, gender provides a source of recognition for a man/woman and for the others around. Therefore, it could be argued that by participating in the hegemonic discourses on gender, can allow individuals to acquire a socially accepted gender identity, according to Butler, she calls this act as gender *performativity* (Butler, 1993, Butler, 2010, Butler, 2004). According to her, performativity is 'a ritualised production' (Butler, 1993) of socially permitted acts within a highly rigid regulatory framework which links the gender identity with the performance of gender acts. She explains:

> If there is something right in Beauvoir's claim that one is not born, but rather *becomes* a woman, it follows that *woman* itself is a term in process, a becoming, a constructing that cannot rightfully be said to originate or to end….. Gender is the repeated stylization of the body, a set of repeated acts within a highly rigid regulatory frame that congeal over time to produce the appearance of substance, of a natural sort of being. A political genealogy of gender ontologies, if it is successful, will deconstruct the substantive appearance of gender into its constitutive acts and locate and account for those acts within the compulsory frames set by the various forces that police the social appearance of gender (Butler, 2010 , p. 45).

Moreover, how this gender identity works is further elaborated by Davies in her work 'The Accomplishment of Genderedness in Pre-School Children'. Davies (1987) argues that for children the task of identifying the working of maleness and femaleness in the everyday world is crucial in order to accomplish children's own 'genderedness'. She states, 'This accomplishment enables them to be perceived by others as 'normal', competent members of the social scenes in which they are engaged'. Thus, it is the idea of getting recognition from society, which makes an individual to participate in those discursive practices of gender (1987 , p. 42-43).

The above analysis of theorizing gender and comprehending the construction of girl/woman from a poststructuralist perspective further dwells in acknowledging the discursive practices, societal processes and cultural patterns as formative occurrences in defining and attributing gender roles. This critical analysis of the production of girl/woman leads another inquiry that what establishes this occurrence of discursive practices. How these claims of gender identity existing in society are established as truth, thus it raises a significant question on the production of truth. In this regard, Foucault expounds on the vitality of production

of truth, how it constitutes the social and cultural patterns and subordination of truth to power. He reasons:

> There can be no possible exercise of power without a certain economy of discourses of truth which operates through and on the basis of this association. We are subjected to the production of truth through power and we cannot exercise power except through the production of truth. This is the case for every society, but I believe that in ours the relationship between power, right and truth is organized in a highly specific fashion.... I would say that we are forced to produce the truth of power that our society demands, of which it has need, in order to function: we must speak the truth; we are constrained or condemned to confess to or discover the truth. Power never ceases its interrogation, its inquisition, its registration of truth; it institutionalizes, professionalizes and rewards its pursuit. In the last analysis, we must produce truth as we must produce wealth (Foucault, 1980 , p. 93).

Keeping in mind Butler's notion of performativity that is done within the highly rigid regulatory framework, it becomes significant to identify the various but diverse modes of production of truths that establish such frameworks. Hence, I will argue in the *discussion chapter* that the discourse of securitization plays a crucial role in producing discourses that invariably constitute the social regulatory frameworks of gender performance, in the context of Pakistan, which is diverse from the European frameworks.

4.4 Producing the Female Body

Following Foucault's idea that society demands a forced production of truth of power for its functioning, it is important to investigate how a girl/woman is placed in society. In order to critically theorize gender and to grasp the placement of girl/woman in society, it is crucial to observe how a girl/woman in her bodily form is produced in society. Likewise, how a girl/woman's body is produced and what discourses of truth are generated to constitute a girl/woman's body. In Foucault's idea sexuality is not an innate product of body but it is a by-product of specific power relations (Mcnay, 1991 , p. 125). 'We are born male or female, but not masculine or feminine. Femininity is an artifice, an achievement'(Bartky, 1997 , p. 95). In the words McKinley and Hyde (1996) woman's body is an act of social construction but what meanings are associated with woman's body needs a further explanation. This explanation is expounded by Butler (2010):

> if sex and gender are radically distinct, then it does not follow that to be a given sex is to become a given gender; in other words, "woman" need not be the cultural construction of the female body, and "man" need not interpret male bodies (p. 152).

While critically elucidating Foucault's *The History of Sexuality,* Buker sheds light on the positioning of woman's sexuality in the Greek context, which later constructed the Western notion of women's sexuality and treated women as incomplete men (Buker, 1990). Buker explains how both Western culture and Foucault's analysis of Greek sexuality suffers from bias in relation to women and limit the existence of a woman to the biological function of bearing children (Ibid). In her analysis, the construction of woman's body occurs not as an actor in society but as a body. Firstly, they are desired by men as a sexual body, which functions to produce children. Secondly, men are entitled to have their authority over a woman's *body,* 'clearly this asserts the authority of the husband over the wife while withdrawing any possibility of authority from the wife by constituting her as a body. Her power, freedom, or choice is not an issue; her body is' (Ibid, p. 817).

Thus, construction of girl/woman is not only restricted to a particular positioning in social discourse and a girl/woman's acceptance of that discourse; in fact, the image of a woman's body is also constituted. What is an ideal body image of a girl/woman is produced as a collective truth, which is not only a disciplinary way of controlling woman's body but is accepted by women at large as a truth themselves, similarly to Foucault's idea of Panopticon (Bartky, 1997, Duncan, 1994).

4.5 The Panopticon Discourse

Sandra Lee Bartky in her detailed study on disciplining 'the female body' strike similarities to Foucault's theoretical explanation of Panopticon – a model prison of circular structure where inmates are placed into divided cells guarded by a supervisor who is placed in the central tower monitoring the visibility and movements of inmates (Bartky, 1997 : p, 94-95). Foucault's account in *Discipline and Punish* elaborates the emergence of panopticon and how it was an act of disciplining prison inmates and later on the model was manifested in the future structures of factories, schools, barracks and hospitals, carrying forward the sole essence of panopticon that is to produce disciplined bodies (Foucault, 1995).

Bartky investigates Foucault's concept of panopticon and weaves an argument around the production of docile bodies of women in the modern world. However, her account of panopticon carries a fair amount of criticism on Foucault for generalising the concept of body, where the body of an inmate is referred to as the body of a man. Thus, treating the body as a unitary structure, where the body of a woman is similar to the body of a man, 'as if men and women bore the same relationships to the characteristics institutions of modern life' (Bartky, 1997 , p. 95).

However, Foucault's metaphorical expression of panopticon provides a significant theoretical vehicle to comprehend the procedures that indoctrinate an impracticable body ideal in women (Duncan, 1994 , p. 48). Thus, it is not the discursive practices solely that provides entry points for girls/women to constitute themselves in societal discourse, moreover, they are monitored and disciplined to create their own body subjectivities. Hence, *becoming a girl* (Jones, 1993) demands to step into the feminine structure of body laid out by societal practices, which are considered to be truth claims. As aptly said by Bartky 'the practices which construct this body have an overt aim and character far removed, indeed radically distinct, from their covert function' (Bartky, 1990, p. 76). Eventually, referring to Foucault's panopticon, it explains how these practices serve an overt aim but marked with their covert manifestations. While Foucault (1995) says visibility in panopticon is a trap for the inmates, however, this induced state of consciousness and permanent visibility assures the automatic functioning of power. In the constructed belief for the inmates, they are under constant surveillance. The mechanism of power is established by making the inmates visible but making the inspector in the central tower invisible. Hence, power relations are not dependent upon the action of the inspector, but inmates are made to believe that they are continuously observed; they themselves become the bearers of that power. Foucault accentuates that establishment and functioning of power mechanism are laid down on the principle of power should be visible, however, unverifiable. Visible as in the positioning of central tower reminding inmates they are being watched constantly. Unverifiable in a sense that they must never realise when they are being watched or not but under a constant thought that they are spied upon (Foucault, 1995 : p, 201).

This model of panopticon is incorporated by Barky (1997) and theorizes how a feminine body is produced through disciplinary practices in the modern world. She describe three categories of such practices: 'those that aim to produce a body of a certain size and general configuration; those that bring forth from this body a specific repertoire of gestures and movements; and those directed toward the display of this body as an ornamented surface' (1997 , p. 95). Therefore, the ideas of 'feel good means looking good, shame and confession, taking great care of yourself and beautiful body' have obsessively made women self-monitoring (Duncan, 1994) , thus socially institutionalizing themselves as the inmates of panopticon, a self-policing subject (Bartky, 1997 , p. 107). Consequentially, Foucault's dissection of panopticon concept consolidates how power is produced and is instrumental in the construction of subjection, he says, 'the panopticon is a marvellous machine which, whatever use one may wish to put it to, produces homogeneous effects of power. A real subjection is born automatically from a fictitious relation' (Foucault, 1995 , p. 202). Thus, construction of a girl/woman's body is induced by the already established and existing discourses, hence the femininity is constituted in a woman once she accepts that body ideal and *positions herself* in the gender specific roles of social discourse and cultural patterns. Therefore, the discursive practices and truth claims of body construction for a girl/woman produces her femininity, thus, constructing the meaning of woman's body and socially constructing girl/woman (as further highlighted in the case of Pakistan in chapters seven – nine).

4.6 Foucault, Butler and the feminist discourse

Agreeing with Said, Mcnay (2007b), stated that although Foucault's thought has substantially contributed in developing feminist and postcolonial theory but his work is marked with 'blindspots' that fails to see gender and the issues of identity politics (p. 10). Sharing similarities with Foucault's work on the process of individuals becoming *subjects,* Butler questions the role of existing power structures in the creation of identities and subjectivity (Butler, 2004, Butler, 2010). Although, Butler and Foucault's exhibits similar interests in the construction of the subject, and former admits the imprints of Foucauldian thought on her work (Butler et al., 2000), but she disagrees with Foucault on many ideas, such as 'the body' (Butler, 1989).

Butler presented a powerful critique of Foucault's conception of the body and labelled it as incoherent and blames him for denying his own claim that the body is a cultural construction. According to her:

> Foucault is thus guilty of two grave and related offenses: his account of inscription is guilty of logocentrism and his account of the body is guilty of offering the false hope of redemption by a recovery of the pure, the unadulterated, the 'real'. The body subject to inscription offers the chimera of liberation. (Dudrick, 2005, p. 226-227)

In response to Foucault, Butler gives her own conception of the construction of the body and contend that it should be viewed as 'a diffuse and active structuring social field' (Butler, 1989, p. 607), instead of analysing it as a non-independent body, which acts as a slate that is marked with inscriptions by cultural discourses and power regimes (Ibid). The reason the issue of the body becomes so critical to this research because in a patriarchal society of Pakistan (Chauhan, 2014), the notion of biological difference becomes an initiating point for the male dominance, and the superiority of a man over a female is legitimised on the basis of the physical strength of a man's body (Macklem, 2003). Therefore, it is crucial to the scholarship of this research that the body of Pakistani 'girl/woman' subject is explored from a perspective that not only addresses the social construction aspect of it but covers the Foucauldian blindspots as well. Hence, poststructuralist feminist approach, particularly Butler's concept of performativity (Butler, 2010), helps the research study to overcome the Foucauldian neglect of the 'gender neutral' social theory of discourse and explore the 'girl/woman' subject as a non-Foucauldian passive body (Mcnay, 1991).

4.7 Conclusion

The above analysis of gender through the poststructuralist perspective analysed the construction of gender and constitution of girl/woman in society. The argument stated that the construction of girl/woman and the production of body image of woman are socially constructed concepts, which spur out of the interplay of various discourses in society. Moreover, these discourses are sustained in society through the production of certain truth. Thus, above argument highlights that how the concept of gender construction through discursive practices follows similar lines to Foucault's notion of practices produce the self – self which is an

individual in social existence. Moreover, Foucault also explains that how these discourses an outcome of power relations, thus, referring to Foucault's work and above analysis of Butler's notion of *performativity*, it is evident that girl/woman is not only socially constructed but invariably is the outcome of power relations that weave the societal discourse and cultural patterns. Hence, theorizing gender through poststructuralist notion and work of Foucault and Butler exhibits the construction of girl/woman as a product of power relations.

Drawing back to the argument presented in the last article, where critical analysis of power through Foucault's work demonstrated how the discourse of securitization could be a form of domination. Therefore, the scholarship of this study explores how the discourse of securitization as a form of domination structures gender in Pakistani society and what impact this domination has on the girls'/women education. Hence, to investigate empirically the impact of the discourse of securitization on girls'/women education in Pakistan, it is therefore necessary to comprehend the subjection of gender in Pakistani society firstly. Thereupon, building a theoretical understanding on the social construction of gender in Pakistan and how Pakistani girl/woman is created within the discourse of securitization is crucial to study.

5 Chapter: Educational Discourse and the creation of Subject

5.1 Introduction

The previous chapter explored the notion of gender construction using feminist poststructuralist perspective. The previous chapters critically evaluated the first two themes of securitization and gender through the works of Foucault and poststructuralist feminist perspectives, thus leading from there, this chapter aims to critically explore the third theme i.e. education. The first section discusses education as in relation to the concept of power, the second section explore the concept of education and subjectivation. Lastly, it aims to discuss the critique of Foucault's work particularly focusing on his work on power, self and subjectivation and critically exploring the commentary on Foucault's work by other scholars, particularly in a postcolonial society.

5.2 Education and Power

Similar to the work of Stephen Ball (2013), I aim to opt for an 'inside out approach' with the intent to critically comprehend the 'girl/woman' subject in the educational discourse of Pakistan. In the manner, where Ball focuses on 'exclusion and abjection to think about policy', likewise, my approach is to *understand the social construction of girl/woman* to think about education policy in Pakistan. This echoes Ball's approach, where the purpose is not to understand the policy to develop a comprehension of the girls'/women education in Pakistan but to illustrate the discourses that constitute the 'other' girl/woman subject, which invariably impacts the educational policy.

Now coming to the issue of education and power, Ball (2013) mentions in his book that Foucault identifies certain knowledge and attendant practices as the main characteristics of social principles and institutions of modern society and label them as human sciences. Educational knowledge and practices which forms a concrete part of human sciences play a greater role in the constitution of human beings as subjects. Understanding the role of educational knowledge and practices

and their relationship with politics, economics and history are vital in order to critically comprehend the creation of human beings as subjects (p. 2). Consequently, this requires an understanding of educational knowledge and practices and to configure their working in society. In his work, *Education and Power,* Apple (1995) argues that how knowledge in a socio-economic discourse is used as a commodity. Thus, this necessitates firstly understanding how knowledge is socially produced in society (Mannheim, 1936, Berger and Luckmann, 1991).

Jardine (2005) states 'every system of knowledge is different, but equal, in its completeness and coherence' (Jardine, 2005p. 18). In order to understand the system of knowledge, Foucault (Foucault, 2002a, Foucault, 1980) emphasised that understanding system of knowledge requires identification of the authority and institutions who can speak of knowledge. Further, he argued that how knowledge and power operate simultaneously, developing a mechanism that not only classifies and monitor the members of modern society but also plays a significant role in controlling, rewarding and punishing them. According to Jardine (2005), this nexus of the system of knowledge and techniques of power is labelled by Foucault as *disciplining power*, and this nexus is vital in the objectification of human beings as objects required by a society (p. 24). The power-knowledge relation is comprehensively elaborated by Walshaw in her book, 'Working with Foucault in Education'. Foucault's critical analysis of power-knowledge relationship is not only insightful but takes the power-knowledge nexus to a completely different level. Understanding this nexus of power-knowledge relation unravels the operationalisation of power in society from a completely new and unique perspective. This new approach by Foucault presented power as a productive force, impacting day to day activities of human beings. Thus, he explored power as a notion that generated knowledge about ourselves, about others and the whole societal mechanism (Walshaw, 2007 , p. 69-70). She further elaborates:

> To talk about power is to talk about knowledge, and to talk about knowledge is to talk about power. You can't have one without the other. So we can't underestimate the way power is implicated in everything we understand to be true. Interestingly, this takes us back to discursive practices because discursive practices are what we set limits on what we can possibly know. Now that we have come full circle, we can begin to

> appreciate that when we know, understand, or make sense of something, we cannot think of our knowledge as God-given. We have to think of our knowledge as constrained by discourses that govern our sense making. And the knowledge includes the knowledge we have of ourselves (p. 70).

Accordingly, investigation of the construction of an educational discourse in society thus requires understanding how power works in society. The above analysis of power-knowledge view set the scene for investigating the construction of educational knowledge and practices in a society. In the words of Apple (1995) although education has a relative autonomy the whole educational discourse is marked by structures which include state, economy and cultural reforms (p. xviiip). The further understanding of the concept of discourse is crucial to the whole debate on education and how educational practices operate in a society and what impact do they have on the construction of human beings as subjects. This is holistically elaborated by Ball:

> Discourse is a central concept in Foucault's analytical framework. Discourses are about what can be said and thought, but also about who can speak, when, and with what authority. Discourses embody meaning and social relationships, they constitute both subjectivity and power relations..... Thus the possibilities for meaning and for definition, are preempted through the social and institutional position held by those who use them. Meanings thus arise not form language but from institutional practices, from power relations (Ball, 2013 , p. 2).

Moreover, discourses encapsulates our daily life schedules and are prevailing in a societal setting both in oral and written form (Weedon, 1997 , p. 108) and are instrument of power, which are inherently part of institutions such as schools, churches, law courts and homes (Pitsoe and Letseka, 2013 , p. 24). Hence, 'in most societies, the education system is controlled by the state, but it works to maintain relations of power throughout the society as a whole' (Ibid , p. 25). Similarly Foucault argues, 'every educational system is a means of maintaining or modifying the appropriateness of discourses with the knowledge and power they bring with them' (Foucault, 1971 , p. 19). Accordingly Basil Bernstein states, 'the way a society selects, classifies, distributes, transmits, and evaluates educational knowledge reflects both the distribution of power and the principles of social control' (Bernstein, 1971 , p. 47).

Moreover, these discourses define, conceptualize and establish what it is to be human (Marshall, 1990). Thus, 'the subject is the basis upon which discourse is founded and, at the same time, the mode of objectification which transforms human beings into subjects (Ibid , p. 14). Therefore, the above argument suggests that it is within discourses meanings are associated to practices and objects, which creates humans into subjects. Likewise, this can be applied to an educational discourse, and its role in creation of meaning making mechanism for a subject within it. Therefore, the analysis of educational discourse and its role in creating subjects holds crucial importance whilst investigating educational practices. The next section will explore the relation between education and subjectivation, applying Foucault's notion of creation of the subject.

5.3 Education and Subjectivation

Foucault through his work analysed how in Western society regimes of truth legitimate forms of social knowledge and techniques that were employed by people to build an understanding of their selves (Foucault, 1988). Foucault labels these techniques and practices as *technologies of self,* through which an individual with his/her own consent defines and constructs his/her own identity (McNay, 2013). In addition to this, on the discourse of self, Foucault not only brought a shift from previous discourse but 'also brings in notions of disciplinarity, governmentality, freedom and ethics as well as notions of corporeality, politics and power and its historic-social context into understanding of the self' (Besley, 2007 , p. 57). In his earlier works, Foucault (1995) coined the term *docile bodies*. Foucault explained that how the self is structured into a docile body. In his words, both the technologies of self and technologies of domination generate a series of chain reactions that invariably constitutes the self (Besley, 2007, McNay, 2013, Foucault, 1995). He further elaborates that how state using a form of power, which he calls *governmentality,* produces docile bodies/citizens whose individuality and conduct is control by these technologies of self and domination (Besley, 2007, Foucault, 1995). Dreyfus adds a new perspective to Foucault's concept of technology and how does that influence the subject and its identity. His understanding of technology in a modern world holds a two-way relationship between the subject and modern technology. In one way the subject uses the technology to objectify and dominate the world, however, in the second way it is

technology which constitutes the subject (Dreyfus, 2002). Foucault explored the model of technology using a set of four interrelated technologies:

> Foucault set out a typology of four inter-related 'technologies': technologies of production, technologies of sign systems, technologies of power (or domination) and technologies of the self. Each is a set of practical reason that is permeated by a form of domination that implies some type of training and changing or shaping of individuals…. These practices, activities, routines or disciplines will operate on a person's privately held, or inner self, on how they behave, act and think, such that currently existing self will be involved in choosing just what those practices might be and what the personal transformation goal might be. Subsequently, the self may then change and be-reconstituted differently (Besley, 2007 , p. 58).

In his later works, Foucault expanded on his earlier works on self and power. He moved away from his notion of power, which he analysed as repressive and dominated and later on, marked power as productive (see see Besley, 2007, McNay, 2013, Foucault, 1980, Mills, 2003b). This marked a shift in his analysis on self and how repressive power produced docile bodies. Consequentially, he accentuated new dimension in comprehending the self, where the self is not a docile body merely accepting the form of dominations (Ibid) but presented individuals 'as self- determining agents capable of challenging and resisting the structures of domination in modern society' (McNay, 2013 , p. 4).

The above analysis of Foucault's work on the idea of self, highlights how the self is socially constructed in society through the order of discourse, regime of practices and production of truth. It argues how power relations forge human beings into subjects and what various social discourses are applied using numerous discourses of production of truth to constitute human beings into subjects. Therefore, through this research I aim to further investigate how education as a form of one of the social discourses forges the self (girl/woman) in a society, and explore the relationship between the discourse of securitization and the social construction subjectivation of the girl/woman within the educational discourse.

5.4 Education and Discourse

In his inaugural lecture on the topic of *Order of Discourse* at the College de France, Foucault (1971) spoke about *discourses* as a form of socially constructed and

accepted knowledge that in return constitutes a set of truths, meanings and ethics. He stated in his lecture:

> Everything seems to have occurred as though, from the time of the great Platonic division onwards, the will to truth had its own history, which is not at all that of the constraining truths: the history of a range of subjects to be learned, the history of the functions of the knowing subject, the history of material, technical and instrumental investment in knowledge. But this will to truth, like the other systems of exclusion, relies on institutional support: it is both reinforced and accompanied by whole strata of practices such as pedagogy - naturally - the book-system, publishing, libraries, such as the learned societies in the past, and laboratories today. But it is probably even more profoundly accompanied by the manner in which knowledge is employed in a society, the way in which it is exploited, divided and, in some ways, attributed. It is worth recalling at this point, if only symbolically, the old Greek adage, that arithmetic should be taught in democracies, for it teaches relations of equality, but that geometry alone should be reserved for oligarchies, as it demonstrates the proportions within inequality (Foucault, 1971 , p. 11).

Hence, an interpretation of Foucault's analytical investigation of discourses suggests that the distribution of knowledge in societal settings requires institutional support. Therefore, in order to establish a certain set of knowledge as a truthful discourse requires a system. The above argument depicts how diverse form of knowledge is classified into various categories and is targeted at different audiences. It also highlights how various structures are utilised such as book-system, libraries and pedagogies in establishing specific techniques and practices in society. Hence, building an association between knowledge-power nexus and the utilisation of institutional structures, this research study aims to explore education as an institutional structure and the role it plays in the subjectivation of human beings.

Jardine (2005) highlights that how '*unities of discourses* or *discursive practices* form a coherent and individualised system of knowledge' (p. 90). Critically investigating education and the role of educators, she sheds light on the role of society, parents and children in assigning two conflicting responsibilities on the shoulders of educators. Firstly, educators are required to deliver all the knowledge, skills and attitudes to their students as per required by the educational system. Secondly, on the opposing hand, society expects that educators will guide the students and help them not to get succumbed into a state

of estrangement, which arises out of 'distractions, unhealthy pressures and distractions' (Ibid , p. 78). However, she points out that while doing so, educators have to deal with a daunting task themselves that is how they 'conceive of teaching, learning, the curriculum, schools, and educational policies' (Ibid). Consequently, this aspect of society impacting behaviours of educators is vital to the objective of this study as they play a major role in disseminating the socially legitimised educational practices (see section on 'the hidden curriculum' in the discussion chapter)

Moreover, according to her looking through Foucauldian lens illustrates that every specific era impacts the understanding of its children to evaluate their own reality through a certain structure of belief system, concepts, knowledge and practices (Ibid). Hence, she states:

> The rules and regularities that undergird our current era's understanding of knowledge, children, education and schooling don't just affect what we know. They affect what teaching practices we understand to be possible and legitimate, as well as what "studenting" practices, so to speak, we can legitimately expect as normal and ordinary from our students (p. 91).

In relation to the above arguments, Popkewitz and Brennan (1997) connect the dot between knowledge, education and subjectivation. Analysing an intellectual discourse of linguistic *turn,* they elaborate on how 'reasoning' became a central focus of research, which catalysed the construction of subject in today's time. They further highlight the need for investigating the constitutive role of knowledge that is central to the construction of social life. Moreover, it is the importance of linguistic turn primarily for two reasons. Firstly, it focuses on the relationship between power, knowledge and change; secondly, it helps 'to historicize the problem of "knowledge," which we call a social epistemology' (Popkewitz and Brennan, 1997 , p. 293). Furthermore, swapping the phrase 'linguistic turn' with 'social epistemology', they argue that how this approach defines the objects which are established by the knowledge of schooling, they state:

> We use the phrase "social epistemology" rather than "linguistic turn" as a strategy in order to place the objects constituted by the knowledge of schooling into historically formed patterns and power relations. Epistemology provides a context in which to consider the rules and

> standards by which knowledge about the world and "self" is formed. Epistemology also provides the means to investigate distinctions and categories that organize perceptions, ways of responding to the world, and the conceptions of "self." Concurrently, social epistemology locates the objects constituted by the knowledge of schooling as historical practices through which power relations can be understood. Statements and words are not signs or signifiers that refer to and fix things, but social practices that generate action and participation ……. When teachers talk about school as management, teaching as the production of learning, or children as being "at-risk," these terms are not "merely" the personal words of the teacher, but are produced in the context of historically constructed "ways of reasoning"(Popkewitz and Brennan, 1997 , p. 293).

Moreover, explaining further, they accentuate how learning is not only a mark of knowledge about the world but in a psychological perspective, it redefines the concept of self as well. Thus, the process of learning which is implied by the teachers in schooling is socially constructed and it stems out of the knowledge. Therefore, the word *learning* is not a self-explanatory concept, in fact, it personifies various connotations of principles, primacies and characters that how one should behave and act in the world (Ibid , p. 294). In addition to this, in the process of schooling, both teachers and students become self-governing actors, and this done by the application of various techniques of *reasoning*.

Thus, education as a form of acquired learning, based on historically constructed ways of reasoning, which stems out of knowledge, plays a significant role in constructing the self. Hence, the constitution of the self in an educational process depends upon the educational practices being applied by the educational systems. Therefore, this point becomes the primary point of interest, in regard to my research aim, that in order to comprehend the impact of the discourse of securitization, it is crucial to comprehend the construction of the girls'/women educational discourse in the context of Pakistan.

Additionally, according to Ball (2013), it is educational institutions that control the access of individuals to various kinds of discourses (2013 p. 3). Furthermore, Nicole and Fejes (2008), using Foucault's notion of bio-power explains that education is perceived as a public effort between the state and individual. Building on Foucauldian notion of Bio-power, they accentuated that it is the social production of individuals in accordance with societal needs of society through the process of schooling. Schooling which embodies certain set of techniques,

structures, beliefs and knowledge so that the self is constituted in particular form meeting the required needs (Ibid , p. 11). Keeping this aspect of the educational discourse in mind, it becomes vital to investigate the educational system of Pakistan and its role in the production of the girl/woman subject, which is performed according to the societal needs of the Pakistani society.

5.5 Conducting Education Research using Poststructuralism in a Postcolonial Society

Spivak's work offers a criticism of Edward Thompson's work in which he aimed to protect brown woman from brown men. Her claim was that the western academic production of knowledge to study the colonial subjects was a way of a white man speaking to a white man about the dilemma of a brown woman (Spivak, 1994). With the application of the poststructuralist theoretical framework to study the issue of gender and education in a postcolonial society, I concede that in a way this makes the voice of this research an echo of colonial knowledge production. According to Legg (2007) colonisation was not only a form of territorial invasion but was a representation of 'epistemic and historiographical violence and domination' (p. 265). The emergence of postcolonial and subaltern studies was with the intent to emancipate the colonial subject from this epistemic domination, emanating in the rise of writers such as Edward Said, Gayatri Spivak, Audre Lorde, Homi Bhabha, Sara Suleri, Stuart Hall, Frantz Fanon, and along with the wave of postcolonial feminists (Fanon and Farrington, 2001, Bhabha, 2012, Hall, 1990, Ashcroft et al., 2009b, Said, 2014, Spivak, 1994, Williams and Chrisman, 1994, Lewis and Mills, 2003).

Though the field of postcolonial and subaltern studies explicitly relied on the Foucauldian vocabulary to academically construct the contours of the postcolonial project (Nichols, 2010). However, at the same time, it had to tackle the Eurocentric blindness of Foucault, where he was accused of using French evidence to constitute epistemological frameworks to make assumptions about the rest of the world (Said, 2000 , p. 196-197). Hence, becoming a victim of his own criticism where he highlighted the hegemonic discourses of the western power/knowledge production mechanisms (Foucault, 1980). Keeping in mind the repercussions that could stem out of relying on Foucauldian blindness, which kept the issues of

postcolonial subject and feminism out of his sight (Racevskis, 2005), I deliberately opt to use Foucault to address the academic gap in the literature on Pakistan. However, in difference to Thompson's (2018) work, it is a brown man speaking to white men and women about the struggles of brown women in a postcolonial society. Hence, in order to make my speech coherent I have chosen to stand on the shoulders of western ideologues such as Foucault and Butler, but that cannot bury the fact that neither Foucault nor Butler, through their work, were able to study a postcolonial subject. Therefore, the application of Foucault and Butler's work to study discourses that plays a significant role in the constitution of a postcolonial subject could be underlined as the limitation of the study.

However, the weakness of this limitation becomes the strength of my argument. The reason being, the way postcolonial societies suffer from a colonial hangover, similarly, any academic effort to decolonise the *White Mythologies* and assimilate the *unassimilable excess* that the Third World is (Young, 2004), it suffers from the Western-colonial academic hangover. The reason for this is the *language*. Although, Said, Spivak, and Bhabha had tried to decolonise and deconstruct the West (Ibid). But they could not get away from the most potent residue of the imperialism, which is their usage of European language and vocabulary, which Phillipson labelled as *linguistic imperialism* (Phillipson, 2003), and Said declared it as the inheritance of imperial legacy (Phillipson, 1997 , p. 238). Therefore, the struggle to negate the influence of the Western ideologues and the absence of the Third World in their works, cannot be addressed till the time the very academic expression to deter this blindness set itself free from its reliance on the European languages. But, I argue, this limitation can be negotiated by assigning *new* meanings to the imperial and colonial concepts that aim to describe the Third World. Just like Foucault and his utilisation of Nietzschean and Kantian concepts to construct new meanings for the postmodern West (Thiele, 1990, Mahon, 1992, d'Entrèves, 1999). Likewise, Spivak, or Said, who used Foucauldian, Derridean and Marxist concepts to introduced the Third World issues from a non-Western perspective to postmodern Europe, and tackle the Eurocentrism of the Imperial West (Young, 2004, Spivak, 2010, Alavi, 1991, Racevskis, 2005). Thus, the language of the study is a reflection of a colonial hangover, but it does strive to offer a new perspective on older concepts and issues. I believe for the academics

and researchers from postcolonial societies, studying in the Western societies, the real struggle should be to challenge the linguistic imperialism by utilising the Western concepts to offer new meanings both for Western and postcolonial readers.

Although, Young, associated the emergence of 'so called post-structuralism' as an outcome of the Algerian War of Independence, which was an anti-colonial movement. Also, it was the Tunisian exposure that allowed Foucault to develop his anti-modernity stance against the liberating concept of the post Enlightenment Western society (Ahluwalia, 2010, Foucault and Parham, 2005). On the other hand, Young, emphatically pointed out towards Foucault's deliberate omission of the colonial world from his work (Ahluwalia, 2010), which he called, 'scrupulous silence' and paved ways for his 'alleged eurocentrism'(Young, 2001 , p. 397). Contrarily, there was a phase of Foucault's life when this silence was erased, in the shape of his Iranian Revolution romance, but that was met with harsh critique from his fellow western academics (Afary and Anderson, 2005). For example, James Miller (2000) connected the dots between Foucault's fascinations with the idea of death, which he drove him closer to the Islamic revolution of Iran, and the narrative of Shiite martyrdom. According to McNay (2007a), Foucault's adventures as a sex tourist to Tunisia clouded his academic judgement, and prompted him to declare Muslim cultures as more accepting of homosexual values as compared to the Christian West. Moreover, in the words of Afary and Anderson (2005), in the Islamic Revolution of Iran, he would found his voice that confronted the Western imperialism, and the societal order it produced.

Furthermore, they pointed out, it was his controversial support of the Islamists and the Iranian Revolution that effected his reputation in France, although Americans still continue to passionately celebrate his work (Afary and Anderson, 2005). In the light of the above debate, I would argue, albeit Foucault through his work, aimed to analyse the Western reality so that one can free oneself from it, and in the form of Islamic teachings of the Eastern world, he found a diverse thought process that does not borrow anything from the Western legal, political, and social thought, and could be a source of alternative reality. However, he missed the point that both the Western Enlightenment, and the Iranian

Revolution, in which the former denounced the religious dogma but the later relied on the religious doctrine to support its cause, failed to understand the most basic power struggle between a man and a woman. It was the patriarchy that arises as a dominant social force out of both historical incidents. It is this postcolonial blindness of Foucault that I have tried to address while studying the social construction of girls'/women education in Pakistan.

5.6 Conclusion

The above analysis of education as in the form of educational knowledge and practices, critically aims to explore the correlation between this knowledge and practices and the creation of subject. Hence, it further indulges in mapping a methodological linkage between educational knowledge and discourse and how it creates subjects. Therefore, academic investigation of the above mentioned relationship requires, firstly, to build a conceptual understanding of educational knowledge and practices and how it does function in society, aiding in the creation of subject. Hence, in order to comprehend the notion of knowledge, the research study utilized Foucault's exploratory concept of power/knowledge. Foucault argues that understanding knowledge requires identification of the authority and institutions that are eligible to speak of knowledge. Furthermore, he contends that knowledge and power create a nexus, which operates in society simultaneously. Hence, this nexus of power-knowledge structures a mechanism of control and reward. Additionally, Foucault highlights that the operationalization of knowledge stems out of how power operates in society. Moreover, he describes power as a productive not repressive. Thus, it is the productive power that spawns the concept of knowledge. Knowledge as argued above that constitutes and defines each and every individual in the society.

The particular analysis offered above, illustrates, in order to understand the working of educational discourse, it requires an understanding of power and the ways in which it fucntions in a society. This brings to the juncture, where in order to investigate the working of educational discourse i.e. educational knowledge and practices, requires critical evaluation of the structures such as state, and society. Moreover, the above analysis highlights the critical investigation of these structures and their impact on the educational discourse. Additionally, the above

academic analysis shows that the state plays a vital role in controlling the educational discourse. Thus, comprehending how educational discourse is assisting in the subjectivation of individuals requires a critical understanding of how educational discourse is constructed primarily. Moreover, Foucault argues that the educational discourse structures society through the nexus of power-knowledge. Hence, it is the power-knowledge nexus constructing a particular form of educational discourse that results in creating subjects. In addition to this, the above argument highlights that the apparatus of learning, which is applied in a schooling system is socially constructed. Moreover, it is the societal knowledge that impacts the working of the learning apparatus. Lastly, the above critical analysis of educational discourse through the work of Foucault explores how the educational discourse in the form of schooling is a mechanism of constituting subjects in accordance with societal structures.

Drawing back to the argument presented in the previous chapters, firstly the critical analysis of power through Foucault's work illustrated that the discourse of securitization can be a form of domination. Secondly, while theorizing gender through poststructuralist notion and work of Foucault exhibited the construction of woman as a product of power relations. Lastly, this chapter analysed that how educational discourse is impacted by the power-knowldege nexus. Hence, critically investigating the three themes of the research study using poststructuarlist feminist and Foucault's perspective highlights the critical role of power and its influnce on the discourse of of securitization, construction of women and defining the educational discourse. Therefore, in the case of Pakistan, invetsigation of girls'/women education requires building a theroretical understanding that explores the ways in which the discourse of securitzation socially constructs the *Pakistani girl/woman* firstly. Secondly, the impact of this discourse on the forumaulation of the educational discourse. Lastly, to comprehend the educational discourse which stems out of the discourse of securitization and its role in the social production of the girl/woman as subject and its impact on the girls'/women education.

6 Chapter: Research Methodology

6.1 Introduction

This chapter deals with the methodological choices made in the research study that I have selected to conduct this research. In the first section, I illustrate the ontological and epistemological stance that has been incorporated to establish the theoretical underpinnings of the research. The following section addresses the methodological approach that was applied in accordance to the ontological and epistemological choices. After that I highlight the employment of elite interviews as the appropriate research method to collect data. The penultimate section provides comprehensive details on the sampling process and offers thorough specifics about the research participants. In the last section. Finally, I describe the data analysis process, and end the chapter by identifying the ethical issues which were managed during the data collection process.

6.2 Research Design: Contemplating the theoretical choices

If a statement can some up the theoretical underpinning of my research design, then I would like to borrow a line that was uttered by Foucault in an interview given to Paul Rainbow and Hubert Dreyfus. He said:

> My objective … has been to create a history of the different modes by which, in our culture, human beings are made subjects (Foucault, 1982a , p. 208).

Likewise, my research objective is to develop a minute but diverse understanding of the '*girl/woman' as educational subject* in a postcolonial and nation-security-state of Pakistan. However, as clarified by Foucault, his academic objective to study the creation of human beings into *subjects* by placing them in the realm of power relations, does not offer a *theory* or *methodology* (Ibid). Therefore, in order to justify my research objective, I required a research design based on the foundations of a theoretical framework that can assist me to build a comprehensive understanding of the 'girl/woman' as subject in Pakistan.

Influenced by the academic approaches of social theorists, such as, Foucault, Butler, Mannheim, Berger and Luckmann (see see Berger and Luckmann, 1991, Butler, 2010, Butler, 1993, Foucault, 1971, Foucault, 1980, Foucault, 1982a, Foucault and Rainbow, 1984, Mannheim, 1936) to understand the production of human subjects within social discourses and its relation to the production of power/knowledge, the primary theoretical lens that I have used to conduct this research study is the 'poststructuralist approach to social theory' (Carter, 2013 , p. 580). According to Murphy (2013a), the field of *social theory*, enables an author to mix up his/her social theorists' ideas with his/her public intellectual persona, which results in the investigation of social ideas, from a scholarly perspective, such as power, structures, gender, ethnicity, identity and many more and offers practical playgrounds, for example, the field of health and education, to demonstrate to people the empirical manifestations of these philosophical concepts operating at various tiers in societies (Murphy, 2013a , p. xxiii - xxvii).

The ontological approach I have chosen is social constructivism, as it brings together these compounded social issues under one umbrella, and asks us to be critical towards the 'taken for granted' realities of life (Burr, 2015, Berger and Luckmann, 1991, Mannheim, 1936). Accordingly, for my epistemological positioning I opted for *poststructuralist feminism*, guided by the theoretical perspectives of Foucault's *power/knowledge* (Foucault, 1980, Foucault, 1982a) and *discourse theory* (Foucault, 1971, Foucault, 1981), along with Butler's notion of *performativity* (Butler, 2010), to grasp the *social construction of girls'/women education* in Pakistan. The rationale behind this choice is to investigate the social construction of the 'girl/woman' as subject in a security state from a subjective point of view, where I as a researcher employing a poststructuralist approach creates a critical meaning for this production process.

However, the real question arises on the selection of poststructuralist approach as my social theoretical framework within the social constructivist paradigm. With the merging of academic inquiry fields such as psychology and sociology, the social constructivist ontological paradigm has encapsulated various social theory approaches to understand the meaning making process of the world, for example, 'critical psychology, discursive psychology, discourse analysis, deconstruction and

poststructuralism (Burr, 2015 , p. 1). Within these varying options to study reality, I have selected poststructuralism, as I desire to critically discern the role of structures such as the army, religion, gender and colonialism in the creation of discourses that influence the meaning making process in society. Moreover, in the words of Peters and Burbules (2004), the theoretical framework of poststructuralism, within the social constructivist ontological paradigm, offers my research design an impetus which takes me closer to my main goal of understanding *the creation of the 'girl/woman'* as *subject*.

> In particular, poststructuralism tends to eschew the traditional account of truth corresponding to reality……. Politically speaking, poststructuralism aims to expose structures of domination by diagnosing "power/knowledge" relations and their manifestations in our classifications, examinations, practices, and institutions. It aims to produce an "incredulity towards metanarratives," to disassemble the structures. The "moves" and strategies of official discourse (whether the state, the party, or political movements and institutions that claim to speak for others) (Peters and Burbules, 2004 , p. 4-5).

The application of poststructuralist theory to answer the research question serves multiple purposes. Firstly, it offers a contrasting understanding of Pakistani state structures, particularly the role of the army and religion as security actors. Secondly, the parallel theoretical relevance is to study the *'girl/woman'* as subject in the context of a post-colonial-security state. Thirdly, it attempts to examine *gender* and *education* in a unique setting, where on one side the state is embroiled in security struggles since its inception but on the other side also has a religion, and is struggling to come out of its colonial hangover (Alavi, 1973, Alavi, 1988, Ayaz Naseem, 2006, Cohen, 2004, Talbot, 2015, Suleri, 2009). This attempt to examine gender in such setting brings to fore Butler's take on poststructuralist theory through her scholarship on the construction of women's' bodies and the performances they are required to enact in order to be characterised as women (Butler, 2010, Butler, 1993, Butler, 2004).

Consequently, this theoretical hybridization (Murphy, 2017) of diverse socio-political theories, in the shape of Foucault's power/knowledge and discourse (Foucault, 1971, Foucault, 1980, Foucault, 1981, Foucault, 1982a), Butler's performativity (Butler, 2010), and the Copenhagen School's securitization theory (Buzan et al., 1998), offer a new theoretical framework to aid the work of

Pakistani feminist scholars (Bari, 2000, Shaheed and Mumtaz, 1991, Mahmood, 2004, Jamal, 2005, Shaheed, 1999). Also, I utilise the *hybridization* approach to take the academic debate forward in the realms of studies dealing with sensitive topics such as gender and education, in postcolonial countries struggling with identity issues. Moreover, following the research spirit of Miner's *making the familiar strange* (Miner, 1956, Roy and Gingrich, 2018, Lysgaard), I suggest utilising the distinct theoretical frameworks of Pakistani feminist scholars, who are embroiled in resistance politics against 'men, money, mullahs, and the military' (Zia, 2009b , p. 30).

6.3 Research Methodology and Methods

Coming from a poststructuralist feminist perspective, I have utilised qualitative methodology as the methodological framework to collect appropriate data in order to answer the research questions. The addition of poststructuralist feminism to qualitative research interprets the functioning of power in a society and rethink the creation of a subject from alternative thinking perspective (Lichtman, 2013 , Olesen, 2018).

Through this study, I am exploring the link between the securitization discourse and the social construction of girls'/women education in Pakistan, therefore, in such a situation the target actors for the research study are not individuals from the general public but are those persons who command a 'privileged position in a relation to a particular activity or area of policy'(Huggins, 2014 , p. 2). As discussed earlier, the primary security actors in this research are the military officers and religious elites, hence, in such scenario, I opted for *elite interviews* (Harrison and Startin, 2013, Burnham et al., 2008, Dexter, 2006, Anderson et al., 1998) as my qualitative research method to collect appropriate data. The other primary reason, I have opted for elite interviewing is the political aspect of my research study while conducting research in an educational context.

Additionally, an important facet of the elite interview method that makes it unlike 'normative interviews' (Anderson et al., 1998 , p. 183), or 'standardized interviewing' is the way it is prepared and conducted (Dexter, 2006 , p. 3). According to Berry (2002), the forte of elite interviewing lies in not going into a

session with best questions but having ‘excellent conventionalist’ abilities to navigate the open-ended questions according to the answers of respondents (p. 679). This is where the preparation element comes into play as a major factor because in contrast to standardized interviews, where the interviewer sets particular sorts of questions and is looking for answers within presupposed criteria, but an elite interview investigator is eager to follow the lead of the interviewee and navigate the direction of the session, according to replies given by the interviewee (Dexter, 2006 , p. 3). Therefore, in order to prepare for such flexibility, the investigator has to study his or her subject and gather relevant information not only on the topic but also about the interviewee, for example conducting an interview with a head of state requires detailed research and careful planning (Anderson et al., 1998 , p. 183).

While conducting elite interviews, the other crucial feature is establishing the criteria for ‘elite’. In the words of Harvey (2011), there is no particular classification for elite and in the domain of social sciences, the scholars have opted for varied explanations. For example, according to Zuckerman (1972), there is a group of ‘ultra-elites’ within a privileged group of powerful people. Contrarily, some researchers define elite in comparison to the social status of the interviewee to that of the researcher or general public (Stephens, 2007, Smith, 2006). Whereas, for some scholars, elites are not usually head of states or big corporations, but those who hold dominant positions in a society within particular social and political structures with an ability to exert their influence because of their elevated position (Woods, 1998, Harvey, 2011).

When referring to my research, I define elites as those who command influential positions within the state structures that have a direct and considerable impact on the issues of national security, religious ideology, gender and education. In other words, people who represent those structures that exert a significant impact on the knowledge production system in Pakistan, and moreover, have the ability to exert their influence which gets reflected both in the policy documents and social practices.

6.4 Participants

The most current National Education Policy Report published by the Ministry of Education in Pakistan (Ministry of Federal Education and Professional Training Pakistan, 2018), in November 2018, states that approximately 40% of country's population (ages 10 and above) do not have the ability to read and write. In addition to this, the report mentions that there are 22.5 million out of school children and majority of them are girls. These are the official figures, however, UNICEF's (2019) country report of Pakistan for the year 2018 states that out of 149 countries, Pakistan ranks 148th on the gender parity index. Moreover, 60% of children of primary school age who remain out of school are girls and a quarter of women aged 20 to 49 were married before 15 years of age. In a situation like this, where the purpose was not only to comprehend the social construction of girls'/women education but evaluate the role of discourse of securitization in this context, the rationale for conducting elite interviews with groups that could hold a credible information on the topic, held a key. Building on this rationale, the government officials particularly high ranked bureaucrats related with the ministry of education, military officers, religious leaders and scholars, third sector officials and educationists were recruited as research participants. They were recruited keeping in mind their proximity to both the educational and social discourses of Pakistan. Initially, I planned to recruit between five-six participants from each cohort but during the data collection process I had to show flexibility because as some groups were easy to contact and approach as compared to the others. For example, getting access to high ranked serving military officers required numerous security clearances and strong personal references. In total I conducted twenty-eight interviews and 45 to 90 minutes sessions were used to collect information on themes such as *power, knowledge, education, gender, security, and religion.*

Before the data collection phase, I was consciously aware to keep a gender-balance while recruiting the research participants. However, the situation changed when I started approaching potential research participants. The recruitment process manifested that there existed noteworthy gender imbalance among the five cohorts. In the army and religious cohort, there was a clear absence of females, although there was some female presence, particularly, in

the army but that was mostly limited to the medical core. Also, I noted the absence of female religious scholars in the country, it was revealed to me during the recruitment process that the dominating and influential religious positions were dominated by men. Likewise, the high rank positions in the education departments were mostly held by men and thorough participant screening exhibited that there were women civil servants and bureaucrats but mostly, from my experience, they were not represented in the education department. The majority of people I interacted with in civil and state departments, particularly at high level posts, such as education secretaries, managing directors, chief executives, and directors, they were men. Only on two different occasions I found two females working in two different education departments, but both were personal secretaries to some high-rank bureaucrats.

After thorough search and going through various contacts, I found one-woman civil servant, but she had more of an educationist background not bureaucratic. On the other side, the educationist cohort showed a much-improved gender balance, where women were both available and accessible but again the high-level positions were taken up by men. One interesting observation that I made during my data collection, particularly, when I visited educational institutes, such as universities, was the gender balance. Girls/women were visibly in equal numbers to boys/men at the universities I visited but there was a clear absence when it came to the working space. Out of twenty-eight participants, I could not find any female participants from the army and religious scholar groups, and similarly from the education departments. Therefore, I ended up with only six female participants, which were either educationists or third sector officials. This absence of girls/women in the working spaces of Pakistani society is discussed in chapters 7, 8, and 9 and sheds light on *the idea of education* for girls/women in Pakistan. Additionally, the majority of participants were between the age range of forty to sixty years except three to four participants who were in their late twenties and early thirties.

6.4.1 Civil Servants

Civil servants/ bureaucrats are government officials appointed by the Government of Pakistan to formulate, administer, monitor and implement the educational

policy. Five civil servants working and related to the ministry of education and its related departments were interviewed. The rational to interview civil servants was to explore how educational policy is formulated and implemented. Moreover, conducting elite interviews with the civil servants was significant to investigate the key factors and crucial players playing a vital role in the formulation and implementation of the educational policy and curriculum.

6.4.2 Military Officials

Serving/retired military officials were interviewed for the research study mostly high rank officer, who served posts that dealt with security along with civil issues as well. Conducting elite interviews with military officials hold immense significance for the research study. The historical and geo-political situation of Pakistan enables the military to command strong impact on the process of policy-making. The rational to interview military officials was to comprehend the contested topic of education policy from the perspective of Pakistan Army. In addition to this, the research study aims to understand to what extent is the military's infiltration impacting Pakistani state's education policy and formulation of the school curriculum. Moreover, Pakistan Army has its own schooling system which has schools in all the cantonments of Pakistan. Similarly, the majority of private schools in Pakistan are located in the developed areas of cantonment and comes under the direct control of cantonment boards.

6.4.3 Religious Scholars

The elite interviews with religious scholars were aimed to examine the role of religion in Pakistan and its impact on the education policy. Religion plays an important role in the realm of Pakistan, as it is the only country in the Muslim world which is created in the name of Islam. The official name of Pakistan is 'The Islamic Republic of Pakistan', not only constitutionally Islam plays a great role, but it has a strong impact on the Pakistani society. The objective to conduct elite interviews with religious scholars was to evaluate the impact of religious factions on the state's education policy particularly towards girls'/women education.

6.4.4 Third Sector and Non-Governmental Officials

By conducting elite interviews with the third sector and non-governmental officials, I wanted to have a parallel opinion on the contested nature of policy-making in Pakistan particularly regarding education. In recent times both at federal and provincial levels, Pakistan government has launched various initiatives in collaboration with NGOs to improve the education sector (United Nations Children's Fund, 2019). Therefore, counting in all these factors, elite interviews with third sector professionals helped gather valuable data on issues regarding gender and education.

6.4.5 Educationists

I wanted to conduct elite interviews with educationists for various reasons. Firstly, I was interested to investigate how educationists interpret government's policies towards girls'/women education. Secondly, to interrogate their professional experiences when it came to the field of education in Pakistan and how government influenced them. Thirdly, research study aimed to explore the major players involved in defining and formulating the education policy and for that reason, educationists understanding on this topic was crucial for the research findings.

Besides, there was a conscious decision to recruit participants from the above mentioned five cohorts because of the topic of the study and its locale. The issue of security, along with the role of the army and religion, particularly around the topic, such as, girls/women, is deemed sensitive (see see Marsden, 2005, Smith, 2018, Aguilar et al., 2011, Raza and Khan, 2016, Gross et al., 2013), and, if you attach education with the already sensitive topic of women, it becomes more controversial particularly in low-income African and Asian countries, and the case of Malala is an apt and recent example of it (Brannon, 2017 , p. 324). This sensitisation of girls/women education is discussed in great detail in the findings and discussions chapters of this thesis, particularly, the issues of girls/women becoming rebels and going out of control after getting exposed to the Western education. Referring to this controversial aspect of research inquiry, Ahlberg (1999) states that some topics can be labelled as 'sensitive in nature'. Further explanting the concept, she illustrates that any study or topic that can bring

‘unwelcome social consequences or psychic costs for the participants or some social category that they may present’, can be called sensitive in nature (p. 11). And this sensitivity varies from culture to culture, and is not about the topic of a research but the relationship of the topic towards that particular society (Ibid , p. 12-13).

Bearing in mind this sensitivity of the topic, I wanted to get diverse opinions from people, who belonged from dissimilar and at times parallel institutions. For example, the foreign funded non-governmental organisations (NGOs), which are heavily funded by foreign donor agencies are considered the promoters of Western agenda and criticised for their harmful impact on the socio-political canvas of Pakistan (Shah, 2016). Recently, twenty-nine NGOs were asked to leave Pakistan citing security reasons, which included big names, such as Save the Children, Oxfam, and Action Aid (Stacey et al., 2017). Although, the relationship between the army and the religious elite ‘have been discursively articulated, secured and contested’ (Rashid, 2011 , p. 97). It also has its own unique socio-cultural dynamics that can have a significant impact on the issue of gender and education. For instance, President Musharraf (former Chief of the Army), who was inspired by the reformist policies of Kamal Ata Turk, wanted to make Pakistan into a ‘modern’ and ‘enlightened’ state post-9/11, and blamed the religious conservatism as a major hindrance in women empowerment. However, at the same time, he formed a coalition with right-wing religious groups to strengthen his dictatorial regime and publicly talking about the issue of women rape during his tenure, he said that getting raped has become a trend these days to acquire Canadian citizenship and make millions of bucks on the side (Ibid , p. 97). Additionally, in the case of Pakistan, Hayes (2016) calls the nexus between the military, the bureaucracy and the conservative religious parties ‘a triumvirate’ that commands the power over the political and institutional processes (p. 115). In such a situation where power is constantly negotiated and contested, the selection of above five cohorts not only offers a diverse point of view around the sensitive issue of gender and education but also plays a significant role in assessing the power struggle among the main power players as well.

6.5 Fieldwork

All the interviews were conducted over the course of six weeks during the period of March/April 2017. As I was dealing with diverse group of individuals, I had to travel to different locations to conduct the interviews. The majority of the interviews took place in three cities Rawalpindi (Military Headquarters is located here), Islamabad (federal capital of Pakistan) and Lahore (the pronvinial capital of Punjab province). Each and every interview was audio-recorded and I also made some handwritten notes during the interviews. As I was dealing with high rank officials so majority of the partciapnts were forty plus apart from the exception of few individuals who were in their late thirties.

One of the biggest challenges that I had to negotiate in the research process was the recruitment of appropriate participants. During the first year of my PhD, I started preparing a tentative list of suitable participants, but the actual test was gaining access to the participants. In the words of Van Maanen and Kolb (1982), 'gaining access to most organisations is not a matter to be taken lightly but one that involves some combination of strategic planning, hard work and dumb luck' (p.14). But in this case, I was not looking at organisations but at state institutions, and interviewing people on sensitive issues (as mentioned above). Under such circumstances, the role of the gatekeepers became very crucial for me (seeReeves, 2010, Broadhead and Rist, Corra and Willer, 2002). At this point, I would like to highlight that although before leaving for the field trip, I tried to contact the probable participants using their emails but not one of them replied to my email. When I spoke about this to one of my friends, who in the past had to conduct interviews with some high profile politicians, bureaucrats, and the army officials for his PhD, he reminded me that I should be aware of a fact that I am dealing with Pakistani professionals and in order to get their replies, I need to go pass their emails and secretaries and approach them directly. Due to this factor, Lieven (2011) calls Pakistan a kinship state, where in order to get your way around you need to know right people in the right places.

Subsequently, before I went to Pakistan, I had a task to identify gatekeepers who could help me to gain access, and these gatekeepers could be friends, contacts, colleagues, and academics (Bryman, 2004 , p. 297). Johl and Renganathan (2010)

list two ways of gaining access, *formal* and *personal*, depending upon the situation of Pakistani context, I opted for the latter one. Luckily, I knew few of my friends and contacts, with whom I went to same educational institutions in Pakistan and assisted me in gaining access. I would like to narrate an incident, just to exemplify the manner in which Pakistani red tape operates. In Pakistan, having a gatekeeper is not enough, it is the professional power that person commands inside the power realm is crucial as well. One of my friends, who works as a bureaucrat and himself enjoys a high-profile position, referred me to one of his colleagues, who overlooked the issues regarding posting and promotions at the Punjab Civil Secretariat. My friend, as he knew the system better than me told me that in order to approach the high ranked officers, such as secretaries and managing directors, you need a high-profile reference, and also, without having a credible reference, they would hesitate to answer your questions outside professional language.

When I went to see my friend's colleague at the Punjab Civil Secretariat, I had to sat in his office for the whole day, at the end of his work day, he called his secretary, took the list of the participants for me, and while handing it over to his secretary, he asked his secretary to make few phone calls on his behalf and inform the 'probable participants' that 'someone like his brother, who studies in the UK wants to conduct some research so please be kind enough to entertain him accordingly'. Now, even with having someone so high profile as your gatekeeper, still it was a challenge to reach the participants. The tradition was not to book an appointment in advance, just go to the office of the respective bureaucrat, and after going through various red tape points, introduce yourself to their secretaries.

Once I went to see one of the Punjab Education secretaries (one of the top education bureaucrats in the country), after I introduced myself to his secretary and gave him the reference of my gatekeeper, he informed me that the secretary was not available, but I can wait in his room if I want. While I was waiting in his room, the secretary walked in and saw me sitting there. I stood up and tried to introduce myself but with his hand gesture, he singled me to go back where I was sitting. At that point, I felt that I have offended the secretary, I sat there in his room for some time with him not uttering a single word. After, a while as he was busy going through his files, he asked, 'so what is the name of your city and your

school?' (He assumed that I am one of government school teachers, who works for the Punjab government) When I told him about myself, and gave him the reference of my gatekeeper, straight away he stood up from his chair, and shook my hand warmly. Immediately, he called his secretary, first he scolded him for not informing him about me, and then he asked him to serve some tea and biscuits. After knowing about me, he was very candid and up front during the interview.

While, we were busy talking about the issues facing girls'/women education in Pakistan and the factors that plays a crucial role in shaping up the policy, three people barged into the room. The secretary stood up from his seat and in a very warm way welcomed the party. After regular chit chat, the leader of the group, in an assertive manner, pointed at the person on his right side and said to the secretary, 'you need to transfer him back to his district and also, you have to build the school, where it is more convenient to us'. After those people went away, the secretary looked at me and said, 'Sir this is the way policy is made over here. You are talking about girls' education? This person who was heading the party, is an MPA (member of provincial assembly). He wanted me to transfer that teacher, who is employed by the state on the behest of him because he wants to bring someone he knows'. He took a pause and said, 'and you know why he is locking horns with the state over the location of the school because he is not interested in education, he is interested in a building which he could use for his personal use to hold political activities, just like a camp office'. He continued, 'this is the way power works over here, if I do not listen to him, he would approach my boss because my boss and him comes from the same city, this is how the system works, this is how we make policies over here'.

This was just one example of power negotiation that took place right in front of my eyes during the course of the interviews. The other interview sessions had their own sets of challenges, for example another factor, which I faced during the course of the interviews was majority of the participants rather than giving answers to my questions, were more interested to educate me. Another interesting observation from my fieldwork was gaining access to the feminist activists, and scholars in Pakistan, who have published their work on the issues related to women in academic journals. I tried various gatekeepers, spoke with

few at the end of conferences to get an interview appointment, also emailed them using their professional ids, and in some cases their secretaries (some of the renowned Pakistani feminist scholar's heads women related government institutions) took my contact and ensured me that they would get back to me. I got successful in holding interviews with feminists' activists, who were related to education but the ones working for women related ministries in Pakistan did not give me time, although I tried contacting them through various gatekeepers.

Keeping in mind, 'the *way* in which we know is most assuredly tied up with both *what* we know and our *relationships with our research participants'* and using the self-reflexivity approach (Guba and Lincoln, 2005 , p. 209 , p. 209), I might contend that doing a research on women's issue in Pakistan, particularly being a man and conducting a research study from a feminist point can be more hard and prompt criticism (Lichtman, 2013 , p. 147). It can raise questions like, 'what is their [men] motivation? Whose interests are served by the inquiry?' (Allen and Baber, 1992 , p. 12). However, Harding (1987), points out that men because of their privileged status in a society at times have access to information and settings, which are restricted for women. In such scenario, if men start asking questions related to women issue, they can struggle collectively with women (Harding, 1987), but it could also increase tension between those who believe that men can do research on issues related to woman and those who resist it (Allen and Baber, 1992).

6.6 Working with Data

6.6.1 Transcription:

Contrary to popular perception, qualitative research can generate large amounts of data (Pope et al., 2000 , p. 114), and in my case it was in the form of interview recordings. Participants used both English and Urdu during the interview sessions, therefore, the important task was to transcribe the interviews and make sure the translated versions stayed honest to the context and meaning. Accordingly, one of the most lengthy and time-consuming process that took a big chunk of my time was transcribing. Initially, transcribing appears to be 'straightforward technical task' but it involves various tiers of detailed processes that can lead to later stages of data interpretation and representation (Bailey, 2008 , p. 127). This was

revealed to me as I started transcribing, not only it helped me to revise the answers of the participants in my mind but I could assess the variations in their voices while listening to the recording tapes, thus, it became a research activity rather than a technical task (Atkinson et al., 1984).

The length of the transcriptions varied, for example some of the interviews were approximately ten thousand words but the lower average was around four thousand words. Transcribing is the first step towards conversation analysis, hence, a crucial point is to give considerable attention to detail, particularly, the context in which the conversation is taking place (Bryman, 2004 , p. 366-367). Consequently, I carefully listened to the interview recordings, and using my field notes I compiled them into in tidy and organised manuscripts.

6.6.2 Data Analysis

Rather than using a software to analyse the data, I used a manual coding technique to analyse the interview transcripts. The first step of the analysis commenced with the *coding technique* (see see Basit, 2003, Elliott, 2018, Saldana, 2013). 'A code in qualitative inquiry is most often a word or short phrase that symbolically assigns a summative, salient, essence-capturing, and/or evocative attribute for a portion of language-based or visual data' (Saldana, 2013 , p. 3), thus, when I began my coding process, initially I used phrases and at times sentences to code an answer or specific piece of text, but as I progressed, I filtered those phrases and sentences into single word codes. Bernard (2018) states that analysis 'is the search for patterns *in* data and for ideas that help explain why those patterns are there in the first place'(p. 452). Hence, it is the coding that helps you to establish that link, where you can group data into various categories and themes, therefore, coding does not stay a labelling exercise but becomes a *linking* practice to connect the data with the idea and then to other data (Saldana, 2013).

Accordingly, I established this link by *marking the data, systematically mark the text, review the codes, think of groupings, and relating it to text* (Bryman, 2004). My method of coding was guided by the Foucauldian poststructuralist approach to data analysis, which emphasised the role of knowledge/production in the creation of discourses and subjects (see see Gilbert, 2008, Keller, 2006). I was not plainly looking for quotations to support a priori thematic ideas but analyse the interview

transcripts using Foucauldian poststructuralist approach, where the focus was not on the fallacy or accuracy of the participants' responses but the interpretation of their accounts. For example, when I asked my participants, 'who do you think holds or commands power in Pakistan?' I did not analysed their answer from a humanism point of view, where a person owns power, and is born with agency and therefore has power (Benozzo, 2019). But, the focus of my analysis was the discourse in which that powerful person has been placed. In response to the question that person replied, 'the one who has authority'. I did not interpret that by assessing who commands authority in Pakistan, but, analysed, using the relevant literature and the research data, that through what discourses that particular person is driving authority in the context of Pakistan (this is discussed in detail in findings and discussion chapters). This application of Foucauldian approach to power/knowledge and discourse, in performing qualitative analysis is elaborated by Keller (2006):

> Rather than focusing on the analysis of "language in use", it is preferable - and possible - to translate some Foucauldian insights on discourse into sociological theory building. With this move, it is possible to elaborate a sociology of knowledge approach to discourse based on the social constructionist tradition of Peter L. BERGER and Thomas LUCKMANN, and to adopt and adapt interpretative or qualitative traditions of data analysis. As an analysis of knowledge production and circulation, this approach is closer to the original Foucauldian programme of analysing discourses as "practices of power/knowledge" and meaning production, than the established focus on "language in use" research (capitalisation in the original text).
>
> (Keller, 2006 , p. 224)

Building on this analytical approach, I coded the interview transcripts. The codes were placed into sub-categories and these sub-categories merged into themes, such as, *the use of authority, the discourse of legitimacy, hidden curriculum and etc.*

6.7 Ethical Considerations

Informed consent, confidentiality, voluntary participation, and truthfulness are the primary points of ethical concerns flagged up both in qualitative research books (see see Silverman, 2015, Bryman, 2004, Gilbert, 2008, Lichtman, 2013, Ryen, 2008, Denscombe, 2010), and the University of Glasgow ethical procedures.

Following the ethical procedures laid down by the university, each and every participant was given a copy of the plain language statement and their written consent was gained before the interview.

Additionally, in regards to my research, another crucial ethical consideration was 'politics in research' (Bryman, 2004 , p. 517). The ethical considerations in social research are highly context dependent, for example, Mies (1993) supports the idea of 'conscious partiality' when feminist researchers conduct research on the issues of women (p. 68). At the same time no research is conducted in the context of 'moral vacuum' (Bryman, 2004 , p. 517). In my case, the research was to be done in a politically correct manner because of two major reasons. Firstly, my research deals with the discourse of securitization, which in the case of Pakistan is an extremely sensitive and cautious area. Secondly, majority of my research participants represented institutions that either government employers or in some ways directly or indirectly part of the state machinery.

The most important political aspect of my research was the issue of *gaining access* (Ibid , p. 518), not only I had to conduct the research in a manner that in no way exhibited that I were being partial towards a particular institution or discourse but also had to sustain the pressure coming from the participants to tow their official perspective. At the initial stages, when I spoke to my gatekeepers, and asked for their verbal consent, they just simply ignored the idea of consent. Most of the research participants did not even bother to read the plain language statement or look at the consent form, all they said was, 'just tell us where to sign'. In such situations, I had to explain them in detail the ethical considerations laid out by the university, and the importance of plain language statements and consent forms.

The other political aspect of ethics was maintaining a *distance from dubious bargains* (Silverman, 2015 , p. 147). During one interview session, a participant kept on saying to me, 'I will only allow you to utilise my information, if you promise that you will not *promote the Western agenda* through your work'. When I inquired from him that what does he mean by promoting the Western agenda? He replied, 'by highlighting those issues, which will put the country or the society in a negative light'. Additionally, there was the ethical dilemma of *invasion of privacy* (Bryman,

2004, Lichtman, 2013), the on-job participants, particularly, the policy makers were slightly reluctant to deviate from the official policy guidelines or codes (Burgess, 2005 , p. 6), while talking about the issues facing girls'/women education in Pakistan. Even at times, when they shared *unofficial* information, either they requested to stop the audio recording or not to mention it in the research.

Moreover, I also had to negotiate the power dynamics of *research relations* (Ibid , p. 5). For instance, every now and then the participants undermined the validity of my research and knowledge abilities. My personal outlook being a male and coming from a British university to conduct a research on the issue of gender and education required constant negotiation of approval from the participants, as I was dealing with the people occupying power positions. On few occasions, the initial part of the interview sessions was like taking up educational class. I had to justify my rationale for choosing the topic, and from time to time I was told that there were numerous flaws in my ideas, and I had to be educated from their perspectives so that I can establish a strong command on my topic. One participant went to the extent that where he completely dismissed the idea of my research and stressed that I should go to rural and underdeveloped parts of the countries. According to him there was no issues with girls'/women education in the developed and urban centres of the country, where as the real problem was in the poverty stricken, security risk and culturally backward areas. He also suggested that he could organise a trip for me to security risk areas near the Afghanistan border, with full protection but only if I had the heart and will to explore the 'real issue'.

Dealing with such ethical dilemmas helped me to understand Bronfenbrenner's (1952) sentiments when he highlighted that such situations can only be avoided by refraining from conducting any sort of research (p. 453). However, in such circumstances, the reflective approach of a researcher can help him or her to understand the complications associated with social and educational research (Burgess, 2005 , p. 7). I dealt with this ethical dilemma by using the 'two ideals-about-interviewer-practices' that is *rapport* and *neutrality* (Rapley, 2008 , p. 19). Keeping in mind that interviews are spaces of interactions, and various methodological practices to conduct interviews are under the influence of local norms and values, I tried to utilise both 'neutral facilitation and co-operative self-

disclosure' (Rapley, 2001 , p. 317-318). I did not confront the opinions that were hurled at me by the participants. Not even once during the course of the interviews, I used deception to exploit particular responses from the participants (see see Bryman, 2004, Lichtman, 2013, Silverman, 2015, Ryen, 2008). Also, following the local socio-political norms and customs, I refrained from mentioning anything controversial about the institution that the participant was part of. Even, in instances, where participants tried to patronise me, I did not show any sort of disregard or take it personally. I remember at the end of a very candid and detailed interview with a policy maker, I asked her, 'any last comments would you like to add'. She (went to a British university to do her doctorate) replied, 'just remember, they (British) do not like smart and strong-headed people. My supervisor tried hard to patronise me, but I resisted that. Make sure you do the same'.

6.8 Conclusion

In this chapter I rationalised the application of constructivism as the appropriate ontological approach for my research. Particularly, I highlighted the use of the poststructuralist feminism as the epistemological stance, facilitated by the Foucauldian perspective, to comprehend the relationship between the discourse of securitization and girls' education in Pakistan. A detailed debate was presented around the qualitative nature of the study, along with justifying the use of elite interviews as the appropriate research method to collect data in relation to the context of the study. I further deliberated the challenges that emerged during the data collection process, along with discussed the analytical approach that was incorporated to interpret the data. Lastly, I reflected on the ethical issues that I encountered during the research process.

The following two chapters will present the research findings and the post findings chapter will provide the discussion around the findings of the research study in the light of the relevant literature.

7 Chapter: The Discourse of securitization, power contestation and knowledge production

7.1 Introduction

The purpose of this first empirically-focused chapter is to illustrate the role of the discourse of securitization in shaping up the authority structure in Pakistan, which eventually holds a significant impact on power negotiation and knowledge production process in Pakistan. Based on an analysis of the interview transcripts, I discern that the discourse of securitization produces diverse discourses in Pakistan, such as *the discourse of authority, legitimacy, threat, and control,* and it is within these discourses power is negotiated between various authority structures. Furthermore, I contend that by employing the discourse of securitization, the major actors, the army and the religious factions, gain the endorsement of the people as the legitimate power structures that aid them to influence the knowledge production in Pakistan.

In order to assimilate the ways in which the discourse of securitization impacts the girls'/women education, I depict that it is significant to examine its role in constituting the discourses of education and gender in Pakistan firstly. Therefore, using the evidence from the research findings, under the first heading *the discourse of authority* I suggest that power is contested and negotiated at various levels by the power structures in Pakistan, and one of the primary discourses around which this power contestation happens is the discourse of blame game. The process of power contestation and the discourse of blame game give rise to *the discourse of legitimacy,* which becomes the second section of the chapter. In the third segment, *the discourse of threat,* I illustrate that the competing power structures resort to the security struggles of the state and uses the notion of threat to legitimise themselves over other competing power structures. In the last section, the discourse of *control,* I contend that the discourse of securitization enables the primary security players, the army and the religious elite, as the legitimised power structures to assert their control over the processes of knowledge production. Being the legitimised voices in the realm of power contestation and knowledge production, the influence of security players

invariably impacts the discourse of gender and girls'/women education. (for further details see chapter eight and nine).

7.2 The Discourse of Authority

During the interviews, it seemed that from the comments made by the participants that in the context of Pakistan, the security issues act as a key determinant in claiming credible authority in the realm of power play. Resultantly, this association between the applications of power to the issues of security lead to the recognition of *the discourse of authority*. For example, Waqar, a retired army general who currently heads a security institute at one of the premier universities in Pakistan, expressed that it is the security paradigm of Pakistan that makes the army a major power broker in Pakistan. He uttered:

> Our current security paradigm has become odd, first your one neighbour (India) was hostile and now you have two hostile neighbours (Afghanistan). Due to this the army is forced to commit itself on two fronts simultaneously, and this security compulsion plays a very major influence in enhancing the role of the army in Pakistan.
>
> (Retired Army General, Male, Security Expert, Educationist)

At another occasion, the significance of this relation between authority and security was exemplified by, Humaira, a renowned feminist educationist who has worked for various universities and third sector organisations, she said:

> In the case of Pakistan, the ideologies, institutions, and individuals, they all are commanded by the state of Pakistan, the *deep state* of Pakistan. It is the *deep state,* i.e., your military and its intelligence wing of Inter-Services-Intelligence (ISI), which holds power. If you would want to understand the *deep state*, then the association between, what I call the establishment of Pakistan, which consists of the military elite, the political elite and the bureaucratic elite of Pakistan, must be understood. If you combine these three and along with the religious elite, whatever is happening in Pakistan they create those things, and they create those things by coming together. And, they enforce it. Ultimately this is what the deep state wants. Till the time these forces are doing what the deep state wants, they are okay but if the deep state feels that people are not cooperating with them then they bring in a martial law but if everything is hunky dory, they let things go the way they're going.
>
> (Educationist, Policy Maker, Third Sector Official, Female)

This ability to *create* and *enforce* things create an element of intrigue around the ability and execution of the deep state to constitute *things* in the society. In the words of Patrick H. O'Neil (2017) *the deep state* consists of 'coercive institutions, and actors' that are 'driven politically by a logic of tutelage and exercising a high degree of autonomy' which is justified by protecting the homeland against existential threats. Being the nucleus of the deep state, the Pakistani army and its intelligence wing Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) is considered the *invisible government* (Davar, 2017), where the omnipotent authority resides with it (Fair, 2014, O'Neil, 2017). Consequently, I argue that under such circumstances, the Pakistani army becomes a top contender to claim its right to occupy the top spot on the authority pyramid.

The five military personnel, who were interviewed for the research study, unequivocally referred to the army of Pakistan as the guardians of the state and its ideological frontiers. According to a retired military commander Ihsan, the Pakistani army not only acts as the guardians of the state but also the guardians of the ideology of Pakistan, which is based on Islamic principles. He argued:

> See guarding the physical frontiers and Islamic ideological frontiers of the state are our (armed forces) mission. Due to this factor an added importance goes to the army.
>
> (Former Military Brigadier, Educationist, Male)

Interestingly, the same sentiment had been practiced by the different military dictators in the past, for example, General Yahya and General Zia, justified their military take overs based on this guardianship (Fair, 2011, Alavi, 1988). The people of Pakistan approve of this authority, and there is a plethora of literature that depicts Pakistan's army's authoritative hold over its domestic and international policies (Alavi, 1973, Alavi, 1988, Christine Fair and Jones, 2009, Cohen, 2004, Daechsel, 1997, Davar, 2017, Fair, 2011, Hoodbhoy, 2007, Inkster, 2012, Jaffrelot, 2002, Jalal, 1995a, Khan et al., 2017, Lieven, 2011, Rais, 1995, Samad, 2011, Synnott, 2009, Talbot, 2015). In the light of the above argument the authority of Pakistani army, I illustrate, is not confined to the protection of its borders and soil but this authority encompasses the ideological underpinnings of the state, and its institutions and individuals, and setting the national character-building process in place. The explanation for this was given by Sana, an educationist, security

analyst and policy maker, she argued that the Western concept of a militarised state does not apply to Pakistan. She stressed that it is militarised in the sense that it is part of the culture. She said:

> Pakistan is not militarised in the way you think it is. It is part of the culture, for example, if I'm going with my husband, it is part of his culture and my culture that he will defend me. Gender equality is not about doing similar things at the same time, gender equality is having the ability to complement each other in diverse domains.
>
> (Policy maker, security analyst, educationist, female)

Therefore, this highlights that the impact of the military on the society of Pakistan is markedly different when compared to other countries, such as in China, India, Iran, and western societies. This militarised culture of the society is sometimes referred to as 'an army with a nation' (Ahmed, 2013). As illuminated above by Sana, not only the military commands the affairs which are related to the defence side of the country, but it holds a grave impact on the socio-political aspects of an individual's life. Accordingly, the army as an institution in Pakistan has the ability to use authority outside its barracks and create and enforce things at the national level. The authority of the army is so overarching in Pakistan that according to Haq, a retired army brigadier who worked for the ISI and currently tutors postgraduate students at a federal university, that it holds a sanctified right over the apt definition of Pakistani nationalism. In his words:

> Foremost you need to understand the perspective on nationalism. How does the perspective of nationalism work? It might appear that the civilians have made sacrifices in our war against terror but in reality, if you see, actually it is the army which is giving all the sacrifices. The civilian casualties are collateral damage, for instance in the case of a bomb blast, which is a backlash of terrorism. Contrary to this, a fauji (soldier) goes to war with his will and heart, fully aware of its consequences that might result in his death. We have plenty of officers whose limbs were amputated due to military operations. On the basis of this, the idea of nationalism between the army and civilians cannot be the same.
>
> (Former Military Brigadier, ISI Official, Educationist, Male)

The above argument depicts that an army officer has a better ability to pitch the idea of nationalism based on the army's wilful sacrifices to protect the state and its people. Hence, based on the findings, I contend that it is the guardianship of

the military authority which considerably holds a certain impact on the socio-cultural practices of Pakistani society as compared to other societies. Additionally, the participants from third sector and education cohorts described that the army's superior attitude is also because of its colonial roots, structural supremacy, and the sophisticated ability (Ahmed, 2013, Alavi, 1973, Cloughley, 2016, Jalal, 2014), Commenting on the postcolonial heritage of the army, Iffat, a well-known educationist and education and gender policy maker, asserted:

> When Britishers were producing a set of brown men to rule over India, the bureaucracy and the army became their major production factories. And due to this reason, post-partition these institutions played a great role in the politics of Pakistan.
>
> (Third Sector Official, Policy Maker, Educationist, Female)

Nevertheless, I have identified that, on the issue of authoritative supremacy, Pakistan's power structures tend to compete with each other. It is not like that the army is given a clean chit to command the authority pyramid, this depicts Foucauldian productive nature of power (Foucault, 1980). In order to be eligible for it, the army has to go through a process of contestation (Ibid). Talking about this contestation, Asif, a serving military colonel, accentuated the sincerity and capability of an army officer's commitment towards his job and country as compared to a bureaucrat and a politician. According to him:

> If you post a civil bureaucrat in some far-flung areas such as Baluchistan on the post of a deputy commissioner, even for six months, he would prefer not to go. Even if he goes, he will spend half of his time in Islamabad – which is more like your developed and urban area. It is only the Pakistani army that has presence all over Pakistan. If you post a captain in the same area, not only he would take his family with himself, but he would perform his duty with diligence and honesty. Due to the structural capabilities of the army, the political governments approach the military establishment even if they plan to build a school in the remote areas of the country. The reason being, the army has the ability, access, structure, and more importantly the intentions.
>
> (Military colonel, Male)

Furthermore, most respondents marked the paramount significance of power struggle among the other authority structures. Consequently, on paper, the military's authority might appear to be sovereign, but it is assiduously contested. This contested nature of power in the realm of Pakistan makes it a *praetorian*

state (Gould, 2011, McCartney and Zaidi, 2019, Rizvi, 2009), where the 'regimes' are oscillating between 'military rule and democracy continuum' that tend to collide with other civil structures such as bureaucracy, impacting the socio-political processes of Pakistan (Khan, 2009 , p, 74). I contend that this element of contestation and negotiation become one of the main characteristics of *the discourse of authority*. The next section elaborates the working of this contestation and negotiation process by the application of *the blame game* discourse.

7.2.1 The Discourse of Authority: A case of power contestation and negotiation

After the conclusion of interview sessions with the cohort of research participants, which embodied the five major key structures in Pakistan, an interesting observation was made. The responses during interviews depicted that there was a tendency among participants to engage in *blame games* in order to justify their own shortcomings. For instance, the army officers portrayed themselves as an educated and moral authority as compared to corrupt political figures such as an MNA (members of nation assembly - parliament) or a bureaucrat. This can be seen as an empirical example of Foucault's argument where he argues that power shapes up the conduct and actions of individuals and groups (Foucault, 1982a). Ihsan, a former military brigadier, who heads one of the social sciences departments at a federal university, argued:

> When you go in a gathering and an MNA (a member of national assembly) comes to attend it, he would not intend to pose authority of knowledge. However, he would pose authority because he has a gun man (security guard), he drove a Land Cruiser (four-wheel drive vehicle associated with a sign of authority and power in the socio-cultural context of Pakistan) to come to attend the event, he has people following him and they would bow to him. That is all, he may be a landlord, a gang lord, or a filthy rich person, so nobody is getting impressed because of his knowledge or thinking, people are influenced by him because he commands authority.
>
> (Retired military brigadier, educationist, male)

On another occasion, I found that there is strong resentment in the military elite towards the political elite. For instance, Haq, quoted:

> They (the political government) want to degrade the army. See if I am as an army officer is perceived by you (referring to a politician) as a threat, then you would aim to downgrade me among the people. And the social media is a powerful way of doing such propaganda because you perceive me as a threat.
>
> (Retired brigadier, educationist, Male)

An example of Foucauldian discourse theory, where the discourse of securitization is constituting practices and assigning new meanings can be seen the way blame games used by the authority structures (Foucault, 1981, Hall, 2004). All five military personals, unanimously, blamed the political elite and the bureaucratic elite for the military's interference into the political process of Pakistan and justified their regimes of martial laws for the incompetence of both the political and bureaucratic elite. Contrarily, the bureaucratic elite was critical of the military pretending to be the lesser evil and sticking to the legitimate self-made reasons to be a moral authority. As an illustration of this, when a high-profile education bureaucrat, Sohail, who works for the Punjab Government's education department and heads one of the major educational wings in the Lahore head office, was probed on the issue of army interviewees blaming the policy officials such as bureaucrats on the failure of the education policy. His response echoed the similar sound of the blame game that was uttered by the military officials to vindicate their professional blemishes. He remarked:

> I tell you about the army people as well. You transfer a general's sister (a primary school teacher) from Lahore to Kasur, their condition becomes of a dead man.
>
> (Education secretary, bureaucrat, policy official, maker)

Another bureaucrat, Amjad, head of a provincial education department, criticised the military-mullah nexus. He said:

> Mullahs are assets of the army, they (the army) do not interfere directly into your job, most of the time they use mullahs. Maulvis (priests) are their wings.
>
> (Bureaucrat, policy official, Male)

On the other hand, the religious scholars pinpointed towards the third-sector officials and NGO officials for acting as the Western prodigies and on the behest of their evil-masters propagating the rule of the devil in the form of anti-Islam

and secular policies. For example, Lateef, a well-known religious scholar and educationist, said:

> There is a well-planned propaganda against us that we are against girls' education and spreading radicalization in society. This propaganda is there because the media is in the hands of *kafirs* (infidels) or *munafiqs* (hypocrites). In order to tackle this propaganda and counter it I have penned by own book. I did my research and found out that for example the whole case of Malala is a propaganda. Basically, Malala is not a Pakistani girl, she is a Caucasian European girl, who was born in Poland in the year 2000 and her real name is Gene. She is a product of Christian machinery and implanted here to show that Taliban are against girls' education. This is what we call propaganda, and by using this propaganda through this candle-mafia and NGOs, they are creating their own set of knowledge and truth.
>
> (Religious Scholar, Educationist, Male)

Interestingly, the educationists placed the onus of blame on the military, political, bureaucratic and religious elite respectively. For example, Yasmeen, a private school principal, criticised the mullahs for hijacking the educational discourse by exploiting the religious sentiment of the people. She commented:

> It is just like when criminally minded people propagate one particular approach during a certain period of time, and gradually that turns into a mafia, and then a time comes when the majority adopts the same approach and people with diverse approaches become a weak minority. If you relate this to current educational systems, the schooling system particularly private is a prime example of this mafia. A mafia whose ideology is not to provide education but to make money. Now recently, in private schooling set up a new mafia is emerging, which is using religion to attract people. Basically, the motive is money but through religious means, and that is your mullah group.
>
> (Educationist, School Principal, Female)

However, the findings suggest that there exist numerous scenarios where loggerhead authority structures would come together to bail each other out. Thus, where friction turns into a relationship of convenience. Consequently, this where these power relations rely on a production and functioning of particular discourses to establish, constitute and characterise a society (Foucault, 1980). Discussing the case of the political parties of Pakistan showing their faith in the military to conduct a census in Pakistan, which is constantly criticising the military for its political interference, Ihsan commented:

> Nobody would have accepted the census results if it was not conducted by the army. Even the political parties said they would accept the census results if the army would conduct it. The reason being, even the political parties admits the legitimate authority of the army. In reality, the army should stay away from the electoral process and although as an army officer I have not given any training on how to conduct elections but still there is a demand by the public and political parties to overlook the procedures of elections. For example, if Nawaz (the former prime minister of Pakistan) government would do it no one would accept it, if you remove the army and let the civilian government do it no one would accept it. This depicts the failure of the state institutions.
>
> (Former Military Brigadier, Educationist, Male)

The above example offers, a meticulous case of power negotiation among two vying authority structures. Although, the political elite staunchly opposes the role of the military in the political domain but rather then vouching for civil institutions to conduct the census, they laid their trust on the side of the military. Waqar, cited the example of two former prime ministers of Pakistan hailing from two different political parties, who reasoned that the mutual distrust between the civilian institutions is due to lack of conviction and their commitment to deliver. He further explained that if the current government would have conducted the national census then the opposition parties would have questioned its credibility and legitimacy. He further explained:

> The census results become the basis on which political constituencies are created. Opposition parties fear that a ruling party would create constituencies on those lines which would benefit them during elections. This mutual distrust among the political elite compels them to approach the army because they have no other option. Although, on one side they object our interference in the political process but when they need us, they open the doors themselves.
>
> (Retired Army General, Male, Security Expert, Educationist)

This embodies that not only there exists constant friction between the authority structures but there is a flip side to this frictional camaraderie, i.e. influencing each other's professional duties to gain personalised favours. The reason for this was further rationalised by Sadia, who currently teaches at a university in Islamabad, and in the past worked on various developments projects, such as issues of primary girl's education in Pakistan, funded by the United Nations, USAID

(United States Agency for International Development), and DFID (Department for International Development). She said:

> People trust the military more and our armed forces more as compare to any other state institution. You see our last Chief of Army staff (the commanding officer of the armed forces of Pakistan and is considered to be the utmost authority in Pakistan, and more powerful than the prime minister), he held strong respect from masses. So yes, even if you see some news on television, where it says that the army is influencing the government representatives to take certain decisions then such news is considered good by the general public. The people believe that the army has a certain role towards the state and usually it is considered better.
>
> (Third Sector Official, Educationist, Female)

Further explaining the reason behind the meddling of the army, Waseem, a third sector official, accentuated that such interventions are not frowned upon in the socio-political settings of Pakistan at large because the military's authority is considered valid and credible. Waseem, a sector official, highlighted this point:

> See we as a country got involved in the Afghan war, in Kashmir Jihad and War on Terror but still, your institutions on the ground are operating. And that makes me a proud Pakistani. That we did not end up like Afghanistan or Syria or there was no uprising in Pakistan just like the Middle East. We are a very strong state and are a part of the Saudi-led alliance, and that is important for the balance of power in this region. See holding a balance of power in the region is very crucial. And why we did not end up like these countries because we have our army to protect us. Eventually, it is through our defence policies we bring certain stability in the power dynamics of this region.
>
> (Third sector official, Political Campaigner, Male)

Under such sentiments, it becomes accessible for the military to unapologetically intrude in political processes as its moral authority is supported by the people at large. This brings to the juncture where I aim to locate the reasons that impact the people to accept the legitimacy of a certain authority structure as more genuine as compared to the other ones. Therefore, in order to locate the rationale behind this, the next section probes the relationship between the security status of the Pakistani and the issues of authority.

Correspondingly, the research was concerned with garnering the views of the research participants about the security status of Pakistan and its relationship to the issues of authority. The study identifies that the credibility of a power

structure to cement its authority in Pakistan has a strong link to the state's security praxis. Interestingly, an overwhelming majority acceded to the fact that the supreme form of authority in Pakistan is the military. Moreover, the respondents commented that the foremost factor strengthening the military's claim to nudge out the competition resides in the shape of India, a constant threat that looms over Pakistan's borders and ideological frontiers. (see literature review chapters for the Indian factor).

7.2.2 The Discourse of Authority: The guardians, the ideology, and the compulsion

During the interview sessions whether with the military personals, religious scholars, or pro-military educationists, most of the times, they tend to divert the topic towards the issue of India and the security concerns stemming out of it. The study suggests that the justifications to the legitimacy of the military's authority resided in the shape of India. The Indian factor is at the heart of the security issue in Pakistan. Therefore, the case of India and its relationship to the security of the state takes on paramount significance while negotiating the issues of authority. This was explained by, Waqar, who argued that the security issues hold significant role in creating certain ideologies and institutions appear more powerful. However, he called this situation as a *compulsion,* which has been imposed on Pakistan since its inception. Therefore, this security compulsion has made the military of Pakistan its central focus, and the main component of this security compulsion is India. He explained:

> You see our neighbours [India], they are Hindus, for example their religion is different from ours and since the time of independence we have ongoing issues with them. If they increase the size of their army, we have to do the same. If they induct new weapons, we have to induct new weapons. And this lens of security is a compulsion for us and in order to safeguard ourselves and no matter how much they say that they're not bothered by Pakistan, but majority of their policies are Pakistan centric and ours are India centric. However, ours are out of compulsion, their policies are reactionary. This is the reason we have nuclear, you don't use nuclear, nuclear is just for deterrence.
>
> (Retired Army General, Male, Security Expert, Educationist)

This reflects that with India comes in the factor of religion as well. Hence, more than a territorial threat it becomes an ideological issue as well. Therefore, the

issue of security gets coupled with the issue of religion. In fact, in the views of some participants, religion is the actual construct of true Pakistan identity. This vital distinction was put into words by Sana. She argued:

> Firstly, religion is our hub of power, it is our hub of knowledge and our main social construct. Everything revolves around Islam in our society. You do not have anything which is strong enough or indigenous enough which can replace it. Number two, the formulation of Islam for Pakistan is distinctly different from Arab Islam, from Persian Islam and from Afghan Islam. It is different from Indian Islam as well due to this Pakistani Islam gives us a unique identity of a different nation.
>
> (Third Sector Official, Educationist, Policy Maker, Female)

Consequently, the *compulsion* of India, which requires the *guardianship* of the army to protect the country's *ideological* frontiers. This association between the compulsion, the guardianship and the ideology, becomes a crucial factor in constituting the securitization of Pakistan. The next section explores the processes through which the discourse of securitization generates discourses such as the discourses of legitimacy, threat and control that are employed by Pakistani power structures to negotiate power and enabling them to leave their imprints on knowledge production process. This has been highlighted by Foucault that power relations and production of knowledge takes place between discourses Foucault, 2002b).

7.3 The discourse of Legitimacy

Understanding, the enigma of Pakistan (Inkster, 2012), requires to comprehend the foundations on which the state is erected. A brief glimpse of this can be seen from the opinions expressed by Sana, arguing the nation-state case of Pakistan, she commented:

> The other crucial important point we need to understand that we are not a Westphalian state, we were a nation before a state. So, the mere fact that Pakistan exists as a state is a modern phenomenon, but we existed as a nation for more than a thousand years is a historical reality. And we existed as a Muslim nation for thousands of years. Our identity is Islam and due to this identity people gave all these sacrifices. Muslims and Hindus lived together for thousands of years but the Hindu-Muslim riots of 1935 securitised this relationship.
>
> (Educationist, Policy Maker, Female)

This notion of Muslim nation looking for a secured Muslim state paved the ways for the emergence of the *indivisible trinity,* i.e., Islam, Pakistan and the army (Ahmad, 1996 , p. 382 , p. 382). Looking at the history of Pakistan, using Islam as a legitimacy agent by the various military and civilian governments to justify their authority is nothing new (Ahmed, 2007, Ahmad, 1996). Whether it was the slogan of the Islamic socialism by the civilian democratic government of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in 1970s, the wave of conservative Islamisation during the cold war era by the military regime of Zia, or the exploitation of mystical Islam in the name of *modern enlightenment* by the military government of President Musharraf in 2000s, Islam has been the mainstay of their authority (Nasr, 2004, Haqqani, 2004, Mezzera and Aftab, 2009). This legitimacy factor was further elaborated by Sana, she mentioned:

> First and foremost is to understand that Pakistan is an ideological state. We are an ideological state that means Islam plays a central role in Pakistan's strategic culture. It cannot be replaced with anything else. This is something which Quaid-e-Azam (the title given to the founding father of Pakistan Muhammad Ali Jinnah) recognised, this is something which everyone, every political leader and every military leader in Pakistan has understood and applied. A different nuance. This is something where power is actually flowing in the country.
>
> (Educationist, Policy Maker, Female)

In this regard, the identification of power hubs holds the key to initiate the process to configure the securitization of Pakistan. Based on the points highlighted above, it could be argued that Islam becomes the primary legitimacy factor for the power structures in Pakistan to justify their authority. It is through the legitimacy of religion; the power structures negotiate power and 'reduce the tension between power holders and subordinates' (Coicaud, 2013 , p. 40). This legitimacy exists both at the state level and public level. For instance, Iffat described the legitimacy of religion at the state level. According to her:

> In our case our own state is religious it says we are the Islamic Republic of Pakistan our state has a religion.
>
> (Third Sector Official, Educationist, Former Policy Maker, Female)

Whereas, Sadia illustrated the impact religion has on an ordinary Pakistani. She remarked:

> See our ABC is about religion, people even comment for instance that it should be A for Allah not A for apple. All of our things revolves around religion because religion has a very rigid framework in our society, it is not dynamic it is not evolving it is not changing with our days and nights and that's why we fear it, there is the element of fear and because of that we do not want to question it.
>
> (Educationist, Third Sector Official, Female)

Resultantly, this force of legitimacy not only empowers the guardianship of the army, but it creates further power structures, such as the religious elite, i.e., the mullahs. Though the army and the religious forces strengthen each other (as illustrated above) but there exists friction as well. Talking about the wave of radicalization that crippled the society after the incidents of 9/11, Tabish, a provincial education secretary who heads the Punjab curriculum board, underlined the might of the religious forces. He stated:

> Even the 2008 anti-radicalization slogan which was led by the military regime of that time to bring religious moderation failed because your mullahs hold a strong influence on our society. Although we do not elect them to parliament, still they command a very strong street power, they come on roads and say this is against Islam, and by doing this they bring out the masses on the roads. We cannot deny that but yes, they do have street power.
>
> (Civil Servant, Policy Maker, Curriculum Board Director, Male)

This depicts the might of religion in Pakistani society. It not only works at macro levels, where it defines the stature of Pakistani state but at micro level has the ability to bring out people from their houses on to roads. The legitimising characteristics of religion influence both the state and its socio-cultural practices. This impact on the construction of reality can be assessed from the opinions expressed by Iffat:

> Due to the reason that the state has a religion there is a constant fight and struggle between various sections of the society. The mullah gets the authority to define the Islamic state, and he tells a woman to dress up in burkas, asks to domesticate them, and don't provide them with education. On the contrary the state of Pakistan, the Parliament, says no women should go to school and get educated. However, we should not give them tickets to run in the elections so that they don't come into the Parliament. Therefore, it is the state which has created this conflict within the state where the state has proclaimed that it has a religion.
>
> (Third Sector Official, Policy Maker, Educationist, Female)

Interestingly, it is not the power structures that can be blamed for exploiting the discourse of legitimacy. Even it becomes a deterrent for ordinary citizens to fend off accountability. To give an empirical evidence of it, Sohail discerned the ways through which accountability is dodged by exploiting this legitimacy factor. Criticising the competency issues of school teachers, he said that accountability is only for those who are either poor or do not have any socio-political contacts. However, to ensure their survival, according to him, such people use religion as a shield to avoid accountability. When I asked him to narrate an example from his own experience as an education secretary, he narrated:

> What I am going to tell you is highly unofficial. I know many female teachers, who are friends or relatives. For example, I know a lady who is a maths teacher and she is pro-religious; she goes to the class and teaches students to recite *Kalmas* (religious texts), she teaches them how to pray, which is the job of an Islamic studies teacher. She won't teach them maths, if you ask her why she is doing this. She replies that because they are not literate about religious stuff. I will see if you try to terminate her. Anyone who would try to terminate her, he would be fixed.
>
> (Bureaucrat, Education Policy Maker, Male)

The above quote is coming from someone who is part of the bureaucratic elite that is considered to be one of the major power structures in Pakistan (Akhtar, 2018, Chaudry, 2011, Jaffrelot, 2002). Hence, I would argue that the discourse of legitimacy not only empowers the army to achieve its political ambitions, but it becomes a process through which it enables people outside the *visible* power play to participate in the realm of power struggle. This was further illustrated when I asked the education secretary that why he could not penalise a lower grade employee for failing to meet her official duties. He expressed:

> The reason is the society grills/trains you. Imagine if I don't say my Friday prayers, whether it is right or wrong and obviously it is wrong, my staff even inquiries from me that why did I miss my Friday prayers. When society is in this frame of mind, what can you talk about?
>
> (Bureaucrat, Education Policy Maker, Male)

Therefore, it means, a dominant discourse which not only ensures an individual's survival but also enables that individual to assert its authority over others by claiming to be part of that dominant discourse. In other words, as described by Foucault, 'discourse is not simply that which manifests (or hides) desire – it is also

the object of desire…. discourse is the power which is to be seized' (1981 p, 52-53). A subordinate who has the authority to inquire from his boss the reasons for skipping Friday prayers, is an empirical example of, what Hekman (1986) calls the ability of Foucauldian discourse that through discursive framework 'not only create knowledge but also power' (p. 174).

7.3.1 The discourse of legitimacy and the blame game

The point I would like to put forward over here is that in the case of Pakistan, the use of authority by the power structures is contested (see the previous sections) and using the discourse of legitimacy they apply different vehicles such as religion, and structural strengths, to compete for supremacy. However, it is within the discourse of legitimacy in the form of the blame game, where the actual power is contested. As an illustration, the army not only secure legitimacy for its authority using its guardianship status, but even in the eyes of its fierce critics, such as Aslam, who heads one of the premier private English medium school networks, is capable to rule because civilian structures are incompetent. He reflected:

> I do not blame the army because if we civilians are competent, the army won't be able to intervene. This is because of the incompetence of our leaders, and their governance models. Therefore, when they fail to deliver, the public makes an uproar and look towards the army, and that provides them a legit reason to intervene in the political process. Deep down inside they –the army- might be wanting the same.
>
> (Educationist, Head of School Network, Male)

Furthermore, the army justifies its meddling with the Pakistani political process based on the moral ills of the civilian establishment. This was exemplified by Haq, who argued that it is the morality angle that cements the army's legitimacy over other authority structures in Pakistan. He said:

> Son the level of corruption in the army is very less as compared to what a politician does. I'm not saying that I'm an angel, there are people who did corruption, but the percentage is very less. A politician spends millions of rupees to win an election so once he joins the parliament his aim would be to recover his investment and make some extra money on the top. Due to such acts of politicians, there is a general perception that all politicians are corrupt. This moral corruption becomes the first sign of this divide. This power struggle is marked with financial and morally corruption. This angle of corruption becomes a major split between the army thought and the civilian thought.

(Former Military Brigadier, Educationist, Male)

Haq added that the other power structures in Pakistan mainly civilian structures such as politicians, media and bureaucrats aim to malign the army. He further concluded:

> And because of their own shortcoming, such corrupt forces and people try to malign the Army. The reason is they think that we are a threat to them Sometimes the opposing forces want to degrade the army.

It was Qasim, a retired military brigadier and Dean of Social Sciences at a local university, who further expounded the reason for this mudslinging at the army. He argued:

> A practical example that the army becomes a legitimate authority in Pakistan can be seen from the electoral process. If an election is held with the army's supervision, the public deemed its credibility. There is a lack of trust among the people of Pakistan towards the civilian institutions. Why no one would accept the results of an election if it is held without the army's involvement because son people are fully aware that the army is an accountable force. Son, the army is a check and balance force, if you are aiming to do some bad and immoral stuff the army will check you.

(Former Military Brigadier, Educationist, Male)

Moreover, he argued that the dynastic political structure of Pakistan is hard-core authoritative in its nature, which is ruled by immoral, uneducated, power monger elite, who try to cover up their incompetency by hiding behind the educated and well-informed bureaucratic elite. Therefore, in his opinion, all these factors validate the legitimate authority of the army. He concluded:

> Army takes the space son when you give it space. If I know that a politician or a bureaucrat is more competent than me so in no way, I would try to empower him because he would challenge me. When space is given to me by politicians and at times by bureaucrats then I (as an army person) take up space. That's the reason the army has its presence in departments such as foreign offices, education departments, health sector, industry and many more.

However, on the question of the army's failure to bring any prosperity during the thirty years of military rule in Pakistan, Waqar, pointed his fingers towards global politics of the world. He asserted:

> The cold war had an adverse impact on our society. With the Russian invasion of Afghanistan, we saw a major influx of refugees coming into Pakistan, and along with them they brought both good and bad things. The majority were hardworking people, but it also brought hard-core radicalised people. This saw an increase in drug and gun culture along with the mushroom growth of radicalised madrassahs. Later, these radicalised factions were used by Americans and Saudis to fight their ideological war using Pakistani turf.
>
> (Retired Army General, Male, Security Expert, Educationist)

Rather than giving a reply to my question, he completely changed the topic. On the other side, Asif, urged that the army should take more keen interest in the depleting health and education situation of Pakistan. Stapling the lack of health facilities with the emergence of security risks, he justified the meddling of the army outside its jurisdiction. He emphasised:

> An issue of health can turn you into an enemy of the state, for example, if my father would get ill and he could not get an injection in a government hospital on time resulting in his death, this could make me hold the state responsible for his death. This could make me an easy target for those elements of the society that would want to recruit me, radicalise me and use me against the state as a suicide bomber. In such cases, in my opinion, the army should look into matters of health as well.
>
> (Colonel, Serving Military Officer, Male).

Interestingly, the guardians of the state that assume that it's their responsibility to protect the religious frontiers of the state, end up blaming the same ideology for creating social ills in the society. Qasim criticising the role of religion in politics expressed:

> My sister who lives in Canada can live on her own, but can you imagine a Canadian woman coming and living on her own in Rawalpindi. The reason there is a lack of security in society, and this lack of security exists in our society because religion plays a vital role in our politics. The politicians in order to increase their vote bank through madrassahs and religious elite are participating in the radicalisation of the society. After 9/11 you did not see any white person doing suicide bombing in Pakistan, it was all done by the local people, which means that the local population got radicalised through the religious narrative.
>
> (Former Military Brigadier, Head of School, Educationist, Male)

However, when I brought his attention to the wave of radicalisation that took place in the 1980s under the behest of the military regime of his time, where the

narrative of religion was exploited by the state to receive foreign funding, he blamed the identity crisis of the general public for embracing this radicalisation. He expressed:

> As Pakistanis, right from the day one we have this severe identity issue. This identity crisis implanted the seeds of division among various sects of our society during the Islamisation of the 1980s. In the 1980s, people took clear positions regarding their religious ideologies; the ideas or beliefs which were hidden became obvious during that time. Men drew the lines for their wives and told them to cover up their bodies so that they did not look like those vulgar women who display their bodies. Mothers told their daughters to behave accordingly so that there should be a clear distinction between a good girl and a bad one.
>
> (Former Military Brigadier, Head of School, Educationist, Male)

Based on the above debate, I would argue that the discourse of legitimacy, and the discourse of blame game within it, not only gets exploited by the power structures to cement their authority but the people associated with these power structures further capitalise on it in order to bargain power for themselves. It is this discourse of legitimacy and blame game, which creates a sense of duality in Pakistani society, which plays a major role in constructing the knowledge and regimes of truth, similar to Foucauldian practices of truth creation within discourses (Foucault, 1981, Foucault, 2002). Therefore, I argue that these discourses play a crucial role in socially constructing girl/*woman* in Pakistan (for further explanation see chapter eight and nine).

Contrarily, the same discourse which enables one power structure, such as the discourse of security enables the army to legitimise its authority, is criticised by the same power structure if a competing power structure uses the same legitimacy factor to enhance its authority (for example the army personals criticise mullahs and politicians for radicalising the society and trying to achieve power by using religion). But from the perspectives of religious leaders and mullahs, they illustrated that they are being used as scapegoats by the army to cover up their shortcomings. Lateef, a renowned religious scholar who runs a madrassah in Rawalpindi where hundreds of students of all ages study, highlighted:

> I want to cry in front of you, there is open discrimination against us. Sometime ago, few of my fellow *tablighis*[3], they were visiting "some area". Now what I will tell you will be in coded language. So, an officer came and told those tablighis that some people would come, and they would set this school on fire. But do not panic, they would be *our* people. He further instructed them that you won't stop them. After some time, those guys came to set the school on fire but because those *tablighis* were men of faith they confronted the attackers and killed them. When they tried to search the dead bodies of the attackers, they found out that they were army officers wearing fake beards. They had taken money on our names. I am telling you this incident to inform you that there is this plain propaganda against us that we are against girls' education and spreading this radicalization in society.
>
> (Religious Scholar, Educationist, Male)

Consequently, it seems that the power structures such as the army and religious elite, capitalise on each other to strengthen their authority claim but at the same time, the discourse of securitization in Pakistan, which gives birth to further discourses such as the discourse of legitimacy and blame game impacts power contestation and negotiation processes. Hence, an interpretation of Foucault's analytical investigation of discourses suggests that the distribution of knowledge in societal settings requires institutional support. Therefore, in order to establish a certain set of knowledge as a truthful discourse requires a system (Foucault, 1971). Furthermore, I argue that the people take part in these discourses to empower themselves and this participation plays a significant role in the social construction of discourses on gender and education, as discourses constitutes practices and meanings (Foucault, 1981). To further expound on this, in the next section, through the notion of threat, I illustrate the ways in which the discourse of securitization trickle down to lower strata of society impacting the citizens of Pakistan.

7.4 The discourse of threat

In the previous section, *the discourse of authority: the guardians, the ideology, and the compulsion*, I highlighted that the *compulsion* of India requires the

[3] Communication of a message or revelation; fulfilment of a mission. Interchangeable with dawah (propagation of faith) in modern usage. *A person who performs this duty is called tablighi.* [http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t125/e2295]

guardianship of the army to protect the religious *ideology* of Pakistan. Whereas, in the previous sections, I also indicated that there exists a power negotiation between the two most impactful power structures in Pakistan, i.e., the army and the religious elite such as mullahs. Now, the substantive concern is to appraise the impact of this discourse of securitization on the socially constitutive practices of gender and education. In this regard, Humaira, argued that mullahs thinking does not reflect the thinking of the people but of the state. She emphasised:

> If we leave the state on the side, then the major conflict in the society is constructed around two varying points of views. The one point of view says the state should not have a religion, whereas the other one says that the state should have a religion. There's no dominant view, no one knows what the dominant view is. But the view of the state and their (mullahs) point of view is similar therefore their point of becomes dominant. Although they are in the minority, if they are the actual majority then people should vote for them and bring them to power. However, when they (mullahs) contest in elections people don't vote for them, then on what basis you can say that they are the ones with the dominant view? Yet these people who side with the state which claims that the state of Pakistan should have a religion due to this factor their point of view holds a heavy weight.
>
> (Educationist, Third Sector Official, Policy Maker, Female)

Contrarily, to this, the penetration of religion and its connection to the lives of the people was illustrated by Hammad, a managing director of foreign donor agency that invests in education and health sector. Through his comments, he dispersed that religion could be a stamp of approval, without which it is difficult for foreign funded projects to find their acceptance in society. Speaking about the role of religious stakeholders, he uttered:

> From my on-field experience, I always felt that religious stakeholders are a positive influence if you are properly orienting them. Religious stakeholders could be in the shape of an *imam* (priest), a tribal leader, and community head, and in some areas such as Swat, every person is religious to be honest. Anyone with a beard you must consult them as a religious authority. It is not like that we would go to an imam and ask him to mention us in the Friday sermons, I think when we work, we want everyone to be represented in the community, so our local staff goes and holds a meeting with them and give them an orientation about our work. So, we did not find any negative obstacle coming from the religious side accept the one in Kohistan, and that was in a meeting when a person stood up and told us that you should not talk about our girl's education.

(Third Sector Official, MD of a Donor Agency, Male)

It might appear that the role of religion is enhanced in the lives of the people because it stems out of the insecurity of the state. But, an intensive understanding of the situation, unravels that it has deeper roots within the society. Even staunch critics of religion, at times, for example Aslam, referred to the global cultural threats looming over the heads of Pakistanis. A highly liberal and non-religious individual, who repeatedly criticised the role of mullah for bringing in the extremist mentality in Pakistan society during the interview session, surprisingly went one step ahead and coupled the geo-strategic issues of Pakistan with the bifurcation between Christians and Muslims. Consequently, the construct of threat stepped outside the state's territorial frontiers and found a rationale in the ideological differences of two major religions of the world. He elaborated:

> There are two sorts of factor which impacts the policy making in Pakistan, one is internal and the second one is external. If you want to understand the external factors than you need to see the influence coming from international politics. If you see, the whole world's intelligence agencies are doing covert operations in Pakistan. Americans are there, British intelligence is also operating here. Even some minister from the Scandinavian country admitted to his or her Parliament at some public forum that they are conducting intelligence operations in Pakistan. This admittance led to a public hue and cry and as the result of it the person was forced to resign. They have this cherry-picking game, where they want, they invade a country and divide it.

When he was further probed that why the international forces particularly the Western intelligence agencies are immensely interested in Pakistan, he explained:

> It is the geo-strategic positioning of Pakistan that becomes a major source of attraction for the developed countries to launch covert operations in Pakistan. They (the Western forces) do not want to mend the bifurcation that exists between Christians and Muslims. They (the Western forces) desire that Pakistan stays in a bleak position. Moreover, the Western forces aim to hijack our nuclear programme so that they can rule us the way they want. Let me ask you a question over here. When the Security Council informed the interested bodies that there were no chemical weapons in Iraq but still America negated that information and launched an operation in Iraq. The reason being they were interested in oil.

(Educationist, Head of School, Male)

In regard to this, I argue, when the element of religion gets conjugated with the discourse of threat, it becomes a survival crisis not only for the state but for the

people as well, thus, acquiring the status of a dominant point of in the context of Pakistan. Due to this factor, Sana, emphasised that we are a security state and we will remain a security state because we are defined by our ideology and geopolitics, and due to this angle, our state's policies are defined by the nature and spectrum of a threat. She stressed on the fact that she is a realist and not one of those liberalists who denounce the security angle of Pakistan and tow the Western liberal agenda. According to her, the survival of Pakistan initially lies in detecting the threats faced by the country, and then working out a mechanism to deter those threats. She listed the following threats that are faced by Pakistan:

> In the case of Pakistan, we are facing numerous sorts of threats. We have several levels of threats. For instance, we're dealing with organized crime, we have territorial issues between India and Pakistan, and we have ideological issues which are based on Kashmir and human rights issues, which are still pending. We have a water dispute with India that will have an adverse effect on agricultural, health, and overall survival of Pakistani people. People's ability to survive epidemics is also going to be a major threat for us.

However, she emphasised that you need strong and capable state forces and institutions to fight off these impending threats. She accentuated how gatekeepers such as the military and Islam help to combat these threats and ensure the survivability of the state of Pakistan and its citizens. Moving out of the regional contexts, she aligned the discourse of the threat to the overarching current global situation and highlighted the importance of the military-Islam nexus in deterring foreign threats. According to her:

> Islam and the military provide a sense of security as a strong you see the state exists on different pillars and the perseverance of the state institutions guarantees the existence of the state. Therefore, if the military exists as a strong corner of security then yes it will enable people to feel secure enough to invest in the future rather than to flee. When the military collapses you have Syria. Nothing has happened in Syria otherwise just a war going on and the implication is the collapse and challenge to the security order of the state. What happened in Iraq? The war was won in 48 hours, American troops went in and Saddam Hussain was defeated. Survival of Pakistan is the survival of its people, and for that you need institutions to ensure this survival.
>
> (Policy maker, security analyst, educationist, female)

The above argument highlights something which holds immense significance in understanding that the most authoritative power structures in Pakistan exist because they ensure the survival of the state, and the survival of the state is the survival of the people of Pakistan. This survival is not only against the challenges presented by India such as in the shape of Kashmir, territorial threats or water disputes but it gets resonated with the security issues of other Muslim countries. Consequently, all the participants, whether they were critical of power structures in Pakistan, particularly towards the military and religious elite, understood the importance of Pakistan's security dilemma, in regard to both its ideological and geographical issues, and the considerable effect it has on the societal discourses. This understanding coupled with the ideological underpinning of the Pakistani state, which is further legitimised in the eyes of the people through the discourse of threat, superimposes the role of the military and the religious elite out of their respected jurisdictions, enabling them to assert their overarching impact on the social issues, such as education and gender.

7.4.1 The discourse of threat and the power struggle

As discussed earlier, the army does believe that Islam is the most vital and significant component of Pakistan's ideology. Moreover, they have used religious vehicles such as madrassahs, mullahs and religious ideology to fight off the external and internal threats but when it comes to the issue of accountability, the army rather than protecting their ideological guardian aide, it openly condemned the religious elements for promoting indolence and extremism in the Pakistani society (see the sections on blame game). In this regard, all the five military personnel blamed the West particularly America for targeting Pakistan because of its stance as the torch bearer of the Muslim world and creating instability in the country. However, the same five military personnel blamed the religious elite for radicalising society and fuelling intolerant attitudes. It shows that in the context of Pakistan each and every power structure sees the other power structure as a *threat*, hence, in such scenario the blame game approach is applied to over step the competing power structure. Through this point, I suggest that the element of threat which is used to establish the legitimacy of authority in front of the general public is also used among the power structures to legitimise their authoritative supremacy. Without comprehending the nuances of this power struggle, it is

challenging to tackle the dwindling social issues such as gender and education. This suggests that threat and survival hold the key to the process of securitization.

On the other hand, the religious elite has its own set of rationale to defend the accusations laid against them. The religious cohort participants seem to suggest that they are being made into scapegoats because the global power structures especially the Western forces are scared of Islam. Zakir, a prominent religious scholar, explained why the anti-Western sentiment is on the rise in Pakistan. He started his answer in the shape of a question.

> Could you please tell me what is the biggest source of income of the Western world? And I am talking about the whole Western world.

One thing that came out of the interview process was an observation that out of all the research participants, the religious scholars offered the most rhetorically convincing, eloquent and backed their arguments with evidence. Contrary to the general perception of mullahs being absurd minded and illogical orators, the viewpoint which was confessed by other research participants. Moreover, the religious scholars, often during the interview sessions rather than answering the questions themselves, preferred to raise questions. It happened on a few occasions where the interviewee kept on asking me questions and expected to get politically correct answers in accordance with the interviewee's own belief. This pattern happened repetitively during Zakir's interview session. He would ask a question, look at me keenly, wait for a response and after an odd pause, he would answer it himself. In response to his above question he said:

> The West's biggest source of income is armament.

However, this was followed by another question. This whole procedure of asking a question followed by an oddly long pause that usually culminated in an answer was more like a student-teacher seminar rather than an interview session. The interview sessions with the religious scholars carried a feeling that they were not only part of collecting information, but it was an opportunity for me to get educated by the interviewee. Zakir moving forward asked the question *where would they use that armament?* Feeling pressured by the situation and to oblige the interviewee, in a reluctant voice I replied, 'in a war?' To this answer, Zakir asked another question, 'War against who? Where would it help their cause to fight

a war? Inside their own countries or outside their homelands? Sensing the answer that the interviewee was searching for, I hesitantly said, 'outside?' After my reply was approved with a nod, Zakir took the argument forward and added:

> Second World War gave the West a lesson that from now onwards they should not be fighting with each other and even if they want to do that it should not be inside their own countries. After that all the wars they have fought, don't you observe that they were fought in the Muslim countries. It was their armament which was bought with our (Muslim) money and was used to kill our own (Muslim) people. If you look at Germany, France, America, Canada and Britain, in all these countries you would observe something. For example, go and read all the surveys, and you will find out that the fastest spreading ideology in these countries is Islam. Don't you think they should not feel threatened by Islam then? How could they halt the spread of Islam in their own territories, when an individual from their own society is feeling disillusioned from their own moral and humanistic values. The same individual whose inner human is not satisfied with the concepts of his own society and culture. What is the biggest dilemma of Western Society? And this is the utmost crucial point which you need to understand. In current time, Christianity has failed to satisfy the internal struggles of a Western person.

When I interrupted him and said that the majority of the Western people have started to disassociate themselves with any sort of religious affiliation, he added:

> Now tell me what is the reason for this? The reason for this is because the teachings of Christianity has become grotesquery. Due to this either they are becoming atheists or someone who has that godly yearning in them is in search of a religion that can quench their thirst of finding a true religion. In the world if there is any religion that can do that is Islam, that's why Islam has become the greatest threat to Western civilization and ideology. Their actual problem is not Islam but how to prevent their own people from getting inspired by Islam. They could not go to their people and start publicising Islam in a negative way. Therefore, what they did, they created rogue and evil elements such as Al-Qaeda and Daesh and pasted the Islamic label on them.
>
> (Religious Scholar, Educationist, Policy Official, Male)

The above statements by Zakir echo the sentiments of the other religious scholars who were interviewed for the research study. Moreover, this is the rationale which is offered by the religious scholars that why they are being blamed for the ills that are happening in Pakistani society. It is the Western agenda which is against them and against the moral and culture values of Pakistan. Therefore, this socio-cultural warfare that erupted from Europe and America aims to engulf societies such as

Pakistan which can pose resistance to their attack. Similarly, a noteworthy finding that crops up while discussing the failure of the structures in Pakistan particularly, political, cultural and security, was the role of Afghan War in further impacting the state and its citizen which were already struggling with the survival issues. A respondent remarked that the religious elite especially mullahs act as a street force to openly call out America and the West as the evil forces trying to destroy Pakistan. Besides, the religious elite firmly believes that the fascination with the European way of living and looking at the West as the champions of advancement and development is a major reason for the socio-cultural deterioration of the Pakistani society and can lead to the extinction of the true Pakistani identity. Shabir explained this point in detail, he said:

> Likewise, the other part of this problem is your NGOs who are blind followers of foreign agenda, including your *candle mafia* (candle vigil – this practice is usually equated with the liberal section of the society and eyed as a practice promoting European cultural values). These organisations in the name of civil society they are trying to restructure the mind of people, all of them have no understanding or association with the social cultural values of Pakistan. They are inspired by the European values and follow a foreign agenda to malign Islam and forces associated with it.
>
> (Religious Scholar, Educationist, Male)

Interestingly, the army blames the religious factions for creating a radical surge in the society but uses it as a street force to mount pressure against India and the western forces. Contrarily, the religious side blames the West for posing as an ancient threat to the Islamic identity of a Pakistani Muslim. The same western forces see Pakistan as a vital ally, whether it was the war against the Soviets or Al-Qaeda post 9/11 and poured billions of dollars not only towards the development sector but supported both the military and the religious outfits to fight their war. Putting the blame on the shoulders of the West, Mehdi, narrated the incident when Margaret Thatcher visited Afghanistan to promote the agenda of Jihad during the 1980s:

> Who created Al-Qaeda, Daesh? Don't you think America created Taliban? It is an uneducated society, you can throw some pennies at people, exploit certain Islamic teaching, and they would wiggle their tails for you. During the 1980s Margaret Thatcher gave sermons to the people of Tribal Areas on the importance of Jihad-e-Islami. Was she Muslim or Christian? Go and

> watch the videos on social media in which Margaret Thatcher was lecturing the tribal leaders and mullahs on the Islamic concept of Jihad. The reason being the concept of Jihad is already there in Islam but who exploited it for their own benefits, it was the Britishers, it was the Americans.
>
> (Religious Scholar, Educationist, Male)

This reflects that even the Western governments, who are the propagators of civil liberties tend to acknowledge the control that the military establishment has in the context of Pakistan (Markey, 2013). Therefore, the global powers tend to benefit from the security conundrum of Pakistan and use it for their own benefits. This not only strengthens Pakistan's security state status and magnifies the importance of the military and religion to the context of Pakistan but also gets a stamp of approval from the global western powers. The global events stemming out of security factors such as the Afghan War and 9/11 has cemented the narrative of Pakistan's security state status (Akhtar, 2011). These international security struggles along with the historicity of Pakistan's internal issue has further legitimised the control of the military and religion over the socio-political discourses of Pakistan. Thus, it is this control that I suggest holds a key when it comes to the process of production of truth in the realm of Pakistan that in result constitutes regimes of practices, particularly on the issues of gender and education (see chapter eight and nine).

Therefore, in such a complicated political complex, this struggles to eliminate threats to ensure the survival of Pakistan constitutes the securitization of Pakistan. This process of fighting off threats propels the security actors to claim a top spot in the framework of the power structure of Pakistan. Using the factor of internal and external threats, the security actors, in the case of Pakistan, the military and mullah nexus are put in a position where they can legitimise their use of authority. In conclusion, the conjugation of two power structures in Pakistan, the military and religion, command the process of securitization. This command enables these two security actors to shape up the form of power/knowledge structures in Pakistan. This commanding disposition is further discussed in the final section of this finding chapter under the label of the discourse of control.

7.4.2 The discourse of Control: Struggle over knowledge production

In the above three sections, I have put forward an argument that illustrates the role of the discourse of securitization in facilitating the army and religious factions to legitimise their claim on the use of authority through the discourses of legitimacy, blame game and threat. The argument also depicted the ways in which various power structures in security centric, ideologically driven post-colonial state compete to maximise their use of authority. Now, in this section, I intend to explore the ways in which this power struggle trickle down from the state and institutional levels to the societal tiers impacting an individual.

It might appear from previous sections that the discourse of securitization appears as a compulsion that the people must accept with or without their consents. However, I argue that it is not a compulsion, but people voluntarily participate in it. The reason for this is the prevalent system of inequalities, as highlighted by Waseem. He pointed out:

> Do you know why the inequalities are arising in our society that hampers our work? The answer to this is the *power elite*. They are the reason or the cause of those inequalities. The other reason is your Parliament is not autonomous. I would like to tell you something about National caucus I was talking earlier. Last week we had a meeting with a senator from Sindh and she said there's nothing in their hands, she said if we raise any issues, we get the response that you should go and talk to 'Ada' (feudal lord) or 'Adi' (feudal land lady). Parliamentarians are the employees of the feudal lords, parliamentarians are not the decision maker. Yes, the policy has been made by the Parliament and with the endorsement of the Parliament it will turn into an act. But it has to be debriefed by someone higher in the political party.
>
> (Third-sector official, NGO worker, Male)

According to Lieven (2011) the survival of an individual in Pakistan is not dependent upon the state but his or her association with a strong kinship or patronage group. This was highlighted by Ihsan as well, he commented:

> In Pakistan, it is solely about personal projection and power struggle, you want to be associated with someone powerful so that he can facilitate you during the times of trouble. That is how the Pakistani system operates. You want to be part of the authority structure or associated with it.
>
> (Retired Army Brigadier, Educationist, Male)

This illustrates that the desire to gain proximity with the authority structures in Pakistan invariably paves way for the legitimization of the already existing power structures (Armytage, 2015, Bhave and Kingston, 2010, Islam, 2004). It is a case of productive power, where the people do not aim to denounce these power structures and critically evaluate their authority. However, they aspire to find discourses and mechanisms that can enable them to get an entry into these power structures. This rationale to be associated with a strong power structure was further clarified by Sohail:

> When there are no accountability measures and people know that their poor performances won't be accounted for then tell me how can you make the system work. Only those people get punished in our society, who do not have any support system, such as in the shape of a political representative, an association with a faith group or an official working in a public department on a higher position. Only the ones without a support system such as poor get punished because they cannot come and grab you from your collar and threaten you.
>
> (Bureaucrat, Education Policy Maker, Male)

In such scenario, where the state wrestles with threat dilemma to ensure its survival, and the people eye their survival by vouching for power structures that enables them to fend off their social inequalities. Therefore, I argue, it is the approval of the people through their voluntarily participation that culminates in putting the control in the hands of those power structures that are enabled to get a stamp of approval. Based on the above arguments, this is where the discourse of securitization triumphs over other competing discourses, and gets into a position, where it becomes a legitimate voice to constitute knowledge. This process of knowledge production plays a vital role in defining a woman in a post-colonial patriarchal society. Highlighting the link between the production of a woman and the securitization discourse, Humaira argued:

> You remember in the beginning you spoke about how a state uses the perception of threat, so in that context they can use gender. For example, when we talk about India we also talk about religion in that context, we say Indian state the Hindu state is attacking Muslim Pakistan, basically we are telling people that threat is based on the religious grounds. So, what happens in this scenario the state says that we need to protect our women -our respect- from that threat. Do you know your country becomes feminised the moment you call your country motherland, why don't you call it fatherland? Therefore, the justification is when you have to protect

> your country because its equivalent to motherland, so you have to protect your women as well. So, what are you doing you're feminising the state. Therefore, the patriarchal state uses the notion of gender to deepen its security paradigm. For example, it also uses religion as an ideological rationale to safeguard our women from threats, this notion of protection further strengthens the gender discourse in the society. For the justification of discursive practices, the state controls the spaces in the society, whether it is your constitution, your educational policy, your health policy, or your media policy whoever is in power will construct that. As the ones who are in power hold patriarchal thinking, due to this it reproduces that discourse within all these systems.
>
> (Educationist, Third Sector Official, Policy Maker, Female)

Consequently, I suggest that Pakistan offers a distinct case study to investigate gender, as the patriarchal discourses are not only culturally and religiously embedded but are further deepen through the discourse of securitization. On the basis of this, the main point that I want to illustrate is that without comprehending the dominant practices that constitutes gender in the society, it would be difficult to comprehend the struggles that hampers girls'/women education in Pakistan. Also, the way it is crucial to conceptualise the gender creation in Pakistan, likewise, before addressing the issue of girls'/women education, it is vital to discern the *idea of education* in Pakistan as well.

7.5 Control: The Idea of Education

Along with the territorial, ideological and global threats (as discussed above), another issue that plays a significant role in enhancing the impact of the securitization discourse is the monetary struggles of Pakistan. This aspect was pointed out by Waqar. According to him:

> When the Russians came to Afghanistan we were used by the Americans and frankly speaking that was a bad decision. They devised a proper campaign which was planned very carefully. They created the syllabus in the University of Nebraska and they distributed the syllabus over here. This was all orchestrated. And due to that one complete generation was radicalised. The aim of the syllabus was to promote the Jihadist philosophy, so that the Muslim population of Afghanistan and Pakistan would not object American interference in Afghanistan. No one paid any attention at that time because dollars were coming into the country.
>
> (Former Military General, Educationist, Male)

This monetary struggle, according to the majority of the participants plays a vital role in constructing the thinking of people in Pakistan, and eventually impacts the education sector as well. For example, Asif, argued that it is the economic reasons that determine a parent's choice about the education of their children. He mentioned:

> The real factor which effects the mind-set of parents is their economic conditions. If you talk about economically marginalised families, they will not vote for those political candidates who would promote education. They know that their children work at a tyre shop, or at some food stalls, if they have to send them to schools that would prevent them from earning money.
>
> (Colonel, Serving Military Officer, Male)

The interviews with the bureaucrats from the education ministry affirmed the impact of economic constraints on girls'/women education. Referring to the issue of education and affordability, Jameel, a high-level education bureaucrat, argued:

> In our local norms and customs, the bread winner for a family is a son, therefore a father prefers that he educate his sons first. If he can afford it then he will educate his daughter/s. There is a mentality that son will become a dad's strength – his arms. Secondly, daughters are not meant to take up any jobs. You want to educate sons because they are supposed to do jobs.
>
> (Bureaucrat, Education Policy Maker, Male)

Likewise, Anjum, one of the country directors for DFID (The Department for International Development), highlighted the same issue:

> There is an issue of resources also, for example most of the out of school girls are from Southern Punjab, and that is where most of poverty exists. So, primarily surveys after surveys, it is poverty which crops up as one of the main indicators as contrary to tradition. It's poverty, 35% parents of out of school girls would sight that either they are poor, or girl's schools are far away, and that becomes difficult for them to take their girls to school.
>
> (Third Sector Official, Donor associate, Male)

The factor of Pakistan's monetary struggles compels the country to look for foreign funding to support its budget deficit. It is the country's conundrum of limited resources that opens ways for the foreign influence to come into the country in

the shape of funding. Hammad explained this situation aptly, when he was questioned on the issue of resources:

> We do have resources, but they are limited. I think not only Pakistan so many other countries need donors, I think without the donors (laughs) our budget deficit would be huge. Even we won't be able to meet our targets of 1 year and 5 years plans especially our commitment to SDGs. As you asked yourself that why donors give money to Pakistan or why the government of Pakistan listens to the donors, the reason is the donors are giving them a lot on budget support on education on health such as USAID, DFID, or Canadians.
>
> (Third Sector Official, MD of a Donor Agency, Male)

However, in the words of Asif, this is the case with the state-run schools, which are mostly for the poor population. But for the financially capable and power elite class, the idea of education is completely different. He concluded:

> In Pakistan education is not taken up seriously. There exists an argument over here that if everyone would get educated then who would *wash my dogs*. Also, the ones who are responsible for policy making discourage equal opportunities for improvised kids. They believe that if their children are studying in expensive private schools then there should be some difference between the kinds of educational opportunities available for people who cannot afford education for their children. It comes down to social hierarchy.
>
> (Colonel, Serving Military Officer, Male)

One can say that this social hierarchy in some ways contributed in creating different educational inequalities. Every power structure has its own educational system, for example the army has its own set of educational institutions (Rahman, 2001), political and land elite send their children to private English medium schools (Rahman, 2005), the impoverished and poor parents either opt for state schools (Fennell and Malik, 2012, Siddiqui, 2017) or send their children to Islamic educational institutions, which offers free education, food and boarding facilities (Khokhar, 2007). This social classification of education based on the social hierarchy; I have labelled as *the idea of education*. This *idea of education,* I argue and have discussed in detail in the discussion chapter, becomes a major point of contestation that constructs societal discourse on education and gender. Moreover, this *idea of education* gets influenced by the discourse of securitization and constitutes the knowledge production struggles in Pakistan as depicted

theoretically by Foucauldian concept of discourse (Foucault, 1981). For instance, as I highlighted above that the state representatives openly admit that there are discrepancies, particularly towards girls/women, in the education sector and the state lacks monetary resources to fund its education sector. In order to meet this education budget deficit, it approaches the foreign donor agencies. However, the elements of securitization are so strong that it perceives this intervention, as a threat to the national identity of Pakistan. This point was raised by Sana, when she was asked that why numerous donors are investing in the education sector of Pakistan especially the girl's/women education. She remarked:

> The think that they can reshape Pakistan's identity. And yes, there is a political agenda because they want to redefine Pakistan in neatly fitted construct which could make sense to them.

When she was further probed that why does the Pakistani government allow this, she answered:

> The reason because we have gaps in our governance. And our gaps of governance are mainly because of our laziness (laughs) rather than being diligent about the spectrum of the threat that could come. The Westerners come with their money and say if you want to be inclusive you have to go by these Western values. The women are empowered in the religion, women are empowered in Islam. If there is a right to undress there should be a right to dress as well.
>
> (Third Sector Official, Policy Maker, Educationist, Female)

The above argument holds a decisive connotation to decipher the working of the Pakistani state. Any narrative that does not fit within the ideological framework of the cultural context of Pakistan and has the potential to influence it, is posed as a threat to its sovereign existence. As highlighted by the education and third sector officials, the reality is that the state of Pakistan requires external resources and donors but as they aim to push their own agendas, there exists a narrative to counter their objectives. This ability and the authority to build this counter narrative and assert it lies with the army and the religious factions. However, this financial dependence on western funding acts as one of the main bones of contention between the military and religious elite. On one side, the military due to its colonial past and structural finesse offers a most suitable option of an ally for the western governments but at the same time it blames these western

governments for pushing Pakistan into radicalization through the Cold War and the War on Terror (Abbas, 2015). On the contrary, the religious elite which is blamed for radicalizing the society but on the other hand is used by the military as a street force to counter the western influence (Afzal, 2018). This multi-layered relationship, which is a product of mutual cooperation and power tussle, triggers discourses in the society which are varying and at times paradoxical in nature, and eventually impacts *education* and *gender* discourses (see chapter eight and nine for further explanation).

Based on the above argument, I contend that the major influence that determines the educational attainment in Pakistan is notably influenced by the issue of affordability. This issue of affordability not only constructs the social hierarchy, like son over daughter, powerful over weak but also compels the state to look out for foreign funding to invest in the education sector that is aimed for the marginalised class (see next chapter). Additionally, and crucially, all these issues are happening in a post-colonial, ideologically driven security state, where the major players to influence the social construction of knowledge are the army and religion. After accentuating the role of the discourse of securitization in facilitating the army and religious factions to legitimise their claim on the use of authority through the discourses of legitimacy, threat, and control, in the next chapter, I present the findings on the impact of this securitization discourse on the social construction of girls'/women education.

7.6 Conclusion

In the first empirically-focused chapter I discerned that it is significant to examine the role of the discourse of securitization in constituting discourses that leave its imprints on the social construction of gender and education. Building on the evidence from the research findings, under the first heading *the discourse of authority* I suggested that power is contested and negotiated at various levels by the power structures in Pakistan, and one of the primary discourses around which this power contestation happens is the discourse of blame game. The process of power contestation and the discourse of blame game give rise to *the discourse of legitimacy*. In the third segment, *the discourse of threat,* I illustrated that the competing power structures resort to the security struggles of the state and uses

the notion of threat to legitimise themselves over other competing power structures. In the last section, the discourse of *control,* I illustrated that the discourse of securitization enables the primary security players, the army and the religious elite, as the legitimised power structures to assert their control over the processes of knowledge production. Being the legitimised voices in the realm of power contestation and knowledge production, the influence of security players invariably impacts the discourse of gender and girls'/women education, which further strengthens the already existing patriarchal practices in Pakistan.

8 Chapter: The Visible and Invisible Discourses: The Social Construction of Girls'/Women Education in Pakistan

8.1 Introduction:

The purpose of this second empirically-focused chapter is to comprehend the extent to which the discourse of securitization impacts girls'/women education in Pakistan. Based on the findings, I suggest, it is significant to explore the social construction of the 'girl/women' as subject in Pakistan that has a deep influence on the idea of girls'/women education. The evidence from the findings proposes that the first layer of impact could be assessed around the social construction of gender. The second tier of impact could be discerned on the societal attitude towards girls'/women education. Consequently, the last layer of impact could be recognized in the practices of the hidden curriculum.

This chapter is divided into four sections: *the social construction of girls/women in Pakistan, the securitization of gender, the idea of education,* and *the hidden curriculum.* In this chapter, based on the research findings, I argue that the 'girl/woman' as subject in a post-colonial and ideologically driven security-state of Pakistan is produced within the cracks of visible and invisible discourses. Therefore, this social construction of the 'girl/woman' as subject, is different from the Foucauldian production of the European woman subject because of the socio-political diversity between the colonial and non-colonial societies. Through my argument, I illustrate that the patriarchal discourses, at some extent do believe in the educational attainment of women but are wary of educational attainment that can be put into practice and enhances the agency of women. Hence, in the case of Pakistan, there exists a duality of discourses, such as, the visible and invisible discourses, that holds a key in sustaining gendered practices of patriarchy. Moreover, these gendered discourses are legitimised through the discourse of threat and requires the 'protection' and 'control' of girls/women so that they remain dependent and do not rebel against the male domination, ensuring the sustainability of the patriarchal status quo.

8.2 The Social Construction of the 'Girl/Woman' as Subject in Pakistan:

The previous empirically-focused chapter highlighted the crucial significance of the military and the religious elite on the securitization process of Pakistan. The aim of this section is to examine the extent to which the discourse of securitization influences the construction of 'girl/women' subject in Pakistan. In this regard, the section opens up with presenting the views of the participants on producing the female body in Pakistan.

8.2.1 The Discourse of Duality: Producing the Female Body in Pakistan:

In chapter seven, I argued that the power structures in Pakistan have a tendency to accommodate two parallel opinions about competing power structures concurrently. Moreover, I suggested that this fluctuation in opinions is governed by the rules of power contestation and negotiation. Likewise, I start this chapter by illustrating that the social construction of the 'girl/women' as subject in Pakistan is marked with similar attitudes, where the people can hold different points of views at the same time, while performing the social classification of the Pakistani girl/woman. Additionally, I conclude this section by proposing that the mutual reinforcing power of religion and patriarchy plays a significant role in *girling the girl* (Butler, 2010). However, I contend that this reinforcement of two diverse discourses is unique because of the discourse of religion is precedingly securitised, which subsequently influences the discourse of patriarchy.

To present an empirical example of the duality that the participants displayed while defining the Pakistani girl/woman, I narrate the opinions expressed by Aslam. During one of the interview sessions, on the question of being an educationist and finding any dissimilarities between boys' and girls' education, in a religiously influenced patriarchal society, Aslam, firmly rejected the question itself and asserted that for him there is no difference. Furthermore, he related this demarcation of education based on sexes as a product of fanatic minds but not for someone liberal like him. Citing his example, he said that he had given an equal share in his property to both his daughters and sons. For him, this was the manifestation of equal love, which he has in heart for his children, as he finds no difference between a son and a daughter. Besides, he repeatedly blamed the

fanatic minds, referring to the religious hardliners, for propagating this division. In addition to this, he asserted that Islam is a beautiful religion but people have misinterpreted its teachings, which in return gave birth to flawed practices, and the reason for this misinterpretation was to score personal petty gains. He argued that although Islam came after Christianity but exhibited a higher level of liberal believes and practices. In his argument, Islam is a beautiful religion because it offers the option of divorce to couples if they found themselves entangled in an unhappy marriage, whereas, there is a no concept of divorce in Christianity. He stressed the fact that Christianity does not fulfil the requirement of polygamy:

> In Christianity it is like one man one wife and that's all. Over here – in Islam – one man four wives, plus bandis (slave girls), plus kaneezain (bondmaids), plus….

At this pointed I interrupted him and asked, 'What about women?'

Through his reply, from being a loving father who held equal love for his sons and daughters, and found the question, whether there is any difference between girls' and boys' education, *irrelevant*, a self-proclaimed liberal person switched his point of view. He advocated that a male's body is superior over a female's body based on their sexual appetites. With his words, he set out that he can hold different views, while talking about the issue of woman. He argued:

> Physiologically a woman does not have that much requirement. It is not equal to the requirement of a male. The level of male hormone, testosterone, which excites a male, is produced eight times more than in a female. Eight times more and you can read this on the internet. Imagine your car is standing (referring to a male's body) and next to that, there is a gorgeous looking girl standing, just like a beautiful car. Due to that proximity and attraction, there would be apparent physical changes in your body (a male's body) but there would be no physical changes in her body. Till the time you do not touch her and seduce her, her mind does not get corrupt. But in your case, your mind is corrupted (excited) all the time (giggles). For men, they are excited all the time. If he sees one woman, he wants her, if he sees another woman, he wants her, he wants all of them.

Interestingly, a person who was earlier castigating the religious fanatics for promoting radicalised biases towards women, opted to employ the religious justification to legitimacy his own thinking. He added:

> This need and desire are catered by Islam in the form of four wives. On top of that, you can have a barter trade and can keep a bondmaid, you can keep two, you can keep three, you can keep as many until the time your thirst is not quenched, and you do not feel ***normal***. Once your thirst is quenched and you feel normal then you should focus on your work.
>
> (Educationist, Head of a Private School Network, Male)

This accommodation of dual thoughts towards the same issue, I argue, paves the way for the *invisible discourses* that deeply influences the social construction of women in Pakistan (for further explanation see the later section of this chapter and the section of *invisible discourses* in chapter nine). Furthermore, I discern that it is this duality that plays a key role in merging the discourse of patriarchy and religion. Just to offer a concrete evidence on this, when I asked a religious scholar, Zakir, to differentiate between the educational opportunities offered to a girl in contrast to a boy, he uttered that in his belief that both men and women are entitled to strive for educational excellence. However, he argued that it is the limitations of female body that prevents her from achieving this educational excellence. He said:

> If a man and a woman started interacting with each other, without any rules and regulations, this would exasperate the animalism inside them. No doubt, a girl and a boy can sit in the same class, for example, a boy can sit on one side and a girl can sit on the other. But they should not come close to each other. When a man and a woman are sitting together somewhere, and *some* parts of her are visible, it generates a sense of attraction in a man for her. Can you prevent this attraction? Is this attraction natural or not? Islam says balance this natural attraction. If you will not put restrictions, and rules and regulations then a person would break away from these limitations and that would be going against the commands of God.
>
> (Religious Scholar, Educationist, Policy Official, Male)

Interestingly, the above two participants, although coming from two extreme social positioning in the Pakistani society, one part of the right-wing conservative segment, whereas, the other one, upholder of the liberal values and promoter of Western reforms, both of them subjugated a woman on the basis of her physical features. On the issue of women, both highlighted from their opinions that the body of a woman is a constant source of attraction for a man, therefore, this attraction should be kept in mind consciously to determine the nature of relationship between a man and a woman in the society. However, I argue, it is

within this religiously justified narrative that a man's body is under the command of this uncontrolled sexual desire that has to be curtailed for the social functioning of the society, plays an important role in *girling the girl* in Pakistan (Butler, 2010).

Although, the opinions expressed by Aslam and Zakir cannot be generalised to the over-all Pakistani population and cannot be a representation of both conservative and liberal sections of the society. Nevertheless, their application of religious rationale to fortify their argument, depicts that two men, who are part of distinct belief systems, attempts to use religion to subjugate a woman into a subject. The process of subjectivation, which is solely based on the different physical features of a man and a woman. Moreover, they both depicted that they believe in equal educational opportunities for both men and women. But somehow expressing their point of view, they found themselves debating about the sexuality of a woman's body but from a masculine gaze and highlighted the performances that are associated with it (Butler, 2010).

Consequently, they placed the onus on the religious dogma to justify their opinions about the body of a woman, and the consequences which its bores, such as cultivating a desire in a man's mind. Although, there belief systems are poles apart, and their aim to take refuge under the religious umbrella is completely distinctive but their objective intersects at the junction, which is a female's body. Based on the opinions expressed by the above participants, it could be argued that there exists an impression that portrays woman's body as a source of temptation for men that either has to be curtailed or possessed – and men's bodies as being subject to particular hormones that need to be regulated.

8.2.2 Protecting the V*ulnerable and Tempting* Female Body: Stage Two of G*irling the Girl*

Contrariwise, Iffat asserted that not only women become subjects to male hegemony in Pakistan due to their physical appearances but are assumed to be naturally weak and require constant protection. According to her, the projection of a female body as a weak body, which is vulnerable in public space, plays into the hand of patriarchy. She commented:

> But then you have the whole question of patriarchy right. That is where the whole question of patriarchy comes, how much of your public space is

> legit for a woman, so if I want to live on my own, how far can I go? I will need a male identity. But for men they do not need adjectives to define themselves, they do not put themselves into relationship categories. Why? Because he is a man, he is strong, he does not need any protection.
>
> (Educationist, Third Sector Official, Policy Maker, Female)

Another participant, a retired military brigadier, pointed out that recently the perception towards women's participation in the Pakistani society is changing. He highlighted that women are doing jobs, which were specifically considered for men in the past, for example, police or air force pilots. Furthermore, he indicated that even in the Pakistani army, which is an outright male-dominated organisation, there are subtle changes taking place regarding women participation. He cited the example of woman doctors who rose to the rank of generals and even got the opportunity to become commandants of military hospitals. He argued that the level of authority and respect they are given is equivalent to a male commandant. For him the times are changing and so are the perception towards women participation in the socio-economic sphere of life. When I probed him about the possibility of a woman rising to the rank of the Chief of Army Staff (Highest rank in the military) in the future. He indicated woman's body as a major hindrance to achieve that status, he commented:

> (Laughs) No son that is difficult. It is not because of their intellect, it is because of the physical requirements of the job, and it is difficult. You do not become the chief of army staff by just putting 30 years of service. He has gone through thick and thin, Siachen, Line of control, seeing wars, physical exertions, led the troops from the front, and your jawans (soldiers) will not absorb it (a female leading the army).
>
> (Former Military Brigadier, Educationist, Male)

The opinion of one military brigadier cannot be the reflection of the over-arching thinking of the Pakistani military. Contrarily, it does highlight a significant issue, where the *jawans* (soldiers) are willing to accept the authority of woman doctor as their commandant but cannot take commands from her as a soldier. This can be seen in relation to Butler's notion of gender performativity, where soldiers expect particular gendered practices associated with women. Her performance as a doctor is validated but not as a chief of army (Butler, 2010). Perhaps an explanation for this reason could be found in the opinion of Shabbir, a religious scholar. He signified the roles that men and women have to perform, based on

their physical attributes, in a society embroiled in security struggles. He mentioned:

> When in the 1980s, Americans desired to defeat Russians in Afghanistan, and for that, they needed men not women to fight the war. Similarly, before the advent of Islam, in the Arab culture men were cherished and girls were buried alive. They had a war mentality so they valued men more as compared to women. Now in today's time through a conspiracy the environment of our country has been made into a war zone. Our four generations grew up under the shadow of this war climate. Because of this, they do not know how to use a pen, but they do know how to fire a gun, and on top of that, *they* (religious extremists) are an authority on religion. This radicalisation of our society is a spill over of the American-Russian conflict in Afghanistan. Now the West blames us for side-lining women, but they needed men to fight their war. Why did not they ask women to fight in Afghanistan?
>
> (Religious Scholar, College Teacher, Educationist, Male)

The security angle of the Pakistani state coupled with its patriarchal demeanour becomes an interesting point of inquiry to explore the transformation of female Pakistani body into a socially constructed woman. The jump from a sexually tempting body, which requires control and possession, and physically unfit person to bear the hardships of war, to a woman that requires a male identity to construct herself socially, becomes a prominent part of the discussion. From a Butlerian perspective, the understanding of construction of Pakistani female body that is unable to function or exists outside its cultural construction is crucial to grasp the role associated with that body (Butler, 1993).

This vulnerability of women plays an important role in locating her societal role in relation to her association with a man. This is the reason when I asked my participants to define the role of a woman in the Pakistani society, an overarching majority used the male companionship as a point of reference to describe a woman's role. Even the question on women's right in the society received an answer from the male companionship reference. It was like a girl or a woman on her own does not possess any rights, she has to be well-guarded and respected woman, according to Mehdi, it is the religion, which enables a man to respect a woman. He concluded:

> In the daily matters of life, we are firm believers of giving women their due rights of participation. Islam has entitled women with numerous

> rights. As a mother she has rights, as a daughter she has rights, as a wife she has rights, and as a sister she has rights. If you study all the religions of the world, you will find that Islam has *accommodated* women in every possible aspect. The kind of respect Islam has given to women no other religion has done that.
>
> (Religious Scholar, Educationist, Male)

A recurring feature, which cropped up during the course of the interviews, and could be recognized from the above participants' quotes, is the reliance on the religious dogma by men to associate her rights with her social protection under the authority of a man. The physical differences that produce the *vulnerable* 'girl/woman' as subject in the society, also has an impact on the construction of division of labour framework for her as well. Talking about this division of labour, and equating with the element of respect, Mehdi, said:

> This can be analysed from this that Islam has not urged women to earn a livelihood for their families. It is not her obligation to stand the financial responsibility of her family and to go work in offices. If she wants, to work, that is her own choice but Islam has placed the financial responsibilities of a household on the shoulders of a man. There is no obligation in Islam for a woman to earn money for a man, however, Islam has directed a man to earn for a woman. Therefore, I think in an Islamic society, a woman is given a *respectable status,* and this is the case in Pakistan as well. People in Pakistan, who have a religious education, and are well educated, they treat their women in a just and dignified manner.
>
> (Religious Scholar, Educationist, Male)

An interesting issue that he highlighted in his comment was an empirical example of the invisible discourse, to which I refer in detail in the next chapter, and the manner in which it is produced. Here *he* (a religious scholar), who as a legitimate power structure (as discussed in the literature review sections and chapter seven), which has the ability to generate regimes of truth because he is an authority on religion, where religion is a major social construct, subtly defined a 'well-educated' and 'religious' person. According, to him, a person is eligible to fall into this category, if they provide a respectable status to their women, and that respectable status is equated with a woman who is looked after by her husband and does not bear any financial responsibilities. Therefore, this is an empirical example of the visible discourse on the social construction of gender, which is openly expressed, however, if a man allows a woman in her family to work that

signifies that he is not giving her a respectable status and in return is not a religious and well-educated man. This production of regime of truths, *which is not said but implied, I argue, becomes the invisible discourses* that produces legitimate knowledge about the 'girl/woman' as subject, just like the Foucauldian subject that is constituted within diverse societal discourses (Foucault, 1981, Foucault and Rainbow, 1984).

8.2.3 The Curious Case of Religious Patriarchy: Protecting the G*ood* Muslim Girl

A female educationist, Yasmeen, equated the liberal mind-set to the original Islamic teachings. For her along with the other female participants and majority of the other male participants, the mullahs create the major ruckus regarding women domination in the Pakistani society. Yasmeen, who heads a premier private English medium school in the heart of Rawalpindi, labelled the domestic environment playing a major role in determining the belief system for a child: She expressed:

> The maulvis have created a nuisance, otherwise the majority might favour enlightenment, when a girl educates from our institutions with beautiful values, liberal values, enlightened values, we have played our role but then she goes into her family's environment. Now let me tell you first what is enlightened and liberal? It is the original Islamic approach. Now after leaving our school when a girl goes back to her own environment, and environment matters, she spends six hours in our school but spends 18 hours in her house, therefore, that environment converts her to fundamentalist again. She might become a doctor, but she will not work, her husband is a fanatic, her parents are fanatic, might be. And at times you become a doctor just to have better marriage proposals.
>
> (Educationist, Private School Principal, Female)

In conjunction to heavy reliance on the religious doctrine to establish one's positions on women particularly in regard to education, and the constant struggle to come up with a suitable interpretation of the Islamic doctrine to support one's argument was repeatedly performed by the participants during the interviews. It appeared whether you want to support, criticise or object the situation of women in Pakistan, the debate eventually directed itself towards the religious angle. Criticising the religion, Iffat, blamed the patriarchal nature of the religion for promoting subjugating practices in the society, for example the practice of

polygamy acquiring a form of the socially accepted norm even by women themselves. She suggested:

> An educated wife is a sign of upward social status mobility. If a person gets a job abroad for example in the Middle East, once he comes back and wants to get a second wife, he usually opts for an educated girl as his second wife. He makes money, gets a house and then he realises that with economic prosperity he needs an educated wife because in majority cases the first wife is uneducated. When our men get exposure and with that, they come to know the importance of education. As a result of that they do not want uneducated girls as their wives. This means that education is doing well for our girls. Now if you want to discuss the issue of the first wife, then that it is your patriarchal religion, the real problem. The problem is with the religion but not with the women who choose to be part of polygamy.
>
> (Educationist, Former Policy Maker, Third Sector Official, Female)

Contrary to this, religion was credited for elevating the respectful status of women in Pakistan. Waqar, a former military general who takes pride in his military laurels, which were awarded, to him by the Americans, along with possessing moderate mentality, highlighted this:

> You and I are very well aware of the fact that how much respect is there for women in Islam. Whatever your mother says it becomes a rule in the house. Take my example, I cannot argue with my wife for more than 2 minutes. *They* (women – referring to mothers and wives not every woman in the family) hold the commanding authority in the house and they do not let us even interfere. Tell me isn't that the case? In our households, they have so much respect and dignity as compared to the West.

Immediately in the next line he blamed the religious radicalisations for the subjugation of women but more likely in the rural areas of Pakistan. Interestingly, it could be noted that religion, which is adorning respectable status to women in the society, becomes a tool for the subjugation of women.

> Much of radicalisation has affected the rural areas and is the reason women are being confined behind the four walls of the house. They (women) do not get much awareness, whatever they learn they learn through their uneducated and ignorant men, therefore the start developing the same radicalised thinking.

Although, he blamed the rural, uneducated and ignorant men for instilling radicalised thoughts in his family. Right in the next line, he indirectly justified this exploitation of religious rationale. Completely out of the context, he expounded,

as if he felt the need to justify the wrong use of religion by the radicalised-rural man:

> But, again, no matter how much educated ones becomes you still feel attached to your religion. This is the main reason when you hear something unpleasant about your religion, even if you are not living in Pakistan but in Europe, you get angry. I think it is true for every religion, every person is emotional towards their religion.
>
> (Retired military general, Educationist, Male)

This is the same duality, which I highlighted in both the previous chapter and the earlier section of this chapter. It is the same religion, which is telling a person to respect women, but same religious doctrine is causing radicalisation in the society, resulting in a particular subjectivation of the 'girl/woman' as a category. Other participants echoed this cherry-picking attitude towards religion and using the religious narrative according to one's own convenience as well. For instance, Anjum indicated the disparity that exists in the beliefs of religious scholars towards their own daughters as compared to other people's daughters. He commented:

> Jamaat-e-Islami (one of the major religious political party that commands great street power but meagre vote bank) has narrow and limited thinking. Maulana Maududi (founder of the party) was not as narrow and rigid thinker as the party has become over time. Thus, their view of women, and their view of minorities, have become narrow as well. And that is unfortunate that they could not grow out of this mentality over the period of time. In fact, they were the most literate people and great individuals. Unfortunately, they are very kind to their own daughters, but they are not kind to other people's daughters. And that's the problem.
>
> (Third Sector official, Male)

The other important aspect, which stems out while configuring the production of the female body in the context of Pakistani society is the notion of violence and aggression aimed towards the female body. In order to investigate the idea of using physical punishment to socially tune the behaviour of the woman so that she acts appropriately according to the socio-religious norms, I asked Zameer, a prominent and highly esteemed religious scholar to express his opinion. I cited the example of the recent ***women protection bill*** that was proposed by the Council of Islamic Ideology of Pakistan (which was headed by his father in the past as well). Ironically, the bill that was aimed to protect women proposed that it should

be constitutionally allowed for a husband to 'lightly beat' his wife. To point it out, the support for this act of light beating was supported by the religious rationale. Also, it was presented by a council that brings together diverse religious sects that are at loggerheads when it comes to offering a singular religious ideology for the people of Pakistan (Murphy and Malik, 2009). When I probed him to share his thoughts on the issue of light beating, he chose to ignore my question and instead pointed out the differences that distinguish the treatment a Pakistani man give to his wife as compared to a European man. He expressed:

> The actual root of all evils is flashing the negatives and diminishing the positives. People like to hide the positive aspects of Islam but exhibit the negative characteristics. Look at America and Europe, where a woman's role of a *life partner* requires her to earn money along with her husband. Whereas, in Islam, nowhere it is stated that she has to earn, the financial responsibility of a household resides on the shoulders of a man. You tell me whether this is *positive or negative*. This is positive, it is positive (repeated his phrase asking for my acknowledgement).

This is an empirical illustration of *the discourse of hypocrisy* (see the same title section in chapter nine) that deeply affects the gender production in Pakistan. The religious factions draft a women protection bill, which allows a husband to beat his wife 'lightly' because the punishment can help her to understand and acquire the role she is supposed to enact in the society as prescribed by men. However, when you inquire a person who is at the forefront of drafting and legitimising (as discussed earlier in the literature review chapters the legitimising role of the religion) such practices constitutionally at the state level, labels it 'flashing negatives in the religion'. This exhibits that if you criticise such authority, they would bring in religion to the forefront. Thus, it becomes about the ideology but not about the man. Another example of *the invisible discourse,* where personal shortcomings are justified by a person by blaming an opposing ideology (the West) and taking refuge behind religious dogma.

Likewise, earlier Waqar rather than addressing the shortcomings of radicalisation that impacted in a particular subjectivation of women, tried to justify the adversities of radicalisation by claiming that it is difficult to curtail one's emotional attachment to their religion. To assert his point, he claimed that even an educated person residing in Europe would react aggressively if his or her religious beliefs were attacked (See the earlier quotes in this section by Waqar).

It could be interpreted from his words that it is unfair to denounce an ignorant, uneducated and radicalised man, who confines his women behind the walls of his house because his *radicalisation* is coming out of his emotional attachment towards religion. He did acknowledge that the radicalised person is not doing something right but because it has a religious angle to it, it cannot be entirely judged.

Contrarily, if you take his or other military personnel's opinion on the radicalisation of the society that happened during the rule of a military dictator, they would put the blame on the religious elite for the propagation of conservative religious discourses and justify their participation as a *compulsion* that is the dilemma of Pakistan's security state. This duality, or the cherry picking, where same issue is judged from different perspectives is, what I call, the *discourse of hypocrisy*.

Coming back to my conversation with Zameer on the issue of 'lightly beating one's wife, when I did not get a response on the issue of light beating, I inquired from Zameer that 'what if she wants to earn?' He replied:

> There is no problem in it, but a man does not force his wife to earn money because he considers it against his *dignity* to use a woman's money, and inheritance. Not a single Muslim man likes to live off on a woman's money it is against his *dignity*. Trust me, a person, who uses his wife's earnings, is considered as a *chota aadmi* (small man). We give our woman a status of love and holiness, but the international media will not show it. They will only show that we do not let our women to work.

Along with the discourse of hypocrisy, the other significant finding that I argue stems out of the research study is the role of *invisible discourses* as one of the factors that influences the social construction of women and their education in Pakistan. This further elaborated in chapter nine and argues that these invisible discourses function in a different way from the Foucauldian discourses that constitutes a woman in the Western world (Foucault, 1980, Foucault, 1981). For instance, if a woman wants to work, it appears from the above quote that she will damage the *dignity* of a man. I discern that there are numerous unsaid and complex challenges embedded in this invisible discourse. Firstly, a woman's choice to work suggests the negation of a man's authority. Secondly, if she wishes to work that poses a threat to a man's dignity. Thirdly, her earnings or contributions

towards her family as compared to a man are considered inferior. A man who was asked to comment on the act of 'light beating', but it prompted him to dig out the invisible discourses, which facilitates in establishing the authority of a man over the inferior body of a woman. In order to further justify his point, he added:

> See husband been the head of a family, and the family members as his dependants, is supposed to be treated with respect and acknowledgement due to his authority. Education and training should be given to the dependants, so they become disciplined.

Consequently, I argue that these invisible discourses of patriarchy that operate in Pakistan, holds an important impact on the social construction of the 'girl/women' as subject. The aim of these invisible discourses is to make the 'girl/woman' as subject understand that her role is of lesser person as compared to men in the society. Additionally, girls/women should be disciplined so that they willingly accept the authority of their male guardians. Furthermore, he linked my question to a global conspiracy, which aims to tarnish the image of Pakistan and Islam. He concluded:

> It is just ***an Islamic version*** given by the Council of Islamic Ideology, but it has been presented so big… so big. But first tell me, are women in Europe treated with sheer good behaviour? It is not like that, even in those societies there exist certain restrictions. Even over there people hit women, they are subject to violence but no one shows their violence. They only show Pakistan's violence; they only show Islam's violence.
>
> (Religious Scholar, Principal of madrassah, Educationist, Male)

A question which was raised to develop an understanding on the issue of 'light beating of a wife' gets directed towards a global conspiracy, where the international media is eyeing to project the negative elements of the Pakistani society and ignoring their own violence towards women. Hence, I suggest, it is the same discourse of the blame game, which takes place between various power structures to justify their authority, gets incorporated to justify the subjectivation of women because it reflects that it is the duty of a superior man to protect his woman from an outside threat, both physical and cultural. Therefore, this notion that a girl/woman is physically weak, socially inferior and a constant sexual distraction for men holds a significant influence in the creation of educational practices for a girl/woman in Pakistan. Hence, *girling of girl*

practises in Pakistan along with performances expected by a girl/woman in Pakistan are greatly context dependent (Butler 1993, Butler, 2010).

Resultantly, the above discussion shows that how religious rationale plays an important role in justifying the patriarchal practices in Pakistan. The religious conservatism is blamed for propagating religious radicalization but when it comes to defining the role of a woman, the society in some ways tends to draw inspiration from the same religious factions to legitimise their own acts. In this scenario, the role of the religious authority comes to the fore because of their eligibility to interpret the religious doctrine. Moreover, it is critical to note that the religious authority, particularly, mullahs, holds a great relevance to the securitization discourse in Pakistan, as it was argued in the last chapter. Therefore, the role of religion is superimposed in socially constructing the 'girl/woman' as subject and becomes an authority to define it socially and accentuate the performances expected from that girl/woman (Butler, 2010). In the light of this, the next section aims to explore the links between the securitization discourse and the gender construction in Pakistan.

8.3 The Securitization of gender in Pakistan

The previous section on the production of the female body in Pakistan exhibited that the people are deeply influenced by the intersectionality of the discourses of religion and patriarchy. Foucault (1980) says that distribution of information is in the hands of those who commands power, and this generates two kind of effects: 'the power of the knowledge of the truth, and the power to disseminate this information (p. 34). Also, he suggests that the exercise of power should be 'visible, solemn and symbolic' (Ibid). Consequently, I advocate that the patriarchal forces exploit religion to constitute the true knowledge about Pakistani girls/women, but also, it gives such forces the ability to further disseminate this knowledge. Moreover, this true knowledge should be evaluated differently because religion, in Pakistan, is one of the primary social constructs in a security-centric, post-colonial state (see chapter five). In the light of this, I discern, in the context of an ideologically driven post-colonial-security-state, not only power is exercised through visible, solemn and symbolic means but it is done through *invisible discourses* as well. Iffat illuminated another example of this

exercise of power through invisible discourses. When I asked her opinion regarding the argument offered by religious scholars that the religion offers legitimization to freedom of women in Pakistan. She answered the question by narrating an incident from her own life. She narrated:

> This is not true. Once I had a case going on in a local court regarding the sale of my house. I took my female friend with me, and told one of the clerks in the courtroom that my friend and I want to present as a witness in the case. The person told me that in order to do so I have to bring a male with me, and he informed me that it is a legal requirement. After hearing this, I had a fit (seizure). When the person saw my terrible condition, he said, 'Do not blame me for this, this is the requirement of the government, I have not created this rule, it is the government who did it, and the government says it has derived this from Islam'. So these practices are there to put us (women) back into our positions. The patriarchal practices of your society stem right from here, where the basic structure of your family forms the structure of your state. How you are placed in a family reflects your placement in the society. So, when you ask me that why a woman is defined by her relationships, the reason is that's the way the state defines her.
>
> (Educationist, Third Sector Official, Female)

As argued, in the previous chapter that it is the religion, which deeply influences the security status of Pakistan. Additionally, the narrative of Pakistani state is drawn around the religious ideology, thus, the application of religious rationale to socially construct women in Pakistan works both at visible and invisible tiers. Therefore, the reason power operates between these cracks of visible and invisible discourses is because of the ways power mechanisms functions in the society. Moreover, this working of power is different from a European society, hence, the creation of the subject (this is illustrated in detail in the next chapter). Consequently, I contend that one of the major reasons for this distinction is the absence of two centuries colonial rule that converged with other discourses in the Subcontinent to construct power/knowledge nexus that differs from non-colonial societies.

8.3.1 The unguarded gatekeeper

The historical impact on the constitution of gender in the Indian Subcontinent that stems out of security struggles and religious confrontations was expounded by Sana. According to her, in order to understand the construction of Pakistani

women, it is crucial to trace the historical events that laid out the foundations, which culminated in the creation of Pakistan in 1947. She argued that the culture of Pakistan is an amalgamation of Indus Valley cultural traditions (eight thousand years old South Asian civilisation) and the Islamic Culture, which encapsulated the gender component as well. Thus, the demarcation between a Hindu woman and a Muslim woman was there even before the inception of Pakistan. For her, in order to locate the Pakistan woman, it is important to locate the Muslim woman of the pre-partitioned Subcontinent, and identify the distinctions:

> The role of women from Razia Sultana (13th century Muslim ruler of the Delhi Sultanate) to the advent of the first Muslim attack from Muhammad Bin Qasim in the 8th century on the plea of a Hindu woman, is the first, I would say the cultural distinction between Islam and Hinduism. Why did he listen to a woman's plea? Because in Islam, woman is to be protected, fought for and to be honoured, and this is one of the major distinctions between Islam and Hinduism. This meant that the first cultural invasion, military invasion, whatever you call it, which has been maintained as an oral tradition act as a primary form of comparison between a Hindu woman and a Muslim woman. If you look at the status of a Hindu woman in their cultural ethos is even lower than the most of their scheduled classes.
>
> (Educationist, Policy Official, Female)

Therefore, it means that the wars in the Subcontinent were not only justified by using religious doctrine but also in *gendered* terms of 'protecting' women. Similarly, Asif, highlighted the fact that women hold the key to the discourse of securitization in the context of Pakistan. In his words, Taliban were clever enough to use the element of gender to propagate their mission so that they can extend the boundaries of Jihad. Giving the example of Malala and the case of Swat Valley, he stressed out the importance of women in the context of securitization discourse in Pakistan. In his words, the discourse of securitization not only impact women in Pakistan but makes them as one of the primary stakeholders in it. He explained:

> Maulana Fazlullah[4] nicknamed 'Mullah FM Radio', when he started to create his hold in the Swat Valley region during 2006-07, he particularly targeted women in the area. He devised a strategy, where he addressed

[4] Was an Islamist militant, who served as the chief of the Pakistani Taliban in 2000s, he used the fiery radio tirades against the Pakistani Government, education and polio vaccine. He was behind the militant movement, which crippled the state affairs in the Swat Valley, and took the responsibility for ordering the shooting of schoolgirl Malala Yousafzai in 2012.

> the women population through these radio sermons. In his sermons, he told women that if he is able to implement the Sharia Law, he would give women their rights and would work towards their empowerment. But before that he directed those women to stop sending their children to schools and ask their husbands and sons to support and join his movement.
>
> (Colonel, Military Officer, Male)

In his analysis, women nurture the environment of a family, and the Taliban were smart enough to capitalise on it. Moreover, they knew that women were deprived off their rights so they gave them hope in the form of the Sharia Law that once it gets implemented, they would be able to achieve their rights. The Taliban took advantage of their ignorance and made them believe that if their children would go to schools, they would go out of their control and stray from the right path. This was the reason that Malala came to prominence as she took a stance against their discourse. The above scenario presents a case of complex duality of discourses here: the ostensible need to 'protect' women and the desire to 'control'. This duality as discussed in the previous section is based around the vulnerability of the 'girl/woman' as subject because she is under numerous threats but at the same time, there is an urge to control her, which recognises that she holds some degree of power and influence in some spheres. This compliments Foucauldian aspect of power, which is productive (Foucault, 1980, Foucault and Rainbow, 1984).

This aspect of productive power that girls/women holds in the society was labelled by Sana *gatekeepers*. Explaining the narrative of women becoming securitised, Sana, placed Muslim women of the Subcontinent in the category of the gatekeepers. Elaborating the scenario of women becoming securitised in the example of Swat, she offered the socio-religious rationale for it.

> Initially, we (as part of the government machinery) could not understand that why the situation in Swat was falling so quickly and getting out of the hands of the state. Then we found out that they have reached out to women, so the actual thought process was to engage women.

When I asked her that why women fell for this narrative, she commented:

> Because religion is important and her (referring to the Pakistani Muslim woman) position is unmatched as compared to the Hindu tradition, where her position does not exist. But in Islamic tradition you go and try to define the position of your mother. I will be damned, no matter what you do in

> life, but you will not be able to define her. You need to understand something over here, I don't know what part of Pakistan you come from. But if a woman wears a burka, she is not doing it just because her father or her mother told her to do so. A part of her conviction also lies in it and this is a fact. Now when a woman gets securitized, you've lost the battle (smiled). Because she already has a status, she is not a disempowered member of the society, she is an empowered member of the society, which is not part of the visible discourse of the society.

Hence, the visible discourses on gender in Pakistan disseminate that in one scenario the woman is vulnerable, who needs protection but also, she is the gatekeeper of the society and family (as discussed here and in the earlier section of this chapter). The duality of discourses is so significant that in a way she is portrayed, as a temptress, constantly instigating sexual desires in men, but if she covers herself, it does not imply that she is doing to protect herself from masculine gaze, but it is a matter of her own 'free will'. On the basis of the analysis of interviews, an interesting observation that crops up, is the transformation of a vulnerable woman to an empowered member of the society, if she honours the desires of men. For example, Waqar mentioned that 'our wives and mothers are in commanding positions in the house', Iffat highlighted that 'women are aiming to get educated because financially capable men prefer to have educated women as second wives', Sana pinpointed that 'in Islamic tradition you will be damned but you will not be able to define your mother, and also if she is covering herself it is because of her own conviction' (see their respective quotes in this chapter). However, if she aims to do something, for example, *earn money for her family*, it makes her husband a less dignified man. Also, the important thing over here is to locate the person who is making such statements, for example, a religious male scholar, has the authority to disseminate knowledge about *true* good Muslim woman. The deep influence of this true knowledge in creation of the *invisible discourses* that make the woman self-aware about herself was highlighted by Sana. Further elaborating this significance, she commented:

> The visible discourses are led by you, the visible discourses are led by other people who go and speak. She is not part of the visible discourse because I think unfortunately in Pakistan, we have not managed to give the sense of responsibility to a woman so that she can shoulder that. We have used Islam in bits and pieces and the idea that Muslim were the rulers, we were the Mughals, Muslim women were affluent and never had to work. Thus, the idea of a woman working in a Muslim household was

> considered beneath social status. If you (a woman) come from a good family, you should not work, if your husband is well of, you should not work.
>
> (Educationist, Policy Official, Female)

The significance of *such* invisible discourses enables the 'girl/woman' as subject to identify the truth about herself, such as, *if* she comes from a good family, she should not work. This signifies that if she opts to work, not only, she is a bad woman, but *her family* is bad as well. Furthermore, this justify if lower strata women worked in fields or did menial labour jobs because it was about the *affluent Muslim men* and their idea of 'ideal educated girl' (Khoja-Moolji, 2018), as these men constituted the dominant ruling class for five hundred years in the Indian Subcontinent before their authority was dislodged by the colonial masters. Hence, I suggest, this transfer of power from powerful Muslim men to white-colonist men, becomes a crucial difference between the Foucauldian European discourses that impacted the subjectivation of women as compared to the non-European discourses that constituted women in a post-colonial-security-centric Pakistan.

8.3.2 The Securitization Discourse and the Altering Role of Girl/Woman

When I asked Humaira that in what ways the societal attitude of recognising women as lesser beings in the context of Pakistan get coupled with the securitization discourse of Pakistan, she gave the following explanation:

> Pakistan is not a very pro people state; it is a security state. It's not a social welfare or human security state, it's a nation security state, which has been prioritising security issues, and this has impacted women as well but more in indirect forms. But of course, when any state is more concerned about the threats and prioritise spending its resources on defence and territorial security rather than investing in the people then women being the second-class citizens get ignored. Because the state is discriminating against less privileged classes such as women, non-Muslim Pakistanis, disabled people or transgenders, so even when the state is aiming to build human capital, the women are considered less valuable. Therefore, the gendered approach of the state is to spend more on men as compared to women.
>
> (Educationist, third sector official, feminist activist, Female)

This prevalent discourse that portrays women as weak and lesser of human beings have been criticised by poststructuralist feminists because it is this notion that plays a significant role in constituting femininity of a woman and establishing

gendered practices in societies (Butler, 2010, Weedon, 1987, Scott, 2018, Hekman, 1990, Hekman, 1996, McNay, 1992). Likewise, during one of the interview sessions, Sadia underlined that this notion of constant protection, defines her own gendered role in the society. Correspondingly, this attitude plays a vital role in their educational choices. For her, this happens both in the rural and urban context. The major subjects that deal with the domains of business, hotel management, and hospitality are looked in a sceptical way. She believed that if a girl decides to study these subjects, men related to her such as her father or brother, who are responsible for security, does not allow her to opt for them. For them, she would get exposed to the treacherous environment, and that could lead to her moral corruption. Further explaining her point, she discerned that the male mind-set identifies a woman as her wife, sister or daughter but not an individual. The idea that women are weak, insecure and need male companionship for them to avoid danger, inculcates a mind-set in the society, where men believe it is their responsibility to make choices on behalf of their women. She reasoned:

> Definitely, it impacts, in fact it impacts a lot. This is mindset is over here because women over here are very dependent upon the male community such as their fathers, brothers, husband. The financial dependency is there but even for commuting majority of the time, you will observe that a woman needs a male companion, and even if they are on their own in public transport, they do not feel comfortable. And then the male counterparts take decisions on their behalves, for example you can work or not, you can study or not, or even if you can work what areas are allowed, it is very common. This is the reason; you are spoon fed from your childhood that once you are married you can do whatever you want. But once you get married, you get out of one male protection and venture into another one.
>
> (Educationist, Third Sector Official, Female)

In contrast to this, a religious scholar, Shabbir, accentuated that a woman who is barred from stepping outside her house without a male guardian, is permitted to take part in a battle or a war if it is the need of the time. In his opinion, the religious extremist mind-set that exploits a woman as a sexual object is the product of the current governance system of Pakistan.

> In your current system of government, whether it is democracy or dictatorship, you needed religious scholars and leaders, which could be controlled through remote control. When you tell them it's time for Jihad, they follow your lead and when you tell them it is not needed, they go

> back to their barracks. And you know the ones you call them extremist and the ones who put limits on women. They do so because they need women for *jihad bin nikah* (sexual jihad). They need as many women with whom they can have temporary marriages and will not create a problem for them. And this thing is only possible, if you keep women ignorant. Girls from the University of Punjab and the Karachi University went to these places such as Syria and Iraq, so that they can be part of the sexual Jihad and satisfy the needs of these extremists who believed that they are fighting a holy War.
>
> (Religious Scholar, Educationist, Male)

Interestingly, as mentioned by the respondents and cited in the previous sections, the mullahs get blamed for creating the environment of radicalization in the society. However, in this case, a religious scholar is blaming the state for exploiting the mullahs for its own benefit. In a society, where girls/women are under threat and needs protection, I asked him what motivated the parents of the girls to give them permission to travel to such hostile conditions and take part in sexual jihad. In his reply, he gave the example of Lal Masjid incident[5].

> When parents went to get their daughters from the Lal Masjid, the teachers said to the girls, this is the time your religion needs you, if you go over this line and go towards your parents then your parents will become infidels. This is your test, it is a trial for you and your parents. And on this argument children disowned their own parents. In the Lal Masjid they had a psychiatrist, who was tasked to control the minds of the madrassah students. The girls were convinced that this is the right thing to be done and following this way, you can achieve Jannah (heaven).
>
> (Religious Scholar, Educationist, Male)

Taking in consideration the arguments presented above, I suggest that comprehending the working of the discourse of patriarchy is constituted around the complex structures of religion, security, and post-colonial history. For instance, men are competing with other men to protect vulnerable women, and this vulnerability influences their status both at state and societal level, which results in restricted access outside the boundary of their houses. However, same

[5] The Siege of Lal Masjid was a confrontation in July 2007 between Islamic fundamentalist militants and the Government of Pakistan. Before the confrontation, the mosque became a base for Taliban-style vigilante squads. Led by fearsome, stick-wielding, burqa-clad young women, radicals poured out of the mosque and the two madrassahs affiliated to it, raiding houses allegedly used as brothels, kidnapping suspected prostitutes, and making bonfires of videocassettes and DVDs that they regarded as un-Islamic.

women become empowered members of the society, when observed through the security angle of the state. They become the gatekeepers and in some cases are willingly supported by their parents to take up weapons and embroil in violent struggle against the state or recruited by religious factions to strengthen their cause (as mentioned in the case of Swat). This reflects that the gendered role of girls/women is not fixed in Pakistani society and tend to get altered on the positioning of the 'girl/woman' as subject in the discourse of securitization. Hence, this duality of the gendered roles, and the contestation of power within the cracks of visible and invisible discourses, I indicate that holds a key in order to comprehend *the idea of education* that becomes permissible for girls/women in Pakistan.

The aim of the next sections is to locate the Pakistani women education in the realm of the discourse of securitization. In order to illustrate this, it is crucial to commence the next section by unravelling the power mechanisms that carve out the educational framework. The reason for this is the study is focusing on exploring the link between the discourse of securitization and girls/women education. Consequently, the next section will first attempt to comprehend the idea of education in Pakistan. In the last section, it will strive to locate the 'girl/woman' as subject in that educational discourse and the practices that are constituted by it (Foucault, 1971). Lastly, assessing the impact of the securitization discourse on girls'/women education.

8.4 The idea of Education

When I asked Iffat to explain the framework that determines *right and wrong* in the Pakistani society. Her reply made me set the pertinent question regarding the issue of education in Pakistan. She stated:

> I do not know how truth and untruth are determined, but I know it determines your morality and ethics etc. But at the same time money does that too, if your bureaucrats are lying, if your politicians are lying, if there is a legal truth and then you have a moral truth, and there could be a difference between legal and moral truth, legally you can win many things that are wrong but morally you may not. So, it's the same Gramsci thing, whether you lead, or you are just ruling. So where is the legitimacy then? I think those would be the questions to be asked, coming back to your girl's education, you need to ask the legitimacy question perhaps. Like

> which education has legitimacy, which discourse has legitimacy and at what level.
>
> (Educationist, Policy Maker, Third Sector Official, Female)

Iffat's reply made me realised that before understanding the association between the discourse of securitization and its impact on the social construction of girls'/women education, I need to comprehend the idea of education in Pakistan which is deemed right both in the policy and among the people. Thus, in this section I illustrate that the idea of girls/women education in Pakistan is marked by the practices of exclusion and inclusion. Moreover, I outline that the inclusion and exclusion discourses of education in Pakistan are constituted around the visible and invisible discourses of power/knowledge. Moreover, it is within the cracks of these visible and invisible discourses the idea of girl/woman educational subject is constituted, similar to Ball's (2013) '"excluded" the educational *other'* (p. 55p. 55).

8.4.1 Inclusion and Exclusion Discourses of Education: Official vs Unofficial

A serving army colonel, Asif, argued that before I can assess the impact of security issues on girls'/women education in the context of Pakistan, I should understand that how education get its treatment in Pakistan. He expressed that comprehending the perception of general masses towards education should be the initiating point. According to him:

> In Pakistan, education is not taken up seriously. There exists an argument over here that if everyone will get educated from where we would bring jobs for all these people. Also, who would wash my dogs for me?

In continuation of his argument, he corroborated the official policy making with the mind-set of the people. In his opinion, access to educational opportunities in Pakistan reflects your social hierarchal position. In such a context, he stressed, the notion that *who can afford education* takes up the central stage. He blamed the people who hold the commanding position in the society for example the policy makers, who have the ability to bring change in the society rather propagate social disparity. For him the state fails to provide equal educational opportunities to its people because the policy makers do not want that.

> The state fails to provide educational opportunities and facilities because the ones who are responsible for the policymaking they discourage it. They believe that if their children study in expensive private schools so there should be some difference between the education of their children and the other kids coming from the state schools, low class private schools and madrassahs. This mind-set becomes a key determinant for educational inclusion and exclusion.
>
> (Serving Army Officer, Colonel, Male)

Likewise, the regional head of an educational NGO, Razia, echoed similar opinions regarding the educational inclusion and its correlation to the social hierarchy. She contended that a well-off person such as an education policymaker, who can afford private schooling for his children, would not want a person who is earning less money and holds lower status as compared to him, sending his children to the same school where his children are getting educated. According to her, it is the society, which gives births to these hierarchies of inclusion and exclusion, and in the result of such practices, the mind-set emerges in the society that convinces the lower economic class to get their children employed rather than getting them educated. She pointed out:

> Yes, the state has failed to provide educational opportunities to the citizens but the other reason is general public do not find value any value in the educational process. The voters do not penalise their representative on the issue that how many schools he or she established in their tenure of last five years. They do talk about roads and hospitals but do not question public representatives about schools. So a representative understands that the will of the majority is that they do not want schools. This is just limited to the narrative.
>
> (Third sector official, Female)

Contrarily, the interviews with the education policy makers and bureaucrats reflected that the educational policy of Pakistan depicts the will of the people, which demands for equal educational opportunities for its citizens. Sohail, a provincial education secretary with the Punjab government said:

> After the constitutional amendment, it is mandatory to bring each and every child between the ages of 4 to 16 years to school and educate them. Before this amendment, there was no constitutional provision in the constitution. Now like your other fundamental rights, educating every child has become a fundamental right, whether it is a boy or a girl without any discrimination.

(Bureaucrat, Education Policy Maker, Male)

Correspondingly, when I went to interview one of the chief policy officials at the Punjab Curriculum Department, before even I could ask a question, he started the conversation. His secretary briefed him about my visit over the phone whilst I waited in her room. When I received the clearance to see him and went in his room, he immediately opened the discussion by the highlighting the aims of the curriculum and coupling it with the constitution of Pakistan. Amjad, an education department bureaucrat[6], who chairs the service delivery side of the educational services, commented:

> The number one aim is the constitutional application. Number two is gender parity. Number three, every policy which is made whether it is on education or health, its main objective is service delivery. The public servant keeping in view the vision of the government makes public policy.

He further gave the example of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, who was the prime minister of Pakistan during the time of the interview and explained the process that constitutes the educational policy in Pakistan.

> Why Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was able to gain electoral victory in the last election because he presented his manifesto to the people. In return the people of Pakistan stamped their approval on the manifesto by casting their votes in his favour (banged the table with his closed fist demonstrating how people stamped their votes). Therefore, when a political leader comes to power after their voters' endorsement, his aim would be to make such policies which provide him the means to execute his manifesto. After seeing the execution of the policy and witnessing that girls are getting educated, people can say that yes, he said he would make policies for girls' education so therefore he is doing so. This establishes

[6] There is an interesting observation which I would like to add here. When I went to my respondent's room, he told me that he is busy with his official tasks, therefore, he would refer me to his subordinate – one of the directors. At this point of time he picked up his telephone and dialled the director's number. While he was on the telephone and the director was on the other side, he started telling about the aims and objectives of primary girl's education in Pakistan. All the above discussion happened with him holding the telephone handle next to his mouth. After he said, '*I have given you the basic rationale'.* Addressing his subordinate over the phone he said, 'Now you tell him few other things and once he will come back to me, I will give my concluding remarks. Also, please offer him a cup of tea on my behalf. Interesting!! Lots of power issues here!

> the credibility of the government. Now who will make the policy? A civil servant or a public servant but keeping in mind the vision of a government.
>
> (Bureaucrat, Education Policy Maker, Male)

The above *official* discourse on education promotes the notion *education for all*, but the interview session with one of the high-level education secretaries, Sohail, depicted that the *official* discourse is limited to verbal claims. In his point of view, majority of the policy officials and bureaucrats are barely aware of the aims and objectives of girls/women education:

> If you would ask anyone about the overall aims and objectives, maybe they would frame them for you in the form of a logo or moto. The reason being, only the person who has read the policy would be available to tell you about it, but you would only find one or two individuals who have actually read the policy.

Talking about the gap between *official* and *unofficial*, he reasoned that it is our infatuation with the British idea of policy making that blurs the understanding of the policy-making mechanism in Pakistan. He gave his own example when he went to do his master's from the University of Cardiff and wanted to compare the procurement procedures of the Punjab government to the British system but was told by his supervisors that the two cases are incomparable.

> Their (British) mechanisms are very detailed and are based on step-to-step procedures. They apply them first and then they develop it, they do not build it in the air first. They do not copy it from here and there like us. The policy which is made over here comes from the *top*.

When I asked him that what he means by *it comes from the top*. His detailed reply illuminated the significance of the *unofficial* or as I have labelled it as *the invisible discourses* within the educational discourses that can be noteworthy to understand the way power operates in Pakistan. He mentioned:

> The government identifies that there is a need for a primary school in a village with a population of one thousand people. It allocates funds for it but as the allocation happens through the local bodies and they are under the political representatives such as an MPA (member of provincial assembly), who could be a feudal lord, tribal leader, or a head of some dominant caste. In such cases, the schools are built not for the educational purposes but to benefit that particular person. For example, they would build schools in far flung areas, such as graveyards away from the population and use them for their own personal use, which could be keeping cattle or a social gathering place. On top of that such *ghost*

> schools are registered in papers, and the teachers are employed to teach students. But in reality, teachers only withdraw their wages monthly but do not go to schools to teach because there are no students to teach.

In response to this when I asked him that how come such individuals are not held accountable by the local people for misusing the public funds. He replied:

> Education is not the priority of your social and economically impoverished class. They cannot afford private schools, also they do not see any benefit in going to schools, so they opt out of your educational discourse. They have no idea about this brutal world and have no sense of what is happening around them and what will happen to them in the future. It is the state which has to educate them, the state has to provide them enabling and conducive environment. It has to offer them some kind of incentive, only then we would be able to bring them into the educational fold. When you have placed education at the backburner and the powerful gets what they want then people do not see any value in education. The ambition of the people becomes in that case to participate in such practices which empowers them, and definitely education is not considered to be that.
>
> (Education secretary, Bureaucrat, Policy Maker, Male)

Additionally, Tabish, one of the heads at the Punjab curriculum board signalled towards the orientation of parents that plays a critical role in the educational choices of their children. He emphasised:

> The biggest reason, which prevents parents from sending their children to school, is economic. Then comes the orientation of the parents. When you do not know what Stanford, Glasgow or MAO College is, I tell you to get admitted to MAO (a low ranked college in Pakistan) College but you have the potential to excel. Parents have no clue about their child's potential regarding education. Even he has potential, and you guide the parents still they will not send their child to a school. If a student enrols in class one and is strong in mathematics, I have seen numerous examples of such sorts where a child performs better than other children, but his parents said, *what is the purpose of him getting education? It would be better if he comes and works with me*.
>
> (Bureaucrat, Policy Maker, Male)

The inclusion and exclusion discourses of education, I discern plays a significant role in defining the idea of education in Pakistan. This split between the official and unofficial policy discourses, I suggest acts as an empirical example of these inclusion and exclusion practices, where policy is for show but actual discourses of

education are different from the policy guidelines. Thus, it is within the cracks of official and unofficial policy the actual educational discourse operates.

8.4.2 Affordability: An Excuse or an *Invisible D*iscourse

When I inquired from, Jameel, an education bureaucrat whose boss instructed him over the phone to stick to the official policy line, to explain the reasons for the perceived failure of the state in changing the orientation of parents towards education and removing the gendered bias towards girls'/women education in Pakistan. He suggested that the State of Pakistan constitutionally aims to provide free and compulsory education to all the children up till the age of sixteen without any discrimination. However, the financial constraints coupled with the issue of accessibility hampers the constitutional responsibility of the state.

> Access to education is one of the major issues. The Government does not have enough money that it can open schools for girls everywhere. The second limitation comes even if you have opened schools, in that case you need qualified teachers, and you need to retain those teachers. And you also have to make sure that the teacher you have provided and even if he is a PhD, he has to deliver, if he fails to deliver his PhD is no use to me. Only building schools are not enough, it has to produce results. You need outputs.
>
> (Bureaucrat, Education Policy Maker, Male)

This might paint a picture that the education sector is absolutely neglected in Pakistan, and the state intentionally intends to keep its public uneducated. However, that is not the case, the education secretary who said that education is placed on the backburner by the government in Pakistan, also informed that after the army, the education department has the largest workforce in Pakistan for a state institution.

> After the army, the education department is the second largest department. If army numbers are between 0.6 million to 0.7 million, we have 0.6 to 0.7 million employees last year. All employees: teachers, administration staff, it is almost equal to the army or the second largest. Just calculate its salary chunk, it will go up to 100 billion of rupees. How rich is Pakistan?
>
> (Bureaucrat, Policy Maker, Male)

It is interesting to note that although the funding is being directed towards the education sector but rather than getting utilised to create educational

opportunities, as mentioned in the above examples, it is being spent to feed the enormous work force. Therefore, this raises the question that why the government and policy officials related to the education department are not able to observe the red flags. In defence of the government, Waseem cited the shortage of funds as the core reason behind the government's perceived incompetency. Thus, the monetary issues compel the state to seek foreign funding, hence resulting in diverse educational discourses in the society. He highlighted:

> I give you an example, the Punjab Education Foundation is a government entity but due to monetary deficits they have partnered with The World Bank and DFID. On top of that they have outsourced all their schools to the private organisations especially the schools which are low performing because the government said they don't have enough human resource to monitor the quality of education. Our (Oxfam Pakistan) stance on this is it is increasing inequality gap between rich and poor. This inequality has created multiple educational discourses in Pakistan, such as, government schools, schools run by a public private partnership, expensive private schools for rich people and number four the informal schools. And on top of that you have your religious schools such as madrassahs.
>
> (Third sector official, Education Campaigner, Male)

In an educational discourse, which is split into multiple discourses based on the socio-economic hierarchy of the state, and is also faced with monetary struggles, identifying issues hovering over girls'/women education can be complicated and multi-layered. To comprehend the official policy discourse on girls'/women education, Anjum, a high-profile director in DFID Pakistan, coupled the incapacity of the Pakistani governments with the structural issues of the political and bureaucratic system. When I asked him that many participants in the research study believe that it is the societal mind-set that act as a major barrier in girls'/women education in Pakistan. He replied:

> It's not the mind-set, it's the management. Look there is high demand for education in Pakistan. I tell you why I'm saying it, in Punjab roughly 50% and in Sindh 48% of children are studying in the private sector. The estimated figures are 11 million in public and 9-10 million in the private sector, and there is almost a gender balance in the private sector. There are lots of parents willing to pay for their children's education. The problem is that you are actually running education with the 18th century institutional design. Now why don't they change this management system? Because there is a lack of capacity in the political structure, who actually understand how you reform the system. So, there are not enough policy trained politicians. And they rely on bureaucrats. Bureaucrats are from

> the same ilk; they are part of the same structure. They have a big work force in the education department but that is to offer employability to people. In real, the aim should be to give education not to create employment opportunities.
>
> (Third Sector Official, Donor associate, Male)

On one side, the bureaucrats blame the government's conviction, orientation of the people, and the monetary struggles, due to which education is not improving. Contrarily, the third sector officials blame both the government and the bureaucratic machinery, and their incapacity in delivering desired results. In a country, where the official discourse highlights that it is the monetary resources, structural discrepancies, societal mind-set, management issues, and policy frictions that creates issues for girls'/women education. However, I contend that these factors are just part of the visible discourses, and yes, they do have a significant impact on girls'/women educational discourse but within these issues there are invisible discourses that deeply influence girls'/women education. To give an empirical illustration of the working of such invisible discourses, I quote an incident shared by Iffat, who did a project to assess the female educational policy failures in the Tribal Areas of Pakistan with a collaboration of the European Donors and the local state machinery.

> It is sad, but the reality is, if you buy a project manager a car, who happens to be a bureaucrat, then you can get anything done in this country. So, when the big donors like the World Bank or DFID bring in consultants, and they formulate reports to improve educational opportunities for girls, but there is no ownership of those policy reports. I was part of an educational project with the aim to tackle issues facing women education in the tribal areas of Pakistan. When I went to see a senior bureaucrat after the completion of the project and took the policy booklet written by one of the donor consultants. During the discussion, when I showed him the policy booklet, in reply he asked me, 'what is this?' I replied that this is the policy report on women's empowerment written by one of the donor consultants, and I reminded him that he was overseeing that project. He grabbed the policy booklet and flung it towards me. With annoyed face he remarked, 'this was written by a consultant, the project is over, we did it but that does not mean we believe in it'. The reason I am telling you this is because they write these policies to meet funding criteria but there is no ownership of these policies.
>
> (Educationist, Policy Official, Female)

Additionally, in response to the lack of funds to uplift girls'/women education sector, Waseem, pinpointed that the manifestos of political parties do talk about spending money on girls'/women education, but this is limited to verbal claims, the actual conviction is not there. He argued:

> In the provincial budgets, after civil administration, the biggest chunk is allocated for education. But, if the provincial governments such as Sindh are spending 1000 rupees on boys, they are only willing to spend 5 rupees on girls. This is a huge gender disparity. Education is the priority of every political party; it is written in their manifestos, but it becomes an important issue when elections are approaching. To tell you about the seriousness of these verbal claims, I give you an example. In Sindh the money is given to the school council in the third part of the fiscal year. When they get the money in the third quarter, they don't have the capacity to utilise the money, and ultimately that money lapses. And when that money is lapsed the district government uses that money in other sectors. On papers, they show that the money was allocated to schools but because the schools did not use that money, so it was redirected towards other sectors. But they won't mention that in their reports that why did not the money was given to schools in the first part of the fiscal year.
>
> (Third Sector Official, Political Campaigner, Male)

Consequently, it is interesting to note that in a country, where education is given priority in both the official and political discourses, but the unofficial discourses exhibit a contrary approach to it. In such scenarios, where the education claims are for show, and there is a major split between the official and unofficial policy discourses, and also, the societal attitudes on girls'/women education are discriminatory, the affordability of girls'/women education, I argue, exist as a visible discourse but along with it, there are multiple invisible discourses that deeply influence girls'/women education. Thus, it is the *idea of girls'/women education* within the idea of education in Pakistan that becomes a crucial point to comprehend the issues effecting girls'/women education in Pakistan. In this case, I contend that exploration of the notion of education with respect to girls/women gets intertwined with the issue of gender construction in Pakistan. Hence, the next section, explores *the idea of girls'/women education* in Pakistan.

8.4.3 The Idea of Girls'/Women Education

When I asked Sadia, who headed one of the United Nation funded projects on girls right to education, that why parents want to educate their girls in our

society. She answered it from the rural-urban bifurcation point of view. She commented:

> In urban-private schools context parents want their daughters to get educated because it is part of the social status. The other desire is to see their daughters independent and engaged in productive professional work. But in most of the cases, I have also witnessed in the elite class that they are not very keen on getting them employed. Mostly, the main drive behind getting them educated is the element of *good rishtas* (marriage proposals). Many parents want their daughters to become doctors because there is a high demand for doctor *bahu* (daughter-in-law). In the rural areas' poverty act as both the reasons due to which the parents want to educate their girls and don't. They want her to get educated so that she can start making money for the family but at the same time due to poverty they are not able to afford it. Priority is given to boys because the parents say that even if my daughter gets a job this will benefit her husband and in-laws. If you see, in both contexts, rural and urban, a girl's education is prioritised based on her gender.
>
> (Educationist, Third Sector Official, Female)

Likewise, Jameel, linked the issue of affordability with issue of boy vs girl. He stated:

> There is this issue of affordability and what are the priorities of a family. In our local norms and customs, the bread winner for a family is a son, therefore a father prefers that he educate his sons first. If he can afford it then he will educate his daughter/s. There is a mentality that son will become his dad's strength – his arms. Secondly, daughters are not meant to take up any jobs. You have to educate sons because they are supposed to do jobs. All these values become part of the whole system and if you sum them up it will give you a reason. Moreover, daughters are like your responsibility, you need to protect them and get them married.
>
> (Education Bureaucrat, Policy Official, Male)

This attitude towards girls'/women education is not only restricted to the ways' parents perceive their daughters' education, but this gets transformed at the higher institutional level. The discourses of gender construction get reflected in the idea for girls'/women education in Pakistan. This was highlighted by Asif, he revealed:

> Once I was in a meeting with Zubaida Jalal, who was the federal education minister at that time. During the meeting she looked at me, and said, *'major sahib sometimes I feel so disappointed by the reaction of my colleagues, when I tell them about the importance of girl's education. They reply to my message with yawning faces. They feel bored and ask*

> *me to tell them those things which would help them to win elections.'* She was right but if you are conducting a meeting with those people who hold zero value for girls' education, and are not interested in the topic, they would exhibit indifferent attitude. The actual problem is that your whole education system is full of uneducated people. A person who would not get a job anywhere becomes a primary school teacher, such is the value of primary education in Pakistan. But if you include girls to the issue of primary education then it grabs minimum concern. It's your society which says that why to waste money and send girls to school, just give them a religious book that can help them learn how to wash dishes, massage your parent's feet, keep the matrimonial harmony and manage the household.
>
> (Serving Colonel, Military Officer, Male)

Resultantly, I highlight that the discourse that the 'girl/women' is a vulnerable responsibility and is required to play the role of a caregiver, plays a major role in constituting the idea of education for her. It seems that changing this might be seen as something that would destabilise the security of the state. According to Asif, this is the primary reason education becomes a contested domain in regard to girls in Pakistan. He expressed:

> Even in today's time, in 2017 there is a sentiment that both in urban but predominately in rural areas that if my daughter became educated, she would become lecherous, and a rebel. They argue that not only educating girls is against the Islamic values but if she does get educated, she would become liberal, and would confront me. You travel 10 kilometres outside any city in Pakistan and you will find this mind-set. See religion offers you a reason, a person who practices his religion in a right way will give his sister a fair share in the property, but the majority uses religion to control women.
>
> (Colonel, Military Official, Male)

Based on the above argument, I propose that the idea of girls'/women education in Pakistan can be evaluated by drawing parallels to Read's (2011) "gendered social construction of the 'popular girls'" that helps girls to identify socially accepted popular gendered roles in a particular society (p. 1). I argue that each society has its own 'popular' gendered role models, for example, Read illustrated that this idea of popular girl is portrayed by celebrities such as Britney and Beyoncé in Western societies. Likewise, in the case of Pakistan, the discourse of 'popular' girl is constructed around the antithesis of the western celebrities, who are supposed to get education, to acquire the role of protected gatekeepers with

the ability to care for their families, but also willingly play the vital role of stabilising factor in the society. However, just like Read's 'popular' girl promotes 'passivity rather than agency and power, similarly, the idea of girls'/women education in Pakistan, I argue, promotes 'passivity rather than agency and power' (Ibid), but the rationale of this passivity in the case of Pakistan is driven by the patriarchal discourses with the support of the invisible discourses of gender construction.

Based on the point of views offered by the participants, in a society where the powerful aim to secure better educational opportunities so that they can hold the authoritative positioning in the society. The findings suggest that in the case of Pakistan educational opportunities are available for those who have the capabilities to avail them depending upon their social status. Moreover, in such situations, the idea of girl/woman education, aims to help her identify approved social roles, which do not make her a rebel but instead influence her to accept the established hegemonic social structures as a natural social construct. Moreover, in the context of Pakistan, and its securitised history, both the discourse of threat and the religious dogma is utilised by both the state and the Pakistani men to legitimise their domination and assert their control girls/women.

8.5 The Hidden Curriculum

8.5.1 The Question of Knowledge: The Visible Knowledge vs the Invisible Knowledge

According to Apple (1979), the discourse of *legitimate knowledge* in a society creates disparities that are considered as natural occurrences. As argued earlier, the example of this natural occurrence and its relationship with the legitimate knowledge in Pakistan, in regard to girls'/women education is framed around their physical existence. In this instance, the crucial point is to locate the forces which holds an impact on the production of this legitimate knowledge (Foucault, 1980). For that reason, this is where the religious authority becomes that force in the context of Pakistan due to its post-colonial past and ideological demeanour that cannot be ignored. On the question of providing education to women in an Islamic society, such as Pakistan, Shabbir, argued that Islam provides equal

opportunities to a woman to achieve education or establish a business. Besides, he claimed that daughters are blessings of God, and in an Islamic society there should be equal opportunities for both men and women, there should not be any concept that one system is for the elites of the society and the other system for the general masses. But at the same time, he warned about the dire effects a woman has on a man.

> She is a *fitna* (strife, temptation). You need to understand that even the intelligence agencies of the world have come to accept the crucial importance of a woman and her abilities. There's a world phenomenon going on in the world which is called by these different intelligence agencies as three Ws, which are wine, women and wealth, and this has been used to control people. She's more deadly than a ballistic missile. And if you go and see a psychiatrist, he will tell you that during the time of leisure a woman can easily manipulate a man and make him reveal what's in his heart, such as confidential information. Due to her this power, she is being used from centuries to carry out such missions.

However, after saying this, he felt the need to turn this evil temptress into a pure and holy being. Therefore, immediately in the next line, he *legitimised* her status by placing her in a relationship with a man. He mentioned:

> But at the same time our religion was telling something different regarding a woman. It was said to seek knowledge from the lap of your mother to your grave. So, the lap of a mother was considered the first educational institution in Islam. It has bestowed such a big honour on a woman. Take an example of Hajj over there women and men are performing the tawaf (one of the Islamic rituals of pilgrimage) together. It is about the purity of spirits not about the body, purity which comes from hearts.
>
> (Educationist, Religious Scholar, Male)

In an instance a woman can be classified as a temptress or a conflict, and cause havoc for men. But the lap of a mother is considered holy and equivalent to an educational institution. For example, if a random person says this, it will not be that significant, but when a religious scholar, utters something of this sort, it becomes a legitimate knowledge, and an element of natural occurrence. According to Foucault (Foucault, 2002a, Foucault, 1980) understanding a system of knowledge requires identification of the authority and institutions who can speak of knowledge and their influence on creating further meanings. Consequently, I expound that this accommodation of two diverse discourses at the same time deeply influences the creation of the discourse of hypocrisy. If a legitimate

authority on knowledge production can exhibit dichotomous point of views on the same issue of women, then it becomes interesting to see its impact on the society. The impact of this double standard approach was exemplified by Sadia, when I asked her to enlist the social barriers from her research case study that hinders female education in Pakistan:

> Religiously *parda* (veil) is a barrier and most of the women listed that as a reason. Regarding domestic life, all these elements are cultural elements. See male counterparts are not considering this element of parda when the women are going out in the fields to work because they are supporting them. Over there the parda is getting disturbed but over there they are not concerned. And there is a factor which makes girls' education a controversial subject in our context. Because there is a fear that she will start answering back, she will start to question, she won't stay obedient, in fact these are the findings of my study. Both, the male and female participants said that they fear women will start to question things, such as, why are we not given equal priority, or equal rights? When you become more aware and informed this can make you question what's right and wrong for yourself. Other than this, religiously it is done for the same reason, you will see male religious leaders, seldomly you will see female religious leaders, and the reason is to keep the male dominance in the society.
>
> (Third Sector Official, Educationist, Female)

It is fascinating to note that, as contested by participants in the above examples, the same religious rationale which is applied to elevate and liberate a woman in a society becomes a barrier as well. The same justification is used to liberate them and contrarily is used to assert the male dominance and establish control. Thus, in the context of Pakistan, the role of religion as argued in the last chapter comes to fore because of its legitimization angle.

This production of visible and invisible knowledge can be located in the official policy stance and along with the other educational discourses in the society. To begin with, I would like to illustrate that over the course of the research I found that the policy makers tried hard to say it out loud that they believe in gender parity, and the education system is offering more opportunities to girls/women. In regard to this, Tabish, commented:

> On the basis of my work with the Education Ministry I wanted to you tell you that we do not have any gender discrimination. But we do have certain things in our books which are women centric such as content on women

> rights. Recently, the government passed a women protection bill and we made it part of the books as well. We have added articles on girl's protection, otherwise our books are not gender specific. The government of Punjab has a strong tilt towards girl's education. A female teacher is a compulsion for a girl's school but she can work in a boy's school as well. Vice versa is not available for boys. Female teachers are more in number and as I told you earlier the balance has already tilted.
>
> (Bureaucrat, Policy Official, Male)

Besides, when I asked an official of an NGO, Imtiaz, whose organisation is managing 450-500 schools in Punjab, about the state of girls'/women education in Pakistan and the challenges it faces it. In response to that he argued that the subject of gender and female education used to be an issue 15-20 years ago. He remarked:

> Parents did not allow it, the community did not allow it, and the environment did not allow it but now that's not the case. Now even the parents from conservatively stubborn regions want their girls to get an education. We do face issues in the areas of the interior Sindh, where people are still hesitant to send their girls to school, otherwise we do not see such issues in Punjab. But yes, boys quit school after early education as they take up early age employment especially parents working in big cities take their male children with them and get them employed in factories, where they work themselves.

(Third Sector Official, NGO worker, Male)

However, when I asked him to list the reasons that prevent girls'/women from getting education, he further suggested:

> One reason for girls not going to schools could be the distance between school and house and also the absence of proper transportation means. It is not an issue for boys because they can go on their bikes or can take a bus but for girls commuting is an issue.

This was the case with most of the participants that they enlisted various indicators that depicted that when it comes to the topic of education, gender is no longer an issue and there are efforts both at the policy level and societal level to curb gender discrimination. But on the contrary, the issues of a girl traveling alone to a school hampers her opportunity to avail education. The idea that boys are safe to go out, whereas, it is unsafe for girls to go out exhibits the gendered customs are practised in the society. Furthermore, when I asked him the thing that differentiates between a boy and a girl's education. He asserted:

> See you have to keep in mind the moral values when you are providing education especially when it comes to girls.
>
> (Third Sector Official, NGO worker, Male)

The same participant who finds that gender discrimination is on the decline in Pakistan, brings in the issue of gender when a girl has to be more aware of moral values or need protection when going to a school as compared to a boy. This dichotomous point of view consistently cropped up during the course of the interviews. At another occasion, Nisar, a parliamentarian officer, who works at the National Parliament in Pakistan and overlooks the parliamentary proceedings of the assembly, through his reply depicted the double standards or the dichotomous point encompassing the discourse of girls'/women education in Pakistan. His reply unveiled the split between the *practice vs policy, education vs application, and visible vs invisible* discourses. He disputed:

> For the last three days, we were stuck in that meeting trying to debate women's rights and I was given the task to take minute by minute notes of the meeting. A woman is produced for a man, what more to be discussed about it. A woman is produced to fulfil your needs and for your service, and beyond that she has no rights. The basic issue is our education process is not in sync, the upper-class education is different from the lower-class education. They are removing Islamisation and including Westernisation. What they are trying to do is include some form of the upper class's education element in the lower-class education, at least by diminishing the religious aspect from it.

When I asked him that does girls'/women education in Pakistan begets a different treatment as compared to the boys'/men education in Pakistan he argued:

> You need to understand something highly significant first. We all say, including the government, the parliament, the state and the political structures that girls should get education, there is no conflict about it. *But they must not be in practice* (he uttered this line in English in an asserting tone). When a woman opts to practice her educational learning, and she talks about equal rights this causes *raulay* (problems, conflicts, and issues).

When I asked him to further elaborate on these conflicts or issues, he replied:

> Clearly it is part of your religious teachings that a woman cannot hold an equal status to man, even in Chinese society you would find a similar understanding. No matter what you do girls can't be equal to boys in education, even name a single woman Chief Justice of Pakistan, why don't they make a female the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court because they

> have serious mood swings (said in English). Go on check my cell phone and you can find messages in it by a girl. In the morning she messaged me that she hated me and now she is saying she wants to meet me, in between I have not replied to her single message. In the span of few hours her mood is fluctuating without any reason. She is a complex being, who first seek attention and security from her dad, then from her brother, then from her husband and later on from her son. In documents, in arguments, in policy papers, in writings, in statements, it is fine, it must be fine to educate them but not in practice. They should be given education so that they could raise their children. They should be given education so that they get awareness about themselves, about their identity, to understand the ethics in the society. Moreover, to learn to respect elders and acquire the mannerism to raise children. She needs to get educated so that she can communicate, for her own advocacy. In our religion it is clearly said that an uneducated and educated person can't be equal. The ones who are pious, patient and educated are closer to God. You are supposed to give education to everyone, but the idea of education depends upon your location, surroundings, society and cultural norms. The army has nothing to do with education, they are only interested in your borders. The religious element is just there to cover the fundamental issues, in real, education is an issue of civil society.
>
> (Civil Servant, public office holder, Male)

One of the major insights of the study are based on the double standards that marked the opinions of the participants, and is a recurring pattern, just like in the above quote, the participant accommodated two diverse discourses on the social construction of gender and the idea of girls'/women education, at the same time. As an illustration, girls/women should seek education to achieve self-awareness and to get in a position to do advocacy for themselves but biologically they are unfit to compete with men. In the light of the above debate, I delineate that in Pakistan the 'girls/women' as subjects are entitled to get education, but that education should be in accordance to the patriarchal discourses. Moreover, I contend that the educated girl/woman is expected to perform the already constituted gendered roles, which are deeply influenced by the socio-political discourses of Pakistan. Consequently, the 'girl/woman' as subject is made aware of her expected performances through the invisible discourses and the practices of the hidden curriculum.

8.5.2 The Hidden curriculum and The Invisible Discourse

On one side, Anjum commented that it is the financial struggles of Pakistan that force the state to seek foreign economic assistance. Additionally, in the words of

Hammad, the geo-political situation of Pakistan is one of the main reasons that brings down the overall education budget. He elaborated:

> Definitely, the biggest criticism which comes from the civil society and the intellectuals of our society and even from abroad is on our budget spending on defence and security. For example it is right in front of you, many governments came with a big mandate and they said okay we will increase the education budget but the moment they join the office and the budget is presented so you find 2.1% or 1.8% of GDP is allocated contrary to their commitment of 4%, again which is linked to the international obligations in the forms of SDGS. And we are not even complying with it because once you come to power you will find out that the requirement of military establishment is completely of a different nature. You cannot negotiate with them, their requirement would be to increase their defence budget because without them you cannot work, and they do not let you work if you do not comply with them.
>
> (Third Sector Official, Donor Organisation Executive, Male)

This Illustrates that the state lacks economic resources, and due to its security issues, the major chunk of the budget goes to the defence sector. Therefore, it has to look out for bail out packages as explained by the third sector officials and the education department bureaucrats during the interviews. This foreign assistance, along with the state's failure to provide equal educational opportunities for the people (as argued earlier in this chapter) opens up a path for the Western donor agencies to enhance their role in the educational sector of Pakistan. Due to this foreign interference, one of the education secretaries commented that this gives a rationale to conservative religious factions to label the Western inspired educational system of Pakistan as a threat to its core values. He remarked:

> Both boys and girls are under threat but girls' schools are a high target. I think you have not heard their narrative; their narrative is this whole educational system produces army officers, judges, bureaucrats and that promotes the Western ideas, and like America is our enemy they are also our enemies. They consider these school systems as the arms of the Western philosophy and it is important to cut these arms first. You know when they came to Swat, they shut down all the schools. They say these schools are producing liberalism. According to them, this is a war between kufr (infidels) and Islam and ultimately, they relate this to the Armageddon. And these are forces of Kufr (infidels) and we are forces of Islam, therefore, it is important to finish these schools.
>
> (Education Bureaucrat, Curriculum Policy Official, Male)

On the other side, Zauq, a civil bureaucrat heading one of the departments in the ministry of finance, informed that whenever the Jamiat-e-Islami forms a coalition government with another political party, they always ask for the education ministry. The reason is they believe that through education they can assert their control over the people. Furthermore, during their tenure what they do is recruit employees from their own political party, sharing similar thinking. Thus, when the political set up changes and the education ministry go into the hand of some other political party with different manifesto, still their people remain in the system. According to him, once you are employed as a government employee you cannot be thrown out.

This impact of the religious right-wing parties on the curriculum formulation process, in the opinions of Anwar, who worked for almost 25 years in the Punjab curriculum board and was one of the directors of the curriculum formulation committee, was immense and unquestionable. On the question of what shapes up girls'/women education policy and curriculum formulation, Anwar reasoned, it is the nexus of the clergy, in the form of religious parties and mullahs, which plays a crucial role. He expressed that once something has been added to the curriculum, it becomes extremely difficult to change it. Citing the example of the curriculum policy that was formulated during the time of General Zia-ul-Haq[7], he said:

> They do not allow to bring any change in the curriculum, once something has been entered, we cannot bring it back, even in today's government it is not possible. Similarly, the process of Modern Enlightenment[8], which was a brain child of General Musharraf to curb the religious radicalization, failed to achieve this change, the reason being 'they' (clergy) holds great influence. So yes, we have to keep in mind the element of the clergy, who commands immense street power, while formulating the curriculum. They influence our work to the extent that it is very difficult if we have to move one lesson from here to there, they create massive issues for us. Imagine when you make some curriculum for a subject and decide to alter its

[7] General Zia-ul-Haq, who as a Military Dictator ruled Pakistan from 1978-88 and was a major force behind the Islamization, and brought many changes to the curriculum and women rights in Pakistan based on religious grounds.

[8] General Musharraf – military dictator who ruled Pakistan from 1999 to 2008- launched a social movement called Modern Enlightenment based on Turkish President Mustafa Kemal Ataturk's policies to curb the wave of Islamic radicalization which incepted during the times of Afghan War and was an official attempt of a former General and President of Pakistan Zia-ul-Haq to bring Sharia Law in the country.

> vertical alignment as in moving a lesson from class 7s curriculum to class 8s, sighting it is a subject of higher level, they will not allow us. They will come on the roads saying, 'you are removing Islam'. This is always the problem, the religious clergy.

On my question that why the clergy and religious factions create such a fuss on altering something in the curriculum, he mentioned:

> Whether you take the example of Sunnis, Shias, or Deobandi, the representatives of these sects exploit religion for their own survival. It is all about survival. It is about power, and control, if they do not come and flex their muscles on the streets, they would go extinct. In order to disseminate their power, they also use knowledge. They tell us what to be taught in the schools. This way they can display their physical force and on top of that influence the curriculum and the educational discourses.
>
> (Former Curriculum Board Director, Government Official, Male)

In the light of the above findings, I contend that the visible discourses of security in Pakistani evidently imprint the educational discourses. They become a medium for the major power structures to contest and negotiate their authority, for instance, infiltrating the curriculum discourse by the religious factions can be rationalised as a way of controlling the knowledge production discourse, resulting in constituting their own truth regimes. Moreover, these visible discourses play a significant role in constituting the 'girl/woman' as subject (Foucault, 1971) as a vulnerable being which requires protection. However, at the same time, when the 'girl/woman' as subject gets herself associated with men in socially legitimised relationships, she can acquire the role of the *gatekeepers*. Moreover, I suggest that these visible and invisible discourses are complex and, productive, meaning they are engaged in a power struggle which operates both at the state and the societal levels. This contestation and negotiation of power is imbibed by the already existing patriarchal discourses and result in the constitution of newly evolved hegemonic forces, which further influences the social construction of girl/woman and the discourse of education. For example, when I asked a school principal, Yasmeen, about the impact of gender on the educational choices made by the parents for their children, she said:

> You won't find major difference in the attitudes of parents when it comes to the issue of being less concerned for their daughters academic

> achievements as compared to boys, there is no difference of that sort, however, when it comes to the issue of admission, they would choose a better school for their boy and a lower category one for their girl. This is I am talking about your middle-class parents. They think their boys would support them so they need to educate them well. Once they are admitted over here, there is no such thing as biasedness between a boy and a girl. But this is once they are over here, when it is about admission, you would see a brother coming to this school and his sister going to another school of lower fee structure.
>
> (Private School Principal, Educationist, Female)

In another example of this educational discrimination, Hammad, lamented the societal mind-set for creating practices of preferentiality. He narrated an incident from his own work experience:

> I will give you an example, I went for the inauguration of a school built by Save the Children in 2010. First, I made a speech as a donor representative and I thanked everyone including the community, after that the guy who gave us the land went to the podium and made an open request, and which exploded like a bomb shell on my head. He said I request ROTA and Save the Children that they give this new school to boys and they can use the old boy's school for girls. And that was the first time in my life ever, where I did not watch out for the protocol and went up to the podium straight away and said that we are always blaming the militants and religious groups that they are against girls' education but over here a sophisticated community member displaying similar discrimination. Also, this was a classic example, where a guy who offered land to us was directly influencing the donor to give the newly built girls' school to boys and put girls in the old boys' school. So, you can understand that it is not entirely that the mind-set of the militants or religious groups works in that way. This is the mind-set, this is the mind-set of male domination, where every good thing is a male right and every second hand thing is for a female. This is my answer to your question on religious groups, the mind-set is beyond religious groups and it can exist anywhere, it can exist in your urban set up. It might exist in my servants who live in my own house.
>
> (Third Sector Official, Donor Organisation Executive, Male)

The other important aspect that I intend to illustrate is the frequent usage of word mind-set by the participants. It seems that by uttering mind-set, the participants tried to convey that it is just the *mind-set* of people, which is the root cause of problems, if one can fix the mind-set, problems can be eliminated. However, I explicate that this very discourse on dealing with a social issue can be a problem in itself. Therefore, the idea of subject creation cannot be explained simply by classifying as a result of particular mind-set or thinking, it has to be comprehended

within the cracks of the visible and invisible discourses (which will be thoroughly discussed in the next discussion chapter).

8.6 Conclusion

In this chapter, based on the research findings, I have argued that the social construction of the 'girl/woman' as subject is deeply influenced by the discourse of duality. The discourse of duality, I have suggested, incorporates the religious rationale to create the 'girl/woman' as subject, and can be associated with both the conservative and liberal patriarchal discourses. The construction of the 'girl/woman' as subject based on her sexuality constitutes the idea of vulnerable but tempting female body that has to be protected and controlled by men. On the basis of the research findings, I contended that this protection and disciplinary practices in Pakistan are deeply influenced by its security struggles, and enhances the role of religion, resulting in the securitization of gender.

Consequently, this discourse of securitization is exploited by the patriarchal discourses and creates a split between the role of women in the society depending upon their proximity to a male relationship. The discourse of duality, which consists of dichotomous practices holds a significant role in the creation of the discourse of hypocrisy, which further impacts the idea of girls'/women education in Pakistan. This discourse of duality can offer an explanation to the existing divide between the official and unofficial educational discourses on girls'/women education. In the last half of the chapter, I have expounded that there exist issues such as monetary resources, structural discrepancies, societal mind-set, management issues, and policy frictions that creates issues for girls'/women education. However, I contend that these factors are just part of the visible discourse, and yes, they do have a significant impact on girls'/women educational discourse but within these issues there are the invisible discourses that deeply influence girls'/women education. These invisible discourses are in the form of hidden curriculum, where the policy does talk about equal educational opportunities but is restricted for *show only* purpose.

I have expounded through my argument that the patriarchal discourses, at some extent do believe in the educational attainment of women but are wary of

educational attainment that can be put into practice and enhances the agency of women. Hence, it is within the visible and invisible discourses, power negotiation and contestation take place between the patriarchal discourses. Moreover, these gendered discourses are legitimised through the discourse of threat and requires the 'protection' and 'control' of women so that they remain dependent and do not rebel against the male domination, resulting in the destabilisation of the society and the state. Consequently, in the light of arguments presented in chapters seven and eight, in the next chapter, I propose to interpret the findings using the relevant literature, particularly focusing on Foucault, Butler and the postcolonial discourses.

9 Chapter: The Securitization Discourse, the Subject Creation, and Girls'/Women Education

9.1 Introduction

This discussion chapter analyses the findings from the chapter seven and eight in the light of the relevant literature and offers a poststructuralist feminist examination of the discourse of securitization and its impact on girls'/women education in the context of Pakistan. Taking in account the findings of the previous two chapters, this chapter, utilises the *hybridization* approach (Murphy, 2017) that conjugates the Foucauldian (1980) notion of power/knowledge, and discourse, with Butler's (2010) idea of gender performativity, to analyse the main research question. Foucault's work presents new possibilities to frame and investigate questions that can offer fresh ways to locate power in diverse areas (Allan, 2013). However, I discern that these new possibilities are accompanied by different challenges, once this application is performed in a postcolonial society such as Pakistan.

Regarding the structure of the chapter, firstly, I begin by employing the Foucauldian concept of discourse to analyse the securitization of Pakistan. Secondly, the chapter critically explores the diverse form of discourses that are produced in the society of Pakistan as the outcome of the securitization discourse. Thirdly, it examines knowledge as a social construct, which through the means of power constitute the subject. Fourthly, it interrogates the social construction of education in the realm of Pakistan from the point of view of the securitization discourse. Fifthly, engaging Foucauldian and Butler's feminist poststructuralist approach, it explores the ways through which the securitization discourse, in a postcolonial state, gives birth to competing discourses, such as the discourses of legitimacy and duality that influence the social production of the girl. Lastly, the discussion will culminate by assessing the impact of the securitization discourse on the social construction of girls'/women education.

9.2 Poststructuralist Feminism: The Rationale

The discussion within this chapter is delivered in the spirit of a poststructuralist approach. Therefore, *my* interpretation of my research findings does not intend to evaluate the accuracy or fallacy of the point of views expressed by the research participants. Similarly, neither does it aim to draw generalisations from the analysis of their views and hypothesize claims about the society of Pakistan. However, the poststructuralist approach aims to offer new possibilities to understand (Jones, 1993) the issues affecting girl's/women education, explicitly about the state's security struggles. In her article, Bronwyn Davis (Davis, 1997) indulges in a debate with Alison Jones, where two poststructuralist feminist scholars contest the notion of *subject* in the poststructuralist framework. She addresses the anomalies that mark the struggles between language and meaning when the poststructuralist analysis is applied. In her opinion, in the poststructuralist framework, the writer does not hold any command over the reader that how it associates a meaning to a text (1997 , p. 272-273). Accordingly, I do not aim to propagate a particular interpretation of the analysis of my work but leave it to the reader to contemplate a meaning by bringing their own set of schemes for inferring meaning.

Additionally, I apply the poststructuralist approach to explore the link between the discourse of securitization and the social construction of girl/woman borrowing Foucauldian concept where *self* is not a fixed concept (Foucault, 1980). The significance of Foucault's contribution to the poststructuralist framework is highlighted by various feminist poststructuralist scholars (Butler, 2010, Hekman, 1990, Hekman, 1996). Davis (1997) talks about the drastic but impactful shift to the academic understanding of 'being human' courtesy of Foucault. In her words, Foucault was not interested 'with individual subjects, but with subjectification'. The application of this particular Foucauldian thought enables me as an educational researcher not to offer solutions for the uplift of girls'/women education, but to highlight the complexities of the securitization discourse, and discourses generated by it, and how it positions the 'girl/woman' as subject in the educational discourse. In the words of Francis (1999), according to Foucault, 'the self is not fixed: instead, it is positioned and positions in 'discourse'—socially and culturally produced patterns of language, which constitute power by constructing

objects in particular ways' (1999 p, 383). Therefore, I look through the lens of poststructuralists such as Foucault (1980), about power, knowledge, and discourses, and offer a new frame of reference to explore the securitization of Pakistan.

Additionally, the feminist poststructuralists such as, Walkerdine (1986), Weedon (1987), Butler (2010), and Hekman (1990) offers a point of view, which is applied in this chapter to discern the ways in which girls/women are presented with socially constructed avenues, particularly, in the form of education to enter gendered subject roles. Moreover, it attempts to explore the meaning of becoming a 'girl' (Jones, 1993) by interpreting the meanings of participants narratives as seen through the securitization discourse. In particular, the chapter argues that it is the invisible discourses of gender that holds a great impact on the social construction of girl, and imprint its impact on the educational discourse, specifically, through the use of hidden curriculum (Lynch, 1989, Jackson, 1990, Apple, 1971, Apple, 1979), and the discourse of hypocrisy. The hidden curriculum that according to Philip W. Jackson (1990) promotes conformity not creativity in schools, but I argue, in the case of Pakistan, this conformity is not restricted to classrooms but happens outside schools as well. In regard to the discourse of hypocrisy, I contend that it is the practices of duality, which as postcolonial residues are exploited by the power structures to socially construct avenues that constitute gender and education discourses in Pakistan.

Finally, deviating from the plethora of standard educational studies on girl's/women education in Pakistan, which either reflects the international development agenda on girl's education (Qureshi, 2012, Aslam, 2007, Aslam and Kingdon, 2012, Saleem and Bobak, 2005, Kabeer et al., 2010, Benz, 2013, Sales, 1999, King and Hill, 1993, Chaudhry, 2007, Sheikh et al., 2017, Asghar et al., 2009, Herz et al., 2004, Sperling et al., 2015, Heward and Bunwaree, 1999), that in itself is triggered by the Western social movements that highlights the case of women rights and civil rights (Khoja-Moolji, 2018, p. 9, p. 9), or assesses education as a medium of women empowerment in Pakistan (Malik and Courtney, 2011, Mumtaz, 2007, Shaheed and Mumtaz, 1993, Mahmood, 2012, Halai, 2011, Khattak, 2018, Khurshid, 2015, Noureen, 2015, Shah and Khurshid, 2019, Khurshid, 2018, Seeberg

et al., 2017). Through this chapter I argue that understanding the social construction of gender can play a key role in assessing the challenges faced by the girls'/women education in the postcolonial state of Pakistan.

9.3 Securitization as a Discourse

To recap the work of the Copenhagen school which examines security, not as an objective condition but the interplay of social processes that are an outcome of social construction (Glover, 2011, McDonald, 2008), the findings of the research identify that in the case of Pakistan there exists a link between the security issues and power/knowledge construction. Through the findings I advocate that the security actors in the context of Pakistan are the main power structures, and the securitization discourse plays an important role in cementing this position. On the other hand, the findings also propose that acceptance of military and mullah as the major power structures is not done by the forceful application of their authority. Their dominance is a result of the constant power struggle which is pivoted around two major notions: mutual cooperation and power tussle (see chapter seven and eight).

Drawing on the discourse of securitization, the findings further reflects the ideas of Chowdhury and Ha, which indicates that discourses have the ability to constitute knowledge. Also, this knowledge can be contested and negotiated based on the context in which it is produced (Chowdhury and Ha, 2014 p. 26). The *key finding* that I present in this chapter is the production of *the visible* and *invisible discourses* by the discourse of securitization that eventually plays a major role in social construction of knowledge on gender and education (see Appendix 1 for the pictorial illustration of the overall thesis argument). Therefore, on the basis of my research findings, I argue that the military-mullah nexus, uses the notion of threat, an illustration of the visible discourse, to legitimise their use of authority. However, it does not depict the invisible discourses that are produced by the discourse of securitization, such as the discourses of *legitimacy* and *control*. Through the research study, I illustrate that the people are vividly reminded about the threats that are looming over their heads, such as in the case of ideological, territorial and global (Kukreja and Singh, 2005). But are not

informed that at times states employ the threat perception to acts as a mode of domination and subjugation (Jackson, 2012).

Besides, I suggest that the parallel working of the visible and invisible discourses opens up a debate around 'off-the-shelf' application of Foucauldian discourse to investigate discourses in a non-occident setting. The obscurity of Foucauldian ideas due to the complexity of his language and their French backdrop has posed challenged for 'Anglo-American audiences' (Guedon, 1977 , p. 245), which Said called Foucault's European *blindness* (2014). While expounding new definitions of power, with the aim 'to cut off the King's Head' (Foucault, 1980 , p. 121) Foucault (1978) said, 'it [power] is the name that one attributes to a complex strategical situation in a particular society' (p. 93), but what about those societies where the King's Head was cut off by colonist invasions, and was followed up with the plan of state building on the European model that constituted the binary world of modern and traditional, West and East, enlightened and primitive (Cohn, 1996). Although, Foucault offers a new perspective to comprehend the securitization discourse due to its Eurocentrism, it requires a postcolonial lens to address the limitations of Foucauldian analysis (see chapter five for more detail on this).

Baesd on the findings prseneted in chapter seven and eight, in the next section I critically evaluate the various discourses that are produced by the securitization discourse. Moreover, I explore the ways in which the prominent power structures indulge in a blame game to establish authority over parallel power structures.

9.3.1 Discourses Generated by the Securitization Discourse in Pakistan

The findings of chapter seven indicate that the securitization discourse is highly acknowledged by the majority of participants for its crucial significance to the ideological, territorial and institutional survival of the state. Also, it is seen as a compulsion on the state of Pakistan to ensure its survival. All the participants, whether they challenged this compulsion or supported it, they did agree to the fact that security issues of Pakistan play a major role in shaping up the societal discourse of the society (see chapter seven and eight). Consequently, it could be suggested that the discourse of securitization not only empower the positioning of chief security actors to constitute knowledge and leave their perpetual imprints on the power relations but as suggested by Whisnant, discourses have the

competence to generate multiple discourses that can be further subdivided into categories (Whisnant, 2012).

Additionally, as my findings show, participants utilised various discourses of 'threat': the discourse of *two nation theory* (Jalal, 1994), the post-colonial discourse (Padamsee, 2005), the Indus culture discourse (Ahsan, 1996), the Muslim salariat discourse (Alavi, 1988), India as a threat discourse (Jalal, 1995a), the discourse of nation and culture (Bekerman, 2002), the Kashmir discourse (Pervez, 2012), the discourse of fear of disintegration (Khattak, 1996), that generated the securitization discourse in the independent state of Pakistan post 1947. Consequently, I contend that there is a multitude of factors that impacts the securitization discourse. As pointed out in the findings of chapter seven, the above-highlighted points become a rationale for the security actors to bargain their hegemony with the people. The research study discerns that the bargaining and negotiation between the security actors, using the securitization discourse as its backdrop, can be explored as one of the chief constituents of subject creation (this is discussed in detail in the later sections of this chapter).

Reverting back to the concept of the self and how it is forged by power relations (Foucault, 1980, O'Farrell, 2005), as discussed in the literature review chapter, and drawing parallels between Nietzsche's concept of domination of church (Warren, 1992) and Foucault's Pastoral Theory (Foucault, 1982a), which illustrated that the obedience from followers is obtained voluntarily not by force and oppression (see chapter three), with the case study of Pakistan, there could be striking similarities. Therefore, in the case of Pakistan, the historical discourses – mentioned above– converge into the securitization discourse, and Pakistani army, as discussed in the findings of chapter seven and highlighted by some participants, not only becomes the structurally capable power to defend its borders because of its structural supremacy inherited at the time of independence (Alavi, 1973), but also becomes the guardians of both the state and its ideological frontiers (Fair, 2011, Shah, 2014). The ideological foundation is rooted in the Islamic identity of the Subcontinent Muslims (Ahmed, 2005, Raja, 2010). In case of Pakistan, the construction of identities of the self are severely under the dominion of Islam (Lall, 2008, Durrani, 2013) and 'the military a central symbol of national identity….. and

integral to Pakistani identity' (Durrani, 2013 , p. 230). As a result of this, the Pakistani army in exchange for protecting the homeland and safeguarding the freedom of people from threats both internal and external seeks authoritative control of the state (Aziz, 2007).

Consequently, as expressed by some participants, the people of Pakistan trust the army more as compared to a politician. For them whenever the civilian institutions fail to perform their duties, the public look towards the army to intervene and sort out the situation. Moreover, the general public feels that the army has a certain role to play in society, and that is considered generally beneficial for the state and its people. Comparing this to the above example of the Nietzschean Church domination case and Foucault's Pastoral power, I argue that even in the case of Pakistan, we can say that there exists some sort of voluntary submission of the people towards the dominance of the army. If we need to further explore the negotiation process of this voluntary submission, thus, it becomes crucial to explore the influence of the securitization discourse on this negation process.

9.3.2 The Discourse of Securitization Generating Discourses in Pakistan

The findings of chapter seven highlighted that although the securitization discourse is acknowledged by the majority of participants for its central relevance to the ideological, institutional and territorial survival of the state. However, as reflected in the findings chapter seven, it is resisted by the same forces which supports it. The participants from the army used Islam as a major reason that distinguishes the Muslims of Pakistan from the Hindus of India. But on the flip side, they cited the negative impact of the mullahs on the society. They claimed that even if we wish to eliminate the religious sentiment, they are so deeply rooted in the society that even the educated class will resent this move. Similarly, such examples of duality were shared by the education sector bureaucrats as well (see quotes on the issue of religion and education in chapter seven and eight).

The above two examples, out of numerous other examples as mentioned in chapter seven, sheds light on the duality of participants perception of the role of army and religion. It could be argued over here, using a Foucauldian perspective that power is constantly negotiated (Foucault, 1980, Miller, 1990), and 'the self is passively positioned in certain discourses, but is at the same time active in

positioning in other discourses' (Francis, 1999 , p. 383). However, Foucault also indicated that within discourses one can identify forms of resistances as well (Foucault, 1980). Therefore, in the light of the above arguments, I contend that not only people position themselves into a discourse depending upon their vulnerability in a discourse (Francis, 1999), but discourses generate discourses and compete for power and influence (Whisnant, 2012). Resultantly, based on the findings, I highlight that it is this power negotiation which results in the creation of the legitimacy discourse. It is within this discourse of legitimacy; the issue of the threat becomes more of an ideological issue than a territorial one. Likewise, this is where the issue of security gets coupled with the issue of religion (see the section *the discourse of authority* and *the discourse of legitimacy* in chapter seven). It is within the discourse of legitimacy, the authority structures, whether the army or the religious elite, can exhibit dual attitudes towards a certain situation (see the later sections such as *the discourse of hypocrisy* for the in-depth discussion on this duality).

This struggle among the power institutions, in a postcolonial society, to seek legitimacy offers an illustration to highlight the inadequacies of Foucault's power/knowledge framework to explore the issue of discourse in a postcolonial society. For example, when Foucault (1980) says, 'sovereignty and disciplinary mechanisms are two absolutely integral constituents of the general mechanism of power in our society' (p. 108), his idea of *our society* cannot be applied to a postcolonial society. The reason, I argue, is that the idea of state which Foucault presents is based on a European society, where the sovereign power of a monarch was gradually overtaken by the power apparatus, such as courts, prison, army, and schools, which disseminated power through various discourses that reproduced regulatory practices, and lead to the creation of subject (Rouse, 1999). This is the reason when he talks about legitimacy, according to him the state derives it through the process of *normalization*. In the process of normalization, the state constitutes laws that appear to be normal for its citizen, and the acceptance of these laws by the citizens ensures the legitimacy and authority of the state, which results in the discourse of discipline (Foucault, 2009, Astore, 2016). But, as in the case of postcolonial states, the colonial powers, and its institutions did not seek legitimacy from the natives to rule them, it was a

reign of oppression by the colonial over the natives (Memmi, 2003), where the rule of law was colonial *difference* that aimed to preserve the 'alienness of the ruling group' (Chatterjee, 1993 , p. 10). However, when the colonials left, the power structures, which colonial used to govern the local population, for example army and bureaucracy, were over developed as compared to the society (Alavi, 1973). Consequently, in postcolonial societies, the new successors of power used 'the rhetoric of nationalism' based on religion, tribal and territorial differences to establish their rules, which replicated the ambitions and policies of the former colonisers, and created the *colonial legacy* (Wiener, 2013 , p. 5-7).

The argument I put forward, based on the findings, is that yes in postcolonial societies the state inherits 'overdeveloped apparatus, which uses institutional practices to control the indigenous population, as argued by Alavi (1973). However, this *control* is not achieved through oppressive practices nor by the *normalization approach,* but these colonial residues strengthen their authority by gaining the support of people through the discourse of legitimacy. In order to seek this support, the discourse of legitimacy applies different tactics, such as, in the form of religion, territory and ideology. Therefore, it is within this discourse of legitimacy, the colonial residues indulge in blame game to overpower the rivalling power structures, and this is where power is contested. Consequently, I propose, this struggle to achieve legitimacy in Pakistan plays a significant role in the social construction of the 'girl/woman' subject, a subject which is different from Foucault's European subject.

In light of this, I would argue that in the case of Pakistan, although there are numerous reasons, as mentioned above, that produce the discourse of securitization. However, the power structures that command the discourse of securitization seek legitimacy from the subjects, it aims to rule, to ensure their authority. Subsequently, this intends to seek approval from the subjects acts as a stimulus to produce the legitimacy discourse. It could be suggested that the legitimacy discourse is where power is contested in the case of Pakistan, and in order to ensure the longevity of their authority, the military-mullah nexus utilise threat, as a discourse to generate knowledge and truth (Schiller, 1998, Geerlings

and Lundberg, 2018), about the Pakistani society, as in the words of Foucault the 'truth effects' (Knights, 2002, Whisnant, 2012, Poster, 1982).

9.4 The Securitization Discourse, the Construction of Knowledge and Truth

The majority of academic literature on Pakistan has severely criticised the role of military-mullah nexus for sabotaging the socio-political structures of the Pakistan society (Alavi, 1988, Cohen, 2004, Haqqani, 2010, Samad, 2011). Contrary to this, I suggest that rather than eyeing the authority of the military-mullah nexus as a forceful compulsion on the people, the main point of interest should be to understand the acceptance of people of this hegemonic rule. It is the willing participation of the people in the discourse of securitization that becomes a crucial aspect to inspect. For instance, many participants acknowledged this willingness (see the section *the discourse of control* in chapter seven).

Accordingly, this leads to the inquiry into the issue of voluntary participation of people in the securitization discourse, which is to comprehend the way through which the securitization discourse achieves this voluntary participation. While talking about the production of discourse in his lecture, *Orders of Discourses,* Foucault illustrated three tiers of exclusion mechanism that contribute towards the generation of the dominant discourse in society. According to him the third, the significant, aspect of the exclusion is the distinction between true and false (Foucault, 1981, Mills, 2003b). Foucault argues that this distinction is 'historically constituted'. This historical division for him constructed our 'will to know'. It is this will to know that determines the position of 'knowing subject' to interpret knowledge. And this 'will to truth, like other systems of exclusions, rest on institutional support: it is both reinforced and renewed by whole strata of practices' (Foucault, 1981 , p. 54-55). Hence, in the case of Pakistan, I argue that it is the discourse of securitization that becomes an approach for the people of Pakistan to interpret knowledge and constitute the exclusion criteria.

The reason the people believe in the voice of security actors such as the army or a religious person, in regards to the securitization discourse as legitimate voices because it has to be spoken by an authority that has the expertise to utter that truth (Mills, 2003b , p. 58). In the case of Pakistan, the military and mullahs are

deemed experts by the people to utter the truth regarding the securitization discourse. In order to do so there has to be a systematic way of informing people so that they can differentiate between truth and falsehood (Ibid , p. 58). Hence, it could be highlighted that the discourse of legitimacy enables the power structures such as the military and mullahs to construct the truth and the regimes of exclusion. Thus, the findings suggest that it is the notion of legitimacy that becomes the arena of contestation where the power structures compete to overthrow each other in the realm of Pakistan. This contestation results in the generation of another discourse of threat and blame game. I argue that it is the *holier than thou* stance that becomes a way to demean the competing power structure in the eyes of the people and legitimise their truth as true knowledge (see Haq's quote in chapter seven in section *the discourse of control*).

It is the process of contestation that enables the power structure to establish its regime of truth and present it to the people as a legitimate authority. The issue of legitimacy is countered by indulging in a blame game. Foucault uttered, it is 'the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true' (Foucault and Rainbow, 1984 , p. 73), in this regard, and the status of the military and the mullahs are better equipped due to their significance to the securitization discourse to justify their blames aimed at their opposing power structures. Their credibility, as discussed in the findings chapter seven, is legitimised by the discourse of threat and its significance to the state of Pakistan. Therefore, through the findings of the study, I accentuate that the discourses do not necessarily compete with each other, but they can compound and strengthen the force of one another.

The study argues that either a subject accept that system of subject creation or resist it, which becomes the hallmark of Foucauldian productive power/knowledge notion (Foucault, 1980). The above discussion discerns that through the securitization discourse, the security actors, as they are in a position to command it, (as discussed above and in the previous findings chapter) possesses the ability to constitute procedures and systems that can significantly impact the behaviours and actions of people (Oliver, 2010). As discussed in chapter seven, the participants rationalised that because society is marked with

inequalities, institutional support plays a crucial role in the life of a Pakistani. If the subordinate is not behaving accordingly to his/her job portfolio or the teacher is not holding herself accountable for her services (see Sohail's in chapter seven under the heading of the discourse of legitimacy). But, they are socially performing in a way, where their sense of participation in the dominant discourse of securitization becomes a priority, and in terms of Foucault becomes a way to perceive reality (Mills, 2003b).

Consequently, I contend that it is within the securitization discourse of Pakistan, where power is constituted, and the social construction of knowledge occurs, which generates the truth production avenues that result in the social creation of *subject* (Butler, 2010, Foucault, 1980, Foucault, 1981, Hekman, 1986, Hekman, 1996, Mills, 2003b, O'Farrell, 2005, Oliver, 2010, Weedon, 1987). On the other hand, I point out that the way Foucault emphasised that in order to study punishment, it is mandatory to first analyse the combination of discourse and power/knowledge nexus, which constituted the idea of crime and the criminal in a certain historical period that produced particular prison regimes (Hall, 2004 , p. 348). Similarly, to study a subject in a postcolonial society, it requires investigation of discourses and power/knowledge nexus, which constructed the idea of colonial and the other, that constituted the subjectivation practices during colonialism. However, Nancy Hartsock (1990), states that Foucault 'fails to provide a theory of power for women', and the notion of power is associated with 'male and masculinity' (p. 157). Correspondingly, I discern that Foucault's European subject creation theory neglects the postcolonial subject and is limited to power/knowledge and discourse theory that only revolves around White European male.

9.5 The Imprints of the Securitization Discourse on the Idea of Education

Keeping in mind that power is a 'notoriously difficult' notion to comprehend and can lead the researchers to look for it in the 'wrong places' (Murphy, 2013b , p. 8), the aim of this section is not to justify that the education in Pakistan is a by-product of the securitization discourse and used by the security actors to use the medium of education to impregnate the society with their philosophies and

ideologies, so that they can create subjects which are aligned to their socio-political wavelength. However, it brings to fore the argument debated by Iffat (see the quote by her in chapter eight under the heading of the *idea of education)*. Compounding the production of truth with the issue of education in a society, she flagged up that the right way to understand the impact of securitization on the educational discourse is to, firstly locate the educational discourse which is considered legitimate.

9.5.1 The Idea of Education: Blaming for Legitimacy

In regards to this, Foucault's work presents new possibilities to frame and investigate questions that can offer fresh ways to locate power in diverse areas (Allan, 2013). Building on this and filling the gap in the educational research done on Pakistan, I suggest that both the policy and the views expressed by the participants supports the notion that education is the foremost priority of each state institution whether it is the army, religious clergy or the parliament. But, the main bone of contention is on the issue of *legitimacy*, meaning, which educational discourse is appropriate and who can participate in that discourse. Thus, unravelling the actors and the dominant discourses, can be a new perspective to study the working of power in the educational domain of Pakistan. Majority of the participants, apart from the religious scholars, blatantly blamed the religious elite as a major hurdle in creating an environment that creates obstacles in girls'/women getting educated. On the contrary, a religious scholar said that because mullahs are already maligned and are an easy target, therefore, the actors who are powerful use them as a smokescreen to achieve their own gains (see the quote by Lateef in chapter seven).

Whenever, I asked the participants that they were blamed by other participants as one of the main reasons that the education sector is not flourishing in Pakistan, they were quick to defend their disposition by blaming the institutions or individuals which blamed them in the first place. For example, if an educationist blamed that it is the lack of resources and the lavish defence budget which drains out the education budget, and when this question was put forward to an army official, he was quick to blame the incompetency of the civilian institutions and the moral and financial corruption prevalent in them. Likewise, when I asked an

army official that the defence budget depletes the education funds, he pointed the finger at the security dilemma and the threat issue of Pakistan. This issue of lack of funds forces the government to look for foreign donors (Malik and Naveed, 2012, Ahsan, 2005). In addition to this, as uttered by the third sector officials because Pakistan is a signatory to various global programmes, such as on education and gender, it becomes a compulsion on it to adhere to it terms and condition (Ali, 2017, Zafar, 2015). However, the effort is limited to creating feasibility reports but the implementation of those reports is not taken up seriously, which creates hurdles in the implementation of the educational policy (Shafi, 2014). Also, the policy which is formulated under the foreign pressure is written in a vague language that becomes a barrier in its practical implementation (Ibid , p. 12) and is only accessible by the high level educated experts (Lingard and Ali, 2009). As mentioned, in the previous findings chapter, to curtail the influence of the Western Donors influence, the mullahs voice their concern over the westernisation of Pakistan and worry that the western influence on the education discourse would eventually influence girls'/women to become a socio-cultural rebel. Hence, this concern results in girls'/women education becoming a controversial issue, especially, the western education.

The study further argues that access to diverse discourses in society is controlled by educational institutions (Ball, 2010). The control over the educational discourse ensures control over the educational institutions. Therefore, the securitization discourse legitimises a form of the educational system, which according to Foucault, forms 'a political means of maintaining or modifying the appropriateness of discourses with the knowledge and power they bring with them' (Foucault, 1981 , p. 64). Resultantly, the security actors such as the army and the religious factions, who have 'the power to influence the nature of discourse' and exert 'considerable control over the nature of educational system and the manner in which people thought about' the Pakistani society and themselves (Oliver, 2010 , p. 37). Consequently, the main issue is not education but *the idea of education* that should be there in the society. Hence, it is suggested based on the findings from the data that the securitization discourse plays a major role in constituting the idea of education in Pakistan, which further constitutes the educational discourse. The study proposes it is through this educational discourse that is

heavily monitored by the issues of the securitization discourse, the practices of educational inclusion and exclusion are created as well. Furthermore, *the idea of education,* acts as a system of Foucauldian surveillance in the form of educational discourse that becomes a site to socially constitute subjects (Ayaz Naseem, 2006).

Based on the findings, and the argument presented by Christopher Hood (2011), in his book, 'The Blame Game', people who have played the blame game long enough and are well-aware of its tricks, tend to cover up their personal agendas by hiding behind the cause of greater good. Therefore, I point out that the blame game offers a way to the power players to camouflage their shortcomings by using altruism and justice as a rationale. Consequently, I argue that *blame game* appears as an empirical example of the visible discourse, but it is accompanied with the *invisible* discourse of legitimacy. Hence, it is personal agenda of *legitimising* authority that is achieved by blaming the competing power structure. Additionally, it is the blame game that can play a major role for a power structure to gain legitimacy from the people in contrast to the opposing power structures. Therefore, not only power is being contested within the cracks of these visible and invisible discourses, but it is been exercised as well.

9.5.2 The Conundrum of Multiple Educational Discourses

As discussed in the findings of chapter eight, the private educational institutes, state schools, army schools and religious madrassahs are an example of the multiple educational discourses in the case of Pakistan. This suggests that the ones who can afford it, they can have their own educational discourse, this could be classified as an empirical example of when Foucault argues that knowledge is a not a reflection of power relations but immanent in them (Kenway, 2010 , p. 174). The ones who can afford education, they don't need to look towards the state and are independent to have their own educational system. The study discerns that this creates a system of inclusion and exclusion in society through educational discourse. The drawback of such system is there are multiple discourses flowing simultaneously, and the one who is better equipped both in terms of public support and infrastructure is in a position to establish its authority over the others.

In order to grasp the exclusion and inclusion practices of the educational discourses in Pakistan and to explore the positioning of girls/women in such discourse, the

Foucauldian perspective offers an approach to analyse it but comes with limitations as well. He emphasized that 'there is an administration of knowledge, a politics of knowledge, relations of power which pass via knowledge…… and lead one to consider forms of domination' (Goodson and Dowbiggan, 2010 , p. 116-117). In the light of this statement, the exclusion of girl/woman from the dominant educational discourse is reflected in a collective attitude of the society that tells about its perception of girls'/women education. I argue, it is not only the issue of affordability but the idea that girls'/women education is of no use because after their education, they are not *supposed* to work (For evidence see the section The *Hidden Curriculum)*.

Accordingly, based on the findings, I further contend that it is not that family or the state that openly lay down policies to prevent girls/women from getting educated. However, 'the whole system' convey to her that the education for boys is a priority. This politics of knowledge depicts the form of domination in the shape of boy's legitimate right over education as to girl. The boy as the breadwinner, the protector of her physical safety and moral honour excludes her from the dominant discourse. Hence, the case of boy's domination in the context of Pakistan, where the state has a religion and is struck with inevitable security dilemma, the study argues, does reflect in the idea of education for girl/woman (see Appendix 1 for pictorial illustration). In the words of Foucault, discourses works 'in a way that reveals the historical contingency of the subject positions made available to us' (Walshaw, 2007 , p. 66). Under the influence of the hegemonic discourse of securitization, the 'girl/woman' as subject is made aware of her educational positioning. The study argues that this does not leave the rest of the dominant discourses out of the equation, but due to the significance of the hegemony of the securitization discourse, it does command an authoritative position to leave its imprints both on the gender and educational discourses.

9.6 The Securitization Discourse and the Production of Girl/Woman

According to Ball, the construction of the subject, from a Foucauldian perspective, is entangled within the domain of power and knowledge. Thus, the scholarly quest to grasp this construction requires insertion of the subject within

the realm of power and knowledge. It is the experts or institutions that are allowed 'to speak knowledgeably about others' are the ones that constitute the script according to which we are supposed to enact our role in society. This 'knowledgeably' aware class constitutes the subject (Ball, 2013 , p. 15). On the other hand, Butler (1989), indicates that Foucault's notion that the body, even before discourses and power use it as a slate to etch their imprints, is 'existentially available' for its own construction. This is borrowed from a Nietzschean concept. She further comments that in the Nietzschean perspective this cultural construction is taken as 'history' and the working of this history on the body is understood as 'inscription'. However, not only she refutes both Foucault's and Nietzsche's idea of the body but gives her own take on the contested topic of the construction of the body. She argued:

> What is clear is that inscription would be neither an act initiated by a reified history nor the performative accomplishment of a master historian who produces history as he writes it. The culturally constructed body would be the result of a diffuse and active structuring of the social field with no magical or ontotheological origins, structuralist distinctions, or fictions of bodies, subversive or otherwise, ontologically intact before the law.
>
> (Butler, 1989 , p. 607)

Acknowledging the intellectual altercation between the Poststructuralist Feminists thinkers and the Foucauldian perspective, I do not aim to discern the ontological status of the subject in Pakistan. Contrarily, I intend to, firstly, grasp the construction of the subject, and, secondly, assess the role of the securitization discourse on the construction of girl/woman. Therefore, the study recognises that the construction of the subject is as complicated as the working of the securitization discourse in society. For example, the data highlights that whenever the participants were asked to define the Pakistani woman or her role in the society, they applied labels such as *mother, wife, daughter or sister* to define her. The most common pattern was translating the idea of a woman to a mother, and that was uttered in a way that it appeared as a natural occurrence not something which is a construct of the Pakistani society. This pattern, the study argues, acts as the initial defining contour for the girl/woman in the society, which is followed up by other socio-religious roles.

As a result of this, I would argue that even before the 'girl/woman' as subject is born in Pakistan, her social classification has already taken place. Furthermore, I would argue, based on the study findings, that the idea of *the body* is produced even before the physical birth of the body. Additionally, as mentioned in the findings of chapter eight, men using the religious rationale and the militaristic masculinity not only construct the idea of an ideal woman but lay claims to her ownership as well. Another factor that the study suggests that holds a great significance to equating a woman to mother, and the use of the religious rationale both by men and women, is to construct an idea for a woman that if she needs to be a mother that means she needs a man and a house. As highlighted in the findings of chapter eight, the major concern for Pakistani men is the protection of Pakistani women. Interestingly, the data suggests, the idea of this protection is to safeguard a woman from other men. And the reason for this is the conception, as mentioned in chapter eight, that women are a constant source of temptation for men, and either that temptation has to be curtailed or quenched. Therefore, it is men trying to compete over women, and once she gets associated with a man, as a mother, wife, daughter, or sister, not only a man becomes a shield for her, but it becomes his duty to protect her as well. Thus, the idea of *the guardian man* vs *the endangered woman*, can be recognised analogous to Foucauldian idea of *the rational man* vs *the irrational woman* (Hekman, 1990). In her analysis of Foucault's critique of the Enlightenment discourse, Susan Hekman (1990) argued that the Enlightenment discourse on rationality constituted woman as an irrational and emotional being, which excluded her from the rationality discourse. Moreover, according to her, the social institutions which are linked with the rationality discourse are also responsible for labelling women as inferior beings (1990 , p. 20). Accordingly, I would argue here that *the guardian man* uses both religion and the state security dilemma to push his cause.

Furthermore, the analysis of participant's responses points out that the idea that a girl/woman needs a man and a house becomes a core issue in the life of a girl and that is the reason marriage for a girl becomes a kind of purpose in her life. Thus, anything that enables her to achieve this purpose becomes a way of life for her, Bartky (1997) categorised this as the 'disciplinary regime of femininity'. In the light of this, I argue that this the reason that majority of girls/women, who

tend to go for education, their families prefer that they do medical subjects as a 'doctor *wife'* becomes an advantage for the 'girl/woman' subject to seek an ideal husband. This is the reason the majority of girls/women in Pakistan, as underlined by some participants, opt to stay home post their marriage and not practice medicine.

Interestingly, this depicts the complexity of the construction process. It could be argued that the society is *girling the girl* (Butler, 1993) but also informs her what kind of performance is expected from her to get herself accepted in the society. Through this p*erformativity* (Butler, 2010), she gets the awareness that in order to ensure her survival she has to perform the role of *the girl/woman*. Therefore, it could be suggested that in the first instance, society construct knowledge regarding the notion of the girl for a girl in society. Secondly, it highlights the entry points for her to enter the legitimised social discourse of gender. But the emphasis of this study is to locate *the girl/woman* in the realm of the securitization discourse. Butler argues that it is within discourses that the subject is created (Butler, 1993), it is the regulatory forces of culture in the shape of discourse that offers a description to the statement, 'It's a girl' (Salih, 2006).

On the other hand, as discussed above, and mentioned by Foucault in volume one of *The History of Sexuality* that where ever there is power, it is marked with resistance as well. He goes on to make a claim that where there is no resistance that means there is a void for a power relation in such cases (Foucault, 1978). Likewise, the study argues that though girls/women in order to ensure their survival in Pakistan perform the given gendered roles within that act of performativity, they tend to compete with men as well. I discern in this study that it is within these *invisible discourses* power is contested with the aim to shuffle the existed regimes of truth regarding gender.

As a result of this, the study suggests that understanding the patriarchal practices within the Pakistani society requires a thorough comprehension of the securitization discourse, as a priori, to locate the constitutive practices that construct the 'girl/woman' as subject. Additionally, the exceptional case of Pakistan, as a security state which has a religion, exploration of the construction of gender cannot be encapsulated thoroughly without recognising the importance

of the securitization discourse and the actors which holds significance power to influence that discourse. For example, in the case of Pakistan, as argued in chapter eight, it is the same discourse of securitization that not only present her in the visible discourse as a weak and disempowered individual but through the invisible discourses recognises her as an empowered individual which acts as the gatekeepers of Pakistani society.

Resultantly, I would argue that the securitization discourse plays a significant role in determining the social positioning of girl/woman. If she adheres to the already existing notions of performativity (Butler, 2010), where the *highly rigid regulatory frame* (Salih, 2006), is based on the notion of threat, she is adorned as an empowered member of the society in the shape of a mother or a gatekeeper. Thus, in a security impacted society such as Pakistan, threat, acts as a form of materiality that plays an important role in the constitution of gender. Therefore, it is the discourse of securitization that plays a major part in establishing an understanding of *the girl/woman*, which in the words of Butler can be categorised as a 'certain construction' that appears 'constitutive'(Butler, 1993). However, the way I have highlighted that the securitization discourse should be taken as a priori to encapsulate the gender construction process in Pakistan. Likewise, I suggest that the securitization of Pakistan could not be assessed as an independent discourse, it has to be studied both from historical and ideological underpinnings of Pakistan. The application of such an approach offers a unique and diverse tactic to grasp the gender construction in Pakistan.

Consequently, based on the findings, I would argue that even before girl is born in Pakistan, her social classification has already taken place. Furthermore, I would argue that the idea of *the body* is produced even before the physical birth of the body. However, I would contend that it should be important to understand the constitution of this body from a subaltern perspective. Therefore, the next section examines the postcolonial angle to examine the production of Pakistani girl/woman inside the securitization discourse. Understanding the nuances of colonialism and the role it had on the socio-political processes of Indo-Pakistan (Ganguly and Fair, 2013), could offer an alternative explanation to comprehend the production of the Pakistani girl/woman.

9.7 The Postcolonial Residue and the Creation of New Subaltern

One of the key arguments that I advanced in this study is that there exists a duality that could be considered as a way of processing reality in the context of Pakistan (see findings chapters seven and eight). For example, the power structure such as military fields the religious defence line to deter Western influence. However, it criticises the same religious factions for jeopardizing the educational and gender discourse that dents its global outlook (refer to the findings chapter). I would argue, based on the findings, that the duality of threat/protection, good/bad, right/wrong, religious/liberal, men/women, Islam/Europe, Pakistan/India, power-negotiation/power-contestation, private/public, urban/rural, Muslim/Hindu plays a vital role in the culmination of binary world view in Pakistan. For instance, the military accentuates this bifurcation by establishing its superiority over the civilian population (Khan et al., 2014 , p. 16). I would suggest that the reason the military commands this knowledge production, where it legitimises itself with the right to pronounce something right or wrong is chiefly because it is a *colonial residual,* the colonists left but they left behind 'residue' that cannot be forgotten and that marked the beginning of new social order (Quayson, 2012, Young, 2012), paving the way for the era of neo-colonial domination (Ashcroft et al., 2009b). The colonial residue that the British left in the underdeveloped society of the Indian subcontinent was in the form of overly developed state structures such as military and bureaucracy (Alavi, 1973, Khan et al., 2014). This binary creation of developed institutions vs underdeveloped society, share its similarities with the binary world of colonial invaders, who constructed white/black, good/evil, knowledgeable/ignorant in their colonial empires (JanMohamed, 1983). I would propose that the way colonial powers created the binary world view of *the West and the rest/the other* (Ashcroft et al., 2009b, Said, 2014, Spivak, 1994, Williams and Chrisman, 1994, JanMohamed, 1983), this has in some ways been replicated by the postcolonial residual to ensure their hegemony, which resulted in the production of the *subaltern's subaltern*.

Now why I have introduced the term *subaltern's subaltern* because it is an attempt to offer a new dimension to conceptualise the issue of gender in a postcolonial societies, such as Pakistan, where the colonial residual, which consists of hegemonic powers such as military, and the urban educated class, have left out

the non-Westernised, uneducated, and rural women. This issue, where urban women are getting educated, and bargaining their gender spaces in the urban public space was almost highlighted by all the participants, both men and women. However, I would argue that this is similar to what Spivak (1994) called *white men saving brown women from brown men,* but in today's postcolonial Pakistan, the former subalterns, for example power-deprived colonized population, have taken up the role similar to their colonial masters by associating themselves with the power structures. And as discussed in the findings chapter, the securitization discourse due to its historical and ideological reasons stands out to be one of the chief prominent power discourses that have the ability to legitimise its participant's superiority. Each and every participant supported the idea that girls/women should be given education, but it attached certain conditions to it. For example, education should be a means of her becoming a *good* mother and a *strong* guardian. No one said that she should be given education for the sake of her well-being.

In the colonial countries, the antidote natives used to deter the control of imperial forces has been 'the idea of nation' (Ashcroft et al., 2009a , p. 117). Addressing 'the pitfalls of this national consciousness', Frantz Fanon (Fanon, 2009 , p. 121-122) stressed that the adversities which struck the colonized population could not be solely blamed onto the ills of the colonial regime. In his analysis, he sheds light on the national bourgeoisie class that in a postcolonial society, applies the similar tactics of colonialists to assert their hegemonic control, which in result produces a fragmented reality that serves the interests of the national bourgeoisie (Ibid). In relation to this, the other argument I would make is that the subaltern men, for example, rural, low caste, uneducated, and tribal, once became part of the national bourgeoisie by joining the imperial residual structures, such as military and bureaucracy, shed their former skin of subaltern. Coming from a Marxist point of view, Ranajit Guha (2011), expresses that the British used bureaucracy appointments to create a sense of representation for the native Indians. The Indian bourgeoisie which yearned to see themselves in the place of their colonial rulers, used the idea of *nationalism* to attract the subaltern population. The nationalism slogan offered an inclusive sense of representation for the dominated members of society. In the early days of Pakistan, the colonial residual of the

military and bureaucracy nexus used religion as bait to instil the idea of Pakistani nationalism in the members of the society (Alavi, 1973, Ganguly and Fair, 2013, Haqqani, 2004, Daechsel, 1997). But as till today the military and bureaucracy still stick to its colonial roots and are elitist structures. However, interestingly, the recruitment patterns of the military have changed from the upper-middle class to the lower-middle class (Siddiqa, 2007). Additionally, the religious parties and organisations have mostly relied on the improvised class to attract their followers, which, also, contributes to the voluntary participation of people from lower strata into the jihad war (Saeed and Syed, 2018, Wang, 2010, Fair, 2008). In the light of the above argument, it could be suggested that the reach of the securitization discourse offers an inclusive representation to the socially and economically marginalised members of the society, which gives them a sense of acceptance and relevance. Therefore, the creation of present-day subaltern cannot be done without grasping the emergence of a nation in postcolonial societies. In the words of Brennan (2009 , p. 123), 'the nation is precisely what Foucault called a "discursive formation". Hence, as proposed by Foucault and supported by Hall, the main focus should be on the theory of discursive practices not on the knowing subject (Hall, 1996 , p. 2).

The debate on subaltern has been mostly dealt from a position where the onus is placed on finding a *voice* for the subaltern subject (Apple and Buras, 2012, Spivak, 1994). Spivak (1994) stressed that subaltern *cannot speak*, even if it does it comes down to the manner in which it is heard. By 'putting the subaltern on the school bus', Apple (2012) claims that the subaltern *can speak* by renegotiating its agency and power by consciously constituting their educational aims. On the other hand, Hall (1996) argues that there should be new approaches to understand the relationship between voice, power, and identity, so that the socially unheard subjects like subaltern, can be seen from a 'new, displaced or decentred position' (p. 2). Taking the debate further, I would argue that in order to gauge the speaking ability of the subaltern subject, and the voice getting equitable attention, the mandatory step should be to address the nuances of gender construction first. A subaltern man's negotiation of his identity, using agency and power, cannot be seen similar to a subaltern woman. Moreover, a case of one postcolonial society cannot be generalised to another. In order to hear the voice

of a subaltern woman in education discourse it should be important to locate and study the processes that construct both its gender and educational discourse. For example, the recent surge in the domain of development studies has brought gender to the forefront (Tharu and Niranjana, 2011), but by highlighting the success stories of urban educated women, which was repeatedly mentioned by the participants, it should not paint a picture that the women who are still outside the educational discourse would be joining their fellow successful women soon. Also, it would be highly significant to critically scrutinise the educational bus (Apple, 2012) that is promising to take them to new identity realms. It's not about the bus but who is driving it and the knowledge route it is embarking on.

Moving on to the knowledge issue and viewing the construction of knowledge production in postcolonial societies, it brings the focus to the idea of colonial's knowledge as superior. This knowledge superiority was addressed by Said (2014) in his seminal work which laid the foundation of postcolonial studies in his book *Orientalism*. The premise of *Orientalism* was based on Foucault's power/knowledge idea, and its role in the creation of modern subject. It was Said (Ibid) who proposed that the colonial powers marched their ways into colonies, and they legitimised their entrance based on the superiority of the knowledge. According to him, the colonial powers acquired this authority to create 'the other' based on the knowledge that was driven through the discourse of European Enlightenment, and resulted in inculcating a thought that due to their proximity to the knowledge discourse, it bestows them with an ability to construct 'the other' as inferior to them because of their nativeness (Williams and Chrisman, 1994). Similarly, for Foucault, the same Enlightenment laid the foundations of modernity. However, his criticism of the Enlightenment knowledge to create the 'man and his others' becomes the epistemological bases of his seminal work on discourse in *The Order of Things* (Williams and Chrisman, 1994 , p. 7, Foucault, 2005). Consequently, in the case of Pakistan, not only the discourse of securitization lays out the contours of Pakistani nationalism, but the chief structure that propagates its significance, the army, derives its superiority from its colonial heritage.

If I look at the arguments presented by the participants and analyse the academic literature, I would suggest that nothing much has changed in relation to the *Muslim* women of the Sub-continent. During the colonial days, they were under threat, and needed liberation, also, in today's Pakistan they are weak and vulnerable beings that are under constant threat. The way British felt that they had to save brown subaltern women from the oppressing brown men (Spivak, 1994), likewise, based on the findings, I would argue that the Pakistani men want to shield her from other men, either local or foreigner. And the one way to ensure her *pious* survival is to bring her into the realm of family-hood (Mernissi, 2003, Khoja-Moolji, 2018), where by becoming a mother she becomes the guardian of the family and the state (see chapter seven and eight).

Furthermore, I contend that this attitude, where a single woman, as highlighted by Sadia, Iffat, and Humaira (see chapter seven and eight) is considered vulnerable, could be further probed by analysing the attitude of white colonial men towards native brown Muslim women. The other adjective which gets commonly attached to women, particularly in the case of Pakistan as mentioned by few men participants, is the *temptress*. If seen through the discourse of colonialism, this *vulnerable temptress* idea was projected by colonial masters as well. An ideal situation to explore the patriarchal thinking of the white colonial male could be seen in the case of *European Barmaids in Colonial Calcutta and Rangoon*. In the 1920s, Lord Curzon, the viceroy of the Sub-Continent, banned the working of European barmaids in the region of western India because the British felt their 'presence in the morally ambiguous space of the bar posed a threat to British prestige' (Wright, 2017 , p. 22). Also, the presence of white women serving non-European brown native men meant 'an inversion of the desired colonial hierarchy' (Ibid , p. 22). Contrarily, for the same colonial masters, the repressed sexuality of native Muslim women made them an exotic fantasy (Ramusack, 2004), and the unveiling of oriental women were deemed as unravelling the hidden secrets (Yeğenoğlu, 2003). The similar pattern could be seen in todays' postcolonial South Asia, where men compete for their masculine superiority in the patriarchal discourse on their ability to protect their mothers (Silva, 1997).

Hence, it is not the agenda of women suppression and liberation on the mind of men, whether colonial or postcolonial, but the negotiation of male space, which is played out by controlling women's body. On the basis of this argument, I would argue that *the Pakistani girl/woman*, just like her colonial counterpart, is considered to be sexually repressed by brown Pakistani men, in a similar manner where it was perceived by the white foreigners. However, the agenda of liberation is stapled to her relationship to a man, that is the reason majority of the participants kept on associating a girl's education as a rite de passage for her to become a good mother (see Appendix 1). Moreover, as she is a constant source of temptation, and labelled as *fitna* (temptation) (Khoja-Moolji, 2018, Mernissi, 2003), and was remarked by few participants as well, her uncontrolled sexual needs demand a constant check. Therefore, the means to address this sexual oppression or the nymphomaniac desire is to give her *education*. Additionally, the discourse of Muslim women in the Subcontinent, had its watershed moment, when education became a chasm that separated the inferior, 'weak', and 'corruptible' beings from middle-class educated women, who stood behind their men as *good* mothers, wives, sisters, and daughters, so that the Muslim men can claim back their respectful status, which they lost to the superior-knowledgeable-white-colonial male (Khoja-Moolji, 2018 p, 57).

Consequently, I suggest that the whole discourse on girls'/women education in Pakistan is centred on her sexuality, hence, it becomes a mean for the men to control, and discipline her, which again takes us back to the Foucauldian debate, where institutions plays a role in the creation of subjects that could be controlled and disciplined (Foucault, 1995). Just like the colonial space was represented by the domination of British white male (Mills, 2003a), in the case of postcolonial Pakistan, the vacant space was occupied by its male predecessor. The prime example of continuation of this colonial domination through the colonial residual could be seen in the policies that were initiated by the military regimes of Pakistan, which aimed the majority of its policies towards the woman body, whether it was the conservative Islamisation by General Zia-ul-Haq during 1980s (Alavi, 1991, Cook, 2001, Suleri, 2009), or the modern enlightenment by General Musharraf in 2000s (Akhtar and Métraux, 2013, Khattak, 2010). The former used the Islamic legal system to substitute the Anglo-Saxon postcolonial jurisprudence

system (Suleri, 2009), whereas, the later approached the moderate mystic Islamic values to appease the Western countries in the post 9/11 world (Zia, 2009a).

In the both extreme scenarios, the most sophisticated and advanced postcolonial residual structure, the military leadership, used Islam to further establish its rule by triggering social and legal changes that were aimed at women for different reasons. Therefore, in this context it could be argued that the unique case of Pakistan's securitization discourse not only continue the policies of colonial India, but it still works with the same classification system that constitutes the women as 'the other', with an aim to keep them inside the disciplinary discourses of Pakistani society. In the case of Pakistan, I discern that the duality which was the hallmark of the colonial rule and constituted 'the other' in the colonial societies, is still operating in the current scenario. In order to support my argument, the next sections explore this duality, and its role in the construction of girls'/woman education in Pakistan. I call this duality, particularly in relation to education and gender construction, *the discourse of hypocrisy*.

9.8 The Securitization Discourse and the Social Construction of Girls'/Women Education in Pakistan

During the Oslo Summit of Education and Development Pakistan was listed as one of the worst performing countries in education. The report highlighted that thirty-two percent of primary age girls are out of school as compared to twenty-one percent of boys. The findings which were part of the Human Rights Watch report also stated that the troubled state of girls'/women education in Pakistan stems out of the issue of gender inequality (Human Rights Watch, 2018). In light of this argument, I would contend that addressing the concerns regarding girls'/women education in Pakistan cannot bear fruitful results without considering the country's gender dilemma. There is a plethora of literature, which argues that educational attainment can address the gender imbalance in Pakistan (Noureen, 2015, Aslam and Kingdon, 2012, Malik and Courtney, 2011, Jayaweera, 1997). The study suggests understanding the formulation of gendered practices of society can offer a way forward to address the problem. Although Islam places no restrictions on the education of women and men, and in fact encourage them to acquire education (Farah and Bacchus, 1999). However, Hill and King (1993) in their credible study

regarding barriers faced by women's in developing countries in education states that the idea of women getting out of control and causing disobedience is a major concern of men in Islamic countries. Contrarily, this study argues that the case of Pakistani men using the religious rationale to justify their domination of women deviates from the other Muslim countries. This is because not only the religion becomes the underpinning of the ideology but is integrated with its security framework. Therefore, I argue that the gender disparity and girls'/women education are two-sides of the same coin, no matter how much funding is allocated into the women education sector, it would be a short-term fix. Hence, a long-term solution lies in addressing the issue of gendered educational practices.

9.8.1 The Invisible Discourses

Dreyfus and Rainbow (1982), highlight that in *Madness and Civilization,* Foucault aimed to divulge into the scheme of power relations that operated within medical establishments. His aim was not to bring forth the atrocities that were faced by individuals at the hands of medical institutions. Likewise, I strive here to comprehend the way gender gets constituted and functions in society, along with the socially structured avenues that are placed within the society and how do women approach them. For instance, Foucault signifies the productive nature of power that sets it apart from its repressive angle. The multitude of studies in the past either aimed to point out the repressive effects of power on women in the Pakistani context (Shah and Khurshid, 2019, Brightman, 2015, Zubair, 2010, Weiss, 2014, Khan, 2018, ZIA, 2019, Khan, 2010, Hussain, 2009, Mumtaz and Shaheed, 1987, Bari, 2000, Kandiyoti, 1991, Khan, 2011), or churn out the stories of women empowerment marking upward development shifts (Zubair, 2016, Patel, 2010, Shah et al., 2015, Siddiqui and Economics, 2006, Malik and Courtney, 2011, Bari, 2010), in a security stricken country where religious dogma offers a rationale for men to establish their superiority. This study deviates from the traditional and populist approach and attempts not to study gender construction either from the women's repression angle or promoting the gender empowerment shifts in the realm of Pakistan, but within the *productive* power/knowledge nexus of gender construction in Pakistan.

Consequently, I have not explored the securitization discourse as a repressing agent for the power structures in Pakistan. Contrarily, I indicate that it is within the securitization discourse the practices of both gender and educational inclusion/exclusion are constituted (see Appendix 1). The study argues that it is not that women are repressed in Pakistani society with the means of sheer violence but 'it is through power that is accepted', power that 'traverses and produces things, it induces pleasures, forms knowledge, produces discourse'(Foucault and Rainbow, 1984). The *hybridized* poststructuralist approach of the study using Foucauldian and poststructuralist feminist perspective is to highlight the importance of the securitization discourse to the power mechanics and the ways in which it impacts girls'/women education. Considering this, it could be argued that the securitization discourse act as a means of a dominant form of power relations that not only produces the 'girl/woman' subject but enables her to identify the accepted gender roles. With this approach in mind, one can aim to explore the creation of gendered practices, such as, mothers and the gatekeepers. The Jamia Hafsa girls, the case of women militants, also known as, *Burqa Birgade, or, Chicks with Sticks* (Afzal-Khan, 2008), were not only able to step outside their domestic boundaries, but also took up the violent route, which in an ordinary realm of societal practices is preserved for men in Pakistan. The cause of this is their gendered behaviours in such instances, falls within the hegemonic discourse of securitization. Therefore, they were exempted from deviating from their normal gendered roles. Hence, this aspect of inclusion and exclusion, in the Foucauldian language, brings to fore both the constituent and inclusion/exclusion role of discourse.

Therefore, the study suggests that till the time 'the girl/woman' is operating within the inclusive boundaries of the securitization discourse, she is able to hold her legitimized positioning in the society. The moment she strives to opt out of those set boundaries, whether it is in the domain of education or domestic responsibilities, it is dealt with opposition (for further explanation on this opposition see section the creation of new subaltern and the discourse of hypocrisy). This explains, as mentioned in the findings chapter, the fear that education can be a catalyst for girl's getting 'out of control'. The society/the policy does not prevent girls/women from attaining education, as discussed

previously, but the issues arise, when on the basis of their educational learning, they aim to set their own goals, and challenge the gendered practices of patriarchy (see chapter eight for participants' quotes on this). In such cases, the religious rationale and the notion of threat comes into play. Also, according to Danaher, Schirato and Webb (2000), this is where the hidden forces of power comes into play, such as, through 'knowledge and technologies', on one side subjects are being controlled and regulated, but on the flip side, 'the official version of the things', convey it is good for the subject to follow these practices, as 'the system is working for you'(Danaher et al., 2000 p, 68 p, 68). This official version versus the unofficial version is discussed in the next section, *the discourse of hypocrisy,* as an empirical example of invisible discourse.

9.8.2 The Discourse of Gendered Hypocrisy

Riveting back to the argument presented in chapter eight, the findings recognise that it is the sexuality of girl/woman that poses a challenge for the society. It is the way she displays her sexuality act as a measure for men to describe her. Therefore, it is the male reference point which distinguishes between a temptress and a mother. For example, the point of view expressed by the majority of male participants displayed that they can hold a diverse point of view towards girl/woman depending upon her relationship towards them (see the section *producing the female body* of chapter eight). Likewise, when confronted to explain their position on girls'/women education, almost each and every male participant used religious teachings as a reason to support the idea of girls'/women education in the society. However, when asked to divulge the reasons for the deteriorating situation of girls'/women education in the society, they astonishingly blamed the religious clergy for using religion to promote conservatism in the society that results in building intolerant behaviours towards girls'/women education. This argument, where participants can use the same reason to justify two different social attitudes towards a single issue, tells a lot about the persistent duality that becomes the hallmark of the gender and educational discourse in Pakistan.

Correspondingly, this becomes a vital point, where the proximity of the religious elite, in the form of the clergy, to the securitization discourse gets superimposed

in impacting the social construction of the 'girl/woman' as subject (as discussed in chapter eight). Albeit, the same clergy, which governs the social construction process of gender, fails to gain the popular majority vote and become a parliamentary force. As discussed in the findings chapter seven, the exploitation of the religious power as a street force to achieve the political gains by the power elite, could be traced back to the ways colonial powers used the issues of caste, creed, language and religion to assert their control over the native population. It is the ideological control through socio-cultural and religious dogmas that becomes a way of legitimate hegemony for the power elite.

Interestingly, not a single participant objected that women should get an education, but they did contest that *what form of education* should be given to girls/women. Apart from single woman participant, who works for the security establishment, every women participant remarked critically about the duality that impedes girls'/women education in Pakistan. Moreover, there were instances (see the quotes by Sadia, Iffat, Humaira, in chapters seven and eight), where the participants talked about the visible gap between the policy and practice regarding girls'/women education, which validates that the policy is *for show* purpose. It is the amalgamation of these educational and gendered discourses, which stems out of the duality of the social processes that I have labelled as *the discourse of hypocrisy*. On the basis of the findings, I argue, the gaps between the policy and practice highlight the point that neither the state nor the people, when dealing with topics such as gender, nationalism, and education, mostly mean what they say. It is within such *invisible* discourses, I contend, in postcolonial societies, the collective knowledge is produced, which in result lays down the performance criteria for each gender. Therefore, when Foucault and Butler, are dealing with occident societies, they are not challenged with tasks such as, 'people do not mean what they say'. Consequently, the production of 'the girl/woman' as subject, which is rationalised by men using religious rationale is an amalgamation of country's postcolonial past and security dilemmas.

9.8.3 The Hidden Curriculum

Raising the question around the concept of *legitimate knowledge*, Apple (1979) points out the role of educational institutions in maintaining the hegemonic status

quo of society. It is within this legitimate knowledge the societal disparities are constituted as natural acts. Furthermore, he suggests that it is within educational discourse power is maintained and challenged. It is through the legitimate knowledge, it is decided that whose knowledge should be included and whose knowledge becomes ineligible. Furthermore, he highlights that it is educational institutions that disseminate knowledge of hegemonic class in the form of hidden curriculum.

> Hidden curriculum that seems uniquely suited to maintain the ideological hegemony of the most powerful classes in this society…. Ideological and social stability rests in part on the internalization, at the very bottom of our brains, of the principles and common-sense rules which govern the existing social order.
>
> (Apple, 1979 , p. 43)

Merging the notion of hidden curriculum (Apple, 1979), with Foucauldian ideas from *Discipline and Punish* (Foucault, 1995), the study suggests that in the context of Pakistan, the hidden curriculum not only operates within the realms of educational institutions but is reflected in processes of policy making, the idea of education, the curriculum formulation, and societal attitude towards girls'/women education. Based on the findings, presented in chapter seven and eight, the study argues that it is the medium of the hidden curriculum that acts as a medium through which the *invisible* discourses of gender and girls'/women education are disseminated. As highlighted, in the findings, the hegemonic class such as men, can accommodate multiple discourses at the same time to legitimise their authority, and to maintain power, but can separate them when it is required to maintain the power. One of the major insights of my study is based on the double standards that were exhibited in the opinions of the participants and cropped up continuously during the course of interviews. Just to give an example, a woman while she is inside the house, holds a secure and dominant position, and is willingly accepted by them. However, the moment, she steps out, not only she becomes vulnerable and insecure but requires male protection as well. Likewise, the findings suggest that unanimously all the participants believed in giving educational opportunities to girls/women but had reservations if through that education they could strive for her own agency.

Consequently, I argue that it is the notion of girls/women insecurity, which is, physical, emotional, religious, cultural, and national, conveyed to her through the practices of the hidden curriculum. The behaviour of others around us, particularly the ones commanding hegemonic positions enables, both men and women, to recognise socially approved models for their own behaviours (Boyle, 1986 , p. 99). Although, the official policy framework is based on inclusive spirit, but the hidden curriculum, such as, perceiving girl as a burden, and a family preferring their son's education over his sister, conveys to girl through unsaid practices, the hegemonic and *natural* dominance of a brother over her sister within the educational discourse. In the context of Pakistan, the hidden curriculum is a medium through which girls/women are given knowledge about their performativity. Moreover, it is not restricted to pedagogical practices, and educational opportunities, but the construction of the knowledge system that enables the 'girl/woman' as subject to identify her legitimized role in the society, which shehas to adopt willingly.

Therefore, these practises that creates regimes of truth that construct the category the 'girl/woman' as subject, I contend, are disseminated through *the hidden curriculum*. In this regard, educational discourse, along with other social and state institutions such as military, hospitals, and market places, 'shape people's abilities, behaviour, attitudes and knowledge about themselves to the extent that this knowledge comes to be thought of as 'true' (Skelton, 1997 p, 184). The study suggests, in the case of Pakistan, the hidden curriculum is not restricted to the educational institutions but is exhibited by the social and state institutions, in the form of the invisible discourses such as *the discourse of legitimacy, control and gendered hypocrisy*.

9.9 Conclusion

In this chapter, utilising the *hybridization* approach (Murphy, 2017) that brings together the Foucauldian (1980) notion of power/knowledge, and discourse, with Butler's (2010) idea of gender performativity, I have argued that the discourse of securitization impacts the social construction of girls'/women education by generating *visible* and *invisible* discourse. These discourses such as, *the discourse of legitimacy, control, hypocrisy and hidden curriculum* plays a crucial role in socially producing the 'girl/woman' as subject.

I argued, just like the securitization discourse, where power is constantly negotiated, the subject creation process is full of contested negotiation practices. Recognising that there exist both the visible and invisible discourses in the society that are generated due to the securitization discourse, the study argued that Pakistani patriarchy, exploits the securitization discourse to further construct practices that ensure the control over girls/women body and her social positioning. Accordingly, the chapter discussed that visible discourses do talk about inclusive education and support the idea of girls'/women education. However, it is the invisible discourses that help to create barriers for girls'/women education, for instance in the shape of the discourse of hypocrisy and hidden curriculum. For example, the hidden curriculum not only impacts the policy making but the societal attitude as well.

Building on the Foucauldian concept that discourses enable to identify legitimate ways through which knowledge can be produced (Mills, 2003b), I suggest that the security actors, due to the historical, ideological and structural reasons, use the discourses of securitization to produce knowledge and contest power. However, I suggest that power contestation mechanism, in a postcolonial state, deviates from the European normalization approach. Hence, the dominant power structures, in Pakistan do not use oppressive practices nor the normalization approach. But, strengthen their authority by gaining the support of people through the discourse of legitimacy. In order to seek this support, the discourse of legitimacy applies different tactics, such as, in the form of religion, territory and ideology. Therefore, it is within this discourse of legitimacy, the colonial residues indulge in blame game to overpower the rivalling power structures, and this is where power is contested. Consequently, I propose, this struggle to achieve legitimacy in Pakistan plays a significant role in the social construction of the subject, a subject which is different from Foucault's European subject.

Finally, the point I highlight through this study is that reliance on the religious rationale to exert male dominance over the educational opportunities offered to girls'/women education in Pakistan is deeply rooted in its colonial past and security dilemmas. Hence, it is the amalgamation of this colonial past and security dilemmas that constitute the discourse of securitization, which generates *the*

visible and *invisible* discourses. Moreover, according to Foucault, power is exercised within discourses, but I contend that, in the case of a postcolonial society, this exercise of power happens within the cracks of the *visible* and *invisible* discourses.

10 Conclusion

In this chapter, I set out to explain the ways in which I have tried to answer the research question and the sub-questions. Moreover, I outline the ways in which study makes an original contribution to the Pakistani educational discourse, particularly, girls/women education. In the concluding remarks, I highlight the limitations of my research study and suggest recommendations for future researches.

How does the securitization of Pakistan impact the social construction of girls'/women education?

In order to answer the research question, my research approach was guided by the constructivist ontology (Larochelle et al., 1998), and applied the feminist poststructuralist (Gavey, 1997) epistemological framework to configure the impact of securitization on the social construction of girls'/women education in Pakistan. For this purpose, I used the theoretical *hybridization* model (Murphy, 2017), which brought in together the power/knowledge, and discourse theory of Foucault, along with Butler's performativity theory, and from the domain international relations, the school of Copenhagen's securitization theory to formulate the theoretical underpinnings of the research. This intersectionality between the School of Copenhagen, Foucault and Butler, to examine a social issue in a country, where religion and security dynamics holds immense importance, is one of the contributions of the thesis to bring together these theories in the context of Pakistan and girls'/woman education within the country.

Using the qualitative methodology, I conducted twenty-eight interviews with officials related to the army, bureaucracy, particularly, education department, along with religious scholars, educationists, and third-sector officials. I applied the elite interview method to conduct interviews that mostly lasted from fifty to ninety minutes. The primary aim, as outlined in chapter one, which guided the motivation of my research inquiry was to establish a theoretical understanding of girls'/women education in the context of Pakistan and to comprehend the manners in which education gets its treatment in a post-colonial and security centric state that has a strong influence of religion on its socio-cultural issues.

According to the findings from the research that employed the Foucauldian discourse theory as the main analytical approach, I have argued that the discourse of securitization impacts the social construction of girls'/women education by generating *visible* and *invisible* discourses on gender and education. These discourses such as, *the discourse of legitimacy, control, hypocrisy and the hidden curriculum* play a crucial role in socially producing the 'girl/woman' as subject and determining the idea of girls/women education. This is further explained by following sub-questions.

Sub-question 1: What form of power/knowledge structure is produced and sustained by the discourse of securitization in the context of Pakistan?

For this research, I used the Foucauldian notion of discourse to approach the securitization of Pakistan, this is the main factor, throughout the thesis, and I refer to securitization as *the discourse of securitization*. According to the argument that I made in the discussion chapter, I have argued that it is not only through the *visible* discourses that the discourse of securitization impacts girls'/women education in Pakistan but there exists *invisible* discourses that come together with visible discourses to constitute the process of gender construction and the idea of girls'/women education in Pakistan.

In the thesis, I have argued that a form of power/knowledge structure that is produced by the discourse of securitization is *the discourse of authority*. Through the findings I advocated that the security actors in the context of Pakistan are the main power structures, and the securitization discourse plays an important role in cementing their hegemonic position in the discourse of authority. On the other hand, the findings also proposed that acceptance of military and mullah as the major power structures is not done by the forceful application of their authority. Their dominance is a result of the constant power struggle which is pivoted around two major notions: mutual cooperation and power tussle (see chapter six). Also, the power/knowledge structure that is generated by the discourse of securitization is different from the working of the European *normalization* approach, as the discourses generated by the securitization discourse are impacted by the historical religious and postcolonial issues of the Indian Subcontinent.

Sub-question 2: To what extent does the discourse of securitization in Pakistan give birth to regime of practices and production of truth in the society, generating a particular form of social discourse?

The analysis of the research findings reflected that the military-mullah nexus, uses the notion of threat, an illustration of a visible discourse, to legitimise their use of authority. The issues of authority and the element of threat become part of the visible discourse. However, it does not depict the invisible discourse that stems out of this discourse of securitization, such as the discourses of *legitimacy* and *control*. Through the research study, I illustrated that the people are vividly reminded about the threats that are looming over their heads, such as in the case of ideological, territorial and global (Kukreja and Singh, 2005). But are not informed that at times states employ the threat perception to acts as a mode of subjugation (Jackson, 2012). Hence, I contended that it is within the crack of these visible and invisible discourses of securitization, the power players exercise power.

Moreover, I illustrated that the discourse of *blame game* appears as an empirical example of a visible discourse, but it is accompanied with an *invisible* discourse of protecting personal agendas. Hence, it is the discourse of personal agenda of claiming authority that is achieved by blaming the competing power structure. Additionally, it is through the discourse of blame game a dominant power structure tries to gain legitimacy from the people in contrast to the opposing power structures. Therefore, I have suggested that not only power is being exercised within the cracks of these visible and invisible discourses, but it is been *contested* as well. I discerned in this study that it is within these *invisible discourses* power is contested with the aim to shuffle the existed regimes of truth regarding gender.

Sub-question 3 Is the gender construction of women in Pakistan and educational discourse influenced by the discourse of securitization? If so, how far and in what ways?

The principal agenda that I have argued through this study that the securitization discourse should be taken as a priori to encapsulate the gender construction

process in Pakistan. Likewise, I suggest that the securitization of Pakistan could not be assessed as an independent discourse, it has to be studied both from historical and ideological underpinnings of Pakistan. The application of such an approach offers a unique and diverse tactic to grasp the gender construction in Pakistan.

Consequently, based on the findings, I had argued that even before a girl is born in Pakistan, her social classification has already taken place. Furthermore, I contended that the idea of *the body* is produced even before the physical birth of the body. In regard to this, I illustrated that by including the postcolonial angle, it could offer an alternative approach to comprehend the production of Pakistani girl/woman inside the discourse of securitization. For this matter, I argued that the unique case of Pakistan's securitization discourse not only continue the policies of colonial India, but it still works with the same classification system that constitutes the girls/women as 'the other', with an aim to keep them inside the disciplinary discourses of the Pakistani society. In the case of Pakistan, I discerned that the duality which was the hallmark of the colonial rule and constituted 'the other' in the colonial societies, is still operating in the current scenario. I labelled this duality, particularly in relation to education and gender construction, *the discourse of hypocrisy*.

I highlighted in this research that a number of participants, when talking about education policy for girls/women flagged that policy is for show and there exists a gap between policy and practice. For example, each and every participant supported the idea that girls/women should get educated but the actual bone of contention was what form of education should be given to them. I gave an empirical example of this discourse of hypocrisy by pointing out that men gauge the sexuality of a girl/woman based on her behaviour. For example, it is the relationship status that exists between a man and a girl/woman that sets differentiation parameters between a mother and a temptress.

Similarly, the male participants used religious dogma to support the idea of girls/women education but when asked to divulge the reasons for the deteriorating situation of girls' education in the society, they astonishingly blamed the religious clergy for using religion to promote conservatism in the society that

results in building intolerant behaviours towards girls' education. This argument, where participants can use the same reason to justify two different social attitudes towards a single issue, tells a lot about the persistent duality that becomes the hallmark of the gender and educational discourse in Pakistan. Consequently, I have labelled this duality discourse as the discourse of hypocrisy.

Sub-question 4: How far does the securitization discourse in the Pakistani context influence educational policy and impacts girls'/women education?

Through this research study, I suggested that in the case of Pakistan, the hidden curriculum is not restricted to the educational institutions but is exhibited by the social and state institutions. The hidden curriculum becomes a converging point for the already existing multiple patriarchal practices to utilise the securitization discourse as a major hegemonic authority to justify the subjectivation of the girl. To give an empirical illustration of this, the official policy framework is based on inclusive spirit, but the hidden curriculum, such as, perceiving girl as a burden, and a family preferring their son's education over his sister, conveys to the girl through unsaid practices, the hegemonic and *natural* dominance of a brother over her sister within the educational discourse.

In the context of Pakistan, the hidden curriculum is a medium through which girls/women are given knowledge about their performativity. Moreover, it is not restricted to pedagogical practices, and educational opportunities, but the construction of the knowledge system that enables the girl to identify her legitimized role in the society, and willingly fits into it. The issue that plays a significant role in the creation of the girl/woman subject is the hegemonic dominance of men that is fed to girls/women through the hidden curriculum. For instance, the issue is not when girls/women get educated but when on the basis of that education they try to negotiate the already established gendered roles. This negotiation is perceived to be a threat to the male hegemonic dominance, where the discourse of securitization teaches girls/women the gendered roles they are expected to perform that ensures the longevity of the state and the society. Hence, it is through the hidden discourse is the notion of girl's insecurity, which is, physical, emotional, religious, cultural, and national, conveyed to her.

10.1 Contribution

One of the contributions of the thesis lies in the research aim and the approach that I adopted to conduct this research. In regard to the research aim, through this thesis, I have made an original contribution to the existing body of literature. Firstly, I have attempted to explore the role of securitization discourse in the social construction of knowledge, which further plays a significant part in the social constitution of the subject. Secondly, through this academic exploration, I have attempted to approach the securitization discourse and comprehend its ability in laying down inclusion/exclusion practices for the subject, which holds significance in influencing the production of the girl and the idea of education. Thirdly, by investigating and finding out that just like the securitization discourse, where power is constantly negotiated, the subject creation process is full of contested negotiation practices. I have aimed to conduct a research study that aims to offer a unique understanding of girls/women education in Pakistan for both, local and international, policy makers and researchers.

Likewise, the hybridization approach of bringing together the ideas of Foucault, Butler and securitization presents a particular case study that can have parallels/similarities in other contexts dealing with the issues of power/knowledge and discourse in educational research. However, at the same time where I enlist the strengths of this approach, I highlight the limitations of using European theoretical models to study non-European social issues. I suggest that the power contestation mechanism, in a postcolonial state, deviates from the European normalization approach. Hence, the dominant power structures, in Pakistan do not use oppressive practices nor the normalization approach. But, strengthen their authority by gaining the support of people through the discourse of legitimacy. I propose, this struggle to achieve legitimacy in Pakistan plays a significant role in the social construction of the subject, a subject which is different from Foucault's European subject. Therefore, the very theoretical strength of the study becomes its limitation, but this conveys that with the evolving social structures and emerging global educational discourses, the academic investigation requires new theoretical models and frameworks that hold relevance when applied to different socio-cultural contexts. Moreover, taking the Foucauldian debate forward, I have argued that power is exercised within

discourses that constitute subjects, but this exercise of power happens within *the cracks* of visible and invisible discourses.

10.2 Alternative Femininities

In 1980s, the dictatorial regime of General Zia-ul-Haq, exploited religion, once again, to reinforce its political ambitions. This resulted in the emergence of controversial *Zina Hudood Ordinance*, which marked the beginning of state sponsored discriminatory practices against women (Weaver, 2006). However, the decade of 1980s saw a formation of an alternative social movement that was a result of a session court ruling, based on Zia's Hudood Ordinance, which sentenced a woman and a man to hundred lashes, and death by stoning for committing adultery (Imran and Munir, 2018). This *alternative and emergent* social movement became the watershed moment for progressive women's activism and laid the foundation for a historic women's movement in Pakistan (Alavi, 1991). This led to the formation of diverse women movements in Pakistan, which not only significantly marked the political sphere of Pakistan, but introduced alternative femininity narratives to the struggles of women in Pakistan (Shaheed and Mumtaz, 1991).

The discriminatory gendered discourses in Pakistan are countered by various non-conservative and progressive women movements with the aim to negotiate power and fight for women's rights against domestic, social, and political violence (Shaheed, 2010). Therefore, the thesis acknowledges the significant triumphs of movements, such as, the Women's Action Forum (WAF), the Democratic Women's Association, the Sindhiani Tehrik and the Women's Front, Shirkat Gah, and the most recent one Aurat March (Women's March) (Alavi, 1991, Imran and Munir, 2018, Shaheed, 2010). Moreover, the thesis recognises their remarkable role in negotiating power in the society by altering the gender narratives and creating a voice for women's struggles and rights both in the form of NGOs, academic literature and feminist resistance politics, which challenge inequitable socio-cultural practices and violence against women (Imran and Munir, 2018). Hence, the thesis highlights that it is the emergence and sustenance of such women led movements that further recognises the productive nature of power in reshaping

existing gender identities. Additionally, it is the contribution of such movements that prompts an academic inquiry, like the current one, to come into existence.

10.3 Limitations: Agenda for future researches

There is number of further aspects of the research study that can be investigated to aid or contest the findings of this research. The research study does not offer the point of view of the political elite or educational researchers. Thus, it would be interesting to include their perspectives. Also, conducting a similar study but using a different epistemological approach, such as, critical theory or pragmatism, can offer new dimensions to the existing literature. Lastly, including the voices of female students both at school and higher educational level can bring in a distinct point of view not from a policy perspective but from the experiences of girls/women.

Also, being a male and doing research on girls/women issue has its own set of limitations. Although, I have tried to keep my own gendered voice neutral, there is a possibility that I unintendedly missed out on incorporating the characteristics of feminist perspective coherently and comprehensively. Moreover, as a part of patriarchal residue, the interpretive perspective of my research cannot fully comprehend the issues and struggles of girls/women experience in the context of Pakistan. Therefore, this study suggests that there should be further academic and policy explorations on girls/women education in Pakistan from varied perspectives of females. Particularly, girls/women hailing from socially and economically marginalised sections of societies, such as rural and underdeveloped regions.

Moreover, as argued in this thesis that the working of power mechanisms is highly relative to the socio-cultural context of discourses. Hence, the way the concepts of self and body are not fixed. Likewise, the emergence and maintenance of discourses cannot be fixed either. Therefore, keeping in mind, historical and cultural, convergence and progression of discourses can play a significant role for policy makers, educational researchers, and academics to investigate social issues in a constantly evolving world. And, just like famously uttered by Said (1983) that theories travel, both through time and in their contextualisation (Legg, 2007),

hence, there is always a way forward in understanding power/knowledge nexus, in a different realm, with a new approach.

Appendix 1: Pictorial Illustration of Thesis Argument



Appendix 2: List of Participants

No.	Pseudonym, Gender	Details
1	Shabbir, Male	***Religious Scholar and Educationist***. Heads the religious education department at a college in Rawalpindi.
2	Zakir, Male	***Religious Scholar.*** A commanding authority on religious affairs, who conducts sessions on television as well, part of the Shia community. Also, in the past was part of Council of Islamic Ideology, (a government institution dealing with matters related to religious affairs and advise the respective legislature bodies)
3	Mehdi, Male	***Religious Scholar and Educationist.*** Runs an Islamic seminary, well-known Shia scholar.
4	Lateef, Male	***Religious Scholar and Educationist.*** A famous Deobandi scholar, who runs a madrasa and supervising more than twenty PhD students at his institution.
5	Zameer, Male	***Religious Scholar.*** A well know Sunni scholar, who runs a large scale and eminent religious school, his part holds a great name in Islamic Theology in the context of Pakistan.
6	Humaira, Female	***Educationist.*** A distinguished and leading feminist scholar, who heads a gender studies department at one of the leading universities in Pakistan. Very popular name on the electronic and social media and has led many popular feminists' movements in Pakistan.
7	Sana, Female	***Educationist and Civil Servant.*** A renowned policy maker, who has worked for various government institutions in the past. An expert on the security issues of Pakistan.
8	Sadia, Female	***Educationist.*** Had worked in past on numerous gender and education related research studies for various NGOs and research institutes.
9	Aslam, Male	***Educationist.*** Head of a private school network.
10	Yasmeen, Female	***Educationist.*** Private school principal.
11	Anwar, Male	***Civil Servant.*** A former director of the curriculum board.
12	Sohail, Male	***Civil Servant/ Bureaucrat.*** One of the high scale education secretaries in the Punjab Education department.
13	Tabish, Male	***Civil Servant/ Bureaucrat.*** Managing director of the Punjab curriculum department.
14	Amjad, Male	***Civil Servant/ Bureaucrat.*** Managing director of the Punjab Education Foundation.
15	Jameel, Male	***Civil Servant/ Bureaucrat.*** Director female education in the Punjab Education board.
16	Nisar, Male	***Civil Servant.*** A parliamentary officer working for the education ministry.
17	Zauq, Male	***Civil Servant/ Bureaucrat.*** A high rank secretary in the ministry of finance.
18	Ihsan, Male	***Army Official.*** Retired military brigadier. Currently, heads one of the social sciences departments at a federal university in Islamabad. Expert on regional security.
19	Qasim, Male	***Army Official.*** Retired military brigadier. Currently, heads one of the social sciences departments at a federal university in Islamabad.
20	Waqar, Male	***Army official.*** Retired army general. Served in the cantonment board and managed an education programme in Balochistan.
21	Haq, Male	***Army Official.*** Retired military brigadier. Former ISI official, currently works as an assistant professor at a provincial university.
22	Asif, Male	***Army Official.*** Colonel. Serving senior rank military official, worked in areas where the Talibans and religious extremists opposed and destroyed girls' schools.

23	Wasim, Male	***Third sector official.*** Works for Oxfam Pakistan, and had worked on campaigns dealing with gender, education, transparency and justice. Extensive experience of working in rural settings.
24	Hammad, Male	***Third sector official.***
25	Anjum, Male	***Third sector official.*** Country for DFID in Pakistan. Worked on various education related programmes both at local and government level.
26	Iffat, Female	***Third sector official.*** An esteemed feminist scholar who has written extensively on the issues related to women. Worked in many important government and third-sector organisations.
27	Razia, Female	***Third sector official.*** Regional head. Works for an education NGO, which targets out of school children's education and enrolment.
28	Imtiaz, Male	***Third sector official.*** An NGO executive who works for a local organisation that manages 400-500 low income schools.

Appendix 3: Plain Langauge statement

University of Glasgow | School of Education

Plain Language Statement

Study title and researcher details

The University of Glasgow, School of Education

Project Title: The securitization of Pakistan and its impact on the social construction of girls'/women education

Researcher: Ali Sameer

Supervisors: Dr Mark Murphy and Dr Barbara Read

Full-Time Research PhD

You are being invited to take part in a research study. Before you decide whether or not to join the study, it is important for you to understand why the research is being done and what it will involve. Please read the following information carefully, and discuss it with others if you wish. Please feel free to contact the researcher if there is anything that is not clear, or if you would like more information. Take time to decide whether or not you wish to take part. Many thanks for taking the time to read this.

What is the purpose of the study?

The rationale for undertaking this study is to develop a case study on one particular aspect of the educational system in Pakistan - the role of the Pakistani State and its impact on girls'/women education. In particular, the research is keen to explore the significance of security issues in Pakistani society and how this concern manifests itself in the educational field. The research aims to investigate who are the key players impacting education policy in the formulation of primary girl's school curriculum. The research will be part of Ali Sameer's PhD, and the study will be completed by 30.09.2019.

Why have I been chosen?

You have been chosen because you are a **[name of participant type]** working for Pakistani State. Your experience and knowledge of working in this field is invaluable, and as such, an understanding of how you are engaged at policy making level will greatly facilitate the study.

Do I have to take part?

It is completely up to you whether or not you would like to take part. If you decide to take part, but then at any stage would like to withdraw from the study, you are free to do so.

What will happen to me if I take part?

If you decide to take part, I would arrange to interview you, which will take **50-60 minutes**. In the interview, I will ask you about your role as a government official and your experience of formulating, implementing and monitoring education policy. Moreover, I will inquire about your understanding of the factors that impact on the formulation of education policy, particularly the primary girl's school curriculum. The interview will take place at a time and place that is convenient for you. With your permission, the interviews will be audio recorded.

Will my taking part in this study be kept confidential?

All information collected about you during the course of the research will be kept strictly confidential. You will be identified by an ID number, as will your institution, and any information about you will have your name, address and institution removed so that you cannot be recognised from it.

What will happen to the results of the research study?

The data collected for the study will be available only to the researcher Ali Sameer, his PhD supervisors Dr Mark Murphy and Dr Barbara Read, and the external PhD examiner. The research will be published as a PhD thesis, journal articles, book chapters and conference presentations. You may request a copy of the dissertation.

Who has reviewed the study?

The researcher and his PhD supervisors have reviewed this study as have the University of Glasgow's College of Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee.

Contact for Further Information

If you have any concerns regarding the conduct of this research project, you can contact the researcher Ali Sameer email at. You can also contact his supervisors, Dr Mark Murphy at Mark.Murphy.2@glasgow.ac.uk or Dr Barbara Read at Barbara.Read@glasgow.ac.uk , or the College of Social Sciences Ethics Officer Dr Muir Houston at Muir.Houston@glasgow.ac.uk .

Appendix 4: Consent Form

Consent Form

Title of Project: The securitization of Pakistan and its impact on the social construction of girls'/woman education

Name of Researcher: Ali Sameer

- I confirm that I have read and understand the Plain Language Statement for the above study and have had the opportunity to ask questions.
- I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time, without giving any reason.
- I consent to interviews being audio-taped.
- I understand that participants are to be referred to by pseudonym and will not be identifiable by name in any publications arising from the research.
- I agree / do not agree (delete as applicable) to take part in the above study.

10.3.1.1 Name of Participant	*Date*	*Signature*
1.1.1.1 Researcher	*Date*	*Signature*

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